The Road towards the East Asia Economic Community(EAEC) 2020
Report of the NEAT Working Group
July 2016, BeijingContents
1. Past Experience in East Asian Economic Integration ........................................................... 2
1.1 East Asian Integration: Market Force and State Efforts .............................................. 2
1.2 East Asian Integration: Globalization and Regionalization......................................... 3
1.3 ASEAN Plus Three (APT): the Main Vehicle of East Asian Cooperation .................. 3
2. Rethinking of the EAEC 2020 .............................................................................................. 4
2.1 From the EAc to the EAEC 2020 ................................................................................ 4
2.2 An EAEC to Be Desired.............................................................................................. 4
3. Opportunities for the EAEC 2020 ......................................................................................... 5
3.1 Rise of Asia in World Economy .................................................................................. 5
3.2 Political Consensus ..................................................................................................... 6
3.3 Existing Cooperative Mechanisms- ............................................................................ 6
3.4 New Initiatives- ........................................................................................................... 8
4. Challenges for the EAEC 2020 ............................................................................................. 8
4.1 Geopolitical Challenges .............................................................................................. 8
4.2 ASEAN Centrality Not in Full Play ............................................................................ 9
4.3 Impact of the TPP........................................................................................................ 9
5. Policy recommendations ..................................................................................................... 10
5.1 To Develop an EAEC Blueprint ................................................................................ 10
5.2 To Substantiate ASEAN Centrality ........................................................................... 10
5.3 To Take Adavantage of the Existing Cooperative Frameworks and Mechanisms..... 11
5.4 To Conclude the CJKFTA and RCEP Negotiations as Soon as Possible .................. 11
5.5 To Promote All-round Functional Cooperation ......................................................... 12

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The idea of an “East Asia Economic Community” (EAEC) originates from the proposal ofbuilding an “East Asia community” (EAc) by the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG I) in 2001. The
EAVG I expected that “the economic field, including trade, investment and finance, is to serve as
the catalyst in this community-building process”. Ten years later, the second East Asian Vision
Group (EAVG II) proposed “Realizing an East Asia Economic Community (EAEC) by 2020” as amain pillar for regional cooperation and community building. The proposal was adopted by the
APT Commemorative Summit in Cambodia in 2012.
Since then, significant progress has been made towards such a goal, including, for example,
the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the launching of the Chiang Mai
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and the transition of the APT Macroeconomic Research
Office (AMRO) to an international organization, the launch of the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, etc. However, despite such progress and political will,
the EAEC building still seems to lack momentum. Unlike the AEC, the EAEC so far has not yet
developed any master plan or work plan. With only four years to go, skepticism and pessimism
arises on the realization of the goal.
In order to assess the EAEC process, identify the major opportunities and challenges on its
way, and produce action-oriented policy recommendations in the hope of turning the vision into
reality, NEAT China hosted a Working Group Meeting on “The Road towards the EAEC 2020” inBeijing on July 1, 2016. About 30 participants from the APT countries attended the Meeting andcontributed their wisdom based on solid academic research. The Working Group Report is
produced on the basis of their papers, presentations and discussions. It consists of five sections.
Section 1 is a brief review of East Asia’s experience in regional economic integration andcooperation. Section 2 reflects on the conception of the EAEC. Section 3 and Section 4
respectively discusses the main opportunities and challenges for the progress and realization of the
EAEC. Section 5 highlights major policy recommendations for the EAEC building proposed at the
Meeting.

1. Past Experience in East Asian Economic Integration
East Asian integration has been driven by both market force and state efforts, and by bothglobalization and regionalization. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) has been the main vehicle of
East Asian cooperation. ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN Way has been practiced as basic
principles.
1.1 East Asian Integration: Market Force and State Efforts
In retrospect, 1997 has been a dividing line in East Asian economic integration. Before that,
only ASEAN pioneered in forging the regional framework for cooperation, East Asia as a region
only existed in the market framework webbed by business community. The eruption of 1997 Asianfinancial crisis made East Asian countries realize that no one is a single island who can mitigate
single-handedly the economic and financial risks in the context of globalization and that only
through enhancing intra-regional cooperation can they consolidate their economic resilience infacing up to external economic and financial shocks. Since then, East Asian countries has
witnessed increasing economic interdependence and the region unprecedented integration in its
recent history, demonstrated by rising intra-regional trade and investment, and multi-layered2

functional cooperation in a broad range strongly supported by governments.
1.2 East Asian Integration: Globalization and Regionalization
Integrating into global production networking has been an integral part of East Asia’s
economic landscape since the end of Cold War. The development of regional production networks
has contributed to the rise of successive waves of ‘‘newly industrialized economies’’, especiallythe emergence of the latest wave (e.g. Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, then China and Vietnam).
This production regionalization has also resulted in high intra-regional trade shares with rapidly
growing trade in components. This has not, however, reduced the region‘s dependence on global
economy. On the contrary, the region’s outstanding growth based on vertical specialization
depends largely on its extra-regional trade in final goods, especially with the US and EU.
Therefore, this growth pattern of “we produce, they consume” dictates the principle of open
regionalism in East Asia, which means that policies should be welcomed as long as they are
conducive to liberalizing and facilitating trade and investment, no matter globally or regionally,
East Asia’s successful practice in the past shows that open regionalism has indeed helped enhance
the competitiveness of the countries in the region by promoting regional integration and shaping
regional production networks, while at the same time constitute a building block for a more open
global economy by complying with current rules set by the multilateral trading system under the
WTO/GATT and further supporting the WTO’s new efforts in speeding up global trade, such as
the forthcoming Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).
1.3 ASEAN Plus Three (APT): the Main Vehicle of East Asian Cooperation
Regionalism requires that one state, or a group of states, provides a sense of direction as wellas common ground around which the others can gather 1. Regional cooperation should also havegeographical scope as its priority because the closer in distance, the easier it is to succeed inreaching an agreement and larger economic benefit. As typical gravity models estimate, a 1
percent increase in the distance between two countries is associated with a fall of 0.7 to 1 percent
in the trade between them. That’s why the United States does markedly more trade with its
neighbors than it does with European economies of the same size. The pathway practiced by EU
and NAFTA proves that it is convenient to unite, cooperate and develop when regional
cooperation is implemented among neighboring countries, especially at the beginning stage.
Therefore, geographic proximity does matter in the process of East Asia’s economic integration.
The APT came into being in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. Having stood the test of
the international financial crisis, and covering both Northeast and Southeast Asia with 57% of
Asia’s population, 88% of Asia’s GDP and 50% of Asia’s total trade, APT has grown into one of
the most mature mechanisms for regional cooperation in East Asia. Now the APT cooperation hasreached an unprecedented level of cooperation and partnership with more than 60 different
mechanisms at various levels, covering 24 areas. Since 2014, about 230 cooperation projects havebeen carried out among member states, producing positive outcomes in finance, food, connectivity,
economy and trade, energy, maritime and cultural fields. The APT has lived up to its role as themain vehicle of East Asia cooperation.

1

Nick Bisley, East Asia’s Changing Regional Architecture: Towards an East Asian Economic Community? PacificAffairs, Volume 80, No. 4, Winter 2007-2008, pp.603-625.
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2. Rethinking of the EAEC 2020
When the EAVGI called upon East Asian countries for the first time to take steps forbuilding an East Asian community (EAc) of peace, prosperity and progress as a long-term goal, an
East Asia Free Trade Area (10+3) was one of the key proposals in terms of economic cooperation.
Whereas in the EAVGII report, it is suggested that the East Asia Economic Community seek tocreate a single-market and production base through the establishment of the RCEP, which includes
16 members (10+3+3). Moreover, the recent Brexit and even the previous Euro crisis also makepeople rethink about the conception of the EAEC. What should an EAEC be like by nature? Whoshould be included? What are the pathways to realize its goals? The answers to these criticalquestions must be based upon a basic fact and understanding that East Asia’s integration has beenquite unique, following an “East Asian Way”.
2.1 From the EAC to the EAEC 2020
Both EAVGI and EAVGII reports include economic, political-security and socio-cultural
cooperation as the main pillars for East Asia community building. However, until the EAVGII
report recommended the realization of the East Asia Economic Community by 2020, the EAC
building has been apparently floundering and directionless as no timeline was set, let alone a
blueprint. A feasible way to realize the EAc is to start from the creation of the EAEC.
Potential gains from implementing the EAEC are enormous, such as leading East Asia to a path ofstable and sustainable growth, reducing vulnerability and volatility, and leveraging diversity
through integration and reducing the development gap existing both within and between member
states, and so on.
2.2 An EAEC to Be Desired
Today, regionalism is a central part of the international relations of East Asia and further
cooperation is desired in trade, investment, finance and macroeconomic policy for growth andtangible benefits. Indeed, it is increasingly seen as a necessary means to cope with the dynamics ofthe global economy. However, geopolitical and geo-economic considerations have complicated theprocess of regional integration. Various institutional efforts reflect competing visions of andstrategies for an regional economic community. Therefore, to build consensus, it is quite necessary
to discuss and clarify what is to be desired in an EAEC.
In terms of the ultimate goal, like the AEC, the EAEC aims to realize a region of sharedinterests featuring equitable, inclusive, balanced and sustainable development with freer
movement of goods, services, investment, and people as well. Though a single market andproduction base is stressed, the EAEC won’t take a customs union as the vision because it requires
higher degree of political cooperation and some pooling of sovereignty. These requirements arepalpably out of reach at present and even in a very long future for East Asian countries. Instead, an
FTA which aims at trade and investment liberalization and facilitation together with a moderateconsideration of rule-making in some areas like competition, intellectual property rights,
economic and technical cooperation, E-commerce etc., would be a best fit at the moment for East
Asia’s institutional architecture in its process of community building.
In terms of membership, the core part of the EAEC will be the APT countries due to threeconsiderations. Firstly, an economic community is commonly considered a group of people whoshare common economic interests and, as the empirical gravity model shows, these interests can
4be easier to achieve for those situated in a given geographical area. Secondly, as above-mentioned,
the APT has lived up to its role as the main vehicle of East Asia cooperation and laid solid
foundation for the EAEC building with substantial achievements in widely-ranging areas. Thirdly,
open regionalism has demonstrated that not only cooperation among regional members can benefit
regional integration and community building, but partnership with external members can also
facilitate regional integration. An extreme example is the WTO which provides multilateral rules
for all the APT countries and has brought about East Asia’s fast integration in the past and atpresent. Another example is the RCEP, though including non-East Asian members, the successful
conclusion and implementation of which will certainly help build up a highly liberalized andlarger common market for the region. And all these will directly serve the realization of the EAEC.
Therefore, all regional cooperative frameworks are part of East Asian integration, and constructive
to EAEC building.

3. Opportunities for the EAEC 2020
3.1 Rise of Asia in World Economy
Since 1980s, many developing countries, typically BRICS, have witnessed rapid growth, andtheir economic strengths have been greatly promoted especially in the 21st century. On thecontrary, developed countries, typically G7, have experienced economic slowdown. Since Asia ishome to the majority of the world’s emerging economies, this process can be termed as the rise of
Asia or the rise of an Asian century. If measured in PPP, the developed economies accounted for
63.7% of the global GDP in 1980, while the developing economies accounted for 36.3% and thedeveloping Asian economies only 9.0%. After entering the 21st century, the developing economies,
especially those in Asia, began to grow faster than ever. By the year 2014, the share of developed
economies in global GDP dropped to 42.9%, while that of the developing economies rose to57.1% and the developing Asian economies to 29.6%. According to IMF’s estimate, thedeveloping Asia will account for 35.0% of the global GDP in 2020. 1 If measured in current USD,
though the developed economies as a whole retain their advantages in GDP shares, the declining
trend is the same.
This shifting of world economic activity from west to east has also been accompanied bytrade and investment movement. Asia has now grown from an almost negligible player in world’s
trade and investment into a major player, with 37.5% of the global trade, more than 40% of the
global FDI inflows and outflows in 2014. 2“An Asian Century” is also gaining reputation from another proof. With half of the global
population, Asia is becoming a fast-growing world consumption market because of the increasing
middle class. According to a study by OECD, the size of the middle class could increase from 1.8
billion people in 2009 to 3.2 billion by 2020 and to 4.9 billion by 2030, and the majority of thisgrowth (85 %) comes from Asia. Demand from the middle class may grow from 2009’s USD21
trillion to USD56 trillion by 2030. Again, over 80 % of the growth in demand comes from Asia.
Before the year 2050, India and China will have more than half of world’s middle classconsumption. 3 In this sense, Asia is now rising and transitioning from traditional production base
1

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016.
Source: UNCTAD stats, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/
3
Homi Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries, OECD Development Centre Working Paper
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to both production and consumption bases. The formation of consumption base is a mostnoteworthy trend to expect in Asia and will have significant and far-reaching impact oninternational trade and investment. At least, with the growing importance of this consumption
market, final-goods trade fueled by consumption needs will be gradually on a par withintra-regional components trade derived from regional production networks, and the region will beeven more deeply integrated.
At the same time, the slow pace of world economic recovery has increased the necessity ofregional cooperation. Currently, most East Asian economies still maintain a higher-than-average
growth rate, which is also quite conducive to regional cooperation.
3.2 Political Consensus
Since the adoption of the EAEC 2020 by the APT Summit in 2012, the vision has been
mentioned and emphasized for many times by leaders. The annual Chairman’s Statements of APT
Summits show that political consensus on the EAEC 2020 still exist with some follow-up study
being adopted. However, this consensus seems to have waned recently because so far all the work
since 2012 has not resulted in an EAEC blueprint.
3.3 Existing Cooperative Mechanisms
Up to now, East Asia has various cooperative frameworks and mechanisms including the
AEC, “10+1”s, “10+3”, EAS, and so on. Due to these mechanisms, East Asia’s integration has
speeded up, with intra-regional trade rising from 38% in 1990 to over 50% today.
The AEC: the Core of the East Asian “Noodle Bowl” of Agreements
ASEAN enjoys a centrality role in East Asian integration. This is because (i) several otherregional groupings have been built around it, and (ii) it has succeeded in developing the concept of“ASEAN Way” of conducting regional cooperation based on consultation and consensus. To date,
ASEAN as a region is a signatory to five FTAs/CEPAs with China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia
and New Zealand, respectively. In addition, there are 50 bilateral FTAs (between one ASEAN
country and non-ASEAN country), and 11 plurilateral agreements (between one ASEAN country
and two or more non-ASEAN countries) or 23 multilateral agreements (between two or more
ASEAN countries and one or more non-ASEAN countries). 1
ASEAN is now working towards elevating its centrality role in the regional economicarchitecture. The measures stipulated in the AEC Blueprint cover much broader issues than
ASEAN+1 FTAs and RCEP. As an integration “project,” its breadth and scope are perhaps second
only to that of the EU. 2 ASEAN has already begun the process of crafting the post-2015 agenda, a
key priority of which is strengthening implementation of the Economic Blueprint to close
remaining gaps. 3 A significant milestone of the AEC is the substantial progress in tariff
liberalization. Since 2010, ASEAN6 has applied zero tariff to nearly 100% of the agreed
commodity list. In the CLMV countries, tariff duties have been eliminated for more than 90% of
the agreed commodity list in 2015, compared to 72.5% in 2014. 4
No.285.
1
Based on information from ADB’s Asia Regional Integration Center FTA database, accessed May 2015(http://aric.adb.org/fta-comparative).
2
ADB: “ASEAN 2030: Towards a borderless economic community”, 2012.
3
ASEAN. 2014. Key Outcomes of the 12th AEC Council Meeting, 46th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM)
Meeting and Related Meetings. Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. 25-28 August.
4
The ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook, 2015
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The “10+1”s : Bilateral Cooperation between ASEAN and Its FTA Partners in East Asia
ASEAN centrality has played a key role in shaping East Asia’s regional cooperation
framework, with ASEAN at the center and a variety of mechanisms mutually reinforcing for the
purpose of common development. By 2010, ASEAN had completed the ASEAN+1 FTAs with its
six FTA partners, namely China (2005), South Korea (2007), Japan (2008), India (2010), andAustralia and New Zealand (2010), covering trade in goods, services, investment and provisions
on trade facilitation. Over time, the substance of these ASEAN+1 FTAs has also deepened. For
example, the upgrade of China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA), which was nailed down in November
2015, covers a wide range of areas including goods, services, investment, and economic andtechnological cooperation. The upgrade of CAFTA provides fresh momentum for economic
development of both China and ASEAN and improves both sides’ ability to participate in tradearrangement with higher standards. These cooperation efforts have also been rewarded by thestrengthened trade tie. China has become ASEAN’s largest external trading partner, up from2001’s 5% to 2014’s 15% of ASEAN’s foreign trade; ASEAN has become China’s third largest
trading partner, up from 2001’s 7.4% to 2014’s 8.9% of China’s foreign trade. A strengthened
centrality role through bilateral cooperation, not only in trade and investment, but also in capacity
building and other areas, can make ASEAN more capable of driving the region’s integration.
The APT: a Region-wide Cooperative Mechanism
The prime focus of the ATP process was initially on improving East Asia’s regional financial
cooperation and governance. So far, the most notable schemes led by the APT have been the
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI).
The CMIM became operative in 2010 and converted the 16 bilateral agreements into acommon funding forex pool of initially US$120 billion. In 2014, the size was doubled to US$240
billion and the de-linked portion from IMF loan plan was lifted to 30% from 20%. The CMIM
system is overseen by the APT Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), whose purposes are tomonitor and analyze regional economies and to contribute to early detection of risks, swift
implementation of remedial actions and effective decision-making of the CMIM. AMRO hascommemorated its successful transition to an international organization by member authorities on
February 19, 2016.
The ABMI established in 2003 provides East Asia with the opportunity to use the region’s
huge financial resources for promoting its own regional financial stability and economic
development, rather than investing in bonds and other securities originating outside the region,
especially in advanced industrial countries. Furthermore, a Credit Guarantee and Investment
Facility (CGIF) was established in 2010 by the APT and Asian Development Bank (ADB) with
about US$700 million joint capital. It is a key component of the ABMI, aiming to help companies
that otherwise would have difficulty tapping local bond markets to secure longer-term financing,
reduce their dependency on short-term foreign currency borrowing to mitigate currency andmaturity mismatches.
The EAS: a Regional Forum for Strategic Dialogue and Cooperation
The East Asia Summit (EAS), comprising the ten ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India,
Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United States and Russia, is a regional leaders'forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation on key issues and challenges such as security,environmental issues and climate change, etc. The EAS is a broad forum in which ASEAN’s
7

partners outside the region can participate in East Asian cooperation, as well as an interface
between the regional and global arenas from an East Asian perspective.
3.4 New Initiatives
In addition to the above-mentioned mechanisms, East Asian cooperation is also expecting the
RCEP and CJKFTA, both of which are quite crucial to the EAEC building. The Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) proposed by China will also provide new impetus for regional cooperation andintegration.
The RCEP aims to consolidate the current five “10+1” FTAs and form a region-wide FTA in
East Asia with significant improvements over the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, while recognizing theindividual and diverse circumstances of the participating countries. The potential benefits of the
RCEP are obvious in terms of both economic and political interest for all the participating
members. One study shows that the RCEP boosts more GDP growth than the TPP, even for
countries participating in both. For instance, Vietnam will have an increase of 23.42% of real GDP
from the success of the RCEP, while only 12.81% from the TPP. 1
As major economies accounting for more than 85% of the region’s GDP, CJK cooperation is
crucial to constructing the EAEC. In the past few years, despite political difficulties, CJK
cooperation has also made great achievements in many areas. For example, Trilateral Cooperation
Secretariat was established in 2010; Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation andProtection of Investment was signed in 2012; and the CJKFTA negotiation was launched in 2013.
It is expected that CJKFTA will not only bring massive economic benefits to the three countries interms of trade, production and economic welfare, but also contribute to introducing suitableagreements that will accelerate trade and investment in the region. In this sense, solid groundworkof CJKFTA will give both economic and political impetus for East Asian integration.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt that links Asia andEurope by inland routes, and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road connecting China with other
Asian countries, Africa and Europe by sea routes. It is a development strategy and framework that
focuses on connectivity and cooperation among countries along the two routes, which willcertainly serve the region’s connectivity and integration. In support of infrastructure connectivity,
the China-proposed Asia infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been put into operation andcollaborating with other international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the ADB andthe EBRD to provide financial support for the region’s connectivity and sustainable growth.

4. Challenges for the EAEC 2020
So far, not a single or coherent plan has been developed that can help progress step by step
towards the final goal of the EAEC, let alone the monitoring process which tracks theimplementation progress. This actually reflects that the EAEC building faces a lot of challenges
and uncertainties.
4.1 Geopolitical Challenges
Mutual trust is the base for regional cooperation. However, it is very hard to build up mutual
trust in East Asia due to increasingly complicated geopolitical context. The rise of China, the1

Kawasaki Kenichi(2011), Determining Priority Among EPAs: Which trading partner has the greatest economic
impact? Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
8shifts in the region’s balance of power and the U.S. rebalance towards Asia have increased
complexities and geopolitical challenges for regional cooperation. In the past, ASEAN succeededin balancing its relations with dialog partners to maintain ASEAN Centrality and in socializing
regional players onto the ASEAN Way for regional cooperation despite differences and diversity.
In the future, a major challenge is whether countries in the region can improve mutual trust to
mitigate risks and manage disputes from power competition or even rivalry, and whether ASEAN
can build up its capacity to remain central in institutionalization of regional cooperation.
4.2 ASEAN Centrality Not in Full PlayASEAN Centrality in the evolving regional architecture will depend to a large extent on the
successful completion of the AEC. Thus, a full ASEAN integration is the most important task
before we move towards the EAEC. However, this centrality might be eroded from both internaland external dimensions.
From internal dimension, ASEAN’s internal integration has not lived up to expectations. So
far as internal integration is concerned, there has been much progress on the AEC, but the project
has not yet met its 2015 timetable. According to the ASEAN Secretariat’s report, as of 31 October
2015, the implementation rate of the full AEC Scorecard stood at 79.5%, or 486 out of 611
measures. Undoubtedly, the remaining 20% of measures will be more challenging. The delayed
issues, such as agriculture, integration of the less-developed CLMV members remain to be worked
out. In addition, complete liberalization of capital flows and ASEAN capital market integration, as
well as opening up financial markets within ASEAN are all areas which need to be addressed.
This prospect of ASEAN’s internal integration will inevitably make the EAEC a mist, whose
progress is highly dependent on the full completion of the AEC.
From external dimension, ASEAN is hard to form common external positions due to the factthat internal and external integration are less clearly sequenced but proceeding in parallel. For
globally competitive economies like Singapore, regional markets will not be big enough, and
ASEAN style agreements with outside partners will not produce sufficient market access abroad.
For less advanced ASEAN economies, in contrast, rapid liberalization may conflict with
development objectives. At the same time, middle-ground regional agreements are unlikely tosatisfy anyone. Thus, ASEAN faces challenges: it has to develop external relationships eventhough its ability to make common policy is limited. As a result, the external policies of ASEAN
members are not closely integrated because as an FTA rather than a customs union, ASEAN
cannot set common tariffs, let alone other common economic policies. For international credibility,
the region will have to demonstrate its ability to create common markets and to function as anintegrated economy entity.
4.3 Impact of the TPP
The TPP, enlisting seven of the RCEP members (four ASEAN members—Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, and three non-ASEAN countries—Japan, Australia and New
Zealand), has become a major external variable in East Asian cooperation and integration. And
now a few more East Asian countries like the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand,
Indonesia and even Cambodia are now showing increasing interest in joining the TPP. The impactsof the TPP on East Asia’s regional integration are as follows:Firstly, the TPP may lead to disunity within ASEAN because not all AMSs are included in
the TPP and this will undermine ASEAN’s centrality role in leading regional integration process.
Secondly, exclusion of China by the TPP will reduce China’s influence in East Asia and thus
9

slow down the EAEC building process. Over the past decades, China has experienced remarkableeconomic growth and played an important role not only in driving trade and economic growth inEast Asia region. Almost all the mechanisms in East Asia have leveraged China’s growth toconsolidate different layers of economic integration. East Asia’s regional integration without
China will encounter a big setback.
Thirdly, the TPP’s higher standards and new rules serve the advanced economies’ goals best
but are unrealistic currently for many East Asian countries. The key point of the TPP’s vision is toseek to expand the role of markets in the delivery of healthcare, housing, foreign investment, andservices into a region like East Asia where government programs have long underpinned social
welfare, national development and international cooperation. Though the final text of the TPP is
actually a compromise with certain concessions from its original ambitions, its broad coverage andhigh standard is still a challenge for many developing economies in East Asia.

5. Policy recommendations
The EAEC won’t come true by itself, but requires closer collaboration among APT countries
to take concrete actions.. The new round of world economic restructuring characterized with thetransfer of manufacturing industries presents a good opportunity for the region. EAEC-building isvital to help upgrade each member’s position in the region’s production network and better
integrate them into the region’s consumption loop for a more balanced, inclusive andeconomically resilient region. To this end, the APT process and cooperation as a main vehicle
in realizing the long-term goal of an EAC with ASEAN as the driving force in the evolving
regional architecture should be strengthened. Therefore, the recommendations are as follows.
5.1 To Develop an EAEC Blueprint
EAEC-building is an evolving process. It is therefore important to chart the future direction
and turn vision into reality through concrete actions. Specific follow-up work plans need to be
developed, not only by 2020, but also beyond 2020. In consideration of ASEAN Centrality inregional cooperation and ASEAN experience in the AEC building, it is sensible to refer to both
AEC Blueprint 2015 and 2025 and develop an EAEC Blueprint 2025.
A pressing matter of the moment is to designate a High Level Task Force (HLTF),
comprising thirteen high-level representatives from all the APT countries to develop a robust andfeasible EAEC Blueprint specifying the outcomes to be achieved by 2020 or 2025 (or a two-phasearrangement) to guide the region’s integration efforts. And due monitoring process also needs to
be in place to track the implementation. In this regard, maybe the function of the AMRO as aninternational organization can be expanded and strengthened.
5.2 To Substantiate ASEAN Centrality
Regional cooperation and integration is a complex, expensive and slow-moving process that
requires not only convergence of interests and values, but also momentum and leadership. ASEAN
Centrality means that ASEAN is in the center of regional integration, facilitating the process andenriching its substance. Hence, it is important for ASEAN to improve its competence, credibility
and capacity to substantiate RTA negotiations (such as the RCEP) for further regional integration.
Firstly, ASEAN needs to fulfill its promise to transform itself into a rules-basedorganization and build a credible AEC. During the process of the AEC building, an effective
10

monitoring mechanism plays a critical role in inducing timely implementation of the ASEAN
commitments. However, with limited human resources and overloaded responsibilities, ASEAN
Integration Monitoring Office (AIMO) has not been competent enough. Thus, the ASEAN
Secretariat may as well introduce more human and technical resources from third parties likeregional research institutions with rich expertise in key policy areas through some partnershiparrangements. Such collaboration in monitoring will be more effective when actual policies
implemented by members could be examined to ensure the full implementation of regional
commitments.
Secondly, in order to maintain credibility in creating common markets in the region, andbring real gains for ASEAN countries, as the driver, ASEAN should set a clear goal of higher
level of commitments for the RCEP negotiations while leaving enough flexibility to theleast-developed members. This may involve (1) aiming at a higher level than that of the current
ASEAN+1 FTAs in terms of tariff, ROOs, trade facilitation, services, investment and economic
cooperation; (2) introducing as many convergent rules as possible to all the chapters: common
concessions in tariff structure; clear definition and approach in non-tariff barriers (NTBs); a
general rule in ROOs; a region-wide approach in trade facilitation and economic cooperation; andfewer types of limitations in services regulation; and (3) making the new framework more
attractive than others to maintain “ASEAN Centrality”.
Third, the Plus Three countries should stand and work together to provide strong
support for the realization of the AEC and ASEAN capacity-building, especially human resources
development in the least-developed AMSs. The two most important areas shall be infrastructure
connectivity and narrowing of the development gap.
5.3 To Better Exploit the Existing Cooperative Frameworks and Mechanisms
In order to make concerted efforts for the EAEC building, all cooperation for regional
economic integration should be encouraged and supported. For example, the AEC can play acentrality role in guiding East Asia’s economic integration and cooperation; the upgrading of
ASEAN’s FTAs with its partners (such as the CAFTA) can strengthen their bilateral economic ties
and especially improve ASEAN’s competence in shaping the region’s economic architecture; andsubregional cooperation frameworks in the region (e.g. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines
East ASEAN Growth Area—BIMP-EAGA; Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand Growth
Triangle—IMTGT; Greater Mekong Sub-region—GMS, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation—LMC)
can also contribute to regional connectivity, narrow the development gap, help CLMV countries
augment their capacity to implement regional agreements and accelerate the regional integration
process as a whole.
5.4 To Conclude the CJKFTA and RCEP Negotiations as Soon as Possible
The CJKFTA, involving the three largest economies in the region, can provide the region
with main market potentials. The conclusion of CJKFTA is not only good for the Plus Three
countries themselves, but also crucial for the integration of a larger East Asia. Therefore, the Plus
Three countries should prioritize economic collaboration.
The RCEP should be prompted not only as an economic integration process but also as aprocess towards a regional community in the long run. However, the road ahead is expected to be
fraught with economic and political obstacles. Here, two things need to be highlighted.
One is the importance of the APT cooperation. As the main pillar of the RCEP, the APT
11countries should continue their virtuous tradition in cooperation and work together to achieve
more ambitious common goals under the RCEP based on both political and economic advantages.
Politically, ASEAN centrality is supported by all the other six members of the RCEP.
Economically, APT cooperation has already made much practical progress in many areas such as
financial cooperation. Therefore, the APT process can be seen as a good foundation for the RCEP
process. What we need is even stronger political will and commitments to the RCEP.
The other is the relationship between the RCEP and the TPP. Competition is actually not thewhole story. Most believe these two arrangements offer different approaches towards deepening
economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. The TPP requires much deeper economic
liberalization from its members and contains provisions to protect labor rights, environment andintellectual property, reform state-owned enterprises and boldly eliminate tariff, while the RCEP
places more importance on providing developing members with economic and technicalcooperation to narrow the development gap. Because of these differences, the RCEP and the TPP
should complement each other rather than substitute one another. Furthermore, for the most part,the TPP and the RCEP offer benefits that are largely complementary—one focuses on deeper
integration with the Americas, and the other on improved access to Asian markets. Indeed, these
two frameworks can be considered as two different stages. Developing countries that cannot meethigh requirements for the TPP membership may achieve economic development under the RCEP,
and then may later join the TPP when they can meet the membership requirements. Therefore,
RCEP and TPP can just be two complementary building blocks for the realization of the long-term
objective of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).
5.5 To Promote All-round Functional Cooperation
Apart from efforts on institutionalization of regional integration (such as the RCEP and theCJKFTA), East Asia should still give high priority to functional cooperation focusing on thefollowing areas.
First, improve regional connectivity. In this regard, the development assistance from the
Plus Three countries, the ADB, the AIIB as well as the Silk Road Fund, will provide much neededfinancial support for the execution of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC).
Especially, the “Belt and Road Initiative” shares striking similarities with the MPAC in envisaging
transport connectivity as a way to bring participating countries closer to one another and to
facilitate better access to trade, investment and people-to-people exchanges. Hence, the two cancomplement one another very well and produce effective and efficient cooperation in both hardand soft connectivity.
Second, promote the ramification and implementation of the WTO’s TFA as soon as
possible. As the first multilateral trade agreement adopted since the conclusion of Uruguay Roundin 1994, the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) represents a landmark achievement for the WTO.
According to World Trade Report 2015, full implementation of the TFA will reduce global trade
costs by an average of 14.3 per cent and is expected to add around 2.7 per cent per year to world
export growth and more than half a per cent per year to world GDP growth. Developing countries
have the most to gain from swift and full implementation of the TFA, as both their exports and
GDP growth will increase at higher rates than those of developed countries. Taking open
regionalism as its doctrine, East Asia welcomes any achievement in the WTO. What’s more, tradefacilitation provisions in the WTO and in the AEC and even the EAEC almost converge.
Third, deepen regional financial cooperation. In order to make the CMIM a more12

effectively-functioning financial safety net within Asia’s regional financial architecture, it isquite necessary to further eliminate IMF conditionality by further raising the de-linked portion to
40% or even higher. In the area of regional development finance, more channels for financing
development projects should be encouraged. At the same time, collaboration between the existing
institutions such as the WB, the ADB, the AIIB as well as the BRICSDB, should also be
encouraged to contribute to the region’s development projects, especially infrastructure andenvironmental projects. In the area of regional financial system stability, the AMRO, as aregional macroeconomic surveillance unit of the CMIM, urgently needs to be strengthened ininterior governance structure and its regional supervision function.
Fourth, narrow the development gap. Equitable economic development and the narrowing
down of the development gap in East Asia are necessary for regional peace, stability, and thelong-term goal of an East Asia community. In order to achieve a balanced growth, APT countries
need to further cooperate in poverty reduction, industrial capacity improvement and humanresources development in less-developed countries by sharing expertise and technical know-how
and promoting investment in a responsible manner. In order to ensure the stability of the supply offood in the region, the EAVG II’s proposal on expanding the coverage of the APT Emergency RiceReserve (APTERR) to include other staple food in times of emergency in the region should also
be supported.

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