助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“Building a Regime of Regional Cooperation in
East Asia and the Role which Japan Can Play”

Tokyo
December 2-3, 2003

“Japan in East Asia”
By
Dr. Yoshihide Soeya
Professor, Department of Political Science, Keio University
Faculty Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and IndustryJapanPrepared for the IIPS Symposium on
Building a Regime of Regional Cooperation in East Asiaand the Role which Japan Can Play
December 2-3, 2003
Tokyo
Session 1
The Effects of Leadership Changes on International Relations in East Asia:
National Security and Economic Issues“Japan in East Asia”
Yoshihide Soeya, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Keio University
Faculty Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

Introduction
The Japanese lower house general elections held on November 9 produced
entirely a new generation of Japanese politicians whose average age is 53.

Thisphenomenon is more significant than the fact that the Democratic Party increased
their seats in the lower house from 137 to 177, while the number of the Liberal
Democratic Party’s law-makers decreased from 247 to 237, making the Japanesepolitical system more like a two-party system.
After all, the issues to be fought between the two major parties will be
re-defined and re-formulated in the coming years with the generational change ofpolitical leaders, which could trigger a gradual re-shuffling of political parties over time,
if not in the immediate future.
Perhaps the most critical aspect of the generational change in politicalleadership, not only in Japan but across East Asia, is that their values, and ways ofdefining challenges and policy issues are different from the previous generation.
In the case of Japan, implications of changes are mixed, indicating theyounger generations’ growing awareness of national security and greater readiness tocope with security and other challenges in realistic terms.

Equally important,however, are the strong awareness and interest in “contribution” to the task ofinternational security beyond national borders and the growing commitment tocommon values connecting civil societies in East Asia.

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These changes are important particularly against the backdrop of deepening
economic integration in East Asia and the development of civil society networks uniting
like-minded middle classes in Asia. Although Japan’s image in these domains is notentirely positive, Japan’s role has nonetheless been significant.

Japan’s engagement

could help build an East Asian community if Japan can form a consensus on thislong-term strategic goal, sustained by its economic and soft power.
With this larger picture in mind, this paper will examine the meanings ofJapan’s domestic changes during the last decade, overview the changing security
landscapes in East Asia by highlighting the catalytic role played by the Bush strategy,
and discuss recent developments toward regional integration with a primary focus on
the roles of Japan and China.
Japan’s Domestic Changes and Foreign Policy
Multi-dimensional Changes
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the 1955 regime have changed themode of Japanese debate and policy making in a fundamental way, although thesubstance of security policy has been changing only slowly and not very substantially.
The changes have taken place in four areas, including international security, the
US-Japan alliance, national security, and regional strategy.
First, the 1991 Gulf War became a critical turning point awakening thegovernment to the new realities after the end of the Cold War.

The absolute

humiliation resulting from the Japanese government’s incapacity, other than through“checkbook diplomacy,” to contribute to multinational efforts to defeat Iraq was acentral driving force behind the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law(PKO Law) in June 1992.
The passage of the law enabled the Japanese government to dispatch its
Self-Defense Force (SDF) to the peace-keeping operations under the United Nations
Transitional Authorities in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was followed by a series ofdispatches of the SDF troops to a number of other UN PKO such as in Zaire, the Golan
Heights, and East Timor１.
As Japan was making this significant engagement in the domain of
L. William Heinrich, Akiho Shibata and Yoshihide Soeya, United National
Peace-keeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Policies (Tokyo, New York, Paris:
１２international security for the first time after the end of the World War II, the monopolyof power by the LDP was broken in August 1993 with the birth of the Morihiro
Hosokawa government as an anti-LDP coalition.
When the desperate LDP came back to power with the Socialist Party head
Murayama as Prime Minister of an LPD-led coalition government in June 1994,
Murayama recognized the constitutionality of SDF and the legitimacy of the US-Japan
alliance, thus destroying his party’s long-standing raison-d’etre. This led to thecatastrophic demise of the Socialist Party, and the collapse of the so-called 1955 regime.
The demise of the leftist-pacifist political forces in domestic politics haschanged the context of political discourse on security matters in a somewhat
fundamental manner. It was particularly significant that an overall change in thedomestic atmosphere lifted long-standing taboos on national and international security
including the issue of the Article Nine of the Japanese postwar constitution.
This phenomenon, however, was not necessarily an indication of Japan
becoming “nationalistic” or “rightist” as many in Asia worried. The initial change ofsignificance had to do with Japanese growing awareness of the importance ofinternational peace-keeping efforts. Opinion polls indicate, for instance, that in the
1990s many Japanese have come to support the revision of Article Nine because they
have felt that it prohibits Japan from “international contribution” such as participation
in UN PKO.２
Second, new regional and global security challenges caused the re-affirmationof the US-Japan alliance. The Clinton administration engaged in major re-adjustmentof the US strategy toward the Asia-Pacific as exemplified by the so-called “Nyeinitiative,” and Japan responded by the adoption of the revised Defense Program
Outline (new Taiko) in November 1995.
New Taiko stressed, among other things, a new role for the SDF ininternational peace-keeping efforts, and the important role of the US-Japan alliance inthese endeavors; it stated that “this close cooperative bilateral relationship based on
the Japan-US Security Arrangements, facilitates Japanese efforts for peace andstability of the international community, including promotion of regional multilateral
security dialogues and cooperation, as well as support for various United Nations

United Nations University Press, 1999).
２ Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives,”
Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.

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activities.”３
Along this line of logic, the “US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security,” signed
by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton in April 1996,
declared that “the Japan-US security relationship …… remains the cornerstone forachieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous
environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.”４
It is equally important to note that the re-affirmation of the alliance took placeagainst the backdrop of the North Korean crisis in 1994.

The crisis came on the vergeof military conflict, which was saved by the Carter visit at the last minute, leading to
the Geneva agreement which established the Korea Energy Development Organization(KEDO) in exchange for the North Korean commitment to freeze its nuclear
programs５.
This crisis led to the subsequent revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense
Cooperation between the United States and Japan, which materialized in 1997.

The

new Guidelines meticulously delineated what Japan constitutionally and legally canand cannot do in the form of cooperating with the United States in the event of aregional contingency. The nightmare at the time for both Washington and Tokyo was
Japanese inaction toward a possible Korean contingency, in which event, many
Americans argued, the alliance would be over. The drafting of the new Guidelines,
therefore, was in essence an attempt to save the US-Japan alliance.
Third, the subsequent security threats posed by a series of North Korean
provocations, such as intrusion by spy ships, the launch of the Teapodon missile, andthe abduction of Japanese citizens, have steadily aroused many Japanese peoples’
consciousness about the country’s own national security.
As a result, nationalist or even somewhat rightist voices, which used to standon the defensive against the dominant pacifism, have become louder. The net effect of
this phenomenon, however, is mixed at best. The case can be made that this representsa phenomenon that former taboos have now ceased to be taboos. More importantly, thissituation indicates that the political context of national security debate has shiftedfrom the 1955 regime to something new.
Here, the recent passage of the domestic emergency laws is indicative of a future“National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996,” (November 28, 1995).
Available at: http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.htm
４ “Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century” (April 17,
1996). Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html
５ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books,
３

４

framework of political debate. For the Japanese, this is by no means a case of Japan
shifting toward the right.

Japan, like any other democratic sovereign state, shouldhave been equipped with the laws a long time ago. It is revealing that protection of civiland human rights under the emergency laws was the central point of contestation
between the largest opposition party, Democratic Party, and the LDP coalition
government.
New domestic debate would be eventually tested over the issue of the revisionof Article Nine of the constitution. A consensus is now forming among politicians that
Article Nine has increasingly become a liability for Japanese participation in
multilateral security as well as for effective national security. A real debate would occur
when they begin to present alternative revision proposals with competing strategies
and national goals.
Fourthly, in recent Japanese attitudes toward regional engagement, there is
new enthusiasm toward regional integration and community building. These efforts
naturally entail structural adjustment to new regional dynamics centering around therise of China and its various overtures toward East Asia.

This will be elaborated on

further in the final section.
Response to 9.11 and After
As discussed, domestic changes in Japan’s foreign policy parameters during
the last decade have accelerated Japan’s participation in international security
including the United Nations PKO.
The development in this direction has been systematic and steady, while
responses in the domain of traditional national security have been sporadic. After all,the emphasis in Ichiro Ozawa’s theory of Japan as a “normal country” was also placed
more on Japan’s participation in international peace-keeping efforts than anythingelse.
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9.11) haveopened up a new chapter for Japan’s coping with international security. Soon after 9.11,
the support of the international community for the United States was unmistakable.
China agreed to the UN Security Council resolution allowing the US-led multinational
forces to engage in a war in Afghanistan, which became the first instance where China

1997)

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voted for the use of force by UN members against a sovereign state.６
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also supported the United States
unequivocally. This was a natural act from the standpoint of Japanese engagement ininternational security whose momentum has been steadily on the rise in the 1990s.

Infact, the anti-terrorism measures law, enacted speedily to dispatch Japanese SDF tologistical support in the Indian Ocean, was legitimized in the name of the United
Nations Charter and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and not the
US-Japan alliance.７ Invoking the US-Japan security treaty was impossible because
the Japanese government has not recognized the right of collective self-defense as
constitutional.
Here, the lesson from the 1991 Gulf War experiences was clearly at work.
The nightmare for the Japanese government was to repeat “checkbook diplomacy.”
Politically, the US factor was not insignificant in the minds of central decision-makers,
particularly Prime Minister Koizumi. In the end, it was fortunate for the Japanese
government that the support for the United States did not contradict contribution tointernational security at the time of the war in Afghanistan. This was not necessarily
the case regarding a war against Iraq, as discussed below.
Bush Strategy and Northeast Asia
Transforming the WorldThe Bush strategy basically defines the US national interests as the core, withthe assumptions that the promotion of US national interests would lead to a betterworld and that the end of the Cold War has given the United States an opportunity totransform the world. The US would carry out this mission with available and effectivemeans including the unilateral use of its dominant power. This conceptualization of
global strategy has not fundamentally changed since Condoleezza Rice presented theargument in her article in Foreign Affairs８.

David Shambaugh, “Sino-American Relations since September 11: Can the New
Stability Last?” Current History, (September 2002), pp. 243-244.
７ “Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the
Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of theUnited Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September
2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures
Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations,” November 2, 2001)
８ Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs
６６Arguably, US strategic objectives have been constant since the end of the Cold
War. The maintenance of a new global order after the Cold War has been of primaryconcern, and Washington’s determination not to allow any rising power to challenge theUnited States, either regionally or globally, has been strong. The 1991 Gulf War
represented the fist manifestation of such US global strategy in the post-Cold War era.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has also regarded terrorism
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as main sources of threat
to global stability as well as to its national security. Throughout the 1990s, the US
forward-deployed military presence has often become a target of terrorist attacks,
many of which allegedly by the Al Qaeda.
And yet, 9.11 proved to be a historic turning point because it gave the Bushadministration a clear goal and a mission in a war against terrorism and those who
harbor terrorism.

In this war against terrorism, which is likely to continue for several

years or even longer, there are three distinct aspects influencing Bush strategy.
First, deep-seated in the mind of the Bush administration is the impulse ofhomeland defense and the determination not to allow another 9.11 at any cost.
Second, the theater for homeland defense is nonetheless global. Also,
counter-proliferation against WMD continues to constitute the central component of
US strategy on the global theater. This continues to fuel the Bush administration quest
for the Missile Defense (MD) programs both globally and regionally.
Third, the Bush administration has been pursuing US strategy with
undisguised missionary zeal.

Political rhetoric, pronounced primarily by President

Bush himself, is universal, appealing to the basic cause of democracy and freedom as
the core guiding principles for transforming the world.
In applying these three components of strategy, the Bush administration in effectmakes a conceptual distinction among three categories of states: allies, strategiccompetitors, and rogue states.

These categories were explicit in the initial

formulation of foreign policy of the Bush administration, and Northeast Asia embraces
all three categories of states.
A strategic competitor for the Unites States is a state having an alternativeorientation to an international system including value issues, which have the innate
inclination to challenge the system of US predominance. In essence, Chinese
long-term thinking and geopolitical orientation make it such a competitor to theUnited States.
(January/February, 2000).

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Under normal circumstances, however, strategic competitors are interested instrategic co-existence, while remaining determined to defend their own core values
and related interests. The current state of U.S.-China relations is characterized bysuch co-existence, which is likely to be sustained for some time to come.
Allies are close friends of the United States sharing basic values and overall
objectives of creating an international order with the United States as the central
agent. In Northeast Asia, Japan’s alliance-based strategy provides the cornerstone for
US regional strategy.
Rogue states, unlike strategic competitors, do not have the capability nor theintention to provide for an alternative international system, but could threaten thenational security of the United States in various conventional and unconventional
ways. Rogue states are also sources of global instability when connected with theproliferation of WMD. North Korea represents such a threat in Northeast Asia.
New Dilemma in the US-Japan Alliance
The initial attempt by the core people in the Washington policy community, manyof whom later assumed important positions in the Bush foreign policy team, was theso-called Armitage report, titled “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a
Mature Partnership９” Although the reality falls far short of the American expectation,
the message was explicit in calling for a US-Japan alliance more closely modeled on the
US-UK relationship.
Implicit in the distinction between a strategic competitor and an ally was afrustration shared by the Bush foreign policy team about the Clinton administration’slack of conceptual clarity in its policy toward the two critical countries in Northeast
Asia. Most problematically for the Bush team, the Clinton administration often
confused a competitor for a partner, as exemplified by the declaration of a “strategic
partnership” with China, at the cost of an alliance relationship with Japan.

Thisconceptual clarity in the US strategy under the Bush administration is an importantsource of the good state of the alliance between the United States and Japan, which isoften called the best since the end of the World War II.
In the Bush global strategy, however, the expected role of allies has undergone asignificant transformation. The Bush strategy basically defines the US national“The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward A Mature Partnership,” Institutefor National Strategic Studies Special Report (October 2000).

９８interests as the core, with the assumptions that the promotion of the US national
interests would lead to a better world and that the end of the Cold War has given the
United States an opportunity to transform the world. Allies are expected to support
and join this US mission.
This redefinition of the alliance for the Bush global strategy has changed themodality of the US-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Koizumi’s performance with
President Bush has been quite effective under this new US definition of the alliancerelationship. Koizumi in effect has been a cheerleader for the Bush global strategy.
This is why the chemistry between Bush and Koizumi is so good.
The question remains, however, to what extent Koizumi is aware of this. Perhaps
not much. If he were, he could have responded differently to the war in Afghanistan
and the war against Iraq.

While the war in Afghanistan was a clear case ofinternational security, the case of the Iraq war was complicated at best.
In one sense, opposition voiced by France and Germany voiced against theBush policy to attack Iraq was meant to encourage the US to behave prudently
according to the norm of international cooperation. The attack on Iraq was not theexercise of such leadership by the United States.

France and Germany could engage

in such diplomacy because they have their own forums of multilateral diplomacy basedin Europe, as well as at the United Nations.
In contrast, Japan does not have effective alternative tools with which to deal
with the United States.

The Japanese government, too, was deeply annoyed by theunilateralism of the Bush administration to go to war against Iraq. It, therefore, hopedthat some U.N. resolution would to be passed justifying the US action. When time ranout, however, the Japanese government did not have any other means but to go alongwith the United States.
Beneath the surface, therefore, the implications of the Japanese support for
the war in Afghanistan and the support for the US war against Iraq are significantly
different. The former was a clear case of international security recognized as such by
the majority of the international community, whereas the latter was not. The case of
the Iraq war has revealed that when and where there is a gap between the role of theUnited States and the cause of international security, Japan would in the end have tofollow the United States.
The aftermath of the war against Iraq has thus revealed a basic dilemma forJapan’s participation in international security. This dilemma, in turn, informs amotivation shared among Japanese policy makers toward community building efforts

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in East Asia, as argued below.

US-China Strategic Co-existence
As stated, the Bush administration in principle conceptualizes China as a“strategic competitor.” It, however, stopped calling her as such soon after its
inauguration. Secretary of State Colin Powell for instance said in July 2001 on his way
to Canberra from Beijing that “the relationship is so complex with so many different
elements to it that it's probably wiser not to capture it with a single word or a single
term or a single cliché.１０”
The 9.11 incident proved to provide a yet further foundation for strategic
coexistence between the United States and China. China played a critical role in thepassage of the UN Security Council Resolution 1368, legitimizing a war in Afghanistan.
The United States does need a cooperative working relationship with China for thefight against terrorism, as well as concerning the North Korean problem.
China, on its part, has stopped challenging the US predominance in the
Asia-Pacific and the world in the late 1990s. This has basically been the bottom-line ofChinese regional strategy since after the Taiwan crises in 1995 and 1996, when both
Beijing and Washington sought to restore the relationship with the mutual visits by
Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton in 1997 and 1998.
In principle, Chinese regional and global strategy is founded upon its
economy-centered orientation, making the most of its economic weight, both real andpotential. As a consequence, the Chinese government has been keeping a low profile
toward the US security presence in the region, including the Taiwan question and the
US-Japan alliance. There is reasonable evidence to believe that China has also
readjusted its policy toward Japan with the same strategic considerations in thesummer of 1999, perhaps upon re-examining the effect of Jiang Zemin’s trip to Japan
in 1998.
The strategic coexistence between Washington and Beijing, therefore, means thatthe most critical great powers in the Asia-Pacific region are having different dreams inthe same bed. They have different strategic orientations, and they need each otherprecisely for the pursuit of their own strategies.

Secretary Colin L. Powell, “Remarks to the Press En route to Canberra, Australia,”(July 29, 2001), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/4347.htm

１０１０The Taiwan question is now an object of such strategic coexistence. Beijing
basically maintained a low key against some of the initial provocative statements by
President Bush, as well as the US policies of arms sale or allowing stopovers in the US
by Taiwanese leaders including Chen Suibien himself.
In order not to exacerbate the problem, the Bush administration has also
re-committed itself to the principle of “one-China” and non-support of Taiwan“independence,” as President Bush himself has now come to pronounce１１.
In principle, the Taiwan question still remains a wild card for US-China relations,which could upset their strategic coexistence. Now, the Chinese economy-centeredstrategy appears to be working. Taiwan’s economic dependence on China is everdeepening, which in turn gives confidence to Beijing which has been advancing its“united front” policy toward “comrades” in Taiwan.
The Chen Suibien administration, however, has been taking mixed responses,
legislating necessary measures for facilitating mutual trade, investment and travels,
while increasing political concerns over the ever-deepening economic dependence on
China. The prospect for stable cross-strait relations could be clouded over the planannounced in November this year to hold national referendum in 2006.
North Korean Problem
In the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, North Korea, Iran andIraq, formerly labeled as rogue states, were upgraded to “an axis of evil.１２” The natureof North Korean threat as an “evil” is three-dimensional, in line with the three aspectsof the US strategy after 9.11 as seen above.
The first aspect has to do with the homeland defense of the United States. Here,a potential threat posed by the Taepodon missile is relevant. Other than this, however,North Korea has yet to represent a direct threat to the US homeland security, andperhaps this would account for the Bush administration’s different approaches
between Iraq and North Korea. In this sense, commitment to the six-party talks is notnecessarily the ultimate choice for the Bush administration.
Second, on the global theater, the proliferation of WMD is an urgent issue indealing with North Korea. Here, multinational endeavors, most notably the PSI, to“President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea,”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021025.html
１２ “The President’s State of the Union Address,”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html
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stop inflows and outflows of nuclear-related materials and technology into and out of
North Korea, are important.
Third, a missionary zeal, often pronounced by President Bush, makes theleadership regime in Pyongyang totally unacceptable for Washington, particularly for
President Bush himself. In this vein, President Bush has often expressed his sympathy
and the need of massive assistance toward the people of North Korea. This aspect of
the US North Korean policy creates an impression that the Bush administration
should be aiming at regime change in Pyongyang.
This last aspect of the Bush policy toward North Korea, compounded by therhetoric of an “axis of evil,” would have naturally aroused a strong sense of crisis forthe leadership in Pyongyang.

This perceived deep crisis for the regime survival evencaused Kim Jong-il, the supreme leader of North Korea, to engage in a surprising
move to accept Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Pyongyang in
September 2002. The determination on the part of Kim Jong-il to seek helping handsfrom Japan was unmistakable in Kim himself confessing and apologizing for theabduction of Japanese citizens and the spy ships１３.
When the gamble to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan stalled, however,
Kim Jong-il once again faced, or did not have any other choice but to face, the UnitedStates squarely in order to get the guarantee of the regime survival in one way or
another. In the face of President Bush, whose stance has been uncompromising tobegin with, however, Pyongyang had to employ unusually provocative measures,
playing a chicken game by climbing step by step up the ladder of nuclear escalation.
Against these escalation tactics of Pyongyang, the Bush administration once
became inclined to go to the United Nations for sanctions. Perhaps this move alarmed
China, which would account for the timing of Chinese shift in its diplomacy toward
North Korea from the emphasis on bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang
to a multilateral framework. On top of this, worsening of the security environment andits apparent impact on the changing nature of security debate in Japan, as well as thenuclear programs of North Korea, are not welcome developments for Beijing.
Pyongyang thus agreed to the six party talks held in Beijing in late August.
Under this framework, however, the US determination to demand Pyongyang to scrap
its nuclear programs is still strong. Accordingly, US expectations on China as amediator could also wane depending on Chinese responses.

１３

Yoshihide Soeya, “Japanese Diplomacy and the North Korean Problem,” Japan

Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2003).

１２

Whatever would turn out to be the case, the determination of Washington andPyongyang to pursue their own agenda head-on appear unchanged, and it may well be
the case that a solution, if any, could only be found out of bad choices１４.
Toward Building an East Asian Community
From Fukuda Doctrine to ASEAN 10
In retrospect, the initial policy of the Japanese government, advanced with aview to building a regional order, was the so-called Fukuda Doctrine, announced in1977 as a policy toward Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced athree-point policy toward Southeast Asia in Manila in August 1977. First, Japan iscommitted to peace and is determined not to become a military power. Second, Japan
will establish a “heart-to-heart” relationship of mutual trust with Southeast Asia
beyond economics and politics. Third, Japan will cooperate with ASEAN’s efforts tostrengthen solidarity and resilience, nurture relations of mutual understanding with
the Indochinese states, and thus would contribute to peace and prosperity of the entire
Southeast Asian region.
The essence of the Fukuda Doctrine was the third point, aspiring to serve as abridge between ASEAN and Indochina for peace and prosperity of the Southeast Asia
region. This principle remained to form the core thinking of Japan’s Southeast Asia
policy during the subsequent years, which was revitalized at the time of theCambodian peace process in the early 1990s, where Japan actively sought to play apolitical role１５.
Arguably, with the realization of ASEAN 10, the expressed political goal of the
Fukuda Doctrine was achieved on ASEAN’s own initiative, sustained by substantial
economic input by the Japanese ODA and private trade and FDI. In early 1997,
anticipating the birth of ASEAN 10, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimotoproposed the Japan-ASEAN summit to further accelerate the integration of ASEAN as
well as Japan’s relations with the ASEAN countries.
From ASEAN+3 to Koizumi Proposal
Victor Cha, “Tighten the Noose around North Korea,” Financial Times, July 28,
2003.
１５ Yoshihide Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy,” James Morley and Masashi
Nishihara, eds., Vietnam Joins the World (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
１４

１３

The realization of ASEAN 10, however, coincided with the Asian financial
crisis, forcing ASEAN countries to go through a series of difficult efforts to restructure
domestic economies and politics as well as regional arrangements. Also, at about thesame time, China has shifted its main strategic focus from high politics to low politics.
ASEAN, following its usual instinct to carefully balance relations with external powers,
turned the Hashimoto proposal into its own initiative leading to the establishment of
ASEAN+3 at the end of 1997.
These developments have ushered in a new momentum toward deepening
regional integration. Singapore took an important initiative to officially propose a free
trade agreement (FTA) with Japan in December 1999 when Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong visited Japan. Japanese economic ministries, most notably the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which had already started to study sucharrangements with several countries including South Korea, responded positively andthe negotiations gained momentum.
In the meantime, observing the momentum of a series of bilateral FTA
initiatives and having achieved the goal of joining the WTO, China also came up with
its own FTA initiative, as most symbolically indicated by the Chinese proposal of a free
trade agreement with ASEAN at the occasion of the ASEAN+3 summit meeting inNovember 2000. In the following year, Chinese and ASEAN leaders reached a basic
agreement that they would achieve a free trade area within the coming 10 years. This
was quickly followed-up in November 2002, when the leaders signed a comprehensive
framework agreement to carry out the plan.
These China-ASEAN initiatives have prompted the Koizumi administration ofJapan to develop its won regional strategy built upon the ongoing process of FTA
negotiations. In Prime Minister Koizumi’s policy speech delivered in Singapore in
January 2002１６, Koizumi proposed an “Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive
Economic Partnership,” built upon the “Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a
New Age Partnership,” the so-called Japan-Singapore FTA, which Koizumi signed prior
to the speech.
More importantly, the Koizumi proposal included an ambitious reference to an
East Asian community. Koizumi said to the audience in Singapore that “our goal shouldbe the creation of a community that acts together and advances together.” Koizumi
Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East
Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership,” (January 14, 2002). Available at
１６

１４

expressed his expectation that, starting from Japan-ASEAN cooperation, “the countriesof ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand will becore members of such a community.”
To substantiate such partnership with ASEAN, Koizumi’s speech advanced a
new approach to Japanese diplomacy with ASEAN. While stating his basic stance topromote policies of the Fukuda Doctrine, Koizumi mentioned that “in thequarter-century since the ‘Fukuda Speech,’ the global situation has undergone
tremendous change.” He then continued:
In Southeast Asia, peace has progressed with the resolution of conflicts in
Indochina, resulting in the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries.
Democratization and a market economy are also progressing in Asia. The
People's Republic of China and Taiwan have joined the WTO. Furthermore,as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States, we've seen aparadigm shift in security concepts, making patently clear the importanceof working together for the sake of peace and stability.
In a nutshell, although Koizumi’s speech took the form of addressing
Southeast Asian nations, it has made clear a comprehensive design of Japan’s regional
engagement. What was quietly implied in this presentation of policy approach is theweight of ASEAN as an equal partner for Japan’s regional role.
Concluding Remarks
In December this year, there will be a bilateral ASEAN-Japan summit meeting
held in Tokyo. This is the very first occasion when the ASEAN countries agreed to holdsuch a meeting outside of Southeast Asia. Previously, any bilateral summit meeting
between ASEAN and its non-member country used to be held in conjunction with theASEAN leaders meetings or the ASEAN+3 meetings, which as a rule take place only in
the Southeast Asian region.
ASEAN has long been known for its balancing act vis-a-vis non-member
external powers. The fact that the ASEAN leaders have now agreed to meet with their
Japanese counterpart outside of Southeast Asia is an indication of their trust in Japan
as well as the decreasing weight of Japan particularly as compared to that of China.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html

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For ASEAN, the presence of China has become so prominent that the holding of abilateral summit with Japan would not upset its balanced diplomacy with outside
powers.
No matter what the motivation on the part of ASEAN, this is a golden
opportunity for Japan to move toward a community building as an equal partner with
ASEAN, without excluding China.
It has long been argued in the Japanese policy community that Japanesepolicy-makers feel most at ease with the ASEAN counterparts in Asia. ASEAN people
also now say that they feel most comfortable with Japan among the external countries.
This is clearly the result of extensive and rich contacts between the two during the last
decades.
The grounds of such optimism, however, could not be turned into assets unlessapproached strategically. As argued in this paper, important domestic changes have
happened in recent years for Japan’s regional and global policies, which haveaccelerated the momentum of Japanese engagement in international security andregional economic integration.
Reportedly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will increase its staff people incharge of FTA negotiations from 30 to 90. The METI minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, is anactive member of the agricultural tribe of the LDP, but is now committed tostrengthening Japan’s engagement in FTA negotiations. After all, the FTA drive will
provide useful momentum for the re-structuring of agricultural policy in line with thebroader regional strategy of community building propelled by FTA and other economic
measures.
It is high time now that Japan move strategically by raising the creation of astable and prosperous regional community as a long-term goal. Eventually, such a
community could and indeed should have elements of a security community, where theuse of force as a means of settling international disputes could be regarded as
legitimate only in multilateral forms and like-minded peoples are connected bycommon values.
The United States as well as China should be a member of such a community.
Ironically, however, the current unilateral tendency of the Bush administration is a
catalyst for East Asian countries to come closer, if not to counter the American
predominance but to prepare for the misuse of its power. China could pose the sameproblem, particularly with regard to the use of force against Taiwan.

Ultimately,prudence on the part of the United States and China is a necessary condition for

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building an East Asian community.
Needless to say, Japan should prove itself to be a credible promoter of such a
strategy by creating a sensible alternative framework of policy debate and policy
making replacing the 1955 regime.

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