Testimony of Sherri Goodman
Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental Security
Secretary General, International Military Council on Climate & Security
Senior Strategist, The Center for Climate & Security
Senior Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center
Founder, CNA Military Advisory Board
Before the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense
Hearing: “Climate Change, National Security and the Arctic”
March 17, 2021
Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I have over 30 years of experience as a national security professional. I served as
the first Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security). I currently
serve as the Secretary General of the International Military Council on Climate &Security, Founding Board Chair of the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) and as
Senior Strategist at the Center for Climate and Security, an institute of the CSR. I
also am the Founder and former Executive Director of CNA’s Military Advisory
Board, and Senior Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center’s Polar
Institute and Environmental Change & Security Program. The views I am
presenting today are my own.
I would like to thank the Subcommittee for holding this important hearing today.
The U.S. House of Representatives, on a bipartisan basis, has consistently included
important provisions in the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) on
climate change, including a recognition that “climate change poses a direct threat
to the national security of the United States.” President Biden’s Executive Orderon Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad reflects this assessment, andSecretary of Defense Austin has indicated his agreement as well, stating, “Weknow first-hand the risk that climate change poses to national security because it
affects the work we do every day.” Secretary Austin’s concerns are shared bymany of his predecessors, including former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis who
1Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

noted in 2017 that, “Climate change can be a driver of instability and theDepartment of Defense must pay attention to potential adverse impacts generated
by this phenomenon.”
Let me start with a short history of how I came to determine that climate change isa security threat, and why it is in America’s interest to understand the magnitude ofthis issue and the urgent need to address it.
I am the first born child of Holocaust refugees who arrived in the US in the late
1930s, among the fortunate few Jews who were able to escape Nazi Germany.
Most were not so lucky, and that awareness became part of the ethos that pushed
me to focus on combating the greatest security challenges of our time. Following
World War II, America’s next great security challenge was the Cold War. Duringthat era, the most important national security threat we faced was of nuclear
annihilation, a “bolt out of the blue” nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. We
characterized such an attack as a “low probability, high consequence event.”
Fortunately, we succeeded and celebrated the end of the Cold War more than 25
years ago, when the Berlin Wall fell. At around the same time that the threat ofnuclear war seemed to be diminishing, President George H.W. Bush was the first
American President to acknowledge the serious implications of a changing climate
for the United States.
When I served as the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental
Security in the 1990s, we were primarily focused on cleaning up hazardous wastefrom Cold War-era military activities. Over time, environmental issues evolved
and became part of our National Security Strategy, when we began to consider thefact that conflicts over access to, or control of, natural resources compromised U.S.
national security interests. The focus then was on regional cooperation between
countries to reduce nuclear risks, including from nuclear waste, prevent
transnational environmental crime such as overfishing and illegal logging, topromote cooperation among various stakeholders both within and outside ofgovernment, and to better understand and address the consequences ofenvironmental threats. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) began integrating
environmental concepts into planning under its Preventive Defense Strategy, and it
took on the role of “…[helping] deter or mitigate the impacts of adverse
environmental actions leading to international instability.”1 The DoD went frombeing a laggard to a leader on environmental and energy security matters.
1

Sherri Wasserman Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, (Environmental Security), Statement Before
the Subcommittee on Installation and Facilities, House Armed Services Committee, May 13, 1993.

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Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

These developments at DoD, along with the implications of climate change coming
into sharper focus, led to a marked increase in concerns about the security risks ofclimate change, from both the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community,2 during the George W. Bush Administration. While at CNA duringthat time, I founded the CNA Military Advisory Board (MAB), comprised ofsenior retired generals and admirals, to assess the national security implications ofclimate change. In 2007, we identified climate change as a “threat multiplier.” In aseminal report on this topic, the CNA MAB stated, “[t]he potential consequencesof climate change are so significant that the prudent course of action is to begin
now to assess how these changes may potentially affect our national security, andwhat courses of action our nation should take.”3 We recommended that the national
security implications of climate change be incorporated into the broad range ofnational security strategy and planning documents. In the FY2008 NDAA,
Congress directed that DOD include the national security implications of climatechange in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy andQuadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Building on the work of the CNA MAB, the Center for Climate and Security(CCS), where I am now a Senior Strategist, assembled an Advisory Board of 30
senior retired military leaders and national security professionals, who have served
across both Democratic and Republican Administrations, and in all branches of the
U.S. military and the U.S. Coast Guard. Since 2011, CCS has been at the forefrontof conducting research on the national security risks of climate change, with asteady stream of reports and articles, and was the first organization to highlight theclimate change dimension in Syria’s political instability.4 CCS also hosts a climate
and security “community of practice,” the Climate and Security Advisory Group,that includes participation from over 300 national security, military andintelligence leaders. In 2019, this Climate and Security Advisory Group released a
Climate Security Plan for America, which laid out a roadmap for the federal
government to tackle the security risks posed by climate change and, in 2020, theGroup assembled a National Security, Military and Intelligence Panel (NSMIP) to
produce the first of its kind Security Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change.
Additionally, with our partners in Europe, CCS has established an International
Military Council on Climate and Security, including representatives from 38
2

The Center for Climate and Security Resource Hub, accessed at: https://climateandsecurity.org/resources/u-sgovernment
3
CNA Military Advisory Board. “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.” Report. 2007.
4!"Military Expert Panel Report: Sea Level Rise and the U.S. Military#s Mission.” Eds 1 & 2. The Center for Climate
and Security. September 2016 & February 20183

Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

countries, to meet the growing concerns about climate change from our allied andpartner nations ’militaries.
These entities and developments underscore that my assessment of the security
implications of climate change is not a partisan one. It’s about security. It comesfrom the careful analysis of our nation’s leading national security, defense andintelligence thinkers and practitioners, both inside and outside of government.
These analysts have been taking the climate crisis seriously since 1989, across two
Democratic and three Republican Administrations.
With that background, let me tell you what I plan to cover today. An overarchingtheme throughout my remarks will be the fact that the Department of Defense ispoised to “lead by example” in a way that both serves and protects the military
mission and enables American leadership. First, I will discuss the unprecedented
threats posed by climate change and how they must be integrated into defense
strategy and planning at the highest levels. Second, I will address how the US
military can make climate a priority in its global military engagements. Finally, I
will talk about how the Department of Defense can lead by example in both clean
energy and resilient infrastructure – in large part by leveraging its buying power
across a range of procurements and investments that support the mission.
1. Climate change presents an unprecedented threat to U.S. national security
Since we first characterized climate change as a “threat multiplier” in 2007, thenational security community has concluded that climate change now contributes tounprecedented security threats for the United States – and the world. Growing
evidence demonstrates that climate change is increasing the likelihood of conflictin key regions.5 In 2016, the Climate Security Consensus Project stated that “theeffects of climate change present a strategically-significant risk to U.S. national
security.” The FY2018 NDAA included the sense of Congress that “climatechange presents a direct threat to national security.” Also in 2018, researchsupported by USAID, further demonstrated the effects of climate change on statefragility around the world. The Director of National Intelligence has repeatedlyemphasized that the United States will have to manage the negative effects of achanging climate in the Worldwide Threat Assessment, and publicly released
papers from the National Intelligence Council on topics such as water security,

5

Schleussner, Carl-Friedrich, Jonathan F. Donges, Reik V. Donner, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber. "Armed-conflict
Risks Enhanced by Climate-related Disasters in Ethnically Fractionalized Countries." PNAS. August 16, 2016.

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food security, and overall climate change developments have noted the national
security implications.
The Biden Administration has not only recognized these threats, but has both
elevated and operationalized that recognition by putting climate security front andcenter in its foreign and security policy, calling for the integration of climate
considerations across the work of all agencies that engage in extensive work
abroad. Secretary of Defense Austin has indicated his support for this focus, andjust last week launched a new senior-level Climate Working Group to coordinate
the Department’s response to the climate change Executive Order and track thePentagon’s progress. Further, Secretary Austin noted in his March 2021 message tothe force, “We face a growing climate crisis that is impacting our missions, plans,and capabilities and must be met by ambitious, immediate action. In line with the
President's direction, we will elevate climate as a national security priority,
integrating climate considerations into the Department's policies, strategies, andpartner engagements.”
This integrative approach is critical as these unprecedented changes in the climate
arrive during a time of other rapid and unprecedented changes in the geostrategic
environment. China’s rise as strategic competitor, combined with population
growth, rising powers, an increase in the political fortunes of authoritarians,
weakening norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction, rapid anddisruptive technological change, among other major risks, are combining tochallenge us in dizzying ways. The impacts of rapid climate change arrive in thisalready unstable and volatile world, threatening to further destabilize theinternational order. While there are many ways in which climate change threatens
U.S. security, today I’m going to focus primarily on how it exacerbates
geopolitical tensions and contributes to political instability.
Exacerbating Geopolitical Tensions and Political Instability
Climate change is affecting the very geostrategic landscape in which we operate,
which, in turn, is heightening tensions around the world, opening new areas ofcompetition, and emboldening others to exert their influence, whether that is
China, Russia, or other hostile political forces and terrorist networks. Three regionsin which these geopolitical challenges are particularly acute and generating new
defense missions are the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
The Indo-Pacific: The China Dynamic

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The Indo-Asia Pacific region is highly exposed to climate change-driven hazards,
including extreme weather events and sea level rise. The disruption of the annual
monsoon cycle across the Indian subcontinent could put millions of people at risk,
beyond those already experiencing such threats, of increased flooding and foodinsecurity. These unprecedented hazards arrive in a region that already faces abroad spectrum of conventional, unconventional and hybrid security risks andchallenges. Upon the release of two new reports from the Center for Climate andSecurity earlier this year, focused on South Asia and Southeast Asia, former U.S.
Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, U.S. Navy (Ret) stated:“ Wehave entered an age in which multiple, converging risks define our security
environment. In the Indo-Pacific region, climate change is the biggest long-term
security threat. I testified to this effect to the U.S. House of Representatives in
2013, and it’s even more true now. Climate impacts are getting more potent,
dialing up the threats from existing conflict patterns and resource scarcities. At thesame time, climate projections are getting more precise. This combination ofpotency and precision translates into an obligation for militaries to anticipate, train,equip and prepare for increasingly dangerous climate security scenarios.”
Across the region, climate impacts are inducing or exacerbating physical andsocio-economic stressors, leading to resource competition, health impacts, societal
tensions and irregular migration and displacement — which in turn can amplify
existing security challenges or create new ones. Climate-related migration canstress densely-packed urban areas and increase intercommunal conflict andgrievances with governments. It can also compromise scarce or shared water (andother) resources , amplifying tensions between states or domestic provinces andethnic groups.
Such scenarios are already playing out in the Philippines, in the South China Sea,and in the context of the India-Pakistan and China-India security rivalries, among
other locations. In particular, disputes over transboundary rivers subject to climateinduced floods and droughts are worsening the already-intense adversarial
relationships between nuclear weapons-possessing states.
For militaries in the region, climate change both impedes operational preparedness
and expands military missions. Military installations, like cities, are vulnerable toextreme weather which damages buildings, infrastructure and assets. Yet militaries
must contend with such impacts even as they are called upon to perform additional
humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions. ASEAN has taken up
coordinated disaster management and emergency response in its new Disaster
Management Framework 2021-2025, and South Asia has the institutional
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framework to do the same in the broader regional organization, the South Asian
Association of Regional Cooperation.
The geopolitical dynamics of climate security in the region are driven in large partby China. For example, China’s control over the origins of Asia’s major river
systems contributes to tensions with other countries in the region. With 22 percentof the world’s population but only 7 percent of its fresh water, China’s efforts tosecure freshwater resources, including building dams, are in some cases
contributing stress to its regional relationships. Upstream dam-building and othercontrol measures taken or planned for the Tibetan Plateau are contributing toregional hostilities among the 60 million people in China, Myanmar, Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam, that rely directly on the Mekong River Basin forlivelihoods and food security.6 At the same time, U.S. allies and partners in the
Asia-Pacific remain concerned about the U.S. commitment and investment in theregion, and may ultimately find it more practical to accept the reality of aregionally-dominant China, and the economic and political consequences of thatreality. Indeed, many nations in the region, in the face of an uncertain level of U.S.
engagement, seem to be hedging their bets as they attempt to both accommodate anincreasingly powerful Beijing, while also maintaining positive relationships with
the United States.7 While a number of nations in the Asia-Pacific are engaged in
disputes with China over contested areas of the South China Sea, China is
expanding its influence not just within the region, but beyond, to Latin America,
Africa, the Arctic (as I will elaborate on in a moment), and elsewhere. China
remains the largest trading partner for Southeast Asian nations and is increasing its
military force significantly in relation to other countries in its neighborhood,including through the deployment of a “blue-water navy” that has ventured as far
from home as the Straits of Hormuz.8
In this context, the United States will need to develop more expansive approaches
to maintaining and enhancing its regional influence, and supporting the interests of
its allies, partners and prospective partners in the Asia-Pacific, including through6!"Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific 2020.” Product of the Expert Group of the International Military
Council on Climate and Security. Authors: Shiloh Fetzek (CCS), Bastien Alex (IRIS), Laura Birkman (HCSS), Steve
Brock (CCS), Brigitte Dekker (Clingendael), Francesco Femia (CCS), Sherri Goodman (CCS), Tom Middendorp(Clingendael), Michel Rademaker (HCSS), Louise van Schaik (Clingendael), Julia Tasse (IRIS), Caitlin Werrell (CCS).
Edited by Francesco Femia & Caitlin Werrell. Published by the Center for Climate and Security, an institute of theCouncil on Strategic Risks. July 2020.
7
Femia, Francesco, and Caitlin E. Werrell. "A Climate-Security Plan for the Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Lessons from the
Marshall Plan" A Climate and Security Correlation Series, The Center for Climate and Security, November 2015.
8
John Kemp, !In search for security, China#s navy enters Strait of Hormuz,” Reuters, September 22, 2014, available
at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/09/22/china-navy-iran-kempidUSL6N0RN2FK20140922

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robustly supporting climate resilience efforts in the region. As I wrote with acolleague in The National Interest earlier this year, “In some cases, the UnitedStates will need to compete for influence where China is taking advantage ofclimate change to improve its military posture in the South China Sea or become
the relief provider of first resort to vulnerable Pacific Island nations.”
The Arctic: Developing a Low Tension, High Effort Agenda
The Arctic has emerged as a region of potential geostrategic competition, primarily
because rising temperatures, melting sea ice, and collapsing permafrost now grant
access to this region previously locked in ice most of year. While the Arctic hashistorically been a region characterized by cooperation and diplomacy, it has more
recently become a zone of increased tensions over valuable energy and mineral
resources, and access to shipping routes. The rapid melting of the multi-year sea
ice has given rise to significant growth in economic and military activities,
including shipping, resource extraction, and other commerce. This rapid change in
the Arctic is feeding into China’s and Russia’s strategic ambitions, both regionallyand globally.
Defense Secretary Austin recognizes these challenges. In response to questions
about the Arctic from the Senate Armed Services Committee ahead of his
confirmation hearing earlier this year, he said, “Climate change is drasticallyaltering the natural environment of the Arctic--and the strategic balance. This is
fast becoming a region of geopolitical competition, and I have serious concerns
about the Russian military buildup and aggressive behavior in the Arctic--andaround the world. Likewise, I am deeply concerned about Chinese intentions in theregion.”A recent report by the Center for Climate Security and the Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs that I co-authored made the following high-level observations
about Arctic climate security risks: the report found that as the Arctic becomesincreasingly navigable, the uptick in commercial, civilian, and military activity
creates more opportunities for conflicts, accidents, and misunderstandings. There isalso an expanding likelihood of states like Russia and China using civilian andcommercial actors for strategic positioning or risky gray zone operations. Russia
envisions a toll road for shipping and transit across its Northern Sea Route, andseeks to enforce this maritime route as internal waterway— a claim which the U.S.
and many other nations dispute. In 2018, China declared itself a “near Arctic
state,” with ambitions to build a Polar Silk Road across the region. China is anactive “Observer” in the Arctic Council, and is increasingly participating in a8

Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

variety of Arctic efforts, seeking to increase its presence and influence in theregion through dual-use scientific exploration and providing foreign direct
investment for infrastructure such as ports and airfields. The institutions that havehelped depoliticize and produce stability in the Arctic for several decades may not
be resilient enough to withstand new demands resulting from climate change, as
climate change introduces significant uncertainties about established rules andnorms and puts stress on existing institutions.9
Aggressive Russian state behavior both in the Arctic and elsewhere poses aparticular challenge in this context. Prior to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea
in 2014, Moscow was engaged in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and theArctic Chiefs of Defense — two forums for discussing cooperation among militaryforces both to deconflict or to support non-military activities such as search andrescue and oil spill response. Since 2014, Russia has not been included in these
dialogues. Lack of coordination raises the risk of misunderstandings,
miscommunications, accidents, or spillover tensions from another regional conflict.
As I noted with some colleagues in a recent Arctic Today article, the priority in the
Arctic must be to establish mechanisms for dialogue and communication so as toincrease clarity of what is and is not acceptable behavior, to communicate
grievances, and to manage risk. To help manage these challenges, the eight Arctic
nations would benefit from a venue for regular dialogue among security forces,
both to build confidence and to reduce risk from accidents that could lead to
miscalculation or escalation.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Contributing to Instability and Risk of Extremism
Sub-Saharan Africa’s geographic vulnerability to extreme climate outcomes andlower economic development and institutional strength will severely challenge theregion's capacity to cope with climate change and its attendant consequences for
instability and conflict.
Already, changes in precipitation patterns and droughts are exacerbating existingtensions among farmers and herders in the Sahel. At the same time, in the past year
climate change-related flooding contributed to instability in East Africa, a region
already strained by the pandemic, rising food insecurity and a locust plague. As
9!"Climate Change and Security in the Arctic.” A product of The Center for Climate and Security (CCS), an instituteof the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR), and The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Authors: Sherri
Goodman, Kate Guy, Marisol Maddox (CCS); Vegard Valther Hansen, Ole Jacob Sending, Iselin Németh Winther(NUPI). Edited by Francesco Femia and Erin Sikorsky (CCS). January 2021.

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Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

the head of the World Food Program in East Africa described the events of 2020 inthat region “it’s shock upon shock upon shock.”
Also of concern is the intersection of climate change and extremism on thecontinent. For example, the rise of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in
Mali, which sparked significant instability across the country and region, contains
a climate change signature.10 More specifically, this situation was shaped in 201214 by an intersection of three salient trends: desertification and food insecurity,
exacerbated by climate change; an ongoing rebellion by Tuareg nomadic herdsmenin northern Mali; and weak government institutions that could not address themarginalization of the Tuareg and their increasing clashes with sedentary
agriculturalist tribes in the southern and central areas of the country.11
Overwhelmed by these challenges, the fragile government was overthrown by acoup in March 2012. Following the coup, the Malian political system was unable
to maintain influence in northern Mali; AQIM and other groups moved in and took
control.12
While climate change alone did not cause the conflict, it certainly was a factor inharming the once-coexistent relationship between the Arab Tuareg and non-Arab
Muslim ethnic groups in central and southern Mali. In fact, the recent Malianconflict fits a pattern of other such conflicts in Africa’s Sahel region, including
Darfur, South Sudan, Niger, and Nigeria. Drought and desertification have
impacted the region for hundreds of years; yet climate change now is worsening
these conditions across sub-Saharan Africa, and has contributed to movement
within and across borders, which can further lead to conflict dynamics in thesecountries that lack adequate governance and sufficiently-robust institutions to settle
conflicts over vital resources. Add to this the involvement of transnational terroristgroups and militias, such as AQIM and the Janjaweed (in Mali and Darfur,
respectively), and these conflicts become more complex, transforming resourcecompetition into ethnopolitical conflict.
2. Prioritizing Climate Change in U.S. Security Engagements

10

Femia, Francesco and Caitlin E. Werrell, !Mali: Migration, Militias, Coups and Climate Change,” The Center for
Climate and Security, April 2019; and The CNA Military Advisory Board, !National Security and the Accelerating
Risks of Climate Change,” CNA Corporation, May 201411
Alexis Arieff, Crisis in Mali (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2013),
http://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf
12
Ibid

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In addition to integrating climate into our assessments of security threats and ourstrategies for addressing those threats, the United States can further “climate
proof” security by bringing climate considerations into our security assistanceprograms with other countries. Addressing the geopolitical dynamics of climatechange risks requires the United States to step up and play a leadership role inhelping allies and partners build resilience to the effects of climate change on their,and consequently on our collective, security. As the Department of Defense carries
out the global posture review, with the goal of aligning force posture with security
strategy, DoD should consider how it can better enhance the resilience of allies andpartners and build within them the capacity to endure the stresses imposed byclimate change. As I mentioned earlier, China is already trying to expand its
influence by doing just that – embracing the climate and energy goals of U.S. allies
and partners, providing direct and tangible assistance to climate-vulnerable nations,and securing influence and economic gains through energy investments.
The United States has many tools in its toolbox with which it can and shouldcompete. As the Center for Climate and Security outlined in its Climate Security
Plan for America, the Defense Department should develop a “Security Forces
Climate Engagement Plan” to promote regular military-to-military and civilmilitary international engagement on climate change preparation, to enhance theresilience of U.S. allies and partners, and to enhance U.S. influence vis-à-vis its
primary competitors. The Department of Defense should revitalize the Defense
Environmental International Cooperation Program (DEIC) with sufficient
resources to make military-to-military environmental cooperation a robust
engagement tool for each regional combatant command.
Additionally, Combatant Commanders should engage allied and partner nations ’militaries on adapting to climate change and working to mitigate impacts tomilitary operations, energy resilience, infrastructure and readiness through avariety of pathways, ranging from formal intergovernmental NATO Summits to
Track II-focused fora such as the Munich Security Conference, Halifax
International Security Forum, the Pacific Environmental Security Forum, and theInternational Military Council on Climate and Security.
3. Leading by Example in Resilient Investment and Infrastructure
The Defense Department is the nation’s single largest energy user, atapproximately 1 percent of U.S. energy. It has already made importantinvestments in clean energy, from solar-powered housing to microgrids andrenewables for remotely-deployed forces and at facilities here in the U.S. – saving
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Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

energy, water, money, and advancing these technologies for both military andcommercial applications. As it implements the requirements in the President’s
Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, such as thefederal clean electricity and vehicle procurement strategy, DOD will deepen theseinvestments.
Resilient Energy and Technology Investments
DOD can lead by example in key energy and climate technologies that align withthe military mission. Here are a few examples:
1. Electric vehicles – DoD leases 166,000 vehicles from the General Services
Administration according to the FY20 Strategic Stability Performance Plan.
The department can help reduce its own carbon footprint, reduce reliance on
fossil fuels, and help advance the transition to net zero through the use ofelectric vehicles and rapid deployment of charging stations on DoD
installations.
2. Microgrids and resilient transmission infrastructure – DOD needs to be able
to operate critical military installations, even if subject to a cyber-attack, ice
storm, hurricane, flood, or deliberate terrorist attack. That is why militarybases practice “Black Start” exercises, to recover from a power outage, andmaintain operations for extended periods even if the grid is down. The
technologies and practices needed to ride out these threats, including
microgrids, distributed energy systems, and advanced energy storage
methods will have the added benefit of promoting resilient infrastructure in
our communities. More transmission infrastructure is needed to create
redundancies – this does not mean duplicating the paths of existing lines. It
means being able to provide power from another area or region to the facility(and surrounding community, in many instances) in need.
3. Climate predictive capabilities – From military operations planning toresilient base infrastructure, a new generation of earth system observationand prediction capabilities, that provides asset-level climate data analytics
for shorter-term (hours to weeks to months) planning, is becoming
increasingly available, both in government labs and in the private sector.
Technological developments, including quantum computing, 5G, artificial
intelligence, data analytics, and more, are further increasing our capacity toforecast, predict, and plan for climate security risks, from extreme weather
events and their impacts, to food scarcity, water shortages and beyond.
These improved predictive capabilities are also being used by city planners,
insurers, and across a range of critical infrastructure sectors to reduce
12Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

climate risk. As DOD adapts these technologies for the military mission, it
will further reduce risk to both operations and infrastructure.
One example of such a predictive capability is the Navy’s Earth System
Prediction Capability (ESPC) model, which has significant potential forregional climate projections. ESPC uses an Earth System Model that
includes interactions between multiple component models (atmosphere,
ocean, waves, land, and sea ice), and is typically run at much higher spatial
resolutions than current climate models. The Office of Naval Research(ONR) developed ESPC for naval operations and is focused on providing
both tactical decision and strategic planning support. ESPC could be used
for high-resolution forecasts of the operational environment in future
decades, enabling regional estimates of sea level rise, understanding ofchanges in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events around theglobe, and refining projections of the opening of new sea routes in the Arctic
due to diminishing sea ice. At present, such climate applications are beyond
the scope of the ONR S&T applied research portfolio that emphasizes shortterm prediction and predictability of weather and ocean behavior for Naval
operations; however, these climate applications could be invaluable for
Combatant Command theater engagement planning on a regional basis, andfor working with partner and allies.
As I noted in my National Interest article, while the department already has asignificant number of clean energy research and development efforts, bringing
together these efforts into a Climate and Clean Energy Innovation Office withadditional investment would enable the Pentagon to more rapidly develop, test anddeploy a wide range of technologies. The article stated, “The department needs tolead not only on mission-driven clean energy research and development but also on
the transition of these technologies to the fleet and the field. Too often, improved
energy and climate technologies do not make it beyond what some call the “Valleyof Death” in technology deployment because there is no acquisition requirement
for it. This can and should change with a Clean Energy Transition Fund thatincentives the military departments and acquisition commands to both try and buy
lower carbon products.”13
Resilient Infrastructure
13

Sherri Goodman and Kate Guy, !Climatizing Security: Protecting Americans in the Age of Climate Change,” The
National Interest, 15 January 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/climatizing-security-protectingamericans-age-climate-change-176454.

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The Department of Defense must also make its own infrastructure, including key
supporting civilian infrastructure, more resilient to climate risks. It is alreadypaying the price of billions of dollars of damage at Tyndall Air Force Base, Camp
LeJeune, and Offutt Air Force Base from recent hurricanes and floods. At the sametime, sea-level rise is making recurring flooding more common in coastal
communities and at coastal bases, and wildfire season is no longer confined to one
season, or one geography. Under current emissions pathways, these risks will only
increase in the years to come.
Given this context, the CCS Climate Security Plan for America calls for the
implementation of a Climate Security Infrastructure Initiative across DoD and the
US government. Such an initiative would be aimed at investing in the resilience ofboth military installations and critical civilian infrastructure, including low-carbon
footprint projects designed to significantly lower the scale and scope of climatechange--bolstering national security and creating long lasting employment
opportunities. In the face of increasing threats from sea level rise, extreme weather
events and wildfires, it should involve a comprehensive program to repair,construct, fortify, and responsibly site the nation’s interconnected military, energy,transportation, agriculture, water, and commerce infrastructure in a climate
resilient fashion. This should include an emphasis on building resilience toprojected climate scenarios--as we’ve seen again and again in the past few months,
what have been considered “worst case” scenarios are increasingly likely. For
example, recent studies on sea level rise and ice melt suggest we haveunderestimated the pace and effects of each.
I am pleased that DOD is already moving to improve base resilience through use of
the Defense Climate Assessment Tool (DCAT) and understand that over 1000
military sites have already had at least their preliminary assessments. The next
step is for DOD to invest in the resilience actions that follow from theseassessments.
To that end, in the FY 2020 NDAA and FY 2021 NDAA, Congress has
significantly enhanced the authorities DoD has to address climate-related threats tomilitary installations and key supporting civilian infrastructure, including
amendments to the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program14, the Readiness andEnvironmental Protection Integration Program (REPI)15, the military installation
14
15

DAR, 23 USC 210
10 USC 2684a

14

Goodman -- HACD Testimony -- 17 March 2021

resilience projects authority16, the Defense Community Infrastructure Pilot(DCIP)17, and other new or strengthened authorities. However, increased funding
sufficient to allow DOD to take full advantage of these new or expandedauthorities has not yet followed and remains more vital than ever. For every $1
spent on mitigation or enhanced resilience now, $6 dollars will be saved inrecovery, according to recent research.
Finally, as we all know, “you can’t manage what you don’t measure.” In the
1990s, I led an effort to establish the first Environmental Security metrics for
DOD, that included contaminated site cleanup, compliance with air, water andwaste laws, and protection of endangered species and cultural resources. I
understand that DOD is working on the next generation of climate and energy
metrics that will enable the Secretary of Defense to measure the Department’s
progress on such matters as Military Installation Resilience Plans, Black Start
capability, electric vehicles, climate predictive capability, and other goals andobjectives of the President’s Climate Executive Order. These metrics will be an
important tool in enabling DOD leadership to hold the Department accountable andreport to Congress and others on progress.
Conclusion
Fortunately, the difference between today and major global disruptions of the pastis that we can spot impending disasters earlier and more easily. We do not have to
wait for the next pandemic, the next 9/11 or the next Pearl Harbor, to better prepare
for the climate crisis we already experience. Though the risks are unprecedented,
our foresight is unprecedented as well. Technological developments have given us
predictive tools that enhance our ability to anticipate and mitigate threats, totransform energy systems for improved mission performance, and to make bases
more resilient and military communities more secure. Congress has strengthened,
and must continue to strengthen, the authorities, programs, and funding available
to DOD address these threats. In short, we have the ability to make ourcommunities, institutions and individuals more resilient to a broad range of threats.
“Climate-proofing” our security is essential to protect America’s 21st-century nearand long-term national security interests. Failing to address climate security risks
now will both embolden our adversaries to take the lead and result in more costly
disasters and loss of American lives.

16
17

10 USC 2815
10 USC 2391(d)15