RAPPORT

Faire avancer la sûreté nucléaire

Shinrai research Project:
The 3/11 accident and its
social consequences
Case studies from Fukushima prefecture

Christine Fassert (IRSN)
andReiko Hasegawa (Sciences Po médialab)Rapport IRSN/2019/00178

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Pôle sûreté des installations et des systèmes nucléaires
Service homme organisation technologie
Bâtiment 28
BP 17
92 262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex

Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident
and its social consequences

Case studies from Fukushima prefecture

Rapport n° IRSN/2019/00178

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Résumé
Ce rapport constitue le rapport de synthèse du projet Shinrai, relatif aux conséquences
sociales de l’accident de Fukushima. A partir de trois études de cas menées dans lapréfecture de Fukushima, et d’un important travail d’enquête mené auprès de différents
acteurs et d’habitants, il analyse la perte de confiance des citoyens envers les autorités
Japonaises et les problématiques de retour et de non-retour dans les villages évacués, enoffrant une catégorisation des habitants en fonction de leur décision.
Il aborde également les dilemmes auxquels les responsables gouvernementaux, médecins, etexperts en radioprotection ont été confrontés, et s’intéresse notamment au rôle des Maires.
Le rapport conclut sur quelques pistes de réflexion sur le socle normatif des politiques postaccidentelles défini par les institutions en charge de leur gestion, et sa confrontation àl’expérience de l’accident nucléaire au Japon, ainsi qu’à la critique onusienne.
Abstract
This report summarizes the research result of the Shinrai project, which deals with social
consequences of the Fukushima accident. Based on three case studies led in the Fukushima
Prefecture, it analyses the loss of trust of citizens towards governmental authorities, andessential questions linked to return or non-return to the evacuated territories, offering acategorization of inhabitants according to their decisions.
It also deals with the dilemma to which governmental officials, medical doctors andradioprotection experts have been confronted, and focus on the role of Mayors. The reportconcludes by making some reflections on the normative foundations of post accidental
policies, as currently defined by the institutions in charge of managing nuclear accidents, andon their confrontation to the Fukushima experience and to the international criticism madeby some of the UN institutions.

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RAPPORT

Thanks （謝辞）Warm thanks to the residents and former residents of Fukushima, government and prefectural
officials, mayors and municipal officials and employees, medical doctors, experts, … who accepted
to be interviewed for the field work presented.
And to Rina Kojima, PhD student, for her invaluable help for interviews.

本報告書は、東電原発事故に関して 100 名以上の方々に面談インタビューを行い、その結果を分析しまとめたものである。面談を快諾していただき、仕事場や時には自宅、また喫茶店などで貴重な時間を私たちとのインタビューに費やしてくださった皆さんに心より感謝の気持ちを述べたい。特に事故の大きな被害に合われ言葉にすることも苦難な状況の中、丁寧に当時の様
子また現在の心境を語ってくださった福島にお住まいの方々また避難された方々に、大きな感
謝と敬愛の念を表明したい。
Many thanks to Philippa Caine La Ganza and Agnès Dumas who helped skillfully for the Englishproof and editing of this report. And to Hélène Faye for her kind last minute help.

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Contents
1.

INTRODUCTION....................................................................... 9

1.1

SCOPE ...........................................................................................9

1.2

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT .................................................................. 10

2

THE POST ACCIDENTAL POLICIES LED IN JAPAN AFTER 3/11 ............. 13

2.1

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 13

2.2

EVACUATION POLICIES...................................................................... 13

2.2.1

Evacuation policy prior to the accident............................................... 13

2.2.2

Evacuation policy following the accident ............................................. 14

2.2.3

NumberS and characteristics of nuclear evacuation ................................ 18

2.3

RETURN (LIFTING OF EVACUATION ORDERS) ............................................ 19

2.3.1

The government structures ............................................................. 19

2.3.2

Policy of lifting Evacuation Orders (EOs) ............................................. 19

2.4

DECONTAMINATION POLICY ................................................................ 23

2.5

COMPENSATION POLICY .................................................................... 24

2.5.1

Japanese nuclear liability regime...................................................... 24

2.5.2

Institutional structure of Fukushima compensation scheme ....................... 25

2.5.3

Fukushima Compensation policy ....................................................... 25

3
IMPLEMENTATION OF POST ACCIDENTAL POLICIES ON THE GROUND:
THREE CASE STUDIES ................................................................... 29
3.1

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 29

3.2

CHAPTER OUTLINE .......................................................................... 29

3.3

KAWAUCHI VILLAGE ......................................................................... 30

3.3.1

Geographical situation .................................................................. 30

3.3.2

Demographical and economic situation (before the catastrophe) ................ 30

3.3.3

the accident and the evacuation of Kawauchi ....................................... 30

3.3.4

Lifting the Evacuation Order ........................................................... 32

3.4

NARAHA TOWN .............................................................................. 35

3.4.1

Geographical situation .................................................................. 35

3.4.2

Demographical and economic situation (before the catastrophe) ................ 35

3.4.3

the accident and the evacuation of Naraha .......................................... 35

3.4.4

Lifting The Evacuation Orders .......................................................... 37

3.5

WATARI DISTRICT ........................................................................... 43

3.5.1

Geographical situation .................................................................. 43

3.5.2

Demographical and economic situation (before the accident) .................... 43

3.5.3

Consequences of the accident and non-evacuation ................................. 43

3.6

A FOCUS ON THE MAYORS’ DIFFICULTIES AND DILEMMAS (KAWAUCHI AND NARAHA)................................................................................................ 49

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3.6.1

Introduction ............................................................................... 49

3.6.2

Kawauchi mayor .......................................................................... 50

3.6.3

Naraha mayor ............................................................................. 54

3.6.4

Conclusion ................................................................................. 57

4
WHETHER TO RETURN OR NOT: A CATEGORISATION OF INHABITANTS’DECISIONS ................................................................................. 61
4.1

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 61

4.2

RETURN AND “FORGET”/RESIST A CULTURE OF RADIOPROTECTION ................ 62

4.2.1

Trying to live “like before” (the accident) ........................................... 64

4.2.2

Forgetting radiation … or “resisting” practical radioprotection?.................. 64

4.2.3

A common sociological profile? ........................................................ 66

4.2.4

Returning in order to put an end to wandering (or the bad life conditions) .... 66

4.2.5

Hesitations before the return (or conditions for …) ................................. 66

4.3

RETURN AND COMPLYING/CONTROLLING................................................ 68

4.3.1“Getting informed”- a question of information and trust .......................... 72

4.3.2

Risk information strategies and decision ............................................. 73

4.3.3

The role of measurements, and their limits .......................................... 75

4.4

RETURN AND WORRY ....................................................................... 75

4.4.1

Returning and doubting ................................................................. 76

4.4.2

Return as “loyalty” towards the village .............................................. 77

4.4.3

Too early? ................................................................................. 78

4.4.4

This Naraha is not the one I used to know ............................................ 79

4.5

RETURN AND COMMUTE .................................................................... 79

4.5.1

DEcontamination is limited ............................................................. 80

4.5.2

DIVIDE BETWEEN “FULL-RETURN” and “HALF-RETURN” ............................ 80

4.5.3“RESISTANCE” TO THE DICHOTOMY OF OPTIONS: RETURN OR RESETTLEMENT . 81

4.6

NOT RETURNING … NOW ................................................................... 81

4.6.1

Returning - when my child is grown up …............................................. 83

4.6.2

Returning TO takE care of ELDERLY parents ......................................... 83

4.7

NOT RETURNING … EVER ................................................................... 84

4.7.1

Protecting my children .................................................................. 86

4.7.2

citizenship and politics after the accident ........................................... 87

4.8

CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 88

5

SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT ............ 90

5.1

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 90

5.2

THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH: EVACUATION ORDERS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES .. 90

5.2.1

Evacuation orders and their consequences ........................................... 90

5.2.2

Evacuation criteria: PROTEST and anger in the population ........................ 92

5.2.3

Evacuation and shelters: a suspended life............................................ 94

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5.3

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AFTER THE ACCIDENT: FACING CONTAMINATION ....................................... 95

5.3.1

introduction ............................................................................... 95

5.3.2

Radiation risks as a divisive topic ...................................................... 96

5.3.3

Radiation: from “correct fear” to “correct attitude” .............................. 98

5.3.4

Conflicts and “genpatsu rikon”........................................................ 101

5.3.5

Living with ionizing radiations......................................................... 102

5.3.6“FLeeing from” ionizing radiation .................................................... 105

5.4

COMPENSATION: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITS ................................ 108

5.5

THREE YEARS AFTER: THE PUSH FOR RECONSTRUCTION ............................. 109

5.6

TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS .......................................................... 110

5.6.1

introduction .............................................................................. 110

5.6.2

Theoretical elements ................................................................... 110

5.6.3

risks communication and its local effects ........................................... 116

5.6.4

Conclusion ................................................................................ 125

6

SYNTHESIS: LIMITATIONS OF POST-ACCIDENTAL POLICY IN JAPAN ..... 127

6.1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 127

6.2

FEW AND UNSUSTAINABLE RETURN AFTER A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT .................. 127

6.3

ATTACHEMENT TO TERRITORIES? ........................................................ 128

6.4

REASONS FOR NON-RETURN .............................................................. 129

6.5

IMPOSED DICHOTOMY BETWEEN RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT ...................... 130

6.6

THE “THIRD OPTION” AND ALTERNATIVE CHOICES .................................... 130

6.6.1

Introduction .............................................................................. 130

6.6.2

The concept of “Transitional Town” ................................................. 131

6.6.3“Stakeholder involvement” as a formality? ......................................... 132

6.6.4

The “Push” for Reconstruction but for Whom? ..................................... 133

6.7

THE RISE OF GROUP LAWSUITS AS A CONTESTATION ................................. 134

6.8

THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW............................................. 136

6.9

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 138

7

CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES .............................................. 139

7.1

MAIN POINTS OF THIS REPORT ........................................................... 139

7.2

IMPLICIT NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE JAPANESE POLICY ....................... 141

7.2.1

Attachment to territory (Vs attachment is not absolute rule) .................... 142

7.2.2

Commensurability of risks (vs parental “absolute” care) ......................... 143

7.2.3

Contamination is where the “zone” is (vs … contamination is everywhere) ... 146

7.3
PERSPECTIVES AND FUTURE RESEARCH: COMPENSATION AND REMEDIATION AFTER A
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ................................................................................ 151
7.3.1

Limited compensation .................................................................. 151

7.3.2

Different Compensations ............................................................... 151

7.3.3

Compensation and reparation issues after a nuclear accident ................... 153

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8

GENERAL CONCLUSION .......................................................... 159

9

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................... 161

10 ANNEX: FIELD WORK ................................................................. I

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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 SCOPE
The Shinrai project was launched in the aftermath of the triple disaster faced by Japan in
March 2011: earthquake, tsunami, and a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident in Fukushima
Daiichi. The authorities had to face a dramatic situation, most notably the radiologicalconsequences of the nuclear accident for the population. This research proposes to focus
on the nuclear post-accidental situation in Japan, and to examine the various social andpolitical consequences of the nuclear accident.
The theoretical framework of this research is inscribed in the field of disaster studies,
which are intrinsically multidisciplinary. The examination of public policies led after an
accident, their inscription in international regulations and institutions, their consequences
for residents, the reactions of and the decisions made by inhabitants as regards evacuation
and return policies, the consideration of contaminated territories and their future, themanagement of waste produced, and so on, all mobilize political sciences as well associology and anthropology. Within such a framework, which evokes countless questions,the choice was made to focus specifically on issues of trust. In fact, in the aftermath of
the accident, this issue appeared quite rapidly within public space, where the media soon
denounced the “loss of trust” on the part of Japanese citizens towards the government incharge of dealing with the crisis. Under this main theme, this project will address various
questions linked to expertise provided in crisis situations: What makes a public expert
trustworthy? What is his/her role in situations of uncertainty and controversy? What is theaccountability of experts in these situations? What specific role did “counter-expertise”
play in post-Fukushima? And how do citizens make vital decisions after a nuclear accident(e.g. to stay or to leave their place of residence, heeding or ignoring governmental advice;
to allow their children play outside or not; etc.) when confronted with divergent sources ofexpertise and scientific controversies (such as the risk related to ionizing radiations forchildren, low-dose effects, etc.)?
The issues of remediation and of compensation, and the disputes these inevitably trigger,
also call for an examination of the juridical aspects. Moreover, in the case of a nuclear
accident, long-lasting divides concerning evaluation of the health effects of ionizing
radiations are instrumental in the difficulty of building widely accepted solutions. This is
why the present analysis proposes a focus on Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies,
examining the major issues related to knowledge production as concerns radiological risks,
and its translation into recommendations, policies, and government decisions.
The research is based on an intensive field work led by a Franco-Japanese team, andcomprises more than 120 interviews with government representatives at national and local
levels, with scientists, residents of Fukushima prefecture, Non-Profit Organisation (NPOs),
and others. Details on the field research are provided in the annexes.
The deliverables of the Shinrai project comprise:--

Report 1: « Revue de littérature sur les concepts de confiance et d’expertise »,(October 2017, in French). The main theoretical elements of this report arebriefly summarized in Chapter 5 when discussing the issue of trust.
Report 2: Controversies and decision-making after the Fukushima Accident (to be
published in 2020)

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Report 3: “Case studies analysis and synthesis” (the present report).

1.2 OUTLINE OF THE REPORTThis report is divided into 7 chapters, including the present introduction (Chapter 1).
- Chapter 2 gives an overview of the government policies established in the aftermath of
the nuclear accident in Fukushima Daiichi in order to deal with the consequences of theaccident.
- Chapter 3 presents their actual implementation in three towns: Kawauchi and Naraha,
two evacuated villages, and Watari, a district of Fukushima city which was outside theevacuation zones. Most of the interviews with inhabitants were conducted with residentsof these places.
The chapter examines how government policy was actually implemented at this local
level, the difficulties encountered, focussing more specifically on the role played by themayors (Kawauchi and Naraha) and how they struggled to implement policy while taking
into account the residents’ (divergent) interests and desires.
- Chapter 4 examines in detail the consequences of these policies for inhabitants and theirdecision whether or not to return to their evacuated village, after the evacuation orders
were lifted. Six types of “decisions” have been identified; this categorisation allows foran account of the variety of inhabitant reactions and judgements regarding theirsituation after the nuclear accident.
- Chapter 5 provides a more general analysis of the social consequences of the nuclear
accident. Beyond the question of “whether to return or not”, this chapter examines themain issues with which inhabitants were confronted. These issues are presented on atemporal basis: from evacuation in the immediate aftermath of the accident, to thesituation six years later, when field work ended for the present research project. They
combine data from this field work (interviews and observations) together with a numberof analyses from scholars in the field, focusing on research projects with a strong
empirical basis.
This chapter also elaborates on the notion of trust. Based on the results of Shinrai report
1, it examines who (or which institutions) people trust or do not trust, after the accident,
while they were being confronted with overwhelming amounts of divergent information
concerning radiological risks, and decisions to be made.
- Chapter 6 also provides a “synthesis analysis”, this time more focused on political andjuridical aspects. It examines - at a general level - the consequences of post-accidental
Japanese policy and its debatable points. It also addresses the juridical aspects and therising number of lawsuits where affected populations collectively brought civil actions
against TEPCO1 and the government.

1

Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. owner/operator of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

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11/165- Chapter 7 presents the conclusion of this report, drawing on lessons learned from thenuclear accident, and offers some perspectives on research questions that are still open.
- Annexes provide details concerning methodology and a list of interviews conducted.

It should be noted that there are inevitable repetitions throughout this report: issues
presented in Chapter 3 are recalled and developed in other chapters along different lines.
This is linked to the authors’ choice to combine micro-level sociological analysis (nearlyclinical) addressing the feelings and emotions of inhabitants, and a macro-level analysis
linked to policy development and implementation. For example, the evaluation ofradiation risks is addressed as a personal appreciation by individuals, but also as a (social)issue of trust: Who do you trust in order to make decisions when science is divided on thesubject? And it is also addressed as a political issue, insofar as the Japanese government
had to decide on a threshold for the evacuations, based on international regulations andstandards.
This allows chapters to be read as stand-alone documents, for readers interested in
specific topics.

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2 THE POST ACCIDENTAL POLICIES LED IN JAPAN AFTER 3/11
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (F1NPP) accident, the Japanese
government issued a number of post-accidental policy statements related to theprotection of affected population. This chapter describes some of the key responses
which profoundly shaped the lives of more than 160,000 people affected by the disaster,of which the consequences will be analyzed through the following case studies. The
chapter is divided into four sections: evacuation, return, decontamination, andcompensation. The first section outlines the government’s criteria and administrative
structure for issuing evacuation orders (EOs), the changes to evacuation zones (EZs), andthe number and types of residents affected by the EOs. The second section describes indetail the criteria and the procedures established by the government for the lifting ofEOs, and the issues at stake for the lifting process, as well as the actual timing of thelifting in respective municipalities. The policies related to return - namely on
decontamination - will also be referred to, with a view to providing a comprehensive
picture of return policy. Finally, section four introduces the compensation scheme
established by the Japanese government for residents affected by the accident.

2.2 EVACUATION POLICIES
2.2.1

EVACUATION POLICY PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

Before the F1NPP accident, nuclear emergency planning was defined in the Prevention
Measures related to Nuclear Facility Emergencies (1980)2 published by the Nuclear Safety
Commission, one of the two major nuclear regulatory bodies at the time which weremerged to create a Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) post-Fukushima. In the guidelines,
the zone within the 8–10 km radius of the nuclear power stations was considered to be an
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), targeted for nuclear disaster drills and preparations.
The guidelines specified that an EPZ was defined “based on a hypothetical scenario
which is almost technically impossible” and thus nuclear disaster preparation would be
suffice to be implemented in limited areas within the EPZ and no further, by insistingthat “(nuclear installations) are safe in normal circumstances and do not trouble any
daily activities of residents” (p.15). According to Imai (2012), “this, indeed, constitutes
the basis of the notion in public policy that nuclear power stations were accident-free”3(p. 24). The NSC’s report on nuclear disaster drills implemented in 2008 in 11 prefectures,for example, shows indeed that the actual evacuation exercise was conducted only
within a radius of 1–3 km from the stations (Hasegawa, 2013).42

NSC (1980), genshiryokushisetutou no bousaitaisaku ni tsuite (Prevention Measures related to Nuclear Facility
Emergencies), June 1980.
3

Imai, A. (2012). The Third Survey of Nuclear Evacuees (Original title: Genpatsu saigai hinansya no jittai chousa (san-ji))(Vol. 402): The Japan Research Institute for Local Government Monthly. Translation by Reiko Hasegawa from Japanese.
4

Hasegawa, R. (2013). Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident.
In S. No.5/2013 (Ed.): IDDRI.Source: NSC (http://www.nsc.go.jp/senmon/shidai/sisetubo/sisetubo019/ssiryo5.pdf). (in Japanese only)

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14/165In Japanese legislation, according to the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness (Act No. 156 of December 17, 1999) (referred to hereafter as
the Act on Nuclear Emergency), Mayors of municipalities have the executive power todeclare Evacuation Orders (EOs) in case of emergencies (Article 27.2) (Imai, 2014).
2.2.2

EVACUATION POLICY FOLLOWING THE ACCIDENT

On the day of the accident, the first evacuation order concerning the 2 km radius fromthe F1NPP was issued by the Fukushima prefectural government. Even though theprefectural governor does not usually have the authority to issue evacuation orders,according to the Act on Nuclear Emergency, the order was largely considered to bevalid and official under such exceptional circumstances and in the absence of State
instructions. Following the prefectural order, the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarter (Nuclear Emergency HQ)5 headed by Japanese Prime Minister, Naoto Kan,began issuing evacuation orders. As Imai (2014) comments, these evacuation orders
were in fact the instruction for affected municipalities to issue evacuation orders forthe residents, since such legal authority lay with the Mayors of municipalities.
Initially decided according to physical, radial distance from the F1NPP, Evacuation
Zones (EZs) rapidly expanded beyond the envisaged EPZ: on the day after the accident,
the Nuclear Emergency HQ instructed a compulsory evacuation of the area within a
20 km radius, which was then extended to the 20-30 km radius, four days later. These
initial orders were thus issued without consideration of the actual radiological situationon the ground. For these distance-based evacuation orders, a total of ten towns were
included: Futaba, Okuma, Namie, Tomioka, Minamisoma, Naraha, Kawauchi, Tamura,
Katsurao, Hirono.
According to the NAIIC report (2013)6, these EOs, issued by the Nuclear Emergency HQ,
were not communicated directly to the concerned municipalities due to telephone line
failures, with the exception of some towns (Futaba, Okuma and Tamura). As a result,the majority of the municipalities took the decision for themselves to evacuate their
inhabitants. Moreover, these decisions were made even before the issuance ofgovernment EOs (Imai, 2014).
More than one month after the accident (22 April 2011), the government started toissue additional EOs based on levels of ambient radiation dose detected on the ground,using the reference dose of 20 millisievert per year (20mSv/year). Two more towns
were then added to the EZs: Iitate and Kawamata.
Based on the same reference dose, the Nuclear Emergency HQ also began to designate
so-called Hotspots, officially named “Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation”,
from June 2011, after having discovered areas with doses over 20mSv/year outside the5

The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter was established on the first day of the accident, 11 March 2011, as
the command centre for responding to the Fukushima accident, based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Act No.156 of December 17, 1999).
6

The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) report is oneof the official reports on the Fukushima accident commissioned by the National Diet of Japan (Japanese parliament).

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15/165designated EZs according to regular radiation monitoring data published by the MEXT
(Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) on 3 June 20117.
The Nuclear Emergency HQ established the procedure for designating Hotspots asfollows8 :1) The MEXT radiation monitoring team must first conduct a detailed radiation survey
in areas with a dose over 20mSv/year, according to MEXT’s regular monitoring;2) After confirmation of the dose on the ground, by the team, the government must
discuss the matter first with the prefecture and concerned municipalities, before
making a final decision on the recognition of Hotspots.
From internal documents declassified in December 2014 on the request of residents ofDate city, in Fukushima prefecture9, it is also evident that the initiative of the Mayorsof concerned municipalities played an important role in the designation of Hotspots.
For example, in Date city, the MEXT detailed radiation survey detected only 32 spots
which exceeded 20 mSv/year in June 2011, but the municipality strongly requested thedesignation of 246 Hotspots, in view of the presence of pregnant mothers and children.
As a result, a total of 117 spots were finally designated by the government. By contrast,in Fukushima city, the MEXT team detected two spots in the Watari district in August
2011 which were not designated as Hotspots by the government after discussion with
Fukushima city10. The Hotspots were, in reality, individual houses at which ambient
radiation dose over 20mSv/year is detected as an average dose between one
measurement at the house’s front door porch, and another in the middle of thegarden11. Once acknowledged as a Hotspot by the government, the family living in thehouse was eligible for financial compensation from TEPCO if they chose to evacuate.
Unlike EOs, the designation of Hotspots was a recommendation for evacuation which
does not ultimately oblige the family to evacuate, thus leaving such choice torespective households. The Hotspots were officially recognized by three municipalities:
Date, Minamisoma, and Kawauchi. In total, 260 Hotspots were designated by thegovernment: 117 in Date, 142 in Minamisoma and one in Kawauchi.
During the three months following the disaster, four different types of evacuation zone
were created, as shown in the map below (Map 1). In all, a total of 13 municipalities
were placed under various evacuation orders and recommendations.

7

Source: the Prime Minister’s official response to the question asked by a member of the House of Representatives,
Tarou Kimura, who inquired on the criteria and procedure involved in the designation of Hotspots on 22 August 2011:
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/a177412.htm
8

http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/06/20/1307473_3_1.pdf

9

Available on the website of a NPO Clearing House for Information Disclosure (only in Japanese):
http://clearinghouse.main.jp/web/cao0005.pdf
10Mainichi Shimbun, “Hinankanshochiten” shiteikijun ni baratsuki, jumin “nattoku dekinai” (The criteria fordesignating the Hotspots is incoherent, residents complains) on 4 November 2011.
11

Information obtained from interview with residents in Watari district, Fukushima city, in October 2014.

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2011

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Criteria

Order

Name of the Zone

2 km radius

Compulsory
Evacuation (issued
by the Fukushima
prefecture)

Restricted Zone

3 km radius

Compulsory
Evacuation

Restricted Zone

10 km radius

Compulsory
Evacuation

Restricted Zone

20 km radius

Compulsory
Evacuation

Restricted Zone

Between
20–30 km

Shelter indoors

Evacuation
Prepared Area

Between
20–30 km

Shelter indoors or
evacuation

Evacuation
Prepared Area

Areas with airradiation doseover
20 mSv/year

Evacuation within
1 monthDeliberate
Evacuation Area
(over 20mSv/year)

Spots with airradiation doseover
20 mSv/year

Recommended for
Evacuation

Hotspot

11 March

16/16512 March

15 March

22 April

16 JuneEvacuation Zones in 2011 (Source: METI)

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17/165Date
Hotspot
Fukushima
Iitate
Dose over
20mSv/year
Zone

Minamisoma

Kawamata

Restricted Area (20 km radius)

Katsurao
Namie
TamuraShelter Indoors/Evacuation Zone
(20-30 km radius)

FutabaOkuma
KawauchiTomiokaNarahaFutabaIwaki

Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant (No.1)

Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant (No.2)

HironoMap 1 of initial evacuation zones (Source: METI)One year after the accident, (30th March 2012) these EZs were reorganized into threezones12 according to the level of ambient dose on the ground (Map 2): Red Zone (morethan 50mSv/year), Yellow Zone (between 20-50mSv/year) and Green Zone (less than
20mSv/year). The evacuation order for the area between 20-30 km radius from the
F1NPP (colored blue in Map 1 above) had already been lifted in September 2011 and all
Hotspots were lifted in December 2012 (Minamisoma and Kawauchi municipalities) and
December 2014 (Date municipality).

12

Policy paper “Basic concept and issues to be challenged for rearranging the restricted areas to which EO have been
issued. 26 Décembre 2011.

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18/165Map 2: Map of reorganized EZs in 2013 (Source: METI)

2.2.3

NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR EVACUATIONThe number of evacuees from Fukushima prefecture peaked at 163,000 in June 201213.
Seven years after the accident (February 2018), 50,000 people were still displaced.
One of the distinctive aspects of the evacuation following the nuclear accident is thatit triggered two patterns of displacement: mandatory evacuation under order from thegovernment, and the spontaneous evacuation of residents living outside designated EZs
who decided to flee of their own accord for fear of the effects of radiation, despite thegovernment’s reassurances (Hasegawa, 2015). The proportion of spontaneous
evacuation within the total number of evacuees remains unclear as so-called selfevacuees are rarely counted in official statistics and are accorded little recognition andassistance by the authorities. Notwithstanding, the number can be estimated from thestatistical gap in various official reports. For example, in June 2014, the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which was responsible for assisting nuclear
evacuees, reported the number of evacuees under its mandate as 80,000, while the13

According to Reconstruction Agency on 13 June 2011: http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/120613hinansya.pdf

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Fukushima prefecture and the Reconstruction Agency 14 counted the total number of
evacuees from the prefecture as 128,000 15 . The difference of 48,000 can thus be
attributed to the number of self-evacuees, with a small number of non-nuclear
evacuees displaced by tsunami. In one of the rare official reports available on thesubject, the Fukushima prefecture estimated the number of self-evacuees as 50,327 in
September 2011 (MEXT, 2011). This lack of recognition on the status of self-evacueesby the authorities led in part to a series of group-lawsuits filed against the State and
TEPCO, which surged through 2013-2014 (see Section 4.5). This phenomenon ofvoluntary evacuation is analyzed in detail in the section below: 3.3 The case study of
Watari district (Fukushima City).

2.3 RETURN (LIFTING OF EVACUATION ORDERS)
2.3.1

THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

Three years after the accident, the government started to lift Evacuation Orders (EOs).
The overall policy and strategy concerning the review of EZs, the lifting of EOs, and theassistance of evacuees/affected residents were the responsibility of the Nuclear
Accident Affected Residents Assistance Team, created under the Nuclear Emergency
HQ on 29 March 2011; its secretarial functions were located at Cabinet Office16. The
Assistance Team was headed by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) andwas comprised of seconded officials from that ministry. In February 2013, the Deputy
Minister of the METI was appointed Head of the Local Nuclear Emergency Response HQ
in Fukushima, in charge of implementing these policies17.
2.3.2

POLICY OF LIFTING EVACUATION ORDERS (EOS)

2.3.2.1 First policy paper
The policy of lifting EOs was initially established in the Basic Principle for Reviewing
the Restricted Zone and other Evacuation Zones, issued by Nuclear Emergency HQ on
26 December 2011. In this document, the criteria (or conditions) for lifting EOs were
defined as follows:
1. Ambient radiation dose in the area is less than 20mSv/year.
2. Physical infrastructure such as electricity, gas, water, sanitation, major roads, andcommunication, as well as social service infrastructure such as medical and nursing
facilities and postal service are restored. Decontamination around children facilities issufficiently advanced.
3. Ample consultation with stakeholders (Fukushima prefecture, municipalities andresidents).

14

The special governmental agency created in 2012 with a ten-year mandate following the Japan’s 2011 disaster,
dedicated to the reconstruction of the Tohoku region
15

METI and Reconstruction Agency’s website: www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/140401.pdf;
www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-1/20140624_hinansha.pdf
16

METI website: http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/downloadfiles/g110331b.pdf

17

Prime Minister’s Office website: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/topics/2013/f1.pdf

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20/165The policy also declared that, in principle, EOs were to be lifted on a municipality-bymunicipality basis, which meant that the government had to consult and negotiate thelifting of any EOs with each municipality concerned. As a basic principle underJapanese legislation, municipalities have the authority to issue evacuation orders toprotect their residents. In the case of the Fukushima accident, municipal Mayors wereindeed the ones who decided to evacuate their residents - before and regardless of theEOs issued by the Nuclear Emergency HQ (NAIIC, 2013; Imai, 2014). Therefore, thegovernment was obliged to negotiate and obtain an agreement from each municipality
for the lifting EOs.
As for the second criteria, decontamination of children facilities, the Ministry ofEnvironment (MoE) came up with a detailed policy only in January 2012, one monthafter the policy paper of Nuclear Emergency HQ on clearing EOs. In the MoE document,
the government fixed a target of 60% reduction in the radiation exposure dose ofchildren over two years (by August 2013), which would be achieved not only bydecontamination but also by weathering effect. The government also declared theambient dose must be less than 1mSv/year for schools before allowing them toreopen18.

2.3.2.2 Second policy paper
Two years after the first policy document, the government issued another policy paper
concerning evacuation zones, in December 2013, entitled Accelerating the Fukushima
Reconstruction from the Nuclear Disaster. The document detailed the government’s
strategy to promote swift return of evacuees by creating additional compensation,
increasing financial aid for local business and reconstruction projects, accelerating
decontamination, and reinforcing risk communication. For the first time, it mentionedthat the government would also help evacuees to start life over elsewhere(i.e. resettlement), especially for those from Red Zone (See Map 2), to which any
prospect of return was considered slim. To support this, the government proposed a
new compensation plan for house construction to those who wished to resettle
elsewhere. The new document also insisted the government’s intention to reduce theresidents’ annual individual exposure dose to less than 1mSv/year in the towns where
EOs would be lifted, which was fixed as a long-term goal. This precision, whichappeared twice in the document, reflects the difficulty that the government faced on
the ground. The document came out when the authorities were negotiating the firstlifting of an EO in Tamura city. Many residents judged it to be too soon; they strongly
opposed the move, by demanding the ambient radiation dose in the zone to be reduced
to 1mSv/year as a condition for their return. The demand for 1mSv/year was also
inspired by the decontamination policy established by the MoE which had fixed thethreshold of 1mSv/year as the criteria for financing the decontamination activities of
the affected municipalities which were located outside EZs. This resulted in setting thede facto decontamination standard at 1mSv/year, which directly contradicted theconditions for lifting the EO set by the Nuclear Emergency HQ at 20mSv/year.
Consequently, the evacuees from the EZs demanded the same criteria - 1mSv/year - for18

ME (2012), Josentokubetsuchiiki ni okeru josen no houshin “Josen roadmap” (Basic Policies of Decontamination in
Decontamination Special Area “Decontamination Roadmap”), 26 January 2012.

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21/165decontamination, as well as for a condition of return. The municipalities and thegovernment were thus obliged to achieve this long-term goal of 1mSv/year rather
rapidly, through decontamination, in order to convince the evacuees to return.
The second policy document also fixed the duration of compensation payment forpsychological damage due to evacuation, paid to evacuees by TEPCO (about
800 euros/person every month), as up to one year following the lifting of the EO. Thisdecision triggered criticism from evacuees, who saw it as a form of pressure, to makethem return against their will and by default - because this compensation for
psychological suffering would constitute de facto the financial assistance enablingthem to sustain their life in refuge. In addition to the compensation, evacuees received
temporary housing assistance offered by host prefectures of their refuge, thanks towhich they could live for free in prefabricated shelters or public subsidized housing, orin private apartments where rent was subsidized. The temporary housing assistance
was placed under the mandate of Prefectural Governors, to be managed by respective
Prefectural Offices19. As Hino (2015) argues, this temporary housing assistance and thepsychological damage compensation constitute the two pillars of essential support uponwhich evacuees have relied to continue their life in refuge, or to start their new life
elsewhere.

2.3.2.3 Third policy paper
Based on these policies, the authorities started to lift the first two EZs, one in Tamura
city in April 2014, and the other in Kawauchi village in October. Faced with fierce
opposition from the evacuees, each time the government was obliged to postpone theplanned date for lifting the EZ for three to six months. When the government started tonegotiate the third case in Naraha with similar difficulties, it published a revised policy
document in June 2015. The novelty of the policy was to extend the compensation
payment to up to seven years after the accident, until March 2018, for residents fromGreen and Yellow Zones (See Map 2). And this was applied to all evacuees from thesetwo zones, regardless of whether EOs had been lifted in the respective municipalities,
whether or not the individual chose to return. For the first time, the document clearlymentioned that lifting EOs did not automatically oblige evacuees to return. The new
document also set the timeframe for lifting all EOs - except the Red Zone - as the sixthyear following the disaster (March 2017). This change of policy, which disassociatedcompensation payment from the lifting of EOs, thereby ensuring equal treatment of all
evacuees from Green and Yellow Zones regardless of their mobility choices,significantly helped the government to accelerate the process of lifting EOs
As a result, all EOs (except those in Red Zone and host towns of F1NPP - Futaba andOkuma) were lifted as planned in March-April 2017, six years after the accident(see Map 3 below).

19

National Diet Library (2017), Oukyukasetsujutakuseido no genjo to kadai (The Status and Challenge of Temporary
Housing Assistance Scheme), Issue Brief No.966, 8 June 2017.

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22/165The chronological list of lifted
EOs is as follows:

Municipality

TimingTamuraApr 2014

KawauchiOct 2014

Naraha

Sep 2015

Katsurao

Jun 2016

Minamisoma

Jul 2016

IitateMar 2017

Kawamata

Mar 2017

Namie

Mar 2017

Tomioka

Apr 2017

Table 2: List of municipalities in which EOs are lifted (Green and Yellow Zones)

IitateMinamisoma

Namie
TamuraFutabaOkuma
KawauchiTomiokaNarahaMap 3: Map of EZs after April 2017 (Source: METI)In March 2017, the government terminated the temporary housing assistance for selfevacuees (including former evacuees from the 20-30 km radius zone) and for the

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evacuees from the former Green Zone (except Naraha). The government alsoannounced that such assistance would stop for those from the Red Zone and former
Yellow Zone in March 2019. Considering the end of psychological compensation fixed in
March 2018, many evacuees would lose both sources of financial support and be left
unaided, to continue life in refuge or rebuild their new life elsewhere. If they could not
find a new job and survive on their own in the place of refuge or resettlement, theywould end up being obliged to return home as many job opportunities were created by
State subsidies in former EZs and additional assistance scheme was made available forthose who did decide to return.

2.4 DECONTAMINATION POLICY
Decontaminating the area affected by the fallout of the F1NPP accident was the policy
which had been officially decided by the Nuclear Emergency HQ on 26 August 2011,
five months following the disaster. From the official minutes of initial Nuclear
Emergency HQ meetings, it is evident that the idea had been put on a table as early as
May 201120, two months after the accident, to be consolidated in the following August.
On 30 August 2011, the National Diet of Japan adopted ‘The Act on Special Measures
Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials
Discharged by the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku DistrictOff the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011’21. This Act allowed
the government to implement decontamination activities and designated the Ministry
for the Environment (MoE) as the agency responsible for setting up policies and plans,
as well as undertaking such activities.
The MoE came up with the initial concept of decontamination activities on
11 November 2011, proposing a plan to divide the target area into two categories:
Special Decontamination Areas (Special Areas) and Intensive Contamination Survey
Areas (Survey Areas). The Special Areas were essentially the zones under EO. The
Survey Areas were defined as any areas outside the EZs where the radiation dose wasfound to be 1mSv/year or higher (0.23 micro Sieverts per hour µSv/hour according tocalculations by the MoE 22 ). The decontamination of Special Areas was directly
undertaken by the MoE while that of Survey Areas was to be carried out by theconcerned municipality, and costs subsequently reimbursed by the government. The
designation of target municipalities for each Special/Survey Area was made public in
January 2012; a total of 102 municipalities over eight prefectures were included in theSurvey Areas. Two more municipalities were added to the Survey Area in February 2012.
The goal for decontamination of the Special Areas was initially fixed at 50% reduction
in public exposure dose (60% for children) over two years - which would also be
achieved by natural weathering effects, and to reach the dose of less than 1 mSv/yearin the long-term.
For schools in the Special Areas, as explained earlier, the MoE fixed the radiation dosetarget at up to 1mSv/year before reopening, while the Ministry of Education, Culture,
20 One of the supporting documents submitted to the 15th Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter meeting held on

17 May 2011, available only in Japanese: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/genshiryoku/dai15/15_05_gensai.pdf
21

http://josen.env.go.jp/en/policy_document/pdf/special_act.pdf 20130118

22

https://www.env.go.jp/press/files/jp/18437.pdf

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Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) established a different criterion for schools
located outside the EZs. On 19 April 2011, they fixed a reference dose of 20 mSv/year(equivalent in hourly dose of 3.8 µSv, according to MEXT calculations23) for schools inFukushima prefecture to allow outside activities for children. According to this MEXT
provisional policy, children in Fukushima prefecture could play outside in the school
yard when the ambient radiation dose was less than 20mSv/year. The MEXT identified a
total of 13 schools, located outside the EZs, where the dose exceeded 20mSv/year but
simply recommended that outside activity for children be limited to less than one hourper day 24 . Even though the MEXT was forced to review this provisional policy on
26 August 2011, aligning the reference dose to 1mSv/year (equivalent of 0,23 µSv/hour,according to MEXT calculations25) following outcry from Fukushima parents26, such a
difference in protection criteria for children between EZs and non-EZs nurtured afeeling of injustice and resentment among affected residents in Fukushima prefecture.

2.5 COMPENSATION POLICY
2.5.1

JAPANESE NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME

Japan officially launched its civilian nuclear program in 1960 and enacted two liability
laws to cover eventual nuclear damages in 1961: the Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage (Compensation Act) and the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation
for Nuclear Damage (Indemnity Agreements Act). At the same period, nuclear liability
regimes were adopted at the international level: the Paris Convention in 1960 and theVienna Convention in 1963. Japan is not a party to any of these international
conventions, but developed its own national liability regime. The country is also one ofthose States which have adopted unlimited liability, together with Germany and
Switzerland (Vasquez-Maignan, 2012). In the case of the Fukushima accident, therefore,
TEPCO is exclusively liable for the damage and its liability is unlimited.
The Compensation Act (Section 6) also stipulates that in any case where the operator
cannot cover compensation payments, the government should intervene to provide
financial assistance. Following this provision, the government set up the Nuclear
Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation in September 2001 to provide financial
assistance to nuclear operators facing compensation payments of more than 120 billion
Yen (880 million euros), which is the maximum amount covered by private insurance(Nomura et al., 2012).

23

The base assumption of the calculation is that a child spends 8 hours outside and 16 hours inside school over
365 days per year: http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1307458.htm
24

http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1307458.htm (only available in Japanese)25

The base of calculation is to suppose that a child goes to school 200 days per year and spends 6.5 hours per day atschool (4.5 hours inside and 2 hours outside): http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1310973.htm
26

On 23 May 2011, about 650 Fukushima parents gathered and protested in front of the Ministry (MEXT) building inTokyo demanding the cancellation of the policy to apply the reference dose of 20mSv/year to schools in Fukushima(Mainichi Shimbun, “F1NPP: 20mSv/year standard, parents demand the annulation”, 23 May 2011); A coalition of fiveNGOs organised an online petition against the 20mSv/year threshold and collected a total of 53,193 signatures from 61
countries in April 2001(https://www.greenpeace.org/japan/Global/japan/pdf/fat4.pdf)

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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF FUKUSHIMA COMPENSATION SCHEME

Following the accident, TEPCO was placed under State control on 31 July 2012.
Currently TEPCO’s largest, controlling shareholder (50.1%), is the Nuclear Damage
Compensation Facilitation Corporation, of which half is owned by the Japanese
government. Since August 2014, the Corporation had also been also tasked with
providing financial support to decommissioning operations, and was thus renamed the
Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation.
By December 2016, TEPCO had received a total of 8 trillion yen (62 billion euros) infinancial aid from the State via the Compensation Corporation in order to pay
compensation 27 . Thus, the compensation was in fact paid by the State, butadministratively managed by TEPCO. In order to receive compensation, residents had
to complete an application form, which initially contained 60 pages, and submit it to
TEPCO with a significant number of supporting documents 28 . By 2 February 2018,
TEPCO had paid a total of 62 billion euros in compensation for 2 million individual cases
and 400,000 cases from corporations and business owners29.
The policy of compensation relative to the F1NPP accident was defined by the Dispute
Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation (hereafter: Reconciliation
Committee,) which was established under the terms of the Compensation Act, under
the auspices of MEXT, in April 2011. The Reconciliation Committee consisted of 10 parttime members, appointed by the MEXT, who would have high moral and academic
standing in the fields of law, medicine, and nuclear. The role of the Committee was
two-fold: 1) mediate any disputes for reconciliation; 2) establish guidelines on thescope of the nuclear damage.
As regards mediation, the center of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) wasestablished in August 2011, under the Reconciliation Committee, to undertake the task
and facilitate out-of-court settlements between parties in dispute. In the case of
Fukushima compensation, plaintiffs could file a claim to 1) TEPCO directly, 2) the ADR,or 3) the civil courts. Under the Paris and Vienna conventions, a single court would be
assigned to hear all claims arising out of a nuclear accident (Vasquez-Maignan, 2012).
2.5.3

FUKUSHIMA COMPENSATION POLICY

2.5.3.1 Establishment of the compensation policy
The Fukushima compensation policy was thus established by the Reconciliation
Committee in the form of guidelines determining the scope of the operator’s liability.
Although the guidelines were only recommendations, thus not legally binding, they
nevertheless played a decisive role in influencing judges, as the victims and theoperator could invoke them before the courts (Vasquez-Maignan, 2012).

27

The Nikkei, ToudenHD genshiryokubaishokikou ni tsuikaenjo wo shinsei (TEPCO requests additional financial
assistance to the Nuclear Damage Compensation Corporation), 27 December 2016.
28

Japan Federation of Bar Association (JFBA) President’s statement made on 16 September 2011:https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/statement/year/2011/110916.html
29

Source: TEPCO website

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26/165The Reconciliation Committee produced Preliminary, Secondary and Interim Guidelines
between 2011 and 2013, but the Interim Guideline issued on 5 August 2011 defined theoverall scope of nuclear damage. The First, Second and Forth Supplements to theInterim Guideline specifically dealt with compensation pertaining to evacuees.
According to these Supplements residents affected by the accident should have theright to compensation for: psychological damage, rehabilitation/reconstruction ofhouses, loss or reduction of property values, loss of employment/reduction in salaries
due to a change of jobs, fall in sales and trading (for business owners), transportation
costs between home and place of refuge, medical costs, and so on. Among thesegrounds for compensation, the question of psychological damage became one of the
key issues at stake for the lifting of EOs in the Green and Yellow Zones, as thisparticular compensation was directly tied to the EO in effect. Once the EO was lifted,
the compensation stopped one year after that date. This was indeed the case forresidents from the former 20-30 km radius zone and Hotspots. This problem wasrectified for Green and Yellow Zone residents by the June 2015 policy paper, which
accelerated the lifting of EOs. For the Red Zone, as residents were not expected toreturn soon, they received the compensation payment equivalent of 12 years from theaccident. In short, the residents from Green and Yellow Zones received in total
8,500,000 yen (65,000 euros) per person for psychological compensation, while Red
Zone residents received 14,500,000 yen (111,500 euros)/person30.

2.5.3.2 Compensation gaps
The Fukushima compensation scheme relating to the affected residents was definedalong the boundaries of Evacuation Zones (Hiraoka and Yokemoto, 2015; Hasegawa etal., 2017): the zone in which a resident’s house is located significantly changes theamount they receive. As such, six different categories of compensation were created
for affected residents, with varying degrees of entitlement (see Table 1 below).

30

Mainichi Shimbun, Naruhodori “Seishinteki baishou” tte, Fukushima (What is psychological compensation?), 20
January 2017: Regional version (http://mainichi.jp/articles/20170120/ddl/k07/070/056000c)

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Amount
Zone

Remark(equivalentin euros)

Red Zone

446,000(‘Difficult-to-Return’ Area)
radiation
dose
50mSv/year

more

than

Yellow Zone(‘Not-Permitted-to-Live’ area)
radiation
dose
50mSv/year

between20-

Evacuation Zone
(EZ)

Green Zone

260,000

260,000(‘Ready-to-Return’ Area)
radiation dose less than 20mSv/year
Hotspot (260 houses)
radiationdose
20mSv/year

77,000more

than

Evacuation Prepared Area (20-30 km
radius zone)
Shelter indoors and then evacuation
Outside the EZ(23 designated cities)

Outside the EZ
55,400Former EZ(until Sep 2011)
Bothevacuees
residents

selfand13,000

Table 1: Amount of psychological compensation received by a family of four (two adults
and two children) according to different zones
Source: Hiraoka and Yokemoto (2015); some adjustment made by the author(R. Hasegawa)In addition to psychological damage, compensation for the loss of fixed-assets value(houses and land) and household effects (furniture, electronics, cars, etc.) was only
paid to evacuees from Red, Yellow and Green Zones, which further widens the divide
with those living in the former Evacuation Prepared Area (20-30 km radius) or Hotspots.
For example, a family of four (two adults and two children) from Green, Yellow and
Red Zones receives between 20,000-40,000 euros for the damage to their house,
38,000–50,000 euros for the damage to household effects, and around 120,000 euros forhouse reconstruction, while a family from the former 20-30 km radius zone or Hotspots
did not receive any of these31.

31

Source: Reconciliation Committee.
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/26/1342848_3_1.pdf

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Self-evacuees and residents from the 23 municipalities 32 situated outside the EZs,
entitled to some compensation according to the terms of the Reconciliation
Committee’s First Supplement to the Interim Guidelines, received one-timecompensation for the psychological damage (Table 2)33. But the amount received was
lower than for residents of Hotspots or the former 20-30 km radius zone. For example,
an adult in this category received 600 euros in total.
StatusAmount (one-time payment)Children and pregnant
women (between 11
March and 31 Dec 2011)
Other adults

Those who stayed: 3,000 euros/child or womenThose who evacuated: 4,500 euros/child or woman
80,000 Yen (600 euros)/person

Table 2: Compensation for self-evacuees (one-time payment)

2.5.3.3 Consequences of compensation gaps
Compensation linked solely to zoning, and not to the precise radiological situation, as
well as the significant gap in amounts received according to the different categories,
triggered a feeling of injustice among the affected population (Yokemoto, 2015;
Hasegawa et al., 2017). It resulted in profound division and tension among residents,
especially in the towns divided into two or three different EZs such as Kawauchi village(see Section 3.2: Kawauchi Case Study). In the case of Minamisoma city, for example,
the municipality was divided into six different zones, of which five were under EO andthus received different compensation payments, while the remaining zone was notentitled to compensation.
Evacuation Zones were mapped out based not only on contamination level, but also
according to various political, economic and administrative considerations (Fassert,
2017; Hasegawa et al. 2017). For example, the line separating an EZ from a non-EZ
could be a border between two towns, or a street which separates two districts withina town. In some cases, residents on one side of a street were told to return as it was
now safe to live in their home, while across the street residents were told not to return
due to a high level of contamination (e.g. Tomioka, Tamura and Minamisoma).
Moreover, a specific feature of radionuclide fallout from nuclear accidents is that
contamination spreads unevenly in patches, like leopard spots, as the radioactive
plume is pushed by winds and radionuclides fall with rain and snow. And so the EZs
were felt not necessarily to represent the extent of actual contamination on the
ground, and the compensation scheme based on these essentially arbitrary EZ dividing
lines fueled feelings of injustice and jealousy among residents inside, outside, and inbetween different EZs, leading to a surge of lawsuits against TEPCO and the State (seeChapter 6).

32

Fukushima city, Nihonmatsu city, Date city, Motomiya city, Koori town, Kunimi town, Kawamata town, Ootama
village, Kôriyama city, Sukagawa city, Tamura city, Kagamiishi town, Tenei village, Ishikawa town, Tamakawa village,
Hirata village, Aasakawa town, Furudono village, Miharu town, Ono town, Soma city, Shinchi town, Iwaki city.
33

Defined in the First Supplement to the Interim Guideline which was published on 6 December 2011

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3 IMPLEMENTATION OF POST ACCIDENTAL POLICIES ON THE
GROUND: THREE CASE STUDIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to analyze the consequences of the aforementioned key post-accident policies
on the ground, the Shinrai project chose three municipalities, which are located indifferent zones and thus affected differently by the said policies. The focus of thepresent analysis is on the process of decision-making on evacuation and return, thereaction of residents, and the consequences of the decisions made. The first case is
Kawauchi village, which had been divided into three different EZs: the 20-30 km radiuszone, the Green Zone, and the Yellow Zone. The second case study is Naraha town, of
which the entire territory, included in the Green Zone, had been evacuated. And thelast case is the Watari district of Fukushima city, which was not included in any of theEZs or designated Hotspots, despite the detection of elevated radiation dose over
20mSv/year in several districts.
The choice of the first two municipalities was made very logically due to the timing of
the lifting of EOs for these towns 34 and that of our field missions. One of the EOs
concerning Kawauchi village had just been lifted when the first field mission for the
Shinrai project was conducted in October 2014. The residents and the municipality
were thus interviewed immediately after the lifting of the EO, and then again, sixmonths later. When the EO in Kawauchi was lifted, Naraha town was in the midst ofinternal discussions on the question of return. It was ideal timing to conduct fieldinterviews in order to observe the development and change in dynamics within themunicipality. In Naraha, interviews could thus be conducted before and during theprocess of decision-making on return, and after the lifting of the EO. The choice ofWatari district, in Fukushima city, was made with a view to see another case ofaffected residents, who were living outside the official EZs, and thus not assisted in theprocess of evacuation. These residents were either obliged to stay despite fear ofradiation effects in the absence of financial aid, or had to evacuate by their own means.
In examining three different cases of affected municipalities and residents, the project
aimed to construct a broader view of the effects of the Japanese government’s postaccident policies.

3.2 CHAPTER OUTLINE
In this chapter, the geographical, demographical characteristics of the three cases(Kawauchi, Naraha, and Watari) are presented first, before detailing how evacuation
took place - or not, in the case of Watari - with specific consequences. The processthat the municipalities established for lifting the EOs is examined, as well as theconcerns and reactions of inhabitants. A last part focuses on the specific role played by
the two Mayors of Kawauchi and Naraha: it highlights what is at stake at the municipal
34

The evacuation order for the 20-30 km radius zone was lifted at the end of September 2011 by the Nuclear
Emergency HQ. At that time, none of the concerned municipalities in the 20-30 km radius zone decided to return
immediately, due to the unstable situation of F1NPP and the radiological contamination of their territory. Furthermore,as outlined in chapter 2, the executive authority to order evacuation, and thereby the authority to lift such an order,
remained in the hands of municipalities.

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30/165level, where the responsibility laid for implementing governmental policy while at thesame time responding to the concerns and interests of inhabitants.

3.3 KAWAUCHI VILLAGE
3.3.1

GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION

Fukushima Prefecture comprises three regions: Hama-dori on the coast, most of which
was placed under evacuation orders; Naka-dori in the middle, the political andeconomic center of the Prefecture; and Aizu, located inland to the west. Kawauchi
village is situated within the 10-30 km radius south-west of the F1NPP. It is part of theHama-dori region, but is a landlocked territory bordering the cities/towns of Iwaki,
Naraha, Tomioka, Okuma and Tamura. It has an area of about 200 km2, 90% of which ismountains and forest35. Arable land accounts for only 5% of its territory.
3.3.2

DEMOGRAPHICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION (BEFORE THE CATASTROPHE)

The village counted 3,028 inhabitants in 2011, of which 34% were elderly (over 65 years
old) 36 . The main economic activity was forestry, production of tobacco leaves, andcattle farming.
3.3.3

THE ACCIDENT AND THE EVACUATION OF KAWAUCHI

Situated within a 10-30km radius from the F1NPP, the village of Kawauchi was divided
into three different evacuation zones: a 20-30 km radius zone (former Evacuation
Prepared Area), a Green Zone (less than 20mSv/year) and a Yellow Zone (between 2050mSv/year). 90% of its residents are living in the 20-30 km radius zone, for which theEO was lifted as early as September 2011. The Green Zone EO was lifted in October
2014, while the Yellow Zone EO was only lifted in June 2016. This case study will focus
on the lifting of the order from the 20-30 km radius zone and on that of the Green Zone.
The Mayor of Kawauchi, Yuko Endo was elected in 2004; at the time of writing, it iscurrently his third mandate as mayor. On 15 March 2011, the day after the explosion ofreactor No.3 at F1NPP, in the absence of EOs from the government, Endo decided toevacuate the villagers:“At 6 a.m. on 12 March 2011, the day after the accident, the Mayor of Tomioka town
called and asked me to temporarily host Tomioka residents fleeing from the accident.
This was the first time I heard about the accident. When the first explosion occurredon the same day (12 March), we saw the explosion but a Tomioka town/TEPCO
employee reassured me, telling me that there would not be any radioactivity emission.
But when police officers and firefighters arrived with protective gear, I started toworry. Our own employees were working without gear. (…) On the explosion of theNo.3 reactor, on 14 March, even the TEPCO/Tomioka employee became nervous.

35

Kitamura, I. a, M., Y. (2016). Research on the relation between rate of permanent return and community activities -Case of Kawauchi Village, Fukushima Prefecture. Journal of Center for Regional Affaires, Fukushima University, , 27 (2),52-60.
36

The information on the printed copy of a PPT presentation made by the Mayor in September 2016, entitled ‘For
phasing out from the “affected area” status: Five years and a half from the disaster, the actual situation and challengesof Kawauchi village’, provided by the Mayor during the interview at the Kawauchi Municipal Office on 11 October 2016.

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By that time, all the media had disappeared from the village. The Nuclear Emergency
HQ issued the order for Kawauchi to shelter indoors. Orders were orders ofconfinement, not evacuation. People were confined, but we realized that there was
not enough food for everyone. I called NISA Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency ofJapan. Without information from the government, we made decisions based on TV
information … On 16 March, after talking with the mayor of Tomioka, we emitted anevacuation order, well it is the mayor of Tomioka and myself who decided to evacuate
the inhabitants”.
As a consequence, on 16 March 2011, the whole village was evacuated and moved toKôriyama city, one of the major cities of Fukushima prefecture, located in the
Naka dori region 55 km west of the village and 70 km from F1NPP.
Time

Event

11 March 2011

F1NPP Accident

14 March 2011

Explosion of the Reactor No.3 at F1NPP

15 March 2011

Shelter Indoor Order from the government (11:00)
Mayor’s decision to evacuate the village (15:00)

16 March 2011

Evacuation to Kôriyama city, together with inhabitantsof Tomioka town

22 April 2011

Evacuation Order from the government

3 August 2011

Designation of a Hotspot

30 Sept 2011

Lifting of EO for 20-30 km radius area

31 January 2012

Mayor’s declaration for return

1 April 2012

Return of the municipal offices to the 20-30 km radius
area of the village and reopening of schools

30 Sept 2012

End of psychological compensation payment for 2030 km radius area residents

14 December 2012

Lifting of Hotspot designation

1 October 2014

Lifting of EO for Green Zone

14 June 2016

Lifting of EO for Yellow Zone

March 2018

End of psychological compensation payment for Greenand Yellow Zone residents

Table 3: Chronology of events in Kawauchi village

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3.3.4

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32/165LIFTING THE EVACUATION ORDER

3.3.4.1 Town Process for organizing the lifting of the evacuation order (LOE)
Kawauchi village is one of two municipalities, together with Tamura city, which
declined the offer from the Reconstruction Agency to conduct resident opinion surveys
before the lifting of EOs. Therefore, the village official interviewed for the Shinrai
project in October 2014, just as the EO in Green Zone had been freshly lifted, did notknow the percentage of evacuees who opposed the lifting of the EO. Instead of
conducting opinion surveys, Kawauchi village organized an expert committee - a third
party - to assess the feasibility of lifting the EO. The Mayor explained the reason for
creating such a committee: “instead of following the decision of the government, weneeded to have some bases to judge objectively the conduciveness of return”37.

3.3.4.2 Expert committee for return
The Kawauchi Return Assessment Committee was established in July 2014. The
members were chosen by the village authority among the experts who had been
engaged in assisting the village since the accident. The committee was headed by
Dr/Prof. Noboru Takamura from Nagasaki University, who was also the Fukushima
Radiation Risk Management Advisor appointed by the Fukushima Prefecture. As early as
December 2011, Nagasaki University had been involved in assisting Kawauchi village, by
measuring radioactivity in the air and soil, and providing radiological protection advice
to the residents38. In April 2013, the University created its satellite office inside thevillage and placed a Public Health Nurse there - Ms. Makiko Orita, a Master’s student at
the time and Assistant Professor since April 2014 - on a permanent basis, to respond to
the anxiety and health concerns of villagers39.
The Committee assessed the feasibility of the return of residents to the Green Zone
according to criteria established by the government: radiological situation, progress of
decontamination, and sufficient infrastructure. It then produced an interim report inAugust 2014 which concluded that, in view of those criteria, the committee judged thesituation as ready for return. Two months later, the EO was lifted in the Green Zone.

3.3.4.3 Governmental Process: Pre-return Homestay and Preparation Period40 and
Explanation Meetings
The government announced the start of the Pre-return Homestay and Preparation
Period to the Green Zone of Kawauchi village in April 2014. This measure allowed
evacuees to spend the night in their homes in EZs - normally prohibited under the EOs 37

Fukushima Mimpo (local newspaper), Raigetsu 3 gatsu, Toushinkigen, Kawauchi-mura kikan ni

Muke kenshoui (The deadline of final response from the Kawauchi Return Assessment Committee at March 2015) on
11 July 2014 (http://www.minpo.jp/pub/topics/jishin2011/2014/07/post_10322.html)
38

Website of Atomic Bomb Disease Institute, Nagasaki University (http://www-sdc.med.nagasakiu.ac.jp/abdi/bases/kawauchi.html)
39

Profile of Ms Orita on the website of Nagasaki University:
http://www.nagasakiu.ac.jp/ja/gakusai/book/05index.html
40

The official name in Japanese (source: METI): furusato heno kikan ni muketa junbi notameno syukuhaku

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with a view to preparing and arranging things for a possible return. The problem withthis Preparation Period programme was that once it was launched by the government,
the lifting of EOs followed systematically, despite opposition from evacuees 41 .
According to the representative of the residents in the 8th District, situated in theGreen Zone, evacuees did not understand at the time that accepting this Preparation
Period would lead automatically to the lifting of the EO42. The decision to lift the EO
was first mentioned by a government official during the first “Explanation Meeting” 43organized by the Local Nuclear Emergency Response HQ, once the Preparation Period
had begun in June 2014. Having learned through media reports that the government
was intending to lift the order as early as July, evacuees voiced their opposition during
the meeting44. Confronted with the protest, the government announced that it would
postpone lifting the EO for one month. At the second Explanation Meeting, held on
17 August, evacuees and the Village Assembly made a formal request to thegovernment and village authorities to postpone it until the end of the year so that they
could have more time to prepare for return. According to the District Head who
attended these meetings, the government declined request, insisting that thedecontamination process had been completed and that the radiation dose had
decreased to under 20mSv/year in the area, so there was no reason not to lift the EO.

3.3.4.4 Reactions of the residents
Some inhabitants were in favour of the EO to be lifted at the soonest possible date:mainly the older residents, whose concerns were considered central by the mayor (seethe section 3.6.2). However, many returnees interviewed for the present study
considered that the government lifted the evacuation order prematurely, without
taking into account the specificities of Kawauchi and its surroundings. The area which
was under the EO in Kawauchi is located at the east end of the village, surrounded by
mountains and isolated from the rest of the village. 90% of the area is woods andmountains, and therefore difficult to decontaminate; many parents expressed concern
about the risk of radiation exposure for their children, questioning the long-term
practicability of living in the village while forbidding children to play in the surrounding
environment (Doi, 2015).
Moreover, inhabitants used to grow food in their garden and eat mountain vegetables
and mushrooms picked in the nearby hills. On their return after the EO was lifted, thevillage authority prohibited consumption of homegrown vegetables due to the risk ofinternal exposure to radiation. Inhabitants also discovered that they now had to drive
to Tamura city, a 90-minute round trip, to do grocery shopping and see doctors
because Okuma and Tomioka, the closest neighbouring towns where they had used torun daily errands, were still under evacuation orders.

41

Information obtained from the first interview with T.K. (male in his 60s), a returnee, conducted in his residence inKawauchi village on 21 October 2014 (Interviewer: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert).
42

Idem.

43

The term used in official documents and by governmental officials to describe a consultation meeting with residents.

44

Many media reports described the strong opposition expressed by the evacuees in detail during the meeting (cf.
Mainichi Shimbun, Toward Lifting the Evacuation Order: Kawauchi Residents’ Heated Protest (Original title:
Hinanshijikaijo he: Fukushima, Kawauchi mura noJumin ha mouhanpatsu) on 17 August 2014)

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34/165Many inhabitants were therefore in favour of postponing the EO to be lifted; so thearguments of the municipality were not accepted by all. The District Head, who
attended the meetings where the matter was discussed, expressed his frustration45:“The scenario was exactly the same as the previous case in Tamura city (where an
evacuation order was lifted in April 2014). No matter what we say, the government
will lift the order anyway”.
When the EO was lifted in Tamura city - the very first lifting of an EO, the then Deputy
Minister of the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which was responsible
for matters related to EZs, was quoted as saying, ‘lifting of EOs will be done based on
the government’s judgement’ 46 . At the time, only 6.7 percent of Tamura evacuees
expressed willingness to return; 34.5 percent were in favor of return if certain
conditions were met (Tamura City et al., 2013).
Another evacuee (female, in her 60s), who returned as soon as the EO was lifted andwas happy to be back home, expressed unease at the way the government operated47:“The government organized consultation meeting with evacuees only twice. Even if I
was in favor of the order being lifted, I was surprised to see that the government
forced it despite strong opposition from the evacuees. I was shocked to see that the
government, once decided, would not listen to the concerns of residents”.
Some inhabitants did not come back to Kawauchi. From the opinion survey conductedin December 2014 after the Green Zone evacuation order was lifted, the main reasonsfor non-return of the residents were listed as follows48:-

worry over radiation risks;
non-return of neighbors and friends;
lack of medical and social infrastructure;poor access to schools (high school) and work places (those with jobs outside thevillage).

After the return was organised and people had been living for a few years in a still
partly contaminated environment, new concerns emerged. The Mayor of Kawauchi,
Yuko Endo explained:“In the beginning, the returned residents paid much attention to what they eat inorder to avoid internal contamination. But five years after the accident, whole bodycounter exams started to detect radioactivity in residents’ bodies, which means thatthe residents started not to pay attention to contamination and to eat everything
without restriction (forest mushrooms and mountain vegetables, for example49)”.
45

stInterview with T.K. on 21 October 2014, Op.Cit., p.21

46

Mainichi Shimbun (2014), Hinankaijo: “Kanryou ha atamaga iindesu”, hantai oshikiru, Fukushima (Tamura city,
Fukushima: Lifting the evacuation order on 1 April. (The government) pushed through its judgement), “ministry
officials are clever” ), 24 April 2014
47

Interview with Ms A. conducted in her residence in Kawauchi village on 19 March 2015, Interviewers: R. Hasegawa
and C. Fassert.
48

Reconstruction Agency Website: http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat14/ikoucyousa/20150220_ikouchousa.pdf
49This remark mirrors our interviews with inhabitants, mostly the seniors, of our “first category” (Returning without
controlling) but it seems that the increase in positive WBC does not affect only senior people, which is more of concern.

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3.4 NARAHA TOWN
3.4.1

GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION

Naraha town is located in the Hama-dori region, along the coastal line facing the
Pacific Ocean. It has an area of 103 km2 of which more than 70% is covered by
mountains and forest 50 . Human habitation is concentrated on the flat plain, which
represents only 20% of the territory. Kido River runs through the town and its spring,
managed by Kido dam, provides drinking water for the inhabitants. In its territory,
Naraha co-hosts, with the town of Tomioka, the Fukushima Daïni (No.2) Nuclear Power
Plant (F2NPP), situated 10-20 km from Fukushima Daiichi (F1NPP). Naraha also co-hosts
J-Village, the National Football League training facility, together with Hirono town,
where Japanese professional football teams used to come for training before theaccident.
3.4.2

DEMOGRAPHICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION (BEFORE THE CATASTROPHE)

The towns counted 7,700 inhabitants in 2010, of which 26% were elderly (over 65 yearsold)51. Main economic activity was agriculture. Since the town hosts the F2NPP, many
residents worked in NPP-related jobs and businesses.
3.4.3

THE ACCIDENT AND THE EVACUATION OF NARAHA

Situated within a 10-20 km radius of the F1NPP, the town’s entire territory was placed
under compulsory evacuation order from March 2011 to September 2015 (four and ahalf years).
According to interview with municipal employees, the municipality had decided of its
own accord to evacuate residents - before the official evacuation order was issued by
the government on 12 March 2011 (Naraha’s decision was taken at 8:00; that of thegovernment, at 18:25), thereby confirming the analysis of the NAIIC report52. The town
was able to take this decision in a timely manner thanks to prompt and reliable
information concerning the critical condition of F1NPP from employees at another
TEPCO-run F2NPP, located within the town. Naraha decided to evacuate their residents
first to Iwaki, one of the major cities in the Fukushima prefecture, located 8-10 km
south of the town along the coast. When the second hydrogen explosion occurred at
F1NPP on 14 March 2011, the municipality decided to evacuate the residents further, toAizu-Misato town in the Aizu region, located 170 km west of Naraha town. But as thesituation at F1NPP slowly stabilized, a majority of residents chose to stay in Iwaki city.
The municipality thus opened two temporary offices: one in Aizu-Misato and the otherin Iwaki. In 2013, 76% of Naraha residents were living in Iwaki city as evacuees. The
temporary offices were closed and returned to Naraha when the EO was lifted on
5 September 2015.

50

Fukushima prefecture website:
https://web.archive.org/web/20160304113022/http://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/sec/11055a/bunkakairou24.html
51

Naraha Town website

52

Op. cit. footnote 5.

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Following the accident, J-Village became de facto the TEPCO Headquarter for F1NPP
cleanup activities, used essentially for workers to eat, rest, and change clothes before
and after working at F1NPP, and for TEPCO employees to sleep. Some of the Naraha
evacuees interviewed for the present research voiced concerns over the presence of
these cleanup workers in town due to this facility - unaccompanied men in general and feared insecurity created by their presence.
Time

Event

11 March 2011

F1NPP Accident

12 March 2011

Mayor’s decision to evacuate all residents to Iwaki city
(8:00)
Evacuation Orders (10 km, then 20 km radius) from thegovernment (17:39, 18:25)

14 March 2011

Explosion of Reactor No.3 at F1NPP

16 March 2011

Mayor’s decision to evacuate residents further to Aizumisato
Town

30 April 2012

New Mayor elected (Mr. Matsumoto)

May-July 2012

Town
Consultation
1,260 participants)withresidents(34 times,

Jan-March 2013

Town
Consultation
537 participants)withresidents(17 times,

Sep-Nov 2013

Town
Consultation
431 participants)

April-May 2014

Town
Consultation
539 participants)

29 May 2014

Mayor’s declaration for return after April 2015

Jan-March 2015

Town
Consultation
691 participants)

6 April 2015

Start of Pre-return Homestay and Preparation Period
declared by the government

April-May 2015

Government Consultation with residents (12 times)

June 2015

Government-Town Consultation with residents (8 times)

5 September 2015

Lifting of EO

with
with

with

residents
residents

residents(15

times,(12 times,(27 times,

Table 4: Chronology of events in Naraha town

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3.4.4

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37/165LIFTING THE EVACUATION ORDERS

3.4.4.1 Town process for organizing the LEOs
Unlike Kawauchi village, which relied on the expert committee to judge the‘conduciveness of return’, Naraha town adapted a strategy to intensively consult andlisten to the concerns and desires of its residents on the issue of return. First, the town
conducted regular opinion surveys among its residents, in collaboration with
Reconstruction Agency, or independently. While Kawauchi village organized surveys
only after the lifting of the EO in December 2014, Naraha town conducted a total ofnine surveys, of which the first was organized as early as August 201153. The town’s
other strategy was to organize regular consultation meetings with residents. After theelection of a new Mayor in April 2012, a total of five series of consultation wereorganised between 2012 and 2015 (the number of residents who participated varied
between 431 and 1,260 per series)54.
After intensive consultations with residents, the town office defined a Return
Programme in March 201455. The Plan identified two essential conditions for return:ensured safety and restoration of daily-life infrastructure, and 24 criteria were
established to gauge fulfilment of these conditions. The town assessed these criteria in
consultation with residents, Town Assembly, and two Expert Committees established in
2013. After a three-month period of evaluation, the Mayor finally pronounced the final
assessment result on 29 May 2014: most conditions for return had been fulfilled, but
the exact timing of return would be decided after April 2015.
During interview, one town official conceded that this declaration was intentionallyvague with regard to the timing of return because there were still many opposing
voices among the population56. The opinion survey conducted in January 2014, threemonths prior to the publication of the Return Programme, showed that only 8% ofevacuees wished to return as soon as possible, while around 60% were either undecided
or did not wish to return (Naraha town et al., 2014) (Figure 1).

8%

I wish to return as soon as possible

24%
33%

I wish to return if certain conditions are met
I cannot decide at the moment

35%

I do not wish to return
Figure 1: Result of opinion survey in Naraha (January, 2014)
Source: Naraha town et al., 2014.

53

Print-out of PPT presentation provided by the Naraha town; from interview with an employee of the town on
24/03/2015 and the Reconstruction Agency website
54

Print-out of PPT presentation provided by the Naraha town; from interview with an employee of the town on 24/03/201555

http://www.town.naraha.lg.jp/information/files/%E5%B8%B0%E7%94%BA%E8%A8%88%E7%94%BB-2.pdf

56

Interview with T.E. at Naraha Temporary Office in Iwaki city on 23 October 2014 (Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert)

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38/165

During field interviews, some of the evacuees expressed satisfaction at the approachtaken by the town authority. One evacuee, in charge of a temporary shelter unit in
Iwaki city, said:“I feel that our voices have been heard by the town officials. But I fear that the
government and TEPCO are creating huge pressure for the EOs to be lifted. They act as
if they want to make evacuees return home as soon as possible. The town office issandwiched between this governmental pressure and residents’ concerns. Residents
are asking the town administration to hold back such pressure from the government
until the living conditions are genuinely met and are truly favourable for return”.57

3.4.4.2 Expert committee for return
Naraha town established two expert committees in 2013, with the aim to better
respond to the worries and concerns of the residents, as well as to advise the town in
the evaluation of criteria for return. One of them was the Decontamination Evaluation
Committee, headed by Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama, Head of the Isotope ScienceCentre at University of Tokyo. Professor Kodama is one of the prominent figures amongexperts following the Fukushima accident. In July 2011, he was invited to provide his
expert opinion as regards the post-Fukushima situation, at the Committee on Welfareand Labour of the Lower House of the Japanese Diet (parliament), where he gave apassionate speech and scolded politicians present in the room who, according to him,
were utterly inactive and not doing much to protect children in Fukushima58. He said:“The fact that no such thing (installing semiconductor detectors everywhere to test
food contamination) whatsoever has been done after three months fills my entire
being with anger…what on earth is the Diet doing when 70,000 people are uprooted
from their homes?”
The video of that Diet Committee meeting circulated widely via social media, and hebecame a celebrity among the Japanese population. Having also watched the video,
the Mayor of Naraha asked Professor Kodama in person to become the advisor for his
town 59 . The Committee’s work included conducting radiation monitoring, evaluating
the radiological situation of the town, and providing radiological protection advice andrisk communication. But the main focus of the Committee’s activities was to ensure thesafety of water taken from Kido dam. Since the Ministry of Environment’s survey found
18,700Bq/kg of caesium134 and 137 contamination in the soil at the bottom of the dam,which had been conducted in July 2014 upon request from the town, the safety ofdrinking water was one of the biggest concerns of residents considering the question of
return60.
57

Interview with M.T. (male, in his 70s) conducted in his temporary shelter in Iwaki city on 23rd March 2015
(Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert).
58

The video is available from https://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/08/16/scientist-lambastes-lawmakersbecomes-youtube-star/; and the transcript in English is available at https://apjjf.org/2011/9/32/KodamaTatsuhiko/3587/article.html
59Interview with Mayor at Naraha Town Office in Naraha town on 13 October 2016 (Interviewers: R. Hasegawa,
C. Fassert and R. Kojima)
60

Naraha Town website: http://www.town.naraha.lg.jp/information/files/%E2%91%A226.12.10.pdf

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39/165The other committee worked on nuclear safety surveillance of Fukushima Daiichi (No.1)
and Daini (No.2) Nuclear Power Plants. As explained above, Naraha hosts F2NPP jointlywith Tomioka town. In order to respond to the concerns of residents over the situationof nuclear power stations in proximity, especially that of the crippled F1NPP, the town
established the committee of nuclear experts to monitor the activities of two NPPs.
The Nuclear Surveillance Committee was headed by Professor Tetsuo Matsumoto(Nuclear Engineering) of Tokyo City University, who is originally from Naraha town61. A
town official commented during interview that these committees had also beencreated to better reassure residents, since “residents seem to be more reassured whenexperts explain things, rather than the town employees”62.

3.4.4.3 Governmental Process: Preparation Period for Return and Explanation
Meetings
According to the declaration of the Mayor made in May 2014, Naraha town was todecide on the timing of return in or after April 2015. But on 30 March, the government
unexpectedly announced the start of the Pre-return Homestay and Preparation Period
in Naraha. As in Kawauchi village, the government organized “Explanation Meetings to
Residents” once the Preparation Period was launched. The first series of meeting was
conducted during April-May 2015, ostensibly to consult with evacuees about the timing
for lifting the evacuation order. But according to a town official who attended themeetings63, although the majority opinion of evacuees was that it was too soon to lift
the EO, government officials insisted on going ahead because they considered thatthree conditions64 established by the Nuclear Emergency HQ had been met in Naraha.
One evacuee who attended one of the meetings expressed her frustrations65:“I felt that there was always no answer from the government or the municipality to
the questions we asked. Everybody felt that their worries or opinions were simply
ignored. I am deeply disappointed in the Mayor, who blindly follows the policy set by
the government”.
Another evacuee who has never attended these meetings answered when we asked him
why he did not go66:“I think these meetings are simply a “performance” by the government, so it can put
down on paper that ‘it had consulted the residents’. Whatever residents say, the61

Information provided by T.E. during interview at Naraha Temporary Office in Iwaki city on 24 March 2015
(Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert)
62

Interview with T.E. at Naraha Temporary Office in Iwaki city on 24 March 2015 (Interviewers: R. Hasegawa andC. Fassert)
63

Interview with T.E., a municipal official, conducted at the Town Office in Naraha, shortly after the EO was lifted on
29 September 2015.
64

Namely: 1) ambient radiation dose less than 20mSv/year; 2) physical and social infrastructure is rehabilitated; and 3)
ample consultation with inhabitants.
65

Interview with Y.I. (female, in her 40s), a municipal social worker, conducted at her work place, Kami-Arakawa
temporary shelter in Iwaki city on 29 September 2015. Interviewer: R. Hasegawa.
66

Interview with M.S. (male, in his 40s), a municipal social worker, conducted at his work place, Onahama-Aikojima
temporary shelter in Iwaki city on 30 September 2015. Interviewer: R. Hasegawa.

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40/165government would simply repeat what it had already decided. From this accident,
what I’ve learned is that the government does not sincerely protect the population”.
As was the case in the previous EO liftings in Tamura and Kawauchi, confronted withstrong opposition from evacuees and Town Assembly members, the government
prolonged the Preparation Period for several months. Subsequently, it announced
without consultation in July the decision to lift the evacuation order on 5 September
2015. Asked by a journalist about the remaining concern of the residents regarding thesafety of drinking water, the Vice Minister of METI was famously quoted as replying,“whether people consider it safe or not safe, it is their psychological problem not ascientific one”67.

3.4.4.4 Reaction of the residents
Surveys of Naraha residents conducted in 2015 and 2016 indicated the following as
main reasons for non-return or hesitation to return68:-

worry over drinking water from Kido dam;long-term risk from the crippled nuclear station F1NPP (clean-up anddecommissioning activities);
radiological risks (radiation levels around their houses, exposure risk from temporary
disposal sites for decontaminated soil);security concerns due to the presence of many clean up/decontamination workers
from outside the area of Fukushima (numbers around 1,000);lack of sufficient medical facilities and other social and commercial infrastructures(supermarkets, pharmacies, elderly homes, etc.).

-

Field interviews with evacuees indeed indicate that many remained anxious about thesituation in the town, and suspicious of the ‘conduciveness of return’. The issue of
drinking water was also often referred to by evacuees during interviews. The town
authority had thus mobilized considerable resources - including the intervention of theState – to address this particular concern. One measure taken was the installation in
April 2015 of a water monitoring system at the water purification plant, which isoperational 24 hours a day and capable of measuring radioactivity every hour. The
hourly measurement data was made available online in real-time69. A 24-hour filtration
system against water turbidity - the amount of suspended material in liquid - was also
set up at the plant, in order to avoid the presence of contaminated mud in the water,
and a germanium semiconductor detector was placed at a community center to enable
residents to verify water safety themselves. Furthermore, water testing at the site ofdam, previously conducted by sampling at one spot, was now increased to 16 spots. Asan ultimate gesture, the Deputy Minister of METI at the time, Mr. Takagi, visited the67

Mainichi Shimbun (2015), Naraha machi hinankaijo he: fuku-keisansou “Anshin ha kokorono mondai” (Lifting
Evacuation Order in Naraha: Vice Minister of METI ‘Anshin is a matter of psychology’), 6 July 2015;
68

Reconstruction Agency Website: http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/ikoucyousa/

69

Naraha Town (2015), Naraha machi no fukkou ni muketa torikumi ni tsuite (Measures for the Reconstruction of
Naraha Town), August 2015: http://www.town.naraha.lg.jp/information/files/27.9.1%E2%91%A5.pdf

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41/165water purification plant on 3 April 2015 and demonstrated the safety of the drinking
water by drinking a glassful taken from the plant in front of cameras and journalists70.
Despite these significant efforts on the part of the authorities to reassure thepopulation, mobilizing considerable financial and technical resources, residents
remained suspicious. One evacuee living in the temporary shelter in Iwaki said71:“Experts say that it is safe to drink water because they are taking it from the surfaceof the dam. But when you know that there is the mud contaminated as much as
15,000Bq/kg at the bottom of dam, I don’t feel reassured. Scientists say that it isanzen safety assessed by science but I don’t have anshin feeling of safety in such asituation. What’s more, the mountains surrounding the dam aren’t decontaminated,which means that every time it rains and snows, contaminated water could pour into
the dam”.
Another evacuee also explained why she was not convinced by the reassuring message
from the municipality about the drinking water72:“Drinking that water for two or three days may be fine, but it would be different if
we were to drink it for the rest of our life”.
Radiation risk was also frequently mentioned by the evacuees as a main cause of theirreluctance to return. Other reasons for not returning included: the presence in front of
their residences of kariokiba (temporary disposal sites for decontamination waste )73,
and also the change of general atmosphere in the town due to the presence of cleanup
and decontamination workers living in temporary housing units built by subcontractors
in town, and the related security concerns. Moreover, one element not clearly evoked
in official surveys, but cited by almost all evacuees during field interviews, was theimportance of former neighbors’ and friends’ choice to return or not: people consulted
their neighbours; they did not want to return alone.

3.4.4.5 The difficulties met by the municipality
Decontamination operations ended in March 2014. After decontamination, average dose
was reduced from 0.70 to 0.38μSv/hour, but in no area was average dose reduced to
0.23μSv/hour as per the Ministry of Environment’s initial goal. The operation itself had
provoked outrage and distrust among residents, due to cases where decontamination
workers misplaced removed soil, cut trees without residents’ consent, or did not follow
proper decontamination procedures. From June 2014, the town conducted latest

70

NHK Fukushima broadcast on 3 April 2015:
https://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/fukushima_nuclear_disaster_news/35556862.html
71Interview with M.T. conducted in his temporary shelter in Iwaki city on 23 March 2015 (Interviewers: R. Hasegawa andC. Fassert).
72

Interview with M.I. (female, in her 40s), a municipal social worker, conducted at her work place, Takaku No.8
temporary shelter in Iwaki city on 28 September 2015. Interviewer: R. Hasegawa.
73

The government plans to stock the waste from decontamination activities in the Interim Storage Facility (ISF) whichis to be established in on the periphery of the F1NPP. But in January 2018, only 63.1% of private land owners havesigned on the lease contract with the State, and the Facility is not yet completed (Ministry of Environment Website). As
a result, the municipalities were obliged to create many kariokiba (Temporaryl Disposal Site) within their towns tostock the decontamination waste until the ISF will be completed and the waste will be transported there.

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measurement campaign, which showed lower dose rates than measurements taken
directly after the decontamination.
As regards radiation monitoring, Naraha town monitors radiation doses every month,independently from government measurement by fixed monitoring posts, using mobile
scintillator counters over 100 spots in the town. In addition, monthly radiation
monitoring around the kariokiba 74 , conducted by MoE, is accompanied by resident
volunteers who verify government measurement.
In 2014, when discussing the main concerns about lifting the evacuation orders andorganizing the return of residents, Mr. Toshiyuki Endo, a municipal officer,75 mentionedthat most of the staff of nursing homes for the elderly in the town had already foundjobs in other cities; it was uncertain whether those employees would come back to
Naraha upon the return of the population. Another concern was that the number ofchildren going to schools in Naraha town decreased from 686 to 160 (after the accident,
public schools in Naraha were also relocated to Iwaki city, using temporary buildings).
Since the majority of children had integrated local schools in Iwaki city and elsewhere,
town officials worried that these children and their parents would not come back to
Naraha when the town returned to its original situation. Lastly, there is still a problem
with the rehabilitation of individual homes. Out of the total 2,400 houses in town, 70%
were evaluated as severely damaged and in need of repairs. But due todecontamination works and other reconstruction projects, it was difficult to findmasons or construction workers. It would probably take several years for individual
homes to be repaired, thus delaying the actual return of the population. In addition, Mr.
Endo 76 explained that in evacuee surveys, the current situation of the Fukushima
Daiichi NPP and the radiation dose in town are the two greatest concerns expressed by
the evacuees.
According to town officers interviewed, this was due to the fact that residents lost
trust in the authorities since the accident. The current state of the damaged NPP,
where many incidents - such as leakage of contaminated water and electricity blackout
due to rats – were being reported by the media, does not reassure them and, in
addition, the fact that such a grave accident did indeed occur despite guarantees
previously provided by TEPCO and the government about the safety of these
installations, was also causing mistrust among residents.

3.4.4.6 The status of return of the residents since lifting of EO
In April 2017, a year and a half after the EO was lifted, Naraha town reported that
16.5% of former residents had returned and 20.9% of its registered residents (including74

Temporary waste storage

75

Interview Mr. Toshiyuki ENDO, Deputy Director, Reconstruction Promotion Division Naraha Town, 23 October 2014
Interview Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.
76

Interview Mr Toshiyuki ENDO, Deputy Director, Reconstruction Promotion Division Naraha Town (in IWAKI CITY ) Mr
Masahiko SAKAMOTO, Section Chief, Radiation Management Division. 23 October 2014. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa
and C. Fassert.

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43/165newcomers who came to live in town for new job opportunities) were currently living in
town 77.
Since the lifting of EO, new residents came and settled in town, attracted by new job
opportunities related to the F1NPP cleanup or others created by State subsidies. From
April 2017 onwards, the town updated only the number of residents currently living in
town, including newcomers – it updated no data on the percentage of return ofevacuees. As such, Naraha town reported that 33.62% of registered residents were now
residing in town in February 2018, but this statistic did not indicate how much of this33.62% comprise the former evacuees.

3.5 WATARI DISTRICT
3.5.1 GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION
Watari is a district located on the east side of Fukushima city, the capital of Fukushima
prefecture. Fukushima city is in the Naka-dori region, the political center of theprefecture. The Naka-dori region, despite being situated between 50-70 km from thecrippled F1NPP, was situated in the passage of the radioactive plume and therefore
found itself with many contaminated spots in the wake of the disaster. Some of thesespots had radiation levels which equaled those of the official EZs.
The Watari district is situated close to the city centre where the Fukushima Prefectural
Government Office building stands. Fukushima city covers an area of 767 km2, of whichmore than 66% is covered by mountains and forest78. It is the political capital of theprefecture, while Kôriyama city is its economic capital. In terms of population, Iwaki
city has the largest number of inhabitants within the Fukushima prefecture, followedby Kôriyama city and Fukushima city.
3.5.2

DEMOGRAPHICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION (BEFORE THE ACCIDENT)In the 2010 population census, Fukushima city had 292,590 inhabitants. Watari district
counted 16,541 residents 79 . The main economic activity of the city is agriculture.
Fukushima city is famous for peach and pear production, and had the largest
agricultural output value in the prefecture.
3.5.3

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT AND NON-EVACUATION

3.5.3.1 Non Recognized Hotspots: decision-making process, issues at stake,difficulties
Despite being 60 km from F1NPP, the city was severely affected by the radioactive
fallout from the crippled plant due to the passage of the radioactive plume. In June
2011 (three months after the accident), the municipality measured ambient radiation
77

Mainichi Shimbun (2017), The proportion of residents living in Naraha town reached 20%: reopening of a school
accelerates return of residents (Original title: Naraha machi kyojuritsu 2wari ni: gakko saikaide kikankasoku),
8 April 201778

Fukushima City website:
http://www.city.fukushima.fukushima.jp/nourin-rinmu/machizukuri/hukushima_sinrin.html

79

The number provided by a City Office employee during the interview on 22 October 2014.

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44/165dose all over the city and found spots with 3.83 and 4.05 µSv/hour inside the Wataridistrict, which exceeded the criteria (3.8 µSv/hour = 20 mSv/year) 80 fixed by the
Nuclear Emergency HQ for issuing evacuation orders 81 . Out of six spots where thesurvey detected the dose over 3.4 µSv/hour, four were located within the Wataridistrict. The same random survey found a total of 182 spots throughout the city with
ambient radiation doses which exceeded 2.0 µSv/hour. But no evacuation order – ordesignation of Hotspots - was issued by the government.
In June 2011, the government began to designate so-called Hotspots in areas locatedoutside the Evacuation Zones found to have radiation doses over 20 mSv/year. Once
recognized, financial compensation would be paid by TEPCO for eventual evacuation if
the concerned families chose to do so. As described in the Chapter 2, Hotspots were
therefore not, strictly speaking, evacuation orders, but rather a recommendation forevacuation.
Despite the provisional policy of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT), which fixed 3.8 µSv/hour as an equivalent hourly dose of
20 mSv/year82, municipalities set up different criteria for designating Hotspots. Dateand Minamisoma cities adopted 3.0 µSv/hour at 1m above the ground as a threshold fordesignating the Hotspots. In addition, they created special thresholds for children andpregnant women: 2.7 µSv/hour at 1 m above in Date city, and 2.0 µSv/hour at 50 cm
above the ground in Minamisoma city 83 . From the government’s internal meeting
minutes - declassified in 2014 at the request of Date city residents84 - we learn that
Date city had also included the area with the dose range between 1.3 - 1.7 µSv/hour inthe Hotspots, taking into account the presence of children and pregnant women in the
area.
When Date city was designated with 104 Hotspots in June 2011, Fukushima city also
conducted its first radiation survey. Eight houses in Watari district were found to havedoses of over 3.1 µSv/hour, the designation threshold fixed by Fukushima city 85 .
Despite this result, the MEXT did not dispatch its team for a field survey until August
2011. Upon a request from inhabitants, the NGO Friends of the Earth (FOE) 86 , incooperation with Fukurô-no-kai 87 , organized radiation surveys of the air and soil in

80

Source: MEXT: http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1307458.htm

81

The ambient dose is measured at 1m above the ground. The data is drawn from Fukushima City website:

http://www.city.fukushima.fukushima.jp/kankyohoushasen/bosai/bosaikiki/shinsai/hoshano/sokute/shinaisokute/documents/8901.pdf
82

MEXT website: http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1307458.htm

83

The presentation made by T. Sakaue (Representative of NGO, Fukuroo no kai), entitled Evacuation Zones andNuclear Compensation on 5 September 2011 in a public lecture organised by NGO, Frinds of Earth (FOE).
84

The request was made on 16 May 2013 and the document was disclosed to the public on 5 November 2013 by theauthority of the Prime Minister. The documents are available at: https://clearing-house.org/?p=983 The particularly
relevant document is found at: http://clearinghouse.main.jp/web/cao0012.pdf
85

Fukushima City website: http://www.city.fukushima.fukushima.jp/kankyohoushasen/bosai/bosaikiki/shinsai/hoshano/sokute/shinaisokute/documents/8901.pdf ; Sakaue, T. op. cit.
86

FoE Japan was established in 1980 as a member of International NGO, Friends of the Earth International, based in
Amsterdam, Netherland.
87

It is a Japanese anti-nuclear NGO which has been working for years to stop the use of nuclear energy in Japan. Afterthe Fukushima accident, Fukuroo-no-kai conducted measurement of radioactivity in many towns in Fukushima andCe document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable.
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Watari and Oonami districts in September 2011, with help of Professor Tomoya
Yamauchi, specialist in radiation physics at Kobe University. Their survey found spots
with 2.7, 3.0 and 3.87 µSv/hour at 1 m above the ground, and 157,274 Bq/kg from thesoil taken at the Yahata Shrine and 38,464 Bq/kg from a house garden within theDistrict (FOE and Fukuro-no-kai, 201288). Strong requests were made by these NGOs andWatari residents; the government and the city authority organized a meeting withresidents on 8 October 2011. The meeting was reported to last five hours, and wasattended by as many as 400 residents; there was heated debate between inhabitants
who requested the designation of Hotspots and government and city officials who
insisted on decontaminating the district rather than evacuating residents. According toreports by FOE, members of which attended the meeting, a government official
explained that they had found only two spots with the dose over 3.1 µSv/hour fromtheir own survey conducted in August 2011. The government and city authorities
explained that since both houses had declined the offer of assistance for evacuation (aBuddhist temple and an old couple), they had decided not to designate them as
Hotspots. Residents at the meeting, however, asked the authorities to designate thewhole district as a Hotspot zone so that the inhabitants who wished to evacuate could
do so (FOE and Fukuro-no-kai, 2012). They also made a special plea to make possible
evacuation of families with small children, even temporarily. But requests forevacuation were rejected by the authorities present at the meeting.
During another meeting with the inhabitants organized in the Oonami district, in theeast of the Watari district bordering Date city, where a high radiation dose was also
found, the city official was reported to have said: “evacuation of inhabitants will
make the economy shrink. We’d like to implement decontamination with thecooperation of inhabitants”89.
Professor Tomoya Yamauchi of Kobe University explained during interview90:“The choice of decontamination was thus imposed on the residents without any otheroptions. It was a pre-selected policy, without having made any cost-benefit analysis
with alternative protection measures. I basically think that this is because thegovernment had chosen economy over protection of citizens … in its post-accident
policies …. Fukushima city is the capital of Fukushima prefecture, where the
Shinkaisen91 runs through. The recognition of Hotspots would have had a significant
symbolic impact on the Naka-dori region as a whole the political and economic centerof the prefecture. They might have feared that the demand for evacuation would

informed the public as an independent source of information. Later on, they worked with the French NGO ACRO
(Association pour le Contrôle de La radioactivité dans l’Ouest).
88

Also, the report of the NGO, FOE (Friends of Earth), whose members participated in the meetings (in Japanese):
F.O.E and Fukuro-no-kai, (2012). For establishing the “right for evacuation”: the frontline on the issues of selfevacuation and compensation, the case of the Watari district of Fukushima city (Original title: “Hinan no kenri”
kakuritsu
notameni:jishutekihinannobaishomondai
tohinanmondainosaizensen).
http://www.foejapan.org/energy/news/p110909.html
89

Information provided by Professor T. Yamauchi of Kobe University during interview on 24 May 2016; Prof. Yamauchi
participated in the meeting held in the Oonami district.
90

Professor T. Yamauchi; interview conducted at his office, Kobe University, in Kobe city on 24 May 2016
(Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert)
91

High-speed train that connects Tokyo and Tohoku/Hokkaido.

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46/165increase in other major cities of the region such as Kôriyama and Nihonmatsu if
Hotspots were to be designated in Fukushima city”.
During interview, a resident who had been a member of the City Assembly for 16 years
suggested similar reasons behind the authority’s firm refusal to designate Hotspots92:“Fukushima city is the prefectural headquarter. So if it becomes under evacuation
orders, it would give an image to the public all over Japan that the whole Fukushima
prefecture is in danger. Because the Watari and Oonami districts are part of the“Fukushima city”, no evacuation order was issued”.
In such circumstances, Professor Yamauchi suggests that the City Office may not have
had any choice. When he met the Mayor of the city at the time, he remembers him
complaining that “the government would not pay for the evacuation of residents”93.
A self-evacuee from Watari reports hearing city employees giving the same responsewhen residents asked why the city did not recognize Hotspots94: “because there is no
designation of Hotspots by the government”; “as for the Watari district, please let
us decontaminate first. If radiation doesn’t decrease after the decontamination, we
may consider other options”.
But a number of news articles reported a different view. For example, on 4 November
2011, the Mainichi Shimbun (one of the major newspapers in Japan) referred to agovernmental source, who was quoted as saying: “I think the city authority cannot
really decide for evacuation because, once Hotspots are designated in the prefecture’s
capital city, population drain or ‘harmful rumors’95 may occur”96.
From the field interviews, it was not possible to identify where responsibility
ultimately lay - city authority or government - for the decision against Hotspot
designation for Fukushima city. But internal meeting notes released on the same issue
with regards to Date city suggest that the initiative of municipality Mayors played an
important role for the designation of Hotspots, even though the final decision remainedin the hands of the government authority.
When the city authority insisted on proceeding with the decontamination of the districtin October 2011, decontamination policy had not yet been established by thegovernment. As explained in Chapter 2.2, the Ministry of Environment produced thefirst policy only in November 2011, and the designation of target municipalities fordecontamination was not defined until January 2012. Fukushima city officials were
therefore insisting on decontamination without yet knowing whether the city would be
included in the decontamination activities financed by the government. Under suchcircumstance, it was extremely difficult for the State and City authorities to convince
the Watari residents to favour decontamination. The actual decontamination of the

92

Interview with M.T. (male, in his 80s) conducted in his residence in Watari district, Fukushima city, on 19 September
2015, Interviewer: R. Kojima.
93

From the interview on 24/05/2016.

94

Interview with Y.N. (female, in her 40s) conducted in her temporary flat in Sendai city on 26 March 2015
(Interviewer: R. Kojima)
95‘Harmful rumors’, in the context of Fukushima, pertains to ostensibly groundless rumors concerning contamination
which would hurt the image of Fukushima or that of its agricultural products.
96

Mainichi Shimbun on 4 November 2011, op. sit., p.5

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district started in April 2012 and was completed in October 2013, two years after the
first Explanation Meeting organized by the State and the City97.

3.5.3.2 Reaction of the residents and protests
This resolute attitude of the authorities regarding the designation of Hotspots in Watariangered many residents, who considered the decision unfair, compared to the situationof residents in other cities. The Representative of Watari District Residents Council
described such a feeling during interview98:“The authorities discovered two spots with radiation doses that would qualify as
Hotspots but did not officially designate them as such, while in the neighboring Datecity, many Hotspots were recognized by the authorities. This led many Watariresidents to feel that they were not treated equally as a citizen”.
A resident who created an association, Save Watari Kids, with other concerned parents
living in the district, expressed his frustration toward the city administration99:“I understand that it was not easy for city officials to deal with the post-accident
situation, but I was very disappointed that the city office simply followed thegovernmental position and did not take its own initiatives to protect its citizens. …
The city officials talk only about decontamination as if it is the solution to everything,
to deal with all the consequences of the accident including the protection of children,and nothing else”.
A self-evacuee (female, in her 40s) living in Sendai city with her children also described
her mistrust toward the authorities100:“By the fact that neither the government nor the city did not want to recognize
Hotspots I felt that neither the government nor the city cared about the children in
the Watari district. … The government prioritized the evacuees from Evacuation
Zones over our children. … The actual house-by-house decontamination in the district
only began after two years from the accident. The authorities let Watari children be
exposed to high radiation dose for two years!”
Numbered at 16,541 before the accident, the inhabitants of the Watari district
decreased to 13,250 by January 2018, which means that the district lost 20% of its
residents following the accident101. Among those who stayed, there were a number offamilies who chose to evacuate children - often with the mother, while the father
stayed on in the city for work. These self-evacuees have often faced financial
difficulties as they have tried to keep up with expenses of two-households without

97

Fukushima city website:
http://www.city.fukushima.fukushima.jp/josensoumu/bosai/bosaikiki/shinsai/hoshano/josen/shinchokujokyo/houtai1
2083101.html; Fukushima Community Portal Site “Momo Link”:
http://www.fukushima.jp/modules/portal/html/tokusyuu/096-01.html
98Interview with H.K. (male, in his 70s)conducted at Fukushima City Office on 22 October 2014 (Interviewers:
R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert)
99

Interview with Y.K. (male, in his 50s) conducted in a café in Fukushima city on 22 October 2014 (Interviewers:
R. Hasegawa,C. Fassert and R. Kojima).
100

Interview with Y.N. conducted in her temporary flat in Sendai city on 26 March 2015 (Interviewer: R. Kojima)

101

Fukushima City Website.

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official financial assistance. A resident of Watari whose husband and children
evacuated to Hokkaido, explained her circumstance102:“We bought our house in Watari before the accident, so we still need to pay back loans.
I cannot therefore quit my job in Fukushima city. It is even more so now that myhusband and I have to support the expenses of three households: one in Watari, thesecond in Hokkaido, and the third as my older son just started his college study lastmonth”.
The resident survey conducted in May 2012 by Fukushima city found that 34 per cent of
the city residents still wished to evacuate from the city, of whom 89 per cent said thatthey were worried about the future health of their children 103 . The internet-based
survey organized in October 2011 by Friends of the Earth indicated that main reasonsfor not choosing self-evacuation were economic concerns and occupational
circumstances (FOE and Fukuro-no-kai, 2012104); one in three residents felt ‘trapped’ inthe city against their wishes, and were thus experiencing psychological distress. The
status of these residents was referred to as chiiki nai hinan (“evacuation withincommunity”) or seikatsu nai hinan (“evacuation within daily lives”) by Imai (2014) andYokemoto et al. (2016), a form of life in suspension or restriction, where residents live
like fugitives in their own communities, avoiding consumption of certain foodstuff,
avoiding going to certain places, and constantly monitoring the radiation dose, which
all ends up restricting and dictating their daily lives. The Japan Federation of Bar
Associations (JFBA) 105 and the Save Fukushima Children Lawyer's Network (SAFLAN),
prominent lawyers associations, asserted the “right to evacuate” for these residents,
urging the government to grant support for evacuation to all residents living in the areawith a dose of over 5 mSv/year because, according to the Japanese legislation standard,
any area with a dose over 5.2 mSv/year is a Radiation Control Area, to which entry is
strictly controlled106.
But those who evacuated of their own accord also suffered a form of psychologicaldistress, caused by stigmatization within their communities. Regarded sometimes asselfish, as disloyal, or even as deserters who abandoned communities in difficulty, selfevacuees often experienced criticism and were sometimes cut off from the originalcommunity, and left feeling isolated in their place of refuge (Hasegawa, 2013; 2015).
The representative of Save Watari Kids (mentioned above), of which 20 out of
25 members had evacuated of their own accord, explained that many couples
separated or divorced due to these pressures, and argued that the government shouldhave accorded some sort of financial assistance for evacuation, even just a small
amount or for a limited duration. A resident interviewed, whose children evacuated to

102

Interview with A.S. (female, in her 40s) conducted in a café in Fukushima city on 18 May 2016 (Interviewer:
R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert).
103

Asahi Shimbun (2012), 34% of residents in Fukushima City currently wish to evacuate, the City’s survey found(Original title: “ima demo hinan shitai”, fukushima shimin no 34%: shi tyousa) on 17 September 2012.
104

F.O.E and Fukuro-no-kai, (2012). Op.cit.

105

The entity which represents all Bar Associations and registered lawyers in Japan. All lawyers must registerthemselves at the Bar Association of the prefecture where his/her law firm is located as well as at JFBA.
106

JFBA’s statement on 4 October 2014(https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/civil_liberties/year/2013/2013_2.html)

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Hokkaido with her husband, expressed her puzzlement at the attitude of theauthorities107:“I don’t understand why the effort to protect our children by self-evacuation, whichis considered to be a good thing under normal circumstances, has to be criticized andlabelled as doing something wrong after the accident. Meanwhile, hiding risks fromour children is somehow regarded as a good thing to do these days”.
In July 2015, a group of 3,107 residents from Watari district filed a claim to theAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) demanding compensation for psychologicaldamage from TEPCO, which would amount to a maximum of 18.3 billion yen(180 million USD)108.

3.6 A FOCUS ON THE MAYORS’ DIFFICULTIES AND DILEMMAS (KAWAUCHI AND
NARAHA)
3.6.1

INTRODUCTION

This section analyses specific issues which confronted the mayors of two evacuatedtowns and the roles the mayors had to play; it draws upon interviews conducted withthe mayors of Naraha and Kawauchi109 and their teams, as well as interviews at central
government (MoE and Nuclear Regulation Authority).
From these interviews, we observed that mayors had often been torn between two
imperatives: the central government policies and the residents’ needs and requests.
The mayors appear to crystallize tension between centralized decisions at State level,
and the local - and divergent - concerns of the villagers. The mayors struggled between
the push from central government, eager to lift the evacuation orders and encourage
the return of inhabitants, and the interests and desires of the villagers, which vary
greatly. Some, often very senior, inhabitants could be eager to come home (see cases
detailed in Chapter 4 below), whereas other inhabitants - often younger and typicallyparents with young children – could be worried, and want to wait for a reduction inradioactivity. (cf. Chapter 4 on “returning or not”, which presents various emblematiccases).
Other signs of divergence of interests were already discernible when the zoning status
was modified, as Naraha evacuee Mr. TK explained in interview110:“In Naraha, an evacuation order was issued which designed Naraha as “Restricted Area”
just after the accident. Access to this town was limited, a special authorisation from
Police was needed to get there, and you had to take a medical exam after the visit.
One year after, the mayor of Naraha and the government issued a new order as “zones

107Interview with A.S, Ibid.

108

ADR was created in August 2011 by the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation,
placed under the auspice of the MEXT, in order to facilitate out-of-court settlements between parties and speed up theprocess.; Mainichi Shimbun (2015), Living with contaminated soil in own gardens: the anger of Watari residents inFukushima city (Original title: Niwa no osendo to kurasu: Fukushima shi watari chiku jumin no ikari) on 28 July 2015
109

Mr Yuko Endo, mayor of Kawauchi, Interviewers: Reiko Hasegawa, Christine Fassert, and Rina Kojima, 11th October
2016. Mr Matsumoto, mayor of Naraha, Interviewers: Reiko Hasegawa, Christine Fassert, and Rina Kojima,th
13 October 2016.
110th

Mr TK (58 years old), Naraha evacuee, 16 March 2015, Interviewer: Rina Kojima.

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50/165ready for the lift of the EO” (Green Zone). This order was issued as if this town did
not have any serious damage. Some evacuees were pleased to see this change of zone,
because they could get to Naraha as they wanted, but others were not because they
were about to receive less compensation, compared to residents of a town classified“difficult for return” (Red Zone).
According to the legislation in place, mayors were in charge of lifting the evacuation
orders, and had some margins for maneuvering; these margins were somewhat limited,but each mayor would choose a particular “style” of exercising those orders. The
mayors were instrumental in associating central policing with local specificities.
Through the choice of consultations with population, timing for lifting the Evacuation
orders, mayors entered into a - sometimes harsh - negotiation process, which they
regarded as a series of hardships to be faced.
But the approach of the present analysis is not normative, it does not consider that
there could be such a thing as a unique and ‘right’ way to proceed at local level in theaftermath of a nuclear accident; this research demonstrates, on the contrary, that
there were a variety of judgements linked to specific interests and views frominhabitants. The accent is also placed on the concrete democratic processes put inplace by the Mayors, and how their limits might be criticized by inhabitants. The
approach here has been to take into account the mayors’ point of view, and how theymobilized implicit or explicit values to respond - with more or less success - to a given
conundrum: how to organize the return of inhabitants to an evacuated village after an
accident, without dismissing the standpoint of inhabitants who prefer NOT to return.
The reasons and values evoked by interviewees may be framed as an “accountability”
process, where they make clear what counts in their eyes, and how they madedecisions.
3.6.2

KAWAUCHI MAYOR

3.6.2.1 Choosing experts
When he set up an expert committee for return, the Mayor of Kawauchi, Yuko Endo
asked a prominent public expert to join: “I asked Professor Noboru Takamura ofNagasaki University, who kindly accepted to assess the soil and water contaminationlevel in the village and to judge whether return would be feasible”. Prof. Takamura
was one of the Fukushima Radiation Risk Management Advisors appointed by the
Fukushima prefecture in the wake of the accident, together with Professor Shunichi
Yamashita of Nagasaki University.
Mayor Endo insisted that he tried to elaborate his own view on radiation risks:
I read a number of books on Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents, but I did not trustthem because of their absence of concrete data. I saw these data in Moritani’s booksee below.
I went to listen to Dr Takamura’s conference, and I learnt that it was possible to livein Kawauchi village again, by paying attention to radiation levels. I asked him to takemeasurements in Kawauchi; he went to conduct measurements of soils and water, withstudents and researchers, and said it was not a worrying situation in December 2011.

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51/165The other expert whom I trusted on matters related to radiation risk was Masanori
Moritani111, and his book, ‘Spell of 1 Millisievert’.

3.6.2.2 “The Right to Return”“Return is a right” appears to aptly summarize the guiding principle of the Mayor of
Kawauchi in the process of lifting the evacuation order for his town. From June 2011,
he started official preparation for return to the village. His decision was justified firstby the radiation dose, which he found to be “relatively low” in Kawauchi, and also by
the situation of the crippled plant, which he considered to be “stabilized”. Whenquestioned by a journalist after this declaration, he explained, “I also worried that theresidents would lose the desire to return to the village if they had lived too long inKôriyama city and got used to convenient city life, where there are many specialized
doctors and shopping facilities” 112. Behind the decision, there was also the Mayor’s
fear of for the survival of the village.
But the primary motive the mayor emphasized was the “low level” of radiation dose in
the village“At the Big Palette large business convention hall in Kôriyama which became an
emergency evacuation centre for Kawauchi residents, the radiation level in theparking lot was 0.6 µSv/hour. And at the temporary housing in the Namiki district ofKôriyama where I lived, there was more than 1 µSv/hour. So the radiation level in
Kawauchi was lower …. When I realized this, I felt that there was a possibility that
we could return to Kawauchi.”
In January 2012, the Mayor officially declared the return to village. His decision was
chastised by a number of inhabitants for being a sign that the mayor was too compliant
with the government push, ignoring the points of view of those who found it was too
early to come back. A number of interviews convey similar judgement of the decision(cf. Chapter 4 “returning or not” for further examples). One inhabitant explained:“In the case of Miyakoji district, Tamura city, the government lifted the evacuation
order by its executive determination in the second consultation meeting, despite
strong opposition from the evacuees. I think it was the same scenario in Kawauchi. No
matter what evacuees said, the government lifted the order anyway. Like the case of
Miyakoji district of Tamura, the evacuation zone in Kawauchi represented only one
part of the village: the majority of the residents lived in ‘normal’ areas. So there
was more political pressure – and also from the village administration - to ‘normalize’
the area under the evacuation zone”.
During interview, Mayor Endo defended his point, by explaining that the “declaration of
return” was intended first to return Village Office functions to Kawauchi and to invite
residents - those who could return - to prepare for return; it was considered anecessary first step. However, Endo insisted mostly on the concern of very old
inhabitants:

111

Masanori Moritani is an expert and commentator in economy and industry affairs.

112

The Nikkei, Kawauchi village (Fukushima) declares the return of village: reopening the village office in Kawauchi in
April (Original titile: Fukushima, Kawauchi mura ga kison sengen, yakuba wo shigatu saikai), on 31/01/2012

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Some inhabitants told me before dying: “I would like to die at home”. Some died
before the lifting of Evacuation orders. I thus thought, as a priority, of those whowanted to return home”.
Finally, the Mayor explained the significance of his visit to the area affected by the
Chernobyl accident in Ukraine and Belarus, in November 2011, together with Prof.
Shimizu, an Economist at Fukushima University.
I felt that the two accidents - Chernobyl, 25 years before, and Fukushima - were notcomparable113. The seriousness of the accident, the political system, and the vision ofhomeland are also different. … There was no decontamination, they razed the houses.
People moved to other towns, with a new job. Also, the type of radionuclides wasdifferent: in Kawauchi the majority of radionuclides were cesium, with little plutonium
and strontium. …. Then in June 2015, I went back to Chernobyl, I met an old couple
who returned home, 14 km from the plant. They were now 80; they were 50 at the timeof the accident. The husband told me: “we evacuated to Kiev after the evacuation order,
and we stayed two years, but my wife became sick, so we came back. The government
forbade us to live here; but we resisted and stayed here. Inhabitants who were younger
than us died in Kiev. So, the secret to living a long life is to live at home114”.
Mayor Endo raised a point which has often been neglected: Evacuation Orders areorders: they entail an obligation. EOs constitute both a right to evacuate and an
obligation to evacuate (see Chapter 4). Mr. Endo was particularly sensitive to the“authoritarian” aspect of evacuation, and he professed himself more than upset atpreventing an old person from coming back home rather than living in temporary
shelters, given that the radiological risks for an elderly person, whose remaining life israther limited, may effectively be discounted. It was a harsh point, discussed withinhabitants, but clearly Mayor Endo justified his decision on ethical grounds: for him, it
was unacceptable, in such conditions, to prevent an old person from “dying at home”;
it was unacceptable not to allow old people to come back to their homes, mostly
family houses where some of them had been living their whole lives. His account ofvisits to Chernobyl illustrates how the mayor gradually cast the issue of return as a“right” for the elderly to come home, in a relatively radiologically safe situation.

3.6.2.3 Return as a way to restore fairness
A main characteristic of the Kawauchi village is that the zoning scheme divided it inthree zones. The evacuation zone (Green and Yellow zones) represented only a smallpart of the village. The majority of residents lived in the normal zone (former 20-30 km
Zone, where the EO was lifted in 2011).
The compensation program, determined in line with evacuation zones, created tension
within the village. One resident living in the former 20-30 km Zone described thesituation succinctly115:

113

Interview Mr Yuko ENDO, mayor of Kawauchi, Interviewers: Reiko Hasegawa, Christine Fassert, and Rina Kojima,
op.cit. 11th October 2016.
114

Similar accounts are given in Ackerman. (2016). “Traverser Chernobyl”. Premier Prallèle.

115

Interview with M.Y. (female, in her 60s) conducted in her residence in Kawauchi village on 25 September 2015
(Interviewer: R. Hasegawa).

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53/165A deep division exists within the village. Returnees to the Green and Yellow Zones are notwell-regarded by the rest of residents because they continue to receive compensation
payments, even after their return to the village. The rest of the residents who live in thesame village, and face the same risks and inconveniences, don’t receive anything. This
creates jealousy and feeling of injustice among the residents.
The mayor indeed made this situation one of the major issues he aimed to resolve bylifting the EO: the Lifting of Evacuation order was also a first step to reunify thevillagers, by putting an end to a measure which had created feelings of unfairness
amongst inhabitants. A town member explained:“The end of compensation payment also brings advantages because it normalizes therelationship between villagers. So stopping this payment given to only one part ofresidents will help reconcile this difference and restore the harmony of the village116”.

3.6.2.4 Arbitration between conflicting interests
The inhabitants who were eager to wait had a number of reasons for doing so, mostparticularly due to, what they considered, “incomplete decontamination”. A resident
working in the village during the day, but continuing his evacuation in Iwaki city
explained117:
Many people protested against the decision at the time, saying that the return was too
soon and that the decontamination of the village should be completed before
returning, especially for the sake of children.
Mayor Endo was aware of the opposition of a number of inhabitants. When he started
consultations with residents in September 2011, there was much resistance, especiallyamong young people. He discussed the issue with most of them: “A medical doctor who
had been working in Kawauchi before the accident told me that he would not return”.
Having acknowledged such opposition, the Mayor emphasized that “those who could
return should return, but the others who still worry could wait and see before making
a decision to return”118.
Mayor Endo recognizes implicitly that, torn between inhabitants eager to return rapidly
to their home and those who preferred to wait and continue evacuation for a variety ofreasons, he chose the interests and arguments of the first. As Mayor, Mr. Endo justified
this decision: allowing people to return would not oblige all inhabitants to come back;the “harm” in not returning, for some, would be more serious than the harm done tothose who wanted to wait.
The village thus recovered its municipal function in April 2012 (one year after theaccident), six months after the government officially lifted the EO for 20-30km radiuszone in September 2011. Psychological compensation for these residents was thus
ended in September 2012, one year after the lifting of the EO. One resident described

116

Interview M. K.T., op.cit.

117Interview with A.S. (male, in his 30s) conducted at his work place, Kawauchi Nursery School, in Kawauchi village on
20 May 2016 (Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert)
118

The Nikkei (31/01/2012), op.Cit, p.18

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54/165during interview that the Mayor’s decision left a “bitter taste” among the inhabitants,
to that day119:“The Mayor should have taken greater account of the opinion of villagers when hedecided on return. He could have also negotiated with the government to postpone
the timing”.
Many residents continued their evacuation in Kôriyama city even after April 2012,
because the decontamination of the village was not completed until March 2014120.
As explained earlier, for the majority of Kawauchi residents (20-30 km radius zone),compensation payment ceased as early as October 2012 and temporary housing
assistance was terminated in March 2017. It became financially difficult for many tocontinue evacuation, unless they bore the cost on their own. In population statistics
dated 1 September 2016, Kawauchi village had 2,746 registered inhabitants, of which
67% (1,838) were reportedly “residing” in the village, while it also reports the number of
evacuees as 1,952. The numbers do not match because, according to Doi (2015), in the
total number of “residing” inhabitants121, the village office also counted former residents
who simply started using their old postal address again, as well as young people under
22 years old whose parents were residing in the village. The gap in numbers can also be
explained by the phenomenon of “daytime return”: some residents made the choice inbetween evacuation (or resettlement) and return; in the survey of residents conducted in2015, 22% of the residents stated having dual residency (Reconstruction Agency, 2015;
Mosneaga, 2015). It means commuting and working in the village during the day, andreturning every evening to temporary housing located in other cities such as Kôriyama or
Tamura, continuing their evacuation for the sake of children or grandparents withspecific medical needs in large hospitals. The evacuees interviewed mentioned radiation
risk concerns and high school opportunities for children as main reasons for this choice.
Before the accident, Kawauchi children went to the high school in Tomioka town, but (atthe time of the interview) the town was under evacuation order - some of them had nochoice but to continue evacuation or move to other cities for their children’s education.
After the village returned (to 20-30 km radius area) in April 2012, various offices andfactories reopened and workers were called to return to their posts. Many residents werethen obliged to go back to their jobs in the village, but some of them decided tocontinue their evacuation. Others had no other choice but to return against their will(cf. Chapter 4 for detailed analysis).
3.6.3

NARAHA MAYOR

3.6.3.1 Choosing experts
The town created two expert committees: one to advise the town on decontamination,
radiation monitoring, radiological protection of the population; the other to advise on
the status of F1NPP and F2NPP, crisis management, evacuation plans in case of
119Interview with A.S. (male in his 30s) conducted at his work place, Kawauchi Nursery School, in Kawauchi village on
20 May 2016 (Interviewer: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert)
120

Website of ME (http://josen.env.go.jp/area/)121

In these affected towns, there are registered inhabitants (who are inhabitants only on paper) and residing
inhabitants (who are actually living there).

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55/165emergencies. The first committee on decontamination was headed by Prof. Tatsuhiko
Kodama, Head of Isotope Research Centre, University of Tokyo, and included Prof.
Norio Nogawa from Fukushima Future Center for Regional Revitalization (FURE),
University of Fukushima. The second committee comprised three experts from theJapanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and was led by Prof. Matsumoto of Tokyo City
University, who is originally from Naraha town. The experts for the first committee
were chosen by Professor Kodama after the town had made a request to him and asked
for his advice (see above Ch. 3.4.4.2.).
Mayor Matsumoto commented his choice of Prof. Kodama:
I chose Professor Tatsuhiko Kodama as Radiation Risk Advisor of the town because I
had been deeply moved by the famous speech at the House of Senators which wasshown on TV during which he urged politicians to “protect children from radiation
risks”. I had tears during the speech. I went to meet Prof. Kodama in person at Tokyo
University and directly asked him to become the radiation risk advisor for Naraha122.
In March 2014, the town announced a Return Programme, in which they laid down
24 required conditions defined by the town after listening to inhabitants. After threemonths of self-evaluation conducted in consultation with residents, town assembly andexpert committees, on 29 May 2014 the Mayor declared that most of these conditions
had been met and that the town would make a final decision on return after thefollowing spring (2015). A member of the township admitted that this declaration,
especially with regards to the timing of the final decision, was intentionally vague(“after next spring”), because the evacuees were still expressing concerns about thecurrent state of the infrastructure in the town, and about radiation-related risk.
However, he insisted on the consultation process: “The town also organized more than
30 consultations with residents on issues related to return, which I consider extremely
important in order to maintain a trustworthy relationship with the residents”.

3.6.3.2 Return as a negotiation (with the Government)
Mayor Matsumoto explained: “I was elected Mayor in April 2012. My first decision was
to organize roughly thirty meetings with inhabitants in order to listen to them”.
He also detailed the first “fight” he had to lead against government decision-making:
At the time, the pressing issue was the reorganization of evacuation zones thegovernment proposed to reorganize the zones at the end of March 2012. The
government told me that it wanted to change the zone of Naraha from Restricted
Zone to Ready-to-Lift-Evacuation-Order Zone (Green Zone) because they said theradiation level in Naraha was relatively low. What I insisted on at the time, to thegovernment, was that it was more logical for the government to cleandecontaminate the town first, before changing the zone resulting in lifting theevacuation order. But I felt that the government was not willing to do so. What I was
made to understand was that unless I accepted the zone change, the government
would start neither decontamination nor reconstruction of infrastructure in Naraha
122

Kodama‘s discourse got a million of views on Internet … He was awarded one of the 10 scientists of the year by
NATURE in 2012. Jobin, P. (2012). Qui est protégé par la radioprotection ? EBISU n°47.

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town, and that I had to make that decision quickly in order to ensure thedecontamination and reconstruction of the town. This was the biggest point, or the
first biggest challenge that I had to overcome after becoming Mayor. If I had not
accepted the zone change at the time, the current situation of Naraha town would nothave been possible123.
For the Mayor, these conditions were difficult to accept: “Responsibility for theaccident lies with TEPCO and the Government, so it is only normal that they should
decontaminate the area without imposing any conditions. I deeply regret that many
residents do not know that my decision to accept the zoning revision was taken underpressure from the Government”.
In this first step, the Mayor was criticized by a number of inhabitants, who consideredthat decontamination should have been conducted first, and that he should haveresisted and imposed the village’s views in response to government pressure. Thisshows how zoning became a critical issue in this context, for a government eager to“turn the page” and to normalize the situation. In the government’s plan for zone
reshuffle, Naraha was effectively classified as “ready to lift evacuation orders” before
the decontamination work started, even though experience indicates that in certain
ways decontamination was not as efficient as foreseen. From the point of view of the
Mayor, he was asked to declare that the village was ready, even though the radiologicalsituation was still uncertain. However, he was obliged to comply with government rulein this instance, because for decontamination operations he depended on investments
decided at national level.

3.6.3.3 Return as a step-by-step process
Although not in a position to impose his views on the above point, the Mayor of Naraha
was keen to establish a step-by-step process in order to organize the lifting of EO andto take into consideration the villagers’ views. As explained in the previous section, thetown conducted regular opinion surveys among residents, in collaboration with theReconstruction Agency or of its own accord – nine were conducted in total, of which
the first was organized as early as August 2011 124 - and they organized regularconsultation meetings with residents. These processes allowed Naraha residents to taketime in assessing the situation and making a matured and solid decision about their
future.

3.6.3.4 Return as a possibility
This extensive consultation process highlighted that a significant proportion of the
inhabitants were not willing to return or not ready to do so. Contrary to Mayor Endo
who framed the possibility of return to the evacuated village as a right, Mayor
Matsumoto framed his role as allowing the reconstruction of Naraha, and return as apossibility for those who wanted to come back to do so. He insisted on the difficulty of
his role: “The role of the municipality was to prepare the living conditions for the123

Interview M. Matsumoto, Naraha mayor, led by R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert, 13th October 2016.

124

Print-out of PPT presentation provided by the Naraha town; from the interview with an employee of the town on
24/03/2015 and the Reconstruction Agency website

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57/165return of residents. But I could not impose the return to inhabitants, because itwas a personal choice”.
After the lifting of EO, in 2015, another central issue stemmed from the arrival of
workers from elsewhere (decontamination workers and sub-contractors for the crippled
reactors). This new demographic status raised issues such as the raise of criminality.
(cf. Chapter 4 on “Returning or not”).
In April 2016, Mayor Matsumoto was reelected.
3.6.4

CONCLUSION

3.6.4.1 Expertise as a political stance“Expert committees” were set up by the two mayors, framed by both as a means ofdelegating a number of issues, amongst which would be the decision on whether thesituation was radiologically acceptable or not. The choice of expert at the head ofthese committees was instrumental in the ensuing process of lifting the Evacuation
Orders. The Mayor of Kawauchi referred to a “government” scientist, whereas Mayor
Matsumoto chose Professor Kodama, a scientist who expressed publicly distance withthe governmental views. When Matsumoto elucidated the reasons for his choice, hementioned spontaneously the political position taken by Kodama (a protest against
government policy; criticism of the retained 20 mSv threshold), but also his own tears
and the fact that he had been personally moved by Kodama’s “famous speech”;
Matsumoto did not refer so much to Kodama’s scientific competence (M. Kodama isfrom the esteemed University of Tokyo 125 ; his credentials are undisputable) as to aprotest which combined a cautious position on radiological risks and reproof ofgovernment policy. This choice of an “alternative scientist”, rather than one of theexperts of the Fukushima Medical and Nagasaki Universities who are government
experts, is a compelling example of politics through expertise. By contrast, the Mayorof Kawauchi called for an expert from Nagasaki University, a place where scientists are
considered to be more in line with government views.

3.6.4.2 Governing reconstruction
Each of the mayors formulated his decision as a way to reconstruct the village
community, and to take account of divergent interests. Each village has its own
characteristics, but it appears also that the major issue was to lift orders underpressure from the government, in a situation where most inhabitants were still
reluctant (with the notable exception of elderly persons eager to come home - and die
there). Struggles that faced both mayors may be framed in terms of rights: the Mayorof Naraha was more inclined not to deny the “right to evacuate”, or to respect theright “not to be obliged to return” whereas the Mayor of Kawauchi justified his positionas maximizing the “right to return”, and framed mainly evacuation as authoritarian,evoking the drama in Chernobyl of the samiossoly 126 who returned to their home indefiance of the authorities. As long as groups of inhabitants had such specific and125

University of Tokyo is typically the place from where political and scientific elites are issued in Japan.

126

Cf. Galia Ackerman, op.cit. : The residents who come back illegally to evacuated territories, details in chapter 4.

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opposed interests, it was difficult to call for a “general interest”. Each of the mayors
justified his decisions by making explicit what he considered important to favour: theright to come back/die at home, or the right to “buy time” and not to come back, forthose not satisfied with the life that return would offer.
However, both insisted on the fact that reconstruction was also reconstruction ofcommunities. The Mayor of Kawauchi considered the lifting of EO an important step toeliminate compensation discrepancies which led to inconsistent rights among
inhabitants. Reconstructing is about reconstructing “the” former community, divided
by the discrepant social status attached to zoning. The Mayor of Naraha explained thatreconstruction would be about recovering the former landscapes (the rice paddies are
no longer part of the Naraha surroundings), but also about reconstructing “a”
community, even if the community after the accident is not the same as the one before
the accident: “Due to the accident, the community has been broken into pieces. I hope
to recreate the community step by step. Inhabitants have been dispersed by theevacuation, the community was destroyed, we have now to enlarge this community,
little by little”.

3.6.4.3 Return as reunification
The case of Kawauchi epitomizes the conundrums of zoning 127 : in fact, zoning
establishes and reifies the territorialization of a risk which is, however, intrinsicallydifficult to circumscribe spatially and temporally. Zoning is, at the same time, adispositive which effectively excludes certain persons from compensation rights, even
if they may be in a very similar “radiological situation” to those defined as victims
under the compensation scheme. Zoning traces limits, which simultaneously includes
some people and excludes others. This is portrayed in The Land of Hope, whenfilmmaker Sion Sono shows how two neighbouring families -formerly friends - arebrutally separated after a nuclear accident, with a border drawn by the zoning
between their homes, which defines the forbidden zone and the other where people
are allowed to stay128. Zoning is also linked to compensation, another type of divide.
The mayor considered his decision to lift the Evacuation Order to be a means toeliminate what could be felt as unfair for those who were between 20-30km radius
which could result in nothing less than reunifying a divided community. However, inboth cases, the lifting of Evacuation Orders also reactivated the divide between
inhabitants who wanted to return and inhabitants who preferred to wait or not toreturn, making it difficult for the mayors not to be chastised for having ‘chosen theirside’.

3.6.4.4 Return as a normalizing process
However, reunification in the case of Kawauchi was also led at the price of“normalizing” the “still contaminated” territories. “Normalisation” is a process often
denounced on a sociological basis, raising the question of who decides that a situation

127

Hasegawa, R, Deves, M, Fassert, C. Kaminski, E. “Zoning: making risks (in)visible and manageable in disasters.,
article submitted.
128

Living in/with contaminated territories. C. Fassert, Technoscienza. July 2017.

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59/165is normal/acceptable. Sezin Topçu identifies normalization as an objective reachedthrough zoning as a tool: “Zones have therefore been conceived of, particularly inrecent times, as moving, socio-technical systems or plans of action, supposed to allow
a way of managing territories, populations, and public health that is, at the sametime, both authoritarian and flexible. Because their borders are not rigid, they are
subject to permanent re-categorizations129”. Moreover, this is done in a context where
uncertainty as regards the extent of contamination, instead of decreasing progressively,
may actually open up new questions and worries. For example, research published in
2018130 gives new insight into radiological contamination, whereby it appears that not
only particles of gaseous radionuclides, such as cesium and iodine, released from thedamaged reactors, but also small radioactive particles, termed cesium-rich microparticles, containing smaller amounts of other radioisotopes, such as uranium andtechnetium131". Their effects on health are unknown, but could be potentially harmful,
although this is still a disputable issue.

3.6.4.5 The making of politics
The objective of this section is to understand how the mayors of the two affected
towns themselves formulated their role and the difficulties they faced after a nuclear
accident. Their actions were sometimes castigated by villagers, and they had toaccount for their decisions to the inhabitants. Their cases epitomize politicalconundrums: How to come to a decision when faced with divergent interests? What roleshould be played by expertise in case of controversies over health risks?
The justifications provided by the mayors themselves allow their decisions to be linked
to a broader range of concerns and visions of justice, elicited in trade-offs or, on thecontrary, in clear-cut decisions which may dismiss the concerns of a certain proportionof the inhabitants.
The discourses held by mayors when they account for their decisions appear to be aninteresting way of deciphering the range of issues tackled by them, and at a moregeneral level “the making of politics”. In the present study, the justifications given by
the mayors were taken seriously, without dismissing the global context in which they
had to conduct their role: a general push for normalization and reconstruction on thepart of a government eager to recuperate (lost) territories, and to promote a view of a“manageable” nuclear accident (Anasuma Brice, 2017). The post–accident situation
proved to be a conundrum of ethical and political concerns, and a considerable burden
for the two mayors. Their testimonies illustrate some of the many issues local politics
may be faced with after a nuclear accident.

129« Les zones sont donc conçues, en particulier dans la période récente, en tant que dispositifs socio-techniquesmouvants, censés permettre une gestion à la fois autoritaire et flexible des territoires, des populations, et de la santépublique. Leurs frontières n’étant pas rigides, elles sont sujettes à des re-catégorisations permanentes ». in : Topçu, S.
(Mai 2016). Catastrophes nucléaires et « normalisation » des zones contaminées. Enjeux politiques, économiques,
sanitaires, démocratiques et éthiques. Les notes de la fondation d’Ecologie Politique.
130

The research, which was carried out by scientists from Kyushu University, Japan, and The University of Manchester,UK, was published in Environmental Science and Technology. The paper, 'Novel Method of Quantifying Radioactive
Cesium-Rich Microparticles (CsMPs) in the Environment from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant' has been
published in the journal Environmental Science and Technology - DOI:10.1021/acs.est.7b06693
131

Sources: Eurekalert. (Access: June 2018) and Fukushima chronicles. ACRO web site. (access: June 2018)

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Beyond the case of Kawauchi and Naraha, it can be understood that such struggles arecentral and may epitomize the political and social questions of post-accidental
situations. The importance of survival for a village, the preservation of its identity, theconsideration of radiological contamination, the diverging wills and desires of the
inhabitants on the question of return, are key issues which often met with a number ofdifferent answers, based on different views as well as the weight placed between
different divergent interests.

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61/1654 WHETHER TO RETURN OR NOT: A CATEGORISATION OF
INHABITANTS’ DECISIONS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This section is based on the interviews conducted by the Shinrai team. It analyzes thedifferent aspects of people’s reasons for returning or not to the evacuated territories,
framed within a more global view of life trajectories after the accident.
The interviews led with the inhabitants of the Fukushima prefecture show atremendous variety in their life conditions after the accident, in their reactions, and intheir feelings. Field work was led in such a way that it could grasp this variety.
Conducting the interviews immediately after Evacuation Orders were lifted in Kawauchi
and in Naraha allowed better understanding of how people came to a decision about
whether or not to return. Other inhabitants interviewed included those who fled fromterritories not under Evacuation Orders (self-evacuees): the question of whether or not
to return was determined according to similar criteria (radiological risks,
infrastructures available, etc.). In each case, biographical elements of how thesepeople had lived before the accident were collected in order to better understand thecontext in which they made up their minds. However, there are undoubtedly limits inthe use of interviews: the interviews do not allow total comprehension of the impact
on everyday lives and what it means to live “with radioactivity”, beyond words. Only
ethnographic work could grasp this thoroughly. It should be noted, however, that theinterviews were complemented by observation of two “information sessions” led by the
local authorities, as well as visits to places where evacuees were met by us during their
daily activities, and attendance at NGO meetings. The types of questions raised
directly by inhabitants themselves show that there is a large overlap between issues
raised in interviews and those asked directly to experts. More details on themethodology are provided in the annexes.
The question of “whether to return or not” did not have to be asked explicitly in the
majority of interviews. It was one of the emerging issues addressed spontaneously byinhabitants during interviews, which were based most often on narratives: “What were
you doing before the accident? And after? What is your life now? And in the future? Oneof the questions explored was about trust with regard to government policy; the themeof trust was very often spontaneously evoked by the interviewees. It appears also that,beyond the question of trust - or the absence thereof - , people were interpretinggovernment policy and its realization at a more local level (township) in terms ofvested interests, and they assessed how much this policy was in line or not with what
they considered to be their own interests. This is why in some cases, even if the
precise word trust was not pronounced, some elements of trust/distrust wereidentified within the wider judgements formulated by the people interviewed.
The aim of this chapter is to profile the residents in relation to the central question of“whether to return or not”, because it appears that this decision is raised in theaftermath of any nuclear accident, in the context of the related evacuations. The
decision epitomizes individual people’s feelings and judgements about their current
and future life situations. Exploring how they make their decisions, how they give an

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62/165account of their reasons, and how they describe their concerns, fears, anger, hope andexpectations is a key aspect of the Shinrai research project.
In order to better synthesize the variety of different situations, six broad categories of
inhabitants were identified from the research results. As with any form of
categorization, this has its limitations.
1

Return and forget/resist

2

Return and control/comply

3

Return and worry

4

Return … and commute

5

Not returning for the moment

6

Not returning ever

Each category contains a variety of people with distinct differences; each category
could always be further refined to reflect such nuances. However, this simple
categorization helps comprehend the main issue for each type of inhabitants, and theconsequences of their decisions on their lives. This report is based on the convictionthat this helps show representative decision types behind the variety of reactions andlife paths after an accident. For each category, one complete “story” was retained, as
an archetype of that category, which allows in-depth presentation of the case of one
person: their reasons for returning or not, their analysis of the situation. This case isemblematic insofar as, beyond each particular individual case presented, the mainfeatures can be found in other cases - in the field work, but also in cases analyzed byother researchers 132 . For each emblematic case, the more prominent factors are
identified; the analysis provided is also completed and enriched with other cases of thesame category, providing the various nuances within each category of inhabitants.

4.2 RETURN AND “FORGET”/RESIST A CULTURE OF RADIOPROTECTION
This first category groups together a number of inhabitants who decided to return
relatively soon after the Lift of Evacuation Order. They insist on the fact that they wantto live “as they did before the accident”, while dealing with the numerous changes andlosses. However, returning is principally a source of relief in their case.

132

Links with field work done by other researchers are presented in Chapter 5.

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Emblematic Case
Ms. KA133, in her 60 yrs.: “I can’t live without touching the soil”.
Ms. KA received us in a beautiful house in the mountains of Kawauchi.
She told us:“We evacuated after the accident; I had to abandon my dog, we were notallowed to take our pets. And my chickens, which were eaten by the foxes. I
spent 3 years away from my home. During all this time, I thought of the animals
that I had abandoned. I went to my daughter’s, then … then I spent somemonths in an apartment in Kanagawa. It’s terrible to live in an apartment when
you have been used to living in a house …. I wanted to help collect the deadleaves in the garden of the residence where I lived, but I couldn’t because an
employee was appointed for this task. It was hard for me. I cannot live without
touching the soil. Coming back home is like a dream come true for me. I feel
alive again! … My son came back to Iwaki in 2012, and he could look after thehouse while we were away from home. Recent measurements taken in thegarden proved that it was safe to grow some vegetables. This was somethingthat was very important for me. I am used to growing my own vegetables, toliving this way … Yes, I gather sensai wild vegetable in the forest. I have had
two Whole Body Counters, and the results were ok. I am not worried. We can go
back, but we are not supposed to eat mushrooms and sensai: it is difficult for
old people. (…) My daughter-in-law and my grandchildren do not come here, mydaughter-in-law does not want to bring them. For me, the real return, that will
be when children will want and be able to come back.
Concerning the way the LEO was organized, Ms. KA said:
Well, it’s a consultation, but in any case, when the State decides, it does it, andthat’s that. The return is in line with what I wanted, but it does not suiteverybody.
The State does not understand that now you have to go 70 km to do shopping.
Before, the shopping zone was in towns which are now in the “difficult toreturn zone”, where the Lift will not happen for a very long time - maybe
never.
“The company in charge did not want to decontaminate the terrace in front of
the house. Officially they are there to decontaminate the house, and theterrace is not part of the house. We did it ourselves (my husband and I)”.
“For me, it was absolutely necessary that I could grow my own vegetables. I test
them, I feel a responsibility when I give vegetables to people.
Q: What about your sources of information about radiation risks?
“We do not need experts, I went once to a conference on ionizing radiation, Ms.
O. explained things … Well, they are here just to reassure people”.
“The state of the Nuclear Power Plant134 worries me but the life of an evacuee(not being able to touch the soil, not being in my house, … ) was worse. I accept

133

Ms. KA, 19th March 2015. Kawauchi. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

134

The NPP is at 15 km from her house.

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64/165this risk in order to live in my own house. I have been living better since I cameback. I cannot live without touching the soil.
With regard to her future, Ms. KA says: “I like cooking, I would like to set up bed
and breakfast here in my home. I do hope people will come”.
4.2.1

TRYING TO LIVE “LIKE BEFORE” (THE ACCIDENT)

Ms. KA epitomizes the case of residents in this first category, who speak mainly of theirrelief at returning, and show a form of satisfaction in (partly) retrieving their former
life, thereby attempting to close (though never completely) the chapter of theaccident in their lives. All of the inhabitants insisted on the drama and the hectic
moments surrounding evacuation. The order and serenity of their rural life werebrutally interrupted; inhabitants link evacuation with abandoning this life - sometimes
leaving behind animals with whom they had spent their life. Ms. KA evokes her dog andher chickens; another interviewee, Mr. K, had dairy cows - the entire herd had to be
shot after the accident when Kawauchi was evacuated. It is a painful souvenir for him.
And he insisted on the fact that he wanted to return to have a job again “in touch withnature135”, something not possible during their “suspended life” as evacuees.
This return is not, however, a return to former living conditions. Ms. KA regretted thather daughter-in-law did not want to bring the kids to Kawauchi. Mr. K and his wife
interviewed described a similar situation: they returned in 2014 (just after the LEO);
before the accident they had been living with one of their children, with his wife andtheir children, but: “Our son does not want to come back to Kawauchi. He now lives
with his family in Miharu”. This is not an isolated case: “There were 33 houses in this
district; so far, 10 families have come back. They are mainly people of our age in their60s, coming back without children”. Another inhabitant, Ms. N.136 (a widow, in her60s) explains that before the accident she was living with her mother, along with oneof her daughters and her son-in-law, and their four children. She went back to
Kawauchi alone with her mother, while her daughter’s family stayed in Mie prefecture.
Separated from her grandchildren, Ms. N’s mother slipped into dementia, and is now
living in a home for the elderly because there was no room for her in their house in
Kawauchi. Ms. N. commented: “There are many of us who have experienced thecollapse of families”. Her daughter came back to Kawauchi recently, with her fourchildren, to another house. While they were evacuees in Mie prefecture, one of thechildren had been bullied at school. Whenever he had quarrels with his friends, he was
told: “Go back to Fukushima!”.
4.2.2

FORGETTING RADIATION … OR “RESISTING” PRACTICAL RADIOPROTECTION?

Ms. KA declared that the soil in her garden was now safe, and that she was happy togrow her vegetables once again. Mr. K participated in research on soil contamination.
He said: “The soil in the garden was very contaminated at the beginning (1000 bq/Kg).

135

Interview Ms KA, 19th March 2015, Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert. Kawauchi. (first interview October
2014)
136

Ms KN, 26th September 2015.interviewer: Rina Kojima, Kawauchi.

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Now the soil is below the detection threshold 137”. There was a ban on growing andselling vegetables, but this order was lifted, and Mr. K started growing vegetables in his
garden again. These inhabitants returned when the contamination of soils was still
high; they participated in taking the proposed radioactivity measurements, but oncethe contamination levels dropped, they were happy to take care of their gardens again,
and to stop any measurement procedures.
Generally, inhabitants in this category have followed a similar path as regards healthmonitoring. At the beginning, they wore their dosimeters, monitored food, checked
their internal contamination through Whole Body Counters (WBC), and underwent
medical examinations. But, at the time of interview, they had abandoned this so-called“Practical Culture of Radio Protection138”. During interview, they all expressed someform of reluctance to engage in such measures, and appeared determined to live a life
without any “monitoring”, while being fully aware of not complying with the advice
provided. Which is why this attitude could also be considered as showing a form of
resistance to the instructions/advice given by the local authorities. These residents
knew that their conduct did not strictly comply with the advice given by the radiation
risk counsellor. There are of course nuances in this attitude; a number of them werestill monitoring the vegetables from their gardens - especially with regard for others: “Ifeel responsible when I give vegetables to others” (Ms. KA); they were also measuring
the contamination of the sensai or mushrooms they collected in the forest. Others weremore radical, like this person who said: “mushrooms in the forest of Kawauchi arereally delicious. I am aware they may be contaminated, but if you’re going to becontaminated anyway, you may as well eat the delicious mushrooms 139 ”. (See also
Chapter 5: the mayor of Kawauchi regretted the increase of positive results in WBC140
when elderly residents stopped respecting recommendations; this is also a worry
expressed by Ms. O., the radioprotection counselor.
Despite certain differences, such attitudes demonstrate a comparable will to distancethemselves from the official discourse and the advice given by the radiation riskcounsellors.
For example, Mr. YO:“I had a WBC in 2012, it was okay; I don’t feel like having another one, I am too lazy
to do it. I know I should have a WBC after eating this kind of mushrooms collected in
the forest, but I do not do it”.
Bearing in mind the fact that ionizing radiations are less harmful for seniors, theseresidents seem determined to live a “normal” life - and not, to borrow Michaël
Ferrier’s expression, a “half-life141”. (Ferrier, 2012). Living normally here means, to

137

th

M. KA, 19 March 2015. Kawauchi.Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

138

The term is based on ICRP 111, and designates all practices that allow monitoring and controlling of the amount ofradioactivity received. Application of the Commission's Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Longterm Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency ICRP Publication 111 Ann. ICRP 39 (3),2009. J. Lochard et al.
139

Interview M. YO, (50-60 years old), 25th September 2015. Interviewer: Rina Kojima.

140

WBC allows to measure internal contamination.

141

Ferrier, M. (2012). Fukushima, récit d'un désastre: Gallimard.

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66/165some extent, “forgetting” or “disregarding” contamination on most occasions, andespecially in daily life. People did not want to talk about or hear about these issues,and often said soberly when the interviewer insisted a little142: “I am not worried”.
The attitude of these people, who are “not worried” after 3 or 4 years, raises thequestion of the feasibility of living in a contaminated environment in the long-term (1020 years) while still “monitoring” daily behavior on the basis of radiological protection
prescriptions intended to prevent them from “forgetting” the situation. This “model”
appears to be an integral part of recommendations set up by internationalorganizations such as the ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection),and the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), but learning from the Japaneseexperience shows that it may not be acceptable for all citizens. The question will beraised again in the conclusion of this report
4.2.3

A COMMON SOCIOLOGICAL PROFILE?

In terms of demographic factors, it must be noted that this category of inhabitantspresents a common profile: people in their 60s, in good health, who possess a housethat has been a family home – in some cases, for generations. Evacuated after thecatastrophe, some of these inhabitants moved several times, taken in by relatives,family or friends, or sheltered in dedicated houses built in the aftermath of theaccident. In this case, there is undoubtedly a strong attachment on the part of these
inhabitants to their former way of life: a certain rural way of living, (growing their own
vegetables, taking care of their garden and animals, and so on). It is also a way ofliving that is attached to a community (sharing vegetable production with theneighborhood; gathering sensai in the forest and offering it to neighbors). The accident
provoked an immense rupture, and returning is considered to be the best option, evenwhen balanced against pending problems (such as state of the crippled NPP), and eventaking into account that life will be very different (for example, living without thechildren and grand-children).
4.2.4

RETURNING IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO WANDERING (OR THE BAD LIFE
CONDITIONS)In this category are people who chose - often with little hesitation - to come back. In
most cases, they were looking forward to returning to their hometown, and they had
been waiting impatiently for the lifting of evacuation order. With regards to their
willingness to return, some of them raised the fact that they’d had to move many times(some had lived in up to eight different places between the accident and the momentof interview). Returning, in this case, would be a relief - to come back to a place which,if far from ideal, would at least allow the end of this “wandering”. It also put an end todifficult living conditions (in tiny temporary shelters where, for some, they in fact
ended up staying for several years).
4.2.5

HESITATIONS BEFORE THE RETURN (OR CONDITIONS FOR …)

Inhabitants in this category were often keen to be authorized to return. However, insome cases they could have certain reservations - for example, concerning the precise
142

Of course, deontology demands that interviewers do not coerce those interviewed on these topics.

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67/165life conditions they would face upon returning. One inhabitant, Mr. K., for example,
checked that his neighbors would come back before making his decision. He explainedthat he could not make a decision individually:“When the township asked us whether we would like to return or not, I couldn’t
answer right away. I called my neighbors in the district where I live. We come back
together, or we do not come back. In the mountain area like here you can’t live on
your own, you have to help each other143”.
One of the specificities of this district is how isolated the individual houses are;30 minutes away from the center of Kawauchi, on a road which is very steep andwinding, there are several kilometers between each of them. After interview, when
this inhabitant learned that Ms. KA (emblematic case) was to be interviewed – she wasa friend of his, in the same district - he insisted on taking his car in order to show the
way: “You could easily get lost here!”.
At a meeting for the LEO in Kawauchi, on 26 September 2015, a woman in her 70s144
expressed her worries thus:“Even if there is a Lift of Evacuation Order, there will be no neighbors around myhome. There will be only boars and foxes. I am 73 … I will not live long now, this is
why I would like to come back home, but in this situation, it seems difficult to me,even if I do want to”
Other misgivings are very specific to local conditions. For example, the contaminationof the water reservoir in Naraha (where measurements taken in the mud had shownhigh levels of contamination) was a concern for many inhabitants. Ms. C.A. explained:“it could be a problem to use the water or to drink it on a daily basis”145.
The efficiency of decontamination measures is one important consideration. But
inhabitants considering return also contemplated future living conditions, andquestioned the availability of infrastructures (hospitals, schools, shopping facilities),
which was a source of worry as well. This shows that inhabitants did not consider their“village”, but more globally, a broader area where adjacent towns and villages used toprovide a set of services. When these towns were in the “difficult to return” zone,
inhabitants realized that they would have to find other ways of living.
A last source of anxiety is the NPP itself. It was striking how much the accident (March
2011) was still considered - at the time the interviews took place (mid-late 2015) - asan enduring accident, and not a stabilized situation. “Every week, we hear about new
problems, new issues detected …146” said one inhabitant. This echoes the concept of
the “endless accident” coined by Ulrich Beck when discussing the development of a“risk society” (Beck , 1986).
However, to conclude on this category, it may be said that these people (senior, ingood health, attached to their home) seem to be the less “impacted” by theconsequences of the accident, and more able to recapture their former life, albeit withcertain limits and regrets (the grandchildren who do not come to visit, difficulties in
143

Interview M. TK. Kawauchi, 21st October 2014, interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

144

Meeting on the LOE, Kawauchi, 26 September 2015, observation led by R. Kojima.

145

Ms. CA. Interviewer: R. Kojima, 15 March 2015

146

Interview Mr. TK. 21 October 2014. Kawauchi. Op.cit.

thst

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68/165daily life, such as shopping and infrastructure), but nevertheless affording them anumber of positive aspects, compared to the lives of other categories.
At the time the interviews took place, since the accident, the village had lost morethan 10% of its population147. Among the total registered residents (2,746), including
both returnees and evacuees, nearly 40 % of them were over 65 years old in September
2016. A number of interviewees insisted on the fact that the aging of rural regions like
Fukushima began before the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, and that this only
accelerated the trend. Also, the long tradition of living with several generations in asingle house was already declining before the accident - which, again, accelerated thetendency. However, the nuclear accident also triggered a more brutal rupture in the
demographics of these villages. A returnee to the former Green Zone described life six
months after the lifting of EO in March 2015148:“Currently 10 out of 33 families have returned to the district, but the composition ofthese families has changed. Only the grandparents’ generation came back, without
their children and grandchildren. I expect more families will come back to this district,but only those over 60 years old fear that life will not be the same in Kawauchi after
the lifting of the EO. There will only be the older generations coming back, and young
people - who usually become community leaders, and organize village festivals, andevents – won’t return. It was probably the trend even before the accident, but I feelthe disaster has accelerated this rhythm”.
Ms. KA also explained that it would not have been possible for her to return if she had
been much older, or less mobile. At the end of the interview, she murmured
regretfully:“My daughter-in-law doesn’t want to bring my grandchildren to Kawauchi due toradiation fears. So I am obliged to travel to Kanagawa prefecture [situated 300 km
away, east of Tokyo] to see them. I think the evacuation order should have been lifted
only when residents could have a more or less ‘normal’ life, where we can lead a semi
self-sustainable life and our grandchildren can come and visit their grandparents
without fears149”.
Hasegawa (Hasegawa, 2016) coined the term “unsustainable return150” to designate thisnew demographic picture, where it is mostly seniors who come back. What will happen
when they get older if there is no infrastructure to ensure that they are taken care of,and if a significant number of younger inhabitants do not come back ? This issue will be
developed in Chapter 6.

4.3 RETURN AND COMPLYING/CONTROLLING
Another category of inhabitants were going to return to their hometown, but would notlive like before. Unlike the previous category “Return and Forget”, these inhabitants
complied with advice given on radioprotection by local authorities, and insisted on the147

Kitamura & Moritomo, op. cit., p.18

148

Interview Mr TK. Kawauchi. 19 March 2015. (Second interview).

149

Ms KA. Op.cit.

th

150

Hasegawa, R. (2015). Returning home after Fukushima: Displacement from a nuclear disaster and internationalguidelines for internally displaced persons. Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Policy Brief Series, 1(4).

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control they could have over radioactivity. They seemed to live with a certain degreeof confidence that they were in control of the situation, with an apparent feeling ofsafety.

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Emblematic Case:
Ms. KS.: “Communication with experts removes fear of radiation”
Ms. KS returned to Kawauchi in April 2012. Of her 3 teen and adult children, theeldest returned with her, and her mother. The youngest stayed in Iwaki with hisfather. She was interviewed twice, in March 2015 and September 2016.
Interview 1151 - March 2015.
Ms. KS evacuated to a hotel in Ishikawa (south Fukushima prefecture) on 12 March
2011. Her husband, as a fireman in charge of evacuating people from Tomioka,
heard about the nuclear accident from his colleagues. Ms. KS left her dog behind,as she could not bring it to the hotel, but went back and forth in order to lookafter it. On 18 March, she evacuated to a school for the disabled in Kôriyama.
There was also a sport stadium to which people from Kawauchi were evacuatedbut there were no more available places. Ms. KS wanted to stay not too far from
Kawauchi. Because she expressed the will to return in January 2012,decontamination work on her home began quickly; they were completed when she
returned in April. She measured doses and found 0.2 µSv/h inside her house.
She was concerned about the waste left at a few hundred meters from her home,for one year: “I knew the radiation dose was not so high, because the bags were
well covered, but they were on the path to school … people were saying that theradiation dose was increasing around them. Close to my house, there were
decontamination workers crushing waste in order to put it in smaller bags; I wasworried about the ashes. At that time, I wondered if it was a good thing to comeback to Kawauchi, when I could see directly in front of me all thisdecontamination work and the radiation waste bags. But now they have been
moved to kariokibas temporary storage sites, I am not worried any more …
however, I imagine people living not far from these kariokibas are not pleased ….
I moved to Kawauchi because I thought it would be better for the children to live
at home, where they feel more comfortable than in a small apartment inKôriyama. My husband worked in Iwaki after the accident, so I had to look after
the children alone, and I felt tired. I wanted to live in a familiar place without
any stress.
At first, Ms. KS was worried, but then she sought out information: “Ionizing
radiation exists in nature and can be removed, like pollen, when it falls on me. I
do not have any more stress to live here. I also heard about internal radiation,
because there is a center in Kawauchi to conduct measurement of radiation levels
in food. In spring 2012, I cooked a meal for my children with vegetables from astore which had been measured, and another one with wild vegetables collectedin the village. I ate them with my mother-in-law, telling myself it was not a
problem to eat them just that once”. My mother-in-law collected mushrooms, I
brought them to the CRMS Citizen's Radioactivity Measuring Station; theydetected a high radiation dose. I did not eat them”.
Interview 2152 - September 2016

151

th

Ms KS., 30 March 2015. Kawauchi. Interviewer: Rina Kojima.

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Ms. KS was now working for the village as one of Radiation Risk CommunicationCounsellors who provide information on radiation, coordinated by the Nagasaki
University-Kawauchi Reconstruction Promotion HQ, led by the team of Nagasaki
University researchers. The main tasks of these counsellors are to conduct
radiation measurements, respond to people’s anxiety on radiation risk incoordination with RP experts153. They also organize meetings with families. Ms.
K.S. seemed to feel she had made the right decision to come back to Kawauchi.
“Radiation levels are measured in food, but also in soil and water. Radiation isinvisible and not perceivable, but through measurement it is made visible. …
Just after my return to Kawauchi, I was worried because I was living not far fromthe NPP; I wasn’t reassured when I was told that there was no problem at the
NPP. Since I am constantly measuring radiation in my job, I clearly see that
contaminated place is not contaminated. As long as I got informed about
radiation levels, I feel reassured and see I was right to come back to Kawauchi”.
The institute organizes meetings on Risk Communication with experts in small
groups. This allows people to share their worries. This dialogue allows people tounderstand radiation better, and to understand how to avoid risks in daily life.
Young mothers participate in these meetings with their friends, because theycannot find answers to their questions on radiation simply by discussing the
subject among themselves or with their husbands. (…) The institute organizedthese meetings several times in Iwaki, and envisages organizing them in Kawauchi
if they found a place. Ms. O. 154 made a presentation in Iwaki for Nagasaki
University. With easy to understand tables and drawings, she explained the healthrisks of radiation, comparing them with risks linked to alcohol and tobacco: we donot see a big difference between these types of risk. So it is not worth worrying
about the risk of radiation. She also explained basics on Bq and Sv and the damage
to health that may occur at a certain radiation dose
When asked whether those mothers were reassured by these meetings, Ms. KS
replies:“Certainly, like that they can protect their children. When a doctor suggests
having an x-ray, we accept that we will be exposed to radiation. Nobody would
say “I’m afraid of radiation, it is better to be sick”. So they should feel reassured
by the expert’s advice. Communication with experts removes fear of radiation.
Before, I had never heard of “Risk Communication”. I wondered what it was (…) I
think people are already sure (about their life here). I think we do not reallyneed Risk Communication. But without speaking of it, they cannot be reassured
on the fact they were right”.
“During these last 5 years, my children have grown up. And I became capable ofdistinguishing food which is not safe. So I’m not so nervous anymore. I have
evolved. As I didn’t see a high dose in the vegetables grown by my mother, I

152Interview of Ms. KS 17th September 2016.

153

Ministry of Environment’s newsletter from the Radiation Risk Communication Counsellors Support Centre(https://www.env.go.jp/chemi/rhm/shiencenter/pdf/c_dayori004.pdf)
154

She is the Radioprotection counsellor delegated by Nagasaki University.

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don’t do the radiation measurements anymore. I still do it on the mushrooms
collected in the mountains, because their contamination depends on the soil
density. And when I see a high dose, I don’t eat them. Before, there were thosebags for radioactive waste left on the path on the way to the school. There are
no more bags around my house, they were carried to the kariokibas sites […].
Now, I do not see these bags any more”.

4.3.1 “GETTING INFORMED”- A QUESTION OF INFORMATION AND TRUST
There is a notable evolution between the two interviews, which shows the degree towhich reassurance is linked in this case to information provided by local counsellors,
and measurements made by the interviewee herself. Measurement activities play a rolein showing the risks - “radiation becomes visible”. Making those risks visible is part ofthe degree of “control” that the person feels he or she can have over this radiologicalsituation.
The case of Ms. KS shows a specific choice: taking information from one unique source(government) and adhering to that information. Information provided in ‘Risk
Communication’ sessions would appear to have played a major role. Her confidence inthose who provide information appears also to be unquestioning. Ms. KS does not evoke“alternative scientists” who may make a different assessment of radiological risks; nordoes she compare different sources of information. Risk Communication as perceived
by her appears to be quite efficient in reassuring inhabitants. It would appear,
moreover, that little or no room is left for sharing uncertainties, not to mention
controversies: Risk Communication “removes fear of radiation”.
Also, commensurability comes to play a key role - radiation is compared to alcohol or
tobacco: “so there is no need to worry”. It is worth remembering here that theconsumption of alcohol and tobacco is normally considered, as such, to constitute“risky conduct”, but they are referred to here in a way that allows experts to reassure
their public. Commensurability of risks, in this instance, could be argued to be
instrumental in taming the degree of radiological risk – the paradox being that the“comparable” risks are usually regarded to be “genuine risks”. Moreover, in thiscomparison, the risks chosen by adults in exchange for certain pleasure are simply
compared with those imposed by the third party to everyone including children without
any benefit. Here, the accent appears to be placed on the familiarity of risks that are
already well identified.
A cluster of elements - measurements made by the person herself, linked to
information provided by local experts, including commensurability with other risks appears to create in Ms. KS a sense of relative comfort in the situation, which alsosuggests a positive evolution in her feelings compared to the first interview (“So I am
not so nervous anymore”). Moreover her children have grown up, thereby diminishing
their sensitiveness to ionizing radiation.
It is also striking to see the role played by the presence and visibility of waste bags
versus their subsequent “disappearance”. One main difference between the first andthe second interview lies in the disappearance of these waste bags from theinterviewee’s immediate surroundings, moved to the local kariokibas. She reports great
relief at no longer seeing the bags near her home. For her, “radiation is invisible …

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73/165but through measurement it is made visible”. The paradox, however, is that radiation
made visible by measurement is “reassuring”, while conspicuous contaminated wastebags are not: when the risk is “visible” – such as these big waste bags were, the impact
may be distinctly upsetting. The transportation of bags to the kariokibas was, in thiscase, very important for the interviewee and inhabitants like her to regain someserenity in daily life.
Such a type of “comfort” may also depend on unreliable visions of risk (“radiation …
can be removed, like pollen, when it falls on me”) and this shows that Risk
Communication may also result in some partial, ill-informed perceptions. However,what can be retained here is the strong impact of recommended measurement
practices, and her insistence on a “before/after”, which relates “education” onradiation risks, and the disappearance of the waste bag, with a major gain in comfort
of life.
4.3.2

RISK INFORMATION STRATEGIES AND DECISION

However, “strategies” on risk information may vary according to each inhabitant,within the category “return and comply”. Another inhabitant, Mr. MU 155 explains onwhat basis he decided to return to Naraha (a few months before the LOE):“We can consider 1 mSv as an ideal criterion. But what is important is being wellinformed about radiation, then to fear it correctly” (放射能を正しく理解して、正しく怖がることが大事だと思う。).
This is very much in line with the official discourse, and even borrows the expression
used by a number of officials: “fear the radiation correctly”. However, Mr. MU gave
details of several sources of information. He went to listen to the symposium organizedby experts from Nagasaki. He is also getting informed on the 1 mSv criteria, and on theblog of Genyû Sôkyû 156 , which states that this limit is not correct. He agrees it isnormal to worry about this threshold for kids, but he considers the point of view ofProfessor Koide157 “too radical”. In consulting several sources of information, he affirmsthat he has established “his own threshold”:“These days, an expert who gives reassuring message would be labelled as goyo
gakusha (“expert patronized by the government”); but an expert who says alarming
things, he would win public sympathy and news articles with this point of view sellquite well.” (今は「安全」と言えば御用学者というレッテルを張られ、どちらかと言えば「不安だ」と言ったもの勝ちで、その方が新聞も売れる).
When Mr. MU met old friends from university, they told him he should not go back to
Naraha, as long as the mountains were not decontaminated. He answered: “yes, mylife is contaminated; I will go back, I want to live in Naraha”.
155

M. MU township member of Naraha. 50-60. Interviewer: Rina Kojima, 23 March 2015.

th

156

Genyû Sôkyû: monk and famous writer, director of a temple in Miharu.

157

Professor Hiroaki Koide is one of the prominent scientists who criticize the government policy after the accident. He
is author of several books (whose titles are emblematic): KOIDE Hiroaki & KUROBE Shin.ichi, 2011. Genpatsu hōshanō :kodomo ga abunai (Radiation and NPP : children in danger), Tokyo, Bungei shunjū. (Nuclear lies), Shiritakunai keredo,
Shitteokanebanaranai Genpatsu no Shinjitsu (What we don't want to know, what we must learn: Nuclear truths),
and Kodomo-tachi ni tsutaetai: Genpatsu ga yurusarenai riyu (I want to tell the children: The reasons why nuclear
power is unforgivable). (non traduits).

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Commensurability of risks is also part of his assessment that living in Naraha is whatsuits him:
“Even if you avoid one risk, you may fall on another one. If you leave Naraha for
Okinawa prefecture, you may have typhoons; if you leave for Gunma, there arevolcanos. There are risks everywhere in Japan - ionizing radiation is one of thoserisks”.
Risks resulting from the nuclear accident are here reframed among “natural” risks withwhich Japan has always been confronted. Mr. MU. epitomizes the informed, educatedperson (he has a university degree), able to compare various sources of information,and to conceive ideological aspects of the question of ionizing radiation. He also finds
it appropriate, in his case, to balance radiological risks with other risks madecommensurable.
One last case illustrates a very different attitude, when people may stay/return
without - self admittedly- being able to assess the situation fully.
Mr. MT is an inhabitant of the Watari district158. He explained:“On the 13th March, I heard about the explosion of the NPP, but I did not know what
the consequences would be. So I made my grandson and his friends go and rescue thevictims: they worked under the radioactive fallout. We heard about the dangerous
effects only much later on. In May or June, the municipality began to lend Geiger
counters. I tried to take measurements at home. It was impossible, because the needle
indicated the maximal dose, like 9.99 μSv/h 87 mSv/y. And as I did not know what it
meant I stayed in Watari. Anyway, there was a trend in Watari: people said at least
it wasn’t touched by the tsunami; it’s good to live in your home, despite theradioactive contamination”.
This last case shows certain limitations to the notion of taking measurements, whensome idea of their interpretation is not clearly articulated to the public. This is an
important question, raised by non-government scientists who were keen tocommunicate measurements in the first place, but without providing the means for the
public to interpret them159.
The interview with Mr. MT also illustrates a sense of culpability associated withignorance in the immediate aftermath of the accident: in this case, an attitude
generally considered “right” in normal circumstances (encouraging the young to help
and rescue others) may have been the wrong advice for this grandfather to give in thiscontext, leading to feelings of guilt.

158

Mr MT., 80 years, Watari, 19 September 2015. Interviewers: R. Kojima

159

These aspects are detailed in a Shinrai future Report.

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75/1654.3.3 THE ROLE OF MEASUREMENTS, AND THEIR LIMITSThe possibility to measuring radioactivity plays a key role for this category of
inhabitant. Ms. KS is herself a member of the local radiation risk communication center
which provides measurement protocols to inhabitants. She expresses herself veryclearly on the role played by measurements: “Since I have been taking measurements
in my work, I can clearly see that contaminated place is not contaminated. However,this effort required in order to be informed (and reassured) was considered too muchfor some inhabitants. During an information meeting 160 , one woman asked about
radiation risks. The answers given by government experts were reassuring overall, but
the woman concluded after a long exchange:“I am not convinced. I would like to return, but considering I would have to be awareof the risks by taking measurements of the radiation myself, and I would have to
avoid going to contaminated places … I do not see the point in repairing my home,which is completely riddled with mice” …

4.4 RETURN AND WORRYThis category shows the poignant case of people who return, but who have doubts
about their choice. The main tone of their accounts is one of anxiety, and this feelingis quite instrumental in the way they envisage their life as a “returnee”.
Emblematic case
Ms. YI161: I do not know even now whether it was the right decision (to return)Ms. YI is a woman in her 30’s in Kawauchi. When they evacuated to Kôriyama(the designated place of evacuation for Kawauchi village), her children were
5 and 3 years old. One of her child was bullied at school. Moreover, Ms. YI
found herself isolated within a group of Kawauchi mothers, with whom she did
not share the same opinion about radiation. Therefore, she and her children
started to suffer in Kôriyama. She returned to Kawauchi in March 2013. She wasinterviewed alongside her friend, who did not return, and stayed on in
Kôriyama.
“When the Mayor announced the return to the village, I thought it was too
soon. I wanted the village to wait until the completion of decontamination.
After the official announcement, I received a telephone call from the
Kawauchi Municipal Public Housing section that our house would be rented out
to others if we did not return by March 2013. We thought about the option ofcontinuing evacuation, and commuting to work from Kôriyama, but my husband
and I are both municipal employees. If we commute to work while continuing
evacuation, we will be criticized by returned residents and by ourcolleagues162. Since my husband is a very sensitive and kind person, I was afraid

160

Meeting on the LOE, Kawauchi, 26 September 2015, observations led by Rina Kojima

161

Ms YI, Returnee, Kawauchi village, 22 March 2017. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

nd

162

The village’s official stance is that it is safe to return to Kawauchi. Therefore, if a village employee does not return,s/he is seen as being antithesis to this official position jeopardising the credibility of the municipal office.

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76/165that he would get sick from psychological pressure. So we returned to our
public housing unit in Kawauchi in March 2013.”
At this point, Ms. YI burst into tears: “I still don’t know even now whether it
was the right decision (to return)… “Before the accident, Kawauchi children went to a High School in Futaba or
Tomioka163 by bus everyday (as there is no High School in Kawauchi). But now
her children will have to go to a boarding High School either in Hirono or
Kôriyama.

4.4.1 RETURNING AND DOUBTING
Unlike the case above (Returning and Controlling/Complying), Ms. YI returned to
Kawauchi, but is not sure she made the right decision164. The interview itself proved
somewhat moving for all present (the two researchers and the two women interviewed),
when Ms. YI bursts into tears, evoking the “decision” she had made. She lives with ahaunting doubt: her children could be ill later on, because of their time living in acontaminated place. She worries about the residual contamination and does not feel at
all comfortable with living in a place where forests still show a high level ofcontamination.
However, she does not give any details on the particular conduct she adopted – or not –to deal with contamination. When asked about the role of the local counsellor, Ms. YI
says that she has “little contact with her” and mentions her “reassurance role”. She
insisted during the interview on the pressure to return that she had felt, because of therole of her husband, a town employee who benefits from a housing. Anxiety linked tothis return is so overwhelming that it allowed no room for conduct such as was the caseamong the previous category of inhabitants discussed (‘Return and Comply’) where
living with contamination is framed as an issue to be tackled through appropriate,
recommended conduct and systematic measurement of radiation levels.
The director of the local school provided more information on parents living in
Kawauchi with children. In interview, he gave details of the life led by these children:“Well, they live like before the accident … well, not exactly like before the accident.
Pupils commute to school by bus and do not walk any more. They are not authorized
by their parents to go into the forests, or to swim in rivers like we used to do before,
as children. We were not allowed to do it, but still we did it (laughs). They do not163

In the “difficult to return” zone.

164

It is interesting to note that there were few interviews with inhabitants who had returned but still questioned theirdecision: living with such a worry may be so unbearable that most parents in this state of mind, and who could
evacuate, had already done so (cf. “not returning definitively”). More generally, we could not interview many parents
with young children, and even if statistics were not provided on the demographical profile of “the returnees” inKawauchi, we were told several times that “only the old people come back”. The first category (return andforget/resist) is very much constituted of this type of person. As our field work is qualitative, we cannot conclude muchabout it. A single indication was given in Kawauchi by the director of the school: there were 60 children in the school
before the accident, there were only 20 after the accident, at the time of interview. Besides this, we asked to be put incontact with this type of inhabitant, either through the township or through Ms O, the local radiation counsellor, but
this request was turned down (not successful?). We understood these types of inhabitants were not keen of being
interviewed.

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77/165climb trees165”. Himself a commuter, he returned to Kawauchi to work, but still live inIwaki, where his wife and two daughters also stay.
“It is worth doing the decontamination work, considering that the level of radiation
has decreased. The level was at 1µSv/h, but after decontamination it decreased to
0.2 µSv/h. But, the level of radioactivity in the mountains is still as high. It is very
stressful not to be able to collect sensei or mushrooms, and not to let children go
there. Life in the village of Kawauchi without those kinds of activities has no sense166”.
それらができないと、川内村に生きている意味がない ».
Parents with children might decide to come back, but to a life that is quite different to
the one they had before the accident. This is a significant difference with our firstcategory - the seniors who returned and (after a period of monitoring) decided to“forget” about radiation. A number of ethical issues are raised here. Michaël Ferrier,(Ferrier, 2012), French novelist and essayist living in Tokyo, coined the term “half-life”- an echo of the half-life of radionuclides - to designate such a life of restrictions; anumber of NPO reports denounced what they considered to be a part of thenormalization of the accident, the idea according to which people can continue living“normally” in contaminated territories even after a grave accident as long as they
adapt themselves to radiation protection measures (Greenpeace, 2015, IPPNW, 2013,
Bournet 167 , 2016). A detailed analysis of what it means to live in contaminatedterritories is provided in the “social analysis” (Chapter 5) of the present study,
comparing these conducts with analyses by researchers who engaged in similar studies
after the Chernobyl accident, and also examining a number of other related
publications.
4.4.2

RETURN AS “LOYALTY” TOWARDS THE VILLAGE

A notable point in Ms. YI’s testimony is that she felt she was pressurized to return.
When the Evacuation Order was lifted, either in Kawauchi or in Naraha, the inhabitants’entitlement to statutory monthly compensation payments would end one year later,whether they decided to return or not. The decision to Lift the Evacuation Order was
made within the framework of a strong push, on the part of the government, for“reconstruction” and the normalization of the situation. A number of inhabitants in theinterviews commented that they did in fact feel “pushed” to return; they mentioned aform of pressure. The decision to return or not could be recast not only as a personal
decision, but also as a manner of social and political act, by which a citizen would
comply or not with the general decisions made by the government. In the particularcase of Ms. YI, there was a particular incentive with regard to their housing - theywould have lost their entitlement to that housing if they had chosen not to return toKawauchi. But she also insists on the fact that, as a municipal employee, her husband
is expected to be an “exemplary inhabitant” and to return: “I was worried about
criticism my husband would probably receive from villagers if he commuted to workfrom Kôriyama to Kawauchi every day”. Section 4.4.3 below, on “returning partially”,
165

Mr. AS, Kawauchi. Interviewers: C. Fassert and R. Hasegawa. 20 may 2016. Quoted in: Fassert, C. 2017.

166

M. AS, 25 September 2015, Kawauchi. Interviewer: Rina Kojima.

th

167

See in particular in Bournet (2016) Franckushima : « échanges avec Roland Desbordes, Président de la CRIIRAD », et
Asanuma Brice : « A Fukushima, la population est dans une situation inextricable ».

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78/165looks at the case of inhabitants who choose to return to work in Kawauchi, but not tolive there. But for those who choose to return, the existence of “resettlers” or “partial
returnees” represents a stark reminder that “the situation is still not normal”.
Cases where residents return under social or family pressure may be associated withextremely ambivalent feelings. One evacuee from Fukushima city living in Kyoto 168 set
up an association for evacuees from the Fukushima Prefecture. She organized a friendmeeting trip for children who were evacuated to Kyoto to invite former school friends
from Fukushima to come for a holiday in Kyoto. For her, the holiday was good for thehealth of Fukushima children as well:“Last year, a 12 year-old girl said something very shocking for me – she said: “I don’t
understand why my friends who evacuated to Kyoto do not come back to Fukushima.
Now things are normal in Fukushima, even though I may get sick in the future”.
What was shocking for the interviewee was that, as well the “pressure” to return felt
by families who wished to stay on in Kyoto, who were thus considered by some as
disloyal to Fukushima, the enduring worries expressed by a 12-year-old who had
returned - “I may get sick in the future” - showed how this return would be far fromfree of anxieties.
4.4.3

TOO EARLY?

When the Evacuation Order was lifted, a number of residents expressed concern that it
was “too early”. These people were not opposed to returning, but were upset by what
they felt as a push from the authorities. The idea that the government wanted, formany reasons, to accelerate the return to the evacuated territories was felt as anadditional burden. In some inhabitants, this led to a kind of fatalism – for example, theattitude that the government had decided, so the local authority had to follow suit.
But in certain cases, it triggered anger towards the local authorities (the mayor and thetown council), who were considered as being unable to “resist” the will of the central
authority169. This central vs local power struggle was decoded by many as, on one side,a central government keen on stopping compensation payments and keen to prove thatthe accident was over, and on the other, a town authority seen as more sensitive to thedesires and needs of villagers. Some judged that it was “too soon”, based on a numberof factors, including the radiological situation (these inhabitants considered that thedecontamination was not “complete”), or that the availability of infrastructures wasinadequate (the closure of hospitals in surrounding villages now included in the“difficult to return” zone).
An important criterion for family was the availability of schools. For example, as Mr.
MK informed us:“Before, the children of Kawauchi went to the high school in Okuma. This high school
is now closed. Okuma is in the “difficult to return” zone; families with teenagers or

168

th

Ms YN, Kyoto, 16 October 2014. Interview led in the restaurant she set up. Minna-no-Te (Hands of Everybody).
Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.
169

See Chapter 3.

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79/165young children prefer to stay in a place where there is a possibility for their children
to go to a high school170”.
These local specific situations of social and educational infrastructure, such as locationof schools, seemed to have been missed or not to have been sufficiently taken into
account by decision-makers when lifting the evacuation orders.
4.4.4

THIS NARAHA IS NOT THE ONE I USED TO KNOW

Returning may be associated with worries about the dangers of living in an environmentthat is still contaminated in Kawauchi and Naraha. But there are also local, specifictypes of worries. Naraha, for example, is confronted with a major change in thecomposition of its population after the authorization to return. Mr. AO171 explained:“Today, there are more than a thousand nuclear workers172 in Naraha, twice as manyas people who are returning. They come from everywhere in Japan, and some of them
have problems, like thieving and drunk driving. The people of Naraha who live alone
talk about how worried they are” ….
For some inhabitants, these issues are actually ignored or denied by the media: “In the
media, they don’t speak of bad things or true things. … For example, they don’t
speak about the rape of a woman working as a cook in a residence for nuclear
workers 173 ”. Despite measures taken -- “We asked to police to reinforce regularsecurity surveillance, and we also asked the companies to organize surveillance of theiremployees” explained Mr. AO - a number of inhabitants refused to return because they
consider the identity of their village to have changed dramatically: “this is not the
Naraha I knew” said some inhabitants. This raises a number of questions as to what
constitutes the identity of a village (nature, architecture, climate, and so on);presumably, based on this reaction, that identity depends on not only thesegeographical characteristics, but also the demographic aspects. In this case, then,returning does not mean coming back to a former life, but facing an entirely new
situation.

4.5 RETURN AND COMMUTE
Some inhabitants come back to work in hometowns while living in the place they were
evacuated to.
Emblematic case:
Ms. W174, “Kawauchi is a place for working, but not for living”
Ms. W has 3 children, aged 8, 5, and 3 at the time of the accident. She returned
to Kawauchi to work, but still live in Kôriyama. Both her husband and she are the170Interview with Mr MK, 19 March 2015. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

th

171

Mr. AO, interviewer: Rina Kojima, 21st September 2015.

172

These workers work for decontamination and for the dismantling of the crippled plant. An account of their life isgiven in Vaulerin (2016) and in Jobin (2012).
173

Mr. TN, 20 September 2016. Interviewer: Rina Kojima.

174

Ms. KW in her 30s, Kawauchi. 22nd March 2017. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

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80/165

employees of Kawauchi village, so when the village function returned to
Kawauchi under the initiative of the Mayor in April 2012, they had to return toKawauchi to work.
“When we evacuated to Kôriyama city, my oldest daughter at junior high school
was bullied there. But since she entered into high school, the bullying has
stopped. We decided to stay and resettle in Kôriyama mainly because of theeducation for children. Because there is no high school in Kawauchi. So myhusband and I drive to work from Kôriyama to Kawauchi by car every day, whichtakes 1h20 one way, during the last six years while the grandparents of myhusband take care of our children after school. My grandmother-in-law says tome: “you should make a decision that would be the best for the children”. So
they came to live together with us in Kôriyama although they maybe prefer toreturn and live in Kawauchi, their hometown. I am so grateful to them.”[She insisted that it is not for “radiological” reasons that she decided not toreturn, but for the possibility of a high school for her children. However, she wasinterviewed with her friend Mrs. YI, who returned “with doubts” on her
decision. ]Ms. W. also thinks that the Mayor’s declaration for return was made too soon: “Ifthey had waited one year or two before to ask the families to return, there
would have been more families who would have return to Kawauchi. I wonder if
the village policy is really geared toward protecting the children or for thechildren’s future”.

4.5.1

DECONTAMINATION IS LIMITEDIf Ms. KW did not return living to Kawauchi for practical reasons (the education of herchildren), other who return “partially” said it was for the radiological situation.
Mr. AS175, who had two children aged 16 and 6, is in this situation. He is an employee of
Kawauchi village (civil servant); but he lives in Iwaki with his family. Mr. AS talked offeeling pushed to return to Kawauchi, but he does not want to settle here.
“Decontamination works were conducted in my home; the radiation level decreased
from 1µSv/h to 0,2 µSv/h. But radiation in the mountains and forests are still high. It’svery stressful that you cannot go there to collect mushrooms or sensai, and also not to
let your children go there ».
This is also a problem mentioned by the school employee, who commutes every day toKawauchi.
4.5.2

DIVIDE BETWEEN “FULL-RETURN” AND “HALF-RETURN”

For those who returned to the village, this choice can be disagreeable.
M. SI176, who returned to Kawauchi, explained: “Some inhabitants work in Kawauchi,
but stay in Kôriyama, in free housing. For them, Kawauchi is a place for working, not

175

Mr. AS, 25th September 2015. Interviewer: Rina Kojima.

176

Mr. SI, 25 September 2015. Interviewer: Rina Kojima.

th

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81/165for living. There is a psychological separation between these two groups of people”.
(川内村は「働きに来る場所」と思っている人「暮らす場所」と思っている人の間に、精神的な隔たりがある)This choice, made by some of the villagers, to come back only to work but not to live,
has created an idea of the village as not being a place where one would want to live which is, difficult to confront for those who have in fact chosen to return “fully”. Thisidea was evidently reinforced by inhabitants who chose not to come back to the village
at all, there would be no further occasions for these two groups to meet. The uneasy
cohabitation between those who returned “fully” and those who returned to work is asource of tension and disagreement within the village community.
4.5.3 “RESISTANCE” TO THE DICHOTOMY OF OPTIONS: RETURN OR RESETTLEMENT
The choice for “half-return” can be regarded as people’s creative attempt to adapt
their lives to a new situation and find suitable solution to their respective situations (ex.
safeguarding the employment while avoiding the radiation risk for children or providing
necessary care for aging parents…). The government has basically offered only two
options to the evacuees after the accident: return with support to restart their lives, or
resettle in other places with little or no assistance. In face of this dichotomy, somepeople chose an alternative, third option: Half-Return or Half-Resettlement. Mosneaga(2015) called it, “dual residency”, one of the “dynamic, makeshift arrangements thatfall somewhere between different settlement options177” But this alternative migratory
choice has not been officially recognized, let alone institutionally supported by thegovernment or local authority.

4.6 NOT RETURNING … NOWThere are quite a few cases of inhabitants who declare that they do not return for the
moment, but that they plan to come back to their hometown at some point in the
future: their decision is not definitive.
The decision of these residents to leave their homes after the accident is presented asa (long) parenthesis, with the underlying idea that, since contamination is supposed todecrease continuously, and that children will grow up and thus become less sensitive toradiation, return may be possible in a future.

Emblematic Case:
Ms. SA178: “I fear that the Government is making the accident look as if it nolonger exists”.
When the reactor exploded on 16 March 2011, knowing this reactor of the Daiichi
NPP was using MOX fuel, Ms. SA immediately left Fukushima city with her
husband and daughter. Subsequently, they moved to Yamagata, then Tokyo,
Hokkaido, Kitakata (west Fukushima), Okinawa, and finally settled in Kyoto in
August 2011 (as her friend Ms. MY had recommended they do). Her daughter was
177

Mosneaga, A. (2015). Op.cit. (p.2).

178

Ms. SA, 23 May 2016. Kyoto. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

rd

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82/16510 years old at the time of evacuation.
Ms. SA lived in city-owned public housing with her daughter; the rent was paid by
the city. Her husband lived in Fukushima city due to his job. Currently there are
30 evacuee families living in the same building, though in the beginning there wereabout 50. She is part of a Kyoto group-action lawsuit, demanding compensation forevacuation costs which, so far, the evacuees have been paying themselves.
“I was very upset about the fact that the Japanese government does notannounce policies to protect children after the accident. After Chernobyl, I
heard that the Belorussian government supported and financed convalescentholiday trips for children living in the contaminated area. The Japanese
government does not support any of those programs. In the recent opinion polls
conducted by the Fukushima prefecture, 25% of the people who live inFukushima would still evacuate if they could.”“We came all the way from Fukushima, but the irony is that Kyoto city issituated around 40-50 km from the nuclear stations of the Fukui prefecture,
while Fukushima city was situated 0 km away from the Daiichi. I feel like thenuclear power plant has followed us to Kyoto.
… With the 2020 Tokyo Olympic games getting closer, I fear that theGovernment is making the accident look as if it no longer exists. I feel that thenuclear accident victims will be abandoned, as was the case in Hiroshima andMinamata. It is sad to say, but history repeats itself: what happened to the
population after the atomic bombing in Hiroshima/Nagasaki, and after the
mercury pollution in Minamata, will happen again in Fukushima.”
When asked about the scientists/experts she trusts, she answered:“I trust Professor Koide of Kyoto University. Also, initially, Mr. Kainuma - but I
was disappointed afterwards” (…) Mr. Kainuma has become quite famous
because of his book: “Fukushima theory, why was the nuclear Village Born 179’,
published in 2011. He was a PhD student at Tokyo University at the time. Nativeof Iwaki city, Fukushima, Mr. Kainuma analysed in detail how these ruralcommunities accepted the NPP installations in the first place, during the 60s,
and how the government and industry at the time managed to silence local
opposition, mainly from farmers and fishermen. But, as he became well-known
and was invited for a lot of interviews in the media, he started to be vocal in
criticizing anti-nuclear demonstrations, denying the increase of thyroid cancer
cases among children in Fukushima, and criticizing the “over-reaction” of thepeople (for example, those living in Tokyo and self-evacuees from Fukushima)
concerning the radiological situation in Fukushima.
A government decision planned to stop housing assistance in March 2017;
Fukushima and Saitama prefectures decided to partially subsidize inhabitants’rent for two years after March 2017.
“I hope that Kyoto would make a similar decision. I worry whether my husband
and I could financially support two households (one in Fukushima and another in
Kyoto) after March 2017.
“My daughter was bullied at local school in Kyoto because she is from
Fukushima. It was difficult for her to make friends as she speaks with adifferent accent and in a different dialect 180 . But now she goes to another179

Kainuma, Hiroshi, “Fukushima” ron: genshiryokumura wa naze umareta no ka ( Fukushima Theory: Why Was The
Nuclear Village Born) (Tokyo: Seidosha, 2011)
180

Kyoto has its specific dialect.

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83/165school and she is doing well. I plan to go back and join my husband in Fukushimacity when my daughter goes to university. My husband is of the same opinion.
He comes to Kyoto every three months, because the return ticket costs
400 euros and we cannot afford it every month. It is very sad when he had to go
back to Fukushima every time”.
Note: When, during a second interview with Ms. SA, the young girl was asked
how she felt about her future, she answered that she wanted to come back to
Fukushima in the following years, and said she felt attached to her hometown.

4.6.1 RETURNING - WHEN MY CHILD IS GROWN UP …
At the time of interview Ms. SA typically bears a financially and emotionally difficult
situation, separated from her husband who stayed in Fukushima, in order to, as she
said “protect her daughter”. She is very active in evacuee associations, and lives in thesame public housing building as Ms. MY, another evacuee from Fukushima, interviewed
in this study, who became her friend. However, unlike the last category (not returning,ever), she plans to come back to Fukushima “later”. She explains that her husband has
a job which he loves and to which he is deeply attached. The young daughter (whoparticipated in discussion during a second interview with her mother) is now quite
happy at her new school in Kyoto; she is also active in denunciating the consequencesof the nuclear accident, and proudly shows the speech she gave to pupils during aschool trip to Europe on the consequences of the accident in her life. However, she
still feels attached to Fukushima and envisages returning in the future, after graduatingfrom high school. She also misses her father’s presence. For Ms. SA, the desire to
reunite her family is very instrumental in the fact she envisages going back to
Fukushima.
4.6.2

RETURNING TO TAKE CARE OF ELDERLY PARENTS

In the case of Mr. and Ms. NA, the project to return later was linked to a later life
project of taking care of elderly parents, when required. Ms. NA and her husband wereborn in Fukushima, and spent their whole life there before the accident. After theaccident, Ms. NA moved to the Miyagi prefecture, then to Sendai. She explained that
she envisaged returning to Fukushima later, when her children would have grown up.
She found life tiring in Sendai (a bigger city), and regretted the quietness of her life in
Fukushima. But her main reason for returning was the aging of her parents: “My parents
and parents-in-law still live in Fukushima and, considering their age, I may need tocome back to care for them”.
Her husband was also keen to come back, but as he had found a job in Sendai, he was
not sure he could find easily a job in Fukushima now”. She envisaged a return when her
child had grown up, but she might have to return sooner, if her parents and parents-inlaw needed her help.
It is interesting to note, in this category, the fact that these inhabitants left after theaccident but do not want to “close the door” to a return. The “parenthesis” of thepartial or total move of the family is linked to the idea of protecting the children
during their childhood, but with the firm objective of coming back later. In both cases,
attachment was linked to people (family) staying in the hometown.

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4.7 NOT RETURNING … EVER
A last category concerns inhabitants who declared that they did not plan to come back,ever, to Fukushima prefecture. They had, to a certain extent, made a fresh start, anddeveloped in most cases a deep mistrust towards the authorities. Again, the reasons fortheir choice were varied, as shown in the results of the survey done by the town ofNaraha.
Emblematic case:
Ms. KT181, Evacuee from Iwaki city, living in Kyoto: “The myth of the absolutesafety of NPPs disappeared after the accident, but the new safety myth of lowdose radiation exposure emerged, and it is still intact”.
Ms. KT lives in Kyoto with her two daughters. She and her husband divorced,
because she refused to return to Iwaki. She was at the time of the interview asocial worker for the elderly and a volunteer at the Kyoto Citizens’ Radioactivity
Measuring Station.
First interview: 25th May 2016.
Until 14 March 2011, Ms. KT lived life as normal in Iwaki, not knowing that theaccident had occurred. Work and school continued as usual. When she talked withher husband afterwards, he had actually known about it since 12 March, but said
nothing to her. She was working at a supermarket; her husband was a truck driver.
As soon as she learned about the accident on 14 March, Ms. KT called her bestfriend. Her friend’s husband answered, and told Ms. KT that his wife had left Iwaki
for Okinawa, with the children, that morning. At that point, Ms. KT decided toevacuate Iwaki.
On 17 March, she and her family left for Atsugi, Kanagawa prefecture (near Tokyo),to stay at her brother’s house for 9 days; they then returned to Iwaki because of
Mr. and Ms. KT’s work. In April, the school started again as if everything was normal- children were doing sport outside, while cesium was detected in the water supplyof Iwaki. Ms. KT’s daughters were also worried about radiation; they were 1 and 12
years old at the time.
In June, the school cafeteria reopened - meaning that Ms. KT could no longer
protect her children from food contamination, as school would decide which food toserve – locally produced vegetables. She reported thinking:“I cannot handle it by myself anymore”, and decided to have her daughters
evacuate to Akita, together with their grandmother, and her sister with her
children, while Mr. and Ms. KT stayed on in Iwaki for work. They still had to pay thebank loans for their house.
Their daughters returned to Iwaki in February 2012, as their grandmother could nottake care of them alone due to her heart problem; Ms. KT mother, her sister andher sister’s children stayed on in Akita.

181

Ms KT, Evacuee from Iwaki city, living in Kyoto, Volunteer, Kyoto Citizens’ Radioactivity Measuring Station atthTanbabashi, 25th May 2016 and 8 October 2017. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

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85/165In April 2012, when the daughters went back to school in Iwaki, their teacher
effectively scolded them as if they had done something wrong:“There were people who wanted to evacuate but couldn’t, so don’t say anything
about your fun time in Akita to your friends”. Ms. KT immediately regretted making
them come back to Iwaki, and started to plan for evacuation again, for a longer
period. One of her colleagues whispered to her at work: “once we are irradiated,discrimination will begin.” When she asked the pediatrician, whom she felt she
could trust, whether she should evacuate her children from Iwaki, the doctor said:“What are you talking about? Iwaki is safe. That is why all the evacuees from
evacuation zones came to Iwaki”. She was shocked by his words.
Although there are no official statistics available, Ms. KT believed that there weremany self-evacuees from Iwaki. Many self-evacuees evacuated without telling
anybody, and hid from others.
Her husband and parents-in-law were opposed to the idea of children being
evacuated (including the first time, to Akita). They said, “there are otheradmirable wives who make effort to stay in Iwaki, but instead, you are abandoning
it (bad wife)”.
Second interview : 8th 0ctober 2017
“My husband and I divorced because he did not agree with the most important thing
for me in life: the life and health of our children. After this accident, I feel like I
learned many things. I finally understood what kind of country Japan was”.
But after five years, she wanted to become “a normal woman and have a normallife again”, that is to say, she wanted not to be thinking constantly about
Fukushima and evacuation. She had to make a living for her and her daughters, andfelt rather tired of participating in activities organised for evacuees. But when her
children thanked her for having protected them from radiation exposure - in coming
to Kyoto - Ms. KT was glad she made that decision.
“The government is imposing the choice to return for the evacuees. I do notunderstand why it invests so much money in renovating houses, decontamination incontaminated areas, when it could assist in the resettlement of residents.
I felt really hurt when other mothers in Iwaki told me ‘because you are originallyfrom Akita, you could evacuate easily’.”In other words, Ms. KT felt distressed that these mothers were accusing her of not
being loyal to Fukushima, because she was not originally from there.
“I helped with an event inviting a Hibakusha ”the irradiated” surviving victims of
the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from Hiroshima to talk about
his experience. I understood that the people who were socially vulnerable,mothers and children, are the ones who paid the biggest price after the Hiroshima
atomic bomb and the Fukushima nuclear accident. The nuclear power generation
has a link to atomic bombs and war.
There is a new safety myth: the myth of the absolute safety of NPPs disappeared
after the accident, but the new safety myth of low-dose radiation exposure
emerged, and it is still intact”.
“Also, I went to a photo exhibition about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

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I thought that there was definitely a link between Hiroshima/Nagasaki and
Fukushima. Nuclear issues are connected to war. I learned it after the accident byreading different things. I finally understood that the nuclear issue led to here
(the war) and the characteristic of Japan has not changed since the war. When I
first evacuated to Kyoto, I went to a war photo exhibition at the University of
Kyoto for the first time in my life. I had never been to a war photo exhibition in
my life. When I saw the photos I thought, what is this? Those who suffered themost are, again, women and children. That is it. The vulnerable population
becomes the biggest victim - just like after the Fukushima nuclear accident. I
thought I have to let people know about this. I was stupid; I knew nothing about
our history. At the end of the exhibition, there was a photo of the explosion of the
Fukushima NPP. An employee of the exhibition came up to me and asked whether I
thought it was appropriate to have the photo of the Fukushima accident at the war
photo exhibition. I answered, “of course it is appropriate. I think war and nuclear
energy are connected”. Then I met and talked with the organizer of the exhibitionand decided to organize the same exhibition in the Mukaijima district of Kyoto,where I had lived for two years. I wanted people to know how much mothers worry
and think about their children when a war/accident happens. I wanted thegovernment to know. When a war/accident occurs the lives of many and children
would be jeopardized. I wanted them to know. Even if I am ignorant, I thought I
had to do this to let people know. The government’s post-accident policies are
horrible and we have actually been abandoned by them. Why do vulnerable people
have to suffer the most? When looking at the photo on the flyer of the exhibition,
where a mother tries to give milk to her baby, whose face was burnt by the atomic
bomb I wonder how much this mother worried and thought about her baby (tears).
Of course, we will not die immediately from the Fukushima nuclear accident, butmany mothers are worrying and thinking about their children’s future.”“After the accident, which is itself an unfortunate event, I learned a lot about
life, met many supportive people, and considered myself lucky despite themisfortune of the accident. I finally understood what kind of country Japan was. I
had been also uninterested in politics before the accident. But now when I think
about the future of our children, we as victims have to raise our voices and let
people know what has happened after the nuclear accident.”

4.7.1

PROTECTING MY CHILDREN

The case of Ms. KT epitomizes the ethical stance of “protecting my children” as theoverarching principle for guiding decisions about returning/remaining after an accident.
This stance led to her divorce, because her husband considered her fear inappropriate
and wanted her and the children to come back. Ms. KT is from Iwaki city which is notunder Evacuation Orders where shelters had been built mainly to provide housing toevacuees from Naraha and other towns under Evacuation Orders. This shows that theofficial zoning, the official risk assessment thereof, is not considered legitimate ortrustworthy by some inhabitants who rather trust alternative risk assessment made byindependent scientists and experts.

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87/165This decision to evacuate can be taken at a high cost – notably: divorce, in a great
number of cases. Indeed, the media and evacuees themselves use the term “atomic
divorce” to designate these cases, where a couple separated because of disagreement
on decisions on whether or not to live in a contaminated area. In other cases, thefamily had to pay for two households. Ms. NS 182 evacuated Fukushima city with her
husband and two sons, to live in Hiroshima because her husband was originally fromthere. Her husband had to return to Fukushima, as his job re-started soon after theaccident. They had been able to get together, as a family, for about one month every
year for the last five years (since the accident). They have double household expenses:“I am afraid of becoming part of the working poor and of jeopardizing my son’s future
in order to avoid radiation exposure and prevent future risks for them”.
Ms. MY was also part of this category of inhabitants who declared firmly that theywould not return to their original hometown. She was a close friend of Ms. SA (seeabove). They moved to Kyoto together after the accident, while their husbands (alsoclose friends) stayed in Fukushima city. Each couple had a daughter; the two girls wereroughly the same age. They lived in the same social housing in Kyoto, and spend a lotof time together; in interview they said that moving together was also a means to
comfort each other. During the second interview, Ms. MY declared she would not comeback to Fukushima city. She added that she would not live in Fukushima city, but nor
would she live in Tokyo (she is originally from Tokyo), which she considered “toocontaminated”, preferring to stay on in Kyoto. However, her husband was not satisfied
with the situation. He works for an NGO that organizes the measurement ofcontamination in Fukushima city. She added that the separation of the family was notan easy thing to live with, and that, because a train ticket between Fukushima andKyoto cost so much, the father could visit them no more than once a month.
4.7.2

CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICS AFTER THE ACCIDENT

An important characteristic of this testimony lies in the way that the disaster,evacuation in particular, radically affected and even transformed the core values andlife-styles of some population, triggering the sense of citizenship, or even politicalengagement. Ms. KT was an employee of a supermarket in her town; she admitted ininterview that, before the accident, she took no interest in politics at all. She insisted
on how she became progressively interested in politics, and increasingly critical of theJapanese government.
“After the accident, which is itself an unfortunate event, I learned a lot about life,
met many supportive people, and considered myself lucky despite the misfortune of
the accident. I finally understood what kind of country Japan was183”.
Ms. KT recast the accident as an opportunity to transform herself from an “ordinary
mother” to a citizen-activist (member of the Citizens' Radioactivity Measuring Station),she recognised becoming more prone to be vocal about the government.
Another new awareness, triggered by her new situation, correlate the Hiroshima andNagasaki bombing - “I was stupid, I knew nothing about our history” - and how she
182

Ms NS, Evacuee from Fukushima city, living in Hiroshima, 21st October 2016. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa andC. Fassert.
183

Ms KT, op.cit.

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associate the military and civil nuclear aspects, which became unquestionably linked inher mind, through the eyes of maternal care. “Of course, we will not die immediatelyfrom the Fukushima nuclear accident, but many mothers are worrying and thinking
about their children’s future”.
Another resident mentioned above, Ms. NS, who evacuated Fukushima city for
Hiroshima, also recast the accident as an occasion to question how citizens wererepresented, and how their interests were defended. She raised the issue of central
government policy seen to be imposing certain solutions on local authorities. She
considered that: “The prefecture is also a victim, but the authorities and town
employees do not take the side of the affected population. The government and the
Fukushima population, for whom they are working? I wish the Fukushima governor andprefecture had become genuine spokesmen for the victims and that they were on thefront line supporting the lawsuit against the State and TEPCO. This would have united
the victims and Fukushima residents despite divisions imposed by zoning andcompensation. Instead, they are abandoning the (self-) evacuees making them look
like simple re-settlers. Their attitude makes evacuees feel that they are doing
something wrong”. Also Ms. NS considered that the accident changed her perception of
the State: “I used to see the local administration and the State as protecting thecitizens. But now I feel that I was completely wrong”.

4.8 CONCLUSION
The presentation of six categories of inhabitants, in terms of their decision to “whether
return or not” after the lifting of EOs in the evacuated territories or, more generally,
their decision to stay in or leave a contaminated territory, allowed to summarize thevariety of positions held by inhabitants. The issue of ionizing radiation (the dangers it
presents - or not - for each type of category) was always spontaneously evoked during
interview, and is a central element in decision-making. It was also a very dividing issue(Slater, 2015, Kimura, 2016). The points raised show that the decision to return or not
involves balancing a whole range of reasons, (infrastructures availability, return ofother villagers, …), making a personal and intimate decision, but that it is also a way of
responding to government ‘pressures’ and incentives. To this extent, whether to returnor not can also be framed as a political stance on the part of residents, which
mobilizes their broad assessment of the government’s post-accidental policy.

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5 SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this section, we come back on a number of topics identified from the field study
results (chapters 3 and 4) and broaden the analysis thanks to the examination of anumber of literature elements from Human and Social Sciences. We explore the manyquestions which are beyond the questions of “whether to return or not”, in order togive a better understanding of the main issues raised after the accident. This analysis isbased on the interviews led with the inhabitants, but also with the persons in charge ofmanaging its consequences, such as government representatives, radioprotection
specialists, medical doctors, etc.
The topics in this chapter are classified on a temporal basis: starting with the accident
and emergency evacuations, and exploring the issues as they gradually emerged: thedecision to leave or not directly after the emergency situation, the time of sheltering,
the perceptions and feelings of those who left, or stayed, and then life after the liftingof Evacuation Orders, for those who stayed or left.

5.2 THE IMMEDIATECONSEQUENCES

AFTERMATH:EVACUATIONORDERS

AND

THEIR

5.2.1 EVACUATION ORDERS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
When speaking about the zoning, and the long-term consequences of being evacuatedor not, inhabitants spontaneously referred to emergency evacuation that took place a
few days after the Nuclear accident. Those emergency evacuations and the sometimes
chaotic emergency scheme although not discussed as such, within the scope of
Shinrai184, have certainly had long-term consequences and therefore warrant mention
here. The lack of information provided by the authorities at the time, and occasional
mistakes in decision-making (e.g. the evacuation of residents from Namie to Iitate,
where the radiological plume had actually migrated meantime), had lasting impact on
the population’s appraisal of post-accidental policy.
When interviewed, Genyû Sôkyû, Head of Temple in Miharu (Fukushima prefecture) andwriter, insisted on the violence of the evacuation and underlined its authoritarian
aspect:“What happened to the town of Namie185 was dramatic. Namie was hit the hardest by
the tsunami in that region. While there were still many people missing, one day after
the tsunami, people were obliged to evacuate. So they couldn’t search for their
missing family members. This bitterness that they feel, I am sure it will continue theirwhole lives. I heard that some people finally found the remains of their relatives later

184

Crisis management and post-accidental management are categorized as two different topics in the current
institutional schemes. However, it is more and more widely recognized that these aspects cannot be handled
separately, and that a number of decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of the accident, or even “during” theaccident are instrumental mid- and long-term. People interviewed always spontaneously came back to the accident
itself, or even to former times, when an accident was considered inconceivable.
185

Namie is located on the Pacific Ocean coastline of the Prefecture of Fukushima.

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91/165on, in a horrible state when the “Restricted Zone” was lifted and people could enter
during the day, but many still have not found the bodies of members of their family.
What is particular about this disaster is that there are still 2553 people missing, eventoday.”186
Emergency evacuations also resulted in a number of deaths. Some of them were a
direct result of the frantic, frightful conditions in which very sick and/or very oldpeople had to be evacuated, during the evacuation itself - because, for example,
medical apparatus had to be unplugged from a power source, or due to lack of care forweak patients who had to be evacuated in standard buses. Prof. TO187, who led Red
Cross emergency teams in the immediate aftermath of the accident, explained:“Nothing was planned for the high dose areas with hospitals: some people died as aresult of the transfer, which was conducted without any precautions.” Other deaths
were indirectly a result of evacuation, such as the suicide of inhabitants who lost theirfarming properties or of very old inhabitants terrified by the catastrophe and its
consequences. For example, the case of one inhabitant of Futaba, aged 102, whocommitted suicide because he had to leave his hometown, was particularly harrowing.
The obvious conclusion is that evacuations have a high cost, in terms of deaths. But thisissue merits further reflection. The organizations in charge of emergency planning
could usefully study the conditions and arrangements/plans that are in place for
emergency evacuation of hospitals. A recent study (Shimada and al., 2018) led by ateam of Japanese researchers concluded that:“… except for a case where there is a possible direct threat to safety (e.g., lethal or
harmful levels of radiation exposure), it is preferable to seek alternatives forvulnerable people other than evacuation, such as sheltering-in-place. However, given
our findings, we would like to stress that the mortality risk of sheltering-in-place in aharsh environment (as articulated above) might be comparable to those in an
unplanned evacuation. It is imperative that potential risks of sheltering-in-place,which are unique to the vulnerable population, are recognized in disaster
preparedness policies188”.
The choice not to move patients who cannot survive without medical apparatus is not
specific to nuclear accidents, however, it also involves a certain “sacrifice” on the partof medical staff who volunteers to stay or who organizes the move meticulously despite
the risk of exposure to high level of radiation. This echoes Takahashi’s analysis (2013)of nuclear energy as a “sacrificial” energy 189 . It also calls for the comparison ofevacuation/non-evacuation schemes, with specifying the precise modalities andconditions.

186

G. Sôkyû. Miharu, 22nd March 2017. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert. More details in Fassert (à paraitre) :“Choses qui se passent après un accident nucléaire. Revue des Sciences Humaines ; Ferrier, M. (Dir.).
187

Interview Pr TO, Nagasaki. 12th October 2017. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

188

Shimada Y, N. S. and Al. (2018) Balancing the risk of the evacuation and sheltering-in-place options: a survival study
following Japan’s 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident. BMJ Open.
189“A system in which the benefits accruing to some parties are made possible at the expense of others’ lives (whether
as biological existence, health, daily routine, property, dignity, or hope)”. Takahashi, T. (2014). ‘What March 11 Means
to Me: Nuclear Power and the Sacrificial System’. The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus, 12 (19). doi: https://apjjf.org/Takahashi-Tetsuya/4114/article.pdf.

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92/165Another aspect of the evacuation to be considered is its “compulsory/authoritarian”
aspect, whereby such evacuation conditions also generated cases of “dissidence” onthe part of those who considered unethical the consequences of a brutal departure ofhumans, abandoning the animals they are responsible for. In his book, The Last Man in
Fukushima, Antonio Pagnotta (2012) describes the life of a man who decided to staybehind (illegally) in order to take care of the cattle and domestic animals who would
die without the care of humans 190 . This particular case mirrors those of numerous
interviewees, who confessed how much they suffered when they had to slaughter theircattle or abandon their pets during the evacuation. Such feelings, triggered at the timeof the evacuation, were to some extent revived when it came to decisions to be madelater on, such as resettling inhabitants for longer periods or lifting the evacuation
orders.
It is interesting to note, in Chapter 3 of this report, how this ‘authoritarian’ aspect ismirrored in the role that mayors played in such processes; in a sense, the lifting of
Evacuation Orders may be considered to have been authoritarian in much the same
way as the order to evacuate. Of course, inhabitants were not, strictly speaking,obliged to come back, but the suspension of statutory compensation payments was inmany cases a strong incentive for them to return, even when they were not willing or
not ready to do so. This research shows that the evacuation schemes, and the choices
made, have left their mark on the minds of people, and many regret that theseimportant aspects of their lives (e.g. caring for domestic animals) have not been taken
into consideration by the authorities.
5.2.2

EVACUATION CRITERIA: PROTEST AND ANGER IN THE POPULATIONThe criteria for issuing evacuation orders also triggered another type of protest. The
criteria used to define evacuated zones were a combination of distance from thecrippled Nuclear Power Plant and radiological factors (see Chapter 1). The Japanese
authorities insisted on the fact that they chose the lowest limit of radiation dose values(20 – 100 mSv) established by the International Commission of Radiological Protection,
which provides radiological protection recommendations in normal and accidental
situations. This is disputable, explains David Boilley, a French NGO: when they set thisthreshold, in April 2011, the situation was no longer considered “an emergency
situation” in terms of radiological risk. According to the evacuation order issued at thetime, inhabitants could evacuate their homes within a period of one month (e.g. Iitate
village); the situation could thus be qualified as an “existing situation”, whereby
radiation values would be chosen between 1 and 20 mSv/y (rather than 20 100 mSv/y)191.
The 20 mSv/year threshold sparked vivid debate and protest, mainly within Japan, butalso on the international scene. In Japan, the most spectacular protest was the
resignation (30th April 2011) of Professor Toshiso Kosako, a government advisor onradiological protection, who declared that he could not accept, scientifically or morally,

190

Pagnotta, A. (2013). Le dernier homme de Fukushima: Don Guichotte, Seuil.

191

D. Boilley is President of ACRO. (Association pour le Contrôle de la Radioactivité dans l’Ouest). French nongovernmental organisation that operates a laboratory for radioactivity analysis and conducts studies on nuclear issues.
Interview led by R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert, Herouville Saint Clair, June 2015.

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20mSv/year as the threshold to be applied for babies and children. Professor Kosako
burst into tears on TV, declaring: “I cannot accept this threshold as a scientist, … I
would not accept it for my children …” 192 . One of the main arguments for the
20mSv/year threshold consisted in denouncing that this threshold for the general
population - including children - was the same as the one habitually in place fornuclear workers.
A number of scientists, including Prof. Shimazono of University of Tokyo and Prof.
Koide of the University of Kyoto, and Dr Sakiyama, member of the parliamentary
accident investigation commission (NAIIC), also publicly criticized this threshold. The
NAIIC report was fairly critical of the general policy established by the government,
including the 20mSv/year threshold to be applied to children. Protests also came froma number of NPOs (Greenpeace Japan, Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy). In thereport on his mission to Fukushima in November 2012, Anand Grover, Special
Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council, also directed a number ofcriticisms at the Japanese government for its post-accidental policies. Furthermore,
Grover argued that the recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP), which include socio economic considerations in its
protection policies, such as notion of “As Low As Reasonably Achievable193”, were incontradiction with the concept of the universal right to health. He argued:“The ICRP recommendations are based on the principle of optimization andjustification, according to which all actions of the Government should be based on
maximizing good over harm. Such a risk-benefit analysis is not in consonance with theright to health framework, as it gives precedence to collective interests overindividual rights. Under the right to health, the right of every individual has to beprotected.”
His criticism opens the way for a wider contestation of current environmental andsanitary policies. This aspect will be discussed further in the conclusion to the present
analysis (Chapter 7).
The threshold of 20 mSv/year was indeed not chosen on a purely scientific basis, butalso based on other considerations. Simulation tools can evaluate the scope of possible
consequences for the population at any chosen threshold. Using these simulation tools,
the French Institute for Nuclear Safety and Radioprotection (IRSN) calculated that at
the threshold of 10 mSv/year - half the chosen dose - 70,000 more residents would
have had to evacuate, which would have placed an additional financial burden on
TEPCO and would have had an added economic impact on the region194. Furthermore,this would have produced a strong symbolic message, of a serious nuclear accident. For
example, Professor Yamauchi, professor in radiation physics at Kobe University 195 ,192

His speech at the press conference, translated in English, can be read at: http://japanfocus.org/events/view/83

193(p.16) “Reasonnably” in ALARA means that economical and social benefits are taken into consideration. A criticalappraisal of ALARA is detailed in: Shinrai rapport 1, and the linked issues will be further detailed in Shinrai futurereport.
194

2« L’IRSN proposerait de prendre en compte un seuil de contamination de 600 000 Bq/m pour les césiums 137 et
134 (correspondant à une dose externe maximale de 10mSv pour la première année) »Si cela avait été appliqué, « 70 000 personnes » supplémentaires auraient été évacuées. Source: IRSN (2011)/Rapport
DRPH/2011-10, 23 Mai 2011.
195

Pr Yamauchi, Kobe. May 2016. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

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estimated that such a threshold was chosen precisely in order to avoid evacuating key
cities of the Fukushima prefecture: “Fukushima city is the capital. It was symbolic, you
couldn’t evacuate the capital city without recognizing the significant consequences ofa nuclear catastrophe”.
Zoning as a policy implies taking a stance, more or less implicitly, on what is “safe”
and what is not. In a context of uncertainties, accidents are an opportunity to“deconfine” controversies, and may offer opportunities for “citizen science196” to be
more visible in the public space (Kimura, 2015). In the case of the Fukushima nuclear
accident, the radiation dose threshold was decided without consultation or discussion
with the affected population, by authorities taking into account political, symbolic andeconomic interests, as well as scientific evidence (Fassert, 2016). Moreover, the global
strategy based on intensive decontamination and recovery of territories was a generalframework which was also not discussed with the population: a number of inhabitants
castigated the financial cost of the government policy grounded in decontamination.
They considered that the money could have been spent in other ways - for example byproviding the possibility to evacuate or resettle elsewhere, for those who chose thatsolution. The question of stakeholder participation must be examined by looking at theframe, mode and scope of their “participation” in policymaking.
Lastly, the protest or the anger of the victims, against this zoning policy as well as
against the 20 mSv/year threshold, was also expressed in the form of legal action. In
April 2015, a group of residents in Minamisoma city took to court the governmental
decision to lift evacuation orders from hotspots using the 20 mSv/year referent dose.
The residents demanded the annulment of the decision, contesting the validity of thisreferent dose. The court proceeding of the “Against the 20 mSv/year Lawsuit” began in
September 2015. Other than this case, as of 2018 there were at least 31 group-action
lawsuits demanding compensation for damages filed against TEPCO and the government,
involving 11,400 plaintiffs all over Japan 197 . These legal aspects are detailed in
Chapter 6.
5.2.3

EVACUATION AND SHELTERS: A SUSPENDED LIFE

For most evacuees, evacuation orders marked the beginning of a long period of erring,
between emergency sheltering, staying with family or relatives, or places found in
shelters in the longer term. However, conditions were quite different among evacuees- some had a chance to find a more durable solution; for example, the town of Kyoto
decided to accommodate some “nuclear refugees” in social housing. As discussed in
Chapter 4: whether to return or not, some inhabitants expressed their decision to
return to their home village as a relief, after years of wandering that were particularly
difficult to endure because of their advanced age. Numerous testimonies mention aremarkable number of relocations after the accident, of people who variously resided

196

The term “citizen science” has a plurality of meanings: from various forms of public participation in science,
community actions for regulating risks, and grassroots hacking. The roles of citizens in these initiatives vary: they may
be trained to collect and analyze data, or, more fundamentally, challenge the paradigms used by scientists. These
aspects will be further detailed in Shinrai future report.
197

Kahoku Shimpo, Genpatsu hinan: shudansosho no genkoku 11,400 nin cho ni (Nuclear Evacuation: the number ofgroup-action plaintiffs rose more than 11,400), 9 March 2017.

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with family or friends, in housing provided by municipalities, and/or in shelters built
for evacuated people. One of them, Ms. AK., who returned to Kawauchi explained:198“On the 12th March, I left for Kôriyama with my sons. My husband stayed in Kawauchi.
On the 14th March, with the explosion of the second reactor, I left Kawauchi to go to
my brother’s place, in Ibaraki, then to Seitama, to another brother’s home, then, toKanagawa, to stay with one of my sons. Then I had free housing in Kanagawa, where
we stayed from April 2014 to June 2015. My husband was then transferred to Haneda.
Then he retired, and we decided to come back to Kawauchi after the LOE”.
This succession of moves has provoked not only an initial severing of original, homecommunity links, for most of them, but has also prompted a repeated scheme of the
rupturing of social links. Ms. YA, another evacuee, explained that after the accident
she moved, from her hometown of Namie, no less than 7 more times before settling in(temporary) housing in Nihombatsu. The next step for her would be to move, this time
for good, to resident housing built by the government specifically for the evacuees. She
was relieved to find a final place to settle, but she had regrets: “once again, we aregoing to be separated from people here in Nihombatsu with whom we have built
links.”199

5.3 AFTER THE ACCIDENT: FACING CONTAMINATION
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION“Enganbou Fûkei kiroku” (Registering of a Coastal Landscape) is a video art work by
Fujii Hikaru, displayed at the National Museum of Modern Art in Tokyo. In the words ofthe writer and academic Michael Ferrier, it is a fixed plan, without any music, of a sunrise in a forest of Iitate. Light is emerging progressively and slowly, the songs of birds
are growing little by little, the colors are developing in the dawn. Lastly, in a corner ofthe screen, figures are appearing: latitude, longitude, … and level of radioactivity(10,41 micro Sieverts/h). This final image is striking: “We realize in an instant that thelevel of radioactivity is now entirely part of the essential features of the place (in thesame way as its physical coordinates, longitude, latitude, altitude) ….”200
It is important to consider key questions related to this experience. What does it mean
to live somewhere where radioactivity level has become an integral, essential part ofthe distinctive information provided about that place, more or less explicitly? After theaccident, people progressively started living with a variety of “tools” that allowed
them to grasp, or to apprehend something essentially invisible. Geiger Counters andradiometers would provide different views of ambient radioactivity, and they would becompleted with food contamination measurement stations. Moreover, other types ofapparatus provided would allow more direct measurement of personal doses:
dosimeters, and Whole Body Counters, and also urine tests to measure radioactivity

198

Mrs AK, Kôriyama. interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert, Kawauchi, 19 March 2015

th

199

Mrs YA, 18 may 2016, Nihombatsu. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

200 “On réalise en un instant que le niveau de radioactivité fait aujourd’hui partie des données incontournables de larégion, au même titre que ses coordonnées physiques, latitude, longitude, altitude) » (…).Ferrier, M. (2014).
Fukushima ou la traversée du temps : une catastrophe sans fin. ESPRIT, 405, Juin 2014.

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96/165levels, thanks to Germanium systems201. This raises the question of how to make senseof this information? How to articulate Becquerel, milliSievert, and in some cases, WBC
results, or thyroid screening results, and so on, in order to decide whether or not thesituation is “safe”?
These questions emerged after the emergency phase, when the issue of “facing” acontaminated environment arose. Assessing the dangers of living in such anenvironment is not an easy task, considering the lack of scientific agreement on thismatter. The objective here, in the current study, is to consider the social
consequences of the divide brought about by this issue within communities and families.
However, this report will not enter into scientific debates around the dangers ofionizing radiation. Shinrai Report 1 (Fassert, 2017) showed that these debates haveendured in the history of military and civil nuclear domains, and provide the principal
elements of the dispute that still opposes “insiders” and “outsiders” of the nuclear
sphere. A Shinrai future report will characterize more in-depth the main issues of thescientific controversies, and how the Japanese government made choices on the basisof international standards and recommendations. In this section, the focus is on thesocial consequences of the scientific debates: the divides, the disputes, and finally,
how in many cases radiation came to be a taboo topic within certain communities,
precisely because disagreement on the dangers became at high stakes, and linked topositions on nuclear energy or on government policy.
5.3.2

RADIATION RISKS AS A DIVISIVE TOPIC

The divisive nature of different attitudes towards the perceived dangers of ionizing
radiation appeared fairly rapidly after the accident. As discussed above, contestationof the 20 mSv/year evacuation threshold was emblematic of a deep divide as regards
assessment of the dangers of low doses of ionizing radiation. The testimony of Dr. TS isparticularly enlightening in terms of the role of medical doctors within the affected
populations. Dr. TS left Tokyo, where he was a junior Medical Doctor in a hospital, to
go to Fukushima in the immediate aftermath of the accident: “I wanted to help
people202”. He organized the first ionizing radiation measurement trials.
“I am not specialized in radioprotection, but I know the basics, being a medical doctor
specialized in the treatment of leukemia, and I know radiotherapy. I held a first seminar
3 days after the accident. But the local government wanted to run it by itself. It wasvery difficult for me. We had no information. There was only ONE dosimeter at thehospital. I brought it to the school, the teachers were not happy with that. With somecolleagues we wanted to begin a monitoring program, but it was impossible to get theWBC, the government didn’t want it. Four months after the accident, we received thefirst machine, a very old one. We wanted to communicate the results officially, but the
government did not want it. The media pressure was stronger and stronger, however.
We did 1,500 WBCs in the following months. There was a 9-month delay to get an
appointment. There was no time to give the results in a consultation, which I findunsatisfactory. The results were sent by letter. At this time, information came fromevery side: “this is safe! This is dangerous!”. It was very confusing for people. …”201

Germanium systems allow to measure internal contamination.

202

Interview Dr Ts, Minamisoma, March 2015. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

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97/165Interviewed in 2015, he expanded on what he considered to be his responsibility as adoctor, and the difficulties of responding to people’s concerns after the accident:“Currently [2015], the exposure is not as high when you live in a town.”; “There are
100 Medical Doctors in Minamisoma Note: the south and west parts of Minamisoma arein evacuation zone, and most of them do not want to talk about the dangers ofionizing radiation to patients. They are afraid of being accused. You may be attacked
from both sides. I was. … However, I think the role of an MD is to go on examining
radiation exposure levels (of the population). There are still many uncertainties. ….
Ionizing radiation has quickly become an ideological topic. This is why many try just to
avoid speaking about it. However, experts must recognize that it is their duty to speak
about it, despite the attacks that we may receive, from both sides”.
Doctor TS reference to “both sides” is enlightening, and was so “self-evident” in thecontext of the interview, that he did not give any precisions as to the nature of the two“sides”. Essentially, he was referring to one side - a globally “reassuring” attitude as
regards the dangers of ionizing radiation, and to the other side – a more “cautious”
standpoint. But these two sides mirror more globally, and very clearly, the “progovernmental/pro-nuclear” versus “anti-government/anti-nuclear” divide, effectively
turning a scientific point of view into a political one. In such a context, someone likeDr. TS - who could be classified as taking a rare middle-ground position: critical of thegovernment, while not promoting self-evacuation for Minamisoma inhabitants – is, in
his own bitter words, “attacked from both sides”.
This correlation, associating assessment of radiation risks with a political position, iswell illustrated in M. Yuasa’s article (2013) to analyze the 20th annual meeting of the
IPPNW (International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War) 203 held in 2012, where aplenary session dedicated to the health effects of the Fukushima accident was heldwith a number of Japanese panelists, chaired by JPPNW, the Japanese branch of theorganization204. The general tone of this session was reassuring, which sparked vivid
protest from a number of participants. Later on, the IPPNW wrote a letter to the MEXT
(Ministry of Education, Sports, Science and Technology) regarding the 20 mSv/year
standard chosen for evacuation, which expressed “deep concern” over the rise ofcancer cases which could occur, mentioning the 2006 BEIR VII report205. But this official
letter was not signed by the Japanese branch, which refused to endorse such appeal.
The president of the JPPNW explained: “I can understand that this letter represents
justified concerns, including that children’s exposure to the radiation should be aimed
for zero. However, I did not add my signature because I think that JPPNW should not
engage in anti-government activities”206.

203

IPPNW was founded in 1980 and represents citizens, mainly from the medical domain, from 62 countries. JPPNW is
the Japanese branch of this organization.
204

Yuasa, M. (2013). Whistle in the Graveyard: Safety Discourse and Hiroshima/Nagasaki Authority in post Fukushima
Japan. In Japan's 3/11 disaster as seen from Hiroshima: A multidisciplinary approach. Hiroshima Shiritsu Daigaku.
205

BEIR (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation) VII report was published in 2006 as a synthesis on radiological issues.

206

Yanagida, 2011, quoted by: Yuasa, op.cit.

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5.3.3

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98/165RADIATION: FROM “CORRECT FEAR” TO “CORRECT ATTITUDE”

5.3.3.1 “Fuhyo-higai” (Harmful Rumor)
On the side of the government, the idea developed progressively that part of the
population was not responding “properly” when facing a contaminated environment.
Within the central and local authorities responsible for dealing with the accident, theexpression, “to fear radiation correctly”, came to be frequently used. Even the Science
Council of Japan (equivalent to the National Academy of Science in the US) organized
an emergency public lecture entitled “fear radiation correctly” in July 2011 inviting
experts including radiation hormesis207 protagonists (Shirabe et al. 2015). This implied,of course, that some inhabitants were not – in the eyes of the government services fearing radiation “correctly”; they were considered to be “overreacting” to thisparticular type of danger.
It was in this context that the term Fuhyo-higai (harmful rumors) emerged, coined in
the context of decline in sales of Fukushima products thought to be contaminated withradiation, and thus avoided by consumers, to refer to the incidence of “subjectively
considering food or products as unsafe, without any scientific basis208”. More generally,
the term is used to criticize an appraisal of contamination risks (ambient or internal)
considered incorrect or exaggerated. It relies on the doubtful idea that there can be a“true” or “objective” risk, which could act as an undisputable reference.
In certain contexts - notably just after the accident when a limited type ofmeasurements was available - any kind of measure could be accused of being Fuhyohigai. As one person from the Watari district of Fukushima explained:“My youngest daughter was going to a private kindergarten in Watari district; it was
the first one to allow Greenpeace to measure radiation at school. The news of thecontamination found there was broadcasted on TV. Then, the kindergarten was put
under pressure by the local community to close and move to another area. The
pressure came from local business, agriculture unions, etc. They accused thekindergarten of spreading the bad image of Fukushima”209.

5.3.3.2 “Radiation Brain Moms”
The normative framework that progressively developed also became dismissive of
attitudes which were considered to be “exaggerated”. In her work on the emergence of
Citizen Radiation Measuring Systems (Kimura A. H., 2016), Kimura shows how the term“radiation brains moms” was coined to characterize concerned mothers as “hysterical”
and “irrational”. In the introduction to her analysis, Kimura presents the case of awoman, Takeshita-San, who worked as a communications manager in a company which,after Fukushima, led advertisement campaigns to calm growing fears on foodcontamination. The main message was “let’s continue to eat to support the cause!”.
Her job was essentially to counter fuhuo-higai in marketing campaigns. But she herself

207

Hormesis is a theory which considers that low-dose radiation exposure brings benefits to human health instead of harm.

208

Kimura A. H., 2016. Sakiya (2011, p 86) quoted by Kimura p 28.

209

Ms AS. Fukushima city, R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert on 18 May 2016.

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99/165began to feel concerned about food contamination. When she raised the point, she wasreprimanded by her boss. She was reluctant to do the job asked of her, and finallyresigned to set up an organization providing food measurements:“The way Takeshita-san was chastised for worrying about food contamination
illuminates the force of such a policy in which what one can sense, discuss andproblematize is already defined by the existing social order. Food policing involves thenormalization of a certain level of risk with food as inevitable, imposing a particular
view on reality and a prescription for a right kind of conduct. People worries, concerns
and actions to lower food risk are censored in the name of science, risk analysis andthe economy210”.
Kimura situates this sanctioning of mothers in “a wider history of women’s struggles
related to scientific uncertainty and how their actions to respond to it often facesocial disproval211”.

5.3.3.3 Wife and Mother: conflicting roles
This type of conflict, such as experienced by Takeshita-San above, has on occasion
been framed in terms of the roles - wife/mother - to be played by women. Just after
the accident, Ms. KT explained that: “My husband and parents-in-law opposed the ideaof evacuating the children. They said: ‘There are other admirable wives who make theeffort to stay in Iwaki, but instead, you are abandoning this place’.” 212 . Slater,
Morioka, and Danzuka (2014) discuss a comparable case of social disproval linked to theroles young mothers must play, examining their specific vulnerabilities in such asituation. He looks at how, in many cases, these mothers were struggling “between
the support of economic recovery and what they consider as a central role: protecting
their children from radiation213”. This type of conflict did not apply solely within theframe of a decision to stay or to leave, but also, for the non-evacuated zones, when it
came to questions of behavior considered appropriate – or not – for wives and mothers
living in a contaminated area. The “admirable wife” who stayed instead of leaving withher children – as evoked by Ms. A’s husband and in-laws - echoes other accounts, suchas those discussed in Slater and al. who give a detailed analysis of the kind of tensions
and pressure exerted on women who sometimes had to choose between two opposite
roles, especially in farming families. Their husbands may have encouraged them not toworry too much about contamination, because the survival of their farming business
was at stake. At the same time, these women may have been extremely concerned
about the consequences on the health of their children. Showing this concern, Slater
explains, is in this case considered as inappropriate, because reconstruction andnormalization of lives in contaminated territory are at stake. A mother he interviewed
in his field work explained:

210

Kimura, op. cit.

211

Kimura, p 28. 2016.

212

Mrs KT, Evacuee from Iwaki city, living in Kyoto, Volunteer, Kyoto Citizens’ Radioactivity Measuring Station ,Interview led by R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert. 25th May 2016.
213

Slater, D., Morioka, R., and Danzuka, H. . (2014). Micro politics of Radiation Young mothers looking for a voice in
Post-3.11 . Critical Asian Studies, (46:3), pp. 485-508.

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100/165“There are times, I guess, when being a good wife and being a good mother are notalways the same thing. Usually, it is a situation of young women struggling to be goodat both, but now, with all of this, some of us feel we have to choose. I know that [theprotective measures I take] cause problems to my husband and the family, but in theend, my real role (yakuwari) is as a mother who needs to protect her children. It’s notlike this is something that I am just doing by myself. It is as a mother that I worry214”.
The case of Ms. AS 215 is rare, where the wife stayed in Fukushima while the father andthree children left for Hokkaido (the island in the north of Japan). When the accident
happened, the eldest son was 18 years old and in final year at high school. In March
2012, as he was accepted at the Hokkaido University, the timing was good to evacuate
all the children. The youngest daughter was 5 years old. Ms. AS grew up in Hokkaido,
where her husband evacuated with the kids – but she stayed in Fukushima, because shewanted to keep a job she loved, as a pharmacist at the hospital. Here, this motherconsidered her choice to evacuate the children the “right thing to do”. For her,protecting children is always the right thing to do - a norm that should transcend any
situation, and not be called into question even after a nuclear accident. Ms. S
explained further:“I do not understand why the effort to protect children, usually (considered by many)
as a right thing to do, has to be criticized and labelled as doing something wrong,while hiding the risk for our children is considered to be a good thing”.
These ideas are not indeed aligned to or considered “appropriate” by those who put
the banner of reconstruction and recovery at all cost: “To talk about radiation in thisclimate was thought to be holding the recovery effort back216” (Slater and al. 2014).
From the perspective of economic reconstruction, inhabitants were expected to avoid
expressing their concerns. Slater considers that the push for reconstruction led people
to disregard a certain type of feelings:“It had the effect of silencing dissent through the imposition of a sort of implicit
criterion of suitable and unsuitable feelings expressible in public. It was a way ofcoding appropriate speech. In this context, to raise the specter of radiation, toexpress your fear of radiation, was clearly not speaking in a way that supported thecollective effort, and in a way, the collective itself, the community. To express
worries about environmental risks, risks to which the whole community was subject,
was seen as threatening—not supporting—the community217”.
Kimura reintegrates this issue in a wider frame (Kimura A. H., 2018). She shows thatit’s not only “appropriate fear” that is proposed, but also “appropriate attitudes”, andfinally “appropriate emotions”. She tackles the issue of emotional registers and how
certain emotional registers are considered “appropriate and desirable”, while others
are dismissed in such situations. She considers that this “dominant affective regime is214

D. Slater. op.cit.

215

Mrs AS. Resident of the Watari district, Fukushima city, 18 May 2016. Interviewers: R. Hasagawa and C. Fassert.

216

P 493. Ibid.

217

P 495. Ibid.

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integral to the broader governance of risk, which is increasingly shifting risk awayfrom the government and the industry towards general citizens218”.
5.3.4

CONFLICTS AND “GENPATSU RIKON”

In many cases the “correct fear of radiation” proposed by the authorities countered amore “worried/cautious” attitude, and in many families, this tension turned into
disputes amongst relatives. Such tensions appeared over whether to flee from a nonevacuated area219 or not, or whether to return or not to an evacuated area once theevacuation order is lifted. The expression genpatsu rikon (nuclear divorce) was coined
to designate cases where a couple ended up in divorce after the accident often due todifference of opinions over radiation risk, evacuation, and most often protection ofchildren. In interviews for the present study, subjects consistently linked thesedisputes to differences in their appreciation of the radiological risk, which echoes
results found in other studies cited, such as Slater and Kimura.
One salient example in our field work was provided in the testimony of Ms. YN which is
reproduced at length in order to show the gradual decision-making process of thismother, combined with her struggle to “convince” her husband and parents of thelegitimacy of her final decision not to come back.
“Two days after the accident, on 13 March 2011, one of my friends sent information
through a Japanese social network called Mixi, it was some advice from a medical
doctor in the Kyusyu region who was recommending evacuation to Fukushima citizens,as the situation at the damaged NPP was critical. I first thought about the possibilityof evacuation, but when I told my parents about it (my husband was in Tokyo for his
job on that day), they were opposed to the idea; they believed what the government
was saying: it was safe to stay in Fukushima city. At the time, even before theaccident, many people trusted what the government was saying and believed that it
was doing its best to protect the citizens. On 15 March 2011, when a big explosion
occurred at the NPP, my parents changed their minds, and my mother came to thehouse to tell me that she now agreed to evacuate. But my husband was strongly
opposed to the idea of voluntary evacuation. Therefore, I couldn’t make up my mind
until 16 March when I talked with my friend’s husband, an organic farmer in Iitate
village who had already evacuated from the village on 13 March, and advised mestrongly to evacuate with my daughter far away - at least 300 km away from the NPP.
And this was when I also learned about the advice the American government had given
to its nationals to evacuate from the 80 km radius of the crippled NPP. That was when
I decided to evacuate. On 18 March, I left Fukushima for Tokyo with my daughter.
First, we moved to a flat rented by my ant in the Saitama Prefecture, for two or threemonths, while my parents joined us. Then I went back to Fukushima city for theGolden Week (at the end of April and beginning of May), to check the situation, and I
realized that bringing up a child was very difficult there as the radiation level was
still high (around 1.8𝜇Sv/hour) and children could not play outside. Then I started to218

P 1. Kimura, A. H. (2018). Fukushima Ethos: post disaster risk communication, Affect, and shifting risks. Science as
Culture, pp. 98-117.
219

The area in which evacuation order was not issued but often situated peripheric to evacuation zones and affectedby radiological contamination.

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look for information on assistance provided by different municipalities, and found that
the Kyoto prefecture was offering public housing (normally built for public servants)
for evacuees - including self-evacuees from Fukushima. So I settled in Kyoto in midJune 2011 with my daughter, and my parents in separate housing. My parents came insupport of me and my daughter; my husband didn’t understand why I left and wasagainst my decision to leave Fukushima with our daughter220”.
This account illustrates well the “decision-making process” of a mother, through thereconciliation of advice, measurement, and other sources of “information” - such as
the American government’s advice to its citizens to leave. It shows how at one point
these elements converge at a given moment with the possibility of evacuation to
Kyoto; it shows also how a personal decision must be taken in a family context, which
was in this case a dynamic one: the parents were progressively on the side of theirdaughter, while the husband stuck to his original appraisal of the situation.
5.3.5

LIVING WITH IONIZING RADIATIONS

5.3.5.1 Introduction
Having examined how the dangers of ionizing radiation developed as a very divisive
topics, leading to social divides, the following final sections will examine two ways of“facing contamination” and their consequences, namely: living with ionizing radiation,for inhabitants who chose to stay, or to come back, or could not evacuate, and fleeing
from the dangers of ionizing radiations, for inhabitants who chose to do so. Theseissues are evoked above, in Chapter 3: “whether to return or not”, where “emblematiccases” describe feelings and judgements of inhabitants who stayed in/returned tocontaminated areas, and those who left those areas. In this section, the issues will bebroadened and discussed alongside relevant elements in the literature of Human andSocial Sciences.

5.3.5.2 Chernobyl: elements of comparison
When considering what it means to live with ionizing radiations, it is of interest to
broaden the scope and to bring in elements of comparison between the situations inJapan and in Chernobyl, which seems highly relevant here. In the literature on theJapanese situation, there are few explicit references made to Chernobyl (types ofcontamination, types of policies put in place, etc.), and no systematic comparison. It is
not the intention of this report to carry out a systematic comparison, which is beyond
the Shinrai project limits. However, some research carried out on the consequences ofwhat happened in Chernobyl for the affected populations in Belarus and Ukraine
provides a constructive framework of analysis.
This is particularly the case of research by a team of researchers who did intensive
field work in the region after the arrival of Alexander Lukashenko (see chapter 7.3).
Bocéno and al.221 examined how inhabitants living in a contaminated territory construct220

Ms YN., in her 50s, self-evacuee in Kyoto, on 16 October 2014. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert

221

Bocéno, L., Dupont, Y., Grandazzi, G., & Lemarchand, F. (2006). Vivre en zone contaminée ou les paradoxes de lagestion du risque. In G. Ackerman (Ed.), Les silences de Tchernobyl (pp. 114-125). Paris: Autrement.

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103/165“a social and symbolic engagement with contamination, danger, space and time, with
the necessity to conciliate the many contradictions linked to their situation222”. Fromtheir empirical work, led in the period 1997 -1998 223 , they identified two maincategories of reaction to the situation: resignation and denial. They also underlined
the loss of trust on the part of inhabitants, towards the discourses of the authorities,
including health control, which appeared not to be independent from the authorities.
Resignation is associated with a feelings of powerlessness (powerlessness to move fromthe contaminated territories; powerlessness to actually act on the situation), which
may result in a form of fatalism; diminution of stress appears possible only at the priceof denial of the dangers of contamination. However, these two categories do notaccount for the variety of individual situations; these can be better accounted for in
further consideration of the following factors:

-

-

-

-

Rational resigned behavior: inhabitants who behave as having a form of “riskculture” of a rational type, linked to the measurement of contamination.
However, this remains ambivalent, considering that they demonstrate “amoderate but necessary degree of trust in the contamination measurement
methods provided by the authorities”. Risk reduction is conducted through theimplementation of the prescribed rules designed to decrease contamination,and experienced as constraints - all the more difficult to accept since they
consist in forbidding the consumption of delicious foods traditionally collectedin nature (mushrooms, fish, etc.), and pleasant activities in the open air (walks
in forests, swimming in river, etc.).
An attitude of denial: these inhabitants behave more or less as they did before
the accident, and do not take any particular protection measures. This “return
to normality”, “like before the accident”, echoes the political project of
rehabilitation aimed at in governmental policy. “Life ‘as before’ consists formany in acting as if nothing has happened”. But when the dangers ofcontamination are still felt, but linked to a feeling of powerlessness, denial isalso linked to a form of fatalism.
Confident resignation: for these inhabitants, protection measures come into
direct contradiction with the economic difficulties for them and their families:
abandoning the protection measures is not a choice, but an economic necessity.
In this case, the measures were gradually considered as “unnecessary”. Notably,
this is a position taken mainly in places where contamination levels are high,where these inhabitants have chosen to stay.
Desperate resignation, on the contrary, is linked to the idea that the authorities
are unable to “liquidate the consequences of the accident and that individual
protection measures are useless”.

Our own categorization was based on the decision to return or not, and the social andsymbolic engagement with contamination was examined only as one of the elements ofthe decision. However, because this element of decision appeared to be a central one

222

Op.cit. p 117.

223

10 years after the accident, a time scale very different to that of the Shinrai project, which was led in the nearimmediate aftermath of the accident.

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for deciding or not the return, it is interesting to examine how the categories
established by Boceno and his colleagues echo our own categories.
In the case of Chernobyl, different territories are concerned, which were contaminatedto a greater or lesser extent; also the evacuation scheme was quite different (with an
exclusion zone, to which some inhabitants returned), and the criterion for evacuation
was set at 5 mSv/y. And last but not least, economic conditions in Chernobyl werequite different. Certain similarities can be easily identified: a “push” forreconstruction; the measurements experienced as a constraint by a number of
inhabitants; a certain mistrust of the authorities. Some categories are similar, to adegree: rational resigned behavior has points in common with “returning andcomplying”, though “emblematic case” (see Chapter 4.3.); the interviewee seemed
fairly trustful of the local authorities, unlike the type of inhabitant categorized here as
rational and resigned. Also, the attitude of denial category partially mirrors that of“return and forget/resist” (see Chapter.4.2), but Fukushima inhabitants did not
manifest the same fatalism mentioned in relation to the people of Chernobyl. In
conclusion, it may be at a more “intimate”, clinical level, that a correspondence canbe found: the loss of the pleasures of rural life (recast as risky conduct), the burden ofradioprotection rest on the shoulder of inhabitants. The authors mention interviews
with medical doctors who, starting from the observation that people no longer takehealth protection measures, conclude that these people are “guilty” of subsequentcontamination if they do not respect their doctor’s advice and recommendations. Alsointeresting is the fact that behavior classed as rational resigned corresponds withbehavior promoted by the authorities, to a greater extent than the other categories.
This is the same for our corresponding category (Return and complying/measuring; see
Chapter 4.3.) which is in line with the “ideal” proposed by the authorities, and in linewith “reconstruction”.

5.3.5.3 Living a half-life
By analogy with the “half-life” of radionuclides, French writer, novelist and essayist,
living in Japan, Michael Ferrier, refers to a kind of “half-life” for the inhabitants ofFukushima. He points out the ethical dimensions linked to such a life – the situation
should not be claimed as “normal” or “nearly normal” by its promoters.
“It’s not because you get used to it that it becomes normal. It is not normal to walkaround with iodine pills in your pocket. It is not normal to ask whether you take a risk
when eating a vegetable. It is not normal that rain suddenly becomes your enemy224”.
This topic became quite central in the public space, bringing together the“normalization process” of the post-Fukushima situation with the political will of theJapanese government to restart reactors 225 (Sato & Tagushi, 2017). A number of
researchers and essayists have, since the accident, analyzed and denounced sometimes radically (Ribault, 2014) - the life implicitly offered to those who return or

224

Qu’on ne présente pas cette situation comme « normale » ou à peu près normale. Ce n’est pas parce qu’on s’yhabitue qu’elle devient normale. Il n’est pas normal de se promener avec une pastille d’iode dans sa poche. Il n’est pas
normal de se demander si on prend un risque en mangeant un légume vert. Il n’est pas normal que la pluie devienne
soudain notre ennemie. M. Ferrier. Fukushima, récit d’un désastre. Gallimard.
225

Sato Y and Tagushi T, Philosophie pour sortir du nucléaire. Non traduit.

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stay in the contaminated territories by policymakers in Japan. Asanuma-Brice (2017)
denounces the process of normalization established by the Japanese government,
which redefines living with contamination as part of a “normal” life. A number of NPO
reports adapted the same line to describe the life proposed to returnees. For a numberof residents, living in the country side no longer has meaning, appeal or interest when“half-life” restrictions are imposed. Kazuhiro Yoshida, chairman of the town assemblyof Namie, said: “Country life is appealing because we can drink good water, and eat
wild foods from the mountains. If you place restrictions on that, you’re not living,
you’re surviving226”. This type of return – to a ‘limited’ way of life – leads to generalreflection, to ethical considerations of living conditions after an accident, of“normality”, and of how people can have very different evaluations of what they will
accept to lose in order to stay in or return to their homes.

5.3.5.4 Accounting for lives lived with contamination
In her analysis of post-accidental management policies, Topçu (2016) makes the pointthat people who stay but “doubt” are made invisible to outside world; her assertion
echoes the findings of the present study. More precisely, Topçu denounces the factthat “the focus made on evacuees’ trauma, with large budgets devoted to study thisphenomena since the 90’s, allows for deliberatively silencing the suffering of those, in
not less significant number, who did not or could not evacuate, and who arecondemned to live in a contaminated environment227”. This would appear to merit theattention of long-term studies, which could examine the situation of such ‘silenced’
inhabitants, for example through ethnographic field work. This point will be consideredagain in the conclusion to the present report (see Chapter 7).
5.3.6“FLEEING FROM” IONIZING RADIATION

5.3.6.1 The unbearable weight of “suspended time”
During interview, one father in the Watari district of Fukushima city talked of how hehesitated to evacuate the Watari district, an area where measurements showed hot
spots but which was not officially evacuated by the authorities. Some parents left andbecame “self-evacuees”. He did not, and confessed soberly: “the difficult thing is that
we have to wait for years to know whether we made the right decision for ourchildren6”. His words echoe those of Mrs. Yi, “emblematic case” who “did not knoweven now whether she made the right decision” (Chapter 4.4).
Time will indeed be one of the judges for such decisions because most health effects,
and principally cancers228, develop decades after radiation exposure. New demands for226

Van der putte, J., Shaun, B. & Ulrich, K. (2014). The IAEA Fukushima Daiichi Accident Summary Report: A preliminary
analysis.
227« La seule focalisation sur le traumatisme des évacués, moyennant de très gros budgets consacrés à l’étude duphénomène depuis les années 1990, sert quant à elle à rendre inaudible, et de manière délibérée, la souffrance non
moins significative de ceux qui ne sont pas, ou n’ont pas pu, être évacués, et qui restent ainsi condamnés à vivre dans
un monde contaminé ». S. Topcu. Catastrophes nucléaires et « normalisation » des zones contaminées. Enjeux
politiques, économiques, sanitaires, démocratiques et éthiques. Fondation de l’Ecologie Politique. 2016.
228

Except for thyroid cancers which may develop in the years following exposition to ionizing radiations.

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recognition of the health effects from the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still
being made, by people in their 80s now declaring they have cancer (Sato K. , 2018)229.
Parents, and specially mothers, had to make decisions on whether to stay, to leave, toreturn - or not. One of the most poignant dimensions to their decisions lies in the“suspended time230”, to use Henri Couchot’s expression, that stretches between thedecision itself and the eventual onset of negative consequences for health. In many life
circumstances, a person can know quickly whether or not they have made the “right”
decisions; because of the slow onset of illnesses due to ionizing radiation, that answer
is postponed for years, whereby “suspended” even for decades.
In her 2014 research on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, Kuchinskaya(Kuchinskaya, 2014) describes what she terms “the politics of invisibility”, i.e., the way
governmental and international infrastructures established after the Chernobyl
accident have effectively made most health effects “invisible”. For Kuchinskaya, oneof the key aspects of this process of “invisibilisation” is the focus on a certain type ofstandardized data on health and the “exclusion of more local, situated, intimately
involved perspectives 231 ”. Basically, she says, the data and knowledge produced by
local medical doctors were frequently disregarded. In her field work, Kuchinskayainterviews one of these local doctors, Dr. Belookaia, who regrets that her own data andappraisal of the health effects on children were not taken seriously, but concludes:“Time will show everything and teach everybody232”.
However, some parents could not bear the idea of waiting in order to know whether
their decision was right and chose to “flee” ionizing radiations. In the emblematic caseof Mrs. Su (Chapter 4) it is evident that she considered the idea of waiting intolerable:“Of course, we will not die immediately from the Fukushima nuclear accident, butmany mothers are worrying and thinking about their children’s future”.

5.3.6.2 (Un)acceptable risk
Another characteristic of parents - especially mothers - who chose to leave, is thatthey refused to balance, or to commensurate the pro and cons of staying or leaving.
Once they equated staying in/returning to a contaminated area with increasing the riskof their children developing cancer, they refused to run that risk. Leaving was cast as
the only solution by which to protect their children. Moreover, radiation damage washere framed more as a danger (not calculable, not comparable), than as a risk
(calculable and comparable). Any quantified approach utilized to foster the idea thatsuch a risk might be acceptable was dismissed. One mother said in interview:

229

Sato, K. (2018). Surviving the bomb: diverging visions and Japan nuclear's governance. Paper presented at the
Revisiting the nuclear order Conf., Paris.
230

Couchot, H. (2016). Penser le temps avec Fukushima : chronique du temps suspendu Penser avec Fukushima:
C. Doumet et M. Ferrier.
231

Kuchinskaya, O. (2014). The politics of invisibility. Public knowledge about radiation health effects after Chernobyl:
PIT Press.
232

Ibid.

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107/165“An expert told us that the risk was very, very low … something like 1% … so, anegligible risk to run … I answered, well if I had a gun with 100 holes and one bullet, I
would not give it to my kid”.
This example epitomizes the gap between the discourses of “rationality” and“commensurability” adopted by the Japanese authorities, and this kind of radical
ethical stance adopted by these inhabitants, these mothers. This tension - between, on
one side, modalities of post-accidental management which foster “rational”
approaches and, on the other, this radical ethical stance – cast a shadow over theeffectiveness or relevance of the comparative risk analysis approach undertaken by theauthorities which promotes the idea that “non-radiological” risks are commensurablewith radiological risks to health. This point will be discussed again in the conclusion tothis report (see Chapter 7).

5.3.6.3 Choosing to stay or to leave?
Lastly, the nuclear accident also revealed social divisions between those who could
afford to leave for a “safer” place, at least for some time, and those who could not.
This could trigger jealousy in the community. When interviewed, Mrs. KT233 explainedthat she temporarily evacuated her daughters in June 2011. When they came back to
Iwaki in April 2012, their teacher scolded them at school by saying, “there were people
who wanted to evacuate but they couldn’t. So don’t tell anything about your fun timein Akita to your friends” as if they did something wrong. Mrs. KT regretted
immediately to make them come back to Iwaki and started to plan for evacuation again
for a longer period.
The 3/11 accident also revealed what was referred to in a Greenpeace report 234 as“unequal impact” on people who were not equal in financial and family situations andthus in the capacity and means to choose evacuation if they wished to do so. Notably,
women were and have been particularly affected by the consequences of the
Fukushima nuclear accident in a traditional family setting where household income ismainly earned by their husbands; indeed, Kimura (2016) calls for an explicitly genderedapproach to analyze the impact of this type of accident.
K. Kawasaki, K. Fukuda and K. Suganami, the founders of Save Fukushima Children
Lawyers’ Network (SAFLAN), which supports and defends “voluntary” evacuees who
fled from the area which was not included in the officially designated evacuation zones,
proposed a new concept ‘the right to evacuation’ in the context of nuclear disasters(Kawasaki et al. 2012). According to the authors, the right to evacuation is not simply
the right to freedom of movement or choice of movement, but to receiving assistancenecessary to realize that choice under the threat to life or health. As for the legal basis,
they referred specifically to the concept of precautionary principles in environmental
law, Article 13 & 25 of the Japanese Constitution, the Convention on the Rights of theChild, and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in human rights law. The concept of
the right to evacuation finds an echo in the debate around ‘trapped’ populations in the233

Mrs KT, Evacuee from Iwaki city, living in Kyoto, Volunteer, Kyoto Citizens’ Radioactivity Measuring Station at
Tanbabashi, Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert. 25th May 2016.
234“Unequal impact”. Kendra Ulrich, Greenpeace Japan. Edited by Ai Kashiwagi and Kazue Suzuki, Greenpeace Japan.
March 2017.

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context of environmental migration (Foresight 2011). It indeed proposes a paradigm
shift in the existing normative frameworks on displacement which has traditionallycentred around the right not to be arbitrarily displaced, and calls for an adjustment toaddress these new concerns.

5.4 COMPENSATION: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITSThe complexity of compensation payments, and the amount of money delivered for
different cases were detailed in Chapter 2 of this report; Chapter 6 will examine
critically the overarching consequences of compensation. This section focuses on thesocial divides brought about by the compensation scheme, as expressed by inhabitants
themselves.
One of the forms of social division that was articulated lies in jealousy, on the part ofsome residents, towards the evacuees in their town. The typical case is Iwaki citywhich is situated 10 km south from the official evacuation zone. Most evacuees from
Naraha went to Iwaki, where they are accommodated in temporary shelters. One
resident explained:235 “Iwaki residents think that the evacuees from Naraha live a rich,pleasant life. At the supermarket, Iwaki inhabitants can distinguish between residentsof Iwaki and evacuees from Naraha, just by looking in their trolleys. The evacuees
choose expensive types of food. Although there are a few Iwaki residents who say a
few kind words to the evacuees, I prefer to go shopping during the evening, when
there are less people”.
Evacuee status and the associated compensation payments could, in some cases, also
be a burden; it could give rise to a manner of assigned identity not easily assumed bysome inhabitants, like Ms. A: “I don’t want to be an “evacuee” in my heart although
the fact that I receive compensation makes me one236”. Also, the very notion of being“compensated” was called into question by evacuees. Ms. A. insisted on this point:“I had to abandon the fields and the graves of my ancestors. The compensation
payments cannot compensate this loss.”
Finally, among the feelings unique to the situation after the nuclear accident, there
was a particular type of relationship and of feelings that developed between TEPCO
employees and residents who received compensation payments. The notion of“forgiveness” (tsugunai) came up several times in interviews. Some inhabitants insistedon the fact that the people in charge at TEPCO did not ask for forgiveness from thevictims of the accident. One of the interviewees, Ms. TK237, explained: “They did not
ask the inhabitants of Naraha for forgiveness, though they did so in other towns”. He
added: “before speaking about compensation, it is important that they ask forforgiveness”. Another interviewee, Ms. YH, explained her feelings238: “when I go to theadministrative office at TEPCO, they give me information, with great kindness. Before,
they just explained to me how to fill in the papers, but now they help me to fill them235

Ms YY, 25 March 2015, interviewer: Rina Kojima.

236

Ms CA, 25 March 2015, interviewer: Rina Kojima

237

th

M. TK, 24 March 2015, interviewer: Rina Kojima.

238

th

Ms YY, 25 March 2015, interviewer: Rina Kojima.

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in, we do it together. … I feel some pity towards the young employees when they ask
sincerely for forgiveness”.
Such issues, concerning the symbolic aspects of compensation, will be discussed indetail in the conclusion to this report (see Chapter 7).

5.5 THREE YEARS AFTER: THE PUSH FOR RECONSTRUCTION
After a period of shock and disorder, from summer 2011, the notion of reconstruction
and the idea that it was time to “turn the page” became apparent in Fukushima, underthe banner of Ganbaru Nippon (“Let’s go Japan”) (Slater & Haruka, 2014). Ganbaru
Nippon and Fukko (recovery, restoration, or revival) became buzz words. For mostpeople, this official discourse was closely linked to the government’s determination toprepare the next step: the lifting of Evacuation Orders, and the “reconquest” of thecontaminated territories. Jacques Repussard, the General Director of the IRSN, made asomewhat blunt remark in 2012: “A nuclear accident is like a war, you may lose someterritories239”. For the Japanese government, it was of utmost importance to prove that(most) territories were not “lost” and could indeed be “reconquered”. Notably, the mostcontaminated area immediately around the crippled nuclear reactors was named the“difficult-to-return zone” - difficult (but not impossible) -, which was considered by anumber of Japanese citizens to be a hypocritical stance. Kojima (2016) investigated thenotion of reconstruction specifically from the point of view of inhabitants -not from thepoint of view of the authorities. She noticed that understanding of the term“reconstruction” varied according to residents’ situations, and that for some“reconstruction” encompassed certain conditions that were, at that time, far from being
attained - for one elderly woman, for example, “reconstruction is when families withkids have returned.240”.
The determined discourse of the government, however, may not be in line with thefeelings, judgements, and desires of the whole population, in the different places
concerned. “Reconstruction” and “turning the page” were certainly motivations for
those willing and eager to return to their original villages; but they were not for those
who were still worried, or who simply had doubts about the health consequences of theradiological situation. Nor were they motivations for those who considered that life in
the evacuated villages had become difficult, due to lack of infrastructures or because
the wider territory around had changed (i.e., in some cases, the area surrounding theirformer home was now a “difficult-to-return zone”).
The following section will explore different cases where “reconstruction push” echoed –or not – the desires and feelings of the people concerned.
Reconstruction is linked to measures following the end of disaster phase. A nuclear
accident raises much the same questions as any “disaster” or “crisis situation”, but withgreater acuity. The question here is: Who decides that the situation is “over”, or “backto normal”? A number of issues seem to have stemmed from the divergence between
what government and local authorities considered to be “normal”, and what inhabitantsconsidered as such. In this vein, ACRO, a French NPO that strives to provide accessible

239

Journal interne IRSN.

240

Ibid.

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information in this field, gave an apropos title to their 2015 report (Boilley, 2014):“Fukushima, Retour à l’anormal (“Fukushima: Back to an (Ab)normal Situation”)241”.
As such, a nuclear accident may uncover previously implicit positions on what a “normal”
acceptable life is, and, to what should be taken into account: it defines to a certain
extent what is a “good life”, but it is also linked to a life style that people used to havein such rural areas. One elderly woman explained: “The compensation payments will be
stopped after the Lift of Evacuation Order. There are inhabitants who will havedifficulty living with only a retirement pension if they can’t grow their own vegetables
because of the ionizing radiation in the fields. If you can’t have a self-sufficient life,
returning to Naraha may be difficult242”.
This is especially true for the most vulnerable people, who may rely on some sort of selfsufficiency to survive. Another woman, in her 80s, explained: “I lived through a difficult
period during the Second World War. But at the end of the war, I could live a selfsufficient type of life in Naraha. Even if I didn’t have any money, I could live by growing
rice and vegetables, and getting sensai in the forest. But after a nuclear accident, I
can’t do that anymore. I’m worried about what to do after I go back to Naraha243”.

5.6 TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
5.6.1

INTRODUCTION

This section provides the conclusion to one of the main theoretical angles of theShinrai project: the issue of trust. In such exceptional contexts, where residents must
make life-changing decisions, it appears that trust may play an important role, because
the context is far from being “fully known and transparent” (see Simmel’s definition oftrust below). Indeed, in the aftermath of a nuclear accident, a veritable mass ofcommunication on the situations and the risks came from government, from local
authorities, from expertise systems and appointed experts, and scientists at national
and international levels, while alternative views and advice were also provided by NPOs,
scientists, etc.
5.6.2 THEORETICAL ELEMENTS
The Shinrai project Task One Report244 provided a detailed account (in French) of theliterature review on the concept of trust. Those elements will be summarized here;
this does not constitute a detailed account of the literature review, but aims at better
understanding the analysis provided through the prism of trust.

241« Retour à l’anormal ». David Boilley. The plays on words in the title and means: “Back to an (ab)normal situation”,
although in French it reads phonetically: “Back to a normal situation”).
242

Ms AO, ibid.

243

Ms CA, 80 years, 15 March 2015 interviewer: Rina Kojima.

th

244

Shinrai Rapport 1, revue bibliographique sur les concepts de confiance et d’expertise. En ligne. www.Irsn.fr . (In
French).

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5.6.2.1 Trust: a multi-faceted notion
Trust is a multi-faceted notion, used in everyday language, and also a subject of
research theorized in Economics, in Sociology, and in the Political sciences. The
German sociologist Georg Simmel developed an extended reflection on trust - its rolein society, its links with belief and faith. He defended his view that trust has a linkwith knowledge, without restricting it to a cognitive issue: “Trust is an intermediarystate between knowing and not knowing. He who knows nothing cannot reasonably
trust, he who knows everything does not need to trust”.
Most reflections on trust begin with its fundamental and extended character: “in many
situations, man has the choice to trust or not, but without a basic trust he could noteven leave his bed in the morning245” said Luhman. (Luhman, 2006). He was the first to
bring together trust and risk. He made a now classical distinction between two notions:trust and confidence. This distinction does not exist in every language; French, forexample, has only one word: confiance. Confidence refers to the general expectations
that we have towards our general world and environment. We all have general
expectations that we can take into account - or not. But in this case, we are not in a
logic of alternatives or of choosing: “The alternative would be a state of permanent
uncertainty, and to renounce your expectations without having anything to put intheir place246”.
Trust is quite different: one “decides” whether to trust or not; trust is linked to somekind of risk-taking (in a very general sense of the word ‘risk’). One can of course refuse
to take a risk, but that entails relinquishing the potential advantages. When we candecide, or choose one situation over another, it is a matter of trust.

5.6.2.2 Trust in Modernity: specificities
The role of “active trust” (and not only of confidence) is more and more important in
our modern society, according to sociologist Anthony Giddens:“We have no choice but to make choices.”; “This society, nevertheless, is not only a“risk society”. It is one where mechanisms of trust shift - in interesting and importantways. What can be called active trust becomes increasingly significant to the degree towhich post-traditional social relations emerge247.”
In our modern lives, the role of trust may be broader, but also more “abstract” than in
traditional lives. Giddens says:“Trust in a multiplicity of abstract systems is a necessary part of everyday life today,
whether or not this is consciously acknowledged by the individuals concerned.
Traditional systems of trust were nearly always based on Facework; because of having
special access to the esoteric qualities of tradition, the guardian was tradition madeflesh. The disembodied characteristics of abstract systems mean constant interaction

245

Luhmann, N. (2006). La confiance, un mécanisme de réduction de la complexité sociale: Economica.

246

Ibid. (p.13)

247

Anthony Giddens, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, Living in a post traditional society. Reflexive
modernization, Polity Press, 1994. (p.89)

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with “absent others” – people one never sees or meets but whose actions directly
affect features of one’s own life.248”
In radiological risks, expertise systems set up before and after the accident, atinternational level (such as the ICRP), or at national level (such as the National
Institute of Radiological Science NIRS, or the Working Group on Radiation Risks249 inJapan), epitomize the “abstract systems” mentioned by Giddens. However, in theaftermath of the accident, experts found themselves in direct contact with the public;
the relationship between experts and public became a “face-to-face relation”:
expertise made flesh.

5.6.2.3 Trust and Reliability
Reliance is common to all the variations of trust: I can rely on a person as I can rely on
a machine. But where reliance can be applied both to tools and to humans, trust can
only apply to humans. This is developed by sociologist Louis Quéré (Quéré, 2006) withthe following example: reliance with regard to a tool means that if I use it, with acertain set of expectations, those expectations remain tacit, and I do not focus onthem while I use that tool. This is the case when I use a computer as a routine; I feel akind of “quiet assurance” (assurance tranquille) which allows me to focus on the
finality of the use, not on the functioning250. This operates the same way for a person:s/he executes his/her tasks, holds his/her engagements, etc. …
British philosopher Katherine Hawley (Hawley, 2013) formulates a supplementary
nuance: the difference between trusting someone, and just mechanically relying uponthem, depends on one’s heightened expectations in the process of trusting, and one’s
reaction if the trustee disappoints you. You cannot “trust” a chair not to break when
you sit on it, and the chair does not “commit” itself not to break. In the spirit ofHawley’s argument, only people may demonstrate “commitment251”.
Trust involves expectations about skill, and expectations about intentions to help;
turning this around, trustworthiness requires both having skill and having goodintentions. Trust is a form of abandon: “(it) demands something else, which is linked tothe absence of doubt in the loyalty of the other towards you, in a situation where you
abandon the care of something to the other, which you consider to be of greatvalue."252 And trust is a commitment: when we trust someone, we rely upon them tomeet their commitments. Reliance can be disappointed; trust can be betrayed.

248

Ibid.

249

The expertise systems and their role will be detailed in a future Shinrai report.

250

Quéré, L. (2006). La confiance. Confiance et engagement. In Quéré, L. et Ogien, O. (Ed.), Les moments de laconfiance. Connaissance, affects, et engagements. Economica.
251

Hawley, C. (2013). Trust: A Very Short Introduction: Oxford University Press.

252« (elle) exige quelque chose d’autre, qui est de l’ordre de l’absence de doute sur la loyauté de l’autre vis-à-vis de soi,dans une situation où l’on s’en remet à lui du soin de quelque chose à quoi on attache une plus ou moins grande
valeur ». Quéré, L. ibid.
252

Cf Report 1 Shinrai on the notion of expertise.

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5.6.2.4 Trustworthiness
The notion of trust, as the absence of any doubt in the loyalty of the trustee, paves theway to the notion of trustworthiness. For certain scholars, issues linked to trust can bereformulated in questions about trustworthiness: if the trustee is intrinsically worthyof trust, trust is appropriate. By contrast, if trust is requested, solicited, it could bewith bad intentions. Many of us remember the “Trust In Me” of the Python, Kaa to his
young ‘prey’ Mowgli in The Jungle Book (the snake is not trustworthy at all… ). So therationale for trusting someone – whether trust is “rightly placed” or not - is closely
linked to characteristics and intentions of the trustee. To the questions: who merits
trust? Which institution deserves to be trusted? Perhaps the answer must be that it
depends on how trustworthy is the trustee.
Luhmann (Luhman, 2006) discusses a number of generic criteria for trustworthiness: tobe trustworthy, an institution must be competent, and must take into account theinterests and, more demandingly, the vulnerability of the truster. Hawley makes a very
similar definition: “a mix of skills and good intentions 253 ”. Giddens (Giddens, 1994)
comments that: “Trust is equipped with the integrity of others254”. This leads to anunderstanding of trust as a dynamic that engages the trustee, which is “engaged”
because of the trust placed in it or in him/her. Trust and being trusted is a moral
sentiment that can be neither demanded nor manipulated (Quéré, 2006).

5.6.2.4.1 Trustworthiness in the aftermath of Fukushima
In terms of this theoretical framework, considering the trustworthiness of institutions
in charge of managing the post accidental situation in Fukushima would mean taking into account (1) their competency and (2) their consideration of the interests andspecific vulnerability of the populations. After the accident, people lost trust notbecause they thought that the experts and authorities were not competent, but rather
because they thought that the experts and authorities did not take into account theirinterests and vulnerability. When, in its communication campaign, the government
adopted the slogan “almost no risks below 100 mSv” (Cabinet Secretariat 2011), they
did not appear to be incompetent, but rather did not consider what population reallyneeded or wanted to know.
Shinrai Report 1, on the subject of expertise in radioprotection, discusses thepersistence of a divide between, on the one hand, nuclear institutions, which more orless affirm the harmlessness of low doses, and on the other hand, “alternative
scientists” who declare their danger 255 . Historical analysis in this domain is highly
developed; to quote a few prominent researchers256: (Thebaud Mony, 2014), (Brown,2017), (Shrader-Frechette & Persson, 2002), (Sato Y., 2018), (Takahashi, 2018).

253

Hawley, op. cit.

254

Giddens, op.cit.

255This s is a bit caricatural, and does not account for forms of dissidence within the nuclearist institutions, or subtile
recent evolutions. But our interviews show that this divide makes sense as a main framework, for both “sides”.
256

Thebaud Mony, A. (2014). La science asservie: La Découverte. Brown, K. (2017). Chernobyl's hidden legacy. Physics
world. (April). Shrader-Frechette, K., & Persson, L. . (2002). Ethical, logical and scientific problems with the new ICRP
proposals. Journal of radiological protection, 22. Sato, Y. (2016). Les faibles doses d’irradiation et le pouvoir desécurité : du point de vue foucaldien sur le « pouvoir-savoir » In C. Doumet & M. Ferrier (Eds.), Penser avec Fukushima:

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In spite of recurring uncertainties and controversies, the discourse held by theJapanese government in the aftermath of Fukushima was an unequivocal one: nomention of uncertainties, no mention of controversies, and one principal maxim –“almost no risks below 100 mSv/y”. It turned out that loss of citizens’ trust in theJapanese authorities was very much linked to the government’s initial discourse ofreassurance with regard to radiological risks. Subsequent discourses (See Slater
hereafter), still cohabitating with the first, could be more complex and more cautious,
but were not easier for inhabitants; the gist of government communication to thepeople was that risk implies an assessment of how much radiation represents a danger,
and they had to decide for themselves how much they accept.
The main critiques were aimed at the choice of threshold (20 mSv) by which todesignate the zones. As discussed above, this threshold was considered inappropriate
by a number of scientists, international organizations (for example, the UN/the Anand
Grover Report), and NPOs257. It was not considered precautionary enough, especially inview of the sensitivity of children to ionizing radiation.
Trustworthiness, in this case, is linked also, beyond precautionary attitudes, toproposing residents a plurality of choices considering various situations of the affected
population, in addition to the choice of decontamination and return. Inhabitants had
felt “pressure to return” and a lack of democratic involvement in the decisions forlifting of the evacuation orders. They felt that the government wanted, through thispressure, to show that the accident was over, and the affected territories were back to“normal”; their feeling was (and still is) much to the contrary.
In this context, emerging counter experts with a divergent, more cautious view, wereconsidered by many to be more trustworthy, because they were taking more evidently
into account the “vulnerabilities” of the population. Trustworthiness is linked to“vulnerability”: when science is controversial, people who feel vulnerable can consider
trustworthy the most precautionary attitude with regards to risks. It is interesting tonote, for example, that in the 2017 IRSN Barometer - a yearly survey designed tounderstand how the French population perceives risk - 80 % of French citizens thinkthat when dealing with risks, it is normal to take every possible precaution, even whenexpert scientists have only expressed doubts258.

5.6.2.4.2 Who trusts whom?
Who do you trust? The question was sometimes answered spontaneously byinterviewees, with regard to principle information source on the dangers of ionizing
radiation. It was interesting to observe spontaneous expressions of distrust. Moreover,the question of whom to trust, in some cases, proved irrelevant, when evaluation of
the risks was no longer a central issue for the persons.

Cecile Defaut ed. Takahashi, H. (2018). Continuing nuclear tests and ending tuna inspections: politics, Science, and the
lucky dragon accident in 1954. Revisiting nuclear orders. Paper presented at the Paris Stanford project.
257

Grover, A. (2013). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health, Mission to Japan (15-16 November 2012),. (A/HRC/23/41/Add.3).
United Nations.
258

80% des français approuvent la proposition : « en matière de risques, il est normal de prendre toutes lesprécautions, même lorsque les experts scientifiques n’ont que des doutes ». Baromètre IRSN 2017.
www.baromètreIrsn.fr

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This section will address the question of which people, which institutions were to betrusted by which type of inhabitant – bearing in mind the categories discussed in
Chapter 4 above. Who trusts whom?
First, the issue of whom to trust was not particularly relevant for our first category ofpeople, who decided to return and “forget about” ionizing radiation and - to a certain
extent - to “resist” a practical radioprotection culture. After having checked
contamination levels with local counsellors, and as long as gardening was possible, they
did not actively continue to collect or consult information on ionizing radiation. They
wanted to live “normally”, and discussing the dangers of ionizing radiation in one’s
environment (and who to trust on that matter, or not) was, for them, definitely notpart of a normal life.
For the second category, those who “come back and control contamination”, the issue
was more variable. Ms. SA (emblematic case, see Chapter 4) trusted the local
counsellor and the team from Nagasaki University, and did not seek any alternative
information; she was enthusiastic about the effects of measurements and found a formof comfort in her measurement and control activities. In other cases, however, Mr. MU
accorded trust only after seeking different sources of information concerning the use of
nuclear energy and on the dangers of radiation. Mr. MU went to the symposiums
organized by experts from Nagasaki University. He sought out information on the 1 mSv
dose limit, and consulted the blog of Genyû Sôkyû- which states that this limit isinacceptable because it encourages people to evacuate to places that might be not lesscontaminated (see Chapter 7). Mr. MU agreed it was normal to worry about 20mSv/year
threshold for kids, but he also said that he considered the point of view of Prof.
Koide259 “too radical”. By consulting several sources of information, he felt that he had
established his own threshold, which allowed him to decide for himself that he could
return to Naraha. In this case, trust in an expert (or a set of experts) was attributed
after careful consideration of different views, and analysis at a “meta” level, linked tothe position of the expert: Prof. Koide was dismissed because of his radical antinuclear stance, but positions of government representatives (who may have vested
interests) were not blindly adopted either, and Mr. MU trusted in his own, informed
opinion: “20 mSv is too high for kids”.
The question of who is to be trusted in relation to the third category of inhabitant “returning and worry” (emblematic case: Ms. YI; see Ch.4.4) is more difficult to grasp.
Ms. YI did not talk about the issue of information and being informed. Her testimony
focused on the fact that she felt pushed to return after the LEO despite her worry overradiological risk. So the issue of radiological risks is her primal concern but she did not
develop much on how she came to form her assessment of the risk. Interestingly, Ms. YI
appeared not to be interested in listening to (trusting) Mrs. O., the local authority
Radioprotection Counsellor, but nor did she mention trusting or not any prominent
figure of the “prudent position”, mainly held by alternative scientists or anti-nuclear
movements.
Lastly, our last category of inhabitants (“not returning, ever”) also presented a trust
which is “one-sided”. Mrs. KT, our “emblematic case” easily listed the people shetrusted: Dr Sakiyama (Takagi School), Professor Yamauchi (Kobe University), Ms.
259259Pr Koide is one of the prominent scientists who criticizes the governmental policy after the accident.

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Mitsuta (Friends of Earth) and Mr. Sakaue (Save Children from Radiation). Like Mr. MU(returning to Naraha), Ms. KT demonstrated a “meta” level of analysis, of the link
between radiological risk assessment and political position (pro/anti-governmental vs
pro/anti-nuclear). Dr Sakiyama is a prominent researcher on radiological risks, wholaunched her career at the National Institute of Radiological Science (NIRS), and so on
the “side” of institutional expertise. But she later joined the Takagi School, a majoranti-nuclear organisation; she was also part of the NAIIC parliamentary committee. Prof.
Yamauchi is a professor in radiation physics, known for having conducted “alternative”
measurements in Watari. Friends of the Earth and Save Children from Radiation areamong numerous NPOs that protested against the 20 mSv threshold. Clearly, Ms. KT
related the people she trusted and the decision she made: “I trust them probably
because I wanted to evacuate my children”. She also firmly calls for pluralism of
positions for trust and for evacuation, which she linked to freedom of thought:“Those who wish to stay are trusting other experts. Human being trust whoever theywant to trust”.
As said above, trust is a form of engagement, linked to adherence to values and ideas,
and cannot be demanded (Quéré, 2006).
5.6.3

RISKS COMMUNICATION AND ITS LOCAL EFFECTS

5.6.3.1 A general assessment
Critical assessments of Japanese post-accidental policy - whether institutional, NGO, or
academic - have evoked citizens’ loss of trust in the authorities and expert bodies, forexample, in the NAIIC report260 (2012) and the report made by the French NPO ACRO261(2012), as well as GREENPEACE 262 and IPPNW reports 263 (2013). Governmental
shortcomings and public loss of trust were also widely commented in the academic
field – see for example Jobin (2012) and Samuel 264(Samuel, 2013) to quote just a few.
This loss of trust in the government was staged as a consequence of a number of limits
and errors in their activities, including positions taken on radiological risks.
This criticism has been valuable; one academic article produced within the scope of
the Shinrai project examines contestation of the 20 mSv threshold for evacuation andexplains why and how this value was condemned on an ethical level. This opened theway to a more fundamental criticism of the principles of radioprotection.
This section will focus on another prism: the assessment, several years later, by theexperts themselves or by their peers, of the communication they led at the time of theaccident, and their own judgement of what happened at that time.
Very shortly after the accident, the report of the NAIIC (Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission) (2012) gave a detailed critique of the Japanese authorities’
260

Op.cit.

261

Op.cit.

262

Ulrich Kendra. (2017). “Unequal impact”: Women’s & Children’s Human Rights Violations and the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Disaster. In A. Kashiwagi & Kazue Suzuki (Eds.). Japan: Greenpeace Japan.
263

Dr. Angelika Claußen, & Dr. Alex Rosen. (2016). Vivre 5 ans avec Fukushima: IPPNW.

264

Samuel, R. J. (2013). 3.11 Disaster and change after Fukushima: Cornell University Press.

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reactions when dealing with the consequences of the nuclear accident. One of the
major points of criticism was directed at the lack of information provided to the
population by the authorities, which developed into a lack of health protection.
“While exposure levels are set as a threshold against acute radiation disorder, there is
no widely accepted threshold for long-term radiation damage caused by low doses.
The international consensus, however, is that the risk does increase in proportion to
the dose. The impact of radiation on health may vary from one person to anotherdepending on age, sensitivity to radiation and other factors, some unknown. After theaccident, the government unilaterally announced a benchmark on dosage without
giving the specific information that residents needed, including answers to questions
like: What is a tolerable level of exposure in light of long-term health effects? How dohealth implications differ for individuals? How can people protect themselves fromradioactive substances? The government has not seriously undertaken programs to help
people understand the situation well enough to make their own behavioral judgments.
They failed to explain, for example, the risks of radiation exposure to different
segments of the population, such as infants and youths, expecting mothers, or people
particularly susceptible to the effects of radiation265”.
The lack of information, and systematically reassuring communication on radiation risks
from government experts, effectively underpinned the Japanese citizens’ loss of trust.
This was the main conclusion of the initial scoping field work for the Shinrai project.
Some of prominent examples of paucity of information are now part of collective
memory for inhabitants of Tohoku, such as the declaration of the government
spokesman at the time, Yukio Edano, who declared that radiation would not “cause any
immediate harm”, and the even more famous declaration of radiation risk managementadviser, appointed by the Fukushima prefecture, Shunichi Yamashita:“As long as you smile, radiation will not come to you. Radiation will come to people
who worry. This fact has been clearly proven by animal testing. People who drink
alcohol thus have less impact from radiation266”.
The same expert gave the advice not to distribute iodine pills, in order to avoid panicin the population (Hasegawa 2013).
As such, communication from the beginning adhered to a very “reassuring” pattern,precluding the expression of any uncertainty on the dangers of ionizing radiation, andmentioning a “threshold” of 100 mSv, below which there were no discernable effects(Cabinet Secretariat 2011).
Three years later, the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, attached to the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), admitted its shortcomings incommunication. In a memo entitled “For Regaining Trust on Nuclear Energy Policy”, itrecognized that: “The government and nuclear operators have always been asked
questions in a dichotomy between safe and unsafe, and we have always answered‘safe’. We should not repeat the mistake of continuing to say ‘safe’ for matters which265

NAIIC (2012). Report: The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. The National Diet ofJapan: http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/266

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g0i7BgwNtiQ

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have risks….. As long as trust in the government and nuclear operators is lost, the risk
analysis of experts would not be listened to by the population267”.
Mr. S. was in charge of government policy at the time of the accident. During theinterview268, he declared that risk communication at this time was a more global failureon the part of the State, and concluded that: “the errors we made in Fukushima weresimilar to the Minamata affair”. Minamata is the name for a health crisis in Japan in
the 1950s, where the Chisso firm had leaked mercury into sea waters, consequently
contaminating numerous inhabitants who were eating the local fish. The firm, and thenthe State, were late to recognize the problem and the victims, who - including heavily
handicapped or still-born babies - can be counted in their thousands269 (Jobin, 2004). It
was impressive to hear a comparison of Fukushima “errors” with this archetypicalenvironmental and health scandal, coming directly from the mouth of a person who
was in charge of the crisis and post-accident policies.

5.6.3.2 Communication and reassurance
The links between communication, trust, and reassurance merit further analysis.
During fieldwork, it appeared that “reassurance” constituted a large part of theJapanese government’s post-accident communication strategy. A number of ourinterviewees mentioned Edano’s declaration as a “trigger” for their distrust of theauthorities. The construction of the sentence is negative, if turned positively – such as,“radiation may cause slow onset health effects”, it would surely have been consideredmore sincere and straightforward.
Reassurance is not usually articulated in what a person say per se: it is often insinuatedand lies in the intentions of the communicator. These intentions and “insinuations” ofgovernmental communications have been detected by a number of scholars who
formulate this hypothesis with serious arguments, often analyzing it in a larger politicalcontext which aims at protecting nuclear industry interests and continuation (Ribault,(2012), Yuasa, (2013), Hirakawa (2013).
It is thus extremely interesting to hear from those experts who communicated onradiological risk at the time of the accident after several years. It is also enlightening
to analyze its purpose from the point of view of those who communicated at the time.
In an interview in October 2017, Mr. A., one of the prominent radioprotection experts
in charge of government communication after the accident, looked back on his actions
at the time of the accident:“Trust is an important aspect. I was in (…) at the time of the accident. I came back toTokyo with my family. Was it ok? Even for us experts, it was difficult, information was
limited. For lay-people, it was even more difficult.

267

METI’s presentation in November 2013 (p.4), found at (only in Japanese):

http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/011/pdf/011_003.pdf Translated by
Reiko Hasegawa.
268

Interview Mr S, in MEXT, Tokyo, on 15 September 2015. Reiko Hasegawa et Christine Fassert.

269

Jobin, P. (2006). Maladies industrielles et renouveau syndical au Japon Editions de l'Ecole des hautes études ensciences sociales.

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In September, I joined a committee on risk communication set up by the municipality.
It was the beginning of my involvement. […. I talked to (…) villagers. I went to the
ICRP Dialogues270, ten times.
I wrote answers posted on the website or on academic societies. People could write
questions on this website, and we wrote answers. We had 1800 questions in 2 years, I
was the chair of the steering committee during those years. In 2013, the site closed.
…. I learned a lot of things, and I realized we were not trusted. Sometimes we hadarrogant and aggressive questions, such as: Do you get money from TEPCO?
Government institutes were not considered reliable. Later on, when I looked at theanswers, I realized I found them unsatisfactory. Most of them were immature or
misleading. The experts used to say: it is ok. It is natural for experts to calm people
down; as a general rule, people do not appreciate radiation. Experts, on their side,
always say: “no problem”; it is ingrained in their minds271”.
Coming back to one of the main points in the government communication of the time,
he admitted: “Many experts said: there are no effects below 100 mSv. It was
misleading”.
In Mr. A’s testimony, it is interesting to what extent the “reassuring” facet to expert
communication was considered to be “natural”, and to constitute an appropriate
response to the - equally “natural” - concerns of lay-people. Mr. A understood to alarge extent the loss of trust on the part of citizens, although he was often shocked bysome attacks he received at this time (such as the accusation of being paid by TEPCO
to calm residents’ anxiety). He was surely considered a goyo gakusha, a term coinedfor designating experts subservient to the government. However, years after he wasready to correct what he considered an error: “I wrote a book because I wanted tocorrect some of the answers I had given at the time”.
At the end of the interview, Mr. A insisted on moral aspects he had dismissed when he
was an expert in the aftermath of the accident, and concluded that: “we should haveshown more empathy.”

5.6.3.3 Reassurance: a domain of relevance?
Where Mr. B presented reassurance as having been inadequate in the context of hiswork, other discourses may find a “domain of relevance” for it. During interview,
Professor Tomonaga (Nagasaki University) came back to the question of official
communication in the immediate aftermath of Fukushima (“As long as you smile,radiation will not come to you. …” see Ch.5.6.3.1), and more precisely to his widely
denounced extremely reassuring” attitude272. Professor Tomonaga nuanced this view:“The government was very satisfied with Yamashita’s activities. It was very thankful
to him, because this communication scheme worked well. If 5 or 10 mSv/y had been

270

ICRP dialogues were jointly organised by AEN (OECD), ICRP and IRSN.

271

Mr B., 2 October 2017, Tokyo. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

272

Of course, Yamashita’s “smile” statement is more than merely “reassuring”: it is incongruous, to say the least.
However, the focus here is on Yamashita’s overall communication (style/strategy?), at this time.

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considered as dangerous, even Tokyo would have had to be evacuated. At this time,
the Cabinet office had to prepare, in secrecy, an evacuation plan for Tokyo. If I had
been in his position I would have said the same, such large-scale evacuation could havebeen even more dangerous. Yamashita intended to control the population, and thiswas compatible with government policy”.
Professor Tomonaga defended the reassuring nature of Yamashita’s attitude asapposite - not because it was intrinsically right, but because the communication of thisinformation could cause harm. In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, Andy
Stirling, a prominent SHS researcher, offered the same kind of nuanced analysis,
discussing the appropriateness of reassurance according to who aims at reassuring, andaccording to the intentions of it. On a blog-post, dated 16/03/2011273, he denounces “anarrative of reassurance” in the media about the still unfolding accident. He gives
some examples of the terms and expressions used at this time (for example: highly
radioactive plumes are qualified as only “potentially dangerous”). But he insists on apoint particularly interesting, by making the following nuance:“With a grim responsibility for preventing the consequences of panic in an alreadytraumatised population, it might at least be understood (if not condoned) that theJapanese Government be circumspect in its readiness to acknowledge the full gravityof the possibilities now faced. But there is no such excuse for media commentators onother continents, many of whom seem explicitly to see their principal responsibility tolie in ‘reassuring’ what is clearly feared to be an inconveniently-skeptical public”.
Stirling evokes the same type of arguments than Pr Tomonaga when nuancing theappropriateness of reassurance, although the general theme of his post is rather tocastigate the “biased and incomplete understatements of the severity of the present
situation and of future possibilities”, reassurance may be considered apposite only insome specific circumstances.
Besides, a number of nuances are to be brought here.

-

-

-

First, the very notion of panic is quite a controversial one. In a synthesis on thistheme, Lee Clarke and Caron Chess (Clarke & Chess, 2008) retain that panic is rare.
Though, disaster plans of policy makers and emergency management personnel
assume it is likely (Birkland 2006, quoted by Clarke and Chess). There are numberof pending complex questions on the definition itself of panic: notably, it implies anormative judgement on what is an appropriate reaction in case of a threat. The
authors insist mainly on the fact that panic can be also attributed to elite; theycoined the term “elite panic” in contradiction with a classical view which attributes
panic to public, but not to people in position of authority.
Second, reassurance schemes may be inappropriate, even in emergency situations.
Some evacuations (e.g. Iitate) showed that reassuring schemes led to situations
where people would be needlessly exposed to radiations.
Third, reassurance may be apposite in very specific circumstances very limited intime. The most interesting point in Professor Tomonaga’s comments is the link hemakes between the timing and context of the communication and the relevance of
the information provided:

273

Stirling, A. The crossing. Japan neglected nuclear lessons. https://stepscentre-thecrossing.blogspot.com. 16-th
March 2011.

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121/165“This type of communication worked well at the beginning, but at longer term,
controversy developed. Yamashita was in a difficult situation. They [the people incharge of communication on radiological risks] did not explain the LNT linear nothreshold model as a complement, which states that risk exists at low doses, even ifthat risk is very small. Yamashita and his colleagues repeated “daijobu” (it’s all right)
again and again. This was wrong.”
The switch from a crisis situation, where radiological risk is balanced against other risks,
to long-term communication is complex; as underlined by Pr Tomonaga, a reassuringcommunication scheme may lose its validity when the situation is no more an
emergency one. This reduces very much the appropriateness of reassurance.

5.6.3.4 The limits of expertise on radiation risks
In the last part of the interview, Mr. A expanded on his own conduct as an expert:“When you say something as an expert, you have to go beyond your expertise. The socalled radioprotection can speak about measurements, but not radiation risks: they
are not experts on radiation risks”.
Of note is that Mr. NB quotes, here, one of the now ‘classical’ thoughts on expertise,first proposed by Philippe Roqueplo274 in his seminal reflection on the subject, one of
the first attempts to show the limits of framing expertise in terms of “objectivity” and“neutrality”. Roqueplo said that the expert will always exceed the limits of his own
expertise (L’expert dépasse toujours les limites de son expertise275).
Also striking is Mr. A’s declaration that: “there are no experts on radiation risks”. Hedeveloped this assertion:“We must be aware of the situation of the person; each time it is a specific situation.
We need to explain what is known and what is not known. In the aftermath of theaccident we were not prepared for this situation, we lost people’s trust”.
The context is important:“Radiation exposure has to be seen in the context in which it occurs, the context inwhich people are exposed. One of the most difficult questions is with regard to CT
scans: when you’ve had several CT scans, the dose is not low. I receive 10 mSv/y in thecontext of a simple check-up276: is that okay? There’s no direct evidence; I can explain
the doses and the possible consequences and effects, but I cannot answer thatquestion: is it okay? because of uncertainties. My son had a number of CT scansbecause of convulsions277. These exams were necessary; if they hadn’t been done, I
may have had another regret. This part is not scientific but emotional. On thequestion of whether to return or not, there was no correct answer. If you’re upset
about radiation risks, then don’t go back. If you love your home, and you think it’s274

Cf deliverable 1 Shinrai on the notion of expertise.

275

Roqueplo, P. (1997.). Entre savoir et décision, l’expertise scientifique: INRA.

276

Note: CT scans for check -ups are current practice in Japan, unlike in France, where a CT scan is prescribed only incase of clinical signs.
277

At the time of the interviews, (2017) results were published of John Matthews’ research on the link between CT
scans received during childhood and cancer; for Matthews the correlation is clear.

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valuable to live there, then you should go back. The government wants to solve this asa general issue, not a particular one. At a municipal level however, it can be more‘customized’.”In this way, Mr. A formulates one of the central issues linked to radiologicalassessment: all forms of exposure are not “equal”; some forms may be perceived as
more “legitimate” than others, especially in the case of medical exposure. During an
ICRP working meeting, one ICRP expert explained:““For many inhabitants, it is not a matter of how important or not the supplementary
radioactivity is; they cannot consider additional dose on top of natural backgroundradiation as acceptable, however little this additional dose is278”.
As a consequence, for Mr. A, it appeared difficult - perhaps impossible - to give ageneral statement on just ‘how risky’ it is from a strictly “scientific” point of view.
In their discussion of the ‘micro-politics of radiation’, Slater et al279 (2014) provide astriking piece of field work where this issue is brought to the fore. The work is quoted
at length, providing the whole context in order to fully comprehend the point:
Each community, school, cooperative, virtually every group was organizing info
sessions and talk events, often with outside speakers, usually from the government orother groups outside of the community.
“Usually it was not clear who these people were — ‘someone from the government’
was often all we knew, so we did not know if they even understood radiation.”
When a real scientist came, the situation was often worse. The scientists would comewith data that they were unable to explain or that was often unanalyzed and informats that local residents could not understand.
“Of course, we could not understand it all” and “our question was always this same,at every meeting: is it safe?”
At a meeting David Slater attended, one scientist explained, “Well, that is hard to say.
What exactly is safe? I think that maybe each of us has our own understanding of safe,
and I do not want to force my ideas on you”
Amidst the furrowed brows and pained expressions of confused and disappointed
mothers, one “noisy” (urusai) activist mother shot up from the audience to say, “We
have no idea if it is safe—that is why we are here. You are the scientist. You have totell us.” An old woman nearby sighed and said to her friend, “Let’s go home. This is
another ‘scientist beholden to the government’ (goyogakusha).” When asked how she
could tell, she replied: “What sort of scientist has ever said he does ‘not know whatsafe means’? He is too stupid to help us or is really probably lying.”280
Slater also analyses how this type of answer had a negative impact on trust:“We are sure that the refusal of some scientists to make pronouncements based on
incomplete data with little historical precedent to guide them was understood by them

278

Working Group ICRP, May 2018. JF Lecomte (IRSN and ICRP expert).

279

David H. Slater, Rika Morioka & Haruka Danzuka (2014) MICRO-POLITICS OF RADIATION, Critical Asian Studies, 46:3,
485-508, DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2014.935138
280

Slater, Morioka, Danzuka, op.cit. See Yamaguchi 2013 for the ways in which “safety” is discussed, in this case,relative to food policy.

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as the only responsible option. But whatever the motive, often the information that wasprovided was so unintelligible as to be useless, or worse, confusing and misleading. Somelocal residents accepted this as a function of their own lack of understanding, but after
two or three of these meetings, more saw this as incompetence or neglect on the part ofthe scientists. In either case, it continued to break down the faith locals had in the expert
advice on offer”281.

5.6.3.5 From Reassurance to “Reassurism”
5.6.3.5.1 Reassurance as an objective: ethical limits
An expert at the IRSN health-related crisis unit set up after the Fukushima accident,
who had to answer phone calls from worried people, made the following comments:“I must say … when you can say something reassuring … it’s so gratifying! Like a doctor
who can give medical results saying: “nothing serious”! … People are relieved. (…)
However, it’s important not to reassure when it is not appropriate. Myself, I would
hate to be falsely reassured. So, as experts, we must be aware of that. Our job is not
to reassure, it’s to say what we know, and if it is reassuring, that’s good”.
In her account, this expert conveys an ethical position, sensing that reassurance might,
in other cases, be an objective in itself, and that in this case – when there is nocertainty associated with the purpose of worry - it could be a dishonest, unacceptable
attitude.
However, reassurance was integral to official discourses and writings after the accident.
The term can be found for example in an IRSN report on decontamination 282 , aconference led by the IAEA on communication. Reassuring people about the dangers ofionizing radiation seems to have been one of the objectives of communication policy
after the nuclear accident. This has precedence, with the communication held inFrance after the Chernobyl accident. (Kalmbach, 2014).
Lastly, and perhaps more perniciously, reassurance communication was not limited to
discourse. Head of Reconstruction Division at Kawauchi Village Office suggested during
the interview 283 : ‘by the fact that a young woman in her twenties such as O. wasposted (as a radiation risk councillor from the University of Nagasaki) and live in thevillage, her existence itself becomes the risk communication, providing a sign that it issafe to live in Kawauchi’. Some inhabitants also mentioned during interview that they
believed that she stayed there only to reassure population.
Such “proof by presence” has a notable precedent, as illustrated by the case of Russian
radiobiologist Mikhail Balonov, after the Chernobyl disaster, in 1986: “to try toconvince the inhabitants living in the area, which had been exposed to radiation fromthe nuclear power-plant explosion, that the situation was not hopeless, his strategy
was to present the crowd with a government scientist, who, along with his pregnant
wife, would be living and working in the contaminated area”284.
281

P 12, op.cit.

282

Statégie de décontamination et de gestion des déchets. Rapport IRSN. RT/PRP-DGE/2015 00015.

283

Mr A., 20 October 2014, at Kawauchi Village Office. Interview led by R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

284

Samuel Loewenberg, ‘Mikhail Balonov: understanding the legacy of Chernobyl’ in The Lancet, Volume 367, Issue
9519, (April 2006) Quoted by: Yves Lenoir, Reporterre, 11 Mars 2017.

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5.6.3.5.2 The excess of reassurance: “Reassurism”
The above observations - on the ethics of reassuring, on communication for reassurance- invite conclusion on what could be considered as excesses of reassurance, a question
which appears to be raised in one form or another by experts themselves (see forexample the testimonies of Mr. B, here above), by inhabitants, and also by thegovernment itself in its admission of guilt. Are there “excesses” of reassurance? Whenis it unacceptable to reassure?
In legal proceedings after the earthquake of l’Aquila in 2009, which killed 300 people,
the experts who composed the Committee for Major Risks (CMR) were put on trial andcondemned for their “reassuring statement”, having insisted that there would not be
any serious earthquake285.
Their reassuring statement was in contradiction with the emic perspective of risk - risk
as perceived in a given culture. In the case of l’Aquila, most people were ready toevacuate, and felt they should, 286 but because the experts of the CMR were so
reassuring, inhabitants did not do so, and as a result some of them lost their lives.
In this context, anthropologist Antonello Ciccozzi (Ciccozzi, 2016), who was a technicaladviser in the l’Aquila legal proceedings, developed the central tenets of his notion of“reassurism”:“if “failure to warn” means “not predicting a disastrous event,” then “predicting thata disastrous event will not occur” means providing a reassurance that proves to bedisastrous when the event in question does actually occur. Since not providing
information is quite different from providing incorrect information, not predicting anearthquake (failure to warn) is quite different from predicting a non-earthquake(disastrous reassurance)”. The signifier “reassurism” might therefore be useful inunderstanding that, in L’Aquila, it was not simply that a lack of alarmism led to a
failure to warn but that, going so far as to engage in reassurance-ism, institutional
representatives produced a disastrous reassurance whose persuasiveness stemmed
from the manifest scientific authority of its source”287.
It is not the objective of this study to establish whether the elements of “reassurism”
in the discourses of authority will, in future decades, produce “disastrous
consequences” or not in Japan: on this issue, as with any other linked to radiologicalconsequences, the divide between institutional expertise and alternative/counter
expertise is wide, and will anticipate different situations 288 . Besides, unlike an
285

The case is complex and epitomizes a number of stringent issues on the responsibility of experts, legal responsibility,
limits of predictability, decision-making in uncertainty, and so forth. We focus here on the notion of reassurism, andpropose in conclusion to explore such issues further in a follow up to the Shinrai project. For detailed presentation of
the case of l’Aquila, see the articles by Antonello Ciccurro and Mara Benadusi. Parola di scienza - Il terremotodell’Aquila e la Commissione Grandi Rischi: un’analisi antropologica, DeriveApprodi, Roma, pp. 192. Maltese, G.,
Tecnoscienza - Italian Journal of Science & Technology Studies, vol 4 n°2 2013, Padova, Dipartimento FISPPA (Sectionof Sociology).
286“Forms of truth in the trial against the Commission for Major Risks- Anthropological notes”, in Archivio
Antropologico Mediterraneo online, a cura di, M. Benadusi e S. Revert, anno XIX, no. 18 (2), pp. 16.
287

Ibid.

288

Moreover, the assessment of what constitutes « disastrous consequences » is itself a moral judgment. (cf Kennedy
for the ban of nuclear tests). “The loss of even one human life, or the malformation of even one baby—who may beborn long after we are gone—should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics
toward which we can be indifferent.” John F. Kennedy, July 26th, 1963

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earthquake, which is a “visible” event with more straightforward, immediate dramaticconsequences, the identification of radiological consequences requires the existence of“infrastructures” (Kuchinskaya, 2014) that allow health-related after-effects to be
deciphered, where the link between death or sickness and its causes remains acomplex issue. This is evident, for example, in the many trials relating to therecognition of a “causal link” between exposition and sickness 289 (Barthe Y. , 2014).
And a number of scholars in environmental health have explored the “invisibility” ofsuch effects. (Frickel, 2007). (Kuchinskaya, 2014) speaks of “the politics of invisibility”
and (Dupuy, 2008) proposes an ethical reflection (l’invisibilité du Mal) on the deaths“not counted” by the institutions of the nuclear sphere. Despite differences between
Fukushima and l’Aquila, the notion of reassurism remains relevant, a notion whichshows the entanglement of the political and the emotional stakes inherent in experts’assessments of risks.
5.6.4

CONCLUSION

It can be said that there were undoubtedly intentions to reassure on the part ofexperts in post-accident Fukushima. In some cases, their reasons may be consideredmorally acceptable from the point of view of a colleague in the short term, but moredisputable in the longer term (testimony of Professor Tomonaga with reference toProfessor Yamashita). One expert in a counselling role may consider that “intentionalreassurance” is inappropriate, in an ethical reflection on her practice, and may frame
her job as “not a reassuring one”. By contrast, another expert in Japan recognized thatat the time he framed his job as “calming” people fears, but recognized later that itwas not an acceptable attitude, considering the uncertainty of the risks.
One can therefore conclude that there were different “regimes of prudence” on thepart of the experts, and that these regimes were evaluated by the citizens in an ethicalframe, in terms of the consequences they experienced or anticipated.
The example of l’Aquila and of its “reassurist” experts is a striking case, where mostinhabitants listened to experts – at great personal cost - because of the “persuasivenessthat stemmed from their scientific authority”290. The case was different in Fukushima,
where alternative experts/alternative science was sufficiently vocal to contradict
institutional expertise - not to mention the lack of agreement internally, among
institutional experts, which caused a stir in the public domain (notably, the resignationof Professor Toshiso Kosako).
This leads to various attitudes, where citizens present different forms of engagement
according to whom they decided to trust, or not. But trust also recast behaviours, interms of choice and of active engagement, and in Fukushima this was not central for
two types of inhabitants: firstly, the seniors who wanted to “forget” radiological risks
and enjoy their rural lives, dismissing the tenets of a “culture of radioprotection” aswell as the concerns of “alternative scientists”; and lastly, those who chose to, or had
289

For example, see Yannick Barthe for his research on the recognition of the consequences of nuclear tests in France.
Other research focused on recognition of link between irradiation and sickness (Barbier and Fassert, 2017). Barbier, L.,& Fassert, C. (2017). The Life Span Study and its criticisms, a socio-historical perspective. Paper presented at theMaking the world nuclear after Hiroshima. May 2017, Stanford University.
290

There has been also an alternative voice in the case of l’Aquila, but the CMR communication took a strong lead andsilenced it.

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to, “return and worry”, and whose testimonies attested to some kind of endless doubt.
We can make the hypothesis that, in this case, there is a tension between an implicit
trust given to the “cautious” side (which leads to the worries on the radiation risks)
which is in opposition with the return. In this case, the “push for return” is felt as
blockage to “trust who you want” (the words of our interviewee who chose to leave)
and act accordingly.

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6 SYNTHESIS: LIMITATIONS OF POST-ACCIDENTAL POLICY IN JAPAN6.1 INTRODUCTION
While Chapter 5 examined the social consequences for the inhabitants, Chapter 6
focuses more on the political issues linked to the nuclear accident management and its
consequences on residents in these territories. It also examines the legal and financial
aspects (compensation) of the consequences of the catastrophe. Lastly, it explores
alternative solutions (such as the concept of the “transitional town”) which have notbeen implemented by the Japanese government, although they could be considered as
relevant solutions.

6.2 FEW AND UNSUSTAINABLE RETURN AFTER A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
One major characteristic of the post-accidental situation lies in the relatively limited
number of inhabitants who returned to the evacuated territories after Evacuation
Orders were lifted. In March 2018, the average rate of return of residents to the former
Evacuation Zones (Green and Yellow zones) over nine towns stood at 15%291. Besides
the exceptional case of Tamura city, which recorded 80.1%, Kawauchi village’s return
rate was 28.5% and that of Naraha town as 31.8%. And in two towns, where EOs werepartially lifted in March 2017 (Tomioka, Namie), the ratio was as low as 4%, according
to the same survey.
The rate of return for children is even lower. Figures from the same time (March 2018)
show the average school enrolment rate in these nine municipalities representing only
8.6% of the total enrolment rate before the accident292. The Reconstruction Agency’s
opinion surveys of the affected residents clearly illustrate the trend: the younger the
person is, the less likely it is that he or she will return. This was also confirmed by fieldstudies for the present report. Many of those interviewed, including municipal officials,
talked of families with small children that would probably not be coming back.
The Shinrai field research suggests, as follows, a typical profile of returnees to theformer Evacuation Zones: a person over 50 or 60 years of age, 293 in good health,autonomous, mobile and thus able to stay in touch with the community, whose children
are already adult and live elsewhere. Yokemoto (2015), who conducted a field study in
Kawauchi, also described typical returnees as “those who are relatively older, have ajob or have already retired, without health problems, and able to drive a car294”. But
the same generation with health problems were more likely choose resettlement in acity, with their children, in order to have access to specialized medical treatment andhelp from their children.
291

Kahoku Shimpo (regional newspaper), genpatsujiko kyuhinanshijikuikikikanritsu 15% Fukushima9shichoson,
zenikikaijokara 1nen (The rate of return to former evacuation zones 15%, of nine municipalities, at one year fromlifting the EOs, on 4 March 2018.
292

Yomiuri Shimbun (English), Weak recovery of school enrollment in Fukushima Prefecture, on 1 March 2018

293

“Over 50” was suggested by the Mayor of Kawauchi village, while “over 60” was mentioned by many
evacuees/returnees interviewed both in Kawauchi and Naraha.
294

Yokemoto, M. (2015). What is imbalanced reconstruction? (In Japanese: Fukintou na fukko toha nanika). In: M.
Yokemoto and T. Watanabe, (Eds). Why does nuclear disaster induce imbalanced reconstruction? : Toward“Reconstruction of Human Life” and Community Revival from Fukushima Accident: Minerva Shobo. (p.14).

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In this context, one wonders what these towns will look like in 10 to 20 years. What
does a community look like when most residents are over 60, and there are very few
people of a working age, or children? How long does such a town survive? When these
returnees fall sick or need nursing at home, they will have to leave the town again in
search of suitable care because there will probably not be sufficient medical andnursing personnel in their town – doctors and nurses are typically of the generation thatchooses not to return. During the interviews, some municipality officials hinted at what
they considered to be the realistic prospect of return of residents: for example, aNaraha official suggested that 50% of former inhabitants would return and not more.
In 1991, sociologist Akira Ono famously coined the term marginal villages (genkai
shuraku in Japanese) to describe communities where more than half of the inhabitants
are over 65 years old and at risk of eventual “extinction” (Yamashita, 2017). Are theformer evacuation zones heading toward becoming marginal villages? How did thissituation come to be?
Professor Yusuke Yamashita of Tokyo Metropolitan University, interviewed in March
2017, suggested some answers to the above question295:“When EOs were lifted the local situation did not meet the conditions for return. As aprinciple, lifting the EO or not should be decided by the concerned municipality, who
knows the local situation best, not the State. … Most municipalities opposed thelifting of EOs but had no choice but to accept the government’s decision because themunicipal budget was totally dependent on State subsidies after the accident. …
These municipalities cannot simply survive without State subventions and therefore
have, in a sense, lost their autonomy as municipalities”.

6.3 ATTACHEMENT TO TERRITORIES?
With regard to the return of residents after a nuclear accident, the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) suggested in its Publication 111 (2009)that “worldwide experience following nuclear and non-nuclear accidents shows thatneither nations nor individuals are very willing to leave affected areas”, (p.26) andthat “most inhabitants generally prefer to stay in their homes rather than to be
relocated (voluntarily or not) to non-contaminated areas” (p.30). The case studies forthe present study in Kawauchi, Naraha and Watari district show the contrary. A
majority of evacuees hesitated and often chose not to return, despite considerable
effort and investment on the part of the State and local authorities. For example,
according data published by METI in December 2016, the government was expecting tospend 6 trillion yen (46 billion euros) for decontamination, even though the return rateof inhabitants remained at just 15% in the former Evacuation Zones296. Naraha town
mobilized tremendous technical resources to dissipate the fears of residents overdrinking water, but the return rate (or residing rate) remained at 31.8%, two and a halfyears after the lifting of EO. The case of Watari district showed that most residents
wished to evacuate even though no evacuation order or recommendation had been

295Interview conducted in his office at Tokyo Metropolitan University, in Tokyo, on 20 March 2017296

Source: The data published by METI on 9 December 2016(http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/kenkyukai/energy_environment/touden_1f/pdf/006_01_00.pdf); Kahoku Shimpo
on 4 March 2018, op. cit, p. 40.

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issued by the government. People left the city by their own means or adapted to a lifeof separate households in order at least to evacuate their children. Our field study thus
suggested a different picture from the one described by the above mentioned ICRP
Publication 111 concerning the mobility choice of affected inhabitants after nuclear
disaster.

6.4 REASONS FOR NON-RETURN
From official opinion surveys and Shinrai field research, the following main reasons forthe evacuees’ decision not to return home can be identified: risk from radiation
exposure (especially children), risk from the crippled F1NPP, lack of sufficient medical
facilities, lack of social and commercial infrastructure, lack of other infrastructure(road, transportation, communication, etc.), the presence of kariokiba, the presenceof cleanup/decontamination workers, non-return of friends and neighbors (former
communities no longer existed), lack of high schools, limited educational opportunities
for children.
In order to dispel the worries of residents over radiation risk, the local and central
authorities adapted a strategy of promoting risk communication by experts. They
created a number of expert committees, both at government and municipal levels, toadvise them on policies and reassure the population. However, Shinrai field research
revealed a number of limitations to that strategy, also partially confirmed by low
return rates of the population. As mentioned during interview by both the Mayor of
Kawauchi village and a Nagasaki University expert, residents did not change opinion,
despite risk communication put into effect by experts297. In the words of the Mayor of
Kawauchi:“Once the residents learn a wrong information, no matter how much risk
communication we do afterwards, that information is stuck in their minds and cannot
be changed298!”
Yamashita et al. (2016) and Yokemoto (2013) consider “loss of community299” to be an
important aspect behind the phenomenon of non-return. In rural communities such as
those affected by the nuclear accident, social relationships had long provided a safety
net of mutual support in difficult times. Without the existence of “community”,
therefore, it would be difficult for some evacuees to imagine returning. (cf. Chapter 4:
Return and Forget/resist).
“Nobody wants to return alone”. Naraha evacuees interviewed often mentioned thereturn of other neighbors and friends as an important condition for their return. Someevacuees literally called all their former neighbors and friends to ask them about theirdecisions before making their own.
Yamashita’s (2017) study also suggests another important aspect: the question ofautonomy. When the residents were not allowed to decide for themselves what was

297

Interview with Mr. Yuko Endo, the Mayor of Kawauchi, at Village Office in Kawauchi village on 11 October 2016 (Interviewer: R.
Hasegawa, C. Fassert and R. Kojima); Interview with Ms Orita, op.cit.
298Interview M. Endo, op.cit.

299

Yamashita, Y., Ichimura, T. and Sato, A. (2016). Reconstruction without Humans (Inhabitants): Nuclear Evacuation
and People’s “Lack of Understanding” (In Japanese: Ningen naki Fukko: Genpatsu hinan to kokumin no “furikai” womegutte), Chikuma Bunko.

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130/165“safe” for them, but were subjected to decisions made by the government, theyultimately lost the sense of control over their own lives300. As a result, many residents
opted not to return, in order to somehow keep a sense of autonomy, whilemunicipalities had no choice, but to return, and thus become completely dependent on
government decisions. As Langer’s study (1983) after Three Mile Island accident has
also shown the lack of perceived control over their lives significantly affects a
population’s mobility choice, as well as their level of trust toward experts after anuclear disaster.

6.5 IMPOSED DICHOTOMY BETWEEN RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
During the interviews, many evacuees expressed that they were not comfortable witheither of the choices proposed by the government, and that they often felt “forced” tomake decisions of which they were not completely convinced. Many said that thetiming for making such a decision was inadequate, and it was imposed too soon before they had sufficient elements with which to make a sound judgement, and feel
confident about restarting their life, back home or elsewhere.
The choice of return versus non-return also created tension and division within theevacuee community. Previously united, in the solidarity of being in the same plight,
evacuee communities began to split over the question of whether to return. Often
those reluctant to go back were stigmatized, since such a choice was perceived bysome as abandoning the community. After conducting several opinion surveys among
these communities, Fukushima University professor Akira Imai (2012) concluded that
forcing evacuees to choose between return and non-return should be avoided (as apolicy) because this transformed the status of ‘not being able to return’ into that of‘not wanting to return’, thus exposing those who opted for the latter to condemnationand judgement from the rest of the community.
But a simple dichotomy between return and resettlement cannot fully grasp orencompass the actual needs or desires of the evacuees, because the decision ‘not toreturn’ often coexisted with the wish to return home one day (Yokemoto, 2015; Shinrai
field interviews). During Shinrai field interviews, most evacuees who had made adecision not to return also said that they did not want to give up the idea of returning
one day. Evacuees in their thirties and forties, with children, said: “I don’t feel safe togo back now or during the next few years. But I want to go back when my children growup and leave our house.”; and: “we want to return at retirement age”; or: “we cannot
go back now, but I hope that our children or grandchildren will return”.

6.6 THE “THIRD OPTION” AND ALTERNATIVE CHOICES
6.6.1 INTRODUCTION
In Kawauchi, some residents adjusted to an alternative solution, in-between return andevacuation/resettlement. This alternative was half-return, or “dual residency”(Mosneaga, 2015), allowing families to keep their jobs in the village while avoiding therisk of radiation exposure for children, or providing necessary care for aging parents

300

Yamashita, Y. (2017). The Future of Communities Taken Away by the “Reconstruction”. (In Japanese: “Fukko” gaubau chiiki no mirai), Iwanami Shoten.

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elsewhere. In Watari, some people opted for a form of self-evacuation that created adual household, where typically a father would stay in Fukushima city to work and earn
an income, while a mother with children would evacuate and live elsewhere. But theseadaptive, ad hoc measures undertaken by many families were, at the time of interview,
under threat since temporary housing assistance and compensation were due toterminate in 2017-2018. These families interviewed all voiced fear of becoming defacto working poor, who would struggle to make ends meet every month in order tosupport the loads of maintaining two or more households.
The current post-accident policy is based on the residents’ choice to return, andsomewhat less on resettlement, largely ignoring alternative choices made by theaffected population, as seen above. Considering the low rate of returnees, it isreasonable to say that the policy is in need of readjustment, in order to enableevacuees to find workable solutions for rehabilitating their lives, offering options otherthan return and resettlement.
6.6.2 THE CONCEPT OF “TRANSITIONAL TOWN”
Some scholars promoted the concept of transitional town or virtual town as a third
option for evacuees, thereby creating an alternative solution to the dichotomy
between return and resettlement (Imai, 2014; Yokemoto, 2015; Yamashita, 2017). One
evacuee from Naraha (male in his 40s) said during interview 301: “If the government
evacuated a whole town due to a nuclear accident, it is its responsibility to resettle
the whole community in another place permanently, so that the community can stay
together rather than dividing the community by pushing people to return”.
During interviews, many evacuees in their 30s and 40s expressed a desire to returnhome in the future, once they genuinely feel safe to go back or when their children
grow up. This “long-term refuge” - rather than permanent resettlement - is consideredby many within a time span of 30 to 40 years (Yamashita et al., 2016); it is the timeframe that these evacuees consider necessary for a realistic return, taking into accountthe half-life of caesium137 (about 30 years) and the decommissioning of the F1NPP(40 years, according to government estimate). In order to make “long-term refuge” aviable option, Akira Imai, professor in governance studies at Fukushima University,
proposed the concept of transitional town or virtual town (also called, second town by
Yamashita and Kainuma, 2012). The idea is to create a sort of “enclave” within anothercity/town where an evacuee community can live together and receive the sanemunicipal services until they can finally go back. The Mayor of Iitate village, which was
included in Green, Yellow and Red Zones, had already suggested in 2011 the creationof a dual-residence registry for its residents. In Japan, you must declare and register inthe town where you live, otherwise you cannot benefit from any municipal services,
including school education for children. Therefore, the proposal of the Mayor of Iitate
was an important step towards materializing the concept of transitional town, whereby
residents could be registered in two municipalities, just like dual citizenship, both inthe original town and in the town of long-term refuge. In this way, residents who

301

Interview with M.S., a municipal social worker, conducted at his work place, Onahama-Aikojima temporary shelter
in Iwaki city on 30 September 2015 (Interviewer: R. Hasegawa).

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In addition to Iitate village, municipalities in Red Zones (Futaba, Ookuma, Namie andTomioka) also expressed interest in this concept, and the Reconstruction Agency evenstarted a consultation process between applicants and target host municipalities in
2012, under the name of “Out-of-Town Community” (Machida, 2015). But it faced
resistance from some target host cities, such as Iwaki city. Confronted with this
opposition, the concept did not materialize, but discussion continued on a case-by-casebasis, coordinated by the Reconstruction Agency302. Iitate village created a de facto
Iitate “bis” community within Fukushima city, though it has not been officiallyrecognized as such. For the academic year 2018-2019, 75 children, representing 14.1%of the students from before the accident, registered to attend the school in Iitate, with
90% of them commuting from other cities, notably from Fukushima city303.
6.6.3“STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT” AS A FORMALITY?

The case studies show that both government and municipal authorities have madeefforts, at varying degrees, to consult with residents on important issues which directly
concern their lives following the serious nuclear accident. Meanwhile, during interviews,
many residents expressed dissatisfaction and frustration toward these consultations,especially the ones organized by the government, and felt that their concerns andopinions were not taken into account in the post-accident policies. The governmentinhabitant direct consultations were often called “explanation meetings” by thegovernment, setsumei-kai in Japanese, which literally means “meetings to explain”.
Mosneaga (2015) called these meetings, “the decide–announce–defend model ofpolicymaking” where consultations appear to have been geared toward setting inmotion policies predetermined by the government rather than adjusting proposed
policies in line with the will of the evacuees. Moreover, the meetings are organizedbehind closed doors without any presence of media, NGOs, legal or independent
experts (Hasegawa, 2015). During the interview with the Nuclear Accident Affected
Residents Assistance Team, the governmental team which defines the policy of lifting
EOs, an officer seconded by METI affirmed that NGOs were not considered as
stakeholders and thus not included in these Explanation Meetings 304 . Without thepresence of third parties, the power balance tends to work in favour of policymakers
with financial means and executive capacities, leaving evacuees often with noalternatives, but to accept the decision imposed (Hasegawa, 2015). According to
Komendantova and Battagli (2016), such model of policymaking where solutions
developed by “educated experts”, project developers or government are simply
communicated to the public, is often destined to fail, leading to social conflicts, delays
and even cancellations of the original project. Mosneaga calls for a more inclusive
approach, moving away from “top-down policies that ignore local voices”, that
promotes true local ownership of recovery solutions.

302

Reconstruction Agency Website: http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat14/20131129194216.html
303

Yomiuri Shimbun on 1 March 2018, op. cit., p.39

304

Interview with N.A., a counsellor, Nuclear Disaster Victim Assistance Team, Cabinet Office, on 15 October 2014.

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6.6.4 THE “PUSH” FOR RECONSTRUCTION BUT FOR WHOM?
When asked in interview what the word “reconstruction” meant for them, mostevacuees answered either that it would mean retrieving their former/“normal” life, orthat it meant all children and young people being able to return home. But when asked
the same question, representatives of the municipality answered slightly differently.
The most frequent responses included that “reconstruction” meant decontaminating
the town and then making it attractive, by bringing in new industry and job
opportunities. Yusuke Yamashita, one of the authors of Reconstruction Without
Inhabitants (2016), argues that there is an enormous gap between the actual
reconstruction policy and the real needs of the affected population, which results indamaging the prospect of genuine recovery of people’s lives. According to him,evacuees are in need of policies addressing their health concerns, helping them rebuild
their lives in their original place or elsewhere, and guaranteeing the continued
existence of their municipalities. But government policy consists of decontamination inorder to promote return, compensation payments to help evacuees rebuild their lives,
attracting new industry to create jobs, and a campaign of risk communication to dispel
radiation fears.
Another problem of the current reconstruction policy is that, because it was designed
for returning residents, those who do not return cannot benefit from the scheme.
Under the current policy, evacuees are supposed to rebuild their lives withcompensation paid by TEPCO. Since such payment ended in March 2018, evacuees areleft alone to rebuild their lives elsewhere. By the same token, anybody who comes tosettle even if not originally from the town would benefit from the reconstruction
scheme in the same way as returnees. The author of Reconstruction without
Inhabitants then asks a question: So whom is the reconstruction really for?
Despite the observably timid return of evacuees, large-scale infrastructurereconstruction projects are in full bloom in the empty former EZs; reconstruction isseeming going ahead regardless of the choice of (former) inhabitants. One evacuee
from Naraha town (female in her 40s) murmured during interview305:
I don’t understand the concept of reconstruction in a town where more clean-up
workers are living than actual residents.
In other interviews, municipal officers from both Naraha and Kawauchi hinted at what
they consider a realistic outlook regarding the return of residents and the future of
their towns: basically, after a certain point, no more residents will come back. But
inviting new business investment and installation by means of reconstruction subsidies
will create new job opportunities and attract new people to settle in the town.
Professor Yusuke Yamashita, however, argued that this strategy, though it appears
pragmatic, would end up making these towns even more fragile and dependent on theState in the near future. For Yamashita, the profile of someone prepared to settle in atown, solely attracted by job opportunities and despite risks, is typically a person who
is already socially and financially vulnerable, who will need some kind of assistance inthe long run. If the municipality ends up populated by such newcomers, he warns, itwill become even more dependent on State subsidies and may one day become a
305

Interview with Y.Y., a municipal social worker, conducted at her work place, a temporary shelter in Iwaki city on 24
March 2015 (Interviewer: R. Kojima).

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marginal municipality, threatened with extinction, compelled to accept morepotentially hazardous and pollutant industrial facilities (e.g. nuclear waste
management).
Reconstruction is also dividing affected communities between those who benefit –namely, the stayers and returnees- and the others who don’t – the evacuees and those
who have resettled elsewhere. Like the compensation scheme which categorizes anddivides the affected communities according to different evacuation zones, the current
reconstruction policy result in including some and excluding others according toindividual mobility choices.

6.7 THE RISE OF GROUP LAWSUITS AS A CONTESTATION
Shinrai field research found that Fukushima post-accidental policies often resulted individing families, friends and communities along various lines, including different
perceptions of radiological risk, migratory choices and, most of all, compensation
payments of which the amount would differ significantly from one zone to another.
Feelings of injustice smolder among communities - within, in-between, and outside
different zones. During interview, many expressed feelings of abandonment andinjustice, indignation, and mistrust toward the government and its post-accident
policies.
These indignation and feelings of injustice among affected population led to numerous
legal actions. By March 2016, five years after the accident, a total of 31 group lawsuits
involving 12,000 plaintiffs from evacuees and affected residents had been filed against
TEPCO and the government all over Japan, demanding a total amount of 1 billion USD
as compensation for various forms of damage 306 . In addition to these civil suits, acriminal action procedure against TEPCO former executives (the ex-CEO and twoformer vice-presidents) was filed by 14,000 plaintiffs in July 2015. The first hearing of
the trial took place at Tokyo district court in June 2017 where the accused pleaded not
guilty of charges307. The protest of affected populations against the reference dose of
20 mSv/year has also taken the form of a lawsuit. A total of 534 residents in
Minamisoma city filed a complaint in April 2015 against the governmental decision to
revoke the designation of Hotspots, using the 20 mSv/year criteria 308 . The groupdemands the withdrawal of this decision, contesting the validity of this reference dose.
This is the first court case specifically brought against the reference dose of
20 mSv/year set by the government as part of Fukushima post-accident policy. The
court proceeding began at Tokyo district court in September 2015 and is still ongoing.
Another proceeding related to the reference dose is a lawsuit against radiation
exposure of children, filed by 201 parents in Fukushima city in June 2015, questioning
the legality of applying the reference dose of 20 mSv/year to children, in view ofJapanese legislation related to public exposure dose limit of only 1 mSv/year, and the306

Mainichi Shimbun (2016), Daishinsai 5nen: genpatsujikogenkoku 12,539, soshou zenkoku 31ken (Five year fromGreat Disaster: 12,539 nuclear accident plaintiffs and 31 Group Actions all over the country) on 06 March 2016
307

The Guardian (2017), Fukushima nuclear disaster: former TEPCO executives go on trial, on 30 June 2017308

20 mSv/year Group Action website: http://minamisouma.blogspot.fr/

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designation of what is known as Radiation Controlled Area at the dose of
5.2 mSv/year309. The court hearings are still ongoing at Fukushima district court.
25% of plaintiffs of all group lawsuits are evacuees from various Evacuation Zones,
while the remaining 75% are self-evacuees from outside official EZs310.
Among 31 group lawsuits, rulings were given on seven by the respective courts in March2018. For the first, a group lawsuit filed at Maebashi district court by 137 Fukushima
evacuees living in Gunma prefecture, the court recognized the responsibility of both
the government and TEPCO, stating that ‘the accident could have been avoided since
TEPCO had already predicted the risk of exceptional tsunami’ 311. The court ordered
TEPCO to pay a total of 350,000 USD to 62 plaintiffs in March 2017. The second rulingwas given at Chiba district court for the group action brought by 45 evacuees from
Fukushima living in Chiba prefecture. The court recognized, for the first time,
psychological damage due to “loss of hometown” and ordered TEPCO to pay a total of
3 million USD in September 2017312. Unlike the Maebashi ruling, however, the Chiba
court recognized only the responsibility of TEPCO and not that of the government. The
third ruling was at Fukushima district court, for the largest group lawsuit, filed byabout 3,800 Fukushima residents who did not or could not evacuate. The court
concluded that both the government and TEPCO were to blame for failing to prepare
for the tsunami risk, which they could predict from the 2002 risk assessment. TEPCO
was ordered to pay a total of 4.4 million USD to about 2,900 plaintiffs313. In February
2018, the fourth ruling, at Tokyo district court, ordered TEPCO to pay the largest
amount so far: 10 million USD, to 321 former residents of Minamisoma city for
psychological damage due to loss of hometown. In the following month, Kyoto district,
Tokyo district and Iwaki district courts gave rulings which ordered TEPCO to pay a totalof 7.5 million USD to 365 plaintiffs. The ruling for the other group actions and at courtsof appeal is due to follow during the next several years.
Behind these numerous group actions, we can identify three key elements ofgovernment’s post-accident policy which may have been the cause for much of theagitation and controversy (Yamamoto et al., 2015; Hasegawa et al., 2017; Fassert,
2017):
1) The reference dose of 20 mSv/year;2) The emphasis on return over resettlement for the evacuees from official EZs, andthereby on staying over evacuation for the residents outside of EZs (e.g. the case of
Watari);3) The differences in financial compensation awarded according to different EZs.

309

Group Action Against Radiation Exposure of Children website: http://fukusima-sokaisaiban.blogspot.fr/

310

Mainichi Shimbun 06/03/2016, op.cit., p.47

311

Mainichi Shimbun (2017). Nuclear Accident: Responsibility for the State and TEPCO, Maebashi district court ordered
to pay compensation for evacuees (Original title: Genpatsujiko, kuni toden ni kashitsu, Maebashichisai hinansha henobaishomeirei) on 18 March 2017
312

Mainichi Shimbun (English version) (2017). Chiba court recognizes nuke disaster evacuees’ ‘loss of hometown’ forfirst time on 23 September 2017.
313

The Japan Times (2017). Government, Tepco ordered to pay 500 million yen in damages for Fukushima disaster, on
10 October 2017

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On the issue of the 20 mSv/year criteria, despite a vigorous risk communication
campaign carried out by the authorities, many remain skeptical as to the validity ofsuch a reference dose, as seen above in the group action of the Minamisoma residents.
The dose was initially contested by a then governmental advisor, Tokyo University
professor Toshiso Kosako, who resigned from his post in April 2011 in protest against
the governmental decision to apply 20 mSv/year reference level for children in
Fukushima, declaring that ‘I cannot possibly accept such a level to be applied to babies,
infants and primary school students, not only from my scholarly viewpoint but also
from my humanistic beliefs’. 314 This resignation remained in the minds of many
evacuees.
The second cause of division can be found in the current reconstruction policy. As
explained in the previous section above, it offers various assistance and opportunities
for those who return but largely ignores others, who resettle elsewhere. An evacuee
who chooses to resettle can receive compensation for house construction in his/herplace of choice, but otherwise very little aid is available.
Thirdly, the current compensation scheme, which adheres to boundaries of EZs, ends
up categorizing residents and treating them unequally since the EZs do not necessarily
correspond with the actual level of contamination on the ground, as shown in the caseof Watari (Fassert, 2017; Hasegawa et al., 2017). As a result, some residents are facing
similar radiological situations, but receiving very different levels of financial
compensation. For example, a family of four from the Green Zone receive a total of
approximately 160,000 euros in psychological damage compensation, while anotherfamily from the 20-30km radius Zone receives only 60,000 euros (the case of Kawauchi).
Similarly, a family from a non-evacuation zone such as Watari is paid only 14,000 euros,
while the family from the designated Hotspot receives 60,000 euros in compensation(see the Chapter 1.3: Compensation). This considerable gap in compensation payment,
which is in reality the financial assistance for evacuation, has triggered jealousy,
tension and division among the affected residents, leaving profound scars in thecommunities.

6.8 THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Japanese government has insisted, on a number of occasions, that its post-accident
policies were formed based on the international guidance and recommendations
established by international nuclear related organizations such as IAEA, UNSCEAR and
ICRP315. However, among international norms, there is another set of international legal
framework related to the protection of displaced persons in disasters, which is based onhuman rights principles. A nuclear accident evokes a “conflict of legitimacies” between
international institutions linked to the nuclear sphere and human-rights/humanitarian
field (Fassert, 2015).
In November 2012, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Health visited Fukushima.
The report of his mission specifically recommended that evacuees should “return only
when the radiation dose has been reduced as far as possible and to levels below
314

Translated from Japanese by Tanaka Izumi (http://japanfocus.org/events/view/83)

315

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation(UNSCEAR), International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)

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1 mSv/year … as the possibility of adverse health effects exists in low-dose radiation”(UN, 2013: p.17). In its Working Group document for the Universal Periodic Review, theUnited Nations Human Rights Council also raised concerns about the Japanese
government’s handling of the post-accident situation in Fukushima, referring
specifically to their criteria for lifting EOs, stating that “the plans to lift thedesignation of contaminated areas with radiation exposure levels under 20 milliSieverts
per year as evacuation zones threatened the health of women and girls”, and urging
the government to adopt a “human rights-based approach” in its disaster responses (UN,2017).
Furthermore, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN, 1998) advocate theprotection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These Guiding Principles are the mostwell-known and respected international set of guidelines related to the protection of
IDPs within the international community; nuclear evacuees, whether they were underevacuation orders or not, plainly fit the definition of IDP as set out therein and shallthus be protected under that framework (Hasegawa, 2015) 316 . Also of note are thecomplementary guidelines, the Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, which specify
that all policies and decisions related to IDPs ought to be made based on their rights,
needs and legitimate interests and “under no circumstances should IDPs be encouraged
or compelled to return or relocate to areas where their life, safety, liberty or healthwould be at risk.” (UN, 2009: p.3). Shimizu (2015) uses the framework of “humansecurity”, protection-based principle initially proposed by UNDP in 1990s, to analyze
post-Fukushima society and suggests that:“Human insecurity was caused by the dysfunction of the State after the nuclear
accident, and the rights of nuclear victims were compromised by controversial andinsufficient post-accident measures as well as sacrificed for the interest of the‘majority’. She bases her argument on the work of a renowned philosophy professor at
University of Tokyo, Tetsuya Takahashi, who famously described nuclear energy as‘sacrificial system’ where “the benefit of some is produced and maintained at theexpense of others’ lives, health, properties, dignities, hopes and so on”, and thesesacrifices are “often either made invisible or praised as “noble sacrifice” for the sakeof common interests such as that of the State, the population, the society or the
economy” (Takahashi 2012: 42).
Despite these calls, Fukushima post-accident management related to the protection ofaffected population was largely treated as part of nuclear matters which would needhighly expertise-intensive response and specific knowledge. As a result, the issue has
been handled exclusively by nuclear regulatory institutions and radiation experts
without referring to the other relevant international regime: the human rights-based
framework to protect those affected by disasters. Consequently, certain post-accident
measures established on the basis of recommendations made by nuclear
regulatory/radiological protection institutions came in conflict with protection
principles of the other international regime. For example, UN Special Rapporteur on
the Rights to Health, Anand Grover, specifically mentions in his report that radiological
316“Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitualresidence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationallyrecognized State border.” (UN, 1998: Introduction)

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protection principles such as “do no harm” or a risk-benefit analysis are “not in
consonance with the right to health framework, as it gives precedence to collective
interests over individual rights” and recommends the Japanese government toformulate policies “based on human rights rather than on a risk-benefit analysis”(United Nations 2013: 16, 23). As Chapter 4 showed, we identified at least six
categories of choices on the question of return, largely dependent on individual
situations related to family compositions, age of children, health status of elderly,
feeling of attachment, work and financial situations, notion of values, disagreement
within a family…etc. Fukushima post-accident “collective” measures indeed resulted inin dividing families and communities as they catered only to those who chose the “right”
decision (i.e. people of the category 2: “return and control”), leaving behind others
who did not or could not accept that solution.

6.9 CONCLUSION
This section proposed to address the consequences of the accident of Fukushima, on
the basis of a number of critiques addressed from the fields of political science andinternational law. It shows that a post-accident management has certain gaps with theinternational norms related to the protection of disaster victims. The disaster is alsoquite particular in a sense that all post-disaster issues are handled exclusively by theauthorities on the basis of radiological protection experts and nuclear-related
institutions advice, and not by the agencies which regularly manage disasters and assist
victims. The event of a nuclear accident evokes a conflict of legitimacies in bothnational and international institutions, and international regimes. A nuclear accident,
once it occurs, triggers immeasurable human and environmental consequences, often
across borders, for decades and over generations due to radiological contamination. If
we focus our attention specifically on the protection and assistance of affected
population, the regime based on human rights and humanitarian principles should beapplied in addition to specific radiological protection measures as the disasterconsequence touches on all aspects of our lives.

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7 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
7.1 MAIN POINTS OF THIS REPORTThe objective of this conclusion is to present the main results of the Shinrai projectwith regards to the case studies analysed throughout an extensive period of fieldwork,
carried out during eight missions to Japan, comprising around 120 interviews withdifferent actors. The present synthesis of principal results from this field work gives
the reader prompt and direct access to details from throughout the report.
After a comprehensive overview of the post-accidental policy, the fieldwork led in
Kawauchi, Naraha, and Watari allowed six categories of inhabitants to be identified inrelation to their decision to return - or not - to their home village after the Lift of
Evacuation Orders, namely: 1. “Return and resist to CRP”; 2. “Return andcontrol/comply”; 3. “Return and doubt”; 4. “Between return and resettlement”; 5.
“Not returning now”; 6. “Not returning ever”. Without ignoring the disputable,potentially reductive nature of any form of categorisation, this classification provides abroad view of the choices, feelings and judgements underlying decisions in suchcircumstances. The issues raised by inhabitants were numerous and encompass theassessment of the dangers associated with ionizing radiation, the economical burdens
associated with evacuation of those who wish to do so, the consideration of what
constitutes “a good life”, the attachment to village community and territory, and so on.
In addition, the results show that “whether to return or not” was also a way of
responding to government pressures and incentives. To this extent, returning or not
can also be framed as a political stance on the part of the residents who mobilized
their broad assessment of the government’s post-accidental policy. (cf. 4.7.2).
A focus on the role and responsibility of the mayors in charge of implementing thepolicy defined by the government at their local level shows concretely what limited
margins for maneuver they had in organizing the Lifting of Evacuation Orders and thereturn of inhabitants. Of particular interest was the way the mayors accounted fortheir decisions. The overall context in which they had to conduct their role wasconstraining – as it could be interpreted as a general push for normalization andreconstruction promoted by a government eager to reconquest (lost) territories(Anasuma-Brice, 2016). The choice was made to take seriously the mayors’
justifications, when they spoke of facing the divergent individual interests of residentsof their districts. As long as particular groups of inhabitants (e.g.: seniors versus
families with young children) had specific and opposed interests, it became difficult to
act in the name of “general interest”. Each of the mayors justified his decisions byexpressing what he considered most important: the right to return to, and eventuallyto die in one’s own home, or the right to “buy time” and not to come back, for those
not satisfied with the life that coming back would offer.
Beyond the cases of Kawauchi and Naraha, such struggles epitomize the political andsocial questions of post-accidental situations. Notably, “Expert committees” were set
up by the mayors and framed by both of them as a means of delegating a number ofissues, including the decision as to whether the situation was radiologically acceptable
or not. Their different choices - “state” scientist versus “alternative” scientist constitute a compelling example of politics through expertise. (cf. 3.6).

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With regards to trust, examining the question of “who trusts whom?” not surprisingly
shows a deep divide between people who trust the “official/governmental” scientists
and experts, and those who trust scientists not linked to governmental or nuclear
institutions. The scientific divide is also a politicized one: an “optimistic” view of theeffects that ionizing radiation can have on health is linked to a pro-nuclear/progovernment position, while a more “pessimistic” view of radiation’s effects is
associated with anti-nuclear/anti-governmental views. Such a divide effectively
renders “taboo” the very question of ionizing radiations consequences on health,because of the potential divisive effects the question can have on communities. For
example, one Medical Doctor explained that many MDs actually avoided discussing such
topics with their patients (cf. 5.3.2).
Risk communication was considered by the authorities to be a solution, in thiscontext; however, the results of this study suggest that citizens also felt that
communication was as a strategy on the part of the authorities. A focus on thereflexivity of actors who were in charge of communication activities illustrates how theintention to “reassure” could be critically analyzed by citizens and by the experts
themselves, when they were offered the opportunity to look back on their actions at
the time of the accident. The notion of “reassurism317”, coined by Ciccozzi (Ciccozzi,2016) in the context of the catastrophe in l’Aquila in 2009, is a useful notion tointerpret the ethical issues underlying experts’ positions and responsibilities. (cf.
5.6.3.5).
When it comes to elaborating on the question of “living with” versus “fleeing from”
radioactive contamination, the SHS literature proved a rich resource, allowing deeper
consideration of the results of the Shinrai interviews. Aya Kimura (Kimura A. H., 2016)
explores the development of “Citizen Radiation Measurements Organisations” and the
involvement of women in food contamination measurement, in a context where a
progressively normative framework also came to dismiss attitudes deemed“exaggerated” as regarded fear for contamination. In her Foucaldian critique, Kimura
maintains that “Food policing involves the normalization of a certain level of risk withfood as inevitable, imposing a particular view on reality and a prescription for a rightkind of conduct 318 ”. For Kimura, in a context where government authorities werepushing for “reconstruction”, only “appropriate” fear was articulated, as were“appropriate attitudes”, and finally “appropriate emotions”, so that other reactions(fear, anger, …), were effectively dismissed in such situations. Slater (Slater, Morioka,
and Danzuka, 2014) shows the tension between “wife” and “mother” roles for women
who stayed in contaminated territories , as “good wives”, stoically stay with husbands
and parents who don’t wish to leave and support reconstruction efforts, yet worry
about the health effects for their children - concerns which may, again, be dismissedby the official discourse. Slater’s research results mirror those of fieldwork for thepresent report. (cf. 5.3.3.3)

317 “if “failure to warn” means “not predicting a disastrous event,” then “predicting that a disastrous event will notoccur” means providing a reassurance that proves to be disastrous when the event in question does actually occur.
Since not providing information is quite different from providing incorrect information, not predicting an earthquake(failure to warn) is quite different from predicting a non-earthquake (disastrous reassurance.)”.
318

P 10, op. cit.

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Political appraisal of the Japanese government actions offers accounts of therelatively low return rate and gives a number of reasons for this. It also explores“alternatives options” proposed by a number of scholars, but not implemented (Imai,
2014; Yokemoto, 2015; Yamashita, 2017). This opens the way for addressing the issue
of “reconstruction” and the question of “for whom” this reconstruction was promoted,
as exposed in “Reconstruction Without Inhabitants” by Yamashita et al. Last but notleast, the human rights framework, such as the concept of human dignity, for example,
also provides a critical perspective for examining the policies established postFukushima. (cf. 6.8).
Finally, number of frustrations and angers turned into legal proceedings led by anumber of citizens against the authorities: at the time of writing, 31 group lawsuits,
involving 12,000 plaintiffs from among evacuees and affected residents, have been
filed against TEPCO and the government all over Japan, demanding a total amount of
1 billion USD as compensation for various damages319. In addition to these civil suits,
criminal responsibility charges against TEPCO former executives (ex-CEO and twoformer vice-presidents) were also filed by 14,000 plaintiffs in July 2015. (cf. 6.7).

7.2 IMPLICIT NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE JAPANESE POLICYThis report – like many others, including studies and research done in Japanese –develops a critical perspective as regards Japan’s post-accidental policy. But it does
not aim to assert that any other country would have done better (if “better” were evento be defined). Some of the other studies focused on Japanese cultural specificities
which could have played a role in their disaster management; this is not theperspective adopted in this report. For this report, it was considered more fruitful totake up a global view and to examine what constituted the “implicit grounds” on which
Japanese post nuclear accident policy was established. By exploring these implicit
motives, it was possible to analyze the extent to which they are shared and recurrent
within a certain “epistemic community”; if this is the case, any other country would
make similar decisions in the face of a nuclear accident, which would then bechallenged again by citizens on a similar basis.
What is meant by “implicit grounds” is a set of common assumptions, elements notdiscussed or taken for granted, which were subsequently challenged by citizens and by
the affected population. It is also of some interest to examine what constitutes thecontour of this epistemic community, and the extent to which this epistemic
community is attached to an international institutional framework which defines norms
and values, leading to these “taken for granted” facts and norms. The different“implicit grounds” of Japanese policy will be examined and discussed below,
presenting how that policy was called into question by inhabitants’ positions, reactions
or judgements.

319

Mainichi Shimbun (2016), Daishinsai 5nen: genpatsujikogenkoku 12,539, soshou zenkoku 31ken (Five year fromGreat Disaster: 12,539 nuclear accident plaintiffs and 31 Group Actions all over the country) on 06 March 2016

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7.2.1

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ATTACHMENT TO TERRITORY (VS ATTACHMENT IS NOT ABSOLUTE RULE)

7.2.1.1 Attachment to territory is the (absolute) rule
The post-accident policy put in place by the Japanese government was largely based on
the idea that contaminated territories had to be “reconquered” through an intensive
decontamination program; they led an aggressive communication campaign on“reconstruction” (Kimura, 2016). A number of reports and institutional
recommendations that claimed to “learn from the Fukushima accident” insisted on therisks associated with evacuation - supposedly as great as “the dangers of contamination”- and on the need to foster “remediation strategies”, aimed at helping people torecover after the nuclear accident. The attachment of inhabitants to their hometown
was essentialized, almost to the point of becoming dogma. For example, Publication
111 of ICRP (2009) states: “Worldwide experience following nuclear and non-nuclear
accidents shows that neither nations nor individuals are very willing to leave affectedareas”, and “most inhabitants generally prefer to stay in their homes rather than tobe relocated (voluntarily or not) to non-contaminated areas320”
Linked to the notion of attachment, reference to resilience passed into the discourseof Fukushima’s post-accidental “management”. In this case, resilience was linked tothe idea that returning to the evacuated areas demonstrated the proper, loyal attitude.
Revet summarizes what is at stake in “resilience” discourses: “Living with danger –therisk of radioactive contamination- grounded on your own competence, without
expecting too much from public authorities nor looking for the causes andresponsibilities, would be at the heart of resilience, publicized in Japan after the
triple disaster both as a cultural characteristic and a national objective321”. In fact,
this “implicit ground” (people would accept to live in a territory not entirely
decontaminated, on the basis of a culture of Radioprotection) underlies the Japanesepolicy and its choice to foster public spending on decontamination activities by large
construction companies. For example, according to data published by METI in
December 2016, the government expected to spend 6 trillion yen (46 billion euros) for
decontamination, even though the return rate of inhabitants remained at 15% in theformer Evacuation Zones322.

7.2.1.2 Versus: attachment is one element
However, these discourses, formulated with a number of strong assumptions, must be
examined in the light of concrete situations in order to see a more complex reality than
this straightforward, unconditional “attachment” notion. First, the case of “selfevacuees” shows that attachment was far from unconditional. And even if it actuallyexisted, attachment came with mixed, contradictory feelings in these nuclear accident
victims: resentment against the nuclear operator, feelings of loss, anger, and fear for320(p.30). ICRP (2009), Publication 111: Application of the Commission’s Recommendations to the Protection of People
Living in Long-Term Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency, Volume 39, No.3.
321

P 198. Revet, S. (2018). Les coulisses du monde des catastrophes "naturelles". Le Bien commun.

322

Source: The data published by METI on 9 December 2016(http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/kenkyukai/energy_environment/touden_1f/pdf/006_01_00.pdf); Kahoku
Shimpo on 4 March 2018, op. cit, p.40.

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the future, and anxiety about health, claims for justice, a desire to “turn the page”,
and so forth. No large-scale inquiry has yet been conducted that would allow us tograsp the extent and the solidity of people’s “attachment” to their living area. Such an
inquiry would allow us to examine, for example, to what extent attachment to one’s
home town may, after a nuclear accident, resist negative effects, such as durable
radioactive pollution, the need to manage one’s own contamination levels through a
set of “appropriate behaviors”, the loss of services, or the loss of employment.
The question that Sezin Topcu (2016) raises bluntly merits careful examination:“Considering these stakes, would French people prefer, at any cost, to stay in theirhometown in case of a permanent radioactive contamination, in order to avoid thestress of displacement and/or in order to ensure that their property does not lose its
value, and this even if detrimental to their health? Nuclearist managers may pretendthat it’s the case, and official experts may have made of this a hypothesis, as implicit
as it is romantic (being removed from one’s roots would be the most unbearable thingthat could happen to someone), but no opinion poll organized by the decision-making
bodies, no panel of experts on social psychology, and no IRSN barometer public risk
perception survey have considered this question worthy of interest323”.
In fact, the field work carried out by Shinrai, as well as a quantity of research
examined in this report (Hasegawa, 2016), (Sugita & Augendre, 2012), and a number of
NPO reports, all show that a number of people would prefer to leave a contaminatedplace. And this is true even for what experts could consider “minor”, residual
contamination, after decontamination work or after the natural decrease ofradioactivity. It is also the case for places that experts would classify as “safe”: those
not under evacuation orders. The case of “self-evacuees” designates these very people,
examples of whom were met and interviewed during Shinrai fieldwork; the DILEMME
project is currently examining them more comprehensively324.
Attachment to the place where you live depends on multiple factors (such as age); it
can be challenged by other, stronger determinants - such as the urge to protect
children from a harmful environment, as discussed in Section 1 (Whether to return or
not).
7.2.2

COMMENSURABILITY OF RISKS (VS PARENTAL “ABSOLUTE” CARE)

7.2.2.1 Risks are commensurable
A second, underlying, normative idea entered the discourse of a number of institutions;
it concerns the idea that radiological risks can/should be compared to other risks inorder to make a “rational” decision, based on pros and cons. In various speeches andstatements by scientists and experts from the government, they insisted on this323

Op. cit. Elle s’interroge : « Au vu de ces enjeux, les Français préféreraient-ils vraiment, à tout prix, rester dans leurcommune/ville/village d’habitation en cas d’une contamination radioactive permanente, afin d’éviter le stress dudéplacement, et/ou assurer que leur propriété ne perde pas trop de valeur, et ce au détriment de leur santé ? Si les
responsables nucléaires ont beau affirmer que oui, et que les experts officiels en ont fait leur hypothèse tout aussi
implicite que romantique (le déracinement serait le plus insoutenable de tout ce qui peut arriver à un individu),
aucune enquête d’opinion commanditée par les instances décisionnelles, aucun groupe d’experts chargé de s’occuper
de la psychologie sociale, aucun baromètre IRSN, n’a jugé la question digne d’intérêt ».
324

DILEMME Project, led by M. Augendre and K. Sugita. University of Lyon 2.

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commensurability in their risk communication process. Commensurability was staged asa “rational” process for dealing with risks. Radiation risks were commonly presented as
one of the many risks you may run in the course of your life. “People must fear
radiation correctly” became one of the mottos of risk underlying this discourse.
Commensurability was sometimes addressed through quantified “risks assessments”,
which looked like absolute facts based on careful calculation. At one seminar in
Fukushima, the presenter concluded by saying that: “Living in a slightly contaminatedenvironment is no more dangerous than NOT eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables
a day325”.
In other cases, commensurability was more difficult to frame as a quantified process,as it related “risks” of different type, nature, and temporality. With regards to themothers who chose to evacuate with their kids, leaving the father behind in the
Fukushima Prefecture, a manager from the Reconstruction agency commented during
an interview: “Living without the father is more risky than living in a slightly
contaminated environment326”.
Commensurability of risks is one of the epistemic pillars which sustains the rationale ofcomparison. This rationale was linked to the idea that the radiological risks have to becompared/balanced with other risks, an idea which was recurrent in the discourses ofradiological protection. For example, our “emblematic case”, Mrs. KS (see Chapter 4.3),
explained how she was reassured by the statement of the local health counsellor, Mrs.
O., who compared radiological risks to alcohol and tobacco. In this case, radiologicalrisks were effectively tempered, by being situated at the level of familiar risks which
adults engage in, for pleasure and by choice.
Lastly, commensurability was also a way of staging radiological risk as now being one
among other specifically “Japanese” risks. In a striking example, one resident ofNaraha explained how he decided that he would return to his hometown: “Even if you
avoid one risk, you may fall on another one. If you leave Naraha for Okinawa
prefecture, you may have typhoons; if you leave for Gunma, there are volcanos. There
are risks everywhere in Japan, ionizing radiation is one of these risks327”.
In conclusion, commensurability of risks was both part of the communication scheme
proposed by experts after the accident, and a practice of making decisions, framed by
the inhabitants as choosing the “lesser of two evils”, or as a common-sense routine.
Commensurability of risks is also part of a wider framework which considers that risks
can be compared, balanced, and even monetarized in order to allow their comparison.

7.2.2.2 Versus: “Risks are not commensurable”
However, commensurability of risks could also be radically dismissed. A number ofparents, aware of the specific sensitivity of children to ionizing radiation, formulated
the problem along the lines: “I cannot put in balance the health of my children with“something else”, because the health of my children is not commensurable to anythingelse”. This comparison would be all the more unthinkable in that there would be
325

Conference of Fukushima mayors, Fukushima city, March 2015.

326

Interview with Mr D Reconstruction Agency. May 2015.

327

M.MU, township member of Naraha. 50-60, interview led by Rina Kojima, March 2015.

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145/165“suspended time” (before possible onset or development of cancer) during which theywould not know. A parent of two young children said in interview328 :“On radiation risk, I heard from a friend who had consulted a doctor in Iwaki city, thatthe effect from radiation exposure could appear 10 years or even 30 years after the
exposure. Therefore, even if there is no health problem today, it doesn’t mean that
there won’t be in the future. When I understood this, I decided not to return to
Naraha town. Because if one of my children gets sick in the future, I don’t want to be
in a situation where I wouldn’t be able to answer their question: Mum, why did you
choose to return to Naraha when you knew the possible risk?”That anticipated question is essentially one of “accountability”: what could a parent
answer their child in such a situation, to account for their decision? Are “uncertainty”
or “controversy” about risks legitimate reasons to give your child? Yoneyana evokes thenotion of “radical accountability” in relation to certain kinds of environmental issues(Yoneyana, 2016); the notion is particularly relevant, and poignant, at this more
personal, individual level, where it conflicts with the rationalizing discourse of thegovernment.
Rationalization may be linked to quantification, supposedly helping people to recognizethat this risk is “small” … However, in this case again, a parent may dismiss theargument: “small” is not at all “small” when risk is not acceptable. One motherexpressed this powerfully:“An expert told us that the risk was very, very low … something like 1% … so, anegligible risk to run. I answered, well if I had a gun with 100 holes and one bullet, I
would not give it to my kid”.
There is a large gap between the discourses of “rationality” and “commensurability”
adopted by the Japanese authorities, and this kind of ethical/accountable stance,
adopted mostly by parents who chose to leave contaminated territories.
Framing risks as commensurable is thus confronted with an entirely different stance,
linked to parental ethics, or more generally parental care. Parents, in this case, would
not accept any kind of “balanced” approach, and refused to accept this “balanced”
approach; for these parents, it was a matter not of relative risk, but of categoricaldanger - not calculable, not comparable. A number of mothers interviewed during thefield work, who left or did not return to the evacuated territories, considered this tobe the only solution they could imagine to protect their children.
The position adopted by these worried parents was difficult to hold in affected
communities where public communication on radiological risks was based on an entirely
different schema, where risks were framed as “tamable” and reconstruction was
promoted, along with the idea of “appropriate fear” which considered “excessive
worries” inappropriate, as seen above (Kimura A. H., 2016). Kimura discusses how
mothers who worried about radiation risks for their children, and did not comply withthe official assessments of “safety”, instead of being praised for their concerns on theirchildren health, were scolded and faced social sanctions, considered as irrational andaccused of rumor-spreading. These women were marginalized, and came to be known
as “radiation brain moms” within the community (see Chapter 0).

328

Interview Ms AO, October 2015.Interviewer: Rina Kojima

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Parental care associated with these decisions was, in some cases, subjected toquestionable judgements. For example, Kurokawa ( Kurokawa, 2017) reports a reallyquite dismaying declaration, quoting the words of the mayor of Date, who said:“Due to late marriages and low birth rate, there is a problem of “excessive love” fortheir children. In one meeting, there was a woman around 50 years old who asked me,“I had my child when I was over 40 years old and so he/she is my only child. I worry
what if something happens to her/him. Is it really ok for a child to live in thisenvironment? I wanted to tell her that there was no problem with this level ofradiation. But it wouldn’t change anything. She probably wouldn’t understand329”.
In conclusion, commensurability of risks, which underlies policies and discourses, may
stand at odds with parental positions, which rest on very different – very strong ethical views.
7.2.3

CONTAMINATION IS WHERE THE “ZONE” IS (VS … CONTAMINATION IS
EVERYWHERE)

7.2.3.1 Contamination is inside the zones …
The last “implicit” factor in the normative framework that underlies post accidental
policy decisions concerns zoning. It is a disaster management tool which allows divisionof the affected area into “safe” and “unsafe” zones. Designating certain zones as“unsafe” (because “contaminated”) allowed everything “outside” the circumscribedplaces to be defined, by extrapolation, as “safe”. Zoning effectively territorializes risk,
as being “here” - and not “there”. More striking, it also restricts the temporality of risk,
making it also “now” (and not before) the accident.
The designation of zones, in several steps, (described in Chapter 2) is another of thepillars of Japanese post-accidental policy, based on the international regulation andrecommendation framework established by ICRP and IAEA. Topçu (2016) provides aninteresting historical insight into how the zoning “instrument” progressively became
the mainstay of nuclear accident management during the 1960s. Such historical analysis
allows the “denaturalization” of certain aspects of policies, often considered to beincontrovertible and inescapable solutions to problems raised by a nuclear accident.
Since the 1950s, the expert committee of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the
United States, aware of the possible consequences of a severe accident, has proposed
the establishment of a (permanent) exclusion zone around nuclear sites; thedimensions of the zone depends on the size of reactors: for a reactor of 1000 MW, forexample, the AEC recommended a permanent exclusion zone with a radius of up to
30 km330. This was proposed on the basis of the Brookhaven report. But in the face of
reluctance on the part of the nuclear industry, which feared public anxiety about andrejection of nuclear energy, the AEC finally adopted a different strategy: thedesignation of evacuation zones in case of an accident, instead of a priori exclusion

329

Shoko Kurokawa (2017), The Invention of “Decontamination of the Mind”: why the advanced decontamination city
stopped to decontaminate, Shueisha International.
330

Topcu refers here the PhD thesis of C. Foasso (2003), Histoire de la sûreté de l’énergie nucléaire en France (1945-2000) :Technique d’ingénieur, processus d’expertise, question de société. PhD Thesis in History. Université Lumière Lyon II.

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zones. According to Topçu (Topçu S. , Mai 2016), this zoning “instrument” isconceptualized based on the following rationale:“Total evacuation from contaminated territories in case of major accident is
impossible (from technical, economic and social acceptance points of view), and it isalso impossible to compensate for all the damage caused to persons and assets”331. She
argues that this progressively led nuclear experts towards a doctrine of “optimization”
in post-disaster management, preferring methods such as evacuation and compensation,
and as a result the zoning “instrument” constitutes a major disaster management tool.
These historical accounts suggest that the concept of zoning is profoundly embedded in
the development of civil nuclear energy.
At a more symbolic level, zoning allows the re-territorialisation of a risk (Fassert,
Living in/with contaminated territories : an STS perspective, 2017) which is, however,inherently difficult to circumscribe spatially and temporally. Radiologicalcontamination is elusive: that is to say, it is enduring, largely unpredictable - given theuncertainties linked to the radioecological models that predict evaluation of long-term
contamination in rural areas, it spreads without borders, and it is undetectable byhuman senses. And the intrinsically elusive nature of radiological contamination is‘tamed’ through mapping. Once the maps are established, they enact a new reality
where risky zones are demarcated from “safe” zones, which seem increasingly solidand legitimate, no matter how uncertain they may be at the outset: danger is turned
into risk. As depicted by Topçu, with zoning, the threat is localized and encircled, so as
to appear to be under control (Topçu, 2015).

7.2.3.2 Versus … Contamination is everywhere and was already there
This implicit framework which uses zoning as a tool for managing post-accidental
conditions was challenged in two ways, at geographical and temporal levels.
At the geographical level, zoning “reifies” and territorializes radiological risks, eventhough important areas of contamination were found outside of the “zones”. Amongst
them, the Watari district of Fukushima city, together with the Oonami district, weresaid to be the area most contaminated by radioactive fall-out within the city 332(Yamauchi, Septembre 2011). However, there was no case of evacuation assisted by
the government from the Watari district nor from Fukushima city as a whole, situatedoutside the evacuated zone. Besides, if the name of “Fukushima” is now associatedwith the consequences of the nuclear accident, a number of its inhabitants deplore

331.

Translated from : Topçu, S. Catastrophes nucléaires et « normalisation » des zones contaminées. Enjeux politiques,économiques, sanitaires, démocratiques et éthiques. Les notes de la fondation d’Ecologie Politique. N° 8. Mai 2016. (p.3)
332

The survey conducted by Professor Tomoya Yamauchi (specialist in radiation physics, radioactivity measurement
and ion tracks) of Kobe University in September 2011 found that the level of radiation dose in the soil sample collected
beside a temple exceeded 40,000Bq/kg and the air-born radiation level was recorded at over 20 μSv/hour at 1cm
above the ground and 2.68 μSv/hour at 1m above. (Tomoya Yamauchi (Kobe University), Report on the level ofradioactive contamination – limit of decontamination in the Watari district, commissioned by Friends of the Earth(NGO), Fukuro-no-kai (NGO) and residents of the Watari district, 20 September 2011). In October 2011, Fukushima cityand the government’s Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters organized a meeting with Watari residents who
were demanding that “radiation hot spots” be designated within the district thereby assisting the families living in theelevated radiation environment to evacuate from the area.

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prefectures have been also contaminated333.
As a consequence, some inhabitants, outside the “risky zone”, may have felt they werein danger: around 60 000 inhabitants evacuated the area, even though they were notliving in the designated evacuated zones (Hasegawa, 2015). These voluntary evacuees,
or “self-evacuees”, made the decision to leave their home village principally because
they felt worried about the radiological situation.
Second, zoning also conveys the idea that the contamination is “now”: a consequenceof the nuclear accident being cast as the starting point of a new, measurable situationof contamination, which is effectively “tamed” through the use of instruments(radiometers) and models that predict the future of contamination. This temporaltaming is also challenged though the experiences of Chernobyl and Fukushima. Brian
Wynne described how contamination attributed to the Chernobyl accident was in fact
partly dued to the formed nuclear tests and to accident of Windscale-Sellafield in 1957.
(Wynne,)Galia Ackerman (Ackerman, 2016) gives a compelling account of this in her book
“Traverser Tchernobyl” where she comes back on her decades of ethnographical visits
in the region of Chernobyl. “Zone”, she explains, has a specific meaning in this part of
the world 334 . For Soviets, the term “zone” was linked to a lexis of prison: zone
designates the place where prisoners stay, where they work, whatever the situation, acamp, or mines or cutting down trees. “For a Soviet, a zone is a place of violence andsuffering.”335. The zoning policy after the Chernobyl accident was quite different to
the one chosen by the Japanese government336, and consisted - amongst other aspects in defining an “exclusion zone” from which residents were permanently evacuated.
This paradigm of permanent “exclusion zones” engendered realities quite different tothose observed in the Japanese case. Ackerman interviewed a number of samiossoly(the name given to people who come back illegally to the evacuated town ofChernobyl). Nicolai and Valentina Koukharenko, a samiossoly couple, explained to theauthor that just after the catastrophe, the director and a few management employees
evacuated their children. Valentina was not evacuated: it was the day before the firstof May, and, because she worked at this time as a seamstress, she had to go on sewing
the costumes for the celebration. Some of the other seamstresses were crying at theirsewing machines. “A person from the municipality came and asked them: Why are you
crying? There is no more radiation than before. If you want to check it, go downstairs
and check the level of contamination in sorrel. And that was true: the level was veryhigh. […] Believe me, I work with women, and the rate of abnormal babies was quite
high before the accident.” It seems, from such accounts, that the “normal operations”

333

In the Ministry of Environment’s plan, the total of 68 municipalities located in seven prefectures, outside of the
Fukushima prefecture, were found with the radiation dose which exceeded 1mSv/year and thus included indecontamination assistance (http://josen.env.go.jp/zone/)334

The Chernobyl accident took place in Ukrainia, but most of its consequences and sanitary effects have impacted Belarus.

335

P 14. Traverser Tchernobyl. Galia Ackerman. Premier Parallèle. 2016.

336

The Shinrai project does not aim at analyzing in details the Chernobyl policies; only details linked to elements ofcomparison with the post- Fukushima accident policies are provided here. A comparison of these policies and theirconsequences might be a follow up of the Shinrai project.

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149/165of the Nuclear Power Plant had produced such a high level of contamination that theplace was already significantly contaminated: in this case, the accident did not bringabout any kind of disruption that would merit quitting. Valentina’s husband, Nicolaï
added that when sand was brought (10 km from the plant) to cover the surroundings ofthe crippled Chernobyl plant, they realized that this sand was more contaminated than
the soil around the plant337. The couple explained to Galia Ackerman that they decided
to stay in the forbidden zone because their own perception was that their territory wascontaminated before the accident.
Their account is particularly poignant when Valentina tells of the conditions at thetime of the (forced) evacuation, where people were assigned to places of evacuation:“My daughter and her husband were sent to Dniepropetrovsk, my parents and sisters
at Krementchoug, Nicolaï’s mother to Tetiev, our son to Konotop, ourselves to Smela.
How can you live this way? Far from your home and family338 ?”In 1987, when they left to visit Valentina’s mother, their house was buried during theirabsence, with all their personal belongings. “Many accepted it, but not me. I sent longtelegrams to Gorbatchev. […] I wrote to him that a sick man has to be cured, notkilled. This is how we should act with our Chernobyl” 339! In another story of resistance,
entitled “Zvizdal 340 ”, the artistic group “Berlin” shows the poignant case of a very
elderly samiossoly couple who returned to their home, to live alone in an empty,
evacuated zone, resisting evacuation. (BERLIN).
The case of forced evacuation also raises the issue of the place or destination proposed
for evacuation. Unlike the Japanese case, Chernobyl were assigned to specificevacuation destinations. One interviewee told Galia Ackerman the case of the little girl
Maria, born in Chernobyl just after the catastrophe, when her mother stayed there
despite that fact that children were not permitted to stay in the zone.
He explained “I think that if they had proposed to Lydia (the mother) to move to Kiev,
to live in public housing, she might have accepted. But they offered her housing in her
native town, Jeltyïe Vody, in the Dniepropetrovsk region. Uranium mines are exploited
there. Compared to Jeltyïe Vody where Radon concentrations are very high 341 ,Chernobyl is a place for holidays!” …342. (Ackerman, 2016).
In Japan also, the nuclear accident, and the infrastructure that developed as aconsequence, allowed former, forgotten contamination to be revealed. Writer, andmonk of the Miharu temple, Genyû Sôkyû evokes the case of inhabitants of the town ofMiharu343 . “They left and settled in the Gifu prefecture (…) In 1980s, the place which
had the highest radiation level in Japan was in Gifu prefecture because there had
been an uranium mine before. But 20 years later, in 2002, the highest spot was foundin Toyama prefecture and the second in Ishikawa prefecture. There were 11

337

The author does not mention it, but this second exemple could be dued to a hotspot fallout after the accident.

338

P 72. Traverser Tchernobyl. Galia Ackerman. Premier Parallèle. 2016.

339

Ibid. P 74.

340

Zvizdal. Chernobyl so far, so close. BERLIN. Le 104. Décembre 2016. www.berlinberlin.be.
Ibid. Ackerman explains further that during the Soviet regime, only prisoners sentenced to the death penalty or avery severe penalty were sent to these mines, where they would often die before the end of their sentence. P 78.
342
P 79. Ibid.
343
Miharu town, about 60 km from the Fukushima Daiishi NPP, is not part of the evacuated zone.
341

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prefectures which had more than 1mSv/year. Many prefectures in Hokuriku region(Toyama, Ishikawa…) had increasing levels of radiation. This is without a doubt due tothe atomic bomb testing in Uyghur region of China conducted by the Chinese
government. He concludes: so, these residents, fleeing from what they felt to be acontaminated area, in fact arrived in a place which is more contaminated344”.
For Genyû Sôkyû, this situation makes it preferable for people to stay in Miharu, apreference which he openly defends:“In 2002, there was a survey conducted all over Japan to measure radiation levels, byinstalling 149,000 radiation detection devices. I managed to get the data from thissurvey, and I was shocked. In the 1980s, the place with the highest radiation level inJapan was in Gifu prefecture because there had been a uranium mine there before.
But 20 years later, in 2002, the highest spot was found in Toyama prefecture and thesecond in Ishikawa prefecture. There were 11 prefectures which had more than
1 mSv/year. Many prefectures in Hokuriku region (Toyama, Ishikawa) showed
increasing levels of radiation. This is without a doubt due to the atomic bomb testingin the Uyghur region of China, conducted by the Chinese government. The total
radiation dose from this testing is reported to amount to 5 million times more thanwhat was released from Chernobyl. This was then pushed and moved by yellow sandphenomenon dust carried on high winds from China. Maybe if they showed such
results to the public it would affect the business sales of Hokuriku Shinkansen thebullet train which runs from Tokyo to Hokuriku region, but for the ‘anshin’ feeling ofreassurance of the Fukushima people, it would be greatly appreciated345.”
It’s nothing less than appalling that a nuclear accident - because it triggers a series ofmeasurements and screenings - may reveal not only the contamination due to that
accident, but also former sources of contamination that have been forgotten, or
obscured, and that this can give rise to such complex and tragic situations as the one
under discussion, in Japan. A nuclear accident may also create the opportunity toreveal the extent of long-term nuclear contamination (produced by military, or mining
activities …). It also reveals the extent to which the identification of contamination (ofany kind) depends on the infrastructures that allow the situation to be made visible(Kuchinskaia, 2012). By revealing prior –forgotten or unknown – contamination, it may
also raise awareness that, in the words of historian and sociologist Soraya Boudia, weare living in a “toxic world” (Boudia, 2010).

7.2.3.3 Conclusion on “implicit”/normative framework
Examining the implicit normative framework used by the Japanese government when
dealing with 3/11 event contributes to a process of “learning from an accident”. In fact,
the Japanese government’s implicit framework was also challenged in many ways bywhat happened afterwards. Therefore, in order to learn from what happened in
Fukushima, the deep-seated, “invisible” aspects effectively revealed after the accident
must be taken into consideration.

344Gonyû Sôkyû. Interview led in Miharu, 22nd March 2017. Interviewers: R. Hasegawa and C. Fassert.

345

Ibid.

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The choice was made to focus on the following three narratives: “attachment toterritories”, “commensurability of risks”, and “contained contamination”. In thecurrent discussions on post-accident management, these implicit aspects still appear to
be insufficiently identified, and have not been called into question. A constructive
follow up of Shinrai could be to examine the extent to which current policies in France(CODIRPA), or at the international level (ICRP, IAEA), integrate the “lessons” ofFukushima, and with which limitations.

7.3 PERSPECTIVES AND FUTURE RESEARCH: COMPENSATION AND REMEDIATIONAFTER A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
A number of questions need further elaboration and research. The focus here is on
certain questions which have emerged from the Shinrai project, and which could
constitute future axes of research. One of them concerns issues linked to justice,reparation, and victims.
7.3.1 LIMITED COMPENSATION
Financial compensation for the consequences of a nuclear accident depends on a set of
specific Conventions (e.g. Price Anderson Act, Paris Convention), as well as more
recent attempts (modification of Paris Convention in 2004), to better compensate
damage by increasing the level of responsibility and the amounts awarded. However,there is still a discrepancy between the actual costs of a major nuclear accident andthe possibility to compensate its subsequent consequences in the different Conventions.
This is regularly discussed by a number of scholars and also by anti-nuclear associations.
Topçu (2014) denounces “the construction and maintenance of a historical gap that is
as discrete as it is exceptional, between the politico-legal costs and the actual
costs346”. This aspect is not developed in the Shinrai project, but it is of course anunderlying scheme which is of major significance when it comes to reflecting on themechanisms of justice and compensation after a nuclear accident347.
7.3.2 DIFFERENT COMPENSATIONS
Feed-back on experience of the two major nuclear accidents (in Chernobyl and
Fukushima 348 ) shows that compensation payments for environmental damage and its
health-related consequences depend very much on national parameters, despite
international regulations. Legal, regulatory, political, and cultural aspects may play arole in shaping each particular situation - the very different management of theaccident in the cases of Fukushima and Chernobyl is proof of this. A nuclear accident
may have consequences which expand to several countries: in this case, national
346

Topçu, (2014). […] « La construction et le maintien d’un fossé historique, aussi discret qu’exceptionnel, entre lescoûts politico-juridiques et les coûts réels ». p 114). Organiser l'irresponsabilité ? La gestion (inter)nationale des dégâts
d'un accident nucléaire comme régime discursif. Ecologie et politique, pp. 95-114.
347

For more details on these aspects, see Topçu, (2014), and the IRSN report (2013), Méthodologie appliquée par
l'IRSN pour l'estimation des coûts d'accidents nucléaires en France. (On line on IRSN Website).
348

Another significant nuclear disaster occurred in Mayak (Kychtym, Russia, 1957); very little information is available
on what happened in Mayak, of which the consequences were long denied by the Soviet authorities. One book isavailable, by the biologist Jaurès Medvedev, and a GREENPEACE report was published for the 60th anniversary of theaccident. Natalia Kupetova, a lawyer who defended the victims of this accident, had to leave her country and is now apolitical refugee in France.

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characteristics may result in different rights and different compensation schemes foreach nation’s victims. With regards to the Chernobyl accident, its consequences wereparticularly serious for Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, but the post-accidental policy wasquite different in each nation. Petryna 349 (Petryna, 2003) discusses the differences
between Ukraine and Belarus: both were contaminated as a result of the accident, butboth responded in quite opposite ways, given their contrasting political and social
contexts.
These disaster recovery processes unfolded in the particular political circumstances of
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a context of poverty following the collapse of theformer political regime, the new Ukrainian government strived to show that it wasmuch more generous towards its victims than the Soviet Union had been. In 1991, when
Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union, it condemned the Soviet
administration for the Chernobyl aftermath, and claimed that it “not only failed in its
obligation to protect citizen’s lives during Chernobyl, but that in its denial of theaccident and its effort to restart the nuclear program, it had exacerbated patterns ofmorbidity by delaying intervention350”. The Ukrainian government designed a recovery
process and a mechanism for compensation that created “biological citizens”: citizens
eligible for financial compensation on the basis of narratives that account for theirillness. Biological citizenship is defined more precisely by Petryna (2003) as the “amassive demand for but selective access to a form of social welfare based on medical,
scientific, and legal criteria that both acknowledge biological injury and compensate
for it351”.
This mechanism of compensation was based on a statewide Chernobyl tax. Confronted
with a hash market transition, Ukraine set up a new compensation program “which
combined humanism with strategies of governance and state building, market
strategies with forms of economic and political corruption352”. This strategy was also a
key asset in the country’s foreign policy, attracting technical assistance, loans andtrading partnerships from western countries.
In Belarus, when President Lukashenko was elected in 1994, the situation became quite
different. Their global policy established a limitation on the rights; they fostered“reconstruction” and the limitation of compensation payments. On the 10th anniversaryof the catastrophe, Lukashenko wanted to “turn the page” and promoted
reconstruction and a normalization of the contaminated territories. “Populations wererequested not to go on with self-pity, but, on the contrary, to envisage the future ona new basis, which relegated Chernobyl to a lower priority 353» (Ackerman, 2016). This“turn” was framed within broader political change, and the reduction of civil rights.
The case of the Fukushima accident and the Japanese government’s post-accidental
policies, surveyed in Chapters 1 and 2, (see Chapter 0) constitute another case of how
to face a nuclear accident: that of a democratic advanced economy able to spend large

349

Petryna, Adriana. 2002. Life exposed: Biological citizens after Chernobyl. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. (p. 6).

350

Ibid. P 23. Note: the same criticism was directed at the Japanese government by a number of scientists.

351

Ibid. (p. 6).

352

Petryna, op.cit. P 5.

356 op.cit

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amounts of money for compensation payments, which led however to numerous
lawsuits.
These three examples provide insight into the way political and economic aspects canshape post-accidental policies.
In the event of a nuclear accident in Europe, where contamination would reach anumber of countries, victims could compare the way they were treated and the amountthey received in compensation payment. This is a real challenge for each nation, which
would have to account for citizens as well as for European and international norms
based on environmental and human rights laws (such as the notion of dignity in theconcept of Human Security promoted at the UN level. Shimizu (2015), for example,
showed the limits of the Japanese post accidental policy when assessed with theserights-based UN frameworks).
The Shinrai project has endeavored to examine the consequences of the postaccidental policies in their multiple dimensions: from the national policies to theirimplementation at the local (municipal) level, with the limited margins of manoeuverof the mayors. New research perspectives are needed, which would combine moral
sociology and (what can be considered as real and fair reparation “justice” after anuclear accident?) with political science and legal studies, which would examine how
an international and national law framework could answer this question.
7.3.3 COMPENSATION AND REPARATION ISSUES AFTER A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

7.3.3.1 Victims and victimisation
This categorization/labeling of citizens to create a clear-cut limit between those whoare “victims” and those who are not is a recurrent issue when it comes to dealing withthe consequences of disasters in general.
The status of “victim” after an environmental accident tightly associates several
elements. Firstly, the recognition of “victim” status, and the difficulty a victim may
have proving that status, for example, in linking exposure to pollutants, and/or proving
the direct negative effects on health. Secondly, there is the question of compensation
payments. And thirdly, there is the representation of the place where the inhabitant
lived before the accident or before damage recognition as a “polluted”, now
uninhabitable territory. These interrelations may turn into very different patterns ofvictimization, whereby the term “victimization” denotes, not a moral judgement but,as Barthe defines it (Barthe Y. , 2017) “the process by which a person defines himself
as a victim and is defined by others as a victim. It does not say anything of thelegitimacy or illegitimacy of this definition 354”; Several victimization processes may
developed, in addition to the “official” notion of victims, which was defined along thezoning lines in the case of Fukushima.

354« Le mot victimisation sera utilisé ici pour qualifier le processus par lequel un individu se définit et est défini pard’autres comme victime ; il ne dit rien, par conséquent, de la légitimité ou de l’illégitimité de cette définition ». p 10.
Barthe, Y. (2017). Les retombées du passé. Le paradoxe de la victime: SEUIL.

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A striking example of this is provided by on the SEVESO accident355, where Cementeri356(Cementeri, 2004) shows how inhabitants resisted the assigned status of victim,
because it was closely linked to acknowledgement of the contamination, and theimperative to leave their home territory. It occurred in a particular context, where apolitically left-wing committee (CTSP) was very willing to frame the Seveso accident asa “capitalist accident”. In order to join their cause, inhabitants would have to assume
the role in public sphere of “victims” of irreparable damage – damage that of which
they would have to declare themselves fully aware. Their approach was based on
intensive counter-expertise activity, aiming to prove the negative health-effects of thecontamination provoked by the accident. On the other side, a movement made up of
local committees linked to the Catholic world asked public authorities to safeguard thelink of people to their territory, because evacuation would break this tight-knit
community. Cementeri shows how the inhabitants adhered to the latter movement,
and discusses the relative failure, on the part of the Left-wing activists, to mobilize theinhabitants on the themes of collective outcry and victimization.
The above section has given some elements with regards to the role of each specific,
national context, including one accident which had consequences in several different
countries, like the Chernobyl accident. Moreover, in a democracy like Japan, postaccident policies based on a number of international recommendations, zoning
measures, and compensation mechanisms, were (and still are) confronted with citizens
calling for other (wider) types of victim recognition. The Fukushima case shows anextension of the notion of victim not strictly based on zoning schemas. And selfevacuees are a representative case of citizens claiming the illegitimacy of zoning andits limits.
Other questions of utmost importance concern the role played by the victimisator:“there are no victims without victimisators” explains Barthe in his research on thevictims of the nuclear tests carried out by the French State. “Victimisators” may be - inthe case he studies, as in many environmental cases - institutions or individuals,
medical doctors, activists, social workers, and so forth. As with the notion of
victimization, Barthe insists that the term has no negative moral connotation; it is nota sophisticated way of “negating” the existence of victims, or the reality of theirproblems. The important point raised here relies on the collective dimension of
victimization, notably with an accent on the important role played by victimisators inthis process. In the case reported by Centemeri, the victimisators who wanted to link
the SEVESO accident to a more general criticism of capitalism failed to bring the
inhabitants into their victimization process. The consequences of this victimization
were not in line with the deeper concerns of the inhabitants, and their strong
attachment to a community and a territory, also framed as a catholic community.
In Japan, the complex victimisator schema is linked, notably, to anti-nuclear
movements and to the reactivation of deep-seated denunciation of the health-relatedconsequences of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The victimisators include a355This chemical accident in the town of Seveso, Italy occurred in 1976 and led to the development of a set of
regulations for chemical industries: directives SEVESO.
356

Centemeri, L. (2011). Retour à Seveso, la complexité morale et politique du dommage à l'environnement. Annales,
histoire, Sciences sociales. Armand Colin, 213-240.

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number of scientists who call into question the general paradigm of a “threshold” forradiation harm357. Moreover, this victimization process is challenging for the authorities- notably because, through the “self-evacuees”, it calls into question the limits
imposed by zoning measures, which, by designating certain areas “unsafe”, effectively
label any others as “safe”.
Lastly, victimization is a complex process; it meets the needs and concerns of anumber of people in some places, while it fails in other cases. The evacuation of acommunity linked to a Buddhist temple, in Miharu, is a powerful example of a
victimization process confronted with its consequences. The role and personality ofGenyû Sôkyû the monk who is the head of the temple, were instrumental in rejecting
those consequences. Sôkyû advocated not evacuating, basing his argument on therelative harmlessness of low-dose radiation and the will to preserve that community,
but also on the fact that measurements proved that some places in Japan were morecontaminated than Miharu, due to Nuclear testing in China (as discussed above).
However, he could not prevent some Miharu residents choosing to evacuate.

7.3.3.2 The “myth of community”?
These questions also interrogate the very notion of community, used in this report. The
fieldwork carried out in the villages of Kawauchi and Naraha showed clearly thatpeople could have divergent interests and desires with regards to solutions proposed,
specifically concerning the divide between evacuation and stay-on solutions (cf.
Chapter 3, comparing Kawauchi and Naraha mayors, and Chapter 4). As seen above, itcannot be presumed that the general underlying feeling will be one of “attachment toterritory” in the case of a nuclear accident. And more widely, reference to “a” or “the”
community is also questionable. In fact, this notion downplays not only the divergencesamongst inhabitants with regards their motivations and inclinations, and theirperception of radiation risk, but also the divergences in their assessment of the postaccidental situation and, more generally, the differences in their political appraisal ofgovernment reactions to the accident. During the interviews, the “community” wasoften portrayed as a micro-level entity, a group of neighbors who knew each other,which works as social safety net at times but also exercises pressure to align one’s
opinion/decision to the majority members.
Indeed, the notion of “community” has raised a number of criticisms in Disasters
Studies literature. Revet (2018) shows that “the community”, conceptualized as ahomogenous set of persons to whom one could speak by the intermediary of a few local
leaders, is a delusion. And certain development actors have in fact integrated thiscritical assessment in their approach, as shown in the title of Chapter 4 of theInternational Red Cross 2014 Annual Report: “The myth of community?”, which
discusses how the term is intended to legitimate the organization and the work of
institutions. For this organization, there are two main hidden objectives in utilizing thisnotion of “community”:“The first is the confirmation that [the help provided] is being done with real people
at the local scale and is not ‘top-down’. The second is to suggest that there is a

357

These aspects, evoked in this report (Chapter 5), will be re-examined in a next Shinrai report.

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collective, possibly structured and cohesive entity that will be an asset to the Disaster
Risk Reduction and Climate change Adaptation process, once it can be mobilized
through participatory activities 358 ”. An additional set of research questions could
usefully explore this complex question of the way to address the inhabitants’ needs anddesires in a post-accidental situation and how this process can be mediated.

7.3.3.3 Environmental justice and the limits of compensation
Lastly, the questions linked to justice, compensation, reparation after a nuclear
accident can be framed within the wider context of environmental justice. A number ofscholars have explored these issues in the nuclear domain (Takahashi 359, Mitchell 360,
Hecht361,) or in non-nuclear domains - notably, the chemical field (Centemeri, Jobin),as well as in relation to natural catastrophes (Revet, 2017).
It is important to note that the issue of compensation is confronted with a critique ofthe notion itself, of ever truly being able to compensate this type of damage, and of
the limitations inherent in objectifying and monetarizing it. The research of Martinez
Allier (2002) was instrumental in wider criticism of the possibility of ever compensating
environmental damage. With the notion of “environmentalism of the poor”, she insistson the incommensurability of environmental damage, and calls for a “language ofvaluation” that would resist the (western) idea that money can compensate a loss ofenvironment. Moreover, the term “environment” may denote “nature” and “wilderness”
or “place of dwelling”; in the latter case, Centemeri considers that through dwelling,the “relationship is crucial or “constitutive” to the consistency of the person362”, andin this case, there is a constitutive or radical incommensurability. Compensation for“the loss of enjoyment” does not mean much for a person in this case.
In recent research on two cases of industrial pollution in Taiwan, Jobin (2018) insists on
the range of expectations of plaintiffs confronted with legal mechanisms which often
neglect the symbolic dimension of their demands. “These mechanisms are really notconcerned with questions like apologies and memory, which are essential to fully atone
damage done to the victims and their environment”. In fact, “commensurability andincommensurability of the damage are entangled, shaping a web of motivations andexpectations among the victims of environmental damage363”. In his analysis of soldiers
who participated in nuclear bomb testing, Barthe concludes that “the fights led by a358

Op.cit.

359

Takahashi, H. (2009). One minute after the detonation of atomic bomb: the erased effects of residual radiation.
International journal of the history of science society of Japan, 19(2);360

Mitchell, M. (28 Septembre 2018). The Cosmology of Evidence: Citizenship, Law, and Biological Knowledge after
Three Mile Island Paper presented at the Repairing Environments: Post-Disaster Mobilisations, Experiences & Tensions,
Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris.
361

Hecht, G. (2012). Being Nuclear Africans and the Global Uranium Trade: The MIT Press.

362

Op.cit.

363

Jobin, P., & Tsai, Y.-Y. (2018). How much compensation is fair enough for repairing a toxic environment? A view
from two class actions in Taiwan. Paper presented at the Repairing Environments: Post-Disaster Mobilisations,
Experiences & Tensions, ENS, Paris.

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number of collective associations may be oriented at least as much toward a recognitionof social esteem as toward monetary compensation364”. (Barthe Y. , 2017).

7.3.3.4 Conclusion
As for all accidents which have a significant impact on environment and people, nuclear
accidents raise the issues of reparation and compensation. What may be considered
specific to the nuclear field, however, is the time-scale of contamination, which can becounted in centuries and millennia. The complex relations between victims andvictimisators, the reflexivity of victims, the process of “secondary victimisation”
proposed by Barthe (when a victim is not recognized as a victim), all constituteimportant future research perspectives which could usefully be developed on acomparative basis (notably, comparing nuclear accidents with other industrial pollution).
This calls for research exploring the complex nexus of reparation and compensation(financial and symbolic), and the links to territories and “communities” or individuals. It
also calls for research aiming to combine anthropological, historical and sociologicalapproaches with the fields of Law and economics.

364

Il se pourrait que les luttes menées par certains collectifs de victimes soient au moins autant orientées par laperspective d’une reconnaissance en termes d’estime sociale que par celle d’une réparation sous la formed’indemnités financières. P 238. Op.cit.

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8 GENERAL CONCLUSION
This report aims at presenting the main results of the Shinrai project regarding thecase studies analysed throughout an extensive fieldwork, led during eight missions inJapan, and comprising more than 120 interviews with different actors. Our main
objective was –to quote the words of Michaël Ferrier speaking on the situation in theaftermath of Fukushima- “to enunciate, and not to denunciate365”. A comprehensive
and detailed account of the consequences of the nuclear accident and of its“management” by the authorities allows to account for the many different andsometimes very opposite views on what happened –and is still happening- for affected
residents. One of its specificities is to have listened to a number of persons who havebeen or are still in charge of dealing with the consequences of the accident (medical
doctors, responsible of the ministries, Mayors, …) in order to understand how they havemade sense of the situation, including the ethical stakes they had to face.
Some of the main findings from this field research can be summarized as follows:365

Six categories of inhabitants were identified in relation to their decision to
return - or not - to their home village after the Lift of Evacuation Orders,
namely: 1. “Return and resist to a Culture of Radioprotection”; 2. “Return andcontrol/comply”; 3. “Return and doubt”; 4. “Between return andresettlement”; 5. “Not returning now”; 6. “Not returning ever”. While
recognizing the limit and potentially reductive nature of any form of
categorization, this classification helps us grasp a panoramic view of the choices,feelings and judgements underlying decisions made by the population after anuclear accident..



Mayors play a crucial role in implementing the policy defined by thegovernment at the local level. They have limited margins for maneuver inorganizing the Lifting of Evacuation Orders and the return of inhabitants. Aslong as particular groups of inhabitants (e.g.: seniors versus families with young
children) had specific and opposed interests, it became difficult to act in thename of “general interest”. Each of the mayors justified his decisions byexpressing what he considered most important: the right to return to, andeventually to die in one’s own home, or the right to “buy time” and not tocome back, for those not satisfied with the life that coming back would offer.

Examining the question of “who trusts whom?” not surprisingly shows a deep
divide between people who trust the “official/governmental” scientists andexperts, and those who trust scientists not linked to governmental or
nuclear institutions. Such a divide effectively renders “taboo” the question ofionizing radiations consequences on health, because of the potential divisive
effects the question can have on communities.



Risk communication was considered by the authorities to be a solution (todissipate fear toward radiation among the population) while citizen considered
it as a strategy employed by the authorities. The reflexivity of actors who werein charge of communication activities illustrates how the intention to

Interview on France Culture.

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Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences160/165“reassure” could be critically analyzed by citizens and by the experts
themselves, when they were offered the opportunity to look back on theiractions at the time of the accident.
Appraisal of the Japanese government actions offers accounts of therelatively low return rate and gives a number of reasons for this. This opens
the way for addressing the issue of “reconstruction” and the question of “forwhom” this reconstruction was promoted, as exposed in “Reconstruction
Without Inhabitants” by Yamashita et al.



Examining the implicit normative framework used by the Japanese
government when dealing with 3/11 event contributes to a process of“learning from an accident”. In fact, the Japanese government’s implicit
framework was challenged in many ways by what happened afterwards.
Therefore, in order to learn from what happened in Fukushima, the deep-seated,“invisible” aspects effectively revealed after the accident must be taken into
consideration. The choice was made to focus on the following three narratives:“attachment to territories”, “commensurability of risks”, and “contained
contamination”. In the current discussions on post-accident management, these
implicit aspects still appear to be insufficiently identified, and have not beencalled into question.

Finally, frustrations and angers toward post-accident policies turned into
legal proceedings led by a number of citizens against the authorities. At thetime of writing, 31 group lawsuits, involving 12,000 plaintiffs from amongevacuees and affected residents, have been filed against TEPCO and thegovernment all over Japan. But these legal actions only play a partial role inrepairing one’s life from the damage incurred by a nuclear accident. As in othercases of environmental damages compensation, symbolic aspects of theseactions such as demand for apology and social recognition shall also be taken
into account in the process of reparation.

A long-term opposition between experts and scientists of the nuclear sphere and noninstitutional experts who have been opposing to them was abruptly “deconfined” after
the nuclear accident. Its combination with a conflict of legitimacies –between nuclearrelated institutions like ICRP and IAEA, and United Nations institutions - opens
questions and challenges for the political and scientific spheres, as well as for SHS
researchers.

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Ningen naki Fukko: Genpatsu hinan to kokumin no “furikai” wo megutte), Chikuma
Bunko.
Yamauchi, T. (Septembre 2011). Report on the level of radioactive contamination –limit of decontamination in the Watari district, commissioned by Friends of the Earth(NGO), Fukuro-no-kai (NGO) and residents of the Watari district, . Kobe University.
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i

10 ANNEX: FIELD WORK
Before the official launch of the Shinrai project, there had been a two-year preparatory
period where five feasibility study missions had been implemented in Japan (2 x F;
3 x CF+RH). The below is the statistical data of all field interviews conducted during bothpreparatory and research missions of the Shinrai project, which was used for this report.

Number of Interviews
The total number of interviews conducted from October 2013 until October 2017 amounts
to 118, of which 62 interviews were with evacuees/residents, 9 interviews withgovernment agencies, 13 interviews with municipal and prefectural officials, 26 interviews
with experts/researchers and 10 interviews with NGOs. As for the number of persons
interviewed, it is counted as 117 (see Table 1). The interviews have been conducted bythree researchers: Christine Fassert (coordinator of the project; IRSN), Reiko Hasegawa(project partner; Sciences Po Médialab) and Rina Kojima (project partner; LATTS). Reiko
Hasegawa has organised and/or conducted interviews with/out C. Fassert with a total of
94 out of 117 persons.
Table 1: Number of persons interviewed by 20 February 2018
Category

Number

Evacuees/Affected
Residents

62

Government officials

13

Local authority

19

Experts/Academics

26

NGOs/civil associations

10

Total

118

Profiles of Interviewees
Evacuees/residents
Among 50 evacuees/residents whom we interviewed, 16 persons are from Naraha, another17 are from Kawauchi, 8 from Watari district of Fukushima city, 4 from the other parts ofFukushima city, 2 from Iitate, 1 from Kooriyama, 1 from Iwaki, and 1 from Miharu town
(Figure 2). Of the total, 28 are evacuees, 19 are residents/returnees and 3 are those whoare between evacuation and return. We have conducted follow-up interviews for a totalof 10 evacuees/residents.

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ii
Table 2: Evacuees/residents: the place of residence at the time of the accident
Municipality

Num
ber

Naraha16

Kawauchi17

Watari district of Fukushima city

8

Other
towns
prefecture

9

Total

of

Fukushima

50

Governmental officials
We interviewed government officials at the following ministries/agencies: Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA), Reconstruction Agency, Japan Atomic Energy Commission(Cabinet Office), Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Assistance Team (Cabinet Office), Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Ministry of Environment (ME)
Local authority
The interviewed local authorities include officials from Fukushima Prefectural Office,Fukushima City Office, Naraha Town Office, and Kawauchi Town Office as well as
members of city/town assemblies in Naraha, Kawauchi, and Fukushima City, and Mayors of
Naraha town and Kawauchi village.

Experts/academics
The experts and academics whom we interviewed are from the disciplines of nuclear
engineering, urban/environmental engineering, medicine, biology, physics, philosophy,
environmental sociology, and STS. They are from University of Tokyo, University of Kyoto,
Tokyo Institute of Technology, University of Osaka, University of Kobe, Fukushima
University, Meiji University, Sophia University, Nagasaki Medical University, Nagasaki
University, Kyoto Seika University, Tokyo Metropolitan University, University of Eastern
Finland, and Takagi School.
NGOs/civil associations
The NGOs that we have interviewed are NOW, SAFECAST, ACRO, Fukushima Save Children
from Radiation, Save Watari Kids, Chikurin-sha, Minna no te, Hidanren, and Hiroshima
Group Action. The activities of these organisations include measuring ambient radiationdose and mapping, measuring radioactivity in food, assisting parents to protect children
from radiation exposure, and assisting victims in lawsuits against TEPCO/government.
Conferences and town meetings
During the field missions to Japan, the project team has participated several conferences,
symposiums and town meetings organised around the themes of the project as shown in
the table below:

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iii
Table 3: Conferences and town meetings participated by the project team
Title
Organizer
The 3rd Citizen-Scientist International
CSRP
Symposium on Radiation Protection (CSRP)
Symposium « Protéger et soumettre à
Maison francoFukushima »japonaiseInternational
International Symosium on Legal-Medical Centre of
aspects of Nuclear Disaster and Human
Environmental
RightsComparative
Law(Michel Prieur)
UNWCDRR side events
UNWCDRR
The 4th Citizen-Scientist Intl Symposium*
CSRP
th
The 5 International Expert Symposium onJapan Foundation
Radiation and Health*The 6th Citizen-Scientist Intl Symposium
Women’s Meeting*Meeting of Naraha evacuees in Tokyo*

CSRP
Women’s
association ofKawauchiNaraha town

Date

Place

Oct 2013 Tokyo
Oct
2013

Tokyo

Oct
2014

Tokyo (Waseda
University)

Mar 2015 Sendai
Sep 2015 Tokyo
Fukushima Medical
Sep 2016
University
Nihonmatsu
Oct 2016(Fukushima)
Sep 2016 Kawauchi village
Oct 2016 Tokyo*The event was participated by Rina Kojima (LATTS).

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iv

List of interviews
Evacuees/Residents

Municipality

No.

Age

Interviewer

Mr. MT

70-80

RH et CF2

Mr. MA20-30

RH et CFMar-15E (Iwaki)3

Ms. WA30-40

RH et CFMar-15E (Iwaki)

4

Mr. N

40-50

RH et CFMar-15E (Iwaki)

60-70

RK

Mar-15E (Iwaki)

60-70

RK

Sep-16R

1
1 (followup)

5
5 (followup)

NarahaOct-14Mar-15E (Iwaki)

6

Mr. TK

50-60

RKMar-15E (Iwaki)7

Ms. CA

80-90

RK

Mar-15E (Iwaki)

40-50

RK

Mar-1540-50

RH

Sep-1588 (follow-up)

Ms. YYE (Iwaki)

9

Mr. MU

50-60

RKMar-15E (Iwaki)10

Ms. MI

30-40

RH

Sep-15E (Iwaki)

11

Ms. YI

40-50

RH

Sep-15E (Iwaki)

12

Mr. MS

40-50

RH

Sep-15E (Iwaki)

13

Ms. YY

60-70

RK

Sep-15E (Iwaki)

14

Mr. HA

60-70

RK

Sep-15E (Iwaki)15

Mr. MY

60-70

RK

Sep-15E (Iwaki)

60-70

RK

Sep-1560-70

RK

Sep-1660-70

RH et CFOct-1460-70

RH et CFMar-1516
16 (followup)
1
1 (followup)

Mr. TNMr. KTE (Iwaki)R

2

Ms. AKIMOTO

60-70

RH et CFMar-15R

3

Mr. AS

50-60

RKMar-15E (Kôriyama)

50-60

RK

Mar-1550-60

RK

Sep-16

4
Kawauchi

Mr. MA

MissionEvacuee or
Resident/
ReturneeName

4 (followup)

Ms. NSE (Kôriyama)

5

Ms. KS

40-50

RK

Mar-15R

6

Mr. SI

50-60

RKMar-15R

7

Mr. YE

20-30

RK

Mar-15E (Kôriyama)

8

Ms. MY

60-70

RH

Sep-15R

9

Mr. YY59

RK

Sep-15R

10

Mr. MY

50-60

RK

Sep-15R

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v
11

Ms. KW

60-70

RK

Sep-15

R

12

Ms. KN

60-70

RK

Sep-15

R

13

Ms. KS

40-50

RK

Sep-16R

14

Mr. YE

30-40

RK

Sep-16E (Kôriyama)

15

Ms. KW

60-70

RK

Sep-16

R

16

Ms. YI

30-40

RH et CFMar-17

R

17

Ms. W

40-50

RH et CFMar-17E/R

1

Mr. YK

50-60

RH, CF et RK

Oct-14

R

30-40

RK

Mar-1530-40

RK

Sep-1640-50

RK

Sep-1540-50

RKOct-1622 (follow up)
3
3 (follow up)

Watari80-90

RKSep-15

R

5

M. TO

60-70

RK

Oct-15

R

6

Mme KT

40-50

RK

Oct-15

R

7

Mme AS

40-50

RH et CFMay-16

R

8

M. TO

60-70

RK

Oct-16

R

60-70

RK

Oct-1560-70

RK

Sep-1670-80

RH et CFMay-1640-50

RH et CFMay-1640-50

RH et CFOct-1740-50

RH et CFMay-1640-50

RH et CFOct-172

1 (followup)

Iwaki

Mme YKM YO

1

2
2 (followup)

Kôriyama city

E/R (Niigata)

M. MT

1 (followup)

Fukushima
city

M. TA

E (Sendai)

4

1
IitateMme. YN

Ms. SA

Ms. MYE (Fukushima)
E (Fukushima)
E (Kyoto)

E (Kyoto)3

Ms. MW

40-50

RH

Oct-16E (Hiroshima)

4

Ms. NS

40-50

RH

Oct-16E (Hiroshima)

1

Mr. II

40-50

RH

Oct-16E (Hiroshima)

40-50

RH et CFMay-1640-50

RH et CFOct-1750-60

RH et CFMar-171
1 (follow up)

Miharu1

TOTAL (#
person)50

Ms. KT
M Genyû Sôkyû

E (Kyoto)R

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vi

Government Authorities
Agency

Name

Title

Mr. KONDO, Syunsuke

Chairman

Oct-13Vice Chairman

Oct-13

Japan Atomic
EnergyCommission (JAEC) Mr. SUZUKI, Tatsujiro

Oct-13

Mr. KITAGAKI, KunihikoOct-13Mr. SAITO, Daichi

Environment andEnergy division,
R&D Bureau

Sep-15

Mr. SUGIMOTO

Also belong toCabinet Office's
Nuclear Disaster
Victim AssistanceTeam

Oct-13

ExpertRadiation
Protection

Oct-14

Deputy Director

Radiation
Protection

Oct-14

Commissioner

NRA Commission

Oct-17

Mr. SAGARA, Masashi

ExpertRAMAT (Radiation
Emergency
Oct-14
Medical AssistanceTeam)

Mr. ARIMA, NobuakiCounsellor

Nuclear Disaster
Victim AssistanceTeam

Oct-14

Mr. TAKETOMI, Hironori

Deputy Director

Nuclear Disaster
Victim AssistanceTeam

Oct-14

Director

Fukuishima OfficeforOct-14
Environemental
Restoration

Mr. ISSE, Masatsugu
Nuclear Regulation
Authority (NRA)
Mr. NAKAGOMI, Shota
Mr. BAN, Nobuhiko
National Instituteof Radiological
Sciences (NIRS)

MissionMr. KAWAMURA, Masayuki

MEXT

Reconstruction
AgencyDepartment

Cabinet Office

Ministry of theEnvironment

Mr. SEKIYA, Takeshi

Total (# persons)13

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vii

Local Authorities
Municipality

KawauchiNarahaFukushima city

Name

Title

Department

MissionMr. Hideo AKIMOTO

Director

Reconstruction
ManagementOct-14

M. Azuma SHIGA

Director of
VillageNursery
SchoolVillage Nursery School

Sep-15May-16

Mr. Yuko ENDO

Mayor

Mayor

Oct-16

M Endo, Toshiyuki

DeputyDirector

Reconstruction
PromotionOct 2014
Mar 2015
Sep 2015

M Sakamoto, Masahiko

Chief

Radiation ManagementOct-14

M Matsumoto

Maire

Maire

Oct-16

M Abe, Kazunori

Manager

M Minamizawa, Hiroshi

Section Chief

M Watanabe, Yuichi

Section Chief

Crisis ManaementOct-14

M Hanzawa, Kazutaka

Assistant
Section Chief

Fukushima City
Assembly OfficeOct-14

Different sections

Oct-13Chairperson,
Committee on
decontaminationOct-16

DecontaminationOct-13

Mr. Abe, Mr. Ise, Mr. Matsuda,
Mr. Hanzawa, Mr. Kuwajima
M Sanada, Hiroshi
M EndoFukushima Pref.

Elu local

Decontamination
Planning
Decontamination
Planning

M TAZAWA

Oct-14Oct-14Oct-13
Evacuee AssistanceM SHOJI

Oct-13

Total (# Persons) 19

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viii
Experts/Researchers
University
Tokyo Tech

Tokyo Univ.

Name

Title

Department

Mr. SHIRABE, Masashi

Assoc.Prof

Mr. MAKINO, Junichiro

Professor

Mar-15

Ms. FUJIGAKE, Yuko

Professor

Oct-13Mr. MORIGUCHI, Yuichi

Professor

Mar-15

Mr. KODAMA, Tatsuhiko

Professor

Mar-15

Mr. TSUBOKURA, Masaharu Doctor
Mr. TAKAHASHI, Tetsuya

Professor

Mr. ISHII, Hideki

Associate Prof

Mr. TANBA, Noriyuki

Professor

MrTAKAHASHI, Takayuki

Professor

Mr. GOTO, Shinobu

Associate Prof

Osaka City Univ.

MrYOKEMOTO, Masafumi

Professor

Osaka Univ.

Mr. HIRAKAWA, Hideyuki

Professor

Fukushima Univ.

MissionMar-15
Philosophy

Mar-17Oct-14

Institute of Env.
Radioactivity
Institute of Env.
Radioactivity
Environmental
planning
Environmental
Policy/Economics
STS

Oct-13Oct-13Oct-13Oct-17Oct-14

Nagasaki Medical
Ms. ORITA, Makiko
Univ.

Assistant Prof/Nurse

Nagasaki Univ.

Mr. TOMONAGA, Masao

Prof
Emeritus/Medical
DoctorDirector Emeritus ofNagasaki Red Cross
Hospital

Oct-17

Meiji Univ.

Mr. KIKUCHI, Masao

Assoc. Prof

Public Policy

Oct-13

University ofEastern Finland

Mr. BAVERSTOCK, Keith

Professor

Mr. KOIDE, Hiroaki

Former Assist Prof

Mr. IMANAKA, Tetsuji

Former Assist Prof

Ms. SAKIYAMA, Hisako

Former NIRS Scientist

Mr. SEGAWA, Yoshiyuki

ExpertLow-Dose Radiation
EffectOct-17

Sophia University Mr. SHIMAZONO, Susumu

Professor

Theology, philosophy

May-16

Kobe University

Mr. YAMAUCHI, Tomoya

Professor

Ion trackMay-16

Kyoto Seika

Mr. HOSOKAWA, Komei

Professor

Environment

Oct-16Univ.

Mr. SON, Wonchoru

Professor
Sociology

Mar-17

Kyoto Univ.

Takagi SchoolTokyo
Mr. Yusuke YAMASHITA
Metropolitan Univ

Assoc Prof

Mar-15Oct-14
Research Reactor
Institute
Research Reactor
Institute

Sep-15Oct-17May-16

Total (# persons) 26

Citizen Associations/NGOs
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ix
NGO

Name

Title

MissionPlace

Mrs. Mariko TomatsuMember

Oct-12Tokyo

Fukushima Save
Children from
Radiation

Mr. Hiroyuki YOSHINOMember

Oct-13

Fukushima
city

SAFECAST

Mr. Brown AZBYMember

Oct-14

Tokyo

Minna no Te

Ms. NISHIYAMA, Yuko

RepresentativeOct-14

Kyoto city

Mr. HAMADA, Kazunori

Secretary General

Oct-13Tokyo

Mr. AOKI, Kazumasa

Vice Sec Gen

Sep-15

Mr. BOILLEY, David

President

Jun-15

Ms. MUTO, Ruiko

RepresentativeOct-16

Ms. OOGAWARA, Saki

Staff

Nihonmatsu(Fukushima)

Mr. Yuichiro ISHIMORI

Lawyer

Oct-16Hiroshima

NOW

Chikurin-sha

ACRO

HidanrenGroup Action
Hiroshima

Normandy,
FranceTotal (# persons) 10

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