Operation Cast Lead:
Political Dimensions and Public Opinion
Yehuda Ben Meir

The government of Israel decided to embark upon Operation Cast Leadsix weeks before the general Knesset elections. According to security
sources in Israel, this is one of the reasons Hamas was surprised by
the operation: Hamas did not expect Israel to embark on a military
operation – certainly not one of such scope – before the elections andthe formation of a new Israeli government. Indeed, this assessment
was not unique to Hamas. In the days leading up to Operation CastLead, many analysts in Israel said that Israel was – in practice, if notin theory – in a time-out of sorts, and that it was highly unlikely thata transition government would undertake a substantial political orsecurity initiative in the midst of an election campaign.
The willingness of the government, especially its two main parties– both at the time vying with Likud to form the next government – tomake such a decision at such a time has a clear political aspect. Above
all, it reﬂects the ability of the Israeli leadership to make decisions evenunder difﬁcult circumstances. There were many, especially abroad, whowondered whether embarking on the operation at this time was notin fact connected to the elections, i.e., a function of the leaders’ desire
to attain strong achievements and tally up points before the voterswent to the polls. This claim was made publicly by Hamas leaders andspokespeople, as well as other parties hostile to Israel.
A more critical analysis, however, leads in fact to the opposite
conclusion, i.e., the timing was not chosen because of the imminentelections but rather despite them. One may safely assume that Israel’sleaders understood that it is very hard to assess the electoral effect ofDr. Yehuda Ben Meir, senior research associate at INSS
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such a military operation ahead of time – indeed, its effect is still far fromclear and may well turn to the unexpected. The political risks of suchan operation – like any military undertaking – are substantial. From theoutset, the campaign’s objectives were limited and were not meant tosatisfy all of the public’s wishes (e.g., a clear decision against Hamas or
the collapse of its government in Gaza); the military achievements andespecially the political ones were by no means a foregone conclusion;
there is always the risk of a high number of casualties among both soldiersand civilians (casualties have a strong impact on public opinion); andthere is also always the risk of unforeseen complications. Added to all
this is the basic critical and suspicious nature of the Israeli public andthe ﬁckleness of public opinion. While before the operation there wastremendous pressure on the government to act and it seemingly had
little choice in the matter, the government has already proven that when
it wants to, it can withstand such pressure. Accordingly, embarking on
the operation one and a half months before the elections demonstrates
the readiness of the country’s leadership to take political risks and its
ability to make difﬁcult decisions. This on its own carries a message ofdeterrence.
From its ﬁrst day, Operation Cast Lead enjoyed massive support
among Israel’s Jewish population. The public saw and continues tosee Operation Cast Lead as a just war in a double sense: there wasfull justiﬁcation for going to war (the war was seen by all segmentsof the Jewish population as a war of “no choice”), and the way it was
conducted and its use of force were justiﬁed. A poll taken the day
after the start of the operation1 showed 81 percent of the Israeli public
supporting the operation, with only 12 percent opposed. In light ofwhat we know today about the profound differences of opinion amongthe Jewish and Arab populations on Operation Cast Lead, it is apparent
that the vast majority of those opposed were Israeli Arabs and that thescope of Jewish support for the operation reached 90 percent.
Unlike the Second Lebanon War, when support for the war and for thepolitical and military leaderships eroded the longer the war continued,support for Operation Cast Lead remained steady throughout and evenafter its conclusion. However, the increase in political support for thetwo main parties in the government conducting the operation that wasevident in the early days of the operation quickly evaporated.

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As for support for the operation, the data is unequivocal. In a pollfrom the ﬁfth day of the war (December 31, 2008), in a statistically
representative sample of the Jewish population,2 79 percent thepopulation “strongly supported” the operation and 14 percent “largelysupported” it. A poll held on the third day of the ground offensive(January 6, 2009)3 showed that 70 percent of the Israeli population felt
it was necessary to continue the operation, compared to 20 percent thatsaid it was time for a ceaseﬁre. Here too, one may assume that some
80 percent of the Jewish population supported the continuation of theoperation. These results are fairly similar to those collected before theground offensive. In a poll taken on December 30, 2008,4 81 percentof the total population (equivalent to about 90 percent of the Jewishpopulation) supported the continuation of the operation, compared
to 10 percent that favored a ceaseﬁre. A poll taken at the end of thesecond week of the operation (January 8, 2009)5 showed that 91 percentof the Jewish population expressed support for the operation and only
4 percent opposed it.
This picture of absolute support within the Jewish population forthe operation was repeated almost exactly in the data collected by theWar and Peace Index of the Tami Steinmetz Center. In a poll taken
January 4-6, 2009,6 94 percent of the Jewish population responded
that they strongly supported the operation; 92 percent thought it hadsecurity beneﬁts for Israel; 92 percent justiﬁed the air force strikes onGaza; and 70 percent felt that sending ground troops into Gaza was “anecessary step.” The poll charted a reverse picture among Israeli Arabs:
85 percent opposed the operation.
The more the operation progressed, the more some segmentsof the population started to feel that the operation had realized its
potential. Still, the large majority supported its continuation. A polltaken on January 13, 20097 showed that 62 percent of the Israeli public(equivalent to some 70 percent of the Jewish population) responded
that the operation ought to be continued, compared with 26 percent ofthe public that supported the ceaseﬁre.
There was also a consensus in the Israeli public regarding theoutcome of the operation. A poll taken on January 13, 20098 – just fourdays before the ceaseﬁre – showed that 78 percent of the Israeli publicfelt that “the operation in Gaza was a success,” compared to only 9Strategic Assessment]7PMVNF]/P]'FCSVBSZ

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percent that deﬁned it “a failure” (13 percent responded “don’t know”).
Eighty-two percent responded negatively to the question “Did Israel
exert unnecessary force?” compared with 13 percent that responded in
the afﬁrmative. Presumably within the Jewish population only a small
percentage answered yes. In a poll taken around the same time,9 82
percent of respondents graded the military activity “very good” andanother 12 percent graded it “good”; 25 percent graded the politicalactivity as “very good” with another 35 percent grading it “good”; andperformance on the home front received grades of “very good” (58percent) or “good” (28 percent). Clearly the Israeli public saw Operation
Cast Lead as both a just and a successful war.
The end of the operation did not meet the expectations of a signiﬁcantportion of the public, despite the fact that the leadership deliberately
did not create unrealistic expectations (a clear lesson from the 2006 war).
Nonetheless, the situation was much more favorable than it was at theend of the Second Lebanon War. Then, the attitude of the public to UN
Security Council Resolution 1701 (which formulated the ceaseﬁre) wasoverwhelmingly negative, whereas in a poll taken the day after the Cast
Lead ceaseﬁre began,10 36 percent said they were in favor of the ceaseﬁreversus 50 percent who were opposed, with 14 percent responding “don’tknow.” Polls published about one week after the start of the ceaseﬁre(and several days of complete quiet on the front) already showed amore positive picture. In one,11 those interviewed were asked: “Should
the operation have been halted or should the entire Gaza Strip havebeen conquered?” Forty-eight percent responded “conquer all of theGaza Strip,” versus 44 percent who responded “halt the operation.” Inanother poll,12 58 percent of respondents answered that “the decision ofthe Israeli leadership to enter a ceaseﬁre and not continue the ﬁghting
in Gaza was the right decision” versus only 38 percent who responded
that it was “the wrong decision.” The ﬁnal public opinion verdict will
likely depend on the situation that prevails in the south. Continuing
violations of the total calm, as occurred in the last days of January andthe ﬁrst days of February, will make themselves felt very clearly interms of Israeli public opinion.
Implications of the war for the elections were more complex. On
the one hand, the popularity of the triumvirate leading the war rose aslong as the operation progressed, though the change was particularly

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dramatic with regard to the minister of defense. Just a few days after
the end of the operation, a decisive majority of the public ranked highly
each of the three as well as the IDF chief of staff and the opposition
leader for their conduct during the operation.13 Even so, the change
was not translated into election results, which was also reﬂected by thepolls. A poll taken the day after the start of the operation14 indicated, forthe ﬁrst time, a change in the ratio between the blocs and an advantage
for the center-left bloc (63 Knesset seats) over the right-religious bloc
(57), as opposed to 66 seats to the right-religious bloc and 54 seats to thecenter-left bloc in a poll published15 on December 23, 2008 (a few days
before the start of the operation).
And yet, already by the fourth day of the operation, the lead
returned to the right-religious bloc, and since then it only increased. OnJanuary 18, 2009, one day after the start of the ceaseﬁre, the advantageof the right-religious bloc returned to its pre-operation proportions – 65versus 55 seats.16 The major erosion was in support for Kadima, which
went from a high of 28-29 seats during the ﬁrst days of the operation toa low of 21-25 seats by the end of January. One poll published towards
the end of January even showed a 70 to 50 advantage to the rightreligious bloc.17
It is difﬁcult to account for this phenomenon with any certainty.
Perhaps the ﬁnal results of the operation did not match the expectations
among the public, or perhaps the public did not fully appreciate theperformance of the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the war – ora combination of the two. It may also be that the war brought out
patriotism, hawkishness, and anti-Arab sentiment, which generallyserve rightist parties (this may also explain the rise in the strength ofLieberman’s Israel Beteinu party). Kadima’s loss of popularity and thestrengthening of the right-religious bloc proved, however, a passingphenomenon.
An additional question addresses the large difference between theIsraeli public’s attitude towards Operation Cast Lead and its attitude tothe Second Lebanon War, considering the fact that the current operation
also did not achieve a clear decision in Israel’s favor: Hamas, much
like Hizbollah, was not vanquished and did not collapse. The question
is if this is linked to the particular characteristics of this operation –the low number of casualties, both among soldiers and civilians, theStrategic Assessment]7PMVNF]/P]'FCSVBSZ

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positive image of how the military performed, particularly the groundforces, and the efﬁcient and organized handling of the civilian front – orwhether this represents a coming of age and a certain sobriety among
the Israeli public regarding the nature of war against terrorist and substate organizations. The ﬁrst is the more likely answer, and some of thedata clearly points in that direction. At the same time, one must notdiscount the possibility that the second supposition is something of afactor as well.

Notes
1”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast on Israel TV’s Channel 10 on Sunday, December 28, 2008.
2 ”TeleSeker,” published in Maariv, January 2, 2009.
3 ”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast during the “Mishal Ham Show” on Israel
TV’s Channel 2 on January 6, 2009.
4 ”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast during the “Mishal Ham Show” on Israel
TV’s Channel 2 on December 30, 2008.
5 ”TeleSeker,” published in Maariv, January 9, 2009.
6 War and Peace Index, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies, January 11,2009.
7 ”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast during the “Mishal Ham Show” on Israel
TV’s Channel 2 on January 13, 2009.
8 ”Dialogue Poll,” published in Haaretz, January 16, 2009.
9 “TeleSeker,” published in Maariv, January 16, 2009.
10 ”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast on Israel TV’s Channel 2 on January 18, 2009.
11 Poll taken by Mina Tzemah, published in Yediot Ahronot, January 23, 2009.
12 ”TeleSeker,” published in Maariv, January 23, 2009.
13 See notes 11 and 12.
14 See note 1.
15 ”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast during the “Mishal Ham Show” on Israel
TV’s Channel 2 on December 23, 2008.
16 ”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast on Israel TV’s Channel 2 on January 18, 2009.
17 ”Maagar Mohot,” broadcast during the “Mishal Ham Show” on Israel
TV’s Channel 2 on January 28, 2009, and published in the newspaper Makor Rishon, January 29, 2009.