Island of Peace, Island of Bases: American Bases amid
Okinawan Population
Yiftach Raphael Govreen

Hebrew University of Jerusalem*This is a draft, do not quote*Introduction
The Okinawa prefecture is unique among the prefectures of Japan. Once an
independent kingdom, it became a Japanese prefecture as late as 1879. A common
perception of Okinawan people is one of peaceful people. This perception is well
promoted by local politicians and activists, and is connected by them to the historicalpeaceful characteristics of the ancient Ryukyu kingdom.
In modern era, Okinawa has suffered great tragedy during World War II and its
aftermath. The battle of Okinawa has left the prefecture devastated and about third of
its population dead. The American military has controlled the prefecture for the next
27 years. The American presence has helped its recovery at first, feeding and giving
shelter to the many people who lost their homes and all earthly possessions. At thesame time, though, the Americans have constructed a vast array of military bases,
covering roughly 20% of the main islands land mass. The rapid growth of mainland
Japan during the 60's and 70's was not felt in Okinawa, which was under American
military control, adding yet another reason for the desire for reversion.
This wish was granted in 1972, when U.S. president Nixon and Japanese Prime
Minister Sato formulated an agreement that would return Okinawa to Japan. A great
anticipation inside Okinawa that the reversion would decrease the amount of bases in
Okinawa was felt. However, even after the reversion not much has changed in thisregard. Roughly 70% of American bases stationed in Japan are in Okinawa, aprefecture with less than one percent of Japan's total landmass. Since the reversion to
Japan, a continuing popular protest calling for the reduction of the bases burden on
Okinawa exists, culminating in a mass popular protest in 1995, leading to a U.S.Japan agreement to reduce the burden upon Okinawan shoulders. Most of theagreement's decisions have not been met.
The Okinawan collective memory of the Battle of Okinawa has greatly influenced theperception of Okinawan people towards pacific tendencies. U.S. usage of bases
stationed in Okinawa during the Korean and Vietnam wars has intensified thesefeelings, based on fears to be dragged into a U.S. led war.
This paper will explore the Okinawan peace identity. It will identify the origins of theperception of the Okinawan peace identity. It will point to the actors who promote it.
It will also attempt to discover whether this perception is based on historic facts orrather is it a modern narrative, focused especially on the dichotomy of before andafter the battle of Okinawa. Finally, this paper will examine in what ways the peaceful
Okinawan population deals with the constant presence of military bases and personnel
all around the island.
In this regard, the paper will seek to identify in what ways the presence of the militarybases conflicts with the Okinawan peace perception and how these conflicts are
manifested in daily life. In addition, this paper will demonstrate the means by which
the Okinawan people protest and object to these conflict.

Historical BackgroundI believe that historical context is relevant to many issues in modern times. When
discussing identity, familiarity with history is essential.
The formation of the Okinawan identity can be traced to early 15th century with thecreation of the unified Ryukyu kingdom. This is where (and when) the Okinawan
story begins.
Creation of the Ryukyu Kingdom and Relations with China
In the 14th century three small rival principalities came to be on the main island of the
Ryukyu archipelago - Hokuzan in the northern part of the island, Chuzan in the centerand Nanzan in the south. In 1372 the Chuzan leader was called to acknowledge
Chinese supremacy. He seized the opportunity, knowing the benefits of formal
relations with the largest empire of the region. This marked the beginning of theformal relations between China and the Ryukyu Islands. This relationship was basedon tribute envoys sent by the Ryukyu kingdom to the Chinese empire. In return, theChinese Emperor recognized and acknowledged the Ryukyu kingdom and its king.
With the tribute envoys scholars were sent from the Ryukyu kingdom in order tostudy the Chinese classics, ethics, culture and so on (Kerr 2000, 60-66, 79).
Change of leadership and succession disputes in all three principalities during the 15th
century lead to the eventual unification of Okinawa by the Chuzan principality.
Chuzan leader, Shō Hashi, placed his main castle in Shuri, making it the center of his
kingdom (Kerr 2000, 84-86).
The tributary system with the Chinese, although evolving, remained basically thesame for a few centuries. The Ryukyu Kingdom kept the ties strong, strengthening thecultural and commercial ties between the two countries.
Ryukyu and Japan
Okinawan ties with Japan started at early 15th century, when Okinawan
representatives traveled through the southern part of Japan – the Satsuma clan
territory, to Kyoto – the capital of Japan at the time. As time passed, the Satsuma clan,
who was deeply involved in the trade with the Okinawan Island, became more andmore dependent on Okinawa as a source of wares for trade (Kerr 2000, 136, 139).

At that time Japanese and Chinese relations were not very close, and the trade
between them was limited. As Japanese-Chinese relations worsened, and direct trade
between them came to a halt, Ryukyu’s role as a mediator got bigger. The events
caused the connections between Ryukyu and Japan to get stronger, and Ryukyu
started sending scholars to Japan as well, as the importance of understanding theirlanguage and culture grew. Ryukyu found itself in the middle of two much bigger
powers, trying to keep the balance by using careful and polite diplomacy (Kerr 2000,
140-143). All this took place until 16th century, a time with instability and wars inside
Japan.
Ryukyu's Golden Age of Trade
Between the 14th to the 16th centuries the Ryukyu kingdom has experienced a golden
age of maritime trade, delivering wares between countries all over East and South
East Asia. A clear symbol for this period of time is the "Bridge across Nations Bell".1
This bell was placed in the Shuri castle, the center of Ryukyuan government, andcommemorates the Ryukyuan role as a connecting link between countries of theregion (Wikipedia 2013).
Loss of independence
After two centuries of chaos in Japan, 1573 brought a change. A daimyo named Oda
Nobunaga has started the process of uniting the war torn Japanese country. In 1577
his principle lieutenant, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, after Oda's assassination, asserted his
supremacy.
Hideyoshi had plans for Japan to become an empire. He planned to invade China
through the Korean peninsula. As part of the preparations for the invasion he sent an
envoy to the Ryukyu Kingdom demanding supplies and help. Sho Nei, the Ryukyuan
king, answered to Hideyoshi that his country is too poor to send supplies. Hideyoshi,
who was involved in the Korean campaign, could not give his real attention to thematter. His death in 1598 ended the Korean campaign, and caused yet another war inJapan for the succession of the leadership. In 1606 Tokugawa Ieyasu, the new shogun,
gave permission to the Satsuma daimyo to chastise the Okinawans for their rudenessduring the campaign in Korea, and their lack of respect for the new shogun. On 1609

1

万国津梁の鐘 (Bankoku shinryō no kane)

Satsuma warriors landed on the Island and conquered Shuri castle, the center of the
Ryukyu kingdom. Soon after the occupation, a group of officials from Satsuma
arrived, and after a survey of the Okinawan economy decided that the Shuri
government will be required to pay about an eighth of its revenues to Satsuma. In
addition, Okinawan foreign trade will be monopolized by Satsuma, and directed to its
interests (Kerr 2000, 152-159).
Okinawa's new position was a difficult one. Satsuma has used Okinawa to circumvent
Tokugawa's policy of seclusion by indulging in foreign trade in spite of theprohibitions. The Okinawans were afraid of reprisals from Edo in case this was
discovered or by a change in policy from Satsuma. On the other hand, the Chinese
wanted to regulate all trade with Japan and if they would discover the trading with
Okinawa was de facto trading with Japan, they might stop it. Satsuma has ordered
Okinawa to conceal their real relations with Japan from the Chinese, so there will be
no excuse for an embargo on trade (Kerr 2000, 166-167).
Annexation of Okinawa
Mid-19th century brought a change to the long lasted seclusion of Japan. Gradually
increasing pressure from western forces to open Japan's borders finally had a result,and the Tokugawa shogunate had to sign a treaty with the Americans in 1854, soon
followed by treaties with other western powers. The end of the seclusion aroused apolitical dispute in Japan between the shogunate and its opposing sections in the
country. These disputes eventually ended in 1868 when the Meiji restoration took
place and signaled the end of the Tokugawa shogunate and the formation of a newJapanese government. This new government, realizing how far Japan is behind thewestern countries regarding science and military power, decided it is top priority tomodernize Japan, and close the gap that was formed during the two and a half
centuries of seclusion (Shillony 2002).
In December 1871 an Okinawan tribute ship heading to China was wrecked on the
coast of Formosa. The local population raided the wreckage and murdered fifty fourof the survivors. The leaders of the new government saw this as an opportunity tomake Okinawa an official part of Japan. In 1872, the Japanese minister at Peking
requested the Chinese to punish the inhabitants of Formosa for the murder of the"subjects of Japan"- the Okinawans. The Chinese, by claiming they have noresponsibility over this area, legitimized a Japanese attack on Formosa to punish the
culprits who murdered these "Japanese subjects". Japan gained formal Chinese
recognition in Japan's paramount interest in the Ryukyus and a British signature on
this concession. Not long after the incident, the Japanese government informed the
Ryukyu kingdom that it will be under the control of the Japanese empire, and willtransform its status from a kingdom to a han. All agreements that the Shuriadministration did with foreign powers will be handed over to, and managed by theForeign Office in Tokyo (Kerr 2000, 356-364).
In 1879, the Japanese decided to make Okinawa an integral part of Japan by
abdicating the king and abolishing the once Ryukyu kingdom, now Ryukyu han, andcreate Okinawa-ken, officially closing the page on independent Okinawa.
Okinawa Becomes a Prefecture
After the change of status, Okinawa became an integral part of the Japanese empire
and entered the Japanese "nation-family". However, the different customs and speech
set the Okinawans apart from the general Japanese public (Kerr 2000, 399). The
Japanese government started to change Okinawa's bureaucratic agencies to fit theJapanese standards. Moreover, the Japanese wanted to implement their education
system, so Okinawans will study as Japanese and shift their old loyalties from Shuriand China to Tokyo and the Emperor (Kerr 2000, 412).
In the years preceding World War II, Japan kept its expansionist policy and themilitaristic sentiments became stronger and stronger. In Okinawa the transition to
become a full-fledged Japanese prefecture was still continuing. Gradually, theJapanese education succeeded in making the younger generations of Okinawans lose
interest in their heritage and strengthen their sense of loyalty towards the Japaneseemperor.
War upon Okinawa
Japanese nationalism, among other factors, led Japan to join forces with Germany and
Italy in World War II, opposing the allied forces. The final campaign of the allied
forces in the war was against Japan. An important part of this campaign was the battleof Okinawa. This battle was the only battle that took place on Japanese soil. The
Japanese forces that were stationed on the island had a mission to fight a battle ofattrition against the allied (mostly American) forces. While the Okinawan citizens
expected the Imperial Army to protect them, the army saw the civilians as partners intheir military destiny, thus having no intention to protect them, and expected them tobehave as fighters, fighting to the death (Ōta 2000, 33,56-57).
Many other Okinawans were conscripts of the Imperial army, and were sept with theJapanese nationalism. Wishing to show their loyalty to the emperor, the fought withas much as ferocity as the mainland Japanese soldiers (Kerr 2000, 459).
The battle took the lives of than 200,000 people, about 90,000 of them non-combatant
Okinawan civilians. More than 10,000 of them were children under fourteen, themajority got killed after they were driven out from hide-outs by Japanese forces,
while others died while performing chores for the Imperial Army (Yoshida 2001, 3-4).
The battle ended in an inevitable victory of the United State forces, and the
Okinawans found themselves once again under foreign rule.
Okinawa under American Occupation
As the dust of war settled down, the Americans found themselves in charge of a torn
island, with a large local population without shelter or food. For the first few years theforces on the island did not do much more than necessary to keep alive the hundredsof thousands of people who survived the war, and now had no place to sleep or foodto eat (Sarantakes 2000, 24-29,36).
In early 1950 the United States government finally took a stance regarding the island(and all the other islands in the Ryukyu archipelago), and decided to keep them under
its military rule, as the strategic location of Okinawa is ideal for stationing American
military forces. In addition, the fact that they were the sole rulers of the island (asopposed to Japan itself, for example, which was placed under the Allied Powers rule)enabled them to use the bases on the island as they saw fit, without externalintervention (Sarantakes 2000, 40-41).
When Japan regained its independence in 1952, Okinawa was not included in theagreement, and stayed under American control. Gradually, Okinawa practicallybecame an American colony. Some form of democracy was introduced to the island,but one that will not harm American military rule. Even though the Okinawans had
ambivalent feelings towards the Japanese - whether for signing a peace treaty that left

Okinawa under occupation, or for being generally discriminated by Japanese, themajority of the public called for reversion to Japan, and the Okinawan reversion
movement gained more and more popularity among the Okinawan public (Yoshida
2001, 151, 172).
In the late 1960's the pressure started to bear fruit. The ever growing influence for thevoices within Okinawa calling for reversion, along with the new Japanese Prime
Minister – Sato Eisaku, who emphasized the issue of Okinawa, eventually succeededin convincing the U.S. government to return Okinawa back to Japan, under theumbrella of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which meant that most bases stayed in
Okinawa. 1972 was set as the goal for the end of technical negotiations and the actual
transfer of administrative authority (Sarantakes 2000, 130, 134, 173).

Constructing Okinawan Peacefulness
The Ryukyu kingdom, a small kingdom surrounded by much larger powers, had touse a careful diplomacy in order to remain independent. The Ryukyuans havemanaged to form an image of peaceful people, thus were welcomed by all, promoting
their ability to trade. One can argue that this is where the Okinawan peace identity
began.
In modern times as well, the idea of Okinawan people as peaceful people can beeasily argued to be true. Large anti-war and anti-base movements, in accordance withan easy going way of life and acceptance of the other are clear characteristics of thissociety.
Historic Depiction of Peaceful Ryukyu
Depiction of Okinawa and its inhabitants as peaceful people is not new. Foreign
visitors to the Ryukyu kingdom have produced a documents of their perception ofolden Ryukyu. In many of these documents, Okinawan society is perceived as almost
utopian – mutual respect, no crime, harmony and so on. An interesting anecdoteconcerns Captain Basil Hall's depiction of Okinawa to Napoleon Bonaparte. Captain
Hall visited Napoleon during his exile in St. Helena, and described to him his voyages
to East Asia. When discussing Ryukyu (Loo-Choo), he described to Napoleon that thepeople of Ryukyu have no weapons at all. Napoleon could believe this and pressed
Captain Hall about this point, to which he answers that as far as he can tell, they havenever had any wars. Napoleon remains astonished, and to as Hall described, his
expression made evident his feelings that a country with no weapons and war is amonstrous anomaly (Hall 1826, 315-316).
Captain Hall's understanding of Okinawa is, of course, skewed at best. The royal
guards of the Ryukyuan Kingdom did indeed have weapons, and the kingdom itself
was formed by a warlord through a series of battles that conquered other warlords byforce. As a testament to Ryukyuan diplomatic abilities, they were able to show
Captain Hall what they desired for him to see, hiding the less idyllic aspects of the
kingdom, promoting the perception of their own peacefulness.
Peace Identity in Modern Okinawa
There are many definitions for the idea of identity. For this paper I deal with identity
thorough two perspectives – first is identity as perceived by oneself – for this casestudy – how do the Okinawans identify themselves? The second is identity as
perceived by others – how do non-Okinawans identify Okinawans? On top of that, I
deal with the ways in which both of these perceptions affect each other.
Construction of peace identity in modern Okinawa is mostly connected to theexperience of the island in World War II.
For example, Keiichi Inamine, governor of Okinawa prefecture between the years
1998-2006, mentions Okinawan strong anti-war sentiments, connecting them to thebattle of Okinawa (Keiichi 2000, 12). He represents a dominant sentiment in Okinawa,
one that remembers the horrors of the war and vows to never experience them again.
Another symbol of peace is the "Cornerstone of Peace" monument in southern
Okinawa. This monument commemorates the names of all of the victims of the battle,
regardless of their nationality. This is unique among war memorials, which usuallycommemorate only the victims of their nation. This uniqueness is considers a true
testament for Okinawan people's true desire for peace (Nobuyoshi 2000, 24-25).
The Cornerstone of Peace is not the only memorial in Okinawa. Many memorials arescattered around the island, where ruins of battle sites reside. These ruins/memorials
are considered in Japan and specifically in Okinawa as "symbols of peace". In theSecond National Symposium for War Ruins Preservation (held in Haebaru town insouthern Okinawa in 1998), preserving these sites and memorials was referred to as
construction of "fortress of peace" in Okinawa (Figal 2001, 38).
Another interesting phenomenon is that of the peace guides. These younger peace
guides (heiwa gaido) are replacing war experience storytellers (senso taiken kataribe)(Figal 2001, 38). As the generation that experienced the war slowly disappears, theyounger generation took on itself to preserve their memories of the battle. Their goal
is to promote peace by remembering the horrors of war.
Ishihara Masaie, a scholar of Okinawan identity, promotes the notion of Okinawa's
distinctive "philosophy of peace". Masaie argues that the memories of the war, addedby the prolonged American occupation and the continued heavy concentration ofbases in Okinawa, "have led to high public awareness of the war and to widespread
public participation in recording its history for purposes of peace promotion". He,
however, connects this peace philosophy to the Ryukyu kingdom as well "men fromthe tiny kingdom of Ryukyu traveled without weapons, armed only with words,
consideration, and good nature, and maintained peaceful relations with peoples
throughout East and Southeast Asia" (Ishihara 1995, 16). Figal addresses this notion
and also quotes the pamphlet of the original Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum,
regarding the Okinawan spirit: "a deep regard for human life, a categorical rejectionof war related acts, the pursuit of peace…". As he rightly suggests, this is a highly
romanticized depiction of the modern and ancient Okinawan moral standards (Figal
2001, 41-42). This emphasis on pacifism, however, does have a meaningful
symbolism regarding how Okinawans perceive themselves. This self-perceived
historical pacifism is manifested to the daily conduct of Okinawan society in the ways
it promotes its causes, handles conflicts and reacts to often not so peaceful realities. It
is important to note that even if the historical peaceful depiction is not accurate,connecting modern pacifistic philosophy to an imagined past deepens its meaning andeffect in the eyes of Okinawans and foreigners alike.
Since the annexation of Okinawa, Okinawans have suffered from discrimination fromJapanese and were not completely assimilated to the Japanese state (Hein 2001, 3233). These facts have enabled the Okinawans to construct a unique identity.

Matsushima Kiyomi, an Okinawan activist, claims that “Uchinānchu 2 arecharacterized, like other indigenous peoples, as a people with a strong ‘value of nonviolence’ and a ‘peace-oriented philosophy’” (Siddle 2003, 144). He, among others,
views that a strong characteristic of the Okinawan identity, not just today, but since
olden times, is peacefulness. Reading literature on Okinawan identity, quotes such as
this are common: "Okinawan tradition is being evoked as the practices of anemotionally satisfying human community, valuing peaceful and moral humanrelationship [sic.]… This is, of course, a utopian notion of Okinawa life, but it still
offers a coherent vision of an alternate future for the rest of us as much as it does for
Okinawans" (Hein 2001, 35-36). McCormak and Norimitsu connect the legend about
the words of Shō Tai, the last Ryulyuan king when facing the abduction of the
Ryukyu kingdom – “Nuchi du dakara” – life is a treasure, as a core statement for
Okinawan moral. In these words, they claim, he stresses that preserving life is more
important than fighting for the kingdom. Moreover, they argue that deviation fromthis moral value during World War II is one of the reasons that led to its tragedy in
Okinawa (McCormack and Norimatsu 2012).
Scholars and laymen alike recognize that the depiction of Okinawan peacefulness ismany times utopian and exaggerated. However, they also agree that suchcharacteristics exist.
Military Bases on a Peaceful Island
The presence of military bases amid civilian population can be a source of many
problems, especially in densely populated areas. Crimes, accidents, pollution andnoise are but part of possible problems that arise from such a situation.
Another issue concerning the bases is one of economy – do the bases and works they
provide assist the local economy, or do their presence and use of land prevents
options for development.
These issues are very important for understanding the complex issue of Americanbases in Okinawa, but are not the focus of this paper. This paper focuses on is theconflict between the warring nature of the bases and the peaceful nature of the
Okinawan citizens. Such conflict is based on two main causes:

2

Okinawans in the local Okinawan language.

1. Fear of War. The horrid battle left many scars, physical and mental, on the islandand its inhabitants. Realizing the devastation left by war, the Okinawan people
developed an "allergy" for war. Since the emergence of the Cold War and thebreakout of its proxy-wars in East Asia – especially the Korean War and Vietnam
War, Okinawans have feared they would be the target of retaliation, as bases stationed
in the island were used in these wars. Remembering the horrors of World War II, they
were weary that a battle they were not part of would consume the island again.
Interestingly enough, this echoes similar sentiments of the older generation living
after the annexation of Okinawa by the end of the 19th century. They have opposed
the conscription of Okinawans to the Imperial army for fear that an armed force
stationed in Okinawa will attract attacks (Kerr 2000, 461-462).
2. Daily Contradiction. After the end of the Cold War, the fear of being dragged into
war has waned (but not vanished), and a new perception in opposition of the bases
emerged. Living in Okinawa, one cannot miss the presence of the American militarybases. Observing the bases when driving along major high-ways, watching low flights
of airplanes and helicopters taking off and landing or the occasional sounds ofgunshots from a nearby shooting range are all constant reminders of their presence.
The Okinawan peaceful way of living and state of mind stands in stark contrast tothese strong militaristic routines.
Protest, Objection and Acceptance
Okinawan way of dealing with the bases is twofold. On the one hand, a constant andmeaningful popular protest exists – in the form of sit-ins, demonstration and so on.
This also usually reflects in politics through elections, especially in recent years,
where candidates promoting anti-base stances triumph. In addition, widespread,usually rather anti-base, is very significant in local mass-media.
On the other hand, the peaceful nature of Okinawa diffuses into Okinawans’
relationship with the American military. Generally, this coexistence runs smoothly,with many interactions of civilian nature – such as joint festivals and shows. In
addition, many Okinawans work in or around the bases, so interaction is unavoidable
and is usually friendly.

Unsurprisingly, the reality is complex, and the Okinawan attitude towards American
forces is both of protest and rejection towards decision makers and of (friendly?)
acceptance towards the men in the field.
The peace guides are a good example for a way to cope with the memory of the war
and existence of battle ruins sites. Such sites serve as evidence to the horrors of war,
but the Okinawans choose to use these memories not as a mean to enhancenationalism and hatred, but rather promote pacifistic ideas of coexistence. This issimilar to mainland Japan peace museums in many ways, but is distinct because of thefact that Okinawa was the only battle ground on Japanese soil.
The notion of peace promotion through symbols of war can be extended to the way
Okinawans deal with the bases issue. Since the American occupation of Okinawa, theOkinawans have protested against the presence of American bases and forces and its
consequences many times. These protests had peaks and lows, with a few points ofmassive popular protests consisting of a large percentage of the island's population.
These protests, however, rarely took the form of violent actions and were never the
ground for an armed resistance, not during the American occupation, and surely notafter the reversion. The few exceptions of violent incidents, most notably the "Kozariot" of 1970, were not part of an organized resistance, but rather an eruption of
frustration that soon subsided.
This is true for the protests today as well. A good example is the ongoing sit-in at the
Henoko shore, where the substitute installation for the Futanma MCAS is planned to
be built. This sit-in is a non-violent resistance linked mainly to human rights,
environmental and other pacifistic organizations. The leaders of the sit-in are part ofan organization called "The Association for Protecting Life" (inochi wo mamoru kai).
As its name suggests, they seek to promote peace and not to wage war.
In a complex reality such as this, though, nothing is that simple. Where there is protest,
there is conflict. Even the members of this association are willing to obstruct theworks and surveys in the area in order to prevent, or at least delay, the construction of
the new base. Such obstructions are peaceful in nature, and do not result in a violent
conflict, promoting the ideas of the "peaceful Okinawans", but making a point –peaceful is not push-over.

The future holds many uncertainties, and as Laura Hein writes, discussing several
options for the future of Okinawa and Japan, Okinawans may “spearhead a national
policy that translates the strong pacifist sentiments of the Japanese population into an
active principle for international engagement…" (Hein 2001, 35). Such conducts will
surely set in stone the Okinawan ideas of peace.
Another question is ought to be asked. Is it possible that constant reminders by public
figures, academics and politicians, Okinawan and foreigners alike, of the Okinawans’
peacefulness have actually made the Okinawans peaceful, or at least empowered thesecharacteristics within them? As shown, this kind of public perception of Okinawans is
not new. Even during the age of the Ryukyu kingdom, a projection of a peaceful,harmonious Ryukyuan people, not familiar with the concept of war was common. Has
the external perception of peaceful Okinawans influenced the internal Okinawan
identity, emphasizing its peaceful nature?
It is a known claim among constructivist forums that words create reality. Is it
possible that this is the case in the modern Okinawan identity as well?

Post Seminar Comments
During the seminar, a few interesting and useful comments were raised. I will deal
with them briefly:
a. The issue of identity. One commentator rightfully questioned my definition ofidentity for the paper. For this paper, identity is defined through two lenses –the first is self-perception – how do Okinawans perceive themselves? The
second is external image – how do others perceive Okinawans? These twoperceptions and the nexus between them create the Okinawan identity
discussed in this paper.
b. Division between “peaceful Okinawa” and “not-so-peaceful Okinawa”. Of
course, there are many facets to Okinawan population, and not all are peacefuland pacifistic. The paper focuses on Okinawans as peaceful people for two
main reasons: a. Okinawan peacefulness as deduced from anti-war/anti-basesurveys is the narrative of the majority of the Okinawan population. b. The
Okinawan pacifistic identity, as a link from ancient Ryukyu to the modern
trauma of World War II, is an interesting and unique case study that is worth
looking into, even if it does not include the entire Okinawan population.
c. Okinawan victimization narrative. One comment revolved around the issue of
Okinawan victimization narrative from the Japanese – starting from theSatsuma invasion in 1609, continued in the “Ryukyu shobun” of 1879, and inmodern times – the battle of Okinawa, the American prolonged occupation,and of course, the bases issue. Although this narrative is closely connected to
the “peaceful Okinawa” discourse, I chose not to focus on it. One reason isthat I think that focusing on the negative aspect of the Okinawan peace
narrative obscures its many positive achievements. A second reason is that I
don’t think that victimization is what defines the Okinawan peace identity, butrather enforces it. It is not the origin for this narrative, but it is used toempower it, both in the political and the cultural fields.

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