Development of the East China Sea Gas Field Dispute◆自由論題＊研究論文◆

Development of the East China
Sea Gas Field Dispute
Explaining Domestic Opinion Constraints
on Chinese Foreign Policy 1

中国の対日政策

東シナ海ガス田をめぐる国内議論と対外政策

Vida Macikenaite
Doctoral Program, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University
マチケナイテ・ヴィダ
慶應義塾大学大学院政策・メディア研究科後期博士課程This paper attempted to explain how domestic opinion had shaped China’s policies toward the East
China Sea gas field dispute with Japan. It suggested an enhanced conceptual explanation of domestic
opinion in China distinguishing between general domestic opinion and limited voiced opinions.
Through such theoretical clarification it was possible to explain the inconsistency of Chinese policies.
The research found that gas field dispute policy was a result of the policy makers’ consideration ofdomestic opinion rather than their direct response to the voiced opinions. Chinese policy makers
adopted preemptive rather than reactive policies and it delayed their decisions.
本研究の目的は、東シナ海ガス田問題に対する中国の対外政策とこれに関する国民の意見との関係を明らかにすることである。本研究において国民の意見を検討する際に、筆者は限定された範囲の人々が表現する「公衆意見」（voiced opinions）と、それを含むより多数の人々が表現する「民間世論」（domestic opinion）を区別した。ガス田問題に対する中国の政策は、限定された「公衆意見」ではなく、国民をより広範囲に捉えた「民間世論」を考察した結果なのである。
Keywords: Chinese foreign policy, domestic opinion, East China Sea gas field dispute, CCP
legitimacy, China-Japan relations

INTRODUCTION

refers to a disagreement between China and JapanThe main purpose of this paper is to explain how

over the exploitation of gas fields located in disputed

domestic opinion shaped China’s policies toward themarine territories. It emerged in summer 2004 when

East China Sea gas field dispute with Japan. The East

Japanese government requested China to submit

China Sea gas field dispute (hereinafter the dispute)geological survey data around the Japan-claimed

1

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自由論題

median line.

foreign policy makers are forced to speculate on

Since then China’s policies toward the disputepossible domestic opinion based on limited voiced

have been rather inconsistent. At first it insisted on

opinions. Such foreign policy making process often

joint development. A political agreement to jointly

results in delayed or inconsistent foreign policy

develop an area around the median line and for

decisions, based on the perceived threat to regime

Japanese companies to participate in the development

stability.

of the Chunxiao gas field ( 春晓气田 ; Shirakaba ( 白I build my argument on the theory of regime

樺 ガ ス 田 ) in Japanese) was reached in June 2008.

legitimacy and empirical analysis of Chinese foreign

Nonetheless, China remained reluctant to negotiate

policy, as well as public opinion in China and its

a legally binding agreement until May 2010. At that

impact on foreign policy decisions. In the following

time Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao ( 温 家 宝 ) called

chapter I lay out the conceptual framework employed

for immediate renewal of negotiations, which Chinese

in this paper. Discussion on regime legitimacyside ceased again in September 2010. Such ambiguity

explains why a non-democratic government in China

of China’s position poses a question, what shaped

takes into consideration domestic opinion. The later

Chinese foreign policy toward the dispute, making

part demonstrates how the conventional concept of

it one of the main impediments in the country’s

public opinion can be unfolded into domestic opinion

relations with Japan.

and voiced opinions. Chapter 3 shortly discusses the

The main argument I suggest here in this paper

development of the dispute, while chapter 4 provides

holds that Chinese policy decisions were preemptive

a detailed explanation of such policies through therather than reactive, and they resulted from thelens of domestic opinion.

policy makers’attempt to balance between domestic
opinion and their foreign policy goals. Chinese

2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

foreign policy makers were constrained by domestic

2.1

Previous Research on the Dispute

opinion, as this policy issue was a possible target of

Earlier academic debate presents a number

society’s anti-Japanese sentiment, which could leadof different explanations, varying from economic

to anti-governmental protests. I argue that traditional

arguments to domestic constraints or the lack ofconcept of public opinion is not suitable to explain

political trust between the two countries. Valencia

the case of China, because public opinion there isargues that the rigidity of the dispute is a result of

not expressed clearly in a consensus as it would be‘unresolved historical grievances and the politics ofin democratic systems with general free elections. I

2national identity.’
Drifte notes the role of domestic

differentiate between general domestic opinion (which

politics of both China and Japan.3 In regards to China

is public opinion in conventional meaning, except

the scholar argues that an increasing number ofthat it is not publicly expressed) and voiced opinions (aactors influence the general outcome of the disputepart of general domestic opinion, publicly expressed

settlement - public opinion, individual ministries, oil

by a limited number of citizens interested in a certain

companies, and particularly the navy.4 Bush argues

issue). Regime legitimacy theory suggests thatthat China is locked in its rigid position due to theChinese policy makers refer to domestic opinion in

opposition from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).5

their decision-making. However, due to the absence

One of the popular explanations of China’s reluctanceof democratic procedures citizens’opinion usually

to implement joint development after 2008 attributes

remains latent. Under such circumstances Chinese

it to the opinions of the society.6 As noted by Valencia

72

Development of the East China Sea Gas Field Dispute‘the key problem lies not with governments but withsecurity but also at fulfilling the fundamental interest

national political constituencies in each state and theof the government to sustain its political power, that

7pressures that they can bring to bear.’is to maintain regime legitimacy. In its broadest sense

Even if these arguments explain particular

legitimacy refers to the governor’s right to rule.12 It

policy decisions, they are of limited capacity to trackdescribes the relationship between the government

the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. Recent

and the governed13 suggesting that regime legitimacy

scholarship on domestic opinion–foreign policy

rests on the general public.

linkage suggests that Chinese domestic opinion plays

Although two-level game theory argues thatan important role in foreign policy making. Based on

public policies of non-democratic governments are

a number of case studies Reilly establishes a directless constrained by such opinions,14 scholarship onlink between public pressure and changes in Chinese

Chinese politics suggests that policy makers in China8

foreign policy. Shirk argues that public opinion

are aware of the possible threats to regime legitimacy

carries significantly more weight than it did in theand therefore take into consideration public opinion.15

past. Accordingly, in recent years the senior officials

The central government in China cannot be voted

have put more credence in the information gathered

out of the office through regular general elections

9by monitoring Internet and the popular media.

as democratic governments, whose legitimacy is

These arguments establish a link between

acquired through established procedures such as

publicly voiced opinions and final policy decisions.

elections. 16‘The regime in China has to rely on

However, Shirk suggests that Chinese foreign policy

other sources of legitimacy such as performance-makers’consideration of such opinions is rooted inbased legitimacy.’17 Such kind of legitimacy may betheir fear of mass public protests. Chinese leaders arealso defined as‘goal-rational”legitimacy derived

nearly obsessed with what they call‘social stability’from the validity of the principle social goals that the

because policy issue-focused protests can turn into

authority professes to represent and to promote.’18

anti-governmental protests.10 The protests in China

In the case of China nationalism 19 and later rapid

can have two targets: the country that is‘offending’economic growth 20 became the holding pillars ofChina and the Chinese government because its

regime legitimacy.21

policies toward these countries are too soft.11 The

Regarding nationalism, one of its major targets

logics of this argument implies that while policy

historically has been Japan. However, once cultivatedmakers refer to limited number of opinions available

by the government, in recent years it became self-

to them, they actually are anxious about actions thatdriven. Zheng notes that‘Whenever Japan does

could be taken by a much larger number of citizens“bad”things to China, they immediately remind

whose opinion is not clearly expressed during thethe Chinese of countless Japanese atrocities in the

periods of social stability. To understand this logic I

22past.’Such anti-Japanese sentiment here and below

discuss regime legitimacy argument and reconsider

is referred to as Japan-issue. As a result, society in

its implications for domestic opinion-foreign policy

nowadays China demands the government to carrylinkage.

out its‘nationalistic promise’, that is to stand firm in
its policies toward Japan. Failing to do so might have

Government Legitimacy and Its Foreign Policy

wider implications for the regime. If the government

Any policy decision (either domestic or foreign)fails to carry out‘appropriate’policies it could stiris not only aimed at upholding the state’s national

citizens’discontent, which might eventually lead to

2.2

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自由論題

mass social unrest and undermine regime stability.23

In its conventional meaning‘public opinion’

As Dickson summarizes‘[China’s leaders] remainrefers to the complex of preferences expressed by awary of the potential of a popular upsurge that would

significant number of persons on an issue of general

threaten their hold on power. For this reason, they

importance.28 This‘number of persons’consists ofcrack down hard on real or perceived efforts to

those affected by or aware of the issue.29 Democratic

24
promote popular protests.’

systems have established procedures through which

Such domestic opinion constraints faced bycitizens are able to express their opinions - elections

the Chinese policy makers may be summarized

or referendums; or they can voice their opinions

as audience costs. Fearon, discussing the linkage

taking advantage of the freedom of speech andbetween domestic audience and escalation of

expression. Meanwhile, in China citizens’opinionsinternational disputes argues that‘these costs ariseare difficult to translate into public opinion due to thefrom the action of domestic audiences concerned

absence of democratic procedures. As a result, thewith whether the leadership is successful orexisting public opinion is expressed only through25

unsuccessful at foreign policy.’ Although Fearon

alternative channels of political participation, such as

suggests that audience costs faced by democratic

public protests, which are not favored by the Chinese

leaders are more significant, the scholar also notices

policy makers as explained above.

that‘since the price of losing power is often greater

Shirk and Reilly argue that Chinese foreign

for a dictator than for an elected leader, a weak orpolicy makers adjust their policy to the publicly

unstable authoritarian regime might be able to create

voiced opinions. However, these opinions do not26

significant expected audience costs in a crisis.’ The

represent general domestic opinion. Such opinions

CCP regime in China becomes vulnerable when the

become evident only when a sensitive issue arises

policy issue in question involves Japan.

and domestic discontent accumulates. In July
2003 during the period of 10 days the Alliance ofPeculiarity of Domestic Opinion in the Non-

Patriots ( 爱 国 同 盟 网 ) collected and submitted

Democratic State of China

to the Ministry of Railways ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 铁 道Concerns over regime performance legitimacy部 ) in Beijing 82,752 signatures against Japanesemake Chinese foreign policy makers sensitive to

involvement in the construction of the Beijing-

public opinion. Unpopular policy decisions might

Shanghai high speed railway. 30 Two years later 10

impose high audience costs as explained above. As

million signatures were collected for the protest

noted by Fearon, authoritarian regimes generate

against Japan’s bid for the permanent seat in the UN‘significant expected audience costs.’Thus the main

Security Council.31 Eventually it led to the protests

question remains whose opinions the government

by some 10,000 people in Beijing on April 9, 2005 andrefers to when formulating its foreign policy? This is adouble the number in Shanghai on April 16.32 Similar

question that dates a few decades back in the studies

situation occurred earlier after the Qiqihair incident,of public opinion-policy making linkage. Kennamer

when 37 Chinese were severely injured and one

summarizes a wider academic debate by stating thatman later died after being exposed to the abandoned

the key problem in studying this linkage is‘ Who areweapons in China since its war with Japan. On

the publics whose opinions are to be linked to policy

September 18, 2003 Chinese activists‘delivered to

2.3

27

making? ’ Definition of public opinion in China is

the Japanese Embassy [an anti-Japanese petition]necessary here.

in ten black binders with 5000 pages of the names

74Development of the East China Sea Gas Field Disputeand home addresses of the 1.2 million signatories.’33

would get the protesters into the streets.’37 While

When compared with scattered opinions expressed

these limited opinions constitute a part of domestic

mainly online on a daily basis such forms of politicalopinion, they are not representative of it. Moreover,participation represent a consensus of a significant

these publicly expressed views are not supported

number of citizens. However, mass protests are

by a significant number of people. Instead, they are

not favored by the central government and general

expressed as a mixture of scattered opinions. Hencedomestic opinion often remains latent.

it would be more accurate to refer to such opinions as

Doob describes such phenomena as internal

voiced opinions (plural, rather than a singular public

public opinion, which can be referred to when theopinion, conventionally used talking about democratic

34

systems). These voiced opinions are a variety of

It only becomes public when strong opposition toviews surrounding certain issues, expressed by aofficial policies accumulates and breaks out into

limited number of citizens, nowadays mainly online.

mass social unrests. It is formed on a daily basis as

They constitute a part of general domestic opinion in

the general opinion of the citizens aware of a certain

China.

attitudes that people posses are not expressed.

issue, but remains unexpressed. However, even if not

For the analysis these two terms are further used

articulated this general internal public opinion is thehere in this paper. Such distinction demonstrates

source of regime stability in China. A number of casethat during the periods of social stability Chinesestudies note that Chinese government fears possible

foreign policy makers can refer only to limited, notdomestic reactions and adopts certain policies

representative voiced opinions, although plausible

accordingly. For example, Kojima ( 小島 ) points out

domestic audience costs threatening the regime

that Chinese government did not report domesticallystability are actually imposed by obscure domestic

when it apologized to the Japanese government for

opinion. Such a distinction is necessary when35

the submarine incident in November 2004. Lewis

explaining Chinese foreign policy. Each of the terms

and Xue argue that‘Currently, before adopting novel

suggests a different pattern of foreign policy making.

foreign policies, the leadership must try to gauge

If Chinese policy makers merely respond to these36

their acceptability in general population.’

voiced opinions, the linkage between domestic

To describe such‘perceived’public opinion,

opinion and China’s foreign policy is rather simple.

which Doob defines as internal, here in this paper I

The input of the policy process is clearly defined byintroduce a term domestic opinion. That is the same

voiced opinions, and the policy makers know what‘public opinion’in its conventional sense, except thatpolicies they are expected to adopt. On the otherit is not publicly articulated. Seeking to emphasize

hand, if it is the consideration of domestic opinion,

this peculiarity I adopt a distinctive term. This

which actually shapes foreign policy decisions, thisdomestic opinion, if dissatisfaction towards certain

linkage becomes more complicated. Rather thanpolicies accumulates, may impose high audience

reacting to clearly defined demands from the citizens,costs on the government, as explained above.

policy makers speculate on possible domestic

Such definition by no means implies that no

opinion and adopt such decisions that are expected

opinions are publicly expressed in China. A limited

not to provoke the rise of negative opinions. As thenumber of views tend to be publicly articulated on

general domestic opinion is clearly expressed onlya daily basis. Johnston notes that such opinions

after such negative opinions accumulate, the policy

serve‘as a barometer of the kinds of emotions thatmakers find themselves in a situation where they

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自由論題

have to speculate one step ahead of the actual policy

Zemin’s ( 江 泽 民 ) visit.41 Later, in autumn 2005,

results. Thus there is a risk that they err on the side

Hu Jintao ( 胡 锦 涛 ) named it as China’s pursuitof caution, and their policy decisions are constrainedof harmonious world and Japan was a part of thismore than necessary. Such different policy making

strategy.

patterns would be overlooked by the conventional

Secondly, the initiative to jointly develop

understanding expressed by the term public opinion,

resources served as an important tool for China

what makes the distinction between voiced opinions

to maintain the status quo in its marine territorial

and domestic opinion necessary.

disputes. Both countries base their territorial claimson the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

3

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD THE
GAS FIELD DISPUTE

However, China and Japan refer to colliding

There may be identified 4 stages in theand EEZ respectively. The settlement of the dispute

development of this dispute since it emerged in 2004.

would be possible only if an agreement between

The beginning of each of them was marked by athe disputant countries was reached or a third party

certain turning point discussed below.

ruled out how the boundary should be delimitated.42

provisions - the extension of the continental shelf

The later one was not favored by China as legal
3.1

A f t e r t h e I n i t i a t ive o f 2 0 0 4 : Pe r i o d o fclarification of conflicting UNCLOS provisions

Negotiations

might jeopardize its negotiating positions over the

In June 2004 Japan expressed its anxiety

territories in the South China Sea in the disputes withthat China might siphon off natural gas from theVietnam, the Philippines or other states.

fields lying east of the Japan-claimed median,never acknowledged by China. It requested China

3.2

to submit geological survey data regarding the

Beyond the Agreement of 2008: Lingering over
the Non-binding Political Accord

38

development of the resources there. At that time

11 rounds of bilateral gas field talks were finallyChinese government stated that it‘could consider

completed by China-Japan political agreement to

the provision for information after an agreement injointly develop natural gas in designated areas

39

principle had been reached on joint development.’

and for Japanese companies to participate in the

Chinese side positioned the situation so that there

development of the Chunxiao field. Such provisions

were hardly any alternatives left.

were not legally binding and it would be more

Such initiative for joined resource development

accurate to refer to the agreement as a bilateralcorresponded to China’s strategic foreign policy

political accord. The two countries had to further

objectives in two ways. First, the initiative came as anegotiate it into an international treaty based on thepart of China’s strategy to avoid confrontation with

political accord of 2008. But Chinese government

Japan and maintain peace and stability in the area.

remained unresponsive to Japan’s calls to negotiate

It was directly linked to China’s wider strategy to

it for almost 2 years and the two countries stayedbuild cooperative relations with different countries

lingering over this non-implemented political accord.

in order to promote favorable environment for

The government of the Liberal Democratic Party

40

China’s domestic development. It had been China’sof Japan, which took office in 2009, adopted a more

new approach to Japan since late 1990s, which was

active stance toward the East China Sea. On January

formally stated in November 1998 during Jiang

19, 2010 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

76Development of the East China Sea Gas Field Dispute

Katsuya Okada ( 岡 田 克 也 ) warned China thatmakers were cautious not to provoke domestic

countermeasures would be taken against China if it

discontent toward the East China Sea gas fieldstarted drilling at the Chunxiao field. A month later

dispute policy decisions. This is a sensitive issue

Japanese Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano ( 平 野including both China’s sovereignty and anti-Japanese博 文 ) said Japan might bring the case against thesentiment, therefore if mishandled this issue mightinternational maritime court.

impose high audience costs on the regime stability.
To prove this argument, here the policy makers’

Recovering the Joint Development Initiative:

perceptions of domestic opinion and their response

Renewed Negotiations

to voiced opinions are discussed first. Second, voiced

The situation changed dramatically in spring

opinions surrounding the dispute, based on content

2010. Although in April Chinese President Hu Jintao

analysis of online forum discussions are examined.

was still reluctant to do so, in May 2010 Premier Wen

Finally, it is explained how these two factors shaped

Jiabao announced his will to launch the negotiations

China’s East China Sea gas field dispute policy

3.3

soon.

43

Earlier comments from the Japanese

making.

politicians were a clear indicator that the credibilityof the agreement of 2008 was deteriorating. By

4.1

Government’s Perceptions of Domestic Opinion

renewing negotiations Chinese side managed toAnalysis of Chinese policy makers’perceptions

restore the credibility of the original agreement.

of domestic opinion since 2004 reveals that they

Already in July Japan and China held the first roundwere sensitive to the views held by the citizens andof talks aimed at signing a treaty over joint gas fieldat times adopted preemptive rather than reactive

development in the East China Sea. The second one

policy measures. The government adopted different

was scheduled in September.

strategies as explained below.
First, there were a significant number of cases

Fishing Boat Incident: Abandoning Joint

when governmental institutions attempted to control

Development Talks

the spread of anti-Japanese sentiment, especially

The month when the negotiations were to bewhen voiced opinions radicalized and expanded

held marked another turning point in China’s gas

in scope, raising the threat of social unrests. In

field dispute policy. On September 7 a Chinese

March 2005, when a campaign to boycott Japanesefishing boat collided with 2 patrol vessels of the Japanproducts was initiated to oppose Japan’s bid for

Coast Guard ( 海 上 保 安 庁 ), when they requested

the membership of the UN Security Council, thethe boat to leave Japan-controlled area around the

CCP Central Publicity Department reportedly

Senkaku Islands. After Japanese legal authorities

banned media reports on this initiative and took

decided to detain the captain of the boat, masscertain measures to limit demonstrations later. 44

demonstrations in various cities across China were

Similar was the case earlier in summer 2004, whenheld and Chinese government suspended bilateralsevere anti-Japanese protests occurred at the Asiantalks on the East China Sea gas field development.

Football Confederation Asian Cup matches. Chinese

3.4

government was said to have intervened to censor

4

GAS FIELD DISPUTE FOREIGNPOLICY MAKING

the anti-Japanese reports in mass media.45 In 2010

This paper argues that Chinese foreign policy

the website of the China Federation for Defending

a day before the Mukden Incident anniversary

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自由論題

Diaoyutai was taken offline. Moreover, messages

Shinichi Kitaoka ( 北 岡 伸 一 ) quoted Chinese

about protests being organized were removed fromcommittee members saying that they‘would like46

the Internet bulletin boards. These are just a few

to proceed with the negotiations but there arecases illustrating that Chinese government grewvarious pressures.’Reportedly they explained thatanxious about the mobilization potential carried byalthough the scholars in China would be able tovoiced opinions.

understand the differences in the views of both sides,

Second, the government also made a significant

the common citizens would not be able to do thateffort to prevent the formation of negative domestic

and a negative reaction could be expected.49 History

opinion. Information campaign in the state-run

research with Japan and joint gas field development

media was obviously aimed at preventing society’s

are independent foreign policy issues. But in terms

misperceptions (as understood by the government)of domestic opinion they fall under one category ofof the government’s foreign policy decisions related

the so-called Japan-issue, thus the government wasto the gas field development jointly with Japan. In

cautious in handling it simultaneously in order to

Xinhua news agency reports each of the later articles

prevent the rise of negative domestic opinion.

was followed by a full timetable of negotiations andFinally, Chinese government also sought tolinks to the articles about them. People’s Daily also

convince the society of the necessity to cooperate

explained the matters carefully. As it is explainedwith Japan. The top leaders publicly stated thatlater, the government took especially active stance

China’s domestic development was linked to theto prevent society’s misperceptions in 2008 just after

international environment and China’s relations

the announcement of joint development agreement.

with other countries, which, it goes without saying,

Preventive strategies were not limited toincluded its close neighbor Japan. Such argument

domestic information campaign. Japanese media

was strongly advanced in an article by Wen Jiabao,reported that China‘repeatedly asked Japanese

titled‘Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage ofgovernment to supervise the domestic media overSocialism and Several Issues Concerning China’s

their coverage of a bilateral row concerning China’s

Foreign Policy’published on February 27, 2007

gas field development in the East China Sea.’High-in People’s Daily. Chinese Premier argued thatlevel CCP members were also said to have insisted

China should‘seize the favorable internationalthat bilateral negotiations to resolve gas development

opportunities to speed up our development.’This

dispute would not move forward unless the Japanese

article further promoted the idea presented by47

media improved their reporting.

President Hu Jintao in 2005. He advocated China’s

Furthermore, avoiding the rise of negative

peaceful development represented by the concept

domestic opinion the government refrained fromof harmonious world, emphasizing the importancecertain policy decisions. Just after the announcementof international peace and stability for the domesticof joint development agreement in 2008, Chinese

development of China. While this was a way toside drastically changed its stance on China-Japandeclare current leadership’s policy goals, it can be

joint history research. Although in the beginning it

also viewed as their attempt to persuade Chinese

proceeded smoothly,48

in July Chinese delegationsociety of the necessity to cooperate with othersuddenly refused to publish research papers,

countries, and in such a way attain society’s consent

reflecting both sides’disagreement over certain

to proceed with policies which go against the logics

historical facts. Chairman of the Japanese committeeof the earlier‘nationalistic promise.’Later before78Development of the East China Sea Gas Field Dispute

his visit to Japan in May 2008, Hu Jintao held a press

mainly related to the necessity to maintain stability

conference arguing for the necessity to improveand avoid war, either due to currently limited China’s

relations with Japan. It was widely reported incapabilities or considerations of negative impact on

domestic media.

its economy. Similar explanations usually appeared

Strategies of persuasion were also carried out

as a response to the questions of other Internet users

on a smaller scale. After the anti-Japanese protests

who expressed their doubts regarding official policies

in April 2005 there were official lecture groups onor asked for a clarification of the matters related toChina-Japan relations touring major cities aroundthe joint resource development. For example,‘What

China to explain to the government officials, PLA

does the joint development mean?’,‘Why do we needrepresentatives and students the history and theto cooperate with Japan?’,‘Why doesn’t China go to

future of bilateral relations as well as present policies

war with Japan?’, and others. A significant number

toward Japan.

of such posts indicate that there were a number of

The government’s efforts to control voiced

citizens who had an interest in public affairs but were

opinions, prevent society’s misperceptions and also

still undecided. Thus they could have been easily

persuade it reveal that it was conscious of domestic

influenced by the loud radical view-holders.

opinion and sought to avoid accumulation of negative

The second trend indicated the link between

opinion.

the Internet users’perceptions of joint gas fielddevelopment issue and China-Japan territorial

Voiced Opinions Surrounding the Disputedisputes as well as Japan-issue in general. Opinions,

The above explained official policies might havesurrounding different issues, were entangled

been encouraged by rather radical voiced opinions.

making it difficult to distinguish how the dispute wasOnline discussion forums were affluent of various

perceived by domestic opinion. The Internet users

comments on the dispute-related policies. Two trends

extensively discussed how the zone, designatedbecame evident from their analysis.

for joint development in the 2008 agreement, fits in

4.2

First, there existed a wide variety of attitudes

the general marine boundary dispute. They posted

toward the dispute. Two opposing poles of the voiced

maps and their individual measurements of how it

opinions can be identified. The rational one argued

actually falls into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)

for the joint development. At the same time theof China. Some of the Internet users expressed

advocates of the radical position sometimes went

concerns that the agreement to jointly develop theas far as labeling the joint development agreement

resources there was an acknowledgement of the

as a betrayal of the country ( 卖 国 ). Such radical

Japan-claimed median line.

views were posted online in any form from a single-

Timing and context of the posts links joint

sentence statement to an extensive argumentation

development issue to the Senkaku ( 尖 閣 諸 島 ;why shelving the disputes and jointly developing

Diaoyutai ( 釣魚台列島 ) in Chinese) Islands dispute

resources was a betrayal of China. One of the Internet

rather than the marine boundary delimitation only.

users even argued that this could provoke a May 4th

A vast number of posts related to joint development–like movement.

appeared immediately after the incident near the

On the other hand, rational explanations

Senakaku Islands in September 2010. Looking at thepresented a variety of arguments why China should

problem from the opposite perspective Manicom

cooperate with Japan on this particular issue. This

found that‘nationalist attachment to the disputed

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自由論題

[Senkaku] islands has broadened to include

In summer 2004 Chinese government initiatednationalist attachment to the East China Sea as a

joint development out of necessity to maintain the50

whole.’

status quo that is seeking to avoid further conflict

In addition, there were cases demonstrating that

escalation and also a possible settlement of thethe dispute was related to the anti-Japanese sentimentmaritime boundary. As a non-democratic government

in general. Reportedly, the link between nationalism

on a short-term basis Chinese government was able

and the East China Sea was evident during theto make such an unpopular policy decision without

1996 incident and again in April 2005. Although thepaying high audience costs. In a non-democratic

demonstrations were set off by the history textbook

system the risk of losing legitimacy immediately wasissue and Japan’s bid for the permanent seat in therather low. There exist no democratic procedures

UN Security Council in 2005, in Shanghai on April

through which the citizens could punish the16, 2005 demonstrators also shouted slogans aimed

government. Moreover, negative domestic opinion

at Japan’s plans for exploration in the East China

usually does not surface immediately, thus enabling

51

Sea. Manicom quotes a member of the Federation

the policy makers to adopt solitary unpopular

to Protect the Diaoyutai Islands as saying thatdecisions.

‘disputes over the sovereignty of the islands and the

However, the government was not able toexploration in the East China Sea exacerbate Chinese

immediately proceed with joint development. Voiced

people’s discontent with Japanese policy toward

opinions radicalized as a result of Japanese Prime

52

China.’

Minister’s Junichiro Koizumi’s ( 小 泉 純 一 郎 )Such trends in voiced opinions indicate that

visits to Yasukuni Shrine and Japan’s bid for thein regards to the East China Sea gas field disputepermanent seat in the UN Security Council. Thus it

Chinese foreign policy makers faced a policy issue,

suggested heightened sensitivity of general domestic

closely linked to regime stability. If mishandled (asopinion. Consecutive unpopular decisions might haveperceived by the society) it might have provokedundermined social stability, as negative domestic

public protests which may turn from policy-focused

opinion tends to accumulate. Thus, on a long-term

to anti-governmental protests. Thus policy makers

basis top policy makers sought to stabilize domestic

had to speculate on domestic opinion considering

opinion first and only then they were able to proceed

possible audience costs of their decisions. A widewith unpopular policy decisions. As a result, the firstvariety of voiced opinions complicated the overallsigns of progress in joint development negotiations

picture of general domestic opinion.

appeared only at the end of 2006 and early 2007.
On September 26, 2006 Shinzo Abe ( 安 倍 晋 三 )Dynamics of the Gas Field Dispute Policy

succeeded Koizumi as a prime minister of Japan. In

MakingOctober 2006 during joint press conference Prime

Part 4.1 showed that Chinese policy makers

Minister Abe and his Chinese counterpart Wen

were sensitive to domestic opinion during the period

Jiabao announced their commitment to constructanalyzed here. As discussed in part 4.2, domestic

mutually beneficial relations, based on common

opinion surrounding the dispute remained obscure,strategic interests, and accelerate consultations on

and was only partially expressed through voiced

the joint development of disputed territories in theopinions. China’s East China Sea gas field dispute

East China Sea. Japanese Prime Minister’s visit topolicy decisions were made under such conditions.

China broke the political stalemate between the

4.3

80

Development of the East China Sea Gas Field Disputetwo countries and marked the improvement of thethreat to regime legitimacy.

relations. Earlier Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine,

In 2010 Japanese politicians clearly demon-

Japan World War II memorial, explain why Chinese

strated that the credibility of the agreement to jointly

government was able to announce joint resource

develop resources in the East China Sea was fading

development agreement with Japan only in 2008.

away. They raised an idea to seek for arbitration in

The period of accommodation to perceived

the dispute. Thus a threat to the status quo emerged

domestic opinion after mass anti-Japanese

again. The issue was escalating and the Chinese

demonstrations in 2005 and Koizumi’s premiershipforeign policy makers made a decision to act. At

was followed by a stage of persuasion andthat time domestic opinion was expected to have

explanation. Earlier Chinese government hadstabilized, and in terms of regime stability it was safe

repeatedly stated its exclusive sovereignty rights

to renew the negotiations.

to Chunxiao gas field. Even a day before theSince 2004 the Chinese foreign policy makers

announcement of the joint development agreement

were balancing between domestic opinion and their

Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated clearly

initial attempt to maintain the status quo throughthat Chunxiao was entirely within the sovereignty

joint development initiative. Such strategy became

rights of China and had nothing to do with joint

especially evident after the fishing boat incident near53

development. But the accord of 2008 compromised

Senkaku Islands in September 2010. In the aftermath

such position. Even though joint development wasof the incident China-Japan relations were often

limited to other fields, Japanese companies were

defined as the worst since Koizumi’s tenure.56 Mass

granted rights to participate in the development ofpublic protests took place in different cities acrossthe Chunxiao field. In such a way the agreement

China. Again the society’s sensitivity to Japan-issue

posed a challenge for the Chinese government torose to a critical level, and expected audience cotsgain the society’s consent to it. There was a risk thatof negotiations regarding cooperation with Japanthe society would not approve Japan’s participation

were high. Observing radical voiced opinions, whichin the development of the field that belongs to China.

expanded to include a significant number of people,

The leadership undertook a difficult task to convince

Chinese government cancelled scheduled 2nd roundits domestic audience. Already on June 26 a press

talks on the East China Sea avoiding reinforcement

conference was held, where the representative ofof negative domestic opinion.

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that thisThe argument that Chinese policy decisions

was not a new practice for China and it had similar

were preemptive in terms of general domestic

agreements with other countries.

54

This follow-up

opinion rather than reactive to already expressedreport was also attended by the Chairman of thevoiced opinions is further supported by China’s

Board of Directors of the China National Offshore Oillater behavior. After the incident China cancelled

Corporation (CNOOC) Zhou Shouwei ( 周守为 ), who

the two countries’leaders meeting in Hanoi at the

explained that‘joint development and cooperative

end of October at the ASEAN summit.57 Hu Jintao

development are fundamentally different.’55 In a

was quoted saying that‘Japan’s statements about

meanwhile the government remained unresponsive

the content of talks [regarding the East China Sea]

to Japan’s calls to negotiate an international treaty.

between the two countries’foreign ministers soured

Through media and public statements it sought tothe atmosphere for a possible meeting of Chinese

persuade the society and reassure there was no

and Japanese leaders in Hanoi.’58 China’s news

KEIO SFC JOURNAL Vol.12 No.1 2012

81

自由論題

agency Xinhua immediately reported that‘China

to avoid rise of negative domestic opinion. Thisdismissed a report that it agreed to resume talks

explains why the government was reluctant towith Japan on exploration for oil and gas in the East

proceed with joint resource development while direct

59

China Sea.’ These comments indicate that Chinese

public pressure was limited. Second, due to suchleadership was mostly worried about the message

considerations of domestic opinion, major decisions

its policy would send to certain audiences rather

were delayed seeking for the stabilization of domestic

than concerned with the state of affairs in China-

opinion. Third, timing was especially important inJapan relations. That is it cancelled the scheduled

China’s dispute policy decision making. The policy

East China Sea talks seeking to accommodate to the

makers were balancing between two extremes –possible domestic opinion.

they sought to maintain the status quo in the area andIn this way Chinese policy toward the East China

avoid domestic social unrest.

Sea gas field dispute with Japan was an attempt

These findings are important as they explain theto balance between the necessity to maintain theinconsistency of Chinese foreign policy. Moreover,status quo and perceived threat to regime legitimacy.

identification of preemptive foreign policy making

Such threat was posed by domestic audience whose

pattern reveals that these decisions were often

opinion remained latent through most of the period

delayed as a result of perceived threat from domestic

since 2004. Seeking to avoid undermining regime

opinion. Finally, the findings of the paper suggest

stability Chinese foreign policy makers speculated

that foreign policy decision making in China mighton domestic opinion and refrained from possibly

provide different actors with a window of opportunity

unpopular decisions when negative opinion was

to promote their limited organizational interests.

expected to accumulate.

For example, military, speculating on the perceived
domestic opinion, may seek to boost its budget

5

CONCLUSION

allocation, which would also explain increased PLA

This paper attempted to explain how domestic

activities in the East China Sea since 2004.

opinion in China affected its foreign policy decisions
toward the East China Sea gas field dispute. It
suggested a new theoretical understanding of the

ENDNOTES

citizens’opinion in a non-democratic state of China

1

This paper is based on the author’s Master’s Thesis researchat the Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio
University. The original paper was submitted in academic
year 2010 in partial fulfillment of the Master’s Program
requirements.
2 Valencia, 2007, p.157.
3 Drifte, 2008, p.27.
4 Ibid, p.35.
5 Bush, 2010, p.143.
6 “Editorial: Japan-China Gas Project.” Asahi Shimbun, June2, 2010. Accessed 2010/07/22 <http://www.asahi.com/
english/TKY201006010390.html>
7 Valencia, 2007, p.163.
8 Reilly, 2008, pp.189-223.
9 Shirk, 2008, p.44.
10 Ibid, p.52.
11 Bush, 2010, p.210.
12 Coicaud, 2002.
13 Barker, 1990, p.17.
14 Putnam, 1988, p.449; Hennessy, 1985, p.16.

distinguishing between limited voiced opinions
and general domestic opinion. Such distinction wasnecessary seeking to demonstrate that China’s
policies were preemptive rather than reactive. The
research showed that policy decisions toward thedispute were more a result of the policy makers’
perceptions of general domestic opinion rather
than their reaction to limited voiced opinions. The
main findings of the research can be summarized asfollows.
First, China’s policy decisions were preemptive
rather than reactive. Foreign policy makers sought82

Development of the East China Sea Gas Field Dispute

15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39

40
41

42

43

44
45
46

47

Wu (p.185) concludes that strong opinions online mightundermine China’s long-term foreign policy design; also
see Reilly (2008), Shirk (2008).
Max Weber, as cited in Barker (1990, p.48).
Zheng&Lye, 2005, p.184.
Yang, 2005, p.71.
Zhao, 2009; Wang, 2008.
Zheng&Lye, 2005.
Dickson, 2011, p. 211.
Zheng, 1999, p.135.
Argument suggested by Shirk (2008).
Dickson, 2011, p.211.
Fearon, 1994, p.577.
Ibid, p.582.
Kennamer, 1992, p.3.
Hennessy, 1985, p.8. Hennessy notes that there are 5 basic
elements of public opinion, which can be also defined as
the core conditions of it. That is there must be: (1) an issue;(2) a significant number of individuals concerned with theissue; (3) a complex of preferences, that is all the opinions
held by the relevant public; (4) expression of the various
views; (5) a significant number of persons interested in theissue (1985, p.8-13).
Ibid, p.13.
Reilly, 2008, p.192.
East Asian Strategic Review 2006, p.105.
Ibid, p.106.
Reilly, 2008, p.198.
Doob, 1948, p.39.
Kojima ( 小島 ), 2005, p.240.
Lewis&Xue, 2006, p.108.
Johnston, 2004, p.626.
MOFA. The Japan-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on
the Occasion of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue Meeting(Summary), June 21, 2004. Accessed 2010/09/30 <http://
www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/meet0406.html>
MOFA. Japan-China Consultations on the East China
Sea and Other Matters, September 30 to October 1, 2005.
Accessed 2010/10/07 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/china/consult0509.html>
Wang ( 王 ), 2007, p.iii.
MOFA. 平和と発展のための友好協力パートナーシッ
プの構築に関する日中共同宣言 , November 26, 1998.
Accessed 2010/11/10 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/
kaidan/yojin/arc_98/c_kyodo.html>
Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, Oceans and Law of
the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea.
Accessed 2010/10/23 <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm>
MOFA. 日中首脳会談 ( 概要 ), May 31, 2010. Accessed
2010/09/30 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/
1005_sk.htm>
East Asian Strategic Review 2006, p.105.
East Asian Strategic Review 2005, p.104.
Christopher Bodeen. “China Tries to Contain Growing
anti-Japan Protests.” Accessed 2010/11/23 <http://www.
boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/10/25/china_trie
s_to_contain_growing_anti_japan_protests>“China Urges Japan to Supervise Media over Gas Field
Dispute Reports.” Japan Times, May 13, 2010. Accessed
2010/11/15 <http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/
view/china-urges-japan-to-supervise-media-over-gas-fielddispute-reports>

48
49
50
51
52
53

54

55
56

57

58
59

For more on China-Japan joint history research see Kitaoka( 北岡 ), 2010.
Ibid, p.65.
Manicom, 2007, p.2.
Ibid, p.16.
Ibid, p.17.
外 交 部： 春 晓 油 气 田 完 全 在 中 国 的 主 权 权 利 范 围
内 , People‘s Daily, June 17, 2008. Accessed 2010/11/20<http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/9491/113836/73936
90.html>
中海油负责人谈中日东海合作 . Xinhua News Agency,
June 26, 2008. Accessed 2010/11/15 <http://news.
xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-06/26/content_8445880.
htm>
Ibid.
“Japan Rejects China’s Demand for Formal Apology.” BBC
News, September 25, 2010. Accessed November 25, 2010.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11410568.
“China Says Japan Ruined Atmosphere for Wen, Kan Talks
in Hanoi.” Business Week, October 29, 2010. http://www.
businessweek.com/news/2010-10-29/china-says-japanruined-atmosphere-for-wen-kan-talks-in-hanoi.html
Ibid.
Ibid.

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