エネルギーの今 ― CSIS より

What An America First Energy Plan
may mean for U.S. Oil & Gas Sector――「米国第一エネルギー計画」が米石油・ガスセクターに与える意味とは？ ――

Jane Nakano

Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program, CSIS
米国戦略国際問題研究所（CSIS）エネルギー・国家安全保障部シニアフェロー Jane Nakano 氏による連載第 2回のテーマはトランプ大統領の掲げる「米国第一エネルギー計画」。トランプ大統領は、規制緩和を通じて米国のシェールオイル・ガスの開発・生産を促進し、雇用創出につなげるとの公約を掲げているが、果たしてその通りに進むのか。アメリカの石油・ガスセクターの現状を俯瞰しつつ、OPECをはじめとした他産油国の動向やトランプ政権による保護主義政策が石油・ガス生産・輸出に与える影響について分析する。

An America First Energy Plan is the energy
policy of U.S. President Donald Trump,whose chief campaign slogan and the inauguration
theme was “America First.” The Plan’s chief feature is to “embrace the shale oil and gas revolution
to bring jobs and prosperity to millions of Americans” mainly through deregulation. How successful
may the administration be in stimulating the U.S.
oil and gas sector, which saw the capital expenditures for upstream activities decline by roughly
50% in 2015, year over year and another 25-30% in
2016, year over year? What would the “revolution”
mean for U.S. exports of oil and natural gas?
Very little happened under An America First EnergyPlan in the President’s first month in the office dueto the slow confirmation of relevant cabinet nominees as well as the administration’s preoccupation
with other issues, such as immigration. Entering its
second month, with key confirmations finally completed (such as the Administrator of theEnvironmental Protection Agency on February 17,
and the Secretary of Interior on March 1), the Trumpadministration is picking up its pace in overturning
many of the Obama-era regulations with the Republican-controlled Congress as its strong ally. For
example, early in his second month in the office, thePresident signed an executive order that aims to rescind or revise the Waters of the U.S. rule, which
the environmental community sees as very important for the protection of U.S. streams and wetlands
from commercial development and pollution.

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hile the voracity with which the WhiteHouse and Congress seek to un-do Obamaera environmental regulations sends a positive signal to U.S. energy producers, directly linking theprospect of wide-ranging deregulation to the recovery of U.S. upstream would be premature, if not
facetious. In fact, the U.S. energy sector has already begun showing some signs of recovery. The
domestic price has risen roughly by 105% for crudeoil, and 85% for natural gas in the last 12 months.
Moreover, the rig counts have grown by 35% foroil and by 46% for natural gas production during
the same time. In the last few months alone, over
120 rigs were added for oil production.
An additional source of optimism comes from theremarkable gains in oil and gas production productivity. For example, as of early 2017, a new well
produces seven times as much crude oil in the Eagle
Ford and four times as much in the Bakken—compared to 2011 (EIA/RBN). The story is similar fornatural gas production productivity in the Marcellus/Utica: each rig adds eight times as much ofnatural gas today over 2011 (EIA/RBN).
Both the pace and contour of recovery will also depend on the December 10 production cut agreement
between OPEC and non-OPEC producers, and its
future success. The rare achievement to strike production cut and the subsequent reporting thatsuggest a high level of compliance has been welcome news to the U.S. unconventional production,
which generally requires a higher break-even pricethan conventional production. The health of U.S. oiland gas sector will be highly influenced by whether
the compliance holds, whether the cut will have

■ エネルギーの今 ― CSIS より

produced a desired price effect and, if not, whether
the stakeholders may extend the agreement for another six months. Notwithstanding a circular
relationship between U.S. oil production and inventory levels, and OPEC’s decisions regarding output,
therefore, whether the administration can claim thesuccess of An America First Energy Plan is subject
to—although not entirely—the future actions of fellow crude oil producer countries around the world.

How will U.S. oil and gas exports fare underPresident Trump? After some years of heatedinternal debate, the United States greenlit the unabridged export of U.S. produced crude oil in
December 2015. In the first half of 2016 alone, U.S.
crude was shipped to over 16 countries around theworld. Yet, the average volume of U.S. crude oil exported in the year ending in January 2017 was only
65,000 barrels per day (mb/d) higher than the previous year’s average (RBN)—far lower than anticipatedas the global crude prices remained competitive.
As for the export of natural gas, the low crude oil
prices and the low spot LNG prices in Asia of thelast few years muted the economic competitivenessof U.S. LNG to long distance markets in Asia. Consequently, fewer cargos with shale-based LNG
have thus far journeyed to Asia from the U.S. Gulf
Coast than originally anticipated. The recent recovery in spot LNG prices in Asia is encouraging forU.S. LNG. Yet, with the sense of oversupply lingering in the global LNG markets, U.S. producers
would welcome stronger demand from major importers, such as Japan. In short, how much crude oiland natural gas the United States will export in thecoming years is bound by the market fundamentals.

Notwithstanding the importance of energy
market fundamentals, the major factor overlaying all of the moving parts mentioned above isthe rising tide of protectionism. The U.S. decision
not to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnershipdashed the prospect for many major LNG importers to qualify for the fast-track LNG export review
by the U.S. Department of Energy. Also impactful
may be the future of the North America Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA). A significant change to thenatural gas provision in the NAFTA could hinder
the robust natural gas exports to Mexico, which imports about 60% of U.S. gas exports today.
Undermining such a reliable outlet as pipeline gas
supply to Mexico could depress U.S. natural gas
prices and resultantly dis-incentivize gas drilling to
the detriment of its own industry.
Moreover, the “border adjustment tax” (BAT),
which is part of the major tax reform that has been
proposed by some Republicans in the U.S. Houseof Representatives, would significantly impact theflow of energy trade. The BAT is said to prohibit
companies from deducting import costs as regularbusiness expenses while making exporters’ foreign
revenue and profits exempt from taxation. Its proponents argue that the BAT could raise significant
revenue that would help offset a large portion of
the $1.8 trillion estimated cost of the proposed reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%.
The proposed BAT raises many interesting questions for the energy sector. Would the BAT, ascurrently proposed, actually discourage crude oil
imports and encourage U.S. production instead ofbecoming a major revenue raiser? And, if domestic
production grows, how much would the prices ofdomestic crude and gasoline rise? More fundamentally, how would the BAT affect the energy
security of the United States as well as the role of
the United States in the global energy economic architecture? These questions warrant a heavy doseof clear-eyed thinking as well as caution. Even if
Congress gets its way—a prospect highly uncertain
at this time—some serious legal showdowns could
be on the horizon over its legality vis-à-vis theWorld Trade Organization rules. It is too early toascertain the impact of An America First Energy
Plan on the U.S. oil and gas sector, but clearly thepolitical winds have shifted.
※著者略歴：Jane Nakano is a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Her areas of expertise
include U.S. energy policy, energy security issues in Asia,
global gas market dynamics, and global nuclear energy trends.
She frequently writes and speaks on these issues at conferences
and to the media. Also, she has testified before Congress onenergy issues in Asia. Prior to joining CSIS in 2010, Ms. Nakano
was with the U.S. Department of Energy and served as the lead
staff on energy engagements with China and Japan.

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