Social Design Engineering Series

SDES-2020-5

Future Design: Bequeathing Sustainable Natural Environments and Sustainable Societies to Future Generations

Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Research Institute for Humanity and Nature
Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology
Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research

29th June, 2020

School of Economics and Management
Research Institute for Future Design
Kochi University of Technology
KUT-SDE working papers are preliminary research documents published by the School of Economics and Management jointly with the ResearchCenter for Social Design Engineering at Kochi University of Technology. To facilitate prompt distribution, they have not been formally reviewed
and edited. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment and may be revised. The views and interpretations expressedin these papers are those of the author(s). It is expected that most working papers will be published in some other form.

Future Design: Bequeathing Sustainable Natural Environments and Sustainable Societies toFuture Generations
Tatsuyoshi Saijo*
Research Institute for Humanity and Nature
Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology
Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research
Abstract"Future Design," a new movement among Japanese researchers and stakeholders, asks thefollowing question: what types of social systems are necessary if we are to leave future
generations sustainable environments and societies? After reviewing the human activity
impact on the global environment and society, I ask why we live in a society producing aseries of future failures that will cost future generations so much. I then argue thatliberalism could be the source of such a society and that market and democracy derived
from it will not be able to avoid these future failures. Therefore, one must design social
systems to activate a human nature called futurability when he/she experiences an increasein happiness as a result of deciding and acting toward foregoing current benefits to enrichfuture generations. One method to study those is using "imaginary future generations."
Here, I present an overview of the theoretical background of this method, the results ofrelevant laboratory and field experiments, and the nature of some relevant practicalapplications implemented in cooperation with several local governments.
Keywords: Future design, imaginary future generation, futurability, intergenerationalsustainability dilemma, time inconsistency problem* This paper is an expansion of an invited lecture presented at the symposium "Future
design and a new theory of the wealth of nations: how can we design sustainable societies
for the future?", which took place at the 2017 annual conference of the Society for
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. I would like to express my gratitude to
Ryuta Aoki, Keishiro Hara, Toshiaki Hiromitsu, Yoichi Hizen, Tatsuya Kameda, Yoshio
Kamijo, Keiichiro Kobayashi, Yutaka Kobayashi, Koji Kotani, Nobuhiro Mifune, Yoshinori
Nakagawa, Naoko Nishimura, Arpana Pandit, Makoto Saito, Yoshimatsu Saito, Mostafa
Shahen, Shibly Shahrier, Kaoru Sugihara, Raja Timilsina, Makoto Usami, Ritsuji Yoshioka,
and Jingchao Zhang for their helpful comments on this paper.
11. What is it that we have done?
Detected on December 31, 2019, the Covid-19 outbreak began in Wuhan, China,
quickly spreading around the world. The World Health Organization declared it a global
pandemic on March 11, 2020 [1]. The peak dates of the first-wave outbreaks were: February
12 (China); March 3 (South Korea), 21 (Italy), 26 (Spain), 27 (Germany), 30 (Iran), and 31(France); and April 10 (England), 11 (Japan), and 24 (USA) [2]. Covid-19 was rapidly spreadby air transport, which, since 1950, expanded annually by approximately 5% and 6% forpassenger and cargo air traffic, respectively [3, 4]. That is, the number of air passengers
would double every 14 years, and the cargo capacity, every 12 years. The air passenger
growth rate approached 6 percent per year for the 2010-19 decade, the 2019 passenger
numbers being over 32 times larger than the 1950 ones. Since the global GDP growth rate
has been less than 4% since 2000 [5], airline passenger numbers are growing at a greaterrate than GDP. Moreover, such globalization has been supported by fossil fuels. Carbon
dioxide emissions from international air transport of passengers and cargo have doubled
between 1990 and 2016 [6]. Although growing at a slower rate than air passenger numbers
and cargo volume due to improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency and other factors, theseemissions increased at approximately a 3% annual rate from 1990 to 2016, with 5.2% during
2015-6 [6].
Steffen et al. [7] demonstrated that indicators of the human activity impact on the
global environment (i.e., concentration of carbon dioxide, nitroxide and methane in theatmosphere, the volume of nitrogen influx into the oceans, and reduction of tropicalforests) show changes at an accelerating pace since the Industrial Revolution, especiallyduring the second half of the 20th century. Further, an accelerating change in indicatorssuch as population, real GDP, use of fossil fuels and fertilizers, and the number of
automobiles has also been reported. The acceleration of air traffic described above is one
such trend. These trends are known as the Great Acceleration.
Planetary boundary research by Rockström et al. [8] identifies nine domains essential tothe maintenance of the comparatively stable Holocene environment that has been in place
for more than 10,000 years and proposes acceptable levels for those planetary boundaries.
However, the authors demonstrate that such acceptable levels have already been breached
for climate change, biodiversity, land system change (the proportion of forest lost), and thecycles of biochemical substances such as nitrogen and phosphorus. For example, theconcentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide and the radiative forcing should not be higher
than 350 ppmv and 1 Wm-2, respectively, compared to their levels before the Industrial
Revolution. Both these indicators are already above these levels, increasing the risk ofirreversible climate changes such as the depletion of the polar ice caps, acceleration of2

ocean level rise, and sudden changes in the forestry and agricultural system [8, 9].
Regarding this, Steffen et al. [9] mentioned the necessity of taking into account the timeneeded by society to react to early warning signs. Furthermore, Steffen et al. [10] found that
there is a risk that the Earth system could be irreversibly pushed down a "Hothouse Earth"pathway despite the Paris Accord target being met.
Crutzen and Stoermer [11] and Crutzen [12] propose that the Holocene age has ended
already, and human beings pushed the Earth System into a new geological age, theAnthropocene. However, to the extent that human activity has indeed changed the Earth,this planetary boundary research can be seen as an evaluation of natural sciences since theIndustrial Revolution.
Next, let us look at the relationship between the Human Development Index (HDI)
and the per-capita Ecological Footprint (EF) of a country [13]. HDI measures well-being
achievements such as average life expectancy, level of education, and per-capita income.
EF, a "sustainability" indicator, reveals whether that country is living within its share of
global means. HDI and EF values are low for developing countries and high for developed
countries. Almost all countries progress from low to high HDI and EF, although theyshould instead aim for high HDI and low EF. The relationship between these two indexes
represents a link between scientific and social evaluations. When viewed in conjunction
with the evaluation related to planetary boundaries, it can be inferred that we arethreatening our own continued existence.
Moreover, developed countries have high levels of outstanding debt. According to
the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database [14], the outstanding debt of Japan is 2.37
times its GDP, and that of Italy, USA and France, 1.35, 1.09, and 0.99 times their GDPs,
respectively. Increasing the existing debt, governments are spending massive amounts ofmoney to cope with the current pandemic. The current generation is maintaining wealth byusing up the resources of future generations. Regarding Japan's public debt, for example, aconsumption tax raise from 10 to 40% for the next 100 years would still account for only
approximately 60% of the outstanding debt balance [15, 16]. Would any generation
implement such a drastic measure?
2. Why are we in this situation, and what will happen next?
Why do we live in a society producing a series of future failures that will cost future
generations so much? One major factor could be the social contract supported by Hobbes[17], Locke [18], Rousseau [19], and others, as the source of liberalism [20]. By breaking theyoke of social classes and norms, ending the "struggle of all against all," and creating asocial contract, people gain freedom, independence, and equity. Another factor might be3the idea of mankind's conquest of nature conceived by Bacon [21].
Sapolsky [22] identified three human traits underpinning the social system based uponliberalism. The first is "contrast." For example, our five senses react to a change in volume,
rather than the absolute volume. A sudden noise or shadow constitutes a change that may
represent a risk, and we naturally react (by default) to it, to increase our chance of survival.
For example, we react more to a change in volume - that is, to its differential value - than toabsolute volume. In other words, human beings react when external factors change. If,
owing to the change in the parameters (external factors) within the objective function, thevariable maximizing the objective function ought to also shift, we can conclude that"contrast" expresses the optimality principle of humans. Of course, "contrast" does not stopwith a person's five senses. The human brain is said to react strongly to the body's position
relative to other people. For example, in a group of people chased by a lion, a person would
not need to be fast in absolute terms, but merely faster than the slowest.
The second human trait is "impulse." It is not easy to resist eating something tasty
laying in front of you. "The dopamine reward pathways in the human brain light up on
brain-imaging tests when we go for the impulsive immediate reward" [22]. In short, toincrease the likelihood of survival, the best thing to do when food was available was to eat
it. Interpreted more broadly, the impulse can be considered "myopia."
The third trait is "sociality." Human beings do not possess the physical abilities ofother creatures. Humans run slower than dogs, let alone horses, our sense of smell is rather
dull, and our eyesight not very keen. For human beings to adapt better than othermammals, and indeed, to thrive, it required a deep understanding of our relationship withother people. For example, humans could hunt big animals only in groups, not alone. By
cooperating with multiple agents, humans reached the top of the food chain, eventually.
However, in sociality, education and experience are necessary; it is not possible to obtainthese immediately.
I would like to add a fourth human trait, namely "optimism" when we consider our
future. The difference between the expected result and the actual outcome has an optimism
bias. According to Sharot [23], approximately 80% of people display this bias. In otherwords, people think that good rather than bad things will happen to them in the future.
There is hardly any research that delves into these human traits and examines theirrelationship with social systems. However, it is natural to consider that human traits are
the basis for the construction of markets and democracy, which form the basic frameworkof our society. First, let us consider the markets. Although the market is an "extremely good
device for realizing the short-term desires of people," it does not "allocate resources in a
way that takes account of future generations." Future generations cannot participate in4

today's markets. Moreover, democracy is a "device that profits people who are currently
living," and it does not "incorporate future generations." If a candidate in an election
proposes a policy that leads to enriching people a hundred years later, the current
generation would not vote for him/her [24, 25].
Dunbar's Number, the maximum number of people with whom a human being is
cognitively able to maintain stable social relationships, is approximately 150 [26]. It would
not be wrong to suggest that markets and democracy are devices that preserve some sort ofsociality when that number is exceeded. Within these devices, a person who displays the
optimality principle, i.e., contrast, can demonstrate both myopia and optimism.
There is no definitive judgment yet on the Industrial Revolution; however, someresearchers opine that it allowed the transition from reliance on organic energy to that on
fossil fuel energy. According to Allen [27] and Pomeranz [28], the mid-14th century Black
Death reduced England's population, giving rise to high wages in the country. In the earlymodern era, Europe, and in particular the UK, experienced a rise in the price of wood due
to urbanization; energy source substitution occurred in favor of coal, which abounded
locally and happened to be cheap. To fulfill the coal demand required by pumping out thesubterranean water accumulating in coal mines, steam engines would work the water
pumps instead of the expensive manual labor. It was exactly this kind of energy shift that
led to the "industrial revolution" and the various innovations that we have experienced.
Innovations continued throughout the Industrial Revolution, and large volumes ofcheap and seemingly limitless fossil fuels were used. These factors are likely to havestrengthened the human traits of contrast, myopia, and optimism while weakening thesociality. The change in human traits transformed, in turn, the market, democracy, andinnovation. This is likely to have created a society blindly focused on growth, despite its
leading to the various "future failures" mentioned above. On the other hand, rather thanwith social institutions as in the Covid-19 crisis, the way we think and behave changes
significantly with radical changes in the environment, which includes social institutions. In
other words, our way of thinking and behaving itself is shaped by our environment,
including our society, and then we change the social institutions.
If this is the case, then the transformation of social institutions themselves should be amajor challenge for the first half of the 21st century. However, the various fields of social
science—which are supposed to be the engines of institutional reform—have become
fixated on individual paradigms, and an answer to the question of how to transforminstitutions for a sustainable future has not yet been found. Nevertheless, the current
mainstream approach is to coordinate and synthesize knowledge from humanities,
information science, neuroscience, and other fields, in addition to that from the social
5sciences, to understand human behavior, devise social systems based on this knowledge,
and solve various problems.
Future Design (FD) takes the opposite position. Traditional social science has assumed
that people's behaviors, thinking, and nature do not easily change. However, they aretransformed by social institutions and their feedback. In other words, the market anddemocracy themselves shape the way we think and behave. To this end, we design various
social mechanisms that transform our thinking itself, and test their performance using
knowledge from various fields. This is the basic framework of FD.
3. Is transformation in favor of a sustainable society possible?
Future Earth (http://www.futureearth.org/) was established in 2012 as an international
research platform that provides knowledge and action intended to accelerate radical
innovation conducive to a sustainable society; it became active by 2015 [29, 30]. One of its
basic concepts is transdisciplinary research. Stakeholders and scientists co-design research
projects, co-produce knowledge, and co-deliver results. However, both stakeholders andscientists are part of the current generation, and, despite a win-win outcome in following
their own incentives, future generations may still stand to lose. To improve their odds, thefuture generation should be included as stakeholders, and the change target should be thethinking way and the behavior of the current generation.
"FD" emerged in 2012 with the aim of creating human "futurability," independently of
Future Earth [25]. A person exhibits futurability when he/she experiences an increase inhappiness as a result of deciding and acting toward foregoing current benefits to enrichfuture generations. FD is the praxis of creating futurability through designing social
systems. It is fundamentally a question of whether the willingness of a parent to eat lessand feed more their children can extend to a future generation not related by blood. In
epigenetic terms, it is the designing of mechanisms that allow the expression of futurability
that could not be conveyed due to markets and democracy, and thus, control markets anddemocracy. This is set-up against the background of stubborn concern regarding theconcept of sustainable development (fulfilling the needs of the current generation without
disregarding the needs of the future generation) in Our Common Future, written by theBrundtland Commission in 1987 [31]. For example, in resolving the aforementioned
outstanding debt, it is impossible to reduce the burden of the future generation without
sacrifices made by the current generation.
There are two basic concepts in the FD research framework: "how humans think" and"social mechanisms." In social sciences, in the past, both "how humans think" and "social
mechanisms" were immutable conditions, and the research approach was to investigate
6what would happen with various issues. Taking consequential impartiality and efficiency
as social aims while assuming that the human thought processes or tastes do not change,
the mechanism design of the late 20th century has taken into account the design of social
mechanisms needed to achieve those aims. However, this approach ignores the viewpointof changing the way that people think. The nudge method is a behavioral economics
approach in which there is no transformation of the social mechanisms, and the alterationof behavior, rather than the change in ways of thinking, is encouraged. However, thismethod is likely to be successful in, for example, reducing greenhouse gases by a few
percent, but unlikely to lower them further. Although Future Earth and Sustainable
Development Goals are calling for transformation in social systems, it seems that markets
and democracy are not part of the picture. FD research aims to realize sustainable societies
by designing "social mechanisms" that change the very "way that humans think."
The idea for the FD research comes from the Iroquois, a confederation of five-six tribesof Native Americans. They considered seven generations in the future when making
important decisions [32]. As one might imagine, they shifted their perspective to the distantfuture and considered the present from there to maintain the peace of the confederacy. The
American founding fathers George Washington and Benjamin Franklin united 13 colonies
using federalism learned from the Iroquois. During the Bicentennial of the U.S.
Constitution, the Senate and the House of Representatives even issued a joint resolution
thanking the Iroquois for their contribution [33]. However, while federalism is ingrained in
the U.S. Constitution, the concept of the "seven generations" appears to have beenforgotten.
Of course, even if we assume that humans possess "futurablity," it is not easy toactivate this trait. Is it possible that new social mechanisms will be constructed, sociality
weakened in the name of the market and democracy strengthened, and that contrast,
myopia, and optimism will be weakened? I summarize here the FD research of the past few
years.
4. FD experiments
Let us summarize the experimental research of Kamijo et al. [34], which constituted thestarting point of the FD research. Three-person groups representing different generations
were asked to choose between Options A and B. Both options involved an amount ofmoney that each group would decide how to distribute among themselves. The discussion
time was limited to 10 minutes. The first generation (G1) chose between A ($36) and B($27). If they chose Option A, Options A and B for the next generation would be reduced by$9. If they chose Option B, Options A and B for the next generation would remain
7unchanged. Table 1a shows the payoffs up to the third generation. For example, if G1chooses Option A, G1 gets $36, and G2 has to choose between an Option A of $27 and an
Option B of $18. If G2 chooses Option B, they get $18, and G3 faces the choice of the same
Options A and B ($27 and $18, respectively). Unlike in the static prisoner's dilemma game,if the current generation chooses selfishly, it puts a burden on the subsequent generations.
Kamijo et al. [34] dubbed the game the "Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma Game"(ISDG).
Table 1．Kamijo et al. [34] – Payoff and resultsa. Payoff
G1

G2

G3
A 18

b. Results without imaginary future persons
…

G1
A
A
A
A
B

A 27
B9
A 36
A 27

G2
A
A
A
A
B

G3
A
A
A
B
A

G4
A
A
A
B
A

G5
A
B
B
A
B

B 18
c. Results with imaginary future persons

B 18

G1
B
B
B
B
B
A
A

A 27

A 36
B 18
B 27
A 36
B 27
B 27

G2
B
B
B
A
A
B
B

G3
B
B
A
B
A
B
A

G4
B
B
A
B
B
A
B

G5
B
A
B
A
A
A
A

In the experiment, a table of the gains of up to the sixth generation was distributed.
Each generation understood that the following generations exist. The participants were
paid according to the decisions that had been made. 210 undergraduate and graduate
students of the Kochi University of Technology participated, and almost all groups chose to
distribute the money equitably.
If a human activates his or her contrast trait (the principle of optimality), Option A
would be chosen automatically. One person per group was asked to negotiate with theother two not for their own sake, but as a representative of the groups from future
generations. The compensation received by this participant agreed with the decision madeby all three. These participants were designated, imaginary future persons.
Table 1b shows the results of the ISDG when there was no imaginary future person. In
8the first row, all generations chose Option A. Note that the actual experiment continued
until the sixth or seventh generation because the final generation would be aware that there
was no further generation and consistently choose Option A. Seven groups out of 25 chose
Option B (28% selection ratio). Table 1c shows the results when there was an imaginary
future person. In this case, 21 groups out of 35 chose Option B (60%). Nakagawa et al. [35],using a new qualitative-deliberative approach, discovered that a human icebreaker having
a neutral attitude toward Options A and B contributed to the selection of sustainable
Option B.
After the experiment, a questionnaire on Social Value Orientation was administered.
Participants were classified as "pro-socialist," "individualist," "competitor," and "other." A
participant had three sets of payoff levels for himself/herself and a virtual person to choose
from. Those who chose the option that gave them the same payoff were pro-socialists,
those who maximized their payoff were individualists, and those who maximized thedifference between their and the other person's payoff were competitors [36]. Note thatsocial psychology defines the terms "individualist" and "competitor" differently from
economics. Among the participants, 78% were "pro-socialist." When there was no
imaginary future person, Option B was selected only when all group members were "prosocialist." In this case, "pro-socialists" comprised 76% of the participants who chose Option
A. However, when in the presence of an imaginary future person, pro-socialists comprised
79% of the members in the groups that chose Option A and 73% of the participants in thegroups that chose Option B. Thus, the difference between the proportions of pro-socialists
in the two situations was small. In other words, whether or not individual participants
were pro-socialist had no impact on selecting Option B. However, following thediscussions in which one of the three group members took on the role of the imaginary
future person, that person's behavior changed and impacted those around them.
Saito [37] used the data from this experiment to conduct the following thought
experiment. Macro-economically speaking, based on a discount rate r, the G1 gain WA istaken to be the present value of the most selfish payoff stream (i.e., G1 selected Option A
and all other generations selected Option B) and the G1 gain WB, the present value when all
generations choose the sustainable Option B. Hence, the following are taken to be true:
WA = 36 +  t =1


27
18

, WB =  t =0t
(1 + r )t(1 + r )If r = 1, then WA = WB = 54 . If r > 1，then WA  WB . If the first generation lasts 30
years, (1 + 0.023)30  2 . Thus, if the discount rate is converted to an annual rate, Option A
9will be chosen if the discount rate is 2.3% or above, and Option B if it is lower than that.
The result of the experiment by Kamijo et al. [34] is interpreted as "a change toward a lower
generational discount rate" due to the introduction of the "social mechanism" of animaginary future generation. Although the interpretation is clear, I would note thelingering doubt surrounding the suitability of a macroeconomic framework that considers
the current generation payoff as the present value of an unlimited payoff stream for all
generations.
Table 2．Results of the ISDG experiment in Bangladesh
Selection of Option B
With imaginary future person
Without imaginary future person
Proportion of pro-socialists

Dhaka
29%
31%
20%

Bogra
86%
74%
45%

From only one experiment, it is impossible to decide the effectiveness of introducing a
new mechanism based on imaginary future generations. Results for various areas withdifferent economic development and historical and cultural backgrounds are needed.
Hence, Shahrier et al. [38] decided to carry out an ISDG experiment in Dhaka, Bangladesh,a megacity with a rapidly growing population, and Bogra, a contrasting rural area. In
contrast to the Japanese experiment, where the participants were students, the Bangladeshi
participants were recruited from within the community (252 participants, each, from Dhaka
and Bogra). As shown in Table 2, regardless of whether or not the imaginary future person
existed, the selection rate of Option B differed significantly between Dhaka and Bogra(approximately 30% vs. 80%, respectively). The scenario involving an imaginary future
person contributed to a higher selection rate of Option B in Bogra, but not in Dhaka. The
Social Value Orientation questionnaire revealed a sharp gap between the proportion of prosocialists in Dhaka and Bogra (21% and 45%, respectively). In contrast to the Japanesestudy participants, the Bangladeshi participants received a monetary incentive
corresponding to the option chosen in the Social Value Orientation questionnaire.
Therefore, the proportion of pro-socialists is rather low in Bangladesh.
In light of the results of Shahrier et al. [38], the issue lies with the design of amechanism that would allow for a sustainable selection in the ISDG in Dhaka as well. In
the study of Kamijo et al. [34], one person represented the imaginary future generation,
increasing the possibility of sustainable selections. For example, it would be possible for all
decision-making participants to be part of the imaginary future generation. However, will
members of the current generation accept decisions made by members of an imaginary
10

future generation? To answer this, Shahrier et al. [39] proposed the Future Ahead and Backmechanism (FAB) mechanism, as follows.
Stage 1: All three participants, as imaginary next future generation members, select either
Option A or B, and then submit a request to the current generation (i.e., themselves).
Stage 2: All three participants, as the current generation, select either Option A or B and, if
the selection is the same as in Stage 1, the process ends.
Stage３: For a different selection than in Stage 1, the outcome is decided on a majority rulebasis.
Based on the FAB mechanism, the Option B selection rate was 85%, similar to the casewhen one person represented the imaginary future generation in Bogra. However, there
were 28% of pro-socialists in this experiment, compared to the 20% in the Shahrier et al.
[39] study. Sustainable decision-making was made possible by adding beforehand twostages to the majority decision mechanism, a technique often used in democracy.
However, what if, in ISDG, there is one decision-maker, instead of three? Shahen et al.
[40] experimented within this scenario by giving previous generations' decision sequencessuch as ABAAB if this person belonged to the sixth generation. Each participant made 36
different decisions. Consider the case where the participant is not an imaginary future
person; here, participants are likely to choose the unsustainable Option A when the
proportion of previous generations that chose A is high, or when the number of future
generations who can receive positive benefits is low. This is quite intuitive, in the sense thatthe people of the current generation tend to give up on sustainable decisions whenprevious generations chose unsustainable options, or only a few future generations will
have the same resources due to being too late, or too grave of a current situation, forsustainability to be improved. On the other hand, when participants are asked to take theperspective of the future generations, their behavior drastically changes; they become moresustainable even when the percentage of unsustainable previous generations is high, or the
future generations who can receive positive benefits are few. These results suggest that left
to their own devices, individuals will act selfishly, with no consideration for future
generations, when intergenerational sustainability is highly threatened. Thus, newinstitutions that could influence the individual in taking the perspective of future
generations might be the only way to mitigate intergenerational unsustainability.
Then, what about democratic voting? Katsuki and Hizen [41] conducted a voting
experiment with 156 participants, using the ISDG described by Kamijo et al. [34]. Eachgeneration had three participants, and each participant was assigned to one of six
11generations, to cast hypothetical votes. If a participant belonged to the second generation,
he/she had to decide based on two possible cases: the first generation choices of either A or
B. If a participant belonged to the sixth generation, the number of cases increased to 64. The
methods of voting were: (a) one vote per person, (b) two votes per person, and (c) one voteper two of the participants and two votes per the third. In scenario b, the participants were
instructed to cast one vote for themselves and the other for the future generations.
Randomly choosing three participants from each generation results in a choice sequencesuch as ABAABA, for example. 50 million simulations performed for each voting method
resulted in Option B being selected at the rate of 9.25%, 17.11%, and 14.66% for scenarios a,b and c, respectively. Voting methods b and c are types of Demeny voting, which will be
discussed later. Given that the selecting rate of Option B in the absence of an imaginary
future person was 28% in the Kamijo et al. [34] experiment, voting may not constitute aneffective method for sustainability.
Hauser et al. [42] conducted an experiment using the Intergenerational Goods Game,
where five participants vote for the amount of fish they will catch. The total number of fish
is limited, say 100. If the number of catches is at most 50, the next generation's resource is100; otherwise, it is zero. The study found that median voting works well. For example,
assume the numbers on the ballots are 4, 5, 9, 14, and 20 (median is 9). Hence, everybody
must catch 9 fish. If this is the case, the total number of fish caught is 45; hence the next
generation's fish resource is 100. Consider the case (a) for Katsuki and Hizen [41]. Once I
establish that the median of AAB is A, and the median of BBA is B, this matches exactly the
majority voting and, apparently, median voting may not work well either.
Deliberation could constitute a method of resolving problems within and between
generations. To show the effect of deliberation alone within the ISDG framework, Timilsina
et al. [43] carried out a field study in urban and rural settings in Nepal. When three people
were involved, they were asked to choose an option both before and after deliberating. The
results showed that deliberation had hardly any impact on the selection outcome. That is,
this experiment shows that democracy does not always serve the desired function insolving intergenerational problems. Furthermore, the selection rate of Option B in theurban area was 64%, while in the rural area, 84%. The selection rate of B is almost double in
Kathmandu compared to Dhaka, which has a five times denser population. Although due
to Covid-19, migration from urban to rural areas is expected, it is undeniable that the
number of people acting with future generations in mind will further decline asurbanization continues.
So far, participants in the experiment have assumed the role of imaginary future
people traveling back in time to consider their choices in the present, trough the viewpoint12

of the future. Nakagawa et al. [44] are developing a method named Past Design, in which
participants evaluate past events that have already occurred from the present. 155
participants from Kochi Prefecture—where 84% of the land area is forested—were
recruited. Using the case method, they were presented with the history, current situation,and issues for debate surrounding Kochi's forests, and also with five relevant policy
options/scenarios (maintenance of status quo; intentional neglect of inefficient forests;
minimum care for inefficient forests; providing forest roads for the continuation of forestry
business; turning forested land into recreation forests). When no conditions were imposed,
the current generation groups' most favored option before debate was turning the forested
land into a recreational forest. When asked to debate the future of the Kochi's forests fromthe viewpoint of the present, the most favored scenario changed to minimum care forinefficient forests. Simultaneously, the other groups were asked to follow the same twin
procedures. The scenario selected by most individuals, after advising people from 30 years
ago, was to provide forest roads to continue the forestry business; the same scenario wasmost frequently selected after the subsequent debate as an imaginary future generation. In
other words, even without debate, the "social mechanism" of looking back at the past - or
Past Design - had a significant effect on the scenario selection.
As mentioned above, the sustainability of public debt is an important issue in Japanand many other countries. Hiromitsu [45] and Nakagawa et al. [46] carried out subject
experiments using an imaginary future generation. Hiromitsu [45] conducted experiments
in different parts of Japan, considering two scenarios: whereby the burden is postponed for
30 years or more (Option A) or shared between the current and future generations (Option
B). Ordinary people ranging in age from their late teens to their seventies were grouped inteams of three, and asked to choose between the two options through debate. Similar to
Kamijo et al. [34], teams were assembled from current generation members, or contained
imaginary future generation members (one teammate played an imaginary person of the
future). 60 of the 83 current generation teams (72.3%) and 57 of the 65 imaginary future
generation teams (87.7%) chose Option B. In addition, the "silver democracy hypothesis"(stating that older people tend to postpone a burden) was investigated; although Option B
was selected less often as the age of the participants increased, the decrease was small
compared to the profit-and-loss arithmetic implied by their own life expectancy. Further,
the pros and cons of the "deliberative democracy hypothesis" (when debating is involved,
Option B is more likely to be chosen than Option A) were investigated; this hypothesis
seemed to be supported by the increase of the selection rate of Option B from 71.6% before
discussion, to 87.7% after discussion. Hiromitsu [45] surmises that this could perhaps be
attributed to group pressure to conform.
13

Nakagawa et al. [46] recruited 379 ordinary people from Kochi Prefecture, Japan, andconducted a deliberation experiment for teams of four; all members of a team belonged
either to the current generation or the imaginary future generation. Employing the Harvard
case method used in business schools, materials were developed to teach national andprefectural financial administration in a short time. Among these, maintaining the statusquo or reducing the budget of local prefectures (two policies) were proposed as national
policies, and maintaining the status quo or the support for specific regional agglomeration
aimed at regional self-reliance (two policies), as prefectural policies. The participants
assigned to the current generation group debated the most favorable policies - out of the
proposed four - for the year 2047 society, chose one, and then individually reported theirpreference. The imaginary future generation group was asked to follow two procedures.
First, before debating, they were asked to complete a Past Design session consisting ofreading 30 years old newspapers, and then send advice to the people of that time. Then,they "time-shifted" 30 years into the future and debated from the perspective of the year
2047, which one of the four policies they would want people to choose in 2018. They
reported their selection from the perspective of an individual living in 2017. After theexperiment, they filled in questionnaires designed to measure the "generativity" (engaging
actively in behavior that creates value for the next generation) and "critical thinking" (thequality of being able to think logically without bias and creativity), developed by
McAdams & de St Aubin [47] and Hirayama & Kusumi [48], respectively. A higher scorethan the median value in at least one of these two indicators suggested that an imaginary
future person was more likely to choose to support specific regional agglomeration aimed
at regional self-sustainability than a current generation person. In other words, people witha high score in at least one of these indicators chose a scenario that took into account the
future generations, owing to the experience of the "social mechanism" of becoming a future
generation person in the twin procedures. Although not an experiment, it should be notedthat Saito [49] created a fictitious deliberation narrative with an imaginary future
generation on the issue of the consumption tax.
The experimental results listed above suggest that one can assume the role of animaginary future person, think from the standpoint of future generations, and consider thewell-being of future people even after one "returns" to the present. In this case, the question
to be answered is: what type of people possess these characteristics? Within the same
framework as the fiscal experiment in Nakagawa et al. [46], Nakagawa et al. [50] have tried
to answer this using critical thinking and generativity for testing purposes. Criticalthinking measures "whether you tend to always think logically," and "whether you tend to
be curious about everything all the time" (see also [51]). They found that a person with14

higher levels of both traits is more likely to successfully become an imaginary future
person. In addition, a person with high levels of curiosity can think about the well-being of
future generations even after they "return" to the present. Moreover, a person who is more
likely always to be aware of future generations (i.e., a person with a high generativity trait)is also more likely to act with the well-being of future generations in mind, even after
he/she returns to the present. If we were to create an organization such as some ministry of
the future, we would be looking for people with these characteristics.
As the falling of birth rates and the aging of society continues, what type of electoral
system would be suitable to promote a sustainable society? Kamijo et al. [52], as amechanism to reflect the children's voice, conducted an experiment based on the voting
system suggested by Demeny [53]. This system gives voting rights to children, exercised bytheir parents by proxy. Three types of votes were used by parents—one vote; two votes:
one for him/her and one for a child; no vote (since this person belongs to a future
generation). Participants voted for either Option A (the current generation receives a large
reward) or B (the reward is split evenly between the current and future generations),
options slightly different than the ones of the ISDG experiments. When both participants
have one vote, half of them previously voting for B supported A when the Demeny voting
system was used. In other words, under normal voting conditions, many participants(equivalent to the older generation at the life stage of having no children or adult children)
took into account the future generations and chose B. However, under Demeny voting, thehalf of one vote participants switched support to Option A, which benefited themselves.
This suggests that the Demeny voting system does not serve the purpose for which it was
intended.
Kamijo et al. [54] invited 1,000 parents with children below the legal voting age andanother 1,000 with children above the voting age, to participate in a survey experiment
where participants donated to a non-profit organization benefiting a future society. The
donation amount was determined by the participants through voting. Two voting systems
were observed: regular and Demeny (parents gave one vote on behalf of their child if they
had any). Mothers of children below the voting age displayed more altruism for posterityin the voting process, in general. However, when the Demeny voting system was used, any
difference vanished, and the average donation amount was smaller. In other words,
Demeny voting does not necessarily lead to decision-making benefiting future generations.
Kamijo et al. [52] compared the case where Demeny voting specified that one more votethan usual was cast for future generations with the case where it did not. Again, theyobserved no effect of Demeny voting when that was not explicitly stated [41]. To mitigate
this issue, Hizen [55] suggested the necessity of introducing other systems than voting.
15

Examples of such systems include the "Mission: The Future," established in Sweden as an
executive government branch to investigate long-term problems, and the ombudsman
system set in Hungary to oversee the executive government branches from the viewpointof the future.
Hiromitsu [56] showed results that are different from the "silver democracy
hypothesis" and concluded that the judgment of individuals becomes unbiased as they age
and approach Nirvana. Saito and Kameda [57] answered that question. To verify thestrength with which older people desire to represent the welfare of future generations, they
conducted a postal survey of 2,000 randomly sampled residents of the Bunkyo ward ofTokyo, aged 18 or older (772 valid responses). The survey revealed that it is possible toanticipate the level of a person's desire to represent future generations from their stage inlife alone (respondents were grouped by the following stages: no children, children but no
grandchildren, and grandchildren). The question used to assess the desire to represent
future generations was: For the sake of the generations as yet unborn, would you like totake on the role of advising on existing social policies from the position of future
generations? The most important point of the question is that it does not ask to advise(future) generations already born (i.e., grandchildren), but "generations as yet unborn." Inother words, as people progress through life stages, they focus on the welfare of future
generations that will comprise the society after their own death. This fact suggests thepossibility that the sustainability of future generations is understood in relation to "third
parties with no connection to oneself" who will come after one's own grandchildren. Saito
and Kameda [57] emphasize the possibility that, when people face the problem ofsustainability, they are buoyed by "expanded egoism," seeing it not as a problem related tounselfish altruistic behavior, but as their own problem. Although "expanded egoism" hasbeen obscured by the market and democracy, another possible explanation is that
"expanded egoism," or "futurability," fostered as human beings have progressed throughlife stages, is a social system similar to an imaginary future generation.
Japan has faced various Natural Hazard Triggering Technological Disaster (Natech)
events. Kurashiki [58] assumed population changes in a city in the Osaka and Nankai areas
as a consequence of the megathrust earthquake, asked participants to propose various
policies from the perspective of risk communication, and verified the effect of an imaginary
future generation. In the future, this is likely to become an important FD research problem.
5. What is the premise of the imaginary future generation?
Kobayashi [59, 60] developed an argument regarding the rationalization of theintroduction of an actor (imaginary future generation) representing the good of future
16

generations, as follows. The image of a human being in Rawls' [61] theory of justice is thatof a self-interested rational individual. Behind a "veil of ignorance" ("original position,"where a person does not know the generation to which they belong nor their own age,
wealth, or health), a person should apply the difference principle (the maximin rule, asocial system in which the utility of the least-fortunate generation is maximized within its
various systems). However, even if a social contract can be agreed upon in the original
position when the veil of ignorance is lifted, and history begins, a self-interested rational
generation has no incentive to follow such a social contract. In other words, the current
generation has no incentive to sacrifice its own gain to secure gains for future generations.
This is because we face the time inconsistency problem, whereby future generations can
impose no penalty if the social contract is broken (Calvo [62]).
Here is an experiment on the veil of ignorance by Klaser et al. [63]. Each generationconsists of three participants supposed to divide 21 Euros. If the total is more than 16Euros, the game ends. If not, the game continues. Each participant knows which generation
he/she belongs to but does not know the total number of generations involved. Under these
conditions, six cases ended in one generation, and the two cases ended in two generations.
On the other hand, without knowing which generation they belong to, the three would
vote until they are unanimous on what allocation should be made under the veil of
ignorance. After that, they know which generation they belong to. Four ended in one
generation, and two ended in two generations. The veil of ignorance faces a time
consistency problem in this experiment, finding also supported by Wolf and Dron [64].
If an imaginary future generation is introduced into society ahead of its time, it ispossible for the happiness of the least-fortunate generation of that society to improve.
People in the original position who stand behind the veil of ignorance, in anticipation ofhappiness, agree to the introduction of an imaginary future generation as a social contract[60]. To establish such a new social contract, the imaginary future generation must possess
strong altruism toward future generations. Kobayashi [60] weakened the assumption ofself-interested rational individuals and claimed that people possess a "weak altruism" withregard to future generations. When people from a future generation fulfill their assigned
roles, they can gain the empathy of others (Smith, [65]). The empathy received from others
produces positive feelings, strengthening the altruism of these imaginary future persons,and helping establish a new social contract theory.
In constructing his principle, Rawls [61] excluded the environment that could foster
feelings of altruism and empathy, imagining instead self-interested, rational actors.
However, as shown by the behavioral ecology research of Saito and Kameda [57], humans
display "expanded egoism." If we can activate futurability by introducing the social
17

mechanism of the adoption of an imaginary future generation, this type of social contract
can be aligned with the new social contract theory of Kobayshi [59, 60].
However, if the starting point of our discussion is not the assumption of a selfinterested rational actor, Hiromitsu [66, 67] considers that agreement between people of thesame generation supports the intergenerational principle; this agreement is, in turn,supported by "the reasonable" described by Rawls [68]. "The reasonable" is a concept thatRawls contrasts with "the rational" and describes people who understand that, if otherpeople respect the fair conditions of cooperation, the principle in question has to berespected, even at the expense of self gain. In addition, Hiromitsu [66], while focusing on
the fact that Rawls himself intended "the reasonable" to be only a political concept, claims
that this image of the human beings is analogous to that proposed by Hume [69], whoargues for altruism as their true character. If we view the expansion of reasonableness as
including the fate of future generations as "futurability" within FD, this provides a logicalfoundation of the framework for designing or agreeing to social systems that activate thisfuturability.
6. Practical application of FD
Parallel to the experimental research mentioned above, practical applications of the FD
are underway. The main framework for laboratory and field experiments relay on
researchers presenting scenarios likely to happen in the future. This enables us tounderstand if the selected scenarios change when the future is examined from theviewpoint of the present and vice versa, as by an imaginary future generation. However, in
FD practical applications, the participating citizens themselves design the scenarios, andthe issue becomes their choice of scenarios and present-day policies. The proposed
scenarios differ qualitatively when considering the future from the standpoint of thepresent and when examining the present from the viewpoint of the future. The following
paragraphs describe practical cases applied in Yahaba, Iwate Prefecture, and Matsumoto,
Nagano Prefecture.
In Yahaba, an imaginary future generation was created in the present to represent
future generations' interests and approach vision design and decision-making from theirperspective [70]. It examined the possibility of decisions taken through negotiation between
this future generation representatives and the current generation, considering the conflictof interests of the different generations. Because the Cabinet Office required allmunicipalities to produce a "long-term vision" for the year 2060, monthly workshops were
held between November 2015 and March 2016. Four teams of five-six residents of Yahaba
were assembled. Two of these teams were asked to think about the Yahaba of 2060 as
18

members of the current generation, and propose policies at the present time, for the future.
Meanwhile, the remaining two teams were asked to "travel to 2060 in a time machine" anddraw up the policies from there.
At this point, I would like to outline the nature of the debate, based upon Hara et al.
[70]. Let us start from the position of the imaginary future generation. First, theiroverriding aim was securing and building a prosperous life for the future inhabitants of
Yahaba; debates arose around their livelihood, lifestyle, and values. For example, while thecurrent generation proposed policies such as free medical care for children to increase thepopulation directly, the imaginary future generation did not have such a specific aim,
discussing instead the possibility of population increase as a result of vision and policies.
Second, they did not propose individual strategies and long-term ideas to achieve theiraims; they constructed a narrative instead, connecting strategies and ideas. Third, if that
helped achieve the aim, existing systems, etc., were regarded as flexible and open tochange. Fourth, they displayed a willingness to actively incorporate any radical technicalinnovations that may occur in the future. Fifth, they demonstrated the highest possible
sensibility and awareness by considering new strategies to respond to urbanization and theaging of society. Sixth, having become aware of the current issues, they devised a new
vision to eliminate those.
Now let us examine the approach of the current generation. First, a better life atpresent became the primary focus. For example, they proposed things such as "eliminating
waiting lists for nursery schools" or "improving care for the elderly." Second, they tended
to consider improvements to existing facilities and frameworks. Third, they leaned toward
proposing policies that did not burden them. Fourth, they favored policies producing
results in the short term. Fifth, they tended to consider polices by comparing thecorresponding policies of other regions. Sixth, they also tended to regard existing
frameworks and systems as immutable.
The current generation regarded the future as an extension of the present time,
constructed visions that resolved immediate problems, and proposed ideas based on
current conditions and restrictions. Meanwhile, the imaginary future generation creatively
gave the highest priority to solving the most complicated and time-consuming problems
and depicting the future thoroughly regardless of current circumstances. They noted thephysical and aesthetic merits and resources of the region and examined ways to utilize
these on a continuous basis.
Six months after the field application described above ended, Nakagawa et al. [71]conducted interviews with several of the participants and reported the following. The
locals who had undertaken the role of imaginary future persons experienced no conflict19

between the current generation and imaginary future person parts of themselves, having acomprehensive overview of both sides. In addition, the very act of thinking as an
imaginary future person was a joy; in their everyday life, they found themselves thinking
like an imaginary future person automatically. The impact of this experience persisting six
months later shows that the effect of introducing imaginary future persons is robust. Thisvalidates the possibility to activate the futurability of humans by prompting them to think
like imaginary future persons. However, when the current generation examines the future,
future generations are seen as outsiders.
In Yahaba, the first 26 of the 1,000 randomly sampled residents were recruited toparticipate in discussions in the period January–March 2017. To summarize, the theme ofthis practical FD application by Hara et al. [72] was to develop a plan for public facilities
and municipal housing in the year 2060. Given the effectiveness of Shahrier et al. 's [39]FAB mechanism, deliberations were carried out based on the following arrangement. The
first session of deliberations was conducted from the perspective of the current generation.
In the second session, one month later, proposals for policies and long-term ideas werediscussed from the standpoint of an imaginary future generation living in the year 2060. In
the third session, vision proposals and decision-making were welcomed from theperspective of either current or future generation. Participants filled out various
questionnaires after each session. As shown by Nakagawa et al. [71], it was ascertained thatthe viewpoints of from both the current generation and imaginary future could coexist
within one individual. In addition, when examining the "degree of shared viewpoint"—ayardstick measuring the extent to which persons in the current and future generation
shared views—it was found that the higher that degree, the stronger a person's awarenessof the current generation's responsibility. Moreover, in policy proposals, a focus on both"the possibility of realization" and "leaving scope for future generations to be in a position
to decide for themselves" was observed. In addition, the language analysis of the first set of
discussions revealed that there were many opinions and proposals relating to facilities asphysical items. However, elements missing in the first session emerged as the second andthird sessions of discussions progressed, such as concern about the current residents ofmunicipal housing.
Yoshioka [73] had been conducting waterworks workshops for residents at Yahaba
since 2008 (no FD methods) and observed that the thinking of the participants could bechanged from taking an inexpensive and reliable water supply for granted to believing it
unreasonable to expect such facilities without any cost to oneself. FD sessions started in2015, and Yahaba held resident FD workshops on the increasingly difficult-to-maintainwater utilities in 2017. Consequently, the residents proposed on their own a water rate20

increase. The town collected an extra 6% the next year. There was little opposition from theresidents' side. After observing these workshops, Mayor Shozo Takahashi declared Yahaba
an FD Town in his 2018 policy speech and established the Future Strategy Office in April
2019. The first task of the office was to develop, together with the residents, a future planusing the FD approach. The development of this plan scheduled to be completed presently.
Thus, Yahaba Town is set to change the town structure, while the very mindset of its
residents is also beginning to undergo change.
A three-day workshop for local government workers was held in November 2017 in
Matsumoto, Nagano Prefecture (Nishimura et al. [74]), to discuss how to work out a basic
concept for the new city hall due to be rebuilt. That was followed by a two-day workshop
for the general public (January and February 2018). The current generation group attachedinformation to a blank map and conducted the "spatial journey task" of writing down the
problems encountered for each region. The imaginary future generation group, in addition
to the blank map task, conducted the "spatial and temporal journey task." Based on atimeline for Matsumoto City from 1960 to 2060, they looked back at past events andimagined the shape of the region and the society of the future. They also added predictions
for various future statistics and technological innovations on the timeline. On the first dayof the local government employee workshop, all groups undertook the spatial journey task.
On the second day, only the future generation group experienced the temporal journeytask. The future generation group performed a lively exchange of views at the meta-level
regarding the future and the functions left for the local government after persistent low
birthrate and increased artificial intelligence use. The starting point in the current
generation group related to current problems, and methods to resolve these were
examined. The general public workshops yielded the same results.
Nishimura et al. [74] administered questionnaires on discount rates before and after
the events. There was no change for the current generation group. However, for the future
generation group, the discount rate was lower after experiencing the temporal journey taskand, thus, acquiring a long-term viewpoint. Furthermore, women's discount rate was lower
than that of men. This experiment was designed to compare the "spatial task" and the"spatial and temporal journey task" + "imaginary future generation." It may have beenpossible to verify the effect of the imaginary future generation if "spatial and temporaljourney task" groups without any imaginary future generation element were considered.
Future designers of a city may ask participants at various practice sites to time travel tothe year 2050, for example. However, it is hard to believe that an ordinary citizen can be an
imaginary future person without effort. Therefore, among those who participated in thefirst practice in Yahaba, Nakagawa interviewed people who became imaginary future21

people. Based on these interviews, Nakagawa et al. [75] created two 10-minute narrated
picture-story shows. Rather than directly using them in practice, their effectiveness wastested by experimenting with regular people as participants. One hundred eighty-six
participants immersed in the same environment of financial sustainability problems of [44]and one picture-story show were used to measure individuals' attitudes both before andafter exposure to this intervention. It was found that exposure to this visual narrative
significantly altered participants' preferences as proxies for future generations. Specifically,
after this intervention, participants were able to avoid regret for not doing certain things in
the past. They tended to wish that the current generation had chosen a more distant option
from the status quo. Based on the results of this study, four picture-story shows werecreated and subsequently used in many practice sites.
In many practical FD applications, the designers form groups of approximately four
participants. The group members discuss the issue in depth from the viewpoint of future
generations. In most cases, a facilitator controls the deliberations. At the end, participants
and facilitators summarize the results. It is of crucial importance to note that the act ofsummarizing deliberations can never be arbitration-free. In fact, there are infinite ways of
selecting and meaningfully connecting statements mentioned during deliberations, the way
these are done depends on the person doing it. With this understanding, Nakagawa [76]proposed a method to visualize contexts of deliberations using a dialog map and extract
viewpoints of the participants based on the transcripts. This method is applied to secure
the transparency of the act of summarizing the deliberation, even if, in principle,
objectiveness cannot be achieved. During the most creative deliberations, the participants'
statements intertwine as if they were running up a flight of stairs. Thus, a collective new
vision is created, which could not have been created by individual members alone. Byvisualizing such lines of deliberation (or context), this method provides clear reasons forwhy some parts of the deliberation are prioritized rather than the rest to extract visions expost (see also [77]).
FD projects in progress are related to renewable energy and environment (Suita City,
Osaka metropolitan area [78]), infrastructure (Uji City, Kyoto metropolitan area), global
warming (Kyoto City), water and sewer (Kyoto prefecture), water (Nagaokakyo City,
Kyoto metropolitan area), infrastructure (Saijo City, Ehime prefecture), future planningwith Kochi Association of Corporate Executives (Kochi Prefecture), urban redevelopment(Ohnuma Town, Hokkaido [79]), and more.
In addition, Matsunaga and Managi [80] question the nature of social sustainability
and propose replacing the GDP with a new, inclusive wealth measure (wealth available tothe society to enhance well-being, benefiting both those alive today and future22

generations), calculating it in practice. This has the potential to become an indispensable
indicator for evaluating FD research.
So far, in practicing FD, researchers and local government officials collaborated toprovide an appropriate "mechanism" for each municipality and then held workshops inwhich local residents could participate. Note that the researchers merely provide
mechanisms for residents to make decisions, and do not address problems themselves.
When, where, and how to bring in problem experts is an important part of the design of"mechanism," of course. However, an FD researcher should not interfere with the problem
itself, the same way a football referee should not play in a game, and neither should aspectator get in the field and play. Furthermore, it follows Hayek's position that "theknowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place" in an area is not easilytransferred to outsiders [81 ,82]. Although each researcher seems to adopt a variety of
implicit rules in practice, I would like to present here principles adopted by the ResearchInstitute for FD of the Kochi University of Technology (RIFD) [83].
Principle 1: Designers should not be players
In the practical designing of a workshop, any researcher should assume the role of a
supporter; the person in charge should make the decisions. The practice should be
conducted by the people in charge, and the researcher should not have any role in thepractice. Furthermore, the researcher must not force or guide the participants or those incharge of any aspect of the FD practice.
Principle 2: Critical Publicity
Kant [84] defines this concept by "all actions having relations to the rights of other men,whose maxims do not allow publicity, are unjust." Whether it is FD or not, any practices
involving citizens must satisfy Kant's criterion. Based on this principle, RIFD proposes thefollowing two principles.
Principle 2-a: Informational Publicity
All parties involved must share information in both directions with all other parties. For
example, regarding emails, this means that all parties are always on the mailing list. Anyother way of exchanging information does not satisfy this principle. The concentration of
information refers to a form of network in which one person acts as a hub, and informationis transmitted to others only through that person.
Principle 2-b: Equality
23

This requires researchers and citizens to participate on an equal footing. In practice, as
Hayek [81] and Scott [82] show, the researchers who design the mechanism lack fieldknowledge, where RIFD shifts the weight to the citizens. In other words, this principle
implies refusing to be led by the researcher. Leading here means one person chairs orpresides over a deliberation, leads the decision-making process, and so on. For example,
consider the case in which one person assumes the role of the hub and leads the exchangeof emails and meetings for researchers only, omitting the person in charge. Such a methodof recognizing the person who becomes the hub does not satisfy the condition of equality.
Principle 3: Evidence-based selection of method
A new method must be validated beforehand through theoretical verification or laboratory
testing, rather than directly used in practice. When using an untested method, the people
involved should be aware of the fact, the advantages and disadvantages of the method
must be made clear, and the choice to use it or not must be left to them.
Principle 4: the "fading away" principle
When researchers and outsiders support citizens, including a variety of stakeholders, thelatter can conduct practical applications without further support from the former. In otherwords, supporters are assumed to withdraw in the future completely.
Principle 5: the "external eye" principle
If a researcher serves as a supporter for an FD session, he/she must submit to criticalevaluation by a party external to the design of the mechanism, the practice, and the outputof the practice. In this context, the external parties exclude the supporter in question andoutside stakeholders.
7. Outstanding issues with FD – in lieu of conclusions
FD research began in earnest in late 2015, now encompassing a variety of issues. Withreference to Kobayashi [16], let us examine three such issues.
The first relates to whether the imaginary future generation will function as intended.
In the experiments reviewed here, people have been found to self-activate their futurability.
In addition, in FD practical applications, they have also been found to exercise an"originality" not found when the future is viewed from the position of the current
generation. That said, the mechanism of the "mind" at work is still unclear. As a result,
Aoki et al. [85] conceived a research area dubbed "neuro future design," in whichcollaborations between psychology, biology, neuroscience, and related fields are essential.
24Even if many people are willing to become imaginary future persons, how will theyfunction within existing organizations? This problem also relates to the second issue: will it
be possible to compensate for the impulsiveness and optimism of the democracy merely by
constructing within existing frameworks new organizations such as a Ministry of the
Future, future departments within various bodies, and a future discussion chamber? We
certainly do not know yet how will policies be drawn up or be chosen from among various
proposals and how will they be pursued. In other words, with the issue of designing "social
mechanisms" offering places where the general public can demonstrate futurability andoriginality, we also face the issue of designing new "social mechanisms" able to implement
such ideas. We must learn to construct social mechanisms in which general public members
who understand the perspective of the future generations can draw up and implement
various policies. Moreover, they should do that not as a task for the sake of others, but as
one that relates directly to them. This frame has the potential to change the existing
representative democracy significantly.
The second FD research issue is the validity of the creation of an imaginary future
generation (with new systems such as a Ministry of the Future) within a democracy. For
example, with Demeny voting, parents with proxy votes for their children ultimately
obtain the right to vote more than once, which contradicts the democratic principle of "oneperson, one vote" and lacks validity. With the rationalization of the imaginary future
generation examined in Section 5, the necessity to consider the validity of a Ministry of the
Future and of various social mechanisms that may be proposed will arise at some point.
The third FD issue refers to what needs to be done so that ordinary people
automatically become imaginary future persons. According to Kobayashi [16], "the next
generation to whom we are bound to contribute must be regarded as something that haspermanence," and we must understand that there is value in contributing to the progress ofhuman intelligence, i.e., to progress in "expanded reason." If "expanded reason" rings alarm
bells regarding the sustainability of the natural environment and societies of the next
generation, we should begin taking countermeasures now. Kobayashi argues that, if"progress in expanded reason" can be considered an asset, implementing countermeasures
today is only logical if the value of that asset is expected to be undermined in the future.
Self-sacrificing behavior on behalf of the next generation is transformed, for the current
generation into logical behavior, to maintain the value of its own asset. Such an attempt canbe found in [86].
In addition to the three issues described above, another important aspect requires
attention is reforming the impulsive market from the viewpoint of FD. One strategy
considers using the market by setting limits (within the carbon budget) on the amount of25

fossil fuel that can be burned each year and trading the relevant emission rights (volume).
How this relates to futurability is still unknown.
Finally, let us investigate the possibility of radical innovations in science from theviewpoint of FD. Although futurability is not a human quality that ought to survive fromthe perspective of evolutionary biology, it does find a way to stay relevant. It is importantto reexamine existing frameworks to investigate why this should be so. Moreover,discounting future economic gains at the expense of future generations for the sake of thecurrent one is the norm. Every aspect of life and decision making lacks the perspective of
future generations. Thus, to ensure sustainable environment for generations to come,perhaps the revolutionizing of science itself is required.
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