Harmony or Discord◆自由論題＊研究論文◆

Harmony or Discord

Donor Harmonization and Multiple Objectives of Aid

調和か不調和かドナー間の協調と援助の複合的性質

Masato Hayashikawa 1
Doctoral Program, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University
林川 眞人
慶應義塾大学大学院政策・メディア研究科後期博士課程

The current debate on aid effectiveness rests on the premise that if donors harmonized their aid
activities and minimized transaction costs by adopting common procedures the effectiveness of aid
would be enhanced. Harmonization is one of the central tenets enshrined in the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness. However, since its inception in the 1940s, aid has been used for multiple purposesby donor governments and, as the revealed preference evidence shows, often as a diplomatic orcommercial expedient. This paper shows that the context of realpolitik which has characterized aid
during the Cold War period continues to be prominent today. Until the perverse incentives that impede
harmonization efforts are tackled, the harmonization agenda will fail to change the donor behavior.
現行の援助効果に関する議論では、ドナー間の協調の実現が、取引費用の削減につながり、より援助効果の向上を促すとしている。援助協調は援助効果に関するパリ宣言の主要な原則の一つである。しかしながら、援助には複合的性質があり、1940 年代に始まって以来、ドナーによってしば
しば外交の、または商業の手段として利用されてきた。この論文では、冷戦中援助を特徴付けていた現実政策の文脈が、今日でも際立っていることを示す。調和化の阻害要因であるよこしまな動機の問題解決に取り組まない限り、ドナーの姿勢を改善することはできない。
Keywords: Foreign aid, Official Development Assistance (ODA), Harmonization, Aid effectiveness,
Aid fragmentationof the architecture of international relations. The

1 Introduction
Foreign aid, or official development assistancenumber of donor agencies operating in developing(ODA), was in the beginning conceived as“acountries has also expanded substantially. There

temporary, transitional feature of international

are now about 467 bilateral and multilateral donor

relations”more than half a century ago (OECD,agencies working in aid business, implementing an

1985: 32). Today, it has become a permanent feature

estimate of 340,000 development projects around the

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world (Deutscher and Fyson, 2008: 16; OECD, 2009a:

more than 100 countries and organizations, sets

29). Given the institutional complexity of the global

out five partnership commitments between donors

aid governance better coordination of donor activities

and recipient countries: ownership, alignment,

has long been prescribed as an indispensable

harmonization, managing for results and mutual

condition for minimizing the costs of aid delivery andaccountability. These are shared responsibilities,

enhancing the effectiveness of‘common aid effort’holding each side accountable for increasing thefor development. Consequently, the global discourse

impact of aid at the country level by changing theon aid effectiveness has evolved from‘what’theways in which ODA is delivered and by putting

common objectives of aid should be (and‘where’to

recipient countries’ownership at the center of the2

spend it) to‘how’it should be delivered collectively

development agenda. Under these five‘principles,’to achieve those objectives. After all many of thetwelve measurable indicators were agreed upon toshortfalls of aid are directly related to the way inmonitor the progress of the commitments, includingwhich donors operate and deliver it.

on harmonization.3

A key issue in the current aid-effectivenessThe driving force behind the global effort todiscourse revolves around this old prescription

strengthen aid effectiveness was the Development

but with a refinement: harmonization has replaced

Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for

coordination as the desired scheme. Coordination,

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),

on the one hand, seeks to avoid waste and damage

a forum for major bilateral donors where thewhen the actions of any one donor affect the

principle of donor coordination is clearly enshrined

outcomes of another’s activities. Harmonization, on

in its mandate. By virtue of being DAC members

the other hand, refers to cooperation between donors– membership made up of like-mindedness – they

to enhance complementarity of their efforts and toshare interests to such a degree that they will be able

reduce the transaction costs of aid delivery imposedto act in unison on a wide range of global challenges,

by them on recipient countries. More specifically, it

including the improved effectiveness of aid. In

relates to increased coordination and streamlining

practice, however, relying only on the good intentionsof donor activities and, in particular, to the use ofof the donor governments will not always delivercommon arrangements for planning, managing andthe desired outcome. There are many indications ofdelivering aid (OECD, 2005: para.32). The Monterrey

difficulties in turning a series of initiatives to promote

Consensus (March 2002) called on donors toharmonization into tangible improvements in donor

intensify their efforts to improve coordination andbehavior. According to the DAC, progress toward

reduce transaction costs. In the Rome Declaration

better donor harmonization has proven to be slow, if

on Harmonization donors committed themselves to

not getting worse (OECD, 2008b: 18).

“harmonize the operational policies, procedures, andRather there is growing concern that aid alloca-

practices of [their] institutions with those of partner

tion is increasingly fragmented – donors giving

country systems to improve the effectiveness ofaid to too many recipients in many small pieces.4

development assistance”(OECD, 2003a: para.1).

The flipside of this problem is the proliferation of

The agenda was further expanded andsources of donor aid and activities at the country

reinforced with a set of quantitative targets in thelevel, spreading aid over too many programs andlater Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The

hence straining the administrative capacity of theParis Declaration, which was endorsed in 2005 byrecipient governments that need to manage donor

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aid coming through a multitude of channels anddonor governments affect not only the amounts of aid

5

programs. According to Frot and Santiso (2008:

to developing countries, but the intended purposes of31), the average number of recipients in a donor

that aid. Understanding them is central to any reform

portfolio increased from less than 20 in 1960 to overof aid to enhance effectiveness.

100 today. To put it differently, a typical recipient

The primary focus of this paper are the 23

country now has to deal with and burden themember governments of the DAC, whom collectively

cost of engaging in dialogue with multiple small

account for around 90 percent of total global aid

donors. In Tanzania, for example, it was reported

channeled each year to the developing world andthat 2,000 uncoordinated aid interventions fromwield considerable influence in the development

40 donors were undermining the capacity of thecommunity. These same donor governments aregovernment (Helleiner et al., 1995: 15). The problem

also major‘stakeholders’and hence the holders

is compounded also by the emergence of new donors

of controlling stakes of the important lenders ofon the global aid landscape, some transitioning fromthe poor, namely the Bretton Woods institutions

being aid recipients to aid donors (e.g. Brazil, China

and regional development banks. Therefore what

and India). This highly fragmented global aid systemthey say or do will have major implications on the– or non-system – has become a real barrier to aid

whole development community.7 The paper aims toeffectiveness, further complicating the harmonization

examine the viability of the current harmonizationof donor activities. For this reason, the Accra Agenda

agenda, based on the premise that it suffers fromfor Action (September 2008), adopted at the Third

collective action problems and is bound to failHigh Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, included ato achieve its intended objectives unless proper

specific clause committing countries and aid agencies

incentives are put in place. Drawing upon a synthesis

to reduce aid fragmentation (OECD, 2008f: para.17).

of arguments and findings from recent literature, thisThe great disparities in levels of engagement

paper looks at the causes that de-incentivize DAC

and commitment, among donors, are a source ofdonors to behave collectively and harmonize their

obstacles and contradictions. Donor governments

efforts with each other, contributing to the worsening

are typically driven by self-interest when makingof aid fragmentation. In particular, it considers three

key decisions on the amount, country allocation, useinterconnected factors that underlie the problem:

and the terms of their foreign aid. Put it differently,(i) foreign aid is driven by political and strategic

aid effectiveness is also largely determined by theinterests; (ii) donor harmonization has costs (andincentive systems internal to donor institutions.

they may be large); and (iii) incentives to harmonize

Indeed this fact may explain why the harmonization

donor practices are lacking. The paper concludes

agenda is failing to change donor behavior despitewith some suggestion for way forward toward aseveral recent institutional attempts and steps taken

realistic orientation for the harmonization agenda.

6

to promote it. A recent DAC study found little overall
indication that the incentives underlying donor

2 Mixed objectives of foreign aid

practices had altered significantly since the signing

2.1 What is aid?

of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2009b: 3). Countries

Aid is a voluntary transfer of public resources

are often obliged to subordinate the priority of aid(Lancaster, 2006: 9) and its criteria relate to theeffectiveness to other concerns. The underlining

development purpose, concessionality and the official

motives, whether self-interested or rational, of thesenature of such flows of resources. Yet, defining

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precisely what is meant by it is no easy task. Aid, as

nations toward the many poor ones”(Morgenthau,defined by the DAC, consists of transfers to countries

1962: 301) and“an indispensable expression ofand to multilateral development institutions whichhumanitarian concern and collective responsibility inare provided by official agencies and each transaction

the world economy”(OECD, 1985: 32).

of which: a) is strictly aimed at improving human orThat said, since its inception in the late 1940s,

economic welfare of developing countries (thereby

aid has been used for multiple purposes by donor

excluding aid for military or commercial purposes),

governments with aid priorities oscillating between

and b) is concessional with at least a 25% grant com-various objectives constantly evolving, often serving

ponent, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent

several at once. Likewise, the goals that donor(OECD 2008a: 1). This narrow and restrictive

governments sought to achieve with their aid are notdefinition, adopted by the DAC almost four decades

always evident in their rhetoric. The elusive natureago, is based on the donors’intention for which aidof, or the mix objectives of aid-giving is reflected

is given. The DAC definition categorizes a transfer

in how the DAC members define their principle

as official development aid (ODA) if the promotion

motivations for giving aid, which include:“altruisticof welfare and development is its main objective.

motivation,”“enlightened self-interest”and“global

Nonetheless, data on ODA are derived from DAC

interdependence”(OECD, 1996: 6). While aid is thedonors’standard statistical reporting. In other“self-evident moral imperative”and“a compassionate

words, the quality of ODA data reflects the quality of

response to the extreme poverty and humandonor reporting. In practice, because the donors are

suffering”the DAC also recognizes the fact thatthe final arbiters, all transfers, including those clearly

development benefits not only the recipients of aid

given principally for political or commercial purposes,

but also the donors themselves as their economies

are invariably reported as ODA. The promotion of

are increasingly dependent on the stability anddevelopment just needs to be one of the purposes

prosperity of their partners in the developing world.

and need not even be the most important one. Based

These motivations do not carry the same weight,

on a review of relevant literature, this section argues

however. The literature on aid allocation (e.g. Maizels

that foreign aid is not always given solely to promote

and Nissanke, 1984; Boone, 1996; Alesina and Dollar,

development but is frequently driven by political and2000; Ostrom et al., 2001; Gunning, 2005) reveals

strategic interests of donor governments.

that donors are by far less altruistic than they claim
to be, largely pursuing their own interests whenallocating aid across recipients. Gunning (2005:

2.2 Why give aid and what for?
Hans Morgenthau, one of the leading 20th49) explains that because development objectives

Century figures in the study of political realism,are not the sole (or sometimes even a partial) aim

regarded aid as a‘real innovation’the modern ageof many donors’foreign aid, they tend to score

had introduced into the practice of foreign policy

low on aid effectiveness when judged only against(Morgenthau, 1962: 301). Boone (1996: 290) called

development criteria. Alesina and Dollar (2000:

it an“unprecedented economic experiment.”Yet to40-41) empirically show that bilateral aid has only asuppose that foreign aid is‘an instrument of foreign

weak association with such development objectives

policy’is a controversial matter and will be frowned

as poverty, governance and good policy. Waly (2004:

upon. A more commonly accepted view is that aid23) demonstrates that the incentive system thatis“the fulfillment of an obligation of the few richprevails in both bilateral and multilateral aid agencies

130Harmony or Discord

does not reward good projects but instead reward

political commitment to policy coherence was weak,

the number of accepted projects regardless of their

the development purpose of aid was also the weakest.

quality.

This may be one factor affecting countries such as

Major donors such as the United States, Japan,

Australia, France, Italy, Japan and the United States

France, Germany and the United Kingdom have allwhich, according to Berthélemy (2006: 191), areused aid as an incentive or a‘reward’for recipientsjudged among the most‘egotistical’donors. Donor

to change decisions or policy stances in ways thatrankings based on new measures of aid quality

favor donors (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984). For

developed by a team of World Bank economists seem

example, Alesina and Dollar (2000: 45-47) foundto confirm these broad assessments (Knack et al.,that Japanese aid was highly correlated with the UN

2010: 24, Table 3).

voting patterns (e.g. inducing aid recipients to vote in

For all the pronouncements about development

favor of Japan’s bid to become permanent member

being above politics and how politics should be keptof the UN Security Council), whereas French aid wasout of foreign aid policy making, it never happens

overwhelmingly biased towards its former colonies

and it would be naïve to expect it. The context ofas an important means to safeguard its sphere of

realpolitik that has characterized aid during the Coldinfluence. The same study also found that U.S. aid

War is just as pronounced as ever today. Aid remains

tended to favor democracies but paid no attention

highly sensitive to political factors which play ato the quality of governance of receiving countries,

large part in translating need into effective demandusing aid as leverage to reach certain politicaland in turn donor support for aid, influencing theiroutcomes even in corrupt countries. For example,

aid resource allocation. Every key decision in thefollowing the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan emerged

history of foreign aid has been shaped in importantas the U.S.’s key geopolitically strategic ally in theways by domestic political considerations (Lancaster,fight against terrorism, so the U.S. government

2006: 18). Burnell (2004: 9) argues that“the size andimmediately lifted its aid sanctions to Pakistan

shape of the aid market are a political construct.”(imposed since 1990) and offered a bilateral debt

In the case of the United Sates, for example, Fleck

relief worth one billion U.S. dollars (Burnell, 2004: 7).

and Kilby (2006: 211) observed that the pattern

There are‘altruistic’donors (e.g. Norway) thatof aid allocation depended on the composition of

fully espouse the poverty-efficient allocation of aid

the government in power. A good example of how(as defined in Collier and Dollar, 2002: 1475-1476),

political variables instrument the purpose of aid cantargeting poor countries with good policies andbe seen in the case of the United Kingdom. Wheninstitutions, in order to increase the development

Tony Blair became the Prime Minister in the late

impact of their assistance as shown in results of

1990s, his Labor government implemented a major

several studies (see Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina

reform, significantly upgrading the status within

and Weder, 2002; Berthélemy, 2006). OECD (2009c:

government and the resourcing of its Department24) also highlights that one of the key factors thatfor International Development, and allocated aid in acontributed to the increase in priority for aid’s

more development-oriented manner. Hence, politicaldevelopment purposes in some of the European

shifts may cause major changes in the distribution ofdonor governments was the commitment to policy

aid.

coherence for development at the highest political

Diplomatic purposes of aid have undoubtedlylevel within those countries. By contrast, when such

had a boost from the events of September 11, 2001,

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igniting the drive for‘aid securitization’as part ofprograms. If donor agencies were able to align their

the global fight against terrorism (see Aning, 2007;

aid programs completely around partner countries’

Howell and Lind, 2008). As was the case during thepolicies and systems,‘harmonization’per se would

Cold War, aid is regarded as a means of dampening

be less of an issue. However, shifting more of thethe social discontent in the developing world that

focus of donor management to recipients does not8

absolve donors of responsibility. Especially in cases

Empirical studies, if taken literally, support this view.

where country ownership is weak, and where it is not

Azam and Delacroix (2006: 332) found a positive

possible to use recipient country systems, donors cancorrelation between the level of foreign aid received

ease this burden by adopting common arrangements

by a country and the number of terrorist attacks(e.g. for disbursement, procurement, and accounting),

originating from that country. They reckon that aid

simplifying and adopting common procedures (e.g.

had been used by donors“as a way of purchasing

reporting requirements), and sharing information.

some involvement by the recipient government

The OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectivenessin this fight”(Azam and Delacroix, 2006: 341).

suggests that“given the difficulty of achieving

Therefore, strategic non-altruistic donor behavior canfull alignment, aid effectiveness can be enhanced

be profitable (from the donor’s point of view) andwhen donors harmonize their actions and adopt –can thus be expected to continue to dominate the aid

where possible – simple and transparent common

allocation agenda in the near future.

procedures”(OECD, 2009: 72). In this context, thecan feed terrorists impulses (Lancaster, 2006: 14).

responsibility for implementing harmonization goals

3 Impact of harmonization

rests primarily with donors.

Ownership is widely regared as a precondition

Over the last decade, a vigorous debate over how

for development (OECD, 2008: 18). When developing

to improve the effectiveness of aid has led to calls

countries are not in the driver’s seat to steer theirby the international community for a policy of donor

own development path, or when donors fail to respectharmonization, with a specific donor commitment

their leadership, then the results from developmentin the Rome Declaration. A large and growing

assistance will most likely be unsustainable. Thus,

body of literature analyses why harmonization of

the aid effectiveness agenda acknowledges“thedonor practices is necessary for making aid moreprimacy of ownership”(Stern et al., 2008: 2). Withintransparent and collectively effective. The problem

the framework of effective development partnerships,of aid fragmentation and donor proliferation isdonors have committed themselves to respect

well described by Knack and Rahman (2007: 178)

the partner countries’right and responsibility to

who observed that higher aid fragmentation was“exercise effective leadership over its development

associated with poorer governance in the recipient

policies and strategies, and coordinate development

countries. The problem of fragmentation may inactions”(OECD, 2005: para.14).

fact be more severe than that suggested by existing

Harmonization refers to cooperation between

literature because there has been a proliferation ofdonors to reduce the transaction costs of aid delivery.

aid-giving agencies within donor countries, while

First and foremost, transferring more aid throughmost analyses assume each donor country to be acountry systems depends significantly on partner

single entity (Kharas, 2007: 19). Cling (2006: 155-156)

countries’ability and willingness to exercise thelists four key advantages of donor harmonizationnecessary leadership over coordinating donor

which are: i) reduced transaction costs for recipient132Harmony or Discord

countries; ii) increased transparency and dialogue; iii)

diverge from each other, the prospects for effective

streamlined objectives and procedures; and, iv) better

harmonization are not good (Kharas, 2007: 20).

division of labor based on comparative advantages.

This section examines the challenges and the

However, these advantages are not without

possible causes of disparities in levels of engagement

contentions as we will see below. Table 1 illustrates

and commitment among donors toward a more

a number of specific actions toward effective donor

effective adoption of the harmonization agenda. In

harmonization.

particular, it looks at costs of and incentives (or the

Harmonization requires a donor to re-definelack thereof) for harmonization.

and re-align its aid objectives and subordinate
its own activities and outputs to a commitment

3.1 Transaction costs

towards collective actions. However, as shown in the

The conventional benefits of harmonization are

preceding section, donors’multiple and sometimes

typically associated with the reduction in transaction

conflicting objectives for giving aid obstruct such a

costs of aid. UNDP/DFID (2000: 7) defines

collective-action process from taking place. Donors

transaction costs in this context as those arising

are undoubtedly concerned with development of thefrom the preparation, negotiation, implementation,

recipient country, but they must trade this objective

monitoring and enforcement of agreements foroff against other goals as well, such as foreign policy

delivery of ODA. Lawson (2009: 10) specifies themand commercial objectives. It is the classic dichotomy

as those costs necessary for an aid transaction to

between realism and idealism. Finding an acceptableoccur but which add nothing to the actual value ofcompromise between strategic interest and altruisticthat transaction. The problem is often compoundedvision of donors’motivation can be at odds at times.

by different languages and fiscal calendars used

That is to say that even if donors know what they

by donors, as well as duplication of various forms

should do, they may choose not to because theof analytical activities (Bigsten, 2006: 121). With“correct”incentives to do so is too weak, a fact whichharmonized donors’actions, these burdens would

was brought to light in the recent evaluation of theeither no longer be imposed on recipients (freeing

Paris Declaration (see Wood et al., 2008). Though“aup their capacity to concentrate their efforts on

significant change in how we do business”(OECD,domestic policies), or saved by donors and passed

2008b: 12) is essential, the number of interests to

on to recipients in the form of added net flows

be accommodated appears to be too great, resulting(Rogerson, 2005: 534). To yield efficiency gains,in little progress. As long as donor interests

the Paris Declaration commits donors to increase

Table 1 Actions associated with harmonization
Establishing common
arrangements andsimplifying procedures

Joint needs assessment; Coordinated donor missions; Sector-wide approaches;
Joint implementation; Co-financing arrangements; Joint monitoring and evaluation;
Common approaches/procedures for strategic environmental assessment

Strengthening
complimentarity anddivision of labor

Streamlining conditionality; Harmonizing financial management and procurement procedures;
Delegated cooperation and joint approaches

Sharing information

Disclosing detailed and timely information on aid (commitments and disbursements, allocation,
country analytic work, including diagnostic reviews, etc.) at country and sector level
Sources: Adapted from OECD (2005) and Balogun (2005)

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complementarity 9 and rationalize division of labor

harmonization (Table 2).

based on comparative advantages, and make

While there is a lot of anecdotal evidence on

greater use of new aid delivery modalities such astransaction costs, we know very little about thesector-wide, program-based approaches, delegatedmagnitude of aid-related transaction costs at country

cooperation and other innovative approaches (OECD,level. The evidence so far only demonstrates the

2005: para.32).

exceedingly difficult nature of identifying andStill, any reform entails costs – institutional,

measuring transaction costs of aid (e.g. UNDP/

financial and political – such as those associated

DFID, 2000; Balogun, 2005; Acharya et al., 2006;

with changing work modalities, and these may be

Lawson, 2009). Such a lack of an accepted method orlarge enough to become a disincentive for countries

good underlying data demonstrates why the existing

to change the way they conduct themselves. In

literature has rarely sought to measure transaction

fact, it is plausible to expect total transaction costs

costs directly. The DAC, for example, did not attempt

to actually rise during this lengthy reform process.

to measure transaction costs associated with theWhat harmonization ultimately does is simply

implementation of the Paris Declaration, but reported

transfer transaction costs from the recipient sideon the perceptions of both donors and recipientto the donor side. The decrease in, for example,

governments in this regard (OECD, 2008b: 26 -27).

direct administrative costs may be counterbalanced

Therefore, without the reliable baseline data, it willby newly generated transaction costs arising

be very difficult to assess whether there have beenfrom increased coordination among donors andmajor net savings in aid-related transaction costs, ormanagement of moral hazard. Any collective choicesavings in some donor agencies but at the expense

process will likely to result in considerable debate

of increased costs for others, thus, cancelling out

about the criteria to be used to determine individual

the overall savings in the process (Rogerson, 2005:

donor contributions, e.g. a decision on how much

535).10to contribute to pooled resources. How to negotiate
the distribution of gains and losses from a possible

3.2 Collective action problem

agreement has often been a problem historically.

When there are many independent, uncoordi-

Moreover, not all transaction costs are deemed bad

nated donors on the ground, responsibility foras some have categories of benefits, such as reduced

success or failure is diffused, and no single donor

uncertainty of contract enforcement (Rogerson,

has much at stake in the recipient country (Knack

2005: 535). Lawson (2009: 15) summarizes different

and Rahman, 2007: 177). As Mancur Olson argued,

types of transaction costs which may be generated bya collective action problem occurs“in a large

Table 2 Nature of transaction costs generated by aid harmonization
Search costs

Identifying like-minded donors and appropriate opportunities for undertaking joint activities

Bargaining &Decision costs

Defining, negotiating and agreeing mutually satisfactory conditions for harmonization

Policing &Enforcement costs

Fulfillment by all donors of agreed reporting requirements.
Monitoring of fulfillment by other parties.
Reacting to censure parties not fulfilling commitments.
Sources: Adapted from Lawson (2009: 15, Table 3)134

Harmony or Discordgroup in which no single individual’s contribution

donors’tendency to crowd into countries where aid

makes a perceptible difference to the group as ais perceived to work well (i.e. donor darlings) while

whole it is certain that a collective good will not beleaving other equally deserving countries with lessprovided unless there is coercion or some outsideaid (i.e. donor orphans).

inducements”(Olson, 1965: 44). The proliferation

Consequently, division of labor for comple-of donors increases the risk of creating incentives

mentarity has been identified as a critical dimension

for individual donors to“shirk”a collective actionof the harmonization agenda. The Paris Declarationthat maximizes the recipient’s overall development

commits donors to“Make full use of their respective

in favor of distinct aid activities that contribute tocomparative advantage at sector or country level

donor-specific objectives (Knack and Rahman,by delegating, where appropriate, authority to lead

2007: 177). Indeed, governments oftentimes opt

donors for the execution of programs, activities andfor“the high politics of bilateral diplomacy”overtasks”and“Work together to harmonize separate

collective action (Burnell, 2004: 11). They also often

procedures”(OECD, 2005: paragraph 35). What“muddle through”the collective choice process

this essentially means is that donors are obliged todue to the weak incentive structure for revealing

subordinate their sovereignty over aid decisions to aone’s true intent for supporting or opposing certain

collective decision-making process. In other words,

courses of collective action (Stevens, 1993: 5). As aa donor, call it Country X, must be willing to cedeconsequence, donors may agree to coordinate (ascontrol of some of its aid money to the“lead donor”‘means’) but without sustaining common objectives

in a given case. However, to the extent that the goalsof collective action (as‘ends’), thus resulting in half-of Country X differ from those of the lead donor’s,hearted commitments by individual donors.

this will make it harder to convince Country X’s

Even under the assumption that the broad

taxpayers to support the effort. Moreover, the loss

motives and aims of the donors are, if not identical,of direct control over aid decisions to another donor

at least compatible, Halonen-Akatwijuka (2004: 2-4)

would undermine domestic constituencies for foreignshows several ways in which missing or asymmetric

aid in Country X and lead to a fall in domestic support

information can cause coordination failures infor large aid budgets.

development aid. When donors with common goals

Where politicians are uninformed or uninterest-

simultaneously implement complementary projects

ed in aid issues, there is a risk of moral hazard

but have incomplete information about other donors’arising due to the asymmetry of information. It is abudgets, coordination failure can occur due toclassic case of a principal-agent problem, whereby

inefficient allocation of aid to that sector. Similarly, if

bureaucracies (the agent) have much more delegated

the utility of each donor depends also on the amountpower over the amount and purposes of aid andof projects funded by other donors, resources may

much less public accountability (to the principal) foragain be allocated inefficiently across projects due

those decisions (Lancaster, 2006: 20). Moreover, self-

to incomplete information about the other donors’interested aid agencies will seek to maximize theiractivities. For instance, major policy shifts likeaid budget which, in turn, requires them to satisfy

increased sensitivity to the quality of institutions

their parliaments (sponsors) and various advocacy

and governance (e.g. corruption) encouraged thegroups (constituents). Inherent difficulties in‘herding’behavior of donors (Frot and Santiso,

streamlining or converging donor preferences can be2009: 25). Such coordination failure results fromexacerbated by their need for visibility to justify their

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activities and therefore get more utility from them.

of participation are high (Stevens, 1993: 13). For

Naturally, faced with these concerns, donors havethis reason, participants in collective action tend tostrong motives to maintain their individually worked

be self-selected based on their expected gains andout projects, even if the development impact of thelosses.

overall aid is thereby reduced.

Put differently, from the strategic interest’s
point of view, a collective choice process may be
exploited to align the public or‘collective’interest

3.3 Coordination or collusion?
In theory, if countries are mutually dependent

to the country’s national interest. Similarly,

on each other to achieve a goal (that they cannot

individual national interests may be compatible withdeal with on their own, such as climate change,

the collective interest. For example, donors may

communicable diseases, migration, financial

coordinate among themselves and harmonize theirinstability, security and conflict, etc.), then inpractices so as to influence or gently coerce theattempting to cope with interdependence they may

recipient country to follow certain policy prescriptions

coordinate and cooperate with each other. These so-(e.g. good governance). Donors can also forge

called‘cross-border’problems have international

coalitions based on such collective interests andspillovers because of globalization and growing

ensure that norm setting in the aid business doesinterdependence. Countries thus share a common

not operate against their interests. Birdsall (2004: 9)

interest in responding to such global challenges as

categorizes this type of donor behavior as‘envy’,

their own economic welfare increasingly depends

claiming that donors are“neither competing nor

on the stability and prosperity of other countries.

11
collaborating”but“in effect colluding.”
In thatLikewise, donor governments often appeal tosense, one might even label the DAC, in the words

the‘global interest’with a collective rationaleof William Easterly, a“cartel of good intentions”

for uniting donors with different objectives anduniting donors with different objectives and agendas

agendas. Indeed, the overall objectives of aid-giving

to coordinate their aid efforts (Easterly, 2002: 11).

have been harmonized to a certain extent by thealignment of the entire international community on

3.4 Emerging donors

the goal of poverty reduction, defined notably by the

Aid effectiveness agenda has long been

Millennium Development Goals. Aid has become adominated by traditional DAC donor governments.

key instrument for solving the global public good

This is a thing of the past. The rise of emerging

problems. However, collective-choice also always

powers as donors of development assistance isneeds to find compromising points in situations

bringing new challenges to donor harmonization.

where harmonization will produce differing costs and

The DAC donors are no longer the only development

benefits to those governments involved. Those who

actors with sources of funding. Because of theiranticipate a net gain after the costs of coordination

growing economies and their stronger influence

are taken into account tend to be active participants

as regional and global players these so-calledin collective choice (multilateralism). Those who‘emerging donors’have gained much attention

anticipate net losses if they do not participate may

worldwide in recent years. They do not fit into thealso be active, especially if the expected losses are

traditional dichotomy of donor-recipient countries,

large. Those who see small gains or losses, however,as they maintain a dual status as both donors andwill tend not to participate, especially if the costs

recipients of aid. Their aid is also often blended with136

Harmony or Discord

commercial links but is framed in a language ofin the domestic policies of recipient countries – so‘mutual benefit’rather than mercantilism (Shafik,

the issue of governance for example is a non-issue

2011: 3). Yet some are more important players in aid

for them. China is said to provide assistance“withthan smaller DAC donors. More importantly, theysincerity and with no conditions attached”12 althoughgenerally operate outside the existing structures andits bilateral aid is also fully tied, implemented byframeworks including key DAC norms like the 1978

Chinese experts and governmental and quasi-

Recommendation on Terms and Conditions and thegovernmental agencies (Chin and Frolic, 2007: 14).

2001 Recommendation on Untying Aid. Developing

Some also object to the idea of‘division of labor’incountries today can shop around for development

the Paris Declaration, seeing it as too donor-driven

models and partners of their liking (Shafik, 2011:and limiting the flexibility to choose donors on the3). China, perhaps the most‘heavyweight’ofpart of recipient governments (Davies, 2008: 13).

all emerging donors, is a signatory to the Paris

Therefore challenges remain in working out ways in

Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. But it signed as awhich emerging donors can collaborate in promoting

recipient country. Whether China adheres to the aid

harmonization of aid between them and the DAC

effectiveness principles when it acts as a donor isdonors. Instead the current thinking within the DAC-a question of the greatest interest among the DAC

hosted Working Party of Aid Effectiveness appears todonors, especially in the context of its aid to Africa

be leaning toward‘adjusting’the aid effectivenesswhere aid from traditional donors is losing its relative

agenda to the increasing diversity and evolving

exclusivity. The effect of China’s demand for natural

realities of the aid architecture (OECD, 2008e: 15).

resources and its ability to export cheap labor-

4 Conclusion

intensive manufactures has major implications for thewhole development paradigm in Africa (Goldstein et

The rationale for harmonization is more effective

al., 2006: 41).

aid. This collective outcome is a public good in that

Chaponnière (2009: 150-151) points to the fact

the production and consumption of effective aid arethat the Paris Declaration as it currently stands does

indivisible and that it is non-rival and non-excludable.

not sufficiently reflect the diversity of aid practices

The public good nature of aid effectiveness can be

and particularities of development assistanceseen in the incentive to free-ride by countries who

provided by emerging donors. They have notwish to benefit from the reduction, for example, inparticipated to the discussion as donor countries ofpoverty but do not want to bear the costs associatedthe principles that have led to the Paris Declaration,with achieving that outcome. For example, in awhich to some is perceived as a‘DAC instrument’

rationalist world, individual participants are assumed(OECD, 2008e: 8). Clearly emerging donors wantto maximize self-interest at the expense of publica more flexible interpretation of development

interest. Therefore, even if harmonization efforts

cooperation in discussion on aid effectiveness. But,

to improve the overall effectiveness of aid would

while recognizing and respecting the diverse aid

contribute to the success of a donor’s own projects,

modalities and experience of emerging donors likethis also contributes to that of other donors’

China’s, the DAC’s relationships with these donors

projects. Thus, the logic of collective action is that

may have to be rooted in‘common interest’rather

the incentive to support harmonization may bethan‘common values’since some of them (China in

weak. Moreover, the current donor-led, institutional

particular) consider that donors should not interfere

approaches to aid harmonization are not sustainable.

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137

自由論題

governments.14

Donors and recipient countries convene in highlevel conferences, like in Accra in 2008 and in Busan

It is important to point out that althoughlater this year, where they – armed with rhetoric –the aid effectiveness agenda tries to change thereassure each other of their commitments to act, yet

donor-recipient country relationship by putting

return to business-as-usual once they are back inownership of the recipient countries and a spirit of

their respective capitals and headquarters. Progress

partnership at the forefront, which can be regarded

is monitored by the DAC which has no coercive

as unprecedented in the history of international aid,

power to hold them publicly accountable to theirdonors are still dominant in the aid relationship.

commitments, other than“through a delicate gameThe effectiveness of aid continues to be assessed13

on the premise that it is solely given to promoteof naming and shaming.”

To the extent that donors’preferences would

development. The problem with this approach is

fully converge, there would be no need to maintain athat it basically ignores what aid really is and why

multitude of donors. Rosenstein-Rodan argued forty

it is fragmented. It does not attempt to change

years ago that‘consortia’of donors would overcome

the incentives donors and recipient governments

the coordination and other problems of a multitude

face, rather it leaves it up to their good faith, andof individual aid programs (Rosenstein-Rodan,

so is unlikely to radically change their behaviors.

1968: 227-228). The literature on aid fragmentation

That is why, while the donors are promoting aid

empirically supports this thesis that a single

harmonization on the one hand, they are still

dominant donor agency is beneficial (e.g. Knack andcompeting on the other. The problem is also

Rahman, 2007: 177; Martens, 2008: 297). All donors

compounded by the emergence of non-traditional

could delegate aid delivery to this single agency. But

donors on the development scene. Although the longthe history of aid-giving has shown that if all aid were

term implications of these emerging donors, liketo be channeled multilaterally – thus making aid

China, Brazil and India, gaining aid market strengthde facto public good – only a fraction of the present

are complex, it is certain that the future aid industry

volume of aid might be obtained due to the free-rider

will less likely to be dominated by the traditional

problem, as Rosenstein-Rodan also pointed out in his

DAC donors. Incentives are constantly at work within

paper (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1968: 224). Harmonization

donor agencies, in the interactions among donorof donors’practices alone would not increase theagencies at international and country levels, as welloverall development impact of aid to a meaningful

as, in the relationship between donors and recipient

degree. A recent paper by Frot and Santiso (2010: 42)

governments, given the rivalries and differences inargues that, in contrary, excessive harmonization byapproaches to and experiences with aid-giving among

donors (i.e. no competition) may cause cartelization

donors. They are dependent on political, institutionalof aid or create“aid monopolies”which, in turn,and individual level factors that shape the perceptions

would undermine policy ownership by recipientand motivations of individual donors. Until thecountries while at the same time reducing their

impediments to harmonization efforts are tackled, themaneuvering room and ultimately their sovereignty.

harmonization agenda will continue to fail to change

Therefore a degree of competition between the aid

the donor behavior. In other words, the primary

donors should be retained. From a more practical

determinants of aid effectiveness lie elsewhere.

point of view, competition in the political process may

Indeed, the recent changes in the internationalcause self-interested donors to listen to the recipient

aid landscape necessitate a greater focus on138Harmony or Discordtransparency and accountability for both theimpact of aid requires active engagement of a larger

allocation and use of development resources. To

network including these emerging donors. For thisaddress the problem of asymmetric information,

to happen, it is important to promote practical andincreased transparency and improved mutual

tangible cooperation with an emphasis on sharing

accountability are key to establishing incentives toexperiences and good practices with each other tohelp strengthen ownership by recipient countries

enhance the impact of collective efforts. Nevertheless,and achieve better development results. Both ofthere is the challenge of selecting‘mutually’

which represent the essential elements for taking

agreeable objectives and expected outcomes within

the broad aid effectiveness agenda forward. By

areas of‘mutual’benefit as this effort must ensure

ensuring full transparency by disclosing detailed

a two-way flow. The increasing influence of non-and timely information on volume, allocation andtraditional donors over the international aid discourse

other information on aid (e.g. country strategies,

can also provide an impetus for the DAC donor

future spending intentions, conditionality, evaluation

governments to reflect their own practice.

results), donor governments will be incentivized totranslate the aid effectiveness principles into actual
behavioral changes and operational practices. This

Endnoteswould also help correct negative misperceptions

１ I thank the anonymous reviewers and editors for theirhelpful comments.

of some donor governments’efforts, such as a

２ The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals,

perception that a donor uses its aid program tofor example, has enable the international donor
community to share objectives regarding on whichissues to concentrate its efforts and thus move towards acoordinated approach, including in some cases sharing
common policies and modalities in development
assistance (Sunaga, 2004: 3).
３ The indicators for harmonization are Indicators 9, 10aand 10b, which measure the extent to which total aid
is coordinated. More specifically, Indicator 9 measures
the proportion of aid that is delivered in the frameworkof program-based approaches (PBAs). Indicators 10aand 10b measure the extent to which there are closer
joint working practices through joint missions andjoint country analytical work, i.e. missions or studies
undertaken jointly by two or more donors, or by one
donor on behalf of other donor(s). The intention
behind these indicators is not simply to have more joint
missions, reports or reviews but to have fewer of themoverall (OECD, 2008b: 54).
４ Fragmentation is def ined as more than 15 donors
providing just 10% of a recipient country’s programmable aid. The more donors that, combined, represent just
10% of country programmable aid, the more severe thefragmentation is (OECD, 2008c: 7).
５ The Vietnamese government, for instance, hosted 752
visiting missions from donor countries in 2007 alone,which is equivalent to accommodating more than three
missions per working day (OECD, 2008b: 15).
６ The drafters of the Paris Declaration were aware ofthese incentive problems and made sure to include in
it a provision concerning incentives for collaborative
behavior which commits donors and partner countries
to: “Reform procedures and strengthen incentives –including for recruitment, appraisal and training – forpursue its narrower national interests. To this end,
the DAC should be empowered with the authority totake on the role of a‘watch dog’of aid quality anddemand from its member governments, multilateral
aid agencies and other non-DAC donors the required
information. This is one concrete and actionablemeasure that the international community can adopt
at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectivenessin Busan (South Korea, November 2011) in order totake a step forward on a path toward enhanced aid
effectiveness.
Finally, emerging donors have become major
players in the ever evolving realm of development
cooperation, introducing competitive pressures into
the existing international aid architecture (Woods,
2008: 1206). Policies and activities of some of theseemerging donors have global impact and affect theissues addressed by the DAC, including on future
aid flows and on the development prospects ofdeveloping countries and regions supported by the
DAC members. Hence, improving the quality and

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自由論題

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management and staff to work towards harmonization,alignment and results” (OECD, 2005: para.36).
７ The sources of both bilateral and multilateral aid
originate from the same donor governments and the
motivations and purposes that drive them to coordinate
also apply to the motives behind channeling theiraid multilaterally, which in itself is a form of donor
coordination.
８ The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, wrote in2008 that “America is not an NGO and must balance
myriad factors in our relations with all countries” andthat it was in the U.S. national interest to align foreign
aid with its foreign policy goals and to use correctly andstrategically as a tool (Rice, 2008: 14). The Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton’s new ‘civilian power’ strategy
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12 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/zcyjs/xgxw/t24932.htm, accessed
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13 A Blog post by Frot, E and J. Santiso (18 January 2010),“Crushed aid: Why is fragmentation a problem forinternational aid?”, available at: http://www.voxeu.org/
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14 In contrast, Reinikka (2008: 183) argues that competition
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thus leads to a situation in which bureaucrats are often
not rewarded for focusing on improving the actual
development benefits from aid but rather on getting
money from donors. Under such conditions, aid projects
are merely viewed as a set of scarce private goods to beallocated as rents.

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