Disaster Prevention
Measures at Petrochemical
Complexes in Japan
December 7, 2017

Extraordinary Disaster
Management Office

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

What Are Petrochemical Complexes?
“Petrochemical complexes” → group of facilities handling large
quantities of petroleum and high pressure gas(Ex.)  Facilities of petroleum refining business and petrochemical industry, etc.

 Storage terminal of petroleum and high pressure gas*The Act on Disaster Prevention in Petroleum Industrial Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities covers overall facilities handling
petroleum and high pressure gas, and steel plants, etc. are also subject to the Act if requirements are met.

(Steel plant)(Petroleum storage terminal) (High pressure gas storage terminal)*High pressure gas is generally 1
handled in large quantities.

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Special disaster protection areas such as petrochemical complexes andother petrochemical facilities and Specific Place of Business
Define special disaster protection areas and specific place of business under the Act to establish necessary
disaster risk reduction systems
 Special disaster protection areas such as(Major idea of area) *100 thousand kL of petroleum or 20 million m3 of high pressure gas
Total petroleum storage and handling quantities
Total processing quantities of high pressure gas
petrochemical complexes and other+≥1
100 thousand kL
20 million Nm
petrochemical facilities (Art. 2 of the Act)
３

Designate the areas where large quantities of petroleum
and high pressure gas are handled under a cabinet order.

32 prefectures 83 areas*As of Apr. 2016

No.

No.

Special disasterprotection areas

No.

Special disasterprotection areas

No.

Special disasterprotection areas

No.

Special disasterprotection areas

34

Kinuura50

Etajima68

Ainoura35

Port of Nagoya
coast

51

Nomi

69

Kamigoto

36

Yokkaichi
coast

52

Iwakuni/
Otake

70

Yatsushiro

37

Owase

53

Kudamatsu

71

Oita

2-2

Ishikari

16

3

Muroran19

North
Keiyo coast
CentralKeiyo coastSouthKeiyo coast
Keihincoast

4

Hokuto20

Negishi coast(NegishiWaterfront)

38

Osaka
North Port

54

Shunan71-2

Sendai

4-2

Shiriuchi

21

Port Niigata(East)

39

Sakai Senboku
coast

55

Ube/Onoda

71-3

Kushikino

22

Port Niigata(West)

40

57

Mutsurejima

71-4

Kagoshima

1

Kushiro14

2

Tomakomai

154-3 Specific place of business(Art. 2 of the Act)

Special disasterprotection areas

MutsuOgawara

Kansai International
Airport5

Aomori23

Naoetsu

41

Misaki

58

Anan

72

Kiire

6

Hachinohe24

Toyama

42

Kobe

59

Bannosu

72-2

Shibushi

6-2

Kuji

25

Fuchu

43

Higashiharima

60

Niihama

73

Henza

7

Shiogama

26

Shinminato

44

Himeji coast

61

Namikata

75

Onaha

8

Sendai27

Fushiki

44-2

Ako

62

Kikuma

9

Oga

28

63

Matsuyama

10

Akita

64

Buzen

11

Sakata65

Kitakyushu

11-2

Hirono65-2

Shirashima

12

Iwaki

66

Fukuoka13

Kashimacoast

67

Fukushima

29

Port of Nanao,
MimuroKanazawa
Port north

45
46

30

Fukui coast

31

Shimizu

32

Atsumi48

33

Tahara

49

47
47-2

Northern coast in
north Wakayama
Central coast in
north Wakayama
Southern coast in
north Wakayama

Gobo
Mizushimacoast
Fukuyama/
Kasaoka

Ptroleum storage and handling quantities Processing quantities of high pressure gas+≥1
３
10 thousand kL
2 million Nm

Class 1 place of business (363 places)
A place of business handling large
quantities of petroleum or high pressure gas

Layout place of business (174 places)
Of Class 1 place of business, a place of businesshandling petroleum and high pressure gas

Class 2 place ofbusiness (323 places)
A place of businesshandling petroleum orhigh pressure over acertain quantity*The number of places of business is the number as of Apr. 1, 2016.

Petroleum storage and handling quantities Processing quantities of high pressure gas+���≥ 1+３
1,000 kL
200 thousand Nm

2

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Status of Accidents at Petrochemical Complexes(No. of Accidents and Breakdown)• The number of accidents has been increasing from 1994 and recently has remained at a highlevel of 200 accidents or more per year.
⇒ (1) Human factors such as inadequate maintenance and management (2) Causes
accompanying physical factors, such as corrosion and other types of deterioration• Half of all accidents are leaks and the other half are fires and explosions, etc.
Great East Japan
Earthquake

Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake

Breakdown of accidents (2016)
Accidents from earthquakes(accidents from earthquakes andtsunami)Others5

General accidents (accidents otherthan those from earthquakes)

Fires
120

Leaks
121

No. ofaccidents

Year

2015
2016

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

Explosions
63

Great Hanshin Earthquake (Earthquake inSouthern Hyogo)
Happened: 5:46 A.M., January 17, 1995
Main affected Areas: Kobe City and Awaji Island in Hyogo
Scale of the Earthquake: Magnitude 7.3, Biggest intensity of the
Earthquake: 7 on the Japanese scale
Damage: Number dead and missing people: 6,435
Number of completely destroyed buildings: 104,906
Number of burned buildings: 7,483

Bus that stopped on the verge ofcropper on the destroyed expressway

Kobe on fire

Collapsed building because of theearthquake

4Comparison of death cause
between 2011 East Japan Great Earthquake and 1995 Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
2.0% 1.1%
4.4%
Drowning
Crushed etc.

2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake

92.4%

BurnedUnspecified
White Paper on Disaster Management 2011

3.9%
12.8%
1995 Great
Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake (Kobe)

Head injury, neck injury,
traumatic shock etc.
Burned83.3%

OthersStatistics on post-mortem inspection in Kobe 1995

5

Damage on Tanks due to Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995
The earthquake created liquefaction, making the tanks lean,
breaking the pipes, getting the oil leaked6Tokachi off shore Earthquake, September 2003
A petroleum tank fire started at the Hokkaido refinery of Idemitsu Kosan after the occurrence of the Tokachi
offshore earthquake on September 26 2003. The fire triggered a big social anxiety in addition to extremely
difficult fire-fighting activities

Fire of oil tank in Hokkaido in 2003

7

Great East Japan Earthquake, March 2011
A massive earthquake of magnitude of 9.0 occurred on Friday
11th March, off the Pacific coast of the northeastern part of theJapanese mainland (Tohoku Region).
Date and Time

11 March, 2011, 14:46

Magnitude

9.0

Epicenter

N38.1, E142.9, Depth 24km

• The largest earthquake recorded in Japan• 6 minute long tremor observed• Destruction by Tsunami. The maximum height of the water level wasrecorded as 9.3m and the run-up height was 39.7m, the highest everrecorded in Japan. Total inundation area: 535km2• Tsunami caused fires• Damage by liquefaction• Maximum number of evacuees: 450,000 (14th March, 2011)• Subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident
8Intensity Distribution during the Great East Japan Earthquake
Seismic
centerIntensity

7
High-6Low-6
High-5
Low-5
4
3
2
1

Distribution of slide,superimposed onto a map

Scope of fault line damage(Numbers in circles indicate
fault destruction)

Extent of slide
Small

Based on Meteorological Agency

Large★ ：Start point of destruction in the Great East Japan Earthquake★ ：Center of earthquakes measuring M7.0 or higher, subsequent to the M7.3
earthquake occurring on March 9th off the Sanriku coast● ：Earthquakes measuring M5.0 or higher, occurring within 1 day of the Great
East Japan Earthquake

9Overview of damage by the Great East Japan Earthquake
Personnel damage

Iwate pref.

Miyagi pref.

Fukushima pref.

Dead

18,703

5,086

10,4493,057

Missing

2,674

1,145

1,299

226

Injured

6,220

212

4,145

182

Iwate pref.

Miyagi pref.

Fukushima pref.

Damage of houses
Fully-destroyed

126,574

18,46082,88921,190

Half-destroyed

272,302

6,563

155,099

73,021

Partial-damage

759,831

14,191

222,781

166,758

Number of fires

Iwate pref.

Miyagi pref.

Fukushima pref.

286

34

135

11

White book 2013, Fire and Disaster Management Agency

10

Oil refinery fire in Chiba Prefecture

Diameter is about 600-750m.

A huge fire ball generated due to an exploding LPG tank 11

Breakdown of Accident Causes – 250 Accidents, in 2016

ShoddyConstruction

BrokenEarthTraffic
Accident quake

Arson

Unknown
Insufficient Maintenance Work

FailureWrong Operation

Defective
DesignLack of Safety
Operation

Deterioration – Corrosion etc.

Lack of Monitoring

Not Complied With

12

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Transition of the Number of Deaths and Injuries Accompanying Accidents
at Petrochemical Complexes
The number of deaths and injuries differs from year to year, but is not yet
on a downward trend.

DeathsInjuredpersons

Year

2014
2015
2016

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

No. ofpersons13

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Establishment of the Act on Disaster Prevention in Petroleum Industrial
Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities in 1975
 In 1974, an accident of heavy oil leak occurred at Mizushima Refinery of
Mitsubishi Oil Company.
*Vertical stairs of a tank fell, the dike was destroyed, and heavy oil leaked in the ocean. As the days and time passed, the leaked
area expanded and stretched not only to the coast of Okayama Prefecture but also to the whole part of the east of the Seto InlandSea, including Kagawa Prefecture and Tokushima Prefecture. It became an unprecedented disaster among oil leak accidents ofpetrochemical complexes.
 In the midst of growing public concern regarding risk reduction countermeasures against disaster of petrochemical complexes,
the then Prime Minister Miki responded to Diet question to the effect that “examination will be made to revise related laws andregulations to prevent accidents” (a meeting of the Lower House Budget Committee on Jan. 30, 1975).

⇒ Promulgation in Dec. 1975 (enforced in June of the following year) <2016 is the40th year from the enforcement><Points of drawing up a bill>
Individual laws (The Fire Service Act for petroleum and the High Pressure Gas Safety Act for high pressure gas, etc.) were
inadequate.
Establishment of an extended, comprehensive, and integrated disaster risk reduction system was promoted.
Also, based on the reflection of the Mizushima accident,• Clarify “matters concerning the assumption of disaster” in a “disaster risk reduction plan for petroleum industrial complexes andother petroleum facilities”• Oblige to set up a private disaster protection organization in a place of business• Promote the setup of a “council” and a “combined disaster protection organization” to establish combined disaster protection
system among local places of business• Set up a disaster risk reduction headquarters including prefecture, municipalities, branches of national government, and business
operators• Obligate a specific place of business to set up materials and equipment for disaster risk reduction and facilities, etc. in addition to
14
provisions of individual laws

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

1974 Accident of Mizushima Heavy Oil Leak An accident of heavy oil leak occurred at Mizushima Refinery in 1974 and became a major social problem.
*Vertical stairs in a tank fell, the dike was destroyed, and 42,888 kL of heavy oil (for about 200,000 of drum cans) were leaked in theocean. One-third of the Seto Inland Sea was contaminated, resulting in an unparalleled large-scale accident with about 50 billion yen ofdamages.

Provided by: Kurashiki City Fire Department

Noji Islands (Dec. 23, 1974)

Omuro Coast, Kiyo, Kurashiki City (December 26, 1974)

15
Provided by: Kurashiki City Fire Department, Okayama Prefecture

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Outline of the Act on Disaster Prevention in Petroleum Industrial
Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities(1) Impose specific business operators obligations necessary for disaster risk reduction(2) Set up disaster risk reduction headquarters in a prefecture where a special disaster protection area exists(A person who established a
specific place of business)

Special disaster protection areas such as petrochemicalcomplexes and other petrochemical facilities

Fire and Disaster
Management Agency

Notification

Disaster risk reduction
headquarters
Confirmation(Chief of headquarters:
prefectural governor)

Prefecture
Specific business
operator Setup of combined
disaster protection
organization
Specific business
operator
Specific business
operator

Council for special
disaster protection
areas

Specific business
operator
 Facility layout
 Setup of specific disasterprotection facilities, etc.
 Setup of private disasterprotection organization (disasterprotection personnel + materials
and equipment for disaster risk
reduction, etc.)
 Disaster protection manager, etc.
 Disaster risk reduction
regulations
 Implementation of disasterrisk reduction operations
 Reporting of abnormal
phenomenon

Policeheadquarters

Self-Defense
Force

Municip
alities

Branches of national
government

Notification
Inspection
Notification

Notification
Notification
Order for improvement
Periodic reportFire
protection
agencyOrder forimprovement
ReportRequire to provide
information

 Provision of training opportunities

16

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Layout Regulations
Since various equipment and devices are laid out complicatedly in a specific place of business (layout place ofbusiness) which handles both petroleum and high pressure gas and a risk of occurrence and expansion of adisaster is particularly large, the layout of facilities is regulated.

<Major contents>
 Layout of facilities according to their use and restriction of area Securing the width of passages according to the standards
 Restriction of height of piping crossing passages
 Securing vacant lot, etc. for a fire brigade to engage in activities

Business administrative
facility zone

Manufacturing facility
zone

Storage facility zone
Divided passage

Setback

Other facilities zone

Specified passage

Utility facility
zone

Specified passage

 Storage facility zone
Mainly petroleum tanks
and high pressure gas
tank facilities.
The entire outer
periphery is required tocontact with specified
passages.
The upper limit area is
90,000 m3.

Public road

Receiving and shipping
facility zone

 Utility facility zone
Mainly electricity selfgeneration facilities,
steam generation
facilities, andpurification facilities,
etc.
A half or more of theouter periphery is
required to contact withspecified passages.

 Specified passage
Must connect to a publicroad.
The width is at least 6 m.
The minimum widthdiffers (6 m, 8 m, 10 m
and 12 m) by the type ofadjacent zone and thearea.
 Manufacturing
facility zone
Mainly plant facilities.
The entire outer
periphery is required tocontact with specified
passages.
The upper limit area is
80,000 m3.
Setback and divided
passage are required
to be establisheddepending on the area. 17

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Disaster Prevention and Emergency Measures pertaining to Specific
Business Operator
For a specific business operator, obligations necessary for disaster risk reduction are imposed, such as theinstallation of specific disaster protection facilities and establishment of a private disaster protection organization.
 Installation of specific disaster protection facilities  Reporting of abnormal phenomena (Art. 23 of the(Art. 15 of the Act)
Act)
*Install to prevent expansion of disaster
Report to a fire station, etc. concerning occurrence of Effluent oil block embankment
abnormal phenomena such as fires, explosions, leaks of Outdoor feed water facilities for fire extinction
petroleum, etc.
 Emergency reporting equipment
 Establishment of private disaster protection
organization (Art. 16 of the Act) Disaster emergency measures (Art. 24 of the Act) Appoint disaster risk reduction manager
When abnormal phenomena occur, a private disaster→ Control private disaster protection organization protection organization, etc. shall implement measures Formulate disaster risk reduction regulations
to prevent occurrence or expansion of disaster.
→ Matters concerning disaster risk reduction*At a disaster site, the fire protection agency may
operations
request provision of information concerning matters Assignment of disaster protection personnel
regarding structure, etc. of a specific place of business.
→ Assign personnel necessary for materials and(Art. 24-2 of the Act)
equipment for disaster risk reduction to be deployed Deploy materials and equipment for disaster risk
reduction→ Deployment of chemical trucks, etc. in accordancewith types and quantities of petroleum to be handled<Combined disaster protection organization> (Art. 19 of the Act)A specific place of business located in one special disaster protection area may establish a combined disaster protection organization to make it carry out a partof operations of a private disaster protection organization.
<Wide-area combined disaster protection organization> (Art. 19-2 of the Act)In the area extending over two or more special disaster protection areas and specified by the Cabinet Order,(*1) a wide-area combined disaster protection
organization may be established to make it carry out operations specified by the Cabinet Order(*2) among operations of a private disaster protection organizationof a specific place of business.
(*1) Currently 12 areas are designated and 11 wide-area combined disaster protection organizations exist (one is a combined disaster protection organization).
(*2) Operations concerning high capacity foam system

18

How Late Business Operators Made Accident Reports
to Fire Services – 250 Cases, 2016
Numberof Caseothersleakage
explosion
fire
10ys average

Minutetimedifference
betweenandrecognition
reportoperatorstime difference
betweenrecognition
report byandbusiness

19

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Thorough Reporting of Abnormal Phenomena
Obligation to notify abnormal phenomena(Art. 23 of the Act on Disaster Prevention in Petroleum Industrial Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities, extract)(1) The supervising manager of a specific place of business shall immediately notify a fire station, etc. when he/she receives areport on fire, petroleum leak, or the breakout of other abnormal phenomena or when he/she finds the same by himself/herself.
(2) The fire station chief, etc. shall report to a police station or maritime security and rescue organization to that effect.

Scope of abnormal phenomena (Notice issued by Director of Local Disaster Risk Reduction Department, Notice Shobochi No. 158 on July 13, 1984, extract)(1) Fire
Burning phenomena requiring extinguishment and requiring use of fire extinguish facilities for extinguishing fire(2) Explosion
Chemical or physical explosive phenomena that accompany damages of facilities and equipment(3) Leak
Leak of hazardous materials, combustible solids, combustible liquid, high pressure gas, combustible gas, poisonous substances,deleterious substances, and other harmful substances, except for the case of leak caused by normal functioning or operations offacilities to be conducted to return to normal conditions and the leak of small amount in the case where the leak is stopped
immediately by minor emergency measures(4) Damage
Those which hinder maintenance and continuation of functions of manufacturing and other facilities and equipment and which
immediately require emergency measures, such as suspension of use(5) Runaway reaction, etc.
Control is impossible with normal functioning and operation of control devices

Thorough reporting of abnormal phenomena (Notice issued by Director of Extraordinary Disaster Management Office,Notice Shobo-toku No. 144 on July 13, 2012, extract)
Since reporting of abnormal phenomena is an extremely important emergency measure in preventing the spread of disaster, reporting is obligatory fora specific place of business from the initial enactment of the Act. Moreover, periodical reporting on the implementation status of disaster risk reduction
operations to municipal mayors is obligatory for a specific business operator under the provision of Art. 20-2 of the Act. The annual reporting on theimplementation status of reporting abnormal phenomena is also specified under said provision.
In your prefecture, reconfirmation should be made concerning the reporting system specified in Paragraph 2, Article 23 of the Act, and necessary
guidance should be provided to related municipalities of your prefecture concerning general inspection of the reporting system at a specific business
operator and notification should be given to them to pay special attention in the case of on-the-spot inspection such as strictly checking the on-site
20
system, etc.

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Specific Disaster Protection Facilities, etc.
A specific business operator must install and maintain specific disaster protection
facilities as follows.

(1) Effluent oil block embankment, etc.

・Install if a petroleum tank of 10,000 kL or more is present.

Section view

Top view

The largest tankwithin the zone
Partition weirDike

The largest tankwithin the zone

(Tank)

Blocking
embankment

Dike

Dike

The largest tankwithin the zone

Partition weir

(Tank)

Dike

Blocking
embankment

Partition weir
Blocking
Dike embankment

The largest oil leak area
The largest oil leak area

*Install a “partition weir” around a tank with capacity of 10,000 kL or more and install a“dike” in each tank zone. Install a “block embankment” to surround the entire dike.

(2) Outdoor feed water facilities for fire extinction*The capability of supplying water with quantities possible to discharge(A + B) x 120 minutes continuously
A: Total of water discharging capability of large-scale chemical trucks,
etc. of private disaster protection organization
B: Of relevant large-scale chemical trucks, etc., water discharging
capability of the largest one(3) Emergency reporting equipment*The installation is obligated at all specific places of business.
・Dedicated telephone (hotline)
・General subscriber phone
・Radio equipment

Fire department headquarters(command and control console)21

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Materials and Equipment for Disaster Risk Reduction, etc.
A specific business operator must furnish materials andequipment for disaster risk reduction, etc. as follows.

(1) Chemical trucks, etc.

 Pump and mixing device<High capacity foam system> Unfold hose
Transport

Large-scale water tower
Raise a water tower and sprayfoam from a high place(Feed water by mixing foam
concentrates with water)

large-scale chemical truck
Take water from a fire hydrant,
mix with foam fire extinguishing
agent, and supply to a largescale water tower High capacity foam cannon<Long-distance water feed system>*The system is specified to be installed at a specific placeof business having a floating roof outdoor storage tankwith a diameter of 34 m or more, but 11 wide-area
combined disaster protection organizations and one
combined disaster protection organization install thesystem on behalf of a specific place of business.

Foam concentrate truck
Supply foam fire extinguishing
agent to a large-scale chemicaltruck(2) Oil fence, etc.

Water supply pond or sea<3 vehicles for petroleum complex fire>*A high-capacity foam system is materials and equipment for disaster risk reduction consisting of a high capacity
foam cannon with capability of discharging 10,000 liters or more of water per min, a water feed pump, a foam
mixing device, hose, etc. One unit of high capacity foam cannon can spray three-fold to ten-fold foam compared to
3 conventional vehicles for petroleum complex fire (3,100 liters per min.).

*Oil fence(Petroleum storage and handling quantities)
1 million kL or more
Length 2,160 m
100,000 kL or more and less than 1 million kL
Length 1,620 m
10,000 kL or more and less than 100,000 kL
Length 1,080 m*Oil recovery vessel
Deployment is necessary in the case of 1 million kL
or more.

22

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Comprehensive Disaster risk reduction System
A disaster risk reduction headquarters is established in a prefecture to promote a comprehensive andintegrated disaster risk reduction system.

Disaster risk reduction headquarters for petrochemical complexes, etc. (Art. 27 of the Act)The headquarters is specified to be established in the prefecture where a special disaster protection area exists.

 Organization of headquarters
 Headquarters chief: Prefectural governor
 Headquarters personnel: Head of a specific local government organization, mayor of municipality/head offire protection agency, representative of a specific place of business, etc.
(Branch of each ministry/agency, Self-Defense Force, head of police headquarters)

 Administration of headquarters
 Preparation and implementation of a disaster risk reduction plan for petrochemical complexes, etc.
 Communication and coordination on disaster emergency measures and disaster recovery, etc.
 Communication and coordination with national government or governments of other prefectures during adisaster, etc.
 Establishment of disaster risk reduction headquarters for petrochemical complexes, etc. when emergent
and integrated disaster risk reduction activities are necessary to be implemented during a disaster (Art. 29of the Act)<Contents of disaster risk reduction plan for petrochemical complexes, etc.>(Art. 31 of the Act)• Development of organization related to disaster risk reduction of related organizations, etc. and administration concerning disaster risk
reduction• Matters concerning disaster risk reduction education and training for staff of specific place of business and other related organizations, etc.
• Matters concerning installation of facilities, machinery, and equipment and materials for disaster risk reduction and their maintenance,storage, transportation, etc.
• Matters concerning assumption of disaster• Matters concerning the collection and delivery of information in the case of occurrence of disaster and public relations• Matters concerning implementation of emergency measures for a disaster23• Matters concerning evacuation during a disaster, traffic regulation, setup of risk cautionary area, etc.

浮き屋根式屋外貯蔵タンクの火災形態
Processof Fire Occurrence at Oil Storage Tank with Floating Roof on

浮き屋根沈降RoofSinking

Surface of Oil
Exposed

引 火
Ignition

リム火災

液表面露出

Rim Fire

消火不奏功
Failurein Extinguishment

引 火
IgnitionFiredamages
消火不奏功
pontoon –火炎によるポン
getting roof
ツーンの損傷により浮き屋根沈降
to sink.

全面火災
Whole
Fire

リング火災
Ring
Fire

24

Weather Shield
Form Dam

Air Form
Chamber
エアーフォームチャンバー
デフレクター
Deflector

Air空気取入口
IntakeCirculation Space
フォームダムlonger than 1.2m Form Dam
環状部分（1.2ｍ以上）

0.9ｍ以上0.9m or higher

The form discharged from air form chambersourced by：FUKADA KOGYO CO.,LTD.

Pontoonポンツーン

25

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Water Discharge Equipment for Petrochemical Complex Disaster
Dragon Hyper Command UnitHigh Capacity Foam
System・About 8,000 liters/min.
・Deploy at fire department
headquarters of Yokkaichi City andIchihara City (planned to deploy at 12
headquarters nationwide by FY2018)
・Loaned by the national government
without charge as materials andequipment of emergency fire response
teams
・Possible to discharge large quantities
of water flexibly

・About 20,000–30,000 liters/min.
・2 units each at 12 blocks
nationwide
・Deploy at wide-area combined
disaster protection organizations
・For floating roof with a diameter of
34 m or more

Deployment situation at special disaster protection areas such as petrochemical complexes and other petrochemical facilities (as of Apr. 1, 2015)

No. oforganizations
Public fire department
headquarters
Places of business(private fire defense
organizations)

Large-scalechemicaltrucks

Large-scale water
towersFoam concentratetrucks

Large-scalechemical and water
towersSo-called “3 vehicles for
petroleum complex fire”
・2,000–3,000 liters/min.
・Introduced to fire department
headquarters and private fire
defense organizations at places ofbusiness nationwide(1) Large-scale water tower
Raise a water tower and spray foam from a highplace(2) Large-scale chemical truck
Take water from a fire hydrant, mix with foam fire
extinguishing agent, and supply to large-scale water
tower(3) Foam concentrate truck
Supply foam fire extinguishing agent to large-scalechemical truck*2 vehicles of large-scale chemical andwater tower (vehicle having function of largescale water tower and large-scale chemical
697
62
27
79
71
truck) and foam concentrate truck are
popularized for labor saving.
*Out of 92 public fire department headquarters, 81 headquarters have at least one of the above vehicles.
(No. of minimum required disaster protection*Out of 697 specific places of business, 113 places have at least one of the disaster risk reduction materials and equipment mentioned above. personnel 6 persons → 4 persons)
92

83

63

90

19

26

Tokachi off shore Earthquake, September 2003

27

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Idemitsu Kosan Hokkaido Refinery, Outdoor Tank Storage Facility Fire
Background of disaster
Because of the Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M8.0) that occurred around 4:50 p.m. on Sept. 26,
2003, a ring fire broke out at outdoor tank storage facilities (30006) of Hokkaido Refineryof Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. located in Tomakomai.
Two days later, a full surface fire further broke out at different outdoor tank storage
facilities (30063). The fire became a large-scale disaster where the Emergency Fire
Rescue Team was mobilized on a national level and foam concentrates were procured ona national level.
100654Crude oil tank
Gasoline

100651 Crude oil tank

Kerosene/light oil
Crude oil

Kerosene

Land shipping
zone

Naphtha40013
Slop tank

40064 Kerosene tank
40062 Kerosene tank

30006 Crude oil tank

40061 Kerosene tank
30063 Naphtha tank

Power zone

Desulphurizati
on facility zone

Heavy oilDirection of
photo
being
taken

Refining zone

Utilities zone

Catalytic
cracking
facility zone

Layout drawing of Hokkaido Refinery

28

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Idemitsu Kosan Hokkaido Refinery (1) Crude Oil Tank Fire
Outline of fire (crude oil tank)Situation of the tankwhen the fire broke out.
Photo taken from theeast side of the tank.

<30006 tank>
1. Day and time of fire breakout
Breakout: around 4:51 on Sept. 26, 2003 (Fri.)
Extinguishment: 12:09 on Sept. 26 2003 (Fri.)
2. Place of fire breakout

Three places: around floating roof of 30006 crude oil tank, insurrounding dike, and around the pipe in the north of the tank
3. Outline of facilities where the fire broke out
Floating roof cylindrical tank (FRT: Floating Roof Tank)
Diameter: 42.7 m Height: 24.39 m
Permitted capacity: 32,778 kL (remaining quantity at the time of fire breakout:
31,160 kL)
Name of item of hazardous material: Category IV, Class I petroleum (crude oil)
4. Cause
Sloshing occurred on the liquid surface of the tanks due to relatively longperiod strong ground motion, and the floating roof was shaken greatly. Thisshaking made crude oil in the tank flow over the floating roof and leak into adike, and combustible vapor was considered to stay on the floating roof or in
the dike. Also, crude oil which had flowed over from the floating roof of the tankleaked into the dike via a roof drainpipe, and combustible vapor was also
considered to stay in the dike.
As for the ignition source, verification was made on the possibilities of the spark fromabrasion and/or impact accompanying the shaking of floating roof, electric spark from
instrumentation devices, static electricity and frictional electrification, etc. The fire ismore likely to have broken out by a spark generated by the collision between the
floating roof and equipment attached to the upper part of the tank accompanying theshaking of the floating roof, or spark from abrasion and impact when the measure hut
fell onto the floating roof, which ignited combustible mixture gas on the floating roof.
Also, as for fire near the pipe around the relevant tank, it is more likely to have spreadfrom the fire which broke out in the upper part of the tank through the crude oil leaked
from the broken part of the pipe due to the earthquake.
The fire identified in the dike around the relevant tank was also likely to have broken
out, judging from the hours when sloshing continued, as a result of overflowing crude oilburning on the upper part of the tank littered on crude oil leaked by the sloshing, and tohave spread by the sloshing.

Situation of the areaaround the dike and pipe
when the fire broke out.
Photo taken from thewest side of the tank.

Situation of a ring fire of thetank where the fire brokeout29

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Idemitsu Kosan Hokkaido Refinery (2) Naphtha Tank Fire
Outline of Outline fire (naphtha tank)）
About 20 hours after thefire breakout<30063 tank>
1. Day and time of fire breakout
Breakout: around 10:45 on Sept. 28, 2003 (Sun.)
Extinguishment: 6:55 on Sept. 30 2003 (Wed.)
2. Place of fire breakout

30063 naphtha tank
3. Outline of facilities where the fire broke out
Floating roof cylindrical tank (FRT: Floating Roof Tank)
Diameter: 42.7 m Height: 24.39 m
Permitted capacity: 32,779 kL (remaining quantity at the time of fire
breakout: 26,874 kL)
Name of item of hazardous material: Category IV, Class I petroleum(naphtha)
4. Cause
The floating roof of the relevant tank completely fell down into oil on theprevious day when this fire broke out due to relatively long-period strong
ground motion. For this reason, foam for fire extinguishment was sprayed toprevent volatilization of naphtha and conceal the liquid surface of naphtha.
However, strong wind on the day pushed foam away toward the south sideof the tank and two-thirds of the liquid surface in the north side was
exposed to the atmosphere. Because of this, volatilized naphtha flowed
over the wind and was diluted with air. Some parts were more likely to enter
the combustible range (1.5 vol%–7.6 vol%).
In the verification of various sources of ignition, the possibility of
sedimentation electrification remained. This occurs through theelectrification of naphtha when foam disappears with the passage of time
and water drops generated when foam returns to water sink into naphtha.
Generated electric charge is accumulated into foam remaining on the liquidsurface and the electric potential of foam rises. Electricity is discharged
between this foam and foam of the tank shell plate or foam contacting to
the tank shell.
Since the floating roof completely fell down in oil and power sources ofaccessory equipment were shut down at the time when the fire broke out,
the possibility of ignition by such ignition sources as mechanical sparks orelectric sparks was denied.

About 25 hours after
the fire breakout

About 27 hours after
the fire breakout

About 43 hours after the fire
breakout(condition of fire being almost
extinguished)30

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

High Capacity Foam System When the Tokachi-oki earthquake occurred in September 2003, a floating roof was
shaken due to long-period strong ground motion and fell into the oil tank. A fullsurface fire of the tank broke out.
⇒ A high capacity foam system was introduced as equipment responding to a fullsurface fire of floating roof tank.
Naphtha tank fire at Hokkaido Refinery of Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd.

About 20 hours after the fire breakout

About 25 hours after the fire breakout Through the revision of the Act on Disaster Prevention in Petroleum Industrial
Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities in 2004, the establishment of wide-areadisaster protection organization became possible to support protection activities.
 Two units are deployed in each of 12 blocks in Japan (the deployment wascompleted in May 2009).
31

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Configuration Diagram of High Capacity Foam System (Example)• Capability of discharging about 30,000 liters/min. (120 mins at the maximum) (About ten-fold capability compared to generallarge-scale water tower and large-scale chemical truck)• (1) Suction seawater with a water pump, (2) Feed water with a water feed pump, (3) Mix foam concentrates and pressurize,(4) Discharge water into a tank from a cannon• Deploy two units at each wide-area disaster protection organization in 12 blocks nationwide• Introduce and share maintenance and management costs jointly between places of business(2) Pump and mixing
device(5) 遠距離送水システム(3) Foam concentrates(4) Foam concentrate truck(1) Water supply pond or sea(1) 大容量泡放射砲

Pressure pump32

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures
Ⅰ 石油コンビナート等特別防災区域における防災対策の充実強化
at Petrochemical Complexes

Allocation of High Capacity Foam Systems

Block Prefecture1

Hokkaido

Aomori2

MiyagiName of special disasterprotection area

No. of units

Tomakomai

108

Muroran3

MutsuOgawara

55

Hachinohe2

Ibaraki

4

Chiba

6

19 101Akita

9Hirono

8

Iwaki

22 92

Kashimacoast
Central Keiyo
coast

No. of units

Total

Block Prefecture

Name of special disasterprotection area

No. of units

Atsumi

13

Hyogo

Ako

4

Kinuura5

OkayamaMizushima
coast

64

Port of
Nagoya coast
Yokkaichi
coast

57 142Tokushima

Anan

61

KagawaBannosu

16 125

Namikata

3

Kikuma

18

Owase

6

Sakai Senboku
coast

58

Misaki6Southern coast in
north Wakayama

Gobo

Total Block Prefecture

9

Ehime

Matsuyama

35 110

Shimizu

8

Niigata

Port Niigata(East)

20

Toyama7

Shinminato

5

Fukui coast

33

10

50

Total

No. of units

Block Prefecture

Name of special disasterprotection area

No. of units

4

Kiire

57 104

2

Nomi

13

Iwakuni/Otake

16

Shibushi

43

6

Henza

63

Onaha

13

ShunanYamaguchi

34 127

Ube/Onoda

32

FukuokaBuzen

2NagasakiAinoura

4

Oita

Oita

18

11

12

Kagoshima

Okinawa

29

Total

Sendai

EtajimaKudamatsu

11

76

1,330

50

(No. of units is the number of tankswith a diameter of 34 m or more)

1 Block
Tomakomai: Largest diameter 82.0 m
Deployment: Hokkaido Office, Hokkaido Joint Oil
Stockpiling Co., Ltd.

145 145
67

Yamaguchi/
Hiroshima

7 125

4

Name of special disasterprotection area

Hiroshima

962

Shizuoka

Fukui

Name of special disasterprotection area

Central coast in
north Wakayama
Wakayama

Negishi coast

ToyamaOsaka

8Keihin coast
Kanagawa

5

Mie

16

Fukushima

3

Aichi

7

Oga
Akita

Block Prefecture

7 118

Shiriuchi

SendaiTotal

7 Block

9 Block
65

Port of Nagoya coast: Largest diameter 91.0 m
Deployment: Yokkaichi Refinery, Showa
Yokkaichi Sekiyu Co., Ltd.

2 Block

Bannosu: Largest diameter 87.1 m
Deployment: Sakaide Distribution Terminal,
Cosmo Oil Co., Ltd.

Oga: Largest diameter 97.0 m
Deployment: Akita National
Petroleum Stockpiling Base

6 BlockFukui coast: Largest diameter 82.5 m
Deployment: Nihonkai Oil Co., Ltd.

3 Block

10 Block
Kashima coast: Largest diameter 97.0 m
Deployment: Kashima Refinery, Kashima Oil
Co., Ltd., Crude oil tank zone

Ube/Onoda: Largest diameter 90.1 m
Deployment: Tokuyama Complex, Idemitsu
Kosan Co., Ltd.

4 Block
8 Block
11 Block
Kiire: Largest diameter 100.1 m
Deployment: Kiire Oil Terminal, JXTG Nippon Oil &Energy Corporation

Sakai Senboku coast: Largest
diameter 98.0 m
Deployment: Sakai Plant,
TonenGeneral Sekiyu K.K.

5 Block

Central Keiyo coast: Largest
diameter 90.1 m
Deployment: Nakasode Crude
Storage Base, Fuji Oil Co., Ltd.

Negishi coast: Largest diameter 81.5 m
Deployment: Negishi Refinery, JXTG Nippon Oil &Energy Corporation

12 BlockOnaha: Largest diameter 91.1 m
Deployment: Okinawa Office, Okinawa CTS
Corporation

33

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Deployment Situation of High Capacity Foam Cannons
Area

Name of wide-area combined
disaster protection organizationand name of combined disasterprotection organization

1st area

Hokkaido area wide-area
combined disaster protection
organization

Hokkaido

Kiuddel

50,000 L/min.

20,000 L/min. × 1 unit
30,000 L/min. × 1 unit

ANSUL

2nd area

2nd area (Tohoku) council for
wide-area combined disasterprotection

Aomori/Miyagi/Akita

Kiuddel

60,000 L/min.

20,000 L/min. × 1 unit
40,000 L/min. × 1 unit

DIC

Fukushima/Ibaraki

Kiuddel

60,000 L/min.

3rd area

Joban area wide-area combined
disaster protection organization

Related prefecture

Maker

Water discharge
capability to be
furnished(As of Apr. 1, 2015)

Chiba

Morita60,000 L/min.

5th area

Kanagawa/Shizuoka area council
for wide-area combined disasterprotection

Kanagawa/Shizuoka

Morita50,000 L/min.

Williams Fire &Hazard Control

50,000 L/min.

Morita60,000 L/min.

Williams Fire &Hazard Control

60,000 L/min.

Hyogo/Okayama/Tokus
hima/Kagawa/Ehime

Kiuddel

50,000 L/min.

West Chugoku/North Kyushu
area council for wide-area
combined disaster protection

Yamaguchi/Hiroshima/F
ukuoka/Saga/Nagasaki/
Oita

Teikoku Sen-i

60,000 L/min.

South Kyushu council for widearea combined disaster protection

Kagoshima

Williams Fire &Hazard Control

80,000 L/min.

Okinawa

Williams Fire &Hazard Control

60,000 L/min.

Hokuriku area council for widearea combined disaster protection

Niigata/Toyama/Fukui

7th area

Chukyo area council for widearea combined disaster protection

Aichi/Mie

10th area

11th area

12th area

Setouchi area council for widearea combined disaster protection

Okinawa area wide-area
combined disaster protection
organization

DIC
25,000 L/min. × 2 units

6th area

9th area

DIC
30,000 L/min. × 2 units

Central Keiyo coast area
combined disaster protection
organization

Osaka/Wakayama council for
wide-area combined disasterprotection

Maker of foam
concentrates

30,000 L/min. × 2 units

4th area

8th area

High capacity foam cannons

DIC
25,000 L/min. × 2 units
DIC
30,000 L/min. × 2 units

Osaka/Wakayama

DIC
30,000 L/min. × 2 units
DIC
38,000 L/min. × 2 units
DIC
40,000 L/min. × 1 unit
20,000 L/min. × 1 unit

DIC

40,000 L/min. × 2 units
DIC
30,000 L/min. × 2 units

DIC 34

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

Outline of “Skills Competition for Private Disaster Protection Organizations at
Petrochemical Complexes and Other Petrochemical Facilities”
1. Purpose and objective
At a specific place of business, such as a petrochemical complex, etc., a private disaster protection organization furnished withdisaster protection personnel and firefighting vehicles is deployed to respond to explosion, fire, and other accidents.
This skills competition has been implemented from FY2014 for the purpose of improving skills and morale of disaster protection
personnel by using firefighting vehicles owned by each place of business.

2. Outline<Scene of FY2016 Skills Competition>

Assuming that a fire broke out in a place of business at an outdoor storage tankstoring petroleum, etc., competition of fire extinguishing activities to respond to
the situation is carried out by using a large-scale chemical and water tower andfoam concentrate truck or a large-scale chemical and water tower and chemicaltruck. In the evaluation, reliable operation of materials and equipment fordisaster risk reduction and safety management, etc. are evaluated, andprejudging through video screening is implemented in the evaluation.

3. Participating organizations
Private disaster protection organizations, which own a large-scale chemical andwater tower and foam concentrate truck or a water tower and chemical truck,participate in the competition. 43 organizations recommended by fire department
headquarters under respective jurisdiction participated in the competition.

4. Time and place of implementation
During the period of one month before or after the Tsunami Disaster Preparedness Day (November 5), examiners (personnel of Fireand Disaster Management Agency) visit each place of business and implement the skills competition (final) to be performed byparticipants.
35

I. Disaster Risk Reduction Measures at Petrochemical Complexes

5. Content of competition<Water discharging formation pattern A><Water discharging formation pattern B>

Large-scale chemical water tower + foam
concentrate truck

Water tower + chemical truck
Discharge
nozzlePreparation for water discharge/water discharge

Water discharge
tower

Water discharge
tower

Place
where a fire
broke out
(estimation)

Fire hydrant

Fire hydrant

Water pipeline
for firefighting

Chemical truck(vehicle 2)
Water pipeline
for firefighting

Petroleumtank

Foam concentratetruck (vehicle 2)

Petroleumtank

Outrigger

Outrigger
Water feed hose

Placewhere a fire
broke out
(estimation)

Large-scale chemical
water tower (vehicle 1)

Large-scale chemical
water tower (vehicle 1)

Liquid feed hose

Discharge
nozzleLiquid feed hose

Water feed hose

(1) Stabilize a vehicle

Set up an outrigger (vehicle-supporting device) of vehicle (1) and stabilize the vehicle.

(2) Set up water
discharge tower

Extend the water discharge tower of vehicle (1) and set up the height so that foam canbe sprayed from overhead of an outdoor storage tank(3) Feed foam
concentrates or water

Feed foam concentrates or water depending on type of vehicle (2) on the feeding side
(Pattern A or Pattern B).

(4) Discharge waterMix form concentrates and water in vehicle (1) in case of Pattern A and in vehicle (1) in case ofPattern B and spray expanded foam from a discharge nozzle.
*In the competition, foam concentrates are not fed, and only water is fed and discharged.

6. Evaluation and awarding
An evaluation and awarding committee headed by the Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency is held on Nov.
17 and decides organizations to be awarded.
Best award: one organization (the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Award), Second best award: four organizations(the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Award), Encouragement award: 20 organizations (the Commissioner of theFire and Disaster Management Agency Award), Special award: one organization (the Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster
Management Agency Award)
36

Explosive Fire at Chemical Factory
Where a hydrochloric acid tower reflux tankused to be located before the accident

37

Explosive Fire at Chemical Factory

Resorcinol Production Instrument
Resorcinol Production Instrument

Corridor between Resorcinol Production Instrument
and Cymene Production Instrument38

Explosive Fire at Chemical Factory

Whole Picture of Site

Burned Down Fire Engine

Firefighting

Exploded Tank Foundation Part
39
Sourced by National Research Institute of Fire and DisasterPetroleum Complex Fire – Jan, 2017
Incident Summary

Chronology
Occurrence: 15:40, Jan 22, 2017
Learnt: 15:47, Jan 22, 2017
Under Control: 08:09, Jan 24, 2017
Full Containment: 08:27, Jan 24, 2017
Evacuation Order
Ordered: 17:20, Jan 22, 2017
– to 2,986 residents of 1,281 households
Lifted：04:10. Jan 23, 2017
Location
Lubrication oil production complex, in Wakayama Prefecture
Casualty
None
Cause of Accident
Assumed that static electricity spark ignited oxygen gas leaked from decayed pipe.

40

Petroleum Complex Fire – Jan, 2017
Images from Aerial camera

Initial Phase

2 hour past

3 hour past

5.5 hour past41

Keys for Successful Operation at Petrochemical Complex Fire,Jan 2017 – No Casualty
Initial Response
1. Grasped the disaster situation immediately after occurrence – the operator properly shared theinformation on the complex with firefighters
2. Safety management, effective firefighting based on the shared information, securing the space forsupportive units to come3. Quick decision making to call for support to neighboring professional firefighters, self fire service
groups and so on
4. Prompt judgement by top management to issue evacuation order, based on the onsite report that
explosion could happen
5. Leaders proactively explained the progress of firefighting to evacuated residents.

Preventive Measures
Development and improvement of self safety arrangement, ensuring of risk assessment, utilizing
knowledge and experience, no matter which internal or external one, enhancing of capacity buildings
1. Improvement of operator‘s guidelines for accident – pick up what information to be shared with
firefighters, make most of risk assessment result for individual facility, get the self firefighters
equipped with such tools as tactic sheet, disaster management map, location map of form fire hydrant
and SDS (safe data sheet).
2. Training and exercise for self firefighters – including mutual support coordination with neighboring
fire service organizations and firefighting skill competition42

Set Up of Information Sharing
between Business operator and Fire Services organization
Business operators are required to promptly provide the info of theirfacilities to firefighter to stop expansion of a disaster and secondary
disaster, and swiftly get fire under control.

A new ministerial ordinance makes it compulsory that business
operators clarify in their internal rules how to share the informationof their facilities with firefighters when an accident occurs –including who is responsible for sharing with firefighters both in andout the business hours.

43

Business operators are encouraged topredetermine what information to be shared with
firefighters, presuming how firefighters makeresponse to accident if it happens
Below is the sample of items to be shared with firefighters

Briefing to Firefighters

1.

Possibility of victims inside, location of fire point and situation of facilities
around accident site

2.

Temperature and pressure of plants – normal time and disasteroccurrence time

3.

Stored substance and intermediate product4.

Facts to take into consideration for planning firefighting operations –flammable substance, poisonous material and radioactive material, andinformation for judgement to discharge water or not

5.

Location and summary information of store facilities and disaster
response facilities in the complex

6.

Possibilities that harmful material leakage and scatter adversely
impacts the outside of the complex

44

Requirements the operators should meet for safety
Proper Installment in Safety Management for Better
Self Safety
・Top management commitment
・Proper budget and human resources, taking field works’ voice
seriously
・Close communication beyond sectors for safe operation
・Affiliate companies’ safety operation to be secured as well

Robust Risk Assessment
・Risk assessment based onassumption of non-steady
operation or emergency
situation

Capacity Buildings

Utilization of Info and knowledge

・Hand down to the next generations about how
comes the accidents happened.
・Capacity building to create core safety managers

・Utilization and gathering of internal andexternal info about accidents
・Third party bodies’ evaluation and verification

Business umbrella bodies are expected to take following initiatives
・Share the past accident lessons and safety measures among member companies
・Support member companies in safety education and training – e.g. making safety guidelines for members
・Take measures to raise safety awareness – e.g. setting platform where top managements exchange
opinions in safety

The ministries related to safety management at petroleum complex gets united to promote the efforts
and the measures above – FDMA, Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare, and Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry.
45