Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula:
Accomplishments and Future Challenges
Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Council on Foreign Relat ions

The U.S.-South Korea alliance has flourished under Pre sidents Obama and Lee
Myung-bak. In fact, it is difficult to find words of crit icism for the alliance in either
Washington or Seoul in the run-up to new president ial elect ions and potent ial
transit ions in leadership at the end of 2012. Both leaders have strengthened policy
coordinat ion toward North Korea and embraced a Joint Vision for the Alliance inJune 2009 that has served to broaden alliance roles and funct ions beyond thepeninsula to an unprecedented degree. 1 In addit ion, they successfully secured
ratification of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). These twoagreements represent a deepening of U.S. -ROK interests and an expansion ofcooperation beyond extraordinarily close policy and securit y coordinat ion toward
North Korea, which has tradit ionally provided the main rat ionale for U.S.-ROK
securit y cooperation.
The U.S.-ROK alliance has proven to be an unexpected source of relat ive stabilit y
for Obama administrat ion policymakers during a turbulent phase in East Asian
relat ions and heightened tension in relat ions with North Korea . In comparison withgrowing concerns over Chinese assert iveness and a preoccupat ion with internaldifficult ies in the U.S.-Japan alliance that came into relief following an
unprecedented transit ion in power in Japan from the Liberal Democratic Part y (LDP )to the Democrat ic Part y of Japan (DPJ), the level of U.S. -ROK coordinat ion in
response to North Korean provocations has mainly been a good news story for the
Obama administrat ion. In contrast, the inabilit y of the United States and Japan toimplement previously agreed adjust ments to U.S. bases in Okinawa became aproccupat ion in the U.S.-Japan relat ionship that obscured the broader securit y vision

1

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the UnitedStates of America and the Repub lic of Korea,” June 16, 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint -vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-Statesof-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea.

1

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 2 But it remains to be seen how and whether South Korea
will be able to capitalize on its increased relat ive capacit y and standing inWashington to carve out a stronger regional role or whether renewed North Koreanchallenges might inhibit an expanded regional role for the U.S. -ROK alliance.
The next leader of South Korea and the win ner of the U.S. elect ion in November
2012 will inherit a stable relationship that holds much promise for further
development, but there are also some notable challenges that, if managed poorly,
could test recent advances in the U.S. -ROK relat ionship. Following a review of new
developments in the U.S.-ROK relationship at the peninsular, global, and regional
levels, this art icle will examine three major challenges that will test the durabilit yand direction of the U.S.-ROK securit y relationship: 1) the re-negot iat ion of a U.S.ROK bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, 2) the U.S. rebalancing policy and its
effect on U.S.-ROK relat ions, 3) U.S. policy toward Korean reunificat ion and its
ramifications for management of Sino -U.S. relat ions. Each of these issues involves
circumstances that involve apparent contradict ions or areas involving potential
conflict between the desired direction of U.S. policy on the part of ROK partners
and other funct ional/geographical object ives in U.S. policy.

Developments in the U.S.-ROK Alliance Under the Lee and Obama Administrations
The Lee and Obama administrations have cemented close relat ions based on an
unprecedented convergence of interests between the two countries and an expansionof South Korean capabilit ies and w illingness to work with the United States on
economic and off-peninsula non-traditional securit y issues. Interest ingly, these
forms of cooperat ion were init iated under Presidents Roh Moo -hyun and George W.
Bush despite the clear gap in world views between the two leaders, but a sharedvision for cooperat ion came to maturat ion under Obama and Lee Myung -bak. As aresult of South Korea’s economic growth and democratizat ion, it emerged as awilling and able potential partner of the United States on many issue s that extended
beyond the main task of the alliance to secure South Korea from potent ial North
Korean aggression. The June 2009 Joint Vision Statement between Obama and Lee
Myung-bak set the stage for a relat ionship bound by “trust,” “values,” and “peace .”It set the tone for an ambit ious agenda of expanded cooperation beyond North Korea
2

Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Mark E. Manyin, “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues forCongress,” Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2012.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf .

2

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

on many issues, including global and regional securit y cooperat ion and the
deepening of the U.S.-ROK trade and investment relat ionship through the KORUS
FTA.
1) North Korea: Consensus in Favor of Denuclearization, But With Litt le Meansto Pursue It
The Lee and Obama administrations both priorit ized North Korea’s denuclearizat ion
as the main challenge on the peninsula and moved in lockstep in response to earlyNorth Korean provocat ions, including an April 2009 failed mult i-stage rocket launch,a May 2009 nuclear test, and difficult issues involving individual Americans andSouth Koreans who had been detained in North Korea. The insistence of both Seoul
and Washington on the necessit y of North Korea accept ing an agenda for talks that
included denuclearizat ion as a main agenda item proved to be a major obstacle to theresumpt ion of Six Party negotiat ions despite the sporadic efforts of both Washington
and Seoul to pursue diplomatic dialogue with the North. 3 North Korea’s sinking of
the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March 2009 and its shelling of Yeonpyeong
Island the following November resulted in scores of military casualt ies and theYeonpyeong Island shelling took South Korean civilian lives for the first time since
the end of the Korean War. North Korea’s provocat ions and the need to closely
coordinate a joint response fueled dozens of high-level meet ings involving diplomats
from Washington and Seoul, as well as an expanded set of joint military exercises
designed to reinforce a message of deterrence against North Korean aggression.
Plans for U.S.-ROK military exercises drew crit ical responses in the summer of 2009not only from North Korea but also from China, whi le Japan also become involvedin exercises with South Korea and the United States, first as an observer and in June2012 as a direct participant. 4
North Korea’s mult i-stage rocket test in April 2009 defined the main themes of
Obama administrat ion polic y at an early stage. Following North Korea’s test,
President Obama declared that violat ions of internat ional law must be punished andpushed for a tough UN Securit y Council Resolut ion that authorized states tointerdict suspected North Korean shipments re lated to its nuclear and missile
3

Emma Chanlett-Avery, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal

Situation,” Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2012.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf
4Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chantlett -Avery, Mary Beth Nikitin, “U.S.-South Korea Relations,”

Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2012. pp. 12 -13
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/191602.pdf

3Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,programs. 5 Rather than rushing to dialogue with North Korea, the Obamaadministrat ion emphasized a regionally-coordinated response that sought to win
China’s cooperat ion. But China’s decision in the summer of 2009 to stre ngthen
relat ions with North Korea ran in the face of the Obama administrat ion’s sanct ions focused policy.
By the summer of 2011, the United States returned to several rounds of diplomat ic
dialogue that resulted in the parallel release of American and No rth Korean
diplomat ic statements on February 29, 2012. Despite Kim Jong Il’s death, theUnited States and North Korea pledged to exchange IAEA monitoring of its uranium
enrichment program for 240,000 tons of food assistance, but that agreement went
nowhere following North Korea’s March 16, 2012, announcement that it would
launch another mult i-stage rocket in defiance of UN Securit y Council resolut ions.
By the summer of 2012, the Obama administration had virtually exhausted opt ionsfor coercing North Korea or for dialogue with the new North Korean regime under
Kim Jong-un, his father’s designated successor, and North Korean rhetoric toward
South Korea had become increasingly strident. Both by design and by default, theUnited States and South Korea maintained close coordination while mulling overdwindling policy opt ions. Since China’s approach was at odds with that of theUnited States and South Korea, and North Korea cont inued its path of provocations,a consensus grew among policy specialists that regime change would be aprerequisite for progress, yet the risks associated with overt pursuit of regimechange carried high costs for near-term stabilit y. The vibrancy of U.S.-ROK policy
coordinat ion toward the North owed much to North Korea’s own provocat ive
behavior.
2) U.S.-ROK Alliance: An Expanded Scope for Non-Tradit ional Securit y
Cooperation
The June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement provided the basis for extending
cooperation beyond the Korean peninsula to meet r egional and global challenges.
The joint vision statement envisions an expanded role for the U.S. -ROK alliance incontribut ing to internat ional securit y in a wide range of areas, including post conflict stabilizat ion, development, non-proliferat ion, and counter-terrorism. These
new forms of cooperat ion are made possible both by an increase in South Koreancapabilit ies and a Korean willingness to step forward and make such capabilit ies
5White House Press Secretary, Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, April 5 ,2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks -By-President-Barack-Obama-InPrague-As-Delivered4

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

available as an internat ional public good for use within the internat ional communit y.
The statement ant icipates that South Korea should make contribut ions tointernat ional securit y commensurate with the ben efits it derives from a stable global
system. But the statement is also so ambit ious that it raises questions aboutpriorit izat ion and capabilit ies within the alliance if indeed it is stretched too thin. 6
South Korea has determined that it will contribute to international securit y as anational defense priority based on an assessment of its own interests and global
responsibilit ies in addition to its efforts t o ensure securit y on the Korean peninsula.
South Korea’s 2010 Defense White Paper identifies “contribut ing to regional stabilit yand world peace” as one of three national defense obje ctives, along with “defending
the nation from external military threats a nd invasion” and “upholding the principle ofpeaceful unification.” To support these activities, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has
established a three-thousand-person standing unit dedicated to overseas deplo yments,
passed legislation authorizing the deplo yment of up to one thousand ROK personnel toUnited Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO) prior to requiring an
authorization request from the ROK National Assembly, and established a PKO centerdedicated to the training of military personnel to be disp atched for overseas
assignments. 7 This is a significant new development that shows South Korea’s
willingness to contribute to international sec urit y for the long haul.
The U.S.-ROK alliance benefits from practical forms of cooperation andinteroperability that are being honed through practical experience of the sort thatcannot be replicated by scenario-based exercises alone. As both countries face theneed to more prudent ly allocate defense budgets, the experience of working together
may also produce opportunities to cooperate in ways that do not und uly limit loss of
specific capabilities. Moreover, as the United States moves to emphasize greaterinteraction and lateral networking of capabilities among its Asian bilateral alliances,
South Korea’s experience working in a mu ltinational environment will prove to be avaluable base of experience from which to operate.
South Korea’s enhanced capabilit y and willingness to contribute to the provision ofinternational security improves its value as a partner to the United States, which inturn adds value to the U.S.-ROK alliance and builds greater resiliency and stabilit yinto the international system. An enhanced South Korean role in international
6

Scott Snyder, ed., The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges , Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 2012.
7

Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper,

http://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_file/info/mndpaper/2010/2010WhitePaperAll_eng.pdf

5

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

security will provide residual benefits for the deve lopment of South Korean
experience and capabilities, particularly as one considers the possibilit y that
prolonged instabilit y in North Korea would likely require some of the skills that arenecessary to participate as members of international stabilization or peaceke eping
operations in other countries. For this reason, South Korea’s exposure to many typesof fragile or failed-state situations and direct involvement in postconflict stabilization
operations may prove to be invaluable practical experience that can be a pplied to the
management of potential future instability in North Korea.
South Korea’s willingness to contribute to global security is in line with its
international development commitment to triple its development assistancecontributions from 2010 levels by 2015. 8 This commitment comes during a period of
fiscal austerit y in the developed world that is squeezing the development budgets ofmany advanced countries. South Korea can offer advanced technical and humanresource skills on development and governance related issues based on its direct
experience as a former recipient of international aid, and is well positioned tocooperate with the United States on joint projects that can en hance development
effectiveness of both countries. Cooperation in international development provides
yet another avenue through which the United States and South Korea are able tocooperate on the basis of shared values to provide global public goods.
The expansion of the U.S.-ROK relationship at the global level is based on South
Korea’s expanded capabilities and expands the scope of U.S. -ROK cooperation at apractical level toward common objectives. Cooperation in these new areas makes therelat ionship more resilient and relevant in addressing an expanded agenda of common
interests that extend beyond the peninsula. However, a notable omission from U.S. ROK security cooperation thus far is related to opportunit ies for cooperation within
the Asia-Pacific region. South Korea participates in the U.S. administered Rim of
the Pacific Exercises, but given shared interests in Asian stabilit y, the United Statesand South Korea should explore opportunit ies to expand collaboration in ways thatreinforce Asian regional stability and prosperity.
3) KORUS FTA Passage: Catalyst for the U.S. to Jump Start its Asian Trade
PolicyThe third leg of U.S.-ROK collaborat ion as it has developed under the Lee andObama administrat ion related to the rat ification of the KORUS FTA. Rat ificat ion
8

Na Jeong-ju, “Korea to Triple Development Aid by 2015,” Korea Times. November 26, 2009.

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2010/06/242_56183.html

6Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,of the FTA faced an extended period of delay following its negotiat ion in 2007
under the Bush and Roh administrat ions. Init ially, the hesitat ion lay wit h President
Roh, who seemed reluctant to pursue rat ificat ion of his own administration’s
agreement with the Korean Nat ional Assembly in the closing days of h is term.
Then, the United States entered a polit ical season during the United States 2008
president ial campaign, during which time the prospects for the U.S. Congress toconsider the agreement diminished. The global financial crisis and U.S. recession
further delayed considerat ion of KORUS, both because the main priorit y became
restorat ion of the U.S. economy and because a newly-elected President Obama had
an extensive agenda of items to address with Congress that were priorit ized more
highly than the KORUS FTA. 9 To his credit, President Lee was pat ient, persistent,
and flexible with his American counterparts. Lee lobbied for President Obama topush rat ificat ion of the KORUS FTA when President Obama visited in Seoul in
November 2009, but at that time President Obama worked with Congress to pass
healt h care reform and was not ready for KORUS FTA.
Moreover, the Obama administrat ion came to the conclusion that it wanted torevise some parts of the agreement and sought a further negot iat ion session tosett le outstanding issues that were likely to be a source of Congressional object ion.
That negotiat ion occurred following President Obama’s part icipat ion i n the Seoul
G-20 in November 2010, and finally resulted in a revised agreement that the Obamaadministrat ion was prepared to send to Congress. Once again, KORUS wassuperseded as a priorit y by negotiat ions between the administrat ion and Congresson the need to raise the U.S. debt ceiling in the summer of 2011. Finally, Lee
Myung-bak’s state visit in October 2011 served as an action-forcing event that
finally led to Congressional ratificiation of KORUS FTA, along with FTAs with
Columbia and Panama. President Lee’s pat ience and persistence in encouraging
President Obama to move on KORUS FTA finally paid off, but it occurred so latein the 18 th Nat ional Assembly that ratification became a heated polit ical issue in
the Nat ional Assembly only six months prior to new elect ions. 10 But the GrandNat ional Part y, with its majorit y, finally pursued unilateral ratificat ion of KORUS
at the Nat ional Assembly in October 2011 and the agreement went into effect thefollowing March.

9

Scott Snyder, “KORUS-FTA and the Need for a U.S. Trade and Investment Policy,” Council on

Foreign Relations, September 21, 2011. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/09/21/korus -fta-and-theneed-for-a-u-s-trade-and-investment-policy/
10“ The FTA Vote (and Fight) Stall for Now,” Wall Street Journal Asia, November 3, 2011.

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2011/11/03/the -fta-vote-and-fight-arrives/

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Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

The passage of KORUS FTA is significant because it greatly expands openness andreciprocit y for Korea and the United States in each others’ mark ets and strengthens
economic interdependence. KORUS also carries with it strategic significance inthat the rat ificat ion of KORUS has given life to the Obama administrat ion’s efforts
to negot iate the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with eight other countries. But inlight of the failure to ratify previously negotiated FTAs, it was hard forcounterparts from other countries to believe that TPP was a serious priorit y for theUnited States. Rat ificat ion of KORUS has breathed new life into the TPP
negotiat ions, which are now drawing interest from Canada, Mexico, and Japan as
countries with an interest in joining TPP. The KORUS FTA has revived U.S. trade
policy and has allowed the United States to push forward a vision for a high standard agreement in Asia that might even lead the way toward renewed global
trade liberalizat ion. 11

Three Major Challenges Facing the U.S.-ROK Alliance
The development of three solid pillars of U.S. -ROK alliance cooperat ion under
Presidents Obama and Lee described above has broadened the scope and resiliencyof U.S.-ROK alliance cooperat ion to the point where President Obama referred to
the U.S.-ROK alliance as a “lynchpin” of U.S. policy for the Pacific. 12 But despite
these developments, the U.S. -ROK alliance remains constrained in several respects.
First, it is not clear whether the Joint Vision for the alliance established by Lee andObama will be sustained under new presidential leadership on either side. Much
will depend on personal chemistry of the South Korean and America n leaders andtheir renewed commit ment to strengthening the U.S. -ROK relat ionship. But evenmore important ly, new leaders in South Korea and the United States will have toreaffirm their respect ive approaches to North Korea, to internat ional securit ycooperation off-peninsula, and further cooperation on promotion of tradeliberalizat ion as the basis for further deepening of cooperat ion in these areas.
There is also another set of tests the alliance will face on three addit ional issues
where U.S. policies toward South Korea are bumping up against other U.S. global
11

Stewart Patrick, “A Revived Trade Agenda?” The Internationalist, October 14, 2011.

http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/10/14/a -revived-trade-agenda/
12

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President

Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic of Korea After Bilateral Meeting,” June 26, 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-leemyung-bak-republic-korea-after-bilateral-8Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

and regional policies in ways that may limit potent ial for U.S.-Korea cooperat ion.
In each of these policy areas, the scope for future cooperat ion will depend at leastin part on whether the United States chooses to treat South Korea as an except ion
to some other facet of its Asian and global policies or whether U.S. -South Korea
policies continue to be pursued within the traditional bounds and constraints of U.S.
policies in these other areas. In other words, U.S. willingness to make except ionsfor South Korea as it pursues other regional and global policies will signal the levelof relat ive priorit y that the United States places on South Korea versus other U.S.
policy priorit ies, and these decisions will have a direct impact on the closeness of
the relationship. By the same token, the level of South Korean willingness to live
within the constraints placed on its own pursuit of policy choices as a result of its
alliance with the United States might also be interpreted as an illustrat ion of thelevel of value that South Korea places on cont inued alliance cooperat ion with theUnited States.
1) U.S.-ROK Bilateral Nuclear Cooperat ion Agreement
The United States and South Korea are current ly in the mid dle of negotiat ions torenew their bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. The previous agreement,
negotiated in 1974, will expire in 2014. During the period of the agreement, South
Korea has made tremendous strides in developing its own nuclear energy sector,
having gradually mastered almost all of the crit ical construct ion technologies andprocesses required to build a nuclear reactor . Since West inghouse supplied South
Korea’s first nuclear power unit Kori 1, which began operat ions in 1978, South
Korea has built seven units in cooperat ion wit h non-Korean firms, and four since1999 almost ent irely by Korean companies. Wit h its 2009 agreement to build a
Korean-version of the AP-1400 reactor in the UAE, South Korea entered theinternat ional nuclear energy supply market. 13
South Korea’s impressive advancements in its nuclear energy product ion
capabilit ies has enabled it to meet its energy demands indigenously and to reduce
its energy dependence. As a new nuclear exporter, South Korea is poised to
combine its longstanding internat ional construct ion experience with its experiencein developing its own domest ic nuclear energy industry to become a major exporterof nuclear power generat ion capacit y, including to the United States. However,South Korea’s development of its own nuclear capacit y faces a universally shared
13Mark Holt, “U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy Market: Major

Policy Considerations,” Congressional Research Service, January 21, 2010.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41032.pdf

9

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

constraint related to the quest ion of how to dispose of radioact ive waste materials
after they have been used to generate nuclear energy. In the case of South Korea,
the current space for sto rage of such materials will all be used by 2016, so there isan urgent need to address this issue.
South Korean scient ists have promoted a form of reprocessing known aspyroprocessing that uses electroreduct ion as the primary means by which to refineand separate the plutonium from the most toxic and radioact ive waste products
from nuclear energy. Those scient ists have been pushing for South Korea to pursue
pyroprocessing as the primary means by which to address the waste problem while
preserving the ‘clean’ plutonium for possible re-use in fast breeder nuclear reactor sthat might be constructed in the future . However, crit ics of this type of reactor saythat it ultimately produces even more waste while also const itut ing a significant
proliferat ion risk since additional treat ment of the plutonium by-product might
result in weapons-grade plutonium that could be used as fuel in a nuclear bomb.
In negotiat ions with the United States over its new bilateral nuclear cooperat ion
agreement, South Korea has requested that the United States provide advanced
consent for South Korea to alter U.S. provided nuclear material in form or content
through reprocessing (pyroprocessing) and/or enrichment of nuclear fuel. Both ofthese processes are relevant to the compet it iveness of South Korea’s nuclear energy
export efforts since other exporters have retained rights to pursue reprocessing andenrichment of nuclear fuel, but the United States on non -proliferat ion grounds has
resisted South Korean requests to gain these rights. As long as South Korea does
not gain these rights, there is a theoret ical and pract ical limit on South Korea’s
abilit y to address its own waste problems, develop new t ypes of nuclear technology
including fast breeder reactors, and to supply nuclear fu el to potential customers aspart of supply contracts with other countries. South Korea argues that other allies,
such as Japan, and strategic partners, such as India, have already been granted suchrights, so a failure to grant South Korea advanced conse nt to engage in enrichment
and reprocessing is a form of discrimination that direct ly limits South Korea’s
efforts to develop its own industry. But to grant such rights is to add one morecountry, no matter how responsible, to the list of potent ial source s of fuel that
could be used to build a nuclear weapon.
The United States and South Korea began negotiat ions on this issue in 2010 , buthave reportedly reached an impasse on the negot iat ions, which are unlikely toresume unt il after two new administrat ions take office in early 2013. This timing
will leave only a short period of negot iations before the agreement will need to be
ratified and submitted for Congressional consideration, as is the case for all U.S.
10

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

bilateral nuclear cooperat ion agreements. A n addit ional potent ial hurdle may bethat the U.S. Congress is trying to strengthen standards for bilateral nuclear
cooperation agreements so as to further restrict U.S. willingness to offer
reprocessing or enrichment privileges to U.S. partners. But this effort faces serious
challenges as the United States itself is playing a smaller role in nuclear power
generation than in the past, with challengers such as China and India developing
plants outside the influence of U.S. standards. These countries are lik ely to emerge
as even less proliferation-conscious sources of supply for nuclear energy producing
reactors that will direct ly compete with South Korean products in the nuclear plant
export market. So South Korea’s commercial interest s and lack of long-term highlevel waste storage have emerged as major issues in the negotiat ions. Both sides
have too much to lose to allow the agreement governing their cooperation to lapse.
Nonetheless, there is current ly not an easy way to solve this issue, which, if
polit icized, could become a source of major conflict between Washington andSeoul. Much will depend on whether the United States is willing to makeadjust ments in its nonproliferat ion policies to accommodate Korean interests, orwhether U.S. nonproliferation interests ultimately serve as constraints that will
limit the development of South Korea’s nuclear program.

2) U.S. Rebalancing Policy Toward Asia
The U.S. rebalance toward Asia is a second area where U.S. regional strategy andpolicies toward Asia may inf luence the direction and forms of cooperat ion within
the U.S.-ROK alliance. Aspects of this policy may be either a source ofopportunit y or constraint on the development of the U.S. -ROK alliance. On the one
hand, South Koreans have largely welcomed renew ed U.S. attent ion to Asia
signified by the Obama administration’s rebalancing strategy to the extent that U.S.
priorit izat ion of Asia in general terms supports stabilit y and prosperit y in theregion. On the other hand, there are issues that could be a sou rce of conflict ordivision between the United States and South Korea as the Obama administrat ion’s
rebalancing strategy unfolds.
The first area of potent ial contradict ion is related to the U.S. emphasis on a broader
geographic distribution of its forces, which might hypothet ically draw U.S.
attention and resources in the direct ion of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean at
the expense of South Korea. This trend could create problems for South Korea inat least three aspects. First, the United States and South Korea will be negot iatinga new host nat ion support package with South Korea in 2013. It is possible thatthese negotiat ions could be even more difficult than usual, given both the11

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,broadening of U.S. scope of operations and policy focus to a regiona lly-distributed
force that covers the whole of the Asia -Pacific rather than a more geographicallylimited priorit ization of Northeast Asia. South Korean defense specialists may
already be worried about U.S. efforts to extract greater financial support fro mSouth Korea for costs related to the U.S. presence there.
Second, a broader U.S. strategy that encourages horizontal cooperation among
alliance partners of the United States has run into some init ial roadblocks overSouth Korean reluctance to establis h an agreement for sharing of intelligence
informat ion with Japan, a country that would be called on to support U.S. -ROK
military operations in the event of a conflict with North Korea. U.S. interests instrengthening the combined defense posture toward No rth Korea include promoting
high levels of cooperat ion with South Korea, but also with Japan on many rear -area
support issues. More effective Japanese involvement in informat ion sharing andlogistical support for the United States and South Korea in the e vent ofemergencies would be facilitated to the extent that South Korea and Japan are able
to cooperate with each other. The U.S. need for and support of stronger ROK Japan cooperat ion through its respect ive alliances with Seoul and Tokyo have been
made clear through U.S. efforts to promote greater trilateral coordinat ion,including marit ime exercises among the three countries on humanitarian anddisaster relief-related act ivit ies. The United States has also supported Korean
involvement in U.S. and Japane se joint research and implementat ion of advanced
missile-defense technologies.
In addit ion to U.S. pressure on South Korea to strengthen horizontal relationships
with Japan, the United States may also seek to work together with South Korea toenhance South Korea’s role in providing securit y in the region based on South
Korea’s increasing capabilit ies. Thus far, U.S. -ROK off-peninsula cooperation has
primarily supported global stabilit y and has occurred outside the Asia -Pacificregion. But there may also be possibilit ies for the United States and South Korea
to enhance non-tradit ional and functional roles, for instance in marit ime securit ycooperation, within East Asia as well.
Third, the U.S. trade strategy reflected in the Obama administrat ion’s rebala ncing
strategy was given a big boost by the rat ificat ion of the KORUS FTA, allowing theUnited States to pursue the Trans-Pacific Partnership credibly as a next -generat ion,high-standards trade negot iat ion for the Asia -Pacific. Despite strong crit icisms o f
KORUS by leading opposit ion polit icians, KORUS was init ially intended in part asa way of countering or slowing down Korean dependence on China. Now, South
Korea is negotiat ing an FTA with China as well as a regional FTA with China and12

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

Japan, but South Korea has not yet joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In thisrespect, South Korea may continue to have a pivotal role in determining the future
direct ion and level of regional trade liberalizat ion. How South Korea approaches
TPP and its respect ive FTAs in Northeast Asia will have a direct influence on theeconomic aspects of the U.S. rebalancing strategy. South Korea’s part icipat ion
could provide much-needed momentum toward broader TPP part icipation in East
Asia, potentially catalyzing greater interest in an inclusive high-standards
mult ilateral trading arrangement including Southeast Asia and China.
3) U.S. Policy Toward Korean Reunificat ion
A third area where U.S. policies toward the Korean peninsula might come into
conflict with other U.S. policies in the region is related to the quest ion of Korean
reunification. The United States and South Korea have stated a clear vision for
Korean reunificat ion on a democrat ic and market economic basis in the June 2009
U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement. This was the first t ime that the United States had
officially made such a clear statement in support of the object ive of Korean
reunification. But China’s primary interest on the Korean peninsula has been to
support stabilit y by shoring up a comprehensive relat ionship with North Korea,
presumably in ways that direct ly conflict with the U.S. -ROK object ive of Korean
reunification.
To the extent that China sees the Korean peninsula in geo -strategic terms as an
object of rivalry wit h the United States, China’s object ive of promot ing stabilit y on
the Korean peninsula ult imately comes into conflict with the U.S. -South Korean
shared object ive of achieving Korean reunificat ion. At the same t ime, broader
regional stabilit y in the Asia-Pacific is increasingly dependent on Sino-U.S.
cooperation to preserve stabilit y and prevent instabilit y in the region. How theUnited States manages this potent ial contradict ion is directly relevant to Japan’s
securit y and the U.S.-Japan alliance: Japan’s securit y is directly related to thesituat ion on the Korean peninsula, but Japan also has a strong interest in a regional
securit y environment that is not characterized by Sino -U.S. confrontat ion.
Alt hough conflict between U.S. policies toward South Korea and China is notinevitable, how the U nited States priorit izes the object ive of Korean reunificat ion in
its respect ive policies toward South Korea and China will influence the scope,
aspirations, and nature of U.S. -ROK cooperat ion within the alliance. While theUnited States must avoid an approach to Korean reunificat ion that unnecessarily
provokes conflict with China, the scope of U.S.-ROK alliance cooperation should
not neglect the fact that both sides have identified unificat ion essent ially on South13

Scott A. Snyder, “ U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future
Challenges,” Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,

Korean terms as a main object ive of the alliance. South Korean policymakers realizethat Korean reunificat ion is unlikely to be attained without regional cooperation,
including with China. But they also realize that South Korea will have litt leleverage to influence China’s stance toward Korean reunificat ion outside the context
of strong policy coordination with the United States.

Conclusion
The U.S.-ROK alliance has grown to encompass significant new scope forcooperation, extending both to economic cooperat ion and to off -peninsula securit ycooperation. These new pillars of alliance cooperat ion do not replace North Korea
as the primary focus for the alliance, but they do great ly expand the scope andrelevance of the alliance to many internat ional securit y issues that had previously
not been relevant to the alliance, thereby expanding the importance and relevanceof Korea to the United States and of the U.S.-ROK alliance to global concerns.
These developments have heightened the relevance of South Korea as a contributor
to global issues and has expanded the ways in which Korea is relevant as a leader
in the internat ional communit y.
However, the cont inued growth of the U.S.-ROK alliance is also bumping up
against other long-standing U.S. policy priorit ies on specific global and regional
issues, including U.S. nonproliferat ion policy, U.S. rebalancing policy toward Asia,and the relat ive priority of stabilit y versus unificat ion as an object ive on the
Korean peninsula, which is of direct relevance to the future of the Sino -U.S.
relat ionship and to broader quest ions of regional stabilit y in East Asia. How theseissues are worked out will be determined largely by new leaderships in South
Korea and the United States who will take office in 2013. The success or failure of
their efforts will determine whether 2012 marks the peak of the U.S.-ROK securit yalliance or is only another step in its cont inued growth and development.

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