2432-7484
21：1-64（2017）

Vol.

21

No.1＆2/2017

Perspectives on Climate Change Researchin Japan after the Paris Agreement :International Negotiations, Technologies
and Countermeasures, Plus Adaptation

Editorial
It is our great pleasure to issue our journal ‘Global Environmental Research’ which aims to disseminate the results of studies on global
environmental issues, studies conducted not only in Japan but also in other parts of the world. Many scientists monitor research in theirown ﬁelds, but communications between scientists are not always easy, because the ranges of their ﬁelds are so broad, subjects are sodiverse, and reports may not be written in an internationally spoken language. This journal is intended to help to ﬁll these gaps.
In recent years, many reports, publications, and other forms of information have been released relating to Japanese studies on global
environmental issues. The main purpose of ‘Global Environmental Research’ is to provide information on Japanese research results toscientists internationally and in a timely manner. We also hope that ‘Global Environmental Research’ will encourage exchanging
information among such as the Asian and Paciﬁc regions where local language barriers and limited opportunities exist.
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP), International Human Dimensions Programme of Global Environmental
Change (IHDP) and other international and interdisciplinary programmes have produced a lot of important results. A new global researchplatform ʻFuture Earth’ will provide the knowledge required to face risks posed by global environmental changes and to seize opportunities
for global sustainability. The results of these studies need to be distributed worldwide. We hope this journal will also make a contribution
to this end.
It was said that the title of the third scientific symposium of the IHDP ‘Global Change, Local Challenge’ recognizes that globalchanges are the results of a variety of local activities shaped by particular cultures, histories, political boundaries, and national policies.
We are certain that our ‘Global Environmental Research’ will serve as a transmitter of information on local activities about global change.
Teiji WATANABE

Editorial Board
Chairperson :Teiji WATANABE

Professor, Hokkaido University

Members :Yoshitaka FUKUOKA

Professor Emeritus, Hiroshima University

Kenji FUKUYAMA

Visiting Senior Researcher, Japan Wildlife Research Center

Yuzo INOUE

Former Program Oﬃcer for Global Environment Research Fund

Naoki K ACHI

Professor, Tokyo Metropolitan University

Hiroyasu TOKUDA

Executive Director, Association of International Research Initiatives for Environment Studies

Guest editors:
Hideo H ARASAWA

Vice President, National Institute for Enviromental Studies

Toshimasa OHARA

Research Director, Fukushima Branch, National Institute for Environmental Studies

Hirokazu K ATOH

Professor, Nagoya University

Keiichi K ITAZUME

Professor, Kansai University

Editorial Secretary : Association of International Research Initiatives for Environmental Studies
Ryoko MORIMOTO

Editorial Administrator

Patricia ORMSBYEnglish EditorGlobal Environmental Research
Vol.21 No.1&2/2017

Perspectives on Climate Change Researchin Japan after the Paris Agreement :International Negotiations, Technologies andCountermeasures, Plus Adaptation

Contents

CONTENTS
Perspectives on Climate Change Research in Japanafter the Paris Agreement : International Negotiations,Technologies and Countermeasures, Plus Adaptation
001

Preface

Hideo HARASAWA

003

Remaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period under the Paris Agreement

011

Transitions of Energy Systems and Technologies toward Achieving the Paris Agreement in Japan

Yasuko KAMEYAMA
Shuichi ASHINA

023

Research Perspectives on Future Scenarios toward Achievement of the 2 Degree Target

029

Overview of Studies in Japan on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation :Towards Climate Risk Management Based on Scientific Evidence

039

Toshihiko MASUI
Kiyoshi TAKAHASHI

Recent Progress in Local Governmental Planning for Climate
Change Adaptation in Japan: A Case of Climate Change Adaptation in Saitama Prefecture
Masayuki HARA and Tomohide SHIMADA

047

Japan’s New Initiative for REDD+ Results-based Financing: Opportunities and Challenges
Makino YAMANOSHITA, Hiromitsu SAMEJIMA and Henry SCHEYVENS

053

Identifying Factors for Promoting Renewable Energy Projects
through the Clean Development Mechanism in China, India and ASEAN Countries

Akihisa KURIYAMA and Minoru MORITAPreface

1

Preface
Key aspects of the Paris Agreement
The COP21 conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
negotiated and adopted the Paris Agreement. Entering into force in November 2016, this epoch-making agreement
united all developed and developing countries for future climate change governance. Essential elements of theParis Agreement closely linked to the papers in this Special Issue of Global Environmental Research are as follows(UNFCCC Home Page, Decision 1/CP.21).
・ The 2 degree Celsius target (Art. 2) — In seeking to strengthen the global response to climate change, the Paris
Agreement reaffirms the goal of limiting the global temperature increase to well below 2℃, while pursuingefforts to limit the increase to 1.5℃.
・ Global emission pathways (Art. 4) — To achieve the 2℃ target, Parties aim to reach global peaking of GHG
emissions as soon as possible, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with the best available
science, to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhousegases in the second half of this century. All parties should formulate and communicate long-term low GHG
emission development strategies.
・ Sinks and reservoirs (Art. 5) — The Paris Agreement encourages the Parties to conserve and enhance sinks andreservoirs of GHGs including forests.
・ Voluntary cooperation/Market- and non-market-based approaches (Art. 6) — The Paris Agreement recognizes
the possibility of voluntary cooperation among Parties to allow for higher ambition and sets out principles for any
cooperation that involves internationally transferal of mitigation outcomes. It establishes a mechanism tocontribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and support sustainable development, and defines a frameworkfor non-market approaches to sustainable development. For this, the Japanese government has proposed a uniquemarket mechanism called the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM).
・ Adaptation (Art. 7) — The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation – of enhancing adaptive
capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change. It aims to significantly strengthen
national adaptation efforts, including through support and international cooperation. All Parties should engage inadaptation planning and are expected to submit and periodically update an adaptation communication on theirpriorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions.
The Japanese government sets its top priority on taking countermeasures against global warming, having
adopted the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures in May 2016 to fulfill the mandate of the Paris Agreement.
It sets a GHG reduction target of 26% by 2030, and long-term GHG reduction goal of 80% by 2050. The Japanese
government will promote R&D of innovative technologies in the areas of energy and environment under this plan.
Regarding adaptation, in November 2015 the Japanese government adopted the National Adaptation Plan as a
Cabinet decision prior to COP21, and in August 2016 it established a platform called A-Plat for supporting
adaptation actions under the National Adaptation Plan.
Outline of the Seven Papers of this Special Issue
In this Special Issue of Global Environmental Research, the editors asked Japan’s top scientists and experts inthe areas of climate change science and policy to review and consider perspectives in related research fields after
the Paris Agreement.
First, Dr. Kameyama of the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) examines key issues foracademic experts to prioritize and deal with to support implementation of the Paris Agreement in the post-2020
period. She presents the overall architecture and provisions of the Paris Agreement, maps its major themes, andconsiders governance issues related to equity and transparency.
Second, Dr. Ashina of NIES discusses transitioning of energy systems and technologies toward achieving theParis Agreement. In Japan, most GHG emissions come from energy consumption, so de-carbonization of energy
systems is crucial and essential. Therefore he underscores the need for technological innovation in energy supply
and demand to achieve the target.
Third, Dr. Masui of NIES deals with future scenarios toward achievement of the 2℃ target. He introducescontroversial discussions in Japan over the past decade toward the 2℃ target, and discusses what will be needed inJapan to realize the 2℃ target.
Fourth, Dr. Takahashi of NIES overviews research on climate change impacts and adaptation in Japan, andexplains climate risk management based on scientific evidence. Based on this review, he suggests important
directions for future research on climate risks such as co-design and co-production of climate risk for decision
making and strategy planning, improvement of quantification and communication of uncertainties in climate risk
analyses, and so on.
Fifth, Dr. Hara and Shimada of the Center for Environmental Science in Saitama (CESS) discuss recent
progress in local governmental planning for climate change adaptation, presenting a typical case in Saitama Prefecture.
Some municipalities have formulated their own adaptation plan based on the National Adaptation Plan. The Saitama
Prefectural Government plays a leading role in local adaptation planning and its implementation as a goodpractice.
Sixth, Dr. Yamanoshita et al. of the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) explain Japan’s new
initiative for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+).
They examine a new bilateral initiative of Japan called JCM REDD+, which would contribute to REDD+ resultbased finance. JCM REDD+ is a unique REDD+ activity, and to maximize its potential, modalities and guidelines
for transparency and accounting related to REDD+, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), andInternationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) should be clarified under the Paris Agreement.
Lastly, Dr. Kuriyama and Dr. Morita of IGES identify factors for promoting renewable energy projects throughthe Clean Development Mechnaism (CDM), and analyze CDM projects in China, India and ASEAN countries.
This paper will be useful in applying the CDM to renewable energy projects in Asian countries.
These seven papers reviewing past research and envisioning future research after the Paris Agreement will beof great help to environmental researchers, experts and policy makers in promoting a variety of studies and surveys
to achieve the 2℃ target.
Guest Editor
Hideo HARASAWA
Vice President
National Institute for Environmental Studies

3

Remaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period
under the Paris Agreement
Yasuko KAMEYAMANational Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)
16-2, Onogawa, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8506, Japane-mail:ykame@nies.go.jp

Abstract
This paper aims at examining key issues that should be prioritized and dealt with by academic experts
in the next three to five years, particularly for the purpose of supporting effective implementation of the Paris
Agreement in the post-2020 period. The paper starts off with a section briefly illustrating the overallarchitecture and provisions of the Paris Agreement, followed by a section mapping out major themes underwhich remaining issues exist that should be overcome before countries start taking actions under Paris
Agreement rules after 2020, and how researchers could contribute to resolving these remaining issues.
Among the remaining issues, this article takes up the dimension related to governance of the Paris
Agreement, covering agendas related to equity and transparency. Other major elements should be further
elaborated by other articles in this special issue. The paper concludes by presenting recommendations to a
Japanese audience as to how Japan should proceed in the post-2020 period under the Paris Agreement. There
are two ways of looking at the world. The first is the traditional image of the 20th century, where the economy
is grounded in a stable fossil fuel supply, and emission reduction seems costly. The second is a new image ofthe 21st century, where emission reduction is considered an opportunity for change. The paper argues thatJapanese stakeholders and researchers are affected by the former image of the world, but they need to beaware of the transition, and start taking action today.
Key words: climate change, governance, Japan, nationally-determined contribution (NDC), Paris Agreement

1. Background
The Paris Agreement has opened a new door for theworld to respond to climate change. Adopted on the final
day of the Twenty-first Conference of the Parties(COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 2015, theagreement took less than a year to enter into force inNovember 2016. While the Paris Agreement has been
hailed as a historic diplomatic success (Kinley, 2016),
there are loads of remaining issues that need to be
tackled for the agreement to be most effectively
workable. Many of the remaining agendas require expert
knowledge and inputs from the scientific community.
This paper aims at examining key issues that should
be prioritized and dealt with by academic experts in thenext three to five years, particularly for the purpose of
supporting effective implementation of the Paris
Agreement. The first section briefly illustrates theoverall architecture and provisions of the Paris
Agreement. The second section maps out major themes
under which remaining issues exist, that should beovercome before countries start taking action under
Paris Agreement rules in the post-2020 period, and how
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 003–010
printed in Japan

researchers might contribute to resolving theseremaining issues. Among these remaining issues, thisarticle takes up the dimension related to governance of
the Paris Agreement, covering agendas related to equity
and transparency. It discusses how Japanese stakeholders
are engaging in this aspect. Other major elements of theParis Agreement are further elaborated by other articles
in this special issue. This article concludes withrecommendations to a Japanese audience as to how
Japan should proceed in the post-2020 period under theParis Agreement.

2. Architecture and Provisions of the Paris
Agreement
The Paris Agreement is the outcome of a four-year
negotiation process that was initiated by a decision called“Durban Platform,” that had been agreed to in 2011 at
COP17 (Bodansky, 2016). The countries involved under
the Durban Platform decided “to launch a process todevelop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed
outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to
all Parties” (UNFCCC, 2011). The process was to include
in its work elements related to “mitigation, adaptation,©2017 AIRIES4

Y. KAMEYAMA

finance, technology development and transfer, transparencyof action, and support and capacity-building.” Thus, thestructure and provisions of the Paris Agreement fullyreflect the scope set by the Durban Platform.
2.1 Long-term Goals
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, which set legal
obligations on countries to limit or reduce theirgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to targets clearly
indicated in the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement
merely obligates each country to periodically prepare
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that it
intends to achieve. The agreement does not ensure thatthe aggregated amount of all countries’ NDCs issufficient to avoid dangerous consequences of climatechange to human beings as well as ecosystems as
described in Article 2 of the UNFCCC. The Paris
Agreement sets a long-term goal of partially overcoming
this deficit. Its Article 2 states, “Holding the increase in
the global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit thetemperature increase to 1.5° C above pre-industrial
levels” would significantly reduce the risks and impactsof climate change. Article 4 follows by further stating,“Achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions
by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in the second
half of this century” should be aimed for to achieve thelong-term target set out in Article 2. The COP decisioninvites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) to provide a special report in 2018 on theimpacts of global warming of 1.5°C and related global
GHG pathways.
2.2 Mitigation
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement obligates eachcountry to “prepare, communicate and maintainsuccessive NDCs that it intends to achieve.” Thesuccessive NDCs are to represent progression beyond
the country’s then current NDC and reflect its highest
possible ambition. Developing countries are urged tocontinue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide
absolute emission reduction targets, while developing
countries are encouraged to continue enhancement of
mitigation efforts. Many of the first NDCs had alreadybeen submitted before COP21, setting targets for years up
to around 2025 or 2030. All Parties must also strive toformulate long-term low GHG emission development
strategies and communicate them by 2020. Countries may
voluntarily use market mechanisms such as emissions
trading schemes to achieve their NDCs (Article 6).
2.3 Adaptation, Loss and Damage
Both the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol put
more weight on mitigation than adaptation, but it has
become clear that adverse impacts of climate change are
already occurring. Thus, the Paris Agreement aims at
striking a balance between mitigation and adaptation. Its
Article 7 establishes a global goal also for adaptation toenhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience andreduce vulnerability to climate change. Countries are toengage in adaptation planning processes and implement
actions, including the development or enhancement ofrelevant plans, policies and/or contributions. Countries
should submit and periodically update adaptation
communications in ways that mitigation actions should
be communicated.
The concepts of loss and damage already existedfrom the time of the UNFCCC, but were enshrined as anindependent article in the Paris Agreement (Article 8).
The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss andDamage associated with Climate Change Impact shallbe subject to the authority and guidance of the meetingof the Parties of the Paris Agreement (CMA).
2.4 Finance
Finance has always been one of central issues ofcontention in the climate regime. Several financial
mechanisms have been established, but financial flows
have been insufficient for responding to all the financial
needs in developing countries. The Paris Agreement
requests not only developed countries but also othercountries to voluntarily provide financial resources tohelp developing countries take actions under the Paris
Agreement (Article 9). One COP decision that was
adopted with the Paris Agreement states, “Developed
countries intend to continue their existing collective
mobilization goal through 2025,” and “Prior to 2025 the
CMA shall set a new collective quantified goal from afloor of US$100 billion per year.”
2.5 Transparency
Now that countries’ central obligation for the post2020 period is to set NDCs and update them
periodically, it has become more important to verify
whether countries are making enough progress toachieve their NDCs. A transparency framework foraction has thus become a necessary component of theParis Agreement in order to build mutual trust andconfidence. On the other hand, a series of processes
have already been established under the UNFCCC thatare related to monitoring, reporting and verification(MRV). Article 13 of the Paris Agreement therefore aims
at making the best use of these existing processes in themost efficient manner. Existing reporting requirements
are focused mainly on mitigation actions, but with newcommitments of the Paris Agreements, actions related toother elements, notably adaptation and finance, should
also be subject to the MRV process.
2.6 Global Stocktaking
Global stocktaking is a process inserted into the Paris
Agreement to assess the collective progress towards
achieving the long-term goals. Countries’ NDCs arenationally determined, which does not ensure reaching
the ultimate long-term goal. The first global stocktaking
is to be held in 2023, but the procedures’ details have yet
to be determined. Somewhat related to the stocktaking
process is a facilitative dialogue among countries to beRemaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period under the Paris Agreement

held in 2018 to take stock of the collective actions, as
described in the COP decision. This is an important
process because this is just about the only avenue forcountries to assess sufficiency of their own and othercountries’ efforts to curb global GHG emissions towards
reaching the long-term goals.
2.7 Differentiation
Both the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol categorizedcountries into two distinctive groups called Annex I and
non-Annex I. The Annex I group consisted of developed
countries and countries in transition into a market
economy, such as former Soviet Union countries.
Countries that achieved economic development were
expected to shift from non-Annex I to Annex I. This
categorization became outdated as the distinction
between the two groups became vague. The Paris
Agreement precluded categorization of countries and set
common commitments for all countries. This does notnecessarily mean all countries face same level ofstringency. Within each element of commitment such as
mitigation, adaptation and finance, all countries are
expected to take the same actions, but at differentiatedlevels. The level of actions is to be determined nationallyand voluntarily.
2.8 Legal Nature of the Agreement
The Paris Agreement takes the form of a treaty. During
the negotiation process, there was a disagreement over thename of the agreement. Some countries wanted it to becalled a “protocol,” while others preferred “agreement” or“implementing agreement.” The legal nature of theagreement is determined not by how it is named, but by
the clauses that form parts of the agreement. Articles on
signing (Article 20), ratification (Article 20), entry into
force (Article 21), and depositaries (Article 26) fulfill
necessary conditions for the agreement to be aninternational treaty with official legal status.
2.9 Non-state Actors
The roles of non-state actors are not explicitly statedin the Paris Agreement itself, but are securely embeddedin the founding basis of the agreement. The Paris
Agreement does not have any teeth in the sense that it
does not determine countries’ GHG emission targets in a
top-down manner. This means that any additionalemission reductions need to occur voluntarily,
independent of national governments’ initiatives. The
COP decision “welcomes the efforts of all non-Party
stakeholders to address and respond to climate change,
including those of civil society, the private sector,
financial institutions, cities and other subnational
authorities.” The Non-State Actor Zone for Climate
Action platform (NAZCA) was established at COP20 tosupport various actions taken by the non-state actors.

5

3. Remaining Issues to be Solved with Support
from Academia
Multilateral agreements usually take at least several
years from adoption to entry into force. The Kyoto
Protocol took eight years for enforcement. The Paris
Agreement was an extraordinary case that entered into
force within eleven months after its adoption. This is agood sign that the world is supporting the transition intode-carbonization, but countries had been expecting
several years at least to negotiate detailed rules toconfidently proceed in the post-2020 period. Among
those are elements that require input from scientificexperts.

3.1 Long-term Goals and Emission Budgets
The first set of research questions is related tolong-term emission trajectories and levels of near-termemission reduction targets. The IPCC has already started
preparing the 1.5°C special report. On the other hand,monitoring data by NOAA (National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration) and NASA (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration) have indicatedthat the year 2016 was the warmest year on record(NASA, 2017). The mean global surface temperature
has already risen more than 1.0°C from the pre-industrial
period, leaving very little room for the world to staywithin the 1.5°C warming path.
“Carbon budget,” or “emission budget,” is a notionthat expresses the amount of carbon, or GHGs, that
could be emitted while aiming to achieve a long-term
temperature goal. If we were to achieve the long-termgoal of 2°C, the total carbon budget since
pre-industrialization would be about 840 GtC of CO2. We
have already emitted about 530 GtC in the past up to 2011
(IPCC, 2014), so there is only about 310 GtC that could
be emitted by future generations in order to keep thetemperature under 2°C. The future budget will be evensmaller if we are to achieve the 1.5°C goal. Calculating acarbon budget is not an easy task. The amount will
depend on how much CO2 can be sequestered by various
sinks and reservoirs. Emissions of non-CO2 gases also
affect the budget. How much of the carbon budget would
be left for the future world at the global level if we wereto reach the 2.0 or 1.5° C goal? How will it change
according to changes in assumptions regarding levels ofdeforestation and CCS (carbon capture and storage)
technologies? These are remaining questions that need to
be answered by researchers.
While global emission pathways are discussed,
others need to focus more on national emission
pathways. Many developed countries have already set
long-term emission goals for the year 2050 at thenational level. This is in line with declarations in 2008
and 2009 among the Group of 8 (G8) member countries
that have called for halving global GHG emission by
2050. In order for these countries to reach deep cuts inemissions such as 80% reduction by 2050, they would
have to make good progress at reducing emissions in the6

Y. KAMEYAMA

years 2030 and 2040 as well. Questions such as “whichis the most economically efficient emission pathway forreaching the long-term goal” need to be answered toenable the world to conduct an effective facilitative
dialogue in 2018 and global stocktaking process in 2023.

3.2 Mitigation: Hard and Soft, Involvement of
Non-state Actors
The second set of research questions is on mitigation
over the short to medium term. It is clear that total
amount of countries’ NDCs for the years between 2025
and 2030 is insufficient to reach the long-term goal
(UNFCCC, 2016). More needs to be done in the area of
mitigation to further deepen the targets, and actuallyreach the targets. But how? There is some opposition to
the long-term temperature goals as too idealistic or
unrealistic (Pielke, 2009). These opposing views stemfrom pessimism regarding plausibility of GHG emission
reductions. It is true to say no one can live without
energy. Energy must continue to be supplied even under
the trajectory towards the long-term goals (Rogeli et al.,2015). Carbon dioxide from fossil fuels should becompletely phased out by mid-century either by shiftingenergy sources to renewable energy or nuclear energy,
or by using CCS technology alongside fossil fuel power
plants. In addition, non-CO2 GHGs such as methane andfluorocarbons needs to be reduced as much as possible.
Remaining emissions should be counterbalanced bysequestration of CO2 in forests.
While making an energy shift towards de-carbonizedsources, the energy demand side also needs to make ahuge transition into a less energy-intensive society.
Urban planning and infrastructure require more than
three decades to make a transition. We need to start
making changes from today if we are to complete therestructuring of our cities by mid-century. Buildings andpeople’s dwellings are also a sector that needs along-term view to reduce their GHG emissions. Thinking
in the long term, we need to take into account various
technologies and means that could totally change ourway of living. As for transportation, for instance, current
automobiles with engines might become a thing of thepast. People could continue enjoying mobilization using
smarter and lighter vehicles with electric motors. It isthus insufficient to argue against stringent emission
targets using only the technologies we have today.
Issues related to mitigation include not only
engineering, or the “hard” aspect, but also policy, or the“soft” aspect. Infrastructure and technologies would notexist without relevant policy implementation. All
countries have already implemented a wide variety ofclimate mitigation policies, including regulations,market-oriented mechanisms, and information-oriented
tools such as labeling. These policies should be further
strengthened and implemented in a speedy manner.
Although many policy analyses have already been
conducted (Höhne et al., 2017), it is still at too early astage to conclude which policy instruments are more
effective than others. The effectiveness of policies will

greatly depend upon each country’s national
circumstances, other relevant non-climate policies, andits share of sectors in terms of emission sources.
Engagement of non-state actors in climate change
mitigation activities is a prerequisite for achieving deep
emission cuts. Technological breakthroughs are achievedby private companies’ R&D. Urban city development isdetermined by local governments and citizens. The roleof policies and measures is to develop enough incentives
for these various actors to voluntarily shift to lesscarbonized behavior. Fossil fuel divestment is amovement that started from NGOs and university
students, to divest their holdings of fossil fuel stocks infavor of other climate-friendly alternatives (Ayling &Gunningham, 2016). More research is needed toinvestigate ways to involve investments by the private
sector, as well as actions by local governments.

3.3 Adaptation and “Loss and Damage”
Adaptation and “loss and damage” is the third pillarof work remaining to be tackled under the Paris
Agreement. Adaptation actions are mainly rooted in eachcountry or even further at each local level. As adverse
impacts of climate change become more evident,
however, the need for more precise estimations of futureplausible damage becomes stronger.
As the COP decision accompanying the Paris
Agreement requested the IPCC to publish a special
report on 1.5°C, climate researchers have already started
to elaborate on plausible climate impacts that are
expected to occur under the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios,and how much damage the world could avoid by seeking
the higher ambitious temperature goal (Hulme, 2016).
This exercise is necessary for comparing the costs
required to reduce GHG emissions to reach the 1.5°C
goal and the cost required to adapt to a warmer world by
2° C or more and damage associated with higher
temperatures. Currently, researchers are making a great
effort to estimate the future impact of climate change.
Mean precipitation and temperature are the mostcommonly acknowledged parameters affected by climatechange, but it is also important for local people tounderstand extreme precipitation or temperature events
locally in a shorter timeframe.
As for loss-and-damage-related debates, the key will
be finding ways to prove direct damage-and-loss
consequences from climate change and those considered
to be associated with climate change. Attribution of
extreme weather patterns and the damage they cause to
climate change is a new frontier in climate science.
Climate security is a notion that aims at finding potential
links between climate change and armed conflict, but
few studies have resulted in robust results so far (Ide,2017). From the legal aspect, responsibility and liability
for loss and damage are still under debate (Lees, 2017).
3.4 Finance, and Involvement of Non-state Actors
Finance has always been an issue at stake in climatechange negotiation. Three types of financial mechanisms

Remaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period under the Paris Agreement

were established in 2001 at COP7: the Special Climate
Change Fund and Least Developing Countries Fund,both under the UNFCCC, and the Adaptation Fundunder the Kyoto Protocol. Establishment of thesemechanisms was supported by developing countries, butdissatisfaction was soon raised by the same countries,
because the amount of financial flow was too meager tofulfill all their needs. To respond to these serious
financial demands, the Copenhagen Accord, adopted in2009 at COP15 included a quantitative target of “US$30
billion for the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocation
between adaptation and mitigation” as short-term
finance, and “US$100 billion a year by 2020” in the longterm (UNFCCC, 2009). The funding sources were notlimited to official assistance, but included both public
and private, and bilateral and multilateral types offinance. A significant portion of such funding was toflow through a newly established financial mechanism
called the Green Climate Fund. The short-term financial
goal was reached through huge financial contributions
from developed countries. The long-term financial goalis yet to be achieved but the amount of financial flow iscertainly on the rise. Much of the growth owes toinvestment by private companies (CPI, 2015). The
Copenhagen Accord only set financial goals up to 2020,
and the COP decision in 2015 supplemented the Paris
Agreement by stating that developed countries intended
to continue their existing collective mobilization goal
through 2025, and that a new collective goal from afloor of US$100 billion per year would be agreed uponprior to 2025.
It goes without saying that the amount of financial
flow makes a crucial difference in making effective
changes towards de-carbonization in both developed anddeveloping countries, but merely talking about quantity
is not enough. Financing should be directed towards themost effective technologies and investments. In reality,
however, it is difficult to track all financial flows, andthere is no assurance that all the financial resources arebeing used either to mitigate climate change or to adapt
to the changing climate (Clapp et al., 2012). Studies areneeded to monitor how financial resources havecontributed to actual emission reductions or adaptation.
There have been a number of studies that elucidated
the financial amounts needed for developing countries totake action against climate change (Kameyama et al.,2016; Bowen et al., 2017). In many cases, most of thefinancial burden required to make substantial emission
reductions occurred at the time of initial investment.
Once the facilities were entirely installed, the investors
could profit from energy saving for the next two to four
decades. Loans and mortgages that leveraged the initialinvestment cost and avoided costs later on could
motivate citizens to invest in less energy-intensive
infrastructure and renewable energy.

7

4. Governance
4.1 Equity: Two Contrasting Images of the WorldThe Paris Agreement was absolutely successful inattracting most countries to be Parties to the agreement.
Nevertheless, the real engagement of countries and othersub-national stakeholders starts today. The agreement
does not force countries to reduce GHG emissions to alevel indicated by any third-party institutions that takeequity into consideration. This means the equity
dimension of the climate change problem is notinstitutionally embedded in the agreement. It is up toeach country how much it will consider its own
responsibility to respond to the climate change problem
and take action voluntarily. This system is completely
different from how many researchers used to consider
equity—or burden-sharing rules—to determine emission
reduction targets for countries (Höhne et al., 2014).
There are two distinctive ways to look at the game ofclimate change politics. Traditional debates related toequity in the realm of climate change politics are basedon the idea that reducing emissions is costly (Barrett,2006). On one hand, countries agree to reduce GHG
emissions globally because they understand climatechange is likely to harm all. On the other hand, however,they oppose setting stringent emission reduction targets
at the national level, insisting that deep emission cuts
would negatively affect their economy. A country that
does not participate in the emission reduction regime,
often called a “free-rider,” will still be able to enjoy
alleviation of adverse impacts of climate change, thanks
to other countries’ efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
Equity considerations are particularly important undersuch conditions to avoid allowing countries to become
free riders. Burden-sharing rules are investigated to see
if any rule could be agreeable to all nations. Emissions
per capita and emissions per GDP are major equity rulesthat have been proposed by countries and researchers(Kameyama, 2004). The Kyoto Protocol’s emission
reduction targets were set after long debates on equity.
This image is, so to say, the “20th century image” of theworld—a fossil-fuel-based economy.
The second way of looking at the game of politics is
to see climate-related investment as an opportunity
rather than a cost. Fossil fuel is a non-renewable natural
resource that will eventually deplete. Coal reserves are
relatively large, but oil production could peak out
sometime within the next few decades. It is therefore
necessary for all countries to start investing in newsources of energy in one way or another for the purposeof energy security. Climate change mitigation has
worked as motivation for the private sector to invest in
renewable energy and other technologies that would
contribute toward moving away from fossil fuel use. The
faster companies develop new technologies, the morecompetitive they become and able to profit bydominating markets. Under the free market of climate
investment, countries will not need to compare NDCs
across countries or make persistent efforts in the equity

8

Y. KAMEYAMA

dimension of the agreement. Rather, countries would
voluntarily implement policies to lead companies toinvest in R&D in the area of energy and efficiency, andset ambitious goals, giving incentives. This image is, so
to say, the “21st century image” of the world, making
huge investments in renewable energy.
Assessments of the effectiveness of the Paris
Agreement largely depend on how individuals see
today’s status quo, whether it is closer to the former orthe latter.
The agreement will have negligible effectiveness in
mitigating climate change if the world continues to havethe former image of the world. Many developing
countries were unhappy about abolishment of the Annex
I – non-Annex I division in the Paris Agreement. During
the negotiations at COP21, developing countries
continuously underscored the importance of thehistorical responsibility of developed countries forcausing climate change and called for the agreement to
be based on equity and common but differentiatedresponsibilities (CBDR) (Ajit, 2015). Developed
countries also accepted differentiation, except that they
insisted that it be reflected in a dynamic manner, since
the world has changed since the time the UNFCCC was
adopted. The agreement was still considered fair bymost countries, because it was agreed upon by thedeveloped countries that a further financial commitment
would be made by the developed countries in the post2020 period. Efforts to reduce GHG emissions by
developing countries are dependent on the amount offinancial resources transferred to the developing
countries, as well as efforts by developed countries toreduce their own emissions. Now that the current U.S.
Trump administration is against the Paris Agreement andoverall emission reduction policies at the federal level, it
is not likely that developing countries will receive apositive message from the richest and second largest
GHG-emitting country in the world.
On the other hand, the Paris Agreement could beconsidered a level playing field for all stakeholders to
shift towards a de-carbonized world, if we could see theworld as the latter image. There have already been a lotof signs of the world being steered in this direction. For
example, Chinese President Xi Jinping is said to bestrongly committed to the Paris Agreement and otherclimate change mitigation efforts, even if the UnitedStates pulls out of the agreement (Phillips, 2017). Saudi
Arabia, the largest oil producer, has been making hugeinvestments in solar and wind power plants, with further
plans to develop almost 10 gigawatts of renewableenergy by 2023 in its vast northwestern desert. It is
expected that new development of renewable energy
could replace the equivalent of 80,000 barrels of oil a
day now burned for power (Dipaola, 2017). In the
United States, many judge that coal production will not
regain profitability even with full support from President
Trump in eliminating all of the regulations set by theformer Obama administration, because the falling priceof natural gas is the primary reason for the plunge in useof coal by utility companies. Renewable energy sources,
such as wind and solar, are also becoming morecompetitive (Isadore, 2017).
The two images of the world co-exist today and will
stay that way in the next decade. It is likely, however,that the first image will slowly fade away. Not only
because of climate change, but also because fossil fuel isa depleting resource and from a sustainable development
point of view, we should not depend on non-renewablesources.

4.2 Transparency: Tracking Efforts
Countries’ actions will be assessed by the transparency
mechanism set up under the Paris Agreement, but theprocess is yet to be discussed. Reliable information on
mitigation, adaptation and financing is the key to ensuring
the agreement’s effectiveness. Many developing countries
lack basic data, including GHG emissions and energy
consumption. One of the remaining tasks for researchers
is to introduce simple ways to collect these data
periodically with the simplest methodology.
The transparency system is important for different
reasons, depending on the image of the world, eachrequiring different types of information. In the case of
the traditional image of the world, transparency isimportant because all countries need to be watched tomake sure they are really doing what they promised to
do. The transparency system should put much effort into
tracking actual emission trajectories, and agree on rules
in case of noncompliance. In addition, countries need tostart discussing possibilities to increase the level ofambition of their future NDCs. This will be a laborious
process because no country wants to set stringent
emission reduction targets. Developing countries will
look at developed countries with an eye on how muchthe rich countries have adopted “common but
differentiated responsibility.”
Meanwhile, in the latter case, transparency isimportant for sharing information on best practices andperformances. Information to be submitted under thetransparency mechanism, the verification processes andcompliance procedure as a consequence would differ
according to which world we assume we are living in.
The transparency system could collect various
information, such as GDP growth data and policies
implemented, to find high-performance policies. Successstories could be duplicated in other countries to enhance
best practices.
A number of reporting and verification processes
have already been established under the UNFCCC
regime, and it has been widely acknowledged that theprocess should be as simple as possible for all countries
to comply with. Some studies have proposed new
methodologies to assess countries’ efforts for mitigation
by grasping the policies implemented in those countries(Kameyama & Kawamoto, 2016; New Climate Instituteet al., 2016). More studies are needed to assess policy
packages that result in maximal emission reductions
while also striking a balance with healthy economic

Remaining Research Agendas in the Post-2020 Period under the Paris Agreement

growth.

4.3 Japan’s Case
In Japan, many government officials and industries
welcome the universal coverage of the Paris Agreement,
officially stating that the agreement is “fair” just because
it achieved more or less universal participation (MOFA,
2015). Meanwhile, the same individuals also stress thatJapan does not necessarily have to endeavor seriously toachieve its NDC, as the commitments elaborated in theAgreement are voluntary and there will be no penalty
even if Japan does not achieve its target. Although thisinterpretation is correct in legal terms, it should be notedthat it is based on the traditional image of the world.
One of the events that have been attracting muchattention worldwide is the inauguration of President
Trump of the United States. He himself has been
unwilling to take action against climate change, andintends to pull out of the Paris Agreement (Worland,2017). Japanese stakeholders also pay much attention tochanges in the United States. People who are unwillingto take action to reduce GHG emissions in Japan will
welcome President Trump’s actions―or inaction―that
almost cancel out what his predecessor, former President
Obama, introduced both inside and outside the UnitedStates to tackle climate change.
Nevertheless, there are others that see signs of thenewer, more proactive image of the world (Kiko
Network, 2017). They feel that Japan should be the front
runner in a race towards decarbonization for manyreasons other than climate change. Foremost, Japan does
not own any extraction or production industries within
its territory related to fossil fuels and is currently almost
totally dependent on energy sources imported fromoverseas. Nevertheless, the share of fossil fuel within the
total primary energy supply was almost 94.6% in 2013,higher than that of most countries around the world(United States: 83.3% , China 88.1% ) (Agency for
Natural Resources and Energy, 2016). Replacement offossil fuel by renewable energy would contribute to
reduced payments to overseas countries for fossil fuelimports.
Actions to reduce energy consumption are likely tocontribute also toward adaptation to a rapidly aging
society. The elderly share of society (ages above 65) islikely to reach almost 40% by 2050 (IPSS, 2012). The
size of the Japanese population, currently around 120
million, is expected to decrease to less than 100 million
by 2050. As the number of elderly lacking support offamily or relatives is likely to expand, more people will
be willing to dwell close to each other, with shops andcommunity buildings within walking distance. Less
driving of automobiles and more use of public
transportation will be welcomed by these people. Energy
consumption per person is expected to be much smallerwhen people live in housing complexes than individual
houses (NIES, 2016).
Japan’s NDC for the year 2030 is a “26 percent
reduction from 2013.” Although there are controversies

9

over the degree of ambition of the target, it should beachievable if Japan were to aim at an 80% reduction by
2050, as has been indicated by the Global Warming
Mitigation Plan adopted as a Cabinet Decision in 2016.
Japan needs to start moving in the direction of adecarbonized community by investing in infrastructure
and buildings that can last for more than three decades(Central Environmental Council, 2017).
In the international arena at meetings under the
UNFCCC, countries are discussing ways for countries todeepen their emission targets. Japan should undertake
additional cooperation with other countries, specificallyin Asia, and develop effective projects for reducing
emissions jointly. One such Japanese initiative is amechanism called the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM).
The JCM develops GHG emission reduction projects indeveloping countries and uses Japanese financial
assistance to install facilities to reduce emissions and at
the same time enhance sustainable development (JCM,
2017). Seventeen developing countries have signed onto
partnership agreements with Japan on JCM projects. The
effectiveness of the mechanism is yet to be seen, butsome projects initiated by the JCM could flourish to
become bigger and more effective projects in the future.

5. Conclusion
We see today evidence of increasing temperaturesand more frequent extreme weather patterns. Even if any
scientific uncertainty still remains, there is nearly aconsensus that climate change and its impacts are humaninduced at a level serious enough for all countries tostart taking action. The Paris Agreement should not be
another excuse for delaying actions just because theachievement of emission reduction targets is not legallybinding, or because the level of the targets could be set
according to each country’s preference. Rather, the Paris
Agreement should be the founding basis for wider
cooperation among countries, local governments, thebusiness community, and citizens. That said, researchers
are expected to supply the various stakeholders withdata sets and information to enable them to find the best,
most effective and least costly solutions obtainable, that
also invite other co-benefits related to sustainability.
Japanese stakeholders should not confine themselvesto the traditional way of looking at the world, assuming
stable prices, with the prices of fossil fuels continuing attheir current level into the future, thinking emission
reduction to be costly. People should be aware that GHG
emission reduction actions bring about opportunities toinvest in reconstructing new ways of living in the 21st
century.

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Yasuko KAMEYAMA
Dr. Yasuko Kameyama is deputy director of theCenter for Social and Environmental Research,
National Institute for Environmental Studies. Her
background is international relations. Her work has
focused mainly on studies of international
negotiations related to global environmental
problems, the institutional dimension of climatechange policies, and implementation. She has authored many publications inboth Japanese and English. One of her latest publications is Climate Change
Policy in Japan: From the 1980s to 2015 (Routledge, 2017)(Received 24 May 2017, Accepted 31 August 2017)11

Transitions of Energy Systems and Technologies toward
Achieving the Paris Agreement in Japan
Shuichi ASHINA
National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)
16-2, Onogawa, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8506, Japane-mail: ashina.shuichi@nies.go.jp

Abstract
In order to achieve the targets in the Paris Agreement, it is important to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions drastically. Because in Japan most GHG emissions result from energy consumption (88.6% in2015), de-carbonization of energy systems is crucial, and there are strong hopes for technological innovationin energy supply and demand to help the targets be reached. Japan has already undertaken various kinds oftechnological development and implementation in society via both the public and private sectors, and these
activities have contributed to the reduction of energy consumption and GHG emissions in Japan. For
example, the total energy consumption in the latter half of the 1990s and first half of the 2000s was around550－560 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe), decreasing to 502 Mtoe in 2015 through comprehensive
energy saving measures and actions to reduce GHGs. Even so, development of innovative technologies isstill needed for further GHG emission reductions. In the past, technological measures focused on devices
such as those involving hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, or batteries and renewables, but research anddevelopment (R&D) is now focused on systemized technologies. One example is energy monitoring systems
in conjunction with energy management, and another is local energy networks with renewables anddistributed energies such as gas cogeneration and biomass boilers. Low carbonization of energy systems is
the key to both GHG emission reduction and achieving a global low-carbon society. Materialization of
innovative technologies is also needed for building a low-carbon society, and Japan’s experience andexpertise in technological R&D could be the first step in the right direction and will go a long way toward
providing a foundation for impressive GHG emission reductions and establishment of a low carbon-society
not only in Japan but also all over the world.
Key words: c limate change mitigation, emission reduction, energy system, system transition,technology development

1. Introduction: Historical Transition in Japan’s
Energy Sector
The value of a “stable climate” as an environmental
commodity has increased. An important feature of theclimate system is its inertia. Because of past and current
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, a certain increase inglobal temperatures is unavoidable, as reported in the
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Such increases
in temperature carry profound risks. Even a small
increase in temperature is likely to have significant
impacts on ecosystems and species, and might lead toincreased droughts or extreme rainfalls, with severe
consequences for our society. Measures against global
warming need to be taken to ensure sustainable
development and a better future for Japan. The scientificinformation in AR5 and many international agreements
and commitments including the Paris Agreement
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 011–021
printed in Japan

indicate the profoundness of global warming and theneed for prompt action. As Japan is no exception, in thatit seems to have been affected in various ways by global
warming, it is time to implement concrete measures inview of disaster prevention, health, water resources,
food, ecosystems, etc., while reducing GHG emissions.
A response to this challenge can be found intechnology development, which is Japan’s area ofexpertise. As such, the perfect opportunity for a new
growth driver can be found right before our eyes.
Competition has already begun. Competition can beovercome by creating low-carbon technologies andsocial systems that have no equal. The key is to takepositive action and not wait around doing nothing.
In order to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions toachieve the low-carbon society indicated in the Paris
Agreement, it is important to understand sources of
GHG emissions and identify causes (or driving forces)©2017 AIRIES12

S. ASHINAof emissions. Based on the IPCC Inventory Guideline,
sources of GHG emissions can be divided into six
categories: (1) energy use, (2) industrial processes, (3)agriculture, (4) waste, (5) land-use change and forestry(LUCF) and (6) bunker fuels. Among these categories,
in Japan, GHG emissions from energy use have adominant share compared to the other categories. In
2015, 88.6% of Japan’s GHG emissions came fromenergy use (NIES/ GIO 2017). GHG emissions fromenergy use have a strong relationship with primaryenergy consumption and level of economic activity, so
getting a picture of GHG emissions from energy use isalmost equal to understanding energy systems andenergy consumption.

1.1 Overview of Energy Profiles in Japan
Figure 1 summarizes energy consumption by primaryenergy source in Japan from 1880 to 2015. Until around
3.11

30
25

NUC

Oil Crisis

20

GAS

15
10
5
0
1880

1900

1920

OIL

COAL

1880
Period:

1895
Meiji

Renewable and Others

1910 1925|Taisho|
Nuclear

1940
Gas

1955 1970
Showa
Oil

Coal

1985
|

Hydro

2000 2015
Heisei

Traditional Biomass

Fig. 1 Long history of energy consumption in Japan, by primaryenergy source (EDMC, 2017).

1880, energy consumption in Japan mainly consisted of
traditional biomass such as fuel wood and charcoal.
Then coal use started to grow and Japan kept coal as amain source of energy until the end of World War II.
Before the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979, energy
consumption, especially oil consumption, increased witheconomic growth. After the latter half of the 80s, i.e., thebeginning of the bubble economy, energy consumption
started to increase again due to the upturn in economic
activity, interfusion with an energy-consuming lifestyleand shift in vehicle preferences to large cars such as land
cruisers. After the bubble economy burst in the latter
half of the 90s, Japan’s prolonged economic slump led
to suppression of energy consumption, and total energy
consumption remained at a level of around 550－560
million tons oil equivalent (Mtoe) for a while after that.
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and subsequentrecession have affected not only economic activity but
also energy consumption, and energy consumption in2009 was 487 Mtoe, down 7% from the 2008 level.
Among energy sources, we should give more
attention to nuclear energy in Japan. Nuclear power wasa key technology for the electricity supply in Japan after
the oil crisis, because Japan’s energy policy aimed todiversify energy sources away from oil. On March 11,
2011, Japan suffered a big earthquake and tsunami. The
nuclear power plants in the northern part of Japan’s mainisland have been now shut down since. On that day, 55
nuclear power units were in commercial operation and
12 units were under construction, as shown in Fig. 2. The
total installed capacity was 49,165 MW, and capacity
under construction, 16,318 MW. The Okinawa ElectricPower Co. (OEPC) has no nuclear power facilities andno future plans to construct any. When the earthquake
hit, 15 plants were shut down in response. Subsequently,

Fig. 2 Locations of nuclear power plants in Japan (EDMC, 2017 and author).

13Transitions of Energy System and Technologies in Japan
300.0
Air condi�oner

Refrigerator

TV

PC

1995

2000

Ownership rate [%]

250.0

200.0

150.0

100.0

50.0
1965

1970
Industrial

1975

1980

1985

1990

Residen�al

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Commercial

0.0
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

2005

2010

2015

Fig. 3 Final energy consumption, by sector (EDMC, 2017).

Fig. 4 O wnership rates for typical home appliances from 1970 to2003 (EDMC, 2017).

the Tohoku Electric Power Co. (Tohoku-EPCO) shut
down all its nuclear power plants (Onagawa: 2,174 MW
and Higashi-dori: 1,100 MW). The Tokyo ElectricPower Co. (TEPCO) also shut down some of its nuclear
power plants on account of the earthquake, but only
plants on the Pacific side of Japan (Fukushima Daiichi:
4,696 MW and Fukushima Daini: 4,400 MW). By 2014,
all of Japan’s nuclear power plants had been shut down
for periodical inspection and never restarted within theyear. Thus, Japan generated no nuclear-power electricity
in the year 2014. Since 2015, some nuclear power plants
located in the western part of Japan have been approvedfor restarting on the condition that they conform tostrengthened safety criteria set by the Nuclear andIndustrial Safety Agency.
In terms of final energy consumption in Japan, total
final energy consumption has shown a similar trend to
primary energy consumption, as shown in Fig. 3. The
industrial sector, especially the manufacturing industry,accounts for a large part of final energy consumption
during the entire period covered by the statistics. In
2015, the total final energy consumption was 316 Mtoe,
with the industrial sector (manufacturing andnonmanufacturing industries) consuming 149 Mtoe,
which corresponds to 47.1% of the total final energy
consumption. However, final energy consumption in theindustrial sector after the oil crises has remained almost
steady at around 150－160 Mtoe and its share of the total
final energy consumption has gradually decreased. The
increase in final energy consumption has come mainly
from increases in final energy consumption in both theresidential and passenger transportation sectors.
In 1965, final energy consumption in the residential
and passenger transportation sectors was 11 Mtoe and 8
Mtoe, respectively. In 2015, the residential sector
consumed 47 Mtoe, which corresponded to 4.4 times the
final energy in 1965, and the passenger transportation
sector consumed 49 Mtoe, 6.2 times the 1965 level. This
is why, especially after the bubble economy started,
lifestyles in Japan shifted toward higher energyconsumption, such as greater varieties of home
appliances, multiple appliance and vehicle ownership,larger sizes of appliances and trends in vehicle
preferences for larger cars. As an illustrative example,
changes in ownership rates for typical home appliances(air conditioners, refrigerators, TVs and PCs) from 1970
to 2015 are summarized in Fig. 4 (some statistical data
after 2004 are unavailable due to a change in thestatistical survey system). More than 100% ownershipindicates that the average household has several units of
the appliance, e.g., 200% ownership of air conditioners
could be interpreted to mean that each household has
installed two air conditioning systems at home. The
figure clearly shows that except for refrigerators,
ownership rates continue to grow. That is, final energy
consumption also continues to grow.

1.2 H
 istorical Transitions of the Energy System in Japan
In the 135-year history of energy statistics in Japan,
we can find at least two energy system transitions (ortechnology shifts). Specifically, one occurred after theoil crisis and the other, after the March 2011 earthquake.
The oil crisis triggered the promotion of non-oil
energy sources such as gas and nuclear, as describedabove, and popularization of energy-saving activities,
including replacement by energy efficient machines orappliances in all sectors, including industrial, residential,commercial and transportation. Although this transition
brought another type of energy system into Japan—theelectrified society— that transition is not yet complete,because even now, oil still accounts for around 45% ofprimary energy consumption in Japan, as shown in Fig. 1.
The accidents in Fukushima following the March2011 earthquake led nuclear power to be shut down forthorough safety review. As a result, nuclear was fully
substituted for by fossil fuels in 2014. Some nuclear
plants, however, have restarted after safety examinations
and approval by the government since 2015, so theenergy transition from nuclear to other energy resources
was not completed.
From the viewpoint of the energy transition in Japan,
even though diversification of fuel sources waspromoted after the oil crisis, oil has remained thedominant energy source consistently during the period

S. ASHINA

from 1965 to now. Before the oil crisis, energy demand
growth covered mainly oil. On the other hand, after theoil crisis, promotion of diversified energy sources
resulted in both suppression of oil consumption growth
and an increased gas and nuclear power supply. In asimilar way, before the Fukushima accident, nuclear
power was considered a key electricity supply and its
capacity grew in line with the Basic Energy Plan
designed by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI). On the other hand, the possibility of restarting
most nuclear power plants, except for a few such as
Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini, is being
explored after the complete examination of facilities.
As shown above, Japan has experienced two energy
system transitions triggered by the oil crisis andFukushima nuclear accident. Now, the Kyoto Protocol,
Paris Agreement and subsequent international agreements
on climate change mitigation are set to bring about athird energy system transition in Japan. The “low-carbon
society” philosophy aims to minimize carbon emissions
in all sectors as well as shift to a simpler, higher-quality
life and coexistence with nature. In order to realize sucha low-carbon society and/or energy system, new,innovative technologies are required not only for theenergy system but also the whole social system. The
needs for technological development cover wide-ranging
aspects, including the energy system, transportation,industry, buildings, energy efficiency, renewable energy,
lifestyle changes, education and awareness, governance,
forestconservation,
waste
management,
airenvironmental quality and urban planning. Even though,low-carbonization of the energy system is inevitable,
understanding of the energy system as well as actions
towards a low-carbon energy system offer hope. This
paper presents an outlook on technology development
before and after the Paris Agreement.

2. Current Technological Measures and Actions
for Climate Change Mitigation in Japan
Japan has tackled GHG emission reduction under acollaborative framework that includes government, local
authorities, industries, businesses, citizens and NGOs. In
October 1990, the Government of Japan ratified a plan
against global warming, named the “Global warming
action prevention plan,” in a ministerial conference on
global environmental conservation. The plan targetedstabilization of CO2 emissions at the 1990 level after theyear 2000. In 1997, the Third Conference of the Parties(COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Kyoto where
the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon. In the Kyoto
Protocol, the GHG emission reduction target for Japanwas set at a 6% reduction compared to the baseline year
from 2008 to 2012.
In June 1998, following the Kyoto Protocol
agreement, the Global Warming Prevention Headquarters
adopted “Guidelines for Measures to Prevent Global
Warming – Measures Towards 2010 to Prevent Global

Warming.“ At the same time, the Law Concerning thePromotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming
was enacted (Law No.117 of 1998) to set a basic
framework for actions to prevent global warming, andother relevant laws and measures, such as the Act on the
Rational Use of Energy, was revised. Since then, thegovernment of Japan has implemented various kinds ofpolicy measures, such as imposition of a tax for global
warming from 2012 and implementation of a feed-intariff (FIT) system for wholly renewable energy from
June 2012. In 2016, the Japanese government renewed
the National Plan for Coping with Global Warming, andsummarized three national GHG reduction targets: a
3.8% or more reduction from the 2005 level by 2020, a
26% reduction from the 2013 level by 2030, and an 80%
reduction by 2050.
Under these laws and plans, various kinds ofmitigation actions using technology have beenpromoted. Hybrid vehicles and electric vehicles, forinstance, have gradually diffused over these 10 years asshown in Fig. 5. In 1998, 3,428 hybrid vehicles and 638
electric vehicles were in use. The number of hybrid
vehicles in 2016 was 5,581,578 units, rising to 16.28
times the 1998 level. Although the increase in electricvehicles was small compared to that in hybrid vehicles,
63,760 units were in use in 2016. Such trends inpenetration can be found for other energy efficienttechnologies, such as LED light bulbs, heat pump water
heaters, solar heaters and efficient industrial furnaces.
Japan’s government and ministries have also
supported the spread of emission reduction technology
through policies and measures. For example, METI, theministry with jurisdiction over energy policy, creates
policies and measures for energy conservation, theKyoto Mechanisms, investment in innovative technology
and promotion of nuclear power. The Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy promotes a variety of energy
policies and measures in conjunction with METI. It has
been promoting the adoption of next-generation cokeovens and propagating high-performance industrial
furnaces in the industrial sector. The agency has
6,000,000

Hybrid vehicles

5,000,000

Electric vehicles
Number of Cars

14

4,000,000
3,000,000

2,000,000
1,000,000

0

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Fig. 5 H istorical trends in penetration levels of hybrid and electricvehicles (Automobile Inspection & Registration Information
Association, 2017).

15

Transitions of Energy System and Technologies in Japanencouraged steady improvements in energy efficiency
equipment in the residential and commercial sectors
through a top runner approach, which sets standards forenergy efficiency. Under Japan’s Energy Conservation
Law, it promotes public relations activities, including
eco-labeling. In the transportation sector, it promotes
modal shifts and improved logistics efficiency.
Renewable energies such as wind and solar are a key
element for both energy policy and global warming
policy, and the agency has been funding technology
development and pilot projects.
In addition, it has also implemented technology
development programs. One example is a microgrid
demonstration project. Installation of renewables such as
solar, wind and biomass contributes to reduction of CO2
emissions and climate change mitigation. On the other
hand, burgeoning renewable generation has a nonnegligible negative impact on the grid system. The
output of renewable generation, especially solar andwind, is unstable, resulting in voltage and frequency
fluctuations in the power grid system. A microgrid(recently termed “smart grid”) is a localized group ofgenerators, storage cells, and electricity users connectedto the grid, that can function autonomously. Generators
include fuel cells, solar, wind, biomass, micro-gas
turbine and so on. In 2003, the New Energy andIndustrial Technology Development Organization(NEDO) started three demonstration projects in Aomori,
Aichi and Kyoto prefectures under its Regional Power
Grid with Renewable Energy Resources Project. Thesedemonstration projects evaluate the feasibility ofintegrating new energy sources into a local distribution
network. In addition to these demonstration projects,
several demonstration projects have been conducted by
the private sector.

2.1 Three pillars of technological actions andmeasures: avoid, shift and improve
As just described, Japan has made many efforts todevelop and promote technology for GHG emission
reduction in both the private and public sectors. These
efforts comprise three mainstays. The Kaya identity is a

useful tool for understanding GHG emission reduction
actions. The Kaya identity is a methodology forexpressing CO2 emissions by multiplying population,
activity level per capita, energy intensity and average
emission factors as shown in the following equation.
CO 2 = Population ×

Activity
EnergyCO2
××
Population Activity Energy

Eq.1

The second item on the right-hand side expresses
activity level per capita, the third item represents energy
consumption per unit activity (energy intensity), and thelast item is CO2 emissions per unit energy consumption(average emission factor). By using the Kaya identity,
the level of effort needed to achieve a certain CO2
reduction can be easily analyzed.
It is assumed that “population” will not change as aresult of taking GHG emission reduction actions. Thus,
emission reduction can be considered almost equal to
improvements in “activity/population,” “energy/activity”(energy intensity) and “CO2/energy” (average emission
factor) created by technology, as shown in Fig. 6.
Therefore, based on analysis using the Kaya identity,
technological actions can be categorized into thefollowing three categories (mainstays):
1) AVOID the use of energy services2) SHIFT energy sources to less GHG-intensive ones
3) IMPROVE energy use efficiency
Essential to avoiding the use of energy services is
cutting the amount of energy wasted. Changing lifestyles
and business-styles also contributes to avoidance of theuse of energy services. In order to accelerate actions to
avoid the use of energy services, it is also important tomonitor and visualize energy consumption.
Shifting energy sources to non-GHG-emitting energy,
such as renewable energies and nuclear power could
lead to sharp reductions of GHG emissions. Renewables
are one of the key technologies for promoting a shift.
Renewable energy capacity has steadily grown all over
the world as well as in Japan, as shown in Fig. 7. Fromthe viewpoint of energy sources, hydropower is the
120,000

Avoid activities

Improve efficiency

Shift resources

Reduce timespent foractivities

Cut energy
waste

Replace with energyefficient appliances

Install renewableenergy technologies

100,000
Capacity of Renewables [MW]Activity
EnergyCO 2
CO 2  Population 
Population Activity Energy

Marine

Wind

Solar

Bioenergy

Geothermal

80,00060,00040,00020,0000

Fig. 6 The Kaya identity and three mainstays of a reduced-carbon
energy system.

Hydropower2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fig. 7 Installed renewable energy capacity (IRENA, 2017).

16

S. ASHINA

dominant technology among renewable resources
throughout Japan. After the year 2000, capacities ofsolar are increasing drastically due to enforcement of afeed-in-tariff (FIT) scheme.
Replacing and/or installing energy efficient technologies
have been key actions to improve energy use efficiency
heretofore. Increasing air leakage efficiency andstrengthening thermal insulation for rooms and spaces arealso effective measures to improve energy efficiency. In
general, energy efficient technology requires additionalcosts for installation. Subsidies and tax relief, however,
could accelerate actions to improve energy use efficiency.
The availability of renewables differs place-by-place.

3. Future Directions of Technology
Development toward the Paris Agreement
Japan has already undertaken development of various
kinds of technology and its implementation in society,and these activities contribute to the suppression of GHG
emissions in Japan. Figure 8 shows the CO2 emissions
trajectory from 1965 to 2016 by sector. The total CO2
emissions trend traces a similar pathway to total primaryenergy consumption as shown in Fig. 1. Before the oil
1,400

CO2 Emissions [MtCO2]

1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0

1965
Power

1970

1975

Ownuse1980
Industrial

1985

1990

Residen�al

1995

2000

Commercial

2005

2010

2015

Transporta�on

Fig. 8 C
 O2 emissions by sector from 1965 to 2015 (EDMC, 2017).

crises, CO2 emission increases corresponded to thegrowth of oil consumption, rising from 392.2 MtCO2 in1965 to 917.5 Mt-CO2 in 1973. After the oil crisis, total
CO2 emissions remained roughly flat at the start ofbubble economy in the latter half of the 80s, because
energy sources shifted to natural gas and nuclear power,
which emit relatively less CO2 per unit energy than oil,and energy-saving activities had become widely acceptedin the industrial sector. In the 90s, total CO2 emissions
showed a similar trend to primary energy consumption,
but in the 2000s, the growth rate of total primary energy
consumption nearly flatlined, while on the other hand,
total CO2 emissions continued to increase, except in
2009, after the global recession. The earthquake andnuclear accident of March 2011 triggered a reduction in
CO2 emissions. Although nuclear power was replaced byfossil fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas, the national
power-saving edict, issued on July 1, 2011, led to achange in attitudes among businesses and citizens toward
not only electricity consumption but also all other typesof energy consumption.
The development of innovative technologies needed
for building a low-carbon society by the deadline might
depend on the accumulation of whatever technologies
have been developed up to that time, changes in systems,
the preparation of social infrastructure that can enable
these new technologies to be incorporated and otherfactors. Table 1 summarizes major technologies forachieving sharp GHG emission reductions by 2050
based on Ashina et al., 2012. In order to achieve theParis Agreement in the long-term, various types oftechnologies in all sectors should be implemented:
energy-efficient air conditioners, LED lights, etc., in theresidential sector; energy-efficient boilers and fuelconversion in the industrial sector; hybrid automobilesand electric vehicles in the transport sector; and energyefficient fossil fuel-fired power generation, CCSequipped power generation, etc., in the energy supply
sector. In addition to these individual technologies,

Table 1 M ajor technologies useful toward achieving the Paris Agreement.
Major technologies
Residential andcommercial sector

Energy-efficient air conditioners, districtwide heating and cooling (cooling/ heating/ hot water), electric heatpump hot water heaters, fuel cell hot water heaters, solar water heaters, energy-efficient lighting, energy-efficientelectrical appliances, energy-efficient commercial power equipment, etc.

Transport sector

Electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, plug-in hybrid vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, improved automobile fuelconsumption (lightweight vehicles, etc.), energy-efficient railways, energy-efficient shipping, energy-efficientaviation, biofuels, etc.

Industrial sector

Innovative steel manufacturing processes, innovative chemical manufacturing processes, increased efficiency forpaper and pulp manufacturing processes, increased efficiency for cement manufacturing processes, highperformance industrial furnaces, energy-efficient motors, energy-efficient boilers, increased efficiency for home
generators, fuel conversion, etc.

Energy supply sector

Energy-efficient coal-fired thermal power generation, energy-efficient gas thermal power generation, nuclear
power generation, general hydroelectric power generation, small and medium-scale hydroelectric power
generation, geothermal power generation, photovoltaic power generation, onshore wind power generation,
offshore wind power generation, biomass power generation, waste power generation, hydrogen production
through fossil fuel reforming, hydrogen production through electrolysis, carbon capture and storage technologies,etc.

Transitions of Energy System and Technologies in Japantechnology systems (or energy-system technology) will
also be implemented.
Among these technologies and systems, batteries,
energy management and local energy networks are
anticipated as innovative technologies for the future.
Since early times, Japan has carried out development
projects for various technologies expected to contributeto large reductions in GHG emissions in the future, suchas hydrogen fuel, fuel cells and carbon capture andstorage (CCS). Some of these technologies have diffused
as planned, but others are lagging and have yet to be
introduced to the market. We can take fuel cells, atechnology first developed by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) in 1961, as an
example. From 1981 to 1986, scientists in Japandeveloped the phosphoric acid fuel cell (PAFC) in the
Moonlight Project. The basic technologies were
demonstrated in the 1990s, and projects such as the New
Sunshine Project and the Fixed-type PAFC Millennium
Project of the Japan Gas Association were carried out
later (2000 to 2004) to highlight the potentials of PAFCs.
Yet, as of this writing, fuel cells have only been
introduced on a trial basis or for demonstration byelectric and gas supply companies. Today, nearly 50
years after its conception, the fuel cell is yet to be solidly
positioned in the market. The status of CCS, the nuclear
fuel cycle and nuclear power technologies is similar, but
technology systems have much room for R&D.

a) Innovative Battery Technologies
Renewables are expected to play a central role in
low-carbon electricity supply systems. Photovoltaic
systems (PVs) and wind power generators have now
been widely adopted around the world as an option for
reducing CO2 emissions, but electricity from renewables,
especially solar and wind, has large volatility over time.
Renewable electricity supplies vary according to natural
conditions, such as solar insolation and wind speed, andthe electricity supply from them rarely matches
electricity demand. Thus it is important to level theelectricity outputs of renewables to match supply-anddemand.
The batteries developed at present can be classified
into six types: (1) secondary batteries, (2) capacitors, (3)fly wheels, (4) superconducting magnetic energy storage(SMES), (5) pumped hydro, and (6) compressed airelectricity storage. Among these types, secondary batteries
can be expected to become popular in future society.
b) Energy Monitoring Systems in Conjunction with
Energy Management
To accelerate lifestyle and workstyle changes, it isimportant to share with all stakeholders information
about the effects of energy saving actions and behavioral
changes on reducing energy consumption for a lowcarbon lifestyle. Japan already has its own statisticalsystem for energy supply and demand, but statistical data
are mostly capable of describing the national orprefectural situation, and it is difficult to determine the17

effects of avoidance actions such as lifestyle changes by
each household. On the other hand, a monitoring system
could provide a comprehensive picture on how muchenergy is consumed and for what purposes in houses,
buildings and districts, but efforts to address national
and/or prefectural energy consumption would face manydifficulties if they only relied on a monitoring system.
Many companies and research institutions have started
developing energy monitoring systems, and some havealready been implemented in the real world. The
government of Japan also supports R&D of energy
monitoring systems in conjunction with energy
management systems. Kitakyushu launched a project
named “Kitakyushu Smart Community Creation Project”
from FY2010 to FY2014, and as a part of the project,smart meters and displays for electricity consumption
were installed in houses and offices. Based on the
project’s results, installing energy monitoring system
could reduce 0.6% of energy use in offices, andintroduction of energy management systems and batteries
in households could almost halve their energy
consumption (Sasakura, 2015).
Energy monitoring systems usually consist of a seriesof data collection systems involving energy-use monitors
for residential, commercial and industrial use; transportmonitoring; greenhouse gas inventories; land use maps;
demographic assessments; and so on. Figure 9 gives theschematics of an energy monitoring system as an
example. The system comprises four functions: (1)electricity monitoring, (2) data transference, (3) datacollection and (4) data sharing. Electricity monitoringmeasures real-time electricity consumption by using
sensors installed in the distribution board of eachbuilding. Electricity consumption can be monitored
minute by minute, and the amount of electricity
consumed can be determined by multiplying power
current by power voltage.
The monitored data are transferred to a data serverusing the data transfer system. The system uses two
types of data transfer methodology. One system uses awired or wireless Internet connection and the other uses
a mobile line. The system is expected to be installed in
offices and commercial buildings which have wired-/
wireless-Internet connections as well as houses whereinternet connections are not always available. The datatransfer speed of mobile lines is slow compared toInternet connections in general, but mobile lines are now
very common everywhere in Japan, so the system
includes both mobile lines and Internet. Mobile lines
often fail to transfer data due to poor reception or slow
connections. To avoid loss of monitored data, the datatransfer system includes temporary data storage that canhold data for 10 days.
The transferred monitoring data are stored at a dataserver. The server has the function of sharing data via
the Internet. Stakeholders such as residents, workers andstaff at monitoring sites can use a browser to accessmonitoring data. The system provides graphicalinformation systems to users for getting information

18

S. ASHINA(2) Data transfer

Internet(3) Data collecting

Monitored
data

Mobile line

Data server
Assembled data

Monitored data

(1) Electricity monitoring(4) Data sharing

Web browser

Distribution
board

Public signage

Currency andvoltage sensors

Fig. 9 Schematics of one case of an energy monitoring system (Ashina et al., 2016).
Lighting

Receptacle

Other

AC

Refrigerator

Sun
3/6

Mon
3/7

Tue
3/8

Wed
3/9

Thu
3/10

Fri
3/11

Sat
3/12

Sun
3/6

Mon
3/7

Tue
3/8

Wed
3/9

Thu
3/10

Fri
3/11

Sat
3/12

Sun
3/6

Mon
3/7

Tue
3/8

Wed
3/9

Thu
3/10

Fri
3/11

Sat
3/12

Sun
3/6

Mon
3/7

Tue
3/8

Wed
3/9

Thu
3/10

Fri
3/11

Sat
3/12

Sun
3/6

Mon
3/7

Tue
3/8

Wed
3/9

Thu
3/10

Fri
3/11

Sat
3/12

OfficeShopping
Mall

Cafe

Hotel

House
hold

Fig. 10 Example of monitoring data (Ashina, 2017).

both in real-time and on past electricity consumption.
The system also provides summarized information onelectricity consumption in certain areas (such as cities
and blocks), and shows information on real-timeelectricity consumption over a public signage system.
Figure 10 shows monitoring data from selected sites
on March 6 to 12, 2016. The monitoring data clearlyshow large differences among the monitored sites.
Offices and commercial facilities (a shopping mall andcafe) consume electricity mainly during the daytime,
while hotels consume electricity both day and night.
Electricity consumption in houses is low compared to
offices and commercial buildings, and is affected byfamily structure, lifestyle and travel. In other words, thelevel of electricity consumption is defined mainly by the
number of members staying in the house.
The monitoring data could be used not only for
notifying stakeholders of energy use but also formanaging energy. The Community Energy Management
System (CEMS) is a system for energy management inareas and communities, and is analogous to the Building
Energy Management System (BEMS), Home Energy
Management System (HEMS) and Factory Energy
Management System (FEMS). CEMS could manage theenergy balance between supply and demand, leading toefficient use of energy. The evolving capabilities of
EMS offer not only effective use of energy in houses
and buildings but also new opportunities to automate
some parts of the commissioning process, and cangenerate benefits over the entire lifetime of a building.
Developing a detailed systematic automated approach
will improve the quality assurance process and may evenintegrate energy audit capabilities that could improve theoverall performance of buildings as well.

Transitions of Energy System and Technologies in Japanc) Local Energy Networks
Local authorities have played an important role inpreventing deterioration of the natural environment andcombating environmental pollution, and they are often
more pioneering than the national government. Chapter
28 of Agenda 21 points out the importance of local
authorities in addressing global warming issues. In
Japan’s general policy for promoting measures against
global warming, basic policy concepts include theimportance of promoting collaborative action among thegovernment, local authorities, businesses and citizens;and local authorities play a crucial role in tacklingclimate change in Japan. Local authorities are expected
to set goals and directions for regional actions, promote
institutional arrangements and development of social
infrastructure for achieving a low-carbon society, andshare information among residents and businesses,
according to local natural and economic conditions.
Each prefecture has established its own plan toprevent global warming. In each plan, a CO2 reduction
target is set for 2020 and/or 2030, and concrete policies
and measures to achieve the target are revealed.
Examples of these policies and measures include
acquiring ISO 14001, an environmental management
system, to reduce the environmental impacts fromcarrying out needed business; or introducing their own
environmental management system. Moreover, in orderto promote voluntary actions against global warming byresidents, some regions have enacted their own
environmental management standards.
In general, GHG emission reduction actions by local
authorities focus mainly on energy demand-side sectors,
including the industrial sector, residential andcommercial sector, and transportation sector, although
the largest GHG emitter in Japan is the power sector, asupply-side sector. Given this situation with the energy
end-use sectors, it can be pointed out that in order toreduce GHG emissions at the local scale, it will be
important to accelerate diffusion of energy-efficienttechnologies among the energy demand-side sectors aswell as to construct a low-carbon energy supply system
within each region.
Progress in designing and implementing local energy
systems involves many difficulties. For example, eachregion has different issues that need to be resolved. The
town of Shinchi, which is located in the northern part of
Fukushima Prefecture and has a population of 8,000, wasselected as an “environmental future city” by the Cabinet
Office in 2012. In Shinchi, a gradual population decline
after 2005 led to a reduced labor force in both primaryindustry and the construction industry, and lower
industrial output. The tertiary industry labor force
continued to grow until 2015, but has started to decrease
now. These shrinking and aging population issues arecommon among rural areas in Japan, and efforts toimplement local energy systems in such areas should aim
to reduce GHG emissions and to solve the problem of
decreasing population. Another difficulty is the19availability of energy sources. Energy systems differ fromregion to region, and the availability of technology also
differs. The northern part of Japan relies heavily on
kerosene heaters and hot water supply equipment, while
the southern regions rely on hot water supply equipmentusing town gas and/or electricity. Implementing gas-basedenergy systems in the northern area could decrease GHG
emissions but would need investment and new
construction of gas infrastructure. For areas rich withresources in renewables such as solar, wind andgeothermal, installation of renewables is a key action for
low-carbonization of the area, while for areas locatedclose to industrial complexes, utilization of waste heatwould be a possible option. Although improvement ofenergy efficiency will be the key to low-carbonization in
all regions, it is important to formulate plans and actions
for a low-carbon society based on regional characteristics.
Some cities in Japan have launched new challenges forachieving energy transition. Shinchi, again, in northern
Fukushima Prefecture revised its city development plan
after the Fukushima accident. Figure 11 gives an outlineof Shinchi’s future development plan. The city has LNG
tanks and industrial parks, and it recently started a new
town development around Shinchi Station. Using theseresources, the city is trying to shift from traditional city
development sustained by oil and fossil-fueled electricity
to an innovative development plan sustained by natural
gas and renewable energies.

4. Summary
Even before the Kyoto Protocol, Japan wasorganizing various kinds of technological development
in both the public and private sectors, and in addition to
reducing GHG emissions, these technologies havecontributed to energy saving and diversification ofenergy sources after the oil shock. Even so, continuous
technology development will be needed for achieving
the Paris Agreement.
For example, Fujino et al. (2008) notes that in order toachieve a 70% reduction in Japan’s CO2 emissions by
2050, the coefficient of performance (COP) for household
air conditioners should be improved to COP8 on a stockbasis. In 2007, the COP for household air conditioners on
a stock basis was 4.26 for heating and 3.85 for cooling(EDMC, 2017), so technological advances able to double
these figures will be needed in order to achieve therequired performance by 2050. Such technologicalinnovation and market penetration processes will require
public and/or private funding for R&D as well as
consumers’ (including companies’ and businesses’)support through the market.
Obviously, some technologies could be deployed
immediately, such as a fuel shift to imported biofuels
and co-firing of woody biomass in coal-fired plants. In
most cases, however, dissemination would require fromseveral years to several decades. Even if innovativetechnology is successfully launched in the market withthe support of R&D investments and/or policies, if

20

S. ASHINATo Natori

Newly locatedindustries
New town
around stationｘ
Komagamine

Plant
factories

Mega solar

Plant
factories

Energymanagement

LNG base

Newly locatedindustries

LNG power plant
Food industries

Soma city

Data center

Heating
Cooling
Gas(LNG)
Electricity

Fig. 11 Innovative development of Shinchi Town (Based on Fujita and Hirano, 2016).

consumers do not choose them when they appear on themarket, subsequent technological innovations will
become less certain to be carried out and further
innovative technologies will be prevented fromappearing on the market, e.g., fuel cells, electric vehicles
and solar heaters.
Technology is a key element of efforts toward a lowcarbon society, but technologies and R&D alone cannot
attain it. Realizing GHG emission reduction with only
technological countermeasures would be costly, but a
combination of policies and countermeasures, such as
lifestyle changes, good institutional arrangements andreassembling the transportation system, would lower thecosts. Taking early action could lead to cost-effective
ways to achieve emission reductions. For that, a large
investment is needed in the initial stage, but it is likelythat early market entry of technologies will lead to
reduced costs of future technologies due to the“learning-by-doing” effect, and the additional
investments will be balanced by the sum of reduced
technology and fuel costs. Learning-by-doing effects canbe detected for many commodities and technologies
when observing markets. Rubin et al. (2015) presented aliterature review on learning-by-doing effects (or the“learning curve”) for electricity supply technologies,
including renewables. Based on their research, thelearning rate of solar PV is in the range of 10%－47%,
and that of offshore wind, 5%－19%.
Moreover, infrastructure cannot be built immediately,
making it difficult to switch suddenly to a low-carbon
type just before 2050. In addition, planning of GHG
reduction policies and actions with both technology andnon-technology options is a key action, and it is also
important to implement and monitor the policies andactions. Planning, implementation and monitoring basedon the PDCA (Plan‐ Do‐ Check‐ Act) cycle should beestablished, so the continuous running of the PDCA
cycle can open the door to the low-carbon society, inwhich society achieves immense reductions of GHG
emissions while maintaining quality of life.
The development of a low-carbon society in Japan is
crucial for tackling climate change issues. The impactsof climate change affect everyone around the world, andJapan is no exception. Policies and actions that do notcontribute to low-carbonization will bring benefits in the
short term, but result in damage to the environment,
nature, economy and life in the long run. In addition,
considering that the global trend is toward achieving a
low-carbon society, a country may lose an opportunity
for green growth and its future international
competitiveness in low-carbon technologies if it fails to
shift to a low-carbon approach because other nations
will achieve green growth and export low-carbon
technologies and experience first.
Low-carbonization of the energy system is a key to
GHG emission reduction as well as achieving a lowcarbon society globally. Development of innovativetechnologies is also a necessary part of building a lowcarbon society, and to meet deadlines it may benecessary to accumulate whatever technologies havebeen developed up to that time, change systems, preparea social infrastructure that will enable these newtechnologies to be incorporated, and take othermeasures. Japan’s experience and expertise intechnological R&D could go a long way toward taking
the first step in the right direction. It will provide afoundation for sharp GHG emission reductions andestablishment of a low-carbon society not only in Japanbut also all over the world.

Transitions of Energy System and Technologies in Japan

21

Acknowledgements
This study was conducted through a grant from theEnvironment Research & Technology Development
Fund (2-1402, 2-1411 and 2-1711) and the Project toAdvance MRV and Related Techniques in Indonesia for
the Promotion of a Joint Credit Mechanism (from
FY2014－2017) operated by the Ministry of theEnvironment, Japan. The authors would like to express
their appreciation for the assistance and cooperation
provided by all who helped to make this study possible.

References
Ashina, S., J. Fujino, T. Masui, T. Ehara and G. Hibino (2012)
A roadmap towards a low-carbon society in Japan using
backcasting methodology: Feasible pathways for achieving an 80%
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050. Energy Policy, 41: 584–598.
Ashina, S., K. Gomi, K. Aizawa, M. Fujii, T. Fujita, K. Uchida, N.
Yabe, M. Ardiansyah and R. Boer (2016) Bridging research andaction toward low carbon society: Preliminary assessment ofeffectiveness of social monitoring system in bogor, Indonesia.
Proceedings of International Seminar on Chemical Engineeringin Conjunction with Seminar Teknik Kimia Soehadi Reksowardojo(STKSR) 2016, ISSN: 2353–5917, 378–387.
Ashina, S. (2017) Visualization of social activities: Energy
monitoring and its implementation in Indonesia. NIES NEWS36(1), 10－14. (in Japanese)
Automobile Inspection & Registration Information Association (2017)
Trends in Automobile Ownership Rates in Japan. <https://www.
airia.or.jp/publish/statistics/trend.html> (in Japanese) (accessed
14 June 2017)
Energy Data and Modeling Center (EDMC)(2017) EDMC
Handbook of Japan’s & World Energy & Economic Statistics
2017. The Energy Conservation Center, Japan.
Fujino, J., G. Hibino, T. Ehara, Y. Matsuoka, T. Masui and M.
Kainuma (2008) Back-casting analysis for 70% emission
reduction in Japan by 2050. Climate Policy, 8: S108–S124.
Fujita, T. and Y. Hirano (2016) Demonstrative town development
projects in Fukushima: Regional innovation plan in Shinchi
Town. Civil Engineering, 101 (12), 60－63. (in Japanese)
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2017) Data &Statistics. <http://resourceirena.irena.org/gateway/dashboard/>(accessed 14 June 2017)
National Institute for Environmental Studies/Greenhouse Gas
Inventory Office of Japan (NIES/GIO) (2017) National GHG
Inventory Report of JAPAN 2016. <http://www-gio.nies.go.jp/
aboutghg/nir/2017/NIR-JPN-2017-v3.1_web.pdf > (accessed 14
June 2017)
Rubin, E.S., I.M.L. Azevedo, P. Jaramillo and S. Yeh (2015) A
review of learning rates for electricity supply technologies.
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Creation Project. <www.nedo.go.jp/content/100750432.pdf >(accessed 14 June 2017)

Shuichi ASHINA
Shuichi Ashina is a senior researcher in the Transboundary Impacts & Mitigation Modeling Section
at the Center for Social and Environmental Systems
Research, and manager of the International
Coordination Office in the Planning Department at
the National Institute for Environmental Studies.
His research focuses on the field of energyeconomy-environmental systems modeling and its application to the designingof low-carbon societies from cities/municipalities to Japan and Asian countries.
He received his B.S., M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Mechanical and System
Engineering from Tohoku University.
(Received 14 June 2017, Accepted 7 September 2017)

23

Research Perspectives on Future Scenarios toward
Achievement of the 2 Degree Target
Toshihiko MASUINational Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)
16-2, Onogawa, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8506, Japane-mail:masui@nies.go.jp

Abstract
The Paris Agreement entered into force in 2016, with the world rushing to realize the 2°C target forholding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. On theother hand, there is a big gap between the aggregate of existing mitigation targets of each country after 2020and emission pathways that would achieve the 2°C target, and this means that more ambitious GHG
reductions will be needed toward 2050 and later. Some countries have already submitted their long-term low
greenhouse gas emission development strategies. Although Japan proposes a 26% reduction of its GHG
emissions by 2030 compared to those in 2013 and an 80% reduction by 2050, it has yet to engage inthorough discussions of its long-term strategy and roadmap. The existing analyses indicate an 80% GHG
emission reduction is technologically feasible, but there are many challenges to realizing it. This paper
introduces discussions in Japan toward achieving the 2°C target, and considers what will be needed in Japanto realize the 2°C target.
Key words: long-term low GHG emission development strategy, mitigation target, Paris Agreement, 2°C target

1. Introduction: Paris Agreement andGreenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Target
The Paris Agreement was adopted at the 21stConference of Party (COP21) of United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
in Paris in 2015 (UN, 2015). In November 2016, theParis Agreement entered into force after the threshold forthat of the Paris Agreement was achieved, which was forat least 55 Parties to the Convention, accounting in total
for at least an estimated 55% of the total global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to have deposited theirinstruments of ratification, acceptance, approval oraccession with the depositary.
It is said that climate policies and actions have moved
to a new phase by the Paris Agreement. Now the UnitedStates has announced its withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement, but many states and private companies in the
USA have indicated their intention to remain in the Paris
Agreement. Recently in many areas, climate change
impacts have become obvious. The movement to realize
the Paris Agreement will not be stopped but will
accelerate in the future.
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement describes the global
average temperature target as follows: “Holding theincrease in the global average temperature to well below
2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts tolimit the temperature increase to 1.5° C above preGlobal Environmental Research
21/2017: 023–027
printed in Japan

industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement mentions the global
emission pathways as follows: “In order to achieve thelong-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties
aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions
as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will takelonger for developing country Parties, and to undertake
rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best
available science, so as to achieve a balance between
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals bysinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of thiscentury, on the basis of equity, and in the context ofsustainable development and efforts to eradicate
poverty.” Moreover, that “All Parties should strive toformulate and communicate long-term low greenhousegas emission development strategies, mindful of Article
2, taking into account their common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light ofdifferent national circumstances” is also mentioned (COP,by decision 1/CP 21, paragraph 35, invited the Parties tocommunicate by 2020 to the secretariat, mid-century,
long-term low greenhouse gas emission development
strategies in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 19, of
the agreement). That is to say, in order to achieve climate
targets such as the 2°C target, global GHG emissions willneed to peak-out as soon as possible, and show a negative
trend during the latter half of the 21st century.
©2017 AIRIES24

T. MASUI

2. The 2 Degree Target and INDCs
Prior to COP21, all countries had to submit their own
intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) to
the UNFCCC. All the submitted documents are listed on the
UNFCCC’s website (http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx). The INDCs
cover not only the targets for GHG mitigation reductions
but also the targets for adaptation in each country. Somedeveloping countries focus on climate change impacts andadaptation rather than GHG reduction targets.
Table 1 shows the mitigation targets of majorcountries and regions of the world. From Table 1, it canbe seen that the GHG mitigation targets reflect thesituation of each country. Most of the developed
countries have adopted absolute targets for GHG
emissions. On the other hand, many developing countries
have adopted intensity targets or relative reduction of
their emissions in a BaU (business as usual) case.
Moreover, some developing countries such as Indonesia
and Thailand have adopted two types of targets: one
unconditional target and a separate conditional target
contingent on other countries’ support.
The UNFCCC (2016) has summarized the all

Table 1 E
 mission reduction targets of major countries and regions.
Country

TargetChina

To reduce carbon intensity by 60% to 65% by 2030 below 2005 levels.

India

To lower emission intensity of GDP by 33% to 35% by 2030 below 2005 levels.

Indonesia

An unconditional 2030 GHG emission reduction target of 29% below BaU including land use, land-use change and forestry(LULUCF) emissions, and a conditional 41% reduction below BaU by 2030 (with sufficient international support).

Japan

To reduce emissions by 26% below 2013 emission levels by 2030.

Korea

To reduce GHG emissions by 37% below BaU by 2030.

Malaysia

To reduce GHG emission intensity of GDP by 45% by 2030 relative to the emissions intensity of GDP in 2005.

ThailandAn unconditional 20% reduction in emissions by 2030 compared to BaU levels. This could increase to 25%, conditional
upon international support.

Vietnam

An 8% reduction in emissions by 2030, compared to BaU. This could be increased to 25% conditional upon international support.

USA

To reduce economy-wide emissions by 26% to 28% below 2005 domestically.

EU

To reduce GHG emissions by at least 40% domestically below 1990 levels by 2030.

RussiaLimiting anthropogenic GHG to 70－75% of 1990 levels by 2030.

BrazilTo reduce GHG emissions by 37% below 2005 levels by 2025.

Source: UNFCCC (2015)

Fig. 1 Comparison of global emission levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the implementation of
the INDCs and under other scenarios. Source: UNFCCC (2016)

25

Research Perspectives on Future Scenarios toward Achievement of the 2 Degree Target

proposed GHG reduction targets. Figure 1 shows thevarious global GHG emission pathways, including
emissions upon achieving the INDCs. This figure showsthat the INDCs can reduce GHG emissions compared to
no GHG reductions in the world by 2025 and 2030, butvery large gaps remain in GHG emissions between the
INDCs and the 1.5°C / 2°C scenarios. In order to achieve
the 2° C target after following the INDCs, very steep
GHG emission reductions will be needed after 2030.
That is to say, more ambitious targets in 2030 will beneeded to achieve the 2°C target according to this figure.
The Paris Agreement mentions the “global stocktake”
which assesses collective progress towards achieving the
purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals.
For each country, “Each Party’s successive nationallydetermined contribution will represent a progression
beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined
contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition,reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities, in the light of different
national circumstances.”

3. Long-term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission
Development Strategies
The Paris Agreement requests each Party to submit a“long-term low greenhouse gas emission development
strategy” by 2020. As of the end of June 2017, a total of
six countries had submitted their own strategies: theUSA, Mexico, Canada, Germany, France and Benin.
Among these countries, the USA, Mexico, Canada,
Germany and France have indicated long-term GHG
emission reduction targets, as shown in Table 2. Although
the benchmark years are different, many countries haveindicated GHG reductions of more than 75% by 2050. In
particular, Germany mentions a 95% reduction by 2050
compared to its emissions in 1990.

4. Discussion on Japan’s Long-term Strategy
The Government of Japan (2015) approved Japan’s
INDC at a Cabinet meeting on July 17, 2015. The GHG
reduction target for 2030 was set at a 26% reduction
compared to the 2013 level. After that, Japan also
approved a Climate Action Plan at a Cabinet meeting on
May 13, 2016. The Climate Action Plan stipulates an 80%
reduction of GHG emissions in Japan by 2050. Figure 2
shows previous trends and future targets for GHG
emissions in Japan. Although Japan achieved its GHG
mitigation target during the 1st commitment period (2008－2012) by using carbon sinks and credits, no sharp GHG
reduction could be observed from 1990 to 2015. In order

Table 2 G
 HG emission reduction targets under long-term low GHG emission development strategies.
Country

Date submitted GHG reduction target

USA

Nov. 16, 2016

80% reduction of GHG in 2050 compared to 2005 level

MexicoNov. 16, 2016

50% reduction of GHG in 2050 compared to 2000 level

CanadaNov. 17, 2016

80% reduction of GHG in 2050 compared to 2005 level

Germany

Nov. 17, 2016

80－95% reduction of GHG in 2050 compared to 1990 level

FranceDec. 28, 2016

75% reduction of GHG in 2050 compared to 1990 level

GHG emissions [GtCO2-eq]

Source: UNFCCC (2017)

1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2030

2040

CO2 Energy industries

CO2 Industries

CO2 Transporta�on

CO2 Commercial

CO2 Residen�alNon-energy CO2

CH4

N2O

HFCs

PFCs

SF6

NF3

Fig. 2 G HG emission trends through 2015 and future emission targets in Japan.
Source: Greenhouse Gas Inventory Office of Japan (2017) and Government of Japan (2015)

2050

26

T. MASUI

to achieve the GHG emission targets for 2030 and 2050, areal break in this trend will be needed from now on.
Although the Climate Action Plan mentions an 80%
reduction of GHG emissions in Japan by 2050, a detailed
concrete roadmap to achieve the 80% reduction target
has yet to be quantified. To discuss the long-term target
for Japan, the Sub-committee on Long-term Low-Carbon
Vision was organized under the Central Environment
Council in July 2016. In March 2017, the sub-committee
presented its long-term low-carbon vision (2017). In thisvision, “simultaneous solution” of economic and social
problems such as aging of society and climate change isregarded as a background issue. The long-term GHG
reduction target for 2050 is clearly set at 80%, and inorder to achieve this target, the vision stresses improved
energy efficiency, increased low-carbon energy supply,
and a switch to low-carbon energies in end-use. In
addition to that, the “carbon budget” concept is
introduced, in which the global mean temperature change
is related to cumulative GHG emissions from the preindustrial level, and it gives the clear message that thetime to act is “Now.” If infrastructure and large-scale
facilities including coal thermal power plants, whichhave long life times, are introduced now, the CO2
emissions may remain high over time. Such “lock-in”
effects will have to be avoided to keep the GHG
mitigation opportunity as high as possible. The vision
points out that development and deployment of new
innovations are key to long-term significant GHG
emission reductions. Not only innovation in technology,
but also innovations in economic and social systems andlifestyles will be needed to realize drastic GHG emission
reductions. The transformation will contribute toemission reductions both in Japan and worldwide. To
support the various actions toward a low-carbon society,the role of “carbon pricing” will be very important.
Carbon pricing will provide the necessary information
and a good incentive to reduce the GHG emissions.

5. Is an 80% Reduction of GHG emissions inJapan by 2050 Achievable?
There have been several studies assessing 80%
reduction of GHG emissions in Japan by 2050. The firstof these was the Japan Low Carbon Society (LCS)
Scenarios toward 2050 Project (2050 Japan Low-Carbon
Society Scenario Team, 2008). This was a research
project of the Global Environmental Research Fund (S-3)
of the Ministry of the Environment, Japan. In this project,
two types of socio-economic scenarios were proposed,
and by using the Asia-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM), it
found quantitatively that a target of 70% reduction of
CO2 emissions by 2050 compared to the 1990 level inboth scenarios would be achievable. Later the GHG
mitigation target for 2050 was changed from 70% to80%, and the new target was also found to be realizable.
The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP)
is another example of a quantitative analysis. The
Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)

1 400 MtCO2eq
1 200
1 000
Reduction by800

non-CO2600

energy efficiency
shift to low-carbon sources

400

CCS

200
GHG emissions

0
(All)

2010

Reference Mixed No-Nuclear

Limited CCS

2050

Fig. 3 CO2 emissions by case and decarbonization wedges for thethree scenarios.

and the Institute for Sustainable Development andInternational Relations (IDDRI) initiated it todemonstrate how countries could transform their energy
systems by 2050 to achieve a low-carbon economy andsignificantly reduce the global risk of catastrophic
climate change. The project currently comprises 16
country research teams, composed of leading research
institutions from countries representing about 70% of
global GHG emissions and at very different stages ofdevelopment.
From Japan, the AIM project team is participating inthis project, and by using the AIM/ Enduse [Japan] (adynamic recursive technology selection model for mid-to
long-term mitigation policy assessment in Japan), it
assesses GHG emission pathways in Japan through 2050
(Kainuma et al., 2015). It has prepared three scenarios toassess 80% GHG emission reduction in Japan by 2050: amixed scenario in which all technology options areavailable; no nuclear scenario; and limited carbon captureand storage (CCS) scenario, in which 100 MtCO2/year of
CCS is allowed, i.e., half the amount considered in themixed scenario.
Figure 3 shows the CO2 emission reductions for thesethree scenarios in 2050. The DDPP shows the threepillars of decarbonization as a whole: energy efficiency,
decarbonization of electricity and electrification of
end-uses. In the case of Japan, these pillars are also
important, and the report concludes that “With largescale diffusion of low-carbon technologies, Japan’slong-term GHG emission reduction target is technicallyfeasible, even if the availability of nuclear power and/or
CCS is limited.” Although the marginal costs of CO2
reduction in the no-nuclear and limited CCS scenarios
are more expensive than that in mixed scenario, thesethree scenarios can achieve the 80% reduction of GHG
emission by 2050.

6. How can Japan Contribute to the 2°C Target?
From the existing quantitative analyses, the 80%
GHG emission reduction in Japan by 2050 is aResearch Perspectives on Future Scenarios toward Achievement of the 2 Degree Target

technologically feasible target, but to realize this target,
we face many challenges. From Fig. 2, no sharp GHG
emission reduction can be observed in Japan from 1990
to 2015. This means that the general level of engagementwith climate change mitigation is still slow.
To ensure the 2°C target is reached, an 80% reductionin Japan by 2050 is inevitable. From the existing studies,the 80% reduction target can be achieved using theexisting and forecasted technologies. Various innovationsof technologies and socio-economic systems can help
implement the mitigation actions.
It is important to show how to support implementationof the mitigation technologies in the actual world. For
example, if the payback period can be considered long,that is to say, decision making with a long-term viewpoint
can be realized, the mitigation costs decrease, and more
mitigation technologies including energy saving
technologies and renewable energies will be able to be
introduced.
Climate change measures to achieve the 2°C target
will have to continue more than 100 years, and strengthenyear by year. On the other hand, the year 2050 is not the
distant future. The target of 80% reduction will have tobe realized before high school students at this moment
reach 60 years of age. A long-term perspective during thedecision making process can help avoid lock-in effects.
The research also will have to contribute toimplementation of GHG mitigation technologies in thereal world to provide a concrete roadmap. For that
purpose, in addition to mitigation technologies, socioeconomic activities in the future will have to be
discussed, and more detailed analyses taking into accountthe local circumstances and stakeholders’ conditions will
be needed in addition to macroscopic analyses.

27

Contributions: An Update. < http:// unfccc.int/resource/ docs/
2016/cop22/eng/02.pdf> (accessed on 1 October 2017)
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)(2017) Communication of long-term strategies.<http://unfccc.
int/focus/long-term_strategies/items/9971.php> (accessed on 1
October 2017)

References
2050 Japan Low-Carbon Society Scenario Team (2008) Japan
Scenarios and Actions towards Low-Carbon Societies (LCSs).
<http://2050.nies.go.jp/report/file/lcs_japan/2050_LCS_Scenarios_
Actions_English_080715.pdf> (accessed on 1 October 2017)
Central Environment Council (2017) Outline of Long-term Lowcarbon Vision. < http: / / www.env.go.jp/ press/ 103822/ 713.pdf>(accessed on 1 October 2017)
Government of Japan (2015) Submission of Japan’s Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC).<http://www4.unfccc.
int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Japan/1/20150717_
Japan’s%20INDC.pdf) (accessed on 1 October 2017)
Greenhouse Gas Inventory Office of Japan (2017) <http://www-gio.
nies.go.jp/index.html> (accessed on 1 October 2017)
Kainuma, M. et al. (2015) Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in
Japan, SDSN–IDDRI. <http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/DDPP_JPN.pdf> (accessed on 1 October 2017)
UN (United Nations) (2015) Paris Agreement.<http://unfccc.int/
files/essential_ background/convention/application/pdf/english_
paris_agreement.pdf> (accessed on 1 October 2017)
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)(2015) INDCs as communicated by Parties.< http: / / www4.
unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.
aspx> (accessed on 1 October 2017)
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)(2016) Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally DeterminedToshihiko MASUI
Toshihiko Masui has worked at the National Institutefor Environmental Studies since 1998. His major
field is modeling and simulation of environmental
policies, especially assessment of climate mitigation
policies. He is in charge of the AIM (Asia-PacificIntegrated Model) project at NIES. He is a subcommittee member of the Central Environment
Council. He also works at the Tokyo Institute of Technology as a visiting
professor. He lectures on the global environmental modeling and environmental
economics and policy theory for both undergraduate and graduate students.

(Received 16 October 2017, Accepted 19 October 2017)

29

Overview of Studies in Japan on Climate Change Impacts
and Adaptation : Towards Climate Risk Management
Based on Scientific Evidence
Kiyoshi TAKAHASHINational Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)
16-2, Onogawa, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8506, Japane-mail:ktakaha@nies.go.jp

Abstract
Persistent efforts to improve scientific understanding of climate risks and countermeasures against them
are indispensable for keeping strong momentum of coordinated climate risk management efforts. For
example, the long-term climate target for the global mean temperature increase from the pre-industrial periodof less than 2 degrees Celsius in the Paris Agreement is not fresh-off-the-farm but has a long history ofpolitical discussion supported by the science available at any given time. On another front, Japan publishedits first national adaptation plan in November 2015. When we look at domestic climate policies, rapidly
growing attention to adaptation in Japan also revolves around the intensified public perception of existing
and anticipated climate impacts. Based on the above, the primary purpose of this article is to give an
overview of previous, ongoing and future studies on climate impacts and adaptations in Japan with regard todomestic and international policy support. This overview of the studies provides suggestions for some
important directions or aspects of future research on climate risks. These include the importance of co-designand co-production in fields of study to support decision making and strategy planning against global
environmental problems; improvements to quantification and communication of uncertainties in climate risk
analyses; the importance of participation in internationally coordinated research activities, including impact
model inter-comparison projects; archiving and management of tools and data developed for risk analysis for
portability and transparency; and responsibility of researchers in the iterative process of periodic climate risk
assessment.
Key words: adaptation, climate change impacts, risk management, long-term target, sustainability

1. Introduction
Persistent efforts to improve scientific understandingof climate risks and countermeasures against them areindispensable for keeping strong momentum of
coordinated climate risk management efforts. The Paris
Agreement, agreed upon among the parties to the
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change) in December 2015 and effective from
November 2016, explicitly manifests its central aim forstrengthening the global response to the climate change
threat by keeping the global temperature rise this century
well below 2 degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels
and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase
even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. This long-termclimate target is not fresh-off-the-farm but has a long
history of political discussion supported by the best
science available at any given time. Most recently, thereferential scientific treatises include the Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) published in 2013-2014 and further scientific
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 029–037
printed in Japanevidence communicated between researchers andpolicymakers at the SED (Structured Expert Dialogue)
process for the periodic review of the long-term target by
the UNFCCC (Fig. 1, a chronological summary of eventson international/domestic climate policy and relevant
research projects in Japan, that are discussed in thisarticle).
If we look at domestic climate policies, rapidly
growing attention to adaptation in Japan also revolves
around the intensified public perception of existing andanticipated climate impacts. In November 2015, theJapanese government formulated its first national plan
for adaptation to the impacts of climate change (NAP)
with the purpose of promoting adaptation to climatechange impacts systematically and comprehensively.
Prior to the NAP’s formulation, the Central Environment
Council (an advisory body of the Japanese Cabinet)
assessed the existing and potential impacts of climatechange on seven major sectors (agriculture, forestry andfisheries; aqueous environments and water resources;
natural ecosystems; natural disasters and coastal areas;©2017 AIRIES

30

K. TAKAHASHI
Climateprojection

Innovative program ofclimate change projection
for the 21st century(KAKUSHIN)

Globalclimate risk
analyses

Integrated research on
climate scenarios forpolicy support and publicawareness (GERF S-5)

Climateimpacts inJapan

Integrated Climate
Assessment ‒ Risks,
Uncertainties andSociety (GERF S-10) Strategic research on
global mitigation and local
Comprehensive study
adaptation to climate
on impact assessmentchange (GERF S-14)
and adaptation(GERF S-8)

Comprehensive
projection of climatechange impacts(GERF S-4 )Research programon climate change
adaptation (RECCA)

Regional
adaptation
IPCC reports and
UNFCCC agreements
Governmental
reports and policies
Information
platform
2005

Research program for
improving integrated
climate models(TOUGOU)

Program for
information on
climate changerisks (SOUSEI)IPCC-AR4Social implementation programon climate change adaptation
technology (SI-CAT)

IPCC-AR5
Copenhagen Accord &Cancun Agreements

ʻWise
Adaptationʼ
reportSED

ʻSynthesis Reportʼ in2009 and 2012
Portal site on climate
impacts statistics

2010

Paris
Agreement
1st NAP

Facilitative
dialogue

Report on science
to support NAP

A-PLAT (Climatechange adaptation
platform)
2015

AP-PLAT (AsiaPaciﬁc adaptation
info. platformʼ)2020

Fig. 1 Chronological summary of international/domestic climate policy events and relevant research projects in Japanthat are discussed in this article.

human health; industrial and economic activities; livesof citizenry and urban life) and compiled the Report on
Assessment of Impacts of Climate Change in Japan and
Future Challenges in March 2015 with the participationof academic experts from a broad range of disciplines.
The first NAP emphasized continuous enhancement ofscientific findings, as one of the basic strategies it listed,through implementation of observation and monitoring,projection and assessment, and promotion of studies andresearch. Based on the first NAP, the Central Environment
Council discussed governmental efforts necessary forsupporting a review of climate risk assessment planned
before or around 2020 and published an interim report
titled Policies and Procedures for Efforts on Scientific
Knowledge and Climate Risk Information to Promote
Climate Change Adaptation in March 2017.
Based on the information noted above, the primary
purpose of this article is to provide an overview ofprevious, ongoing and future studies on climate impacts
and adaptations in Japan with regard to domestic andinternational policy support. Section 2, below, provides abrief review of previous major scientific efforts (relatively
large research projects) on climate change impact andadaptation analysis. Section 3 explains urgent research
themes for supporting adaptation policy that have been
identified in recent reports by the Central Environment
Council. Section 4 introduces ongoing activities of new
research on impacts and adaptation in Japan. Lastly,
Section 5 concludes the article with a discussion ofprospects for impact and adaptation studies in Japan.

2. Previous Climate Impact and Adaptation
Analysis Efforts in Japan
While impact studies on specific sectors alreadyexisted in 1990s, coordinated analyses of climate
impacts on comprehensive sectors in Japan didn’t
emerge until FY2005. As a research project funded by
Japan’s Ministry of the Environment (MOE). The
project, titled “Project for Comprehensive Projection of
Climate Change Impacts” (commonly known as the“GERF S-4 project”; FY2005-2009) contained a wide
range of research teams from national research institutes
and universities and conducted coordinated scenario
analyses of climate impacts on water resources, humanhealth, agriculture, ecosystems, and natural disasters. Key
findings of the project were summarized in two research
reports published in 2008 and 2009 (http: / / www.nies.
go.jp/s4_ impact/English/seika-e.html), and were alsoutilized intensively in a ministerial report of the MOE,
titled Wise Adaptation to Climate Change―Report by
the Committee on Climate Change Impacts andAdaptation Research, published in June 2008 (http: / /www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/wacc_080618.pdf).
The basic research structure of the GERF S-4 project
was taken over by the succeeding project, called the“GERF S-8 project” (“Comprehensive Study on Impact
Assessment and Adaptation for Climate Change”;
FY2010-2014) funded by the MOE for further emphasison adaptation analysis and explicit consideration of
future climate uncertainty. In parallel with the GERF S-8

Overview of Studies in Japan on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation

project, the RECCA project (“Research Program on
Climate Change Adaptation”; FY2010-2014; https: / /www.restec.or.jp/recca/eng/) funded by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(MEXT) tackled sophistication of adaptation analyses in
specific regions and sectors for supporting decision
makers in local governments. In addition to the research
projects noted above, progress was achieved towardsophistication of hazard analyses relevant to natural
disaster prevention mainly by the KAKUSHIN program(“Innovative Program of Climate Change Projection forthe 21st Century”; FY2007-2011) and the succeeding
SOUSEI program (“Program for Risk Information on
Climate Change”; FY2012-2016) funded by MEXT
under a strong partnership with global/regional climate
modeling teams in Japan. The research findings obtained
through the projects above conducted during this decadewere intensively utilized in compiling the Central
Environment Council report published in March 2015
and the first NAP published in November 2015, both ofwhich were mentioned above.
For global scale analyses of climate change impacts, inthe 1990s, there were a few sectorial analyses in Japan,
some of which were conducted for the development of a
global integrated assessment of climate policies (e.g.,Harasawa et al., 2003). The GERF S-5 project (“Integrated
Research on Climate Scenarios for Policy Support andPublic Awareness”; FY2006-2010) made the first effort
toward coordinated analyses of global climate impacts inJapan, aiming to interpret the latest climate projections
available during the period to depict expected climate risks
mainly to natural systems. The GERF S-5 project’s risk
analyses highlighted uncertainty in the climate projections
and the implications regarding future climate impacts.
Some of the global climate risk analyses in the GERF S-5
project were succeeded by the GERF S-10 project(“Integrated Climate Assessment – Risks, Uncertainties
and Society (ICA-RUS)”; FY2012-2016; https://www.
nies.go.jp/ica-rus/en/index.html), where they were mademore comprehensive for discussing and developing
global climate risk management strategies. The primary
purposes of the GERF S-10 project included comparing(i) sector climate risks expected under the long-termclimate targets for global mean temperature increases
from the pre-industrial period not exceeding 1.5, 2.0 or
2.5 degrees Celsius and (ii) mitigation efforts required
for achieving these respective targets.
The large research projects presented above tended
to be self-contained and were conducted independently
without substantial collaboration with other research
projects. That may have resulted in inefficiencies suchas duplicated data collection that might have been
avoided through cooperative efforts. This deficientcollaboration was more remarkable among projects
funded by different ministries or funding agencies. Someconcrete measures have been tried for enhancing organic
integration of projects. One was establishment of a task
group for climate scenarios, which was co-managed by
the MOE-funded GERF S-5 project (risk analyses) and

31

MEXT-funded
KAKUSHIN
Program(climate
projections). The task group was expected to support
efficient data transfer from the climate modelingcommunity to the impact projection studies. Periodic
task group meetings were held for exchanging the latest
research information and discussing the efficient sharing
and transfer of large archives of climate model outputs.
Publication of Synthesis Report on Observations,
Projections, and Impact Assessments of Climate Change－Climate Change and its Impacts in Japan in 2009 and2012 through inter-ministerial collaboration among theJMA (Japan Meteorological Agency), MEXT and MOE
also worked as a link for improving organic connections
among the research projects funded by any of thoseministries/agencies.

3. Urgent Research Themes Identified inGovernmental Committee Reports
As discussed in Section 2, major governmental
reports on adaptation policy have tended to be linked
with and based on outputs of the coordinated research
projects for studying multi-sector impacts at thenational/local scale. The first NAP stresses theimportance of improved scientific evidence forsupporting periodic climate risk assessment, and theinterim report (Policies and Procedures for Efforts on
Scientific Knowledge and Climate Risk Information to
Promote Climate Change Adaptation), which wascompiled in March 2017 as a follow-up activity to the
NAP, suggested research themes and areas that should
be prioritized for supporting periodic risk assessment.
While not all the suggestions derived from politicalneeds may be realized due to limited financial andtechnical resources, the suggestions in the report willaffect the direction of research conducted in Japan in the
coming years. Thus this section summarizes the urgent
research themes indicated in the committee report.
The report advises the Japanese government topromote climate change risk analysis and implement
adaptation through cooperation among relevant ministries
and partnerships with a wide range of stakeholders. The
MOE has been advised by the report to work on (1)enhancement of scientific knowledge, (2) promotion ofunderstanding and cooperation of stakeholders throughthe effective provision of climate risk information, (3)promotion of adaptation policy at a regional scale, (4)promotion of international cooperation and contribution.
More specifically, regarding (1), enhancement ofscientific knowledge, the following five policy directions
are presented.
i.	Continual observation and monitoring of climatechange and its impacts-	
Review of climate impact observation andmonitoring of implementation plans by relevant
ministries-	
Securing long-term sustainable observation/
monitoring activities supporting adaptation plan

32

K. TAKAHASHI

implementation
ii. Projection of climate change and its impacts-	Review of climate scenarios and other settings for
impact projections by relevant ministries-	
Promotion of studies on tools for developing
national/regional SSPs that are consistent with
global SSPs
iii.	Enhancement of investigative research on climate
impacts-	Promotion of studies to develop indices andmethods for evaluating vulnerability, exposureand adaptive capacity-	
Promotion of assessments of vulnerability andexposure at a regional scaleiv.	Evaluation of effects of overseas climate impacts on
Japan
-	
Investigative
research
focusingontheinternational supply chain and global food demandand supply
v. Periodic assessment of climate risks-	Collection and transmission of the latest scientificknowledge on sector impacts through theestablishment of expert working groups in aplanned and consistent way-	
Improvement of evaluation criteria forsignificance, urgency and confidence of climate
risks based on new scientific findings, as neededWith regard to policy direction (i) itemized above,for prioritizing, promoting and realizing adaptations
urgently needed for mitigating climate risks in sensitive
sectors, an accurate understanding of the present stateof vulnerability and exposure as well as hazards is
crucial. Scientific evidence of emerging climate impacts
would be a strong motivation for people and society to
implement the necessary urgent adaptation measures.
Moreover, continuous monitoring of relevant factors forclimate risks will be crucial for enhancing
understanding of the problems’ mechanisms, which
would also increase public perception of the problems
and promote implementation of the measures. Among
various governmental policies regarding observationand monitoring of changes in the natural environment
and ecosystems, “Monitoring Site 1000” (http://www.
biodic.go.jp/moni1000/) and “Ikimono-Log” (https: / /ikilog.biodic.go.jp/) operated by the MOE are unique
for their reliance on reporting by non-experts as well as
experts to increase the temporal and spatial coverage ofmonitoring as well as the sense of participation by the
stakeholders. Under “Monitoring Site 1000,” the MOE
set up about 1000 locations for long-term monitoring ofvarious types of ecosystems and is trying to catch
quantitative and qualitative deterioration of naturalenvironment at an early stage. For sustainable long-term
observation, networks among universities, research
institutes, experts, regional NPOs and volunteers havebeen constructed, and monitoring activities are being
implemented. The collected data are processed andpublicized swiftly for enhanced information sharing

among stakeholders and expedited conservation actions.
A portal website for statistics relevant to climatechange impacts (http://www.nies.go.jp/occco/statistics_
portal/index.html) is also operated by the MOE with thesupport of the OCCCO (Office for Coordination of
Climate Change Observation) at NIES (National Institutefor Environmental Studies). The portal site wasdeveloped and launched based on recognition thatclimate change impacts had already been manifesting inmany places and sectors and it was important to detect
those manifesting impacts quickly enough for the
purpose of adapting to them in a timely manner. With thecooperation of relevant ministries and agencies, statistical
data recorded and consolidated by various institutions fortheir own respective purposes are collected extensively
from the viewpoint of relevance to climate impacts andput in order at the portal site. The data list in the portalsite contains not only statistical data on impacts directly
attributed to recent climate change but also otherstatistical data that may be informative for understanding
climate change impacts better. Continuous updating of
the list is planned.
Policy direction (ii) highlights proper formulation of
scenarios for climate, socio-economic and otherenvironmental factors to be assumed in impact
projections. For global or terrestrial climate scenarios,
not only climate projections with the domesticallydeveloped global climate models but also climate
projections supplied by the foreign modeling teams need
to be collected, evaluated and utilized efficiently. For
impact analyses targeting Japan, spatial downscaling is a
key procedure and should be carefully considered. Whileregional climate models have been improved steadily
during recent decades, how to process the outputs ofregional climate models is also a crucial consideration
for developing climate scenarios suitable to each impact
analysis.
Development of national/regional socio-economic
scenarios for assuming future vulnerability and exposureis also an urgent task, since it will be an importantelement in coordinated climate risk analyses. For global
scale impact analysis, SSPs (Shared Socio-economic
Pathways) have been developed to be commonly used,especially in research aiming at contributing to
IPCC-AR6 (Riahi et al., 2017). National/regional socioeconomic scenarios do not necessarily need to beconsistent with the global SSPs. If consistency ismaintained, however, the results of climate risk
assessment in Japan can be better linked or comparedwith global assessments or assessments conducted inother countries based on similar assumptions. Whiledeveloping quantitative downscaling methods forland-use, population and other factors is essential todevelopment of a national/ regional socio-economic
scenario, bottom-up visioning of the future by local
stakeholders and experts is also valuable and should beconsidered. Regarding the downscaling of the SSPs,
some precedent research exists, conducted mainly byresearch teams in Europe and the U.S. (e.g., Absar &Overview of Studies in Japan on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation

33

Fig. 2 Risk of climate-related impacts resulting from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including
hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems.
Changes in both the climate system (left) and socioeconomic processes including adaptation andmitigation (right) are drivers of hazards, exposure and vulnerability. (Adapted from IPCC (2014))

Fig. 3 I llustration of the dependence of risks associated with a “reason for concern” (RFC) on the level of climate change and the exposureand vulnerability (E&V) of society.
	Left (a): dependence of risk associated with RFCs on the level of climate change assessed in IPCC-AR5, which does not explicitly
express dependency of risk on E&V. Right (b): Schematic figure illustrating the idea of extending the ordinary RFC diagram (left) toconsider E&V dependency explicitly. “Medium” E&V indicates a future development path in which E&V changes over time are
driven by moderate trends in socioeconomic conditions. “Low” and “High” E&V indicate futures that are substantially more optimistic
or pessimistic, respectively, regarding exposure and vulnerability. (Adapted from Figs. 19-4 and 19-5 in Oppenheimer et al. (2014) )Preston, 2015).
Regarding policy direction (iii), more attention has
been paid recently to the need for research on vulnerability
and exposure with relevance to development of national/
regional socio-economic scenarios as mentioned above.
While there have been many projections of impacts onnatural systems such as hydrological state, vegetationand crop yields so far, climate impacts on social systems
have been less studied and understood. Even inprojections of socio-economic impacts, there has been atendency to assume that vulnerability, exposure andrelated adaptive capacity remain constant (no change in

34

K. TAKAHASHI

the future from the present state).
This limited consideration of future change in socioeconomic conditions is not merely the case just in Japanbut more universally. IPCC-AR5 highlighted theimportance of considering vulnerabilities and exposure
for assessing and managing risks (Fig. 2; IPCC, 2014) as
well as hazards. The Reasons for Concern (RFC)
diagram was also claimed to be improved by considering
future change and uncertainties in vulnerabilities andexposure more explicitly (Fig. 3; Oppenheimer et al.,2014). The determination of key risks as reflected in the
RFCs has not previously been distinguished acrossalternative development pathways (left plate in Fig. 3).
The RFCs, however, represent risks that are determinedby both climate-related hazards and the vulnerability andexposure of social and ecological systems to climatechange stressors.
The right plate in Fig. 3 illustrates this dependence
on vulnerability and exposure in a modified version of
the burning embers diagram. Literature published before
IPCC-AR5 (before 2014) was insufficient for supporting
confident assessment of specific RFCs using theillustrated approach. While this limitation has been amajor concern for many years, intensive efforts toovercome it will be made with support of the SSPs in
the years to come before the next IPCC-AR6. Not being
left behind by the international frontline of research
efforts is quite important to the Japanese researchcommunity for attaining proper, realistic adaptation
policies as well as for increasing its presence in theinternationally competitive research community.
Policy direction (iv), evaluating the effects ofoverseas climate impacts on Japan, poses a traditionalfrequently asked question that has yet to be answered
sufficiently. Conceptually, this type of risk was already aconcern even at the initial stage of climate policy
discussion. A typical example is the effect of crop yieldchanges in other countries which are propagated throughinternational food trade. However, after Thailand
experienced a huge flood in 2011 causing severe
disruption to international industries, including global
car manufacturers, people began calling for a more
serious discussion. The fragility of the global
commercial supply chain was recognized more
concretely than before. Beyond the hypothetical andqualitative indications of indirect potential risks from
impacts outside Japan, quantitative analyses need to be
improved. Recently, impacts on national security
affected by changes in migration patterns caused byclimate change and rising occurrences of conflicts
caused by increases in extreme climate events have also
been a concern (e.g., Burke et al., 2015). From thepractical viewpoint of model simulation, coherent
downscaling of the climate and socio-economic
scenarios discussed above is also related to thefeasibility of the analyzing knock-on effects of climatechange impacts in other countries on Japan.
Finally, regarding policy direction (v), as found in
the IPCC process for global circumstances, it should be

remembered that promotion of academic research andperiodic scientific assessment of available knowledge
are interdependent. Since researchers know that research
results are surveyed and assessed periodically forsupporting policymaking processes, they can plan theirresearch so that it will be useful and timely for those
processes.
Otherwise,
without
theimproved
understanding provided by the research, periodic climate
risk assessment cannot be conducted effectively. The
explicit signal from the government that suggests a needfor periodic assessment of the latest scientificunderstanding will increase motivation among
researchers to conduct relevant studies, especially if thesignal is embodied within prioritized provision ofresearch funding. Regarding improving evaluation
criteria for climate risks, continuous efforts to improverisk communication based on stakeholders’ views will
become more important.
To promote the understanding and cooperation of
stakeholders through the effective provision of climate risk
information, prioritized policy (2) listed above, the A-PLAT(“Climate Change Adaptation Platform”; http: / / www.
adaptation-platform.nies.go.jp/en/index.html) establishedby the MOE in 2016 is expected to function as a bridge
for interactive communication between the science
community, which provides evidence, and stakeholders
such as public citizens, the private sector and local
governments. The platform is designed to contain andprovide data and tools for supporting adaptation
decisions, like simplified climate risk models and risk
maps. It also contains guidance materials for promoting
adaptation actions by individual stakeholders, includingsummary reports of good practices in the private
business sector. The platform is also planned to beequipped with the additional function of supporting
adaptation policy developments in developing countries
in the Asia-Pacific region, to be extended to the
AP-PLAT (“Asia-Pacific Adaptation Information
Platform”) by 2020, based on the statement by Ministerof the Environment Koichi Yamamoto at COP22 in 2016
on support from Japan’s government for thedevelopment of infrastructure to share climate risk
information regionally. In a word, any adaptation-related
studies conducted in Japan are encouraged to utilize theplatform as an outlet for research deliverables, and thiswill surely affect research proposals on adaptation issues
in the coming years.
Other policy initiatives related to enhancing
adaptation at a local scale as well as in developing
countries in the Asia-Pacific region also give researchers
full play. For example, promotion of adaptation at a
local scale will be supported by the “Consortiums for
Local Scale Adaptation,” consisting of the national
government, local authorities and research organizations.
The consortiums are expected to conduct climate risk
analyses based on collaboration among relevant
stakeholders and evidence-based adaptation planning. It
would be quite a new challenge for researchers to workon research themes based on direct discussion andOverview of Studies in Japan on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation

collaboration with potential audiences (i.e., co-designand co-production proffered in FutureEarth). A similar
approach is also applicable to collaborative work with
Asia-Pacific countries. For example, some projects forsupporting adaptation policy planning in Asia-Pacificcountries have been conducted through collaboration
among local stakeholders who have the ability to affectlocal policies, local researchers who understand the local
problems best and have good access to proper data, andexperts from Japan who bring tools like impact analysis
models as introduced in Section 4.

4. New and Ongoing Research Projects on
Climate Impact and Adaptation Analysis
Here, it is worth summarizing ongoing major
research projects on climate impacts and adaptation to
get an overview of present research interests anddirections in Japan and to consider their potential
contribution to achievement of the Paris agreement.
Regarding global-scale analyses of climate impacts,
the GERF S-14 project (“Strategic Research on Global
Mitigation and Local Adaptation to Climate Change”;
FY2015-2019; http://s-14.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eng/) fundedby the MOE has been working on analysis of mitigation
and adaptation in an integrated manner. It also contains
a research module that aims at linking a global economic
model (AIM-CGE) with sector impact models toimprove economic analysis of climate change impacts.
For example, Takakura et al. (2017) estimated theeconomic cost of heat-related illness prevention throughworker breaks associated with climate change under awide range of climatic and socioeconomic conditions
using the AIM-CGE linked with a worktime reduction
impact model. The study showed that GDP losses in
2100 will range from 2.6 to 4.0% compared to thecurrent climate conditions under the highest emission
scenario while the losses could be less than 0.5% if the
2.0° C goal is achieved. To discuss long-term climate
targets and mitigation pathways, accurate economic
analysis of climate change impacts will be crucial. The
analyses’ comprehensiveness (coverage of the impacted
sectors), however, is still insufficient for such a
discussion. By expanding the sectors for which
economic impacts can be estimated, studies conductedby the project will be able to contribute to policy
discussions of long-term global climate targets. The
project also aims at better consideration of adaptation in
impact projections, so it would fill one of the key
research gaps in this research field.
The SI-CAT program (“Social Implementation
Program on Climate Change Adaptation Technology”;
FY2016-2020; https://si-cat.jp/en/staticpages/index.php/
about) funded by MEXT collaborates with local
governments in developing technologies thatcomprehensively assess precise near-term climate
projections and the effectiveness of countermeasuresagainst climate change impacts in Japan, consideringrespective regional characteristics. The keyword and35

ultimate target of the project is “social implementation.”
It aims at either avoiding or reducing the damage causedby climate change by reflecting these technologies inplanning for urban development, agriculture and otherindustries. The SI-CAT program conducts technologicaldevelopment to find adaptation measures needed for the
future in collaboration with researchers in geoscience,social science and the humanities, and officials of local
governments for protecting the security of residents andtheir property from climate change threats. It willcontribute to the development of adaptation plans bylocal governments and the creation of new enterprises inconsideration of steady adaptation of various needs toclimate change.
As discussed in Section 2, improvement of climate
models and future climate projections have been
conducted mainly in successive large research projects
supported by MEXT. The latest ongoing project is called
the TOUGOU Program (“Research Program for
Improving Integrated Climate Models’), which waslaunched very recently in May 2017. The program
consists of four research themes: global climate
projection and development of basic models for the
projection, improved understanding of the carbon cycle
and climate sensitivity, integrated projection of climatechange, and integrated projection of hazards. This
research program can be considered a successor to
MEXT-funded research projects for the development andimprovement of climate models that have utilized theEarth Simulator (high-speed super computer) since
FY2002. After several system updates to reflect computer
technology improvements, the ES3 (the 3rd generation
Earth Simulator) has been operational since June 2015.
Based on the accumulated research knowledge andresources, the new program is going to tackle novel tasks
such as provision of climate projections suitable foradaptation analyses with fine spatial resolution (a fewkm); decreasing the uncertainty regarding the carbon
cycle, nitrogen cycle and climate sensitivity so that ascientific basis can be formed for mitigation policy; andgaining further insight into tipping elements. These newfeatures would be useful for supporting the developmentof national disaster prevention plans and ambitious
mitigation policies. It is also worth noting that the project
also aims at producing climate projections useful forassessing adaptation not only inside Japan but in other
East Asian countries, following governmental policy tosupport adaptation in the region.
Here, let us also look at existing or anticipatedinternational collaboration. For global scale analyses ofclimate impacts, the importance or necessity ofparticipation in model inter-comparison projects is
becoming well recognized in Japan as well. For example,
four Japanese impact models were considered in the fasttrack analyses of the ISI-MIP project (Inter-Sectoral
Impact Model Inter-comparison Project) and contributed
to papers surveyed in IPCC-AR5 (Warszawski et al.,2014). Furthermore, in ongoing consecutive rounds ofthe project, larger number of Japanese modeling teams

36

K. TAKAHASHI

are participating. It seems that uncertainty in impact
projections caused by the choice of analytical methods(models) have been proven to be no less than theuncertainty caused by future climate and socio-economic
scenarios. As previously experienced in the global
climate model development process, engagement ininternational model inter-comparison projects will bebeneficial for providing insight into the frontline of theresearch. It will also increase the presence of theparticipating modeling teams in the international
academic community.
Contribution to the IPCC is highly recognized in theJapanese research community. This should not be limited
to elevating active researchers to the report writing
teams, but there should be various other ways tocontribute as well. Generally, research funds granted bygovernment ministries require the recipients to produce
output that directly benefits the ministerial services. In
some cases, however, citations of published literature by
IPCC reports are also highly appreciated as contributing
to a governmental service, as they may be consideredinternational contributions from the Japanese
government.
As discussed in Section 3, support of Asia-Pacificcountries for policy planning and implementing
adaptation is also a prioritized policy direction explicitly
mentioned in the first NAP. Concrete policy actions havebeen initiated as a follow-up to the NAP. The plan oflaunching the AP-PLAT introduced in Section 3 is oneof the typical efforts for supporting adaptation policies
in these countries. Bilateral collaborative projects arealso being conducted for adaptation analysis, planningand implementation.

5. Conclusion
The above-given summary of recent research
activities on climate risk analysis, brought up some
important directions or aspects of future research.
First, “co-design” and “co-production,” highlighted
in FutureEarth, are becoming more and more importantin the field of study to support decision making andstrategy planning in response to global environmental
problems (as discussed in Section 3). They also apply to
climate risk analysis and adaptation assessment.
Involvement of stakeholders at the initial stage of
research planning is crucial. This might not be achieved
effectively by voluntary efforts of researchers alone, andresearch funding systems may also need to change topromote interaction between the research communityand potential study audiences.
Second, while quantification and communication of
uncertainties in climate risk analyses have become better
recognized in the previous decade, further improvement
is still needed. The availability of new scenarios such as
SSPs for socio-economic change and new climate
scenarios will help us analyze future uncertainties in amore comprehensive manner (as highlighted also in theinterim report introduced in Section 3). Spatial

downscaling of those global scenarios to national/local
scale impacts and adaptation analyses will also be
important.
Third, there are internationally coordinated activities
aiming to improve impact analysis and adaptationassessment, which include model inter-comparison
projects (as discussed in Section 4). Constant active
participation in such activities would increase the qualityof risk analysis conducted in Japan, which would
ultimately increase their international presence. As ashorter-term task, contribution to scientific assessments
conducted by the IPCC and dialogues between
policymakers and researchers in the UNFCCC may beprioritized, since they can provide direct input tointernational negotiation processes. What would be evenmore beneficial would be to contribute during theframing stage of internationally coordinated activities.
Fourth, climate risks and adaptation options needed
for managing the risks are generally region-specific andneed to be analyzed considering individual and uniquelocal conditions. Tools, models and some types of datafor quantitative analysis of the risks, however, could be
generic to some degree. For efficiently increasing thecoverage of analyses, tools and data developed andaccumulated during the process of adaptation analysis ina specific region should be archived and maintained
properly to be utilized for analyses in other regions.
Such an archive of tools and data would be also effective
for maintaining scientific rigor by increasing thefeasibility of their validation. Previously, it often
occurred that tools and data developed in a research
project or governmental survey were not maintained
very well after the project ended and valuable products
were not efficiently used again. Fortunately, it seems
ongoing large research projects and policy initiatives fordata management and distribution (e.g., A-PLAT,
explained in Section 3) have been conducted with more
careful consideration to data management issues.
Finally, the first national adaptation plan has explicitly
shown a need for periodic risk assessment based on thebest tools and data available in each period. Researchers
are expected to support the process through sustainable
efforts for improving risk assessment methods. To
improve the performance of analyses, it is naturally the
responsibility of researchers to develop and improveanalytical tools such as more accurate and precise impact
simulation models. More active participation ininternational model comparison may be an effective stepfor steady improvement of analytical methods as
discussed above. Long-term, continuous, repetitive
investigation using the tools developed may not be
considered academic research, but it might be consideredroutine investigation or a monitoring task. Appropriate
interpretation of long-term repetitive assessments,
however, will be a situation where researchers’ expertiseis crucial.

Overview of Studies in Japan on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation

37

Acknowledgment
This article is based on the results of multiple research
projects including the Environment Research andTechnology Development Fund (S-14-5 and S-10) of theEnvironmental Restoration and Conservation Agency.

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Kiyoshi TAKAHASHI
Kiyoshi Takahashi has a PhD in Engineering. His
major areas of expertise include environmental
system modeling. Since starting work at NIES in
1996, he has been engaged in the development of
AIM (Asia-Pacific Integrated Mode), an integrated
assessment model for climate policy analysis, andhas contributed to improvement of the global climate
impact analysis modules within it. Recently, his greatest interest is in policies
and measures for achieving both long- term climate targets like the Paris
Agreement and sustainability targets represented simultaneously by the
Sustainable Development Goals. He has taken the role of lead author in boththe 4th and 5th IPCC assessment reports.

(Received 22 June 2017, Accepted 27 August 2017)

39

Recent Progress in Local Governmental Planning for Climate
Change Adaptation in Japan: A Case of Climate Change
Adaptation in Saitama Prefecture
Masayuki HARA1,2* and Tomohide SHIMADA1
1
Center for Environmental Science in Saitama,914, Kamitanadare, Kazo, Saitama, 347-0115, Japan
2
Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology,
3173-25, Showa-machi, Kanazawaku, Yokohama, Kanagawa, 236-0001, Japan*email: hara.masayuki@pref.saitama.lg.jp

Abstract
The surface air temperature in Japan continues to rise, as can be seen from observations beginning in
the 1890s. This temperature rise has been caused not only by urbanization but is also greatly affected byclimate change. Under these circumstances, efforts toward adaptation to climate change have recently begun
in Japan among local governments. Since the national climate change adaptation plan was issued in 2015,
formulation of adaptation plans by local governments has steadily progressed. This is partly attributable tosupport from national projects for the development of local government adaptation plans, availability of aclimate change adaptation information platform launched by the Ministry of the Environment, and easieraccess to climate change adaptation information. In this paper, we survey and review the present state ofclimate change adaptation planning in local governments in Japan. We also describe the current progress
toward climate change adaptation in Saitama Prefecture as an example of climate change adaptation planningby a local government.
Key words: climate change adaptation, local government, thermal environment

1. Introduction
It has been pointed out that climate change due toanthropogenic forcing already affects nature and humansociety, and there is a high possibility that serious,
widespread irreversible effects will occur if the degreeof global warming increases in the future (IPCC, 2013).
Even if future greenhouse gas emissions are reduced tozero, the globally-averaged surface air temperature will
rise, and the risk of climate change is expected toincrease toward the end of the 21st century.
The Japan Meteorological Agency has been conducting
more detailed future climate forecasts for the Japaneseregion (Japan Meteorological Agency, 2013 & 2017).
They postulated the Representative Concentration Path
(hereafter, RCP) 4.5 scenario in Global Warming
Prediction Information, Volume 8, and the RCP 8.5
scenario in Volume 9. The temperature increase in theregion around Japan is predicted to be 2.5° C– 3.5° C
under the RCP 4.5 scenario and 3.3°C–4.9°C under the
RCP 8.5 scenario. It is predicted that the number of days
with hot weather, when the daily maximum surface airtemperature exceeds 35 °C, will be much higher than at
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 039–046
printed in Japan

present.
In the Paris Agreement signed at the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015 (COP21), moves have been made to restrict the global averagetemperature increase to less than +1.5°C or +2.0°C in
the future as compared with the preindustrial climate. It
is difficult to predict the future temperature increase
because there is great uncertainty not only in climate
prediction but also in the prediction of socioeconomic
and technological innovation. For this reason, in order toreduce the impact of climate change, we should plan not
only “mitigation,” to control greenhouse gas emissions,but also “adaptation” to the effects that have alreadybecome apparent and the unavoidable effects in the nearand distant future.
Observation, surveillance, prediction / evaluation,
investigation, etc., of climate change and its impacts areunderway around the world. Particularly in recent years,
adaptation measures have progressed remarkably in Japan.
In 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries(2015) and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism (2015) announced adaptation plans. Based onthese plans and research results on recent adaptations, the©2017 AIRIES40

M. HARA and T. SHIMADA

Central Environment Council evaluated the impact ofclimate change with the participation of experts from awide range of fields at the Central Environment Council
for the government’s adaptation plan formulation. In
November 2015, the government’s first adaptation plan for
the impacts of climate change as adopted by Cabinet
decision (Government of Japan, 2015).
The National Plan for Adaptation to the Impacts of
Climate Change explains that one of the basic strategies
is to promote regional adaptation: cooperation between
the national agency and local governments through thepromotion of climate change impact assessments,
adaptation planning, and capacity building within local
governments. The scale and range of vulnerability due
to climate change depend greatly on regional
characteristics such as climatic, geographical and social
conditions in the affected area. In addition, it isimportant for local governments to develop their own
local communities and societies based on regional
characteristics in order to adapt to future climate change.
Therefore, each local government should play an activerole in tackling climate change adaptation, because
adaptation strategies should depend on the locality.

2. Adaptation Planning in Local Governments in
Japan
Global warming strategies of local governments,
especially at the prefectural and designated city level,
are mostly based on mitigation. Each local government
has its own action plan for global warming mitigation(Ministry of the Environment, 2017a) and is executing
its own action plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
After the Paris Agreement in 2016 (UNFCC, 2016),
climate change adaptation on a local scale became oneof the main issues in the environmental divisions oflocal governments, even in Japan. Therefore, some local
governments have recently made their own action plansfor climate change adaptation.
Some national projects to support creation of climatechange adaptation plans by local governments have beenplanned and implemented since 2010 in Japan. Table 1
gives a list of past and current national projects related toclimate change adaptation planning by local
governments. Twenty-one prefectures and five designatedcities have been supported by those national projects
since 2010.
Under two national projects, the Comprehensive
Study on Impact Assessment and Adaptation for Climate
Change, S-8, of the Environment Research andTechnology Development Fund (Ministry of theEnvironment) and the Research Program on Climate
Change Adaptation (RECCA) (Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT))
implemented from 2010 to 2014, national research
institutes and universities share information with local
governments partaking in the projects, and work together
to create climate change adaptation plans for local
governments. The Support Project for Impact
Assessments and Adaptation Planning for Climate
Change (Ministry of the Environment, 2017b), which
was executed from 2015 to 2016, provided information
about climate change adaptation plans in other local
governments in Japan and other countries. Additionally,
the Social Implementation Program on Climate Change
Adaptation Technology (MEXT), an ongoing project,provides information on climate change adaptation.
The SI-CAT project is targeting some local
governments, called “Model Municipalities,” andattempting to apply advanced technology and information
to implement a climate change adaptation strategy. The
project is also examining how to use advanced technology
and information in local governments at the prefecturelevel and making guidelines to establish a climate change
adaptation plan.
Table 2 shows the status of climate change adaptation
plan-making in prefecture-level local governments as of
May 2017. Seven prefectures and one designated city had
established their own climate change adaptation plans,and 30 prefectures and 11 designated cities had added a
climate change adaptation strategy to their climatechange mitigation plans, environmental action plans orTable 1 National projects supporting climate change adaptation planning in local governments.
Name of project

PeriodMunicipalities involved in the project

Comprehensive Study on Impact Assessment and
Adaptation for Climate Change, S-8, The Environment
Research and Technology Development Fund (Ministryof the Environment)

FY2010－2014

Prefectures: Saitama Pref., Tokyo Met., Nagano Pref.

Research Program on Climate Change Adaptation(RECCA) (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology)

FY2010－2014

Prefectures: Aomori Pref. Saitama Pref., Tokyo Met., Toyama
Pref., Fukui Pref., Kochi Pref.,Designated cities: Nagoya City, Yokohama City
Core city: Kochi City
City: Tajimi City

Social implementation Program on Climate Change
Adaptation Technology (Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology)

FY2015－2019

Prefectures: Ibaraki Pref., Saitama Pref., Nagano Pref., Gifu Pref.,Tottori Pref., Kagawa Pref., Kochi Pref., Tokushima Pref., Ehime
Pref., Saga Pref.
Designated city: Osaka CityThe Support Project for Impact Assessments andAdaptation Planning for Climate Change (Ministry of
the Environment)

FY2015－2016

Prefectures: Fukushima Pref., Saitama Pref., Kanagawa Pref., Mie
Pref., Shiga Pref., Hyogo Pref., Ehime Pref., Nagasaki Pref.,Kumamoto Pref. Designated cities: Sendai City, Kawasaki City

Recent Progress in Local Governmental Planning for Climate Change Adaptation in Japan

41

Table 2 D
 istribution of local public entities (prefectures and designated cites) that had established an adaptation strategy as of May 2017.
Red letters indicate local governments supported by the national projects.
Method of establishing plan

Municipalities

Establishing their own climate Prefectures: Saitama Pref., Fukushima Pref., Mie Pref., Shiga Pref., Hyogo Pref., Tokushima Pref.,change adaptation plans
Kagawa Pref.
Designated city: Kawasaki City
Adding climate change adaptation Prefectures: Iwate Pref., Akita Pref., Yamagata Pref., Ibaraki Pref., Tochigi Pref., Gunma Pref.,strategies to public documents Chiba Pref., Tokyo Met., Kanagawa Pref., Toyama Pref., Fukui Pref., Yamanashi Pref., Nagano(Global warming strategy action Pref., Gifu Pref., Shizuoka Pref., Shiga Pref., Kyoto Pref., Osaka Pref., Hyogo Pref., Nara Pref.,plan, environmental planning)
Wakayama Pref., Tottori Pref., Shimane Pref., Hiroshima Pref., Ehime Pref., Saga Pref., Nagasaki
Pref., Kumamoto Pref., Oita Pref., Okinawa Pref.
Designated cities: Sendai City, Chiba City, Yokohama City, Sagamihara City, Shizuoka City, Kobe
City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, Kitakyushu City, Kumamoto City, Miyazaki City
Table 3 H
 istory of climate change adaptation in Saitama Prefecture.
Year

Events2008

・“Impact assessment of the global warming in Saitama Prefecture” published.

2009

・“Stop Global Warming Saitama Navigation 2050 (Saitama Prefecture, 2009a) ”, the Global warming strategy action planin Saitama Prefecture, published and added climate change adaptation information into.
・The Saitama Prefecture Ordinance on the Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures effected. Climate change
adaptation is described in the ordinance.

2010－2014 ・Involved in Comprehensive Study on Impact Assessment and Adaptation for Climate Change, S-8 (Ministry of Environment) .
2012

・Committee on the global warming adaptation promotion in Saitama Prefecture established.
・The 4th environmental planning in Saitama Prefecture revised and climate change adaptation information added.
・“Council on the Global warming adaptation in agriculture” held with Department of Agriculture and Forestry andDepartment of Environment.

2015－2016 ・Involved in the Support Project for Impact Assessments and Adaptation Planning for Climate Change (Ministry ofEnvironment).
2015

・The Global warming strategy action plan in Saitama Prefecture revised and climate change adaptation information added detailed(Saitama Prefecture, 2011).
・Climate change adaptation plan in Saitama Prefecture published.

2015.12－2019

・Involved in Social implementation Program on Climate Change Adaptation Technology (Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology) as a Model Municipality.

environmental white papers. Seventy-nine percent ofprefectures (37/47) and 60% of designated cities (12/20)
had described their approach to climate change
adaptation in their official documents. Among local
governments that were supported by the national projects
mentioned above, over 90% of prefectures (19/21) and
100% of designated cities (3/3) had described their own
plans in official documents. This shows that the national
projects have strongly supported climate change
adaptation planning by local governments.
The climate change adaptation platform (A-Plat) built
by Japan’s Ministry of the Environment in 2016 (Ministryof the Environment, 2017c) makes it easier for local
governments to access integrated and comprehensive
information about climate change adaptation. A-Plat is an
important tool for local governments in considering how
to plan for climate change adaptation.

3. History of Climate Change Adaptation
Planning in Saitama Prefecture
Saitama Prefecture established a climate change
adaptation plan in 2016. The prefecture has been
receiving assistance from the national projects and isproceeding earlier than other local governments toreflect climate change adaptation in its prefectural
climate change adaptation plan.
Table 3 lists events in the history of efforts toward
climate change adaptation in Saitama Prefecture. In
2008, an impact assessment of global warming in
Saitama Prefecture was published. Information wasadded on climate change adaptation to Saitama
Prefecture’s mitigation action plan in 2009 (Saitama
Prefecture, 2009a). In 2012, a committee was set up on
global warming adaptation promotion in Saitama
Prefecture, which has shared climate change information
since then among all divisions in the prefectural
government. In 2016, a climate change adaptation planfor Saitama Prefecture was established and published.
Impact assessments are given, and current public
policies and plans for each sector such as agriculture,
forestry, fisheries, water resources, ecology, natural
hazards, human health and urban environments aredescribed in the plan. There are four issues (paddy rice,
floods, heat stroke, and thermal environment) ofparticularly high concern that are listed as pioneering
subjects in the prefecture.
Figure 1 outlines the management process of Saitama

42

M. HARA and T. SHIMADA（℃）

Fig. 1 Flow chart of Saitama Prefecture’s climate change
adaptation strategy.

Fig. 2 SAT time series at Kumagaya Station, Japan Meteorological
Agency.

Prefecture’s climate change adaptation plan. Saitama
Prefecture publishes, manages, executes, verifies andrevises its climate change adaptation plan following aprocess described in Shimada et al., 2016, which isbased on “adaptive management” as suggested in Sirai
et al., 2017.

Department of the Environment compiled and analyzed
many kinds of surface air temperature data, such as theAutomated Meteorological Data Acquisition System(AMeDAS) established by the Japan Meteorological
Agency and air pollution monitoring stations managed
by Saitama Prefecture. The document shows long-term
trends, seasonal variations, land use/ land cover effects
and estimated anthropogenic heat, revealing the main
factors in the heat island effect. The impact assessmentof global warming in Saitama Prefecture, published in
2008, reported that the summertime thermal environment
was getting worse in urban areas. Stop Global Warming
Saitama Navigation 2050, published in February 2009
(Saitama Prefecture, 2009a), is a mitigation action plan,but it also includes an adaptation policy, including
countermeasures to the heat island effect andsummertime thermal environment. A guideline for heatisland countermeasures in Saitama Prefecture was also
published in 2009 (Saitama Prefecture, 2009b) and the
document describes specific plans to implement effective
measures against the heat island effect.
Stop Global Warming Saitama Navigation 2050 was
revised in 2015 (Saitama Prefecture, 2015). The document
includes not only heat island countermeasures but also acomprehensive policy for climate change adaptation in
Saitama Prefecture. The Department of Environment,
Saitama Prefectural Government also started a model
residential area project for advanced measures against theheat island effect to mitigate the heat island effect thatyear.
As mentioned in the previous section, the recent SAT
rise in Saitama Prefecture was caused not only by global
warming but also by enhancement of the urban heat island
due to urbanization. Figure 4 shows the urban fraction of
the Tokyo metropolitan area in 1976 and 2009 and thedifference between them, estimated for a three-kilometer
grid. We cannot find any differences in the center ofTokyo, because the urban fraction was already saturated
by 1976, but we can see urban fraction trends sprawling
into western Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba.
Thus, the summertime thermal environment in
Saitama Prefecture is getting worse. Figure 5 shows
mortalities from heat stroke in Saitama Prefecture. After

4. Strategy for Improving the Thermal
Environment in Saitama Prefecture
The Tokyo Metropolitan area (dominating thesouthern part of the Kanto district) is known as one of
the hottest places in summer in Japan. The area contains
more than 38 million people and is the world’s largest
megalopolis. The amplitude of diurnal variation of thesurface air temperature (SAT) is especially large in
Saitama Prefecture (just north of Tokyo), where the daily
maximum SAT sometimes reaches 40 ºC.
Figure 2 shows the annual mean SAT at the
Kumagaya Meteorological Observatory. The trend from
1897 to 2016 has been a rise of 2.07°C /century. This
trend is relatively larger than in the rural region because
it contains not only the impact of global warming but
also that of the urban heat island effect.
Figure 3 shows histograms of the daily maximum
and minimum SATs at the Kumagaya MeteorologicalObservatory. Both histograms show a shift to the warmerside from the 1980s to 2007-2016. The number of days
during which the maximum SAT exceeded 35ºC
increased rapidly, from 73 days in the 1980s to 199 days
from 2007 to 2016. The number of the days during
which the minimum SAT exceeded 25ºC from 2007 to2016 was 3.79 times of the number in the 1980s.
Thus, in the past decade, the summer heat
environment in Japan has grown worse, and the numberof emergency transportations due to heat stroke has
rapidly increased. Therefore, people are concerned about
the summertime thermal environment in Saitama, andthe prefectural government has established various
measures for adaptation to a hotter environment.
Saitama Prefecture established “Heat island report in
Saitama Prefecture” on its heat island effect in March
2006 (Saitama Prefecture, 2007). The Saitama Prefectural

Recent Progress in Local Governmental Planning for Climate Change Adaptation in Japan

43

Fig. 3 Histogram of daily maximum (left) and minimum (right) SAT at Kumagaya Station. Orange bars indicate histogram from 1980 to
1989, blue bars indicate histogram from 2007 to 2016.

(a)Urban fraction in 2009(b)Urban fraction in 1976(c)difference between (b) and (a)Fig. 4 Urban fraction of Tokyo metropolitan area. The urban fraction is calculated from land utilization segment mesh data obtained
through a national land numerical information downloading service in 3-km grid boxes.

Fig. 5 Mortalities due to heat stroke in Saitama Prefecture.
(Population Census, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)Fig. 6 Population time series in Saitama Prefecture.
(Population data were provided by Statistics Division,
Department of General Affairs, Saitama Prefecture.)

44

M. HARA and T. SHIMADA

2000, casualties began increasing, and in 2010, thehottest summer in recent decades, they exceeded 120.
Mortalities from heat stroke are much higher than thosefrom other natural hazards such as floods, snow disasters
or landslides in Saitama Prefecture.
The population of Saitama Prefecture is still
increasing as of January 2017 (Fig.6), though populations
in most prefectures are decreasing. Casualties fromheat stroke strongly depend on age. The population’s
average age is rising drastically: in 2000, 12.8% of
the population was over 65 years old; in 2017, thatfigure had increased to 25%.

5. Example: Local-scale Adaptation in Saitama
Prefecture
In this section, we describe one example of Saitama
Prefecture’s advanced climate change adaptation
measures. To reduce the impact of future heat waves insummertime, the Saitama Prefectural Government isintroducing some effective measures against heat at the
Kumagaya Sports and Culture Park, where major rugby
and football matches often take place.
MEXT launched the Social Implementation Programon Climate Change Adaptation Technology (SI-CAT) in
2015, the goal of which has been social implementationof climate change adaptation on a local government
scale. In the project, national research institutes anduniversities provide their advanced adaptation
information and technology to local governments.
Saitama Prefecture is one of the “Model Municipalities”
of SI-CAT. We established a working group for thermal
environment adaptation, consisting of the Japan Agency
for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC),
the University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki University, Rissho
University and the Center for Environmental Science in
Saitama, and performed in situ observations and finescale numerical simulations.
In August 2016, we performed a set of in situ
observations to evaluate adaptation measuresquantitatively, to verify numerical simulations and to
spread information to citizens and prefectural officers on
Saitama Prefecture’s climate change adaptation strategy.
Figure 7 shows a map of the Kumagaya Sports andCulture Park. The numbers show the locations of
installed observation instruments.
The observations were made on August 9, 10, and19, 2016. The weather was clear and hot on theobservation target days. To share the methodology andinformation from the thermal environment observations
with scientists and policy makers, people from several
sectors such as national research institutes, universities
and local governments took part in the observations. The
daily maximum SAT exceeded 33ºC on all the observed
days. The highest temperature, 36.9ºC, was observed at
the Kumagaya Meteorological Observatory on August 9.
The Kumagaya Sports and Culture Park is located at139.4040 degrees east and 36.1669 degrees north,
3.5 kilometers north of Kumagaya Station on the JR Takasaki

Line. The park area is about 100 ha, the longitudinal size is
2 kilometers, and the latitudinal size is 3 kilometers.
The park contains the “Sainokuni Kumagaya Dome”(a multipurpose dome), three rugby courts and twoathletic tracks.
Figure 7 shows the observation locations. The P1 site
was located at the center of a grass-covered field. We set
that point as a super site and installed an automatedweather station there that could measure air temperature,humidity, pressure, black bulb temperature and threedimensional supersonic wind speed. We also installed an
aspiration psychrometer (Assmann type) and aradiometer that could observe upward and downward,
longwave and shortwave, and four radiation
components. The situation was ideal for generalmeteorological observation. We also took thermography,
temperature and pressure observations in the lower
boundary layer using a drone and radiosonde. Figure7(b) shows the P1 observation site, (c) shows diurnal
variations in SATs in the park, and (d) provides athermographic and visible image. Such efforts areimportant not only for improving numerical models byusing observational data but also for educating theprefectural government about the impact of climatechange.

6. Summary/Discussion
As of 2017, some advanced local governments had
already published their own climate change adaptationplans. National projects, which support creation ofclimate change adaptation plans by local governments,
are very effective, and most of the local governments
supported by these could form their own climate change
adaptation plans. The national projects play a crucialrole in propagating local government plans for climatechange adaptation. Risks due to climate change andfactors that increase climate change vulnerability dependon geographical and social conditions. Climate change
adaptation plans should differ for each local government.
Climate change mitigation by local governments is
mandated by law (Act on Promotion of Global WarmingCountermeasures) in Japan, but as of 2017, adaptation
has not been mandated by any laws, so there is lessmotivation to make climate change adaptation plans.
As mentioned in the Introduction, most local
governments supported by the national projects could
make their own adaptation plans. A-Plat is a helpful tool
for local governments for making climate change
adaptation plans. It is important to maintain, add andupdate data to facilitate climate change adaptation more
widely.
For local governments to achieve the next stage ofclimate change adaptation, support for those unable to
make their own adaptation plans will be essential.

Acknowledgments
This paper is supported by the Social Implementation

Recent Progress in Local Governmental Planning for Climate Change Adaptation in Japan

45

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Fig. 7 Example of a thermal environment observation at the Kumagaya Sports and Culture Park. (a) map of observation sites (map data arefrom http://openstreetmap.org), (b) picture of one observation site, (c) our observed SATs and data from the Kumagaya MeteorologicalObservatory, Japan Meteorological Agency, located about 2 km southwest of the park, and (d) visible and infrared images ofobservation site P2.

46

M. HARA and T. SHIMADA

Program on Climate Change Adaptation Technology (SICAT), MEXT. Observations of the thermal environment
at the Kumagaya Sports and Culture Park were
supported by members of the Thermal Environment
Working Group of SI-CAT, MEXT.

UNFCC (2015) The Paris Agreement. < http: / / unfccc.int/ files/
essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_
agreement.pdf> (accessed 30 May 2017)

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Masayuki HARA
Masayuki Hara, Ph.D., is a researcher at the Center
for Environmental Science in Saitama (CESS), anda visiting scientist at the Japan Agency for MarineEarth Science and Technology. He received his
Ph.D. from the University of Tsukuba Institute ofLife and Environmental Science in 2014. He has
been a research scientist at the Japan Agency for
Marine-Earth Science and Technology (2004–2014). His research fields are
local climatology and meteorology, and their utilization in climate change
mitigation and adaptation planning.

Tomohide SHIMADA
Tomohide Shimada is assistant director of theEnvironment Department at the Center for
Environmental Science in Saitama (CESS). He is
conducting research into adaptation for global
warming in the region.

(Received 12 June 2017, Accepted 28 August 2017)

47

Japan’s New Initiative for REDD+ Results-based Financing:
Opportunities and Challenges
Makino YAMANOSHITA1,2*, Hiromitsu SAMEJIMA1and Henry SCHEYVENS1
1Natural Resources and Ecosystem Services Area, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies(IGES),
2108-11, Kamiyamaguchi, Hayama, Kanagawa, 240-0115, Japan
2
Asian Natural Environmental Science Center, The University of Tokyo
1-1-1, Yayoi, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-8657, Japan*e-mail:yamanoshita@iges.or.jp

Abstract
Article 5 of the Paris Agreement specifies implementation of REDD+ (reducing emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation) through results-based payments. Currently, however, REDD+ resultsbased financing is insufficient for incentivizing full implementation of REDD+ by developing countries. In
this article, we examine how a new bilateral initiative of Japan called JCM REDD+ could contribute to
REDD+ results-based financing. JCM REDD+ is unique as a CDM-like mechanism providing ex-ante
funding to project-based REDD+ activities and issuing credits later for emission reductions achieved which
can be used for both countries’ NDCs. The features of JCM REDD+ would complement other existing
payment-on-delivery mechanisms. JCM REDD+ supports activities on the ground which directly affectdrivers of deforestation. It also has the potential to exploit financial sources from the private sector, in which
involvement in REDD+ remains low. JCM REDD+, however, would have no significant positive influences
immediately on the landscape of REDD+ results-based financing, as its scale of implementation is restricted
in terms of number of projects in the pipeline and available funding sources. To maximize the potential of
JCM REDD+, modalities and guidelines for transparency and accounting relevant to REDD+, Nationally
Determined Contributions and internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should be clarified under theParis Agreement. At the same time, we find it is crucial to consider policy designs in developed countries
that would enhance investment in REDD+.
Key words: internationally transferred mitigation outcome (ITMO), Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM),
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD+), results-based payment

1. Introduction
Article 5 of the Paris Agreement clearly states that theparties should take action to conserve and enhance thefunction of forests as sinks and reservoirs of greenhousegases. It also encourages the parties to implement andsupport REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestationand forest degradation), the framework for which was
adopted in 2013 as the Warsaw Framework for REDD+
as a result of a decade of negotiations at the UNFCCC(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Chante). One distinctive feature of REDD+ under the
UNFCCC is that it employs results-based payment for
financing. Results-based financing is a financing approach
where payments are made only after a quantified outcome
has been verifiably achieved (Voigt & Ferreira, 2015). In
the context of the UNFCCC, results-based financing
generally refers to payments made for REDD+ activities
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 047–052
printed in Japanthat demonstrate real reductions in emissions from theforestry sector, as well as consistency with otherperformance criteria such as the REDD+ safeguards(Wilder, 2014).
The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ specifies therequirement for developing countries to implement
REDD+ to access results-based payments. It requires
them to establish a national strategy or action plan for
REDD+, national forest reference emissions level and/or
forest reference level, national forest monitoring systemand safeguard information system. To help developing
countries meet these requirements, REDD+ has adopted aphased approach, which is another prominent feature of
REDD+ . In the first phase, a country prepares toimplement REDD+, for example by developing a national
REDD+ strategy and capacity building for monitoring,
reporting and verification (MRV) for REDD+. The second
phase is for more advanced readiness, focusing on©2017 AIRIES

48

M. YAMANOSHITA et al.

REDD+ implementation with demonstration activities,
and in the third phase, the country is compensated for its
REDD+ activities through results-based payment (WertzKanounnikoff & Angelsen, 2009). The phased approachallows countries at different levels of capacity toparticipate in REDD+ and ultimately access REDD+
results-based financing.
International financial support for REDD+ has to be inline with the phased approach to materialize this concept.
The Warsaw framework for REDD+ affirms thatdeveloped country parties are urged to support
development of the first and second phases throughmultilateral and bilateral channels from public and private
sectors, which provide adequate and predictable support
for all phases (Wilder, 2014). Financial support has been
provided in parallel with negotiations on the rules for
REDD+ at the UNFCCC. Donor countries pledged
US$5.0 billion through bilateral agreements between
2006 and 2014 and US$3.2 billion through six multilateralfunds targeting REDD+
and sustainable forest
management between 2008 and 2014, and 58% of thefinance has been channeled to readiness activities such as
capacity building, training workshops, strengthening of
in-country institutions and development of national
REDD+ policies and strategies (Norman & Nakhooda,2014). As a result of this readiness support, we note a listof 25 countries who have submitted their forest reference
levels to the UNFCCC, one of the requirements foraccessing REDD+ results-based payments (UNFCCC,
2017a). On the other hand, results-based funding forPhase 3 to date is still at an initial stage and its scale isstill limited. Adequate, predictable and sustainablefinancing will be crucial for full implementation of
REDD+ and scaling up of the REDD+ results-based
financing is required.
Japan is the 5th largest donor to REDD+ following
Norway, the US, Germany and the UK and has provided
REDD+ support mainly through bilateral channels forthe purpose of promoting REDD+ readiness amongdeveloping countries, especially in building capacity formonitoring, reporting and verification (Norman &Nakhooda, 2014). There is a new unique initiative underdevelopment in Japan to support REDD+ in an approachsimilar to results-based payments. This article examines
Japan’s new initiative, called the JCM (Japan Crediting
Mechanism) REDD+ , for its positive influence on
REDD+ results-based financing. We first review theinitiative, then discuss its opportunities and challenges.

2. Review
2.1 Current Landscape of REDD+ Results-based
Financing and Japan’s Contribution
The funding for the results-based payments of
REDD+ remains at 42% of the total pledge to REDD+ as
mentioned above. Norway has made a significant
contribution, providing over US$3 billion of its pledge,
which is more than 70% of its total pledge, throughbilateral channels (Norman & Nakhooda, 2014). Norway

signed agreements on payment for emission reductions
with Brazil, Guyana and Indonesia. We have to say,however, that the scale of financing for REDD+ resultsbased payments in Phase 3 is not sufficient. For example,
Brazil, one of the largest emitters in the forest sector andthe pioneer of REDD+, reported to the UNFCCC in their
Biennial Update Report that the emission reduction fromtheir REDD+ activities in the Amazon during the period
from 2006 to 2010 was 594 million CO2 eq per year
(UNFCCC, 2017b). To compensate fully for theachievement of this one country, it would cost about
US$3 billion per year based on simple estimations using
the unit price negotiated between the Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund and developing
countries (approximately US$5/CO2 eq). Recently, there
have been other bilateral pledges for results-based
REDD+ at the Climate Summit in New York in 2014.
Germany, the UK and Norway pledged US$5 billion in
total between 2016 and 2020 through multilateral andbilateral channels and they notably utilize the REDD
Early Movers program (REM), an initiative under
Germany’s official development assistance (ODA) with afund size of EUR€65 million (Ehringhaus & Streck,
2015; Germany et al., 2016; NDC Partnership, 2016).
REM is a program to reward the emission reduction
performance of countries who are already taking theinitiative themselves in REDD+ (GIZ, 2012).
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is considered themain funding source within the UNFCCC. Forty threestate governments have made a pledge of US$10.3 billion
in total to the GCF (GCF, 2017b) but it is not yet clear
how much will be allocated to REDD+ results-based
funding. Discussions on developing funding modalities
for REDD+ results-based funding are still underway at
the GCF board meetings as of June 2017 (GCF, 2017a)
and it is expected to start calling for proposals by late
2018 at the earliest (Leonard, 2017). Outside of the
UNFCCC, the FCPF Carbon Fund of the World Bank
has initiated results-based funding for REDD+ , withcapital of about US$390 million (FCPF, 2013a). It
provides payments for verified emission reductions from
REDD+ activities in countries which have madesignificant progress in their REDD+ readiness endeavors(FCPF, 2013b), and has selected four programs in Chile,
Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Mexico for its portfolio, with 15 programs in thepipeline (FCPF, 2017).
Japan has been supporting REDD+ mainly throughODA projects conducted by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and providing technicalcooperation to 12 countries (Shishido, 2015). From 2006
to 2016, the government of Japan reported that theamount of aid provided for REDD+ has reached US$1.7
billion (FAO, 2017). Through multilateral channels, Japan
contributed US$14 million to the FCPF’s Readiness Fund,
US$60 million to the Climate Investment Funds’ Forest
Investment Program (FIP) and US$3 million to UN-REDD(Government of Japan, 2017a). So far, Japan has neversupported results-based REDD+ but has been developingJapan’s new initiative for REDD+ results‐based financing

a new scheme for results-based funding. It seems atpresent that this scheme is the sole instrument Japan has
for contributing to results-based REDD+ financing andthat there are no other options like the German
government’s REM utilizing ODA for REDD+ resultsbased payment under consideration.

2.2 JCM REDD+
The government of Japan is promoting a bilateralmechanism called the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM),
which is implemented under a bilateral agreement
between Japan and partner countries. As of May 2017, 17
countries have signed the agreement. The purpose of the
JCM is to facilitate diffusion of leading low-carbon
technologies as well as to implement mitigation actions,contribute to sustainable development in developing
countries and use those emission reductions or removals,
appropriately evaluated in a quantitative manner, toachieve the emission reduction targets of the countries
involved (Government of Japan, 2017b). In the firstnationally determined contribution (NDC) of Japan it
was stated that “the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) is
not included as a basis for bottom-up calculation ofJapan’s emission reduction target, but the amount ofemission reductions and removals acquired by Japan
under the JCM will be appropriately counted as Japan’s
reduction.” This is expected to achieve 50 to 100 million
tCO2 eq of emission reduction by 2030 through JCM
programs undertaken within the government’s annual
budget (Government of Japan, 2015).
Under the JCM, private companies in Japan together
with local companies jointly implement a project bytransferring low-carbon technology, then conservatively
calculate the emission reduction achieved following the
JCM guidelines and issue JCM credits. The JCM is ascheme similar to the Clean Development Mechanism. A
Joint Committee (JC) consisting of representatives fromboth countries takes a role like that of the CDM
Executive Board such as developing rules and guidelines,
approving methodologies and project registration, anddeciding the amount of credit to be issued (Governmentof Japan, 2017c). The governments of both countries
issue credits based on notifications from JC and establish
and maintain a registry. There were 16 projects registered
to the JCM and 105 projects in pipeline as of May 2017.
As business investment costs are the major burden for acompany starting a project, Japan’s government provides
several subsidy programs. One program under the
Ministry of the Environment (MOE) named “JCM Model
Projects” supports a maximum of 50% of the initialinvestment for a JCM project and requires the subsidized
project to deliver back more than 50% of the credit
issued by the project to the government (Asakawa, 2016).
The MOE prepared approximately US$60 million for
FY2017 for this program. REDD+ is within the scope of
the JCM, and guidelines for JCM REDD+ are underdevelopment and to be agreed upon with partnercountries. There were two subsidized projects among the
JCM Model Projects in Laos and Indonesia in 2016.

49

They were the projects with the largest estimatedemission reductions in the subsidy program (Koakutsu etal., 2016).
The distinctive feature of JCM REDD+ is that it
adopts a project-based approach rather than the national
approach that the JCM have followed in the wake of the
CDM. The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and related
decisions in the UNFCCC recognize that REDD+ is
implemented at a national scale, and subnational
activities can be implemented as an interim measure(UN-REDD Programme, 2016). Most of the resultsbased payment mechanisms currently implemented
prefer to adopt a national or jurisdictional (e.g.,
provincial) scale for implementation in line with
UNFCCC decisions. In the cases of JCM REDD+ Model
Projects in Laos and Indonesia, the project proponents
provide technical support for local households in the
project area for changing current agricultural practicesuch as slash and burn cultivation, which was identified
as a deforestation driver. The project areas cover 30,000
ha and 89,000 ha, respectively (GEC, 2016a, 2016b). The
Japanese government’s methodological guidelines draft
for JCM REDD+ provides methods for setting projectspecific reference levels and calculating achieved
emission reductions, although it also accepts national or
sub-national reference levels and monitoring systems if
the partner country submits them to the UNFCCC(Government of Japan, 2017c). The timing of thepayment is a notable point. The JCM provides up-front
payment for the costs of REDD+ activities while otherresults-based payment mechanisms pay for outcomes thatare monitored and verified ex-post. Another remarkablefeature of JCM REDD+ is that the scheme issues credits
and Japan’s government intends to use the credits
allocated to it based on the level of contribution, toachieve Japan’s emission reduction target (NDC). Other
bilateral funding schemes have no intention of issuing or
receiving credits in return.

3. Discussion
3.1 JCM REDD+ Opportunities
JCM REDD+ is based on the CDM scheme andwould be classified as a results-based financing scheme
providing ex-ante payment via market mechanisms. It
supports the initial costs of implementing REDD+
activities. With payment-on-delivery schemes such as the
FCPF Carbon Fund, the host country has to initiate andcover the cost of REDD+ activities. That might lead to
non-participation of lower-income countries or
impoverished subnational regions or socioeconomic
groups (Wong et al., 2016). In an interview we conductedwith a government officer in a country participating in
the FCPF Carbon Fund we learned that it was very
difficult to secure domestic funding for the activity
implementation they had listed in the proposal they had
submitted to the Fund.
The FCPF Carbon fund sets a fixed price for reduced
emissions through negotiations for a purchase agreement

50

M. YAMANOSHITA et al.

with the recipient country in advance, but it would be
difficult to set the price adequately, as the cost ofemission reductions varies even within the same country.
When the set price is low, the REDD+ activities will be
implemented only in areas where the cost is lower thanthe price, and this will often be where forests are least
threatened (Wong et al., 2016). On the other hand,through the JCM REDD+ approach, a project can target
forests with high conservation value or areas that will
create co-benefits from forest protection such as
livelihood improvement for local communities. It is
possible, however, for the emission reduction amountachieved in the project to be much lower than expected.
The investors have to take the risk of emission reduction
activity underperformance, unlike in the case of resultsbased financing with ex-post payment.
Supporting activity implementation on the ground for
REDD+ through projects is important. Even a developed
country can improve and develop legislation andinstitutional arrangements for REDD+ through pastnational level readiness support that may previously
have been insufficient as a measure to prevent
deforestation, especially when the deforestation driver
was linked to livelihood practices of local communities.
For example, if the newly established limits reduce thearea for shifting cultivation per household, direct action
for the local community is absolutely necessary, such as
capacity building for alternative livelihoods and this iswhere JCM REDD+ would be able to contribute. A mix
of up-front and ex-post payment will be required forfinancing of REDD+ (Angelsen, 2017).
Funding sources for results-based REDD+ from thepublic sector have been limited, but JCM REDD+ has
the potential to enhance investment from the private
sector for REDD+. It was reported that 94% of US$30
million in transacted forest carbon offsets to buyers in2015 in the voluntary market was from the private
sector, who rely on a positive reputation to do business(Goldstein & Ruef, 2016). These private companies might
prefer to invest in individual projects rather than be oneof many investors in a large-scale fund for national-scale
REDD+, because it enables them to explain clearly that
their investment contributes to emission reductions
as well as conservation of important forests andimprovements to local society as part of their corporatesocial responsibility.

3.2 Challenges of JCM REDD+
We classified JCM REDD+ as a scheme using market
mechanisms in the previous section, but JCM credits are
not currently tradable (Government of Japan, 2017b),
though discussions to make them tradable are ongoing
among JCM partner countries. Even if they become
tradable, it seems there is no market existing for trading
them, as private Japanese companies have not set any
GHG emission caps. The accelerated progress of JCM
development seems to be backed up by the attractivenessof the government subsidy program, which supports
initial business investments for introducing energy

efficient equipment and requests a share of the credits
generated by the project in return. On the other hand, theREDD+ project has high potential for large emission
reductions but it is not directly linked to companies’
business. Thus, companies’ interest in JCM REDD+
seems to remain rather low. In addition, the subsidy
prepared for JCM REDD+ is limited because the main
source of the subsidy program is the global warming tax,
the use of which is restricted to emission reduction
activities in the energy sector.
Internationally under the UNFCCC, the market
mechanism is recognized as a necessary tool to meet the“2 degree Celsius target,” and Article 6 under the Paris
Agreement allows for the creation of an international
carbon market. The JCM is a cooperative approach
under the article, meeting its important criteria, namely
involvement of internationally transferred mitigation
outcomes (ITMOs) towards NDCs (Koakutsu et al.,2016). The rules for operationalizing Article 6 arecurrently under negotiation, including on their scope,accounting and the nature of the ITMOs (Marcu, 2017).
In terms of REDD+, and JCM REDD+ as well, although
the necessary rules and guidance for implementation
have been determined under the Warsaw Framework for
REDD+ and results-based payment is allowed in Article
5 of the Paris Agreement, it is not yet clear how REDD+
will be treated in discussions on the ITMOs. Future
decisions on the broader architecture of the Paris
Agreement, including NDC accounting and transparency
and cooperative approaches, will have a significant
impact on REDD+ and that is why both developing anddeveloped countries hesitate to mainstream REDD+ intheir climate change policies, especially using resultsbased payment (Graham, 2017). A country like Indonesiathat has a clear, ambitious emission reduction
commitment in the NDC and identifies forest
management as an important sector for reducing
emissions would inevitably be careful about acceptinginternational support for REDD+ involving transfer of
REDD+ outcome. Indonesia, in fact, has yet to sign theletter of intent for the FCPF Carbon Fund, which is thefirst step in the fund’s emission reduction purchaseagreement (FCPF, 2017).
The challenge for developing countries involved in
the ITMOs after relevant decisions are made will beshaping their domestic policies and taking actions toprevent the risk of double counting at the national level.
The JCM has taken measures to prevent such risks in its
scheme by establishing rules, guidelines and a registrysystem. If there are plural mechanisms, however, inwhich some transfer credits within the country and some
do not, the national government has to be able to manage
a centralized registry for reporting their NDCs
adequately. Moreover, registry management may
become complex if the mechanisms adopt different
methodologies. The methodologies of JCM REDD+ and
the FCPF Carbon Fund will differ, for example.
Diversity in approaches to supporting full
implementation of REDD+ will be important. To

Japan’s new initiative for REDD+ results‐based financing

leverage complementary relationships among different
funding schemes, further studies will be required to
identify and compare the strengths and weaknesses ofeach approach and lessons learned from past experience.
That would help identifying the role of JCM REDD+
and ways to coordinate with other financing schemes.

4. Conclusions
The “2 degree Celsius target” will be unachievable if
emission reductions from deforestation remain
unaddressed (Goldstein & Ruef, 2016). More than 100
countries have mentioned REDD+ in their NDCs
(Leonard, 2017), but results-based REDD+ has not yet
been fully operationalized and REDD+ results-based
financing must be scaled up. From our review of
REDD+ in this article, we have to conclude that there
are few contributions JCM REDD+ would immediately
make toward changing the landscape of REDD+ resultsbased financing at the current stage. At the same time,
however, we have also identified the possibility of JCM
REDD+ complementing the existing results-based
funding with payment-on-delivery as it supports theinitial costs of activities linked directly to deforestation
drivers on the ground. As it seeks a market-based
approach, JCM REDD+ has a potential to open up
sources from the private sector. The involvement of theprivate sector has been widely recognized as animportant source of funding for REDD+ but concreate
breakthroughs have yet to occur. To maximize thepotential of JCM REDD+, modalities and guidelines fortransparency and accounting relevant to REDD+ , the
NDCs and ITMOs should be clarified under the Paris
Agreement, and these should not force developing
countries to choose between whether they receive
international support or show ability to comply with
their NDCs. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider new
policy designs in developed countries to enhanceinvestment for preventing deforestation in developing
countries and to scale up REDD+ financing, which has
not been actively discussed in the ODA-dependent
REDD+.
The limitation of this study is that our discussion goesno further than the potential opportunities and challengesof JCM REDD+ as its implications are still undernegotiation with certain JCM partner countries. Further
study on its actual impact will be necessary once theJCM REDD+ project is operationalized.

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GEC (Global Enviromment Centre Fundation) (2016b) JCM REDD+
Project in Luang Prabang Province through Controlling
Slash-and-Burn.
<http://gec.jp/jcm/projects/16redd_lao_01/> (accessed 29
August 2017)
Germany, Norway and United Kingdom (2016) Coordination and
Coherence of Finance for REDD+.
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GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)(2012) REDD Early Movers:Tools and Instruments.
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Finance, Performance, and Non-Carbon Benefits, Center forInternational Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor.

Makino YAMANOSHITADr Makino Yamanoshita has been involved inresearch on forest and climate change mitigation.
She developed a forest carbon project (A/ R
CDM) with local villagers in Vietnam. She
analyzed the complicated mechanism thatprevented participation of local communities in
the project and resulted in increased risk of nonpermanence. She is currently interested in REDD+ and supporting theJapanese government in international REDD+ negotiations.

Hiromitsu SAMEJIMA
Dr. Hiromitsu Samejima has worked for Natural
Resource & Ecosystem Services Area at theInstitute for Global Environmental Strategies since2015. His main research areas are ecology oftropical forests, sustainable forest management, andREDD+ . He got his doctorate in science from
Kyoto University in 2005 and has worked for theMuseum of Nature and Human Activities, Hyogo Prefecture; the Center for
Ecological Studies, the Graduate School of Agriculture and the Center forSoutheast Asian Studies, all at Kyoto University; and the Graduate School ofEngineering at Kyushu University.

Henry SCHEYVENS
Dr. Henry Scheyvens holds a Ph.D. in Political
Science from Monash University and a M.Phil. in
Development Studies from Massey University. He
has taught at several universities in New Zealand,
Australia and Japan. He joined IGES in 2004,
where he now leads the Natural Resources andEcosystems Services Area. His research interests
center around poverty, livelihoods and rights issues. In the past few years, his
research has focused on timber legality and sustainability, participatory forest
mapping and monitoring, REDD+ readiness, and inclusive financial services.

(Received 3 July 2017, Accepted 31 August 2017)

53

Identifying Factors for Promoting Renewable Energy Projects
through the Clean Development Mechanism inChina, India and ASEAN Countries
Akihisa KURIYAMA1 and Minoru MORITA2
1

Climate and Energy Area, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies(IGES),
2108-11, Kamiyamaguchi, Hayama Kanagawa, 240-0115, Japan
2
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University,
1-6-1, Nishiwaseda, Shinjyuku-ku, Tokyo, 169-8050, Japan*email: kuriyama@iges.or.jp

Abstract
This study analysed the greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement cost of renewable energy projects developed
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in China, India and ASEAN countries. The results fromthis study show that the average abatement cost for all renewable energy technology including biomass,hydro, wind and solar renewable energy in ASEAN countries was the highest among these three countries
due to the absence of a “scale of economy,” lower penetration rate of new technology such as PV and wind
power, and lower magnitude of grid emission factors. To encourage the implementation of renewable energy
in ASEAN countries towards a decarbonised economy, the following research topics could be examined in
the future. First, it will be necessary to analyse the “learning curve” for new types of technology, i.e., PV andwind power technology. Second, effective mitigation mechanisms and incentives need to be examinedbecause as the results of this study imply, the magnitude of grid emission factors could affect the abatement
cost and business conditions for investments in renewable energies through mitigation mechanisms. Lastly, it
is important to discuss the overall policy arrangements since ASEAN countries implement not only feed-intariffs for renewable energy, but also subsidies for fossil fuels, which provide some advantages to fossil-fuelpower plants and affect estimations of CO2 abatement costs. Apparently, climate policies interact so closelywith energy policies that it is worth proposing comprehensive climate and energy policies with analyticalinsights into energy-related technologies and policies in ASEAN countries.
Key words: abatement cost, ASEAN, China, India, renewable energy, scale of economy

1. Introduction
In December 2015, the Conference of Parties (COP)
adopted the Paris Agreement to strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change, aiming to keep
the global temperature rise this century to well within
two degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels. The Paris
Agreement requires all countries including developing
countries to make their best efforts to implement
mitigation actions through nationally determined
contributions (NDCs).
Among the developing countries, China and India
emitted 9.1 billion tonnes and 2.0 billion tonnes of CO2,
respectively, from fossil fuel combustion in 2014,
accounting for 34% of the world’s total CO2 emissions
from fossil fuel combustion in 2015. Also, among the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia had GHG
Global Environmental Research
21/2017: 053–059
printed in Japanemissions positioned within world’s top 30 (World Bank,2015). Furthermore, the final energy consumption of thewhole ASEAN region is expected to increase by 2.2%
per annum, which indicates an increase from 549 Mtoe
in 2011 to 1,004 Mtoe in 2035. The Asian Development
Bank (ADB) (2013) has forecasted the amount ofelectricity generation to increase to 1,879 TWh in 2035
from 696 TWh in 2011, which indicates a 4.2% annual
increase. In particular, it is expected that the use of coal
will increase in Viet Nam, the Philippines and Lao PDR
which have not used fossil fuels as electricity sources in
the past (ADB, 2013). Therefore, it is important to takethe best actions for mitigation in the electricity sector,
especially in ASEAN countries, in order to achieve theultimate goal of the Paris Agreement.
Until the end of the first commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol in 2012, the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), which is a baseline and credit©2017 AIRIES54

A. KURIYAMA and M. MORITA

Number of registered projects

1,200
1,000

Other
Industrial gas

800

Biomass
600

MethaneEnergy Efficiency

400

Hydro power
2000PV, etc
Wind power2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Fig. 1 Annual estimated emission reductions through CDM project activities, categorised by project type and project starting date.
Source: author, based on IGES (2014).

mechanism in developing countries authorised under the
Kyoto Protocol, provided significant incentives topromote mitigation measures in developing countries.
By the end of May 2014, the CDM had registered 7,490
projects and issued 1.5 billion tons of certified emission
reductions (CERs) (IGES, 2016).
Figure 1 illustrates trends of annually estimatedemission reductions through CDM projects. As shown in
Fig. 1, project developers promoted energy efficiency
CDM projects mainly for waste heat recovery,hydropower generation, methane recovery andavoidance, and fossil fuel substitution by using biomass
and industrial gases such as HFC and N2O from 2004 to
2007. From 2007 onwards, registration of those projecttypes has become less active, while renewable energy
project types such as wind power and photovoltaic
power have increased. As a result, renewable energy
projects accounted for 64% of the total registeredprojects that had been developed by 2014. In particular,
China and India hosted 60% and 27% of those renewableenergy projects, respectively. This indicates that China
and India hosted 38% and 17%, respectively, of all CDM
projects. This result can be explained by looking at thebusiness incentives for CDM project developers. In
other words, most project developers were interested ina project that would bring a higher profit, or in a country
where the business market could be expected to expand.
Regarding the attractiveness of the investment for hostcountries, Jung (2006) evaluated the potential of CDM
project formulations from three aspects: reduction
potential in each country, institutional framework in hostcountries, and investment in climate change. Among
Asian countries, Jung (2006) concluded the assessment
for China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia andMalaysia was “very attractive” or “attractive.” Oleschak& Springer (2011) also evaluated the attractiveness ofproject investments in the host countries from three
aspects: the institutional framework for the Kyoto

100%
80%
60%

12%
4%
11%

29%
6%
13%

40%
20%
0%

China

73%

53%
Share of CO2 emissions
from power sector
India

ASEAN

Share of CER issuancefrom renewableenergy projects
Other non-Annex B countries

Fig. 2 CO2 emissions in the electricity sector and CER issuancestatus of renewable energy projects.
Source: author, based on IEA (2014a), IGES(2016).

Mechanism, legal regulations in host countries, andeconomic activity. As a result, India was evaluated as
the most attractive country for investment by project
developers, with China in second place. Winkelman and
Moore (2011) also state that total GHG emissions, theemission intensity of the economy, domestic humancapital and increased electricity demand are importantfactors in hosting a CDM project.
Indeed, ASEAN countries including Indonesia,
Thailand and Viet Nam have a high potential to host a
considerable number of CDM projects because thosecountries have sufficient institutional capacity and a huge
potential for GHG emissions reduction owing to therapid increase in economic activity. However, as Fig. 2
shows, CERs in the electricity sector have not been
issued there in contrast to India and China when it
comes to considering the ASEAN countries’ share of
CO2 emissions in the power sector. A possilble factor
hindering the development of CDM projects in thosecountries could be high GHG abatement and transaction
costs in ASEAN countries since, generally speaking, theIdentifying Factors for Promoting Renewable Energy Projects through the CDM in ASEAN Countries

cost issue is one of the major concerns for CDM project
developers. This study, however, focuses solely on
analysing GHG abatement costs because the transaction
costs for renewable energy projects account for only
14.4% of the total (Michaelowa & Jotzo, 2003).
As shown in Equation (1), the CO2 abatement cost
per ton can be calculated by dividing the abatement costby the amount of emission reductions (Rahman et al.,2009). The abatement cost is defined as the difference
between the baseline cost and the project cost, andemission reduction is identified by the difference
between baseline emissions and project emissions.

55

literature, Rahman et al. (2012) define the abatement cost
as the difference between the project cost and baseline
cost, charged for supplying the same amount ofelectricity in the absence of the renewable energy
technology proposed under the CDM. In particular,
Castro and Michaelowa (2010) and Wetzelaer and Linden(2007) define the baseline cost as the net present value ofelectricity sales, and the project cost as the net present
value consisting of investment costs and operation costs.
When project developers calculate the net present value,
they can usually use the discount rate as a value for theirbusiness. Therefore, this study follows the same approach
identifying theabatement cost of CDM projects using
Projecttocost-Baseline
cost(1)
Average GHG emission abatement costthebenchmarkrate
Baseline emissoin-Project emissionas shown in Equation (2). GHG
emission
reductions
arereferred
to by the numbers
cost-Baseline
Project Projectcost-Baseline
cost cost(1)
n abatement
cost
described
in
each
PDD.
Using
the
project
period outlined
(1)
ment
cost
emissoin-Projectemission
BaselineBaseline
emissoin-Projectemissionin the PDDs, emission reductions during the assessment
The cost of a CDM project consists of investment
period are calculated using Equation (3). The duration
costs and operating costs for the project. The baseline
used in evaluating the net present value is same as thecost is defined as the cost of generating electricity using
project period for each project.
conventional power plants that would be operated in theabsence of the CDM. For a renewable energy project,
the baseline cost is defined as the selling price ofelectricity (Rahman et al., 2012). The effect of(3)
technological innovation can also be considered, in which
where “t” denotes the year of the project activity
the cost of GHG reduction falls in proportion to thestarting date, “n” represents the project period, “i” denotes
decrease in the cost of the project. (Lantz et al., 2012;ith project serial number, and “r” indicates the discount
IEA, 2014b).
rate defined by the value of the benchmark described in
A review of past studies reveals that there are few
the PDDs. “ACi” represents the net present value of GHG
studies analysing the CO2 abatement costs using data
abatement costs without social costs for project i.
from actual projects in China, India and ASEAN“OMCi,t” denotes the operation cost of project i at time t,
countries. Rahman et al. (2012) calculated the GHG“FCi,t” represents the fuel costs of project i at time t,
abatement cost for all CDM projects that had been
“OTCi,t” represents other costs of project i at time t, suchregistered up to 2011 in Annex B countries but which
as water usage rights and insurance. “IEi,t” represents
did not have any focus on ASEAN countries. Simon etincome from electricity sales of project i at time t.
al. (2016) investigated the abatement cost structure of
For projects which do not provide a benchmark value,
CDM projects in India. Therefore, this study analyses
this study uses the lending interest rate given by the World
the reasons ASEAN countries failed to harness a
Bank (2015). To collect cost data, this study examines
considerable number of CDM projects compared to theireach PDD that is made available on the UNFCCC
mitigation potentials, from the two perspectives of “scale
website. Since the PDDs provide cost data using severalof economy,” which causes the average cost of
currencies, this study unified all the cost data into USD
producing something to fall as the volume of its output
for the year 2013 using the exchange rate and consumer
increases, and renewable energy technology type. The
price index provided by the World Bank (2015). Table 1
discussion section analyses possible impact by level ofsummarises the basic statistics for all the data.
grid emission factors.
“Abatement Cost” indicates the GHG abatement
Section 2 introduces data preparation for projectcost. “Abatement” denotes the amount of emission
costs and abatement costs. Section 3 discusses the
reduction during the project period. “Biomass,” “pv_analytical approach, Section 4 describes the analyticalsolar” and “wind” represent the dummy variables ofresults, Section 5 draws conclusions and discusses them,biomass power, PV or solar power and wind powerand Section 6 remarks on prospects for further studies.
projects, respectively. The numbers for 2006 to 2012
denote the dummy variables for each year. “Project
2. Data
Duration” indicates project operation period. “India” andThis study developed data for analysing CO2“ASEAN” denote the country dummy variables.
abatement costs for renewable energy projects under the
CDM, based on the information used in the investment
analysis to demonstrate additionality. This information isprovided in the project design documents (PDDs) for
each renewable energy project. In a review of existing

56

A. KURIYAMA and M. MORITA

Table 1 Summary statistics.
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Abatement
Cost

3381

15.4

1.32

2.6

20.1

Abatement
(Log)

3842

14.1

1.11

10.0

18.3

biomass

3895

0.1

0.23

0.0

1.0

pv_solar

3895

0.0

0.19

0.0

1.0

wind

3895

0.5

0.50

0.0

1.0

2006

3895

0.1

0.29

0.0

1.0

2007

3895

0.1

0.33

0.0

1.0

2008

3895

0.1

0.33

0.0

1.0

2009

3895

0.1

0.33

0.0

1.0

2010

3895

0.2

0.36

0.0

1.0

2011

3895

0.2

0.39

0.0

1.0

2012

3895

0.1

0.31

0.0

1.0

Project
Duration
(Log)

3895

3.1

0.19

1.9

3.9

India

3895

0.2

0.40

0.0

1.0

ASEAN

3895

0.1

0.27

0.0

1.0

3. Methodology
The cost function for emissions abatement throughCDM refers to existing studies on pollution abatement
costs. Hartman et al. (1997), Goldar, et al. (2001), andRahman et al. (2012) note that the abatement costs ofprojects under pollution control can be explained by the
first and second powers of emission reduction ofpollutants as shown in Equations (4) and (5). If thecoefficient of the second power of emission reductions
is negative, the result can imply that the abatement costhas a scale of economy.
(4)(5)
where “ACi” denotes the abatment cost (USD)
derived by Equation (2), “Ai” represents the amount ofemission reduction during the project period (tCO2),“Xi” denotes explanatory variables and “εi” denotes theerror term.

4. Estimation Results for Abatement Costs in
China, India and ASEAN Countries
Table 2 presents the estimation results of this study.
Model 1 shows the results for all of the countries
including China, India and ASEAN countries. The
coefficient of abatement is positive at a significancelevel of 1% while the coefficient of squared abatement
is negative at a significance level of 5% . This result
implies that abatement costs in all of the countries havea scale of economy. All the models include the dummy

variables of project types, which enable us to discuss theimpact of cost increases compared to the base project.
Hydropower is selected as the base project because it is
the only the type of renewable energy technology that is
widely implemented across the regions in this study.
Regarding abatement cost differences by project type,abatement costs for biomass power, PV and solar
thermal power (hereinafter, solar) and wind power CDM
projects are around 30%, 16% and 64% higher than thecost of hydropower projects, respectively. Considering
the effect of the project starting year, the abatement costhas increased over the years. Looking at the country’s
effect on CO2 abatement costs, the abatement cost of a
CDM project in India is 12－16% higher than in China.
On the other hand, the abatement cost in ASEAN is
estimated to be 47－48% lower than in China. This result
is consistent with the consequences of investment in
CDM projects, whereby China and India host a large
number of CDM projects and ASEAN countries have
had less investment through the CDM despite their
mitigation potential as discussed in Section 1.
Models 2, 3 and 4 show the country-specific results.
For China, the coefficient of abatement in Model 2.1 isestimated to be 0.745 at a 1% significance level. In
Model 2.2, however, the coefficient of abatement andsquared abatement are not significant. This result
implies that renewable energy projects in the CDM
did not have a scale of economy. The cost of biomass,solar and wind power projects in China are 103－106%,
181－183% and 71－73% higher than the cost of hydropower
projects, respectively. The abatement costs of renewableenergy projects have been continuously increasing over
the years.
For India, the coefficient of abatement in Model 3.1
is estimated to be 0.985 at a 1% significance level. Also,in Model 3.2 the coefficient of abatement is 1.941 at 1%
significance levels while the coefficient of squared
abatement is －0.036 at 5% significance levels. This result
implies that renewable energy projects in India have ascale of economy effect. The cost of biomass power is52－55% lower than the cost of hydropower plants, while
the cost of solar and wind power plants are 97－100 and
42% higher than the cost of hydropower plants,
respectively. Regarding the dummy variable of a
project’s starting year, variables for 2007, 2008 and 2011are positively significant. The weak trend of increasing
CO2 abatement costs as years pass is consistent with paststudies conducted by Simon et al. (2016)
Regarding ASEAN countries, the results do notindicate a scale of economy effect. This can be seen inin Model 4.2, where neither the coefficients of abatement
nor squared abatement are significant. Compared to theresults in China and India, the abatement costs of solar
and wind power plants in ASEAN countries are morethan 200% higher compared to the cost of hydropower
plants. This result implies that solar and wind power in
ASEAN countries are still much more costly thanconventional renewable technology such as hydropowerand biomass power. Unlike the results for China and57

Identifying Factors for Promoting Renewable Energy Projects through the CDM in ASEAN Countries
Table 2 Estimation results for all countries and by country.
Abatement Cost
(Log)
Abatement (Log)
Squared Abatement (Log)
Renewable Energy Dummies:
biomass
pv & solar
wind
Project’s Start Year:
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 and After
Project Duration (Log)
India
ASEAN
_cons
Number of obs.
Adjusted R2

ALL (Model 1)
Model 1.1
Model 1.2
Coef.
Coef.
0.868 ***
1.446 ***
(0.02)(0.23)－-0.021 **(0.01)CHINA (Model 2)
Model 2.1
Model 2.2
Coef.
Coef.
0.745 ***
0.081
(0.03)(0.48)
0.023(0.02)INDIA (Model 3)
Model 3.1
Model 3.2
Coef.
Coef.
0.985 ***
1.941 ***
(0.03)(0.39)－-0.036 **(0.02)

ASEAN (Model 4)Model 4.1
Model 4.2
Coef.
Coef.
0.933 ***
1.006
(0.05)(0.81)－-0.003(0.03)

0.312 ***
(0.10)
1.630 ***
(0.17)
0.642 ***
(0.04)

0.294 ***
(0.10)
1.609 ***
(0.17)
0.642 ***
(0.04)

1.026 ***
(0.08)
1.834 ***
(0.27)
0.706 ***
(0.05)

1.055 ***
(0.08)
1.811 ***
(0.28)
0.733 ***
(0.05)－-0.518 ***(0.14)
0.995 ***
(0.28)
0.417 ***
(0.13)－-0.545 ***(0.14)
0.974 ***
(0.27)
0.415 ***
(0.13)－-0.040(0.46)
2.183 ***
(0.26)
2.069 ***
(0.26)－-0.043(0.47)
2.182 ***
(0.26)
2.064 ***
(0.27)

0.112(0.09)
0.183 **
(0.08)
0.228 ***
(0.08)
0.337 ***
(0.08)
0.410 ***
(0.08)
0.442 ***
(0.08)
0.348 ***
(0.09)－-0.390 ***(0.14)－-0.161 ***(0.05)
0.478 ***
(0.07)
3.699 ***
(0.39)

0.108(0.09)
0.182 **
(0.08)
0.232 ***
(0.08)
0.346 ***
(0.08)
0.410 ***
(0.08)
0.436 ***
(0.08)
0.341 ***
(0.09)－-0.336 **(0.15)－-0.118 **(0.06)
0.472 ***
(0.07)－-0.524(1.75)
3,360
0.61

0.077
(0.10)
0.141(0.10)
0.202 **
(0.09)
0.497 ***
(0.09)
0.516 ***
(0.09)
0.485 ***
(0.08)
0.430 ***
(0.09)
0.214(0.18)-

0.080(0.10)
0.141(0.10)
0.197 **
(0.09)
0.495 ***
(0.09)
0.515 ***
(0.09)
0.487 ***
(0.08)
0.429 ***
(0.09)
0.217(0.18)-

0.291(0.21)
0.380 **
(0.19)
0.444 **
(0.18)
0.259(0.18)
0.327 *
(0.19)
0.557 ***
(0.19)
0.186(0.21)－-1.340 ***(0.31)-

0.293(0.21)
0.401 **
(0.19)
0.477 **
(0.19)
0.283(0.18)
0.339 *
(0.19)
0.574 ***
(0.19)
0.208(0.21)－-1.277 ***(0.32)-－-0.170(0.44)－-0.193(0.43)－-0.055(0.51)－-0.135(0.46)－-0.015(0.41)－-0.221(0.44)－-0.141(0.47)－-0.302(0.38)-－-0.169(0.44)－-0.192(0.43)－-0.055(0.51)－-0.135(0.46)－-0.014(0.41)－-0.221(0.44)－-0.142(0.48)－-0.306(0.40)
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.61

3.510 ***
(0.45)
0.52

8.366 **
(3.55)
2,403
0.52

5.130 ***
(1.06)
0.61－-1.287(3.01)
697
0.61

3.337 **
(1.31)
0.62

260

2.828
(5.35)
0.61

Note: Each model shows the results both with and without the variable of Squared Abatement (Log). For all models, the base technology is hydropower.
For Models 1.1 and 1.2, the base country is China.

India, none of the year variables of ASEAN countries
were significant, meaning that the abatement costs in
ASEAN countries have not increased over the years.

5. Discussion and Limitations of This Study
As discussed above, mitigation by renewable energy
projects under the CDM was higher than the costs in
China and India. Three reasons can be considered forthis result. First, scale of economy could have resulted
in the lower CO2 abatement costs of renewable energy
projects in India. Indeed, India has the lowest average
abatement cost for the whole country among the threegroups. On the other hand, only the coefficients ofabatement are significant for China and ASEAN
counties. Furthermore, while China’s coefficient is
0.745, the coefficient of ASEAN is 0.955 which implies
that abatement costs increase in proportion to increased
abatement. This result could indicate that CDM project
developers in ASEAN countries have been unable tobenefit from scale of economy.
Second, the incremental cost of ASEAN’s wind andPV technology compared to hydropower plants is larger
than that of the incremental costs in China and India.
The results from our empirical model show that the costof wind power technology in India is only 42% higher
than the cost of hydropower plants. On the contrary, thecost of wind technology in ASEAN countries is 207%
greater than the cost of hydropower plants. Similarly, thecost of solar technology in ASEAN countries is higher
than the cost in China and India. This result could be
explained by the fact that CDM project developers have
implemented a large number of solar and wind power
projects in these two countries. In fact, China had hosted
1,427 wind power projects and 118 solar projects by
2014. India had hosted 570 wind power projects and 20
solar projects by 2014. Therefore, China and India could
benefit from the “learning curve” from suchtechnological innovation, which has contributed to a
reduction in the initial cost of renewable energy
technologies.
Third, the grid emission factor of ASEAN countries
is lower than those in India and China. In fact, thebaseline emissions of renewable energy projects which

58

A. KURIYAMA and M. MORITA

displace electricity from electricity grids are obtained bymultiplying the amount of electricity generation (MWh)by the grid emission factor (tCO2/MWh). For example,
the average grid emission factors in China and India are
0.90 tCO2/MWh and 0.88 tCO2/MWh, respectively, which
are higher than those of other CDM project hostcountries according to data from IGES (2015). On theother hand, the grid emission factors of Indonesia, Viet
Nam and Thailand are 0.76 tCO2/MWh, 0.56 tCO2/MWh
and 0.55 tCO2/ MWh, respectively, which are mid orlower level among the host countries. The differences ingrid emission factors among China, India and ASEAN
countries mean that CDM project developers in China
and India gain 1.6 times the CERs compared to ASEAN
countries even though they generate the same amount ofelectricity by renewable energy. Thus, even if the power
generation costs per kilowatt hour are at the same level
among those countries, CO2 abatement costs fromrenewable energy are not uniform owing to differencesin GHG emission reductions. While the magnitude ofgrid emission factors could have a significant impact on
the abatement costs of renewable energy, there is no
sophisticated method for identifying grid emission
factors, and in fact there is room for improvement. In
fact, Hawkes (2014) pointed out that quantification of
CO2 emissions from electricity use is usuallyaccomplished using short-run emission factors, but theseshort-run factors do not take account of structuralchanges in power systems. He also suggested that
long-run marginal emission factors need to be analysed
to quantify CO2 emissions. In particular, although the“tool to calculate the emission factor for an electricity
system” (UNFCCC, 2013) takes into account structuralchanges in the electricity system, it does not consider
how the newly-built or avoided power stations would
have operated in the absence of the CDM. Harmsen andGraus (2013) pointed out that an average CO2 intensity
approach cannot be used to estimate future electricity
savings in situations where the change in both electricity
generation and the emission intensity occur
simultaneously. In this case, they recommend applying amarginal CO2 intensity approach with a scenario-based
analysis.
Indeed, the result of our model also supports the factthat ASEAN countries have enormous potential to
implement renewable energy because the abatement
costs using renewable energy technology in China andIndia have increased over the years while the cost in
ASEAN countries has not increased. Also, as discussed
above, if the project costs of renewable energy decrease
further owing to the scale of economy, or methods for
identifying CO2 emission reduction from electricity use
are improved to take into account possible increases offossil-fuel power plants, then the abatement costs ofrenewable energy in ASEAN countries would decrease.

6. Prospects for Climate and Renewable
Energy Policies in ASEAN Countries
In this concluding section, this study identifies
possible research topics to be examined in the future.
First, it would be interesting to examine the learning
effect or learning curve of a new type of technology, e.g.,
PV and wind power technology. As predicted by various
research (Taylor, et al., 2015), the levelised cost ofelectricity (LCOE) for that technology would be lower
than for conventional power plants. However, there arestill few studies on how technology has been developed
using actual data.
Second, an effective mitigation mechanism thatprovides appropriate incentives in line with long-termemission reduction goals needs to be examined. The
results of this study imply that the degree of the gridemission factor could affect the abatement costadvantage. The limitation of current grid emission
factors, however, is that they can only reflect historical
CO2 emissions or short-term trends in electricity sectors
as discussed in Section 5. The number of fossil fuelfired power plants, including coal-fired power
technology, however, is expected to increase in ASEAN
countries. In this case, the mitigation impact by
renewable energy could be higher if it takes into accountlong-term energy forecasts. Therefore, an appropriate
method that promotes renewable energy technology at
an early stage as possible needs to be considered tofulfill the two-degree target, which is the ultimate
objective of the Paris Agreement.
Third, it is necessary to discuss a comprehensive
policy framework. In order to calculate CO2 abatement
costs in this study, the abatement cost was defined as thedifference between project and baseline costs. The
baseline cost was determined by the electricity sales,consisting of electricity generation and tariffs. In fact,
those elements could be affected by certain energy
policy interventions. For example, if a government
implemented feed-in tariffs, the baseline cost would
increase. As a consequence, the abatement cost would
decrease. On the other hand, some ASEAN countries
have introduced fossil fuel subsidies for energy,
especially for oil prices. In this case, the fuel cost forelectricity generation is lower than that of business-asusual. As a consequence, the electricity price is lower
than the normal level, and tariffs for electricity also
decrease. In this case, though, abatement costs increase.
Above all, the mitigation costs of renewable energy
depend on the level of technology development, thedesign of mitigation mechanisms and incentives, andpolicy arrangements. Renewable energy for ASEAN
countries, however, is critical for achieving adecarbonising society, so the development of thesetechnologies should be constantly promoted with stablepolicy support. For that reason, a policy proposal basedon analytical policy research and fundamental policy
discussion would have a significant impact on promotionof steady mitigation actions in ASEAN countries.

Identifying Factors for Promoting Renewable Energy Projects through the CDM in ASEAN Countries

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Akihisa KURIYAMA
Akihisa Kuriyama obtained his master’s degree inJapan from the Graduate School of Science andEngineering(International
Development
Engineering), Tokyo Institute of Technology on
environmental economics and econometrics.
After that, he worked for IGES to implement
capacity building programs for mitigation
activities in Asian countries inlcuding Cambodia, Lao PDR, the Philippines
and Indonesia. He also conducts quantitative research on the Kyoto
mechanisms and CO2 emissions from the electricity sector.

Minoru MORITA
Minoru Morita obtained his Ph.D. in Economics
from Sophia University in Japan. Currently, he is anassistant professor in the Faculty of Political
Science and Economics at Waseda University. His
research interests include climate change policies,
energy policies and indoor air pollution indeveloping countries.

(Received 2 June 2017, Accepted 22 August 2017)

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ヒ素の地圏－水圏－生物圏における循環：そのメカニズムから対策まで
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IGBP Activities and Results in Japan
Hajime KAYANNE
Vol. 2 No. 1 / 1998

IGAC Activities in Japan

Title

Mountain Environments and Human
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Studies on the Recent Glacial
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Teiji WATANABE

Teiji WATANABE

Vol. 10 No. 1 / 2006

Hajime AKIMOTO

Vol. 16 No. 2 / 2012

Global Environmental Change andHuman HealthVol. 10 No. 2 / 2006

Global Warming and Its Impacts

Ecosystem Services Assessment of theSatoyama and Satoumi for aNatureHarmonious Society

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Hideo HARASAWA

Masataka WATANABE

Vol. 11 No. 1 / 2007

Vol. 17 No. 1 / 2013

Masatoshi YOSHINO

Mikiko KAINUMA

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Recent Counter-measure for
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Satoshi MATSUMOTO
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Weather Forecasting for Health andSociety

Pathways towards Low-Carbon
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Rice Production in Monsoon Asia
Masatoshi YOSHINO

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Vol. 17 No. 2 / 2013

Acid Rain

Principles and Practice of Ecological
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Izumi WASHITANITomomi INOUEKey Studies on Tropical Mangrove
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Ecology and Conservation of Migratory
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Progress in Human Dimension
Research of Global Change in Asia

Vol. 18 No. 1 / 2014

Emerging Threats Posed by Infectious
Diseases Transmitted fromWildlife

Impacts of the Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami on Human
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Akio YAMADA/Hiroyoshi HIGUCHI

Hiroyoshi HIGUCHIVol. 12 No. 1 / 2008

Syuzo NISHIOKA
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Traditional Sustainable Ecosystem‘SATOYAMA’ and BiodiversityCrisis inJapan: Conservation Ecological Perspective
Izumi WASHITANI

Vol. 18 No. 2 / 2014
Vol. 12 No. 2 / 2008

Ecotourism and Global Change

Trends and Directions of Land Change
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Masatoshi YOSHINO

Teiji WATANABE / Hideaki SHIBATA

Vol. 13 No. 1 / 2009Vol. 19 No. 1 / 2015

Masami IRIKI

Hisao OHTAKE / Kazuyo MATSUBAE /Masaru YARIME

Vol. 6 No. 1 / 2002

Global Warming and Sustainable Useof Mountain Resources in Asia
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New Horizons in Global Environmental
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Sustainable Use of Phosphorus in Asia

Vol. 6 No. 2 / 2002

Volcanic Ashes and Their Soils
Satoshi MATSUMOTO

Biological Uniqueness andConservation of Island Ecosystems

Wind Disaster Risk and Global
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Yukio TAMURA/Masatoshi YOSHINO

20 1-122 2016

20 No.1&2/2016

Vol.

Vol. 8 No. 1 / 2004

Toshiya OKURO

Invasive Alien Species Problems in Japan :Present Status andCountermeasures【II】

Atoll Islands

Vol. 14 No. 2 / 2010

Education for Sustainable Development :
Promises and Challenges
Frans LENGLET / Zinaida FADEEVA/
Yoko MOCHIZUKI

Vol. 15 No. 1 / 2011

Biomass Burning and Its Impacts on
Earth’s Environment【II】Studies on Impact of Climate

Haruo TSURUTA/Kenji FUKUYAMA

Masatoshi YOSHINO
Vol. 9 No. 2 / 2005

Vol. 15 No. 2 / 2011

Hiroyuki MATSUDA

Akiyo YATAGAI

Conservation and Management of
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Radioactive Environmental Pollution fromthe Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident
and Measures towards Recovery– Advances in Environmental Research –Toshimasa OHARA et al.

Vol.20 No.1&2/2016

21：1-64（2017）

Hajime KAYANNE

Change Related to APN

Cesium 137

Vol. 20 No. 1&2 / 2016

2432-7484

Izumi WASHITANI
Vol. 9 No. 1 / 2005
【 I 】Sustainable Land Management of

Vol.20 No.1&2/2016

Hiroyoshi HIGUCHIVol. 8 No. 2 / 2004

Radioactive Environmental Pollution fromthe Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident and
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Desertification Control and Restoration of
Ecosystem Services in Northeast Asia

Izumi WASHITANITransformation towards Sustainability
under the Sustainable DevelopmentGoals

2432-7484

Vol. 7 No. 2 / 2003

Invasive Alien Species Problems in Japan :Present Status andCountermeasures【 I 】

Vol. 19 No.2 / 2015

Norichika KANIE/Mari KOSAKA

Vol.19Vol.19 No.2/2015
No.2/2015

Naoki KACHI

Conflict between Crows and Humans in
Urban Areas

No.2/2015
No.2/2015

Vol.19 No.2/2015

Vol. 7 No. 1 / 2003

19
19

Vol.
Vol.

Transformation
Transformation towards
towards
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Sustainable
Development
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Vol. 13 No. 2 / 2009

Precipitation Products: Development andApplication to ClimateChange Studies

21 No.1＆2/2017

Vol.

Perspectives on Climate Change Researchin Japan after the Paris Agreement :International Negotiations, Technologies
and Countermeasures, Plus Adaptation

Vol. 21 No. 1&2 / 2017

Perspectives on Climate Change Researchin Japan after the Paris Agreement :International Negotiations, Technologies andCountermeasures, Plus Adaptation
Hideo HARASAWA

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