Introduction

Empirical analysis

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Climate Change and the Demise of Marriage of theMillennials
Masahiro Yoshida

PhD Workshop
December, 2023

Introduction

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Empirical analysis

Empirical analysis

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Introduction

Empirical analysis

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Background: Declining marriage rate of the Millennials
Since 1970s, a marriage rate has been declining across rich countries, most
severely for the Millennial generation and after (born in 1980-).
• Alarming: population aging & shrinking; unstable environment forchildren; threat on social security
Figure: A never-married ratio (25-34 aged males; 2000 (Gen. X) vs. 2019
(Millennials), U.S. Commuting Zones (CZs))

Note: Census and American Community Survey.

Introduction

Empirical analysis

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Climate change at the dawn of the Millennium
The warming has started around 1970, and the 21st century underwent thelargest recorded increase in hot days (>75F). The Millennials are the first
generation coming of age in the new century, receiving the severest warmingin the formative age (18-34).
Figure: Change of hot and cold days across CZs in the U.S. (1970-2000 vs.
2000-2019)

Note: Computed from GHCN-Daily. The hot days are 20 year moving-average (right).

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Question: Did climate change fuel declining marriage rate?
The paper tests a hypothesis that climate change suppressed marriage rate,
especially of the Millennials.
1 Due to technology revolution and globalization, an increasing share of
non-colleged males work outdoors. (e.g., agriculture, construction,mining, package delivery)2

Due to global warming, working outdoors bring more discomfort (e.g.
sweating).
X In the long run, worsens mental health. The rise of crimes (Ranson [2014]),
suicides (Burke et al. [2018]), negative tweets (Baylis [2020]) on hot days)3

Due to higher cost of working outdoors, the Millennial non-colleged
males shifted to indoor sectors with lower salary. (including
unemployments and dropouts at home)=⇒ Their marriage market value declined.

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More non-colleged males worked outdoors
Historically, 95-98% of outdoor workers have been males. Increasingly ratio of
non-colleged males work outdoor regularly.
Figure: The composition and ratio of working outdoor by gender and education

Note: Census, ACS, and Work Context survey at ONET. I construct an indicator where a person
regularly works outdoor (cf. at least once a week) for 873 occupations. Ratio of outdoor workers is aratio out of employment.

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Millennial non-colleged males avoided working outdoors
Non-colleged males in the younger cohort are becoming detached fromwork outdoors.
Figure: Trend: the ratio of working outdoor by age (out of employments)

Note: Census, ACS, and Work Context survey at ONET. I construct an indicator where a person
regularly works outdoor (cf. at least once a week) for 873 occupations.

Introduction

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Empirical Strategy
Use a differential change in hot (or cold) days across regional labor markets asa “natural” experiment in the U.S. mainland.
• Variation of analysis 722 CZs × years (1970, 80, 90, 2000, 2010, 2019)
X CZ most likely captures both temperature of workplaces and commuting
routes (instead of counties).

X Not only marriage rates, but labor market proxies (e.g., occupation andwages) and demographics are computable from micro data.

• From daily (partially hourly) weather big data, I document a dramaticallyrich variation of climate change across CZs.
• Climate change is governed by meteorology and geography.

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Data
I assemble a panel of climates (long-run trend of daily weathers) andnever-married rates across CZs during a half century.
• Climate change
X daily (and partly hourly) temperature and precipitation from 2,000-3,000
stations from National Climatic Data Center (NCDC).

X compute # of “hot days” under daily mean temperature over 75F (23.6C);“cold days” under 35F (1.7C). Using a decadal average as a climate.

• Never-married rate
X IPUMS micro data from Census (1970-2000, by decades), and American
Community Survey (2010-2012, 2017-2019)

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Preview of preliminary findings• Occupational exposure to 10 more hot days (>75F (23.6 C)) or cold
days (<35F (1.6C)) in a decadal baseline increased never-married rates.
• Both hot and cold days decreased the ratio of salaried outdoor workers,increased unemployed and dropouts of young males (aged 18-34).

• Across occupations, the ratio of salaried working outdoors for males isnegatively linked with never-married rates.
• (conjecture) Climate change shrank the gender wage gap by occupationsorting.

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Literature: declining marriage rate
The paper adds to the marriage literature via a lens of an outdoor labormarket, exposed to the climate change.
• Labor demand shocks and marriage rate
X Free trade shocks (Autor et al. [2019])
X Declining labor force participation for males (Binder and Bound [2019];
Krueger [2017])• Educational attainment of females (Chiappori et al. [2009])• Rising disability and morbidity (e.g. opioid; alcohol) (Parsons [1980];
Case and Deaton [2017])

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Introduction

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Empirical model: isolate climate effects
I estimate a DID-style model by the panel data regression at CZ l and decadet (1970,1980,1990,2000,2010,2019):
SingleRatel,t =∑z∈{ hot,cold}+ Xl,t−1 +| {z }covariates

Bl,t|{z} zz
 β dayl,t ×labor demand shocks

rl,t0|{z}+

initial outdoor intensity+

δs,t + δ| {z }l+state×year FE and czone FEel,t|{z}clustered by czones• Now, climate is interacted with an initial (1960) outdoor emp. share.
• Regional covariates Xl,t−1 at start-of-decade t−1 includes:
X Other climate proxies: precipitation and snow
X Demography: age, education, race and ethnicity, veterans, birth of state
X Health: disability Wealth: personal NLI, rented houseIntroductionEmpirical analysis

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1. Climate change raised Never-married rates
Both hot and cold days raised a single rate for females (and almost
equivalently, males, too).
Table: Never-married rates (aged 25-34 females; across CZs)

Note: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 1%; ∗∗ : p < 5%;∗ : p < 10%. Weighted by regional female population in 1960.

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2. Climate change reduced salaried outdoor workers
Both hot and cold days reduced salaried outdoor emp. rate and raised
self-employed emp. rate. (→ Salaried workers have less flexibility of timeand location than the self-employed.)
Table: Emp. rate of outdoor workers (aged 25-34 males; across CZs)

Note: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 1%; ∗∗ : p < 5%;∗ : p < 10%. Weighted by regional male population in 1960.
I construct an indicator where a person regularly works outdoor (cf. at least once a week) for 873
occupations.

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3. Climate change generated Non-workers
Both hot and cold days raised unemployed and dropout rate.
Table: Market attachments (aged 25-34 males; across CZs)

Note: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 1%; ∗∗ : p < 5%;∗ : p < 10%. Weighted by a prime-aged male population.

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4. Salaried outdoor workers are typically more married?
Working in salaried (or self-employed) outdoor jobs is negatively (orpositively) associated with a never-married rate.
Table: Exposure to outdoor and single rates (aged 25-34; across occupations in1970-2019)

Note: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 1%; ∗∗ : p < 5%;∗ : p < 10%. Weighted by an annual employment.

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5. Non-workers are typically more single?
Unsurprisingly, Non-working rate of males is strongly associated with asingle rate of females (and males).
Figure: The male unemployment (left) and dropout (right) rates and female single
rates (change from 2000-2019)

Note: Census, ACS.

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Concluding Remark
The paper suggests that climate change eroded the partner value ofyoung males by hurting their physical advantage of working outdoors.

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David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, et al. When work disappears:
Manufacturing decline and the falling marriage market value of young men.
American Economic Review: Insights, 1(2):161–78, 2019.
Patrick Baylis. Temperature and temperament: Evidence from twitter.
Journal of Public Economics, 184:104161, 2020.
Ariel J Binder and John Bound. The declining labor market prospects ofless-educated men. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2):163–190, 2019.
Marshall Burke, Felipe González, Patrick Baylis, Sam Heft-Neal, Ceren
Baysan, Sanjay Basu, and Solomon Hsiang. Higher temperatures increasesuicide rates in the united states and mexico. Nature Climate Change, 8(8):723–729, 2018.

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Anne Case and Angus Deaton. Mortality and morbidity in the 21st century.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2017:397, 2017.
Pierre-André Chiappori, Murat Iyigun, and Yoram Weiss. Investment inschooling and the marriage market. American Economic Review, 99(5):1689–1713, 2009.
Alan B Krueger. Where have all the workers gone? an inquiry into the declineof the us labor force participation rate. Brookings Papers on EconomicActivity, 2017(2):1, 2017.
Donald O. Parsons. The decline in male labor force participation. Journal of
Political Economy, 88(1):117–134, 1980.
Matthew Ranson. Crime, weather, and climate change. Journal ofenvironmental economics and management, 67(3):274–302, 2014.