Nuclear Regulation
2016

The Safety Cultureof an Effective Nuclear
Regulatory Body

NEANuclear Regulation

The Safety Culture of an Effective
Nuclear Regulatory Body

© OECD 2016
NEA No. 7247
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTThe OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 34 democracies work together to address the
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policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
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This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYThe OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1 February 1958. Current NEA
membership consists of 31 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The
European Commission also takes part in the work of the Agency.
The mission of the NEA is:•

to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international
co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe,
environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;•

to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues, as
input to government decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD policy
analyses in areas such as energy and sustainable development.

Specific areas of competence of the NEA include the safety and regulation of nuclear activities,
radioactive waste management, radiological protection, nuclear science, economic and technicalanalyses of the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear law and liability, and public information.
The NEA Data Bank provides nuclear data and computer program services for participating
countries. In these and related tasks, the NEA works in close collaboration with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, with which it has a Co-operation Agreement, as well as with otherinternational organisations in the nuclear field.
This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any
territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found online at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.
© OECD 2016
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Cover photos: June 2015 NEA Workshop on Challenges and Enhancements to the Safety Culture of the Regulatory Body (NEA, 2015);
Regulatory officials observe inspection of new CANDU fuel bundles at the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station, Clarington, Ontario(CNSC, 2015).

FOREWORD

Foreword

The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities(CNRA) is an international body made up of senior representatives from nuclear
regulatory bodies. The committee guides the NEA programme concerning theregulation, licensing and inspection of nuclear installations with respect to safety.
It acts as a forum for exchange of information and experience, and for review ofdevelopments which could affect regulatory requirements.
The NEA has produced a series of regulatory guidance reports, known as“green booklets”, which are prepared and reviewed by senior regulators andprovide a unique resource on key nuclear regulatory issues. The booklets examinevarious regulatory challenges and address the major elements and contemporary
issues of a nuclear safety regime. (See Appendix 1 for a complete list of reports.)
As part of discussions at its June 2014 meeting, the CNRA reviewed andapproved the green booklet on The Characteristics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator(NEA, 2014) noting that the characteristic of “safety focus and safety culture” wasone of the four fundamental principles from which all regulatory body actions
should be derived. The CNRA therefore agreed that the topic of the safety cultureof the regulatory body was an important area for further work and that a green
booklet on the safety culture of an effective nuclear regulatory body would be atimely and appropriate addition to this resource on key contemporary nuclear
regulatory issues. A senior-level task group (STG) was thus established with theremit to prepare a regulatory guidance document on the safety culture of aneffective regulatory body.
Although the audience for this report is primarily nuclear regulatory bodies,
the information and ideas herein are also expected to be of interest to stakeholders
involved in the nuclear industry. The NEA believes that it could be of special
interest to countries looking to begin a nuclear energy programme, which have yet
to develop well-established regulatory regimes. The NEA also encourages andchallenges all established regulatory bodies to use this report as a benchmark andto continually strive to enhance their effectiveness as they fulfil their mission toprotect public health and safety.
The characteristics developed in this report are not exhaustive and areintended to complement other work, for example by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and others, in this constantly developing area. It is
important that each regulatory body develop its own frame of reference, using thisreport as a basis against which it can carry out its own self-assessment andbenchmarking.

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FOREWORD

This report was prepared on the basis of discussions and input from membersof the Senior-level Task Group on the Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear
Regulatory Body, as well as the outcomes from the June 2015 NEA Workshop on
Challenges and Enhancements to the Safety Culture of the Regulatory Body (NEA,
2015), which was organised by the CNRA with the support of the NEA Committee
on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the NEA Committee onRadiological Protection and Public Health (CRPPH). Information was also taken into
account from a wide array of documents produced by the NEA, its member
countries and other international organisations.
Mr Lennart Carlsson (Sweden) chaired the meetings and work of the seniorlevel task group. Members of the STG were Mr Benoît Bernard (Belgium);
Mr Robert Lojk (Canada); Ms Kaisa Koskinen (Finland); Ms Anne-Cécile Rigail(France); Ms Gisela Stoppa (Germany); Mr Ferenc Lorand (Hungary);
Mr Masahiro Aoki (Japan); Mr Kenichi Fujita (Japan); Ms Hiroko Takada (Japan);
Mr Takaaki Kurasaki (Japan); Dr Young Sung Choi (Korea); Mr Martin Smit
(Netherlands); Ms Tatiana Bogdanova (Russia); Mr Alexander Sapozhnikov (Russia);
Mr Alexander Smetnik (Russia); Mr Rafael Cid Campo (Spain); Mr Lars Axelsson(Sweden); Mr Lennart Carlsson (Sweden); Dr Anne Edland (Sweden);
Dr Cornelia Ryser (Switzerland); Ms Miriam Cohen (United States); Mr Ben Ficks(United States); Ms Andrea Valentin (United States); Ms Adriana Nicic(International Atomic Energy Agency); Ms Aurélie Lorin (Nuclear Energy Agency);
Mr Takayoshi Nezuka (Nuclear Energy Agency); and Dr Len Creswell (NEA
Consultant).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents

1. Executive summary........................................................................................................ 7
2. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 11
Definitions .................................................................................................................... 11
Leaders and managers ................................................................................................ 12
Management systems and safety culture ................................................................. 12
An interconnected system .......................................................................................... 12
Self-reflection ............................................................................................................... 12
National culture’s influence on the safety culture .................................................. 13
Focus in time ................................................................................................................ 14
3. Principles and attributes for the safety culture of an effective nuclear
regulatory body ........................................................................................................... 15
Principle 1: Leadership for safety is to be demonstrated at all levelsin the regulatory body........................................................................... 15
Principle 2: All staff of the regulatory body have individual responsibility
and accountability for exhibiting behaviours that set thestandard for safety ................................................................................ 17
Principle 3: The culture of the regulatory body promotes safety, andfacilitates co-operation and open communication........................... 18
Principle 4: Implementing a holistic approach to safety is ensured byworking in a systematic manner......................................................... 19
Principle 5: Continuous improvement, learning and self-assessment
are encouraged at all levels in the organisation ............................... 20
4. Safety culture challenges ............................................................................................ 23
5. Conclusions and recommendations ......................................................................... 27
6. References ...................................................................................................................... 29
Appendix 1: Complete list of the NEA series of regulatory guidance reports(green booklets) ........................................................................................................... 31

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Executive summary

The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that,within their respective countries, activities related to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy are carried out in a safe manner, consistent with appropriate domestic andinternational safety principles and with full respect of the environment. In order toeffectively achieve this objective, the nuclear regulatory body requires specificcharacteristics that will allow it “to do the right thing well and efficiently”.
A healthy safety culture within the regulatory body is a fundamental characteristicof an effective regulator (NEA, 2014).
Although the national regulator plays an essential role in each country,
operating experience has shown that accidents may impact other countries andmay involve other national regulators. Safety is therefore not bounded by national
borders. The implications of this global nuclear safety approach should be taken
into account when addressing the safety culture of the national regulator.
It is also important to emphasise that, although the mission of the regulatory
body is to provide oversight on nuclear safety, the prime responsibility for thesafety of a nuclear installation remains with the licensee or plant operator.
The regulatory body nevertheless has an important responsibility in assuringthat the licensee meets its primary goal of ensuring the safety of nuclear
installations. The regulatory body, along with many other stakeholders, isembedded in a wide system, which shares common societal values and norms. By
directly and indirectly interacting with each other, all participants of this system
mutually influence their respective safety cultures. By nature of its role, one of the
stakeholders who most deeply influence the licensees’ safety culture is theregulatory body. With its regulatory strategy, the way it carries out its daily
oversight work, the type of relationship it cultivates with licensees, the values it
conveys and the importance it gives to safety – in short, with its own safety culture– the regulatory body profoundly impacts the licensee’s safety culture and its
sense of responsibility for safety. Hence, the regulatory body needs to be consciousof its own safety culture’s impact on the safety culture of the organisations it
regulates and oversees in order not to hamper those organisations’ willingness andefforts to take on their primary responsibility for safety. For this reason, it isparamount that the regulatory body not only consider safety culture as a matter ofoversight, but also as a matter of self-reflection. It should actively scrutinise how
its own safety culture impacts the licensees’ safety culture. It should also reflect on
its role within the wider system and on how its own culture is the result of its
interactions with the licensees and all other stakeholders.
A regulatory body should have public safety as its primary focus and a healthysafety culture is essential in this regard. Such a safety culture should encompass

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

individual staff members, leaders and the organisation as a whole. The
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group’s report on the safety culture,
INSAG-4 (IAEA, 1991), was originally written for operators but the concepts apply
equally well to regulatory bodies, although their roles are different. The definitionof safety culture in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety glossary(IAEA, 2007) is derived from INSAG-4 as follows: “Safety culture is that assembly of
characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes
that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention
warranted by their significance.”
This Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) regulatory guidance report identifies anddescribes five principles and their associated attributes that underpin and support
the safety culture of an effective nuclear regulatory body. Each of thecharacteristics – the principles and the attributes – discussed in this report is anecessary feature of the safety culture of an effective nuclear regulatory body, but
no one characteristic is sufficient on its own. It is the combination of thesecharacteristics – the principles and the attributes – that leads to a healthy safety
culture within the nuclear regulatory body.
The five principles which are adopted in this report are:•Leadership for safety is to be demonstrated at all levels in theregulatory body.

•All staff of the regulatory body have individual responsibility andaccountability for exhibiting behaviours that set the standard for safety.

•

The culture of the regulatory body promotes safety and facilitates cooperation and open communication.

•

Implementing a holistic approach to safety is ensured by working in asystematic manner.

•

Continuous improvement, learning andencouraged at all levels in the organisation.

self-assessmentare

A regulatory body which applies these principles and the associated attributes
described in this report should have a continuously developing and constantly
improving safety culture that makes a significant contribution to the ability of a
nuclear regulatory body to be effective. The safety culture of an organisation canalso build an atmosphere where many positives are seen and which helps to build
pride in belonging and commitment to the organisation with all those involved.
The report concludes that the following elements support a healthy safety
culture within the regulatory body:

8•

Excellence in leadership for safety at all levels of the organisation todemonstrate the importance of prioritising safety above all else.

•

Strong sense of personal accountability so that everyone takes personal
ownership of their actions and decisions with respect to safety.

•

Formal direction on safety culture (i.e. a clear corporate policy on safety
culture in the form of statements, guidance or a code of conduct).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY•

Staff who are aligned and engaged: a healthy safety culture is
supported by staff who know what they are doing.

•

Open and transparent communication, internally and externally.

•

Informed, balanced accountability that encourages open and honest
reporting and respects safety information.

•

A comprehensive and systemic approach to the regulatory environment
which is a complex and interdependent system that requires a holistic
approach to its management.

•

A clear and appropriate regulatory framework.

•

Continuous improvement and learning: an open, adaptable andlearning attitude in technical, regulatory and organisational areas helps
avoid complacency by continuously challenging existing conditions andactivities.

•

Self-assessment: assessment of the safety culture of the regulatory
body supports continuous improvement. At the same time, more work
is needed in the development of assessment methodologies andappropriate performance indicators.

•

Benchmarking to ensure consistency with peers, share experiences andsupport a global safety approach.

Many challenges exist to regulatory bodies’ safety culture which must berecognised, understood and overcome (e.g. maintaining the main focus on safety,
addressing external pressures, adapting to an evolving system, maintaining
competence, managing an emergency situation). In addition, safety culture cannot
survive solely on goodwill and good attitude. It needs to be nourished by adequate
resources, competence and support programmes such as management systems.
This report concludes that a regulatory body with a healthy safety culture
maintains its focus on safety and makes safety its overriding value. In addition,
when the regulatory body demonstrates a healthy safety culture, it positively
influences the behaviour of licensees and enhances the confidence of all
stakeholders.
This regulatory guidance booklet on the safety culture of an effective nuclear
regulatory body provides a unique resource to countries with existing, mature
regulators and can be used for benchmarking as well as training and developing
staff. It will also be useful for new entrant countries in the process of developing
and maintaining an effective nuclear safety regulator.

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INTRODUCTION

2. Introduction

The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that,within their countries, activities related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy arecarried out in a safe manner; the prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear
installation remains with the licensee or plant operator. However, the regulatory
body itself has an important responsibility in assuring that the licensee meets its
primary goal of safety of nuclear installations. The regulatory body, along withmany other stakeholders (such as the licensees, manufacturers and contractors,
research institutions, technical support organisations, international organisations,as well as governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, themedia and the public) are part of a large interconnected and inter-related system,
which shares common societal values and norms. By directly and indirectlyinteracting with each other, all participants of this system mutually influence theirrespective safety cultures. Therefore, the safety culture of the regulatory body isimportant, among other reasons, for the effect it can have (both positive andnegative) on the industry and those responsible for safety (NEA, 1999).

Definitions
In this report, the “safety culture” is considered as “the assembly of characteristics
and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as anoverriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted bytheir significance” (IAEA, 2007). This statement was originally written by INSAG(IAEA, 1991) to be applied to operators, but these concepts could be applied equallywell to regulatory bodies, although their roles are different.
In this report, the term “healthy” was adopted to qualify the safety culture but
the qualification can be adapted as appropriate to the circumstances.
For the purpose of this report, the following definitions are used:•

Principles: fundamental, primary and accepted basis of conduct fromwhich all actions are derived.

•

Attributes: qualities that identify or describe an organisation that
results from the actions of the organisation.

In the context of this report, the nuclear regulatory body should be consideredin the widest sense and encompass: relevant parts of government, national
inspection and licensing authorities, the technical support organisations and anyother organisations involved.

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INTRODUCTION

In addition, the regulatory body’s mission of ensuring nuclear safety should beseen, as appropriate, to include radiological protection and environmental
protection.

Leaders and managers
Both leaders and managers are embedded throughout organisations with staff at
all levels taking on both of these roles from time to time. Leadership is about
winning the hearts and minds of people to achieve a common purpose byproviding vision and strategic direction, and creating an atmosphere (a culture)
within the organisation. Management is about implementing the processes andfollowing the path set by the vision and strategic direction.

Management systems and safety culture
A management system is needed to ensure an organisation works properly andefficiently. It also helps to enable and develop the safety culture (NEA, 2006), andso it is important that essential actions concerning safety culture are integrated
into the organisation’s management system and that the management systemshould maintain coherence of these concepts. In particular, self-assessments andreviews of safety culture should not only be triggered by external peer reviews but
should be an integral part of the overall management cycle. The principles andattributes set out in this report are complementary to a management system andare considered necessary to develop, maintain and improve the safety culture of
the regulatory body. These characteristics should be considered and addressed
during the development, implementation and operation of the regulatory body’s
management system and relevant processes.

An interconnected system
The regulatory body profoundly impacts the licensee’s safety culture and its senseof responsibility for safety. Hence, the regulatory body needs to be conscious of its
own safety culture’s impact on the safety culture of the organisations it regulates
and oversees in order not to hamper those organisations’ willingness and efforts totake on their primary responsibility for safety. For this reason, it is paramount thatthe regulatory body not only consider safety culture as a matter of oversight but
also as a matter of self-reflection. It should actively scrutinise how its own safety
culture impacts the licensees’ safety culture. It should also reflect on its role within
the wider system and on how its own culture is the result of its interactions withthe licensees and all other stakeholders.

Self-reflection
Like the tip of an iceberg above the water’s surface, only a small portion of theelements that make up a safety culture (of both licensees and regulatory bodies)can be readily perceived. In the case of the regulatory body, these elements are, forinstance, the shared behaviours of the inspectors when doing their oversight work

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INTRODUCTION

and interacting with the licensee’s employees, or the regulations and requirements
issued by the regulatory body. The largest part of the cultural elements – such as
attitudes, values, beliefs and deeply rooted assumptions shared by the regulatory
body’s employees – cannot be seen or otherwise directly perceived. They
constitute the part of the iceberg below the water’s surface. They are not tangible
and are often even unconscious, but they essentially determine the behaviour andtangible artefacts above the surface. Self-reflection activities of the regulatory bodyshould therefore not be limited to an analysis of daily oversight practices and of
regulations, but should also aim at identifying and debating attitudes, values andbeliefs held and shared by the regulatory body’s employees, in order to assess how
they can positively or negatively impact the licensees’ safety culture.

National culture’s influence on the safety culture
National culture is one of the elements that should be considered in fostering andenhancing an organisation’s safety culture. The characteristics of organisations
with a strong safety culture are the same the world over. However, an organisationthat wishes to foster and enhance these characteristics needs to design its
programme to fit the unique culture of that organisation. National culture will be
one of the influences on the organisation’s culture, and on the likely success or
failure of improvement programmes.
The effect of national culture to safety culture of an organisation is twofold.
Firstly, the individuals working in an organisation always execute some features of
their national culture (e.g. certain values or social norms) in their work behaviour.
Secondly, national culture is embedded in the societal structures around nuclear
safety (e.g. legislation, education, roles of different stakeholders) which may affectthe organisations’ activities to a great extent.
National cultures are evolving continuously. The culture, cultural values andthe cultural changes depend on the history and origins of the countries, even the
climate and environment where the cultures have evolved around the globe haveinfluenced the cultural characteristics. Nowadays also more and moreglobalisation is influencing the national cultures. These are factors that should betaken into consideration when analysing and developing nuclear safety culture.
For example, the cultural trait of individualism versus collectivism and the statusquo versus innovation can tend to differ between countries. If the trend ofcollectivism is strong, it is important to clarify the accountability of individuals on
the process of decision-making. Similarly, if the trend of the status quo is strong, itis necessary to establish a climate within the organisation of continuous change tobe able to foster the continuous improvement of activities.
It is important that characteristics of national culture should not be viewed as
an impediment to safety culture but rather as characteristics and cultural
strengths to be aware of and to be used and fostered in developing safety culture.
It is therefore useful for organisations, where possible, to compare experiences andbenchmark with similar organisations from their own country as well asinternationally.

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INTRODUCTION

Focus in time
The culture of the regulatory body should create a balance between theimportance people give to the past, present and future. Excessive focus on one ofthese time frames to the exclusion of others can create problems. For example, alack of awareness of past accidents could lead to a certain insouciance; refusal toaccept any current risk that could lead to a reduction of future risk may be theresults of an excessive focus on the present and a wish to maintain the status quo;
wishful thinking and over confidence can cause the future to be discounted. The
degree to which national cultures, mindsets and behaviours cause people andorganisations to be oblivious to the past and discount the future differs among
countries. However, these are universal issues that should be addressed by allorganisations. A balance in relation to the focus in time should be found whenplanning activities and employees’ work. The need to have a balanced focus on
defining risks (past), extracting potential risks (present) and examining thechallenges for the future (future risk) is an important feature of the safety culture.

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PRINCIPLES AND ATTRIBUTES FOR THE SAFETY CULTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY BODY

3. Principles and attributes for the safety cultureof an effective nuclear regulatory body

The following principles and attributes constitute a framework for a healthy safety
culture within a nuclear regulatory body.
Principle 1: Leadership for safety is to be demonstrated at all levels in theregulatory body.

Leaders perform essential functions in organisations. The quality and actions ofleadership have widespread consequences for an organisation’s safety culture andits performance. Leaders significantly affect an organisation’s safety culture
through the priorities they establish, the behaviours and values they model, thereward systems they administer, the trust they create, and the context andexpectations they establish for interpersonal relationships, communication andaccountability. Leaders also exert significant influence on change initiatives. They
have the power and responsibility to set strategy and direction, align people andresources, motivate and inspire people, and ensure that problems are identified
and solved in a timely manner. A lack of commitment or clear communication
about what is important to the organisation can create a conflict for employees
who must then decide between potentially competing messages. This leads
employees to make their own interpretations, thereby increasing the probability ofnegatively affecting the organisation’s safety culture. It is clear that behaviour
matters and that leadership behaviours which support the safety culture are
critical. Leaders should establish an organisational culture that fosters a healthysafety culture.

Attributes:a) “Safety first” is a guiding principle in the regulatory body.
The prioritisation of safety over other competing requirements should be ingrainedin the culture of the regulatory body. Organisations demonstrate theircommitment to safety by promoting behaviours, and by implementing policies andpractices that support a healthy safety culture. This could include a policy
statement outlining key positive traits such as leaders’ safety values and actions,problem identification and resolution, personal accountability, internal
communication, continuous learning, a questioning attitude and an environment
conducive to raising concerns. These traits describe patterns of thinking, feelingand behaving that emphasise safety, particularly in situations when safety goals
could conflict with schedules or budgets. To ensure engagement from all staff of

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PRINCIPLES AND ATTRIBUTES FOR THE SAFETY CULTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY BODY

the regulatory body, policy elements should be promoted as core values of theorganisation, championed by leadership and reinforced through internal
communications and activities.
b)

All leaders throughout the regulatory body demonstrate a commitment to safety intheir decisions and behaviours.

In day-to-day decision making, all leaders of the regulatory body effectively
prioritise the consideration of safety over other matters (e.g. time pressure) with ahigh degree of integrity, transparency and consistency. This includes behaviours
and interactions with all staff of the organisation. Safety culture is eroded when adecision-making process leaves a majority of its staff or the stakeholders out of the
discussion.
c)

Leaders create an environment for positive development of the safety culture.

An important responsibility for leaders at each level is to create an atmosphere offree and open exchange of views and ideas as well as one of raising concerns.
Therefore, it is crucial to allow criticism, and to accept and be open to different
opinions. All views, concerns and ideas should be valued – even in cases where
they do not lead to any change or uncover any issue(s).
There should be a relationship of trust between leaders and staff so that staff
feel comfortable raising safety concerns, and leaders should support staff
members in making safety related decisions. Leaders should also show confidence
in staff members and defend staff member’s decisions, if appropriate. When aleader (or manager) overrules a staff member’s opinions or decisions, they shouldtake full accountability and explain why the decision was overruled.
Leaders should respond to questions and information from staff openly andhonestly and should maintain good relationships with their staff. In particular, any
self-reporting of mistakes by them or those of others should not lead to retaliation,
intimidation, harassment or discrimination.
Leaders should ensure that safety consciousness is a priority throughout theorganisation. Candidates for safety relevant leadership positions should therefore
be selected and evaluated with due consideration of their demonstrated ability tofoster a healthy safety culture.
d)

Leaders clearly define individual roles, responsibilities and authority.

Leaders are enabled by the organisation to define roles, responsibilities andauthority, as well as a code of ethics within the regulatory body. They also ensurethat these are clearly communicated and understood. Managers appropriately
delegate responsibility and authority to promote ownership and accountability. As
a consequence, all staff members have a clear understanding of their individualrole(s) in day-to-day operations and in emergency situations. The responsibility
assigned to individuals is defined and documented in sufficient detail to prevent
ambiguity. The definitions of the authority and responsibility of individuals should
be regularly reviewed to ensure that there are no omissions or overlaps, and no
problems of shared responsibilities.

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PRINCIPLES AND ATTRIBUTES FOR THE SAFETY CULTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY BODYe)

Leaders ensure that the necessary resources are available to meet the safety mission.

Leaders strive to strategically plan and ensure the prerequisites for the regulatory
body – such as effective technical independence and the availability of sufficient
resources – to ensure that its mandate is continuously met. Appropriate support
systems (e.g. information technology and administration) should be provided toenable all staff to execute their functions. The necessary resources are essential tofulfilling the safety mission, and their availability demonstrates commitment toenhance the safety culture.
Principle 2: All staff of the regulatory body have individual responsibility andaccountability for exhibiting behaviours that set the standard forsafety.

Personal accountability reflects the fact that individual staff members accept
responsibility and take ownership of their performance and the role they have innuclear safety. In organisations with healthy safety cultures, individuals have astrong sense of accountability for safety and behave accordingly.

Attributes:a)Personal commitment to and accountability for safety from every staff member, at alllevels of the organisation.

Accountability can motivate mindfulness, attention to detail and self-assessment,
and it can contribute to improving nuclear safety. In order for accountability to
become a fundamental part of an organisation’s safety culture, everyone shouldtake personal ownership for his or her actions and decisions. Reinforcement of thisaccountability can come from managers, but also from co-workers, the public,
other influential leaders, and an individual’s own personal values and standards.
b)

A strong sense of collaboration and co-ordination of activities across the organisation.

Individuals and work groups should communicate and co-ordinate their activities
within and across organisational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is
maintained. Individuals should also demonstrate a strong sense of collaborationand co-operation in connection with projects and operational activities. They
should work as a team peer-checking and ensuring that safety practices arefollowed, actively coaching new personnel and sharing tools and publications.
Individuals should strive to meet commitments and collaborate in order tocontribute to organisation’s goals.
c)

The need for moral courage and agility in doing the right thing.

Individuals should have the necessary support to raise safety concerns and towithstand undue pressure due to conflicting interests which may have a negative
impact on safety. Staff of the regulatory body should exhibit moral courage andagility and should not feel constrained in making the right decision, even if thisdecision challenges or puts them in conflict with a licensee or other stakeholder.
Moral courage can be developed through a supportive environment, expertise and

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PRINCIPLES AND ATTRIBUTES FOR THE SAFETY CULTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY BODY

encouragement from leaders and colleagues which helps strengthen confidence indecision making.
Principle 3: The culture of the regulatory body promotes safety, and facilitates
co-operation and open communication.

In order to ensure and promote nuclear safety, the regulatory body needs to foster
co-operation within its own organisation. A regulatory body with a healthy safety
culture provides a respectful, collaborative working environment which is
supportive of open, honest and free dialogue, and where staff are able to freely
raise concerns.
The regulatory body needs to build trust by being open and transparent in its
dealings and when communicating internally with its staff and with external
stakeholders such as licensees, the public and the wider regulatory community.

Attributes:a)Openness and transparency.

In order to build trust and confidence, both internally and externally, theregulatory body should communicate and consult in an open and transparent
manner, and fully engage with its staff and stakeholders. The scope and nature ofthese activities should be such that it is clear how the regulatory body’s mandate is
being discharged, and why and in what manner decisions are made. The allocationof communication resources should be undertaken in a balanced way based on
considerations of risk and public needs so as to ensure that safety is the primary
focus.
b)

Clear organisational commitment to co-operation.

Co-operation and dialogue at all levels of the regulatory body’s organisation(including technical support organisations, where applicable) fosters engagement
and alignment. Open communication also ensures that regulatory staff are able towork effectively, with a more complete and integrated common understanding ofsafety issues. Likewise, co-operation and dialogue with other regulators,
government entities, international organisations and non-governmentalorganisations ensures that the regulatory body is engaged and knowledgeable ofboth the latest thinking and positions on safety. Failure to adequately share,
discuss and analyse uniquely held expertise and experiences compromises
collective problem-solving and may result in the inadvertent dismissal ofimportant safety issues or findings.
c)

A questioning attitude, and mechanisms to raise differing opinions on regulatory
decisions.

Safety is fostered and supported by working environments that promotequestioning attitudes, facilitate discussion on safety concerns and are free of any
fear of negative consequences. Staff should be encouraged to challenge the way
things have traditionally been done. A questioning attitude helps to ensure
appropriate decisions are made and bad practices do not become institutionalised.

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Good working environments are founded on mutual trust and respect, and support
policies and mechanisms for handling differing opinions (for example, nonconcurrence and whistle blower programmes) in order to protect and support
those who come forward with concerns. It is important that all safety concerns
raised are resolved, and that feedback on the resolution of the safety concern isprovided to the individual who raised the concern.
d)Promotion of safety and associated knowledge.

Promoting the importance of safety, the dissemination of related knowledge andsupport of research should be encouraged and made part of the organisational
culture of the regulatory body. Also important is the selection of an appropriate
regulatory approach as outlined in the NEA Regulatory Guidance Report The
Characteristics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator (NEA, 2014).
Not all staff of the regulatory body work directly on safety issues, but allindirectly support implementation of the mandate. Consequently, to help ensurethat the focus remains on safety, all staff members should understand how theirwork contributes to safety and the implementation of the organisation's mandate.
Principle 4: Implementing a holistic approach to safety is ensured by working ina systematic manner.

A healthy safety culture is dependent on the regulatory body using a robust,holistic, multi-disciplinary approach to safety. Regulators oversee and regulate
complex socio-technical systems that, together with the regulatory body itself,
form part of a larger system made up of many stakeholders, with competing aswell as common interests. All the participants in this system influence and react toeach other, and there is a need for awareness and understanding of this mutual
influence.

Attributes:a)

A healthy respect for the consequences of all actions and decisions taken by theregulatory body.

In its decision making process, the regulatory body should apply a conservative
approach, by considering the short and long-term potential outcomes. Thisrequires a healthy respect for the consequences of all actions and decisions, or
looking beyond the decisions towards the consequences. Such an approach also
requires that the regulatory body effectively manage and control the allocation of
its resources through, for example, the application of a graded approach, where
the regulatory intervention is proportionate and based on the risk and hazards
involved. When there are competing requirements and pressures, safety should
always be the priority.
b)

Clear awareness of roles and responsibilities in relation to licensees.

Regulators and licensees have their own individual responsibilities andaccountabilities for safety, which should be clear and recognisable. Licensees
should respect and fully co-operate with the regulatory body while the regulatory

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PRINCIPLES AND ATTRIBUTES FOR THE SAFETY CULTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY BODY

body should respect licensees and their processes. Regulatory oversight should
help licensees strengthen safety and not unduly interfere in the licensees’ own
processes so as not to diminish the importance of the licensee’s own responsibility
for safety. In essence, the regulatory body should not take on the role of thedecision maker in relations to safety issues as it should recognise that the primary
responsibility for safety rests with the operating organisation. Safety is enhanced
when regulators are open to dialogue with licensees so as to better leverageknowledge and understanding which helps to develop better guidance andapproaches to safety.
c)

A clear regulatory framework.

Safety is enhanced when the regulatory body sets a clear and comprehensive
regulatory framework, based on hazards and risk. This framework should not be so
detailed as to set up undue constraints. Regulatory requirements and guidelines
need to keep evolving in order to incorporate lessons learnt and new
developments. The regulatory body should emphasise that licensees have theprime responsibility for safety. This responsibility cannot simply be discharged bycomplying with the regulatory framework. The regulatory body should encourage
the licensee to strive higher, and this policy should be part of the “regulatory
framework”.
d)Proactivity, adaptability and a holistic approach.

Safety is enhanced when the regulatory body applies proactive, adaptable andholistic approaches to the delivery of its mandate. Such approaches involve
effective problem anticipation, good foresight, suitable planning and a capacity toreact quickly and properly to changing or new circumstances.
The regulatory body should apply a holistic approach to its work by constantly
scrutinising operations for safety, taking into account the performance of theentire system, the interconnection between its parts, its current state and the
direction the system is taking. The licensee should be perceived as part of a larger
socio-technical system influenced by technical, human and organisational,
environmental, economic, political and societal factors. Regulators should strive to
do more than simply establish standards; they should consider the performance ofthe entire system that ensures safety.
e)

Recognition of the complexity of safety issues.

Safety issues are complex and involve a number or inter-related factors, activities
and groups, whose importance and effect on each other and on safety might not be
immediately recognisable. Appropriate monitoring, evaluation and oversight, as
well as (where needed) preventative or corrective actions are required to ensurethat important indicators of degraded performance or safety are not ignored.
Principle 5: Continuous improvement, learning andencouraged at all levels in the organisation.

self-assessment

are

INSAG-4 (IAEA, 1991) stresses the importance of commitment to continuous
improvement, by regularly performing self-assessments, external reviews and by

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developing a learning attitude in order to avoid “blind spots” and identify areas for
improvement. Such improvements rely on the competence and professional
knowledge of staff in order to be effective.

Attributes:a)

Looking at ourselves in the mirror: safety culture self-assessment and peer reviews.

The regulatory body should take a good look in the mirror to see its own “ways ofthinking and ways of doing”: its philosophy, policies, processes, procedures andpractices. The safety culture self-assessment process itself is as important as its
results because it enables exchanges between people from various departments
and levels. It may help to identify some assumptions and informal rules that
influence and structure the internal decision process.
The self-assessment process comprises a first phase of qualitative evaluation.
The findings of this qualitative evaluation are then compared to a set of references,which leads to an action plan. Such an assessment should be performed
periodically.
A combination of various tools should be encouraged when performing thequalitative evaluation: detailed questionnaires, analysis of performance indicators,
results of panels, reviews of past regulatory decisions, results of team-building
projects aimed at representing the main characteristics of the organisation or
feedback from licensees and other stakeholders on the regulatory body’s safety
culture, etc. When using existing tools, these should be adapted to the national
culture so that the staff feel free to answer easily and honestly. Some concepts
may be difficult to translate directly from an international reference document andthus should be explained, potentially by providing some examples. This selfassessment can be triggered internally or externally and may be supported byinternational peer reviews or other types of external assessment. It should beconsidered as an opportunity for discussion and exchange, and particularly for
identifying any traits of the national culture that may impact the safety culture of
the regulatory body.
b)

Learning from experience, fostering exchanges and increasing knowledge.

In order for individuals and organisations to avoid complacency and continuously
challenge existing conditions and activities, the regulatory body should develop
and maintain an open-minded and learning attitude in the technical andregulatory field.
Systematic training can be an opportunity, beyond the consolidation ofcompetence, to have people from various departments get to know each other andopen their minds to other points of view. Interdisciplinary exchanges (internal
meetings, conferences, information exchange platforms) should be encouraged. In
particular, it is important for the regulatory body to support research programmes
and have frequent exchanges with research institutes, technical support
organisations and other stakeholders in order to remain up to date on ongoing
research and development in the nuclear field, such as: advantages anddisadvantages of new technological solutions, developing technologies, materials
and components, and human and organisational factors.

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PRINCIPLES AND ATTRIBUTES FOR THE SAFETY CULTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR REGULATORY BODY

International involvement of the regulatory body offers an opportunity to learn
from experience (including through case studies of events), identify best practices
and try to adapt them to its own organisation. In particular, the development ofmethodologies for the assessment of the safety culture of nuclear regulatory
bodies could enhance and enable the benchmarking and continuous developmentof the safety culture of regulatory bodies. Sharing of experiences with regulators of
non-nuclear sectors could also be beneficial to learn from events in other sectors
and discuss commendable practices.
c)Knowledge management to build a healthy safety culture.

As part of the regulatory body’s knowledge management programme, carefulattention should be paid to the transfer of knowledge and history of nuclear
programmes to a new generation of staff. The corporate knowledge of pastexperience and decision making should be captured (for example, in recordings or
databases) and these tools should be easy to use by anyone in the organisation.
Appropriate mentoring should also be provided by experts in the oversight ofsafety.
In order to avoid silos and to foster a common safety culture, management
should ensure that people regularly meet, either formally or informally, to shareopinions, experiences and knowledge on issues relevant to the areas they regulate.
d)Continuous improvement as a clear value of the regulatory body.

Self-assessment, external reviews and an open, learning attitude are key
ingredients for continuous improvement in all regulatory body activities. The
regulatory body should be aware of the basis of its organisational culture (values,
assumptions and artefacts). It should not only correct its weaknesses but should
also focus on maintaining and enhancing its strengths.
The importance of improving the regulatory body’s performance should beclear at all levels of the organisation. Commitment to continuous improvement
should be reflected in corporate policy, and the regulatory body should devote
sufficient time and resources to this continuous improvement loop. In particular,findings arising from self-assessments or external reviews should be addressed ina timely manner with comprehensive action plans.
A specific safety culture expertise should be available to the regulatory body inorder to implement assessment processes, facilitate dialogue in the regulatory
body and analyse the results. The findings and trends concerning the safety
culture of the regulatory body should be periodically communicated to the staff inorder to keep the momentum for improvement.

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SAFETY CULTURE CHALLENGES

4. Safety culture challenges

External and internal factors create challenges that should be seen as
opportunities to strengthen the regulatory body’s safety culture. Nevertheless, if
not recognised and properly addressed, these factors can weaken the safety
culture of the regulatory body.
Some examples of the challenges are presented below:a)

Maintaining the main focus on safety

Maintaining a real consciousness of risks and a focus on the safety priority might
be a challenge as the regulatory body could become trapped in habits detrimental
to its safety culture.
The regulatory body should not be complacent in relation to the level of safety
in the country, believing it to be adequate with no significant risk of accidents.
Bureaucratic inertia, which may lead to minimising problems in order not to deal
with them or a postponement of difficult decisions, is a tendency thatmanagement should be aware of. A certain degree of fear may also exist within theregulatory body that the introduction of new regulatory approaches would causesignificant social confusion and foster a perception that existing measures are
insufficient, therefore making the regulatory body reticent to implement changes
and improvements.
A certain sense of self-importance, complacency or infallibility can result in
isolation from other stakeholders and from the international community. In thisrespect, active involvement of the regulatory body in international exchanges
offers both an opportunity for self-examination, peer reviews and benchmarking,which can help the regulatory body to develop awareness of its own strengths andweaknesses and act upon them.
There is also a risk of an erosion of institutional memory over time, unlessmeasures are taken to support knowledge management. It is a challenge tomaintain over time the awareness of risks and make sustainable efforts toenhance safety and not to fall prey to the “safety myth” that a severe accident
cannot happen again, or at all.
b)

Addressing external pressures on the regulatory body

The regulatory body must protect itself against any undue influence placed on it by
the industry. Even if the industry is facing competition in its sector, the regulatory
body must do its job in a thoughtful, predictable way and not feel pressured to act
in such a manner that would jeopardise safety. The regulatory body should avoid
any kind of “regulatory capture” situation where its decisions are unduly

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SAFETYCULTURE CHALLENGES

influenced by the licensee. Leaders and managers should ensure that schedulepressures do not come at the expense of safety and of internal open debate.
Other stakeholders can also put pressure on the regulatory body (governmental
bodies, non-governmental organisations, local communities). It is thus a challenge
for the regulatory body to stand firm and maintain its priorities in order to address
the safety issues in a way that is commensurate with their significance.
Another challenge linked to the transparency policy is for the regulatory bodyto obtain complete information from the licensees when they know that thisinformation might have to be publicly disclosed by the regulatory body. The
regulatory body needs to find appropriate ways to maintain and foster an open
dialogue with licensees under these boundary conditions.
c)

Building, maintaining and adapting a regulatory system

The regulatory body has to adapt its oversight system and practices to thespecificities of various stages of the installation life cycle and to the maturity ofoperators (new design, new build, ageing plants, end of operation date known,
decommissioning). The regulatory body has also to adapt to changes resulting
from the evolution in national policies (e.g. on energy mix). Interacting withbuilders and licensees from several nationalities is also a challenge when projects
and approaches convey these national cultures.
Countries embarking on a nuclear power programme have to create a nuclear
regulatory body “from scratch” and have unique challenges in adaptinginternational regulatory approaches to their own situation and culture. These
challenges also include funding, lack of any corporate memory and, creating,nurturing and communicating a safety culture vision to a disparate group of multinational and contract employees. Although new regulatory bodies can benefit fromadvice and good practices developed by countries with established nuclear
programmes, they nonetheless have to take into account differences in national
circumstances and adapt these practices to their national culture.
In the case of conflicting goals, incorporating safety and security goals could bea challenge, with transparency and exchanges of information potentially being
restricted.
The regulatory body should incorporate provisions for maintaining a healthysafety culture in its management system. When relevant, the safety culture of theregulatory body including its technical support organisation(s) or authorisedorganisation(s) should be such that the organisational values are shared and thatsafety priorities are consistent.
d)Maintaining regulatory competence

Since the oversight of the regulatory body covers many subjects, it is critical thatthe regulatory body develop and maintain its technical independence by ensuringthat its staff are fully competent in all relevant technical areas. Moreover, newregulatory missions (new technology and facilities, decommissioning, etc.) also
lead the regulatory body to hire new staff as it needs new skills. In all cases, new24

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SAFETY CULTURE CHALLENGES

staff must be trained, be able to gain experience and be integrated into the safety
culture of the regulatory body.
A similar situation exists with staff turn-over, with the added challenge of lossof corporate memory, unless knowledge management provisions are in place. As
experienced staff retire or leave the regulatory body, knowledge may be lost. The
regulatory body may also lack qualified personnel because of general economic
conditions in the country or specific political decisions concerning the nuclear
programme. The economic situation in a country could lead to budget and staff
reductions in the regulatory body that may preclude the regulatory body fromassessing all safety relevant issues.
When allocating its internal resources to the various projects and initiatives,
the regulatory body should be careful to give the appropriate attention and energy
to long-term issues such as spent fuel and radioactive waste management facilitiesor the remediation of contaminated territories from past nuclear activities. The
proper staff should be hired and trained to deal with these questions, and the
involvement of the regulatory body needs to be focussed on the long term.
e)Managing an emergency situation

In the case of an emergency situation, the regulatory body has to perform duties
that differ from those of normal operations (although the scope will vary according
to the country). It should act with a calm, clear vision, and in an appropriatemanner.
Co-ordination with all other organisations involved in the emergency
management system can be difficult (conflicting priorities, influence of otherorganisations on staff). Faced with an unusual event, the regulatory body might
not react as expected. It might even experience a kind of “regression” in its safety
culture as it loses its points of reference. A special team must be ready to respondto an emergency with sufficient means and the appropriate competence andleadership.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5. Conclusions and recommendations

A healthy safety culture is essential to both licensees and regulatory bodies. A
regulatory body with a healthy safety culture maintains its focus on safety andmakes safety its first priority. When the staff of a regulatory body demonstrate
positive behaviours at all levels, it positively influences the behaviour of licensees
and enhances the confidence of all stakeholders. The following elements support
healthy safety cultures within a regulatory body:•

Excellence in leadership for safety at all levels of the organisation: Good
leaders, beyond providing the necessary resources and managerial
framework, provide excellence in vision, clear direction and engenderstrong engagement. Through their own behaviour, they demonstrate theimportance of prioritising safety above all else.

•

Strong sense of personal accountability for safety: Everyone takes personal
ownership for their actions and decisions so that accountability becomes afundamental part of the regulatory body’s safety culture. This means that
individuals within the regulatory body all have a strong sense ofaccountability for safety and behave accordingly.

•

Formal direction concerning the safety culture: Staff need to know what is
acceptable and what is not. Therefore, a clear statement on corporate policy
concerning safety culture in the form of guidance or a code of conduct
should be available to all staff. Additionally, staff and management needguidance for day-to-day operations and decision making, in terms of whatrisk control systems can be implemented, how to effectively control where
resources are allocated and how to make decisions. This should be
integrated into the organisation’s management system.

•

Staff who are aligned and engaged: A healthy safety culture is supported
by staff who know what they are doing and why they are doing it. They arealigned and engaged towards the same safety objective and regulatory
mission. This awareness contributes to the development of a respectfulenvironment that supports open, honest and free dialogue andcollaboration, while enhancing an overall sense of belonging.

•

Open and transparent communication: Good communication practices
with all stakeholders builds trust and confidence, within and outside anorganisation. Such communication should be supported by transparent,
clear, available information concerning regulatory activities, including thedecision-making process.

•Informed, balanced accountability: An informed, balanced accountability
system encourages open and honest reporting and respects safety

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

information. Such a culture is supported by a working environment which
promotes a questioning attitude and facilitates the raising of safetyconcerns by staff, without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment or
discrimination.
•

A comprehensive and systemic approach to the regulatory environment:
The regulatory environment is a complex and interdependent system
which requires a holistic approach to management. Regulatory decisions
need to consider the performance and response of the entire systemdelivering safety, how the different parts of the system are coupled and the
direction the system is taking.

•

Clear regulatory framework: Safety is enhanced when there are clear andappropriate expectations on safety within the regulatory framework,without undue constraints on the system. Regulators should strive to do
more than simply establish and ensure that technical standards are
implemented; they should focus on how licensees deliver safety objectives
and encourage them to constantly strive for higher levels of safety. The
framework should reflect the regulators primary mission to actively
promote safety among licensees through the appropriate selection ofregulatory approaches and practices that foster the licensees’ sense ofaccountability, as well as their active acceptance and discharge of having
the primary responsibility for safety.

•

Continuous improvement and learning: An open, adaptable and learning
attitude in the technical, regulatory and organisational disciplines helps
avoid complacency by continuously challenging existing conditions andactivities. Different strategies can be applied, including arrangements forformal training, implementing best practices, leveraging research andparticipating in international activities.

•

Self-assessment: Assessment of the safety culture of the regulatory bodysupports continuous improvement. However, given the nature of the safety
culture and its inter-dependence with other factors, some thought stillneeds to be given to the development of assessment methodologies andappropriate performance indicators.

•

Benchmarking: The regulatory body should look outside to ensure
consistency with peers, share experiences and support a global safety
approach.

Many challenges exist to regulatory bodies’ safety culture which must berecognised, understood and overcome. These challenges include: maintaining the
focus on safety under constant pressure and scrutiny from stakeholders;considering economic factors and budget limitations; promoting the need to adapt
to changing regulatory environments; complacency; attracting and keeping
appropriate resources; interfacing with other regulations and regulators; managing
abnormal events and emergency situations; and adapting to other evolving andemerging challenges. The application of the principles and attributes outlined inthis report could help turn these challenges into opportunities to further
strengthen the overall health of the safety culture of regulatory bodies.

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REFERENCES

6. References

NEA (2015), “CNRA/CSNI/CRPPH Workshop on Challenges and Enhancements to
Safety Culture of the Regulatory Body”, Paris, 3 June 2015, www.oecdnea.org/nsd/workshops/scrb2015/.
NEA (2014), The Characteristics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator, Regulatory Guidance
Report 16, OECD, Paris. www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/pubs/2014/7185-regulator.pdf.
NEA (2006), “State-of–the-Art Report on Systematic Approaches to Safety
Management”, NEA/CSNI/R(2006)1.
NEA (1999), The Role of the Regulator in Promoting and Evaluating Safety Culture,
Regulatory Guidance Report 1, OECD, Paris.
IAEA (2007), Safety Glossary, Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection,
IAEA, Vienna, www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1290_web.pdf.
IAEA (1991), Safety Culture: A report by the International Nuclear Safety Group, Safety
Series No. 75-INSAG-4, IAEA, Vienna, www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/
PDF/Pub882_web.pdf.

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29

COMPLETE LIST OF THE NEA SERIES OF REGULATORY GUIDANCE REPORTS

Appendix 1: Complete list of the NEA series of regulatory
guidance reports (green booklets)

1

1999

The Role of the Regulator in Promoting and Evaluating Safety Culture

2

2000

Regulatory Response Strategies for Safety Culture Problems

3

2001

Nuclear Regulatory Challenges Arising from Competition in Electricity Markets

4

2001

Improving Nuclear Regulatory Effectiveness

5

2002

The Nuclear Regulatory Challenges in Judging Safety Backfits

6

2002

Improving versus Maintaining Nuclear Safety

7

2003

The Regulatory Challenges of Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors

8

2003

Nuclear Regulatory Review of Licensee Self-assessment (LSA)

9

2004

Nuclear Regulatory Challenges Related to Human Performance

10

2004

Direct Indicators of Nuclear Regulatory Efficiency and Effectiveness: Pilot Project Results

11

2005

Nuclear Regulatory Decision Making

12

2006

Regulatory Challenges in Using Nuclear Operating Experience

13

2008

The Regulatory Goal of Assuring Nuclear Safety

14

2011

The Nuclear Regulator’s Role in Assessing the Licensee Oversight of Vendor and Other
Contracted Services

15

2012

Challenges in Long-term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants: Implications for Regulatory
Bodies16

2014

The Characteristics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator

17

2016

Implementation of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power Plants: Lessons Learnt from the
Fukushima Daiichi Accident

18

2016

The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body

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31

NEA PUBLICATIONS AND INFORMATION

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In addition to basic information on the Agency and its work programme, the NEA
website offers free downloads of hundreds of technical and policy-oriented reports.
An NEA monthly electronic bulletin is distributed free of charge to subscribers,
providing updates of new results, events and publications. Sign up at www.oecdnea.org/bulletin/.
Visit us on Facebook at www.facebook.com/OECDNuclearEnergyAgency or follow
us on Twitter @OECD_NEA.

OECD/NEA PUBLISHING, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16

The Safety Culture of an Effective
Nuclear Regulatory Body

The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that
activities related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy are carried out in a safe manner
within their respective countries. In order to effectively achieve this objective, the nuclear
regulatory body requires specific characteristics, one of which is a healthy safety culture.
This regulatory guidance report describes five principles that support the safety cultureof an effective nuclear regulatory body. These principles concern leadership for safety,
individual responsibility and accountability, co-operation and open communication, aholistic approach, and continuous improvement, learning and self-assessment.
The report also addresses some of the challenges to a regulatory body’s safety culturethat must be recognised, understood and overcome. It provides a unique resource tocountries with existing, mature regulators and can be used for benchmarking as well as
for training and developing staff. It will also be useful for new entrant countries in theprocess of developing and maintaining an effective nuclear safety regulator.

Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
46, quai Alphonse Le Gallo
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, France
Tel.: +33 (0)1 45 24 10 15
nea@oecd-nea.org www.oecd-nea.org

NEA No. 7247