Why anti-whaling norms fail to preserve whales - Three hypotheses○Ayako Okubo * , Atsushi Ishii * * , and Yasuhiro Sanada * * *1. Introduction
Japan’s recent withdrawal from the IWC and whaling in the Antarctic may look like areconfirmation that the case of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) is the classic caseof a polarized conflict of norms between anti- and pro-whaling camps. Indeed, the existing
literature often assumes, diagnoses, and/or refers to the whaling case as a norm conflict. However,
the reality is that, anti-whaling countries have not taken action to bring ongoing whaling
activities (except the aboriginal subsistence whaling) under the control of the IWC in order tostrengthen cetacean conservation. In search for a more plausible explanation of anti-whaling
countries’ negotiation behavior in the IWC, this paper first critically reviews the existing
literature to identify its explanatory capacity and then it suggests three alternative hypotheses.
2. Critical review of the existing literature
The most fundamental mistake in the existing literature is that it too easily and automaticallyequates the anti-whaling norm with conservationism or preservationism and don’t elaborate thenature and content of the anti-whaling norm furthermore; the simple basic fact is that being
against whaling (=anti-whaling) and pursuing conservationism or preservationism are not thesame. As argued in the paper, there are even some political situations that pursuing anti-whaling
becomes an obstacle for pursuing conservationism and/or preservationism.
While we do not deny the importance of norms in the whaling debate, the existing literature on
the anti-whaling norms is not only unsuccessful in explaining the IWC negotiations but also inneed of a fresh perspective focusing more on the interaction between the two forces.
3. Three alternative hypotheses
Symbolic politics hypothesis (H1) assumes that the behavior of anti-whaling countries in theIWC meetings is a kind of “symbolic politics”, in which these countries use the moratorium andother conservative proposals as symbols to demonstrate their determination to never accept
whaling (except for aboriginal subsistence whaling). Their objective of doing so is not that they
are trying to save the whales, but it is because they can evade criticism that they do not takeeffective actions to conserve cetaceans. “Symbiotic and scheduled confrontation” hypothesis

***
***

Department of Maritime Civilizations, School of Marine Science and Technology, Tokai University
3-20-1 Orido, Shimizu-ku, Shizuoka 424-8610 TEL054-334-0411 E-mail: okubo@tokai-u.jp
Center for Northeast Asian Studies, Tohoku University
Organization for Regional and Inter-regional Studies, Waseda University

(H2) suggests that the status-quo confrontation in the IWC has been needed by both pro- and antiwhaling countries to pursue their domestic interests. It posits that the long-standing contested
interaction between them has generated a symbiotic relationship between pro- and anti- whaling
countries. Whereas H1 focuses on political behavior announcing goals and measures without
actual intention to implement while shifting responsibility to the other side, H2 grasps
advantages for each side gained from the status-quo. For anti-whaling countries, theconfrontation with pro-whaling countries those who challenged the moratorium provision has
continuously provided favorable opportunities to gain domestic support by appealing theirhard-line attitude toward whaling. Clash of identities discourse hypothesis (H3) attributes theintransigent attitude of anti-whaling countries to the anti-whaling identity discourses whereanti-whalers are categorized as environmentally-friendly, humane, democratic, and so on incontrast with anti-environmental, inhumane, and undemocratic whalers. On the other hand,pro-whaling nations’ identity discourse is closely connected with its national and cultural values
and, frame anti-whaling as negating such their values. As anti- and pro-whaling identity
discourses are positioning themselves as fundamentally opposite to each other, they “clash” witheach other, making concessions to the other side extremely difficult, if not impossible.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
The important characteristic that three hypotheses have in common is that they focus on theinteractive, relational tension between pro- and anti-whaling. The presence and behavior of theopposing side has, we argue, served as an important determinant of behavior of both pro- andanti- whaling countries. For each side, the opposing side has been: a scapegoat to evade own
responsibility (as in H1); a provider of domestic interests (as in H2); and providing the “other”
side of the binary-opposing categories of anti- and pro-whaling which is indispensable toconstruct and reconstruct their identities (as in H3).
Although the explanatory power of each hypothesis needs to be subject to further empiricalanalysis, Japan’s recent withdrawal from the IWC may provide a difficult case for H2 since Japan
is to abandon its own interest it has symbiotically gained from the confrontation with theanti-whaling countries in the IWC. On the other hand, H1 and H3 are still likely to be valid for
explaining the state negotiation behavior in the IWC even after Japan’s withdrawal. Both cases,
needless to say, must be tested through rigorous analyses using systematic and comprehensive
critical discourse analysis which, as for the former, reveal the hidden intention of the states’
behavior, and, as for the latter, reveal the identity categories in use and the relative discursive
positionings of the relevant actors. We believe that a systematic and comprehensive testing of ourhypotheses will provide a better understanding of the long-standing whaling debate and also
further contribute to the study of norms, identities and discourses in international settings.