助成

Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・

IIPS International Conference“Enlargement and Future of Europe 2002”
Tokyo, 12-14 November“NATO in the Age of Uncertainty: a Japanese View”
byYuzuru Kaneko
Chief of First Research OfficeSecond Research Department
National Institute for Defense Studies
JapanNATO in the Age of Uncertainty: a Japanese View

Yuzuru Kaneko

Paper prepared for the conference on:

Enlargement and Future of Europe 2002
Institute for International Policy Studies
Tokyo
12 November 2002

NATO in the Age of Uncertainty: a Japanese View
National Institute for Defense Studies, Second Research Department
Chief of First Research Office
Yuzuru Kaneko

Introduction
With the end of the East-West confrontation and the disappearance of an overt adversary,
Europeans have started to promote regional cooperation. By signing the Maastricht Treaty in
February 1992 to create the European Union, European states accelerated the integration
process under the guidance of market democracy. It might be said that the desire of Jean
Monnet, who dedicated himself to the creation of an antiwar community in Post–World War II
Europe and contributed to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, hascome to the fore among Europeans espousing the idea of European Identity.
On the other hand, with the signing of the CFE Treaty in November 1990, NATO, thewinner of the Cold War, altered its military posture and modified its military strategy toaccommodate itself to a new security environment in Europe. NATO also began proceedingwith enlargement to the East in order to create a war-free Euro-Atlantic area. In addition,
NATO has applied its efforts to increase its capability for crisis management, in order tomanage the frequent regional and ethnic conflicts which have broken out in the Post-Cold War
world. NATO’s efforts in search of a new security regime might be seen as aiming for thecreation of the Atlantic Community which US President John F. Kennedy envisioned in theearly 1960s, and to transform NATO from a military alliance into a community with common
values that will foster freedom and democracy in the world.
However, as the EU has faced difficulties in coordinating interest among the member
states in the course of further integration, NATO is encountering certain problems inaccommodating itself to the new security environment. This paper takes up two issues—enlargement to the East and crisis management—and discusses how NATO should manage
変更されたフィールド コード

them for the future of the alliance. This paper also discusses how these European security
issues will affect the course of Japan’s security.

NATO Enlargement to the East
Around the time of the Malta Summit between the United States and the Soviet Union in
December 1989, at which both states announced the end of the Cold War, NATO changed its
1
Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

raison d’être from the previous “framework for a military alliance” to a “political framework
for an international alliance”(1). Then, at the July 1990 NATO summit in London, NATOdeclared “We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension,
and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2
of our Treaty” (2) and began to accommodate itself to a new security environment in Europe,in which the Soviet Union (and later Russia) could not be categorized as “the enemy.” Keeping
the “bottom line” of collective self-defense against future uncertainties in an unthreatening
manner, NATO tried to develop its capabilities as a security organization for all of Europe bymodifying the “superstructure”, such as the joint military organization and the common
strategy (3).
NATO enlargement to the East, however, created a curious reversal in NATO. This was
because, while the existing NATO states had begun to seek restructured relations with Russia,
the former East European states, anticipating Russia’s recovery, began to expect admission to
NATO as a “military alliance.” Although NATO had fully realized the necessity to fill thepower vacuum generated in the former East European states, there was an appreciation thatsuch action by NATO would cause Russia to defy it as a new containment measure, whichmight provide another excuse to the nationalists in Russia and trigger new confrontation. Fromthe start, the issue of NATO enlargement contained inherent theoretical contradictions.
In late August 1993, the press reported that Russian President Boris Yeltsin had given“implicit approval” to Poland’s participation in NATO in talks with Polish President Lech
Walesa. This was something that the Polish government had been expecting. These external
conditions touched off the sudden surfacing of the NATO’s enlargement arguments, which had
not been a topic of official discussions. As a result, at the Informal Meeting of NATO Defence
Ministers in Travemuende, the ministers provisionally agreed that, while the immediate goal
was the structuring of cooperative relations in peacekeeping activities through the frameworkof the Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO would also consider certain new activities geared
towards future enlargement, NATO would individually consult with any active participant in
the PfP if that partner perceived a direct threat to its territorial integrity, and thus the issue wascarried (4).
The discussions on enlargement of NATO appeared to have reached a certain level of

変更されたフィールド コード

agreement. However, it did not resolve the dissatisfaction of the former East European states.
In October, incidentally, the instability of the Russian domestic situation was made apparent
by the forceful suppressive actions against the Russian White House carried out by President
Yeltsin. There was appreciation that such a firm attitude by Yeltsin might drive Russia to takehard-line foreign policies again. There was also a risk that the reactionaries in Russia, who had
2Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

started to rise under the slogan of resurrecting a strong Russia, might cause the Yeltsin
Administration to be disturbed. The PfP did not satisfy the expectations of these former East
European states.
At the same time, the United States government made new moves to accelerateenlargement of NATO. President Clinton announced that the issue of enlargement of NATOwas a matter of “when and how to execute” during his visit to the Czech Republic in January
1994, which communicated subtle changes in the US government’s posture. In July 1994,
President Clinton visited Poland and announced that Poland was the first candidate for new
membership of NATO and that Russia, which was opposed to enlargement of NATO, had noauthority to refuse it. Although the UK and France still frowned upon the United States’
attempts to accelerate the enlargement movement, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl officially
supported enlargement in November by placing priority on the stability of the neighboringstates. In December, less than a year after the adoption of the PfP, NATO allies agreed to theenlargement policy in keeping with the intentions of the United States. Thus, the issue had
been transformed from the initial questioning of the pros and cons of enlargement to thespecific decision stage of “who and when” (5).
In late September 1995, when the conflict in former Yugoslavia seemed to have abated asa result of NATO’s heavy bombing in Bosnia, NATO sent a document on its enlargement
policy to PfP member states, all but brushing off Russian opposition. This document stipulated
that the objective of NATO enlargement was to provide increased stability and security for all
in the Euro-Atlantic Area. It also stipulated the rights and duties for the members of NATO,and urged further efforts on the part of the states seeking new participation, in accordance with
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, to satisfy those conditions (6). In addition, in December
1995, NATO mentioned for the first time the “cooperative security” that informed the new
relationship with Russia and sought the understanding of the Russians. Russians, however,were unlikely to accept this announcement by NATO that stipulated the structuring of asecurity system in which the assurance of security of one party would not damage the securityof the other.
The gap between NATO and Russia was not bridged in 1996, mainly because both theUnited States and Russia were obsessed with their own domestic affairs and because Yeltsin’s
ailment was serious. Even at the summit held in March 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin could not
bridge the gap. Yet Russia did not have enough power to stop the already-turning wheels ofNATO enlargement. Thus, in late May, both sides signed the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and agreed
to establish the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). These measures reflected NATO’s expectation
3

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

変更されたフィールド コード

that, in return for Russian tolerance of enlargement, NATO would consult closely with Russia
before NATO puts its own policies into force. As a result, at the summit held in Madrid in July
1997, NATO decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become newmembers, in accordance with the US open-door policy (a policy permitting any country thatapplies for membership and meets the requirements to join the alliance).
In this way, NATO achieved the first stage of enlargement without coming up against a
tough stance or a shift in military posture by Russia. However, at the Prague Summit inNovember 2002, new problems will be added to the unresolved ones of the first stage, when
the candidates for the second round are nominated.
The first problem is the relationship with Russia, which still regards NATO as a military
alliance. In this sense, the affiliation of the Baltic states is most contentious (7). If Lithuania
joins NATO, the Kaliningrad Oblast will be severed from Russia, and Russia would face a
difficult situation, similar to the one faced by the West with former West Berlin. In this case,there is no doubt that the creation of a corridor via Belarus and Poland would become aproblem. If Estonia and Latvia join the Alliance, even if NATO troops are not to be stationed
in these states, it would create a situation where the NATO defense line comes into directcontact with Russia. Consequently, if the Russian military, State Duma, or others worry about
the situation, they may feel frustration both with themselves and with President Putin, who issearching for a way to compromise with NATO. This may result in demands by Russia for the
early amendment of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, or, if a tight Russian military budget hinders the improvement andreinforcement of conventional forces, Russia may adopt a first-use policy and deploy tactical
nuclear weapons which do not contravene existing treaties.
Thus, the May 2002 Summit agreement between Russia and NATO on establishment of
the NATO-Russia Council seems to reassure Russia (8). This is because the new council, inplace of the PJC inaugurated in May 1997, gave Russia equal status with the NATO members
in discussion of common security issues, such as antiterrorism, and encouraged decision byconsensus (9). The new council, however, has its limitations. Although the council wasostensibly created to allow Russia to participate in the NATO decision-making process, andgave Russia the appearance of “quasi-member” status in NATO, this new council was as

変更されたフィールド コード

notable for what it left out as for what it included. More specifically, it was based on theunderstanding that Russia would not participate in discussions relating to NATO’s strategic
concept or its force structure, which that are the very roots of the military alliance. The
establishment of the NATO-Russia Council was nothing more than the product of a4

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

compromise designed to be politically advantageous to Putin—who is seeking good relations
with NATO—in return for his tacit acceptance of the next NATO enlargement.
From this point of view, transformation of NATO’s military posture will be important. It is
expected that, at the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO will agree to an increase in its
crisis management capabilities, which the US government has made much of since the end of
the 1990s. Taking the limited military resources of the allies into consideration, NATO will
acquire new military capabilities, such as strategic transport, command, control andcommunications, and precision guided munitions, at the expense of scaling down its territorial
defense capabilities. Hence, further transformation of NATO’s superstructure, through theamendment of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe, is expected to reassure Russia.
A second problem is the redefinition of the Alliance for the next enlargement. In the
United States, in late February 1998, at the start of the ratification proceedings at the Senate,
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright explained the significance of the enlargement ofNATO at the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee as follows, and sought understanding (10).
First, she expressed the view that “a larger NATO will make the U.S. safer by expanding thearea of Europe where wars do not happen, second, a larger NATO has given the states ofCentral and Eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems, and third, the newmember states will add strategic depth to the alliance, not to mention well over 200,000 troops,
and we will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive.” In contradiction of its external
explanation, the US administration was regarding NATO as a military alliance, and this tonefound its way into the Senate discussions. Thus, at the end of April, this bill was passed in the
Senate by the remarkable majority of 80 to 19. As a result, however, Congress added several
conditions of enlargement that included: “NATO is first and foremost a military alliance;” “astrong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects the United States’ vital
national security interests;” “the United States maintains its leadership role in NATO throughthe stationing of US combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATOcommands, and through the presence of the US nuclear forces on the territory of Europe;” andvarious other stipulations based on the traditional character of NATO as a “military alliance”(11).

変更されたフィールド コード

However, the US administration’s rationale for the first round of enlargement could not beapplied to the second round. The states that will be nominated for the second round ofenlargement would not contribute to the strengthening of NATO’s military capability. In
addition, the future role of the Alliance remained unclear (12).
5Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

Let us assume that no future military threats will come from inside Europe and that efforts
to reduce the likelihood of Article 5 incidents will continue through stronger relations with
Russia and through disarmament. If so, through a revision of decision-making systems and/orrole differentiation between the allies, and instead of the present cohesion, NATO may becomea framework for joint military action or for affirmation of a common will to manage new typesof threat which would occur outside Europe. At the same time, the future role of NATO, which
had found its raison d’être by committing itself to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, may beaffected by the US vision of the ”Atlantic Community.” However, there is a difference ofviews among the allies on the future role of NATO.

US and European Views on the Crisis Management Mission
The decreased dependence on the US military capability brought about by the end of the Cold
War has provided an opportunity for European states to display their autonomy, even in thearea of national security. The EC Summit held in Maastricht in December 1991 agreed tocreate the European Union for further integration, and, bringing the issue of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the fore, the member states expressed their intention tostrengthen ties with the Western European Union (WEU), the independent European security
organization. This describes the changing strategic environment in Europe most eloquently(13). Yet, even though abdicating the role of the world’s policeman in the post-Cold War
world, the United States, regarding itself a world leader, needed a way to stay involved inEuropean politics. Therefore, from the United States’ point of view, the increasing European
role in security issues should be conducted through the “European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI) within NATO”. At the same time, if the United States was to be a leader ofNATO, it would have to bestow on the Alliance new roles in addition to the role envisioned in
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
In May 1991, NATO Defence Ministers agreed to establish the Immediate Reaction Forceand the Rapid Reaction Force. This demonstrated NATO’s intention of responding quickly toregional and ethnic conflicts occurring outside the NATO defense area. In parallel with this,some European states took their first step down the road to independence. In October 1991,
France, anticipating the Maastricht Treaty, announced to the President of the European
Commission its intention to establish a Euro-corps with Germany. In November 1992, when
European integration gained momentum with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, French andGerman military leaders consulted with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
and agreed that military operations connected with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty should

6

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

変更されたフィールド コード

be conducted by NATO, but that the WEU could execute independent humanitarian aid
operations and peacekeeping missions separately from NATO.
Meanwhile, viewing the European movement to be inevitable, the US government devised
new measures to keep the WEU’s activities within the framework of NATO. Although they
were advocating independent military activities, the WEU lacked sufficient militarycapabilities and thus would have to rely on the US in this regard. This would clearly become
the key.
At the above-mentioned Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, convened in
October 1993 to discuss enlargement to the East, US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin advanced
a proposal on creating a Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF), in which NATO—that is to
say the United States—would provide the WEU with its military assets for conducting militaryactivities under the guidance of the CFSP, which the United States would not take part in. The
proposal was realistic and reasonable because it was impossible militarily and financially for
the Europeans to prepare command, control and communications systems, and other militaryequipment, on their own, and because both sides of the Atlantic had to avoid unnecessary
duplication. Thus, the establishment of the CJTF was approved at the NATO Summit inBrussels in January 1994. Progress in working out the details continued thereafter and NATOannounced the official inauguration of the CJTF in June 1996.
The inauguration of the CJTF, a non-permanent military force within NATO, was very
important to the United States. Firstly, this force has opened, albeit indirectly, an avenue for
NATO to justify its military activities outside the defense area defined by Article 5 of theTreaty, using the WEU, which is not under such restrictions. Secondly, it tacitly confirmed apriority of NATO in which the United States plays the leading role when both NATO andWEU decide to launch the same campaign. Thirdly, in conjunction with the first two points,
the United States has got a systemic guarantee of a voice in the decision-making process of the
WEU, even when the WEU is different from what the United States envisions.
The arguments on crisis management between NATO and WEU appeared to haveaccomplished certain settlement. However, a completely new situation was created when theheads of the UK and France announced in early December 1998 their intention to create a
rapid deployment force, and when the US proposed to strengthen NATO soon thereafter. The
expectations of a Europe aiming for broader discretion in the form of more independent
military capabilities came into collision with those of the US not only to increase the range ofcrisis management activities of NATO but also to conduct the combat operation missions
exclusively by NATO.
7

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

変更されたフィールド コード

In early December 1998, the heads of the UK and France met in Saint-Malo, where they
announced the Joint Declaration to add original military function to EU and to establish a rapid
deployment force of more than 30,000 troops. In this Joint Declaration, both heads of state
made clear their intention to enact the CFSP which had been strengthened in function by the
Amsterdam Treaty (an amended version of the Maastricht Treaty adopted in October 1997),
and in particular to increase their ability to conduct a common defense policy for Europe. The
declaration called for an enhancement of the EU’s capacity for autonomous action so as to beable to mount a rapid reaction to the new risks, backed up by credible military forces, andemphasized the necessity of solidarity between the EU members for that purpose. In addition,clearly stating the necessity for acting in conformity with NATO’s obligations, it alsoemphasized possible military actions in which NATO as a whole would not be engaged. Thus,
the EU embarked on a course toward building up their own military forces outside the context
of the US-backed CJTF.
At the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1998, when NATO’s militaryintervention in Kosovo was in the air, US Secretary of State Albright presented seven agenda
to be solved to harmonize the intentions of NATO, and, in particular, proposed the addition ofcountermeasures against the proliferation of mass destruction, ethnic and regional conflicts andother diversified threats as NATO’s main missions at the summit meeting to be held in April
1999 in Washington DC (14). In general, the member states of Europe maintained a cautious
stance against the enlargement of engagement outside the area, as proposed by the UnitedStates. This was because they were anxious about a situation in which NATO’s new mission
would be justified in principle, and then expanded at US initiative. Furthermore, they fearedthat the crisis management measures, which even included military action to prevent
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which the United States adopts as a platform,
would be expanded to the Middle East and Africa, as seen in the air operations in Iraq by US
and British forces, and that they might develop beyond the limits of national strength andnational interests.
Thus, in early February 1999, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, who was deeply
concerned about this problem posed by the United States, emphasized that they should notregard activities that arose in regions outside the joint defense area stipulated in Article 6 of theNorth Atlantic Treaty, as “international policeman” activities by NATO. He also announced
that each item of NATO activities of this nature would require the approval of all the members,in accordance with the existing consensus system, and confirmed that such actions should be in
the spirit of both international law and the UN Charter (15). As a result, the Strategic Concept
which NATO adopted in April 1999, when the bombing of Kosovo was starting, stipulates that
8

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

変更されたフィールド コード

the member states shall review, item by item, whether NATO should be engaged in crisis
management activities that include military operations, and that these actions would beselected only when the entire membership agreed on the engagement, and that on thoseoccasions, Article 7 of the Washington Treaty (which stipulates the priority of the role of the
UN Security Council) must be observed(16). Contrary to US expectations, NATO set a limit
on its own crisis management activities.
Meanwhile, the EU concentrated its efforts on the establishment of its own rapid
deployment force. At the June 1999 Summit, the member states agreed that they would
integrate these kinds of military activities into the EU and dissolve the WEU. In late November
1999, a meeting of the EU, attended by defense ministers of the member states, called for astrengthening of the EU Security and Defense Policy in preparation for the Helsinki Summit
the following month. At this meeting, approval was given for the creation of military forces to
conduct EU-led crisis management operations, the creation of the Political and Security
Committee and the Military Committee respectively, and the maintenance of strong ties with
NATO. In concert with the EU meeting, the British and French governments held a summit inLondon the same month, at which both countries called on the European Council in Helsinki totake a decisive step forward in the developing its own corps-level rapid-deployment forces
with the necessary C3I, logistics, combat support and so forth. Taking US concerns into
consideration, they also declared that NATO remained the foundation of their collective
defense and that it would continue to play an important role in crisis management (17).
At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the member states officially approved
deployment of the forces by the year 2003. The force should be capable of the full range ofPetersburg tasks, as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, in operations up to corps level (up to 15
brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons), and be capable of being deployed within 60 days and forat least one year. They also made clear their intention to establish a standing Political andSecurity Committee (PSC) comrised of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level,
and a Military Committee (MC) to give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC
when necessary, and to set up interim bodies by March 2000. They also underlined theirdetermination to develop an autonomous capacity to launch and conduct EU-led military
operations in response to international crises in which NATO as a whole was not engaged, andexpressed the view that the process would avoid unnecessary duplication and did not imply thecreation of a European army (18).
Immediately after the EU Summit of mid-December 1999, the North Atlantic Council held
in Brussels acknowledged the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action sothat it could take decisions and approve military action when the Alliance as a whole was not
9
Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

変更されたフィールド コード

engaged, and noted that this process would not imply the creation of a European army (19).
The Europeans promised the United States that they would not encroach on NATO's role.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who attended the meeting on behalf of the Secretaryof State, emphasized the willingness of the US Government to accept the resolution of the EU,
and, in addition, underlined the urgency of closing the gap in US–EU military capability which
had become apparent during the Kosovo campaign. He spoke cynically of Europeans who
would not increase their own defense budgets to a level compatible with their desires. He also
urged the member states of the EU to consider the danger of the spillover of out-of-area crises
into NATO’s defense area and give special status to NATO member states who were not EU
members so that they could participate in the political process (20).
On 12 September 2001, condemning the terrorist attacks which took place on 11
September 2001 in the United States, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, in
which the Council regarded the act as a threat to international peace and security, andrecognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with theCharter. Up until then, excepting the unusual US views, terrorism had been considered an
emergency handled by domestic legislation, but now it had become subject to the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense. The use of the right to collective self-defense by
NATO at the behest of the US, and the resulting NATO attacks on the Taliban—recognized asa terrorist support group—not only blurred the line between crisis management operations andterritorial defense activities stipulated by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty, but also createdan atmosphere in which NATO—not the EU—which would have primacy in crisis
management operations. The decisive factors were: that the terrorist attacks happened in the
United States, that only the US maintained sufficient capability to carry out massive
counterterrorism operations, and that the EU had never prepared its own forces for impending
crises. In fact, the US administration took the opportunity to actively implement antiterrorism
and WMD countermeasures.
As a result, at the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002, the European allies willprobably, under strong US leadership, agree to implement the Defense Capabilities Initiative(DCI) approved at the Washington Summit in April 1999, with its specific list of items.
However, it is a different story with NATO attacks on Iraq. Russia, which is cooperating with
NATO on antiterrorism measures, strongly opposes a US attack on Iraq without a UN Security
Council resolution. In addition, France, Germany, and other European states feel unease over a
US attack on Iraq.
What is the role that NATO should play in the creation of a new world security regime?
Should NATO play a central role in joint military actions against the new threats in the world?
10
Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

変更されたフィールド コード

Should NATO instead limit its role to that of a political framework for achieving consensus
among the allies and commit military actions to ad hoc coalitions like that of the Gulf War, orto a yet-to-be-created UN force? Will the gaps between the US’ and Europe’s perceptions of
the future role of NATO widen in the face of the differences in national power and national
interests? What should the Alliance aim to become? These are the reasons why the direction inwhich NATO is headed draws our attention.

変更されたフィールド コード

11

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

Japan’s Quest for a New Security Regime
The previous sections examined how NATO’s quest for a new security regime and theaccompanying systemic changes have created friction between the US and Europe by focusingon NATO’s enlargement to the East and its crisis management mission. By way of conclusion,
this section takes a look at the influence of NATO’s changing nature on Japan’s security.
Firstly, Russia’s reaction to NATO enlargement will have an important effect on East
Asian security, particularly on Japan’s security. If Russia reacts negatively to the second roundof NATO enlargement and attaches importance to defense of the European theater, it isentirely possible that Russia will seek improved relations with China in order to achieve
stability on the eastern front. This will be in sharp contrast to the period of antagonism
between China and the Soviet Union during which Russia sought détente with NATO andChina sought rapprochement with the United States. Sharing concerns about US hegemony in
the Post-Cold War world, China, which is seen as a potential threat by the US, and Russia,
whic is anxious about NATO expansion to its borders, have dispelled their past antagonism. In
fact, in April 1997, the two states agreed on the disengagement of forces deployed around theirshared border under the framework of the so-called Shanghai Five. In June 2001 thisframework was reorganized into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which thecontracting parties promised cooperation on antiterrorism and other related areas. Furthermore,in July 2001 China and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness andCooperation in place of the former Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance which
had expired in 1980. Then, both heads of state emphasized that the new treaty would not leadto a military alliance, but some words were inserted in the joint declaration to balance US
hegemony. In addition, based on this relationship, Russia will acquire foreign capital througharms sales to China, and China will modernize its armed forces, especially its blue-water navy.
As a result of this, if the tension between Japan and the US on one hand, and Russia and China
on the other, which has been receding in magnitude since the end of the Cold War, were to
reappear, accompanied by a US perception of China as a strategic competitor, Japan might bethrown into the tension in East Asia.
Secondly, considering the spread of new types of threats such as terrorism, and the limits
変更されたフィールド コード

of national resources, it is necessary for Japan to prevent inter-state conflicts in the region.
Following a lead by NATO of its fruits of arms control and disarmament in Europe, themeeting of defense ministers of Asia-Pacific states in Singapore, as proposed in June 2002 by
the then Director-General of the Defense Agency, Mr Nakatani, and the proposal to increase
efforts in arms control and disarmament presented by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi at the12

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei in July can be seen as a new Japanese initiative aimed atstability in the region. Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to North Korea on 17 September 2002
will lead to normalization of diplomatic relations between the two states, although thenegotiations ahead are expected to be arduous. This represents an important opportunity, notonly to contribute to peace and stability in East Asia but also to restrain North Korea from its
nuclear development program, which is perceived as a direct threat to Japan.
Thirdly, in parallel with the encouragement of international cooperation in the face of new
types of threats, as demonstrated by NATO in its collective defense in response to the terrorist
attacks of 11 September, the diminishing distinction between crisis management operations
and territorial defense activities, and the broader application of the inherent right of selfdefense may become global trends. However, this does not mean that exercising the right ofself-defense will solve all problems. Rather, wider acceptance of this may bring instability to
the East Asian security environment, and may obstruct Japan from properly making up for the
past in the region. It is also possible to foresee an era in which international cooperation basedon UN Security Council resolutions takes first priority. In such an era, it may turn out that therole of the Alliance will be, not as a creator of ad hoc coalitions so much, but as a guarantor ofcollective security as stipulated in the UN Charter. If so, NATO’s quest for a new security
regime is not completely unrelated to that of Japan, which has close ties with the United States.

Notes
(1)

See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures (NATO Information Service,1984), p.22 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures (NATOInformation Service, 1989), p.13.

(2)

See Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of Stateand Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (The London
Declaration), 6 July 1990.

(3)

See Michael Howard, “The Remaking of Europe,” Survival, Vol. 32, No. 2 (March/April
1990), p.104, in which he dissects NATO into the “bottom line” necessary to maintain
Alliance functions (as defined in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,) andthe integrated military organization, command/order systems, deployment of forces,

変更されたフィールド コード

strategy and “superstructure” necessary for adapting to the changing times.
(4)

NATO publicly announced the PfP in January 1994. While this document kept futureenlargement of NATO on the table, it also dealt with practicalities and the possibility ofemergencies, and included the specific objective of cooperation in peace-keeping
missions, which NATO was hoping to adopt as a new sphere of activity. NATO held out
13

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

the possibility of NATO military action in the event of a crisis within the territory of amember state, but stopped short of committing to this, saying that it would discuss eachcase on its merits; hence, consideration of problematical issues was postponed.
(5)

For a discussion of how NATO’s eastward expansion was dominated not by theconsensus of Alliance member countries but by the dictates of US national politics, see
Yuzuru Kaneko, “NATO Enlargement and the U.S. Administration,” Journal of National
Defense Volume 24, No. 3 (December 1996), pp. 83-98, and Yuzuru Kaneko, “The Birthof a New NATO: A Triumphant Alliance in Jeopardy,” NIDS Security Reports Volume 2,
No. 1 (June 1999), pp. 52-71 (in Japanese). The latter work was reprinted in English in
NIDS Security Reports, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 80-100.

(6)“The Study on NATO Enlargement issued by the Heads of State and Government
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” consisting of six chapters,
the first stating the purpose and rules of expansion, was sent together with the “Fact Sheeton NATO Enlargement”.

(7)

In January 1998 the Clinton administration independently concluded “A Charter ofPartnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, theRepublic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania,” which contained language thatsuggested a US promise of inclusion in NATO.

(8)

The adopted declaration, “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declaration by
Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation,”
was called the “Rome Declaration”.

(9)

At this council, cooperation between Russia and NATO was said to cover these nine
items: the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control
and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea,
military-to-military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergencies, and new threats
and challenges.

(10) For more information on statements made by US Secretary of State Albright, see U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Administration Views on the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th. Cong. 2nd. Sess.,
February 24, 1998, pp. 7-13.
(11) See U.S. Congress, Senate, Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the
Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 105th. Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Executive Session, Congressional Record, Vol. 144 (30 April 1998): S3756-S3782.
14

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16

変更されたフィールド コード

(12) See James M. Goldgeier, “Not When but Who,” NATO Review, Spring 2002 (Internet
version).
(13) This summit approved the basic rules of the CFSP, and, in particular, requested the WEU
to develop a greater European responsibility on defense matters. In response to thisrequest, the WEU declared that it would form an integral part of the process of thedevelopment of the EU and would enhance its contribution to solidarity within NATO.
For information on this WEU declaration, see Declaration of the Member States ofWestern European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role of
WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance.
(14) See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement to the North Atlantic Council(Brussels, Belgium, December 8, 1998).
(15) For information on Secretary General Solana’s lecture at the Aspen Institute in Berlin,
see NATO: A Strategy for the 21st Century, Secretary General’s Wallenberg Lecture (1February 1999).
(16) See The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23 and24 April 1999.
(17) See Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence,
Anglo-French Summit, London, Thursday 25 November 1999.
(18) See the pages on Common European Policy on Security and Defence in Presidency
Conclusion, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999 (SN 300/99). The
name “European army” derives from the so-called Pleven Plan in October 1950, just after
the outbreak of the Korean War, in which French Prime Minister Rene Pleven,considering the rearmament of West Germany unavoidable in order to prevent aggression
by the Soviet Union, proposed the creation of an independent standing army in Europe.
Although the plan resulted in the Treaty of European Defence Community, in August
1954 the French parliament refused to ratify it and the plan was not realized.
(19) See Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, on 15 December 1999.

変更されたフィールド コード(20) See Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, The State of the Alliance: an American
Perspective, Brussels, 15 December 1999.

15

Kaneko.（最終稿）.doc 03/03/14 16:10

of 16