助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“Enlargement and Future of Europe 2002”
Tokyo, 12-14 November“The New NATO”
byKarl Kaiser
Otto-Wolff-Director,
Research Institute, German Council on Foreign Relations,
Germany

The New NATO
Karl Kaiser
Paper for the Conference of the International Institute for Policy Studies“Enlargement and Future of Europe 2002”
Tokyo November 12 –14, 2002
(Do not quote without permission of the author)

The changes in structure and orientation of NATO that has occurred since theend of the Cold War and again since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001,
reflect and contribute to the profound transformation of the international
system that was characteristic of the 20th century. In the globalized world of
the 21st century the security problems of Europe and the globe as a whole
become more intertwined and NATO will have to adapt its role accordingly.
Moreover, with the shift of security challenges from classical problems of
aggression to the complex challenges of terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction and intra-state conflict the North Atlantic Alliance will have toassume new responsibilities and create the necessary capabilities and structures
for their exercise.

I.

NATO’s transformation before September 11, 2001

It has often been argued that the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, havechanged everything, created a fundamentally different world and consequently
require totally new approaches. NATO, it was then concluded, would have to be
seen in the same context. In reality, however, the watershed was not quiet asclear as it is often argued. Many of the problems which are now at the centre of
our attention, existed before or were only enhanced in their impact by theevents of September 11, 2001.

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The “old” NATO which had been an essential part and product of the Cold War
inevitably changed with the end of that conflict in 1989/1990. Indeed, it can beargued that a process of marginalization started then for several reasons.
First, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact the classicaldanger of a large scale aggression for which the original NATO had beencreated receded into the background and became but a theoretical possibility as
the 1990’s progressed. Planers, who at the beginning of the 1990’s still included
the possibility of the revival of a Russian danger into their calculations, began towrite it off by the mid 1990’s. Instead, the new dangers of the Post-Cold War
area began to dominate security policy and the actual planning of the armed
forces structure. The “New Strategic Concep” of NATO of 1999 is the result of
this fundamental change of perception.
Second, the transformation of the West’s relationship with Russia, the country
which had been the very cause of the creation for the Alliance, could not butchange the meaning of NATO. Enlargement, it must be remembered wasalways persued as a “double strategy” combining an effort to include theemerging democracies of East, Central and South East Europe with a renewed
and co-operative relationship with a Russia on the way to democracy andmarket economy. Not only the partnership with the former main adversary but
also the enlargement by three new Central European democracies (now to becomplemented at the Prague Summit by seven more countries) increased
NATO’s heterogeneity and political character thus moving it away from aclassical defence alliance.
Third, the activities of NATO in the Balkans, notably the peace-keeping forces,
its military intervention in Bosnia and in particular in Kosovo, made the Alliance
proceed in ways, for which it had originally not been created. Peace-keeping
was not on the agenda of NATO during the Cold War, and when the Alliance
went to war in Kosovo it did so without activating Article V, i. e. without being

2attacked (and even without a UN mandate). The actions of the Alliancereflected a new changed perception of its role and responsibilities quite
different from the preceeding era of the East-West conflict.
Fourth, during the 1990’s the creation of a “European pillar” of security policy
inside NATO increasingly changed the character of the Alliance despite thecontinued disagreements on the relationship between an emerging European
security and defence policy and NATO as well as on its orientation among themembers of the European Union. During the 1990’s it become increasingly clearthat this question redefined the structure and division of labour of the Alliance.
Fifth, the events of the 1990’s unleashed a debate that continues to this day
how the transatlantic character of NATO could be maintained within the internal
debate in the United States the relevance of a continued US presence in Europe,
notably in the Balkans was increasingly questioned, thus raising concern among
Europeans that the US might move toward a new division of labour, assigning
European security problems to the Europeans and global questions to theUnited States. The post September 11 debate which the United States triggeredon the concept of “the mission defines the coalition” has its true origin in theearlier discussions on who should play what role in the Balkans.
II.

Dealing with terrorism after September 11, 2001

The initial reaction of the Bush Administration to the terror attacks of theSeptember 11 positively surprised many of the earlier critics of the US
Government who had expected a unilateral and possibly ill considered
instantaneous action. However, the new strategy of Washington represented a
victory of Realpolitik and pragmatism over ideology and reaction by instinct. It
was based on a careful analysis of the situation, advocating a policy of “patient
accumulation of success” (President Bush) rather than quick fixes. Moreover,
the US reaction was strikingly multilateral involving the United Nations in a3

creative and unprecedented manner, building a new global Alliance against
terrorism with countries not traditionally allied to the US, such as China andRussia and advocating a “multidimensional” strategy including economic,
political and military elements. President Bush explicitly pointed to the necessityof “nation building” and of avoiding a “clash of civilisations”.
Throughout the preparatory and active face of America’s new anti-terror policy
NATO played no significant role. Despite the mentioning of global terrorism in
the 1999 “ New Strategic Concept’” of NATO its organisation had not done any
planning for this eventuality nor was its structure suited. To be sure, theexpedition of AWACS planes to relieve American planes over US territory was
greatly appreciated, and the activation of Article V was considered as a mostwelcome sign of solidarity in the Alliance, but NATO as an organisation did not
get involved beyond these two measures. If an anti-terrorism strategy was tobe treated in its broad sense of comprising cultural, economic, political andmilitary means, the established structure of the Alliance was ill prepared to fulfilthat function. It was the clear feeling of the US military planners that during the
war in Afghanistan American action would only be hampered if submitted to theoften cumbersome procedures of NATO institutions. As a result America acted
alone and called on individual allies, such as Britain, France and Germany toprovide assistance on a bilateral basis.
Article V was activated for the first time in NATO’s history and undercircumstances for which it had not been originally created, namely to deter orprovide assistance in case of major armed aggression. Though the activation of
Article V was essential to provide the necessary legitimacy for the use of
military force among the democratic member countries of NATO, e. g. in thecase of Germany, it supported primarily the action of national states and not of
the Alliance as a whole. Moreover, it is entirely unclear when the activation ofthis Article ends, for unlike a war where the termination of hostilities also
indicates the end to Article V, that matter is entirely unclear with regard to the4fight against terrorism. Will Article V be deactivated when the last terrorist is
defeated?
In its campaign against terror the United States created a new Alliance of global
scope that included such diverse members as the NATO members Japan, Russia,
China, Pakistan, or Arab States. Comprising established democracies, emerging
democracies, dictatorships and autocratic kingdoms it remains inevitably fragile
but nevertheless united by the single purpose of fighting terrorism. Unlike
America’s old Alliance with the European democracies it was an effective ad hocgroup manifesting the degree to which American security policy had turned
away from Europe to global problems.

III.

Tasks of the New Nato

Reflecting about the future of NATO it must be remembered that this Alliancehas played a constructive and positive role in several areas which continue toremain immensely relevant in the world of the 21st century. First, NATO wasand continues to act as an obstacle to a re-nationalisation of security policy.
Thanks to its co-operation and integration of national military and security
structures NATO substantially contributed to the historic achievement of thedemocracies of the West namely the exclusion of war as means of politics
among and thus transforming this group of nations into a functioning peace
system. The preservation of this historic achievement remains vital if aminimum of order is to be preserved in a new era of instability.
Second, NATO has become the essential framework for stability in Europe.
Through enlargement it has and will continue to support the process of
democratisation and reform of the economies in Central and South East Europe.
NATO’s new relationship with Russia is likely not only to have the same effectbut in addition to create an overarching relationship of co-operation with5

Europe’s largest power. Moreover, NATO remains vital for preserving peace andstability in the Balkans and thereby the preconditions for the estabalishment of
democracy there.
Third, NATO remains the most essential link between the United States andEurope. Though the security problems of the modern interdependent world canoriginate from any corner of the globe consequently requiring approaches todeal with them a global level, NATO remains a framework of likemindedcountries united by common values, interests and a well established system ofco-operation. If and when the United States look for allies in any particularcrisis it is here where they are likely to find them as was proven in the
Afghanistan campaign in which NATO members made most valuable outsidecontributions to the American effort.
The fight against globalized terrorism, in particular in its deadly combination
with weapons of mass destruction, cannot be won by one country, not even the
United States, the world’s most powerful one. In a world of interdependence,vulnerable societies and open borders many allies are necessary. For thesereasons the continuation of the anti-terror Alliance, created by the UnitedStates, remains an essential prerequisite for success. Moreover, “failing states”
as potential generators of terrorism must be dealt with. This can only be done
through a time consuming and complex strategy of nation building. Any
medium and long term anti-terror strategy must deal with the roots andconditions of terrorism. An essential instrument for defeating terrorism is the
spread of democracy which in turn requires social and economic development
and consequently a more substantial and successful effort of the industrialised
countries in this direction. Moreover, an anti-terror strategy has a greater
chance of success if accompanied by progression or solutions to the great
conflicts of our time, notably the Isreali-Palastinian conflict.

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What conclusions will the NATO countries have to draw if the Alliance is tobecome a more relevant instrument for dealing with the problem of terrorism.
First, NATO countries have to take part in the global effort of co-operation
among likeminded countries to install a well functioning system of informationexchange and common action among police, intelligence systems anddevelopment agencies. In that same context they will have to make an
inevitably time consuming effort to establish a dialogue with those forces inIslam that oppose the abuse of religion for extremist purposes.
Second, the new NATO, soon to be enlarged further, will play a meaningful rolein combating terrorism only if it expands and redefines its role in four different
areas:•

It has to enlarge the geographic scope of its action since the opennessof modern society, the vulnerability of its structures and global
interdependence that jointly make distant threats an immediate danger
to NATO countries will require that NATO deals with the problems“where ever” they begin. This could mean tasks of peace-keeping andintervention by economic, political and sometimes military means inrelatively distant areas. The old disagreement between Europeans andAmerican about a global reach of NATO has been bypassed by theevents of September 11, 2001.

•

NATO

will have to reorient its purpose from an Alliance to defend

against an aggression which has become but a theoretical possibility to
an Alliance that deals with available means of diplomacy, development
policy and military means with problems as they arise and turn into asecurity threat. This will occasionally require forms of intervention toprevent such problems from escalating to an unacceptable level of
threat.

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•NATO will increasingly turn into a framework to organise a “coalition of
the willing” whenever threats arise and according to the nature of suchchallenges. As a consequence it must enhance the capability of the
Alliance members for interoperability and co-operation. The NATO
response force proposed by the United States and to be created in thenear future, would hopefully be a flexible instrument to provide aframework for changing “coalitions of the willing”.

•

If the new NATO is to become effective the new group of 20 states
formed with Russia must play a central role in dealing with sharedsecurity problems.

Third, the new NATO requires a better equipped Europe, i. e. European
members with a technologically more advanced military capability and an
effective European Security and Defence Policy that can play a meaningful roleinside the Alliance and, as an autonomous European force. The intervention
force of the EU which is in the process of being formed should not only fulfil
these requirements but also be able to contribute to a NATO response force tobe created.
Fourth, of all the problems of security in the forthcoming years the question of
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should deserve
unquestioned priority. The combination of terrorism and these weapons as wellas their potential use in volatile regions can have such a disastrous anddestructive effect that the Alliance should devote particular attention topreventing the spread of these weapons, of materials for their production as
well as means of delivery.

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IV.

NATO and World OrderThe present era is similar to the period following World War II when theinternational system was fundamentally remade. This assigns a special
responsibility to all major actors, in particular to the United States as the preeminent power. The way rules are being remade and structures of world politics
and institutions changed will profoundly shape international politics for many
years to come. The adaptation of NATO to the new global problems is part ofthis process because this Alliance will have to deal with essential security
challenges of the new era and because three of the five Permanent Members of
the UN Security Council are NATO members.
The debates that have surrounded the question of how to deal with Iraq and its
programmes of weapons of mass destruction have been so controversial
because they relate to the functions and redefinition of basic rules ofinternational law and, in particular of the United Nations Charter. If theinternational community continues to passively accept a continued noncompliance of Iraq of the disarmament order of the Security Council, theauthority of the UN will undoubtedly be undermined. On the other hand, amilitary intervention without a mandate from the Security Council, given thepotentially destructive impact of such an intervention, would undermine thevalidity of the UN as well. If war becomes a means to change a regime,
however autocratic or evil it may be, it would undo a basic rule of internationallaw since the peace of Westphalia of 1648 which made territoriality and noninterference in internal affairs a basic rule of international law. The same is true
for a doctrine of pre-emption. While it cannot be denied that the security
problems of the modern era, notably the combination of terrorism and weaponsof mass destruction, may require forms of intervention in order to prevent a
problem from escalating to unacceptable threat proportions, the establishmentof a right to pre-emptive strikes would unhinge Article II of the UN Charter as
the central element of world order.

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It will be the task of NATO members and likeminded countries in dealing withthe security problems of the modern world, to make sure that the essential
rules of the multilateral order that was established after World War II arepreserved. If adaptations are necessary they should not be executed throughunilateral action but in a co-ordinated manner on the basis of a dialogue among
the major actors in world politics.

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