March 2016

First returns and intentions to return of residents evacuated following
the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
In the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the Japanese government promptly
decided to take steps to decontaminate areas that had been contaminated byatmospheric releases in March 2011. This concerned both evacuated areas andcontaminated areas that had not been evacuated.
In the evacuation zone, which includes all or part of 11 municipalities within the
Fukushima Prefecture, decontamination operations on public and private buildings,
infrastructure, farmland and roads had been completed in six municipalities (Tamura,
Naraha, Kawauchi, Okuma, Katsuaro, Kawamata) by the end of 2015. On completionof these and various other operations (restoring infrastructure and services, setting
up structures allowing dialogue and information exchange), the authorities lifted theevacuation order in all or part of three municipalities (Tamura, Naraha, Kawauchi).
The rate of return of the population to date is between 9% (Naraha now has apopulation of 700 compared with 7,474 before the accident) and 41% (Tamura, 146
inhabitants compared with 205 previously), representing a total of 900 returnees outof nearly 80,000 evacuees. Regularly organised surveys of evacuees showed that, asat the end of 2014, 22% were prepared to return home, 42% had already decided not
to return, while 36% were still undecided.

1) "Fukushima reconstruction" policy
As of 8 August 2013, Japan has engaged in a process aimed at promoting the early return of evacuees underthe best possible conditions. This "reconstruction and revitalisation" policy was formally set out in thePrime Minister's Cabinet Decision of 20 December 2013, entitled For Accelerating the Reconstruction of
Fukushima from the Nuclear Disaster. It is built around four priorities:Enhancing initiatives for lifting evacuation orders and for returning evacuees to their homes;
Enhancing initiatives to support evacuees starting new lives;
Enhancing efforts aimed at controlling the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant and managing the contaminated water issue;
Accelerating the reconstruction of the Fukushima Prefecture after the nuclear disaster (a joint
effort by the Japanese government and TEPCO).

The conditions for lifting evacuation orders are set out in the basic principles laid down in the Cabinet
Decision Accelerating the Reconstruction of the Fukushima Prefecture from the Nuclear Disaster, dated 20
December 2013. There are three conditions:

A total annual dose below 20 mSv (dose rate less than 3.8 µSv/h);Sufficient progress in terms of:

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reconstruction of infrastructure and housing support services (electrical power, gas anddrinking water supply, drainage and sewage treatment, main roads, telecommunications,medical and nursing services, post offices, transport, etc.);- decontamination (especially areas where children are present);
The creation of structures allowing dialogue between residents and local government (i.e.
municipal councils and Fukushima Prefecture).
-It must be stressed that the "derived reference value" calculated in terms of dose rate (3.8 µSv/h)measured one metre above the ground is already met in the green zones (except in a few "hot spots")
before decontamination work has even begun. This value is calculated on the assumption that theadditional exposure due to residual artificial radioactivity from the accident will not lead to an annual dose
above 20 mSv, in addition to natural radioactivity (which is 40 nSv/h on average in Japan according to ahighly conservative estimate)1:(3.8 measured dose rate - 0.04 deducted background)µSv/h x (8 h outdoors + 16 h indoors x 0.4 protection factor of roof and walls) x 365d
= 20 mSv
The "derived reference value" of 3.8 µSv/h must therefore be interpreted as "3.4 µSv/h above the reference
background" and within a given agreed framework (considering the occupancy rate of buildings and theaverage protection factor afforded by their roofs and walls).
The condition relating to decontamination specifies that an effort will be made with particular regard to
public places, especially those frequented by children (school playgrounds and sports and playing fields).
Thus, a "derived reference value" of 0.23 µSv/h very soon emerged from the value of 1 mSv/year referred
to by the government as a long-term goal.
(0.23 measured dose rate - 0.04 deducted background)µSv/h x (8 h outdoors + 16 à indoors x 0.4 protection factor of roof and walls) x 365d
= 1 mSv
The population very often sees this theoretical ambient dose rate of 0.23 µSv/h as a goal to be reached
before decontamination can be considered complete and the areas reopened, when in fact the effective
reference value is 3.8 µSv/h. This means that lifting an evacuation order in a "green zone" only guarantees
in theory that the potential received dose will be below 20 mSv/year (i.e. that the dose rate will be below
3.8 µSv/h).
Given this situation, the other measures implemented to allow evacuees to return home under acceptableconditions (setting up evacuee consultation services, repairing and reopening administrative and economic
facilities, providing tax incentives for evacuees who choose to return home, etc.) are often viewed withsuspicion by the population, and efforts at rehabilitation (particularly regarding decontamination) areconsidered inadequate. This reflects the fact that many evacuees consider that acceptable conditions for
return have not been met.

1

Note that the ambient dose rate in France varies from 45 to 210 nSv/h according to the region (influence ofterrestrial radiation) or weather conditions (influence of radon). Cosmic radiation alone is estimated at 30-40 nSv/h at
sea level, and twice this value at 2,000 m above sea level.

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2) From completion of decontamination to lifting of evacuation orders
Decontamination is the top priority among the post-accident countermeasures implemented by and under
the responsibility of the Japanese government, laid down in the Act of 11 November 2011 on "Special
Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by the NPS
Accident Associated with the Tohoku District - Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11,
2011".
As mentioned earlier, one of the conditions to be met before evacuation orders can be lifted is that"sufficient progress" must have been made in decontamination. Progress in decontamination work is gauged
against compliance with the technical criteria set out in a special decontamination guide prepared by theJapanese Ministry of the Environment and published in December 2011 (Decontamination Guidelines, 2nd
Edition. Tentative Translation, 2013.) This highly illustrated technical guide describes all thedecontamination methods, practices and tools available that do not involve the use of chemical processes(high-pressure water cleaning or shot blasting, scrubbing, scraping, ploughing, soil excavation, removing
and covering top soil, cutting and pruning vegetation, etc.), according to the contaminated area (soil,
walls, roofs, roads, drains, gardens, fields, forests, vegetation, street furniture, sports fields, school
playgrounds and parks, etc.), the type of surface and the kind of soil, and the radioactive level prior todecontamination. It also specifies procedures for packing and storing waste generated by decontamination
operations, together with the metrological methods and techniques to be used (before, during and after
decontamination work).
"Large-scale" decontamination began in November 2012, although many local initiatives had already been
undertaken before that date by residents themselves outside evacuated areas. The national government is
the project owner for decontamination in the various parts of the Special Decontamination Area (SDA),
while this role is assumed by the municipal authorities in the Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (ICSAs).
Decontamination operations have generally fallen behind schedule. The authorities claim this is because"the number of houses and public places to be decontaminated was underestimated". According to theoriginal roadmap prepared in 2012, decontamination was scheduled for completion in spring 2014 (green
and orange zones). However, in February 2014, the deadline was put back by a year for Katsurao and Iitate,then postponed by another year in March 2015.
Decontamination was completed in a number of municipalities in the SDA between 2013-2015: Tamura inJune 2013, Naraha, Kawauchi and Okuma in March 2014, Katsuaro and Kawamata in December 2015 (seeFigure 3). The Joban Expressway, which crosses the evacuation zone along a north-south axis, wascompletely reopened to traffic in March 2015, following the completion of decontamination work in June
2013.
The delays in decontamination work have elicited two attitudes among the population. They often cause
anger among evacuees wishing to return home. This generally concerns farmers who are attached to theirland and anxious to put an end to the daily to-ing and fro-ing between their farms and their temporary
homes, a situation they have had to endure for more than four years (particularly in Iitate). Conversely,
those opposing a return home have grouped together to press the government to stop spending (or in theiropinion wasting) large sums of money on decontamination operations that they consider unnecessary, andinstead to finance the settlement of evacuees outside the evacuation zone which they believe will remain
uninhabitable for years to come. This attitude is not only explained by radiological concerns, but also by
the lack of jobs and services, and the enforced separation from children, grand-children and loved ones.
On completion of decontamination work, three municipalities - or areas within them - met the conditions
for return defined by the Japanese government, leading to the evacuation order being lifted. This
concerned the municipalities of Tamura (the village of Miyakoji) on 1 April 2014, Kawauchi on 1 October
2014 and Naraha in September 2015. Before the evacuation order is lifted, residents are prepared for theirreturn home during a period referred to as the "pre-homestay stage". For about six months, they are invited
to prepare their homes and future living areas (renovating their home, gardening, etc.), and receive
material and financial aid for this purpose. If requested, one member of each household is authorised toremain on the site at night.

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March 2016

Figure 3: Progress in decontamination work as on 31 December 2015 for the 11 municipalities or areas within thembelonging to the Special Decontamination Area (SDA). The SDA includes all the municipalities or areas within themthat were evacuated following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
(Source: Japanese Ministry of the Environment).

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March 2016

3) Return of evacuees and intentions to return

3.1) Current situation concerning the return of evacuees
Table 1 shows the estimated number of evacuees by municipality and by zone as of May 2015, and thenumber of returnees in the three municipalities where evacuation orders have been lifted. The rate of
return is respectively 9%, 20% and 41% in Naraha, Kawauchi and Tamura. In all, 900 people have returned tothe home they occupied before spring 2011.

Green zone

Orange zone

Red zone

Number ofevacuees

Number of
returnees

Iitate

784

5,266

271

6,321

0

Kawamata

1,054

126

-

1,180

0

Minamisoma

11,774495

212,271

0

Namie

7,713

8,097

3,279

19,0890

Katsurao

1,321

62

116

1,499

0

Futaba

245

-

6,113

6,358

0

Okuma

23

370

10,485

10,8780

Tamura

351

-

-

205

146 (1)

Tomioka

1,365

8,630

4,141

14,1360Kawauchi

328

-

-

274

54 (1)

Municipality

Naraha

7,474

-

-

7,474

About 700 (2)TOTAL

32,432

23,046

24,407

79,685

About 900

Table 1: Number of evacuees and returnees after evacuation orders were liftedsince 1 April 2014. (1) Estimated in February 2015. (2) Estimated mid-September 2015.

In June 2012, some 112,000 people had left their homes, either because they lived within a radius of about
30 km around the power plant (86,000 of these people were considered as "forced evacuees"), or because
they preferred to leave their homes for fear of being evacuated shortly afterwards (26,000 people
considered as "voluntary evacuees" living in the former evacuation preparation zone of 2011), or because
they simply preferred to leave given the situation (48,000 other residents in the Prefecture had also left
their homes and had not returned in 2012). In all, 160,000 residents of Fukushima Prefecture left theirhomes as a result of the nuclear accident.
In October 2014, the authorities estimated that some 80,000 evacuees would be able to return home once
evacuation orders were lifted. This figure breaks down into slightly more than 32,000 people in the green
zone, slightly more than 23,000 in the orange zone, and slightly more than 24,000 in the red zone, where
the prospects of return are farther off in the future (Table 1). To this figure must be added another 20,000
residents who had left the former "emergency evacuation preparation" zones, but who did not return after
30 September 2011. This group particularly concerns the municipalities of Kawauchi, Hirono, Tamura and,more especially, Minamisoma, a locality affected by the earthquake and tsunami2 as well as the nuclear
disaster. Of the total number of residents above, 25% currently reside outside Fukushima Prefecture and75% have been rehoused there. Some have moved, having bought a house elsewhere, others live with theirfamilies or friends or in temporary housing arranged in "villages" scattered in and outside Fukushima
Prefecture. Depending on the original municipality of residence, this distribution is highly uneven. For
example, 40% of Futaba residents were rehoused outside Fukushima Prefecture, whereas almost all
Kawamata (97%) residents remained there (Figure 4). It can be seen that former residents of themunicipalities worst hit by the nuclear disaster and tsunami (red zone and coastal towns) have more often
been rehoused outside Fukushima Prefecture than people residing in other municipalities.

2

The tsunami claimed the lives of 3,800 people in Minamisoma out of a total population of 72,000.

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March 2016

Okuma

24
%

Futaba

42
%
76
%

58
%

TamuraTomioka

37
%

91
%

Kawauchi
10
%

90
%

28
%

Naraha70%

Hirono
12
%

72
%

86
%

IitateKatsurao

7%

7%

93
%

30
%

63
%

14
%

9%

Namie

Minamisoma

88%

Kawamata
3%

93
%

97
%

Figure 4. Current place of residence of evacuees - outside Fukushima Prefecture [red] or in Fukushima Prefecture[blue] according to original municipality of residence (data as at the end of 2014).

3.2) Survey of intentions to return
Since 2012, the Ministry of the Environment Reconstruction Agency has regularly published on the Internet(in Japanese) the results of a survey of evacuees to determine whether or not they intend to return to theirhomes once the evacuation order is lifted. Respondents are given four choices: 1- "I am going to return", 2"I have not decided yet", 3- "I am unwilling to return", and 4- "No response". (Figure 5).
The results of this survey show that the number of intentions to return is the lowest in the worst hit
municipalities, particularly in areas where return is deemed "difficult" even by the authorities (Futaba,
Okuma, Namie, Tomioka): 12% to 17% in autumn 2014. Conversely, the number of intentions to return is thehighest (more than 45%) in municipalities where measured levels of radioactivity are currently the lowest,
where decontamination is complete and, in some cases, where the evacuation order has been lifted(Tamura, Kawauchi, Naraha and Kawamata). Katsurao, Iitate and Minamisoma have roughly the same
responses (about 30% in favour of a return, the same number unwilling to return, and undecided
respondents accounting for slightly less than 50% of the total). The number of undecided respondents
ranges from 30 to 50% according to the municipality.
Overall analysis of these figures shows that of the 79,500 evacuees from the SDA, only 17,500 (~22%) wereprepared to return to the areas they had left more than three and a half years ago, more than 33,000(~42%) had already chosen not to return, and roughly 29,000 (~36%) were still undecided (see Figure 11).
Most (more than 80%) of those who say they intend to return, however, add that their decision is dependent
on the restoration of infrastructure in the social (local government and public services, schools, transport)
and economic (shops, jobs) areas.

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Figure 5. Results of the 2014 survey carried out by the Japanese Reconstruction Agency on whether or not evacuees
intend to return home (source: Reconstruction Agency website).

3.3) The role of Counsellors for returnees or evacuees willing to return home
One of the conditions to be met before evacuation orders can be lifted is the requirement to set up
permanent structures allowing dialogue between evacuees and residents and with the municipalities (andPrefecture).
The Japanese government has set up a department for supporting residents affected by the Fukushima
accident. This department is called the "Support Team for Residents affected by Nuclear Incidents" and ispart of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, Cabinet Office. In 2013, the government carried out
several consultations of local experts and residents of a number of municipalities that had not been
evacuated and in which radiation protection initiatives had been implemented based on dialogue among
stakeholders (Date, Suetsugi in the town of Iwaki). The decision was made in November 2013 to create thefunction of Counsellor within the consultation team for residents who had decided to remain in or return tothe affected areas.
A special budget3 was taken from the "Special Fund for Accelerating the Revitalisation of Fukushima" todeploy at least one and often several counsellors for municipalities in the Prefecture. A communication
centre on the radiological risk was set up in Iwaki to provide training for counsellors and coordinate theiractivities. The chief task of counsellors is to put residents' new living conditions and individual received(measured) doses into perspective. Counsellors must help to improve residents' living conditions and wellbeing through dialogue and by setting up local projects in consultation with residents.

3

Following the decision by Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) on 20 November 2013 entitled "Practical
Measures for Evacuees to Return to Their Homes" and the ministry decision of 20 December 2013 "For Accelerating theReconstruction of Fukushima from the Nuclear Disaster".

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March 2016

Most counsellors are from civil society and include doctors, nurses, social workers, retired civil servants andformer public sector employees, including teachers, or radiation protection experts. They must create aclimate of trust in order to:-

help anyone wishing to do so to measure radioactivity (the emphasis being on individual external
and internal doses),interpret and explain the results of these measurements,
tune in to residents' needs, questions and concerns,
propose suitable projects that would contribute to radiation protection and better living conditions
for residents in the municipality in question.

The counsellors' job consists in enabling any residents who have chosen to remain in or return to anaffected area to know their actual exposure levels according to their daily activities. This can be achievedby enhancing radiation protection culture in general and, more specifically, by teaching residents how totake individual dose measurements.
So far, counsellors have been deployed in municipalities that are located completely or partially outside
the evacuation zone (Date, Suetsugi, Iwaki, Fukushima, Hirono, Kawamata, Minamisoma, Koriyama) but inwhich permanent residents live alongside evacuees in temporary housing. A local consultancy structure isplanned wherever evacuation orders have been or will be lifted. This has already been the case in Kawauchi
or Tamara since 2014, while in May 2015 an office was opened in Naraha, three months before theevacuation order was lifted. Counsellors also support evacuees who previously resided in the municipalities
of Okuma, Futaba, Namie, or Tomioka, and who now occupy temporary housing in and outside Fukushima
Prefecture.

4.4) Conclusion
Unlike the Soviet, then Ukrainian, authorities, which decided to declare a long-term exclusion zone over aradius of 30 km around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant after the explosion in reactor 4, the Japanese
authorities promptly decided to reclaim contaminated areas through a programme combining massive
decontamination operations and revitalisation operations in affected areas. Despite some delays, thedecontamination program continues both in evacuated areas and in areas that were contaminated but notevacuated.
Regarding evacuated areas and the SDA, which groups together all or part of 11 municipalities in Fukushima
Prefecture, decontamination work on public and private buildings, infrastructure, farmland and roads had
been completed in six municipalities (Tamura, Naraha, Kawauchi, Okuma, Katsuaro, Kawamata) by the endof 2015. On completion of these and various other operations (restoring infrastructure and services, setting
up structures for dialogue and information exchange), the authorities lifted the evacuation order in all orpart of three municipalities (Tamura, Naraha, Kawauchi). So far, out of a total population of 7,953, 900
people have returned to these three municipalities. Furthermore, surveys by the Japanese Reconstruction
Agency show that more than 40% of evacuees from the entire SDA have already made the decision not toreturn home when evacuation orders are lifted.
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