The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:

Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project - Briefing 8NATO:
Nuclear Sharing orProliferation?
“A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliancesolidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue torequire widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear
forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation
arrangements.”
NATO's Strategic Concept

Nuclear weapons
have played a http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htmkey role inNATO’smilitary strategy Backgroundsince its inception
uclear weapons have played a key role in NATO’s military strategy

Nsince its inception in 1949. NATO’s current Strategic Concept (1999)
states that the:Fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: topreserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war.

photo: NATO

NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the UnitedStates, France, and the United Kingdom, along with US ‘sub-strategic’ or‘tactical’ nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO these substrategic weapons are seen as symbolic of the transatlantic link between
the United States and its European allies.
Five Non Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) parties to theNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – Belgium, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands and Turkey – participate in nuclear sharing arrangementswith the United States. These countries host US B61 ‘gravity’ bombs that,in the event of nuclear war, could be delivered by aircraft and pilots
belonging to the host nation. Previously Greece also participated innuclear sharing, but in 2003 US nuclear weapons were reportedly withdrawn from the country. The United Kingdom also hosts US nuclearweapons, USAF aircraft and pilots.
http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd04norris

Does NATO nuclear sharing
breach the NPT?

NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements were at the centre of negotiations between the United States and Russia on Articles I and II of theNPT in the mid-1960s. Article I of the NPT states that:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not totransfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly.
Article II imposes a complementary obligation on NNWS not to “receivethe transfer” of nuclear weapons.
NATO nuclear sharing appears to breach these obligations as it is intended to allow the transfer of US nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Allies todeliver in time of war. NATO asserts that nuclear sharing is compatible
with the NPT, based on a US interpretation that it does “not involve anytransfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer becontrolling”.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2000nuclearsharing5.htm#Annex%201

In the past ten years, this interpretation has become increasingly controversial. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Mexico asked in Main
Committee 1 for clarification on whether nuclear sharing breached
Articles I and II. Mexico's concerns were taken up by the Non-Aligned
Movement. As a result several proposals for language questioning the US
interpretation were put forward for inclusion in the Committee's final
report, including:
The Conference notes that among States parties there are various
interpretations of the implementation of certain aspects of articles Iand II which need clarification, especially regarding the obligationsof nuclear weapon States parties…when acting in cooperation withgroups of nuclear-weapon States parties under regionalarrangements…

NATO also
asserts that
nuclear sharing isin compliance with
the NPT because
it predates theNPT

In 1998, Egypt proposed a way to close the loophole on nuclear sharing
by suggesting that:
The PrepCom recommend that the 2000 Review Conference state inclear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II of the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for no exceptions
and that the NPT is binding on States Parties at all times.
At the 1999 PrepCom, a statement on behalf of the New Agenda
Coalition (NAC) stated that, “all the articles of the NPT are bindingon all States Parties and at all times and in all circumstances”.
NATO also asserts that nuclear sharing is in compliance with the NPT
because it pre-dates the NPT. However, not all parties to the NPT weremade aware of the NATO arrangements at that time. Although nuclear

sharing was not challenged in the 1960s, it is being questioned today. Is it
really desirable for the NPT to be non-binding during wartime? It is timefor this ambiguous loophole to be closed.

Developments since the2000 Review Conference

TA diminishingrole for nuclearweapons
in security
policies

he 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament contain a number of commitments relevant toNATO, such as the establishment of additional Nuclear Weapon-Free
Zones (NWFZs), and the need for strengthened security assurances forNNWS. Similarly, the 2000 NPT Final Document includes: the need for further unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals;
 increased transparency;
 further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weaponssystems; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.
This call for a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies”
followed concerns about NATO’s Strategic Concept, which describes
nuclear weapons as the “supreme guarantee” of Allied security.
In June 2004, NATO published two fact sheets, which it claims demonstrate the “radical” and “far reaching” steps the Alliance has taken toadapt its nuclear policy, by reducing the number of nuclear weapons inEurope since the end of the Cold War.
http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/index.html

However, recent figures published by the US-based National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) indicate that the number of US nuclear warheads based in Europe has remained static at about 480 since the 1994 US
Nuclear Posture Review. Since 2000, therefore, there has been no
positive change to Alliance nuclear posture.
Far from reducing the role of nuclear weapons, the United States is now
pursuing development of weapons such as ‘bunker busters’ and ‘mininukes’, and enhancing the role of nuclear weapons in counter-proliferation and preventive war strategies. NATO may come under pressure toadopt similar policies.

Prospects for Progress

NATO does not publish details on the number of nuclear weapons
remaining in Europe, despite the member states’ commitment totransparency in the 2000 NPT Final Document. The continued presenceof US nuclear weapons has, in part, also resulted in Russia declining todiscuss their ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon holdings and dismantlement.

NATO claims that it is in “full compliance” with the NSAs issued by theUnited States, the United Kingdom and France on the eve of the 1995
NPT Review Conference. However, NATO’s refusal to rule out first useof nuclear weapons is a major obstacle to further steps to strengthen
NSAs. It also effectively gives a green light to NATO military planners toprepare for the option of using nuclear weapons first. NATO’s policies
have also proved a serious obstacle to any possibility of a NWFZ inCentral Europe.

NATO could
play animportantrole instrengtheningthe NPTNATO could play an important role in strengthening the NPT bysupporting: ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); and the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament
at the Conference on Disarmament.
However, since the 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO communiqués havebeen silent on the subject of non-proliferation and disarmament.

Recommendations
We urge that:
1. The remaining US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe.
These weapons are militarily obsolete and impede improved
transatlantic relations.
2. NATO seeks to negotiate a treaty with Russia on the verifiable
elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons and on warhead
accounting.
3. NATO conducts a review of its Strategic Concept to include adiminished role for nuclear weapons, including a commitment to no
first use of nuclear weapons.
4. The NPT Review Conference agrees a statement that the Treaty isbinding at all times and in all circumstances.

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March 2005