Insurance Law Alert

May 2017

In This Issue
Washington Supreme Court Rules That Pollution Exclusion Does Not
Bar Coverage For Carbon Monoxide Claims Based On Lack Of Proximate
Causation
The Washington Supreme Court ruled that carbon monoxide claims were not barred by apollution exclusion because the efficient proximate cause of the underlying injuries was acovered negligent act. Xia v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co., 2017 WL 1532219 (Wash. Apr. 27,2017). (Click here for full article)“They arecounselors and savvy
partners in addition to
being top-flight lawyers. The
value of services provided
is excellent.”–Chambers USA 2017,
quoting a client

Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Action Dismissal Relating To “Program
Business,” Finding Sufficient Allegations Of Soliciting And Transacting
Insurance By AARPThe Ninth Circuit ruled that a California federal district court erroneously dismissed aputative class action against the American Association of Retired Persons alleging violationsof California statutory law based on the organization’s alleged solicitation and transaction of
insurance. Friedman v. AARP, Inc., 2017 WL 1657553 (9th Cir. May 3, 2017). (Click here forfull article)

Reversing District Court, Third Circuit Holds That Asbestos Exclusion
Unambiguously Bars Coverage
The Third Circuit ruled that an asbestos exclusion unambiguously precluded coverage forclaims alleging injury caused by asbestos-containing products. General Refractories Co. v.
First State Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2017). (Click here for full article)

New York Appellate Court Rules That Statute Does Not Eliminate
Insurer’s Burden To Prove All Elements Of Fraud
A New York appellate court ruled than a bond insurer cannot rely on state statutory law to
avoid proving loss causation in its fraud-based suit against Countrywide Financial Corporation.
Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2017 WL 2115841 (N.Y. App. Div.
May 16, 2017). (Click here for full article)


Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

Eighth Circuit Rules That RICO Claims Against Insurance Entities Are
Reverse Preempted By State Insurance Regulations
The Eighth Circuit dismissed federal RICO claims against an insurance company andits affiliates, finding that allowing the claims to proceed would impair state regulation of
insurance. Ludwick v. Harbinger Grp., Inc., 854 F.3d 400 (8th Cir. Apr. 13, 2017). (Click here
for full article)

Fourth Circuit Rules That Claims Against Insurer Are Time-Barred And
Preempted By National Flood Insurance Program
The Fourth Circuit ruled that homeowners’ claims against their property insurer were timebarred and, in any event, preempted by federal law relating to flood insurance. Woodson v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 628 (4th Cir. May 3, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Eleventh Circuit Rules That Policyholder’s Failure To Allocate Settlement
Between Covered And Non-Covered Claims Precludes Indemnification
The Eleventh Circuit rejected a policyholder’s demand for indemnification based on its failure
to allocate an underlying settlement between covered and non-covered claims. Highland
Holdings, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2017 WL 1628953 (11th Cir. May 2, 2017).
(Click here for full article)

Iowa Supreme Court Rules That Breach Of Contract Is Not Prerequisite To
First-Party Bad Faith Claim
The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a workers’ compensation insurer was liable for bad faitheven though it did not breach the insurance policy. Thornton v. American Interstate Ins. Co.,2017 WL 2200461 (Iowa May 19, 2017). (Click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher News Alerts
Click here for information relating to the Firm’s recent insurance-related honors andengagements.

2

Typically, the doctrine is implicatedPollution Exclusion context.
in the first-party property context when acovered and uncovered peril both contributeto a loss. As the insurers argued (and theAlert:
dissenting opinion emphasized), application

Washington Supreme Court Rules
That Pollution Exclusion Does Not
Bar Coverage For Carbon Monoxide
Claims Based On Lack Of Proximate
Causation
The Washington Supreme Court ruledthat carbon monoxide claims were notbarred by a pollution exclusion because theefficient proximate cause of the underlying
injuries was a covered negligent act. Xia v.
ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co., 2017 WL
1532219 (Wash. Apr. 27, 2017).
A homeowner sustained carbon monoxide
injuries as a result of the improper
installation of an exhaust vent. The
homeowner, as assignee of the builder,
sued the builder’s general liability insurer.
The insurer denied coverage based on an
absolute pollution exclusion and a townhouseexclusion. A Washington trial court granted
the insurer’s summary judgment motion,
finding that the townhouse exclusion barred
coverage. An appellate court reversed, findingthat the townhouse exclusion did not apply,
but that the pollution exclusion did. The
Washington Supreme Court reversed.
The Washington Supreme Court ruled thatcarbon monoxide is a pollutant within themeaning of the pollution exclusion and thus
the carbon monoxide leak was an occurrence
barred by the exclusion. However, the court
held that the insurer owed coverage because
the efficient proximate cause of the injuries
was a covered occurrence – namely, thenegligent installation of the exhaust vent.
The court stated: “The exclusion cannot
eviscerate a covered occurrence merely
because an uncovered peril appeared later inthe causal chain.”This opinion appears to run counter to a wellestablished body of law. In determining thescope of a policy’s coverage, courts typicallyanalyze coverage provisions, and then turn to
exclusionary clauses. Here, however, the court
first determined that the pollution exclusion
applied, but then deemed it inapplicable
based on an initial coverage grant for
negligent occurrences. Moreover, as the court
noted, the efficient proximate cause doctrine
has not previously been applied in thisof the proximate causation doctrine in thiscontext operates to defeat the pollution
exclusion almost entirely because most acts ofunintentional pollution begin with negligence.
Finally, the decision ignores the plain policy
language. In applying the proximate causation
doctrine, the court reasoned that “emphasis
must be given to the phrase ‘caused by’”in the pollution exclusion. However, theexclusion is not limited to injuries or damages“caused by” pollution. Rather, the exclusion
also encompasses injuries or damage“resulting from, attributable to, contributed
to, or aggravated by the actual, alleged or
threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage,migration, release or escape of pollutants.”
The court similarly declined to enforce a
provision that stated that the pollution
exclusion “applies whether any other causeof the bodily injury, property damage, or
personal injury would otherwise be covered
under this insurance,” finding that the clauseimproperly attempted to circumvent theefficient proximate cause rule.

Insurance Alert:

Ninth Circuit Reverses Class Action
Dismissal Relating To “Program
Business,” Finding Sufficient
Allegations Of Soliciting And
Transacting Insurance By AARPThe Ninth Circuit ruled that a California
federal district court erroneously dismissed
a putative class action against the American
Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”)
alleging violations of California statutory
law based on the organization’s alleged
solicitation and transaction of insurance.
Friedman v. AARP, Inc., 2017 WL 1657553(9th Cir. May 3, 2017).
The complaint alleges that AARP serves as
the group policyholder for Medigap coverage
sold by UnitedHealth, and that pursuant to acontractual arrangement, AARP participatesin the solicitation of new members and thecollection of premiums for UnitedHealth. Inturn, AARP retains 4.95% of each dollar paidby enrollees prior to remitting the premiums3

to UnitedHealth. The complaint assertsthat this fee is a commission on the sale ofinsurance, and that by collecting this fee,
AARP violated the California Insurance Code,which provides that a person “shall not solicit,
negotiate or effect contracts of insurance”
without a proper license. AARP moved todismiss the complaint, which the district
court granted. The district court concluded
that the complaint did not plausibly allege
that AARP acted as an “unlicensed insurance
agent” or that the 4.95% fee was an improper“commission.” The district court also heldthat AARP did not “solicit” insurance
because the marketing materials did notallow potential enrollees to directly purchaseinsurance coverage from AARP. The Ninth
Circuit reversed.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that, at the motion
to dismiss stage, the complaint sufficiently
alleges that AARP solicits and transacts
insurance. In particular, the court reasoned
that allegations that the 4.95% fee is acommission sufficiently plead the transactionof insurance. In so ruling, the court rejected
the argument that the method of fee
calculation conclusively establishes that it
is a royalty rather than a commission. The
court also held that the complaint sufficiently
alleges the solicitation of insurance because,
among other things, AARP’s marketing
materials expressly state: “This is asolicitation of insurance.” The Ninth Circuit
rejected the district court’s reasoning thatsolicitation was not alleged because AARP’s
website did not permit direct purchaseor enrollment.
The Ninth Circuit also addressed an issue notreached by the district court – the “filed-rate”
doctrine. AARP had argued that the claims
were barred by the “filed-rate” doctrine,
under which “rates duly adopted by aregulatory agency are not subject to collateralattack in court.” Because the district court
concluded that the complaint failed to statea claim, it did not reach this issue. However,
the Ninth Circuit noted that in light of its
reinstatement of the complaint, the “filedrate” doctrine reemerges as a relevant issue.
The court therefore remanded the matter tothe district court.

Asbestos Alert:

Reversing District Court, Third
Circuit Holds That Asbestos
Exclusion Unambiguously Bars
Coverage
Reversing a Pennsylvania federal district
court decision, the Third Circuit ruled that anasbestos exclusion unambiguously precluded
coverage for claims alleging injury causedby asbestos-containing products. General
Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 855
F.3d 152 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2017).
The parties disputed whether two excess
policies covered claims arising out of
exposure to asbestos-containing products
manufactured by General Refractories. The
sole issue on appeal was whether a policy
exclusion that bars coverage for losses“arising out of asbestos” applies to injury
claims derived from exposure to asbestoscontaining products. A Pennsylvania federal
district court deemed the exclusion latently
ambiguous, finding that “asbestos” wassubject to two reasonable interpretations—
raw asbestos only or asbestos-containing
products—and thus held that the policies
were obligated to cover the losses. The Third
Circuit reversed.

4

The Third Circuit ruled that the phrase“arising out of,” when used in an insurance
exclusion, is unambiguous underPennsylvania law. It means that the exclusion
applies when the excluded act or thing is abut for cause of the injury or damage. Because
the losses at issue would not have occurred
but for asbestos (either raw or within finishedproducts), the exclusion squarely applies.
The Third Circuit explained that the district
court’s analysis of the term “asbestos” wasmisplaced because the phrase “arising outof” has “an unambiguous legal meaningthat renders any uncertainty concerning themeaning of the word ‘asbestos’ immaterial.”

Fraud Alert:

New York Appellate Court Rules
That Statute Does Not Eliminate
Insurer’s Burden To Prove All
Elements Of Fraud

those elements. The court explained that
Section 3105, which provides that a material
misrepresentation “shall avoid [a] contract of
insurance” and “defeat recovery thereunder,”does not create a separate cause of action,
but rather codifies common law insurance
principles. The court further reasoned that
Section 3015 is inapplicable because it
generally applies to rescission claims (rather
than claims seeking monetary damages), andAmbac’s policies are expressly unconditional
and irrevocable. Notably, other New York
courts, addressing the same issue, havereached a different conclusion. See MBIA Ins.
Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 963
N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dep’t Apr. 2, 2013) (rejecting
Countrywide’s argument that Insurance
Law §§ 3105 and 3106 bar the “recovery of
payments made pursuant to an insurance
policy without resort to rescission”); MBIA
Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
39 Misc.3d 1220(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
Apr. 29, 2013) (insurer need not demonstratejustifiable reliance for fraudulent inducement
claim under § 3015).

Reversing in part a New York trial court
decision, an appellate court ruled than a bondinsurer cannot rely on state statutory law
to avoid proving loss causation in its fraudbased suit against Countrywide Financial
Corporation. Ambac Assurance Corp. v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2017 WL
2115841 (N.Y. App. Div. May 16, 2017).
The suit arose out of securitizations consistingof over 375,000 pooled residential mortgage
loans with an original principal balance ofapproximately $25 billion. Ambac provided
insurance for the securitizations, under which
it agreed to insure payments of principal andinterest due to investors. Following the failureof the securities to perform, Ambac paid
more insurance claims than it anticipated andultimately entered statutory rehabilitation.
Ambac then sued Countrywide, alleging thatit fraudulently induced Ambac to insure thesecuritizations and breached representations
and warranties made in transaction
documents. Both parties moved for summary
judgment on various issues.
The appellate court ruled that to recover,
Ambac is required to prove all elements of
its fraudulent inducement claim, including
justifiable reliance and loss causation. The
court rejected Ambac’s argument that New
York Insurance Law § 3105 dispenses withthe common law requirement of proving

The court also ruled on the scope of
permissible damages against Countrywide.
Among other things, the court ruled that
Ambac was not entitled to damages for
all past and future claims paid under thepolicies, reasoning that Ambac “accepted
the risk that an economic downturn could
cause the loans to default and trigger its
obligation to pay.” However, the court heldthat the trial court should not have dismissed
Ambac’s reimbursement claim, finding thatthe relevant transaction agreements entitled
Ambac to reimbursement for claims paid asa result of Countrywide’s failure to abide by
the repurchase protocol, and that a separate
remedy-limiting provision did not apply tosuch reimbursement claims.
5Preemption Alerts:
Eighth Circuit Rules That RICO
Claims Against Insurance Entities
Are Reverse Preempted By State
Insurance Regulations

The Eighth Circuit dismissed federal RICO
claims against an insurance company andits affiliates, finding that allowing the claims
to proceed would impair state regulation of
insurance. Ludwick v. Harbinger Grp., Inc.,854 F.3d 400 (8th Cir. Apr. 13, 2017).
Ludwick sued Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance
Company and several affiliates, alleging
RICO violations. The complaint asserted that
Fidelity misled her into overpaying for anannuity by disseminating inaccurate reports
and marketing materials and by transferringbillions of dollars of liabilities off its books toaffiliate companies. According to Ludwick, if
Fidelity had properly accounted for certaintransactions, it would have had to report anegative balance instead of the billion dollar
surpluses reported during the relevant time
period. A Missouri federal district court
granted Fidelity’s motion to dismiss, findingthat the claims were reverse preempted under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides
that federal law may not be construed to“invalidate, impair or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose ofregulating the business of insurance.” 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b). The court concluded thatenforcement of federal RICO claims in thiscase would impair state insurance regulation
because the claims involved transactions
that were approved by state regulators.
Further, the court reasoned that questions
about an insurance company’s solvency fallsquarely within the regulatory oversight ofstate insurance departments. In so ruling,
the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that
the RICO claims were based on Fidelity’s
bookkeeping rather than the propriety ofthe state-approved transactions. The court
explained: “To decide whether F&G’s reported
financials reflected a significant departurefrom the accounting principles it claimed tohave followed, a federal court would need to
ask what the result of the transactions shouldhave been under those principles. That woulddrag the court right back into second-guessing

state regulators’ oversight of F&G’s solvency
and stability.”

Fourth Circuit Rules That Claims
Against Insurer Are Time-Barred
And Preempted By National Flood
Insurance Program
The Fourth Circuit ruled that homeowners’
claims against their property insurer weretime barred and, in any event, preemptedby federal law relating to flood insurance.
Woodson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 628(4th Cir. May 3, 2017).
The Woodsons sought coverage from Allstatefor hurricane-related damage to their home.
Following an inspection of the damage,
Allstate denied most of the claim. Less than
one year after the denial, the Woodsons filed
suit against Allstate in North Carolina state
court, alleging breach of contract and bad
faith. Shortly thereafter (but more than one
year after the claim denial), Allstate removed
the case to federal court and argued that thesuit was barred by the applicable one-year
statute of limitations. The district court did
not address the limitations issue and enteredjudgment for the Woodsons on both claims.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that theclaims were time barred and that the bad faithclaim was preempted by federal law.
The National Flood Insurance Program
governs all flood insurance, whether issued
by FEMA directly or by authorized private
insurers that use the standardized agreement.
Under the standard form policy, a homeownermust sue in federal court within one year after
the date of claim denial. The Fourth Circuit
held that the Woodsons’ suit was time barredbecause more than one year had elapsed
between the claim denial and Allstate’s
removal of the case to federal court. The court
rejected the notion that the federal statute oflimitations should be equitably tolled by thefiling of a complaint in state court.
The court also ruled that the bad faith claim
was preempted by federal law, noting that thepolicy expressly provided that “all disputes
arising from the handling of any claim under
the Policy are governed exclusively by theflood insurance regulations issued by FEMA,
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 . . .
and federal common law.”6

Settlement Alert:

Eleventh Circuit Rules That
Policyholder’s Failure To Allocate
Settlement Between Covered And
Non-Covered Claims Precludes
Indemnification
The Eleventh Circuit rejected a policyholder’sdemand for indemnification based on its
failure to allocate an underlying settlement
between covered and non-covered claims.
Highland Holdings, Inc. v. Mid-ContinentCas. Co., 2017 WL 1628953 (11th Cir. May
2, 2017).
Home Design sued Highland Holdings for
copyright infringement of architecturaldesigns. The suit alleged that Highland
infringed upon Home Design’s copyrightby advertising, designing, and constructing
residences with house plans that were
exact duplicates of plans registered byHome Design. Mid-Continent, Highland’s
liability insurer, initially defended theaction. Thereafter, Highland rejected thedefense and settled with Home Design,
agreeing to pay $650,000 as a full andfinal settlement of “all claims raised or that
could have been raised.” When tendered
the settlement, Mid-Continent refused
to indemnify because Highland failed toallocate its damages between covered andnon-covered claims. A Florida district court
agreed with Mid-Continent’s denial, granting
its summary judgment motion. The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed.
The Eleventh Circuit explained that thesettlement encompassed both covered claims(for advertising injury) as well as non-covered
claims (for copyright infringement andadvertising injuries committed knowingly,
after receipt of a cease and desist order).
Because the settlement did not address
allocation to each category of claims, thecourt concluded that Mid-Continent had no
duty to indemnify. In so holding, the court
rejected Highland’s argument that all of its
liability “arose out of” covered advertising
injury because the schematic house plans
were advertisements, whose very purpose
was to attract customers, distinguishing
Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Kipp Flores
Architects, L.L.C., 602 F. App’x 985 (5thCir. 2015) (discussed in our March 2015
Alert). In Kipp Flores, the court held thathouses, with a design based on an infringed

copyright, constituted advertisements for the
purposes of liability coverage. However, inthat case, the policyholder had establishedthat it used its model homes as its primarymarketing means.
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Highland’sargument that a logical method of allocating
the settlement is to divide the payment
among the number of homes constructedusing an infringing house plan. That method
is inadequate, the court explained, because
it fails to account for the portion of thesettlement that reimbursed Home Designfor its attorneys’ fees or for the excluded“knowing” advertising injuries that occurred
after Highland’s receipt of the cease anddesist letter from Home Design.

Bad Faith Alert:

Iowa Supreme Court Rules
That Breach Of Contract Is Not
Prerequisite To First-Party Bad
Faith Claim
The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a workers’
compensation insurer was liable for bad faitheven though it did not breach the insurance
policy. Thornton v. American Interstate Ins.
Co., 2017 WL 2200461 (Iowa May 19, 2017).
The dispute arose out of a work-related
injury that left Toby Thornton partiallyparalyzed. His workers’ compensation
insurer paid weekly benefits, but contested
whether he was permanently and totallydisabled (“PTD”). Additionally, the insurer
resisted Thornton’s petition for a partial
commutation award, which would haveallowed him to obtain a lump sum payment
in addition to reduced weekly payments. The
Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner
later determined that Thornton was PTD andgranted his petition for partial commutation.
Thereafter, Thornton sued the insurer forcommon law first-party bad faith. Ruling on
cross-motions for summary judgment, a trial
court held that the insurer acted in bad faith
as a matter of law by contesting PTD andcommutation. A jury awarded Thornton $25
million in punitive damages and $284,000 incompensatory damages.
On appeal, the insurer argued that it could not
be liable for bad faith because it voluntarily
7and continuously paid weekly benefits under
its policy. The court rejected this argument,
finding that bad faith may be establishedwhen an insurer lacks a reasonable basis fordenying benefits under the policy. The court
reasoned that “the requisite ‘denial’ may
occur when an insurer unreasonably contests
a claimant’s PTD status or delays deliveryof necessary medical equipment,” even in
the absence of a breach of a specific policy
term. Because the record clearly establishedThornton’s PTD shortly after the accident,
the court affirmed that the insurer lacked any
reasonable basis to dispute that status.
However, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed
the trial court’s finding of bad faith as amatter of law based on the insurer’s resistanceto commutation. The court explainedthat unlike mandated weekly payments,
commutation is a discretionary issue,
based on the Commissioner of Insurance’s
consideration of various factors. As such, thecourt concluded that Thornton’s petition forcommutation was “fairly debatable” on its
facts. Notably, the court declined to foreclose
the possibility that a bad faith claim may arisefor resisting commutation under different
facts, but held that the present record did notestablish bad faith and that the insurer wasentitled to summary judgment on that issue.
Finally, the court ruled that Thornton was notentitled to fees incurred in prosecuting his
bad faith action, noting the lack of statutory
or common law support for such damages
under Iowa law. The court distinguishedsuch fees from costs incurred by Thornton

in the workers’ compensation proceedings
to establish coverage, which are allowable ascompensatory damages. The court reversed
the trial court judgments for actual andpunitive damages and remanded the case fora new trial on the remaining bad faith claims.

Simpson Thacher
News Alerts
Bryce Friedman spoke at the New York Bar
Association’s Current Issues in Insurance
Regulation 2017 program, held on April
21. Bryce participated in a panel discussion
titled “Regulation of the National Flood
Insurance Program,” which addressed various
emerging issues, including unresolved
claims stemming from Superstorm Sandy,
the insurance-related implications of bills
pending in Congress and the impact of recent
staffing changes at the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners.
Euromoney has shortlisted Mary BethForshaw (Insurance and Reinsurance) and
Lynn Neuner (Litigation) for Americas
Women in Business Law Awards. The
Americas Women in Business Law Awards
celebrate the achievements of womenleading the field in their respective practiceareas across the Americas. Euromoney will
announce the winners at an awards ceremonyon June 8 in New York City.

8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

David J. Woll
+1-212-455-3136
dwoll@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212455-2846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
9SimpsonThacherWorldwide

UNITED STATESEUROPE

SOUTH AMERICANew York
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017+1-212-455-2000

LondonCityPoint
One Ropemaker Street
London EC2Y 9HUEngland+44-(0)20-7275-6500

São Paulo
Av. Presidente Juscelino
Kubitschek, 1455
São Paulo, SP 04543-011
Brazil+55-11-3546-1000

Houston
600 Travis Street, Suite 5400
Houston, TX 77002+1-713-821-5650
Los Angeles
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067+1-310-407-7500
Palo Alto
2475 Hanover Street
Palo Alto, CA 94304+1-650-251-5000
Washington, D.C.
900 G Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001+1-202-636-5500

ASIA

Beijing
3901 China World Tower
1 Jian Guo Men Wai Avenue
Beijing 100004
China+86-10-5965-2999
Hong Kong
ICBC Tower
3 Garden Road, Central
Hong Kong+852-2514-7600
Seoul
25th Floor, West Tower
Mirae Asset Center 1
26 Eulji-ro 5-gil, Jung-gu
Seoul 100-210
Korea+82-2-6030-3800
Tokyo
Ark Hills Sengokuyama Mori Tower
9-10, Roppongi 1-Chome
Minato-Ku, Tokyo 106-0032
Japan+81-3-5562-6200
10