Insurance Law Alert

January 2016

In This Issue
Insurer’s Untimely Disclaimer Does Not Preclude Denial of Coverage,
Says New York Appellate Court
A New York appellate court ruled that an insurer’s untimely disclaimer did not preclude it fromdenying coverage where the denial was based on “a lack of coverage in the first instance” rather
than a policy exclusion. Black Bull Contracting, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 2016 WL
39829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t Jan. 5, 2016). (click here for full article)“I square off
against them often,
and they never fail toimpress me with their subject
matter expertise andlitigation talent.”–Benchmark Litigation
2016, quoting apractice area
peer

Insurer Entitled to Recoup Defense Costs Pursuant to Restitution
Doctrine, Says Ohio Appellate Court
An Ohio appellate court ruled that an insurer was entitled to recoup defense costs following
a ruling that it had no duty to defend the underlying suit. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2015 WL 9594035 (Ohio App. Ct. Dec. 30, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Illinois Appellate Court Rules That Municipality Must Exhaust PubliclyFunded Self-Insurance Before Accessing Umbrella Coverage
An Illinois appellate court ruled that umbrella coverage was excess to pooled self-insurance
and therefore that umbrella coverage did not apply until underlying self-insurance limits had
been exhausted. Ill. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Assoc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2015 WL
9393506 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 22, 2015). (click here for full article)

Vermont Supreme Court Rules That Pollution Exclusion Is Not Limited To
Traditional Environmental Contamination
The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that a standard form pollution exclusion bars coverage forclaims arising out of the spraying of pesticide inside a home. Whitney v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2015
WL 8540432 (Vt. Dec. 11, 2015). (click here for full article)

Texas Supreme Court Rules That Loss-of-Use Damages Are Permitted in
Total Destruction Property Cases
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that loss-of-use damages are allowed in total destruction
property cases, and are not limited to partial destruction cases. J&D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alt.
Ins. Corp., 2016 WL 91201 (Tex. Jan. 8, 2016). (click here for full article)


Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

Arkansas Supreme Court Rules That “Actual Cash Value” Provision
Violates State Law
The Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled that state law prohibits including the depreciation oflabor costs in calculating the actual cash value of a covered loss even where a policy provision
expressly allows for such depreciation. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goodner, 2015 WL 8482788(Ark. Dec. 10, 2015). (click here for full article)

Eighth Circuit Enforces Policies’ Anti-Stacking Provisions
The Eighth Circuit ruled that anti-stacking provisions in two insurance policies wereunambiguous and should be enforced as written. Gohagan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2016 WL
66944 (8th Cir. Jan. 6, 2016). (click here for full article)

Montana Supreme Court Rules That General Aggregate Limits Provisionin Excess Policy Is Ambiguous
The Montana Supreme Court ruled that a general aggregate limit provision is ambiguous andtherefore should be construed as providing an additional $4 million in coverage. Westchester
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Keller Transp., Inc., 2016 WL 154989 (Mont. Jan. 12, 2016). (click
here for full article)

Fourth Circuit Rules That “Interrelated Wrongful Acts” Provision Bars
Coverage
The Fourth Circuit ruled that a liability insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify anunderlying lawsuit because, based on the policy’s “interrelated wrongful acts” provision, theoriginal claim against the policyholder was made prior to the inception of the policy. W.C. &A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 2015 WL 9487938 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Statutory Violation Exclusion Does Not Bar Coverage For Claims Alleging
Violation of Genetic Privacy Act, Says Texas Court
A Texas federal district court ruled that an insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify asuit alleging a violation of the Alaska Genetic Privacy Act notwithstanding a statutory violation
exclusion in the applicable policies. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Gene By Gene, Ltd., 2016 WL 102294(S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2016). (click here for full article)2

Disclaimer Alert:

Insurer’s Untimely Disclaimer Does
Not Preclude Denial of Coverage,
Says New York Appellate Court
A New York appellate court ruled that aninsurer’s untimely disclaimer did not preclude
it from denying coverage where the denial
was based on “a lack of coverage in the first
instance” rather than a policy exclusion. Black
Bull Contracting, LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins.
Co., 2016 WL 39829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t
Jan. 5, 2016).
Indian Harbor insured Black Bull Contracting
under a general liability policy. WhenBlack Bull was sued in a personal injury
action, it tendered defense of the suit toIndian Harbor. More than two months after
receiving the notice of claim, Indian Harbor
disclaimed coverage on the basis that theunderlying claims were not within the scopeof policy coverage. Black Bull sued, seeking adeclaration that Indian Harbor was obligatedto defend and indemnify the personal injury
suit. A New York trial court disagreed anddismissed the complaint. The appellate
court affirmed.
The appellate court noted that Indian
Harbor’s disclaimers would have been
untimely as a matter of law “had they been
subject to the timeliness requirement of
Insurance Law §3420(d)(2).” The court
explained that Section 3420 precludes aninsurer who issues an untimely disclaimer
from denying coverage based on a policy
exclusion. Where, as here, the disclaimer
is based on “a lack of coverage in the first
instance,” untimeliness does not preclude
a coverage denial. As the court explained,
requiring payment of a claim under suchcircumstances “would create coverage where
it never existed.”
Black Bull clarifies that Insurance Law§3420 should be read less expansively thanpolicyholders often suggest. The provision
does not bar insurers from asserting thatclaims do not fall within a policy’s coverage
grant, even when disclaimers are not timely
issued.

Defense Alert:

Insurer Entitled to Recoup Defense
Costs Pursuant to Restitution
Doctrine, Says Ohio Appellate Court
An Ohio appellate court ruled that an insurer
was entitled to recoup defense costs following
a ruling that it had no duty to defend theunderlying suit. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc.
v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,Pa., 2015 WL 9594035 (Ohio App. Ct. Dec.
30, 2015).
Numerous tort claims were filed against
Chiquita based on its alleged funding ofColombian terrorist groups. National Union
refused to defend the claims until it wasordered to do so by an Ohio trial court. With
each defense cost payment, National Union
reserved its right to seek reimbursement of
the payments upon resolution of outstanding
coverage issues. Ultimately, an Ohio appellate
court found that National Union had no duty
to defend because the underlying suits did notallege covered “occurrences” in the territories
defined by the policies. Thereafter, National
Union sought reimbursement of the defense
payments. An Ohio trial court ruled in theinsurer’s favor, concluding that it was entitled
to recoup payments based on an implied-infact contractual right to reimbursement. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of thetrial court.
The appellate court ruled that National Union
was entitled to recover the defense costs
under the principle of restitution. Although
the policies were silent as to reimbursementof defense costs upon a judicial determinationthat there was no duty to defend, the court
explained that restitution was appropriate
as “a means to enforce adherence to a3

contract through ordering repayment of asum to which the recipient was never entitledunder the contract’s terms.” Separately, theappellate court rejected reimbursement basedon an implied-in-fact theory, explainingthat Chiquita’s “acceptance of defense-cost
payments was clearly premised on its position
that the payments were due under the termsof the policies, and not on an ‘acceptance’of the terms contained in National Union’s
accompanying letters.”
The court emphasized that its holding was“a narrow one,” based on the following
particular facts of this case: that Chiquita
demanded a defense; that National Union
did not provide a defense until after it was
required to do so by a court, and that it did
so under a reservation of rights including
the right to seek reimbursement; and that anappellate court subsequently determined thata duty to defend never existed.

Excess Coverage
Alert:

Illinois Appellate Court Rules
That Municipality Must Exhaust
Publicly-Funded Self-Insurance
Before Accessing Umbrella
Coverage
An Illinois appellate court ruled that umbrella
coverage was excess to pooled self-insurance
and therefore that umbrella coverage did not
apply until underlying self-insurance limits
had been exhausted. Ill. Mun. League Risk
Mgmt. Assoc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 2015 WL 9393506 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec.
22, 2015).
The Village of Lynwood belongs to theIllinois Municipal League Risk Management
Association, a municipal risk-poolingorganization. When a car owned by themunicipality and driven by a municipal
employee was involved in an accident, theAssociation defended and ultimately settled
the suit. Thereafter, the Association, as
subrogee for the municipality and employee,
sued State Farm, seeking coverage underan umbrella policy issued to the employee.
State Farm refused to contribute, citing
an “other insurance” clause that made its
coverage “excess over all other insurance

and self-insurance.” An Illinois trial court
ruled in favor of State Farm, finding that
the Association was obligated to provide
indemnity up to its contract limit of $8
million. Because the underlying suit was
settled for approximately $5.8 million, thecourt concluded that State Farm had no duty
to contribute to the settlement. The appellate
court affirmed.
The appellate court ruled that although the
Association’s contract was not technicallyan insurance policy (it was an arrangementof publicly-funded pooled self-insurance
among municipalities), it nonethelessqualified as underlying “insurance” for the
purposes of enforcing the “other insurance”
clause in State Farm’s umbrella policy. In
so ruling, the court rejected the argumentthat self-insurance should be limited to
privately-funded risk pools. The court stated,“We see no grounds to limit the reach of
the other insurance clause in the manner
the Association suggests. We construe theumbrella policy to provide insurance coverage
only when the loss exceeded available limits
of insurance and self-insurance, including
pooled self-insurance.”

Pollution Exclusion
Alert:

Vermont Supreme Court Rules That
Pollution Exclusion Is Not Limited
To Traditional Environmental
Contamination
Our April 2015 Alert reported on a Vermont
Supreme Court decision holding that an
absolute pollution exclusion bars coveragefor injuries caused by spray foam insulation
fumes. Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Homes, Inc., 2015
WL 1524206 (Vt. Apr. 3, 2015). There, theVermont Supreme Court rejected the trial
court’s holding that the exclusion applies
only to traditional environmental hazards.
However, the Vermont Supreme Court
expressly limited its ruling to the particularsurplus lines policy at issue, noting that theexclusionary language was broader thanstandard form pollution exclusions and that
Vermont regulations required in-state generalliability insurers to provide pollution coveragein most cases. Last month, the Vermont
4Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue
left open in Cincinnati – namely, whether
a standard form pollution exclusion bars
coverage for claims arising out of pesticide
spray inside a home. The court held thatit did.
In Whitney v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 WL
8540432 (Vt. Dec. 11, 2015), the Vermont
Supreme Court reversed a lower court
decision on interlocutory appeal and heldthat a standard form pollution exclusion
in a homeowner’s policy unambiguously
applies to claims arising from interior
residential pesticide application. The court
explicitly rejected the argument that pollution
exclusions should be “presumed, as a class,to be ambiguous or to be limited in theirapplication to traditional environmental
pollution.” Rather, under the “plain, ordinary
and popular meaning,” the exclusion applies
to the spraying of toxic chemicals insidea home.
In another ruling issued last month, the Fifth
Circuit reached the same conclusion, holdingthat under Texas law, a pollution exclusion
bars coverage for personal injury claims basedon the installation of foam spray insulation
inside a home. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Lapolla
Indus., Inc., 2015 WL 9460301 (5th Cir. Dec.
23, 2015).

underinsured-motorist policy. American
denied the claim on the ground that Texas
law does not permit recovery of loss-of-use
damages in total destruction cases. In ensuing
litigation, a jury awarded the towing company
loss-of-use damages. American appealed,arguing that the trial court erred in allowing
the loss-of-use damages issue to be submitted
to a jury. The appellate court agreed andreversed the trial court, ruling that Texas law
allows recovery of loss-of-use damages only inpartial destruction property cases. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed.
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that “theowner of personal property that has been
totally destroyed may recover loss-of-use
damages in addition to the fair market
value of the property immediately before
the injury.” The court reasoned that thedistinction between partial destruction
cases and total destruction cases “is not only
illogical but is also against the great weight ofjurisdictions that have eliminated that archaic
distinction.” In addition, the court heldthat loss-of-use damages “must be available
in total destruction cases pursuant to theprinciple of full and fair compensation.”
Significantly, the court cautioned that lossof-use damages must be “foreseeable anddirectly traceable to the tortious act” rather
than speculative. “Although mathematicalexactness is not required, the evidence offered
must rise above the level of pure conjecture.
Moreover, the damages may not be awarded
for an unreasonably long period of lost use.”

Property Insurance
Alerts:Arkansas Supreme Court Rules
Texas Supreme Court Rules That
Loss-of-Use Damages Are Permitted
in Total Destruction Property Cases

That “Actual Cash Value” Provision
Violates State Law

Clarifying unsettled Texas law, the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that loss-of-use
damages are allowed in total destruction
property cases, and are not limited to partial
destruction cases. J&D Towing, LLC v. Am.
Alt. Ins. Corp., 2016 WL 91201 (Tex. Jan.
8, 2016).

In a plurality decision, the Supreme Courtof Arkansas ruled that state law prohibits
including the depreciation of labor costs in
calculating the actual cash value of a covered
loss even where a policy provision expressly
allows for such depreciation. Shelter Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Goodner, 2015 WL 8482788 (Ark. Dec.
10, 2015).

The coverage dispute arose out of a car
accident, which resulted in the total
destruction of a tow truck. The tow truckcompany settled with the insurer of the otherdriver for the loss of the truck, and thensought loss-of-use damages from American
Alternative Insurance Company under an

The property policy at issue provided that,in the event of a covered loss, the insurer
would pay the actual cash value of damaged
property. Actual cash value is defined as“total restoration cost less depreciation.” The
policy defines depreciation as “the amountby which any part of the covered property
5. . . has decreased in value since it wasnew,” and explicitly provides that “[w]hen
calculating depreciation, we will include thedepreciation of the materials, [and] the labor. . . .” In accordance with this provision, theinsurer issued payment to the homeowners
that reflected total restoration costs, less thepolicy deductible and a deduction for the
depreciation of material and labor costs. The
homeowners filed suit seeking a declarationthat the depreciation clause violated public
policy. A trial court agreed and granted thehomeowners’ summary judgment motion.
The Supreme Court affirmed.

In finding the policy provision unenforceable
as against state law, the court relied solely
on a prior decision in which the term “actual
cash value” was undefined and thus deemedambiguous. Adams v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co.,
430 S.W.3d 675 (Ark. 2013). Notwithstanding
this significant distinction, the Shelter Mutual
court ruled that Adams was controlling state
law that prohibited the depreciation of laborcosts in calculating actual cash value.
As the dissent noted, the plurality’s relianceon Adams is curious because there, the court
answered a certified question that addressed
whether labor cost depreciation could be
included in actual cash value calculation
when the term is undefined and therefore
deemed ambiguous, which was not the casehere. The dissent also took issue with thetrial court’s conclusion that allowing for the
depreciation of labor costs violated public
policy, noting that “there is no statute on the
depreciation of labor” nor any interferencewith public welfare that would warrant “theunprecedented step of creating public policyin the absence of legislation.”

Aggregate Limits
Alerts:Eighth Circuit Enforces Policies’
Anti-Stacking Provisions
The Eighth Circuit ruled that anti-stacking
provisions in two insurance policies wereunambiguous and should be enforced as
written. Gohagan v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2016
WL 66944 (8th Cir. Jan. 6, 2016).
Cincinnati Insurance issued a generalliability policy and a business owners policy
to Thomas Campbell. Each policy had a$1,000,000 per-occurrence limit. Bothpolicies contained anti-stacking clausesthat provided that “the aggregate maximum
limit of insurance” under all policies “shallnot exceed the highest available limit of
insurance” under any one policy. Campbell
sought coverage under both polices after
settling an underlying personal injury dispute.
Cincinnati contributed $1,000,000 under
the general liability policy, but argued thatthe business owners policy did not cover theunderlying claims, and that in any event,under both policies’ anti-stacking provisions,coverage was limited to a single $1,000,000
per-occurrence limit. A Missouri federal
district court agreed and ruled in favor of
Cincinnati. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that thislanguage unambiguously limited coveragefor the underlying settlement to a single
policy-limit. The court rejected the argumentthat the provisions were ambiguous because
they did not define the phrase “aggregate
maximum limit.” Similarly, the court rejected
the argument that the policies’ “otherinsurance” clauses created ambiguity as tothe stacking issue, explaining that otherinsurance provisions apply only where
coverage is provided by policies issued bymore than one insurer, which was not thecase here.

Montana Supreme Court Rules That
General Aggregate Limits Provisionin Excess Policy Is Ambiguous
The Montana Supreme Court ruled thata general aggregate limit provision is
ambiguous and therefore should be construed
as providing an additional $4 million incoverage. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins.
6

Co. v. Keller Transp., Inc., 2016 WL 154989(Mont. Jan. 12, 2016).
The coverage dispute arose out of a highway
accident that resulted in a gasoline spill.
The policyholders were insured under acommercial transportation policy issued by
Carolina Casualty. The policy provided two
distinct coverages: commercial automobileand commercial general liability. Each was
subject to a $1 million per occurrence/
accident limit, and the general liability
coverage was additionally subject to a $2
million “general aggregate.” The policyholders
were also insured under an excess policy
issued by Westchester, which followed form
to the Carolina policy except where otherwise
stated. The Westchester policy limited
coverage to $4 million per occurrence witha $4 million “general aggregate” limit. The
term “general aggregate” was undefined.
After the accident, Carolina Casualty madepayments that exhausted the $1 million
automobile coverage limit. Thereafter,
Westchester undertook defense of the matter
until it had paid $4 million in clean-up andlitigation costs, at which time it referred thematter back to Carolina Casualty. Carolina
Casualty sought a declaration as to theinsurers’ defense and indemnity obligations.
A Montana trial court ruled, among otherthings, that the policyholders were entitled toan additional $4 million under Westchester’s
excess policy. The trial court reasoned that“general aggregate” was ambiguous and could
be read as establishing an aggregate limit forexcess payments for each type of coveragein the underlying policy (auto and generalliability), rather than an aggregate limit for
the entire policy. The Montana Supreme
Court affirmed.
The Montana Supreme Court ruled that
under the factual circumstances presented,
the general aggregate limit provision was
ambiguous. The court explained that “thefundamental interpretational problem iscaused by Westchester’s failure to define
the term ‘general aggregate’ in a policy thatprovides excess coverage for an underlying
policy with more than one coverage and morethan one stated limit.” In this respect, thecourt suggested that ambiguity would not befound where the term was defined or where
the underlying policy provided only a single
type of coverage.

Coverage Alerts:
Fourth Circuit Rules That
“Interrelated Wrongful Acts”
Provision Bars Coverage

The Fourth Circuit ruled that a liability
insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify
an underlying lawsuit because, based on thepolicy’s “interrelated wrongful acts” provision,
the original claim against the policyholder
was made prior to the inception of the policy.
W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,2015 WL 9487938 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2015).
In 2006, several entities and employees
affiliated with Miller Development were
sued over a contract dispute. In 2010,
Miller obtained liability insurance from
Continental Casualty. Shortly thereafter,
Miller was sued in a fraudulent conveyanceaction, seeking recovery on the judgment
entered in the 2006 lawsuit. Miller tendered
the suit to Continental, which refused todefend based on an “interrelated wrongfulacts” provision. A Maryland federal district
court agreed, finding that the 2010 lawsuit
alleged interrelated wrongful conduct withthe allegations in the 2006 lawsuit and thusthat a “claim” was originally made prior to
the inception of the 2010 policy. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed.
The policy provided that “[m]ore than
one Claim involving the same Wrongful
Act or Interrelated Wrongful Acts shall beconsidered as one Claim which shall bedeemed made on . . . the date on which theearliest such Claim was first made.” The
policy further specified that “interrelated
wrongful acts” are any acts which are“logically or causally connected by reason of
any common fact, circumstance, situation,transaction or event.” Noting the “expansive”
definition of “interrelated wrongful acts,”
the court concluded that the conduct allegedin the 2006 and 2010 lawsuits shared a“common nexus of fact.” In particular, thecourt noted that both suits arose out of thesame land development project, the same
operative contract, common circumstancesand “a multitude of common facts.” Thecourt therefore held that the claims allegedinterrelated wrongful acts that must be
deemed “first made” in 2006, outside thescope of Continental’s policy period.

7

Statutory Violation Exclusion
Does Not Bar Coverage For Claims
Alleging Violation of Genetic
Privacy Act, Says Texas Court
Courts routinely enforce statutory violation
exclusions to bar coverage for underlying
claims alleging violations of state or federal
statutes. Moreover, as reported in previous
Alerts, courts have also applied statutory
violation exclusions to bar coverage fornon-statutory claims if those claims arise outof statutory violations. See December andJanuary 2015 Alerts; April and May 2014
Alerts. However, in a recent decision, a Texas
federal district court departed from this trend,
ruling that an insurer was obligated to defend
and indemnify a suit alleging a violation of the
Alaska Genetic Privacy Act notwithstanding astatutory violation exclusion in the applicablepolicies. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Gene By
Gene, Ltd., 2016 WL 102294 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
6, 2016).
A class action suit against Gene by Gene, agenealogy website, alleged that the company
violated the Alaska Genetic Privacy Act
by improperly publishing clients’ DNA
results without their consent. Evanston
Insurance refused to defend the suit basedon an exclusion entitled “Electronic Data
and Distribution of Material in Violationof Statutes,” which precludes coverage fora claim based upon or arising out of any
violation of (a) the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, (b) CAN-SPAM, or “(c)any other statute, law, rule, ordinance orregulation that prohibits or limits the sending,transmitting, communication or distributionof information or other material.” Evanston
argued that the underlying claim fell squarely
within section (c) of the exclusion because
the Alaska Genetic Privacy Act prohibits the
public disclosure of a person’s DNA analysis.
The court disagreed and ruled in favor ofGene by Gene.
The court applied the doctrine of ejusdem
generis to find that section (c) of the
exclusion did not apply to alleged violationsof the Alaska Genetic Privacy Act. Ejusdem
generis provides that “where generalwords follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words are [usually]
construed to embrace only objects similarin nature to those objects enumerated by
the preceding specific words.” The court
reasoned that because sections (a) and(b) of the exclusion (relating to TCPA andCAN-SPAM violations) regulate the use ofunsolicited communications (via telephone/facsimile and email, respectively), section(c) should likewise be interpreted to refer to“other forms of unsolicited communication
to consumers ‘that intrude[ ] into one’s
seclusion.’” The court therefore concluded
that an alleged violation of Alaska’s Genetic
Privacy Act is outside the scope of the
exclusion because it “does not concern
unsolicited communication to consumers, butinstead regulates the disclosure of a person’s
DNA analysis.”8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.
Mary Kay Vyskocil+1-212-455-3093
mvyskocil@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

David J. Woll
+1-212-455-3136
dwoll@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212455-2846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
9SimpsonThacherWorldwide

UNITED STATESEUROPE

SOUTH AMERICANew York
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017+1-212-455-2000

LondonCityPoint
One Ropemaker Street
London EC2Y 9HUEngland+44-(0)20-7275-6500

São Paulo
Av. Presidente Juscelino
Kubitschek, 1455
São Paulo, SP 04543-011
Brazil+55-11-3546-1000

Houston
600 Travis Street, Suite 5400
Houston, TX 77002+1-713-821-5650
Los Angeles
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067+1-310-407-7500
Palo Alto
2475 Hanover Street
Palo Alto, CA 94304+1-650-251-5000
Washington, D.C.
900 G Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001+1-202-636-5500

ASIA

Beijing
3901 China World Tower
1 Jian Guo Men Wai Avenue
Beijing 100004
China+86-10-5965-2999
Hong Kong
ICBC Tower
3 Garden Road, Central
Hong Kong+852-2514-7600
Seoul
25th Floor, West Tower
Mirae Asset Center 1
26 Eulji-ro 5-gil, Jung-gu
Seoul 100-210
Korea+82-2-6030-3800
Tokyo
Ark Hills Sengokuyama Mori Tower
9-10, Roppongi 1-Chome
Minato-Ku, Tokyo 106-0032
Japan+81-3-5562-6200
10