The Trump Administration and Japan:
Challenges and Visions forJapan's Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era

Japan-US Alliance Study Group Report
Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS)
January 2017

The Trump Administration and Japan:
Challenges and Visions forJapan's Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era

Japan-US Alliance Study Group Report

Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS)
January 2017

Contents
Introduction

1

Trends in US Politics

2

Regional Implications

3

1. Korean Peninsula
2. China and Taiwan
3. Southeast Asia
4. Europe and Russia
5. The Middle East
6. Maritime legal order and the rule of law

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4
6
8
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10

Proposals for the Japanese Government

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1. Security policy
S-1: Revise the National Security Strategy and the
National Defense Program Guidelines
S-2: Incrementally develop conventionalcounterstrike capabilities
S-3: Strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities
S-4: Urge the Trump Administration to reaffirm
US commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands

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2. Foreign policy
F-1: Korean Peninsula
F-2: China and Taiwan
F-3: Southeast Asia
F-4: Europe and Russia
F-5: The Middle East
F-6: Maritime legal order and the rule of law
F-7: Latin America and Africa
F-8: The United Nations, global issues,
and multilateral frameworks

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15
15
16
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17
17
18
18

Japan-US Alliance Study Group

12
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Introduction
It is possible that Donald Trump’s success in the US presidential election of November
2016 will touch off the greatest transformation in world politics since World War Two.
This is because, for the first time, the presidency of the United States—a country thatsince World War Two has consistently upheld the liberal world order—has been won by
a man who asserts that the US national interests will take precedence over international
cooperation.
If so, Japan could be one of the most profoundly affected countries. Japan has thus far
accepted its status as a junior partner within the US security framework and—without any
significant military power of its own—has devoted itself to economic development.
Although it is difficult to predict what Mr. Trump’s policies will be, there is apossibility, based on the statements he has made to date, that he will be calling for Japan
to become more self-reliant. Although his comprehension of the Japan-US security
arrangements is fraught with misconceptions, there is ample possibility that he will
ultimately opt to maintain the current Japan-US security framework. However, given thatthe average defense expenditure of NATO countries is 2% of their GDPs, and that the
average expenditure of OECD countries on official development assistance (ODA) is
0.7% of their GDPs, it is highly questionable whether Mr. Trump will approve of Japan’slevel of defense spending (less than 1% of its GDP) or of its level of spending on ODA(approximately 0.2% of its GDP).
It would not be such a bad thing for Japan to become more self-reliant in terms of
security. It is almost unnatural for Japan to maintain this relationship as it is, in the form
that it has taken since before Japan’s postwar reconstruction. However, in the context ofinternational relations in East Asia, it has long been taken for granted that this is Japan's
basic stance. Changing this will be no easy task—either domestically or in terms ofJapan’s relations with neighboring countries.
In these respects, the authors of this paper decided to consider the question of how
Japan should develop its foreign and security policy, and to offer some proposals in thisregard.

1Trends in US politics
The election of Mr. Trump provides numerous indicators regarding current and future
trends in US politics.
The 2016 presidential election was exceptional, not only for Mr. Trump’s lack of both
political experience and military service but also because it was the first time since WorldWar Two that the Republican Party had nominated a presidential candidate with anisolationist disposition. Also, both the Republican and Democratic candidates for thepresidency pledged opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The latter two
points would seem to be especially important in regard to the consideration of the future
evolution of US politics.
In overall terms, it would seem that elites in the United States (as well as in a numberof European countries, including the UK) have seen a decline in their ability to influence
the course taken by their respective countries. The success of Mr. Trump (who had only
rejoined the Republican Party in 2012) in overcoming opposition and resistance from theparty’s establishment and leadership during the contest to become the Republican Party’s
nominee for the presidency, and thus securing nomination, would seem to be amanifestation of this phenomenon. Similarly, in the contest for the Democratic Party
nomination, Hillary Clinton (who appeared to enjoy an overwhelming advantage byvirtue of her name recognition, financial muscle, experience, and personal network) foundherself in an unexpectedly difficult struggle with Senator Bernie Sanders—a socialist andvirtual unknown.
Mr. Trump’s career record was by no means his only heterodoxy. Among the policies
or slogans (such as “Make America Great Again”) that Mr. Trump put forward, thefollowing trio stood out: an anti-illegal immigrant stance employing fierce rhetoric thatparticularly resonated with the white blue-collar demographic; an anti-TPP, anti-NAFTA
protectionism; and an anti-internationalism that ventures to reduce the US's roles inrelations to its allies. Mr. Trump’s victories in states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, and Wisconsin would surely have been impossible without fervent support forthese policies—in particular, the first two—from the white blue-collar demographic.
There is a certain level of apprehension that future contests for the Republicanpresidential nomination will regularly see the ascent of candidates who structure theirelection campaigns around this trio of policies put forth by Mr. Trump. It is feared that,in this event, there will be a transformation in the Republican Party, which during thepostwar period has consistently adopted a fundamental stance in favor of upholding theinternational order, based on the rule of law, and has promoted the principle of free trade.
Even in the Democratic Party, though 1972 presidential candidate George McGovern was
an exceptionally unabashed isolationist, other candidates have endorsed moderateinternationalism. On trade issues, former president Bill Clinton promoted NAFTA, while
President Obama has displayed leadership on the TPP. The Democratic Party of today isclearly more inclined towards protectionism than it was 20 years ago.
Though such tidal changes could be taking place in US politics, the Government ofJapan should not quickly change or improvise anew its policy vis-à-vis the United States,in response to its regime change this time. A minority voice could call for support innuclear armament, blindly following the recommendation by Mr. Trump during his

2electoral campaign, or could welcome the withdrawal of the US base and the abolishmentof Japan US security arrangements. Such arguments basically benefit Japan very little.
To begin with, it is not the case that US public opinion has turned hostile to Japan.
Though at times Mr. Trump referred to Japan by criticizing it, such statements carried
little weight in the electoral campaign. The public view in the US in general has certainly
shown a trend shifting towards protectionism in comparison to the 1960s or even to the1990s. It is, however, still supportive of internationalist foreign policies, and of free trade.
Such a feature is more conspicuous among the social elites. Even in Mr. Trump’s
government, one could never be sure that all the high-ranking officials of the federal
government to be assigned, as many as 4,000, are in accord with President Trump’s
policies.
What is more, there is a possibility that the nature of a President and his regime couldchange in a short time, or a possibility that internationalist free-trade proponent
government could be resurrected in a short while.
As discussed above, the possibility that the US should change in the long term canneither be denied. In this respect, the thinking that goes back to the basics of foreign andsecurity policies should be indispensable for Japan. What is at the basis of such thinking
is, of course, the evaluation of threats to Japan, and the decision on whether response
against such threats is adequate for Japan acting on its own. The security environment
surrounding Japan is severe by all means, and it is never easy for Japan to deal with it on
its own. It would therefore be vital for Japan to firmly uphold the policy line based on theJapan-US Alliance, and to further strengthen the Alliance to improve its security
environment.
Faced with the emergence of a US President who has made remarks, in spite of US
and Japan being allies, pointing to policies towards Japan differing from those henceforth, Japan, while prudently discerning the actual US polices, could also be required tosearch for security undertakings stepped up further than before. In other words, Japanought to start putting into action whatever it can on its own.

Regional Implications
1. Korean Peninsula
The Japan-US alliance is an international public good that guarantees not only the defenseof Japan but also the defense of South Korea and the peace and stability of the AsiaPacific region. Foreign and security policy experts in Japan, the United States, South
Korea, and Southeast Asia widely share this view. Given the advent of the newadministration in the United States and a presidential election scheduled in South Korea
this year, it is imperative for Japan to have the new leadership in Washington and Seoul
understand the strategic importance of the Japan-US alliance. With the heightened levelof North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities, strengthening the Japan-US allianceand the Japan-US-South Korea security cooperation is crucial.
Stronger sanctions and closer security cooperation are the key to the success of our
North Korea policy. The former should involve the thorough implementation of UN
Security Council sanctions resolutions and stricter financial sanctions against North
Korea in a more coordinated manner. Since individual sanctions have not proved effective
in deterring the development of missiles and nuclear weapons by North Korea, it will be3vital to implement a diverse range of sanctions consistently and comprehensively.
Sanctions can be effective only if they are implemented thoroughly and by all UN
member countries. The sanctions adopted against North Korea in the wake of its fifth
nuclear test in September 2016 established an upper limit on the country’s coal exports,
which account for one-third of its export earnings. In collaboration with the international
community, Japan must forcefully demand strict enforcement of these sanctions by China
and other countries that have significant trade relations with North Korea. Japan, theUnited States, and South Korea must not only exert diplomatic pressure on China but
should also consider a policy of imposing sanctions on Chinese companies that do
business with North Korea in violation of the sanctions resolutions.
In terms of security cooperation, Japan and the United States must continue to actively
make efforts necessary for dealing with the threat of North Korea’s missiles and nuclear
weapons. As well as strengthening its missile defense capability and civil protection
measures, Japan should also consider incrementally acquire capabilities to destroy North
Korea’s missiles and missile facilities if necessary. Having signed the General Securityof Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in November 2016, Japan and South
Korea must continue to expand bilateral security cooperation. Since this will obviously
require amicable relations between Japan and South Korea, the two countries must
continue to improve their relations on various fronts.
While strengthening sanctions and security cooperation as outlined above, Japan, theUnited States, and South Korea must consider reestablishing the trilateral North Korea
policy coordination mechanism. President-elect Trump has demonstrated that he believes
in taking a bilateral approach to the resolution of international issues. If the United States
is to engage in bilateral negotiations with North Korea, prior consultation with its allies
on its approach to North Korea will be essential. Japan, the United States, and South
Korea will need to constantly reaffirm the importance of close policy coordination, whichis the only way for us to be able to put an end to North Korea’s missile and nuclear
development, transform North Korea into a country that respects human rights, andrespond effectively to any contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.
2. China and Taiwan
Although during the presidential election campaign Mr. Trump made harsh statements on
the economic front in the context of policy towards China, there were many unclear
aspects to his statements regarding security, and it was unclear what his attitude towards
China was really founded upon. For this reason, the belief in China was that the electionof Mr. Trump (with his emphasis on economic issues that could be resolved throughnegotiation) might be more beneficial to China than that of Secretary Clinton, as it was
anticipated that she would take a harder line towards China than President Obama has, interms of policy. Mr. Trump’s assertion that he would request that allied countries shoulder
the cost of stationing US military forces on their soil, his statements with regard tointernational security that indicated unilateralist thinking, and his statements that hinted
at deals between superpowers reinforced this tendency to view a potential Trumpadministration as more desirable than a potential Clinton administration.
While Mr. Trump’s words and actions on China since his election as the next US
president are partially coming to match the statements he made during the presidential
election campaign, in some ways they do not correspond at all. Although he made critical4statements about US allies during the campaign, he agreed to hold talks with Prime
Minister Abe on November 18, right after the election. He has also taken unprecedented
actions, such as holding talks by telephone with Tsai Ing-wen, the president of Taiwan,
on December 2, and stating in a television interview on December 11 that, if accord
cannot be reached with the Chinese government on a range of issues, including trade,
there would be no reason to adhere to the One-China policy that has been followed bysuccessive US administrations. Mr. Trump has been quoted as stating that China must
adhere to the rules on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and this can be seen
as a sign that currently his attitude towards the country is hardening, rather than being
placatory.
In terms of staff to support his China policy, however, Mr. Trump nominated Iowa
governor Terry Branstad, who has a history of friendship with the Chinese president Xi
Jinping, as US Ambassador to China—even before naming a secretary of state. This kindof action can be seen as evidence that his attitude is also to put a premium on dialogue
with China. On the other hand, he nominated Exxon-Mobil CEO Rex Tillerson, who has
experience in negotiating with China on issues of resource development in the South
China Sea, as Secretary of State. More recently, Mr. Trump issued a harsh statement
regarding China’s capture of an unmanned US underwater vehicle in international waters
in the South China Sea.
Mr. Trump’s language and behavior since his election as above have probably
engendered a sense of foreboding in China over the possible advent of strained relations
between the United States and China. The Chinese government’s response to his
postelection words and actions has so far been restrained. In response to Mr. Trump’s
statement on the One-China policy, however, a Chinese government spokesperson statedthat “if the US government were to reconsider its One-China policy, this would ruin thepeace and stability that exist between China and Taiwan, and would also hinder thedevelopment of healthy and stable relations between China and the United States.” With
incoming White House chief of staff Reince Priebus subsequently commenting that “weare not suggesting that we’re revisiting the ‘One China’ policy right now,” it will benecessary to keep a close watch to see how the Trump administration handles the issue of
Taiwan.
While the Trump administration is essentially inheriting the Obama administration’s
policies towards China, judging from its track record so far (in the security sphere,requesting that allied countries shoulder the financial burden so as to reduce the financial
burden on the United States; rescinding the agreement to join the Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP), one of the twin pillars of the rebalance to Asia policy; as well as
indulging in behavior such as holding unprecedented talks with President Tsai Ing-wen),
Japan and China are faced with the possibility of a whole new situation. Thus, the Trumpadministration could potentially be either advantageous or disadvantageous for Japan. It
will be necessary to watch closely, in particular, to see if some kind of “deal” (as alluded
to by President-elect Trump during the election campaign) might be concluded between
the United States and China.
The Japanese government should encourage the Trump administration to demonstrateinternationalism in the global arena and to increase its involvement in the Asia-Pacificregion. The rebalance to Asia policy included both security and economic components,
but with US withdrawal from the TPP already announced, the rebalance has lost one ofthese two key elements. It would be desirable for the security component to be maintained
5and for the economic component to be shored up—for example, through a TPP without
the United States or an economic partnership agreement (EPA) between Japan and theUnited States. However, it cannot be ruled out that the United States will become more
inward-looking, just as it was in the latter half of the 1970s. Accordingly, Japan should
team up with a partner, such as Germany or the EU, to prevail upon the United States tomaintain its internationalism. In so doing, Japan should also consider including China,
which is looking to take the opportunity to improve Japan-China relations in 2017 and2018. If the United States should request some form of cooperation of Japan, Japan should
consider responding positively to the extent possible, while seeking stronger relations
among the allied countries. Alluding to the fact that Japan has shouldered significant costs
to date, Japan should, in line with requests from the Trump administration, promotestronger relations between the allies and with other allied countries, jointly request theUnited States to maintain its involvement.
Japan must also absolutely minimize the possibility of any deals struck between the
United States and China that would be disadvantageous to allied countries. Mindful ofthe fact that the US-China relationship exerts a huge influence over the situation in East
Asia and the western Pacific, Japan must in particular absolutely minimize the chance ofany such deals being made on issues regarding the East China Sea or the South China Sea.
To this end, it will be necessary to fashion a pluralistic, triangular framework that includes
Japan, the United States, and China, and to make full use of it. Should the US regional
influence wane, the Taiwan Strait will become the principal focus of China’s attention.
In light of this, it will be necessary to address the importance of a triangular framework
consisting of Japan, the United States, and Taiwan.
3. Southeast Asia
There is considerable diversity between the foreign-policy stances of the Southeast Asian
countries. The Philippines and Thailand are allied with the United States; Indonesia—
having the largest population in Southeast Asia—is developing its own independent
foreign policy; and Cambodia and Laos are regarded as being pro-China. On the other
hand, maintaining their influence by preserving a certain level of unity under the bannerof ASEAN represents an important foreign-policy asset for these countries. In 2017,
ASEAN will mark the 50th anniversary of its founding.
In diplomatic terms, the various Southeast Asian countries are at differing distancesfrom the United States. However, for the most part, they accept that US involvement inEast Asia and Southeast Asia is conducive to regional stability. In that sense, the Obamaadministration’s rebalancing policy was essentially favorable to these countries. On theother hand, it is extremely unclear what Trump administration policy towards Southeast
Asia will be. In addition, the development of ASEAN-led multilateral institutions, suchas ARF, the EAS, and the ADMM+, has been due to the approval of major countries,
such as the USA, China, and Japan, of ASEAN performing its central role in constructing
the regional architecture, as well as to the policy aims of the Southeast Asian countries.
However, it is also unknown whether the incoming Trump administration will respect
ASEAN’s position in this regard.
The reactions to, and evaluations of, Mr. Trump’s victory among the Southeast Asian
countries have been diverse and complex. This reflects the various standpoints of theSoutheast Asian countries with regard to three of the characteristics that have been
6

glimpsed so far in the incoming Trump administration’s foreign policy: (1) the
protectionist characteristics in economic policy, (2) the anti-Islamic stance, and (3) Mr.
Trump’s scant interest in issues relating to universal values such as human rights anddemocracy. Regarding the protectionist characteristics in economic policy, anxiety is
spreading that the free-trade system may be disturbed and that limitations may be placedon access to US markets and on US investment. Since Mr. Trump has also clearly
expressed his opposition to the TPP, apprehensions over the negative economic effects of
Trump administration foreign policies are evident in TPP member states in Southeast
Asia—particularly in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore. Next, regarding an anti-Islamic
stance, there are strong fears in Indonesia and Malaysia (both home to many Muslims)
that Mr. Trump’s anti-Islamism will result in policies that restrict investment in the twocountries, as well as antipathy from a religious perspective. Regarding universal values,
Thailand, Cambodia, and the Philippines—countries that have attracted criticism from
Western countries over conditions surrounding human rights and democratization—arewelcoming the relatively less interest expressed by Mr. Trump.
However, it should be noted that, irrespective of whether their attitude to the advent of
Mr. Trump is positive or negative, Southeast Asian countries are not looking forward toa reduced US presence in the region. Given the preference of Southeast Asian countries
for omnidirectional foreign policies, they would find the power vacuum that would arise
as a result of the withdrawal of the US presence undesirable. What these countries wish
for is a United States that upholds the free-trade system, is tolerant of a wide range ofvalues, and maintains its involvement in the region. On this score, their standpoint is
identical to Japan’s.
Accordingly, Japan should encourage the United States under the Trumpadministration to maintain its involvement in that part of Asia. At the same time, Japan
should also step up its efforts to formulate open regional governance mechanisms thatwould be desirable in Southeast Asia and East Asia.
One specific theme that could be raised is further promotion of regional economic
integration. It will be vital to move forward on multiple fronts—preserving the TPP,
making progress on the RCEP, and strengthening support for ASEAN regional
integration—on the precondition that the United States will not be excluded. A second
objective should be to strengthen cooperation on various issues that relate to the peaceand stability of the entire Southeast and East Asian region. It should be possible tostrengthen maritime security cooperation, the support of antiterrorism countermeasures,and support with regard to defense equipment and technology. Japan is already engaged
in cooperation—including coast guard support—with the Philippines, Indonesia, andMalaysia, among others. There is also currently discussion involving some ASEAN
countries of strengthening cooperation to deal with the increasing danger of terrorism dueto the spreading influence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). A greater
contribution by Japan on shared regional issues will lead to stronger regional governance.
It will be also necessary to make greater use of regional multilateral frameworks, basedon ASEAN, in which the United States also participates, such as ARF, the EAS, and the
ADMM+. Although Japan is on track to provide concrete support to the Philippines,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia with regard to defense equipment andtechnology, it will be necessary to make further progress on these efforts in accordancewith a "proactive contribution to peace."7

A third important issue for Japan is its policy orientation with regard to human rights
and democracy in Southeast Asia. Although there does seem to have been somedemocratic progress in Southeast Asia since the 2011 transition to civilian rule in
Myanmar, apparent setbacks for democratization—such as the persistence of the military
regime in Thailand—are also evident in the region. However, if Japan were to engage inthe kind of human rights and democracy-based diplomacy that Western countries have
utilized thus far, it would harm relations with some ASEAN countries and would notnecessarily improve the situation. Japan should take a flexible approach according tocircumstances in each country while remaining steady with regard to such universal
values as human rights and democracy.
4. Europe and Russia
Europe could be the region that is most affected by the inauguration of President Trump.
First, it is possible that the Trump administration will significantly alter the US
relationship with Russia. If the new administration changes its existing policy and works
to repair relations with Russia, this will create even greater levels of territorial concern in
Ukraine and the three Baltic states. Second, the effects of nationalism and populism havethrown European integration into chaos, and it is possible that this may affect global
politics as well.
During the presidential election campaign, Mr. Trump repeatedly asserted that hewould review existing alliances, and this will likely have greater repercussions for US
alliances in Europe—that is, with NATO countries—than it does for its alliances in Asia.
The reason for this is that US trade with the Asia-Pacific region is greater in volume thanUS trade with Europe, and thus the US relationships with Asia—the center of global
economic growth—are more closely tied to US national interests. The Trumpadministration is unlikely to show much interest in multilateralism or regional integration.
This would indicate that a major rift could occur between the United States and Europe
with regard to the norms of the international order.
Moreover, since the presidential election campaign (during which he dubbed his own
movement “Brexit Plus”) and in the wake of the UK referendum that yielded the decision
to withdraw from the EU, Mr. Trump has believed that the Brexit initiative and his
movement are linked—both spurred by a white middle-class, antiestablishment tendency.
More specifically, the belief that Brexit in the UK and the election of Mr. Trump aspresident of the United States represent two connected movements signifies a major
setback for the liberal international order based on the rule of law, which both the UnitedStates and the UK have consistently supported since World War Two. This would also
have major repercussions for the Japan-US alliance.
Separately, for a long time during the postwar era, the United States has been asupporter of European integration; however, it is possible that from now on it will instead
oppose the idea. If the United States were to work together with nationalist and populist
movements in Europe, it is possible that European integration would be forced into an
impasse. Instead, the need may arise for Germany to step up as the leading defender ofliberal values and norms in the Western world. This would likely further increase
Germany’s influence. Japan would then probably be faced with a difficult choice—8

between a Germany that shares its values and a United States that shares its strategicinterests.
The most important element of US policy in Europe is its relationship with Russia. On
multiple occasions during the presidential campaign, Mr. Trump spoke of his high regard
for President Putin of Russia. Mr. Trump has also expressed interest in strengthening US
relations with Russia. The Russian government, too, welcomes Mr. Trump’s victory in
the election. Moreover, Exxon-Mobil chief Rex Tillerson, who has close ties with Russia,
has been nominated for the position of secretary of state. Trump's advances towards
President Putin would likely be cause for serious concern among the three Baltic states
and the Ukraine, which are Russia’s neighbors, and would likely further destabilize thisregion. If US-Russia relations do improve significantly, it will be essential that there beample coordination between the Japanese and US governments (including discussions ofpolicy towards Russia at Japan-US summit meetings and at similar venues), so thatJapanese national interests or Japan-Russia relations are not harmed as a result.
5. The Middle EastIn December 2015, an American couple, steeped in the ideology of ISIL, went on ashooting rampage in San Bernardino, California, killing 14 people in an incident that sent
shockwaves across the entire United States. Fears of terrorism in the United States
increased once again, and in public opinion polls, “international terrorism” is cited as theleading threat to the United States. Against this backdrop of public anxiety, Mr. Trump
has been calling, ever since the election campaign, for counterterrorism measures to be
drastically strengthened. He has been advocating for military operations targeting ISIL
inside Iraq and Syria, ideological and cyber warfare, as well as the eradication of terrorism
financing. He has also spoken of reinforcing immigration controls, so as to prevent an
influx of terrorists, and of being willing to torture terrorists. He has also spoken of looking
for ways to share information and mount joint operations with various Middle Eastern
nations, European countries, and Russia. However, even if realized, actual cooperation
with Russia could be ostentatious. Since it is also expected that international collaborationon counterterrorism measures would be stepped up, it is highly likely that the UnitedStates would request allies to make cooperation of various kinds in this regard. It is worth
noting that Mr. Trump has stated that the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan werea mistake, so a close watch will have to be kept to see what form military operations
against ISIL will actually take.
During the election campaign, Mr. Trump also asserted that he would rescind or
renegotiate the nuclear accord that was concluded with Iran in July 2015. Since there isstrong opposition to the nuclear accord also within the U.S. Congress, particularly among
Republican members, Mr. Trump could very well rescind the agreement. If he does so,moderates in Iran will suffer politically and hardliners would reemerge. Iran could further
increase its dependence towards China. Moreover, there would likely be a backlash fromother countries that were party to the accord, such as the UK, France, and Germany. It
would likely be welcomed by Israel, Saudi Arabia and other states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), but the situation in the Middle East would further deteriorate.
Mr. Trump has nominated former Marine Corps General James Mattis, who hasabundant experience in the Middle East, for the post of secretary of defense, andCongressman Mike Pompeo, who has been an advocate of drastic counterterrorism
9

measures, for the post of director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It appears that Mr.
Trump is clearly forming his administration to shift towards counterterrorism and the
Middle East. It will be necessary to keep a close watch on whether leading administration
officials are still able to direct sufficient strategic attention towards Asia.
If the regional turmoil in the Middle East seems likely to intensify, Japan should
persuade the Trump administration against making major changes to the Iran policy while
continuing to expand its efforts to help stabilize the region. In response to an ISIL video
warning of the murder of Japanese citizens abroad—which the organization released
during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the Middle East in January 2015—the prime ministerdeclared that the $200 million donation announced during his visit was part of thecooperation including refugee assistance, and Japan would continue its non-militarycontributions to the War on Terror. In addition, a leaders’ declaration was issued at the
May 2016 G7 Ise-Shima Summit that stressed the importance of medium- to long-term
initiatives to deal with refugee and migration issues. Subsequently, at the Leaders’Summit on the Global Refugee Crisis hosted by President Obama in September 2016,
Prime Minister Abe announced that, to pursue “human security,” starting in 2016 Japan
would provide, over a period of three years, approximately $2.8 billion in humanitarianand self-reliance assistance to refugees and migrants, and assistance to host countries andcommunities. Separately, Japan has announced that, starting in 2017, it will accept 30
students each year from Syria, up to a maximum of 150 over a five-year period—aninitiative that has been commended.
6. Maritime legal order and the rule of law
China is the one country that repeatedly makes self-serving claims that represent a direct
challenge to the current maritime order, as enshrined in the UN Convention on the Lawof the Sea—an agreement that crystallizes the universal wisdom and philosophy rooted
in human maritime history, which date back to ancient Phoenicia. China is causing
disorder and creating major ructions in the international community by making selective
claims which fall under such categories as, “unilateral interpretation,” “disregard,” or“proposals for arbitrary new regulations” that completely deviate from existing
international law and practices. The essential elements of China’s maritime expansion
can be broadly observed in the following two ways as follows: (1) the assertion of
territorial rights to maritime features such as islets and (2) challenges to the interpretationof the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the rights of coastal countries andregarding the principle of the freedom of the seas, as typified by its assertion that it
possesses exclusive jurisdiction over the central part of the South China Sea.
In the first place, territorial disputes should essentially be resolved by the countries
concerned, and neither Japan nor the United States is party to any of the territorial disputes
in the South China Sea. However, China’s approach to issues in the South China Sea is
as follows: it divides the countries involved, turns the matter into a set of bilateral disputes,
and simultaneously tries to impose its will on each of the other countries within thecontext of the bilateral relationship (against the backdrop of its overwhelming economic
clout and military power). Thus, it attempts to ignore the law and resolve disputes throughforce, which naturally inspires great apprehension in every country concerned, as well as
in uninvolved countries. Coastal countries that are directly subjected to pressure by China
are hoping that the United States will be involved in the situation and that other countries

10

outside the region are also keeping a close eye on China’s tendencies and the changing
circumstances.
Next, there are the issues that relate to the freedom of the seas and to the interpretationof the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. China counters the universal principle ofthe freedom of the seas by asserting that the central part of South China Sea hashistorically been under Chinese jurisdiction and that it regards these waters as a controlledarea in which domestic Chinese law circumscribes the freedom of the seas. This assertion
stems from China’s unilateral and high-handed execution of all kinds of maritime
activities that are designed to make its control of this area a reality. This is also the very
essence of China’s dispute resolution method—use force and ignore the law. At the sametime, it is a point of acute conflict with US doctrine, which holds that the freedom of theseas is a US national interest.
Under its rebalancing policy, the United States has been proceeding with all kinds ofmeasures in response to this regional situation, which has been greatly affected by China’s
actions. Specifically, in part out of consideration for requests from countries and regions
apprehensive over China’s high-handed policies, the United States has strengthened
diplomatic relations and security cooperation with countries outside the region, such as
India, as well as with regional countries, and has thus isolated China internationally. As
well as conducting enhanced joint military exercises with coastal countries, the UnitedStates has been demonstrating an unbending will by conducting Freedom of Navigation
operations, and by refusing to indulge China’s self-serving maritime activities. However,an overall assessment of the "rebalance" policy reveals its limitations, such as their failure
to prevent China from constructing and militarizing manmade islands or to suppress
China’s coercive maritime activities.
Based on such awareness, there is an urgent need to formulate a Japan-US joint
strategy that spotlights the geopolitical character of the South China Sea—the central
main front in China’s maritime expansion—as a “mare clausum” (closed sea) which
would focus on the following three zones: the seas beyond the South China Sea (theIndian Ocean, the western Pacific Ocean, and the waters north of Australia); the sea’s
periphery (the coastal countries and regions of Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam); and the inland sea. There are further needs toformulate a new Japan-US joint strategy towards the East China Sea (the second front in
China’s maritime expansion), as well as to build the as-yet dangerously meager
capabilities of the coastal countries and regions—in particular, to improve their domainawareness capabilities.

Proposals for the Japanese Government
The aspect of the foreign-policy statements made so far by Mr. Trump that creates somedegree of apprehension is his apparent tendency to view diplomacy and global politics as
essentially transactional in nature. On a related note, he seems to make virtually no
mention of values, the international order, or human rights, and he has made hardly any
statements regarding these topics.
In other words, the United States that has been intent on leading and upholding theliberal international order and the free market system may be changing its shape. Thismight be a short-term change, but it could also be the harbinger of a transformation that11

extends to the medium and long term as well. Japan must discern the precise nature ofthis change and think about the most appropriate foreign and security policies to adopt.
This will likely involve initiatives to further strengthen the alliance with the United States,
as well as an intensification of Japan’s own defense and foreign-policy efforts.
1. Security policy
The current Abe administration, which was inaugurated in December 2012, has thus far
carried out a whole raft of security policy reforms: the formulation of the Act on theProtection of Specially Designed Secrets in 2013; the establishment of the National
Security Council, formulation of the National Security Strategy, and revision of the
National Defense Program Guidelines in December 2013; the formulation of the Three
Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology to replace the Three
Principles on Arms Exports in April 2014; the July 2014 cabinet decision partiallyallowing the exercise of the right to collective self-defense; and the adoption of security
legislation based on this cabinet decision in September 2015.
Within the context of Japanese politics, this has represented a quantum leap in policy
terms. Consequently, these changes have encountered a considerable level of domestic
opposition. To the world at large, however, these all amount to no more than a natural—and as yet insufficient—set of policies. Among the world’s major states, there is no otherthat is under so many constraints that limit its exercise of military power. The current
interpretation with which the right to collective self-defense is deemed only partiallyemployable is a case in point.
This was evident in the debate over the authorization of Self-Defense Force members
to perform kaketsuke-keigo (“rush to the rescue”) duties in UN peacekeeping operationsin autumn 2016. Nowhere else in the world does an expression equivalent to “rush to therescue” exist—the reason being that, for all other states that participate in UN
peacekeeping operations, the protection of a fellow country's military units or civilians
would just be a matter of course and would require no debate.
A near neighbor of Japan is North Korea, which is increasing its missile launchcapability, miniaturizing nuclear weapons, and developing submarines that are capableof carrying nuclear weapons. In addition, China is catching up with the United States interms of military power. In this environment, it is essential for Japan to develop a morecomprehensive defense capability.
S-1: Revise the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program
Guidelines
Considering the above realities, the National Security Strategy should be
revised. In line with the practice in the past, a "Council on Security and
Defense Capabilities" could be established in the process. In conjunction
with this, it will also be necessary to revise the National Defense Program
Guidelines and to consider substantial changes in strategy.
S-2: Incrementally develop conventional counterstrike capabilities
Japan should develop deterrent capabilities of its own, possessing weapons
such as cruise missiles so that it can prevent further attack and conduct
12

counterstrike if armed attacks against it occur. In doing so, Japan must
make sure that (a) its strike capabilities would be constituted solely by
conventional weapons and used only after taking enemy attacks, and that(b) any counterstrike operations should be conducted through close
consultation with the US government.
In legal terms, destroying missiles pointed at Japan immediately before
they are launched has always been regarded constitutional and consistent
with Japanese laws. In reality, however, no decision to possess capabilities
for that purpose has ever been made—out of consideration for public
opinion, as well as out of consideration for a United States that wasconcerned about possible negative consequences of a Japan withindependent offensive capabilities. However, with the current security
environment being so much worse than before for Japan, both the UnitedStates and the people of Japan would likely recognize the fact that it isessential for Japan to possess its own deterrent capabilities, and accept theidea of Japan possessing conventional counterstrike capability premised on
the two premises laid out above.
At present, missile defense has been at the core of Japan’s defense
measures against missile attacks. For example, if North Korea were tolaunch Nodong missiles against Japan, Japan would take defensive
measures using its missile defense systems. However, when it comes to theissue of preventing further attacks, Japan would have no other option thanto request the US allies to launch counterstrike operations, imposing
significant risk on the US military without itself taking such risk. Certainly,
it would not be easy to destroy Nodong missiles operated on mobile
launchers even if Japan possessed counterstrike capabilities. Nevertheless,
if North Korea were deterred from launching such missile attacks byJapan’s counterstrike capabilities in the first place, this would besignificant—even if these capabilities did not result in the physicaldestruction of the missiles. In addition, Japan's counterstrike capabilities
would undermine North Korea's ability to conduct offensive missile
operations, which in turn would enhance Japan's ability to conduct missile
defense operations effectively.
• S-2-1: Make sure that (a) Japan's counterstrike capabilities would be constitutedsolely by conventional weapons and used only after taking enemy
attacks, and that (b) any counterstrike operations must be conducted
through close consultation with the US government.
• S-2-2: Reiterate Japan's position that it has the inherent right to possess counterstrikecapabilities against adversaries' bases and explain the necessity of
exercising such right both at home and abroad.
• S-2-3: Closely coordinate with the United States in the process of acquiring theconventional counterstrike capabilities and clearly explain to concernedcountries that Japan's counterstrike capabilities are intended for
responding effectively to the complex security environment and reflect
Japan's intention to contribute to regional security in the mannercommensurate with its international standing.

13• S-2-4: For the purpose of utilizing Japan's counterstrike capabilities efficiently andeffectively, shape common strategic understanding with the UnitedStates, determine how to coordinate Japan's counterstrike capabilities
with those of the US forces, and ensure connectivity between Japan's
capabilities with US military command, control, and intelligence (C4I)
systems.
S-3: Strengthen Japan's defense capabilities• S-3-1: Increase the level of defense expenditures from the current 1.0% to 1.2% ofgross domestic product (GDP) in order to respond effectively to thechanging security environment while taking into consideration the
defense efforts made by other major powers. 1• S-3-2: Strengthen missile defense capability and remedy major deficiencies in thefunctions of the Self-Defense Forces in the way that coherence in JapanUS joint strategy and operational concepts is maintained.
• S-3-3: Significantly increase the budget for the Japan Coast Guard in order toadequately supply manpower and equipment, to include thestrengthening of patrol ship flotillas, to the organization. Such a step isnecessary in view of the enlargement of the China Coast Guard's
equipment and capabilities as well as the continued frequency at which
Chinese government vessels and fishing boats violate Japanese

1

According to the Defense of Japan, an annual white paper published by Japan's
Ministry of Defense, the defense budgets for 2014 of major countries as a proportion of
GDP were: The United States 3.4%, China 1.3%, Russia 3.5%, South Korea 2.4%,
Australia 1.8%, the United Kingdom 1.9%, and France 1.8%. Japan's Ministry of
Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, p. 193. According to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, the defense expenditure for 2015 of Germany and Italy as aproportion of GDP was 1.2% and 1.3% respectively. "Trends in World Military
Expenditure, 2015," SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2016, p. 2
<http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf>. Furthermore, estimates on China's
actual defense related expenditure varies between sources. For example, the Ministry of
National Defense of Taiwan estimates that China's actual defense related expenditure is
2 to 3 times that of publicly announced figures. The Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates it to be 1.5 times larger than publicly announced
figures, and the US Department of Defense estimates the figure to be more than 1.25
times that of announced figures. Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan, National
Defense Report 2015, p.55, <https://michalthim.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/2015national-defense-report.pdf>; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
Military Expenditure Database, "Source and Methods," < https://www.sipri.
org/databases/milex/sources-and-methods #sipri-estimates-for-china>; US
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016, p.77,<https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20
China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf>.
14

territorial waters. 2 Missions of the Japan Coast Guard as defined in theJapan Coast Guard Act should also be reviewed and, if necessary,
revised so that they reflect the fact that the Japan Coast Guard is actually
performing the mission of maintaining Japan's territorial integrity today.
S-4: Urge the Trump Administration to reaffirm US commitment to the defenseof the Senkaku Islands
The US government has, up until now, affirmed its position that Article 5of the Japan-US Security Treaty applies to the defense of the Senkaku
Islands. However, given the fact that China continues to engage in coercive
revisionist activities and that the new administration has come into officein the United States, the Japanese government is advised to urge the US
government to reaffirm its alliance commitment to the defense of the
Senkaku Islands. Clear demonstration of the US defense commitment—a
critical element of deterrence generated by the Japan-US alliance—has
become more important than ever before in preventing any misjudgmenton the part of China and North Korea.
2. Foreign policy
F-1: Korean Peninsula• F-1-1: Demonstrate more clearly how the Japan-US alliance contributes to peaceand stability on the Korean Peninsula, and serves the national interestsof the United States and South Korea. Japan must articulate a vision forthe closer coordination between the Japan-US alliance and the USSouth Korea alliance.
• F-1-2: Develop a three-pronged strategy toward North Korea consisting of stronger
sanctions, enhanced defense measures, and closer Japan-US-South
Korea policy coordination.
F-2: China and Taiwan• F-2-1: Japan should explain that policy to strengthen the US involvement in the
Asia-Pacific region (including the TPP, which incorporates bothsecurity and economic dimensions) is in accord with the long-term
national interest of the United States, and Japan should request that theUnited States continue this involvement. In doing so, Japan should
encourage the United States to continue to maintain its internationalism
in global fora and to refrain from becoming excessively unilateralist.
• F-2-2: Japan should strengthen its relations with allied countries in the western
Pacific; together with these allies, it should request that the UnitedStates maintain its involvement in the region, and it should discourage
any deals between the United States and China that would be
2

Japan Coast Guard's budget for 2017 (initial budget) is 210.6 billion yen. Japan Coast
Guard, Overview of 2017 Japan Coast Guard Budget, p. 2.
<http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/soubi-yosan/H29ketteishiropan.pdf>.
15

disadvantageous to allied countries. If this yields requests forcooperation from the United States, Japan should comply as far as
possible (for example, regarding an expanded role for Japan), andshould also consider requesting that the alliance be strengthened.
• F-2-3: Japan should accept China’s overture to make 2017 and 2018 a turning point
in improving Japan-China relations. In the meantime, reestablishing the"21st Century Japan-China Friendship Association" and recommencing
the "Japan-China Joint History Research" would be good starting points.
Japan should also strengthen the triangular framework between Japan,
the United States, and China. A triangular framework consisting ofJapan, the United States, and Taiwan should also be constructed.
F-3: Southeast Asia
• F-3-1: In order to promote regional integration, Japan should proceed with efforts
on multiple fronts—to preserve the TPP, make progress on the RCEP,
and strengthen support for ASEAN regional integration—on theprecondition that the United States will not be excluded.
• F-3-2: Japan should promote regional security cooperation by strengthening
maritime security cooperation, providing stronger support on
antiterrorism countermeasures, and providing stronger support on
defense equipment and technology. In doing so, Japan should makeappropriate use of multilateral institutions to which the United States isalso a member, such as ARF, the EAS, and the ADMM+.
• F-3-3: Japan should maintain firmly its support of universal values such as humanrights and take a flexible approach to their promotion according tocircumstances in each country.
F-4: Europe and Russia• F-4-1: The United States anticipates substantial improvements in its relationshipwith Russia. It is possible that this would lead to major geopolitical
upheaval in Europe. The Japanese government will have to use its
judgment, in the interests of stability and the international order, todistinguish between areas in which it can support Trump administration
policy towards Russia, and areas in which it ought to distance itself.
• F-4-2: Although the UK has isolated itself in Europe with Brexit, such that its
influence is expected to decline, at the global level Japan should
proceed to strengthen relations with the UK, which is a permanent
member of the UN Security Council. In parallel with this, at the EU
level, Japan should at the same time proceed to strengthen relations withGermany.
• F-4-3: NATO is an important strategic partner of Japan, with which it shares values
such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. The United Statesoccupies a pivotal position within NATO. Japan should strengthen
relations with NATO and at the same time increase cooperation
between the Japan-US alliance and NATO. The major US allies, such
as Japan, the UK, France, and Germany, should make visible efforts to16

expand their current defense roles and alleviate the burden of allianceon the United States.
F-5: The Middle East
• F-5-1: With the 2020 Tokyo Olympics in mind, Japan should strengthen its
international counterterrorism measures without waiting for a requestfrom the United States.
• F-5-2: To counter the problem of unprecedented numbers of refugees andinternally displaced persons, Japan should seek to broaden the range ofmeasures used for attempting to bring stability to the Middle East witha mid- to long-term perspective. Japan should make effective use ofinternational organizations to extend well coordinated humanitarianand development cooperation with a view to assisting with the socialand economic development of countries that border conflict zones, andpromote mutual understanding through Inter-civilization Dialogues.
• F-5-3: Japan should persuade the United States not to drastically revise its policy
towards Iran. If the United States were to begin embarking on a revisionof its policy towards Iran, the Japanese government should request thatit be a party to the so-called P5+1 framework or in other forms of
consultations among countries concerned, and thereby more actively
engage international policy consultations regarding the Middle East and
the Persian Gulf region.
F-6: Maritime legal order and the rule of law• F-6-1: As a practical matter, Japan will need to face the reality of China’s selfrighteous challenges to the maritime legal order and the rule of law, andits high-handed maritime expansion, as well as the fact that there arelimitations to other countries' policies designed to counter them, suchas the US rebalance policy. In light of these realities, it will be necessary
to formulate and put into practice a new Japan-US joint strategy that
focuses on the geopolitical character of the South China Sea and East
China Sea, which constitute the ocean area around China.
• F-6-2: It will be necessary to formulate a Japan-US joint strategy for deterring
Chinese adventurism in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean,the seas beyond the South China Sea (which is a “mare clausum” orclosed sea). Japan and the United States will need to coordinate on
strategy with the countries and regions that make up the periphery of
the South China Sea—Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. It will be necessary to formulate andimplement a Japan-US joint counterstrategy to prevent China fromestablishing and expanding a fait accompli in the South China Sea
which China regards as an inland sea. In doing this, Japan and theUnited States should make it a priority to ensure that a fundamental
element of this strategy is its compatibility with the strategies ofAustralia and South Korea (both common allies of Japan and the UnitedStates) and of the friendly regional power, India.

17• F-6-3: Japan should formulate a proactive counterstrategy for the East China Sea
and construct operational infrastructure (that is, develop a defensive
capability). In addition, a Japan-US joint operational plan that iscompatible with Japan-US joint strategy should be formulated, basedon the designation of Japan’s role and mission as being to ensure theefficient and flexible use of US armed forces in the above.
• F-6-4: A Japan-US joint strategy to enhance the sea power and domain awarenesscapabilities of the coastal countries and regions of the South China Sea
which directly face China should be formulated and put into practice.
F-7: Latin America and Africa• F-7-1 (Latin America): In general, the countries of Latin America are importantpartners for Japan—both economically and in terms of shared values.
As newly emerging states strengthen their mutual cooperation after themodel of BRICS, Japan should continue to cultivate closer bilateral andmultilateral relations with them. As it does so, Japan should also
encourage the United States that it ought not to reverse its diplomatic
posture (including its stance towards Cuba, with which it has justattained historic normalization of diplomatic relations) and turn inwards.
• F-7-2 (Africa): In August 2016, the sixth Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD) was held in Nairobi, Kenya, jointly
chaired by Prime Minister Abe and African leaders. Japan hosted
TICAD in 1993, directly after the demise of the Cold War and before
any other state had launched a comparable initiative, and had held it
every five years. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan(UNMISS), a peacekeeping operation in South Sudan--a State founded
only five years ago--includes headquarters staff and an engineering unitthat are dispatched from the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The UN
Security Council is attempting to resolve the conflict in South Sudan
and foster peace. Japan, which has been a nonpermanent member of thecouncil 11 times (more than any other UN member-state), is playing aunique role in this effort. In close consultation with the United Statesand other leading states, Japan should continue to advocate widely forthe moral and practical utility of multilateral rule-making and systemmanagement.
F-8: The United Nations, global issues, and multilateral frameworks• F-8-1 (The United Nations): Japan should promote reform of the UN Security
Council to ensure that its composition is in keeping with the realities of
the international community and continue efforts to pursue its long-held
objective of becoming its permanent member, through maintaining thesolidarity among the G4 members. Japan should also participate
actively in peacekeeping-operations, and give due consideration to
making strategic use of different UN agencies.
• F-8-2 (Global issues and multilateral frameworks): Even the largest countries
cannot, without international collaboration, effectively deal with cross-18

border global issues, such as refugees and displaced persons, infectious
diseases, natural disasters, climate change, and international organizedcrime. As a partner of the United States, Japan should continue toadvocate widely for the moral and practical utility of the multilateralframeworks and institutional administration of international rules.
Separately, if the new US administration should call into question thefundamental raison d’être of multilateral frameworks for dealing with
global issues, Japan should use this as an opportunity for their reformand display intellectual leadership towards their effective
administration.

19

Japan-US Alliance Study Group
Head:
Shinichi Kitaoka

Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo;
Executive Director of Research, IIPS

Deputy Head:
Fumiaki Kubo

Professor, University of Tokyo

Members:
Yoji Koda

Vice Admiral (ret.), Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force;
Advisor, Japan Marine United Corporation

Shin Kawashima

Professor, University of Tokyo; Senior Fellow, IIPS

Yuichi Hosoya

Professor, Keio University; Senior Fellow, IIPS

Satoshi Mori

Professor, Hosei University

Narushige Michishita

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Mie Oba

Professor, Tokyo University of Science

Participants:
Ken Sato

Former Vice Minister for Defense; President, IIPS

Misako Kaji

Senior Research Fellow, IIPS

Hiroshi Takayama

Senior Research Fellow, IIPS

Akira Okubo

Senior Research Fellow, IIPS

20

Institute for International Policy Studies
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