REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
FOR MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

By

Commodore Sam Bateman PhD RAN (Rtd)(Research Fellow, Centre for Maritime Policy,
University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia 2522)

Introduction
The first two books of meeting proceedings from the Maritime Cooperation Working Groupestablished by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) had the titles,
Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation1 and The Seas Unite:
Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region 2. These titles reflected an optimistic view thatmaritime cooperation in the region would ease tensions at sea. Unfortunately this has not been
the case. While regional maritime cooperation has increased, particularly with fisheries, safety
and marine environmental management, unfortunately the maritime security situation seems
more dangerous now that it was in the early 1990s. The current surge in naval spending3 hasmore serious overtones than the increased naval expenditure of the early and mid-1990s prior
to the economic downturn of the late 1990s. The “first round” of naval expansion appeared partof an understandable, non-threatening process of modernisation4. This does not seem the casewith the “second round” of naval expansion that appears more based on assessments of threats
posed by other regional countries. It has more of the characteristics of a naval arms race,
particularly in East Asia5.

1 Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime
Cooperation, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 114, Strategic and Defence Studies, Centre,
Australian National University, Autumn 1996.
2 Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates (eds), The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region,
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 118, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National
University, Spring 1996.
3 Malcolm R. Davis, “Back on Course”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol.35, No.4, 24 January 2001, pp.22-27.
4 Sam Bateman, “ASEAN's tiger navies - catching up or building up?”, Jane's Navy International, Vol.102,
No.3, April 1997, pp.18-27.
5 Shawn W. Crispin, “On Their Marks”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 October 2000, pp. 29-30; andAnthony Bergin, “East Asia returns to spending”, Australian Financial Review, Defence Special Report, 7
February 2001, p.6.

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Despite the economic downturn of the late 1990s, the Asia Pacific is back on course to be themost dynamic region of the world over the next few decades. However, East Asia in particularfaces an unprecedented period of strategic competition that has dangerous overtones for the
security of the entire region probably spilling over into the Indian Ocean. Great power rivalries in
the region may continue to grow and complicate maritime security cooperation. Much depends
upon the nature of the relationships between the region’s major powers – China, Japan, India,
Russia and the U.S.

The focus of strategic rivalry is China with apparent attempts by other regional powers tocontain the strategic rise of China. These moves are most evident in the maritime domain. They
are apparent in attempts to create a trilateral naval coalition in Northeast Asia, involving Japan,
South Korea and the U.S.6, and in the U.S. proposal for a multilateral security relationshipbetween the U.S. and its main Pacific allies: Australia, South Korea and Japan7. They are alsosuggested by Japan’s proposal for anti-piracy patrols in the South China Sea and involvementin the expanded multilateral exercises COBRA Gold conducted in Southeast Asia8, as well as
by the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises between the USN
and Southeast Asian navies9. Similarly, Indian naval activities, such as naval ship visits andexercises East of Singapore, suggest the maritime containment of China.

However, these activities are a little like King Canute trying to hold back the rising tide. There issome inevitability about the rise of China’s strategic power and influence. The U.S., andparticularly the U.S. in close alliance with Japan, cannot assume that East Asian countries(other than Japan itself) will support attempts to contain China. These countries are well awareof geo-strategic realities and may at least “sit on the fence” if not move into the Chinese “camp”.
ASEAN nations, particularly Burma, Malaysia and Thailand, have a pragmatic view of China
and are unlikely to be part of a containment process. With the prospects of closer economic andtrade links between ASEAN and China, there are indications of acceptance, at least inSoutheast Asia, of China as the dominant Asian power. From a Chinese perspective, efforts tocontain China are threatening and justify increased military expenditure, particularly naval.

6 As promoted in recent years by workshops jointly sponsored by the Center for Naval Analyses (US), theKorea Institute for Defense Analyses and the Okazaki Institute (Japan).
7 Stratfor Strategic Forecasting,” U.S.- Asian Alliance Proposal Aimed at China”, 8 August 2001,
http://www.stratfor.com/northamerica/commentary/0108082120.htm
8 Micool Brooke, “Japan’s Strategic Interests in the Asia-Pacific”, Asian Defence Journal, 6/2001, p.4.
9 Lt. Leslie Hull-Ryde USN, “Enhancing Regional Naval Cooperation: CARAT 2000”, Asia-Pacific Defense
Forum, Fall 2000, pp. 22-34.

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Regional Naval Developments
Most current trends with strategic initiatives and the development of naval capabilities are in thewrong direction in terms of impact on the future stability of the region. Dangerous waters could
lie ahead10. Expenditure on regional maritime forces (ships, submarine and aircraft) stands toincrease generally in line with regional rates of economic growth with the consequence that, if
current trends continue, some regional navies might become the most powerful in the world
after the USN11. These navies will be highly involved in capabilities such as information warfare
and naval missile defence.

Developments with regional navies are marked by two clear trends. The first is that mostregional navies are concentrating strongly on war-fighting capabilities and the exploitation ofmodern naval technology. They are not being diverted into less demanding constabulary andpeacekeeping roles. The second is that separate coast guards are being developed to meet
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) surveillance and offshore sovereignty protection tasks thatmight otherwise have justified naval expansion. Regional nations that have coast guards arebuilding them up, and those that did not previously have coast guards are now establishingthem. With the expansion of both regional navies and coast guards, it is a “boom” time formaritime security forces. Both types of force stand to grow in the future in Asian regions.

As a result of major developments in technology, particularly with the collection and processingof information, fundamental changes are occurring in the ways that advanced defence forces
operate in peacetime and will fight in any future war 12 . However, these developments atpresent only affect high technology navies that can afford the relevant capabilities. They widen
the difference between “high tech” and “low tech” navies and potentially inhibit maritime security
cooperation. At present the navies that can exploit technology to the full are mainly in Northeast
Asia, except for Singapore and to a lesser extent, India and Malaysia. China currently lacks but
aspires to having “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) type capabilities13. Wide-area space10 Sam Bateman, “Dangerous Waters Ahead”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol.35, No.13, 28 March 2001, pp.2427.
11 David Saw, “The Regional Naval Environment – Growth at Sea”, Asian Military Review, Vol.8 Issue 5,
August/September 2000, pp.26-30.
12 Ross Babbage, “Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific in the Twenty-first Century” in Donald R Rothwell,and Sam Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea, The Hague, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p.68.
13 Malcolm R. Davis “China’s security aspirations for the 21st Century and challenges for East Asia”, AsiaPacific Defence Reporter, August/September 1999, p.11.

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based, airborne, ground and sea-based sensors and a networking of their outputs can make theair, surface and sub-surface environments far more transparent. When linked together withships, submarines and aircraft, we have the capability for Network Centric Warfare (NCW).

Developments with separate coast guards are very evident in South and East Asia. These
reflect recognition of the significance of increased maritime jurisdiction and the potential politicalsensitivity of law enforcement at sea. Some new coast guards are fairly recent (e.g. Bangladesh,the Philippines and Vietnam). The Japan Coast Guard, formerly the Japanese Maritime Safety
Agency (JMSA), and the Indian Coast Guard are prime examples of. para-military marine
constabulary forces adopted by countries with extensive maritime interests and a reluctance touse conventional military forces in routine maritime enforcement. During 2000 and 2001, Japan
has been actively exploring the scope for Japan Coast Guard vessels and aircraft to participate
in anti-piracy activities in Southeast Asian waters14. Following the success of the Indian Coast
Guard in retaking the pirated Japanese vessel Alondra Rainbow in November 199915, India
has also been promoting joint action on Asian piracy16. Thus coast guards are emerging as
significant national institutions in the Asia Pacific with the potential to make a major contribution
to both oceans governance and regional security cooperation. They are an important newelement to consider in maritime security cooperation.

Frameworks for Maritime Security Cooperation
Maritime security cooperation refers in this paper to any cooperation between regional countries
at sea or associated with the sea, conducted by military or non-military institutions, with theobjective of improving regional security. The process is underdeveloped at present in the Asia
Pacific with the exception of the South Pacific where the strong common interests of island
countries have provided a firm foundation for cooperative endeavours. Different levels ofmaritime security cooperation can be identified that take account of varying political levels, orintensity, of strategic commitment, shared policy objectives and cooperation, and different threat
assessments. This paper recognises four levels of cooperation: alliances, coalitions, non-

14 Nayan Chanda, “Foot in the Water”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 March 2000, pp.28-29. MarkValencia, “Joining Up With Japan to Patrol Asian Waters”, International Herald Tribune, 28 April 2000.
15 In October 1999 the cargo ship Alondra Rainbow was taken by pirates after leaving an Indonesian port forJapan. On 16 November 1999 the Indian Coast Guard intercepted the vessel under another name off Goa andwas successful in boarding the ship and arresting the pirates. IMO, “Piracy and armed robbery at sea”, Focus on
IMO, January 2000, pp.1 and 7.
16 “India calls for joint action on Asian sea piracy’, The Times of India online, 16 February 2001,
http://www.timesofindia.com

4coalition naval cooperation and maritime cooperation17. These different levels of cooperation
are not mutually exclusive and some types of activity might overlap different levels.

The first two levels, alliances and coalitions, constitute a higher tier of maritime security
cooperation where some degree of political commitment must be present. Coalitions are more
limited in scope than formal alliances and imply a lower level of political commitment. Naval
operations by an alliance might encompass the entire span of maritime operations frompeacetime exercises and training through to the highest level of naval war-fighting in a multithreat environment. Comprehensive standard operating procedures and doctrine will be agreed
between the participating forces. NATO is the prime example of an alliance and the doctrine
and procedures developed under the auspices of NATO underpin most multinational naval
operations and exercises. The bilateral alliance relationships between the U.S. and Japan,
South Korea and Australia are regional examples of alliances that are the basis of regularcombined naval exercises and doctrine development.

Coalitions may be of a formal, established nature covered by treaty arrangements (e.g. the Five
Power Defence Arrangements or FPDA, and U.S. commitments to the external security ofThailand and the Philippines), or less formal with a lower level of political commitment. Naval
operations conducted by a coalition may be ad hoc, such as the UN INTERFET operation in
East Timor and those now being conducted as part of the war on terrorism. For such operations,ships may not have to be integrated into the same force where high levels of interoperability are
required but rather a niche approach might be possible with different navies or groups of navies
providing particular capabilities. For example, “low tech” or more politically constrained navies
might perform logistic support, patrolling and blockading tasks while war-fighting capabilities
against high level threats are provided by “high tech” coalition partners.

Naval peacekeeping operations are a particular example of coalition operation Traditional
peacekeeping is carried out under the authority of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter (PacificSettlement of Disputes) and is conducted with the agreement of the opposing forces. The typesof maritime task may include the supervision of a marine or riverine demarcation line, themonitoring of a cease-fire afloat and the patrol of a buffer zone at sea. Peace enforcement
operations are those conducted in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution under
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
17 This part of the paper draws on a recent monograph: Chris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition
Building in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospects, Working Paper No.7, Royal5Peace, and Acts of Aggression). These are operations carried out to restore peace between
belligerent parties who may not have consented to intervention and may be engaged in combat.
They require capable, “high tech” naval forces well experienced in the technologies of modern
maritime warfare. The types of naval operation involved might include air defence and themaintenance of no fly zones; the opposed evacuation of nationals and casualties; theenforcement of sanctions and a blockade; and amphibious support for ground operations. The
problems associated with peacekeeping can be complex, particularly when the navies involved
have little or no experience of working together previously.

“First track” regional arrangements provide possible frameworks for maritime security
cooperation. These include Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association ofSouth East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the Indian
Ocean region we have Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC), the Indian Ocean
Rim- Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 18 . However, all face a range of political problems andlimitations in their ability to address maritime security cooperation, particularly those in the
Indian Ocean. In the Pacific, various working groups established under the auspices of APEC
are addressing problems of the marine environment, maritime safety and fishing and the ARF
has sponsored several meetings of maritime experts to consider maritime security issues,particularly small “s” security problems, including piracy19. The ARF (and CSCAP at a “second
track” level) are important forums for the engagement of China on regional security issues.
China uses its participation in these forums as a CBM20 while still being hesitant to implement
many of the measures discussed except for low-key naval ship visits and the like21.

The lower tier of maritime security cooperation, non-coalition naval cooperation and maritime
cooperation, encompasses cooperative activities between countries which do not necessarily

Australian Navy, Sea Power Centre and Centre for Maritime Policy, October 2001.
18 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Maritime and Naval Cooperation in the Indian Ocean”, Asian Strategic Review
1997-98, Institute of Defence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, 1998, pp. 258-282.
19 Sam Bateman, “Regional Efforts for Maritime Cooperation: State and Prospect” in Dalchoong Kim, SeoHang Lee and Jin-Hyun Paik (eds), Maritime Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific toward the 21stCentury, East and West Studies Series 46, Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1998,
pp. 215-240.
20 Kenneth W. Allen, “China’s Approach to Confidence-Building Measures” in Ranjeet K. Singh (ed),Investigating Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Report No.28, Washington DC, The
Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1999, p.20.
21 Benjamin l. Self, “Confidence-Building Measures and Japanese Security Policy” in Singh (ed), Investigating
Confidence-Building Measures, p.47.

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share any specific common political or strategic objective other than a common interest in for
example, confidence-building, preventive diplomacy or law and order at sea. Cooperation will befocused on non-controversial issues, including basic interoperability requirements to facilitate
cooperation on activities such as search and rescue and humanitarian relief. Maritime
cooperation encompasses any cooperative activity associated with an interest in the sea, theprotection of the marine environment or a use of the sea or its resources. The objectives ofmaritime cooperation are twofold:•

firstly, to provide a “building block” for regional stability by easing tensions and reducing therisks of conflict at sea; and•secondly, to help promote a stable maritime regime22 in the region with the free movementof seaborne trade and nations able to pursue their maritime interests and exploit theirmarine resources in accordance with agreed principles of international law.

Naval cooperation is a subset of the broader concept of maritime cooperation. It has wide scopeand may be bilateral or multilateral. At the lower end are low-key, confidence-building activities(e.g. ship visits, fleet reviews, personnel exchanges, navy-to-navy talks, and multilateral naval
conferences). More ambitious activities might include information/intelligence exchanges, joint
doctrine development, standard operating procedures (SOPs), combined exercises, avoidanceof incident at sea (INCSEA) agreements, and cooperation on tasks such as marine scientificresearch and anti- piracy. The top end of naval cooperation might include cooperative maritime
surveillance, standing regional naval forces, cooperative sea lines of communication (SLOC)
protection, and mine-countermeasures.

The multilateral Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is a leading example of noncoalition naval cooperation23. However, a host of other activities, both bilateral and multilateralalso fit within this category (e.g. passage exercises when ships of one nation visit another or aninternational fleet review is held such as the one hosted by India in February 200124). The main
thrust of the WPNS has been the harmonisation of existing procedures rather than multilateralnaval operations although a major recent achievement has been the inaugural Western PacificMine Countermeasure Exercise and First Western Pacific Diving Exercise held in and around
22 Michael Leifer, “The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia”, The Pacific Review, Vol.4,
No.2, 1991, p.128.
23 WPNS member countries are: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, United States andVietnam; and observer countries are: Canada, France, India and Chile.
24 “India all set for naval extravaganza”, The Times of India online, 15 February 2001, http://www.timesof

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Singapore in June 200125. Other tangible outcomes from the WPNS meetings include thedevelopment of a Maritime Information Exchange Directory, a WPNS Tactical Signals
Handbook, and a WPNS Replenishment at Sea Handbook26.

Seaborne trade, the protection of shipping and the security of SLOCs27 stand out as common
interests of countries in Southeast and Southwest Asia that might provide a bridge between thetwo regions and lead to maritime security cooperation becoming more of a reality. International
maritime commerce is the classical multilateral maritime security interest. Its protection always
involves at least two countries (i.e. the exporter and the importer), and perhaps a third (i.e. theFlag State of the ship carrying the cargo). Historically, as we have seen with convoy operations
in two world wars, the development of NATO maritime doctrine, and arrangements for the naval
control of shipping (NCS), it has provided the fundamental rationale for multinational security
cooperation. It also provides the most basic demonstration of how a nation's maritime security
interests extend beyond its own waters (e.g. the interest of Japan in the security of SLOCs in
Southeast Asian waters). As the security of SLOCs is such an important common interest ofregional nations, it could be an important basis for maritime security cooperation.

The Pacific and Indian Oceans Shipping Working Group (PACIOSWG) is an existingarrangement to promote common doctrine and procedures for the naval control of shipping(NCS) in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The core membership of PACIOSWG comprises
Australia, Canada, U.K. and the U.S. Chile and South Korea joined in 1989, initially as
observers, and France is an occasional participant. There may be potential to extend themembership of PACIOSWG.

“Second track” forums have utility for establishing maritime security frameworks, particularly by
spreading awareness of problems and potentially identifying solutions that may be too sensitiveor embryonic for consideration at a “first track” level. Notable “second track” maritime security
india.com/150201/15indi11.htm
25 Fifteen ships and 1,500 personnel from 16 nations took part in this WPNS-sponsored exercise, China, Japanand the U.S. “16 nations in anti-mine action”, The Jakarta Post, 13 June 2001, p.13.
26 For a fuller discussion of the activities of the WPNS see Dick Sherwood, “The Navy and National Security:
The Peacetime Dimension”, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.109, Canberra, Strategic andDefence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1994, pp. 61-64. Also the WPNS home page at
http://www.apan-info.net/conferences/wpns/WPNS%20Unprotected/WPNS-Home.htm
27 On the issue of terminology, I prefer sea lines of communication (SLOCs) rather than the alternative, sea
lanes of communication, because sea lanes have a distinctive meaning in the law of the sea, particularly witharchipelagic sea lanes and routing systems. While it is acceptable to speak of the security of SLOCs, it mustalso be remembered that, in operational terms, it is ships that are defended and not lines in the ocean.

8forums include the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group, the biennial international
SLOC conferences, and the annual Workshops for Resolving Potential Conflict in the South
China Sea. The main contributions of the CSCAP Working Group have been the developmentof CSCAP memoranda on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation28 and Cooperation for
Law and Order at Sea in the Asia Pacific 29 . The Working Group is now working on aprospective memorandum on the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific.

The SLOC conferences date back to the 1980s and have the objective of fostering the common
interest in the security of SLOCs.30 Recent conferences have been held in Taipei, Tokyo andSeoul with the last in Canberra in April 2001. Unfortunately despite attempts to secure
participation in these conferences from China, so far these have not been successful. However,as there is no formal membership procedures for participation in the SLOC process, it is unlikelythat the non-participation by China is due to the involvement of Taiwan in the process.

Limitations on Maritime Security Cooperation
It is not hard to find problems with strengthening maritime security cooperation. Some countries
may have suspicions concerning the capabilities and intentions of their neighbours. There are
no obvious naval “partners” in Southeast and Southwest Asia. Problems exist with common
doctrine, language and interoperability of equipment. Regional navies acquire their ships,
submarines and aircraft from a wide range of sources. The problems involved become evenmore acute as the technological levels of navies increase. Navies are at different stages oftechnological development. Technical deficiencies in some navies may significantly inhibit
cooperation with less advanced navies being reluctant to engage in operational cooperation forfear that their deficiencies will be too apparent. The level and use of combat data systems are
particular areas where differences will appear. Language may be a problem. Clearly it isimportant to ensure that all participants in a cooperative activity have a common understandingof what they were talking about. Or not talking about!

Another problem is that cooperative activities may be used to gain intelligence on thecapabilities of another country. It is well known that even innocuous naval port visits provide an
opportunity to gather intelligence both by the host nation collecting information about visiting

28 The Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation are available on the AUSCSCAP website at:
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/AUSCSCAP/Guidelin.mcw.html
29 This memorandum was published in February 2001 as CSCAP Memorandum No.5.
30 Hon Shin Kanemaru, “Foreword” in M.J. Kennedy, M.J., and M.J. O'Connor, Safely by Sea, Lanham,
Maryland, University Press of America, 1990, p.ix.

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ships and by visiting ships about the host nation. This might include signals intelligence gainedby listening in on the host nation’s naval communications while a foreign warship is in port.
Normally it is standard practice for a host nation to close down sensitive transmissions while a“potential intelligence collector” (PIC) is in port. Expert intelligence collectors can obtain muchvital information on another navy, particularly data on weapons, sensors and communications
systems (including the possible identification of highly sensitive frequencies to support
prospective electronic warfare), during operations with ships and aircraft of another country.
In view of the increasing number of submarines in the region 31 , the safety of submergedsubmarine operations is of particular concern. The regional ASW capability is also increasing
with the consequent probability that “intruder” submarines may be detected. This may create apotentially serious situation if there is tension between the countries that could be involved or if
the detection is made in a sensitive area. It may be necessary to consider the establishment ofa regional submarine Movement Advisory Authority (or water space management regime32)
along the lines of the procedures currently followed by NATO and other Western navies but thiswill be difficult in view of the essentially sensitive nature of submarine operations. The concern
for submarine safety in the region was demonstrated by the four-nation combined submarine
rescue exercise held in the South China Sea in October 200033.
Prospective limitations on maritime security cooperation in Southeast and Southwest Asia areevident both at a political level and a technological one. Navies may be uncomfortable about
discussing operational and doctrinal issues and prefer to keep dialogue, at least initially, to thesmall “s” side of the security spectrum and the lowest tier of maritime security cooperation. A
cautious approach to maritime security cooperation is indicated. Cooperation between coast
guards may be particularly beneficial in overcoming some of the political sensitivities with navies.

There is a presumption in this paper and in fact in the theme of this conference that maritime
security cooperation is beneficial. But this may not always be so. Rather than being a “building
block” for regional security, the pursuit of cooperation could also be a “stumbling block” thatheightens insecurity and increases regional tensions. This could occur, for example, throughincreased awareness of strengths and weaknesses leading to a naval arms race or by the
31 Prasun K. Sengupta, “Submarine Fleet Build-up In Asia-Pacific”, Asian Defence Journal, 8/2000, pp.26-32.

32 Graeme Dunk, “Do we need a Southeast Asian Water Space Management Regime”, Asian Defence Journal,
5/95, pp.12-13.
33 Participating countries in this exercise, “Pacific Reach 2000”, were South Korea, Japan, Singapore and the
U.S. “Korean Navy to Join Submarine Rescue Drill in Pacific”, The Korea Times National online, 5 September

10creation of alliances or coalitions among some countries and apparently aimed at others. For
example, China has high sensitivity, if not hostility, towards potential Korean-U.S.-Japanese
security cooperation. The search for cooperation can also have the undesirable effect ofemphasising differences in security perceptions and capabilities.

This is not to say thatcooperation should not be pursued but rather to highlight the need for caution.

In terms of the frameworks for maritime security cooperation suggested in this paper, the pursuitof the higher tier of alliances and coalitions risks sending the wrong messages throughimplications of exclusiveness. The basis of exclusiveness might be political or technological.
For this reason, the WPNS and other forms of non-coalition naval cooperation offer ongoing
potential as inclusive activities that can overcome problems and sensitivities before proceeding
too far with maritime security cooperation. Similarly, maritime cooperation (including cooperation
between regional coast guards) should be encouraged recognising that this will largely befacilitated through non-security frameworks such as APEC and IOR-ARC. “Second track”
arrangements, such as CSCAP, are particularly useful and might even be extended to forums
for the management of regional oceans and seas.

Conclusions
The risks are high of sustained confrontation between major regional powers. In thesecircumstances, East Asian countries have ample justification to expand their military forces,
particularly their naval capabilities, and a naval arms race is increasingly evident in the region.
The current trends will only be reversed through a sustained process of confidence and trust
building facilitated by the development of strong regional multilateral structures and frameworks.
However, this requires a change in the political mindset to that evident in the region at present.
Where possible, the focus of new initiatives should be on inclusive multilateral maritime security
frameworks rather than exclusive ones. Virtually by definition, this suggests an emphasis on
non-coalition naval cooperation and maritime cooperation rather than on alliances and coalitions(except for ad hoc coalitions for peacekeeping purposes). There is a particular need to pursue
cooperative relations with China and to make clear that strategies of containment and exclusion
have no place in policies towards China.

2000, http://www.hk.co.kr/kt_nation/200009/t20000905173304411177.htm

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