『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号

2017 年

Infant industry argument for trade protection andJapanese automotive industrial policy
Toshihiro ATSUMI
Faculty of Economics
Meiji Gakuin University

1．Introduction
The infant industry argument for trade protection has a long history. In this research note, I
review the Japanese experience on the development of the nation’s postwar era automotive industry
from 1945 to the 1970s. Although the focus is on policy, I offer data that may be relevant to examine
whether the Japanese experience can be considered as a case for the infant industry argument for
trade protection.

2．The infant industry argument for trade protection
The original ideas behind infant industry trade protection are found in the writings of John
Stuart Mill, a nineteenth century English philosopher and economist, who argued that providing temporary protection to an infant (undeveloped) industry can be beneficial because it allows the industry
space to gain competitiveness and become more efficient, and thus eventually stand on its own andcompete against foreign products without the protection. The idea has been attractive to authorities
in developing countries wishing to catch up with the more industrialized countries.
Suppose that there is no domestic supply of automobiles because production costs are too highcompared to world price. Automobiles, therefore, are all imported. Now suppose that the government
decides to take on a protection policy and imposes a tariff on imported automobiles. Then the domestic price that the consumers face will rise. If the tariff makes the corresponding rise in the domestic165

『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号

price high enough, it will promote domestic supply. As is well known, however, this leads to losses in
consumer welfare that outweighs the sum of producer surplus gain and tariff revenue. The net loss
is the dead weight loss. If the protection takes the form of import quotas, there will be no tariff revenues, and importers earn rents instead. As in the tariff case, however, by harming consumers, imposing quotas on imports also leads to dead weight losses, which can be worse when resources are used
to capture rents. This is the standard argument about the consequences of such trade protection.
The infant industry argument, however, goes on to say that, during protection, the domestic
producers gain experience and efficiency over time through the production of automobiles such thatits supply curve shifts outward. Then the quota/tariff protection can be lifted to eliminate the deadweight losses, and in addition, domestic supply implies some producer surplus. Theoretically, protection policy can be justified if the producer surplus generated later outweighs the dead weight losses
during protection.

3．Postwar development of the Japanese automobile industry
3.1

Background and initial status
Before the Second World War, Japan gained some experience in automobiles through the pro-duction of military trucks and other commercial vehicles such as buses. Production of passenger vehicles was limited. After the war began, companies such as Toyota, which had started passenger car
production, were ordered by the government to concentrate on military and commercial vehicle production instead.
Automobile imports to Japan immediately after the war were mostly for the Occupation Armyand related personnel. This was because of a regulation with such a restriction that was in place until 1952. The route for Japanese to obtain cars was to purchase used cars from them, although demand was limited because of the poor economic situation of most Japanese.
The supply of passenger cars in 1951 is estimated as follows. The total supply to the Japanesewas 5,248 vehicles, of which 3,598 were domestically produced. The remaining 1,650 were supplied as
used cars that the Occupation Army had sold to the Japanese. The Occupation Army was basically
exempt from foreign currency control and tariffs (described in the next subsection) and imported
3,981 passenger cars that year, in addition to the cars that they brought in themselves. Therefore,
the amount of passenger cars imported to Japan exceeded domestic production.
3.2

Policies taken by MITI

Policies until the 1950 s
Japanese imports in the aftermath of the Second World War were tightly controlled by the166

Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy

government due to the nation’s low foreign currency reserves. It was considered that automobile imports were wasting Japan’s monetary reserves at a time when the authorities were desperate to preserve them. Government approval of foreign currency allocation was required in order for the private sector to import goods from abroad. This effectively put a cap on imports. Specifically, foreign
currency quotas for automobile imports were set every six months; these are shown in table 1 andfigure 1. As indicated in figure 1, it was not until the 1960s that the cap was gradually lifted.

Table 1.

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962

Foreign currency allocation to automotive imports (unit: $1,000)

Cars (CBU)

Repair parts

Knocked-downparts (CKD)

Motorcycles andrepair parts

Total   6009,380
8,750
12,665
13,735   612   922
1,500
1,818
1,553
2,236
5,125
8,226
12,560

   ―
   ―
   ―
   ―
   ―
1,971
3,672
3,372
1,784
2,392
2,400
2,785
   ―
   ―

   ―
   ―
   ―
1,170
4,094
4,729
3,890
2,618
  480
   ―
   ―
   ―
   ―
   ―

―
―
―
―
―
105
―
282
321
401
422
528
―
―

   6009,380
8,750
13,835
17,829
7,417
8,484
7,772
4,403
4,346
5,058
8,438
8,226
12,560Source: Keizaihyoronsha, various years

Figure 1.

Foreign currency allocation to automobile imports (unit: $1,000)

50,00040,00030,00020,000Source: JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

167

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

1962

1961

1960

1959

1958

1957

1956

1955

1954

0

1953

10,000『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号

In addition to the foreign currency quota, tariffs were imposed on automotive imports, including parts. For example, 40% and 30% tariffs were levied on passenger vehicles and engines, respectively.
Liberalization process of the automotive sector
In 1962, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) set up a passenger
vehicle policy committee, and formally began to consider trade liberalization in the automotive sector. In December 1962, the committee concluded that auto imports should be liberalized by the endof fiscal 1964 (March 1965), and preparations would be necessary to improve the international competitiveness of the Japanese passenger vehicle industry. Such preparations included establishing domestic passenger vehicle production and strengthening the sales and distribution system of the industry.
MITI, in response to the committeeʼs recommendations, advised Japanese automakers to reduce passenger car prices. It also announced that the foreign currency allocation system for auto imports will be modified so that currency would be allocated upon request, rather than under a fixed
quota system for the first and the second halves of every year. In addition, MITI announced thatconcessional government loans would be offered to Japanese automakers that planned to merge withother Japanese manufacturers to increase production scales.
Further, in September 1964, MITI requested the Japanese auto manufacturers to 1) cooperatewith domestic companies, and refrain from forming alliances with foreign companies and from bringing in foreign capital, and 2) price car parts properly, and cooperate with each other to enable mass
production of parts.
Also in 1964, as previously announced, the foreign currency quota on automotive imports wasincreased drastically, which meant that the Japanese passenger vehicle market was essentially liberalized, in the sense that the general public could import as many automobiles as they could afford.
Sakurauchi, the Minister of MITI at the time, announced that the passenger vehicle market of Japan
would be liberalized on September 1, 1965. After a one month delay, passenger vehicle import wasliberalized on October 1, 1965 by the abolition of the quota system.
It should be noted that, at this point, liberalization only affected assembled passenger vehicles,
and import restrictions on engines, major engine components, engine and chassis assemblies, andused passenger vehicles were still in place via the foreign currency allocation system. The government and most industry leaders were mistrustful about foreign direct investment in Japan or the assembly of knocked-down parts in Japan by foreign manufacturers. By restricting imports of essential
parts, including those for engines, MITI and the industry protected its market from foreign investment in assembly factories. Not everyone in the industry was supporting the policy of blocking for168

Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy

eign investments, however. For example, Soichiro Honda, the founder of Honda Motor Co., was concerned that Japanese protection of its automotive sector would lead to their losing business
opportunities abroad. Foreign investment in automobile production was not liberalized until April
1971.
It is also noteworthy that the liberalization in 1965 did not mean zero tariffs: the abovementioned 40% and 30% tariffs on imported assembled passenger cars and engines still remained. The
first reduction of the 40% tariff, to 36%, occurred in 1968. After several subsequent reductions, in November 1972, the tariff on passenger car imports was reduced from 8% to 6.4%. Finally, in December
1977, the Japanese government announced that prior to the settlement of the GATT Tokyo round, itwould abolish the tariff on passenger car imports, which it did, effective March 1978. It was from thispoint on that automobile imports in Japan became free of both quotas and tariffs. (Important policychanges described above are summarized in chronological order in table 2.)
MITI’s blueprint of the Japanese automotive industry and challenges from abroad
The blueprint
The basic intension of MITI can be understood as a kind of a blueprint. The blueprint on thedevelopment of the Japanese automobile industry consisted of the following: 1) promoting domestic(passenger) car production by protecting its market, 2) encouraging mergers of Japanese manufacturers to gain economies of scale, and 3) liberalizing imports in a stepwise manner, while blocking foreign investments.
Background of the blueprint
In the background of the blueprint were 1) the idea that MITI took it for granted that they
could control domestic companies, and 2) acquisitions of European manufacturers by the U.S. Big 3,
namely, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler.
The first point can be observed in the attitude of MITI when it requested the Japanese manufactures to merge and increase production scales to reduce costs in the early 1960s. MITI was planning to reduce the number of automobile manufacturers. The fact that these requests were madesuggests that MITI had the idea that they had the authority and power to influence the companies
in the automotive sector.
The second point seems to have contributed to strengthening economic nationalism seen in
the attitudes of most stakeholders on the Japanese side, and fostered a policy rejecting foreign investment in Japan, which is in stark contrast to the policies today that encourage inward investment.
GM had acquired a German manufacturer, OPEL, Ford had subsidiaries in Europe, and a French car
manufacturer, Simca, was acquired by Chrysler. Having seen the acquisitions of European automo169

『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号

bile manufacturers by the U.S. counterparts, MITI and the Japanese manufacturers became cautious
about the same thing happening in Japan. This seems to have led MITI to postpone as long as possible foreign investment liberalization of the Japanese automotive sector.
Foreign pressures that affected MITI’s Policy
Foreign pressures came from two levels. One was from international organizations, and theother was mainly from the United States. Japan joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) in 1955 . In 1964 it joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) and accepted Article 8 obligations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These meantthat Japan had to liberalize trade and investment, as part of the obligations of the industrialized
economies. The international obligations gave MITI and the stakeholders of the automobile industry
the understanding that their home market protection and rejection of foreign investment into Japan
could not continue forever. Hence, both the industry and the government recognized the need toprepare for the coming inevitable liberalization of the auto market.
From around the 1960s, with the improved competitiveness and the resultant increase of exports of the Japanese passenger cars, particularly in the smaller segment of the market, foreign pressure on lifting protection got stronger. In addition to meeting international obligations, MITI’s blueprint faced challenges from individual countries abroad, particularly from the United States. The
Japan-U.S. automotive talks were held in December 1967 and January 1968; at these talks, the U.S.
representatives requested Japan to 1) reduce tariffs on large passenger cars, 2) liberalize imports ofengines and major components, 3 ) reduce domestic taxes on automobiles, and 4 ) liberalize capitaltransactions. MITI was pressurized in these meetings to widen the scope of liberalization of its automotive sector.
Tentative summary of MITI’s blueprint and policy implementation
The MITI policy actually observed, as summarized above, was the product of compromises
made between the blueprint and the foreign pressures. The decisions to liberalize were also the results of the changes in the international status of Japan. It can be understood that, confronted withforeign pressure at various levels, the Japanese government was obliged to remove the remaining
protections, rather than it making strategic decisions on its own to liberalize. (The core policies andtheir results are summarized in table3. The players that influenced MITI’s automotive policies are
summarized also in the Appendix.)
The reconstruction/development of the Japanese economy and the rise of Japanese automobile manufacturing themselves also affected policy through confidence-building within Japan. As will
be shown in the next section, by the late 1960s, increased Japanese exports began contributing to Ja170

Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy
Table 2.
year

Import policy

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

liberalization of1961 truck andbus imports
1962
1963

Policy and events in the Japanese automotive sector, 1945-1981

quota
tariffforeign currency allocation passenger cars: 40% engines: 30%
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓

Investment policy
not permitted
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓
↓

↓
↓

↓
↓

↓
↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

abolished

↓

↓

↓

―

↓

↓

1967

―

↓

↓

1968
1969
1970

―
―
―

36%
↓
34% to 20%

↓
↓
↓

1971

―

10%

15%

1972

―

8% to 6.4%

12%↓foreign investment
liberalization of
motorcycles↓↓↓
foreign investment
liberalization of
automobiles
↓

1973

―

↓

6%

↓

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

―
―
―
―
―
―
―
―

↓
↓
↓
↓
0%
↓
↓
↓

↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
5.3%
0%

↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓

1964

liberalization of1965 passenger
car imports
1966

171

International

joined GATT

joined OECD,
accepted IMF Article8 obligations,
GATT Kennedy
Round(until 1967)

GATT Tokyo round(Until 1979)

『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号
Table 3.

Tentative summary of MITI’s blueprint and policy implementation

Blueprint

Policy Implementation

1)

Promote domestic production by blocking imports
via quota/tariff

Quotas imposed until the first half of the 1960s; tariffs levied until 1978

2)

Strengthen the industry by promoting mergers andacquisitions among domestic automobile manufacturers, thereby reducing the number of manufacturers to gain scale economies

Totally failed; the industry did not respond as MITI
intended (few mergers took place)3)

Liberalize imports in a stepwise manner, while
blocking investments from abroad

Realized almost exactly as planned; imports gradually liberalized and investment liberalization delayed until April 1971

pan’s rise as the second largest automobile manufacturing country. The confidence gained may wellhave led to a change in the stakeholder mentality and an understanding that protection was no longer necessary. However, it must be stressed that many stakeholders in the Japanese auto industry
remained wary of foreign investment in the domestic market, even in this era.
3.3

From imports to the rise of domestic production and exports
How did the automobile industry perform in the postwar era? The overall picture can be seen

by comparing the changes in production, exports, and imports over time. According to table 4 andfigure 2 , production started from around 1950, took off in the 1960 s, and grew rapidly in the late1960s, exceeded 2 million passenger cars per year. This growth continued in the 1970s, except for
during the Oil Shock year of 1974, and exceeded 7 million passenger cars in 1980.
Exports can be considered a sign that an industry is becoming competitive in the international
market, and thus a sign of “graduation” from the infant stage. The first passenger car export to theUnited States by Toyota was seen in 1958 when the company exported its car named Crown. However, the initial attempt ended in failure. Kobayashi (2011) explains that, in this this era, the best carsfrom Japan still did not match the quality levels of foreign cars. Indeed, according to the data it is
only from the late 1960s that automobile exports from Japan started to pick up. In 1969, 560 thousand
passenger cars, that is, roughly a fifth of passenger cars produced in Japan, were exported abroad.
Exports kept increasing along with production increases, and in 1980 almost 4 million passenger cars
were exported, which means that more than half of passenger cars produced in Japan were soldoverseas.
Import data are shown separately in figure 3, as its scale is so tiny compared to productionand exports. Imports were kept low through the 1950s, and only started increasing in the 1970s. Despite the liberalization of imports, the highest figure recorded until 1980 was 64 thousand in 1979. Japan did liberalize trade and investment of its automotive sector, but the apparent imbalance between
172

Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy
Table 4.

Production and exports of Japanese automobiles (unit: number of cars)passenger cars
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

0
0
110
381
1,070
1,594
3,611
4,837
8,789
14,472
20,26832,05647,12150,64378,598165,094
249,508
268,784
407,830
579,660
696,176
877,656
1,375,755
2,055,821
2,611,499
3,178,708
3,717,858
4,022,289
4,470,550
3,931,842
4,567,854
5,027,792
5,431,045
5,975,968
6,175,771
7,038,108

production
trucks

buses

total

exportpassenger cars

1,461
14,914
11,106
19,211
25,56026,50130,81729,96036,14749,85243,857
72,958
126,820130,066
177,485
308,020553,390
710,716
862,781
1,109,142
1,160,090
1,387,858
1,743,368
1,991,407
2,021,591
2,063,883
2,058,320
2,238,340
2,570,916
2,574,179
2,337,632
2,771,516
3,034,981
3,237,066
3,397,214
3,913,188

0
7
104
775
2,070
3,502
4,062
4,169
4,842
5,749
4,807
6,052
8,036
7,594
6,731
8,437
10,981
11,206
12,92013,673
19,34820,88527,36338,59841,842
46,566
34,59633,80941,29145,81936,105
42,13948,496
56,11962,561
91,5881,461
14,921
11,32020,36728,70031,59738,49038,966
49,77870,07368,932
111,066
181,977
188,303
262,814481,551
813,879
990,706
1,283,531
1,702,475
1,875,614
2,286,399
3,146,486
4,085,826
4,674,932
5,289,157
5,810,774
6,294,438
7,082,757
6,551,840
6,941,591
7,841,447
8,514,522
9,269,153
9,635,546
11,042,884

―
―
1
1
15
308
93
2
0
1
2
46
410
2,357
4,884
7,013
11,531
16,011
31,447
66,965
100,716
153,090
223,491406,250
560,431725,586
1,299,351
1,407,340
1,450,884
1,727,396
1,827,286
2,538,919
2,958,879
3,042,237
3,101,990
3,947,160

Source: JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

exports and imports gave rise to another issue, that is, trade frictions, particularly with the UnitedStates.

4．Price/cost data
The following two questions should be asked in order to evaluate infant industry protection
policies: 1) What kind of protection took place and for how long? 2) Did costs go down during protec173

『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号
Figure 2. P roduction and export of passenger cars, 1950-1969 (unit: number of cars)
2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

production

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

1962

1961

1960

1959

1958

1957

1956

1955

1954

1953

1952

1951

0

1950

500,000

exportSource: JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

Figure 3.

Passenger car imports, 1955-1980 (unit: number of cars)

70,00064,80860,00054,51750,00042,21840,00036,92230,000046,28540,416 41,395

24,75920,00010,00045,4805,311 6,684 6,179 5,450 5,994

5,646
3,540 4,310

9,339

12,185 12,881

15,244 14,352 15,000 15,748

19,080 18,551

1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Source: ‌JAMA statistical yearbook, various years

tion? The first question has been mostly answered in the previous section. Data relevant to the second question are presented in this section.
Data provided by Keizaihyoronsha ( 1965 ) show that in 1965 the retail price of Volkswagen
1200cc passenger car (VW1200) in Japan exceeded that of the Nissan Bluebird passenger car. The
Volkswagens were priced at 900 thousand Yen (although their Yen converted retail prices were 344
174

Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy

thousand Yen in Germany), while the Nissans were 583 thousand Yen. The retail price of VW1200
was much higher in Japan than it was in Germany not only because of transportation and othertrade costs but also because of the 40% tariff imposed on imported cars. The cost composition estimate of VW 1200 is shown in figure 4 : Its free on board (FOB) price is estimated as 460 thousand
Yen, and freight to Japan and insurance cost 7 thousand Yen. On top of this, a 40% import tariff (18thousand Yen) and 15 % sales tax ( 7 thousand Yen) were added, and finally 12 thousand Yen wasneeded for accessories and margins for importers/dealers.
The data suggest two things:
1) ‌Protection was effective. If it were not for the 40% tariff, Volkswagen 1200cc passenger car could
have been sold at 720 thousand Yen. Considering the likely quality difference between European
and Japanese cars at the time, the Volkswagens would have been much more competitive in theJapanese market.
2) ‌The FOB price of VW1200 is estimated to have been around 460 thousand Yen. This suggests thatat around 1965, Japanese passenger cars (Nissan Bluebird in this case) still could not compete wellin the international market.
Although the above international comparison suggests that the production costs of Japanesepassenger cars were still relatively high in the mid-1960s, there is evidence that the costs did go
down when a longer time period is examined. According to Yamazawa (1986), Nissan Bluebird was
priced at 595 thousand Yen in 1959 and it was 619 thousand Yen in 1976, which is a 3.8% rise. During

Figure 4.
90
80
70
60
50

Cost composition of VW1200 in Japan, 1965 (unit: ten thousand Yen)
Accessories andimporter/dealer margin, 12
Sales tax, 7Import tariff, 18
Freight and insurance, 7

40
30
20

FOB price, 46

100
Source: Author’s calculation based on Keizaihyoronsha (1965)

175

『経済研究』（明治学院大学）第 153 号

the same period, overall consumer prices rose by 230%. This implies that the relative price of the car
decreased by 31.5%. Indeed, therefore, passenger cars had become much more affordable to the Japanese public.

5．Concluding comments
Brazil started protecting its computer industry in 1977. Both imports and foreign firms’ activity in the country were blocked in order to promote Brazilian computer production. This policy was
kept in place until the 1990s. Luzio and Greenstein (1995) studied the case to find that the Brazilian
computer industry never caught up to the industry leaders. Instead, made-in-Brazil computers remained more expensive than those available in the international market, and the adopted protectionist policy ended up generating net welfare losses in Brazil.
The outcome of the Japanese case of automobiles is clearly different from that of the Brazilian
computer industry case. The Japanese automobile industry did develop and automobiles did becomemuch more affordable to the consumers. Given the observed protection policy and the developmentof the Japanese automobile industry, the bottom line shows that it is possible that the Japanese policyof protection worked for the development of its auto industry. The causal relation remains unknown
since there could be other reasons, for instance, the economic development and rise of Japanese income that increased the demand for automobiles.
The mid-1960s marked an important stage not only in the change in Japan’s international position but also in the change of the automotive policy from protection to liberalization. The liberalization process was very well synchronized with the development of the Japanese automobile industry,
and importantly it was not too delayed. Foreign currency quotas were abolished in 1965, when Japanese cars were still somewhat lagging behind European cars in terms of cost and quality. It may besaid that the slightly early liberalization had a disciplining impact on Japanese manufacturers. At thesame time, however, if it were not for the foreign pressures to liberalize, the whole process could
have been much more delayed. The delay could have imposed larger dead weight losses on Japanesesociety.
Numerous Asian governments, including those of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and China, have adopted more or less similar automotive sector protection policies. It is of interest to study how the policies and their outcomes compare with those of the Japanese experience.

176

Infant industry argument for trade protection and Japanese automotive industrial policy

Figure A1.

AppendixInstitutions and agents involved in the policymaking of Japan’s postwar automobile industry

International organizations

OECD, GATT and IMF

Foreign government

United States

Foreign automobile manufacturers

Big3: Ford, GM and Chrysler

Japanese government

MITI

Toyota, Nissan/Prince, Mitsubishi, Isuzu,
Japanese automobile manufacturers Suzuki, Subaru, Honda, Toyo (Mazda),
Daihatsu

Japanese consumers
Note:

observed relations

potential/indirect relations

Acknowledgement

I appreciate the financial support from a Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (16H06548) fromthe Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

References
Luzio, Eduardo and Shane Greenstein. 1995. “Measuring the Performance of a Protected Infant Industry: The
Case of Brazilian Microcomputers” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, No. 4, pp. 622-633.
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association. Jidoshatokeinenpo (Automobile statistical yearbook), various years.
Keizaihyoronsha. Nihon no jidoshakogyo (The automobile industry of Japan), various years.
Kobayashi, Shotaro. 2011. Nihonjidoshashakaishi (Social history of Japanese Automobiles). Tokyo: Kodansha.
Yamazawa, Ippei. 1986. Kokusaikeizaigaku (International Economics). Tokyo: Toyokeizaishinposha.

177