The 2011 East Japan Earthquake Bulletin of the Tohoku Geographical Association
http://tohokugeo.jp/disaster/disaster-e.html
1 April 2012

Displaced human mobility due to March 11 disasterYoshitaka Ishikawa
Department of Geography, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
Email: ishikawa.yoshitaka.4n(a)kyoto-u.ac.jp
Abstract
After confirming the number and the data sources of the refugees caused by the
March 11 disaster, we examined their destinations as well as the difficulties faced bythem and the damaged areas.
Introduction
Most human mobility in the contemporary world is considered voluntary. The
giant tsunami and the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, caused by the huge
earthquake on March 11, 2011, catastrophically damaged the Pacific coastal areas of the
Tohoku region. The number of casualties in the tsunami was horrific. As of March, 2012,
the dead and missing are approximately 15,850 and 3,150, respectively. This disaster
caused massive flows of displaced people in three prefectures: Iwate, Miyagi and
Fukushima. This paper investigates their evacuation and focuses on these threeprefectures.
Number of Refugees
Immediately after the tsunami and the nuclear plant disaster, a mass evacuation
took place from the coastal to the inland areas and the more distant regions. Fig. 1 shows
the number of refugees (hinan-sha). Although this figure’s curve seems very strange, it
reflects the data frequently used by the mass media during the past year and shows theseriousness and complexity of the displacement.
On March 14, three days after the earthquake, the number of refugees exceeded
468,000. Then it started to decrease rapidly. A slight rise in the number in early June
2011 is related to the change of the data source from the National Police Agency to the
Cabinet Office. The sudden increase of refugees in the middle of November 2011 reflectsthat the newly confirmed refugees at temporary housing (kasetsu jutaku) in the threeprefectures had been incorporated into the total. Therefore, the decline of refugees until1

mid-November (Fig. 1) is misleading because it overlooks a considerable part of them. If
we keep this in mind, the actual number has probably been decreasing very slowly since

11 Feb 201211 Jan 201211 Dec 2011

11 Nov 2011

11 Oct 2011

11 Sep 2011

11 Aug 201111 Jul 201111 Jun 2011

11 May 201111 Apr 2011

500,000
450,000
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,0000

11 Mar 2011

Number of Refugees

the middle of March, 2011.

Fig. 1 Number of refugees
Source: National Policy Agency, the Cabinet Office, and the Reconstruction Agency

The evacuation started when refugees left their original residences. The great
majority of evacuation sites were shelters (hinan-jo) and included schools, gymnasiums,
preschools, city or town halls, community centers, libraries, hospitals, fire stations,
shopping centers, and shrines/temples. Even inns/hotels or the houses of relatives/friends
were used by the refugees. The construction of temporary housing (kasetsu jutaku) began
in April 2011 (Kokudo Kotsu Sho, 2012), and local governments encouraged them to moveinto these houses. Temporary houses have gradually replaced shelters as evacuationsites.
Data Sources on Refugees
The data sources for identifying refugees can be divided into three kinds. The firstsource is lists containing information on individual refugees, such as name, age, gender,
home address, and so on. These lists have been uploaded to many official websites of thelocal governments in the three prefectures.
Iwate/Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures listed the refugee information insomewhat different formats. Iwate prefecture released 730- and 733-page lists of refugee
information as of April 11 and April 28 as pdf files (see, for example, Iwate-ken, 2011). For
approximately 70,000 refugees, each long list contains such information as names and2

addresses of shelters, names, home addresses, and ages. Fukushima Prefecture released
similar lists as pdf files on 74,872 refugees and 1,012 pages of information (March 31),82,653 refugees and 1,100 pages (May 3), and 82,644 refugees and 1,102 pages (May 29).
Moreover, many refugee lists prepared by local municipalities were also uploaded. In
Miyagi prefecture, such long, prefecture-wide files were not released, but many lists,
which often included handwritten information, were made available on local
municipalities’ websites. One excellent point of Miyagi’s files is that the municipalities
where refugees lived previously and the municipalities to which they moved were
presented as origin-destination tables (see, for example, Miyagi-ken, 2011). This
simplifies geographical investigation.
Since the above files contain detailed data on the evacuees and much personal
information, they should not be released under normal conditions from the standpoint ofprivacy protection. However, such announcements on websites were generally adopted bygiving priority to confirming the safety of residents. Newly updated files have often been
added, based on changes in the refugees living in each shelter. This situation reflects theseverity of this displacement, but it also presents a good opportunity for human mobility
research from a geographical perspective. However, as shelters (in particular, type A in
Table 1) were closed due to temporary housing construction, the websites, including
refugee files, have gradually been closed. Although these data based on such sources arevaluable for geographical examination, they are somewhat difficult to use due to different
file formats.
The second data source is announcements by the national government based on
the information reported from the damaged municipalities. Since the birth of thousandsof refugees on March 11, disaster reports, including the refugee-related information, havebeen released by the National Policy Agency, followed by the Cabinet Office, Governmentof Japan. After the inauguration of the Reconstruction Agency in December 2011, suchwork has been assumed by this agency.
This source provided decomposed refugee numbers by prefecture and four
categories of facility: type A (shelters: community centers, schools, and so on), type B(inns or hotels), type C (other: houses of relatives, friends, and so on), and type D(residences including public houses, temporary houses, private houses, and hospitals).
Immediately after March 11, a great majority of the refugees was forced to live in type A,
and thus, the term “shelter” tended to be narrowly used to denote only this type. However,as construction of temporary houses progressed, most refugees have moved to type D.
Using these cross-tabulated data between prefecture and facility type, we can3describe the following evacuation information in the three prefectures since early June,
2011 (Table 1). Note that this information has been announced almost every two weeksince June 2011.
Table 1 Refugees by prefecture and facility type
Iwate

No

Surveydate

Miyagitype D

type A

type B

type C

type D

type A

type B

type C(shelters)(inns/(houses of(resi-(shelters)(inns/(houses of(resi-

hotels)relatives/

dences)hotels)relatives/

dences)

Total

Total

friends)

friends)1

Jun 2 2011

25,747

9,039

14,701-

25,48923,454

2,035

-

-

2

Jun 16 2011

18,641

7,018

2,032

9,591

-

19,266

17,231

2,035

-

-

3

Jun 30 2011

9,339

5,006

2,032

2,301

-

15,871

13,836

2,035

-

-

4

Jul 14 2011

6,127

2,771

2,032

1,324

-

12,874

10,839

2,035

-

-

5

Jul 28 2011

4,892

1,144

2,032

1,716

-

10,282

8,247

2,035

-

-

6

Aug 11 2011

5,092

651

54

3,516

871

7,361

5,713

1,648

-

-

7

Aug 25 2011

4,233

105

16

3,232

880

6,038

4,744

1,294

-

-

8

Sep 8 2011

1,801

4

8

884

905

2,853

2,234

619

-

-

9

Sep 22 2011

1,807

4

8

886

909

2,122

1,836

286

-

-

-

10

Oct 6 2011

1,877

4

8

882

983

910

822

88

11

Oct 20 2011

1,922

0

8

878

1,036

321

225

43

53

-

12

Nov 2 2011

1,978

0

0

893

1,085

398

176

25

197

-

13

Nov 17 2011

42,47200885

41,587122,229

31

16

191

121,991
122,35114

Dec 1 2011

43,95300882

43,071

122,557

16

15

175

15

Dec 15 2011

43,81200873

42,939123,927

5

15

147

123,760

16

Jan 12 2012

43,87500876

42,999125,0080

0

137

124,871

17

Jan 26 2012

43,78200861

42,921

125,14600

133

125,01318

Feb 9 2012

43,77300863

42,910126,23200

123

126,10919

Feb 23 2012

43,35300791

42,562

127,714

0

0

1,021

126,693

Fukushima

No

Surveydate

type A

type B

type C

type D

Total of

Total of(shelters)(inns/(houses of(resi-

three

other

hotels)relatives/

dences)Total

prefectures prefectures

National
total

friends)1

Jun 2 2011

23,9796,105

17,874--75,21549,379124,5942

Jun 16 2011

22,063

4,744

17,319--59,97052,435

112,4053

Jun 30 2011

19,484

3,455

16,029--44,69454,542

99,236

4

Jul 14 2011

16,642

2,528

14,114--35,64355,90991,552

5

Jul 28 201113,192

1,898

11,294--28,366

58,69787,063

6

Aug 11 2011

9,077

1,015

8,062

-

-

21,53061,56983,0997

Aug 25 2011

6,683

780

5,903

-

-

16,95465,991

82,9458

Sep 8 2011

3,834

230

3,604

-

-

8,488

66,41274,9009

Sep 22 2011

2,634

133

2,501

-

-

6,563

66,68673,24910

Oct 6 2011

1,628

95

1,533

-

-

4,415

67,163

71,57811

Oct 20 2011

1,149

79

1,070

-

-

3,392

67,966

71,35812

Nov 2 2011

466

45

421

-

-

13

Nov 17 2011

94,34341

92-

94,2102,842

68,72371,565

259,044

69,859328,90314

Dec 1 2011

95,20019

37-

95,144

261,71070,981

332,69115

Dec 15 2011

95,54618

22-

95,506263,285

71,501

334,78616

Jan 12 2012

96,8350

2-96,833

265,718

72,101

337,819

17

Jan 26 2012

97,2870

2-97,285266,215

75,196

341,41118

Feb 9 2012

97,2310

1-97,230267,236

75,273

342,50919

Feb 23 2012

97,43300-97,433

268,500

75,435343,935

Source: The Cabinet Office and Reconstruction Agency

4

Until summer 2011 the main category was type A in Iwate and Miyagi and type B
in Fukushima. However, after completion of the temporary houses, type D has become
predominant in all three prefectures. In Fukushima, type B has always exceeded type A
in Table 1, because facilities classified as type A could not accommodate a large number of
evacuees, especially from the eastern coast areas, due to the nuclear plant accident, and acertain part of them fled to type B for safety. Type C remains important in Iwate, because
it amounts to 790 – 900 persons since September 2011 and the number of evacuees in thistype has been rather stable. According to an explanation by an official at theReconstruction Bureau of the Iwate Prefectural Government, they can be regarded as
long-term evacuees from Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures.
Moreover, note in the table a consistently increasing amount of refugees from49,000 in early June 2011 to 75,000 at the end of February 2012 in other prefectures
except the three prefectures. This suggests that the disappearance of large-scaleevacuation since March 11, 2011 seems quite unlikely in the near future. A great majority
are refugees from Fukushima Prefecture because of the nuclear plant disaster (Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, 2012).
The third data source is the National System of Refugee Information (zenkoku

hinan-sha joho shisutemu), which was established by the Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications in April 2011 to identify the exact evacuation locations of refugees. In
this system, the refugees themselves provide their current information to themunicipalities of their home address through the municipalities of their current address.
Therefore, unlike the first and second sources, this is based on the refugees’ own
declarations, which is the merit of this system. Note, however, that since a particularrefugee can be counted more than once due to a change of shelter, the data based on thissystem are not necessarily exact and complete.
Despite the above merit, this system’s data have not been tallied sufficiently since
October 2011. Since the refugee number seemingly tended to increase due to evacuation
termination or shelter changes, the data provided by this system diverged from actuallyplausible numbers. Moreover, the substantial similarity of the local municipalities’ work
between this system and the usual investigation of refugees, which gathered refugee
information as the first data source, led to the cessation of detailed summing-up jobs.
Even though the data derived from the National System of Refugee Information seemconvenient to use, since this system was developed to effectively confirm refugee
information, academic researchers are generally not allowed access to it.

5Evacuation Destinations
Figure 2 shows the displacement destinations by prefecture as of August 25, 2011
and February 23, 2012, based on announcements by the Cabinet Office and theReconstruction Agency. Maps utilizing the data from the National System of Refugee
Information, which were specially provided to us to investigate refugee evacuation, werealso drawn, but the spatial patterns of the destinations resemble those from the Cabinet
Office. Thus, maps based on the system are not presented here. Note that many fewer
evacuees existed in August 2011 than in February 2012 because the former does notcontain a considerable portion of the temporary housing dwellers. This figure depicts a
few salient features.
First, note the massive short-distance evacuation in particular prefectures or tothose located west of the three prefectures such as Akita, Yamagata, and Niigata.
Intra-prefectural evacuation in Miyagi is also seen from the above origin-destinationtables. Acutely damaged municipalities with saw-toothed coastlines, such as Kesennuma
City, Minami-sanriku Town, Onagawa Town, and Ishinomaki City, tend to have more
intra-municipality evacuees.
Second, evacuation destinations are widely dispersed throughout eastern Japan,
including the Tokyo metropolitan area, reflecting that with respect to usual voluntary
migration, the Tokyo area is a major destination from the Tohoku region, including thethree prefectures.
Third, remarkably, a certain portion of refugees moved beyond the Tokyo area toprefectures located in the western half of the country, which contains the two major
metropolitan areas of Nagoya and Osaka (also see Oda, 2012). Even prefectures farther
west of Osaka received refugees, although not many, partly due to the positive support
offered by local governments in western Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 2011; Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, 2011c). As a result, although the Osaka metropolitan area (consisting of Kyoto,
Osaka, Hyogo, and Nara prefectures) showed net out-migration from 1974-2010, theinflux of evacuees from eastern Japan, including Fukushima prefecture, and officerelocations from the Tokyo metropolitan area resulted in slight net in-migration (4,209
persons) in 2011 (Asahi Shimbun, 2012a).
We should also devote attention to foreign residents who returned to their homecountries after the nuclear plant crisis (Nikkei Business, 2011). Due to space limitations,however, this topic is not examined here.

6Fig. 2 Evacuation destinations by prefecture
Source: The Cabinet Office and Reconstruction Agency

7

Difficulties of Refugees and Damaged Areas
Next, we briefly discuss the difficulties of the refugees and the disaster areas
chiefly based on newspaper articles. Unlike voluntary migrants, displaced migrants faced
the following difficulties.
First, a certain portion experienced multiple traumatic movements from their
original residences due to the changing situation of the receiving organizations andmunicipalities or their policies of closing small shelters and merging them into larger
ones (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011a, b). However, such cases may be acceptable if the
refugees are eventually able to return to their home addresses or municipalities.
Second, evacuation was especially difficult for elderly evacuees, since they tended tosuffer the most relocation damage. This deteriorated health and even resulted in death. As
Isoda (2011a) mentions, senior citizens constitute a distinct class of disaster victim. In
Minami-sanriku Town, Miyagi Prefecture, which was devastated by the tsunami, more than
20% of the elderly suffer from symptoms of disuse syndrome (Kahoku Shinpo, 2012). Elderly
evacuees who were separated from other members of their community tend to feel loneliness,leading to alcoholism, deepened dementia, and even a lonely death (Iwate Nippo, 2011).

Third, the movement from shelters (in particular, type A in Table 1) to temporary
houses was considered an important step in the refugees’ self-help. However, somerefugees were reluctant to make this move, because temporary housing dwellers cannot
receive free food service and have to pay for electricity, gas, and water. Some temporary
houses were constructed away from the coastline at higher and less accessible locations,which are inconvenient for shopping and hospitals, and have poor reputations for theirnarrow, insufficient heating and baths (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011e; Asahi Shimbun,
2012b).
Finally, a crucial concern for evacuees is whether they can eventually return totheir original residences. Unfortunately, a significant portion have very poor or noprospects of doing so. Although refugees can only remain in temporary housing for two
years, many have little hope after being forced to leave such houses. This especiallyapplies to the refugees from Fukushima’s coastal areas, which experienced highradioactive contamination (also see Isoda, 2011b).
Furthermore, here are the major problems of the devastated areas. Most of thefishing boats and ports along the Pacific Ocean were badly damaged, and a considerable
part of the flatlands along the coastline of Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures wereaffected by the tsunami and nuclear power plant disaster. It will be very difficult tosufficiently regenerate agriculture and fisheries as basic industries. In addition, there is a8great lack of employment opportunities in the damaged areas. Some small fishingvillages washed away by the tsunami will be reconstructed, but others may simply
disappear forever (e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011d).
Even before March 11, 2011, the coastal areas of the three prefectures had
experienced depopulation; the serious damage caused by the tsunami will probably
further accelerate this trend. In fact, very recent out-migration has been reported fromthese areas. According to the latest Report on Internal Migration in Japan Derived from
Basic Resident Registers, Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures exhibited a net
out-migration of more than 40,000 persons during the period 2010-11 (Asahi Shimbun,
2012a).
Meanwhile, there is also a heartening recent topic implying the return of
residents to the damaged prefectures. According to Fig. 3, which shows the monthly net
migration of the three prefectures since January 2010, net out-migration in Iwate andFukushima and a slight net in-migration in Miyagi with the regional capital Sendai City
were confirmed by February 2011. March and April 2010 witnessed large net
out-migration, because they correspond to year-end and new-year months in thefiscal/academic year in Japan. The tsunami and the nuclear plant accident on March 11
gave rise to large net out-migration of 1,800 persons in Iwate, 4,400 in Miyagi, and 5,900
in Fukushima, and the numbers in these prefectures rose in April.

Fig. 3 Monthly net migration of three prefectures
Source: Report on Internal Migration in Japan Derived from Basic Resident Registers

9However, the net out-migration of Iwate and Miyagi began to shrink from May
2011 and has continued to show a net in-migration since July 2011. This reflects thereturn of refugees, who evacuated to other prefectures after the tsunami. Quite
regrettably, a net out-migration continues in Fukushima, although the number has been
reducing. Therefore, Fig. 3 suggests a big difference of displacement between
Iwate/Miyagi and Fukushima.
Concluding
Concluding Remarks
The damage caused by the tsunami and the nuclear plant accident wasdevastating. If we consider the return of evacuees to their previous residences as acriterion of the termination of the disaster’s negative impact, at this stage there is no or
little prospect for solving the displacement, especially for evacuees from the coastal areasof Fukushima due to their high radioactivity. We have to keep paying great attention tothis displaced human mobility and pursue a careful comparative study between thesituation observed over the past year, especially in the three damaged prefectures inJapan, and that of other displacement migrations throughout the world including theGreat Hanshin Earthquake in 1995.
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
The author offers a prayer for the souls of the victims of the tsunami. An earlier
version of this paper was presented at a meeting organized by the International
Geographical Union’s Commission on Global Change and Human Mobility at Rome
Sapienza University, Italy, on September 23, 2011. The author is grateful for thesuggestions from the participants and the Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications for providing the data derived from the National System of Refugee
Information. He is also thankful to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for its
financial support by a grant-in-aid (no. 21242032).
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