Running to Stand Still: Common Property Induced Inertia in the Spatial Commons〇 Yutaro Sakai * * , Joshua K. Abbott † † , and Alan Haynie ‡ ‡１ ． Introduction
The metaphor of the “race to fish” is powerful, conveying the over investments in fixed andvariable harvesting inputs when seasonal harvesting rights are ins ecure. We contribute anadditional insight to the linkage between management institutions and harvester behavior bydeveloping and testing a simple theory of the use of space and time in resource systems underinsecure harvest rights that enriches the usua l “race to fish” metaphor. We propose that fishers
in a spatially distributed common -pool fishery may be less mobile than in a system with secure
catch rights and demonstrate the validity of our predictions using exceptionally detailed
spatiotemporal dataon vessel-level effort

in a

trawl fisherybeforeandafter

theimplementation of a catch share system.
２ ． The model
Our stylized model has three key features. F irst, we focus on fishers' within -season time
allocation between harvest and non -harvest (i.e. time spent in moving between grounds)
activities. We assume the variable inputs used for both activities per unit time is optimized out
in a previous stage of decision making, so that fishers focus on how lon g to employ these fixed
inputs at and between fishing grounds. Second, a fisher ’s harvest from a fishing ground depends
only on his/her own harvest time; and it does not depend on other fishers’ efforts directly(congestion externality) or indirectly throu gh fish stocks (stock externality). Thus, the onlyinteraction

among fishers operates

through adepletablecommon -pool quota. Theseassumptions allow us to focus on the exact nature of how a common -pool quota setting affects
fishers’ time allocation. F inally, we assume a decreasing marginal harvest in individual fishingtime at each fishing ground due to localized depletion or dispersal of the harvestable resource.
A key result from our model is that a common -pool quota increases the opportunity cost oftime for individual fishers relative to under an individualized quota system. Under acommon-pool quota system, other fishers continua lly harvest fish from the common pool, andthe value of these foregone fish serves as the added opportunity cost of time for each fisher.

東 京 大 学 大 学 院 農 学 生 命 科 学 研 究 科 Graduate School of Agricultural and LifeSciences, The University of Tokyo、 〒 113-8657 東 京 都 文 京 区 弥 生 1－ 1－ 1、 Email:ytr.sakai@gmail.com† † School of Sustainability, Arizona State University‡ ‡ NOAA Alaska Fisheries Science Center**

This wedge distorts fishers’ time allocation by skewing the relative prices of harvest andnon-harvest time. If the undistorted marginal cost of time spent in harvest activities is greaterthan that of non-harvest activities, then insecure property rights to catch induces fishers todelay the decision to move to new grounds. Paradoxically, the “race” to fish manifests its elf in
an intense, yet relatively stationary, fishery.
３ ． Empirics
We demonstrate the empirical relevance of this effect by analyzing fishing behavior before andafter a transition to a catch share in the Eastern Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands (BSAI)
mixed species groundfish trawl fishery. Prior to 2008, the fishery operated as a limited licenseprogram with fleet-wide total allowable catches (TACs) allocated to each target species. In 2008,Amendment 80 (A80) to the BSAI F ishery Management Plan was implemented. A80 effectively
granted each vessel a defined share of the total A80 TAC for the six target species .
The primary data for o ur analysis are unusually detailed confidential observer data on thelocation and catch of each vessel from the North Pacific Groundfish Observer Program (NPGOP).
Onboard observers record the deployment and retrieval location and times for every trawl.
Observers are also tasked with randomly sampling, without pre -announcement, particular hauls
for species composition sampling. On ce these hauls are selected the contents are randomly
sampled to provide assessments of the weight or numbers of target and prohibited species catch(PSC). We have access to this unusually thorough record of fishing activities and catchcomposition for vessels both before and after Amendment 80.
Using this exceptionally high-resolution data and a variety of rules to classify whensubsequent trawls are “mining ” a ground vs. moving to a previously unfished area, we use linear
probability models to demonstrate that the propensity to move to new fishing grounds
increased in statistically and economically significant ways after the institution of catch shares.
We also use quantile regression techniques to demonstrate that the entire distribution ofdistance of movement (as measured by the distance between subsequent trawls) experienced an
upward shift, validating the predictions of our theoretical model.
４ ． Conclusion
Our findings not only shed additional light on the role of space and time in the dissipation of
resource rents under insecure access but also raise interesting questions about the potential
impacts of how access institutions alter both the magnitude and the concentration of fishingactivities across the marine environment – potentially concentrating impacts on particular
habitat substrates in ways that are not adequately understood.