助成Institute forInternational Policy Studies
・Tokyo・IIPS International Conference“Building a Regime of Regional Cooperation inEast Asia and the Role which Japan Can Play”

TokyoDecember 2-3, 2003

“The Nuclear Crisis & Multilateral Security
Approach in Northeast Asian”
By
Prof. Yang Bojiang
Professor,
Director of Northeast Asia Division,
Director of Center for Taiwan Related Studies,
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)The Nuclear Crisis & Multilateral Security
Approach in Northeast Asian ***YANG Bojiang, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations

Introduction

A new round of tension in the Korean Peninsula has been attracting the eyeballsof the whole world. However, people’s focuses are more narrowed on the nuclear
issue per se while the related problems are ignored, although which may castprofounder impacts upon those living in the Northeast Asia.

Actually, we must see through the nuclear issue, develop a comprehensive
understanding and make an adequate estimation of its regional implication andpotential consequences.

Additionally, we must apply with broader perspectives

before we anticipate the tendency of the changes in the international pattern inNortheast Asia and devise strategic plans and principles to cope with such evolutions.

In this sense, quite a number of issues are worthy of our concern and close
attention, among which the interaction between the nuclear issue and regional
multilateral security dialogue and cooperation is a typical strategic topic.

Between the Two Crises***

Prepared for the Conference on “Building a Regime of Regional Security Cooperation in East Asia and the Role

which Japan Can Play,” organized by the Institute for the International Policy Studies (IIPS), December 2-3, 2003,
Tokyo.

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It is both interesting and meaningful to follow the nuclear issue all the time andcompare the international as well regional environments of the two crises. We findthat the different external conditions between a decade ago and the present led to
drastically unlike crisis management and regional consequences.

In the last decade, particularly the past three or four years, regional situation
became moderate and relations among regional powers all improved, with the only
exception of the complex US-DPRK relations. Another change, which is mutuallyfacilitating and interacting as both cause and effect with the improved state-to-state
relations, was the growing attempts to establish multilateral security dialogue andcooperation in the region and varied policies and actions towards this direction taken
by related countries.

It is worthy of our attention how the bilateral improvement affected themultilateral relations and regional situation. In the cold-war era, there used to be aSouthern Triangle and a Northern Triangle in the Northeast Asia. The so-calledcross-recognition was only accomplished half. Given such a background, the effect ofimprovements in either the DPRK-Japan relations or the Sino-ROK relations naturally
go beyond the concerned parties to the pattern and order of the whole regional.

In fact, different schemes about multilateral security cooperation have alreadybeen put forward from long ago. For instance back to 1998, the then Japanese Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed the Six-Party formula during his meetings with theUS and ROK counterparts and his plan was echoed by President KIM Dae-jung
immediately. International academic circles increased debates over the issue ofmultilateral security dialogue since 2000 and related governments also embarked on
studying all designs.

We can infer from the above analysis that energy propelling multilateral security
dialogue and cooperation has already been in accumulation and atmosphere favoring2

such dialogue and cooperation has been brewing for a long time before the October
2002 nuclear crisis. The improvement of the relations between concerned parties andthe détente of the general regional situation have created positive conditions for thefuture necessity of multilateral security dialogue.

In short, between the two nuclear crises, we may conclude or predict two maindifferences. First, there are different players involving in the solutions. Some engage
in the crisis management from the very beginning while last time stood by idly, suchas China and Russia; some fully engage this time while only partially last time, suchas the ROK and Japan; and some still remain completely irrelevant while engaged infollowing up tasks last time, such as the European countries. Second and more
important, the consequences will be different. Last crisis resulted in the US-DPRK
Geneva Nuclear Framework and the KEDO both of which only related to the solutionof the DPRK energy problem and the improvement of the US-DPRK bilateralrelations. While this time the international counter-proliferation regime, more bilateralties and the overall pattern in the Northeast Asia will be affected.

In other words, compared with 10 years ago, the nuclear crisis has involved froma bilateral political issue to a regional multilateral security issue even a global
counter-proliferation issue. Therefore the ending of the recent nuclear crisis cannot be
an exclusive US-DPRK agreement, though it is possible that within certain
comprehensive agreement there might be a separate bilateral accord. Another reason
why we can come to the second conclusion is that the directly concerned parties all
adopted different strategic thinking and policy approaches aiming beyond the DPRK
nuclear issue itself.

From Crisis to Opportunity

Under the collective effects of the above factors, two trends have come into
being during this round nuclear crisis: “peaceful, diplomatic means” and “multilateral,3

regional approaches”. Some argue that the Six-Party talks resemble the multilateral
consultation framework imagined for years, which is also aiming at peace andstability in the Korean Peninsula-centered Northeast Asia. “The multilateral format
supports the idea that this is a regional problem, not a bilateral US-DPRK issue, asNorth Korea contends.”1 However, what matters is not the similarity in forms but
inner connections in substances. Compared with last time, this nuclear crisis and thefollow-up resolving efforts bear more regional security implications.

Of course credits should in the first place be given to the adjusted US policies.
Bush Administration’s current multilateral policy towards the DPRK won popularsupport at home. As one US think-tank believes, that “The failure of China toparticipate as an enforcer of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework led to the situation
we face today. The Bush administration was right to be firm in insisting on amultilateral format in addressing and resolving this issue.”2

On the other hand, the replacement of the 1994 format by the present Six-Party
talks is also the certain outcome of the involution of the regional situation in theNortheast Asia in recent years. Increasingly closer interactions among regional
players have made not only any attempts to solve the nuclear crisis by military meansdifficult but also multilateral solutions inevitable. Within the multilateral framework,
all participants have both enthusiasm and clear crucial interests so that they can playeither unique roles or common roles.

Dr. Henry Kissinger supports the multilateralapproach in addressing the DPRK nuclear issue and suggests “a multilateral
reciprocal non-aggression pledge – not one that singles out the United States”.

Oneof his arguments is that the nuclear issue harms not only the American interests, or inother words, it does not harm the American interests in the first place.3

1Peter Brookes: The Six Party Talks: Same Bed, Different Dreams, the Heritage Foundation Website, Aug. 26,2003.
2Ibid.

3

Henry Kissinger: How to resolve North Korea situation, the Washington Post, Aug. 18th, 2003.
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All kinds of outsiders expressed their deep concerns through the mass media
over the possibilities of the “soft-landing” of the nuclear crisis and avoiding the war
on the Peninsula. Few people did see the positive facet of the Crisis. In fact, theoutbreak of the nuclear crisis provided us, though in an apparently negative way, an
important opportunity to release the energy in favor of multilateral dialogues andcooperation accumulated since long time ago in the Northeast Asia.4

The Six-Party format and framework developed along the process of crisis
solution have certain self-evident profound regional implications and model values:

It has some epoch-making significance regarding the international politics in theNortheast Asia. Since the East Asian modern state system established in the 19thCentury, it is the first time that representatives from all regional countries talking toeach other on an equal footing. It will certainly speed up the establishment of a newsecurity mechanism in the Northeast Asia. On the other end of the tunnel may weeventually see not only the solution of the nuclear issue but also the formation of a
new security order even the establishment of a peace mechanism on the Peninsula.

It provides us an important opportunity to defreeze the cold-war structure left in
the Northeast Asia. Actually, the Northeast Asian alliances have been reshuffling andundoubtedly, the ending will be the relationship created in the cold war – no matterthe Northern Triangle or the Southern Triangle – weakened. The concept ofcross-recognition was first introduced in 1975. It took fifteen years for the USSR and4Scholars who believe bilateral military agreements more effective in safeguarding regional security thinkmultilateral security dialogue mechanisms fragile, inefficient and vulnerable to contingencies. However if welook it from another angle, we may find the contingencies effective catalyst to multilateralism.

Because after theimpact and adjustment, participating countries will modify or change their policies and approaches to themultilateral mechanism and hence improve the effectiveness of the multilateral security cooperation mechanism inpromoting regional peace and stability. The current nuclear crisis is such a contingency.
5the ROK normalized their diplomatic relations in 1990. It will be another fifteen years
by the year 2005. For me, it is very interesting to see whether the cross-recognition
will be completed by that time.

What is more important to the international politics, it will affect the model ofinternational dispute settlement in the 21st Century. Since 1990s, from the Gulf War tothe Kosovo War, from the war on Afghanistan to the war on Iraq, most international
disputes have been settled through military means. If the nuclear crisis on the Korean
Peninsula is to be solved through a series of peaceful negotiations, the diplomaticmeans will be proved to be still effective and applicable to modern international
dispute settlement; and since the war is not omnipotent, it should not be worshiped
any longer. In this sense, the peaceful solution of the nuclear crisis will significantly
contribute to the international community.

Goal & Way

Multilateralism means more than three countries, abiding by common behavior
code, jointly handle international issues through long-term cooperative andinstitutionalized methods. In the post-cold war era, however, the following reasons
contributed to the multilateral diplomacy and communications being highlighted: first,
big powers generally want to handle international peace and security-related issues
through the UN in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar confrontational system;
second, the development of regionalism after the cold war has not only provided
opportunities of establishing regional multilateral conference and dialoguemechanisms, but also enriched the experiences of all countries; third, compared withthe past, multilateral solution of the state-to-state disputes will reduce the individual
country’s responsibility and cost thus becomes more feasible and effective.

The practice of the CSCAP and ARF all proved the growing importance of themultilateralism in dealing with regional security issues under the new international
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security environment after the cold war. In Northeast Asia, since the power of balanceis undergoing some changes, multilateral security dialogue and policy coordination
will obviously be conducive to enhancing mutual understanding and reducing
hostility among regional countries. However it is noteworthy that the survival andgrowth of multilateralism in various regions will need different soil conditions owing
to the diversified regional situations.

In short, the Northeast Asian multilateral security dialogue and cooperation must
be based on the concepts of common security and cooperative security. Common
security focuses on inter-dependence and common responsibility of safeguarding
regional security by all regional countries. Individual country’s security and survival
are not achieved through hostility and threat to others but joint efforts in preventing
crisis or war and defending peaceful security environment in the region.
Cooperative security means the multi-dimensioned security issues must be addressedby cooperative efforts among states and emphasizes on the practice and mechanism ofdialogues as the foundation for such efforts.5

In order to promote multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in theNortheast Asia, we must insist on the following principles: (1) such dialogue andcooperation must be achieved through widely consensus not powerful pressures orforcible means.

It is not only because countries will resist forcible multilateral

cooperation, but also because many regional security disputes cannot be solved byforcible arrangement; (2) the establishment of such dialogue and cooperation must5

To foster the concepts of common security and cooperative security is the requirement of the principle ofreciprocity in the multilateralism. Reciprocity means the rewards to the other’s cooperative activities. In the eyesof the realists, competition always exists between countries and hence they are reluctant to engage in multilateralexchanges for the fear of others might achieve relative gains by conducting such contacts.

However in reality,

when countries observe the common norms and regulations, mutual benefits and absolute gains are not unusual in
the multilateral exchanges. Therefore, abiding by the reciprocity principle, participating countries are actuallybuilding the collective good; their communications and interactions could reduce the uncertainty of the shadow of
the future.
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serve the overall regional interests of promoting security and mutual trust not specificbloc’s influence or checking power.

Based on the above principles, when promoting multilateral security dialogue
and cooperation in the Northeast Asia, we must coordinate the existing bilateral
military relations with the multilateral security structure in the region and stress thatthe bilateral military agreements mustn’t be power-balance-oriented and repressing
the others so as not to let any country feel under threat or repression. If the militaryagreement is still targeting at specific country then confrontational state-to-state
relations aiming at power-balance will remain and regional security and peace not beimpossible. Generally speaking, bilateral military cooperation should make up anorganic part of the multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the region not an
obstacle.

Based on the concepts of common security and cooperative security, multilateral
security cooperation in the Northeast Asia should be advanced through both First
Track and Second Track dialogues. Here First Track refers to the official regional
security dialogues or forums. And Second Track means unofficial organizations,scholars, individuals and civil think tanks jointly discussing regional security issues.
Multilateral security cooperation could have different formats, both official,governmental and unofficial, non-governmental.

As for specific issues like the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsular, we should,
in the preliminary phase, emphasize on the CBMs and increasing the transparency.
Experiences gained by the CSCAP and ARF have proven that through interactions
and communications within the multilateral framework and by sticking to these twocore issues, related countries could develop some common norms and understandings,
enhance their mutual understanding particularly of each other’s weakness andvulnerabilities, and eventually give up or moderate their confrontational or deterrent
security and military policies.
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