JAPAN MNE Insights
Volume 6, Issue 1

March 2020

Japan Academy of Multinational Enterpriseswww.mne-jp.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Special Essay:
Japan and JapaneseFirms: Historical andModern Lessons forInternational Businessand Economic
Development

2. Special Essay:
Dynamic Marketing
Capabilities for
Emerging Market
Development: Lessons
from JapaneseMultinationals.

Special Essay:
Japan and Japanese Firms: Historical and Modern
Lessons for International Business and Economic
Development
Rajneesh Narula
Professor of International Business Regulation,
John H. Dunning Chair in International Business, Henley Business School,
University of Reading, UK

Introduction
As a young graduate student newly arrived in the US in the 1980s, it washard, if not impossible, to avoid the US obsession with the phenomenon best
described as ‘rising Japan’. The media and the popular press churned out articles,
documentaries and even Hollywood films that narrated the rising wave of Japaneseacquisitions of major corporations, the occasionally unfair practices of Japanesefirms that explained their growing market share in manufacturing, the seeming
dependence on Japanese consumer goods on the imitation of US technologies (andan inability to be truly original), and the single-mindedness and discipline that were
hallmarks of Japanese culture. Airport bookshops were crowded with books on thesubject, divided into two groups. The first1 were those that admired Japan’s rapid
economic rise (particularly the rapid expansion of its multinational enterprises) andsought to distil management and organizational lessons for US firms to emulate(Just-in-time, the Toyota way, total quality control). The second2 highlighted theunfairness of Japan’s tactics, the danger of Japan as the next economic hegemon, itsclosed domestic markets, the prejudicial use of transfer pricing, the exclusion of
non-Japanese suppliers, the unfair HRM practices that favoured Japaneseemployees, exploited workers, and propagated a stronger gender bias. Not
surprisingly, US policymaking was equally focused on how the Japanese juggernaut
might best be tamed. Universities, firms, government and private think tanks, and1

The list is long – every intellectual worth their salt published at least one paper on Japan during the 1980s and 1990s. For
illustrative purposes, see e.g., Shingo, S., & Dillon, A. P. (1989), Buckley, P. J., & Mirza, H. (1985), Ouchi, W. G., & Cuchi,
W. G. (1981), Nonaka, I., & Johansson, J. K. (1985), Westney (1996).
2
A few examples: The Enigma of Japanese Power" (1989) by Karel van Wolferen, William S. Dietrich's "In the Shadow of the
Rising Sun" (1991), Daniel Burstein's "Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and Its Threat to America" (1988), Robert Zielinski
and Nigel Holloway's "Unequal Equities" (1991).

1Vol.6 Issue 1"A Japan obsession was
replaced by the mid-1990s
with a NICs
preoccupation, and later
by a BRICs craze, whichin the last decade, is now
primarily a China mania."

JAPAN MNE Insights
government agencies were all interested in sponsoring research that might shed
greater light on how the ‘Japanese Miracle’ happened, and what the future mightlook like if these trends continued.
Indeed, such was the enthusiasm in academia that I (like many of mycounterparts) sought to study Japanese MNEs for my PhD, only to be firmly
discouraged by my supervisor (John Dunning). Having also contributed to thistheme (e.g., Dunning 1986, Dunning & Cantwell, 1989), he assured me that thisNippon-mania would come to an end. In my stubbornness, we compromised –there is only a single chapter on Japan in my dissertation (Narula, 1996).
Dunning, was, of course, right. A Japan obsession was replaced by the mid-1990s
with a NICs preoccupation, and later by a BRICs craze, which in the last decade, is
now primarily a China mania.
This wholesale neglect of the study of Japan and Japanese business andmanagement practices during the last three decades is puzzling, because not only
does Japan and Japanese MNEs continue to matter (despite their absence from thenews, Japan is still one of the largest outward investors in the world. Nor are
Japanese firms in decline: in terms of patenting activity, Japanese firms are second
only to US firms). There is much to learn, not only from their contemporary
activity, but from their historical actions.
This short research note is motivated by two observations. First, that theparanoia fuelled by Trump’s China-US trade wars and the justifications for the needto curtail China’s rise seem peculiarly similar to the debates and discussions in the
1980s and 1990s about Japan. This might seem tediously obvious to scholars who
were studying Japan’s economy three decades ago, however, those studying China’s
economic transformation (even at some of China’s premier institutions) react withdisbelief and surprise when I explain the parallels with Japan. I see no reason todelve into a comparison between China and Japan here, not least because theirindividual periods of rapid economic growth happened in two very different epochs
and extremely disparate geo-political settings and domestic political circumstances.
What is interesting is the outcome of the period of rapid catch-up, as China goesbeyond low and medium tech industries towards greater innovation-intensive
activities, just as Japan did in the 1970s. Not coincidentally, this is the period when
Japanese economic actors started investing abroad systematically, developing
appropriate ownership advantages and sophisticated management practices. There
are lessons not just for China, but other emerging economies from the Japaneseexperience.
Second, there is a common (mistaken) belief amongst policymakers in lessdeveloped countries (and academics studying development) that one has to study
the success of Japan since 1945, Korea since 1960, or China since 1980, to discover
the policies and actions necessary to fast track economic catch-up. What thisapproach overlooks are that for all three countries in the periods in question, thesecountries had already achieved a threshold level of national absorptive capability,
typified by a well-functioning administrative system, a high level of literacy at the
primary, secondary and tertiary levels and other basic infrastructure (Criscuolo &2Vol.6 Issue 1

JAPAN MNE Insights

Narula, 2008). In addition, all three countries during the post WWII era had afairly well-functioning interaction between the state and private enterprise (theblueprint for which has arguably been the Meiji period). Most less developed
countries (and by this term I deliberately mean countries that are not emerging)
do not meet these threshold levels of absorptive capability necessary for rapid
growth. I feel that studying the Meiji restoration, the formation of a centralised
Japanese political entity, and its deliberate actions to overcome its economic
backwardness to be a much more useful avenue for study. In particular, I refer tothe period from 1868 to 1912, during which time Japan had successfully moved
away politically, technologically, socially, and economically from what wasarguably a pre-capitalist, feudal society3 (and by any definition severely underdeveloped) to a well-functioning capitalist and industrial economy.
This paper is necessarily brief: its purpose is to engage with the academic
community to highlight a number of research areas that would benefit from thecareful study of Japan and Japanese MNEs. This paper consists of two parts. In
the first section I review some key lessons for economic development from the
Meiji era. In the second part, I remind the modern reader of the immense
contribution that studies on Japanese business practices have made, not only tounderstanding the forces of development, but since the 1980s, to the conceptualand practical literature on management, international business, organizational
structure and governance.

" I feel that studying the
Meiji restoration, theformation of a centralised
Japanese political entity,
and its deliberate actions
to overcome its economic
backwardness to be amuch more useful avenue
for study."

Misunderstanding Japan’s Meiji era: Generic development lessons
It is a common misunderstanding that Japan’s meteoric rise dates fromthe end of World War II. Its rapid growth is more accurately dated from thereforms and policies initially implemented during the Meiji era (1868-1912).
This period was crucial in the building up of Japan’s location advantages, andthe rapidity of the reforms in this period underlined much of its subsequent
growth.
The foundation of its location advantages is well documented in reports
such as those produced by the Iwakura Mission, a high-level delegation of
influential actors from Japan that travelled throughout the major western
economies between 1871-1872, examining the causes and opportunities fordevelopment (Kunitake et al., 2009). Considerable effort was made to identify‘best practice’ in more advanced countries, and then introduce new formal andinformal institutions that were necessary to establish the key organizations, andto integrate them within society at large.
One of the clearest lessons from the Iwakura mission was the importanceof infrastructure as a basis for economic development (p.457): ‘The foundationof what the West regards as education…is imparting such knowledge as will
ensure that the people may all acquire wealth or make a living without difficulty,3

It is still a matter of debate whether Japan in the Tokugawa era could be described as pre-capitalist (e.g., Cohen 2015;
Crawcour, 1974).

3

Vol.6 Issue 1"It is a common
misunderstanding thatJapan’s meteoric rise dates
from the end of World War
II. Its rapid growth is moreaccurately dated from thereforms and policies
initially implemented
during the Meiji era (18681912)."

JAPAN MNE Insights
and that none is deficient in performing the duties required of a citizen.’ Thiswas clearly emphasised in the Meiji era’s policies. Government education policy
increased the stock of human capital and provided the basis for convergence withthe west. Japan introduced modern compulsory education in 1872, and alreadyby 1875, 54 percent of boys and 19 percent of girls of school age were attending
schools. By the turn of the century, it may well have been on par on most
European nations. Established in 1877, Tokyo Imperial University wasproducing 1,000 engineers every year by 1900 (Nicholas, 2011).
Infrastructure development also meant considerable investment not only
in roads, but also railways, shipping and subsequently in public transportation.
As the Iwakura mission noted,‘Another important factor which increases a nation’s productivity and helps it
become rich is transport. The ports and harbours of the West are filled with
forests of masts; the streets of the cities are thronged with elegant carriages.
Every one of these is a product of industry. The art of shipbuilding has developed
into one of the leading scientific disciplines; bridge-building has become aprincipal branch of architecture. The ever increasing number of travellers andgoods transported bring ever-greater profits.’
The Iwakura Mission seemed particularly taken by the state of European roads,
and the importance of railways:
Western cities spare no expense in paving and maintaining their roads. .... A
single horse can exert enough force to pull up to thirty tons. This may seem
astonishing and incredible, but it is really quite simple. Wheels are very wellmade and roads are well surfaced. A load of one ton can be carried by twenty
people or seven pack-horses. However, if it is hauled on well-made wheels, one
healthy horse will be sufficient. If it is moved on rails, only eight pounds ofpulling power is necessary.
Indeed, among the key industries targeted in its development plans wererailroads and shipbuilding. From 1872 and 1907 the domestic rail network
expanded from 29 to 7,152 kilometres and the number of locomotives from 10 to
1,924 (Tang, 2014). Shipbuilding was considered to be key for an island nationsuch as Japan, not only because of its benefits for increased commerce bothwithin Japan and for trade, but also for defence. However, unlike Britain, where
the industry depended upon other important developments in related industries,
from steel to engines and instruments, Japan developed without them (Fukasaku,2005). This made rapid growth in shipbuilding difficult in the absence of strong
players in these complementary and supportive industries, and during the firsthalf of the Meiji era, Japan depended greatly on imports. During the second partof the Meiji period, large firms such as Mitsubishi were encouraged to become4Vol.6 Issue 1

JAPAN MNE Insights

conglomerates, expanding and branching out from shipbuilding to internal
combustion engines, steel and so on. Nonetheless, a more pragmatic approach of
relying on ‘best practice’ through technology imports (Fukasaku, 1995). These
technologies were often adapted and improved to fit Japanese conditions, apractice that continued to shape the competitiveness of Japanese firms throughmuch of the 20th century (Westney, 1986).
A key realisation was the importance of technology and innovation.
Indeed, as the authors of the Iwakura mission noted,‘Industry advances as a result of both improved technical skills and new
inventions. Technical skills, on the one hand, are acquired in the process ofmaking profit. Inventions, on the other hand, are the foundation on which themaking of profit rests. Consequently, some method is required to ensure thatinventors are able to gain financially from their inventions as a reward for theirinvestment of money and labour, and thus there will be no decline in the spirit ofenterprise. This is why, in the West, exclusive sales licences are granted, which
are called ‘patents’. The people to whom such licences are awarded are classed
as inventors, discoverers or improvers.’
The Meiji reforms were by no means painless (Crawcour, 1989). The
state had to dispossess a number of economic actors and establish new ones inorder to achieve a sound fiscal base sufficient not only for the purposes of new
investment in infrastructure education and so forth, but also to maintain andaddress the needs of important interests groups. Given the greater competition
from growing imports, there were also limits on its extant tax base, and therefore
the resources to invest in building infrastructure that was largely absent at the
beginning of the reform period. Thus, reforming institutions required creating a
new tax base, land reforms, creating a convertible and common currency, asound banking infrastructure, and financial instruments that allowed the state toborrow money. In addition to implementing a number of constitutional changes,
it also provided the legal basis for a modern firm sector (Crawcour, 1989).
During much of the Meiji era, government investment in infrastructure was atleast as great a contribution to economic development as was direct government
participation in industry. Indeed, it was during the Meiji era that the basis of awell-functioning interaction between the state and private enterprise developed,
and was the inspiration for the system utilised by Korea, Taiwan, Singapore andChina, to mention just a few, 50 years later.

"The Meiji reforms were by
no means painless(Crawcour, 1989)."

The government initially engaged directly in industry, but these stateowned enterprises were poorly run and unsuccessful (Kobayashi, 1986). These
were later sold to private entrepreneurs, implementing laws and policies topromote modernization and encourage these private firms to thrive, which
formed the basis of the Zaibatsu (Hirschmeier, 1970). Although FDI in the5Vol.6 Issue 1

JAPAN MNE Insights
modern sense was a fairly small phenomenon, Japanese enterprises relied largely
on arms-length technology transfers, even though this was not a consistently
implemented policy over time. From 1868 to 1892, the central government spent
1.5 percent of its expenditures for foreign employees, also sending thousands
abroad for training and education (Nafziger, 1985). The various ministries andthe private sector employed many tens of thousands of expatriates as teachers,
advisors and technical experts (Inukai, 1981).
While one of the other primary objectives of the Meiji Restoration was torestore Japan’s economic independence, the policy of industrialisation requiredconsiderable ‘cooperation’ with foreign firms. While realising that they needed
foreign technology, the government moved to restrict the entry of foreign firms
into manufacturing, after an initial period of openness (Paprzycki & Fukao,2008). The hope was to be able to reverse-engineer imported technologies, but
this turned out not to be easy as hoped. By 1899 Japan systematically opened up
to foreign direct investors. One of the first was Western Electric which
established the Nippon Electric Company (NEC) in 1899 (Jones, 2005). Japan
had the attraction of being a large market with high entry barriers to imports, andthis encouraged MNEs a certain degree of investment and technology transfer.
As Jones (2005) notes, US firms were especially keen, as, unlike the French andthe British (as with other European colonial powers) they did not have thebenefit of captive markets in the form of colonies.
This building up of the necessary organisations, both in the public andprivate sector, and the establishment (in part through trial and error) of theinstitutions by which these establishments interacted to achieve industrial andeconomic upgrading is, arguably, the greatest achievement of this era. Indeed,almost all subsequent developments and industrial strategies followed theblueprint established during this period.
My discussion here on the Meiji period is not intended to be exhaustive. I
simply wish to underline that much is misunderstood of the meteoric rise ofJapan from a peripheral economy to an economically powerful, developed
country. From a policy perspective, there is much to enlighten development
economists and International Business scholars alike. This need not be limited toless developed countries. Despite the stereotype that Japan’s economy has beenstagnant since the 1990s, there has been considerable evolution in the
management and structure of Japanese firms and their innovation systems. Suchdevelopments represent a useful preview of challenges ahead for the moreadvanced emerging economies such as China and India as well as the newadvanced economies, such as Korea.
International business theory and Japan studies: searching for new insights.
My brief discussion in the previous section points to an important andunderdeveloped link to development and innovation policy. There are four key

6Vol.6 Issue 1

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lessons that can be drawn from the Meiji period for policy makers in developing
countries.
First, it is a reasonable to argue that the impetus or trigger from the Meiji
era represented a major discontinuity or ‘exogenous shock’ that led to a systemic
and widespread reforms. Society gets ‘locked-in’ to suboptimal routines, but due
to institutional and systemic inertia, actors fail to adapt to the new circumstances
unless an exogenous shock forces radical change (Narula, 2003). Nonetheless,even where other societies have experienced such a strong discontinuity (often in
the form of a revolution), society returns to its previous equilibrium, even if it isconsidered sup-optimal, because systems of actors and the institutions that bindthem together are resilient. Indeed, this has been observed in the case of theformer centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe (for a discussion see
Narula & Jormaneinen, 2008). Nonetheless, despite considerable political andsocio-economic conflicts and challenges, Japan was able to establish a newsocio-economic and political system which functioned coherently.
Second, the establishment (admittedly through trial and error) of a publicprivate partnership between state actors and private enterprise was key. Third,
the necessity to innovate, and to do this within the rubric of a public-private lens,achieving rent-seeking for private firms while achieving larger, national targets
and priorities lies at the heart of Japan’s success. Indeed, the first careful study ofthis ‘systems of innovation’ phenomenon was published by Chris Freeman(1987) building on the case study of Japan.
The systems of innovation literature has been hugely influential over thelast four decades, modified and refined to the specific case of less developed
countries in the ‘systems of learning’ approach (e.g., Narula, 2003; Lall &Pietrobelli, 2005; Criscuolo & Narula, 2008; Niosi, 2008; Pietrobelli &Rabelloti, 2011; Pietrobelli & Staritz, 2018). This discussion has considerable
traction for policy, at the city, regional, national, and global level.
Fourth, the nature of these private-public interactions, and the modes ofgovernance that belie traditional western practices that favour equity andownership have become a prominent phenomenon, not only in developing
countries, but elsewhere as well, in the industrialised world. The understandingof how networks functioned also came out of post-WWII era Japan.
Considerable energy has been invested in understanding the complex inter andintra-firm networks that made up the Keiretsu (although to appreciate thekeiretsu, one had to understand the Zaibatsu as their precursors), and how firms
collaborated while also competing (Dyer, 1997; Teece, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993).
The idea of varieties of capitalism, and that there were multiple ways for acapitalist economy to function was no doubt inspired in part from these studies(Whitley, 1999; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Adler, 2001). All this has contributed toan ongoing lively debate on control versus ownership by MNEs, and the benefitsof internalisation, governance of modes, and the role of non-equity agreements(Narula, et al., 2019). The literature on alliances and quasi-internalisation has,

"There are four key lessons
that can be drawn from the
Meiji period for policy
makers in developing
countries."

7Vol.6 Issue 1

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since the 1990s, moved away from a Japan focus, but what is particularly worthy ofnote is that the principles of inter-firm collaboration, open innovation, theimportance of innovation systems and the learning economy (Freeman, 1987;
Lundvall & Johnson, 1994), all draw greatly from these early studies of Japanese
corporations and their behaviour.
It is a matter of record that the post WWII studies of japan have received
considerably more attention in addressing management challenges (Ahmadjian &Shaede, 2015). Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the study of Japanesebusiness and its MNEs has contributed immensely to the original pioneers ininternational business. ‘Alliance capitalism’ a term popularised in the 1990s by
Gerlach (1992) can arguably be said to have pointed the direction for others toconsider that hierarchical, full ownership and control were not always the mostobvious choices (Dunning, 1995).
I certainly think that the growth of Japanese MNEs in the US and Europe led
to a realisation, perhaps for the first time explicitly, that MNEs need not depend
upon O advantages that consisted of ‘hardware’, in the sense of technology assets’,
or what we now refer to as asset-type ownership advantages or FSAs (Dunning,1993). That a firm might be competitive even it possessed similar or even inferior
technologies, where they were able to complement such weaknesses by superior
intra-firm and intra-MNE organisational skills. That is, the importance of being anefficient MNE went beyond having the latest technologies, but being able toorganise the use of these assets efficiently mattered, and most importantly,
coordinating both internal and external embeddedness effectively – what we
nowadays refer to as transaction and combinational FSAs (Narula & Verbeke,2015).
The nature of the keiretsu has changed over the last few decades, althoughsome aspects of their operations and their governance are resilient. What might thereorganization of Japanese economic activity portend for firms and countries that
imitated Japanese MNEs? Many countries (notably, the Asian NICs, and to an
extent, China) have imitated the public-private partnership in innovation andindustrial policy, and it is also no accident that these countries were (and in somecases, still are) intricately integrated into the supply chains of Japanese firms. I
believe that in many ways, the study of Japan and Japanese business provides
important clues to the future organization of international business, both within andbetween countries, and provide a glimpse of the future.

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REFERENCES
Adler, P. S. (2001). “Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge economy and the future of capitalism.”
Organization science, 12(2), 215-234.
Ahmadjian, C.L., & Shaede, U. (2015). The impact of Japan on Western management. In N. Holden, S.
Michailova, & S. Tietze, (eds), The Routledge companion to cross-cultural management. Routledge.
Buckley, P. J., & Mirza, H. (1985). “The wit and wisdom of Japanese management: an iconoclastic
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Cohen, M. (2015). “Historical Sociology’s Puzzle of the Missing Transitions: A Case Study of Early
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Crawcour, S. (1974). “The Tokugawa period and Japan's preparation for modern economic growth.” Journalof Japanese Studies, 1(1), 113-125.
Crawcour, S. (1989). Economic change in the nineteenth century, in Jansen, M. B., The Cambridge Historyof Japan. The Nineteenth Century Volume 5, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 569-617.
Criscuolo, P., & Narula, R. (2008). “A novel approach to national technological accumulation andabsorptive capacity: aggregating Cohen and Levinthal.” The European Journal of Development
Research, 20(1), 56-73.
Dunning, J. (1986). Japanese participation in British industry. Routledge.
Dunning, J. H. (1993) Multinational Enterprises and The Global Economy, Addison Wesley
Dunning, J. H. (1995). “Reappraising the Eclectic Paradigm in an Age of Alliance Capitalism.” Journal ofInternational Business Studies, 26(3), 461-491.
Dunning, J. H., & Cantwell, J. A. (1989). “Japanese manufacturing direct investment in the EEC, post 1992:
Some alternative scenarios.” University of Reading Discussion Paper in International Investment andBusiness Studies, No.132, September.
Dyer, J. H. (1997). “Effective interim collaboration: how firms minimize transaction costs and maximisetransaction value.” Strategic management journal, 18(7), 535-556.
Freeman, C. (1987). Technology, policy, and economic performance: lessons from Japan. Pinter Pub Ltd.
Fukasaku, Y. (1995). “Foreign influence in the development of shipbuilding technology and the education ofengineers in Japan, 1855–1940.” History and Technology, 12(2), 119-127.
Fukasaku, Y. (2005). Technology and Industrial Growth in Pre-War Japan: The Mitsubishi-Nagasaki
Shipyard 1884-1934. Routledge.
Gerlach, M. L. (1992). Alliance capitalism: The social organization of Japanese business. University ofCalifornia Press.
Hagedoorn, J. (1993). “Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: Interorganizationalmodes of cooperation and sectoral differences.” Strategic management journal, 14(5), 371-385.
Hall P.A., & Soskice D.W. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparativeadvantage. Oxford University Press.
Hirschmeier, J. (1970). “The Japanese spirit of enterprise, 1867–1970.” Business History Review, 44(1), 1338.
Inukai, C. (1981) “Experience in Transfer of Technology from the West: Lessons from False Starts.” In H.
Nagamine, (ed.) Nation-building and Regional Development: The Japanese Experience. Hong Kong:
Maruzen Asia.
Jones, G. (2005). Multinationals and global capitalism: From the nineteenth to the twenty first century.
Oxford University Press.
Kobayashi, M. (1986). Japan's early industrialization and the transfer of government enterprises:

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government and business. Japanese Yearbook on Business History, 2, 54-80.
Kunitake, K., Tsuzuki, C., & Young, R. J. (2009). Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA andEurope. Cambridge University Press.
Lall, S., & Pietrobelli, C. (2005). “National technology systems in sub-Saharan Africa.” International
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Lundvall, B. Ä., & Johnson, B. (1994). “The learning economy”. Journal of industry studies, 1(2), 23-42.
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Narula, R. (1996). Multinational investment and economic structure: Globalisation and competitiveness.
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Narula, R. (2003). Globalization and technology: Interdependence, innovation systems and industrial policy.
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Narula, R., Asmussen, C. G., Chi, T., & Kundu, S. K. (2019). “Applying and advancing internalization
theory: The multinational enterprise in the twenty-first century.” Journal of International BusinessStudies, 50, 1231-1252.
Narula, R., & Jormanainen, I. (2008). “When a good science base is not enough to create competitive
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Nicholas, T. (2011). “The origins of Japanese technological modernization. Explorations in Economic
History”, 48(2), 272-291.
Nonaka, I., & Johansson, J. K. (1985). “Japanese management: what about the “hard” skills?.” Academy ofManagement Review, 10(2), 181-191.
Ouchi, W. G., & Cuchi, W. G. (1981). Theory Z: How American business can meet the Japanese challenge(Vol. 13). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Paprzycki, R., & Fukao, K. (2008). Foreign direct investment in Japan: multinationals' role in growth andglobalization. Cambridge University Press.
Pietrobelli, C., & Rabellotti, R. (2011). “Global value chains meet innovation systems: are there learning
opportunities for developing countries?.” World development, 39(7), 1261-1269.
Pietrobelli, C., & Staritz, C. (2018). “Upgrading, interactive learning, and innovation systems in value chaininterventions.” The European Journal of Development Research, 30(3), 557-574.
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Oxford.

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Special Essay:
Dynamic Marketing Capabilities for
Emerging Market Development: Lessons
from Japanese Multinationals
Tetsuya Usui, Ph.D.
President, Japan Academy of Multinational Enterprises
Professor of International Business and Marketing
College of Law, Nihon University, JAPAN

Problems We Have Faced and Problems We Have Yet to Face
Developing and sustaining competitive positions in international markets
have been the primary strategic focus of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs
need to pursue economies of scale by transferring and exploiting home-based(available) resources and standardizing marketing strategies (such as the marketingmix). They likewise need to respond to each local market condition bysimultaneously adapting their strategies. However, MNCs from developed nations
may face more difficulties in utilizing their home-based, firm-specific advantages(FSAs) for value creation when they enter emerging markets, as a wider
institutional gap exists in these cases (Peng, et al., 2008). We realize that emerging
markets have gained and will continue to gain increasing attention in the world
economy, simply because these markets have been garnering a higher portion ofworldwide GDP based on their higher economic growth. The major MNCs fromdeveloped nations such as Japan, the United States, and Western Europe have been
struggling with establishing and maintaining competitive advantages in emerging
markets (i.e., China in the 1990s, Southeast Asia in the 2000s, and Africa in the2010s). This is expected to continue being the most critical global marketing issue
unless our globe turns entirely flat. In this special essay, as an international
marketing scholar, I will share with you some significant lessons drawn fromJapanese MNCs that demonstrate how they are able to surmount these difficulties inemerging market developments by utilizing their home-based resource bundle. Of
course, these strategies did not succeed right away.
Source of Competitive Advantage of MNCs from Developed Nations
Rugman & Verbeke (2003) identified a problem with the internalization
theory from the perspective of strategic management (Narula & Verbeke, 2015).
This problem pertains to the assumption that an MNC’s core FSAs normallyoriginate from the parent company in the home country market and that these FSAs
are usually location-bound. To modify this assumption, they proposed classifying
FSAs into two types: non-location-bound FSAs (NLB-FSAs) and location-bound
FSAs (LB-FSAs). Although NLB-FSAs are the primary transfers to local markets"In this special essay, as aninternational marketing
scholar, I will share withyou some significant
lessons drawn fromJapanese MNCs that
demonstrate how they areable to surmount these
difficulties in emerging
market developments by
utilizing their home-based
resource bundle. "11

Vol.6 Issue 1"The creation of much of
the value in a local market
largely relies on an MNC’s
ability to successfully
deploy its existing homebased FSAs to the specificcircumstances of emerging
markets."

JAPAN MNE Insights
because of their comparative advantages over local competitors, the value oftransferred FSAs may be very limited. Therefore, after initial market entry using
NLB-FSA transfers, an MNC may invest in developing LB-FSAs in foreign
markets, leading to local responsiveness and complementing the transferred
NLB-FSAs.
Despite the benefits of LB-FSA development, MNCs have significant
incentives to share knowledge and resource bases (home-based FSAs) between
home and subsidiaries to minimize communication costs and achieve economies
of scope. In transaction cost economics, there exists an assumption incommunication cost minimization within MNCs that can play a substantial rolein FSA selection, transfer, and utilization management. The creation of much of
the value in a local market largely relies on an MNC’s ability to successfully
deploy its existing home-based FSAs to the specific circumstances of emerging
markets. While FSAs may still be the functional key in creating value for local
customers, few studies have investigated the dynamic process of sensing andselecting home-based FSAs for creating value and building further
competitiveness in evolving emerging market development.
Dynamic Marketing Capabilities for Home-based FSA Selection
Dynamic marketing capabilities (e.g. market-sensing, planning, andimplementation capabilities) characterize the strategic marketing process oforganizations, which involves reconfiguring resources and enhancing current
marketing capabilities (Morgan, et al., 2018). Dynamic (or higher-level)
marketing capabilities focus on learning from and adapting to market conditions
in order to gain better fitness of firms’ resource bundles in relation to changing
markets. Marketing capabilities are defined as a firm’s ability to use available
resources to perform marketing tasks to achieve desired outcomes (Morgan, etal., 2018). These are a vital mix of skills and knowledge, embedded in theorganizational process, and largely contribute to developing and implementing
strategies throughout the marketing process. In changing international
marketplaces (e.g. emerging markets), sources of firms’ competitive advantages
are likely to be found in different places at different times; therefore, firms withresource bundles will never be able to identify the ultimate source of theircompetitive advantage because of the infinite regression problem. Hence, it
could be a challenge for MNCs from developed nations to accurately determine
and predict the main source(s) of their competitive advantage at very different
locations in evolving emerging markets. The issue here is whether we canconfirm the extended value that home-based resources actually generate before
or soon after their transfer and the actual practices in emerging markets. The
only effective way to counter such uncertainties in international markets may bethrough experimenting with new approaches or learning through institutional
entrepreneurship (Cantwell, et al., 2010: 571).
While much attention has been given to studies on marketing capabilities,

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more studies are needed to comprehend the dynamics of international marketing(Morgan, et al., 2018). In more globally mature firms, the focus is more on
maintaining the benefits of global scale or establishing repeatable processes
across international markets. The redeployment or transfer of home-based FSAs,
therefore, should be a critical issue in the strategic planning of MNCs. There is ahigh demand, both in the academia and in actual business practice, for the
exploration of the dynamic process of how MNCs—in the relationship between
headquarters and subsidiaries—sense and select the value-achieving, homebased resource bundle to obtain the desired performance in emerging markets.
Summarizing our arguments, the issue facing MNCs is whether initiallyselected FSAs are effective in creating value for local customers in terms of costs
as well as maintaining their competitive advantage. When home-based FSA
leveraging is successful, MNCs seem to create value, minimize costs, andsimultaneously avoid uncertainty in building a competitive advantage inemerging markets. The questions to be asked here are the following: How do
MNCs sense, recognize, and select the customer value-achievable FSAs at theinitial market-entry stage? What types of dynamic processes are involved in
deploying marketing capabilities that enable an MNC to achieve successful
home-based FSA selection and value creation in emerging markets? To answer
these questions, successful FSA selection practices must be examined.

"Summarizing ourarguments, the issue
facing MNCs is whether
initially selected FSAs are
effective in creating value
for local customers interms of costs as well as
maintaining theircompetitive advantage."

Practices of Japanese MNCs: Shiseido and Uniqlo
We conducted a comparative case study on the dynamic marketing
capabilities in FSA selection of several Japanese MNCs. In this essay, we
analyze two examples in the consumer business, Shiseido and Uniqlo, as they
entered the Chinese market. Shiseido is Japan’s largest cosmetics company,
ranked fourth in global sales volume in 2019. Shiseido entered the Chinese
market in 1981 as one of the pioneers among Western cosmetic multinationals;
however, they have been struggling to achieve the top market position in recent
years, especially since 1994 when they established concrete business bases in
China. Uniqlo, founded in 1984, is a casual apparel brand operated by Fast
Retailing Co., Ltd. Uniqlo; it initially operated retail stores, but has transformed
its business operation into an SPA (specialty store private label apparel), sellingits manufactured label in its own stores. The company has been rapidly
expanding its international business since 2007. In 2018, both its number ofstores and annual sales volume in international operations exceeded the domestic
business, with 1,407 international stores compared to 827 domestic stores, and¥89.6 billion of annual international sales against ¥86.7 billion in annual
domestic sales. It is one of the fastest growing Japanese companies in the past 20
years.
Our case studies revealed two main findings on the dynamic marketing
capabilities of MNCs. The first finding refers to the organizational mechanism of
a two-stage selection process of value-achievable, home-based FSAs along with

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Vol.6 Issue 1"Our data highlight that
FSA selections weredirected at value
prediction in the initialstage and then were
gradually shifted to actual
value creation insubsequent stages. "JAPAN MNE Insights
Chinese market entry. Our data highlight that FSA selections were directed atvalue prediction in the initial stage and then were gradually shifted to actual
value creation in subsequent stages. This indicates that MNCs tend to avoid theimmediate creation of new location-bound FSAs in host markets to minimize
communication costs between headquarters and subsidiaries. In Shiseido’s
Chinese market entry and expansion, the firm initially transferred its home-based
resources relative to channel-based product brand development capability
through department store channel expansion. This was the home-based resourcethat Shiseido had accumulated over a long period in Japan by launching new
product brands for different target customer groups and for different sales
outlets. In Japan, Shiseido had historically developed its business by targeting awider range of customers, from luxury brands sold at department stores toaffordable products for teenagers at convenience and drug stores. Whenestablishing its business operations in China, the company launched theoriginally developed “Aupres” brand in 1994, which targeted upper-middle classChinese women. This original product was based on a Japanese formulation
technology involving basic safety tests on its ingredients. It was initially soldonly in luxury department stores in major cities, and subsequently distributed
throughout the country. Following the success of “Aupres” and the quick
expansion of its department store network, in 2006, the locally produced “Urara”
brand was launched for the cosmetic-store market (known as voluntary chain
stores). Within the next three years, the network grew rapidly to 2,400
independent outlets. In the early 1990s, the concept of customer service was notwell understood in China, including by the Chinese beauty consultants (BCs)managing the sales counters in luxury department stores. A sense of hospitality
and the desire to serve customers are crucial qualities for Shiseido’s BCs. The
effective training of Chinese BCs on these customer service skills, played an
important role in Aupres’ success. The newly acquired skills would enable BCs
to communicate with and entice first-time customers who did not have previous
exposure to luxury cosmetics.
Shiseido was able to re-utilize the transferred home-based FSAs—in thiscase, the improved customer care skills of its beauty consultants (BCs)—alongwith additional investments in the development of new distribution channels for
China’s middle-class market. In the early stages, Shiseido selected its homebased FSAs through value output prediction for its department store network,
taking into consideration the expansion of the middle class market and also theeffort invested in training BCs. These investments enhanced the initiallytransferred FSAs (BCs’ service skills), giving Shiseido the ability to createcustomer value.
In Shiseido’s case, we ascertain that a series of home-based resource
transfers involved value prediction and cost minimization in the early entry
stage. Although the effect of home-based FSAs on value creation was uncertain,
Shiseido successfully managed to select and transfer its excellent product brand14

Vol.6 Issue 1

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development and BCs’ service capabilities from its headquarter to its China
operations through a two-stage practice. It is important to note that Shiseido did
not confirm the achievable value of its initially selected resources, they identified
that great value was generated in the Chinese market only after learning to adapt
to the competition through the expansion of department store channels.
In Uniqlo’s initial entry stage, they were struggling to provide superiorvalue to local customers by leveraging home-based resources. The company
realized that its strategy of offering high-quality products at the lowest market
price, based on capabilities accumulated in the domestic market, was noteffective for creating value in relation to customers in China. Subsequently, thecompany came to realize that Uniqlo’s brand needed a new position in emerging
markets. Therefore, in the second stage, Uniqlo decided to maintain its brandposition with a focus on its in-store service capability and product quality
characteristics. It determined that the brand should not be positioned as lowpriced with affordable product quality; instead, it shifted direction to position
itself as a high-quality brand in China and other emerging markets in Southeast
Asia. Uniqlo focused on sophisticated in-store displays and customer service andenhanced its brand recognition. It is important to note that Uniqlo could not fully
predict which home-based resources might contribute to value creation in the
Chinese market.
Resource repositioning as dynamic marketing capabilities
The second finding is related to pursuing conditions in which homebased resources translate into value-achieving FSAs (NLB-FSA). NLB-FSAs
can explain the comparative advantage condition in which differences in
economic productivity make it desirable for firms to specialize in products andservices that reflect their superior capabilities (Rugman, 1981; Kogut andZander, 1993). On the one hand, the question we should explore is why does acertain home-based resource become a value-achieving FSA in the host market?
On the other hand, why is it not possible to utilize other home-based resources as
FSAs?
Our case studies show that there are dynamic competitive market effects
on resource reconfiguration in emerging market developments. It clarifies which
conditions enable home-based resources to become NLB-FSAs in host markets
and the marketing capabilities that MNCs must possess for successfully
implementing home-based FSA selection and transfer for rapid local market
development. We identified some of the essential conditions for transforming
home-based resources into NLB-FSAs. Figure 1 illustrates the market positionsof home-based resources in different locations. For instance, in the case of
Uniqlo, in-store service capability in the Japanese market was recognized as
medium in customer perceived preferences but not rare because the in-store
service quality that Uniqlo developed just reached the average level and was
unable to contribute largely to its differentiation. However, in China, in-store"Our case studies show that
there are dynamic
competitive market effects
on resource reconfigurationin emerging market
developments."

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Vol.6 Issue 1"In Figure 1, we depict a“resource repositioning
framework” to illustrate theprocess through which themarket position of resources
developed in the home country
market transform theirpositions in host markets."

JAPAN MNE Insights
service capabilities are seen as both high in customer perceived preferences andrare in the markets. We observed that customer preference for Uniqlo’s in-store
service capabilities were even higher in China than in Japan at the entry stage.
This is because the high standard of customer service quality commonly found inJapan is hard to find or replicate in emerging markets. After its early struggle,
Uniqlo realized its in-store service capabilities could be value-achievable NLBFSAs that can be selected and immediately transferred to its host markets.
Figure 1.

On the other hand, Uniqlo’s market position with regard to priceleadership, that functioned as the firm’s most critical source of competitive
advantage in the domestic market, was not utilized in China at the initial entry
stage. This is because many of its competitors in China offered even lower prices
with affordable quality products. In addition, a price leadership strategy does notalways help achieve the company’s goal of establishing itself as a premium
brand in international markets. For instance, in China, Uniqlo’s products are
priced higher than many local products; therefore, Uniqlo is seen as a premium
brand by upper-middle class consumers. Thus, price leadership is neither
perceived as preferred by customers nor as a rare resource in the foreign markets,
especially in Asian countries. Therefore, Uniqlo’s price leadership was not
utilized as an NLB-FSA.
In Shiseido’s case, we likewise observed that resources and bundles ofresources are tailored to specific market conditions, including customer
perceived preferences and competitor skills. Moreover, we observed that homebased resources were repositioned differently in China in terms of customer
perceived preferences and rarity. We found that both a channel-based product16

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brand development capability and a BC’s service capability at sales counters havebeen re-positioned as higher in rarity in the Chinese market than in Japan.
Especially for middle-mass market development, customer service capability wascritical in building Shiseido’s brand image. Advanced formulation technologies
such as anti-aging and skin renewal, were not appealing to the Chinese market atthe initial entry stage despite the company’s well established and advanced R&D
capabilities as a domestic market leader in skincare products.
In the home-based FSA selection process, only those resources that haveboth high customer perceived preference and rarity in the market can be chosen as
NLB-FSAs in creating and delivering exceptional value to local customers.
Customer perceived preference is defined as the prospective customer’s evaluationof all the benefits and costs of an offering (Zubac, et al. 2010). The preference for afirm’s resources is assessed and perceived by customers in the market, and firms
assess the customer preference level of its resources in comparison to those of otherinternal resources. The rarity of resources is determined by the availability ofsimilar resources in the market; changes in market conditions (e.g. number and sizeof competitors or supply sources) affect rarity. Therefore, a resource’s ability tocontribute to firm performance depends on a number of contextual factors,
including whether or not such resources enable a firm to tailor its offerings for the
specific market (Barney, 1991; Zubac, et al., 2010). Strategic management literaturepoints out that environmental conditions assist in isolating the resource attributes
that exploit opportunities and/or neutralize threats, and thus, specify which
resources enable firms to gain a competitive advantage in the market (Barney, 1991;
Day, 2011).
In Figure 1, we depict a “resource repositioning framework” to illustrate theprocess through which the market position of resources developed in the homecountry market transform their positions in host markets. A bundle of home-based
resources has been developed over time to suit a company’s unique domestic
market environment and competition. It has been functioning as a key successfactor for achieving and delivering a desired value to customers in the domestic
market. In emerging market development, the bundle of resources should first be
unbundled in terms of market position as well as customer preference and rarity.
Thereafter, a successful MNC can utilize its home-based resources to find a newmarket position for each home-based resource in the host market using two
evaluation factors: "degree of customer perceived preference" and "degree ofrarity." A resource that is positioned in a right-upper quadrant in the resource
repositioning framework can be defined as an NLB-FSA that is high in bothcustomer perceived preference and rarity in the host market. An MNC that is able todetermine which home-based resource can be repositioned in a right-upper quadrant
as an NLB-FSA has a better chance of successfully gaining a competitive advantage
in emerging market.

"Our findings clearly showthat an international marketer
needs to fully exploit arepositioning framework as ananalytical lens for emerging
market strategy planning andimplementation to create acompetitive advantage over
local competitors"

Lessons from Japanese MNCs
In this special essay, the contents of dynamic marketing capabilities of17

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MNCs are identified through process analysis of two success cases of Japanese MNCs entering Chinese
market. That is, they are a two-stage FSA selection process and a resource repositioning framework.
Previous studies in international business suggest that the re-combination of the home-based NLB-FSAs andthe newly developed LB-FSAs in the local market is effective for gaining a competitive advantage in thelocal market. From a long-term perspective, a newly developed LB-FSA will contribute significantly toensuring competitive advantage. However, our case studies show that in the initial stages of entry, priority isgiven to the utilization of home-based resources; the mechanism for exposing critical home-based resourcesthat create a competitive advantage in the local market should be examined. Our findings clearly show thatan international marketer needs to fully exploit a repositioning framework as an analytical lens for emerging
market strategy planning and implementation to create a competitive advantage over local competitors. A
resource repositioning framework helps international marketing managers in deploying critical, dynamic
marketing capabilities of MNCs for effective and efficient emerging market developments.

REFERENCES
Barney, J. B. (1991). “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage.” Journal of Management,
17(1), 99-120.
Cantwell, J., Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. (2010). “An evolutionary approach to understanding
international business activity: The co-evolution of MNCs and the institutional environment.” Journalof International Business Studies. 41(4), 567–586.
Day, G. S. (2011). “Closing the Marketing Capabilities Gap.” Journal of Marketing. 75 (July), 183–195.
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1993). “Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the multinational
corporation.” Journal of International Business Studies, 24(3), 625-645.
Morgan, N. A., Feng, H., & Whitler, K. A. (2018). “Marketing Capabilities in International Marketing.”
Journal of International Marketing. 26(1), 61-95.
Narula, R. & Verbeke, A. (2015). “Perspective: Making internalization theory good for practice: The essenceof Alan Rugman’s contributions to international business.” Journal of World Business. 50, 612–622.
Peng, M. W., Wang, D.Y., & Jiang, Y. (2008). “An institutional-based view of international businessstrategy: A focus on emerging economies.” Journal of International Business Studies, 39(5), 920-936.
Rugman, A., & Verbeke, A. (2003). “Extending the theory if the multinational enterprise: internalization andstrategic management perspective.” Journal of International Business Studies, 34(2), 125-137.
Teece, D. J. (2014). “A dynamic capabilities-based entrepreneurial theory of the multinational enterprise.”
Journal of International Business Studies. 45, 8–37
Zubac, A., Hubbard, G. & Johnson, L. W. (2010). “The RBV and value creation: a managerial perspective.”
European Business Review, 22(5), 515-532.

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Japan Academy of Multinational Enterprises
2020-2022 Executive Board
President
Tetsuya Usui (Nihon University)
Vice President
Yoshinori Yasuda (Soka University)
Masayuki Furusawa (Kindai University)
General Affairs
Hiroshi Hoshino (Kyusyu University)
Takeshi Ohtowa (Kanto Gakuin University)
General Planning and Publications Commitee
Yasuro Uchida (University of Hyogo)
Hajime Baba (Kansai University)
Syohei Tabata (Kindai University)
Tamiko Kasahara (University of Shizuoka)
Takeshi Fujisawa (Kwansei Gakuin University)
Best Book and Paper Award Commitee
Syohei Tabata (Kindai University)
Kazuhiro Asakawa (Keio University)
Takeshi Ohtowa (Kanto Gakuin University)
Akio Tokuda (Ritumeikan University)
Hirofumi Tatsumoto (University of Tsukuba)
International Relations
Tomokazu Seki (Rikkyo University)
Chie Iguchi (Keio University)
Hajime Baba (Kansai University)
Naoki Yasuda (Tokyo University of Science)
Mitsuru Nakagawa (Nihon University)
Program Commitee
Naotoshi Umeno (University of Hyogo)
Masahiro Ida (Hannan University)
Takao Yamamoto (Kanagawa University)
Hiroyuki Yamabe (Nara Prefecutural University)
Kyuho Choi (Osaka University of Commerce)

MNE Academy Journal, Editorial Team
Editor-in-Cheif
Hajime Baba (Kansai University)
Editors
Takeshi Fujisawa (Kwansei Gakuin University)
Wataru Kikuchi (Rikkyo University)
Yasuro Uchida (University of Hyogo)
Risa Jitosho (Kansai Gaidai University)
Public Relations
Masashi Arai (Asia University)
Chie Iguchi (Keio University)
Tamiko Kasahara (University of Shizuoka)
Masato Yamauchi (Senshu University)
Eastern Chapter
Susumu Harada (Meiji University)
Masashi Arai (Asia University)
Hironori Uchibori (Hakuoh University)
Hiroyasu Furukawa (Nihon University)
Tatsuya Karasawa (Kanto Gakuin University)
Western Chapter
Yukiko Shinomiya (Kindai University)
Takahide Yamaguchi (University of Hyogo)
Osamu Ishida (Kyushu University)
Taehyun Lee (Hannan University)
Motoyuki Kanetsuna (Nanzan University)
Executive Secretariat and Directors
Head Office: Takuya Fukazawa (Tokyo Fuji University)
Eastern Chapter: Nisato Suzuki (Hakuoh University)
Western Chapter: Yukiko Shinomiya (Kindai University)
AuditorKazumi Tada (Hosei University)
Shingo Nishii (University of Hyogo)

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JAPAN MNE Insights

Japan MNE Insights will be published twice a year on the AMNE official website(www.mne-jp.org). Please feel free to contact with the editorial team if you have any question
or request.

Japan MNE Insights Editorial Team
Editor-in-Cheif
Tamiko Kasahara (University of Shizuoka)
EditorMasashi Arai (Asia University)
Chie Iguchi (Keio University)
Masato Yamauchi (Senshu University)
Japan MNE Insights Editorial Team is currently located at
Office of Dr. Tamiko Kasahara,
University of Shizuoka, School of Management and Information
52-1 Yada, Suruga-ku, Shizuoka, 422-8526, Japan
TEL/FAX:+81-54-264-5435 (direct)
Contact e-mail address: kasahara@u-shizuoka-ken.ac.jp
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