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1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________

No. 24A78_________________

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v.
LOUISIANA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY_________________

No. 24A79_________________MIGUEL CARDONA, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,ET AL. v. TENNESSEE, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[August 16, 2024]

PER CURIAM.
The application for a partial stay presented to JUSTICEALITO in No. 24A78 and by him referred to the Court isdenied. The application for a partial stay presented to
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH in No. 24A79 and by him referred to
the Court is denied.
The Department of Education recently issued a new rule
implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of1972. The rule newly defined sex discrimination to“includ[e ] discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes,
sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual
orientation, and gender identity.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33886(2024).
Several States and other parties sought preliminary
injunctions against the new rule, arguing among otherthings that the rule exceeded the bounds of the statutory
text enacted by Congress. District Courts in Louisiana and
Kentucky agreed with the plaintiffs and preliminarily
enjoined enforcement of the rule in the plaintiff States. The

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DEPARMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANAPer Curiam

Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits thendeclined to stay the injunctions in the interim period while
those courts consider the Government’s appeals of thepreliminary injunctions.
The Government has now filed emergency applications inthis Court seeking partial stays of the preliminary
injunctions pending resolution of the appeals in the Fifthand Sixth Circuits. The Court denies the Government’s
applications.
Importantly, all Members of the Court today accept thatthe plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief
as to three provisions of the rule, including the central
provision that newly defines sex discrimination to include
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity. But the Government argues (and the dissent
agrees) that those provisions should be severed and that theother provisions of the new rule should still be permitted totake effect in the interim period while the Government’s
appeals of the preliminary injunctions are pending in the
Courts of Appeals. The lower courts concluded otherwise
because the new definition of sex discrimination isintertwined with and affects many other provisions of the
new rule. Those courts therefore concluded, at least at thispreliminary stage, that the allegedly unlawful provisions
are not readily severable from the remaining provisions.
The lower courts also pointed out the difficulty that schools
would face in determining how to apply the rule for a
temporary period with some provisions in effect and someenjoined.
In this emergency posture in this Court, the burden is on
the Government as applicant to show, among other things,
a likelihood of success on its severability argument and thatthe equities favor a stay. On this limited record and in its
emergency applications, the Government has not provided
this Court a sufficient basis to disturb the lower courts’interim conclusions that the three provisions found likely

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Per Curiam

to be unlawful are intertwined with and affect otherprovisions of the rule. Nor has the Government adequately
identified which particular provisions, if any, aresufficiently independent of the enjoined definitional
provision and thus might be able to remain in effect.
Moreover, related to the equities, the Sixth Circuit has
already expedited its consideration of the case andscheduled oral argument for October. The Court expects
that the Courts of Appeals will render their decisions withappropriate dispatch. In light of all of the circumstances,
the Court denies the Government’s applications for partial
stays.
It is so ordered.

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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________

No. 24A78_________________

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v.
LOUISIANA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY_________________

No. 24A79_________________MIGUEL CARDONA, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,ET AL. v. TENNESSEE, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[August 16, 2024]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN,JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting
in part from the denial of applications for stays.
Respondents challenged a Department of Education rule
implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of1972. Respondents contend that the rule unlawfully redefines sex discrimination; that it violates students’ and employees’ rights to bodily privacy and safety; and that its definition of hostile environment harassment is inconsistent
with the statute and violates the First Amendment. Every
Member of the Court agrees respondents are entitled to interim relief as to three provisions of that Rule: 34 CFR§106.10 (2023) (defining sex discrimination), §106.31(a)(2)(prohibiting schools from preventing individuals from accessing certain sex-separated spaces consistent with theirgender identity), and §106.2’s definition of hostile environment harassment. Respondents’ alleged injuries flow fromthose three provisions.
Today, however, a majority of this Court leaves in place

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DEPARMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANASOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

preliminary injunctions that bar the Government from enforcing the entire rule—including provisions that bear noapparent relationship to respondents’ alleged injuries.
Those injunctions are overbroad. To be sure, this litigationis still unfolding, and respondents might eventually show
injuries from the other portions of the rule. If so, those injuries might merit further relief. For now, on the briefing
and record currently before us, I would stay the preliminary
injunctions except as to the three provisions above, in keeping with the traditional principle of equitable remedies that“relief afforded [to] the plaintiffs” must not “be more burdensome than necessary to redress the complaining parties.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979); see
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765(1994) (“[An] injunction [should be] no broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals”).
I
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United Statesshall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 86 Stat. 373, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).
Congress charged the Department of Education with “issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability” to“effectuate” Title IX’s antidiscrimination mandate. §1682.
Pursuant to that authority, in April 2024, the Department
issued an omnibus rule amending Title IX’s regulations, set
to take effect nationwide on August 1, 2024. See 89 Fed.
Reg. 33474 (2024) (Rule). The amended provisions of theRule cover a range of matters, most of which do not reference gender identity discrimination and went unmentioned
by respondents.1——————
1 Those provisions include: a provision requiring access to lactation
spaces and “reasonable modifications” for pregnant students, such as restroom breaks, 89 Fed. Reg. 33888, 33895–33896 (to be codified in 34

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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

Respondents claim they are harmed by three provisionsof the Rule. First, at 34 CFR §106.10, the Rule defines“[d]iscrimination on the basis of sex” to “includ[e] discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics,
pregnancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, andgender identity.”
89 Fed. Reg. 33886.
Second, at§106.31(a)(2), the Rule addresses Title IX’s application insex-separated spaces. 89 Fed. Reg. 33887. The Rule leaves
untouched Title IX’s explicit recognition that schools may
differentiate between students on the basis of sex in somecontexts, such as in assigning dormitories and creating athletic teams.2 Outside those statutory exceptions, however,——————
CFR §§106.40(b)(3)(v), 106.57); a provision affirming the legal rights ofparents and guardians to act on behalf of complainants and respondents,
89 Fed. Reg. 33885 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.6(g)); three provisions
addressing schools’ obligations in responding to claims implicating Title
IX, including measures to assist impacted parties, employee-notification
requirements, Title IX coordinator duties, applicable grievance procedures, and protection of personally identifiable information, 89 Fed. Reg.
33888–33895 (to be codified in 34 CFR §§106.44, 106.45, 106.46); a provision addressing schools’ obligations to designate Title IX coordinators,
and adopt and implement a nondiscrimination policy and grievance procedures, 89 Fed. Reg. 33885–33886 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.8); a
provision clarifying schools’ obligations with respect to retaliation, 89
Fed. Reg. at 33896 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.71); a provision clarifying that the Department of Education’s Assistant Secretary of Civil
Rights will not deem a recipient to have violated the Title IX regulations
solely because the Assistant Secretary would have reached a different
decision in a particular complaint alleging sex-based harassment, 89
Fed. Reg. at 33895 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.47); and a provision
addressing what pre-employment inquiries a school may make regarding
an individual’s marital status and sex, 89 Fed. Reg. 33896 (to be codified
in 34 CFR §106.60).
2 Specifically, those contexts include membership in fraternities or sororities, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a)(6), separate living facilities, §1686, and athletic teams, Education Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 612. The Department explained in the Rule that neither §106.31(a)(2) nor anything elsein the Rule addresses or alters existing requirements governing sex separation in athletics, which is the subject of a separate rulemaking. 89
Fed. Reg. 33816–33817.

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DEPARMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANASOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part§106.31(a)(2) states that Title IX generally permits “different treatment or separation on the basis of sex” only to theextent that such differential treatment or separation doesnot “discriminat[e]. . . by subjecting a person to more thande minimis harm.” Section 106.31(a)(2) further provides
that a policy or practice that “prevents a person from participating in an education program or activity consistent
with the person’s gender identity subjects a person to morethan de minimis harm on the basis of sex.” (Emphasis
added.) Sections 106.10 and 106.31(a)(2) are the only provisions in the entire Rule that reference “gender identity.”
Third, at 34 CFR §106.2, the Rule defines several terms,
including “hostile environment harassment.” 89 Fed. Reg.
33884. “Hostile environment harassment” is a prohibited
form of sex discrimination that, as defined by the Rule, involves “[u]nwelcome sex-based conduct that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, is subjectively and objectively
offensive and is so severe or pervasive that it limits or denies a person’s ability to participate in or benefit from therecipient’s education program or activity (i.e., creates a hostile environment).” Ibid. Respondents do not object to§106.2’s definitions of other terms within the Rule, such as“complaint,” “disciplinary sanctions,” “elementary school,”and “student.”
Two groups of States filed suits in two District Courts
challenging the new Rule as unlawful.3 They contend that——————
3 One suit was brought by the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Idaho, joined by the Louisiana Department of Education and
18 Louisiana school boards. Another suit was brought by the states ofTennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia, joinedby an association of Christian teachers and a 15-year-old girl from West
Virginia. Several other States and parties have filed similar suits challenging the Rule and requesting preliminary injunctions within theplaintiff States. See Kansas v. United States Dept. of Ed., __ F. Supp. 3d__, 2024 WL 3273285 (D Kan., July 2, 2024); Texas v. United States, No.
24–CV–86, 2024 WL 3405342 (ND Tex., July 11, 2024); Carroll Independent School District v. United States Dept. of Ed., __ F. Supp. 3d __,Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in partthe Rule unlawfully rewrites Title IX’s prohibition on sex
discrimination to include discrimination based on students’gender identity. Respondents further argue that §106.2’s
definition of “hostile environment harassment” is unlawful
under Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S. 629(1999), because it waters down the standard for what constitutes actionable sex-based harassment: Title IX complainants can prevail under the Rule by showing the allegedharassment was severe or pervasive (as opposed to both)and do not need to prove that the offending conduct denied
them access to educational benefits. Respondents separately assert that §106.2’s definition of “hostile environment harassment” violates the First Amendment bychilling or compelling speech, including on issues of gender
identity.
Accordingly, when respondents asked the District Courts
to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the Rule, they focused on the two provisions concerning gender identity—§§106.10 and 106.31(a)(2)—and §106.2’s definition of “hostile environment harassment.” Respondents alleged thatthose three provisions would cause them irreparable harm
if the Rule went into effect. Specifically, they asserted thatthey would incur unrecoverable costs in complying withthose provisions (and a loss of Title IX funding if they failed
to do so), that they would lose the right to speak freely on
issues such as gender identity, and that they would be unable to enforce existing state laws that conflict with theRule’s prohibition of gender identity discrimination. Although respondents’ alleged irreparable harm apparently
traces back to just three of the Rule’s provisions, the District Courts preliminarily enjoined the Government fromenforcing the entire Rule in all the respondent States.
——————
2024 WL 3381901 (ND Tex., July 11, 2024); Arkansas v. United States
Dept. of Ed., No. 4:24–CV–636, (ED Mo., July 24, 2024), ECF Doc. 54;
Alabama v. Cardona, No. 7:24–CV–533, 2024 WL 3607492 (ND Ala.,
July 30, 2024).

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DEPARMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANASOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

After unsuccessful efforts to seek relief from these overbroad injunctions in the lower courts, the Government asks
this Court to stay the injunctions in part. The Government
does not contest the continued injunction as to §106.31(a)(2)(regulating access to sex-separated spaces) or §106.2’s definition of hostile environment harassment as applied to gender identity discrimination. Instead, it asks this Court tostay the injunction as to §106.2’s definition of hostile environment harassment as applied to other forms of sex discrimination, §106.2’s other definitions, §106.10, and the remainder of the Rule’s unchallenged provisions.
II
I would grant most of the Government’s stay requests andleave enjoined only its enforcement of the three challenged
provisions.4 A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary”
exercise of equitable authority, appropriate only “upon aclear showing” that a party is “entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7,
22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must
establish, among other things, that it would likely suffer irreparable harm without equitable relief. Ibid. Even whena party makes that showing, though, a court must tailor equitable relief to redress the party’s alleged injuries withoutburdening the defendant more than necessary. See Madsen, 512 U. S. at 765 (“[An] injunction [should be] nobroader than necessary to achieve its desired goals”); Yamasaki, 442 U. S. at 702 (explaining that “relief afforded[to] the plaintiffs” must not “be more burdensome than necessary to redress the complaining parties”).
Here, respondents’ alleged injuries flow from the challenged provisions. Even assuming respondents establishedthat those provisions subject them to a threat of irreparable
harm, enjoining enforcement of the entire Rule appears to——————
4 For §106.2, I would leave enjoined only its definition of “hostile environment harassment.”

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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in partgo beyond what was necessary to redress those injuries.
Consider some of the unchallenged provisions. The Rulerequires schools to provide “reasonable modifications” topregnant students, including but not limited to “breaks during class to express breast milk, breastfeed, or attend tohealth needs associated with pregnancy or related conditions.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33887. A separate provision prohibits
schools from making a preemployment inquiry as to an applicant’s marital status and limits the circumstances underwhich a school may make a preemployment inquiry as to an
applicant’s sex. Id., at 33896. The Rule also mandates that
schools prohibit staff and students from retaliating against
students who file Title IX complaints, and provides the procedure a school must follow upon receiving a complaint ofretaliation. Ibid. Those provisions (like many others in theRule) do not reference gender identity discrimination or
hostile environment harassment and bear no apparent relationship to respondents’ alleged injuries. As litigation
over the Rule proceeds, respondents might be able to show
those other portions of the Rule will irreparably harm themin a manner justifying further equitable relief. At this juncture, however, enjoining the application of any other part of
the Rule needlessly impairs the Government from enforcing
Title IX and deprives potential claimants of protections
against forms of sex discrimination not at issue in respondents’ suit.
Respondents maintain that the Government must remain enjoined from enforcing the entire Rule because thechallenged provisions “permeate” it. Respondents fail to explain, however, why enjoining enforcement of the entire
Rule at this stage is necessary to redress their alleged injuries. As an initial matter, many unchallenged provisions(such as those governing preemployment inquiries about anapplicant’s marital status or sex and prohibiting pregnancy
discrimination) include no reference to gender identity dis-

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DEPARMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANASOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in partcrimination or hostile environment harassment. Respondents offer nothing to justify preventing the Government
from enforcing those parts of the Rule. As for the provisions
that do incorporate the Department’s allegedly unlawful
definitions of sex-based discrimination and harassment, respondents do not explain how those provisions would injure
them while the Government is enjoined from enforcing the
disputed definitions. Take the Rule’s requirement that employees be trained on “[t]he scope of conduct that constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX and this part, including the definition of sex-based harassment.” 89 Fed.
Reg. 33886. Even respondents do not argue that the training requirement is itself unlawful. With the challenged provisions out of the picture, the “scope of conduct” under thattraining provision would exclude gender identity discrimination and hostile environment harassment, the sources of
respondents’ alleged injuries. If there were any doubt on
this score, moreover, the Court could simply have excluded
the provision from its stay order.
Respondents further assert that the Rule would be unworkable with the Government enjoined from applying its
definition of sex discrimination. For 50 years, however, Title IX regulations have not defined sex discrimination, andrespondents offer no evidence that schools cannot comply
with their Title IX obligations without such a definition.
***
By blocking the Government from enforcing scores of regulations that respondents never challenged and that bear
no apparent relationship to respondents’ alleged injuries,
the lower courts went beyond their authority to remedy thediscrete harms alleged here. The injunctions this Court
leaves in place will burden the Government more than necessary. The injunctions will also affect the public. Individuals in the respondent states will be deprived of guidanceCite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

related to their rights under Title IX, of updates to the processes schools must follow in investigating their complaintsof sex discrimination, of protections from retaliation should
they file a complaint, and of much more. On the present
record, more tailored relief focused on the three challenged
provisions would have redressed respondents’ alleged injuries without depriving the public of the Rule’s other provisions. Because the majority of this Court nonethelessleaves the overly broad injunctions in place, I respectfully
dissent in part.