Insurance Law Alert

May 2016

In This Issue
New York Court of Appeals Applies “All Sums” Allocation and Vertical
Exhaustion to Determine Excess Coverage
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that under the applicable policy language, all sums
allocation and vertical exhaustion governed excess insurers’ coverage obligations for long-tailasbestos injuries. Viking Pump, Inc. v. TIG Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1735790 (N.Y. May 3, 2016).
(Click here for full article)“A very, very
impressive team whichis completely hands-on interms of shaping the issues,and dealing with other parties
and the judge.”–Chambers USA 2015,
quoting a client

New York Court of Appeals Rules That Anti-Subrogation Rule Does Not
Bar Insurers’ Claims Against Liable Party
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the anti-subrogation rule did not bar insurers’ claims
against a party who was not an insured under the applicable policy. Millennium Holdings LLC
v. The Glidden Co., 2016 WL 2350158 (N.Y. May 5, 2016). (Click here for full article)

Sale of Counterfeit Goods with Infringing Trademark Does Not Constitute
Advertising Injury, Says Second Circuit
The Second Circuit ruled that an insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify trademark
infringement claims arising out of the policyholder’s sale of counterfeit products, finding thatthe allegations did not constitute covered advertising injury. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Fendi Adele S.R.L., 2016 WL 2865578 (2d Cir. May 17, 2016). (Click here for full article)

Michigan Court Rejects Policyholder’s Implicit Disparagement Argument
for Advertising Injury Coverage
A Michigan federal district court ruled that an insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify
infringement and false advertising claims because they did not allege disparagement within thescope of advertising injury coverage. Vitamin Health, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2016 WL
2622353 (E.D. Mich. May 9, 2016). (Click here for full article)

Ohio Supreme Court Rules That Abuse Exclusion Bars Coverage for Direct
and Vicarious Liability
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that an abuse and molestation exclusion barred coverage fordamages based on the insured entity’s vicarious liability and that its application was not limited
to damages arising directly from its employee’s abuse of a minor. World Harvest Church v.
Grange Mutual Cas. Co., 2016 WL 2754889 (Ohio May 12, 2016). (Click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

Seventh Circuit Rejects Policyholder’s Attempt to Recast Contract Claims
as Negligence Claims For Coverage Purposes
The Seventh Circuit ruled that an insurer had no duty to defend a suit alleging that a law
firm had failed to pay certain benefits to a retired employee, finding that the suit alleged only
uncovered breach of contract. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Karlin, Fleisher & Falkenberg,
LLC, 2016 WL 2849449 (7th Cir. May 16, 2016). (Click here for full article)

Wisconsin Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal of Bad Faith Claim Against
Property Insurer
A Wisconsin appellate court ruled that a trial court did not err in granting summary judgment
to an insurer on a first-party bad faith claim on the basis that coverage was “fairly debatable.”
Tripalin v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1370129 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2016).
(Click here for full article)

D.C. Court Rules That Government Wrongly Reimbursed Health Insurers
A Washington, D.C. federal district court ruled that the government unlawfully paid billions ofdollars to insurance providers under the Affordable Care Act without a funding appropriationfrom Congress. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 2016 WL 2750934 (D.D.C. May 12,2016). (Click here for full article)

Second Circuit Rules That Physicians and Medical Associations Lack
Standing To Sue Health Insurers
The Second Circuit ruled that psychiatrists and professional medical associations lacked
standing to bring claims against health insurers based on allegedly discriminatory
reimbursement practices. American Psychiatric Assoc. v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 2016 WL
2772853 (2d Cir. May 13, 2016). (Click here for full article)

U.S. Supreme Court Reverses Ninth Circuit on Standing Issue, RulingThat Statutory Violation Does Not Automatically Satisfy Injury-in-Fact
Requirement
The United States Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision holding that an individual
plaintiff had standing to sue Spokeo, a search engine company, under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. May 16, 2016). (Click here for full article)2

Allocation Alert:

New York Court of Appeals Applies“All Sums” Allocation and Vertical
Exhaustion to Determine Excess
Coverage
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that
under the applicable policy language, all sums
allocation and vertical exhaustion governed
excess insurers’ coverage obligations for longtail asbestos injuries. Viking Pump, Inc. v.
TIG Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1735790 (N.Y. May 3,2016).
Viking Pump sued excess insurers seeking
coverage for asbestos-related injury claims.
In 2009, relying upon “non-cumulation” and“prior insurance” provisions in the policies
at issue, the Delaware Court of Chancery
ruled that coverage for injuries spanning
multiple years should be allocated on an “allsums” basis, under which the policyholder
can designate a single policy year to bear
the responsibility for a covered loss thatspans multiple policy periods. Viking Pump,
Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 2 A.3d 76 (Del.
Ch. 2009) (see December 2009 Alert). The
Chancery Court thereafter transferred thecase to the Delaware Superior Court for trial.
In 2013, the Superior Court ruled that, under
New York law, horizontal exhaustion applies,
such that all policies of a layer of coveragemust be exhausted before any policies of ahigher layer of coverage are triggered. In a
subsequent decision, the court clarified its
ruling, predicting that New York’s highest
court would rule that horizontal exhaustion
would apply in continuous injury cases only
to the primary and umbrella layers, but would
not govern payment among excess tiers ofcoverage. Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century
Indem. Co., 2014 WL 1305003 (Del. Super.
Ct. New Castle Cnty. Feb. 28, 2014) (see April
2014 Alert).
In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded that resolution of these mattersdepended on “significant and unsettled
questions of New York law,” and certified thefollowing questions to the New York Court ofAppeals:(1) Under New York law, is the proper
method of allocation to be used allsums or pro rata when there are
non-cumulation and prior insurance

provisions? (2) Given the Court’s
answer to Question #1, under New Yorklaw and based on the policy language
at issue here, when the underlying
primary and umbrella insurance in thesame policy period has been exhausted,
does vertical or horizontal exhaustion
apply to determine when a policyholder
may access its excess insurance?
In a unanimous opinion issued this month,
the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
under the applicable policy language, all sums
allocation and vertical exhaustion governed
the excess insurers’ coverage obligations. The
court reasoned that non-cumulation clauses
and prior insurance provisions in the excess
policies compelled all sums allocation. The
court explained:[I]t would be inconsistent with thelanguage of the non-cumulation clauses
to use pro rata allocation here. Suchpolicy provisions plainly contemplatethat multiple successive insurance
policies can indemnify the insured
for the same loss or occurrence byacknowledging that a covered loss or
occurrence may “also [be] covered inwhole or in part under any other excess[p]olicy issued to the [Insured] prior
to the inception date” of the instantpolicy. By contrast, the very essence of
pro rata allocation is that the insurance
policy language limits indemnification
to losses and occurrences during thepolicy period. . . .
The court distinguished Consolidated Edison
Co. of N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 98 N.Y.2d 208(2002), which applied pro rata allocation
to long-tail environmental contamination
claims, based on the policy language. In
Consolidated Edison, the court’s decision
turned upon interpretation of the same“all sums” and “during the policy period”
language at issue in Viking Pump, but did not
address non-cumulation or prior insurance
provisions.
The court also concluded that the policy
language required vertical exhaustion (underwhich an insured need only exhaust the
primary and umbrella policies immediately
underlying an excess policy, rather than all
triggered policies in underlying layers). In
so ruling, the court explained that the excess
policies at issue “primarily hinge[d] their
attachment on the exhaustion of underlying3policies that cover the same policy period
as the overlying excess policy, and that are
identified by either name, policy numberor policy limit.” Finally, the court heldthat vertical exhaustion was “conceptuallyconsistent” with an all sums allocation,
allowing a policyholder to “seek coveragethrough the layers of insurance available for a
specific year.”

Subrogation Alert:
New York Court of Appeals Rules
That Anti-Subrogation Rule Does
Not Bar Insurers’ Claims Against
Liable Party

The New York Court of Appeals ruled that theanti-subrogation rule did not bar insurers’
claims against a party who was not an insured
under the applicable policy. Millennium
Holdings LLC v. The Glidden Co., 2016 WL
2350158 (N.Y. May 5, 2016).
The coverage dispute arose from paint andpigment manufacturer Glidden Company’s
complex corporate history, which involved
numerous corporate purchases, transfers andtakeovers. Ultimately, Glidden’s pigment andpaint businesses were divided and became
separately owned entities. Akzo Nobel
Paints (“ANP”) is the successor company ofthe paint business, and Millennium is the
successor company of the pigment business.
ANP’s predecessor agreed to indemnify
Millennium’s predecessor.
Various London insurers and Northern
Assurance Company provided primary andexcess coverage to one of Millennium’s
corporate predecessors. The insurers funded
the defense of lead paint/pigment claims
asserted against Millennium and ANP underthose policies. In the present action, theinsurers, as Millennium’s subrogee, sought
indemnification from ANP for the defense
costs based on a judicial ruling that ANP’s
predecessors were not insured under thepolicies issued to Millennium’s predecessor.
See The Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens MutualCasualty Co., 112 Ohio St. 3d 470 (2006).

subrogation claim against ANP. Millennium
Holdings LLC v. The Glidden Co., 2013 WL
6182552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. New York Cnty. Nov.
25, 2013) (see December 2013 Alert). Under
the anti-subrogation rule, “an insurer has noright of subrogation against its own insured
for a claim arising from the very risk forwhich the insured was covered even where
the insured has expressly agreed to indemnify
the party from whom the insurer’s rights arederived.” Even though ANP was not insured
under the subject policies (either by name orby operation of law), the trial court concluded
that the anti-subrogation rule applied because
the insurers sought “to recover for the veryrisk [they] insured when [they] originallyissued the policies.” More specifically, thetrial court reasoned that the reimbursement
the insurers sought from ANP—relating to
defense costs for lead paint/pigment claims—
was the same risk the insurers covered underpolicies issued to Millennium’s predecessor.
Therefore, the court dismissed the insurers’
claims. An intermediate appellate court
affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, applying a literal reading of thepolicies at issue.
The New York Court of Appeals ruled thatthe anti-subrogation rule applies only where“the party the insurer is seeking to enforce its
right of subrogation against is its insured, an
additional insured, or a party who is intended
to be covered by the insurance policy in someother way.” Here, because it was determinedthat ANP and its predecessor were notinsured under the applicable policies, theanti-subrogation rule did not apply. The court
distinguished Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 92 N.Y.2d 363 (1998),
which held that the anti-subrogation rulebarred an insurer’s claim against a noninsured party. In Jefferson, the non-insured
party was covered under the policy as a“permissive user” of the insured vehicle andwas thus “a party who was intended to becovered by the insurance policy in some otherway.” The court also distinguished cases inwhich lower courts have extended the antisubrogation rule to third parties who are notcovered by the applicable policies as “limited
and distinguishable” and based on public
policy grounds not applicable here.

A New York trial court found that ANP was
required to indemnify Millennium under thepredecessors’ agreement but that the antisubrogation doctrine precluded the insurers’
4Advertising Injury
Alerts:media,” the court held that mere productidentification (or misidentification) is not
equivalent to advertising activity.

Sale of Counterfeit Goods with
Infringing Trademark Does Not
Constitute Advertising Injury, Says
Second Circuit

Michigan Court Rejects
Policyholder’s Implicit
Disparagement Argument for
Advertising Injury Coverage

The Second Circuit ruled that an insurer had
no duty to defend or indemnify trademark
infringement claims arising out of thepolicyholder’s sale of counterfeit products,
finding that the allegations did not constitutecovered advertising injury. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fendi Adele S.R.L.,
2016 WL 2865578 (2d Cir. May 17, 2016).

A Michigan federal district court ruled that aninsurer had no duty to defend or indemnify
infringement and false advertising claims
because they did not allege disparagement
within the scope of advertising injury
coverage. Vitamin Health, Inc. v. Hartford
Cas. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 2622353 (E.D. Mich.
May 9, 2016).

The coverage dispute arose out of trademark
infringement suits in which Ashely Reed
was found liable for its role in transactions
involving counterfeit Fendi products. During
the relevant time frame, Ashley Reed wasinsured under liability policies issued by
USF&G. The policies covered damages caused
by “advertising injury,” defined to include
injury resulting from the “use of another’s
advertising idea in your ‘advertising.’” USF&G
sought a declaration that its policies did notcover the underlying suits because the claims
were based on the sale, not the advertising,of counterfeit products. A New York federal
district court agreed and granted USF&G’s
summary judgment motion. The Second
Circuit affirmed.

Bausch & Lomb sued Vitamin Health alleging
patent infringement and false advertisingbased on Vitamin Health’s advertisementsfor vision-related supplements. Vitamin
Health’s insurer, Hartford, refused to defend
or indemnify, arguing that the underlying
complaint did not state a claim for productdisparagement. The court agreed and granted
Hartford’s summary judgment motion.

The Second Circuit ruled that there wasno coverage under the advertising injury
provision because Ashley Reed did not engage
in any advertising of the counterfeit products,
and in the underlying suits, Fendi did notallege any injuries based on advertising
activities. The court rejected an argument
frequently asserted by policyholders inthis context—namely, that the use ofanother company’s trademark constitutes“advertising” because it “attract[s] theattention of others by any means for the
purpose of seeking customers or supporters
or increasing sales or business.” The court
explained that reasonable parties would
not expect advertising injury coverage toextend to the sale of infringing goods where
the insured engaged in no advertising.
Emphasizing the difference between the“placement of a counterfeit brand label” on a
product and the “act of soliciting customers
through printed advertisements or other

The court ruled that the underlying complaint
could not be read to allege that Vitamin
Health disparaged Bausch & Lomb’s products.
The complaint alleged that Vitamin Healthmisrepresented the content of its own
products, not its competitors’ products. The
court rejected the notion that Vitamin Health“implicitly disparaged” Bausch & Lomb’s
products by creating a false comparison
between the two companies’ products. In
so ruling, the court distinguished cases inwhich false advertising claims were held
to allege disparagement because they
contained assertions of product superiority,and therefore implied that competitors’
products were inferior. The court also heldthat even assuming the claims were within
the scope of advertising injury, coverage wasbarred by intellectual property and failure toconform exclusions.

5

Coverage Alerts:

Ohio Supreme Court Rules That
Abuse Exclusion Bars Coverage for
Direct and Vicarious Liability
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that an abuse
and molestation exclusion barred coveragefor damages based on the insured entity’svicarious liability and that its application
was not limited to damages arising directlyfrom its employee’s abuse of a minor. World
Harvest Church v. Grange Mutual Cas. Co.,2016 WL 2754889 (Ohio May 12, 2016).
In an underlying abuse suit, a church and its
employee were found liable for assault andbattery, negligence, and intentional inflictionof emotional distress, among other claims.
Grange, the church’s general liability insurer,
refused to indemnify based on an exclusionthat precluded coverage for the “actual or
threatened abuse or molestation by anyoneof any person while in the care, custody orcontrol of any insured.” The church argued
that the exclusion barred coverage only fordamages arising from an insured’s direct
liability for abuse, and did not extend todamages based on vicarious liability. The
Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and ruled in
the insurer’s favor. The court reasoned thatthe abuse exclusion was broadly worded,and did not contain any language limiting its
application to damages based on an insured’s
direct liability.
The court also ruled that post-judgmentinterest is based only on the portion of thejudgment that reflects covered injury, notthe entire underlying judgment. Because theunderlying suit did not allege any covered
injuries, the court held that Grange was not
obligated to pay any post-judgment interest.

Seventh Circuit Rejects
Policyholder’s Attempt to Recast
Contract Claims as Negligence
Claims For Coverage Purposes
The Seventh Circuit ruled that an insurer
had no duty to defend a suit alleging that a
law firm had failed to pay certain benefits
to a retired employee, finding that the suitalleged only uncovered breach of contract.
Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Karlin, Fleisher& Falkenberg, LLC, 2016 WL 2849449 (7thCir. May 16, 2016).

A retired attorney sued his former employer
alleging that it had failed to compensate him
for unused vacation time and sick leave in
violation of his employment contract andapplicable law. Hartford denied coverage on
the basis that the claims did not allege any
covered acts of negligence. An Illinois federal
district court agreed and granted Hartford’ssummary judgment motion. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed.
The law firm argued that the attorney’s
claims, although sounding in contract, wereactually based on negligent acts—namely, thefirm’s failure to maintain accurate records
and/or properly administer employee
benefits. The Seventh Circuit rejected thisargument, holding that the underlying claims
were based on money owed by virtue of theemployment contract. The court further heldthat Hartford was not estopped from denying
coverage notwithstanding a seven-monthdelay in disclaiming coverage. The court
found that a delay cannot create coveragethat does not exist and that, in any event, thelaw firm should have reasonably known thata breach of the employment contract was notcovered by the policy.

Bad Faith Alert:

Wisconsin Appellate Court Affirms
Dismissal of Bad Faith Claim
Against Property Insurer
A Wisconsin appellate court ruled that a
trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment to an insurer on a first-party bad
faith claim on the basis that coverage was“fairly debatable.” Tripalin v. American
Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1370129(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2016).
Tripalin filed a claim with American Family
for roof damage allegedly caused by hail.
American Family denied coverage basedon an adjuster’s report concluding that thedamage was caused by defective shingles
rather than hail. Tripalin submitted a reportfrom a local contractor opining that thedamage was caused by hail and requested
that American Family reconsider its coveragedenial. American Family denied the request.
Thereafter, Tripalin sued for bad faith. A trial
court granted American Family’s summary
judgment motion, finding that bad faith6was not established because the cause ofdamage was “fairly debatable.” The appellate
court affirmed.
The appellate court set forth the stringent
standard for withstanding summary judgment
on a bad faith claim:
It is not enough to point to evidence
supporting or undermining an expert’s
opinion in a bad faith case. Rather, toestablish a bad faith denial of coverage,
Tripalin would need to show that the
opposing expert was so obviously wrong
in his opinion that American Family
could not have reasonably relied on his
opinion in its decision to deny coverage.
The court concluded that no such showing
had been made because at most, the two
conflicting opinions as to the cause ofroof damage supported the argument thatcoverage was “fairly debatable.”

Affordable Care
Act Alert:

D.C. Court Rules That Government
Wrongly Reimbursed Health
Insurers
A Washington, D.C. federal district court
ruled that the government unlawfully paidbillions of dollars to insurance providers
under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)
without a funding appropriation from
Congress. U.S. House of Representatives
v. Burwell, 2016 WL 2750934 (D.D.C. May
12, 2016).

The House of Representatives filed suitalleging that the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services and otherfederal agencies spent unappropriated funds
in order to reimburse health insurers fordiscounts given to low-income consumers
pursuant to the ACA. More specifically, thesuit alleged that insurers were improperly
reimbursed for discounts they provided
pursuant to Section 1402 of the ACA (inthe form of “cost sharing reductions,”
such as reduced deductibles, coinsurance
and copayments) because funds for such
reimbursements were never appropriated by
Congress. The court explained:
Paying out Section 1402
reimbursements without anappropriation thus violates theConstitution. Congress authorized
reduced cost sharing but did not
appropriate monies for it, in the FY
2014 budget or since. Congress is the
only source for such an appropriation,and no public money can be spent
without one.
The court rejected the argument that thefunds were available through a related ACA
provision that provides funds for subsidies
that reduce the cost of health insurance
premiums (Section 1401), noting that “[s]uch
an appropriation cannot be inferred, nomatter how programmatically aligned theSecretaries may view Sections 1401 and
1402.”
Although the court issued an injunction
enjoining the use of unappropriated monies
to fund reimbursements to health insurers
under Section 1402, the ruling will not take
immediate effect because the court issued astay of the injunction pending any appeal.

7Jurisdictional
Alerts:Second Circuit Rules That
Physicians and Medical
Associations Lack Standing To Sue
Health Insurers
The Second Circuit ruled that psychiatrists
and professional medical associations lacked
standing to bring claims against healthinsurers based on allegedly discriminatory
reimbursement practices. American
Psychiatric Assoc. v. Anthem HealthPlans, Inc., 2016 WL 2772853 (2d Cir. May
13, 2016).
Two psychiatrists and three professionalorganizations sued health insurancecompanies alleging that the insurers’
reimbursement practices discriminate against
patients with mental health and substanceabuse disorders in violation of ERISA and theMental Health Parity and Addition Equity Act(“MHPAEA”). The psychiatrists brought suit
on behalf of themselves and their patients,
while the associations sued on behalf of theirmembers and their members’ patients. A
Connecticut federal district court dismissed
the suit on several bases, including lack ofstanding. The Second Circuit affirmed.
The Second Circuit held that the psychiatrists
did not have a cause of action under ERISA
based on the health insurers’ alleged
MHPAEA violations. The court explainedthat ERISA unambiguously provides that civil
actions may be brought by a “participant,beneficiary or fiduciary.” Because thepsychiatrists did not fall within any of thesecategories, they did not have standing tosue. The court rejected the psychiatrists’assertion that they were entitled to “stand in
the shoes of their patients” for the purposesof bringing suit. The court acknowledgedthat policy reasons might support allowing
physicians to sue on behalf of patients withmental disorders, but concluded that it was
not authorized to apply its own judgment
to recognize a cause of action that Congresshas denied. The court also rejected thepsychiatrist’s standing argument based on theprinciple of assignment (i.e., that patients had
assigned their right to sue to the psychiatrist).
In order to confer an ERISA cause of action
upon a provider, an assignment must be madein exchange for consideration, in the form of

the provision of health care services. Becausesuch consideration did not exist here, there
was no valid assignment of the right to sue.
Finally, the court held that the associations
lacked constitutional standing because theirindividual members lacked standing.

U.S. Supreme Court Reverses Ninth
Circuit on Standing Issue, RulingThat Statutory Violation Does Not
Automatically Satisfy Injury-in-Fact
Requirement
The United States Supreme Court reverseda Ninth Circuit decision holding that anindividual plaintiff had standing to sue
Spokeo, a search engine company, under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. May
16, 2016).
The putative class action suit was based onincorrect personal information disseminatedby Spokeo on its website. A California federal
district court dismissed the complaint,
holding that the plaintiff had not properly
pleaded injury in fact as required by Article
III of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that the plaintiff had
adequately alleged injury in fact because healleged that Spokeo violated his statutory
rights (not just the rights of other people)
and because the plaintiff’s “personal interestsin the handling of his credit information are
personalized.” The Supreme Court vacatedthe decision.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Ninth’s
Circuit’s analysis was incomplete becausea plaintiff must allege injury that is both“concrete and personalized” in order toestablish injury in fact. The Ninth Circuit
focused only on particularity and did not
address concreteness. In remanding thematter to the Circuit court, the Court notedthat the term “concrete” is not necessarily
synonymous with “tangible,” and that
intangible injuries can, in some instances, be
concrete. However, the Court cautioned thata plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement simply by alleging
a violation of a statutory right.

8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

David J. Woll
+1-212-455-3136
dwoll@stblaw.com

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+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212455-2846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

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