助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“Building a Regime of Regional Cooperation in
East Asia and the Role which Japan Can Play”

Tokyo
December 2-3, 2003

“LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN CHINA:IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY”
By
Dr. Noel M. Morada
Executive Director,
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS),
Associate Professor of Political Science,
University of Philippines Diliman

1
LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN CHINA:IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
By Noel M. Morada, Ph.D.1
Introduction
The change of leadership in China that began in November 2002 is one of the mostimportant political transitions in East Asia in the new century. Leadership change
also took place in South Korea in 2003, and similar transitions will take place in
Taiwan and some countries in Southeast Asia in 2004. This paper basically looks at
the significant events that transpired in China since the 16th Party Congress and the10th National People’s Congress, and examines the security implications of these to
the region from a Southeast Asian perspective. It basically argues that because thefourth generation leadership is going to be preoccupied with the country’s internal
political and economic priorities, the change in leadership in China will notsignificantly alter the security environment in the region. However, the newleadership also faces a number of internal and external challenges that may impact
on East Asia’s peace and stability over the medium- to long-term. As the Party
attempts to find new bases of political legitimacy, its cohesion will only be ensured
if it absorbs the new sectors of the economy. Externally, provocations from
Taiwan’s pro-independence movement may put to the test the new leadership’s
resolve to exercise restraint in using military force in dealing with the Taiwan issue.
Leadership Change in China: New Leaders, New Ways?
The 16th Party Congress in November 2002 and the 10th National People’s Congressin March 2003 ushered in the leadership change in China. Hu Jintao took over from
Jiang Zemin as head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC), although the latter still retained his post as headof the party and state Central Military Commissions (CMC). The top level
leadership change was basically a sweeping one, based on the fact that:••

More than sixty percent of the members of the Politburo are new to thatbody;
Eight of the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee are new;

1 Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines,

Diliman, Quezon City, and Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS),
Inc. This paper is to be presented at the Institute for International Policy Studies’ (IIPS) conference
on “Building a Regime of Regional Cooperation in East Asia and the Role which Japan Can Play,”
ANA Hotel Tokyo, 2-3 December 2003, Tokyo, Japan.

2
•
•
•
•

Seven of the eight members of the Party Secretariat are also new;
Most of the heads of party Central Committee are new;In the State Council, all of the vice premiers and state councilors are new
to their posts; andOf the 28 State Council ministers, eighteen are new as a result of the
National People’s Congress.

A corresponding change in China’s provincial party and people’s congresses alsocame about prior to the national party and people congresses, with eleven of the 31
province party secretaries and fifteen of the 31 governors are new to their posts. 2
The three top leaders of the “fourth generation”3 – Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, and
Wen Jiabao – are all over 60 years old. The average age of Politburo Standing
Committee members is 62, while the average age of all members of the 16th Politburo
is 60.4. Out of the 313 members of the 16th Central Committee whose ages are
identified, only 14 (or 4.5 percent) are leaders of the “fifth generation” who wereborn after 1957.4 Based on distinctive historical experiences of political elites in
China, the fourth generation leaders are also known as the “Cultural Revolution
generation”,5 who are technocratic in training and more pragmatic in their thinking
than their predecessors. Although they are mostly engineers and were primarily
educated in China, the fourth generation leaders are said to be more conscious ofinternational opinion and modern economic and technical trends.6
Leadership Style, Goals and Objectives
Since his installation as head of the party and the state, Hu Jintao has been
consciously attempting to portray the new Chinese leadership as actively seeking toaddress the widening economic gap brought about by the country’s prosperity bypromoting clean and transparent government, as well as the rule of law. In
particular, Hu charged his party colleagues in the new leadership to adhere to the“two musts” that were put forward by Mao Zedong – i.e., to “remain modest,
prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness,” and to “preserve the style of plain
2 H. Lyman Miller, The 10th National People’s Congress and China’s Leadership Transition, China

Leadership Monitor, No. 7, pp. 1-2, from http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20033/lm.html.
3 The idea of numbering generations of leaders came from Deng Xiaoping, who identified the first
generation as that of Mao Zedong, and the second generation was Deng’s own. Deng called Jiang the“core” of the third generation. See Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley (eds.), China’s New Rulers: The
Secret Files, pp. 10-11.
4 Cheng Li, The Emergence of the Fifth Generation Provincial Leadership, in China Leadership Monitor,
No. 6, pp. 75-76, from http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20032/lc.html.
5 Ibid.
6 Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley (eds.), China’s New Rulers, p. 21.

3living and hard struggle.” 7 He also undertook a bold initiative of promoting
transparency within the party by allowing routine public reportage of the party’s
Politburo and Standing Committee meetings. For instance, the official Xinhua news
agency reported on two “study group” sessions in the Politburo led by Hu that wasdevoted to the examining the PRC’s constitution as the basis for the rule of law ingovernance, and on world economic trends.8 A similar but extensive reporting ofState Council meetings have also been undertaken, which for many China observers
could lead to a comparable effort at “glasnost” with respect to party andgovernment decision making at the lower levels. Overall, under Hu’s leadership,
the Party is expected to emphasize collective leadership, decision-making
transparency, government accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of theChinese people.9
Challenges and Domestic Priorities
Following the 10th NPC in March 2003, the new leadership in Beijing met a numberof challenges to which it responded accordingly:•

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic that rapidly
spread to several urban centers in China and other countries, which
negatively affected the PRC’s international image. President Hu andPrime Minister Wen acted decisively in dealing with the situation bysacking central and provincial leaders, emphasizing cooperation with theWorld Health Organization (WHO), and imposing emergency restrictions
on public travel and activities to contain the spread of the disease.

•

The US went to war with Iraq in March 2003 despite strong opposition
from China and other members of the UN Security Council. The Chinese
media expressed concerns about the potential economic impact of the Iraq
war on world oil markets, which could directly affect the PRC’s economic
growth. This led the new leadership to consider the need for having astrategic oil reserve.

•

On the North Korean nuclear issue, China took on a more active
diplomacy in concert with South Korea, Japan, the US, Russia and North
Korea that led to a consensus on the opening of the six-way talks with

7 H. Lyman Miller, Hu Leadership Focuses on Compassionate Conservative Governance, in China

Leadership Monitor, No. 6, p. 71, from http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20032/lm.html.
8 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
9 H. Lyman Miller, The Hu-Wen Leadership at Six Months, China Leadership Monitor, No. 8, p. 3, fromhttp://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20034/lm.html.

4Pyongyang in Beijing in August and brokered the resumption of talks in
October.
•

Beijing buckled down on Hong Kong’s security legislation under Article
23 of the 1984 Basic Law following massive protests in July, and agreed to
new “consultations” on the legislation.10

Notwithstanding the immediate challenges that it faced, the new leadership in
Beijing appears to have remained focused on a number of political reforms that wereagreed upon in the 16th Party congress and the 10th NPC. This includes: 1) reform of
the State Council in order to manage the impact of China’s entry into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) on the country’s domestic economy; 2) structural reformof the state-controlled media, which is partly intended to accommodate WTO
stipulations that provide for foreign participation in retail distribution of
publications and in other roles; and 3) preparations for the reform of China’s
constitution in the second session of the 10th NPC in the first quarter of 2004.11
Within the Party itself, priority is apparently given to issues of law and order as wellas ideology-propaganda that suggests the new leadership’s concern about party
discipline, public security, and social unrests that may stem from at least threesources: 1) the economic dislocations that may be brought about by China’s
adjustments to its WTO concessions; 2) escalating unemployment amidst thecontinuing push for reform of state-owned enterprises; and 3) intra-party resistanceto transformation of party membership according to the “three represents”
concept.12
Internal Party Debates
The smooth transition in China’s leadership was preceded by internal Party debatesthat revolved around rethinking the role of the CCP amidst rapid economic andsocial transformations within the country as well as in the external environment. In
July 2001, former party chief Jiang Zemin delivered a speech during the anniversaryof the Party advocating the inclusion of private entrepreneurs to join the CCP, alongwith other people from new sectors of China’s society. Jiang identified six sectorsthat have developed in China over the years, namely: 1) entrepreneurs and technical
10 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
11 Ibid., p. 2.
12 H. Lyman Miller, Hu Leadership Focuses on Compassionate Conservative Governance, ibid., p. 69.

The “three represents” refers to the idea put forward by former President Jiang Zemin concerning
what the Chinese Communist Party stands for: 1) it represents the development trends of advanced
productive forces; 2) it represents the orientations of an advanced culture; and 3) it represents thefundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people of China. These “three represents”
were also incorporated into the constitution of the CCP in the 16th Party Congress in November 2002.

5
personnel employed by scientific and technical enterprises of the non-public sector;
2) managerial and technical staff employed by foreign-funded enterprises; 3) the
self-employed; 4) private enterprise owners or “capitalists”; 5) employees inintermediary organizations; and 6) freelance professionals.13
It was reportedly acknowledged by the Party that it had poor representation in theprivate sector, which is the fastest growing sector in the PRC’s economy. There wasa concern that if the Party fails to absorb young entrepreneurs and intellectuals, thismay push them into becoming oppositionist vis-à-vis the CCP. Party theoreticians
apparently have also come to recognize that because intellectuals are part of theworking class, the emergence of “knowledge economy” in China implies that thecomposition of the working class is also changing. This has led some party
members to argue that although the Party is supposed to be the vanguard of theworking class, party membership need not come solely from the working classbecause what is more important is the consciousness of the party members. Thus,
what matters most is not the class origins of membership but ideology.14
The ruling Party is also facing increased pressure for greater inner-party democracy
as it begins to compete with other models of political organization primarily due toincreased influence of globalization as well as the growing attraction of Westernmodels of democracy within China. Another reason is the need to promote party
members or cadres that are acceptable to their local constituency in order to reduce
conflicts between party secretaries and local government leaders and increase theaccountability of party leaders. Apparently, one of the sources of tension between
local cadres and the public (as well as within the party itself) has been over themonopoly of power. Calls for party reform, therefore, revolve mainly around thenomination and election procedures within the CCP, especially reform of the party
congress system. Some of the measures that were proposed include: 1) convening ofparty congresses on a more regular basis; 2) the bottom-up nomination of delegatesto party congresses; 3) the election of congress delegates in competitive elections
instead of being appointed by the party committee; 4) allowing congresses to decide
their own agenda; and 5) establishing a party congress standing committee system
similar to the NPC.15 During his National Day speech in October 2003 delivered
before the Politburo, Hu said the Party must undertake “sweeping systemic project”
that will increase public participation in government and enforce the rule of law inthe country. Specifically, he emphasized the need for democracy by enriching theforms of democracy, making democratic procedures complete, expanding citizens
13 From footnote reference of Joseph Fewsmith, Rethinking the Role of the CCP: Explicating Jiang

Zemin’s Party Anniversary Speech, China Leadership Monitor, No. 1, Part 2, p. 9, footnote no. 7, fromhttp://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20011b/20011JF.html.
14 Joseph Fewsmith, Rethinking the Role of the CCP, ibid., pp. 3-4.
15 Ibid., pp.7-8.

6orderly political participation, and ensuring “that the people can exercise democraticelections, democratic decision-making, democratic administration, and democratic
scrutiny.”16
The Military
Forty-three People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers compose 22 percent of the 16th
Central Committee of the Party, which includes 26 new personalities. Three new
officers were added to the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) – Generals
Liang Guanglie, Liao Xilong, and Li Jinai – all of which are “fourth generation”
military leaders and contemporaries of Hu Jintao. Based on their biographicalsketch, the career officers of the CMC share some common characteristics: 1) at least
three of the officers have combat experience; 2) all received senior professional
military education; and 3) all the officers served in sensitive military regions
relevant to Beijing’s interests in counter-terrorism or conflict with Taiwan.17
The Party’s CMC appointments apparently indicate that the “fourth generation”
Chinese leadership is professionalizing the PLA as its membership is composed ofyounger and better-educated individuals who are more oriented towards building
China’s military capability. For example, General Cao Gangchuan (who was named
the new defense minister of China in the 10th NPC) and Li Jinai are reported to be
familiar with missiles and missile operations. General Liang commanded a unit in
the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, led military exercises directed against Taiwan, andoversaw the writing of the book Sea Crossings and Landing Operations while he wascommander of the Nanjing Military Region.18
As defense minister, General Cao is expected to broaden his mainly ceremonial
function by maintaining oversight of the PLA’s arms sales ties with other countries,
especially its key link with the Russian military-industrial complex.19 He is also aknown advocate of a slimmed-down, high-tech military – an idea that met somestrong resistance from supporters of the old strategy of a “people’s army” ofpassionate but low-tech cadres. In particular, Cao wants the present 2.5 million
standing armed forces of China cut down to 1.5 or even 1 million. At the same time,
however, he wants the PRC's military budget to continue with its double-digit

16 Joseph Kahn, “China’s Leader Calls for ‘Democratic’ Changes,” The New York Times Online

Edition, 2 October 2003, from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/02/international/asia/
02CHIN.html.
17 James Mulvenon, The PLA and the 16th Party Congress: Jiang Controls the Gun?, China Leadership
Monitor, No. 5, pp. 23-24, from http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20031/jm.html.
18 Ibid., p. 24.
19 Ibid., p. 25.

7growth over the last decade in order that new military technology could be acquired
and developed.20

Implications for East Asian Security
The change in China’s leadership has a number of security implications for theregion in the short- and medium-term. For one, the preoccupation of the newleadership with domestic concerns will likely mean that the regional security
environment will continue to be stable. China may also be expected to continue toplay a more active role in promoting and strengthening the multilateral security
frameworks already in place in the region, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum aswell as the six-party dialogue in Northeast Asia that primarily deal with the North
Korean nuclear issue.
Regional Security Environment
The emergence of the fourth generation leaders in China will basically notsignificantly alter the region’s security environment given that they are likely to be
preoccupied mainly with sustaining the country’s economic growth andmaintaining internal political order and stability. A peaceful external environmentis therefore necessary in order for China to concentrate on these domestic economic
and political priorities. Even so, there are still a number of security issues that may
disturb China’s relations with some countries in the region. This include:•

The Taiwan issue, which may destabilize the region given the recent
aggressive declarations of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive
Party of President Chen Shui-bian. Although China looks at the Taiwan
issue as essentially a domestic problem, it is complicated by the US factor
that, according to President Hu Jintao, is the root cause of the delay inresolving the issue. Most fourth generation leaders in China see Taiwan,
along with Tibet, as a proxy battlefield in Beijing’s relations with
Washington. Given this context, the new leaders are in agreement that the
military option for solving the Taiwan problem must be preserved
because without it, a political solution will not be possible. Even then, thenon-military strategy continues to be an important strategy as well, which
relies on the economic attractions of the mainland to the Taiwanese.21

20 Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley (eds.), China’s New Rulers, pp. 223-224.
21 Ibid., pp. 215-217.

8
Recently, China gave its strongest threat of war against Taiwan amid a
promise by President Chen Shui-bian to change the island’s constitution,
which is to be the centerpiece of his campaign for re-election in March
2004. Earlier, the Taiwanese leader proposed a change in the island’sname even as he rejected Beijing’s “one nation, two-systems” formula forreunification.22 Foreign affairs officials in Manila felt the seriousness of
this threat from China when the Chinese ambassador warned that thePhilippines’ security could be affected if Taiwan’s drive for independence
triggered a war with China. Allegedly, some Taiwanese strategists arelooking into the Philippines as an “escape route from possible
annihilation” if a war erupts across the straits.23 Along with thePhilippines, other ASEAN member countries view with much concern thedestabilizing effects of a potential military conflict between China andTaiwan in the region.
•

China’s military modernization is a continuing source of concern for many
countries in the region. For instance, ASEAN continues to be worried
about the security implications of China’s rise as a military power. Muchof this stems from the fact that the PRC’s military expenditures haveincreased considerably over the past decade, while those of ASEAN andother powers remained constant or even decreased (see table below).
Despite Beijing’s efforts to allay persistent fears in the region about its
military posture, particularly through publication of defense White Papers,
some in ASEAN still remain suspicious of China’s intentions given thestill unresolved territorial conflicts that it has with some claimants in theSouth China Sea as well as with Japan. It is also inevitable that countries
in the region may link China’s growing military power with its perceived
assertive behavior, particularly on issues that involve territorial disputes
including the conflict over Taiwan. Specifically, China pursuing a military
approach in responding to provocations from Taiwan’s pro-independence
movement will only adversely affect Beijing’s relations with its ASEAN
neighbors and Japan.

22 Jonathan Watts, “China ratchets up threat before Taiwan’s elections,” The Guardian, 20 November

2003, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,1089122,00.html.
23 “China warns: Philippines at risk in a war with Taiwan”, Agence France-Presse report, Inquirer
News Service, 22 November 2003, from http://www.inq7.net/brk/2003/nov/22/brkpol_7-1.htm.

9Comparative Military Expenditures(China, Japan, USA, and ASEAN 10, 1990-2001)

Countries

1990

1995

SIPRI

SIPRI

SIPRI

2000
IISS

SIPRI

2001
IISS

(US$ billion)
China
Japan
USA
ASEAN10

12.0
34.3
405.5
14.1

13.9
36.9
316.4
17.8

23.1
38.0
305.2
[15.6]

42.0
45.3
304.1
15.1

27.0
38.4
306.5
[8.1]

46.0
39.5
322.3
15.2

(US$ million)
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
MyanmarPhilippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

307
58
756
-1053
6146
733
2284
1803
1031

255
106
925
-1744
8036
945
3208
2598
--

-80
1111
-1567
5727
843
4523
1808
--

353
195
614
20
2579
1020
1357
4316
2419
2303

-78
--1766--4542
1731
--

279
188
860
19
3249
1088
1065
4280
1831
2351

Sources: SIPRI 2002 Military Expenditure Database (first.sipri.org) andIISS’s The Military Balance, 2002-2003. Figures for ASEAN10 basedon aggregate of SIPRI and IISS data; those in brackets based only on
available SIPRI data.

Regional Security Cooperation
Notwithstanding concerns in the region about China’s growing military power,
Beijing appears to have been quite successful under its new leadership in promoting
a more positive image of China as an emerging regional power that is committed toregional security cooperation.
In the sixth ASEAN-China Summit in November 2002 in Phnom Penh, ASEAN and
China signed a joint declaration on “Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional
Security Issues, along with the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea” and the “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation (CEC) between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China”. It is10interesting to note, however, that while ASEAN highlighted the signing of the
Declaration concerning the South China Sea as the most important achievement in
the Phnom Penh Summit, China played up its CEC initiative and the declaration ofcooperation in non-traditional security issues as equally important.
During the ASEAN Bali summit in early October 2003, China acceded to the Treatyof Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and signed a supplementary protocol to the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and other related
documents. During the recent APEC summit in Bangkok, China also showed its
commitment to be deeply involved in the main activities of the region. Somesecurity analysts perceive this growing sophistication of the PRC’s diplomacy in theregion as part of an overall strategy of countering American influence even as it
attempts to promote a multi-polar world order as well as to allay fears of somecountries in the region about the “China threat”. Views in the region about China’s“charm offensive” vary, although they basically agree that Beijing’s diplomaticefforts will help in the promotion and strengthening of multilateral security
frameworks in the Asia Pacific.24

Conclusion
The smooth transition in China’s leadership basically augurs well for East Asia’s
security and economic prosperity. However, it remains to be seen how the fourth
generation of leaders will respond to challenges from within, especially given theenormous tasks of making the ruling Communist Party more relevant amidst rapidchanging political and economic conditions of the country. Externally, the newleaders are also going to face provocations from Taiwan’s pro-independence
movement as elections draw near on the island. Countries in East Asia will monitor
closely how the leaders in Beijing will respond to developments in Taiwan even as it
would be an important indicator of how China will exercise its military power. For
sure, many in ASEAN are hopeful that Beijing will continue to exercise restraint inorder to avoid any negative security repercussions in the region. Both Japan andthe US also have a role to play in making sure that a military confrontation will be
avoided across the Taiwan Straits.

24 See for example Bantarto Bandoro, “China’s diplomatic outreach in Asia”, The Jakarta Post, 3

November 2003, from http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20031103.F03 and Amitav Acharya, “China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia”, International
Herald Tribune, 8 November 2003, from http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=116813&owner=(IHT)&date=20020602155942. See also Jane Perlez, “Chinese are eroding influence of the US,” The
New York Times, 20 October 2003.