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基盤研究(A)「紛争と開発：平和構築のための国際開発協力の研究」(編) [*1]

Discussion Paper for Peace-building Studies, No.06 [Spring 2005]

No.06
Afghan Refugees and Migrants in Iran:Who is responsible for empowering them?
Hisae NAKANISHI [*2]Spring 2005[*1]

http://www.peacebuilding.org/[*2]

名古屋大学大学院国際開発研究科教授

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By Hisae Nakanishi
Professor of GSID, Nagoya University/TZXUJ[IZOUT
Since the Afghan War in November 2001, many Afghan refugees returned homeduring the year of 2002. It is estimated that at least 2.1 million refugees being assistedby the UNHCR returned from Pakistan and Iran in 2002 and the first half of 2003.
However, it is said that only 10 to 15% of the returnees were actually from Iran. It isestimated for example that 900,000 Afghans returned from Pakistan as opposed to only
100,000 people from Iran between November 2001 and August 2002.
With no reliable statistics available, it is difficult to know the actual number of
undocumented Afghan refugees. However, UNICEF estimates that there could be up to
500,000 Afghan children aged 6-15 years in Iran, among those whom are
undocumented.
One of the most significant tasks for the reconstruction of Afghanistan is thecapacity building of Afghans in various sectors of society. The capacity building ofAfghans is needed in the administration of Government, in the fields of education,technological improvement for socio-economic infrastructure of society, theconstruction of new industries, and so on. Yet, it goes without saying that providing
primary education is one of the most significant and vital tasks in capacity building. To
be more specific, to improve the level of literacy is a key for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan where the current literacy rate is estimated at 30%.
The objective of this paper is to examine how primary education and/or literacy
programs have been provided for Afghan refugee children in contemporary Iran.
Through my field research conducted in the summer of 2002 and 2003, this study
investigates the interaction between Iran’s policy toward Afghan exiles, the UNHCR,
and Iranian local NGOs in shaping Afghan children’s opportunities for primaryeducation. Furthermore, an attempt is made to analyze the impact of the so-called-1 -*OYI[YYOUT6GVKXLUX6KGIKH[ORJOTM9Z[JOKY4UA9VXOTMC“Repatriation Program for Afghan refugees” on Afghan children’s access to primaryeducation, and to delineate a complicacy of the relationship between Afghan children’s
rights to basic education in their place of exiles and the aid policies of both Iran and the
UNHCR toward Afghan refugees and migrants. This study ultimately argues that thestatus of refugees and migrants is politically determined in a hosting country and thus it
is extremely difficult for an international donor like the UNHCR to formulate aid
policies for refugees and migrants.
This study consists of three parts. First, it provides an overview of the current
situation of the presence of Afghans in Iran. Second, the paper examines theeffectiveness of the so-called “Repatriation Program” for Afghan refugees. Third,
attention is paid to the changing policies of the Iranian government and that of the
UNHCR on granting primary education and/or assistance to Afghan students.

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Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran have been estimated to number
approximately 2 million. It has been said that the number of Afghans was as large as
2.5 million at its peak. Given this astronomical figure, the government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran has stumbled into the position of being host to the largest number ofrefugees and migrants in the world.
The history of Afghan refugees and migrants dates back to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December, 1979. The influx of Afghans into Iran continued to increaseduring the Soviet military from 1980 until 1992. It has been said that the number ofAfghans entering Iran continued to grow between 1994 and 2000 when the Taliban
captured Kandahar and later Kabul, expanding their territory of influence inAfghanistan. It is hard to estimate how many Afghans entered Iran and continued tostay there before and after 1994 until September 2001. The results of my research at
Tehran UNHCR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, local NGOs in
Tehran however suggest that the number of Afghans who came to Iran dramaticallyincreased in 2000, a year before September 2001.
What the presence of Afghans in Iran has meant for the Iranian society is anextremely complex issue. During Iran-Iraq war, the government of Iran stressed thesignificance of the unity of the oppressed (Mostazafin) and accepted Afghans,particularly Shi’i Afhgans (mainly Hazaras). Iran also needed extra manpower as the
population of Iran was only 35 million at the time, and thus welcomed Afghans who
worked in various sectors and industries and also served in the military.
The continued presence of Afghans in Iran however, has been considered a
substantial economic burden for Iran over the last decade. The population of Iran has
become doubled since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the problem of
unemployment has continued to become increasingly serious year by year, particularly-2 -*OYI[YYOUT6GVKXLUX6KGIKH[ORJOTM9Z[JOKY4UA9VXOTMC

among young people. It is estimated that there are about 2 million Iranians who are
unemployed and thus, some criticism has emerged in Iran society against Afghan
workers, who are accused of occupying jobs, which Iranians should otherwise fill.
Criticism has been also leveled against the assistance of some sections of Iran’s
government and other international donors toward Afghan refugees and migrants. On
the other hand, Iranian employers generally conceive Afghan laborers to be hard
workers and many Afghans laborers usually undertake hard, dangerous and dirty jobs,
which Iranians would hesitate to take.

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Under the above-mentioned circumstances, the government of Iran attempted toencourage the repatriation of Afghans first in 1993-1994. It is reported that about one
million Afghans were repatriated to Afghanistan. Another attempt was made by the
Iranian government in 2000 under a joint program with the UNHCR. However, owing
to severe drought, continued and escalating hostilities between the Taliban and theNorthern Alliance, a massive influx of Afghans into Iran was seen in the first six monthsof 2001. It is reported that more than 100,000 displaced Afghans were accommodated
in the centers for displaced in Eastern Iran and Western Afghanistan by early April,
2001. Moreover, it is said that 1,000 Afghans entered into Iran every day during themonth of April of that year. There was another slight increase in the number ofdisplaced Afghans at the time of the Afghan War in November 2001. Yet, it is said thatthe increase of Afghan refugees who received emergency assistance was rather
temporary, and the majority of those who lived in the camps located along the Iranianborder as well as at the camps inside Afghanistan were later disbanded.
It is to be noted that the problem of Afghans in Iran was not just an outcome of the
Afghan War in 2001 nor was it the emergence of the Taliban. The presence of Afghans
in Iran has more than two decades of history commencing in 1979. It is also said that alarge segment of Afghans had existed in big cities and their surrounding areas within
Iran before the US attack on the Taliban in 2001 as they had fled from the threat of the
Taliban. Some Afghans came and lived (and often still live) alone with their family
remaining behind in Afghanistan. Others came with a family and have stayed (and stillstay) in Iran. However, it is observed that more single Afghans than those accompanied
by family members have lived and continue to live in Iran. Thus, a distinction should
be made between the “refugee” and the “migrant” to examine the real status of Afghans
in Iran.

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8KL[MKKY\Y3OMXGTZYAt present, at least 1.8 million Afghan refugees and migrants still reside in Iran.
According to my analysis of a report commissioned by UNESCO-Tehran, there arethree categories of Afghans in terms of their legal status. The first is the so-called “bluecard” holder, a status granted to those who arrived before 1992. They have the right ofresidence and access to government services such as education and health. They areallowed to “work in a limited number of sectors (mainly low-paid, hazardous or
labouring jobs).”
The second category of Afghans are those who came to Iran between 1992 and1994 and obtained temporary cards at the end of 1994. The cards were often renewed
however finally expired in 1996. Many of these temporary cardholders have continued
to stay in Iran.
The third category encompasses those who came after 1996 and were not granted
any document. It is generally the case that the limited number of Afghans who arrived
after 1996 were legally granted permission to stay for a short period of time. Since thefall of Mazar-e Sharif to the Taleban in 1998, there has been a large influx of Afghans
who fled the oppression of the Taleban. It is said however, that only a small number ofthe Afghans were actually issued temporary cards.
The above-mentioned explanation of these three categories of Afghans
considered, it is clear that only a limited number of Afghans should actually beclassified as “refugees”, while international donors and NGOs often consider almost all
Afghans in Iran as refugees. Legally speaking, from the Iranian government’s point ofview, blue card holders are, more or less, identified as “migrants”, and thus are allowed
to remain in Iran. This is clearly evident in the cardholders’ documents, which state
that, they are given permission to remain in Iran as “migrants.” On the other hand, fromthe viewpoint of refugee status seekers, blue card holders were the ones who originallymade a claim of “refugees” as they took refuge from the Soviet military.
The question thus becomes; “who is a refugee?” Those who arrived after 1998
and received temporary IDs are most likely qualified as refugees both from the point ofview of Afghans – the claimers – and the Iranian government, which granted temporary
permission of stay. In particular, in March 2000, about 50% of requests by Afghan
refugees were granted permission for temporary stay of up to 6 months Iran, after
screening centers were set up in various provinces in Iran to determine the status of
those claming to be refugees.

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There is almost no dependable data, historical nor current, showing the number of
undocumented Afghans in Iran. As mentioned earlier, documented Afghans have accessto government social services, and are allowed to work. Undocumented Afghans arelegally not allowed to be in Iran, and thus the policy of the Iranian government has beenthat undocumented Afghan children have no right to receive formal education while all
documented refugee children have the right to a free education just like Iranian children.
Faced with a growing unemployment rate in Iran and the criticism against the
government regarding the presence of Afghans, the Iranian government has launched acampaign to promote the repatriation of Afghans as well as to deport undocumented
Afghans. The Iranian government considers that assisting Afghan children in primaryeducation would contradict the government’s efforts to send Afghans back home, whichhave been underway since the end of the Afghan War in November 2001.
After a long period of deliberation between the Iranian government’s Bureau for
Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs which commenced in 2000, the UNHCR assisted
repatriation program started operations in April, 2002. The statistics provided by the
UNHCR demonstrates that the cumulative number of UNHCR assisted and spontaneous
returnees from April 2002 reached 370,000 Afghans at the end of 2002. The first half of2003 however witnessed a considerable drop in the number of Afghan returnees, seeing
only 80,000 return during this period. Faced with this reality, the Iranian governmenthas been pressuring the UNHCR to speed up the repatriation program.
Incidentally, the UNHCR changed its education policy toward Afghans in Iran inearly 1990’s, the mid-90’s, and again from 1996. In the early 1990’s, it aimed atfunding primary schools which targeted for refugee children and actually establishedschools for them. The first policy change occurred in 1996. The UNHCR decided toprovide Iran’s Ministry of Education and Training (MET) with a grant in accordancewith the number of refugees who registered in the Iranian government schools. Thus,
the UNHCR’s policy was to alleviate the cost of the MET and let the MET maintainexisting schools and conduct training programs for Afghan teachers.
Further change is now imminent. A fundamental policy of the UNHCR regarding
the approval of the status of “refugee” is that those who came to Iran after November
2001 are not to be recognized as refugees. Behind this policy is the logic that
repatriation should be promoted as long as the security in Afghanistan is such that
Afghans are able to return.
Moreover, the UNHCR has a basic policy of providing “education forrepatriation” to Afghan children. Along with this policy, the UNHCR and the MET
have taken measures to make sure that the recipients of any education program will
return to Afghanistan. For example, the MET provides scholarship to Afghan university
students in exchange for their promise of their returning to Afghanistan upon thecompletion of their education. The same policy is employed for Afghans who undergo
the MET’s training program to become teachers in Afghanistan. The UNHCR policy of“education for repatriation” as implemented by the MET has in effect stripped from-5 -

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both documented and undocumented Afghan children, their opportunity to accessprimary education.
However, even among documented children, certain restrictions were posed andhave become harsher. Documented children as well as temporary card holders required
travel permits if they attended government schools outside the area where their blue
cards were issued. From 1998/99, even permanent cardholders were barred from
attending schools in Qom and Tehran where the shortage of primary schools has been
severe even for Iranian children. Blue cardholders were allowed only inside the districts
where their cards were issued.
Clearly, the most seriously affected in terms of educational opportunity have been
undocumented Afghan children. Furthermore, it is easy to assume that there have been
more undocumented Afghans than documented.
The majority of Afghan children who came to Iran after 1996, as mentioned
earlier, are undocumented, and thus can not attend government schools. There has beena growing demand from Afghans and international NGOs that even undocumented
Afghans should be allowed to enroll in government schools. Yet, faced with the limited
capacity of schooling even for Iranians, Iran’s Ministry of Education has not expanded
the enrolment of primary schools to undocumented children, at least until August 2003.
Iran’s Ministry of Education’s decision to continue restrictions over undocumented
Afghan children reflects the Government’s general policy toward the Afghans.
A new approach, however, to support undocumented Afghan children was made in
2002. The Iranian government decided to allow undocumented children to receive free
primary education at schools run by the Literacy Movement Organization of Iran(LMO), a quasi-nongovernmental organization. Those who attend such schools are
officially recognized as equivalent to students who go through government schools.
According to my research conducted in the summer of 2002 and 2003, Iranian local
NGOs are active in schools run by the LMO.
There are some reasons for this. First, NGOs in Iran are in most cases not reallyNGOs, but rather closo to Governmental Organizations. This is because Iranian NGOs
have not been developed fully as independent organizations. In order for any NGO in
Iran to carry out activities, it is necessary for a NGO to officially register at the Interior
Ministry. Second, due to the first reason, only quasi-governmental organizations likethe LMO are permitted by the MET to support undocumented children. Therefore,
Iranian volunteers who are affiliated in one way or another with the LMO are major
activists in operating LMO classes.
The fact that Iranian NGOs are under the control of the Government means that
their activities are influenced by the Government’s policy on Afghan refugees andmigrants. Therefore, one should hold some degree of reservation about the extent towhich LMO can play a sustainable role in expanding the education opportunity for
undocumented Afghan children.
As a matter of fact, the Iranian government declared on May 24, 2003 that Iranwould scrap Afghan refugees’ permanent residence permits from September 23 2003.
According to this new policy of Iran, blue cardholders are supposed to submit their-6 -*OYI[YYOUT6GVKXLUX6KGIKH[ORJOTM9Z[JOKY4UA9VXOTMC

cards to the alien affairs office by this date, and those who are found to have difficulties
in returning to Afghanistan may be given temporary cards. If this guideline of BAFIA
is fully implemented, the Iranian government’s education policy toward Afghan children
will drastically change. Consequently, it is likely that even documented children will be
excluded from formal education. It goes without saying that the LMO’s literacy classes
may close for undocumented children, even though LMO originally started the “Basic
Education for All” program as an important facilitator of this scheme, which has been
generally propagated by UNICEF in its policy toward children of developing countries.
The issue then, is who can really facilitate the “Basic Education for All” program for
Afghan children?
There are Afghan community schools, where undocumented children are
studying. The UNHCR estimated about 40 Afghan schools in Tehran and the outskirtsof Tehran. These schools are called informal schools because they do not have theofficial permission of the MET to run. Thus, those who go through primary educationin such schools are unable not receive any certificate upon completion of education.
An agreement, however, was made between the Iranian government and theinterim government of Afghanistan to recognize the validity of Afghan community
schools when President Karzai visited Iran in September 2002. Consequently, those
who graduate from community primary schools are now considered graduates ofprimary education. The names of the students who attended and finished schools arenow submitted to Afghan Ambassador in Iran, who issues certificates to those students.
Thus, these students are able to continue on to secondary schools when they return to
Afghanistan without lapse.
One of the problems that Afghan community schools usually face is a lack offunding. They are usually run by the minimal fees paid by the parents of the students
and teachers are paid very low wages. Moreover, such schools are unable to afford asolid and permanent building of their own and thus are forced to rent a small space at amosque or conduct classes in tents.

)UTIR[YOUTThe above-mentioned examination demonstrates that the opportunities for Iran’sAfghan children to attend schools has, on the whole, expanded as documented children
started to be officially accepted and LMO classes for undocumented children have beenpromoted. This however is not foreseen to continue. On the contrary, it is likely that
Afghan children may find it more difficult to gain access to primary education in thenear future as the on-going repatriation program is further promoted.
The definition of refugee is highly problematic as explained earlier. The
determining of who to protect as a refugee is a task for either the hosting country as wellas the UNHCR. Therefore, the UNHCR and the Iranian government are faced with the-7 -*OYI[YYOUT6GVKXLUX6KGIKH[ORJOTM9Z[JOKY4UA9VXOTMC

difficult decision of the extent to which they should provide primary education for theAfghan residing in Iran.
The on-going unrest and the slow progress in establishing security in Afghanistan
appears to be causing a delay in the entire process of reconstruction. From theperspective of UNICEF’s emphasis on a children’s right to education and thus on “Basic
Education for All,” it is mandatory for Afghan children to receive primary education
regardless of the situation in which they are placed and whether they are documented or
undocumented. Thus, their right to education is justifiable even though they illegally
stay in Iran as long as they claim their difficulty going back home.
From the viewpoint of UNHCR and Iran however, who intend to promote therepatriation of Afghans, providing basic education to Afghan children would reduce
their parents’ incentive to return home. According to my interview with an officer at
UNHCR-Tehran, the UNHCR is likely to decide on a 40% reduction in the budget of
education for Afghans in Iran, and instead would reallocate the amount of such
reduction to Afghan children in Afghanistan as a part of its comprehensive
reconstruction programs.
On the other hand, the economic burden on Iran, if the Afghans are allowed tostay is in reality to great for Iran to bear continuously as Iran’s unemployment rate issaid to be getting increasing over the past number of years. Though it is true that
employing Afghans in some sectors of Iran’s industry helps Iran to keep the rate of
inflation in check, the Iranian government has been exposed to criticism of the Iranianpeople, who are against Iran’s hosting such a huge number of Afghans. Thus, Iran’s
government now is forced to pressure Afghans leave the country.
Here one should argue that an inevitable conflict exists between universally heldchildren’s rights to education in an exiled country and Iran’s solving their domestic
economic problems by kicking out Afghans. Moreover, as discussed earlier, thedefinitions of “refugee” and “migrant” involve a great deal of politics between a hosting
country like Iran and an international donor like the UNHCR. This makes it difficult for
both a hosting country and the UNHCR to formulate aid policies for refugees andmigrants.
Iran is now finds itself in an era in which it must formulate a “migration policy”
for Afghans not a “refugee policy.” As a mater of fact, negotiations are underway
between Iran and the ILO regarding the establishment of an ILO office in Iran to deal
with the employment of Afghan migrants. If this eventuates, the number of Afghan
workers who are to be officially employed and thus to be able to obtain working permits
is likely to increase. This will, in turn bring about the increase in the number of
documented Afghans whose children may have a better chance to access education.
However, a question still remains for the majority of Afghans who are present inreality but whose presence has not been officially recognized. The question is, “Whocan aid Afghan undocumented children?” It seems that international NGOs and otherpolitically neutral actors will remain limited players in this field until the degree ofAfghanistan reconstruction is such that Afghan exiles can return.

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Notes: This paper is written based mainly on my field research conducted inAugust 2002 and August 2003. I interviewed the Director of Bureau for Aliens andForeign Immigrants Affairs (under Interior Ministry), Iran’s Former Ambassador to
Afghanistan, the Director General of the Institute of Political and International Affairs(at the time), the Former Deputy Minister of Iran’s Ministry of Defense, andapproximately twenty Afghans living in Tehran, Kan and Sharahzad which are locatedin the suburbs of Tehran. The following references were also utilized.

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8KLKXKTIKY
1. Unied Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A Statistical Overview of the
UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Programme of Afghan Refugees from Iran: April
9th to August 7th 2002.
2. UNHCR. Iran Operational Update No.7-9 August, 2002.
3. Squire, Catherine. Education of Afghan Refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Report Commissioned by UNHCR, Tehran. December 2000.
4. Donimi, Antonio, Norah NIland & Karin Wermester. Nationa-Building Unraveled?:Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press Inc., 2004.
5. Education Programme Secretariat, Ministry of Education. Educational andVocational Training: Mid-Year Review. Kabul, September 2003.
6. Academy for Educational Development. Final Report: Education Situation Survey
and Head Teachers Training for the Urgent Rehabilitation Support Program in
Afghanistan. (prepared for PCJ/JICA). January 2003.

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