Prospect for Change of Strategic Environment
and Future of U.S. Force Presence in East Asia

by
Woosang Kim
Department of Political Science and Diplomacy
Yonsei University
Seoul, Korea
kws@yonsei.ac.kr

Prepared to present at the conference on "Maritime Security in Southeast andSouthwest Asia," December 11-13, 2001, Tokyo, Japan.

The Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits are often cited as two
potentially explosive areas in East Asia. The two areas have a lot in common. Firstof all, they portray confrontations between different systems - capitalist versus
communist and democratic versus authoritarian. Second, these are the very places
where American and Chinese strategic interests collide with each other. For
example, the Korean peninsula has been the historical demarcation between
maritime and continental powers. Third, both in the Korean peninsula and the
Taiwan Straits, status quo seems to be the only option to satisfy all the relevant
countries including the U.S, Japan and Russia.
Scholars like William Wohlforth or Zbignew Brzezinski have said that thecurrent international system is the U.S. hegemonic stability system or Pax
Americana and this system will last very long. On the other hand, scholars like
Samuel Huntington have argued that the current system is the U.S. led unimultipolar system and that order will last only 10 to 20 years and will change tomultipolarity. Many have thought that the U.S. was the hegemonic power in thesystem and the U.S. foreign policies were rather unilaterally decided or carried out.
But, since the 9.11 terrorist attack on New York, the U.S. alone cannot easily tackle
the main issues of the day. In solving problems related to terrorism, drugtrafficking, money laundering, and other transnational crime, weapons of mass
destruction, humanitarian assistance, refugee issues, environmental problems, andso forth. The U.S. needs other great powers and regional major powers' support.
We knew that comprehensive security and human security issues were going to beimportant. But, since the 9.11 terrorist's attack and the war against terrorism,
those issues drastically became the most important ones.
In this paper, I speculate a short-term and a long-term strategic
environment in East Asia. I come up with several scenarios for the future
regional security structure. I also discuss future of the U.S. force presence in East
Asia.
Determinants of the Future East Asian Security Environment
The future course of China and the U.S. response seem to be the main
determinants in molding the future East Asian security. The current picture
shows a stable superiority of Washington. However, velocity and magnitude ofChinese economic and military growth may end in different situations. In

1addition, there do exist three potential sources of systemic change: erosion of
U.S.-Japan alliance, active participation by Russia and unification of Korea.
China and the United States
Can China manage to maintain rapid growth rates for two to three
decades and eventually catch up with the Unites States? A number of studies
suggest that China may likely become the economic superpower and overtake
the United States position. According to the Economist, for example, China’s
economic size in the year 2020 to 2040 will be about 40% larger than that of theUnited States. Including such factors as “long-range military power, efficientforeign policy machinery, public support for vigorous foreign policy, andmaterial interests abroad,” China is the only potential power that can challenge
the United States in the system.1
However, this view of China as a potential regional hegemon is notuniversally held. Others suggest that China's power is in fact still quite weak
and is likely to remain so for many years to come. Among others, potential
leadership struggle, the increasing gap between economic development in thehinterland and the coastal areas may work against China's success story.2
When considering the “China factor,” however, we should always keep
in mind that perception and misperception really matters. That is, how theUnited States and China perceive their relative national powers is probably
more important than their actual relative national capabilities.3
The “America factor” has something to do with the U. S. national
interests and strategies. Two types of United States foreign policy can be
identified: a policy of internationalism and a policy of isolationism. Historically,
the United States has pursued one or the other of these broad policies. Since theUnited States became the leading power in the postwar international system,
however, it has pursued a policy of internationalism. The question is, now thatthe unifying Soviet threat is gone and domestic pressure for withdrawal
increasing, how long the United States will maintain this policy of active
engagement in East Asia, forward deployment of forces, and military allianceswith the regional powers.4
China’s level of dissatisfaction with the international and regional
security order is another important factor that will influence regional stability.
Even if the “one China” principle has been honored by most of the countries in
the world, China is not satisfied with recent changes of the relationships

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between Taiwan and other major powers in the region. China is particularly
unhappy with the United States' explicit support for Taiwan.
The United States' strengthening of its ties with Japan, and its overt
remarks about forward presence of forces in Korea and Japan after the Korean
reunification also help contribute to China’s dissatisfaction and angst. U.S.
leadership and its active engagement in the region can be considered one of themost important factors contributing to China’s dissatisfaction with the regional
security environment. As long as China maintains the current form of regime
based on communist ideology, it will remain as the potential challenger to theUnited States-led “uni-multipolar” systemic order.5
Thus, the China factor and the America factor constitute the corevariables around which the scenarios of the future regional security order
below are constructed, and the dissatisfaction factor explains the likelihood andintensity of great power conflict in the region.
The United States-Japan Alliance
The U.S.-Japan alliance has been the primary factor contributing
economic prosperity and political stability in the region. If current trends
continue, Japan will become the “normal state” sooner or later, and its
economic and political role will be expanded in the region. However, Japan’s
security role will be restrained within the current framework of the U.S.-Japan
alliance structure. That is, Japan’s future role on regional security issues will bedependent on United States security policy toward the region. In the short term,
no dramatic change in the bilateral alliance is likely to take place.
In the long term, however, if a significant change of this partnership in
the future occurs, the region’s security setting would be drastically shaken. The
alliance has been a major tool for blocking China’s rise as a regional hegemon
and also for checking Japan’s revival as a regional destabilizer. U.S. militarypresence in Japan is even referred as “bottle cap” or as an “egg shell.”Therefore, an erosion of the alliance would be detrimental to the security of theregion and also become the cause of changes in distribution of regional power.
RussiaRussia’s future influence depends on its growth and stabilization ofpolitico-economic situation. No matter how successful its processes of economic
modernization and political stabilization, however, Russia’s potential influence3

on East Asian regional security issues may not substantially increase in any
time soon. Even if Russia starts to recover, it won't be easy for Russia to devote
the necessary resources to the Far East to become an influential actor as Chinaor the United States on East Asian security order in the near future.
Unification of Korea
Unification of Korea will cast another source of change. The Korean
peninsula is one place where the U.S.-China rivalry is clearly visible. The
current situation is the embryonic stage in which the U.S. and China compete
for influence over North Korea.
It is notable that historically Korea has tended to align with continental
power, namely China. The only exception was the past fifty years when South
Korea aligned with maritime power, the United States. If we put domestic
variables such as anti-American sentiment and historical distrust toward Japan
into consideration, there remains no guarantee that a unified Korea will remainaligned with the United States.

Long-Term Scenarios for Strategic Environment
Now, let me briefly examine long-term regional security environments,
about 30 to 40 years from now. Since Japan's position is more or less dependent
on its alliance relationship with the U.S. and Russia's future influence seems to
be limited, I give more weight on the China factor and the U.S. factor.
If the United States still maintains its current policy of active engagementin East Asia through forward deployment of forces and military alliance with
regional powers, there are two possible long-term scenarios. First, the “U.S.-led
uni-multipolar scenario” will be materialized if China fails to catch up with theUnited States in national capabilities. Second, if socialist China successfully
catches up with the United States, then the “major systemic crisis scenario”
would occur.
The U.S.-led uni-multipolar stability scenario pictures the status quo. In
this scenario, the U.S.–Japan alliance and NATO will be the main security
framework for United States engagement policies. The United States will see its
alliance with Japan as beneficial to maintaining East Asian regional order and,
therefore, will keep it. The socialist China and Russia will remain dissatisfied

4

but basically acknowledge or accept the U.S. leadership in the region. In this
scenario, Korea and Taiwan will enjoy regional stability and Taiwan will
maintain its independence from China’s potential military threat.
If, on the other hand, China perceives that it successfully catches up withor even overtakes the United States, then the major systemic crisis scenario will
be materialized. If the United States anticipates that China's challenge isimminent, it will try to protect its sphere of influence in the region and maintainthe existing security order. The United States may attempt to build the virtual
triangular alliance among the U.S., Korea, and Japan. The United States may
consider re-normalizing diplomatic ties with Taiwan and eventually form amilitary alliance with it. The United States may improve its relationships with
India as well. With reformulation of its alliance structure, the United Statesalliance members will surround Chinese mainland. With Japan, Korea, andTaiwan from China's south and west, and India from east, the United Statesalliances will checkmate China's move. The NATO will also play a crucial rolein tying Russia down so as not to form an alliance with China. In this kind of
situation, a major war between the declining status quo power and rising
revisionist power is highly likely. This major systemic crisis scenario suggests
increased military and political roles for Japan and Korea, and an improved
relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan.
The above two scenarios are plausible only if the United States adopts a
policy of internationalism. But, what if the United States decides to change its
policy from internationalism to isolationism? The United States is more likely toswitch its policy of internationalism to that of isolationism if it perceives its
relative power declines to its supreme challenger, China. If the United States
decides to appease to China's imminent challenge, then the “appeasement or
bandwagon scenario” will materialize. In this scenario, the U.S. interests is notthreatened by Chinese effort to reclaim its traditional hegemony in East Asia
because China aims not to be global power but to be regional hegemon.
In this scenario, the U.S. will sever its alliance ties with both Japan and
Korea and accommodate China's regional hegemonic status. And the UnitedStates is more likely to adopt an appeasement policy toward China. Other small
and weak neighbors will bandwagon as well. Korea, because of a lack of
capabilities to stand alone, would bandwagon to the threatening power.
The “balance of power scenario” will transpire if China fails to catch up
with the United States in national power. In this case, three more or less equal5powers--China, Japan, and Russia--will check each other’s aggression. Although
the United States will remain as the strongest power in the system, it will be
involved only minimally in regional politics.
The balance of power scenario suggests that the United States will notkeep its military alliance ties with Japan or Korea. Unless any one great power
tries to break the status quo, the United States will remain uninvolved. Only
when the regional status quo and its national interests in the region are
threatened the United States will play the role of “balancer.”This scenario also presupposes that the United States is satisfied withmaritime dominance while accepting Chinese dominance in the continent. In
this kind of situation, Japan will not rely on the United States for its security
protection. Instead, Japan will increase its military. Japan, China, and Russia
will compete against each other for influence in the region. In this scenario,
heated competition between China and Japan would be expected. Japan, China,
and Russia will try to increase their influence on the Korean peninsula. In
addition, China and Japan may compete over the influence on Taiwan.
Especially, Japan may try to build an alliance relationship with Taiwan, while
China tries to unify Taiwan with it military superiority.
Table 1 summarizes four scenarios described above. These four scenarios
are based on the assumption that China continues to maintain the socialist regime
type and to be very much dissatisfied with the existing regional security order. I
can come up with four more scenarios by assuming that China becomes aconstructive member of the regional society in the next thirty to forty years. Thatis, if a future China becomes more democratic, less provocative and more flexible
in handling foreign affairs. Table 2 summarizes four scenarios with cooperative
China.
(Table 1 about here)(Table 2 about here)
If the United States maintains its foreign policy of active engagement inEast Asia through forward deployment of forces and military alliance with
regional powers, there are two possible scenarios. If China fails to catch up with
the United States, the situation will be the same as the U.S.-led uni-multipolarstability scenario except that the United States will cooperate with China rather
than compete with it.

6In case a cooperative China succeeds in catching up with the UnitedStates, the two superpowers will not resort to arms to resolve the conflict ofinterests. Instead of challenging the existing, U.S.-led regional security order,
China is likely to accept the status quo and therefore the U.S. will allow China
to share its regional leadership position without a struggle. I call this the U.S.China condominium scenario, or Pax Consortis in which major powers in theregion including the U.S., Japan and China cooperate each other.
If the United States decides to change its policy from internationalism
to isolationism, while a cooperative China successfully catches up with theUnited States, then the China-led stability will materialize. This situation will be
the same as the appeasement scenario except that China will be less likely toattempt to rewrite the existing rules of the game. The situation will be similar to
the U.S.-led uni-multipolar stability scenario except that the United States will
not exercise its influence on regional security too greatly.
If China fails to catch up with the United States in national power, while
the United States pursues the policy of isolation, three more or less equal
powers -- China, Japan, and Russia -- will check and balance each other. Thissituation is the same as the balance of power scenario except that China is more
likely to support the existing regional order and the conflict among three
powers is less likely.
No matter which type of scenarios becomes the reality, as long as China
becomes fully cooperative and abides by the rules of the free market system, theregion will be more likely to be stable.
Short-Term Change of Strategic Environment
In the long-term scenarios, there is a potential for China to challenge theU.S. leadership. In the short-term, however, it is very clear that China will nothave enough time to catch up with the United States.
In the next five to ten years, North Korea will still pose a considerable threat
to Northeast Asian stability with its continued development efforts of weapons ofmass destruction. Russia will still face political and economic vulnerabilities anduncertain international status. Japan will be more likely to accomplish the status of“normal state,” but still be dependent upon the United States in security matters.
China will pursue economic reform and its “one-China” policy, while maintaining
its current form of socialist free market system. The United States will maintain its

7policy of active engagement. I can rather confidently forecast that status quo will
be maintained, and thus the future system in the short-term perspective will stillbe the United States-led “uni-multipolar system.
Conclusion: U.S. Force Presence in East Asia
According to recent reports by the Commission on America’s National
Interests and by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), theU.S. “vital” national interests in East Asia include: preventing the emergence ofany regional hegemonic power; containing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, primarily nuclear weapons and missile technology, biological andchemical weapons; and ensuring continued military, political, and commercial
access to and through the region. These vital national interests suggest that theUnited States will pursue the policy of internationalism in the years to come.
Revisionists have long argued for withdrawal of the United States troops
in East Asia. However, I expect continuation of the United States policy of active
engagement in this region. Recently, several leaders of the United States,
including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, have reconfirmed theengagement policy and indicated U.S. willingness to maintain a forward
military presence in Korea even after unification. The 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) also suggests the U.S. military presence in East Asia
even after the Korean unification. The new “Defense Guidelines” between the
U.S. and Japan is another indication.
Some modifications could be made in the size, missions, and nature of
the United States forces in the region, depending on the changes of the security
environment. However, as long as the United States strategic interests exist in
the region, the United States will maintain its forward deployment structure inan effective and viable form.
Based on the short-term speculation, the current United States-Japan and
Korea-United States alliances will play an important role on deterring thepotential North Korea’s aggression and maintaining stable regional security
order including Taiwan’s sovereignty. China will be threatened by thestrengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and their joint development efforts of themissile defense(MD) system. But, on the other hand, China will want to see the
U.S.-Japan alliance neither too tight nor too lose. At a minimum, China will not
like to see an independently postured Japan. (Art 1998/99; Christensen 1999)

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What about the potential for China's challenge in the long run? As I havebriefly discussed, there are mixed views. While some suggest that China willattain a rising hegemonic status that can compete with the United States in thenext 30 to 40 years, others are very skeptical about China’s potential for a regionalhegemonic status. It is of course consequential to know which speculation is more
likely to become the reality. However, I believe that the perception andmisperception problem is more important. Even if most agree that China would
fail to catch up to the United States, China may still think that it is strong enoughto challenge the United States. Although the Soviet Union never reached ahegemonic status in retrospect, it was considered a “legitimate” challenger to theUnited States during the Cold War era. Just like the Soviet case, China is highly
likely to be considered a “legitimate” challenger to the United States hegemonicstatus in the years to come.
In addition to China's potential growth, the newly burgeoning
nationalism in China and its sensitivity to the Taiwan issue could constitutemajor stumbling blocks for China to be a responsible actor in the existingregional order. Even though all the scenarios I have mentioned are conceivable,
these speculations will lead us to two highly likely scenarios--the U.S.-led unimultipolar stability and the major systemic crisis scenarios.
At this moment, the U.S. is well postured at least to respond to thepotential crisis situation in the Korean peninsula. However, in case of the Korean
unification, there might be strong popular pressure for the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces in East Asia. A complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea or fromJapan would not be in the interest of Korea, Japan or the United States. Especially,
the U.S. should seek ways to ensure that it could keep its forces on the peninsula
or on Japan even after the Korea unification. To maintain the U.S.-led, stable unimultipolar system and to secure its vital national interests in the region, theUnited States should maintain its ties both with Japan and Korea and keep its
forward deployment of forces especially in Japan.
After the Korean unification the U.S. may withdraw most of its forces fromthe Korean peninsula except for a small number of "rapid response" force as atoken of the still remaining U.S.-Korea military alliance. In Japan, the U.S. may also
have to carry out a considerable reduction in troop numbers along with theirreassignment to less intrusive locations. However, certain U.S. facilities will be
critical to U.S. ability to project power and to prepare for potential crisis situationin case the major systemic crisis scenario materializes. The naval facilities at

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Yokosuka and air base at Kadena will play vital roles. By securing naval facilities
at Yokosuka the U.S. will be able to base aircraft carriers in Japan. The air base at
Kadena, Okinawa will be the only U.S. air base within tactical fighter range of
Taiwan.
In addition, the U.S. should also make every effort to cultivate proAmericanism both in Korea and Japan, and find ways to persuade the Korean and
the Japanese people of the value of a continued U.S. military presence even after
the Korean unification. Reductions of U.S. forces in Korea and Japan should occur
only in the context of a restructuring of the U.S. alliance relationships with Korea
and Japan aimed at ensuring the long-term viability of the alliances.
Finally, the United States’ continued efforts to pursue the policy ofcomprehensive engagement toward China are also critical. The United States,
Japan, and Korea should make efforts to induce China to become an importantand responsible member of the democratic and free market-oriented regional
order. As long as China pursues economic prosperity and becomes lesschallengeable to existing regional order, no matter which scenario becomes thereality, the regional system is more likely to be stable.

10Table 1
Four Scenarioswith Socialist China

U.S. takes the policy ofInternationalism

Isolationism

Successfully

Major Systemic

Bandwagon

Catches up
with the U.S.

Crisis Scenario

Scenario

Fails tocatch upwith the U.S.

U.S. led UniMultipolar Stability
Scenario

Unstable
Balance of Power
Scenario

China

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Table 2
Four Scenarioswith Cooperative China

U.S. takes the policy ofInternationalism

Isolationism

Successfully

U.S.-China

China-led

Catches up
with the U.S.

Condominium Scenario

Stability Scenario

Fails tocatch upwith the U.S.

U.S. led UniMultipolar Stability
Scenario

StableBalance of Power
Scenario

China

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(Endnotes)

1

John Naisbitt, Megatrends in Asia (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1995); Nye (1997/1998); The

Economist, October 1, 1994, p. 4; The Economist, January 3, 1998, p. 18.
2

Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Constrainment of China,” International Security, vol.20, no.4

(Spring 1996), pp.107-135; William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International
Security, vol.24, no.1 (Summer 1999), pp.5-41; Avery Goldstein also argues that China’s
capabilities will never catch up with that of the United States in the early part of the twenty-first
century. Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International
Security, vol.22, no.3 (Winter 1997), pp.36-73.
3

For the relationship between perception and misperception and the likelihood of conflict, see

Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973); Robert Jervis, Perception
and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Jack
Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,”
World Politics, vol. 36, no.1 (1983), pp. 76-99.
4

Segal(1996); David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s

Responses,” International Security, vol.21, no.2 (Fall 1996), pp.180-209; In addition to the policies
of engagement and of isolationism, Robert Art adds a policy of selective engagement. Robert J.

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Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” International Security, vol.23,
no.3 (Winter 1998/99), pp.79-113.
5

Samuel Huntington names the current United States-led system as the “uni-multipolar”

system, while Joseph Nye calls it the United States “preponderant” system. See, Joseph Nye,
“Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, vol.78, no.4 (July/August), pp.22-35; SamuelHuntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2 (March/April 1999), pp.3549.

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