(Field survey; June, 2007)
ODA Loan Project Ex-Post Monitoring Report
Evaluator: Yasuichiro Ishimori (Value Frontier Limited)
Project Name: South Sumatra Swamp Improvement Project, Indonesia (L/A No. IP-389)
Outline of Loan Agreement
Loan Amount/Disbursement Amount
Loan Agreement
Loan Completion
Ex-Post Evaluation
Executing Agency: 5,577 million yen/4,426 million yen: October 1992
: November 1999
: FY2002: Government of the Republic of Indonesia /Directorate General of Water Resources Development bureau (DGWRD)

Project Objective
The Project aimed to increase crop production in the South Sumatra Province districts of Pulau Rimau and Air Sugihan Kiri through repairing and improving irrigation
facilities, and thereby contribute to raising local farmers’ living-standards and to stimulating the region’s economy.
Consultants: Euroconsult (Holland), Pacific Consultants international (Japan) and others
Contractors; Rinkai Construction SAC., PT. Huama Karya (Indonesia), and others
Overview of Results
Item
At Time of Ex-Post Evaluation
Effectivenessand Impact

At Time of Ex-Post Monitoring,Although the cropping area, excluding rice, decreased in comparison
to the ex-post evaluation, it had been switched to the more profitable
crops such as palm oil and coffee. The unit yield and average
production had been generally maintained until 2005, only falling in2006 due to the adverse effects of natural disasters. In addition, aBeneficiaries Survey found that women had spent less time for drawing
water and that sanitary conditions had improved.

(1) Actual cropping area (ha) according to crop
(1) Planned and actual cropping area (ha) by crop
The table below shows the cropping area for the principal crops grown in
The table below shows the cropping area for the principal crops grown Pulau Rimau and Air Sugihan Kiri. The cropping areas for coconut andin Pulau Rimau and Air Sugihan Kiri.
cassava both decreased due to the reasons stated below. However,planned targets for rice and corn were approximately achieved.

Table 1：Pulau Rimau
Farmers in Pulau Rimau continuously desire to grow rice and corn.
However, since the farmers quitted growing low-profit crops such as
cassava, total cropping area fell from 15,045 ha in 2000, to 12,610 ha in2006. Because the farmers have continually shifted from low-profit
coconut to high-profit palm oil since 2001, cultivation of coconut hadpractically stopped.

Table 1：Pulau Rimau
Total cropping area in Pulau Rimau: 7,527 ha (1996)→ increased to 15,045ha (2000) (83% of planned target)

Plan

Actual Cropping Area(ha)Actual Cropping Area (ha)1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999/00

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

Rice

8,192

2,720

3,108

4,912

5,860

6,160

Rice

6,160

6,423

6,423

6,750

7,100

6,925

Corn

1,638

2,242

2,.352

3,458

3,720

4,608

Corn

4,120

4,230

4,230

4,122

3,978

4,285

Cassava

n.a

2,325

2,578

2,570

2,850

2,900

Cassava

751

662

421

306

354

140

Coconut

8,192

240

n.a.

n.a.

1,000

1,377

Coconut

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

Total

18,022

7,527

8,038

10,94013,43015,045

Palm oil

864

924

986

1,040

1,120

1,260

Total

11,895

12,23912,06012,21812,552

12,610Source: Banyu Asin Office

Table 2：Air Sugihan Kiri
Total cropping area in Air Sugihan Kiri: 7,527 ha (1996)→ increased to 14,321 ha (2000) (128% of planned target)

Table 2：Air Sugihan Kiri
Farmers in Air Sugihan Kiri also continuously desire to cultivate rice andcorn, but stopped growing the low-profitability crops of cassava andcoconut. In addition, the desire for a stable income has led them to workfor construction industries, or even a job-change to the food restaurant
industries. As a result, farming in the district has decreased, and total
cropping area fell from 14,321 ha in 2000, to 6, 538 ha in 2006. Between
2001 and 2003, some farmers switched from growing low-profit coconut
to high-profit coffee. Because the farmable land available to thesefarmers is limited, in the past few years this switch has amounted to no
more than 210 ha.

PlanActual Cropping Area (ha)1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999/00

2000/01

Actual Cropping Area (ha)2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

Rice

2,910

3,100

3,700

3,700

3,400

2,980

Rice

5,088

2,720

2,889

3,467

4,296

3,793

Corn

1,018

2,242

3,905

3,185

4,663

4,104

Corn

3,114

3,676

3,109

3,245

2,918

2,352

Cassava

n.a

2,325

1,827

2,206

2,540

2,928

Cassava

851

873

873

841

936

882

Coconut

5,088

240

n.a

n.a

n.a

3,496

Coconut

654

464

286

286

239

114

Total

11,194

7,527

8,621

8,858

11,49914,321

Coffee

194

205

210

210

210

210

Total

7,723

8,318

8,178

8,282

7,703

6,538

Source: Musi Banyu Asin Office(2) Unit yield by crop (t/ha)(2) Unit yield by crop (t/ha)
The table below shows the unit yields of the principal crops in Pulau The tables below show the unit yields of the principal crops in Pulau
Rimau and Air Sugihan Kiri.
Rimau and Air Sugihan Kiri.
Table 3: Unit yield (t/ha) in Pulau Rimau by crop
From 2001 to 2005, unit yield for rice was between 82% to 91% of theplanned targets. The natural fire in 2006 caused of a longer-than-usualdrought at the time of harvest. Since it has drastically decreased, only
76% of the plan target was achieved in 2006. The corn and cassava yields
also decreased due to the effects of the same fire.

Table 3: Unit yield (t/ha) in Pulau Rimau by crop
Unit yield for rice in 2000, 99% of plan

Plan

Actual Unit Yield(t/ha)
1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999/00

2000/01

Actual Unit Yield (t/ha)
2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

Rice

3.3

2.2

2.5

2.5

3.1

3.2

Rice

3.0

2.9

2.9

2.7

3.0

2.5

Corn

n.a

2.4

2.9

3.4

4.3

4.0

Corn

3.9

3.7

4.2

4.1

3.8

2.2

Cassava

n.a

10.4

10.1

14.0

12.5

14.4

Cassava

13.7

14.1

13.9

13.8

14.0

9.6

Coconut

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

Coconut

0.7

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.6

Palm oil

n.a

n.a

0.7

1.8

2.4

2.1

Source: Banyu Asin Office

Table 4: Unit yield (t/ha) in Air Sugihan Kiri by crop.
Unit yield for rice in 2000, 79% of plan.

Table 4: Unit yield (t/ha) in Air Sugihan Kiri by crop.
Unit yield for rice from 2001 to 2005 was between 73% to 79% of theplanned target. However, this fell to 52% in 2006 because of the naturalfire caused of a longer-than-usual drought at harvest time resulted in a

decrease in crops yielded from the cropping area. The corn and cassava
harvests also decreased in 2006 due to the effect of the same fire.
Plan

Actual Unit Yield (t/ha)

Actual Unit Yield(t/ha)
1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999/00

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

Rice

2.4

2.4

2.6

2.3

2.5

1.7

Corn

2.6

2.9

3.1

3.2

2.4

1.9

Cassava

11.4

12.1

13.2

12.8

12.8

10.6

Coconut

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.8

0.8

0.9

Coffee

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.3

2000/01

Rice

3.3

1.6

2.0

1.6

2.9

2.6

Corn

n.a

2.1

2.1

2.6

3.2

2.7

Cassava

n.a

10.1

11.2

14.2

12.4

10.8

Coconut

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

Source: Musi Banyu Asin Office(3) Average yearly production (t)(3) Average yearly production (t):The table below shows yearly average production based on the figures The table below shows yearly average production based on the figures inin tables above.
tables above.
Table 5: Yearly average production (estimate) in Pulau Rimau by crop.
Average yearly rice production in 2000, 74% of plan

Plan

Table 5: Yearly average production (estimate) in Pulau Rimau by crop.
Rice production from 2001 to 2005 was between 67 to 79% of plannedtargets. In 2006, this fell to 64% due to a decrease in unit yield caused ofthe effects of natural fire. Corn production also fell in 2006 for the same
reason. Between 2001 and 2005, cassava production was on a declining
trend. This was a result of farmers reducing the cassava cropping area
based on their perception of it as a low-profit crop. In addition, unit yieldworsened in 2006 due to the effects of natural fire.
Actual Yearly Production (t)Actual Yearly Production (t)1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999/00

2000/01

Rice

27,034

5,920

7,771

12,281

18,26519,880

Corn

n.a

5,360

6,811

11,75316,02018,432Cassavan.a

24,23325,97036,08335,67041,660Coconut

n.a

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

Rice

18,48018,627

18,627

18,22521,30017,313Corn

16,06815,651

17,766

16,90015,116

9,427

Cassava

10,289

9,334

5,852

4,223

4,956

1,344

Coconut

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a

Palm oil

n.a.

n.a.

690

1,872

2,688

2,646

Source: Banyu Asin OfficeTable 6: Production in Air Sugihan Kiri (estimate) by crop.
Rice production in 2000, 59% of plan

Plan

Table 6: Production in Air Sugihan Kiri (estimate) by crop.
Rice production from 2001 to 2005 was between 42 to 57% of theplanned target. This was because of a decrease in the cropping area due
to an increase in farmers working away from home and changing jobs.
The adverse effect of natural fire in 2006 meant production fell to 30% of
the planned target. The production of corn between 2001 and 2006
decreased for the same reasons.
In addition to the reasons above, production of cassava decreased as
farmers reduced the cropping area of this low-profit crop. Production of
coconut also decreased for the same reason. Coffee production in 2006
decreased due to a slight fall in unit yield.
Actual Yearly Production (t)Actual Production (t)1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999/00

2000/01

Rice

16,790

3,902

5,874

5,634

12,591

9,918

Corn

n.a

7,222

8,338

8,374

15,09911,019Cassavan.a

25,23920,374

31,374

31,596

31,659Coconut

n.a

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

Rice

6,984

7,440

9,620

8,510

8,500

5,066

Corn

8,096

10,660

9,638

10,384

7,003

4,469

Cassava

9,701

10,563

11,524

10,765

11,981

9,349

Coconut

523

371

200

229

191

103

Coffee

78

82

84

84

84

63

Source: Musi Banyu Asin Office(4) Collection rates for irrigation service fees (ISF)
ISF are not imposed in either district.

(4) Collection rates for irrigation service fees (ISF)
The Indonesian government does not impose a legal obligation to collect
ISF. However, the government recommends the collection of ISF topromote the operation and maintenance by farmers themselves. Despite
this, the Palembang DOR (Regional Office of Directorate of Swamp)
does not collect ISF in either district, nor do they plan to collect them inthe future, in order to safeguard the farmers’ standards of living.

(5) EIRR: 7.4%
(Calculation conditions) EIRR was calculated according to thefollowing assumptions;・The economic costs were applied by combining the project‘sannual disbursement and the planned disbursement of other plans,
・ The economic benefits were the farmers’ income increase(defined as benefit) obtained from the interview survey of thebeneficiaries.

(5) EIRR: Negative(Calculation conditions) EIRR was calculated according to the following
assumptions;・ The economic costs were applied by combining the project
construction costs and the operation and maintenance costs of theirrigation facilities
・ The economic benefits were the farmers’ income increase (defined
as benefit) obtained from the interview survey of thebeneficiaries. EIRR was negative as the economic benefit, defined as
farmers’ income, decreased.

Impact(1) Impact on the living environment
A beneficiary survey showed that approximately 75% of respondents
believed that the condition of the facilities provided by this project was“good.” Since the domestic-use water supply facility was being used tosupply drinking water, women came to spend less time drawing water,
and that sanitary conditions improved(1) Impact on the living environment
According to a beneficiary survey, 76% of respondents considered thefacilities provided by the project “needed repairs.” Regarding thedomestic-use water supply facility (a large container placed beneath awater spout to capture and collect rain water), 99% of respondents said
that that it had contributed to reducing the time women spent drawing
water and to improving sanitary conditions.

(2) Impact on the environment
1. Salt accumulated in the soil(2) Impact on the environment
1. In both Pulau Rimau and Air Sugihan Kiri, water-regulating gates forthe primary, secondary, and tertiary canals were completely inoperable
due to rust damage. As a result, during high tide in the dry
season—particularly during September and October—seawater flowed
into the irrigated land and caused salt damage. However, it has not
become a chronic problem as the large quantities of rain falling during
2. A report on an additional environmental monitoring survey was the rainy season, which starts from January, acts to wash away theplanned to be submitted to the project operation and maintenance accumulated salt.
institution.
2. A report on the environment monitoring survey was not submitted to
3. Effect on plant life from oxidized pyrite and soil pollution resulting the relevant authorities because it has a low priority for them.
3. The effect of the construction and repair work on plant-life has notfrom construction and repair work
been ascertained.
Sustainability

The problems in organizational structure and financial status identified
at the time of ex-post evaluation are still evident. Due to these
problems, the adequate operation and maintenance of both facilities
and equipment by the project has become harder and. the sustainabilityof this project is concerned.

(1) Technical capacity : Uncertain
On the other hand, operation and maintenance policy was determinedin consultation with the farmers. Although an operation andmaintenance training program was conducted in cooperation with local
universities, additional training was desirable since not all the local
community had received sufficient instruction in technology for
operation and maintenance. However, this additional training has notbeen conducted.

(1) Technical capacity: The Palembang DOR, which operates andmaintains the primary and secondary canals and bridges, and the farmers,
who operate and maintain the tertiary canal, believe that they have noproblems with their technical capacities, but it lacks of objective
evidence.

(2) Operation and maintenance system: Water use associations (2) Operation and maintenance system: Regarding the yearly(WUAs), which are responsible for management and operation and management and operation and maintenance of the project, between 1998
maintenance, are hoped to be strengthened.

Pulau Rimau
Air Sugihan
Kiri

Target2000/01

102
associations
110
associations

40 associations

Achievement
Rate
39%

42 associations

38%

and 2000—the period prior to the decentralization of power to regional
governments—the government allocated a budget and a support system
necessary for sustainability. Decentralization to the regions saw the
responsibility for management, and operations and maintenancetransferred to the South Sumatra Province Regional Government for theperiod of 2001 to 2004. The support system deteriorated as thegovernment no longer allocated a budget. In addition, so far the WUAs
has conducted no special management or operation and maintenanceactivities except for group meetings for the purpose of informationexchange. Since they have not collected ISF and so have had no funding
for their operations, farmers were unable to carry out operation,
maintenance, and other activities because many were working away fromhome or had changed jobs.
Pulau Rimau
Air Sugihan Kiri

2006/07
40 Associations
42 Associations

Achievement Rate
39%
38%

* Farmer numbers are unlikely to increase, due to reasons such as farmers
working away from home. Consequently, expectations are low that WUA
numbers, the achievement rate, will increase.

(3) Financial status: The government budget allocation wasconsiderably less than the amount required for the project (thenecessary amount), at 18.4% for Pulau Rimau and 13.9% for Air
Sugihan Kiri. In addition, because the expected collection rate of ISF
is low, the operation and maintenance costs budgets in both districts isless than 20% of the actual required amount.

(3) Financial Status: The government budget allocated to the project has
been considerably less than the amount required (the necessary amount).
No government budget was allocated to Pulau Rimau between 2001 and
2004, and in 2005 and 2006 it was 4% and 30% respectively of thenecessary amount. Similarly, in Air Sugihan Kiri, no government budget
was allocated between 2001 and 2004, and in 2005 and 2006 it was 7%
and 14% respectively of the necessary amount. Therefore, the actual
budget for operation and maintenance has been less than 30% of thenecessary amount. As a result, of the 26 bridges in both districts thatcross the primary canals, as of the present, six have been left in a state ofdisrepair. In addition, due to the above stated reasons, the WUA have notconducted any special management and operation and maintenanceactivities. Consequently, some of the tertiary canal is overgrown withweeds, and is unable to maintain the necessary volume of water flow for
irrigation.
(4) The operation and maintenance situation

1. The Palembang DOR still operates and maintains the primary andsecondary canals. But due to the previously stated chronic shortage of
1. The primary and secondary canals are operated and maintained by funds, it cannot conduct optimal operation and maintenance. The canals(4) The operation and maintenance situation

the Palembang DOR.

2. The tertiary canal is operated and maintained by the WUAs.

are unable to maintain the necessary volume of water-flow for irrigation
due to the accumulation of mud flowing in from the river. For example,
water depth at one location in the primary canal was measured at one
meter, despite an original depth of four meters.
2. The farmers (the WUAs) operate and maintain the tertiary canal. But
adequate operation and maintenance cannot be conducted due to thepreviously stated lack of operational budget and manpower. Some of thetertiary canal is overgrown with weeds and unable to maintain thenecessary volume of water flow for irrigation.

3. The Palembang DOR conducts operation and maintenance of bridges
constructed across the primary canal. But it cannot conduct adequate
3. Several bridges that cross the primary canal have been damaged by operation and maintenance due to the previously stated chronic shortage
seawater. However, some had already been repaired, and the remainder of funds. Currently, of the 26 bridges in both districts, six have been left
was planned for repair by the beginning of 2001.
in a state of disrepair and cause inconvenience to travel. However, they
are scheduled for repair when funds become available.
4. The Palembang DOR operates and maintains the primary andsecondary canal water-regulating gates, while the farmers (the WUAs)
4. Adequate operation and maintenance of the water-regulating gates operate and maintain those at the tertiary canal. But because of the
had not been conducted.
previously stated reasons, adequate operation and maintenance had notbeen conducted, and more than 90% of these gates have been rendered
inoperable by rust damage. As a result, the volume of water-flow for
irrigation cannot be controlled.
For these reasons, significant concerns remain regarding; theorganizational structure of operation and maintenance institution, thefinancial status, and the operation and maintenance conditions of theirrigation facilities. The factors jeopardize the sustainability of the
project, and are expected to have an adverse effect on both effectivenessand impact in the future.

Lessons
Learned,Recommendat
ions,
Information
Resources andMonitoring
Methods(1) Follow up
on lessons
learned andrecommendations made in
ex-postevaluation
report or otherevaluations
conducted after
the ex-post
evaluation(2) Lessons
learned at
the time of
ex-postmonitoring
andrecommenda
tions forsecuring
sustainability

To maintain and improve the project’s yearly production targets, thepolicy support for farmers’ shift away from low-profit crops such as
cassava and coconut is needed in the future. In addition, someirrigation facilities should be rehabilitated. Furthermore, to increase thesustainability, it is also important to improve the operation andmaintenance system and financial status(1) In order to achieve the project goals, coordination between the (1) Recommendations for the present, seven years after the completion of
the project.
relevant government agencies and other bodies is essential.
・ There has been insufficient coordination between the SSSIP and
the SSSTCDP during this project on the scheduling of coconut
planting. The result has been coconut cultivation continuallyfalling beneath the planned target. All relevant government bodies
and institutions must coordinate sufficiently and develop a betterworking environment in order to promote mutual understanding
and to raise awareness of the tasks assigned to each institution.
These measures will enable the joint goals of the project to berealized.
・ It is also vital an O&M training program is conducted from theperspective of project sustainability and the potential forindependent development. (The project-constructed canals
function as both irrigation and drainage channels, making themconsiderably more complicated than conventional irrigation
facilities. As a result, substantial expertise and abilities are
required for their operation and management.)

Recommendations for the WUAs, the Palembang DOR, and the Ministryof Public Works.

To maintain and improve the project’s yearly production targets,the policy support for farmers’ shift away from low-profit crops
such as cassava and coconut is needed in the future. In addition,
in a rice-producing region where irrigation plays a vitally
important role, the functions of some of the irrigation facilities
need to be repaired – particularly both mud-dredging andreplacing the rust-damaged water-regulating gates in the
primary and secondary canals.
To increase the sustainability of this project, it is essential thatthe organizational structure for operation and maintenance andthe financial status are improved. To achieve this, thePalembang DOR has to secure the necessary budget from
Ministry of Public Works and has to strengthen theorganizational structure and the financial status to establish
divisions which support farmers for switching crops, as well as
to secure staff necessary for conducing operations. Further,
the WUA should replace its deliberate policy of not collecting
ISF with a system for collecting fees solely for the operationand maintenance of equipment. This will help strengthen theorganizational structure, such as securing necessary operationand maintenance staff, and also serve to strengthen the financial
status.