NORTH KOREAMILITARY POWER
A GROWING REGIONA L and GLOBA L THREAT

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INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKPREFACE
In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency
to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was toprovide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a comprehensive andaccurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over
250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages
and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth ofSoviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the first time. DIA also produced
similar documents describing North Korean military strength in 1991 and 1995.
In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of major foreign
military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on North Korea’s defense
and military goals, strategy, plans and intentions; the organization, structure, and capabilities of its
military to supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. This productand other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, leaders and troops, the national
security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.

IVNORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

From North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un's Remarks at the 8th Workers’ Party
Congress, Released 9 January 2021
“Building the national nuclear force was a strategic and predominant goal. The status of our state
as a nuclear weapons state…enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for
coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield. New, cutting edge weapons systems
were [also] developed one after another … making our state’s superiority in military technology
irreversible and putting its war deterrent and capability of fighting war on the highest level.”1
North Korea is one of the most militarized countries in the world and remains a critical security challenge
for the United States, our Northeast Asian allies, and the international community. The Kim regime has
seen itself as free to take destabilizing actions to advance its political goals, including attacks on South
Korea, development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, proliferation of weapons, and cyberattacks
against civilian infrastructure worldwide. Compounding this challenge, the closed nature of the regime
makes gathering facts about North Korea's military extremely difficult.

In 2018, at the historic first summit between Kim Jong Un and the President of the United States, North
Korea pledged to work with the United States to accomplish what it described as “the denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula”, and committed to other measures to reduce tensions and achieve “a lastingand stable peace regime.” In the following years, North Korea tested multiple new missiles that threaten
South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there, displayed a new potentially more capable ICBM and new
weapons for its conventional force. Additionally, there continues to be activity at North Korea’s nuclear
sites. These actions indicate that North Korea will continue to be a challenge for the United States in
the coming years. This report, is a baseline examination of North Korea and its core military capabilities,
and is intended to help us better understand the current threat Pyongyang poses to the United Statesand its allies.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Equally dangerous, North Korea continues to maintain one of the world’s largest conventional militaries
that directly threatens South Korea. The North can launch a high-intensity, short-duration attack on theSouth with thousands of artillery and rocket systems. This option could cause thousands of casualties
and massive disruption to a regional economic hub. Kim Jong Un’s emphasis on improving militarytraining and investment in new weapon systems highlights the overriding priority the regime puts on
its military capabilities.

D E F E N S E

Kim Jong Un has pressed his nation down the path to develop nuclear weapons and combine them withballistic missiles that can reach South Korea, Japan, and the United States. He has implemented a
rapid, ambitious missile development and flight-testing program to refine these capabilities and improvetheir reliability. His vision of a North Korea that can directly hold the United States at risk, and thereby
deter Washington and compel it into policy decisions beneficial to Pyongyang, is clear and is plainly
articulated as a goal in authoritative North Korean rhetoric.

A G E N C Y

Just over twenty years ago, North Korea appeared to be on the brink of national collapse. Economic
assistance from former patrons in the Soviet Union disappeared; society was confronted with the death in1994 of regime founder Kim Il Sung—revered as a deity by his people—and a 3-year famine killed almosta million people. Many experts in academia and the Intelligence Community predicted that North Korea
would never see the 21st century. Yet today, North Korea not only endures under a third-generation Kim
family leader, it has become a growing menace to the United States and our allies in the region.

Scott D. Berrier
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
D i r e c t or
D efen se I nt el l igence A genc yVINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKNORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

CONTENTS
Introduction and Historical Overview.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1Origins and Combat History of the Korean People's Army (KPA), 1948–1953.  .  .  .  .  . 2The Post–Korean War KPA, 1953–1991 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  3
Shift to Asymmetric Capabilities, 1991–Present.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  4

National Military Overview.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7Threat Perceptions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8National Security Strategy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  9
Political Stability .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 11External Relations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 12

Core North Korean Military Capabilities .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 19
Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 19
Program History and Pathway to Weapon Development .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  19
Ballistic Missile Force .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  22
Biological and Chemical Weapons .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28
Offensive Conventional Systems .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28
National Defense .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30
Underground Facilities .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30
Air Defense.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  31
Coastal Defense .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 32
Electronic Warfare.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  32

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Perceptions of Modern Conflict .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 14
Military and Security Leadership.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  14
National Military Command and Control .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 17
Nuclear Command and Control.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  18

D E F E N S E

Military Doctrine and Strategy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 14

A G E N C Y

Defense Budget .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13

VII

Space/Counterspace.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 32
Cyberspace .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 33
Computer Network Attack and Intimidation .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  33
Cyber-Enabled Propaganda.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  33
Intelligence Collection .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  34
Currency Generation.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  34
Denial and Deception.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .34Logistics and Sustainment .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 35
Human Capital.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 36

Outlook: Targeted Investments in Select Military
Capabilities.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  38
Appendix A: Strategic Force .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 40
Appendix B: Ground Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  42
Appendix C: Air and Air Defense Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  45
Appendix D: Navy .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 48
Appendix E: Special Operations Forces .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  52
Appendix F: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 55
Appendix G: Intelligence Services.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  57
Appendix H: Defense Industry and the Energy Sector .  .  .  .  .  .

60

Appendix I: Arms Sales .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  67
Acronyms.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  71

VIII

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Satellite view of the Korean Peninsula at night, 2020. Visible light emissions from North Korea continue to be extremely sparse, reflecting limited
availability of electricity to most of the country outside the capital, Pyongyang, and the leadership’s fundamental decision to invest a large portionof North Korea’s resources into building military power.
Image Source: NASAX

T

he evolution of the Korean People’s
Army (KPA) from a regional military
to an aspiring nuclear force with intercontinental strike capabilities is the result of
decades of commitment to two consistent missions given to the military by the Kim family
regime: preserve the North Korean state’s
independent existence against any external
power, and provide the means for North Korea
to dominate the Korean Peninsula. Over thecourse of its existence, the KPA has seen both
the decline of some core strengths and the evolution of new capabilities, but it has retained
these central roles. Although expanded inscope, the new capabilities North Korea’s
military is developing are consistent with its
founding objectives. They are intended to holdthe United States at bay while preserving thecapacity to inflict sufficient damage on theSouth, such that both countries have no choice
but to respect the North’s sovereignty andtreat it as an equal.2
North Korea’s military poses two direct, overlapping challenges to the United States and its
allies: a conventional force consisting mostlyof artillery and infantry that can attack South
Korea with little advance warning, and a ballis-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Introduction/Historical Overview

D E F E N S E

Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first leader. Kim founded the Korean People's Army in 1948 with support andequipment from the Soviet Union.

A G E N C Y

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Image Source: AFP

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

1tic missile arsenal, intended to be armed with
nuclear weapons, that is capable of reachingbases and cities in South Korea and Japan, andthe U.S. homeland.3 Although the conventional
threat to the South has evolved slowly over
several decades, the rapid pace of development
and testing in the nuclear and missile programs
between 2012 and 2017 has brought this second possibility closer to reality faster than mostinternational observers had anticipated. These
capabilities create growing risk of a military
flashpoint in Northeast Asia that could quickly
escalate off the Korean Peninsula, possibly
across the Pacific Ocean to U.S. soil.

Origins and Combat Historyof the KPA, 1948–1953
The KPA was founded in 1948 as an infantry-centric force established to provide Kim Il Sung—theSoviet-backed North Korean leader who rose topower after the peninsula was divided in 1945—ameans to defend his new regime, provide a platform to indoctrinate his people, and allow him toachieve dominance over the entire Korean Peninsula. Most of the KPA’s original equipment, support infrastructure, and training was provided
by the Soviet Union. Kim founded the KPA on amix of Soviet strategic and Chinese tactical influences, deriving doctrine and military thoughtfrom Marxism-Leninism and interpreting it for a
Korean audience.4
In 1950, Kim launched a general invasion ofSouth Korea with the intention of reunifying
the peninsula under Pyongyang’s rule. The
KPA drove South Korean and U.S. forces to2

the southern tip of the peninsula in a matter ofweeks. Operating under a United Nations Command (UNC) established by Security Council
Resolution 84, forces and support personnel
from over a dozen countries reversed the KPA’s
advance and drove it back to the Yalu River,which divides North Korea from China. Chinese forces then intervened on North Korea’s
behalf, leading to an eventual stalemate at
the 38th parallel—today’s Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ). The Korean War remains the only sustained conflict in which the KPA participated
as a major belligerent. North Korea sufferedan estimated 1.5 million soldiers and civilians killed in the war and endured devastating damage from aerial bombing and groundassault.5 These losses deeply influenced North
Korean strategic thinking and military anddefense planning, resonating into the presentday. Although hostilities were suspended withan Armistice Agreement in 1953, no peace
treaty was signed, and the peninsula technically remains in a state of war.

U.S. aerial bombing over Wonsan Harbor during
the Korean War. North Korea suffered massive
industrial damage in combat with United Nations
Command forces from 1950 to 1953.
Image Source: ShutterstockA Growing Regional and Global Threat

In the 1970s and 1980s, the North Korean
regime accelerated and redirected KPA modernization initiatives toward reestablishing
offensive conventional warfare capabilities.
In an August 1976 Korean Workers' Party
journal, an article entitled "Scientific Features of Modern War and Factors of Victory"
kicked off a rare internal debate on military
doctrine by stressing the importance of economic development and the impact of new

A G E N C Y

Rebuilding after the Korean War, North Korea
had shifted its military strategy by the 1960s toa Maoist-style war of attrition, hoping to undermine the government in Seoul through covert
infiltration, assassinations, and attempts tofoster Communist insurgencies.6,7 During thisperiod, Kim embarked on a program to modernize the KPA and posture it to defend in depth
against any foreign aggressor. In December
1962, Kim Il Sung espoused the Four Military
Guidelines: arm the entire population, fortify
the entire country, train the entire army as a
"Cadre Force" (meaning all soldiers capableof establishing and training military units),
and modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics
under the principle of self-reliance in national
defense.8,9 Early North Korean interest in
nuclear technology, which dates to the 1950s,
reached a practical stage during this period; aSoviet-supplied research reactor went online
in 1967, and a domestically-designed reactor
began operating in 1986.

weapons on military strategy. The author
argued that the quality of arms and the levelof military technology define the characteristics of war. The primacy of conventional
warfare again became doctrine. This article
laid down several concepts that continued toinfluence North Korean operational doctrine
through the 1990s and into the 21st century;
particularly influential was an emphasis on
operational and tactical mobility, deep-strikecapabilities, and use of the subterranean
domain throughout the depth of the battlefield.10 Although these tenets remain central
to North Korean military doctrine, the ability of the state to sustain forcewide modernization began to decline in the late 1980s.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

The Post–Korean War KPA,
1953–1991

Kim Jong Il, right, became leader in 1994 after thedeath of Kim Il Sung, left. The younger Kim set
North Korea on course to further its nuclear andmissile programs.

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: AFP

3

Shift to Asymmetric
Capabilities, 1991–PresentWith the loss of direct Soviet and Chinese military-to-military support in the early 1990s,
the beginning of a major economic decline,
and the famine in the late 1990s, accompanied by advances in U.S. and South Korean
military capabilities, North Korea becameless and less likely to prevail in a conventional war on the peninsula. Under new
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, the KPA
emphasized asymmetric capabilities, suchas special operations forces, chemical andbiological weapons, and long-range artillery
postured against the predominantly civilian
population in Seoul, and renewed its emphasis on developing a nuclear strike capability.
Also during this period, Kim publicized theSongun ideology—“Military First” politics —apublic reaffirmation of the KPA’s centrality to
the regime. Under this philosophy, the military became one of the dominant institutionsin North Korean society.11

By the 1990s, North Korea was making strides
in ballistic missile development. In 1993 theNorth flight-tested a new, Scud-derived medium-range ballistic missile, the No Dong, andin 1998 North Korea attempted to launch asatellite using a prototype multistage rocketthat could support the development of longer-range ballistic missiles.12,13 North Korea
continued to operate a nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon during this period, fueling concernsthat Pyongyang could extract plutonium foruse in nuclear weapons.14 These developments
spurred international efforts to constrain thegrowth of the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs, first through a bilateral Agreed Framework between North Korea
and the United States and later through amultilateral Six-Party Talks process also
involving South Korea, Japan, China, andRussia. For a time, Kim Jong Il cooperated
with some of these initiatives, temporarilysuspending missile testing and nuclear activities and submitting to some degree of international monitoring in exchange for economic
incentives and security assurances.15“Military First” Politics
North Korea’s “Military First,” or Songun, philosophy established the military as the mostimportant North Korean institution and a means to solve social, economic, and politicalproblems.16,17 Although some North Korean accounts date its origins to the 1930s, when Kim
Il Sung led an anti-Japanese guerrilla movement, Songun was not formally introduced until
after Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994. Kim Jong Il established the ideology in part because themilitary served as a better power base for him than the Korean Workers' Party did.18 Military First has resulted in a larger role for the KPA in social and economic projects, including large-scale infrastructure development and agriculture.19 Although the ideology persists,
Kim Jong Un has reinvigorated the status of the Korean Workers' Party during his rule.

4

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

larger multistage rockets, and carried out
North Korea’s first nuclear test.20 Additional ballistic missile flight tests and asecond nuclear test followed in 2009. 21 Since
then, despite intense international pressure and daunting technological challenges,
North Korea has unambiguously linked its
national security strategy, interests, andidentity to becoming a nuclear power withintercontinental reach. These concepts are
now enshrined in North Korea's law, doctrine, and constitution.22

Kim Jong Un has rapidly accelerated development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles since
assuming power in 2011.

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

By the mid-2000s, Kim Jong Il had decided
to put the North on a path to a nuclear
breakout. His primary motivations wereapprehension about U.S. military intentions after the 9/11 attacks and major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, a continually worsening military imbalance on thepeninsula, and failure to obtain anticipatedenergy assistance and other economic concessions from international negotiations. In
2006, he resumed ballistic missile testing,renewed satellite launch attempts using

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

5

Kim Jong Il died in 2011. His youngest son,
Kim Jong Un, succeeded to leadership at age
27 and accelerated the pace of development ofboth nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
By mid-2017, the new leader had overseen four
underground nuclear tests (for a total of six
since 2006) with higher yields than previous
tests and had debuted and flight-tested morethan half a dozen new ballistic missiles of varying ranges, including a submarine-launchedballistic missile, two types of mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and the first tested
North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.23,24,25
Kim Jong Un has also focused his attention
on the KPA’s conventional capabilities. From
2011-2017 Kim kept up a steady pace of public engagements with military units to emphasize the KPA’s centrality to the North Korean
regime, and has directed improvements in therealism and complexity of military training. To
that end, Kim presided over high-profile artillery
firepower exercises, Air Force pilot competitions,and special forces raid training on mock-ups of
the South Korean presidential residence.26, 27
In April 2018, Kim began prioritizing diplomatic engagement likely in an effort toencourage sanctions relief. At the same time,
North Korea introduced new weapons systems in a September 2018 military paradefeaturing conventional forces.

tems and equipment sets across all its military
services, including new tanks, artillery rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles, most ofwhich have been displayed in military parades
linked to important North Korean holidays
and observances.28 The extent to which somenew equipment has been integrated into theforce is unclear, but these observations suggest
a continuing KPA emphasis on modernizing
strike weaponry, improving surveillance andreconnaissance capabilities, and broadening
the regime’s options for raids or other special
forces operations in South Korea.
The North Korean military, once considered athreat that would be confined to the 20th century, has never abandoned its ambition of dominating the peninsula and, if possible, reunifying
it under Pyongyang’s rule. The KPA currently
lacks the operational capability to forcibly
reunify the Korean Peninsula, as attempted in
1950, but Kim’s forces are developing capabilities that will provide a wider range of asymmetric options to menace and deter his regional
adversaries, quickly escalate any conflict off thepeninsula, and severely complicate the environment for military operations in the region.

During the first half of 2019, Kim gradually
resumed efforts to highlight military capabilities, likely signaling his frustration over thelack of progress on diplomatic initiatives. He has
resumed publicizing military visits and weapons
launches, and in October 2020 and January 2021
military parades displayed multiple new missiles, including a larger ICBM.
Since Kim Jong Un took power, North Korea
has introduced a few new conventional sys-

North Korean soldiers stand atop armored vehicles
during September 2018 military parade.
Image Source: AFP

6

The Korean People’s Army at a Glance
Services: Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, Strategic Force (ballistic missiles)
Personnel: Over 1.3 million (plus approximately 7 million paramilitary, reservists and bodyguard command personnel)
Recruit base: Universal conscription
Equipment profile: Primarily Soviet-era systems; some newer systems in each service
Core strength: Massed artillery threat to South Korea, Special Operations, undergroundfacilities, defensive fortifications
Developing strengths: Strategic ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons
Key vulnerabilities: Logistics for sustained combat operations

I N T E L L I G E N C E

National Military Overview

D E F E N S E

North Korean military event in Pyongyang. The North remains one of the world’s most militarized societies.

A G E N C Y

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Image Source: AFP

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

7

Threat Perceptions
North Korea's perception that the outside worldis inherently hostile drives the North's security
strategy and pursuit of specific military developments. This perception is informed by a history
of invasion and subjugation by stronger powers
stretching back centuries and, in the 20th century, by the 1910–45 Japanese occupation andthe externally enforced division of the Korean
Peninsula at the end of World War II.29 The Kim
family dynasty has exploited this history to craft
a totalitarian political culture that is defined byresistance to outside powers and that invests
the Kim family with unique, unquestionableauthority to protect the Korean people fromexternal threats. To respond to this existential
threat, North Korea’s leaders believe they must
develop the military capabilities to hold external aggressors at bay and preserve the North’s
sovereignty and independence. These essential
themes have been constant across all three Kim
dynasty leaders, with the North’s capabilities
evolving over time to meet different manifestations of the perceived threat.
The North views the United States as its primaryand immediate external security threat. This perception is strongly rooted in the U.S. role during
the Korean War, the U.S. military presence on thepeninsula since the armistice, and the leading role
Washington has played in attempting to modify
Pyongyang’s behavior and constrain its nuclear
ambitions. South Korea and Japan are treatedas extensions of U.S. aggression. The North also
perceives a strong and longer-term ideologicalthreat from South Korea because Seoul’s different
economic and political systems represent an alter-

8

native—and, to Pyongyang, unacceptable—wayof life for the historically unified Korean people.
Advances in South Korean and Japanese militarycapabilities over the last two decades have also
clarified a major and growing gap between the
North's military power and that of its neighbors.
China and Russia have historically been allies,
partners, and patrons of the North Koreanstate, but, despite broader diplomatic outreach since 2018, Pyongyang tends to show
little trust in either country. The North fears
absorption or preemption by a much more powerful China and probably wants to preserve its
political independence from Beijing even at therisk of alienating Chinese leadership. Pyongyang probably sees Russia as a relatively lessimportant partner in the region.
The Kim regime is driven by fears of threats to
its power from internal sources as well. Kim Il
Sung endured a period of factionalism before
consolidating absolute rule over the North in
the late 1950s; this experience taught him toplace a priority on eradicating all political, economic, and social influences that might threaten
his ideological control of the population. Over
decades, this manifested as a series of overlapping internal security measures and societal
controls designed to ensure absolute loyalty to
the leader. Political control over the military
was particularly critical, and it remains a major
priority for the Kim Jong Un regime.30
One of the greatest perceived threats to North
Korea’s ideological control and internal stability is the growing influence of what the regime
sees as politically corrosive outside information,
including through foreign media exposure andA Growing Regional and Global Threat

North Korea’s national security strategy has
two main objectives: ensure the Kim regime’s
long-term security, which the leadership defines
as North Korea remaining a sovereign, independent country ruled by the Kim family, andretaining the capability to exercise dominant
influence over the Korean Peninsula. Since themid-2000s, the North’s strategy to achieve thesegoals has been to prioritize the development of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver
nuclear weapons to increasingly distant ranges
while maintaining a conventional military capable of inflicting enormous damage on South
Korea. Kim Jong Un expanded the nuclear andA G E N C Y

National Security Strategy

missile programs in an effort to develop a survivable nuclear weapon delivery capability thatthe regime could use, in theory, to respond to any
external attack. Pyongyang’s goal is to maintaina credible nuclear capability, which it believes
will deter any external attack. It also seeks to
use its nuclear and conventional military capabilities to compel South Korea and the UnitedStates into policy decisions that are beneficial toNorth Korea. As part of his strategy, Kim Jong
Un has publicly emphasized the ability of North
Korean nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to strike
the United States and regional U.S. allies in an
attempt to intimidate international audiences.

Kim Jong Un takes personal interest in developing
KPA capabilities and is often portrayed in state media
directing exercises and observing training.
Image Source: AFP/KCNA VIA KNS

From North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un's Remarks at 5th Party Plenary
Session, Released 1 January 2020
“This is a great victory… strategic weapon systems planned by the party are coming into ourgrasp one by one… Such leaps in cutting-edge national defense science make our military andtechnological advantage irreversible, accelerate the increase of our national strengths to the maximum, heighten our ability to control surrounding political situations, and give our enemies animmense and overwhelming strike of anxiety and fear.”33

I N T E L L I G E N C E

the importing of entertainment programmingthat depicts daily life in South Korea.31 This
trend has grown as the regime’s capability to provide basic goods and services to the populationin the provinces outside Pyongyang has steeply
declined, driving an increase in market activity
that has coincided with broader availability ofcell phones. Since the 2000s, North Korea has
attempted various military and security efforts
to monitor and deal with unsanctioned activity
but has been forced to accept a degree of risk
posed by the influx of outside media.32

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

9Targeting U.S. Forces
Historically, North Korea used military action against both South Korean and U.S. targets
after the 1953 Armistice Agreement halted the Korean War. Pyongyang targeted U.S. forcesin several high-profile incidents, including the seizure of the USS Pueblo in international
waters in 1968 and the shootdown of a U.S. reconnaissance plane in international airspacein 1969. Pyongyang has largely avoided the deliberate targeting of U.S. personnel since thelate 1970s and has concentrated its limited-objective attacks on South Korean personnel,
except in a 1994 incident when a U.S. Army helicopter was shot down, killing one crewmember, after it accidentally strayed into North Korean airspace.
The North also has traditionally used periodic,
limited-scope military actions to pressure South
Korea and to underscore the fragility of the armistice, which it seeks to replace with a peace treaty
on its terms. During the 1960s and 1970s, theseactions took the form of aggressive skirmishes
along the DMZ and overt attempts to assassinate South Korean leaders, including the South
Korean president, with special forces raids andterrorist tactics.34 In recent years the North has
confined aggression against the South to targeted
engagements in the disputed Northwest Islands
area. Confrontations between patrol craft andother incidents along the Northern Limit Line
have claimed more than 50 South Korean lives
since 1999.35 In 2010, North Korea attacked andsank a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors, and bombarded a South Korean
Marine Corps installation on Yeonpyeong Island,
resulting in 2 military and 2 civilian deaths.36,37

South Korean corvette Cheonan, which was sunkby a North Korean torpedo in March 2010, pictured
here on a salvage barge.
Image Source: AFP

10

No comparable attack on the South has yet
occurred under Kim Jong Un’s rule, but North
Korea’s willingness to strike South Korea withlethal force endures. In August 2015 a landmine detonated in the DMZ and wounded two
South Korean soldiers, kicking off a monthlong

Image Source: AFP

confrontation with the South that ultimately led
to artillery fire along the border. Escalation to awider conflict was possible although averted inthis instance.38

Political Stability
Kim Jong Un views political stability as essential
to safeguarding his rule, a perception inheritedfrom his father and grandfather. No North Koreanleader has tolerated the emergence of a competing
political system or a lack of loyalty among regime
elites. To maintain stability and control, the stateretains a pervasive internal security apparatus
consisting of multiple agencies and departmentswith overlapping areas of responsibility andbroad powers to monitor all North Korean citizens
for criminal and subversive behavior. North Koreans are also encouraged to report on one anotherat the local level through a “neighborhood watch”
system called inminban. Citizens found to havetransgressed can be interned in a massive systemof state-run prison camps, where they are subjected to abusive conditions.39

Despite renewed emphasis on ideological indoctrination and strengthened border controls,
North Koreans continue to defect abroad. Most
escape into China and, if they are able to elude
authorities and find work, eventually make their
way to South Korea by way of Southeast Asia.42
In 2020, 229 North Korean defectors arrived inSouth Korea, a notable drop from 1,047 in 2019,
which is probably because North Korea closed its
borders to prevent COVID-19 transmission. The
defection rate has declined from a high of 2,914
people in 2009, probably owing to strengthened
security along the North Korea-China border.43
A small number of higher-profile North Koreansdefect—notably, in 2016, including the deputy
chief of mission to the embassy in London—but

I N T E L L I G E N C E

In 2010, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island
along the northwestern maritime border with South
Korea, the first kinetic strike on South Korean–occupied territory in decades.

Kim has used purges and executions to eliminate
perceived threats to his authority and compel loyalty from subordinates. His perception of a threat
may be driven in part by sensitivity to questions
about whether the young Kim was capable oftaking full leadership of North Korea after his
father’s death, and it also seems intended to
invoke memories of Kim Il Sung, whose image
and methods Kim Jong Un has sought to emulate. Most prominently, Kim publicly removed
his uncle, Chang Song-taek, from the position ofvice chairman of the National Defense Commission in December 2013 and had him executed foralleged crimes against the state.40 In the military,
Kim has repeatedly reshuffled personnel in key
defense positions and demoted senior officers inrank. The result is a system that appears largely
stable from the outside, with elites motivated byfear and co-opted with privilege to preserve theKim regime.41

A G E N C Y

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

11this trend does not yet seem to have broadened tothe point where Kim considers it a major threat.44

External Relations
North Korea’s external relationships do not appear
to significantly contribute to its defense establishment or boost military readiness. Internationalsanctions against North Korea contribute to potential partners’ lack of interest in expanding ties.
In the first years of his rule, Kim Jong Un madefew efforts to engage foreign counterparts. However, starting in 2018 he began an international
outreach effort, travelling abroad for the firsttime as leader of North Korea to meet the leaders of China, South Korea, the United States,
and Russia. He likely believes these efforts arenecessary to obtain sanctions relief.
Pyongyang’s only formal defense agreement iswith China: the 1961 Sino–North Korean Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.
This agreement obliges each signatory to rendermilitary assistance in defense of the other if one is
attacked,45 but direct military-to-military engagement between Pyongyang and Beijing has been

Kim Jong Un meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping
in Beijing on 8 January 2019.
Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS

12suspended for years. Diplomatic relations between
both countries worsened after North Korea’s
nuclear and missile tests accelerated. In 2017,
China instituted new import restrictions intended
to affect the North Korean economy and continued to call for North Korea to cease its nuclear
and ballistic missile test activities. Kim Jong Un
visited China and met with President Xi Jinping
in March, May, and June of 2018, and in January
2019, indicating a desire to nurture relations. Xi
made his first visit to North Korea in June 2019.46
Russia, which provided substantial military
assistance and equipment to North Korea during
the Soviet era, has largely curtailed its defense
relationship with North Korea. Since UNSC
sanctions in August 2017, however, some economic and diplomatic engagement with Russia
has taken place. In October 2017, a state-owned
Russian company began to provide a second internet connection to North Korea, reducing Pyongyang’s dependence on China.47 Kim Jong Un met
with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the
first time in April 2019 as part of Kim’s effort todiversify diplomatic and economic ties and further reduce economic dependence on China. The
two discussed diplomatic and commercial opportunities, although no official agreements wereannounced.48 Thus far, these overtures have
led to minimal improvements in relations given
North Korea’s perception of Russia’s pressure todenuclearize and failure to provide significant
economic and military concessions.
North Korea views Japan and South Korea asadversaries but maintains lines of communication with both countries. North Korea met
with a Japanese delegation in 2016 to discuss

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Defense Budget
Although the regime does not publish exact economic figures, estimates are based on trends
in observed economic activity. As such, North
Korea’s economy shrank by about 4 percent
in 2018 because of UNSC sanctions. In 2019,
North Korea’s economy grew slightly, but likely
contracted in 2020 because of trade disruptions
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.52 Coal, other

National Defense Burden Comparison, 2020 Global Baseline<1%<1-1.9%2-9.9%

63

61

62

10-19.9%

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20-30%
NORTH
KOREA

2
Percentage of GDP Spent on Defense#

Number of Countries

2

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Defense spending is a regime priority. Spending
estimates range from $7 billion to $11 billion;
20–30 percent of North Korea’s GDP is allocatedto the military.54 This level of commitment makes
North Korea the highest spending nation in theworld for defense as a percentage of GDP. Pyongyang has probably increased defense spending
during the past decade and likely will continue
devoting a large portion of its GDP to national
defense through at least 2021.55 A detailed
breakdown of North Korean military spendingby categories such as personnel, procurement,
or operations and maintenance is unavailable.
Pyongyang has mustered sufficient funds, most
likely by shifting priorities, to finance foreign
procurement and domestic development and production for testing missile systems and nuclear
weapons. Nonmonetary resources, including raw
materials and electrical power, are also prioritized for use in military projects.56

A G E N C Y

minerals, and clothing account for almost 70
percent of Pyongyang’s nonmilitary foreign
trade, according to the International Trade Centre, but are currently banned as North Korean
exports by UNSC sanctions imposed in 2017.53

an ongoing dispute over the disposition of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea during
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The North andSouth held two summits in 2018, and have intermittently held high-level talks at Panmunjom
in the DMZ to tamp down tensions in inter-Korean relations. In September 2018, the Koreas
signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement,
which calls on both sides to take measures toprevent accidental military clashes. After an
initial push to carry out the agreement, progress stalled and in June 2020 North Korea
demolished a liaison office and threatened toreverse military actions taken thus far.49,50,51

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

13

Military Doctrine and Strategy

ers—to raise the cost of taking and holding
North Korean territory.

Perceptions of Modern Conflict

Some investments in specific North Korean
military capabilities are intended to improve
the odds of North Korean success in a modern conflict. However, these efforts are generally isolated to a few areas and would not, in
Pyongyang’s estimation, confer overwhelming
advantage on the KPA in a modern conflictagainst the United States and South Korea.

North Korea understands that the character of
war has changed since its last sustained combat experience in 1953 and sees its military aslargely unprepared to engage in modern warfare. Pyongyang probably assesses its force asa whole cannot prevail in combat against theUnited States, given U.S. forces’ overwhelming advantages in power projection, strategic
air superiority, and precision-guided standoff strike capability. This perception has been
informed by North Korea’s monitoring of U.S.
operations in the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999
Kosovo air campaign, campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and U.S.-led air operations in
Libya in 2011 and Syria since 2014. The North
also is a keen observer of South Korean militarycapabilities and probably judges it is at a qualitative disadvantage against its neighbor.57,58,59
North Korean defense planning, therefore, has
adapted to deter direct U.S. military intervention by signaling that the cost of such intervention would be unacceptably high to the UnitedStates even if North Korea ultimately lost theengagement. In the last few years, this effort
to shape adversary deterrence calculations has
centered on developing and publicizing a survivable nuclear-armed ballistic missile force.
Should deterrence fail, North Korea would
seek to maximize its defensive advantages—
including inhospitable terrain, widespreaduse of underground facilities, and a population
conditioned from birth to resist foreign invad-

14

Military and Security Leadership
Kim Jong Un is the supreme commander ofthe KPA, in addition to his position as head of
all governmental, political, and security institutions in the country. He holds the rank ofmarshal in the KPA and was appointed a fourstar general before his succession, although
he is not known to have any actual military
experience. In North Korea’s unitary leadership structure, Kim is the ultimate authority
for all defense and national security decisions,
including operational planning and execution, procurement and acquisition, and strategy and doctrine. As the first secretary of the
Korean Workers' Party, he establishes policy
and guidance for North Korea’s military andimplements party policy through key national-level organizations.60,61 As the party's Central Military Commission chairman and theState Affairs Commission chairman, Kim controls all military and defense-related policy,
with broad authority to consolidate political,
military, and state powers during both wartime and peacetime.62

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Kim Jong Un's Leadership Priorities
Born in 1983, Kim Jong Un was the youngest of Kim Jong Il’s three sons. Kim Jong Il formally
introduced Kim Jong Un as his successor in 2009, bypassing his older sons, Kim Jong Nam andKim Jong Chol. Little is known about Kim’s life before his succession to leadership in 2011.

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

In relations with the United States, Kim initially responded to Washington’s demands that heabandon his nuclear aspirations by accelerating the program’s development and by issuing specific threats to attack the United States. In 2018, Kim demonstrated a willingness to participate
in talks on denuclearization. However, since 2019 he has demonstrated his intent to continue bolstering North Korea’s military deterrent by developing and testing new missiles and developing
new military equipment for the conventional force.

A G E N C Y

Kim’s priorities as leader of North Korea have been to solidify the state's nuclear capability andmake rapid strides toward achieving a ballistic missile arsenal capable of threatening the UnitedStates while attempting to modernize the economy – a “dual line” policy called Byungjin in the
North. Although economic development is a priority, Kim is willing to endure financial losses inorder to advance other goals; North Korean nuclear and missile tests continue to result in UN
sanctions, and, in 2016, a rocket launch prompted South Korea to close the Kaesong Industrial
Complex, which provided the regime about $100 million a year through cash remittances.

Kim Jong Un at a military parade, April 2017. Kim has directed improvements to each KPA service’s capabilities.
Image Source: AFP/KCNA VIA KNS

15

General Staff Department Chief Vice Marshal Pak
Chong-chon with Kim Jong Un.
Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

Image Source: Uriminjokkkiri

Through the General Political Bureau, North
Korea maintains a separate political commandand control apparatus to ensure military loyalty to the Kim regime and implementation ofparty guidance. The bureau leads all politicaland ideological training, monitors morale andpersonal lives, guides servicemen’s political
lives, and disseminates propaganda for the
military in order to maintain military loyalty
to the regime. The director of the General Political Bureau usually serves as a key adviser to
Kim Jong Un. Vice Marshall Kwon Yong-chin
was appointed head of the General Political
Bureau in January 2021.63,64,65

Korean military. Vice Marshal Pak Chong-chon
was appointed as the General Staff Department
head in September 2019, and is one of Kim’s
principal military advisers.67

Operational control of North Korea’s armed
forces resides in the General Staff Department,
which reports directly to Kim Jong Un.66 The
department as a whole aggregates and operationally commands all military service headquarters, functional and combat commands,
and military communications, and it evaluates
the overall training and readiness of the North

16

Vice Marshall Kwon Yong-chin, General Political Bureau .

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is
responsible for administrative control of themilitary and external relations with foreign
militaries. MND manages the manpower andresource needs of North Korea’s conventionalarmed forces and special operations forces.
In the past MND-controlled companies wereinvolved in earning foreign currency throughexports and domestic distribution, though thisactivity has probably been reduced by international sanctions.68 As of July 2021, Colonel General Kim Chong-kwan has been removed fromhis position as MND chief and his replacement
was not announced. The MND minister is positioned primarily to manage defense acquisitions, resourcing and financing allocations for
all North Korean armed forces.69

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

National Military Command
and Control
As the KPA supreme commander and central
decisionmaker in North Korea, Kim Jong Un
is the linchpin of KPA command and control.
Kim exercises command and control over allcorps-level military organizations, including ground, air, naval, and ballistic missile
forces.70 The General Staff Department maintains overall control of all North Korean military forces and is charged with turning thesupreme commander’s directives into operational military orders.71

North Korean Military Command and Control

1707-13888

Supreme Command

Ministry of National Defense

Wartime Procedure
General Staff Department

Ground Forces

Air Force

Peacetime Consultation

Navy

Strategic ForceI N T E L L I G E N C E

State Affairs Commission

D E F E N S E

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un
Korean Workers’ Party
Central Military Commission

A G E N C YSupreme Commander Kim Jong Un operates as the absolute decisionmaker of North Korea’s armed
forces. The Supreme Command would disseminate any order from Kim to North Korea’s armed
forces, including its ballistic missile corps, the Strategic Force. As the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman and the State Affairs Commission (SAC) chairman, Kim
controls all military and defense-related policy.

17

Kim Jong Un exercises personal command and control over North Korea’s nuclear, ballistic missile, and conventional military forces. In this 2013 image released by North Korean state media, a map of notional missile strikes
on the United States is the backdrop to Kim signing a “firepower strike plan.”
Image Source: AFP

During wartime, Kim Jong Un would exercise
overall control of preparations, mobilization, andoperations. The Supreme Command functions asboth the highest ranking advisory board to Kim
on all state and military affairs and as the organization charged with converting the supreme commander’s strategies into actual wartime directives. The Supreme Command would comprisesenior officers from the General Staff Department, Ministry of National Defense, and otherkey national-level organizations.72

Nuclear Command and Control
Kim Jong Un has established through public
policy statements and legislation that he is the18

sole release authority for North Korean nuclear
weapons use against any adversary. In 2013,
North Korea revised its national constitution
and passed a law on nuclear use, which statedthat nuclear weapons could not be used without an express order from the supreme commander.73 Kim has personally authorized North
Korea's nuclear tests, most recently in September 2017. North Korean state-sponsored media
published the order with his signature after
the test occurred.74 Other North Korean public
media releases have emphasized Kim’s singularrole in authorizing missile force alerts and thesigning of a “firepower strike plan,” ostensibly
for nuclear attack on the United States.75

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global ThreatCore North Korean Military Capabilities
Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles
Construction of additional reactors—a 50-MWe
reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-MWe reactor at
Taechon—provided additional indications of alarger-scale nuclear program.76

A G E N C Y

North Korea joined the Nonproliferation
Treaty in 1985, but inspections only started
7 years later under the treaty's safeguards
regime, inviting questions about the North’s

North Korean nuclear research began in thelate 1950s through cooperation agreementswith the Soviet Union. The North’s firstresearch reactor began operating in 1967,
and Pyongyang later built a nuclear reactor
at Yongbyon with an electrical power ratingof 5 megawatts electrical (MWe). This reactor
began operating in 1986 and was capable ofproducing about 6 kilograms of plutonium per
year. Later that year, high-explosives testing
and a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium
from the reactor’s spent fuel were detected.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Program History and Pathway to
Weapon Development

Reactor at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex.
North Korea has acknowledged both plutonium
reprocessing and uranium enrichment activities atthis installation. Activities at Yongbyon sites continue.

D E F E N S E

North Korea has aspired to become anuclear weapons power for decades.
Although the nuclear program’s foundation dates to the 1950s, Pyongyang started
making its most significant progress toward
developing a nuclear weapons capability after
withdrawing from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2002, citing increasing alarm over U.S. military activities abroadand dissatisfaction with the pace at which international economic aid, promised in past nuclear
negotiations, was arriving. The North began
testing nuclear devices underground in 2006.
North Korea discloses very few details about its
nuclear weapons inventory and force structure.

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons19

North Korean Nuclear and Rocket Launch Facilities
North Korea’s launch installations have supported
ground test and launches of multi-stage rockets,
nominally for putting satellites in orbit. These activities provided a test bed for long-range ballistic
missile technology, and support the developmentof ICBMs now in the North Korean inventory. Recent
activities at the Pyongsan Uranium Concentration
Plant have also been reported.77

20

1707-13887

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Development Organization and stopped shipmentof heavy fuel oil to North Korea, whose response
was removing the international monitors andseals at the Yongbyon facility and restarting its
plutonium production infrastructure.79

plutonium production. In 1994, North Korea
pledged to freeze and eventually dismantle its
plutonium programs under the Agreed Framework with the United States. At that time, anumber of sources estimated that Pyongyang
had separated enough plutonium for one or two
nuclear weapons. North Korea allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to place seals
on spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor and toundertake remote monitoring and onsite inspections at its nuclear facilities.78
In 2002, negotiators from the United States confronted North Korea with evidence of a clandestine uranium enrichment program, a claim that
North Korean officials publicly denied. Disagreement over the North’s establishment of a uranium
enrichment program led to the breakdown of theAgreed Framework. The United States reachedagreement with members of the Korean Economic

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFPThe North began underground nuclear testing in2006 and used early tests to both validate device
designs and to send a political signal that it wasadvancing its nuclear capability. By September
2017 North Korea had conducted six nuclear
tests: one each in 2006, 2009, and 2013; two in
2016; and one in September 2017, according toseismic detections and public claims by North
Korean media.81,82 Successive tests have demonstrated generally higher explosive yields, according to seismic data.83 The September 2017 test
generated a much larger seismic signature than
had previous events, and North Korea claimed
this was a test of a “hydrogen bomb” intended
for use on an intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM).84 North Korea has exclusively used theunderground nuclear test facility in the vicinityof Punggye for its nuclear tests. In May 2018,
North Korea disabled some parts of the Punggye
test site, announcing that it no longer needed
to conduct nuclear tests. However, Pyongyang
retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons minimizing the impact of this development.

D E F E N S E

Kim Jong Un examines a mock nuclear warhead displayed in front of a ballistic missile.

A G E N C Y

North Korea has demonstrated the capability
to produce kilogram quantities of plutonium fornuclear weapons and has claimed to possess theability to produce enriched uranium for nuclear
weapons. The North disclosed a uranium enrichment plant to an unofficial U.S. delegation inlate 2010 and claimed it was intended to produce
enriched uranium to fuel a light-water reactor.80

21Ballistic Missile Force
North Korea established a Strategic Force (previously known as the Strategic Rocket Forces)
in 2012 and has described this organization
as a nuclear-armed ballistic missile force. The
Strategic Force includes units operating shortrange (SRBM), medium-range (MRBM), intermediate-range (IRBM) ballistic missiles, andICBMs, each of which North Korea has stated
represents a nuclear-capable system class. In
2016, the North claimed a Scud class SRBM
launch had tested nuclear weapon components
in a mock attack against a South Korean port.85
Pyongyang has occasionally hinted at thepossibility of other nuclear-capable units, forinstance, by marching infantry troops carrying
backpacks emblazoned with the nuclear symbol in a 2013 military parade.86
The North’s ballistic missile force is structured
around multiple regional and intercontinental
target sets. The Strategic Force operates Scudclass missiles that can range South Korea, someextended-range variants of the Scud that canreach Japan, and the No Dong MRBM, which
can reach Japan. This force also is responsible for
the Hwasong-12 IRBM, which was designed torange Guam; and the Hwasong-14 ICBM, capable of reaching the continental United States. 87
North Korea revealed its first road mobile
ICBM in a 2012 military parade. In 2015, it
began flight-testing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Pukguksong-1. Subsequently, the North conducted an initial flightof a new solid-propellant MRBM, the Pukguksong-2 and a new IRBM, the Hwasong-12, whichappears to be a replacement for the Musudan

22

Hwasong-14 ICBM on a road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher prior to launch, July 2017.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

IRBM. North Korea conducted multiple flighttests of the Hwasong-12, including flight tests
in August and September 2017 over northern
Japan, ultimately reaching a range of approximately 3,700 kilometers, its longest-range direct
trajectory ballistic missile flight tests to date.88,89
North Korea conducted an inaugural launchof its ICBM class system, the Hwasong-14 on
4 July 2017 and again on 28 July 2017. It thenlaunched a second type of ICBM, the larger
Hwasong-15 on 28 November 2017.90

Hwasong-15 ICBM on its mobile launcher, November 2017.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFPNORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

included one new short-range ballistic missile, which was arrayed in pairs on four-axle
trucks. North Korea began testing a versionof this solid-propellant missile in May 2019.92
Between 2019-2021, North Korea launched atotal of four new types of SRBMs.
North Korea also possesses space launch vehicles (SLV) which could reach the continental
United States if configured as ICBMs. 93 Thesesystems use ballistic missile technology, andA TD-2/Unha-3 space launch vehicle preparing forlaunch, April 2012. Satellite launches contribute valuable data to the ballistic missile program.

North Korea conducted this second Hwasong-14 ICBM
flight test on 28 July 2017.

Image Source: AFP

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

During an April 2017 parade, North Korea
showcased a modified ICBM launcher witha launch canister, as well as a new mobileerector-launcher with a launch canister.
Road-mobile launch canisters are typicallyassociated with solid-propellant missiles.
Actual missiles for the launch canisters were
not displayed. The North also paraded a
new Scud variant with a modified warhead,probably a maneuverable reentry vehicle.91
North Korea’s February 2018 military parade

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

23

space launches provide North Korea with valuable data applicable to the development of longrange, multi-stage ballistic missiles.94 North
Korea’s Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2), called Unha-3 in
the North, has been under development since atleast the early 2000s. Its first flight test attempt,
in 2006, failed; subsequent launches in 2009 andApril 2012 also failed. In December 2012 andFebruary 2016, the North successfully launched
an object into low Earth orbit with the TD-2.95
The 4 July 2017 Hwasong-14 launch was North
Korea’s first ICBM flight test. The Hwasong-14
was launched almost straight up to an unusu-

Ballistic Missile Inventory96

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Systems

Number of
Launchers

Propellant

Deployment Maximum
Mode
Range (km)

SCUD B/C (SRBM)

Fewer than 100

LiquidRoad-Mobile

300–500

SCUD ER (SRBM)

Undetermined

LiquidRoad-Mobile

1,000

Unnamed SRBM variants(Launched 2019)

Undetermined

Solid

Road-Mobile

380–600+

No Dong (MRBM)

Fewer than 100

LiquidRoad-Mobile

1,200+

Hwasong-10(Musudan IRBM)

Fewer than 50

LiquidRoad-Mobile

3,000+

Hwasong-12 (IRBM)

Undetermined

LiquidRoad-Mobile

4,500

Pukguksong-1 (SLBM)At least 1
submarine

Solid

Submarine

1,000+

Pukguksong-3 (SLBM)

Undetermined

Solid

Submarine

1,000+

Pukguksong-4 (SLBM)

Undetermined

Solid

Submarine

Unknown

Pukguksong-5 (SLBM)

Undetermined

Solid

Submarine

Unknown

Pukguksong-2 (MRBM)

Undetermined

Solid

Road-Mobile

1,000

Hwasong-14 (ICBM)

Undetermined

LiquidRoad-Mobile

10,000+

Hwasong-15 (ICBM)

Undetermined

LiquidRoad-Mobile

12,000+Unnamed ICBM
(Paraded 2015)

Undetermined

LiquidRoad-Mobile

Intercontinental

Unnamed Larger ICBM
(Paraded In 2020)

Undetermined

LiquidRoad-Mobile

Intercontinental- Hwasong and Pukguksong designators are based on published North Korean names.
- All ranges are approximate.

24

A Growing Regional and Global Threattical distance traveled by the missiles during
the July 2017 flight tests.98 North Korea flighttested another new ICBM – identified as the
Hwasong-15 - in a lofted trajectory at an apogee of 4,475 kilometers on 28 November 2017.
These ICBM flight tests mark significant milestones in North Korea’s ballistic missile development process—the first flight tests of missiles which can reach the United States.99,100

1707-13887

By testing ICBMs to
extremely high altitudes,
North Korea can assess
how they would perform
at long distances while
keeping impact areas
within the region.

A G E N C Y

North Korea's ICBM Flight-test Trajectories, 2017

I N T E L L I G E N C E

ally high altitude of approximately 2,800 kilometers above the Earth before impacting into
the Sea of Japan.97 On 28 July, North Korea
tested the Hwasong-14 to an even higher loft
than achieved on 4 July. The lofted-launch
technique enables the North to model how
far the missile could travel without overflying
another country and without a full-range flighttest. In its tested configuration the Hwasong-14
ICBM is capable of reaching North America ifflown on a direct trajectory based on the ver-D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

25

Nuclear Deterrence Strategy and Use Doctrine
The steady development of road-mobile ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs highlights Pyongyang’s
intention to build a survivable, reliable nuclear delivery capability.101 This developing capability has been accompanied by high-level statements, the first of which was issued in 2013,
in which North Korea stated it would use nuclear weapons to respond to an invasion andmay use them to prevent an attack. Together, these developments suggest the potential
for nuclear weapons to be used at any stage of conflict when the North believes itself in
regime-ending danger.102,103,104 The point at which North Korean leadership would perceive
this threat is unclear, as are specific regime plans for nuclear use.

North Korea Missile Launches and Nuclear Tests105
KIM Il SUNGKIM JONG IL

1984-199425

1994-20111707-13888

KIM JONG UN

2011-present

Number of Events

20

15

10

SRBM

SLBM

IRBM

(300–1,000 km)(1,000–3,000 km)(3,000–5,500 km)

ICBM

MRBM

Nuclear Test

(5,500+ km)(1,000–3,000 km)

2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

1998

1984

0

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

5

Space Launch
Cruise Missile
Unknown Missile

Accounts for full flight tests only. Does not include partial tests of missile subsystems, such as static engine firings orcold-launch ejection tests, tests of air defense systems, close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range rockets,or artillery firings. Updated as of September 2021.

26

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

A G E N C Y

1707-13887

I N T E L L I G E N C E

North Korean Ballistic Missile Ranges

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

27

Biological andChemical Weapons

Offensive
Conventional Systems

North Korea has a longstanding biological
warfare (BW) capability; additionally its biotechnology infrastructure could be redirected
to support a BW program.106 The North is asignatory to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC) but has yet to declare
any relevant developments and has failed toprovide a BWC confidence-building measuredeclaration since 1990.107,108,109 Pyongyang may
consider the use of biological weapons during
wartime or as a clandestine attack option.

North Korea’s conventional military consists ofthe ground, air, naval, and special operations
forces. Each is limited to operations on or aroundthe Korean Peninsula and poses a direct threat
to South Korea and to U.S. forces based in South
Korea. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy canoperate at long distances off-peninsula or project
power outside the region. North Korea’s conventional strike capability is concentrated primarily
in massed fire from KPA artillery forces, Special
Operations Forces (SOF), and, less effective,
fixed-wing attack by fighters and bombers.

North Korea has a chemical warfare (CW) program that could comprise up to several thousand metric tons of chemical warfare agents,
and the capability to produce nerve, blister,
blood, and choking agents.110 North Korea is
not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. North Korea probably could employ
CW agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles, along with unconventional,
targeted methods. For example, North Korea
was responsible for the assassination of Kim
Jong Un’s half-brother in Malaysia using thenerve agent VX.111 An Indonesian woman anda Vietnamese woman were tried for the murder; four North Koreans were charged but
fled the country before arrest.

KPA Ground Forces operate thousands of longrange artillery and rocket systems along theentire length of the DMZ. These weapons include
close-range mortars, guns, and multiple rocket
launcher systems (MRLs) trained on South
Korean military forces deployed north of Seoul,
and longer-range self-propelled guns, rockets,
and CRBMs that can reach Seoul and some points

Long-range artillery guns in mass firing position for
training exercise.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

28

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

A G E N C Y

1707-13887

I N T E L L I G E N C E

North Korean Artillery and Rocket Threat to South Korea

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

29

south of the capital. Collectively, this capability
holds South Korean citizens and a large numberof U.S. and South Korean military installations
at risk.112 The North could use this capability to
inflict severe damage and heavy casualties on theSouth with little warning.
North Korean SOF are designed for rapid offensive operations, infiltration, and limited attack
against vulnerable targets in South Korea.
Operating in specialized units, SOF personnel are among the most highly trained, wellequipped, best-fed, and highly motivated forcesin the KPA. Recently, North Korea has emphasized SOF unit training with particular focus on
improving their capability to raid key government installations in the South.
The North Korean Air Force can fly strike missions against targets in South Korea with fighters and bombers; its most capable platforms are
the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter and the MiG-23
Flogger fighter, although these would have considerable difficulty overcoming South Korea’s
more modern air forces and air defenses. Several North Korean unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) have been sighted over South Korea
since 2014; models that crashed and were examined by the South Korean government had been
configured for surveillance and reconnaissance,
but the North could arm future UAVs.113

National Defense
Defending the North Korean homeland against
external attack is a foundational KPA mission,

30

constituting a major share of effort for KPA
ground, air and air defense, and naval units.
The criticality of homeland defense as a KPA
mission was demonstrated during the Korean
War. Although North Korea enjoys considerable geographic advantages for defense—
including mountainous terrain, coastal mudflats, and long seasons of poor weather—aerial
bombardment by the United States and othernations in the UN Command force devastated
all of North Korea’s major cities and urban
areas during the Korean War. The North
responded by constructing dense fortifications
and multilayered air and coastal defense systems, embracing new electronic warfare technologies as they became available in order tofoil U.S. precision-guided weapon systems, andburying most of its key military command andcontrol nodes and critical equipment in deep,
hardened underground facilities (UGFs).

Underground Facilities
North Korea’s UGF program is the largest andmost fortified in the world, estimated to consistof thousands of UGFs and bunkers designed
to withstand U.S. bunker-buster bombs.114,115
The UGF program’s primary function is toprotect and conceal regime leaders, weaponsof mass destruction, ballistic missiles, warfighting stores, and elements of military forcesand defense industries. In 1963, Kim Il Sung
publicly announced, “The entire nation must
be made into a fortress. We must dig into theground to protect ourselves.”116 The size andsophistication of these facilities range fromsmall tunnels, only large enough to accom-

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

and raise the cost of combat operations on
the peninsula. North Korea will continue toimprove and construct hardened bunkers andunderground facilities to protect its forces.118

modate personnel or a few vehicles, to large,
complex UGFs for command and control, missiles, and other strategic assets. North Korea
maintains a road network under Pyongyang toprotect and conceal Kim Jong Un and seniorleaders during a crisis, which improves conditions for sustainment of the regime and may
embolden Kim to take more belligerent action
if he perceives he is safe from counterattack.117
North Korea has adapted the use of deception
in its defenses after observing U.S. conflicts inthe Vietnam War, Kosovo, and both Iraq Wars.
North Korea could use UGFs and mountainous
topography to fortify its military installations
and for concealment and defense during a conflict, probably hoping to strain U.S. resources

North Korean airspace is divided into four air
divisions, and each air division headquarters is
responsible for the defense of its assigned region.119
Although Air Force Headquarters remains the
final authority on engaging hostile forces, during
wartime the various air defense divisions probably
will operate autonomously within their assigned
regions. North Korea has a large number of aging
early warning and intercept radars that provide
basic detection of large aircraft at long distances
to support the defense of its airspace.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

D E F E N S E

Entryway to a South Korean tunnel dug to interdict a secret North Korean infiltration tunnel under
the DMZ. In addition to constructing sophisticatedunderground facilities for military use, North Korea
may have built more than twenty infiltration tunnels
for surreptitious KPA entry into South Korea, four ofwhich were discovered between 1974 and 1990.

North Korea maintains a dense network of integrated air defense systems (IADS), providing
overlapping, redundant coverage of Pyongyang,
the DMZ, both coasts, and its strategic infrastructure. North Korean air defenses comprise
primarily fixed, but transportable strategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, some mobile tactical SAM systems, antiaircraft artillery (AAA)positions, and man-portable air defense systems(MANPADS). North Korea’s IADS make gooduse of camouflage, concealment, and deception
procedures and underground facilities to protect against attack. North Korea occasionallyconducts field deployment training of air andair defense assets to improve wartime survivability. North Korean fighter aircraft are also
capable of basic air defense operations.

A G E N C Y

Air Defense

31

Coastal Defense
North Korean coastal defense is maintained by
the North Korean Navy, which operates radars,
defense artillery and missile sites, and commandand control nodes complemented by smaller
patrol craft, mines, and attack, coastal, andmidget-type submarines; and Air Force-operated aircraft. Defense radars and undergroundfacilities on both coasts support coastal defense
artillery and coastal defense cruise missile sites.
The Navy is divided into East and West Coast
Fleets, each operating a variety of patrol craft,
torpedo boats, and guided-missile patrol vesselsthat carry a variety of antiship cruise missiles,
torpedoes, and guns. North Korean Navy patrol
craft mostly operate in immediate coastal waters.
The North Koreans have a credible minelaying capability. Numerous small surface ships
are capable of delivering mines to impede military and civilian shipping. Mines would be
used to defend against amphibious assaults,
provide seaward flank protection for land
forces, and defend strategic ports. Defensive
mines would be monitored by coastal observation teams and radar, and they would be
supported by well-emplaced artillery and missile batteries, making approaching and mineclearing operations extremely hazardous.

Electronic Warfare
North Korea views electronic warfare as an
essential tool in countering the threat posed byadvanced Western weapon systems and precision-guided munitions, and critical to denying

32

and disrupting enemy command and control,targeting, and intelligence gathering efforts.
North Korea has operated GPS jammers near
the DMZ, at times interfering with navigation
systems onboard commercial aircraft flying in
the area.120

Space/Counterspace
North Korea can be expected to try to deny anadversary use of space during a conflict; ample
evidence is available to Pyongyang in open
sources describing the general U.S. reliance on
space-based assets to support joint operations
and intelligence collection. The North’s nonkinetic counterspace capabilities include GPS andsatellite communication jamming, which havebeen tested on multiple occasions in the past
decade. Possession of ballistic missiles and spacelaunch vehicles that can reach orbit theoreticallysuggests the North could attempt to disrupt
orbiting satellites in a conflict.
North Korea’s space program is administered by astate-run civilian agency, the National Aerospace
Development Administration.121 The North maintains a space launch complex on the west coast,
the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, and associated space tracking facilities in Pyongyang, bothof which supported satellite launch cycles in 2012
and 2016. An older space launch site on the east
coast has not been used for a launch since 2009.
Although North Korea has placed two satellites inorbit and has articulated further space ambitions,its program also enables it to test technology usedin ballistic missiles.122

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Cyberspace
North Korea views its offensive cyberspace capabilities, including computer network attack,as a cost-effective and deniable tool that it canemploy with little risk of reprisal. Pyongyang’s
cyberspace capabilities support military operations and national security goals by providing theKim regime a way to influence and intimidate its
adversaries and collect information on them. In
light of the numerous sanctions targeting North
Korea, cyberspace capabilities also provide theregime with a means to generate currency thatcircumvents international controls.123

Computer Network Attack
and Intimidation

and Guardians of the Peace.124 The attack followed North Korean demands that Sony cancel
the release of a film depicting the assassinationof Kim Jong Un and resulted in data deletionand shutdown of employee network access.125
The FBI stated that there was sufficient evidence to attribute the attack to North Korea.
In December 2017, the U.S. Government linked
North Korea to the May 2017 WannaCry computer worm attack, which affected over 250,000
computers in over 150 countries. This attack
disrupted critical computer systems acrossthe world, including Great Britain’s National
Health Service.126

Select North Korean Cyberspace Units

1707-13888

Institution/Unit

Mission and Activities

Central Party Investigative Group

Technical education and training

Unification Bureau Operations
Department

Cyber-psychological warfare, organizational
espionage

204th Unit (Unification Bureau
Operations Department)

Psychological operations, incitement of disorder inSouth Korea

Number 91 Office

Offensive cyberspace operations

I N T E L L I G E N C E

North Korea was linked to a 2014 cyber-intrusion into Sony Pictures Entertainment networks undertaken by a group called Hidden
Cobra, previously referred to as Lazarus Group

North Korea has also used its cyberspaceresources for political purposes and to spread
propaganda on South Korean networks. South
Korea has reported that the North hacked various websites to post pro-North opinions.127

A G E N C Y

Cyber-Enabled Propaganda

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

33

Intelligence Collection
North Korea has used the Internet since the1990s to stay abreast of international developments, but with its growing cyberspace capabilities Pyongyang is now gaining access to secured
information. In late 2016, South Korea’s Cyber
Command was reportedly hacked by North
Korean cyberactors. The intranet server of the
Cyber Command was contaminated with malware. The South also found that some military
documents, including confidential information,
had been hacked, according to a South Korean
Ministry of National Defense official. In a subsequent cyberspace operation in 2017, the North
allegedly exfiltrated classified war plans, according to a South Korean legislator.128,129 In addition, North Korea is reportedly actively engaged
in cyberspace infiltration into the United Statesand European countries for the purpose of exfiltrating technical data important to solving technological problems with miniaturizing nuclear
weapons and perfecting its ballistic missiles.130

Currency Generation
North Korea is broadly suspected of using
cyberspace means to steal money from financial institutions worldwide. North Korean
hackers use overseas infrastructure to achieve
their goals for the regime while also masking their attribution. The North's cyberactors
also operate from overseas locations to generate currency illegally while maintaining legalmeans of revenue generation on the surface.131
The 2016 theft of $80 million from the Bankof Bangladesh has been attributed to North

34

Korea. Several international cybersecurity
firms have conducted research and documented similar North Korean cybercrime
operations resulting in thefts from more than
100 global banks using a combination of malware tools and harvested user credentials,
including in the Philippines, Vietnam, andPoland and others.132
In addition to cyber-enabled theft, North
Korean hackers engage in global fraud, blackmail, online gambling, and other cyberactivities to create profits. These activities together
are estimated to generate an annual revenueof $860 million, some portion of which probably supports military activities. Given theincreased sanctions against North Korea as aresult of nuclear and missile activities, Pyongyang will continue turning to cybercrime as ameans to generate currency to fund its weapon
programs while sidestepping international
efforts to freeze the regime’s funding.133

Denial and Deception
Denial and deception (D&D) is fundamental
to North Korean military operations. The KPA
makes extensive use of D&D methods andmaterials to conceal its readiness and enhancesurvivability of its forces. North Korea probably
understands the United States' and its allies’
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancecapabilities and is able to take measures tocounter collection activities, including scheduling activities to occur at night or undercloud cover, using mountainous topography
for terrain masking, and hiding equipment in

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Logistics and Sustainment

ficient supplies for only 2 to 3 months.138,139
Subsistence supplies could last up to 3
months, and ammunition could last slightly
longer.140 Inadequate availability of fuel andtransportation assets, poor maintenance ofground lines of communication, and insufficient training all constrain North Korea’s
ability to sustain large-scale conventional
offensive operations.141,142,143,144

Although doctrinal planning requires the
KPA to maintain 6 months of supply in all
resource categories to sustain defensive combat operations, North Korea may have suf-

North Korea’s transportation infrastructure
is in poor condition; it has damaged roads,
resource availability constraints, and difficult
terrain.145,146 Many roads are unpaved gravel
or dirt surfaces and lack consistent mainte-

The Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge provides North Korea an important transportation link to China.

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

UGFs. The KPA also uses camouflage netting
and paints, equipment decoys, false signals
emitters, and smoke and obscurants.134,135,136
North Korea dedicates a substantial portion of
its D&D resources to concealing activities associated with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, conducting many activities in UGFs.137

Image Source: Shutterstock35

Junior KPA soldier at attention during a military event in Pyongyang. The KPA is a platform for ideologicalindoctrination and internal social control in addition to its offensive and defensive missions.
Image Source: Shutterstocknance.147 Although these features are a defensive advantage in case of invasion, they also
hamper KPA mobility in the offense. North
Korea has fortified key maneuver corridors
along the coasts, the DMZ, areas surrounding
Pyongyang, and roads adjacent to the North
Korea–China border.148,149,150,151 These roads
provide access and mobility to some of North
Korea’s supplies that are stockpiled in UGFs
bordering the DMZ.152,153 Railroads also provide
critical links between major cities within the
country and connect to Chinese and Russian

36

rail lines despite having similar inconsistentmaintenance.154 The military is likely to use therailway network to reposition forces and supplies to sustain operations.155,156

Human CapitalOver 1.3 million people out of North Korea's
population of approximately 25 million servein the KPA, making North Korea's military the
fourth largest in the world. As many as 20 per-

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Historically, KPA servicemembers wereafforded better rations than the general population, but this trend has declined precipitously
since the mid-1990s, and most KPA conscripts
now are subject to the same deprivation as thegeneral population outside Pyongyang.158 Former KPA servicemembers who have defectedto the South describe malnutrition and harshOver the next few decades, the effects of the
1994-97 famine will continue to affect the population that constitutes the majority of the
KPA reserve manpower pool. North Koreanchildren born in the 1990s suffered malnutrition, which resulted in declining physicaldevelopment, stunted growth, and mental
underdevelopment.160 This trend suggests thatsome number of KPA conscripts in the reserves
will function at lower levels of effectivenessdue to mental and physical impairments.161,162
The COVID-19 pandemic probably is having
a disruptive impact on the North Korean population. North Korea has reported suspected
COVID-19 cases, but has not officially reported
any confirmed cases.163 Nonetheless, COVID-19
has exacerbated North Korea’s already weakeconomy and despite continued denials of any
domestic cases, Pyongyang has implemented
border closures, quarantines, lockdowns, andsteep reductions in trade to prevent the spreadof the virus. North Korea’s military has probably experienced some degradation in unit
proficiency, but can conduct most functions ifordered. How COVID-19 will ultimately affect
North Korean civilians, military personnel, or
leadership is unclear.

A G E N C Y

The bulk strength of the KPA is made up of
conscripts serving a 10-year enlistment period.
North Korea drafts women, although shorter
enlistments are available to females and to
personnel in specialty fields. Most KPA personnel spend their entire conscription periodwith the same unit in the same location, often
using and training on the same equipment fora full decade. Conscripts who are selected foruniversity-level education are eligible to serve
their enlistment after graduation and may
serve a shorter time in the military.

service conditions. Because of North Korea’s
chronic food insecurity, military personnel
are periodically diverted away from standard
duties to plant or harvest crops.159

I N T E L L I G E N C E

cent of North Korean males between the agesof 16 and 54 are in the military at a given timeand possibly up to 30 percent of males between
the ages of 18 and 27, not counting the reserves
or paramilitary units. The active-duty forcesaccount for at least 6 percent of the population
and at least 12 percent of the male population.
With universal conscription and long-term
service, the KPA serves as a key socialization
mechanism for the state and a pathway to
Korean Workers' Party membership.157

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

37

Outlook: Targeted Investments in
Select Military CapabilitiesK

im Jong Un has set North Korea’s military on a path to expand its capabilities
across multiple domains in the coming
years. Kim has placed a priority on thedevelopment and demonstration of weapons thatprovide North Korea the means to strike distantadversaries—including the United States—with
nuclear weapons, improve the KPA’s capability
to strike key targets in South Korea at increasing distances from the DMZ, and further fortify
North Korea against external attack or invasion.
These operational goals reflect an overarching
security strategy focused on deterrence and coercion; Kim appears to judge that he can prevent
the United States from taking action against
North Korea if he demonstrates a viable nuclear
weapon deliverable on a reliable long-range ballistic missile. Moreover, Kim will continue tobolster his conventional military’s offensive anddefensive capabilities to raise the cost of a conflict
if deterrence should fail and to expand his options
to threaten South Korea and locally based U.S.
forces. Even absent WMD capabilities, these conventional capabilities continue to pose a constantthreat to South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in
the region.
Breaking from the fast pace of missile andnuclear testing in 2016-2017, North Korea
pursued diplomatic outreach in 2018 andearly 2019, and declared its support for thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
It has not conducted any nuclear tests since38

2017, and has reversibly dismantled portions of its WMD infrastructure. However,
we continue to observe activity, at Yongbyon
and elsewhere, inconsistent with full denuclearization. North Korea began flight testing new SRBMs and an SLBM in mid-2019.
In an October 2020 military parade, North
Korea revealed a new larger ICBM, probably
designed to deliver multiple warheads. North
Korea retains its WMD capabilities, and it isunlikely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles,delivery systems, and production capabilities.
North Korean leaders view nuclear arms as
critical to regime survival.
Unless it agrees to, and follows through with,full denuclearization, including the scrapping ofdelivery systems, North Korea will likely growand advance all of the following military sectors:
Land Based Ballistic Missiles. In 2018,
North Korea stated that it would abide by a missile launch moratorium during dialogue with theUnited States; however, it conducted multiple
launches of new solid-propellant SRBM variants
beginning in May 2019. Even if additional flighttests of longer range systems do not occur in thenear term, Pyongyang will probably focus on
training and improving its missile forces which
are increasingly central to North Korea’s deterrence strategy. North Korea also will work to
improve its newer solid-propellant ballistic missiles - solid fueled missiles can be made ready forlaunch more quickly than liquid fueled missiles.

UAVs and may look into arming UAVs to supplement the Air Force’s ground-attack capabilities.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles.
North Korea’s debut of an SLBM in 2015 openeda new potential area of operations for the North
Korean Navy. It tested another new SLBM, thePukguksong-3, in October 2019 and paradeda new Pukguksong-4 in 2020 and a Pukguksong-5 in 2021. This capability is likely to growslowly because constructing and deploying new
submarines requires a lengthy, resource-intensive manufacturing process.

Cyberspace Capabilities. North Korea willcontinue to target U.S. and allied networks in thegovernment, military, and private sectors. Pyongyang will focus hacking efforts on targets thatoffer opportunities to steal useful information anddeny or disrupt our use of computer networks.
Cyber-enabled theft and currency-generating
activities also will continue, and the North’s hacking techniques may become more sophisticated.

Nuclear Weapons. Integrating a nuclear
weapon with a ballistic missile and enablingthat nuclear-armed missile to function reliably
as a system is North Korea’s ultimate operational goal. Further underground nuclear tests
to validate weapon capabilities are possible if
North Korea reconstitutes its nuclear test siteor establishes a new one.
Long-Range Artillery. North Korea’s development of longer range and precision-guided MRLs
will continue, and these systems will be deployedwith the Ground Forces to multiply the artillery
threat to Seoul and points south of Seoul.
Special Operations Forces. The North’s
efforts to train SOF for operations in South
Korea will continue and will be used for propaganda purposes as well as practical unit training. The North may seek to build proficiencies
in infiltration techniques and raids against
South Korean government facilities.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. North Korea has
demonstrated a capacity to field multiple classes
of UAVs and fly them into South Korean airspace
undetected, although several of these UAVs havemalfunctioned and crashed. The North probably
sees future intelligence gathering roles for its

Limited Resources Hamper Development
in Other Sectors. North Korea lacks the capacity to invest significant resources in new, morecapable systems across the entire force. Elements of North Korean military power that do
not receive this level of leadership attention,such as the Air Force or the surface Navy, willremain capable of executing their core missions,but their readiness and capability will probably
remain static or erode over time. Critical deficiencies and shortfalls in North Korea’s transportation infrastructure and military supply base arelikely to persist, limiting the KPA’s mobility on
the offensive and preventing it from sustaining amajor advance into South Korea.
Sanctions placed on North Korea have probably limited the amount of resources it has toimplement military modernization on its own.
North Korea will continue to use diplomatic
engagement, counterpressure against the sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion to try
to mitigate some of the effects of the sanctions.
North Korea may calculate that China and Russia will eventually distance themselves from the
U.S. policy of strict sanctions enforcement aseach seeks to increase its leverage in the region.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

It is possible we could see a test of a long range
missile over the next year.

A G E N C Y

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

39

APPENDIX A: Strategic Force
North Korea’s Strategic Force operates theregime’s ballistic missiles. The service’s mission is nuclear and conventional ballistic missile strike against targets inside and outside
the region. Kim Jong Un has prioritized thedevelopment of new Strategic Force-operated
missile systems and has directed more launchesof older missiles, suggesting this service could
become one of North Korea’s more capable military arms if training and development are sustained and pursued consistently forcewide.

The Strategic Force is a service-level entity on
par with the North Korean Air and Air Defense
Command or Navy; it is probably subordinateddirectly to the General Staff Department andis only one step removed from Kim's personalcommand. The Strategic Force enjoys a highpublic profile and is credited with numerous
key advances in North Korean ballistic missile capabilities. Kim has, according to North
Korean state media, issued orders to the Strategic Force on multiple occasions directing it

Kim Jong Un inspects a Hwasong-12 IRBM prior to flight-testing. Tests to improve the reliability of ballistic missiles
have been increased and publicized under Kim Jong Un.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

40

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

to increase its alert status and prepare formissile strike operations against U.S. basesin the Western Pacific and against the UnitedStates directly.164

North Korea’s ballistic missile force is one of
the most rapidly modernizing elements of thenational military. Several new ballistic missile
systems and associated equipment were publicly

debuted in 2017 through flight testing and a military parade; those systems that are deployed
operationally will almost certainly be operated
by the Strategic Force. Also in 2017, tracked
ballistic missile launchers were observed forthe first time.169 In 2018, North Korea paradeda never before seen SRBM that appears similar
to the Russian solid-propellant Iskander missile system. It tested this and three other new
types of SRBMs multiple times since 2019.170,171
The Strategic Force also continues to operate
several missiles that date to the 1980s–1990s,
including Scud class SRBMs and the No Dong
MRBMs. Continued flight tests on these systems from 2015-2017—as well as North Koreanpress statements highlighting the role theyplay in current nuclear attack plans—suggestthat North Korea remains interested in improving the performance of these older missiles andvalidating the proficiency of their launch crews.

A G E N C Y

Image Source: 2017 DIBMAC Report

I N T E L L I G E N C E

The strength of the Strategic Force is estimatedat 10,000 personnel. The service controls over
200 road-mobile ballistic missile launchers.167 In
a missile deployment or strike scenario, mobile
launchers permit North Korea to mobilize systems out of garrisons and conceal them while
launch preparations are under way. Since 2014,
the Strategic Force has undertaken multiple
mobilization and launch exercises apparently
designed to train on these tactics, techniques,and procedures, and North Korean media has
described some missile launch events as testing
nuclear components.168 Kim has personally overseen land- and sea-based ballistic missile testingand publicized the achievements through photos
and video, reflecting his personal interest in thisservice’s development.

Scud class SRBM on new tracked launcher, paraded inPyongyang in April 2017.

D E F E N S E

North Korea’s ballistic missile units control
a wide selection of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs,
and ICBMs.165 It is unclear what operationalrole, if any, the Strategic Force has withrespect to North Korea’s developmental submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). North
Korean state media has shown testing of a ballistic missile with a precision-control guidancesystem and has alluded to a possible antishiprole for North Korea's ballistic missile units.166

41

APPENDIX B: Ground Forces
KPA Ground Forces—armor, infantry, andartillery—remain the core of North Korea’s military power and the primary means by which
Pyongyang threatens Seoul. The KPA groundunits comprise 10 regular corps, 2 mechanized
corps, 1 armored division, 4 mechanized divisions, and 1 artillery division plus numerous
combat, combat support, and combat service
support brigades and regiments. The Ground
Forces number about 1,000,000 active-duty
soldiers, and another 150,000 are assigned toreserve units.172,173,174,175,176 With a large artillery
and infantry force forward-deployed, the KPA
Ground Force can mount an attack on South
Korean and U.S. forces with little or no warning. Although the KPA may meet initial success,its maneuver and sustainment problems, stemming from resource shortages, probably would
limit its ability to maintain the momentum ofan attack, unless it receives outside support.

security and manpower to replace combat
losses. These forces are organized into theWorker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG) and Red
Youth Guard (RYG).178 These organizations
are present at all levels of government (province, county, ward) and are under the controlof the Korean Workers' Party in peacetime
but revert to military control during crisis orwar. The WPRG and RYG have about 6 million personnel (approximately 25 percent of
the North Korean population).179
The KPA artillery and armored force mainlycomprises North Korean–produced copies ofSoviet-era equipment. It is largely based on oldtechnology but is reliable and easy to maintain.
The artillery force includes a large number ofconventional towed and self-propelled systems
and long-range 170-mm guns and 240-mm multiple rocket launchers.180

Ground Forces are subordinate to the General Staff Department. The force is infantry
heavy and is supported by significant artillery
and armored/mechanized forces. The forward
corps and the armored, mechanized, and artillery units operate the most modern groundequipment in the KPA inventory. The rearcorps are a mix of regular and reserve forces
with older equipment. The KPA is oriented toa conflict along the DMZ, with over 70 percentof the force deployed south of Pyongyang.177
In addition to the regular and reserve forces,
the KPA has an extensive paramilitary organization that assists in providing rear-area42

New 300-mm MRL CRBM in live fire exercise, 2016.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFPA G E N C Y

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I N T E L L I G E N C E

Major Ground Units181,182

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

43

KPA Ground Forces modernization is slow andincremental, but Kim has dedicated some new
systems to ground units. North Korea debuted
a new main battle tank in a military paradein 2010, and the KPA has conducted multiple
tests of the new 300-mm MRL CRBM since2014. The 300-mm MRL CRBM is an advanced
MRL system configured to fire up to eight 300mm guided, rocket-propelled munitions per
launcher. Presumably it will be deployed withartillery units. The system will extend therange of KPA firepower well south of Seoul
and could be sufficiently accurate for precision targeting against key South Korean and
U.S. military installations on the peninsula.183
Additionally, in September 2018 North Korea
paraded a new self-propelled artillery system
and a new six-wheeled, eight canister tacticalguided missile system, most likely an antitank guided or surface-to-air missile. North
Korea probably tested this new tactical guided
missile system in April 2019.184,185 [For moredetails on modernization, see Appendix H.]
North Korean strategy, doctrine, and tactics
for ground operations have remained fairly
consistent since the 1950s. In the event of amassed attack against South Korea, the Northwould use heavy concentrations of infantry
and armor supported by artillery to breakthrough and attempt to destroy forces defending along the DMZ, and advance rapidly down
the entire peninsula. These operations would
be coordinated closely with the opening of asecond front comprising special operations
forces (SOF) units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in the South Korean rear area.

44

The KPA Ground Forces are capable of defending against and deterring a land invasion
from the South. The KPA would initially focus
on infantry and light infantry operations supported by large volumes of artillery fire support, but would default to guerrilla-style operations targeting rear areas and logistics if
invading forces progressed beyond the DMZ.
KPA doctrine puts great emphasis on fighting under arduous conditions, at night, in themountains, and during inclement weather.
KPA tactics are heavily influenced by Kim Il
Sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla activity, whichemphasized the value of small-unit fighting.
The modern KPA emphasizes small and large
units attacking an objective simultaneously,
such as SOF or light infantry attacking theobjective from the rear or flank while heavy
infantry supported with artillery assaults
from the front and flanks.186

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

APPENDIX C: Air and Air Defense Forces

The air and air defense forces have about 110,000
personnel and control over 900 combat aircraft,

Russian MiG-29C. The North Korean model of this1980s-era fighter is the newest aircraft in the North
Korean Air Force inventory.

The most common North Korean groundbased air defense artillery threat to aircraft (helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft)
and unmanned aerial systems is very likely
manually directed AAA and man-portable
air defense systems (MANPADS). Manually
directed systems will have limited ability
to engage smaller targets, such as UAVs, inaddition to poor ability to engage all targets
at night and in inclement weather.

A G E N C Y

The Air Force’s most capable combat aircraft
are its few MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters procured
from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, its
MiG-23 Flogger interceptors, its Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, and its Il-28 Beagle
bombers. The majority of its aircraft are mucholder and less capable; the Air Force is one ofthe only air forces in the world that still operates MiG-21s, MiG-19s, MiG-17s, and MiG-15s.
The Air Force also maintains a large fleet ofAn-2 Colt aircraft, first produced in the 1940s,
which are single-engine 10-passenger biplanes
probably tasked with inserting SOF into South
Korea but are also capable of supporting simple
air-to-ground strike missions. The Air Force isrounded out with other Soviet-era transport aircraft, including helicopters that would be used
for troop transport and limited ground attack.188

I N T E L L I G E N C E

North Korean air and air defense forces are organized into four air divisions (each responsible fora sector of the country) that control surface-toair missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft artillery (AAA),and air surveillance assets. The forces also control transport units and two airborne sniper brigades as well as various support elements. The
air divisions control combat and transport aircraft and helicopters that operate from a large
number of airfields.

over 300 transport aircraft, and 300 helicopters.
The more modern aircraft are concentrated inand around Pyongyang, and the SAMs and AAA
provide perimeter security for the country and thecapital in particular. The capital has one of themost dense concentrations of AAA in the world.187

D E F E N S E

The North Korean Air Force is primarily responsible for defending North Korea’s airspace andterritorial integrity. Its other missions include
tactical air support to KPA Ground Forces, insertion of SOF, transportation and logistics support, wartime strikes against targets in South
Korea, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is capable of defending
North Korean airspace, with aircraft and groundbased systems but would struggle to penetrateSouth Korean air defenses in an attack role.

Image Source: AFP

45

Major Air Units189

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AIR ORDER OF BATTLE (approx.)

RUSSIA

110,000

Personnel strength
Combat aircraft

900

Helicopters

300

Transport aircraft

300

Sungam-ni
CHINA

Orang (HQ)
Kuktong

Manpo

KanchonSonchonPanghyon

NORTH KORE A

Taechon (HQ)

Uiju

Hwangsuwon

Changjin-up

PakchonIwon

Toksan
KaechonKwaksanSondokPukchang

SunchonPyongyang

Kowon

Kangdong
Mirim

WonsanKuum-niPyongyang

OnchonChunghwa (HQ)
Hwangju (HQ)nerNort hL i m i L in et

46

Hyon-ni

Demarca tion Line andryta
ilitarize d Zone
e
D m

Mil
i

TaetanTransport baseKoksan

KwailFighter baseNuchon-ni
SOUTH KOREA

Helicopter base
Other airfield
All locations are notional

050
100 Kilometers
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

aircraft.191 Under these conditions, North Koreanpilots most likely focus their training on simple
pilot proficiency and the maintenance of basic
aeronautical skills. The pilots of more advanced
fighter aircraft probably fly more frequently,
maintaining a higher degree of proficiency andat times participating in aerobatic competitions
and demonstrations during public air shows. In
September 2016, North Korea hosted its first
advertised International Friendship Air Festival, at Kalma Airfield in Wonsan, where a variety of pilot drills were held and aircraft were displayed for the public.192

Flight time for North Korean pilots reportedly isseverely restricted to as few as 15–25 hours per
year. Flight hours this low probably stem fromfuel shortages and may reflect concern over the
upkeep and maintenance of the North’s aging

North Korea has probably modernized selectolder air defense systems in addition to introducing some newer systems. During a 2010
military parade, North Korea first displayed a
new mobile SAM launcher and accompanying
radar that externally resembled the Russian
S-300 and Chinese HQ-9; this system was mostrecently tested in 2017.193 The North is also
developing or procuring a variety of UAVs, someof which have been used for reconnaissancemissions over South Korea and which could
be equipped with rudimentary armaments.194
North Korea is probably pursuing larger UAVs
for a variety of military missions.

The SA-5 surface-to-air missile is North Korea's
longest-range SAM.
Image Source: Shutterstock

North Korean reconnaissance drone, recovered after
crashing in South Korea. Several UAV models havebeen sighted in South Korean airspace.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

KPA ground-based AAA probably will rely
heavily on medium-caliber (30-mm to 57-mm)
AAA guns. Medium-caliber AAA guns maximize firepower (a combination of rate of fireand kinetic energy) by offering some of thehighest rates of fire while being large enoughto have sufficient terminal ballistics andlethality characteristics. The KPA also fields
numerous 14.5-mm antiaircraft machineguns
and domestically produced MANPADS (SA-7,
SA-14, and SA-16). North Korea operates avariety of SAMs, mostly Soviet-era systems,
including the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-13.190

A G E N C Y

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: AFP/SOUTH KOREAN DEFENCE MINISTRY47

APPENDIX D: NavyThe North Korean Navy is the smallest of the
KPA’s three conventional force services, with
about 60,000 personnel. The Navy’s primary
mission is to defend North Korea’s coastline
and territorial waters from attack and to protect the approaches to North Korea’s main ports.
The Navy is also responsible for SOF insertion,
coastal surveillance, and the protection and control of fisheries operations. In wartime, the Navy

will focus on antisurface warfare, mine warfare,and interdicting sea lines of communication tohinder the United States and UNC’s ability toflow forces into the theater.195 North Korea’s
Navy would be constrained to a largely defensiverole in a conflict, and it would face significant
challenges attempting to operate against South
Korea or the United States.

North Korean Navy Romeo-class diesel-electric attack submarine, 2014. Kim Jong Un is aboard for an inspection.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

48

A G E N C Y

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I N T E L L I G E N C E

Major Naval Units196

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D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

49

North Korea’s Navy is primarily a coastal
force. It maintains one of the world’s largest
submarine forces and operates a large fleet
of air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional
landing craft to support amphibious operations
and SOF insertion. The force is divided into
East and West Coast Fleets, with each operating a variety of patrol craft, guided-missile
patrol boats, submarines, and landing craft.197
North Korea has about 70 diesel-electricattack, coastal, and midget class submarines
in service divided between both coasts. Manyof the North’s submarines are of older designand have limited endurance; however, they
are sufficiently capable of using torpedoes
and mines to threaten merchant ships andU.S. and allied navies operating near the
Korean Peninsula. Determined to expand its
undersea and deterrent capabilities, North
Korea launched a new ballistic missile submarine with a single launch tube in 2015 andbegan flight-testing SLBMs the same year.

North Korea is expected to continue SLBM
development and expand its naval deterrent
unless it proceeds with denuclearization.
Finally, North Korea is likely to introduce
other new submarines into its force.198,199,200,201
The Navy’s surface ship order of battle comprises mostly small patrol craft that carrya variety of antiship cruise missiles, torpedoes, and naval guns. The Navy also operates a large fleet of air-cushioned hovercraft
and conventional landing craft to support
amphibious operations and SOF insertion.202
The Navy uses a variety of torpedoes, including straight-running and wake-homing
torpedoes, that can be launched from submarines and some surface ships. An international investigation concluded that North
Korea used a wake-homing torpedo known as
CHT-02D to sink the South Korean corvette
Cheonan in March 2010.203,204

Pukguksong-1 SLBM launch, April 2016 (left). North Korea’s SLBM progressed rapidly from ejection tests toshort-range flight test, later followed by a launch of Pukguksong-3 in 2019 (right).
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP and AFP PHOTOS/KCNA

50

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Image Source: AFP

I N T E L L I G E N C E

North Korean Navy patrol boat on guard in waters
off the Mt. Kumgang international tourist zone, 2011.

D E F E N S E

The most dramatic new development in the
North Korean naval force was the debut ofa ballistic missile–capable submarine andits associated SLBM, the Pukguksong-1(translated as Polaris-1). According to North
Korean press statements, the SLBM will becold-launched and solid-fueled, will carrya nuclear warhead, and is intended to belaunched from ballistic missile submarines.
North Korea conducted multiple flight testsof the developmental SLBM in 2016 anddisplayed it in a military parade in 2017.206
North Korea tested a second SLBM, called
Pukguksong-3, in October 2019. A ballistic
missile strike role would be wholly new for
the Navy, which may not yet have a final
plan for how to incorporate this new mission into existing doctrine and plans. North
Korea’s Navy also tested antiship cruise missiles in 2017.207

A G E N C Y

North Korea has a history of mine warfare
being instrumental to its coastal defense strategy. During the Korean War, North Korea’s
naval forces were able to mine Wonsan Harbor and, as a result, successfully prevented
a U.S. amphibious landing from cutting off
retreating North Korean ground forces. Therefore, mines probably remain a key element ofNorth Korea’s maritime defense strategy.205
The Navy may also attempt offensive miningof South Korean ports.

51

APPENDIX E: Special Operations Forces
North Korea's special operations forces (SOF)
are designed to infiltrate South Korea and attack
targets in the rear area, and to defend against
foreign attacks on North Korea. SOF members
operate in specialized units, including reconnaissance, airborne and seaborne insertion, andcommando squads.208 Core SOF doctrine emphasizes speed of movement and surprise attack toaccomplish the mission. SOF personnel may beairlifted by helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft(and possibly Civil Air Administration transports), moved by surface ships or submarines, ortravel on foot over land or via suspected crossDMZ tunnels to attack high-value targets, suchas command and control nodes, airbases, andports. North Korean SOF are highly trained andwell-equipped in comparison to other units, and,if successfully infiltrated into the South, would
be capable of disruptive attacks in the rear area.

are accounted for in KPA manpower figures).
North Korean SOF units are provided with thebest available equipment, including weapons,
explosives, incendiaries, chemical and biologicalagents, parachutes, aircraft, and communications equipment. Compared with the equipmentof other worldwide SOF units, North Korea's
equipment is rudimentary, and North Korean
SOF probably lacks such sophisticated items
as burst communications equipment, advanced
signal-processing equipment, and specialized
explosives. State media photos from two training exercises revealed purported North Korean
SOF using newly identified equipment, including helical magazines, improved ballistic helmets, night-vision devices, and body armor, but
fielding of this equipment to operational units
cannot be verified.209

SOF personnel are present at all echelons of
the KPA (from brigade and division to corps)
as well as the strategic-level 11th Corps, which
controls a number of SOF brigades for strategic
missions, including creating a “second front” inthe rear area that disrupts and distracts fromthe main fight along the frontlines. SOF lightinfantry, sniper, and reconnaissance elements
and air and naval SOF elements are present inmany infantry divisions and the forward corps.
The various SOF units comprise over 200,000
personnel organized into brigades of 3,000–
5,000 members and separate regiments andbattalions of varying strength (these personnel

KPA special operations forces parade in Pyongyang, 2017. New optical equipment and firearms
are displayed.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

52

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

South Korean naval personnel recover a damaged
North Korean semisubmersible craft in the sea southof Jinhae, South Korea, 1999. North Korean SOF
utilize such vessels to infiltrate agents into the South.

Infiltration of enemy territory—possibly
before a war begins—is a key KPA SOF
mission. SOF can be infiltrated by air using
the An-2, which can support this operation
by paradrop or by landing on a highway todebark personnel. Maritime infiltration canbe accomplished by cushioned hovercraft,which could deliver over 7,000 SOF personnel to each of South Korea's coastlines, andby submarines, including Romeo class diesel-electric submarines and specially outfitted
Sango class submarines, which are designed
solely for coastal infiltration.210,211
Operational SOF units support corps objectives with light infantry and reconnaissancemissions. In wartime light infantry units will
target critical terrain and command-and-control assets, delay South Korean, U.S., and UNC
reserve forces, and attack division (and higher)
command posts. In addition, these units ascertain enemy intentions, develop targeting information for ballistic missiles and long-range
artillery, conduct poststrike assessments, anddetermine locations of South Korean, U.S., andUNC reserve forces. Tactical SOF units support
maneuver division and brigade objectives withlight infantry operations. Light infantry units
attack brigade and division command posts,
capture key terrain to assist in maneuvering divisions and brigades, and destroy South
Korean, U.S., and UNC reserve forces. The
organic reconnaissance company of the maneu-

A G E N C Y

facilities; air defense locations; and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) assets in South Korean rearareas. In addition, strategic units also may
kidnap or assassinate key South Korean or
U.S. personnel.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Strategic SOF units support national objectives with reconnaissance and raid missions.
Specifically, these units develop targeting
information, report South Korean civilian
and military actions, and conduct poststrikeassessments. Typical missions would involvethe location and sabotage or destruction ofnational-level artillery; airfields; storage

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: AFP

53

ver unit performs tactical reconnaissance. The
reconnaissance company and light infantry
battalion develop targets for destruction. Thesetargets include air defense sites, force concentrations, artillery positions, and C3I assets.
Doctrinally, North Korean SOF units train in
unconventional warfare following the tenets
laid out by Kim Il Sung in various training

and doctrine manuals. Defensively, the North
Korean SOF serves as North Korea's primarycounter-SOF force, guarding key sites against
possible targeting by enemy SOF during wartime. Because of the importance that the regime
places on North Korea's SOF capability, SOF
members often receive more frequent trainingof a much higher quality than regular KPA
infantry receive.212

Air-cushioned landing craft used for SOF infiltration, shown in training exercises publicized by North Koreanstate media.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

54

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

APPENDIX F: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces
scenario, RMTUs and other paramilitary groups
are trained to function as insurgents and defend
their homeland against external attackers.
North Korea also has an extensive paramilitary structure that includes the Worker Peasant Red Guard (WPRG) and Red Youth Guard(RYG) under party/civilian control in peacetimeand organized into regiments and battalions.
These paramilitary units are usually mobilized

Soldiers in the Worker Peasant Red Guard paramilitary train for concealment and defense operations, 2013.

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

The KPA has an extensive reserve structure
built around numerous Reserve Military Training Units (RMTUs). These units primarily comprise infantry divisions and brigades and artillery brigades and regiments. The RMTUs' role
is to maintain North Koreans' basic soldier skills
and proficiencies should citizens need to augment the active-duty forces during a crisis. The
majority of the RMTUs are in the rear corps, butsome are also in the forward corps. In a conflict

Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

55

for domestic projects, such as road building andagricultural support. The corps-sized Bodyguard Command (with multiple brigade units)provides regime protection forces outside the
KPA's control. Finally, engineering and logistic
units provide numerous services often associated with the private and government sectors
in other nations but that are under party andgovernment control in North Korea, including
agricultural support and road maintenance.213
The RMTU elements comprise up to 600,000
personnel, but few are on active duty at any
one time. The WPRG and RYG comprise up to
5 million personnel and 1 million personnel,
respectively. They comprise about 25 percentof the entire population but are seldom mobilized in any significant number. The Bodyguard
Command and other militarized elements add
an additional 300,000 personnel to the overall strength of the paramilitary force and are
actively engaged in their roles at all times.
RMTUs are routinely activated in small numbers during the KPA's summer and wintertraining activities. RMTUs augment local
active-duty forces in force security, counter-SOF operations, movement of logistics, etc.

56

The RMTUs’ training during either training
cycle generally reflects KPA training in basic
soldier skills and small-unit combat skills.
North Korean reserve military personnel areissued uniforms for wartime use and for training with active units and are equipped withindividual weapons, including handgrenades
and rocket-propelled grenades. Reserve soldiers
are most likely to be armed with older variantsof Kalashnikov-model (Type 58/68) rifles. Most
reserve units have wartime reserve caches of
weapons, food, and supplies near their wartime
areas of operation.
The WPRG is organized into elements thatvary in size and serve locally in each village,
town, factory, and enterprise. The WPRG and
the RYG conduct combat and political training
as preparation for an all-people resistance war
to defend their provinces, counties, and hometowns as required to defend the North as partof an impregnable fortress. Physically qualified nonexempt North Koreans are assigned
to a reserve military unit upon release from
KPA active duty. Male reservists serve with anassigned unit until they are 60 years old.

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

APPENDIX G: Intelligence Services
Reconnaissance General Bureau

North Korean Intelligence Services

1707-13888

Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un

Korean Workers’ Party

State Affairs Commission

United Front

Cultural

Ministry of People’s

Department

Exchange

Armed Forces

Ministry of State Security

BureauGeneral Staff Department

Reconnaissance General Bureau

Operations

ReconnaissanceTechnology

Overseas

Inter-KoreanServiceand CyberIntelligence

Talks

SupportI N T E L L I G E N C E

The RGB consists of six bureaus with compartmented functions, including operations, recon-

A G E N C Y

The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)
is North Korea’s premier military intelligence
service, responsible for collection, analysis, andclandestine operations.215, 216 The RGB was established in 2009 during a reorganization of North
Korea’s intelligence services, which transferred
three intelligence agencies from the Korean
Workers' Party and consolidated them under the
National Defense Commission (disestablishedand replaced by the State Affairs Commission
in 2016).217 Administratively, the RGB is subordinate to the KPA General Staff Department.218

D E F E N S E

North Korea has four primary intelligence andcounterintelligence services: the Reconnaissance
General Bureau, the Ministry of State Security,
the United Front Department of the Korean
Workers’ Party, and the Cultural Exchange
Bureau, which was formerly known as the 225th
Department. North Korean intelligence andsecurity services collect political, military, economic, and technical information through open
sources, human intelligence, cyberspace capabilities, and signals intelligence capabilities.
North Korea’s primary intelligence collection
targets are South Korea, the United States, andJapan.214 The North’s intelligence services havealso conducted operations against these countries, including the abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.

57

naissance, technology and cyberspace functions,overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks, andservice support.219 The RGB and its predecessor organizations have been tied to a number offoreign kidnappings, assassinations, state-sponsored terror attacks, cyberoperations, and infiltration operations.220 The RGB also oversees
businesses in foreign countries, which are used
as fronts for espionage, currency generation,
cyberoperations, weapon sales, goods procurement, and other illicit activities.221, 222
RGB personnel are highly trained, attending an
intelligence academy where operatives receive
instruction in firearms and explosives, martial
arts, underwater diving, and other activities before
becoming operational.223 The RGB also recruits
and co-opts foreign nationals to gather intelligenceand execute operations in foreign countries.

Ministry of State Security
The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is North
Korea’s primary counterintelligence organization, tasked with operating North Korean prison
camps, investigating cases of domestic espionage,
repatriating defectors, and conducting overseas
counterespionage activities in North Korea’s
foreign missions.224 The MSS is an autonomous
agency of the North Korean government, reporting directly to Kim Jong Un.225 Jong Kyong-thaek
was appointed the Minister of State Security asof October 2017.226
The MSS executes its counterintelligence mission abroad as well as domestically and has been
implicated in widespread human rights viola-

58

tions.227, 228 The MSS investigates political crimes
and manages North Korea’s political prison
camps, where prisoners are subject to extrajudicial punishments, brutal treatment, poor conditions, and summary executions.229 The MSS also
enforces censorship laws related to foreign media
and monitors the populace and foreign citizens inNorth Korea through technical surveillance, communications monitoring, recruited citizens, andrandom inspections.230 The MSS deploys agents
globally—often under diplomatic cover in embassies and UN posts—to monitor North Korean
personnel working overseas and to repatriate
North Koreans. The MSS has increased its presence abroad because of North Korean defections
in recent years.231

United Front Department
The United Front Department (UFD) is North
Korea’s primary civilian intelligence agency,
propaganda office, and policymaking entity forinter-Korean relations and dialogue.232 The UFD
is directly subordinate to the Korean Workers'
Party.233 The UFD overtly attempts to establish
pro-North Korean groups in South Korea, such as
the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council.234

Cultural Exchange Bureau
The Cultural Exchange Bureau (CEB) is responsible for running agents in South Korea toestablish underground political parties focusedon fomenting unrest, revolution, or pro-DPRK
views. The CEB also conducts clandestine influence operations.235, 236

NORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

North Korean Intelligence Services’ Covert and Clandestine Operations

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2021

2020
2019

Conducted cyber espionage against United States and other foreign government entities.

2018
2017
2016
2015

2014
2013
2012

2011

Feb - Murder of Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, in Malaysia.
May - WannaCry ransomware attacks.
Nov - Hack of world banking system; $81 million stolen from Bangladeshi bank reserves through SWIFT.
3 Nov - Hack of Sony Pictures; destroyed 70 percent of firm’s computers, compromised employee PII and internal emails, resulted indelay of movie release.
20 Apr - DarkSeoul cyberattack executed by North Korea; malware rendered tens of thousands of computers in South Korea’s financial
and media sectors inoperable.
Sep - Attempted assassination of defector Park Sang-hak by North Korean agent.

2010

2003
2002
2001
2000
1999

1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988

1987

North Korea hacking of South Korean and U.S. Defense Department networks.

Jun - North Korean midget submarine captured by South Korea on probable spy mission; all four
North Korean agents onboard committed suicide after killing five sailors from the sub’s crew.
Feb - Defector from extended Kim family, Lee Han-yong, assassinated outside his apartment building in Bundang, South Korea.
Sep - North Korean submarine on espionage mission infiltrated South Korean territory; 24 North Koreans killed, 13 South
Koreans killed, 1 North Korean missing, 1 North Korean captured.
Assassination of South Korean diplomat Choi Duk-keun in Vladivostok, Russia, by poison.

29 Nov - Bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 between Baghdad and Seoul by two North Korean agents; all 115 people onboard killed.

1986
1985
1984

1983
1982
1981
1980
1979

1978
1977
1976
1975

1974
1973
1972
1971
1970

1969
1968

9 Oct - Attempted assassination of South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan in mausoleum bombing in Rangoon; 21 killed including
18 South Koreans.

Jan &June - Kidnapping of South Korean actress Choi Eun-hee and producer Shin Sang-ok from Hong Kong.
15 Aug - Second assassination attempt on South Korean President Park Chung-hee in South Korea. Park’s wife, Yuk Young-soo, wasinadvertently killed in the attack.
11 Dec - North Korean agent hijacks domestic Korean Airlines Flight YS-11; holds passengers and crew hostage; 39 passengers
later released, 11 kept in North Korea.
21 Jan - Failed raid on South Korea’s Blue House in an attempt to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee; South Koreanand U.S. military personnel killed in the incident.

A G E N C Y

2004Jun - Denial-of-service attacks against U.S. and South Korean government telecommunications services led by RGB’s Lab 110 unit.
Attempted assassination of North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

2008
2007
2006
2005

D E F E N S E

2009

59

APPENDIX H: Defense Industry and the Energy Sector
North Korea places a high priority on its
defense-industrial base because it produces
the military hardware that Pyongyang views
as essential to maintaining national security.237 North Korean government support forthe defense industry comes at the expenseof the country's civilian economy; while portions of the nonmilitary industrial base havebecome outdated and fallen into disrepair, key
defense industries have continued to operate and modernize.238 North Korean defense
factories produce a diverse array of military
hardware, including small arms, a full rangeof munitions, light armored vehicles, tanks,
naval ships and submarines, and advanced
missile systems.239 Production priorities haveshifted over the decades from a focus on large
quantities of ground forces equipment in the
1960s–1990s to the development of morecapable missile systems.240
Although North Korea continues to pursue
the ideal of self-reliance in weapon systemdevelopment and production, it still requires
materials and technology purchased on the
open market abroad to improve domestic production capabilities and weapon system effectiveness. Pyongyang is attempting to upgrade
select elements of its large arsenal of mostly
outdated weapons and will continue to focus
its limited production resources on force modernization, emphasizing strategic deterrence
and defensive and asymmetric attack capabilities to counter the technological superiority ofSouth Korean and U.S. forces.241 North Korea

60

will produce limited amounts of improved
equipment in the naval, aviation, and groundarms sectors, based on regime prioritization
and resource availability.

Ballistic Missile Sector
In support of the growing regime-directed
requirements to develop a nuclear-armed
ballistic missile force capable of threatening
the United States and the region, Pyongyang developed multiple longer-range liquid-propellant systems.242,243 North Korea isalso testing new solid-propellant systems, an
MRBM, an SLBM, and multiple SRBMs.244,245
In addition, the country probably has several
hundred SRBMs and MRBMs in its inventory, based on 1950s legacy Scud liquid-propellant technology.246

ICBMs
In July 2017, North Korea conducted its firsttwo launches of an ICBM class system, testing the liquid-propellant Hwasong-14, whichis capable of reaching the United States.247,248
A follow-on flight-test of another new ICBM,
Hwasong-15, occurred in November 2017.
North Korea has displayed two other developmental liquid-propellant ICBMs that have
yet to be flight-tested. In April 2012 and July
2013, North Korea paraded six three-stage
Hwasong-13 ICBMs on eight-axle transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). In October 2015,
Pyongyang paraded four previously unseen

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

two-stage liquid-propellant ICBMs on thesame eight-axle TELs used in 2012 and 2013;
North Korea has not announced a name forthis system.249,250,251,252,253 Then, in October
2020, North Korea paraded 4 new larger
ICBMs on 11-axle TELs; these missiles have
not yet been tested.

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA

SLBMs
North Korea has developed and produced its
first SLBM system and a submarine launchplatform, the single-launch-tube Gorae ballistic missile submarine and the Pukguksong-1
missile, which was originally a liquid-propellant–fueled system but was replaced with asolid-fueled missile system. Solid fuel has anumber of benefits, including being more stable and easier to handle, store, and transport.
The medium-range Pukguksong-1 has beenejection-tested numerous times from both aland-based ejection stand and a seagoing ejection test barge. These tests culminated in an
August 2016 launch in which the missile flew
about 500 kilometers. North Korea reached

New untested SLBM, October 2020.
Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA

IRBMs
North Korea has two developmental liquid-propellant IRBM systems, the Musudan and the Hwasong-12. The Musudan
was first displayed in a 2010 parade but
was not flight-tested until 2016; seven of
the eight tests ended in failure because missiles exploded on takeoff or early in flight.258
The Hwasong-12 was first displayed in an
April 2017 military parade and flight-tested

I N T E L L I G E N C E

North Korea featured a new ICBM in its October 2020
military parade.

this milestone after only 3 years of ejection
tests and flight tests, which demonstrates afast-paced missile development program.254,255
North Korea tested a second medium-range
SLBM, Pukguksong-3 in 2019. Since then
North Korea paraded 2 new SLBMs, the Pukguksong-4 in October 2020 and the Pukguksong-5 in January 2021. Pyongyang has nottested these new missiles or indicated whichsubmarine will employ them. Improvements
and expansion at Sinpo Shipyard indicate that
North Korea may produce a larger submarinewith the capability to carry and fire more than
one missile at a time.256, 257

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

61

Hwasong-12 IRBM.
Image Source: AFP

North Korea launching a new type of SRBM; July 2019.
Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

in mid-May 2017.259 The Hwasong-12 has ademonstrated range of over 3,700 kilometers, sufficient to reach Guam.260,261

62

hundreds of Scud-based SRBMs and Scud-derived No Dong MRBMs that were developedand initially deployed during the mid-1980s to
early 1990s. North Korea continues to develop
new SRBM systems, including a liquid propellant SRBM on a new tracked TEL paradedin April 2017 and a SRBM similar to the Russian solid-propellant Iskander missile systemparaded in 2018. North Korea tested a versionof this missile and two other new SRBMs multiple times since May 2019.262,263,264,265 In October
2020, North Korea paraded 52 solid propellant
SRBMs on 6 different wheeled and tracked TEL
chassis. North Korea introduced yet another
SRBM at its January 2021 parade. It conducted
the first test of this missile in March 2021.
Additionally, in September 2021 North Korea
tested a new rail-based launcher for an SRBM .
Pyongyang is developing a solid-propellant
MRBM known as the Pukguksong-2, a landbased version of the developmental Pukguksong-1 SLBM. This is the largest known
solid-propellant system produced by North
Korea. The Pukguksong-2 was flight-tested in
February and May of 2017 and is carried on a
tracked TEL.266

SRBMs and MRBMs

Other Missile Developments

North Korea’s SRBMs are the foundation of
Pyongyang’s ballistic missile program. SRBMs
are a proven capability that provides Pyongyang
a reliable platform for testing and developing
longer-range systems while holding at risk theUnited States and its allies on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan. North Korea probably has

In its October 2020 military parade, Pyongyang
displayed a new missile system mounting four
previously unseen canisters on towed two-axle
trailer launchers pulled by a three-axle cabover-engine truck. This system is likely a cruise
missile, possibly a land-attack variant of North
Korea’s anti-ship cruise missile. In September
2021, North Korea tested LACMs from a 5 can-Image Source: Rodong Sinmun

ister TEL that had carried probable SRBMs in
the October and January parades.
In an April 2017 military parade, Pyongyang
displayed two previously unseen containerized ballistic missile systems, although
actual airframes were not observed. The firstsystem consisted of a capped launch tube
mounted on an eight-axle TEL. The second
system also had a capped launch tube, thoughslightly shorter than the first, mounted on afour-axle trailer pulled by a three-axle cabover-engine truck.267

Naval Sector
North Korea’s naval industry can produce
vessels to support a coastal force which today
comprises primarily aging patrol craft (thatcarry a variety of antiship cruise missiles,
torpedoes, and guns) and a few large corvette-sized vessels. In addition, Pyongyang
has built a large fleet of air-cushioned hovercraft and conventional landing craft to support amphibious operations and SOF insertion. Construction of surface ships during
the past 5 years has concentrated on a small
number of modern, higher speed designs
for patrol boats and corvettes with minimal

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Kim Jong Un tours submarine construction hall; July 2019.

A G E N C Y

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

63

surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile
capability. Naval shipyards are on both theeast and west coasts, but because of insufficient resources they usually produce infrequently. The naval industry is able to maintain a portion of the North Korean Navy fleet
with regular repair and maintenance capabilities, but many vessels remain pierside or innonoperational condition.268 Submarine production efforts are focused at the Sinpo Shipyard on the east coast.

Aviation and Air Defense Sector
North Korea’s aviation industry is capableof assembling light, single-engine airplanes,
such as the Cessna 172, and small-to-medium
UAVs. In the 1980s and 1990s, the industry
was able to assemble fixed-wing aircraft andhelicopters from partially completed kits supplied by Russia, China, and other countries,
but that capability has since waned. North
Korea is unable to produce modern jet fightersand engines, instead relying on cannibalization and the purchase of spare parts from overseas markets to maintain its dated forces.269
North Korea has recently been flying small-tomedium–sized photoreconnaissance UAVs withautonomous GPS-waypoint navigation capabilities over the DMZ into South Korean territory.
These UAVs are based on commercial Chinesedesigns; some systems are produced in China
and purchased on the open market, and others
are produced in North Korea using imported
components. North Korea has built larger
UAVs, including target drones and training
simulators and probably attack drones. Most of64

these larger systems are based on older models procured from Russia and China, with the
exception of a jet-powered UAV based on the
U.S. MQM-107D Streaker system that probably
was acquired from Middle Eastern sources.270

Ground Arms Sector
The majority of North Korean ground forces
are equipped with 1950s–1970s Russian andChinese light and medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, and towed and self-propelledartillery, or North Korean–developed versionsof this legacy equipment. Since at least 2010,
North Korea has produced only limited quantities of improved ground forces equipment,

Long-range self-propelled artillery piece, one of thousands of such guns capable of striking Seoul.
Image Source: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

including an upgraded main battle tank, andthe 300-mm MRL CRBM. In development sinceat least 2013, this CRBM system is equippedwith two rocket pods carrying a total of eight
guided rounds; the pods are mounted on athree-axle Chinese-origin truck chassis.271, 272

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

New main battle tank, paraded in 2020.
Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNAIn October 2020, North Korea paraded several
new systems that showcased North Korea’s
continued defense industrial activity to diversify and modernize its military force, in spiteof strict sanctions. These included a new tankdesign that had flat armor panels around theturret and seven road-wheels; previous tanks

The Energy Sector
North Korea’s oil and gas sector remains in astate of disrepair because of sanctions and yearsof neglect. The country has no oil and natural gas
production and relies on crude oil imports from
China to meet demand.275 Pyongyang officially
imports a small amount of refined petroleum
products from China and Russia.276 Although
North Korea reportedly has some oil and gas
reserves offshore as well as on land, the country
does not have the technical expertise to explore
or develop these resources.277,278 China exports
about 10,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil bypipeline to North Korea’s only operating refinery, in Paengma Ri (29,000-b/d capacity).
North Korea’s other refinery, in Sonbong(45,000-b/d capacity), was constructed to process Russian and Middle Eastern crude oil
imports. It has been shut down since the late
1990s because of the breakdown in the Six-Party
Talks on nuclear disarmament and because of
payment issues.279
North Korea gives priority to the military overthe civilian population when it comes to providing access to refined petroleum products. Since
2018, the United States and its allies observed
North Korean maritime vessels using illicit
at-sea, ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum fromthird-country tankers to acquire additional
refined petroleum as a way to mitigate theA G E N C Y

In a September 2018 military parade, Pyongyang displayed a new tracked, self-propelledartillery gun and a tactical guided missile system, most likely an anti-tank guided or surface-to-air missile, mounted on a six-wheeledarmored chassis. It is unknown if either of thesesystems is currently deployed with the KPA.274

only had six. It also paraded never-before-seenlight armored vehicles with gun turrets andanti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. These new
systems are not yet fielded.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

In August 2010, North Korean news media
aired video footage of the regime’s new main
battle tank. The tank has features similar
to the Russian T-72, which would provide
improved performance over Pyongyang’s Chonma-ho family of tanks that is based on the Russian T-62. The tank probably is in service with
only one armored unit in the Army.273

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

65

effects of UNSC sanctions.280 These ship-to-shiptransfers stabilized North Korea’s fuel supplies
and prices, though acute shortages still affectcivilian industry and military operations.281
North Korea’s electric power sector cannot
meet the country’s demand for electricity due
to decades of overuse, poor maintenance, andequipment shortages. Since the early 1990s,
North Korea has experienced frequent blackouts and has the third-lowest electric power
consumption per capita among East Asian and

66

Pacific countries.282,283 In his 2019 New Year
Address Kim Jong Un identified increasing
electricity generation as one of the most important goals for improving the North Korean economy.284 North Korea is exploring ways to use
wind and solar energy for electricity generation
to reduce its reliance on oil imports and vulnerability to international sanctions. North Korea
and China jointly operate four hydroelectric
power plants on the Yalu River that accounted
for 16 to 17 percent of North Korea’s total electricity production in 2013.285

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

Global concern about North Korea’s proliferation activities continues to mount, leadingsome countries, such as Namibia, to halt newpurchases from Pyongyang and leading othernations to take action to prevent arms-relateddeliveries.294,295 Although some of its weaponstransfer attempts have been interdicted by theinternational community, North Korea very
likely will continue to attempt arms shipments
via new and increasingly complex routes.
North Korea uses a worldwide network tofacilitate arms sales activities and has had a
core, but now dwindling, group of customers
that include Iran, Syria, and Uganda. Other
customers, such as Sudan, have recently
agreed to end arms cooperation with Pyongyang.296,297 North Korea has transferred ballistic missile–related equipment, components,

In addition to Iran and Syria, past clients forNorth Korea’s ballistic missiles and associatedtechnology have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya,
Pakistan, and Yemen.302 Burma has begun distancing itself from North Korea, but concerns
remain regarding lingering arms trade ties
between the two countries.303
North Korea uses various methods to circumvent UNSCRs,304 including falsifying end-user
certificates,305 mislabeling crates,306 sending
cargo through multiple front companies andintermediaries,307 and using air cargo for deliveries of high-value and sensitive arms exports.308
North Korea has demonstrated a willingness
to proliferate nuclear technology.309 Using theproliferation network of Pakistani nuclear
scientist A.Q. Khan,310 in early 2001, North
Korea provided Muamar Qadafi’s Libya withA G E N C Y

North Korea has exported conventional arms
and ballistic missiles for several decades.
Despite the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718,286
1874,287 2087,288 2094,289 2270,290 2321,291 and
2356,292 which prohibit North Korea from selling weapons and providing related technicaltraining, Pyongyang continues to market, sell,and deliver weapons-related goods and services. Weapon sales are an important sourceof foreign currency for North Korea’s weapons
programs, and thus, Pyongyang is unlikely
to cease export activity despite UN Security
Council sanctions,293 increased international
efforts to interdict North Korea's weapons-related exports, and the implementation of Executive Order 13382, under which designated
WMD proliferators’ access to the United Statesand global financial systems is targeted.

materials, and technical assistance to countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
Conventional weapons sales have included
ammunition, small arms, radars, and SAMs
as well as related repairs, technical support
services, and military equipment production
facilities.298,299 In late 2009, North Korea was
implicated in the attempted sale of rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons to
Iran or possibly to Hizballah when Thailand
interdicted and seized a cargo plane ladenwith arms.300 In 2013, a North Korean ship,
the Chong Chon Gang, was held by Panamanian authorities as it attempted to transit the Panama Canal laden with 240 tonsof military equipment, including a MiG-21
fighter aircraft, concealed under a licit cargo
shipment of sugar. North Korea claimed that
it was repairing the equipment for Cuba.301

I N T E L L I G E N C E

APPENDIX I: Arms Sales

D E F E N S ENORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

67

uranium hexafluoride311 – the form of uranium
used in the uranium enrichment process to
produce fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear
weapons. This material was removed in 2004
by the United States and United Kingdom

under the terms of an agreement to eliminate
Libya’s nuclear weapons program.312,313 North
Korea also provided Syria with nuclear reactor
technology until 2007.314, 315

North Korea’s Conventional Weapons and Missile-Related
Customers, 2002-2020

1707-13887

North Korea is a viable alternative for those countries that cannot obtain military equipment from othersuppliers because of sanctions or severe budgetary constraints. North Korean military sales to Iraq predate
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

68INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKNORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

MSS

Ministry of State Security

BWC

Biological Weapons Convention

MWe

Megawatts electrical

BW

Biological weapons

RGB

Reconnaissance General Bureau

CMC

Central Military Commission

RMTU

Reserve Military Training Unit

CRBM

Close-range ballistic missile

RYG

Red Youth Guard

CW

Chemical weapons

SAC

State Affairs Commission

C3I

Command, control, communications,and intelligence

SAM

Surface-to-air missile

SLBM

Submarine-launched ballistic missile

D&D

Denial and deception
SLVSpace launch vehicle

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone
SOF

Special Operations Forces

GDP

Gross Domestic Product
SRBM

Short-range ballistic missile

GPS

Global Positioning System
TEL

Transporter-erector-launcher

ICBM

Intercontinental ballistic missile
UAV

Unmanned aerial vehicle

IRBM

Intermediate-range ballistic missile
UGF

Underground facility

KPA

Korean People’s ArmyUN

United Nations

UNSCR

United Nations Security Council
Resolution

WPRG

Worker Peasant Red Guard

MANPADS Man-portable air defense system
MND

Ministry of National Defense

MRBM

Medium-range ballistic missile

MRLS

Multiple rocket launcher system

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Anti-aircraft artillery

D E F E N S E

AAAA G E N C Y

ACRONYMS

71

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKNORTH KOR E A M ILITARY P OWE R

A Growing Regional and Global Threat

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