Prepared for the IIPS Symposium onJapan’s Role in the Forthcoming World Order
Tuesday, 1 November 2005
TokyoSession 1

The State of the Foreign Policy in the US

Fumiaki Kubo
A. Barton Hepburn Professor of American Government and History
Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo

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Japan’s Role in the Forthcoming World Order
November 1, 2005 at ANA Hotel, Tokyo
The Institute for International Policy Studies
Session 1, US Strategy in Foreign Affairs and the Forthcoming World Order
The State of the Foreign Policy in the US
Fumiaki Kubo, Ph.D., A. Barton Hepburn Professor of American Government andHistory, Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo
1. The Deadlock in Iraq
Conflicting developments in Iraq: progress toward constitutional democracy, but
increasingly growing pressure for the US military to quit in the US.
US is not losing as it did in Vietnam, but it is not winning impressively.
There is some progress. Election in January this year. Referendum on the Constitutionin October. But the number of the casualties of Americans has reached 2,000.
Public opinion in the US has been against Iraq since last year.
The things that we need to keep in mind:
The insurgency in Iraq is still rampant, crippling the reconstruction seriously, but it
will be hard for it to win and successfully govern Iraq. This is different from Vietnam,
where the government of North Vietnam finally united the whole Vietnam by force.
Very probably, Iraq will be eventually governed by elected officials with democraticlegitimacy.
The inability of the US to continue the large-scale reconstruction, rehabilitation aid, oroccupation with heavy casualties, whatever the rhetoric of the President. It is evident
in Afghanistan, and it could become more visible regarding Iraq in the coming years.
2. Lessons Learned from Iraq
Neo-conservatives argument for the democratization of Iraq discredited.
Discredited neo-conservatives rhetoric: easy job to democratize Iraq, no burden for
US taxpayers or US allies, US military welcomed by Iraqis as a liberator.
It is easy to win the war but hard to win the peace.

2Especially for the US, it is hard to complete the mission of occupation that will takemany years.
Eventually, populism might prevail, which dictates that US military quit soon.
John F. Kerry, initially talking a lot about the American responsibility, appealed andsuccumbed to anti-war populistic sentiments at the base of the Democratic Party.
Growing awareness that the Iraq War is different from anti-terrorism measures.
If attacked by terrorists again, which is fairly probable, US will respond strongly,resolutely. But US will, and has to, be cautious about another preemptive attack or
preventive war.

However, it is important to remember that the UN and most of the major countries
were not effective enough in stopping Saddam Hussein’s challenge to the UNimposed sanctions and inspections. It is only through the threat of force and largescale military mobilization by the US that Saddam accepted the UN inspection. We
have to be aware of this prehistory of Iraq War.
3. The Bush Administration in trouble
Growing public wariness for further military intervention abroad unless attacked
directly.
President’s approval rate around 36 to 45%
Still haunted by Katrina.
Partial privatization plan of pension stalled, even criticized by religious conservatives.
General public is against the plan.
High gas prices.
Anger among conservatives against the nomination of Harriet Miers for supreme court
judge.
Still no exit in sight for Iraq.
No breakthrough in North Korea, or Iran.
Scandals involving Tom DeLay, Bill Frist, Karl Rove, and Lewis Libby.
4. Forthcoming American politics and foreign policy
The Democrats are getting reinvigorated, reactivated. Especially its anti-war liberalwing is looking forward to the coming elections.
It is probable that the Republicans lose seats in the 2006 mid-term election.

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It is impossible to predict the outcome of 2008 Presidential election. Hillary Clinton v.
who? Or someone from the South instead of Clinton?
There is no star in the conservative wing of the Republican Party, whereas unorthodox
candidates like Giuliani or McCain has charisma and overwhelming popularity.
What if, for example, one of them wins the nomination for the President for theRepublican Party? It might cause a lot of confusion among the Democrats, forcing amajor change in their strategy and political calculations.
Anyway, a major change in the foreign policy outlook is not unlikely.
Fluctuations are a major feature of American foreign policy in the past two or three
decades, which is accelerated by the ever growing partisanship and ideologicaldivision of American political parties and politics.
5. US-China relations: Bound to be unstable
While economic ties are deepening between US and China, that does not mean thatthe bilateral relations will be all the more stable.
China is a divisive political issue both in the Democratic Party and the Republican
Party. Unions and human rights groups are the pillars of the anti-China forces in theDemocrats, while some of the New Democrats are eager to envision better relations
with China like Clinton did. On one hand, business interests would like to have stable
relations with China on the Republican side. On the other, there are military hawks,
ideological anti-communists, conservative Christians, and those sympathetic withTaiwan and Tibet that consistently look at China with deep suspicion in theRepublican Party.
Given the partisan atmosphere of current American politics, there is a tendency for theopposition party to attack the Administration’s China policy, whatever it is.
Especially US Congress is a bastion of anti-China forces. Their presence is morepermanent than the Administration. Congress is consistently more critical of China
than the Executive Branch is. Sometimes, the left and the right there, crossing theparty line, conspire to form a formidable coalition that is very tough with China.
Trade conflict could get very nasty, because politicians can combine trade and othercriticisms such as that there is no human rights, or no union rights.
As far as China does not give up a hope to regain Taiwan by force, it will not or it
cannot be a stabilizing force in the world.
6. US-Japan relations for the near future
Peculiar, asymmetric shape of the alliance. Rights and obligations are not symmetrical.

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The right to use the military bases in Japan for the security and peace in the Far East,
the obligation to defend Japan.
The bottom line: Japan does not have to defend US when US is attacked.
During the Cold War, it did not have to think about this possibility.
In 2001, US was in fact attacked, and Japan had to think about what to do.
Is the alliance sustainable if Japan does nothing to help US when it is attacked?
But if it fights with US for US, it incurs an extra obligation other than to let US use
the military bases in Japan.
Does the public know that? Will the public accept it?
Constitution will be amended in the near future, and the right to collective
self-defense will be written into the Constitution. In the long-term, this will contributeto the stability of not only the US-Japan relations but also that of the entire Asia.

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