Lai: Maritime Security in Southeast Asia
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Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Issues and Perspectives
Frances Lai
In today’s Southeast Asia we are witnessing the emergence of a post cold
war order. The region is so diverse in history, culture, religion, colonial
heritage and ethnicity that the new regional structure has taken a long time to
evolve and is still evolving. There are many new issues and varied
perspectives. The final shape of the post cold war system depends not only
on the states in the region but also on the policy and role of major players
from outside of the region, especially the US, Japan and China. At present,
at least three trends can be identified: In terms of security matters in generaland in maritime security in particular, the region is evolving from a cold war
structure to a multilateral framework; from overall military and ideologicalconcerns to economic concerns; and from a preoccupation with conventional
security to a focus more on comprehensive security. There are changing
threats and perception of threats of security. Some of the changes are still
very volatile and in flux.
Towards a Multilateral Framework
At the end of the Cold War, the states in the region launched a series ofmultilateral initiatives in order to bolster their national security and stability.
APEC was launched and ASEAN was re-vitalized. The membership of thelatter was expanded to include the Indo-Chinese states of Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam. While ASEAN is a far cry from the European Union,
it does provide a somewhat collective identity and a loose working
framework for the Southeast Asian states ASEAN provides a forum for
dialogue not only among its member states but also between its members andnon-member states. For example, it engages the major countries in its
vicinity, namely Korea, Japan and China in the ASEAN+3 framework. In thefield of security, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) goes beyond thesethree East Asian countries. There are altogether twenty-two nations,
including the United States, Russia, Canada and India, to discuss regional
security issues. Although it is often criticized as merely a “talk shop,” ARF
remains the only Track One security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. On
the Track Two (or more precisely Track 1.5) level there is the Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and its Maritime Working
Group. The September 11 terrorist attacks added new impetus to multilateral
cooperation among ASEAN military forces. The second annual ASEAN
Chiefs of Armies Multilateral Meeting held in early November 2001agreed
for the first time to coordinate anti-terrorist activities through exchanges of
information and the setting up of special organizations and communications1

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against cross-border crime. (Bangkok Post Nov.20, 2001 pp. 3 and 12,
Bangkok Post Nov. 26 p.12).
Given the diversity in the region and the recent history of hostility amongsome of the states, most Southeast Asian states find the presence of the US
in the region a stabilizing force. Multilateral cooperation is pursued inparallel to and not in the place of a US presence. How far multilateralism
can go in Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific, to a certain degree, is also afunction of the politics of major countries in the region. With stronger
bargaining power, major powers generally prefer to deal with other nations
on a bilateral basis. The powers can exert direct influence and fine-tune thenature of the relationships according to their own need.
China, for one, had vehemently opposed a multilateral approach when it firstjoined the international community. Yet, China’s open policy in economic
development demanded a high level of participation in the world community.
More particularly, China’s bid for WTO membership required the support ofother nations. As a result, China has progressively shown more support ofmultilateralism in the realm of economic cooperation. China has expressed
its readiness to establish a free trade zone with ASEAN in the recent
ASEAN+3 meeting. In political and military matters, China often still
prefers bilateral negotiation. In the year 2000 alone, China signed fourbilateral cooperation agreements with Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines
and Singapore respectively. Both agreements with the Philippines andSingapore included defense cooperation and exchanges between theirrespective strategic and security research institutes. While China agreed towork out a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with ASEAN, it
refused to have the issue discussed in the broader multilateral forum of ARF.
The U.S. is another country that has been impatient and dissatisfied with amultilateral process. The Bush Administration frustrated if not angered quite
a number of allies and friends by its unilateral action of withdrawing fromthe Kyoto Memorandum on Global Warming and by its unilateral push for
the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD).
The impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the need for the US to
muster support around the world for its military action against the Taliban
made it necessary for Bush and his administration to rally support with allies
as well as non-allies. With Secretary of State Collin Power attending the
ARF and Bush attending APEC there seems to be a renewed acceptance ofmultilateralism as an effective framework for international politics in theregion.
Japan has wanted to play a bigger role in the region. It has done a lot for theregion, from the ‘recycling of yen” to the establishment of the Asian2

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Development Bank; in maritime security, from being the sole contributor toa revolving fund for the safety and environmental security of the Straits ofMalacca to the more recent rallying point of coordinated efforts against
piracy. However, Japan sways between its desire to lead and tackle theunique problems in the region and its desire to be a team player of worldpolitics. Its response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 is a case in point.
As an analyst observed, “Paradoxically, Japan appears to be both the driving
force for monetary regionalism in East Asia and its main opponent… Japanwishes to maintain its status to the region, while at the same time notprovoking criticism in Washington.” (Far Eastern Economic Review July 12,2001 p.29) The comment that “Today, Japan’s approach to regionalism,
characterized by its preference for hierarchy and its negligence ofneighbours’ demands, won’t work” may provide the clue for success inAsian regionalism: first among equals may be a better leadership style.

From Military to Economic Focus
Once the Cold War was over, the region devoted itself to economic recovery
and there were a number of notable successes, first in the Newly
Industrialized Economies (NIEs) and later in the “growth triangles” along
the hinterland of national boundaries. Such successes brought confidence
and higher standards of living to the people. The military, still a powerfulgroup in many of the countries, has also been benefited from the economic
growth of the countries with better equipment and amenities. Although there
were skirmishes throughout the region, there were no wars. Everyone wasdazzled by rapid economic growth. The financial crisis of 1997 came as ashock. It threw most Southeast Asian countries into disorientation and every
effort was made to counter the impact of the crisis and to revive the economy.
With rapid economic development, there is an increasing need for natural
resources. Much of the region’s manufacturing and industrial activities
depends on the steady supply of low cost energy. Furthermore, most of theSoutheast Asian countries are developing nations with very low average
income levels. Thus, food security is very important to the maintenance ofthe quality of life and social stability of these countries.
The 1997 financial crisis had a devastating impact on the region. Many
countries were strapped with bad debt. Government officials and corrupted
politicians were challenged in Southeast Asian states such as Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. One consequence was that Suhato
and his government were toppled and Indonesia was thrown into social andpolitical chaos. Another consequence was that separatist movements became3Lai: Maritime Security in Southeast Asia
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rampant in both Indonesia and the Philippines At times, the most important
security issue in these two countries was internal law and order. Ultimately,
economics remains the crucial instrument to bring about law and order andto turn the tide of events in the region.
Current Situation: Military Concerns
Territorial and boundary disputes remain the most explosive maritime
security issue in the region. The overlapping claims in the South China Sea
tops the list. China/Taiwan and Vietnam claim all the islands and reefs of theSouth China Sea. Malaysia and the Philippines claim some of the islands
closest to their territories. Brunei and Indonesia also have small claims. Mostof the Spratlys and other South China Sea islands are too small or semisubmerged to sustain life. The ocean area around the islands is tootreacherous to be used as major sea-lanes of communication andtransportation. With the exception of brief armed clashes between China andSouth Vietnam when the latter occupied several islands off its shore, theSouth China Sea disputes were basically left dormant. It was only after theCold War when countries in the region set forth to exert their territorial
sovereignty and to exploit their resources from the sea that the territorial
disputes in the South China Sea became explosive. An Indonesian initiative
has brought all claimants together in a conflict management dialogue for thelast ten years. Issues as emotional as the sovereignty of nations and as
enticing as potential ocean resources are not easy to defuse. Overlapping
claims among multiple claimants certainly complicate matters, if not making
these overlapping claims almost totally impossible to resolve.
The greatest tension in recent years, however, is between China and thePhilippines over Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island). Early this year, anumber of confrontations between Chinese fishing boats and the Philippines
armed forces took place. Officials on both sides exchanged claims, counterclaims and diplomatic protests but neither country allowed the incidents to
disrupt overall bilateral relations.
The need for good working relations among the states and the necessity forregional cooperation prevail. Any armed conflict could aversely affect theeconomic environment and keep other relations on hold. In recent years,
China agreed to work with ASEAN to develop a Regional Code of Conduct
for the South China Sea. It proved to be a difficult process. To date,significant differences of opinion remain, not only between the ASEAN
states and China but also within ASEAN.

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Boundary disputes in other parts of Southeast Asia have seen better though
not easier solutions. In most cases, resource-based considerations served as
the rationale to compromise. It took years for Thailand and Malaysia to workout their Joint Development Area (JDA) arrangements in the Gulf ofThailand. The area is now finally producing gas on a commercial scale.
More recently, Thailand and Vietnam agreed to disagree on theiroverlapping boundary in the Gulf of Thailand, agreed to set up joint naval
patrol and are now eyeing the possibility of joint development of gas fields
in their vicinity. Cambodia has also asserted pressure on the Thais to have
similar agreement over their disputed maritime boundary in the Gulf ofThailand so that they can also start working on some joint development ofoil and gas with the Thais. To date, the Thais have found the Cambodian
overlapping claims unacceptable and a resolution is still pending. In the
Gulf of Tonkin, through the strong political will of the leadership on bothsides, Vietnam finally settled its boundary dispute with China at the end of
2000.
Sea Lane Security in the archipelagos is still a problem. The Philippines hasrectified the UN Law of the Sea but according to its Constitution, thePhilippines considered the water within the treaty map between the US andSpain as internal waters, not archipelagic waters. Even though it allows
passage of ship through its waters, it made no identification of archipelagic
sea-lanes for international navigation. As a result, there remains much
ambiguity to international navigation rights and obligations through its
waters. Indonesia, on the other hand, has followed the Law of the Sea anddesignated three north-south sea-lanes through its archipelagic waters forinternational shipping. It has yet to identify any east-west sea-lanes. This
lack of official designation of any east-west sea-lane caused some concerns
between the US and Indonesia over the transit right of US naval fleet in the
mid-90s. Both sides came to agree that until Indonesia designated the eastwest sea-lane, the US fleet would transit through the archipelago according
to its customary practice. To date, the east-west sea-lanes have not yet been
designated.
Current Situation: Economic Concerns
With the end of the Cold War, most of the conventional maritime security
issues, including the explosive issue of overlapping claims in the South
China Sea, proved to be unnecessary irritants that leaders of the Southeast
Asian governments preferred not to have to deal with. The more earnest
issues at hand were non-military in nature. Some of the major ones include
piracy, smuggling, environmental security and resource security. All parties
concerned agreed that the issues should be tackled but that there were also5Lai: Maritime Security in Southeast Asia
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diverse perspectives and solutions that still needed to be discussed andresolved.
Piracy was rampant in the history of Southeast Asia. The countless islands
and numerous waterways in the region provided excellent hideouts and fast
get-away routes. Singapore has clearly marked this change of time.
Singapore used to be a notorious pirate hideout but is now a modern statewith impeccable law and order. With the passage of time and changes insociety and economy in the region, piracy faded into the background. Piracy
returns to haunt these waters at the worst of times when law and order is lax.
For many years, the region had relatively few cases of piracy. However, in
2000, the region witnessed a dramatic jump of 56% as compared with 1999
and four and a half times as compared with 1991. While most of theincidents reported by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) are minor
cases of robbery, the violence and brutality of the cases are intensifying.
Even organized crime started to get involved. The attached table and chartshow changes across time and an overview of the geographical locations of
the crime committed among countries most prone to piracy. Indonesia andthe Philippines were the two countries that were most infested with pirates
and they were the same countries that had a breakdown of law and ordercaused by social unrest and separatist movements.

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Piracy Incidents by Location 1991-2000
Location
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
S E ASIA
Cambodia
111
11Indonesia
55
49
10
22
33
57
47
60 115 119
Malacca Str.
32
7
5
3
2
3
1
2
75
Malaysia
1
2
4
5
5
4
10
18
21
Myanmar1
2
1
5Philippines
5
5
24
39
16
15
6
9
Singapore Str.
3
2
2
5
1
14
5
Thailand
4
16
17
2
5
8
FAR EAST

China/HK/M.
EastChina Sea
PNG
Solomon Is
S China Sea
TaiwanVietnamWorld Total

1
10

1

14

107

6

106

31

103

6
6

6

31

9
1
1
2

2

3
2
4

90

188

228

5
1
1
1
6

2
3
5

4
248

2
1

202

1
3

2
9

2

6

300

469

The Following seven areas shared over two thirds of the total number ofincidents, i.e. 331 from a total of 469 attacks for the period.
Countries most prone to Piracy attacks
in 2000

Indonesia 119

13 13
35

Malaysia 21
Malacca Straits 75

119

Bangladesh 55

55

India 35
Red Sea 13
Ecuador 13

21
75

Source: Jayant Abhyankar, “Piracy and Shipping Robbery: A Crowing Menage” in Hamzah
Ahmad & Akira Ogawa (ed.) Combating Piracy (Tokyo: The Okazaki Institute, 2001) p.23 -24.

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Because of the increasing seriousness of the piracy issue, quite a number ofworkshops and conferences were held during the past two years. The atrocity
and problems of piracy were well documented. [e.g. see Hamzah Ahmad andAkira Ogawa ed. Combating Piracy (The Okazaki Institute, Tokyo) 2001] A
highlight of some examples of differences in perception that may hamper
closer regional cooperation follows.
As often is the case in regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region,
sovereignty is a sensitive issue. While no coastal state is against cooperationin eradication of piracy, many are uneasy with the way the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) tried to redefine “piracy.” According to the United
Nations of Law of the Sea, piracy is “any illegal acts of violence or
detention…on the high seas…or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State…” (1982 UNCLOS Article 101) Under international law, all states
have the right to arrest pirates on the high seas and to punish them according
to their own law. In Southeast Asia, vast extent of water falls into the regimeof archipelagic waters which are also legally within the territorial
sovereignty of the archipelagic state and are not subject to law regarding
piracy on the high seas. But, in reality, most of the acts of “piracy” arecommitted in Straits, ports and anchoring areas within the territorial sea limitof the coastal state. In order to be effective in its act against piracy, IMB
defined piracy as “any act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with
the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability
to use force in furtherance of the act.” (2001 Annual Report on Piracy andArmed Robbery Against Ships of the International Maritime Bureau) The redefinition of the term piracy would raise the number of acts of piracy
committed and would give rise to a higher profile of the piracy problem.
While this would help to alert the world community to the seriousness of the
problem, some officials are worried about the possible creeping jurisdiction
such re-definition may bring about. It would increase external pressure, if
not external interference, on what nations basically consider to be a nationallaw enforcement issue.
Japan’s offers of assistance, such as enhancement of patrolling capacity andmonitoring capacity both in hardware and in training, are welcome thoughsome nations are uneasy about joint naval patrol with the Japanese navy.
Malaysia and Indonesia have expressed that they are unwilling to allow
foreign armed vessels into their territorial waters. Southeast Asian nations
are small and medium states that often have to take into account the politics
and relations of major countries in the region. Joint naval patrol would
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introduce the physical presence of yet another major power into the alreadycomplex situation in Southeast Asian waters. For easy access of data,transfer of technology, building of capacity and multilateral coordination,some Southeast Asians would also prefer to have the piracy-monitoring
center, if any, to be established in the region rather than in Japan.
The bottom line of the issue is while Southeast Asian countries are sincere in
their concerns over the menace of piracy they do not consider it a top priority.
Furthermore, many see piracy activities as a function of the overall social,economic and political well being of countries and communities in theregion. For example, when China was unable to have full control of its
coastal area and when corruption and crimes were rampant, there were morepiracy activities along its coast, using ports as hideouts. As China’s socialand economic order improved, piracy statistics correspondingly dropped.
Most experts agree that the recent increase in piracy incidents in theSoutheast Asian waters, to certain extent, is a function of the social,economic and political disorder in the Indonesian archipelago and its vicinity.
Aside from piracy other crimes at sea are also haunting the region. They
include kidnapping and abduction for political and monetary purposes andthe smuggling of drugs and goods across national borders. Several highprofile cases of abduction of foreign tourist by the Abu Sayyaf separatists
have not only damaged the tourist industry in Southern Philippines but havealso affected the islands of Malaysia off East Sabah. Smuggling of goods
and illegal drugs is also on the rise. The national security adviser of theFilipino government, Golez, had charged that the “greatest threat” to national
security came from Chinese gangs smuggling illegal drugs into thePhilippines.
Resource security, especially food security has always been an importantstabilizing factor for many countries. As Southeast Asian states turn tonation-building and economic endeavors, the need for resources such as oil
and gas becomes a higher and more dominating priority Energy poor
countries
such as Thailand are most vulnerable. The search for energy
security has led to greater cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand. They
shelved their sovereignty rights issue on their overlapping claim in the Gulfof Thailand in order to co-exploit the oil and gas resources there. The
success of the joint development project inspired further cooperation among
the countries around the Gulf. As an example, Vietnam and Thailand agreed
on their overlapping claims and started joint naval patrol of the area. The twocountries also are looking at possible joint development of oil and gas
resources in that area. Cambodia also pushed hard on Thailand to have
similar arrangements over their common but contested border. Thailand
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found the Cambodian claim unacceptable and could not agree to disagree. To
date no agreement on the overlapping area has been reached.
The concept of energy security has undergone some fundamental changes inrecent years. There has been an increasing reliance on natural gas as a main
source of energy. Countries turned to a gas pipeline as a way to securecontinual supply of energy. Singapore connected a natural gas pipeline from
West Natuna, Indonesia and commenced its first production in January 15,
2001. Singapore also signed a contract to connect another gas pipeline from
Sumatra, Indonesia. Malaysia also signed a contract to get gas from WestNatuna. There is a growing regional integration to ensure regional securityof energy supplies. In 1997, the ASEAN Head of States adopted the ASEAN
Vision 2020 that called for cooperation to “establish interconnecting
arrangements for electricity, natural gas, and water within ASEAN throughthe ASEAN Power Grid and a ASEAN Gas Pipeline.” Such strategies will
greatly enhance regional cooperation and energy security.
Another resource security issue is more problematic. It is the issue of fisherywhich is a main source of food security in the region. The need for food andeconomic income leads to rapid depletion of fish stocks in Southeast Asia,
especially in the Gulf of Thailand. With the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and archipelagic states jurisdictions established by the UNCLOS III,
there are no more high seas in Southeast Asia. Many traditional fishinggrounds formerly free for all to fish have been changed into either
Archipelagic waters or EEZ where the coastal state has the sole jurisdiction
over living resources, such as fish. Although UNCLOSIII calls upon the
coastal and archipelagic states to respect traditional fishing rights, no proper
provision is made in the Southeast Asian waters and fishermen fishing in
traditional fishing ground are often considered to be engaged in illegal
fishing. There is also the related issue of fishery disputes, including thepassage of fishing vessels through the EEZ of a third country. Thailand has
many problems with its neighbors - Malaysia, Myanmar and Cambodia.
More recently, the Thais have also had problems with Indonesia for fishingillegally in their EEZ and archipelagic waters.
Environmental Security is gaining attention in some parts of Southeast Asia,
especially in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. A more important issue
concerning navigation in the eyes of Southeast Asians, especially Malaysianand Indonesian, is the navigational safety and the environmental security of
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Thousands of ships pass through theStraits every year, including some of the world’s largest oil tankers. The
hazard of navigation through the narrow and shallow waterway is well
documented. The Revolving Fund is the only fund existing today that is used10

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to help combat oil pollution in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. It was set
up with contributions from the Japanese Malacca Strait Council. With its
funds dwindling, there is no current regional or strategic plan for its
replenishment
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has sponsored or co-organized
several international conferences in Malaysia and Singapore in recent years
to discuss maritime safety and marine pollution in the Straits. The need for
greater burden sharing in the maintenance of the Straits was brought up in
the 1996 IPS/IMO Conference. Since then, there is a growing consensus thatusers should contribute their share to maintain navigational safety and also tomaintain the marine environment in the Straits. The arguments center on thequestions of: who pays? What is a fair share? How can this be accomplishedwithout infringing on the right of freedom of navigation and how should thefund be managed?
Conclusion
From the very brief overview above we can see that the current maritime
security issues and problems in Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly
serious. In the South China Sea, multiple claimant states are locked into acomplex wrangle for which there is no immediate or fast solution. Eachclaimant state is tempted to consolidate its claims by various means. Eachunilateral move or bilateral confrontation can upset the precarious peace.
The sea-lane of communication is increasingly being challenged by pirate
attacks. Adequate contingency to safeguard the environmental security of theStraits of Malacca and Singapore is suspended over a long-drawn debate of
responsibilities and contributions. Recent economic and political crises havebrought social disorder and have fueled separatist movements, especially inthe archipelagos. Fortunately the region as a whole is moving towards
greater cooperation as agreements and cooperative arrangement arehammered out. The governments in Southeast Asia realize that regional
cooperation may be the only way out of economic crisis. Given the diversity
among the states, regional leadership and multilateral approach are necessary.

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