113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERSCORRUPTION IN JAPAN AND THE US
Anthony Didrick Castberg*I. INTRODUCTION
Comparing corruption in countries isalways difficult, and this is no less true
when the two countries are Japan and theUnited States. While both countries areadvanced industrial democracies, thesimilarities generally end there. Japan’s
legal system is based on French andGerman models, and is therefore a civil lawsystem, while the legal system of the US isbased on the English system, making it acommon law system. Japan has a multiparty parliamentary political system, while
the US has a two-party, republicanfederalist system. The list can continue
almost indefinitely, but let us rememberthat not only are the systems ofgovernment quite different, so too are thecultures. Thus, one would expect the typesof corruption, if not the amount, to vary aswell.
This paper will not attempt to determine
the relative amounts of official corruptionin each country, but rather the nature ofsuch corruption and the measures used tocounter it. Measuring corruption isparticularly difficult in this case because“corruption” is not a crime, but a generalclassification for a variety of criminal acts,
including bribery, abuse of authority,
breach of trust, and misappropriation ofpublic funds. The definitions of thesecriminal acts differ between Japan and theUS, and more importantly, all of Japan issubject to one penal code, and therefore asingle definition, while the US has 50
different penal codes (one per state) as well
as a national (federal) code, resulting in* Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii
at Hilo, United States of America.

numerous definitions. Finally, while Japankeeps detailed statistics on corrupt acts,
the US has no centralized record keeping
for corrupt acts. This paper will, therefore,
discuss differences in types, causes, andefforts to reduce, rather than amounts.
II. CORRUPTION IN JAPAN
Corruption in Japan generally takes theform of bribery of high officials in thevarious ministries or prefectural governors,
or those of lesser rank. This bribery cantake the form of direct payments of cash
for favorable consideration, ofentertainment (“wining and dining”) ofofficials by those currying their favor, of giftmemberships in expensive golf clubs, or it
may take the form of unlisted stocks whose
value will rise once they are offered to thepublic as a whole. In recent years there
have been cases of corruption involving theMinistries of Labor, Education, Finance,
International Trade and Industry, andHealth and Social Welfare, as well as
politicians in a number of prefectures inJapan.
Corruption in the US tends to take place
at lower levels than in Japan. There arevery few recent corruption cases involving
high officials, although several cabinetofficials during the Clinton administration
were investigated but not charged.
Corruption among law enforcement
officers, at both the local/state and federallevels, occurs with some regularity, just as
it does in Japan. In neither nation is suchcorruption extensive. From time to time astate public official is convicted ofcommitting a corrupt act, but it is rare foranybody at the secretarial level (equivalentto ministerial level in Japan) to be435

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
convicted of a corrupt act. Henry Cisneros,
former Secretary of Housing and UrbanDevelopment, pleaded guilty earlier thisyear to a misdemeanor charge of lying tothe F.B.I about payments he made to aformer lover. The payment was not frompublic funds and the case had nothing to
do with his official duties. The
investigation took 4 years, cost $10 million,
and was seen by many as motivated bypartisan political concerns. Former
Secretary of Agriculture, Mike Espy, wascharged with bribery and acceptance offavors, but was found not guilty.
Corruption in the US is most prevalentin political campaign financing, where laws
are violated with regard to individual andcorporate campaign contributions, butwhere the candidate rarely personallybenefits financially. What is sought iselection or re-election rather than cash,
although election or re-election may haveclear financial implications. As noted inan earlier paper, those who contribute topolitical campaigns, legally or illegally,
expect something in return, so one could
argue that politicians who accept suchcontributions are in effect accepting bribes.
It would, however, be extremely difficult
to connect such acceptance to subsequent
specific acts of favoritism by the politician.
So the corruption that is seen in suchsituations is a generalized corruption of thepolitical process, rather than specificcorrupt acts by specific public officials.
Problems of the corruptive influence of
campaign contributions also are prevalentin Japan. As the Asahi Evening News noted
in a recent (September 12) editorial, “Theheavy dependence of parties and politicianson corporate donations has been a breeding
ground for corruption.”
What explains the differences in thenature of corruption in the two countries?
As we have seen, campaign financing
corruption is common in both nations, but436

the relative lack of corruption of highofficials in the US, and relative prevalencein Japan, requires some discussion. Highranking officials, secretaries of cabinet
agencies in the US and ministers ofagencies in Japan, are appointed by thechief executive in each country. In Japan
this is the Prime Minister, and in the US it
is the President. In Japan, a Prime
Minister may remain in that post for as
long as his party, or a party coalition, is inpower. Over the past ten or 15 years, thelongevity of Japanese prime ministers has
not been great, with some administrations
lasting less than one year. In contrast,presidents in the US enjoy a minimum offour years in office, and frequently eight.
High-ranking appointed officials generally
remain in their positions for at least thefirst term of the president who appointed
them, and it is not unusual for them to staylonger if the president is re-elected. InJapan, however, short administrations
mean short terms in office for political
appointees. With little job security, thetemptation of bribes must be strong,
especially when the bribe includes
promises of future employment in thesector overseen by the minister. In the US,
as in Japan, political appointees lose theirpositions when the administration
changes, but many of these high-ranking
officials obtain jobs in private industry,
universities, or run for elective office.
Because they know when their term willend, they can plan their futures. When one
never knows when one’s term will end, it
is difficult to plan a future and there may
be, therefore, the temptation to obtain asmuch money as possible while in office, as
well as set one’s self up for a lucrative
position in private industry as soon aspossible, perhaps through favours given toprivate industry.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
III. MEASURES AGAINSTCORRUPTION
Both Japan and the US have numerous
laws against corrupt acts. In Japan, theselaws may be found in the Penal Code, theNational Public Service Law, the Local
Public Service Law, and in the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law. In the US,
the penal codes of all fifty states containprovisions against such corrupt acts asbribery, abuse of power, and embezzlement,
and the federal codes contain numerous
provisions against corrupt acts by bothfederal and state/local officials. A
significant portion of the federal laws
against corrupt acts in the US is of recent
origin, the result of the “Watergate”
scandals in the Nixon administration. In
addition to state and federal penal codes,
US law contains codes of ethical conduct,administrative regulations, andpresidential orders. Under many of theselaws, regulations, codes, and orders,administrative, civil, and criminal
sanctions may be imposed. The US also
has the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
which makes the paying of bribes to foreign
officials (private or public) a crime; it is theonly nation with such a law. There is, then,no shortage of laws against corrupt acts inJapan or the US.
It is doubtful that either nation needs
additional legislation to deal withcorruption of public servants, although
Japan might consider a law similar to theForeign Corrupt Practices Act. More severe
sanctions in Japan for corrupt acts may
serve as a deterrent, but the widespread
publicity given to past and current
scandals, and the resulting sanctions
imposed on former high-ranking
politicians, would seem to serve that
purpose. If one examines the sanctions
given to these former officials carefully,
however, one finds that they are not thatsevere. Imprisonment is often suspended,as judges feel that public exposure may beenough punishment. So rather thanincreased penalties in the Penal Code andother relevant legislation, perhaps judges
should treat such corruption more seriously
by imprisoning corrupt officials.
In the US, by contrast, the penalties forcorrupt officials are usually quite severe,
especially if the case was tried as a federal
crime. Federal US judges have little
discretion in sentencing, so those who areconvicted normally serve a prison term.
There is not as much consistency in statecases, as state sanctions vary, as does
judicial behavior, but it is still safe to saythat the vast majority of public officials
convicted in state courts of felonies
involving corruption will serve some timein prison.
IV. PROSECUTION ANDADJUDICATION
One finds major differences between
prosecution and adjudication in Japan andthe US. This is due to differences in thenature of those offices, differences that arereflected in the manner in which cases areprosecuted and adjudicated. In Japan, bothprosecutors and judges are career publicofficials. Both have been trained in theelite Legal Training and Research Institute(Shihoo Kenshousho), the only law school
in Japan, to which only about 3% of its
applicants are admitted. In the US,
however, the only requirement to becomea judge or a prosecutor is to have graduatedfrom an accredited law school, of which
there are hundreds with significant
differences in quality, and to have passed
the bar exam of the state in which theperson is to serve. Many states require thatthose who aspire to a judgeship be amember of the bar for a minimum periodusually five years- but no special training
is required. State judges may be either
appointed or elected, while federal judges

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
are appointed by the president with theconsent of the Senate. State judges haveterms of office ranging from 4 to 10 or 12years, while federal judges serve “duringgood behavior,” meaning for life.
Judges in the US, therefore, must beconcerned about politics. If they want tobe re-elected or re-appointed, they must
make certain that their decisions will notwork against them when the time comesfor re-election or re-appointment. Even
where terms of office are lengthy-10years,
for example- decisions can be held against
a judge or a prosecutor by those who arepolitically powerful. Federal judges do nothave such concerns, as they can be removed
from office only by impeachment. But
political considerations play a major rolein their initial appointment, so the result
may be the same. Many of President
Clinton’s judicial appointments have notbeen approved by the Senate because ofideological differences between
conservative Republican members of theSenate Judiciary Committee and thePresident. In order to make sure an
appointee is confirmed then, a president
must select candidates whose political
ideology will pass muster in the Senate.
Thus, the federal judiciary is shaped bypartisan politics.
Chief or head prosecutors in the US are
either appointed or elected at the statelevel, while US attorneys at the federal
level are appointed by the President.
Lower ranking prosecutors may also beappointed by the chief prosecutor, or may
be hired through a civil service system.
Only a small percentage of prosecutors in
the US make prosecution a career, however,and turnover is frequent. Good prosecutors
can almost always make more money inprivate practice, and their status in thelegal community is generally lower thanthose in private practice, especially privatepractice in large firms.

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Those prosecutors who choose to makea career in public office tend to be either
highly dedicated to law enforcement orincapable of getting a better position
elsewhere. This is quite different than thestatus of prosecutors in Japan, whose
status ranks with that of judge, and isoverall quite high. More importantly,
however, is the fact that prosecutors in the
US are politicized, while in Japan they arenot. That is not to say that there are nopolitics in prosecutor’s offices in Japan, butthat the office itself is not political andprosecutors do not have to run for reelection or worry about re-appointment.
Prosecutors in Japan are also morecohesive than those in the US - they tend
to have the same values, use the same
methods and approaches, and have acollegiality that is not found in most officesin the US.
What this means is that there may beclear political considerations in thedecision-making of many prosecutors andjudges in the US, as their careers may
depend upon making the correct decisions,whereas such is not the case in Japan. This
is not to say that most prosecutorialdecisions in the US are political decisions,as most criminal cases are routine, butrather that in major corruption cases
involving prominent suspects, politicalconsiderations are more likely to play a role
than in Japan.
V. CONCLUSION
Volumes could be written on thedifferences in official corruption between
Japan and the US. This paper has only
scratched the surface, but I hope that theessential differences between the corrupt
acts themselves and the manner in which
they are dealt with by the respective
criminal justice systems is apparent. It is
not likely that the corruption experienced
in Japan will become common in the US,

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
although the reverse may happen. Nor isit likely that the successful structural
aspects of the Japanese criminal justicesystem will be adopted by US prosecutors.
But there is no reason why the US cannot
insist that its prosecutors and judges bebetter qualified and better trained, nor thatthe role of politics in prosecutorial andjudicial decision-making be reduced
significantly. I hope that by comparing thetwo systems both will benefit, and as aresult, official corruption will be minimized
and the citizens of both countries will havemore confidence in and respect for theirpolitical leaders.

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