SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE IN US MILITARY PRESENCE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I.

Introduction

During the Cold War, ASEAN had a pivotal role in protecting this region –an important trade route – from confrontation between the United States and theSoviet Union.
Member states developed rapidly, both economically andpolitically, and ASEAN became Asia’s most important regional organization andan asset to US interests.
Geographically, the region straddles sealanes that connect not only the
Indian and Pacific Oceans but also north-south routes linking Australia and New
Zealand to the countries of northeast Asia. Also, because of the littoral nature ofmost ASEAN nations and the relative lack of land-based transport, much
intraregional trade depends on these waterways. This fact led the US to imbue
this region with strategic relevance for international security and commerce.
From a military perspective, these sealanes are critical to the movement of US
forces from the western pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
ASEAN has eclipsed the importance of several traditional US trading
partners. ASEAN is a large market for American goods and services as well as
an increasingly important US investment destination and source of imports.
Despite the Asian economic crisis, ASEAN remains an important US trading
partner. In 1999, the US merchandise exports to ASEAN reached about $40
billion, while imports totaled $78 billion. ASEAN is the US’ fourth largest trading
partner (after Canada, Japan and Mexico). There is potential for further growthin trade between the US and the ASEAN in view of the on-going structuralchanges in the region’s economies. ASEAN is also a major destination for
American foreign investment. From 1990 to 1997, US foreign direct investmentin the region climbed from $11.8 billion to $37.5 billion, surpassing Japan, Brazil,
China and Hongkong.
II.

Changes in US Military Presence in the Region
A.

Cold War Presence

The US has maintained a military presence in the region since thebeginning of the Cold War in the closing days of World War II. This presence
peaked during the Vietnam War with the US stationing some 500,000 US troops
at its highest in the region. Subic Bay served as the main naval base of the US
7th Fleet. Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam likewise served as the other 7th Fleetbase apart from the military facilities in Thailand with which the US hasmaintained a closer military partnership.

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US intervention in Vietnam heralded the deep involvement of its
military forces in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. However, the US militarydefeat in that country left the US stretched to the limit politically, militarily,
financially and emotionally. The fiasco led succeeding US governments to think
twice before committing ground troops in succeeding conflicts around the globe.
After the end of the Vietnam War, the US continued to deploy asignificant number of its forces primarily to contain the soviet strategic designs in
the region and also as a deterrent to North Korean adventurism.
B.

Post Cold War Presence

The US withdrawal from Vietnam signaled the formal decline of its militarypresence in Southeast Asia. This was subsequently followed by the conclusionof its bases lease agreement with the Philippines for Subic Naval Base and Clark
Airforce Base in 1992.
With the end of the Cold War and the non-renewal of its base leaseagreement with the Philippines, US military presence in Southeast Asia
considerably waned, but a substantial number of US troops remained in
Northeast Asia.
As early as 1990, the US began to consider changing its military strategy
and structure in the Asia-Pacific Region in response to the end of the Cold War.
However, in its third East Asian Strategy Report (EASR) published in 1995, theUS noted that continuous areas of uncertainty and tension required a
reaffirmation of US security commitments to the Asia-Pacific. Where the 1990
and 1992 EASR anticipated reductions in US forward deployed forces, the 1995
report confirmed Washington’s intention to maintain approximately 100,000
troops in the region and strengthen bilateral relationships. More recently, thefourth EASR in 1998 underscored that US priorities in the Asia-Pacific Region
remained constant, and that it is always ready to promote fresh approaches tosecurity in response to changes in the regional environment.
III.

Current US Military Policy/Posture in the Region

During the latter part of the last decade, the US realized the need tobolster its presence in Asia-Pacific Region and has turned its sights on Southeast
Asia to regain its foothold.
Maintaining overseas military presence remains a cornerstone of US
National Security Strategy and a key element of its military policy. Thus, it has
committed to station 47,000 troops in Japan and 37,000 in South Korea owing to
the vulnerability of the region to the North Korean threat.

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In Asia, US force presence plays a particularly key role in promoting
peace and security in regional affairs. US strategic interests in Southeast Asia
center on developing regional and bilateral security and economic relationshipsthat assist in conflict prevention and resolution and expand US participation in
the region’s economies.
The importance of keeping its military influence in Asia was highlighted in
the Pentagon’s so-called “joint vision 2020”. Aside from projecting a presence in
Korea even if North Korean threat disappears, this key defense document
envisioned Asia instead of Europe as the prime focus of US military in the
coming decades; identifies China as a “peer competitor”; and sees even closer
military coordination with Japan.
Along with the new posturing in the region, the US has formulated thefollowing security objectives in the region:¾ to maintain security alliances with Australia, Thailand and thePhilippines;¾ to sustain security access arrangements with Singapore and other
ASEAN countries; and¾ to encourage the emergence of a strong cohesive ASEAN capable ofenhancing regional security and prosperity.
US policy combines two approaches. First, the US maintains a productive
relationship with ASEAN and enhances security dialogues under the Asean
Regional Forum (ARF). Second, the US pursues bilateral initiatives withindividual ASEAN states.
Among those bilateral initiatives include the following:¾ Signing of the visiting forces agreement with the Philippines in January
1998;¾ Singapore’s offer of the use of the new and enlarged Changi Naval
Station to US naval combatants. the facility includes a pier which canaccommodate a US aircraft carrier;¾ After the closure of its base facilities in the Philippines in 1992, the US
entered into a series of access agreements with countries such as
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.
The recent terrorist attacks in its territory heralded a new thrust in the US
military involvement in the region. During the recent APEC Summit in Shanghai,
China, President George W BUSH called on the support of Asian leaders in his
global campaign against terrorism. BUSH made clear his intention to elicit thebacking of his economic allies to bolster his multi-pronged campaign against
terrorism sparked by the September 11 attacks.

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IV.

Implications of Change in Military Presence in the Region

Changes in US military presence have their profound effects andunderscored in the following realities:
A.

Smaller Presence in Southeast Asia

As a result of current realities after the end of the Cold War and theimpact of the Vietnam War, succeeding US governments deemed it necessary tosignificantly reduce troop presence in Asia/Pacific and concomitantly inSoutheast Asia where relative stability was perceived existing with the end of the
US-Soviet rivalry. US troop involvement were necessarily channeled to crisisridden regions like Europe where disintegration of states have become prevalent.
Southeast Asia, faced with this stark reality, grew politically, but has
been bugged with nagging uncertainty. To reduce uncertainty, US remained
active politically, economically, socially and commercially in the region.
B.

Focus on Critical Areas

The disengagement in Southeast Asia led the US to focus on morecritical areas in the region like Northeast Asia where the threat of North Korea isperceived to be real.
Continuing uncertainty demanded the greater role of allies inensuring stability in the region. Thus, the US expected Australia, Japan, Korea,
the Philippines and Thailand to contribute in the maintenance of peace and sharein the burden of ensuring security where critical areas are at stake. A US study
envisions a coalition of US Asian allies, including Australia and the Philippines,
acting jointly to quell any regional conflict.
It is in America’s interest to maintain the balance of power in Asia,
to act as the pivot for a security structure that includes Japan and South Korea,
and to provide leadership to encourage stable and profitable democracies todevelop. Southeast Asia, particularly through the association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), has played an increasingly important role in regional security.
The nations of ASEAN have grown more confident and assertive in the years
following the end of the cold war, an appropriate posture for countries that haveundergone a generation of considerable struggle, accomplishment anddevelopment. Despite the financial crisis that has shaken the area’s leading
developing economies, these countries continued to be important US security
partners.

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C.

Emerging Powers

The withdrawal of the superpowers in the region at the end of theCold War left a political vacuum that was waiting to be filled up by emergent
nations.
China’s rapidly rising economic power, meanwhile, has beenaccompanied by more aggressive military-political policies in the region, posing acurrent focal point of regional security concern. Beijing has reinforced Chinese
nationalistic sensitivity over disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea,
complicating efforts to manage the dispute without undermining regional stability.
A strong evidence that points to china’s efforts is its occupation of mischief reef
and the strengthening of its occupied islands.
ASEAN members are seriously concerned with china’s rise but
remain pragmatic in dealing with the situation. As such, ASEAN encourages the
US and other outside powers to support it in efforts to persuade and press China
to preserve regional stability. The ASEAN expects the US to formulate an
appropriate stance towards China’s increasingly assertive role in Asian regional
affairs, which may include military actions in the South China Sea and near
Taiwan. The US is also expected to formulate a policy that will carefully balance
US policy with regard to the territorial issues. That no country will capitalize fromthe political vacuum in the region is a key point in the US effort to bolster astronger ASEAN and ensuring political and economic stability among thecountries in the region. The US seeks to promote a balance of power so thatnone emerges as a dominant country or that the countries gang up with others
against itself in the future.
D.

Military/Defense Build-up

One common view that seems to be shared by all regional states isthat the US security commitment is the indispensable anchor for East Asian
security. Insofar as it is conducive to peace and security as well as a hindrance
to a so-called arms race in the region, an abrupt and large-scale US withdrawal
would leave a power vacuum no other power would be able to fill without
profoundly destabilizing consequences.
Without an alternative security
mechanism in place, the US presence is pivotal to maintaining stability in a timeof rapid power redistribution. For countries with bilateral arrangements with theUS, a continuing US military presence strengthens their own national security.
For countries without direct security ties with the US, the US security
arrangement puts a lid on potentially destabilizing forces in the region.
Almost all countries are, in varying degrees, engaged in militarymodernization. Thanks to growing economic power and the availability ofadvanced weapons at bargain prices in the international arms markets. As thehistory of international relations shows, a country’s efforts at arms acquisitions toenhance its own security often inadvertently heighten the insecurity of its-5-

neighbors, who could be tempted to engage in a reactive arms build-up. The
lack of an accelerated arms build-up in East Asia is due to a large extent to thestabilizing role of the US.
E.

Tensions Remain

The absence of actual war has not diminished the uncertainty ofprevailing new threat scenarios. Unlike the Cold War, every major challenge topeace and stability today exists in Asia. In the new security landscape,traditional and new threat actors have complicated the security make-up ofSoutheast Asia. The emergence of new security issues eventually impinged on
the countries in the region. Among these sources of security concerns are thefollowing:1.

Global Terrorism

The recent terrorist attack in the US has brought far-reaching
implications not just for the US but for the region as well. Old and bitter rivalries
have been set aside in favor of new realignments and renewed friendships forthe common universal role of combating terrorism. Complicating the threat isthe capability of terrorist groups to obtain weapons of mass destruction.
Terrorism will remain a major transnational problem, driven
by continued ethnic, religious, nationalist, separatist, political and economic
motivations. One worrying trend is the rise of terrorist groups that are
multinational in scale of operation and less responsive to domestic or external
influences.
2.

Transnational Crimes

The global terrorist threat has also brought to the fore thegrowing threat of transnational crimes such as piracy, drugs and firearms
trafficking and other syndicated activities. Piracy remains a nagging concern in
the region threatening regional maritime trade and freedom of navigation
particularly in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, South China Sea andIndonesia where piracy is at an all-time high.
The region also remains a convenient and ideal ground for
drug and firearms trafficking and other highly-syndicated activities via theseaborne route. The fact that terrorist organizations derive their financial
resources from these illegal activities emphasized the gravity of the threat.
The international drug trade is becoming more complex as
new areas of drug cultivation and transit continue to emerge and international
criminal syndicates take advantage of the rapid advancements in global
communications, transportation and finance to mask their illicit operations.

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3.

Maritime Dispute/Conflict

The South China Sea is a vast area of water between
mainland and maritime Asia. It is located along the littoral states of China, thePhilippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia.
The South China Sea provides an abundant source of food and oil and is a vitalcommercial sealane.
Among the disputed islands in the South China Sea, theSpratly Island Group is the most contentious because of the number of claimants
involved in the sovereignty issue and their defense posturings in the area. Six(6) states lay claim over the area. Their claims are reinforced by physicallyoccupying several islands, reefs and shoals. All claimants remain firm in theirsovereignty claims over the Spratlys. They have fortified their defense facilities
and structures and expanded their troops in occupied islands, reefs and shoals.
Among the claimant countries, China is perceived to be the most aggressive.
4.

Environmental Degradation

The rich marine and aquatic resources in the South China
Sea particularly in the RP-claimed Kalayaan Island Group in the Spratly andScarborough Shoal has made the areas a likely target for maritime exploitation
by both local and foreign fishing vessels.
For the last few years, foreign fishermen, especially Chinese,
have been engaging in illegal fishing activities and gathering of corals and otherendangered marine species in these parts of the West Philippine Sea. Illegal
fishing activities usually entails the use of dynamite and cyanide, thus essentiallydamaging the ecological balance in the area. For this matter, environmental
degradation will remain to be a main source of threat for the region.
V.

Imperatives and Realities

The Pentagon has been constructing the diplomatic and politicalframework for the US military “reentry in Southeast Asia”. The revamped US
military relationship with the Philippines represented by the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) may be a model for Southeast Asia. Instead of building andmaintaining bases, it would be more prudent for US forces to conduct frequent
joint exercises to train American and Southeast Asian troops to operate togetherin everything from disaster relief to full-scale combat.
Part of these efforts is the need for the US to help in the diffusion ofnagging tensions in the South China Sea. The US is expected to exhort
competing states to implement confidence building measures and assist in the
diffusion of tensions in the area. Realizing the importance of the area as a vitalsealane of communication, the US is also expected to call on its traditional allies-7-such as Japan to share the burden of mitigating differences among claimant
states through multilateral mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF).
This also holds true for the growing threat of piracy, drug trafficking,human smuggling and other maritime concerns than can easily disrupt the
freedom of navigation and undermine the region’s security and stability. There
are signs that these illegal maritime activities will parallel the regionalization andglobalization of legitimate activities. In this light, the US is expected to participate
in regional efforts in combating these threats in terms of joint maritime patrols,
joint training exercises and information exchanges with its Asian allies.
As far as military relationship and cooperation is concerned, the US
CINCPAC has expanded the scope of its cooperation through continuous
conduct of bilateral and multilateral exercises that aim to improve interoperability,
coordination and deeper relationships among forces of countries in the region. It
also aims to enhance specialization and proficiency and in aspects that the US
feels lacking in the region.
Cobra Gold is the largest training opportunity in Southeast Asia and thecenterpiece of an impressive exercise program that provides training
opportunities and enhances interoperability. To the US, Cobra Gold provides animportant opportunity to communicate through action, its continued commitment
to the security and well-being of its treaty allies, and demonstrate how serious it
is about remaining engaged in the Asia-Pacific Region. The US plans to merge
four bilateral exercises in the Asia-Pacific into a larger regional one to be called
team challenge starting from 2001. The US has maintained its close military ties
with Thailand, and has forged an agreement with Brunei for small-scale military
exercises using the sultanate’s jungle survival training facility.
In 1999, the US, in partnership with the member nations of ASEAN,
opened the international law enforcement academy in Bangkok, Thailand.
Officials of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), US customs service,
FBI and other agencies provide high-caliber training in areas such as drugtrafficking, alien smuggling, cyber crime, and other transnational threats. The
International Law Enforcement Academy also promotes cooperation andinformation sharing, as well as significantly improving regional counterdrug
capabilities.
In the light of the profound threat of global terrorism, the US and thePhilippines are renegotiating their Mutual Defense Treaty. A proposed RP-US
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) is being considered that would
provide the American military access to Philippine ports for repairs and supplies.
The so-called MLSA, earlier called the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement(ACSA), was revived because of the Philippines support to the US-led
International Counter-Terrorist Coalition (ICTC).

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Likewise, the US and Thailand have agreed to redesign their annual joint
military exercise – the Cobra Gold – to train soldiers in addressing the threat ofterrorism. Hence, succeeding Cobra Gold exercises will be geared towards
training to meet small-scale terrorist threats in the region, such as those posedby separatist groups in the Philippines. The US also urged Thailand to step up
efforts to fight terrorism through combatting drugs, the sharing of intelligence
information between their military and police forces and anti-money laundering
efforts.
As part of its comprehensive engagement in the region, the US has
increased economic involvement in the region through increased trade andinvestments. Washington is set to sign a landmark trade agreement with
Vietnam which is expected to boost the latter’s economy amid the current global
recession.
US forces were also instrumental in helping douse wildfires in Indonesiathat threatened the health and safety of nations in the region. Further, the US
has assisted the region in the efforts against fisheries depletion, deforestationand in attaining sustainable growth during the onslaught of the 1997 regional
financial crisis.
Indeed, the passage of time has not diminished the importance ofSoutheast Asia to US global politico-economic and security interests. The region
has been always an important US major trading partner and also served as acounterfoil to emerging powers in Asia. As such, the US will remain to be a maincontender in the equation to maintain peace and security, preserve balance ofpower, and thwart any contingencies that may threaten its wide-ranging interestsin the region.
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