Prepared for the IIPS Symposium onJapan’s Role in the Forthcoming World Order
Tuesday, 1 November 2005
Tokyo
Session 1

The Precarious State of International Order:
Assessment and Policy Implications

Hanns W. Maull
Chair of Foreign Policy and International Relations
University of Trier, Germany

The Precarious State of International Order:
Assessment and Policy Implications
Paper prepared for the Conference “Japan´s Role in the Forthcoming World Order”
Organised by the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS)
Tokyo, Nov.1 and 2, 2005

Hanns W. Maull
Chair of Foreign Policy and International Relations University of Trier, Germany

I. International Order: Where are we, where are we headed?
Today’s international order has been shaped by one major force, the force of globalisation,and two series of important events, the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of
Sept.11, 2001, which have battered the dynamics of globalisation into the specific shape ofglobal governance which we observe today.
Globalisation is not new - the dynamics of international relations have long been
driven by the secular processes of modernisation which we today call “globalisation”, butthey have assumed a new quality since around the 1960s. Ultimately, it was the forces ofglobalisation which undid the Soviet empire and thus produced the first set of events whichhave shaped today’s world politics: the disintegration of the East-West conflict, which hadcome to dominate world politics since the late 1940s.
The second major event which has shaped world politics was the attacks against theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon carried out by al-Qaida on September 11, 2001. Morespecifically, what changed the trajectory of world politics since 2001 was the new sense ofvulnerability which the attacks injected into American politics and the way in which
American foreign policy reacted to those attacks. The Bush Administration chose to define
the challenge of September 11, 2001 as a declaration of war by international terrorism against
the civilised world, and it has responded to this by waging a “global war on terror”, with farreaching consequences for international relations.
Those forces and events together have produced a state of international order which
seems increasingly precarious. The dynamics of globalisation offer enormous opportunities(such as the defeat of hunger and poverty worldwide), but they also carry huge risks (such as
pandemics, terrorism, environmental destruction and climate change), and its force iscorrosive to political order. As pointed out already, the dynamics of globalisation were theunderlying cause for the implosion of the Soviet empire, which in turn has taken away muchof the external pressure which in the past had obliged countries to focus resources andpolitical energy on foreign policy and security policies. With the end of the East-West
confrontation, attention began to wane from international relations; domestic politics now
rules the roost in most countries. Moreover, America’s response to the attacks of 9/11 2001
on balance have been detrimental, rather than conducive to international order. As aconsequence, most multilateral institutions and international regimes are plagued bysymptoms of crisis – think only of the recent World 2005 Summit at the United Nations, thestate of the WTO-Round, or the failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
this summer.
What characterises the precarious state of today’s international order? I see sevenmajor trends which, taken together, describe where we are with regard to global governance:
11. Concentration of power resources in the international state system
From the perspective of inter-state relations, the United States occupies an overwhelmingly
powerful position. This American preponderance finds its most obvious expression in the factthat the United States alone today accounts for roughly forty percent of global military
expenditure; in fact, the annual American budget for military research and development in2003 was larger than the total defence spending of the People’s Republic of China, America’s
only conceivable long-term rival for the status of a dominant power in international relations.1
And on top of its military superiority, America also boast the world’s largest economy, one ofits largest markets, superior technological innovation capacities and an excellent elite
education system which continues to promote America’s cultural attractiveness. Overall,America’s overwhelmingly powerful position will probably remain unchallenged for several
decades to come, at least in terms of its relative power resources position.
In the league below America, we have a group of two “rising” powers, China andIndia, and three “declining” powers, (Germany, Japan and Russia), as well as one power of astill rather uncertain kind, the European Union. As a “civilian power”, the European Union
may or may not represent the wave of the future in world politics; for now, its ability to effectits external environment, while growing, is still limited both geographically and functionally.
In the nxt league below them, we have several important regional and middle powers, and alarge array of other states. Overall, the number of states in world politics is approaching 200 –up from 165 before the dissolution of the Soviet empire and former Yugoslavia.
2. Diffusion of Power in International Relations
Putting the focus on inter-state relations to assess the state of international order can produce
very misleading results, however, for international relations are (to follow a felicitous image
suggested by Joseph S. Nye, jr.2) acted out on at least three different chessboards
simultaneously. Apart from the traditional chessboard bringing together the major powers andstates, there is the chessboard of transnational economic relations and that of transnationalsocietal processes of interaction. If one includes all those three dimensions in the analysis ofinternational order, the overall picture changes from one of concentration of power to one
dominated by power diffusion. This diffusion of power is owed importantly to the exponential
growth of the number of relevant actors with the ability to influence international relations.
Not only has the number of states increased significantly over the last fifty years, as we justnoted, but that of transnational corporations and international non-governmental organisations(INGOs) has also grown exponentially. So has the amount of transnational interactions of all
kinds. As a result, if we define “power” as the ability to control outcomes, that is, to influence
future developments in line with one’s own preferences, then it has become significantly moredispersed and diffused than it used to be during the period of the Cold War.
3. The Erosion of State Authority and Political Legitimacy
One important reason for this diffusion of power lies with the growing difficulties of politicalinstitutions at all levels to command loyalty and following. Politics worldwide are confronted
with growing expectations and demands, while its ability to meet those expectations by“allocating resources authoritatively” (which is what politics is about) is increasingly
challenged. An expression of this trend is the “third wave”3 of democratisation, which since1

IISS, The Military Βalance 2003/2004, London: Oxford UP 2004
Nye, Joseph S.: The Paradox of Power. Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone,
Oxford: OUP 2002; idem: Limits of American Power, in: Political Science Quarterly 117:4 (Winter 2002/3), pp.
545-5593
Huntington, Samuel P: The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,22the 1970s has swept the world and brought a form of governance to a whole range of new
countries which institutionalizes critical scrutiny of those exercising power and subjects themto electoral scrutiny.
From the perspective of international order, perhaps the most serious erosion of
authority and legitimacy has concerned America’s international leadership. Across the world,
America no longer is perceived as a benign hegemon, but as an assertive and potentially
dangerous power.4 This erosion of American authority and legitimacy has serious
implications not only for the effectiveness of American foreign policy, but also for global
governance and, hence, international order. For the present international order not only haslargely been created by American diplomacy, but it also rests above all on the ability and thewillingness of the United States to uphold its rules and its institutions. The present
administration in Washington has lost much of its previous interest and increasingly also isrisking its ability to sustain international order, thus contributing to its growing fragility.
4. The Growing Weight of Markets
The diffusion of power in international relations has enhanced the importance of markets andmarket–type processes. In markets, outcomes are determined not by specific actors and theirstrategies, but by “invisible hands” which spontaneously “order” the interactions of huge
numbers of individual players. Yet that order can be precarious, and sometimes quite
problematic. Markets are prone to overreactions, to bubbles and violent corrections - in short,
to turbulence. To function well from the broader perspective of people’s well-being, they
have to be embedded into a politically determined and sustained order which they cannot, as arule, generate by themselves.
5. Growing Importance of Fundamentalist Ideologies
Ideologies are in many ways a natural response to the complexities and turbulences ofglobalisation: they offer a sense of belonging, they question and challenge the logic ofglobalisation and thus respond to people’s uneasiness and anxiety, and they also claim to offer“solutions” to its problems. As a powerful response to the individual search for identity undercircumstances where many traditional ties are dissolving, fundamentalist ideology really is atwin brother to globalisation, the other side of the coin of ever closer integration ofindividuals and institutions into global contexts. Thus, such ideologies can be expected toremain important, or even increase their salience in the future. They will also continue to posea significant potential for violence.
6. The Declining Utility of Military Force
The violence exercised by international terrorist organisations, which has been on the rise, has
tended to obscure a larger trend away from organised violence in international relations.
However cruel and devastating the “new wars” are – statistically, war and civil war has beenon the retreat since the early 1990s in what may well be a secular trend towards theobsolescence of major war. As Norman Angell argued famously as early as 19135 (but only a
few months before World War One), the logic of globalisation (while the world was not yet inuse, the phenomenon certainly existed already), with its ever more complex divisions oflabour over ever larger distances at ever shorter intervals and ever more precise rhythm,
requires the absence of organised violence to function well. This means that force ought to becontained, sterilised and ritualised – and this indeed has been happening. Yet precisely
Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press 1991
4
Pew Global Attitudes Project, US Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative, Survey released June 23, 2005,
available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247 [accessed Oct.17, 2005 ]5Angell, Norman: The Great Illusion, London & New York 19133

because the use of violence has become increasingly dysfunctional and thus a “taboo”, it also
has attracted those who want to provoke, to express their protest, and to destroy.
There is thus a deep paradox about war and organised violence: it is becoming less andless useful yet simultaneously more attractive as the ultimate provocation. But it is very
difficult to deploy force constructively, and this in fact constitutes a second paradox: while
military power is becoming ever more destructive in its possibilities, and increasingly alsoavailable even in the extreme form of weapons of mass destruction to “rogue states”, as wellas to non-state actors (think of 1995 and the Aum Shin Rikyo attacks), it is hard to wield force
in ways which are conducive to national or international order. As we are observing in Iraq,
US military power could easily overwhelm the ancien regime of Saddam Hussein, but finds it
extremely difficult to establish a new political order. While the monopoly of force still
represents the ultimate foundation of political order at the state level, and continues to be
relevant to international order, as well, the actual invocation of military power often quickly
demonstrates how difficult it is to restore political order once it has been lost. American
foreign policy under this Administration has severely underestimated those paradoxes of force,and its over-reliance on superior military power and preventive strikes risks to do damage to
America’s interests in the world, but also to global governance.
7. The Nation State: The Indispensable but Increasingly Fragile Foundation ofInternational Order
International order does not exist in a political vacuum: it still rests very largely on the ability(and the willingness) of states to impose order within their own boundaries and cooperate inbuilding, sustaining and effectuating international order. Other actors, such as INGOs,
transnational corporations or international organisations, can contribute to international order
only if and when they find support among governments. But functioning modern statehood,which enables governments to impose order at home and contribute to international orderabroad, in many states is more fiction than reality, while in many others, already existingelements of modern statehood are disintegrating.6 Even among those countries which havefully developed modern statehood, including democratic forms of governance and broad
welfare state systems, the state is, in the words of Susan Strange, coming under pressure frombelow, above and from the sides, through the forces of globalisation.7 It therefore needs toadjust and adapt. In short, functioning modern statehood remains the essential ingredient ofinternational order, but this is becoming an increasingly scarce resource. It is therefore hardly
surprising that “state building” – i.e., the reconstitution of failed or deficient statehood –recently has become an important task of the international community.
Taken together, these trends combine to produce an increasingly fragile international
order. It begins to resemble the famous Potemkin village: the facades of international
institutions and regimes are still there, but there is little of importance going on inside. This
precarious state of global governance reflects an underlying problem of globalisation: it
encourages a revolution of rising expectations and demands on politics, but it simultaneously
hampers the ability of politics to meet that demand. The result is an opening gap between the
demand and the supply of governance in international relations (as, probably, at all levels ofpolitics). The most serious manifestation of that gap today is America’s deficient response to
the imminent problems of global governance.

6

Gurr et al: State Failure Task Force Report, Findings Part III, available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf [accessed Oct.17, 2005].
7
Strange, Susan: The Retreat of the State, The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge: CUP
1996

4

II. What Do We Mean By “International Order”, and How Much
Do We Need?
In a nutshell, political order is about the management and resolution of conflict without
recourse to physical coercion or elimination, and the creation of opportunities for people topursue their individual ambitions and dreams. A minimum requirement for international orderwould be that it can plausibly prevent major war or other global disasters. As far as the former
is concerned, this may be the case for today´s international order; whether it would be able tocope with the less obvious systemic vulnerabilities of an increasingly interconnected world to,e.g., asymmetric violence or pandemics seems much less certain. Under present conditions,the international order may thus seem deficient even against a fairly modest set of
expectations.
A second, more ambitious definition would describe “international order” as a systemof global governance which would allow mankind to manage well both the opportunities andthe risks of globalisation. What this could imply specifically has been laid out rather well by
the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in its report to the Secretary
General of the United Nations.8 The political will to implement this ambitious programme fora refurbished international order has so far been largely absent, however: the 2005 World
Summit Meeting at the UN produced very meagre results - and, as we know, no reform of the
UN Security Council.
One problem with this summit was the idea that the international order could bereformed in one large package deal at one go. A third possibility to define international orderwould therefore aim at a long-term vision, the vision of “civilising” international relations in
the way domestic politics have been civilised within advanced Western democracies. What
this could imply can be described with the civilisational hexagon developed by Dieter
Senghaas (see Chart). This hexagon sets out six interdependent political objectives which
need to be advanced, as much as possible, simultaneously so as to make advances mutually
supporting. Overall, the hexagon illustrates an ambitious but realistic political agenda for
global governance, which has a number of practical advantages: it provides a sustainablevision, it can be realised in steps, but it also suggest clear and reasonably precise criteria foradvances. Moreover, it enjoys widespread political support already: the ideas of democracy
and human rights represent the most powerful (yet moderate) political ideology of today, andtheir appeal and legitimacy is universal, no longer only Western. The vision of civilisinginternational relations can therefore count on substantial implicit support, at the popular aswell as at the state level. The reform agenda pursued by Kofi Annan at the World Summit,
which was built on the High Level Panel report, was in many aspects entirely compatible withsuch a vision and tried to specify it concretely.
Whichever way we imagine “international order”, to be real it needs to be both effective
and legitimate. In other words, a sustainable international order will incorporate appropriate
responses to two fundamental questions. First, how much and what kind of global governancewill be required to manage the opportunities and risks of globalisation? And, second: whicharrangements of global governance will be supported by international society? This latterissue of legitimacy really consists of two different components: legitimacy among states, andlegitimacy among peoples. One of the more troubling aspects of today’s international order isthat the prevailing arrangements of global governance by and large seem to enjoy legitimacy
among states, but much less so among peoples, and that their capacity to manage globalisation
effectively and efficiently seems to be rather less than what is widely deemed necessary.

8

A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary General´s High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, http://www.un.org/secureworld [7.10.05]

5III. Policy Implications
Let me now briefly draw some policy conclusions from this analysis:•

First, national foreign policies of all major powers ought to develop long-term strategies
to enhance international order, built on a coherent vision of the future, as a way to provide
perspective to day-to-day management of international affairs. At present, such coherence
seems to be missing in most countries. Or should we see the stark contrast between formal
commitments of governments at major international diplomatic events, such as theMillenium Summit, and their actual behaviour simply as cynicism?

•

Second, America continues to be of overriding importance for international order, but its
policies increasingly also contribute to its erosion. For America’s allies and partners, theconclusion must be a) to exercise all their influence in Washington to encourage
constructive policies, b) to support those policies by word and by deed, but c) also be
prepared to disagree with the United States and act in concert with others towards theshared objective in the context of strengthening international order. This should not bedone in the spirit of opposing the US, in general, but as a means to advance international
order, if necessary, against American objections. It is important in this context to keep
open any resulting arrangement for future American participation. There are examples for
this: think of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, specific agreements
within the context of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services.

•

Third, Europe and Japan (and others) should expand both their political attention andenergies and the share of resources they devote to international order, so as to enhancetheir ability to contribute to strengthening global governance, either with the United Statesor, if necessary, without and even against it. So far, international order has come fairly
cheap to others, and Americans have a case when they complain about a tendency towards
free-riding on Uncle Sam’s dovetails by others.

•

Fourth, Europe and Asia should deepen and widen regional integration. If successful, as inEurope, regionalism can create spheres of peace, stability and prosperity and thus bothrelieve the political burden on global governance and contribute to its ability to manage
globalisation. Regionalism does not, and should not, preclude close co-operation with
America on issues arising in the regional context, but the US should not be allowed (norshould it wish) to determine the pace and direction of regional co-operation and integration.

•

Fifth, international co-operation and integration can also be promoted along functionallines, as shown by the WTO. Strengthening, deepening and enlarging functionalarrangements of global governance strengthens the international order overall in rather
then same way regional integration does. Functional co-operation and integration as a rule
will need to involve America, and there would best include it.

•

Six and last, effective and legitimate global governance requires the ability to forge andeffectuate broad political coalitions. The US used to be in a class of its own in that regard
in the past, as well, but it has been losing some of that skill more recently. The same
applies to Germany, and probably also to Japan;9 China, on the other hand, has recently
played this role very skilfully.10 Germany and Japan in this context both have particular
opportunities, but also particular responsibilities; they ought to be able to do better thanthey have been doing recently.

9

For Japan, see Hughes, Christopher W.: Japans´s Re-emergence as a Normal Military Power, London:
Routledge 2004 (= IISS Adelphi Paper No.368-369) and Hughes, Christopher W.: Japan´s Economic Power andSecurity, Japan and North Korea, London and New York: Routledge 1999
10
This has been most clearly visible in Asia. See the superb analysis in Shambaugh, David: China Engages Asia,
Reshaping the Regional Order, in: International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99

6

Democratic
Participation

Rule of Law

Constructive
Conflict Culture
7

Monopoly of ForceThe Civilisational Hexagon

Social Justice

Promotion ofInterdependence
and Emotional
Self-Restraint