The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus

Volume 20 | Issue 17 | Number 3 | Article ID 5743 | Oct 01, 2022

The Hawai‘i Connection: Okinawa’s Postwar Reconstruction
and Uchinanchu Identity
Kelli Y. Nakamura, Brandon Marc Higa
Introduction

Abstract: The historical experiences of
Hawai‘i’s Okinawan American (Uchinanchu)
community in connection with Okinawa afterWorld War II helped to shape an understandingof their own cultural and ethnic distinctiveness,
which was influenced by U.S. policies in
Okinawa. In the aftermath of the war, Hawaiʻi’s
Uchinanchu community worked to provide
relief for their brethren in the devastatedislands of their homeland. Their efforts were
supported and indeed encouraged by the U.S.
military. As the U.S. military transformed andrebuilt Okinawa, the U.S. sought to justify theoccupation of Okinawa and its concentration of
military bases on the islands. One means of
doing this was referring to the Uchinanchu
contributions to the rebuilding of their
homeland as part of the expansion of US soft
power. It can be argued that the emergence ofa unique Okinawa American identity in Hawai‘iin the post-World War II period reflected
America’s Cold War “public diplomacy” withina liberal multicultural discourse.

思い故郷に通わさみりば
I let my thoughts wander back to
my hometown[Omoi furusato ni kayowasamiriba]

戦争場の哀り思いまさてI think of the sorrow of thebattlefield[Sensōjō no awari omoimasate]

無情に渡らりみ人ならわし[Mujō ni watararimi hito no narawashi]
The ways of this world unrelentingly spread

まさて親兄弟の哀り知らば
Sadder, when I think of the grief of myparents andKeywords: Okinawan Americans, Okinawa,
Hawai‘i, Cold War, Relief Efforts, Community
Organizations, Indigenous Minorities, U.S.
Militarization, USCAR, Uchinanchu[Masate oya kyōdai no awari shiraba]
siblings

ハワイめる人の志情の衣Clothing from the beneficent people1

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APJ | JFof Hawaiʻithe legal status of Okinawans in Japan as “shinnihonjin” (新日本), new Japanese, underpinned
the separation of Okinawan immigrants from“wajin” (和人) who came from other parts of3
Japan (Ziomek, 2019, pp. 30-31). To trace theorigins of a distinctive Okinawan American
identity in Hawai‘i, it is essential to examine
their experiences on the plantations where
mainland Japanese immigrants discriminatedagainst Okinawan arrivals who followed themthree decades later in the early 1900s
4(Uchinanchu, 1981, p. 224). Additionally, thewartime and postwar experiences of Okinawans
need to be considered as the events of WorldWar II and the Cold War would dramatically
impact the formation of this diasporiccommunity’s identity that complicate historicaland contemporary issues of indigeneity,
militarism, and self-determination in both
Okinawa and Hawai‘i.

[Hawai meru hito no shijō no koromo]

やがて親兄弟ぬうれしなみだ
Parents and siblings will soon shed tearsof joy[Yagate oya kyōdai nu ureshi namida]

ウチナ万民に地獄みして[War created] hell for all
Okinawans[Uchina banmin ni jigoku mishite]This poem by Maui poet Saburō Agena waspublished in major Japanese newspapers aspart of efforts to mobilize community support in
Hawaiʻi for relief efforts in Okinawa (Higa,
1974, p. 171). 1 These efforts were not just areflection of the personal connections thatexisted between the Okinawan American
residents of Hawaiʻi and Okinawa but also weresanctioned and supported by the U.S. military.
The U.S. postwar occupying forces in Okinawa
created a neoliberal security state throughrelief efforts aimed at rebuilding the war-torn
infrastructure and promoting American rule in
the territory.2 Similarly, World War II has hadlasting impacts on the State of Hawai‘i with the
U.S. military maintaining an active presence
down to the present.

The Battle of Okinawa
On April 1, 1945, the United States Tenth Army
invaded Okinawa as part of Operation Iceberg,a plan to occupy the Ryūkyū Islands. Aftereighty-two days of intense combat, about
17,000 Japanese troops surrendered, ending
the final and bloodiest battle in the Pacific War.
More than 12,000 Americans were killed and37,000 were wounded, while nearly half of theestimated 250,000 Japanese killed were
Ryūkyūans, including those serving with theJapanese forces in various capacities.
Moreover, approximately one-third of thecivilian population—possibly as many as
150,000 men, women, and children—werekilled during the fighting and thousands
became refugees (Dower, 2001, p. 54). 5
Additionally, much of Okinawa’s infrastructure
was destroyed in the year-long bombardment
by the U.S. military before the invasion.

The historical experiences of Hawai‘i’s
Okinawan Americans (self-referenced as
Uchinanchu below) helped to shape anunderstanding of their cultural distinctivenessthat was sanctioned by the U.S. However, therecognition of Okinawan Americans in Hawaiʻi
as a “minority within a minority” originatesfrom immigration during the early 1900s when

When American forces finally gained control
over Okinawa, the monumental task of2

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immigrants arrived in Hawai‘i seeking
employment for ambitious young men
8(Uchinanchu, 53). Approximately 20,000
Okinawans immigrated from 1900-1924, about
half of whom either returned to Okinawa or
moved to the continental United States. In
addition to discovering the difficulties ofplantation labor, many encountered prejudicesfrom mainland Japanese (Naichi), who
considered them “foreigners” or “outcasts.”

rebuilding and transforming Okinawa
commenced. Approximately 42,000 acres ofland were confiscated by the US military,
dispossessing Okinawan landowners of theirproperty as U.S. military installations wereconstructed throughout Okinawa Prefecture
6
without compensation. As a result of thedestruction caused by the fighting, the military
established refugee camps in the area for the
first eighteen months after the battle. The local
population subsisted primarily on food,clothing, medical supplies, and other items
provided by the military as free rations or ascompensation for labor. Despite many
challenges, widespread starvation and the
spread of disease were prevented as
Okinawans and American military officials
began wrestling with the fate of this island
nation as Cold War tensions increased in the
Asia-Pacific region. These events were closely
monitored by Okinawans who had immigrated
to both the United States and Hawai‘i who
maintained connections to their ancestral
homeland. Hawaii Uchinanchu, in particular,
experienced a dramatic transformation in theirsocial, economic, and political status within
Hawai‘i due in part to their contributions topostwar relief programs fostering relationships
between the U.S. occupying forces and hostcommunities to facilitate the U.S. militaryoccupation as new installations were built andtroops were deployed to engage in thesubsequent U.S-Korean War (Allen, 2009, p.
188).7 Hawai‘i’s diasporic Okinawan communitythat had immigrated nearly five decades earlier
would ultimately play a critical role in the relief
and rebuilding efforts spearheaded by the U.S.
military to stabilize Okinawa and promote anarrative of military benevolence.

Naichi’s discriminatory views toward Okinawan
immigrants reflected a government-sanctioned
caste system in Japan whereby ethnic
minorities, including Okinawans and Ainu, weredistinguished as lower-class citizens. At thetime of immigration in the early 1900s,
Okinawan immigrants were classified as “shinNihonjin,” new Japanese citizens, following theannexation of the Ryūkyū Islands as Okinawa
Prefecture in 1879. Additionally, officials forced
Ryūkyūans to comply with linguistic andcultural assimilation policies by adhering tobehavioral norms set by the central Japanese
government to avoid punishment for using the
Ryūkyūan language or practicing Okinawan
religious customs (Uchinanchu, 55). 9 In
Hawai‘i, Naichi discouraged “intermarriage”
with Okinawans, and some referred to Nisei
Okinawans (2nd generation Okinawan settlers)with the phrase, “Okinawa ken, buta kau kau”
(pidgin Japanese, [people from] Okinawan
Prefecture, eat pigs) in reference to pork as astaple of the Okinawan diet, something viewed
as unclean by Naichi (Uchinanchu, 41).10
According to researcher Arakaki Makoto, four
factors emerged that would diminish the divide
between these two groups in Hawai‘i. First, the“Naichi discrimination pressured Okinawan
Issei (1st generation settlers) to reject theirlanguage and culture and to encourage their
Nisei children to assimilate into Japanese andAmerican communities (Nakasone, 2002, p.
200).”11 Additionally, the second generation ofboth groups primarily spoke English as theirfirst language and shared similar experiences,

Okinawan Immigration to Hawai‘i and theExperiences of the Prewar Okinawan
Community
In 1900, the first group of Okinawan3

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APJ | JFK. Howell, commanding officer of the POWbase camp, noted that one of the biggest
problems confronting officials in charge of the
10,619 POWS in Hawai‘i was locals fraternizing
with Okinawan POWs, who comprised roughly
one-fourth of the total number of prisoners in
the Islands (Hawaii Times, 1945, 2). 16 Local
Okinawans often visited Okinawan POWs out
on work detail in the community and gifted
them cigarettes, fruit, candy, and even moneyin spontaneous gestures of friendship as fellow
Okinawans (Allen, 1950, p. 196).17

resulting in the language divide diminishing.
Further, the discrimination faced by both
Japanese and Okinawans during World War II
helped to erode the gulf between the two
communities as people in mainstream America
and in Hawai‘i referred to both as “Japs”.
Finally, as many Naichi were not in positions ofsocio-economic power, their attitudes had little
effect on the advancement of Okinawan Nisei
who became vital members of Hawai‘i’s
postwar community, in part because pork
became an important source of protein for
12
Hawaiians during the war (Uchinanchu, 217).

“Many residents of Hawai‘i, however, wanted
to do much more to support the people of
Okinawa particularly after “official andunofficial reports reaching Honolulu that
Okinawans [were] in urgent need of clothingand [would] suffer severely this winter unlessrelief [was] provided” (Honolulu Advertiser,
1945, p. 3; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1945, p. 7).18
Some of this information likely came from Nisei
soldiers with Hawai‘i connections who were in
Okinawa as part of the occupying forces(Harrington, 1979, pp. 317-318; Higa, 1988,
pp. 160-161). 19 However, according to TarōHiga, a Nisei veteran who helped to mobilize
early relief efforts, some within the Japanesecommunity in Hawai‘i criticized these efforts
even in the postwar period as unnecessary:

Historian Mitsugu Sakihara highlights the war
as critical in “destroy[ing] many of the oldsocial barriers and discrimination” as wartime
work shortages opened new economic
opportunities for many, including Okinawans
and Japanese Americans who also served in thearmed forces (Sakihara, 1980, p. 15). 13 As
discrimination decreased in the postwar period,
Uchinanchu and other Okinawan American
identities became celebrated and embraced inpart due to their wartime experiences,
particularly after the Battle of Okinawa in 1945
and the resulting relief efforts in the immediate
postwar period. These efforts helped to(re)create connections between Okinawa andits diasporic communities, particularly in
Hawai‘i, that were in part facilitated by the
U.S. Cold War policies in the Asia-Pacificregion (Tozzer, 1944, p. 46).14[H]owever, in an unfortunate incident fromthe group of victory believers, that is“Hisshōkai”, I was threatened several
times as these self-advertisers from thesame town opposed the rescue movement.
The reason for the opposition from thesepeople was that as Japan was winning thewar, it was not necessary to send relief
supplies. It was because they believed thatin the near future, the Imperial Japanese
Navy will proudly arrive at Pearl Harborand rule over Hawaii (Higa, 66).20

World War II Relief Efforts of Hawai‘i
Uchinanchu
Even before the conclusion of the war,
Okinawans in Hawai‘i had made informal
efforts to seek out and assist their relatives.
During World War II, Okinawans in the
Hawaiian Islands provided Okinawan Prisonersof War (POWs) incarcerated in Hawai‘i food,cigarettes, and other sundries to make theirstay less onerous (Stephan, 1984, pp. 30-33).15

4

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Although Higa did not identify these individuals
as Japanese or Okinawans, victory groups did
exist in Hawai‘i due to the upheaval of the
postwar period and the censorship of news thatmade individuals susceptible to rumors(Stephan, 1984, p. 172; Lind, 1943, p. 21;
Kimura, 1947, pp 84-85; RASRL, 1948, p. 1).21
Organizers also were immediately confronted
by two important questions about theappropriateness of “aliens” and other JapaneseAmericans undertaking relief efforts in light ofexisting anti-Japanese sentiment in the UnitedStates, and the U.S. Navy’s need to receive
permission to send goods collected in Hawaiʻi22
to Okinawa (HUOA archives). They soon
arrived at a solution: “Appeal to the religiousorganizations in Hawaii, whose principles ofhumanity do not discriminate between enemies
and friends, and solicit their guidance andadvice (HUOA archives).” 2 3 Numerous
American Christian organizations that operated
through the Licensed Agencies for Relief in
Asia (LARA) were active in postwar Japan insending aid. (Headquarters; Rogers, 1994).24

Figure 1. The clothing drive relief
committee sits behind boxes packed withclothes in Maui, Hawaiʻi, on Dec. 15, 1945.
The postwar humanitarian effort was
initiated by a second-generation
Uchinanchu who enlisted as a U.S. service
member from Hawaiʻi. (Photo provided by
Dan Nakasone)26

Thus, as early as December 14, 1945,
Okinawan residents in Hawai‘i beganparticipating in relief efforts organized by theCouncil of Churches on Hawai‘i Island to ship
500 boxes of clothing aboard a U.S. military
vessel to Okinawa as part of the Okinawa Relief
Association (Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 1985, p.
44).25Figure 2. The Okinawan community in
Hawaiʻi gathers to support a postwar relief
effort initiated by a second-generation
Uchinanchu and U.S. service member from
Hawaiʻi. (Photo provided by Dan
Nakasone)275

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grandson of one of the seven Okinawan
voyagers)30

Other relief efforts included providing medical
supplies and goods, even sewing machines,
used eyeglasses, school supplies, andequipment that an Okinawan American
women’s group known as Lepta Kai (The PennyClub) provided to the residents of Okinawa(Honolulu Advertiser, 1951, p. 13; Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, 1950, p. 23; Adaniya, 1981, p.
327; Kobashigawa, 1985, 38).28 Thus, women
also took an active role in relief efforts,
reflecting community-wide support for theseendeavors. Subsequent shipments followed in1949 of over 2,750 goats, 500 of which werepurchased by residents of Hawai‘i, in acollaboration with the National Heifer Projectcommittee of New Windsor, Maryland(Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1948, p. 6; Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, 1949, p. 2; Honolulu StarBulletin, 1949, p. 18; Honolulu Advertiser,
1949, p. 7).29

Okinawan Americans’ collective relief efforts
were a sign of goodwill toward their relatives
still living in Okinawa, which further reinforced
the U.S. military’s efforts to feed Okinawans in
the war-torn occupied territory. While
Uchinanchu efforts were not unique and werelimited in scale—Okinawan residents in theAmerican mainland also contributed to relief
initiatives—it is important to note how theseactions, supported by the U.S. military who
provided the necessary transport vessels andfacilitated the distribution of these donations,created a unique bond between Okinawa and
Hawai‘i (History, 1988, p. 133). 31 They also
highlight the agency of local Okinawans in
supporting humanitarian efforts and defining
their role, and subsequently their identity, inthe postwar period.

Figure 4. An elementary school in Shuri,
Naha City, receives books from Hawaiʻiduring the post-World War II relief effort.
The postwar humanitarian effort was
initiated by a U.S. service member from
Hawaiʻi who was a second-generation
Okinawan. (Photo provided by Dan
Nakasone)32

Figure 3. The USS Owen transportation ofpigs to Okinawa during postwar relief
efforts. (Photo courtesy of Shinyei
Shimabukuro, provided by Jon Itomura,6

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U.S. Occupation and the Promotion of
Okinawan Culture

The Okinawan Americans’ collective relief
efforts remain a significant event within
Hawaiʻi’s Okinawan community as they
fostered a distinct local identity among theestimated 28,000 Okinawans in the Hawaiian
Islands in the postwar period that celebrated
Okinawan culture within a shared experience ofhardship and the overcoming of prejudice anddiscrimination (Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1950, 3;
33
Tozzer, 58).

Following the enactment of the 1951 U.S.Japan Security Treaty that severed Okinawa
from the rest of Japan, the U.S. military
promoted goodwill efforts between American
personnel and Okinawans to facilitate theircontinued presence in Okinawa as a criticalcomponent of the U.S.-Japan Security Allianceand other U.S. military policies in the region
during the Cold War era (Ferguson and38
Turnbull, 1999, pp. 2, xiii). This approach isconsistent with a strategy that politicalscientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. later termed “softpower” that “rests on the ability to shape thepreferences of others” through the promotionof culture, political values, and foreign policies
while pursuing military objectives (Nye, 2004,
39
pp. 5, 11). Similarly, Japanese Americans in
Hawaiʻi are presented as successful andassimilated Americans in various publications
as part of the promotion of a positive view of
the United States in the postwar period(Yaguchi, 2014).40 Hideko Yoshimoto refers to
U.S. activities in Okinawa throughout the Cold
War as “public diplomacy” to support its
military and national security objectives, asmany Okinawa continued to play in essential
role in U.S. military strategy in Asia and thePacific (Yoshimoto, 2019, p. 2).41 The militarybases in Okinawa provided one of the mostimportant permanent U.S. footholds in Asia,
continuing after Reversion to the present.

One of the best-known relief efforts benefitting
Okinawa’s recovery following World War II wasorganized by the Hawaiʻi United Okinawa
Relief Association, a civic organization thatsent 550 pigs from Omaha, Nebraska acrossthe Pacific to replenish Okinawa’s hog industry
crippled during the Battle of Okinawa. Before
the war, there were 140,000 pigs in Okinawa
but by the war’s end, only 2,000 remained. Inan event celebrated as “Pigs from the Sea,”
organizers raised $47,00034 and sent seven men
to accompany the pigs from Portland, Oregon
to Okinawa in a voyage that took nearly amonth and is credited with rejuvenating the35
hog industry in Okinawa (Chinen, 2004, p. 1).
Even today, this story is celebrated as one of
the seminal events that created a bond
between Okinawa and Hawai‘i (Higa, 1978;
Higa, 1974).36 However, an often overlooked
part of the story is the assistance of the U.S.
military in this and other relief efforts as they
provided the necessary transport vessels andassisted in the distribution of donations to the
Okinawan population (Kudaka, 2019). 37 Not
only did American military forces support
civilians in Okinawa displaced by war after the
Battle of Okinawa, but also Okinawan American
service members, who as part of the occupying
forces, shared the news of the devastation of
Okinawa with family members in Hawaiʻi.

Yet even before a formalized relationshipexisted between Japan and the United Statesthat sanctioned the presence of the American
military in Okinawa, American military officials
were already emphasizing the difference
between Okinawa and Japan to legitimize thecontinued occupation of Okinawa Prefecture
while re-legitimizing the rest of Japan’s
sovereignty. On June 1, 1944, the Office ofStrategic Services Research and Analysis
Branch (in Hawai‘i) released a report entitled“The Okinawans of the Loo Choo Islands: A
7

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APJ | JFJapanese Minority Group.” The report detailed
the historical difference between the twogroups in Hawai‘i in a section entitled“Cleavages” noting, “In these islands it is the
prejudice of the Japanese toward the
Okinawans about which we hear most (Tozzer,
4274).” Extrapolating from its observations on
Hawai‘i, the report foresaw the possibility ofusing the cleavage between mainland Japanand Ryūkyū along with previously Japaneseoccupied territories such as the MarshallIslands and Davao in the Philippines.
Highlighting this “natural” cleavage “foundedon racial differences together with those oflanguage and culture,” the report encouraged
the cultivation of differences between Japaneseand Okinawans during World War II (Tozzer,
84).43that of a Japanese citizen, formerly as “ShinNihonjin” residents of Okinawa Prefecture nor
a U.S. citizen by residing in a U.S.-occupied
territory. However, unlike Japan’s government
in the earlier twentieth century, the U.S.
occupation took an active role in promoting
Okinawan music and dance as part of its efforts
to separate Okinawa from Japan and referred
to its duties to control the local population as
47“civilian affairs activities” (Yoshimoto, 3).
Yoshimoto notes that when USCAR succeeded
the Military Government (MG), officials were
well aware that polls had indicated that many
Okinawans wanted to return to Japanesesovereignty. While reserving veto rights over
local legislation, “USCAR deployed public
relations campaigns to positively spin the U.S.
authority over Okinawa, while promoting afavorable image of the U.S. presence”(Yoshimoto, 5).48 Thus, U.S. officials referred to
Okinawans as “people” or “inhabitants” rather
than “citizens” and avoided the use of the term
“Okinawa,” its former name as a Japanese
prefecture. U.S. administrators instead
embraced the term “Ryukyus” to stress thedifferences between Okinawa and Japan andemphasize the region’s local and historical
identity. However, since most Americans were
unfamiliar with the name Ryūkyū, the term
“Okinawa” was used in Congress ingovernance, finance issues, and within the
media.

As military interest shifted to the occupation of
Okinawa by October of 1944, when it became
evident that Taiwan would not have to beoccupied by the U.S., the Murdock group,
which had been researching Okinawa,
produced a report that was published by the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations on
December 15, 1944. This report was entitled“Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu [Loochoo]Islands” and, like the June report, emphasized
the cleavage between Okinawans and Japanese(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1944,
p. 43).44 Masanao Kano has extensively detailed
efforts by the American military administration
to emphasize the differences between
Okinawans and Japanese and highlight theliberation of Okinawans from Japanese forces(Kano, n.d., pp. 54-56). 4 5 These efforts to
identify Okinawans as different from Japanese
were also consistent with subsequent efforts by
the Japanese government to justify thepresence of American military bases on
Okinawa rather than on the main four islandsof Japan (Allen, 2002, 7).46

Critical to this endeavor to cultivate a positive
image of the U.S. military and foster a separate
Okinawan identity were community-basedorganizations both in Okinawa and Hawai‘iwhich had experienced military rule andoccupation under martial law during WorldWar II (Scheiber and Scheiber, 1990, pp.
49341-378; Anthony, 1955). While scholars like
Yoshimoto focused on domestic events andorganizations in Okinawa that helped topropagate a positive view of the U.S. military,
this study focuses on the “public diplomacy”
that military officials engaged in with diasporicOkinawan communities, particularly in the

The Okinawan people faced a period ofstatelessness under the U.S. militaryoccupation where their legal status was neither8

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worthiness as American citizens-subjects
despite their minority “alien” status (Koikari,
52
2015, p. 12).

Pacific, as Okinawa provided important bases
for U.S. forces during the Korean and Vietnam
Wars. Yoshimoto notes that after World War II
and throughout the Cold War, the U.S.
“expanded its overseas public diplomacy andpublic affairs efforts” to minimize the inherent
contradiction between promoting democracy
abroad against “communism” while
maintaining a militarized presence in another50
sovereign state (Yoshimoto, 153).

Reconstituting
Identity

Hawaiian

Although Hawai‘i was granted statehood in
1959, it had been a hard-fought battle due tothe large number of non-whites in the Islands
that for many years had made Hawai‘i and its
residents seem “unfit”, indeed, an“impediment” to statehood (Hawaii Hochi,
1932, p. 1; Bell, 1984). 53 However, scholar
Christina Klein shows that during the Cold
War, this same multiethnic, multicultural,multilinguistic population was recast as an
asset as it was Hawai‘i’s “Asian population thatheld out the promise of securing access to themarkets and resources of Asia”, particularly
during the Cold War (Klein, 2004, p. 251). 54
Dean Itsuji Saranillio notes how the efforts ofJapanese Americans in the 442nd Regimental
Combat Team and 100th Infantry Battalion topromote their loyalty and assimilability also
helped statehood proponents to “further argue
for statehood by working though racialdifference, not extinguishing it” (Saranillio,
2018, p. 140). 5 5 This revisioning of Asian
Americans in the Islands coincided with local
Okinawan efforts in Hawai‘i to recast their“minority within a minority status,” tochallenge perceptions of racial inferiority, andto highlight their socio-economic ascendancy inthe postwar period. Koikari notes theinvolvement of Japanese Americans andOkinawan Americans in Hawai‘i who werestrongly pro-American, as an “indispensablepart” of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa(Koikari, 105). 56 It is important to note thatthese displays of loyalty and patriotism toAmerica within Okinawan American
communities in Hawai‘i, were not unique asother groups such as Chinese Americans werealso intent on highlighting their anti-communist
stance during the Cold War period, particularly
during the Korean War (Wu, 2014, p. 112). 57
However, their role in the relief and rebuilding
efforts spearheaded by the U.S. military tostabilize Okinawa helped to advance a

Okinawan

Located literally between East and West in the
Pacific Ocean, the expansion of the Universityof Hawai‘i had a role to play in Hawai’i’s public
diplomacy. The founding of the East-WestCenter, an international training and education
center that Congress established in 1960, one
year after the granting of statehood, wassignificant. At the East-West Center, students,
educators, and foreign leaders would be
imbued with “the American way of life” andreceive technical training and education under
the supervision of Baron Goto, a JapaneseAmerican educator, and head of East-WestCenter’s Institute for Technical Interchange(Kamins and Potter, 1998, p. 77).51 While Mire
Koikari focuses on the importance of the
University of Hawai‘i and the East-West Centerin Cold War domestic training and technicalinterchange, she also notes the centrality of
Hawai‘i Okinawans in the relief efforts thathighlighted their postwar integration in
America’s Cold War narrative of inclusivenessand multiculturalism:
As Japanese and Okinawan Americans in
Hawaii began to participate in the occupation
as educators, instructors, advisors, andtechnicians, their involvement not only
reinforced the American claim ofmulticulturalism and racial equality, but also
gave Hawaii’s immigrant communities
invaluable opportunities to assert their920 | 17 | 3

APJ | JFThe Role of Community-Based
Organizations in Promoting Cold War
Connections

narrative of military benevolence that
promoted statehood in Hawai‘i and themaintenance of military bases throughout Asia
58
and the Pacific (Saranillio, 2018, p. 14).

From the end of World War II until 1972, when
Okinawa was returned to Japan with U.S. bases
and military forces intact, USCAR
acknowledged the UOA as the official
representative of Okinawan Americans in
Hawai‘i. In this capacity, the UOA hosted
official visitors from Okinawa and participatedin various government-sponsored programs. On
September 21, 1951, when the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty was announced that separated
Okinawa from the rest of Japan, the various
member clubs united their relief efforts in a
ceremony held at the Nu‘uanu YMCA
auditorium and attended by over 300 people(Otani, 1951, p. 1). 62 The UOA resolved thatmembers unite to effectively help in therebuilding of Okinawa, to contribute to the“prosperity and welfare of Hawai‘i,” and “ inaccordance with the American principles ofliberty and equality by denouncing all alien,
destructive, and unpatriotic ideas.”63

Okinawan Americans in Hawai‘i were uniquely
positioned in the postwar period due to theirdifferentiation from Japanese Americans frommainland Japan and their descendants. This
separation from the wider Japanese American
community and their rising economic statusbecame the cornerstone of their unique identity
in the Islands (Atta and Atta, 1981, pp.
188-203; Nakasato and Taniguchi, 1981, pp.
204-216; Kimura, 1981, pp. 217-222; Hiura andTerada, 1981, pp. 223-232; Hokama, 1981, pp.
243-259). 5 9 Noriko Shimada notes theascendancy of the local Okinawan population in
Hawai‘i was due to the wealth they
accumulated both during and after the war thatin turn allowed Hawai‘i’s Okinawans tocontribute to postwar relief efforts in Okinawa.
Shimada argues, “the U.S. Occupation of Japanand U.S. military rule in Okinawa had a positive
influence on Okinawans in Hawai’i, by helping
them alleviate feelings of social and racial
inferiority (Shimada, 2012, p. 118).”60 In the
postwar years, the Okinawan community in
Hawai‘i for the first time attained a largely
positive self-image sharing in the benefits ofAmericanization (Koikari, 136-144; Asato,
2006; Tamura, 1994).61 Spearheading this effort
were community-based organizations in
Hawai‘i that eventually coalesced into one
unifying entity known as the Hawaii Okinawa
Rengo Kai, or United Okinawa Association(UOA), and was later renamed the Hawaii
United Okinawa Association (HUOA) in 1995.
The HUOA ultimately became therepresentative body for the local Okinawan
community in Hawaii that united the various
azasonjinkai (字村人会, villagers’ associations)that for years had remained separate due todifferent dialects and regional identities.

The emphasis on upholding American
principles of liberty and equality and thedenunciation of “alien, destructive, andunpatriotic ideas” also reflected Cold War fears
in the Islands. On October 7, 1949, theterritorial legislature passed a concurrent
resolution requesting the United States House
Committee on Un-American Activities to cometo Hawai‘i to investigate what it claimed werepotential “communist” threats that existed in
the territory. As a culmination of theinvestigations, one month before theinauguration of the UOA, authorities arrested
the “Hawaii Seven” who were tried under theSmith Act for: “(1) unlawfully, willfully, andknowingly to advocate and teach the duty andnecessity of overthrowing the Government of
the United States by force and violence, and (2)unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly to organizeand help organize as the Communist Party of
the United States of America a society, group10

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APJ | JFand assembly of persons who teach andadvocate the overthrow and destruction of theGovernment of the United States by force and64
violence” (Holmes, 1994, p. 190).

Affairs Section (G-5) of the US Army Pacific,
Fort Shafter, in Hawai‘i recognized that
Okinawans in Hawai‘i would be suitable
goodwill intermediaries since “they were
American citizens who knew the language of
Okinawan people and shared with them thesame ethnic background” (Adaniya, 1981, p.
330). 69 The program proved successful asevidenced by the U.S. Army’s expansion of the
Friendship Mission to include Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, the Philippines, and other countries
with an American presence. Thus, therelationship established among the U.S.
military, the UOA, and occupation authorities
helped to formalize transnational ties between
the Okinawan community in Hawai‘i and theirancestral homeland of Okinawa through acommon history of war and occupation(Ueunten, 2007, p. 57).70

Accusations of disloyalty were particularly
acute for Okinawans in Hawai‘i who were still
considered aliens until the McCarran-Walter
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
During World War II the Office of StrategicServices estimated that officials incarcerated
approximately 200 Okinawans (Tozzer, 60).65
Initial organizing efforts by the UOA were also
hindered by the questioning of several
Association leaders by officials from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service foralleged communist sympathies. Althoughnothing resulted from these inquiries, Ruth
Adaniya notes, “Rumors of communist
influences spread (Adaniya, 1981, p. 328).”66
Officials accused International Longshore andWarehouse Union (ILWU) leaders with
Okinawan ties, such as Tom Yagi, of communist
sympathies, and although he recalled the“hardship and embarrassment” placed upon
him and his family, he and 38 others who
became known as the “Reluctant 39” took theFifth Amendment as a matter of principle(Uchinanchu, 229).67 Thus, official declarationsof loyalty to the United States stated in thefounding resolutions of the UOA were designed
not only to deflect communist accusations
against the leaders but also to reflect the roleof the UOA in Okinawan American relations
during the Cold War.

The Question of Reversion within the
Okinawan Community in Hawai‘i
While UOA representatives welcomed officials,
students, and dignitaries from Okinawa, thequestion of the status of Okinawa and its
reversion to Japan was one of great debate
within the Okinawan community in Hawai‘i inthe postwar period. According to Mitsugu
Sakihara, many believed that “it would be in
the best interest of Okinawa to become a U.S.
territory” due to many Issei recalling theirearly life in poverty in Okinawa, stories of thebenefits of U.S. occupation, and the Nisei’sembrace of Americanization (Sakihara, 1981, p.
117).71 Casting doubts about American control
over Okinawa were individuals such as theReverend Jikai Yamasato of the Jikoen
Hongwanji where donations for relief efforts
were collected as well as Dr. Minoru Shinoda,
Assistant Professor of History at the Universityof Hawai‘i at Mānoa.72

In its capacity as the representative of
Okinawans in Hawai‘i, the UOA was importantin such programs as the Hawai‘i-Okinawa Farm
Youth Training Program started in 1953 thatbrought trainees from Okinawa to work andlive for six months with farmers in Hawai‘i(Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 1965, p. 5). 6 8 Of
particular significance is the Hawai‘i-Okinawa
Friendship Mission, which was started in 1959
as a way to foster better relations between
Americans and the people of Okinawa. The Civil

On August 27, 1960, Tom Yagi, International
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU)
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director on Maui returned from a trip to
Okinawa and addressed similar concerns about
continued U.S. control over Okinawans. He
reported, “Okinawans find their natural desire
for dignity and self-respect, frustrated by the
U.S. occupation. The majority want to become
part of the Japanese state.” He described how
members of the American occupation team
were living in “plush conditions,” while themajority of Okinawans were “poverty stricken.”
Yagi also questioned the humanitariannecessity of the U.S. presence in Okinawa,
alluding to the military importance of Okinawa
in the Cold War: “Many whom I talked to said
the US-Japanese treaty was not a document forpeace, but a stepping stone for another world
conflict between the so-called Free World andthe socialist countries of Red China andRussia.” While the Army had “no immediate
comment” after Yagi’s article was published,
Yagi’s claims were met with rebuttals fromother members in the Okinawan American
community, such as businessman Yets Higa,
who sponsored an “unofficial fact-finding tour”
to counter Yagi’s claims (Honolulu Advertiser,
73
1960, A-5). According to Higa, “Nobody is
starving in Okinawa,” adding that“[s]entimentally, perhaps, the Okinawan people
lean toward Japan. But they know that
economically and socially they are much betteroff under the U.S. I don’t think they’ll want tochange any time soon (Honolulu Advertiser,
1960, A-4).”74

treatment of Okinawans as a separate groupregarded as inferior by other Japanese in
75
Hawai‘i” (Kimura, 1968, p. 337). Additionally,
many held distinct cultural perspectives andspoke different dialects of Uchināguchi (沖縄口; ウチナーグチ) that separated various
groups. Thus, many hesitated to join an
organization that highlighted the distinct
Okinawan identity that had made them thetarget of prejudice by Naichi. Compounding
these issues of identity, prejudice andacculturation was likely the complicated status
of Okinawa itself to both the United States andJapan. Mitsugu Sakihara highlights thiscomplexity in the various name changes of the
UOA that reflected the changing status of
Okinawa during the Cold War from Hawaii
Okinawa-jin rengōkai (Hawaii United
Association of Okinawan people) to Okinawa
kenjin rengokai following the reversion of
Okinawa in 1972 (Sakihara, 118).76

Contemporary Understandings andChallenges to the American Military inIndigenous Politics and Identity
Until the 1972 Reversion to Japan the UOA’s
involvement in relief efforts and cultural
exchange as a liaison between Okinawa and theUnited States reinforced Okinawans’ sense of
distinctiveness from other Japanese in Hawai’i.
Moreover, these roles enhanced theirconnections to Okinawa, and their embrace of
Okinawan culture. Thus, much of the focus of
the UOA in the postwar period was centered on
cultural promotion that began as early as 1971
and coalesced in 1982 in the annual Okinawan
festival that celebrates Okinawan dance, music,
language, food, and history (McDermott, Tseng,and Maratzki, 1980, p. 124; Shimada, 2012, p.
131). 7 7 Revealingly, this celebration of
Okinawan culture through various activities led
by locality clubs (azasonjinkai) coincided withthe second Hawaiian Renaissance in the 1970s
that witnessed the embrace of Hawaiian music,

This debate, centered on Japanese andAmerican control over Okinawa, also reflected
the ambivalence within the community
regarding the relationship between Okinawans
and Naichi due to experiences of prejudice anddiscrimination against Okinawans in Hawai‘i aswell as Japan. Previous efforts to unify thevarious local clubs had failed for several
reasons, including “considerable opposition toforming such an exclusively ‘all Okinawan’group on the grounds that special recognitionof Okinawans represented a reversal of theirpast collective efforts to eliminate prejudicial
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language, dance, and other cultural practices.
The Hawaiian Renaissance also renewed calls
for activism against militarism anddevelopment in rural areas and on other islands
besides O‘ahu (Goodyear- Kaʻōpua, Hussey, andWright, 2014).78 However, perceptions of theneed for this kind of political activism against
the military in both Hawai‘i and Okinawa areuncommon among most Okinawans in Hawai‘i,with a few notable exceptions. While many
Okinawans in Hawaiʻi embraced the cultural
awakening of the 1960s Civil Rights and Asian
American movements, there was community
silence concerning the anti-war and anti-draft
movement that inspired and mobilized otherethnic communities at this time to engage inradical political protest (Fong, 2008, pp.
299-300). 7 9 Many also did not criticallycomment of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanand the important corollary issues related tocivil rights and militarism. This absence andthe conservative pro-American nature of
Okinawan identity in Hawai‘i should beunderstood within Hawai‘i’s complicatedhistory of colonialism and imperialism with
Asian immigrants, who are often accused ofcomplicity in the subjugation of indigenous
peoples (Okamura and Fujikane, 2008).80 Still
today there is relative silence from the HUOA
regarding the growing anti-war movement in
Okinawa based in part on the recognition ofindigenous rights.

Americans in Hawai‘i implicitly rejectedcommonalities with other colonized andindigenous peoples, despite their own
experiences with imperial Japan and later
America. However, the very complexity of thisissue and the variety of responses to thenarrativeofAmericanmilitary
benevolence—that IWLU leader Tom Yagi
challenged—demonstrate differences andcomplexity even among settlers who mustnavigate between different colonizing forces
and interests (Elkins and Pederson, 2005, p. 4;
82
Saranillio, 2018, p. 74).
Additionally, the promotion of a conservative
diasporic Okinawan American identity is
consistent with Japan’s complicatedrelationship with Okinawa and its celebrationof American ideals of freedom and liberty at theexpense of Okinawans. 8 3 The Japanese
government has actively suppressed Okinawan
free speech and expression, particularly
concerning the expansion of American militarybases. 84 In response, local organizers have
convened large anti-base demonstrations andOkinawan residents have elected anti-basegovernors who have refused to sign leases tomaintain the bases (Ota, 1999, p. 205;
McCormack and Norimatsu, 2012; Johnson,
85
1997, pp. 389-397; Smith, 2014). Base
opponents call for the removal of the bases
because of their negative impacts on theenvironment, multiple, high profile rapes andsexual assaults by US servicemen and civilian
workers of local Okinawan women and men,and the economic dependency of some on the
U.S. military presence for employment on thebases and by mainland Japanese contractors
servicing them (Suzuyo, 2016; Johnson, 1999).86
Despite this opposition, from a macropoliticalperspective the Japanese and American
governments rely upon the continued U.S.
military base presence in Okinawa Prefecture
to fulfill the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security
Alliance and Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA).87

Many Asian American communities in Hawai‘i,
while embracing cultural elements of their
distinctiveness, also feel part of a “local”
culture that is both a unifying andhomogenizing influence, to the extent that
activist Chris K. Iijima notes that “onlyHawaiians’ indigenous culture—now resurgent
after centuries of assault—can lay claim tobeing the authentic ‘local’ one” (Louie andOmatsu, 2006, p. 9; Darrah-Okike, 2020, p. 5).81
Thus, in promoting their assimilability in the
postwar period, which was highlighted in their
participation in relief efforts that were
supported by the U.S. military, many Okinawan
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Okinawa and Hawai‘i would be sites ofAmerica’s soft diplomacy efforts that witnessed
the emergence of an Okinawan American
identity in Hawaiʻi focused on culture, arts, andcuisine, thus overlooking the militarized,
gendered, and inherently unequal position of
Okinawa in the U.S.-Japan bilateral security
alliance. 9 0 In this context, legacies ofimperialism and militarism still impact andcomplicate Okinawan American identity today,
particularly concerning recent campaigns toreclaim indigenous rights in both Okinawa and
Hawai‘i and growing opposition to theAmerican military presence in Okinawa.91

Conclusion
As Asian settlers in Hawai‘i, Okinawan
Americans embody a unique paradox
highlighting their indigeneity within acolonized land. The postwar period represents
the renaissance of Hawai‘i Okinawan identity
and the embrace of the traditional elements ofa once derided culture by Okinawan Americans
that was consistent with the U.S.’s liberalmulticultural narrative during the Cold War.
While Okinawan Americans celebrated theirsuccess and ascension in the postwar period
through their participation in relief efforts andcelebration of Okinawan culture, thedetrimental effects of U.S. imperialism andmilitarism were overshadowed in the liberalmulticultural environment of the Cold War thatsanctioned militarism, expansion, andconquest.88

The experiences of Hawai‘i’s Okinawan
Americans in the postwar period and thepresent highlight an important recognition of
settler colonialism by Uchinanchu and thelegacies of war and imperialism in both Hawai‘iand Okinawa. Their experience also reveals
how Uchinanchu identity is an ongoing processof negotiation and recalibration among various
groups and interests struggling to define theirrelationship with each other, the land,
economics, militarism, and politics (Roher,
2016, pp. 55-64).92 The Hawai‘i United Okinawa
Association and other cultural organizations
emerging from the Cold War era continue tomaintain a visible presence in Hawaiʻi today,even as both Okinawan and JapaneseAmericans are largely recognized asassimilated into the mainstream society in thecommunities throughout the Hawaiian Islands.

By promoting goodwill relief efforts among
Okinawan community organizations in Hawaiʻiand through the rebuilding of Okinawa, theU.S. attempted to justify the militaryoccupation of Okinawa and its base-centeredeconomy. Thus, the emergence of Okinawan
and Okinawan American identities in the postWorld War II period reflected America’s Cold
War “public diplomacy”. The Cold War played
an important role in Asian Americans’transition from a “yellow peril” to a “model
minority” in which Okinawan Americans
experienced the economic and educational
achievements of Chinese, Japanese, andKoreans (Odo, n.d., p. 229). 89 Indeed, both

Kelli Y. Nakamura is an Associate Professor at Kapi‘olani Community College. Her researchinterests focus on Japanese and Japanese American history, and she has published articles in
Amerasia, the Historian, the Pacific Historical Review, and the Hawaiian Journal of History
where she currently serves as a co-editor. She also teaches in the Ethnic Studies and History
Department at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa focusing on gender and race during WorldWar II.
14

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Brandon Marc Higa is a third-generation Okinawan American attorney with a Juris Doctor(J.D.) degree from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa William S. Richardson School of Law.
Higa received a National Security Education Program David L. Boren Graduate Fellowship to
conduct post-graduate field research on the U.S. military presence in Japan while attending
Stanford University’s Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies. Higa is analumnus of the University of Southern California (BA/MA in International Relations) and iscurrently a doctoral candidate at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa’s Doctor of Juridical
Sciences (S.J.D.) program.

Notes
1

Tarō Higa, 移民は生きる / 比嘉太郎編著: Imin wa ikiru (Tōkyō: Nichibei Jihōsha, 1974), 171.
While the name 安慶名三郎could be read Akena Saburō, Agena is the more common reading
and the 1940 United States Federal Census lists a “Saburo Agena” living in Makawao, Maui,
Hawai‘i. Year: 1940; Census Place: Makawao, Maui, Hawaii; Roll: m-t0627-04591; Page: 3B;
Enumeration District: 5-15.
2
Postwar development efforts implemented by the United States Civil Administration of the
Ryūkyū Islands (USCAR) were critical, for example, in the establishment of the University of
the Ryūkyūs (琉球大学, Ryūkyū Daigaku), abbreviated to Ryūdai (琉大) as the first institutionof higher education in the Ryūkyū Islands on May 22, 1950. The university was an essential
component of the redevelopment of the postwar occupied territory. See: University of Hawaii
and Okinawa’s University of the Ryukyus Celebrate 20th Anniversary of their SisterUniversity Relationship,” University of Hawai‘i News (Oct. 14, 2008). However, Okinawa
remains the poorest of Japan’s 47 prefectures with comparatively higher poverty rates (37.5%
of Okinawan households; nearly triple that of the other 46 prefectures) and an average annual
income of roughly 70% of similar jobs on mainland Japan. See: Ministry of Health, Labor, andWelfare Bureau of Family Affairs Division of Home Welfare, ひとり親家庭の現状と支援施策について[Hitori Oya Kamei no Genjō to Shien Shisaku ni Tsuite/ Report: Status of Single-Parent
Families and Support Measures (Nov. 2, 2021); see also Steve Rabson, “Henoko and the U.S.
Military: A History of Dependence and Resistance,” 10:4:2 The Asia-Pacific Journal (January
16, 2012).
3
Kirsten L. Ziomek, Lost Histories: Recovering the Lives of Japan’s Colonial People(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2019).
4
Uchinanchu, a History of Okinawans in Hawaii (Honolulu: Ethnic Studies Program,
University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, 1981), 224. Japanese in Hawai‘i recognized Okinawan
immigrants as distinct from them and were critical of particular cultural practices such as
tattooing women’s hands as tattoos were associated with criminals and outcasts.
5
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York, NY: W.W.
Norton & Co., 2001), 54.
6
The dispossession of Okinawan landowners through the U.S. military’s confiscation of land
during the postwar occupation remains a source of resentment among Okinawans, as well as
a hotly contested legal and political issue. Although the U.S. government subsequently
implemented a land leasing system to provide compensation to Okinawan landowners, someformer landowners were entirely dispossessed due to the loss of records of land ownership15

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predating the war and the massive casualties during the Battle of Okinawa. Surviving
landowners were either able to reclaim their land or were awarded parcels of land by the U.S.
occupying forces. These landowners eventually received compensation through leasing
agreements authorizing the continued use of Okinawan land parcels for use by the U.S.
military following the 1972 reversion. Notably, Governor Masahide Ota refused to sign theland leases, alleging that he had an obligation under the Local Autonomy Law not to authorize
uses for Okinawa’s lands in a manner that threatens the human security of Okinawan citizens.
Saikō Saibansho [Supreme Court of Japan/SCOJ] Aug. 28, 1996, Gyo-tsu no. 90, Saikō
Saibansho Hanreishū [Saikō Saibansho web] (Japan) (SCOJ’s Grand Bench denying Governor
Ota’s appeal challenging the constitutionality of the Japanese National Government enforcing
the governor’s duty under Article 36(5) of the Land Expropriation Law to re-authorize the useof lands for U.S. military under the SOFA); Masahide Ota, “Governor Ota at the Supreme
Court of Japan,” in Chalmers A. Johnson, Okinawa: Cold War Island. Edited by Chalmers
Johnson. (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999). The Okinawa Prefectural
Government has renewed its stance against the renewal of land leases under current
Governor Denny Tamaki and has launched legal challenges opposing the construction of a
new military installation in Henoko. See Gavan McCormack, “The Henoko Base Project:
Okinawa’s Tamaki Government at the Brink,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 16:24:2 (2018); Andrew
Daisuke Stewart, “Kayano v. Hokkaidō Expropriation Committee Revisited: Recognition of
Ryūkyūans as a Cultural Minority Under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, an Alternative Paradigm for Okinawan Demilitarization,” Asian-Pacific Law and Policy
Journal 4:2 at 418-26 (2003).
7“Okinawa, Ambivalence, Identity, and Japan.” In Japan’s Minorities (USA: Routledge: 2009),
210–227
8
Uchinanchu, a History of Okinawans in Hawaii, 53.
9Uchinanchu, a History of Okinawans in Hawaii, 55.
10Uchinanchu, a History of Okinawans in Hawaii, 41.
11
Ronald Y. Nakasone, Okinawan Diaspora (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002), 200.
12
Uchinanchu, a History of Okinawans in Hawaii, 41. Due to the prominence of Okinawans in
the hog raising industry prior to the war, Okinawans were uniquely positioned to capitalize on
the demand for pork during World War II. Uchinanchu, a History of Okinawans in Hawaii,
217.
13
Mitsugu Sakihara, “Discrimination overcome: Okinawan immigrant gains seen at 80th,”
Honolulu Advertiser, 13 January 1980, 15.
14
The Office of Strategic Services estimated that officials incarcerated approximately 200
Okinawans during the war although specific individuals were not identified. Alfred M. Tozzer,
United States Office of Strategic Services, Okinawan Studies, Volume 3: The Okinawans of
the Loo Choo Islands: Japanese Minority Group (Honolulu: Office of Strategic Services, 1944),
86.
15
These actions by the Okinawan population in Hawai‘i seem separate from efforts by theJapanese population in the Islands to support the Japanese military. John J. Stephan, Hawaii
Under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plan for Conquest After Pearl Harbor (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1984), 30-33.
16“Fraternization With POWs Held Problem Here,” Hawaii Times, 26 September 1945, 2.

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17

Gwenfread Allen, Hawaii’s War Years: 1941-1945 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1950), 196.
18
“Okinawans Need Clothes Group Says, Announcing Drive,” Honolulu Advertiser, 30
November 1945, 3; “Clothing Drive to Aid Okinawans Will Open Here Monday,” Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, 1 December 1945, 7.
19
Many knew of family members still in Okinawa or had attended school in Okinawa and tried
to coax civilians out of the hundreds of caves in Okinawa before American forces blasted themshut in an effort to secure the island. The Nisei of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) havebeen particularly credited with saving thousands of Okinawan and Japanese due to theirfluency in the Okinawan hōgen [dialect] that allowed them to reassure the people hiding incaves and burial chambers that it was safe to come out. This was a particularly challenging
assignment as Japanese soldiers were often mixed with the civilians who discouraged andeven prevented civilians from surrendering upon the threat of being shot. Joseph Daniel
Harrington, Yankee Samurai: The Secret Role of Nisei in America’s Pacific Victory (Detroit:
Pettigrew Enterprises, 1979), 317-318; Tarō Higa, Memoirs of a Certain Nisei,
1916-1985=Aru Nisei No Wadachi (Kāneʻohe, Hawaiʻi: Higa Publications, 1988), 160-161.
20
Tarō Higa, 移民は生きる / 比嘉太郎編著.; Imin wa ikiru (Tōkyō: Nichibei Jihōsha, 1974),
166.
21
The persistent rumors of Japan’s victory even in the postwar period, which has been
documented in primary sources, is of great interest to scholars as it shows that even within
diasporic communities, pro-Japanese sentiment prevailed among some members. John J.
Stephan, Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan’s Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 172; Andrew W. Lind, The Japanese in Hawaii
Under Wartime Conditions (Honolulu, New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1943), 21; Yukiko Kimura, “Rumor Among the Japanese,” Social Process in Hawaii
Vol. XI (May 1947): 84-85; The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory (RASRL), A-1989:
006, Box 10-11, “A Former Hissho-Kai Leader Aiding Relief Projects for Japan: Exposes Inner
Activities of ‘Katta-To,” 22 July 1948, 1; The Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory(RASRL), A-1989: 006, Box 10-11, “Interview with Mr. Tokuzo Shibayama—advisor of HisshoKai,” 9 July 1948, 1.
22“THE ORIGIN OF THE OKINAWA CLOTHING RELIEF DRIVE IN HAWAII,” Collection of
Chizu Inoue, Hiroaki Hara, Dan Nakasone, Hawai‘i United Okinawa Association archives.
23“THE ORIGIN OF THE OKINAWA CLOTHING RELIEF DRIVE IN HAWAII,” Collection of
Chizu Inoue, Hiroaki Hara, Dan Nakasone, Hawai‘i United Okinawa Association archives.
24
Headquarters Ryukyus Command Military Government, Labor & Welfare department,“Ryukyus”, Hawai‘i United Okinawa Association archives; Thomas. S. Rogers, “The Licensed
Agencies for Relief in Asia: Esther B. Rhoads and Humanitarian Efforts in Postwar Japan,
1946-1952,” Quaker History 83: 1 (Spring 1994): 18-33.
25“Chronology highlights Okinawan years,” Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 22 September 1985, 44.
26
Photo Album: Marine Corps Installations Pacific by Nika Nashiro, “Okinawa, Hawai‘i Reflectof Postwar Relief Efforts, Reaffirming Spirit of Yuimaaru,” Defense Visual Information
Distribution Service, 18 January, 2019.
27
Photo Album: Marine Corps Installations Pacific by Nika Nashiro, “Okinawa, Hawai‘i Reflectof Postwar Relief Efforts, Reaffirming Spirit of Yuimaaru,” Defense Visual Information17

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Distribution Service, 18 January, 2019.
28
Okinawans in North America also contributed to relief efforts directly to Okinawa as theseparation of Okinawa from Japan during the American occupation resulted in most aid toJapan failing to reach Okinawa. “Okinawa Medical Group to Hold Meeting Oct. 28,” Honolulu
Advertiser, 17 October 1951, 13; “Okinawa Medical Relief Association Soliciting Funds to Buy
Supplies,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 31 January 1950, 23; Ruth Adaniya, “United Okinawan
Association of Hawaii,” in Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii, ed. Ethnic Studies
Oral History Project (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1981), 327. Ben Kobashigawa,“On the History of the Okinawans in North America,” Amerasia, 12:2 (1985), 29-42.
29
Okinawa Relief Group Launches $30,000 Drive,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 12 November
1948, 6; “Drive to Aid Okinawa With Goats at Half Way Point With $15,000,” Honolulu StarBulletin, 4 January 1949, 2; “Local Men Arrive in Okinawa With Goats,” Honolulu StarBulletin, 23 June 1949, 18; “Local Men Back from Okinawa Urge Aid for Isle,” Honolulu
Advertiser, 16 August 1949, 7.
30
Photo Album: Marine Corps Installations Pacific by Nika Nashiro, “Okinawa, Hawai‘i Reflectof Postwar Relief Efforts, Reaffirming Spirit of Yuimaaru,” Defense Visual Information
Distribution Service, 18 January, 2019.
31
By 1949, there were 1,294 Okinawans in America who also supported various relief efforts,
spurred by efforts led by Shingi Nakamura and Shinsei Kōchi who were sent to Japan as partof the American government’s Atomic Bomb Casualties Commission. History of the
Okinawans in North America (Los Angeles, California: Okinawan Club of America and the
Asian American Studies Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1988), 113.
32
Photo Album: Marine Corps Installations Pacific by Nika Nashiro, “Okinawa, Hawai‘i Reflectof Postwar Relief Efforts, Reaffirming Spirit of Yuimaaru,” Defense Visual Information
Distribution Service, 18 January, 2019.
33“Okinawans Stop Factional Rifts and Pledge Hearty Teamwork,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 27
March 1950, 3. By 1968, Yukiko Kimura estimated that there were approximately 35,000
Okinawans out of a total of about 225,000 Japanese, two-thirds of whom were Hawai‘i-born.
In 1932, the Japanese Consulate of Honolulu published a population report that revealed thatmost Okinawans in Hawai‘i were concentrated in rural areas on O‘ahu and on Hawai‘i Island.
United States Office of Strategic Services, and Alfred M. Tozzer, Okinawan Studies Volume 3,
The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands: a Japanese Minority Group (Honolulu, Hawaii: Officeof Strategic Services, 1944), 58.
34
The equivalent of more than $570,000 in current U.S. dollars based on an inflation rate of
1,112.8% from 1948 to 2022. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics(accessed Jun. 27, 2022).
35
Karleen C. Chinen, “‘Pigs from the Sea,’ 1948 Aloha Mission to Okinawa Comes to theBlaisdell Concert Hall,” Hawaii Herald 25:8 (April 23, 2004): 1.
36
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) made a documentary of this event and in 2004, a
performance was held at the Blaisdell Concert Hall in Honolulu. Numerous books in Japanese
have also detailed this and other relief efforts in the postwar period. Takenobu Higa, Hawai
Ryūkyū geinō shi = History of Ryukyuan accomplishment in Hawaii (Honolulu: Higa
Takenobu, 1978); Tarō Higa, 移民は生きる[Imin wa ikiru=The Immigrant Lives] Tōkyō:
Nichibei Jihōsha, 1974.

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37

Shoji Kudaka, “A little tale about Okinawa’s pigs from the sea,” Stars and Stripes Okinawa,
February 10, 2019, accessed August 25, 2020. U.S. public diplomacy efforts include activities
promoting community engagement between the U.S. forces in Okinawa and hostcommunities. These narratives, however, make little or no mention of U.S. destruction of
Okinawa during the Battle for the Islands which took so heavy a toll on Okinawan andJapanese lives.
38
Goodwill efforts also exist in Hawai‘i, another highly militarized island, where scholars
Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull note that “The local newspapers are saturated withmilitary coverage, ranging from reports on changes in personnel to coverage of military ‘Good
Samaritan’ activities, to local protests against stray bombs and hazardous materials stored
near schools.” These goodwill efforts help to naturalize the military whose presence is“desirable, and constructive, therefore welcome.” Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, Oh,
Say, Can You See?: The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1999), 2, xiii.
39
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public
Affairs, 2004), 5, 11. The U.S. military and USCAR’s postwar relief efforts in Okinawa
promoted the American way of life notably including the use of the U.S. dollar and English
language.
40
Yujin Yaguchi, “Japanese Reinvention of Self through Hawai‘i’s Japanese Americans” PacificHistorical Review 83:2 (May 2014): 333-349.
41
Hideko Yoshimoto, U.S. Occupation of Okinawa: A Soft Power Theory Approach (Victoria,
Australia: Trans Pacific Press, 2019), 2.
42
United States Office of Strategic Services, and Alfred M. Tozzer, Okinawan Studies Volume
3, The Okinawans of the Loo Choo Islands: a Japanese Minority Group (Honolulu, Hawaii:
Office of Strategic Services, 1944), 74.
43
Okinawan Studies Volume 3, The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands, 84.
44
United States. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands([Washington]: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept., 1944), 43.
45
Masanao Kano, 戦後 沖縄 の 思想像 [Sengo Okinawa no shisōzō] (Tōkyō: Asahi
Shinbunsha, n.d.,), 54-56.
46
Matthew Allen, Identity and Resistance in Okinawa (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 7.
47
Yoshimoto, 3.
48
Yoshimoto, 5.
49Martial law involved the outright suspension of constitutional liberties as civilian courts
were declared closed, all government functions—federal, territorial, and municipal—were
placed under Army control, and a military regime was established. The commanding generaldeclared himself the “military governor” of Hawai‘i and he controlled the entire civilian
population with absolute discretionary powers. Harry N. Scheiber and Jane L. Scheiber,“Constitutional Liberty in World War II: Army Rule and Martial Law in Hawaii: 1941-1946,”
Western Legal History 3:2 (1990): 341-378; J. Garner Anthony, Hawaii Under Army Rule
(Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1955).
50
Yoshimoto, 153.
51
Robert Kamins and Robert Potter, Mālamalama: A History of the University of Hawaii
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(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 77.
52
Mire Koikari, Cold War Encounters in US-Occupied Okinawa: Women, Militarized
Domesticity, and Transnationalism in East Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press,2015), 12.
53“The Finger Points,” Hawaii Hochi, 14 January 1932, 1; Roger Bell, Last Among Equals:
Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1984).
54
Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 251.
55
Saranillio, 140.
56
Koikari, 105.
57
Ellen D. Wu, The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 112.
58
Dean Itsuji Saranillio, Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawaiʻi Statehood(Duke University Press, 2018), 14.
59
George Atta and Claudia M. Atta, “Okinawans and Business,” in Uchinanchu: A History of
Okinawans in Hawaii, ed. Ethnic Studies Oral History Project (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i
Press, 1981), 188-203; George M. Nakasato and Chad Taniguchi, “Okinawans in Hawaiian
Agriculture: Poultry and Vegetable Crops,” in Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii,
ed. Ethnic Studies Oral History Project (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1981),
204-216; Yukiko Kimura, “Okinawans and Hog Industry in Hawaii,” in Uchinanchu: A Historyof Okinawans in Hawaii, ed. Ethnic Studies Oral History Project (Honolulu: University of
Hawai‘i Press, 1981), 217-222; Arnold T. Hiura and Vinnie K. Terada, “Okinawan Involvementin Hawaii’s Labor Movement,” in Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii, ed. Ethnic
Studies Oral History Project (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1981), 223-232; Lillian Y.
Hokama, “Okinawan Participation in the Legislature,” in Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans
in Hawaii, ed. Ethnic Studies Oral History Project (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press,
1981), 243-259.
60
Noriko Shimada, “The Emergence of Okinawan Ethnic Identity in Hawai’i: Wartime andPostwar Experiences,” The Japanese Journal of American Studies 23 (2012): 118.
61
Koikari, 136-144. The pro-American stance of the Okinawan community in the postwar
period was much different from the Americanization efforts experienced in the Japanesecommunity during the 1930s (and by the Nisei during World War II) as traditional Okinawan
values were celebrated as part of Cold War multiculturalism. This difference highlighted theincompatibility of the alleged un-American values of Japanese culture in an effort to close
Japanese language schools that were thought to promote “Mikado worship” due to thegrowing military threat of Japan. In both instances, however, military considerations would
promote a positive or negative view of Japanese and Okinawan culture. Noriko Asato,
Teaching Mikadoism: The Attack on Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii, California, andWashington, 1919-1927 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2006); Eileen Tamura,
Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity: the Nisei Generation in Hawaii (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1994).
62
Curtis Otani, “14 Okinawa Clubs in Unity Ceremony,” Honolulu Advertiser, 22 September
1951, 1.
63
Adaniya, 328.
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64

Michael T. Holmes, The Specter of Communism in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1994), 190. Those arrested were Jack Hall, regional director of the International
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) ; John Reinecke, former teacher; Jack Kimoto, an
employee of the Honolulu Record; Koji Ariyoshi, editor of the Honolulu Record; Jim Freeman,mechanic; Charles Fujimoto announced chair of the Communist Party of Hawaiʻi; and Eileen
Fujimoto, wife of Charles Fujimoto and secretary at the ILWU Longshore Local 136.
65
Okinawan Studies Volume 3, The Okinawans of the Loo Choo Islands, 60. One year later, in
1952, the United States Senate and House of Representatives voted on the McCarran-Walter
Act that allowed Japanese immigrants to become naturalized U.S. citizens.
66
Adaniya, 328.
67
Uchinanchu, a History of Okinawans in Hawaii, 229.
68
“Isle YF’s Travel to Okinawa, California,” Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 17 January 1965, 5.
69Adaniya, 330.
70
Wesley Ueunten highlights “the conservative pro-American nature of the U.O.A. thatdeveloped as a result of its close association with the U.S. military and its formation during
the Cold War” that helped to build a unique transnationalism between Hawai‘i and Okinawa
that still exists today. Wesley Iwao Ueunten, “The Okinawan Revival in Hawaiʻi:
Contextualizing Culture and Identity over Diasporic Time and Space” PhD Dissertation
University of California, Berkeley, 2007, 57.
71
Mitsugu Sakihara, “Okinawans in Hawaii: An Overview of the Past 80 Years,” in
Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii, ed. Ethnic Studies Oral History Project(Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1981), 117.
72
Minoru Shinoda, “Okinawa’s Status Is Challenge to U.S. In Asia,” Honolulu Advertiser, 27
December 1959, E-18.
73“Okinawa is Fine Shape Says Higa,” Honolulu Advertiser, 22 September 1960, A-5.
74
“Army Spokesperson Has No Comment,” Honolulu Advertiser, 27 August 1960, A-4.
75
Yukiko Kimura, “Locality Clubs as Basic Units of the Social Organization of the Okinawans
in Hawaii,” Phylon 29 (December 1968): 337.
76
Mitsugu Sakihara, “Okinawans in Hawaii: An Overview of the Past 80 Years,” in
Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii, ed. Ethnic Studies Oral History Project(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1981), 118. Although descendants of Okinawan
immigrants to Hawaii share unity in the local “Uchinanchu” identity perpetuated by the
HUOA, this consolidation of the multitude of Okinawan identities overlooks the plurality of
dialects, cultural histories, religious beliefs and practices, and geographical context ofdistinct communities across the Okinawan Islands. The azasonjinkai were more
representative of the diversity of indigenous groups of Okinawan people but were assimilated
into a consolidated representative body after 1972. Alternative Report to the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)(Jul. 2018), Association of the Indigenous
Peoples in the Ryukyus (AIPR).
77
Anthropologist William P. Lebra describes the 1950s to 1970s as a period of Okinawan“cultural florescence” while scholar Noriko Shimada states that the development of
Uchinanchu cultural realization began a few years earlier. John F. McDermott, Wen-Shing
Tseng, and Thomas W. Maretzki. People and Cultures of Hawaii: a Psychocultural Profile(Honolulu: John A. Burns School of Medicine: University Press of Hawai‘i, 1980), 124;
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Shimada, 131. See generally The Okinawan Festival, Hawai‘i United Okinawa Association.
78
High profile protests against development and militarism occurred in places such as
Kahoʻolawe, Kalama Valley, and Waiāhole/Waikāne. Noelani Goodyear-Kaʻōpua, Ikaika
Hussey, and Erin Kahunawaikaʻala Wright. A Nation Rising: Hawaiian Movements for Life,
Land, and Sovereignty (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).
79
Timothy P. Fong, The Contemporary Asian American Experience: Beyond the Model
Minority (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2008), 299-300.
80
Jonathan Okamura and Candace Fujikane, eds., Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local
Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press,
2008).
81
Steve Louie, and Glenn Omatsu, Asian Americans: The Movement and the Moment (LosAngeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 2006), 9; Jennifer Darrah‐Okike,“Theorizing Race in Hawai‘i: Centering Place, Indigeneity, and Settler Colonialism” Sociology
Compass 14: 7 (2020), 5.
82
Historians Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson note that “Settler colonialism in thetwentieth century is thus marked by ongoing negotiation and struggle among four key groups:
an imperial metropole where sovereignty formally resides, a local administration charged
with maintaining order and authority, an indigenous population significant enough in size andtenacity to make its presence felt, and an often demanding and well-connected settler
community.” Thus, settler colonialism is never a uniform experience, identity, or
understanding as there have always been a dynamic relationship between federal, state,
military, native, and settler interests. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson, eds., Settler
Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (New York: Routledge,
2005), 4; Saranillio, 74.
83
American democratic principles were well-established in other western nations when Japan
adopted its postwar Constitution under the U.S. occupation in 1947, replacing the Meiji
Constitution of 1889. Japan’s postwar constitution reflects a liberal democracy with legal
traditions of the United States, guaranteeing certain fundamental rights of its citizens. The
overhaul of the previous Meiji Constitution was primarily intended to totally transform Japan
into a democratic, demilitarized, and capitalist state that respected individual rights of its
citizens. Whereas the Emperor was previously regarded as the official head of state, thepostwar Constitution limited the Emperor’s powers to primarily serve a symbolic role.
Notably, Japanese citizens gained substantive rights through Chapter 3 pertaining to the
Rights and Duties of the People (Articles 10-40). Whereas Japanese citizens were previously
referred to as subjects of the Emperor under the Meiji Constitution, the postwar Constitution
added a spectrum of individual rights in alignment with Western democratic norms andfundamental human rights. It is important to note that the postwar Constitution was not inforce in Okinawa a U.S.-military colony that was separated from Japan until the 1972
reversion.
84
Nihonkoku kenpō [Constitution], art. 21 (Japan) (“Article 21. Freedom of assembly andassociation as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No
censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication beviolated”).
85
Former Okinawa Prefecture Governor Masahide Ota refused to sign leases on behalf oflandowners, under Japan’s Land Acquisition Law, who were unwilling to renew leases for22

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exclusive use by U.S. military bases. The Japanese central government attempted to
intimidate Governor Ota into signing the leases. The Prime Minister of Japan sued Ota under
the Local Autonomy Law seeking “a court order for the governor to execute the duties
delegated to him [to sign the leases].” The Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch ruled in favor of
the Prime Minister. Ota appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan and lost in a verdict
announced on August 28, 1996. See Masahide Ota, Governor Ota at the Supreme Court ofJapan, in Chalmers A. Johnson, Okinawa: Cold War Island. Edited by Chalmers Johnson.
(Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 205; Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka
Norimatsu. Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States (Lanham, Md:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2012); Chalmers Johnson, “ESSAY—The Okinawan Rape Incident andthe End of the Cold War in East Asia,” California Western International Law Journal 27: 2,
Article 6 (1997): 389-397; Sheila A. Smith, “The Constancy of Contest with Okinawa,” Forbes
Asia (Jan. 27, 2014).
86
Takazato Suzuyo, “Okinawan Women Demand U.S. Forces Out After Another Rape andMurder: Suspect an ex-Marine and U.S. Military Employee,” Asia-Pacific Journal 14:11:4(2016); Chalmers Johnson, Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy ResearchInstitute, 1999).
87
Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, Agreement Under
Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the UnitedStates of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed
Forces in Japan, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652.
88
Saranillio explains that “U.S. ambitions for global hegemony during the Cold War founddiscursive alliance with portrayals of Hawai‘i as a racially harmonious U.S. state and selectednarrations of Japanese American loyal service, setting state-led antiracist narratives to publicmemory through global circulation, entertainment, and publicity, while colonial narratives of
Hawaii’s occupation by the United States were designed for historical deletion” (Saranillio,
14).
89Franklin Odo, ed., Finding a Path Forward: Asian American Pacific Islander National
Historic Landmarks Theme Study (Washington D.C.: National Historic Landmarks Program,
National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, n.d.), 229.
90
Laura Hein and Mark Selden note that “What it means to be Okinawan is being contested,
redefined, and inscribed in the consciousness and praxis of Okinawans today” highlighting
the difficulty of defining a very fluid identity. Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Islands of
Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power (USA: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 1.
91
The authors acknowledge the conflicting viewpoints among Okinawans in Japan regarding
defining Okinawans as an indigenous people. Okinawans are recognized as indigenous
peoples by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
legitimized as unique indigenous peoples in Japan who have endured a history of colonialism
and imperialism. However, the Japanese government does not formally recognize Okinawans
as an indigenous people and there is reluctance among Okinawan citizens and government
officials in being referred to as indigenous peoples. Patrick Heinrich and Fija Bairon, “Wanne
Uchinanchu–I am Okinawan. Japan, the U.S. and Okinawa’s Endangered Languages,” The
Asia-Paciﬁc Journal 5:11 (2007): 1–19. See generally Brandon Marc Higa, “Okinawa andHuman Rights Scholarship in the Law and Japan Field: A Bibliographic Compilation,” Asia23

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Pacific Law and Policy Journal 22:1 (2021).
92
Scholar Judy Roher applies Patrick Wolfe’s five elements of settler colonialism to Hawaii
and notes that it is 1.) Structure, Not an Event; 2.) The Central Focus Is Land; 3.) Logic of
Elimination; 4.) Reliance on Imported Labor; 5.) Nonnatives Replace Natives. Judy Roher,
Staking Claim: Settler Colonialism and Racialization in Hawaii (Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press, 2016), 55-64. With increasing intermarriage to Japanese Americans and othergroups, joint membership and leadership in various community organizations, as well as a
growing trend of assimilating Okinawan American into the broader identity of JapaneseAmericans, Okinawan American identity in Hawai‘i is often posited as distinct from Japaneseculture. However, how this distinction is internalized or understood by individuals varies.

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