Insurance Law Alert

February 2017

In This Issue
Rejecting Constructive Knowledge Claim, Ninth Circuit Says No Duty To
Defend Without Tender
The Ninth Circuit ruled that absent formal tender, insurers had no duty to defend a
policyholder in an underlying environmental contamination suit. M.B.L., Inc. v. Federal Ins.
Co., 2017 WL 128095 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2017). (Click here for full article)“Extremely
thorough, detailed,always well prepared when
getting ready for trial, theyknew every aspectof the record.”–Chambers 2016,
quoting a client

South Carolina Supreme Court Addresses Effectiveness Of Reservation Of
Rights And Coverage For Punitive Damages
The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that an insurer’s reservation of rights was ineffective
and that the policy provides coverage for punitive damages. Harleysville Grp. Ins. v. Heritage
Comtys., Inc., No. 2013-001281 (S.C. Jan. 11, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Washington Supreme Court Rules That Insurance Fair Conduct Act Does
Not Create Independent Cause Of Action
The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the Insurance Fair Conduct Act does not create an
independent cause of action for regulatory violations. Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire &Cas. Co., 2017 WL 448991 (Wash. Feb. 2, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Maryland Court Of Appeals Rules That Insurer Failed To Establish
Prejudice Resulting From Three-Year Notice Delay
Maryland’s highest court ruled that an insurer was not entitled to disclaim coverage undera claims-made-and-reported policy, notwithstanding a nearly three-year delay in notice.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Fund for Animals, 2017 WL 383453 (Md.
Jan. 27, 2017). (Click here for full article)

New Jersey Supreme Court Rules That Anti-Assignment Clause Does Not
Bar Post-Loss Assignments
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that an anti-assignment clause does not preclude a postloss transfer of insurance benefits. Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 2017
WL 429476 (N.J. Feb. 1, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Insurer Did Not Waive Right To Rescind Based On Misrepresentations,
Says Third Circuit
The Third Circuit ruled that an insurer did not waive its right to rescind a policy based on thepolicyholder’s material misrepresentations in the application. H.J. Heinz Co. v. Starr Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 2017 WL 108006 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2017). (Click here for full article)
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

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Rhode Island Supreme Court Rejects Application Of Stacking Statute In
Underinsured Motorist Case
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that a statute that allows stacking of underinsured
motorist benefits for policies issued by “the same insurance company” does not apply where
policies are issued by insurance companies owned by the same parent company. Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dias, 2017 WL 66148 (R.I. Jan. 6, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Finding “Other Insurance” Clauses Mutually Repugnant, Tenth Circuit
Applies Pro Rata Allocation
The Tenth Circuit ruled that “other insurance” clauses in two policies cancel each other out
and that losses should be apportioned on a pro rata basis. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v.
Lexington Ins. Co., 845 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 2017). (Click here for full article)

Second Circuit Declines To Vacate Arbitration Awards Based On Umpire’s
Evident Partiality
The Second Circuit ruled that an umpire-arbitrator did not demonstrate “evident partiality”
requiring vacatur of the awards. National Indem. Co. v. IRB Brasil Reseguros S.A., 2017 WL
421944 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Oregon Supreme Court Rules That “Recovery” In Attorneys’ Fees Statute
Does Not Require Adverse Judgment Against Insurer
The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the term “recovery,” as used in a state statute that
imposes attorneys’ fees against insurers under certain circumstances, does not require an
actual monetary judgment against the insurer. Long v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 2017 WL
445087 (Or. Feb. 2, 2017). (Click here for full article)

STB News Alerts:
Click here for information on the Firm’s recent insurance-related honors and publications.

2

Duty To Defend
Alert:

Rejecting Constructive Knowledge
Claim, Ninth Circuit Says No Duty
To Defend Without Tender
The Ninth Circuit ruled that absent formal
tender, insurers had no duty to defend a
policyholder in an underlying environmental
contamination suit. In so ruling, the court
rejected the policyholder’s argument that a
duty to defend was triggered by the insurers’
constructive knowledge of the suit. M.B.L.,
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2017 WL 128095 (9thCir. Jan. 13, 2017).
MBL, a defunct dry cleaning company, wasinsured under policies issued by Federal,
Great American and Utica. MBL argued thatits failure to tender the suit to its insurers
was not fatal to its coverage claim because theinsurers had constructive knowledge of thesuit. In particular, MBL contended that its
previous tender of a potential administrative
proceeding was sufficient to establish tenderof the lawsuit. The court disagreed.
Each policy imposed a duty to defend any“suit” against MBL. Under California law,an administrative proceeding pursuant
to environmental statutory law is not
the equivalent of a “suit” for insurance
coverage purposes. The court therefore
reasoned that MBL’s tender of the agency
proceeding did not trigger a duty to defend
the lawsuit. The court distinguished cases
finding constructive tender, explaining thatin those cases, the policyholder tendered a
suit, but failed to “conform precisely to therequired formalities,” whereas here, there
was no tender at all. The court also ruledthat the insurers’ receipt of notice fromanother insurer (seeking contribution) did
not establish constructive tender. Finally, thecourt noted that MBL received a full defense
from two other insurers and that California
statutory law (Cal. Civ. Code § 2860(c))
forecloses MBL from seeking additional
defense costs from Appellees.

Reservation Of
Rights Alert:

South Carolina Supreme Court
Addresses Effectiveness Of
Reservation Of Rights And
Coverage For Punitive Damages
The South Carolina Supreme Court ruledthat an insurer’s reservation of rights wasineffective and that the policy provides
coverage for punitive damages. HarleysvilleGrp. Ins. v. Heritage Comtys., Inc., No. 2013001281 (S.C. Jan. 11, 2017).
Harleysville provided a defense to Heritage
under a reservation of rights in underlying
construction defect litigation. After verdicts
were entered against Heritage in those
suits, Harleysville filed a declaratory
judgment action, alleging that it had no
duty to indemnify Heritage. Alternatively,
Harleysville sought apportionment of theunderlying judgments. A Special Referee
ruled that coverage was triggered because
the juries’ general verdicts included somecovered damages. The Referee further heldthat it would be improper and speculative toallocate the general verdicts between covered
and non-covered damages. Therefore, heordered full payment of the damages, but
limited Harleysville’s obligation to its pro rata
time on the risk. Lastly, the referee ruled that
punitive damages are covered by the policies.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The court ruled that Harleysville failed toproperly reserve the right to contest coverageby sending generic denials of coverage,
coupled with “a verbatim recitation of allor most of the policy provisions.” The court3

held that a valid reservation must explain theinsurer’s position as to the policy provisions
invoked therein. Here, the reservation
letters failed to advise Heritage of the needfor allocation between covered and noncovered losses, Harleysville’s intent to dispute“occurrence” and policy period issues, or apotential conflict of interest, among otherthings. The court also rejected Harleysville’s
reliance on oral reservations, explaining thateven assuming that oral reservations are
permitted in South Carolina, the statements
at issue fell short of the specificity required.
However, the court ruled that the reservationof rights was sufficient with respect to one
issue – punitive damages – for which a
detailed basis for denial was provided.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the policy
covers punitive damages because it does
not expressly limit coverage to actual orcompensatory damages. The court explainedthat punitive damages may be awarded inSouth Carolina for gross negligence and thatthe record did not establish a finding of an
intent to cause harm.
Finally, the court ruled that punitive
damages are not subject to pro rata timeon-the-risk allocation, notwithstanding theavailability of pro rata allocation for actual
damages. The court reasoned that timeon-the-risk allocation “was developed as ameans of apportioning actual, compensatory
damages where the injury progressed overtime.” Therefore, the “logic and policy
considerations underlying the time-on-therisk method may not as easily lend themselvesto the application of this concept to punitive
damages.” Notably, the court declined toestablish a bright-line rule in this context
and expressly limited its holding to thefacts presented.

Bad Faith Alert:

Washington Supreme Court Rules
That Insurance Fair Conduct Act
Does Not Create Independent
Cause Of Action
Resolving a conflict among lower courts, theWashington Supreme Court ruled that theInsurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”) does
not create an independent cause of action
for regulatory violations. Perez-Crisantos v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2017 WL 448991(Wash. Feb. 2, 2017).
Perez-Crisantos sought coverage fromState Farm for injuries sustained in a car
accident. State Farm agreed to pay the limitsof his personal injury coverage, as well as$400 for lost wages, but denied his claim
for underinsured motorist coverage. PerezCrisantos sued State Farm alleging violationsof the IFCA and Consumer Protection Act.
The action was stayed pending arbitrationof the claims. After an arbitration panel
awarded Perez-Crisantos another $24,000,
he amended his complaint against State
Farm to clarify that the basis for his IFCA
claim was State Farm’s alleged violation of a
Washington Administrative Code provisionthat prohibits insurers from forcing first-party
policyholders to litigate to recover “amounts
due under an insurance policy by offering
substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in such actions.” WAC 284-30330(7). A Washington trial court dismissed
the claims. The Washington Supreme Court
granted direct review and affirmed.
The IFCA provides a cause of action against
insurers who unreasonably deny coverageand permits courts to award attorneys’ fees ortreble damages under certain circumstances.

4

RCW 48.30.015. Addressing a matter offirst impression, the Washington Supreme
Court ruled that the IFCA does not create
a new and independent private right ofaction for violations of state regulations in
the absence of an unreasonable denial ofcoverage. Although the court deemed thestatutory language ambiguous, it concluded
that legislative history did not evidence anintent to create a private cause of action forregulatory violations.

Late Notice Alert:

Maryland Court Of Appeals Rules
That Insurer Failed To Establish
Prejudice Resulting From ThreeYear Notice Delay
Our February 2016 Alert discussed a
Maryland appellate court decision holdingthat an insurer was not entitled to disclaim
coverage under a claims-made-and-reported
policy, notwithstanding a nearly three-year
delay in notice. Fund for Animals, Inc. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,PA, 2016 WL 385222 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb.
1, 2016). Last month, the Maryland Court ofAppeals affirmed. National Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Fund for Animals,2017 WL 383453 (Md. Jan. 27, 2017).
In 2000, the Fund for Animals sued Feld
Entertainment, Inc., a circus operator,
alleging violations of the Endangered Species
Act (the “ESA Case”). In 2007, Feld filed aseparate action against the Fund, alleging
RICO violations in connection with the Fund’sprosecution of the ESA Case. Feld asserted
that the Fund bribed individuals to testify

falsely and committed other criminal acts
for the purposes of establishing standing
in the ESA Case. The RICO suit was stayedpending resolution of the ESA Case and was
ultimately settled.
Nearly three years after the RICO action was
brought, the Fund sought coverage from
National Union under a 2007 claims-madeand-reported policy. By that time, a court
had ruled against the Fund in the ESA Caseand had made numerous factual findings
detrimental to the Fund. National Union
denied coverage based on late notice. The
coverage dispute went to trial, and at theclose of evidence, the court granted National
Union’s motion for judgment, finding thatit had met its prejudice burden. (Maryland
statutory law requires an insurer to establish
actual prejudice by a preponderance of theevidence in order to deny coverage basedon late notice under a claims-made policy.
See Ins. Sec. 19-110). The appellate court
reversed, finding that National Union failed toestablish a causal link between the delay andany prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals stated that “the mere
passage of time is not enough to establish
actual prejudice.” Rather, National Union
is required to establish that “actual harm …
resulted from the delay in receiving notice of
the RICO claim.” The court held that National
Union failed to meet this burden. The court
explained that National Union did not provethat, had it been given timely notice of the
RICO case earlier, it would have taken someaction that would have affected the outcomein that case (e.g., that it would have settled
for a sum less than the actual settlement).
The court emphasized that National Union
did not insure any defendant in the ESA Caseand thus had no contractual right to control
any aspect of that litigation. In this respect,
the case is distinguishable from cases inwhich an insurer is not provided notice until
after a judgment has been issued against thepolicyholder in an underlying suit in which
the insurer could have controlled the defense.
Under such circumstances, an insurer would
presumably be prejudiced by the delay due toits inability to investigate claims and control
the defense.

5Assignment Alert:

New Jersey Supreme Court Rules
That Anti-Assignment Clause Does
Not Bar Post-Loss Assignments
Joining a growing majority of jurisdictions,
the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled thatan anti-assignment clause does not preclude
a post-loss transfer of insurance benefits.
Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 2017 WL 429476 (N.J. Feb. 1, 2017).
Givaudan Fragrances (“GF”) sought
coverage under various liability policies
for environmental contamination claims.
Insurers denied coverage on the basis that
GF was not a named insured, and that any
purported assignment of policy benefits to GF
was invalid because consent was not given.
In ensuing litigation, a New Jersey trial court
ruled in the insurers’ favor. An appellate court
reversed, reasoning that the transfer was
valid because the covered loss had alreadyoccurred and the insurers’ risk was therefore
unchanged. See September 2015 Alert. The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.

The New Jersey Supreme Court stated: “Wehold that, once an insured loss has occurred,an anti-assignment clause in an occurrence
policy may not provide a basis for an insurer’s
declination of coverage based on the insured’s
assignment of the right to invoke policy
coverage for that loss.” The court further heldthat it is not necessary for the claims to be
reduced to a judgment, reasoning that “therelevant event giving rise to coverage is theloss event, not the entry of a judgment fixing
the amount of damage for that loss.”Rescission Alert:

Insurer Did Not Waive
Right To Rescind Based On
Misrepresentations, Says Third
Circuit
The Third Circuit ruled that an insurer did not
waive its right to rescind a policy based on thepolicyholder’s material misrepresentationsin the application. H.J. Heinz Co. v. Starr
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2017 WL 108006 (3dCir. Jan. 11, 2017).
Starr issued a product contamination policy
to Heinz. The policy application posed twoquestions pertaining to complaints or recallsof Heinz products. Heinz responded “no” toone of the questions, and left the other blank,
but attached a loss history spreadsheet. Afterthe policy incepted, Heinz notified Starr of acontamination claim. During its investigationof the claim, Starr discovered that Heinz had
incurred a loss in excess of $10 million inconnection with baby food contamination andreserved its right to limit or deny coverage.
Heinz sued, alleging breach of contract andbad faith. Starr counterclaimed for rescission.
A jury found that Heinz made material
misrepresentations in its application, but that
Starr waived its right to assert rescission. A
Pennsylvania federal district court agreed
with the jury on the misrepresentation
issue, but disagreed with the waiver finding.
The district court declared the policy void.
The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting threearguments asserted by Heinz on appeal.
First, the court rejected the notion that by
invoking the policy’s choice-of-law clause,
Starr had essentially ratified the policy. Heinzargued that Starr was not entitled to assertthat the policy should be rescinded as if itnever existed while seeking to enforce its
choice-of-law provision. The court explainedthat the choice-of-law provision itself refutes
that argument because it explicitly statesthat the “validity … of this Policy will begoverned” by New York law, indicating thatthe choice-of-law provision can be invoked
to determine the validity of the policy in thefirst place. Second, the Third Circuit rejected
Heinz’s contention that the district court
improperly applied a preponderance of theevidence burden of proof on Starr’s rescission
claim. According to Heinz, New York law
requires the elements of rescission to beestablished by clear and convincing evidence.
6

Without deciding the issue, the Third Circuit
ruled that the factual evidence satisfied
both standards. Finally, the court rejected
the assertion that Starr waived its right toassert rescission based on its knowledge ofHeinz’s misrepresentations. Heinz argued
that email communications suggested that
Starr knew of Heinz’s prior losses. The Third
Circuit affirmed the district court’s findingthat “[t]hese items, without more, would
not trigger a reasonably prudent insurer tofollow-up further.” The court also rejected
the contention that Starr failed to assert
rescission promptly after learning of themisrepresentations, reasoning that a fivemonth period of investigation preceding therescission claim was reasonable.

Allocation Alerts:
Rhode Island Supreme Court
Rejects Application Of Stacking
Statute In Underinsured
Motorist Case

The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled thata statute that allows stacking of underinsured
motorist benefits for policies issued by “thesame insurance company” does not apply
where policies are issued by insurancecompanies owned by the same parent
company. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dias,2017 WL 66148 (R.I. Jan. 6, 2017).
Dias was involved in an accident while riding
a motorcycle. He settled his personal injury
claim against the tortfeasor’s automobile
insurer. Because that settlement did not fullycompensate his injuries, Dias subsequently
filed and settled an uninsured-motorist claim
against Progressive Northern, which covered
the motorcycle. Seeking additional coverage,
Dias also filed suit against Progressive
Casualty, which insured the automobiles
owned by Dias and his wife. Progressive
Casualty denied coverage based on an“owned-but-not-insured” clause. Dias did
not contest the applicability of the provision,
but argued that it was preempted by R.I.
Gen. Laws. §27-7-2.1(i). Section 27-7-2.1(i)states that when an insured has multiple
uninsured/underinsured policies “with thesame insurance company, the insured shallbe permitted to collect up to the aggregate
amount of coverage for all the vehicles
insured, regardless of any language in thepolicy to the contrary.” Dias contended that
this provision entitles him to stack the limitsof the Progressive Northern and Progressive
Casualty policies. The court disagreed.
The court ruled that Progressive Northernand Progressive Casualty are not “thesame insurance company,” although bothcompanies are wholly-owned subsidiariesof the same parent (The Progressive
Corporation). Dias argued that stacking
should nonetheless be permitted based on thereasonable expectations doctrine. He argued
that a policyholder would reasonably believethat the two insurers are the same company
based on the following facts: they use thesame claims manual, they advertise under thesame Progressive brand, they employ someof the same individuals, and they list thesame telephone number and website on theirpolicies. Rejecting this argument, the court
explained that the reasonable expectations
doctrine applies only to interpreting
insurance policies, not to statutory language.
In any event, the court concluded that thephrase “the same insurance company” is clear
and unambiguous.

Finding “Other Insurance” Clauses
Mutually Repugnant, Tenth Circuit
Applies Pro Rata Allocation
The Tenth Circuit ruled that “other insurance”
clauses in two policies cancel each other out
and that losses should be apportioned on a
pro rata basis. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co.
v. Lexington Ins. Co., 845 F.3d 1330 (10thCir. 2017).
A school building that suffered fire damage
was insured by both Philadelphia Indemnityand Lexington. Philadelphia issued a policy to7

a charter school that was leasing the building,and Lexington issued a policy to the school
district, the lessor. The insurers disputed theirrespective responsibilities to indemnify theloss. An Oklahoma federal district court ruledthat the identical “other insurance” provisions
in the policies were “mutually defeating”
and that the loss should be apportioned on a
pro rata basis according to policy limits. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed.

The Tenth Circuit ruled that under Oklahoma
law, “their respective excess-coverage clauses
cancel each other out and that their identicalpro rata clauses require the two insurers[to] share the loss.” Lexington argued thatthe clause-cancellation rule does not apply
because each insurer covered a different
named insured. The court disagreed,
explaining that both policies protect the samebuilding against the same risk of fire damage.
The court also rejected Lexington’s argumentthat the lease agreement between the charterschool and the district (which required theschool to procure property insurance) makes
Philadelphia the primary insurer. The court
reasoned that it is the insurance policies, notthe lease, that control loss apportionment.
Finally, the court dismissed Lexington’sassertion that Philadelphia is the primary
insurer because its policy is “more specific to
the risk.” Lexington noted that Philadelphia’s
policy covered only the damaged building,whereas Lexington’s “blanket” policy covered
more than 100 sites owned by the district.
Noting a lack of Oklahoma authority forthis argument, the court deemed this fact
irrelevant to the allocation analysis governedby the “other insurance” clauses.

Arbitration Alert:

Second Circuit Declines To Vacate
Arbitration Awards Based On
Umpire’s Evident Partiality
Affirming a New York federal district court
decision, the Second Circuit ruled that an
umpire-arbitrator did not demonstrate“evident partiality” requiring vacatur of theawards. National Indem. Co. v. IRB Brasil
Reseguros S.A., 2017 WL 421944 (2d Cir. Jan.
31, 2017).
In this reinsurance arbitration, IRB petitioned
to vacate certain arbitration awards issued
against it on the basis of arbitrator partiality.
IRB argued that the umpire was not impartial
because (1) he refused to withdraw after IRB
objected to his service as a party-arbitrator
in another matter on behalf of Equitas, anentity that IRB claims is effectively identicalto National Indemnity; and (2) he accepted
an appointment as Equitas’ party-arbitrator
in a second arbitration while the present
arbitrations were pending. The district court
disagreed and granted National Indemnity’s
petition to confirm the awards. The Second
Circuit affirmed.
Under the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
a court must confirm an award unless it
finds a ground for refusal specified in theFederal Arbitration Act. The FAA permits
vacatur of an award “where there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators.”
The court reasoned that the umpire’s work
as a party arbitrator on behalf of Equitas
does not amount to “evident partiality.”
Even assuming that Equitas and National
Indemnity are corporate affiliates, the court
held that this relationship standing alone isinsufficient to establish partiality. The court
also noted that the umpire was not alleged tohave any personal or business relationshipwith National Union or Equitas. Finally,
the court emphasized that the umpire had
ultimately voted against Equitas in the otherarbitration and has also accepted arbitrator
appointments “against” National Indemnityreinsured parties, like Equitas.

8

Statutory Alert:

Oregon Supreme Court Rules That
“Recovery” In Attorneys’ Fees
Statute Does Not Require Adverse
Judgment Against Insurer
The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that theterm “recovery,” as used in a state statute that
imposes attorneys’ fees against insurers undercertain circumstances, does not require an
actual monetary judgment against the insurer.
Rather, an insurer’s voluntary payments
satisfy the “recovery” requirement of thestatute. Long v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon,
2017 WL 445087 (Or. Feb. 2, 2017).
Farmers made several payments to ahomeowner for damage caused by a waterleak. The homeowner sued, alleging that
her losses exceeded Farmers’ payments andthat Farmers failed to submit to an appraisal
process. The court ordered an appraisal,
after which Farmers made two additional
payments. Following a trial, the homeownerpetitioned for attorneys’ fees under ORS
742.016, which provides that
if settlement is not made within six
months from the date proof of loss isfiled with an insurer and an action isbrought … and the plaintiff’s recovery
exceeds the amount of any tender
made by the defendant in such action,a reasonable amount to be fixed by the
court as attorney fees shall be taxed aspart of the costs of the action.
The parties disputed the meaning of“recovery” in the statute. The homeownerargued that the term refers to “any kind ofrestoration of a loss, including a voluntary
payment,” whereas Farmers argued that it islimited to money judgments in a civil action.

The court deemed the provision ambiguous
and concluded that legislative history andoverall statutory language indicated an intent
to encompass voluntary payments as part of“recovery.” In particular, the court noted that“recovery” has not been limited to monetaryjudgments in other statutory contexts andthat the compensatory purposes of the statutewould be furthered by an interpretation that
includes voluntary payments as “recovery.”In so ruling, the court explained: “theinsured received a sum from the insurerthat exceeded any amount timely tendered,a result that indicates that, at least in some
practical sense, the insured prevailed in theaction.” However, the court emphasized thata declaration of coverage is insufficient totrigger ORS 742.061; a policyholder mustalso obtain a monetary recovery after filing anaction, although that recovery need not be aformal judgment.

STB News Alerts:
Simpson Thacher received the National
Insurance Practice of the Year Award atEuromoney’s Benchmark Litigation 2017
Awards Dinner for the fifth consecutive
year. In addition, Mary Beth Forshaw was
shortlisted for the Insurance Lawyer of theYear Award.
Deborah Stein and Karen Cestari co-authored“Conflicts of Interest, Independent Counsel,
and Control of the Insured’s Defense.” The
article, featured in the Winter 2016 Editionof New Appleman on Insurance: Current
Critical Issues in Insurance Law, discusses
the complex issues that may give rise to an
insured’s right to independent counsel inunderlying litigation.

9

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

David J. Woll
+1-212-455-3136
dwoll@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212455-2846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
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Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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