On Multilateralism＊―Ideas and Actions of a World Banker―
Hideaki Asahi＊＊Contents
1. Prologue
2. An Ultimate Multilateralist: His Ideas and Actions

11(1) Lucid and balanced analytical capacity; (2) Insightfulness
and flexibility of strategic thinking; (3) A grand frameworkwith detailed designs; (4) “Burden-sharing” and “power-sharing”;(5) Interpretations of agendas in historical context; and, (6) Investmentin presentation and public relations

3. Asia and the Pacific and Europe: Japan and Germany
4. A Responsible Stakeholder: China
5. After the Crisis?: the United States
6. The Birth of a New Multilateralism: The G20
7. Challenges of a World Banker
8. The Potential of Multilateralism in Japan
References

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＊This is a revised and expanded version of an essay I originally wrote in Japanese

under the same title, which was contributed to Advanced Social and International
Studies 2009, the Annual Bulletin of the Department of Advanced Social andInternational Studies, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University ofTokyo.
＊＊The author is a professor of the University of Tokyo

On Multilateralism― Ideas and Actions of a World Banker ―1. Prologue
The genesis of this essay was a series of conversations over the Internet with along-time friend who made a whirlwind trip to Japan at the end of 2009. At the time, I
felt compelled to write by his suggestion that the concept of multilateralism might wellbe understood and become more prevalent among not only policy-makers, but also thegeneral public, and that this would serve the interests of Japan in changing international
circumstances. Subsequently, I was requested to draft an essay for contribution to aforthcoming annual bulletin of the graduate course I was about to leave at theconclusion of tenure. The bulletin struck me as an opportune medium for the
dissemination of an essay on multilateralism. With this backdrop in mind, it should beunderstood that the essay was neither a piece of academic research nor a policy
advocacy piece targeted at the ordinary readers of public opinion journals. It is rather an
attempt to weave together vivid memories and piece together remembered fragments of
conversations held over the past three decades, an undertaking I have long consideredworthwhile. The contents of this essay intentionally steered clear of stories concerning
my friendship with this person already reported by well-known journalists in Japan 1.
Instead, the essay is intended to examine the core elements of what he stands for, known
as multilateralism, which may be paraphrased as liberal internationalism in theliterature of international relations. 2 Accordingly, I hope the essay will serve as apersonal memorandum. I also hope that it will help the readers envisage how
multilateralism works and deepen their understanding of what it is all about by
connecting the concept of multilateralism to concrete images and offering food forthought.

2. An ultimate multilateralist: his ideas and actions
His name is Robert B. Zoellick 3, president of the World Bank Group since July 2007.
1

Toshimitsu Shigemura, “Yurakucho: Gaiko-to-Yujo,” the Mainichi Shimbun (newspaper), Dec 5, 1997.
Hisayoshi Ina, “Dainiki-Nichibei-domei-no-juyo-na-wakiyakutachi,” Foresight, March 2005
2 See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, State-Building – Governance and World Order in the 21st Century(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp.106
3
After joining the Treasury Department, Zoellick served in various important postings within the U.S.

1

He and the author have been good friends for the past thirty years, ever since they
became college roommates in the United States, where the author was sent by theJapanese government for in-service training in the early 1970s. Needless to say, Zoellick
is one of the most prominent figures in international public service in this age ofsweeping globalization and his statements and travel activities always attract media
attention. In July 2007 he took office as president of the World Bank Group, which wasestablished as one of the four institutional pillars for post-war stability and peace,
together with the United Nations, GATT (now superseded by the World Trade
Organization (WTO)), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a twin of theso-called Breton Woods system. The World Bank Group is the Mecca of multilateralism
in the areas of international economics, development finance, and assistance to thedeveloping world. Since I am very mindful of an unfair charge laid against my friend
when he served in several senior ranking positions in Republican administrations, I
should also like to explain how mistaken and inimical to Japan’s genuine interests werecertain wrongly formed perceptions, such as that my friend was “less friendly to Japan,”and thereby set the record straight in that regard. Zoellick, having taken over from Paul
Wolfowitz, succeeded in reviving an institution demoralized and disgraced by his
predecessor’s misconduct and eventually restored the discipline of Bank officials andstaff, which had been weakened under Wolfowitz. As a result, it is now said that
Zoellick will become as powerful and renowned a top manager of the economic
powerhouse as Robert McNamara. In my opinion, Zoellick is an ultimate multilateralist
in his own right, a person fit to head up an organization such as the World Bank Group.
In his book Special Providence, Walter Russell-Mead, a political scientist of American
political thought, typifies four different schools of the American foreign policy debatefrom the eighteenth to the twenty-first century 4. He also compares their respective
strengths and weaknesses. The schools of debate, deeply rooted in domestic politics, canbe characterized as follows: – the Jeffersonian, democratic and introversive; theJacksonian, populist and jingoistic; the Hamiltonian, internationally commercial andrealistic; and the Wilsonian, internationally liberalistic and missionary. The trait ofmultilateralism that permeates the latter two schools also runs through Zoellick’s ideas
and actions.
government: counselor to Treasury Secretary James Baker, counselor to Secretary of State James Baker,
under secretary of state, and briefly deputy chief of staff at the White House and assistant to thepresident from 1985 to 1992. Zoellick joined the presidential election campaign team of George W.
Bush and, after Bush’s victory, became the United States trade representative (USTR) from 2001 to 2004,
and deputy secretary of state from 2005 to mid-2006.
4
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World( New York: Knopf, 2002)

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As John Gerald Ruggie defines it, “Multilateralism refers, at its core, to coordinating
relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.” 5 Added tothis definition of multilateralism are several caveats. First, institutional expressions that
rest on an “indivisibility” among the members of a “collectivity” with respect to a rangeof behavior in question take different forms depending on circumstances, such as orders,regimes, or organizations, and cannot therefore be equated with one specific form.
Second, expectations of “diffuse reciprocity” are held among the members of thecollectivity, or, “The arrangement is expected by its members to yield a roughequivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time.” 6 And, third, in fact there are avariety of actual cases of multilateralism that contradict the formal definitions. In thisconnection, six characteristics of a multilateralist sort are noticeably woven as
leitmotivs into the ideas and actions Zoellick has developed ever since his debut at theforefront of American foreign policy in the early 1990s. They are: first, lucid andbalanced analytical capacity; second, insightfulness and flexibility of strategic thinking;third, a grand framework with detailed designs; fourth, “burden-sharing” and“power-sharing”; fifth, historical interpretations of agendas; and, sixth, investment inpresentation and public relations.
(1) Lucid and balanced analytical capacity
It is needless to say that the capacity of lucid and balanced analysis is a prerequisite forthe formulation, deciding, and implementation of any public policy. As is crystal clear in
his writings ranging from “America in Asia,” an article in the name of James Baker said
to be Zoellick’s maiden article 7 in Foreign Affairs magazine, 8 to “Campaign 2000: A
Republican Foreign Policy” also in Foreign Affairs magazine, 9 in support of the
Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush, and to After the Crisis?, 10 the textof a highly sensational lecture delivered at the Johns Hopkins University just after the
G20 summit meeting at Pittsburgh in September 2009, Zoellick is a genius gifted withsuperb analytical capacity. As he continuously held pivotal positions in Republican
5John Gerald Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: Theory and Praxis of An Institutional Form (NewYork: Columbia, 1993), pp.3-14
6
Ibid.
7
Toshimitsu Shigemura, “Scramble: Baker-no-Futokorogatana, Zoellick-Kokumujikan-no-TainichiSenryaku,” Chuo-Koron, February 1992. This view is corroborated by the fact that only fewer than ten
pages were spared to cover Asia and the Pacific affairs in Baker’s nearly 700-page memoir. See James
Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995), pp.604-13 (especially, pp.609-613).
8James Baker III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1991/92
9
Robert Zoellick, “Campaign 2000: A Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2000.
10
Robert Zoellick, After the Crisis?: a lecture delivered on Sep 28, 2009 at the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University3

administrations in his mid-30s, he was privileged with so many opportunities toparticipate in the formulation of grand designs of foreign policy strategy and in theextraordinary challenges of making difficult decisions that he has in fact developed
astute political skills and a sense of balanced judgment reliant on a multitude of refined
information. Richard Darman, then director of the Office of Management and Budget,
who introduced Zoellick to Treasury Secretary James Baker, reportedly commented,“He does as much work alone as twelve do in a day.” 11 The author, who often
remembers “his school days with the recollections of jogging alone even in rainy andcold weather,” 12 can attest to Zoellick’s intellectual superiority and extraordinary
resourcefulness. In his memoir The Politics of Diplomacy, James Baker III, who
included Zoellick in his first “inner circle,” describes him as follows: 13
Zoellick, a native of Illinois, combined Midwest common sense with the policy sophisticationof someone who had been educated at America’s most elite schools: Swarthmore, Harvard
Law School, and the Kennedy School of Government. He had worked for me at Treasury andwas a superb manager, policy analyst, and writer. I had learned at the White House that tocontrol policy you need to control paper, so I made Zoellick counselor of the Department(“C”) and mandated that every piece of paper sent to me go through him first. That made him,
as one journalist put it, my ‘second brain’ who could organize, synthesize, and refine ideas,
thus ensuring that only quality, fully vetted initiatives and ideas got to my desk. With thepossible exception of Richard Darman, it would be hard to find someone more suited to thejob. Zoellick’s ability to take reams of information and boil it down to one page of ‘bullets’and ‘ticks’ – standard briefing paper format – was legendary. So were his lists of what needed
to be done. If he had a weakness, it was that he was too smart and would come up with ten
reasons for doing something when three would have sufficed. Like most of my aides, he did
not suffer fools gladly; combined with his position in the bureaucratic food chain –gatekeeper – this made Zoellick one of the most feared people at State.

Even since becoming World Bank Group president, Zoellick appears to work hard atcollecting raw information, ardently listen to reports from “the ground,” and neverhesitate to intervene at project sites. By drawing upon the information thus refined andincorporated into his strategic framework, he can produce valid analyses seasoned witha sense of reality and balance. In this regard, one of his many exemplary analytical
11

Toshimitsu Shigemura, “Scramble: Baker-no-Futokorogatana Zoellick- Kokumujikan-no-Tainichi-Senryaku,” Chuo-Koron, February 1992
12
Hideaki Asahi, “Koyuroku: Kyuyu-no-Omoiyari,” The Nikkei Shimbun, 20 May, 2004
13
James Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995), pp.32

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works that I consider a masterpiece is a keynote address titled Fragile States: Securing
Development, 14 which Zoellick delivered at the IISS annual plenary conference in
September 2008, only a year after taking up his new post. Before the assembled security
experts and scholars from across the world, Zoellick addressed one of the mostfrequently discussed issues: that is, (post-war) reconstruction of weakened states or“fragile states.” In the address, he made a set of points that were highly insightful forthe specialists and practitioners seeking to work out solutions to the issue. No one now
doubts that, thanks to Zoellick’s personal ability and leadership, during the past few
years the World Bank Group has played a leading role not only in alerting members of
the international community to a range of global issues, including soaring food andenergy prices and the financial crunch, and ensuing economic recessions, but also incampaigning for resources to deal with those issues.
(2) Insightfulness and flexibility of strategic thinking
A second characteristic of Zoellick is the insightfulness and flexibility of his strategic
thinking. Zoellick is neither a “senior government official” in the sense that applies toJapan’s bureaucratic system nor a politician; rather he can be called a “technocrat” inthe positive sense of the word. He falls somewhere between bureaucrat and politician,combining the positive elements of the two. He is, therefore, free from theorganizational constraints and rigid mindset that often prohibits freedom of action.
Moreover, unlike politicians, he can distance himself from the political pressures ofnarrow-minded interest groups in political constituencies. He thus enjoys the luxury ofideal circumstances in which he concentrates on strategic thinking about what
represents real public interests and where those interests lay. It is Zoellick who hastaken the lead in advocacy of a G14 15 to meet the challenges of increasingly
complicated global governance. As a result of the political deals between the leaders of
the United States and the European Union, the existing G20 16 came to the fore as a
14

Robert Zoellick, Fragile States: Securing Development: an address made on September 12, 2008 at theplenary of The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), held in Geneva, Switzerland
15
Members of a G14 that Zoellick enumerates are the following: the G7 (the United States, Japan, theUnited Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada), Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, and South Africa. See Robert Zoellick, Modernizing Multilateralism and Markets: an address
made on 6 October, 2008 at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C.
Besides Zoellick, who insisted on the revamping of the G7 (G8) framework of global governance,international economist Fred Bergusten and President Nicholas Sarkozy of France are said to be among
those who advance a similar advocacy for reform.
16
The G20 originated in the finance ministers and central bank governors meetings of 20 countries andregional organizations that were regularly convened since 1999. The G20 members are the G7 countries,
Russia, the EU, plus 11 other newly emerging economic powers (Argentina, the Republic of Korea,
Australia, Mexico, Turkey, Brazil India, China, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa)

5compromise organization substituting for the G7. 17 Zoellick’s call for a “new steeringgroup” 18 comes from an understanding of the new reality that while the emerging
developing powers represented by the BRICs become internationally more assertive, theG7 members continue to lose their aggregate share of the global GDP and fail to meetthe expectations of the international community. It is in this political context that
Zoellick prevails on Japan, which adheres to the G7 because of “prestige” (the sole
representative of Asia) rather than “function” (global governance), to wean itself fromits “narrow” national interests and shift to “enlightened” national interests based on
multilateralism. The author once argued that because the Japanese have a bitter
historical memory of international isolation and subsequent war devastation triggeredby the dissolution of the reliable Japan-Anglo alliance and the Washington System ofmultilateral security arrangements in the Pacific, they are inclined toward somethingsolid to rely on, such as the Japan-United States alliance and the G7 19. Zoellick’s reply,
imbued with a deep understanding of Japan’s modern history is seen in part in a
Financial Times article titled “Japan is ready for evolution and reform.” 20 The author
should like to return to this theme later.

(3) A grand framework with detailed designs
It was in the “America in Asia” essay in Foreign Affairs that Zoellick weighed into theforeign policy debate with a grand design detailed by carefully examined components.
As previously mentioned, the essay is a policy vision for new U.S. engagements in Asiaand the Pacific in the post-Cold War era, which was prepared on the eve of President
George H. W. Bush’s trip to the region. It visualizes a new “architecture” which,basically resting on the traditional “hub and spokes” security concept, consists of “A fan
spread wide, with its base in Northern America and radiating west across the Pacific.”21
In Zoellick’s words, in the face of “The Asian realities – that is, the elements of apromising future and the difficult remnants of times past – it pursues a viablearchitecture for a stable and prosperous Pacific Community.” 22 To that end, it addresses
three concrete policy issues: “First, to examine a framework for economic integrationthat will support an open global trading system; second, to foster the trend toward
17

See Henry Paulson, Jr., On the Brink (New York: Business Plus, 2009), pp.375-6
See Robert Zoellick, Modernizing Multilateralism and Markets.
19
This is the author’s personal view. See also Hisahiko Okazaki, Rekishi-no-Kyoukun (Tokyo: PHP,
2005), pp.77-144. Hisahiko Okazaki, Shidehara Kijuro-to-sono-jidai (Tokyo: PHP, 2000), pp.183-207.
20
Robert Zoellick, “Japan is ready for evolution and reform,” the Financial Times, 27 November, 2006
21
James Baker III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1991/92
22
Ibid.
18

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democratization so as to deepen the shared values that will reinforce a sense ofcommunity; and, third, to define a renewed defense structure for the Asian-Pacifictheatre that reflects the region’s diverse security concerns and to mitigate intra-regional
fears and suspicions.” 23 Yoichi Funabashi, editor of the Asahi Shimbun (newspaper)and author of The Asia-Pacific Fusion 24, a book that focuses on this subject, argues that
because the United States could barely afford the maintenance costs of “spokes” andwould have to ask that financial burdens be shared with its allies, it needed to formulate
the new notion of “fan.” As a matter of course, however, there were genuine American
stakes involved in this initiative in view of the fact that the total volume of America’s
Pacific trades had already surpassed that of its Atlantic trades. There is also a clear
understanding that East Asia will become the growth center of the 21st century. Zoellick,drawing upon his strategic instinct, holds that the United States will have to take hold on
a prosperous Asia. This could be construed to be a shift in American foreign policy
priorities. It is said that John Hay, who was secretary of state around the turn of thetwentieth century, was the first to cite the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific for
the U.S., declaring, “The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic the oceanof the present, and the Pacific the ocean of the future.” 25 Firmly grasping the historicalcontext, Baker states in his memoir, “By the time I became secretary of state, Hay’s
prophesy was rapidly becoming a fact: the year 2000 would herald the beginning of the‘Pacific Century.’ My job was to make sure the United States would be a major part ofit.” 26 What matters is not only the post-Cold War architecture, but also a reform design
to address the international crisis of the political economy of “once in a century”
magnitude that is now under way. How Zoellick’s multilateral ideas and actions work is
examined in the chapters to come.

(4) “Burden-sharing” and “Power-sharing”
A fourth characteristic of Zoellick concerns his sense of the rules about“burden-sharing” and “power-sharing,” which reflect changing power configurations ininternational politics and economic interactions. As has often been referred to in pastarguments about Japan being a “free rider” of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty relations,the question of how to match actual benefits accruing from multilateral arrangements to
responsibilities assigned to each member of the system is a truly difficult one. It is well
23

Ibid.
Yoichi Funabashi, The Asia-Pacific Fusion –Japan’s Role on APEC (Tokyo: Chuo-Koron-sha, 1995),
pp.26925
James Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995), pp.609
26
Ibid.
24

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known that Zoellick, then deputy secretary of state, suggested that a rising China beaware of its role as a “responsible stakeholder” 27 of the international system and duly
share the burden with the other members. Indeed, there is no sense of a “big power
attitude” of generosity or magnanimity in Zoellick’s philosophy of global strategy forsystem management, which can be compared to the “plus alpha” 28 one scholar detects
in the “hegemonic stability” theory of Charles Kindleberger. Zoellick apparently seeks
to build on a “concerted-model” of multilateral architecture in which each member,whether large or small, works with other members to maintain the international orderaccording to its capacity and benefits. This may be tantamount to the “Constitutional”
model of international order, one of the three models, along with the “balance of power”
and “hegemonic” models, that John Ikenberry of Princeton typifies in his book After
Victory. 29 Against the background of the deepening of interdependence of today’s
world, Zoellick confines the notion of American “unipolarism” to the military
dimension. Also, he is apparently disposed to intellectual thinking that I consider part ofthe essence of his multilateralism: that is, a formulation that “Power should bemeasured comprehensibly and relatively, taking into consideration a variety of its
components, not only military, political, and economic, but social and cultural.” His
way of thinking reminds the readers of that of a Harvard professor Joseph Nye, who
discusses the changing nature of power affecting the shape of a new international orderin the age of globalization and argues for power games on “three layers of the chessboard,” political, economic, and cultural. 30 This is perhaps part of the reason a fault line
existed between Zoellick and a group of the so-called “neo-conservatives.” James Mann,author of the widely-read book Rise of the Vulcans, notes that “Some critics complained,
fairly or not, about Zoellick’s style and personality, but the underlying reality was thathaving never served in the Pentagon, Zoellick was one Vulcan who simply did not fit inwith the new team or share its interests.” 31
That aside, Zoellick is unwilling to embrace the “G2” theory view that politicallysignifies the inevitable dominance of a rising China, on the grounds that this does notreflect realities of power configurations, but would instead threaten to curtail other27

Robert Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? remarks made on 21September,2001 to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York City. See Chapter 4., which
discusses the subject at more length.
28 See Masataka Kosaka, Heiwa-to-Kiki-no-Kouzou (Tokyo: NHK Library, 1995), pp. 150.
29
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 21-40.
30
See Joseph Nye, “American power: The new Rome meets the new barbarians,” The Economist, 21
March 21, 2002. See also Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why The World’s Only
Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford, 2002), pp. 35-40.
31James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), pp.24

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multilateral resources. On the other hand, he is positive about the utility of a “G2”rhetoric that supposedly provides a basis for persuasion that it is even possible to deal
with China on the basis of mutual benefits, however limited, existing with the UnitedStates. He concludes that the latter argument is valid for those political conservatives
within the U.S. who insist that there should be no room for deals with China. In myview, Zoellick is an ultimate realist in the sense of the belief that no matter how great
the differences between the countries, deals are still possible where there is even a small
scope for mutual benefits. His practical actions marked by such a “win-win” approach
are confirmed in a host of historical examples in which he was involved. The following
are just a few examples relating to the then Soviet Union and China. In his account of
the Two plus Four initiatives for German unification in which he actively engaged,
Zoellick said “The United States sought to treat the Soviet Union with respect. America
designed a negotiating process that offered the Soviets an opportunity to participate in
the development of Europe’s new security system, and the United States and Germany
tried to address legitimate Soviet concerns.” 32 As for China, he said, “We do not urge
the cause of freedom to weaken China. … Our goal … is to help others find their own
voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way…” 33(5) Interpretations of agendas in historical context
A fifth characteristic of Zoellick is interpretations of agendas that are made against
historical backgrounds. The abovementioned After the Crisis?, his most recent lecture,delivered at the Johns Hopkins University, concludes with quotations from Edmund
Burke’s classic treatise Reflections on the Revolution in France and points to thedifficulty of interpretations of contemporary history in constant fluidity. I haveindirectly heard that a certain central bank governor, when he read the lecture text, wasstrongly impressed by Zoellick’s penetrating insights into history and the richness of his
knowledge of classic studies. Zoellick once confided to the author that his experience
while serving as Secretary James Baker’s counselor at the State Department of sifting
through all the papers sent to his boss, and adding short notes on his historicalinterpretations of the subjects in question, was enormously rewarding. When I learned
that Zoellick, in his current role as head of the World Bank, expects aides to do what hedid for Secretary Baker, I was overwhelmed by the extent to which past practices had
influenced his career development method. At the same time, I was convinced about a32
33

Robert Zoellick, “Two plus Four: Lessons of German Unification,” The National Interest, Fall 2000.
Robert Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?: remarks made on 21
September, 2001 to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York City.

9lesson I had learned from history: that is, “Rules and practice move with man.” It is in
Zoellick’s previously mentioned keynote address at the IISS plenary, Fragile States:
Securing Development, that we find another good example of how Zoellick skillfully
paraphrases his subject theme in a historical perspective. He relates the contemporary
problem of state failure to the founding rationale of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD): “The nexus among economics, governance,and security.” 34 As a matter of course, there are many examples of insightful historicalreferences in Zoellick’s work. For instance, in the article “America in Asia,” Zoellick
refers to “a 21st-century Pacific analogy from a nineteenth century experience: thedevelopment of the American continent. As the pattern of expansion and influence in
the American West was determined by the location of telegraph lines and railroads, so
the infrastructure links we are building across the Pacific in areas such as
telecommunications and transportation will shape the economic and political characterof the region and our ties to it.” 35 Furthermore, in his speech made just before the G20
summit meeting in London in April, 2009 36, with a view to reaffirming the importanceof multilateralism for today’s world, Zoellick invoked the ideas of John Maynard
Keynes, born eighty years before at a time of economic crisis on an unprecedented scale.
It is a secret pleasure of mine to come across and be immersed in historical episodes
when I read and listen to transcripts of Zoellick’s statements and messages.

(6) Investment in presentation and public relations
Last but not least, as important as the former characteristic are Zoellick’s business styleand practices. That is to say, Zoellick pays all possible attention to presentation andpolicy advocacy and makes shrewd calculations to elicit the maximum effect. As
previously mentioned, it is widely acknowledged that during Zoellick’s tenure theWorld Bank Group has done well in addressing a host of global issues. Examples ofmatters that have been adroitly handled and have met with professional appreciation areways of ensuring good timing and decisions on what subject to take up and whom totarget. One exemplar in this connection is the article “Time to Herald the Age of
Responsibility,” which appeared in The Financial Times early in 2009. In this op-ed
article, Zoellick sought to draw the attention of the general public to the importance ofpoverty reduction, the most pressing agenda not only for the leader of the World Bank
34

Robert Zoellick, Fragile States: Securing Development: an address made on September 12, 2008 at theplenary of The International Institute for Strategic Studies, held at Geneva, Switzerland.
35
James Baker, III, “America in Asia”
36
Robert Zoellick, Seizing Opportunity from Crisis: Making Multilateralism Work: an address deliveredon March 31, 2009 at the Thompson Reuter Building, Canary Warf, London.

10Group but also for the international community as a whole, so that the present era might
truly become the “Age of Responsibility.” In fact, President Barack Obama has called
the 21st century the Age of Responsibility, as opposed to the Dark Ages, the Renaissance,
the Reformation, and the Age of Reason – epochs into which Western history has been
divided that represent the cultural, economic and political values of the time.
What has made Zoellick’s media strategy most attractive and effective is investment inpresentation and public relations. On taking office, he set up a support team that
includes many members with talent and experience in public relations. His decisions inthis regard, including the appointment of a former director of public relations as his
chief of staff, demonstrate how much importance he attaches to this portion of his
portfolio. It seems to me that although, organizationally speaking, team work is a basic
prerequisite for achieving objectives, Zoellick makes it a rule to write his own drafts fortalks on major occasions, something almost beyond imagination considering his
extremely tight schedule. There is one more thing to add with regard to Zoellick’s
extraordinary management skills: his ample experience in public service and his style ofpreparatory arrangements. An example of this is advance briefings or consultations withinterested groups, which are required to make presentation as effective and productive
as possible. Under his pointed guidance and concrete instructions the Bank has moved
more deliberately and actively to establish good public relations not only with theAmerican Congress, but also with representatives of the member states. It is reported
that Zoellick himself frequently takes direct action, something unprecedented for a
World Bank president. This implies that Zoellick is a super technocrat who does well
not only in policy but also in action.

3. Asia and the Pacific and Europe: Japan and Germany
It may have been not long after Zoellick left the West Wing of the White House, where
he worked as Deputy Chief of Staff at the end of the administration of President George
H. W. Bush, when the author met him and received an account of his days ingovernment. Zoellick confessed that he was proud of his personal engagements in two
historic incidents: the Two plus Four initiative of 1989 to bring about a soft landing forGerman reunification and The Tokyo Declaration of United States-Japan Global
Partnership of 1992. 37 Europe and Asia and the Pacific were so important from the U.S.
strategic view-point that it was only natural that a robust initiative to launch the designof new architectures of post-Cold War order and stability for these regions be among the37<http://www.mac.doc.gov/japan-korea/market-opening/ta920109.htm >[accessed 4 April, 2010]11

highest priority agendas. James Baker notes in his memoir, “… we would work on
ensuring our ‘continental base’ (relations with Canada, Mexico, and Central America),
then strengthening and, where necessary, expanding or alliances across the Atlantic andPacific. Bob Zoellick convinced me that thinking in terms of ‘concentric circles’ was themost useful way to proceed.” 38 In connection with the foregoing, in his book After
Victory, which discusses how a victor in a great war struggled to use its acquired power
in order to shape post-war order, John Ikenberry maintains, “The United States
employed institutions as a mechanism to lock in other states to desired policy
orientations, and it was willing to exchange some limits on its own autonomy to doso.” 39 Looking back on the Bush administration’s foreign policy agendas, Baker recalls,“Regional institutional building initiatives were the key elements of its post-Cold War
order-building strategy.” 40 He likened its efforts to the American strategy after 1945:
Men like Truman and Acheson were above all, though we sometimes forgot it, institution
builders. They created NATO and the other security organizations that eventually won theCold war. They fostered the economic institutions – GATT itself, the World Bank, and theInternational Monetary Fund – that brought unparalleled prosperity to the nations of the freeworld during the decades following World War II. At a time of similar opportunity and risk, I
believed we should take a leaf from their book. 41

Ikenberry considers Baker’s conclusion to be the idea to “‘plant institutional seeds’ – tocreate regional institutional frameworks that would extend and enhance America’s
influence in these areas and encourage democracy and open markets.” 42 He quotes
Zoellick, who had done a tremendous job assisting Baker in post-Cold War
order-building, extolling the U.S.-Japan-Europe Trilateral system as a pillar of stability:

38

James Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1994), pp. 42. In Japan, there is aview that it was Zoellick who redefined the strategic importance of Asia and the Pacific to American
foreign policy against the background of “departure from Asia” in the wake of the Vietnam War and that
he upgraded the region’s status to that of the Atlantic. See Toshimitsu Shigemura, “Scramble: Baker-noFutokorogatana Zoellick-Kokumujikan-no-Tainichi-Senryaku,” Chuo-Koron, February 1992. For an
overview of American multilateralist approach to the region, see Kent Kalder & Francis Fukuyama (ed.),East Asian Multilateralism (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp.1-12.
39
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp.234
40
More specifically, regional institutions such as NATO, EC, and CSCE in Europe, NAFTA and the“South Corn” in the Western Hemisphere, and APEC in East Asia were considered. In addition theestablishment of a WTO was also regarded as a top American agenda for institution-building. See James
Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp.604-5.
41
Ibid., pp.605-6
42
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory, pp.234-5

12

The most powerful participants in this system – especially the United States – did notforswear all their advantages, but neither did they exercise their strength without substantial
restraint. Because the United States believed the Trilateral system was in its interest, itsacrificed some degree of national autonomy to promote it. 43

The foregoing represents one of the key elements of Zoellick’s multilateralist idea. The
other key elements are examined in the following chapters.
Although Zoellick appears to exercise the self-restraints of not disclosing insidestories of the diplomatic practice in which he was involved, his account of the Two plus
Four initiative verges on being an exception to this rule. As is explained at greater
length in The National Interest magazine, 44 Zoellick reveals his strategic method,which draws on lessons from history, in the hope that in the case of German unification
we avoid repetition of the grave mistake of the Versailles Treaty of imposing unbearable
burdens on Weimar Germany that eventually lead to catastrophe. Zoellick also
employed an overarching strategy of his own device that struggles to, on the one hand,incorporate a united Germany into a unifying Europe with strengthened ties with the
U.S. and, on the other hand, to place it within a newly emerging political and security
framework of the European continent in the wake of the breaking away from theCold-War structure. What strikes the reader intellectually is the thrilling diplomaticmaneuverings and moving human dramas that evolved in the midst of historic
upheavals with the aim of not only groping for possible opportunities emerging fromcool analyses of political dynamism but also looking for a new security order. The
account of the Two plus Four process enables the readers to recognize not only
Zoellick’s tremendous contributions, but also his special commitments apparently
derived from his background, notably his fellowship at the German Marshall Fundduring the Clinton administration. In November 2009, twenty years after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, Zoellick recalled the political earthquakes of that tumultuous time and drew
the following conclusion contributed in a New York Times op-ed column: “Over the last
20 years, Germans have accomplished important things. They have helped integrate thecountries of Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union and into thetrans-Atlantic security of NATO. They have helped build an historic European Union inpeace. The global economic crisis was the first big test of this New Europe. European
43

Ibid., especially pp.271. See also Robert Zoellick, “The United States,” in Zoellick, Peter D.
Sutherland, and Hisashi Owada, 21st Century Strategies of The Trilateral Countries: In Concert or
Conflict? (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1999), p.5
44Robert Zoellick, “Two plus Four”

13states, for all their internal debates have recognized their interdependence. Under stress,
Europe did not splinter.” 45
Zoellick’s interest in Asia and the Pacific region was acquired and perhaps developed
later than his interest in Europe. Zoellick may have been influenced by a short stay inHong Kong on a law enforcement fellowship and the concomitant experience of life in
Asia, among other things. It is said that U.S. strategic intentions to willingly play a more
complex and sophisticated role in an emerging new regionalism exemplified by the
APEC were concealed in the “America in Asia” article that Zoellick allegedly wrote on
behalf of James Baker. Baker, who embraces an interest in the development of a
“broader Pan-Pacific organization,” discloses in his memoir, “Zoellick and I had
discussions at Treasury in 1988 with one of my international aides, Bob Fauver, aboutdeveloping this idea of a Pacific organization further.” 46 In 1989, the President George
H. W. Bush took office and Zoellick joined Baker at the State Department, where before
long he learnt of Australia’s announcement of a proposal, with backing from Japan, for“the idea of an East Asian group to promote trade in the region,” and became involvedin the embryonic process of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Funabashi
identified Zoellick as “one of the group of people who have worked indispensable
contributions to the development of APEC in persuading their respective national
leaders.” 47 According to Funabashi, Zoellick recognizes the importance of APEC: “Wesee APEC as an important mechanism for sustaining market-oriented growth, foradvancing global and regional trade liberalization and for meeting the new challenges ofinterdependence.” 48 APEC, he says, “is as much the hallmark of American engagementin the region as are U.S. security ties.” 49 It is still vividly remembered, however, that
the United States strongly opposed the insistence, of then Malaysia Prime Minister
Mahathir bin Mohamad, on an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) along the lines of
the EU and put pressure on Japan and other East Asian members of APEC. Baker
frankly admitted, “Without strong Japanese backing, the EAEG represented less of athreat to or economic interests in East Asia.” 50 Elaborating the underlying American
strategic position, Zoellick refers to a growing strong relationship between economics
and security as its rationale. He commented, “American presence and commitments to45

Robert Zoellick, “Guiding Germany’s Unification,” New York Times, Nov 7, 2009
James Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1994), pp.44-45, and pp.609
47
Yoichi Funabashi, The Asia-Pacific Fusion, pp,79
48
Ibid., pp.189-90
49
Ibid., pp.170; See also G. John Ikenberry, After Victory, pp.235
50
James Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp.611
46

14

these regions after the Cold War would increasingly hinge on economic interests. To theextent that regional framework facilitated greater economic interdependence, American
stakes in the region increase. America’s security role becomes more important.” 51 The
question of how to deal with the U.S. when we consider the future of an East Asia
Community, which is now in an embryonic form, again becomes a major diplomatic
issue for not only Japan, but also other countries in the region.
Another characteristic of Zoellick’s ideas contained in the new American engagement in
Asia is his flexible and realistic approach resting on the formulation ‘form should
follow function.’ Implementing this approach, he seems to design a new architecture
taking into consideration both Asia’s diversity and complexity on the one hand and theincreasingly deepened links between politics and security, and trade and investment
relations on the other. In the “America in Asia” article, he also discussed the thorny
issue of the process of reconciliation and eventual reunification on the Korean peninsula.
He speculated on the future of the ‘six-party talks’ (multilateral) framework as follows:“As the North-South dialogue progresses, we will explore the possibilities for a forum
for the two Koreas and the four major powers (the United States, Soviet Union, China
and Japan) in Northeast Asia that will support the dialogue, help in the easing oftensions, facilitate discussion of common security concerns and possibly guarantee
outcomes negotiated between the two Koreas.” 52 He seems to be a strong believer thata multilateral security framework should work in Northeast Asia. In addition, there isone more unforgettable historical episode deserving mention that demonstrates
Zoellick’s deep understandings of Asia’s economic woes and political sensitivities in the
instance of the Asian economic crisis that happened in 1997-1998. The author stillrecalls that the casual demeanor of IMF Managing Director Michael-Jean Camdessus
looking down on President Suharto from above with his arms folded in a photo from thesigning ceremony for a rescue transactions package for Indonesia published around theworld was perceived to be not so much impolite as arrogant by Asian standards.
Subsequently, not only economic but also psychological shocks mixed with politicalrages swiftly rippled around the world from Asia. The Clinton administration,
apparently taken by surprise by Zoellick’s warning op-ed article 53, responded to theeconomic turmoil with various measures other than mere monetary transactions, taking
into account larger political and security implications. This turn-about of the Clinton
51

Yoichi Funabashi, The Asia-Pacific Fusion, pp.170
James Baker III, “America in Asia.”
53
Robert Zoellick, “A Larger Plan for Asia,” Washington Post, Jan 6, 1998
52

15

administration shows the extent to which Zoellick could exert bipartisan influence andat the same time implies how good policy works across party lines.
As Zoellick proclaims in the article, “The keystone of America’s engagement in East
Asia and the Pacific is its relationship with Japan,” 54 which crystallized in the Tokyo
Declaration of Japan-United States Global Partnership, 55 agreed on when President H.
W. Bush visited Japan in January 1992. In addition to bilateral relations, the Declaration
extends to multilateral agendas both nations agreed to address in the global context anddefines their respective roles and areas of cooperation. In other words, this newframework of agenda setting, involving both bilateral and multilateral issues, has been
carried on by the subsequent governments and administrations. Examples of theextension of this framework are the Tokyo Declaration of 1996, concluded between
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton, 56 and another jointstatement, released after the last summit meeting of June 2006 between Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush, 57 in which Zoellick apparently
participated as President Bush’s aide. Judging from some of Zoellick’s writings, such as
Survival (1997-98) 58 and a task force report of the Trilateral Commission (1999), 59 for
instance, his multilateralist ideas appeared to have further progressed and deepened
during the course of the Clinton administration. In this connection, it is also notable thatPresident Barack Obama, proclaiming himself the “Pacific president,” reaffirmed U.S.
commitments to Asia and the Pacific in his policy address in Tokyo in 2009 60, which
Zoellick also endorsed. 61
With regard to my own opinion and impressions, I regret not having necessarily fully
realized in the beginning the real significance of the fact that Zoellick’s attachment of

54

James Baker, III, “America in Asia.” On the other hand, Baker also agrees in his memoir to the sameobservation. See James Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp-612
55 <http://www.mac.doc.gov/japan-korea/market-opening/ta920109.htm >[accessed 4 April, 2010]
56
U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21st Century-; See<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html> [accessed 4 April, 2010]57 Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century; See<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/print/20060629-2.html>
58
Robert Zoellick, “Economics and Security in the Changing Asia-Pacific,” Survival 39:29-51, 1997-98
59
Robert Zoellick, “The United States,” in Zoellick, Peter D. Sutherland, and Hisashi Owada, 21stCentury Strategies of The Trilateral Countries: In Concert or Conflict? (New York: TrilateralCommission, 1999) , pp.5
60 See Remarks by President Barack Obama at the Suntory Hall on November 11, 2009.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall> [accessed 4
April, 2010]
61
An e-mail conversation with the author

16strategic importance to Japan-U.S. relations rests on his multilateralist thinking.
Zoellick’s call for Japan to work together with the U.S. is genuine in accordance with“… the lesson the U.S. learned from its reluctance to play an active role in world affairs
in the period between the two world wars: For the international system to work, leading
powers must lead.” 62 This is, I think, an important part of his multilateralist creed aswell. Zoellick continues to call for genuine partnership with Japan and Japan’s
cooperation and maintains, “This is why today we seek to build a global partnershipwith Japan – with Tokyo assuming a greater leadership role in a system from which it
derives significant benefits.” 63 He admitted that he was disappointed at the outcome of
President H. W. Bush’s visit to Japan, whose preparations he led. Things did not
progress according to the scenario he formulated to play up a redefined U.S.-Japan
strategic relationship, which is the cornerstone of the new American engagement in East
Asia. He confessed later that his intentions were undercut and that press attention wasdiverted to bilateral economic issues, mainly the so-called automobile frictions, which
was politically manipulated and then nearly erupted due to the domestic pressures. 64 I
keenly sensed his regret at the outcome of the visit when I repeatedly perused the text ofthe 1992 Tokyo Declaration. In contrast with the essential first half of the Declaration,
the second half was indeed stuffed with a lot of “rubbish” that the U.S. side persisted in,
but which was all irrelevant, superfluous, and disproportionate. The author has heard
from people influential in business and political circles that the Declaration certainly
sent out shock waves that revitalized them politically and that, as a result, they came tobelieve that Japan-U.S. relations would enter a new and promising phase. Although it
seems cynical in retrospect, Japan retreated into the so-called “Lost Decade(s),” and its
people were beset with a “sense of besiegement.” I feel truly sorry that Zoellick has
seen Japan, once his strategic partner for institutional order building, now slip into
freefall.
The capacity to architect and provide a grand design for a new architecture ofgovernance that might attract other parties and eventually lead to a mutually acceptableagreement is an essential condition for a leading actor in multilateral negotiations. I was
confounded by an article in a Japanese newspaper on a press interview in which
Zoellick referred to Japan’s flawed approach to the Doha Round negotiations. 65 Thissentiment came in part from a very well-known reason: Zoellick had very tense
62James Baker III, “America in Asia”
Ibid.
64
Conversation with the author
65
An Interview with President Zoellick, The Asahi Shimbun, 9 Dec, 2009.
6317

relations with his Japanese counterparts. Zoellick seldom offers his own accounts in thisway. It is my opinion that the real problem lies in structural flaws built into Japan’s
unique style and system for negotiations, which tend to passively protect fragmented
interests of various stakeholders rather than promote a unified platform of prioritizednational interests. Zoellick once said to me that this posture appears less thancooperative at best and obstructive at worst in the eyes of counterpart negotiators when
they are serious, either willingly or not, about finding a point of convergence forconflicting interests to reach a final bargain. It saddened me to hear this. According toZoellick, players of a multilateral game (trade, for instance) attempt to take the lead byoffering big ideas instilled with their own interests as a basis for negotiations and induce
other members to deal, haggle, settle down to bargains, and finally reach an overall
compromise. Japan suffers a lack of political power and will, which were sorely needed
not only for coordinating among fragmented interests, but for defining national interests
for the sake of compromise. This frustrated Zoellick in the trade talks. As a matter ofcourse, since Zoellick as USTR was delegated negotiating authority by the U.S.
Congress, he, too, could not totally free himself from unreasonable pressures fromparliamentary and business circles, or escape from the unreasonable burdens ofrepresenting parochial or narrow interests. There were more than a few instances ofinfamous “grey areas” allegedly committed or condoned during his time as USTR: tocite two examples, an administrative directive concerning protective measures for the
steel industry and various subsidy measures for U.S. agricultural products. The author
remembers meeting with Zoellick in Tokyo in January 2006, at which he honestly
confessed, “It was a difficult time.” This was when a BSE problem was about to erupt
and a major spat awaited him in Japan. Readers will recall the manner in which Zoellick
responded in good faith to irritating Japanese consumers, as was illustrated in a timely
carton in a Japanese newspaper. 66 I am confident that others share my sense about
Zoellick’s attitude. The period of Japan-U.S. economic frictions is already behind us,
while friction between the U.S and China is intensifying. I may not be alone in mynostalgia for those days.
After serving a year and a half as deputy secretary of state, Zoellick left the Bushadministration in July 2006. He had a contract with The Financial Times as a columnist
and late that year published his first column, titled “Japan is ready for evolution andreform,” to refocus attention on Japan. The readers would see in this op-ed column
66

See the carton by cartoonist Sunao Hari, with the sub-caption “Hey! We haven’t seen such alow-keyed America for a while,” The Asahi Shimbun, 25 January, 2006.

18

Zoellick’s cautious optimism toward a Japan that had seemed to regain its vitality
thanks to the optimism attributable to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s reform
efforts. Zoellick discussed Japan’s problems and a possible future course, drawing on
the formulation from Kenneth Pyle’s newly released book Japan Rising, 67 that Japan
has the unique ability to transform and adjust itself when it faces a threatening external
crisis. The visit to Japan Zoellick decided to make in December 2009 less than a monthafter the dispatch of a high-powered World Bank delegation led by a managing director
and five vice presidents demonstrates his interest in the historic implications of therecent change in government in Japan. Judging from the press interview alreadymentioned, it seems to me that the visit which consisted not only of meetings with the
new top leaders of the new government, but also young hopefuls of the next generation,
may have given Zoellick a sense of real change that has probably met his expectations.

4. A Responsible Stakeholder: China
Since I have already discussed Zoellick’s main argument on this subject in Chapter 2.(4),I should like to add here what has yet to be discussed. Although it should be
acknowledged that Zoellick may be a highly “controversial” public figure in both
Kasumigaseki (location of the government bureaucracy) and Nagatacho (location of theDiet), the author has undertaken to defend him on the grounds that figure-pointing andlabeling Zoellick as “anti-Japan and pro-China” would be counterproductive to thenational interests of Japan. There are several reasons why repugnancy toward or
resentment against Zoellick was widespread and powerful. Also, there are accordingly
two opposing groups in Japan the author recognizes. One group is trade negotiators andcommerce promotion officials who resented Zoellick’s “unfriendly” response as USTR
to the request for appointments for meetings with the group of cabinet ministers at the
Doha Round negotiations and were angered at the exclusion of Japan from important
informal negotiations on trade issues. A second group is security and defense people
who were resentful of Zoellick’s decision, on becoming the deputy secretary of state, toabolish the “strategic dialogue” with Japan, established by his predecessor Richard
Armitage and shift to a strategic dialogue with China. When Zoellick stopped over inJapan in January 2006, we discussed this issue. He avoided referring to the real reason
for the closure of the dialogue, but I surmised disappointment on his part at a Japan that
had failed to meet his expectations of “real strategy talks.” As mentioned earlier, mycounterargument is to point out that it is unlikely that a man who takes pride in the 1992
Tokyo Declaration be against Japan. I have already referred to people who distance67

Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).

19

themselves from both groups mentioned above and positively agree with my position.
The unfounded allegations that Zoellick is a “pro-China” agent are not confined toJapan, but are voiced in the United States as well, especially among Republican
conservatives. In the American press he has at times been called horrible names such as“China bugger.” However, as a friend of Zoellick’s I am encouraged to see him stay thecourse in consistently suggesting that “China build on its success to become a“responsible stakeholder.” In September 2005, Zoellick made a now-famous speech at
the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York in which he maintainedthat China, which has made great economic strides in keeping with the decision madeunder Deng Xiaoping that “it would embrace globalization rather than detachthemselves from it,” has to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international
system 68. Furthermore, he stated the following:
China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success.
In doing so, China could achieve the objective identified by Mr. Zheng 69: “to transcend the
traditional ways for great powers to emerge.” 70

Here we can reaffirm one of Zoellick’s tenets of multilateralism: the principle of“win-win” is to be sustainably secured among members through multilateral rules. The
following are sentences of the speech.
Indeed, we hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjusts to the internationalrules developed over the last century, but also joins us and others to address the challenges of
the new century.
From China’s perspective, it would seem that its national interest would be much better
served by working with us to shape the future international system. If it isn’t clear that why
the United States should suggest a cooperative relationship with China, consider thealternatives. Picture the wide range of global challenge we face in the years ahead – terrorism
and extremists exploiting Islam, the proliferation of weapons destruction, poverty, disease –and ask whether it would be easier or harder to handle those problems if the United States
68

Robert Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?: remarks made on September
21, 2001 to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York City.
69 Mr. Zheng has served as advisor to China’s political leaders for a long time and is now president ofChina Reform Forum. He promoted the idea of China’s “Peaceful Rise,” the keeping of harmony with
the international community. See also Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to Great Power Status,”
Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2005.
70
Robert Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?

20and China were cooperating or at odd.
We now encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.
As a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would work with
us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success. Cooperation as
stakeholders will not mean the absence of differences – we will have disputes that we need to
manage. But that management can take place within a larger framework where the parties
recognize a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems thatprovide common benefits. 71

In his keynote address titled From Shanghai Communique to Global Stakeholders, 72delivered in Shanghai in March 2007 to commemorate the thirty-fifth anniversary of thenormalization of U.S.-China relations, Zoellick also took the consistent and steadfast
position of urging China to grapple with four international problems. The four problems,
namely, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and international energy security share a common
parameter: that is, they are prone to destabilize international efforts for a new peacefulorder and require China’s cooperation for solutions. Zoellick’s posture to China can becontrasted with those of President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
both of whom were later criticized domestically for their “overly conciliatory” attitudes.
In fact, since the two stopped short of raising some contentious issues, including humanrights violations, with Chinese leaders as legitimate American concerns, apparently
because of political calculations, subsequent public polls showed a downward trend. It
is quite obvious which attitude is more orthodox and trusted as American mainstream
diplomacy. In his involvement with China policy, first referred to in the “America inAsia” article, Zoellick proclaims, “Our ideals and values must be an essential part of ourengagement with China.” 73 This diplomatic posture was reaffirmed again in the
afore-mentioned address in New York as follows:
Freedom lies at the heart of what America is … As a nation, we stand for what President
Bush calls the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. 74

In Zoellick’s eyes, Japan may still be distinct from China in its sharing with the U.S. thesame liberal political system and human rights values and also in the practice of fair
71
72
73
74

Ibid.
See Robert Zoellick, “China and America need a new Shanghai agreement, The Financial Times, 16
April, 2007

James Baker III, “America in Asia.”
Robert Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?

21

economic competitions based on free-market rules. I think this may be why Zoellick
remains friendly to Japan despite having been repeatedly disillusioned.

5. After the Crisis?: the United States
I once heard a joke that is popular in the diplomatic community in Washington D.C.
According to the joke, Zoellick is a most difficult guest to entertain as he prefers neitherdelicious dishes nor witty chats, but rather serious conversations stuffed with policy
implications. Although I am not in a position to confirm whether the joke has a basis infact, I can report that what pleased Zoellick at the last time we had dinner together was
the pleasant and relaxed talks about his lecture After the Crisis?, delivered at the Johns
Hopkins University. He did in fact argue, “The United States would be mistaken to takefor granted the dollar’s place as to the world’s predominant reserve currency,” 75 and“Looking forward, there will increasingly be other options to the dollar.” 76 A heatedexchange of views, mainly between Zoellick and a highly respected journalist, wastriggered by my comments that some were taken by surprise by the extent to which
Zoellick had warned his nation about the dollar’s future. The journalist insisted that it
would never be possible for the renminbi to replace the dollar as the world leading
currency, not even three decades from now, no matter what may happen: for instance,
whether China surpasses the U.S. in GDP or whether the renminbi meets some, if not all,of the conditions required for key currency status. Zoellick, apparently a bit excited andfinally exhausted, concluded the exchange by saying, “Let’s have dinner here again in
two decades!” Someone to whom I disclosed part of this discussion commented that
although he shared the concerns about the possibility of the Department of Treasury
losing budgetary control because of the key currency status, he thought that pumppriming is basically the right policy alternative at a time of extraordinary contraction ofhousehold demands caused by the bursting of the housing loans bubbles. It seemed tome that Zoellick would be more interested in a far-reaching outlook of the new power
structure, and especially in the competitive relations between the U.S. and China thatwould emerge after a reconfiguration of powers to include rising powers such as China
and India, which are now driving forces of the global economy. His lecture After the
Crisis? offers ample hints in this regard.
According to Zoellick, another message he hopes that readers will take away from75

Robert Zoellick, After the Crisis? : a lecture delivered on September 28, 2009 at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.
76
Ibid.

22

After the Crisis? concerns the latter part of the lecture, which is indirectly addressed to
the U.S. Congress. The issue is, first, which public institutions should be authorized toregulate banking practices and promulgate rules in order to meet the expectations ofpublic opinion in the wake of the collapses of banking institutions triggered by thebankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Second, would not the additional delegation of
authorizing power to the Federal Reserve Board, already powerful and equivalent to acentral bank with independent status and power, impinge upon America’s fundamental
principle of government, the rule of “balance of power.”?
Will democratic governments permit independent central banks to assume even moreauthority?
The U.S. Congress was surprised to learn of the scope of the Federal Reserve’s authority tocreate funds, buy assets, devise global swap lines, and make transactions outside the usual
process for expending public monies.
The Congress has had an uneasy relationship with banks and bankers since Alexander
Hamilton. It took the United States until 1913 to set up a central bank. The Federal Reserve
earned its hard-won independence over years of effort.
So it should not be a surprise that American democracy is hesitating about authorizing the
Fed to supervise systemic banking risks as well as operate monetary policy, adding to its
power. 77

The statements above are the very essence of the message to Congress from Zoellick,
who aspired to become treasury secretary during the second half of the George W. Bushadministration. It is intellectually stimulating to speculate on how Zoellick would havedealt with the current crisis. It seems to me that he might have done well, making themost of his “inner vision” concerning a range of issues such as international
macroeconomics, finance, and budgets, a vision that he has formulated since the time hebegan to work for Treasury Secretary James Baker, who concluded the Plaza Accord
with Japan and the other G5 countries. I also surmise that he might have adhered to“discipline,” a hallmark of Republican DNA, in handling budget policies, albeit
flexibly.
Zoellick appears, on the other hand, to be free of partisanship. He participated in the2000 presidential election campaign by contributing the essay “Campaign 2000: A
Republican Foreign Policy,” to policy debates on paper, traditionally arranged by
77

Ibid.

23

Foreign Affairs magazine. Drawing upon a traditional stream of moderateinternationalism, Zoellick challenged his Democratic opponent about the policy failurescommitted during the eight years of the Clinton administration. In his criticism of the
Democrats he focused not on ideological differences, as his Republican peers theneo-conservatives would do, but rather on the failed methods the Democrats employed,
and he sought a new national agenda acceptable on a bipartisan basis. When conflicts
between the moderates and neoconservatives rose to the surface at the time of thesecond Gulf War, Zoellick, who had assisted James Baker in his diplomatic efforts tolobby international support in the first Gulf War, stayed out of the fray in his role as atrade negotiator, or, to put it bluntly, seemed to keep political distance from the neo-cons.
In November 2009, Senator John Kerry, the 2004 Democratic presidential candidate andnow chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited the World Bank
Group headquarters at the invitation of its president. Though the Senator delivered anaddress critical of the World Bank Group’s flaws and long-standing problems, hestopped short of any criticism of Zoellick’s leadership and endorsed the institution’s
agenda. 78 Furthermore, in response to a question from the author, one member of thehigh-powered delegation to Tokyo lead by Managing Director Ngoji Okonjo-Iweala
said, “Bob is a multilateralist!” The author took the answer at face value and came tothe conclusion that Zoellick may be getting along well with the new Democratic
administration.

6. The Birth of a New Multilateralism: The G20
As previously mentioned, it was Zoellick’s long-held view that in the face of today’s
systemic crises, the G7 (G8) partnership for global management had already failed
because of its inadequate capability to address diversifying global problems andemerging new challenges. In October 2008, Zoellick publicly initiated advocacy of “…
a new multilateralism, initially the creation of a G-14, for a new global economic
management at the time of deepening interdependence.” 79 On the eve of the“substantially first” G20 summit meeting, held in London in March 2009, Zoellick helda kind of briefing session to offer insight into the background and necessity of the firstmeeting and a perspective. The audience was able to confirm not only his uniqueapproach to this new multilateralism, but also his pragmatic method of implementation.
78

John Kerry, Building a Twenty-First Century Development Bank: New Challenges, New Priorities:
remarks made on November 18, 2009 at the World Bank headquarters, Washington, DC. See <http//:
worldbank.org//HBJELHSXX0>79
Robert Zoellick, Modernizing Multilateralism and Markets: an address made on October 10, 2008 at
the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.

24

On the basis of the basic understanding that “Unlike any economic crisis in the past
sixty years, this is a new global crisis,” 80 he analyzed the nature of the G20 meeting in
more detail.
We live in a global economy driven by private individuals, companies, unions, and national
governments. They trade, invest, work, invent, bargain, and build within and acrossnation-states, which set the rules and sometimes agree to abide by negotiated terms andprocedures. The G-20 will not change that reality of the international system. But a
strengthened multilateralism can magnify the advantages, and temper the downside risks of
economic interdependence. 81

He argues against ideas for new institutions or new forums for global governance andinsists on starting with reform and empowerment of the existing institutions. He goes on
to say:If leaders are serious about creating new global responsibilities or governance, let them startby modernizing multilateralism to empower the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank Group tomonitor national policies. Bringing sunlight to national decision-making would contribute totransparency, accountability, and consistency across national policies. 82

It is along this line of thinking that the G-20 is expected to serve as a “new steeringgroup” for dealing with and overseeing the following four tasks: first, to endorse a WTO
monitoring system to advance trade and resist economic isolationism, while working tocomplete the Doha negotiations to open markets, cut subsidies, and resist backsliding;second, to institutionalize a monitoring role for the IMF, review the execution of thesestimulus packages, and assess results calling for action, if necessary; third, to clean up
bad assets, and have concerned governments recapitalize their banking systems; andfourth, to overhaul the financial regulatory and supervisory system, and address theneed for better and deeper international cooperation. There is one more task that
Zoellick very much wanted to bring to light. He maintains, “There is a missing fifth
dimension in our response to the global crisis: the developing world.” 83 This dimension
was indeed “missing” in the crisis John Maynard Keynes had experienced almost eighty
80

Robert Zoellick, Seizing Opportunity from Crisis: Making Multilateralism Work: an address deliveredon March 31, 2009 at the Thompson Reuter Building, Canary Warf, London.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.

25

years before and is attributable to the extent of globalization that is a feature of today’s
world. Zoellick, therefore, rightly points out:
In this crisis, developing countries are being battered by successive waves. These waves
emanate from the sharp contraction in economic growth and tightening of credit in thedeveloped world. Just as the global economy once helped to lift hundreds of millions out ofpoverty, today there is a risk of development in reverse, as our interconnected world transmits
negative shocks with greater power and velocity. 84

Zoellick also insists that developing countries, too, can be a key part of the solution.
Bearing this in mind, as reported in the press, Zoellick called for an allocation of 0.7
percent of the domestic stimulus packages developed nations prepared to boost theireconomies to invest in a Vulnerability Fund 85 for the developing world. Furthermore,
he devised a master-plan for a strategy of development that is aimed at the realization ofan “inclusive and sustainable globalization” with multiple poles of growth, including
the developing world, which was considered feasible in light of the growth experiencein Africa.
Another important element that characterizes Zoellick’s idea of multilateralism is“power-sharing,” which has already been discussed in Chapter 2. (4). He argues that:If developing countries are going to be part of the solution they must have seats at the table.
It is not easy for large groups to share responsibilities and generate a cohesive common
purpose. Within the G-20 we already see the emergence of different blocs: the EU organizing
a common position for its eight participants; the BRICs of Brazil, Russia, India, and China
coordinating joint statements. This development may be expected, but it would be
unfortunate if the new, broader G-Group created new fault lines between developed anddeveloping countries.
A strong G-2 within the G-20, and cutting cross development lines, could form thecornerstone of a new multilateralism – a multilateralism that recognizes the realities of aninternational system born, not of nation-states alone, but of nation-states linked througheconomic interdependence.
84

Ibid.
The main purpose of this proposition is not to establish a new fund, but rather to earmark and spend
for developing countries 0.7 percent, of the stimulus packages prepared by developed countries to boost
their economies. See Robert Zoellick, “Time to herald the Age of Responsibility,” The Financial Times,
25 January, 2009.

85

26

That modern multilateralism will require that rising economic powers have a larger say in
how institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF are run. This is both right andinevitable. The world has changed radically since Keynes attended the Bretton Woods
conference in1944. We must change with it.86

Zoellick employs a “differentiated business model” to the so-called middle-income
countries, such as China and Brazil, as one of the “six strategic themes” for his
presidential agenda, which will discuss in the following chapter. He holds that otherdeveloping countries should be accorded the same opportunity as China is to vie for the
status of a “stakeholder.” In his opening remarks to the Board of Governors of theWorld Bank Group meeting held in October 2009, Zoellick reiterated his conviction “Ifdeveloping countries are going to be part of the solution they must have seats at thetable,” 87 This was received as a sign of his strong resolve. On the other hand, paying
attention to Japan’s evolution from the largest borrowing country in the past to thesecond largest donor country today, Ngoji Okonjo-Iweala purposefully likens Japan’s
marvelous post-war record of reconstruction and development to the Bank’s role model
for assistance for developing countries. 88 Zoellick’s ideas that “If developing countries
are part of the solution, they must also be part of the conversation,” and that “With
responsibility, there should be more voice and representation,” are not only part of thelogical components underlying the G-20 network, but also part of the essence of his
multilateralist philosophy. 89 In fact, Zoellick proclaimed at the abovementioned Boardof Governors meeting that reform efforts to enhance the voice and representation ofdeveloping and transition countries had already been made. He also contends, “To go
further to rebalance voting shares and Board seats, it is imperative that the developed
countries reconsider old prerogatives and controls, and that they must be bold andfar-sighted.” 90 Zoellick never forgets to urge rising stakeholders to recognize that “Withrights come responsibility, including boosting of development assistance,” and that “Therecognition of new powers should not be at the expense of the powerless.” 91
Incidentally, I not only participated in the policy-making process concerning Japan’s
86

Robert Zoellick, Seizing Opportunity from Crisis: Making Multilateralism WorkIbid.
88 Okonjo-Iwaela made this point in her key-note address of the symposium held at the University ofTokyo on November 3, 2009. See Hideaki Asahi, “A Report of University of Tokyo/World Bank Group
Joint HSP Symposium,” Kyoyo-Gakubuho (Gazette), N.526, 6 January, 2010.
89 Robert Zoellick, The World Bank Group Beyond the Crisis: remarks made at the Board of Governorsof the World Bank Group in Istanbul, Turkey on October 6, 2009. See also Robert Zoellick, An Inclusive& Sustainable Globalization
90
Robert Zoellick, Seizing Opportunity from Crisis: Making Multilateralism Work
91
Ibid.
87

27

effort to promote what was called “international cooperation” 92 throughout the 1990s,
but also have field experience on the ground of a UN peace operation. As a result of
these experiences, I acknowledge that in Japan, there remains a lack of a sense and anunderstanding of how multilateralism works, something widely shared among otherinfluential members of the international community.
In short, it may be fair to say that it is still too early to draw any conclusion about the
future of the G-20. Or, in other words, experts are divided in their opinions about
whether the G-20 will reliably develop into the “steering group” that Zoellick envisages
in his new architecture for global governance. What happened at the COP15 93 summit
meeting in Copenhagen last December may be an early signal about the coming intoplay of new games over non-traditional security issues such as climate changes.
Delegates from many countries around the world are reported to have been confoundedby what is referred to as the “trauma of Copenhagen” syndrome, and Japan is no
exception. The problem, however, is how to proceed next. There are other issues as well,such as how such a new multilateralism can evolve and whether the G-7 will be able tosurvive itself. The outcome of these issues will depend on a host of speculative
movements and a configuration of powers, new and old, and thus require continued
attention. Zoellick has lent good offices, both directly and indirectly, to give birth to theG-20. Since he is a genuine multilateralist with vision and power, he may have ideas
about how to stave off difficulties and move forward.

7. Challenges of the World Banker
I will begin this chapter by relating some political gossips that have spread among trade
officials and WTO specialists. 94 First, it is well-known among this crowd that Zoellick
and Pascal Lamy became good friends when the former was the USTR, and the latterthe EU trade commissioner. Second, the two friends boosted one another’s career
aspirations: Zoellick’s desire to become president of the World Bank and Lamy’s desire
to become director general of the WTO. Despite feeling a bit awkward about the92

There is a strong criticism in Japan, especially among practitioners and intellectuals that this term
implies altruism rather than self-interest and that it ironically exposes the absence of a sense of
responsibility required of an actor for global governance.
93
COP15 is an abbreviation for The 15th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
94
It is certainly true that it is necessary to examine the trajectory of Zoellick’s ideas and actions when he
was engaged in trade and commerce issues, especially NAFTA and the New Round negotiations if one
intends to outline a complete picture of what Zoellick subscribes to as multilateralism. Because of time
constraints, however, I have not done this. Those interested should see Paul Blustein, Misadventures ofthe Most Favored Nations (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009)28

authenticity of these rumors when I first heard them, I nevertheless sent a message tocongratulate Zoellick on his appointment to the World Bank. The feeling of
awkwardness came from my apprehension as to whether Zoellick would do as well in“low politics” as in “high politics” at which he has been far more experienced andskillful. Notwithstanding my misgivings, in his one hundredth-day speech with thehighly symbolic main title An Inclusive and Sustainable Globalization, and subtitle To
Overcome Poverty, Enhance Growth with Care for the Environment, and Create
Individual Opportunity and Hope, Zoellick successfully redefined a new policy
direction for the World Bank Group by reinterpreting “low politics” issues in theframework of “high-politics.” 95 This seems to me not only to imply an increase instrategic importance of dealing with “low-politics” issues as a result of the evolution of
a security paradigm that also affects a new architecture of global governance. This also
seems to justify Zoellick’s new role of combining the implications of both “low” and“high” politics. While appreciating the positive aspects of globalization on the one hand,
Zoellick warns in the speech against possible dangers of its negative aspects if effective
measures are not taken to prevent those aspects from spreading from alienated people
on the periphery as well as from environmental degradation. He proclaims, “It is thevision of the World Bank Group to contribute an inclusive and sustainable globalization– to overcome poverty, enhance growth with care for the environment, and create
individual opportunity and hope.” 96 Zoellick also formulates a set of policy agendas
that accommodate “inclusive” and “sustainable” remedies of globalization. At thisjuncture, Zoellick maintained in a Financial Times article in early 2009 that for the 21st
century to be an age of responsibility, it has first of all to be an “‘era of responsible
globalization,’ where inclusivity and sustainability take precedence over the enrichmentof a few.” 97 Zoellick puts forth six strategic themes for achieving the above-mentioned
goals: first, support for the poorest countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa; second,some special problems of post-conflict states or states facing breakdown; third, different
development solutions and business models for middle-income countries (MICs); fourth,a global and regional public goods agenda, with a particular focus on the environment,
aid-for-trade, financial-services integration and transnational health issues; fifth, open
development in the Arab world; and, sixth, a knowledge agenda that cuts across all
categories. 98
95

Robert Zoellick, An Inclusive & Sustainable Globalization: an address made at The National Press
Club, Washington D.C. on October 10, 2007
96
Ibid.
97
Robert Zoellick, “Time to herald the Age of Responsibility”
98“Not Your Average Banker – A Conversation with Robert B. Zoellick,” The National Interest,

29

Amid the occurrence of a range of incidents on a global scale since he became president,such as high food prices, called the “silent tsunami,” soaring energy prices, and credit
crunches, Zoellick has taken the lead in offering relevant perspectives from which these
global issues were to be addressed. When Zoellick calls a critical phase that appears at
the turn of a historical era A Challenge of Economic Statecraft, the readers can discern
the pride and self-confidence of a man who has experienced so many crucial stages of
U.S. foreign policy. He looks back in the following way:
There is a challenge of statecraft in times such as these: to recognize the changing landscape,often as events and fate rush by, so as to address pressing needs, while also planting seeds
that may become the supportive timbers of the future. Today, we need to counter immediate
threats while also building an inclusive and sustainable globalization that will often offer
more sources of growth and innovation for the future, enhance multilateral cooperation todeal with shocks and downturns, and maximize opportunity and hope for all. 99

Zoellick concludes the speech by quoting Otto von Bismarck and stating the following:
Bismarck once said that the mark of statesmen is recognizing Fate as she rushes by, so as tograb on to the mantle of her cloak.
This is a moment for statecraft in the political economy. 100

If practical steps are taken against unprecedented moves at precisely the right moment, a
new opportunity to pave a path to the future will be secured. In other words, to seize theopportunity that appears in the midst of a changing economic crisis is the “challenge ofstatecraft.” The author thinks that this is tantamount to Zoellick’s own challenge as a
World Banker. In this connection, he identified “four immediate needs” in his speech 101:
first, high food prices: a new deal for global food policy; second, now or never on a
global trade deal; third, reversing the resource curse: launching an extractive industries
transparency initiative (EITI) ++; and, fourth, a “one percent solution” for equity
investment in Africa. All of these needs are distinct in that they are progressive andpractical action plans, and in that they are not overly theoretical and out of touch withreality. His intellectual charm and traction, which strike a strong contrast with his rather
May/June 2008, p.9. See also Robert Zoellick, An Inclusive & Sustainable Globalization
Robert Zoellick, A Challenge of Economic Statecraft: a speech made at the Center for Global
Development in Washington D.C. on April 2, 2008
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
99

30

subdued and quiet character, reside in his policies.
The above general remarks aside, these needs have one more feature in common, afeature that concerns Africa, which is also Zoellick’s personal agenda. I still vividly
recollect that when I handed on to him as a small gift a copy of Paul Collier’s
best-selling book The Bottom Billion during his short visit in Tokyo in August 2007,
those accompanying him suddenly began to buzz about it. At the Department of State,
Zoellick was a well-informed Deputy Secretary on the issues on Africa andknowledgeable about Africa. In fact, he was assigned to the special mission for asolution of the Darfur problem - presumably because of then Senator Barack Obama,
who showed great interest in the problem - and frequently visited Sudan to mediatepeace talks. As Paul Blustein explains in his book Misadventures of the Most Favored
Nations, Zoellick took action as USTR to help lift the patent restrictions on
HIV/AIDS-related medicine, and, as a result, deserved special praise and trust from theleaders of the developing world. Although anyone in his position might naturally havean interest in African problems, Zoellick is the right person with the capacity and will tograpple with them in earnest and therefore is one of the few people in developed
countries qualified for the job. Let us return his statements at more length:
We also have a larger strategic goal: We should make it possible for the growth economies
of Africa to become a complimentary pole of growth over the next 10 to 15 years.
We are devising a ‘One Percent solution’ for Equity Investment in Africa to be a step
towards the goal. Where some see sovereign funds as a source of concern, we see
opportunity.
What of Africa? Between 1995 and 2005, 17 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, representing
36 percent of the population, grew on average 5.5 percent without the impulse of great
natural resources; eight oil-producing nations representing another 29 percent of the people,
grew on average 7.4 percent over the decade.
These countries want to build on the social development foundation of the MDGs. They
want to grow. They need low-cost, reliable energy; infrastructure; regional integration withaccess to global markets; and stronger private sectors.
They offer investment opportunities. 102

Japan certainly benefits from Zoellick’s posture concerning Africa. The TICAD formula,established by Japan to deal with development issues in Africa, has recently come under
102

Ibid.

31

criticism for losing its diplomatic charm because it has turned out to be a mere forum
for talk without meaningful follow-ups. It is now noted that the fourth conference(TICAD-IV), held in Yokohama in 2008, succeeded in reversing that infamy thanks to
the World Bank’s substantive commitments to help draft an action plan for the first time.
The author has a sense that the success of the conference has provided a good turning
point in stocktaking of Zoellik’s cooperative attitude toward Japan. Now that China has
also launched a similar diplomatic initiative and entered an international competition
with Japan in development assistance in Africa, Zoellick’s political decision toparticipate in the TICAD-IV conference should be highly appreciated.

8. The Potential of Multilateralism in Japan
In the general election held in the summer of 2009, the Japanese public opted for achange of government after a half century of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). Against a backdrop evolving external environments propelledby global “mega competition,” the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has set out toimplement its reform agenda. It seems to me that this must appear in the eyes of
Zoellick to be a typical pattern of internal transformation induced by external changes.
He may observe, “Japan is among the first leading industrial powers to experience aninternal political upheaval in the wake of the compelling external crisis.” However, at
this stage no one is certain what will become of the ongoing reform efforts given thefact that strong vested interest groups still adhere to the outmoded success model that is
the target of political attacks. While there is a consensus view among the general public,on the one hand, that they have no other alternative but to secure Japan’s future byrevamping the less-than-effective domestic structure and rules for governance, there is acommon sense view, on the other hand, about the importance of coexistence andcooperation with the international community. In this connection, Makoto Iokibe, a
political scientist of Japan’s diplomatic history, maintains, “Revolutionary parties thatwin victories that overwhelm ancient regimes are prone to falling into “historical” traps,
that is, illusions of being almighty and eventually to committing follies.” 103 He warns
the revolutionaries against over-confidence that “They can change things not only
domestically, but also externally.” Concerning external relations, attention should be
paid to one point: that is, nowadays in the light of dwindling diplomatic resources andmeans, the policy guidance on the practice of “selection” and “concentration,” about
which quite a few senior government officials are rather cynical, will gradually have to103

Makoto Iokibe, “Jidai-no-Arashi: ‘Saka-no-ueno- Kumo” no Nihon ‘Kaiten-no-Igyo-ni-Youna,’ The
Mainichi Shimbun, 6 December, 2009.

32

carry weight. At the same time, however, the potential of multilateralism to benefit
Japan deserves attention. For instance, the multilateralist approach could be effective indealing with non-traditional threats that Asia and the Pacific, the center of global growth,
confronts when envisioning stability and peace for the 21st century, including
environmental degradation, communicable diseases, drug trafficking, and piracy.
Zoellick is positive and even cooperative about the role Japan may play multilaterally.
He takes the entrepreneurship view that assistance to developing countries is not social
welfare, but investment for the future, whose returns will be export increases and theopening of markets, and which will thus benefit the national interests of donor countries.
There are some references in the lecture After the Crisis? that validates thisinterpretation:
A global economy with more poles of growth could offer Japan new markets, especially for
its impressive capabilities to use energy efficiency.
The world will be deeply interested in the shape of a Japanese foreign policy that can besustained across parties and that might assume new responsibilities. Such a foreign policy
could build on Japan’s experiences in development. Japan could deepen cooperation withother Asian-Pacific actors in ASEAN, Australia, China, and Korea, while maintaining its
global role, especially through relations with the United States. Development opportunities inAfrica, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Middle East would also enable Japan ‘do wellwhile doing good.’ 104

Luckily, Japan has just completed a thorough governmental reform to streamline allirrelevant systems and rules from “upstream” to “downstream” and, as a result, has set
in motion a new aid mechanism that keeps bilateral and multilateral operations inharmony. In addition, the strategic planning of grand designs from the viewpoint of
national interests has just been made possible. Zoellick’s abovementioned press
interview with a Japanese newspaper provides his penetrating insights that “Japan has
come to consider development assistance not as international social welfare but from theview-point of national interest.” 105 As symbolized by the “underrepresentation”
phenomenon and statistics of both the World Bank Group and the United Nations, inJapan multilateralism is an empty word that elicits a sense of remoteness andun-familiarity, and thus tends to create passive and rather negative views, as expressedin the saying “No Japanese flags can be seen.” It is against this backdrop of the104
105

Robert Zoellick, After the Crisis ?
An Interview with President Zoellick, The Asahi Shimbun, 9 December, 2009.

33

“visibility problem” that a very limited numbers of Japanese, such as Yasushi Akashi(former under secretary-general of the United Nations), Sadako Ogata (former United
Nations high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR)), Hisashi Owada (chief justice of theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ)), and Koichiro Matsuura (former director-general of
the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)) arenotable exceptions. They have been highly prominent and well-respected internationallyand have done a great deal to connect Japan to the outside world. It is to be hoped thatcoming generations of young people will follow their example. To that end, several
steps should be implemented to narrow the abovementioned perception gap, taking into
consideration the recent tendency among young students toward an inward-looking
mentality. It is therefore very encouraging to note that Zoellick called on the leaders of
the DPJ government to make more use of international institutions like the World Bank
Group and at the same time showed his understanding of Japan’s problem and gave theJapanese an inkling of his initiative.
In conclusion, the array of multilateralist ideas Zoellick has developed during the period
from his maiden article “America in Asia” to the recent lecture After the Crisis? bear on
the major challenge that Japan faces in leading the task of order-building in Asia, which
is vitally important to its resurgence. This order should be a multi-dimensional as wellas multi-layered architecture of global governance that engages China, and other rising
Asian nations, including India. At the same time, as Joseph Nye points out, “TheJapan-U.S. alliance relationship, redefined in the 1996 Tokyo declaration, must be on
board with respect to the international good of shoring up stability in the region.”106
Funabashi reports, “These days, many Americans tend to view China as an “insider” of
the international system.” 107 If the G2 theory to which the U.S. subscribes is an attempt
to rationalize its global strategy by making China more like an “insider,” Japan has notime to spare in its effort to shape and implement multilateralist foreign policy.

106

Nye maintains that for stability and prosperity in the region, the U.S.-Japan alliance has two positive
functions of ‘integrate, but hedge’ to an empowering China and a nuclear North Korea. See Joseph Nye,
“An Alliance Larger Than One Issue,” New York Times, 7 January, 2010.
107
Yoichi Funabashi, “Sekai@Nihon: Tamesareru- Seiken-no-Gaikoryoku,” The Asahi Shimbun, 7January, 2010.

34

References-Hideaki Asahi. Peace Building in Practice: Lessons from the Ground – Forging
Japan’s New Strategy for Peace Building, JIIA, April 2008
Available from:http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/resarch/2009/200904-Peace_Building_in_Practice.pdf[Accessed 4 April, 2010]
Zheng Bijian. China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct
2005.
-Robert Zoellick. Campaign 2000: A Republican Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs,
Mar/Apr 2000. Available form:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55632/robert-b-zoellick/campaign-2000-a-republ
ican-foreign-policy [Accessed 4 April, 2010]-Robert Zoellick. Modernizing Multilateralism and Markets: address made at thePeterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. on October 6, 2008.
Available from:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21927552~pa
gePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html [Accessed 4April, 2010]-Robert Zoellick. Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?: remarks madeto the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations on September 21, 2001.
Available from:http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%2028_2/Zoellick.pdf
http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol16no4.pdf [Accessed 4 April, 2010]-Robert Zoellick. The World Bank Group Beyond Crisis: remarks made at the annual
meetings of Board of Governors of the World Bank Group in Istanbul, Turkey on
October 6, 2009.
Available from:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22340541~pa
gePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html [Accessed 4 April, 2010]35

-Robert B. Zoellick. An Inclusive & Sustainable Globalization, The National Press Club,
Washington, D.C. on October 10, 2007.
Available from:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21504730~pa
gePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html [Accessed 4 April, 2010]-Robert B. Zoellick. Fragile States: Securing Development, The International Institutefor Strategic Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, September 12, 2008
Available from:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21898896~pa
gePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html [accessed 4 April, 2010]- Robert Zoellick. Seizing Opportunity from Crisis: Making Multilateralism Work: anaddress delivered at the Thompson Reuter Building, Canary Wharf, London on
March 31, 2009.
Available from:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22121476~pa
gePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html [Accessed 4 April, 2010]- Robert Zoellick. Guiding Germany’s Unification, New York Times, Nov 7, 2009
Available from:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/opinion/07iht-edzoellick.html [Accessed 4 April,
2010]-Robert Zoellick. From Shanghai Communique to Global Stakeholders, a paper
prepared for the Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture on Sino-American Relations, held on
March 21, 2007 and sponsored by the Shanghai Association of American Studies andthe National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Shanghai.
Available from:http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=733 [Accessed 4 April,
2010]-Robert Zoellick. A Challenge of Economic Statecraft: an address delivered at theCenter for Global Development, Washington, D.C. on April 2, 2008.
Available from:36http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21711307~p
agePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html [Accessed 4 April, 2010]37