Insurance Law Alert

October 2015

In This Issue
Nevada Supreme Court Adopts Cumis Rule For Deciding When Insurer
Must Fund Independent Policyholder Counsel
The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that an insurer must provide independent counsel for its
insured when an actual conflict exists between the two parties, but that a reservation of rights
letter does not create a per se conflict. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2015 WL
5656978 (Nev. Sept. 24, 2015). (click here for full article)“If it looks like it’sgoing to go to trial,
we will switch counsel toSimpson Thacher. That alone
sends the other side a message
that things are getting serious.”–Benchmark Litigation
2016 quoting a client

Seventh Circuit Limits Scope of “Publication” for Liability Coverage
Purposes
The Seventh Circuit ruled that a company’s practice of secretly recording customer phone calls
for its own purposes did not constitute “publication” under an advertising injury provision.
Defender Security Co. v. First Mercury Ins. Co., 2015 WL 569251 (7th Cir. Sept. 29, 2015).
(click here for full article)

Third Circuit Rules That Class Action Suits Based on ZIP Code Collection
Do Not Allege Personal and Advertising Injury
The Third Circuit ruled that insurers had no duty to defend underlying suits alleging violationsof state statutes and common law privacy rights based on the collection of personal ZIP code
information in connection with credit card purchases. OneBeacon America Ins. Co. v. Urban
Outfitters, Inc., 2015 WL 5333845 (3d Cir. Sept. 15, 2015). (click here for full article)

Montana Court Rules That Insurers Have No Duty to Defend Spyware
Suits
A Montana federal district court ruled that primary and umbrella insurers had no duty to
defend suits alleging that the policyholder secretly installed spyware programs on consumers’
computers. Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., 2015 WL 568013 (D. Mont.
Sept. 25, 2015). (click here for full article)

Second Circuit Rules That Series of Related Events Constitutes Three
Separate Accidents Under Policy
Applying New York’s “unfortunate event test,” the Second Circuit held that a series of related
automobile accidents within a short time span constituted three separate “accidents” forpurposes of policy coverage. Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Itzkowitz, 2015 WL 5332109 (2d Cir.
Sept. 15, 2015), as amended (Sept. 22, 2015). (click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

New York Appellate Court Rules That Brokerage Exclusion Bars Coveragefor Madoff-Related Losses
A New York appellate court ruled that a policy exclusion barring coverage for losses caused by
the dishonest acts of brokers applied to Madoff-related losses even though he was not “acting”
as a legitimate broker. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Nine Thirty FEF Investments, LLC, 2015
WL 5794368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t Oct. 6, 2015). (click here for full article)

Minnesota Court Rules That Crime Policy Does Not Cover Loss ofInvestment Returns Caused by Ponzi Scheme
A Minnesota federal district court ruled that a crime policy did not cover the loss of returns
that the policyholder allegedly earned on certain investments, but lost due to the fraud of
its investment advisors. 3M Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2015 WL
5687879 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2015). (click here for full article)

Intentional Acts Exclusion Does Not Bar Coverage for Texting-Related
Train Crash
Applying New York law, a California court ruled that an intentional acts exclusion did not bar
coverage for claims arising out of a train crash allegedly caused by the train conductor’s use of acell phone while on duty. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Connex Railroad,
LLC, No. BC493509 (Cal. Superior Ct. Sept. 18, 2015) (transcript). (click here for full article)

Eleventh Circuit Rules That Contractual Liability Exclusion Bars Coverage
for Tort Claims
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for tort claims
that had a “clear nexus” and were “inextricably intertwined” with certain operative contracts.
Bond Safeguard Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2015 WL 5781002(11th Cir. Oct. 5, 2015). (click here for full article)

2Defense Alert:

Nevada Supreme Court Adopts
Cumis Rule For Deciding When
Insurer Must Fund Independent
Policyholder Counsel
Ruling on a matter of first impression under
Nevada law, the Nevada Supreme Court ruledthat an insurer must provide independent
counsel for its insured when an actual conflictexists between the two parties, but that areservation of rights letter does not create aper se conflict. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Hansen, 2015 WL 5656978 (Nev. Sept.
24, 2015).
Answering questions certified by a federal
district court, the Nevada Supreme Court
ruled that when an actual conflict of interest
exists between an insurer and its policyholder,the insurer must provide independent counselof the policyholder’s choosing. The court
explained that a conflict of interest exists
when the outcome in the underlying litigation
will affect the determination of coverage.
The court emphasized that a reservation ofrights does not automatically create a conflictof interest. Rather, a conflict of interest
determination must be made on a caseby-case basis, taking into account whether
insurer-appointed counsel will have control
over an issue in the underlying litigationthat will directly affect the coverage analysis.
Notably, there is no conflict “if the reservationof rights is based on coverage issues thatare only extrinsic or ancillary to the issues
actually litigated in the underlying action.” In
adopting California’s Cumis rule, the Nevada
Supreme Court rejected the notion (endorsed
by a number of jurisdictions) that suchconflicts of interest are sufficiently addressedby reference to professional ethics rules, orthat divergent interests between an insured
and policyholder do not create a conflict ofinterest because the policyholder is the “soleclient” of counsel. As the court noted, Nevada
is a “dual-representation state,” recognizingthat insurer-appointed counsel represents
both the policyholder and the insurer.

Data Privacy
Alerts:Seventh Circuit Limits Scope of“Publication” for Liability Coverage
Purposes
As reported in our January 2014 Alert, theConnecticut Supreme Court has ruled thatclaims arising out of the accidental loss ofcomputer data are not covered by generalliability policies if there was no “publication”
of the data to a third party. Recall Total
Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2015
WL 2371957 (Conn. May 26, 2015). Lastmonth, the Seventh Circuit employed similarreasoning and held that a company’s practiceof secretly recording customer phone calls
for its own purposes did not constitute“publication” under an advertising injury
provision. Defender Security Co. v. First
Mercury Ins. Co., 2015 WL 569251 (7th Cir.
Sept. 29, 2015).
A customer sued Defender Security Company,
alleging violations of state statutory law
based on the company’s practice of recording
customer phone calls without permission.
The recordings, which were stored for various
business purposes, contained personal
information, including customers’ addresses,
dates of birth and social security numbers.
First Mercury Insurance Company refused
to defend the suit on the basis that it did
not allege covered advertising injury. In
particular, First Mercury argued that there
was no “publication” of the personal data
because the recordings were not released to
any third party. An Indiana federal district
court agreed and dismissed Defender’s breachof contract claim against First Mercury. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Although “publication” was not defined in
the policy, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the term requires a release of theinformation by the party holding it. Because3the suit against Defender did not allege thatthe recordings (or the information contained
therein) were shared with or transmitted
to any third party, the court held that there
was no publication. In so ruling, the court
rejected Defender’s assertion that publication
occurred when the material was transmitted
to a separate recording device. Rather, thecourt analogized the recordings to notetaking during phone calls, explaining that theexistence of notes in a filing cabinet would notconstitute publication.

Third Circuit Rules That Class
Action Suits Based on ZIP CodeCollection Do Not Allege Personaland Advertising Injury

publication to third parties is alleged, apolicy exclusion for claims alleging privacyrelated statutory violations precluded
coverage. Finally, the court held that
where policyholders allegedly used the
ZIP code information to send unsolicitedadvertisements, there was no violation ofprivacy (as required by the advertising injury
provision) under Pennsylvania law. The court
cited to fax blasting coverage cases, notingthat Pennsylvania courts have held thatthe right to privacy referenced in Personaland Advertising Injury provisions does notencompass the right to seclusion and isinstead limited to the protection of secrecy
interests.

The Third Circuit ruled that insurers had
no duty to defend underlying suits alleging
violations of state statutes and common
law privacy rights based on the collection of
personal ZIP code information in connection
with credit card purchases. OneBeacon
America Ins. Co. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc.,
2015 WL 5333845 (3d Cir. Sept. 15, 2015).
The policyholders sought Personal andAdvertising Injury coverage under liability
and umbrella policies for three class action
complaints. Each complaint alleged thatthe policyholders violated statutory andcommon law by collecting customers’
ZIP code information for marketing andpecuniary benefit. However, each complaint
included different factual allegations as tothe policyholders’ use of the information.
A Pennsylvania federal district court ruledthat the insurers had no duty to defend
or indemnify any of the suits. OneBeacon
America Ins. Co. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc.,21F. Supp.3d 426 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (discussed inJune 2014 Alert). The Third Circuit affirmed.

Montana Court Rules That Insurers
Have No Duty to Defend Spyware
Suits

First, the Third Circuit held that the collectionof personal information for a company’s
own pecuniary interests does not constitute“publication” for purposes of Personal andAdvertising Injury coverage. Although thepolicies did not define “publication,” thecourt held that the term was unambiguous
and that Pennsylvania law generally
requires dissemination to the public inorder to establish publication. Therefore,
the policyholders’ use of personal ZIP code
information for internal business-related
purposes did not constitute publication.
Second, the court held that even where

A class action suit against Aspen Way, a“rent-to-own” store, alleged that Aspen
Way installed undetectable software on
computers that were leased or sold tocustomers. According to the complaint, thesoftware allowed Aspen Way to secretly takephotographs with the computer’s webcam,
capture keystrokes and take screen shots –all without the consumer’s knowledge. The
complaint alleged violations of state statutory
law and common law right to privacy.
The common law claims were dismissed,

A Montana federal district court ruled thatprimary and umbrella insurers had no duty to
defend two suits alleging that the policyholder
secretly installed spyware programs on
consumers’ computers. Am. Econ. Ins. Co.
v. Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., 2015 WL
568013 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2015).

4

leaving only the cause of action alleging a
violation of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act. Liberty Mutual agreed todefend the suit under a reservation ofrights. A second suit was filed against Aspen
Way by the State of Washington alleging
violations of state statutory law. This suit
was resolved by a consent decree, underwhich Aspen Way agreed to pay $150,000.
Liberty Mutual paid this sum on behalf of
Aspen Way, but reserved the right to seek
recoupment upon a declaration of noncoverage. Thereafter, Liberty mutual filed
suit seeking reimbursement from Aspen
Way and a declaration that it had no duty to
defend either suit. The court granted Liberty
Mutual’s summary judgment motion as to theduty to defend.
The court ruled that the class action
complaint alleged “Personal and Advertising
Injury” under Liberty Mutual’s primaryand umbrella policies because it alleged“publication … of material that violates aperson’s right of privacy.” The court explainedthat under Montana law, “publication”
occurs when information “is transmitted toa third party.” Here, because the complaint
alleged that customers’ personal information
was “forwarded to unknown persons andlocations,” the publication requirement
was met. However, the court held thatcoverage was barred by a “Recording andDistribution of Material or Informationin Violation of Law Exclusion,” which
excluded coverage for violations of statutes
that address the collection or distributionof material or information. Notably, theexclusionary language in two of the umbrella
policies contained typographical errors
which rendered the provision nonsensical.
However, the court reformed the language tomirror the grammatically-correct languagein the primary and other umbrella policies,
finding that Liberty Mutual had establishedby clear and convincing evidence that theomission was a mistake that Aspen shouldhave suspected.
With respect to the Washington Stateaction, the court concluded that Liberty
Mutual had no duty to defend because thecomplaint did not allege facts that, if proven,would constitute “publication.” As the court
explained, the allegations were based only
on Aspen Way’s installation of the spyware
and its retention of data, rather than on any
alleged transmission to third parties.

Number of
Occurrences Alert:

Second Circuit Rules That Series ofRelated Events Constitutes Three
Separate Accidents Under Policy
Applying New York’s “unfortunate event test,”
the Second Circuit held that a series of related
automobile accidents within a short timespan constituted three separate “accidents”
for purposes of policy coverage. Nat’l Liab. &Fire Ins. Co. v. Itzkowitz, 2015 WL 5332109(2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2015), as amended (Sept.
22, 2015).
The relevant sequence of events began whena dump box attached to the back of a truck
hit and damaged a highway overpass. After
hitting the overpass, the dump box separated
from the truck and landed on the highway.
Between thirty seconds and five minutes
later, a vehicle struck the detached box. At
some point between a few seconds and twenty
minutes thereafter, a second vehicle struck
the box. The parties involved in the incident
argued that this series of events constituted
three separate “accidents” under the policy,
whereas National Liability advocated a oneoccurrence position. A New York federal
district court ruled in favor of the drivers, andthe Second Circuit affirmed.
Absent policy language indicating an intent
to aggregate separate incidents into a single
occurrence (as the court noted, “accident”
and “occurrence” are used interchangeably
in this context), New York law follows theunfortunate event test to determine how
many occurrences exist for coverage purposes.
The unfortunate event test focuses on (1) the“operative incident” giving rise to liability,and (2) “whether there is a close temporaland spatial relationship between the incidents
giving rise to injury or loss, and whether theincidents can be viewed as part of the samecausal continuum, without intervening agentsor factors.” Here, as a preliminary matter, thecourt rejected National Liability’s contention
that the policy language at issue (providingthat all injury and damage “resulting
from continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same conditions will beconsidered as resulting from one ‘accident’”)
evidenced an intent to aggregate separate
accidents into a single, unified occurrence.
Applying the unfortunate event test, the court
5

concluded that the incidents constituted
three separate accidents. The court reasoned
that each collision was a “separate operative
incident” and that “although the incidents
occurred close in time, nothing suggests thatthe narrow timespan between each incident
played a role in causing any of the otherincidents.” The court further explained that
although the incidents shared a common
origin (the dump truck’s collision with theoverpass), the events were not part of the“same unbroken continuum.”
Notably, court declined to “draw a hard line atany particular number of seconds or minutesthat must elapse before two incidents are
distinct accidents.” Rather, court emphasizedthat courts must employ “‘common sense’balancing” in applying the unfortunate
event test.

Ponzi Scheme
Alerts:New York Appellate Court Rules
That Brokerage Exclusion Bars
Coverage for Madoff-Related Losses
Our October 2013 Alert reported on a New
York trial court decision holding that a policy
exclusion barring coverage for losses causedby the dishonest acts of brokers did not apply
to Madoff-related losses because Madoff andMadoff Securities were not acting as brokers
but “were actually imposters who merely
pretended to be or do something as part oftheir fraudulent scheme.” United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Nine Thirty FEF Investments,

LLC, 44 Misc.3d 1213(A), 997 N.Y.S.2d 670(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 1, 2013). This month, a
New York appellate court reversed the ruling.
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Nine Thirty FEF
Investments, LLC, 2015 WL 5794368 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1st Dep’t Oct. 6, 2015).
Two investment companies sought coveragefor Madoff-related losses under financial
bonds issued by U.S. Fire Insurance
Company. U.S. Fire denied coverage on
several bases, including “Exclusion (x),”which precluded coverage for “loss resulting
directly or indirectly from any dishonest or
fraudulent act or acts committed by any nonEmployee who is a securities … broker, agent
or other representative of the same generalcharacter.” The trial court had ruled that
Exclusion (x) did not apply because Madoff
had not been “acting” as a securities broker
in connection with the losses but rather had
engaged in only illusory brokerage activities.
Rejecting this reasoning, the appellate
court emphasized that the exclusion uses
the phrase “who is a securities broker” anddoes not require the non-employee to havebeen “acting” as a securities broker. The
appellate court held that the exclusion applied
because it was undisputed that Madoff wasa registered broker during the relevanttime frame. The court further noted thatapplication of Exclusion (x) did not contradict
or otherwise nullify another policy provisionthat covered losses arising from the dishonest
acts of outside investments advisors. As thecourt explained, that provision could still
provide coverage for losses resulting from thedishonest acts of outside investors who are
not brokers.

6

Minnesota Court Rules That Crime
Policy Does Not Cover Loss ofInvestment Returns Caused byPonzi Scheme
A Minnesota federal district court ruled that acrime policy did not cover the loss of returns
that the policyholder allegedly earned on
certain investments, but lost due to the fraudof its investment advisors. 3M Co. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2015
WL 5687879 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2015).
3M invested its employee-benefit plan assets
in WG Trading Company. The investment
was structured as a limited partnership in
WG Trading. After it was discovered thatthe founders of WG Trading were operatinga Ponzi scheme, the SEC brought suit, and
3M was able to recover all of the capital
contributions that it had invested in WG
Trading. In submitting an insurance claim,
3M argued that it suffered a loss becausesome of its capital had been invested in“legitimate vehicles and produced legitimate
earnings,” which 3M never recovered.
National Union denied coverage on several
bases, including that 3M failed to establish“ownership” of those earnings, as requiredby the policy. The court agreed and granted
National Union’s summary judgment motion.
The policy’s “ownership provision” requires
covered losses to be “owned by the Insured, orheld by the Insured in any capacity whether
or not the Insured is legally liable, or may
be property as respects which the Insured
is legally liable.” The court held that evenassuming that 3M’s investment generated
legitimate earnings that could be quantified
and attributed to 3M, those lost earnings
were not covered under the policy because
3M did not “own” those earnings at the timethey were stolen. First, the court rejected
3M’s contention that the ownership provision
was irrelevant to its claim for coverage under
the Employee Dishonesty clause. Instead,the court concluded that the ownershipprovision operates to limit coverage afforded
under the Employee Dishonesty clause byrequiring 3M to have some kind of interestin the property on which the claims are
based. Second, the court concluded thatthe lost earnings for which 3M sought
indemnification did not qualify as property“owned” by 3M. The court explained that 3M
owned only a limited partnership interest
in WG Trading; therefore, all earnings were

owned by WG Trading up until the point at
which they were distributed. In this context,
the court explained that 3M’s “general rightto receive distributions from the partnership”
does not constitute an ownership of specificearnings prior to distribution. Finally, thecourt deemed irrelevant certain ERISA
regulations that more broadly construe“own” in terms of investments in limited
partnerships, explaining that the purposesof those regulations “is to ensure thatfiduciary responsibilities are spread broadly… not an attempt to redefine property rights
established under state law.”

Coverage Alerts:

Intentional Acts Exclusion Does Not
Bar Coverage for Texting-Related
Train Crash
Applying New York law, a California court
ruled that an intentional acts exclusion
did not bar coverage for claims arising out
of a train crash allegedly caused by thetrain conductor’s use of a cell phone whileon duty. Those Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, London v. Connex Railroad, LLC,
No. BC493509 (Cal. Superior Ct. Sept. 18,
2015) (transcript).
The coverage dispute arose out of a train
accident that resulted in numerous deaths.
Underlying lawsuits against the train ownerand operator were filed and ultimately
settled. Certain Underwriters, as excess
insurers, contributed to the settlement fund.
Thereafter, Certain Underwriters filed suitseeking reimbursement of the settlement
payments on the basis that an intentional
acts policy exclusion barred coverage for theclaims. In particular, Certain Underwriters
argued that the train company knew that its
engineers were frequently using cell phones
while on duty and that such conduct was
likely to cause an accident, but took no action
to prevent or punish such behavior. The court
disagreed and granted the policyholders’summary judgment motion.
The intentional acts exclusion barred
coverage for “bodily injury which the insured
intended or expected or reasonably could
have expected.” The court explained that
New York law requires a policyholder to have“intended or expected the consequences
flowing directly and immediately from theact” in order for the exclusion to apply. Here,7the court concluded that allegations that thetrain company willfully ignored violationsof regulations against cell phone use despiteknowledge that such violations were likely tocause an accident did not meet the “intended
or expected” standard. The court reasoned
that such allegations established only
negligence or recklessness. In addition, thecourt emphasized that the evidence failed
to raise a triable issue of fact that the train
company reasonably expected the specificaccident at issue because prior to that crash,
the company had not experienced any othertrain accidents caused by cell phone use. The
decision, which applies a “stringent New Yorkstandard” for application of intentional acts
exclusion, is likely to be appealed. We willkeep you posted on further developments inthis matter.

alleged contractual liability of the Companyof any other Insured under any express
contract or agreement.” A Florida federal
district court agreed and ruled in favor of
National Union. The district court concluded
that the contractual liability exclusion was“unambiguously broad so as to preclude
coverage for tort claims that depended on theexistence of the insured’s contractual liability
under any express contract or agreement.”
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Eleventh Circuit Rules That
Contractual Liability Exclusion
Bars Coverage for Tort Claims
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a contractual
liability exclusion barred coverage for tort
claims that had a “clear nexus” and were
“inextricably intertwined” with certain
operative contracts. Bond Safeguard Ins. Co.
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,PA, 2015 WL 5781002 (11th Cir. Oct. 5, 2015).
Real Estate developer Land Resource, LLC(“LRC”) contracted with municipalities
to develop residential subdivisions. LRC
obtained surety bonds from Bond Safeguard
Insurance Company and Lexon Insurance
Company (collectively “Bond-Lexon”).
The surety bonds guaranteed LRC’s timely
completion of the subdivisions. In connection
with the surety bonds, LRC and BondLexon entered into a General Agreement of
Indemnity (“GAI”) under which LRC agreed
to indemnify Bond-Lexon for any liability
incurred in connection with the bonds.
Several years after initiation of a subdivisionproject, LRC ceased work and Bond-Lexon
was obligated to pay the municipalities
pursuant to the surety bonds. Thereafter,
Bond-Lexon sued LRC. Bond-Lexon initiallyalleged breach of contract and negligence,but later amended its complaint to allege
only negligence. LRC sought coverage from
National Union, which the insurer denied.
National Union argued that there was nocoverage because a contractual liability
exclusion applied to all losses “arising out of,based upon or attributable in any actual or

Although Florida courts have not interpreted
the precise language at issue, the Eleventh
Circuit held that under Florida law, theterm “arising out of” should be interpreted
broadly to mean “some causal connection.”
The court concluded that this standard wasmet because the alleged tort losses arosefrom LRC’s contractual breach of either the
GAI or its contracts with the municipalities.
More specifically, the court held that although
Bond-Lexon’s claim sounded in negligence
and was based in part on conduct that
pre-dated the GIA, those alleged acts ofnegligence “occurred during the course of
LRC’s performance under the development
contracts with the municipalities.” The court
therefore concluded that Bond-Lexon’s claim“depended on the existence of contractual
liability of some kind” and was thus excluded
from coverage.
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of
the phrase “arising out of” was outcomedeterminative in this case. However, as
reported in previous Alerts, other courts
disagree as to whether the phrase should
be construed broadly to require only somecausal connection (as was the case here) or
construed narrowly to require proximate or“but for” causation. See June 2015 Alert; May2012 Alert.
8Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.
Mary Kay Vyskocil+1-212-455-3093
mvyskocil@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

Andrew S. Amer
+1-212-455-2953
aamer@stblaw.com

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dwoll@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
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Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
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Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
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Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw(mforshaw@stblaw.com/+1-212455-2846) and Bryce L. Friedman(bfriedman@stblaw.com/+1-212-4552235) with contributions
by Karen Cestari(kcestari@stblaw.com).

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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