COVER STORY • 5W

ill a Taiwan Emergency
Happen? Analyzing theChallenges Facing China

By Yasuhiro Matsuda

There is talk that war could break out across the Taiwan Strait. The
US-Japan Joint Statement, issued at the summit meeting between
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and President Joe Biden in Washington
in April 2021, referred to the importance of peace and stability in theTaiwan Strait. This was the first time since 1969 when Prime Minister
Eisaku Sato met with President Richard Nixon that the phrase had
been mentioned at a US-Japan summit.
Are military tensions around the Taiwan Strait really rising? Will war
break out across the Taiwan Strait? In short, will China use force
against Taiwan? Or will the use of force be avoided even if tensions
rise? Let’s consider the question from the perspective of thechallenges that China, which would be the party initiating the use offorce, would face.

Long-Term Difficulties of Unification by ForceFirst of all, the probability of the use of force against Taiwan by
China for the purpose of unification (military unification) is extremely
low for the time being. China lacks the ability to do that, and it’s hardto think it could be achieved in the next decade or so. Any war is avictory if it achieves a goal, but if it cannot be achieved, even if thebattles are won, it is defeat. For China, the purpose of a war against
Taiwan’s armed forces would be to fully occupy a heavily armed island
more than 100 kilometers away, establish a new government, andmaintain its rule for a long time.
In order to achieve this, China would have to successfully attack
satellites in outer space, conduct cyberattacks, attack with ballistic
missiles, secure air and maritime dominance, conduct land invasion
operations, and supply its large forces that land without interruption.
At any stage, even if a landing operation is successful, if the US
military intervenes and the supply lines are interrupted, the troops thatlanded would be cut off and annihilated. Moreover, Taiwanese forces
would naturally fight back and could even take the war to mainland
China. No matter how strong China is in certain areas, such as
cyberspace, it cannot realize the occupation of Taiwan. China will notachieve its war objectives as long as Taiwan defends itself. Taiwan
does not have to beat China – it will win if it does not lose. In this way,
any operation to fully occupy Taiwan would be too costly and risky,and extremely difficult for China to undertake.
Moreover, it would escalate into a large-scale war for as long asTaiwan resists. In addition, if the United States and China entered into
conflict in earnest, unless the US mainland was hit by nuclear
18 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2022

Author Yasuhiro Matsuda

weapons, China would become a battlefield and suffer damage. Any
operation by China to seize Taiwan by force would be a head-on
challenge to the post-World War II international order largely createdby the US. The US would have the military option of inflicting moredamage on China than it could stand, in the short term at least.
How would China respond to any such military attacks by the US?
Would it overcome the temptation to use nuclear weapons? But if
China showed even a slight readiness to launch a preemptive nuclear
attack on the US, the US should not hesitate to launch a first suchstrike on China. In other words, a war against Taiwan is a war thatmight never end and would be easy to escalate. So in whatcircumstances would China make the decision to launch a war inwhich it may fail to occupy Taiwan, lose its opportunities fordevelopment, and escalate the conflict to a possible nuclear exchangethat could lead to the destruction of humanity?
It is likely only if the Chinese leadership makes serious and unusual
miscalculations. Moreover, any such war would take several months toprepare and surprise attacks would be difficult. Taiwan, the US, Japan,
and other nations will know in advance if China plans to embark on
this great war, and the Chinese attack would begin in a situation where
Taiwan is most strongly defended. Yet China would not have wonunless it completed a full occupation of the island.
For this reason, we can conclude that the likelihood of China
choosing to use armed force for unification is extremely low for thetime being.

China’s Fundamental Contradictions
It is easier to understand this issue from the point of view of China
itself. Its plan to attack Taiwan has huge contradictions. As mentioned,
US intervention is what it fears most. China has the ability to occupy
Taiwan by force unless the US intervenes. But if China attacks Taiwan
only to occupy it, US forces in Japan such as in Okinawa immediately
next door would not be attacked or harmed. Nonetheless, the US
might choose to intervene by easily using such unharmed forces in aTaiwan emergency. With any such military intervention by the US,
China’s attempt at unification by military means will be difficult. Even if
the possibility of such US military intervention is insignificant, China
cannot simply neglect that possibility.
That’s why China is taking a purely military perspective and would
launch operations to attack US bases in Japan from the beginning of
the Taiwan attack operation. And as an attack on US military bases inhttps://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

Japan is also an attack on Japan itself, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces willalso counterattack. If Japan and the US are attacked, the probability of
a US counterattack and intervention in the Taiwan emergency is 100%.
In other words, whether China attacks only Taiwan or attacks the US
bases in Japan first, it has no choice but to act on the assumption of
100% US military intervention.
How does China resolve this contradiction? By having the Chinesearmy build the ability to annihilate US forces including those in Japan,
South Korea, Guam, and Hawaii in battle and making the timenecessary for the Taiwan occupation, as well as by increasing its
nuclear capabilities, including intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs), China will build a situation in which the US could neverconfidently intervene. China’s military build-up is clearly moving in thisdirection. By the middle of the 21st century, China’s goal is to competewith the US as the world’s leading military.
The question is whether the US, Japan, and Taiwan will allow China
to take more than 20 years to bring about this situation. If they do, thecapabilities of the US and China will eventually be reversed. If they do
not tolerate this and continue to maintain the current gaps incapabilities, the status quo will be maintained for a longer period oftime. At a time when China’s medium- to long-term trend is almost
fixed, the current state of the Taiwan Strait depends on what decisions
the US, Japan, and Taiwan make and implement to maintain the statusquo.

However, what China would lose is great. Simply put, by taking the“outposts” of remote islands, there is a greater possibility that it would
not be able to occupy Taiwan, its principal target. For example,
hundreds of Taiwanese troops are deployed in the Pratas Islands. Ifthey die in war or become prisoners of war, they will strengthen theanti-China feelings and resistance of Taiwan residents. Also, China has
no control over how much the Taiwanese army will fight back, andeven a small attack on mainland China could lead to a gradualescalation as it would force a counterattack.
In addition, with China’s moves to change territorial boarderlines inthe South China Sea by using force, Vietnam and the Philippines, bothof which have territorial disputes with China, and Japan, which isunder pressure from China over the issue of the Senkaku Islands,
should feel a sense of crisis about China’s actions and strengthencountermeasures against them. The sense of crisis in the US, theUnited Kingdom, France, Australia, and other countries that are waryof China’s claim of the Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea and theestablishment of a military base would also rise rapidly. The US would
strengthen its support for Taiwan. In other words, the capture ofTaiwan’s main island, which is China’s principal goal, would be difficult
to be realized by the occupation of these small islands in the South
China Sea.

Occupation of Remote Islandsin the South China Sea(B) is Kinmen Island and the Matsu Islands, a group of islets on thecoast of Fujian Province. However, there is not much that China will
gain from occupying these islands. These are parts of Fujian Province,
where exchanges with mainland China are thriving and relations aregood, while many residents are also opposed to Taiwan’s
independence and dislike the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
government. What merit would there be for China if it kills themthrough use of force? Also, China does not rush to take territory that it
could take at any time. Hong Kong is a good example. China tends tochoose escalation only when it is inferior.
In addition, both Kinmen and Matsu have Taiwanese forces
deployed there, and they might counterattack by hitting Xiamen andFuzhou on the other side. China has no control over the actions of theTaiwanese army, and even if China were to win Kinmen Island, if
Fuzhou and Xiamen were exposed to war and damage, the Chinese
government would have difficulty proclaiming “victory” to the people.
However, since Kinmen and Matsu are also not in the realm of“Taiwan”, they are not an area applicable to the Taiwan Relations Act.
The US has no responsibility to defend them. Having said that, the US
may not necessarily intervene 100%. When China launched a massive
shelling of Kinmen Island in 1958, the US intervened by sending alarge number of aircraft carriers. These islands were not part of theUS-China Mutual Defense Treaty at the time, but the US dispatchedtroops to Taiwan. So it cannot ultimately be denied that an attack on
Kinmen could lead to US intervention.

Next, let’s consider the probability that China will use limited force
which is unlikely to be counteracted by the US. Such limited use offorce can be divided into several cases. The targets of the attack are(A) remote islands in the South China Sea, (B) remote islands along
the Fujian coast, (C) the Pescadores which are effectively controlled byTaiwan, (D) the main island of Taiwan, divided into four parts.
(A) is the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands) controlled by Taiwan andItu Abba island in the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands) that Taiwan also
has effective control over. Since 2020, China has been flying military
aircraft along a route connecting Taiwan and the Pratas Islands. Most
cases of Chinese military aircraft entering Taiwan’s Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) go along this course. If Chinese forces
attacked and occupied the Pratas Islands and Itu Abba, Taiwan would
have almost no way to stop them. These remote islands are out of therange of Taiwan’s main weapons. Also, even if Taiwan dispatches
military aircraft and ships, it must engage the Chinese army in an area
where China has secured air and maritime dominance. Where Taiwanfights back, China should be able to easily overcome it.
Moreover, there is no responsibility for the US to intervene on theTaiwanese side with regard to remote islands in the South China Sea.
These islands are not in the realm of “Taiwan of historical meaning”
and are not under the scope of the Taiwan Relations Act. So at firstglance, China appears to be able to carry out a “perfect war” there thateliminates Taiwanese forces and completely occupy these remoteislands.

The Occupation of Kinmen & Matsu

Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 202219Limited Use of Force Against the Pescadores& Taiwan(C) is the Pescadores (or Penghu Islands) that have historically
been part of Taiwan and are within range of missiles of the Taiwanesemilitary. Taiwan will do its utmost to protect the Pescadores and even
if they are temporarily taken, Taiwan will surely try to get them back. In
the case of the Pescadores there could be sufficient intervention by USforces under the Taiwan Relations Act. In other words, attacking thePescadores would be almost synonymous with attacking Taiwan’s
main island.
(D) The same is true in cases where a limited attack is launched on
the main island of Taiwan. China can use ballistic missiles to surpriseand destroy Taiwan’s military facilities and political and economic
centers at any time. But for what purpose it would do this is a bigquestion. As Taiwan’s forces fight back, if China stops attacking at
some point, Taiwan would proclaim to the world that China’s attempt
at unification by force has failed. With this, the Chinese government
will lose face. In other words, as I pointed out earlier, Taiwan wins if it
is not occupied, and if it does not lose, it wins.
In addition, attacks on (C) and (D) are the most likely to prompt USforces to intervene. If China withdrew after attacking Taiwan because
the US military and self-defense forces intervened, the Communist
Party’s government would collapse. In these cases also, it is possiblethat China would become a battlefield due to Taiwan’s counterattacks.
Maritime transportation routes in the South China Sea and aroundTaiwan, which have supported China’s economic development, would
also be seriously affected. In other words, attacks on (C) and (D)undermine China’s development strategy from the ground up. China
would have to be prepared for enormous damage, even in the case ofa limited attack on the main island of Taiwan, and if it adhered to using
only conventional weapons, the US mainland would remain intact.
Moreover, in the short term, in addition to the above-mentioned
profit and loss calculations, there are circumstances in China thatprevent it from launching armed attacks in terms of timing. This isbecause the 20th Party Congress scheduled for autumn 2022 will
determine whether President Xi Jinping will serve a third term, anduntil this is ensured no mistakes would be allowed by the Xi
administration.

Military Provocation Type of Use of Force That Is
Likely in the Short Term
So it is not a question of whether the use of force is impossible. For
example, if China “subjectively recognizes” that Taiwan and the US
have “provoked it beyond the limits of patience”, the probability ofusing force increases. Such provocation might come about if Taiwan
clearly moved to de jure independence and if the US recognizedTaiwan as a state, or sent a large US military force to Taiwan, or if theUS president visited Taiwan. With such provocations, the Chinese
Communist government would believe that unless it demonstrated its
strong will by military force its regime would collapse. In this case, theprobability of China’s using force would increase at a stretch.
20 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2022

However, it would be a limited symbolic use of force because itwould simply be to demonstrate a “strong will”. In other words, itwould be a “military provocation type” use of force that does not
actually change borderlines of territory or cause Taiwanese casualties,
and would stop immediately after implementation and end without any
counterattacks by the other parties. For example, there could becountless scenarios, such as firing ballistic missiles onto a highsummit in Taiwan where no one lives. The purpose would be to warn
the US and prevent a US-Taiwan approach. China could avoid a
political crisis by claiming it had won a major victory, and that Taiwan
and the US had been afraid, after carrying out such a provocation.
Since the end of the 1950s, China’s use of force on issues ofsovereignty and territory has often been symbolic and limited, with theexception of the 1974 Naval Battle of the Paracel Islands, in which it
actually captured the territory that the opponent was defending. In
many cases, when China has recognized that it has become extremely
disadvantaged, it has used limited symbolic force to break the situation
at once, and immediately withdrawn and propagated a victory. The
possibility of such a “military provocative use of force” is far from low
and could happen at any time.

“Coercive Peaceful Unification”
Because Xi has won three elections, Taiwan, the US and Japan
should pay attention to the medium- to long-term possibility of“peaceful unification by coercive measures”. This is unlike the“peaceful unification through discussions with the Taiwaneseauthorities” that Deng Xiaoping originally envisioned. It assumes thatTaiwan is isolated and its armed forces surrender without fighting.
Although the possibility of the Xi administration moving to pursue
unification by force is small, in 10 or 20 years China should have evengreater military power to achieve this.
In order not to make China think it can do so, it is essential tocontinue to meet the following three conditions at the same time.
These are the three conditions for maintaining the status quo. First, theUS does not abandon Taiwan; second, the US-Japan alliance remains
strong; and third, Taiwan maintains the threat of force. Even if one ofthese factors is missing, China will remain afraid of miscalculation.
What we should primarily fear is the limited use of force of militaryprovocation types in the short term and peaceful unification by coercive
measures in the long run. In particular, the latter means that the era ofpeace and development in the region under US hegemony ends, andChina’s hegemony will be established. Therefore, the answers that I
offer to the question “Will a Taiwan emergency happen?” are notnecessarily good news, but rather represent a more serious situation.
We are in the midst of long-term strategic competition between the USand China, and if we do not respond properly, tragedy awaits.
Yasuhiro Matsuda is a professor of international politics at the University ofTokyo’s Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, and gained his Ph.D. from theGraduate School of Law at Keio University. He spent 16 years at the National
Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of the Japan Defense Agency (later theMinistry of Defense) as an assistant and senior research fellow. He specializes in
the political and diplomatic history of Asia, politics and foreign relations in Chinaand Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations, and Japan’s foreign and security policies.