On-site evaluation: April-May 2006
2006 Ex-Post Monitoring for Completed ODA Loan Projects

External Evaluator: Masakatsu Kato (IC Net, Ltd.)
Project: Bangladesh “Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project” (BD-P36)
Loan Outline
Loan Amount/Disbursed Amount: 21,562 million yen / 21,290 million yen
Loan Agreement: June 1994
Loan Completion: August 2000
Ex-Post Evaluation: March 2001
Executing Agency: Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority (JMBA), Bangladesh
Project Objective:
By constructing a multipurpose bridge on the Jamuna River, which flows from north to south almost through the center of Bangladesh, the project aims to handle traffic demand and tocorrect disparities between the eastern and western regions, thereby contributing to economic development of Bangladesh.
Consultant: Ben C. Gerwick Inc. (USA), and others
Contractor: Local companies, and others
Item
Effectiveness & Impact

At time of ex-post evaluation

At time of ex-post monitoring
Since the traffic volume has continued to grow after the ex-post
evaluation, greatly exceeding planned figures, the effectiveness has
been high. The project is also considered that it has been
contributing for the increased agricultural productivity in the westbank region.

Effectiveness(1) Traffic volume
Volume of traffic crossing the river on Jamuna Bridge
Overall traffic volume exceeds planned figures by 29.7% (1999).

1(1) Traffic volume
Volume of traffic crossing the river on Jamuna Bridge (table below)1
Overall traffic volume exceeds planned figures by 80% (Actual figures
exceeded forecast figures by 84% in 2005, and are expected to exceed themby 88% in 2006).

The source is created based on questionnaire responses (responses of JMBA), and data received during the present field survey.

1Table 1: Comparison of Average Daily Traffic Volume:
Forecast at Time of Appraisal vs. Actual
1999
2000*2Index
1998*1(Projectcompletion
year)
Trucks*3 Forecast Actual 1,093 645 1,253 891 1,365 1,361(per day) Achievement rate*5
59.0%
71.1%
99.7%
Buses*4
Forecast Actual 340
660
383
825
414 1,192(per day) Achievement rate
194.1%
215.4%
287.9%
Passenger Forecast Actual 196
773
227
702
247
893
cars,
Achievement rate
394.3%
309.3%
361.5%
motorcycles(per day)
Total
Forecast Actual 1,630 2,079 1,865 2,418 2,025 3,445(vehicles Achievement rate
127.5%
129.7%
170.1%
per day)
Source: JMBA data
*1 Figures for the volume of general traffic from June to December*2 Figures from January to June
*3 Actual figures are the total of these vehicle categories for tolls: light truck,medium truck, heavy truck.
*4 Actual figures are the total of these vehicle categories for tolls: small bus,
large bus.
*5 Achievement rate =(Actual traffic volume) /(Traffic volume expectation at appraisal)

2002
1586 1537
97%(Vehicles/day)_
2003
1701 1913
112%

445 1178265%

477 1321277%

510 1476
289%

Passenger Forecast Actual 267 658
cars,
Achievement rate
246%
motorcycles
Total
Forecast Actual 2186 3220
Achievement rate
147.3%

288
682
237%

309
744
241%

2352 3540
150.5%

2522 4133
163.9%

Index (Year)
2004
Forecast Actual 1820 2349
Achievement rate
129%

2005
1942 2561
132%

2006*
2039 2604
128%

544 1669
306%

578 1818315%

608 1999
329%

Passenger Forecast Actual 331 769
cars,
Achievement rate
232%
motorcycles
Total
Forecast Actual 2696 4787
Achievement rate
177.1%

354
910
257%

372 1076
289%

2875 5289
183.9%

3019 5678
188.1%

TrucksBuses

TrucksBuses

Index (Year)
2001
Forecast Actual 1473 1384
Achievement rate
94%
Forecast Actual
Achievement rate

Forecast Actual
Achievement rate

* Data for January to April(2) Time to cross river
Ferry (one way): Approximately 2.5 hours
Waiting time to board ferry: 8 to 48 hours
Jamuna Bridge (one way): 12 to 18 minutes(2) Time to cross river・ Ferry (one way): (Aricha to Nagarbari, several dozen kilometers
downstream) Approximately 55 to 80 minutes (Waiting: time 10 to 20
minutes, Crossing time: 45 to 60 minutes)
・ Jamuna Bridge (one way):2

Average 7 minutes(Waiting time: 0.5 minutes, crossing time: 6.5 minutes)(3) Crossing toll
Comparison in Jamuna Bridge tolls with ferry fares
Table 2: Comparison in ferry fare with toll to cross Jamuna Bridge
Truck
Bus
Passenger
cars,
Motorcycle
Small Medium Large
Small
Large Motor Passen-cycle ger
cars
JamunaBridge
750
1000
1,250
550
800
30
400
crossing
toll
Ferry fare
705.5
1,346.7
29
290.9* Truck: Small (below 5 tons), Medium (5 tons – 8 tons), Large (over 8 tons)
Bus: Small (29 or less seats), Large (30 or more seats)(4) It is confirmed that river management (dike work) is appropriately
maintained.

(5) Other
There are plans to add a railroad, electricity transmission lines, a gas
pipeline, and telephone cables.

3(3) Comparison in Jamuna Bridge tolls with ferry fares
Jamuna Bridge tolls have not changed since the time of ex-post evaluation.
Ferry fares (Aricha to Nagarbari)
Truck: 1090 takas
Bus: 1155 takas + 14 takas/passenger
Passenger cars, motorcycle: 115 takas + 14 takas/passenger
Jeep or pickup: 305 takas + 15 takas/passenger(4) Maintenance and safety work for river control (dike work) is outsourced
by the executing agency to an operation and maintenance company. Dike
work is operated normally and appropriately, with river patrols, waterway
measurement surveys, engineering surveys, safety management, etc.

(5) Other
Since the bridge is built for multipurposes, in addition to the road, thefollowing were installed and began its operation after the ex-post evaluation(However, the railroad, electricity transmission lines, gas pipeline, andtelephone cables were not financed by the ODA loan).
(1) Railroad – Trials began in 1999, and full operation began in 2002.
(2) Electricity transmission lines – Installation of 230kV transmission
capacity completed, but actual electricity transmission has not started yet.
(3) Gas pipeline – Installation completed in 1999, and transport of natural
gas began in 2002.

(4) Telephone cables – Installation planned for 2006.
(6) EIRR
At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the economic internal rate of return(EIRR) was calculated to be 14.7%. This is comparable to the 14.9% planned
at time of appraisal.
Impact(6) EIRR
17.2%(1) Bridge related1) Gross Regional Domestic Product on east and west banks of the river:
not available.

(1) Bridge related
1) GDP growth rate of the west bank (1998-2001) (Rajshahi Division): 5.5%
The east bank: not available
According to a survey performed in 2002* by a Bangladesh consultant
company, “During the years after Jamuna Bridge was opened from 1998 to2001, the GDP growth rate of Rajshahi Division was 5.5% which was 0.5%
higher than the national average. In particular, agricultural production
increased remarkably, growing 17.6% annually during 2001-02, which wasnearly twice the 9.5% national average. There was high activity in transportof agricultural inputs via the Jamuna Bridge from the east to the west, and of
agricultural production from west to east. The regional economy was active,
centering on agriculture, and average wages in the region rose to 45% during
the five years after Jamuna Bridge was opened.” Thus, it can be said that the
project is supporting increased agricultural production.
(*Research results from the “Economic Impact of Jamuna Bridge on
Rajshahi Division” by Bangladesh Consultants Ltd. (BCL) in 2002, andfrom an impact survey for Jamuna Bridge done in the same period by Louis
Berger Group, Inc.)

2) Annual comparison of production from existing industries (agriculture,
jute, silk) in the region west of the river:
not available.

2) Agricultural production of the west bank (Rajshahi Division) grew faster
after the bridge was opened (2001-02), relative to growth before it opened(1997-98). There was especially rapid growth for potatoes (65%), wheat(42%), rice (38%), fruits (32%), and vegetables (30%). At the same time,
producer prices rose rapidly overall, especially for fruits and vegetables(66%), and fish/milk/eggs (40%) (comparing 1998 with 2002). It is thoughtthat producer prices rose due to improvements on the road in the east bank,
improved access for agricultural produce from the west bank region to major
markets such as Dhaka and Chittagong, which contributed to strong
economic activity.

43) Utilization rate of electricity transmission lines laid along the bridge:
Operation planned in future.

3) Electricity transmission lines – Installation is complete, but actual
transmission of electricity has not started yet (It appears that a related
institution will soon begin improvement work. In addition, relocated resident
beneficiaries near the bridge said in interviews: “We are happy because there
are fewer power outages.” However, according to executing agency sources,
electricity supply to that area nearby is unrelated to the Jamuna Bridge
electricity transmission lines).

4) Utilization rate of gas pipelines laid along the bridge:
Operation planned in future.

4) Gas pipeline – Supply volume is 425 mmscfd (installed transport capacity(utilization rate) is 85%).

(2) Related to resident relocation
・ Achievement level of resident relocation plan(2) Related to resident relocation
Compensation payments from resident relocation plans (Revised
Resettlement Action Plan, Erosion and Flood Affected Persons) were almost
finished in 1999/2000. From that time, work was done on infrastructure in
the relocation destination, and training provided to relocated residents. The
entire plan finished at the end of 2003. Residents are satisfied with theinfrastructure improvements of the relocation destination, but some areexperiencing unemployment and worse living standards.
* The following is information collected from interviews with 302
households living in the relocation areas in the east and west banks, tounderstand the current situation of relocated residents (there is no actual dataon improvement or deterioration).

Table 1: RRAP Achievement Rate
Category
Item
Unconditional
compensation

Conditional
compensation• CCL payments• Extra 50% added to CCL
payment• Lump sum cash
compensation• Cash compensation
related to housing
construction• Cash compensation
related to housing
relocation• MARV payment• Stamp tax payment
refund• Substitute siteacquisition after monetary

Achievement rate(from progress report)• 74% or greater• 100% of CCL
recipients• 100%• 92%• 100%• 48% (The basis for thisplanned value is
uncertain)• 48% (The basis for thisplanned value is
uncertain)• 93% (The basis for thisplanned value is

5i) Regarding the situation of housing in the relocation destination, 52% said
it was “improved after relocation.” 17% said it was “worsened.”ii) A great majority of relocated residents welcomed improved social
infrastructure and public facilities, such as water supply, sanitation facilities,
access to electricity, roads, schools, and mosque facilities.
iii) Regarding access to agricultural land, 90% of households said thatownership and access to agricultural land had worsened, and agricultural
producers fell from 60% before relocation to 24% after (day labor
agricultural workers increased from 7% to 11%). However, it also seemedthat the farmers found alternative sources of income.
iv) Regarding the problem of employment and income sources (livelihood),
the most serious problem widely raised was the lack of employment
opportunities and income sources to replace agriculture. These are generalcompensation (excluding
relocation to prepared
relocation site)• Relocation to prepared
relocation site
• Training for humanresource development• Occupational training

Table 2: EFAP Achievement Rate
PeriodThe expected
number ofapplications

1996, 97
1998, 99

10,4994,536

uncertain)• 85% (The basis for thisplanned value is
uncertain)• 50% (This planned
value was calculated
based on the survey)• 48% (This planned
value was calculated
based on the survey)

The number ofapplications
actually
received andhandled
9.337
2,790

Payment
achievement
rate

problems in rural Bangladesh, but an important cause could be the loss ofagricultural land through relocation, resulting in lost employment andincome sources. (*According to JMBA, the lack of employment opportunity
is a common phenomenon in Bangladesh. People who lost their agriculturalland, particularly in the east side of the bridge, found alternative
development opportunities in business, service and the other trade. Now,establishment of tourism & resort business and the O&M activities opened
up these opportunities to the people, etc. On the other hand, compared to theeast side, west side population suffers from lack of employment
opportunities both in terms of lost agricultural land and creation of new
alternative jobs. Therefore, steps can be taken by the government to further
improve the employment. Initiative was taken to set up an industrial park
which could create job opportunities for many of the displaced people.)v) Food security and cash income worsened for 43% of households after
relocation (28% are gradually improving).

100%
63.5%

(3) Environmental impact
The status of natural life, fish, insects, and animals was surveyed before andafter project implementation, and serious effects on existing plants andanimals were not recognized.

(3) Environmental impact
Since various environmental programs took effect, no serious impacts on theenvironment have arisen.

Sustainability
The size of the executing agency is not changed since the time of
ex-post evaluation. There were also no particular problems since
operation management was contracted to a private company. The
financial status also continues to be profitable. However, The
function on decision-making has weakened due to reorganization in
the Ministry of Communications.

(1) Technical capacity
Three engineers from JMBA (Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority) are
stationed in the office of JOMAC (Jamuna Operations and MaintenanceContract) on the east bank of the Jamuna Bridge.

6(1) Technical capacity
JMBA consists of 22 engineers. Eight people received technical training
from 1998-2003. It plans to train 15 people over five years from 2004.
Moreover, three JMBA engineers are stationed on the east bank at Jamuna
Bridge.

(2) Structural organization
JMBA consists of approximately 100 staff. Many staff are from institutions
related to the Ministry of Communications, and are transferred to or
employed by JMBA, primarily engineers and experienced staff. For five
years after bridge completion, JMBA contracted operation and maintenance
to JOMAC (a multinational company formed from three companies in South
Africa, England, and Bangladesh. It has a total of 352 employees). The
contract period with JOMAC is scheduled to end in 2002.

(2) Structural organization
JMBA consists of 157 staff. Many staff are primarily engineers andexperienced managers from institutions related to the Ministry ofCommunications, and are transferred to or employed by JMBA. During the
project, JMBA was as an independent organization at the ministerial level(its head was a Secretary). However, after the project was implemented, it
was lowered to the level of a department in the Ministry of Communications,which weakened JMBA’s ability for decision-making, operation andmaintenance. Since 2003, operation and maintenance has been contracted toMarga Net One Ltd. (300 employees).

(3) Financial status
JOMAC has an annual operation and maintenance contract of about US$24
million. Toll revenues in 1999 were 597 million taka. The government
decided to give priority to expenditures for the operation and maintenancebudget for this bridge. There are no particular problems with budget
measures.

(3) Financial status
JMBA has been managed profitably for the past five years (FY2000/01 –2005/06) with a good cash flow. JMBA has also paid subsidies on behalf ofthe government since FY2004/05 (4.4 million taka in FY 2005/06).
Table
JMBA Revenues and Expenses(Thousand Taka)
Fiscal year Revenues Expenses Operation and ODA loan Balance
maintenance payments(%) **
costs (%) *2000/2001 1,080,757 571,574
44
41
509,189
2001/2002 1,072,909 599,481
47
39
473,428
2002/2003 1,365,334 670,099
36
35
695,235
2003/2004 1,580,718 870,324
25
49
710,394
2004/2005 1,834,365 1,426,444
8.5
72407,9212005/2006 1,903,794 1,519,087
384,707**** Operation and maintenance costs divided by Expenses** ODA loan repayments divided by Expenses*** Expectation
Table
JMBA
Toll Revenues, Operation and Maintenance Expenses

7

Fiscal year

Toll revenues

2000/2001

811.49(Million Taka)
Operation andmaintenance expenses
253.8

2001/2002
2002/2003
2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006

・Operation and maintenance (Current status of output, and its operation andmaintenance)
JOMAC is in charge of collecting tolls, supervising traffic, security of thesurroundings, and regular maintenance of the bridge, approach road, andriver dikes. If major problems arise with the facility, JMBA will directly
carry out maintenance. Also, the structure includes JMBA engineers stationed
at the bridge who inspect the maintenance situation, etc.
Lessons Learned,
Recommendations,
Information Resources andMonitoring Methods

919.99
1,070.23
1,293.00
1,504.34
1,560.79

280.9
240.6
221.1
120.7
121.0

・Operation and maintenance
The operation and maintenance system is basically similar to that at the timeof ex-post evaluation, but since 2004 JMBA has been directly in charge of
maintenance work on the approach road. Some cracks were found on thebridge’s deck surface at the start of 2006, which is currently investigated.
Also required are the restarting operation of the freight vehicle weighbridges (for trucks), and installation and operation of a railcar weigh bridge.

No lessons learned or recommendations were mentioned.
In large-scale infrastructure projects, it is important to consider
positive and negative social and environmental impacts such as
resident relocation issues from the planning stage. It is also necessary
to ensure that the executing agency has sufficient technical andorganizational capabilities for implementation, operation, andmaintenance.

(1) Follow up on lessons
learned andrecommendations made in
the ex-post evaluation reportor in later evaluations(1) Lessons at time of ex-post monitoring
In large-scale infrastructure projects for roads or bridges, such as Jamuna
Bridge (especially when associated with converting use of a huge land area),
it is necessary to systematically survey and draft plans regarding the major
issues of impacts on society and the natural environment during project
design, then take sufficient measures, as it was done in this project. When
resident relocation occurs, it is necessary to secure future means of
livelihood for residents in relocation plans. For sound execution, it is also
important to clarify the participatory approach based administrative andorganizational framework.

(2) Proposals for securing
sustainability, andinstructions given at time of
ex-post monitoring(2) Recommendations for securing sustainability
・ To ensure JMBA has sufficient operation and maintenance abilities, it isimportant to strengthen its administrative position and decision-making
authority in the Ministry of Communications, and develop specialist

8

・

9

staff able to plan and manage work from a longer-term viewpoint(minimizing employment transfers).
For the financial sustainability of JMBA, it is vital to ensure sufficient
future revenues, and necessary to strengthen financial planning ability
over the medium term, including setting tolls.