Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series 251

Research Unit for Statisticaland Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (Hi-Stat)

The Restoration of the Gold Standard after
the US Civil War: A Volatility Analysis

Hi-Stat Discussion Paper

Max Meulemann
Martin Uebele
Bernd Wilfling

November 2012

Hi-Stat
Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitatchi Tokyo, 186-8601 Japan
http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp

The Restoration of the Gold Standard after the US
Civil War: A Volatility Analysis

Max Meulemanna , Martin Uebeleb* , Bernd Wilflingc
a Department of Economics, ETH Zürich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, CH-8092 Zürichb Department of Economics, University of Münster, Domplatz 20-22, D-48143 Münsterc Department of Economics, University of Münster, Am Stadtgraben 9, D-48143 Münster*Corresponding author: Domplatz 20-22, Fürstenberghaus, R. 22, D-48143 Münster, Germany.
Tel.: +49(0)251 832 54 52, Fax: +49(0)251 832 43 57, martin.uebele@wiwi.uni-muenster.de

Abstract
Using a Markov-switching GARCH model this paper analyzes the volatility
evolution of the greenback’s price in gold from after the Civil War until the return
to gold convertibility in 1879. The econometric inference associated with our
methodology indicates a switch to a regime of low volatility roughly seven months
before the actual resumption. Since this empirical finding is most likely to bereconciled with a change in market expectations, we conclude that expectations
affected the exchange rate more than fundamentals. Our analysis

alsodemonstrates that regime switches in the volatility of exchange rates may reflect
historical events that remain undiscovered otherwise.
Keywords:

US monetary history, 19th century, greenback, Markov-switching

GARCH models
JEL-Codes: N11, E42, E52, C32

2I

The Civil War was not only a decisive moment in American history but also a
fundamental turning point in financial development. The return to the gold standard
constituted an important signal to financial markets worldwide since this monetary
regime was appreciated by almost all major countries until World War I and
ultimately let the US dollar inherit the role of the leading world currency from the
British pound. However, within the U.S. bullionists and inflationists fought afierce political battle over the expected distributional consequences of either
monetary regime.
In this paper we study the period between the end of the American Civil War
and the return to gold in 1879 and contribute to the theoretical debate on the factorsthat may drive exchange rates. In the literature covering this debate two opposing
opinions predominate. On the one hand, monetarists like Friedman and Schwartz(1963) argue that exogenous macroeconomic fundamentals like money supplies,
price inflation and price parities cause the high premiums on gold. This view is
supported, inter alia, by Kindahl (1961), and Officer (1981). On the other hand,
Calomiris (1992; 1988; 1985) strongly opposes this view by stating that
expectations are more important to the greenback exchange rate than the classicalfundamentals (like money supplies). Consequently, Calomiris supports the researchpursued, among others, by Mitchell (1903) and Willard et al. (1996) who attempt
to incorporate news and significant events in their study of the greenback markets.
However, besides these opposing views other authors (e.g. Smith and Smith, 1997)
argue that both expectations and macroeconomic fundamentals did play a role in theevolution of the greenback exchange rate.

3

In this paper we make contributions to both the financial history of the U.S.
and to the debate on the factors that drive exchange rates. To this end we
implement a so-called Markov-switching GARCH model that has recently
emerged in the macrofinance literature (see for example Wilfling, 2009) andwhich enables us to analyze time-varying conditional variances of daily greenbackgold exchange rates.
More explicitly our methodology helps us to identify distinct phases (regimes)of high and low exchange-rate volatility. Since such distinct exchange- rate volatility
regimes can easily be reconciled with market participants’ expectations on futurechanges in the exchange rate (rather than with changes in fundamentals), weinterpret our results as empirical evidence that agents had anticipated theexchange-rate fixing associated with the return to the gold standard beforehand.
In particular, our econometric analysis detects a regime switch from high to low
exchange-rate volatility several months before the actual resumption thus
supporting Calomiris’ view that expectations may have mattered more thanmacroeconomic fundamentals. Our econometric technique also provides a newmeans of gauging the Civil War and the postbellum period. Initially, from afinancial investor’s perspective, our results reflect the considerable politicaluncertainty that characterized the postbellum years. However, the switch to a low
volatility regime long before the actual resumption date demonstrates that policy
makers were surprisingly able to commit to their announced resumption plan.
This paper contains 6 sections. In Section I I we briefly review the historicalbackground for which we rely on some of the established historical literature(e.g. Mitchell, 1903; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Unger, 1964). Section III

4presents our data set. In Section IV we specify our econometric model in theform of a two-regime Markov-switching GARCH model. Section V presents theestimation results while Section VI offers some concluding remarks.

II

Before the Civil War the U.S. money supply consisted of gold and silver coins,copper pennies and notes issued by state or private banks. All non- specie money
could principally be converted into gold. There was no paper money issued by thegovernment. However, the U.S. was practically on a gold standard since the relative
price of gold to silver was higher than the world- market price so that not many
silver coins were in circulation. Unlike today, there was no strong banking andcurrency system and no Federal Banking System in the U.S. More than 1,600 statebanks existed all over the country and more than 7,000 different kinds of bank notes
were in circulation the half of which carried no real worth.
At the beginning of the Civil War the Unionist government encountereddifficulties in selling sufficient bonds to finance its war efforts, which lead to thesuspension of specie payment by private banks and the government on December
30, 1861. This was partly due to the increased war expenditures and the low
confidence in public securities and to some extent to the lack of confidence inthe government and the prospects of the war. These were gravely tampered by thedanger of a war with the United Kingdom because of the Trent affair (an incident
in which two Confederate envoys were captured from the British Mail steamer
Trent). The government reacted by issuing an inconvertible currency which became
rapidly known as the ‘green- back’ to cover war expenditures. Three Legal Tender5

Acts in February 1862, July 1862, and in January 1863 put around $450 million
greenbacks into circulation.
However, since transactions with foreigners and the payment of customs duties
and tariffs required gold, greenbacks did not constitute a perfect substitute for gold
dollars. Consequently, a market emerged soon after the green- back issuance and thegreenbacks depreciated from par, the main reasons for the depreciation being theincreased demand induced by the government’s war spending, the expansionist
fiscal policy, negative trade balances and also war news. Bad news induced
hoarding in an expectation of a higher gold price while good news prompted
peopletosell gold inanticipationofdeclining prices. Nevertheless,contemporaries believed this to be a temporary measure and the parity to berestored

after the war, although nothing had been specifically declared.

Meanwhile, greenbacks served as legal tender in most parts of the country where
prices were quoted in greenbacks and gold was valued at its current premium
market price. Only at the West Coast prices were quoted in gold and discounted togreenback prices at the current market value.
The time after the Civil War saw a huge decline in commodity prices which
may be ascribed to the contraction efforts undertaken by the Secretary of theTreasury, Hugh McCulloch. These efforts were affirmed by the Congress in
December 1865, but later restricted by the Congress in April 1866 and finallycompletely ceased in 1868. In addition, ‘natural growth’ reduced price levels as
the money stock was held fairly stable.
Three legal decisions in 1868 reduced the role of greenbacks in business
transactions. (1) In Lane Country vs. Oregon it was ruled that state taxes could

6

only be paid in specie, but not in legal tender notes. (2) In Bronson vs. Rhodes
the Supreme Court decided that contracts demanding payment only in specie werelegal. (3) In Bank of New York vs. Board of Supervisors the state was denied tolevy property taxes on state notes which meant that the court did not consider
them as money. The decision about the legal status of greenbacks was engaged by
the Supreme Court in 1869. Initially it was ruled under Chief Justice Chase (whohimself at that time had issued the Legal Tender Acts) that greenbacks had no legal
tender status for contracts before the Legal Tender Acts. Owing to the accession of
two new members to the court, this decision was reversed in 1871 when it was
ruled that the government had the right to issue legal tender notes. However, theissue was not settled before 1884 when it was ruled that the government was
eligible to do so also in times of peace. The government’s commitment to debt
payment in coin was shown when President Grant came to power and the goldpayment bill was enacted – which obliged the government to pay its debt in specie.
In the fall of 1873, the railroad boom suddenly came to an end and thesubsequent banking panic marked the beginning of a crisis in most parts of thecountry.

For the rest of the decade the currency problem and the conduct offinancial policy became the issues of major public and political concern. President
Grant was cautious in following either expansionary or contractionary monetarystances, an attitude that deeply confused the public opinion. Mixon (2006), forexample, reports that the business community characterized the situation as‘frustrating, uncertain, and unclear, and the finger of blame is clearly pointed at the
government.’
After a period of controversial debate the Inflation Bill finally emerged in

71874. The bill was to provide for additional national bank note circulation and toreturn to the $400 million of greenbacks which had circulated before thecontraction measures in the 1860s. It was intended to resume specie payment on
January 1, 1876. Although a rather modest measure, it represented a retreat from theresumption policy and therefore conservatives appealed to Grant to veto the law.
On April 22 Grant gave his veto to the bill which for the public opinion came like a‘bombshell.’ In the aftermath, the Republican Party fell into a state of great disunityand for the first time since 1861 the Party lost the majority in Congress.
Therefore, the Republicans were eager to restore their unity and enacted theResumption Act during the lame-duck session after the congressional elections in
1874. Fearing another presidential veto and the upcoming presidential elections,
the Republican Senatorial caucus tried to realign inflationists and conservatives on
a compromise that both sides could accept. In the wake of this free banking wasintroduced as a major concession to the soft money faction and inflationists since itallowed controlled inflation and a promotion of the national banking system. In
addition to this, $80 of greenbacks were to be redeemed in exchange for each$100 bank note until only $300 million were supposed to be left. Resumption was
proposed for January 1, 1879. Compared to the vetoed Inflation Bill the proposal
itself did not constitute a real innovation, but the resumption was put exactly three
years later on January 1, 1879 and many observers did not assess this decision as
final.
Although the Presidential Election in 1876 loomed dark over the country andthe Republican Party, it was finally decided by aspects like railroad issues andpatronage. After Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican candidate, had won by a

8margin of one electoral vote the White House was commanded by a Republican, theHouse of Representatives by the Democrats, while the Senate was in a stalemate.
Hayes, a well-known sound-money representative, appointed John Sherman as
Secretary of the Treasury. Sherman, from then on in charge of the accomplishmentof resumption, believed that he needed at least an amount of gold large enough tobe able to redeem 40 per cent of the outstanding greenbacks. This appeared to bea difficult task since at the same time Germany and France were in dire need ofgold themselves. He proved to be up to the task by offering bonds with higher
interest rates to foreigners and prevented a critical drain on the money market byincreasing deposits in national banks. An attempt to repeal the Resumption Act
passed the Congress, but was declined in the Senate by one vote. The Bland Allison
Acts of 1877 and 1878 and the Coinage Act in May 1878 constituted the final
attempts to avert resumption, but did not endanger the resumption policy orchange the legal commitment to resume specie payment on January 1, 1879. The
crop failures in Europe injected large amounts of gold into the U.S. and activatedthe U.S. trade balance from 1876 onwards. Sherman secured this inflow of goldby selling gold bonds and by November 1878 he had built up a gold reserve ofaround $141.9 million. The premium on gold fell constantly and on December 17,
1878 par had been reached for the first time since 1862. In the days after
resumption only a few notes were redeemed and in fact more gold was exchanged
for paper money. Although this might be considered as a victory of the hard money
faction the issue had definitely not been settled yet. More than $346 million
wartime greenbacks and an annually increasing amount of silver certificates stillthreatened the gold standard. The reserve of around $100 million gold dollars

9

could only maintain the gold standard as long as the country remained prosperous
and the important task of the subsequent government was to secure the gold
standard. However, Calomiris (1992) demonstrates that fear about inflation
remained by reporting expected inflation rates to be higher than real inflation rates.
In a similar vein, Studenski and Krooss (2003) perceives the risk that silver could
be used to pay government obligations and that gold could be drawn from theTreasury reserves and exported.

III

For about two weeks after the suspension of the gold standard there was no
official market for gold in New York. People willing to buy or sell gold needed toappeal to foreign coin dealers until this business became too voluminous to be
conducted in such an unorganized way. The first organized gold trading started at
the New York Stock Exchange on January 13, 1862. A competing trading place
was established in a ‘dingy cellar’ in William Street dubbed the ‘coal hole’ (seeMitchell, 1903). As the business became larger the market moved first into the
Gilpin’s News Room, later into the old stock board at No. 24 Beaver Street, andfinally into New Street next to the Stock Exchange. The traders in this market
started referring to it as the ‘Gold Room’ and were content with the loose
organization. It was not before October 1864 that a constitution and by-laws wereadopted and regular officers elected. It is noteworthy that trading gold for otherthan commercial reasons at the New York Stock Exchange was consideredunpatriotic or a bet against the Union’s victory. This appeared in contrast to theGold Room where speculations were not shunned at (see Nugent, 1968).

10

The transaction volumes in these and in two other markets were reported to belarge. Importers and exporters had to change paper currency and gold to buy andsell goods, but also tried to protect themselves against fluctuations of thecurrency’s value while awaiting the execution of their contracts. In fact, Mitchell(1903, pp. 182-185) believed that the volume of speculation exceeded normaltransactions by far. However, speculators were not cherished by everyone asclarified by Willard et al. (1996) quoting Abraham Lincoln’s dictum on gold
market traders: ‘I wish every one of them had his devilish head shot off!’
Since the prices from the New York gold markets were telegraphed to allother important U.S. cities and regarded as authoritative, we neglect prices fromother cities. First sources of our data are financial columns of daily papers likethe Hunt’s Merchant Magazine, the Bankers’ Magazine or the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle.

Typically, these sources report daily highest, lowest, andclosing prices. There are similar tables from the Chamber of Commerce of theState New York as well as yearly published almanacs by other newspapers.
However, the main source were the detailed reports by J.C. Mersereau, Register of
the Gold Exchange, who published an annual book called ‘American Gold, 1862(date of issue)’. This book gave the quotations from 10 a.m. until 3 p.m. for every
quarter of an hour.
All sources combined did not deviate by much and Mitchell (1908) checked
them for typos. He collated the data based on Mersereau’s latest issue from 1878
with the tables from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle from which he took
the data for the last year 1878. Finally, the first two weeks were taken from New
York’s daily papers so that the complete data set contains 5,170 daily

11

observations of the greenback/gold dollar exchange rate for the whole period from1862 until 1879. The exchange rates are given in indirect quotation meaning that$100 greenback were exchanged for a given sum of gold dollars. For example, onJanuary 2, 1863 $100 greenback were exchanged on average for $74.77 in gold.
Mitchell (1908) compiled all his data in the book ‘Gold, prices, and wages under
the greenback standard’.1

Figure 1 displays the golddollar/greenback exchange rate between 1862 and
1879. In mid-1864 the exchange rate dropped to only 37% of its face value andsteadily recovered afterwards. The first vertical marking represents the end of the
Civil War around April 9, 1865 while the second marking shows the enactment of
the Resumption Act on January 14, 1875.2

Figure 2 about here

Figure 2 displays the evolution of the golddollar/greenback exchange rate during
the years 1874 to 1879. The reason for considering this shortened time interval isthat we aim at locating the switch to a regime of low volatility around theannouncement date January 14, 1875. Shortly after Grant’s Veto the greenback’s
value appreciated, but then again fell steadily for several months (see the firstvertical marking). Overall, this period was characterized by high uncertainty about
the upcoming financial policy and possibly financial market participants were12

initially relieved that the Resumption Act was considered to be an inflationist
measure in the short run. The second vertical line marks the day of theResumption Act on which the greenback price fell. The price went on falling andremained low for more than six months before it suddenly peaked in September
1875. The exchange-rate dynamics directly following the Resumption Act may beinterpreted as evidence that in the beginning the resumption did not affectfinancial markets substantially.
The third vertical marking represents Hayes’s victory of the presidential
elections. From then on the exchange rate appears to be trending upwards.
Although Unger (1964) reports that the financial question had not been of major
public concern during the elections, we interpret this exchange-rate dynamics asevidence that Hayes’ hard money reputation actually affected the time series.
In spite of their political relevance the last three events represented byvertical markings did not affect exchange-rate dynamics considerably. The failureof repeal in 1877 had the potential to be the decisive hit against sound money
opposition and it appears that the appreciation was only delayed by this decisionin favor of the resumption. The steps taken later in 1878 had no substantial effecton the legal commitment of resumption so that the greenback steadily continued totrend upwards towards par.

Figure 3 about here

Figure 3 displays the daily exchange-rate returns defined as 100 · [ln(xt ) −ln(xt−1 )] for the time between June 1, 1874 and December 31, 1879 amounting to a13

total of 1394 observations. Mere visual inspection of the return series reveals aregime of declining exchange-rate volatility beginning in spring 1878 with thereturns falling to an extremely low level several months before the resumption. The
mean of the exchange-rate returns appears to fluctuate randomly around zero.
In a first preliminary statistical analysis we split the whole sample into two
equally large portions and compared the means and the standard deviations of bothsubsamples. While the two subsample means only differ slightly from each other,
the standard deviations of both subsamples are given by σ̂1 = 0.21 and σ̂2 =0.15 andappear to be significantly different from each other. This difference in thestandard deviations becomes even larger if we modify both subsamples byconsidering the first subsample ranging from June 1874 until April 1878 and thesecond subsample ranging from May 1878 until December 1878. In this case bothstandard deviations are given by σ̂1 = 0.20 and σ̂2 = 0.067 hinting at a low volatility
regime at the end of the sample, a finding that is consistent with our conjecture
described above.

IV

In this section we provide an explanation for why we expect to find distinct
volatility regimes in the nominal golddollar/greenback exchange-rate data
described above. Our explanation rests on the fact that the return to the gold
standard marked a transition between two alternative exchange-rate systems. Before
the return to gold the exchange rate floated freely reflecting changes in therelative supply-to-demand conditions of the currencies involved while the return
to gold represented the introduction of a system of completely fixed rates.

14

Bearing this transition in mind we invoke the existing literature on exchange-rate
dynamics under alternative exchange- rate systems and under consecutive
international monetary regimes which provides a theory-based motivation forswitching volatility regimes in our time-series data.
Several authors have analyzed a transition from a system of floating exchange
rates into a fixed-rate system on a given future date and at publicly announced
fixing-parity. Under rational expectations, the mere knowledge in the market thatthe presently floating exchange rate will be irreversibly fixed in the future does
affect the exchange-rate dynamics prior to the fixing. Theoretical models of
exchange-rate dynamics under such a scenario have been developed by Miller
and Sutherland (1994), Sutherland (1995), DeGrauwe et al. (1999) and Wilfling and
Maennig (2001). Although focusing on different aspects, all papers derive thesame unambiguous result: at that moment when the authorities publicly announce
the future exchange-rate fixing the spot rate jumps from its floating-path onto aninterim-path which assures an arbitrage-free transition into the fixed-rate system.
The analytical form of the interim-path crucially hinges on the political andinstitutional framework during the run-up to the fixed-rate system. However,
Wilfling and Maennig (2001) analyze a setting in which foreign exchange market
participants may be uncertain about the authorities’ adherence to the publicly
announced fixing date, that is, in which agents take account of the fact that the
beginning of the fixed-rate system may be delayed. Two results concerning(conditional) exchange-rate volatility along the interim-path are apparent from theirmodel. (1) The mere announcement of future exchange-rate fixing reduces
exchange-rate volatility along the interim path. This volatility reduction is certain,

15

even in a setting with market uncertainty about the punctual entrance into the fixedrate system. Only in the absolutely extreme case in which agents believe that the
fixed-rate system will never be implemented, exchange-rate volatility remains
unaffected by the announcement. (2) The volatility reduction along the interim-path
is maxi- mal when agents assess the political announcement as fully credible, thatis, if they are convinced that the exchange-rate fixing will occur punctually at thepreviously specified future date.
Overall, an essential feature of the Wilfling and Maennig (2001) model is that
there are two extreme volatility regimes during the run-up to the fixed- rate system:(1) an extreme high-volatility regime, during which agents are either not aware of
the future exchange-rate fixing or believe that the fixed- rate system will never be
implemented, and (2), an extreme low-volatility regime during which agents are
absolutely convinced that the exchange- rate fixing will start according toschedule. Apart from the economically well-grounded statements on the distinct
volatility regimes, the Wilfling and Maennig (2001) model rests on an assumptionthat may appear unrealistic at first glance. Their model assumes that there is aclear-cut date (the so-called announcement date) at which the future exchange-rate
fixing is announced and that this announcement comes as a surprise to market
participants. In reality, however, inspired by political debates and perceptible
institutional processes, agents frequently form expectations about the punctual fixing
long before any definite official announcement.
A straightforward way to overcome this inconsistency is to reinterpret theannouncement date from the theoretical model as the date-of-first-notice, that is, as
the date at which market participants perceive a potential future exchange-rate16

fixing for the first time. Starting from this date, agents deem a shift from presently
floating to fixed exchange rates possible and continuously assess the likelihood thatthe fixing will occur punctually at the given date. This phase of uncertainty
revisions will typically last for a while until market participants are absolutely
convinced that the exchange-rate fixing will happen according to schedule. In
what follows, the earliest moment from which onwards agents are absolutely
convinced of the punctual exchange-rate fixing will be termed the date-of-fullacceptance.

Figure 4 about here

Figure 4 displays the schematic representation of the exchange-rate volatility
dynamics prior to the return to the gold standard as predicted by the theoretical
Wilfling and Maennig (2001) model.

Before the date-of-first- notice agentsbelieve that the currently existing system of freely floating ex- change rates willhold forever so that exchange-rate volatility is high (extreme high-volatility
regime). Next, we consider the time between the date-of-full- acceptance and thereturn to gold. During this period, all uncertainty about the punctual fixing will
have been completely resolved so that exchange- rate volatility should be low
and, according to the theoretical model, should converge to zero shortly before theimplementation of the gold standard (extreme low-volatility regime). Finally, we
consider the time between the date- of-first-notice and the date-of-full acceptanceduring which agents begin to incorporate the potential future exchange rate fixing
into their currency valuation schemes, but—owing to relevant news—more or lessfrequently modify their assessments about the punctual return to the gold standard.

17

Depending on the changes in these assessments, this period is typicallycharacterized by news-induced switches between high and low exchange-rate
volatility regimes. Wilfling and Maennig (2001) derive analytical formulas for theconditional exchange-rate volatility during this period of uncertainty. They also
prove that exchange-rate volatility during this period strictly lies between thevolatility levels from the above-described high- and the low-volatility regimes
what justifies the notion ‘intermediate exchange-rate volatility’ used in Figure 4.
Finally, it should be noted that the date-of-first-notice and the date-of- fullacceptance are both free to vary along the time axis in Figure 4 so that thisframework covers a broad range of possible scenarios. For example, both dates
will coincide if market participants perceive a prospective return to the gold
standard for the first time and are immediately convinced that the exchange-rate
fixing will start as officially scheduled. An alternative scenario involves aconsiderable extent of uncertainty about the return to gold that may remain until
the actual institutional implementation of the gold standard. In this case, the dateof-full-acceptance would coincide with the return to gold.
However, although theoretically possible, it is not very likely that the market
uncertainty characterizing the period between the date-of-first-notice and the dateof-full-acceptance lasts for a very long time in real-world situations. Moreover,since the corresponding volatility levels necessarily range between the volatility
levels of the extreme regimes, we waive modeling such intermediate regimes andfocus on the detection of the two extreme volatility regimes in our subsequenteconometric analysis.
In order to model the two distinct volatility regimes in our exchange-rate return18

series {Rt } which we define as
𝑅𝑡 = 100 ∗ [ln(𝑋𝑡 ) − ln(𝑋𝑡−1 )]we make use of a Markov-switching-GARCH model as developed(1)
in Gray(1996b) and recently refined in Wilfling (2009) and Gelman and Wilfling (2009).
The general idea behind this econometric framework is that the data- generatingprocess (DGP) of the return Rt is affected by a latent random variable which
represents the state the DGP is in on any particular date t. In our analysis wedenote this latent state variable by St and use it to discriminate between the two
distinct volatility regimes. We specify St = 1 to indicate that the DGP is in thehigh-volatility regime whereas St = 2 is meant to indicate that the DGP is in the
low-volatility regime.
The basic element of our Markov-switching-GARCH model is the well- known
probability density function of a mean-shifted t-distribution with ν degrees of
freedom, mean µ and variance h, tν,µ,h . Based on this parametric density function,
our next step will consist in specifying stochastic processes for the mean and thevolatility in regime i, denoted by µit and hit , according to which the exchange-rate
return Rt is generated conditional upon the regime indicator St = i, i = 1, 2. After
having specified µit and hit we can then represent the conditional distribution of the
return as a mixture of two mean-shifted t-distributions:𝑅𝑡 |𝜙𝑡−1 ~{𝑡 𝜇1 ,𝑣1 ,ℎ1 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝1𝑡,𝑡 𝜇2 ,𝑣2 ,ℎ2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (1 − 𝑝1𝑡 )(2)

where φt−1 defines the information set as of date t − 1 and p1t ≡ Pr{St =1|φt−1 }denotes the so-called ex-ante probability of being in regime 1 at time t.
In modeling our regime-dependent mean equation, we consider a simple form

19

by assuming a first-order autoregressive process (AR(1)-process) in each regime
yielding
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0𝑖 + 𝑎1𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑡−1 .

(3)

In contrast to the mean equation (3), the specification of an adequate GARCH
process for the regime-specific variance hit is more problematic. Without going
into technical detail, we first consider an aggregate of conditional return variancesfrom both regimes at date t:3ℎ𝑡 = 𝐸[(𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 )2 ] − {𝐸[𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ]}222= 𝑝1𝑡 (𝜇1𝑡
+ ℎ1𝑡 ) + (1 − 𝑝1𝑡 ) ∗ (𝜇2𝑡
+ ℎ2𝑡 ) − {𝑝1𝑡 ∗ 𝜇1𝑡 + (1 − 𝑝1𝑡 ) ∗ 𝜇2𝑡 }2(4)

The quantity ht now provides the basis for the specification of the regime-specificconditional variances hit+1, i = 1, 2 in the form of a parsimonious GARCH(1,1)structure. More explicitly, we follow the suggestion in Dueker (1997) and firstparameterize the degrees of freedom of the tν,µ,h-distribution by q=1/ν, so that
(1−2q)=(ν−2)/ν, and then specify our regime-specific GARCH-equation as2ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑖 ∗ (1 − 2𝑞𝑖 )𝜀𝑡−1+ 𝑏2𝑖 ℎ𝑡−1(5)with ht−1 as being given according to Eq. (4) and t−1 being obtained from𝜀𝑡−1 = 𝑅𝑡−1 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑡−1 |𝜙𝑡−2 ] = 𝑅𝑡−1 − [𝑝1,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝜇1,𝑡−1 + �1 − 𝑝1,𝑡−1 � ∗ 𝜇2,𝑡−1 ] (6)It is important to note here that for i = 1, 2 the sums b1i (1−2qi )+b2i of thecoefficients from Eq. (5) constitute convenient measures of the regime-specificpersistence of volatility shocks. The higher the value of this measure the more time
it takes until a shock dies out. A regime-specific volatility shock will die out infinite time if the coefficient sum is less than 1. For the case of the coefficient sum
being equal to 1 (i.e. for an integrated GARCH(1,1) process) volatility shocks havea permanent effect and the unconditional variance of the process becomes

20

infinitely large.
Finally, we close our Markov-switching-GARCH model by parameterizing theregime indicator St as a first-order Markov process with constant transition
probabilities. Denoting by πi he probability of the DGP persisting in regime i (for i= 1, 2) between the dates t − 1 and t, we specify
𝑃𝑟 ( 𝑆𝑡 = 1|𝑆𝑡−1 = 1) = 𝜋1(7)Pr ( 𝑆𝑡 = 2|𝑆𝑡−1 = 1) = 1 − 𝜋1 ,Pr ( 𝑆𝑡 = 1|𝑆𝑡−1 = 2) = 1 − 𝜋2 ,Pr ( 𝑆𝑡 = 2|𝑆𝑡−1 = 2) = 𝜋2 .

Now, the log-likelihood function of our Markov-switching-GARCH(1,1) model

can be obtained by performing similar calculations as in Gray (1996b). The exact
form of the function is presented in Wilfling (2009). The log-likelihood function
contains the ex-ante probabilities p1t ≡ Pr{St = 1|φt−1 } which can be estimated via arecursive scheme. These probabilities are useful in forecasting one-step-ahead
regimes based on an information set that evolves over time. In our context, the exante probabilities p1t reflect current market perceptions of the one-step-ahead
volatility regime, thus representing an adequate measure of foreign exchange
market volatility sentiments. Besides the ex-ante probabilities p1t we also address
the so-called smoothed probabilities Pr{St = 1|φT } which can be computed by theuse of filter techniques after the model estimation has been carried out.4 Thesmoothed probabilities are based on the full sample-information set φT and provide
a tool for inferring ex post if and when volatility regime switches have occurred in
the sample.

21

Table 1 about here

V

Table 1 presents the maximum-likelihood estimates of our Markov-switching
GARCH model. Maximization of the log-likelihood function was performed bythe ‘MAXIMIZE’-routine within the software package RATS 6.1 using the BFGSalgorithm, heteroscedasticity-consistent estimates of standard errors and suitablychosen starting values for all parameters involved. In contrast to our theoreticalmean equation (3) we estimated an AR(1)-process with identical, non-switchingparameters across both regimes. We imposed the simplifying restriction a01 = a02
and a11 = a12 for two reasons, namely (1) in order to reduce the number ofparameters to be estimated, and (2) to focus on the volatility features of theexchange-rate returns.
In the first step of the empirical analysis we address the statistical significanceof the model parameters on the basis of the conventional t-statistics. To this end
some comments on the probability distribution of the conventional t-statistic
within our Markov-switching-GARCH framework are in order. It has to be notedthat the exact finite-sample distribution of our t-statistics is generally unknown.
However, owing to some well-known asymptotic properties of general maximumlikelihood estimators in conjunction with an appropriate limiting-distribution
result, it can be concluded that under the null hypothesis of a single parameter
being equal to zero, our t-statistics should converge in distribution towards a
standard normal variate. This implies asymptotic critical values of 2.58, 1.96 and1.64 for the absolute value of the t-statistic at the 1, 5, and 10%-levels,

22

respectively. Overall, we find that 9 out 12 parameters from our mean and GARCH
equations (3) and (5) are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The GARCH parameters of regime 1, b01 , b11 , b21 appear much larger than theircorresponding counterparts b02 , b12 , b22 in regime 2. In conjunction with the(modified) degree-of-freedom parameters q1 and q2 the regime-specific volatility
persistence measures b1i (1 − 2qi ) + b2i are given by 0.6615 in regime 1 and 8.3·10−6
in regime 2 indicating a substantially higher degree of volatility persistence inregime 1 than in regime 2. However, both volatility persistence measures are lessthan 1 which suggests stationary conditional volatility processes in both regimes
implying that regime-specific volatility shocks die out in finite time. The
estimates of the transition probabilities π 1 and π 2 are given by 0.9776 and0.8096 indicating a particularly high degree of regime persistence for regime 1.
Apart from parameter estimation we also performed several specification tests
and diagnostic checks of the model fit. Inter alia, we tested for serial correlation of
the squared standardized residuals for the lags 1, 2, 3, and 5 with the well-known
Ljung-Box-Q-test finding that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot berejected up to lag 5 at any conventional significance level. This result provides
some evidence in favor of our two-regime Markov- switching GARCH
specification.5

Figure 5 about here

Next, we address the ex-ante and the smoothed probabilities Pr{St = 1|φt }and Pr{St = 1|φT } both of which are relevant to detecting how often and at which

23

dates the exchange-rate returns switched between the high-volatility and the lowvolatility regimes. Figure 5 displays these regime-1 probabilities (in the upper
panels) along with the conditional variance process (in the lower panel) estimatedfrom our Markov-switching GARCH model.
Theoretically, we would expect to observe dynamics of the regime-1
probabilities (more concretely of both the ex-ante as well as the smoothed regime-1
probabilities) in line with the schematic representation depicted in Figure 4.
Before the date-of-first notice exchange-rate volatility is high and, consequently, theregime-1 probabilities should be close to 1. Between the date- of-first notice andthe date-of-full acceptance exchange-rate volatility should attain an intermediatelevel with regime-1 probabilities fluctuating between 1 and 0 while exchange-rate
volatility should be low after the date-of-full acceptance until the actual return to thegold standard with regime-1 probabilities being close to 0.
In line with these theoretical considerations the vast majority of the regime-1
probabilities depicted in Figure 5 are indeed close to 1 at the be- ginning of thesampling period. During this period the DGP is in the high- volatility regime as
indicated by the conditional variances shown in the lower panel of Figure 5.
Between January 1876 and January 1878 the regime-1 probabilities exhibit more
frequent downturns towards zero indicating the interim period between the twoalternative exchange-rate systems during which market participants became
increasingly convinced of the future switch in exchange-rate regime. Finally, in
May 1878 the regime-1 probabilities start a sustained decline from one towards
zero for the rest of the sampling period reflecting the switch to the low-volatility
regime as suggested by the schematic representation from Figure 4.

24Interestingly, we can explain some of the downturns in the regime-1
probabilities by decisive historical events. We observe, for example, an increasing
number of downturns during the year 1877 which we explain as being triggered
by Hayes’ victory in the presidential elections in November 1876 since Hayes
was well-known for his sound money attitude what might have strengthened
financial market participants’ beliefs in the Resumption Act. However, it was not
until May 1878 that the regime-1 probabilities exhibit a more persistent decline
towards zero indicating the entrance into the low- volatility regime. While before
that date the Bland-Allison Act of January 1878 might have kept the DGP in thehigh-volatility regime 1 (although its impact on the credibility of the resumption
appears questionable) we attribute the sustained switch to the low-volatility regime
2 in May 1878 to the Silver Act which did not affect the legal commitment toresume on January 1, 1879. Furthermore, we interpret the persistent change in theregime-1 probabilities after May 1878 as a substantial change in financial market
participants’ expectations. This interpretation is compatible with anecdotal
evidence reporting that Sherman’s efforts to accumulate sufficient gold reserves
for resumption were considered credible.
A closer look at the conditional variances depicted in the lower panel of Figure
5 reveals that the variances stay below the value 0.025 most of the time and evenbelow 0.01 on 794 sampling days. It is presumably this narrow range of volatility
levels which makes it difficult to distinguish sharply between high- and lowvolatility regimes so that our regime-1 probabilities do not appear as clear-cut assuggested by our theoretical reasoning. However, we sum up by emphasizing that
our Markov-switching GARCH framework is capable of locating a date after25

which market participants appeared to be convinced of the resumption. We
identify this date as June 1878 after which the DGP of our Markov-switching
GARCH model remains in the low- volatility regime most of the time. By contrast,
we do not find that clear-cut empirical evidence around the start of the resumption
process for which our model appears to switch erratically between the volatility
regimes. We interpret this result as evidence for a high degree of uncertainty in
U.S. financial markets after the Civil War.

VI

In this paper we analyze volatility changes in daily greenback-gold
conversion rates after the U.S. Civil War with the objective of characterizing thegreenback’s eventual return to convertibility in 1879. To this end we allow thegreenback returns to endogenously switch between high- and low-volatility
regimes and model this scenario within a Markov-switching GARCH frame- work.
Our methodology is able to locate the shift to low exchange-rate volatility andthus identifies the time when market participants assessed the implementation of
the announced fixed exchange-rate regime fully credible.
Our contribution to America’s historiography consists in the finding that theswitch to convertibility announced for January 1, 1879 became credible half a year
earlier in summer 1878. In the light of the intense political struggle between
inflationists and bullionists after the Civil War this result is quite surprising.
Regarding only qualitative evidence from historical sources, one might be
inclined to conjecture that the question of convertibility had not been settled
before its ultimate implementation on January 1, 1879. However, despite all26controversial discussions, our volatility analysis provides strong quantitative
evidencethatpolitical

leaders

could credibly commit totheir policy

announcement.
Apart from its historical focus our volatility analysis also contributes to thegeneral debate about the economic factors that drive the exchange rate. Significant
volatility regime-switching, as observed in this study, is likely to be caused bychanging expectations rather than by changing fundamentals. Consequently, weinterpret our empirical findings as endorsing evidence emphasizing the substantial
role of financial market expectations in exchange-rate determination.
The transition from a system of floating exchange rates to a fixed-rate system
is a topic of major concern to economic historians.6 However, the bulk of thisliterature focuses on theoretical models capturing specific features of theexchange-rate dynamics during this transitional period (see, inter alia, Flood andGarber, 1983; Froot and Obstfeld, 1991). Besides a very few exceptions scattered in
the literature (e.g. Smith and Smith, 1990) our study is one of a few analyzing thereturn to a fixed exchange-rate regime empirically. We believe that apart from its
application to the greenback resumption, our approach to analyzing switching
structures in exchange-rate volatility may be successfully applied to othercomparable historical episodes.

27

References

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28

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30

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31

Footnotes
1

The data can be accessed online at http://EH.net/databases/greenback.

2

There still is controversy on the exact day dating the end of the Civil War. For an overview

treating the significant events of the Civil War see Rhodes (1999).

3

See Gray (1996b) for a rigorous formal discussion.

4 In

this paper, we have computed all smoothed probabilities with a filter algorithm provided

by Gray (1996a)

5 Technical details of our specification and autocorrelation tests are available upon request.

6 See for example Miller

gold after World War I.

and Sutherland (1994) concerning the debate about sterling’s return toGolddollar / Greenback
End of Civil War(April 1865)

100

Resumption Act(14/01/1875)

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
1862

1864

1866

1868

1870

1872

1874

1876

1878

Figure 1: Golddollar/greenback exchange rate from 1862 to 1879

Golddollar / Greenback
100

Inflation Bill
(22/04/1874)

Bland-Allison Act(28/02/1878)
Presidential Elections(07/11/1876)

98
96

Coinage Act(May 1878)

94
Resumption Act(14/01/1875)

92
90
88

Attempt to Repeal(December 1877)

86
84
I

II III IV I

II III IV I

II III IV I

II III IV I

II III IV

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

Figure 2: Golddollar/greenback exchange rate from 1874 to 1879 and significant
eventsGreenback returns
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0
-2.5
II III IV
1874

I

II III IV
1875

I

II III IV
1876

I

II III IV
1877

III III IV
1878

Figure 3: Daily returns from June 1874 to December 1879high exchange‐
rate volatility

intermediate
exchange‐rate
volatility

low exchange‐
rate volatility

regime‐1
probabilities
close to 1

regime‐1 proba‐
bilities fluctuate
between 1 and 0

regime‐1
probabilities
close to 0

date‐of‐first
noticedate‐of‐fullacceptance

fixed exchange‐
rates

return to gold

time

Figure 4: Schematic representation of exchange-rate volatility dynamics according
to the Wilfling and Maennig (2001) modelEx-ante regime-1 probabilities
1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
Jul 1874 Apr 1875 Jan 1876 Oct 1876 Jul 1877 Apr 1878 Jan 1879

Smoothed regime-1 probabilities
1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
Jul 1874 Apr 1875 Jan 1876 Oct 1876 Jul 1877 Apr 1878 Jan 1879

Conditional variances
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Jul 1874 Apr 1875 Jan 1876 Oct 1876 Jul 1877 Apr 1878 Jan 1879

Figure 5: Ex-ante regime-1 probabilities, smoothed regime-1 probabilities and conditional variances of exchange-rate returns

Table 1
Estimation results for the Markov-switching-GARCH model
Estimate
Std. error
Mean equation:(identical in both regimes)
a01 = a02
0.00000.0000a11 = a12−0.0021***
2.29 · 10−11
Regime 1:
b01
b11
b21
q1 = 1/ν1[b̂11 · (1 − 2qˆ1 ) + b̂21 ]0.0023***0.5992***0.3001***
0.1984***[0.6615]

1.85 · 10−11
4.98 · 10−10
8.57 · 10−10
7.70 · 10−10

Regime 2:
b02
b12
b22
q2 = 1/ν2[b̂12 · (1 − 2qˆ2 ) + b̂22 ]

0.00000.0081***0.00000.4996***[8.30 · 10−6 ]0.00007.83 · 10−6
0.00003.96 · 10−11

Transition probabilities:
π1
π20.9776***0.8096***

1.22 · 10−6
1.13 · 10−9Note: Estimates for parameters from the Eqs. (2) to (7). ***, ** and * denote statistical significanceat the 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively.