Convention on Nuclear Safety
National Report of Japanfor the Fifth Review Meeting

September, 2010
Government of Japan

|1Convention on Nuclear Safety
National Report of Japan for the Fifth Review Meeting
Table of Contents
A

Introduction……………………………………………………………………...….

1

National policy in nuclear energy………………………………………...

1

2

Present status of nuclear energy utilization ………………………………

1

3

Implementation of the obligations under the Convention andApproach to Nuclear Safety

4B……………………………………………….

Structure and preparation of the National Report5……………………….

6…………………………………………………………………………….

7

1

Progresses on nuclear safety since the previous National Report …….

7

2

Planned measures to improve safety

83

Responses to the results of the previous Review Meeting

4

Responses to all recommendations adopted at the previous

Summary

Review MeetingC1………………………………….....
……………..

…………………………………………………………......

Reporting Article by Article………………………………………………………..

Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations……………………………………….

Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Framework…………………………….

8

10

11
11

27

Article 7 (1) Establishing and maintaining a legislative andregulatory framework……………………………………...........

Article 7 (2) Safety requirements and regulation

Article 8

Regulatory Body

28…………………………..

35………………………………………………………

41

Article 8 (1) Establishment of the regulatory body…………………………

42

Article 8 (2) Status of the regulatory body ……………………………………

54

Article 9

Responsibility of the Licensee Holder

Article 10 Priority to Safety………………………….......

61………………………………………………………

63

2|

Article 11……………………………………

71

Article 11 (1) Financial resources……………………………………………

72

Article 11 (2) Human resources…………………………………………....

73

Article 12 Human Factors…………………………………………………….….

79

Article 13 Quality Assurance………………………………………………….…

85

Article 14

Financial and Human Resources

Assessment and Verification of Safety………………………….....

91

Article 14 (1) Assessment of safety………………………………………...

92

Article 14 (2) Verification of safety………………………………………

93

Article 15

Radiation Protection…………………………………………………

Article 16

Emergency Preparedness...………………………………………..

Article 16 (1)Emergency plans and programs

Article 16 (2)Information to the public and neighboring countries

Article 17

Siting.…………………………..

97

105
106

….…..

118

…………………………………………………………………..

121

Article 17 (1)Evaluation of site related factors

Article 17 (2)Impact of nuclear installation on individuals,
society and environment……………………...……..

122..………………………………...….

123

Article 17 (3)Re-evaluation of site related factors …………………...…….

125

Article 17 (4)Consultation with other countries having potential to beaffected by the installation……………………………………

126…….………………………………………

127

Article 18 (1)Implementation of protection in depth ……………...………..

128

Article 18 (2)Incorporation of proven technologies………………...……..

135

Article 18 (3)Design for reliable, stable and manageable operation ...…..

137

Article 18

Article 19

Design and Construction

Operation……………………………………………………………..

139

|3

Article 19 (1)Initial authorization

Article 19 (2)Operational limits and conditions

Article 19 (3)Procedures for operation, maintenance,
inspection and testing

Article 19 (4)D……………………………………………
…………………………….

..……………………………………….

140
142

143

Procedures for responding tooperational occurrences and accidents ……………………...

154

Article 19 (5)Engineering and technical support …………………………..

156

Article 19 (6)Reporting of incidents significant to safety …………………..

157

Article 19 (7)Operational experience feedback…………………………..

159

Article 19 (8)Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste on site …

162.…………………………………………………………………………….

165

Annexes1

List of nuclear installations

2

List of incidents reported under the Reactor Regulation Act
during the reporting period3.……..…………………………………………

..…………………………………………………………

168

171

Outline of JEAC 4111-2009: Rules of Quality Assurance for
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants.…..….….……………………………….

5

List of nuclear emergency drills during the reporting period

6

Definition and function of each class related to safetyfunction importance7

166

List of standards of academic societies and associations
endorsed by NISA

4…..…………………………………………….

173

………….

177

…....…………………………………………………..

179

Inspection items of pre-service inspection on each construction
phase defined by the Electricity Business Act…..……………………….

8

Incident reporting criteria defined by the Ministerial Ordinance9

References

181

………

182

………………………………………………………………...

184

4|

Acronym and Abbreviation Used in this Report

ABWR

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

ACNRE

Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy

AEC

Atomic Energy Commission

ALARA

As low as reasonably achievable

ANRE

Agency of Natural Resources and Energy

APWR

Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor

AMTA

Ageing management technical assessmentBTC

BWR Operator Training Center Corporation

BWR

Boiling Water Reactor

ConvExConvention Exercise, IAEA

Dose Notification

Notification for Dose Equivalent Limits on the Basis of theRules for Commercial Power Reactors

ECT

Eddy Current Test

ENAC

Emergency Notification and Assistance Convention

ERSS

Emergency Response Support System

FBR

Fast Breeder Reactor

FY

Fiscal Year

GCR

Gas-cooled Reactor

HVAC

Heating, Ventilating and Air-conditioning

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP

International Commission on Radiological Protection

INES

International Nuclear Event Scale

INPO

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

IRRS

Integrated Regulatory Review Service

JAEA

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

JANTI

Japan Nuclear Technology Institute

JCO Criticality Accident

Criticality Accident at JCO Co. Uranium Fuel Fabrication
Facility

JEAC(G)

Japan Electric Association Code (Guideline)

JNES

Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization

KEPCO
Technical Standards
Ministerial OrdinanceKansai Electric Power Company
Ministerial Ordinance for Establishing Technical Standards for
Nuclear Power Generation Equipments

METI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MEXT

Ministry ofTechnology

MITI

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (METI at present)

Monju

Prototype fast breeder reactor owned by the JAEA

Education,i

Culture,Sports,ScienceandAcronym and Abbreviation Used in this Report

MOX

Uranium and Plutonium Mix Oxide fuelNCA(A)

National Competent Authority (Abroad)

NCA(D)

National Competent Authority (Domestic)

NDT

Non-destructive Test

NEAT

Nuclear Emergency Assistance and Training Center

NISA

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

NSC

Nuclear Safety Commission

NS NetNuclear Safety Network

NTC

Nuclear Power Training Center Ltd.

Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Act
NUSS

Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness
Nuclear Safety Standard, IAEA

NWP

National Warning Point

OECD/NEAOJTOrganizationof
Economic
Development/Nuclear Energy Agency
On the Job Training

OSART

Operational Safety Assessment Review TeamPNRA

Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority

PWR

Pressurized Water Reactor

Radiation Hazard
Prevention Act

Act concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards due toRadioisotopes, etc.
Response Assistance Network, IAEA

RANET

Co-operation

andReactor Regulation Act

Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Fuel
Material and Reactors

RM

Relationship Management

SNW

Senior Network

SPEEDI

System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
Information

TEPCOTokyo Electric Power Company

TRU waste

High level radioactive waste
generation radioactive waste

WANO

World Association of Nuclear Operators

ii

and

long-lived

low-heatA Introduction

A
1

Introduction

National policy in nuclear energy
National policy in nuclear energy is built on the Basic Plan for Energy formulated by
the Government and the Framework for Nuclear Energy determined by the Atomic
Energy Commission of Cabinet Office. In October 2005, the Cabinet decided torespect the Framework for Nuclear Energy, which considers nuclear power
generation as the key power source and requests its steady promotion.
With regard to promotion of nuclear utilization, the Framework for Nuclear Energy set
the following five policies and or principles, namely.
The level of nuclear power generation is to be about 30 to 40 % or greater of the total
power generation in 2030 or later.
The basic policy on the fast breeder reactor is to introduce it on a commercial basis inaround 2050, on the premise of meeting the necessary conditions including economic
viability.
The basic policy is to establish the nuclear fuel cycle and effectively use uranium andplutonium as energy sources. To avoid international suspicion about nuclear
proliferation, Japan has determined in principle not to have excess plutonium that will
be not be used.
For assuring safety, the guidelines on responsibilities of the Government andlicensees, development and establishment of safety culture and continuous
improvement of operation management, utilization of risk information, measures foraging management, and communication on nuclear emergency preparedness andsafety activities are provided.
The guarantee of peaceful uses, treatment and disposal of radioactive waste,development and securing of human resources and coexistence of nuclear energy
and the public/local communities should be strengthened as the basic activities fornuclear utilization.

2

Present status of nuclear energy utilization(1) Situations of reactor facilities
In July 1966, Tokai Power Station (GCR: 166 MWe) of the Japan Atomic Power Co.
started commercial operation as the first commercial nuclear power plant in Japan.
Since then, construction and operation of nuclear installations have been steadily
promoted. Tokai Power Station and Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Units 1&2
ceased commercial operation in March 1998 and January 2009, respectively.
Tomari Power Station Unit 3 of Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.(PWR: 912 MWe)was commissioned on December 22, 2009. As of the end of March 2010, nuclear
installations in operation amount to 54, with the total output of 48,847 MWe(licensed output). The nuclear installations under construction are three in total with
two BWRs and one FBR, and those in preparation for construction are twelve. Out

1

A Introductionof nuclear installations under construction, fast breeder prototype reactor Monju,
which was shutdown due to sodium leakage from the secondary cooling system
during test run in December 1995, resumed test run in May 2010.
Nuclear power generation is recognized as an important power source that
accounts for approx. 29 % of the total power generation in Japan. Fig. A-1 shows
the composition of power sources as of the end of FY2009.
In response to the experience of two oil crises in 1970s, Japan decreased
dependency on oil and encouraged diversification of power sources. As a result,
nuclear power and natural gas increased their shares in the total power generation.
Because of scarce natural resources, Japan also promotes the nuclear fuel cycle inwhich spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed to recover nuclear fuel materials to be used
for the energy source. This nuclear fuel cycle also pursues effective use of uranium
resources through reprocessing and, at the same time, proceeds with theplu-thermal program using uranium and plutonium mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) in
the existing light water reactors, while aiming at establishing the fast breeder
reactor cycle that uses extracted plutonium in the fast breeder reactor.

New Energy,
etc
10.5
Nuclear
279.8

Water
79.3

Water
Thermal956.5
millionMWh

Nuclear
New Energy,etc

Thermal586.9

Unit：million MWh

Fig. A-1 Composition of Power Sources2

A Introduction

Nuclear Power Plant
BWR (in operation)

BWR (under construction)

PWR (in operation)

PWR (under construction)

Tomari Power Station
1 2 3
Ohma Nuclear Power Station
Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
1

2

3

4 5 6

Higashidoori Nuclear Power Station

7

1

Shika Nuclear Power Station
1

Fugen
ATR (Under decommissioning)

2

Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
1

Tsuruga
Power Station
1

2

FBR (under construction)

Fukushima Daini Nuclear PowerStation

Mihama Power Station

1 2 3 4

1 2 3
Ohi Power Station
2

3

3

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
1 2 3 4 5 6

Monju

1

2

Tokai Power Station
GCR (Under decommissioning))

4

Takahama Power Station
1

2 3

Tokai Daini Power Station

4

Shimane Nuclear Power Station
1

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station

2

3

2

5

Units 1&2: Under decommissioning

Genkai Nuclear Power Station
1

4

3 4

Ikata Power Station
1

2

3

Sendai Nuclear Power Station
1 2

Fig. A-2 Locations of Nuclear Installations

3

A Introduction(2) Plutonium utilization in light water reactors
In October 2009, 16 MOX fuels were loaded into Genkai Nuclear Power Station
Unit 3 (PWR: 1,180 MWe) of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. and started operationin November. This marked the first utilization of MOX fuel in the commercial LWR(plu-thermal) in Japan.
Subsequently, in February 2010, Ikata Power Station Unit 3 (PWR: 890 MWe) was
loaded with 16 MOX fuels and started operation. In the future, Hamaoka Nuclear
Power Station of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. is also expected to adopt theplu-thermal program.
In adopting the plu-thermal program to existing nuclear installations, permission for
amendment of the reactor installment license is required to load MOX fuel into thereactor core. The licensees seeking for the plu-thermal program consecutively
obtained the permission of license amendment. Table A-1 shows the nuclear
installations that have obtained permission of license amendment as of the end of
March 2010 to start the plu-thermal program.
Table A-1 Reactor Facilities Licensed for Installment Alteration to Start Plu-thermal
ProgramLicensee of Reactor

Reactor Facility

Operation
The Kansai Electric

Licensed Date

Takahama Units 3&4 (PWR)

Dec. 1998

Tokyo Electric Power

Fukushima Daiichi NPS Unit 3 (BWR)

Jul. 1999

Co., Inc.

Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS Unit 3 (BWR)

Mar. 2000

Genkai NPS Unit 3 (PWR)

Sep. 2005

Ikata Unit 3 (PWR)

Mar. 2006

Hamaoka NPS Unit 4 (BWR)

Jul. 2007

Ohma* NPS (ABWR)

Apr. 2008

Shimane NPS Unit 2 (BWR)

Oct. 2008

Onagawa NPS Unit 3 (BWR)

Jan. 2010

Power Co., Inc.

Kyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Shikoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Chubu Electric Power
Co., Inc.
Electric Power
Development Co. Ltd.
The Chugoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Tohoku Electric Power
Co., Inc.

*: Ohma Nuclear Power Station obtained license for use of uranium-plutonium mixed
oxide fuel from the initial start-up.

The licensed date in the Table corresponds with thedate of licensing for installment.

4

A Introduction

3

Implementation of the obligations under the Convention and Approach to Nuclear
Safety(1) Implementation of obligation of the Convention
Japan has ensured implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, including
establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework to govern thesafety of nuclear installations and establishing or designating a regulatory body
entrusted with the implementation of the legal framework, and has been steadily
implementing the obligations under the Convention in accordance with the related
laws such as the Atomic Energy Basic Act, the Reactor Regulation Act and theElectricity Business Act. In compliance with Article 5 of the Convention, Japansubmitted four National Reports on Nuclear Safety so far.
(2) Approach to nuclear safety
As an approach to ensure nuclear safety, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency(hereinafter referred to as NISA), the regulatory body in Japan, has focused on thedevelopment of institutional, knowledge and human resource bases since its
establishment in 2001. Part of the development of the institutional base, aninspection program on preservative action based on the Preserving Program wasintroduced in 2009. This is aiming at enhancing the safety regulation system byputting an emphasis on the software side as seen in inspection of quality assurance
activities by the licensees. To comply with the policy of developing the performancecode on the technical standards, the standards established by academic societies
and associations that could be used as the regulatory standards have beenorganized step by step. In the pursuit of increasing the public’s trusts in regulatory
activities, NISA’s efforts are being exerted to make the information on regulatory
activities available to public, using information service tools such as the web site. In
addition, basic policies of developing the international nuclear safety activities weredeveloped to vitalize international cooperation in the field of nuclear safety. In
preparation for nuclear emergency, responsibilities of the Government, local
communities and licensees have been clearly assigned and identified andemergency centers to respond to a nuclear emergency have been established. The
Government takes a leadership in holding the Integrated Nuclear Emergency
Response Drill almost every year.
Issues concerning safety regulations to be addressed in the future were identified in
the report prepared by the Basic Safety Policy Subcommittee of Nuclear andIndustrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources
and Energy. NISA, considering efforts made so far significantly helped to develop
the infrastructure of the safety regulation, determined to continuously deal with theproposed issues by properly responding to changes in nuclear environment. The
activities requiring continuous commitment, for example, re-evaluation of seismic
safety of the existing nuclear installations, etc., shall be pursued systematically andsteadily.

5

A Introduction

4

Structure and preparation of the National Report
Based on the Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on
Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/572/Rev.3) adopted by the First Extraordinary Meeting of
Nuclear Safety Convention in September 2009, the National Report of Japan for theFifth Review Meeting was prepared by NISA of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, andIndustry (hereinafter referred to as METI), which is the regulatory body of nuclear
installations under the Convention. The National Report was prepared in cooperation
with the governmental organizations including the Agency of Natural Resources andEnergy of METI, the Cabinet Office (the Atomic Energy Commission (hereinafterreferred to as AEC))and the Nuclear Safety Commission (hereinafter referred to asNSC)), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(hereinafter referred to as MEXT), the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare andMinistry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Incorporated Administrative Agency Japan
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (hereinafter referred to as JNES), Incorporated
Administrative Agency Japan Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as
JAEA) and the Federation of Electric Power Companies.
In principle, this report compiles the information available as of the end of March 2010,
unless otherwise specified. It is also released to public via the web site of NISA/METI
and other measures.
The basic principles of preparing this report consist of comprehensive and concise
explanation on the safety regulation on nuclear installations in Japan and descriptionof major issues occurred during this reporting period for the past three years. As
INFCIRC/572/Rev.3 shows issues recommended to be included in more detailed andclearer way, the contents of the report are reviewed completely to meet
INFCIRC/572/Rev.3, not to just update the Fourth National Report.
The main part of the report shows the corresponding Article of the Convention in the
top box of each Article.
“Introduction” summarizes the nuclear program in Japan as well as the nuclear
utilization program. “Summary” briefly reports the main developments after the lastreport and actions that were taken to deal with the issues requiring the response in
the last Review Meeting. Some issues described in “Summary” are discussed in moredetail in each report for the Articles. Article 6 reports completed or ongoing activities
during this reporting period. Information on summary of the safety regulation systemshows the corresponding issues for each of articles in Article 7 and after. The datawith a considerable volume inappropriate to be included in the main part are attachedas Annexes. As for the articles of national legislations, English translation of theReactor Regulation Act, the Electricity Business Act and Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness were posted on the web site of the
Ministry of Justice. Therefore, they are not included in this report. Each URL for the
English versions of these Acts is listed in the Annexes.

6B Summary

B
1

Summary

Progresses on nuclear safety since the previous National Report(1) Introduction of new inspection system
NISA started to review the inspection program in the Task Force on Inspection
System from January 2005. It compiled the report on a new inspection system
based on the Preservation Program in August 2008. Taking into account thedeliberations so far, the ministerial ordinance was revised and a new inspection
system was enacted in January 2009. The inspection system in Japan is describedin Article 19.
(2) Introduction of measures to inform the public of emergency information promptly
NISA adopted the emergency information mailing service in July 2008 to deliver the
emergency information to the registered e-mail addresses promptly. Emergency
information has been experimentally provided to foreigners staying in Japan in theirnative languages through foreign embassies to Japan since the Comprehensive
Nuclear Emergency Drill which was held in October 2008. Measures to transmit the
emergency information are described in Article 16.
(3) Approaches to human factor
In February 2008, NISA developed the guidelines for the regulatory body toevaluate the licensee’s voluntary actions aiming at correcting incompliance directly
caused by human factor. Approaches to human factor are reported in Article 12.
(4) Approaches to long-term operation
Tsuruga Unit 1 (BWR: 357 MWe) of the Japan Atomic Power Co. marked its
40-years operation in March 2010 since its commissioning in 1970. NISA evaluatedthat the aging management technical assessment (AMTA) conducted by thelicensee was appropriate. Approaches to long-term operation are reported in Article
6.
(5) Completion of safety assessment of Fast Breeder Prototype Reactor Monju
Monju had suspended its commissioning test operation for 14 years due to a
sodium leak accident from the secondary system during commissioning test in
1995. In the meantime, various measures were taken and the unit has resumed
commissioning test operation. Safety assessment on Monju is discussed in Article
6.
(6) Adoption of system to reflect latest knowledge
NISA adopted a new system in the pursuit of more efficient review of the permission
for the reactor installment license or its amendment and implementation of safety
examination based on the latest knowledge. This system is described in Article 6.

7

B Summary(7) OSART review on Mihama Power Station Unit 3 of Kansai Electric Power Co.,Inc.
Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. decided to further support safe plant operation
through the international comparative review of their operation management
system of Mihama Unit 3. They invited the Operation Safety Review Team(OSART) from the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as
IAEA) for review. The OSART review is summarized in Article 6.
2

Planned measures to improve safety(1) Re-evaluation of seismic safety
In response to the revised Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Reactor Facilities in September 2006, the existing nuclear
installations and others are being evaluated by the licensees, seeking for further
improvement in seismic safety. As Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station hit
by Niigata Chuetsu-oki earthquake in July 2007, NISA required the licensees toreflect the insights obtained from this earthquake into re-evaluation of seismic
safety. Re-evaluation of seismic safety is reported in Article 6.
(2) Risk-Informed Regulation
The utilization of risk information in the safety regulation has been continuously
under consideration. More efficient and effective Risk-Informed Regulation would
help allocate the regulatory resources appropriately to the priority issues within theconstraints of the regulatory resources. However, it is recognized that further
review will be essential to adopt this system. Some regulatory fields have alreadyused risk information; a possibility to expand the scope of utilization will be
discussed in the future.

3

Responses to the results of the previous Review Meeting(1) Challenges
a Preparation and implementation of action plan based on IRRS
recommendations and suggestions to prepare the IRRS follow-up mission
Giving due consideration to the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
recommendations and suggestions given in June 2007, the Basic Safety Policy
Subcommittee of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee for Natural Resources and Energy identified the issues to beaddressed by the regulatory body. NISA is moving forward toward response tothese issues. Summary of the IRRS review in Japan is reported in Article 8.
b

Re-evaluation of seismic safety following the revision of the Regulatory Guide

8

B Summary

for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Facilities
Taking into account the insights obtained from the review on effects of Niigataken
Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in July 2007 on Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power
Station, the plan for the seismic safety re-evaluation was revised by the licensees
and the re-evaluation were steadily progressing and NISA is evaluating thereported results. Progress of re-evaluation of seismic safety is explained in
Article 6.
cAssessment of the safety of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Power units
Since the Niigataken Chuetu-oki earthquake in 2007, all units at
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station stopped operation to investigate forpossible damages by the earthquake. Units 6 & 7 are now in operation, after theinvestigation concluded that both units would be operated safely, safetyassessment of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station is reported in Article
6.

dCompletion of the study of improving the inspection system to make it more
flexible and incorporate the measures against aging, past detected falsified
inspection data
NISA started to review the inspection system in the Task Force on Inspection
System from November 2005, and prepared a report on new inspection system
based on the Preserving Program in August 2008. Taking into account the review
so far, the ministerial ordinance was revised to enact a new inspection system inJanuary 2009. Japan’s inspection system is reported in Article 19.

eImprovement in Periodic Safety Reviews taking into account the possibility ofback-fitting
NISA issued the guideline for implementation of Periodic Safety Review. This
guideline clarifies the essential requirement to implement Periodic Safety Review
and specified to incorporate the additional measures identified by the Periodic
Safety Review into the quality assurance program. The Periodic Safety Review isreported in Article 19.
The Periodic Safety Review in Japan covers the operator safety activities atnuclear installations in operation, but it does not cover the design review. The
nuclear installations have been designed with sufficient safety margin, than thatthey just met the necessary design criteria so that back-fitting has not been
institutionalized. However, every time a new design insight to which the existing
nuclear installations should be given is identified, safety assessment isconducted to ensure appropriate safety margin is maintained.

fEnhance the application of Risk Informed Regulation
NISA used the risk information on a trial basis during their inspection on nuclear
installations. In January 2009, as a part of improvement of the inspection system,

9B Summary

it started to use the risk information by adopting the safety significancedetermination process.
g Further reduction of collective operational dose
Japan is now reviewing the actions to be taken to reduce the collective dose.
They are explained in Article 15.
(2) Planned measures to improve safety
a Promotion of mid-term and long-term efforts concerning Risk Informed
Regulation including the development of an implementation plan
NISA issued the report of the Issues on Nuclear Safety Regulation in February2010 and reported it to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee. The
report concluded that it is appropriate to continuously study for a possibility to
expand the scope of utilization of risk information from the point of view of
improvement in safety or regulatory effectiveness, with referring to the latest
experience in overseas.

4bComplete preparations of the mid-term strategic and supporting workforceplans
In August 2009, NISA compiled its mission and action plan and reported it to the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for
Natural Resources and Energy. The report reconfirms the mission of NISA, sets
the mid-term goals, identifies major issues and actions to be taken and thenformulates specific work programs.

cHarmonization of codes and standards with the IAEA and other internationalorganizations including the management of the “softer” issues
NISA prepared the guidelines for evaluating the approaches to prevent
degradation of the licensee’s safety culture and organizational climate in
November 2007, in cooperation with the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization, for assessing the safety activities by the licensees. These
guidelines are explained in Article 10.
Responses to all recommendations adopted at the previous Review Meeting

Regarding the issues that were discussed in the summary report of the previous
Review Meeting, actions were taken, or are now being taken on the issues regarding
the legislative framework of nuclear safety in Japan, independence of the regulatory
body, safety management and safety culture, staffing and competence, Probabilistic
Safety Assessment, Periodic Safety Review, Aging Management and Lifetime
Extension, Emergency Management and new Nuclear Power Plants. The details are
discussed in the related sections.

10C

Reporting Article by Article

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6

Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear installations
existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as
possible. When necessary in the context of this Convention, the Contracting Party shall ensure that allreasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear
installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear
installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the wholeenergy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.

Overview of Article 6
In Japan, during this reporting period, two nuclear installations ceased operation andentered the decommissioning phase, and a new nuclear installation commenced
operation. Therefore, a total of 54 units are currently operating.
In accordance with the revision of the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Designof Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities in September 2006, Japan has been conducting
reevaluation (back check) of the seismic safety of all existing nuclear power reactor
facilities across the country, and completed the reevaluation for some of the nuclear
installations during this reporting period. In addition, at the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear
Power Station, which was affected by the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in July
2007, the licensee of reactor operation has steadily been conducting checks. And
confirmation of the safety of Units 6 and 7 has been completed and they are currently innormal operation. Furthermore, the commissioning test of the fast breeder prototype
reactor Monju, which had been suspended since the sodium leak accident in 1995, wasrecently resumed.
Approximately 60 incidents have been reported in accordance with legislation in thepast three years, and they are all evaluated to be below or equal to Level 1 on theInternational Nuclear Event Scale (INES).

11

Article 6

1

Existing Nuclear Installations

Nuclear installations of Japan
In Japan, as of the end of March 2010, a total of 54 nuclear power reactors (30 boilingwater reactors (BWRs) and 24 pressurized water reactors (PWRs)) are operating. In
addition, three reactors are being constructed, and four reactors are being
decommissioned.
In Japan, in any decade of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, multiple nuclear
installations were commissioned. Japan also has nuclear installations that will becommissioned in the 2010s. These facts indicate that the construction of nuclear
installations has been implemented continually and steadily, and the technologies forconstructing them have been passed on. However, domestic construction of nuclear
installations has recently remained stagnant, and it is necessary to maintain orstrengthen the depth of technological abilities and human resources in the nuclear
power industry of Japan by capturing overseas markets until the renewal constructionof existing reactors will shift into full swing in 2030. In addition, boiling water reactors
and pressurized water reactors have been equally operated in a balanced manner,and four ABWRs (advanced BWRs) have been commissioned and the construction of
APWRs (advanced PWRs) has been planned. Thus, technological improvements
have also been made. Additionally, the commissioning of the fast breeder prototype
reactor, which has been developed as the next-generation reactor, was resumed in
May 2010. Furthermore, the decommissioning of nuclear installations those haveceased operation has been progressing.
Therefore, activities related to all stages in the construction, operation anddecommissioning of nuclear installations are conducted in Japan, and it is expectedthat this situation will continue in the future.
A list of the nuclear power reactors in Japan is provided in the Annex.

2Major events that occurred during the reporting period
Among the events in nuclear installations that occurred in three years: fiscal 2007,2008 and 2009, a total of 63 events have been reported to the regulatory authority inaccordance with the Reactor Regulation Act. A list of these events is provided in the
Annex.
In the past three years, there has been no event in Japan that had any significant
impact on safety. However, some events from which we should learn lessons,
including ones that occurred in connection with an earthquake, are described below.
(1)

Events in connection with the Niigata-ken
Chuetsu-oki Earthquakea Fire of a house transformer for Unit 3 of theKashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
In the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, a fireoccurred at a house transformer 3B for Unit 3. As the

12

House transformer of Unit 3
after fire was extinguished(Source: TEPCO)

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6cause of the fire, it is inferred that the foundation of a duct for the secondary
connection bus of the house transformer subsided due to the earthquake,causing the duct to contact the connection terminal, damaging the bushing toallow the insulation oil to leak, causing an arc due to ground fault and short circuit,
igniting the leaked insulation oil, resulting in the fire.
b Leak of water containing radioactive material to a non-controlled area in the Unit
6 reactor building of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
In the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, water leak was found in a
non-controlled area on the 3rd floor and the 3rd floor mezzanine of the reactor
building. As a result of examining the leaked water, the volume of leaked water
was approx. 0.6 liter and the amount of radioactivity was approx. 2.8 × 102 Bq on
the 3rd floor, and the volume of leaked water was approx. 0.9 liter and the amountof radioactivity was approx. 1.6 × 104 Bq on the 3rd floor mezzanine. It was also
found that leaked water in the non-controlled area had been discharged to sea
through a drain path in the station. Its volume and radioactivity amount wereapprox. 1.2 m3 and approx. 9.0 × 104 Bq, respectively. For the cause of thedischarge of the leaked water, it is inferred that the water in the spent fuel pool
spilled on the floor surface of the operating floor due to the earthquake flowed
into the non-controlled area through a clearance gap of the seal of the electricalwire penetration in the fuel handling machine feeder box, which must remain
hermetically sealed, then dripped down, and the dripping water flowed into thenonradioactive drain collector tank through a draining point, then was discharged
by a drainage pump to sea.
cDamage of the coupling for the overhead crane in the Unit 6 reactor building of
the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
In a facility check of equipment after the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, it
was found that the cross pin on the wheel side of the coupling for transmitting the
motion of the south side and north side travelling devices, and the cross pin on
the motor side of the coupling for transmitting the motion of the south side
travelling device, had been broken (3 out of the 4 cross pins had been damaged).
For the cause of the damage, it is inferred that an excessive rotational force wasapplied to the couplings for transmitting motion due to the earthquake, causing
the cross pins to be broken.

d Flooding in the operating floor of the reactor building of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa
Nuclear Power Station
In a patrol after the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, it was found that thewater of the spent fuel pool had overflowed throughout the operating floors(controlled area) of the Units 1 to 7 reactor buildings. As a result of analyzing theoverspilled water, it was found that it contained radioactive substance withapprox. 4.1×100 Bq/cc to approx. 7.8×101 Bq/cc. The cause was the overflow of13

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the water of the spent fuel pool due to sloshing resulting from the earthquake.

Before the earthquake

After the earthquake

Fig. 6-1 State of the spent fuel pool of Unit 3 of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear
Power Station before and after the earthquake (Source: TEPCO)
3

Efforts to secure safety(1) Actions taken after the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
On July 16,
2007,
a 6.8-magnitude
earthquake centered offshore Chuetu of Niigata
Prefecture occurred. At the Kashiwazaki Kariwa
Nuclear Power Station, which is located approx.
16 km from the epicenter, Units 2, 3, 4 and 7,
which were operating or at the stage of start-up
operation, automatically shut down. These
reactors were brought to cold shutdown
State of the on-site road of theapproximately 9 to 20 hours after the earthquake Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Powerthrough the cooling/depressurizing processes
Station after the earthquake(Source: TEPCO)
performed by operators, and thus the safetyfunctions of all reactors were secured. In this earthquake, accelerations exceeding
the maximum acceleration assumed in designing the power station were observed,
including acceleration 680 gal at a maximum recorded at Unit 1.

Table 6-1 Maximum acceleration of motions of the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
North-south

East-west

Vertical

Unit 1311 (274)680 (273)

408 (235)

Unit 2304 (167)606 (167)282 (235)

Unit 3308 (192)

384 (193)

311 (235)

Unit 4310 (193)

492 (194)

337 (235)

Unit 5277 (249)

442 (254)

205 (235)

Unit 6271 (263)

322 (263)

488 (235)

Unit 7267 (263)

356 (263)

355 (235)

Observed values at the base mat level of the lowest floor of each reactor building
2

Unit: gal (cm/s ); the values in the parentheses are assumed maximum accelerations.

14

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6

Attaching importance to the fact that the power station was exposed to groundmotions exceeding the acceleration assumed in designing the station, NISA
decided that it is necessary to check whether the integrity of the facilities exposed
to such large tremors has been affected, to identify why the ground motions
exceeded the motions assumed in the design, and to confirm the seismic safety of
the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station.
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (hereinafter referred to as TEPCO) started
checking the facilities immediately after the earthquake, and confirmed 3,600
nonconformities (deviations from the required state of facilities). Of thesenonconformities, 85 were regarded as important for safety, and 4 were considerednecessary to be reported to the regulatory body under legal provisions. These 4
nonconformities were described in the preceding section.
NISA had its Nuclear Safety Inspectors check the state of the facilities andequipment, directly interviewed the shift supervisor, operators and other persons
involved, and check documents such as log book, operation parameter records andwalk-down records. Thus, the agency verified the procedures and actions taken
until the cold shutdown of all reactors was achieved after the earthquake inchronological order. NISA also confirmed that the framework of nonconformity
control by TEPCO was appropriately functioning, and selected cases for feedback
to other nuclear operators after examining the safety importance.
Considering the actions taken following the earthquake, the regulatory body and thelicensee of reactor operation recognize the following agenda, and have taken
measures.


Evaluation of seismic safety based on knowledge acquired from the Niigata-ken
Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
State of operational management of the reactors and integrity of equipment when
the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake occurred, and future actions
Optimal use of the in-house fire brigade system and the information
communication system and optimal provision of information to the community by
the nuclear operator in case of earthquakes

TEPCO has been working on check/evaluation of the facilities, geologicalinvestigation, evaluation of the basis ground motion, etc. In addition, for the
in-house fire brigade system and the information communication system, thecompany has taken measures to enhance the initial fire extinguishing system,
improve reliability of the fire extinguishing equipment, improve reliability of thecommunication equipment related to firefighting activities, and conduct practicalfirefighting training in cooperation with municipal firefighting organizations.
On June 20, 2008, NISA decided to revise Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial
Nuclear Power Reactors concerning the Installation, Operation, etc. and required
licensees of reactor operation of the establishment of an initial fire extinguishing15

Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

system in the operational safety program.
For the information communication system,TEPCO originally planned to set up an
emergency response headquarters to collectinformation on the state of the power station andprovide external communication in case ofearthquakes. However, the doorway of theemergency response room was deformed toprevent access, and it was inevitable to set up aState of the administrative building
temporary emergency response headquarters toroom immediately after theearthquake (Source: TEPCO)
perform operations, resulting in delay incognizance of the situation and communication. Using this as a lesson, thecompany has taken actions such as securing the information collection systems,
preventing the system equipments from overturning and multiplexing the power
supply. These actions were also introduced to other licensees of reactor operation,and they have been completed by the end of September 2008.
The NSC established a Special Committee on Seismic Safety Evaluation in
December 2007 in order to comprehensively investigate and deliberate seismic
safety as a neutral position. The Special Committee investigates and deliberates
the reevaluation (back check) of seismic safety conducted by the nuclear operator
and NISA for the existing nuclear power reactor facilities and the evaluation of the
facilities of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in terms of integrity. The
re-evaluation was conducted by the nuclear operator and NISA in accordance with
the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor
Facilities, which was revised in September 2006.
NISA was providing information to international organizations since immediately
after the earthquake. To make the lessons and knowledge acquired through thisearthquake shared across the world, and to contribute to raising the nuclear safetylevel, NISA accepted mission of the IAEA for 5 days from August 6, 2007. NISA also
accepted a follow-up mission by the IAEA for 5 days from January 28, 2008, and asecondary follow-up mission by the IAEA for 5 days from December 1, 2008. In
addition, in June 2008, a workshop organized by the IA EA on seismic safety washeld in Kashiwazaki City, and a total of 335 people consisting of participants andaudience from 28 countries and 2 international organizations attended theworkshop. At this workshop, the IAEA announced its decision to establish an“International Seismic Safety Center,” and the center was founded in October 2008.
Japan has actively been providing cooperation such as sending staff to theInternational Seismic Safety Center and making a special contribution. As part of
the activities of the International Seismic Safety Center, it held a second workshop
organized by the IAEA in Kashiwazaki City in March 2010.
(2) Safety evaluation of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
The ground motions of the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake exceeded the design

16

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6basis ground motion, and un-expectedly large force may have been applied. Thus it
was necessary to evaluate the impact of the earthquake on the facilities, equipment,
buildings and structures in the power station, including assessment of whether any
invisible damage or effect that may influence safety was left, in order to evaluate theintegrity of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station. However, there had been
no reference case of the check method applicable to evaluation of integrity of facilities,
equipment, buildings and structures after earthquakes, and no relevant checking
criteria was available. Therefore, NISA studied the issue based on expert opinions,and decided it necessary to analyze the level of a force applied due to the seismic
force (seismic response analysis) by calculating the force using a model, and evaluate
the integrity by combining them, in addition to detailed check of individual facilities andequipment. NISA presented the following basic policies for integrity evaluation offacilities.








Check the facilities, equipment, buildings and structures that the regulatory bodyconfirmed when the power station was constructed. For important facilities andequipment, perform not only visual check, but also detailed check through testingsuch as operational test, leakage test and overhaul. In addition, analyze the levelof the force applied due to the seismic force, and combine the analysis result withthe check result to make comprehensive evaluation.
If no damage is observed as a result of check, and it is inferred that no force that
may cause deformation has been applied as a result of analysis, evaluate it asintact.
If it is considered that a certain level of force that may cause deformation has
applied as a result of analysis, perform additional check and detailed examination
based on expert opinions even if no damage is observed as a result of check.
Based on the results of the check and the analysis above, evaluate the compliancewith the technological requirements and whether or not repair/replacement isnecessary.

NISA decided to instruct TEPCO to implement integrity validation in accordancewith these perspectives, and that it would check the result of the validation.
NISA requested that check and evaluation program for each unit at the power
station should be prepared and submitted in consideration that the design andtremors are different unit by unit. On November 9, 2007, based on the above
requests, NISA provided the following instructions to TEPCO.


Check all the major facilities, equipment, buildings and structures that theregulatory body checked when the power station was constructed.
For those buildings, structures, facilities and equipment important for safety,
perform analysis of the impact of the ground motions in addition to their checks.
When analyzing the impact, identify the ground motion assumed to have been
applied to each part based on the actual ground motions at the time of the17Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, and evaluate the impact based on that.
For portions to which a particularly large force is assumed to have been applied asa result of analysis, perform thoroughgoing check.
Analyze the form of assumed damage in earthquakes for each type of facility, andreflect the result in the method of check.

In response to these instructions, TEPCO submitted a check/evaluation programwith regard to integrity evaluation of Unit 7 on November 27, 2007. As the result of
examining the content of the program, NISA evaluated the program as appropriate
since the facilities and others to be checked and the method of checks areappropriately defined in accordance with the above instructions, and subsequently
TEPCO commenced check and other works. The company also prepared andsubmitted check programs for other units, and then commenced the checks after
similar processes.
For facilities and equipment, it is necessary to not only perform checks of individual
facilities/equipment, but also check that they normally function as a whole system,
and for final confirmation, to start up the plant to generate power. Consequently,
TEPCO performed the inspection in the following three steps.


Evaluate whether the integrity is maintained by evaluating the impact of theearthquake on individual equipment that constitute the unit concerned (evaluation byindividual equipment).
Evaluate whether the safety function of each system consisting of these equipment
remains intact (evaluation by individual systems).
Based on the evaluation by individual equipment and by individual systems,
evaluate whether the functions of each unit as the whole nuclear power plantremain intact by commissioning the whole plant combining the reactor and power
generator of each unit (evaluation of the whole plant).

NISA evaluated that the series of start up test procedures for the Unit 7 reactor of theKashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, i.e.; power increase, and the functional
test of the whole plant were appropriately performed and their results are also
appropriate, and determined that there is no problem in the functional integrity of thewhole Unit 7 plant of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station. In addition, theagency determined that combining the results of evaluations by equipment and bysystems, the fitness for service of Unit 7 of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power
Station is maintained and the unit could be continuously and safely operated without
problem.
For Unit 6, safety check program was implemented in the same steps as Unit 7,
and it was confirmed that the fitness for service of the unit is maintained.
(3) Re-evaluation of seismic safety
In response to the revision of the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design18

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities by the NSC in September 2006, NISA issued awritten instruction “Basic Idea, Evaluation Method and Validation Criteria in
Evaluation and Validation of Seismic Safety of Existing Commercial Power Reactor
Facilities in Accordance with the New Seismic Regulatory Guide”. And NISA asked
electric power companies to perform seismic safety evaluation of their commercial
power reactor facilities that are operating or under construction in accordance withthe revised Regulatory Guide.
In addition, NISA also instructed the electric power companies to appropriatelyreflect the knowledge acquired from the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake,
which occurred on July 16, 2007, in their seismic safety evaluation and quickly
complete the evaluation.
The licensees of reactor operation submitted interim reports and other documents to
NISA by March 2008, and NISA is currently evaluating the documents. As of the endof March 2010, reviews by NISA and the NSC on the result of re-evaluation (including
the interim evaluation reports) of seismic safety of 11 nuclear installations weredeliberated, and the evaluation of adequacy was completed. In addition, a review of
one nuclear installation by NISA has been finished and it is under review by the NSC,
and the other reactor facilities are under review by NISA.
The licensees of reactor operation are implementing evaluation works, etc. for the
preparation of final reports including the response to the review result by NISA.
(4)

Resumed commissioning of the fast breeder prototype reactor Monju
After sodium of the secondary coolingsystem leaked in December 1995, the fast
breeder prototype reactor Monju had been
shut down for approx. 14 years. However, in
May 2010, its commissioning was resumed.
Since September 2005, the JAEA, which isthelicenseeofreactoroperation,
implemented the remedial work to cope withthe sodium leakage (completed the work in
May 2007), and conducted tests to confirm
Fast breeder prototype reactor Monju(Source: Japan Atomic Energy Agency)
the validity of the work, the functions andperformance of the plant. In addition, the JAEA improved safety management system,
such as establishing an autonomous quality assurance system, preparing manuals
required for resuming the commissioning after long period of suspension, developing
an operations management system and an accident response system, andimplementing maintenance management reflecting the characteristics of Monju.
In February 2010, NISA put together an evaluation that “the JAEA has establisheda system in which it can satisfactorily ensure safety in resuming the commissioning”
on the grounds that the improvements based on indications for comprehensive
safety check relating to the sodium leak accident have appropriately been made,and the fitness for start of commissioning test of the facilities has been confirmed.

19

Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

Concerning the evaluation of the seismic safety in accordance with the revised
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor
Facilities, NISA evaluated its validity in March 2010.
The JAEA has announced that after resuming the commissioning of the fast
breeder prototype reactor Monju, it will conduct performance testing and full-scale
operation of the reactor in order to verify the reliability of Monju as a power plantand establish a sodium handling technology through its operating experience.
NISA intends to continually check the safety of the fast breeder prototype reactor
Monju by performing inspections such as operational safety inspection, on-site
inspection and pre-service inspection.
(5) Introduction of a system for reflecting new knowledge
NISA recently introduced a new system aimed at improving the efficiency of thereview relating to the license for installment or alteration and conducting reviews
based in the latest knowledge. This system allows the industry including nuclear
power plant manufacturers to submit reports on new technologies or knowledge
relating to the safety of plants (topical reports) to the regulatory body in advance toundergo evaluation of safety. This will benefit both the regulatory body and theindustry from the viewpoint of improving the predictability related to decision
making in safety regulations, and is expected to improve the review throughutilization of the topical report in the evaluation concerned in actual licensing.
In Japan, by laws of the regulatory body relating to the topical report system for fueldesign and safety analysis codes have been formulated as an area with highversatility in utilization for various plants. Currently, topical reports on fuel rod
thermal and mechanical design submitted by fuel fabricators are being evaluated.
(6) Efforts for long-term operation
The Japan Atomic Power Company performed
the 40th–year aging management technicalassessment (AMTA) of Tsuruga Unit 1 (BWR:
357 MWe), which entered 40th year ofoperation in March 2010. In this AMTA, thecompany analyzed the management of ageing
effects in sufficient detail including the
Tsuruga Unit 1 of the Japan Atomic
operational
experience
andtechnical Power Company (Source: the Japanknowledge acquired after the 30th year AMTA
Atomic Power Company)
to conclude that the plant can be operated safety supposing 60-year operation.
Additionally, the company evaluated the validity of the 30th AMTA and theeffectiveness of the long-term maintenance program defined in the 30th AMTA inorder to reflect to the 40th AMTA.
Based on the 40th AMTA, the company defined the long-term maintenanceprogram in addition to the currently performed maintenance activities to maintainthe plant in safe for the next 10 years operation.

20

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6

NISA reviewed the adequacy of the submitted long-term maintenance program
taking account of the verification result the 40th AMTA conducted by the Japan
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. In the course of the review, NISA sought anexpert opinion from a working group on AMTA established under the Aging
Countermeasures Examination Committee, which belongs to the Nuclear andIndustrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources
and Energy. NISA also conducted on-site inspection of the Tsuruga Power Stationin order to directly verify data and documents that support, or serve as the basis for,the implementation system, method and result of the evaluation performed by thelicensee of reactor operation, whereas such data and documents are stored andmanaged mainly at the station.
NISA indicated items to be required further examination on the content of the AMTA
report to the applicant in the course of the above review, and the licensee of reactor
operation amended the report. NISA comprehensively reviewed the report, anddetermined that the contents of the report and the long-term maintenance program
based on the report are complied with the Guidelines in Implementing Measures forAging Management.
The licensee of reactor operation intends to operate Tsuruga Unit 1 until 2016,
which is Japan’s first reactor facility that has entered 40th year of operation(7)

Evaluation of Mihama Unit 3 by the Operational Safety Review Team of the IAEA
As a remedy to the pipe rupture accident
in the secondary system of Unit 3 of theMihama Power Station in August 2004,
the Kansai Electric Power Company(hereinafter referred to as KEPCO) took
various measures to prevent recurrencein line with the “Action Plan concerning
the Measures to Prevent Recurrence ofMihama Power Station of the Kansai Electric
the Accident in Mihama Unit 3,” andPower Company(Source: the Kansai Electric Power Co.,Inc.)
resumed operation of the reactor
concerned in January 2007. Based on the judgment that it would be productive tohave the reactor undergo an evaluation based on the comparison with international
good practices and the safety standards of the IAEA, the power company announced
that KEPCO would invite the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of the IAEA
for their evaluation. With the request of KEPCO, NISA requested the IAEA to send
the OSART mission. The OSART mission stayed at the Mihama Power Station for 17days from January through February 2009, and a group of 13 experts from 12
counties including staff of the IAEA evaluated Unit 3 in 9 areas. The areas ofevaluation
were:organization/management/operation;
training/qualification;
operation; maintenance; technical assistance; utilization of operational experience;
radiation protection; chemistry; emergency preparedness.
An evaluation report of OSART was put together by the review team, and was21

Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

published by KEPCO in August 2009. In the report, the review team concluded thatthe management of KEPCO and the Mihama Power Plant were striving to increase
the safety and reliability related to the operation of the power plant. In addition, thereport presented good practices, recommendations and proposals as indicated inTable 6-2.

22

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6

Table 6-2 Good practices, recommendations and proposals selected by the OSART
Good practices
Organization /management /operation
Training / qualification

Operation

MaintenanceUtilization ofoperational experience
Radiological protection
Chemistry
Emergency plan andcountermeasures

A comprehensive mechanism for evaluating the safety culture is established.
The ladders in the power station are equipped with safety blocks forpreventing fall accidents.
The lecturers of the Nuclear Operation Support Center and the Nuclear Power
Training Center are selected from experts with extensive work experience.
An “S ring” with keys bundled in the order of operations is utilized in order toprevent erroneous operation of interrupters, disconnecting switches, etc.
On the walls, pipings and valves hidden behind the walls are displayed.
A network of cameras for monitoring the site that are linked with fire alarms
are installed.
Toolbox meetings are held before works.
Continual information sharing is practiced through briefing sessions onblood-chilling cases.
High-performance personal dosimeters (glass badges) are used.
A CCD camera is used to automatically detect the separation surface of thecondensate demineralizer.
An electrical conductivity meter using a cation membrane is installed in thesecondary system.
Comprehensive nuclear emergency drills involving Fukui Prefecture andMihama-cho are conducted on a regular basis.

Recommendations
Training / qualification

Operation

Chemistry
Emergency plan andcountermeasures

It is recommended to improve the repetitive and continual training programsfor technical staff involved in facility maintenance, quality assurance,
radiological protection, chemistry and nuclear fuels so that they are
implemented in accordance with SAT.
It is recommended to ensure perfect operation by improving the requirements
for entering and leaving the main control room.
It is recommended to improve the inflammable material management
practiced in various places of the power station so that it is effectively
implemented.
It is recommended to prepare manuals including for analysis work in thechemical test laboratory.
It is recommended to improve the quality control for raising the technical levelof the analysis ability in the chemical test laboratory.
It is recommended to make more effective preparations in order to protect
people in the power station from radiation in case of emergency.

Proposals
Organization /management /operation
Training / qualification

Operation

MaintenanceTechnical assistanceRadiological protection

It is proposed to formulate operational indices consistent in different places ofthe power station, and study their operation for trend management andutilization.
It is proposed to study a mechanism for verifying the ability of an operator who
has been off duty for a long period and is returning to work.
It is proposed to study operational improvements such as improvement of theenvironment surrounding the emergency shutdown panel.
It is proposed to study temporary operational change of the operational
actions, and improvement of the handling of the instructions concerning thechange.
It is proposed to study improving the prevention of foreign material fromentering equipment, pipings, etc.
It is proposed to study enhancing the trend management of the result of thesurveillance test of power station facilities.
It is proposed to study methods for implementing works to minimize thechance of spreading of any pollution occurring in the controlled area.

23Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

KEPCO recognizes that the OSART evaluation mission implemented at Unit 3 of
the Mihama Power Station was very productive for the company, and intends towork on further improvement of the operations management of the nuclear power
station based on the evaluation result of the report that the OSART has put together.
In addition, KEPCO intends to accept a follow-up mission of the OSART concerning
the state of the response of the power station to the recommendations andproposals presented in this evaluation mission from the end of May to early June
2010.
4

Facilities to be decommissioned(1) Tokai Power Station of the Japan Atomic Power Company
Electric output: 166,000 kW
Reactor type: graphite-moderated CO2
gas-cooled reactor (GCR)
Fuel: natural uranium
Commissioning: July 25, 1966
Operation shutdown: March 31, 1998
Operation period: 31 years and 8 months
Tokai Power Station of the Japan Atomic
State: under decommissioning
Power(Source: Japan Atomic Power)

Overview:
The Tokai Power Station is an advanced reactor facility that is based on the
Calder-Hall type natural uranium, CO2 gas-cooled reactor, which was developed
and put to practical use in the United Kingdom, and that adopted an seismic
design unique to Japan. It was commissioned in July 1966 as Japan’s firstcommercial nuclear power station. However, the output of the power station issmall despite the large sizes of the reactor and the heat exchangers because it isa CO2 gas-cooled reactor, and the power cost is higher than light water reactors.
In addition, the maintenance cost and the fuel cycle cost are relatively high since
it is the only reactor type in Japan. For these reasons, its commercial operation
was ceased in March 1998. The licensee of reactor operation commenced
decommissioning the power station on December 4, 2001, which serves todemonstrate safe and rational decommissioning of Japan’s first commercial
nuclear power station. Technological know how acquired at the Tokai Power
Station would have been accumulated in order to play a pioneering role tocontribute to decommissioning light water reactors in the future by promoting theestablishment of a remote dismantling technology, realization of methods of thevolume/radioactivity evaluation, realization of waste disposal/treatment anddevelopment of a project management system. In the decommissioning, removal
of facilities has been implemented at first from auxiliary equipment and the Japan
Atomic Power Company plans to dismantle and remove the facilities in the24

Existing Nuclear Installations

Article 6

reactor area after safely storing them for approximately 10 years until theirradioactivity is decayed out.
(2)

Advanced thermal reactor Fugen of the JAEA
Electric output: 165,000 kW
Reactor type: heavy water moderated,boiling light water cooled prototype reactor(pressure tube reactor)
Fuel: natural uranium, enriched uranium,
mixed oxide
Commissioning: July 29, 1978
Operation shutdown: March 29, 2003
Advanced thermal reactor Fugen
Operation period: 24 years and 8 months(Source: Japan Atomic Energy Agency)
State: under decommissioning
Overview:
The advanced thermal reactor Fugen is a prototype reactor that Japan has
independently developed. During its operation period, a total of 772 MOX fuelassemblies were loaded, and achievements were made including the realizationof a small-scale fuel cycle in which plutonium separated from spent fuels was
re-used as a fuel in Fugen. However, since the advanced thermal demonstration
reactor program was aborted in 1995, development of this reactor type wasterminated. Subsequently, the licensee of reactor operation obtained approval forits decommissioning plan on February 12, 2008. The NPS is renamed as a
“Reactor decommissioning R&D center”. It is planned to safely and rationallyproceed dismantling the reactor facility while taking into account the conditions
for those facilities that require maintenance management even after the
shutdown. The JAEA plans to actively publish the results obtained throughtechnological development, various preparations and the achievements from thedecommissioning in order to be effectively utilized them for decommissioning
reactor facilities in Japan, while providing collaboration and technologicalcooperation with the related organizations.

(3) Units 1 and 2 of the Hamaoka Power Station of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Electric output: 540,000 kW (Unit 1); 840,000 kW (Unit 2)
Reactor type: boiling water reactor (BWR)
Fuel: enriched uranium
Commissioning: March 17, 1976 (Unit 1); November 29, 1978 (Unit 2)
Operation shutdown: January 30, 2009
Operation period: 32 years and 10 months (Unit 1); 30 years and 2 months (Unit 2)
State: under decommissioning
Overview:
Chubu Electric Power Company was initially studying an improvement work forincreasing the seismic margin of five reactor facilities installed in the Hamaoka

25

Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

Nuclear Power Station. However, for Units 1 and 2, the power company
concluded that it would require a considerable work cost and a long work period
in order to make them resistant to the voluntary set target of the ground motion,and determined that it would hardly be economical if the operation were resumed
after the improvement work for increasing the seismic margin. On November 18,
2009, the power company obtained approval for the decommissioning plan.
5

Operation of nuclear Installations of those safety is ensured
Japan domestically secures the obligations defined in the Convention on Nuclear
Safety under the safety regulations enforced in accordance with legislation. In otherwords, for all existing nuclear installations in Japan, steps mentioned in Article 6 of
the Convention are taken. If a licensee of reactor operation was unable to makenecessary safety improvements such as defined in Article 6 of the Convention, thelicensee would not be able to continue the operation of the nuclear installation underlegislation and safety regulations of Japan. This means that the operation of any
nuclear installation in Japan would not be continued without meeting therequirements defined under laws and safety regulations of Japan, and therefore, theoperation of the nuclear installation would not be continued without fulfilling theobligations defined in Articles 10 to 19 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Therefore,
any decision to continue operation without complying with the obligations of theConvention would not be made in Japan.

26

Legislative and Reulatory Framework

Article 7
1.

Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern
the safety of nuclear installations.

2.

The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:(i)the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;(ii)

a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of the operation of a
nuclear installation without a license;(iii)

a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain compliancewith applicable regulations and the terms of licenses;(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses, including suspension,
modification or revocation.

Outline of Article 7
In the legislative framework for nuclear safety in Japan, under the Atomic Energy Basic
Act that defines basic philosophy of utilization of nuclear energy, the Act on theRegulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, and the Act
concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes, etc. have been
established as the legislation those specify the Governmental safety regulation. The
laws necessary to ensure nuclear safety have been also organized, such as theElectricity Business Act, which regulates nuclear installations from the view point ofelectric facilities, and the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness, which specifies the nuclear emergency response. In addition, theNuclear Safety Commission developed the guides to be used in the examination of thesafety review conducted by the regulatory body. These guides are also used when theregulatory body conducts safety examination, to achieve more efficient and smoothsafety reviews by the Government.
During this reporting period, Ministerial Ordinances were revised to improve safety
regulation, but no change was made to the legislative and regulatory framework
mentioned above. The major Ministerial Ordinances revised during this reporting period
include:Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors concerning theInstallation, Operation, etc.:
 Revised to improve the fire protection system by reflecting the lessons learned
from the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki earthquake Revised to enhance maintenance management
Ministerial Ordinance for Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment:
 Revised to request compliance of the emergency core cooling systemequipments
The number of standards of academic societies and associations endorsed by NISA astechnically adequate standards to be used for specification codes has increased to 45
from 21 shown in the previous report.

27

Article 7

Article 7 (1)1Legislative and Regulatory Framework

Establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework

Overview of main legislation and regulations regarding nuclear safety(1) The Atomic Energy Basic Act
The Atomic Energy Basic Act promulgated in 1955 serves as the basis of utilizationof nuclear energy in Japan. The objectives of the Atomic Energy Basic Act arequoted as "to secure future energy resources, achieve progress in science andtechnology, and promote industry, by encouraging research, development, andutilization of nuclear energy, and thereby contribute to improvement of the welfareof human society and the people's living standard." The basic policy is prescribedas follows: "the research, development and utilization of nuclear energy shall belimited to peaceful purposes, on the basis of the highest priority of ensuring safety,
and performed on a self-controlled basis under democratic administration, and theresults obtained shall be made public and actively contribute to international
cooperation." In order to operate nuclear administration democratically, the Act also
requires establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety
Commission and observance of the governmental regulations in the case of
construction of a nuclear reactor, use of nuclear fuel material, etc.
The governmental regulations that shall be complied with in construction etc. of a
nuclear reactor are specified in the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source
Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (hereinafter referred to as the“Reactor Regulation Act”) and the Electricity Business Act.
(2) The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material andReactors and related Ministerial Ordinances
The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material andReactors, promulgated in 1957, comprehensively covers safety regulation ofutilization of nuclear energy in Japan. The Reactor Regulation Act regulates theutilization of nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material, and reactors. Namely
the act regulate the refining, fabricating and enrichment, storage, reprocessing andwaste disposal activities, installation and operation, etc. of nuclear reactors, to belimited to peaceful purposes, to be carried out in a planned manner, and to ensure
safety of the public by preventing the hazards due to these utilization and byproviding physical protection of nuclear fuel material, in accordance with the spiritof the Atomic Energy Basic Act. The act also provides necessary regulations on theuse of the internationally controlled material, etc. to execute the obligations inaccordance with the conventions and/or other international agreements concerning
utilization of nuclear energy. The Reactor Regulation Act provides the proceduresfor safety regulation and the licensing criteria as for the installment and operation ofreactors, etc, including installment license, approval of design and construction
methods, pre-service inspection, facility periodic inspection, approval of operationalsafety program, Operational Safety Inspection, decommissioning, etc.. The act also
provides disposition such as suspension of operation and license revocation andcriminal punishment including imprisonment and fine.

28

Legislative and Reulatory Framework

Article 7

The allegation system was established so that the personnel of the licensees canallege violation of the Reactor Regulation Act to the competent minister or the
Nuclear Safety Commission without concern about being treated unfavorably by
employer. The allegation system is expected to help uncover the licensee’s
violation of legislation and regulations early.
For commercial power reactors, the provisions of the Electricity Business Act are
applied to the regulations on “approval of design and construction methods,”“pre-service inspection,” “the welding method and inspection” and “Facility Periodic
Inspection.” Therefore, the corresponding provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act
are exempted from application.
The Ministerial Ordinances complied with the Reactor Regulation Act, which are
related with the safety regulation of nuclear installations are:








Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors concerning
the Installation, Operation, etc. (Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Power
Reactors)
The Ministerial Ordinance was enacted to implement the provisions of theReactor Regulation Act. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is
responsible for their revision and abolishment. The Commercial Power
Reactor Rules regulate major nuclear power plants in Japan. That iscommercial boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors are
regulated by the Rules.
Ministerial Ordinance for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Nuclear Power
Reactors at the Stage of Research and Development ( Ministerial
Ordinance for Reactors at the Stage of Research and Development)
The Ministerial Ordinance was enacted to implement the provisions of theReactor Regulation Act. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is
responsible for their revision and abolishment. The Ministerial Ordinancefor Reactors at the Stage of Research and Development aim toregulate the fast breeder prototype reactor Monju.
Ministerial Ordinance for Technical Standards on Design and Construction
Methods of Nuclear Power Reactors at the Stage of Research andDevelopment
The Ministerial Ordinance provides the technical standards to be used inapproval for design and construction methods based on the provisions of
the Reactor Regulation Act and the Ministerial Ordinance for Reactors at theStage of Research and Development.
Ministerial Public Notice for Radiation Exposure Dose Limits
On the basis of the Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Power Reactor
and for Reactors at the Stage of Research and Development, the Ministerial
Public Notice for defining radiation exposure dose limits were set out by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, respectively. These notices specify
the radiation exposure doses in the controlled area and the environmental
monitoring area, the surface contamination limit, radiation exposure dose
limits of radiation workers, radioactivity concentration limits outside of the29Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Frameworkenvironmental monitoring area, etc.
(3) Electricity Business Act and related Ministerial Ordinances
The Electricity Business Act was promulgated in 1964. The objectives are to protect
the interests of the electricity users and to achieve sound development of Electricity
Business by realizing appropriate and reasonable management of Electricity
Business and to assure public safety and to promote environmental preservation by
regulating the construction, maintenance and operation of Electric Facilities.
The Electricity Business Act, which is applied to not only nuclear power but thermal
power and hydraulic power generation, comprehensively regulates the electricity
business in Japan. The Electricity Business Act regulates nuclear power plants inJapan as one type of electricity business, but the issues specific to nuclear energy
utilization are regulated by the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Ordinances which comply with the Electricity Business Act and are related withthe safety regulation of nuclear installation are:








Ministerial Ordinance for the Enforcement of the Electricity Business Act
Specific processes of the procedures specified by the Electricity
Business Act are provided in order to implement the said Act.
Ministerial Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear
Power Generation Equipments
Technical standards applied to the approval of construction plan, pre-service
inspection and periodic inspection based on the provisions of the Electricity
Business Act are specified.
Ministerial Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards on Nuclear Fuel
Material for Power Generation Facilities
Technical standards that applied to the approval of fuel assembly
design and fuel assembly inspection based on the provisions of theElectricity Business Act are specified.
Ministerial Public Notice for Technical Standards on Dose Equivalent, etc.
due to Radiation Relating to Nuclear Power Generation Facilities
Details of doses provided in the Ordinance of Establishing TechnicalStandards for Nuclear Power Generation Facilities are specified.

(4) Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Taking into account the specificity of nuclear emergency, the Act on Special
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness established in 1999
stipulates special measures for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, including
licensee’s obligation for preparedness on nuclear emergency, the Declaration of
Nuclear Emergency, and establishment of the Nuclear Emergency response
Headquarters. The act also stipulates the activation of emergency measures innuclear emergency to improve the actions to deal with nuclear emergency and giveprotection to the public lives, bodies and property from nuclear emergency, together
with the Reactor Regulation Act, the Basic Act on Disaster Control and other laws
to prepare for nuclear emergency.

30

Legislative and Reulatory Framework

Article 7This Act focuses on actions to be taken during nuclear emergency as
afore-mentioned, and also establishes the measures to be conducted in recovery
operations. Other general emergency measures are stipulated in the Basic Act on
Disaster Control. Article 16 explains nuclear emergency preparedness in detail.
(5) Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage
The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage was promulgated in 1961, for the
purpose of establishing the basic system on compensation for nuclear damage
caused by reactor operation etc., protecting victims from nuclear damage andcontributing to sound development of nuclear power industry. The Law stipulates
liability of compensation for nuclear damage, financial security, the Governmental
actions, and Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage
Compensation.
The Law adopts the “liability without fault” principle, which imposes sole liability ofcompensation for nuclear damage by reactor operation on “nuclear operator”, in the
aspect of protection for victims, based on the general principle of the Civil Law.
Furthermore, the Law imposes infinite liability of compensation on the nuclear
operator. To secure the fund of nuclear operator and to facilitate the compensation,
the nuclear operator is required to make the Financial Arrangement for Liability for
Nuclear Damage. The amount of the Arrangement is 120 billion yen for each site in
principle.
Financial security consists of the Contract of Liability Insurance for Nuclear
Damage and the Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage. The
former is a civil insurance, which covers nuclear damage caused by a general
accident. The latter is an insurance, which is concluded between the national
government and the nuclear operator. The latter supplements the former in thecase of nuclear damage, caused by earthquake, volcanic eruption etc. On the basisof decision by the Diet, the National Government shall give a nuclear operator anaid, required to compensate the nuclear damage, in the case that the actual
amount exceeds that of the financial security and of the compensation the National
Government regards it as necessary to attain the objectives of the Law. In the caseof a catastrophic natural disaster, nuclear operators are exempted from liability forcompensation and the national government bears the compensation.
(6) Environmental Impact Assessment Act
The Environmental Impact Assessment Act was enacted in June 1999, replacing
the Decision of MITI Departmental Council, July 1977, which stipulated theenvironmental impact assessment of nuclear installation other than safetyassessment. The environmental impact assessment is implemented in accordancewith the Act.
The objective of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act is for licensees toperform proper assessment of a large business plan which may pose large impact
on the environment, and to prepare appropriate plan. The Act provides a set ofprocedures for it. Environmental assessment on commercial power facilities,
including nuclear power stations, is performed in accordance with the provisions of31

Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

the Environmental Impact Assessment Act and the corresponding provisions of theElectricity Business Act. In installing a nuclear power plant, the environmental
impact assessment is obligatory for nuclear installations regardless of its scale.
(7) Act Concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes, etc.
The Act Concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes, etc.
(hereinafter referred to as “Radiation Hazard Prevention Act”) was promulgated in
1957, and, in compliance with the Atomic Energy Basic Act, regulates use, sale,lease, disposal or other handling of radioisotopes, use of radiation generating
device, and disposal or other treatment of the materials contaminated byradioisotopes to prevent radiation hazard and secure public safety.
Under the Radiation Hazard Prevention Act, the Cabinet Order for Enforcement of
the Radiation Hazard Prevention Act and the Ministerial Ordinance for Enforcementof the Radiation Hazard Prevention Act were established.
A person or an organization that has obtained the license, etc. for use, sales,
leases and disposal activities stipulated in the Radiation Hazard Prevention Act isobliged to receive the facility inspection before start of the service and the periodic
inspection when it has a storage facility larger than a certain level of scale or uses
the radiation generating device.
A user, etc. shall prepare the Ministerial Ordinance for Radiation Hazard Prevention
Act, appoint the supervisor of radiation protection and report them before starting
handling. In addition, the user, etc. is obliged to comply with the criteria of a usage
facility, etc. and the criteria of usage specified by the legislation and regulations, aswell as to measure the radiation dose both within and on the border of the place ofbusiness, measure the exposure dose of radiation workers and to give educationand training, the medical check-up, etc. (excluding some licensees).
Radioactive waste generated from the place of business that handles radioisotopes,
etc. or materials contaminated by radioisotopes shall be processed of in the said
place of business or in the place of business of processing in pursuant to thecriteria provided by the legislation and regulations. The Radiation Hazard
Prevention Act revised in June, 2004 and the related Cabinet Order for
Enforcement and the Ministerial Ordinance for Enforcement established the basic
framework for disposal of radioactive waste by the licensee of disposal. Ministerial
Public Notice of technical details including the dose criteria at the disposal site, etc.
is now being compiled to put waste disposal into practice.
When the use of radioactive isotopes or radiation generating device is discontinued,
the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology shall be notified
of it, and actions that had been taken to discontinue etc. shall be reported.
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Technology shall implement thewitness testing by the radiation inspector, if necessary, to confirm the status ofobservance of the criteria, etc. specified by the legislation and regulations.

32Legislative and Reulatory Framework

Legislation

Article 7

Cabinet Order

Ministerial Ordinance Ministerial Public Notice

Cabinet Order for
Reactor Regulation
Act

Ministerial
Ordinance forCommercial Power
ReactorAtomic Energy
Basic Act
ReactorRegulation Act

Ministerial Public Notice for Dose
Limit Based on Provisions ofCommercial Power Reactor
Ministerial Public Notice for
Criteria on Person Responsible
for Operation
Ministerial Public Notice forTechnical Details of Transport of
Nuclear Fuel Material, etc. in
Factory or Place of Business
Ministerial Public Notice for
Important Safety Related
Equipment, etc.

Ministerial
Ordinance for
Reactors at theStage of Researchand Development

Radiation Hazard
Prevention Act

Electricity
Business Act

Cabinet Order for
Radiation Hazard
Prevention Act

Ministerial
Ordinance for
Radiation Hazard
Prevention Act

Cabinet Order forElectricity Business
Act

Ministerial
Ordinance forElectricity Business
Act

Ministerial Public Notice for Dose
Limit Based on Provisions ofReactors at the Stage of
Research and Development

Ministerial Public Notice forTechnical Requirements on Dose
Equivalent, etc. due to Radiation
Relating to Nuclear Power
Generation Facilities

Ministerial Ordinance for Establishing Technical Standards
for Nuclear Power Generation Facilities
Ministerial Ordinance for Establishing TechnicalRequirements for Nuclear Fuel Material of Power
Generation

Basic Act on
Disaster Control
Measures
Act on Special
Measures
Concerning
Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness

Cabinet Order for
Act on Special
Measures
Concerning
Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness

Ministerial Ordinance for Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

Fig. 7-1 Main Legal Structure of Safety of Nuclear Installations in Japan

33

Article 7

2

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

International conventions
Japan is a contracting party of the following nuclear related conventions:







Convention on Nuclear Safety
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safetyof Radioactive Waste Management
Convention on Early Notice of a Nuclear Accident
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear MaterialInternational Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

To ratify a convention, Japan takes adequate actions by providing reasonableassurance by the legislation and regulations regarding necessary domestic actions.
Thus, the Government of Japan recognizes that the obligations of the contracting
party of the Convention on Nuclear Safety have been adequately observed in Japanas shown in the current and previous National Reports.
In addition, Japan was assigned to the Country Group Officer in the Review Meetingsof the Convention on Nuclear Safety and has made efforts to smooth the convention
process. Japan also took the leadership as President in the review process during the
3rd Review Meeting of the Joint Convention held in May, 2009. In the Meeting ofCompetent Authorities with respect to the two emergency conventions held in July,
2009, Japan was elected as the representative of the Asian and Australasia region of
the National Competent Authority Coordinating Group from 2009 to 2011. As a part ofnuclear emergency preparedness among the contracting parties in Asia andAustralasia region, Japan has assumed the leading role in the actions such as
preparation of regional activity plan, development of the regional information network,
inspection of the domestic comprehensive nuclear emergency exercise and activities
to enhance awareness of nuclear emergency activities.
In preparation for providing appropriate assistance for nuclear emergency in othercountries, registration of assistance capabilities that Japan can provide on IAEA’s
response assistance network, IAEA (RANET) is now under consideration. In 2010,
the National Institute of Radiological Sciences voluntarily formed the Nuclear Disaster
Assistant Team. As can be seen in these cases, development of various international
cooperation systems is moving ahead both on the bases of the public and the private
sectors.

Article 7 (2)1Safety requirements and regulation

Regulatory requirements stipulated by the Minister of Economy, Trade andIndustry

34

Legislative and Reulatory Framework

Article 7

The regulatory requirements for securing safety of the nuclear installations are
specified in the Reactor Regulation Act or the Electricity Business Act. Based on them,
the Ministerial Ordinance for Establishing Technical Standards were provided inaccordance with the Reactor Regulation Act or the Electricity Business Act.
The competent minister is responsible for establishment, revision and abolishment of
Ministerial Ordinances and Ministerial Public Notices regarding technical standards;
namely, preparation and revision of specific regulatory requirements are assigned to
the regulatory body.
In January, 2006, NISA revised the Ministerial Ordinance for Establishing TechnicalStandards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipments (hereinafter referred to as“Technical Standards Ministerial Ordinance”) so that the standards provided byacademic societies and associations endorsed by the regulatory body (standards ofacademic societies and associations) may be used for the codes on the detailed
technical specifications in the regulatory requirements. Accordingly, the safety
performance that the nuclear installation should comply is provided by the TechnicalStandards Ministerial Ordinance, while the specific technical specifications are
determined using the standards of academic societies and associations endorsed by
NISA. When NISA endorses the standards of academic societies and associations, it
implements the technical evaluation with taking into account the opinions of experts
from Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy.
In this technical evaluation, for the determination whether the standards have met theregulatory requirements as the regulatory codes, the following conditions are
considered:
The development process of the standards shall value fair, equitability andopenness (an unbiased constituent of members, release of proceedings,
implementation of public review, documentation and release of the development
procedures, etc.)

The items and scope of the standards shall comply to the performancerequired by the technical standards or other legislation and regulations, orthe documents based on them (consistency with the scope of the regulatory
requirements).
The specific approaches and specifications for technical matters necessary
to achieve the performance required by the technical standards shall be
described. The specific approaches, specifications, methods and actions
shall be described for the technical matters necessary to attain therequirements by the other legislation and regulations or the documents
based on them.
The technical validity of the specific approaches, specifications, methods
and actions shown in the standards of academic societies and associations
shall be verified or its rationales shall be described.

35

Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulations, NISA has
determined to make its decision promptly, with respecting the engineering insights ofthe experts participating in the development processes of the standards. As of theend of March, 2010, NISA announced a total of 45 standards of academic societies
and associations could be used. Annex shows a list of the standards of academic
societies and associations that have been endorsed by NISA.
2

Guides specified by the Nuclear Safety Commission
The Nuclear Safety Commission established the guides such as the Regulatory
Guide for Reviewing Safety Design of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
as the evaluation criteria for reviewing the safety review implemented by theregulatory body. Table 7-1 lists the regulatory guides regarding the nuclear
installations. These regulatory guides were developed by the Nuclear Safety
Commission after hearing the views of the experts.
Revision of the regulatory guides undergoes examination and deliberation by theexperts with the Nuclear Safety Commission taking into consideration thedevelopment of the science and technology. Recently revised was the Regulatory
Guide for Reviewing Classification of Importance of Safety Functions of Light Water
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities in March, 2009. These Regulatory Guides do notcorrespond to the regulatory requirements, but the internal regulations to be used by
the Nuclear Safety Commission in the secondary review. NISA also examines thecompliance with the Regulatory Guides in the safety review for the installment of thenuclear installations.
The major guides stipulated by the Nuclear Safety Commission are available on its
web site: http://www.nsc.go.jp/NSCenglish/guides/index.htm

36Legislative and Reulatory Framework

Article 7

Table 7-1 Major Regulatory Guides Specified by the NSC for Power Generating Light
Water Reactors
SitingDesignHazards Prevent

Safety Evaluation

Dose Target

Technical Competence3

Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Nuclear Reactor Site Evaluation andApplication Criteria
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Design of Light Water Nuclear Power
Reactor Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Classification of Importance of Safety
Functions of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor
Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Fire Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power
Reactor Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Radiation Monitoring in Accidents of Light
Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Fundamental Policy to be Considered in Reviewing of Liquid Radioactive
Waste Treatment Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Evaluating Safety Assessment of Light Water Reactor
Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Evaluating Core Thermal Design of Pressurized Water
Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors
Regulatory Guide for Evaluating Emergency Core Cooling System
Performance of Light Water Power Reactors
Regulatory Guide for Evaluating Reactivity Insertion Events of Light Water
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Evaluating Dynamic Loads on BWR MARK-I
Containment Pressure Suppression Systems
Regulatory Guide for Evaluating Dynamic Loads on BWR MARK-II
Containment Pressure Suppression Systems
Regulatory Guide for Meteorological Observation for Safety Analysis of
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Regulatory Guide for the Annual Dose Target for the Public in the Vicinity ofLight Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Evaluation of Dose Target for Surrounding
Area of Light Water Nuclear Reactor Facilities
Guide for Radiation Monitoring of Effluent Released from Light Water Nuclear
Power Reactor Facilities
Regulatory Guide for Examining Technical Competence of License Holder of
Nuclear Power

Licensing system
In installment of a nuclear reactor, the license shall be issued by the competent
minister in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. The
reactors are classified into five types: reactors for purpose of power generation,
reactors to be installed in ships, reactors for purpose of testing and research, reactors
for purpose of power generation and at a stage of research and development, andreactors at a stage of research and development other than those for purpose of
power generation. Competent ministers who issue the license have been determined
depending on each reactor type. The license for installment of reactors for purpose of
power generation shall be obtained from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.

37

Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

The Reactor Regulation Act sets out the ineligibility for license: persons who are notallowed to have the license. They are those: a person whose installment license has
been rescinded, and for whom two years have not yet elapsed from the day of therescission, a person who has been sentenced to a penalty consisting of a fine orseverer punishment for violating the provisions of the Act, and for whom two years
have not yet elapsed after the penalty was executed or an adult ward. If the licenseeof reactor operation intends to alter the licensed matter, he/she shall obtain
permission for alteration or notify the alteration.
As no particular expiration date is specified for the license for reactor installment inJapan, procedure for license renewal does not exist. For the extended period of
operation, safety is regularly evaluated not by a license renewal, but by theprocedures for the periodic inspection, aging assessment, etc.
NISA the regulatory body conducts the safety examination for the installment license
as remitted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The safety examination is
described in Article 17.
When the safety examination by NISA is completed, the Minister of Economy, Tradeand Industry shall listen to the views from the Atomic Energy Commission from theperspective that there would be no possibility of nuclear power to be used except forpeaceful purpose, the license would not obstruct planned execution of nuclear
development and utilization, and there would be accounting foundation forestablishing a reactor; the said Minister also shall listen to the views from the Nuclear
Safety Commission from the perspective that the technical competence of properly
installing and operating a reactor would be provided, and that there would be no
problem in preventing nuclear hazards caused by a reactor. The licensing system inwhich the regulatory body implements the safety examination, while the Atomic
Energy Commission and Nuclear Safety Commission double-check (secondary
review) the regulatory body’s review, is an effective mechanism to ensure theindependency and transparency of nuclear safety regulation in Japan.
In response to consultation from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry about
the review result of the application for permission of reactor installment, the Nuclear
Safety Commission holds an open public hearing to hear the opinion of local
residents before starting examination and deliberation. In the public hearing, NISA,
the regulatory body in charge of safety examination, summarizes the safety
examination to the local residents and shows its view to the stated opinions. The
Nuclear Safety Commission conducts the secondary review with taking into accountthe opinions stated in the public hearing, and reports the result to the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry. When the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
received the report from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety
Commission, the said Minister issues the license for reactor installment to theapplicant with the consent of the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. Any
person who installed a reactor without the license for reactor installment is punishedby imprisonment with work for not more than three years or by a fine of not more than38

Legislative and Reulatory Framework

Article 7

three million yen, or by both, in pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor RegulationAct.
A person who has obtained the license for reactor installment shall be approved theconstruction plan by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry prior to construction
based on the provisions of the Electricity Business Act. Among the alterations ofconstruction work, certain alteration construction work provided by the Ordinance ofthe Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry shall be notified in advance.
The design of fuel assembly to be loaded into the reactor shall be approved by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry based on the provisions of the Electricity
Business Act. If any person who has implemented construction without approved
construction plan shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than
three years or by a fine of not more than three million yen, or by both, based on theprovisions of the Electricity Business Act.
4

Inspection and evaluation system
In construction of the nuclear installation, the licensee of reactor operation shallreceive and pass the pre-service inspection, which is implemented for eachconstruction phase by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, based on theprovisions of the Electricity Business Act, before using the electric facilities.
The fuel assembly to be loaded into the reactor shall receive and pass the fuelassembly inspection implemented for each construction phase by the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry, based on the provisions of the Electricity Business Act
before use.
The welds of pressure boundary components and the containment, etc. shall undergo
the operator’s inspection on welding, as well as the review by the Japan Nuclear
Energy Safety Organization (safety management review on welding) on theorganization in charge of implementation of inspection, process management andother issues specified by the Ordinances of the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry.
After the reactor starts operation, the licensee of reactor operation shall conductperiodic operator’s inspection, and receive the periodic inspection by the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry on the pre-determined important safety related
components. The licensee shall also receive the review by the Japan Nuclear Energy
Safety Organization (periodic safety management review) on the organization in
charge of implementation of inspection, process management and other issues
specified by the Ordinances of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Safety inspection on the operating facilities includes the compliance inspection of theoperational safety program periodically conducted by the Minister of Economy, Tradeand Industry based on the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. NISA’s Nuclear
Safety Inspector conducts inspection work, consigned by the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry. In accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, the complianceinspection of physical protection program is conducted as the physical protection

39Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Frameworkinspection.
Any person who has used the electric facilities or fuel assembly that did not pass the
pre-service inspection or fuel assembly inspection, or who has refused, prevented or
avoided the pre-service safety management review, safety management inspection
on welding, periodic inspection or periodic safety management review shall be
subject to imprisonment with work for not more than one year or a fine of not morethan a million yen, or both, under the provisions of the Electricity Business Act. Any
person who has refused, prevented or avoided the access, inspection or submissionof samples involved in the operational safety inspection or physical protection
inspection, or has failed to make a statement or has made a false report in responseto the questioning, is subject to imprisonment with work for not more than one year ora fine of not more than a million yen, or both, under the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act. Article 19 explains the detailed inspection program, in Japan.
5

Law enforcement
Law enforcement concerning nuclear safety regulation in Japan can be classified into
two categories: enforcement by the regulatory body and enforcement by the law
enforcement agency including judiciary. If the licensee of reactor operation is found toviolate the provisions, etc. of the laws, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
may order revocation of the license for reactor installment or suspension of operationof reactor not more than one year. If the performance of the nuclear installment is notfound to comply with the technical standards, the Minister of Economy, Trade andIndustry may order suspension of operation, modification, repair or transfer of thenuclear installation, specification of operating method or other actions required toensure safety.
The past experience of orders of measures such as suspension of operation issued
by the regulatory body on a nuclear installation under the provisions of laws is theadministrative disposition by falsification regarding the reactor containment leak rate
inspection at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of the Tokyo Electric Power
Co., Inc. in November 2002, which resulted in one-year suspension of its operation.

40

Regulatory Body

Article 8
1.

Article 8

Regulatory Body

Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate the regulatory body entrusted with theimplementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, andprovided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill its
assigned responsibilities.

2.

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation
between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization
concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

Overview of Article 8
The Minister of METI have jurisdiction over nuclear installations in Japan. The
organization that administers the safety regulation is NISA, which was established as a
special organization of the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy of METI to ensure
safety of nuclear power reactor installations.
The Science and Technology Policy Bureau of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT) is responsible for the safety regulation of the research
reactor facilities that are not covered by this Convention.
The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of the Cabinet Office audits and supervises theadequacy of the safety regulation implemented by these regulatory bodies from theperspective of the third party to ensure independency and transparency of the safety
regulation. These regulatory bodies and regulation system have not changed since thelast report.
During this reporting period, NISA strengthened its system for development of humanresources and sending out of information. It also moves ahead aiming at further
improvement by sorting out the mid- and long-term challenges with taking into accountrecommendations and suggestions of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service(IRRS).
As reported in this Article, NISA has the human resources with a wide variety of
specialties. NISA not only educates them within the organization but also accepts theresources with career from other organizations. NISA secures sufficient manpower, thus
resulting in the sufficient human resources. As NISA is financed by the national budget,they also have sufficient financial resources.

41Article 8

Regulatory Body

Article 8 (1)1Establishment of the regulatory body

Nuclear and industrial safety agency(1) Organization, authority and responsibility
The Minister of METI is responsible for the safety regulation of the nuclear
installations in Japan, and NISA, as remitted by the Minister of METI, implements
its administrative work. NISA was established pursuant to the provisions of the Law
for Establishment of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry as a specialorganization of the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy. Specifically, NISA,
conducts clerical work on enforcing the competence of the Minister of METI
described below. A special organization refers to an organization that may beestablished if judged necessary under the National Government Organization Law.
The Law for Establishment of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
stipulates that NISA is the organization to ensure safety of nuclear and otherenergies and industrial safety. NISA belongs to METI in the organizational structure,
but the Director-General of NISA has the authority to appoint and dismiss his
personnel.
The Minister of METI is in charge of the safety regulation of the nuclear installations
and has the authority to issue licenses for installment of nuclear installations, after
examining siting, structure, and equipment to assure the installment of a nuclear
installation will not cause any radiological hazard. The Minister of METI has theauthority to establish Ordinances specifying the details of the safety regulations
including measures for the safe operation and physical protection of specificnuclear fuel materials, the Operational Safety Program, measures to be taken in
emergency, etc. The functions of the said Minister include approval and inspectionof the design and construction of the facilities, approval of the Operational Safety
Program and the decommissioning plan, etc. of the nuclear installations, collectionof reports from the licensees of reactor operation and execution of on-site
inspection, if necessary. The said Minister also has the authority to evocate or
discontinue utilization of a license for installment of a nuclear installation, ordermeasures for operational safety, dismiss a Chief Engineer of Reactor,
implementation order concerning decommissioning, implementing order for an
emergency preparedness, etc.
The divisions of NISA involved in nuclear safety consist of the Policy Planning and
Coordination responsible for comprehensive coordination within in NISA, Nuclear
Safety Public Relations and Training, Nuclear Safety Regulatory Standard, Nuclear
Safety Special Investigation, Nuclear Power Inspection, Nuclear Power Licensing,Nuclear fuel Cycle Regulation, Nuclear Fuel Transport and Storage Regulation,
Radioactive Waste Regulation, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and ElectricPower Safety (Fig. 8-1). As shown in Table 8-1, the Nuclear Safety Inspectors andSenior Specialists for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness are stationed at nuclear
site.

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NISA has a total of approximately 370 staff engaged in the nuclear safety regulation,out of which 110 staff members are Nuclear Safety Inspectors and Senior
Specialists for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness stationed at nuclear sites.
Director-General
Deputy Director-General
Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Power
Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Safety
Deputy Director-General for Industrial Safety
Deputy Director-General for Safety Examination
Policy Planning and Coordination Div. (coordination of general policy of NISA, human resources,
budgetary, administration of international cooperation）
Nuclear Safety Public Relations and Training Div. (activities for public hearing and public relations
concerning the nuclear safety, administration of the Nuclear Safety Inspectors and Senior Specialists for
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness)
Nuclear Safety Regulatory Standard Div. (planning & coordination on technical matter)
Nuclear Safety Special Investigation Div. (management of allegation and litigation on nuclear safety)
Nuclear Power Licensing Div. (license for installment of commercial power reactors and approval of
construction plan)
Nuclear Power Inspection Div. (Inspection and approval of operational safety program of commercial
power reactors)
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Regulation Div. (safety regulation of refining, fabrication and reprocessing facility)
Nuclear Fuel Transport and Storage Regulation Div. (Safety regulation of interim storage of spent fueland transport of nuclear fuel materials)
Radioactive Waste Regulation Div. (safety regulation of waste disposal, waste processing facility anddecommissioning of nuclear facilities)
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Div. (nuclear emergency preparedness, measures to address
accident and failure of nuclear facilities, physical protection of nuclear materials）
Electric Power Safety Div. (operational safety of turbine, generator, etc. of commercial power reactor
facilities, safety of electricity)
Industrial Safety Div. (safety of high pressure gas, petrochemical complex, explosives)
Gas Safety Div. (safety of city gas and heat supply)
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Safety Div. (safety of liquefied petroleum gas)
Mine Safety Div. (safety of mines)
Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office (Table 8-1)

Fig 8-1 Organization of NISA

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Table 8-1 Nuclear Safety Inspectors Offices Under METIName of Office

Facility Covered

1

Tomari Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P)2Higashidori Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (B)3Rokkasho Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Fuel Facility

4

Onagawa Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (B)5

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant(B)6Fukushima Daini Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (B)7Kashiwazaki-kariwa Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office8

Tokai & Oharai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office9

Yokosuka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office10

Shika Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (B)Power Plant (B), Fuel Facility
Fuel Facility
Power Plant (B)11

Hamaoka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (B)12Tsuruga Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P, B, F)

13

Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P)14

Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P)15

Takahama Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P)16

Kumatori Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Fuel Facility

17

Kamisaibara Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office18

Shimane Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (B)19

Ikata Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P)20Genkai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P)21

Sendai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office

Power Plant (P)Fuel Facility

The facility covered is classified as follows:
P: PWR B: BWR F: FBR
Fuel Facility: Uranium enrichment, fabrication, reprocessing and disposal(2) Development of human resources
Despite a move to downsizing and restructuring promoted by the Government,
NISA has requested the personnel management office of the necessary staffing
and secured the human resources to implement the safety regulation firmly. The
regulations on the nuclear installations are reviewed and revised flexibly in thecontext of technological development and social requirements. In view of suchcircumstances, securing adequate human resources has become important infulfilling the responsibility of the regulatory body. The regulatory administration
concerning nuclear safety requires high level of expertise. Therefore, to prevent
possible deficiency due to the retirement of the employees on the work
management, a special arrangement has been made for employees with broad
expertise to allow them to continue working as regular staff.
In 2009, NISA introduced the competency management system into its training andeducation program. This system not only provides opportunities for training or OJT
to obtain the knowledge necessary for performing the work assigned to thepersonnel, but also develops education and training programs under the44Regulatory Body

Article 8

involvement of the management to ensure such training and on the job training(OJT) can be received. The objectives of the competency management system
include to encourage the employees to take the training proactively and to provide
the opportunity to take training programs under the personnel’s tight work schedule,
which has been the long-time concern to be resolved. It should be noted that thetraditional education and training programs other than the competency
management system continue to be effective in parallel. The personnel should
acquire necessary skills and knowledge while he/she is on the job; this has been
acknowledged an important element in cultivating the regulatory staff. Fig. 8-2
shows the skills necessary for the personnel of the nuclear safety divisions and therelated major training programs.

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Job Title
Skill-Director for
SafetyExamination-General Manager
of Nuclear
SafetyInspectors
Office-Deputy General
Manager of
Office-AssistantManager-Inspector-Senior Specialist
for Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness

Legislation &Personnel

Personnel

with Experienceat NISA

without
Experience at
NISA

OJT

Regulations on
Safety Administration

Education and Training on Radiation

Knowledge Related
Review
Knowledge Related
Inspection
Knowledge ofEmergency
Preparedness
Knowledge and Skillsof Public Relations
Inspection Skills

Training
for
GeneralManager

Applied Seismic
Training

Basic Seismic
Training

Applied Training
for S.I.

Basic Training for
F.I.& S.I.

Training for
Senior Specialist
for Nuclear
Emergency

Basic Training for
Senior Specialist for
Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness

Applied Training
on RiskCommunication

Training on
Nuclear Risk
Communication

Nuclear Special Training

Knowledge ofRadiation Protection

Training on Nuclear Safety Public
Relations

Training on Condition Monitoring,
Simulator, Loop and NDE

Skills on Emergency
Preparedness
Safety Management,
Quality Assurance

Nuclear Safety Basic Training

Simulator Training

Facilities

Field Training at Nuclear Facilities

General of Nuclear

Wide Area Field Training

Applied Training on Quality（JEAC4111, safety culture）

Basic Training on
Emergency Prep.

Basic Training on Quality（ISO9000）

S.I. : Safety Inspector , F.I. : Facility Inspector

Fig. 8-2 Skills Required for Personnel of Nuclear Safety Divisions and Related Major
Training Programs
In April, 2008, in relation with the development of human resources, NISA
established the Japan Nuclear Safety Training Center in Hitachi-naka City, Ibaraki
Prefecture to strengthen the training program, aiming at developing and improving
the competency of the personnel. This center provides the training facilities for
BWR operation simulators (PC simulators), non-destructive test training equipment,

46

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eddy current test (ECT) equipments for steam generator tubing, 3-Dimentional cut
models of NPP major components, electrical and instrumentation training facilities,
the e-learning system (to study the PWR system), loop test devices (incident
simulating loop and process instrumentation loop), condition monitoring testing
facility and classrooms for lecture.
NISA continuously recruits personnel who have gained career in nuclear industry.
This is recognized as a useful method to contribute to level up technicalcompetence of the regulatory body.
(3) Financial resources
All financial resources to cover the activities of NISA come from the coffers of state.
NISA annually submits the budget request based on the estimates necessary forthe projects or regulatory activities related to nuclear safety for the coming fiscal
year to the financial authorities. These procedures are common to the all
governmental organizations in Japan. As the financial authorities assess therequested budget on the basis of Japan’s financial situation, a slight increase or
decrease will be seen every year; however, the budget necessary to cover the
regulatory activities has been secured so far. NISA’s budget for the reporting periodamounts to 37.64 billion yen (including 22.51 billion yen as subsidies for operationof JNES) in FY 2008, 36.92 billion yen (22.19 billion yen as subsidies for theoperation of JNES) in FY 2009 and 32.55 billion yen (20.7 billion yen as subsidies
for operation of JNES) in FY 2010.
(4) Ensuring transparency
a Information disclosure
NISA is one of the governmental organizations, and is obligated of disclosure of
documents based on the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative
Organs. The claim of information disclosure in accordance with this Act shall be
accepted except for the information defined not to be disclosed because
disclosure of the said information is likely to cause harm to the rights andinterests of an individual or public.
b Public hearing and public relations activities
In addition to the said legal framework for the information disclosure, NISA has
systematically developed the information release activities in a way combinedwith the regulatory processes. As a new move to reflect the feedback of opinionsfrom the outside into the quality improvement of regulatory activities, therelationship management (RM) system was introduced for active information
release. The challenges of RM include gaining of recognition of NISA throughout
the society, well understanding of NISA’s daily activities by public, response to
the special interest of the public, formation of opinion on the direction andrevision of the regulatory system, response to an emergency such as an accident
and activation of the internal communication. Under these circumstances, in April

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2004, the Nuclear Safety Public Relations and Training Division responsible forenhancing public hearing and public relations was newly established in order toprovide various public hearing and public relations activities. Resident Public
Relations Officers are also assigned. The major public hearing and public
relations activities include (i) supply of information on policies and activities ofnuclear safety regulation (supply of information on its web site, issuance of thenews letters, development of brochures, preparation and distribution of thenewspaper ads or leaflets, supply of information using CATV, etc.); (ii) various
symposia and explanation meetings to the residents; (iii) two-way dialogue
communication with the local residents in nuclear installation site area, (iv) public
hearing and public relations activities hosted by Nuclear Safety Inspectors Officeand (v) information distribution during emergency (“Mobile NISA”*, the web site
on an emergency). For the purpose of expanding the staff knowledge, training
programs focusing on nuclear safety public relations, risk communication, etc.
are given. In addition, the Nuclear Energy Library was established in JNES andthe applications for reactor installment license and nuclear incident reports areavailable to the pubic.
Mobile NISA: This is the mailing service to release the information promptly to the local
residents and public when a large-scale earthquake, etc. occurs in thecommunities hosting the nuclear facilities. NISA intends to deliver to the
pre-registered persons with the first report on the emergency via e-mail within
one hour or so after its occurrence. The information to be disseminated consistsof the operating status of the concerned nuclear facility, radiation monitoring dataaround the facility, etc. This mailing service promptly released the information
during the earthquakes in the northern coastal area of Miyagi Prefecture in July,
2008 and in Suruga-wan in August, 2009, etc.

NISA has been steadily improving its communication activities in Japan, whilemuch remains to be addressed with the public relations in foreign languages
such as the information release to abroad. A considerable amount of valuable
insights that Japan has accumulated with 40-year experience of regulation for
the nuclear installations is shared within only a limited extent. It is undeniable thatthe international contribution by Japan, which has a large nuclear program,shows low profile compared with other countries with a similar size of the
program.
To break out this situation, Japan has been focusing on the emergency
information release service in foreign languages, which seems to have the top
priority, during this reporting period, to begin with. The emergency information will
be disseminated via foreign embassies to Japan and Japanese diplomatic offices
in foreign countries. The system was operated on a trial basis in thecomprehensive reactor emergency drill during this reporting period and at thetime of occurrence of a large-scale earthquake as well. In the future, the English
web site will be open, aiming at sharing broad knowledge on nuclear safetyincluding operating experience.

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Article 8(5) Technical supporta Technical support organization
NISA established JNES (approx. 400 executives and employees as of April 1,
2010) as their technical support organization in October, 2003.
JNES takes a neutral position independent from the licensees of nuclear energy
related activities to be regulated. Their mission is to implement nuclear safety
regulation efficiently and appropriately together with NISA. JNES is in charge ofthe inspection of nuclear facilities pursuant to the laws by sharing responsibilities
with NISA. In addition, JNES as an entity of the expert engineers to ensure
nuclear safety, provide technical support to NISA with the safety review andassessment on the nuclear installations, with the development of the safety
regulation criteria, as well as with the emergency preparedness activities andwith the collection of safety information.
In accordance with the Law for the Incorporated Administrative Agency Japan
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, JNES implements the following activities:







Inspection of nuclear installations and nuclear facilities, and related work,
Safety analysis and evaluation of designs of nuclear installations and nuclear
facilities;
Work for prevention of nuclear emergency, mitigation of nuclear emergency(including the probability of occurrence of nuclear emergency), andrestoration from a nuclear emergency;
Investigation, testing, research, and training to ensure safety in utilization of
nuclear energy; andCollection, analysis and provision of information to assure nuclear safety.

In fulfilling their work, based on the General Rules for the Incorporated
Administrative Agency, JNES shall prepare a scheme (mid-term program) toaccomplish the mid-term objectives directed by NISA to obtain approval from the
Minister of METI, develop an annual plan based on the mid-term program, andreport to the Minister of METI. The Evaluation Committee on Incorporated
Administrative Agencies that was set up in METI assesses the performance ofeach fiscal year and achievements to the mid-term objectives.
The fund of JNES comes mainly as the Governmental subsidies and also as thefees paid by the licensees of reactor operation for the inspection.
In October, 2007, JNES established Seismic Safety Division and enhanced theirfunction to address the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, etc. In April, 2009,
JNES drastically reformed their organizational structure in the pursuit of
improvement in tasks, technology transfer and enhanced comprehensive
coordination function.

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Regulatory Bodyb Council
The council related with NISA is the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommitteeof the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, which wasestablished to advise issues such as securing nuclear safety and operationalsafety activities of utilities. This subcommittee was structured to explore
discussion more specifically from both perspectives of generals and details. To
be specific, the nuclear safety regulation systems are deliberated in thesubordinate subcommittees or in working groups of each regulatory field andoffers suggestion to NISA.
The members of working groups or subcommittees include the staff not only withthe academic background in nuclear thermal design, fuel design, system design,
mechanical design, seismic design, material strength, radiation control,
meteorology, geology, soil, and other engineering expertise, but also in the fields
of cultural science and social science and the representative from the ordinary
consumers and the mass media and all these members participate in thediscussion. Neutral position of these members is assured and the deliberation isheld open to public in principle. In addition, NISA may hear the views from themembers of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee and other experts
other than the opportunity of discussion in the above councils when the safety
regulations should be implemented.

50Regulatory Body

Table8-1

Article 8

List of Nuclear Related Councils of Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources andEnergyNuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee
Basic Safety Policy Subcommittee
INES Evaluation Subcommittee
Chuetsu-Oki Earthquake Nuclear Installations Investigation and Study Subcommittee
WG for Operation Management and Equipment Integrity Evaluation
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Safety Subcommittee
Reprocessing WG, Study Group on Comprehensive Inspections of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant,
WG for Aging Management Evaluation, WG for Interim Storage of Spent Fuel,
WG for Transport of Radioactive Material
Seismic and Mechanical Design Subcommittee
Joint Working Group on Earthquake, Tsunami, Geology, and Ground Structure, Mechanical WG
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee
Risk Management WG, WG on Measures for Incident and Failure, Accident Management WG,
Fire Protection WG
Nuclear Reactor Safety Subcommittee
Review Meeting of Maintenance Management, Confirmatory Meeting of Safety of Monju, WG for
Operation Management, WG for Safety Assessment, WG on Technical Validation of Standards, Fuel
WG, WG for Evaluation of Inspection Technology, WG for Comprehensive Preventive Maintenance,
WG for Evaluation of Safety Management Technology, WG for Upgrade of Reactor Thermal Output
Aging Countermeasure Examination Committee
WG for Technical Evaluation of Aging
Radioactive Waste Safety Subcommittee
WG for Study on Supporting Radioactive Waste Regulation , Engineering WG for Returned LLW,
Review WG for Clearance of Uranium
Decommissioning Safety Subcommittee
WG for Evaluation of Decommissioning Technology
Nuclear Safety Infrastructure Subcommittee
WG for Study of Safety Infrastructure
Study Group on the Way of Inspection
Radiation Safety SubcommitteecSafety research
In fulfilling its regulatory administration, NISA makes use of the result of safety
research, as it necessitates.
Safety research is necessary for NISA or JNES to implement the safety
regulations appropriately. These examples are shown below:Planning and coordination of safety regulatory system
 Research to coordinate the procedures for safety review, etc. by the51

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regulatory body in preparation to the establishment of the legal
framework for safety regulations on high level radioactive waste
disposal Research to study regulatory measures for reducing exposure(collective dose) of radiation workers
 Establishment of technical approaches and methods for implementing
safety regulatory actions
 Acquisition of engineering knowledge necessary to prepare
engineering manuals, guidelines, etc. used in approval of designand construction plan, welding inspection, pre-service inspection,
periodic inspection, fitness-for-service assessment of equipment,etc.
 Acquisition of engineering knowledge necessary for decision making
of safety regulatory actions
 Study of off-shore ultrasonic survey, etc. to validate the seismic
safety evaluation by the licensee of reactor operation
 Acquisition of the data necessary to confirm validity during the safety
review in adopting fuel, etc. using new design or materials by
licensee of reactor operation
 Study of engineering insights, etc. to evaluate validity of plant aging
measurers, and acquisition of engineering data on aging
degradation
 Acquisition of data necessary for the confirmation by the regulatory
body in cause analysis of accidents or troubles
 Establishment of the engineering Infrastructure required forregulations
 Basic study and research to use the risk information in the safety
regulations on nuclear installations and nuclear fuel cycle facilities
 Collection and analysis of the information on accidents and troubles
occurred in Japan and abroad, on their causes and on
countermeasures
 Investigation on trends of establishment and revision of foreign
regulatory standards, acquisition and compilation of the evaluation
data and examination of compilation of safety criteria of theinternational organizations such as IAEA
(6) Management system of NISANISA’s staff is obliged to comply with the legislation and regulations as the staff of
the Japanese government in accordance with the National Public Service Act. In
consideration of importance of securing nuclear safety in protection of the public
lives and property, NISA provides a strong commitment to its mission, scientific andreasonable judgments, transparency, neutrality and fairness as the code of conduct
for the staff’s activities.

52

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For administration work, the Policy Planning and Coordination Division watches
and assesses the performance of other divisions of NISA in discharging their duties,
and takes timely remedial actions after consulting with the senior management. In
order to improve the quality of regulatory activities, the development of the NISAWork Management System started in FY 2006, which was implemented from FY
2007. According to the NISA Work Management System, NISA including theInspectors Offices sets the annual goals to serve as the in-house business goals.
Since 2008, these goals have been released to public to allow the external
evaluation and help contribute to performing work with consciousness toaccomplishment. In addition, NISA makes a continuous effort to maintain the highquality of regulatory work through education and training of the personnel,
international activities and the hearing of advice from experts such as members of
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee.
2 Overview of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service
In June, 2007, the IRRS team of the International Atomic Energy Agency visited NISA.
The objective was to confirm the compliance with the IAEA’s safety standards, as in
the conventional review, and, in addition to this, a wide range of political dialogue withthe senior regulators from Member States on the regulatory concerns.
The IRRS team reviewed the following relevant areas:









Legislative and governmental responsibilities
Authority, responsibilities and functions of the regulatory body
Organization of the regulatory body
The authorization process
Review and assessment; inspection and enforcement
Inspection and enforcement
The development of regulations and guides
Management system for the regulatory body

The mission included a series of interviews and discussions with key personnel
at NISA and at other organizations, and observation of an inspection at anuclear power plant. NISA supplied a package of documentation andself-assessment in advance of the mission and the team presented its findings
based on the IAEA safety standards. Additionally, the IRRS team, together withNISA staff, discussed policy issues relating to the regulation of nuclear safety.
The results of the discussions will serve as a useful basis for the evolution of
future IRRS missions and will assist with continuous improvement in theregulation of nuclear safety.
The IRRS Review Team noted the open, transparent and learning attitude of
NISA staff throughout this mission, and it was evident that significant effort had
been put into the preparation of the mission. During the review the53

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administrative and logistical support was excellent and the team was extended
full cooperation in technical discussions with NISA personnel.
The IRRS Review Team appreciates and acknowledges NISA’s participation ininternational cooperation activities and encourages NISA to continue its activerole in the exchange of experience and expertise among regulators.
The IRRS team highlighted following three major findings:
1) Japan has a comprehensive national legal and governmental framework fornuclear safety in place; the current regulatory framework was recently
amended and is continuing to evolve;
2) NISA as the regulatory body plays a major role for directing and coordinating
the evolution of the regulatory framework;
3) Challenges have already been addressed to improve the relations among
NISA, the nuclear industry and stakeholders in order to come with a better
understanding and cooperation. Further work is underway.
The IRRS Review Team identified good practices and made recommendations
and suggestions that indicate where improvements are necessary or desirable
to further strengthen the effectiveness of regulatory oversight.
The IRRS report was issued in December, 2007 and is available on the METI’s web
site: http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20080314007/report.pdf
Taking into account the recommendations and the suggestions of the IRRS, the Basic
Safety Policy Subcommittee of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee ofAdvisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy (hereafter referred to as“ACNRE”) proposed the issues to be addressed on the part of the regulatory body forthe future. NISA has now been actively engaged in the realization of the proposal.
The IRRS follow up mission was initially to be invited in February, 2010. However, it
was postponed because it would be more effective to receive their review after thesuggestions of the Basic Safety Policy Subcommittee were implemented.

Article 8 (2)Status of the regulatory body

1 Position of NISA in the government
The Japanese government consists of 1 office and eleven ministries. Of them, theministries involved in the nuclear safety regulation are the Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, theMinistry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and Ministry of Health, Laborand Welfare. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission
established in the Cabinet Office are the independent organizations to supervise andaudit the regulatory bodies set up in these Ministries.
Type of utilization of nuclear energy determines the ministry in charge: METI is in54

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Article 8

charge of utilization of nuclear power as an energy source and MEXT is in charge ofutilization of nuclear energy regarding research and development. The safety
regulations are also provided by each ministry concerned. NISA of METI serves as
the regulatory body of the power reactor facilities. Fig 8-3 shows the position of NISA
in the Government.
Structures and roles of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety
Commission of the Cabinet Office are explained in Section 3 below.
Cabinet Office
NSC

Prime Minister

Recommendation

METI

Consultation &ReportReportMinister of METI
ReportCommission &Direction

ANRE

ReportCommission& Direction

NISA

Fig. 8-3 Position of NISA in the Government
2 Establishment of effective separation
The Law for Establishment of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Law
clearly stipulates that NISA is “the organization to ensure safety of nuclear energy,”
and it is positioned as a special organization of ANRE of METI.
NISA has definitive authorities and functions for the safety regulation based on theprovisions of the Reactor Regulation Act and the Electricity Business Act. The
Minister of METI is responsible for the regulatory activities over the nuclear facilities
such as the license for reactor installment pursuant to the Reactor Regulation Act,and the approval of construction plan and pre-service inspection pursuant to theElectricity Business Act. The Minister of METI commits these regulatory activities to
NISA, which independently makes a decision or consults their proposed decision with
the Minister of METI without involvement of ANRE. As NISA performs the safety
regulation administrative work committed by the Minister of METI, and at the point ofcompletion of safety review when NISA issues the license for reactor installment
pursuant to the Reactor Regulation Act, they shall consult the review with the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission. This means
implementation of the safety regulation is supervised independently. NISA reports the55Article 8

Regulatory Body

regulatory activities such as approval of construction plan and inspection on thefacilities and safety activities to the Nuclear Safety Commission subsequently andalso undergoes regulatory review implemented by the Nuclear Safety Commission.
The Nuclear Safety Commission is an organization established under the Cabinet
Office, independent from the ministries and agencies involved in utilization of nuclear
power. It has the authorities to supervise and audit the safety regulation implemented
by the regulatory bodies from the independent perspective and makerecommendation to the regulatory bodies via the Prime Minister, if necessary.
3 Nuclear related organizations of Cabinet Office(1) Atomic Energy Commission
The Atomic Energy Commission was established under the Prime Minister's Officeon January 1, 1956 to conduct national policy concerning research, development
and utilization of nuclear energy in a planned manner and to ensure the democratic
administration of the nuclear energy policy. (The AEC was transferred to the
Cabinet Office on January 6, 2001.)
The AEC has duties of planning, deliberation, and decisions concerning:
1)
2)
3)
4)

preparation of the basic policies on research, development and utilization of
nuclear energy,
planning of allocation of nuclear related expenses,
statements of views to the competent minister on application of permission
criteria specified in the Reactor Regulation Act,
coordination of administrative work of research, development and utilization of
nuclear energy of the related administrative agencies.

If the AEC deems it necessary as part of its assigned duties, on the basis of theAtomic Energy Basic Law and the Law for Establishment of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission, it may advise by way of thePrime Minister, and request reports and cooperation including the submission ofmaterials, statements of viewpoint, and explanation from the heads of relevant
administrative organizations. The Ministers of METI and MEXT, before issuing thelicense of nuclear related installations based on the Reactor Regulation Act(excluding nuclear fuel use facilities) shall receive views of the AEC with regard to
the following items: (1) the nuclear installations will not be used for any purposes
other than peaceful purposes, (2) the license will cause no hindrance to theplanned development or utilization of nuclear energy, and (3) the applicant has anadequate financial basis to construct and maintain the nuclear installations.
The AEC has developed the Long-Term Program for Research, Development andUtilization of Nuclear Energy, which determined the basic nuclear policy in Japan,
almost every five years since 1956. The title of the Long-Term Program for
Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy was changed to the56Regulatory Body

Article 8“Framework for Nuclear Energy” in 2005, and the AEC compiled the basic
objectives and concepts. (The Framework for Nuclear Energy was endorsed by the
Cabinet in October, 2005.)
The AEC is composed of a chairman and four other commissioners appointed by
the Prime Minister with the consent of the Diet. The Cabinet Nuclear Energy Policy
Office assumes responsibility for the administration of the AEC coordinates theclerical work among the related administrative agencies and makes an effort torealize the decision made by the AEC.
The AEC may have experts to investigate and deliberate the special issues and set
up the advisory committees, round-table conferences and other necessaryorganizations. Currently, five advisory committees have been established (Advisory
Committee on the Evaluation of Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, Advisory
Committee on Nuclear Security, Advisory Committee on Research andDevelopment, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Fusion and Special Committee on
International Affairs) to deliberate the related matters. The members of committees
are appointed by the Prime Minister out of those with the academic backgroundpursuant to the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Law for Establishment of theAtomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission.
In principle, all deliberations including those in the advisory committees,
subordinates under the AEC are open to public. The contents of the deliberations
are provided to the public on the AEC’s web site (http://aec.go.jp/) or via Nuclear
Energy Library, etc.
(2) Nuclear Safety Commission
The Atomic Energy Basic Act was partially revised on October 4, 1978 to establish
the Nuclear Safety Commission under the Prime Minister’s Office. The NSC
administers the function of safety regulation that had belonged to the AEC up until
then, in order to strengthen the system of ensuring nuclear safety.
(Note: The NSC was transferred from the Prime Minister’s Office to the Cabinet
Office due to central government reform on January 6, 2001.)
The NSC is responsible for planning, deliberation and decisions on matters that are
related to ensuring safety of the research, development, and utilization of nuclear
energy.
The NSC conducts its own review of the results of NISA’s (as commissioned by the
Minister of METI) examination on the application for the license to install nuclear
installations from the neutral view points of the experts:(i)whether the applicant has technical competence necessary to install the
nuclear facility and to perform reactor operation appropriately, and(ii) whether the location, structure and equipment of the facility do not hinder
prevention of hazards caused by nuclear fuel materials or a reactor.
The NSC reviews the regulatory activities conducted by the regulatory body57

Article 8

Regulatory Body

subsequent to the licensing to install nuclear facilities in order to supervise andaudit from view points of reasonableness, effectiveness and transparency. In doing
so, the NSC encourages continuous improvement in quality, effectiveness andtransparency.
Concerning the assigned duties, when the NSC deems necessary may makerecommendation by way of the Prime Minister to the heads of relevant
administrative organizations, and may request reports and ask cooperation
including submission of materials, statements of viewpoint, and explanation to theheads of relevant administrative organizations. Since April 2003 (partially, from
October 2003), the above functions have legally been enacted. The NSC may
receive from NISA on the quarterly bases the following; reports on incidents andfailures and reports on the conduct s of regulatory activities including approval of
construction plan which is submitted after approval of a license to install nuclear
facilities, Pre-service Inspection, Periodic Inspection, Periodic Safety Management
Review, Safety Management Review on Welding, Approval of Operational Safety
Program, implementation status of the Operational Safety Inspection. The NSC
also has the authority to inquire directly of the licensees, and of the contractors ofmaintenance and/or check work in order to supervise and to audit the safety
regulation implemented by regulatory bodies.
In the case of a violation of the safety regulations in any of nuclear facilities, theemployee can directly allege the fact to the NSC, and it has the authority toinvestigate the allegation. The NSC is composed of five commissioners appointed
by the Prime Minister with the consent of the Diet, and these commissioners elect achairman among them. General affairs of the NSC are performed by the NSC
Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. The NSC Secretariat is composed of theSecretary-General, the Management and Coordination Division, the Regulatory
Guides and Review Division, the Radiation Protection and Accident Management
Division and the Subsequent Regulation Review Division and has about 100
members of staff.

58Regulatory Body

Article 8

Nuclear Safety

Secretary General
Management and Coordination Divisioninternational relations, safety research, etc)

(generalcoordination,

publicrelations,

Regulatory Guides and Review Division (development of review guides and criteria, safety
review of nuclear facilities, etc.)
Radiation Protection and Accident Management Division (accident and failure, emergency
preparedness, environmental monitoring)
Subsequent Regulation Review Division (supervision and audit of subsequent regulations
conducted by the regulatory bodies)
Senior Officer for Planning
Director for Nuclear Safety Review
Director for Subsequent Regulation Review

Fig. 8-4 Organization of the NSC
Under the NSC, two safety examination committees and fifteen special committees
are organized as shown in Table 8-2. The Special Committees may organize
working groups under them, if necessary. The members of the Committee on
Examination of Reactor Safety and the Committee on Examination of Nuclear Fuel
Safety are appointed from persons of knowledge and experience by the Prime
Minister in accordance with the Law for Establishment of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission. The Emergency TechnicalAdvisory Body is composed of the commissioners of the NSC and thecommissioners on the Emergency Technical Advisory Body who are also appointed
by the Prime Minister from persons of knowledge and experience.
Results of the investigation and evaluation by each review board and special
committee are reported to the NSC and are deliberated by the NSC. Reflecting theresults of the discussion in the Emergency Technical Advisory Body, the NSC
determines the recommendation items for an emergency.
Deliberations of all committees, including the special committees and working
group under the NSC are open to the public. The contents of the deliberations areprovided to the public on its website (http://www.nsc.go.jp/) or via Nuclear Energy
Library.

59

Article 8

Regulatory Body

Table 8-2 Councils of the NSC
Safety Examination Committee
Committee on Examination of Reactor Safety
Committee on Examination of Nuclear Fuel Safety
Special Committee, etc.
Commissioner on the Emergency Technical Advisory Body
Special Committee for Nuclear Safety Standards and Guides
Special Committee on Analysis and Evaluation of Nuclear Accidents and Failures
Special Committee on Radioactive Waste and Decommissioning
Special Committee on Radiation Protection
Special Committee on Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials
Special Committee on Nuclear Disaster
Special Committee on Nuclear Safety ResearchSpecial Committee on Safety Goals
Investigatory Advisory Board on Assessment of Seismic Safety
Project Team on Safety Survey of Reprocessing Facilities
Advisory Board on High-level Waste Repository Safety
Emergency Technical Advisory Body for Nuclear Disaster Prevention due to Armed Attacks
Emergency Technical Advisory Body for Disaster Prevention of Nuclear Carriers and Submarines
Emergency Technical Advisory Body

60

Responsibility of the License Holder

Article 9

Article 9

Responsibility of the License Holder

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests
with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each suchlicensee meets its responsibility.

Overview of Article 9
In Japan, it is clearly stated in the Atomic Energy Basic Act that use of nuclear power
shall be conducted in autonomic manner, and this principle serves as the basis forproviding for responsibility of the licensee. The safety regulations are established as amechanism to ensure this principle. The licensee fulfills its responsibility by complying
with the safety regulations, while the regulatory body makes the licensee comply withthe regulations to ensure that the licensee fulfills its responsibility. There is a mechanism
to issue penalties to the licensee in case it violates the legislation or the order based on
the legislation and regulations.

61Article 9

1

Responsibility of the License Holder

Prime responsibility for safety
Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Act which establishes the most fundamental
matters related to use of nuclear energy in Japan states that “the research,development and use of nuclear energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, shallensure priority to safety, and shall be conducted in autonomic manner underdemocratic administration, and the results obtained shall be made public and shallactively contribute to international cooperation.” In pursuant to this provision, theprime responsibility for the peaceful use of nuclear power and ensuring safety rests
with the licensee.
Furthermore, Article 14 of the Atomic Energy Basic Act provides that “those who
attempt to construct reactors shall be subject to the regulations to be enforced by theGovernment as provided by other laws.” More specifically, the licensee shall have aduty to conform to the regulations enforced by the Government. The regulations to be
enforced by the Government are established by the Reactor Regulation Act and theElectricity Business Act.

2

Measures for the licensee to fulfill its duties
The licensee must comply with the relevant legislation and regulations so as to fulfill
its prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation. Various arrangements
are undertaken for the licensee to fulfill its responsibility, which include promotion of
the spirit of compliance through the education on operational safety, and activities
aiming at further improving safety consciousness in a workplace for the purpose of
ensuring the safety of a nuclear installation. Regulatory requirements and proceduresfor ensuring safety, established by the legislation and regulations, are provided in
Article 17 to 19.
As an institutional mechanism which encourages the licensee to fulfill its responsibility,
licensee is a primal entity for safety examination, inspection or related penalty basedon the legislatives.
When the Minister of METI finds that the performance of the nuclear installation does
not confirm with the stipulated technical standards or that the operation of a nuclear
installation violates the regulatory requirements, he/she may order any licensee todesignate a method for operating the reactors or order the necessary safetymeasures to be taken. When the licensee violates the order, the Minister of METI may
rescind the permission of nuclear installation or specify a period not exceeding a year
and order suspension of operation for that period imprisonment with work, a fine, orboth shall be imposed on the basis of the provisions of Act, when violation such as
installing nuclear reactor without permission is found. It is the same when the licensee
does not obtain approval for the Operational Safety Program (the program whichmust be established by the licensee for the safety of a nuclear installation) from the
Minister of METI before commencing operation of the reactors, when the licensee
amends the Operational Safety Program without obtaining prior approval from the
Minister of METI, or when the licensee or its employees do not comply with the
Operational Safety Program. As mentioned above, a mechanism is provided to
impose penalties on the licensee when it does not fulfill its responsibility.

62

Priority to Safety

Article 10

Article 10

Priority to Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in
activities directly related to nuclear facilities shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear safety.

Overview of Article 10
In Japan, the regulatory authority and the licensee are respectively making efforts forfostering the attitude to put utmost priority to safety.
NISA has introduced the quality assurance into the operational safety activities
conducted by the licensee. In addition, NISA has promoted activities to prevent
degradation of organizational climate and to foster safety culture for the ultimate
purpose of enhancing safety culture. During this reporting period, NISA has been
preparing the guidelines for the root cause analysis of accidents and failures, and taking
measures to thoroughly permeate the attitude of priority to safety.
The licensees make individual efforts as well as concerted industry-wide efforts.

63

Article 101

Priority to Safety

Regulatory requirements for prioritizing safety
The provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act requires that the Operational Safety
Program established by the licensee must provide for the matters related to thesystem for compliance to the relevant laws and Operational Safety Program, thesystem for fostering safety culture, and also the matters related to quality assurance
in the operational safety activities. The requirement for quality assurance wasintroduced to the regulatory requirements by amending the Ministerial Ordinance for
the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors enforced in November
2003 in response to the suggestion of the interim report prepared by the Study Groupon the Way of Inspection in June 2002. On the other hand, the regulatory
requirements related to the systems for compliance to relevant laws and Operational
Safety Program and for fostering safety culture were established by amending thesaid Ministerial Ordinance in December 2007, in response to the order of the Ministerof METI to conduct comprehensive check of electric power facilities in November
2006, which was issued after the incidents such as data falsification by a certain
electric power company.
In Japan, prior to the above reform, a mechanism was constructed and has been
implemented since January 2006 that the licensee must examine its efforts to prevent
degradation of safety culture and organizational mind as part of its own quality
assurance activities during the Periodic Safety Review which is conducted every 10
years as part of the operational safety activities, while the regulatory body must
examine the efforts of the licensee for prioritizing safety during the process of theApproval Operational Safety Program and Operational Safety Inspection.
The report on the issues of the inspection system and future improvement policies,
which NISA prepared based on the discussions at the Study Group on the Way ofInspections in September 2006, pointed out the necessity to prepare a guideline toevaluate the efforts of the licensee toward preventing degradation of safety culture
and organizational mind during routine operational safety activities in the entire
organization so as to reinforce the efforts for ensuring safety. NISA drew up the“Guideline for the Regulatory Authority to Evaluate Licensees' Efforts to Prevent
Degradation of Safety Culture and Organizational Mind” in November 2007 incooperation with JNES. This guideline is a compilation of perspectives and methods
for the regulatory authority to understand and evaluate the routine efforts fordeveloping safety culture and organizational mind in the safety operational activitiesof the licensee. It is used in the quarterly Operational Safety Inspections and theinspections carried out for the safety significant activities, and also in the compliancesurvey of the Operational Safety Program carried out outside the Operational Safety
Inspection period.
This guideline adopted definition of safety culture from INSAG-4, and is prepared byreferring to the concepts of degradation of safety culture of the IAEA (TECDOC-1321,
1329, INSAG-13, 15, Safety Report Series No. 11, No. 42 etc.) and OECD/NEA,
paying attention to be in harmony with international standards.

64Priority to Safety

Article 10

This guideline presents 14 items as important factors of safety culture, which function
as the viewpoints for evaluating the efforts for preventing degradation of safety culture
and organizational mind in the routine operational safety activities. These are top
management’s commitment, senior management’s clear policies and behavior,
avoidance of incorrect decision-making process, consistently questioning attitude,
reporting culture, good communication, accountability and transparency, compliance,
learning organization, organization working on prevention of accidents and failures,
self or 3rd party assessment, work management, alteration management and attitude
and morale.
Efforts of the licensee are evaluated at each step as before start of evaluation, during
evaluation and comprehensive evaluation periods. In the comprehensive evaluation
period, the items considered to require enhanced efforts by the licensee are
abstracted. Those items requiring further efforts are suggested to the licensee, while
those efforts which should be encouraged as good practice are founded. It is
confirmed at the subsequent Operational Safety Inspection whether the items
requiring efforts are appropriately conducted.
2

Efforts of the NSC(1) First-Series Roundtable Discussions on Safety Culture
The NSC, as one of measures taken after the JCO nuclear criticality accident
occurred in September 1999, held the “First-Series Roundtable Discussions on
Safety Culture” with unit managers and shift supervisors of twenty one (21) nuclear
facilities in Japan from July 2001 to December 2003. The contents were compiled
and published in a document “Site interviews about Safety Culture -Discussions onsites where the safety should be assured-“(January 2004). The summary is asfollows;Opinions and comments proposed during the Roundtable Discussions on
Safety Culture are summarized in three viewpoints, namely, “a viewpoint
related to individual personnel’s consciousness and awareness,” “a viewpoint
related to the organizational management,” and “a viewpoint related to work
activities (contents)”, and it is necessary to appropriately address respective
viewpoints.
It is also important to focus on the external factors those may influence thesafety culture (external environment). Those are “feelings/attitudes of thegeneral public towards nuclear power,” “media coverage of nuclear power,”“relationship with residents/local governments around the site of a nuclear
installation,” “relationship with the regulatory bodies,” and “electricity market”.
It is necessary to manage safety culture according to its state focusing on theabove three viewpoints and the viewpoint related to the external influences so
as to develop safety culture in a nuclear installation and to upgrade safety65Article 10

Priority to Safety

culture to the healthier condition.
(2) Second-Series Roundtable Discussions on Safety Culture
The NSC held a series of “Roundtable Discussions on Safety Culture”, from
October 2004 to April 2005, as one of the measures after the secondary systempipe rupture accident at the Mihama Power Station Unit 3 in August 2004, in order
to exchange opinions with top managements of electric power companies andmajor contractors. The contents were compiled and published in a document"Fostering a Culture of Safety in Japan’s Nuclear Industry Exchange of Views withTop Management" (June 2005). The summary is as follows.
 Management safety consciousness and activities
In the use of nuclear energy, everybody in the organization must share andpractice the concept of “safety priority”, by constantly questioning whether thecurrent practices of activities are appropriate from the viewpoint of ensuringsafety. To this end, the top management should take leadership in such areas asorganizational composition, resource allocation, quality assurance system,
technology, human resources and training.
 Productive communications between site staff and upper management
To give substantial significance to safety-ensuring activities, it is crucial thatsafety-related information permeates throughout the organization smoothly, andthat a system and means be provided to enable it. With full awareness of the
difficulties involved in creating smooth communications, management must
constantly and intentionally motivate their staff to improve the situation by
ensuring the bi-directional information channels, and appropriate and timely
remedial actions.
 Workplace environment
Regulators and licensees must continue to make bilateral efforts to improve theeffectiveness of regulatory activities for productively improving safety assurance,
without being content with the formalities in meeting regulatory standards ineffect. It is necessary that the management of licensees and contractors will
maintain and promote a thoroughgoing cooperative relationship, while sharing astrong perception that ensuring safety is the prerequisite to everything else innuclear activities, and that it be the most efficient means of cost optimization.

3

Licensee’s measures for priority to safety(1) Efforts of the licensee
All licensees have declared their principles to give due priority to nuclear safety at
nuclear installations, and have tried hard to improve not only in the safety culture
but also the corporate ethics or quality assurance. Under the policy to give priority
to safety, each licensee constructed a system so that the top management
participates in ensuring safety under his direct responsibility. The causes of data66

Priority to Safety

Article 10

falsification occurred under such circumstances were that efforts by the licensees
were not pervading thoroughly to the work fronts, and the support by top
managements and managers were insufficient to lighten a burden of site staff.
After discussing about the prevention of recurrence at the “Reliability Recovery
Committee” of the Federation of Electric Power Companies, which is an electricity
industry group, the electric power companies reexamined the action agenda of theFederation. Also in May 2007, it presented an action plan for prevention ofrecurrence to NISA, which includes participation of the top management,
thoroughness of training and education of personnel, enhancement of sharing
safety information, and this started the reconstruction and fixing of the safety
culture.
The licensee incorporates the priority to safety policy to its management system asa basic principle of the operational safety activities of a nuclear installation. The
activities aimed at priority to safety at the sites of a nuclear installation are deeply
related to the operational safety activities such as human error prevention activities.
Therefore, these operational safety activities are integrated into the management
system, and subject to planning, monitoring/surveillance, evaluation andcontinuous improvement.
Specifically, the licensees share information and inculcate the attitude of priority tosafety at work through the efforts to learn from the past failures, and training for
anticipating risks associated withdiverse works. For example, Chubu
Electric Power Co.,Inc. built a“Corridor for Learning from Failures”
in the training facility at Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Station. In this space,along with the panels describing
summaries of accidents and troubles,
actual items and models, messages
from the personnel who addressed
Corridor for learning from failures
the troubles, and newspaper articles（Provided by Chubu Electric Power）
at the time are on display andeffectively used for personnel training so that lessons learned from the past
accidents and troubles and the accumulated technical know-how are handed down
without being forgotten. These efforts of each licensee are based on sharing of the
in-house operating experiences. Sharing of operating experiences among thelicensees is reported in Article 19.
(2)

Policies of the whole nuclear industry
The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Inc., consisting of about 480 business
operators including manufacturers who are directly or indirectly engaged in the
nuclear business, established a "Charter for Safety by Nuclear Power Industry"composing of the following five articles in October 2006 for every person engaged

67

Article 10

Priority to Safety

in the nuclear industry to have a sense of pride and a sense of responsibility, toraise the consciousness of “not causing any accident by any means”, and toestablish the safety by taking action in order to be trusted by society with publicconfidence.
Article 1

Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5

We have a sense of responsibility and an awareness of its duty, andwe give the priority to ensuring safety over all, no matter what it may
be in what status.
We aim at thoroughness of safety measures by learning modesty frompast faults and sharing safety information.
We make effort to develop good working environments, where mattersperceived to be unsafe can be discussed at any time, are produced.
We always keep a "questioning attitude", without being self-conceitedwith good safety achievements.
We positively release error information as well as we listen sincerely tothe voice of society.

The top managements of all organizations are obligated to take necessary
measures so that the "Charter" penetrates to the all fronts of each organization, andis practiced positively as an autonomous and continuous effort, and is aimed to thelong-term continuation of safety achievement. The Japan Atomic Industrial Forum
Inc. has performed activities to promote the establishment of the Charter by the
President’s visit to local governments by the President, visiting members’ offices to
explain the Charter, the presentation of each member's independent efforts at themember's liaison councils, etc.
In April 2005, the nuclear industry established the Japan Nuclear Technology
Institute (JANTI), as a new entity that amasses the combined strength of the entire
nuclear industry, by integrating and restructuring the functions of the Nuclear
Information Center of the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry and"Nuclear Safety Network (NS Net)". JANTI inherited the activities of the aboveorganizations and is provided with the function to develop and promote industry
standards. JANTI promotes development of technological infrastructure based on
the scientific and rational data, tries to utilize the infrastructure in a wide range of
relevant organizations, and helps enhancing the nuclear industry’s voluntary safety
activities. In the mean time, JANTI exercises a check function from an independent,
objective and third-party point of view. JANTI set up a council consisting of third
persons and makes an attempt to disclose information for upgrading transparencyof organizational operation. The activities of this association are as follows:a

Safety culture dissemination activities
Seminars concerning safety and lecture meetings or opinion exchange meetings
concerning safety for members including reactor operators, fuel manufacturers,
plant vendors, etc. are held. E-learning materials and brochures for member
companies’ staff to learn about safety culture are produced and distributed to the68Priority to Safety

Article 10

members.
Information gathered by investigation of domestic and international movements
is utilized for enhancing safety culture.

4bPeer review activities
Peer reviews are periodically conducted for reactor operators, fuelmanufacturers, plant vendors, etc., according to the business form. Conducting
peer reviews focusing on site observations, in cooperation with the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) who has abundant peer review achievementsin the U.S. and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) who
conducts the international peer reviews, and thus supporting the operations of
the members by extract good practices and suggestions for improvement withtaking account of the operational experiences over the world. Moreover, JANTI
makes efforts to obtain good foreign practices and to make an international
contribution, by dispatching personnel to the peer reviews of WANO and OSARTof the IAEA.

c

Gathering, analysis and utilization of operating experiences
Gathering, analyzing and utilizing operating experiences by inheriting and further
enhancing the activities at the Nuclear Information Center of the Central
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, utilizing the nuclear power public
information library "NUCIA" and overseas operating experiences, making
suggestions based on the analysis results, and utilizing the obtained informationfor operation management and maintenance activities.
Extending cooperation and support for voluntary safety activities of reactor
operators concerning quality management system, and enhancing anddisseminating the root cause analysis to reactor operators, fuel manufacturers,
plant vendors and reactor operators’ group companies.

d

Safety culture assessment activities
Questionnaire investigations and interviews to the employees of reactor
operators, etc. are conducted as external assessment concerning the status of
the safety culture of the members. The results obtained are sorted out andanalyzed according to the seven principles of safety culture advocated by JANTI,
and offered to the members to help support their voluntary activities for fosteringsafety culture.
Priority to safety at the regulatory authority

Staff of NISA is government employees, and they must work for public interest as
servants for the entire nation in conformity with the National Public Service Act. They
are also obliged to devote themselves to their tasks and to keep secrecy under thefundamental principles that government employees must make every possible effort

69Article 10

Priority to Safety

to carry out their tasks. Violation of the said act is subject to punishment. In addition to
the basic law-abiding system for government employees, NISA establishes thefollowing code of conduct for raising the staff’s morale for ensuring safety based on
the recognition that ensuring safety of nuclear installations is their primary task:Execute one’s tasks with a sense of tension based on the strong sense of
missionComprehend real situation of a workplace as an expert of safety andsecurity administration, and act under scientific and rational judgment
Ensure transparency in execution of tasks, promote information disclosure,and achieve accountability in order to gain trust of the nation.
Make neutral and fair judgment as the safety regulation authority

NISA also provides for instructions for inspectors who work at the sites ofnuclear installations so as to reinforce consciousness for priority to safety bykeeping every inspector informed of the above code of conduct and the indicesrelated to indication of safety culture degradation of cited from INSAG-14.

70

Financial and Human Resources

Article 11
1.

Article 11

Financial and Human Resources

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial
resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear facility throughout its life.

2.

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers ofqualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all
safety-related activities in or for each nuclear facility, throughout its life.

Overview of Article 11
The regulatory authority confirms the financial resources of the licensee for ensuringsafety, or for conducting necessary improvement in establishing and operating a nuclear
installation in the process of safety examination for the permission of reactor installment
license. The licensee is required to reserve internal resource for decommissioning sothat smooth transition to decommissioning stage can be made when operation of a
nuclear installation is terminated. Funding for reprocessing of spent fuel generated froma nuclear installation and disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated from
reprocessing is also required. Thus, financial measures are taken so that no trouble
shall occur in any phase of utilizing nuclear energy.
The licensee is also required to ensure human resources with necessary knowledge
and skills for operation of a nuclear installation. A chief engineer of reactors must also
be designated as an individual who is responsible for operational safety administration.
While educational institutes play an important role in human resource development,
additional efforts are also being made including recent establishment of professional
graduate schools specialized in nuclear energy.

71Article 11

Financial and Human Resources

Article 11 (1)Financial resources

One of the criteria for the permission stipulated in the Reactor Regulation Act requiresthat the applicant of reactor installment license shall have necessary financial basis forreactor installment. When applying for the reactor installment license, the applicant
must prove that it has sufficient financial basis by attachment of application document
and other sources to the application document so as to prove its financial basis. In turn,the regulatory authority examines if the applicant has necessary financial basis forreactor installment in the safety examination process for permission of reactor
installment license.
Concerning the provision of financial resources required for decommissioning of a
nuclear installation, and management of spent fuel and radioactive wastes, appropriate
mechanism is respectively prepared.
In order to provide for decommissioning, electric companies deposit funds covering
expenses for dismantling and removal of power reactors and expenses for the treatment
and disposal of the waste generated from decommissioning, based on the Ministerial
Ordinance concerning Reserve Fund for Dismantling Nuclear Power Facilities,
established by the Minister of METI, in pursuant to the provisions of the Electricity
Business Act. It is stipulated that electric companies must obtain approval of the
Minister of METI by the end of every fiscal year, for the estimated total cost required fordismantling of each nuclear power generation facility. The balance of the reserved fundas of the end of March 2010 was approximately 1trillion 2 hundred billion yen.
Concerning the spent fuel management, electric companies reserve the fund in theadministrative agency designated by the Minister of METI, at the time of generating
power, based on the “Act for Deposit and Management of the Reserve Funds for
Reprocessing of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Generation”, which came into effect in
May 2005. It is provided that the amount of reserve fund for spent fuel reprocessing andso forth shall be the amount which is calculated by the Minister of METI and notified foreach licensee, in accordance with the criteria defined by the Ministerial Ordinance of
METI, based on the situation of spent fuel generation accompanied with operation ofcommercial power reactors, capacity of reprocessing and availability of a reprocessing
facility, and expenses required for reprocessing and various other items. It is also
provided that the Minister of METI can notify the amendment of the above-mentioned
amount of money in case significant change of situation can be confirmed which include
significant change of the amount of spent fuel generation. The fund reserved for spent
fuel reprocessing amounted to approximately 2 trillion 1 hundred billion yen as of theend of March 2010.
With regard to high-level radioactive waste and long-lived low-heat generation
radioactive waste (TRU waste), generated in the process of reprocessing, the SpecificRadioactive Waste Final Disposal Act stipulates that the amount of fund shall be theamount of money required for final disposal work per unit quantity of high level
radioactive waste, etc., multiplied by the amount of high level radioactive waste and thatthe necessary amount of money required for final disposal work per unit quantity shallbe defined by the Ministerial Ordinance of METI based on the total expenses required
for final disposal work and the total amount of high level radioactive waste subject to72

Financial and Human Resources

Article 11

final disposal. A system has been developed for the Minister of METI to appropriately
evaluate the amount of the reserve fund. The reserve fund for final disposal of high-level
radioactive waste and so forth generated during reprocessing of spent fuel has been
deposited in the administrative agency designated by the Minister of METI, andamounted to approximated 750 billion yen as of the end of March 2010.
The reserve fund for decommissioning shall be deposited by each electric company as
its internal reserve because the fund is allocated for dismantling and removal of nuclear
installations owned by electric companies. On the other hand, the services related tospent fuel management and final disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated
from reprocessing are provided by the licensees of reprocessing activities and spent
fuel management activity, which are different juridical persons from electric companies.
Therefore, the reserve fund shall be deposited not in the internal reserve of electriccompanies, but in the administrative agency. There is a mechanism which prohibits
reversal of the internal reserve and deposited reserve by legislation, and so the fundcannot be used except for its original purpose. Moreover, the Minister of METI canconduct on-site inspection for electric companies and the administrative agency by law,and a system is provided to evaluate appropriateness of the amount of money and thesituation of the reserve fund.
Thus in Japan, when a nuclear installation is installed, it is confirmed that sufficientfinancial basis are available for the licensee to operate the nuclear installation safely
and appropriately throughout its operating life, and the system for depositing the fundfor decommissioning and for spent fuel and radioactive waste management duringservice life of the installation is legislated. Therefore, the provision of financial resources
required by this article is satisfied.

Article 11 (2)1Human resources

Regulatory requirements for human resources for operation of nuclear installation
The competent minister confirms that the licensee has sufficient technicalcompetence to install and appropriately operate a nuclear installation when permitting
to install a nuclear installation. The minister also consults the NSC for a license
applicant’s technical competence when giving permission to installing a nuclear
installation.
The NSC established the Regulatory Guide for Examini9ng Technical Competence ofLicense Holder of Nuclear Power in May 2004, and based on which it investigatesand examines the applicant's technical competence for the following items andreports to the Minister of METI:The examination items of technical competence;

Organization for design and construction,
Ensuring engineers for design and construction,
Experience related to design and construction,
Quality assurance activities concerning design and construction,73

Article 11








Financial and Human Resources

Organization for operation and maintenance,
Ensuring engineers for operation and maintenanceExperience related to operation and maintenance,
Quality assurance activities concerning operation and maintenance,
Education and training for engineers,
Designation and staffing of qualified personnel etc.

The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that the licensee must take the operationalsafety measures and must establish the Operational Safety Program and its
approval by the Minister of METI before commissioning of a nuclear installation.
The operational safety measures include that the licensee must assign those whohave knowledge required for reactor operation to perform operation, that the licensee
must not operate a reactor unless there is sufficient number of personnel required for
operation, and that the person responsible for operation must be those who havenecessary knowledge, skills and experience required for operation of reactors, andwho satisfy requirements provided by the Minister of METI, and also that the methods
and other means to judge if the persons satisfy the concerned requirements must be
confirmed by the Minister of METI. These are the regulatory requirements forappropriate personnel assignment and qualification of on-site technicians. In addition,
it is stipulated in the ministerial ordinance that the licensees must specify
implementation policy and contents of education on operational safety of personnel incharge of operation and administration of a nuclear installation in the Operational
Safety Program. NISA examines the licensees’ situation of compliance to the
Operational Safety Program four times a year, and confirms that the appropriate
education and training is performed. Moreover, the licensees are obliged by law to
appoint a Chief Engineer of Reactor to supervise safety operation of nuclear
installation, a Chief Electrical Engineer and a Chief Engineer of Boiler and Turbine tosupervise safety during construction, operation and maintenance of electric facilities.
The licensees are responsible for ensuring safety of the decommissioning of nuclear
installations and for securing sufficient personnel to safely carry out
decommissioning.

2

Personnel for operation of nuclear installations(1)

Training of personnel involved in operation and maintenance of nuclear
installations
The licensees continuously prepare the training plan for operation staffs, and carryout education and training programs so as to ensure sufficient number of personnel,
and maintain and improve their skills and capabilities systematically for a long-term.
With regard to operation of nuclear installations, the licensees establish their own
standards for the skills required for personnel such as operation staff andmaintenance staff. There is no established method to analyze necessity of training
because the training for these personnel is performed in accordance with thetraining plan. On the other hand, when a manager such as a shift supervisor
considers that training is necessary for particular personnel judging from the74

Financial and Human Resources

Article 11

condition of daily work performance, or when personnel do not receive training
required for performing intended work, it is flexibly decided if training is necessary
or not.
Trainings of operators are carried out in the operator training facilities owned by thelicensees when the operation staffs are not involved in shift work. Each licensee
owns an operator training facility on site or in the vicinity of power station, and manyof them are equipped with a full-scale simulator. A full-scale simulator is an
essential training facility for operation staffs as it reproduces an actual control room
where the operating staff operates thereactor. The instructors who govern thesimulator training are chosen from those
personnel who have a lot of experience inoperation of nuclear installations, andcontributetoperforming
effective
Simulator for ABWR operation
simulator training.
(Source: BTC)
In addition, BWR and PWR operation
staffs are periodically dispatched to the BWR Operator Training Center (BTC) or
the Nuclear Power Training Center (NTC) respectively for intensive re-training.
These training centers offer curriculum according to the capabilities of participating
operation staffs.
For maintenance staffs, each licensee has
established maintenance training centers foreducation and training of maintenance personnel.
Various mock-up devices, inspection devices andtraining devices, etc., simulating plant facilities fortraining purposes, have been used to maintainand improve the knowledge, skills and work
management capabilities of personnel involved in
Maintenance work of control rod
maintenance and inspection. Maintenance skill
drive mechanism at the reactor
lower head (Source: Chubu
training is also provided through maintenanceElectric Power Co.,Inc.)
work using real plant facilities, which, effectively
combined with training at the dedicated training centers, helps promote the skills to
be maintained, improved and handed down.
(2) Feedback of safety assessment to training
Licensees have performed various safety analyses in the process of operating
nuclear installations, and accumulated operating experiences. The knowledge
acquired through these analyses and experiences is utilized for safe operation of
nuclear installations. The unique operational feedback training in Japan is thetraining of how to respond to major earthquakes. Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki
Earthquake in July 2007 affected the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station.
Operating condition was reproduced based on the data of reactor behavior during
the earthquake, and utilized in the simulator training of operation staffs at the BWR
Operator Training Center.
Thus, the licensees have established a mechanism to accumulate knowledge by75

Article 11

Financial and Human Resources

taking various opportunities and to utilize it in training.
(3) Personnel required for operation of nuclear installations
Ministerial Ordinance for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Power
Reactors requires the licensees to ensure personnel necessary for safety operationof nuclear installations.
The licensees are responsible for appointing Chief Engineer of Reactors per
nuclear power station and for authorizing them to be in charge of operational safetyadministration. A Chief Engineer of Reactors is a national qualification, and thelicensees select from the candidates who have passed the written and oral
examination conducted by the National Government.
Concerning the Chief Operation Staff, who is assigned at every nuclear installation,
conditions related to experience, knowledge and position are defined in the rules ofstandards, etc. of the Chief Operation Staff (Notice of METI). The licensees mustobtain confirmation of the Minister of METI regarding the method of judging
conformity to these standards, system of implementing judgment, term of validity
for conformity judgment, and procedure of renewal.
The quantity and quality of personnel required as operating staffs of nuclear
installations, other than those who should act as administrator in operating nuclear
installations, varies depending on the design of each nuclear installation and theskills needed for each operational action. Therefore, evaluation means cannot be
decided in a single uniform way. Each licensee defines appropriate evaluationmeans taking into consideration characteristics of its installation. Every licensee
has introduced some form of skill accreditation system which involves operation
test, and thus tried to ensure sufficient skills of operation staff.
Table 11-1

Examples of operation simulator training course (The Kansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.)

Training
CourseMain equipment
operator course
Initial training
courseIntended
personnel
Turbineoperators
Reactor control
operators,
Turbineoperators

PurposeSkill improvement of turbine operators

3 days x once/year

Development of reactor control
operators

40 days x once

Control room
operators
courseReactor control
operators

Skill improvement of reactor control
operators

Supervisors
courseShift supervisors
Shift foreman,Chief shift crew

Reinforcement of ability to judge andimprovement of leadership of supervisors

Team work
training course

Operation team

Reiteration drill
courseOperation team

Number of days

Reinforcement of responsive action andcooperation, and maintenance andimprovement of teamwork of an operationteam as a whole
Follow up of an operation team and each
operator.

76

5 days x twice/year

2 days x 3 times/year
1 day x once/yearFinancial and Human Resources

Article 11(4) Administration of contract workers
Contract workers are essential in complementing and supporting the licensee’s
personnel in operation and maintenance of a nuclear installation, and it is extremely
important for the licensee to administrate the quality of the contract workers in orderto ensure safety. The licensee defines how to assure quality of the services it
procures in its work management system, and requires the contractors to satisfy
quality standards in the terms of contract. In other words, the policies and principles
related to administration of contract workers are clarified in each contract.
For example, if the work requires national qualification, accreditation of contract
workers can be confirmed by possession of the concerned national qualification.
The individuals who work in a nuclear installation are, regardless of being acontract worker or not, required to receive equivalent education on operationalsafety as the licensee’s personnel, and to be familiar to the rules for operationalsafety of the nuclear installation. The licensees establish the curriculum for
operational safety education and number of hours of educational courses on thebasis of the Operational Safety Program, and one cannot be engaged in the work in
the nuclear installation without receiving the education on operational safety.
3

Human resource development in nuclear fields(1) Efforts by the National Government
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology established atechnical discipline for nuclear and radiation technology as Professional Engineers
in 2004 fiscal year, for the purpose of upgrading the skills of engineers in nuclear
technology fields, utilizing their ability in nuclear safety regulation fields, and further
strengthening safety management system in each entity. The Professional
Engineers System is to accredit competent engineers with technical expertise
related to scientific technology, and high level of practical ability and abundant
experience in profession, and also with high level of engineers’ ethics. Since theProfessional Engineers of Nuclear and Radiation Technology was established,qualifying test is conducted every year, and as a result, the number of nuclear
engineers who obtain this qualification is increasing, and thus the new system has
contributed to development of human resources in nuclear fields.
(2) Efforts by the nuclear industry
Facing a crucial period that the first generation experts who had made experiencesin commissioning test, operation, maintenance, and trouble shooting in abnormal
events are in the age of retirement, the nuclear industry recognizes the vital task ofensuring experienced human resources and succession of expertise andtechnology which is challenged by the gap between generations. In order toaccomplish the task, the nuclear industry has been carrying out the following
activities:Training of on-site technicians and succession of skills
There are examples that the training for qualification, training of practical skills for77Article 11

Financial and Human Resources

maintenance, OJT training at the power station, etc. are implemented beyond theframe of an individual company.
 Study on qualification and certification system by private sectors
For the purposes of improved skills of maintenance workers, appropriate staffing,and ensuring future human-resources, the common standards and qualification /certification procedures for objective evaluation of skill level are being studied.
 Acquisition of advanced expertise
Licensees’ engineers acquire the education in the graduate schools related to the
nuclear energy, thus engineering specialists with advanced expertise are
fostered.
(3)
Efforts by Universities and Research Institutes
In Japan, importance of nuclear education is re-acknowledged in terms of ensuring
human resources in the nuclear field. Thus the faculty, graduate school andprofessional school have been established for the purpose of training forengineering specialists with practical capabilities and engineering theories in the
nuclear field. Moreover, since 2007, MEXT and METI have been carrying out thenuclear human resource development program, focusing on the development ofbasic nuclear education and study in the universities, graduate schools, andspecialized vocational schools, assistance of educational activities including
enhancement of internship and development of core curriculum of nuclear studies,and support of research activities in the field of basic and fundamental technologies
which underpin the nuclear power in terms of steering succession of researches. In
addition, some research organizations and graduate schools incorporate acooperation system of graduate schools. Through the system, thefacilities/equipment and human resources in the research organizations are shared,
the contents of education/study at the graduate school become more advanced,
the communication between researchers is promoted, and the education at
graduate schools is activated. The Atomic Energy Society of Japan has founded asenior network (SNW) whose members are retired employees from nuclear relatedorganizations. SNW promotes dialogues with college students and other activities
to make succession of nuclear technologies to young engineers and students who
are responsible for next generation and to spread correct understanding of thenuclear energy.

78

Human Factors

Article 12

Article 12

Human Factors

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and limitations ofhuman performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

Overview of Article 12
In Japan, consideration for human factors is incorporated in design and operation
management of nuclear installations as a factor to ensure safety. NISA establishes
regulatory requirements and confirms that they are met through reviews andinspections.
Licensees of reactor operation address not only the hardware side of a nuclear
installation such as use of fail-safe concepts or interlock systems, but also make efforts
to improve man-machine interface by means of such as introduction of instruments
which allow easier visual confirmation. In addition, licensees of reactor operation are
improving operation procedures, and provide training for their staff.

79

Article 121

Human Factors

Regulatory requirements and policies related to human factors
The Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Design of Light Water Nuclear Power
Reactor Facilities requires that “the nuclear installation be designed to reflectappropriate preventive considerations against operators’ misoperation”, and its
explanatory document requires that “In designing, attention should be given inconsideration of ergonomics-oriented factors, to panel layout, operability of operating
devices, valves, etc., instrument and alarm indication for accurate and quick
recognition of reactor status and prevention of errors during maintenance and check,”and that in designing, measures should be taken so that necessary safety function is
maintained without operator’s actions for a certain length after the occurrence of anabnormal condition.
The guide also requires that control room be designed that the situation of operations
and principal parameters of reactor and principal related facilities can be monitored
and that prompt manual control can be performed, whenever required, to maintainsafety.”In conformity to these requirements, the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety
Assessment of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities requires that safety
analysis be performed in consideration of the following: in case that operator actions
are expected at the occurrence of abnormal situations, sufficient time and adequate
information be available so that operator may be able to properly judge the situations
and take necessary acts with a high degree of confidence.
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) uses “Manual for evaluation ofhuman factors in the main control room”, prepared by the Japan Nuclear Energy
Safety Organization (JNES) under NISA’s direction, to confirm that theserequirements are reflected in the design.
At the Approval of Construction Plan, the Technical Standards as a performance code
under the Electricity Business Act request that the main equipment necessary for safe
operation of nuclear installation can be monitored at a glance and necessary actions
can be taken in the control room without any operational errors.
NISA, with the technical assistance of JNES, clarified the requirements for preventionof operational errors, so that the above mentioned performance code is reflected on
the specification code developed as an academic society and association standard.
These requirements are shown on Table 12-1.

80Human Factors

Article 12

Table 12-1 Requirements to prevent misoperation in a main control room
Item
Environmental
conditions of a main
control room

Arrangement andworking space of amain control room

Arrangement ofdevices on control
panels

Display system(including alarmsystem)Control function

Requirements
Main control room should be in comfortable environmental conditions taking into
consideration temperature, lighting and noise so that operators can operate
appropriately.
(1) Consider that the following to avoid too much burden to operator in any of plant
operating conditions.
Functional allocation between human and machines shall be defined.

Items that should be intensively supervised and operated in a main control
room shall be defined, and clearly discriminated against the functionallyallocated among local panels including the vertical back panels installedat the main control room.
The equipment arrangement shall be designed so that effective information
sharing among operators to be expedited.
(2) When manual operation is required in an abnormal condition, for plant safety, theoperations shall be defined in due consideration of operators’ monitoring
capability and operability.
Alarm, display and control devices which are installed on control panels shall bearranged with systematic display so that operator's operational or cognitive error
can be prevented.
(1) Information function

Information that displays status of plant system or equipment which isnecessary for ensuring safety shall be all included and shall be provided tooperators in such a way to be easily understood at suitable position.
It should be considered that communication defect or judgment error
should not arise concerning communication and cooperation with on site
emergency station.
Safety significant information should be displayed in the position where all
operators of control room may recognize such information at the sametime.
(2) Alarm function
When an anomaly arises in the plant equipment or process, it shall be noticeable
to operators so that suitable action can be made by operators.
(3) Operation support
When an operation support system is provided, even when the system function is
lost, plant facilities should be operable safely.
(1) The control equipment shall be easy to operate so that operational error becomesas fewl as possible.
(2) Systems or equipment controlled from a control room should be designed so thatthe unsafe operation which may impair plant safety is impossible.
(3) During an automatic operation, operators should be able to check the progress of
the automatic operation.

With regard to operational safety activities by licensee of reactor operation aiming forthe remedy to the factors causing human errors, NISA, in cooperation with JNES,
established a guideline for the regulatory body to evaluate the licensee’s
self-controlled efforts for correcting non-conformance etc., related to direct cause ofhuman errors in February 2008. This guideline presents four viewpoints in terms ofevaluation; these are, the viewpoint to confirm the mechanism of the self-controlled
efforts, the viewpoint to confirm specific contents of efforts related to individual events,
the viewpoint to confirm specific contents of efforts for collection and analysis of data81

Article 12

Human Factors

and for the utilization of them as appropriate, and the viewpoint to further promote thelicensees’ self-controlled efforts. This guideline is used when the licensees’ efforts areevaluated during operational safety inspection.
Moreover, NISA instructs the licensees of reactor operation to feedback thecountermeasures against human errors to other nuclear installations when itiis
necessary. JNES analyzes the human error events in detail and identifies items to bereflected in the safety regulations, compiles them in the collection of lessons learned,
and stores them in the database.
2

Considerations in design
Licensees of reactor operation take following considerations on human factors indesigning a central control room.
The central control room is designed so that operating conditions of the reactor andother important equipment and principal plant parameters can be monitored at a
glance and necessary actions can be taken in the room during normal operation andabnormal transients, and in an accident of a nuclear installation. For example,
advanced BWRs (ABWRs) and the latest PWRs are designed by re-examining the
instrument layout and applying computer technologies, and also by adopting
advanced central control panels, which are improved in visual confirmation capability
with higher operability and parameter monitoring. Moreover, a large display screen,
which is easy to overlook power station status at a glance and to share information
among operators, offers increased opportunity for preventing errors and taking
corrective actions.
When remodeling control panels in the central control rooms of existing nuclear
installations, extensive use of CRTs has improved monitoring capability andoperability of control panels. For digitalized main control panels, JEAG 4615-2005,“Guide for Development and Design of Computerized Human Machine Interface in
the Main Control Rooms of Nuclear Power Plants” was established by the Japan
Electric Association as one of the academic society and association design standards.
This guide refers to related international standards and overseas requirements, andas well it incorporates the Japanese regulatory requirements and the results of design
development etc. that reflected latest technical progresses and the operational
experiences This guide also defines requirements on functions and designs of thecentral control room (information display, control and operation equipment, alarm
devices etc.) and standardized development and design processes of the humanmachine interface.

3

Considerations in operation management
Licensees of reactor operation perform appropriate operation management during
normal operation and in accidents in order to operate nuclear installations in a safe
and stable manner for a long time.

82

Human Factors

Article 12(1) Operational managementa Organizations for operation
The manager of power generation division, who is responsible for the operationof a nuclear installation, controls operating shifts in charge of the operation andtheir supporting groups.
The shift supervisors have authority and responsibilities to take measuresrequired for ensuring safety. They shall be selected from those who conform tothe criterion specified by the Minister of METI, and have suitable experiences
and suitable competence.
b Shift of operators
Operators work in shifts as nuclear installations are operating continuously for 24hours/day. Work plan is formulated in such a manner that a part of the operationteam who works on shift can leave the operation shift for a certain period of timein order to attend education and training courses. In this way, operators receive
regular training, and thus maintain and improve their capability.
When turning over shift duties, the shift supervisor is required to make sure topass on the supervisor logbook, keys, and precise description of operations tothe succeeding supervisor. Each operating staff also transfers information ofplant operation to the succeeding operating staff.
cOperation manuals
The licensees of reactor operation prepare operation manuals which cover
operational actions not only under normal operation, but also at the time of
accidents and failures so as to maintain safety of power stations. These
operation manuals reflect experiences of accidents and failures, and modificationof equipment as appropriate, so that operators can reliably perform their tasks.
Symptom-based manuals for multiple failures are prepared in addition toscenario-based manuals for design basis events. The symptom-based manuals
enable prevention of accident progression without identifying the type of theevent.
The licensees of reactor operation also prepared the manuals addressing severe
accidents exceeding design basis events, and accident management guidelines
for the staff group supporting shift operators in case of accidents and failures.
The effectiveness of these manuals is verified by comparison with the results of
the analysis of plant transient by the analysis code used in the application forlicensing for installment, and also probabilistic safety assessment results.
Moreover, operational action training on the basis of symptom-based proceduresis conducted using simulators at the operator training facility aiming that
operators become proficient in using manuals. Preparation of the manuals for
emergency situation is expected to be effective for mitigation of operators’ stressin an emergency.

83Article 12

Human Factors(2) Maintenance management system
The maintenance department of a licensee of reactor operation controls the work ofperiodic check, modification works, etc. of a nuclear installation carried out by theplant manufacturer and many affiliated companies. A majority of human errors in
the past occurred in the works associated with maintenance and repair works,
which means that the maintenance management by the licensee is very important.
When conducting modification works, scope of work, scope of responsibility andauthority is clarified so as to assure that the work is performed safely and reliably.
Also maintenance of important equipment is carried out with a prior mock-up test,
as appropriate.
Chief Engineer of Reactors, Chief Electrical Engineer, and Chief Engineer of Boiler
and Turbine perform verification and assessment of regulatory inspections byattending the regulatory inspections or confirming inspection records. They also
perform verification and assessment, as appropriate, of the plans and results ofregular checks or modification works to prevent human errors in maintenance andmanagement works.
4

Evaluation and measures for human factors
Licensees of reactor operation are responsible for reporting to NISA those accidents
and failures in nuclear installations which are designated to be reportable by law.
Among these reported incidents, if the incidents are identified as caused by humanerror, licensees are requested to consider the remedy to those events including
improvement of facilities. In addition, licensees are required to analyze the directcause of human errors and correct non-conformance in pursuant to the guidelines
established by NISA.
Licensees of reactor operation confirms that degradation of organizational climate
has not occurred by introducing management review by which the president
periodically examines appropriate execution of management system, taking into
consideration of the significant influence due to organizational and management
issues to safety operation of nuclear installations.
At the jobsites of nuclear installations, various information such as methods of workand risks associated with work is shared among workers during tool box meetings
held before the work starts. These efforts result in promotion of work safety. Also,
licensees of reactor operation analyze various failures including human errors at thejobsites, and organically reflect the experiences at the jobsites by conducting training
for anticipating near misses with the intention of periodically sharing the recurrence
prevention measures among workers.
These activities, recognized as effective in ensuring work safety, are conducted atevery licensee’s nuclear installation, with the differences of frequency according toeach licensee’s situation.

84

Quality Assurance

Article 13

Article 13

Quality Assurance

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance program areestablished and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all
activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the operating life of a nuclear installation.

Overview of Article 13
The concept of quality assurance as part of regulatory requirements for ensuring safetyof a nuclear installation was first introduced in October 2003, and the Nuclear Safety
and Industrial Agency (NISA) requires the licensees of reactor operation to introduce a
quality management system in the operational safety activities.
NISA endorsed the Code of Quality Assurance (JEAC 4111) which had been developed
based on the ISO9001 and GS-R-3 as standards to be applied to the quality
management system for a nuclear installation. Accordingly, licensees establish thequality management system in accordance with JEAC 4111.
During this reporting period, the Ordinance for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors
concerning the Installation, Operation, etc. which defines the regulatory requirements ofquality assurance was revised, and the JEAC 4111-2003 was revised to the JEAC
4111-2009 so as to correspond to the GS-R-3 which was revised in 2006, and toincorporate ISO9001: 2008.

85

Article 13

1

Quality Assurance

Regulatory requirements and policies
In February 2002, the Study Group on the Way of Inspection was established under
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for
Natural Resources and Energy to discuss inspection of a nuclear installation. In theprocess of discussion, significance of quality assurance for nuclear safety gained
renewed recognition. The Study Group suggested that the quality assurance concept
based on ISO9001:2000 should be introduced to the safety regulations, considering
the necessity of conforming to international quality assurance standards.
NISA revised the ministerial ordinance based on the Reactor Regulation Act in
October 2003, and stipulated the quality assurance requirements for nuclear safety inconcrete terms.
On the basis of these developments, the Quality Assurance Subcommittee of the
Nuclear Standards Committee of the Japan Electric Association started to prepare theCode of Quality Assurance for safety operation of nuclear power plant (JEAC4111)
which realized the quality assurance requirements, in March 2003. JEAC 4111-2003
has the following characteristics:







Modification was made considering applicability in nuclear power plants
based on ISO 9001:2000 as its basis.
Not only conforming to ISO 9001:2000 as its basis, ensure consistency withthe existing guideline by incorporating the contents of the IAEA Safety
Standard 50-C/SG-Q (1996) relating to quality assurance, on which the
Guide of Quality Assurance had been based.
Definitions were added to the unique terms which are different from thoseused in ISO9000:2000, for example, clarification of statutory requirement to
the top management, stipulated in ISO9001:2000.
Interpretation was rearranged so that concepts such as “products”,“customers” and “quality” stated in ISO 9001:2000 can be applied to nuclear
power plants.

Subsequently, JEAC4111-2009 was issued after the quinquennial periodic review.
The key changes are as follows:

Requirements and notes were added in accordance with revision of the
Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors concerning theInstallation, Operation, etc.
Statement for safety culture was added in order to address IAEA GS-R-3
which was revised in 2006.
Contents of ISO 9001:2008 were incorporated.

In June 2009 NISA endorsed the JEAC4111-2009 “Code of Quality Assurance for86Quality Assurance

Article 13

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants” are technically adequate as standards to satisfy theregulatory requirements.
The key points of the quality assurance activities are:1) To involve top management;
2) To be based on international standards on quality assurance;3) To improve the activities continuously by Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle forplanning, performing, and evaluating the operational safety activities; and4) To implement the full scope by the internal independent audit organization.
As legislative measures, the ministerial orders based on the Reactor Regulation Act(Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors concerning theInstallation, Operation, etc.) require that the quality assurance program shall beestablished and stated in the operational safety program as a quality assurance
system for necessary measures of operational safety. The items to be defined in thequality assurance program are as follows:
1) Organization for Implementation of quality assurance;
2) Planning of operational safety activities;3) Implementation of operational safety activities;4) Evaluation of operational safety activities; and
5) Improvement of operational safety activities.
NISA requires the applicant for license to submit appropriate quality assurance
program at each stage of safety regulation.
When licensing for the installation of a nuclear installation, NISA requires theapplicant to attach the “Basic Policy for Quality Assurance” to the license application
so as to review the basic policy of the licensee’s quality assurance activities at thestage of installation.
In application of the construction plan of a nuclear installation, NISA requires thelicensee to attach the “Description concerning to the Quality Assurance” which thelicensee should implement at each stage of design, manufacturing, installation andfunctional test. For the confirmation of quality assurance of fuel assemblies, NISA
requests the licensee of fabricating activity to attach the "Description concerning to
the Quality Assurance" to the application of the approval of fuel assembly design.
In case of import of fuel assemblies, NISA requires the licensees to submit“Description concerning to the Quality Assurance” etc. when they apply for inspection.
When fuel assemblies contain uranium-plutonium mixed oxide fuel, NISA requires thelicensees to submit the “Description concerning to the Quality Assurance Program”
approximately 1 month before starting manufacturing fuel assemblies and the“Description concerning to the Quality Assurance” approximately 1 month before
starting marine transport of fuel assemblies.

87Article 13

Quality Assurance

NISA commissions JNES to review as a periodic safety management review that theperiodic Licensee’s inspection is appropriately conducted during the periodic outage
inspection of a nuclear installation in order to confirm the in-service quality assurance
activities. In addition, NISA performs inspection on licensee's quality assurance
through the Operational Safety Inspection based on the Reactor Regulation Act andconfirms the licensee's implementation situation of the quality management system ina timely manner. As a quality assurance activity for the Operational Safety Inspection
itself, nationwide inspectors from Nuclear Safety Inspectors Offices meet together at“Nuclear Inspectors Meeting”, and participate in the effort aiming to level
nuclear-safety-inspection methods and information sharing by Nuclear Safety
Inspectors, by performing " model Operational Safety Inspection".
2

Implementing status for quality management of the integrated management
systemLicensees of reactor operation establish the quality assurance program for theoperational safety activities based on JEAC4111-2009, and carry out the quality
assurance activities. JEAC 4111-2009 is a revision of JEAC 4111-2003 which was
prepared with reference to 50-C-Q, and thus conforms to GS-R-3. In other words, werecognize that licensee in Japan appropriately implement the quality management
system of the safety standard GS-R-3, by establishing and operating the quality
management system based on JEAC 4111-2009.
When issuing JEAC 4111-2009, JEAC 4111-2003 was compared to GS-R-3 and ISO
9001: 2008. The results of which are shown in Annex.

3Management system
JEAC 4111-2009 requires the licensees to establish, document, implement andmaintain the quality management system, and to continue to improve its effectiveness,
as a general requirement. This rule also specifies the concrete requirements when
actually developing the quality management system. These requirements areclassified into “Responsibility of Top Management,” “Management and Control of
Resources,” “Planning and Implementation of Work” and “Evaluation and
Improvement.”
As a requirement for human resources, the rule stipulates that personnel who are
involved in the work which can affect achievement of nuclear safety must havecompetence in terms of education, training and experience. The licensees of reactor
operation are required to clarify the necessary competence, and if needed, to takemeasures such as providing education and training so that personnel can attainintended competence.
As a requirement for procurement control, the licensees of reactor operation are
required to procure by clarifying the requirements for approval of products,

88Quality Assurance

Article 13

procedures, processes and equipment, the requirements for confirmation of eligibilityof personnel, and the requirements for the quality management system. The
licensees are also required to inspect whether the procured products satisfy the
pre-established requirements for procurement, and to verify at the vendors’ site, as
appropriate.
Licensees choose the vendors of products and services based on the predetermined
standards as procurement control in the quality assurance program, established inpursuant to JEAC4111-2009. When procuring, they present specifications to thevendors and confirm that products and services satisfy the requirements, for example,
by inspecting items delivered in case of products, and by results of tests andperformance in case of services.
Specifications define not only the requirements for products and services, but also therequirements for reporting non-conformance and actions.
4

Audit
The quality assurance activities are audited in accordance with the quality
management system in relation to operation of a nuclear installation. Generally, thedepartment of the headquarters, which is responsible for audit and independent fromthe departments directly involved in operation of a nuclear installation, implements
audit so as to ensure independency. Frequently, the department responsible for audit
directly belongs to the president in terms of organization structure so that information
for improvement obtained through audit reaches the president in a timely manner.
In procurement control, generally, the licensees of reactor operation directly audit thevendors for confirming that the product and service vendors satisfy the requirements
defined in the specifications.
Concerning products, specifications which clearly state the requirements arepresented to the vendors when order is placed, and it is confirmed at the time ofdelivery that the products satisfy the requirements. When confirmation is necessaryduring the manufacturing process of products, the licensees sometimes visit thevendor and directly confirm the manufacturing process.
Concerning services, specifications which clearly state the requirements arepresented to the contractors who receive the order so as to ensure that individuals
with necessary skills engage in the concerned service. The requirements include theconfirmation of presence of technicians who can perform the work requiring special
skills such as welding.
As a party who made the order, the licensee of reactor operation requests thecontractor who received the order to submit the quality assurance program andconfirms that the contractor satisfies the requirements made by the licensee. This
serves as a mechanism to prevent issuing an order to the contractor whose quality
assurance system is inappropriate.
Thus, the licensees of reactor operation in Japan firmly recognize that the quality89Article 13

Quality Assurance

assurance program of the vendors, to whom they order products or services, is an
essential element for maintaining the licensees’ own quality assurance system, and amechanism has been built in which the licensees directly audit vendors or contractors
who received the order, as appropriate.

90Assessment and Verification of Safety

Article 14

Article 14

Assessment and Verification of Safety

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i)Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction andcommissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shall be well
documented, subsequently updated in the light of operating experience and significant new safety
information, and reviewed under the authority of the regulatory body;(ii)

Verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that the physicalstate and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance with its design,
applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits and conditions.

Overview of Article 14
Safety assessment of a nuclear installation is divided into assessment of installment ofa reactor and assessment of operation of a reactor. When installing a reactor, thelicensee of reactor operation implements safety assessment. Then this assessment isreviewed by the regulatory body in the process of examining application for reactor
installment license.
Subsequent to the start of operation, safety of a nuclear installation is confirmed by theregulatory body through inspections such as periodic inspection and operational safety
inspection, and by the licensee itself through patrol and other activities.
As an assessment related to safety, the Japanese government has been committed totackling aging degradation of a nuclear installation. NISA required the licensees ofreactor operation to implement aging technical evaluation, and to develop a long-term
maintenance program in 2003, and established the Guidelines in Implementing
Measures for Aging Management at Commercial Nuclear Installations and the Standard
Review Procedures on Measures for Aging Management on Commercial Power
Reactors in 2005.
During this reporting period, NISA decided that the long-term maintenance management
policy based on the results of aging technical evaluation shall be included in theoperational safety program in response to the revision of inspection system, and NISA
introduced a mechanism to reflect aging technical evaluation in the maintenanceactivities of nuclear installations.

91Article 14

Assessment and Verification of Safety

Article 14 (1)1Assessment of safety

Regulatory requirements for safety assessment
Safety assessment before construction of a nuclear installation is conducted in
response to the application for reactor installment license. The Reactor Regulation
Act specifies that a reactor license applicant must submit to the competent minister
the results of evaluation, which prove that the basic design or the basic design policyof a nuclear installation is sufficient for ensuring safety, along with the installment
license application document. Then, the competent minister examines them fromfollowing five view points. Those are, that the reactor will not be used other than forpeaceful purposes, that licensing will not disrupt systematic nuclear development andutilization, that the applicant has sufficient financial basis and technical capability, thatat the same time, it has sufficient technical capability required for appropriately
operating a reactor, and that the location, structures and facilities of a nuclear
installation will not disturb prevention of disaster caused by the matters contaminatedwith nuclear fuel material or by a reactor. The Ministerial Ordinance for the Installation,
Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors specify that the installment license
application document for a commercial power reactor must state the basic design or
the basic design policy of a nuclear installation for which the license is applied, andmust be attached with the explanation evaluating the situation of climate, foundationsoil, hydraulic properties, earthquakes, and social environment of the site where anuclear installation is planned to be installed, and also the safety design of a nuclear
installation, radiation exposure control and radioactive waste disposal, and types,
extent and effects of reactor accidents. The procedure of licensing for reactor
installment is stated in Article 18.
After the license for reactor installment is granted, a construction plan is developed
and pre-service inspection is conducted based on the Electricity Business Act, also
approval of fuel assembly design and fuel assembly inspection is conducted for thosefuel assemblies which are to be loaded in the reactor. The Rules for the Electricity
Business Act require that when applying for permission of the construction plan,detailed design of a nuclear installation must be submitted. Moreover, explanation ofseismic resistance and strength, and explanation of the safety design specific to theequipment, about which application is made, must be attached as safety evaluation
conducted by the licensee of reactor operation based on the detailed design. The
Rules for the Electricity Business Act require that when applying for fuel assembly
design approval, explanation of performance such as thermal, radiation andcorrosion resistance of fuel assemblies, and the strength of fuel assemblies must be
attached. In addition, the licensees must conduct the inspection on welding at thewelded section of the pressure boundary and containment, and must undergo
examination of JNES for the system concerning implementation of the inspection on
welding (safety management review on welding). Moreover, the licensees mustreceive authorization for operational safety program which compiles those matters

92

Assessment and Verification of Safety

Article 14that should be conformed to for the safety of nuclear installation before they start theoperation of reactor facilities. Construction plan, pre-service inspection, approval offuel assembly design, fuel assembly inspection and safety management inspection
on welding are explained in Article 19.
Comprehensive verification of safety of a nuclear installation is carried out throughoperational safety inspection, periodic inspection, and periodic safety management
review as safety evaluation during its lifetime, and also through the periodic
evaluation, periodic operator’s inspection, surveillance tests based on the operationalsafety program, investigation of incidents and failures and measures to prevent
recurrence, and on-site inspection conducted as necessary. These inspections andsurveys are reported in Article 19.

Article 14 (2)1Verification of safety

Arrangements for safety verification
Concerning regulatory requirements for ensuring safety of nuclear installations inJapan, the Electricity Business Act specifies the pre-service inspection and periodic
inspection to be conducted by the Ministry of METI, while the Reactor Regulation Act
specifies the inspection of compliance to the operational safety program to be
conducted by the Ministry of METI, and patrol and maintenance management of
nuclear installations to be conducted by the licensees.
Concerning maintenance management conducted by the licensees of reactor
operation, the Ministerial Ordinance for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial
Power Reactors provides for the policies related to maintenance management of
nuclear installations, its objectives and its implementation plan, and requires thelicensees to implement maintenance management according to the plan. The Rules
also require the licensees of reactor operation to appropriately evaluate the objectives
and plans and reflect them in maintenance management.
The licensees of reactor operation establish various type of check plans so as tooperate nuclear installations safely. Regular self-controlled check, patrols in the site
carried out by the operating shift is among the activities of those check plans. The
frequency and items to be implemented are specified in the detailed provisions suchas the operational safety program or the procedures developed on the basis ofoperational safety program.
As self-controlled check, each equipment of important to safety related systems, suchas emergency core cooling system and emergency diesel generators, is actuatedonce a month and is confirmed its operability. In the operators’ site patrol, walkdown
and check of the designated points of a nuclear installation is performed once in every
operating shift. Operating condition of active components such as pumps, andpresence of leak from sealed sections is checked in detail and recorded. Generally,
the results of patrol are reported by an operation shift to the next shift. However, if

93Article 14

Assessment and Verification of Safetymeasures such as repairs and servicing are judged to be necessary, information issent from the operating shift to the maintenance and repair division for taking timely
measures. If a trouble discovered during patrol is judged to be dealt with by shutting
down the reactor, measures including manual shutdown are taken at the discretion ofa shift supervisor.
As stated above, management system such as patrol with appropriate content andfrequency is established, and timely measures including reactor shut-down are taken.
The operational safety program is a necessary rule for the licensee of reactor
operation to ensure safety of a nuclear installation, and thus it must be suitable for the
nuclear installation. For example, change of operational action due to equipment
modification should be appropriately shared among the design division in charge ofthe concerned modification and the division in charge of the operational safety
program.
It is possible that the operation specified in the operational safety program may not be
efficient in terms of operation management of a nuclear installation. In this case, it
becomes important to share information in the operations division. Information
sharing between divisions or within a division and proper updating of the operationalsafety program are reviewed as a part of appropriate document control in thelicensee’s quality management system.
2

Measures for aging management
Among currently operating nuclear installations in Japan, the oldest installations
started to operate in 1970 and has been operating for 40 years. Not a few reactors
started to operate in the 1970’s, and thus measures for aging management areconsidered to be highly important. The numbers of units of operating nuclear
installations in Japan according to years of operation at the end of March 2010 are
shown in Fig. 14-1.

94

Assessment and Verification of Safety

Article 14

Numberof units

12
10

BWR: 30 units
PWR: 24 units
Total: 54 units

40-year-assessment
40年目評価を実施済
has been implemented,
み及び実施中or is under
implementation

8

Aging technical
高経年化技術評価実施
evaluation has been済み
implemented

64Aging technical
高経年化技術評価未実
施evaluation has not been
implemented

20Years ofoperation

Fig. 14-1 Distribution of number of units according to years of operation
NISA revised the “Ministerial Ordinance for the Installation, Operation, etc. ofCommercial Power Reactors” in October 2003, and provided the periodic assessmentof nuclear installations. These rules require the licensees to conduct aging technicalevaluation and to develop a long-term maintenance program. Moreover, NISA
launched the Coordination Committee on Technical Information in JNES, in order toreinforce the measures for aged plants, and in order to share domestic and overseas
technical information for effective utilization among the industrial world, academic andgovernmental institutions. Furthermore, JNES established an ad-hoc committee thatconsists of NISA, universities, research organizations, electric utilities, nuclear plant
manufacturers, plant engineering companies, etc. under the Atomic Energy Society ofJapan. From July 2004 through March 2005, the ad-hoc committee had prepared aroad map on measures for aging management and long life-time safe operation oflight water reactors.
The Aging Countermeasure Examination Committee under the Nuclear andIndustrial Safety Subcommittee prepared and issued the "Enhancement of Measures
for Aging Management at Commercial Nuclear Installations" in August 2005. In
response to the report, NISA established the “Guidelines in Implementing Measures
for Aging Management at Commercial Nuclear Installations” and the “Standard
Review Procedures on Measures for Aging Management of Commercial Power
Reactors (bylaws)” in December 2005. And, JNES prepared and published the "TheCompilation of Technical Information concerning Measures for Aging Management",
which disclosed the standards, viewpoints and evaluation points when NISA and
JNES assess and review licensee's technical evaluation reports and long-term
maintenance programs.
In response to the “Enhancement of Measures for Aging Management at Commercial
Nuclear Installations” issued by NISA, the licensees of reactor operation reported to95Article 14

Assessment and Verification of Safety

the Aging Countermeasure Examination Committee, the status of consistent efforts
for the measures for aging management for the following matters:(1) Ensuring transparency and effectiveness;(2) Preparing technical information infrastructure;(3) Preventing deterioration in corporate culture and organization climate, andkeeping and improving technical capabilities; and(4) Accountability on measures for aging management.
The aging technical evaluation reports for Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Unit 1 of the Hamaoka Nuclear
Power Station of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., and Unit 3 of the Mihama Power
Station of the Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. have already been submitted in thisframework. NISA assessed the technical evaluation report and the long-term
maintenance program for Unit 1 of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station of Chubu
Electric Power Co., Inc. on January 31 2006. Then, NISA reported the results to the
NSC in May 2006 that the system for implementing the technical evaluation isappropriate, that the technical evaluation implemented for aging, the technicalevaluation for ensuring seismic safety, and conservation measures are appropriate,
and that the long-term maintenance program based on the technical evaluation isappropriate. The same assessments were carried out for the other two nuclear
reactors mentioned above.
Conventionally, NISA had evaluated adequacy of aging technical evaluation andlong-term maintenance programs prepared by the licensees of reactor operation.
However, NISA revised the Rules for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial
Power Reactors associated with revision of inspection system. It was decided thatfrom January 2009, the long-term maintenance management policies based on the
aging technical evaluation and its results shall be included in the operational safety
program. Accordingly, the program such as maintenance management per operation
cycle, which embodies the long-term maintenance management policies, has
become included in the maintenance activity program of a nuclear installation.
Under the current system, the licensees of reactor operation steadily conduct themeasures for aging management based on the maintenance plan, and NISA confirms
the implementation situation of each licensee through periodic inspection, Periodic
Safety Management Review, and Operational Safety Inspection.
NISA focuses on the safety research for aging management of nuclear installations as
one of its important research programs on the Nuclear Safety, and is carrying out the
research on clarification of aging phenomena, development of prediction methods ofaging process, development of methods for early detection of cracks anddeterioration and fine measurement approach, and development of structural integrity
evaluation.

96

Radiation Protection

Article 15

Article 15

Radiation Protection

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the radiation
exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be kept as low as reasonably
achievable and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed nationaldose limits.

Overview of Article 15
Radiation protection standards in Japan are established by respecting therecommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).
The regulatory requirements concerning facilities such as the area control in a nuclear
installation are specified by the ministerial orders and notices based on the Reactor
Regulation Act, while the regulatory requirements concerning worker protection, which
include measures for preventing health damage such as measurement of work
environment and health examination are specified by the Industrial Safety and Health
Law.
In Japan, radiation dose of workers are unitarily controlled at the Radiation Worker's
Registration Center. So, a system is provided to control the history of the personal dosefor each worker who works in more than one nuclear installation.
It has been recognized recently that reduction of collective dose of the workers inJapanese nuclear installations is not in progress in comparison to the cases in
European and American nuclear installations partly because the Japanese operating
cycle is relatively short. This is a matter that was suggested to be addressed at the 4th
review meeting. NISA is committed to carrying forward the study of policy for reducing
the collective dose during this reporting period.

97Article 15

1

Radiation Protection

Legislative and regulatory arrangements for radiation protection(1) Legislative arrangements for radiation protection
The Government of Japan clearly specifies the radiation protection standards fornuclear installations by laws such as the Reactor Regulation Act, the Electricity
Business Act, and the Industrial Safety and Health Law, and the subordinate
legislation based on these laws and guidelines. The standards for radiation
protection were established by respecting the recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and incorporated in laws andregulations. The Radiation Review Council checks consistency of these technicalstandards for the prevention of radiation hazards.
As a legislative framework, regulatory requirements for area control for radiation
protection, requirements for exposure control of radiation workers, andconcentration monitoring of the released radioactive material regarding gaseousand liquid waste control are specified in the ministerial ordinance based on theReactor Regulation Act, such as the “Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Nuclear
Power Reactors concerning the Installation, Operation, etc. (Commercial Reactor
Ministerial Ordinance)”. The Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Power Reactors
provides that the licensee of reactor operation is required to report immediately to
NISA when a concentration of radioactive materials in the air outside the peripheral
monitoring area exceeds the allowable limit in discharging gaseous radioactive
waste, or when the concentration of radioactive materials in the water at the outerboundary of the environmental monitoring area exceeds the allowable limit indischarging liquid radioactive waste, and report the status of the event andmeasures taken against it within ten days. Also, the “Notification for Dose
Equivalent Limits on the Basis of the Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Power
Reactors (Dose Notification)” quantitatively prescribes dose limits andconcentration limits of radioactive materials both inside the control area and outside
the environmental monitoring area, dose limits of radioactive materials for radiation
workers, and dose limits for workers in emergency activities.
The Industrial Safety and Health Law provides that employers take measures toprevent damage to the health of radiation workers, including radiation exposure,throughout their period of employment, and it requires that they shall be educatedon issues of health and safety, work environment monitoring and medical
examination of workers. On the basis of the law, the Ministry of Health, Welfare andLabor has enacted ‘the Ministerial Ordinance for Prevention of Hazards from
Ionizing Radiation’, which prescribes the requirements for controlled areas, dose
limits and measurement, protection from external radiation, and prevention ofradioactive contamination.
The Ministerial Ordinance for Prevention of Hazards from Ionizing Radiation require
employers to measure the dose due to external and internal exposure of workers
who are engaged in radiation work or in emergency work, or enter temporal accessinto the radiation controlled area. The ministerial ordinance also require employers
to monitor and check daily the dose due to external exposure, if it is expected to
exceed the specified value of 1 mSv at 1 cm dose equivalent, and to calculate,
without delay, the dose of the personnel engaged in radiation work using the98Radiation Protection

Article 15

method prescribed by the Minister of Health and Labor, and to keep these records
for a period of thirty years.
Regulations similar to the Reactor Regulation Law are applied to the activities
involving the use of radioisotopes etc. in nuclear installations, based on the “Law
Concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes, etc.”
As a measure to ensure that the licensees comply with these legislativerequirements regarding radiation protection, “The Ministerial Ordinance for the
Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors” requires each licensee
to prescribe in the Operational Safety Program, 1) radiation controlled area, access
controlled areas, and environmental monitoring area and access control to theseareas, 2) monitoring equipment at air ventilation and water discharge, 3) monitoringof the dose, the dose equivalent, the concentration of radioactive materials and thedensity of the surface radioactive materials of objects contaminated by radioactive
materials, and the decontamination, 4) maintenance of radiation monitoring
equipment.
The Regulatory Guide for the Annual Dose Target for the Public in the Vicinity ofLight Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities is one of the guidelines used forreviewing licensing of reactor installment. The guide provides specific indicators for
reducing effects of radiation caused by installment of a nuclear installation toenvironment as low as reasonably achievable. It also states the quantitative dosetarget guide for keeping the dose of the general public in the vicinity at low level.
The licensees of reactor operation define the release control value of liquid wastes
and gaseous wastes in the operational safety program based on this guide.
The 1990 Recommendation of the ICRP (Publication 60) has been, after
examination by the Radiation Council, incorporated into national legislations andregulations on radiation protection, by revision of related ministerial orders andnotifications in April 2001 with the following additional considerations. First, theradiation controlled area is defined where the dose may exceed 1.3 mSv/3 months,
corresponding to 5 mSv/year which is a special dose limit to the public. Second, theoccupational dose limit for female workers is set at 5 mSv/3 months, an allocatedvalue for a shorter period, reducing possible dose of a potential embryo. The dose
limits in emergency work remain 100 mSv/year as before, considering the IAEA
BSS.
The Radiation Council is an organization established under MEXT for the purposeof coordinating technical standards on prevention of radiation hazards. The
Radiation Council submits reports related to inquiries from related administrative
organizations, or advises them as necessary.
The Radiation Review Council has been discussing in order to incorporate the
ICRP 2007 recommendation to domestic laws and regulations since 2008.
Concerning the specific dose limits, the Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial
Power Reactors and the Dose Limits Notification requires licensees to establish aradiation controlled area including the reactor room, spent fuel storage facility andradioactive waste disposal facilities, where the dose of external radiation may
exceed 1.3 mSv for three months, or where the concentration of radioactive
materials in the air or the surface density of radioactive materials may exceed thevalues specified in the Notification, respectively, and to establish necessary99Article 15

Radiation Protection

measures to be taken in these areas.
The Dose Notification specifies the dose limits for radiation workers and generalpublic as listed in Table 15-1.
Table 15-1 Dose limits for the radiation workers and the public
Item
A

Limit

Radiation workers(1)

Effective dose limits(2)

Female

100 mSv/5 years, but do not exceed 50 mSv/year.
Besides conforming to (1), do not exceed 5 mSv/3
months.
Besides conforming to (1), do not exceed 1 mSv(3)

Pregnant female

for internal exposure from notification of pregnancy
to delivery.

(4)

Equivalent dose limit for eye lens

150 mSv/ year

(5)

Equivalent dose limits for skin

500 mSv/ year

(6)

Equivalent dose limits for abdominal

2 mSv/ from notification of pregnancy to delivery.

region of pregnant female
B

Dose limits for radiation workers involved in emergency work(1)

Effective dose limits

100 mSv(2)

Equivalent dose limits for eye lens

300 mSv(3)

Equivalent dose limits for skin

1 Sv

C

General public(1)

Effective dose

1 mSv/year(2)

Equivalent dose for eye lens

15 mSv/year(3)

Equivalent dose for skin

50 mSv/year(2) Involvement of regulatory body in radiation protection activities
NISA is also involved in radiation protection activities from regulatory aspect basedon the Reactor Regulation Act, etc.
In the stage of licensing for establishment, waste management including radiation
exposure control and discharge of radioactive material outside the nuclear
installation is reviewed in the safety review of the basic design.
In the stage of approval of construction plan, the concrete design of instrumentation
devices for radiation control, ventilation facilities, and biological shielding devices
are examined. Further, it is confirmed by the pre-service inspection that thesefacilities are constructed in pursuant to the approval.
During operating life of a nuclear installation, it is confirmed by the complianceinspection of the operational safety program that the ministerial ordinance provided
in the operational safety program, such as access control to controlled area, etc.,
monitoring equipment at air ventilation and water discharge, monitoring of the dose,the concentration of radioactive materials and the density of the surface radioactive
materials, and the decontamination, are observed.
In case of a nuclear disaster, such as the release of significant amount ofradioactive materials to the environment in association with an accident in a nuclear

100Radiation Protection

Article 15

installation, nuclear emergency measures provided by the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster are
implemented. Nuclear emergency preparedness is explained in Article 16.
2

Radiation protection program of the licensees(1) Record of individual dose
The average individual effective dose of radiation workers at the commercial
nuclear installations during this reporting period was 1.0 to 1.1mSv per year.
In FY 2009, the effective dose of radiation workers was under the dose limit
prescribed by regulation (50 mSv/year).
In FY 2009, the number of radiation workers who had been exposed over 20 mSv
was 0, and 15 to 20 mSv was 258. The total number of radiation workers at thecommercial nuclear installations was 83,489.
(2) Record of collective dose
The total collective dose at the commercial nuclear installations was 82.08 man-Sv
in FY 2009.
The trend of collective dose and average dose in the past 10 years is shown in
Figure 15-1.
man-Sv

mSv

1.5

75

1.0

50

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Average dose (A.D.)

Collective dose (C.D.)

100

0.5

C.D. 78.83 78.05 84.03 96.41 77.86 66.91 67.43 78.18 84.04 82.08
A.D.

1.2

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.2

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.1

1.0

Fig. 15-1 Trend of collective dose and average dose(3) Dose target and discharge control to reduce dose of the public in the vicinity
In the Regulatory Guide for the Annual Dose Target for the Public in the Vicinity ofLight Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities, the NSC has prescribed a numericalguide of 50 micro Sv, one twentieth of the dose limit to the public, in order to reducethe dose for the public due to discharge of radioactive material to the environment
during normal operation of a nuclear installation as low as reasonably achievable.
The licensee of reactor operation, in order to achieve the target, establishes anannual numerical discharge control guide, which corresponds to the annual
discharge amount evaluated at the safety review and assessment, and makes the101

Article 15

Radiation Protection

effort to keep the discharge of radioactive effluents below the numerical discharge
control guide. NISA acknowledges the numerical discharge control guide andreceives the report from the licensee.
(4) Discharge data and the measures taken to reduce the amount of the discharge
The discharge records of radioactive gaseous and liquid waste from the nuclear
installations (BWRs and PWRs) over the past seven years are shown in Figure15-2 and Figure 15-3. The discharge quantities are substantially below thedischarge control targets, the noble gas discharge from the PWR being only one
1000th of the discharge target. This is due to the fact that the licensees of reactor
operation have carried out the radiation management of the nuclear installation inline with the ALARA principle, including the following measures.
Gaseous waste is discharged from the ventilation stack, while being measured andmonitored, after particles are removed by a high efficiency particulate air filter,
noble gas and iodine are decayed in a holdup tank or activated carbon type noble
gas hold-up device.
Iodine(I), kBq
1.0E+06

Noble gas(N.G.), kBq
1.0E+101.0E+09

1.0E+05

1.0E+08

1.0E+04

1.0E+07

1.0E+03

1.0E+06

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

1.0E+02

希ガス
N.G. 1.40E+08 8.50E+07 1.20E+08 9.00E+07 5.00E+08 5.70E+08 1.50E+09 9.60E+08 1.00E+09 1.10E+09
ヨウ素
1.10E+04 5.50E+02 9.50E+02 2.30E+02 1.90E+05 4.60E+03 4.60E+03 2.30E+04 1.80E+03 1.10E+03
I

Fig. 15-2 Trend of released gaseous waste (noble gas and iodine)
All liquid waste is collected and treated in a disposal facility. The equipment drain isprocessed in a filter and demineralizer system. The floor drain is recovered after
being processed in a concentrator and demineralizer. Floor drain is reused ingeneral, though part of it may be discharged through the discharge outlet after theradioactive concentration is measured. The recovered liquid waste from the resin isreused after being treated in a concentrator and demineralizer. Concentrated liquid
waste generated in this process is treated as solid waste. Low-level laundry
wastewater, etc. are usually discharged into the environment after being treatedthrough a filter and then it is monitored.
In addition to the measures shown in the paragraphs above, a very low level ofgaseous discharge and liquid radioactive waste was achieved through the following
efforts; the number of fuel leak occurred during this reporting period were only two102

Radiation Protection

Article 15

in the BWRs (total of three fuel assemblies), and one in the PWRs (total of one fuelassembly), ventilation during the work such as periodic inspection is filtered by alocal high efficiency filter, and efforts are made to reduce the amount of liquid waste,
except tritium, as low as reasonably achievable. Due to the strict control describedabove, the amount of discharged liquid and gaseous radioactive waste has been
kept at a very low level compared to international standards.
kBq
1.0E+12Tritium
トリチウム以外

1.0E+10Liquid waste other
トリチウム
than Tritium

1.0E+08
1.0E+06
1.0E+04
1.0E+02
1.0E+00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Fig. 15-3 Trend of released liquid waste(5) Measures to reduce exposure
In nuclear installations, the licensees of reactor operation take measures such as toreduce the radiation of system components in nuclear installations, to keep offset
distance from radiation source, and to install shielding in order to reduce exposureof radiation workers as low as reasonably achievable. For management of facilities,
they take measures such as to discuss work procedure before starting work so as
to shorten the time required to complete the radiation work. The radiation exposure
at nuclear installations in Japan is below the regulatory dose limits. The licensees’
ongoing efforts stated above should be highly valued as self-controlled efforts forfurther reduction of radiation dose, and it is desirable for such efforts to becontinued.
Generally, the radiation workers involved in repair works in nuclear installations
receive orders from more than one licensee and carry out radiation work in thecontrolled areas in multiple nuclear installations. Considering the importance of
unitary management of personal exposure of radiation workers who work in
multiple nuclear related facilities, the Radiation Workers’ Registration Center of the
Association of Radiation Impact was established in November 1977 to reduce such
workers’ exposure. This Center unitarily collects and manages personal exposure
dose of each radiation worker who works in nuclear installations in Japan. Thissystem enables any licensee to know the history of exposure dose record ofradiation workers if they work in multiple nuclear installations, and helps thelicensees to implement appropriate exposure control.
The trend of collective dose in Japan after 1990s has generally continued to be flator a gradual increase, while that of Western countries has gradually decreased.

103Article 15

Radiation Protection

Though the decreasing trend is observed after 2004 with the decrease ofmodification work, the trend through the whole period still remains at a higher level
as compared with that of Western countries.
In view of the recent situation, NISA carried out a study of radiation exposure at
nuclear installations in both Japan and Western countries and the efforts for dose
reduction based on the ALARA principle were also investigated in order to clarify
the reasons of difference between Japan and Western countries and also to identify
the issues for dose reduction (from fiscal year 2004 to 2009).
Concerning differences of the collective dose between Japan and Westerncountries, the factors such as differences in workload during plant outage (amountof construction/modification work and the number of workers), length of operation
cycle and difference of maintenance policy seem to be related. Also, the results ofinvestigation on the efforts for dose reduction identified the importance of thesubjects for the optimization of collective dose management, such as the need for
medium and long term dose reduction strategy, further information sharing withregard to ALARA, enhancement of the licensees’ self-controlled activities, andinvolvement of regulatory bodies towards such efforts.
At present the individual dose (average annual dose of recent years: about 1 mSv,
maximum individual dose: about 20 mSv/year ) is below the dose limits (100 mSv/5
years and 50 mSv/year), and so the collective dose level itself (about 1.4 man-Sv)
is not a matter of concern. However, it is important to promote activities forcollective dose reduction in a continuous and self-controlled manner based on the
ALARA principle.
The regulatory body will carry forward the study of solid control measures ofcollective dose, focused on the exposure dose reduction processes in order tostimulate the licensees’ activities.
(6) Environmental monitoring
The licensee conducts radiation monitoring at the site vicinity during normal
operation, assesses the impact upon the environment of the discharge ofradioactive materials from the nuclear installation, and feedbacks the results inimproving discharge control and facility management.
Local governments (prefectures where nuclear installations are located) also
monitor the radiation level independently at the site vicinity to protect public healthand safety.
The NSC decided the fundamentals of planning and implementation of themonitoring and the evaluation of radiation dose in the Guide for Environmental
Radiation Monitoring, in order to improve and to standardize the monitoring
technology. Local governments and licensees implement the above-mentioned
monitoring in accordance with this guide. The Guideline for Environmental
Radiation Monitoring was established in March 2008, by integrating the Guide forEnvironmental Radiation Monitoring and the Guide for Environmental Radiation
Monitoring in Emergency.
Environmental monitoring data is open to public on the website of the Disaster
Prevention and Nuclear Safety Network for Nuclear Environment operated by the
Ministryof
Education,
Culture,Sports,ScienceandTechnology(http://www.bousai.ne.jp/eng/) and can be checked in real time.

104

Emergency Preparedness

Article 16
1.

Article 16

Emergency Preparedness

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and off-site
emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover the activities to be carriedout in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear installation, such plans shall be prepared andtested before it commences operation above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.

2.

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they are likely to beaffected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the competent authorities of the States inthe vicinity of the nuclear installation are provided with appropriate information for emergency
planning and response.

3.

Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation in their territory, insofar as they are likely
to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear installation in the vicinity, shall takethe appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for their territory that cover
the activities to be carried out in the event of such an emergency.

Outline of Article 16
Nuclear emergency preparedness and response activities of Japan are carried out
based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.
Though the framework of the nuclear emergency response has not been changed fromthe last report in essence, an improvement has been made in consideration of thefindings obtained from such drills as the Integrated Nuclear Emergency Response Drill
held annually under the initiative of the National Government.
The improvement during this reporting period is a measure taken to provide emergency
information to the public. The NISA started an emergency information mailing service inJuly 2008, and established a system by which to provide emergency information toe-mail addresses registered beforehand quickly. Concerning the information distribution
to foreign citizens staying in Japan, the NISA conducted the emergency communication
exercise for a French community in the Integrated Nuclear Emergency Response Drill
held in October 2008, with the cooperation of the French Embassy in Japan. In thismanner, the NISA has been taking measures to improve the response to diversifying
recipients of information.

105

Article 16

Emergency Preparedness

Article16 (1)1Emergency plans and programs

Development of Laws and Rules for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
For Japan who was promoting the use of nuclear energy under the basic premise of
ensuring safety, the JCO criticality accident which occurred in September 1999 was
the first serious accident of its kind, and it was so serious that local residents were
instructed for sheltering or evacuation. Lessons learned from this accident clarified
the special characteristics of a nuclear emergency, which would require quick initial
responses, close coordinated cooperation between the National Government andlocal governments, strengthening of the national emergency response system andthe clarification of licensee's responsibilities. The Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (hereafter referred to as “Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Act”) was enacted in December 1999 and it was enforced
in June 2000, addressing the special characteristics of nuclear emergencies asmentioned above.
The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act was enacted so as to harmonize with theexisting legal framework established by the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures,
which had defined the roles of the National Government, local governments, etc. in an
emergency such as floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, and eruptions. The “Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness” in the Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness based on
the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures was extensively revised in accordancewith the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, clarifying roles and responsibilities of
the National Government, local governments, licensees, etc.
The NSC, in May 2000, also taking into consideration the Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Act and the lessons learned from the JCO criticality accident, revisedthe " Regulatory Guide: Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities " on technicaland special matters of nuclear emergency preparedness and response, to include:






Responding to the mechanism of the new Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Act;
Responding to research reactors, nuclear fuel facilities, and radioactive
waste facilities as target facilities in addition to the usual nuclear power
stations, reprocessing facilities, etc.;
Responding to release of nuclear fuel materials and criticality accidents inaddition to the measures against radioactive noble gas and iodine; and,
Newly describing a concept of establishment of an Off-Site Center and abasic concept of emergency preparedness during transport of nuclear fuelmaterials, etc.

In May 2007, further clarification was made on the purpose of the Regulatory
Guide, target facilities, etc. in consideration of the international trend as seen in
the actions of the International Atomic Energy Agency, etc. and description was106Emergency Preparedness

Article 16

added on the effectiveness of preventive protective measures. In addition, thesections that overlapped with the provisions of the Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Act and Regulatory Guide of the NSC were organized .
As the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act provides that its enforcement situation
is subject to review five years after its enforcement, the enforcement situation wasinvestigated by MEXT and METI. Results of the investigation were reported to theSpecial Committee on Nuclear Disaster, the NSC in March 2006. The Nuclear andIndustrial Safety Agency checked the enforcement situation concerning four issues
that were presupposed to respect (clarification of a licensee’s responsibilities,
ensuring of quick initial responses at the time of disaster, close cooperation among
the National Government, local governments, licensees, etc. and strengthening of therole of the National Government that has professional knowledge of nuclear energy)
when the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act was enacted, and reported thefollowing:







Non-scenario-based drill and the like should be carried out as means to checkthe quickness of initial responses, and the effort should be continued;
Concerning enhancing the cooperation among the National Government andlocal governments, the "Integrated Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Network", which is a large-scale system and preparation of a fast unified
network of communication among them, should be made;Concerning enhancing the emergency response system of the National
Government, necessary renewal of materials and equipment of the Emergency
Response Center should be promoted; and,In relation to clarification of the licensees’ responsibilities, the effectivenessshould be verified and improved so that nuclear emergency response staff
may achieve their required functions in an emergency.

There are two types of nuclear disasters under the provision of the Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Act: the Specific Event and the Nuclear Emergency. The
Specific Event includes a case in which a radiation dose detected near the siteboundary is 5 micro Sv/h or more at one point for more than 10 minutes continuously.
Related government ministries and agencies in Tokyo convene a meeting for
emergency response, and related local organizations get together at the local Off-SiteCenter to respond.
The Nuclear Emergency includes a case in which a radiation dose detected near thesite boundary is 500 micro Sv/h or more at one point for more than 10 minutes
continuously. Like the Specific Event, related organizations respond in Tokyo and at
the local Off-Site Center while the Prime Minister declares a nuclear emergency
situation, and an emergency response such as an evacuation of residents is made.
See Table 16-1 for criteria concerning the Specific Event and the Nuclear Emergency.

107

Article 16

Emergency Preparedness

Table 16-1 Specific Initial Event and Nuclear Emergency Specified in the Special Law
of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster
Eventsa) Radiation dose near
the site boundaryb)

Detectionofradioactive materials
in usual release points
such as exhaust pipesc) Detection of radiationorradioactive
materialsbyfire,
explosion, etc (outside
the control zone)d) Individual events of
each
nuclearinstallation
Failureofreactorscram
Loss of reactor coolant

Loss of all AC power
supplies
Decrease in water levelof the spent fuel pool at
reprocessing facilities

Criteria for Specific Event
5 micro Sv/h or more at one point for
more than consecutive 10 minutes
5 micro Sv/h or more at two or morepoints simultaneouselyWhen
theconcentrationofradioactive materials equivalent to 5
micro Sv/h or more continues for 10
minutes or more, or radioactive
materials equivalent to 50 micro
Sv/h or more are released
Radiation dose of 50 micro Sv/h or
more

Criteria for Nuclear Emergency
500 micro Sv/h or more at one point for
more than consecutive 10 minutes
500 micro Sv/h or more at two or morepoints simultaneousely
When the concentration of radioactive
materials equivalent to 500 micro Sv/hor more continues for 10 minutes or
more,orradioactive
materials
equivalent to 5 mSv/h or more arereleased

Release of radioactive materials
equivalent to 5 micro Sv/h or more

Release of radioactive materials
equivalent to 500 micro Sv/h or more

When the nuclear reactor shutdown
cannot be performed by usual
neutron absorbers
When leakage of nuclear reactor
coolant occurs, which needs
operation of the emergency core
coolant system (ECCS)
When power supply from all AC
power supplies is failed for 5
minutes or more
When water level is decreased tothe point where a fuel assembly is
exposedWhen all reactor shutdown functions
are lost in a case where emergency
reactor shutdown is necessary- The competent minister sends staff
with expertise on request of local
governments.
- The resident Senior Specialist for
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
carries out necessary work.

- The competent minister reports thenuclear emergency to the Prime
Minister immediately after confirming
the situation.
- The Prime Minister declares “Nuclear
Emergency” and takes the following
responses:- to lead, advise or direct related local
governments on necessary measures
such as sheltering or evacuation;- to establish the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters and Local
Nuclear
Emergency
Response
Headquarters; and- to establish the Joint Council for
Nuclear Emergency Response for
information exchange among the
National Government and local
governments- Related ministries and agencies
organize a joint task group for theincidents in Tokyo.
- Related local organizationsorganize a joint local task group in
the Off- SiteCenter.

108

Radiation dose of 5 mSv/h or more

When water cannot be injected into the
nuclear reactor by any ECCS
When all functions for cooling a reactor
are lost with loss of all AC power
supplies

Emergency Preparedness

2

Article 16

Response and measures for nuclear emergency(1) Nuclear emergency response concerning nuclear installation
Quick initial response and closely coordinated cooperation among relevantorganizations are important in a nuclear emergency. See Fig. 16-1 for the outline ofthe organizations relating to nuclear emergency situation responses based on the
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act.















The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act requires licensees toimmediately report to the competent minister and heads of local
governments when an event stipulated in Article 10 of the law occurs at
nuclear installation;
The competent minister, receiving the notification, triggers activities
according to the procedure stipulated by law. Staff with expertise inemergency measures will be sent to local governments on request. The
Senior Specialist for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness collects
information and coordinates activities preventing expansion of the events;
When the competent minister recognizes that the Specific Event exceeds
the predetermined level and has developed into an emergency, theminister immediately reports it to the Prime Minister;
The Prime Minister declares a “Nuclear Emergency” and directs relevant
local governments on emergency response measures to be taken by themsuch as sheltering or evacuation and preventive stable iodine
administration;
The Prime Minister establishes the "Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters" in Tokyo, which he will head, and the " Nuclear Emergency
Response Local Headquarters" at the concerned Off-Site Center;
In a nuclear emergency, the NSC convenes with the “Technical Advisory
Organization in an Emergency” that is composed of commissioners andthe Advisors for Emergency Response. The Organization gives technicaladvice to the Prime Minister;
Local governments establish their own emergency response
headquarters; and,In order to share information between the National Government and relatedorganizations such as local governments, licensees, etc., and, if necessary, tocoordinate emergency measures to be implemented by the respective
organizations, the "Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response" is to beestablished at the Off-Site Center.

109

Article 16

Emergency Preparedness

AdviceNuclear Safety Commission

National Government
Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters
Head: Prime Minister

ReportLicenseeApproval

Dispatch

Participation

National Government
Nuclear Emergency Response
Local Headquarters
Head: Senior Vice Minister of METI

Off-Site Center
Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response
Municipalities
Emergency Response
Headquarters

Prefectures
Local Headquarters- Evacuation Order- Public Relations
Emergency Response
Headquarters

Local Residents- Rescue of Victims- Dosage Measurement, etc.

JAEA and National Institute of Radiological Sciences: Special supports
National Police Agency: Security
Fire and Disaster Management Agency: Fire extinguishing, rescue and first-aid
SDF: Nuclear disaster dispatch

Fig. 16-1 Outline of the organizations relating to nuclear emergency responses(2) Plan for nuclear emergency preparedness
The plan at the highest level in nuclear emergency preparedness of Japan is the
Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness formulated on the basis of the Basic Act
on Disaster Control Measures. Concerning nuclear emergency measures relating
to nuclear installations, the following are stipulated in the Basic Plan for Emergency
Preparedness as preparation for disaster prevention, emergency response
measures, and emergency restoration:aDisaster prevention
 To ensure safety of facilities, etc.;
 To prepare for quick and smooth emergency response measures andemergency restoration;
 To disseminate knowledge of emergency preparedness and response;
 To promote research on nuclear emergency preparedness andresponse, etc.;110Emergency Preparedness




b

c

Article 16

To implement measures to prevent recurrence; and,To prepare for quick and smooth emergency response measures for
accidents during transportation of nuclear fuel materials, etc. outside
nuclear sites.

Emergency response measures To ensure an information collection and communication system, anemergency contact system, and communications; To establish an action mechanism; Protective activities such as sheltering and evacuation;
 To maintain social order including crime prevention;
 To ensure traffic routes for emergency transportation, and emergency
transportation activities;
 Rescue and first aid activities, and medical and fire fighting activities;
 Activities for appropriate communications with related personnel, etc.;and, Quick and smooth emergency response measures for accidents duringtransportation of nuclear fuel materials, etc. outside nuclear sites.
Emergency restoration
Procedure for canceling the declaration of a nuclear emergency
situation; and,
 Measures for reducing harmful rumors, restoring subsidization ofsmall/medium-sized enterprises, etc.

Administrative organs formulate emergency preparedness action plans based on
the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures and the Basic Plan for Emergency
Preparedness. In the METI emergency preparedness action plans, nuclear disastermeasures are to be taken based on the provisions of the Basic Act on Disaster
Control Measures, the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, and the Act on theRegulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors(Reactor Regulation Act).
Local governments work out their respective regional disaster prevention plans
based on the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act and the Basic Plan for
Emergency Preparedness, establish systems for emergencies, responsibilities forcarrying out emergency preparedness and response activities, etc. It is stipulated
that local governments shall carry out the environmental radiation monitoring in an
emergency, and that they issue an advisory or an instruction on eviction for
sheltering or evacuation to local residents, etc. based on a direction, advice, an
instruction, etc. given by the Prime Minister.
In consultation with local governments, licensees shall formulate the Nuclear
Operator Emergency Action Plan concerning measures to prevent a nuclear
disaster, emergency response measures, and measures for restoration from111

Article 16

Emergency Preparedness

nuclear emergency for each nuclear site, including not only on-site measures, butalso an off-site cooperation system.
The Nuclear Operator Emergency Action Plan is required to include the following
matters:






















Matters relating to duties of a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager,a Deputy Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager, and nuclear
disaster prevention staff;
Matters relating to a person who takes care of the duties of a Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Manager or a Deputy Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Manager;
Matters relating to the formation of an on-site organization for nuclear
emergency preparedness;
Matters relating to the assignment of nuclear disaster prevention staff,
and education on disaster prevention for nuclear disaster prevention staff;
Matters relating to the installation and maintenance of radiation
measuring equipment and other equipment for emergency preparedness;
Matters relating to the furnishing, and maintenance and check of materials
and equipment for nuclear disaster prevention;
Matters relating to implementation of a emergency response drill;
Matters relating to the reporting by a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Manager to the competent minister, a governor of a prefecture where thenuclear site is located and a mayor of a municipality where the nuclear site is
located, governors of related neighboring prefectures, a police agency, andother relevant organizations when a Specific Event occurs, and relating to thereporting of the status of the Specific Event to these organizations;
Matters relating to the reporting of emergency measures to be taken to preventa nuclear disaster or its expansion when a Specific Event occurs, and asummary of these measures;
Matters relating to the implementation of emergency response measures;
Matters relating to the implementation of dispatch of nuclear disasterprevention staff, lending of materials and equipment for nuclear disaster
response, and other necessary measures when emergency response
measures are taken;
Matters relating to the implementation of measures for restoration from
nuclear emergency;
Matters relating to the implementation of dispatch of nuclear disasterprevention staff, lending of materials and equipment for nuclear disaster
response, and other necessary measures when measures for restorationfrom nuclear emergency are implemented;
Matters relating to cooperation with other licensees;
Matters relating to the preparation of documents or drawings specifying
major facilities and equipment on a nuclear site; and,112

Emergency PreparednessArticle 16

Matters relating to work to be carried out by an on-site organization for
nuclear emergency preparedness and response to prevent a nuclear
disaster or its expansion on a nuclear site in addition to the matters
mentioned in each subparagraph above.

(3) Responsibilities of relevant organizations concerning nuclear emergency
preparedness and response, and related measures
The National Government, local governments, and licensees prepare thenecessary emergency preparedness and are ready to take measures in an
emergency:a

The National Government
 The competent minister stations a Senior Specialist for Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness in the vicinity of each nuclear installation,
who guides and advises the licensee in preparing its emergency action
plan and, in an emergency, takes the necessary measures in preventing
expansion of the emergency.
 The competent minister designates a base facility in the vicinity of a
nuclear installation as an Off-Site Center to be used in an emergency. In
the case of an emergency, the National G overnment, the local
governments and the licensee establish the "Joint Council for Nuclear
Emergency Response" at the Off-Site Center, in order to share
information and to coordinate their activities. Off-Site Centers are built on
the areas indicated in Fig. 16-2, and have necessary facilities andequipment capable to communicate with the Prime Minister’s Official
Residence, the Cabinet Office, the Emergency Response Center of NISA,
the Emergency Operation Center of MEXT and related local governments.
Each Off-Site Center is equipped with means by which to monitor
environmental radiation levels and the plant status. The real-timeenvironmental radiation levels, other than emergency environmental
radiation monitoring data measured in an emergency situation, can bemonitored at every moment since the monitoring equipment isconnected on line with the monitoring posts located in the vicinity of thenuclear installation. The plant status can be predicted by means of an
Emergency Response Support System (ERSS), which predicts progressof an abnormal condition of a nuclear installation using plant information
sent from the licensee on-line. Each Off-Site Center is also equippedwith a System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
Information (SPEEDI) by which to quickly predict an impact ofradioactive materials on the environment by calculating an atmosphericconcentration of radioactive materials in a surrounding environment andan exposure dose based on the information on a source of release suchas a prediction value of a released amount by an ERSS, weather

113

Article 16Emergency Preparedness

conditions, and topographic data.
The National Government establishes a response system necessary forquickly putting response capabilities into the site in emergency.
In a nuclear emergency, the NSC organizes the “Technical Advisory
Organization in an Emergency” which consists of the NSC
Commissioners and the Investigators for Emergency Response, andgives technical advice to the head of the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters on designation or alteration of regional areas thatnecessitate emergency measures to be taken, and technical matters on
the implementation of emergency response measures and dissolution ofa nuclear emergency.
The national government conducts the comprehensive Integrated
nuclear emergency Response drill based on the program established by
the competent minister.

Mihama Nuclear Emergency
Center. (Mihama-cho)

Ohi Nuclear Emergency Center(Ohi-cho)

Higashidori Off-Site Center(Higashidoori Village)

Nuclear Emergency Center in
Hokkaido Pref. (Kyowa-cho)Fukui Pref.

Tsuruga Nuclear Emergency
Center (Tsuruga City)

Takahama Nuclear Emergency
Center (Takahama-cho)

Nuclear Emergency Center in
Miyagi Pref. (Onagawa-cho)Shiga Off-Site Center in Ishikwa
Pref. (Shiga-cho)●Kashiwazaki-Kariwa N.E.C. in
Niigata Pref. (Kashiwazaki City)

Nuclear Emergency Center in
Shimane Pref. (Matsue City)

Nuclear Emergency Center inFukushima Pref. (Okuma-machi)

Off-Site Center in Saga Pref.
(Karatsu City)

Hamaoka Nuclear Emergency
Center in Shizuoka Pref.
(Omaezaki City)

Designated by METI (15)
Nuclear Emergency Center in
Kagoshima Pref.
(Satsumasendai City)● Designated by METI and MEXT
Off-Site Center in Ehime Pref.
(Ikata-cho)

Off-Site Center in Ibaraki Pref.
(Hitachinaka City)

Fig. 16-2 Off-Site Centerb

Local governments
 Local governments formulate and implement their respective regional
disaster prevention plans; Prefectures support the duties for emergency preparedness carried out
by municipalities and perform overall coordination; and,
 Local governments conduct an on-site Inspection to check whether or not114

Emergency Preparedness

Article 16

preventive measures for a nuclear disaster are taken by licensees in an
appropriate manner.
c

Licensee
Each licensee shall develop its Nuclear Licensee Emergency Action Plan
after consulting with relevant local governments, and submit it to thecompetent minister before its nuclear related activity;
 Each licensee shall establish an on-site organization for nuclear emergency
preparedness and response, and designate a Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Manager who administers the organization; The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager shall immediately report
the National Government, the prefecture where the nuclear site is located,etc., when a Specific Event occurs; and,
 Each licensee shall install and maintain radiation measuring equipment on
the nuclear site for making a reporting decision, prepare radiation
protection equipment, emergency communication equipment, and othermaterials and equipment necessary for the on-site organization for nuclear
emergency preparedness to carry out its work, and perform maintenanceand check of them.
dNuclear Emergency Assistance and Training Center
The Nuclear Emergency Assistance and Training Center (hereinafter referred to
as NEAT) was established by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency in Ibaraki
Prefecture and Fukui Prefecture in March 2002 for the purpose of conducting
specialized technical support activities such as the environmental assessment
and radiation protection activities for the Off-Site Centers across the nation thatserve as bases of operation in an emergency or local governments.
NEAT’s main activities in an emergency are, on the request of the National
Government or local governments, to efficiently collect and organize accident
information from various fields, and analyze and assess the information as anuclear research institute, and to dispatch experts and mobile type special
vehicles such as whole body counter vehicle and body surface monitoringvehicle to the concerned site, as needed.
The main activities at normal times include conducting training on nuclear
emergency responses for related parties such as the National Government, local
governments, police, fire departments, and licensees. Also, as research anddevelopment on nuclear emergency preparedness and response, NEAT collectdomestic and overseas information on nuclear emergency preparedness andresponse, etc., and develop the database in order to provide necessary data
quickly.
Furthermore, as an international contribution in nuclear emergency andpreparedness and response field, NEAT endeavor to share knowledge with Asian
nations through the activities of the IAEA Asian Nuclear Safety Network.

115Article 16

Emergency Preparedness(4) Emergency preparedness and response activities by licensees
Licensees equip and maintain radiation measuring equipment on nuclear sites thatis necessary in reporting of a Specific Event, and also prepare radiation protection
equipment such as an anticontaminant suit, a respiratory oxygen tank, and aprotective mask, emergency communication equipment such as a cell phone and a
facsimile machine, measuring equipment such as a fixed measuring instrument ordose meter and a portable measuring instrument for measuring radioactive
materials released outside a building, and other materials and equipment for
nuclear disaster response.
A mechanism has been established by which information necessary for cognizing
operational status of a nuclear reactor such as operation parameters is transmitted
in real time to the Off-Site Center and the NISA’s Emergency Response Center set
up at the headquarters of METI in Tokyo.
(5) Nuclear emergency response drill
Nuclear emergency response drills are implemented to confirm the effectiveness ofthe nuclear emergency response system based on the Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Act. The purpose of the nuclear emergency response drill is 1) toenhance understanding of, and adequate actions for, nuclear emergency responseby responsible personnel of the National Government, local governments, thelicensee, and residents, and 2) to verify whether emergency response measures
function in a predetermined way, and whether information sharing and cooperation
among related organizations are adequate. The National Government, local
governments, designated public organizations and the licensee cooperate andparticipate in the drill, which cover communication, monitoring, decision on
emergency measures to be taken, sheltering or evacuation etc. In Japan, various
forms of the drill, ranging from a large scale national drill to the licensee’s on-site
drill, are performed. These are explained below.

aDrills Planned by the National Government
Nuclear emergency response drills used to be planned and conducted by local
governments with support and coordination of the National Government before
the JCO criticality accident in 1999. The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act
stipulated the drills to be planned and conducted by the National Government.
The drill planned by the National Government has been conducted once a year
as the Integrated Nuclear Emergency Response Drill in collaboration with the
National Government, local governments, licensees, etc. The Integrated Nuclear
Emergency Response Drill is open to the public. Visitors to the Off-Site Centers
can observe the training freely so long as they don’t interfere with the drill. This iseffective in ensuring opportunities for the public to be familiarized with nuclear
emergency response activities, and plays a certain role in disseminating

116

Emergency Preparedness

Article 16

information on nuclear emergency preparedness and response.
Drills conducted in this reporting period (2007 to 2009) are as follows:

On October 24, 2007, a drill was conducted jointly by the National
Government, Aomori Prefecture, related municipalities, Japan Nuclear
Fuel Limited, and relevant organizations involved in emergency
preparedness and response, assuming an accident at the reprocessing
plant of Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (Rokkasho Village, Aomori
Prefecture), in which about 1,800 people including local residents
participated. This was the first drill for reprocessing facilities, in which
fire fighting training was conducted, assuming release of radioactive
materials, and efforts were made to improve public relations activities
including improvement of information transmission to overseas media.
On October 21 and 22, 2008, a drill was conducted with the participationof the National Government, local governments including Fukushima
Prefecture, TEPCO, and other relevant organizations, assuming an
accident at Unit 3 of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station of
TEPCO, in which about 4,000 people including local residents
participated. In this drill, efforts were made to improve the quickness of
initial responses, and as part of public relations activities, emergency
information was transmitted to the French Embassy in Japan with thecooperation of the Embassy.
On December 21 and 22, 2009, a drill was conducted by the National
Government, local governments including Ibaraki Prefecture, the Japan
Atomic Power Co., other relevant organizations, local residents, etc.,
assuming an accident at Tokai Dai-ni Power Station of the Japan
Atomic Power Co., in which about 3,100 people participated. In this drill,a study was made on the evacuation of residents using private cars,and on the protected area utilizing the “Basic Form of Evacuation Plan”
based on the regional disaster prevention plan of Ibaraki Prefecture.
That year again, emergency information was provided to the French
Embassy in Japan. Emergency information was also provided to the
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (hereinafter referred to as PNRA),
through the Pakistani Embassy in Japan on the request from the PNRA
of Pakistan.

Proactive information transmission to not only domestic but also overseas
recipients is characteristic of the recent Integrated Nuclear Emergency
Response Drill.
The result of the drills is assessed, and good practices, challenges, etc. are
extracted. They are reflected in the drill items and methods of next drill. Threekinds of methods, a participant’s questionnaire, check by an independent
assessment agency, and observation by external experts, are taken for the drill

117Article 16

Emergency Preparedness

assessment.
bDrills planned by the NSC
The NSC conducts notification drills several times a year using automatic
simultaneous notification equipment, and a drill for nuclear disaster per year fromthe viewpoint of maintaining and improving the nuclear emergency response
capabilities of the Commissioners, the members of the Emergency TechnicalAdvisory Body, the personnel of the Secretariat, etccDrills planned by local governments
The regional emergency preparedness plan prescribes the local drills to beplanned and conducted by each local government, which the NISA and the NSC
support by dispatching expert staff. Drills reflecting the framework of the Civil
Protection Law are also conducted in part of those drills.

dDrills planned by licensees
Each licensee implements an on-site drill once a year including establishment ofan emergency response headquarters, reporting and communication,
emergency environmental radiation monitoring, etc. based on the Nuclear
Licensee Emergency Action Plan defined for each nuclear site. Each licensee
also implements a drill in order to confirm effectiveness of the organization
implementing the accident management. When the said nuclear site is subject tothe drill conducted by the local government, the on-site drill has been
implemented at the same time with the local drill implemented by the local
government etc.

eParticipation in international exercise
Japan is a contracting party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, and to the Conventions on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency (Emergency Convention). Japan has
continuously participated in the Convention Exercise (ConvEx) organized by the
IAEA in order to ensure implementation of notification in an emergency based on
the provisions of the Convention.

Article 16 (2)1Information to the public and neighboring countries

Measures to provide information to the public
The measures to disseminate disaster prevention plans to the public taken in Japan
include the participation of local residents in the Integrated Nuclear Emergency
Response Drill conducted by the National Government and nuclear emergency
response drills conducted by local governments. In these drills, evacuation, radiation

118

Emergency Preparedness

Article 16

surveys, etc. are actually conducted for residents of areas to be evacuated. Prior to
the drills, the disaster prevention plans are explained to the residents by local
governments.
There are a number of means prepared for providing emergency information toresidents in the neighborhood of reactor facilities in an emergency. A local
government wireless system for emergency preparedness and response is installedin municipalities where nuclear installations are located, for sending emergency
information to residents. The local government wireless system for emergency
preparedness and response is useful as an information providing tool, but because
there may be a case where power is not supplied to the system or the apparatus isout of order, municipalities where nuclear installations are located provide information
using publicity cars as well to ensure the distribution of information to residents.
Furthermore, emergency information is provided to areas to be evacuated, etc. by fire
departments using their vehicles.
The NISA established an emergency information mailing service in July 2008. This isa system by which to provide emergency information to e-mail addresses registered
beforehand quickly in an emergency.
Starting from the drill in 2008, information has been provided to foreign embassies inJapan on a trial basis in order to explore the possibility of providing emergency
information to foreigners staying in Japan and to foreign countries in foreign
languages. In the Integrated Nuclear Emergency Response Drill in October 2008,
emergency information was provided to the French Embassy in Japan. In the 2009
drill, information was provided to the French Embassy in Japan and the Pakistani
Embassy in Japan. The method of providing emergency information to foreignembassies in Japan can be effective to ensure safety of the public in an emergency
without discrimination in Japan, where there is a linguistic constraint incommunication with foreigners residing in Japan. Mass media also play a part inproviding information to residents in the event of a nuclear disaster. Information isreleased timely from the local Off-Site Centers that serve as the front line base for
emergency response and the Emergency Response Center in Tokyo, and theinformation is provided to residents through TV and radio.
There is also a method of providing information through web pages as means toprovide emergency information.
2

Providing emergency information to neighboring countries
Japan, located in the East Asian region, is an island country across the ocean fromthe continent that does not border on any other country in land areas. However,Japan’s neighboring countries across the sea such as China, Korea, etc., havenuclear installations, and sharing of emergency information in a nuclear disaster is amutually important theme. Japan, China and Korea set up a meeting by senior
regulators in August 2009, in which an agreement was made on the establishment ofan early notification system for emergency information. In the past, information

119Article 16

Emergency Preparedness

exchange has been made between persons in charge of these three countries asneeded, and the mechanism of information sharing by the three countries which is
newly agreed on is going to be studied from now on.
Apart from the above mechanism among the three countries, Japan is proactively
utilizing websites concerning the Emergency Convention (ENAC Web) operated by
IEC of the IAEA as an existing information sharing system. The NISA has establishedstandard procedures for notification of information to the ENAC Web, and has been
making efforts to speed up the provision of information. In the Surugawan-oki
Earthquake in August 2009, the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station adjacent to theepicenter was affected by the earthquake, and the nuclear reactors in operation werescrammed. This earthquake occurred early in the morning, but the NISA held anurgent call out of the crisis management staff and established an initial response
system to collect information. As a result, the first information was transmitted to the
ENAC Web only about two and a half hours after the occurrence of the earthquake.
3

Response in a case of a nuclear accident in neighboring countries
Japan is a state party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,
and to the Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency. To implement the response system as expected in the provisions of theConventions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is designated as the Notification Warning
Point (NWP), and the National Competent Authority Abroad (NCA(A)) in the case of a
nuclear accident and a radiation emergency situation that have occurred outside
Japan’s territory. A system has been established by which the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs receives notification when a radiation emergency situation occurs outside
Japan’s territory including neighboring countries, and immediately transfers it to therelevant organizations including the National Competent Authority Domestic(NCA(D)) to share information and take necessary measures. Concerning theConvention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, Japan’s relevant organizations have been registered to IAEA Response
Assistance Network (RANET) as assisting capabilities.

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Siting

Article 17

Article 17

SitingEach Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are
established and implemented:(i)for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear installation for its
projected lifetime;(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals, society and theenvironment;(iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) so as toensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;(iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, insofar as they arelikely to be affected by that installation and, upon request providing the necessary information to such
Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and make their own assessment of the likely
safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear installation.

Outline of Article 17
In siting reactor facilities, it is obligated to conduct an environmental impact study on thesite as it is required to conduct for general large-scale industrial facilities. An
assessment on radiation effects due to the installment of the nuclear installation isconducted within the procedure for a reactor installment license. A re-evaluation of thesite is conducted as needed.

121Article 17

SitingArticle 17 (1)1Evaluation of site related factors

Site-related factors that affect the safety of nuclear installation
An evaluation of site-related factors that affect the safety of nuclear installation isconducted in the process of reviewing an application for a reactor installment license.
An applicant is required to attach document that explains the evaluation results on theconditions such as weather, soil, hydraulic status, earthquakes, and social
environment, etc. concerning the site where the applicant intends to install nuclear
reactor, to an application document for a reactor installment license. The NISA
conducts an evaluation of site-related factors, too. A reactor installment license is
explained in Article 18.

2

Design provision used for external events
The Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Design of Light Water Nuclear Power
Reactor Facilities established by the NSC is adopted in the safety review conducted
by NISA, too, as judgment criteria for the safety review concerning a reactor
installment license. In this Guide, the following points are set forth as what should beconsidered for natural phenomena in designing the facilities:

Structures, systems and components with safety functions shall be assigned toappropriate seismic design categories, with the importance of their safetyfunctions and possible safety impacts of earthquake-induced functional loss
taken into consideration, and they shall be designed to sufficiently withstanddesign seismic forces defined as appropriate.
Structures, systems and components with safety functions shall be so designedthat the safety of the nuclear installation will not be impaired by other postulated
natural phenomena than earthquake. Structures, systems and components withsafety functions of especially high importance shall be of the design that reflects
appropriate safety considerations against the severest conditions of anticipatednatural phenomena or appropriate combinations of natural forces andaccident-induced loads.

Regarding to external man induced events, the following are specified as matters to
be considered in designing:Structures, systems and components with safety functions shall be so designedthat the safety of the nuclear installation will not be impaired by postulated
external man-induced events.
The nuclear installation shall be so designed that structure, systems andcomponents with safety functions are protected by appropriate means
against any unjustifiable access by third persons.

122Siting

Article 17Concerning the consideration to crashing of aircraft, a standard assessment method
is provided in the Assessment Criteria of the Probability of Aircraft Crashing on
Commercial Power Reactor Facilities (bylaw) established by NISA as internal rule in
July 2002, together with general criteria for determining whether or not design
considerations should be given as “possible external man induced events.”

Article 17 (2)1Impact of nuclear installation on individuals, society and environment

Environmental impact assessment
An environmental impact assessment is required for starting a business of over acertain scale, including the installment of a nuclear power station. Procedures for anenvironmental impact assessment are specified in the Environmental Impact
Assessment Act, while the procedures for an environmental impact assessment
unique to power stations are set forth in the Electricity Business Act. Whether anenvironmental impact assessment is required or not is determined depending on thekind and size of a power station, but it is mandatory required for the installment of a
nuclear power station.
(1) Review of scoping items and methods for an environmental impact assessment
A licensee shall prepare a document (Environmental Assessment Procedure)
describing items of an environmental impact assessment and methods forinvestigation, prediction and assessment, and forward it to the Minister of METI andrelevant local governments. The licensee shall also publish the document, make itavailable to the public, and seek opinions from the relevant local governments,
local residents, etc.
Taking into account the opinion of the prefectural governor based on the local
governments’ opinions, and also giving consideration to the opinions of the local
residents, etc., the Minister of METI review the Environmental Assessment
Procedure, and may make recommendations on the items and methods for theenvironmental impact assessment.
(2)

Review and recommendations by the Minister of METI for a draft environmental
impact statement
A licensee shall take into account the opinion of the prefectural governor, respect
the opinions of the local residents as well, make necessary consideration on theitems and methods for the environmental impact assessment based on therecommendations of the Minister of METI, and prepare a document (a draftenvironmental impact statement) describing the results of the environmental impact
assessment for the business concerned. The licensee shall forward the document
to the Minister of METI and relevant local governments, publish the document, and123

Article 17

Sitingmake it available to the public. The licensee shall hold an explanatory meetingand seek opinions from the relevant local governments, local residents, etc.
Taking into account the opinion of the prefectural governor based on the local
governments’ opinions, and giving consideration to the opinions of the local
residents, etc., the Minister of METI review the draft environmental impact
statement after hearing the opinion of the Environment Minister and may makenecessary recommendations.
(3) Alteration order by the Minister of METI to an environmental impact statement
A licensee shall take into account the opinion of the prefectural governor, respect
the opinions of the local residents, etc., make necessary consideration on thedescriptions of the draft environmental impact statement based on therecommendations of the Minister of METI, prepare an environmental impact
statement, and forward it to the Minister of METI.
The Minister of METI may order alteration of the environmental impact statement, if
especially necessary, to ensure appropriate environmental considerations. Whenthe Minister of METI recognizes that alteration order is not necessary, the licensee
is notified to that effect.
On receiving the notification to the effect that alteration is not necessary, thelicensee shall forward the environmental impact statement to the relevant local
governments, publish the document, and make it available to the public.
(4)

Development of a construction plan in line with results of the environmental
impact assessment
By specifying in the requirements for approval of a power station construction thatthe plan should be in line with the environmental impact statement, and by not
approving the construction plan if this is not complied with, the results of theenvironmental impact assessment will be reflected in the business without fail.

(5) Consideration to environmental preservation
With giving appropriate environmental considerations, a licensee shall construct a
power station, carry out alteration of construction work, and perform maintenanceand operation of the power station in line with the descriptions of the environmental
impact statement.
2

Evaluation of nuclear reactor siting as an element for a reactor installment license
The Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Nuclear Reactor Siting Evaluation andApplication Criteria, however, requires the following site conditions in principle toensure public safety in case of rare accident.


There have as yet been no event liable to induce large accident and no such
event is expected to occur in the future.

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SitingArticle 17

There have also been very few events deemed liable to expand disaster.
In relation to their safety guarding facilities, nuclear reactors shall be located at a
sufficient distance from the public.
The environment of the nuclear reactor site including its immediate proximity
shall be such that appropriate measures for the public can be implemented as
required.

The followings are set forth as the conditions that satisfy these requirements:Regarding the area surrounding a nuclear reactor, within “the range in a specified
distance” from the nuclear reactor shall be the non-residential area. Here, “therange of specified distance” means a range of distance where person may be
exposed to radiation hazard, if they remain at the point of that distance under a
Major Accident, and “non-residential area” means the area where the public do
not reside in principle.
The region within the range in specified distance from the nuclear reactor andoutside the non-residential area shall be the low population zone. Here, “therange in specified distance” means that wherein the public may be exposed tosignificant radiation hazard in the case of a Hypothetical Accident unless certain
countermeasures are provided. “The low population zone” means the region
where appropriate countermeasures can be provided to prevent significant
radiation hazard (for instance, a low population density zone).
The nuclear reactor site shall be separated by specified distance from the dense
population zone. Here, the specified distance means the distance where thecumulative value of whole-body dose in case of a hypothetical accident shall besmall enough to be deemed acceptable based on the viewpoint of collectivedose.

In examining an application for a reactor installment license, the regulatory bodyexamines whether or not the basic design of nuclear installations for which a license
is applied conforms to the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act, and also to therequirements of the guidelines formulated by the NSC. The result of the examination
by NISA is reviewed by the AEC and the NSC. Thus in the process of granting alicense for installment, review criteria concerning licensing are appropriately used in
the system in which the regulatory body conducts an examination, and the AEC andthe NSC double-check the result of the examination by the regulatory body as a third
party (secondary review).

Article 17 (3)1Re-evaluation of site related factors

Activities on the re-evaluation of a site

125

Article 17

Siting

All the factors related to site selection must be re-evaluated at the time of alteration of
installment license, such as additional nuclear installation construction at the existing
site, so as to ensure the continuous safe operation of the nuclear installation. And
also the adequacy of the safety design is re-evaluated referring to new findings andnew experiences having impact on the safety design.
2

Result of the re-evaluation
As nuclear installations in Japan hold a large area, they are generally thought to beinsusceptible to change in siting conditions due to population change in the vicinity,
land development, etc.

Article 17 (4)Consultation with other countries having potential to be affected by the
installation

Japan, located in the East Asian region, is surrounded by the sea on all directions, anddoes not border on neighboring countries directly. Nuclear installations in Japan arelocated along the coastline to use sea water for cooling, and all of sites are far enoughaway from neighboring countries. And installments of the facilities and their operation
have no impact on neighboring countries. Therefore, it is not deemed necessary to takethe procedure or make an arrangement to obtain neighboring countries’ consent, etc. insiting the facilities.

126

Design and Construction

Article 18

Article 18

Design and Construction

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i)the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels and methods ofprotection (defense in depth) against the release of radioactive materials, with a view to preventing theoccurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiological consequences should they occur;(ii)

the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation are proven byexperience or qualified by testing or analysis; and,(iii)

the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable operation, withspecific consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface.

Outline of Article 18
In Japan, a mechanism by which the regulatory body reviews the design consists ofthree procedures: licensing for reactor installment in which basic design and safetyassessment concerning siting of nuclear installations are reviewed, approval of aconstruction plan in which detailed design, that is, specific design of facilities, isreviewed, and approval of fuel assembly design in which design of a fuel assembly usedin nuclear installations is reviewed. Concerning the construction of nuclear installations,the regulatory body examines whether or not nuclear installations are constructed or
manufactured as approved by means of a pre-service inspection and a fuel assembly
inspection.

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Article 18

Design and Construction

Article 18 (1)1Implementation of protection in depth

Regulatory procedures concerning design and construction of nuclear installations
The licensing process in the stages of design and construction of nuclear installationsin Japan is shown in Fig. 18-1.
(1) Licensing for reactor installment
In accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act, the person who
intends to install a nuclear reactor shall obtain a license for reactor installment after
undergoing a review of the basic design or basic design policy of the nuclear
installation by the regulatory body. The reactor installment license applicant isrequired to submit to the competent minister an application describing the purposeof use, type, thermal power, and number of units of the reactors, name and addressof the factory or place of business where the reactors are to be installed, location,
structure and equipment of the reactors and their associated facilities, spent fueldisposal method, etc. The applicant is required to attach to the application a
description on safety design of the nuclear installation, a description on types,
extent, impacts, etc. of reactor accidents, and so on. The applicant is also required
to perform a safety assessment for the siting of the nuclear installation, and attach
the result to the application.
The NSC Regulatory Guide used in the secondary examination is utilized in thesafety assessment conducted by the applicant and the safety review conducted by
the regulatory body as well. The Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Nuclear Reactor
Siting Evaluation and Application Criteria specifies the following as principal siting
conditions:there have as yet been no event liable to induce large accident and no such
event is expected to occur in the future. There have also been very few events
deemed liable to expand disaster;in relation to their safety guarding facilities, nuclear reactors shall be located ata sufficient distance from the public;
the environment of the nuclear reactor site including its immediate proximity
shall be such that appropriate measures for the public can be implemented as
required.

As basic objectives to ensure the safety of the public at the time of an accident in
the installed nuclear installations, the Guide specifies:

not to cause radiation damage to the neighboring public, even when assuming
a serious accident (Major Accident) that is deemed to have a possibility ofoccurrence under the worst scenario from technological point of view, byconsidering the events in the site vicinity, the characteristics of the nuclear
reactor and related safety guarding facilities,
to prevent significant radiation hazard to the neighboring public when an

128

Design and Construction

Article 18

accident (here after termed “Hypothetical Accident”), which exceeds the Major
Accident level and is not expected to occur from technological point of view. is
hypothesized,
in case of a Hypothetical Accident, effect on the collective dose shall be
sufficiently small.

The Guide specifies that, in evaluating the suitability of the siting conditions, at least
the following three conditions shall be met in achieving the above basic objectives:
1.
2.
3.

the area surrounding a nuclear reactor, within the range in a specified distancefrom the nuclear reactor, shall be the non-residential area,
the region within the range in specified distance from the nuclear reactor andoutside the non-residential area shall be the low population zone,
the nuclear reactor site shall be separated by specified distance from thedense population zone.

Tentative judging criteria to apply the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Nuclear
Reactor Siting Evaluation and Application Criteria are provided as follows:- as for “the range of a specified distance” in the above 1, a dose level of 1.5Sv forthe thyroid gland (child), and 0.25Sv for the whole body shall be used.
- as for “the range of a specified distance” in the above 2, a dose level of 3Sv for the
thyroid gland (adult), and 0.25 SV for the whole body shall be used.
- as for “separated by specified distance” in the above 3, examples in foreigncountries, such as 20,000man-Sv, shall be referred to.
(2) Approval of a construction plan
A commercial power reactor licensee who has obtained a license for reactor
installment shall do the detailed design of the nuclear installation as the next step,and obtain approval of the design from the Minister of METI in accordance with theprovision of the Electricity Business Act. When nuclear installations are to be newly
constructed, the licensee shall describe, in the application for approval of aconstruction plan, the matters concerning detailed design of facilities specified in
the Rules for the Electricity Business Act, including the reactor, reactor coolingsystem equipment, instrumentation and control system, fuel equipment, radiation
control system, disposal equipment, reactor containment, ventilation stack, steam
turbine, auxiliary boiler, fuel system of auxiliary boiler, smoke processing facility ofauxiliary boiler, and attach explanations specified in the Rules to the application.
When modifications to the existing nuclear installation are to be carried out, thelicensee shall obtain approval for modifications concerning the modifications to thealready approved matters. When examining the application for approval of aconstruction plan, the regulatory body uses the standards of academic societies
and associations endorsed beforehand as criteria in determining whether or not theplan satisfies the performance criteria specified by the law.
The licensee carries out construction work of the nuclear installation after thedetailed design has been approved. The pre-service inspection conducted by the129Article 18

Design and Construction

regulatory body verifies whether or not the construction work is being performed as
approved beforehand..
(3) Pre-service inspection
In accordance with the provision of the Rules for the Electricity Business Act, apre-service inspection is conducted for each construction phase. The specificinspection items for each construction phase are shown in the Annexes.
In manufacturing fuel assemblies used in the nuclear installation, fuel manufactures
shall obtain approval for the design from the Minister of METI beforehand, andunless the fuel assemblies pass a fuel assembly inspection to verity that they are
manufactured as approved, they cannot be used in the nuclear installation as fuel.
The licensee of reactor operation is also obligated to perform a welding inspection
for welded portions of important equipment such as a containment under theElectricity Business Act. The system for performing the welding inspection (theorganization, methods, etc.) is required to undergo examination by the Japan
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization.

Licensee
Application
Basic design

Inquiry
ReportApplication

Application
Inspection*

Completion

examination

ReportReview

Approval of
construction plan

Construction

Secondary

Safety review
License for
installment

Detailed design

NSC

NISA

Subsequent
regulation
review
Pre-service
inspection**

Issuing certificate of permission*: Part of the inspection is conducted by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization at thedirection of the Minister of METI, and the result is forwarded to the Minister of METI.
**: In parallel with the pre-service inspection, the fuel assembly inspection and the safety
management inspection on welding are conducted.

Fig. 18-1 Main procedures in the design and construction stages of nuclear installations
2

Regulatory requirements concerning design of nuclear installations
Nuclear installations in Japan are operated based on the same concept of "protection
in depth" as prescribed in the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) of the IAEA. Original
design of light water reactors in Japan was introduced from the United States ofAmerica. Later on, design of reactors has been improved so that the installations
have become safer and easier in maintenance management through series of
Improvement and Standardization Programs led by METI (then MITI), reflecting the130

Design and Construction

Article 18

operating experiences of licensees of reactor operation who have obtained license forreactor installment, and knowledge obtained in research and development program ofnuclear power industries.
The principle of "protection in depth" is as follows:Prevention of deviating from normal operation conditions by means ofconservative design, manufacturing and construction of the nuclear plant inaccordance with the appropriate quality level and engineering practices,
Detection of the occurrence of an abnormal event at an early stage and taking
preventive measures against its progression into an accident,
Control of the progression of accident and mitigation of its consequences, even if
assuming that progression to an accident might not be prevented at thepreceding stage.

In order to apply these fundamentals to design of nuclear installations, the Regulatory
Guide for Reviewing Safety Design that was established by the NSC stipulates thefollowing items.
The first protection is preventive measures for the occurrence of an abnormal event.
More specifically, the first protection implies such measures of designing with a safetymargin, implementing strict quality control in fabrication, inspecting the facilities andcomponent to be fabricated as required by the design, and preventing degradation of
performance through monitoring, check and maintenance during the operation.
Each component, equipment and system of nuclear reactor facility is to be designed
considering the importance of its safety function, and the quality control during design
and manufacturing is to be conducted corresponding to the importance of safetyfunction.
The second protection is to prevent expansion of abnormalities. More specifically, thesecond protection implies the early detection of the abnormal condition, its correction
or taking measures in advance to prevent the progression into an accident.
The third protection is to mitigate the consequence of an accident. More specifically,
the third protection implies taking measures to ensure the safety of the public in thevicinity by mitigating the consequence of the accident.
In Japan, through these measures, it is possible to reduce the potential for theoccurrence of a severe accident to the extent that its actual occurrence would betechnologically inconceivable, and to maintain the risk of the nuclear installation at a
sufficiently low level. Therefore, preparation of the accident management can be
regarded as a measure to reduce this low risk further.
From the viewpoint of confining radioactive materials, nuclear installations aredesigned, constructed and operated, in such a way as to confine radioactive materials
within a series of physical barriers. These physical barriers are the fuel pellet, the fuelcladding, the reactor coolant pressure boundary and the reactor containment. The
requirements for these physical barriers in the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety
Design etc. and the outcome of the design improvements in them are as follows:131Article 18

Design and Construction

Fuel and claddings
The fuel assembly shall be so designed that; the integrity will be retained under the various conditions that could occur in the
nuclear reactor in service; the safety protection system will actuate the reactor shutdown system, etc. sothat the allowable design limit of the fuel shall not be exceeded at abnormaltransients during operation;
 the reactor core cooling will not be impaired by a reactivity insertion accident
and, more specifically, the maximum fuel enthalpy by analysis will not exceed
the specified value; and the emergency core cooling system will be capable ofpreventing major damage to the fuel in a loss of coolant accident, and the fuelcladding metal water reaction will be limited to sufficiently small amount.

These requirements are stipulated in the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety
Design, and the requirements for safety assessment are stipulated in the Regulatory
Guide for Evaluating Reactivity Insertion Events of Light Water Nuclear Power
Reactor Facilities and the Regulatory Guide for Evaluating Emergency Core Cooling
System Performance of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors.
Reactor coolant pressure boundary
Concerning the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the Regulatory Guide for
Reviewing Safety Design specifies the following: the reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be so designed that its integrity will
be ensured during normal operation and abnormal conditions,
 the reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed not to exhibit brittle
behavior and develop any quickly propagative failure during normal operation,
maintenance, testing, and abnormal conditions,
 the leakage of the reactor coolant, if any, from the reactor coolant pressure
boundary shall be designed to provide for quick and proper detection,
 the reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed to be capable ofbeing tested and inspected to verify its integrity throughout the service life of
the nuclear reactor,
 pressure on the reactor coolant pressure boundary shall not exceed thespecified value during reactivity insertion events.



Reactor containment
Concerning the reactor containment, the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety
Design specifies the following: the reactor containment shall be designed to withstand the load resulting fromthe postulated events for reactor containment design and an appropriate
seismic load and prevent the specified leakage rate from being exceeded withthe aid of properly operating isolation functions,
 the reactor containment shall be so designed that the leakage rate of the entire
containment can be measured under a specified pressure on a periodic basis, the reactor containment boundary shall be designed not to exhibit brittle

132

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Article 18

behavior and develop any quickly propagative failure during normal operation,
maintenance, testing and abnormal conditions, and the pipelines that penetrate
the reactor containment walls shall in general be fitted with containment
isolation valves.
Concerning design of nuclear installations, the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing
Safety Design specifies that systems with safety functions of an especially highdegree of importance shall be designed to have redundancy, diversity or
independence. Classifications of the structures, systems and components thatmake up nuclear installations and their safety functions are shown in Table 18-1.
Definitions and functions with respect to classifications of importance of safetyfunctions are shown in the Annexes.
Table 18-1 Classifications of importance of safety functions
Classification
by function
Classification
by importance
Structures, systems
and components
related to safety

Class 1
Class 2
Class 3Structures, systems and components withsafety functions
With functions toWith functions toprevent an occurrence mitigate an impact ofabnormalities (MS)of abnormalities (PS)
PS-1
MS-1
PS-2
MS-2
PS-3
MS-3

Structures,
systems andcomponents
without safetyfunctionsThose that
perform only afunction otherthan safetyfunctions

Structures, systems andcomponents not related to safety

Redundancy or diversity and independence are required for design of MS-1, part ofPS-1, and part of MS-2 on the table. Part of PS-1 is a valve that serves as part of
the reactor coolant pressure boundary by being open during normal operation andclosed at the time of an accident. Part of MS-2 is a system having a function tocognize the state of a plant at the time of an accident, which is a minimum system
required for monitoring the conditions of the three most important functions inensuring safety, that is, reactor shut-down, core cooling, and radioactive material
confinement.
In the safety design assessment of nuclear power reactor facilities, postulated
event groups are defined for "abnormal transients during operation" and"accidents", respectively, based on the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety
Assessment, as mentioned later, then the safety is evaluated by conducting safety
analysis. These event groups almost conform to the classification defined in the
Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) of IAEA.
The person who intends to install a nuclear reactor conducts the safety analysis forthese postulated event groups, compares the analysis results with each criterion,and confirms that the safety design is appropriate.
On the other hand, NISA examines the safety analysis of the person who intends to133

Article 18

Design and Construction

install a nuclear reactor, and confirms its validity, getting an independent analysis
report performed by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, if necessary.
The postulated events for the safety assessment are selected and evaluated in thefollowing manners:
Malfunctions and operational errors of the systems or components, which areapplied in the basic design, are analyzed, and the event which results in theseverest case is selected among the events in the similar propagation process as
the postulated event group for the safety assessment. Depending on the possibilityof occurrence and the degree of its impact at the time of occurrence, these
postulated events are classified into "abnormal transients during operation" or"accident" as provided in the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Assessment,
and the safety of those postulated events are also evaluated based on the criteria
defined to each classification.
a Abnormal transients during operation"Abnormal transients during operation" are defined as events that result inabnormal conditions caused by a single equipment failure, malfunction or single
operational error assumable in the lifetime of the nuclear installation, and theexternal disturbance assumable to occur with similar frequency of the single
equipment failure, etc. during the operation of the nuclear installations, andfourteen events and twelve events are selected for PWRs and BWRs,
respectively. The safety analysis is conducted for these events based on thecriteria of the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Assessment, the integrity ofcore and reactor coolant pressure boundary is confirmed, and the adequacy ofthe safety design of important safety related equipment, such as the safety
protection system and the reactor shut-down system is logically clarified.
b Accident
The "accident" is an abnormal condition exceeding the "abnormal transientsduring operation", which is assumed to occur, although the frequency ofoccurrence is very small, and a release of radioactive materials from nuclear
installations should be evaluated. Ten events and nine events for PWR and BWR,
respectively, are selected. The safety analysis is conducted for these events
based on the criteria of the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Assessment,
and it is confirmed that the core does not result in a significant damage and areactor containment boundary is intact. Moreover, no risk of excess radiation
exposure to the general public in the vicinity is confirmed. And it is logicallyconfirmed that the safety design of engineered safety features is appropriate.
Specifically in the analysis of the "accidents", for the loss of coolant accidents,
the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Assessment and the "Regulatory
Guide for Evaluating Emergency Core Cooling System Performance of Light
Water Nuclear Power Reactor" are applied, and for the reactivity insertion events,
the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Assessment and the "Evaluation
Guide for Reactivity Insertion Events of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor
Facility", etc. are applied for the verification and evaluation respectively.

134

Design and Construction

3

Article 18

Main modifications implemented in response to the result of safety assessment
When nuclear installations are to be installed in Japan, designing with a sufficientmargin is required in consideration of the prevention of an accident exceeding adesign basis accident or the mitigation of the impact of such an accident, andbackfitting is not institutionalized. However, voluntary modifications of facilities basedon the result of the safety assessment are not restricted, as in the case of amodification for improvement of a seismic resistance margin. An example of this is theconstruction work for improvement of the seismic safety margin at the Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Station.
In Japan, seismic safety of nuclear installations has been re-evaluated since 2006 in
accordance with the revision of the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Designof Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities, and in some nuclear installations, voluntary
seismic reinforcing work has been carried out in light of the revision of the Regulatory
Guide.
The Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station had ensured seismic safety to withstand anearthquake ground motion (vibration on the bedrock) of 600 gal, taking into
consideration the Ansei-Tokai earthquake (magnitude of 8.4) exceeding a possible
Tokai earthquake (magnitude of 8.0), and a larger earthquake (magnitude of 8.5), but
in light of the deliberations by the national government on the revision of theRegulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities
that started in July 2001, the licensee of the reactor operation carried out the seismic
margin improvement work voluntarily, recognizing that it is important to improve theseismic safety margin, reflecting the latest findings. Before starting the improvement
work, they confirmed the seismic safety margin for a target earthquake ground motionof about 1,000 gal in the buildings, structures, equipment, piping, etc., sorted out
necessary items of the improvement work, and carried out planning, detailed review,
and prior investigations for the work. They completed the improvement work in March
2008 for Unit 3, and in December 2007 for Units 4 and 5.

Article 18 (2)1Incorporation of proven technologies

Regulatory requirements concerning technologies to be incorporated
In Japan, such actions as feedback of the operating experience and utilization of thetechnical knowledge obtained through testing and analysis have been taken, so thatthe safety and reliability of nuclear installations has been enhanced. The breakdowns
are described below. The new knowledge obtained through these actions has beentimely incorporated in existing guidelines and used to develop new guidelines.
(1)

Feedback of operating experiences from nuclear installations



From the experience of the secondary system piping rupture accident due to thethinning of the piping at the Mihama Power Plant, Unit 3 in 2004, in which the135Article 18

Design and Construction

steam that erupted invaded the main control room, a requirement of airtightness
for a main control room was added as an item to be examined at the time of asafety review of new nuclear installations.
Many fire events have occurred repeatedly in and outside Japan and in the past
OSART, review has made recommendations/suggestions on fire protection
management. So that, the standards and the guidelines on design andmanagement for fire protection of nuclear installations have been re-examined
and improved in Japan. The requirements were clarified for each stage of "fireprevention", "early stage detection and extinguishing of fire" and "fireconsequence mitigation". Reflecting these activities, the fire-protection standards forthe design is being re-examined and the preparation of standards of academic
societies and industrial associations for operation management have been
progressing.
Electric cables currently used in the nuclear installation degrade gradually innormal operating conditions by oxidation due to environmental factors such astemperature and radiation etc., and may occur rapid degradation in theenvironment of high temperature steam and high radiation at the time of a
postulated design base accident. The studies are carried out to evaluate suchaging and performance degradation and to confirm the integrity of cables during
in-service operation. In order to evaluate the accelerate ageing method, thestudies have been conducted using test samples of the safety-related cablecurrently used in the nuclear installation and obtained the deterioration data ofthermal and radiation ageing adopted sequentially and simultaneously. The
objective of research is to establish the comprehensive assessment method of
the cable aging characteristics and define environmental design conditions
appropriately based on the new knowledge obtained in recent years. Thereby theevaluation methods and evaluation test guideline of aged cables will beestablished on the basis of the normal and accidental conditions in a nuclear
installation.

(2) Feedback of the knowledge obtained through test and analysis
Recognizing the importance of assuring safety in development and utilization of
nuclear energy, the researches for development of safety standards, guidelines,
reference materials for acceptance criteria in safety review and assessment etc., aswell as improvement of the safety itself, are promoted in Japan.
The major subjects related to the research are shown in the following:
1) Study corresponding to advanced light water reactor fuels
 Study on the safety of high-burn-up MOX fuel
 Confirmatory test on the safety margin of high burn-up fuels
 Reliability demonstration test of 9X9 type fuel
 Reliability demonstration test of nuclear design methodology for the full MOX
core

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Design and Construction

Article 182) Study on advanced safety assessment technologies
 Research of advanced nuclear and thermal-hydraulic best estimate method Improvement of safety analysis codes for nuclear power reactors
3) Study on severe accident Improvement of the accident management-related knowledge base fornuclear installations
 Study on sustenance of the containment confinement function at the latestage of a severe accident
4) Seismic safety study of nuclear installations
 Study on the design earthquake ground motion with a consideration of thecharacteristics of the postulated earthquake Test on the seismic-assessment technologies of nuclear installations
 Study on the hazard map for seismic design

2

Measures taken by licensees of reactor operation to incorporate demonstrated
technologies
In designing nuclear installations, a licensee of reactor operation is required to ensure
their safety. When the licensee of reactor operation is to obtain approval of aconstruction plan, the technology adopted in the design of nuclear installations isrequired to have been verified by the licensee.
Licensees of reactor operation conduct research on nuclear safety for the purpose of
improving safety and reliability required for their own business, research for the
purpose of explaining adequacy for safety regulations, and research for promotingsocial understanding of nuclear safety. Besides the research conducted by a licensee
independently, there is cooperative research of electric power companies conductedjointly by licensees when there are common research needs and large sums ofmoney are required. Concerning the individual research programs, there is research
entrusted to reactor manufacturers, fuel manufacturer, general contractors, etc.,
cooperative research with the JAEA, etc., and research conducted by the Central
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, which is run by benefits from licensees
of reactor operation, depending on fields of research needs and research contents.

Article 18 (3)1Design for reliable, stable and manageable operation

Regulatory requirements concerning reliability, stability and ease of operations
management
It is the safety design requirements concerning operating management to makenuclear installation more reliable, more stable and more manageable by taking into
human factors and man-machine interface in consideration. These requirements are
implemented in design and operation of the commercial power reactors in Japan.
Considerations of the design to an operator behavior, requirements on the design of a137

Article 18

Design and Construction

control room and concrete design approach for these requirements are described in
the report of Article 12.
The regulatory body examines the application for approval of a construction plansubmitted by a licensee of reactor operation in accordance with the provision of theElectricity Business Act. And the approval of construction plan is issued after
confirming that detailed design of nuclear installations conforms to the licensing
conditions for reactor installment under the Reactor Regulation Act, and to thetechnical requirements established by the Minister of METI.
2

Measures taken by licensees of reactor operation concerning reliability, stability
and ease of operations management.
(1) Incorporation of new technology
When new technology is to be incorporated in nuclear installations, the licensee ofreactor operation is required to verify the technology.
For example, the application of digital instrumentation and control equipment
started initially for a waste processing system in the 1980s or so, and, later, a digitalcomputer was applied mainly for an instrumentation and control system of the nonsafety grade system.
Based on the operating performance acquired during these applications, the scopeof application was expanded in a step by step manner, and the digital computer
started to be incorporated in the instrumentation and control system of safety
protection system as well. The licensee of reactor operation carries out verificationand validation for the incorporation in the safety protection system to ensure thesoftware quality.
(2) Measures for operations management
Good practices and non-compliances identified during periodic inspections, as wellas the experiences in design, construction and operation of domestic and foreign
nuclear installations, were analyzed, and the results are incorporated in designmodification, improvement of construction methods, etc., when they can berecognized to be effective, during the course of licensing for installment, approvalof construction plan and pre-service inspection.
For accidents or failures that occurred in the domestic nuclear installations as wellas in foreign reactors, the corrective measures are implemented after identifying
the cause of failures.
From the standpoint of the comprehensive preventive maintenance of nuclear
installations, periodic safety review is performed for each power reactor with theinterval of approximately ten years. And its safety and reliability are confirmed,
reflecting the situation of operational safety activities and the latest technicalknowledge. The situation of periodic safety review is described in Article 19.

138

Operation

Article 19

Article 19

Operation

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i)

the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate safety analysis
and a commissioning program demonstrating that the installation, as constructed, is consistent withdesign and safety requirements;(ii)

operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and operational experienceare defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for operation;(iii)

operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted in accordancewith approved procedures;(iv)

procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to accidents;(v)

necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available throughout the
lifetime of a nuclear installation;(vi)

incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant license to(vii)

programs to collect and analyze operating experience are established, the results obtained and thethe regulatory body;conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms are used to share important
experience with international bodies and with other operating organizations and regulatory bodies;(viii)

the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation is kept to theminimum practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and in volume, and any necessary
treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste directly related to the operation and on the same site
as that of the nuclear installation take into consideration conditioning and disposal.

Outline of Article

19

The regulatory system for ensuring safety in the operation of nuclear installations has
not changed much from the time of the last report. Licensees of reactor operation cancommence operation of their nuclear installations only after they have passed a
pre-service inspection, obtained approval to the operational safety program, andimplemented all other procedures provided for by the law. While nuclear installations arein operation, inspections such as the periodic inspection and the operational safety
inspection are conducted by the regulatory body, in addition to safety assessments suchas periodic assessments, and aging technical evaluations conducted by licensees ofreactor operation. Licensees of reactor operation are obligated to report when an
important safety related event has occurred in accordance with the law.
Enhancements have been made to the inspection system during this reporting period.
The inspection that was conducted in a uniform manner is now performed flexibly
considering the characteristics of individual nuclear installation. Also, enhancements
have been made to the inspections during operation. The safety management at thetime of plant shut-down was also enhanced in response to the comprehensive check of
power generation facilities in 2006. These programs were put into practice by therevised Ministerial Order promulgated in January 2009.

139

Article 19

Operation

Article 19 (1)Initial authorization

In Japan, the person who intends to install nuclear installations and operate them shallobtain a license for reactor installment in accordance with the provision of the Reactor
Regulation Act, and then obtain approval to a construction plan on the detailed design ofthe reactor facilities in accordance with the provision of the Electricity Business Act.
One of the initial approval procedures for operation of a nuclear installation in Japan is a
pre-service inspection, the certification criterion of which is that the construction of thenuclear installation to be inspected is being done according the approved construction
plan, and meets the technical requirements established by the Minister of METI. It isalso necessary to obtain approval to the operational safety program, and approval to thephysical protection program before handling nuclear fuel materials in accordance withthe provision of the Reactor Regulation Act.
Licensee

NISAConstruction

OperationalsafetyprogramApplication

Physicalprotection
programApplication

Review
Approval
Review
Approval
Application
Inspection

Pre-service
inspection
ReportCompletion
Issuing
certificate

Periodic assessment

Ageing technical evaluation

Inspection

Inspection

Operational
inspection

safetyRegulation
review

NSC

Physical protection
inspection

Operation
Application
Periodic inspection
Inspection

Fig.19-1 Main processes in the operation stage
1

Pre-service inspection
Before commencing construction of a nuclear installation in Japan, licensee of reactor
operation is required to obtain approval of the Minister of METI to the design of thenuclear installation in advance. Whether or not the construction is actually performed

140

Operation

Article 19

as approved is verified by pre-service inspection conducted by the Minister of METI.
Licensee of reactor operation is required to undergo pre-service inspection and pass
the inspection in accordance with the provision of the Electricity Business Act in order
to use the nuclear installation. However, licensee of reactor operation may use thenuclear installation without passing a pre-service inspection in the case where thereactor is used for test purposes, or in the case where there is a special reason forhaving to use a completed part of the nuclear installation, to which the licensee need
to obtain approval of the Minister of METI on the period and method of that use, or in
the case where the Minister of METI issues an instruction to allow that the nuclear
installation may be used without undergoing a pre-service inspection, recognizing that
there is no problem from the viewpoint of the conditions about the place of installmentof the nuclear installation or the contents of the construction.
After obtaining approval to the construction plan, a licensee submits an application fora pre-service inspection to the Minister of METI. This inspection is conducted inconvenience at an appropriate time in each construction phase. Prior to eachinspection, such documents as pre-service inspection guidelines are prepared by theregulatory body, and the inspection is conducted according to these documents. On
receiving an application for a pre-service inspection from the licensee, NISA gives aninstruction on the implementation of the inspection to JNES to delegate part of theinspection work in accordance with the provision of the Electricity Business Act. See
the Annex for inspection items of the pre-service inspection for each construction
phase in accordance with the provision of the Electricity Business Act.
In the pre-service inspection, inspection items are specified in advance. Those
inspection items are determined based on the design of the nuclear installation, andsafety performance required of the facilities, and acceptance criteria for them aredetermined based on the construction plan approved in advance. The safety analysis
in the pre-service inspection has previously been conducted in the design phase, andhas been approved by the Minister of METI after the regulatory body’s review.
Therefore, the safety analysis is not conducted at this stage.
NISA is entrusted with matters relating to the pre-service inspection by the Minister of
METI, and electric facility inspectors of NISA conduct the actual pre-service
inspection work. Inspectors of JNES that conducts part of the inspection work carryout the pre-service inspection according to the instruction of the Minister of METI, andnotifies the Minister of METI of the result. NISA puts together the result of theinspection carried out by electric facility inspectors, who are personnel of NISA, andthe result of the inspection carried out by inspectors of JNES, and reviews the resultof the pre-service inspection in a comprehensive manner. When the inspection result
is determined as acceptable as a result of the review by NISA, the Minister of METI
issues a pre-service inspection certificate to the licensee.
In the approval of the operational safety program, the regulatory body reviews theapplication submitted by the licensee of reactor operation. The operational safety141Article 19

Operation

program is required to specify measures to be taken under the situation that can havea direct impact on safety, such as the establishment of limiting condition for operation,and measures to cope with deviation from operational limits to ensure safe operationof nuclear installation. It is thought, therefore, that the safety analysis conducted by
the licensee in formulating the operational safety program should be reviewed strictly.
2

Operation plan
In accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act, licensees of reactor
operation are required to submit a three-year operation plan for each reactor every
year starting from the year when the commissioning is expected to start. The
operation plan needs to include a power generation plan, a heat consumption plan, anuclear fuel loading plan, etc.

Article 19 (2)1Operational limits and conditions

Regulatory requirements concerning operational limits and conditions
In Japan, licensees of reactor operation are required to establish the operationalsafety program and obtain approval of the Minister of METI before commissioning inaccordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act.
Concerning the limiting condition for operation of nuclear installation, shut-down
margins, thermal limits of a reactor, etc. need to be specified in the operational safety
program.
In the event that the operational limits are not observed, the Minister of METI mayorder the licensee of reactor operation to shut-down the nuclear installation inaccordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act.
In the event that a nuclear installation has deviated from operational limits, thelicensee of reactor operation is required to declare the deviation immediately andreport to the regulatory body.
The licensee of reactor operation takes measures to return to normal operation fromthe deviation of operational limits within the allowable operating time for the deviation,
but in the case where the deviation is not resolved within the allowable time, thelicensee of reactor operation is required to shut down the reactor.
On receiving a report of the deviation from operational limits from the licensee ofreactor operation, the regulatory body investigates the cause, and provides otherlicensees with feedback when needed.

2

Establishment, implementation and revision of limiting condition for operation

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Article 19

In nuclear installation, operating teams operate and monitor the reactor in shift, anddo their duties including observing limiting condition for operation, and taking
measures in the event of deviation from the limits. Limiting condition for operation,and measures to be taken in the event of deviation from the limits are documented
specifically in the operational safety program, and operators in the shift are required
to carry out the procedures appropriately. Operating teams are given a time to leave
the reactor on a regular basis, during which they receive training using a plant
operation simulator. The training for the measures to be taken for deviation fromoperational limits, together with training for other operational procedures are
effectively used in the actual operation of the reactor.
Limiting condition for operation is the key point for the safe operation of a nuclear
installation. They need to be changed in such cases as when a modification is madeto the facilities involved. As mentioned above, limiting condition for operation need to
be specified in the operational safety program, and their revision requires approval of
the Minister of METI. This means that in revising limiting condition for operation, thelicensee of reactor operation is required not only to conduct a review including thesafety assessment, but also to undergo a review by the regulatory body.

Article19 (3)1Procedures for operation, maintenance, inspection and testing

Regulation for nuclear installations in operation
The following are the components of regulations for nuclear installations in service:Application for alteration in the installment license and application for theconstruction plan approval
When the licensee of reactor operation intends to modify or repair the nuclear
installation, and matters that have been approved for the nuclear installation are to
be altered, the licensee of reactor operation is required to obtain approval of the
Minister of METI to the alternation of the installment license. If matters related tothe construction plan which have already been approved, such as specific facility
design, are to be altered, the licensee needs to obtain approval of the Minister of
METI to the construction. However, if the construction is of a routine nature, suchas the replacement with the same parts associated with ageing degradation, etc.,
the construction is permitted by notification only. With regard to the facility for whichapproval to a construction plan has been newly obtained for its modifications, etc.,
the licensee needs to undergo a pre-service inspection and pass it before using thefacility as in the case of original construction.
Approval of the operational safety program143Article 19

Operation

In accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act, the licensee ofreactor operation is required to establish and observe the operational safety
program for the operation and maintenance of a nuclear installation. The
matters to be documented in the operational safety program are provided forin the Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors inaccordance with the Reactor Regulation Act as follows:

Matters relating to a system for the observance of the relevant laws andthe operational safety program (including involvement of top
management) Matters relating to a system for fostering safety culture (including
involvement of a top management) Matters relating to the quality assurance of the nuclear installation(including a method of root cause analysis, a system for performing theanalysis, position of operation manuals, etc. in the operational safety
program, and matters relating to a periodic assessment of the nuclear
installation)
 Matters relating to duties and organization of personnel engaged in theoperation and management of the nuclear installation (excluding mattersin the next subparagraph) Matters relating to the scope and content of duties of a chief engineer ofreactors, and authority and position in the organization of a chief engineerof reactors required in conducting supervision of operational safety
 Matters listed below relating to the education on operational safety for
personnel engaged in the operation and management of the nuclear
installation:
 Matters relating to an implementation policy of the education on
operational safety (including formulation of an implementation plan) Matters listed below relating to the content of the education on
operational safety:- Observance of relevant laws and the operational safety program- Structure, performance and operation of the nuclear installation- Radiation control- Handling of nuclear fuel materials and objects contaminated by nuclear
fuel materials- Measures to be taken in an emergency
 Other important matters relating to the education on operational safety
for the nuclear installation
 Matters relating to the operation of the nuclear installation (excluding thematters in the following two subparagraphs)
 Matters relating to the operating period of nuclear installation

144

Operation






















Article 19

Matters relating to the safety examination for the operation of the nuclear
installation
Matters relating to the designation of radiation controlled areas, access
controlled areas and environment monitoring areas, and restriction ofaccess to these areas
Matters relating to ventilation and drainage monitoring equipment
Matters relating to monitoring of the dose, the dose equivalent, theconcentration of radioactive materials and the surface contamination
density of radioactive materials of objects contaminated by radioactive
materials, and the decontamination
Matters relating to the management of radiation measuring instruments
Matters relating to patrols and checks of the nuclear installation and theirassociated measures
Matters relating to receipt, delivery, transport, storage and other handlingof nuclear fuel materials
Matters relating to treatment of radioactive waste
Matters relating to measures to be taken in an emergency
Matters relating to the establishment of a system for initial fire fighting
Matters relating to appropriate recordkeeping and reporting on theoperational safety (including an observance status of the operationalsafety program) of the nuclear installation (including reporting to top
management when events of accidents or failures specified in the Article
19-17, or similar events occur)
Matters relating to the maintenance management of the nuclear
installation (including matters relating to a technical evaluation of ageing
degradation and a long-term maintenance management policy)
Matters relating to sharing of technical information on operational safetyobtained from licensees of reactor operation that have carried out
maintenance and inspection among licensees of reactor operation
Matters relating to releasing of information on nonconformity in the eventthat nonconformity has occurred
Other required matters relating to the operational safety of the nuclear
installation

The operational safety program is the rule for the licensee to operate a nuclear
installation, and can be revised after the approval by reflecting change in theorganization of the licensee of reactor operation, and modifications of the nuclear
installation. For altering the operational safety program once approved, thelicensee of reactor operation needs to obtain approval of the Minister of METI to therevised operational safety program. Meanwhile, the Minister of METI may orderalteration to the operational safety program in accordance with the provision of the145Article 19

Operation

Reactor Regulation Act when the alteration is thought necessary for preventing
hazards by objects contaminated by nuclear source materials and nuclear fuelmaterials, or by the reactor.
Since the operational safety program is a document at the highest rank for theoperation of nuclear installation, the licensee of reactor operation prepares various
operation manuals, test guidelines, etc. to establish procedures for the actual
operation and maintenance of the nuclear installation. These subordinate
documents for the operational safety program are managed in an appropriatemanner under the quality management system of the licensee of reactor operation,
ensuring their consistency among the operational safety program.
 Periodic inspection
Periodic Inspection of a nuclear installation (excluding that underdecommissioning) is conducted periodically in order to prevent accidents andfailures and to mitigate the consequences in reactor, associated facilities andsteam turbine facilities that constitute electric facilities for power generation. This is
the inspection conducted for facilities especially important in ensuring safety of a
nuclear power generation facility.
Starting from October 2003, JNES carries out part of the periodic inspection on
behalf of NISA according to the instruction of the Minister of METI given inaccordance with the provision of the Electricity Business Act, and notifies the
Minister of METI of the result. NISA compiles the result of the inspection carried out
by electric facility inspectors, and the result of the inspection by JNES, andevaluates the periodic inspection. The licensee of reactor operation is required toundergo the periodic safety management review to examine the organization,
inspection methods and schedule control involved in the implementation of theperiodic operator's inspection, and other matters specified in the ordinance of METI.
The periodic safety management review is conducted by JNES, and the result of
the review is reported to NISA. NISA evaluates the periodic safety management
review based on the report from JNES.
According to the provision of the Electricity Business Act, the periodic inspection isconducted at intervals of 13 months or 18 months specified by the notice of the
Minister of METI for a reactor and associated facilities. During the periodic
inspection it shall be verified that these facilities are maintained and operated inconformance to the technical requirements defined by the ordinance of METI.
In the periodic operator's inspection mentioned later, electric facility inspectors of
the NISA, and inspectors of JNES applying the quality assurance standards,
witness the inspection of the facilities particularly important to safety, or check
relevant records, and verifies the process of the periodic operator's inspection(appropriateness of inspection procedures, inspection staff, justification of theinspection results, etc.). Starting from January 2009, verification is additionally146

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Article 19

conducted for the maintenance program. This is a procedure in which the licenseeof reactor operation submits a check and maintenance plan of individual
instruments (maintenance program) for each operation cycle, based on the checkrecords, deterioration status of the instruments etc. to NISA. NISA conducts theverification of the maintenance program prior to the periodic inspection. Also,
Nuclear Safety Inspectors verifies the implementation status of maintenanceactivities of the licensee in the operational safety inspection, etc.
Currently, about 60 items are subject to inspection in the periodic inspection. The
inspection is conducted with emphasis on the status of conformity to technicalrequirements relating to nuclear facilities to ensure the integrity of each facility.


Periodic operator's inspection and periodic safety management review
Licensees of reactor operation have voluntarily verified conformance to TechnicalStandards of the nuclear power generation facilities heretofore, but inaccordance with the amendment of the Electricity Business Act in 2003, thisvoluntary verification action was defined as the “periodic operator’s inspection”
by licensees of reactor operation, and the implementation status of the inspection
has been verified by the regulatory body since then.
Specifically, JNES examines the implementing system of this periodic operator's
inspection by reviewing documents and on-the-spot examination from thestandpoint of the inspecting organization, inspection methods, schedule control,
recordkeeping, control of contractors, and appropriateness in education andtraining, which are the six items specified by the law (periodic safety
management review).
NISA establishes the “evaluation committee on the periodic safety management
review for nuclear power stations,” and, based on the result of the periodic safety
management review by JNES, performs a comprehensive evaluation of theimplementing system.
NISA notify the result of the evaluation in either of the following two categories, tothe licensee of reactor operation that has undergone the review.
1

2

The periodic operator's inspection implementing system at the organizationthat has undergone the review is an appropriate and sufficient one that allows
the organization to perform a periodic operator's inspection autonomously
and appropriately.
The periodic operator's inspection implementing system at the organizationthat has undergone the review requires verification that corrective measures
have been established, or needs to be improved.

When the periodic operator's inspection implementing system is evaluated as
appropriate and sufficient, the licensee is encouraged to make further efforts to147

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ensure safety by the adoption of incentive regulation, such as the exclusion ofrecordkeeping, and education and training from the six items subject to review as
specified by the law, effective from the next review.


Operational safety inspection
The operational safety inspection is the inspection to verify that the licensee ofreactor operation complies in the operation and maintenance of the nuclear
installation with the operational safety program which was approved by the
Minister of METI beforehand. It is conducted four times a year for two weeks or
so each time. In the operational safety inspection, the Nuclear Safety Inspector
can enter the office, etc., inspect documents, equipment, etc., ask relevant
persons questions, and have them submit necessary samples in accordance withthe provision of the Reactor Regulation Act,
In addition to the operational safety inspection four times a year, in accordancewith the provision of the Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Power Reactors,
the Nuclear Safety Inspector may check the observance status of the operationalsafety program when the operations mentioned below are conducted, on theoccasion of the periodic inspection provided for in the Electricity Business Act: Operations relating to start-up or shut-down of a reactor
 Operations relating to the replacement of fuel
 Operations relating to switching of a residual heat removal cooling sea
water system of a boiling water light weight reactor
 Operations relating to a decrease of water level in a reactor vessel of apressurized water light weight reactor, and operations relating to theremoval of residual heat conducted while water level in a reactor vessel
remains decreased
Under the inspection system introduced in January 2009, licensees of reactor
operation are obligated to collect/accumulate ageing degradation data forcontinuous improvement, and to conduct a degradation assessment due to aging
based on the data collected from routine maintenance. Licensees of reactor
operation, therefore, have been enhancing the monitoring of conditions of theirequipment during operation. NISA checks implementation status of thesemaintenance activities in the operational safety inspection.
The operational safety inspection four times a year and the periodic inspection
are conducted for the 54 units of nuclear installation in operation four times ayear for a total of more than 200 times. It has been 10 years since the operationalsafety inspection was introduced, and licensees’ awareness of safety and theiractions for ensuring safety have been sophisticated. For this reason, there has
been no issue in recent years that may have a significant impact on the148Operation

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operational safety of nuclear installation, and the operational safety of nuclear
installations is maintained in a satisfactory manner.


Maintenance management of nuclear installations
In accordance with the provision of the Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial
Power Reactors, the licensee of reactor operation is required to take themeasures mentioned below concerning check, testing, inspection, repair,
replacement, modification and other necessary measures carried out for the
maintenance of a nuclear installation (maintenance management) during
operation or shut-down:
 To establish a policy on the maintenance management of nuclear
installation (hereafter referred to as maintenance management policy)
so that the performance of the nuclear installation specified in thereactor installment license can be maintained.
 To establish objectives of the maintenance management to be achieved
according to the maintenance management policy (including objectivesof the maintenance management to be established quantitatively for areactor and systems for which the maintenance management isimportant).
 To formulate a plan to implement the maintenance management,
specifying the following matters, and implement the maintenancemanagement accordingly in order to achieve the objectives of themaintenance management:- Matters relating to the commencement and period of the plan toimplement the maintenance management- Matters relating to methods, frequency, and timing of check, testing,inspection, repair, replacement, modification, etc. (check, etc.) of thenuclear installation- Matters relating to measures taken for ensuring operational safety incarrying out check, etc. of the nuclear installation- Matters relating to methods for confirming and evaluating the result ofcheck, etc. of the nuclear installation- Matters relating to corrective actions for methods, implementation
frequency, and timing of check, etc. of the nuclear installation to be
conducted, and to preventive measures reflecting the confirmation of
the result and the result of evaluation of check, etc. of the nuclear
installation- Matters relating to records on the maintenance management of thenuclear installation
 To periodically evaluate plans for the maintenance management policy,
the objectives of the maintenance management and the implementation

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Article 19Operationof the maintenance management of the nuclear installation
To reflect the result of the evaluation in the preceding subparagraph in
the plans for the maintenance management policy,, the objectives ofthe maintenance management, or the implementation of themaintenance management of the nuclear installation
To take special measures for the measures in each of the preceding
subparagraphs depending on the status of the nuclear installation in thecase where the operation of the reactor is suspended for a considerable
period of time, or the nuclear installation is in other special conditions
from the viewpoint of implementing the maintenance management

When the long-term maintenance management policy mentioned later has beenformulated, or altered, the licensee of reactor operation is required to reflect it in
the maintenance management policy.
Periodic Safety Review
In accordance with the provision of the Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial
Power Reactors, the licensee of reactor operation is required to evaluate theimplementation status of operational safety activities in the nuclear installation,and the situation of reflection of the states of arts technical knowledge in theoperational safety activities in the nuclear installation at the interval not
exceeding ten years. The periodic safety review had been conducted since 1992
as administrative guidance, but was enshrined into law in the Ministerial
Ordinance for Commercial Power Reactors in 2003 as safety measures, and, in
2005, deterioration of organizational climate of the licensee was added as amatter to be evaluated. In August 2008, NISA established a guideline for the
implementation of the periodic safety review, and called on the licensees ofreactor operation to carry out their periodic safety review based on this guideline.
As matters subject to the periodic safety review, the guideline mentions theevaluation of the implementation status of operational safety activities in the
nuclear installation, the evaluation of the situation of reflection of the state of thearts technical knowledge in the operational safety activities in the nuclear
installation, and the probabilistic safety assessment. Concerning the probabilistic
safety assessment, the guideline mentions it is desirable that this assessment be
conducted by the licensees of reactor operation on a voluntary basis.
Though the basic framework of the periodic safety review has not changed fromthe time of the last report, there have been some improvements made for thedetails in concert with an improvement to the system related to nuclear safety
such as the improvement made to the inspection system.
In this system, the licensee is required to examine the need of effective additional
measures to further improve safety and reliability of plants based on the result of150

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the periodic safety review.


Ageing Management Technical Assessment

The licensee of reactor operation is required to conduct technical evaluation nolater than 30 years after commissioning of the reactor and re-evaluate every 10
years since then. The ageing management technical assessment (AMTA) of
nuclear power plant which is defined by the Minister of METI as important inensuring safety of nuclear installation, and also of the equipment and structures
mentioned below shall be conducted. Based on the result of the evaluation, thelicensee of reactor operation must establish a policy for the maintenancemanagement of the nuclear installation (long-term maintenance program) to be
implemented for the coming ten years.
 Equipment and structures with a function to generate actuation signals
to engineered safety features and reactor shut-down systems
 Equipment and structures with a function to cognize the state of thenuclear installation at the time of an accident
 Equipment and structures with a function to shut down the nuclear
installation safely from outside the central control room Equipment and structures with a function to contain reactor coolant andthose which are not important safety related equipment
 Equipment and structures with a function to circulate reactor coolant
 Equipment and structures with a function to store radioactive materials
 Equipment and structures with a function to supply power and thosewhich are not important safety related equipment
 Equipment and structures with an instrumentation and control function
for the nuclear installation
 Equipment and structures with a function to assist operation of thenuclear installation
 Equipment and structures with a function to prevent diffusion of fission
products into reactor coolant
 Equipment and structures with a function to clean up reactor coolant
 Equipment and structures with a function to mitigate the reactor
pressure increase Equipment and structures with a function to control the power increase Equipment and structures with a function to make up reactor coolant
 Equipment and structures important in taking emergency response
measures, and equipment and structures with a function to cognize
abnormal situations
The licensee of reactor operation is required to document the long-term
maintenance program in the operational safety program and obtain approval of151Article 19

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the Minister of METI. The contents of implementation for each operation cyclethat have fleshed out the long-term maintenance program are to be reflected in
the check and maintenance plan for individual instruments (maintenance plan)
based on the check records and the deterioration status, and verified by NISA.
The implementation status of the maintenance plan is verified by the Nuclear
Safety Inspectors of NISA in the operational safety inspection, etc. See Fig.
19-2 for the outline of the maintenance activities.

Approval of operationalsafety program

30th year

Operational safety program
Long-term maintenance program(every 10 years)
Ageing Management
Technical Assessment
Maintenance plan
Periodic
inspection

Specific implementation
timing, implementation
plan and progress situation

Prior notification

Reflect
Enhancedmaintenance plan

Enhancedmaintenance plan

Enhancedperiodic
inspection

Enhancedmaintenance plan

Enhancedperiodic
inspection

Check the maintenance plan implementation status by inspection (operational safety inspection, etc.).

Fig. 19-2 Maintenance activities at reactor facilities
On-site inspection
In accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act or the Electricity
Business Act, the Minister of METI may conduct an on-site inspection to theextent that is necessary for enforcing the laws. In the on-site inspection, theInspector may enter the office, place of business, etc. of the licensee of reactor
operation, inspect documents, records and other objects, and ask relevant
persons questions.
 Chief reactor engineers and persons responsible for operation
The chief reactor engineers assigned to each nuclear reactor by the licensee ofreactor operation need to have their qualification certified by the national
examination and the appointment or dismissal of them needs to be reported to
NISA. The chief reactor engineers may offer their opinion to the superintendentsof the plants when they recognize it is necessary for the safe operation, may give
advice or recommendation to respective duty positions, and may take part inestablishing plans for safe operation.
The persons responsible for operation are designated by the licensee of reactor
operation and assigned to each nuclear reactor. The mission of the persons

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responsible for operation is to perform the monitoring of the overall operation andsupervise/give guidance to operators. They understand the situation ofoperations and the present condition of the safe operation by periodic patrol tothe premises.
The documentation developed and kept by the licensee of reactor operation
should include the records relating to fuel assemblies, inspection of the nuclear
reactor, operation, radiation management, maintenance, abnormalities andaccidents, and the meteorological condition, in accordance with the Reactor
Regulation Act. Moreover, subjects, methods, results, etc. of the inspection
should be recorded and kept as the result of the periodic operator’s inspection inaccordance with the Electricity Business Act.
2

Establishment, implementation and revision of operation procedures
Operation procedures established at each nuclear power station are documented
through approval process within the power station, and applied to the operation of therespective nuclear installation. In the case where the procedures are altered due tothe modification of facilities, etc., the operation procedures need to be revised in an
appropriate manner so that operators may not operate the nuclear installation
erroneously.
The operation manual covers operations required for operating the nuclear
installation. The operation manual is kept in the control room, etc. so that the staff
involved in the operation of the nuclear installation can use it readily. In addition to theoperation manual, the operational safety program and the quality assurance plan, etc.,
which are the documents at higher rank, are equipped in the control room so that therelevant staff of the nuclear installation can use them when necessary.
In revising the operation manual, the involvement of the operators who actuallyengage in the operation of nuclear installation is an important factor. The operators
carry out various procedures in their daily operational actions, and in such a case as
when the operation manual needs to be revised, it is common practice that they are
given an opportunity to offer an opinion based on their operating experiences.
The operation manual is a document established on the basis of the operationalsafety program and is included in the scope of the application of the quality
management system. The operation manual is reviewed periodically, and applied tothe operational actions while being revised as needed.

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Article 19 (4)1Operation

Procedures for responding to operational occurrences and accidents

Regulatory requirements concerning response to abnormal eventsThe licensee of reactor operation is obligated to describe “matters relating to theoperation of the nuclear installation” in the operational safety program. They include
procedures for operation in an accident or an abnormal event in addition to themanual for normal operation so as to cope with accidents and abnormal eventssmoothly. The matters relating to “measures for abnormal events” include: recognitionof the situation; elimination of the cause; measures necessary for preventing
propagation; and measures after a reactor scram. Operation procedures in an
emergency are one of the operation procedures based on the operational safety
program, and the regulatory authority reviews the procedures, the implementation
system, etc. in the operational safety inspection.

2

Operation procedures in an emergency
Operation procedures in an emergency are established as a subordinate provision
based on the operational safety program. They are formulated, for example, on thebasis of events such as earthquakes and fires, or formulated on the basis of change
in operational parameters of reactors.

3

Response to severe accidents
Licensees of reactor operation in Japan have voluntarily implemented their own
measures for preventing severe accidents and mitigating the impacts based on“Accident management as measures against severe accidents in light water nuclear
power reactor facilities (formulated by the NSC on May 28, 1992, and partially revisedon October 20, 1997).”
Typical facility modifications for preventing severe accidents and mitigating theimpacts are as follows:
PWR:
 Alternative recirculation (installation of alternative recirculation pumps, orcore flooding using the containment spray system by installing the tie-line
between the containment spray system and the residual heat removal
system) Containment natural convection cooling (utilization of the nonsafety grade
containment recirculation unit) Alternative component cooling (utilization of the HVAC chilled-water, etc.)
 Water injection into a reactor containment (utilization of fire pumps)

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 Common usage of power supply among units (usage of power from theneighboring nuclear installation through the tie-line) Controlled combustion for hydrogen-concentration control (hydrogen
combustion by igniters; only for the ice condenser type PWR)
BWR:
 Alternative reactivity control (recirculation pump trip and alternative
automatic control rod insertion)
 Alternative cooling water injection (utilization of the condensate watermakeup system and the fire protection system) Automatic reactor depressurization (automatic depressurization by thereactor low water level signal)
 Heat-removal from a reactor containment (pressure venting for preventing
vessel rupture and utilization of drywell cooler, etc.)
 Power supply system (common usage of power supply among theneighboring nuclear installations)
For implementing accident management at operating commercial nuclear installations,the licensees of reactor operation have been developing the accident management
measures progressively, substantiating the facilities as mentioned above during theoutage of the periodic inspection as well as establishing operational measures suchas implementing system, procedures, education of personnel, etc. The accident
management measures that were prepared by licensees of reactor operation werereported to NISA in May, 2002, together with the PSA results of internal events forrepresentative reactor types for the purpose of quantitatively verifying theeffectiveness of enhancement of the safety. NISA evaluated the effectiveness of theaccident management measures, and based on the opinion of specialists of the"Accident Management Workgroup" established under the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Subcommittee, compiled the evaluation report in October 2002, which was
submitted to the NSC. The PSA results of the internal events for all commercial powerreactor facilities under operation (other than representative reactor types) werereported to NISA by the licensees of reactor operation in March 2004. The
development programs of the accident management for commercial nuclear
installation under construction were reported to NISA by the licensees of reactor
operation for three units in July 2003, and one unit in March 2008. The evaluation
results were reported to the NSC by NISA in September 2003 and in October 2008
respectively. The NSC evaluated the reports and concluded that they werereasonable in December 2003, and in January 2009 respectively.

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Article 19 (5)Engineering and technical support

In Japan, the reliability verification test and safety research programs on major
components and equipment have been carried out to enhance the safety of nuclear
installations. Promotion of these tests and research is shown in Article 14.
In Japan, private electric power companies own and operate nuclear installations aslicensees of reactor operation, and each of the electric power companies own power
stations such as hydraulic and heat power stations, and power grids in addition to the
nuclear power stations. Due to this form of business, headquarters operations of electric
power companies normally specialize in the business management and its peripheralbusiness in many cases. Meanwhile, electric power companies having researchfacilities for technological development provide technical support to the respective
power stations other than the headquarters operations.
The Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry is a technical support
organization overriding the framework of electric power companies. It is the organization
established by donations from electric power companies that is engaged in research,
survey and experiment on electric power engineering and economy required for theoperation of electricity business, and overall coordination of them. The Institute gives
technical support to electric power companies in such a manner that they are entrustedwith research services by electric power companies and pass the research results on tothem.
In principle, the regulatory body has no regulatory means for the technical support fortechnological development of electric power companies. However, in the case where
alterations of reactor installment licenses, construction plan approvals, etc. thosealready obtained by the licensee of reactor operation have become necessary as aresult of the technical support, the regulatory body conducts a review according to thepredetermined procedures for the alterations.
A nuclear installation is a huge system in which the system to control a reactor andgenerate electric power as the core, and systems to support it are operated. Generally,an operating team that conducts monitoring and operation of the nuclear installation iscomposed of the personnel of the licensee of reactor operation, but part of a peripheral
system, such as management of clothes, etc. used in a controlled area, radiation
management, management of waste is conducted by contractors. Also, during theperiodic inspection period, contractors carry out maintenance work for reactor facilities
based on the contracts with the electric power company.
In the case where the licensee of reactor operation entrusts work to specialized
contractors as technical support in the daily operation management of the nuclear
installation, the licensee of reactor operation is required to supervise and manage thecontractors in an appropriate manner based on their own quality management system.
This is the matter to be verified by the regulatory body in the operational safety
inspection, etc.

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Article 19 (6)1Article 19

Reporting of incidents significant to safety

Regulatory requirements
In accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act, the licensee isobligated to report to the Minister of METI an accident, a failure, etc. of the nuclear
installation immediately, and the status and measures taken for them within 10 days.
Further, the licensee is required to report to the Minister of METI immediately if theaccident falls under the category of a specific initial event or a nuclear emergency
provided in the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency.

2

Outline of reporting criteria and reporting procedures
Event reporting criteria in accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act
are provided for in the Ministerial Order issued under the Reactor Regulation Act. The
licensee is required to report to the Minister of METI according to these event
reporting criteria. The event reporting criteria defined by the Ministerial Order are
shown in the Annex.
NISA has built a system in which to receive the notification of event reports even in
holidays and at night in order to fulfill the responsibility of receiving the event reports
to the Minister of METI and respond. When an event to be reported occurs, thelicensee is required to immediately provide the first report to the staff of NISA, andkeep reporting according to law.

3

Events reported in the past three years
Of the events that occurred in FY 2007, FY 2008 and FY 2009, those reported to the
NISA in accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act are shown in the
Annex.
The reported events were 23 in FY 2007, 24 in FY 2008, and 16 in FY 2009. Of these
events, seven were rated as level 1 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES),
and the others were rated as zero (including provisional rating).

4

Provision of documents and official announcement related to the reported eventsThe licensee of reactor operation is primarily responsible for the events that haveoccurred at the nuclear installation, and is required to conduct an investigation into
the cause and take measures to prevent recurrence in a responsible manner. The
regulatory body verifies that the process is carried out in an appropriate manner, or157

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gives guidance so that the process can be carried out in an appropriate manner.
The licensee of reactor operation conducts an investigation of the event, creates
documents compiling matters relating to the cause and countermeasures, submits
them to NISA, and makes them public.
NISA receives reports from the licensee and officially announces contents of theevent, response of NISA, provisional or official INES rating without delay.
NISA holds a meeting of the council established under the Advisory Committee for
Natural Resources and Energy in a timely manner to discuss the contents reported by
the licensee of reactor operation, and listens to the opinion of experts on the cause
and recurrence-preventive measures to verify the adequacy of the licensee’s
investigation and measures. Based on the licensee’s final reports, NISA discusses the
INES rating for the event, and after the discussions in an open session of the council,
determines the formal INES rating. The document created by NISA showing the
grounds for assessment concerning the determination of the formal INES rating ispublished to the webpage of METI.
Concerning the recurrence-preventive measures for the event, the licensee isrequired to take appropriate preventive measures against not only the findings
obtained from the event that has occurred at the nuclear installation, but also thefindings obtained from the event that has occurred at other facilities in accordancewith the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act. NISA directs installations other than
the installation where the event has occurred to take preventive measures against
similar events as needed in writing.
5

INES utilization policy
In Japan, events that occurred domestically had been rated using Japan’s own
nuclear event scale since July 1989, but since August 1992, accidents and failures
have been assessed using the International Nuclear Event Scale. In switching to the
new scale, comparison was made between Japan’s own nuclear event scale and theINES, and it was found that almost all the events rated as zero to level 1 on Japan’s
own nuclear event scale for the defense in depth were assessed as zero on the INES.
To better adapt the INES to Japan’s assessment, level zero on the INES is classified
into zero plus (0+) and zero minus (0-) so that accidents and failures are
distinguished in more detail. Level zero on the INES is classified into either an eventthat is not significant in safety but can impact on safety (0+) or an event that does not
impact on safety (0-).
See the Annex for the assessment status of accidents and failures by the INES in
Japan.

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Article 19 (7)1Article 19

Operational experience feedback

Regulatory measures concerning operational experience feedback
In accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act, the licensees ofreactor operation are required to report to the Minister of METI without delay whenimportant safety related events occur. NISA makes public news releases and reports
to the NSC incidents or failures upon immediate receipt of the information from thelicensees. NISA also makes a public news release and reports to the NSC the causes
and recurrence-preventive measures when the investigation is completed. The NSC
points out issues on the content of the report when necessary. The NSC hasestablished the Special Committee on Analysis and Evaluation of Nuclear Accidents
and Failures and investigated and reviewed in and outside Japan. In March 2007 thiscommittee summarized the guidance to use the incident and failure information of
nuclear installations.
NISA assesses each incident or failure in detail to extract the lessons learned withrespect to the safety, being advised by subcommittee members of the Advisory
Committee on Nuclear and Industrial Safety, who are experts on operation
management, inspection and radiation control. When necessary, NISA requests thelicensees of reactor operation to reflect the lessons in their operation andmaintenance, or reflects them in the regulatory activities.
Operating experiences, etc. concerning safety of a nuclear installation other than
accidents and failures are fed back to licensees of reactor operation for their activities
to ensure operational safety. This information is assessed as safety quality
information, for which necessary measures are taken in a timely manner, and isshared among licensees of reactor operation through the NUCIA database mentioned
later.
JNES has the system to collect and analyze safety information in and outside Japan.
JNES provides collected safety information and the results of analysis for NISA for
quick sharing with NISA. JNES and NISA have jointly established the “Safety
Information Review Meeting” to evaluate and to take adequate regulatory measures.
The “Safety Information Review Meeting” is held periodically.

2

Measures taken by licensees of reactor operation to utilize operating experiences
The licensees of reactor operation and the Japan Nuclear Technology Institute(hereafter referred as to JANTI) perform overseas information exchange through theInstitute of Nuclear Power Operation (hereafter referred as to INPO) and the World
Association of Nuclear Operators (hereafter referred as to WANO) Tokyo Center.
Furthermore, each licensee of reactor operation utilizes individual agreements on
information exchange with overseas utilities and manufacturers. There are many

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examples of utilizing the feedback of operational experiences by licensees of reactor
operation, which are reflected in preventive maintenance and planned repair andreplacement of parts. Examples for BWR are replacements of the core shroud andthe in-core monitoring housing, etc. An example for PWR is replacement of the upper
head of reactor vessel.
Meanwhile, the licensees of reactor operation established the specializedorganization named, “Japan Nuclear Technology Institute”, on March 15, 2005 inorder to develop the technical infrastructure and promote the voluntary operationalsafety activity for the purpose of contributing to the activation of nuclear powerindustry. Concerning the safety information of domestic nuclear installations, they
developed a system named “NUCIA” that is a nuclear information publication library,with which information including minor events can be shared all over Japan, and it isposted on the internet site of JANTI. In February 2009, JANTI reexamined the criteria
to register the incidents and events to NUCIA.

Operation and maintenanceinformation
Patrol and checkin operation

Abnormal events during
operation (power surge,
steam leak, water leak, etc.)

Maintenancebased on normal
maintenanceprogram- Faults discovered during periodic inspection(damage to and cracking of equipment, etc.)- Measures for preventive maintenance

Other information

Report toGovernment

Subject to reporting by law

Implementation ofnecessary measures

Event Evaluation

Safety-related quality
information

Measures basedon feedback of
information fromother companies

Official
announce-ment

Each company
determines scope ofannouncement (withconsiderations for local
public)Information of other companies (shared
among license holders)
NUCIA database
Analysis/
evaluation
Measuresrequired

Domestic information• Events subject toreporting by law• Safety-related quality
information
Foreign information (WANO,
INPO, NRC, vendors, etc.）

Sharing and publicpresentation of registeredinformation on events
subject to regulatory
requirements andsafety-related quality
information

Fig. 19-3 Outline of the operating experience feedback through the NUCIA

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The scope of the operational experience feedback encompasses all fields including
nuclear installations and personnel training. The specific feedback to be utilized
differs depending on individual operational experiences. An example of the feedback
applied to a wide scope is the re-examination of fire-fighting facilities from theexperience of the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in which piping for water for
fire fighting ruptured and this interfered with fire fighting efforts. In addition to there-examination of the fire-fighting facilities, the feedback led to the establishment ofan In-house Fire Brigade System and conducting of training for communication of
information.
The feedback is made as the guidance by the regulatory body, but there are also
efforts taken by the licensees of reactor operation autonomously through the NUCIA
database as mentioned above.
For the purpose of sharing information, Japan BWR Owners Group was formed by
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Chubu Electric PowerCo, Inc. Hokuriku Electric Power Co., the Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. the Japan
Atomic Power Company, Electric Power Development Co. Toshiba, and Hitachi-GE
Nuclear Energy in April, 2006, and Japan PWR Owners Group was set up by
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc. the Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. Shikoku ElectricPower Co., Inc. Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. the Japan Atomic Power Company,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation in October, 2005.
3

International sharing of operational experiences
Japan thinks that it is important to widely share operational experiences of nuclear
installations internationally, and that sharing of them is the responsibility of Japan
having many operational experiences of nuclear installations in improving
international nuclear safety. Concerning international sharing of information by NISA
and JNES, there is a system by which to share accident and failure information withinternational organizations such as the IAEA and the OECD/NEA, and as bilateral
cooperation.
With regard to sharing operating experiences with international organizations,information is proactively provided to the Incident Reporting System (IRS). In Japan,
domestic operating experiences are collected and compiled into a database by JNES,
and this information is provided to the IRS.
The bilateral information sharing has been made through the periodic informationexchange meetings.
Concerning the information that is particularly required to be shared with theinternational community, NISA provides the information to relevant recipients
individually. One of the examples is the provision of information about theexperiences at Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station when the Niigata-ken

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Chuetsu-oki Earthquake struck in July 2007. NISA not only transmitted theinformation to the international organizations, etc., but provided the information at
various international conferences. Also, NISA cooperated with the investigation by theinvestigation team from the IAEA.

Article 19 (8)1Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste on site

Management of spent fuel on site
Storage of spent fuel at a nuclear installation is done by dry storage casks in addition
to spent fuel pools. For the storage of spent fuel, necessary measures need to betaken for cooling in accordance with the provision of the Rules for the Installation,
Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors, and the storage facilities need to be
designed in such a manner to ensure their sub-criticality. That the storage facilities
are constructed as designed is verified in the pre-service inspection. Also, that the
integrity of the storage facilities is maintained during the in-service period is verified
by the periodic operator's inspection conducted by the licensee.
Since the management of spent fuel on site is positioned as part of the measure forthe safety of the nuclear installation under the safety regulations, its implementation
status is verified by the operational safety inspection

2

Management of radioactive waste on site
In accordance with the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act, the licensee of reactor
operation is required to take appropriate measures for transport, storage andprocessing of radioactive waste in plants as measures necessary for safety. When
processing of radioactive waste in plants, the licensee of reactor operation is required
to ensure that the processing is carried out under the supervision of the person who
has necessary knowledge of the processing and the radiation protection involved in
the disposal.
Concerning the disposal of radioactive waste, measures to be taken are specified foreach state of the waste. Radioactive waste in the gaseous state is required to bedischarged by the ventilation facility, or stored in a waste gas tank for disposal.
Radioactive waste in the liquid state is required to be discharged by the discharge
facility, to be stored in a waste liquid tank, to be enclosed in a containment, or
solidified integrally with a containment and stored in the storage facility, or to beincinerated in the incineration system.
Radioactive waste in the solid state is required to be incinerated in the incineration
system, enclosed in containment or solidified integrally with containment, and stored
in the storage facility. The radioactive waste such as large machinery which is162

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extremely difficult to dispose of by this method, or the radioactive waste that needs adecrease in the level of radiation over time is required to be stored in the storage
facility.
Radiation monitoring necessary for preventing radiation hazards, criteria that
containers used for disposal should meet, etc. are specified for each storage methodin the Rules for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Power Reactors, andappropriate handling of radioactive waste is ensured.
The licensee of reactor operation stores radioactive waste generated in the nuclear
installation to the storage facility installed on the site until it is transported to disposal
facilities.
Radioactive waste is classified into gaseous waste, liquid waste, and solid waste. The
gaseous radioactive waste is generated by ventilating equipment or rooms in theradiation management area, and is discharged from a stack while being monitoredwith an emission monitor.
The radioactive waste in the liquid state is the liquid waste generated in a controlledarea, and is not discharged to the environment in principle, but is reused after it isfiltered, demineralized, and condensed, exception is the radioactive waste of a very
low level which is discharged after monitoring the radioactivity.
The solid waste like the waste materials generated in repair work at the time of theperiodic inspection, etc. is enclosed in drums as it is, or volume-reduced byincineration, melting, compression, etc., enclosed in drums, and stored at theradioactive waste storage facility on site.
Though there is no regulation that obligates licensees of reactor operation to minimize
radioactive waste generation in Japan, they are making efforts to minimize theamount of radioactive waste voluntarily as there is a limit to the amount of radioactive
waste that can be stored on site, and disposal of radioactive waste is costly.
Treatments such as evaporative concentration of liquid waste, and compression or
melting of solid waste are examples of licensees’ voluntary efforts to reduce theamount of waste.
Since the management of radioactive waste on site is positioned as part of themeasures for the safety of the nuclear installation under the safety regulations, its
implementation status is verified in the operational safety inspection.
3

Procedures for the clearance
Concerning radioactive waste generated from nuclear installations, “materials not
requiring treatment as radioactive waste” are divided from the radioactive waste
safely, and recycled/reused or disposed of appropriately and reasonably under theclearance system in Japan.
In implementing this clearance system, licensees of reactor operation formulate
methods for measurement and assessment of radioactivity concentration level for

163

Article 19

Operationmaterials to be cleared, etc. in accordance with the provision of the Reactor
Regulation Act, and the regulatory body is involved appropriately.
NISA is involved in the following two steps:
First step:NISA checks the adequacy of “methods for measurement and assessment ofradiation concentration level” formulated by the licensees of reactor operation andapproves it.
Second step:NISA confirms that licensees’ measurements and assessment are properly done by
the approved methods and their wastes are below the clearance level by checking
records, etc. (Part of the confirmation is conducted by JNES in accordance with theReactor Regulation Act.)
This clearance system applies to general radioactive waste not only from nuclear
installations, but also from nuclear facilities including nuclear fuel cycle facilities, etc.

164

D Annex

DAnnexes

1 List of nuclear installations
2 List of incidents reported under the Reactor Regulation Act during the reporting period
3 List of standards of academic societies and associations endorsed by NISA
4 Outline of JEAC 4111-2009: Rules of Quality Assurance for Safety of Nuclear Power
Plants

5 List of nuclear emergency response drill during the reporting period
6 Definitions and functions with respect to classifications of importance of safety functions
7 Inspection items of Pre-service Inspection on each construction phase defined by theElectricity Business Act

8 Incident reporting criteria defined by the Ministerial Ordinance
9 References

165

D Annex

1

List of nuclear installations (Article 6)

LicenseePower
Station

Unit

ReactorType

Output(MWe)Commissioned

Status

1

PWR

579

1989/06/22

In Operation

2

PWR

579

1991/04/12

In Operation

3

PWR

912

2009/12/22

In Operation

1

BWR4

524

1984/06/01

In Operation

2

BWR5

825

1995/07/28

In Operation

3

BWR5

825

2002/01/30

In Operation

1

BWR5

1,100

2005/12/08

In Operation

2

ABWR

1,385

In Planning

BWR5

825

In Planning

1

BWR3

460

1971/03/26

In Operation

2

BWR4

784

1974/07/18

In Operation

3

BWR4

784

1976/03/27

In Operation

Fukushima

4

BWR4

784

1978/10/12

In Operation

Diichi

5

BWR4

784

1978/04/18

In Operation

6

BWR5

1,100

1979/10/24

In Operation

7

ABWR

1,380

In Planning

8

ABWR

1,380

In Planning

1

BWR5

1,100

1982/04/20

In Operation

Fukushima

2

BWR5

1,100

1984/02/03

In Operation

Daini

3

BWR5

1,100

1985/06/21

In Operation

4

BWR5

1,100

1987/08/25

In Operation

1

BWR5

1,100

1985/09/18

In Operation

2

BWR5

1,100

1990/09/28

In Operation

3

BWR5

1,100

1993/08/11

In Operation

4

BWR5

1,100

1993/08/11

In Operation

5

BWR5

1,100

1990/04/10

In Operation

6

ABWR

1,356

1996/11/07

In Operation

7

ABWR

1,356

1997/07/02

In Operation

1

ABWR

1,385

In Planning

2

ABWR

1,385

In Planning

1

BWR4

540

1976/03/17

Under Decommissioning

2

BWR4

840

1978/11/29

Under Decommissioning

3

BWR5

1,100

1987/08/28

In Operation

4

BWR5

1,137

1993/09/03

In Operation

5

ABWR

1,267

2005/01/18

In Operation

6

ABWR

1,400

Hokkaido
Electric PowerTomariCo., Inc.

Onagawa
TohokuElectric Power
Co., Inc.

Higashidori
Namie/Odaka

Tokyo ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Kashiwasaki
KariwaHigashidori

Chubu ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Hamaoka

166

In PlanningD Annex

Power
StationLicensee
Hokuriku
Electric Power
Co.

Shika

MihamaThe Kansai
Electric Power

Takahama

Co., Inc.

Oi

The Chugoku

ShimaneElectric Power
Co., Inc.
Kaminoseki
ShikokuElectric Power

Ikata

Co., Inc.

KyushuGenkaiElectric Power
Co., Inc.
Sendai

The Japan

ReactorType

Output(MWe)Commissioned

Status

1

BWR5

540

1993/07/30

In Operation

2

ABWR

1,358

2006/03/15

In Operation

1

PWR

340

1970/11/28

In Operation

2

PWR

500

1972/07/25

In Operation

3

PWR

826

1976/12/01

In Operation

1

PWR

826

1974/11/14

In Operation

2

PWR

826

1975/11/14

In Operation

3

PWR

870

1985/01/17

In Operation

4

PWR

870

1985/06/05

In Operation

1

PWR

1,175

1979/03/27

In Operation

2

PWR

1,175

1979/12/05

In Operation

3

PWR

1,180

1991/12/18

In Operation

4

PWR

1,180

1993/02/02

In Operation

1

BWR4

460

1974/03/29

In Operation

2

BWR5

820

1989/02/10

In Operation

3

ABWR

1,373

2011/12

Under Construction

1

ABWR

1,373

In Planning

2

ABWR

1,373

In Planning

1

PWR

566

1977/09/30

In Operation

2

PWR

566

1982/03/19

In Operation

3

PWR

890

1994/12/15

In Operation

1

PWR

559

1975/10/15

In Operation

2

PWR

559

1981/03/30

In Operation

3

PWR

1,180

1994/03/18

In Operation

4

PWR

1,180

1997/07/25

In Operation

1

PWR

890

1984/07/04

In Operation

2

PWR

890

1985/11/28

In Operation

Tokai

GCR

166

1966/07/25

Under Decommissioning

Tokai No. 2

BWR5

1,100

1978/11/28

In Operation

1

BWR2

357

1970/03/14

In Operation

2

PWR

1,160

1987/02/17

In Operation

3

APWR

1,538

In Planning

4

APWR

1,538

In Planning

1

ABWR

1,383

2012/03

Under Construction

1979/03/20

Under Decommissioning

Atomic Power
Co.

Unit

Tsuruga

Electric Power
Development
Co., Ltd

Oma

Japan Atomic

Fugen

ATR

165

Energy Agency

Monju

FBR

280

Under Construction

Remarks
In Planning: Plan was announced to public by the electric company and yet not licensed for installation
Under Construction: Licensed for installation and yet not passed Pre-service Inspection
In Operation: Passed Pre-service Inspection
Under Decommissioning: Approved of Decommissioning Plan

167

D Annex

2

List of incidents reported under the Reactor Regulation Act during the reporting
period (Article 6 and Article19)

Incidents reported in 2007 fiscal year
Nuclear Power
StationSendai Unit1
Onagawa
Unit 1
Fukushima
Daini Unit 2
Fukushim
Daiichi Unit 1
Hmaoka Unit 5
Kashiwazaki
Kariwa Unit 3
Kashiwazaki
Kariwa Unit 6
Kashiwazaki
Kariwa Unit 6
Kashiwazaki
Kariwa Units 1-7

Ohi Unit 1
Tomari Unit1
Mihama Unit 2
Takahama Unit 2

Tsuruga Unit 2
Ohi Unit 2
Onagawa
Unit 3
Hamaoka
Unit 4
Shimane Unit 1
Hamaoka
Units 1 & 2
Takahama
Unit 2
Takahama
Unit 3
Ohi Unit 2
Hamaoka Unit 1

INES

Incidents

Date

Deterioration of the Steam Generator Tubes
Reactor Manual Shutdown Due to Low Flow rate of High
Pressure Injection System2007/05/10

0-

2007/05/22

0-Erosion of part of the suppression pool wall

2007/06/08

0-

Damages of an Emergency Diesel Generator

2007/6/25

0-

2007/07/05

0-

2007/07/16-

2007/07/16

0-

Damage of the drive axis universal joint of the overhead crane,

2007/07/24-

Overflow of water to the refueling floor,

2007/07/25

0-

2007/09/03

0-

2007/09/19

1

2007/09/25

0-

2007/10/02

0-

2007/10/18

0-

2007/11/07

0-

2007/11/10

0-

2007/11/15

0-

2007/11/21-

2007/11/27

0-

2007/12/04

0-

2008/02/04

0-

2008/03/12

0-

2008/03/17

0-Power Reduction due to inoperability of the reactor average
power monitor
Fire of the house transformer, Consequences of “the Niigataken
Chuets-oki Earthquake in 2007”
Leakage of water containing radioactive materials to
non-controlled area,

Reactor Manual Shutdown due to leakage of reactor coolant fromthe primary coolant pump seal water injection filters
Reactor Manual Shutdown due to in-operability of EDG
Flaws Found in the Welding Portion of Steam Generator-A
Primary Coolant Inlet Piping Nozzle Stub
Malfunction of the Control Rod Drive System
Flaws Found in the Welding Portion of the Steam Generator
Primary Coolant Inlet Piping Nozzle StubThinning of the Elbow Portion of the Secondary Main Feed-water
PipingReactor Manual Shutdown Due to “Off-Gas Dehumidification
Cooler outlet Hydrogen concentration high” at the off-gas
treatment system
Manual shutdown due to stoppage of the reactor coolant cleanup
systemDeformation of the refueling machine’s fuel gripper
A Crack Found in the Pass-through Section of the Common
Exhaust Stack
Damage to the weld on the primary coolant inlet nozzle stub inthe steam generator
Damage to the weld on the primary coolant inlet nozzle stub inthe steam generator
Decrease in power output due to one of the four control rods
found to be out of position
Corrosion in the condensate tank

Remarks- : Not applicable for evaluation*: In Japan there are 0- and 0+ for the events evaluated as INES Scale 0.

168

Scale

D Annex

Incidents reported in 2008 fiscal year
Nuclear Power
StationTomari Unit2
Sendai Unit1
Ohi Unit 3
Fukushima
Daiichi Unit 5
Kashiwazaki
Kariwa Unit 6
Tomari Unit1
Tsuruga Unit 2
Shimane Unit 1
Tokai Daini
Tomari Unit1
Monju
Tsuruga Unit 2
Takahama
Unit 4
Takahama
Unit 4
Hamaoka
Unit 5
Fukushima
Daini Unit 3
Fukushima
Daiichi Unit 1
Tsuruga Unit 1
Hamaoka
Unit 3
Hamaoka
Unit 5
Fukushima
Daiichi Unit 1
Onagawa
Unit 1
Shimane Unit 1
Fukushima
Daiichi Unit 3

Incidents
Damage to welds on the primary coolant inlet nozzle stubs in thesteam generators
Damage to the Charging/High-Pressure Injection Pump
Flaws Found in the Welding Portion of the Reactor Vessel Loop-A
Outlet Nozzle Stub
Deviation from the Limiting Conditions for Operation due toinoperability of high pressure core injection system and reactor
core isolation cooling system
Defective coupling between the Control Rod Drive Mechanism
and the Control Rod
Failure of the Charging Pump-A
Malfunction of Starting Steam Inlet Valve for Turbine Driven
Auxiliary Feed-water Pump
Deviation from the Limiting Conditions for Operation of Unit1 due
to automatic shut-down of High Pressure Core Injection System
Deviation from the Limiting Conditions for Operation due to themalfunction of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
Damage of the Steam Generator Tubes
Corroded Pore in the Outside of the Exhaust Duct
Flaws found at the weld in the upper part of the high pressure
turbine casing
Damage of Steam Generator Tubes
Flaws Found in the Weld of the Steam Generator Primary
Coolant Inlet Nozzle Stubs
Reactor Manual Shutdown due to the temperature increase of
the charcoal rare-gas hold-up equipment in the off-gas treatment
systemExcessive Insertion of the Control Rod
A Small Amount of Water Oozing from a Valve in the Control Rod
Drive Hydraulic Control System
Corroded pores in the air duct of the main control room HVAC
systemDeviation from the limiting conditions for operation due to theinoperative of the EDG-A
Reactor Manual Shutdown due to the increase of the hydrogenconcentration of the off-gas treatment system
Power Reduction due to the turbine bypass valve full closure
Control Rod Insertion without its any Operation during theReactor Start-up Operation
Erroneous Insertion of the Control Rod
Excessive Insertion of the Control Rod

Remarks- : Not applicable for evaluation*: In Japan there are 0- and 0+ for the events evaluated as INES Scale 0.

169

Date

INES
Scale

2008/04/09

0-

2008/04/18

0-

2008/05/26

0-

2008/05/27

1

2008/06/27

1

2008/07/18

0-

2008/07/23

0-

2008/08/05

0+

2008/08/07

0-

2008/09/04
2008/09/10

01

2008/09/19-

2008/09/22

0-

2008/10/03

0-

2008/11/05

1

2008/11/07

0-

2008/11/26

0-

2008/12/11

0-

2008/12/24

0+

2008/12/30

0-

2009/02/25

0+

2009/03/23

1

2009/03/26

0-

2009/03/26

0-D Annex

Incidents reported in 2009 fiscal year
Nuclear Power
StationFukushima
Daiichi Unit 3
Hamaoka
Unit 4
Hamaoka
Unit 4

Incidents

Date

INES
Scale

Excessive Insertion of the Control Rod

2009/04/06

0-

Occurrence of the Injury of a Worker in the Turbine Building

2009/04/22-

2009/05/05

0-

2009/05/13

0-

Excessive insertion of the control rod

2009/05/28

0-Reactor manual shutdown
Damage of the emergency diesel generator

2009/07/17
2009/08/21

Fugen

Leakage of the radioactive material in the controlled area

2009/10/0800+
0-Tsuruga Unit 1

Thinning of the sea water piping for cooling the high pressure
core injection system diesel engine

2009/10/14

Fukushima
Daini Unit 4Power Reduction

2009/10/15

Shika Unit 2

Reactor manual shutdown

2009/11/13

Tsuruga Unit 1
Onagawa
Unit 3
Tokai Daini
Tomari Unit 3

Reactor Manual Shutdown due to the increase of the hydrogenconcentration of the off-gas treatment system
A flaw in the seat portion of the vent valve for the control rod drive
hydraulic system

Hamaoka
Unit 3Unexpectedly power change during the generator powerincrease operation
Leakage of liquid radioactive waste in theradiation controlled area

Tokai Daini

Thinning of the residual heat removal sea water system piping

2010/01/13

Takahama
Unit 4Significant signal indications of flaw on the Steam Generator tube

2010/03/16

Mihama Unit 2

Flaw on the weld of the air vent piping in the chemical andvolume control system

2010/03/23

Mihama Unit 1

Remarks- : Not applicable for evaluation*: In Japan there are 0- and 0+ for the events evaluated as INES Scale 0.

170

2009/11/13
2009/12/1

interim0interim

01
interim0interim

0interim

0interim

0interim

0interimD Annex

3

List of standards of academic societies and associations endorsed by NISA
(Article7)

The Japan Electric Association
Technical Guidelines for a seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants:
JEAG 4601-S-1984
Classification and Allowable Stress
Technical Guidelines for a seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants
JEAG 4601-1987
Technical Guidelines for a seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants:
JEAG 4601-1991
Supplement
Guideline for Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants
JEAG 4607-1999
Guideline for Design of Radiation Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants
JEAG 4615-2003
Primary Reactor Containment Vessel Leakage Testing
JEAC 4203-2004
Definitions of Nuclear Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Reactor
JEAC 4602-2004
Containment Boundary
Definitions of Engineered Safety Features and Related Systems of Nuclear
JEAC 4605-2004
Power Plants
Ultrasonic Examination Guideline for In-service Inspection of Light Water
JEAG 4207-2004
Cooled Nuclear Power Plant Components
Guideline for Maintenance Management of Nuclear Power Plants
JEAG 4210-2007
Rules of Maintenance Management of Nuclear Power Plants
JEAC 4209-2007
Guideline for the evaluation of drift of safety protection system instruments
JEAG 4621-2007
Technical Guideline for Diagnosis on Nuclear Power Plants Components:
JEAG 4221-2007
Diagnostic Technology for the Vibration of Rotational Components
Guidelines for Application of Rules of Quality Assurance for Safety ofAppendix of
Nuclear Power Plants (JEAC 4111-2003)- Operation Stage of Nuclear
JEAG4121-2005
Power Plants(Amendment 2 2007)
Method of Surveillance Tests for Structural Material of Nuclear Reactors
JEAC 4201-2007
Methods of Verification Tests of the Fracture Toughness for Nuclear PowerJEAC 4206-2007
Plant Components
Technical Guideline for Diagnosis on Nuclear Power Plants Components:
JEAG 4222-2008
Diagnostic Technology for Lubrication Oil
Technical Guideline for Diagnosis on Nuclear Power Plants Components:
JEAG 4223-2008
Diagnostic Technology for Infrared Thermography
Primary Reactor Containment Vessel Leakage Testing
JEAC 4203-2008
Ultrasonic Examination Guideline for In-service Inspection of Light Water
JEAC 4207-2008
Cooled Nuclear Power Plant Components
Rules of Quality Assurance for Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
JEAC 4111-2009
The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers
Evaluation Guideline on Hydro-Dynamic Vibration of Piping Internal
JSME S012-1998
Cylindrical StructureStandards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Maintenance
JSME S NA1-2000

Standards (revised in 2000)

Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Welding Standards
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Design andConstruction Standards
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: MaintenanceStandards (revised in 2002)
Guideline for Prevention o f Fluid Induced Vibration of Tube and U-Tube of
Steam Generator
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Concrete Reactor
Containment Vessel

171

JSME S NB1-2001
JSME S NC1-2001
JSME S NA1-2002
JSME S016-2002
JSME S NE1-2003

D Annex

Evaluation Guideline on High Cycle Thermal Fatigue of Piping
JSME S017-2003
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Maintenance
JSME S NA1-2004
Standards (2004)
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Design and
JSME S NC1-2005
Construction Standards (2005)
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Standards for Piping
JSME S NG1-2006
Wall Thinning Management for Pressurized Water Reactor
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Standards for Piping
JSME S NH1-2006
Wall Thinning Management for Boiling Water Reactors
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Design and
JSME S NC1-2007
Construction Standards(Amendment of 2007)
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Welding
JSME S NB1-2007
Standards(revised in 2007)
Standards for Spent Fuel Storage Facility: Structural Standard for Metallic
JSME S FA1-2007
Cask (revised in 2007)
Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Equipment: Maintenance
JSME S NA1-2008
Standards (revised in 2008)
Standards for Equipment, Maintenance and Case of Nuclear Power
JSME S
Generation Facilities: Alternative Provision for Allowable Defect Angle
NA-CC-002
Restriction for the Defect of Peripheral Direction
Standards for Equipment, Design and Construction and Case of Nuclear
JSME S
Power
Generation
Facilities:
Standard
forProtectionof
NC-CC-001
Over-pressurization
Standards for Equipment, Design and Construction and Case of Nuclear
JSME SPower Generation Facilities: Standard: Considerations for Inhibition of
NC-CC-002
Occurrence of Stress Corrosion Cracking
Standards for Equipment, Design and Construction and Case of Nuclear
Power Generation Facilities: Application of “Amendment 2005 of
JSME S
Standards for Equipment, Design and Construction,” Piping Design (Joints
NC-CC-003
and Flanges) replacing Corresponding JIS
Standards for Equipment, Design and Construction and Case of Nuclear
Power Generation Facilities: Application of “Amendment 2005 of
JSME S
Standards for Equipment, Appendix: Figures and Tables of Materials”
NC-CC-004
replacing Corresponding
The Atomic Energy Society of Japan
Performance Criteria of the Measures for Aging Management for Nuclear AESJ-SC-P005：
Power Plants(2008)
2008
The Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society
Guidelines for Accumulation Prevention of Mixed Gas (Hydrogen and JBWR-NCG-01-20
Oxygen) inside BWR Piping
05
The Japanese Society for Non destructive Inspection
Qualification and Certification of Personnel for Performance
NDIS0603:2005
Demonstration of Ultra Sonic Testing System

172

D Annex

4

Outline of JEAC 4111-2009: Rules of Quality Assurance for Safety of Nuclear
Power Plants (Article 13)

JEAC 4111-2009 was established on the basis of ISO 9001, taking into consideration
the IAEA Safety Standards Series, which define requirements specific to nuclear power.
JEAC 4111-2009 is intended to realize the requirements related to quality assurance ofthe operational safety activities of nuclear power plants, provided by nuclear safety
regulations.
(1) Requirementsa Quality management system
The Rules provide that the licensee shall establish, document, implement andmaintain the quality management system and continually improve its
effectiveness. The Rules also provide for the items to implement so as to achieve
the above mentioned goal, grading of the degree of application of therequirements of the quality management system, operation and management of
the processes, and management of outsourced processes.
bResponsibilities of management
The Rules provide for management commitment, emphasis on nuclear safety,
quality policy, planning, responsibilities, authorities, communication andmanagement review.

cResources management
The Rules provide for clarification and provision of resources required forkeeping nuclear safety, human resources, nuclear installations and work
environment.

dPlanning and implementation of work
The rules provide for planning of work, processes related to requirements forwork, design and development, procurement, implementation of work,
management of monitoring and measurement equipment.

e

Evaluation and improvement
The Rules provide for monitoring, measurement, analysis and improvement
processes, nonconformity management, data analysis and improvement.

(2) Relationship with GS-R-3
Comparison was made between JEAC 4111-2003 and GS-R-3 in order to revise
JEAC 4111-2003. As a result, the following insights were gained:173

D Annex













As the general structure of GS-R-3 corresponds to ISO 9001: 2000,
conceptually GS-R-3 is a same management system as JEAC 4111, which isalso based on ISO 9001.
In GS-R-3, the product is defined as the “results of processes” as in ISO 9001
so that GS-R-3 can be applied to activities in entire stages from site selection
to decommissioning, and also to diverse facilities. However, as the goal of
GS-R-3 is “emphasis on safety”, it is equivalent that JEAC 4111 is intended
for “accomplishment of nuclear safety”.
GS-R-3 is a management system which integrates factors related to safety,
health, environment, security, quality and economic efficiency. On the other
hand, JEAC 4111 is a quality management system for safety in the nuclear
power plant, and so it does not necessarily require to be integrated. However,as the requirements for work are decided placing utmost priority to the safetyof a nuclear power plant, the requirements necessary for accomplishing
nuclear safety is incorporated into the system.
As GS-R-3 is an integrated management system, the subjects whichcorrespond to customers in ISO 9001 are defined as stakeholders. On theother hand, in JEAC 4111, the customers are defined as Japanese people,
and nuclear safety regulations which are mandated by Japanese people sothat JEAC 4111 can be applied to the operational safety activities. However,there is no difference in the policies regarding customers or subjects.
GS-R-3 requires the licensees to utilize management system as a tool tofoster safety culture. Therefore, safety culture is taken into consideration in
the related provisions such as the management review, education andtraining, self-assessment, and independent assessment. On the other hand,
although JEAC 4111 is strongly related to safety culture, there is no explicit
requirement for safety culture in JEAC 4111.
GS-R-3 took over the self-assessment and independent assessment from50-C-Q and JEAC 4111 incorporates such assessment from 50-C-Q.
Therefore, the matters related to the self-assessment and independent
assessment had already been addressed.

Other factors specific to nuclear power;

Grading:
As JEAC 4111-2003 incorporates the grading system from 50-C-Q, JEAC4111
and GS-R-3 are equivalent.
‘Individuals other than the original designer in the design verification shall
implement,’ ‘independency of inspection and test personnel’:
GS-R-3 requires that if independency is necessary, it shall be explicitly stated in
the section concerning the “management of processes”, which corresponds to
the realization of products in ISO 9001. DS349, which is a guideline tocomplement, requires independency of design verification with regard to the174D Annex‘design’, thus, the content of regulation for independency remains the same.
ISO9001:2000

ISO9001:2008

RevisedReflect Content

Reflect Content
JEAC4111-2003

50-C-QJEAC4111-2009
RevisedReflect Content

Reflect Content
Revised

GS-R-3Figure D-1 The Relation between Standards/Codes

175

D Annex

GS-R-3

ISO 9001: 2000

JEAC 4111-2003

Integrated Management System

Quality Management System

Quality Management System








Safety Culture
GradingDocumentation

General Requirements
Requirements for Document

Management Responsibility
Management Responsibility






Management Commitment
Interested Parties Satisfaction
Policies
Planning
Responsibility and Authority








Resource ManagementProvision of Resources
Human Resources
Infrastructure and Work
Environment






Provision of Resources
Human Resources
Infrastructure
Work Environment







Plan of Product Realization
Customer Related Process
Design and Development
Purchasing
Production and Service
Provision
Control of Monitoring and
Measuring Equipment











Analysis

andMonitoring and Measurement
Self Assessment
Independent Assessment
Management System Review
Non-Conformance andCorrective and Preventive
Actions
Improvement

Focus on Safety








Measurement,
improvement






Analysis






and

GeneralMonitoring and
Measurement
Control of Nonconforming
Product
Analysis of Data
Improvement






Work Plan
Process on Work
Requirement
Design and Development
Purchasing
Work Implementation
Control of Monitoring and
Measuring Equipment

Measurement,
Improvement






Plural Analogy

Figure D-2 Relation between Standards and Codes

176

Provision of Resources
Human Resources
Nuclear Facilities
Work Environment

Work Plan and Implementation

Focus on Customer Satisfaction

1 to 1 Analogy

Management Commitment
Focus on Nuclear Safety
Quality Policy
Planning
Responsibility, Authority andCommunication
Management Review

Resource Management

Product Realization

Developing Processes
Process Management
Generic Management System
Processes

Measurement,
Improvement

Management Responsibility

Resource Management

Process ImplementationManagement Commitment
Customer Focus
Quality Policy
Planning
Responsibility, Authority andCommunication
Management Review

General Requirements
Requirements for Document

Analysis

andGeneralMonitoring and
Measurement
Control of Nonconforming
Product
Analysis of Data
Improvement

Accomplish Nuclear Safety

D Annex

5

List of nuclear emergency drills during the reporting period (Article 16)
Organized by

Date

Sites

(1) Drills conducted by the National Government
Government

Oct.24,2007

Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

Government

Oct.21-22,2008 Tokyo Electric Power Co.,Inc., Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

GovernmentDec.21-22,2009 The Japan Atomic Power Co., Tokai Dai-ni PS(2) Drills conducted by the local governments (Prefecture)
ShimaneJan.30,2007

The Chugoku Electric Power CO.,Inc., Shimane NPS

Shizuoka

Feb.1,2007

Chubu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Hamaoka NPS

Fukushima

Feb.6,2007

Tokyo Electric Power Co.,Inc., Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Kanagawa

Feb.6,2007

Gloval Nuclear Fuel Japan, Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant

Fukui

Aug.2,2007

The Japan Atomic Power Co., Tsuruga PS

IbarakiSep.28,2007

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Oarai R&D Center, “Joyo”

Okayama

Oct.11,2007

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering
Center, Prototype Uranium Enrichment Plant

Fukushima

Oct.22-23,2007 Tokyo Electric Power Co.,Inc., Fukushima Daini NPS

Kagoshima

Oct.23,2007

Kyushu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Sendai NPS

Hokkaido

Oct.30,2007

Hokkaido Electric Power Co.,Inc. Tomari PS

ShimaneNov.2,2007

The Chugoku Electric Power CO.,Inc., Shimane NPS

Ehime

Nov.6,2007

Shikoku Electric Power Co.,Inc., Ikata PS

FukuuiNov.18,2007

The Japan Atomic Power Co., Tsuruga PS

Ishikawa

Nov.22,2007

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Shika NPS

Saga

Nov.25,2007

Kyushu Electric Power Co.,Inc.,Genkai NPS

MiyagiJan.23-24,2008 Toholu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Onagawa NPS

Shizuoka

Feb.13,2008

Chubu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Hamaoka NPS

IbarakiSep.30,2008

The Japan Atomic Power Co., Tokai No.2 PS

Okayama

Oct.9,2008

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering
Center, Prototype Uranium Enrichment Plant

Fukui

Oct.25,2008

The Kansai Electric Power Co.,Inc., Takahama PS Unit 3

Aomori

Oct.29,2008

Tohoku Elecric Power Co.,Inc., Higashidori NPS Unit 1

Ehime

Nov.5,2008

Shikoku Electric Power Co.,Inc., Ikata PS Unit 2

Ishikawa

Nov.14,2008

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Shika NPS Unit 2

Saga

Nov.19-20,2008 Kyushu Electric Power Co.,Inc.,Genkai NPS Unit 2

MiyagiJan.23,2009

Toholu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Onagawa NPS Unit 2

Kagoshima

Jan.31,2009

Kyushu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Sendai NPS Unit 1

Hokkaido

Feb.10,2009

Hokkaido Electric Power Co.,Inc. Tomari PS Unit 2

Shizuoka

Feb.12,2009

Chubu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Hamaoka NPS Unit 3

Okayama

Oct.9,2009

Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering
Center, Prototype Uranium Enrichment Plant

Aomori

Oct.21,2009

Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., Reprocessing Plant

Ehime

Oct.20,2009

Shikoku Electric Power Co.,Inc., Ikata PS Unit 2

177

D Annex

Saga

Oct.23-24,2009 Kyushu Electric Power Co.,Inc.,Genkai NPS Unit 2

Hokkaido

Oct.29,2009

Hokkaido Electric Power Co.,Inc. Tomari PS Unit 2

ShimaneNov.13,2009

The Chugoku Electric Power CO.,Inc., Shimane NPS Unit 2

MiyagiNov.18,2009

Toholu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Onagawa NPS Unit 3

Fukui

Nov.22,2009

The Kansai Electric Power Co.,Inc., ihama PS Unit 3

Kagoshima

Jan.19,2010

Kyushu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Sendai NPS Unit 1

Shizuoka

Feb.4,2010

Chubu Electric Power Co.,Inc., Hamaoka NPS Unit 3

IshikawaMar. 17,2010

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Shika NPS Unit 2

178

D Annex

6

Definition and function of each class related to safety function importance (Article
18)

Classification

PS-1

Class
1
MS-1

Definition

Function

SSCs whose damage or failure may
cause events potentially leading to(a) considerable core damage or(b) extensive fuel failure
1) SSCs capable of promptly
shutting down the reactor,
removing residual heat andpreventing overpressure in thereactor coolant pressure
boundary in the event ofabnormal conditions, thereby
preventing undue radiologicalinfluence to the off-site public.

1) Reactor coolant pressure boundary
2) Prevention of excessive reactivity
insertion3) Maintenance of core geometry
1) Prompt shutting down of the reactor
2) Maintenance of sub criticality
3) Prevention of overpressure in thereactor coolant pressure boundary4) Residual heat removal after reactor
shutdown
5) Core cooling6) Confinement of radioactive materials,
radiation shielding and reduction ofradioactivity release
1) Generation of actuation signals to theengineered safety features andreactor shutdown, system
2) Supporting functions especially
important to safety
1) Containment of reactor coolant(except for small-diameter pipes thatare excluded from the reactor coolant
pressure boundary, such as those for
instrumentation, and other pipes andequipment not directly connected tothe boundary)2) Storage of radioactive materials, notbeing directly connected to the reactor
coolant pressure boundary3) Safe handling of fuel1) Reseating of safety valves and relief
valves2) Other SSCs essential to Safety

1) SSCs whose damage or failure
may cause events potentiallyleading to excessive release ofradioactive materials to theoutside of the site, but hardly
leading to considerable coredamage or extensive fuel failure
PS-2

Class
2

MS-2

Class
3

PS-3

2) SSCs whose functioning isrequired during normal operations
and anticipated operational
occurrences and whose failure
may lead to degraded corecooling.
1) SSCs capable of sufficiently
reducing radiological influence tothe off-site public caused bydamage or failure of SSCs
belonging to PS-2.
2) SSCs especially important tocoping with abnormal conditions

1) SSCs not belonging to PS-1 andPS-2 whose failure may become
initiating events of abnormal

1791) Water makeup to the fuel storagepool2) Prevention of radioactive materials
release1) Monitoring of plant status in case ofan accident2) Mitigation of abnormal conditions3) Safe shutting down from outside of
the control room
1) Retention of reactor coolant (otherthan PS-1 and PS-2)
2) Circulation of reactor coolant

D Annex

conditions.

MS-32) SSCs capable of maintaining theconcentration of radioactive
materials in reactor coolant as
low as acceptable for normal
operation.
1) SSCs capable of mitigating
anticipated operational
occurrences in conjunction with
MS-1 and MS-2.
2) SSCs necessary for coping withabnormal conditions

1803) Storage of radioactive materials4) Electric power supply (except for
emergency power supply)
5) Plant instrumentation and control(except for safety protection Function)
6) Auxiliary functions for plant operation
1) Prevention of the dispersion of fission
products into reactor coolant
2) Reactor coolant cleanup1) Mitigation of reactor pressure
increase2) Suppression of reactor powerincrease
3) Reactor coolant makeup
Functions important to emergency
management and monitoring ofabnormal conditions

D Annex

7

Inspection items of pre-service inspection on each construction phase defined by
the Electricity Business Act ( Article 19)
Construction Phase

Inspection Item

A. When eachcomponent isinstalled and ready to
be tested on
structure, strength
and/or leak tightnessof reactor, reactor
cooling system,
instrumentation andcontrol system, fuelhandling system,
radiation control
system, waste
treatment system orreactor containment
B. When installation ofbottom half part ofturbine casing iscompleted and when
its main part ofauxiliary boiler iscompletely
assembled

Inspection to confirm structure, function or performance of reactor,
reactor cooling system, instrumentation and control system, fuelhandling system, radiation management system, waste processing
system or reactor containment, specifically;
1) material inspection2) dimensional inspection3) visual inspection4) assemble and installment inspection5) pressure test6) leak test7) inspection on foundation of reactor containment

C. When the reactor isready for fuels to beloadedD. When the reactor isready for criticality
operation
C. When all construction
work under theConstruction Plan has
been completed

1. Inspection to confirm structure, function or performance of steam
turbine, specifically;
1) material inspection2) dimensional inspection3) visual inspection4) assemble and installment inspection
2. Inspection to confirm structure, function or performance of auxiliary
boiler, specifically;
1) material inspection2) dimensional inspection3) visual inspection4) assemble and installment inspection5) pressure test6) leak test
Inspection to confirm functions or performances which are necessary
when reactor fuels are loaded, specifically for;reactor, reactor cooling system, instrumentation and control system,
fuel handling system, radiation management system, waste
processing system, reactor containment, ventilation stack, steam
turbine, generator, transformer, voltage regulator or voltage phaseregulator, phase controller, frequency convertor or rectifier, breaker,
control system for operation of the power station and standby
emergency power generating system.
Inspection to confirm functions or performances which are necessary
when the reactor attains criticality, specifically for;reactor, reactor cooling system, instrumentation and control system,
steam turbine and generator.
Inspection to confirm total performance of the nuclear power station
at reactor power operation.
Inspection necessary to confirm the completion of the construction
work.

181

D Annex

8

Incident reporting criteria defined by the Ministerial Ordinance (Article 19)
Licensees should report incidents and failures based on the Reactor Regulation Act
according to the following criteria.
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

When nuclear fuel material was stolen or lost.
When a reactor was shut-down by failure of a nuclear installation or when it
became necessary to shut-down a reactor during operation, or when reactor
power output fluctuates more than 5%, or when change of reactor power output
was required. Except when it was one of the following and the licenseeannounced officially about the situation of the concerned failure.
i) When it occurs in the term of the Periodic Inspection provided in Article 54-1of the Electricity Business Act i.e. the failure in the equipments that thefunctional and operational conditions of the failed equipment cannot bechecked under the reactor shut-down condition.
ii) When the failure did not cause any deviation from the limit of operation, andthere is no change observed related with the concerned failure, and when
the licensee performs inspection of the failed equipment concerned.
iii) When the reactor output change is required to follow the limit of operation.
When a licensee checked the equipment and structure important to the safety,
and when concerned equipment etc. important to safety was considered that it
does not satisfy the standard described in Article 9 or in Article 9-2 of the
Ministerial Ordinance of Establishing Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation Equipment (Ordinance No. 62 of MITI, 1965), or when it wasconsidered that it does not have function to ensure safety of the nuclear
installation.
When there was a failure of equipment etc. important to safety by the fire. Except
the concerned failure was associated to the measure of fire extinguishing or
prevention of the spread of fire.
Other than the preceding three items, when deviation from the limit of operationby the failure of a the nuclear installation (except those minor troubles whose
impact on operation of nuclear reactor is insignificant) was caused, or when themeasure for the concerned deviation defined in the Operational Safety Program
was not implemented at the time of deviation from the limit of operation.
When the failure of a nuclear installation or occurrence of other un-anticipatedsituation had caused any trouble to discharge gaseous radioactive wastes
through the ventilation facility or to discharge liquid radioactive wastes throughthe drainage facility.
When the concentration of radioactive materials in the air outside theenvironment monitoring area exceeds the allowable limit in the case of dischargeof gaseous radioactive wastes through the ventilation facility.
When the concentration of radioactive materials in the water outside theenvironment monitoring area exceeds the allowable limit in the case of thedischarge of liquid radioactive wastes through the drainage facility.
When nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated with nuclear fuelmaterials (hereinafter referred to as "nuclear fuel materials etc.") leaked out of182

D Annex

the controlled area.
10. When nuclear fuel materials etc. leaked within the controlled area associated to
failure of a nuclear installation or occurrence of other undetermined situation.
Exceptions are the followings (except the case when new measures such asaccess control into the leakage-related place and key control have been taken or
when the leaked substances have spread outside the controlled area):i) When revealed liquid nuclear fuel materials etc. did not spread out of thefloodgate that is installed in the circumference of the equipment of theconcerned leakage for prevention of leakage spread.
ii) When the ventilation facility of the concerned area of the leakage wasworking properly at the time when gaseous nuclear fuel materials etc.
leaked.
iii) When the amount of radioactivity of the leaked nuclear fuel materials etc. isvery little and when the degree of the leakage is minor.
11. When the person who enters into the controlled area suffered radiation exposuredue to the failure of a nuclear reactor facility or occurrence of other un-anticipatedsituation, and when the effective dosage of concerned exposure exceeds or
could exceeds five mSv for a personnel engaged in radiation work or 0.5 mSv fora person other than the personnel engaged in radiation work.
12. When the dosage of personnel engaged in radiation work exceeds or could
exceed the allowable dose limit.
13. When the control rod which is not under insertion or withdrawal operation moves
from the original control position (control rod position which is located andindicated at certain interval defined in licensee’s document on control rod
operation based on the Operational Safety Program.) to or passing other control
position, or when fully inserted control rod (control rod inserted to the maximum
control position) which is not under insertion or withdrawal operation moves
across and over the fully inserted position. Except the case when no fuel in thecore.
14. Other than those above items, when personnel are injured or could be injured in
the nuclear installation (except when the injury was other than radiation hazard
and was not necessary for hospitalization).

183

D Annex

9

References Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/tyoki/taikou/kettei/eng_ver.pdf
 Nuclear Energy Basic Act
http://www.nsc.go.jp/NSCenglish/documents/laws/1.pdf
 Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material andReactors
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1849&vm=04&re=01
 Electricity Business Act
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=51&vm=04&re=01
 Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=106&vm=04&re=01
 Issues on Nuclear Safety Regulation (Nuclear Safety Infrastructure
Subcommittee of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee, February2010)
http://www.meti.go.jp/report/data/g100205aj.html
 NISA Measures Concerning to the Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS Suffered by the
Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (1st Report [February 2009], 2nd Report[June 2009], 3rdReport [April 2010], NISA)
http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/resources/subcommittee/index.html
 Introduction of Inspection based on the Maintenance Program (August 2008,
NISA)
http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/materials2/downloadfiles/g80806a04j.pdf

184