Is copyright an incentive to create a good anime?

Shinya Kinukawa*
September 9, 2020

Abstract
Theoretically, copyright encourages creativity by rewarding creators for their efforts.
This paper explores the effect of copyright on the quality of Japanese TV animation or
anime, whose creators, anime studios, choose to be the copyright holder or to otherwise
take a fixed payment instead of being the copyright holder. First, a simple economic
model analysis shows that a creator chooses copyright to produce higher quality work if
a fixed payment is sufficiently low. Even if a fixed payment is high, it is shown thatcopyright can be more favorable to a creator focusing on creativity more than profit.
Then, the average treatment effect is estimated by using the quality measure of eachanime work as the output; the treatment is whether or not an anime work was createdby a creator who chose to be the copyright holder. The results show that, on average,
anime works whose creators hold the copyright are more highly rated and viewed
compared to the works whose creators do not hold the copyright. From this, it can beconcluded that copyright is an incentive for anime studios to create higher quality
anime.

Keywords: Copyright, creativity, the Japanese anime industry, average treatment effect* Professor, Faculty of Global Media Studies, Komazawa University, Tokyo, Japan.

e-mail: kinukawa@komazawa-u.ac.jp

1. Introduction
Theoretically, copyright encourages creativity by rewarding creators for their efforts
and thus is an incentive for them to provide valuable artworks. However, as Towse(2010) points out, it is difficult to empirically verify its causal effect because copyrightautomatically attaches to the authors of all works that fall in the scope of the copyrightlaw. Hence, it is hard to find counterfactual situations to test the impact of copyright oncreativity. There has been only indirect data for research on the incentive role ofcopyright (Towse, 2013).
This paper explores counterfactual situations to test the effect of copyright on thequality of artistic work, particularly in the case of Japanese TV animation or anime.
Under Article 29 of the Copyright Law of Japan, anime studios, the creators of anime,
can be copyright holders only if they participate as members of the production
committee (Seisaku-iinkai in Japanese), which consist of companies that finance theproduction.1 Otherwise, studios do not possess the copyright and only receive a fixed
payment from the production committee as contractors. Many anime studios create
anime works but do not possess the copyright thereof. Therefore, a counterfactual
analysis is available to examine the possible change in an anime’s quality if its creator,
who took a fixed payment instead of copyright, had ever chosen to be the copyrightholder.
The analysis begins with a simple economic model that examines the relationshipbetween copyright and a studio’s creativity based on an economic explanation of thecreative process by Throsby (2001). In this model, the quality of an anime is compared
under two types of a studio’s attitude toward creativity and two compensation schemes:by copyright or by a fixed payment. It is shown that copyright can be an incentive tocreate higher quality anime if a fixed payment is sufficiently low. Even if a fixed
payment is high, it is shown that copyright can be more favorable to a creator focusing
on creativity more than profit.
Empirically, the quality of anime work is measured by viewers’ ratings posted on
Anime News Network, a news and information website focusing on anime and manga(Japanese Comics).2 The website claims to be the leading English language source forAnime is categorized as a cinematographic, and its creator is denoted as “author” inthe law.
2 Anime News Network, FAQ, “What is Anime News Network (ANN)?”https://fast.animenewsnetwork.com/faq#what_is_ann (last accessed on September 9,11

anime and manga news on the Internet, and its Encyclopedia, a collaborative databaseof anime and manga titles, offers user ratings and information about those titles. By
using the quality measures of each anime as the output, the average treatment effect isestimated, where the treatment is whether or not an anime work is created by thestudio holding the copyright. The estimation results show that, on average, anime
works whose studios hold the copyright are more highly rated and viewed compared to
the works whose studios do not hold the copyright. Since the results imply the causal
effect of copyright, it can be concluded that copyright is an incentive for studios to create
higher quality anime.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the industrial organization of
the Japanese anime industry and the production structure. Section 3 proposes an
economic model for copyright and a studio’s creativity. Section 4 presents the empiricalframework, data, and the estimation results of the average treatment effect. Section 5
provides conclusions.

2. The Japanese anime industry
In 2018, the total revenue of anime and anime-related products was 2,001 billion yen.
3This revenue comes from TV, movies, video, internet distribution, merchandising,music, pachinko (Japanese pinball), and live entertainment. The entire minutes of all
TV anime produced in 2018 add up to 130,808 minutes. Many recent TV anime titles
consist of 10 to 13 episodes, each of which is about 30 minutes long. Thus, roughly morethan 300 new anime titles were produced in 2018.
The key players of the industry are anime studios, which are currently comprised of
542 studios in Tokyo, and several local studios such as Kyoto animation (Kyoto) and PA
WORKS (Toyama). They engage in planning, production, scriptwriting, direction,
drawing, computer graphics, art, special effect, shooting, and editing. The total revenueof all commercial anime studios was 267 billion yen in 2018, which was about 0.13 of thetotal revenue of the anime and related products industry. This small share of anime
studios in the industry implies that the copyright of many anime works belongs to

2020)
3 The data of Japanese anime industry is from the Association of Japanese Animations,Anime Industry Report 2019 Summary

https://aja.gr.jp/download/anime_ind_rpt2019_summary_en (Last accessed on
September 9, 2020).
2

anime-related companies other than studios.
A group of an anime work’s copyright holders is called the “production committee,” ajoint venture by several companies in anime-related businesses to fund and coordinate
the production, distribution, and marketing of an anime work (Craig 2020, Chap. 9).
The member companies include TV networks, DVD publishers, movie distributors,
manga publishers, record labels, toy and video game makers, web streaming services,and so on. As joint copyright holders of an anime work, they share the revenue to thecommittee. The share in revenue and content of the rights differ among member
companies, but the leading company that invests the most considerable amount has thelargest share. Large studios mainly create anime as the primary contractor of thecommittee, taking a fixed payment for the production cost. In most cases, the production
process is divided, and the primary contractor subcontracts many operations to otherstudios.
Anime studios themselves often participate in the production committee when theycreate an original anime as opposed to a derivative work of a novel or manga created byothers. They also participate in the committee when they bear a part of the production
costs and become joint copyright holder with other member companies. Otherwise, theytransfer all copyright, except for moral rights, to the committee and only receive a fixed
payment.
The 2009 report by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission reveals that anime studios
have relatively weak bargaining power against their client companies, especially TV
networks.4 Creating higher quality anime requires a larger amount of drawing, which
increases production costs. Thus, many anime studios who try to raise the quality of
their works tend to request for higher payments. However, especially for contracts withTV networks, many studios answered that payments are insufficient to createhigh-quality anime, and the client often refuse their request for a pay increase.

3. Copyright and creativity: an economic modelThis section proposes a simple economic model to explain the relationship between
copyright and the creativity of an anime studio manifested by the quality of its work.

The report (only in Japanese) is available athttps://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/cyosa/cyosa-ryutsu/h21/090123.html (lastaccessed on September 9, 2020).
4

3

The model is based on the economic explanation of creativity by Throsby (2001), whoclassifies types of creators into the next three: (I) income as constraint, (II) income as
joint maximand, and (III) income as sole maximand. The type I creators maximize awork’s quality and require only a fixed amount of income that covers the costs for living
and creation. The type II creators maximize both work’s quality and profits. The type III
creators are the same as profit-maximizing firms.
Throsby (2001) categorizes the entertainment industry companies like film andcommercial television as Type III because their creations are solely for business.
However, as Craig (2020) explains, many current anime studios split away fromestablished major studios because of animators or directors who wanted more creative
freedom. An anime studio can be seen not only as a business entity but also as a groupof creators seeking artistic value. Thus, in the following, anime studios are categorized
either as type I or II. 5 Based on these behavior models of Throsby (2001), the effect of
copyright on work’s quality is examined.

3.1 Basic setting
Let 𝑞 be the quality of an anime work and 𝐶 𝑞

𝑞 be the creation cost of the work.

When a studio does not hold the copyright of its work, it receives a fixed payment 𝐹from the production committee. On the other hand, when a studio holds copyright as amember of the production committee, the expectation of the present value of revenue
given 𝑞 during the copyright term is modeled as,
𝑅 𝑞where the parameter 𝑎𝑎𝑞,

0 includes the exogenous factors such as market size, studio’s

bargaining power against other committee members, and discount rate. A work’s
market size may differ from others due to marketing strategies such as export andmerchandising. If a studio’s bargaining power is strong, it may obtain a significant
share of the revenues from its work. Finally, if a studio is smaller and younger, thediscount rate to the future revenue would be higher. Along with these exogenous factors,
the expectation of the revenue increases when the quality increases.
A studio can either choose to be a copyright holder as a member of the production
committee or to take a fixed payment as the contractor without holding the copyright.
The production committee member companies other than anime studio would care for
profits rather than the artistic value and thus be categorized as type III.

5

4

In reality, a studio that chooses copyright receives a fixed payment from the committee,
but at the same time, invests as a committee member. Therefore, in case a studiochooses copyright, it is assumed that the fixed payment offsets the investment, and the
copyright is the only revenue source. Let 𝑞 be the quality of an anime work when thestudio has its copyright, and 𝑞 be the quality when the studio does not have thecopyright and takes a fixed payment instead.

3.2 Behavior of studios
First, for the type I studio, the income is sufficient if it is equal to the production cost,
and the objective is to maximize the quality as much as possible. Then, it solves
max 𝑞∗ , 𝑞 ∗ ,
where
𝑅 𝑞∗

𝐶 𝑞∗ .

𝐹
Since 𝑞∗𝑎 and 𝑞∗

𝐶 𝑞∗ ,√𝐹,𝑞∗𝑞∗ ⇔ 𝑎𝐹.

Therefore, if the fixed payment 𝐹 is smaller than 𝑎 , the studio chooses copyright tocreate higher quality work.
Second, for the type II studio, both the quality and income are the objectives to be
maximized. If the studio chooses copyright, it determines 𝑞 to maximize
𝜋 𝑞Since 𝜋 𝑞

≡𝑅 𝑞

𝐶 𝑞 .

is concave, from the first-order condition, the level of quality maximizing

𝜋 𝑞 , 𝑞 , is
𝑎
.
2

𝑞

If the studio chooses the fixed payment 𝐹, the maximization problem is assumed that it
makes the quality 𝑞 as large as possible, ensuring at least the same level of profit ascopyright, that is,
𝐹

𝐶 𝑞

𝜋 𝑞

.

Then, the optimal quality level for the fixed payment 𝑞
𝐹and thus, by assuming 𝐹

𝐶 𝑞

𝜋 𝑞

𝑎 /4,

5

,

satisfies

𝑞

𝑎
.
4

𝐹

The studio solves max 𝑞 , 𝑞 , and
𝑞

𝑞 ⇔

𝑎
2

𝐹.

The results of the above analysis are summarized as the following:(i) If 𝑎 /4

𝐹

𝑎 /2, both types I and II studios choose copyright, which is an

incentive to create higher quality works.
(ii) If 𝑎 /2

𝐹

𝑎 , type I studio chooses copyright, and type II studio chooses the fixed

payment. Copyright is an incentive to create higher quality work only for type I
studio.
(iii) If 𝑎𝐹, both types I and II studios choose the fixed payment, and the copyright is

not an incentive to create higher quality works.

Whether copyright is an incentive for creating a higher quality work depends on therelative size of fixed payment and studios’ types. If a fixed payment is sufficiently low,many studios will choose copyright to create higher quality anime. Even if a fixed
payment is high, copyright can still be more desirable for studios focusing on creativity
more than profits. As explained in the previous section, many anime studios haverelatively weak bargaining power and are occasionally forced to accept insufficient
payments. Moreover, creators in many anime studios value creative freedom. Therefore,
the model implies that Japanse anime studios would choose copyright to create higher
quality anime, if possible, rather than a fixed payment.

4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Framework
In this section, the effect of having and not having a work’s copyright on its quality is
examined by estimating the average treatment effect. The observation unit for theestimation is an anime work; the outcome is its quality; the treatment is whether or notits creator, anime studio, holds the copyright.
Let 𝑌 denote an anime’s quality if its studio chose copyright and 𝑌 the quality if its
studio chose a fixed payment instead of copyright. The expectation of the difference,6

E𝑌

𝑌 , indicates the causal effect of having the copyright on the quality. It cannot be

estimated because we cannot observe both 𝑌 and 𝑌 for an anime work. However, it
can be estimated based on the observed outcome data by using variables that affect boththe outcomes and treatment but are not affected by treatment. If the outcomes andtreatment are independent conditional on a vector of covariates 𝑋 that satisfies theabove conditions, the average treatment effect can be estimated as
E𝑌

𝑌 |𝑋

E 𝑌 |𝑋E 𝑌 |𝑋 .

For the details, see, for example, Wooldrige (2010).

4.2 Data and sample
The population for the analysis consists of TV anime works created by Japanesestudios whose works are included in an anime ranking list “Anime Top 100 Most
Popular” of Anime News Network. The Top 100 are chosen from all anime works,
including TV anime, movies, and original video animation (OVA), created by Japanesestudios. Detailed information for every anime work is provided on each work’s page inthe website’s “Encyclopedia,” including viewers’ ratings and the number of votes, which
are used as the quality measure in the following analysis. The anime works are limited
to ones where one episode is aired in the 30-minute broadcast time; short TV anime
aired in less than 30 minute time is excluded. Anime works jointly created by two or
more studios are also excluded so that the covariates 𝑋 can include characteristics of asingle studio.
Moreover, anime works created by the following studios are dropped from the
population: (i) studios that created few works as the primary contractor; (ii) subsidiaries
of large companies; (iii) studios that mainly created kids anime. These are excluded forthe following reasons. For (i), a subcontractor only takes the fixed payment from theprimary contractor and cannot be a copyright holder. For (ii), a studio’s financial statusis affected not only by the revenues from an anime work but also by the investment
from the parent company. Some studios became subsidiaries during the sample period,
and their works are excluded except for ones that they created when they wereindependent companies. For (iii), many kids anime titles have no vote for ratings in
Anime News Network.
The sample includes TV anime works that were aired in Japan between 2000 and2018 and whose production committee members were disclosed. Two quality measures7

are used as the output variables. One is the average (arithmetic mean) of all viewers’
ratings (0 to 10) for each title (“rating” hereafter). The other is each title’s averagerating multiplied by the number of votes (“popularity” hereafter). The works that haveno vote are excluded from the sample. Finally, the sample for the estimations consists of
493 anime works created by 17 independent anime studios.

4.3 Variables
The variables used to estimate the average treatment effect are characteristics ofan anime work and its creator, i.e., the studio in charge of its creation as the primarycontractor of the production committee. The data was taken from Anime News Network
and Wikipedia from October 2019 to April 2020. All the characteristics possibly related
to the quality and the decision to take copyright are adopted as variables.

(1) Studio creativity
A studio will create higher quality anime if its creators have a higher level ofcreativity. Since a studio’s level of creativity is not directly observed, a substitutevariable is introduced. The variable studio creativity is defined as the number of eachstudio’s titles listed in “Anime Top 100 Most Popular” of Anime News Network, which
includes many classic titles created out of the sample period. The studio creativity
differs among studios and is constant during the sample period.

(2) Studio age
The ages of studios may affect the copyright decision and works’ quality. Older studios
may have relatively strong bargaining power against the production committee.
Younger studios may have more highly motivated creators. The variable studio age isdefined as the number of years from the studio’s establishment to the work’s initial
on-air year of the first episode.

(3) Number of episodes
An anime with more episodes generates larger revenue for its creator because of its
volume and thus may affect the copyright decision.

8

(4) Derivative work dummy
Many anime works are derivative works of popular comics or novels, for which the
popularity can be highly expected. Being a derivative work or not can affect both the
copyright decision and its quality.

(5) Sequel and spinoff dummy
Sequel and spinoff works are included in the sample as independent observations
because different studios occasionally create an original and its sequel/spinoff works,
respectively. However, in many cases, a sequel or spinoff work is created after its
original work has commercially succeeded. Thus, being a sequel or spinoff needs to becontrolled.

(6) Publication year dummies
Older titles tend to have more votes. Furthermore, several macroeconomic factors canaffect a studio’s copyright decision. For example, on-demand subscription services havebeen increasing studios’ revenue sources through the 2010s. The Japanese governmenthas been improving the business environment of the anime industry since the early2010s under the “Cool Japan Strategy.”6 The year effects and those macroeconomic
factors are controlled by the year dummy variables, which takes one for the initial
on-air year of a work’s first episode.

(7) Genre dummies
An anime work of specific genres may obtain higher or lower ratings than others.
Moreover, anime works of some genres, such as “action” and “science-fiction,” maygenerate more merchandising revenue, for which copyright can be a strong incentive tocreate high-quality anime. In the Encyclopedia pages of Anime News Network, one ormore genre tags are attached to each anime title, and sixteen genres are identified fromthe sample data. Among these sixteen genres, the genre “erotica” is removed. There arethree works for which the genre “erotica” is attached, and they are all created by studiosthat do not hold their copyright. Thus, the “erotica” dummy can perfectly predict the

Cool Japan Proposal, the Cabinet Office of Japan,
https://www.cao.go.jp/cool_japan/english/pdf/published_document3.pdf (Last acceessedon September 9, 2020)
69

treatment for those three works. Since multiple genres are attached to them, theirgenre characteristics are explained by genre dummies other than “erotica.”

4.4 Sample summary
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the outcome and the work level variables
except for genre/year dummies, dividing the sample into copyright and no copyrighttreatment. The sample averages for the two quality measures (i.e., rating andpopularity) are both higher in copyright treatment than in no copyright treatment. The
difference in the average number of episodes is relatively large; the number in copyrighttreatment is about 1.3 times larger than that in no copyright treatment. No significant
differences are observed for the studio age, the number of derivatives, and the numberof sequel/spinoff works.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the outcome and the work level variables

Treatment
Copyright No copyright
OutcomeRatingAverageStandard deviation

7.336
0.784

7.160
1.014

AverageStandard deviation
Independent Variables
Studio age (average)
Number of episodes (average)
Number of derivative works
Number of sequel/spinoff works

11056.019
16773.413

7767.402
11296.024

23.75824.65919355

24.51118.786
204
55

Popularity

Figure 1 and 2 shows the number of works by genres and years. The ratio of copyrighttreatment to no treatment works is especially high in Science fiction and Magic (morethan 2), and low in Slice of life (less than 0.5). For the year trend, the number of
copyright treatment works is larger than the number of no copyright treatment works
after 2012.

10

Tournament
Thriller
No copyrightSupernatural
Slice of life

Copyright

Science fiction
Romance
Psychological
Mystery
Magic
HorrorFantasy
Drama
ComedyAdventure
Action
0

50

100

150

200

Figure 1 Number of works by genres

30
Copyright
25
No copyright
20

15

10

5

0

Figure 2 Number of works by years

Table 2 shows the statistics related to studios: studio creativity, each studio’s total
number of works in the sample, the number of works with copyright in the sample, theratio of works with copyright to all sample works, and the average rating and popularity
11

of all sample works. Differences among studio creativity are significant. A few studios
created many popular titles as opposed to others that created a few. Moreover, there arestudios whose works are all with copyright or without copyright in the sample, which is
the reason why studio dummies cannot be used as variables for estimating the averagetreatment effect.
The correlation between studio creativity and the ratio of works with copyright to all
sample works is 0.293. The correlations between studio creativity and averagerating/popularity are 0.187 and 0.219, respectively. These correlations imply that thestudio characteristic may be necessary as an explanatory variable for the outcome andcopyright decision.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the studio level sample data
StudioRatio of
Number ofcreativity
Total
works withworks with
Studio(Number of
number of
copyright tocopyright
works in "Topworks (A)all works
(B)
100")
(B/A)
Arms
1
19
1
0.053
Artland (before 2006)
1
3
0
0.000
Bones
8
36
35
0.972
Brain's Base
2
26
4
0.154
GAINAX
17
7
1.000
GONZO (before 2016)
5
39
32
0.821
J.C.STAFF
5
73
30
0.411
Kyoto Animation
8
26
20
0.769
Madhouse (before 2011)
12
65
26
0.400
Manglobe
2
15
5
0.333
P.A. Works
1
3
2
0.667
Pierrot
5
41
33
0.805
Production I.G
4
40
35
0.875
Radix (before2006)
1
3
2
0.667
SHAFT
2
22
14
0.636
Studio DEEN
5
67
18
0.269
WHITE FOX
1
8
0
0.000

Averageratings
6.645
7.672
7.548
7.403
7.092
7.107
7.372
7.848
7.311
7.401
7.892
6.941
7.324
5.914
7.638
6.886
7.419

Averagepopularity
8078.843
15426.657
15116.124
6560.226
11630.457
11589.775
7792.727
19150.930
10105.432
11015.084
20236.042
8257.963
9467.070
2559.209
7881.292
5524.653
3940.958

4.5 Estimation results of the average treatment effectTwo procedures are used to estimate the average treatment effect: regression
adjustment and inverse-probability weighting. For the former, the outcome regression
model is the linear one, and for the latter, the probability model of the treatment(copyright) is the logit.7
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimated average treatment effect for rating and popularity,
respectively. See the Appendix for the estimation results of the outcome regressions and7

Both estimations are conducted by using STATA.
12the logit model of the treatment. The estimation results show that, on average, both therating and popularity of works are higher if studios have copyright than if they do not.
All the differences in the average rating and popularity are statistically significant at
the 5% level. The results imply that copyright is an incentive for studios to create higher
quality anime works.

Table 3 Estimated average treatment effect: rating

Regression adjustment

RobustStd. Err.
0.273
0.081

p-value
for z
0.001

7.412
7.139

0.000
0.000
p-value
for z
0.000

Coef.

ATE (Copyright － No copyright)
Possible outcome means
Copyright
No copyright
Inverse probability weight
ATE (Copyright - No copyright)
Possible outcome means
Copyright
No copyright

0.048
0.073
RobustCoef.
Std. Err.
0.332
0.092
7.404
7.072

0.049
0.085

0.000
0.000

Table 4 Estimated average treatment effect: popularity

Regression adjustment

RobustStd. Err.
4737.541251.76p-value
for z
0.00

12016.25
7278.720.00
0.00
p-value
for z
0.00

Coef.

ATE (Copyright － No copyright)
Possible outcome means
Copyright
No copyright
Inverse probability weight
ATE (Copyright - No copyright)
Possible outcome means
Copyright
No copyright1150.79
714.66
RobustCoef.
Std. Err.
4711.661118.04

11437.43
6725.77

1007.64644.110.00
0.00

5. Conclusion
Copyright is indispensable for the anime industry because it is used for businesses suchas DVD sales, internet distribution, and merchandising. Without copyright, anime
works would hardly be provided as information goods. However, is there any difference
between copyright and a fixed payment for anime studios to create high-quality anime?
This paper addresses such a question both theoretically and empirically.
The economic model shows that copyright is superior when a fixed payment is13

sufficiently low, which has been often observed in the Japanese anime industry because
studios have relatively weak bargaining power against their clients. Moreover, evenwhen a fixed payment is high, a studio that focuses on artistic value can choose
copyright because its effort in raising the quality can be directly connected to a revenue
increase, which covers the production costs for high-quality anime. The results of theempirical analysis support the model’s implications. By estimating the averagetreatment effect, it is shown that a work’s quality would have been lower if its creator
had not held the work’s copyright. Thus, copyright is essential not only for businesses
using anime works but also for their artistic value.
Copyright, however, can also harm creativity because copyrighted materials are
inputs for other creative works, as Landes and Posner (1984) point out. Nevertheless,such a negative effect may be minor. An example is a legendary anime Moblie Suit

Gundam, aired in 1979-80.8 Its creator, a studio Nippon Sunrise, was a young andsmall studio at that time. By the late 1970s, established anime studios dominated theTV anime market by providing derivative anime works of popular comics (manga), andthe studio could not enter the market in the same way as those established studios.
Then, it contracted a toy manufacturing company to create a TV anime so that thesponsor company could sell the anime’s merchandise toys. That anime, Moblie Suit

Gundam, was created as an original anime work inspired by another studio’s highly
popular anime, Star Battleship Yamato, aired in 1974-75. It also included a new idea:
integrating a human drama into a science fiction story featuring robots (mecha) thatwere described as being governed by realistic physics and technological limitations. This
new idea built a successful new genre called mecha anime, and many original anime
works in this genre obtained considerable popularity.
Ideas are not protected by copyright, and thus there are plenty of resources to produce
new creative works even under the restriction of copyright, as Liebowits and Margolis(2005) point out. At least in the Japanese anime industry, copyright has not been a
restriction but a driving force of creativity.

The following explanation about Moblie Suit Gundam is from GUNDAM-MONO: THE
MEN WHO MADE GUNDAM, a Japanese book published by KODANSHA in 2002.
8

14

References
Craig, T. (2020). Cool Japan: Inside Japan’s Cultural and Creative Industries. Ashiya,
Japan: BlueSky Publishing.
Landes, W. M. and R. A. Posner (1984). “An economic analysis of copyright law,” Journalof Legal Studies, Vol. 18. No. 2, 325-363.
Liebowits, S. J. and S. Margolis (2005). “Seventeen famous economists weigh in on
copyright: the role of theory, empirics, and network effects,” Harvard Journal of

Law & Technology, Vol. 18, No. 2, 435-457.
Towse, R. (2010). “Creativity, copyright and the creative industries paradigm,” KYKLOS,
Vol. 63, No.3, 461-478.
Towse, R. (2013). “The quest for evidence on the economic effects of copyright law,”

Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 5, 1187-1202.
Throsby, D. (2001). Economics and Culture. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Wooldrige, J. M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

15

Appendix
Table A1 The estimation results of the outcome (rating) regressions
Copyright

6.880
0.029
-0.013
0.001
0.233
0.076

0.299
0.015
0.005
0.001
0.108
0.097

p-value
for z
0.000
0.053
0.017
0.280
0.031
0.432

-0.128-0.1850.175
0.622-0.003-0.336-0.330
0.093
0.265
0.062
-0.2170.546-0.021
0.426-0.045

0.094
0.115
0.094
0.097
0.138
0.173
0.148
0.127
0.139
0.095
0.103
0.187
0.118
0.335
0.145

-0.307
0.170
0.078
0.095
0.296
0.246
0.225
0.207
0.178
0.002
0.422
0.218
-0.064-0.0590.034-0.081-0.143
0.080

0.352
0.346
0.332
0.304
0.314
0.332
0.333
0.303
0.331
0.379
0.332
0.335
0.330
0.325
0.315
0.377
0.363
0.372

Coef.
Constant
Studio creativity
Studio age
Number of episodes
Derivative work
Sequel/Spinoff
Genre dummies
actionadventure
comedydrama
fantasy
horrormagic
mystery
psychologicalromancescifi
life
supernatural
thriller
tournament
Year dumies
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

No copyrightStd. Err

16

6.205
0.015
-0.019
0.018
0.143
0.558

0.565
0.025
0.007
0.006
0.217
0.140

p-value
for z
0.000
0.557
0.008
0.002
0.509
0.000

0.173
0.109
0.063
0.000
0.985
0.052
0.026
0.465
0.056
0.513
0.035
0.003
0.862
0.203
0.756

-0.484-0.419-0.0050.442-0.124-0.194
0.038
0.140
0.548
0.039
0.014
0.396
0.009
0.106
-0.400

0.129
0.194
0.125
0.165
0.185
0.183
0.263
0.197
0.176
0.140
0.192
0.169
0.143
0.198
0.312

0.000
0.031
0.968
0.007
0.503
0.288
0.884
0.478
0.002
0.782
0.941
0.019
0.950
0.591
0.200

0.384
0.624
0.816
0.755
0.347
0.458
0.498
0.496
0.590
0.996
0.204
0.516
0.846
0.856
0.913
0.830
0.694
0.830

-0.067
0.654
1.007
0.718
0.529
0.865
0.696
0.881
0.810
1.026
0.679
0.614
0.062
0.482
0.935
0.652
-0.370
0.700

0.587
0.439
0.453
0.459
0.482
0.434
0.513
0.463
0.429
0.440
0.446
0.457
0.501
0.497
0.454
0.543
0.693
0.528

0.909
0.136
0.026
0.118
0.273
0.046
0.174
0.057
0.059
0.020
0.129
0.179
0.902
0.332
0.039
0.230
0.594
0.185

Coef.

Std. Err

Table A2 The estimation results of the outcome (popularity) regressions
Copyright

Constant
Studio creativity
Studio age
Number of episodes
Derivative work
Sequel/Spinoff
Genre dummies
actionadventure
comedydrama
fantasy
horrormagic
mystery
psychologicalromancescifi
life
supernatural
thriller
tournament
Year dumies
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

No copyright

Coef.

Std. Err

3703.21209.88-369.3493.61
3778.42-1177.89

4773.32331.21131.1036.25
2164.85
1369.89p-value
for z
0.438
0.526
0.005
0.010
0.081
0.390

490.53-3891.82
2702.717284.205832.39-3211.03-1751.40-1596.844528.13-2105.02-1666.678845.77
3168.72
22311.59-3410.21

1939.66
2311.69
1757.67
1864.852579.764070.842032.972442.79
2359.712125.842491.934407.57
2479.089319.902415.93

0.800
0.092
0.124
0.000
0.024
0.430
0.389
0.513
0.055
0.322
0.504
0.045
0.201
0.017
0.158

3194.2015.83
1177.444956.54-1025.15
2383.03433.06-2382.19
9510.01
1164.51-2416.91
4369.65-1270.32
6115.58-841.99

1706.90
1914.18
1254.00
1309.131449.99
6377.482873.48
3500.214001.75
1357.982284.39
1976.69
2124.015055.01
1682.40

0.061
0.993
0.348
0.000
0.480
0.709
0.880
0.496
0.017
0.391
0.290
0.027
0.550
0.226
0.617

1107.75
14117.83
13682.69
8195.43
14211.36
15148.61
6542.482774.924543.27
1238.803023.522419.36-1179.65-375.46-1530.66-6634.08-2683.55
1943.334896.216743.57
8147.534868.195399.33
7549.994440.35
4078.504829.825162.72
4213.884399.24
4070.95
4065.68
4281.654631.214942.20
4813.96

0.821
0.036
0.093
0.092
0.008
0.045
0.141
0.496
0.347
0.810
0.473
0.582
0.772
0.926
0.721
0.152
0.587
0.686

5165.882326.7210459.88
7654.314133.47
8750.404782.292815.33
1141.99
1592.37-2241.49-2239.85-3867.96-1735.38-2724.81-1198.33-771.41
1964.945524.113014.144598.135968.44
3566.653516.294519.853245.613468.203040.18
3189.092994.192941.00
3103.522925.233350.023740.753629.18

0.350
0.440
0.023
0.200
0.246
0.013
0.290
0.386
0.742
0.600
0.482
0.454
0.188
0.576
0.352
0.721
0.837
0.588

17

Coef.

Std. Err-1584.20
12.63-182.4849.94
5556.2630.56

3227.15312.9089.71
50.78
2183.77
1436.51

p-value
for z
0.623
0.968
0.042
0.325
0.011
0.983

Table A3 The estimation results of the logit model of the treatment

Dependent variable: Copyright = 1, No copyright = 0
p-value
Coef.
Std. Errfor z
Constant-1.1760.741
0.112
Studio creativity
0.119
0.041
0.004
Studio age-0.0240.014
0.074
Number of episodes
0.023
0.009
0.011
Derivative work
-1.0700.306
0Sequel/Spinoff-0.1860.260
0.476
Genre dummies
action
0.462
0.249
0.064
adventure
0.382
0.307
0.212
comedy-0.192
0.229
0.402
drama
-0.2000.244
0.413
fantasy-0.2380.314
0.449
horror
0.099
0.435
0.821
magic
0.970
0.457
0.034
mystery
0.519
0.367
0.158
psychological-0.037
0.376
0.923
romance
0.173
0.250
0.489
scifi
0.733
0.290
0.012
life
-0.8780.400
0.028
supernatural
0.630
0.289
0.029
thriller-0.7480.610
0.22
tournament
0.744
0.431
0.084
Year dumies
2001
0.990
0.751
0.188
2002
-0.718
0.814
0.378
2003
0.658
0.741
0.375
2004
1.056
0.723
0.144
2005
0.618
0.752
0.411
2006
0.418
0.717
0.56
2007
1.451
0.706
0.04
2008
1.256
0.700
0.073
2009
1.614
0.741
0.029
2010
0.655
0.759
0.388
2011
1.218
0.781
0.119
2012
1.700
0.759
0.025
2013
1.880
0.752
0.012
2014
2.192
0.783
0.005
2015
1.825
0.776
0.019
2016
2.228
0.845
0.008
2017
2.487
0.848
0.003
2018
2.318
0.861
0.007

18