brief 47
MANPADSA Terrorist Threat to
Civilian Aviation?

Contents
List of acronyms

4

Executive summary

6

Acknowledgments

7

Introduction

8

1 MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft 10
Princess Mawuena Amuzu
Introduction

11

MANPADS and the vulnerability ofcivilian aircraft

11

History

11

Discussion

19

Weapon and perpetrators

19

NSAGs and MANPADS

19

Aircraft vulnerability and outcome

20

Phase of flight22

Attack location and civilian targets

22

Effects of civilian attacks by MANPADS

23

Conclusion

25

2 Technical aspects andcomponents of MANPADS

26

Christof Kögler
MANPADS architectures—An overview

27

Passive homing

28

Command guidance

35

Semi-active laser homing

36

4 Stockpiles

86

Michael Ashkenazi
Method87

World MANPADS stockpiles

88

United States

88

Russia

89

China

91

The world stockpile picture

92

Stockpiles standards in practice92

Conclusion

92

5 Regulating MANPADS

93

Michael Ashkenazi
Discussion

100

Conclusion

100

6 MANPADS countermeasures102

Princess Amuzu, Michael Ashkenazi
and Marc KöslingTechnical countermeasures

103

Behavioral, administrative andpolitical processes

107

Discussions

109

Conclusion

110

7 Discussion, summary and policy
recommendations

General discussion

111
111

Implications of technical aspects for
MANPADS threat assessment

37

Summary

113

Conclusion

40

Policy recommendations

114

Final word

115

Literature cited

116

Appendix A	

132

3 MANPADS transfers

41

Michael Ashkenazi and Jan Grebe
Background42

Value of trade42

Black market

42

Originator picture

58

The gray and black markets

74

Conclusions: The gray and black markets

77

Theft and losses

78

Surplus destruction

79

Technology transfer

83

Conclusion

84

This research project is supported by the German
Foreign Office.

brief 47
MANPADSA Terrorist Threat to
Civilian Aviation?

Dr. Michael Ashkenazi,
Princess Mawuena Amuzu, Jan Grebe,
Christof Kögler and Marc Kösling3

List of acronyms
AA
AD
ALBI
APEC
AQIM
ASEAN
ATLAS
BCU
BICC
CCD
CdS
CIS
CLOS
CM
CPU
CREWPADS
DIRCM
DMZ
FARC
FMLN
FN
FOV
FSA
FYR
GOB
GUNT
HEL
HgCdTe
HN
HY
ICAO
ICU
IFALPA
IFF
InSb
IR
IRCM
ISAF
LML
LOS
LTTE
MANPADS
MAWS
MBDA
MFA
mmW
MNLA
MPLA
MTHEL
NAMSA
Nm
NSAG
NSPA
OAG

4

Anti-AirAir Defense
Air-Launched Ballistic Intercept
Asia-Pacific Economic Forum
Al-Qaida in the Maghreb
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Advanced Twin Launcher Anti-air Strikes
Battery Coolant Unit
Bonn International Center for Conversion
Charge-Coupled Device
Cadmium Sulfide
Commonwealth of Independent States
Command to Line-of-Sight
Countermeasures
Central Processing Unit
Crew-Portable Air Defense Systems
Directed Infrared Countermeasure
Demilitarized Zone
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front)
Fei Nu (Flying Crossbow)
Field of view
Free Syrian Army
Former Yugoslav Republic
Government of Belarus
Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition (Transitional Government of National Unity)
High-Energy Laser
Mercury Cadmium TellurideHong Nu (Red Cherry)
Hong Yang (Red Tassel)
International Civil Aviation Organization
Islamic Courts Union
International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations
Identification Friend or Foe
Indium Antimonide
InfraredInfrared Countermeasure System
International Security Assistance ForceLightweight Multiple Launcher
Line of Sight
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
Missile Approach Warning System
Matra BAe Dynamics Alenia Marconi Systems
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Millimeter Waves
Mouvement National de l’Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)
Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
Nanometers
Non-State Armed Group
NATO Support Agency
Organized Armed Group

OAS
OOB
OSCE
PbS
PFLP
PKK
PLA
PLAAF
PLAN
PLO
PM/WRAPN
POA
Polisario Front
PR
PSSM
QW
RBS
RMP
RPG
SACLOSSADRAL
SAL
SALW
SAM
SAS
SFOR
SHORAD
SIPRI
SNA
SPADS
SPLA
TAAG
UAV
UEMS
UNIFIL
UNITA
USAF
UN-POAUSSRUVVSHORAD
VZM
WA
ZIPRA
ZVBw

Organization of American States
Order of Battle
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Lead Sulfide
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
People’s Liberation Army
PLA Air Force
PLA Navy
Palestine Liberation Organization
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
Proportional Navigation
See UN-POA
Frente Popular de Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia
el-Hamra and Rio de Oro)
Public Relations
Physical Security and Stockpile Management
Qian Wei (Advanced Guard)
Robotsystem
Reprogrammable Microprocessor
Rocket-Propelled GrenadeSemi-Automatic Command to Line-of-Sight
Systeme d’AutoDefense Rapprochee Anti-aerienne Legere (Light Short Range Anti-Aircraft Self-Defense
System)Semi-Active Laser
Small Arms and Light Weapons
Surface-to-Air Missile
Small Arms Survey
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Short-Range Air Defense
Stockholm International Peace Research InstituteSomalia National AllianceSelf-Propelled Air Defense Systems
Sudan People’s Liberation Army
Transportes Aereos Angolanos
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence ofAngola)United States Air Force
United Nations - Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All its Aspects
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ultraviolet
Very Short-Range Air Defense
Vazovski Machinostroitelni Zavodi
Wassenaar Arrangement
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (Verification Center of the German Armed Forces)
Throughout this brief acronyms are introduced the first time they are used. In addition, less common
acronyms are reintroduced the first time they occur in each chapter.

5

Executive summaryThe object of this BICC brief is to summarize the issueof Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
for political decision-makers concentrating on thepotential effects of MANPADS on civilian aviation.
The brief is divided into chapters which cover theentire spectrum of issues relating to MANPADS effects
in the civilian realm. Three main themes run throughthis brief:

Identification of the factors (technical, political, legal,
security) that support or hinder MANPADS attacks
against civilian aircraft.
The brief describes the history of MANPADS attacks
against civilian aircraft and analyzes these cases.
Control of MANPADS stockpiles and transfers are a
key to restricting MANPADS attacks. Other criticalfeatures of MANPADS controls are the legal anddiplomatic agreements, such as the Wassenaar­
Arrangement, which act to restrict MANPADS diffusion
to some degree. Finally, we also discuss the conceptof ‘layered countermeasures’ as a key to protecting
civilian aircraft.
The effects of MANPADS attacks.
There is a continuing debate over the effects of
MANPADS attacks against civilian aircraft. The brief
identifies about fifty attacks. Some of these havebeen unsuccessful, others succeeded in bringing
down an aircraft. Though some technical patterns
emerge as to weapons used and aircraft survivability,
the issue is complicated. Overall, propeller-driven
aircraft are very vulnerable to MANPADS attacks, as
are aircraft in the take-off phase. Immediate costs ofan aircraft shoot-down are measured in the millions tohundreds of millions of euro. The longer-term effects
are less clear cut, with some analysts claiming that a
successful shoot-down would cost billions of euros inbusiness disruption, insurance claims, and passenger
confidence. Other evidence does not point to suchdramatic effects. However, it seems likely that a shootdown in Europe or the United States will have dramaticeffects, whereas one in a less developed country will
have far less impact.
Available tools to limit or halt MANPADS attacks.
There are a number of ways to affect the potential
of attacks against civilians. While technical solutions(e.g. on-board countermeasures) seem, intuitively,
to be an effective solution, these all have problems
or ­weaknesses including cost, effectiveness or risksof collateral damage. Layered countermeasures,
involving technical, legal and intelligence measureswould seem to be more effective. However, there6

are two major tools available that have not been
sufficiently exploited: security measures for MANPADS
stocks— including inspections, ‘smart gun’ ­technology,
good record-keeping, and storage ­technology—,
and legal measures.
Security measures embedded in such proposals as the
Wassenaar Arrangement’s document on MANPADS
provide a valid, useful security standard which needs
to be enforced by all manufacturing countries on
their clients. The embedded principles for transfer andstorage, if followed religiously by both originators andrecipients, are likely to significantly cut the access ofundesirable elements to MANPADS.
Legal measures to ensure MANPADS security are
unfortunately weak. Only one country, the United­States, specifically legislates against the trade or­ownership of MANPADS by civilians. Other states
subsume legislation on MANPADS—a uniquely threatening weapon—into general legislation on war materiel. While over fifty countries have signed up to thedetailed principles embedded in the Wassenaar
Arrangement, many others have not. This is true forboth, individual states and regional agreements.
More work needs to be done to bring the remaining
non-signatory states into line with the Wassenaar­standards.
Finally, while detailed standards for transfer andstockpiling of MANPADS exist, there is some evidence
that these standards are not adhered to even bystates that are signatories to these arrangements.
Moreover, a general weakness of all agreements
to deal with MANPADS (bilateral as well as regionaland ­international) is the lack of enforcement. Since­
participation is voluntary, there is no way besides
name-and-shame (which signatory states seem loath
to do) to ensure compliance.

Main findings
1.

2.
3.

4.

MANPADS and their components are very durable
and can be functional after decades of storage
even though inevitable degradation leads to anincreasing loss of reliability.
Modern jet aircraft can survive being hit by
MANPADS.
Attacks have almost exclusively taken placein active war zones. The threat to civil aviation
outside conflict zones may thus be less grave thanassumed.
The most commonly used MANPADS in attacks
against civilian aircraft have been from the Strela

5.

6.

family, which are the most widely ­proliferated
systems in the world. It can be expected thatnewer 2nd or 3rd generation MANPADS will
become available to non-state armed groups inthe coming years.
In the course of political chaos during regimechange, MANPADS stockpiles are extremely
vulnerable to leakage. In such situations, physicalstockpile security measures could be a crucial
factor in limiting MANPADS proliferation.
The quality and detail of international regulationof MANPADS has improved in the last decade,though enforcement is still weak. The ­strongestbasis for MANPADS control is currently the
Wassenaar Arrangement’s MANPADS document.

Major recommendations
1.

Encourage states manufacturing MANPADS toincorporate technical innovations to control

AcknowledgmentsA

great many people are owed thanks for their
help in providing data and criticism during the
production of this brief. Some of these requested
anonymity for one reason or another; to these we
extend our thanks without naming them.
We would first of all like to thank Mr. Wolfgang Bindseilof the German Foreign Office who commissioned thisbrief and provided support throughout. We would also
like to thank the official spokespeople of the foreign
ministries of Albania, Austria, Canada, Colombia,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Jamaica, Macedonia, Malta,
Panama, Romania, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, and Uruguay, for responding to ourrequests for information on their MANPADS p­ olicies.
Ms. Elvan Isikozlu was initially a member of the teamand compiled much of our early research before
temporarily moving on to a much more importantengagement.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

illegal spread such as planned degradation ofbatteries and coded ‘smart gun’ mechanisms inall components.
Increase the development of passive counter­measures on aircraft and air crew training toprotect against MANPADS attacks. Provide­assistance to less affluent countries to secure theapproaches to their airports and their aircraft.
Encourage manufacturers and militaries to moveto less mobile CREWPADS rather than MANPADS,
so as to limit attractiveness and discourage theft.
Encourage states to enact MANPADS-specificlegislation.
Exchange real information about legacy
MANPADS from manufacturers and stockpilers.
Encourage strong physical stockpile ­security
measures to limit leakage in times of weak
­governmental oversight.
Develop a compliance mechanism for Wassenaar
standards in the realm of MANPADS.

who commented on the brief, as well as arranging
hands-on training and familiarization with MANPADS
for the team. We thank Master Sgt. Klaus Holtkamp
of the Technische Schule Landsysteme und Fachschule des Heers für Technik for his introduction to thet­ echnical workings of MANPADS.
Master Sgt. Klaus Holtkamp, Mr. Daan Redelinghuys of
Mines Advisory Group, as well as Mr. William Caplanof Netherlands Infrared Consulting and Modelling, allreviewed the technical chapter of this brief and gave
valuable feedback.
Mr. Jim O’Halloran of IHS Jane’s provided his expertiseon some advanced technical questions regarding
MANPADS.
We thank Mr. Larry Schultz from DTRA, Mr. Michael
Peugeot from NAMSA (now NSPA), and the membersof MSAG for encouragement and critical comments.

Dr. Nicholas March of PRIO, and Lt. Col. (Ret.) Robert
Payan of the French Army read and commented indetail on earlier drafts, as did Lt. Col. Stefan Gundlachof the Bundeswehr.

At BICC, Dr. Elke Grawert, Mr. Marius Kahl, and Mr.
Robert Willeke read early drafts of the brief and theircontributions helped immensely in shaping the final
form. As always, thanks are due to Ms. Heike Webbfor meticulous final editing and taking responsibility forprodding us to meet deadlines.

Particular thanks go to staff at the Bundeswehr­Verification Center led by Lt. Col. Stefan Gundlach

Notwithstanding the above, the opinions expressed
and the errors committed are our sole responsibility.

7

Introduction

C

lose upon their first deployment in the late 1960s
as Very Short-Range Air Defense (VSHORAD),
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
became attractive weapons for Non-State Armed
Groups (NSAGs) to defend themselves against aircraftin asymmetric conflicts, and as a terror weapon
against civilian aircraft. The first recorded attemptedattack against a civilian aircraft was in 1973 against
an aircraft bearing Israel’s then Prime Minister, Golda
Meir. The attack at Rome’s airport was foiled by Italianpolice before launch. Since then there have beensome fifty recorded attacks by MANPADS against
civilian aircraft by NSAGs and state military units, inaddition to the hundreds of attacks, some successful,many not, against military targets.
MANPADS were developed as a military weapon by
the United States starting in the late 1950s as an aerial
defense for infantry units, and soon copied by the
USSR. MANPADS are generally used militarily to:• Protect light units (infantry and special forces)
against close attacks by enemy aircraft(VSHORAD);• Serve as an element in layered defense, notably
in zones not covered by heavier mobile or static
anti-aircraft defenses;• Serve as a ‘last ditch’ defense for high value
targets (e.g. HQs and VIPs);• Ambush attacking aircraft from well-camouflaged unexpected positions, made possible by
MANPADS easy mobility and small size.

MANPADS have been used in a number of state–state
conflicts (e.g. the Cenepa War, the Yom Kippur War).
They have been reported to be successful, thoughhave not proven to be a major threat in such wars
when utilized on their own, except in the ambush
posture (that is, when they are used unexpectedly)or where the attacking aircraft or airforce have
limited technical capacities. Nevertheless MANPADS
are found in the arsenals of around 100 states. Early
MANPADS were relatively ineffective against military
targets. The newest versions have been improvedin all aspects, and may constitute serious threats to­military aircraft.
The prime goal of this BICC brief is to provide acomprehensive survey of all aspects of MANPADS asa problem in managing civilian security. The ­intention
is to summarize the issue of MANPADS for politicaldecision-making, concentrating on effects in the­civilian realm. The issue is particularly crucial, sinceestimates of the direct and indirect damages that­
could occur from a single successful MANPADS attack8

are in the billions of euro. Moreover, since civilian air
traffic is a major linchpin of modern business (freight
as well as passengers), lack of confidence in thistraffic system as result of a MANPADS strike would
have severe worldwide economic impact.
The objectives of this brief are to:• Enumerate and describe known attacks on
civilian aircraft and what can be learned fromthose attacks;• Describe the various types of MANPADS currently
available;• Describe what is known about the world MANPADS
stockpile and MANPADS transactions between
states and between states and NSAGs;• Describe and analyze international and national
attempts to regulate MANPADS and to provide
technical and other civilian countermeasures to
MANPADS attacks;• Make recommendations to limit the threat of
MANPADS to civilian aviation.
While we do discuss military data and related issues
to some extent, it must be noted that the focus of
this brief is on civilian MANPADS issues, not the military
aspects of their use or deployment.

Structure
The brief is divided into seven chapters and a numberof case studies, each of which, except the discussion
and conclusions, is more-or-less autonomous.
In Chapter 1 we present and analyze attacks on
civilian airliners from the 1970s to the latest attacks.
We examine some of the effects and the nature of
attacks including weapons (when known), aircraft
types, attack profiles, and results.
Chapter 2 introduces the technical aspect of
MANPADS insofar as these have been published.
We describe both obsolete MANPADS and moreadvanced ones and analyze the role of their different
components regarding attacks against civilian
aircraft.
In Chapter 3 we document transfers of MANPADS frommanufacturers to customers, and between states and
NSAGs. The chapter also details what is known of the
programs to destroy surplus MANPADS and draws
some conclusions about this particular exercise.
Chapter 4 provides a picture of the world’s stock of
MANPADS as of 2011/12. Due to inconsistent data, itwas necessary to devise and describe some methods
that can be used to partially supplement publishedreports on MANPADS stockpiles.
In Chapter 5 we report on, and analyze, international,
regional, and national attempts to regulate MANPADS
through laws, treaties, and arrangements. We also
assess the successes (and failures) of these regulatory
attempts and point to some ways of improvement.
Chapter 6 describes and compares various technicaland behavioral means to counteract MANPADS. We
discuss means to disrupt MANPADS shoots, as well asmeans that have been developed to weaken theeffects of hits should they occur.
In Chapter 7 we discuss and examine some of the
major conclusions emerging from this study andprovide some policy recommendations at both thenational and international levels.
This brief is as comprehensive as we could make it
within the scope of our research. Inevitably, there
is too much information for some, and possibly too
little for other readers. Therefore, we urge readers toread in depth those aspects of particular interest. The­technology chapter is intended to provide readerswith no or superficial knowledge of how MANPADS
work with an authoritative source to the various types.
Chapters 3 and 4 are of particular interest to readersinterested in the state and effects of the MANPADS
trade and stockpile control, whereas Chapter 5
presents a comprehensive view of the normative­and legal aspects of MANPADS control. Chapter 6
is intended largely for readers who need coherent
information on the current and future state of thetechniques and processes for reducing the dangers
of MANPADS hits. In a sense it is a continuation of
the regulatory framework described in Chapter 5,
including technical possibilities.

the data on some topics, including national s­ tockpiles,
i­nternational transfers, and users of MANPADS is­inconsistent and not uniformly reliable, and must be
seen as t­ entative and open to c
­ orrection.
In addition to the publicly available documents,
we rely on other supplementary sources. All known
MANPADS producers were mailed a formal interview
request. In addition, over 200 letters were sent to theofficial national contact points of the UN Programmeof Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects (UN-POA). Only one MANPADS producer
responded to our ­correspondence, denying therequested interview. However, eighteen national
authorities provided us with information about their
MANPADS regulations. In addition, several colleagues
in various positions provided us with critiques andadvice on puzzling aspects of the issue. We also
benefited from a day’s briefing and training at a
Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) facility, under
the sponsorship of the Verification Center of theGerman Army (ZVBw). We have been greatly reliant
on publicly available graphic sources, including
photographs of MANPADS available on the web, andvideo clips available from various websites. Some ofthose have been ­authenticated by others; all havebeen ­
examined by us carefully for a conservativeinterpretation of MANPADS presence in e.g. Syria and
Libya, and for their use.
Data collection was communal, with the first draftof chapters written by different individuals on theteam. Texts were then critiqued, first inside the team,with each chapter being overseen by at least two
members, and the final product reviewed in-house at
the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),
before review by external reviewers. Final editing andquality control were performed by BICC’s in–house
Managing Editor.

MethodUnsurprisingly for a military weapons system, dataon many aspects of MANPADS are secret and notavailable for publication. Moreover, many aspects of
the MANPADS issue even in the civilian domain are
under-reported, vague, contradictory, or inaccurate.
Most of the information in this brief has been reliant
on publicly available documents including research
papers, technical papers, manuals, newspaper
reports and available correspondence. We have tried
wherever possible to cross-check information from
more than one independent source. Nevertheless,9Princess Mawuena Amuzu

1

10

Manpads attacks
on civilian aircraftIntroduction
Commercial aviation is a major socio-economic
world feature and therefore also a continuing target
for terrorists. Attacks on civilian planes using ManPortable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), originallydesigned for military warfare to defend against aerial
attacks, can occur, have occurred and arguably
remain a threat (Brooks et al., 2005, p. 6; O’Sullivan,
2005, p. 2).
The use of MANPADS against civilian planes is almost as
old as its use in warfare. Since 1973, there have been
approximately 50 MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft(in addition to other forms of attack such as hijacking
and bombing). Although being illegitimate objects ofwar, hostile action against civilian targets has served
as a terror tactic for a number of NSAGs (Non-State
Armed Groups). The threat posed by MANPADS to
civilian aircraft deserves much ­attention as one missile
could cause a crash, killing scores of civilians. Thoughextensive damage to larger planes may be reduced
due to their size, design, and multiple engine system,
there is evidence of approximately 30 fatal attacks,
and 920 civilian deaths (see Table 1 below). Of the
MANPADS ­manufactured since the 1960s, over 6,000
are, it is claimed by some authors, outside official
national armories or stored with q­ uestionable ­security(Pena, 2005, p. 4; ­Schroeder, 2007a). These ­estimates,
however, p­ re-date the recent uprisings in the Middle
East and the loss of control of state armories tonon-state actors during which several thousand­
MANPADS may have been added to this count from
Libyan stocks (Chivers, 2011a; Marrouch, 2012).
Air travel vulnerability has been a major topic ofdiscussion since September 2001 with an evolving
scope of actors, power shifts, heightened incidenceof terrorism, and more inclusive security governance.
The Mombasa Arkia Airline attack of 2002 and the
DHL attack in 2003 (discussed below) brought tolight the potency of MANPADS threats, sparking­reflections and debates on the ­possibility of threats,­vulnerability of the commercial airline industry andpossible ­countermeasures (Isensen and Lindsey,
2002; ­Czarnecki, Yelverton and Brooks, 2005, p. 10).
More recently, this issue has resurfaced as one ofgreat concern with the developments in the Middle
East, particularly the acknowledged threat of Libyan
missiles and terrorist acquisition of these systems(Stewart, 2012). In addition to actual attacks, thethreat of MANPADS attacks against civilian aircraft
is a terror weapon of its own (Arasli, 2010). Though

there is no evidence of a sustained and consistentrumor planting campaign of this sort, this should be
kept in mind, since attacks against civilian aircraft are
intended for public effect.
The objectives of this chapter are to summarize, withas much detail as possible, forty years of MANPADS
attacks against civilian aircraft. With data gatheredfrom open sources, this chapter of the brief proceedswith a short introduction to the vulnerability of large
civilian aircraft, followed by a discussion of select past­incidents, trends and impacts, and a conclusion.
It must however be recognized that neither thearguments nor the data are straightforward. Claims
that an aircraft had been hit by a MANPADS canbe hard to verify where technical infrastructure andaircraft crash reviews are not available. Thus eventhe numbers of successful attacks cited are open tochallenge. The same is true of aircraft survivability in
MANPADS attacks, and the overall effects of attacks
on the international community.

Manpads and the vulnerability ofcivilian aircraft
Civilian aircraft fly at relatively high altitudes andcruise levels that are out of reach of MANPADS.
Their ­vulnerability to these weapons is, however, not­eliminated. A wide window of opportunity is presented
when a commercial jet descends into the ‘danger
zone’ for landing or during take-off. This is due to its
large size and lower altitude, as well as “
­ predictableflight paths, slow speed, and high Infrared (IR)­signatures” (Brooks et al., 2005, p. 6). Consequently,
commercial flights are highly vulnerable within thetime period of approximately 10 to 15 minutes before
landing and after take off and for a distance of about
50 miles from the takeoff/ landing point (Erwin, 2003;
Thompson, 2003).
History
The first recorded case of an attempted MANPADS
attack against a civilian airplane was in Italy in 1973,
orchestrated by the Black September Palestiniangroup.1 The attack was foiled by the Italian security
services before launch. Since then, civilian passenger
and cargo planes have been periodically attacked.
Reports regarding the total known number of attacks
1“Black September” was an internal PLO cell largely manned by
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) personnel. Theirmain objective was attacks against the Jordanian government
which had suppressed Palestinian armed groups in Jordan in
September 1970.

11range from 29 to 50 (Aviation Safety Network, 2012;
O’Sullivan, 2005; Stratfor, 2010). This section firstprovides an overview of past attacks against civilian
aircraft in Table 1 and an incident discussion of someselected cases.
Table 1: Recorded attacks
No.

Date

Aircraft1

15/01/1973

Israeli Government Flight
Boeing 707

2

05/09/1973

3

Fatalities

Attackers

4 Jet Engines

    0Black September

El Al
Boeing 707

4 Jet Engines

    0Black September

14/03/1975

Air Vietnam

Unknown

26

North Vietnamese
Forces4

25/01/1976

El AL

Unknown    0

Baader Meinhof
and PFLP

5

29/01/1978

French DC-4

2 Piston Engines

3

National Liberation
Front of Chad

6

03/09/1978

Air Rhodesia
Vickers 782D Viscount4 Turboprop Engines

48

ZIPRA

7

12/02/1979

Air Rhodesia
Vickers 782D Viscount4 Turboprop Engines

   59

ZIPRA

8

16/05/1981

TAAG-Angola Airlines

4 Turboprop Engines

4

9

08/11/1983

TAAG-Angola Airlines
Boeing 737-2M2

2 Jet Engines

130

UNITA

10

09/02/1984

TAAG-Angola Airlines
Boeing 737-2M2

2 Jet Engines

    0

UNITA

11

21/09/1984

Ariana Afghan Airlines
McDonnell Douglas
DC-10-30

3 Jet Engines

    0

Afghan guerrillas

12

04/09/1985

Bakhtar Afghan Airlines
Antonov AN-26

2 Turboprop Engines

52

Hizb i-Islami

13

16/08/1986

Sudan Airways Flight
Fokker F-27 Friendship

2 Turboprop Engines

  60

SPLA

14

05/10/1986

Corporate Air Services
Fairchild C-123K Provider

2 Piston Engines

3

Sandinistas

15

05/05/1987

Sudanese Aeronautical Services Airways(SASCO)

Unknown

13

SPLA

16

11/06/1987

Bakhtar Alwatana
Airlines
Antonov AN-26

2 Turboprop Engines

53

Afghan guerrillas

17

09/11/1987

Air Malawi Shorts SC.7
Skyvan2 Turboprop Engines

  10

Mozambique Army

18

11/04/1988

Bakhtar Alwatana
Airlines
Antonov 26

2 Turboprop Engines

  29

Afghan NSAG

12EngineUnknownWeapon used

Phase of flight

Point of impact

Outcome

Location of attack

Unknown

Landing

Unknown

Foiled in final
minutes

Italy

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Foiled in final
minutes

Italy

SA-7

En route

Unknown

CrashedVietnamUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

Foiled in final
minutesKenya

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Crashed

Chad

SA-7

Take off

Right wing

CrashedZimbabwe

SA-7

Unknown

Left engine

CrashedZimbabwe

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

CrashedAngolaUnknown

Initial climb

Unknown

CrashedAngolaUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedAngolaUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedAfghanistan

Unknown

Take offUnknown

CrashedAfghanistan

SA-7

Take offUnknown

Crashed

Sudan

Unknown

En Route

Unknown

CrashedNicaragua

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Crashed

Sudan

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

CrashedAfghanistan

Unknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedMozambiqueUnknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedAfghanistan

13

No.

Date

Aircraft19

08/12/1988

United StatesID flight 1
T&G Aviation – Douglas
DC-7CF20

08/12/1988

21

Fatalities

Attackers

4 Piston Engines

5

Polisario Front

United StatesID flight 2
T&G Aviation – Douglas
DC-7CF

4 Piston Engines

    0

Polisario Front

28/06/1989

Somalia Airlines
Fokker F-27 Friendship
600RF

2 Turboprop Engines

  30

Unknown

22

21/12/1989

Doctors Without Borders
IRMA/Britten-Norman
BN-2A-9 Islander

2 Piston Engines

4

SPLA

23

12/6/1990

Aeroflot Uzbekistan
Ilyushin 76MD

4 Jet Engines

    0

Afghan guerrillas

24

22/02/1991

Antonov 26 Transport
Flight2 Turboprop Engines

47

UNITA

25

16/03/1991

Transafrik Airlines
Lockheed L-100
Hercules

4 Turboprop Engines

    9

UNITA

26

01/04/1991

ICRC flight

Unknown

    0

UNITA

27

10/06/1991

Angolan Government
Contract Cargo Flight

4 Turboprop Engines

7

UNITA

28

17/09/1991

ICRC Flight

Unknown

    0

Unknown

29

28/01/1992

Azarbaijani Government
FlightUnknown

47

Armenian NSAG30

27/03/1992

Armenian Airlines
Yakovlev 40

3 Jet Engines

    0

Unknown

31

03/09/1992

United National Flight
Alenia G-222TCM
Operators Aeronautical
Militare Italiana

4 Turboprop Engines

4

Unknown

32

05/04/1993

United Nations Flight

Unknown

    0

UNITA

33

26/04/1993

United Nations Flight
Antonov 12B

4 Turboprop Engines

1

UNITA

34

25/06/1993

Aeroflot Airlines
IAI Arava

2 Turboprop Engines

    0

Abkhazian NSAG

35

22/07/1993

Tupolev TU-154 plane

Unknown    0

Abkhazian NSAG
suspected

36

20/09/1993

Orbi Georgian Airways
Tupolev 134A

2 Jet Engines

    0

Abkhazian NSAG

37

21/09/1993

Transair Georgia Airlines
Tupolev 134A

2 Jet Engines

27

Abkhazian NSAG

38

22/09/1993

Transair Georgia Airlines
Tupolev 154B

3 Jet Engines

108

Abkhazian NSAG

14

EngineWeapon used

Phase of flight

Point of impact

Outcome

Location of attack

SA-7

En route
11,000ft

EngineCrashedWestern Sahara

SA-7

En route
11,000ft

Unknown

LandedWestern Sahara

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

CrashedSomalia

Unknown

Take-off/ initial climb

Unknown

Crashed

Sudan

Unknown

Unknown

EngineLandedAfghanistan

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

CrashedAngolaUnknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedAngolaLandedAngolaCrashedAngolaLandedSomalia

Unknown

Initial climb

Unknown

Unknown
Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

CrashedAzerbaijan

Unknown

Initial climb

Unknown

LandedArmenia

Unknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedBosniaUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedAngolaUnknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedAngolaUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedGeorgia

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedGeorgia

Unknown

Take offUnknown

Unclear

Georgia

Unknown

ApproachUnknown

CrashedGeorgia

Unknown

ApproachUnknown

CrashedGeorgia

15

No.

Date

AircraftEngineFatalities

Attackers

39

06/04/1994

Rwandan Government Falcon 50

3 Jet Engines

12

Rwandan Patriotic
Front

40

29/09/1998

Lionair Flight
Antonov 24RV

2 Turboprop Engines

55

Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE)

41

10/10/1998

Congo Airlines
Boeing 727-30

3 Jet Engines

41

Tutsi NSAG

42

26/12/1998

United Nations Flight
Hercules Lockheed
L-100-30

4 Turboprop Engines

14

UNITA

43

02/01/1999

United Nations Flight
Hercules
Lockheed L-100-30

4 Turboprop Engines

8

UNITA

44

08/06/2001

United Nations Flight

Unknown

    0

UNITA

45

16/06/2001

United Nations Flight

Unknown

    0

UNITA

46

16/06/2001

United Nations Flight

Unknown

    0

UNITA

47

28/11/2002

Arkia Israeli Airlines
Boeing 757-3E7

2 Jet Engines

    0

Al-Qaida

48

22/11/2003

DHL Cargo Flight
Airbus A300B4-203F

2 Jet Engines

    0

Iraqi NSAG

49

23/03/2007

TransAVIAexport Cargo
Plane
Ilyushin 76TD

4 Jet Engines

11

al Shabaab

50

13/08/2007

Nordic Airways

Unknown

    0

Iraqi NSAG

Sources: Aviation Safety Network, 2012; Berman, Schroeder, and Leff, 2011; Stewart, 2012; Stratfor, 2010.

The general outcome based on the above ­information
is presented in Figure 1 below, where 30 of the 50
attacks resulted in crashes and 14 aircraft landed.
Figure 1: Outcome of past MANPADS attacks

Source: Illustration based on Table 1

Table 1 illustrates that of the 50 incidents recorded
through the years, seven occurred within 1970 and1979 representing 14 percent. The most incidents
16

occurred during the period 1990 and 1999, a total of
21 representing 43 percent. Although there appears
to be a decline through the decade after that,
this does not necessarily imply a reduction in the
MANPADS threat. Figure 2 below illustrates the attacks
by year. Since the 2007
Nordic Airways attack in
Iraq, no other attack on a
civilian aircraft has beenrecorded. It is conceivablethat the peaks in attacks
correlate with politicalevents: major intra-state
conflict, the ­dissolutionof the USSR which madeaccessto
MANAPDSeasier, and the Iraq War
and its aftermath.
Since 1975, when the first civilian casualties from a
MANPADS attack on a commercial aircraft wererecorded, 920 deaths are attributed to MANPADSrelated plane crashes (see Figure 2).

Weapon used

Phase of flight

Point of impact

Outcome

Location of attack

SA-16

ApproachUnknown

CrashedRwandaUnknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedSri Lanka

SA-7

Take offUnknown

Crashed

Democratic Republicof the Congo

Unknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedAngolaUnknown

En route

Unknown

CrashedAngolaUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedAngolaUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedAngolaUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

LandedAngolaSA-7

Take offUnknown

Missiles missed
target

Kenya

SA-7

Take off

Wing

Landed

Iraq

SA-18

Take off

Wing

CrashedSomalia

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Missile missed
targetIraq

Figure 2: Number of civilian casualties by year

Source: Illustration based on Table 1.

17

Box 1: Selected MANPADS attacks
Many MANPADS attacks against civilian aircraft
have not been well-documented. A sample ofthe better documented representative events
are noted here.
Zimbabwe 1978/79
On 3 September 1978, passengers on Flight 825, a
Rhodesian Viscount aircraft from Salisbury en routeto Kariba fell victim to a MANPADS attack. Known
locally as the Hunyani Disaster, only eight of the
52 passengers and four crew members survived(ten of the casualties were reportedly as a resultof ground fire after the crash). The SA-7 missile
used in the attack was launched by the armed
group the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary
Army (ZIPRA). The reported distress call before thecrash indicated engine failure later confirmed as
caused by the entry and ‘explosion’ of ‘a heatseeking missile hitting the inner starboard engine’(Herald Reporters, 1978). Apparently, the plane hit
a gully during the attempt to land and broke up
on impact (Herald Reporters, 1978).
Angola 1983
On 8 November 1983 at approximately 1520 hrs, aBoeing 737-2M2 was allegedly hit by a MANPADS.
Operated by Transportes Aereos Angolanos(TAAG) Angola Airlines, the flight was en routeto Luanda-4 de Fevereiro Airport from Lubango
Airport. After a successful take-off and gaining
an altitude of 200ft, the plane was struck andplunged, hitting the ground 800 m from the runway(Aviation Safety Network, 2012a). The National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola(UNITA) rebels “claimed credit for downing theplane with a missile” (Berman, Schroeder and Leff,
2011) although there is no confirming evidence.
The Angolan government however attributed thisincident to technical malfunction. 130 people losttheir lives.
Sudan 1986
On 16 August 1986, a domestic scheduled
passenger aircraft was hit by an SA-7 weapon
en route to Khartoum-Civil Airport from Malakal,
South Sudan (Aviation Safety Network, 2012a).
Of its 57 passengers and three crew members,
no-one survived as the Fokker F-27 Friendshiptwin-propeller aircraft crashed after being struck

18

shortly after take-off. This attack was attributed
to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)(Stratfor, 2010).
Rwanda 1994
A Dassault Falcon 50 executive jet, operated by
the Rwandan government, was attacked by a
MANPADS on approach to Kigali Airport. Aboard
were the Rwandan President Habyarimana, andBurundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira returningfrom peace talks in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania(Berman, Schroeder and Leff, 2011). The attack
occurred at approximately 2020 hrs on 6 April 1994
and resulted in the loss of all 12 passengers andcrew. The missile was reportedly launched from
Kanombe Camp, near the international airport,
as the plane descended towards the runway.
The plane burst into flames and crashed about
2 km (1.3 mls) east of Kigali Airport. The attack wasprobably launched by the Anti-Aircraft Battalionof the Armed Forces (Mutsinzi et al., 2009).
Kenya 2002
On 28 November 2002, an Arkia flight, Boeing
757-3E7 from Mombasa was target of a terrorist
attack allegedly planned and carried out by
Al-Qaida (Berman, Schroeder and Leff, 2011;
Isensen and Lindsey, 2002). Two missiles werelaunched at the aircraft en-route to Tel-Aviv with
271 aboard—both missed. They were reportedly
fired from Changamwe, (approximately 1.25
miles from the airport) where two launchers werelater found (Kuhn, 2003, p. 26). The aircraft, usedp
­ reviously to transport Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
in April of the same year, remained on course andlanded safely in Tel Aviv.
In analyzing the attack, Kuhn (2003, p. 28) suggests
a number of possibilities:• countermeasures aboard the aircraft which
had previously been used to transport Prime
Minister Sharon,• engagement altitude, which was extremely
low, and• faulty missiles probably due to age andimproper storage.
Kuhn concludes that the altitude at which theaircraft was engaged was probably the prime
factor (2003, p. 28), possibly caused by pooro
­ perator training (Thompson, 2003).

Baghdad 2003
On 22 November 2003, A DHL Airbus A300B4203F, en route to Bahrain International Airport,
carrying US Army mail, was attacked by Iraqi
insurgents. Shortly after take-off (approximatelyaround 8000 ft), the cargo plane was struck by
an SA-7, in the wing, penetrating and igniting afuel tank. Its three-man crew, despite the loss ofthe ­hydraulics system, successfully returned andlanded at Baghdad Airport, notwithstanding themissile hit ‘burning away a large portion of thewing’ (­Aviation Safety Network, 2012).
Somalia 2007
A Belarusian Transaviaexport IL-76TD 4 engine jetairlifter cargo plane was attacked by the armed
group al Shabaab on 23 March 2007 resulting in acrash and 11 casualties (Stratfor, 2010, p. 6). The
plane took off from Mogadishu and was attacked
using two SA-18 missiles transfered from Russia to
Eritrea which then transfered the missiles to theSomali NSAG (Berman, Schroeder and Leff, 2011;
Stewart, 2012; Schroeder and Buongiorno, 2010a,
p. 13).

Discussion
Weapon and perpetrators
It appears from the above tables and cases that themost common type of MANPADS used in attacks are
the Russian Strela (SA-7) models, although others havebeen used as well. These are relatively cheap on theblack market with single units costing as low as US$5000 (Schroeder and Buongiorno, 2010b). In 1994,
the Rwandan attack involved SA-16 systems (Stewart,2012). More recently, in the 2007 Somali attack, 2
SA-18 MANPADS were used (Berman, Schroeder and
Leff, 2011), routed through Eritrea (Stewart, 2012).
Data concerning the human element in firing a
MANPADS is somewhat contradictory. On the one
hand, MANPADS are designed for ease of use, withnewer MANPADS built with aiming aids to ensure
accuracy (see Chapter 2). Our own brief hands-on
experience with MANPADS showed that the basic
actions are relatively straightforward. Whether we,
as untrained operators, would be able to fire and hit
successfully, is moot. On the other hand, there areclaims that poor operator training has a major effect.
Thus Thompson (2003) contends, for example, thatthe attack on an Arkia aircraft in 2002 failed due topoor operator training though Kuhn (2003) argues
other factors might have been more important. In­Afghanistan, where the anti-Soviet Mujahidin received
several types of MANPADS from the CIA, poor training
is claimed to have led to many misses (Urban, 1984).
Video clips from the Syrian civil war (see for example
Table 8, items 5, 10) seem to indicate that while basic
practice using a MANPADS is simple, actual firingunder battlefield conditions is not.
More advanced MANPADS require less training as
many functions are automated to a lesser or greater
degree and the warheads are more lethal. Thus should
an NSAG acquire a more advanced MANPADS, it isalso likely to be more lethal (see Chapter 2). Overall, we
would argue that it is difficult to operate a MANPADS
successfully under battlefield conditions when theoperator is under threat. Using MANPADS under lessthreatening conditions may require less training. Moremodern MANPADS are easier to operate than thosefrom older generations.
NSAGs and MANPADS
It appears from the previous section that most of theperpetrators of attacks against civilian aircraft havebeen ideologically driven NSAGs whose acts, recruitment and training are commonly outside the control or
influence of state actors. These NSAGs, do not operate
within the frame of international law. Their covert
operations, training and weapon acquisition are
reliant on the gray and black markets (see Table 31 in
Chapter 4 for a tentative list of NSAGs with MANPADS).
NSAGs with the motivation to use MANPADS against
civilian aircraft are spread throughout the world,
thereby increasing the existing threat arena withregard to civilian attacks. Currently, some 47 NSAGS
are believed to have held, or be holding, MANPADS
of various models (Small Arms Survey, 2012). A
large ‘pool’ of available MANPADS such as those in
Libya, and, potentially, Syria, would exacerbate the­situation and bring MANPADS into many more hands(cf. Stewart, 2012). MANPADS transfers from manufacturing states such as the United States and Russia
to NSAGs seem to have declined, though there isevidence that secondary ­manufacturing states suchas Iran were still providing MANPADS through the graymarket until fairly recently (Gertz, 2007; Schroeder,
2008; US Department of State, 2008). Given the fluidity
and interconnections of NSAGs, it is highly likely that
MANPADS will spread from the 47 on the Small Arms
Survey list to other organizations.

19Aircraft vulnerability and outcome
MANPADS have been used to attack different civilian
aircraft models, sizes and capacities over the years
including an Airbus A300, a Fokker F-27 Friendship,an Ilyushin 76, an Antonov 26, a Dassault Falcon 50,
a Vickers Viscount and a Boeing 737. What then,can the vulnerability, survivability and impact sketch
reveal, considering the wide range of aircraft andengine types? The vulnerability and extent of damage
to civilian aircraft attacked by MANPADS is contested
by flight specialists and aeronautical engineers.
Stewart (2012), argues that as MANPADS warheads
were originally designed to destroy “military aircraft
densely packed with fuel and ordnance”, their size,
capabilities and suitability for larger aircraft ‘kills’ aredoubtful. Larger aircraft generally have multiple “…
high-bypass engines [which] produce less heat” and“… can fly on one engine” (Thompson, 2003), making
it likely that aircraft with multiple engines can survive
the attack. Schmieder (an aircraft research ­engineer)claims, too, that these “… missiles are too small totake out a passenger jet [as] … commercial jets aredesigned to cope with losing an engine and can
fly on just one” (cited in Duffy, 2003). Adding to thedebate, Kuhn (2003, p. 29) states that “the engine
body and cowling of an airliner may mitigate mostof the blast from a missile entering the engine.” Henotes, however, that this will cause immediate engine‘shut down’ and in the event of twin-engine loss forlarge aircraft (as was intended in the 2002 Mombasa
attack), survival chances are poor. These arguments
aside, the fact is that commercial aircraft havebeen attacked successfully and fatally. As successful
attacks such as the Ilyushin attacked in Mogadishu
show, large commercial aircraft can be hit and may
consequently crash.
Analysis of a highly technical issue from a socio-­
political perspective is always fraught. Nevertheless,four critical variables emerge from examining thedata about successful and unsuccessful attacks (seeTable 2): engine numbers, engine types, hit location,and pilot skill.
Though multi-engine aircraft have been attacked
successfully (e.g. Somalia 2007 [a four engine Ilyushin76], and the Air Rhodesia attacks 1978 and 1979 [bothfour engine Viscounts]), some have survived attacks(Arkia 2002) and even hits (DHL Boeing 737). This seems
to indicate that multiple engines alone do not offer adefense against MANPADS attacks.

20

A more significant variable appears to be the engine
type concerned. Overall (see Table 2), aircraft withpiston or turboprop engines (whether multiple engines
or not) are much more vulnerable to MANPADS,
suffering both hits and crashes to a greater extent
than jet-propelled aircraft. This may be because
propeller aircraft are inherently slower, or because
they fly at lower altitudes (both a function of the typeof propulsion), or possibly because they are older andthus lack many of the safety redundancies present inmore modern jets.
The third critical variable appears to be hit location.
Schaffer, while arguing that commercial aircraft are
relatively safe from MANPADS, acknowledges that on
the issue of survivability, “a crucial determining factor
is where on the aircraft the missile or its explosive
debris hits” (1998, p. 76). Indicating that an aircraft
has a number of “points of vulnerability to e
­ xplosive
trauma”, he notes that the severance of criticalcables or “… explosive detonation in or near a fueltank” will cause a ‘massive explosion’, fire or loss ofcontrol thereby causing a crash. In large aircraft, the“explosive loss of an engine or … a substantial gap
in a wing or fuselage could cause large asymmetricyaw or pitch movements” (ibid.).
Since aircraft are reliant on hydraulics and fuel pipes
extending to the wings, an explosive entry point in thewings may be fatal. This is consistent with the reported
events of the DHL- Baghdad 2003 case which was hit in
the wing by an SA-7, igniting a fuel pipe. Closer ­analysis
of hit results conducted empirically by C
­ zarnecki etal. (2011a, p. 6) who tested MANPADS hits on testbed
commercial jet engines argue that there is the needto generate ‘likely engagement outcomes’ to better
understand and mitigate the existing ­potential for anaircraft kill. This requires analysis through threat models
testing, for instance, the sustainable blast damage,and also missile body debris penetration (Czarnecki etal., 2011b). The authors further indicate that the “mostlikely impact point for a MANPADS is on an aircraft’s
engine” (ibid.), somewhat contradicting Kuhn’s observation that terminal guidance algorithms direct many
missiles away from the engine towards the airframe.
Besides this, however, the critical factors appear to be
point and angle of entry, level of likely damage, andresultant effect on control and maneuverability.
This variable also touches upon the nature of moreadvanced MANPADS. As Kuhn (2003, p. 29) points out,
modern MANPADS such as the newer FIM-92 Stinger
and Igla families possess a capacity that redirects themissile’s flight path towards the body of the aircraft,rather than the hot exhaust of the engine during theterminal phase of missile flight. This, in a civilian aircraft,
will lead to “… possible loss of control surface” (Kuhn
2003, p. 29), destroyed wing flaps, thus making the craft
unmaneuverable, further decreasing the chances ofsurvival. Furthermore, early generation MANPADS withlead sulfide-based detectors, which are ­principally
implicated in attacks against civilian aircraft, are only
able to lock on to the extremely hot exhaust plume ofjet engines. Reduced heat signatures would ­arguably
lower the chances of being hit (see Chapter 2 for more
information on seeker technology). Later generation
MANPADS with indium antimonide-based detectors,
in contrast, are able to lock on to the cooler airframe
as well, making them more effective against targets
with lower heat signatures. Moreover, improvements
in warheads (see Chapter 2) such as shaped charges
and continuous-rod warheads are likely to cause
spalling which would create even greater damage
to control surfaces and possibly to passengers inthe body of the aircraft, leading to loss of life due tocrashes or onboard f­ atalities.

4 Turboprop
enginesUnknown

9

Landed Crashed – 9
Foiled Missed -14

Landed – 6
Crashed – 3
Foiled – 3
Missed – 1

Source: Based on Table 1

The Baghdad incident illustrates a fourth variable:
even in the event of damage to critical ­components,
and in this instance the partial destruction of a wing,skilled conduct by a crew can nevertheless bringa plane down to land safely after a successful hit.
However, Hughes points out that “…in landing theaircraft [the pilots] displayed superb airmanship.
People have tried to replicate this incident on simulators, and, as yet, nobody has been able to land an
aircraft [under similar conditions]” (2007, video, 10:17–
10:29). This suggests that even with very good traininga sizable portion of luck is required to be able to safely
land the aircraft.

Table 2: Aircraft engine type and outcome of attack
Type of engine

2 Piston engines

4 Piston engines

2 Jet engines

3 Jet engines

4 Jet engines

2 Turboprop
enginesNumberattacked

Outcome of
attack3

Landed Crashed – 3
Foiled Missed -2

Landed – 1
Crashed – 1
Foiled Missed -6

Landed – 2
Crashed – 2
Unclear – 1
Missed -1

5

Landed – 2
Crashed – 3
Foiled Missed -2

Landed – 1
Crashed – 1
Foiled Missed -9Landed - 1
Crashed – 8
Foiled Missed -To conclude this discussion, putting together thevarious arguments and the available data, we candetermine the following:• Propeller-driven aircraft have proven to be highly
vulnerable to all types of MANPADS. Jet aircraft
are less vulnerable.
• Multiple engines increase aircraft survivability,
though there is insufficient conclusive evidence
whether the size and category of the plane­determine ‘survivability’ (Thompson, 2003).
• The likelihood of critical systems failure depends
on the location of the MANPADS hit as well as thetype of warhead.
• Most attacks against civilian aircraft have been
by relatively older MANPADS, which has resulted
in many unsuccessful attacks.
• There is insufficient evidence to determine
whether modern MANPADS such as later Stingers
and Igla-S are more effective against civilian jet
aircraft, though it would appear that the effects
of improved and larger warheads and bettertargeting abilities may cause major damage andlikely crashes.
• Pilot skill can, admittedly under extraordinary
circumstances, mitigate the effects of a MANPADS
hit even in critical systems.

21

Phase of flightthat attackers have less lead time to prepare during
a landing phase. In summary, the data on aircraft
and flight appear to indicate that, for inconclusive
reasons, most attacks have been during the take-offphase of the flight. However, propeller-driven planes,
which are much slower than jets and fly at lower­altitudes, are vulnerable even during the cruise phaseof their flights.

The aircraft on which data was acquired were atdifferent stages of flight when attacked. However,available information is incomplete. After take-off,during initial climb, as well as through the gain in
altitude, aircraft are very vulnerable to MANPADS,­
as indicated in Table 3. From available information,
the most hits resulting in crashes were just after takeoff, during initial climb, and en route before cruise­altitude. Within the table, flights attacked during initial
climb, are categorized as ‘Take-off’, and ‘Landing’includes the entire approach as the aircraft starts
descending from cruise altitude. The ‘en-route’ phaseindicated here does not refer solely to cruise altitude
but includes cases where the exact speed, velocity
during attack are unknown. Cruise altitudes differs but
are approximately 10,000 meters for jet aircraft (outof range of MANPADS which have an ­engagement
altitude ceiling of approximately 1,500–7,000 meters.
See Chapter 2). Prop-driven aircraft have a ­generally
lower cruise altitude, putting them at more risk. Attacks
in which reliable data regarding actual phases were
unattainable are placed under ‘Unknown’.

Attack location and civilian targets
Targets of MANPADS attacks, including survivors, havebeen heterogeneous. Besides government officials
such as the attempted assassination of Prime Minister
Golda Meir in 1973 and the successful assassinationof Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira in 1994,
victims on attacked civilian flights have included crew,
doctors (Doctors Without Borders, 1989), ­tourists (Air
Rhodesia 1978/1979), development aid workers (USAID flight 1988), United Nations staff (UN Flight  1992;
1993; 1998; 1999; 2001), and ­undifferentiated civilians.
The total number of civilian casualties of MANPADS
stands at 920 (see also IFALPA, 2006; Stratfor, 2010).

Table 3: Phases of flight and outcome
Number of
attacks

Crashes

Missedtargets

PlaneslandedAttempt
foiledUnclearTake-off

12

8

1

2

0

1

En-route

12

11

0

1

0

0

Landing

4

3

0

  0

1

0

Unknown

22

8

1

11

2

0

Total

50

30

2

14

3

1

Phase of flight

Source: Derived from Table 1.

Most attacks were directed at aircraft in take-off anden-route phases. In eleven cases, aircraft managed
to land without any indication of the phase of flight(see Table 3).
Table 4 below summarizes the findings for those cases
where type of aircraft and phase of flight data are
available.
Most attacks occurred during take-off and en-route.
However, a large number of the latter occurredagainst turboprop planes, which, given turboprop
craft’s relative slowness, and relatively lower flight path
make them more vulnerable. Somewhat surprising is
the low number of attacks during landing, when one
would expect the aircraft to be more vulnerable toattack as it powers down on approach. It may be
22With a few notable exceptions, most MANPADS attacks
against civilian aircraft have taken place in active war
zones. Due to the nature of warfare in the latter halfof the 20th century which has been ­preponderantly
intra-national in nature, these war zones may not havebeen ‘officially declared’ but were nevertheless areasof ongoing violent conflict. Most victims, perhaps asa consequence, were engaged in what might becalled ‘peri-military’ activities: UN personnel, medical
personnel and other professionals engaged, at someremove perhaps (e.g. development personnel), andas neutrals, in conflict zone activities.
Two exceptions stand out. The 2002 attack against
an Israeli flight filled with tourists flying from Mombasa
was outside a war zone, though a terrorist action
within the framework of an ongoing violent conflict.

Table 4: Phase of flight and type of aircraft
Phase of Flight
Numberof attacks

Outcome
Crashed

Pistondrive
engineTake-off

En-route

1

2

Landed5

Landing

Percentage byengine type

Unknown

Total

1

4

            801            20

517            94

1

1

6

6

            40

3

5

33.3

1

6.6

2

13.3

1

6.6

1

MissedFoiledUnknown
CrashedTurboprop
engine48Landed18

MissedFoiledUnknown

Jet engine

15

Crashed3

Landed2Missed1

3

FoiledUnknown

1
1

CrashedUnknown
engine
type

12

1
2

3

25

Landed

1

7

7

58.3

Missed1

1

8.3

Foiled1

1

8.3

Unknown
Source: Derived from Table 1.

The ­destruction of an aircraft carrying the presidentsof Rwanda and Burundi by elements of the Rwandan
military was an assassination during peacetime.
This has two implications. First, the ability and perhaps
the willingness of terrorist groups to attack civilian
aircraft outside war zones appear to be limited.
For unclear reasons, NSAGS have not, ­effectively,
conducted MANPADS attacks in non-war zones.
Second, this implies that the overall threat of
MANPADS attacks against civilian air traffic in areas
such as North America and Europe may well be
exaggerated. Terrorist organizations may not havethe capacity, or may be inhibited by better security
in developed countries. Certainly the will and ability
to create civilian air traffic terrorist incidents involving
other means has been well demonstrated.
The two exceptions demonstrate the rule. In the
Rwandan case, internal sedition effectively bypassed
what would have been normal security provisions.
In the Israeli case, Israel’s robust civilian air s­ecurity,

including control of areas that could threaten
its i­
nternational airport, and possibly technical­countermeasures meant that the attackers had had
to choose a site in a less-developed country where
on-the-ground security was expected to be weak.
Effects of MANPADS attacks on civilian aviation
The commercial air transport industry contributes tothe overall economic growth of nations, is crucial
for international trade, and provides tax income. Its
relative importance is evident in its global economic
volume which currently stands at US $2.2 trillion and56.6 million individuals employed in aviation andrelated tourism (IATA, 2012). An attack against sucha major economic sector could be expected to
produce significant effects.
When examining the effects of successful MANPADS
attacks against civilian aircraft, a number of issues
need to be disaggregated. Two notable analyses,
one by the US military (Whitmire, 2006), the other by
23the Rand Corporation (Chow et al., 2005) ­differentiate
between immediate and long-term costs. In addition,
a number of other variables need to be considered.
Crucially we believe, these are the location of theattack and the number and characteristics of thevictims.
The immediate costs of a successful attack include,
but are not limited to monetary losses. Loss of lives (inthe aircraft and possibly on the ground), as well as
trauma and subsequent fear of flying in the case of­ estruction
survivors are likely. In addition, there will be d
and loss of property (including the plane and its
cargo) and possibly on the ground. Direct costs of a
successful attack were estimated by Chow et al. to
be US $1 billion (2005, p. 7). To provide a standard,
the Libyan government paid some US $2.16 billion to
the families of the Lockerbie victims (on the groundand in the air). PanAm, the plane’s owner claimed US$4.5 billion for the loss of the aircraft and the effect on
the airline’s business. An immediate cost of some US$1 to 4 billion in total would therefore seem to be a­reasonable figure (keeping in mind that the Lockerbie
figures emerged after lengthy wrangling, and that theairline undoubtedly inflated its demands).
In addition to the immediate costs, there are extended
long-term effects. Required insurance premiums arelikely to soar while productivity dips due to reduced
patronage (cf. Australian Government, 2008, p. 17f).
Immediately following an attack, there are ­‘corporate
travel freezes and leisure trip ­cancellations’ whichcause a ‘decline’ in industry performance ­(Whitmire,
2006, p. 21) due to security concerns and loss ofconfidence in aviation. Indeed, tourism to Kenya
did decline drastically after the unsuccessful 2002
Mombasa attack, though it recovered to normal
levels within six months.
The September 11 terrorist attacks caused a 35 to 40
percent drop in airline revenues in the last quarterof the year in the United States (Pena, 2005, p. 2).
Related job losses occurred in the aviation industryand ­interrelated sectors as well. Chow et al. argue
that indirect but immediate costs such as shutdownof flights after an attack need be considered as well.
They estimate the costs of a one week shutdown to beabout US $3 to 4 billion in the United States alone (2005,
p. 9). If reluctance to fly is factored in, the total cost ofa one week system-wide shutdown might exceed US$15 billion (Chow et al., 2005, p. 9f).
Attempting to estimate losses from a putative
MANPADS attack requires one to keep in mind a24

number of factors. First is the available data from
MANPADS attacks. Second are possible analogies
and their validity. Third is a careful parsing of relevant
attack variables.
As we have noted above, there have been a numberof successful MANPADS attacks against civilian
aircraft in the past four decades. Two closely related
issues need to be kept in mind about the successful
attacks: they occurred in war zones or less-developed
l­ocations, and the effects of the attacks on world
aviation traffic were minimal. We argue that these two
features are related: as air traffic in the developed
world was not affected, for most people in North
America and Europe (unless personally affected)
these shoot-downs were little more than a news itemfrom a faraway location. Thus where the attack takes
place, and, critically, who the passengers were, is an
important variable. To put it bluntly and rather sadly:
an attack involving largely non-Western aircraft,
personnel and location would likely be less costly
overall than one involving US or Western interests or
actors generally, and have less media effect.
Both Whitmire (2006) and Chow et al. (2005) use theanalogy of the 9/11 attacks in the United States as abaseline for their estimates. This analogy must be takenwith great caution. The 9/11 events were not simply
bombings as had happened before (for instancein Lockerbie 1988). They differ in both ­material andpsychological dimensions from a single shoot down
by a MANPADS. Materially, four planes were involved,
as well as deliberate and massive damage on the
ground. Psychologically, the event was drawn out,
dramatically visible and audible, and concluded
with massive effects ranging from the destructionof a major landmark to the nominal “War on Terror”
and an actual war in Afghanistan with all the legal
implications and changes in security practices for­airlines passengers.
It seems doubtful to us that the shooting down of anaircraft by a MANPADS would have a similar effectunless the context and effects were as dramatic as
9/11. It should be noted that large civilian aircraft
have been shot out of the sky (with loss of life) in thepast (Aviation Safety Network, 2012), yet the ­long-term
effects have not been as significant or economicallycostly as claimed by Chow et al. and Whitmire.
The psychological effects of a MANPADS attack are
an element in the long-term effects. However, whether
a MANPADS attack will have a substantially greater
effect than any other kind of air terrorism remainsunproven. Presumably, the reaction to a MANPADS
attack will depend on a number of factors.

Conclusion
Civil aviation has been a prime target for some
NSAGs and terrorist groups.2 Attacking a civilian
aircraft creates immediate disruption, but, more
importantly, it gives credibility to the NSAG as anarmed threat, has major repercussions and therefore offers major exposure to the group’s ideals,
and can serve as a motivational and recruitment
tool. The threat of such attacks has been acknow­
ledged almost universally (see Chapter 5), anddrives policy, cooperation and technology. The
major conclusions of this chapter are:
• Approximately 50 aircraft of various sizes, engine
types and configurations have been attacked
leading to an estimated loss of 920 civilian lives.
• Aircraft kills have resulted from impact-related
fires, explosions and crash landings due to lossof control.
• Aircraft can survive a hit by MANPADS, eventhough the chances are low. The four ­significant
factors appear to be type of aircraft (jets havesurvived better), point of impact (impact on
exhausts improve survivability), type of missile
used (older missiles are less effective), and pilot
training and skill.
• Most attacks have occurred during take-off
and in the en-route phase.
• Propeller-driven aircraft are inherently more
vulnerable than jet aircraft and can be hit evenat their cruising altitude.
• The most commonly used MANPADS in NSAG
attacks have been Strela family, though others
have been used as well. No later generation
MANPADS (advanced Stingers or Igla-S) havebeen implicated in attacks.
• Most MANPADS attacks take place in war zones,
with only two documented attacks outsidethem, and no attacks within the airspaces ofdeveloped countries.
• The short-term effects of an attack are fairly
well understood. Long-term effects which may
include effects on air travel are not unambiguously known, though so far there is no evidence
that these effects will differ from other forms ofattacks against civilian aircraft.

These would include:• Where the attack took place (within North
America and Europe would have much more
long-term impact than elsewhere in the world);• Whether the perpetrators were apprehended
and air travel was declared safe within a shortperiod of time;• The nature of the attack (e.g. multiple successful
attacks would leave a more lasting impact than asingle attack);• Government and industry responses, and theavailability of substitutes for air travel;• Local psycho-cultural factors, such as previous
national experience with terrorism.
It seems unlikely that worldwide panic or ­worldwide
economic downturn would result from a single
MANPADS attack. The analogy of other passenger
aircraft shot down (Aviation Safety Network, 2012alist a number of major aircraft losses to non-MANPADS
ground attacks, the most recent in 2001) indicates noworldwide panic. The growing frequency of global
travel for individuals, with world air traffic increasing
every year, could mean a growing personal interestin passenger safety by potential passengers, andthus greater sensitivity to aircraft failures, including
MANPADS-caused, but evidence is still lacking.
To summarize, our own feeling is that a single successful
MANPADS attack would not be a unique event, andits effects would be similar to those of other forms of
air terror. Multiple attacks, a major aircraft crash, andsuccessful attacks in the developed world are unlikely
to have greater effects simply because the terror
instrument was a MANPADS.

2

Why some NSAGS have targeted civilian aircraft (bombs,
hijacking, and MANPADS included) and others have not is arelevant question but beyond the scope of this brief.

25Christof Kögler

2

26

Technical aspects andcomponents of MANPADST

his chapter will examine the architecture ofdifferent types of MANPADS, as well as their­components, as a basis for understanding the threat
these weapons represent. It will first identify thecomponents of MANPADS, describe the role they playin the MANPADS’ functioning, and assess component
criticality.

The second part of this chapter will analyze to what
extent the characteristics of each individual component can contribute to limiting the p­roliferationof MANPADS. This can be the case (a) when acomponent is sensitive to shock, extreme temperature, improper storage or handling and thus has anincreased chance of failure as time progresses, (b)when a component increases the complexity of the
MANPADS and makes it significantly harder to operate
without proper training, (c) when a component plays
a particularly critical role in the MANPADS’ functioning(d) when a component is difficult to replace withspare parts or with improvised craft components.

MANPADS architectures—An overview
Out of the wide array of possible strategies to guidea missile to its target, only three have been used in
MANPADS: nearly all missiles rely on passive homing
and command guidance; the exception is the Chinese
FL-2000B (QW-3) which employs a ­semi-active homing
system.
In passive homing, the missile is equipped with a sensor
unit (the ‘seeker’) that tracks radiation ­‘naturally’emitted by the target. This approach has several
consequences:
1. After launch, no further communication between
operator and missile is necessary, which hasearned this type of missile the nickname ‘fire andforget’. As the gunner does not have to track thetarget after launch, he can reposition himself toevade incoming fire or acquire another target.
2. It does not rely on an external source of radiation
to ‘illuminate’ the target, and thus does not alarm
the target that it is being attacked.
3. The missile is susceptible to decoys that imitate theradiation emitted by the target.
Passive homing is the technique employed by thevast majority of MANPADS. It is used by the US Redeye
and Stinger, the Japanese Type 91, South Korea’s
Chiron (also known as Singun), and the French Mistral.
The most significant representatives of this missile type,however, are the Russian Strela and Igla families, as

they are the most copied and most widely available
MANPADS in the world. Amongst its various derivatives
and reverse engineered models are the Egyptian Sakr
Eye, the Chinese HN-5, QW-1 and QW-2 series, thePolish Grom-2, Romania’s CA-94M, Pakistan’s Anzafamily, as well as the Iranian Misagh series.
In command guidance, the unit which tracks thetarget is ‘outsourced’ to a system on the ground. Itthen communicates guidance commands to themissile and thus directs it to the target. This has several
implications:
1. The missile is reduced to warhead, (flight) control
unit, propulsion, and a receiver for guidancecommands from the ground. That makes it more
lightweight and reduces missile costs.
2. The gunner needs to track the target until impact(usually maintaining line of sight with the target)and is thus more exposed to attack.
3. Both missile and target have to remain withinline of sight until impact, somewhat limiting theengagement envelope.
4. The launching unit needs to track the target,
calculate a missile course, and transmit therelevant data to the missile. It is thus bulkier andheavier, making it less mobile. In most cases, thistype of MANPADS is fired from a tripod rather thanfrom the gunner’s shoulder.
5. The missile is immune to most counter-measures(cf. Chapter 6).
Command guidance, usually in a beam-riding­ onfiguration, is employed by two MANPADS famiclies. The first is the British Blowpipe, Javelin, Starburst,
and Starstreak series. The Blowpipe was used in­Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well as in the Falklands
War, where it proved very ineffective. Out of 100
launches only two succeeded in downing the target(Hillson, 1989; Freedman, 2005, p. 734). The gunnerneeded to track both the missile and the target, andhad to steer the missile to the target manually. In later
members of the series, the missile is tracked automatically by the launching unit, which also assists thegunner in tracking the target. This approach is calledsemi-automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS)
guidance. The second series of MANPADS to rely oncommand guidance is the RBS-70 family, producedby Saab-Bofors in Sweden. Both Starstreak and RBS-70
use a laser beam to guide the missile to its target.
While they have performed well in tests, the newer
command guided missiles are yet to be tested underbattlefield conditions. Generally, command guided
missiles are far less common and less widespread thanthe passive homing variants.
27

The ‘odd one out’, semi-active homing, while unusual
for MANPADS, is frequently employed in precisionguided munitions, like laser-guided bombs or missiles.
It is ‘semi-active’ in that the target is illuminated byan outside source, in the case of the QW-3 a groundbased laser. The missile is equipped with a seeker
which detects the reflected laser light. This meansthat:
1. Like with passive homing missiles, no further directcommunication between gunner and missile isnecessary after launch.
2. The gunner (or another ground-based unit) needs
to illuminate the target with a laser beam untilintercept and is thus more exposed to attack.
3. Through the illumination, the target has a highchance of being alarmed of the attack.
4. The missile is immune to most counter-measures.
The only specimen of this type is the FL-2000B variantof the Chinese QW-3 MANPADS (the FL-2000 variant
employs infrared passive homing), which enteredservice with the Chinese armed forces in 2005(­ Richardson, 2003; NA, 2007; Jane’s, 2012a; NA, 2009).
It should be noted that it remains unclear whether thissystem is available in a MANPADS configuration at
all or only as a self-propelled system. For the sake ofcomprehensiveness, the technology will be included
here nonetheless.

The following sections will consider each of thesemissile types—passive homing, command guided,and semi-active homing—in detail and introduce
their individual components.
Passive homing
Passive homing MANPADS consist of three major­separate elements: The missile in a launch tube, adetachable triggering unit called a ‘gripstock’, and aunit to supply power and cooling for the missile called
the battery coolant unit (BCU). Terminologically, it
is usual to differentiate between a ‘missile round’,consisting of missile and launch tube, and a ‘weaponround’, which is a fully functional MANPADS including
gripstock and BCU.
MANPADS missiles, including spares, are not delivered
as is, but are always contained in a launch tube. The
launch tube includes the sight assembly for acquiring
a target, sockets for gripstock and BCU (in somecases, notably the US Stinger displayed in Figure 3,
the BCU is inserted into the gripstock, not the launchtube), and sometimes for an IFF (identification friend
or foe) antenna. While the launch tubes are reusable
in principle, they are not intended to be reloadedwith a missile on the battlefield. Reloading is done—if
at all—in a factory setting and requires both appropriate tools and expertise (Hughes, 2007).

Figure 3: Cutaway model of a Stinger weapon round

Sight Assembly

Launch Tube

Battery Coolant Unit (BCU)

Gripstock

Source: Adapted from Klaus Holtkamp, First Sergeant, Technische Schule Landsysteme und Fachschule des Heers für Technik,
Bundeswehr.

28

The gripstock forms the main interface between the
MANPADS and the gunner. It consists of a handle
with trigger and a housing, containing, dependingon MANPADS type, targeting and other electronics.
The gripstock is attached to the launch tube before
launch and removed after the missile has been fired.
Only the US Redeye, the first MANPADS ever built, hada gripstock which could not be removed.3 ‘RedeyeII’, which would later be renamed ‘Stinger’, alreadyhad a reusable gripstock to save costs and withhold
crucial information from the enemy, as used launchtubes were often jettisoned after an engagement.

All three elements are integral parts of a complete
MANPADS and the system is inoperable with any ofthem missing. The heart of the MANPADS, however,is the missile itself, which is a complex piece of­engineering. The following section will look at each ofits components from a technical perspective.
Seeker
In passive homing MANPADS, the seeker is the ‘eye’ ofthe missile. It is located at the front of the missile andis used to detect radiation emitted by the target. This

Figure 4: Cutaway model of a Stinger gripstock with BCU

Source: Adapted from Klaus Holtkamp, First Sergeant, Technische Schule Landsysteme und Fachschule des Heers für Technik,
Bundeswehr.

To provide energy for start-up and for cooling theinfrared (IR) seeker, a BCU is attached to the launch
tube before each launch. The BCU consists of a thermal
battery that provides energy for the ­pre-launch phaseof the missile and of a ­pressurized gas tank that cools
the seeker head before missile launch. Once activated, it supplies power for a limited amount of time(about 30 to 90 seconds, depending on MANPADStype) and is then discarded. Typically, a missile is delivered with two BCUs, one main and one spare.

3

radiation usually falls into the infrared (IR) spectrum,
i.e. electromagnetic waves slightly longer than thoseof visible light. The human eye can typically detect
wavelengths between 390 and 750 nanometers(nm), while IR radiation ranges from 750nm to 1mm(1mm=1000μm; 1μm=1000nm). IR radiation is emitted
by warm or hot sources at different wavelengths
depending on the temperature of the source.

The early Redeye prototypes had a detachable gripstock as well,
but it was later decided to switch to a ‘unitized’ system to increase
the weapon’s reliability (Cagle, 1974, pp. 69–71).

29

Figure 5: Cutaway model of a Stinger battery coolant unit

The range of the electromagnetic spectrum inwhich a MANPADS seeker is designed to seek, isinfluenced on the one hand by the range of wavelengths in which the target emits radiation. On theother, it depends on the ‘atmospheric windows’, i.e.
the ranges of ­electromagnetic radiation that are
not easily absorbed, scattered or scintillated by theatmosphere, leading to a distorted or weak signal­(Kopp, 1982).
Figure 7: Atmospheric windows

Source: Adapted from Klaus Holtkamp, First Sergeant, Technische Schule Landsysteme und Fachschule des Heers fürTechnik, Bundeswehr.

Figure 6: The electromagnetic spectrum
Source: Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain.

Near IR

Thermal IR
Far IR

Radar

AM

Source: User: Pennbag, Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY - SA 2.5

The seeker thus has to be able not only to detect IR
radiation, but also to distinguish between different IR
sources. Passive homing seekers can be ­categorizedaccording to the range of the electromagnetic­spectrum in which they seek or according to the sizeand shape of the area they scan.
30

Early models, as the Strela-2 or Redeye, scanned injust one range (or ‘color’) of the spectrum, initially inthe 2–3μm band (Cagle, 1974, pp. 60, 199; Fiszer and
Gruszczynski, 2002, p. 49). While this enables the seeker
to distinguish between the IR radiation of the earth(around 10μm), the sun (around 3μm), and a fighterjet (2μm for the tailpipe, 4μm for the aft airframe and
4–8μm for the exhaust plume), it can easily be fooledby flares designed to radiate in this spectrum (Kopp,
1982). Also, early seekers were only able to detect the
hot jet engine of the aircraft, limiting it to tail-chaseengagements. Newer generation models switchedto the 3–5μm range (Strela-3; Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 49), and later added a second ‘band’ ofwavelengths to increase target discrimination. The
latter are thus called dual band or two color seekers—
using either two bands in the IR spectrum or a combination of IR and a band from a completely different
spectrum, like ultraviolet (UV) radiation, millimeterwaves (mmW) or visible light.
The seeker range is closely related to the material
used to detect IR radiation. Early MANPADS used leadsulfide (PbS) detectors which were uncooled (Lyons,Long and Chait, 2006, p. 10; Yildirim, 2008, p. 40). Latermodels used indium antimonide (InSb) or mercury
cadmium telluride (HgCdTe), which need to becooled to around -200°C to achieve sufficient sensitivity, as well as cadmium sulfide (CdS), which covers
part of the UV spectrum (Lyons, Long and Chait, 2006,

p. 10; Yildirim, 2008, p. 40; Kopp, 1982; Macfadzean,
1992, p. 243; Jane’s, 2012b).
Another characteristic of IR seekers is the size andshape of the area they scan, as well as the pattern
in which they scan it. The first generation of IR seeker
heads had a rotating rectangular field of view (FOV)with a single detector element, leading to increasing
inaccuracy in close proximity to the target (Kopp,
1982). The second generation of IR seekers used aconical scanning technique which eliminated these
inaccuracies. Third generation seeker heads used avery narrow FOV that moved in a rosette pattern toimprove the information available to the guidancesystem. This technique is also called ‘quasi-imaging’,
as an image is assembled from several data points.
The latest generation of seekers use imaging IR,
which work similar to a digital camera. They are moreeasily capable of distinguishing between the target
and countermeasures such as flares or decoys (seeChapter 6 for a discussion of countermeasures).4

Figure 8: Schematic representation of a gyroscope

Source: Adapted from Wikimedia Common, Public Domain.

Guidance
The central role of the seeker section in a MANPADS
is highlighted by the fact that IR homing missiles areclassified into different generations according to theseeker technology they employ. Table 5 provides an
overview of the four generations of passive homing
MANPADS and their defining characteristics.
As some of the intended targets of MANPADS are very
maneuverable, it is impossible to keep them directly‘in front of’ the missile. The seeker head, which has
a very narrow FOV, must therefore be able to moveindependently from the missile’s orientation. In orderto achieve this, the seeker head is gimbal-mounted
and stabilized by a gyroscope (see Figure 8). Oncethe rotor has gained sufficient momentum, the spin
axis will remain stable regardless of gimbal movement.
Seeing that most missiles rotate at a frequency of
between 10 and 20Hz (cf. Lyons, Long and Chait, 2006,
p. 15; Fiszer and Gruszczynski, 2002, p. 47), precise
gyro-stabilization is crucial to missile accuracy. The
seeker head is covered by an IR-transparent dome toprotect it from aerodynamic drag without distorting or
degrading the incoming IR radiation.

4

See Yildirim, 2008, p. 39f for a summarizing overview of scanning
patterns, detector materials and seeker range of different
generation MANPADS.

The guidance section of the missile translates theinformation from the seeker as well as informationon ­attitude and speed of the missile into concrete­guidance commands for the steering section.
There are different algorithms available for thisprocess, the most important one being proportionalnavigation (PN), a guidance method developedin the 1940s (Dyer, 2004, p. 16; Siuris, 2003, p. 194).
As opposed to pure pursuit navigation, in which themissile keeps its velocity vector aligned with the lineof sight (LOS) between missile and target, PN keeps
the missile’s acceleration proportional to the LOS turnrate (Siuris, 2003, pp. 166, 194; Frieden, 1985, p. 451).
This effectively steers the missile to a predicted future
position of the target. PN has proven so effective that
it is used in virtually all modern guided missiles, eventhough in some cases in an altered configuration(Siuris, 2003, p. 161).
Conceptually, a MANPADS flight can be divided into
the boost phase, the mid-course phase, and theterminal phase (Frieden, 1985, pp. 432–34,   54). The
boost phase serves to get the MANPADS into a position with LOS to the target and to accelerate it tomaximum speed. The mid-course phase usually is thelongest part of the flight and serves to bring the missile
as close to the target as possible. During the terminal
phase, the missile is guided to a vulnerable part of theaircraft to maximize the chance of destruction. The
terminal phase demands the highest performance31

Table 5: Generations of IR homing MANPADS

5

MANPADS generation

Detector

Optical modulation

Characteristics

1st generation
FIM-43 Redeye5
SA-7A Strela-2
SA-7B Strela-2M
HN-5A
Anza Mk I
CA-94

Uncooled PbS (leadsulfide) infrared (IR)detectorSpin-scan• Tail-chase engagement
only• High background noise• Increasing tracking
error in close proximity
to target• Vulnerable to flares• Single-shot killprobabilities between
   0.19 and 0.53

2nd generation
FIM-92A Stinger BasicStrela-2M/A
SA-14 Strela-3
HN-5B
Sakr Eye
QW-1
FN-6
Anza Mk II
Misagh-1
CA-94M

Cooled PbS, InSb (indium
antimonide) or HgCdTe(mercury cadmium telluride)
IR detector

Conical scan

• All-aspect capability• Reduced backgroundnoise• No tracking error• Some resistance to   flares• Single-shot killprobabilities between
   0.31 and 0.79

3rd generation
FIM-92B Stinger POST
FIM-92C Stinger RMP
FIM-92E Stinger Block I
SA-16 Igla-1
SA-18 Igla
SA-24 Igla-S
Grom-1
Grom-2
Mistral 1
Mistral 2
Chiron (Singung)
QW-11
QW-18
QW-2
FN-16
Anza Mk III
Misagh-2

Cooled dual channel
IR or combined IR/UV
detector

Rosette scanning(quasi-imaging)• All-aspect capability• High resistance to flares• Better target
discrimination underunfavorable conditions• Single-shot killprobabilities between
   0.44 and 0.98

4th generation
Kin-SAM Type 91
QW-4

Cooled imaging IR or
combined IR/UV detector

Full imaging• All-aspect capability• Very high resistance to   flares and decoys• No data on single-shotkill probabilities
available

532

From Block II onwards, the FIM-43 Redeye used a gas-cooled
PbS seeker (Cagle, 1974, p. 129). As it retained spin-scan opticalmodulation, the missile can arguably be placed between
generations 1 and 2.

of the guidance system. While this does not necessarily imply that different seeker mechanisms or evendifferent guidance algorithms are used during eachphase, most IR passive homing MANPADS do switch toa different guidance algorithm for the final phase of
the flight. During ‘terminal guidance’, as this phase iscalled, the missile guidance algorithm is usually biased
towards the airframe proper of the aircraft rather than
the jet engine exhaust (Lyons, Long and Chait, 2006,
p. 13; cf. Jane’s, 2012c).
Control
The guidance computer inputs the information on
the target’s position relative to the missile into theguidance algorithm and computes the appropriate
acceleration to correct the missile’s current velocity
vector. This information is then translated into concretecommands for the missile’s steering elements. Usually,
there is a set of stabilizing fins at the rear end of themissile and a set of steering canards in the front third,in the vicinity of the guidance section.

Warhead
The warhead is the element of the MANPADS thatserves to destroy or render inoperable the target
aircraft. In all cases, this is achieved by means of an
explosive, although the missile’s pure kinetic energy(mass*speed) can exert an enormous destructive
force on the target on its own.
In principle, there are two main strategies of exerting
force on the target: The first consists of the shock wave
created by the explosion, as well as a large amountof small fragments of the warhead casing which are
rapidly accelerated. This design is called blast fragmentation. In its most basic form, the force of e
­ xplosion
is not directed anywhere specific and results in a
spherical shock wave. A more refined form is annular­ xplosion is directed
blast fragmentation, where the ein a ring shaped form to increase its ­effectiveness.
The majority of MANPADS rely on some form of blast
fragmentation to achieve the ­­destruction of thetarget (Gander, 2011). Some of the latest systems

Figure 9: Stinger front section

Source: Adapted from Klaus Holtkamp, First Sergeant, Technische Schule Landsysteme und Fachschule des Heers für Technik,
Bundeswehr.

As with the seeker head, missile flight control isa c­hallenge due to the rapid missile roll. Quickmechanical implementation of the steering­commands and precise information about themissile rotation are therefore crucial for steering
the missile accurately. It comes as no surprise that
Lyons, Long, and Chait have identified the improveds­ervomechanism and dedicated laser gyroscoperoll frequency sensor of later Stinger versions as key
innovations to improve the MANPADS’ accuracy­(2006, pp. 12–13).

have combined annular blast fragmentation with a­ rojectile consisting of a series of short metal rods thatphave been welded together at alternating ends, much
like a folding rule, to expand into a large circular metalring upon explosion, which then cuts into the aircraft.
This setup is called continuous rod and is employed by
the Russian SA-24 (9K338 Igla-S) and allegedly by the
Chinese QW-3 (Macfadzean, 1992, p. 277; Gander,
2011; Jane’s, 2012a; NA, 2007; Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 52). The second way of exerting force on thetarget is by use of a shaped charge, which focuses
33the energy of the explosion into a very small area. This
technique is often used in armor-piercing warheads,
where a cone-shaped piece of metal is condensed
by the targeted ­explosion and heats up so quickly
that it changes its aggregate state to plasma whichthen melts through armor plating. Only the Swedish
RBS-70 MANPADS uses a shaped charge warhead,
although the current Bolide missile combines bothshaped charge and blast fragmentation in a single
warhead (Jane’s, 2011c).
To achieve the optimal destructive force of thewarhead, it must be detonated at the right place at
the right time. The guidance system is responsible for
ensuring that the missile gets in a position that is as
close as possible to the most vulnerable part of thetarget aircraft. A fuze then initiates the detonation of
the warhead. Fuzes come in two types: proximity or
impact. As the name says, a proximity fuze initiates
detonation once a specific distance to the target isachieved, ranging from 0.5 (C-94M) to five (Igla-S)
meters (Jane’s, 2012d; Fiszer and Gruszczynski, 2002,
p. 52). An impact fuze detects the first impact with thetarget and initiates detonation either immediately orafter a time delay. The latter is utilized in cases where
the missile can penetrate the target and explodethere, as in the Starstreak missile projectiles, whichreach a comparatively high maximum speed of
between 1,020 and 1,150 meters per second (Jane’s,
2011a; Jane’s, 2012e; Gander, 2011). Most other
MANPADS use an impact fuze or a combination of
impact and proximity fuze.

fuel, which is stored in a fuel tank separate from theoxidizer, or on a solid propellant which ­integrates thesecomponents. In most cases, MANPADS rocket motors
use a composite solid propellant which consists ofa binder, a fuel (for example aluminum), an oxidizer(usually ammonium perchloride), and a number of
optional additives, such as a catalyzer or stabilizer.
Generally, while the use of a solid ­propellant reduces
the performance of the engine, its high density results
in a more compact and lighter ­propulsion section
which, in turn, leaves more room for other components, most notably the warhead (Thakre and Yang,
2010, p. 1). It is also very stable, which makes it easier
to handle under battlefield conditions. The reactivityof the propellant depends on its exact compositionand cannot be altered after production. MANPADS
flight motors usually use two different ‘grains’ of
propellant: a small amount of highly reactive booster
propellant for rapid acceleration and a larger amountof less reactive sustainer propellant (cf. e.g. Jane’s,
2011b; Jane’s, 2012f; Jane’s, 2011c; Jane’s, 2012g).
These burn in a combustion chamber and the exhaustis ejected through a nozzle at the rear to achieve
forward propulsion.
While it is one of the simplest components of themissile, the rocket motor contributes most to size andweight of the missile. The rocket motor of the Redeye
missile, for example, weighed 4.5 kg (10 lbs), with a
total missile weight of 8.3 kg (18.3 lbs) (Cagle, 1974,
p. 146). The Russian Strela-2M carries 4.2 kg of solid
propellant fuel, while the missile weighs 9.6 kg (Jane’s,
2011d).

Propulsion
Gripstock
As MANPADS are launched from the gunner’s
shoulder, it needs to be ensured that the latter is outof harm’s way when the missile is accelerated tosupersonic speed. All systems employ a dual stage
propulsion system to solve this problem. First the missile
is propelled out of the launch tube by a small launch(or eject) motor. The launch motor extinguishes
before leaving the launch tube to protect the gunnerand drops to the ground after some meters. Aftercoasting a distance of between five and ten meters,
depending on the MANPADS model, the flight (orsustainer) motor ignites and rapidly accelerates themissile to its maximum speed.
Conceptually, a rocket motor contains the fuel andan oxidizer, as opposed to a jet engine which uses
air sucked in by the engine as an external oxidizer(Frieden, 1985, p. 465). Rockets can either run on liquid

34

The gripstock is the main interface between missile
and gunner and mediates target acquisition andlaunch sequence (US Army, ND, p. 22). It enables thegunner to ‘uncage’ the seeker head (i.e. unlock it,so that it can move freely and acquire the target),start up the missile electronics and gyroscopes, initiate
target lock, and trigger the missile launch. If desired
and available, it also serves as an interface to the IFF­interrogator. While gripstocks of early versions, namely
the SA-7, merely contained the trigger ­mechanism,
those of more advanced MANPADS have a more
prominent role in the acquisition and launchsequence.
The gripstock has sometimes been classified as
the actual weapon, while the missile round hasbeen ­classified as ‘merely’ ammunition6. While thisis a matter of definition, it is certainly true that the­gripstock has a key function in a MANPADS system.
Without it, a MANPADS missile cannot be fired and it isoften shipped and stored separately from the missilerounds to limit the likelihood and impact of theft.
The missile round of a MANPADS is in many cases­identical to those used in other, non-MANPADS setups.
A prominent example is the Strelets multiple missile
launcher for the Russian Igla-S missile, which is usually
installed on a vehicle chassis. When, in the wake of
the Libyan revolution, SA-24 Igla-S missiles which had
been delivered with Strelets twin launchers werelooted from government arms depots, they could
not be used as a MANPADS as the gripstocks required
to launch them were missing. This illustrates the key
importance of tight gripstock control.
Other launch mechanisms
Classic gripstock setups are used in the American andRussian MANPADS series and all their ­descendants
and copies. In addition, there are a number of passive
homing MANPADS which use a different, bulkier
launching mechanism in combination with a tripod.
These include the French Mistral and the South Korean
Chiron. This setup allows for assisted target tracking, as
well as day and night sight devices. On the downside,these systems are substantially heavier and bulkier,and need to be transported by vehicle.7
Battery coolant unit
The battery coolant unit (BCU) is a disposable cartridge
which is attached to either launch tube, gripstock orlauncher unit, depending on the MANPADS modeland it provides power to the system and cooling to theseeker head. Once activated, it provides power for
start-up and launch of the missile for 30–90 seconds,
again depending on missile type. If the missile has
not been fired in this time period, the engagement
6

7

The United Nations’ Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts
on Small Arms, A/52/298, of 27 August 1997 defines in §26 “Portablelaunchers of anti-aircraft missile systems” as light weapons, while“Mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action antiaircraft and anti-tank systems” are defined as an ammunition (UN,1997). The International Tracing Instrument of 8 December 2005, A/
CONF.192/15, uses the same definition for launching mechanisms,
while ammunition is not covered by the agreement (UN, 2005).
Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence 2012 stateson the Mistral 1 that “[t]he basic assembly can be broken down
into two 20 kg loads - the containerised missile and the pedestal
mount with its associated equipment for carriage by the missile
team commander and the gunner respectively. In operationaluse, the system will normally be transported in a light vehicle tothe deployment area where it will be man packed to the firing site
by the team.”

will have to be aborted and the BCU will need to be
replaced by a spare. With passive homing MANPADS,
the BCU consists of two parts: a thermal battery and atank with compressed gas for cooling.
The battery unit of the BCU is a so-called ‘thermal’battery’, even though ‘thermally activated chemical
battery’ would be a more accurate term (see Guidotti
and Masset, 2006). Like a conventional battery, itconsists of an electrolyte and two electrodes. Unlike
a conventional battery, however, the electrolyte isin solid state at room temperature and the battery isinert until the electrolyte is melted by a pyrotechnic
device situated between the electrodes (Guidotti
and Masset, 2006; Davidson, 2003; ASB Group, ND;
Doughty et al., 2002, p. 357). The pyrotechnic device
is activated by an impulse generator located in thegripstock (e.g. Stinger; Lyons et al., 2006, p. 11). Upon
activation, the battery generates heat as a byproductof the chemical reaction, leading to temperatures ofmore than 200°C at the surface of the BCU (US Army,
ND, pp. 25, 54). The thermal battery supplies powerfor gyroscope spin-up, the activation of the on-board
thermal battery or generator, eject motor ignition,
as well as some less energy extensive pre-launch
processes (Lyons et al., 2006, p. 11).
The second function of the BCU is to cool the infraredseeker head to its working temperature of around-200°C. This is achieved by the so-called JouleThompson effect, the rapid expansion of a gas, either
argon (e.g. Stinger; see Jane’s, 2012g), nitrogen (e.g.
Strela-3, Igla, Igla-S; see Ochsenbein, 2008, p. 8) orcompressed air (e.g. Mistral; see NA, ND).
Command guidanceCommand guidance MANPADS share many
components with their passive homing relatives.
­
The missile itself, however, is lighter and cheaper,as the complicated seeker and guidance setups
are outsourced to a launcher unit on the ground.
A command guidance MANPADS thus consists ofa missile round and a launcher unit, which is usuallyattached to a tripod assembly.
As with passive homing MANPADS, the missile iscontained in a sealed, reusable launch tube.
Together, these elements form a missile round. Oncethe missile has been fired, the now empty launch tube
is replaced with a new missile round and the launch
tube can only be reloaded in a factory setting. As themissile is guided from the ground, it does not require
an on-board seeker. The weight and room that is35

freed up by the absence of a seeker section can beused for a more powerful rocket engine or warhead.
In addition to managing the missile launch, thelauncher unit is also responsible for tracking themissile, calculating the required missile course, and­transmitting guidance information to the missile.
Guidance architectures
The flight phase of command guidance MANPADS
can be conceptually divided into two phases. First,
the missile needs to be ‘gathered’ by the ­respective
guidance mechanism, i.e. the missiles must be
brought into the FOV of the gunner or into the guiding
radio or laser beam (Kopp, 1989). Second, guidancei­nformation is transmitted to the missile until the target
is hit. The way this is achieved has differed between
models and generations of command guidance
MANPADS.
In the early 1970s, the first two command guidance
MANPADS were developed: the British Blowpipe andthe Swedish RBS 70, which entered service in 1975 and1976 respectively (Gander, 2011; Kopp, 1989). The
Blowpipe was effectively a radio remote controlled
missile, which was guided to the target solely by
the gunner. Once the missile was automatically­‘gathered’ into the gunner’s FOV, he had to track themissile and the target and steer the missile with thehelp of a thumb joystick. The RBS 70 used a ‘beam
riding’ configuration, in which the gunner directs themissile to the target with the help of a laser beam.
The gunner points the beam at the target and themissile uses sensors at the rear to ensure that it stays
within the laser beam (Jane’s, 2012h). This setup iss­ emi-automatic, as the gunner only needs to track thetarget and keep the guiding beam aligned with it. The
missile is again automatically ‘gathered’ into the laser
beam and then continuously determines its position
within the beam and corrects any deviations.
While both systems require very good operator training,
the Blowpipe was so difficult to handle that even welltrained gunners had a very low hit rate (Hillson, 1989;
Freedman, 2005, p. 734). The Javelin, Blowpipe’s
successor, still stuck to command ­guidance but with
automatic missile tracking. In practice, the gunnerneeded to only track the target and keep a s­ tabilized
aiming mark aligned with it. The system would track themissile via infra-red sensing, ­calculate the ­necessary
guidance commands to keep the missile on the line ofsight between gunner and target, and communicate
them to the missile via a radio link (Kopp, 1989; Jane’s,
36

2012i). With the introduction of the Starburst MANPADS
in 1990, the radio guidance technique was abandonedin favor of a beam riding setup to avoid jamming(Jane’s, 2012j). Since then, all modern command guidance MANPADS rely on laser beam riding.
Launcher unit
In command guided MANPADS, the launcher unit
plays an even more crucial role than in passive homing
models, as it is instrumental in guiding the missile to thetarget. Without it, the missile cannot be guided in any
way. In fact, if the missile loses the guidance beam—
and with it communication to the launcher unit—midflight, it will self-destruct (see e.g. Joshi, 2011b).
The launcher unit consists of two functional parts: thesighting unit and the control unit. The sighting unit
enables the gunner to acquire and follow a target
until impact. It consists of an optical sight, which isgyro-stabilized to facilitate target tracking, as well as
an aiming mark, crosshair or aiming reticule, which
the gunner needs to keep aligned with the target(Kopp, 1989). Modern command guided MANPADS,
like the Starstreak II or RBS 70 NG, are also equippedwith a thermal sight enabling engagements during
night time (Saab Group, 2011; Thales Group, 2011).
The control unit calculates initial lead angles andpermits the gunner to follow the target with the helpof a thumb joystick (Kopp, 1989).
The launcher unit is supported by a tripod stand,although there is a shoulder launched version of theStarstreak missile where the launcher unit is attacheddirectly to the missile round.
Semi-active laser homing
In principle, semi-active laser (SAL) homing missiles
resemble IR passive homing ones. There are, however,two major differences. First, the missile is equippedwith a laser seeker head, which is immune to flaresand highly resistant to jamming. It is also capableof locking on to low-signature targets, like attack­helicopters or cruise missiles, at a much larger distancethan a passive IR seeker. Second, the target needs tobe illuminated by a ground-based laser rangefinder
so that the missile can lock on to and track the target.
There is very little open source data available about
how the technology is implemented in the Chinese
QW-3 missile. According to Jane’s (2012a) the QW-3
comes in an IR only, a SAL only, and a combined
variant. It is not clear whether the SAL QW-3 is­ ctually available in a MANPADS configuration or isaonly employed in a vehicle mounted multiple missile
system, where it is designated FL-2000B. The fact that
the SAL QW-3 is a two-stage missile with a weight of 23
kg suggests the latter, but it is not inconceivable that
there is a tripod-mounted version as well.

Implications of technical aspects for
MANPADS threat assessment
Seeker, guidance and control: In passive and semiactive homing missiles, the seeker and guidance
section of a MANPADS is the single most important partof the missile to ­determine its ­accuracy. This does not
only include the IR detector and ­guidance algorithm,
but also other elements, such as the gyroscope thatstabilizes the detector element and the roll frequency
sensor that improves flight control. All other things
being equal, the MANPADS with a more advanced
seeker and guidance section will thus present agreater danger to civilian aircraft than earlier versions.
To reach maximum accuracy, the seeker head inparticular must work under the right conditions. A
gyroscope enables it to keep a stable position ­relative
to the ground disregarding missile spin. A coolant
keeps the temperature at around -200°C and anauto-tracker keeps the seeker centered on the target.
As such, the seeker head is one of the most sensitiveand vulnerable parts of an IR homing MANPADS anda forceful blow with a hammer to the seeker dome willrender the missile useless.
First generation uncooled PbS seekers—apart frombeing easily distracted by background IR clutter—are only able to lock on to the engine of an aircraft,
permitting tail-chase attacks only. Later generation seekers decrease interference of background­radiation, allow to lock onto all aircraft surfaces andare all-around more reliable.
Warhead: Like all explosives, a MANPADS warhead
is subject to degradation. Yet, as the warhead is asealed unit, this happens very slowly. While evenseveral decade-old warheads can continue to befunctional, warhead degradation leads to a decrease
in reliability of the MANPADS. Consequently, the older
a MANPADS is, the higher the chance of warhead
failure.
This trend is amplified by technological advancesin warhead design. Early generation warheads, likethat of the Russian Strela-2, had so little destructive

power that not even a direct hit would reliably deal
sufficient damage to down the target aircraft (Fiszer
and Gruszczynski, 2002, p. 49). Later generations used
more effective and more stable explosives as well as
more functional warhead designs, leading to everincreasing single-shot kill probabilities (see Table 6
for details). Strategies to increase warhead lethality
are manifold and include combining an increased
area of impact with a proximity fuze, as employed by
the Igla-S, as well as splitting the warhead into three­separate darts to increase the hit probability, as usedby the Starstreak MANPADS.
Rocket motor: Warhead and rocket motor rely on
similar chemical processes, leading to some sharedcharacteristics. The Russian Igla family (excluding the
Igla-1E, which was mainly produced for export) evenuses the l­eftover fuel as an additional explosive toenhance the destructive power of the warhead.
Like the warhead, a MANPADS rocket motor willslowly degrade, leading to an increase in failure
and a decrease in consistency and uniformity of the­reaction, both of which are crucial for accurate missile
guidance.8 Solid-fuel composition has changed andimproved over time, with stabilizers being added toinhibit premature oxidation of the fuel. Consequently,
later generation rocket motors are not only more­reliable by design, but also by their lesser age and lessadvanced fuel degradation. In addition, one expert
pointed out that the squib or electrical ignitors of botheject and sustainer motor need to be recharged orchanged on a regular basis, which requires special
equipment.9
Battery coolant unit: Thermal batteries are extremely
robust and ­resilient against shock, extreme­temperatures, and ­degradation. According to Guidotti
and Masset, thermal batteries can ­withstand forcesof 16,000 g and storage temperatures of between-55 and +75°C without significant ­degradation (2006,
p. 1444). When protected from moisture and oxygen,they can stay operational for 25 years and longer(Guidotti and Masset, 2006, p. 1444). This makes them
particularly suited for guided munitions and missiles, aswell as space travel applications.
8

In an introductory presentation on MANPADS at a meeting of theOrganization of American States on 8 March 2007, Chris Hughesof the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense stated regarding therocket motor that “[…] when these things are manufactured thequality control of this part is very, very important because it has toburn evenly along the length of the motor to enable it to performand fly in a straight line or as guided by the control” (7:38-7:54).

9

Personal email from a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) expert,
18 September 2012.

37

Nonetheless, the BCU has been identified as one of
the weakest components in a MANPADS, concerning
the life expectancy of the system, which indicates theoverall robustness of MANPADS.10 In addition, the shortlife span of the battery upon activation—a Strela-2
battery expires after 30 to 40 seconds—makes it harderfor the gunner to conduct a successful engagement
and may lead to a shortage of BCUs. Due to the hightemperature of the activated thermal battery, theBCU has to be removed within minutes, or p
­ ermanent
damage to the BCU receptacle may render theweapon round inoperable (US Army, ND, p. 45).
Overall, the BCU clearly represents a limiting factor
to successful attacks on civilian aircraft. It degrades
more easily than other components, complicates theengagement process, can damage the MANPADS if
handled improperly, and needs replacement once
activated, even if the MANPADS cannot be fired.
IR vs. SACLOS: Contrary to the belief of some analysts(e.g. Wisotzki, 2007), command guidance MANPADS
are not an evolution of, and therefore inherently
better or more advanced than, passive homing
ones. Rather, both have been used and developedin parallel, with newer models of both kinds, like the
British Starstreak (command guidance) or RussianIgla-S (passive homing), being more capable than theearly ‘pioneers’, like the British Blowpipe (commandg­ uidance) or US Redeye (passive homing) MANPADS.
Yet it is true that command guidance missiles of thebeam riding type are immune to most currently available countermeasures, the majority of which havebeen developed to confuse passive homing missiles,
as well as jamming devices which aim to disrupt
communication between gunner and missile. While thismakes them more dangerous for military targets, thisquality is less relevant for civilian aircraft, most of which
are not equipped with ­countermeasures anyway, sothat passive homing missiles are not at a disadvantage against such targets. Yet, this point does require
an important qualification: The analysis of attacks on
civilian aircraft in Chapter 1 shows that MANPADS
attacks have occurred near exclusively in active war
zones. While it is not feasible to equip civilian airplanes
worldwide with IR countermeasures, a focus on areasof armed conflict may reduce the risk of successful
MANPADS attacks drastically. This is especially relevant in light of the finding that there is no evidence
for attacks on civilian aircraft with command guided
systems (see Chapter 1) and the near ubiquity of IR
guided MANPADS worldwide (see Chapters 3 and 4).
1038

Personal email from a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) expert,
18 September 2012.

Currently, however, only a very small amount ofcivilian airplanes is equipped with systems to counterthe threat of MANPADS attacks. Therefore, for civilian
airplanes the pure hit probability of a MANPADS isthe deciding factor, assuming that the missile is fully
functional and the gunner is familiar with its handling.
All modern MANPADS, regardless of the type, havedemonstrated a very high hit probability in testing(see Table 6), though many have not been used on
the battlefield.
Some additional factors need to be consideredregarding MANPADS performance:
Weather conditions: A weakness of laser beamriding missiles is their dependence on clear weather­conditions, as water particles diffuse the laser beamand the gunner needs to be able to track the target
visually. Even very advanced systems, like the British
Starstreak II and the Swedish RBS 70 Bolide MANPADS
suffer from this problem. Only the very latest RBS 70 NG
operates independent of weather conditions.
Launch mechanism: Launch mechanisms, i.e. gripstocks and tripod-mounted launch units, have become
more complex and their role in MANPADS has increasedin i­mportance. One expert reported that improvised
gripstocks for SA-7 MANPADS have been found in
Afghanistan.11 Second generation and more recent
IR homing MANPADS, however, are very unlikely to be
fired without a gripstock. While a theoretical ­possibilityof use with an improvised launching ­mechanism
remains for IR homing MANPADS, a command guided
MANPADS is completely useless without the launcher
unit and it will self-destruct if communication with thelauncher unit is lost during missile flight.
Ease of use: Even for early generations of IR homing
missiles, ­operators were able to learn basic ­maneuvers
relatively quickly. While a large number of hours is­necessary to qualify as a MANPADS gunner in a ­militarycontext, this time is substantially shorter from a purely
practical perspective. One expert of the German
Armed Forces estimated that a 30 minute introduction
would be sufficient to perform the basic operationsof a Stinger MANPADS. Precise and r­eliable operationof a MANPADS does, however, require a much larger
amount of training. Command-guided MANPADS, on
the other hand, gained a reputation of being very
hard to operate, even with a good amount of training.
The abysmal combat p­ erformance of the Blowpipe
MANPADS, both in Afghanistan and in the Falklands
11

Personal email from a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) expert,
18 September 2012.

Table 6: Single-shot kill probabilities of different MANPADS.12
MANPADS

Claimed hit probability

Actual hit probability

Strela-2

0.19–0.25 (Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 49)

Strela-2M

0.22–0.25 (Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 49)

Strela-2M/A

0.42–0.45 (“Advantages whencompared to the standard Strela2M warhead are: […] A 0.2 percent increase in the single-shot killprobability figure” (Jane’s 2011e)13)

Strela-3

0.31–0.33 (Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 49)

Igla-1 (SA-16)

0.44–0.59 (Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 49)

Igla (SA-18)

0.45–0.63 (Ochsenbein, 2008 p. 7)
0.45–0.65 (Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 49)

Igla-S (SA-24)

0.5–0.75 (Fiszer and Gruszczynski,
2002, p. 49)

Stinger Basic (FIM-92A)

0.79 (Kuperman, 1999, p. 246)

Redeye (FIM-43)

0.403–0.53 (Cagle, 1974, p. 147)

FN-6/HY-6

0.7 (Jane’s, 2011f)

FN-16/HY-6>0.8 (Jane’s, 2012k)

QW-3 (FL-2000B)>0.85 (Richardson, 2003)

Mistral 1“very high” (Jane’s, 2011g)
0.98 (Joshi, 2011a)

Starstreak I

0.96 (Jane’s, 2012e)

RBS-700.93 (Pike, 2000)

Chiron0.9 (Jane’s, 2012l)

War, was a key factor for this reputation. In the past
decades, however, command guided MANPADS
have introduced a range of m
­ echanisms that assist thegunner in operating the system, notably a stabilizedsight and target auto-tracking. As a c­ onsequence,
the gap between IR homing and command guided
MANPADS regarding ease of use has become significantly smaller and other aspects, like mobility, price,
and availability, have gained in importance.

12 Note that these numbers need to be taken with a grain of salt
and are not fully comparable. It is often unclear under which
circumstances and against which targets the hit probability wasmeasured. The table serves merely as an illustration of the ordersof magnitude of different MANPADS’ hit probability.
13 As a 0.2 percent increase would be insignificant, we assume thatthe author actually means an increase of 0.2 in the kill probability,
which would equal an increase of 20 percentage points.

Exploiting aircraft vulnerabilities: While an IR guided
missile will always home in on the engine, a command
guided missile can, in theory, be steered towards
a more vulnerable part of the airpart. This does,
however, require a very well trained gunner and adds
to the existing difficulties in operating a command
guided missile.
Overall, command guided MANPADS are thus still at a
disadvantage compared to their IR homing ­relatives,
even though the difference has decreased enormously. They are more difficult to use, more ­dependent
on clear weather conditions, and cannot be usedwithout the appropriate launch mechanism. Their main
advantage, immunity to ­countermeasures, is of little
relevance in the context of attacks on civilian aircraft
which are not equipped with such mechanisms in the39

first place. Their ability to target the most vulnerable
part of an aircraft depends on a well trained operator.
System weight and setup: A number of MANPADS are
noticeably bulkier and heavier than others, making
them more difficult to smuggle and transport. They
employ a setup where a launcher unit, attached to atripod, is used rather than a gripstock. While the latterweigh between 15 and 19 kg, the former range from24 to 35 kg. They need to be carried by a team of twoor three people and require more time to set up thanthose of the gripstock variety. Overall, this makes themslightly less desirable for a clandestine attack on a
civilian aircraft. MANPADS of this category include the
RBS 70, Mistral I and II, Chiron, as well as the Lightweight
Multiple Launcher (LML) version of the Starstreak.

In principle, however, all missile parts can be replaced.
According to one expert, the seeker and the rocket
motor’s electrical ignitors are the most sensitive parts
and are likely to fail first.15 Given the relatively low
prices of MANPADS on the black market (see Chapter
3; cf. Silverstein and Pasternak, 2003), complicatedand potentially dangerous repairs are likely as a lastresort only, while acquisition of a functional MANPADS
seems more feasible and likely.

Conclusion
From the above analysis, the following conclusions
can be drawn regarding the threat of MANPADS
for civilian aviation:• Overall, MANPADS are very durable and can befunctional after decades. Some components—
including warhead, rocket motor, electrical
ignition, and thermal batteries—degrade more
quickly than others, leading to a decrease inreliability with greater system age.
• The seeker and guidance sections contributemost to a MANPADS’ accuracy, but they arealso the system’s most sensitive elements. Froma purely technical perspective, later generation
MANPADS with their higher hit probability posea higher risk to civilian aircraft. Destroying theseeker head of an IR passive homing or semiactive laser homing MANPADS will make thesystem unusable.
• IR passive homing MANPADS continue to beeasier to use as they require less training and havea higher chance of a successful e­ ngagement
than command guided MANPADS. Still, thelatter have closed the gap significantly and in
the not too distant future may be as easy to use
as passive homing MANPADS.
• Tripod-mounted MANPADS are less mobile andmore difficult to transfer clandestinely. Shoulderfired systems pose a greater danger to civilian
aviation.
• While repair or replacement of nearly all­components is possible in theory, the ­technicaldifficulties of such a procedure make itvery unlikely. Increasing complexity of later
generation MANPADS, as well as low black­
market prices of complete systems, further
decreases the likelihood of ‘craft MANPADS’.

Semi-active laser guidance: SAL MANPADS facesimilar restrictions to command guided missiles: they
are more difficult to operate, heavier and bulkier thanIR homing MANPADS, and are impossible to operate
without a complete system. As such—apart from thenear complete absence of such weapons from theworld market—they do not represent the weapon of
choice for an attack on a civilian aircraft.
Repair and spare parts: As many of the MANPADS in
circulation are several decades old and often stored
in less than ideal ­conditions, failure of or damage toparts of a MANPADS are increasingly likely to occur. In
addition, MANPADS that were looted from state stockpiles or other sources are often incomplete, lacking
either gripstock, BCU, or both. The question thus arises,
whether a non-state armed group can realistically
repair a damaged MANPADS with spare parts or withimprovised craft components.
MANPADS missiles are compartmentalized and allcomponents can in principle be replaced. This,
however, is not a trivial enterprise without expert
know-how and outside a factory setting. Even­
removing the missile from the launch tube requires
the loosening of a number of connections between
the tube and the missile which transfer power, information, and the coolant to the missile before launch.
Another problem is aligning the components neatly
after replacement. At production, each missile istested electronically for imbalances. This is important,as the missile rotates at high speed and needs to beable to withstand high-g maneuvers. Outside a factory
setting this level of precision is hard to achieve.14
1440

Hughes emphasized this point, stating: “I would like to make thepoint that this is not the sort of thing that a terrorist or an insurgent
can manufacture in a workshop in his garage, in his basement,
and put one of these things together. It’s a very, very technicalproduction.” (2007, 6:03–6:17).

15

Personal email from a Mines Advisory Group (MAG) expert,
18 September 2012.

Michael Ashkenazi and Jan Grebe

3

MANPADS transfers

41

Background
While the demand for anti-air point defense and
VSHORAD (Very Short-range Air Defense) has been
growing in the period since the 1970s, the complexityof manufacturing MANPADS is such that only alimited number of manufacturers have the ­necessary
technology to produce these weapons. A direct­
result of this basic fact is a lively trade in MANPADS
from manufacturing countries to many of the world’s
armed forces. The objective of this chapter is to­highlight the main features of this trade, ­concentratingon what we know of state-to-state and other transfers,
keeping in mind that many transactions are either
secret, for reasons of military security, or under thetable, as for example supplies to Non-State Armed
Groups (NSAGs).
It is necessary to keep in mind that reports of receipts
of MANPADS by destination are not always ­equivalent
to reports from originating nations. Either or bothparties to a transaction may not report, or evenactively hide, any transactions, so that it is difficult topiece together the full picture with a desired level ofreliability. What characterizes MANPADS transfers ingeneral are d­ ifferences of scale. Some transfers are ofless than twenty units, others are of thousands.
There is often no clarity about what is being­transferred: missiles alone (in their tubes, whichassumes the ­recipient has gripstocks) or missiles andgripstocks, effectively, ready to fire systems. Judging
from manuals and instructional material (e.g. US Army,
1984), a relationship of one gripstock to four missiles
seems reasonable (two weapon rounds ready to use
and two missile rounds still boxed), though this often
depends on specific posture (see below). In somecases, a purchaser may purchase more missiles thangripstocks to keep a stock for emergencies.
Three patterns of purchase can also be identified.
Western states and those who ally themselves with
European or US patrons tend to choose Western
manufactured weapons whereas former Soviet
allies tend to prefer Russian weapons (see Table 7 for
numbers). Developing nations tend to acquire a mixof MANPADS from different sources. It is not always
clear what motivates a particular purchase: pricing,policy, or tactics, export restrictions, or political quid
pro quo.
One complex issue that needs to be considered isthe conversion of systems mounted on a vehicle
to MANPADS configuration. For example, many
42

Mistral configurations are designed for mounted, notdismounted, use. Can such missile tubes be usedwith a portable launching mechanism? The Russian
answer is unequivocally ‘no’ (Litovkin, 2005) though
at least several experts we have interviewed indicate
such conversion is possible but unlikely.

Value of trade
Large purchases of MANPADS tend to be characteristic of states with weak air forces that ­compensate
for such weakness by bolstering their ground-based
anti-aircraft capabilities. A further variable is military
doctrine: Soviet/Russian military doctrine ­emphasizes
anti-aircraft defense at all levels down to the battalionlevel of regular infantry, artillery and armoredunits which incorporate MANPADS in their Table ofOrganization. US doctrine emphasizes MANPADS­
units for all maneuver divisions. Other Western
doctrines tend to use MANPADS for special units andcircumstances. Soviet and current Russian doctrine­emphasize mobile anti-aircraft protection for highvalue artillery and headquarter targets. ­Dependents
and allies tend to follow the pattern of their patron,with many reservations. This has implications in termsof the numbers of MANPADS and transaction value,depending on the relevant military’s doctrine.
In addition to the missiles themselves, MANPADStransfers often include training aids, ranging from­
simple dummy missiles to complex computerizedplanetarium-type training buildings. The availabilityof these training aids can indicate the importanceof these weapons in the particular mix of weapons
an armed force requires. This in turn implies thatthe economic value of any MANPADS transfer ismisleading, since ancillary services, as training, testing,and maintenance (and possibly the political advantage gained), may account for a significant part ofthe deal.
Black market
In addition to the legal trade, there is, apparently, an
extensive black market for MANPADS, here defined
as any MANPADS transaction between non-state
actors. Prices on the black market vary extensively(Schroeder and Buongiorno, 2010b. Silverstein and
Pasternak, 2003, give slightly lower prices overall).
Authenticated price quotes range from a low ofaround US $5,000 for a first generation Strela-2, up to US$160,000 for Stingers and Igla-S. Given the high volatility of this market, prices should be expected to behighly ­flexible depending on the needs and pocketsof the buyers. It seems that such transactions tend to
involve small numbers of individual units, so the total­monetary value (however costly individual items mightbe) is not too high. At the individual level, of course,­ ttractive merchandise
MANPADS represent highly afor ­unscrupulous merchants, whose ultimate clients
may be NSAGs or even state entities under embargo,
who may settle for what they can get or other lessaffluent states (see Box 4 “The Mombasa attacks andthe Yemeni arms markets”). A further effect on prices
on the black market is the persistent attempt of the US
government to purchase black market weapons for
destruction. Claimed successes include the purchaseand destruction of over 1000 MANPADS in Yemen(Seche, 2009).
It should be kept in mind that insofar as the black
market is concerned, it is the quality of the weapons
sold rather than the volume of sales that is at issue.
Individual units of high-performance MANPADS­(generation three and above) in the hands of terrorist
constitute a significant hazard to civilian transport.
They are consequently in high demand and priced
accordingly. Older Strela family missiles have a mixed
record against jet airplanes and are thus muchcheaper.
MANPADS, as an economic segment, represent
a minor income stream for manufacturing andtrading nations. Clearly, price flexibility is not purely
an economic matter, but depends more on politicalfactors. What seems to be of more crucial i­mportancethan sales from manufacturing countries, are theblack and gray markets. Within that segment, salesof obsolete stocks by a purchaser are particularly­problematic, as the Ukrainian and Venezuelan cases
show.

Destination pictureThis section describes the transfer picture from thedestination side. Given that not all transactions are
confirmed publicly, we are unable to state thatthese are the only transactions that have takenplace. However, in several instances we are able to­identify transactions and subsequent effects. At least
102 countries have or have had MANPADS in theirinventories. The examples dealt with here in some­detail were selected as representative cases.
Based on the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database (SIPRI,
2012), Table 7 presents all MANPADS transfers in the
period between 1990 and 2010. The Table does notinclude missiles that were delivered in a vehicle or shipmounted, non-MANPADS configuration. It also disregards technology transfer and licensed produced
systems, as these are dealt with in a separate section
below.

Table 7: MANPADS transfers between 1990 and 2010
Recipient

Supplier

MANPADSYear

No. Comments

Afghanistan/ NA

RussiaIgla-1/SA-16
Gimlet2000

100

AngolaUSSR

Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet1990

150

Armenia

RussiaIgla/SA-18
Grouse1996

200 Ex-Russian; illegal transfer; transfer also
includes 40 launchers

Australia

SwedenRBS-70 Mk-3
Bolide2007

150 SEK150 m (US $18 m) deal (part of
SEK600 m ‘Project Land-19 Phase-6’)

Austria

FranceMistral

1996

500 Part of US $129 m deal (incl. euro 87 m
for RAC; offsets US $344 m) incl. 22 RAC
radars and MITS-2 night sights; dealincl. also 63 or 76 launchers

Azerbaijan

UkraineStrela-3/SA-14
Gremlin2008

18 Ex-Ukrainian

Bangladesh

China

HN-5A
HN-5A
QW-2

1992
2001
2007

50
21 HN-5JA1 version
250

43

Recipient

Supplier

MANPADSYear

No. Comments

Belgium

FranceMistral

1994

290 Deal incl. also 24 ATLAS launchers

Bolivia

China

HN-5A

1995

30

Botswana

RussiaIgla-1/SA-16
GimletJavelin1996      501992

25 Deal also incl. 5 launchers

Igla/SA-18
GrouseIgla-S/SA-24

1994

112 Deal also incl. 56 launchers

2011

250

UK
BrazilRussiaBruneiFranceMistralMistral

1999
2006

48 FFR200 m (US $30 m) deal
24

Burkina Faso

UkraineStrela-3/SA-14
Gremlin1999

10 Probably ex-Ukrainian; designation
uncertain (reported as ‘SAM’); possibly
delivered to Liberia via Burkina Faso

BurundiUnknowncountry

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1990

305

Cambodia

China

FN-6

2009

50 Possibly FN-16 version

CanadaUK

Javelin

1992

1100

Starburst

1992

100

Chile

FranceMistral

1997

750 Deal incl. also Mygale SAM systemwith ASPIC launchers and MANPADS
launchers

Cuba

USSR

Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet1990

100 Incl. SA-N-5 version

CyprusFranceMistral

2005

200

Czech Republic

SwedenRBS-702007

90 SEK204 m (US $29 m) deal (incl. 15-16
launchers); offsets 100%

DenmarkUSA

FIM-92 Stinger

1996

840 US $150 m deal

DRC (Zaire)

Unknowncountry

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1995

10

Ecuador

China
Russia

HN-5A
Igla-1/SA-16
GimletIgla/SA-18
Grouse1994
1998

72 Deal incl. also 30 launchers
222 US $14 m deal

2009

50

FIM-92 Stinger

1991

100 Aid; for use in 1990-1991 Gulf War;FIM-92A version
Delivery 20121990

100 Ex-Nicaraguan; aid

1990

10 Supplier uncertain1990

45 Ex-Nicaraguan; aid

Egypt

USA

FIM-92 Stinger
El Salvador/
FMLN

44

Nicaragua

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail
Igla-1/SA-16
GimletStrela-3/SA-14
GremlinRecipient

Supplier

MANPADSYear

No. Comments

Eritrea

RussiaIgla/SA-18
GrouseIgla/SA-18
Grouse

1995

50

1999

200

Estonia

FranceMistral2009

100 Part of euro 60 m deal; Mistral-2 version

FinlandSwedenRBS-70 Mk-3
BolideIgla/SA-18
Grouse2010

200 SEK600 m (US $85 m) deal

1990

100

USSR
Georgia

PolandGrom-2

2007

100 Incl. 30 launchers

GreeceUSA

FIM-92 Stinger
FIM-92 Stinger

1994
2006

FIM-92 Stinger

2004

1500 US $124 m deal (incl. 500 launchers)
432 US $48 m deal; for ASRAD SAM systems
from FRG
200 Part of US $89 m deal (for 1007 missiles
for Greece, Italy and UK)

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1994

Igla/SA-18
Grouse2003

250 Incl. SA-N-5 naval version; probably
ordered from Soviet Union anddelivered from Russia after break-up
of Soviet Union
2250 US $32-50 m deal

Igla/SA-18
Grouse2011

200 US $26 m deal; delivery 2008–2012

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1991

Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet1991

2500 Incl. SA-N-5 naval version; probably
more delivered from Russia after
break-up of Soviet Union
2500

QW-3

2007

QW-3

2009

QW-3

2010

130 Incl. for Indonesian UN peacekeeping
force in Lebanon
80 Part of US $35 m deal; for TD-200B SAM
system
15
1000

India

Indonesia

Russia
USSR

China

Iraq

USSR

Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet1990

Ireland

NorwayRBS-702008

20 Ex-Norwegian

IsraelUSA

FIM-92 Stinger

1996

344

Italy

USA

FIM-92 Stinger

2002

FIM-92 Stinger

2004

50 Probably US $10 m deal; possibly for
A-129 helicopters; status uncertain
200 Part of US $89 m deal (for 1007 missiles
for Greece, Italy and UK)

Japan

USA

FIM-92 Stinger

1991

232 FIM-92A version

JordanRussiaIgla/SA-18
Grouse

2001

100

45

Recipient

Supplier

MANPADSYear

No. Comments

KuwaitEgypt

Strela-2/SA-7
GrailStarburst

1990

36 Sakr Eye version

1995

250 GBP50 m (US $80 m; incl 50 launchers)

UK
Laos

RussiaIgla-1/SA-16
Gimlet2005

50 Designation uncertain; deal incl. also
25 launchers

LatviaSwedenRBS-702007

102 SEK185 m (US $28 m) deal(incl. ex-Swedish launchers as aid)

Lebanon/Hezbollah

IranStrela-2/SA-7
Grail

1997

100 Ex-Iranian; aid

Lithuania

NorwayRBS-702005

USA

FIM-92 Stinger

2007

260 Ex-Norwegian; part of LTL135 m(US $50 m) aid; deal incl. also 21
launchers
54 US $31 m deal (incl. 8 launchers)

Macedonia/ NLA

Unknowncountry

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

2001

10

Malaysia

China
Pakistan
RussiaFN-6
QW-1 Vanguard
Igla-1/SA-16
GimletJavelin

2009
2003
2002

64
160 US $13 m deal; Anza-2 version
382 US $48 m deal (incl. 40 launchers)

1991

Starburst

1997

60 Deal also incl. 12 to 48 launchers;
status uncertain
504

UK

MexicoRussiaIgla/SA-18
Grouse2002

30 US $2.1 m deal (incl. 5 launchers); to
protect off-shore oil installations

Myanmar

Bulgaria

Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet
HN-5A

1999

100 Supplier uncertain

1992

200

China
Myanmar/ MTA

Cambodia

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1994

10 Illegal deal; sold via Singaporeandealers; several more confiscated in
1995 by Thailand while being delivered

New ZealandFranceMistral

1998

27 Part of NZD23 m (US $16 m) deal(incl. 12 launchers)

Nicaragua

El Salvador /FMLNStrela-3/SA-14
Gremlin1991

17 Returned by FMLN to Nicaragua after
peace

Oman

UK

Javelin

1990

280

Pakistan

FranceMistral

1995

100

Peru

Bulgaria

Igla-1/SA-16
GimletFN-6
QW-11
Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet1996

417 Deal also incl. 56 launchers

2010

15 US $1.1 m deal

2009
1993

10 QW-18 version

China
Nicaragua

Portugal

46

UK

Javelin1995

216 Ex-Nicaraguan; deal incl. also
72 launchers
200 No. delivered could be up to 500

USA

FIM-92 Stinger

1996

30

Recipient

Supplier

MANPADSYear

No. Comments

Qatar

FranceMistral1996

500 Incl. for Vita FAC; deal incl. also
MANPADS and SADRAL launchers

Saudi Arabia

FranceMistralMistralFIM-92 Stinger

1992
2010
1990

700
1000 euro 500m deal; for National Guard
200 Delivered in reaction to Iraqi 1990
invasion of Kuwait (Gulf War)USA
Serbia & Mont.

Kazakhstan

Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet1995

226 Ex-Kazakh; deal incl. also 57 launchers;
illegal deal

Sierra Leone/RUF

UkraineStrela-2/SA-7
Grail

1999

5 Designation uncertain; supplied to
Burkina Faso but from there illegallytransferred to RUF

Singapore

FranceRussiaMistralIgla/SA-18
Grouse1996
1999

500 Deal incl. also MANPADS and SIMBAD
350 (naval) launchers
Deal incl. also 30 launchers; no. could
be 440; possibly assembled in
Singapore

Slovakia

RussiaIgla/SA-18
Grouse2010

120

Slovenia

RussiaIgla-1/SA-16
Gimlet2003

4

Somalia/SNA

Eritrea

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1998

50

Somalia/UIC

Unknowncountry

Igla/SA-18
Grouse2006

6 Allegedly from Eritrea

South Africa

UK

Starstreak

2005

96 US $13 m deal (part of US $117 m‘Ground Based Air Defence System(GBADS) Phase-1’ programme)

South Korea

FranceMistral

1997

RussiaMistralIgla-1/SA-16
Gimlet2000
1996

984 US $180 m deal (offsets 25%); deal alsoincl. 130 MANPADS launchers
1742 US $300 m deal
50 Part of ‘Bul-Gom’ or ‘Red Bear-1’ deal
worth US $209 m (payment of Russiandebt to South Korea)

Spain

FranceMistral

1997

840 US $154 m deal (incl. 108-200
launchers; offsets 50%)

Sri Lanka/LTTE

Cambodia

1995

25 Supplier uncertain

Unknowncountry

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail
Strela-3/SA-14
Gremlin

1998

5

Sudan

China

FN-6

2006

50

Syria

BelarusIgla/SA-18
GrouseIgla/SA-18
Grouse2003

300 US $30-100 m deal; supplier uncertain

TaiwanUSA

FIM-92 Stinger
FIM-92 Stinger

2001

728 US $180 m deal (incl. 61 launchers)
US $9.9 m deal; Stinger Block-1 version

Tanzania

Unknowncountry

Igla-1/SA-16
Gimlet

1996

50

47

Recipient

Supplier

MANPADSYear

No. Comments

ThailandRussiaSwedenIgla-S/SA-24
RBS-702010
1997

RBS-702005

36 US $4 m deal
15 US $4 m deal (incl. 3 launchers);
RBS-70 Mk-2 version
75

Germany (FRG) FIM-43C Redeye

1994

300 Ex-FRG; aidUSA

FIM-92 Stinger

1992

469 US $33 m deal (incl. 150 launchers)

Turkey/PKK

Unknowncountry

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1997

10

United ArabEmirates

FranceMistral

1994

RussiaIgla-1/SA-16
Gimlet1999

500 For Abu Dhabi; deal incl. also ATLAS
launchers
400 For Abu Dhabi; may include SA-18
versionUganda/LRA

Unknowncountry

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

2002

5

United Kingdom

RussiaIgla-1/SA-16
GimletFIM-92 Stinger

2006

31

2004

100 Part of US $89 m deal (for 1007 missiles
for Greece, Italy and UK)

Afghanistan
Mujahideen

FIM-92 Stinger

1992

AngolaFIM-92 Stinger

1992

UkraineIgla/SA-18
GrouseIgla/SA-18
GrouseStrela-3/SA-14
GremlinIgla-1/SA-16
Gimlet2003

2006

10 Delivered in 1980s as aid to
Mujahideen and bought back after
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
Delivered in 1980s as aid to UNITA and
250 bought back after peace agreementin Angola
Probably for evaluation and training
29 Probably for evaluation and training
Ex-Ukrainian
128
Ex-Ukrainian
33

2006

295

TurkeyUSA
United States

2006

Venezuela

FranceRussiaSwedenMistralIgla-S/SA-24
RBS-70
RBS-70

2002
2010
1991
2001

100
2000 Deal incl. also 200 launchers
200
200 Part of SEK375 m (US $54 m) deal

Vietnam

North Korea

Igla-1/SA-16
GimletIgla/SA-18
Grouse

1997

100

2002

50

Strela-2/SA-7
Grail

1994

100 Ex-Russian; SA-7b version; launchers
delivered from Bulgaria

RussiaYemen

RussiaSource: Adapted from SIPRI, 2012.

48

Overall, transfers totaled 36,826 missiles (not systems)
during these two decades. The largest single source
for the missiles was the Soviet Union and its successor
states, which exported 15,648 missiles, followed by
France, which transferred 8,805 missiles. France also
exported a large number of systems in a non-MANPADS
configuration. Only in third place, do we find theUnited States with 5,479 exported missiles. We haveto keep in mind, however, that the license-produced
missiles of the European Stinger Program alone add up
to 12,500 additional missiles. Other notable exporters
during this period were the United Kingdom with 2,111,
Sweden with 1,292, and China with 1,037 missiles.
On the recipient side, the most significant is India,
which received 7,700 Russian missiles between 1990
and 2010. Other large recipients include South Korea(2,776), Venezuela (2,500), Greece (2,132), and Saudi
Arabia (1,900). The following section will deal with asample of transfers in greater detail, demonstrating
the great variety of sales.
Azerbaijan
In the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994) theA­ rmenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh foughtfor secession from territory claimed by Azerbaijan.
Armenian and Azerbaijan troops clashed in several
battles which demonstrated the material and ­military
weakness of the Azerbaijanis. As a consequence, andnotably since the financial windfall of oil ­productionin the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan has been ­persistently
pursuing military superiority over Armenian andNagorno-Karabakh forces. Advanced weapons havebeen sourced from the West, in addition to legacy
Soviet weaponry abandoned or sold after the fall of
the Soviet system.
In addition to short-range air defense (SHORAD)
systems such as the Israeli SPYDER, which is truckmounted, ­the Azerbaijani Army has also reported
purchasing 18 Strela-3/SA-14 missiles and 10 launchers
from Ukraine in 2007/08. This seems an unlikely number
and type. Though the Strela-3 is a vastly improved
version of the original Strela, and though it has a
successful record, it was by no means a modern
weapon by 2007, when it had been supersededby the SA-18 and SA-24. It is conceivable that the
Azerbaijani’s could not purchase Russian weapons­
due to Russia’s support for Armenia. At the sametime, there are some indications that Ukraine had also
attempted to sell MANPADS to Armenia (Trend, 2012).
The absence of reporting (and the report’s claim that
the Ukrainians wanted the export kept ­unpublished)shows that official reporting does not reflect acomplete picture.
Bangladesh
While Bangladesh’s security issues are largely internalrather than external, the Bangladeshi military has
acquired MANPADS in three different transactions
over the past two decades. In 1991/92, Bangladesh
purchased 50 HN-5A missiles and an undisclosed
number of gripstocks from China (SIPRI, 2012). Thiswas supplemented in 2001 with a further shipment of
21 slightly upgraded HN-5JA1 versions of the missile.
Between 2004 and 2007, the Bangladesh militaryprocured a shipment of 250 advanced QW-2 missiles,
presumably with an undisclosed number of gripstocks
as well.
BrazilBrazil has an arsenal of MANPADS for use by the threedifferent armed services (army, air force, and navy).
Between 1994 and 1997, the Brazilian Navy purchased
160 Mistral missiles from France for installation as point
defense on its craft, including the aircraft carrier Minas
Gerais. These are mounted in the SADRAL (6-cell) and
SIMBAD (2 cell configuration). It is not clear whether
the order also included individual gripstocks.
Given its vast territory, much of it in the Amazonian
jungle, it is unsurprising that the Brazilians are investingheavily in point defense. This may be on the basis oflessons learned from observing the use of MANPADS
during the Ecuadorian–Peruvian war.
North Korea
North Korea has a lengthy involvement with the useof rocket and missile artillery. The most recent known
purchase of MANPADS was an extraordinarily large
shipment of Igla type (either SA-16 Gimlet or the moreadvanced SA-18 Grouse) in 2001 (though this transfer
does not appear in the UN Transfer Report). 3,000
missiles were apparently delivered, at what appears to
be far below market rates. The single source reporting
asserts that the missiles were bought at a cost of US$5,000 per missile with gripstock, and US $3,700 foreach additional missile. Assuming once again theratio of gripstocks to loads is about 1:4, the totalt­ ransaction was around US $12 million: a ­negligible sum
according to this single source (Isby, 2001). However,these prices are way below normal market prices forthese missiles, indicating either the political nature of
the transfer or a faulty source. A more realistic cost49

assessment ­(political ­considerations aside) would be
US $120 million at US $40,000 per missile.
North Korea’s first receipt of MANPADS consisted ofa transfer of an unknown number of Strela-2 missiles
and launchers from Egypt (Jane’s, 2011b). These werereverse engineered for local manufacture. In the­mid-1990s, North Korea received shipments of HN-5A
from the China, and later of Strela-3 and Igla-1 from
Russia. By then, Korea had managed to acquire anumber of FIM-9A Stingers from an unknown source. Allof these transferred missiles were later ­manufactured
in North Korea under license (except the Stingers).
Given the large purchase in 2001, it seems likelythat there were problems in quality or quantity in­manufacturing later acquisitions.
Transfers to North Korea of MANPADS represent a
problem in two significant ways. North Korea has
conducted pinpoint attacks on its rival, South Korea,
using a variety of means as a way of making politicalpoints. The presence of large numbers of MANPADS,

Box 2: Libyan MANPADS and the Sahel
The Libyan case illustrates two major issues. First,
the problem of identifying MANPADS flows innations that do not report on MANPADS transactions. Second, the risk of regime dissolution to
MANPADS stockpiles.
Many observers claim that the Libyan arsenal
comprised some 20,000 MANPADS, with types
ranging from Russian SA-7s through SA-24s(Chivers, 2011b). The authenticated transfers ofwhich we have evidence are:Table 9: Known transfers to Libya

A second problem is the issue of proliferation. North
Korea is on record as a point of origin for weapons transfers as well as dangerous technologies such as nuclear
power and ballistic missiles to states that are otherwise
limited in their access to such things. The state’s needfor scarce foreign exchange, its i­deological stanceand its isolation mean that it is possible that reverseengineered MANPADS would be sold to customers
without any checks or end-user agreements.
In summary, North Korea represents a black spot in
attempts to control MANPADS. It is neither amenable
to end-user controls, nor does it appear to adhere toexport controls. North Korea does not report its smallarms and light weapons (SALW) exports to the UN
Register on Conventional Arms. Proliferation to NSAGs
is possible.

3,500 missiles (without reference to gripstocks)
were transferred to Libya before 2011. Chivers(2011b) who assessed shipments in one storage
location in Libya saw shipping cases for Strela-2
variants from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Russia. He
estimated that the number stored at Ga’a basecould have totaled 5,270 missiles and an unknown
number of gripstocks. Ga’a base was the only
one examined by Chivers, but other bases may
also have contained similar numbers. There is noevidence, though it cannot be discounted, that
the Libyan government managed to find additional sources for more advanced MANPADS.
We would therefore estimate Libyan receipts at
between 10,000 and 20,000 missiles.

Type

OriginNumberDate

SourceComments

SA-24/Grinch/
Igla-S

Russia482

2006–2008

SIPRI, 2012

In Strelets vehicle-mounted
configuration

Strela-2M/A

Bulgaria

Unknown

Unknown

Jane’s, 2011eStrela-2/Grail/
SA-7

Russia1500

1982

Jane’s, 2011bStrela-2M/Grail/
SA-7b

Russia1500

1982

Jane’s, 2011d

Igla-S

Russia24

2004

Jane’s, 2012m

9K36 Strela-3/
Gremlin/SA-14

RussiaUnknown

2010

Jane’s, 2012n

TOTAL
50

and the closeness of ROK’s major airport to the border
between the two states means that MANPADS could
also be used in that role.

In Strelets vehicle-mounted
configuration

3506
Source: Adapted from Jane’s 2011–2012 and from SIPRI, 2012.

Stockpile
All SA-7s are supposedly around 30 years old,which suggests that at least some of them will haveexceeded their shelf-life. Unfortunately, there isvery little information on the SA-14s in Libya, but
articles about findings of SA-24 tubes are evident(Wedeman and Formanek, 2011; Malglaive, ND).
So far it seems the SA-24 was stocked in Libya
only in the Strelets version, a vehicle-mounted
twin launcher, and not the MANPADS version (cf.
Chivers, 2012)
Whatever security provisions had been in place
before the Libyan uprising, these all disappearedwith the uprising. There are several reports ofunguarded stocks that were easily accessible (e.g. Bouckaert 2011). MANPADS storageboxes were photographed by foreign journalists(Chivers, 2011b) and in several cases, MANPADS
were identified in the hands of Libyan insurgents(Chivers, 2011b). Some MANPADS appear to havebeen transferred across the borders (Stewart,2012) possibly for transfer to Al-Qaida in the
Maghreb (AQIM), to Hamas in Gaza, and possibly
to Syrian insurgents. By mid-2011, the dispersal ofan unknown but probably large portion of the
Libyan MANPADS stockpile was a fact. Militias in
Libya have been fighting over arms stockpiles
as late as June 2012, when two groups fought
over access to 22 containers of weaponry in Ad
Dafniyah (Basar, 2012, p. 1). One problem here
appears to be that the Libyan government, in its
weak state, still depends on militia groups to carryout security relevant tasks such as border patrols.
A resumption of state control will remain a challenge for Libya for quite some time (Basar, 2012,p. 2).
To add to the problem, the Gaddafi regime had
hired hundreds, if not thousands of mercenaries
from the Sahel region. After the fall of the regime
and the death of Gaddafi, many returned to theirhome countries, often taking weapons with them.
Many of these mercenaries were Tuaregs, with astrong grudge against the Malian government.
There are suspicions that among the weapons
they appropriated are an unknown quantity of
MANPADS (Stewart, 2012).
Where have all the MANPADS gone?
Since the NATO intervention in Libya was limited
to air-strikes, the weaponry outflow could not

be prevented by the international community.
Subsequently, it seems that some of the Gaddafi
regime’s MANPADS stock found its way to neighboring countries where it could contribute to afurther destabilization of the Sahel. According toa UN report on the situation in Libya, an increasein arms trade in West Africa was noticed after thefall of the Gaddafi regime (UN, 2012. p. 10).
The beneficiaries of the lootings, apart from thedealers themselves, are probably primarily NSAGs
in the region, such as the National Movement for
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in Mali, AQIM,
especially in Algeria and Mali, and the Nigeriabased militant organization Boko Haram (UN,2012).
The Tuareg fighters of the MNLA are supposedlyin possession of SA-7s as well as SA-24s (Batacchi,
2012; Stewart, 2012). However, neither have beenin evidence during the current civil war in Mali.
The MNLA is aiming for the independence of the
primarily Tuareg inhabited northern region of Mali,fighting with different intensity since as early as
the 1960s (Batacchi, 2012). According to a Malian
Army colonel, the “Tuareg rebels have [recently]
used heavier, more sophisticated weaponsand demonstrated improved military organization in their attacks” (Batacchi, 2012). MANPADS
from Libya may have also reached the Somali
al-Shabaab group (Batacchi, 2012) and Hamas in
the Gaza strip (e.g. Harel and Issacharoff, 2011).
There have been reports of Libyan MANPADS
being found in Egypt (Ahram, 2011; Ma’an, 2012),
but it is likely that Egypt is just a transit point for
Gaza or Lebanon, and possibly Syria.
Discussion
A number of issues emerge from the Libyan case.
There does not appear to be any clear enumeration of the Libyan MANPADS stockpile. Such
records as may have existed have likely been
destroyed. There is also some suspicion that the
Gaddafi regime did not itself know the extent of
its stockpiles. Most reports cite the number 20,000,
but judging by available records of transfers,
multiplied by a reasonable factor, the number isprobably lower, though still over 10,000.
Libya also represents a situation in which regime
dissolution endangers MANPADS stocks even had
they been adequately protected. Basically, oncea regime breaks down, Wassenaar or other agree-51

ments lose their validity (see Chapter 5). This is asobering concept, since unstable state regimes
are not rare, and many of those have MANPADS
in their stocks.
There is also a methodological question. Reports—some from highly reliable sources, others not—suggest that Libyan MANPADS have reached as
far south as Mali, west to Algeria, and north andeast to Egypt, the Sinai, Gaza, Lebanon, andperhaps Syria. However, there is no hard public
evidence (whatever clandestine sources exist).
This means it is difficult to claim that the dispersal(or the numbers dispersed) is as reported, or lessor more than that. Two telling items of evidence
are missing: photographs or authenticated observations of the presence of these missiles is one.
The other is valid evidence of use: so far, notwithstanding Israeli aerial attacks on Gaza, there
is only one publicly authenticated report of a
MANPADS shoot:  an attack against a helicopter
gunship in the Negev. One possible explanation isthat there has been little evidence of compatible
gripstocks being found with the missiles, resulting
in difficulties to fire the MANPADS (see Chapter 2).
The effects of even a small number of MANPADS
finding their way into Sahel countries could be
an ongoing problem. Mali, for instance, has a
handful of transport helicopters and two Hind
(Mi-25) gunships, all of which would be highly
vulnerable to MANPADS. And, as the example of
the French civilian airliner shot down in Chad in1978 shows, MANPADS would constitute a major

Ecuador
Following the successful deployment of MANPADS byspecial forces during the Cenepa War (1995) against
Peru, the Ecuadorians have added purchases of
MANPADS.
Ecuador’s initial purchase of MANPADS was a ­shipmentof 240 Blowpipe missiles from the United Kingdom.
Alongside an unknown number of SA-7 Strelas, thesewere used in the Cenepa war. It is ­uncertain to what
effect, since different sources provide ­contradictory
reports, but the Ecuadorians claimed success. The
transfer of the Strelas has not been recorded publicly.
For political, economic and military reasons, theEcuadorians have since purchased only Russian andRussian-derived missiles. In 1994, the Ecuadorians
52

threat to the region’s civilian air traffic. However,no MANPADS have been fired at French jets orhelicopters during the January 2013 offensive.
This could mean a number of things: inability tooperate the missiles, technical problems or adesire by the NSAGs to retain these weapons foran extended guerilla war.
Conclusion
Conclusions about the Libyan MANPADS stockpile
are necessarily tentative. What can be said (andmay need to be modified by further study) is:• Libya had a stockpile of SA-7 and SA-14
MANPADS of around 10 to 20,000 missiles.
• The SA-24 systems were almost certainly in a­self-propelled configuration, not MANPADS.
• While the numbers of MANPADS that weret­ ransferred at the end of the Gaddafi regime(by fleeing loyalists, arms buyers, or returning
mercenaries) is probably not large, theseweapons do constitute a game change in the
Sahel. Neither Mali, Chad, nor Niger (the area
most likely for the relocation of the weapons)have large or effective air forces. As a consequence, even a few MANPADS in the hands ofdedicated and tactically minded rebels would
pose an unacceptable hazard.
• If the Libyan MANPADS get transferred evenfurther to Gaza, or to terrorists in Western­countries, the dangers for civil aviation would
rise significantly, due to the comparatively
heavier traffic (see Chapter 1).
Marc Köslingpurchased 72 HN-5A missiles from China, including
30 launchers (SIPRI, 2012). In 1998, 222 SA-16 Gimlets
were purchased from Russia. 50 SA-18 Grouse
were purchased from the same exporter in 2008/09(Cooper, 2003; Herz, 2002).
The Ecuadorian purchases represent a case wherea national military compensates for perceived­weaknesses (the Peruvian air force was considered
one of the more formidable in the Andes region at
the time) in air assets by deploying ground-based
anti-aircraft. In-and-of-itself this does not represent a
negative trend and cannot be considered i­ndicativeof greater threat of proliferation. Ecuador claims tohave a good record of SALW stockpile control, though
this claim is unverified (Comando Conjunto De Las
FF.AA., 2007)

Peru
The conclusion of the Cenepa War (1995) between
Peru and Ecuador in which the Ecuadorians claimed
a number of hits by MANPADS highlighted to the
Peruvian military the importance of this weapon,­
notably against slow-moving attack aircraft andhelicopters. As a consequence, Peru has been­
importing MANPADS at a rapid pace.
By 1996, the government of Peru had completed
a deal with Bulgaria for the purchase of 417 Igla-1/
SA-16 Gimlets, including 56 launchers (SIPRI, 2012;
Karp, 2009). In 2009, two additional deals were madewith the China National Precision Machinery Importand Export Corporation (CNPMIEC) for purchase of
15 FN-6 missiles for the Peruvian Navy (total value US$1.1 million), and an additional 18 QW-18 missiles for
the Peruvian 1st special Forces Brigade (value US $1.4
million) (SIPRI, 2012).
As in the case of Ecuador (and perhaps some other
South American countries) the Cenepa War triggered
an awareness of the possibilities of MANPADS that had
been less significant before. Given the limited aerial
assets of the combatants, the use of light groundforces armed with MANPADS near and behind enemy
lines in jungle terrain brought about an increase inrequests for imports.
Syria
Due to its inferiority in fielding aircraft against its­principle opponents (Israel and Turkey) and following
Soviet/Russian doctrine, the Syrian military has­consistently strengthened its anti-aircraft assets at alllevels, including both heavy (SA-2, -3, -5), and medium(SA-8) AA missiles, and lighter MANPADS. Most of thesewere acquired from Russian block countries, withpossible later imports from Iran.

Box 3: Syrian MANPADS in the Civil War
Stockpile
Syria has been importing MANPADS since thefirst shipment in 1974. Since then, more modern,as well as older models have been acquired toan estimated over 8,000 items. In 2011, Russia
agreed to supply Syria with Igla-S/SA-24 missiles in
the mounted “Strelets” configuration. The recent
shipment of self-propelled Strelets systems (whichuses Igla-S missiles and containers) is claimed by

Syrian MANPADS acquisitions (of Strela-2) started soonafter the 1973 war with Israel. In 2003, Syria imported
300 Igla/SA-18 Grouse from Belarus. Given the needsof the Syrian military, it is reasonable to suppose thatsome older stocks of e.g. Strela-2 (SA-7) would havebeen transferred to clients down the line, e.g. NSAGs
in Lebanon. In 2005/06 Russia transferred 200 SA-18s to
Syria, albeit in the mounted form (SIPRI, 2012). ­Transfers
may also have occurred from allies, ­specifically Iran,though these are not recorded in any of the open
sources surveyed. One unsourced estimate puts
Syrian imports at 30,000 units.
There is no evidence, for or against, that these imports
were accompanied by a robust end-user ­agreement.
Evidence from other purchases (e.g. Pantsyr-1
mobile anti-aircraft system) purchased by Syria is thatsamples were transferred to Iran. The same is possible
in the case of the SA-18 purchases. The possibility ofintentional transfers pales by comparison with the­potential for stock dissolution under conditions of civil
war, currently in process in Syria.
The total numbers of MANPADS in Syria’s arsenals is
assessed by us and others at more than 8,000 items(Nerguizian and Cordesman, 2011, p. 4), including
both ground and air force inventories. These are mainly
obsolescent SA-7 with 100 SA-14 and some SA-18s.
One source indicates that SA-16 are also present(UPI, 2003) without providing numbers or source. An
estimate of the Syrian order of battle (OOB) supports
this contention with the ground forces requiring slightly
over 4,000 missiles and slightly over 1,000 gripstocks.
The rest would be under air force control. For a morein-depth discussion of the situation brought about by
the Syrian civil war, refer to the Box 3: “Syrian MANPADS
in the Civil War”.

Russian sources to be unusable in the MANPADS
configuration. However, should a user acquire acompatible gripstock (which was not supplied by
the Russians) it is conceivable that the Igla-S could
be used in a MANPADS configuration.
The Syrian Army and Air Force have MANPADS in
regular use. The Army assigns MANPADS down tofairly low levels, notably for protecting assets suchas artillery battalions, which means the weapons
are relatively easily accessible. MANPADS have53

been stored in the stockpiles of air-defense units
as well: the Air Force is considered more loyal
and steadfast to the regime than the land forces,
which are composed largely of conscripts.
There have been reports that the Syrian government has transferred MANPADS to Hezbollah
perhaps largely for the protection of the group’s
rocket assets notably those stored in the Bekaa
Valley.

with great force. Public demonstrations in 2011,
largely about domestic issues, led to reprisals andgrowing violence. As the opposition to Assad’s rulebecame more violent in early 2012, demonstrations turned to armed confrontations. At the time,
Syrian rebels in what has become a full-fledged
civil war lacked major weapon systems. Examination of pictures and films shows use of a hodgepodge of weapons from shotguns and pistols toAustrian Steyr rifles, and even giant slingshots.

The Syrian civil war: An ongoing story
The Assad family, father and son, have beenin power in Syria since 1975. Opposition to theregime has been fragmented and intermittent,
and when it became threatening, was suppressed

As the civil war accelerated, the Syrian Armed
Forces became less discriminate in their use of
weapons. Helicopters, both M-25 gunships andarmed Mi-8 helicopter transports were used torocket and bomb insurgent positions. Jet trainers

Table 8: Progress of MANPADS–use in Syrian conflict

54

No.

Event

Date

URL

Date accessed/downloaded

1

Syrian rebels claim
military Mig 23
Fighter shot down
(weapon unknown)

13 August 2012

http://www.youtube.com/watch
12 September?v=FX5qH4GvgQE&feature=related 20122

Syrian rebels down
Fighter Jet in Idlib
province

30 August 2012

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v 12 September=KcKXJJsqmW0&feature=related
2012

3

Complete SA-7 withgripstock shown

30 August 2012

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EaaftfI8Qec&feature=player_
detailpage

17 December
2012

4

FSA SA-7 shown

1 September 2012

http://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=r8nObAcIWGE&feature=player_detailpage

26 November
2012

5

2 Videos:
1. SA-7 Two-man
team apparently
with complete
system
2. Apparent attack
and miss

14 October 2012
- Date on original
YouTube videos(Blog piece dated
15 October)

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/10/15/heat-seeking-missilesin-syria-the-sa-7-in-action-withrebels/

2 November
20126

Picture of complete
SA-24 System at
Babla Base

13 November 2012

http://brown-moses.blogspot.
co.uk/2012/11/new-type-ofshoulder-mounted-surface-to.html

17 December
20127

SA-24 without gripstock shown

15 November 2012

http://syrianarmyfree.com/vb/
showthread.php?p=186692
http://brown-moses.blogspot.
de/2012_11_01_archive.html
http://newsmotion.org/tags/
manpads

17 December
2012

8

Complete SA-24
Systems with gripstocks in crates(possibly training)

16 November 2012

http://www.youtube.com/
watch?feature=player_
embedded&v=vuED7JCz3mU

17 December
20129

SA-16 in crates(comment in folder:46 reg. outside
Halab)[2 videos of thesame event]

18 November 2012(video released on
19 November)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=9EsJWLiONd8&feature=player_
embedded

17 December
2012

10

FSA Training on SA-7

20 November 2012

http://www.youtube.com/watch?
feature=player_embedded&v=ItILHFTON6o

26 November
2012

11

Fired SA-7

ND

http://www.youtube.com/watch?
feature=embedded&v=R0NEq
0iTtzY (No longer available)

ND recorded

12Mi-8 shoot down inSheikh Suleiman

27 November 2012

http://www.youtube.com/
watch?feature=player_
detailpage&v=YaNvcJGRkf0

17 December
2012

13

SA-7 in Al-Tawhid

29 November 2012

http://cjchivers.com/
post/37448078406/the-lions-ofal-tawhid-revisited-earlier-this17 December
2012

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=spiD0PASzzI&feature=player_
embedded(Aero L39 of Czech manufacture) have been
filmed in the ground attack role, as have ancientMig-21s and more modern Mig 24 ground attack
craft. The rebel response has been to use 23, 14.5,
and 12.7 machine guns mounted on ‘technicals’
to provide AA fire. Some Syrian air assets havebeen shot down by such means.
The progress of MANPADS–use by Syrian rebels
While the Syrian rebels had some successes usingguns in the anti-aircraft role, shooting down helicopters and even fighter planes, the regime’s Air
Force essentially controlled the skies. By 31 July
2012, there were reports that outside interests (theoriginal story from NBC did not give its sources) had
supplied the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with unidentified MANPADS, which were variously reported as
Stingers, though no supporting evidence emerged(Reuters, 31 July 2012). However, as the fighting
progressed, films and photographs posted on the
web began to show growing evidence of accessto MANPADS all, apparently, from Syrian militarystockpiles. The progression as we saw it moved

from fighters flourishing empty MANPADS tubes,
through tubes without, then with gripstocks, to fullsystems, actual use, and even training films by arebel MANPADS professional.
Crucially, what Table 8 shows is the gradualprogress over a period of eleven months fromalmost helplessness in the face of regime aerial
attacks, to the ­destruction of warplanes. It delineates the importance of MANPADS as a weapon
for small forces. Yet most significantly from thisbrief’s perspective, the gradual penetration of
MANPADS into the battlefield in Syria demonstrates, as perhaps no other case does, that ultimately MANPADS, however well secured, are at
risk of dispersal from official hands, notably whena regime weakens.
Prognosis
For a period, the Syrian Army and Air Force seemto have successfully protected their MANPADS
assets. There did not appear to be a wholesaleleakage of these weapons into insurgent hands.

55

However, as time went by, and Syria’s military
proved less than capable of protecting its own
assets, MANPADS, including more advanced Igla-1
and Igla-S have fallen in some quantity into rebel
hands, notably when Syrian Army bases havebeen overrun and weapon stockpiles captured.
Insofar as can be seen from visual evidence on
the web, Igla-S have not been shown in action,but Strela 2 and Igla-1 appear to be full systems,
and one of those seems to have been usedsuccessfully. It can be assumed that over the next
few months, if hostilities continue, the rebels willlearn how to use the MANPADS, and the numbersof shoot-downs of regime aircraft will increase.
The ransacking of regime armories was a featureof the rebellion in Libya. In Syria, as in Libya, an
important issue from this brief’s perspective has to
do with the effects of the political results of thewar on the MANPADS picture. Several different
scenarios have been posited for the outcome of
the civil war in Syria. Roughly, they can be divided
into government victory and retention of Assadand Ba’ath power; rebel victory and regimechange; and a stalemate in which the Assadand Alawite monopoly of force is broken, no
clear winner emerges, and internal forces—Kurds,
Sunnis, Salafis, Alawites, Druze—control different
cantons of the country.
Should the Assad regime maintain its power, it islikely that they will need to engage in a serious
program of collecting the missing MANPADS,
which otherwise will remain a threat to local
civilian and military aircraft. An outright rebel
victory would present the same problem, which,given the fractured nature of the Syrian o­ pposition,
would be no easy task, and a “Libyan” result (aformal government supported, and sometimes
opposed, by armed militias) could well emerge.
Finally, there is the problem of cantonization (cf.
Karon, 2012). If Syrian MANPADS stockpiles are
randomly ransacked by opposition NSAGs who
have their own interests to protect, the danger
that Syria’s MANPADS stockpile (which before
the conflict stood at over 8,000) would disperse
to numerous NSAGs in these cantons is great. In
this case, Kurdish groups such as the PKK as well
as home-grown Syrian Kurds, Palestinians, Alawite
and Sunni provincial powers, and NSAGs in
Lebanon could acquire these weapons, whether
as tradeable resources, for their own use in self-

56

defense, or for attacking civilian targets in actsof terrorism. Given the relatively better stockpile­conditions in Syria (compared to Libya), as wellas the better ­organization and military skills of
local and ­neighboring NSAGs, it is likely that sucha scenario would constitute a serious threat, as‘excess’ MANPADS, and cooperation between
such groups cause percolation of the weapons
throughout the Middle East.
Lebanon is already fractured badly. It is likelythat MANPADS would fall not only into the handsof Hezbollah, a Shi’ite organization, but also into
the hands of opponents in the Christian, Sunni,
and Druze camps. Lacking the support of Syria,
Hezbollah could be tempted to arm itself against
attacks by internal and external foes (e.g. Israel)and increase its arsenal. Notably, they would beinterested in better protection for their rocket
assets, which to date are exposed to Israeli air
attacks.
A massive transfer of MANPADS to the handsof NSAGs may well trigger preemptive strikes
by regional powers (e.g. Turkey against potential Kurdish zones, and Israel against Hezbollah­shipments) with serious local consequences.
Conclusion
At the time of writing, the Syrian saga was in themaking. Both rebels and the regime in Syria are
still fighting. Still, some tentative conclusions canbe made:• The increased use of air assets by the Syrian
Armed Forces is likely to mean that the FSA(and their supporters) will be highly motivatedto acquire MANPADS to defend the revolution
and civilian population under their control.
• We are beginning to see the use of MANPADS
as a form of successful defense against aerial
attack: at least one shootdown, and increasinguse of flares by Syrian attack craft.
• The government has not succeeded in its efforts
to ensure that MANPADS (along with others­ ignificant weapons) do not fall into rebel hands.
• What appears to be successful (thoughevidence is inconclusive) is the separation ofgripstocks from MANPADS rounds, which may
have been one cause for the limited use of
MANPADS so far, and their slow introduction into
the battlefield.

• A radical change in the situation in favor of therebels will expose the MANPADS stockpile tovolatile changes, and possibly to ­untraceable
dispersal throughout the Levant. This would

Venezuela
The purchase of MANPADS by Venezuela should not
be seen in isolation. The Venezuelan armed forces
are in the process of building a multi-layered air
defense system to compensate for their ­weaknessin aircraft. Negotiations and some purchases havebeen made for high-altitude, medium-altitude,
and low-­
altitude missile batteries. The purchase of
MANPADS to protect the major surface-to-air missile(SAM) assets is part of this process. Venezuelan moral,
and clandestine military and economic support to
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
rebels in ­neighboring Colombia, have ­escalated
tensions between the two Latin American neighbors.
Strong support from the United States for Colombia
has meant that the balance of air power is largely
in Colombia’s favor. As a result, Venezuela hasrecently (2010–11) invested heavily in the acquisitionof ­anti-aircraft assets, including one of the largest
MANPADS ­shipments in history.
Transfers to Venezuela have included three sources.
The Venezuelan Army acquired a limited number of
RBS-70 missiles and systems from Sweden. The systems
included four Giraffe radars, each of which canhandle six firing posts, so it is conceivable that the
total delivery of missiles was around 50 units at most,sufficient to equip one air defense group. Some of
the missiles were replaced in 1999 by a limited orderfor the Mark II missile. A number of Mistral missiles, in
the ATLAS configuration, were supplied by France
at the same time (Jane’s, 2011g). These are vehicle
mounted rather than MANPADS systems. Venezuela
then acquired an unknown number of 9K38, Igla/
SA-18 ‘Grouse’ systems from Russia (Jane’s 2012c).

Box 4: The Mombasa attacks and the Yemeniarms market
In 2010, an Israeli Arkia passenger airliner took offfrom Mombasa airport to Tel Aviv. Two Strela/SA-7
MANPADS were fired at the airliner as it took off.
Both missiles missed. The airliner continued on its
way and landed safely in Tel Aviv.

have unforeseen consequences regarding thebalance with Israel, with Turkey, and possibly
within Lebanon.

In 2009, Venezuela received a shipment of 2,400
missiles from the Russian company KBM. Many ofthese, perhaps all, are SA-24 Grinch (Igla-S), thenewest MANPADS in the Russian arsenal, ­comparable
to the latest US Stinger. While the UN Register of Arms
records only 1,800 delivered, and does not specify
type (UNODA, 2012), other sources indicate the muchhigher number (McMichael, 2010). Several films havesince appeared (Arcesolo, 2009; ­Venezueladefensa,
2011) showing the missiles and their launchers onparade, and claiming the existence of a full brigade’s
worth of the weapons (Arcesolo, 2009). If the­Venezuelans follow Russian doctrine, that will meanat least 214 operative launchers with three reloads
each, or possibly double the amount of launcherswith fewer reloads.
Another film shows MANPADS storage (Venezuela­
defensa, 2011) which on the face of it indicatesthat these weapons are properly securitized andsafe (though for a contrary view see Clinton, 2009a).
­Venezuela has not recorded any losses of theweapons. Even though the Venezuelan ­government
has actively supported FARC rebels, supplying ammunition, funds, and occasional weapons, it seems
unlikely that they would go so far as to officially transfer
these newest weapons to FARC, at least in the shortterm. Concern has been expressed by US sourcesthat corruption in the Venezuelan military is likely tofacilitate the transfer of MANPADS to FARC, which ison record as demanding these weapons from its allies(Clinton 2009a and see the Peruvian case). Largetransfers, however, are always dubious and should
be examined with care. In this case, it appears that
the Venezuelan demand comes about as a result ofColombia’s (their main potential ­opponent) superiority

Of interest to us here is the path the missiles took to
Kenya. Both missiles were part of a shipment soldby Ukraine to Yemen in a normal government-togovernment transaction, which included an enduser certificate. While in Yemeni official stockpiles,
the missiles were diverted (by theft or through aninside job) and disappeared from the inventory.
They were apparently identified in one of Yemen’s

57many weapons markets and were purchased byan arms trader who shipped them to Mogadishu,
where they were offered openly for sale. From
Somalia, they were smuggled into Kenya, where
they were used in the attack.
Partly as result of the attack, the United States andthe Yemeni authorities engaged in a program
to sop up available MANPADS that were being
offered for sale in Yemen’s (semi-legal) weapons
markets. A report by the US State Department
concluded that most of the freely available
MANPADS had been bought and then destroyed.
Remaining stocks in private hands were in thehands of tribal leaders or Islamic groups who
would not give up these weapons under any
circumstances (Krajefsky, 2004; Seche, 2009)
SummaryThis brief anecdote illustrates a number of issues:• Unless accompanied by physical on-site inspection, end-user certificates are not robust enoughto stop diversion, particularly of single items suchas MANPADS.
• The missiles in questions were transported at least
twice across national borders. In the absence ofin air assets and training. This does mean, however,that as the Venezuelans’ air force reach parity with
­Colombia’s we may see a growing risk of transfer of
MANPADS, notably of the older versions, even if the
Venezuelan system is not as riddled with corruption
as the United States suggests. The Venezuelan casehighlights the point that a regime that may be seen as
reliable and well-disposed towards an exporter (in thiscase Sweden and France) at one point, can easily
switch fronts in the long or even mid-term.

Originator picture
In this section, we approach the transfer picturefrom the perspective of the suppliers and countriesof origin. Very few originators have been completelytransparent about their sales or transfers. Some of the
manufacturing states such as Bulgaria and Romania,
which had been Soviet dependencies in the past, nolonger manufacture or export MANPADS. Others suchas the Ukraine are destroying or selling off Soviet-era
surpluses. The China, Russia, Sweden, and France arestill the major source countries for MANPADS.

58

robust border controls, MANPADS are relatively
easily moved about through porous borders.
• Notwithstanding many predictions (e.g. ICAO,
2007) the hit on the Arkia airline does not appear tohave had a major impact on the airline ­business.
While an Arkia spokesperson declined to provide
relevant information, there is no evidence of any
sharp, continuous drop in passenger flights to
Mombasa or similar ­destinations. However, tourist
revenue in Kenya dropped sharply for a brief
period before rising again.
• On-ground security, and particularly intelligence, could have contributed to stopping thetransfer of MANPADS across borders, and theactual attack.
• Any system to stop illicit MANPADS transfers must
involve all the potential links in the chain. In
this case, reining in the free trade in MANPADS
in Yemeni markets probably contributed togreater security. Certainly the free availabilityof MANPADS in Yemen’s freewheeling weapons
emporia was a causal factor assisting in the
Mombasa attack.
Mike Ashkenazi

Bulgaria
Bulgaria’s manufacture of MANPADS was part ofits strong relationship with the Soviet Union. Bothcooperation and manufacture of MANPADS by the
Bulgarian manufacturer Vazovski Machinostroitelni
Zavodi (VZM) ceased with the breakup of the Soviet
Union. However, until the breakup, three MANPADS
types were manufactured in Bulgaria and transferredabroad:Strela-2M: Manufactured under license by VZM(Jane’s, 2011d), an undisclosed number of these
MANPADS may have been transferred to Libya, sincesome old storage boxes (similar to the Russian ones,
since the missile is identical) were found in Libya after
the revolution (Chivers, 2011b). There is no evidenceof numbers or condition.
Strela-3: VZM produced the Strela-3/9M36 (the 9M36-1
is the export variant)/SA-14 Gremlin under license(Jane’s, 2012n). Insofar as is known, none were transferred or exported from Bulgaria in any form.

Igla-1E: The Igla -E was a license-produced version of
the Igla (SA-16 Gimlet) produced by VZM in Bulgaria.
It was sold to a number of states and possibly to
one NSAG (Hamas in Gaza). Production was limited
and VZM ceased production of all MANPADS about
a decade ago, though missiles are still sold from
Bulgarian Army stocks (Jane’s, 2012t).
Table 10: Igla-1E transfers
Recipient

NumberDate

Afghanistan?

?

Ecuador

20?

Gaza & West
Bank

?

2005

Hungary?

1999

South Korea

?

?

Peru

56
launchers

1994

Peru

190 missiles

1994

Peru

21

1995

Comments

Later variants are based on indigenous technologies.
Like the Soviet Union before it, China has exported
systems as well as licensing production to allies. Its
newest systems are as yet unavailable abroad, but if
China follows its previous pattern, the newer MANPADS
models will also become available on the market.
HN-5A/B: The HN-5 is an improved version of the RussianStrela-2. It was accepted into PLA (People’s Liberation Army) service in about 1991. The technology wastransferred to Pakistan for indigenous development of
the Anza Mk I MANPADS.
Table 11: HN-5A/B transfers

RumoredRecipientAfghanistan
Albania
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Cambodia“Systems”, so
presumably
gripstocks withmissiles.

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012t. Peruvian transfer
detailed in UN Arms Register.

Iran

Number

Year

400

1982

100

1978

2,050

1991–92

28

1985

1,000

1982

500

1986–88

Myanmar200

1990–92

North Korea

600

1983–94

Pakistan

1,100

1987–98

Thailand

1,150

1987–88

TOTAL

7,128

Summary: Bulgarian MANPADS transfers

Source: Adapted from Jane’s (2011i).

Bulgaria was never a major player in the MANPADStransfer world. However, during the period of close
relationship with the Soviet Union, it may have served
as a conduit for transfer where the Soviet Union did
not wish to appear as principal, or for its own reasons.
As a Soviet satellite, it also manufactured and sold its
own versions of Soviet originals, an activity that waswound down with the state’s shift to a Western orientation. There is evidence for transfers to Libya of earlyStrela-2 MANPADS, possibly via Libya to the Hamas in
Gaza (Chivers, 2011b). The transfer to Peru is the single
largest Bulgarian transfer, as Peru developed a shortterm romance with the Soviet bloc.

As can be seen from Table 11, customers for the HN-5
series include clients, allies, and others such as ­Thailand
with no particular attachment to the Chinese sphere.
In addition to systems, China exported knowledge
openly to Pakistan, and perhaps clandestinely to Iranto counterbalance the US interest in those countries.

China16
China’s first MANPADS were licensed and unlicensed
copies of Russian originals. However, China has beendeveloping two parallel series of MANPADS, manyof which are offered for export. Early variants were
copies of weapons from Russia and the United States.
16

QW-(1,2,3,4,11,18): The original QW-1 is a secondgeneration MANPADS and may be partly based on
the FM92 Stinger. It is similar to the original Stinger in
its performance and many attributes. 1,350 weretransferred to Pakistan in 2008 and the Anza Mk II isbased on this MANPADS (Janes, 2012b). Some units
may have been transferred to Hezbollah in Lebanon
as technical samples (Janes, 2012b), though there isno concrete evidence for that.
The QW-2 is a further development of the QW-1 andsimilar in performance to the Igla series (Janes, 2012o).
In addition to the PLA, Bangladesh received a shipment of 250 missiles in 2007.

In this brief, China is used to refer to the territory excluding Taiwan.

59

The QW-3 is a low and ultra-low targeting variant of
the QW series. In addition to passive IR, it may also
use a laser-guided mode. The QW-3 is in service with
the PLA, and has been transferred to Indonesia, which
acquired 210 units between 2006 and 2008.

MANPADS in all. What is more worrisome is the willingness of China to transfer technology to regimes thatare known to have no reluctance to transfer missiles
to NSAGs, as well as to transfer technical samples
directly to NSAGs.

The QW-4 has entered PLA service and insofar as is
known has not been transferred to any other user
than the PLA. QW-11 and 18 are in development, andexamples have been shown at Chinese trade fairs.
Insofar as is known, no transfers have occurred forthese models.

Egypt

Table 12: QW transfers
Recipient

NumberYear

Bangladesh       250

Hezbollah?

?

Indonesia       210

2006-08

Pakistan

    1,250

2008

TOTAL

1,710+

Notes

2007
?

Unverified

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012a, b, o, p, q, r.

FN-6: The FN-6 is an all-aspects MANPADS intended foruse against cruise missiles and other low-flying targets.
Apart from the basic MANPADS version, there are anumber of variations. It is not clear whether the FN-6
version exported was the MANPADS version or its selfpropelled multi-missiles mount variant.
Table 13: FN-6 transfers
Recipient

NumberYear

Cambodia?

2009

Malaysia

16

2010

Pakistan

?

2010

Peru

25

2009

Sudan

10

2010

TOTAL

51+

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2011f

A more advanced version of the FN-6 labeled FN-16(designated HY-6 within the PLA) has been reported
to be in service with the PLA. There is unconfirmed
information that systems have been transferred to
Malaysia, Cambodia, Sudan and Peru.

The Strela-2 was used by the Egyptians successfully
during the Yom Kippur war, and after the war the‘Ayn-al-Sakr’ MANPADS was produced indigenously
by reverse engineering the Strela-2. The missile has
been in service with the Egyptian Army since 1985.
Small numbers were exported to Kuwait (36 systems in1987) and Oman (unknown number, unknown date.
Jane’s, 2011h). It is also possible that small numbers
have been transferred clandestinely to Hamas andthe Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Gaza
and/or the West Bank.
Egypt also transferred an unknown number of Strela-2
to North Korea and Pakistan as technical samples
to stimulate their indigenous MANPADS development programs. Officially, at least, the Soviets had noknowledge of these transfers.
FranceThe French indigenously developed Mistral and
Mistral II MANPADS are one of the more successful
export MANPADS and have been exported to 23
countries (Janes, 2011g).
Mistral: The Mistral is a tripod mounted weapon whichmakes it less flexible and probably less attractive to
NSAGs. On the other hand, its robust construction
and very reliable dual-channel IR seeker provide arobust military battlefield solution. Entering service in
1990, the Mistral, in addition to the French military, wastransferred to several other countries (see Table 14).
Table 14: Mistral 1 transfers
Recipient

60

Year

Notes

Austria500?

Belgium

714

1995

+118
launchers

Brazil

290

1994

ATLAS

320

1997

160

1997

88

1999/2006

Conclusions: Chinese MANPADS transfers
The total number of MANPADS transferred by China
is not high when compared to the United States andRussia. China may have transferred around 10,000

Number17

Brunei17

A naval multi-launcher version of Mistral.

SIMBAD17

Chilewho now owned the Mistral production line, sought
co-production with manufacturers in new markets,heavily emphasizing the self-propelled and mounted
versions of the Mistral 2. The Mistral 2 has been sold tofour countries, often in the mounted version (ATLAS or
ALBI).

750

1997

?

?

Cyprus290

2005

Ecuador100

1998

Estonia?

2009

Finland

540

1989

Table 15: Mistral 2 transfers

Gabon

60

1988

Recipient

NumberYear

Hungary

180

1999

Estonia

100

2008

India

20

?

Indonesia?

2006

Indonesia

?

2006

Italy

?

?

Jordan

?

?

200

2008

Kenya

100

1992

Saudi
ArabiaMalaysia

?

?

UAE

?

?

New
Zealand

39

1998

TOTAL

300+

Norway

400

1997

Oman

230

?

Pakistan

50+

2010

Qatar

500

1996

Romania

?

?

Saudi
Arabia

1

2009

500

1996

South
Korea

?

?

Spain

200

2008

Taiwan?

?

Thailand

36

1997

UAE

524

1994

?

?

Colombia

Singapore

Venezuela
TOTAL

ALBI

Notes
ATLAS
on localvehicleSource: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012s.

Summary and conclusions: French MANPADS transfers
ALBI

ATLAS

7,591+Overall, France, one of the countries that is not only
a signatory of the Wassenaar Arrangement but
also lives up to its responsibilities that come with it, isconservative and careful with its missile exports. Questions however remain, as for instance, with the transfer
to Venezuela, which is suspect of complicity in transfer
to FARC NSAG.
It should also be noted that, while France has nevermade any official technical transfer to other states of
MANPADS technology, at least two missile systems are
partially based on the Mistral: the guidance system for
the Korean Singung and the Chinese FN-6 MANPADS
may have benefited from reverse engineering the
Mistral.
Germany

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2011g.

It should be noted that the Mistral has a number ofversions. The ATLAS and ALBI versions are self-propelledrather than man portable air defense systems. Thesesystems consist of multi-missile launchers and targetacquisition systems mounted on a vehicle. A naval
multi-launcher version called SIMBAD has also been
exported to a number of nations.
Mistral 2: The Mistral 2 entered service in 2000, andproduction of the original Mistral ceased at that time.
In the economic climate during the following decade,Matra BAe Dynamics Alenia Marconi Systems (MBDA),

Germany’s first production of a modern MANPADS
has been the joint production (with Greece, theNetherlands, and Turkey) of a version of the US FIM92
Stinger intended for their own use but made available to NATO as well. This weapon is not available forexport outside NATO. However, while not recorded
as a transfer, West Germany apparently received anumber of Redeye MANPADS from the United States.
In 1993/94, 300 of these were transferred to Turkey aspart of an aid package (Sipri, 2012). This has been
the largest transfer from Germany recorded publicly.
A few individual units of RBS-70 were also transferred
to Finland by agreement with Sweden, perhaps as61samples for evaluation. With that one exception,
Germany has not been a major exporter of MANPADS.
Iran
Iran’s first home-manufactured MANPADS were
copies of Russian and Chinese technologies provided
by sympathetic countries such as the China. On
those bases, Iran, which has a self-reliance ideology
in weapons production, has developed its own
MANPADS versions. The Misagh-1 was based largely
on 2nd generation QW-1. The weapon is no longer
in production. Aside from the Iranians, reports claimthat the weapons have probably been supplied to
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to Iraqi insurgent groups.
The Misagh-2 is based upon the Chinese QW-2 andsimilar in performance and components to the early
Igla series.
Iran has been deeply implicated in the transfer of
MANPADS to NSAGS, notably to Hezbollah in Lebanon(Schroeder, 2012) and to Shi’a insurgents in Iraq (Rice,2008). Some of the transfers have been of Chinese
weapons (Rice, 2008), which indicates that Iran does
not adhere to its end-user commitments, or that they
were supplied without one.
North Korea
In 1978 or thereabouts, North Korea started fielding adomestically produced copy of the Strela-2 supplied
for the purpose by Egypt. The missile termed Hwasung
Chong was used operationally to shoot down amisguided US helicopter that had crossed the demilitarized zone (DMZ) (Burdick, 2010, p. 270). The cloningof the Strela-2 was followed by licensed productionof Strela-3 (SA-14) and later of Igla-1 (SA-16). Reverse
engineering was carried out on Stingers that reached
North Korea, and locally manufactured variants arein use with the North Korean Army (see Stimmekoreas,2012). It has been suggested that clones of the SA-14
and SA-16 have been exported to Cuba, though little
is known of this transfer (Janes’s, 2012u).

PolandPoland produces two indigenous MANPADS, Grom-1,
heavily based on the Russian Igla-1/SA-16 Gimlet,and Grom-2 which is a native Polish development.
The Grom has been exported to the following two­countries:
Conclusion: Polish MANPADS transfers
The Polish case illustrates two issues that should always
be kept in mind. First, any moderately ­industrializedstate would be able to retroactively engineer a
MANPADS once it has had time to analyze one.
Second, transfers to other nations almost always
involve the risk of these weapons falling into otherhands. In the Grom case, poor security and highcorruption within Georgia, on the one hand, andeither battlefield losses or defecting soldiers on theother have brought MANPADS into the possession of
irredentist NSAGs.
Soviet Union (to 1991)/ Russia (1991 onwards)
Soon after the emergence of the Redeye in the UnitedStates, the Soviets developed the 9K32 Strela-2/SA-7
Grail, which entered service in 1968. Like the Redeye,
this was a first generation MANPADS. Soviet MANPADS
have since been constantly upgraded, with a new
family, the ‘Igla’ series emerging in 1981. All of these
versions have been made available to export, andmany have been used successfully in combat. Some
Russian MANPADS missile exports are in mounted
form, such as the Strelets configuration of missile tubes
mounted on an armored carrier. The Russians argue
that this form of self-propelled air defense system(SPADS) mounted on a vehicle is qualitatively different
from the MANPADS configuration of the same system,and that SPADS cannot be converted to MANPADS
form. A couple of experts interviewed for this brief,
as well as our own analysis suggest that this is not
the case. If an appropriate gripstock is available, amissile intended for a Strelets system can be used asa MANPADS.

Table 16: Grom transfers
Recipient

NumberDate

Georgia100

2007/ Two Grom MANPADS were found by Russian forces in Chechnya, identified by2008 part number and writing as part of the Georgian shipment. A further two were
captured by ­Ossetian forces during the Georgian–Russian conflictIndonesia

2 systems 2010

62

Comments

Both systems mounted on Zubr attack craft, so most likely not in the MANPADS
configuration.

9K32 Strela-2/SA-7a/b Grail: The Strela-2 was exported
in huge numbers to Soviet allies and clients during
the Cold War and the period of independence andliberation wars in the second half of the t­wentieth­century. Table 17 summarizes those transfers. In­addition, the weapons were transferred to other clientsfor whom no numbers or dates are available, so thetotal in the table is well below actual transfer numbers.
Table 17: Strela 2 transfers
Comments

Georgia

Unknown

Germany(GDR)

Unknown

Ghana

Unknown

GuineaUnknown

GuineaBissau

5

GuyanaUnknown

Hungary

Unknown

Recipient

NumberDate

Afghanistan

Unknown

1972

India

500
Unknown

Unknown

Algeria

1,000

1975/1976

Iran

Angola

1,000

1981

Iraq

Unknown

Argentina

Unknown

1987/88

Jordan300

Destroyedby NAMSA& US

Kazakhstan

250

Some
destroyedby NAMSA& US

KuwaitUnknown

Armenia

Unknown

Unknown

Azerbaijan

Unknown

Unknown

Destroyed
under deal
with UnitedStatesServedas basisfor local
versionKyrgyzstan

Unknown
100

1984

Belarus

Unknown

Unknown

Laos

Benin

Unknown

Unknown

Lebanon250

Unknown

Botswana

60

1988

Libya

1,500

Bulgaria

Unknown

Unknown

1978–
1982

Burkina Faso

UnknownMali

40

Unknown

Cambodia

233

Mauritania

100

Unknown

Cape Verde

Unknown

Mauritius

Unknown

Unknown

Chad

8

Moldova

Unknown

Unknown

China

Unknown

Mongolia

Unknown

Unknown

Croatia500

Montenegro Unknown

Unknown

Cuba

100

Morocco200

1981

Cyprus50

Unknown

Unknown

Czech
Republic

Unknown

Mozambique
Namibia

Unknown

Unknown

DR Congo

10

Nicaragua

1,151

1982–85

Egypt

10,000

Nigeria

Unknown

Unknown

El Salvador

Unknown

North Korea

250

Unknown

EritreaUnknown

Oman

Unknown

Ethiopia

1,550

Peru

500

1978–81Finland200

Poland1,000

1970–72

Gaza andWest Bank

Unknown

Qatar

Unknown

Unknown

Romania

Unknown

Unknown
63

Comments

Table 18: Strela-3 transfers

Recipient

NumberDate

SerbiaUnknown

Unknown

Recipient

NumberDate

Unknown

Unknown

Seychelles

50

1979–80

Afghanistan

Sierra Leone

Unknown

Unknown

AngolaUnknown

Unknown

Slovenia

Unknown

Unknown

Armenia

Unknown

Unknown

Slovakia

120

Unknown

Azerbaijan

Unknown

Unknown

South Africa

Unknown

Unknown

Belarus

Unknown

Unknown

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Unknown

Unknown

Bulgaria          200

Unknown

Croatia          500

Unknown

Cuba

Unknown

1966/67

Sudan

70

1981–84

Syria

15,0001970–83

Tajikistan

Unknown

Unknown

Tanzania

200

1977–78

Tunisia

Unknown

Unknown

Turkmenistan

Unknown

Unknown

Czech Republic           200

1984

El Salvador

Unknown

Unknown          105

1986/87

Uganda200

1975/87

FinlandUkraineUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Uzbekistan

Unknown

Unknown

Gaza andWest Bank

Vietnam

5,080

1971/75/96/99

Georgia

Unknown

UnknownYemen

80

1989/91

Unknown

Unknown

Zambia100

1979

Germany(GDR)

Zimbabwe

Unknown

Unknown

Hungary          300

1987/89

TOTAL

41,507+

India          600

1995/97

Iran

Unknown

Unknown

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2011b.

Jordan          200

1987

Two shipments stand out in terms of volume: Syria,
which received 15,000, and Egypt, which received
10,000 Strela-2. Both countries were engaged in active
or semi-active wars with Israel at the time of transfer.
Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Angola also received largetransfers and were engaged in wars at the time.
Jane’s includes a number of Strela-2 t­ransferred toGaza and the West Bank, though it seems unlikely thatthese shipments were directly from Russia. More likely
these were transferred from Egyptian and/or possibly
Jordanian stocks. In addition, Egypt transferred­individual weapons to North Korea and Pakistan topromote their manufacture of MANPADS.

Kazakhstan            50Unknown

KosovoUnknown

1999

Kuwait          500

1985

Kyrgyzstan

Unknown

Unknown

LebanonUnknown

Unknown

Libya

Unknown<2010

Moldova

Unknown

Unknown

To summarize, huge amounts of Strela-2 weret­ ransfered, in many cases apparently without ­end-user
assurances. Considering the political climate at thetime—almost the height of the Cold War—we cansafely say that the manufacturing country saw theseweapons as a diplomatic tool.
9M36 Strela-3/SA-14 Gremlin: The Strela-3 wasdesigned to compensate for the weaknesses of theStrela-2a/b. With almost the same range, altitude and64

Nicaragua

117

North Korea

Unknown

1986/87/91
UnknownPeru

Unknown

Unknown

Poland          100

1987

Serbia45

Unknown

Slovakia

Unknown

Unknown

South Africa

Unknown

Unknown

Sri Lanka

Unknown

Unknown

Syria       1,500

1987/89

Tajikistan

Unknown

Unknown

weight, it was characterized by a second-generation
seeker system, and a more powerful warhead.

Turkmenistan

Unknown

Unknown

India

UkraineUnknown

Unknown

Indonesia

United ArabEmirates          100

1986/87

Jordan          240

Unknown

Kazakhstan

Unknown

Unknown

Uzbekistan

Unknown

Unknown

Kyrgyzstan

Unknown

Unknown

VietnamUnknown

Unknown

Laos            501999LebanonUnknown

Unknown

Macedonia

Unknown

Unknown

Moldova

Unknown

Unknown

Myanmar          100

1999

Nicaragua          360

1987/88

North Korea

        1250

Unknown

838

1992–96

TOTAL

4,517+

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012n.

The largest recipient for this model was again Syria,
though as can be seen, the total volume of Strela-3s
shipped is much lower than that of the Strela-2. Thismay be because of general easing of tensions in the
post-Cold War era, or because information about
the Igla series was becoming known, and customers
were waiting for the new weapon. Beyond supplies to­traditional allies and clients, Strela-3s were supplied tovery few Western oriented states, such as Jordan.
9K310 Igla-1/SA-16 Gimlet: The Igla-1 was the first of
the Igla series to supplant the Strela. It is characterized
by greater range and a third-generation IR seeker.
Table 19: Igla-1 Transfers
Recipient

NumberDate

Afghanistan         100

1999/2000

Angola         150

1990

Azerbaijan

Unknown

Unknown

Belarus

Unknown

Unknown

BosniaHerzegovina

Unknown

Unknown

Botswana            501996Brazil

Unknown

Unknown

Bulgaria

Unknown

Unknown

Croatia

Unknown

Unknown

Cuba           100 1989/90

Czech
Republic

Unknown

Unknown

Ecuador242 1998

Finland             90 1986

Gaza andthe West
Bank

Unknown

2005

Georgia

Unknown

Unknown

Germany(GDR)

Unknown

Unknown

Hungary

Unknown

1999

Comment

Peru       2,500
16

1990/91
2003

RwandaUnknown<1994

Saudi Arabia

Unknown

Unknown

SerbiaSlovakia

226
Unknown

1995
Unknown

Slovenia

4

Somalia

Unknown

Unknown

2003

South Korea

Unknown

Unknown

Sri Lanka

Unknown

2006

Tajikistan

Unknown

Unknown

Turkmenistan

Unknown

Unknown

Ukraine          200

Unknown

United ArabEmirates          400

1998/99

UnitedKingdom31

2005/06

United States313

2006/07

Uzbekistan

Unknown

Unknown

Vietnam          100

1996/97

TOTAL

7,360+

Suppliedundercountermeasureagreement?

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012f.

The emergence of the Igla-1 in 1981 also marked achange in the Soviet Union’s export strategy. Egypt
and Syria, the two major overseas clients for the Strela
did not purchase any of the early Igla systems—
Egypt because it was now concentrating on Western
weaponry, Syria, presumably because it could not

65

afford new weapons for economic reasons. The
largest purchaser was India, possibly because theaging Indian Air Force was considered insufficientfor defense against the Pakistani Air Force, which
was being supplied by the United States. The UnitedStates also acquired some Iglas under an agreementwith the Russians for mutual development of counter­measures (the “U.S.-Russia agreement on MANPADS
cooperation” See Embassy Moscow, 2004).
9K38 Igla /SA-18 Grouse: In terms of transfers, the Igla
marked a singular change in Russian export strategy:
for the first time, most recipients were not former Soviet
allies or clients.
Table 20: Igla transfers
Recipient

NumberDate

Armenia          200

1995/96

Belarus

Unknown

Unknown

Brazil168

Comment

1994

Colombia(FARC)

Unknown

Unknown

Czech
Republic

Unknown

2010

Ecuador            50

2001

Egypt

          600

2007

Eritrea          259

1995/99

Finland          100

1990

Gaza andWest Bank

Unknown

2005

Germany

Unknown

Unknown

Hungary

Unknown

UnknownIndia       2,500

2001/03

Iran

Unknown

Unknown

Jordan       1,900

2001/09/10

Laos            502005Malaysia            402002MexicoUnknown

Unknown

Via either
Venezuela
or theftfrom Peru

Myanmar            20Unknown

North
Korea

Unknown

UnknownPeru

Unknown

Unknown

Singapore       1,050

1998/99

Somalia

Unknown

Unknown48

Unknown

Sri Lanka

Unknown

Unknown

Sudan

Unknown

Unknown

Syria          500

2003/06

ThailandUnknown

Unknown

UkraineUnknown

Unknown

UnitedArab
Emirates

Unknown

Unknown

South
Korea

UnitedStatesSometransferred
to UIC
Somalia

Replacement forStrela-2

Unknown

Unknown

Vietnam            50

2002

TOTAL

Some
reportedtransferred to
Myanmar2003/05/06

Venezuela

7,692+

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012c.

As can be seen, the Russian trend to expand its
customer base continued with the Igla. More of thecustomers are traditional Western allies or partners. In
some cases, e.g. Jordan, the weapons were boughtas replacement for destroyed Strela-2 weapons.18 The
largest transfers were to India, Jordan, and Singapore
respectively. While Singapore does operate the Igla,
there have been rumors that some of these missiles
were diverted, presumably to Myanmar, though theSingaporean government reputedly acted speedily
to cut off the diversion.
9K338 Igla-S/SA-24 Grinch: The Igla-S is the newest
version of the Igla series. It became operational in
2002, and since then has been supplied to a limited
number of other countries.

18

66

157

Numberin service,
no import
numberInterview with disarmament expert at NATO on 23 April 2012.

Table 21: Igla-S transfers
Recipient

NumberDate

Hezbollah

Unknown

Unknown

India

Unknown

Unknown

Jordan          200

2008

24

2004

In Strelets(vehicular)
configuration

Unknown

Not
confirmed

Libya

Malaysia
MexicoSyria

ThailandUnknown
5

2003

Unknown

2002

36

Not
confirmed

In Strelets(vehicular)
configuration

Unknown

Venezuela          100

2009

VietnamUnknown

Unknown

TOTAL

Comment

365+

Numbersince
upgraded
to 2,400.
2,060
includingVenezuela

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012m.

The Igla-S is comparable to the newest FIM92-RMP
Stinger in its capabilities. It has been transferred toa limited number of other countries. Much has been
made of the transfer of Igla-S to Libyan stockpiles, andtheir alleged theft and re-transfer to Gaza. However,
the missiles identified in Libya are almost certainly all
without gripstocks. The Russians claim that a small
number of Igla-S were supplied to the Qaddafi regime.
However, and this is born out by ­subsequent investigation (Chivers, 2011b; Peterson, 2011; ­Schroeder, 2011,
p. 18-19) these were in the ­Strelets configuration,
designed to be vehicle mounted.
Copies and reverse engineering of Russian MANPADS:
Both the Strela and the Igla family of MANPADS havebeen copied extensively, and have been models
for Pakistani, Chinese, Korean, Egyptian and Iranianversions. Transfers of those weapons are summarizedunder the headings of the relevant source c­ ountries.
Crucially, the Soviet government was generally fairly
relaxed in permitting the copying of their small arms.
The Strela-2 and -3 were copied by Egypt, Iran, andChina, and have been transferred to Pakistan andNorth Korea by the Egyptians for reverse engineering.
In addition members of the Soviet block—Bulgaria,
Hungary, Romania and Poland—have manufactured
versions or (in the case of Poland), reverse engineered
the weapons.
Russian transfers to NSAGs:
There is no direct evidence of the transfer of
MANPADS to NSAGs by the Russian authorities. The
Soviets did transfer MANPADS to organizations thatlater morphed into official governments. However,these ­organizations (e.g. People’s Movement for the
Liberation of Angola, MPLA) were arguably (insofar as
the Soviets were concerned, at least) the de-facto
government, and so transfers to Angola may not
fall under the NSAG label. Transfers to other NSAGs
ranging from Hezbollah to the Sandinistas were
presumably handled indirectly through Soviet proxies.
The breakdown of the Soviet Union also meant that
new NSAGs in former Soviet dependencies hadaccess to Soviet stocks (and the skills to use them)because these stocks were located in their newly
independent/autonomous national territory. This has
been a particular problem in the Caucasus, where
a number of NSAGs, including Chechen, ­Armenian,
Ossetian and presumably others, have actively
sought and used Russian MANPADS in their struggles.
Personnel in those NSAGs are often former membersof the Russian military, and their military experience,
perhaps with MANPADS, constitutes a major hazard,
as the picture of an SA-18 shooting down a Russian
helicopter shows (SpotterXY, 2009).
Summary: Russian MANPADS transfers
In historical perspective, the picture of Russian t­ ransfersof MANPADS seems to have changed. Initially, theSoviet regime appeared to transfer missiles almost
indiscriminately to allies and supporters. Upon thefall of the Soviet regime, the Russian government has
taken more responsibility for controlling the transfersof MANPADS. This appears to be due to two different
causes. On the one hand, the need for hard currency
has meant that, to date, Russia has made more
efforts to ensure that its manufacturing prowess is notsquandered, and the income from Russian p­ roducts,
including MANPADS, accrues to Russia. On the other,starting with the Afghan war, Russia has found itself
subject to many of the same threats encounteredby other countries engaged in asymmetric warfare:
the threat of MANPADS being one of the mostserious. Russia’s engagement with the United Statesin ­multilateral (UN) and bilateral (MANPADS ­Discussion
Group) fora demonstrates that the Russians have67

become more sensitive to the potential threat of
MANPADS against themselves as well. The publicizeddowning of a Russian helicopter in the Caucasus(SpotterXY, 2009) by Chechen separatists firing a
Russian MANPADS illustrates that threat. From analmost indiscriminate transfer partner, ­therefore, Russia
has become more responsible in providing transfers,
albeit not to the degree that is desirable, and not withother states’ interests in mind.

Bolide missile, with the same firing mechanism andcasing, but an improved range and performance.
There have also been improvements in networking
and communications. Nevertheless the system isessentially unchanged and for the purposes of thisbrief the original RBS-70 missile and the Bolide aretreated as one. Countries that have received thesystem are noted in Table 22.
Table 22: RBS-70 and Bolide transfers

It is clear that Russia has become much moreamenable to controlling the spread of MANPADS
than it has before. For example, under dual Americanand Israeli pressure, it ensured that the newest Igla-S
supplied to Syria was only in the vehicle-mounted
version. Russia also claims that its recent ­transfers
include the right to on-site surprise inspections. What
does not come through is the degree of political will
the Russians have to actually use those instruments
consistently. Thus, while the right to inspect Venezuelan stockpiles exists, the Russians claim they see noneed: perhaps for fear of political ­repercussions with
the Venezuelan government.

Recipient

NumberArgentina

Unknown Unknown

Date

Australia          250

Bahrain

161

1987/
2003/
2007

49 launchers/
250 missiles

1980/81

14 launchers/
161 missiles

Bangladesh

Unknown Unknown

Brazil

Unknown Unknown

Czech
Republic

16

2007

In summary it is possible to say that:• The picture of Russian transfers of MANPADS is an
improving one to date, in terms of the number of
items transferred and the number of recipients,
both of which have been falling steadily over the
past three decades.
• Russian transfers appear to be strongly correlatedwith Russian political interests. Should tensions
with other blocs rise again, it is eminently possiblethat they will use MANPADS as political tools
once again, though given the economic value,
it is unlikely they will return to the widespread­‘donation’ of these arms.
• The legacy problem of older Russian MANPADS
remains. While a Strela-2 may not be the bestof battlefield weapons, remaining undestroyed
stocks still pose a problem to civilian aircraft,most notably because their price has dropped to
extremely affordable.

Finland128

2008

Germany

16

2007

Indonesia          150

1982

Iran

          200

1985

Ireland            202007/08

Latvia          102

2006/07

Lithuania

281

2004/05

Malaysia

Unknown 2008

Norway       5,550

1981/84/87
90-94

Pakistan       1,205

198688/2008

Singapore          500

1980/81

Taiwan            201984Thailand            901997/2002/05

SwedenTunisia          300

1980/81

Sweden has produced and marketed its RBS-70 and
its Bolide missiles in large numbers. Eighteen ­countries
are reported to have received one or anotherversion of the RBS-70. In 2006/07 the Latvian Air Force
received a number of RBS-70 systems. A year later,
systems were delivered to Finland, supplemented in2010 by a further shipment worth some US $35 million.
The ­original missile for the system was replaced by theUnitedArab
Emirates          304

1980/81

Venezuela

TOTAL

8

Unknown

9,301+

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012h.

68

Comments

60 launchers/
300 missiles

no. inservice, no
import no.

There have been a few minor transfers within thisgroup of recipients (e.g. transfer of individual missiles
from Germany to Finland and from Norway to Finland)
but this does not change the picture significantly.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has manufactured four
­ enerations of MANPADS, starting with the Blowpipegin 1975, then the Javelin, the Starburst, and finally thecurrently manufactured Starstreak. While the Blowpipe
was widely sold abroad, British transfers of MANPADS
have declined from 11 countries for the Blowpipe,
to only one export customer for the S­tarstreak.
Missiles bought by Argentina were used by both the­Argentinean Army and the British ­expeditionary forces
during the Falklands war, claiming three successes:
one for the Argentineans against a British Harrier
fighter-bomber, the other two by the British against
slow-flying prop-driven Argentinean Aermacchi
MB-339A and Pucara attack craft (Smith, 1989).
Blowpipe: The Blowpipe was an inaccurate andi­neffective weapon and was in service between 1975
and 1993 when it was replaced by the Javelin. Duringthat time, Blowpipes were transferred to a numberof states. Some 280 launchers were acquired by theUnited Kingdom itself. Conceivably the purchaseof Blowpipes (mainly by former British-influenced
nations) was due to the fact that the 1980s were theearly period of MANPADS acquisition.

Canada55

1982–83

Subsequently
destroyed andno longer instock (Canada
letter)

Chile

48

1982

Deal incl. also
8 launchers

Chile          50

1983

Chile

          501988Malawi          701985Deal incl. also
14 launchers

Nigeria        200

1983–84

US $28 m deal

Oman        200

1985–86

Portugal          60

1983

Qatar

          501985–86

Thailand        100

1981–82

Thailand          501982–83

Thailand          501984US $1.7 m deal

UAE        100

1981

For Dubai

TOTAL

1,441

Source: Adapted from SIPRI Trade Register 1980–2011

Two of these transfers proved to be problematic. The
Afghan weapons were part of a Western program tosupport the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet
and Afghan governments’ air assets. The Blowpipe
performed below standard and was eventuallyreplaced by the US-made Stinger.

Table 23: Blowpipe transfers
Recipient

NumberDate

Comments

Afghanistan/
Mujahideen          501986Possibly ex-UK;
financed byUnited States;delivered via
Pakistan

Afghanistan/
Mujahedeen        300

1987

Probably
ex-UK;
financed byUnited States;delivered via
Pakistan8

1981

Subsequently
used by Argentina in Falklands War

Argentina

Javelin: Javelin was conceived of as an intermediate solution to the problems encountered with the
Blowpipe system. The Javelin was exported to a small
number of countries: Botswana, Canada, Peru, South
Korea, Malaysia, and possibly Afghanistan. The Javelin
was in service from 1986 to 1993 when production was
terminated and the Javelin was moved, in the British
military, into reserve stockpiles.

69Summary: British MANPADS transfers

Table 24: Javelin transfers
Recipient

NumberBotswana

25

Date
1986/92

Chile

Unknown

Unknown

South
Korea

Unknown

1986

Malaysia

12 (or 48)

1991

Oman

        280

1984/90

Peru        200

1995

TOTAL

Comments

Numberuncertain

517+

Source: Adapted from Sipri Trade Register 1980–2011 andJane’s, 2012i.

Starburst: This MANPADS, which was the follow-on to
the Javelin with some of the characteristics of themore advanced Starstreak, entered into service with
the British Army as a Javelin replacement in 1990. Some
250 were supplied to Kuwait, though that number
might be a low estimate (Jane’s, 2012j). These missiles
were supplied with 50 lightweight multiple launchers,a configuration that, while considered a MANPADS,
contains three missiles on a tripod, along with aiming
and communication mechanisms, which makes it
effectively a CREWPADS. Additional sales include
100 missiles to Canada, none of which are currently
in service, an unknown number to Jordan, and 504
missiles to Malaysia. Production of the Starburst ended
in 2001, and few of the recipient countries count themin their inventories.

The early British MANPADS were well-marketed andsold to a number of export customers. Later on, UK
exports of MANPADS declined despite improved
models, possibly due to changes in government(Davis, 2002), perhaps attributable to objections by
the British public to arms exports in general. There are
a number of points worth keeping in mind:• British MANPADS were sold to Argentina, whichused them during the Falklands War (1982) toattack, in one case successfully, scarce British air
assets.
• It is possible that by focusing on light multiple
launchers and more heavily based missiles, British
MANPADS lost some of their market share. On thepositive side, this may mean that the newer British
missiles are less attractive to NSAGs.
UkraineThough the Ukraine does not manufacture MANPADS, it
still possesses enormous stocks of Soviet era ­weaponry,
including MANPADS. There is some evidence ofopen and clandestine export of MANPADS. 50
Igla-1 systems were supposed to be transferredclandestinely to Armenia according to one source­(Stratrisks, 2012). According to FAS, Ukraine exported anumber of MANPADS missiles, ­gripstocks, and systems
during the years 2003–09 (Table 26). However, and­notwithstanding the Ukrainian government’s claimthat it adheres to the principle of reporting SALW
transfer to the UN Register, there is some doubt about
the veracity of this claim.19

Table 25: Starburst transfers
Recipient

NumberDate

Canada          100

1992

JordanUnknown

Unknown

Kuwait          250

1995

Malaysia          504

1995/97

Comments

Incl. 50
launchers

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012jStarstreak: Starstreak is the current British MANPADS
variant in use. In service since 1997, it has been exported
to South Africa in the LML (Lightweight Multiple
Launcher) format which can be ground or vehicle
mounted, but is not considered ­man-portable. Eightsystems were exported and there is no ­information on
further transfers.

Table 26: Total transfers claimed by Ukraine in UN
Register (2003–2009)
RecipientType

NumberDate

Azerbaijan

Strela-3         102008UnitedStatesIgla(SA-18)         292003UnitedStatesIgla grip-          10stocks2003

UnitedStatesIgla(SA-18)         292005UnitedStatesIgla gripstocks

6

2005

19

70

Comment

MissilesMissilesGovernment position as communicated in a letter to the authors
received from the Ukrainian ambassador on 30 August 2012.

UnitedStatesIgla-1

UnitedStates

Igla

UnitedStatesIgla-1

UnitedStatesIgla gripstocks

UnitedStatesIgla-1

71

2006

Missiles         992006Missilesthese rumors are necessarily true, but that in the lackof a robust transfer regime, smaller (and even larger)
quantities of MANPADS can easily slip through the net.
United States

71

2006

18

2007

       120

2008

UnitedStatesIgla grip-             9stocks2008

UnitedStatesStrelagripstocks

25

2008

UnitedStatesStrela-3
gripstocks

18

2008

Total gripstocks
Total missiles

Missiles         96439Source: Adapted from Buongiorno, 2009.

The weapons transferred to the United States areintended for one or two purposes: ­countermeasure/training for the US military, and destruction. The
Ukrainian government and the United States haveagreed on the destruction of surplus MANPADS
stocks. ­Regardless of Ukrainian reluctance and later­disagreements (Taylor, 2007), some of this overstock
has been destroyed.
Summary: Ukrainian MANPADS transfers
Notwithstanding current agreements on the transfer
of SALW which many countries support, the realityof transfers may well be different. States such as
the Ukraine which possess a large stockpile ofsurplus weapons as a result of political changes, areinherently tempted to sell those weapons on the­free market, notably since they may not feel boundto honor the obligations of their predecessor (in thiscase, the Soviet Union). Indeed, as can be seen fromState Department cables, the Ukrainians agreed tosell Igla missiles for destruction to the United States atmarket prices (Taylor, 2007).

The United States has had two distinct types of
MANPADS: the earlier Redeye, which was the firstrecorded MANPADS, but which performed with little
success, and the later Stinger. Both types of missile
were exported. The Redeye, the first MANPADS
in service, may also be the first MANPADS to becompletely removed from service. An ­aggressive
buy-back campaign, sometimes in the form of­one-for-one replacement by the United States andan effective destruction process has meant that few if
any Redeyes are available.
The Redeye’s replacement, the FIM-92 Stinger, is­ rguably one of the most successful MANPADS inaterms of sales. It does, however, represent a major
proliferation problem, as its dispersion in Afghanistan
demonstrates.
FIM-43 Redeye: The Redeye was the first MANPADS to
be operationally deployed (1967) and showed all the
weaknesses of a first generation weapon. It remains
unclear how many Redeye systems were produced
overall. According to Cagle, 31,268 systems were built
between 1965 and 1973, including 2,876 for foreign
customers (1974, p.155). Clearly, production continued
after that year, as is evident from the various exports
between 1974 and 1986 listed in Table 27. However,the number of 85,000 systems produced by 1969, as
cited by various Internet sources, contradicts the data
provided by Cagle, cannot be confirmed by credible
sources, and is very likely to be incorrect. The missile
was superseded in US American service by the FIM-92
Stinger in 1981. Foreign sales were robust, though theUnited States ceased support to the weapon in 1995.
Such evidence as is available indicates that, with the
exception of Afghanistan and probably Iran, none ofthese transfers, whatever their volume, are still active.

Moreover, even where states formally adhere to­international agreements, there is little e­ nforcement,
and, as the rumors from Ukraine indicate, there
is always the possibility of clandestine deals andinternational arrangements. This is not to say that­71

Table 27: FIM-43 Redeye transfers
Recipient

NumberDeliveryComments

Afghanistan/           50Mujahideen

1984–85

Ex-US; aid; delivered via Pakistan

Australia        260

1969–70

Chad          301983Ex-US; aid against Libyan ­invasion and Libyan supported GUNT rebels

Chad        100

1986

Ex-US; aid against Libyan ­invasion and Libyan supported GUNT rebels

Denmark

243

1970

FIM-43C version; Danish ­designation Hamlet

Germany(FRG)     1,400

1975

FRG
designation Fliegerfaust-1 (FLF-1)

Greece        500

1975

Israel        500

1975

Israel882

1977

Jordan        300

1977–78

Nicaragua/Contras        300

1986–87

Saudi Arabia        190

1973–77

Saudi Arabia        310

1979-80

Somalia        300

1982

Ex-US; US emergency aid during Ogaden War (between Ethiopia andSomalia)

125

1984

Ex-US;
emergency aid after border war with Libya
US $8 m deal; Swedish ­designation Rb-69

Sudan

Ex-US; part of US Fiscal Year 1987 US $100 m aid for Contras

US $6 m deal

Sweden     1,083

1967–70

Thailand        100

1982

Including 20 launchers

Thailand        100

1983

Numberdelivered could be considerably higher

Turkey        789

1985–86

TOTAL= 7,562

Ex-US

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

Two other transfers of Redeye took place in addition
to transfers from the United States. With US permission,Germany transfered 300 Redeyes to Turkey in 1994.
In 1989, the Nicaraguan government transferred 10
Redeye systems to an El Salvador NSAG, the Frente
Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN).
These had been captured by the then-Sandinista
government from the Contras NSAG. The CIA had
supplied the Contras with 300 Redeyes in 1987.
FIM-92 Stinger: The Stinger (FIM-92) was developed infour main variants, the original basic version (15,669
rounds built); Stinger-POST (under 600 rounds built)
Stinger-RMP, in production since 1987 (over 44,000
by 1997), and Stinger RMP Block I which enteredproduction in 1995. Production is at about 700/monthwhich means 126,000 maximum manufactured
72

1997–2012, though this number must be treated withgreat caution due to cuts in military budgets worldwide since 2008. To 30 September 1996, 6,584, missiles
were delivered or on order for export. In addition, theEuropean production group consisting of Germany,
Greece, the Netherlands and Turkey produced 12,000
Stinger-RMPs under license.
The Stinger (all variants) has been acquired by at least
35 countries and NSAGs around the world (Jane’s,
2011g). In addition, several states (North Korea, China)
and non-state armed groups (PLO, ­Chechnyan
rebels) are suspected of having acquired the missiles
in one or another variant.
In July 2009, Raytheon received an order from the
US Army on behalf of Foreign Military Sales for 171

Stingers for Taiwan and 178 Stingers for Egypt andTurkey, delivery by 2012. Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola,Iran, Israel (in addition to 344 reported in the Table),
Kuwait, Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR), ­Macedonia,­
Singapore, South Korea, and Spain received­unreported quantities of Stingers.

       200

1990

Switzerland

    3,500

1996

Taiwan    2,027

2001

171
TurkeyNumber

Date

14

1988

Chad

         30

1987

Chile

378

Bahrain

1992

178

Table 28: Reported Stinger transfers
Recipient       469

Comment

UnitedKingdom    4,800

2004       1001982       100

2004

Croatia       120

Denmark       100

1991

TOTAL

       840

1996

Source: Adapted from Jane’s, 2012g.

       100

1991       600

2003       600

2008

Egypt

178
France         501983Germany

    4,500

2004(from European
Stinger
Consortium)

Greece    1,500
       200
432

1994
2004
2006

(+1,100 from
European Stinger
Consortium)

Israel344

1996+ undisclosed
number in second
shipment

Italy       4501988         502002       200

2004

555

1988

232

1991

       150

2008

62

2007

       720

1985

874

2003

       1001985         501987         30

1996

Qatar

12

1988

Saudi
Arabia       400

1984

Japan

Lithuania
The
Netherlands
Pakistan
Portugal

Mounted version

from European
Stinger
Consortium=26,516

A number of interesting features emerge from Table
28. Stingers are bought by satisfied customers who
also upgrade their stockpiles. Thus there is a wave ofpurchases in the 1980s, followed by further purchasesin the late 1990s and mid-2000s as upgradedversions of the weapon are made available. Somemanufacturing countries—the United Kingdom,­France, and Pakistan—seem to have made smallpurchases before their own domestic production took
off, perhaps more to examine the product than to usethem as battlefield weapons.
Transfer of US manpads to NSAGs:
Of particular concern are US transfers to NSAGs. In
1987, the CIA transferred some 300 Redeyes to theContras NSAG in Nicaragua, some of which were
captured by government forces. A selection of thecaptured weapons was then turned over to another
NSAG, the FMLN in El Salvador.
The case of some 600 to 1,000 (the numbers are indispute) Stingers transferred to Afghan Mujahideenby the CIA is of course notorious. The weapons weretransferred as a way of disrupting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Though the effect of the missiles isdisputed—Russian pilots quickly learned to overcome
the threat, and there are strong claims that the Soviet
government had decided to reduce its involvementin Afghanistan before the Stingers became a threat(Cordovez and Harrison, 1995, pp. 69–70; Urban, 1988,
pp. 225–56)—the transfer has produced concernsthat relict Stingers might be used against US forces in
Afghanistan.
Stingers in the hands of NSAGs are seen as a threat in
two other areas of the world. Jane’s (2012g) reports73

that samples of Stingers have been transferred­(knowingly or not) from Egyptian or possibly ­Jordanianstocks to the PLO and Hamas. None of these reports
have provided any evidence to substantiate theclaims, though, given the political realities, they arecertainly possible. There are some ­unsubstantiatedclaims that Stingers have been transferred to Chechen
rebels. However, no public substantiation is available.

The gray and black markets

Summary: US MANPADS transfers

The black market concerns trade that is unlicensed
and usually illegal, conducted by individuals for profit
and violates a number of international a­ greements
and understandings including the United Nations
Programme of Action (UN-POA) on SALW, theWassenaar Arrangement, and in many cases statelaws.

Trade in the gray market is legal (insofar as the states inthe transaction are concerned) but goes against thespirit, and often the letter of international agreements(see Chapter 5). It includes rarely reported transfersfrom state entities to NSAGs. Such transfers are dealt
with here in a separate section.

The United States was the first country to deploy
successful battlefield MANPADS. US policy on thetransfer of MANPADS has also been, officially at least,
fairly consistent. MANPADS were largely transferred
to reliable allies. To counterbalance that it needs
to be said that (a) many transfers consisted of verylarge shipments; (b) many such ‘reliable’ allies werepolitically unstable and thus their alliance value wassomewhat hollow, and (c) the United States violated
its own stated policies by opening channels for the
supply of these weapons to NSAGs.

By their nature, gray and black market trades are
difficult to identify. They sometimes come to light as aresult of police action, or in historical ­perspective. Yet,
one can use the rule of thumb often cited by customs
officers: What is uncovered is usually ten percent of
actual activity. Even though this is not transferrable
one-to-one to MANPADS, arguably only a small
portion of illicit tranfers will be uncovered. One needs
to keep in mind that in the gray market, and particularly the black market which is oriented more towards
NSAGs and criminal enterprises, it may be in theinterest of states that have uncovered t­ ransactions tokeep them hidden, for fear of awkward questions andeven potential panic affecting civilian aviation andtourism.

Starting with the provision of Redeyes to the Contras
to the supply of Stingers to Afghan Mujahideen (USsupply of Stingers to the FSA in Syria (Reuters, 2012b)
is unproven) US clandestine policies and practices
seemed to contradict the formal pronouncements.
There is little solid evidence of the use of Stingers
against Coalition forces in Afghanistan today, but
the fear that these weapons will be used against­Coalition aircraft is ever present. Moreover, ­inasmuch
as some of the allies proved to be less than r­eliable,
clandestine supplies from former US allies have­become a problem on the world market.

The gray market
Unofficial, unreported, and clandestine transfersfrom state entities have been features of MANPADS
proliferation from an early stage. These weapons­
provide a qualitative edge, at low cost, and in certain
situations can be an extremely useful tool. Table 29
provides data on some known transfers. It is by nomeans comprehensive, and other transfers are boundto have occurred.

Another feature of the US involvement with thetransfer of MANPADS is the attempts made by the
US State and Defense Departments to recover anddestroy obsolete MANPADS, and those in the hands of­unreliable groups. This has been an active policy of theUnited States, and it has been successful in r­ ecoveringand destroying virtually all Redeye MANPADS, which,however little use they may be on the battlefield, still
could constitute a threat to civilian air traffic.
Table 29: Known gray market transfers
SourceRecipient

Date

Type

NumberComments

Egypt

China

1974

Strela-2

small

Given for reverse engineering

Egypt

North Korea

1974

Strela-2

small

Given for reverse engineering

UkraineArmenia

2010

Igla

30

Not clear if transfer carried out

Source: Adapted from Jane’s 2011b; except Ukraine: Trend, 2012 (all dates are approximate).

74

The number of such uncovered transfers and their­ bsolute volumes are relatively small, which couldaindicate either a data gap, or the absence of­much movement within the gray market. Eithercase is plausible. Another feature which becomes
evident is that relatively small numbers have been
exchanged between technically capable states forthe purpose of reverse engineering. Transfers of thattype are ­generally from clients (e.g. Egypt) of ­original­ anufacturers (e.g. Russia) to a third party (e.g. Northm
Korea) for copying. This could imply two things, bothof which are relevant: either the supervision of theoriginal manufacturer has not been sufficient to limitthe ­distribution of technical knowledge, or the ­original
manufacturer was complicit in the distribution. In
the one case, it may be possible to strengthen the­supervision processes to avoid repetition. In the other,
the lack of political will to impose restraint is worrying,
and little more can be done than to attempt to applypressure on the manufacturing state by diplomaticmeans.
International clandestine transfers to NSAGs
This section deals with the intentional transfer of
MANPADS from a state or para-state agency to NSAGs.
(For purchases on the black market by NSAGs—andstate entities—please see above.) There are many
reports—some confirmed, most not—about transfersof MANPADS from government stockpiles to NSAGs.
The most notorious is the transfer of Stinger missiles
to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan from CIA stocks.
These were intended for use against the Soviet army
and its Afghan allies, but later fell into the hands of­anti-American NSAGs and are still considered a threat
to American forces in Afghanistan. The most recent
case is a claim by NBC that MANPADS have been
supplied to the rebel Free Syrian Army to counter the
regime’s overwhelming air power.

Transfers of weapons to NSAGs can be extremely
problematic, since NSAGs almost always have poorer
stockpile control than state armed forces, and in nocase known have their stockpiles met international
standards. Moreover, NSAGs are likely to trade favors
with their opposite numbers in other conflicts, bringing
about an uncontrolled proliferation of weapons suchas MANPADS. Finally, NSAG intentions for use are often
mixed, ranging from defending themselves against air
attacks by their opponents (normally governments) to
attacks against civilian airliners in their own countries
or worldwide.
The major manufacturing states have generallycommitted themselves publicly to responsible
transfers of MANPADS. However, this needs to be­taken in context. During the Cold War, and before­ mergence of standards such as the Wassenaar
the eArrangement, transfers to NSAGs by their various
patrons were fairly common. Table 31 summarizes
the known transfers, though the table may be partial
in both its coverage (which may be low) and thesources and volume of transfers. What is better known
is that such transfers often have major implications forcivilian air transport safety.
Many rumored transfers of MANPADS appear to beephemeral. While some NSAGs display technical andtactical expertise in deploying their MANPADS, many
do not (or perhaps the rumors of the transfer were
simply not true). Afghan Mujahideen proved occasionally adept at using their Stingers against Russian and
Afghan government airplanes, ­reputedly shooting
down a number of them over a period of two years(the actual number is in deep dispute, cf. Kuperman,
1999 and Urban, 1988). However, and notwithstanding
their prowess and the reputed numbers of MANPADS in
Mujahideen possession, there is no concrete evidenceof Coalition forces losses in Afghanistan due to Stingers.

Table 30: Transfers to NSAGs
SourceRecipient

Date

Type

NumberComments

Reference

Eritrea

Islamic Courts
Union (ICU)/
Al- Shabaab
Somalia

Unknown

SA-18

6

Two used when Belorussian cargo aircraft
was shot downUN, 2007, p. 15

Eritrea

Somalia(Al-Shabaab)July 2006

Unknown

Unknown(not morethan 30)

Part of a larger
weapons shipment

UN, 2006, p. 13

Eritrea

Somalia(Al-Shabaab)Aug. 2006

SA-6, SA-7

2+
unknown

Part of a larger
weapons shipment

UN, 2006, p. 14

75

Source

Recipient

Date

Type

Iran

Somalia(Al-Shabaab)July 2006

Unknown45

UN, 2006, p. 21

IranSomalia(Al-Shabaab)Aug. 2006

Unknown         80UN, 2006, p. 22

Syria

Somalia(Al-Shabaab)Aug./Sept.
2006

Unknown3

UN, 2006, p. 26

Bulgaria

Angola(UNITA)

mid-1990s

SA-7       100

CIA (US)

Afghan Mujahideen

1980

Redeye“severaldozen”

Shipped via Pakistan

Cordovez andHarrison, 1995,
pp. 69–70.

CIA (US)

Afghan Mujahideen(1982Unknown)

SA-7

Unknown

Through third parties

McMichael, 1991,
p. 30.

CIA (US)

Afghan Mujahideen(1984)

BlowpipeUnknown

Bought from the UK

Cordovez andHarrison, 1995,
pp. 158–159.

CIA (US)

Afghan Mujahideen

1986–87

StingerApprox.
       250launchers
and~1,000
missilesShipped via Pakistan

Cordovez andHarrison, 1995,
p. 198.

US

UNITA(Angola)1986

Stinger

UnknownOne­­explanation may be that for some reason the­ ommission because of improper
weapons are out of cstorage, though, stored properly, they can last for
decades. A second reason could be some cunningplan, keeping the weapons for the right opportunity.
Given the ­fractious nature of the Afghan resistance,
this seems rather far-fetched. A third explanation isperhaps that the weapons have all been expended,
sold, or given up in buy-back programs. The same
argument holds concerning the reports of MANPADS
in the hands of Palestinian and Lebanese resistancegroups. Neither the PLO in the West Bank nor Hamas(with one recorded exception in 2012) in Gaza haveused their stockpile against Israeli planes, even during
dire straits such as the 2010 Operation Cast Lead andPillars of Defense. A recorded successful attack in
Lebanon that brought down an Israeli helicopter was­apparently by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG),not a MANPADS as claimed. Certainly one possible
explanation is that the many reported transfers to thePalestinian and Lebanese NSAGs have been wrongly
inflated and that these groups lack the expertise toproperly store and effectively fire them. (For a detailed76

NumberComments

Reference

Schroeder, 2007a

Congressional
Record, 1987,
p. 7557.

discussion of the penetration and use of MANPADS in
Syria, see Box 3.)
Summary: MANPADS to NSAGs
A number of states have provided NSAGs with
MANPADS for political reasons. With a few e­ xceptions,these have not proven to be successful strategies in
the long term. The noted exception has been thetransfer of Stingers to the Afghan insurgency. Even
there, the source state has had reasons to entertain
second thoughts about the action. Some general
conclusions can be made about the practice:• There have been proven and rumored cases of
MANPADS transfers to NSAGs.
• Though in a few cases these transfers have provento be an important battlefield weapon. In mostcases the value has been dubious.
• Many reports on transfers of MANPADS to NSAGs
do not show evidence of use in the field.
• Some NSAGs (and it is difficult to predict which
ones would do so) have used MANPADS against
softer civilian targets rather than purely military•

ones. This results in loss of civilian lives, and may
rebound on the supplier if identified as such.
In two cases at least (Nicaragua and ­Afghanistan),
MANPADS transferred to NSAGs may havesubsequently been used against the original­
supplier.

The black market
Black market channels are obviously an ­attractive
source for NSAGs looking for weaponry, and forstates interested in acquiring samples of ­weaponry
either for countermeasure design or for reverse
engineering. In the past two decades, a number­of cases of attempted trades in MANPADS havebeen uncovered. Notoriously, MANPADS have beenoffered for sale in Yemen’s open arms markets. Mostof these have been stolen or diverted from legitimate
shipments. Small numbers of MANPADS have beenoffered for sale by individual arms merchants, andhave come to light as a result of police investigations.
Schroeder and Buongiorno (2010b) have detailed anumber of transactions and supposed transactions.
Much of the data is anecdotal and has little proof.
Nevertheless, it appears that small-scale black market
transactions do occur.

Two features characterize these trades. First, they are
generally small scale, amounting to single or double
digit unit transactions of missiles and gripstocks. Thisimplies that they are not intended for use by regularstate forces, but by NSAG or criminal groups. Second,
many of these transactions are of first or secondgeneration weapons. There have been few third andlater generation weapons offered for sale (or, at least,that have been published about).
Conclusions: The gray and black markets
The gray and black markets represent the most­ ifficult area of research on MANPADS to ­penetrate.
dThose engaged in these markets are of course
interested in complete secrecy. Nevertheless, from­time to time, such transactions do come to light.
One can ­characterize them in two categories: Smalli­ndividual transfers and large material transfers. Small
individual transfers, again, can be divided into stateand c­ riminal transfers.
• Criminal transfers can demonstrably be interdicted ­by proper use of intelligence, buy-back programs,
police stings, all originating from political will
(whether innate or purchased is irrelevant).
In other words, stopping the criminal trade in­individual items is up to good police work.

Table 31: Known black market transactions
SourceRecipient

Date

Type

NumberComments

Reference

Unknown

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE) (Sri Lanka)(1979)–
2009

SA-7
and
SA-14

Unknown

Moss, 2009

Unknown

Al-Shabaab (Somalia)(Oct. 2006)

SA-18(severaldozen)

Schroeder,
2007c

Peru
(theft)

FARC (Colombia)

2008–09

Strela /Igla

at least
seven

Tamayo, 2010

Libya

Hamas (Gaza)(2011)

SA-24

Unknown

missileroundswithout
gripstocks;
via Egypt

Chivers, 2012

Libya

Hezbollah (Lebanon)(2011)

SA-24

Unknown

missileroundswithout
gripstocks;
through
Syria

Chivers, 2012

Libya

Hamas (Gaza)

late 2011–
early 2012

SA-7

Unknown

during orafter theLibyan civil
war

Benari, 2011

77

•

•

State individual transfers are more often thannot motivated by political considerations. States
have the apparatus to move small items (e.g. by­diplomatic bag or other means) and if they arewilling to do so, there are very few means ­available
beyond disclosure, to stop the practice. Where
such transfers by a stockpiling state are against theinterests of the original provider state, it is likely thatthe originating state will have ­sufficient sanctioning
tools to stop the practice. Here the key to stopping
the practice is good intelligence, and a politicalanalysis of the ­interests of the relevant actors.
Large clandestine material transfers appear tobe the easiest to identify, if only in retrospect. In­practice, as has been seen, most such state-toNSAG transfers seem to have rebounded on theirperpetrators. Even state-to-state gray transfers
have this potential. Here it is likely that publishing
information about the transfer and the threat of
exposure may well be a potent tool to stop, or atleast, limit the practice.

Theft and losses
None of the surveyed countries has publishedaccounts of lost or stolen MANPADS. We assume
that where states have a record of poor ­stockpile
maintenance, there will be a certain amount of­leakage of MANPADS, even if these weapons
are somewhat better protected. One relatively­well-documented case is the theft of Strela and Igla
missiles from Peruvian arsenals in 2008 and 2009. The
theft was a diversion by a ring of Peruvian officials
and associated criminals. They were sold, a­ pparently
to FARC in Colombia, along with other Peruvian
weapons (Tamayo, 2010).
With the exception of major domestic chaos (seeBox 3: Syrian MANPADS in the civil war and Box 2:
Libyan MANPADS and the Sahel), thefts of MANPADS
that have been uncovered seem to be of relatively
small volumes. Admittedly, even small numbers of
MANPADS in the hands of terrorists could threaten
civilian airplanes. However, the evidence seems to bethat most MANPADS used by NSAGs against civilian
airplanes did not originate from theft, but were
either seized during domestic chaos (in e.g. Iraq) or­actually came from the gray market, in other words,
were transferred clandestinely by a state actor (seeChapter 1).
No state authority interviewed for this study was
prepared to admit the loss of MANPADS from their78

stockpile, which is understandable. However, it is almost
impossible to eliminate field training, accounting,and battlefield losses completely. ­Individual soldiersand teams lose materiel during training on a regularbasis. The frequency of such losses obviously depends
on training, experience, and many other factors.
It is unlikely that many MANPADS have been lost
this way, partly because dummies are more likely
to be carried in field exercises. ­Nevertheless, thepossibility of losses of individual units should not be
discounted. Accounting losses occur when stockpile­documentation is insufficiently precise, or ­inventories
are not properly updated. Again, no SALW Focal
Point was willing to speculate on such losses, let alone
when applied to MANPADS. Where poor accounting
and inventory practiced are the case and there is anorm of ­corruption, it is highly likely that such thefts will
go on and MANPADS, as in the case of Peru will findtheir way onto the black market. Finally, battlefield
losses are unpredictable: during battle it is virtually
impossible to keep track of expended ordnance, lost
weapons, captured weapons, and even accounting(again, varying depending on circumstances). Theseb­ attlefield losses do feed into the black market(see e.g. Tribune-Review, 2010; Watson, 2012). In
the following, we suggest some effects that could
contribute to MANPADS losses.
Effects of posture
We speculate that “posture” (the ways in which
MANPADS are deployed by a military) can have a
direct effect on the security of MANPADS, notably
in situations of flux. Thus, a military that disperses it’s
MANPADS assets widely (as is done in the United States
where MANPADS platoons operate at Battalion levels
in all arms divisions) and Russia (where MANPADS
platoons are integral to air defense units), is more
vulnerable to weapons loss under field conditions.
Conversely, in military systems in which MANPADS
are controlled tightly by units that are under directcontrol of higher echelons, it is likely that losses would
be less. While this rule of thumb has its limitations(training, discipline, etc.), three scenarios need to be
kept in mind: a) normal field practice, where losses
are ­investigated, discipline is notably tighter, and thelikelihood of either loss of theft lower; b) battlefielduse where there is potential for battlefield capture or
loss; and c) situations of flux, where authority is broken,
and there is the possibility of discipline breakdown, as
occurred in Libya. In the latter case, where MANPADS
are distributed throughout the military system,­unrecorded losses are bound to occur, which mightfind their way into the black market.

Effects of insurrection chaos
As has been seen in the case of Libya and Syria (seeBoxes on Syria and Libya), even a seemingly orderedstate can fall rapidly into conditions of political andsocial anarchy. In such a case, even the most solemn
commitment may be of little value. Accounting for the
possibility that a state’s security and other ­mechanisms
might fail is almost impossible, and most g­ overnments
would bristle at the suggestion by a patron or supplier.
The fact that weapons outside the umbrella ofordered security forces can be used by anyone is amajor weakness in securing MANPADS. This need notnecessarily be the case. Electronic and other solutions
for neutralizing the threat of u
­ nauthorized use exist.
What is needed is a standard to ensure that thesemeasures are indeed taken to counter the possibilityof insurrection.
Effects of corruption
As the Peruvian case demonstrates, theft—throughphysical action or more likely corruption—is a major
threat to MANPADS stockpiles. No administrative
system is proof against corruption of an individual orgroup within the system. However, corruption within asystem ought to be one of the major factors affecting
the decision to transfer MANPADS to another state.
Even the most far-reaching MANPADS transfer­standards (e.g. Wassenaar) make no direct mentionof the effects of corruption. However, whateverformal processes are displayed to support limitations
on MANPADS transfers may well be insufficient, whena state or individuals within a state are willing to makecorrupt decisions.

(International Shipping News, 2010). The ship, carryinga shipment of tanks, ammunition, and AA guns from
Ukraine to South Sudan via Kenya was pirated off
Somalia, and the ship held for ransom. The “Leopard”
and “Faina” cases illustrate the need for careful­securitized shipments of MANPADS.
Conclusions: Thefts and losses
The stockpiling and transfer chain of MANPADS offer
a number of weak points which will have to be dealt
with if MANPADS transfers are to fulfill their ostensible
purpose: the protection of state forces against aerial
attacks. In practice, as we have seen, these weak
points can be, or have been exploited to transfer
MANPADS to non-state groups. Among the prominentissues is the need for:1. Proposing universal means of securing MANPADS
in the field and in storage against unauthorized
possession and use. A combination of electronic
and physical measures might significantly reduce
the risk of MANPADS diversion, whether it be bycarelessness of those keeping them in the field, or
due to political shocks.
2. Corruption can not truly be predicted, but betterand more rigorous inspections by source countries
might go far to ensure that procedures against
theft and diversion are sufficient to deter mostcorrupt office holders from actually pursuing theiraims.
3. Transportation is a weak link, and MANPADS mustbe transported by the most secure (rather thancheap or fast) route possible, to ensure against
piracy, theft, or diversion.

Surplus destruction

Effects of storage and transportation
Moving MANPADS is another weakness in transfer
regimes. While in theory such transfers ought to bewell-guarded and well-documented, as for instancethe transport of hazardous materials (which MANPADS
come under as Class 1, that is, most hazardous).
This may not be observed in practice. Two cases­illustrate the problem. In 2010, Serbia exported
Serbian-­manufactured components from Serbia
to Vietnam, based on an end-user certificate. The“Leopard” an unarmed and unguarded ship carrying
the ­components was hijacked by pirates, and thecontents were to be auctioned off (International
Shipping News, 2011).20 The well-known case of the
Ukrainian merchant ship “Faina” is also illustrative
20

A copy of the Leopard’s manifest specifying “Strela-2 rocket
motors and other parts” in the possession of the authors.

Destruction is one sure way to ensure that MANPADS
are not transferred without control or to ­undesirable
end users. The US government has been at theforefront of attempts to persuade various states­owning obsolescent and surplus MANPADS to destroy
those weapons lest they be transferred to ­undesirable
NSAGs. It has provided funding, political pressure, andtechnical competencies to destroying both UnitedStates’ and Soviet surplus weapons. Other ­countries—
Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom—have supported
destruction in various parts of the world. Fundingis generally at the government level, while actual
destruction activities are carried out by o
­ rganizations
with expertise in a­mmunition disposal. The NATO
­Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA now
NSPA) is one agency engaged in destroying surplus
MANPADS in various countries including Kazakhtstan
79

and Jordan; the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has
done similar work in Burundi and e­ lsewhere. Where
possible, local facilities and ­organizations havecarried out the work (e.g. in Ethiopia). All of those­projects have been hugely dependent on the ­political
will of the ­countries concerned. In some cases, thewill to engage in destruction has had a ­commercial
aspect. In other cases, political considerations havepredominated. Table 32 provides a perspective.
­
It needs to be emphasized that not all destruction­projects are listed, as there is no single authoritative list.
We have tried to be conservative about the numbers.
For example, though the Tajikistan project involved
more MANPADS, we were able to verify the ­destructionof only twelve. In some cases, e.g. Jordan, where webelieve the entire stock of Strela-2 was destroyed(with some components going for ­recycling) we know
anecdotally that ‘several hundred‘ were destroyed.21
If all were destroyed that would bring the total to an
additional 300 or 500 if Strela-3 and early Igla are to be
added. To this need to be added the entire US stock of
Redeye MANPADS less the 7,500 that were ­transferred
to other countries and may or may not have been
expended or destroyed. It is not known whether asimilar exercise took place in Russia. However, given

the Russian propensity to store ­obsolete weapons
rather than destroy them, this is unlikely. Given thedata conservativism we have adopted, it is possiblethat total numbers of destroyed MANPADS (again,
excluding US destruction of its Redeye inventory)
approaches the 32,000 touted by the US State Department (McLeary, 2011).
Some issues need to be highlighted. First, as can beseen from Table 32, numbers destroyed vary quite
widely, from individual missiles, to several thousands.
Second, often destruction projects only destroy
non-functioning weapons, some of which arevisible in photographs. Third, only older generation
missiles—Strela-2 and Redeyes—appear to be on the­destruction list. We could find no evidence of newer
MANPADS being destroyed.
Motivations for permitting destruction
Data on motivations for destruction are hard to comedestruction
by, but important if the momentum of ­is to be maintained. However, piecing together
bits of data, including cables from US embassies,­photographs, and other sources, there appear to be
three main motivations for MANPADS destruction.

Table 32: Known/verified MANPADS destruction projects
State

Date

Type

NumberAgencyReference

Afghanistan

2007

?

101

ISAF

PM/WRA, 2007

Belarus2005–08

Strela 2M

29 (+16planned)Bosnia andHerzegovina

2004

?

6,000

SFOR

Shapiro, 2012; Cukali, 2003

Bolivia

2006

?

?

US Government

Greenlee, 2006

Burundi2008

Strela-2

104

MAG

MAG, 2008

Croatia

2011

?

1,000

Cyprus2009

Strela-2

324;
101 gripstocks;
648 batteries

Cyrprus National
Guard

Martynyuk and Diaz, 2009

Ethiopia

2010

?

1

RECSA/Ethiopian
PoliceRECSA, 2010

Hungary

2005/06

Strela-2

1,540

Liberia

2007

?

45

UN-DDR

PM/WRA, 2007

Libya

2012

?

5,000 approx.

LMAC

Shapiro, 2012

Mauritania

2012

?

141

NSPA/ Handicap
International

Avvocato Militare, 2012

21

80

Interview with disarmament expert at NATO on 23 April 2012.

Krol, 2005; RiaNovosti, 2008

US Department of State, 2011;
Rockwell, 2011

Embassy Budapest, 2006

Nicaragua

2006

Strela-2

2,000 approx.

Republika
Srpska

2003

?

1,077

SFOR

Cukali, 2003

Serbia2007

Strela-2

4,280

Self

Munter, 2008

Sudan

2007

?

21

NI

PM/WRA, 2007

Tajikistan

2012

Strela-2

12

Uganda2007?

?

SaferAfrica

Guardian, 2010

Ukraine

2007

?

1,000

NAMSA

PM/WRA, 2007

TOTAL

Schroeder, 2006; US Departmentof State, 2005

NAMSA, 2012

22,849+Some states, e.g. Uganda, Nicaragua and Hungary
have destroyed their stocks of early MANPADS
because their military assessment sees these missiles
as a problem to store, and a possible threat to civilian
security while other states, Jordan, for example, are in
the process of replacing older missiles with newer onesor have already done so. Finally, a large ­categoryof countries views MANPADS (usually obsolete ones)
as a potential source of income if sold on the open­(officially, the state-to-state) market.
A US government Agency, the Office of WeaponsRemoval and Abatement (PM/WRA) has engaged
some thirty countries in destroying their MANPADS
stocks, and provides the most extensive ­information
on such efforts. Combined with other sources ofdata, this presents a reasonably good picture of theprocesses involved in destroying MANPADS. Overall,some states recognize the threat of MANPADS and
are willing, sometimes anxious, to collaborate with theUnited States in their destruction, provided funds (andsometimes expertise) are made available by foreign
donors (most often the United States). Destruction andcapacity-development then take place together,with the US agency contributing to local programs
such as Physical Security and Stockpile Management(PSSM). A long list of countries have gone this route.
In other cases, the motivation is effectively pecuniary.
Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen, for example, engaged inlengthy negotiations for market-level c­ ompensation
for their excess MANPADS, with the Serbians evenstarting negotiations with Egypt for the sale of theirremaining surplus stocks.

the destruction of 2,000 of its Strela-2, and the transfer
to the United States of an additional 1,200 Igla andIgla-1 and their gripstocks for ­countermeasure testing.
In return, the United States believed it would provide
US $5 million for a heavy ammunition disposal project
the Ukrainians were interested in, while the Iglas
would be provided free in the framework of a joint
US–­
Ukrainian study of countermeasures. ­Effectively,
this transfer would be to test the missiles to ­destruction.
The ­Ukrainians stood firm that all transactions were tobe paid for, while trying to minimize the numbers of
missiles for both local destruction and ­countermeasuretransfer. The wrangling took six years to settle, withmuch lower numbers being included (Clinton, 2008;2009b).
The examples of Nicaragua and Bolivia may have
had a different basis. In both countries, the ­presidents­(independently of each other) agreed to thed­ estruction of stocks of MANPADS. Political o­ pposition
at home then called the entire project into ­question
after only about half the agreed inventory wasdestroyed. In both cases, the national p­ arliament
voiced serious objections to the destruction ofnational weapons, in Bolivia to the point of attempts
to impeach the president. While financial interests
may have been part of the motivation for objections(Nicaragua had been the source of several MANPADS
leaks. Schroeder, 2006) interior political wrangling,framed in the ever-touchy Latin American issue ofresistance to US domination was very important.

Resisting destruction: Ukraine and Latin America
Three notable cases—Ukraine, Nicaragua, andBolivia—who have resisted MANPADS destruction are
instructive. The Ukraine and the United States reached
an agreement in which the Ukraine would agree to81Box 5: Belarus’ negotiations on MANPADS
destruction
Negotiations on the destruction of MANPADS
can be complicated by various considerations.
To show how negotiations regarding the destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) andespecially MANPADS can go wrong, this Box takes
a closer look at the case of Belarus.

destruction of excess SALW around US $800,000.
Khainousky also stressed that Belarus wouldn’t
have any excess MANPADS to destroy, but as a
gesture of goodwill, it would destroy 30, including
the 14 already destroyed in March (Krol, 2005).
The Belarusian OSCE delegation had originallyagreed that the GOB would destroy MANPADS
stockpiles, but changed its course after the
UK offered industrial shears for the destruction.
Different interests within the GOB led to the factthat other options than the destruction of theexcess MANPADS were considered. In this case,once MANPADS destruction was off the table, theUK was reluctant to pay for the storage of excess
SALW, which, apparently, was the ­Belarusianside’s main interest. Finally in December 2008,
the Defense Ministry of Belarus claimed to havedestroyed the remaining 15 Strela-2M MANPADS,
bringing the total to 29 after five years of backand forth on the matter (NA, 2008b).

In July 2003, the Government of Belarus (GOB)
was the first participating state that requested
help with securing SALW and the destruction ofexcess SALW under the Organization for Security
and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) document
on Small Arms and Light Weapons, agreed uponin November 2000 (NA, 2008a). Two projects led
by the United Kingdom (UK) were initiated. One
project aimed at securing stockpiles and one at
destroying excess SALW including MANPADS.
Two years later, in March 2005, the GOB
had destroyed 14 Strela-2M MANPADS as a­demonstration of its intent to move forward on
the projects (Krol, 2005). When in mid-October
the UK OSCE delegation asked the GOB about
its contribution to the project, it claimed to havebeen “misheard” and that no MANPADS were to
be destroyed. It appeared that Minsk just wanted
the OSCE to help secure their excess SALW (Krol,
2005).

The Belarusian case illustrates four major points:• Political agreement on MANPADS destruction
does not necessarily lead to the results hopedfor by the donors.
• Stockpiling states will try to use the MANPADS
issue to leverage benefits in other areas notconnected to MANPADS, but of greater
concern to themselves.
• Multiple interests of actors within a stockpilinggovernment can lead to delays or cancellations
in destruction programs. Outsiders may havelittle effect on the ultimate decisions, which aretaken for internal power and political reasons.
• MANPADS offered for destruction were obsolete
and of no great military use: a pattern that isseen in many SALW buy-back programs.

By the end of October 2005, the GOB had­
apparently
backpedaledandAleksandr
Khainousky, Deputy Head of the International­
Security and Arms Control Department at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the UK had
focused on stockpile security throughout thepast two years and that Minsk subsequently had
dropped the destruction of excess SALW becauseof the lack of donors. Notwithstanding that, theestimated costs of improving stockpile security
would have been around US $3.6 million and theSummary and conclusions: Surplus destruction
•

•

82

In MANPADS destruction projects, about 32,000
MANPADS have been successfully destroyed—
possibly as much as five to ten percent of world
inventory (depending on estimate of total­stockpiles).
Most of the stocks destroyed were obsolescentweapons.

Marc Kösling••States do recognize the danger in stockpiling­ bsolete MANPADS and are happy to destroyothose, particularly if approached with an­appropriate ‘sweetener’.
Not all states have the capacity to destroy
MANPADS, and capacity-building efforts, as well
as related development of infrastructure andfunding for PSSM are a proven tool to help suchstates overcome reluctance to destroy local
weapons.

••

A legacy of a military–political ideology that
believes in storing all weapons or that views
weapons in ideological–nationalistic terms canseriously inhibit MANPADS destruction.
Buy-back programs such as the United States canbackfire, notably when states feel they can get abetter financial deal on the open market.

Technology transfer: Reverse engineering,copying, and self-madeA number of technology transfers of MANPADS haveoccurred in the past four decades since MANPADS
first appeared. A transfer of MANPADS technology toanother state is generally motivated by an ideologymix (e.g. US transfers to Contra and Afghan NSAGs,
and licensing to a European consortium, as well as
Soviet licensing to its satellites and allies), economics(e.g. Russian sales to Venezuela), and politics (e.g.
Egyptian transfers to North Korea). There are two,rather different scenarios of technology transfers.
One, a manufacturing state licenses the m­ anufactureof a MANPADS type to another country (e.g. licensing
of QW-1/2 to Iran). The licensee may then go on tosubsequently produce a more advanced versionof the weapon. Scenario two typically involves thereverse engineering of the MANPADS without the­(official) permission of the originating state.

­ akistan, Iran, and North Korea for manufacture ofP
their versions of Chinese versions of Russian originals. Both the Pakistani Anza Mk II/III and the IranianMisaghs were developed on the basis of originals andtechnical specs provided for the purpose by China(Janes, 2012v, w).
The Soviet Union encouraged its allies and ­dependents
to copy its weaponry among other things to ensure acommonality. The Kalashnikov rifle, for instance, hasbeen copied by over fifty countries. To some degree it
appears that the same phenomenon caused a spreadof manufacture of Russian MANPADS to Bulgaria,
Romania and other Eastern European countries
which produced the Strela-2 under license, at least
until the appearance of the Igla, at which point theRussians became more restrictive in their approach.
­Nevertheless, Igla-1 have been licensed to Singapore,and both Strela-2 and Igla-S have been licensed for
manufacture by Vietnam (Defense Update, 2007).
Other manufacturers have been far more restrictive inallowing copies to be made: Mistral has been copied
to some degree by South Korea, though neither the
Swedish RBS-70 nor British MANPADS appear to havebeen manufactured elsewhere. However, India’s
intention to modernize its ground-based air defense
systems, and the likelihood that they will order 5,000
systems will probably involve technology transfer andmanufacturing in India (Sakar, 2012).

Licensed production
Reverse engineering and copying
Licensed production of MANPADS has occurredin several cases. The European Stinger ­Consortium
composed of Turkey, Greece, Germany and The
Netherlands manufactures Stinger missiles under­­
license from the United States for their own­consumption. Some 12,000 Stingers have been
­manufactured under the provisions of that a­ greement.
The ­Consortium has a ‘no third party clause’ which
prohibits the export of this weapon without express
consent of the licensor, and the missiles were intendedfor ­consortium members’ own militaries. An export ofEuropean Stingers to Italy was approved by the UnitedStates. A similar co-production arrangement wasmade with Switzerland, which resulted in the production of some 2,000 missiles according to our estimates.
China22 has developed most of its families of MANPADS
on the basis of Russian originals. It is not clear whether
these were licit copies or reverse engineering. Whatis clear is that China then licensed production to22

In this brief, China is used to refer to the territory excluding Taiwan.

In contrast to licensed production, a number of
MANPADS lines have come into existence throughreverse engineering and copying. The Egyptians havereverse-engineered the Strela-2 to ­manufacture the‘Ayn-al-Sakr. Samples of Strela-2s were sent to ­Pakistan
and North Korea intended for technical study, andthose countries began to assemble their own (aided
by deliberate China technological support). Samplesof Stingers that reached China through Pakistan
were reverse engineered as well (Donovan, 1996,
p. 10). The same is true of Stinger samples that reached
North Korea and are apparently being manufactured
there (Jane’s, 2012g).

Generally, the Russian Strela and Igla families are themost copied—be it licensed or reverse engineered—of all MANPADS. The Polish Grom-1 is heavily based on
the Igla-1 (SA-16). Claims that it was actually a licensed
production have been disputed by the producers. It
seems that a license was denied after Poland left the83former Soviet Block in the early 1990s. There has beensome speculation that the Polish ­intelligence service
managed to get access to the Igla design plans,
rapidly shortening the development of the Grom.
The Grom--2 is an indigenous ­enhancement of theGrom-1. The CA-94 is a Romanian reverse engineered
Strela-2M. The CA-94M is an indigenous ­improvementof the CA-94. In addition, practically all Chinese
MANPADS are reverse engineered and improved
versions of Russian missiles.
Implications of technology transfer
Transferring technology of as dangerous a weapon as
MANPADS implies a certain lack of control. Howeverrobust an end-user regime, losses and unforeseen
events are almost inevitable. Moreover, the easewith which some MANPADS technologies havebeen copied, often by less-responsible regimes,
casts doubts on the ability of the world community
to fully control the proliferation of MANPADS, or theirreaching dangerous actors. Some generalizations
can be made.
•••Even a moderate technical ability enables aninterested actor to copy MANPADS from existing
samples (e.g. Egypt).
Copied weapons are often improved upon, since
the copying normally takes place well after theoriginal model has been produced. Examples
are the Chinese QW series, the Polish Grom or the
Romanian CA-94.
It is technically feasible to manufacture an­operating MANPADS from disassembled parts of
one or several existing missiles.

Though MANPADS are technologically complex
devices, it appears that there is no serious barrier toreverse engineer any of them. Most cases of reverse
engineering have been by state actors who havethe resources and will to engage in such a project.
However, given the growing availability of off-theshelf components, as well as the worldwide spreadof ­technical resources, one cannot discount the­possibility that an organization or state with ­sufficient
willpower, time, and funds, would be able to reverse
engineer a fairly sophisticated MANPADS. This bodes
very ill for the possibility of controlling MANPADS’
spread, and implies the need for broader, more­inclusive, and more intrusive surveillance over ­potential
sources of machinery and materials. It must be kept inmind that for illegal purposes, a MANPADS need not
be of military grade. For military purposes, robustness
and compactness are necessary prerequisites. The
84

same may not be true for an NSAG operating outside
a battle zone. Airliners in approach are vulnerable
over a lengthy part of their descent (see Chapter 1),
which is often over populated areas where an NSAG
could assemble separate elements that, in a military
MANPADS would be unwieldy or impossible to use due
to field conditions.

Conclusion• While not a major market segment in theworld’s weapons trade, the sale of MANPADS­constitutes a respectable income stream, albeit
heavily influenced by political consideration.
• The second-hand market for state–to–statetransfers is a major issue, notably for states thathave economic problems. Ukraine and North
Korea have been heavily implicated in sales
and attempted sales.
• Problematic recipients of MANPADS include
those whose governments—by design, because
of incapacity, or corruption—facilitate thetransfer of MANPADS to third parties. China andNorth Korea are prominent in that regard. Whilemost such transfers are state–to–state, in somecases transfers to NSAGs are an enduring andprominent problem.
• The Syrian and Libyan cases demonstrate that
MANPADS in particular, are extremely vulnerable to political chaos, which would allow
the escape of MANPADS from even the bestguarded stockpiles into NSAG and private
hands. Transferring MANPADS to another statealmost always constitutes a security risk, since
future political conditions cannot be foreseen.
• Some states, even where they have nottransferred the MANPADS themselves, have­contributed to the uncontrolled p­roliferation
problem by providing either samples of missiles
or plans for the development of i­ndigenous
MANPADS to other states (e.g. the Soviet Union,
Egypt, China). Such technology ­transfers,
both clandestine and open, remain a weak
spot in control efforts. Even where states
make attempts to protect their technologicalknowledge, reverse engineering on weapons­
such as MANPADS is feasible.
• Legacy generation one MANPADS remain aproblem even after the emergence of newer
weapon types, unless they are carefully
destroyed. While such legacy weapons arenot a serious military threat, they nevertheless­represent a threat to civil aviation.
• MANPADS mobility and lethality have meant insome cases that manufacturers (such as Russia,
the United Kingdom and the United States) haveand are facing the threat of their own weapons
being turned against them. This could be a
motivating point to enhance efforts to reduce
MANPADS spread.
• France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
seem to be moving away from developing
pure MANPADS, with all the risks associated withsuch mobile and concealable weapons, to the
production of light self-propelled SAMS to fulfill
the MANPADS role. These have the advantage
of being less susceptible (and probably lessattractive) to terrorists as they require a more
complex infrastructure for maintenance andaiming.
• Attempts to recover and destroy MANPADS
have reduced world stocks by about 30,000. Thisis a negligible number representing between
less than ten and less than five percent ofworld stocks (the number depending on thestarting figure). Nevertheless, these efforts must
continue since they focus on less controllable
stockpiles, as well as surpluses which can easily
be a ­temptation for theft and redirection.
• The black and gray markets consist of bothlarge and small clandestine shipments and­transfers. For the purely black market which
is d­ominated by individual traders, criminalgroups, and NSAGs, better intelligence andpolice work seems to provide the best optionsfor ­interdiction. Larger state–to–state, or ­state–to–NSAG transfers remain problematic
because states often have the capacity to hidesuch transfers officially. However, in many cases,
such large transfers become known, if only inretrospect. A considered name-and-shame
program, or threats to use that tool, mightserve as a deterrent for states considering such­activities.
• Technical training (see for instance Schroeder,
2007a, b) and capacity-building are likely
to help deter theft. Nevertheless, systemic­problems (e.g. high levels of state ­corruption)and ­transportation weaknesses represent
ways in which MANPADS can proliferate­uncontrolled. More vigorous utilization of enduser inspection by manufacturers, as well astransportation regulation could help in
better ­this regard.
• The United States’ buy-back campaign has been
relatively successful. However, like all purchases,
it presents a systemic problem. ­Specifically,
if such purchases are seen as economic­transaction, the current owners may be loath torelinquish the weapons, feeling they can makea better deal elsewhere. ­Buy-back campaigns
would therefore seem to be most useful when
incentives, and with a
combined with other ­vigorous publicity campaign explaining thenon-economic value of the b­ uy-back.
• Most more-or-less sophisticated industrial
producers would appear to have little problem
in reverse engineering MANPADS. If the engineer wishes a MANPADS that is not up to military specs, the problems are even simpler. Thisimplies that technical solutions as well as thepolitical will to develop and deploy them, must
be devised to complicate and limit copying.

85

Michael Ashkenazi

486

Stockpiles

T

his chapter is intended to provide an overview ofthe MANPADS stockpile worldwide. Little reliable
data, however, is available about world stockpiles.
States are notoriously reluctant to disclose the quantities of weapons they possess. We necessarily have
had to use extrapolation more than is desirable.

Of as much concern as the sheer number of
MANPADS in existence (larger numbers imply greater
vulnerability to theft and diversion) is the quality ofnational stockpiles. We are less concerned about
safety (protection from unintentional combustion)in this regard than security (freedom from threat byexternal action), though there is a connection inasmuch as safety accidents can hide security irregularities, and may sometimes be started on purpose
to cover up theft or irregularities. As is the case withstockpile numbers, few states willingly disclose security
weaknesses, unless these come to light under exceptional public circumstances. Thus our evaluation of the
security of MANPADS stocks is dependent largely on
what we know of stockpile security in a given country
in general, which may not be much.

•

The objectives of this chapter are therefore twofold:to estimate stockpiles in several key countries, and to
estimate the security and safety of those stockpiles.

MethodGenerally speaking, a stockpile consists of several
categories of ownership that can be expressed in theformula in Figure 10.

•

many countries report on transfers to the UN Arms
Transfers Register, partly because information on
MANPADS constitutes valuable economic data
which firms may want to publicize in support ofe.g. stockholders, and partly from other sources
such as shipping news, transfer reports are rarely
complete and not always detailed.
Based on an analysis of the military doctrine
concerned, it is also possible to estimate, withwide margins, what national stockpiles look like. In
some states, MANPADS are integrated into every
maneuver division (e.g. the United States), inothers they are used by specialist units (e.g. New
Zealand) which gives an indication of scale andnumbers, notably if supported by other data. The
unit estimation method is never complete, sinceother military or para-military formations may also
have MANPADS stocks: in the United States the
Secret Service, a branch of the Treasury Department is believed to have MANPADS to protect
the president of the United States. In Syria, the airforce holds an unknown number of MANPADS toprotect its bases, in addition to the army whoseorder of battle (OOB) is relatively well-known,
including MANPADS units. It also has to be kept inmind that doctrine does in many cases not translate one to one into reality. Rather, it is an ideal
state that a military aspires to.
Finally, the use of photographic and film evidence
provides some clues as to holdings. Some states,e.g. Venezuela, have displayed their MANPADS
holdings publicly, and these materials are available on the Internet.

Figure 10: Calculating national stockpiles

National stockpile = manufactured weapons + imported weapons – expended(training+operations+destroyed) weapons – exported weapons – leaked(stolen+lost) weapons.
In the case of MANPADS, none of these numbers
are indisputably known. The security and safety ofstockpiles is as sensitive a topic as stockpile numbers,
perhaps even more so. None of the sixteen states thatanswered our queries would provide any informationon thefts, losses, or security & safety, beyond notingthat they adhered to OSCE Best Practice Guidelines(see Chapter 5). Methodologically, we must keep anumber of issues in mind:• Even though monitoring of MANPADS transfers(see Chapter 3) is improving slowly, partly because

We have assumed that MANPADS stockpiles will be at
the upper end in terms of quality of storage (safety &security) but that general storage practices, as madeevident by e.g. accident reports, may also provide
clues as to the quality of MANPADS storage.
The combination of methods used provides someinsight into stockpiles of MANPADS. However, ourresults must be viewed with great caution.

87

World MANPADS stockpiles
Reports on MANPADS stockpiles worldwide put the
number at 500,000 to 750,000 MANPADS (Bartak, 2005;
Berman et al., 2011; Schroeder, 2007b). However, thisestimate does not appear to have much by way ofevidence and stands on somewhat shaky methodological grounds. Given the formula shown in Figure
10, we simply do not know how many operative
MANPADS are available in world stockpiles. The estimates below are thus extremely tentative.
Counting MANPADS is not as much an issue as is toassess the state of the stockpiles. And other issues,
such as safety and security procedures, transport
safety and security, and proper accounting, count foras much, and perhaps more.
The examples of the major stockpiles provided below
are intended to demonstrate what we know of one
dimension of the problem.
Three of the major MANPADS stockpiles in the world
are also the major manufacturers in terms of volume
produced, numbers transferred to other countries,
and variety of types. These three—United States,
Russia and China—own the world’s major MANPADS
inventories. They also provide us with examples ofpotential ways to measure stockpiles.
United States
The United States has been manufacturing MANPADS
for over four decades. MANPADS are used as a toolof diplomatic policy (viz. Afghanistan and Nicaragua), for domestic security (e.g. protecting thepresident), as well as a military weapon. MANPADS
are deployed in maneuver units of the army andmarines, and certain overseas air force bases as well.
It is also possible, though unlikely, that MANPADS are
deployed by police units in e.g. New York (In From
the Cold, 2011). In theory, the widespread dispersionof MANPADS makes the stockpile more susceptible
to theft and leakage, though no such evidence hascome to light so far.
Manufacturing perspective: 15,669 FIM-92A (Basic
Stinger) and just fewer than 600 FIM-92B (Stinger-POST)
missiles were produced. The last Stinger-POST rounds
were produced by August 1987 (Jane’s, 2012g). Thus,around 2,000 Stingers were manufactured per year. If
this number is valid for the FIM-92C (RMP) and FIM-92E(Block I), then since 1995, when the RMP enteredservice, some 36,000 additional units have been
88

produced. Excepting use, losses and theft if any,
this would bring the US stockpile to around 50,000. If
manufacturing continued between 1987 and 1995 at
the same pace, which is possible, the total number
would be 66,000.
OOB perspective: Four of the five armed services
deploy MANPADS (the Coast Guard being the exception) as a normal part of their Order of Battle (disposition of units and forces and their equipment. Thereis evidence that the US Secret Service, charged withprotecting the president, has a small stockpile aswell. Other government-related security organizations such as the Homeland Security department may
have MANPADS on their inventories.
MANPADS were counted here on the basis of what
is known about US doctrine for the use of MANPADS(US Army, 1984; US Army, ND) combined with the 2012
Military Balance (IISS, 2012).
• All US army divisions have MANPADS assets (72teams with six MANPADS each in airborne divisions, 60 in armored and mechanized divisions, 40
in light divisions).
• Marine expeditionary forces (equivalent to a division), have 90 Stinger teams with six missiles each,• Marine expeditionary brigades, 45 teams, and• a marine expeditionary unit, 15 teams.
• A small number of Stinger teams are assigned
to US air force bases in Saudi Arabia and Korea(Jane’s “FIM-92 Stinger”; IISS, 2012).
On this basis we estimate the minimum stockpileof ready-to-use MANPADS in the US inventory to be
45,078 missiles, and about one-third that number ofgripstocks. This number does not include other government related security organizations’ stockpiles, which
may number in the hundreds. We would also assume
that there are, in addition, reserve stocks which might
equal between one-third to equal-to the ready-touse MANPADS, bringing the total stockpile, by our estimate, to 60 to 90,000 at most.
Photographic and documentary evidence: Neither
de-classified documents nor photographic evidence
provide any clues as to the size of the US MANPADS
stockpile. Some of the documents (e.g. US Army, ND)
shed light on the procedures for securing MANPADS in
the field, which appear to be relatively redundant androbust. However, an audit by the General Accounting
Office of the US Congress indicates that when it comesto MANPADS sold abroad, there has been a provenwide gap between doctrine and practice, in termsof inspection rigor and record-keeping (US GeneralAccounting Office, 2004). Whether this reflects on US
military practice at home as well is unknown.
Theft and accident perspective: “… there are no(publicly) confirmed cases of successful thefts [ofMANPADS] from US arsenals” (Schroeder, 2009). US
arsenals in general are subject to a multiplicity ofphysical and other checks, and so the statement by
Schroeder would seem to reflect the reality. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the US MANPADS
stockpile is widely dispersed, accidents happen, andsoldiers are notorious for abandoning weapons on thebattlefield under certain circumstances.
While some cases have come to light of attempted
black market transactions involving Stingers, thesewere almost always cases of stings conducted by
US law enforcement agencies, and do not provide
evidence about stockpile quality. While we doubt
US stockpiling procedures are perfect, they appear
nevertheless to be robust, and no cases of theft or loss
in the United States have come to light.
Summary and conclusions: US stockpile
•

•

•

•

The overall size of the US MANPADS stockpile isestimated at around 50 to 66,000 using manufacturing data, or 60 to 90,000 using the OOB
method, the higher number in each estimate is a
product of the reserve stocks factor used, i.e. 50 or
100 percent reserve.
The US stockpile appears to be widely distributed,
including overseas, which would imply a certain
degree of vulnerability.
Oversight of Stingers sold abroad has been
patchy, though it is unknown whether lack ofoversight is also true of home stockpiles.
There is no evidence of cases of theft or lost
MANPADS from US stockpiles.

RussiaRussia started producing MANPADS after securing
plans for the US Redeye. The Strela MANPADS has
been manufactured since 1970 when it entered series
production, and is still being produced by Vietnam
and Serbia under license. Unlike the Redeye, theStrela-2 was never recalled for destruction, though
it has been made obsolete in the Russian armed
services. Assessing Russian MANPADS stockpiles is also
complicated by the number of types produced inthat country.

MANPADS are deployed in front-line battalions of theRussian army, and as part of in-depth air defense
system for valuable installations and headquarters.
There is no public evidence for their presence in Air
Force or Strategic Rocket Force bases, but given the
Russian doctrine of air defense in depth, one may
assume this is the case as well.
Manufacturing perspective: No reliable source
provides information on the rate of production for
Russian MANPADS. We thus have no real picture of
the capacity of Russian MANPADS manufacture. Asa rough estimate based on number of Igla/SA-18
produced (roughly 8,500) over a period of 27 years(series production started in 1983, and continued forexport until 2010 at least) we get 300/year production,
which seems somewhat low (Jane’s, 2012c). Given
that thousands of MANPADS have been exported ina single tranche, it is to be assumed that production
capacity is considerably greater than actual yearon-year production. The Igla-S to Venezuela were
supplied within two years of contract signature (seeForero, 2010), which implies a production capacity ofaround 1,000/year.
A second factor needs to be considered as well. In
contrast to the United States, Russia rarely destroys
old and even obsolete weapons (see Box 5: Belarus’
negotiations on MANPADS destruction). Thus the total
Russian stockpile most likely includes obsolete Strela2s along with advanced Igla-S, albeit, presumably insecond and third echelon (that is, reserve and homeland defense) units or stockpiles. If the Russians havebeen manufacturing between 300 (the minimum
estimate) and 1,000 per year, for domestic purposes,
we estimate the total stockpile by this method to be
between 13,300 and 46,000. The higher number seems
more likely.
OOB perspective: The picture for the Russian armed
forces is complicated by a number of factors:
First, the Russian armed forces are still in a period offlux. The army is currently being restructured arounda brigade-based structure, rather than an army
corps and divisional system. Second, Russian military
formations of the same type, e.g. motor rifle brigades,
might have slightly different structures. Third, we could
find no valid evidence of the MANPADS located on
Russian navy vessels, and have made an estimate
of one team per vessel (excluding submarines)as we
did for the United States. Air bases and radars which
are likewise protected by layered anti-aircraft assets
are unenumerated, but an additional total of some89

10,000 missiles would not be unlikely. Fourth, there is noevidence of a Russian program to destroy ­obsolescent
MANPADS such as the Strela family. These may havebeen sold, destroyed clandestinely, or transferredto Ministry of Interior Border Guard or Interior Troops,
which removes them from the purely military OOB, but
not from the national stockpile.
In Russian doctrine, every combat battalion isprotected by one platoon (we assume three sections/teams each, with six missiles per team) of MANPADS. In
addition, high value targets, air defense assets, radars,
and command posts are all protected by teams, or incases of larger assets, platoons of MANPADS operators.
Basing ourselves on the most recent edition of Military
Balance (IISS, 2012), and including surface combatantvessels of the navy (N=185) with one team aboard
each, and around 10,000 missiles for high value sites,
we estimate the number of ready-to-use missiles at
64,160. To that should be added a reserve stock of
between one-third and the ready-to-use number,bringing the current stockpile estimate to 128,320 asa likely maximum. We have assumed that the otherRussian government-related security services—theFederal Border Guard Service, the Interior Troops(ODON divisions and OBRON brigades), Federal
Protection Service, Railway Troops, and Federal
Communications and Information Agency Troops—
are not armed with MANPADS. Should that not be thecase, then we would need to add around 92 brigades
worth of MANPADS (72 missiles per brigade) to an
additional number of 6,624 (plus a possible equivalent number in reserve). At a maximum, therefore, wewould estimate Russian stockpiles at 140,000.
Theft and accident perspective: Problems of securing
Russian stockpiles, notably at the manufacturing end,
appear to have been endemic (Pyadushkin et al.,2003). While such problems are probably more true ofthe early post-Soviet period, they likely persist today
as well, at least to some degree. Security for existing
stockpiles is sometimes poor (see for example RTCom,2010). The situation in air defense bases which may
also contain MANPADS is not much better (see Think
Defence, 2010).
We have no direct evidence of thefts of MANPADS
from Russian stocks. As in the United States, there
have been cases of Russian stings against would-bepurchasers (Williscroft, 2006, pp. 197–98). However,given the relative restrictiveness of the Russian media
world, such cases as might have happened would
not have reached the public.
90

Russia has also suffered from a number of wellrecorded ammunition accidents (cf. Reuters, 2012a;
RT, 2011). These have reportedly included artillery
shells and bombs, but the presence of MANPADS insuch massive depots should not be unlikely. Cruciallyfor this study, it indicates serious deficiencies in Russian
stockpile safety procedures. These explosions bothcomplicate the stockpile count, and also may besources for MANPADS diffusion, as stocks of MANPADS
accounted for as ‘destroyed in accident’ may­actually have been stolen either before or after theaccident.
Even more so than in the case of the United States,
the Russian stockpile is spread over an enormous territory and MANPADS are in the possession of numerous
units. This means that vulnerability to theft and diversion are even greater than in the United States, allthings being equal. During the immediate post-Soviet
period and until the recent military reforms (2010and after; Rossiskaya Gazetta, 2012), when pay wasboth late and low, it is possible that MANPADS weresold to non-state groups and individuals as a way of
supplementing pay. To add to the problem, Russia has
been plagued by a number of rebellions in the North
Caucasus, with Chechnya being the most publicized.
Many of the rebels are former Russian army veterans
who may have deserted with MANPADS, or who may
have contacts within the armed forces to acquirethem (US State Department, 2008).
Summary and conclusions: Russia’s stockpile•••

By the manufacturing method, we estimatedRussian stockpiles to be a maximum of 46,000.
The OOB method yielded a minimum of 64,000
MANPADS. If we assume a 100 percent reserve
stockpile, the number would be 128,000.
There is no evidence of the Russians destroying
obsolete stocks of e.g. Strela-2A/B, which may
have been transferred to Border Guard and interior troops. If this is the case, the stockpile may
reach 140,000 MANPADS.
Russian stockpiles are widely dispersed andpossibly poorly guarded. There is repeatedevidence of leakage from SALW manufacturers,
which may include MANPADS. There is evidenceof poor guard practices of other munitions, and of
repeated ammunition explosions, leading to theconclusion that MANPADS may be at risk as well,with possible diversions before accidents.

China23
China is the third largest producer of MANPADS witha number of versions of MANPADS, and missiles for
self-propelled short-range missile systems. MANPADS
are deployed in the PLA (People’s Liberation Army),
and we assume the PLA Navy (PLAN) and Air Force(PLAAF). The PLA is modernizing, and is in the processof reorganizing more professionally, but it is still possiblethat MANPADS may be found within the local defense
units as well.
Manufacturing perspective: Chinese capacities andvolumes for MANPADS manufacture are unknown. We
could find no indications of production volumes. Given
China’s rapid industrialization, and the emphasis on
modernizing the PLA, it can be expected that theseare similar to the manufacturing capacities of theother two major producers.
OOB perspective: Currently, the PLA ground force isorganized into 18 group armies, along with a numberof independent units. Maneuver forces consist of
approximately 40 divisions and about 43 separate
brigades (armor, mechanized, amphibious, andinfantry), supported by roughly 42 artillery and air
defense divisions and brigades, and various otherunits.
In addition to the PLA, the PLA Navy has two­amphibious divisions.
The PLA Air Force has an airborne army of two airborne
divisions plus combat support elements, perhaps
amounting to a third division (Blasko, 2005).
In a very detailed report, Andrew (2009) provides
details of the air-defense picture for PLA maneuver
elements. Every maneuver battalion includes aplatoon of three MANPADS teams with six missiles
each (Andrew, 2009). We take this to include brigade
HQ which is usually battalion size. Divisions include 106
MANPADS controlled by the Divisional Air Defense
brigade commander. Artillery brigades are protectedby one platoon of 24 MANPADS.
We have no information on MANPADS deployed by
the PLAN or PLAAF. For the PLAN, once again we
have made the conservative estimate that surface
combatants will be armed with at least one team of
MANPADS, though this may not be the case for major
surface combatants which have more complex air
23

defense suites. There is some photographic evidence
that MANPADS are installed on small craft, albeit
in a mounted configuration which may or may not
be dismountable. The PLAN disposes of some 650
surface ships of various capacities and sizes (IISS,
2012). Assuming one team with six missiles on average(smaller combatants obviously are likely to carry less)we have 3,900 MANPADS deployed. It is likely thatboth PLAAF installations and those of the Second Artillery Force (Strategic Missile Forces) are protected by,among other weapons, MANPADS. The PLAAF has five
SAM/mixed SAM Divisions, 13 SAM/ADA brigades, 10
SAM/ADA regiments, and four SAM battalions (Military
Balance, 2012). If these follow the PLA pattern of 106
MANPADS per AD brigade, this represents an inventory of 4,100 MANPADS. The Second Artillery Corps,
which is the strategic missile corps of the PLA is organized into 28 brigades (IISS, 2012). Once again we
have assumed that each brigade has 106 MANPADS
for defense.
The total inventory of ready-to-use MANPADs would
thus appear to be around 23,000. Assuming a readyreserve of around that same number, we estimate
the total MANPADS holdings of China to be around46,000.
Theft and accident perspective: In the period 1998–
2012, China reported three unplanned explosions atmunitions ites (SAS, 2012). Whether this is a case ofunderreporting or of good management of ammunition stocks is hard to say. There have also been noreported cases of thefts of Chinese MANPADS. Though
Chinese MANPADS have been found in individual
hands or with NSAGs, these have generally beenreported as being the result of transfer from a third
party (US State Department, 2008).
Overall, it seems that Chinese MANPADS stocks arewell guarded, and appear to be stored with due
regard to safety as well.
Summary and conclusions: Chinese stockpile
Very little has been published about China’s MANPADS
stockpile conditions. The absence of any information
may be due to absence of problems, or to a wellcontrolled press.
• From the OOB perspective, it appears that
Chinese stockpile consists of about 46,000 missilesof different types.
• The assessment of the stockpile relies on only one
method, as no other information was available.

In this brief, China is used to refer to the territory excluding Taiwan.

91

•

There is no information that would suggest thisstockpile lacks security or safety, and no evidenceof leaks.

The world stockpile picture
Estimating the world’s total stockpiles is complicatedby the factors noted at the beginning of this chapter:lack of transparency, and absence of reliable data.
(Appendix A presents the publicly available data ina table.)The data for worldwide stockpiles based on publishedmaterial amounts to 153,341 MANPADS, a number far
below the estimates for Russia alone. Individual state
stockpiles may be of the order noted in that table,
but world stockpile is likely to be several times higher.
What is also evident is the paucity of destruction incomparison to stockpiles. While large parts of somestockpiles have been destroyed, the total number ofdestructions does not even equal the manufacture of
new weapons.

Stockpiles standards in practice
Stockpile standards vary enormously, and this is trueof MANPADS components as well. Evidence from
Russia indicates that SALW and their components arevery often open to theft, stored not guarded, andmay have been diverted, at least in the past. Stockpiles in other countries have been compromised, as
the case of Peru indicates. There is also evidence
that Wassenaar Arrangement signatories are lax inexercising their right to full inspection of stockpiles ofpurchasing countries, with the potential for leakages.
Regime dissolution and battlefield losses
As the cases of Libya and the Soviet Union demonstrate, where a regime dissolves, either for internal orexternal reasons, whatever stockpile system was inpractice is likely to deteriorate fast. The case of GROMMANPADS sold by Poland to Georgia is instructive. 100
MANPADS and 60 gripstocks were sold to the Georgian
military. Polish instructors were in Georgia, helping the
Georgians attain Wassenaar Arrangement standards
for the stockpile when the war with Russia broke out.
As the Polish instructors for the Georgian army told
the US embassy, “… the Georgians ‘completely losttheir heads,’ threw the GROMS on trucks, and transported them to the battlefield” where they distributed
them to untrained military, and to civil defense units
with no training whatsoever (US Department of State,922008). The instructors were able to secure 66 of themissing missiles, but some apparently made their way
to Chechen NSAGs.
The Georgian case above illustrates two ways in which
MANPADs can enter the civilian/NSAG sphere. First, byuncontrolled distribution of MANPADS during periodsof major threat. In a number of states, civil disturbances have been met with widespread distributionof arms to the populace. In the Georgian case, thisincluded MANPADS. And while the number of GROMMANPADS was relatively small, and the Polish instructors were able to recover many of those lost, thereis neither indication that all were collected, nor thatnone other MANPADS were lost. Second, however
good their training, soldiers tend to lose munitions in
the battlefield. That happens in the case of a military force retreating in panic, as in Georgia, or evenduring the heat of an assault. And, as the Georgiancase demonstrates, these can easily make their way
outside the military.

Conclusion
Data about world stockpiles is extremely fragmentary. The use of different estimation methods
yields very different results. Most of our conclusions
to this chapter are therefore extremely tentative.
• The three largest inventories of MANPADS(China, Russia, and the United States) total aminimax of 160,000~276,000. We prefer to adopt
the larger figure largely because we feel thatmost manufacturers and origin states tend tounder report their holdings and transfers.
• The three major manufacturing nations havegrossly underreported their MANPADS holdings(as reflected in Appendix A) so we feel safe inadding the total of the three major manufacturers to the Appendix A total (bringing the world
estimated stockpile to over 475,000 MANPADS
missiles.
• MANPADS stockpile security varies from robust,with few or no losses insofar as we can tell,
to dismal, with real or potential leakages of
MANPADS into unauthorized hands.
• It is currently impossible to ensure against battlefield losses, and MANPADS on the battlefieldremain vulnerable to diversion.
• However strong a MANPADS security regime
is, when a government dissolves, and in theabsence of the rule of law, MANPADS stockpiles become extremely vulnerable to theft anddislocation.

Michael Ashkenazi

5

Regulating MANPADS

93

T

he transfer, and to some degree stockpiling, of
MANPADS has been an international concern
for over two decades, though the actual weapons
have been in service since the early 1960s. A numberof bilateral, multilateral, and international agreements exist to regulate the trade. Inter alia these
instruments and practices also provide a standard­
for stockpile security. Notwithstanding these, few
states appear to have specific legal instruments that
regulate the storage, transfer, or use of MANPADS.
These are generally subsumed within existing firearmr­egulations, or are part of the state’s military doctrine
and rarely open to outsiders. In this chapter we shallsurvey the principal legal instruments and where
possible their actual application. Given the inherent
right of self-defense embedded in the UN Charter,
the legal trade in MANPADS, as specifically defensive
weapons cannot be generally prohibited. The transfer
of MANPADS to NSAGs for use as either defensive or
offensive weapons is more problematic. Though it
appears to be covered by virtually all agreements
which prohibit transfer to criminal groups, one workaround is to argue that a specific group is not criminal.
In other words, the inherently political nature at thebase of all these agreements, legally binding or not, istheir Achilles heel.

The Wassenaar Arrangement
The Wassenaar Arrangement covers the field of
MANPADS and their trade in great detail, and serves
unofficially as the ‘Gold Standard’ of MANPADS­transfers, to which even states that are notmembers of the agreement claim to adhere. The
Wassenaar Arrangement is based on an ­affirmationby ­participating states that they adhere to certain
specific national controls on the export of arms. With
41 signatories from all continents, the Wassenaar
Arrangement (original 1996, “Elements for Exportof MANPADS” adopted 2003, amended 2007) is
the most robust and detailed arrangement for­regulating the export of weapons. Unusually for SALW
agreements, the Arrangement devotes a chapter­
specifically to MANPADS, recognizing their uniqueand ­particularly dangerous nature, and mandating
special ­arrangements for the transfer and storage ofthese weapons.
• The scope includes transfer and retransfer, as wellas transfer of development and engineering data
(WA, p. 31, 1.2).
• It specifies that transfers are only on a state-tostate basis, and that the exporting government
takes responsibility for ensuring compliance to94•

Wassenaar standards of storage and accounting(WA, p. 32, 3.8).
Exports are to be evaluated based on criteria
evolved within the Wassenaar Agreement(WA, p. 32, 3.6) taking into account potential­diversion risks in the recipient country (WA, p. 32,
3.6, 3.7), assurances about proper security andaccounting practices (WA, p. 32, 3.9) and secure­transportation, storage, and use (WA, p. 3, 3.9).

Crucially, securing export of MANPADS in the
Wassenaar Arrangement rests on three related
processes: the vendor’s assessment of the r­ecipient’s
willingness and capabilities to guard against ­diversion(including theft, etc.); guarantees from the ­recipientwith regard to security of the material and the­intellectual property; and satisfaction of the demandfor ­measurable procedures to ensure weapon­physical safety.
The 2000 update detailed Best Practices For ­Effective
Enforcement, which contains a series of measuressignatories to the Arrangement could employ toensure ­compliance. While these are very detailed,and cover most b­ est-practice ideas, they are notbinding on members of the Arrangement. The
weakness emerges from the terminology used.
­
Source c­ ountries are to ‘satisfy’ themselves that theconditions are indeed attained. As the exchange of
positions between Russia and the United States about­Venezuelan MANPADS imports shows, ‘satisfy’ can beread in many different ways, and does not require
actual eyeball ­inspection (Clinton, 2009a). In otherwords, signatories to the agreement are at liberty to
decide for themselves whether recipients fulfill therequirements. In a world of national interests, it is somewhat ingenuous to expect that nations will not further
their political agenda within normative statements.
Nevertheless, given the often vague and generalexhortations in many other ­international agreements,
the Wassenaar ­Arrangement represents a significant
and desirable advance in MANPADS regulation.

The Programme of Action on SALW Control
The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects (POA) does not specificallyrefer to MANPADS (UN Document A/CONF.192/15).
However, since MANPADS fit the parameters used to
identify SALW (portability, size, caliber) they can beseen to be encompassed by the protocol as well. The
POA’s normative focus is the removal of SALW from

criminal and insurgent hands. MANPADS are not aquintessential criminal weapon. They are however
effective terror weapons, and useful for NSAGs in
defending themselves against attacks by state airforces. The dilemma arises from the amorphous andshifting definition of terrorism as a criminal act, in aworld where, roughly speaking, one man’s terrorist is
another’s freedom fighter.
Given the unique potential of MANPADS as a mass
terror weapon, and the demonstrated use in that role(see Chapter 1), it seems that the wording of the POA
is not sufficiently strong where it comes to MANPADS.
MANPADS have no utility in crimes for profit. The single
criminal use they can be put to is within acts of terror,and subsuming these weapons under the generalcategory of SALW weakens the POA’s legal strength
in this regard. Some of the weaknesses of the POA
have been addressed in a further document, the UN
MANPADS Resolution.

The UN MANPADS Resolution
With the weakness of the POA in regard to MANPADS
being apparent, and perhaps spurred by a recordof MANPADS attacks against airliners (the dramaticand fortunately unsuccessful attack against an
Israeli airliner in Mombasa took place in 2002), theUN General Assembly passed a Resolution in 2004
to supplement the POA, thus effectively introducing
MANPADS as a discrete item to the POA (UNGA, 2004).
It effectively reinforces (without changing) the needto adhere to effective practices in restricting the illicit
transfer, ­unauthorized access and use of MANPADS.
As a General Assembly Resolution, and lacking any
enforcement mechanism, its power is limited to ­politicalpressure. In effect, the Resolution repeats the major
items of the POA with reference to MANPADS rather
than to SALW in general. It urges all states to adhere toprinciples of non-transfer to non-state actors, improve
national legislation, and enhance national controls
on production, stockpiling, transfering and brokeringof MANPADS. In the s­ixty-second session in January
2008, the UNGA repeated, almost word for word andwith no major substantive changes, the Resolution of2004 in Resolution 62/40 (UNGA, 2008). Judging fromthe content, either political wrangling did not permit
advances in dealing with MANPADS, or there was
general consensus that these statements were as far
as could be reached in the UN forum.

G8 Action Plan—Evian Summit 2003
The G8 Action Plan was agreed in 2003 within theframework of enhancing transport security. An entire
chapter is dedicated to MANPADS. The Action Plan
is based largely on the Wassenaar Arrangement andeffectively is a reiteration of its principles on MANPADS.
Two new and welcome elements are ­introduced. In
Item 1.6., the G8 agree to “… exchange ­informationon unco-operative countries and ­entities;” and to“…examine the feasibility of development for new
MANPADS of specific technical performance or launch
control features that preclude their ­unauthorised use.”
The degree to which Item 1.6 has been implemented
is unknown. Bilateral information exchanges such as
the one between the United States and Russia on theissue of MANPADS have been mired in what amounts
to protocol and definitional disagreements. We havefound little evidence to suggest that electronic orother measures to preclude unauthorized use—somerelated materials are on the market already (Armatix,2012)—are being implemented on a regular basis in
new MANPADS manufacture, though this will ­probably
develop with time.
The Action Plan was elaborated in the Secure andFacilitated International Travel Initiative (G8, ND).
The SAFTI document introduces a number of newelements.
• Work towards adopting the Wassenaar “Elements
for Export Controls on MANPADS” as an­international standard (Item 9);• Deter marketing of MANPADS technology tostates that do not maintain strong standards forexport controls (Item 10);• Establish a best practices document on optimal
methods for securely storing MANPADS (Item 11).
• Develop a method to assess airport vulnerability
to the MANPADS threat and effective countermeasures (Item 12).
All four of these items represent a new and welcome
development in the realm of MANPADS control. The
adoption of the Wassenaar standards on MANPADS—
the most far-reaching and detailed available—isa step towards developing a world standard for
MANPADS transfers. So too is item 11 of the G8 Action
Plan. Together, Items 9 and 11 advance the principleof worldwide standards for MANPADS control a stepfurther. Taken together, these documents recognize
in effect that some states are not likely to adhere
to principles of controlled exports of MANPADS and95

that something needs to be done beyond the normal
political wrangling and compromise statements thatcharacterize many control measures.
Though the G8 reiterate statements and sentimentsthat have appeared before, providing specificaction plan items is an advance on previous actions.
The heavy reliance on the specific provisions of theWassenaar Arrangement means that there is anoperative standard with almost universal standing.
­What is missing in as powerful a forum as the G8, issome indication of a future roadmap. Given theimportance of air transport, and the possible effects
of a MANPADS hit on national, regional, and possibly
world economies (cf. Chow et al., 2005, and our own
assessment in Chapter 6), a detailed, timed roadmap
would have been a major step.

OSCE
The OSCE, which has a great deal of political weight
as a standard bearer for multilateral ­security issues,
published its first comprehensive paper on MANPADS
in 2004 (OSCE, 2004). This followed on a ministeriald­ ecision in 2003 (OSCE, 2003). The ­principles weredrawn from the Wassenaar A­ rrangement’s MANPADS
paper (cf. WA, 2012, pp. 31–34). The scope of the­‘Principles” elaborates on the list provided in the
Wassenaar Arrangement. It is also more specificconcerning evaluation criteria, specifying thatdecisions are to be made by senior policy-level­
personnel, that licenses for MANPADS are to be uniqueand specific, and that agents must present an End User
Certificate (Item 2.1). The principles ­reiterate the needfor technical limiters on ­unauthorized use of MANPADS(Item 2.4). The document is also more detailed thanthe Wassenaar Arrangement in ­specifying that missilesand ­gripstocks/ firing mechanisms be stored ‘farenough so that penetration at one site will not place
the second at risk’; continuous 24-hour surveillance;
access only by two authorized persons (Item 2.7).
As in the G8 Action Plan (G8, 2003 and see above),
the Principles call for exporting governments to share
information about receiving governments that fail­to meet the criteria and regarding non-State entities
making attempts to secure MANPADS. Finally, Item
3 requires that participating states ensure penalty­provisions for infringement of export control legislation.
Two years later, the OSCE also published an Annex
to the Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms
and Light Weapons titled “Best Practice Guide on
National Procedures for Stockpile Management and96

Security. Annex C: Man Portable Air Defense Systems(MANPADS)” which provides best practice notes ingreat detail (OSCE, 2006). Crucially, the brief guideprovides chapters on physical security; access control
measures; handling and transport; and inventory
management and accounting control. In 2008, theOSCE updated its 2004 Principles for Export Controlsof MANPADS (OSCE, 2008). While most of the text isborrowed from the 2004 document, some changes
are evident. The most important change is the principle that exporting states should confirm fulfillmentof the principles by the importing state “…which may
include on-site ­inspections of storage conditions …”(Item 3.6).
The OSCE documents, while based on the Wassenaar
Arrangement’s MANPADS principles, push theboundary of regulation even further, by specifying
how supervision must be exercised. The introductionof the principle of physical examination (even thoughwatered down slightly by a ‘by mutual consent’clause) minimizes the gap between the legalr­equirements and practical realities on the ground.
The Best Practice Guide provides a comprehensive
set of applicable procedures to secure MANPADS
stockpiles.

Asia-Pacific Economic ForumOne article of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum(APEC)’s Bangkok Declaration (APEC, 2003, p. 3) isdevoted to MANPADS. Two things need to be noted.
The article is a general statement of principles,summarized presumably from the 2003 Wassenaar
Arrangement. The second issue is that, unlike theG8 statement which is principally concerned withcivil aviation, or the Wassenaar Arrangement whose
motive is security, the APEC focus is on protection
from terrorism, and the article is followed by, andclearly oriented towards, the issue of terrorism. In 2005,
the APEC leaders once again made a Declaration
relating to MANPADS which noted the delivery of
MANPADS component pocket guides from the UnitedStates, and planning for airport MANPADS vulnerability
assessments (MVAs), effectively tying the APEC Declaration to the G8 Action Plan (ABEC, 2005).
The APEC Declarations support but do not initiate
measures for MANPADS control. Given that four
MANPADS manufacturers (United States, Japan,
China, and South Korea—the fifth, North Korea, is not
an APEC member) are on the Pacific Rim, one might
have expected a stronger statement. Nevertheless,the fact that APEC leaders are aware of the issue, andthat that awareness is reflected in official ­agreements
is a positive step.
This was reaffirmed during the 2006 Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forumministers’ meeting which noted “… the importance ofstrengthening controls of the transfer of man-portable
air defense systems (MANPADS), to help preventthese weapons being acquired or used by terrorist orother non-state groups. The Ministers noted that the
proliferation of these weapons to non-state groups­
posed a threat to international civil aviation and to all
countries in the region.” (ASEAN, 2006, Item 30).

Commonwealth of Independent States
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
which is a major stockpiler, manufacturer, and exporterof MANPADS, only drew up a coherent MANPADS
policy in 2003 (PCOAS/CHS, 2007). ­Nevertheless,notably after the MANPADS attacks on the Israeli
airliner in Mombasa, the heads of states of the CIS
agreed in 2003 on a document “On measures tocontrol international transfers of man-portable antiaircraft missile complexes of ‘Igla’ and ‘Strela’ types by
Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent
States” (reported by Ambassador Vrin in PCOAS/CHS,2007). As result of the document, a common format
for reporting on MANPADS holdings and transport
was proposed, and then adopted by many, though
not all, CIS states. The Document allows for mutual
support, reporting, capacity-building and, where
necessary, physical assistance in destroying surplus
MANPADS. In addition, in a ­bilateral ­arrangement(notwithstanding worsening military ties) Russia andUkraine agreed to exchange i­nformation about SA-7
and SA-18 MANPADS exported or imported to theirterritories within the framework of fighting terrorism(Razumkov Center, 2009).
Many of Ambassador Vrin’s remarks as reported in(PCOAS/CHS, 2007) do not break new ground. His
suggestion for making MANPADS export decisions
at high policy levels, the exclusion of general export
licenses in MANPADS transactions, the exclusion ofprivate brokers, all echo statements made by WA,
OAS, and OSCE. What is new in the Ambassador’s
statement is the recognition that MANPADS areconsidered a major problem, and have been used incombat in several internal CIS conflicts. A final point
is worth making here as well. Buy-back programs
favored by the United States, appear, in CIS view, tobe only partially effective. Ambassador Vrin points outthat buy-back programs offer far less per missile thancan be received on the black market, and, effectively encourage black market sales.
The fight against terrorism and independence groups
within the CIS and with the Russian Federation inparticular has been a major spur to attempts tocontrol MANPADS, along with other SALW (Mariani,2007). The resultant 2003 agreement (see PCOAS/
CHS, 2007) driven by Russia cemented this interest.
This agreement is bolstered by a set of national
legislations adopted by most CIS member states­over the period before and since 2003. Presumably,most of these cover MANPADS as well, though wefound no evidence of MANPADS-specific legislation.
A further problem, evident from Ambassador Vrin’s­presentation and pointed out by Mariani (2007), is thelack of independent criteria for arms transfers, which
seem at all times to be subservient to national politicalinterests. Moreover, the technical ability of some ofthese states to implement legislation appears to be
doubtful, notwithstanding mutual support and aid.

Organization of American States
Basing itself on the UNGA Resolution 59/90 (UN, 2004)
as well as on the PoA (UN, 2001), the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) published a General Assembly
Resolution during its fourth plenary session in June 2005
dedicated wholly to MANPADS. In previous instances,
the issue had been noted by the OAS, without any
great detail. AG/Res 2145 (OAS, 2005) provides no
new advances in MANPADS control beyond urging
member states to “…maintain strict controls…”,
ban transfer to non-state parties, destroy surplus,
and conduct high-level consultations on controlling MANPADS. Perhaps the most important innovation is the inclusion of the International Civil Aviation­Organization (ICAO) recommendations for MANPADS
control (originally published by the OSCE). These
guidelines, published in an Annex to the ­Resolution,
are agreed upon as binding by OAS members.
Resolution AG/Res 2145 was further reiterated in­2006 (OAS, 2006) when the General Assembly of the
OAS requested the Permanent Council to convene
a meeting in 2007 to discuss effective strategies for­mitigating the effects of MANPADS.

97

NATO
The NATO approach to MANPADS regulation is
described in a document (NATO, 2004) which details
MANPADS activities supported by NATO, without
enlarging on any legislative or legal agreements.
The document pays special attention to the issueof removing MANPADS—during storage, use andtransit—from possible acquisition by terrorists.

African Union
The African Union has recently (March 2012) produced
a document which states, among other issues, that the
AU has “…noted the support provided by a number ofbilateral partners, … including efforts to mitigate thethreat of the [sic] Man Portable Air Defense Systems(MANPADS)” (AU, 2012, Item 7). The document also
takes note of the dispersion of MANPADS from Libyan
stockpiles (AU, 2012, Item 11)

The US–Russia Bilateral MANPADS Meeting
Concerned about the spread and threat of MANPADS,
two of the largest producers maintain a bilateral system
of mutual information-sharing at the d­ iplomatic level. The
agreement—the ‘United States–Russia A­ rrangement
on Co-operation in Enhancing Control of Man-Portable
Air Defense Systems’ was signed by both countries in
2005, and allows the two major ­manufacturers to sharei­nformation and concerns about MANPADS proliferation. Most of the meetings under the arrangement are
secret, but occasionally the protocols of these meetings have leaked. The transfer of Igla-S MANPADS inlarge numbers (1,800 announced, 2,400 delivered inp­ ractice, to ­Venezuela; see Chapter 3) raised alarms in
the US government (Clinton, 2009a). Three issues wereof particular concern. Venezuela (beyond its hostility to
the United States) had a history of transferring weapons
to FARC guerrillas in neighboring Colombia; the Igla-S isthe newest and most potent MANPADS in the Russianarsenal; and the size of the shipment. This concern
had been raised earlier, in 2005, when the shipment
was first mooted. In September 2009, the United Statesraised the issue again, focusing on the possibility that
MANPADS had been re-transferred to the FARC. The
Russians claimed the evidence was fragmentary, andthe serial numbers on the weapons would e­ liminatethat possibility (Susman, 2009). In early March, Russian
foreign minister Lavrov assured the United States thatsurprise inspections would be carried out to avoid
MANPADS transfers. In a later exchange at the Russia–
98

United States bilateral ­meetings, this decision waswatered down. To the best of our knowledge there
is, at present, neither ­compelling evidence to showthat the Venezuelans have transferred any MANPADS
to FARC nor any evidence of Russian robust checks,
including surprise inspections of Venezuelan MANPADS
stockpiles.
The existence of a bilateral mechanism for the control
of arms transfers, notably of MANPADS is an important
step. It provides a framework within which states whoare both suppliers of large amounts of MANPADS andfearful of their use can get together and semi-formallywork out better control mechanisms. However, as canbe seen from the Venezuelan case, where politicalinterests prevail, even such quiet meetings are unlikely
to bring about substantive changes.

National legislation
In most cases we have been able to identify,
MANPADS-related legislation is subsumed under thegeneral heading of arms and ammunition licensing
and storage regulations. It should be noted that thewillingness of states to respond to questions about
MANPADS legislation is limited. The International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which numbers
most states in its membership managed to obtain 36
responses to a 2007 letter requesting information on
steps to counter MANPADS (ICAO, 2007). Responses
to our own letter were worse (18 responses of which
one did not contain pertinent information). Overall,the ICAO study revealed that most respondents
claimed to fulfill either the Wassenaar Arrangement,
NATO ­standards, or the OSCE Practice Guide. In ourcase, none of the questioned states had specificlegal structures for dealing with MANPADS, and all
claimed to adhere to Wassenaar Arrangement­principles. Overall, it is likely that the picture worldwide is not different, with the control of MANPADS
subsumed within national arms control and/or arms
and a­ mmunition stockpile legislation.
Only one state—the United States—has specific
MANPADS legislation, which is encompassed withinthe “Intelligence Reform And Terrorism Prevention
Act Of 2004”. It is the only national legislation we
have been able to identify that specifies MANPADS
by name, and demands specific penalties (up to US$2 million fine and up to life imprisonment for illicit
handling of MANPADS, to death if used in a homicide).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
has published a document—effectively a copy of the

OSCE standards—which, however, is not reflected inlegislation, so its legal status is unknown (MFA of theRussian Federation 2003).

In other states, MANPADS issues are handled­ dministratively most often within the framework ofaarms exports, stockpiling or ammunition movement,
to which specific administrative guidance in the caseof MANPADS is added.

Table 33: International MANPADS Agreements
TitileDateStrengths

Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)1996/2000- Robust and detailed- Specific MANPADS chapter- Includes transfer, retransfer, and transfer ofdevelopment and engineering data
- Lists export criteria- Update includes “Best Practices for Effective
Enforcement”

WA—Elements For Export Controls
Of MANPADS

2003/2007- Updated

APEC

2003/2005- No specific strengths

UN-PoA (A/CONF.192/15)

2001- No specific strengths- No mention of MANPADS specifically

G8

2003

- Uses WA as basis- Clause on information exchange about
unco-operative countries and entities- Plan to examine the possibility of launchcontrol-features

CIS

2003

- No specific strengths

UN Resolution A-RES-59-90 MANPADS Control

2004- Putting the MANPADS issue on the UN stage- Raising political pressure

OSCE Principles on Export Controls of
MANPADS2004- OSCEs political weight in security issues- Based on WA- Specific evaluation criteria- Based on WA- More detailed on security issues than WA- Penalty provisions for breach of export control
legislation

OAS (AG/Res 2145)

2005- ICAO guidelines for MANPADS control agreed
upon as binding

US–Russia Bilateral Meetings

2005 -  

- Semi-formal framework of two major MANPADS
suppliers to work out better control mechanisms

OSCE Best Practice Guide on National
Procedures for Stockpile Management andSecurity – Annex C Man-Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS)

2003- Best practice notes in great detail

UN Resolution 62/40. “Prevention of the illicit
transfer and unauthorized access to and useof man-portable air defence systems”

2008- No specific strengths

OSCE Principles on Export Controls of
MANPADS2008- Demands confirmation of fulfillment of principles
from importing state by exporting state- Best Practice Guide for Stockpile Management
and Security- Best Practice notes specifically for MANPADS
99

Discussion
From a normative perspective, the universe oflegislation against improper transfers and storage­of MANPADS is comprehensive. Indeed, as a legal
regime, the tools for legislating against mis-transfer
of MANPADS are universally available. States andregional organizations have borrowed from a­ vailable
models to develop their own agreements and­protocols for ensuring that the illicit trade in MANPADS
is restricted, and the licit trade controlled. However,from an empirical viewpoint, the practices mandated
by agreements effectively lack enforcement. As ageneral rule, states that wish to violate the rules cando so with impunity.
Looking at international MANPADS agreements froma historical and geographical perspective, we notethat international formal action to control and limit
MANPADS has advanced incrementally, and is now ata reasonable development stage. ­Historically, there
is now general agreement that a set of criteria fortransport, stockpiling, inspection, and ­destruction areavailable to those states that care to ­implement them.
Geographically, more and more states are starting
to adhere, at least notionally, to the need to deal
explicitly with MANPADS. Starting with the Wassenaar
Arrangement with 41 members, the OSCE, APEC, CIS,
OAS, and ICAO have adopted some ­practical andlegislative measures to deal with MANPADS. In thisregard, we would argue that overlapping membership in many of these organizations facilitates theacceptance of MANPADS agreements.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the legal ­framework
for the regulation of MANPADS is insufficiently
universal. This is meant in two senses. First, someregional ­organizations—ASEAN, AU, League of ArabStates—have not published any documents on the
topic of MANPADS, though it could be argued that
MANPADS may be included in other SALW control
issues. ­Inasmuch as MANPADS are particularly
prevalent in countries that are members of those­organizations, this tends to weaken the universality ofthe documents. In a second sense, we have a serious
problem of enforcement. Specific provisions in theBest Practice Guides are effectively not implemented
in full. This is often the case where national politicalor economic interests trump the need for safety from
MANPADS threats. States that wish to avoid the wordor spirit of the agreements do so with impunity, since
not only is compliance voluntary, but enforcement
is effectively nonexistent, and states can violate theprovisions without penalties. With countries that are100

not signatories to one or another of these agreements,
the situation is even worse. As a case in point, Eritrea,
Syria, Iran, and North Korea have apparently supplied
MANPADS to the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia.
Some of these were subsequently used to shoot downa Belarus cargo plane (UN, 2006). It should be notedthat two of the parties involved—Iran and North
Korea—have domestically manufactured MANPADS
and supplied weapons to NSAGs.
Understandably, the military are loath to provide
detailed information on the deployment or ­securityof their MANPADS stocks. Consequently, we havevery little information on the regulatory (that is,­sub-legislative) aspect of stockpiles or use: How arelaws intended to regulate SALW (and MANPADS)
actually implemented nationally? A number ofnational SALW Focal Points contacted during thisstudy merely replied blandly that ‘the governmentof X adheres to all international standards in theexport and stockpiling of MANPADS’. While there issome visual evidence of good stockpile processes(e.g. Venezuela cf. Arcesolo, 2009), there are also agreater number of film clips and pictures showing thereverse (see Table 8 in Chapter 3). This implies that
actual practices vary considerably, and even where
national legislation exists, enforcement may well bepatchy at best.

Conclusion• The quality and detail of international r­ egulationof MANPADS has improved in the last decade,starting with the most general (UN-PoA in2000) to the very detailed OSCE Best PracticeG­ uidelines (2006).
• The spread of international agreements on
MANPADS has also been impressive withmany international and regional organizations
encouraging their members to adhere to higher
standards of MANPADS control.
• The strongest basis for MANPADS control is the
Wassenaar Arrangement’s MANPADS document, supplemented by the OSCE’s Best Practice Guide. Many regional documents makereference to, or strive to adhere, to the standards set by those two documents.
• Not all regional organizations have issued formal
statements on MANPADS, let alone outlined
standards for their control.
• While the OSCE’s Best Practice Guide is highly
detailed, all of the documents reviewed here
suffer from lack of enforcement and oversight.

• We found little evidence that states (with the
exception of the United States) have legislationthat specifically refers to MANPADS, recognizing
their uniquely dangerous and difficult nature.
• Unfortunately, we also found evidence thatsome states that are signatories to one or
another of the documents described here do
not uphold the principles in practice, though
they profess to do so.
• Obligations under one or another of these
documents are open to interpretation, are notpoliced, and thus provide a major weakness in
MANPADS regulation.

101

Princess Amuzu, Michael Ashkenazi, and Marc Kösling

6102

MANPADS countermeasuresP

arallel to the emergence of MANPADS as a threat
against aircraft (military and civilian), a number ofsolutions have been developed to counter this threat.
Many studies have discussed ­countermeasures(CM) to protect civilian aircraft against the threatof MANPADS (e.g. Chow et al., 2005; Czarnecki etal., 2005; Choi, 2010; US Department of HomelandS­ ecurity, 2010). These measures can roughly be
divided into technical measures (on-board and on
the ground) and ­behavioral measures (pilot training,changes in approach and take-off procedures,­security ­practices around airports). These ­supplement
and extend the process of regulating MANPADS
by agreements, which can be considered to be­‘political’ countermeasures.
Military countermeasures are not always appropriate to the civilian sphere. Principally this is becauseof differences between the craft themselves (warplanes are far more maneuverable, cost is less of
an issue) and their flight environment (a war zone as
opposed to civilian zones in peacetime). Moreover,c­ ountermeasures are not 100 percent effective, andcargo planes with countermeasures on-board havebeen hit by MANPADS (Bolkcom and Elias, 2006, p. 6).
In this chapter, civilian MANPADS countermeasures aredescribed and some of their pros and cons assessed.

Technical countermeasures
Technical countermeasures embrace a variety ofdevices—some active, others passive, some airborne,
others on the ground—to interdict or confuse andmisdirect MANPADS fired at civilian craft. The choice
and development of countermeasures is against thebackground of the technical evolution of MANPADS
themselves (see Chapter 2), that is, as MANPADS are
improved, new countermeasures are required.
The most common guidance method for MANPADS is
on-board passive radiation reception in the infrared(IR) and ultraviolet (UV) ranges (see Chapter 2). Most
countermeasures therefore concentrate on disrupting
this type of seeker. Guidance systems that dependon the missile or the operator identifying a shape—­
whether command to line-of-sight (CLOS, directcommand or laser beam riding) devices (e.g. ­Starstreak
and RBS70) or charge-coupled devices (CCD), which
rely on TV imaging as used in 4th ­generation IR homing
missiles (e.g. KimSan91)—are effectively immune to
the kind of countermeasure that would work on the
Stinger, Strela or Igla series. The crucial lesson to belearned here is that ­countermeasures must evolvein response to the threat, which itself is constantly
evolving. However, all CLOS devices are somewhat
difficult to aim without extensive training and areoften Crew-Portable Air Defense Systems (CREWPADS) rather than single-operator MANPADS, and thus
less attractive to non-state armed groups (NSAG). The
Japanese MANPADS KimSan which relies heavily on
imaging via a CCD has not been exported and wehave no evidence of any losses from Japanese stockpiles, and so may be less of a threat as well.
It must be emphasized that even in the communityof experts on MANPADS countermeasures, there
is no agreement that on-board countermeasures
are the answer. One expert in the subject, himself a­commercial pilot, argues with some later ­justificationfrom Czarnecki et al.’s study (2012b) that the­
combination of modern jet aircraft robustness andpilot training means that MANPADS are not as greata threat as claimed (Romero, 2005). Airlines argue
frequently that there is no proven general threat incountries such as the United States (Wagstaff-Smith,
2010, p. 29). The degree to which this claim is valid
remains to be seen.
Countermeasure technology
Countermeasures for air defense systems are­categorized into active and passive systems.
Active countermeasures are for example flares anddirected infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) (seebelow). Passive countermeasures include infrareds­ ignature reduction, fuel tank inerting and ­redundant
controls (Schaffer, 1998, p. 78) (see Table 34). The
cost of any system is relative to the complexityof technology and effectiveness (Schaffer, 1998,
p. 77). The cost of equipping large civilian aircraftwith countermeasure technology ranges from US$1–4 million per aircraft (Bolkcom and Elias, 2006;
Erwin, 2003). In addition, the cost of operating suchcountermeasures in terms of fuel and operating costs
has been estimated at around US $300,000 per year
(Chow et al., 2005). This means that the retrofitting ofaircraft with a countermeasure suite has economic
implications which must be balanced against threats.
Other systems such as counter–counter missiles orrockets have been considered as well (Cherry, Kramer
and Hagan, 1996). For safety reasons, as well as cost,these appear not to be suitable for ­commercial
aircraft.

103

Table 34: Examples of active and passive countermeasures
Active countermeasures

Passive countermeasures

Missile approach warning systems (MAWS)

Infrared signature reduction

FlaresFuel tank inerting

Chaff

Redundant controls

Offset decoys
Infrared countermeasure systems (IRCM)
High-energy lasers (HEL)
Source: Adapted from Schaffer, 1998; Erwin, 2003; Kuhn, 2003; Choi, 2010.

Active countermeasures
Active on-plane countermeasures against passivehoming MANPADS missiles can be divided into
two major technologies: Flares/ chaff and infrared­countermeasure systems (IRCM) and directed
infrared countermeasures (DIRCM). All of these active
technologies depend on the presence of an effective
missile approach warning system (MAWS) to identify athreat and turn on the countermeasure (Bolkcom andElias, 2006). MAWS must be able to identify MANPADS
launches with a low probability of false warnings,
which in one system is reported to be <1,000 flights per
false alarm (Hughes, 2004; Ovost, 2005).

Despite the latest developments in this field, flares
are no reliable solution to the threat of missiles more
recent than first-generation MANPADS (Whitmire,
2006, p. 40). Moreover, flares are possible sourcesof ­environmental pollution, and, of more concern,
possible causes for fires if they fall in built-up or
wooded areas (Bolkcom and Elias, 2006). Though flaresystems have been developed with special attention
to civilian flight ­limitations, they are still not authorized
in many national airports (Hughes, 2004).
Advantages• Comparatively cheap (Chow et al., 2005, p. 19).

All aircraft-borne countermeasures described below
have an additional disadvantage: Their weight andattachment to the hull of an aircraft can increase
the cost of flight by a significant amount. All these­structures create drag and turbulence, increasing fuelcosts, which, in the context of flying long distancesand multiple flights can add up significantly (Chow etal., 2005). Both ground-based and on-board systems
are currently under development in a number ofcountries (Richardson, 2007; Rivers, 2004). Some are in
active deployment.

Disadvantages• Some flares constitute a fire hazard, which makes
them unattractive to civilian aircraft that land in
airports in highly populated areas (Kaiser, 2010,
p. 50);• Ineffective against generation Three and above
MANPADS and against any CLOS MANPADS;• Extra on-board weight, which leads to higher fuelcosts;• High visibility, which raises concerns about calling
public attention to the missile threat (Schaffer,
1998, p. 80).

Flares

Chaff

One way to deflect heat-seeking missiles is to provide
another heat source. Flares are based on this concept,
but developed into more complex countermeasuresover the past 40 years (Withey, 2010). Modern flares
do not just burn hotter than an airplane engine, but
can even simulate the spectral signature of a jetengine. Simulations indicate that firing a sequenceof flares can bring the hit probability of generation
One and Two MANPADS types (e.g. Strela-2/3) close
to zero (Jackman et al, 2009; 2010). Using non-visiblelight emitting flares would lessen the ability of older
generation MANPADS (e.g. Strela-2/3) to hit even slow
flying aircraft (Hughes, 2004).

Chaff is a cloud of short plastic or fiber sticks or ribbons
with a conductive coating. Packed into a containerand explosively released, chaff creates a cloud thatcan confuse radar homing systems (Macfadzean,
1992, pp. 77f). Modern infrared (IR) chaff fabricatedfrom pyrophoric materials can also confuse IR seekers
in missiles with a lower risk of fires on the ground thanwith flares (Chow et al., 2005, p. 18).

104

Advantages• Comparatively low fire hazard;• Low cost.

Disadvantages• Extra weight,• Ineffective against CLOS and imaging seekers.
Offset decoys
Offset IR decoys consisting of powerful IR sources
on masts projecting from an aircraft frame or the
ground have been proposed as decoys. These mightcause missiles to miss the aircraft, or at least reduce
the effect of the impact. This method is cheaper
than flares and avoids the fire risks of burning flares
falling to the ground (Bolkcom, Elias and Feickert,
2004; Phelps, 2003; Schaffer, 1998, p. 78). However,i­nstallation degrades aircraft performance, andthey are e­xpensive to operate. As ground-based­countermeasures, they need to be scattered widely
and raised on masts, which increases costs and leaves
them open to destruction (e.g. by accurate fire fromthe ground).
Advantages• Can protect against any radiation seeker;• Nothing is ejected from airplane.
Disadvantages• Ineffective against CLOS;• Cause drag and degrade aircraft performance;• Possibility of damage from close hit if missile
impacts on offset.
Infrared countermeasures systems (IRCM and DIRCM)
IRCM are a more costly alternative to flares, but also
more effective with second- and third-­
generation
MANPADS. IRCM jam the IR guidance system ofa missile through lamp-based energy. DIRCM are
updated versions that use directed IR energy in formof laser-beams (Avihai, 2008; Maltese et al., 2006;
Whitmire, 2006, p. 41). A DIRCM system consists ofa sensor suite connected through a MAWS (missile
attack warning system), a targeting system basedon radar or laser, and a laser projector to blind or
distract the incoming missile on a flexible turret or anelectronically steered array. The active componentsof the system, including sensors and projectors, must
be housed outside the aircraft’s hull, contributing toweight and drag during flight.

and SAGEM’s CASAM (cf. Avihai, 2008; Bolkcom andElias, 2006, pp. 11ff; Bruno, 2006; Case and Wolff, 2004;
Chow et al., 2005, pp. 17ff; Guhl, 2012; Knight, 2004;
Taylor, 2005; Vergnolle, 2007). DIRCM systems appear
to be far more effective than simple lamp-based
IRCM countermeasures, notwithstanding technicalproblems (Maltese et al., 2006) and, as noted, havebeen deployed aboard the aircraft of some airlines.
Advantages• Protection against most MANPADS generations;• Updateable.
Disadvantages• Requires an up-to-date library of threat-seeker
codes to ensure optimum performance ­(Whitmire,
2006, p. 42);
• Ineffective against CLOS;• Cause drag and degrade aircraft performance;• May cause (temporary) blindness on the groundor to ­neighboring aircraft crew and passengers(Chow et al., 2005, pp. 19ff).
A summary of the most common active on-board
countermeasures can be seen in Figure 11.
Given the high cost of equipping aircraft with­countermeasuresuites,alternative
activecountermeasures have been suggested on the­
ground. Currently, these are based on either­high-energy lasers (HEL) or high-powered microwave
phased array projectors as the active disruption
element, with a sensor array and a command andcontrol center (Grant and Richardson, 2007).
HEL (high-energy laser) systems
A high-energy laser can be used as an anti-MANPADS
weapon, as tests by Northrop Grumman’s groundbased mobile tactical high-energy laser (MTHEL)
show. “A palletized variant of MTHEL, called Hornet,
has been proposed for a wholly ground based
defense against MANPADS” (Chow et al., 2005,
p. 21). One of the advantages of such a system isthat it can counter all current technologies and canbe upgraded to counter future seeker technology(cf. Chow et al., 2005; Choi, 2010, p. 94). Detailedt­echnical c­ onsiderations have been described byPorcello (2004).

There is a broad variety of systems on the market or
currently being developed, including Elta’s MAGIC,
Northrop Grumman’s Guardian, BAE Systems’
JetEye, Thor Systems’ Commercial-Aircraft Protection
System(C-APS); Zenit’s L166C1; Cassidian’s MANTA
105

Figure 11: Comparative utility of on-board countermeasures
Threat type

Proliferation

Countermeasures                                                                                                       Flares                         Laser             High power laser
Older generation infared (IR)Very wide

Current generation IR

WideRadio control

LimitedLaser beam rider

LimitedFuture IR (imagers)

None

Demonstrated

LimitedNo EffectivenessPotential

Source: Adopted from Chow et al., 2005.

Microwave phased array based systems
Raytheon has developed a microwave system titled“Vigilant Eagle”. It projects microwave pulses toscramble MANPADS avionics (Global Security, 2011;
Kren, 2006; Vollin, 2006). The system has been field
tested and can provide 360 degree coverage toexisting airports. It is independent of aircraft, and,according to Raytheon, is ten times cheaper to installand operate than on-board systems. Like the MTHEL
concept, Vigilant Eagle is upgradeable to face future
MANPADS technologies.
Advantages• Effective against any generation of MANPADS,
artillery, rockets, unmanned vehicles, and othermissile threats (depending on configuration);• Ground-based system could be much cheaper
than equipping every airplane with CM systems(Whitmire, 2006, p. 44).
Disadvantages• System must be secured against ground threats;• Potential fratricide (Whitmire, 2006, p. 44);
• Full protection only if aircraft is flying both fromand to a countermeasure-equipped airport.
Passive countermeasures
Passive countermeasures include a variety of technical measures that, without projecting objects
or energy, could make aircraft less vulnerable to106

MANPADS attacks. This includes measures to reduce
the likelihood of a hit by a MANPADS missile, as well asways to reduce damage should a hit occur.
Infrared signature reduction
Fire-and-forget MANPADS, notably earlier versions
such as the very common Strela-2 and the Redeye,home onto the infra-red (heat) signature of jet engines.
Finding ways to minimize aircraft infrared signature,
notably its jet exhaust, is a useful ­countermeasure,accomplished by shielding or ducting the exhaustthrough shielding or mixing cold airstream with hot
plume gases. For more advanced MANPADS seekers
which also rely on aircraft shape discrimination (e.g.
Igla-S and Stinger RMP), IR suppressing paint may
offer some protection and may provide a degree ofprotection against SACLOS and CLOS weapons as­well when their targeting sights are IR based (Bolkcom
and Elias, 2006, p. 16; Schaffer, 1998, p. 78).
Advantages• Cheaper than most active CMs.
Disadvantages• Possible extra weight, depending on the measuretaken;• Reduces hit probability, but does not eliminate it(Bolkcom and Elias, 2006, p. 13).

Fuel tank inerting
To reduce the risk of fire or explosion in the fuel tank,different inerting techniques have been consideredand some are already in use. This method would notjust reduce the effects of a missile hit, but generally
reduce the risk of fuel fires(Chow et al., 2005, p. 14; Schaffer, 1998, p. 78).
Advantages• Reduces damage caused by missile hit;
• Generally reduces the risk of on-board fuel fires(Schaffer, 1998, p. 78);
• Low additional weight.
Disadvantages• Does not reduce hit probability, only damage
severity.
Redundant controls
A single missile hit at the right spot could shut down
the avionics of an aircraft. Redundant controls withseparation of the systems would reduce that risk, andare recommended for aircraft survivability (Schaffer,
1998, p. 79).
Advantages• Reduces effect of missile hit.
Disadvantages• Added cost to aircraft construction;• Cannot be retrofitted easily.
Structural changes
Strengthening the aircraft’s wings and structure would
seem to offer some potential for resistance against a
MANPADS hit. However, the costs of such are likely tobe prohibitive. Moreover, most common MANPADS
aim at the engines. While some studies have been
conducted on the effects of MANPADS strikes oncommercial jet engines, structural changes as such
do not seem to be the answer (Czarnecki et al., 2012).
One conclusion of the Czarnecki et al. (ibid.) physicaltests appears to indicate that while fragments from a
MANPADS-hit turbofan engine may damage the hull,
the engine itself is likely to survive (albeit, inoperable)
and the fire set by the explosion will be extinguished by
the on-board fire suppressant system. Evidence from
actual attacks supports this claim (Kopp, 2003, p. 34).
In summary, engine and airframe structural changes
could provide improvements for aircraft survivability

in case of a MANPADS hit. Current engines are notas vulnerable to catastrophic failure as would be
supposed, and even with one engine hit, most aircraft
would be able to make a landing, provided crew weretrained to that effect. Improved airframe and engine
protection would have to be balanced against costsof retrofitting as well as operating costs for the aircraft.

Behavioral, administrative and politicalprocesses
The technical countermeasures described above,
both passive and active can be paralleled bybehavioral, administrative, and political processes.
Like the technical countermeasures, these too haveto do with (a) reducing the statistical likelihood of a
MANPADS being deployed against a civilian aircraft,(b) lowering the likelihood that a MANPADS shoot will
actually hit its target, and (c) reducing the damage a
hit will cause to the aircraft.
Pilot training
Pilot training for the likelihood of a MANPADS hit may
be necessary to ensure an aircraft’s survivability. As
Romero (2005) notes, commercial crews are routinely
trained to deal with more serious damage thana single MANPADS is likely to cause. ­Nevertheless,the likelihood of survival against the specifics of a
MANPADS hit (e.g. spalling from fragments, fire) may
be enhanced by simulation training and specificstrike scenarios, evasive maneuver training, as well as
adapting flight path on take-off and landing (both very
steep) to minimize time in the danger zone (Bolkcom,
Elias, and Feickert, 2004). McKenna (2006) argues
that pilot training may be one of the more i­mportant
countermeasures employed. The ­­importance of aircrew training has been demonstrated by the DHL
pilots in Iraq who landed their plane safely after a
MANPADS hit. Nevertheless, air crew training canonly mitigate the effects of a MANPADS attack, notnegate it.
Airport security
With 43,794 airports around the world, according
to the CIA World Factbook (CIA, 2012), airports incountries with lax security and porous borders are­
relatively easily accessible to terrorists who are­­planning attacks. Even in states that have extensive
security ­arrangements, the impossibility of complete
ground security is ­highlighted by Thompson who statesthat “protection of approach and departure paths
107for a single runway could require policing an area of
300 square miles” around every airport (2003). Policing
potential launch points is also made more difficult as
many airports are in cities with many potential firinglocations (Kuhn, 2003, p. 30). Regular, unscheduled
helicopter patrols along ­unpredictable routes, while
ensuring minimized air traffic ­interference, are ameasure that may be adopted in regions of known
threat. Another possibility is the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV) with MAWS or armed with DIRCM
to patrol the skies over airports (Knowles, 2007). Project
Chloe, as this system is called, provides advantages
in terms of cost (commercial aircraft will not carrythe ­countermeasure equipment) and coverage.
However, the tests so far just show satisfying resultsin blue-sky conditions, because clouds can interferewith the sensors of the high flying UAV (Philips, 2007).
Threat assessment analysis at major airports is now arecognized way of countering MANPADS. This includes
an analysis of airport and runway layouts, flight paths
and other vulnerabilities (Bolkcom, Elias und Feickert,
2004). Intelligence-led and public ­participation‘neighborhood watch’-type security systems may also
be an element in airport security, as a British policeproduced handbook on airport security notes (NPIA,
2011, pp. 67–68).
Figure 12: Airport vicinity vulnerable to MANPADS
attackApproach

RunwayDeparture

6 miles

50 miles6 miles = 9.6 km; 50 miles = 80.4 km

targets the black markets would further serve threat
reduction purposes. Past buy-back campaigns to
reduce the numbers available outside state control,
such as those instituted by the United States may be
adopted more broadly, such as in the Middle East
following raided stockpiles and proliferation of smallarms and light weapons during the ‘Arab Spring.’
Shared intelligenceIntelligence has a role to play in foiling future MANPADS
attacks or clamping down on black market rings, as
the foiled attack on Prime Minister Golda Meir attests.
Kuhn (2003, p. 30) also highlights the ­contribution of
intelligence to pilots’ awareness and cautiousness. As
the MANPADS threat to civilian aircraft is a ­collective
problem, shared intelligence and international­cooperation are vital.
One problem with an intelligence-led approach has
been highlighted before the implementation of virtual
attacks as a terror tactic, which is effective as a PR
tool and a­ ttention-catching ploy.
Disrupting NSAG training
Disrupting NSAG MANPADS training efforts may bepossible, notably if combined with technical devices
to limit MANPADS use by unauthorized operations (seebelow and also Chapter 5: OSCE Best Practice Guide).
The availability of training manuals for MANPADS in
the public domain means that an enterprising NSAG
could, in theory, train its members in MANPADS use(cf. US Army, 1984). Some of these manuals havebeen translated into e.g. Arabic and are available on
the web (NA, 2012). Limiting the availability of such­
publications may help in controlling the ability of
NSAGs to use MANPADS.

Source: Adapted from Thompson, 2003.

MANPADS technical development
Stockpile security
Strict adherence to stockpile security standards andmanagement serves to reduce the threat of MANPADS(see Chapters 4 and 5). Commonly enforced ­standardsof stockpile management would reduce the potential risks to the minimal. Destruction of surplus stocks
and obsolete systems and missiles coupled with caps
placed on national stockpiles, enforced by a world
body, would be beneficial though the latter is unlikely.
Within the transfer and proliferation arena, theadherence to, and adoption of, stronger trade­
regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement that also
108

The most advanced MANPADS, including the Stinger
RMP and the Igla-S, are fire-and-forget systems that
require both a gripstock and a missile in its tube toprovide a launch. They are heavily ­dependent on
microelectronics and a computerized ­connection
between the elements. “Smart Gun” technology,
which restricts a gun’s use to an authorized user has
been in development for a long time and is being­developed by a number of commercial ­companies
such as Armatix24 and Metal Storm (Hanlon, 2010).
­Inasmuch as the firing sequence in MANPADS is24

For details see: http://www.armatix.de.

controlled electronically via a CPU, “Smart Gun”t­echnology seems to be an obvious next stepin ensuring that MANPADS will not be used by­unauthorized individuals, or, at least, will make suchuse much harder, and thus lessen the attractivenessof these weapons.

Discussion
For a complex challenge or threat of this nature, amulti-pronged approach, targeting the issue fromvarious angles is necessary: proliferation control andthreat reduction; tactical countermeasures; andtechnical countermeasures (US Department of Homeland Security, 2010). This is necessary as arguably“[n]o level of countermeasures can totally ensure thesecurity of inbound or departing aircraft” (Kuhn, 2003,
p. 31).
The development and deployment of civilian
MANPADS countermeasures must be seen as adynamic process: the traditional arms race between
the sword and the shield, the attack device anddefense against it. Simple MANPADS, such as theStrela-2 and the Redeye could easily be decoyedby flares burning hotter than a jet engine. The Igla-S
and Stinger RMP, which use several different targeting
methods (IR, UV, imaging, movement algorithms) canonly be neutralized or decoyed by more sophisticatedmulti-spectral measures.

Second, all active countermeasures have the p­ otential
for collateral damage. Thus the fear of flares igniting
fires in civilian areas have meant that they are generally not useful for civilian use; DIRCM systems may blind
people on the ground (or other pilots), and DIRCMcarrying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may interferewith airport traffic. In other words, the damage that acountermeasure can cause must always be balanced
against the MANPADS threat. As Chow et al. (2005, p.
xi) note, well-financed ­terrorists would be able to plan
attacks so as to defeat any technical countermeasure.
Thus the value of ­technical countermeasures on theirown is highly doubtful in the long run.

Layered countermeasures
If there is one major realm of agreement (including
those opposed to on-board countermeasures such as
Romero) about MANPADS countermeasures, it is that
protection against MANPADS must be layered (Liams,
2006). Chow et al. (2005, p. 14) for instance, ­emphasize­ountermeasures as
the multi-layered nature of cfollows:
Figure 13: Multi-layered countermeasures

Minimize hit damage:Inertial fuel tanks: Redundancy
systems; Pilot training

Increased consequence of failure to prevent

Three other issues need to be taken into account,
two technical, and the other economic. On the­technical side, “…“[t]here are no technologies thatwill enable combat aircraft to overfly enemy ­territory
with ­impunity …” (Puttre, 2001). This observation iseven more true of larger and slower civilian aircraft
when faced by MANPADS: no technological solution
can provide absolute immunity.

Third, economically, on-board countermeasures are
expensive, with a unit cost of US $1 million and up. This
must of course be balanced against risk: the cost ofa shot-down civilian aircraft would be high, though
we disagree with the figure of around one billion
euro, and collateral losses rising to over ten billion
euro, suggested by Chow et al. (2005). ­Nevertheless,states and airlines are loath to bear the costs of fitting
all their aircraft with countermeasure pods. One
possible partial solution is the Elta one in which a­countermeasure pod is attached (or not) according
to the degree of threat assessment for that particularaircraft and its destination(s). Civilian airlines also
promote non-technical solutions, some of which havebeen described above inasmuch as they appear to
be as effective, but far less costly than technologicalsolutions (McKenna, 2006).

Preventing launched missile
from hitting:
DIRCM; Flares; Ground-based
countermeasures; Pilot training

Preventing MANPADS launch:
Airport; Security; Perimeter patrols;
Intelligence

Preventing MANPADS reaching
firing positions:
Surveillance; Interdicting transportroutesPreventing MANPADS
acquisition by attackers:
Buy-back; Policing; Technology
control; Stockpile control

Source: Adapted from Chow et al., 2005.

109

A statistical model to test two parameters—attacker’s
characteristics (weapon and location) and defendercharacteristics (active countermeasures and actions)indicated that lower hit probabilities were associatedwith the use of on-board countermeasures combinedwith securing the airport’s environments (Okpara
and Bier, 2008). These findings strengthen the validityof Chow et al.’s ‘layered countermeasures’ model.
The choice of which of Chow et al.’s elements to­emphasize, if at all, depends on a number of different
parameters, and requires careful modeling andanalysis, since it is likely to be different from airport toairport, and between countries (cf. O’Sullivan, 2005).

Conclusion
There is still disagreement about the level of threat
MANPADS represent for air traffic worldwide­(Czarnecki et al., 2011b). It is generally agreed
that air traffic within conflict or war zones makes
civilian aircraft into targets. At the other pole ofthe threat continuum, it is generally agreed byairlines and by many civilian airline pilots (though
not necessarily by security agencies) that thethreat in the United States and Europe is minimal
due to the difficulty of deploying MANPADS in
those ­
countries. In other countries, the threat
presumably varies depending on the NSAG­
concerned (some will attack anywhere in theworld, others are strictly local) and the ­security
abilities of airport and country concerned.
Nevertheless, a single successful attack on a­major commercial airline anywhere in the world
will have major ­ramifications. This background
dictates some of the conclusions that can bereached.
• Overall, layered countermeasures involving
focused efforts at interdiction, intelligence,
behavioral, and technical countermeasures
are considered most effective.
• Due to the constant evolution of MANPADS for
military purposes, civilian technical countermeasures must constantly improve and evolve
as well, inasmuch as different countermeasures
work on different generations of MANPADS.
• There are material and technical costs
for the installation of technical andother ­
countermeasures which must be­counterbalanced by the enormously high costsof failure to protect against even one successfulcommercial passenger aircraft shoot-down.

110• On-board, directed infrared ­countermeasure(DIRCM) systems, which are flexible andupgradeable, are likely to replace lamp or flaresystems, though their high cost of >US $1 million
are prohibitive for large aircraft fleets.
• Airport technical countermeasures (both­high-energy laser (HEL) and microwave-based)
are overall cheaper to install and operate, but
can provide an answer end-to-end only forflights originating and ending in a protected
airport, in practice, within North America andEurope.

Discussion, conclusions, andpolicy recommendations
General discussion
The core of this brief has been, in effect, to look at
three central questions.
• What factors support or hinder MANPADS attacks
against civilian aircraft?
• What are the effects of a MANPADS attack?
• What tools are available to limit or halt MANPADS
attacks?
In this section, we address each of these three­questions in turn, drawing on material and ­conclusions
from all the previous chapters. We thus provide across-cutting picture from the technical, through theeconomic to the political.
Attacks against civilian aircraft
Ideally, a complete survey of MANPADS attacks
would provide an answer to the five basic questions:
When, Where, Whom, How, and Why? In practice, theanswer to all of those questions in the aggregate isdifficult to assess within the framework of open-source
research. Even the seemingly basic questions of when
and where are sometimes arguable, as we discussed
in Chapter 1: Some crashes supposedly caused by
MANPADS might have been due to mechanicalfailure (e.g. Angola 1983). Virtually all attacks against
civilian aircraft were carried out by NSAGs, but it
is likely that their motives and the presence of false
claimants could put some of those claims into doubt.
The “How?” too, is difficult to assess as a ­generalizable
question. Most MANPADS attacks were carried out
using Strela-2A/B so these ­particular weapons are
implicated as a major risk. More advanced MANPADS
have been seen in the hands of NSAGs (e.g. in
Chechnya) but whether they are more effective inhitting aircraft is open to question, since the training(or lack of it) ­variable must always be considered.
The “Why” question is problematic as well. Generally
speaking, MANPADS attacks can be classified under
the heading of ‘terror activities’ that is because most
attacks against civilian aircraft have been carried out
not against military targets (by ­definition) but against
civilian targets with the overt intention of publicizing a
cause and/or causing fear in an opponent’s civilian
population and civilian support. Nevertheless, some
MANPADS attacks, such as the one against the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in 1994, had an overt
political motive. Others, such as Baghdad 2003, wereagainst civilian aircraft carrying military or quasi-military cargo.

Going beyond the data gaps, however, some generalizations can be made: Older MANPADS, specifically the Strela-2, constitute the major hazard. This
is not because they are technically sophisticatedbut because they were developed and marketed
during a period in which the two major powers were
supporting their allies and dependents without muchregard to the future. This experience should raisea red flag: indiscriminate distribution of MANPADS
will most likely turn against the providers. Still, older
MANPADS, including the battery coolant units whichwere supposed to have been the Achilles’ heelof a MANPADS system, are far more durable than
expected. Even old MANPADS, imperfectly maintained, can still be operated. This implies that aconcerted and expensive campaign would need tobe mounted to dispose of all these weapons.
While the actual number of MANPADS worldwide
is in question, their general ubiquity is not (seeAppendix A). Given the argument that some47 NSAGs possess MANPADS and have the apparent
motivation to use them, we should be asking why
MANPADS attacks are not more frequent. A numberof complex, not mutually-exclusive answers occur,and may be worth exploring in greater detail:• MANPADS in the hands of NSAGs may not have
all the necessary components; as the early Syrian
evidence may show. If this is the case, it is a tributeto the idea of separating MANPADS components(rounds, gripstocks, and batteries) as a security
measure.
• MANPADS may be difficult to use and deploy.
Evidence from Afghanistan is contradictory, but
at least one writer (Urban, 1989, p. 270) indicatesthat the Mujahideen were not terribly effective atusing the Stingers they had been given.
• Politically, the ownership of a MANPADS may
well be a better threat and political statementof puissance than a useful weapon. NSAGs
such as the Syrian rebels may feel that having alive MANPADS on display is a better card in theinternal struggle for prestige, recruits, and support
than an expended MANPADS tube which may,or may not, hit its target. Indeed, as the Syrian
evidence shows, use of MANPADS only occurred
after capture of large numbers of these weapons
from Syrian army arsenals.
• Continuing on the previous point, better ­organized
and more sophisticated NSAGs such as e.g.
Hamas and Hezbollah may recognize that
attacking a civilian aircraft would likely be
detrimental to their cause, and very likely­

111

precipitate major military action against them­with few political gains and much political loss to
be made.
Turning to the targets—the aircraft themselves—
we can see that world political changes may havelessened the likelihood of MANPADS attacks. The­
heyday of MANPADS attacks in terms of numbers
per year was in the last quarter of the 20th century.
Since then the frequency has gone down. Thismay be due to the fact that most of the majoranti-­­
colonial wars have died down, and thus the
motivation for attacking aircraft, and the numbersof groups willing to do so, has declined. It is also
possible that ­improvements in aircraft safety, increasein ­countermeasures, and evidence that jet aircraft
can survive MANPADS attacks have dissuaded somepotential attackers. Finally, changes in the worldarms regimes, ­improvements in stockpile security andsafety, and layered MANPADS countermeasures may
be more effective than given credit for.
Limiting MANPADS attacks
A great deal has been done in the previous decades
to limit the likelihood of MANPADS attacks against
aircraft. Yet a great deal remains to be done. In­principle, limiting MANPADS attacks is a ­combinationof efforts in many fields: diplomatic, legislative,­perational, and technical. Perhaps the greatestoadvance is conceptual: the recognition that limiting
MANPADS attacks is a layered process, involving
each of these fields. It is recognized by all that it is
impossible to provide 100 percent security against
MANPADS attacks. Posing the issue in the form of
probability has the benefit of recognizing that eachindividual ‘layer’ (see Chapter 6) is a contributor to
defense, rather than a determinant: each layer adds
to the probability that an attack will be foiled. Activity
in each layer degrades the ability of a MANPADSarmed attacker to successfully intercept an aircraft.
We examine below this principle with relation to thelevels proposed by Chow et al. (2005) and slightly
modified by us.
Preventing MANPADS acquisition by attackers
Much of the international diplomatic activity
concerning MANPADS has been concerned withkeeping the weapons from reaching the hands ofattackers. International and regional instruments
have been provided, as well as practical processes
to ensure the security of MANPADS in stockpiles andin transit. Legislatively, the picture is less rosy, with only112

one country actually providing legislation to control
MANPADS (the United States). Operationally, too,
there is evidence of shared intelligence and sting
operations of international scope, intended to ensure
the same end. The US-led buy-back and destroy
program has succeeded in destroying some 30,000+
MANPADS, in addition to the almost total recall anddestruction of the entire Redeye inventory. Finally,
improvements in PSSM (physical security and ­stockpile­management) may mean that, for example, theseparation of ­gripstocks (and ideally batteries) fromthe missiles will restrict the potential use of stolen or
misappropriated MANPADS to some unknown degree.
In practice, the picture is less rosy. In the diplomaticarena, some of the major manufacturers—China, Iran,North Korea—are not signed up to the Wassenaar
Arrangement which can be viewed as the “Best
Practice” standard. Critically, there is no mandatory
reporting system to the Arrangement, and there is noenforcement of the guidelines, which remain in effectvoluntary, with a very high standard of proof for even‘name and shame’ activities. To add to the problem,
legacy Strela-2s—unreliable, with little counter-­countermeasure ability, small warhead and all—remain commonly available, and still constitute an
unknown level of threat (given survival rates of modern
aircraft, countermeasures, etc.). Attempts to destroy
these weapons have reduced them by less than
10 percent of the total world inventory, and an
unknown percent of the Strela-2 inventory, about whichmuch more must be known. It is also to be hoped thatlessons have been learned by ­manufacturing powers
about the widespread ­distribution of MANPADS to‘allied’ NSAGs, some of which seem to turn against
the provider.
In the technical arena, the policy of improving
stockpile security by separating components does­
not mean that MANPADS are no longer stolen. Nor
do good MANPADS policies and practices ­guaranteethat MANPADS will not reach a civilian populace
when a regime fails, as happened in Russia, Libya and
Syria, but it does seem to have limited the usabilityof MANPADS. And while older MANPADS might beusable without the original gripstocks, using ­jury-rigged
batteries and stocks, newer MANPADS that areheavily dependent on computerized ­functions in thegripstocks are far less so. Finally, a policy of ­preferring
CREWPADS to MANPADS may make the weapons
less attractive, and more difficult to transfer throughborders.

Preventing MANPADS from reaching firing positions
Substituting CREWPADS for MANPADS would have amarked benefit in that the larger, more bulky, crewoperated weapons are easier to detect by anti-­
smuggling and police activities than smaller MANPADS.
In this case, the civilian defense against MANPADS
benefits from what appears to be a steady military­ ddition, p­ rocedures
development of the weapon. In afor MANPADS defense, including ­
intelligence­cooperation, security surveys of airport approaches,
and the installation of surveillance devices has limited
potential attackers’ options: it seems unlikely anyone
could successfully replicate the attempted attack
against an Israeli aircraft in Italy in 1973 by simply
driving up to the airport fence to fire MANPADS.
Yet in poorer countries, airports are less well servedby these technologies and practices. In effect, many
airports in less-developed countries are likely to bevulnerable to attack. Under conditions of growing
national or international tension, it is possible that an
NSAG team could approach an airport unseen with
its MANPADS as happened in Mombasa, with possibly
dire results.
Preventing MANPADS launch
The age of more commonly available MANPADS
and subsequent degradation of their components isworking in favor of an unsuccessful launch of thesemodels. N­evertheless, we have seen that evencomponents such as batteries last well beyond
expectations. Obviously, early ­identification—throughintelligence or technology—of a MANPADS launchalso plays an important role in the possibility of limiting
the effects of a launch.
A technological solution—such as coding gripstocks
electronically to limit firing to authorized personnel—
is feasible, and perhaps ought to be considered as
an addition to the Wassenaar Arrangement ­protocols
for MANPADS. This would not stop all launches,
considering the prevalence of older models, but­would definitely restrict launches of more advanced(and deadlier) MANPADS in the future.
Preventing launched missiles from hitting
Preventing a launched missile from hitting its
intended target depends on a number of ­variables(see ­Chapters 1 and 6). On-board passive ­counter­measures have the advantage of low cost, and the­ isadvantage of r­ elatively lower effectiveness. Actived­countermeasures such as flares are effective only
against some types of MANPADS. DRCM measurescover a wider array of threats, but are expensive to
install and to operate. Land-based countermeasures
are really effective only for aircraft flying from andto ­countermeasure-equipped airports, meaning in
effect, in richer countries only.
Minimizing hit damage
The damage caused by smaller, less powerful, andless smart MANPADS is containable and survivable.
However, the same would probably not be true ofmore advanced missiles such as Stinger RMP and
Igla-S. Minimizing hit damage would include somethought devoted to (a) enhancing the physical survivability of aircraft at the manufacturing stage, and (b)providing civilian aircraft pilots with enhanced training
on dealing with an aircraft hit. While (a) is an ongoingprocess that can be directed to some degree by­consultations with aircraft manufacturers, (b) again is
likely to leave air crew from poorer countries (and thus
their ­passengers) more exposed.
In the broader economic sphere, we feel that Chowet al. (2005)’s predictions of mass panic and paralysisof the air transport system are open to question. There
will be extended effects, we agree, on global andnational economies but their extent is impossible topredict.

Summary
The main points presented here are constituted fromwhat we consider the most important lessons to belearned from the previous chapters.
Attacks on civilian aircraft:• The most commonly used MANPADS in attacks
against civilian aircraft have been from theStrela family, though others types have also
been used.
• Insofar as is known, missiles used in attacks
against civilians have either originated fromstate transfers or thefts from state armories.
• Modern jet aircraft can survive a hit by
MANPADS. This is due to a combination of thepoor quality of the MANPADS fired (usually aStrela), material structure of the aircraft, and aircrew training in responding to emergencies.

113

MANPADS characteristics:• MANPADS are very durable and can be functional for decades. Some components are
more vulnerable and will deteriorate with time,
but so far, this deterioration has defied expectations and old systems may well still function.
• For doctrinal reasons, many militaries are moving
away from MANPADS towards the employmentof tripod- and vehicle-mounted MANPADS-likesystems. This is a benefit, since they are lessmobile than MANPADS and more difficult totransfer clandestinely.
Stockpile control:• In the course of political chaos during regimechange, MANPADS stockpiles are extremely
vulnerable to leakage. In such cases, normal
security procedures do not work, and armories
can be looted, with the escape of MANPADS
into NSAG and private hands from even thebest guarded stockpiles.
• Manufacturers (such as Russia and the UnitedStates) face the likelihood that MANPADS
provided to NSAGs for political reasons will end
up being used against their own civilian aircraft.
• Total world stockpile of MANPADS is probably
closer to 500,000 than the 750,000 often cited,even though the major inventories are probably
underreported.
• Attempts to recover and destroy MANPADS
have reduced world stocks by about 32,000. Thisis a negligible number representing between
less than 10 and less than five percent of worldstocks.
Regulation:• The quality and detail of international regulationof MANPADS has improved in the last decade,leading to hopes that at least some of the threat
can be mitigated.
• The strongest basis for MANPADS control
is currently the Wassenaar Arrangement’s
MANPADS Document, supplemented by
the OSCE’s Best Practice Guide. These two
documents serve as the golden standard for
MANPADS control, including transfers andstockpile management. Other agreements andarrangements exist, though they rely on the WA
standards or are extremely weak, sometimes
dissolving into generalities and statements ofintent.
• While specific and highly detailed, even the
Wassenaar Arrangement suffers from lack ofenforcement and oversight.
114

•

•

Some states that are signatories to one or
another of the agreements or other documents,
do not uphold the principles in practice, though
they profess to do so.
No state, with the exception of the UnitedStates, has legislation that specifically refers to
MANPADS, recognizing their uniquely dangerous
and difficult nature. Since MANPADS are generally included within normal ammunition legislation, there is little emphasis in law enforcementon these weapons.

Damage control:• No single countermeasure—technical, diplomatic, or behavioral—is likely to be effective
against a MANPADS attack. Layered countermeasures involving focused efforts at interdiction, intelligence, behavioral and technicalcountermeasures are likely to be the only effective route to controlling MANPADS attacks.
• Due to the constant evolution of MANPADS for
military purposes, civilian technical countermeasures must constantly improve and evolve
as well.

Policy recommendations
The discussion above also provides openings forsome policy recommendations. These derive from thediscussion and the data presented, and range overvarious aspects of MANPADS as a policy problem.
Clearly, MANPADS in some form are here to stay. The
deployment, and thus production of MANPADS, is partof the inalienable right to self-defense enshrined in the
UN Convention and international law. Nevertheless,and without infringing on national sovereignty, there
are things the international community, or leading
nations in this community, can do to reduce thethreat of MANPADS.
Encourage states to specifically and forcefully enact
MANPADS legislation
As noted, only one state—the United States—hasspecific legislation mandating penalties against unauthorized possession or trade in MANPADS. While such
legislation in itself would not stop the black market,
it would provide law-enforcement authorities withspecific tools for the job. It would also serve to draw
attention to the specific civilian threat of MANPADS.
This type of legislation needs to become universal,
through legislative example, by working through multilateral fora such as the OSCE and NATO.

Non-voluntary compliance mechanism for Wassenaar
The Wassenaar Arrangement and the OSCE
MANPADS guide provide very specific best practices
for MANPADS transfers and stockpiling. The weakness
is that these provisions are purely voluntary. ­Institution,in the first instance, of an oversight mechanism, and­ echanisms
in the second, of some form of sanction m
to ensure WA provisions are adhered to, should beconsidered. Clearly this would need to start wellbefore formal consultation on such a process, in a
program of sensitization and lobbying in the member
states of the WA. This would require an individualstate’s l­eadership and direction, and willingness to beengaged for the long term.

Continue to provide assistance to poorer countries tosecure the approaches to their airports and their aircraft
The likelihood of a MANPADS attack against a wellestablished, wealthy state’s aircraft within its territory
appears to be rather low due to the heavy investment
in all countermeasure levels discussed above. This isprecisely one of the weaknesses in terms of international travel: such heavy investment is not possible forall states. A corollary for that is that more avenues offunding, training, access to technical countermeasures and procedures should be made available topoorer countries. Such a fund would require regularinvestment, and should not be dedicated solely to
one or another solution, given that we know that alayered, comprehensive solution is necessary.

Exchange of real information about legacy MANPADSAs noted, older legacy MANPADS are currently the
major threat against civilian aircraft. Yet we do not
know, to this day, how many of these have been manufactured, and to whom they have been transferred.
This is a recurring problem in all MANPADS studies.
Given the need to concentrate largely on weapons
produced between twenty and thirty years ago, it
seems possible that manufacturing states would be
willing to declassify this information, which is no longer
militarily sensitive. From the manufacturing/ origin
states’ point of view, this has a positive and negativeside: on the one hand, it would increase and enhance
an atmosphere of trust in international relations, on
the other it would expose some of these states (viz.
the United States, Russia, China) to negative publicity
for their past activities. One way to possibly alleviatethat is by convening a purely academic meeting forexchange of historical information about MANPADS,
with the understanding of full cooperation about
historical matters by those countries’ governments.

Encourage states manufacturing MANPADS to incorporate coded ‘safe gun’ mechanisms in all components
Newer models of MANPADS are highly reliant on
microcomputers and programming in both missiles
and gripstocks. The addition of ‘safe gun’ technology,
which limits use, through codes or keys, to authorized users is a cheap, effective, and relatively simple
measure to install. Ensuring that no major componentof a MANPADS could be fired by an unauthorized
person would greatly reduce the dangers inherent inthe ‘crumbling regime’ effect, which exposes stockpiles to looting, and vastly reduce the attractivenessof stealing MANPADS at a fraction of the cost of manufacturing. Encouraging such a manufacturing change
can be engendered through political will, multilateraland bilateral discussions. Ideally, such mechanisms,
which are encouraged briefly in the OSCE Best Practice Guide, would become a firm demand within the
Wassenaar Arrangement protocols.

Encourage CREWPADS over MANPADS

Final word

It appears that military doctrine is moving away fromthe use of MANPADS and towards the design, manufacture, and deployment of CREWPADS and selfpropelled ADS. This is dictated by changes in military
structures, and the move towards more mechanized
and mobile forces unrelated to civilian concerns. In
due course, it may be possible to encourage states
to consider MANPADS, as a weapon type, obsolete
in favor of heavier ADS. As it stands, manufacturing
states could be encouraged to move doctrinally inthat direction, with the aim of shrinking pure MANPADS
manufacture.

There are three overarching lessons to be learned
from the MANPADS phenomenon:
1. No matter the tools employed, it is impossible
to ensure to 100 percent that MANPADS will notcause a tragedy.
2. While the struggle between the threat of
MANPADS and its abatement is a dynamic
between MANPADS and countermeasures (’soft’and technical), it can be reduced overall.
3. No single strategy, device, or practice will restrict
the MANPADS threat: Only a combination of thosewill work, which means a great deal of collaborative and cooperative work at all levels.
115

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131

Appendix A
Estimated World MANPADS Stockpiles Based on Available Publications
State nameType

Afghanistan

Igla-1E/SA-16?

Igla-1/SA-16
HN-5A/B

Afghanistan (NSAG)

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer?

Bulgaria     100

1999/2000

Russia+Lic.

     400

1982

China

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

?

1972

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Blowpipe     350

1986/87

UK

FIM-43C Redeye       50

1984/85

United States

Albania

HN-5A/B     100

1978

China

Algeria

Strela-2/SA-7a/b  1.000

1975/76

Russia+Lic.

AngolaStrela-2/SA-7a/b  1.000

1981

Russia+Lic.

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14
Igla-1/SA-16
Argentina

Armenia?

1990

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     150?

1987/88

Russia+Lic.

RBS-70 & Bolide?

?

SwedenBlowpipe

8

1981

UK

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

     200

1995/96

RussiaAustralia

RBS-70 & Bolide     250

1987/2003/07

SwedenAustria

Mistral 1     500

1996

FranceAzerbaijan

Strela 3/SA-14

18

2008

UkraineStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

?

Igla-1/SA-16
Bahrain

Bangladesh

Belarus?

Russia+Lic.

RBS-70 & Bolide

161

1980/81

SwedenFIM-92 Stinger

14

1988

UnitedStates+ESC

HN-5A

       50

1992

China

HN-5A/B

  2.000

1991/92

China

HN-5A

21

2001

China

QW-2

     250

2007

China

RBS-70 & Bolide?

?

SwedenStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

?

Igla-M/SA-18
Belgium

132?

RussiaMistral     290

1994

FranceMistral 1

714

1995

FranceDestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                       0                   100                   400          1012007                       0Unclear which type was destroyed, but
likely SA-7s, since oldest.

                       0                   350                     50         100                       0Destruction data doesn’t specify type,but it’s likely that all MANPADS weredestroyed.

                1,000                1,000                       0                   150    ? (all?)                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                   200                   250

With 49 launchers                   500

63 or 76 launchers18                       010 launchers
As basis for local version                       0161With 14 launchers

14                     50                2,00021                   250                       0  29 (all?)

2003-08                       0                       0Jane’s says all Belarusian missiles weredestroyed.

                       0                       0                   290714133

State name

Type

Benin

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

Bolivia

HN-5A

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Date(s)Manufacturer?

Russia+Lic.

       30

1995

China

HN-5A/B

28

1985

China

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

?

Igla-1/SA-16
Botswana

BrazilBrunei

Bulgaria?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b       60

1988

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

       50

1996

Russia+Lic.

1986/92

UK

Javelin

25

Mistral     160

1997

FranceMistral 1     290

1994

FranceMistral 1     320

1997

France?

Russia+Lic.

1994

RussiaIgla-1/SA-16?

Igla-M/SA-18

168

RBS-70 & Bolide?

?

SwedenMistral48

1999

FranceMistral24

Mistral24

2006

FranceStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

     200?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14
Burkina Faso

ImportFranceStrela 3/SA-14

18

1999

UkraineStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

BurundiStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Cambodia

FN-6 (possibly
FN-15)

       50

2009

China

HN-5A/B

  1.000

1982

China

CanadaStrela-2/SA-7a/b

233?

Russia+Lic.

Blowpipe55

1982/83

UK

Starburst     100

1992

UK

Cape VerdeStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

ChadStrela-2/SA-7a/b

8?

Russia+Lic.

FIM-43C Redeye     130

1983/86

United States

FIM-92 Stinger       30

1987

UnitedStates+ESC

134

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                       0?

2006                       0Unclear how many were destroyed,
but most likely all

?

2006

                       0Destroyed with US Government aid

2003/04                       0According to Jane’s                       0There are no import numbers, but it
islikely, that the whole stockpile wasdestroyed      4,749

43

2003/04                       0                     60                     5025                   160

For SIMBAD                   290

For ATLAS

                   320                       0168                       0
4824                       0                   200                       018                       0312?

                       0Destruction: http://www.state.gov/t/
pm/rls/fs/169139.htm

                     50
1
233

?

                       0http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2007_09/CoverStory#23

55

2009/10                       0Communication with National
Defence, Government of Canada         100

2009/10                       0Communication with National
Defence, Government of Canada                       0?

?

8http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2007_09/CoverStory#23

                   130                     30135

State name

Type

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer

Chile

Mistral     750

1997

FranceBlowpipe

148

1982

UK

Javelin?

?

UK

FIM-92 Stinger

378?

UnitedStates+ESC

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

HN-5

?

1976/84

China

QW-1

?

?

China

QW-2

?

1998/2002

China

QW-3

?

2001

China

QW-4

?

?

China

QW-11

?

?

China

QW-18

?

2006/10

China

FN-6

?

?

China

FN-16

?

?

China

Colombia

Mistral?

?

FranceColombia (FARC)

Igla-M/SA-18?

?

RussiaCroatia

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     500?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

     500?

Russia+Lic.

?

?

Russia+Lic.

FIM-92 Stinger     120?

UnitedStates+ESC

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     100?

Russia+Lic.

China

Igla-1/SA-16

Cuba

Strela-3/SA-14
Cyprus?

1966/67

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

     100

1989/90

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b       50?

Russia+Lic.

Mistral       90

1989

France2005?

France?

Russia+Lic.

1984

Russia+Lic.

MistralCzech Republic

Strela-2/SA-7a/b
Strela-3/SA-14?
     200

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

?

2010

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide

16

2007

SwedenDR Congo

Strela-2/SA-7a/b       10?

Russia+Lic.

Denmark

FIM-92 Stinger     940

1991/96

UnitedStates+ESC

EcuadorIgla-1E/SA-16

       20?

Bulgaria

Igla-1/SA-16

242

1998

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

       50

2001

RussiaMistral-1     100

1998

France136

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                   750148                       0378                       0Estimation: 46,000 MANPADS                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0Still in development?

                       0Development complete?

                       0                       0                       0                       0      1,000

2011                       0Via Venezuela or theft from Peru

                       0Destruction not specified, but most
likely Strela 2 and 3                       0                       0                   120                   100                       0                   100
324

2009

                     50Including 101 gripstocks: http://www.
state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/169139.htm

                     90                       0                   200                       0                       016                     10                   940                     20242                     50                   100137

State name

Type

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer

Egypt

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

10.000?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

     600

2007

RussiaFIM-92 Stinger

1.478

1991/2003/08

UnitedStates+ESC

El Salvador
Eritrea

Sakr Eye

?

1987

Egypt

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

1995/99

RussiaIgla-M/SA-18
Estonia     259

Mistral-1?

2009

FranceMistral-2     100

2008

FranceEthiopiaStrela-2/SA-7a/b

  1.550?

Russia+Lic.

Finland

Mistral-1     540

1989

FranceStrela-2/SA-7a/b     200?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

     105

1986/87

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

       90

1986

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

     100

1990

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide

128

2008

SwedenFIM-92 Stinger       50

1983

UnitedStates+ESC

Mistral-1

  5.000

1988

FranceMistral-2     800

2000

FranceMistral-1       60

1988

FranceFranceGabon
Gaza & West Bank

Georgia

Germany (DDR)

138

Igla-1E/SA-16

?

2005

Bulgaria

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

?

2005

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24?

?

RussiaSakr Eye

?

?

Egypt

Grom

?

2007/08

PolandStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments              10,000                   6001,478                       0                       0                       0                       0                   259                       0                   1001

2010                1,549

Unclear where the destroyed
MANPADS came from. Found in apolice station.

                   540                   200                   105                     90                   100128                     50                5,000                   800                     60                       0Rumored                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0139State nameType

Date(s)Manufacturer

Germany

Igla-M/SA-18

Import?

?

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide

16

2007

SwedenFIM-92 Stinger

  4.500

2004

UnitedStates+ESC

FIM-92 Stinger

12.500

?

ESC

?

?

Russia+Lic.

Ghana

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

Greece

FIM-92 Stinger

  1.500

1994

UnitedStates+ESC

FIM-92 Stinger

1.732

?

ESC

GuineaStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Guinea-Bissau

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

GuyanaStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Hungary

Igla-1E/SA-16

?

1999

Bulgaria

Igla-M/SA-18?

?

Russia1999

France?

Russia+Lic.

Mistral-1
Strela-2/SA-7a/b

IndiaIndonesia

Iran?

Strela-3/SA-14

     300

1987/89

Russia+Lic.

Mistral-1       20?

FranceStrela-2/SA-7a/b     500?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

     600

1995/97

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

  2.500

1990/91

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

  2.500

1001/03

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24?

?

RussiaQW-3     130

2007

China

QW-3

       80

2009

China

QW-3

15

2010

China

Mistral-1?

2006

FranceMistral-2?

2006

France

Grom

2

2010

PolandIgla-1/SA-16

16

2003

Russia+Lic.

RBS-70 & Bolide     150

1982

Sweden

HN-5A     500

1988

China

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

?

?

Russia1985

Sweden?

Iran2006/09

Iran

Igla-M/SA-18
RBS-70 & Bolide140     180     200

Misagh-1?

Misagh-2     550

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                       0There is contradictory information
on Jane’s compared with equipment information in the 2012 Military
Balance.

16                4,500              12,500                       0                1,500
1,732                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                   180      1,540

2005/06                       0Most likely that’s all there were of theStrela-2.

                   300                     20                   500                   600                2,500                2,500                       0                   130ATLAS on local vehicle                     8015                       0                       0216                   150                   500                       0                       0                       0                   200                       0                   550

141

State nameType

Date(s)Manufacturer

Iraq

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

Import?

?

Russia+Lic.

Misagh-1

?

?

Iran

2007/08

Sweden1996

UnitedStates+ESC?

FranceIreland

RBS-70 & Bolide       20

Israel

FIM-92 Stinger

344

Italy

Mistral-1

Japan

JordanFIM-92 Stinger     700

1988/2002/04

UnitedStates+ESC

FIM-92 Stinger     937

1988/91/2008

UnitedStates+ESC

Type-93 Kin-Sam

18

1993

Japan

Type-91 Kin-Sam     90+

1991

Japan

Igla-S / SAM-18

182

2007

RussiaMistral-1?

?

FranceStrela-2/SA-7a/b     300?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

     200

1987

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

     240?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

  1.900

2001/09/10

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24

     200

2008

RussiaStarburst
Kazakhstan

?

?

UK

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     250?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

       50?

Russia+Lic.

?

?

Russia+Lic.

1992

Russia+Lic.
China

Igla-1/SA-16
Kenya
Korea, North

Mistral-1

Kosovo142     100

HN-5A/B     600

1983-94

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     250?

?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

  1.250?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18?

?

RussiaStrela-3/SA-14

Korea, South?

Chiron  2.000

2006-?

South Korea

Mistral     984

1997

FranceMistral

1742

2000

FranceIgla-1E/SA-16?

?

Bulgaria

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

48?

RussiaJavelin

?

1986

UK

Strela-3/SA-14

?

1999

Russia+Lic.

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                       0                       0                     20344

+ undisclosed number in second
shipment.

                       0                   700                   93718                     90Possibly more

182                       0         300?

                       0By NAMSA and US / PersonalCommunications F.P.

                   200                   240Replacement for Strela-2 (Strela-2
destroyed?).
                       0         300

2010                       0By NAMSA and US / Since ex-Soviet
state, there are probably more instocks.

                     50                       0                   100                   600                   250                       0                1,250                       0                2,000                   9841,742

130 launchers                       0                       048                       0                       0143State name

Type

KuwaitStrela-2/SA-7a/b

Kyrgyzstan

Laos

Import?

Date(s)Manufacturer?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

     500

1985

Russia+Lic.

Starburst     250

1995

UK

Sakr Eye36

1989/90

Egypt

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     100

1984

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

       50

1999

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

       50

2005

RussiaLatviaRBS-70 & Bolide     102

2006/07

SwedenLebanonStrela 2/SA-7

     100

1997

?

?

?

China

     250?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Lebanon (Hizbolla)

Misagh-1

?

?

Iran

Liberia

?

?

?

?

Libya

Strela 2/SA-7

  1.500

1982

RussiaStrela 2 MA?

?

Jugoslavia

  1.500

1982

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24

24

2004

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24

482?

RussiaStrela 3/SA-14

?

<2010

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide281

2004/05

SwedenFIM-92 Stinger

62

2007

UnitedStates+ESC

Macedonia

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

MalawiBlowpipe       70

1985

UK

Malaysia

FN-6

64

2009

China

FN-6

16

2010

China

Mistral-1?

?

France2002

RussiaQW?
Strela-2/SA-7a/b

Strela 2m/SA-7b

Lithuania

Mali
144

Igla-M/SA-18

       40

Igla-S/SA-24?

?

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide

?

2008

SwedenJavelin

12

1991

UK

Starburst     504

1995/97

UK

Anza MK-II     500

2003

Pakistan

Strela-2/SA-7a/b       40?

Russia+Lic.

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                       0                   500                   250

50 launchers36                       0                       0                       0                   100                     50                     50                   102                   100                       0Hisbollah                   250                       0                       0                       0
45

2007

                       0Probably all destroyed.

                1,500      5,0002012                       0Unclear which types were destroyed,
but probably no SA-24s.

                1,500
24

In Strelets vehicle-mounted
configuration

482

CSMonitor 2011                       0
281
62
156

?

Mounted version                       0Destruction: http://www.state.gov/t/
pm/rls/fs/169139.htm

                     70With 14 launchers

6416                       0                     40                       0not confirmed                       0
12Maybe even 48 / source unclear.

                   504                   500                       0145State name

Type

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer

Mauritania

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     100?

Russia+Lic.

Mauritius

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

MexicoIgla-M/SA-18?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-S/SA-24

?

2003

RussiaStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Mongolia

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Montenegro

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

MoroccoStrela-2/SA-7a/b     200

1981

Russia+Lic.

Mozambique

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

Russia+Lic.

Myanmar

HN-5A     200

1992

China

Strela 2/SA-7

       10

1995

CambodiaIgla-1/SA-16

     100

1999

Bulgaria

Igla-M/SA-18

       20?

Russia?

?

Russia+Lic.

Moldova?

Namibia

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

Netherlands, The

FIM-92 Stinger

  1.594

1985/2003

UnitedStates+ESC

New Zealand

Mistral-1       39

1998

FranceNicaragua

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

1.151

1982-85

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

117

1986/87/91

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

     360

1987/88

Russia+Lic.

Nicaragua (Contras)

FIM-43C Redeye     300

1986/87

United States

Nigeria

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

NorwayOman

Blowpipe     200

1983/84

UK

Mistral-1     400

1997

FranceRBS-70 & Bolide

  5.550

1981/84/87/90/92

SwedenMistral-1     230?

France?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

Pakistan146

Blowpipe     200

1985/86

UK

Javelin     280

1984/90

UK

Sakr Eye

?

?

Egypt

HN-5A/B

  1.100

1987-98

China

QW-1

  1.350

2008

China

FN-6

?

?

China

Mistral-1       50

2010

FranceRBS-70 & Bolide  1.205

1986-88/2008

SwedenFIM-92 Stinger     150

1985/87

UnitedStates+ESC

Anza MK-II

?

1994

PakistanAnza MK-III

?

2006

PakistanDestroyed141

Date(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments

2012                       0Probably all destroyed.

                       0                       05                       0                       0                       0                       0      1,500?

                       0Destruction: http://www.state.gov/t/
pm/rls/fs/169139.htm

                   200                       0                   200                     10                   100                     20                       0                1,594                     39      1,000

05/07.2004

151

Destruction see Jane’s

117                   360                   300                       0                   200                   400                5,550                   230                       0                   200                   280                       0                1,100                1,250                       0                     50                1,205                   150                       0                       0147State name

Type

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer

Peru

Igla-1E/SA-16

      190

1994

Bulgaria

21

1995

Bulgaria

Igla-1/SA-16

838

1992-96

Russia+Lic.

FN-6

25

2009

China

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

PolandPortugal

Qatar

1978-81

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

     500?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18?

?

RussiaJavelin     200

1995

UK

Strela-2/SA-7a/b  1.000

1970-71

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

     100

1987

Russia+Lic.

Grom-1?

1995

PolandGrom-2200-300

2000

PolandBlowpipe       60

1983

UK

FIM-92 Stinger       30

1996

UnitedStates+ESC

Mistral-1     500

1996

France?

Russia+Lic.

1985/86

UK

Strela-2/SA-7a/b
Blowpipe?
       50

FIM-92 Stinger

12

1988

UnitedStates+ESC

Republika Srpska

?

?

?

?

Romania

Mistral-1?

?

FranceStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

CA-94

?

?

Romania

RussiaStrela-2/SA-7a/b

5.000+

1968-?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

2.500+

1974-?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

   500+1981-?

Russia+Lic.

Igla/SA-18

   500+1983-?

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24?

2002-?

RussiaRwandaIgla-1/SA-16

?

<1994

Russia+Lic.

Saudia Arabia

Mistral-11

2009FranceMistral-2     200

2008

France?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

SerbiaSeychelles

148?

FIM-43C Redeye     310

1979/80

United States

FIM-92 Stinger     600

1984/90

UnitedStates+ESC

Igla-1/SA-16

226

1995

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

45?

Russia+Lic.

1979-80

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b       50

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                   190

56 launchers

21“systems”

83825                   500                       0                       0                   200                1,000                   100                       0                   300                     60                     30                   500                       0                     5012      1,077

2003                       0Probably old Yugoslavian stocks.

                       0                       0                       0                5,000

Estimation: 46–140,000 MANPADS                2,500                   500                   500                       0                       01                   200                       0                   310                   600226      4,280

2007                       057 launchers
Unclear which type. Agreement was
to destroy 5,000, so its likely there aremany more in stock.

45                     50149State name

Type

Sierra Leone

Strela 2/SA-7

Singapore

Slovakia

Slovenia
SomaliaSouth Africa

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer

5

1999

UkraineMistral-1     500

1996

FranceIgla-M/SA-18

  1.050

1998/99

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide     500

1980/81

SwedenStrela-2/SA-7a/b     120?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

4

2003

Russia+Lic.

Strela 2/SA-7

       50

1998

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18?

?

Russia1982

United States

FIM-43C Redeye     300

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Starstreak-I       98

2006

UK

Spain

Mistral-1     200

2008

FranceSri Lanka (LTTE)

Strela 2/SA-7

25

1995

Russia+Lic.

Sri Lanka

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

?

2006

Russia+Lic.

?

Igla-M/SA-18
Sudan

?

RussiaFN-6       50

2006

China

FN-6

       10

2010

China

Strela-2/SA-7a/b       70

1981-84

Russia+Lic.

?

Russia125

1984

United States?

Igla-M/SA-18
FIM-43C Redeye?

SwedenRBS-70 & Bolide

2003/?

SwedenSwitzerland

FIM-92 Stinger

3.500

1996

UnitedStates+ESC

Syria

Strela-2/SA-7a/b

15.0001970

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14

  1.500

1987/89

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

     500

2003/06

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24

?

2002

RussiaMistral-1?

?

FranceSwedenTaiwanTajikistan

RBS-70 & Bolide       20

1984

FIM-92 Stinger

  2.198

2001/?

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

?

?

Russia+Lic.

1977(78

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16
Tanzania

150

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     200

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments

5                   500                1,050

Some reported tranferred to Myanmar.

                   500                   120                       0                       0                       04                     50                       0                       0                   300                       0                       0                     98                   20025                       0                       0                       0                     50                     10
21

2007

                     70Unclear which type.

                       0125                       0                3,500              15,000                1,500                   500                       0                       0                     20
12

2012

                       0Unclear on how many are in stocks.

                       0                       0                   200

151

State name

Type

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer

Thailand

HN-5A     500

1987

China

HN-5A

     650

1988

China

Mistral-1

36

1997

FranceIgla-M/SA-18?

?

Russia36

Igla-S/SA-24

Tunisia
TurkeyTurkmenistan?

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide       90

1997/2002/05

SwedenBlowpipe     200

1981-84

UK

FIM-43C Redeye     200

1982/83

United States

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

RBS-70 & Bolide     300

1980/81

SwedenFIM-43C Redeye     300

1994

United States

FIM-43C Redeye     789

1985-?

United States

FIM-92 Stinger

647

1992/?

UnitedStates+ESC

FIM-92 Stinger

  4.800

2004

ESC

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

1975/87

Russia+Lic.

UgandaStrela-2/SA-7a/b     200

UkraineStrela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

     200?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18?

?

Russia1994

France?

FranceUnited Arab Emirates

Mistral-1

524

Mistral-2?

Strela-3/SA-14

     100

1986/87

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

     400

1998/99

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

United Kingdom?

RussiaRBS-70 & Bolide     304

1980/81

SwedenBlowpipe     100

1981UK

2005/06

Russia+Lic.

1982/2004

UnitedStates+ESC

Igla-1/SA-16
FIM-92 Stinger
Blowpipe31     200?

UK     295

1989

UK

?

1991

UK

Starstreak-I

7.000+

1995

UK

Starstreak-II

?

?

UK

JavelinStarburst

152

?

?

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate

Comments                   500                   65036                       0                       0                     90                   200                   200

Number delivered in 83 shipment could
be considerably higher.

                       0                   300                   300

From Germany                   789647                4,800

Likely from European Stinger
Consortium                       0                       0                       0?

2007                       0       3,000

2007                       0Original number unclear / http://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/CoverStory#23

                       0                       0                       0524                       0                   100                   400                       0                   304                   10031                   200                       0Out of service, but unclear if destroyed.

                   295

Over 16,000 were produced, probably
large stockpile.

                       0                7,000                       0153State name

Type

ImportDate(s)Manufacturer

United States

Igla-1/SA-16

313

2006/07

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

157

2003/05/06

FIM-92 Stinger

379+

Uzbekistan

Venezuela

VietnamUnited States

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

Strela-3/SA-14?

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16?

?

Russia+Lic.

Mistral1?

?

FranceIgla-M/SA-18?

?

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24

   1002009

Russia?

SwedenRBS-70 & Bolide

8Strela-2/SA-7a/b

5.080

Strela-3/SA-14?

1971/75/96/99

Russia+Lic.

?

Russia+Lic.

Igla-1/SA-16

   1001996/97

Russia+Lic.

Igla-M/SA-18

     50

2002

RussiaIgla-S/SA-24?

?

RussiaYemen

Strela-2/SA-7a/b     80

1989/91

Russia+Lic.

ZambiaStrela-2/SA-7a/b

   1001979

Russia+Lic.

Zimbabwe

Strela-2/SA-7a/b?

?

Russia+Lic.

TOTAL
Sources: Adapted from Jane’s, 2011-2012; SIPRI, 2012; IISS, 2012154

DestroyedDate(s)Stockpile estimate
313

Comments
Possibly supplied undercountermeasure agreement

157                   379

Our estimate: 50–90,000 MANPADS                       0                       0                       0                       0                       0                2,400
8

In delivery
Number “in service” no import number.

                5,080                       0                   100                     50Unknown                     80                   100                       0153,341

155

About the authors
Princess Mawuena Amuzu (MA Development
and Governance) works at BICC in the areasof Arms, Natural Resources and Conflict. She
studied Development and Governance at the
University of Duisburg-Essen and International
Affairs at the University of Ghana. Her researchinterests include SALW control, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), peaceagreements, peace education and human­trafficking.
Michael Ashkenazi (PhD, Anthropology) iscurrently Program Leader for SALW Control
at BICC. He has conducted research in
Afghanistan, China, Guinea Bissau, Japan,­
Korea, Liberia, Nepal, South Sudan, Timor Leste,and Uganda. His current research interests
range from traditional security providers througharms and ammunition storage, DDR, SSR, to theeffects of SALW on societies and development.
He has previously worked on Japanese religion,
food culture, business culture, and migration.
Jan Grebe (MA, Political Science) is currently
Project Leader for Arms Export Control at BICC.
He studied Political Science, Sociology as wellas Economic and Social History at Aachen
University, where he is currently enrolled as a­
PhD-Student. His current research interest range
from German and European arms export policies
through maritime security to regional security
cooperation in West Africa. He has also worked
on traditional conflict resolution and sanctions.
Christof Kögler (MA Political Science and­Anthropology) works at BICC as Researcher,where his work focuses on the areas of SALW
control, SSR, DDR, as well as the conflict ­potentialof renewable energy installations in the MENA
region. He has conducted field work in Sudan,
Egypt, and Nepal. In the past, he worked
on group identities and citizenship as well as­sustainable consumption.

156

Marc Kösling (Dipl.-Soz.-Wiss.) is a Research­Assistant at BICC and works in the area of smallarms and light weapons (SALW) control. He
studied at the University of Duisburg-Essen andgraduated with a major in Political Scienceand a minor in Psychology. In his diploma thesis,
he analyzed peace operations by different
international regimes. Other research interests­
include the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and smart
weapons technology.

Photo credits
p. 10

DHL plane after MANPADS attack in
Baghdad, 2003/ Jim Gordon/ CC BY 2.0

p. 26

Stinger front section/ Klaus Holtkamp;
Technische Schule Landsysteme undFachschule des Heers für Technik,
Bundeswehr

p. 41

Syrian fighter with SA-16/ Joshua Landis

p. 86

MANPADS in Uganda/ Mines Advisory
Group

p. 93

NATO MANPADS workshop in 2007/
NATO

p. 102 Angel flares/ Wikimedia User: Tidus Tia/
CC BY-SA 3.0
title:

Mongolian soldier with SA-18/ Snyder

title:

NATO MANPADS workshop in 2007/
NATO

title:

Thunderbolt damaged by SA-16/ Master
Sgt. Kit Thompson

title:

Syrian fighter with SA-16/ Joshua Landis

title:

DHL plane after MANPADS attack in
Baghdad, 2003/ Jim Gordon/ CC BY 2.0

title:MANPADS in Uganda/ Mines AdvisoryGroup

title:Angel flares/ Wikimedia User: Tidus Tia/
CC BY-SA 3.0

157

158

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