JAPAN MNE Insights
Volume 7, Issue 2
January 2022
CONTENTSJapan Academy of Multinational Enterprises

http://www.mne-jp.org

1. Special Essay:

Special Essay:

Strategy in JapaneseBusiness: A New Era?

Strategy in Japanese Business: A New Era?

2. Special Essay:
Business and Society:Rethinking of the Old
and Contemporary
Issues Inspired by the
Indian Experience

Derek Lehmberg
Professor of Management,
North Dakota State University, U.S.A.
derek.lehmberg@ndsu.edu

Introduction
In his widely read 1996 article, “What is
Strategy?” Michael Porter lamented that “Japanesecompanies rarely have strategies” (Porter, 1996: 63).
At the time I first read the article, I was amanagement consultant with Japan Management
Association (JMA) Consulting’s California office.
Our practice assisted clients in making operational
improvements. When Porter said that operational
effectiveness should not be confused with strategy, it
hit home to me. My superior at the time, a seasoned
industrial engineer from Hiroshima, indicated that hewas not terribly concerned about Porter’s comments
and reiterated the importance of quality and cost.
Perhaps that is what I should have expected. Afterall, the Japanese name of JMA, Nihon Noritsu
Kyokai, could also be translated as Japan Efficiency
Association. Still, his response actually reinforced
Porter’s message in my mind.
At first, Porter’s comments had seemed
controversial. After all, how was it possible thatcompanies without strategies were beating everyone
else in the world? Then, after a while, what Porter
was saying made sense, and even became acommonly held view.
Over the years, I moved on to academia fromconsulting, and from operations to strategy, although
I retained my interest in Japanese business. I havereread Porter’s article many times. I regularly assign
it for my MBA Strategy course. Every time I read it,
I ask myself what has changed? Would Porter still
say this about today’s Japanese businesses?

Porter’s Arguments
Porter’s (1996) arguments, which were further
fleshed out in Porter, Takeuchi, and Sakakibara(2000), considered business level and corporate levelstrategies of Japanese firms. At the business level,
Porter (1996) contended that Japanese firms in the
1980s
had
developed
superior
operational
effectiveness which allowed them to improve both1Vol.7 Issue 2
cost and quality compared to other firms. This ability
reduced the degree to which they needed to maketradeoffs between cost and non-cost attributes (e.g.,features, quality, etc.) of their products. This alsomeant that the competitors were effectively
competing directly instead of each seeking out uniquemarket positions. This, in turn, led to excesscompetition and low profitability.
Examining corporate level strategy, Porter etal. (2000) argued that Japanese firms often mimiceach other and end up with similar portfolios ofproducts. To make this point clearer, Porter et al.
(2000, p. 84) presented the different productcategories which several major Japanese electronics
companies sold. They looked remarkably similar.
Porter’s (1996) view of strategy, in general,emphasizes making tradeoffs. At both the businessand corporate level, Porter argued that most Japanesecompanies were not making them.

What I saw in Tokyo
As a practicing management consultant inTokyo in the early 2000s, I observed things which
supported many of Porter’s arguments in my mind.
First, I was surprised by the degree of diversificationand complexity of many Japanese companies. I
remember looking at Hitachi’s website andwondering how a CEO could effectively run acompany with over one thousand subsidiaries. I
knew that if had been CEO, I would not even havebeen able to name them. What on earth, other than
the name, connected them together?
I was also sometimes surprised at what struck
me as insufficient attention to strategy in new
business development. I witnessed a healthy amountof entrepreneurial spirit in many of the companies I
visited or worked with. I remember discussing thiswith other expat consultants.
Many Japanesemanagers and engineers we met were trying todevelop new products and services which createdJAPAN MNE Insights
value for their customers. On the other hand, wewere concerned that relatively little attention was
being paid to whether the company could capturesome of the value created and make a meaningfulprofit from the new business. Perhaps it was specificto the firms we were exposed to, but we also noticed
there was relatively little discipline about deciding
which new projects to invest in, and which not to. It
occurred to me that one reason Japanese firms were
so diversified was the organic entrepreneurial entry
into new businesses.
After I began doing my PhD studies in 2004, I
continued to be interested in Japanese business eventhough I was no longer directly involved with thebusiness community. While some observers may
argue about how effectively or how deeply Japan haschanged over the past two decades, there is little
disagreement that it has changed. The 2009 deep
recession often referred to in Japan as “Lehman
shock” and general economic stagnation in Japan
provided a difficult environment for Japaneseorganizations. On top of this, in numerous industries,
technological uncertainty and the emergence of new
and stronger international competitors have resulted
in a very different competitive landscape from that
faced by many major Japanese companies when they
were in their heyday. The change from analog todigital technologies reduced the benefits of Japanesemonozukuri (manufacturing) skills which had been
central to the competitiveness of Japanese firms (Foran example about TV sets, see Nikkei Business,2009). In many industries initially launched by
Japanese firms or ones in which they had once
claimed high market shares, such as TV sets andsemiconductors, Japanese companies have exited or
become niche players.

Turnaround of Japanese Electronics Companies
I recently began a project to look at corporate
turnaround in the Japanese electronics industry, inparticular, the large multi-business companies such as

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Vol.7 Issue 2
Hitachi, Panasonic, and Sony. These firms have all
faced major losses and have attempted toturnaround their businesses. In examining change
amongst these companies, I hope to shed light bothon turnaround in Japan and to gain a greater
understanding of strategy in Japanese companies
and how it is changing. I should note that I am notfollowing the methodological approach typicallyused to identify and compare successful andunsuccessful turnaround companies using financial
metrics of performance and likelihood ofbankruptcy (Barker & Duhaime, 1997) in this pieceof research since it would limit my study’s target
companies too greatly.
Before presenting some tentative findings
from my current data gathering, I will make some
general observations.
Looking at the overall
developments amongst these companies over thelast two decades, I cannot help but think about thetransformation American business went through inthe 1980s and 1990s. At the time, American firms
in many industries seemed to have lost their way.
They had become bloated, ineffective, andbureaucratic organizations. Their competitivenesshad fallen and they had lost share toforeign (often Japanese) competitors.
At the time, I sensed that many
Americans had lost faith in American
management and organizations. There
was a lot of soul searching andconcern about the future. It was also“

Robinson, 2001) as it had earlier in the US. Afterdisappointing results and pressure from investors,
Japanese companies began to reconsider theircorporate strategies more thoroughly and changed theirbusiness portfolios, placing more emphasis on related
core businesses which had synergies and away fromthose that did not (Schaede, 2008, 2020). Thesechanges have been particularly evident in theelectronics companies I am currently studying.

Tentative Observations on Japanese Turnaround
Although this research is still in a very earlydata gathering stage, I am starting to develop a few
tentative observations. First, consistent with common
observations of turnaround in the U.S., Japanese firms
followed turnaround strategies of retrenchment andreorientation.
Retrenchment
actionsaim
tostem
organizational decline through cost cutting, divestmentof assets, reduction in labor force, or other efficiency
improvements (Pearce & Robbins, 1993, 1994).
Reorientation actions aim to develop growthFirst, consistent with common observations ofturnaround in the U.S., Japanese firms followed
turnaround strategies of retrenchment andreorientation.”around this time that managers and investors started
to pay more attention to strategy, and in particular,
corporate strategy.
Unrelated conglomeratebusinesses were broken apart and industries andsectors reorganized into more focused companies.
Across numerous industries, particularlyelectronics, semiconductors, and information
technology, Japanese firms lost market share andfaced strong international competitors as their U.S.
counterparts had earlier. Restructuring, once rare in
Japan, became more common (Ahmadjian &opportunities by introduction of new products,
entering new markets, acquisition, and other means(Barker, Patterson, & Mueller, 2001). Although I
observe similarity between Japanese and U.S.
turnaround company actions at the level of strategy,
it appears likely that the specifics differ a great deal.
In particular, some retrenchment actions, such as exit
(Lehmberg, 2018), are much more difficult toimplement in the Japanese context than in the U.S. orneed to be performed in a different manner.
The process of retrenchment and reorientation3Vol.7 Issue 2
typically leaves the turnaround firm with a different
corporate strategy after having exited some businesses
and entered others. This is indeed what I am observing
amongst my sample firms.
As I mentioned earlier, Porter et al. (2000)
presented an analysis comparing product categories
across electronics companies, including those I am
currently studying. At the time Porter et al. (2000)
performed their analysis, the companies appeared tohave similar product portfolios, but that is no longer
true. Although the major electronics companies ofJapan today may have overlaps, they are on divergent
pathways. In a nutshell, each is developing a new
identity and new strategic direction. They are clearlymaking difficult strategic decisions involving tradeoffs
between being in different potential businesses.
It seems that the downturns these Japanesefirms faced may have awakened top management toneed for more strategic thinking. While Japanese
executives in the 2000s often discussed their attempts
to “choose and focus,” they have started doing morethan just play lip service to the notion since then. In
some cases, they are exiting large legacy businesses
which had previously defined their companies, forexample, as Hitachi did with its coal fired power plantbusiness.
Second, changes in the top management team,
especially CEO replacement, were common in these
Japanese turnaround firms, as they had also been in the
U.S. firms (e.g., Barron, Chulkov & Waddell, 2011;
Chen & Hambrick, 2012). However, while change has
been commonly observed in the top management
teams of Japanese and U.S. turnaround companies, theprocess of CEO selection and appointment appears to
be different between firms in the U.S. and Japan.
Additionally, the nature of the incoming CEOs appears
to vary significantly between turnaround companies
from the two countries. In the United States, outsiders
are often selected as the new CEOs in turnaround firms(Boyne & Meier, 2009), whereas they rarely are in
Japan. Carlos Ghosn at Nissan was a prominent
exception, that seems to prove the rule here. It appears

JAPAN MNE Insightsthat personal connections and seniority may beespecially important attributes of successful turnaround
CEOs in Japan, reducing the suitability of external
CEOs. Describing how he turned around Hitachi,
Takashi Kawamura commented that his seniority andconnections gave him the power to implement some
unpopular decisions which might not have beenpossible for a CEO without those assets (Kawamura,2016).
Although the original intention of this study is
to examine corporate turnaround, my tentative
observations nonetheless have implications about thenature and prevalence of strategy in Japanese firms.
These observations suggest that Japanese firms, at leastin this industry, are developing and implementing
more intentional and divergent corporate strategies
than in the past. This suggests that while Porter et al.’s(2000) points were important, and may remain true insome companies and industries, there has been an
increase in the number of Japanese firms which aredeveloping intentional strategies involving tradeoffs.

Effective Japanese Strategies
Although Porter (1996) acknowledged that a
few Japanese companies did have strategies, I think it
is also good to remember that some Japanese firms
over the years have developed really outstanding
strategies, particularly at the business level. Uniqlo,
Nintendo, and Sharp come to mind as a few examples
to consider.
Uniqlo’s strategy of selling high quality,
reasonably priced basic clothing items addressed key
difficulties in the apparel industry and is behind
Uniqlo’s amazing growth and success (Lehmberg,
2018). Nintendo’s strategy identified untapped groupsof potential game users and changed the way games
are played, avoiding head-to-head war with other game
console companies on resolution or speed
specifications.
At the corporate strategy level, Sharp’s

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Vol.7 Issue 2
stepping stone strategy initially developed andintroduced products such as calculators which only
required basic LCD technology, and later entered into
product categories which successively required moresophisticated displays, such as video cameras,
laptops, and eventually LCD TV sets (Lehmberg,
Dhanaraj & White, 2019). This strategy enabled
Sharp to become and, for many years, to remain the

sandwiched somewhere in the middle.
Theseobservations suggest the potential benefits ofdeveloping stronger strategies for existing firms insome older industries.

Conclusions

We are currently in an era offundamental change for many Japanese
It is also worth noting that, in some of the businesses. Japanese companies are
reorienting themselves to become moreindustries where Japanese firms had not strategic and competitive. The way theytaken strong strategic positions in the think about strategy is changing. Effective
past, newer entrants with clearer strategies should result in betterorganizational performance in the future,
strategies have been doing so.”however, the new importance of strategy inJapanese business brings challenges aswell. While Japanese business attracts less interest
leader in LCD technology. While Sharp eventually
amongst academics than it did in the past (Makino &ran into trouble, its strategy was arguably a good one.
Lehmberg, 2020), the kind of changes that Japanese
At some point even successful strategies need toorganizations are going through today makes themchange.
worthy of greater attention. These are interesting
Strategies such as these can provide
days to study Japanese business.
inspiration for the hard work of developing andimplementing strategy in Japanese business. Some of
the causes Porter et al. (2000) cite for the observed
Referenceslack of strategy in Japanese firms continue to be
Ahmadjian, C. L., & Robinson, P. (2001). Safety inbarriers to good strategy formulation andimplementation. The existence of the exemplar
numbers: Downsizing and the deinstitutionalizationof permanent employment in Japan, Administrative
strategies discussed above shows that such obstacles
can be overcome.
Science Quarterly, 46 (4), 622-654.

“

It is also worth noting that, in some of theindustries where Japanese firms had not taken strong
strategic positions in the past, newer entrants withclearer strategies have been doing so. Porter et al.
(2000) argued that companies in the apparel industry
did not have strategies, and after that Uniqlo grew to
become Japan’s largest apparel brand. Similarly inconsumer white goods, like toasters and other kitchen
appliances, Balmuda entered on the high end,changing perceptions about quality and consumers’
willingness to pay. On the low end, Iris Ohyama
entered with low priced products, leaving the older
consumer electronics firms like PanasonicBarker III, V. L., Patterson Jr, P. W., & Mueller, G.
C. (2001). Organizational causes and strategic
consequences of the extent of top management
team replacement during turnaround attempts.
Journal of Management Studies, 38(2), 235-270.
Barker III, V. L., & Duhaime, I. M. (1997). Strategicchange in the turnaround process: Theory andempirical evidence. Strategic Management
Journal, 18(1), 13-38.
Barron, J. M., Chulkov, D. V., & Waddell, G. R.
(2011). Top management team turnover, CEO5

Vol.7 Issue 2
succession type, and strategic change. Journal ofBusiness Research, 64(8), 904-910.
Boyne, G. A., & Meier, K. J. (2009). Environmental
change, human resources and organizational
turnaround. Journal of Management Studies, 46(5),835-863.
Chen, G., & Hambrick, D. C. (2012). CEO
replacement in turnaround situations: executive(mis) fit and its performance implications.
Organization Science, 23(1), 225-243.
Karube, D., Numagami, T., & Kato, T. (2009).
Exploringorganisational
deterioration:‘Organisational deadweight’ as a cause of
malfunction of strategic initiatives in Japanese firms.
Long Range Planning, 42(4), 518-544.

JAPAN MNE Insights
Pearce II, J. A., & Robbins, K. (1993). Toward
improved theory and research on businessturnaround. Journal of Management, 19(3), 613636.
Pearce II, J. A., & Robbins, K. (1994). Retrenchment
remains the foundation of business turnaround.
Strategic Management Journal, 15(5), 407-417.
Porter, M. E. (1996). What is Strategy? Harvard
Business Review, November-December, 61-78.
Porter, M. E., Takeuchi, H., & Sakakibara, M. (2000).
Can Japan compete? Cambridge, MA: Perseus
Publishing.
Raynor, M. E. (2007). The Strategy Paradox: Why
committing to success leads to failure. New York:
Doubleday.

Kawamura, T. (2016). 100 nen kigyo no kaikaku:
Watashi to Hitachi. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun
Shuppansha.

Schaede, U. (2008). Choose and focus: Japanesebusiness strategies for the 21st Century. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.

Lehmberg, D. (2017). The process of industry exit in
the Japanese context: Evidence from the flat panel
display industry. Journal of Management &Organization, 23(1), 92-115.

Schaede, U. (2020). The business reinvention ofJapan: How to make sense of the new Japan andwhy it matters. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.

Lehmberg, D. (2018). Uniqlo: Re-examining American
Expansion. Ivey Case number 8B18M067.
Lehmberg, D., Dhanaraj, C., & White, R. E. (2019).
Market adjacency and competing technologies:
Evidence from the flat panel display industry,
Industrial and Corporate Change, 28 (6), 14291447.
Makino, S., & Lehmberg, D. (2020). The past andfuture contributions of research on Japanesemanagement.
Asian Business & Management,
19(1), 1-7.
Nikkei Business. (2009). Special report: The threat oflow cost digital: How to make a 50000 yen TV set(特集激安デジタルの脅威：5 万円テレビはこう作る). Nikkei Business (1491), 26-31.

6Vol.7 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

Special Essay:
Business and Society: Rethinking of the Old andContemporary Issues Inspired by the Indian Experience
Naotoshi Umeno, Ph.D.

Professor of International Business,
Osaka University of Commerce, Japanumeno@daishodai.ac.jp

Business and Society, a sharp contrast between
India and Japan
In this essay, I talk about the old and newissues, Business and Society, based on the Indian
experience. I recently published a book about thecorporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives ofIndian companies (Umeno, 2021). The researchquestions of the book are the following:・ Why and how did India enact the Companies Act
of 2013 including the mandated CSR?
・ What kind of thoughts and philosophies are there
behind the relationship between business andsociety in India?
・ What kind of initiatives have Indian companies
been taken since the CSR was mandated, and whatchallenges are they facing now?
In conducting research on this theme, I felt
shocked by a sharp contrast between India and Japan interms of the attitudes toward the social responsibilityof a firm. I witnessed several Indian companies
enthusiastically engaging with various community
development projects. On the contrary, Japanesecompanies were filled with scandals and scams, whichwere reported in the media almost every day, such asaccounting fraud, false-labeling, quality data
falsification, and tax evasion. Such corporate scams arestill going on. I felt sad hearing such miserable
news about Japanese companies when comparedwith socially responsible Indian companies. What isgoing on in Japanese companies? Did they losebusiness ethics/moral and social responsibility?
With regard to the question about businessethics and social responsibility, the Japanesecritiques and media often quote Shibusawa Eiichi, awell-known entrepreneur and business leader during
the late 19th and the early 20th centuries in Japan.
His philosophy is based on Confucianism, and heemphasized an integration/harmony of morality andeconomic activity. His argument on business ethics
is still effective for the current Japanese businessleaders.
I begin this essay by explaining the
mandated CSR and its background in India,
followed by an introduction of two Indiancompanies’ CSR initiatives. Then, I take Shibusawa
and his thoughts about business and society. Finally,
I conclude with a few remarks about businessmorality regarded as a universal value.
Learning from the Indian experience
India enacted the Companies Act of 2013,
which included the mandated CSR. According to
Section 135 in the Act, every company with a net

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Vol.7 Issue 2

worth of INR (Indian Rupee) 5 billion or more, orServices in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.
a turnover of INR 10 billion or more, or a net
Responding to the various scams, the Indian
profit of INR 50 million or more should spend atgovernment began taking initiatives to deal with theleast 2% of their average net profit in the previous
situation. In 2009, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
three years on CSR activities. This Act also
issued CSR Voluntary Guidelines, and the government
indicates the activities taken by thecompany as specified in the
Schedule VII of the Act. Some
In conducting research on this theme, I felt
examples are the following: (1)shocked by a sharp contrast between India
Eradicating hunger, poverty, andand Japan in terms of the attitudes towardmalnutrition; promoting healthcare
the social responsibility of a firm.”
including preventive healthcare andsanitation. (2) Promoting education,
including special education andemployment enhancing vocational skills. (3)also planned to introduce a new company act
Promoting gender equality and empowering women,
including the mandated CSR. Finally, in August
setting up homes and hostels for women and orphans.
2013, the Companies Bill, 2013, was passed into law(4) Ensuring environmental sustainability (Mitra and(Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2009).
In my book, I took five Indian companies as a
Schmidpeter, 2020:13, 245–247).
According to Sundar, India had a tradition ofcase. Here I picked up two companies that strongly
impressed me regarding their proactive social
business charity, and the most critical motive forcontributions to their local communities (Umeno,
merchant charity was religious belief. All the2021: 149–185).
religious philosophies prevalent in India of the early
The first case is Sobha, which is an integrated
years were conducive to giving community benefit(Sundar, 2013: 77–79). Entering the 20th century, theconstruction company headquartered in Bengaluru.
emergence of Mahatma Gandhi and his theory of
The CSR of Sobha is completely based on its foundertrusteeship made a profound impact on Indian
P.N.C. Menon’s philosophy, “Giving back tosociety.” Their CSR activities take place at thebusiness leaders of the time, such as Jamsetji Tata, G.
founder’s birthplace and its neighboring villages. The
D. Birla, and Jamnalal Bajaj. Gandhi believed that a
future society could emerge in which private
beneficiaries are the poor living there. Sobha
property and competition would be harnessed, on aprovides the poor with a variety of services, such as
voluntary, non-violent basis, to bring about a just andeducation, medical treatment, caring for elderlies,
and even holding dowry-less weddings. Sobha aims
egalitarian society (Sundar, 2013: 41–42,129–133).
to break the vicious cycle of poverty, in which theAfter the Independence, the tradition offollowing four elements make a cycle: poverty,business charity and a sense of the social contribution
ignorance, deprivation, and exclusion. Sobha alsoof the Indian business leaders declined because of theinsists that they are doing Personal Social
heavy taxation and the notoriously known
Responsibility instead of CSR. They say, that they
government’s licensing system called “License Raji.”
are just doing righteous things for human beings. It is
In 1991, the Indian government launched an
taken for granted.” (Interview with A. R. Kutty on 18
economic reform policy and liberalized its economy.
September 2019)As a negative consequence of the economic
The second case is Kitex, which is the thirdliberalization policy, India witnessed a series oflargest OEM producer in the world of baby and childcorporate scams represented by Satyam Computer“8Vol.7 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

garments. The CSR policy reflects the philosophy of
M. C. Jacob, the founder, “Caring the community.”
Kitex has such an ambitious vision that its CSR bodyaims at creating the best model for rural development
in India. The company helps the poor with various
programs specifically focusing on eradicating hunger
and poverty. Kitex classifies the household in thecommunity by their incomes into four ranks andissues four color-coded ID cards. The red cardholders(classified as the poorest) can take free meals

Whenever corporate scams occur in Japan,
Shibusawa Eiich and his philosophy are always
quoted and refrained in mass media. Shibusawa’s
core philosophy is known as “Gapponshugi,” which
is defined as the principle of developing a businessby assembling the best possible people and funding
to achieve the mission and aim of pursuing the public
good (Kikkawa, 2017:3). This philosophy became amental backbone in building modern Japanese
capitalism.
“Gapponshugi” consists oftwocomponents:
the relationship
Again, I want to remind Japanese businessbetween morality and economic
leaders to reflect on themselves andactivity, and the organization ofreconsider their philosophy and thebusiness activities by bringing
significance of business and society.”
together financial and humanresources. Shibusawa believed thatprovided by the company. Kitex also builds andthe inseparability of morality and economic activity
donates new houses to homeless people andwas integral to the management of any capitalist
transform slum areas into residential towns.
enterprise and that economic activities were needed
Looking at both cases, I could not help
to contribute to the broader interest of the
feeling the gap between India and Japan. Are there
community. He argued that a business should not be
any equivalents in Japan working to solve social
conducted through unjust means and emphasized theissues on the same level as India? Although
importance of morality and honesty in businesscomparing the two countries in the same mannerconduct (Hunter, 2017: 93).
Shibusawa’s philosophy has been inherited
widening income gap and the increasing number ofthe poor. These situations have been getting worse
until today. Inamori Kazuo, the founder of Kyocera
particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. Are
and KDDI, has a similar philosophy. He advocatesJapanese companies contributing to eradicatingthat business leaders should have a philosophy andpoverty and helping the poor like Indian companies?
keep telling it to their employees. His fundamental
It seems to me that Japanese companies avoid or
philosophy is altruism, arguing that a company
even ignore the problems, making excuses thatshould be for the public good instead of the privateinterests of business leaders and owners (Inamori,poverty eradication or helping the poor is a2015).
responsibility of the government.

“

Learning from Japanese business history,
Shibusawa’s “Gapponshugi” philosophy
Japanese companies should learn not only
from India but also from Japanese business history.
As I mentioned at the beginning, I doubt that thecurrent Japanese business leaders seem to have a low
awareness of business ethics or the issue of businessand society.

Refraining the universal values
The issue of business and society has long
been an essential and critical agenda in management
regardless of times, nations, and industries. The ideathat businesses should be for the public good seems
to be a universal value in the world.
According to Geoffrey Jones, a Harvard
Business School (HBS) professor of business history,

9Vol.7 Issue 2
American business leaders represented by Andrew
Carnegie, who built a large steel business in the UnitedStates, held the same idea. Carnegie insisted that
entrepreneurs had a responsibility to use their wealth topromote social good, not by leaving money for theirfamilies but by funding public institutions, such as
schools and libraries, that would further opportunities
for others (Jones, 2017: 147).
The same thought was also observed in Wallace
Donham, the second dean of HBS. He wrote that“unless more of our business leaders learn to exercise
their powers and responsibilities with a definitely
increased sense of responsibility toward other groups
in the community …our civilization may well head forone of its periods of decline” (Jones, 2017: 150).
Now, Japanese business leaders should
reconsider their own values and business ethics.
Recently, the word “purpose” is becoming a popularjargon in Japanese businesses, easily influenced byAmerican business management. Similarly, the term
“SDGs” has caught considerable attention fromJapanese businesses. Many Japanese companies’
executives commonly put the SDGs logo badge in theirsuits on TV and in newspapers. I think that they likebooms and are easily influenced by public opinion, but
are they really thinking about the meaning andimportance of business and society? Do they keep
practicing their own philosophy and values for society?
Finally, I conclude with the Inamori’s saying:
Performance = Philosophy × Energy × Capability. Heemphasizes the importance of philosophy because
performance will be negative once the philosophy iswrong (Inamori, 2004). Again, I want to remindJapanese business leaders to reflect on themselves andreconsider their philosophy and the significance ofbusiness and society.

JAPAN MNE Insights
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Hunter, J. (2017). “Obtaining wealth through fairmeans”: Putting Shibusawa Eiichi’s Views on
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Delhi, India: SAGE.
Umeno, N. (2021). Indian kigyo no CSR, [The CSR
Initiatives of Indian Companies], Tokyo, Japan:
Ochanomizu Shobo.

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Vol.7 Issue 2

Japan Academy of Multinational Enterprises
2021-2023 Executive Board
President:International Relations:Tetsuya Usui (Nihon University)

Chie Iguchi (Keio University)
Hiroshi Hoshino (Kyushu University)
Naoki Yasuda (Rikkyo University)
Xiaohong Qin (Kyushu Sangyo University)*

Vice President:

Yoshinori Yasuda (Soka University)
Masayuki Furusawa (Kindai University)

General Affairs:

Masahiro Ida (Hannan University)
Hiroshi Hoshino (Kyushu University)

General Planning:

Yasuro Uchida (University of Hyogo)
Hajime Baba (Kansai University)
Tamiko Kasahara (University of Shizuoka)
Nisato Suzuki (Meiji University)
Tatsuo Mori (Hirosaki University)*

Publications Commitee:

Hajime Baba (Kansai University)
Takeshi Fujisawa (Kwansei Gakuin University)
Naoki Yasuda (Rikkyo University)
Sadanori Arimura (Yamaguchi University)*
Hiroyasu Furukawa (Nihon University)*

Best Book and Paper Award Commitee:

Naotoshi Umeno (Osaka University of Commerce)
Susumu Harada (Meiji University)
Shohei Tabata (Kobe International University)
Shingo Nishii (University of Hyogo)*
Hirofumi Tatsumoto (University of Tsukuba)*

Public Relations:

Masashi Arai (Asia University)
Tamiko Kasahara (University of Shizuoka)
Yukiko Shinomiya (Kindai University)
Hiroyuki Yamabe (Nara Prefectural University)
Takao Yamamoto (Kanagawa University)*

Program Commitee:
Tomokazu Seki (Rikkyo University)
Takeshi Fujisawa (Kwansei Gakuin University)
Takahide Yamaguchi (University of Hyogo)
Motoyuki Kanetsuna (Nanzan University)*
Yoshikazu Sakamoto (Nihon University)*
Masato Yamauchi (Senshu University)*

Eastern Chapter:
Susumu Harada (Meiji University)
Kohei Mishima (Keio University)
Chitose Furukawa (Aichi University)*
Tatsuya Karasawa (Kanto Gakuin University) *Mitsuru Nakagawa (Nihon University)*

Western Chapter:

Yukiko Shinomiya (Kindai University)
Naotoshi Umeno (Osaka University of Commerce)
Sungwoo Byun (Kindai University)*
Taehyun Lee (Hannan University)*
Yoshihiro Matsukawa (Hiroshima University of Economics)*

Executive Secretariat and Directors:

Head Office: Takuya Fukazawa (Tokyo Fuji University)
Eastern Chapter: Nisato Suzuki (Meiji University)
Western Chapter: Hiroyuki Yamabe (Nara Prefectural University)

Auditor:Kazumi Tada (Hosei University)
Risa Jitosho (Ryukoku University)

Note: Those with * are coordinators of the role.

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JAPAN MNE Insights

Vol.7 Issue 2

Japan MNE Insights will be published twice a year on the AMNE official website (www.mne-jp.org).
Please feel free to contact with the editorial team if you have any question or request.

Japan MNE Insights Editorial Team
Editor-in-Chief
Tamiko Kasahara (University of Shizuoka)
EditorMasashi Arai (Asia University)
Yukiko Shinomiya (Kindai University)
Hiroyuki Yamabe (Nara Prefectural University)
Takao Yamamoto (Kanagawa University)
Japan MNE Insights Editorial Team is currently located at
Office of Dr. Tamiko Kasahara,
University of Shizuoka, School of Management and Information
52-1 Yada, Suruga-ku, Shizuoka, 422-8526, Japan
TEL/FAX:+81-54-264-5435 (direct)
Contact e-mail address: kasahara@u-shizuoka-ken.ac.jp
Copyright @ Japan Academy of Multinational Enterprises (Japan)

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