HOW TO DEAL WITH CHINA
George Kennan’s Philosophy and Cultural Internationalism
KINOSHITA, Hideaki

INTRODUCTION
The well-known 8,000-word Long Telegram and the X Article that George Kennan issued in theearly part of the Cold War is considered to be a quite valuable and persuasive proposal in regards to
the U.S. government’s formulating of strategies for dealing with Soviet Russia. Contemporaries of
Kennan were struck with awe by the detail and thoughtfulness of his proposal in spite of aconsiderable number of questions and opposition raised against his messages. In addition, his writings
are quite sophisticated and attractive in their rhetoric and in rendering ideas. Many are charmed by
the eloquence, and are filled with a sense of deep affection and admiration, not only among thepundits of U.S. foreign policy, but also among English learners and instructors as well.
Taking into consideration of Kennan’s basic philosophy as thus elaborated, this paper examines
how to deal with present-day China’s assertive geopolitical strategies. Some excellent passages fromthe messages of the Long Telegram, the X-Article and the memoir（1950-1963）were extracted forthis purpose. Though this situation differs significantly from the global conditions at the time ofGeorge Kennan’s writing, there appears to exist significant instructive notions that can be consideredwhen charting the course of strategy vis-a-vis China as a newly rising power.
In order to present feasible ideas on extending the policies towards China, Kennan’s philosophy for
dealing with Russia in the Cold War will be first introduced as a reference to policy formation for ahierarchical power. Then, the writer will emphatically exhibit Chinese governmental requirements
before specific ways of dealing with China are enumerated, namely through consideration regarding
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank（AIIB）, China’s currency in the global market, andcooperative deterring actions. Considering the actual implementation of the policies towards China,
the cultural definition of international relations shall be shown to be equally as important as invoking
George Kennan’s doctrine for dealing with the hegemonic power.

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KENNAN’S PHILOSOPHY

In the last part of the Long Telegram dispatched on February 22, 1946 from the American
Embassy in Moscow to the State Department, Kennan advised how to deal with Russia, which had
been extending aggressive policies both in official and unofficial covert planes. Kennan said in thetelegram that “the first step to be taken is to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of
the movement with which we are dealing --- Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal
problems of our own society, to improve self, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own
people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow ---”. He concluded that the greatest danger that the U.S.
had in coping with the problem of Soviet communism at that time was that the U.S. itself allowed
them to become like those they were coping with,（which was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics（USSR））（Kennan 1946: 17）. Thus, he stressed moral solidarity and the vibrant society of theAmerican people as well as that of the West as a whole.
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CHINA NEEDED AN OUTSIDE ENEMY

As being illustrated, Kennan’s first advice was to apprehend and recognize the nature of the
movement which was being dealt with. Along with this guidance, in this writer’s opinion, it issignificant to understand what now makes the Chinese government be assertive and advocate ananti-Japan policy in the current Xi Jinping government. To prove my point, it is important to notethat in the Chinese political system of Communist control, there has always existed the weakness of
not having any means to ask about and reflect public opinion through actual policies. Therefore, in
their political system, it is necessary for the top leader to govern all the hierarchical organizations,which are party, politics and military. The recent announcement of the reorganization of the militaryforce, in which all branches of the armed forces would come under a joint military command, is aclear indication to the grip of the Communist Party over the 2.3 million member military.
Kennan stated in the X Article, “In the USSR, the existence of civil war and the long foreignintervention in the past together with the obvious fact that the communist represented only a tinyminority of Russian people made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity”（Kennan 1947:
568）. There appears to be an analogy between these two communist powers if we focus on the needsof the maintenance of the internal political structure since China was also beset by invading hordesof tribes and foreign powers in their vast tracts of land in her history. In both cases, the government
tends to pursue a dictatorial type of path, and to justify its control upkeep there has always a need
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for an outside enemy. That is why any Chinese communist government, such as the chairmanship of
Mao Zedong, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, or Xi Jinping, sought an outside enemy.
The writer highlights the following three cases in past Chinese communist administrations. From
1951 to 1952, Mao Zedong started the Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns in the name of eradicating
enemies of the state and corruption in the cities. The number of purged capitalists, landowners andpolitical opponents during this period is estimated at several million. On June 25th, 1950, less than
one year after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Mao sent the Peoples Liberation
Army（PLA）to Korea, crossing the 38th parallel. Hither, the US was designated as an outside foe,and Mao tried to arouse antagonistic feeling among Chinese people concentrated on American
imperialism.
Another example is the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. This time, Mao shelled the islands ofKinmen and Matsu to drive away the Republic of China（ROC）army. However, the bombardment inessence helped to promote the Three Red Banners Movement, which included the Great Leap
Forward and the People’s Commune policies that he was undertaking forcefully despite thelackluster outcome and disarray. By generating tension in the Taiwan Strait, the power of the PLA
was reinforced and so was Mao’s, allowing him to enact policies that would have otherwise been
unpopular.
The third example is the border clashes with Soviet Russia that occurred on Damansky Island at
the Amur River in March, 1969. The seven months of military crashes were efficacious to distractfrom the alleged domestic chaos at peril in the wake of the infamous Cultural Revolution（1966-1976）.
This time, Soviet Russia was chosen to be a new enemy of China codifying them as Soviet Russia
Revisionist Socialistic Imperialism.
Ⅲ

ANTI-JAPAN CAMPAIGNAs being exhibited, establishing a recognized outside enemy performed an important role forstability of the Chinese Communist Party administration by keeping the deference of ordinary people
to the authority. It was particularly effective during the fiercely implemented policy period as it
diverted the people’s dissatisfaction. Mao Zedong actually disclosed this necessity for China in histalk with Dr. Kissinger on February 17, 1973 in Beijing, when the U.S. and China started to warm up
each other. The memorandum of conversation recorded Mao saying “Actually, it would be thatsometimes we want to criticize you for a while and you want to criticize us for a while. That, yourPresident said, is the ideological influence. You say, away with you Communist. We say, away withyou imperialists. Sometimes we say things like that”（Foreign Relations of the United States 1969− 61 −

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1976）
.
Initially, there was no need to resort to anti-Japan sentiment because the principal enemies ofChina were the U.S. and later the Soviet Union. After abortive attempts by Mao, namely the Great
Leap Forward Movement and the Cultural Revolution, which were stifling the national economy,
Deng Xiaoping and other leaders decided in 1979 to lead the country on a path of economic
development based on a market economy. Doing a complete about face, eroding their communist
principle which they had been forcing on the people for decades, the government decided to resort
to nationalism, including an anti-Japan campaign, to continue their unchallengeable validity of control.
The nationalism campaign was designed to defuse any inevitable tension that was to be generated in
the aftermath of the radical change of the economic system since it was accentuated by the fact thatclass distinction was to be perpetuated by the ensured unequal distribution of wealth.
As has been the case in the past, for Jiang Zemin, the then General Secretary of the Communist
party（1993-2003）, it was important that an outside enemy existed to enable leadership. However, it
was not wise any more to make the super powers, such as the U.S. and Russia, outside enemies.
Seeing events and possibilities in context, Japan was now set as a sole target of their propaganda
campaign. If they threaten Japan with such issues as history problems or Yasukuni Shrine, Japantends to express “apology and reflection”. In a word, the anti-Japan campaign was a “no risk andhigh-return” policy, and they compiled the story of the Chinese people as victims（Lucas 2015）. Thus,for the Chinese government, the anti-Japanese movement is so congenial to their impulse, and affords
pseudoscientific justification for vesting internal control by sidetracking the people’s dissatisfaction.
They emphasized the historical aspect, and have denounced the Japanese and their past conduct torestore the new image to that of an enemy, which gave rise to the imbued vogue and vociferous
appeals of anti-Japanese movement across the country.
Highlighted in this was the decision by the Japanese government to purchase the Senkaku Islands
from a private Japanese owner in 2012. Excessive Chinese nationalism returned, and it yielded
decisive impact on latent anti-Japanese emotion animating and hoisting the activities of scathing
attacks on Japanese shops and factories in China. Drawing on a period of similar intense social
conflict and anxiety in the U.S., John Bodnar described in Remaking America（1992） about theAmerican leader’s activities of influencing the symbolic inventory of American public memory. He
noted “The need to sustain loyalty to the nation during World War II and during the earliest day of
the Cold War obviously did not diminish the enthusiasm of authorities in the federal government andthe states to use commemorations to foster patriotism. --- In this effort leaders could draw up on
existing memories and traditions that had become thoroughly familiar to much of the population.
Thus, they honored soldiers who fought for the belief of their leaders and pioneers who built a− 62 −

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nation”（Bodnar 1993: 250）
. The same thing is happening in China now as demonstrated by last year’s 70th anniversary military parade for victory over Japan.
To further complicate the matter, there is another weighty issue which appears to accelerate
Chinese nationalism. It is a prediction by economists that China’s present economic growth trajectory
will be followed by a period of much slower level. Prominent economists believe that it would be theright time now for China to grow at less than 7 percent per year, even though this is what Xi
Jinping declared when he became a General Secretary of the Communist party. This economists’direction is quite reasonable taking into consideration China’s current debt bubble at the local
government levels, which is now exceeding the scale of the entire German economy. In fact, during
the 2016 National People’s Congress ended on March 16, the GDP growth rate during the period of
the next five years, which is from 2016 to 2020, was set as a “minimum 6.5%”. If the lackluster
economic model starts faltering in the near term with ensuring recession, as the economists predict
and as it is actually falling on the path now, the Chinese Communist Party will most likely inculcate
nationalism to avoid less deference to authority. This will eventually lead to more anti-Japan
campaign and more rather than less assertiveness in abroad since they would have less room toafford more conciliatory policies.
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HOW TO DEAL WITH CHINA

In this atmosphere of intense acrimony of anti-Japan movement and the bullying behavior in theSouth China Sea, one may wonder what kind of policy should be dispensed for dealing with China.
As an improvised solution, there tends to be a pursuance of the canonical containment policy. It wasa popular dictum of the belligerent group in the U.S. government at Kennan’s time, utilizing his
convenient phrases stipulated in the X-Article. Albeit with this well tempted policy adopted during
the Cold War, the policy to be facilitated for China now should be more discreet, and, rather, in adiametrically opposing manner. A case in point is a cultural definition of international relations. In
the book, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, published in 1997, Akira Irie clarified as “nowmilitary power, strategy, mobilization for war, and alliance diplomacy have lost their once dominantroles in defining international relations, other forces, social and cultural, are coming to the foe, andnow a cultural defined community is real”（Irie 1997: 183）.As being stressed, it is important to adopt
a cultural perspective in defining future relations with China leaving aside the geopoliticalpreoccupation.
Currently, culturally right and workable means to dispense is to make an effort to accommodate
China as an important and responsible leader in the international community. Francis Fukuyama− 63 −RESEARCH BULLETIN

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explicitly stated that in a sense there was an analogy between China now and pre-World War I
Wilhelmine Germany. He pointed out that after 1871, there was no way that Germany would not
exercise greater influence through Europe, and there was a historiographies view that the problem
was the Triple Entente’s failure to adequately accommodate Germany（Fukuyama 2014: 1）. This
statement provides quite instructive suggestion to pursue. It proposes that when a great power tobe appearing, the international community is to fulfill the task of adjusting to such a dramaticallyrising power. It also suggests that the international community should devise a strategy toaccommodate the rising power, invariably having her hold clear responsibility as a world political,
economic and a culturally defined leader within the framework of universal law.
Accordingly, Japan should not itself consider China such an enemy because of China’s overtures.
The way Japan bases its policy vis-a-vis China should not be based on how it would treat an enemy,
but how it would engage with a rising power more in general as being illustrated above. The
following suggestions are directed toward Japan and the international community in conjunction
with Japan, but can also be considered in other countries that may now or later be vilified by China’squest to create a distracting bogeyman.
１

AIIB
One of the most efficient and immediate steps that Japan could exercise is to join in the AIIB. In

December 2015, the AIIB was founded by fifty seven nations, including China, England, France,
Germany, and Russia. Japan and the U.S. decided not to join because of their concern about the
governance and transparency of the new organization. However, rather than bickering in the process
of formulating the organization from without, by joining the organization, Japan could exercise her
skill to build the bank’s basic rules from within, utilizing her expertise developed through her longactivities in the Asia Development Bank and the World Bank. This means that Japan could herald
the beginning of cultural internationalism, since by staunchly supporting the healthier operation of
the bank, Japan would engender trust in China. It could even redound to the security of the region
by mitigating the tension and discord through the influence of economic internationalism.
２

Renminbi in the Global Market
On November 30, 2015 the IMF recognized the renminbi, the official currency of China, as thebasket of currencies of their reserve asset, the Special Drawing Right（SDR）. Figure 1 below shows
the current share of the currencies in the SDR. Starting in October 2016, the renminbi will hold an
11% share of the SDR basket as, shown in Figure 2.

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

Figure 1. Current official currencies in SDR
Source: The Japan Times, December 2, 2015



Figure 2. Official currencies of SDR from October, 2016
Source: The Japan Times, December 2, 2015

The majority will still be the dollar at 42% and the Euro at 31%, but it is an important milestone toaccommodate the Chinese economy into the global financial system. This is leading to induce an
incentive to China’s cultural internationalism activity. It is because China is expected to make much
more progress in reforming its financial sector, including opening its tightly controlled onshore
financial market, allowing more capital outflows and widening the trading band for their currency.
Notably, the exchange rate of the renminbi is now set as only moving up to down two per centagainst the U.S. dollar from a mid-rate set daily by the central bank. This should be passed on to− 65 −RESEARCH BULLETIN

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actual daily market parity as with other SDR currencies.
During the meeting of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in
October, 2015, they categorically declared to establish China-Europe International Exchange（CEINEX） in Frankfurt with joint investment of renminbi 200 million （3.8 billion yen）. Here,
Exchange Traded Fund（ETF）corresponding to the stock index of the Chinese market and theRenminbi bond issued by Chinese and overseas companies are to be welded. Equally important,during Xi Jinping’s visit to England in October, 2015, it was agreed that the Renminbi bond wasgoing to be issued in the London market. Accommodation of renminbi for all these global financial
schemes is expected to be the stimuli for China to be a responsible power befitting its economic
might along the norm of the international community.
３

Deter Bullying Behavior
It is widely believed that China’s current underlying policy thrusts the notorious “nine dash line”, ahuge tongue shaped maritime area shown in the map published by the Chinese government in 1949.
The Pentagon revealed that China reclaimed about 11.7 sq. km. of land in the Spratly Islands from
December 2013 to June 2015, which is 95 percent of the reclaimed land in the area by China,
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan combined（The Japan Times November 2, 2015）.
This audacious practice by no means conforms to international law. China’s intention is hard tofathom, and they have not stated, yet, asserting claims specifically to territorial seas and air spaces
around the artificial islands as they have declared an Air Defense Identification Zone （ADIZ）
demarcation in East China Sea. Nevertheless, it is envisaged that they would speak up when the
military bases are completed, which no doubt would rankle the other concerned countries.
The only way to make China to curtail the bullying activities in the South China Sea and to exhort
her to be a responsible regional member is for a cooperative international community to demonstrateadroit and vigilant opposing actions. In the last part of the X-Article issued in the July 1947 edition of
Foreign Affairs, Kennan suggested some important point that the West could take into theconsideration. He said, “the U.S. had its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet
policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation andcircumspection that it had to observe, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventuallyfind their outlet in either breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power”（Kennan, 1947: 582）.
There seems to be considerable evidence to support that this message should be considered inrelation to Chinese divisive policies.
As an eloquent testament of demonstration, the USS Curtis Wilburt, a guided-missile destroyer
based in Yokosuka, conducted a freedom of navigation operation（FONOP）within 12 nautical miles− 66 −

HOW TO DEAL WITH CHINA（KINOSHITA）（22 km）of Triton Island in the disputed South China Sea on January 30, 2016. A similar operation
was conducted by the USS Lassen, an Aegis guided missile destroyer, within 12 nautical miles ofSubi Reef last October. These momentous manifestations yielded profound implications for China in
not allowing her intention of disquieting feature of status quo in the South China Sea.
Relating to this kind of daunting actions, there now are components of the alliance system, which
are the respective bilateral treaties of the U.S. with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and thePhilippines. These treaties should be reinforced, and create wedges with other countries afflicted by
China for instance, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. The alliance could forestall fraught
crashes between China and other clamoring countries in a somewhat unpalatable situation. As a partof the aligned coalescing work, Japan could readily focus its efforts on maritime capacity building inSoutheast Asia by providing patrol boats, surveillance equipment, more joint military training andfrequent ship visits. On December 12, 2015, Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Modi of India
reached a slew of agreements in New Delhi including a $15 billion deal for helping to build India’s
first high-speed rail link and for defense aimed at deterring China’s expansion. By building such amultilateral apparatus and dovetailing the actions in purpose, it is expected that China realizes thatits defiant actions are inextricably fraught with danger with the surrounding countries, and thecorollary is that they are literally eroding their own international position.
４

The Permanent Court of Arbitration
In November last year, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled that it had

jurisdiction to hear a case filed by the Philippines against China over the disputed South China Sea.
The decision is a good sign to other potential claimants since it made China preemptive and freaked
as they sought to resolve the issue unilaterally. China would eventually come under intensified
diplomatic and legal pressure if the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague decides in favor of
Manila, which is expected to happen in the summer this year. Along this development, in Sydney on
November 22, 2015, the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and Australia made a statement tosupport the right of South China Sea claimants to seek arbitration. Subsequently, Vietnam made asubmission to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in support of Manila’s case. Furthermore,Indonesia’s security chief said in December, 2015 that Jakarta could take Beijing to court over the socalled nine dash line. Through all these actions converged from various sources, as Kennan advised,
it is hoped that China would eventually find their outlet of gradually “mellowing” to become aresponsible international member.

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POLITICAL POWER

As an important factor in international relations, we should scrutinize how Kennan considered themilitary power in the process of foreign policy decision. In his Memoirs（1950-1963）he stated, “--- theSoviet leaders, interested in extending their real power by measures short of general war have notbeen oblivious to the possibilities of such things as threats and intimidation-the possibilities of the useof the shadow of armed strength rather than its substance-as a means of influencing the politicalbehavior of peoples elsewhere” （Kennan 1972: 335）. Accordingly, Kennan admitted that military
power was a “shadow” of a political power. Additionally, he told students at the National War College
in 1946 the following:“You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness andpleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background.” “Theexistence of such forces is probably the most important single instrumentality in the conduct of the
U.S. foreign policy”（Gaddis: 38）.
On the other hand, Kennan stated at the National War College in October 1947. “Remember, that...as things stand today, it is not Russian military power which is threatening us, it is Russian politicalpower. ... If it is not entirely a military threat, I doubt that it can be effectively met entirely by
military means” （Gaddis: 39）. Kennan reckoned that it is not exclusively military power which
determines the total position of a nation on the international stage. In fact, in a lecture at the National
War College on August 20, 1948, Kennan articulated with equal brevity, such factors as armed forces,
economic power, propaganda weapons, and diplomacy as means of pursuing basic objects ofAmerican foreign policies（Suzuki: 100）
. These are what he called political power.
Invoking Kennan’s philosophy, it is political power that Japan should be based around and thrustin implementing policies towards China. Military power, of course, constructs an important part ofpolitical power, but it should not be the pretext as an instrument to be manipulated tactically on an
extensive scale. Rather, it should be formulated as a fixed factor in the conduct of foreign policy, andshould function as a deterrence and “shadow” underpinning the other constituents of the politicalpower. Economic power, probably, has a more profound influence than the other elements of politicalpower. To face an assertive and highly hierarchic power such as China, a healthy and vigorous
domestic society appears to be a force to be reckoned with. As a matter of fact, for building such asociety, no amount of domestic economic reform would suffice. Indeed, maneuverability of
propaganda and diplomacy, to a great extent, relies on economic strength as well as internalsoundness and the permanence of one’s own society.

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CONCLUSION
From their inherent one party political system, China needed and may demand even now an
outside enemy as the Stalin’s Soviet Russia had definitely needed during the interwar period, during
World War II, and during the Cold War, which was clearly specified in the Long Telegram and the
X Article. However, as Kennan suggested, there seems to be considerable evidence to support theidea that military power is not the factor to be bolstered in the forefront when dealing with a rapidly
rising power such as China. Rather, the cultural definition of international relations represented byeconomic internationalism and diplomatic power appears to be the one to be extended to lead China
as an important and responsible actor in the international setting. For this goal, it is imperative thatthe international community accommodates China through various scenes such as the operations ofAIIB, Renminbi, and even in the activities of Trans-Pacific Partnership（TPP）and Conference of theParties 21（COP21）. Adopting these activities, China could perform an important role as a global
leader, which is quite natural with her large national and economic scale. Through these activities,
the cultural internationalism of China in the international society is starting to be influential by
overcoming excessive parochialism.
Nonetheless, the support for China by the international community necessitates deterrence to beintertwined to make her perform as a responsible global leader. Particularly, the activity ofreclaiming lands in the Spratly Islands is considered to be a challenge to the status quo in the region.
It is generating tension with other relevant countries. This kind of unilateral action should be
inhibited by coalescing activities of the concerned countries as well as the international community
as a whole. The U.S. conduct of FONOP and the announcement of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration regarding its jurisdiction over the issue are necessary manifestations and an antidote to
the prevailing bullying behavior of China in the South Pacific. These actions are conducive to make
China understand the universal norm to be observed as a leading international community member
through the process of “mellowing of their power” as Kennan emphasized.
In a word, it is

widely expected that China would follow the rules and precepts of theinternational community and pursue the cultural definition of international relations rather thanfalling in the path of traditional geopolitical strategy. Additionally, to face with the assertive andhighly hierarchical power such as China, the vital economic strength appears to be important for the
powers concerned. In conclusion, besides adopting China in the international community as a leading
responsible power by the aligned coalescing work, the healthy and vigorous economic society in eachrelevant country tends to be equally important.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
It is a great honor for the author to contribute this paper for Professor Yoshihiko Nitta’s
retirement edition of Nihon University College of Economics Research Bulletin. Professor Nitta was
the author’s senior colleague in Hitachi Ltd., Tokyo during the 1970s and 1980s, and this writer isgrateful for the opportunity given for celebrating and commemorating his lengthy professional
service in the university.
Bibliography
Official Files
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, P. 125
Kennan, George. Incoming Telegram, February 22, 1946. Document 9, Papers of George M. Elsey. U.S. Department ofState.
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Bodnar, John（1993）Remaking America. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Gaddis, John Lewis（1982）Strategies of Containment. New York: Oxford University Press.
Irie, Akira（1997）Cultural Internationalism and World Order. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University
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Kennan, George F.（1972）Memoirs 1950-1963. New York: Pantheon Books.
Suzuki, Taketo （2002） Fujikome Kousou to Beikoku Sekaisenryaku［Containment Planning and American World
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Kennan, George（July, 1947）‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’. Foreign Affairs.
Lucas, Patrick（February 25, 2015）‘Chyuka Minzoku Fukkou［Revival of Chinese Race］’. Asahi Shinbun, P. 17
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The Japan Times, Article（December 2, 2015）− 70 −