JAPAN MNE Insights
Volume 2, Issue 2

February, 2016

Academy of Multinational Enterprises (Japan)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Special Essay:
Do we really
understand why
there aremultinational
enterprises? A lookat early Japanese
foreign direct
investment in the
United States.
2 Special Essay:
The CSR Approachfor Reverse
Innovationwww.mne-jp.org

Special Essay:
Do we really understand why there are
multinational enterprises? A look at earlyJapanese foreign direct investment in the
United States.

Jean-François Hennart, Ph.D.
Professor of International Management
at Tilburg University, Netherland

Peter Buckley argued back in 2002 that the field ofinternational business (IB) had successfully solved the puzzle ofwhy multinational enterprises (MNEs) exist and why they take theforms they do, and proposed a new list of research questions forthe next millennium. My reaction was, and still is, “not so fast!”
While we do have sophisticated theories of the MNE, too many
researchers still cling to theories that cannot satisfactorily explainsome types of foreign direct investments (FDIs), in particular someundertaken by Japanese MNEs.
Take Dunning’s OLI paradigm, the most widely accepted
theory of the MNE (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). An MNE is anorganization that coordinates transborder activities throughemployment contracts, as opposed to through market
transactions. The OLI paradigm provides an intuitive list of theconditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of such a firm.
It states that to be an MNE a firm must have ownership, location,and internalization advantages. Ownership advantages, also calledfirm-specific advantages (FSAs), are based on intangibles, newproducts and processes and strong brand names. They allow MNEs
to offset the higher costs they are likely to incur in foreigncountries and hence to successfully compete with local firms. But
having FSAs is not a sufficient condition for being an MNE, i.e. for
operating with employees abroad, because a firm can exploit its

1Vol.2 Issue 2" Resource-seeking
investments are notexplained by OLI theory
since they are not basedon the exploitation of
FSAs, the investors
having often little or no
specific expertise in thesubsidiary’s operations,the main motivation
being the assurance ofsafe supplies"

JAPAN MNE Insights
FSAs by incorporating them into products at home and exporting them tothe foreign country. A second condition is therefore that a firm must findit more desirable to serve foreign customers by locating production inthat foreign country than by exporting from home. This occurs when theforeign country has location advantages, also called country-specificadvantages, or CSAs. CSAs consist of all the factors (natural resources,
factors of production, customers, and local institutions) that favor
production in a foreign country. A third condition for the existence of
MNEs is that, given that a foreign location is preferred, the firm finds it
more efficient to exploit its FSA by producing there through its employees
than by selling or renting its FSAs to foreign firms (for example bylicensing them). In other words, there must be internalization advantages,
i.e. imperfections in markets for FSAs.
The OLI model thus posits that having ownership advantages(FSAs) is a sine-qua-non condition for being an MNE. As Guillen andGarcia-Canal (2009: 34) put it, “no firm-specific capabilities, nomultinationals”. But if that were true, how does one then explain
knowledge-seeking investments, such as the recent spate of acquisitionsof Japanese, European, and North American high technology firms by
emerging market multinationals? These firms invest abroad to obtain
FSAs, not to exploit them. It is difficult to reconcile that with a theory that
posits that having FSAs is a necessary condition for expanding abroad. In
fact, knowledge-seeking investments belong to the more generalcategory of resource-seeking investments, alongside backward vertical
integration into commodities and raw materials and forward vertical
integration into distribution. Resource-seeking investments are notexplained by OLI theory since they are not based on the exploitation of
FSAs, the investors having often little or no specific expertise in thesubsidiary’s operations, the main motivation being the assurance of safe
supplies1.
In OLI, the third condition for MNEs is that firms must exploit their
FSAs internally (the I advantage). Internalization is preferred because it
provides a superior method of FSA exploitation, and avoids themisappropriation that would result if MNEs used contracts or joint
ventures (Rugman, 1981: 42). To safeguard FSAs, OLI implies that themost efficient ownership structure is the wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS),
unless political risk makes that solution too risky (Anderson and Gatignon,1986). This prediction seems at odds with the widespread use of lessthan-full equity stakes by MNEs, even in countries with low political risk,such as the United States. Between 1952 and 1980, Japanese firms took
694 stakes in US manufacturing subsidiaries, but only 35.5% of them were
full ones2.
The transaction cost (TC) theory of the MNE (Hennart, 1982; 2010)2

Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

provides a more general explanation of why MNEs exist, and canaccount for a much wider range of FDIs. The starting point is theexistence of potential or actual interdependences between parties
located in different countries: one party may have a product or service
useful to another, or both could achieve together what they cannot
separately. Organizing such interdependences yields potential gains,
but also incurs costs. The parties need to be informed about the gains
and to agree on their division, and there must be some way to enforce
what is agreed upon. The price system and hierarchy are two genericmethods to perform these three tasks. The price system works throughmeasurement of outputs, and hierarchy through monitoring andrewarding behavior. Because there are fundamental differences in theway the price system and hierarchy work, the net gains generated byorganizing a given interdependence will vary with the method used toorganize it. Firms use mostly hierarchical methods. TC theory identifies
the characteristics of interdependencies that determine whether theyshould be organized on markets or within firms. Hence the TC theoryof the MNE posits that there are two necessary and sufficientconditions for an interdependence to be organized within an MNE: (1)an internalization condition, i.e. the benefit of organizing aninterdependence must be higher than its costs, and higher using
employment contracts than using the price system; and (2) a location
condition, i.e. locating production in the foreign country must be more
efficient than at home.
TC theory posits that MNEs arise when organizing international
interdependences through employment contracts is more efficientthan doing it on the market. This way of looking at the conditions forthe emergence of MNEs makes it easy to understand why firms may
expand abroad even when they do not have FSAs. For instance, tacitknowledge has been shown to be difficult to license. This explains why,
as predicted by OLI theory, firms eager to exploit tacit knowledge in
foreign countries find it efficient to do it internally, but it also explains
why firms eager to access tacit knowledge also have to do it internally,
either by acquiring a firm that holds it or by setting up greenfield R&D
facilities abroad. Likewise imperfections in the markets for intermediate
inputs explain why downstream processors may integrate upstream,
but also why upstream producers may integrate downstream. The TC
theory of the MNE thus explains why a firm does not need Oadvantages (FSAs) to be an MNE.
While OLI theory provides an intuitive explanation for most US
investments abroad, it seems less able to explain other types of FDI, forexample early Japanese FDI in the US. Such investments were mostly
through minority stakes and joint ventures (JVs). This is explained in" Because there arefundamental differences in
the way the price systemand hierarchy work, the net
gains generated byorganizing a given
interdependence will varywith the method used toorganize it."3

Vol.2 Issue 2" This pattern of small,short-lived equity stakes
is totally different fromthe one predicted by
OLI.."

JAPAN MNE Insights
part by the important role played by Japanese trading companies, arole difficult to explain by OLI, but that fits well within a TC framework.
Being relatively small in size and lacking language and crosscultural skills, many Japanese exporters have used trading companies(sogo shosha) to handle their foreign imports and exports. When the
United States started to put barriers on Japanese imports of raw
materials such as seafood and forest products and exports of finishedproducts such as textiles and steel, the sogo shosha were faced with athreat to their trading business. Their answer was to orchestrate theestablishment of foreign production subsidiaries. For example, in
seafood the gradual exclusion of Japanese fishing from US coastal
waters after the war forced Japanese trading companies to set up
inshore production plants such as North Pacific Processors, a 50-50
fish canning JV between Marubeni and a US fishing firm. In textiles
and steel, the sogo shosha partnered with Japanese manufacturers to
set up US-based plants to bypass rising US trade barriers. Examples
are General Knits of California, a three-way JV between Itochu (59%),
Kawabo (20%) and Tokai Senko (20%) to dye and finish knitted goods,
and Auburn Steel, a steel minimill JV between Ataka (60%) and Kyoei
steel (40%). The sogo shosha also took minority stakes in potential US
high-tech exporters to Japan such as Qantel, a manufacturer of small
business computers, in which Itochu took in 1969 a 19% stake.
As Hennart and Kryda (1988) show, the logic behind theseinvestments is better explained by a TC model than by OLI. Trading
companies did not invest to exploit FSAs but instead to safeguard
their existing trading relationships and to develop new ones. Their
stake in US-based plants served as a commitment of support for theventure, and as a guarantee to continue to handle its business.
Minority stakes also helped to develop new potential customers whichmight have had difficulty finding long-term financing elsewhere.
Because the goal of their equity stakes was not to safeguard the
exploitation of their FSAs but instead to tie in customers, sogo shosha
took as little equity as needed. Stakes were often short-lived: in somecases the ventures went bust, in others the sogo shosha were able tosell their stakes back to their Japanese and US JV partners while stillsafeguarding their trading rights—as in the case of Mitsui’s 45% stakein Alumax sold back to Amax and replaced by a long-term contract(Roehl, 1988). This pattern of small, short-lived equity stakes is totallydifferent from the one predicted by OLI.
Does it matter if IB researchers use an incomplete theory of
the MNE like OLI? Yes, because it leads them to draw misleading
conclusions--like the one that emerging market firms will not engage
into FDIs because they do not possess FSAs. It also causes them to4Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

waste resources in empirical dead-ends, for instance the quest for an empirical
relationship between multinationality and performance. A more complete theory of the
MNE exists.
1

To address this problem, Dunning added to intangible-based ownership advantages a new category ofownership advantages which he called ‘transactional advantages’. These arose from the multinationalityof a company. But this is a tautological explanation, since the only way we know a firm has ‘transactional
advantages’ is from the fact it has internalized transactions.

2

A full stake (a WOS) is defined by an ownership stake of 95 to 100%. All data in this piece are from theauthor’s database of early postwar Japanese investments in US manufacturing.

REFERENCES
Anderson E. & Gatignon H. (1986) Modes of foreign entry: a transaction cost
analysis and propositions. Journal of International Business Studies 17(3): 126.
Buckley, P. (2002) Is the international business agenda running out of steam?
Journal of International Business Studies 33(2): 365-373.
Dunning J. & Lundan S. (2008) Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy.
Cheltenham, U.K: Edward Elgar.
Guillen M. & Garcia-Canal E. (2009) The American model of the multinational firm
and the ‘new’ multinationals from emerging economies. Academy ofManagement Perspectives 23(2): 23-35.
Hennart J-F. (1982) A Theory of Multinational Enterprise. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press.
Hennart J-F. (2010) Transaction cost theory and international business. Journal of
Retailing 86(3): 257-269.
Hennart J-F. & Kryda, G. (1998) Why do traders invest in manufacturing? In The
Multinational Traders, Jones, G. (ed.). London: Routledge, pp. 213-227.
Roehl, T. (1988) Is efficiency compatible with history? Evidence from Japanesegeneral trading companies. In The Multinational Traders, Jones, G. (ed.).
London: Routledge, pp. 201-212.
Rugman A. (1981) Inside the Multinational: the Economics of Internal Markets. New
York: Columbia University Press.

5Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

Special Essay:
The CSR Approach for Reverse Innovation
Hiroo Takahashi, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus of Hakuoh University, Japan

1. The Market Dilemma in Emerging Countries
The idea of “reverse innovation,” previously not just unconsidered
but also counter to all expectations, now finds itself being widely
discussed? The reason lies in the expected expansion of the economiesof emerging markets, seen as the drivers of 21st century economic
growth, and the accompanying development of new products andtechnological approaches. Most advanced countries businesses alreadyengage in the development of products for emerging countries, and thecorresponding establishment of R&D operation aimed at these countries.
However, most of these efforts have been focused on introducing low
cost products selected from the line of products available in developed
markets, and not on products developed within the local market. The
sales, production, and tuning of products is similarly limited to minor
adjustments of existing products. However, this type of BOP (Bottom of
Pyramid) strategy, where middle-of-the-range (and below) products
already accepted by developed markets are introduced to emerging
markets, has failed to achieve significant market penetration.
Emerging markets were basically seen as little more than a minor
addition to the developed ones, and not allocate the significant
management resources for new one. This is due to the fact that due tothe fierce competition between businesses in the developing countries
markets, there was a limit to the amount of effort that could be diverted
to the comparatively less-skilled emerging markets. It was under this limitthat companies from developing countries markets first enteredemerging markets. While they may have initially had a technologicaladvantage, they soon saw their market share being capture bycompetitors from the emerging markets. This battle is known as the“Dilemma of Emerging Market Strategy,” or the “The Innovator’s
Dilemma.” For example, Honda, a world leader in motorcycles, was quick
to enter the emerging Chinese market. However, with their productssoon copied and reproduced more cheaply by local companies, Honda
found itself suffering and unable to capture significant market share.
So how are companies to achieve growth in the important andgrowing emerging markets while simultaneously dealing with the"However, this type of
BOP strategy, wheremiddle-of-the-range (andbelow) products alreadyaccepted by developed
markets are introduced
to emerging markets, hasfailed to achievesignificant market
penetration"

6Vol.2 Issue 2" In this regard, while we
may expect rapid economic
development in theemerging markets,
development left in its
present situation will lead tonumerous societal issues,
including global warming,
global resource depletion,issues of social inequality
caused by increasing
disparity in wealthdistribution brought about
by market competition, andlabor issues.”

JAPAN MNE Insights
realities of cheap products and increasing catch up skill withinemerging markets? G.E. CEO Jeff Immelt, declaring that GE would
have no future without engaging in development in the emerging
markets, decided that a completely new approach to R&D would betaken in countries like China and India. The subsequent developmentof handheld electrocardiograph devices and low-priced portable PC
based ultrasound machines show one possible answer to thedilemma.
2. Reverse Innovation from the view of CSR
CSR and Emerging Markets
Let’s now take a look at reverse innovation from the view ofCSR. CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) deals with, as the namesuggests, the social responsibility and contributions of corporations
to society. In Japan, social responsibility became a pressing issue withthe 1960s “pollution problem,” the early 1970s “panic buying” and“reluctant sale” issues of trading companies, and the various scandal
which arose after the collapse of the economic bubble in the 1990s.
Since the 90s, staff misconduct has become an issue which leads todoubt about a company’s basic business conduct ability. In Japan,
2003 is widely hailed as the year in which CSR was born. This birthshould be seen as something fundamentally different than the
demands for social responsibility brought about by the
aforementioned problems. Before 2003, CSR was simply seen as apart of a company’s operation, whereas the CSR being discussed now
is seen as the core business operation that a company must engage
in in its entirety. Looking at this responsibility as it applies toemerging markets, we can see that, from the view of CSR the various
responsibilities exist for Japanese companies. In this regard, while we
may expect rapid economic development in the emerging markets,
development left in its present situation will lead to numerous societal
issues, including global warming, global resource depletion, issues ofsocial inequality caused by increasing disparity in wealth distribution
brought about by market competition, and labor issues.
It is within this environment that companies are considering
what it is they should do, and that their core strategies are being
questioned. CSR until now has largely been just a single, responsive
part of a company. But now the need for active CSR that is integrated
into a corporate strategy has become clear. M. Porter, well-known
corporate author, and his colleague M. Kramer, wrote on theimportance of developing strategic CSR that goes above and beyond
simple responsive CSR (Harvard Business Review 2002, Dec.). The

7

Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

article’s argument can be used to explain why BOP businesses
operating in emerging markets should adopt comprehensive CSR
strategies to address societal problems.
The BOP market, envisioned as a pyramid, occupies the bottom
layer of income distribution (figure 1). In “The Next 4 Billion,” (2007)
World Resource Institute & International Finance Corporation
estimates that 72% of the world’s population (approx. 4 billion) has
annual incomes of less than $3000, the MOP (Middle of Pyramid) layer
above is comprised of approximated 14 billion people, and the TOP(Top of the Pyramid) layer consists of a mere 1.75 billion people. Even
if individual annual income is less than $3000, this means that the BOP
market is a $5 trillion market that easily matches Japan’s GDP. Though
Japanese companies have traditionally only targeted the top and partof the middle, they can be expected to start to develop newopportunities targeting the middle in its entirety.

" CSR until now haslargely been just a single,
responsive part of acompany. But now theneed for active CSR thatis integrated into a
corporate strategy has
become clear."

Figure 1 World Population & Annual Income, Market Size

Source: World Resource
Corporation(2007)

Institute&International

FinanceBusiness in Emerging Markets
From the view of CSR, what can we expect of businesses inemerging and BOP markets? In emerging markets, rapid economic
growth can lead to a wide range of problems, including environmental
destruction, pollution due to factory construction, Co2 emissions due
to car use in cities, and other problems related in population growth(such as housing, food, medical, energy, and education). Thoughmultinational corporations have already entered into numerous
corporate strategies in the developing emerging markets, the focus is
now shifting to looking at how their business can contribute toaddressing these societal problems. GE’s development of handheld
electrocardiograph devices and low-priced portable PC based
ultrasound machines served to address a medical issue by making

8Vol.2 Issue 2" Multinational companies`
investment in R&D inemerging markets is, it goes
without saying, one way tomatch R&D to local needs.
But, it can also serve as asource of new products andideas for the parent
company in its homecountry."

JAPAN MNE Insights
devices that were accessible to lower income levels. Thanks to GE’s
work, numerous lives have been saved, and a thriving example of atruly CSR-driven business employing numerous people over a broad
area was born.
Examples of this kind of CSR-driven business development
within emerging markets can also be seen in some Japanesecompanies. For example, Yakult has made “protecting the health of all
the world’s people” a goal of its business, including in developing
foreign markets. Started in 1963, Yakult’s home product delivery by its
Yakult Ladies contributed to Japanese society both in terms ofpreserving health and in creating employment opportunities for
women. Bangladesh’s Grameen Danone Foods (a joint venture
between Grameen Bank and Dutch food and beverage maker Danone)
made use of this exact model in having its low-priced, highly
nutritious yogurt sold by Grameen Ladies. AJINOMOTO, wanting to
improve the nutritional situation in developing countries, joined with
JICA and UNISEF to bring its flagship product Aji No Moto to
emerging markets. Another example, Osaka’s Poly Glu, focused onproviding clean and safe drinking water in Bangladesh through thedeveloped of water purification chemicals. Sumitomo Chemical’s bug
repellant “Olycef Net,” which is seen as a highly effective method of
combating malaria, has seen large purchases from the WHO and
UNICEF to be distributed free-of-charge to the poor in developing
countries.
3. The Meaning of Reverse
Multinational companies` investment in R&D in emerging
markets is, it goes without saying, one way to match R&D to local
needs. But, it can also serve as a source of new products and ideas forthe parent company in its home country. This is the definition of“reverse innovation,” where ideas and products developed inemerging markets find themselves imported to advanced industrial
economies. While reverse innovation became a topic of muchdiscussion thanks to the successful example of GE, there are two ways
to look at the issue.
The first is where news products and skills are born from the
R&D of companies original from the emerging markets they serve.
One example of this would be India’s Tata Motors, which has
produced $3,000 Nano car, and developed solar panels and electricbicycles in China. The emerging markets have an urgent need for
products which address a range of pressing issues. These include lowcost medical devices, carbon capture (products to reduce Co2

9Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

emissions), solar and wind power, biofuels, distributed power
generation, water purification, electric vehicles, and ultra-low-cost
housing, among others. Given that “necessity is the mother of
invention,” it would not be surprising to see developing countries leadthe developed in the development of technology in these areas. On
the national level, this gives one reason for the development of
products in emerging markets which have are able to hold their own
and take on the markets of developed nations. If we look at America
and Japan, America was responsible for a large amount of innovation
at the start of the 20th century. However, this technology found its
way to Japan, where innovation led to the birth of products able tocompete in the developed markets. The auto industry is but one
example. America’s development and discovery of new products andskills is known as “product innovation,” while Japan’s development of
more efficient processes is known as “process innovation.”
It seems fair to say that Japan’s excellent “process innovation”
was, in fact, just another example of reverse innovation flowing todeveloped countries. The second way to look at the issue can be seenin the GE example, where a multinational corporation’s R&D successoverseas found itself being imported back into the home country.
However, GE’s initial goal was not to aim for re-importable advances,
but to increase its competitiveness in the local market. As statedabove in The Dilemma Facing Markets in Emerging Countries, they
adopted a completely new approach to overcome the obstacles they
faced.
It evolved the local growth team (LGT) model, which is basedon five critical principles;
1. Shift power to where the growth is
2. Build new offering from the ground up
3. Build LGTs from the ground up, new companies
4. Customize objectives, targets, and metrics" Given that “necessity
is the mother of
invention,” it would
not be surprising tosee developing
countries lead thedeveloped in thedevelopment oftechnology in theseareas. "For a global R&D strategy to facilitate innovation in emerging
markets, numerous, numerous restructurings must be made, including:reallocating resources between headquarters and the local office,creating an environment that promotes research that is bothunhindered and cooperative, and an incentive system that promotes
said research. Compared to America and Europe, Japanese companies
seem to have opened numerous research bases in emerging markets.
However, in actuality, much of the real research activity remains
definitively in Japan. Even is the research in emerging markets does
not lead to a specific product, the very process can lead to a variety of
discoveries, innovations, and, as a result, patents. One example of this10Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights
can be seen in the patents held by foreign investment firms in China.
Looking at patents held by western and Japanese companies in theearly 2000s in China, the involvement of locally formed companies isminimal. However, by the latter half of the decade, the involvement oflocally formed western companies has risen sharply compared tocontinued minimal involvement by Japanese offshoots. Numerous
American patents reference the work of domestic Chinese universities
and companies, displaying an ability to work within the local
innovation system. If this represents success, than Japanesecompanies are failing in comparison.
In order to achieve a broad range of innovations, it is necessary
to harness each location’s unique qualities, something which cannot
occur if R&D remains centered in Japan. This is an example of theJapanese business trait of “self-sufficiency”. While it is certainly
beneficial to make use of one’s own resources, focusing too much on
this one point leads to an inability to implement a management stylethat makes use of other resources, such as open networks. Developing
innovation in emerging markets calls for rapid cooperation with local
universities, research institutions, and industry.
4. In Conclusion" In order to achieve a
broad range ofinnovations, it isnecessary to harness
each location’s uniquequalities, somethingwhich cannot occur if
R&D remains centeredin Japan."This article looked at “reverse innovation” as it relates toglobalized R&D, calls for new ways to look at the global market. Peter
Gammeltoft clarified six motives as following, Innovation-driven
motives is like Reverse innovation
Until now, the path of R&D and products aimed at the
emerging market was decided by the top of the BOP pyramid: thehigh income class. However, in today’s rapidly developing economies,
future growth and development will come from the middle and lower
layers of the pyramid. These demographics call for products that carrya low price, are portable, and are easy to operate. However, this rapid
growth has also led to an increase in societal issues. There are many
issues that advanced global companies can address from a strategic
CSR standpoint. They include issues of health, medical, environment,water pollution, energy, food, housing, and emissions in cities. In
order to address these issues, R&D at the local level cannot simply belimited to localizing already developed products. A new style ofapproaching the R&D problem was looked at with the example of GE
and medical products in China and India. Looking at emerging
markets, the fact that advanced corporations in the developed world
hold the management skills and resources necessary to engage in
R&D is not likely to change soon.

11Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

Figure 2 Ratio of Patents of Foreign Companies in China

Source: Japan Economic Newspaper. December 30. 2013.
Figure 3 Motives for internationalising R&D" In order todevelop products
suited to thismarket, a
globalized R&D
strategy which
focuses on securing
the necessary
human resources
becomes necessary,and here theemerging markets
provide an answer."

Source: Gammeltoft, P. (2010) “Internationalization of R&D”
However, products must be designed for their markets. This paper
looked at how, as the developed world reaches a plateau and begins toage, major growth will come from the emerging markets. In order todevelop products suited to this market, a globalized R&D strategy which
focuses on securing the necessary human resources becomes necessary,and here the emerging markets provide an answer. Developing global
human resources is seen as a pressing issue for Japanese companies.
Here too is an area were the development and use of researchers andtalent in the emerging market is surely necessary.

12Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

References
Asakawa, K. & Son, A (2008)“Internationalsation of R&D in China and India” Convential Wiston
Versus Reality, Asia Pacific J. Management 25:375-394.
Christensen, C. M. (1997) “The Innovation Dilemma” Harvard Business School Press.
Gammeltoft, P. (2010)“Internationalisation of R&D: trend, drivers and managerial challenges”
Int. J. Technology and Globalization, P186.
Govindarajan, V. (2012) “A Reverse Innovation.” Harvard Business Review, 2012, December.
Govindarajan, V. & Trimble, C. (2012) “A Reverse Innovation Playbook” Harvard Business
Review, 2012, August.
Immelt, J. R., Govindarajan, V., Trimble, C. (2010) “How GE is Disrupting Itself” Harvard Business
Review, January.
Kuenmmercle, W. (1977) “Building effective R&D capabilities abroad”, Harvard Business Review,
March -Apr.
Porter. M. & Krammer, M. (2002) “The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy”
Harvard Business Review, December, 2002.
Motz, R., Raliu, C. and Taleb, A. (2010) “The Multinational Enterprise in Developing Countries”
Routledge.
Takahashi, H. (2000) “Global R&D Network” (Japanese: Bunshindo).
Takahashi, H. (2013) “The Challenge for Japanese Multinationals” Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Wessel, M. & Christensen, C. M. (2013) “Surviving Disruption” Harvard Business Review, June.

13Vol.2 Issue 2JAPAN MNE Insights

Japan MNE Insights will be published twice a year on the AMNE official website(www.mne-jp.org). Please feel free to contact with the editorial team if you have any question
or request.

Japan MNE Insights Editorial TeamThe chairperson of the Newsletter committee
Toshiaki Sugita, Konan University

Editor-in-Cheif

Chie Iguchi, Keio University

EditorMasashi Arai, Asia University
Tamiko Kasahara, University of Shizuoka
Hironori Uchibori, Hakuoh University
Tetsuya Usui, Nihon University

Japan MNE Insights Editorial Team is currently located at
Office of Dr. Tamiko Kasahara,
University of Shizuoka, School of Management and Information
52-1 Yada, Suruga-ku, Shizuoka, 422-8526, Japan
TEL/FAX:+81-54-264-5435 (direct)
Contact e-mail address: kasahara@u-shizuoka-ken.ac.jp
Copyright @ Academy of Multinational Enterprises (Japan)

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