Only の単純な伴立分析鈴木 聡 (Satoru SUZUKI)
駒澤大学総合教育研究部非常勤講師

A considerable number of studies have been made on the particle ‘only’. (1) OnlyJohn can speak French. The underline is used to indicate a focused term. (1) is
considered to relate to the following propositions:• the exclusive proposition that nobody other than John can speak French,and• the prejacent proposition that John can speak French.
Ippolito (2007) discusses the following four analyses that take the same position (assertion) on the exclusive proposition but take diﬀerent positions on theprejacent proposition:• Entailment Analysis (Atlas 1993),• Strong Presupposition Analysis (Horn 1969),• Weak Presupposition Analysis (Geurts and van der Sandt 2004), and• Implicature Analysis (McCawley 1981).
According to Ippolito, in the entailment analysis, (1) asserts both the exclusive
and the prejacent propositions. This analysis can account for the meaninglessnessof the following sentences: (2a) ♯ Only John can speak French, and/but Bill cantoo. (2b) ♯ Only John can speak French, and/but John cannot. For the second
part of (2a) contradicts with the exclusive proposition, and the second part of (2b)contradicts with the prejacent proposition. According to Ippolito, this symmetry
breaks down in negative sentences: (3a) Not only John can speak French. Therefore, somebody other than John can speak French. (3b) Not only John can speak
French. Therefore, John can speak French. For in (3a) the exclusive propositionis negated, whereas in (3b) the prejacent proposition is not negated (Problem1 ). According to Ippolito, in the strong presupposition analysis, (1) asserts theexclusive proposition, and presupposes the prejacent proposition. Because presuppositions project under negation, the asymmetry in (3) is explained. According1

to Ippolito, contrary to the standard behavior of presuppositions like in (4b), theprejacent proposition does not project in modalized ‘only’ sentences: for example,in (4a) the speaker is not committed to the truth of the prejacent proposition(Problem 2 ): (4a) It is possible that only John can speak French, and maybe noteven he can. (4b) ♯ It is possible that John regrets having smoked, and/but maybe
he never smoked. According to Ippolito, in the weak presupposition analysis, (1)asserts the exclusive proposition, whereas ‘only’ is a presupposition trigger but
the presupposition that it triggers is an existential proposition. (1) presupposesthat someone can speak French. The prejacent proposition follows from the exclusive proposition together with the existential proposition. According to Ippolito,
an ‘only’ sentence with a conjoint NP in focus, such as (5), only presupposes thatsomeone can speak French: (5) Only John and Mary can speak French. Because
what is asserted is that nobody other than John and Mary can speak French, theprejacent proposition does not follow (Problem 3 ). According to Ippolito, in theimplicature analysis, (1) asserts the exclusive proposition, whereas the prejacentproposition is a conversational implicature. This analysis cannot explain why
the truth of the prejacent proposition is conveyed by a negative ‘only’ sentence(Problem 4 ). Ippolito (2007) proposes a new analysis of ‘only’ that can deal withall of Problems 1-4 above. However, even in Ippolito’s analysis of ‘only’, there
remain at least two problems that Ippolito herself points out in explaining thediﬀerence between (6a) and (6b) (Problem 5 ) and that between (7a) and (7b)(Problem 6 ): (6a) Only Mary can speak French, and maybe not even she can.
(6b) ♯ Only John married Sue, and maybe not even he did. (7a) ♯ I don’t knowwhether Mary can speak French, but definitely only she can. (7b) I don’t knowwhether Mary ate all of the cookies, but she definitely ate some. The aims ofthis talk are to provide a first-order epistemic logic of ‘only’ (FELO) that is avariant of entailment analysis and that is by far simpler than Ippolito’s analysis
in Ippolito (2007) and, to show that FELO is suﬃcient to deal with not only allof Problems 1-4 in the existing analyses before Ippolito (2007) but also Problems
5 and 6 in Ippolito (2007) only in terms of semantics (truth conditions) without
resorting to complicated pragmatics to which Ippolito’s analysis does. （使用言語：日本語）

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