自由論題［研究論文］

Nuclear Power and Host Communities
in Japan
An Inquiry into Human Insecurities

原子力発電所と共に生きる
地域住民のリスク理解と不安

Tarek Katramiz
Doctoral Program, Graduate School of Media and Governance, Keio University
ターレク カトウラミーズ
慶應義塾大学大学院政策・メディア研究科後期博士課程

Abstract:

The fieldwork over the past two years in a community -- Hamaoka Nuclear
Power Plant in Shizuoka Prefecture -- in the settings similar to the Fukushima
nuclear power plant site helps uncover that the community residents lack viable
alternatives to the way they have customarily led their lives while facing an array ofrisks related to the operation of the nuclear power plant: employment opportunities,
rise and decline of service sectors and conditions of social infrastructure which
had been financed by the nuclear facility-related subsidies. More importantly, thisarray of risks is as threatening to the residents as the threat of a nuclear power
plant failure, except the former is a daily threat whereas the latter still presents
itself as “probable.” The paper examines the difficulty attendant upon the lifeof the residents in a nuclear power plant site in the form of human insecurities(vulnerabilities) existing before and after the Fukushima disaster.
過去 2 年の間に、筆者は福島第 1 原子力発電所と類似する境遇に置かれている地域住民（静岡県御前崎町の浜岡原子力発電所）に焦点をあてて研究を進め、地域住民は日常生活の中でどのように原子力にかかわるリスクを認知し、それに基づいてどのように判断を下すのか、観察を続けてきた。研究では、地域住民の選択の自由は原子力発電所による補助金やインフラが作る環境の影
響などで経済的や雇用に関わる理由上、限られていることがわかった。本稿では、原子力の発展の歴史の文脈と詳細な地域住民の語りを考慮に入れながら、人間の不安定な生活状態（脆弱性）の形を提示する。

Keywords: nuclear power plant, host community, risk, human security, Hamaoka

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Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japan

Introduction
Since Japan’s triple disaster on 11 March 2011, there have been
understandably vast amounts of literature in English on the naturaland nuclear disasters from the lens of human security (Bacon andHobson, 2014; Bacon, Hobson and Cameron, 2014). However, little
attention has been paid to the life of local communities hosting othernuclear power plants around Japan. While the safety of nuclear power
plants has occupied much of the post-Fukushima disaster issues, thehuman insecurity of the host communities elsewhere has failed tocatch the attention with similar intensity.
Persisting socio-economic vulnerabilities – shrinking and ageing
population and corresponding weakening of economic foundations –within these communities are nevertheless a decisive factor in shaping
the host communities’ attitude towards nuclear power plants. For
them, radioactive contamination and risks to health from a Fukushimalike nuclear accident – which has always been a potential scenario
among every host community in Japan – is but one among many
concerns acting on decisions making and everyday life choices. The
Fukushima crisis has only exacerbated these unaddressed situations– highlighting a dangerous facility in their backyards. What happened
to the host community of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plantis acting today as a mirror reflecting the insecurities that come withliving next to a nuclear facility.
This fraught situation – a potential threat that the hosting
communities face and the lack of attention to it in a broader context
of life – can be seen as a result of decades of preoccupation with theneed to accommodate national economic interests at the cost of local
community life. Part serves the good of the whole.
This paper explores the underlying human insecurity that drives
the residents of host communities to neglect the nuclear threat.
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For an outside observer, the more obvious threat of nuclear power
plant failure should easily slight the residents’ other concerns in thecontext of everyday life. However, the insecurity emanates from nothaving alternatives to the way the residents have customarily led theirlives, and as such is as potent as living with a possibility of nuclear
power plant failure.
Human security, a notion first presented in 1994 United Nations
Development Program, has since refined its analytical perspective
through policy practices and theoretical debates. (See for example
Kaldor, 2007 and Lautensach and Lautensach, 2013). The perspective
which particularly merits our attention is its focus upon the conditions
for“informed decisions”(Commission on Human Security, 2003), as
it encourages us to closely examine a particular source of threat –nuclear power plant failure – against a vast array of concerns which
dictates life of any ordinary citizen. This perspective that a nuclear
power plant failure does, or can, not fully consume the life of theresidents of the host community offers the basis of understanding whysometimes the residents appear to be too concerned with protecting
narrowly their interests, or they appear to be even ignorant of
the apparent threat of nuclear power plant failure. As such theperspective brings us closer to the life of the residents of the hostcommunity where there is a limited freedom in exercising choices.
The findings and interviews through multiple rounds of fieldworks
conducted between April 2012 and December 2014 in Omaezaki city [1]where the Hamaoka nuclear power plant is built offer the basis forthe examination from this perspective. Similar to other nuclear power
plant-host communities in Japan, the local community in Hamaoka has
been supporting the operation of a nuclear facility in their backyard
due mainly to financial reasons: the municipality receives large sum ofmoney in the form of subsidies, contributions and property tax. On 14

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Nuclear Power and Host Communities in JapanMay 2011, all operations were suspended at the plant in the wake of
the Fukushima nuclear crisis and amid the fears that an 8-magnituteearthquake might hit the Tokai area within the next 30 years (Japan
Times, BBC News, Bloomberg, 8 May 2011).
The host community in Hamaoka has always been somewhat
divided regarding its position on the nuclear power plant in its
backyard. After the Fukushima crisis, the reality of the nuclear
threat has become impossible to ignore. However, despite legitimate
safety concerns, many appear to be in favor of restarting the nuclear
facility. This has been portrayed in the media after the mayoral
election campaign in Omaezaki city in 2012 when the restarting or
decommissioning of the Hamaoka nuclear power became a hot issue
and Shigeo Ishihara, a supporter of nuclear power plant, was reelected (Asahi Shimbun, 16 April 2012).
What is striking about this post-Fukushima development is thatthe local residents, regardless of their preference on restarting thepower plant, seem to be lacking choices while facing an array of risks
related, but not necessarily restricted, to the operation of the nuclear
power plant. Destabilized employment opportunities, rise and declineof service sectors and conditions of social infrastructure, which had
been financed by the nuclear facility-related subsidies, are some ofthe deep-running concerns among the residents. Through the Hamaoka
case study, an overall picture of the situation of post-Fukushima hostcommunities in Japan may be illuminated.
In accordance with the objective of this study, this paper is
a combination of an exploratory and descriptive research, whichcalls attention to the multiplicity of risk element in the site of the
Hamaoka nuclear power plant. I use the notion of“risk”developed byGerman sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992) who argues how individuals
in industrial societies are caught in a significantly complex chain
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of causes and effects, and are increasingly incapable of recognizing
the consequences of their own action with certainty. In other words,
individuals are likely to be left with insecurity even when the decision
for action is their own. The reason for adopting a narrative approachand semi-structured interviews emanates from critiques of theorizing
around risk society. Tulloch and Lupton (2003) in particular argue
that theorizing should be accompanied by empirical evidence. Thus,
they suggest that people’s risk narratives need to be examined in thecontext of their everyday lives and in regard to the different ways
they experience their local and social identities.
A positive aspect of using a narrative approach during myfieldwork in Hamaoka was evident in the way the interlocutors
responded; I found they had little reluctance to speak up their minds
when asked amid a casual conversation, within familiar settings. All
the interviews were thus conducted in a manner that engaged the
respondents in a conversational approach, instead of a rigid questionanswer format. The fieldwork mainly consisted of two parts. First,
I conducted arbitrary interviews with many local residents in the
middle of their regular activities. Second, I conducted semi-structured
interviews with six residents who live in the vicinity of the nuclear
power plant. Every interview lasted no less than an hour and was
conducted in Japanese.
The residents expressed many concerns beside their safety,
resulting in a highly paradoxical attitude towards the nuclear facility.
The research found that they have found ways to live normally –much less deviation than expected from the way they have lived – inthe shadow of the nuclear facility while addressing the more pressing
demands of everyday life. This does not mean that the residents
ignore or minimize the danger that a nuclear power plant in theirbackyard represents; I found that they make constant references to436

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japantheir concerns over the Fukushima crisis. However, this increasingawareness, as real as it appears, rarely if ever, translates into anarticulated opposition to the nuclear power plant. One of the paper’s
main purposes is to convey the stories of some local residents in
Hamaoka as an attempt to contextualize the usual bipolar dichotomyof being‘for’or‘against’the nuclear power plant.

1

Before Fukushima: Human Security vs. Economic
Security

1.1 Nuclear Power: Inherent Human Insecurity?
That“for most people today, a feeling of insecurities arises morefrom worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic
world event”(United Nations Development Program, 1994, p.3) may beeasily dismissed as a mere passing statement. But this passage, morethan anything else, touches upon the core of insecurity confronting the
Hamaoka residents.
There may be two developments that call our attention. First,
Hamaoka represents similar communities where nuclear power
plants have been installed over the past half-century all over Japan.
These communities have faced what is popularly known as kaso – depopulation and the attendant ageing of the remaining population. Kaso
is more than a demographic phenomenon, and is accompanied by thedeterioration of financial and other foundations of the community.
The power industry, while facing the need for alternative energy
sources to oil, began constructing nuclear power plants, exploitingthese socio-economic vulnerabilities (Bacon and Hobson, 2014). Long
before the Fukushima disaster took place, the so-called“nuclear
village”[2] – the coalition of government, bureaucratic, academic andindustrial pro-nuclear advocates – took advantage of the economic
insecurities of the community. Daniel Aldrich goes even further in
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Site fights (2008), stating that impoverished communities with“lowcommunity solidarity”and low“social capital”are targeted in orderto minimize the risk of opposition and make them accept monetaryoffers for hosting nuclear power plants. Faced with few options, thesecommunities tend to accept more readily hosting nuclear power plantsthat offer sources of revenues and employment opportunities, if less inthe plant itself than in secondary industries such as construction andservices.
The other development, corollary to the first, is that many ofthese communities, in the absence of appropriate human resources,were mostly excluded from the decision-making process as secrecy
surrounded planning and arrangements were made in advance. To
avoid intra-community conflict in Hamaoka, Chubu Electric Power
Company maintained confidentiality about the nuclear proposal andrelied on behind-the-scene power brokers to manage the promotionof the project (Lisberel, 1998). It was only when the plan was leaked
to the Sankei newspaper in July 1967 that an opposition could – andindeed did – emerge in the area. Similarly, in Okuma town, close
to where the Fukushima Daiichi is located, the town assembly had
blocked information about the project from becoming public andapproved hosting the plant two years before the local residents
found out (Onitsuka, 2012). From this perspective, the developmentof nuclear power did not enhance human security when it comes toexercising“informed”decision (Commission on Human Security
Report, 2003, p.10).
The nuclear industry in Japan has been developed by exploiting
weak and vulnerable host communities. This exploitation of
depopulating and impoverishing communities has always existed in
Fukushima, Hamaoka and other host communities. The Fukushimadisaster has only helped us identify these long-existing issues. Human

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Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japansecurity, in this essay, deals with the manner by which the weak
confronts the limited choices in their life.
1.2 Towards Nuclear Power: Historical Context
Retracing how Japan historically brought nuclear power into its
territories is crucial in order to understand the current situation of
the host communities. One cannot indeed help but raise the question
on how Japan, the only country to have experienced the trauma of
nuclear bombings, ended up being the third-largest user of nuclear
power, after the United States and France, [3] Japan heavily promoted
the use of nuclear energy after WWII based on economic interests.
However, though power development was a major economic and energy
policy in postwar Japan, the beginning of the nuclear power industry
was“political rather than economic”. [4]The Daigo Fukuryu-maru (Lucky Dragon 5) incident, on March
1, 1954, was a triggering factor. On this day, all crewmembers of theJapanese fishing vessel, Daigo Fukuryu-maru, a 140-ton fishing boatout of Yaizu, Shizuoka Prefecture, were exposed to different levelsof radiation following a US hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Atoll. The
tragic event added on the pre-existing anti-nuclear sentiments, thelegacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki being still fresh on the national
psyche. The Lucky Dragon incident thus acted as a catalyst to breakthe long-suppressed rage over the 1945 atomic bombings. Japanesepublic was appalled and anti-US movements broke out, which led to
the formation of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan. [5]To contain the situation and overcome anti-nuclear sentiment, theUS stressed the peaceful use of nuclear power as being previously
stated in Eisenhower’s speech“Atoms for Peace”, delivered in
1953. [6] This helped the US to soften their own image of a wartime
enemy responsible for dropping the two atomic bombs. During the
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same period, Japanese conservatives were becoming aware of theeconomic potentials nuclear technology offered. In particular, Houseof Representative member Nakasone Yasuhiro ( prime ministerfrom 1982 to 1987 ) and the owner of the Yomiuri newspaper,
Shoriki Matsutaro [7] (who became the first president of the Atomic
Energy Council in 1956), were two influential personalities who
enthusiastically promoted Eisenhower’s“Atoms for Peace”project.
Despite the skepticism of Japanese scientists at the time about the“peaceful use”of nuclear power (Yoshioka, 1999, p. 64), Nakasone
and Shoriki’efforts resulted in allocating for the first time abudget for nuclear power in the national budget of 1954.[8] In 1955,
the Japanese government passed the Atomic Energy Basis law,which stated that nuclear power must be promoted based on threeprinciples –“democratic”methods,“independent”management and“transparency”.[9]At the same time, Japan began to import cheap crude oil from theMiddle East, shifting from coal to oil and pushing the development of
nuclear power to the 1960s. The country started its first commercial
nuclear reactor (Tokaimura) in 1966, and began operating three moresimilar reactors, including one in Fukushima prefecture in 1970. Dueto the oil shock in 1973, Japan decided to expand the reliance on
nuclear energy in order to prevent facing a similar crisis that would
jeopardize the productivity. Japanese electricity companies were also
becoming drawn to nuclear power as an attractive technology and a
relatively cheaper one compared to hydroelectricity, which requiredhuge investment in dam constructions, or to thermal power, which
depended on the oil market. Japan was dependent on crude oil imports
nearly exclusively from the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. By
1973, Japanese politicians came to the conclusion that investment in
nuclear energy must be increased to keep achieving high economic

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growth. Even after the Fukushima accident, the 96-year-old Nakasone
still advocates nuclear energy stating that Japan must“maintain andadvance its nuclear policy”(Asahi Newspaper, 23 May 2011). In thesame article, he recalled that, back in the mid-1950s,“Energy was themost critical issue in postwar Japan. We had no oil, no gas, and ourcoal reserves were dwindling. To recover from the defeat in the war
and be back on our feet again, securing energy was our country’s mosturgent task. That is why I concluded nuclear energy had to be theanswer.”The Japanese government thus supported the constructionof nuclear power plants to decrease the dependence on foreign oil andnatural gas. Today, many conservatives share the same mindset as
Nakasone in regard to nuclear power. Those politicians typically relyon the same economic argument through emphasizing the importance of
securing energy, while underplaying the risks and threats surrounding
nuclear power plants.
Most nuclear power plants were constructed in Japan during
the 1960s and 1970s. The period between initial planning and thestart of the operation varies depending on each case, but it generally
took about ten years. Japan’s first nuclear reactor was constructedin Ibaraki prefecture, Tokai district, in 1961 and began operating
in 1966. Tsuruga, Fukushima Daiichi and Mihama plant commenced
operation in 1970. Takahama plant and Genkai Plant in Kyushu cameafter, in 1974 and 1975 respectively. Hamaoka plant in Shizuoka
was initially planned in 1967 and the first reactor began operating in
1976. The expansion of nuclear power continued to increase in thefollowing years as many of the above-mentioned plants added newreactors. With fifty-four reactors in operation, Japan had the thirdlargest number of reactors in the world by the mid 1990s. Prior to
the nuclear crisis in Fukushima, Japan had fifty functioning reactorsthat generated 30 percent of its electricity.
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1.3

Siting Nuclear Power Plants: Creating a “Cycle of Economic
Addiction”
The whole process of turning Japan into a leading country innuclear power production did not go without provoking a response
from potential candidates of host communities. To facilitate siting new
projects or adding new reactors to the ones already in operation, theJapanese government passed the“Three Power Source Development
Laws”system (dengen sanpo) in 1974 to subsidize local municipalities
willing to host the nuclear facilities. The new system provided a
powerful incentive as it produced a flow of cash by requiring all
Japanese power consumers to pay a tax that was funneled to hosting
communities. This played a major role in promoting and developing
nuclear power as an alternative to oil.
In total, local governments hosting nuclear reactors received 915
billion Yen in subsidies after the law was passed. Moreover, plant
operators paid a total of 892 billion Yen in fixed property taxes tohost towns and donated 53 billion Yen to local governments. The
donations, however, could be higher because local governments andelectric utilities refuse to confirm the sum total of donations (Asahi
Shimbun, 15 September 2011). As a result, host communities havebecome dependent on the nuclear industry and central government.
Subsidies not only improved living standards, but also createdemployment opportunities and attracted secondary industries. The
subsidies also improved welfare services and lowered taxes.
Another characteristic of the process of siting nuclear power
plant in Japan is that localities where organized opposition was
likely to be the lowest were systematically targeted. In Hamaoka, thecommunity was rural, depopulating and had weak local organizations
and no history of opposition or environmental movements. In sucha context, once a local community accepts the first nuclear reactor,

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it becomes susceptible to be selected to host future ones (Hoyman,2001). The initial acceptance of nuclear power plant creates what
activists from civil society call“cycle of addiction”(Hasegawa, 2004,p.26): the taxes and side contribution coming from the facilities create
dependency in host communities. This is because acquired funds only
peak when a reactor is accepted and then drop sharply after operation
begins. Thus, host communities are incented to host additional
reactors so the municipality remains financially sounds. Hamaoka hosts
five nuclear reactors and the construction of the sixth one began in
2008. The construction had to be suspended later following the triple
disaster in 3.11.
Thus, the development of nuclear power plant in Japan has ahistory of targeting economically weak communities and trappingthem into long-term contracts of dependence. Both the Japanese
government and the nuclear industry were actors in this strategy.
From a human security perspective, socio-economic insecurity madelocal communities more vulnerable for exploitation and deprived themof freedom of choice.

2 Development of Nuclear Power Plant in Hamaoka
The old town of Hamaoka, where I have been conducting
fieldwork, has been through major transformations since theconstruction of the nuclear facilities. This has played an importantrole in shaping people’ lives in the years following the introductionof the nuclear facility. In the following paragraphs, by relying on
interviews with local residents and literature accounts, I would like todescribe the changes that affected the old Hamaoka and how these led
to transformations in the livelihoods of the locals.
According to the historical study of the journalist Mori Shigeki,
Genpatsu no machi kara (From the Nuclear City):“The region [Ogasa
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district[10]] which lies between the city of Shizuoka and Hamamatsuis blessed with lands in abundance”. He later adds that,“when it
comes to the Taiheiyou belt [also known as the Tokaido corridor],industrialization and development have been widespread in the region
except for the southern part”. Indeed, this was the case in the old
Hamaoka town, located in this southern part, which was left behind by
developers after the war. Hamaoka town was created from the merging
of several villages in the 1950s and the population was about 17000
before the planning of the nuclear facility began.[11] The main source ofincome was farming (70% of the population produced rice, tea, melon
and tobacco) with a large proportion of part-time farmers.[12] However,with no industrial base, the Hamaoka town was facing a depopulation
crisis, as it was losing around 300 young people every year to otherurban regions that offered higher employment opportunities. As one
informant (70 years old) said,“In 1950s and beginning of 1960s, thename‘Hamaoka’did not ring a bell when brought up in Shizuoka or
Hamamatsu city. This town was certainly some kind of marginalized
unknown place to many people”. Hamaoka was just another typicaldepopulated town, with a very weak and negligible tax base that
accounted only for 37% of the town finance. [13]The nuclear project went public for the first time after the
project proposal was leaked to the Sankei newspaper, which featured
the plan in its front page (July 5, 1967) with an article entitled:“Chubu
Nuclear Power Plant: Hamaoka Town (Shizuoka prefecture) will bein the lead with Generation Capacity of 500.000 KW, three times theamount of Tokaimura Nuclear power plant”. It was in the summerof 1967 that Chubu Electric officially chose Hamaoka as the location
for a nuclear power plant; they anticipated receiving the approval of
the Electric Power Development Coordination Council (EPDCC) by
the end of the same year.[14] Siting nuclear power plant was feasible444

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japanin the area because of the absence of mountainous terrains and theabundance of adequate cooling water.
As for the Japanese government, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) positively assessed the project because it
was supposed to balance the market in the central regions of Chubu
and Kansai.[15] On the prefectural level, the government valued thenuclear project highly in terms of achieving three policy priorities
listed in the 7th economic development plan (1966).[16] The firstpriority focused on maintaining high levels of economic growth as
Shizuoka, unlike the nearby regions of Kanto and Kansai, had low
levels of economic growth in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s.
The prefecture entered a high growth period only in the mid-1960s,
as a result of development and industrialization of the eastern andwestern regions. In this regard, the nuclear power plant was essential
to enhance the economic development. Following MITI’s concerns
about electricity, the second priority was to increase electricity selfsufficiency in Shizuoka to reduce its reliance on energy plants inTokyo and Kanagawa.[17] The third priority was to stimulate economic
growth in the isolated southern part of Shizuoka to catch up with theeastern and western part of the prefecture. This part compromising
Hamaoka, Omaezaki and other towns was labeled by MITI as
underdeveloped.[18]Gaining approval for siting the Hamaoka nuclear power plant
took less than two years making the bargaining settlement one of
the fastest in the history of nuclear power sitings in Japan (Lisberel1998). Political Scientist S. Hayden Lisberel did an extensive
work on the bargaining process for siting nuclear power plants inJapan (NIMBY Politics in Japan 1998) and showed through multiple
case studies why some bargaining processes could take short time
for gaining approval while other could be prolonged, forcing the
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promoters, in some situation, to even abandon the whole project. In
bargaining, according to Lisberel,“it is important to keep the doors
open to negotiation or to open them where they are closed. Bargaining
processes and outcomes will be influenced by the extent to which
promoters manage effectively distributional issues in the ways thatminimize unwanted interference”(Lisberel, p.80). Lisberel describes
in his account on the siting of Hamaoka how Chubu Electric learnt
from lessons of a failed experience at Ashihama in Ise: avoid regional
officials and rely on regional power brokers to split any kind of
emerging opposition (ibid).
As expected, there was an influential network of politicians,
businessmen, regional and local powerbrokers whose interests andregional loyalties led them to bringing development to southernpart of Shizuoka prefecture.[19] Following the Sankei article, town
authorities opened a local briefing to discuss the primary construction
plan of the nuclear reactor with local residents.[20] In addition, themayor presented a progress report to the surrounding municipalities
such as Omaezaki and Sagara at the end of the same month. On 23
September of the same year, the town council of Hamaoka decided toenter negotiations with Chubu Electric Power. The council agreed toaccept the construction of the nuclear power plant“if the terms andconditions of compensations are fulfilled”(Mori, 1982, p.54). This is
how the construction of nuclear facility was decided in Hamaoka.
However, two major problems emerged throughout the planning:purchase of land and opposition from fishing cooperatives. In October,
Chubu Electric began negotiations with 302 landowners in Hamaoka
for land acquisition (1.6 million m2). Negotiations did not go verysmoothly and the two parties only reached agreement the following
year.[21] In the end, Chubu Electric paid a total of 1.6 billion Yen forland compensation, three times the average compensation paid by446

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in JapanTEPCO or Kansai Electric Power.[22] The main reason lies in thefact that the land purchased for the nuclear facility was not distantfrom dwelling houses. In the end, 302 landowners received large sumof money ranging from 10 to 70 million Yen.[23] This has resulted in arift between the newly rich residents and those who did not receive
money. Human relationships changed in this communal farming town ina way that would affect the decision-making structure in the following
years. Chubu Electric exploited the new hierarchical network of local
politics in the community to obtain acceptance of the nuclear facility
and, over the years, of its expansion.
The second problem came from the fishing cooperatives, which
comprised Omaezaki, Sakai Hirata, Sagara, Jittogata, and Yoshidafishing cooperatives. These formed the largest association of fishingcooperatives in Shizuoka prefecture. [24] Around 1100 fishermenorganized demonstrations in the neighboring towns. Coastal fishermen
were concerned about the environmental impact of the project andpossible loss in value of their catch that mainly consisted of whitebait
and shrimps. In particular, the coastline from Hamaoka to Yoshida had
an ideal environment for whitebait, which catch valued at 1.1 billion
Yen at the time. Fishermen argued that waster water released fromthe nuclear power plant would increase the temperature of the wateraround the shore. However, fishing cooperative had high proportionof deep-sea fishermen and those in contrast did not worry about thenegative impact the plant could have on their catch, mainly tuna. Also,
they were more interested in obtaining compensation to reduce theirdebts.[25] This rift between coastal and deep-sea fishermen acted to
weaken the opposition and failed to change the structure of bargaining
process. Another factor that contributed to this failure was that thefishing industry was less important to the economy on prefecturallevel.[26] Promoters effectively capitalized on the weak position of
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fishermen and managed to change their stance by mitigating the risks
and paying compensations (600 million Yen) for fishing rights.[27]However, opposition did emerge despite the fact that people
were not yet fully aware of the danger of commercial nuclear power
plants.[28] A group constituted mainly of lawyers, teachers, housewives
and some local farmers who were concerned about the potential
environmental hazards of nuclear energy was formed. Utilities andtown assembly responded by holding public lectures to assure thesafety and benefits of the nuclear energy.[29] Moreover, Chubu Electricarranged free trips for community members (top to bottom level of thecommunity) to visit other sites of nuclear power plants. This approacheffectively acted to alleviate safety concerns and highlight generous
benefits brought by nuclear power. [30]This is how the construction of nuclear power plant wasapproved. Chubu Electric relied on power brokers to facilitate thenegotiation with the Hamaoka community. By managing opposition
effectively, Chubu Electric could reach a very fast settlement and gain
the permission for construction. Operators successfully downplayed
the nuclear risk and capitalized on the economic vulnerabilityof the local community. Upon completing the construction of thefirst reactor, commercial operation began in 1976. Beside thecompensation, nuclear-related subsidies peaked after the central
government passed the“Three Power Development Laws”in 1974 andthe local government of Hamaoka received a flow of cash. Even when
Chubu Electric proposed the expansion of the plant with a second
reactor, opposition was insignificant and the local community ralliedin favor because of the economic dependency it had created. The tworeactors brought the town hundred of millions in public works money
and property tax revenues, which accounted to 40%. For accepting
to host five reactors, Hamaoka has received more than 45 billion Yen

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in subsidies as of fiscal year 2010 (Japan Times, 16 February 2012).
The money funded many public facilities such as hospitals, schools,
a public library and a swimming pool. The nuclear plant provided
employment, less in the plant itself than in the secondary industries.[31]For an impoverished underdeveloped rural area like Hamaoka, theeconomic security brought by the nuclear plant created a sense of
dependency that has deepened over the years. One informant summed
it up:“The town was so poor that many times we were not able to set
up the budget... The nuclear power plant was like a goose that laid
golden egg on a muddy land.”3 Local Residents’ Narratives
During my fieldwork in Omaezaki city, I conducted one to twohour semi-structured interviews with six local residents who live
within 5 km radius to the Hamaoka nuclear power plant. The choiceof these residents was based purely on their willingness to talk witha stranger about their everyday life: no specific criteria were applied
beyond this one that appeared fundamental to me in order to obtainas spontaneous, as personal an account as possible. I had no priorknowledge of their opinions on the power plant, nor information about
whether their livelihood was in anyway dependent on it. However,it turned out that all of them had something to say about how theirlives had been affected, for better or worse, by them hosting a nuclear
power plant in their backyard.
Although the main focus of each interview revolved around the
respondent’s position in regard to the restart or shutdown of thepower plant, interviews touched upon various topics such as local
politics, employment, family ties, local history and others. The local
residents naturally brought up their social and familial backgrounds
as well as their perception of the local context in order to answer
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each question. As their narratives will demonstrate, the residents
themselves mentioned an array of urgent concerns in order toarticulate their position towards the nuclear power plant. Thus, theproblem never translated into being simply for or against hosting a
nuclear power plant but rather into a complex on-going negotiation
among various elements of their everyday lives.
3.1 Mrs. A
Mrs. A is a talkative and welcoming lady in her 50s. She owns
an inn with a capacity of around 20 clients located in the vicinityof the Hamaoka nuclear power plant. It is not the only inn of its
kind but hers is one of the closest, being only around 2 km from thenuclear plant. Relying mainly on clients affiliated with the nuclear
facilities, she managed to turn her small family property into a goodbusiness 20 years ago. During the operation of the plant, her hotel
relied on technicians, engineers and businessmen coming from big
cities like Tokyo and Osaka. Today, following the Fukushima nuclear
disaster and the subsequent suspension of the Hamaoka nuclear power
plant, Mrs. A is uncertain about the future. She has no alternative
business plan for her hotel in case the power plant is pushed towarda shutdown. For the time being, however, the suspension of the power
plant has not yet badly affected Mrs. A’s business. The hotel has
been quite busy with clients of different purposes: journalists, antinuclear activists and professionals involved in the building of the tideembankment in front of the Hamaoka nuclear power plant.“I live inconfusion and so does everyone in this town”, she tells me.
I start with Mrs. A’s narrative because it captures theuncertainties residents whose livelihoods depend on the nuclear
industry face on a daily basis. Mrs. A has one son (22 year-old) and
one daughter (19-year-old). Her son did not continue his studies after450

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japanfinishing high school and decided instead to work with his motherrunning the inn business. As for his sister, she had to move out from
Omaezaki city when she was accepted in undergraduate program at
Shizuoka University. When I ask Mrs. A for which candidate she
voted in the mayoral election conducted in the summer of 2012,
she says:“I voted for Ishihara because he promised to restart the
Hamaoka nuclear power plant. You could argue that restarting the
Hamaoka is a wrong decision and I would agree with you. But let’s
not fool ourselves here. There are no other alternatives for now orin the near future.”Mrs. A thus justifies her political choice out ofpragmatism. Mrs. A believes that her business would not survive
without the restart of the power plant. She tells me that she wishes
there was a better alternative where clients would come to her hotelfor other purposes than the power plant.
3.2 Mr. B
Mr. B is a former high school teacher (76) who lives around2.5 km from the plant. He readily tells me that he has always been
opposed to the plant and been actively involved in anti-nuclear
campaigns since the Kobe earthquake. When asked about how hereceived the news of Fukushima in 2011, Mr. B says that,“people
around me were totally shocked when the Fukushima disaster hadtaken place. They always thought nuclear power is safe”. He admits
that he himself, despite his awareness of the danger a nuclear power
plant poses, was taken aback with the triple disaster of 3.11.“Thewhole thing in Fukushima came as shock even for someone like me whoalways felt skeptical about nuclear power. It is very traumatic when
you realize that it could have happened in Hamaoka”. Mr. B thinks the
future of Omaezaki would be better without the nuclear power plantand believes that today is the right time to step up discussions on
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how to build a future without depending on large subsidies and grants
for hosting a nuclear power plant. His position is explicitly based ontaking into account a broader context than the immediate surrounding
he lives in. He says:
I think the town can survive without the nuclear facilities.
Many people share the same view and many started thinking
about developing the town without the power plant. But also,
unfortunately, many people still think that Omaezaki would be
financially a poor municipality without the nuclear power plant.
There are examples from the past that support their arguments.
Historically, when Japan changed its energy policy and shiftedfrom coal to oil, many towns such as Yubari in Hokkaido and othertowns in Kyushu, were subsequently impoverished following theclosing of coalmines.
The comparison with the case of Yubari is interesting: thelocality is now well known for being one of the poorest in Japan. Mr.
B thus seems to acknowledge how such an example could represent astrong argument in favor of the pro-nuclear discourse.
Mr. B expresses his frustration with people who kept silent
after the Fukushima accident, in cautious terms. He does not point atanyone in particular but he says that some still do not want to openly
oppose the nuclear facility or even at least voice their anxieties about
the danger surrounding it. He blames the current situation on thelocal government who so far failed to provide a viable alternative forthe future,“Even after the Fukushima disaster, the local government
continues to promote hosting the Hamaoka nuclear power plant due tothe generous financial contributions that it brings.”452

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japan

3.3 Mr. C and Mrs. D
Mr. C and Mrs. D are married and both in their late 60s. They
work together in their ramen shop, which they opened in 1985 inOmaezaki. The place is very authentic in style with more than 10
pictures hanging on one wall. There is one black and white pictureof Mr. C and his parents wearing Japanese Kimono.“This was taken
during the summer festival in the beginning of the 60s”Mr. C says.
He still remembers how hard life was as a child in this small fishingvillage. He adds:
My father used a small boat to catch shirasu [whitebait],
which he carried on his back to the market. There were no roads
at the time. Villagers had to walk through narrow unpaved paths
in straw sandals. This of course, all changed after the nuclear
power plant was introduced in the town.
There is a picture of Mr. C and Mrs. D taken in front of thefamous Sensoji Shrine in Asakusa, Tokyo.“That was during ourhoneymoon,”says Mrs. D and she adds while smiling that“visiting
Tokyo was like a dream for many here.”There is another picture
taken during a baseball game of the couple and their daughter, whorecently moved with her family to Kansai. On asking them whether
they miss her, Mrs. D comments:
It was a very sad period when my daughter and her husband
decided to move out from Omaezaki after the good job offer myson-in-law received from a construction company in Osaka. It wasparticularly sad to be separated from my two grandsons. Today,
however, watching on TV what happened to the families affectedby the Fukushima disaster, we both feel relieved to have our two
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grandsons away in Osaka rather than here where the Hamaoka
nuclear power station is very close.
Mr. C agrees with his wife and says:“We cannot imagine what
would happen to our town if a similar disaster hits the area.”The
old couple does not want to take the risk of having their grandsons
around Omaezaki and prefer to go visit them in Kansai. Contrary tomost of the residents I talked to, the old couple does not try so muchto articulate for me the situation in economic or political terms, butmainly shares their emotions towards the beloved members of theirfamily. They are especially willing to talk about their memories ofthe past, presenting their life before the power plant as very hardand inconvenient, doing so with some nostalgia. They do not declarethemselves clearly for or against the power plant, Mr. C stating onlythat he is skeptical about the safety of the nuclear power plant andmentioning having an argument with a pro-nuclear local assemblyman.
As paradoxical as that may sound, Mr. C does not explain thisargument as resulting from an open opposition on his side to thepower plant.
3.4 Mr. E
Mr. E (56) is an operator of a restaurant located in the vicinityof the Hamaoka nuclear power plant. After having a conversation withhim, I understood that his business relies heavily on clients employedby the nuclear station. He believes that he will be facing troubles if
the power plant is shut down permanently.
Shutting down the power plant would be ideal for people
whose livelihoods are not dependent on this industry. Many
people, including myself, support the power plant today because454

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japan

we are dependent on it. With the suspension of the operation, theeconomic situation of this town is uncertain. I know for sure thatmy business would not survive unless the nuclear reactors arerestarted.
Despite this attitude, Mr. E is so aware of the danger of the plantthat he is encouraging his two sons, who are high school students, tofind a university in big cities like Tokyo or Osaka. He adds:
The local government keeps talking about the need for a
future vision that would bring prosperity to this town. Thoughpeople do not see any prospects for the future. In the past, I
thought my sons would take over my restaurant but now I changed
my mind. I do not want them to stay in Omaezaki anymore. I would
rather have them working away without bearing so much risk. For
now, and as long as my children are around here, I want to secure
our everyday life so I support the restart of the power plant.
Thus, openly supporting the restart of the power plant does not
automatically equal to seeing in the power plant a viable solution for
the future: Mr. E wants the power plant to restart for the sake of his
business but does not consider Omaezaki city as a promising place tobuild a life, with or without a nuclear power plant.
3.5 Mrs. F
Mrs. F was born in 1976, the same year that the Hamaoka nuclear
power plant began its operation. She was raised in Hamaoka town
and still lives there with her husband and two children. The 38-yearold housewife expresses her worries about the safety of the Hamaoka
nuclear power plant. She has been devoting her free time to reading
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about Fukushima.“The more I read about the current situation, themore worried I become”, she says, and continues:
My family and I are still in shock because of the ongoing
Fukushima crisis. We have never thought that such a terrible
accident would happen in our country. Residents have been always
assured of the safety of the nuclear reactors by the school andthe government. Today, everything has changed and there is no
final solution. It is mentally exhausting. We are all worried about
whether the same disaster could happen at the Hamaoka nuclear
plant.
Mrs. F, like many other residents, was shocked by the Fukushimadisaster. Indeed, all respondents have expressed a feeling of anxiety
about the safety of the Hamaoka nuclear power plant. Minor accidents
that the locals have experienced in the past were narrated as primersof anxiety. However, a Fukushima-like accident was the most anxietyprovoking event so far. Mrs. F’s account is particularly interesting in
the fact that she mentions how Fukushima made her lose the trust she
used to have towards the two institutions that she credits for tellingher nuclear power was safe: school and government.
Despite Mrs. F’s reluctance to support the nuclear facility in her
town, she was pressured by her husband’s economic conditions to votefor the candidate who promoted the nuclear power during the mayoral
campaign. The reason behind this surprising shift in position is that
an electric company, which is affiliated with Chubu electric, hires Mrs.
F’s husband. She concludes:
Unfortunately, my family has only one source of income andthat is my husband’s job. As long as this situation continues withno concrete plan, we have to go for the nuclear power in this town.

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In the interim, I will just keep my fingers crossed for a miracle tohappen.
Just as Mr. E is encouraging his teenage sons to leave in the
future, Mrs. F somewhat wishes for her children a future far awayfrom Hamaoka. However, for both residents, this wish does nottranslate whatsoever into any effective steps towards them moving
away. In the case of Mrs. F, her children being too young to be able tomove away on their own does not seem to make a significant differencein the way she weighs up her options.

4 Analysis of Local Residents’ Narrative:
As shown above, local residents are generally well aware of therisk involved in hosting a nuclear power plant but are also confronted
with difficult decisions to make, which have visible consequences on
everyday life. This reaffirms Beck’s (1992) discussion in the context
of modernization where the individuals are caught up in a complex
network of causes and effects in the society. Thus, it is the notsafety alone that is causing distress among local residents. Whileacknowledging that nuclear power is a risk and as such anxiety
provoking, residents are still reluctant to raise their voices against
the plant, fearing an unexpected outcome on their livelihoods. Many
residents indeed think that speaking against the nuclear power plant
may cause unintended collateral damage in other corners of theirlives.
What is surprising is that all of the accounts are characterized
by“uncertainty”and the“lack of ability to decide”. It appears
evident in the residents’ narratives that the threat of a nuclear
accident is overshadowed by the more urgent and deep-running
concerns of everyday life. The residents are thus left with an inability
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to weigh up multiple options on the one hand – rightly or wrongly,
they have the feeling that they are being presented with very limited
choice. On the other hand, all the residents I talked to do not consider
that the limited options they have – such as leaving Hamaoka – arerealistic: I did not meet anyone who was considering or planning on
leaving, despite many voicing their beliefs that a life away from thenuclear power plant would be better. Local residents’accounts arecharacterized by the absence of a framework in which they are abled
to make informed decisions.

5 Conclusion
The Hamaoka local community is one example of those hostcommunities locked into contracts of dependence. At the same time,
the Japanese government promotes nuclear energy as an importantand essential energy policy for national autonomy, while the hostcommunities are sacrificed for this national agenda. The local
residents in Fukushima and elsewhere are seen not as partners, but
as targets for policy tools. Because of the lack of alternatives tonuclear power plants, communities maintain their support even after
the Fukushima disaster. Despite an increasing sense of anxiety, many
local residents indeed stayed silent so that their livelihoods will not
deteriorate.
From a human security perspective, the toll from a nuclear power
plant in Hamaoka is manifold. On the one hand, the construction andoperation of a nuclear power plant amidst the host community has
visibly enhanced human security from an economic perspective. The
economic perspective comes under the first pillar of the concept ofhuman security as defined by the Commission on Human Security in
2003:“the freedom from want”. However, it has been a major factor
in incapacitating two aspects of human security. First, by causing458

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japana constant threat suddenly exacerbated by the Fukushima nuclear
disaster, it affects directly on the psyche of host communities andprevents them from attaining what the Commission on Human Security
lists as another pillar of human security,“freedom from fear”.
Second, by siting a nuclear power plant in Hamaoka, local residents
have become more dependent with less freedom to exercise choices
and thus not attaining“freedom to make an informed choice of one’sown”(Commission on Human Security, 2003).
A human security framework should pursue the security at threelevels, individual, institutional and structural. This would involvean understanding of the socio-cultural contexts on the definition of
security and threats from the perspective of those who experience
them, instead of being imposed from the state and the industry. This
type of framework goes beyond short-term goals of achieving economic
benefits, and would advance the culture of safety and the absenceof threats. The Japanese government should play a“protective”
role to reduce threats from events [nuclear accidents] beyond [hostcommunities]’control”(Commission on Human Security, 2003, p.11).
This protective role lies in putting the safety of people and hostcommunities in parallel or even in a higher place than economic
interests. Rather than focusing on securing energy, the concern should
be more with“how resources are sustained, distributed, and mobilized
within national boarders.”(Umegaki, 2009, p.4).

Notes
[1]

In April 2004, the old town of Hamaoka merged with Omaezaki town to form
Omaezaki city. See http://www.city.omaezaki.shizuoka.jp (Accessed 2015/02/26).
[2] The origin of the term genshiryoku mura (nuclear village) has been attributed to
Iida Tetsunari (See Wall Street Journal, 2012/06/12). Since the Fukushima accident,
the term has been widely used by critics to stress the strong ties among the above-

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mentioned key actors and their support for nuclear energy.
Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, International
Energy Outlook 2000, Report No. DOE/EIA-0484 (2000), http://www.eida.doe.gov/
oiaf/ieo/index.html (accessed 2015/02/26).
[4] See Hiroshi Onitsuka,“Hooked on Nuclear Power: Japan State-Local Relations
and The Vicious Circles of Nuclear Dependence”, http://www.japanfocus.org/Hiroshi-Onitsuka/3676 (accessed 2015/02/26).
[5] See Yamazaki Masakatsu and Okuda Kenzo,“Pacifying Anti-American Sentiments:
Introducing Nuclear Reactors into Japan after the Bikini Incident? [in Japanese]”,
Journal of History of Science, Japan. Series II 43(230), 2004, pp.83-93.
[6] To fight the nuclear allergy prevalent at the time, the US government decided
to shift the focus from the military use of the nuclear energy to its peacefulapplication. On December 8, 1953, Eisenhower delivered his“Atoms for Peace”
speech at the Untied Nations, and vowed to spread the benefits of atomic power in
the US and abroad by constructing nuclear reactors. For more, see Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists, 10(1) (January 1954).
[7] According to Arima Tetsuo, Shoriki used the Yomiuri newspaper to promote fornuclear energy development. Shoriki launched campaigns and exhibitions about
the peaceful and socially beneficial uses of nuclear energy. Through this agenda,
Shoriki entered the world of Japanese politics and became the first president of theJapan Atomic Energy Council (Arima, 2008, pp.32-90).
[8] See Nakasone’s autobiography, Jiseiroku (Meditations).
[9] For more, see nuclear power in Japan webpage on World Nuclear Association:
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Japan/(accessed 2015/02/26)[10] Before its dissolution, Ogasa district was a rural area located in western Shizuoka
prefecture. In 1986, it was divided between one town (Kakegawa) and 45 villages.
Up until the 50s, several mergers and consolidations happened creating new towns,
including Hamaoka (March 31, 1951).
[11] State of economy of Hamaoka in 1967 when the planning of the nuclear power
plant became public: population 17361, area 53.91 Km2, 3415 households (from theStatistics Webpage of Omaezaki City Website).
[12] Interviews 2014.
[13] See Mori, 1982, pp.32-36.
[14] See Sankei newspaper, 1967/7/5.
[15] Power shortage in the central electricity sphere, compromising Chubu, Kansai, andHokuriku power companies, increased at 26% per annum.
[16] Several articles from Shizuoka newspaper published in the summer of 1967.
[17] According to Enerugii keizai kenkyu-jo (1980), self-efficiency was about 85% in
Shizuoka prefecture.
[18] Interviews 2014.
[19] Chubu Electric discussed the nuclear power plant project with Mizuno Shigeru,
president of the Sankei newspaper and influential businessman in Shizuoka, andMaruo Kenji, a prefectural Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) assemblyman. Mizuno
and Maruo had been born in Hamaoka and were both interested in the project at theprefectural level. (Interviews 2014 and Mori, 1982, pp.51-52).
[20] Interviews 2014.
[3]

460

Nuclear Power and Host Communities in Japan[21] Outline of the agreement? 1) Chubu paid 750,000 Yen for 10 Ares of farmland andadded maximum of 1,200,000 Yen for farming compensation and cooperation fees
(There were three rankings for land purchase)? 2) Chubu paid 360,000 Yen for
10 Ares woodland and added maximum of 3,730,000 Yen for forest compensationcooperation fees (There were six rankings for woodland purchase) (Mori, 1982, pp.
65-66).
[22] The average purchase price per one tsubo (3.3 m2) was remarkably high: about 3000
Yen (1000 Yen was the average price for land compensation paid by TEPCO andKansai Electric Power at that time). Ibid.
[23] Mori, 1982, pp.66-67.
[24] Interviews 2014.
[25] Interviews 2014.
[26] Interviews 2014.
[27] Mori, 1982, pp.75-79.
[28] Anti-nuclear power movement was not significant until 1970s. For more, see
Yamazaki Masakatsu,“Nuclear Energy in Postwar Japan and Anti-Nuclear
Movements in the 1950s”, Historia scientiarum. Second series: International Journalof the History of Science Society of Japan, 19(2), 2009, pp.132-145.
[29] Interviews 2014.
[30] Promoters financed trips to Tokaimura and Mihama as they had good safetybooming local economies. This successfully changed‘community perceptions about
the risk and benefits of nuclear power’. (Lisberel, 1998 and interviews 2014).
[31] As of 2010/10/1, Chubu Electric provided 3594 jobs in Hamaoka nuclear power
plant. 41% of the employees are from Omaezaki city (Hamaoka) and the rest arefrom neighboring cities: kakegawa, makinohara and Kikugawa city and other cities
in Shizuoka. Over the years, the nuclear facility brought secondary industry (suchas construction and manufacturing), which provides 7295 jobs. For more data, see
Chubu Electric webpage on Hamaoka: http://hamaoka.chuden.jp/english/about/index.html, and Omaezaki city’ statistics webpage: http://www.city.omaezaki.
shizuoka.jp/ (accessed 2015/02/26).

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