electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies (ejcjs)
Conference and Seminar Papers in 2002

KenkyuProceedings of a Postgraduate Research Seminar in Japanese Studiesth

Oxford Brookes University Research Centre, Oxford Brookes University, UK, Saturday 28 July, 2001
Post-Graduate Network in Japanese Studies (PGN)

Changing partisan support patterns and the rise of
the Mutōhasō during the 1990s~ Can the decline of the JSP be explained through voting behaviour? ~Sarah HydeTEPCO Senior Student, Pembroke College, Oxford
sarah.hyde@pembroke.ox.ac.uk

Introduction
Between 1989 and 1996, the Japanese left went from boom to bust. In the 1989 Upper
House election, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) won a majority in the House for ithe firsttime since the party’s formation in 1955. However in 1993, the party lost half of its seats in
the House of Representatives election and shortly before the next Lower House ballot in1996 it split, with the majority of Diet members joining the newly formed Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ).1 The JSP still exists and has nineteen Diet members in the Lower
House and twelve in the Upper House, yet it has become more of a single-issue party
basing its policies on the maintenance of the Constitution. This paper analyses whether
voting behaviour can account for the decline of the JSP in the 1990s. It will be based on thefindings of The Japanese Voter (Flanagan et al. 1991), analysing first how voting andpartisan support have changed and look at the reasons which can account for the change. It
will show that the biggest change has been the decline of partisan support.
1

The JSP is the name of the party from its formation in 1955 until 1989 when it was changed in English to
the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). In 1995, the party also changed its Japanese name to a similar
title, Nihon Shakai Minshutō. For clarity the JSP will be used to refer to the party. When referring to the JSP,I refer to the pre-1996 manifestation of the Party. Even after the emergence of the DPJ, there has been a small
group of the JSP which remains. When referring to this party is its post-1996 entity I will refer to it as the
SDPJ. The Democratic Party of Japan was formed in 1996 and was drastically enlarged in 1998. The
Japanese differentiates between these two periods as Kyū Minshutō and Minshutō. Once again, for reasons ofclarity, only one term will be used and the English title DPJ has been adopted.

60

As The Japanese Voter has pointed out, contemporary political sociologists’ concern for therole of socio-political cleavages have been a reflection of the importance of these cleavages
on European politics. These cleavages have been defined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as
centre - periphery; state - church; land - industry; and owner - worker. However, thisframework of cleavages cannot be applied to Japan for various reasons. Firstly, there is no
religious divide that can be considered influential enough to be a cleavage, despite thepresence of the Kōmeitō, the political party of the lay Buddhist organisation, the Sōka
Gakkai. Secondly, there are no cleavages based on regionalism. Japan has some districts
where a particular party is stronger than others but these in no way create a cleavage suchas the cleavage which exists in South Korea between government and the south-west of thecountry, which had opposed the government for so long that the government deliberately
withheld development projects and resources. Similarly, in Japan there is no region with astrong ethnic divide which affects voting patterns. Finally, the application of the LipsetRokkan thesis to Japan is also complicated by the fact that the Meiji Restoration of 1868
was the ‘revolution’ that enabled the industrialization of Japan to take place (Ware 1995:
208). The rural and urban divide was also not as pertinent to the creation of the party
system in Japan as in Europe, as pre-war conservative parties were coalitions of urban andrural interests (Flanagan 1991: 399).
What theories then, can be used to explain voting behaviour in Japan? Why do theelectorate vote in the way that they do? Theories of voting behaviour can be broken down
into two main concepts: instrumental and expressive voting. As models of voting behaviour,
these are not exhaustive, but they do capture the salient features of Western debate on thesubject and can be considered a useful starting point for analysis of Japan.
The instrumental models stress the importance of calculation of individual self-interest andissue preferences on electoral choice because voter choice is conscious and deliberaterather than reflexive or deterministic. Thus the voter will analyse policy preferences andvotes for the party which he feels will maximise his own gains, whether that be a personal
gain or a benefit for society at large.
Expressive theories stress the importance of environment and socialization experiences onvoting behaviour. These theories suggest that conformity to parents, friends, workplace etc.
is highly influential on voting behaviour and party identification
Once formed, this type of party identification is believed to be increasingly durable andleads to stable voting patterns. In Britain, this equates with voting based on the ‘class’
structure. Martin and Stronach (1992) suggest that Japan is a hybrid of these two models
because, as in Britain:•••

the electorate may be acting out of mixed motives in different proportions at
different elections
different voters vote out of different motives
rationality is strongly shaped by circumstance and lifestyle.

This paper will show that expressive theories of voting, rather than instrumental theories,
can better explain the tendencies of the Japanese electorate. Whilst the argument will not bemade that instrumental theories are completely irrelevant, as that would disregard theimportant issues of ideology, peace and welfare issues within the Japanese politicalstructure, this chapter intends to show how significant expressive methods of voter

61

mobilisation have been in Japan suggest that it is changes in these patterns of voting thatcan explain the electorate’s move away from the party and why the parties are not able tomobilise the electorate as effectively as they did up to the 1980s.
When The Japanese Voter analysed Japan from the perspective of a social cleavage
hypothesis, some conformities and deviancies to the western normative of working
class/middle class cleavage were displayed. Unionised workers supported the JSP or theJapan Communist Party (JCP). Professionals and managers tended to support the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). This is where the conformities to the West ended because whitecollar workers were split between support for the LDP if they were not unionised and theprogressive parties (JSP/JCP/DSP) if they were. This trend could also be seen to a lesser
degree amongst blue-collar workers. As a rough generalisation, it would be fair to say thatthe larger the organisation, the more likely the workers were to be unionised and therefore
supportive of a progressive party. Farmers and small business owners tended to vote for the
LDP.
A more relevant cleavage in Japan was the type of housing and community that the voter
lived in. An urban, rural divide has been suggested, noting that the urban voter was more
likely to be progressive and the rural voter conservative. If the voter lived in a stablecommunity of home owners, they were more likely to be conservative, and if they lived intransient rented apartments, they were more likely to vote for a progressive party. This last
divide was connected with the issue of social networks, as home owners were more likely
to be integrated into neighbourhood associations which have been considered to beorganisationally part of the conservative vote gathering machine.
In The Japanese Voter, the 1976 Lower House election was studied statistically and results
showed that education, income and occupational status had no impact on the vote as would
may be expected from Western norms of voting behaviour. However, community
integration, occupational environment and the urban rural divide had an impact on who
would vote for each party.
Martin and Stronach (1992) found similar results with two major differences. They foundthat higher levels of education would result in higher turnout for opposition parties. They
also concluded that age would influence voting patterns although they contradicted The
Japanese Voter’s assumption and suggested that young people are becoming conservative
rather than tending to vote for opposition parties as they had done in the 1960s and 70s. Yet,alongside the conclusions of The Japanese Voter, they found that being integrated into
societal groups was important, as was the urban-rural cleavage. Personalism, ‘the extensive
and complex hierarchical and lateral communication networks that broaden the reach ofinterpersonal messages in Japan’, which are ‘well-developed, institutionalised proceduresfor transmitting partisan communications’ are also of importance (as shown in The
Japanese Voter).
Based on the above findings, this chapter will ask whether voting behaviour has changed
sufficiently since 1980 to explain the decline of the JSP and the increase of non-partisan
support in the 1990s.

62Voting behaviour, 1980-2000
Analysing voting behaviour can be difficult in Japan due to the lack of available data to theresearcher who does not have the resources to commission their own survey. Consequently,
data has been obtained from the Asahi Shimbun’s monthly opinion poll on support forpolitical parties (Asahi 1996) An average of 2,500 Japanese over the age of 20 arequestioned monthly. Data is collected on support for parties according to age, sex, type ofelectoral district and type of employment. According to Yoshida Takafumi of the
newpaper’s Opinion Poll Department, data is not collected on income or education, since
Japanese people would regard this an infringement of privacy.2
There are three main areas that I have decided to analyse. First, voting for political party
according to age, secondly support for parties according to type of occupation and finally
support for parties broken down to size of the town or city in which the voter is resident.
We have opted not to analyse voting behaviour according to sex, as this has not existed inother voting behaviour surveys which we are using for comparison in this study. However,
all other categories will be analysed to show how that variable has affected party voting
patterns.
Parties have been split up into four groups. The LDP, the JSP, other parties, and nonvoters. 3 The category ‘non-voters’ includes those who do not know which party they
support as well as those who do not support a party.

AgeGraph 1

80
60

LDP
JSP
Others
Non

40
20
0
19
80
Ju
19
l
81
Ju
n
19
82
Ju
n
19
83
M
ay
19
84
M
ay
19
85
Ju
n
19
86
M
a
19
y
87
M
ay
19
88
Ju
ne
19
89
Ju
n
19
90
M
ay
19
91
Ju
19
n
92
Se
p
19
t
93
A
pr
19
il
93
D
ec
19
94
D
ec
19
95
D
ec

percentage of Vote

Voting of 20-24 yr olds according to party 19802000

Date

Graph 1 shows how 20-24 year olds voted between 1980 and 2000. This is first graph of2

Interview with Yoshida Takafumi, 12th March, 2001.
Other parties includes the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Kōmeitō, Japan Communist Party (JCP) andsince 1992 the Japan New Party (JNP), the Shinseitō, Sakigake, and Shinshintō.
363this series that breaks traditional expectations. Younger people are expected by bothWestern and Japanese voting behaviour literature to vote progressively (Flanagan 1991).
What we see here is that young people always have and still do support the LDP above anyother party, thus confirming the view of Martin and Stronach (1992). Furthermore, we see
as much support for other parties combined, as we do for the JSP, the main opposition party
until 1993. If we take into account the high levels of support for other parties in 1993, we
see a situation in which young voters are obviously interested in politics and want tosupport a new party through probable feelings of disillusionment about existing parties andpolicies. Finally, the most important result in this table is the sudden surge from 1995
onwards in non-voting. 20-24 year olds are showing themselves to be the key component of
the non-partisan strata and should this behaviour continue as they get older, it could
continue to grow steadily throughout each age cohort.
By comparison with the 20-24 year olds, the voters who are over 60 (see Graph 2) show an
obvious tendency throughout the 1980s and 1990s to support the LDP. What we see here in a very significant finding - is that the over-sixties have also become part of the nonvoting/non-partisan phenomenon. In the period around the Asian financial crisis in Summer
1998, over 60 year olds show a considerable drop in support for the LDP. Perhaps thisrepresents feelings of distrust and insecurity towards the government and the LDP about
what could happen to their lifelong savings. Also, the trend towards non-partisan support
has levelled off in this age cohort and shows the extent to which the non-voting crisis isaffecting political parties, particularly the LDP, if they cannot even count on one of theirmain support cohorts to vote for them. The JSP never really received much support fromthis cohort apart from in the 1989 House of Councillors election, yet the disillusionment
showed by this cohort is no doubt significant to the decline of the JSP as it represents thegeneral declining interest in politics and political parties by all age cohorts.
Graph 2
Voting of over 60 yr olds according to party 1980-2000

60
LDP

40

JSP
Others
Non

n

ar

Ju
20

00

M

n
Ju
19

99

n
Ju

98

97
19

19

n
19
82
J
19 un
83
M
19 ay
84
M
ay
19
85
J
19 un
86
M
19 ay
87
M
ay
19
88
Ju
ne
19
89
J
19 un
90
M
ay
19
91
Ju
19
n
92
S
19 ept93Ap
19 ril
93
D
19 ec
94
D
19 ec
95
D
ec

Ju

81

19
80

0

Ju
l

20
19

Percentage

80

Date

I will now examine how the age cohorts compare with each other in terms of support for
the JSP. In Graph 3, we see results that contradict a Western norm that younger people are
more likely to vote for a progressive party and, once again, we see the JSP as a party withlittle support. It should be recognised, however, that The Japanese Voter did not suggest

64age to be a significant variable for voting in Japan. Graph 3 shows that 20-24 and 40-49
year olds have similar tendencies towards voting for the JSP which suggests that The
Japanese Voter variable of socialisation is in fact more valid than age. Those in their
twenties are as likely to be unionised as their seniors which would be the main social factor
affects JSP voting behaviour. We can also see that support remains for the JSP after 1996
and the emergence of the DPJ. This support mostly consists of those in their forties closely
followed by people in their sixties. I would suggest that this key support is based aroundthe peace and defence cleavage, and the JSP continues to receive support as it is the only
party, apart from the JCP, which has a clear, concise commitment to maintaining theConstitution and Article Nine. These voters maybe have memories of wartime, theoccupation and financial hardship after World War II, or they could have been brought up
by parents with vivid memories of hardship. Thus, the JSP has managed to maintain a small
core support from the generation with memories of World War II because of its clear cut
pacifism. Once this age cohort begins to die out, I would suggest that the JSP will alsocease to exist.
Graph 3

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

20-24
40-49
over 60s

n

ar
M

Ju
20

19

00

n
Ju

99

n
Ju
97

98
19

ec
D

95

19

ec
D

94

19

A

pr

il

ec
19

D

93

93

19

19

n

pt

Ju

Se

91

92

19

n

ay
19

Ju

M

89

90

19

ay

ne
19

M
19

88

87

Ju

n

ay
M

86

19

ay

Ju

19

M

85

84

19

n

ay
19

19

82

Ju

M

83

n

Ju
80

81

19

19

Ju

l

all ages

19

Percentage

Voting according to age for JSP, 1980-2000

Date

In Graph 4, we see the worrying increase in numbers who do not support any of theexisting political parties (the so-called mutōhasō). In 1980, about 15% of voters in theirearly twenties tended not to support any party, whereas by 1998 this had risen to over 70%.
In 1998, over 60% of those in their forties did not support any party compared to less than
10% only twenty years ago. Even over 30% of those in their sixties had decided not tosupport any party. The other significant finding is that the 60 year old cohort and the 40
year old cohort have changed places. Prior to the mid-nineties, the 40 year old cohort was
the one most likely to support a political party. This group by the late 1990s has become
second most likely not to vote after the 20-24 year old cohort. This is a significant trend as
this cohort still has a further life expectancy of at least thirty years and their apparent
disinterest in politics could continue for this period of time.

65Graph 4

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

20-24
40-49
over 60s

n

ar

Ju

00
20

19

M

n
Ju

19

99

n
Ju

c
19

98

c

De
95

97

c

De
94

19

19

ril

De

Ap

93

93

19

n

pt
19

Ju

Se

91

92
19

n

ay
M

90

19

ne

Ju

89

19

19

ay
M

87

19

88

Ju

ay
M

86
19

19

ay

Ju

M
19

19

85

84

n

ay

Ju

M

83
19

19

82

n
Ju

Ju
80

81

19

19

n

all ageslPercenatge

Non-partisan support according to age 1980-2000

Date

Occupation
Graphs 5 and 6 show how classic Japanese occupations have related to mobilised voting.
The JSP garnered its main support from office workers and factory workers who were most
likely to be members of a union. This form of mobilisation is highly dependent on union
membership remaining high. As will be shown below, the level of unionisation is gradually
dropping and this could partly explain the decline in JSP support. The JSP’s lowest support
comes from among self-employed and agricultural workers who show the greatest amountof support for the LDP. It must be noted, however, that support for the LDP is also
consistently dropping in each occupation.
Graph 5

40
35
30
25

Office Workers
Supervisory
Factory Workers

20
15
10
5
0

Self-employed
Agriculture

Date

66

ar

n
20

00

M

Ju
99

98

19

19

19

97

Ju

Ju
n

n

n
19
86
M
ay
19
87
M
ay
19
88
Ju
ne
19
89
Ju
n
19
90
M
ay
19
91
Ju
n
19
92
Se
pt
19
93
A
pr
il
19
93
D
ec
19
94
D
ec
19
95
D
ec

Ju
85

19

M
ay

19
84

n
Ju

M
ay

19
83

19

82

Ju
81

80

Ju

n

l

Unemployed19

19

Percentage

Support for JSP according to Occupation 1980-2000

Graph 6
Support for LDP according to Occupation 1980-2000
90

Factory worker

80

Self employed/Own
business

Percentage of Support

70
60

Supervisory/Manageme
nt

50
40

Office Worker

30
20

Agricultural

10
0

19
8
19 0 J
81 ul
19 Ju
82 n
19 Ju
83 n
19 M
84 ay
19 Ma
85 y
19 Ju
8 n
19 6M
87 ay
19 M
88 ay
19 Jun8 e
19 9 Ju
90 n
19 Ma
9 y
19 1 J
92 un
19 Se
93 pt
19 Ap
93 ril
19 De
94 c
19 De
95 c
De
c
19
97
19 Ju
98 n
19 Ju
99 n
20 Ju
00 n
M
ar

Unemployed/Other

Date

Graph 7

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Office Workers
Supervisory
Factory Workers
Self-employed
Agricultural

ar

n

n

M
00

20

19

99

Ju

n

Ju

Ju

98

97

19

19

Ju
n
19
86
M
ay
19
87
M
ay
19
88
Ju
ne
19
89
Ju
n
19
90
M
ay
19
91
Ju
n
19
92
Se
pt
19
93
A
pr
il
19
93
D
ec
19
94
D
ec
19
95
D
ec

n

M
ay

85

19

19
84

n

Ju

19
83

Ju

82

81

19

80

Ju
19

19

M
ay

UnemployedlPercentage

Non-voting according to Occupation 1980-2000

Date

Non-voting according to occupation (Graph 7) shows more subtle results. Non-partisan
support seems higher amongst the unionised office workers and factory workers,
traditionally JSP and now DPJ supporters. In contrast to this, traditional LDP supporters,
self-employed and agricultural workers seem to have maintained their voting habits. These
results tentatively suggest that it is the opposition that is being the hardest hit by theincreasing mutōhasō (block of non-aligned partisans) and this can partially account for the
decline of the JSP.

Residence
Japanese voting behaviour has traditionally suggested that it was in the big cities where
workers are mobilised into unions and where the lack of chōnaikai and kōenkai weaken
LDP mobilisation tactics that we would see a high level of progressive voting. To thecontrary, Graph 8 suggests that voting for the JSP is higher in towns of over 100,000

67residents rather than in the ten (thirteen) metropolitan districts.4 Furthermore, at several
points in the twenty years under analysis (and also in March 2000), we see that voting for
the JSP is in fact higher in small towns and villages. By March 2000 this is probably
accounted for by the age shift mentioned above. High levels of JSP supporters are in theirforties and above and it is this group that is likely to live in smaller towns and villages. The
fact, however, that prior to the nineties we also saw high levels of voting for the JSP in
towns and villages does challenge traditional expectations.
Graph 8Support for JSP according to residence

Percentage

4030
Met Districts
Over 100,000 Citizens

20

Under 100,000 citizens
Towns and villages

10
19
97
Ju
n
19
98
Ju
n
19
99
J
20 un
00
M
ar

19
80
Ju
l
19
81
Ju
n
19
82
Ju
19
n
83
M
19 ay
84
M
a
19 y
85
Ju
n
19
86
M
ay
19
87
M
19 ay
88
Ju
ne
19
89
Ju
19
n
90
M
a
19 y
91
Ju
19
n
92
Se
19
p
93 t
A
p
19 ril
93
D
19 ec
94
D
19 ec
95
D
ec

0
Date

Graph 9Non-partisan support according to residence 1980-2000

Percentage

80
60

Met districts
Over 100,000

40

Under 100000
Towns and Villages

20
n

ar
M

Ju
20

00

n
Ju
19

99

n
Ju
97

98
19

19

n

19 Jun
83
M
19 ay
84
M
19 ay
85
J
19 un
86
M
19 ay
87
M
a
19
88 y
Ju
19 ne
89
19 Jun
90
M
19 ay
91
J
19 un
92
Se
19
p
93 t
A
p
19 ril
93
D
19 ec
94
D
19 ec
95
D
ec

Ju

82
19

81

19

19
80

Ju
l

0
Date
Non-partisan support according to residence (Graph 9) shows significant results. Rather
traditionally, towns and villages show the highest level of voting which can be expected
due to higher levels of ‘social control’ and the significance of the mobilisational theories
which control voting in Japan. What this graph also shows is the huge increase in nonpartisan support which affects all parties, as it is happening in every type of electoral
district regardless of traditional expectations of high voting levels in rural areas.

4

In the statistics used, the number of large metropolitan districts increased in June 1981 to 11, in April 1989
to 12, and in April 1992 to 13.

68Conclusion
From the graphs shown, four main conclusions can be drawn. First, a traditional Westernvoting behaviour pattern cannot be assumed to be relevant in Japan as young people havenever been strong supporters of the left-wing parties (Graph 1). This suggests that voting ismore along the expressive model than the instrumental model with young people being
mobilised to vote through environmental influences rather than policy and ideologicalconsiderations. The progressive nature of young people has been shown by their huge
support for the new parties in 1993.
Secondly, whilst we have suggested that mobilisational forces and environmental factors
are important in determining voting behaviour, we have seen a tendency for these voting
patterns to break down. Graph 5 has shown that whilst people are becoming non-partisan
across all occupations, support is particularly dropping among those in occupations which
left-wing parties have traditionally mobilised through unions. LDP support is also dropping(Graph 6) across each occupation but not to the extent of the decline of the left.
Thirdly, a core of support remains for the JSP, which Graph 3 has shown to consist ofvoters in their forties and above. It is thought that this group may continue to support the
party through considerations of peace and the peace cleavage.
Finally, the biggest change that the graphs have shown, is the large increase in non-partisan
supporters which can relate in real terms to non-voters. I would suggest that it is this factor- aided by the other factors mentioned above - which partly explains the decline of the JSP.
This leads to the question: why have the electorate become disengaged from politics? As
has been discussed above, expressive and instrumental theories of voter mobilisation
combine to influence the electorate on why they vote for a certain party. The decline andchanges of trade unions, chōnaikai, and working patterns have combined to makeexpressive forms of voter mobilization more difficult for the parties to undertake.
Furthermore, the electorate’s concerns about political corruption have created an ennui thathas also affected the instrumental methods of voter mobilization. I believe that the decline
in voting and partisan-support is connected to the feeling that politics have become corrupt
and the electorate feels that there is no party who supports their concerns.
This paper has also both confirmed and contradicted the findings of The Japanese Voter.
This work, which has been the basis of analysis on Japanese behavioural politics in the past
twenty years showed that environmental and mobilizational factors were pre-eminent in theestablishment of voting patterns. They discounted some factors which are Western normsof voting behaviour, such as age, and instead said that a person’s environment, family andwork situation were more important. In this paper, I have confirmed these findings. I havefound that there is no real correlation between age and voting trends for left-wing parties
yet a Japanese voter’s work place is far more important.
Yet, I have also shown that some environmental factors (residence and occupation) are notas important as The Japanese Voter considers. Voting for the JSP was higher in large cities
than in metropolitan districts and voting for the LDP is declining amongst farmers and selfemployed. The most significant finding is that in comparison to The Japanese Voter, levelsof voting and partisan support have declined significantly.

69

Finally, how do these changes contribute to changes in the Japanese left - my originalquestion? Other variables are of critical significance in understanding why the JSP declinedin the 1990s and the DPJ emerged in its place. To understand these changes it is important
to consider the changes made to the electoral system of the House of Representatives in
1994, declining trade union support for individual politicians, the impact that debate over
the Constitution since the Gulf War has made and the individual actions of politicians aswell as voting and mobilisational factors. This paper has demonstrated two factors whichhave undoubtedly contributed to the decline of the JSP: the declining ability of trade unions
to successfully mobilize the left vote and the increasing group of non-partisan supporters(mutōhasō). Both of these factors have been instrumental in the decline of the JSP.

References
Primary sources
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Flanagan, Scott C. et al. (1991) The Japanese Voter, New Haven, CT: Yale University
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