Sino-Japanese Interaction via Chinese Junksin the Edo Period
MATSUURA Akira*Abstract
To maintain its policy of national isolation during the Edo period, Japan
restricted contact with the outside world to Dutch merchant ships andChinese junks at the Japanese port of Nagasaki. Sino-Japanese interaction
consisted not only of trade in goods, but also of cultural and scholarly
exchanges. This paper will examine how this unofficial trade affected both
Japan and China from a cultural perspective.
Key words: Edo period, Junk, Sino-Japanese interaction, Nagasaki, Zhapu

During the Edo era, cultural interaction between Japan and China wasaffected by the Tokugawa bakufu’s policy of national isolation, which
prevented Japanese from sailing to China. For the most part, this was an era
in which Sino-Japanese interaction was maintained through the arrival ofvessels from China to Nagasaki. For this reason, Chinese sailing vessels(junks), called Tōsen by the people of Edo, were a major channel of cultural
trade between China and Japan.
The term Tōsen 唐船 derives from the word that people in the Edo era
generally used for China, Tō meaning the Tang dynasty. Similarly, the Chinese
who sailed to Japan were called Tōjin (唐人 people of Tang). Chinese werealready aware by the end of the Ming dynasty that China was called Tō in
Japan. In the fifth year of Tianqi (1625), Nan Juyi, the governor (xunfu 巡撫)
of Fujian, reported to the Tianqi emperor on Chinese junks. The 58th volumeof the Xizong shilu (熹宗實錄 Authentic Records of Xizong), for the first dayof the fourth month of the fifth year of Tianqi, records the following:
The governor of Fujian, Nan Juyi, wrote that people on land and sea use
the ocean as rice fields: the powerful use it for trade, buying and selling* Director, Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies; Director, Center for the
Study of Asian Cultures; Professor, Faculty of Letters, Kansai University.

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in Japan and Europe; officials use it to extract fees; moreover, countries
with armies use it to divide wealth. None of this is forbidden. How could
we know that merchant junks would go to Japan and other countries? . .
. I’ve heard that people from Fujian, Suzhou, and Zhejiang live in theJapanese archipelago. I don’t know how many hundreds or thousands offamilies are there. Or how many have married Japanese, and have sonsand grandsons. They call the locale Tang City. These hundreds or thousands of clans, and the families of the married couples, are aware of who
is secretly taking part in this trade. Many people are involved. The junks
that frequent the port are called Tang junks. All the big ones carry goods
from China, which they sell directly to the Japanese or through joint
ventures with the Japanese.
At the beginning of the Ming dynasty (1368), the court adopted a policyof gradually restricting sea trade, but this policy was relaxed from the latter
half of the sixteenth century, after which the number of merchant junks clandestinely sailing to Japan increased. Thus, even before the Tokugawa bakufu
was established, the Chinese and Japanese had already established a trade inculture through Chinese shipping.
The Tokugawa bakufu prohibited Japanese commoners from engaging intrade abroad to restrict access to foreign countries. Active relations withforeign countries was limited to the Satsuma clan for relations with the
Ryukyu Islands and to the Sō clan of Tsushima for relations with the Korean
court. In relations between Japan and Holland and between Japan and China,
via Nagasaki, the focus was on trade. Though China typically required tributary status of its neighbors, Japan was able to maintain a continuous traderelationship with the Ming and Qing courts on an equitable basis. Throughout
most of the Edo era, Sino-Japanese cultural interaction took the remarkableform of cultural exchange via Chinese merchant ships and junks arriving in
Nagasaki. In this paper I will examine the role of the Chinese junks thatfrequented the port of Nagasaki in cultivating an environment for SinoJapanese cultural interaction.

Review of Research on Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction in the Edo
Era

Research on Sino-Japanese cultural interaction in the Edo era dates backto eight issues of Shigaku zasshi (25, no. 2 [February 1914] to 26, no. 2[February 1915]), when Nakamura Kyūshirō (Nakayama Kyūshirō) publishedthe paper “Kinsei Shina no Nihon bunka ni oyoboshitaru seiryoku eikyō”(ThePowerful Influence Exerted by Premodern China on Japanese Culture). In thisseminal work Nakamura considered Sino-Japanese cultural relations from a﻿Sino-Japanese Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Period

59

variety of perspectives: Confucianism, history, literature, linguistics, art, religion, medicine, natural history, receptivity to new Western learning, Chinesepolitical law, Japanese and Chinese manufactures, food and drink, music,
martial arts, customs, and games. He emphasized the need to use a variety oftheories to study the influence on Japan of the Qing dynasty, which hadcollapsed just two years earlier. Nakamura concluded, “The influence ofpremodern China on Japan is exceedingly great and hardly inferior to that ofTang dynasty documents.”1 Nakamura thus stressed the importance of Mingand Qing culture for Edo Japan.
Nakamura’s research was followed by the work of Yano Jin’ichi, whoapproached cultural exchange from the perspective of trade with Nagasaki. In
the early summer of 1923 Yano was asked to compile a history of Nagasaki,
and in the following year he gave the lecture “Shina no kiroku yori mitaru
Nagasaki bōeki ni tsuite”(On Trade with Nagasaki as Seen in Chinese
Annals).2 In 1925 Yano published his first paper, “Shina no kiroku kara mita
Nagasaki no bōeki”(Nagasaki Trade As Seen in Chinese Annals). The
opening paragraph of Yano’s paper states,
The role of Nagasaki in trade resembles that played by the only foreign
port in China: Canton. When we compare the influence of overseas tradeat Nagasaki with that of Canton, however, we can see that trade via
Nagasaki cannot be put into the same category. The influence fromabroad on Japan through the port of Nagasaki is far greater, indicating
just how different in scale are the cultures of China and Japan.3
He concludes,
When we speak of foreign trade at Nagasaki, we are really talking only
about Dutch-Japanese and Sino-Japanese trade. Sino-Japanese trade was
especially important. Vessels trading between Japan and Holland werelarge, and their cargos were great, but the number of Dutch ships was far
fewer, and such trading vessels visited the port of Nagasaki only once ayear. The frequency cannot compare with Chinese junks, which arrived
at the Japanese port three times a year—in the spring, summer, andautumn.4
As Yano points out, the amount of Chinese trade was two to three times that
1 Nakamura, Shigaku zasshi 26, no. 2 (February 1915), p. 4.
2 A talk given at the meeting of the Shigaku Kenkyūkai (Society of Historical
Research), June 14, 1914. Noted in Shirin 9, no. 4 (October 1924): 149–150.
3 Nagasaki-shi shi (The History of Nagasaki), p. 462.
4 Nagasaki-shi shi, p. 463.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol.1 2010of the Dutch, a fact that underscores the influence of Chinese trade on Japan.
Thereafter, Yano continued his research of premodern Chinese history inconjunction with research on Chinese trade with Nagasaki, and he publishedthe results in Nagasaki-shi shi (The History of Nagasaki City) in November
1938. In the preface to his history Yano states,
Simply narrating the trajectory of trade development is insufficient todescribe the history of Nagasaki trade. The passage of trade via thegateway of Nagasaki has exerted an immeasurable influence on theculture of our country through the influx of culture from China. This has
greatly helped in the development of our own culture. The impact ofimports of Chinese textiles and silk thread has been tremendous,
contributing greatly to the development of our country’s silk industry.
The important issues of cultural and industrial history must be examinedthrough the data on Nagasaki trade.5
In his history Yano proposed that areas he did not cover be researched in the
future. Yet even now after nearly eighty years have passed, we still cannot
say that the issues he raised have been sufficiently resolved.
Research in this field was subsequently published by Yamawaki Teijirō
in his Nagasaki no Tōjin bōeki (Chinese Trade with Nagasaki, 1964). The field
was further developed in new directions by Ōba Osamu in his Edo jidai ni
okeru Tōsen mochiwatashisho no kenkyū (Research on Chinese Trading Vessel
Cargo Lists in the Edo Era, 1967), and Edo jidai ni okeru Chūgoku bunkajuyō no kenkyū (Research on Receptivity to Chinese Culture in the Edo Era,
1984). Research on Nagasaki trade from a Japanese perspective was subsequently published by Nakamura Tadashi in Kinsei Nagasaki bōeki shi nokenkyū (Research on the History of Trade at Nagasaki, 1988), and by Ōta
Katsunari in Sakoku jidai Nagasaki bōeki shi no kenkyū (Research on
Nagasaki Trade during the Period of National Isolation, 1992). Research
providing details about the Chinese side of the trade include Matsuura Akira’s
Shindai kaigai bōeki shi no kenkyū (Research on the History of Overseas
Trade during the Qing Era, 2002). Yet the cultural aspects of Sino-Japanesetrade, research first proposed by Nakamura Kyūshirō in his 1915 magnum
opus, continues to be widely overlooked.

Sino-Japanese Commercial Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo
Era

During the Kan’ei period (1624–1643), when the Tokugawa bakufu
enacted the policy of national isolation, Chinese junks that had heretofore
5 Nagasaki-shi shi, preface, p. 5.

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61

visited several ports in Kyushu were now restricted to the port of Nagasaki.
From the first half of the seventeenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century (the end of the Ming era through the beginning of the Qingera), Chinese junks that frequented Nagasaki sailed from nearly the entire
length of the Chinese coast to Southeast Asia. In addition, trade was also
carried out by the Qing court and by Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga, 1624–1662), who used Taiwan as a base to support the collapsing Ming government. In 1683 Chenggong’s grandson, Zheng Keshuang, still based in Taiwan,
surrendered to the Qing government. The following year the Qing court
issued an edict for development of the seas (Zhanhai Ling 展海令), which
lifted the ban against maritime shipping. Consequently, there was a sudden
increase in the number of trading junks visiting the port of Nagasaki from thecoastal regions of China, and in particular from the Yangtze River Delta andthe Jiangnan region. Examples of trading ships from that era are the Ningbo
junks numbered 84 and 85, which arrived in Nagasaki in October 1685.
These two Ningbo junks originally were based in Zhangzhou, Fujian. It isquite possible that because there were not enough sailors or cargo to go to
Japan, the merchants trading in Zhangzhou went north to Ningbo, where theyprocured goods for Japan before sailing to Nagasaki:
For our junks there is a shortage of transport goods from Zhangzhou in
our country, so we are petitioning for goods to be sent. This spring they
will be coming from Zhangzhou to Zhejiang and Ningbo. For some time
we have been asking for goods for shipping abroad, and are petitioning
again for some now.6
From the above, it is clear that when the ban was lifted on shipping, manymerchants desired to trade with Japan, but there was a shortage of commodities to trade.
Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki every year. The ships arriving toconduct trade were numbered chronologically according to the Chinese sexaTable 1. The arrival of 194 Chinese junks in Nagasaki in 1687 by month and thenumber of their crew members
Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Total

Junks
%

6
3.1

7
3.6

20
10.3

98
50.5

41
21.2

15
7.7

4
2.1

3
1.5

194
100

Crew
%

246
2.6

291
3.2

946
10.2

4,432
47.7

2,037
21.9

894
9.6

225
2.4

220
2.4

9,291
100

6 Kai hentai (Chinese Metamorphosis), vol. 1, p. 536.

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genary cycle. The number of Chinese junks that visited Nagasaki in 1688
climbed to 194. Table 1 presents the data, organized by month.7
In response to the rapid rise in the number of junks arriving in Japan in 1687,
the government began restricting the number of trading vessels allowed tovisit ports, so that only 70 junks came to Nagasaki in 1689, and 80 junks
came in 1698. From 1709 the number of trading vessels visiting the port was
restricted to 59.
The main products transported by Chinese junks from Japan to China
were Japanese copper and marine delicacies. From the beginning of the Edoera, the Qing court began actively purchasing Japanese copper. As China’s
monetary economy developed, there developed a shortage of silver sycee(ingots) and copper cash in circulation. Throughout the Kangxi period (1662–1722), the Chinese relied on Japan as an important source of copper forminting copper coins, a need that resulted in the arrival of many Chinesemerchants in Nagasaki. Japan became a major source of supply of these
metals. Copper was also produced in the Yunnan region of China, but in 1716
the amount of copper supplied to the Qing court from Yunnan was only
1,663,000 catties (993 metric tons), versus approximately 2,772,000 catties(1,654 metric tons) from Japan. In other words, Japanese copper contributed
a significant 62.5 percent of the total amount of copper used to supply the
Qing dynasty’s monetary economy.8
Japanese copper production decreased after the eighteenth century,
however, and the amount of copper supplied to China fell correspondingly.
China next sought Japan’s marine products, such as dried abalone (baoyu 鮑
魚 or fuyu 鰒魚 in Chinese), sea cucumber, and shark’s fin (shayu 鯊魚 or
yuchi 魚翅 in Chinese).9 These items were used in Chinese cooking to give aunique flavor to dishes. Dried abalone and shark’s fin were major ingredientsin seafood dishes in China during the Qing era, when such dishes began togrow in popularity even among the common people. Dried sea cucumber,
literally, ocean ginseng (haishen 海参), was also highly prized for its medicinal
value, and imports from Japan rivaled that grown in China. Dried marine
products thus developed into a major trade commodity between the two countries as Japan became an important source of supply, perhaps indicating asignificant impact of Japanese foodstuffs on Chinese folk culinary traditions.10
7 Matsuura Akira, Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū (Sino-Japanese
Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era), p. 248.
8 Matsuura Akira, Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū, p. 111.
9 See Matsuura Akira, Shindai kaigai bōeki shi no kenkyū (Research on the Historyof Foreign Trade in the Qing Era).
10 Matsuura Akira, Shindai kaigai bōeki shi no kenkyū, pp. 382–402.

﻿Sino-Japanese Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Period

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In Japan as well, increased production of these three products—dried sea
cucumber, dried abalone, and shark’s fin, collectively called tawaramono or
hyōmotsu (俵物 goods in straw bags) —was actively promoted. At the beginning of the Guangxu years (1875–1908), He Ruzhang, appointed as plenipotentiary to Japan, wrote in his Shidong zaji (Miscellany of an Envoy to Japan),“Many Chinese merchants take raw cotton and white sugar, and return withvarious marine products such as sea cucumbers and dried abalone.”11 He
Ruzhang’s note clearly underscores the importance of these products in China
even after the Edo era.
In 1715 the Japanese government promulgated the Shōtoku Shinrei (正徳
新令 New Edict of the Shōtoku Period), which restricted the outflow of gold,
silver, and copper through the Nagasaki trade. Until this time the main
constraint on trade was on the number of junks allowed to trade at Nagasaki.
The Shōtoku Shinrei newly allowed the issuing of trading licenses (shinpai信牌), mainly to junks docking at Nagasaki. After promulgation of the edicton sea trade, possession of a trading license, granted by the Japanese government to conduct trade in Nagasaki, became required for trade. If the captainof a Chinese ship did not have this license, the ship was not allowed to dockin Nagasaki the next time it sailed to Japan. Further, any Chinese captain or
merchant caught violating this law was not given a second chance to obtain alicense, so it was impossible for that person ever to come to Japan again. Thissystem ensured that junks coming to Nagasaki without a license could not
engage in trade thereafter. Licenses thus constituted a limitation on trade as
well as a system for designating merchants.
Subsequently, the policy was gradually tightened. In 1717, 40 junks wereallowed to enter the port of Nagasaki; in 1765, 13 junks were permitted to
dock; and in 1791 only 10 junks were allowed, a situation that continued until
the end of the Tokugawa era.
After promulgation of the Shōtoku Shinrei, junks entering the port ofNagasaki were mainly restricted to those from the Jiangnan delta region ofChina, immediately south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, as I will
discuss shortly. “Kairo, sara ni kazu, narabi ni kokin Karakuni-watari minato
no setsu”(Explanation of Shipping Routes and Numbers, as well as Ports Old
and New in Crossing Over to China) states,
In that era, there were two convenient ports: Shanghai and Zhapu. All of
the junks would travel back and forth to, and congregate in, these two
ports to conduct trade. These two ports, however, restricted their trade to
11 He Ruzhang, Shidong zaji (Miscellany of an Envoy in Japan), Xiaofanghu-zhai
yudi congshao (Geographical Essays from the Xiaofanghu Studio), slip case
10.

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textiles, various medicines, low-quality goods, and a variety ofcontainers and tools produced in several places. Several hundreds oftraders would bring goods, whereupon merchants from Jiangnan,
Zhejiang, and Fujian would check the silver purchasing price and ship
the goods from these two ports. Even if there are junks sailing over from
Ningbo, Zhoushan, Putuoshan, Fuzhou, Amoy, and Guangdong, most of
the junks come from Shanghai and Zhapu.12
From the above we can conclude that the most important ports for conducting
trade via Chinese junks with Japan were Shanghai and Zhapu.
Zhapu was closely guarded as an area that required defending. Volume
72 of Shizong shilu (世宗実録 Authentic Account of the Yongzheng Emperor),for the seventeenth day of the eighth month of 1728, has the entry “It is
known that there is an area called Zhapu in Pinghu County. It is an eminent
seaport for Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Trade from Zhapu reaches the countries
across the sea. Moreover, it is only a little over 200 li [approximately 129
kilometers] from Hangzhou.”In a report to the emperor dated the sixth day of
the first month of 1730, the provincial governor of Zhejiang, Liwei, noted,“Zhapu is an important port for conducting marine trade with Japan in theEast.”13 Zhapu continued to maintain its position as a major trading port withJapan until well into the middle of the nineteenth century. In the mid-nineteenth century, the British said of Zhapu, “Chapoo, on the Gulf of Hangchow, owes all its commercial importance to the exclusive trade which it
enjoys with Japan, monopolized by six imperial junks.”14
Why did Zhapu receive such attention? One of the most important reasons
was that Suzhou was in its hinterland. In the Qing era, Suzhou was animportant hub for Chinese commerce. Hence, the Jiangnan delta region was aconvenient location for collecting together fine silks and other handicrafts
ideal for shipping, as well as for selling products imported from Japan.15 The
geographic location of Zhapu fostered a close relationship with the majorcommercial center of Suzhou. In addition, situated on the coast of the conti12 Nagasaki bunken sōsho (Nagasaki Document Series), series 1, vol. 2, Nagasaki
jitsuroku taisei seihen (Principal Compilation of an Authentic Account ofNagasaki), p. 241.
13 Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zuozhe (Inner Palace Files Reported to the
Yongzheng Court), compilation no. 15 (January 1979), p. 424.
14 Thomas Allom and G. N. Wright, China, in a Series of Views: Displaying theScenery, Architecture, and Social Habits of That Ancient Empire (1843), vol.
3, p. 49.
15 Matsuura Akira, Shindai kaigai bōekishi no kenkyū (Research on the Historyof Foreign Trade in the Qing Era), pp. 382–402.

﻿Sino-Japanese Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Period

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nent, Zhapu was a port of call for coastal trading ships from Fujian andGuangdong in China’s southeastern region. Sugar, for example, which was
produced along China’s southeastern coastal region, was transported bycoastal sailing ships to Zhapu, transferred to trading ships heading for Japan,
and then taken to Nagasaki. Of the goods transported by Chinese junks to
Nagasaki, sugar produced in southeastern China was important as an inexpensive cargo.
Changes in Qing political policies and in Tokugawa trading policies greatly
influenced trends in Chinese trade in Nagasaki. Economic exchange was thefocus of Sino-Japanese relations during the Edo period, but that focus was
profoundly influenced by political policies of the Qing court and the
Tokugawa bakufu.16

Sino-Japanese Cultural and Scholarly Interaction

The nearly constant Chinese trade that occurred in Nagasaki throughout
the Edo era provided a basis for the cultural interaction that occurred between
Japan and China in the premodern era. It is well known that Japan was therecipient of Chinese learning, but the role of captains of junks in this transmission of culture has not been widely explored.
Beginning in the first half of the eighteenth century, Chinese merchants
who engaged in trade with Japan were organized mainly into shippers(caidong 財東), captains of ships visiting Nagasaki (chuanzhu 船主), boatowners (chuanhu 船戸), and crew (huozhang 夥長, zongguan 総管, shuishou 水
手, etc). The central figure in Nagasaki trade among Chinese merchants was
the captain (sentō 船頭 in Japanese).17
During the early stages of Nagasaki trading, a portion of the district called
Yadochō was designated for the Chinese to lodge, but after a variety of problems arose with the arrangement, a separate foreign settlement known as
Chinese residences (Tōkan 唐館 or Tōjin yashiki 唐人屋敷) was built in 1689,
and Chinese coming by sea to Nagasaki were ordered to stay in the housing
provided there. This was the case until 1868, when the residences began to be
dismantled.
Among the Chinese captains who had been sailing to Nagasaki for a longtime were intellectuals, with whom Japanese men of letters sought to interact.
One such person was Wang Shengwu, who first introduced to Japan the Gujin
16 Matsuura Akira, “Shinchō Chūgoku to Nihon” (Qing China and Japan), chapter
2 of Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū (Sino-Japanese Cultural
Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era).
17 Matsuura Akira, Shindai kaigai bōekishi no kenkyū (Research on the Historyof Foreign Trade in the Qing Era), pp. 73–90.

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tushu jicheng (古今圖書集成 Collection of Illustrations and Writings Past andPresent). In the Edo era Nagasaki became a desirable location for Japanese
men of letters who sought out Chinese scholar-merchants. For example, thegeographer Nagakubo Sekisui (1717–1801), from Mito, interacted with theshipping merchant Ming Heqi, as depicted in Nagakubo’s Shinsa shōwashū(清槎唱和集 Collection of Qing Raft Call and Response Songs) (see illustration). In addition to these cases, Shiba Kōkan (1747–1818), a famous
Japanese painter and printmaker, met the Chinese merchant Tian Mingqi.18
Some of the individuals who came from China to Nagasaki as traderssought documents that had already been lost in China, the best example being
Wang Peng (Wang Zhuli). Wang Peng came to Japan to look for the lost
book, Guwen xiaojing (古文孝經 Classic of Filial Piety in the Ancient Style).
After locating the book, he took it back with him to China, and it was later
reprinted by Bao Yanbo in his Zhibuzu-zhai congshu (知不足齋叢書 Collected
Reprints from the Studio of Insufficient Knowledge). Even now it is possible
to find the name of Wang Peng in the preface of the Guwen xiaojing.19 Since
Wang Peng used the alternate name of Wang Zhuli when he came toNagasaki as a merchant, little attention was paid to his presence. If his namehad been recorded in the trade annals under Wang Peng, he would not havebeen overlooked until just recently. Since Wang Peng was restricted during
his sojourn in Japan to the Chinese residence in Nagasaki, in all probability
he was compelled to retrieve the lost document by securing the cooperationof Japanese merchants. His contributions to the development of scholarship at
the Qing court are all the more impressive considering the lengths to which
he was driven to recover the Guwen xiaojing.
A well-known merchant-scholar who came to Japan to take back documents pertaining to China is Yang Shoujing (1839–1915), a wealthy Chinesemerchant’s son who became famous as a calligrapher, epigraphist, geographer, and bibliophile. Less well known is that Yang Shoujing was preceded byover a century by a merchant-scholar with the same intentions.
Other Chinese intellectuals who sailed to Japan included men of science.
On a plaque in the Mazu Shrine at Sōfukuji Temple in Nagasaki, forexample, is engraved the name of Yang Sixiong (Yang Xiting), a medical
doctor.20
18 Matsuura Akira, Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū (Sino-Japanese
Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era), chap. 3, “Chūgoku
shōnin to Nihon”(Chinese Merchants and Japan).
19 Matsuura Akira, Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū (Sino-Japanese
Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junk in the Edo Era), pp. 202–216.
20 Matsuura Akira, Shindai kaigai bōekishi no kenkyū (Research on the Historyof Foreign Trade in the Qing Era), pp. 247–251.

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67

Sino-Japanese cultural interactions during the Edo era were not limited
to trade. Unexpected relationships arose when storms at sea caused shipwrecks and the problem of castaways. Examples of castaways in China during
the Edo era have already been enumerated by the Japanese scholar Sōda
Hiroshi.21 Records of some Edo-era castaways remain even now in thepossession of established families. There are also examples of classicalChinese poems sent by Chinese to Japanese castaways embellishing Japanesesliding paper doors (fusuma) in their family homes.22
Premodern Sino-Japanese relations were also influenced by world events.
In particular, when the Tokugawa bakufu abandoned its policy of isolation,
Japanese began actively going abroad. The bakufu dispatched official ships toShanghai with the intention of expanding trade. The first such ship, which left
Nagasaki for Shanghai in April 1862, was the Senzai-maru. Takasugi Shinsaku
and Godai Tomoatsu were aboard, and they brought back to Japan stories ofa prospering Shanghai and of Qing China.
During the period when they were traveling to Shanghai, a newspaper
written in literary Chinese and called the Shanghai xinbao was being
published in the city. The first issue of the newspaper was published in
November 1860 in Shanghai by the British merchant newspaper company
Zilin yanghang (字林洋行). Most of the articles were translated from foreign
newspapers, but there were also extremely useful stories carried in the paper
concerning the Taiping Rebellion, the large-scale revolt that lasted from 1850
to 1864 and affected significant portions of southern China. The Shanghai
xinbao also carried information on the crew of the Senzai-maru and their stayin Shanghai from the beginning of June 1862 through the end of July.
Another influential newspaper published in Shanghai at the time, theNorth-China Herald, wrote in its issue for July 7, 1861 (no. 619),
The arrival at the port of Shanghai, during the past few days, of a
British-built vessel sailing under the Japanese flag is in itself an event
worthy of notice. When we learn further that this ship has not only beenpurchased by the native [Japanese] government, but that she is ladenwith the produce and manufactures of the country for trading purposesabroad, it throws an entirely new light upon the exclusive policy of that
peculiar people. Hitherto we have been led to understand that the
Tycoon and his Yaconins, and the Damios who rule with despotic swayover the subjects of the empire, were not only averse to the encourage21 Sōda Hiroshi, “Kinsei hyōyūmin to Chūgoku”(Castaways in the Premodern Era
and China).
22 Matsuura Akira, Edo jidai Tōsen ni yoru Nit-Chū bunka kōryū (Sino-Japanese
Cultural Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Era), chap. 3, pp. 301–324.

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68

ment of foreign commerce, but held in contempt those who pursued thevocations of merchants and ship-traders.23
This quote indicates the strong interest in the Senzai-maru when it docked in
Shanghai. Mention of the sailing of the Senzai-maru informed Westerners
residing in Asia that the Tokugawa bakufu was abandoning its policy of
seclusion and opening Japan to foreign trade. This new development in Japanwas of major interest to Westerners in Asia.
The Taipings greatly influenced the Nagasaki trade when they wereexpanding their power on the Chinese mainland in the mid-1800s. The
Taiping Rebellion devastated the economy of Jiangnan, the base of Chinesemerchants who traded with Nagasaki. Subsequently, it became difficult tocontinue trade via Chinese junks to Nagasaki. Some Chinese merchants tried
to maintain trade by even chartering British ships. Other Chinese merchants
were compelled to resort to making a living by residing in Japan.
Mutual political influence on trade is apparent in the relationship between
the two countries. From the Japanese perspective, the Nagasaki tradeconducted by Chinese merchants was not merely an economic exchange; it
was also a cultural and scholarly interaction that became an important foundation for Japan’s modernization from the latter half of the nineteenth
century.

Conclusion

Toward the end of the Qing era, the nature of Chinese trading in Nagasakichanged greatly with shifting world trends. First, the Taipings’ attack on
Zhapu, which had served as a base for trade between Nagasaki and Suzhou,
caused the merchants’ trade organization and arrangements to collapse. Later,when Japan opened up to the world after years of isolation, fast new clipper
ships and steamships from the West began frequenting Japanese ports for
trade in great numbers. As a result, Chinese junks quickly lost their competitiveness in the new international setting.
Sino-Japanese cultural and intellectual interchange during the Edo era wasa unique interlude in world history, one that depended on the efforts ofChinese shipping merchants, whose junks dominated marine transportation in
Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The relationship also
depended on the Tokugawa bakufu’s adoption of a national policy of isolation, which prohibited Japanese ships from sailing abroad. A remarkablecultural exchange resulted from this unique state of affairs.
23 Mainichi Komyunikēshonzu, Gaikoku shinbun ni miru Nihon (Japan As Seenin Foreign Newspapers), vol. 1, 1851–1873, p. 186.

﻿Sino-Japanese Interaction via Chinese Junks in the Edo Period

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol.1 2010

Figure 1. A Chinese junk, from Tōkan-zu
Rankan-zu emaki (Picture Scroll of the Chineseand Dutch Residences), painted by Ishizaki
Yūshi

Figure 2. Illustration of a Chinese junkentering Tsu Harbor, Nagasaki woodblock print (Nagasaki Tamatoya Print)

Figure 3. Scene inside the Chinese residential area, from Tōkan-zu Rankan-zu emaki(Picture Scroll of the Chinese and Dutch Residences), painted by Ishizaki Yūshi

Figure 5. Dried sea cucumber(haishen)Figure 4. Illustration of Chinese in Shinsa
shōwashū (Collection of Qing Raft Call andResponse Songs)