The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and
Diplomacy of Japan Towards the Central Asia

Marat Nurgaliyev

Tokyo, 2008

Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and
Diplomacy of Japan Towards the Central Asia

Introduction

3Part I
Historical Background of the SCO
1.1 Starting the Shanghai process
1.2 Creation of the SCO as a complete international organization

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4
7

Part II
SCO: Interests of Powers
2.1 Russia
2.2 China
2.3 Central Asian states
2.4 The United States and the SCO

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Part IIIThe Policy of Japan in the Central Asia and the SCO
3.1 Development of Japanese diplomacy in the Central Asia
3.2 The future of Japanese policy in the Central Asia
3.3 Japan and the SCO: is cooperation possible?

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Conclusion

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Introduction
On the modern stage the Shanghai Cooperation Organization attracts greatinterest of the international community. Leading actors of the international
relations, such as the United States of America, Japan and European countries
carefully observe over the process of development of the organization. The interestof these countries is mainly related with the lack of information on true activitiesof the SCO and the real essence of the organization. Leaders of the SCO memberstates constantly assure that the organization has peaceful intentions and that the
SCO is not going to start the confrontation with the West. Nevertheless, some steps
and decisions have taken by member-stated in frame of the SCO arouse suspicions
and distrust of leading global powers. Thus, any significant event organized inframe of the organization is often considered as challenge to the West and first of
all to the United States.
Japan, as one of the leading world powers and close partner of Washington
on the international arena, shows the interest to the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization as well. More and more Japanese experts and researchers start
thinking on the SCO development issues. In particular, they want to understandand get an exact idea of the organization and possibilities of cooperation with the
SCO. Current interests of Japan in the Central Asia can explain attention ofJapanese scientists and some politicians to the SCO. It is well known that in recent
times Japan is becoming more active in cooperation with Central Asian countries
in the sphere of atomic energy. Another important factor, which arouses interest ofJapan to the SCO is participation of Russia and China to this organization. In
particular, Moscow and China can put obstacles on the way of Japanese policy in
the Central Asia and even use the mechanism of the SCO for that purposes.
In this regard, in frame of my research I would like to find answers on thefollowing questions:
1. What is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization today?
2. What are the prospects of further development of this organization? In
particular, will it transform into a kind of AntiNATO military alliance or not?
3. What kind of interests does Japan have in the Central Asia today and how
can we describe current positions of Tokyo in the region?
4. Is cooperation between Japan and the SCO possible in future?

3

Part I
Historical Background of the SCO
1.1 Starting the Shanghai Process
After the collapse of the USSR and gaining independence by new states
geopolitical situation in the Central Asian region has radically changed. New
independent states of the region as well as other former parts of the USSR faced a
lot of economic and political problems. Their economies were still interdependent
but they had to create absolutely new relations not only with each other but alsowith great powers, such as Russia, China and the United States. In this regard
Uzbek scientist Farkhod Tolipov stated the following: “The newly independent
countries found themselves, so to speak, doubly confused: by the process of the
new World Order formation that they have to enter on the one hand, and by thenecessity to understand their selfness on the other. In other words, they are in an
awkward state of confusion regarding concept of independence andinterdependence” 1 .
That time one of the instruments of creating and strengthening new relations
was forming new regional structures or frankly speaking internationalorganizations. Following that way (trend), new states accompanied mainly by
Russia started creating different regional forums and organizations. For example:
CIS, Collective Security Treaty, Customs Union, GUAM etc. So “Shanghai Five”
became one of the ways of starting relations between People’s Republic of China
on the one hand and Central Asian states and Russia on the other hand.
Actually that was how Shanghai process started. That time main agenda for“the Shanghai Five” was solving boundary issues.
The history of the SCO standing can be divided on two parts. First part
includes the period from 1996 until the end of 2000. This period can becharacterized as an early development of the organization. This time the “ShanghaiFive” participants made their first steps towards the cooperation and started
creation the legal base for the SCO. Of course it was not made as a kind of goalseeking steps. Actually nobody knew that time what will happen after the ten oreven five years of cooperation. Parties just wanted to get friendly relations forsolving primarily border security issues.
***
On April 26, 1996 heads of states of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan first met in Shanghai. As a result they signed an “Agreement on
confidence measures strengthening in military sphere along the borders”
between China from one hand and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistanfrom the other hand. The “April meeting” became historical one because it started
Shanghai process in fact. During the meeting five heads of states showed their
1

Farkhod Tolipov. The Foreign Policy Orientation of Central Asian States: Positive and Negative Diversification.
Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2007), p. 24-25

4

readiness and strong will for starting cooperation in the new, post cold war age. As
a result of signing the agreement tension along Chinese and post-soviet states
border sufficiently decreased. There were created demilitarized secure areas along
borders and each party had a right to conduct mutual military inspections.
With the beginning of the Shanghai process member-states gained visible
progress in border issues. From that time members of the “Shanghai Five” started
to organize meetings on the highest level on a regular basis. Also there was started
tradition of arrangement meetings on the levels of Heads of governments,
Ministers, National coordinators etc.
One year later after the first meeting, leaders of the “Shanghai Five” met in
Moscow on April 24, 1997. This meeting became fruitful as well. Parties signed
another document called “Agreement on armed forces mutual reduction in theborder area”. That was one more effective step on the way of mutual confidencebuilding.
Next meeting of the “Shanghai Five” was held in 1998 in Almaty,
Kazakhstan. Heads of states of the “Shanghai Five” discussed issues of regional
security cooperation. And the main event of the meeting was signing “Mutual
declaration of the Almaty Meeting participants”. By signing that important
document “Shanghai Five” member-states defined their vision of the world orderand their future intention to create security and maintain regional stability.
In frame of the Shanghai process a new trend appeared in this period. The“Shanghai Five” participants started giving more attention to the issues of regional
economic cooperation.
Fourth meeting of the “Shanghai Five” was organized on August 24-26,
1999 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. During that meeting parties exchanged their views
on regional security situation and mutual cooperation in that sphere. The main
result of the meeting was signing the “Joint Declaration on struggle against
national separatism, religious extremism and trans border criminality”. Thusin this period the “Shanghai Five” started transforming into a new regional
mechanism for solving current security problems mainly related with terrorism andseparatism. These issues were very important for all participants of the Shanghai
process at that time. Russia had serious problems with strong separatist movementin Chechnya 2 . China had to deal with Uigur separatists in Xingjiang Uigur
Autonomous Region 3 . As for Central Asian states they also had a list of security
problems. Tajikistan faced a civil war, which caused political instability andactivation of radical Islamic movements. From time to time religious extremist
movements invaded Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from the territory of Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan did not face that problems directly but it was living in permanent
waiting of destabilization of its Southern neighbors and was ready to any
aggravation of the political situation in Central Asia. Regarding the existed
situation it was easy to understand why actually three comparatively small Central
Asian states were eager to intensify security and economic cooperation with such
2

That time Russia just started the Second Chechen War which lasted from 1999 until 2006
East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – Uigur, militant organization. The main aim of ETIM is creation
independent Islamic state on the territory Xinjiang region of China.
3

5

great powers as Russia and China. Each state of the “Shanghai Five” required
support of each other.
In November 1999 in Bishkek parties organized the first meeting of heads ofthe law-enforcement structures of the “Shanghai Five”.
Starting from 2000 one can see the unprecedented activation of the Shanghai
process. Parties started intensifying their relations. In fact this year was marked byseveral important events in the “Shanghai Five”, such as different meetings on thevarious ministerial levels. In March 2000 Heads of the “Shanghai Five” Defense
Ministries first met in Astana. They discussed military aspects of cooperation
related to the creation of security in the region. In April 20-22, heads of lawenforcement structures met second time in Moscow. 23-rd of June there wasorganized first session of national coordinators of the “Shanghai Five” member
states. On July 4 Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. That was the first meetingon the level the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. As a result parties officially createdthe system of regular meetings of heads of Ministries for Foreign Affairs andpublished mutual communiqué.
On July 5 Dushanbe organized fifth meeting of the heads of states of the“Shanghai Five”. This meeting indicated interest of Uzbekistan in the Shanghai
process. The President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov first time participated to the“Shanghai Five” meeting as an observer. Another result was signing by the headsof states the “Dushanbe Declaration”.
21st of November the “Shanghai Five” experts first met in Moscow to
conduct discussions on the issues related with Afghanistan.
December 18-19 the “Shanghai Five” military experts gathered in Moscow
to finalize the results of military cooperation in the 2000 passed year. By the end of
the meeting the experts accepted the “Shanghai Five” military cooperation plan on
2001.

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1.2 Creation of the SCO as a complete international organization
The second part of the Shanghai process development includes the period
starting from 2001 until present. This period can be characterized as creation of the
SCO as true international organization. The SCO becomes a new actor ofinternational relations. There was started intensive institutional work inside of the
SCO. There were created new organs such as Secretariat and Regional Antiterrorist
Structure. SCO members started giving more attention to the economic issues ofcooperation. So in this period we can see the institutional and functional
development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
After the 9.11.2001 terrorism issues becomes the main security problem in
the world as well as in the region of Central Asia, especially taking into
consideration geographic proximity of Afghanistan to the region. This factor alongwith other important political, economic and geopolitical factors played the role ofimpetus for deepening security cooperation in frame of the SCO. So let’s get somebrief historical background.
***With the beginning of 2001 in frame of the “Shanghai Five” was started
process of inclusion of Uzbekistan into the organization. January 19, 2001
Uzbekistan informed Chinese party that Islam Karimov will take part in Shanghai
summit 2001. Moreover official Tashkent reported that Uzbekistan is ready to
become a member of the Shanghai forum.
As a response to the statement of Uzbekistan Assistant to the Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Guchan met his Central Asian colleagues in
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and discussed with themprospects of Uzbekistan’s membership in the “Shanghai Five”.
April 7, 2001 national coordinators of the “Shanghai Five” met in Almaty
and considered issues related to the Uzbekistan’s future membership in theorganization. After that in the end of April and the first part of June the “ShanghaiFive” members organized several meetings in Moscow and Beijing on the levels ofnational coordinators, deputy ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Annual summit of 2001 was organized in China in the middle of June.
Leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan met
in Shanghai and came to several important decisions which can be fairly called
historical.
• Uzbekistan was admitted to the “Shanghai Five” mechanism and automaticallytransformed it into the Shanghai Six.
• The “Shanghai Five” was recalled to Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) and on June 15 member-states accepted the Declaration of Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. Main aim of the declaration was to transform theShanghai process into a higher level of cooperation.
• SCO members signed “Shanghai convention on war on terrorism, separatismand extremism”. Actually parties developed a concept of three evils in frame ofthe organization.
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• Leaders of the SCO member-states signed “Mutual declaration of heads ofstates of the Republic of Kazakhstan, People’s Republic of China, Kyrgyz
Republic, Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan and republic of
Uzbekistan”.
• Also during the Summit SCO Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed “Temporary
regulations on activity order of the member-states’ National Coordinators
Council. SCO Ministers of Defense signed mutual communiqué as well.
During the final press conference leaders of states emphasized importance of
the above-mentioned results. President of People’s Republic of China Xian Xemin
called birth of a new organization as a historical step. He declared that new
regional structure would form the basis for long-term neighborliness, friendshipand cooperation in the new century. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the
SCO as a very perspective organization. And he marked that the goal of the SCO
member-states is intensification of political and economic partnership,
development of scientific and cultural cooperation.
September 13-14, 2001 SCO Heads of Governments met in Almaty. They
discussed further prospects of economic cooperation and signed Memorandum of
main aims and directions of regional economic cooperation and starting the processof creation of favorable conditions for trade and investments. Another issue
considered during the meeting was terrorist attacks against the United States ofAmerica. In particular Heads of Governments of the SCO member-states declaredthat Shanghai Cooperation Organization is ready to use effective measures and tocooperate in war against terrorism.
On January 7, 2002 an extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairsof the SCO member states was held in Beijing. Ministers of six states exchanged
there opinions on the current issues in Afghanistan, international cooperation in
struggle against terrorism, and strengthening the role of the SCO in regional
security issues.
Also in 2002 SCO member states gained significant success in theinstitutionalization of the organization. Thus in the first part of 2002 SCO memberstates conducted several meetings on different levels to discuss and develop the
problems of further SCO institutionalization. On April 26 SCO Ministers ofForeign Affairs gathered in Moscow to work out above-mentioned issues. Meetingof Heads of law-enforcement structures of SCO member-states was held on May
23 in Astana. Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Trade was held in the end of
May in Shanghai.
As a result during the second Summit of the SCO Heads of states held in St.
Petersburg on June 7 parties signed several important documents such as SCO
Charter, Agreement on Regional Antiterrorist Structure and Mutual declaration of
Heads of states. Signing of these three documents marked intensification of
institutionalization process in Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The Charter of the SCO became a basic document, which defined mainprinciples, intentions and aims of the organization. In particular there were defined
following prior aims of the SCO:
• Strengthening confidence and friendship between member-states;
8• Development of multilateral cooperation to maintain and strengthen peace,security and stability in the region. Assistance in building new, fair anddemocratic international order;• Mutual resistance to terrorism, separatism and extremism, countering illegal
drug and arms trafficking. Countering transnational criminal activities andillegal migration 4 .
Thus SCO Charter clarified main directions in political, economic, socialand cultural cooperation as well. But of course security issues always make main
agenda of the SCO 5 .
Decision to create Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) became very
important in solving Central Asian security issues. Document on creation of RATS
signed on St. Petersburg Summit defined following functional tasks of thisstructure:• Antiterrorist cooperation inside the SCO area and strengthening coordination
with other international organizations on terrorism, separatism and extremism
issues;• Participation in development of international projects of documents aimed on
countering terrorism, separatism and extremism. Cooperation with United
Nations’ Security Council and it’s Antiterrorist Committee as well as with otherinternational organizations to create effective mechanisms that will regulate
global challenges and threats;• Collection and analysis of information related with issues of terrorism,
separatism and extremism. Information should be regularly presented by the
SCO member-states. Creation of RATS data base which will include allcollected information and will help development of antiterrorist cooperation
within the SCO area;• Preparation and organization of international conferences dedicated to issues ofterrorism and the other regional threats. And there is no doubt that this measure
will force exchange of opinions and useful information and stimulate further
cooperation in countering regional security challenges 6 .
During the St. Petersburg Summit another interesting thing took place.
China started using the SCO as an instrument for realization of its politicalinterests. Due to Chinese efforts SCO Ministers of Defense accepted
communiqué, which emphasized that Chinese government is only one legal
government and Taiwan is an integral part of China. Taiwan issues wereconsidered as internal business of China.
April 29, 2003 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO member-states met
in Almaty. During the meeting they mainly discussed institutional building of the
SCO, economic cooperation and security issues in Central Asia and in the world.
One of the most important events of 2003 became Annual SCO Summit,
which was held in Moscow on May 28-29. During the Summit Heads of States
4

SCO Charter // www.sectsco.org
SCO Charter came into a force on September 19, 2003
6
SCO Official website // www.sectsco.org
59signed an agreement on forming and implementation of the SCO budget. Main
agenda of this Annual meeting was improvement of the organization’s
institutionalization. Thus during the meeting parties signed series of documents tostrengthen institutional level of the SCO such as: “Regulations on Council ofHeads of states of the SCO member-states”, “Regulations on Council of Heads ofGovernments”, “Regulations on Coucil of Ministers of Foreign Affairs”,“Regulations on Council of National Coordinators”, “Regulations on consultations
between the Heads of ministries and departments”, “Regulations on the SCO
Secretariat”, “Regulations on the SCO RATS Executive Committee” and“Regulations on permanent representatives in the SCO Secretariat”. Also duringthat meeting parties approved the SCO Executive Secretary, Ambassador Zhang
Deguang and symbols of the SCO.
From August 18 until 23 of 2003 five SCO member-states organized firstjoint antiterrorist exercises. That time Uzbekistan did not take part in.
September 1-2 OSCE meeting on prevention of acts of terrorism took placein Lisbon, Portugal. SCO representative, ambassador of China to Portugal Ma
Enhan informed meeting participants on position and policy of the SCO
concerning terrorism.
September 5 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO member-states met in
Tashkent (Uzbekistan) to discuss issues of further SCO institutionalization as wellas current international and regional problems. Also Ministers of Foreign Affairs
signed protocols on modification of the SCO Charter, Shanghai convention on
struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism, Agreement on the SCO
Regional Antiterrorist Structure. Finalizing their work Ministers published Joint
Communiqué.
At the same time Ministers of Economy and Trade of the SCO memberstates gathered in Kyrgyzstan to conduct exchange of opinions on further
development of regional economic cooperation inside the SCO area. Finally
Ministers of Trade and Economy accepted a program of the SCO multilateral tradeand economic cooperation.
September 10 Ministers of Transport of the SCO member-states met in St.
Petersburg. Participants of the meeting studied issues of creation of multilateralagreement on auto transport, joining of the SCO members to the European
highway transport agreement as well as of further development and improvementof auto transportation highways inside the SCO area.
September 23 meeting of Heads of Governments of the SCO member-states
took place in Beijing. During the meeting participants discussed main SCO
development issues such as economic cooperation and institutionalization of theorganization. There was signed Memorandum on technical start of permanent SCO
organs, ratified program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation between
the SCO member-states as well as budget of the organization in 2004.
On January 15, 2004 Official inauguration ceremony of the SCO Secretariat
took place.
June 17, 2004 the meeting of Heads of states of the SCO member-states took
place in Tashkent – the capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan. There was held
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official ceremony of establishment of the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure in
Tashkent. Establishment of Secretariat in Beijing and Regional Antiterrorist
Structure in Tashkent marked complete institutionalization of the SCO andstarted a new age in the organization’s development.
Also during the Tashkent Summit six Heads of States signed several
important documents such as “Regulations on observer status in SCO”,“Agreement on combating illegal drug trafficking and psychotropic substances”,“Convention on privileges and immunities in the SCO”, “Tashkent Declaration”
etc.
First time in the history of the SCO Annual Summits representatives ofcountries that geographically far from the traditional SCO area attended it. Thus
Leader of Afghanistan Khamid Karzai and Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Luvsangiin Erdenechulun were invited to take part in the summit. As a result of theSummit Mongolia became first official observer to the SCO.
In 2004 and 2005 SCO started intensifying its contacts with otherinternational organizations. Thus in December 2004 Shanghai Cooperation
Organization became an observer in the General Assembly of the United Nations
Organization. In April 2005 there were signed several memorandums on mutual
understanding between the SCO and ASEAN and between the SCO and CIS.
One of the most sensational events in the history of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization took place in Astana (capital of the Republic of
Kazakhstan) during the next Annual SCO Summit held on July 5. The Summit wasrepresented by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev,
President of the Kyrgyz Republic Kurmanbek Bakiyev, President of the Republicof Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmonov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam
Karimov, President of People’s Republic of China Hu Jintao and the President of
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. Also this Summit was participated by the
President of Mongolia Nambaryn Enkhbayar, First Vice-President of IranMokhammad-Reza Aref, Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz, Indian Ministerof Foreign Affairs Natvar Singh and Executive Secretary of the SCO Zhang
Deguang.
As one of the results of the Astana Summit several countries got an observer
status in SCO – Iran, India and Pakistan.
Main result of the Astana Summit became Joint Declaration of the SCO
member-states. Actually parties admitted the importance of counteringinternational terrorism, destruction of its financial base by combating illegal tradeof weapons, drugs and organized transnational criminality. SCO member-states
obliged to cooperate actively in investigation and capture of terrorist, separatist andextremist groups.
At the same time Joint Declaration of the SCO member states signed in
Astana included a statement, which had a strong political and even geopoliticaleffect. Actually in that document member states declared the following:“We support and we will continue supporting international coalition which
conducts antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. We mark positive dynamic instabilization of political situation in Afghanistan. Several SCO countries provided
11

their infrastructure for temporary use by military contingents of coalition
participants as well as their territory and air space for military transit in the interestof coalition.
Taking into account completion of the active phase of the antiterrorist
operation in Afghanistan, SCO member-states consider that it is necessary for
appropriate participants of the antiterrorist coalition to define final terms of stayingof their military contingents on the territory of the SCO member-states” 7 .
In simple terms it means that SCO member-states asked United States towithdraw its military bases and contingent from the territory of Central Asianstates in a very polite form. In particular that time United States had military basein Uzbekistan (Karshi Khanabad) and they used civil airport Manas in Kyrgyzstan
for refilling its planes and helicopters operated in Afghanistan.
Generally speaking Astana declaration evoked strong negative reactionin the West. Most of political scientists and experts in international relations
started considering the SCO more like a kind of Anti-NATO or Anti-Westernalliance than a regional security organization. Getting the observer status in
SCO by Iran just complicated the situation and strengthened these kind ofcritics and suspicions.
Nevertheless SCO continued developing in its prior directions. In the middleof September 2005 SCO delegation headed by Executive Secretary Zhang
Deguang attended as an observer the High-level plenary Meeting of the 60th
session of the United Nations General Assembly.
October 6, 2005 meeting of Heads of the SCO Governments took place in
Moscow. As a result parties signed an Agreement on Inter-bank cooperation andAgreement on cooperation in case of emergency situation. There was held ameeting of the SCO Business Council as well.
June 15, 2006 Annual SCO Summit took place in Shanghai. Heads of six
states signed different documents on security issues including: “Agreement on
conditions of organization and conduction of joint antiterrorist exercises on the
SCO member-states territory”, “Agreement on countering the activity of terrorist,
separatist and extremist groups on the territory of the SCO countries”, “Program of
the SCO member-states on struggling terrorism, separatism and extremism in2007 – 2009”. During the Summit several economic documents were accepted aswell. In particular “Program of support regional economic cooperation between
banks – members of Inter-Bank Union created in frame of the SCO”, “Agreement
between the governments of the SCO member-states on cooperation in the sphereof education” etc.
In 2007 SCO organized two main events, which should be pointed out. Firstwas conducting of joint military exercises “Peaceful mission 2007” on the territoryof Russia on August 9-17. Antiterrorist exercises “Peaceful mission 2007” became
the largest in the history of the SCO. About 4 000 military staff from all SCO
member-states were involved in the exercises. And it is no wonder that these

7

SCO Astana Declaration // www.centrasia.ru

12exercises were considered by most of western analysts as a demonstration of power
directed mainly against the United States of America.
The second event was traditional Annual SCO Summit that took place inBishkek on August 16, 2007. Most of experts expected that SCO would makeanother offensive declaration concerning the policy of the United States and evenWest as a whole. But it did not happen. Parties signed three main documents that
did not become a sensation in the international life. Those were “Agreement on
long-term neighborliness, friendship and cooperation between the SCO memberstates”, “Bishkek declaration of Heads of states” and “Joint communiqué of the
SCO Heads of states”.
***
Analyzing historical background of the SCO we can see the evolution ofmultilateral cooperation between Central Asian states and Russia on the one hand
and China on the other hand. Initially the “Shanghai Five” was created as an
instrument for solving border issues between member-states. And it really
succeeded in that sense. Later participants of the Shanghai process decided totransform the forum into a multifunctional organization. Thus, leaders of the SCO
member-states signed several documents for development of relations in spheres of
security, economy, transport, communications, culture, education etc.
It is also seen that international contacts of the SCO are growing up lastyears. In 2004 Mongolia became a first observer state in the SCO. In 2005 Pakistan,
Iran and India became SCO observers as well. Byelorussia and Sri-Lanka officiallydeclared on their intension to become SCO observers. SCO is getting a greatinterest of the European Union, CIS and East Asian countries. In December 2004
SCO became an observer to the General Assembly of the UN. In spring 2005 SCO
signed Memorandums of Mutual Understanding with such internationalorganizations as ASEAN and CIS. On May 2006 the same agreement was signed
between the SCO and Integration Committee of the Eurasian Economic
Community.
Thus, we can mark following trends appeared during the SCO developmentin the second historical period (i.e. starting from 2000):• The process of institutionalization was started inside of the SCO.
• SCO member-states started giving more attention to the economic part of thecooperation.
• Some SCO member-states started using the organization as an instrument forachievement of political goals on the international arena.
• Western countries and the US started considering the SCO negatively.
• At the same time SCO extend its contacts on the international arena.

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Part II
SCO: Interests of Powers
In the second part of the research author will try to give analysis of theinterests of main powers and main actors of the SCO. Those are Russia, China andCentral Asian states. At the same time it is necessary to consider modern relations
between the SCO and the United States of America, because activities of the SCO
sometimes counter the US strategic interests in Central Asia. One more important
fact is that US is a still global power and it is able to have influence on the regional
processes and the SCO as well. On the other hand the SCO can not ignore thepolicy of the United States in Central Asia, because this region is the main interest
sphere of the organization.
Author believes that analysis of the interests of powers in the SCO will givea full portrait of modern trends that take place inside the organization. It will help
to understand different approaches to the SCO as well, which come from its
member-states.
***
2.1 Russia. Interests of Russia in the SCO are closely related with its
geopolitical ambitions in the region of Central Asia. On the modern stage Russia
needs the SCO first of all because of the necessity of strengthening leadership of
Moscow in the region. Moscow considers Central Asia as an area of its legal andtraditional interests. In this regard the SCO is a quite effective instrument forstrengthening political ties with heads of Central Asian states.
For example, during the SCO Summit 2005 held in Astana participants of
the organization let the United States see that they are not interested in long term
military presence of the US military forces in Central Asia. I consider that this step
was made first of all in the interests of Moscow. With the beginning of the US
military operation in Afghanistan “Operation Enduring Freedom” Russia starts
worrying about the Washington’s intentions (to reduce Russia’s impact) in Central
Asia. In particular, the United States sufficiently enlarged military and politicalcooperation with Central Asian countries. US deployed military bases in
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. NATO set its base in Tajikistan. Turkmenistan started
helping the US in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and trans-border security
strengthening issues. Kazakhstan gave the United States’ air forces access forusing its air space for the needs of antiterrorist coalition. In this regard the SCO
declaration signed in Astana contributed to strategic defeat of the United States inCentral Asia. Of course such kind of situation comes first of all close to Russianinterests. Therefore after that declaration Washington had to withdraw its militarybase “Karshi-Khanabad” from the territory of Uzbekistan. Disputes around theissues of using Kyrgyz airport by American military forces appeared as well.
Nevertheless as a result of series of negotiations held between Kyrgyz andAmerican government United States saved its military base in Kyrgyzstan, but
annual rent sufficiently increased. American expert Martha B. Olcott describes
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appeared situation as following: “Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiev reaffirmed
the status of the base during a visit by Secretary of Donald Ramsfeld to Kyrgyzstan
in August 2005, shortly after Bakiev’s election, but the negotiations over the basecontinued for over a year, after the new government demanded $200 million
annually in rent. In the end, the Kyrgyz and US governments agreed to basearrangement that included rent for the base as a part of a larger and broader foreignassistance package. But the basing issue will continue arise, and is likely to remaina factor causing friction between the two countries, as both the opposition and thegovernment remain “suspicious” of the US, the government in part because it iscommitted to trying to balance relations with the US with close ties with both
Russia and China, and the opposition because they feel that the US has not been
supportive enough of their efforts to continue the “Tulip Revolution” that ousted
Akaev until a real democratic system is introduced in Kyrgyzstan” 8 . Thus, theSCO declaration signed in Astana had great political and impressive effects as well.
The image of the United States of America as the only one global superpower
trembled. United States could not stand against the common will of Central Asianstates (in particular of Uzbekistan) decisively supported by Moscow and Beijing.
Thus, one can mark that Russia tries to use the SCO as an instrument forrealization its own geopolitical interests in Central Asia.
On the other hand SCO is one of the basic platforms for creation of effective
cooperation with China. Annual summits on the level of heads of states contributeto strengthening personal contacts between leaders of Moscow and Beijing. And it
certainly helps the development of bilateral Russian-Chinese comprehensive
relations in the spheres of economy, policy, energy and security.
Actually political cooperation with China is one of the most important
issues for Russia, because it helps to counter ambitions of the United States in
the Central Asia. In this regard Russia considers the SCO as an important
construction for strengthening political relations with China as well. There is no
doubt that it is much difficult challenge for the United States to stand against
united position of two regional powers than if Russia will do it itself.
At the same time a lot of experts consider that Russia and China started
latent rivalry inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization along with the evident
fruitful cooperation. I think that the main reason of that trend lies in historicalbackground or traditional distrust between China and Russia appeared during thesoviet past and still remained at present. Military and political establishment of
Russia still consider China as a potential rival. Suspicions of Russia arestrengthening against the background of the Chinese economic activity in Central
Asia. Actually trade between China and Central Asian states has positively
growing dynamics and the volume of trade doubles every two years. Chinesecompanies and corporations occupies sufficient niche in the energy sector ofCentral Asian countries. Development of trade with China is highly important for
all Central Asian states. Investments coming from China to Central Asian states are
8

Martha Brill Olcott. Eyes on Central Asia: How to Understand the Winners and Losers. Eager eyes fixed on
Eurasia (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2007) p. 7-8

15

growing. For example, today China is one of major investors in Kazakhstan’s oil
industry. There are several oil and gas transportation projects developing between
China and Kazakhstan as well. Kyrgyzstan hopes to become a gateway for flow ofChinese products to the West 9 . In this connection it is important to mark that
Kremlin considers Central Asia as a zone of its traditional interests and any
country which can counter or even argue that interests becomes potential rival of
Russia. Growing military potential of China worries Russia as well. China is a
nuclear power which is able to make sufficient influence on development ofpolitical processes on the regional and global scales. On the top of all China havevery ambitious plans in domesticating space.
Current latent rivalry between Russia and China in frame of the SCO can beseen in the following example. At present time China is planning to realize costive
railway project that will connect the territories of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and
China. At the same time during the last SCO Summit held in Bishkek in 2007
Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev
the amount of $2 billion for the development of joint economic project in case of
Kyrgyz part will be able to propose Moscow concrete project of technical andeconomic reason.
Murat Laumulin characterizes current Russian-Chinese relations in frame of
the SCO in the following way: “Russian military community views the promotionof cooperation with China within the framework of the SCO as indispensable, but
remain divided over the extent of such strategic military cooperation in light ofpossible rivalry between the two. The Russian General Staff does not consider
China to be a reliable partner, and refuses to sell certain military equipment andtechnologies deemed too sensible. Russia is also unwilling to sell China any kindof license to manufacture complex arms systems. Moscow is clearly becoming
concerned about growth of Chinese influence in Central Asia and the region’s
increasing dependence on China” 10 .
One more important interest of Russia in the SCO is that Moscow is morethan any other member-state is interested in strengthening of the military andpolitical component of the organization. In this regard joint military exercises“Peaceful Mission 2007” conducted in frame of the SCO on Russian territory (inAugust 9-17) are very illustrative. In particular, Russia became the main initiator,
donor and the most active participant of the exercises as well. According to theMass Media information 4 700 soldiers, helicopters Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-28H and jetplanes Su-25 presented Russia in that exercises. At the same time Chinese presenceat the exercises was comparatively less, especially taking into consideration thequantity of regular People’s Liberation Army of China. Thus, 1 700 soldiers,
helicopters G-9, Mi-17 and jet-planes G-7A presented Chinese party. Participationof Central Asian states in these trainings was comparatively insignificant.
Amphibious companies presented Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan did not
9Martha Brill Olcott. Eyes on Central Asia: How to Understand the Winners and Losers. Eager eyes fixed on
Eurasia (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2007) p. 17
10
Murat Laumulin. The Geopolitics of XXI Century in Central Asia (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies,
Almaty, 2007), p. 146

16

send its soldiers at all. Uzbek officers took part only during the exercises inheadquarters 11 .
On more interesting fact is that Russia covered almost all expenses relatedwith organization of these exercises. The total sum was more than 2 billion
Russian rubles. These facts clearly indicate that Russia is more than otherparticipants is interested in strengthening military and political component of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Actually it is not hard to understand this kindof intentions of Moscow. They are strongly related with deterioration of relations
between the Russia and the United States of America. The speech presented byPresident Putin in February 2007 in Munich clearly indicated modern mood of
Kremlin, which mean that Russia is not going to bear with global unilateralleadership of Washington. Current Russian-American relations have a list of
problems and it can be estimated as very complicated. Mutual critics come alongwith almost any significant international issue. For example the issues around
Kosovo independence, bilateral relations between Russia on the one hand andGeorgia and Ukraine on the other hand, Iranian nuclear problem, plans of the US
on deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile System in Eastern Europe, NATOenlargement, democracy problems in Russia etc. The policy of the United States
bothers strategic interests of Russia and Moscow as a response try to counterthe policy of Washington starting its own initiatives. In this regard the SCO isa demonstration of Russian political power in the Central Asian region.
Strengthening of military and political component in frame of the SCO will
indicate the US that Russia is still leading power in Central Asia.
Moreover during the SCO Summit held in August 2007 in Bishkek, Russian
leader Vladimir Putin made several claims, which gave rise to concern in the
United States. Thus, he marked the necessity of strengthening the militarycomponent of the organization and made a proposal on conducting annual military
exercises on the territories of the SCO members. On the top of all Vladimir Putinannounced that Russian strategic aviation starts air alert in far regions.
Thus, it is necessary to mark that Russian interests in the SCO aredetermined by the following factors:
First, Russia tries to use the SCO as an instrument for protection of its
interests in the Central Asia.
Second, Russia needs political cooperation with China to counter
ambitions of the US in Central Asia.
Third, Russia is interested in enlargement of military component of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

11

www.shos2007.ru

17

2.2 China. Starting of the Shanghai process gave China the possibility tostart cooperation with countries of Central Asian region. The prior interest of
China in its relations with Central Asian states at that time was security provision
for Chinese western borders. One of the most important concerns of Beijing at thatmoment was regulation and getting control over Uighur separatist movement in
Xing Jiang. In this regard China strived for getting overall support from its Central
Asian partners. Beijing wanted to receive guarantees that none of Central Asianstates would ever support Islamic separatists in Chinese western province.
Shanghai process became an effective mechanism in solving that problem for
China.
After receiving the guaranties of western borders security China starts
changing its priorities in frame of the SCO. Today, Beijing considers the SCO as aplatform for enlargement of Chinese impact in Central Asia. In contrast to Russia,
China does not have a lot of possibilities for multilateral cooperation with Central
Asian states. In this regard SCO is only one structure giving such kind of chance toChina.
On the modern stage China is trying to get the image of peaceful economic
power. It wants to be seen as a leading Asian country, which promotes economic
development and stability and stands for the interests of developing countries on
the international arena. For example Chinese author Sun Zhuangzhi gives
following description of the modern China: “China has an active economy andadheres to the policy of reform and opening to the world. The opportunities
provided by its large market have a strong appeal to every country. China can also
firmly and unshakably represent the interests of the developing countries ininternational affairs” 12 . Regarding these principles China supports the ideas ofstrengthening economic cooperation in frame of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. Current Chinese position in the SCO is determined by the following
factors:• One of the main factors is geopolitical. At the present times China does notwant to aggravate relations with West and escalate rivalry with the UnitedStates of America in Central Asia. In this regard Beijing is against thetransformation of the SCO into a kind of military alliance/block, which willdefinitely work against the USA. In this case interests of Russia and China in
the SCO are totally different.
• Economic factor. China considers Central Asian region as a prospective
market for Chinese products. Reasonable prices of Chinese production make it
attractive and competitive on this market. Thus, China actively promotes theidea of creation of Free Trade Zone in frame of the SCO 13 .
• Energy factor. On the modern stage energy resources of Central Asian states
attracts more and more interest of Chinese investors. Chinese energy companies
such as CNPC are highly presented in the Central Asian energy market. In this12

Sun Zhuangzhi, The Relationship between China and Central Asia. Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia (Hokkaido
University, Sapporo, 2007), p. 45
13
Chinese promote idea of creation of Free Trade Zone in frame of the SCO. Partners against // June 9, 2006
www.centrasia.ru

18

connection for China the SCO may become an effective mechanism fordeepening relations with Central Asian states and Russia in the sphere of energy.
• Strategic factor. China considers that strengthening of economic cooperationin frame of the SCO will contribute to enhance Chinese positions and influencein the region. Beijing understands that Russia has very strong ties with Central
Asian countries, which are determined by common history, culture, language,
mentality and the other important factors. Thus, enlargement of economic
cooperation in frame of the SCO and as a result growing of Chinese capital in
the economies of Central Asian states will afford China strengthen own
influence in the region in future. Taking into account that fact Chinese
representatives in the SCO periodically perform with the ideas of necessity ofstarting large-scale economic projects in frame of the SCO, which will be
conducted under the Chinese financial support. For example, at the end of
October 2005 during the regular session of Council of Heads of Governments,
which was held in Moscow, Chinese representatives attempted to steer thedevelopment of the SCO toward strengthened economic cooperation. Wen
Jiabao, Chinese Premier declared that China is ready to give $900 million for
financing of joint economic projects. Chinese part was promoting the idea ofheavy subsidizing the economies of the SCO member-states and attempting totransform the political organization into an economic one 14 .
There is no doubt that China as well as Russia does not exclude the prospectof confrontation between Moscow and Beijing because of the rivalry and collisionof interests in the Central Asia. In this regard one can suppose that China isdeveloping its own tactics towards the Central Asia, the SCO and Russia.
At the same time one cannot deny that China needs political support ofRussia as well. Moscow and China traditionally hold the common position inseveral issues of current international policy, such as reforming the United Nations
Organization, OSCE, countering terrorism etc. In frame of the SCO after
presenting Astana declaration in 2005 China received own profits of that as well.
Weakening of positions of the United States in Central Asia corresponds strategic
and security interests of China.

14

Murat Laumulin. The Geopolitics of XXI Century in Central Asia (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies,
Almaty, 2007), p. 139

19

2.3 Central Asian States. There are different opinions about the advantages
for Central Asian states in participating at the SCO at present times. Diversity ofviews is closely related with the fact that four Central Asian countries –Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – are totally different fromtheir partners at the Shanghai process – China and Russia. It is very easy tounderstand the difference if we compare economic potential, territory, politicalpower and the other important factors of the member-states of the SCO. On the one
hand there are four young and small Central Asian countries, which gained their
independence only after the cold war. And on the other hand the SCO includes two
powerful and mature states, both pretending to be regional powers at least. Taking
into account marked features it is very hard to compare Central Asian states with
Russia or China as equal participants of the SCO. This fact arouses interest of
many experts and forces them to think on the following question: “Are there any
real advantages for Central Asian states in participating to the SCO?” In this partof the research I will try to give answer on this question.
For example the following description of the SCO today was given by wellknown Kazakh expert Murat Laumulin: “What initially stands out about thisorganization is the disproportion between its members: it includes giants such as
China and Russia on the one hand, and considerably smaller Central Asian stateson the other – in terms of their political weight, the scale of their economies, theirdemography and the size of their territories” 15 .
Uzbek scientist Farkhod Tolipov describes modern SCO in a same manner:“It consists of two global powers and four relatively small, weak Central Asianstates. These are not just six states but rather, six unequal states, from theviewpoint of political, economic, military, demographic and social potential. So in
reality, the SCO is a potentially asymmetric organization” 16 .
I think that participation of Central Asian countries to the SCO gives themadvantages and disadvantages as well. Let’s consider them in details further.
Participation to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization gives Central Asianstates following advantages:• Participation in the SCO correspond the multi-vector policy of Central
Asian states, which is the main principle of their foreign policy. Being
member of the SCO and at the same time collaborating with security
organizations (for example with NATO in frame of the “Partnership for Peace
Program”) Central Asian states get a possibility of balancing between theinterests of East and West. Again, participating to the SCO allow Central Asianstates balancing between the interests of Moscow and Beijing, especially taking
into account latent rivalry between these two powers. Such kind of tactics,
which is called “multi-vector policy”, is the most effective one for the Central
Asian countries and they use it from early creation of their own foreign policy.

15

Murat Laumulin. The Geopolitics of XXI Century in Central Asia (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies,
Almaty, 2007), p.135
16
Farkhod Tolipov. The Foreign Policy Orientation of Central Asian States: Positive and Negative Diversification.
Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2007), p. 29

20

• Some Central Asian states, the same as Russia and China, are trying to use
the SCO in their own political interests. For example, Uzbekistan has
radically changed its foreign policy vector after the well-known disorders inAndijan took place in May 2005. Uzbek President Islam Karimov started close
cooperation with Kremlin and cut off his friendly relations with West and theUnited States. After establishment of allied relations with Russia 17 Uzbekistan
starts strengthening cooperation with the SCO as well. And such situation isbeneficial for Uzbekistan, taking into account that all participants of the SCO
support regime of Islam Karimov. For example, in case of West start criticizing
Uzbek regime and making pressure-using OSCE, Shanghai Cooperation
Organization is able to make a stand for Uzbekistan as a very authoritative
organization. Thus, after the last presidential elections held in Uzbekistan in
December 2007, Election Observation Mission from the SCO publisheddeclaration where they marked that the elections were legitimate and compliedwith all international and democratic standards 18 . The declaration was made inspite of the numerous critics, which came from the West and internationalorganizations such as the OSCE. Thus, political benefits that give membershipin the SCO to Uzbekistan are well seen.
• In order to achieve leadership in Central Asia Russia and China promote
different economic projects in frame of the SCO. Major financial projects,
which can be realized under the aegis of the SCO, are potentially very
profitable for the economic development of the Central Asian countries.
For example, there is list of plans for development of regional transport andcommunication potential, construction of modernized highways, rebirth of thelegendary Silk Way in frame of the SCO etc.
• One more important issue for the Central Asian countries is security. In case of
appearance of terrorist threat in the CA (that kind of threat can not be excludedin future, taking into account geographic proximity of such countries like
Afghanistan or Pakistan, where political situation is far from stability), SCO
can become an effective tool for collective cooperation in this sphere andneutralization of activities of different religious and extremist
organizations.
Along with evident benefits for Central Asian states in participation to the
SCO, it is necessary to mark some negative aspects of such cooperation as well,which can threaten national interests of the Central Asian countries. In particular,
we can emphasize that some unfavorable consequences for the CA states comingfrom the participation to the SCO have latent feature:• The prospect of escalation of rivalry between the key players in the SCO –Russia and China, do not correspond the interests of the Central Asianstates. In case of situation will develop according to this scenario Central Asian
countries will be forced to make a choice between Russia and China. And there
is no doubt that the choice will be made in the prejudice of relations with one of17

In November 2005 Uzbekistan and Russia signed an agreement on allied relations, which guaranteed the safety ofIslam Karimov’s regime and political support from Moscow.
18
December 24, 2007 //www.sectsco.org

21the parties. Of course this kind of prospect does not fit interests of any Central
Asian country because both of Russia and China are important political andeconomic partners.
• The possibility of transformation of the SCO into a kind of specificmechanism to promote mutual control of Russian-Chinese tandem over theCentral Asian region can not be excluded as well. This prospect also is notcorresponding interests of Central Asian countries, which will becomecompletely dependent on political and economic decisions of Moscow and
Beijing and as one of the negative results loose the possibility of strengthening
cooperation with Western countries. There is also no benefit for the Central
Asian countries in case of only one power inside of the SCO (Russia or China)
will get major positions. For example, Farkhod Tolipov marks that evennowadays politicians and analysts percept the SCO as a kind of RussianChinese joint project to establish control over the Central Asia and prevent
entrance of the United States. “In any case, however, with or without the US
presence, Russian-Chinese geopolitical control of this kind is just another formof external dominance of the region’s countries and of their falling into a newform of dependence” 19 .
• The prospect of strengthening anti-western moods inside of the SCO is also
undesirable for the Central Asian states. But it can easily happen, especially
if one will take into account aggravation of bilateral relations between Russia
and the US.
In this regard an interesting point on the SCO perception by Kazakhstan wasgiven by Murat Laumulin: “The SCO in the mode seen in Moscow and Beijing may
become another sizable challenge to the development of Kazakhstan. That is to say,as an influential international organization of geopolitical dimensions, in which
China and Russia will undoubtedly dominate, Central Asian states are likely to be
assigned the role of “guided”” 20 .
At the same time, considering listed negative moments of cooperation for
the Central Asian countries, one have to mark that unfavorable consequences ofcooperation in frame of the SCO have mostly hypothetic and not evident character.
All these listed negative scenarios can happen in future but at the same time one
should not exclude the possibility that the SCO will develop in a more constructive
and favorable way for its Central Asian members. At least, until the present times
Central Asian states have not felt any negative consequences, which came out of
the cooperation in this organization. For example, if existing economic projects inframe of the SCO will be successfully realized (which are aimed on common
regional development) Central Asian states will definitely get their profit. On theother hand the SCO could become less politicized organization and concern more
about the current regional security problems such as countering illegal drugs traffic,
which comes from Afghanistan. Countering illegal drug trade correspond the19

Farkhod Tolipov. The Foreign Policy Orientation of Central Asian States: Positive and Negative Diversification.
Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2007), p. 29
20
Murat Laumulin. The Geopolitics of XXI Century in Central Asia (Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies,
Almaty, 2007), p. 153

22

interests of all members of the SCO. Weather or no we cannot deny that there arecommon interests inside the SCO. Thus, member-states should concentrate oncooperation in these critical spheres to achieve significant results. In case of using
the SCO as an instrument for realization of only own political interests by eachmember-state it is hardly to believe that the SCO will ever become an organization,
which is able to solve effectively current vital issues of the Central Asian region.

***
2.4 The United States and the SCO. Considering modern development of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization it is necessary to give some attention to thedevelopment of relations of the organization with the outer world, in particularwith global powers. In this regard the most interesting thing for analysis isrelations between the SCO and the United States of America. Western Mass Media
often calls the SCO as an anti-western military block, which has primarily antiAmerican activity – countering its interests in the Central Asia.
Activity of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization attracts more and more
attention of George W. Bush Administration. In comparison with the past times
American politicians and scientists are more interested in the issues of the SCO
development in our days.
Nevertheless at present United States does not have any clear strategy
towards the SCO. For example, in spite of evident political and economic activityof the organization, SCO was not even mentioned in the National Security Strategyof the US published in 2006. Thus, current policy of the United States towards the
SCO can be characterized as not active and mostly contends of wait-and-see
attitude. Position of the United States towards the SCO can mainly be seen in
declarations and performances of high-ranking officials of the US government andthe other officers, which are made as a response on particular actions of theorganization. Thus, for example, after the Astana declaration of the SCO Heads ofstates regarding the terms of withdrawal of American military bases from Central
Asia 21 , Chamber of Representatives of the American Congress accepted resolution
where United States “expressed concerns” about the SCO declaration. Such kind of
American position is determined by the following objective factors:¾ At present stage USA analyzing the potential of the SCO. On the back ofother important international issues (such as Middle East policy, military
operations of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear program of Iran etc.)
SCO becomes the second level problem for the US. Moreover last years SCO
did not make any provoking steps against the USA. Member-states of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization continue declaring that the SCO is not ananti-western military block on the official level.
¾ American politicians, scientists and experts do not know much about thereal essence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This fact does not
21

SCO Summit in Astana took place in June 2005

23

contribute to creation of determined American policy or even position regarding
the SCO. For example, Assistant to the State Secretary for South and Central
Asia Richard Baucher during his performance in the Chamber ofRepresentatives of the American congress in 2007 did not even mention the
SCO. Moreover R. Baucher – the person who in fact is charge of policy making
in the regions of Caucasus and Central Asia, answering on the question related
to the SCO could not correctly give the information on present member-statesof this organization. Indeed, the lack of information about the SCO among
American experts and politicians contributes to making wrong valuation of the
SCO by the White House.
On the top of all vacuums in the critical information on the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization creates predominantly/mainly negative image in mindsof American political elites.
At the same time SCO has some potential threats for the strategic interests of
the United States in the Central Asia. In particular, development of the SCO as aregional organization includes following trends which give rise for concerns in
administration of the White House:¾ Enhancement of the cooperation between Russia and China. Moreover one
can not exclude that present cooperation between these two powers willtransform into a real union, which will actively protect own strategic interests in
the Central Asia. And of course such activity will go against the interests of the
Washington in the region.
¾ Different regional actors and powers give more and more attention to the
SCO. First of all India and Pakistan expressed their desire to become membersof the SCO. Iranian interest in the SCO raises specific concerns of the USA. In
case of Teheran will finally get membership in the SCO it would be muchharder for the United States continuing political pressure on this state regarding
Iranian nuclear program. Moreover membership of Iran in the SCO will preventthe plans of the US to isolate Iran from all external political and economic
processes. On the top of all Iranian membership in the SCO will completely
make this organization anti-western.
¾ Concentration of military, political, economic and geopolitical processes inCentral Asian region around Russia and China. Enlargement of complex
cooperation of the Central Asian states with Russia and China in frame of the
SCO, especially in spheres of energy, transport, communications and security
does not fit the interests of the Washington.
¾ SCO is completely ignoring the United States of America during its
activities. Thus, United States were not presented on the last SCO Summit,
took place in Bishkek on August 16, 2007. United States requested to send theirobserver to the SCO military exercises “Peaceful Mission 2007” as well. The
request was declined at first. 13th of August representatives of the American
Embassy in Beijing and Authorities of the exercises declared that Americans
would not accept permission to take part in the event. Nonetheless the SCO
gave permission the US and NATO to send their representatives.
24

Listed trends, which have regular development in frame of the SCO
contributes the Administration of George W. Bush to percept the SCO as apotential threat for the American interests. The popular opinion on the Westthat the SCO is military alliance created against NATO attracts special interest.
Taking into account negative trends developing inside the SCO UnitedStates make steps directed on weakening the political role of the organization in
the region of the Central Asia. Thus, one of the most significant political initiativesof the Washington regarding the SCO for the last years became strategic plans of
the US to create alternative regional organization in the Central Asia. In particular,
after the well-known SCO Summit, which took place in Astana in June 2005,
Washington proposed new initiative of creation regional forum on cooperation anddevelopment of Great Central Asia (Project of Great Central Asia). In August 2005
famous American expert Frederick Starr published an article where he was proving
the necessity of creation of such kind of forum and on its economic benefits for theCentral Asian states.
According to the strategic plans of the Washington PGCA Forumshould duplicate functions of already existing regional organizations, first of
all the SCO and the OSCT and finally push them out of the geopolitical spaceof the Central Asia. Thus, the United States are intended to lead Central
Asian states out of the influence of Russia and China and establish own
strategic dominance in the region.
However, considering the reality of the development of political situation in
Afghanistan, active support and realization of the Project of Great Central Asia as
an alternative to the SCO is not possible in our days. Creation of economic andpolitically stable Afghanistan is key condition for further development of theAmerican Project PGCA.
At the same time one cannot exclude the possibility of activation of NATOin the Central Asia as an American response in case of strengthening militarycomponent of the SCO. At present time programs of NATO on strengthening
military and political cooperation with Central Asian states becoming the most realcounterbalance to the SCO.
Generally, position of the United States towards the SCO is notcritically negative, yet the administration of George W. Bush does not deny
the possibility of threat coming from the SCO. Thus, statement of the US
Assistant State Secretary for South and Central Asia Richard Baucher regarding
the SCO, which he made on April 10, 2007, is very illustrative. In particular, hemarked that the SCO is economic organization. And United States does not haveany problems with the SCO regarding the economic issues. At the same time heemphasized that the United States hope that during the next SCO Summit in
Bishkek participants of the meeting would not go out of the law sides and that theUnited States does not want other countries to dictate their policy on any meeting
participants. Therefore, US Assistant State Secretary gave the SCO members tounderstand that the Washington did not want the aggravation of relations with the
SCO.
25

***
In general we have to mark that there is no SCO member (who somehow
participate to the SCO development) who is interested in unilateral enhancement of
only one power in the Central Asia. On the contrary, each of external actors istrying to strengthen its own strategic, economic and geopolitical positions in theregion and use the SCO for that purposes. Such kind of situation constantly creates
potential for escalation of rivalry in the Central Asia.
As for the Central Asian countries, they are not interested in domination of
only one power in the Central Asia as well, because it will reduce vital space for
their diplomatic maneuvers. In this regard the aim of Central Asian states in frameof the SCO is to prevent unilateral enhancement of positions of particular actor.
Therefore, leaders of the Central Asian states are trying to develop equal
relationships with West as well as with East. Unfortunately, at present times they
do not have other reasonable alternatives.

26

Part IIIThe Policy of Japan in the Central Asia and the SCO
3.1. Development of Japanese Diplomacy in the CA
The policy of Japan towards the Central Asia after the end of the Cold War
passed through several stages. With appearance of new independent players in theregion Japan starts making steps towards developing relations with post soviet
states. On its first stages regional policy of Japan was mainly concentrated on thedevelopment of bilateral relations with Central Asian countries. Thus, in 1992
Japan established first diplomatic contacts with Uzbekistan. Later, gradually and ina stable manner Japan established bilateral relations with other Central Asian
countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The first regional strategy of Japan towards the Central Asia was “Eurasian
Diplomacy”, declared by Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1997. It
is necessary to mark that the strategy of “Eurasian Diplomacy” appeared as apractical result of Obuchi Mission, which was conducted from July 28 until June 9,
1997. Obuchi Mission became first significant diplomatic initiative of Japan
towards the Central Asia. Members of the mission visited Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and laid a foundation for the long-termcooperation in future22 . At that time one of the most important tasks of Japan was
creation of new relations with countries of the post soviet union and strengthening
own positions in the region. It is important to emphasize that at the same time
Japan considered the Central Asia only as one of parts of broader space – Eurasiancontinent, i.e. at that time Japan did not have any defined strategy towards theconcrete region – Central Asia. “Eurasian Diplomacy” had broader destination. But
anyway there is no doubt that “Eurasian Diplomacy” of Prime Minister Hashimoto
became significant contribution to strengthening relations and enlargement ofcontacts between Japan and Central Asian countries.
Starting from 2004 Japan changes its previous approach towards the Central
Asian region. In particular, in 2004 under the management of Minister of Foreign
Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi Japan developed and launched new project, which wascalled “Central Asia + Japan” Dialogue. Due to the new regional project initiatedby Japan relations between Tokyo and Central Asian countries reach institutional
character. In particular, members of the “Central Asia + Japan” forum defined
main aims and tasks of the new structure, which included the strengthening ofregional security and economic development of Central Asian states. Participantsof the forum started important tradition. In particular, “Central Asia + Japan”
Dialogue members started organizing meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on
the regular basis. During the meetings parties normally discuss current issues ofregional economic and security cooperation.

22

Yuasa Takeshi. Japan’s Multilateral Approach toward Central Asia. Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia (Hokkaido
University, Sapporo, 2007), P. 70

27

Thus, in June 2006 during the second meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the participants to the “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue parties
accepted an important document, which determined prior directions of cooperation
between Japan and the Central Asian countries for the middle term perspective,
which was called Action Plan of the “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue. In frameof the Action Plan participants to the Forum came to the following key decisions:
9 Cooperation in the international arena. Japan and Central Asian statesagreed that the reform of the United Nations Organization and Security Council
is needed, in order to deal with current global threats and challenges. Japansupported idea of creation Nuclear Weapon Free Trade Zone in the Central Asia.
Parties decided to continue cooperation on the international arena trough suchinternational organizations as United Nations, the Conference on Interaction
and Confidence-Building Measures in the Central Asia (CICA) and Asia
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD).
9 Promotion of cooperation on the regional level. Japan confirmed its readinessto support efforts of Central Asian states in creation of stability on the regional
level. In particular, in such vital spheres as countering terrorism and illegal drugtrafficking, clearance of anti-personnel mines, reduction of poverty,
improvement of health and medical care standards on the regional level, support
in solving regional environmental issues, reduction and prevention of natural
disasters, development of the regional water and energy potential, activation ofregional trade and investment process, providing assistance for the developmentof transport infrastructure in the Central Asia.
9 Promotion of business. Japan and Central Asian states expressed theirintention to set up a joint government-business working group on economic
issues within the framework of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue with aview to studying cross-regional projects and other related matters. Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan expressed their intention to work on a framework for promoting
regular discussions with Japanese chamber of commerce in each country so as
to identify problems that Japanese companies operating in the countries are
faced with. The Central Asian states agreed to hold business forums and roundtable meetings to promote exchanges between Japanese and Central Asiancompanies.
9 Mutual support for the intellectual dialogue. Parties agreed that intellectual
exchange is an important element, which would serve promoting political
dialogue, bringing closer stance and coordination in relation to perspectives for
economic integration of the Central Asia, and developing new directions forbroad-ranging cooperation.
9 Development of Cultural and Human Exchanges. Participants to the “Central
Asia plus Japan” Dialogue agreed to promote mutual cooperation in the spheresof cultural exchange and education 23 .

23“Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue Action Plan. According to the information on the official web-site of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan // http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/dialogue/action0606.html

28

Moreover, during the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of “Central
Asia plus Japan” Dialogue in Tokyo 2006, participants agreed to continue
cooperation in the sphere of development of projects on creation of new routes forexport of oil, natural gas and raw materials from Central Asia to global markets
through the territory of Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. In this regard Japan
actively supports the projects on creation of oil and gas pipelines from the Central
Asia towards Southern direction with prospects of reaching the markets of South
East Asian region and Japan in future.
On December 13, 2007 “Central Asia plus Japan” Forum continued its
activity holding the third Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
Delegations from four Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan) were represented on the levels of Deputy Foreign Ministers.
Turkmenistan was represented by country’s Ambassador to Tajikistan, what marks
the interest of new Turkmen government to the Dialogue. The Japanese delegation
was led by Mr. Keiichi Katakami, Special Representative in charge of Central Asia,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Deputy Director-General of the European Affairs
Bureau), and consisted of officials of the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA). During the meeting parties reviewed the progress of the adopted action
plan and exchanged views on further cooperation development. Participants also
confirmed the importance of holding the third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the“Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue and agreed to coordinate its schedule andvenue 24 .
One of the most important events in the history of development of Japanesediplomacy towards the region of Central Asia became first visit of Prime Ministerof Japan D. Koidzumi to Central Asian countries. In frame of the official tour in2006 Koidzumi visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In fact, during these visits
Koidzumi indicated new priorities of Japanese foreign policy in the Central Asia.
In particular, this visit marked growing interest of Japanese business in thedevelopment of nuclear energy of the region. During the meeting with President of
Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, Koidzumi emphasized that Japanese party is intended
to deepen relations with Kazakhstan, especially in cooperation in the sphere of
nuclear energy – development of uranium fields. As a result of the visit, parties
signed Memorandum of intentions between the governments of Kazakhstan andJapan on advancement of cooperation in the sphere of utilization of atomic energy.
Analysis of regional initiatives of Tokyo on the modern stage shows thatat present time main interest of Japan in the Central Asia is provision ofnational energy security through enlargement of access to the energy
resources of the region. For example, Japan imports oil mainly from countries ofthe Middle East region. Considering high conflict potential in this region(escalation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, permanent pressure of the US and theWestern countries on Iran due to its national nuclear problems, destabilization ofIraq), Japan is interested in searching new partners, who will be able to guarantee
24

The Third “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue Senior
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/12/1176649_840.html

29

Officials

Meeting(SOM)//uninterrupted supplies of energy recourses to the country. Diversification of importroutes will reduce dependence of Japan on Arab world. In August 2006 before
coming to Astana Prime Minister of Japan D. Koidzumi stated that Japan isinterested in the energy recourses of the Central Asia. In particular, Koidzumi
emphasized: “Regarding our energy recourses strategy, it is not good when Japan
is too much dependent on the Middle East. But Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan possess
vast reserves of resources” 25 .
After D. Koidzumi resigned from his post and after several changes ofgovernments Japan, the strategy of Tokyo towards the Central Asia in generalremains unchanged.
For today one of the key priorities of Japan in the Central Asia is uranium.
Thus, regarding the previous agreements between governments of Central Asianstates and Japan on cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy, Japanesecompanies gradually settle on perspective energy markets of the region. For
example, one of the most recent achievements of modern Japanese diplomacy inCentral Asia is agreement, signed with Kazakhstani government on enrichment of
the uranium. According to the agreement Kansai Electric Power Corporation andtrade-investment Sumitomo Corporation along with Kazakhstani Kazatomprom
Company will enrich uranium on the territory of Kazakhstan. Japanese companies
will start enrichment of the uranium from 2010. Agreements also include technicalreconstruction and modernization of the old type uranium production plant, which
will cost about $600-700 millions. Total sum of investments in frame of the projectis expected to reach several billion American dollars. As a result the volume of theenriched uranium on the Kazakhstani territory is expected to exceed twice current
Japanese uranium demand 26 .
***Thus, as we can see on the modern stage Japan is becoming more and more
involved in the regional affairs of the Central Asia. Main aim of Japanese current
policy in the Central Asia is to strengthen own positions in the regional energy
market. In this regard due to the strong involvement of Russia, China and the US in
the regional oil and gas markets, Japan seems to hold active positions in the sphereof uranium production and enrichment.

25
26

August 30, 2006 // http://www.kommersant.ru
Japan will start enrichment of uranium in Kazakhstan. December 26, 2007 // www.centrasia.ru

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3.2 The future of Japanese policy in the Central Asia
At present time on its way of strengthening positions in Central Asia Japan
faces several problems to resolve. First of all Japan has to define its future role in
the Central Asia and give an answer on the crucial question: does Japan really needto involve more deeply into the region, especially considering the fact that theCentral Asia is not an area of Japanese traditional interests? Or may be it would be
more reasonable for Japan to develop relations with Central Asian countries on abilateral level and mainly in the commercial spheres? Such as signing perspective
agreements and making deals. At the same time Japan have to take into account thefact that more active involvement into affairs of the Central Asia will requiresignificant financial and material costs as well as strong efforts.
On the other hand Japan needs to develop clear strategy and policy towards
the Central Asian region, which will define future role of Japan in the region andimportance of the Central Asia for Japan. For this purpose it is necessary to give
more attention to problems of the region. In this regard establishment ofgovernmental think tanks and research centers, which will conduct reports oncurrent issues of political and economic development of Central Asia, would be
helpful. Laying research foundation will definitely contribute to reach the outlinedtask.
In this regard development of contacts with Central Asian research centers
and think tanks would be helpful as well. It will give new possibilities fororganization of mutual scientific conferences where experts from both sides will beable to exchange useful information and opinions.
Another important thing is strengthening cultural ties between Japan andCentral Asian countries. For that matter one of the most significant problems islack of information about each other. For example, common citizens of Kazakhstan
do not know much about the modern Japan, its culture, moral system and far lessabout its current foreign policy priorities and modern diplomacy. The same
situation faces Japan. Common Japanese people almost know nothing about
Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries. Existing vacuum of information
creates mutual misunderstanding and negatively effects development of bilateral
cooperation between Central Asian states and Japan and moreover, Japanesemultilateral cooperation initiatives in the region.
For example, on the modern stage Japan is not represented enough in
Kazakhstan. Bilateral relations are developing mainly on the basis of Japaneseenergy interests in Kazakhstan. To my mind development of cultural ties andexchange of important information is very helpful as well. Organization of cultural
events, seminars and forums on the regular basis will give additional opportunities
for common people to know more about each other. As a result Kazakhstanisociety will be more interested in Japanese culture and way of life. Japanese people
will know more about culture and traditions of Kazakhstan. There is no doubt thatsuch kind of activities will contribute to the development of bilateral cooperation31

in the sphere of education. Parties will create and launch new programs of students
exchange.
***
In general, Central Asian states consider Japan as attractive, economicallydeveloped country, which has peaceful foreign policy. In contrast to Western statesand especially USA, Japan has more soft policy. For example, Japan supports
development of democracy in Central Asian countries but never make pressure onthem regarding lack of some democratic standards. In this regard Japan always try
to take into account cultural and historic development specifics of the region. Suchkind of Japanese position is highly appreciated by Central Asian states. And it lays
a good foundation for development of further comprehensive and mutually
beneficial relations between Japan and Central Asian states.

***
3.3. Japan and the SCO: is cooperation possible?
Position of Japan towards the SCO is closely related to its interests in theregion of Central Asia and to bilateral relations with Russia and China. For
successful provision of own policy in the Central Asia Japan needs to create
constructive and confidential relations with Russia and China first. Otherwise,
these two regional powers may counteract Japanese initiatives in the Central Asia.
In this regard Shanghai Cooperation Organization attracts more and more
attention of Japanese politicians and experts. There are no doubts that along withcreation of own policy towards the Central Asia, Japan has to take into account the
SCO factor, because in our days Shanghai Cooperation Organization shows itself
as active, powerful and authoritative enough regional structure. Moreover, alongwith the Central Asian states SCO includes Russia and China – both of them areable to make significant impact on the development of regional economic andpolitical processes. Regional security and stability issues depend much on thesetwo powers as well.
The foreign policy of new Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda can becalled as very diplomatic. For example, new Prime Minister did not continue
tradition of visiting Yasukuni shrine (which always had negative reaction of some
Asian countries) and declared the necessity of perfection relations with Japaneseclose neighbors – Russia and China 27 . Considering new approach in Japanese
foreign policy Japan has chances to become more active player in the Central Asia.
At the same time one cannot deny the possibility of future cooperation between
Japan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
27

Yasuo Fukuda, a moderate, is chosen
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/23/asia/japan.php

32

to

lead

Japan

//

September

23,

2007

To my mind at present times cooperation between Japan and the SCO ismutually beneficial for Japan and the SCO member-states as well. Throughactivating own foreign policy on the Eurasian continent Japan can strengthen its
international positions and prestige as peaceful power acting in the role of mediator.
For example, Japan can perform as a mediator in creation of dialogue between the
SCO and the West. It can be reached if Japan will get supervisor status in the SCO.
Such kind of situation would be beneficial for Japan itself, the SCO members andthe Western world as well. The SCO will get rid of “AntiNATO” labels andWestern countries, in particular the USA, will have an opportunity to start new
mutually beneficial relationships with the SCO. According to Japanese expert
Akihiro Ivashita: “Japan, as a trustworthy ally of the U.S., should persuade the U.S.
to make a more positive commitment toward the SCO, to reshape the Eurasiansecurity situation together. As a historic gateway to Asia, Japan has an incentive toinvite other western countries to back up this mission” 28 .
At the same time Japan has possibilities to support development of relations
between the SCO and the other regional structures, which has the same aims with
the SCO, such as provision of regional security, stimulating of economic
cooperation of member-states etc. For example, on the modern stage Shanghai
Cooperation Organization is highly interested in development of relations with
ASEAN. The interest of the SCO members to ASEAN is related to the fact that the
Asian Pacific region is one of global centers for economic growth on the modern
stage. Thus, in April 21, 2005 secretariats of the SCO and ASEAN signed
memorandum of understanding, which defines directions of cooperation andinteraction in the spheres of economy, finances, tourism, ecology, utilization ofnatural resources, issues of transnational crime etc 29 . In this regard in February
2008 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.
Yermekbayev emphasized the following: “Member-states of the SCO and ASEAN
are tied with geographical proximity and common interests in the Asia Pacificregion. Participants of both organizations are interested in strengthening peace andstability in the “areas of activities”, in starting mutually beneficial cooperation insuch spheres as economy, transport, culture and tourism. At the same time the SCO
is interested in broad and diverse forms, methods and mechanisms of interaction inframe of the Association. ASEAN has 40 years working experience and it can give
much positive things to such comparatively young structure as the SCO” 30 . In thisregard Japan, using its international authority and experience can contribute to thedevelopment of comprehensive relations between the SCO and ASEAN.
For the Central Asian states participation of Japan to the SCO is very
beneficial as well. Regarding the long-term interests of small members of theorganization (CA countries) participation of Japan to the SCO is enlargement of
space for economic and political balancing in fact.
28

Akihiro Iwashita. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Japan: Moving Together to Reshape the EurasianCommunity // http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/0128_asia_iwashita.aspx?p=1
29
February 25, 2005 http://www.rian.ru/politics/20050225/39459836.html
30
From the interview of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Yermekbayev “onprospects of interaction between the SCO and ASEAN // 25.02.2008 www.sectsco.org

33

As for positions of two regional powers Russia and China, Japan is morewestern state. In spite of the fact that the SCO is not a military block (Russia andChina officially reject such claims) Moscow and Beijing are suspicious to theactivities of the US and NATO in the Central Asia. Therefore, Russia and China
try to use diplomatic instruments of the SCO to keep back other players.
Nevertheless, Kazakhstani experts do not deny the possibility of getting observer
status to the SCO by Japan, if Tokyo will show interest for cooperation 31 .
Thus, it is necessary to emphasize that on the modern stage Japan has
enough opportunities to involve more actively in the region of the Central Asia andfor starting cooperation with the SCO as well.

31

Sanat Kushkumbayev. Development of the SCO as a Regional Organization: Potential for Enlargement // July 3,
2007 www.kisi.kz

34

Conclusion
Today, Shanghai Cooperation Organization is important and authoritativeinternational organization. During the years of development SCO evolved into afull-fledged international institution, with own charter and well formed structure.
SCO members actively cooperate to resolve current regional economic, politicaland security problems. It is also necessary to point out that the SCO is active andeffective organization, which builds and sustains mutual confident relations
between Russia and Central Asian states on the one hand and China on the other
hand.
The territorial area of the organization is really huge. At present timecommon territory of six SCO member-states is more than 30 million square
kilometers or almost 3 of 5 parts of the whole Eurasian continent. The populationof the SCO area exceed 1,5 billion people what is nearly quarter of the world
population 32 .
Taking into account these amazing figures and the fact of participation tothis organization of to giant-states, it is not hard to understand growing interest ofinternational community to the SCO. As for western political experts andpoliticians, they often criticize the SCO and sometimes call it anti-western military
alliance or some kind of AntiNATO.
At the same time it is necessary to mark that at present time SCO has a lot of
objective problems and obstacles inside, which do not afford it to become ortransform into a military alliance:
First. There is no clear and common foreign policy course of the SCO
member-states. Most of Central Asian states still use the “multi-vector policy” or
the policy of balancing between the interests of big external powers – Russia,
China and the United States. Central Asian states are always trying to keep goodand stable relations with West as well as with East. Otherwise they can come to the“geopolitical dead end”. For example, Central Asian states cannot afford
themselves to spoil relations with the United States. In that case they will become
too much dependent on Russian political will or even on Chinese. As for other
SCO members, Moscow and Beijing, policy of these countries in frame of the SCO
strongly depend on their strategic interests in the Central Asia, which sometimes
counter to each other.
Second. Last years functions of the SCO are going broader. Today,
parties are intensively developing cooperation not only in the security area, but ineconomy, communications, energy, science, ecology, education, tourism and sport
as well. Extension of functions sometimes leads to misunderstanding and loosing
32

Regarding the SCO official web-site information // www.sectsco.org

35

true or initial tasks and aims of the organization. Thus, SCO is becoming a regionalorganization, which duplicates the function of other existing structures, such as
OSCT in the security area or EurAsES in the sphere of economy. At the same time,
military component of the organization is still insignificant.
Third. The character of the SCO is mainly declarative. Practical activityof the organization is not so visible. It mainly includes joint antiterrorist exercises
and organization of Annual Summits of the SCO heads of states, which sometimes
arouse disputes in the international community.
Fourth. SCO has features of latent rivalry between its key members –Russia and China.
Listed problems allow us to conclude that the SCO is rather transforming
into an ordinary regional organization, with ordinary routine tasks than into a kindof military alliance. On the other hand, today, SCO is only a part of great
geopolitical game in the Central Asia – the region, where interests of big
powers periodically come into collision.
Along with leading players on the international arena, Japan is also muchinterested in the SCO and observes over the development of the organization.
Mutually beneficial cooperation with this organization can give Japan newopportunities for successful provision of own strategic interests in the Central Asia.
Japanese participation to the SCO may contribute to warming relations with Russia
and China as well. Therefore, they will not counter much against the Japaneseinitiatives in the Central Asia.
As for Central Asian states, they are only for the Japanese participation to
the SCO, because it will give them new possibilities and space for diplomaticbalancing between the regional powers. They will be able to go out of the frames
marked by Russian and Chinese strategic interests in the region.
As one of the most economically developed states of the world and using its
weight in the international community Japan can contribute to creation of
constructive dialogue between the SCO and leading western countries. There is no
doubt that SCO members will appreciate such kind of mediator activities of Japan,
because speaking frankly there is no member-state in the SCO, which would reallylike to spoil relations with West.
To reach that goal and to strengthen positions in the Central Asia, Japanneeds to develop comprehensive approach towards the Central Asian region, taking
into account the interests of Central Asian states, Russia, China and the UnitedStates. In this regard it is necessary to mark, that Japan as first of all peaceful
power with developed economy has enough opportunities to enhance own
positions in the Central Asia.
At the same time, considering all positive and negative factors Japanese
government should choose the right way for further conducting of its Central Asianstrategy. Is it reasonable for Japan to activate own multilateral initiatives in theCentral Asia in future? (Especially taking into account the fact that it will requirehuge financial support and a lot of efforts) Or it would be more effective tocontinue current approach, which mainly includes concentration on development36

of bilateral relations with Central Asian states, based on practical strategic interestsof Japan?

37