G-SEC WORKING PAPER No.19
Decoding the Anti-Secession Law:
The Analysis of the Conflicts
across the Taiwan Strait
Pei-Ling Lee *July, 2007

Abstract
On March 14, 2005, the third session of the Tenth National People’s Congress of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) passed the Anti-Secession Law. It was the first time that
China legalized its policy against Taiwan independence movement. After this law was
passed, it caused a series of demonstrations and criticisms in Taiwan. From China’s
standpoint, the Anti-Secession Law is the solution to the conflicts of the cross-Strait
relationship. From Taiwan’s view, however, the law itself is the cause of an oncoming
conflict. In order to discuss the major conflicts and barriers to negotiation and cooperation
between China and Taiwan, this paper, by using document and conversation analyses, will
review the history and then analyze the current situation on the cross-Strait relationship In
addition, this paper will analyze the related articles and statements of the Anti-Secession
Law for the purpose of investigating the transformation of the PRC government’s “oneChina” policy, the development process of this law, the reactions to the Anti-Secession Law
from Chinese and Taiwanese political leaders, and the possible effect of the enactment of
this PRC law on cross-Strait relations.
Keywor ds: The Anti-Secession Law, the Taiwan Strait, the cross-Strait relationship.

* Doctorial candidate, School of Communication Studies, Bowling Green State University, BowlingGreen, Ohio, USA.
Email: peilee@bgsu.edu

On March 14, 2005, the third session of the Tenth National People’s Congress of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) passed the Anti-Secession Law. It was the firsttime for China to formalize its Taiwan strategy, which can be applied to deal with theconflicts across the Taiwan Strait. The contents of this law include: (1) The PRC’s
concept of the “one China” policy. (2) The definition of the cross-Strait relationship. (3)The guidelines for improving the two-sides relations and seeking future reunification. (4)The possibility of using “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan’s secession from China.
The enactment of this law provoked a series of demonstrations and criticisms in Taiwan.
For instance, the ruling party (DPP, Democratic Progressive Party) of the Republic ofChina (ROC, also known as Taiwan) and the ROC President, Chen Shui-bian, organized
an “anti-Anti-Secession Law” demonstration on March 26, 2005 to express Taiwan’s
resistance to the Anti-Secession Law. From China’s standpoint, the Anti-Secession Law
is the way for the PRC government to solve the conflicts between China and Taiwan.
From Taiwan’s view, however, the law itself is the cause of an oncoming conflict. This
paper, therefore, will review the history and the current situation across the Taiwan
Strait in order to discuss the major conflicts as well as barriers to negotiation andcooperation of the two sides. In addition, this paper will analyze the related articles andstatements of the Anti-Secession Law for the purpose of understanding the influenceson the future cross-Strait relationship.

1

The Cross-Strait RelationshipThe relationship between China and Taiwan is complicated and controversial. Afterthe People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the PRC has claimed its
sovereignty over Taiwan. Even though the meaning of “China” has been revised several
times over different periods, the “one China” policy remains the basic guideline for the
PRC government to deal with the Taiwan issue. Taiwan (the ROC government), on theother hand, has changed its mainland policy from seeking China’s reunification toemphasizing Taiwanese political identity. When Lieberthal (2005) discussed therelationship of the two sides across the Taiwan Strait, he indicated that “one of thegreatest dangers to international security today is the possibility of a militaryconfrontation between China and Taiwan that leads to a war between China and theUnited States” (p. 53). In order to analyze the impacts of the Anti-Secession law on the
cross-Strait relationship and even global security, this paper will, first, discuss theestablishment of modern Chinese political systems and the historical background of thetwo sides. Then, the essay will move to the discussion of the current cross-Strait
relationship, as well as the major conflicts and barriers to consultations between China
and Taiwan.
Historical Background
The first democratic regime in China, the Republic of China (ROC), was founded
in 1912 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The establishment of the ROC marked the end of more than
two thousand years of monarchical rule in China. However, after the state was2established, the Chinese mainland was mired in domestic chaos because it was
separated and occupied by different warlords. The central government in Nanjing andthe ruling party (Kuomingtang or KMT) had no power to control the situation.
Therefore, China moved into the period of warlordism and suffered a series of civil
wars by different armed forces including national army, warlords, and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). After the ROC military leader, Chiang Kai-shek, suppressed
warlords in 1928, the national army shifted its target and concentrated on warfare
against the armed force of the CCP. However, the Xi'an Incident in 1936 led to the endof fighting between the CCP and the KMT. After Japan invaded China in 1937, the CCP
army joined the Chinese national army to fight against Japan.
After World War II, the Chinese mainland did not gain enough time to recover. The
CCP and the KMT quickly started the second period of civil war in China. The result of
the second civil war caused the controversy of the sovereignty issue that has continued
more than 50 years. In 1949, Mao Zedong and the CCP won the war against the KMTarmy and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Peking. Thus, the PRC
government has ruled most territory of China and claimed its sovereignty over China.
On the other hand, The KMT lost the war and retreated to Taiwan; however, it did notrecognize the fall of the ROC. Until now, the regime in Taiwan still keeps the officialname as the “Republic of China” rather than “Taiwan” or any other names.

3

The Changes of the Cross-Strait Relationship
After the Chinese mainland and Taiwan were ruled by different regimes (PRC vs.
ROC), the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can be separated into
three periods (Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan, n.d.): (1) From 1949 to 1979, battles
and sea warfare still continued between the PRC and the ROC. For instance, the PRC
military attacked Kinmen in 1949, occupied Dachen island in 1954, and bombard
Kinmen in 1958. Also, Chiang Kai-shek, the president of ROC at that time, originallyplanned to counterattack the Chinese mainland in 1962 but was stopped by the UnitedStates. (2) From 1979 to 1987, the two sides of the Strait had maintained a peacetimeand did not confront each other. In Taiwan, the formal president Chiang Ching-kuo
adopted a “three NO” policy: NO contact with the PRC regime, NO negotiate with the
Chinese Communist Party, and NO compromise with the enemy. (3) From 1987 topresent, the two sides have consulted and negotiated with each other. For instance, theStrait Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established in 1991 in Taiwan; the major goal ofthis non-governmental organization is to “assist the government to deal with related
mainland affairs” (“Statement,” n.d.). In the same year, the PRC government establishedthe Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) as a sister organizationof SEF.
From 1991 to 1999, the relationship between the two sides rose and fell because ofdifferent political events. However, after the formal president of the ROC, Lee Teng-hui,announced the “special state-to-state relationship” theory in 1999, the communication4

across the two sides has been at a standstill until now. After the current ROC president,
Chen Shui-bian, was elected in 2000, the contacts and communication between SEF and
ARATS has stayed clam and the circumstance of the two sides has remained unfriendly.

The Major Conflicts Between China and Taiwan
Taiwan’s (ROC) Changes of the “One China” Policy.
The major conflict across the Taiwan Strait is the reunification issue; however, thepoints in dispute of reunification are different between China and Taiwan during
different periods. During the Warfare Time (1949-1979), both the PRC and the ROC
governments argued for being the only “legal regime” in China. From the ROC
standpoint, the original articles of the ROC Constitution claimed that the Chinese
mainland and Mongolia were still governed by the ROC. At that period, the ROC
government insisted that the ROC was the “only China” of the world, and argued that
the PRC usurped the Chinese mainland and state power. The ROC government
therefore called the PRC as “the communist bandit.” During the Period of No Contact
Time (1979-1987), the ROC still held this kind of “one China” policy. However, thispolicy had gradually changed during Lee Teng-hui’s two presidencies, and was finallyabandoned after Lee announced the “special state-to-state relationship” theory in 1999.
Initially, Lee did not announce that the ROC wanted to give up the “one China”
policy during his first term and most of the second term of presidency. Nevertheless, themeaning of “China” had slightly changed during Lee’s presidencies. When Lee

5governed the ROC, the ROC government recognized that the ROC did not govern the
Chinese mainland, and the Mainland was ruled by another “political entity.” In otherwords, the ROC government under Lee’s rule recognized the existence of the PRC anddid not treat it as an illegal regime anymore.
In 1991, Lee adopted the Guidelines for National Unification. According to thisdocument, “the Mainland and Taiwan are both sides to be part of ‘China’ (Zhongguo).
The two parties are alternatively referred to as ‘Taiwan ’ and ‘Mainland’ as
governmental policies” (Chang, 2004, p.12-13). Lee also led six revisions of the ROC
Constitution during his presidencies. Amendment II to the ROC Constitution indicatesthat Taiwan is the “free area” of China, and the ROC president can be only elected by
the people who live in the free area.
In short, the statement of the Guidelines for National Unification (one China, twoequal political entities) and the amendments of the ROC Constitution revealed thechanges of the ROC mainland policy. From Lee Teng-hui’s presidencies, the ROC hademphasized the political status of equality rather than the competition of the “oneChina.” Therefore, the ROC government stated that “Taiwan and the mainland are bothparts of China and the PRC is not equivalent to China” (Sheng, 2002, p. 17). Hence, theROC government started to identify itself as “the ROC on Taiwan” during Lee’s second
presidency. The claim of “the ROC on Taiwan” did shift the original meaning of the
ROC’s “one China” policy because it recognized that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan
are ruled by separate “political entities.” However, this claim did not exactly cross the6bottom line of the ROC’s “one China” policy because it maintained enough ambiguous
space for each side to explain the meaning of “China.” Rhetorically, however, “the ROC
on Taiwan” implied the tendency of separating the ROC sovereignty from the Chinese
mainland and was the foundation of Lee’s “special state-to-state relationship” theory.
In 1999, the last year of Lee’s second term of presidency, he announced the“special state-to-state relationship” theory. It was the first time for the ROC government
to view that the cross-Strait relations as a state-to-state or at least a special state-to state
relationship. This statement was one important change in how the ROC government
represented its national identity. In addition, this statement expressed Taiwan’s
abandonment of the original “one China” policy.
Table 1
Changes of the One China Policy in Taiwan

Presidents/TimeOne China (ROC)

Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo/
1949-1988

One China, two equal political entities

Lee Teng-hui’s first term of presidency/ early
1990s

The ROC on Taiwan

Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state
relationship” theory/ 1999

The ROC is Taiwan

Chen Shui-bian/2000-current______________________________________________________________________

7

Table 1 shows the ROC’s changes of the “one China” policy after it retreated to
Taiwan. Based on Lee’s statements of “the ROC on Taiwan” and the “special
state-to-state” theory, the current ROC president, Chen Shui-bian, went a step further
and claimed that with “Taiwan and China standing on opposite sides of the Strait, there
is one country on each side” (“Present Chen,” 2002). During Chen’s presidencies, Chen
has repeated this claim several times and clarified that the meaning of “one country oneach side” is “the ROC is Taiwan.” In fact, “the ROC is Taiwan” broke the ambiguous
explanation of “one China” and departed the ROC’s sovereignty from the Chinese
mainland to Taiwan.
The Meaning of “One China”: From the PRC standpoint.
During the Wartime Period, the PRC, like the ROC, claimed its representation of
the only legal regime of China. They refused to recognize the existence of the ROC, andthe slogan they used at that time was to “liberate Taiwan.” In the 1970s, the PRC
replaced the ROC gradually in terms of international relationships and activities. In
1971, the PRC substituted for the ROC’s position in the United Nations. Also, the PRC
and the United States built up the official diplomatic relationship in 1978. During that
period, because the two sides of the Taiwan Strait held the “one China” policy, the PRC
and ROC governments, therefore, applied this standard to their international policies. In
other words, both the PRC and the ROC did not allow other countries to recognize a“two China” policy. Accordingly, when one side joins an international organization, theother side must choose to withdraw. For instance, when the PRC was accepted to join

8the United Nations, the ROC gave up its position immediately. Because of theirinsistences of the “one China” policy, both sides started a series of competitions on
diplomatic, armed, and economic levels. The competitions stated above have continued
until now.
In the late 1970s, the authorities of the PRC started to claim to “solve the Taiwan
problem peacefully” (e.g. Deng Xiaoping’s statement in 1979). In 1981, the chairpersonof the National People’s Congress of the PRC, Ye Jianying, announced “Ye’s Nine
Principles.” Ye’s principles actually included the central spirit of the “one country, twosystems” that Deng Xiaoping stated in 1979. The idea of “one country, two systems”
dominated China’s Taiwan strategy from the late 1970s to early 2000s. The “one country,
two systems” policy presents a clear central government (PRC) vs. local government(Taiwan) claim. For instance, Principle 3 indicates:
After the country is reunifies, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a
special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central
Government will not interfere with local affairs in Taiwan.1
And Principle 6 again presents the sense of “central vs. local:”When Taiwan’s local finance is in difficulty, the Central Government may
subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.
In 1995, Jiang Zemin, the former PRC President, announced “Jiang’s Eight-point
Proposals.” This proposal did not depart from the frame of the PRC’s “one China”
policy and the concept of “one country, two systems.” However, it mentioned the1

The English translations of principles and statements of “Ye’s Nine Principles” and “Jiang’s Eight-point
Proposals” in this paper are from the website of Mainland Affairs Council, ROC. Retrieved June 24, 2007,
from http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/tra/5.pdf

9

guideline for negotiations, economic exchanges, non-governmental agreements, etc. ofthe two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Basically, Jiang’s proposal again emphasized thedesire of the PRC for seeking peaceful reunification but held the possibility of using
military forces to deal with the Taiwan issue. This concept is also applied to theAnti-Secession Law.
In 2000, the PRC announced the white book of “One-China Principle and Taiwan
Issue.” This document demonstrated a new direction of the cross-Strait relationshipcalled the “three-phrase statement on the one China issue” or “one China syllogism.”
The idea of this “syllogism” is “both sides of the Taiwan Strait recognize there is only
one China; Taiwan is part of China; the PRC is the sole legitimate government ofChina” (Chuang, August 07, 2000). The “one China syllogism” in 2000 still followed
the principle of the “one China, two system” and indicated that the PRC is the central
government of China. In other words, the “one China” is equal to the PRC regime, andthe Taiwan authority is identified as a local government. However, this kind ofstatement was not presented in the PRC’s official document to the Taiwan issue after
2000. In 2002, the PRC Foreign Affairs minister, Tang Jiaxuan, announced the “second
one China syllogism” in the UN. According to him, both sides of the Taiwan Strait
should recognize that there is only one China, Taiwan and the mainland are parts ofChina, and the integrity of China’s territory and sovereignty brooks no division. The
major difference between the first and second “one China syllogism” is the third
premise. The second one does not emphasize that the PRC is the sole legitimate

10

government of China, and this concept is also applied to the Anti-Secession Law.
In January 2005, Jia Qinglin, the Chairman of the 10th National Committee of theChinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, announced a “new one China
syllogism:” both sides of the Taiwan Strait recognize that there is only one China;
Taiwan and the mainland are parts of China; and even though the two sides has notreunified yet, the fact that Taiwan and the mainland are parts of China has neverchanged. Again, the major difference between the newest syllogism and old ones is thethird premise. The most important issue of Jia’s “China syllogism” is: it was the firsttime for the PRC to record that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have not reunified yet.
Of course, it does not mean that the PRC gives up its “one China” policy and recognizes
the ROC sovereignty over Taiwan. However, this statement rhetorically implies that the
PRC recognizes Taiwan is ruled by another “political entity.”
In March 2005, right before the Anti-Secession Law was passed, the current PRC
President, Hu Jintao announced “Hu’s Four-point Proposals.” Hu’s announcement
demonstrated that the PRC might adopt a more flexible strategy to deal with the Taiwan
issue because he did not discuss the use of armed forces in dealing with the Taiwan
issue. In addition, Hu did not touch the controversial standpoint of “central vs. local”
between China and Taiwan. In short, the Anti-Secession Law is the conclusion of the
PRC’s “one China” policy. The concepts mainly draw from the “Jiang’s Eight-point
Proposals,” the old and new “one China syllogism,” and “Hu’s Four-point Proposals.”This law does not directly include Jia’s statements in 2005 about the present situation of11

the two sides and does not exactly abandon the sense of “central vs. local.” It, however,does not state that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China. This kind ofchange reflects the flexibility of the PRC in dealing with the Taiwan issue and displays
the desire of the PRC for seeking China’s future reunification.

The Analysis of the Anti-Secession Law
When Jiang Zemin stated the “Jiang’s Eight-point Proposals” in 1995, he alreadyrevealed China’s wish to negotiate and cooperate with Taiwan authorities. After ten
years, the Anti-Secession Law even lists guidelines and details for future negotiationand cooperation between China and Taiwan. However, the two sides have never had any
official political, governmental negotiation since 1949, and they had a series ofcompetitions rather than cooperation in terms of economic, armed, and diplomatic
activities. Recently, China and Taiwan have even stopped regular non-governmental
contacts. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the barriers on the cross-Strait relationshipand to analyze whether the Anti-Secession Law is a good solution to the conflicts acrossthe Taiwan Strait.
Barriers
According to Ury (1993), there are five barriers to cooperation: reaction of its own
side, emotion of the other side, position of the other side, dissatisfaction of the otherside, and power of the other side. The strategies and tactics that Ury discussed in thisbook, Getting Past No, focus more on the interpersonal or inter-group negotiation.

12However, the major concept of the barriers and breakthrough strategy can still beapplied to analyze the cross-Strait relationship.
From the discussion above, people can find that, at different periods, the conflicts
between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait can be separated into three aspects: first,
the conflict of China’s sovereignty; second, different explanations of the “one China;”
and last, different expectations to the reunification issue. When the two sides argued therepresentation of the sole legal regime of China, it was an impasse to the cross-Strait
relationship because both sides treated the other as enemies. In other words, during theWartime period, both China and Taiwan held a “legitimate vs. illegitimate” position anddid not accept any possibility to recognize each other.
When Taiwan was ruled by former president Lee, the Guidelines for National
Unification and the amendments of the ROC Constitution revealed a fact: the ROC
government recognized that China has been separated and the Chinese mainland has
been governed by the PRC regime since 1949. Also, when the ROC announced to end
the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion in
1991, it indicated that the ROC suspended treating the PRC as an enemy. Of course,
these actions did not mean that the ROC recognized the legitimacy of the PRC regime.
However, they can be treated as a breakthrough to the cross-Strait relationship.
Nevertheless, the PRC’s reaction to Taiwan’s changes did not satisfy what the ROC
government and Taiwanese people expected. The PRC identified Taiwan’s changes as
the first step to achieve future independence. Therefore, “Jiang’s Eight-point Proposals”

13expressed that “We must firmly oppose any words or actions aimed at creating the‘independence of Taiwan’ and propositions that run counter to the principle of one
China such as ‘two split sides with separate administrations,’ ‘two China over a periodof time’ and so on.” The first “one China syllogism” still held a sense of “central
government vs. local government.” From the early 1990s, the two sides alreadypresented huge differences in explaining the meaning of “one China.” From Taiwan’s
standpoint, it did not insist that the ROC government has to be the only legal regime of
China. In other words, the sense of “one China” is more like a “future China” or even acultural China. The PRC government, on the contrary, insisted that the PRC regime isthe sole representation of China, and accordingly treated Taiwan as a province of the
PRC. The PRC, therefore, believed that Taiwan’s changes from its “one China” policy
were seeking independence rather than reunification. Because of different explanationsof “one China,” both sides insisted their standpoints and ignored emotion anddissatisfaction of the other side. In addition, the reactions that both sides took had
reinforced the deadlock across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, even though both sides
mentioned their desires for seeking negotiation, cooperation, and reunification, thehostility to the other side had continued and consequently caused the ROC government
to abandon its original “one China” policy.
Cooperation and Competition
According to Deutsch (2000), substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility are threeelements to “understanding the social and psychological processes involved in creating

14

the major effects of cooperation and competition” (p. 23). Substitutability means how
actions of one side can satisfy intentions of the other side; attitudes refer to thepredisposition to respond positively to aspects that are favorable to them and vice versa;
and inducibility means that the willingness of one side to accept another’s influence andto fit his or she expectations. From the discussion above, people can realize that bothsides of the Taiwan Strait basically have negative influences on the aspects ofsubstitutability, attitudes, and inducibility. The relationship between China and Taiwan
therefore is more competitive than cooperative.
In the same article, Deutsch (2000) also indicated many components that may
induce cooperation, such as perceiving similarity in attitudes, being willing to help eachother, having an open communication style, being sensitive to common interests anddeemphasizing to different interests, enhancing mutual power, and so on. The idea offinding common interests or common ground is one tactic to break barriers in a
relationship or negotiation. On the cross-Strait relationship, the atmosphere was positivein the early 1990s when the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taiwan and the
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) of the PRC established the“common consensus of the 1992 Wang-Koo talks” (Taiwan also calls it “the spirit of the
1992 Koo-Wang talks”). In a word, this common consensus or spirit can be explained as:“two sides ‘agree to disagree’ on their respective interpretation of the ‘one China’concept and to leave this question aside” (Cabestan, 1996, p. 1267). Both SEF and
ARATS therefore agreed, directly or indirectly, to table the controversies and15

concentrated on non-political, administrative affairs.
However, the 1992 common consensus did not hold too long because China, at thattime, still insisted that the PRC equals China, and Taiwan revealed a tendency to pursue“one China, one Taiwan” or “one China with separate administrations.” In the 1990s,
China’s Taiwan strategy was hard and coercive. For instance, the missile crisis in 1996
was the way for China to react to Lee Teng-hui’s (the former ROC president) speech in
the US in 1995 and to influence Taiwan’s presidential election in 1996. As Yu (1997)
indicated, this missile test in 1996 “further eroded popular support for unification anddrove more Taiwanese to support independence” (p. 19). In 2000, Taiwanese people
elected Chen Shui-bian as the 10th ROC President, and Chen belongs to a political party
that is seeking for Taiwan’s independence. After 2000, the PRC’s Taiwan policy has
become flexible and has not emphasized the sense of “central vs. local.” However, thecontacts between China and Taiwan have almost stopped after Chen has become thepresident. The PRC government has presented a highly distrustful attitude to Chen’spolitical tendency. For instance, China has identified Chen’s statements and politicalactivities, such as “one side, one country”, establishing a new Constitution, or the 2004
referendum, as efforts seeking future independence. Therefore, the establishment of theAnti-Secession Law can be treated as one tactic for the PRC government to deal with
Chen’s independent claims and the complicated Taiwan problem.
After the draft was submitted, the Anti-Secession Law attracted a lot of attention
because it would demonstrate the PRC’s guidelines and bottom line to the conflicts

16

across the Taiwan Strait. Major criticisms from Taiwan to the Anti-Secession Law
focused on Article 8, which clearly indicates that China shall employ non-peacefulmeans and other necessary measures when “the ‘ Taiwan independence’ secessionist
forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s
secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China
should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely
exhausted2.” Because of Article 8, the Anti-Secession Law, therefore, is identified as a
“War Law” that will legalize China’s attack to Taiwan by some Taiwanese critics.
The Anti-Secession Law, however, can be treated as a very important advance on
the cross-Strait relationship. First, the “one China” concept in the Anti-Secession Law isbased on the second “one China syllogism” and other related statements after that.
Article 2 still treats Taiwan as a part of China; however, it did not state the PRC is thesole legal regime of China. Therefore, it manifests that the PRC decides to holds a more
flexible strategy to deal with the Taiwan issue. Of course, it does not mean that the PRC
recognizes the legitimacy of the ROC, but “not refusing the existence” can be treated as
an improvement on the cross-Strait relationship.
Furthermore, Article 7 claims that “the state stands for the achievement of peacefulreunification through consultations and negotiations on an equal footing between thetwo sides of the Taiwan Straits.” The most important point in this statement is the word“equal footing;” it is the first time for the PRC to promise that the status between two

2

The English translations of articles of the Anti-Secession Law are from the website of China Online.
Retrieved June 24, 2007, from http://chineseculture.about.com/od/governmentinfo/a/a002.htm

17

sides is equal. It is a very interesting thing to see that the “one China” concept containedin the Anti-Secession Law is similar to what the ROC claimed in the Guidelines for
National Unification in 1991. This similarity may be treated as common ground andthen it also offers a great opportunity for future negotiation and cooperation between
China and Taiwan.
Also, the Anti-Secession Law provides guidelines for promoting cross-Straits
relations and future consultations and negotiations. This law clearly indicates thatmeasures, steps, and phases of cross-Strait contacts can be flexible and negotiable. Afterthe PRC passed this law in March 2005, for instance, it has taken action to contact
Taiwanese people and several opposition parties in Taiwan. One example is that the
PRC revoked the tariff on Taiwanese fruit in order to encourage Taiwanese farmers tosell fruit to the Chinese mainland. Traditionally, many Taiwanese farmers in Southern
Taiwan are firm supporters of the current ruling party for seeking Taiwan independence.
However, mainland China is a big, unavoidable market, especially when the PRC
government offers such preference. According to the spirit of the Anti-Secession Law,
the PRC’s flexible tactics would like to gain support from Taiwanese people and toisolate the current ROC government.
According to Yu’s (1997) article, China has developed a 4-steps strategy aimed atensuring future China-Taiwan reunification in the long run: (1) to increase Taiwan’s
economic dependence on China. (2) to diplomatically isolate Taiwan in order to prevent
international cooperation of its future independence. (3) to obstruct arms sales to Taiwan

18

by any countries. (4) to hold the possibility of using force in case all steps above failed
to stop Taiwan from seeking independence. The articles in the Anti-Secession Law
actually present this 4-steps strategy. Taiwan, no matter on the levels of economy, armed
forces, or international relationship, is comparatively powerless. The current
government in Taiwan, based on its political claims, refuses to contact the PRC.
However, from offering preferential treatments to Taiwanese people, the PRC is trying
to contact Taiwanese people directly in order to establish a positive image of China.
However, Article 8 in the Anti-Secession Law states that China would not give up
using coercive power to deal with the Taiwan question. The establishment of theAnti-Secession Law, therefore, was criticized as a two-sided strategy. Article 8 is also
the most important reason that the Anti-Secession Law has attracted so much attention,
because this article suggests the possibility of using forces to deal with the conflicts in
the Taiwan Straits. The meaning of Article 8 in the Anti-Secession Law is ambiguous
and broad. In other words, according to Jian (March 15, 2005), China keeps the right todefine the meaning of the “fact” and “major incidents” of Taiwan’s secession from
China, and the possibility for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.
Because of Article 8, the Anti-Secession Law may not have a positive effect on
improving the cross-Straits relationship. According to Deutsch (2000), the value ofnonviolence is one norm for cooperation and constructive conflict resolution. Barash(1991) indicated nonviolence is “directly relevant not only to the prevention of war, butalso to the establishment of social justice, environmental protection, and the defense of19human rights” (p. 573). However, in Ury’s (1993) suggestion, one side of negotiation
may consider using power to warn, but not threaten, the other side to know theconsequence.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Anti-Secession Law, however, may reflect the effort of
the PRC government to reduce the influence of announcing the use of armed forces.
These articles indicate strategies and tactics that China plans to achieve peacefulreunification in the future. In short, the Anti-Secession Law concludes the PRC’s “oneChina” policy and includes both hard and soft approaches for the PRC to deal with thecomplicated Taiwan issue. If articles 5, 6, and 7 are soft approaches, Article 8 presents
China’s bottom line on the cross-Strait relationship and can be treated as a warning to
Taiwan. According to past experiences, however, China’s use of coercive force, such as
the missile exercise in 1996, has not achieved its expectation but pushed Taiwanesepeople to support Taiwan’s independence. Nevertheless, it is hard to expect theconsequence if China announced to give up using coercive ways to deal with the Taiwan
question.

Conclusion
Is the Anti-Secession Law a good solution to solve the conflict in the Taiwan
Straits? It is hard to provide an absolute answer; depending on where they come fromand what political standpoints they hold, people may have totally different opinions
about it. By taking Taiwan’s position, some articles, such as Articles 5 and 7, can be20

treated as a great improvement to China’s original Taiwan strategy because they offer
the possibility of common grounds for future negotiation and cooperation. However, themost important thing of the Anti-Secession Law is the action of establishing this law.
On the one hand, if China identifies Taiwan as taking any action to achieve secession
from China, the Anti-Secession Law legalizes China’s attack over Taiwan. On the other
hand, this law also limits the PRC government to attack Taiwan without any otherpurposes. In addition, China’s Taiwan strategies usually were revealed in the statementsor speeches by important political leaders of the PRC government. Different leaders
may have different thoughts, and this kind of revelation is hard for Taiwanese
authorities to expect and predict China’s Taiwan strategies. The advantage the ROC
government can take from this law is to realize the PRC’s measures and procedures ofseeking peaceful reunification and its bottom line in order to prevent unnecessary
conflicts and unexpected consequences.
Another implication of the Anti-Secession Law is its recognition of the current
separate situation in the Taiwan Straits, even though this law does not include Jia
Qinglin’s statement about recognizing the present separation of the two sides across the
Taiwan Straits. However, according to the broad, ambiguous definition of Article 8 in
the Anti-Secession Law, if China does not attack Taiwan now, it means that China
recognizes that, in present situation, Taiwan is not seeking any secession from China. In
other words, the goal of this law is to achieve a future peaceful reunification, but it
indirectly recognizes and allows the existence of two separate political entities across21

the Taiwan Straits. Maintaining the status quo is the one option that has gained support
by the majority in Taiwan. Article 7 of the Anti-Secession Law states that any
consultations and negotiation for achieving peaceful reunification between the two sides
will based on an equal footing. Accordingly, this law actually has had a positive
influence on maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Straits.
According to PRC President’s, Hu Jintao, statement in 2006, he claimed that thetwo sides should hold the “common consensus (spirit) in the 1992 talks” to seek future
reunification. The former chairperson of the major Taiwanese opposition party (KMT),
Lian Chan, suggested that China and Taiwan should consider signing a peacefulagreement that focuses on four aspects: first, Taiwan announcing to abandon seeking for
Taiwan independence; second, China announcing to abandon using forces to deal with
the Taiwan question; third, the status of “no independence, no attack” should maintainfor the next thirty to fifty years, and the future of the two sides should wait for future
consultations; and last, through the integration of regional economic exchanges, the twosides can progressively solve the political conflicts across the Taiwan Straits (Lian,2005). In fact, the Anti-Secession Law may not have an immediate effect on breaking
barriers on the cross-Strait relationship. However, it can still be considered as abreakthrough, or at least an option, to solve the conflicts between China and Taiwan.

22

References
Barash, D. P. (1991). Introduction to Peace Studies. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Inc.
Cabestan, J. P. (1996). “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; Reunification,
Later”, The China Quarterly, Vol. 148, pp. 1260-1283.
Chang, H. J. (2004). “Managing Identity by Naming ‘China’: An Analysis of the
Taiwanese Government’s Term of Address”, Paper presented at the 90th National
Communication Association, Chicago, IL, USA.
Chuang, P. L. (2000, August, 07). “China and Taiwan Should Set Talks Aims”, Taipei
Times, pp. A8.
Deutsch, M. (2000). “Cooperation and Competition”, In M. Deutsch and P. T. Coleman,eds. The handbook of conflict resolution, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc, pp.
21-40.
Jiang, J. Y. (2005, March 15). “The Hard Approach: The Lawmaking of theAnti-Secession Law; The Soft Approach: Wen Gave Olive Branch”, Economic
Daily News, pp. A2.
Lian, C. (2005, March 15). “The Two Sides Should Sign a Peaceful Agreement: No
Independence, No violence for 30-50 years [Letter to the editor]”, United Daily
News, pp. A4.
Lieberthal, K. (2005). “Preventing A War Over Taiwan”, Foreign Affair, Vol. 84, No. 2,
pp. 53-63.
Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan. (n.d.). “The Studies of Cross-Strait Relations”,
Retrieved June 24, 2007, from http://www.peace.org.tw

23

President Chen Delivers the Opening Address of the 29th Annual Meeting of the World
Federation of Taiwanese Association via Live Video Link. (2002, August 4).
Retrieved June 24, 2007, from http://www.president.gov.tw/en
Sheng, L. (2002). China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Statement of the Straits Exchange Foundation. (n.d.). Retrieved June 24, 2007, fromhttp://www.sef.org.tw/
Ury, W. (1993). Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way From Confrontation to
Cooperation. New York: Bantam Books.
Yu, T. (1997). “Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact And Limit of Chinese
Military Coercion”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 7-36.

24