Routing Security Roadmap
Job Snijders
NTT Communications
job@ntt.net
This presentation contains projections and other forward-looking statements regarding future events or our future
routing performance. All statements other than present and historical facts and conditions contained in this release,including any statements regarding our future results of operations and routing positions, business strategy, plansand our objectives for future operations, are forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended). These statements are only predictions and reflect our current

What’s this talk about?
• Differences between IRR and RPKI semantics• What issues the industry faces• Using the hegemonic IRR aggregator duopoly for goodAverage view on routing security

Perception: it is hopeless, too many holes…

But really, there is a only a finite amount ofhurdles…

How are IRR and RPKI different?
• IRR route/route6 objects are statements:• About what Prefix/Origin ASN combinations can exist• Not necessarily made by the owner of the resource• Doesn’t tell us anything about the validity of other route objects, or othernon-matching BGP announcements• Unsuitable for filtering your upstream, OK-ish for peers and downstreams• Not exclusive• RPKI on the other hand:• Objects are only created by resource holders• RFC 6811 is game changer – RPKI based BGP Origin Validation allows for nonauthorized BGP announcements to be rejected• ExclusiveExhaustive list of issues in the currentecosystem• IRRdb / database inaccuracy (stale, autopiloted, non-validated)• IXPs and ISPs not filtering• Lack of Path Validation• Lack of sufficient and good enough software

IRR – what is broken what can be fixed?
• Some IRRdbs do not perform validation• Meaning that virtually anyone can create virtually any route/route6 object
and sneak those into the prefix-filters• Eleven relevant IRRs not validating: RIPE, NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB,ARIN IRR, BBOI, BELL, LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE• Two solutions:• Lock the database down (RIPE / RIPE-NONAUTH)• Filter on the mirror level

RIPE NWI-5 proposal & implementation• RIPE NCC’s IRR previously allowed anyone to register any non-RIPEmanaged space if it had not yet been registered. *DANGER*• The “RPSL” password & maintainer was used for thisSOL
VEDThree steps were taken:• Cannot register non-RIPE-managed space any more
• All non-RIPE space moved to separate “RIPE-NONAUTH” database• Route/route6 ASN authorization rules have been improvedMore info: https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/db/impact-analysis-for-nwi-5-implementation

OK – so current status• Ten relevant IRRs not validating: NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, ARIN IRR,BBOI, BELL, LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE• Done: RIPE

ARIN IRR allows anyone to register anythinghanna:~ job$ whois -h rr.arin.net 2001:67c:208c::% This is the ARIN Routing Registry.
% Note: this output has been filtered.
%To receive output for a database update, use the "-B" flag.

% Information related to '2001:67c:208c::/48AS15562'
route6:

2001:67c:208c::/48

descr:

2001:67c:208c::/48 - Job's net

remarks:

Job asked me to steal his net.

origin:AS15562

mnt-by:MNT-ATTW-Z

source:ARIN # Filtered

Honest!

ARIN community also recognized this is anissue• Consultation at NANOG and through ARIN-Consult mailing list
• https://www.arin.net/vault/resources/routing/2018_roadmap.html• https://teamarin.net/2018/07/12/the-path-forward/“Improve, or kill it”

ALM
OST
SOL
VED

OK – so current status• Nine relevant IRRs not validating: NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, BBOI, BELL,LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE• Done: RIPE, ARIN IRR• How to deal with the remaining nine …. ?
• Not all of these are so easily communicated with, not all are really
actively managed

The “IRR” system access• The IRR is access through predominantly two “gateways”• whois.radb.net (the bgpq3 and peval default)• rr.ntt.net• All mirroring is essentially done with one software: IRRd
Solution: Let’s use the hegemonic duopoly for good!

Improving security at the ”aggregator”?
Data sources

Aggregators

RIPE IRRClients

whois.radb.net

NTTCOM

bgpq3

RADB
rr.ntt.netAPNIC…

Proposal: Let RPKI “drown out” conflicting IRR• RPKI can be used for BGP Origin Validation – but also for other things!
• A RPKI ROA is sort of a route-object• It has a “prefix”, “origin” and “source” (the root)• We can use RPKI ROAs for provisioning BGP prefix-filters• Extend IRRd so that when IRR information is in direct conflict with a
RPKI ROA – the conflicting information is suppressed (Github)RPKI filter at the aggregators
Data sources

Aggregators

RIPE IRR

Clients

whois.radb.net

NTTCOM

bgpq3

RADBrr.ntt.net
APNIC…

RPKI suppressing conflicting IRR advantages•Industry-wide common method to get rid ofstale proxy route objects – by creating a ROA youhide old garbage in IRRs
•By creating a ROA – you will significantly
decrease the chances of people being able touse IRR to hijack your resource
gnieboslasiayti
This idenummocEPI
Rnide
dis cus s

OK – so current status• IRRs not validating: no longer problematicSOLVED• Done: RIPE, ARIN IRR, NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, BBOI, BELL, LEVEL3,RGNET, TC, CANARIE

NTT & Dashcare have started a full rewrite of IRRd to make this possible:
https://github.com/irrdnet/irrd4

”Filtering at IXPs is hard”

SOLVED• Many IXPs have come to realize their responsibilities to the Internetecosystem and the commercial benefits of a more secure product.
• http://peering.exposed/• 9 out of top 10 IXPs are filtering, tenth will later this year. IX.br making goodprogress• IXP filtering has become much easier, there are multiple fully featured
configuration generators:• https://www.ixpmanager.org/• http://arouteserver.readthedocs.io/Route servers must begin dropping RPKI Invalids• Route servers by definition provide partial Internet tables• No guarantees whatsoever that a given route will be available via RS• When a route server drops a prefix, worst case scenario is rerouting –not an outage.
ISPNetworkA

Internet
Exchange

NetworkB

Not everyone needs to do RPKI
• Because of the centralization of the web, if a select few companies
deploy RPKI Origin Validation – millions of people benefit• (google, cloudflare, amazon, pch/quad9, facebook, akamai, fastly,liberty global, comcast, etc…)• I think only 20 companies or so need to do Origin Validation for there
to be big benefits…
• https://dyn.com/blog/bgp-dns-hijacks-target-payment-systems/

“RPKI Origin Validation is useless without PathValidation aka BGPSEC”• The lack of path validation can be resolved through twomethods:• Densely peer with each other (Example: Google &Akamai have 126+ facilities in common with eachother)• An AS_PATH blocking mechanisms like “peerlock”• Both effectively are “path validation for 1 hop”
• Perhaps “1 hop” already is good enough J“There is no healthy software ecosystem”• RIPE NCC Validator v3 is works and actively maintained• NLNetlabs released their RPKI Cache Validator (Routinator 3000)• OpenBSD is looking to fund/develop a third validator implementation• Almost all serious routing vendors have RPKI support (Cisco, Juniper,BIRD, Nokia, FRR – and more are on the way)

SOLVED• Solution: more users results in better software, start using!

Timeline• IETF meetings should start now!
• IXPs – start doing RPKI Origin Validation on your route servers now• Quite some companies are deploying RPKI OV before the end ofthe year!
• ISPs / CDNs
• if you are pointing default somewhere and have local peering,
do it now

• In 2019 RPKI data will be used to clean up IRR• Hopefully the ARIN RPKI TAL situation will improve in 2019

Conclusion