Quotes from Judges regarding Evan Hendricks when they qualified him as anexpert witness, and allowed to testify at trial

In Julie Miller v. Equifax Credit Information Services, LLC: U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Oregon. Judge Anna J. Brown commented:

I think Mr. Hendricks, by virtue of his long experience as a consumer advocate,
who has had the kind of access he describes to information that's not generally publiclyavailable, about how credit reporting agencies function and how they respond to disputes
and complaints by consumers, does in fact have specialized knowledge about theconsumer -- I'm sorry, the credit reporting agency industry, if you will …
… THE COURT: Well, I can tell you I'm -- I'm satisfied Mr. Hendricks is qualified byhis actually acquired experience and knowledge to offer some opinions that will be
helpful to the jury on one or more of the ten contentions plaintiff is ready to proceed on.

In Eric Robert Drew vs. Equifax Information Services, LLC, et al., U.S. District Court for theNorthern District of California, Case No. CV 07-00726-SI. Expert report, Deposition, TrialTestimony. Daubert challenge. Judge Susan Illston presiding.

Defendant objects to the admissibility of the FTC and state Agreement ofAssurances documents, and to Mr. Hendricks’s testimony regarding them …
Even if the agreements themselves (and Mr. Hendricks’s testimony regardingthem) were not admissible, the logic of Mr. Hendricks’s conclusion would be supported
by his expertise and the record.

In Laura Jones v. Capital One: U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia(Alexandria), Case 09-14499-BFK, Chapter 7. Judge Brian F. Kenney, said from the bench:“Before we begin with Mr. Hendricks, a brief disclosure. I had a case a few years
ago. Mr. Hendricks may recall that I was representing a creditor in which Mr. Hendricks wasidentified as an expert witness in the Eastern District of Virginia. I believe it was the Sloane
case, Mr. Hendricks. I took Mr. Hendricks' deposition and I subsequently moved to exclude
him as an expert in the case on a Daubert challenge. I lost the Daubert challenge. The court
allowed him to testify as an expert witness; and I will say, during the course of his deposition
and the Daubert challenge, I learned quite a bit about credit reporting. Just in the interest offull disclosure, I'll disclose that to the parties.”

In Angela P. Williams vs. Equifax Information Services, LLC, et al., Circuit Court for theNinth Judicial Circuit, Orange County Florida.
In response to Equifax’s Daubert challenge, Judge George A. Sprinkel IV presiding: “Well, I’mcertainly going to permit the expert’s testimony.”In April Barnett vs. Chase Bank, Judge Virginia Hopkins“Consistent with the qualification principles outlined in Frazier, the court findthat Mr. Hendricks’s substantial experience in the fields of consumer information
generally and credit reporting more specifically renders him qualified to testify about
Chase’s noncompliance with its loan servicing and credit reporting practices andprocedures, including his years of accumulated internal data regarding Chase, theway Chase maintains, uses, and discloses information,4 how that relates to credit
reporting on a consumer, and how that impacts on the credit reputation of consumers,
like Ms. Barnett.
Relatedly, the court determines that Mr. Hendricks is qualified to testify about industry
practices, including how credit reporting agencies function and how they respond to disputes andcomplaints by consumers. Mr. Hendricks is similarly qualified to testify about the nature andpurpose of credit, credit reports, and credit scores.
Additionally, the court concludes that Ms. Barnett has satisfied the helpfulness prong ofRule 702. In particular, the court is persuaded that Mr. Hendricks’s expert testimony in all theseareas will assist the jury and offer “more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closingarguments.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262-63. Accordingly, the corporate compliance section of theDaubert Motion is DENIED, and Mr. Hendricks is HEREBY PERMITTED to offer opinions
about Chase’s noncompliance with its own policies and procedures in its handling Ms. Barnett’sloan and the reporting of her credit with the exception of any negligence related opinions likethose identified in Ms. Barnett’s opposition ( i.e., Chase’s failure to exercise adequate care)because no negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision claim remains in the lawsuit.10
2. Opinions On Chase’s Conduct in Other Cases
Chase seeks to prohibit Mr. Hendricks from testifying about its alleged mistreatment ofother borrowers in other cases on the basis that such evidence “would not assist the trier of factin understanding or reaching a decision on any of the claims in this case, nor are they relevant to
the jury’s determinations.” (Doc. 82 at 34). Ms. Barnett counters that this evidence is relevant toher fraud claims to show the prima facie element of Chase’s intent to deceive her and its possible
financial motive to misrepresent the status of her loan. This type of expert evidence is also
relevant to establishing Ms. Barnett’s breach of contract claim.
Accordingly, the Chase’s conduct in other cases section of the Daubert Motion is
DENIED, and Mr. Hendricks is HEREBY PERMITTED to offer opinions about Chase’s
noncompliance with its own policies and procedures in its handling of loans by other borrowers,
including in particular its handling of Mrs. Barlow’s loan.

In Matthew Kirkpatrick v. Equifax, LLC, U.S. District Court for District of Oregon,(Slip. Op. CV-02-1197-MO, in response to Equifax’s Daubert challenge in 2005, Judge Michael
W. Mosman said from the bench:
THE COURT: That's fine.
4The last and major issue we left with when we were

5 last together was the expert testimony of Evan Hendricks. I
6 reviewed that material. There are sort of layers of
7 questions about it.
8The first question is, is this an area subject to

9 expert testimony. I believe that it is under Kumho Tire.
10 It's certainly not the standard scientific testimony under
11 Daubert, but under Kumho Tire, I believe it's an area that
12 is subject to expert testimony.
13The second question is is Mr. Hendricks in the14 abstract or in general qualified as an expert in this15 general area. And I believe that he is. There are things
16 that he has reviewed that aren't readily available to the17 jury. There's a context of congressional action, industry
18 issues and identity theft as a nationwide problem that would
19 be helpful to the jury to hear from someone who has studied
20 these issues.
21The sources of his study are sufficient to qualify

22 him as an expert both with regard to what he has read, and23 that includes not only his own paper that he puts out, but

24 the deposition testimony is a sufficiently precise and
25 unavailable source of expertise that it would be helpful to

4

1 the jury to hear from someone who has assimilated that sort
2 of information.
3

The more precise question, and really the question

4 raised by the defense is is his testimony in this case
5 supported by any of that sort of research and expertise on
6 particular issues that are raised. And my answer to that is
7 that on most of them, I believe that his testimony is
8 sufficiently supported by his own expertise; that is, that
9 what he offers to this jury on the issues presented in this10 case is sufficiently supported by his general expertise to
11 satisfy Rule 702.
12As a general statement, what I'm allowing and the13 reason I'm allowing it is testimony that puts the particular
14 actions of the defendant in particular here in context, in
15 the context of the nationwide problem of identity theft, in16 the context of the congressional reaction to that and other17 issues in the credit-reporting industry, when he can by
18 virtue of his study and his prior testimony, both in court19 and to Congress, make comparisons, then that's something
20 that's helpful to the jury …