助成Institute forInternational Policy Studies・Tokyo・IIPS International Conference“Building a Regime of Regional Cooperation inEast Asia and the Role which Japan Can Play”

TokyoDecember 2-3, 2003

“The Effects of Leadership Changes on International Relations
in East Asia: National Security Economics Issues”
By
Mr. Jusuf Wanandi
Co-founder and member, Board of Trustees
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
Indonesia

Not for quotation without
Permission of the author.

Conferenceon

Building a Regime of Regional Cooperation in East Asiaand the Role which Japan Can PlayANA Hotel, Tokyo
December 2-3, 2003

The Effects of Leadership Changes on International
Relations in East Asia: National Security Economics Issues
Jusuf Wanandi
Co-founder and member, Board of Trustees
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

Organized byInstitute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), Tokyo1

The Effects of Leadership Changes on International Relations
in East Asia: National Security Economic Issues
Jusuf Wanandi
CSIS, Jakarta

Introduction
The topic of leadership changes is indeed relevant today and in the future for
the East Asian region. In North East Asia there have been changes recently inJapan, South Korea and China. A little bit earlier Taiwan’s leadership also haschanged, where a former opposition leader, Chen Sui-Bian from the DPP, who
was pro-independence for Taiwan, has gained the presidency and is going toface election next year. This has brought about a sea change in Taiwan’s
foreign policy.
In South East Asia changes in leadership have also happened in the last fewyears, to be followed by other leadership changes and in the next one year or
two with significant impact on policies, which could impact on international
relations. Thailand and Malaysia have changed their leadership, and Indonesia,Philippines and Singapore might do the same next year.
In some instances, these personnel changes are part of generational changes aswell, such as in South Korea and in China as well as in Taiwan or Singapore. Inothers it was not, such as Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia. Leadership changes
are also happening as part of deep societal changes such as in South Korea orIndonesia. In others those societal changes have happened earlier. Changes intandem with generational or societal changes could be deeper and could create
greater impact on policies, although in varying degrees.

2Because the situation and development of those leadership changes are very
dependent on the socio-political environment in each of the countries
concerned, the best way to explain them is by examining the changes in eachcountry, and then to make some observations about their similar or different
impacts on foreign relations.

Changes in the Selected Countries
South Korea: President Roh Moo Hyun has been elected by a young electorate,
who have no experiences of the Korean War, and the U.S. role in defending
South Korea with over 50,000 American lives. The president himself has also
not been exposed to foreign policy and international affairs. Therefore, hishesitation on relations with the U.S., and particularly with this administration,
could be understood. On the other hand, he has been a protégé of President
Kim Dae-Jung, whose “sunshine policy” would like to deal with North Korea
in a more conciliatory way. And Mr. Roh was following that policy, also on theissue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation that caught the attention of theinternational community, especially the Bush Administration, mid last year.
Hopefully by now he could see the benefit of reacting more strongly in a
unified manner in the six parties talk with the North Korean regime, who has
forfeited its written promises and agreement with the international community.
President Roh’s political weakness is not helping him to adopting a strong
stance and policy on the North Korean nuclear proliferation problem.
Japan: the election of PM Koizumi has at last given Japan a leader who has thesupport of public opinion and is willing to undertake the necessary economicand political reforms. He has been hampered by the “LDP old guard”, and thelast general election has not given him a very clear mandate to strongly push3

for the reforms. This has created some worries among Japan’s friend andneighbours that the hesitation for further reforms will not help revive theeconomy and allow Japan to play its natural role regionally and globally as thesecond biggest economy in the world. On the other hand, PM Koizumi’s“normalisation” process to increase Japan’s defense and security role, as part ofthe U.S. alliance against terrorism and WMD, has been well accepted by
ASEAN and is appreciated by the region. PM Koizumi is also willing tocontinue Japan’s close cooperation with ASEAN and there will be a special
Japan-ASEAN Summit in December 2003 in Tokyo. This relationship could
form the nucleus of the East Asian Community in the future.
China: this important country is now governed by a new generation of leaders,
the so-called fourth generation of leaders, under President Hu-Jin Tao. Theirefforts on the economy and fight against SARS augur well for the future.
Particularly appreciated are their efforts to do something on domestic politicaldevelopment, in terms of giving more power to the Central Committee, which
is a good token for future Chinese stability. On foreign policy, they arefollowing President Jiang Zemin’s more relaxed and pragmatic policies. They
have continued their cooperation with the U.S. on anti terrorism. They also
tried to cooperate with U.S. to balance the huge imbalances in their bilateral
trade. With ASEAN, China has not only proposed a free trade agreement(FTA), but also signed the Protocol to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, asa political signal to ASEAN to be willing to solve differences peacefully.
Of course it is China’s strategy to be close to ASEAN, because she was as asource of anxiety to the region. China needs ASEAN for a peacefulenvironment to continue with her modernisation, and to prevent any possibilityof encirclement to contain her in the future. She is very supportive of andcommitted to the East Asian Community idea, which at this juncture is known
as the ASEAN + 3 process. Whether PM Wen Jiao-Bo intended that this is thenew regional architecture for economic and security cooperation in the future is4

not very clear yet. He mentioned this at the opening of the recent Boao Forumof Asian Leaders (government, business and academe). If it is meant tocounterbalance the U.S., because the U.S. has become more unilaterist, it will
be divisive as most if not all ASEAN governments are not willing to be part ofsuch a move.
On the other hand, if in the long term the U.S. will oppose China, because
China is becoming on her own right another “superpower”, then most countries
in the region, including the ASEAN countries, will not go along with that as
China is now already an important member of East Asia. To prevent thisconfrontation, East Asian regionalism can assist. First, by making sure that
China becomes a status quo power, and second, by showing the U.S. that thisnew regional institution is not meant to oppose her presence and role in theEast Asian region.
Taiwan: Although she is not a full player in the diplomatic and political fields,
Taiwan has economic interest and relations with the region. The way President
Chen is playing with the idea of “independence” is seen as a threat to stability
and peace in the region, and will be opposed by most regional countries. The
region wishes to see a peaceful resolution to the divide across the Taiwan
Straits, and both sides are responsible for that. But President Chen’s“brinkmanship” in the independence issue will create chaos and instability, andeven the possibility of war in the region.
On the other hand, more subtle and finesse policies on the Chinese side will bemost welcome by the region. In the longer term, the region thinks that
Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland is for real and will influence
the course of a peaceful resolution to reunification.
Thailand: Thailand under PM Thaksin Shinawatra has a very active foreignpolicy. Not only has PM Thaksin changed a lot in domestic politics by having a5solid majority in parliament for his Thai Rak Party, but he is also very proactive in foreign policy, as he has shown in chairing the APEC meeting inBangkok several weeks ago. How far this activity and leadership will go will
depend partly on how far ASEAN as a group will support his foreign policyinitiatives. But he is definitely going to become a very proactive leader among
the next generation of ASEAN leaders and has to be watched more closely. He
has improved Thailand’s economy and regional standing quite remarkably.
And he is behaving like the CEO of Thailand. He is very popular among theThai people, although lesser so among the elite, particularly the academia,
because of his disdain for press-freedom and the role of the civil society.
Malaysia:

PM Abdullah Badawi is more a consensus seeker and is forcollective leadership than PM Mahathir. Perhaps this is what Malaysia needs
after 22 years of activism under PM Mahathir. He is also a better expert on
Islam and Muslim issues and could face PAS more effectively on those issues.
He has said that he is not going to change existing policies established by PMMahathir except to fine-tune some of the rough edges.
This means that he is going to stick to a non-aligned policy, pro the developingworld interests and playing solidarity to Muslim causes. Above all, of course,
he will make solidarity and close cooperation with ASEAN as the center-pieceof Malaysia’s foreign policy. His rhetoric will be more subdued and that also
will be good for Malaysia’s external cooperation in the future.
Philippines: President Arroyo will stand again in the coming presidential
election and has a fighting chance to win, if backed by the established elite as
widely expected. That does not mean that the political divide has been
overcome as has been shown by the abortive coup by some officers and theprotest on the streets of Manila. She is backed by the U.S., who is concerned
about the Southern part as a potential training ground for Muslim terrorists

6linked with Al Qaeda. Relations with the U.S. has always been very important
for the Philippines, for its economy as well as its security.
Hopefully President Arroyo could become a more forceful and capable
president than she has shown in the first term, which was considered slow andnot achieving very much. Otherwise the Philippines will not be able to recoverher economic competitiveness. But in foreign policy she has strengthened her
relation with the U.S. and restored what was damaged when the U.S. bases
were closed in the early 1990s.
Singapore: A change of guard with DPM Lee Hsien Lung taking over is
expected in 2004/2005. Policies will broadly be the same, but the style ofleadership will differ, because PM Goh is very amenable and popular, due tohis relaxed style. DPM Lee will try very hard to be more relaxed and in the last
six months he has achieved a remarkable acceptance by the Singaporean public,
including the younger generation. Therefore, the transition will go well andsmooth.
The policies are going to be the same, although more structural changes in theeconomy is to be expected, since last year’s crisis and this year’s slow growth
have been a real omen for the need of change. This is indeed a must forSingapore to maintain its competitiveness. Foreign policy will also be the same,with ASEAN as the center piece and be allied to the U.S., so as to be able tokeep its status as a global city in the mid of Southeast Asia.
Indonesia: There will be both Presidential and Parliamentary elections nextyear. Since President Megawati’s PDI-P party is split at the center as well as inthe regions, her re-election, which until 6 months ago was expected to be a“walkover”, is now more suspect. In fact, if the Golkar Party becomes thewinning party in parliament, as is widely expected because its political machine7

is functioning well, then they have a fighting chance to win the presidency as
well, but only if they could offer a respected candidate.
If that happens, a more “experienced hand” will take over, backed by anexisting political machine across Indonesia and a formidable representation inParliament, which under the new constitution is supreme and powerfulcompared to the executive branch. This will make Indonesian policies andinstitutions more credible and more consistent. Greater attention will be given
to foreign policy, which will be more pragmatic because of a more experienced
and steady hand at the presidency and in Parliament. This also means thatIndonesia could again play its leadership role in ASEAN and in East Asia
commensurate with its size and with the expectations of the region.
In turn, ASEAN could again play a more pro-active and positive role in theEast Asian region. In the security realm, Indonesia could become more
dependable in overcoming global and regional terrorism. And in the economic
field, the necessary reforms have a greater chance to be pushed through. While
staying non-aligned in principle in its foreign policy, Indonesia could become abetter partner for the region and for the world.

Concluding Remarks
What could be concluded from the above analysis of change in leadership in
the East Asian countries for international and regional relations?
First is the fact that although personnel changes happened or is going to happen
in the various countries of East Asia, the strategic environment is likely toremain the same. Some of the new leaders might want to change the policies,
but in the short and medium term, it will be very difficult for them to do so.

8The strategic environment is very much dependent on U.S. strategic presencein the region as the balancer or arbiter for peace and security as well as animportant engine for the region’s economies. It should be noted that the regionis still dependent on a balance of power concept a la Europe of the 19th century.
And since there are no strong regional institutions to maintaining peace andstability, such as in Europe through the EU and NATO, that role has been
played by the U.S. military and their strategic presence in East Asia.
In fact, there is no congruence yet in the security outlook of the countries in theregion. Even among ASEAN countries there is a need for closer cooperationand to work on a common perception of peace and security in the region. That
is why ASEAN leaders in the Concord II Agreement at the Bali Summit, haveagreed to establish an ASEAN Security Community, to coordinate andcooperate on common perceptions and to establish understanding andwillingness to prevent conflicts among themselves. U.S. positive role in theEast Asian region has been accepted by every country in the region, including
by China, and with the exception of North Korea.
In the longer term, this could change if relations and cooperation in the region
will be intensified. This will not happen in the foreseeable future. This has beenrecognised by President Roh of South Korea, especially in dealing with theNorth Koreans. That is also what the Chinese have recognized and therefore,
they are willing to cooperate with the U.S. on global terrorism and haveaccepted U.S. presence in the East Asian region in a positive way. Of course,
the unilateralist tendencies of this U.S. administration have to be corrected, butthat could be done if there is rapport with the U.S. and if done together withother friends and allies of the U.S.
In that sense, maybe, the words of PM Wen at the Boao Forum should beinterpreted as a common effort by East Asians to correct the U.S. for her own
interest. That is especially true for China in relation to the Taiwan question.

9The U.S. has to understand and appreciate the emotional historical baggage of
the Civil War in China, and despite the ideals of democracy etc., she has todampen adventurous tendencies of the Chen Sui Bian Administration inTaiwan. That view is also shared by most if not all of the countries in East Asia.
No government is willing to oppose the U.S. frontally at this stage. Too muchnational interests are involved for everyone in the relationship to be able orwilling to do that. Even for Indonesia, while the Indonesian community,
especially the Muslims, are against the Iraq War, the government has been very
pro-active in restraining the reactions of the Muslim community so as not to get
it out of hand, and damage the national interest in relations to the U.S., which isconsidered of vital importance. But corrections, advices, even protest andcriticisms have to be given to the U.S. as a friend, in order to make her morepolitically acceptable in the region and, therefore, make her policies more
effective. Japan’s role in dealing with the U.S. is of paramount importance as
the main ally of the U.S. in the region. Japan can also correct and criticize theU.S. whenever needed.
In that context, the East Asian Community is an idea whose time has come, andhas to be pursued by every East Asian country. But here again it is importantthat the U.S. understands its rationale. In this regard Japan can play animportant role as she has done earlier to make the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) acceptable to the U.S.
Another important effort by the East Asians is to support and strengthen APECa Pacific wide regional institution where the U.S. is a member. This will also
give credibility to the argument that the East Asian Community will not split
the Pacific politically.

10