ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTERDISCUSSION PAPER

No.179Developing Vietnam’s financial market:
Using examples from Japanese experience
by

Nguyen Thi Quy

December 2010

ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTERGRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICSNAGOYA UNIVERSITY

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................... 7
CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................................................. 8
OVERVIEW ABOUT VIETNAM’S FINANCIAL MARKET .......................................................... 8
I. FINANCIAL MARKET ...................................................................................................................... 8
1. The formulation and development of the banking system ................................................................... 8
1.1.

Period before 1990s: operated under one-level banking model .............................................................. 8

1.2.

Period from 1990 to present: operated under two-levels banking model.................................................. 8

2. Scale of operations of the Vietnamese banking system ...................................................................... 10
3. Division of the market portion for operations of commercial banks ................................................. 14
4. Evaluation of the monetary market development process ................................................................. 16
4.1.

The formation and development process of monetary market .............................................................. 16

4.2.

Evaluating the real situation of the monetary market development ..................................................... 18

4.3.

Evaluation of the real situation in developing the market of deposit and mobilized capital ....................... 19

5. Evaluation of the development process of the capital market............................................................ 20
5.1.

The formation and development process of stock exchange market ...................................................... 20

5.2.

Lessions on the development of 2 stock exchange centers ................................................................... 21

II. VIETNAM’S MONETARY POLICY IN CURRENT YEARS ................................................. 23
1. Vietnam’s monetary policy before global financial crisis 2008 ........................................................... 23
1.1.

Low rate inflation period (1999- 2003) ...................................................................................... 23

1.2.

Higher rate inflation period (2004- 2008) ................................................................................... 23

2. New points of monetary policy in global financial crisis 2008 ........................................................... 27

CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................................... 30
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND MONETARY POLICY OF JAPAN ............................................... 30
I. JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ............................................................................................... 30
1. General evaluation ............................................................................................................................ 30
2. Characteristics of Japanese financial system ...................................................................................... 31
2.1.

Households’ Invested Assets promoted the Japanese financial system ................................................... 31

2.2.
The close relationship between banks and enterprises and the enterprise capital supporting responsibilities
formed Main Bank System ................................................................................................................... 32
3. Japanese financial market .................................................................................................................. 33

2

4. Japanese bank and financial institution system .................................................................................. 35
4.1.

Organizational structure ........................................................................................................... 35

4.2.

Non- performing Loans ............................................................................................................ 38

4.3.

Business profits of Japanese banks .............................................................................................. 41

5. Reforms of the Japanese financial system.......................................................................................... 44
5.1.

Actual situation ...................................................................................................................... 44

5.2.

Depression causes of the Japanese financial market ......................................................................... 44

5.3.

The need for reform .................................................................................................................. 45

5.4.

The main reform programs ........................................................................................................ 46

5.4.1. The Japanese financial Big Bang .......................................................................................... 46
5.4.2. The Postal Saving System Reform (2007) ............................................................................ 47

II. JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY............................................................................................... 49
1. The monetary policy by periods ........................................................................................................ 49
1.1.

The period of 1953-1975: The traditional monetary policy .............................................................. 50

1.2.

The period of 1975-1981: New monetary policy ............................................................................ 51

1.3.

The modern monetary policy 1981 .............................................................................................. 51

2. Zero interest rate policy .................................................................................................................... 53
3. Exchange rate policy ......................................................................................................................... 55
4. The Japanese current financial system – problems and solutions ....................................................... 60
4.1.

General evaluation of the Japanese current financial system............................................................... 60

4.2.

Challenges.............................................................................................................................. 60

4.3.

Countermeasure policy .............................................................................................................. 61

CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................................................... 62
PRACTICAL LESSONS FOR VIETNAMESE FINANCIAL MARKET ..................................... 62
1. The first lesson ..................................................................................................................................... 62
2. The second lesson ................................................................................................................................ 65
3. The third lesson .................................................................................................................................... 72
4. The fourth lesson ................................................................................................................................. 77
5. The firth lesson..................................................................................................................................... 78
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 82
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................... 83

3

List of Tables
Table 1.1: A number of main targets of monetary – banking operations in 1991-2008 ................. 12
Table 1.2: Operation Scale of Commercial Banks in 2007 ................................................................ 13
Table 1.3: Effectiveness of the State Commercial Banks during the period of 2000-2007 ............ 15
Table 1.4: Mobilized capital source and loan debt balance of the CB in 2001-2007 ...................... 16
Table 2.1: Changes in Households' Asset Allocation in the U.S and Japan ..................................... 31
Table 2.2: Major Financial Markets in Japan and Their Size ............................................................ 34
Table 2.3: Banking Groups and Consolidated Assets........................................................................ 37
Table 2.4: Number Changes of Private-Sector Financial Institutions by Business Type ............... 38
Table 2.5: Outstanding Stock and Disposals of Non-Performing Loans ........................................ 40
Table 2.6: Profitability of Japanese Banking Sector ........................................................................... 42
Table 2.7: 10 largest banks in the world in 2009 ................................................................................ 48
Table 2.8: Change in the Official Discount Rate by Date ................................................................. 53
Table 2.9: Money supply to Japanese economics ............................................................................... 57
Table 2.10: Foreign trade balance and general payment account ..................................................... 57
Table 2.11: FDI of Japan to overseas ................................................................................................. 58
Table 3.1: Over-due debts of Japanese banks in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 ................................... 73
Table 3.2: Bank’s market shares in Vietnam (in late 2000)................................................................ 78
Table 3.3: Impact of discount interest rate reduction on other interest rate ................................... 66
Table 3.4: Market interest rate (IR) after adjustment policy on discount interest rate.................... 66

List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Two-level banking system in Vietnam ............................................................................... 9
Figure 1.2: Division of the market portion for operations of commercial banks ........................... 14
Figure 1.3: Quarter economic growth in 2008-2009.......................................................................... 27
Figure 1.4: Exchange rate VND/USD in period 2007-2009 ............................................................ 28
Figure 1.5: Capital mobilization’s interest rate, loan interest and inflation period 2008-2009 ....... 29
Figure 2.1: A classification of Japanese financial institution ............................................................. 35
Figure 2.2: Non-performing Loans and Write-off Costs by Japanese Banks .................................. 39
Figure 2.3: Banks’ ROE and ROA: US and Japan ............................................................................. 43
4

Figure 2.4: The transmission mechanism of monetary policy .......................................................... 50
Figure 2.5: The traditional money policy ........................................................................................... 50
Figure 2.6: The new monetary policy .................................................................................................. 51
Figure 2.7: The modern monetary policy ........................................................................................... 52
Figure 2.8: The exchange rate JPY / USD in the period 1991 – 1997............................................. 56
Figure 3.1: The distribution plan of 60 thousands billion Yen public fund..................................... 74
Figure 3.2: Progress of mobilized interest rate and VND lending interest rate in 2008 – 2009. ... 67
Figure 3.3: Exchange Rate of JPY / USD (2005) .............................................................................. 70

5

ACKNOWLEGEMENT

I am deeply indebted to many people for their help during the time I wrote this discussion paperin fulfilment of my research as Visiting Professor in Economic Research Center, Nagoya
University, Japan.
I would like to extend my gratitude and respect to Professor Hitoshi Hirakawa, for his valuableguidance, suggestion and comments which have been the greatest help at all the time during thewriting of this paper. I am also very grateful to Professor Nobuyoshi Yamori, for his criticalcomments and suggestion throughout the paper development.
I would like also to express my gratitude to all staff members of Economics Research Center,
School of Economics, Nagoya University whose kind help during my stay in Japan was muchmeaningful to me.
I am very grateful to Foreign Trade University’s management board, especially to Professor
Hoang Van Chau, the President of Foreign Trade University, Vietnam for his support andmaking good condition for me to conduct my research. I am also thankful to all my colleagues inFaculty of Banking and Finance for their regular connection, help, and care.
Finally, I am deeply indebted my husband and my sons who always encourage me to complete
my paper.

Nguyen Thi Quy
Visiting Professor ( From October 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010 )Economic Research Center
School of Economic, Nagoya University

6

ABSTRACT
Since 1986, Vietnam has started making the transition from a centrally-planned to a marketbased economy. In general, the progress of economic transition in Vietnam has been rapid andhighly successful. Though there are many challenges appearing from war, poverty and backward
lagging behind the world, Vietnam has gained significant achievements and improvement ineconomy. The development in Vietnam is not only the result of herself effort but also comingfrom the cooperation and support from many other countries in the world, in which thecollaboration with Japan plays a very important role. In that economic condition, Vietnam’s
financial market has also faced with various difficulties in financial construction reform,
monetary policy management, and global financial-economic crisis.
Japanese financial market, in comparison with America’s and United Kingdom’s ones, has notbeen a strong and perfect system. However, through the achievement gained by this 2nd biggest
economy of the world, it is admitted that Japan’s financial system has significantly contributed on
the economic development as a key sector. In 1990s, Japan successfully passed economicfinancial problems related to deflation that never happened before, and the risk of tremendous
frozen capital during this period. The Japanese banks had approached many suitable and special
monetary and financial policies to stabilize and develop national economic system. The
experiences on financial policy making of Japan in last decades, especially after recent global
financial crisis in 2008, has become a valuable lesson not only for Vietnam but also for manyother countries in the world that facing similar financial problems in economic system.
The main objective of this paper is to asset financial policies implemented in Japan in last 20
years. Based on the current policy analysis and lessons getting from Japanese experiences thispaper also intends to provide some policy suggestion to promote Vietnam’s financial market
stabilization.

7

CHAPTER 1OVERVIEW ABOUT VIETNAM’S FINANCIAL MARKET
I. FINANCIAL MARKET
1. The formulation and development of the banking system
1.1. Period before 1990s: operated under one-level banking modelOn 6th May 1951, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) was officially established. At that time, SBV
was called as the National Bank of Vietnam, operated under one-level bank model. With a viewto allocating the capital to the Economy, the specialized banks, turn by turn, were given birth. In
which, the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam(BIDV) was established in 1957.
The Vietnam Bank for Foreign Trade(VCB) was established in 1963, The Bank for Agriculture
and Rural Development and the Vietnam Bank for Industry and Commerce were established in
19881.
In 1986, Vietnam started the process of renovation. There have been three noteworthy points.
Firstly, the period 1986-1988 was the most unstable duration of the macro-economy in which
the Vietnamese economy experienced with the fact that the Government used the printing ofmoney to offset the budgetary deficit, galloping inflation with three digits. Secondly, this effort
for the financial liberalization had been proceeded whilst there had been almost no reforms inthe sectors of industry, stated-owned enterprises (SOE) and foreign trade activities. Thirdly, theliberalization had been gone so far that all economic organizations could be permitted to do
currency business. In the mean time, the financial supervisory system had not been existed.
Organizations mobilized the capital from the people in the form of savings deposit for lending
without having to comply with traditional banking regulations, such as obligatory reserves andcapital ratio/debit balance.
1.2. Period from 1990 to present: operated under two-levels banking model
In 1990, SBV’s Law was announced. Under that law, banking operation system started with twolevel model, in which SBV was the 1st level and other commercial banks were at 2nd level. In the
two – level banking system, the state bank played the role of the Central Bank of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam continued to renovate and kept the active role in the international
integration (Figure 1.1).
From 1990, commercial joint-stock banks was started to establish, foreign banks were permitted
to participate in the form of the establishment of branches or joint-venture with domestic banks.
In 1995, the Bank for the Poor was established. Until 2002, it was changed its name into theSocial Policy Bank. In 1997 , one other state commercial bank, namely, the Bank For the
Housing Development in the Mekong Delta was established with its initial functions expressedin its called name, but later on, it was possible that due to the failure of the housing development
program in the Mekong Delta, this bank becomes presently a purely-commercial bank.

8

Figure 1.1: Two-level banking system in Vietnam
State Bank of Vietnam(SBV)

Financial intermediaries/
Institutions

Commercial BanksBusiness organizations

Enterprises.
( Source: The State Bank of Vietnam’s website : www.sbv.com.vn)
Recently, the structure of the State Bank of Vietnam contains: 5 State Commercial Banks; 39
Commercial Joint Stock Bank; 40 branches of State Bank; 5 joint venture banks; 17 financecompanies; 13 leasing companies; and 53 representative offices of foreign bank located in
Vietnam.
In the two – level banking system,the state bank played the role of the Central Bank of theSocialist Republic of Vietnam continued to renovate and kept the active role in the international
integration in the orientation of:
1. Improvement of organizational model: State central bank, state bank branches in provinces,cities; units under the direct authority; Banking Institute and Banking University in Ho Chi
Minh City.
2. Ceaseless upgrading of state management capabilities in the field of currency, especially theconstruction and improvement of legal environment on banking activities to guarantee instrict accordance with the spirit of resolutions of various Party Congresses as well as thestrategy in the renovation period, integration of the Vietnamese Communist Party
promulgated in 1998 and amended, added in 2003; the law on credit organizations was also
promulgated in 1998 and amended, added in 2004. In 2007, the amendment of and addition
to the two afore-stated banking laws was continued to put in the plan for the third time inorder to be in conformity with international practices, especially commitments to open thedoor integrate in the finance and currency market in the framework of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). By-law documents and other legal documents on currency, credit andbanking operations had been promulgated quite fully, synchronized, conformed graduallywith international practices, to entrust the autonomy and create the fairer competition inbusiness activities of commercial banks, credit organizations and banking operations.

93. Forceful renovation and ceaseless enhancement of validity, efficiency of activities on
inspection, control, auditing of activities on currency, banking. Guarantee of activities oncurrency, credit, banking and activities of credit organizations for increasingly safe, efficient,protecting the interests of clients, citizens, investors, money-depositors at the bank.
Especially the Decree on the prevention and fighting against money laundry and specialized
agencies for the prevention and fighting against money laundry had been established.
4. Upgrading of capabilities on construction and operation of monetary policies, effective useof banking operations of the central bank, in conformity with international practices andinternational integration tendency, active effects upon the development of the financial
market, especially, the monetary market, to guarantee for the socialist-oriented role of state
management and operations. Especially, the State bank transferred the use of direct tools
into the use of indirect tools in managing the monetary policy. The very importantachievement was the successful implementation of objectives of operating monetary policy,
accelerating the economic growth , monetary stabilization, curbing inflation, boosting thecreation of new jobs in the society and renovation of business activities of enterprises, family
household, in which, it was worth of mentioning that the state bank transferred to theoperation according to agreed interest rate mechanism. Commercial banks and credit
organizations played the active role in fixing the interest rate for deposited money andlending interest rate, From 2000, the State Bank put into use the operation of the open
market and up to present, this market has been operating increasingly with great scale,intervening effectively in the available assets of commercial banks, credit organizations andthe interest rate on the monetary market, the state bank cancelled the foreign exchange saleratio, expanded variations of exchange rate transaction in the purchase and sale of foreignexchange between credit organizations and their clients. Regulations on the receipt andpayment of foreign exchange had also been renovated in the favorable direction and creationof the active choice in selling or receiving whatsoever kind of foreign exchange for theforeign exchange receiver. Other regulations on foreign exchange management were also
amended, added in conformity with international practices.
5. Acceleration of the financial market with the participation of multi-economic components inthe activities of banking and financial market, absorption of foreign-invested capital inbanking activities, absorption of money deposited by the people, in the society, investments
in different channels for the socio-economic development, in which, state commercial banks
played the leading role. At the same time, the establishment of the Bank for the Poor, lateron, being the Social Policy Bank to implement the policy to eradicate hunger and alleviate
poverty and other social policies of the Party and the State.
2. Scale of operations of the Vietnamese banking system
The biggest contribution of the Vietnamese banking system in the renovation years and theactive integration to the international economy in the field of finance – currency were thesuccessful implementation of the national monetary policy, acceleration of the development of
the financial market and the high economic growth of 7.0% - 7.6% and the stability in recent
10years, the inflation under control, stable currency. The Bank for the Poor, presently, the Social
Policy Bank contributed significantly to the national program for hunger eradication and poverty
alleviation, creation of jobs, student’s borrowing for studies. The development of the monetary
market allowed the maximum mobilization of idle monetary source, capital sources in theeconomy to the banking-investment system for socio economic development. The Stock market
began to be formed and developed.
With regard to specific targets in banking activities. In recent year the total payment facilities
increased from 20% - 34% of the total mobilized capital source increased 25%- 34%; the total
lending credit balance and investment for the economy increased averagely 22% -30%
The banking system attained the highest level of capital mobilization and lending debit balancenever seen before. Until the end of 2008, the system of commercial banks and credit
organizations all over the country had the lending debit balance and capital investment for the
economy increased to 37.8% as compared to the end of 2006 and increased about two-fold incomparison with the anticipated level from the beginning of the year : 17-21%. The total ofmobilized capital source, until 31 December 2007 was estimated to increase to 36.5%, more than
3.5 times the economic growth rate. In Ho Chi Minh City, calculated until the end of December
2007. The total mobilized source of commercial banks and credit organizations in the area
attained VND487,028 Billion, increasing 70.6 as compared to the end of 2006; The total lending
debit balance attained VND406,353 Billion, increasing 76.9% as compared to the end of 2006.

11

Table 1.1: A number of main targets of monetary – banking operations in 1991-2008
Year

Growth rateof payment
methods%

Increase
rate ofmobilized
capital%Increase rateof lending
creditbalance for
economy%Money
volumesupply to theeconomy%Increase
rate of gold
price
%

Price
increase
rate
USD
%

Bid-wontreasurybondvolume(VND
Billion)Economic
growth rate%

Inflation%

Foreignexchange
absorption
%

1991

88.7

5.8

67.4

35.00

1992

31.3

8.7

17.5

136.64

1993

7.4

8.1

5.3

140.98

1994

27.8

8.0

8.8

14.4

249.47

1995

22.6

-3.0

9.5

12.7

284.96

1996

22.7

22.7

2.5

9.3

4.5

468.99

1997

26.1

25.7

22.6

26.1

-6.6

14.2

2,917.58.8

3,6400.00

1998

23.9

34.0

16.4

25.6

0.7

9.6

4,011

5.8

9.0

950.00

1999

39.25

34.0

19.2

39.3

-.02

1.1

3,011

4.8

6.8

1,200.10

2000

26.5

43.3

38.14

25

-1.7

3.4

4,766

6.8

-0.6

1,157.00

2001

25.53

25.1

21.44

-

5.0

3.8

3,955

6.8

-0.2

1,820.00

2002

17.7

19.4

22.2

-

19.4

2.1

8,140

7.0

4.0

2,154.00

2003

24.94

25.8

28.41

-

26.6

12.2

15,9017.2

3.0

2,580.00

2004

30.39

33.2

41.65

-

11.7

0.4

19,4657.5

9.5

3,000.00

2005

24.4

23.11

20.6

32.24

11.3

0.9

22,1207.7

8.4

3,500.00

2006

29.7

33

24.8

32.59

27.1

0.9

22,0758.16

6.6

4,200.00

2007

36.9

36,5

37.6

37

33

0.10

10.2208.46

12.6

5,500,000( Source: The State Bank of Vietnam )12

Banking operations developed rapidly, strongly, firmly, efficiently with the quality and scale, thus
speeding up the renovation of production and business activities, services and upgrading thelevel of knowledge of the people on monetary-banking activities
The group of commercial joint stock banks transferred from the rural area to become urban
commercial joint stock banks attained the highest growth rate
The group of commercial joint stock banks belonging to middle category had also the impressive
growth rate
The group of commercial joint stock banks belonging to leading category still kept the tradition
The state commercial joint stock bank block in possession of firm growth rate
Table 1.2: Operation Scale of Commercial Banks in 2007
Unit: Billion VND
VCB

Vietinbank

BIDV

Agribank

Total assets

196,117

172,000

204,000

Capital mobilized directly from economy

143,635

153,434

149,468

295,048

Total lending debit balance and investment

95,579101,282

125,660

281,869

Pre-tax profit

3,100

2,000

2,000

( Source: The State Bank of Vietnam )The Block of foreign banks and joint-venture banks attained the high growth rate in several years
symbolizing the improvement of investment environment of Vietnam:
The block of foreign bank branches had also very impressive business results. Until 2007, in
Vietnam there were 35 foreign bank branches, 5 banks joint-venturing with foreign countries, 4finance leasing joint venture companies and 2 finance leasing company with 100% foreign
invested capital. The total assets of foreign bank branches and credit organizations having
foreign-invested capital and credit organizations with foreign-invested capital amounting to over
VND 215,000 Billion, the of the pre-tax total income of the block of banks and credit
organizations having foreign-invested capital attained over VND 2,400 Billion.
The Block of joint venture banks, credit funds, finance companies and finance leasing company
had the more modest growth rate.
The social policy bank was more diversified for the capital-borrowing programs and objectives.
Especially, the effective development with great scale of programs for students and pupils toborrow capital for their studies.

13

3. Division of the market portion for operations of commercial banks
The financial market portion, specifically speaking, was the market for mobilizing the capital andlending of the banking system that developed rigorously in the increasingly competitiveenvironment. The competition had brought forth the result that the market portion of the state
commercial banks were having the tendency to narrow, although, there had been still the big
density, the market portion of the commercial joint stock companies were having the tendency
to expand. Until the end of 2007, state commercial banks occupied about 56.9% of the market
portion, thus decreasing drastically as compared to the level of 72% - 73%, 3 years ago; 1
development bank and 1 social policy bank occupied 3.3% of the market portion; commercial
joint stock banks occupied about 26.5% of the market portion, sharp increase as compared to
the level of 16-17% 3years ago; the block of foreign banks with 39 branches in Vietnam and 5
joint-venture banks occupied 9.4% of the market portion; 9 finance companies, 12 financeleasing companies and 996 People’s credit funds occupied about 39% of the market portion. In
addition, there had been 51 representative offices of foreign banks and foreign credit
organizations in Vietnam acting as the bridge linking to investment activities, financial-monetaryservices of the foreign banks in Vietnam.
Figure 1.2: Division of the market portion for operations of commercial banks( Source : The State bank of Vietnam)
First, all Commercial Bank and Credit Organizations has developed quickly and totally, yielded
sustainable profits , and participated actively in the financial market.
Second, the Commercial Banks of Vietnam proved active changes in handling stagnant debts,
reducing bad debts, increasing credit quality.
Until now, the Commercial Banks and Credit Organizations has bad debt proportion under 5.0%
according to international standard. The debt classification and risk spare budget is implementing
and will do as international common practice.

14

Third, the Commercial Banks of Vietnam have many measures of diversifying the services,
opening new, modern and useful services and enhancing the service quality of traditional banks.
Forth, the organization structure of the Commercial Banks of Vietnam become more and more
properly and efficiently, the system becomes more diversified, expanded and developed, which
spreads substantially towards urban and potential areas.
That system ensures closeness to the people, and facilitates the transactions of them and of theenterprises. The joint stock Commercial Banks system has a rapid expanding speed in cities,
important economic zones, new urban areas, industrial and dense populated areas.
Fifth, Commercial Banks and credit organizations of Vietnam have deep insights about
mentality, customs, clients incomes, and local markets. Modern banking technology is applied
effectively in clients transactions, managements and administrations. These are the strong
competitive points in international integration in the area of finance – monetary.
Sixth, Commercial Banks of Vietnam have abundant human resource, with a big number ofcadres basically trained, experienced and having administrative, managerial and organizational
capacities in banking; the human resource quality is also elevated.
Seventh, there is effective cooperation between big economic corporations and Commercial
Banks, which increases the competition strength and the active integration to international
economy.
Table 1.3: Effectiveness of the State Commercial Banks during the period of 2000-2007
Unit: %
Target/year

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Overdue debt/total debt
balance

11.19

8.74

7.58

5.01

4.98

5.25

4.8

2.3

Net profit/ROE

12.81

15.85

9.43

6.54

6.53

6.50

6.5

6.6

Net profit/ROA

0.36

0.38

0.3

0.38

0.41

0.42

0.43

4.5

(Source: State Banks of Vietnam, Data in 2007 is the author’s estimation)
As international practice, a good bank is one which has average ROA at 1% and ROE at 15%.
During 1999-2007, the ROA index of the State Commercial Banks got only 0.42 - 0.60%, while
ROE tended to decrease continuously during 2001-2007, from 15.85% in 2001 to 6.54% in 2003
and 6.5% in 2005 in which the reason of low profit-yielding capacity was due to the very highproportion of passive debt. Therefore, the current productive capacity of the State Commercial
Banks (CB) is very low compared to other good banks in the world.

15

Table 1.4: Mobilized capital source and loan debt balance of the CB in 2001-2007
Unit: billion dongs
No. Target
1
2
3
4
5

Mobilized
capital source
Loan debt
balanceGDP
Mobilized
capital/GDP
Loan debt
balance/GDP

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

231.000

290.000

337.000

475.000

584.000

776.7201.080.000

215.000

281.000

328.000

454.000

545.000

661.630

1.012.860

481.295

535.762

613.443713.071837.858906.060

982.647

48%

54%

55%

67%

70%

85.7%

109.8%

45%

52%

53%

64%

65%

60%

103.1%(Source: State Banks of Vietnam, Data in 2007 is the author’s estimation)
4. Evaluation of the monetary market development process

4.1. The formation and development process of monetary market
The monetary market which is mainly the open market and the market of state exchequer bills
tender managed by the Vietnam State Bank has developed as this process:In continuing the operation renovation following the integration trend, from July 2000, Vietnam
State Bank officially introduced the Open Market Operation (OMO). This is one of many sortsof the monetary market. The open market operation is an activity of dealing short-term valid
papers or short-term dealing of valid papers between the Central Bank and the Commercial
Banks, Credit Organizations and other organizations, through which the available and reserve
capital of such organizations is involved and the interest rate of the monetary market is
impacted.
While the transaction turnover in 2 years of 2000-2001 on the open market was still small, it roseannually at the rate of 200% in the years from 2002-2004, in which the transaction turnover in2004 was 2.92 times of the 2003 and 16 times of one of 2001. The transaction turnover increased
quickly because the OMO sessions were held more regularly, and the turnover of each session
also increased. In 2005, the transaction turnover was 165.5% compared to 2004. In 2006, thetransaction turnover on the open market reached fairly high level, which was 100,000 billion
dongs.
In 2007, the open market service achieved great success in intervening in the available capital of
the Commercial Banks and drew money back from circulation, repressed inflation. The total
quantity of short-term valid papers that the State Bank bought in short-term went up to 61,133
billion dongs, timely responding to the needs of available capital for the Commercial Banks. But
in the same year of 2007, the total turnover of State Bank bills and valid papers sold was 356,850

16

billion dongs, reached the highest level until then. This number also showed the very highcapacity of absorbing money back of the State Bank.
Especially, the State Bank has organized a big number of 355 transaction sessions, on some days
2-3 sessions was hold to respond to the market’s need. In many sessions, the State Bank offeredat the price of 10,000 billion dongs. This is the remarkable number till present. In total, there
were 584 participations of bidding members, in which 399 participants were the State
Commercial Banks, 142 were joint stock Commercial Banks and 43 were the branches of overseabanks in Vietnam; there were 481 participants won the contracts, in which 360 were the State
Commercial Banks, 86 were joint stock Commercial Banks and 35 were the branches of overseabanks in Vietnam. This was a different happenings compared to the previous years and showed
the wide scope of participation, the role of the open market to Commercial Banks as well as tothe management of the monetary policies. The terms of valid papers transacted were also
different, but in multiform, about 10 terms, but mainly 7 days, 14 days… The interest ratetended to increase and stayed at high level compared to the recent years.
The market of bidding for exchequer bills through the State Bank was introduced since 1994.
This was a very important channel of capital mobilization to timely respond to the State needs incapital in particular, and to the economy in general. It was a premise for the development ofstock market, the secondary market and the implementation of services of the Central State Bank
(the market of dealing bills, open market, discount on short-term valid papers and loan backed
by advancing short-term valid papers).
Currently, after 14 years of operation, the market of bidding for exchequer bills (TPKB) included
47 members, in which: 5 State Commercial Banks (NHTMNN); 18 joint stock Commercial
Banks (NHTMCP); 4 joint venture banks (NHLD); 13 branches of oversea banks in Vietnam; 6
insurance organizations and the Central Credit Fund. However, in the past years, it seems that
only the state commercial banks participated in and won the bids. In 2006, there were 82
successful tenders from the state commercial banks out of 86 winning members. Or in otherwords, the banking circles supposed that this market is only reserved for the state commercial
banks. The bloc of joint stock, joint venture and Oversea affiliated banks… still act as outsiders.
The main reason was that this bloc of banks have only small source of capital, limited available
capital to be afford to enter the bids. But another reason was the method of biddingorganization that deprived small-scale banks of winning the bid. The total successful bid
turnover in the exchequer bills bidding market reached more than 22,000 billion dongs.
In the year of 2007, the exchequer bills bidding market was not as eventful as the previous years,
but it continued to take an important role in the intervention of the State Banks to the available
capital of the Commercial Banks and in the creation of transaction goods for the open market,
that impacted on the interest rate of the monetary market and on the rate of mobilized capital of
the Commercial Banks. The transaction scale of the exchequer bills bidding market in 2007 did
not reach the estimated high level from the beginning of the year and was lower than in 2006,17

the total successful bid turnover was 10,220 billion dongs, the lowest in recent years. But theoperation of the exchequer bills bidding market supported substantially to the management ofmonetary policies of the State Banks, especially in creating transaction goods for the open
market.

4.2. Evaluating the real situation of the monetary market development
This was the earliest developing market and the most recognizable in the economy development
process following the market mechanism of our country. The members operating in this market
were mainly the finance intermediary organizations, with the focus on Commercial Banks,
investment funds… Therefore, beside of the emergence of the dual banking system: the StateBank taking the duty of governmental management of banking operation; the commercial banks
and the other Credit Organizations doing the monetary business and banking services; thesystem of Commercial Banks and Credit Organizations also developed extremely various withmany types of diverse ownerships. Next to them are the Insurance organizations and Investment
Funds, the Financial lease companies, the Finance companies in the model of state parent
companies, the Postal savings service companies.
Until present, the participant members of the various kind of monetary market include 5 State
Commercial Banks and Social policy banks, 37 Joint stock Commercial Banks, 4 Joint venturebanks, 39 Oversea affiliated banks, 5 Joint venture banks, the Central credit fund, nearly 1,000
civil-based credit funds, some insurance and re-insurance companies, Credit funds…
The mechanism of impact and intervention on monetary market was showed intensively in thetools for managing monetary policies and the Central Bank service. Based on that, and for thesuitable step by step changes to common practice, from June 2002, the State Bank switched tocarrying out the mechanism of managing the interest rate per agreement instead of the previous
mechanism of managing the interest rate per basic rate. Combined to that is the monthly
announcement of the State Bank of the basic interest rate, but still regulating the refinance andrediscount interest rate; together with the interest rate of Swap foreign exchange service, of theopen market, to the exchequer bills bidding market that impact on the market interest rate, themobilized capital interest rate and the Credit funds loan interest rate.
The compulsory reserve tool also impacts on the interest rate. When the State Bank adjusts up
the proportion of required reserve, it makes the input expenditure of the credit funds to increase.
As a result, the credit funds must either keep the interest rate of mobilized capital intact and riseup the loan interest rate; or they must both increase the loan interest rate and rise up themobilized capital interest rate.
The tool for controlling the exchange rate also impacts on the interest rates of the credit funds inthe monetary market, but not very clear.
With the growth of the finance intermediary organizations, especially the credit funds, and withthe management mechanism of the monetary policies and the Central Bank service coming close
to the common practice, the Commercial Banks and Credit funds are allowed to take initiatives
in mobilizing capital and loan activities, to participate actively, dynamically and to compete one
another strongly in the monetary market, and thanks to that, they have good conditions inpushing forward the monetary market.

18

Besides participant members of the interbank market, the exchequer bills bidding market, theopen market…do not include all the aforementioned organizations, only the State Commercial
Banks, the Urban Joint stock Commercial Banks, the Joint venture banks, the Oversea affiliatedbanks, some insurance companies.

4.3. Evaluation of the real situation in developing the market of deposit and mobilized capitalThis is the market where the competition is most fierce and eventful between the financeintermediary organizations in the absorption of idle money of the public. In recent times, theCredit funds launch these forms of activities:− Compete to encourage clients to open personal account, card account…All blocs ofCommercial Banks strongly develop the service for personal bank to absorb deposits and idle
capital in society into the bank system. It is estimated that until the end of June 2008, there
were about 9.2 million personal accounts opened in Commercial Banks all over the country,
more than 8 million cards were issued, in which 7.7 million local cards, more than 302.000
international cards, over 4,300 ATM machines and 23,000 POS equipments were installed.
− Compete to absorb non-term deposits of the economic social organizations. Competition
between the credit funds in absorbing deposits of the State Exchequer, the Vietnam social
insurance, Bao Viet, the human insurance, post and telecommunication, electric…
− Compete to attract the savings deposits: this is a traditional form of capital mobilization
between the credit funds and the Post office savings service Company, especially the civilbased credit funds. In recent times, some banks launched a new service in order to encourage
the clients: deposit at one place and draw at many places; accumulate savings or in otherwords collective savings; savings associated with human insurance; progressive savings withinterest rate according to deposits – the higher the deposit and the higher the interest rate;
flexible savings which means the clients may draw the money at their needs and the interest
rate is calculated per real days deposited correlative to the nearest term; savings withreward…
− Issue deposit certificate, term note, bond…mostly mobilize the capital with terms of 6months and more, and attractive interest rate.
In the near 6 years of 2003-2008, there was a hectic competition in the market of absorbing
deposit and capital mobilization, especially the finance intermediary organizations implemented
various and diverse products and services in absorbing deposit and capital mobilization.
However, in the development of this market, a big shortcoming still exists – the no-term
deposits, the idle money of people were not absorbed in maximum into the banks, and so notchoose the payment service via banks or cash checks for needs at anytime. This is a very big andimportant capital source which can make a momentum for the monetary market development,
since it helps increasing the source of no-term deposits and available capital to the Credit funds.

19

5. Evaluation of the development process of the capital market

5.1. The formation and development process of stock exchange market
5.1.1. The operation of the Stock Transaction Center in HCMC
In 1997, the State Stock Committee was founded to carry out the initial functions that prepared
for the birth of the Stock Market in Vietnam, which were to set up the legal basis, train theofficers, build up the infrastructure and technology… Three years after the appearance of theState Stock Committee, in carrying out the decision of the State Prime minister dated July 20,
2000, the Stock Transaction Center was opened and operated and held the first stock transaction
on July 28, 2000. This was an important milestone which marked the presence of the first andintensive stock transaction market in Vietnam after a prompt and active preparation process ofthe necessary conditions about the related legal frame, the human resource, the technology
infrastructure and material facilities.
The initial name, the location to open the market was pondered very carefully in the Model ofVietnam Stock Market and the document of the State Stock Committee submitted to the Partyand State leaders for permission of establishment of the Stock Transaction Market. The name of“Stock transaction center” and not yet the “Stock Transaction Service” indirectly expressed theorientation of the step, scope, capacity, method of the initial stock transaction arrangements ofthe market. A different feature of Vietnam compared to other countries in the world was in theinitial formation and development period of the Stock Market was that Vietnam did not have areal market economy, and goods on the market were mostly stock shares equitized from the state
enterprises and the government bonds were issued by the Ministry of Finance; enterprises andthe public had chance to access for the first time to the concepts and forms of capital
mobilization, investment on Stock Market. The state invested all the material facilities, trained
human resource, issued regulations on establishing and initiating the first Stock Transaction
Center into operation; in hierarchy, the Center is a unit directly belonged to the State Stock
Committee.
To have a real concept about the operation of the intensive stock exchange market, to obtain theoperation regulations of the Stock Transaction Service for reference and selection suitable toVietnam situation, many cadres of the State Stock Committee had participated in survey team,studied at the Stock Transaction Service and stock companies, the Center of Stock Link offriendly countries during 1997-1999 as the technical support projects agreed at Government level
between the two countries. In supporting the initiation and operation of HCM city Stock
Transaction Center, the State Stock Committee temporarily assigned key cadres, young trainedwith good capacity cadres to the positions of Director of Stock Transaction Center, to leadimportant service departments of the Center in the first years of operation.
Until June 2008, with 8 years of operation, the Stock Transaction Center of HCM city has held
approximately 1,850 stock transaction sessions; the information announcement, transaction

20

supervision became more and more effective, respond basically to the needs of market growth;
the operation and management of the Center grew to be more and more professional.
From October 2007, the Stock Transaction Service of HCM city (changed from the Stock
Transaction Center of HCM city since August 2007) began to implement the continuous ordermatches beside of the implementation of the term match method exerted in nearly 8 previous
years. From two companies that posted stocks on the first exchange session, there were 150
shares and 2 stock investment fund certificates posted and transacted at the end of June 2008.
The scope of the posted shares market on the Stock Transaction Service of HCM city grewsignificantly from only more than 1% GDP at the end of 2005 to nearly 50% GDP in June 2008.
the Stock Transaction Service of HCM city has admitted the 75th transaction member as stockcompany, compared to only 5 members in the start. Such numbers proved a really big effort andendurance of the Stock Transaction Service of HCM city in such a limited conditions intechnology infrastructure and human resource. From the mid of March 2008, the Stock
Transaction Service of HCM city turned to use the no-floor transaction method based onmodern technology.
5.1.2. Operation of the Stock Transaction Center in Hanoi
The active and total change of Vietnam Stock Market together with the experience gathered after
5 years of organizing and operating the Stock Market is a basic and important premise for theGovernment to permit the operation of Hanoi Stock Transaction Center on March 8, 2005.
Pursuant to the Development strategy of Vietnam Stock Market approved by the Prime minister,
the operation trend of Hanoi Stock Transaction Center is to hold a market for special transaction
stocks; shares of small and medium enterprises, unposted enterprises in HCM city market…
following a flexible transaction method, suitable to the needs of the market and based onmodern technology. The birth and operation of Hanoi Stock Transaction Center following thistrend has contributed to complete the structure of the Stock Market, organize markets in morediversified post standard, gradually narrow the operation of free market without control, anddiversify the channels of capital and investment mobilization for the enterprises as well as forstock investors. More than 2 years before, there were only 6 companies posted shares with a total
value of 1,500 billion dongs per nominal value, then in June 2008, there were more than 130
companies with a total posted value reached to 31,000 billion dongs. The number of securities
companies as members of Hanoi Stock Transaction Center rose from 11 starting members to 70
companies.
5.2. Lessions on the development of 2 stock exchange centers
After 8 years, it can be seen that Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city stock exchange centers haveovercomed many difficulties, including the policy changes, lack of management experience, therequirement of investors and stock companies. Those stock exchange centers help to makemarket more clear and public and reduce the complex of administrative procedure

21

The leading principle of market development is from small to large scale, from low to high leveland from simple to a modern and international standard. Vietnam gets experiences during thepractice, then issue suiltable policy to the government, market manageremnt institutions,especially when the market becomes “too hot” or “too cold”, affected by global financial market.
In addions, those center have contributed into the renovation of state enterprises throughprivatization progress; capital mobilization for the governement with low cost via bond tender.
The privatization of enterprises has been made more clear and public.
The development of Vietnamese stock market has received attention of many other foreign
stock markets. Vietnam has expanded signing MOU with foreign stock exchange centers,
especialy the big center like New York, Tokyo, London.
5.2.1. Achievement in the liberalization progress of Vietnam following WTO
1. First, Vietnam has selected a correct way on commitment. Vietnam commited to implement
financial liberalization based on the policy of more FDI attraction, more foreign tradeactivities in Vietnam to enhance capacity of domestic financial mechanism such as using
foreign capital, learning management skills, then gradually develop financial market.
However, Vietnam applied cautious actions on liberalization to avoid competition indomestic market and protect national enterprises.
2. Second, Vietnam has made basic reform on legal system in accordance with international and
WTO regulation. The policy of single window in administrative reform brings goodcondition for investment environment and banking business.
3. Third, Vietnam has applied cautious commitment in financial liberalization such as remaining
the limittation of foreign branches, limited capital mobilization in VND, limitted branches
openess of foreign banks, and litmiited real estate mortgage for foreign banks.
5.2.2. Issues
1. Vietnam have to improve legal frame to make good condition for commitment
implementation. Vietnamese law systme has not been comprehensive and fit withinternational law.
2. Vietnam has not have a effective supervision mechanism. In banking system, SBV has
already issued regulations on banking safety such as safe capital rate, debt classification, fundfor risky management. However, the supervission system is backward compared withinternational stardard that could not encourage financial organizations in risky management.
Thus, it is necessary to build up a supervision system following international standard (Baselcapital agreement).
3. Vietnam should be careful when applying liberalization on capital account. Currently,
Vietnam has many similar points as countries that facing financial crisis with high inflation,

22

high nominar interest rate, low foreign currency reserve, chronic account deficit, bad-debt,
high risky rate, weak management skills, inflexible exchange rate.
4. The macroeconomic management ability of Vietnam is still weak, especially in the field ofpolicy predictation. That leads to the negative impact when any unusual factor appear to
economic system.
II. VIETNAM’S MONETARY POLICY IN CURRENT YEARSIn last two decades, one of the most important sectors that significantly contributed toVietnamese economic archievement, especially the participant to WTO as an official member, isthe role of monetary policy. Based on the economic development periods, it is observed that
Vietnam’s government and the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) has successfully selected suiltablemonetary policy which effectively impacts on all economic faces.
1. Vietnam’s monetary policy before global financial crisis 2008
The main objective of monetary policy in any country at any time is to stabilize money’s value,
control inflation rate, and make contribution to the stablization of macro-economics. According
to macro-economic theories, monetary policy creates impact on the economic growth in shortterm, but long term on inflation. Thus, the State’s implement of both “easy monetary policy”
and “tight monetary poilciy” at a same period aims to reach one of two above objectives. “Easey
monetary policy” supports to economic growth in short term. It doesn’t make any impacts on
economic growth in long term, but increases inflation rate. In order to curb inflation when it
raising too fast, the State ‘makes money tight” through a “tight monetary policy”.
In fact, in last 10 years in Vietnam, based on the level it could device inflation into 2 period:
1.1. Low rate inflation period (1999- 2003)
In this period, the economic growth was lower than potential output (lower than the output inwhich economic uses maximum its source). Thus, it leads to the low rate inflation (0,5 – 4% ),1.2. Higher rate inflation period (2004- 2008)
In this period, economic growth is higher than potential output about 1%- 6%, leading to ahigher rate of inflation. In 2007, the inflation rate was 12,6 % that made Vietnamese State
implemented “tight monetary policy” together with following supporting policy instruments:
1.2.1. Setup required reserve ratio for commercial banks.
According to Decision No 187/2008/QĐ-NHNN dated 16 January, 2008 all commercial banks
have to raise bank deposits with reserve requirement and increase 1% for reguired reserve ratio
in compared with current stipulation
This decision has not been applied to financial institutions in rural areas
1.2.2.

Open market operation and Treasury Bill Placement23

On 13 February, 2008 the State Bank promulgated Decision No 346/QĐ- NHNN in which
State Bank’s treasury bill was placed in VND compelled to commercial institutions with total
20.300 billion dong due on 364 days per year, interest rate 7,8%. The treasury bill have been
distributed to 41 commercial banks that hold a capital source,including 4 state-commercial
banks, 28 join stock commercial banks, 7 branches of foreign banks, 2 joint venture banks and 1
petro finance corporation
As the adjustment of required reserve ratio, the open market operation aims to reduce capital
flow, control the growth rate of payment method and debit balance increase, and curb inflation
for a sustainable macroeconomics.
1.2.3. The adjustment of rediscount interest rate and basic interest rate.
The interest rate liberalization process in Vietnam has been implemented through the following
steps:- From June, 1992 to 1995, the interest rate was adjusted in consistence with interest rate
frame mechanism. Accordingly, the State Bank set deposit rate floor and lending rate ceiling for
sectors of the economy. Financial institutions, commercial banks would base on interest rate
frame of the State Bank to set suitable interest rate for themselves. It was this interest ratemechanism that marked an opening for the interest rate liberalization in Vietnam.
- From 1996 to July, 2000, the interest rate ceiling mechanism was applied. Accordingly,
liberalization of mobilized interest rates as well as flexibility of lending interest rate ceiling wereallowed by the State Bank. This mechanism facilitated the economic growth, controlled inflation,and stabilized purchasing power of Vietnam dongs in comparison with other currencies in thearea after the Southeast Asian monetary crisis in 1997 – 1998.
- From August, 2000 to May, 2002, the State Bank applied the management mechanism of
prime interest rate accompanied by rate band. Accordingly, the basic interest rate and rate margin
would be published monthly and the State Bank only made adjustment when necessary. Thismechanism showed determination of the State Bank in changing interest rate policy in directionof liberalization and step by step shortening the gap between domestic and regional andinternational interest rate.
- From June, 2002 to 2006, negotiated interest rate mechanism was applied. In fact, from May,
2001, this mechanism had been carried on by the State Bank for lending in foreign currencies;
but it was until May, 2002 that it came into practice for domestic financial activities. In 2007 andearly 2008, the interest rate continuously jumped.
- On 30 January 2008, the State Bank of Vietnam promulgated Decision No 305/ QĐNHNN on basic interest rate adjustment in VND from 8,25% to 8, 75%, 7.5% for refundinterest rate and 6% for rediscount interest rate.

24However, some commercial banks faced difficulty on liquidity after the implementation ofinterest rate adjustment because they have invested in stock and property loan. Thus, it started astrong competition among commercial banks. Though the State Bank required financial
institutions not to mobilize saving interest rate over 12% per year, the saving interest rate wasabout 13-14% in reality. In order to cope with those problems, the State Bank has issued
Decision No 16/QĐ-NHNN on “mechanism of basic interest rate adjustment”. In thisDecision, the ceiling interest rate at 12% had been officially removed to the rate of market
merchanism. On 10 June 2008, basic interest rate was adjust to increase from 12% to 14% andthe basic interest rate of Lombard credit was required at the ceiling rate of 15%
Thus, basic interest rate is not only a mail instrument of monetary policy but also plays a role inmarket interest rate, as a necessity of market-oriented economy. This led to two urgent issues inthis period was solved by the increase of basic interest rate, including:First, ceiling interest rate of Vietnam’s financial banks reached at 21%
Second, it made good conditions for financial banks to increase saving interest rate, attract moreunused capital, reduce financial burden of State bank’s refund, and contribute to the bankliquidity, tighten mony supply and curb inflation.
However, before long-lasting effects of the global financial and economic crisis, the domestic
economy kept strong decline. During this time, the State Bank implemented cautious currency
relaxation policy by continuously reducing basic interest rate in six remaining months of 2008. In
details, in the last three months of 2008 (from October, 2008 to December, 2008), after fourcontinuous deductions, the basic interest rate fell from 14% to 8.5% per annum, refinancing
interest rate from 15% to 9.5% per annum and discount rate from 13% to 7.5% per annum.
The flexibility of interest rate management of the State Bank supported financial institutions todecrease lending interest rate, encouraging production and export, stabilizing micro-economicand ensuring safety of banking system.
Some main landmarks of monetary policy implemented by the State Bank-

Since 01 June 2007, the State Bank has doubled required reserve ratio from 5% to 10% for
VND deposit under 12 months and from 2% to 4% for deposit from 12 to 24 months.

-

In the first 6 months of 2007, the State Bank withdrawed from capital flow 90,000 billion, incompared with about 150,000 billion dong spending on buying USD.

-

On 29 May, 2007 the State Bank issued direction No 03/2007/CT-NHNN about debit
balance ratio and stock mortgage control that not exceeding 3% of total debit balance.

-

On 30 January 2008, The State Bank announced interest rate adjustment in which basic
interest rate increased from 8, 25 to 8, 75% per year, lending interest rate increased from 6, 5
to 7, 5% per year, rediscount interest rate increased from 4, 5 to 6,0%/ per year.

25

-On 30 January 2008, the State Bank filled up pumping more than 12,000 billion dong tosatisfy banks’ liquidity-

On 31 January 2008, the State Bank announced to add 15,000 billion dong to the market.

-

On 31 February 2008, the State Bank announced to issued compulsory treasury bills on 17
March for 41 commercial bank with the total value of 20,300 billion dong, due date 364 days
and interest rate: 7,80% per year.

-

On 19 and 20 February 2008, the State Bank provided 23,000 billion to open market-

On 21 February 2008, the State Bank added more 10,000 billion to open market-

On 27 February 2008, the State Bank applied ceiling interest rate at 12% per year for capital
mobilization of commercial banks-

ON 16 May 2008, the State Bank issued Decision No16/QĐ-NHNN on mechanism ofbasic interest rate operation in VND, in which ceiling interest at the rate of 12% wasremoved-On 10 June 2008, the State Bank issued Decision No1317/QĐ-NHNN increasing basic
interest rate 2%, from 12% to 14%

1.2.4. Flexible exchange rate policy
In last decades, the exchange rate of VND cemented with a strong foreign currency that was
USD. This strong attachment with one foreign currency led to contrary impact on national
economic development at different periods. When US’s economy developed, the exchange rateincreased making none impact on the export price of Vietnam’s products. However, when there
was a crisis in US’ economy, the exchange rate between VND with a losing value foreign
currency created bad influence to export activities. It is remarkable that more than 70% export
value of Vietnam’s products were paid by USD.
However, in recent years, Vietnamese Government has applied a more flexible exchange rate,
upon that there is an adjustment of exchange rate between VND and USD (and other foreign
currencies) based on market’s demand-supply relation. Simultaneously, the government has
enlarged deal of foreign currency in financial institutions from 0.75% to ±2% in compared withaverage transaction’s exchange rate of interbanks.
Together with monetary policy instruments, the Governement simultaneously implemented tightfiscal policy (controlling public investment and overspending) and other domestic market
management instruments.

The weakness points of monetary policy*/ The Decisions of government were not consistent. For example, based on some above
landmarks of monetary policy, it can be seen that:26

- In February the State Bank withdrawed 20,300 billion dong from capital flow throughcompulsory treasury bills, but then the State Bank provided about 40,000 billion dong tocommercial banks for payment liquidity and stock and real estate invesmnt.
- In May 2007, because of the increase on stoct market and stock debit balance, the State Bank
issued Direction No03/2007/CT-NHNN to curb debit balance and keep stock debit balance at
the rate of 3%. However, commercial banks raised credit leading to the increase of capital flow.
This made unstable in monetary market and puzzled by commercial banks and enterprises.
*/ There was a lack of initiative from policy makers and market participants. Most of policies
have been based on market approach without scientific forecast basis, leading to unactive
measures. Monetary policy has been changed frequently making disorder in financial market andmacroeconomic environment.
2.

New points of monetary policy in global financial crisis 2008

Though there was an ominous sign of financial crisis in summer 2007 with a sudden increase ofoil, food and basis materials price (the price of crude oil was 147 USD per gallon, steel: 830USD
per ton, 1,000USD per ton, the price of real property in US reduced, ect), until 15 September
2008 the financial crisis official known in US with the bankrupt of Lehman Brothers Bank of
Investment and AIG Insurance Company, Washington Mutual Inc Bank and quickly spreaded
out EU’s financial market and other areas. In order to prevent financial market from collapse
and economic recession, the State banks of developed countries such as US, Germany, France,
England, Japan and other developing countries have already applied many method to increasefinancial liquidity and extend credit for a effective support to financial banks and institutitons.
The easy monetary policy have been applied by reducing interest rate, providing more money tocapital flow at many countries, in which Vietnam is not a exeption.
Firstly, it have been clearly seen that the global financial crisis has made a negative impact on
the economic growth of Vietnam (below figure).
Figure 1.3: Quarter economic growth in 2008-2009
8,00
7,43
7,00

6,5
5,82

6,00

5,5

5,00
4,42
4,00
3,10
3,00

2,00

1,00

0,00
Quý I

Quý IIQuý IIIQuý IVNăm 2008

Quý I

Quý 2
Năm 2009(Sourse: General Statistics Office)27

In the graph, Vietnam’s economic growth slowed down in 02 consecutive quarters of 2009. The
growth rate increased to 5.5% for the 4th quarter of 2008, 3.1% for the first quarter 2009, and4.42% for the second quarter 2009. The economic growth rate in 2nd quarter 2009 was higher
than the first’s, but it was still lower than the rate of 4th quarter 2008.
In macroeconomic environment, inflation was in a low rate but there was a trend of highinflation because of impact from economic stimulus policies; budget deficit increased caused byoil prices and reduced export price. The export turn-over decreased 13.4% in the first 7 monthsof 2009 and there was a decrease in FDI, ODA disbursement, and low overseas national
currency exchange in compared with 2008.
- The deposit in foreign banks had been to withdrawed before due date leading to the reductionof benefits; there was a decrease in capital mobilization from oversea; the cost of borrow services
and bad debt also increased in compared with 2008.
Facing with those difficulties of economy, monetary policy has followed economic stimulus
strategy of the Government.
1/ Since October 2008 the State Bank has prudently changed from “tight monetary policy” to a“easy monetary policy” in which: (1) There was an adjustment on decisive interest rate (basic
interest rate reduced from 13% per year down to 7% per year, refund interest rate reduced from
14% per year down to 7% per year, rediscount interest rate reduced from 12% per year down to
5% per year; the required reserve ratio in VND reduced from 11% down to 3%; flexible open
market operation and foreign currency exchange to support to commercial bank’s liquidity;
adjust interest rate for required reserve from 10% per year down to 1,2% per year; (2) Flexible
operation on USD/VND exchange rate by increasing exchange rate between VND and USDfrom +3% to +5% for all transaction of commercial banks. The result showed that there was asuiltable increase in total payment methods and credit (in 2008, total payment methods increased
20%, credit increased 23,58%; in the first 7 months of 2009, those number were 20,22% and22,61%); the market interest rate became stable, VND/USD exchange rate increased 2,12%, thefinancial system run savely and smoothly (below graph)
Figure 1.4: Exchange rate VND/USD in period 2007-2009( Source : The State Bank of Vietnam)

28

Figure 1.5: Capital mobilization’s interest rate, loan interest and inflation period 20082009( Source: the State Bank of Vietnam )2/. The implementation of interest rate support mechanism at 4% per year
In the first months of 2009, the State Bank, Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Government’s
Office and other relevant Ministries has cooperated to conduct interest rate support mechanism
following the Prime Minister’s requirement. The support method is: when financial banks,financial institutions, social policy banks, Vietnam Development Bank, and local Investment andDevelopment Funds collect interests from customers, they deduct their interest from customers
and receive the compensation from the State Bank through their report. At the end of July 2009,
total debit balance of interest rate support for customers reached the number of 403,448 billion
dong.
Through the analysis of economic stimulus package of other countries, Vietnam’s economic
policy in last decades, and the result of interest rate support mechanism, it is observed that theuse of 17,000 billion dong for this support mechanism is a suiltable policy for Vietnam’s
economic condition.
(*) Source: Harvard Report-State of the Nation,s Housing 2008 Repor(**) Source: “Japan,s lessons for a world of balance-sheet deflation” ; Financial Times

29

CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND MONETARY POLICY OF JAPANI. JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
1. General evaluation
Up to now, there is no sufficient basic to ensure that the Japanese financial system is thestrongest, most perfect among countries which have developed economies in the world.
However, despite of many economic and financial hazards in 1990s, Japan has strived to reachthe 2nd position, only after the United States, in term of GDP. Before the Second World War,Japan was known as a poor country in natural resources but often suffered calamity such as
earthquakes. After the War, however, its look was entirely changed. All the world had to look up
to Japan – a country that lost the battle took revenge by economic miracles. Japan owns brandsof high quality products such as Toshiba, Sony, Toyota that became symbol of Japan as well as
pride of dedicated employees who devote themselves for nowadays Japan. Besides, it can’t beignored the significant role of Japanese financial and banking system and monetary policy that
contributed much on the miraculous economic development of Japan.
In 1980s, the Japanese financial system was widely accepted as an example by both developed
countries and emerging economies. It was the financial system support that Japanese companies
were partly strengthened in the international market. Japan owned the highest savings rate in theworld, which were invested effectively by Japanese companies. Bank system was always
confident that capitals supplied by banks would be usually invested effectively in the long termby the strict inspection of at least one main bank. In case of an enterprise faced any contingency,
the main bank would seriously inspect and support enough capital for the enterprise to recoverfrom the difficult time until liquidation was thought to be necessary.
In addition, with the support, management and strict control of Bank of Japan as well as theappropriate monetary policies in each development stage of the country’s economy, the Japanesefinancial system has generated more sustainable growth, facilitating both the economy tomaintain the position as one of the three leading economies (the United States, EU, Japan) in theworld and the general development of the international financial system. Monetarymeasurements and policies that Japan implemented in the most harsh period, especially when the
country had to face the long-lasting deflation, high non-performing loan rate and financial crisis
in 1990s, and most recently, the challenges and impacts of the global financial crisis in 2008, havebecome valuable experiences that should be learnt by other countries.

30

2. Characteristics of Japanese financial system

2.1. Households’ Invested Assets promoted the Japanese financial system
After the United States experienced burst of “bubble economy” in the late 1980s, private
businesses promoted structural reforms including advancement of new business lines. After that,in 1990s, the United States generated the outstanding growth rate based on the active
performance of capital market as a key support. Similar to Japan in 1995, in early 1990s, U.S.
authorities maintained a very low interest rate policy, thus, real savings interest rate decreased toabout zero to boost economic growth and profits for financial institutions.
Table 2.1: Changes in Households' Asset Allocation in the U.S and Japan(1) The U.S.

($billion)

Investment Trusts
MMF
Pensions and Insurance
Credit Market
Time and Saving Deposits
Corporate Equities
OthersTotal

1985-90

1991-96

390
176
1358
811
646
-554
281
3108

940
162
1688
458
80
-677
473
3124

(2) Japan(¥trillion)

Public Sector
Postal Savings
Postal Life Insurance
Public Pensions, etc.
Subtotal
Private Sector
Cash and Deposits
Insurance
Pensions
Securities
Subtotal
Total

1990 – 94

1995 - 99

67
39
45
151

60
32
34
126

88
40
31
-26
135
286

85
14
35
7
140
266

( Source: Okumura, 2001)
Data in table 2.1 shows the main movement of financial assets from household sector to mutual
funds (similar to "investment trust") in the United States. However, there was not such
movement of financial assets in Japan. Instead, data in Japan shows more than 50% of 552
billion of additional household financial assets accumulated in 10 years was moved to publicfinance sector (postal savings, postal life insurance…). Although the postal savings or otherassets of public finance sector were in effect risk-free, their interest rates were relatively equal31with private banks’ rates. However, in Japan, despite the low interest rate, individual investment
funds were definitely kept in postal savings deposits because high-yield, risk-free financial
products were guaranteed by the postal savings system in years. It was also the reason why inmany years afterwards, this system has become the significant savings instrument for manyfamilies. It can be said that it was the households’ invested assets that promoted the Japanesefinancial system growth and formed reliable mainstay for Japanese enterprises. This conclusion isbased on the following points:- Firstly, in consideration of the composition of the financial assets held by the household
sectors in Japan, the US and Germany, it can be seen that the Japanese households owned highrate of savings and deposits, half of which were deposited at banks. In Germany, this rate wassimilarly high but significantly decreased in 1990s. In Japan, however, this rate continued to
grow.
- Secondly, in Japan, capital-safe financial instruments were dominant. Beside savings earnings,
especially since fixed-earnings products were considered as the core of insurance policy andpension plan, more than 80% of household assets were defined as capital-safe financial
instruments. It means that Japanese household sector met nearly no financial risk. Meanwhile, in
the United States, not only the low interest rate savings and deposits, but also insurance policy
and pension plan were defined as nonprofit-making or capital-unsafe financial instruments. In
the United States, households bears high financial risk while in Japan, it was financial institutions,instead of households, who took that risk.

2.2.

The close relationship between banks and enterprises and the enterprise capital supporting
responsibilities formed Main Bank System

Japan bank system experienced 3 panics in 1920s, in specific, in 1920, 1923 and most seriously in
1927. To solve the situation, the government issued new bank code, which officially came into
effect in January, 1928. The Department of Finance took the responsibility to enforce the newlaw and since the early enforcement, it had great impacts on every system activity. In order to cut
a large bank quantity, one principle was born, which was “one bank in one prefecture”.
Accordingly, banks were granted self-governance in a certain area. The bank quantity cut process
gained results thanks to the support of consolidated public fund. In the situation, thegovernment had to directly participate in the financial system before starting the war against
China and the United States.
In 1930s, the financial market, especially the share issue, played an important role in the fundingof industry. In the period 1931-40, shares provided 31.7% of funds, bonds 4.3%, loans fromprivate financial institutions 27.3% and retained earnings 37%. After the war, market share ofshares reduced about 5 to 10% while market share of financial institutions and their retained
profits increased remarkably. And the “Main Bank” system was established in the beginning ofwartime control from 1937 to 1941. During this period, the Temporary Law of Fund

32

Adjustment of 1937 allowed further government intervention, including their ability to require allenterprises above a certain size to increase their equity base or merge.
However, some large banks of the Zaibasu group responded against the government control
because they didn’t want to centralize capitals to munitions companies. The government moved
to counter this resistance and gradually applied system of central control of financial resources,in which, Bank of Japan played a central role. This process came to top when the munitions
companies designated financial institutions system in January 1994. As the system’s regulations,each defense company was allowed to nominate one main bank who then took responsibility forthe financial demand of the company. Since then, the relationship that was born in the war time
has developed into postwar “main bank" system.
From the above analysis, the basic characteristic of main bank system is the long-lasting
relationship between banks and enterprises and the main bank relationship ensures the bank acts
a delegated monitor and helps to overcome the agency problem between managers and the firm.
Beside capital allocation through the Reconstruction Financing Bank (RFB) and The Japan
Development Bank (JDB), the Government intervened in the financial system by holding
interest rate at low levels between 1950s and 1960s. This brought back a serious of great impacts,
one of which was the provision of rents to banks. These rents helped facilitate the solvency ofbanks and stabilize the financial system.
3. Japanese financial market
One easy-to-see point is in the Japanese financial system, banks gained the better advantage. Itmeans that the stock market was at the weaker position in the comparison. Fact shows that,
however, the strong economic growth of the United States in 1990s was generated by theefficient support of NASDAQ and other securities markets supported by IT companies.
Therefore, it is necessary to boost stock market’s capacity in the financial system, especially insuch a changeable period as now.
After deregulation corresponding to the financial Big Bang, Japan actively supported the stock
market to perform better, which resulted in the competitiveness at the same level as the U.S andEU markets.

33

Table 2.2: Major Financial Markets in Japan and Their Size

Balance (Market Capitalization)
Bond
Long-Term
Financial Markets

MarketStockMarketInterbankMarketStraight Corporate Bonds

624,434

Straight Government Bonds

5,488,230

TSE (all companies listed)

3,630,393

JASDAQ

113,922

Call

186,529Bill

297,900

Public and Corporate
Repurchase Market
Short-Term
Financial Markets

Open
Market(JPY
hundredmillions)

Bonds

in

178,806

Public and Corporate Bonds Loan
575,097
MarketCD

302,333

CP

155,753

TB/FB

1,267,672

Tokyo Offshore

398,461( Source: Yamori, 2005)
Similar to any financial market, the Japanese stock market was also divided into component
markets: short-term monetary market and middle and long-term capital market.
-

Short-term monetary market is the market in which trading capital’s term is usually one yearor shorter. This market, in general, is classified into inter-bank market, which are limited tobanks and other financial institutions and the open market where non- financial companies
can participate. The inter-bank market is the market, in which financial institutions manage
their temporary financial losses or profits. This market holds the most important role incredit checking for Bank of Japan.

-

Long-term financial market is the market in which, trading capital’s term is one year andmore and usually classified into the bond or stock market and other markets, such as thebond futures markets. Among traditional stock markets, the Tokyo Exchange Section I
maintains the dominant share.

34

4. Japanese bank and financial institution system
4.1. Organizational structure
The Japanese bank and financial institution system was divided into 2 classes as in figure 2.1.
This figure shows that, the central bank – Bank of Japan – was the bank of banks, took
responsibility for planning the monetary policies and managing the whole system. Next was thesystem of financial intermediaries and other financial institutions. In the commercial banksystem, city banks were the largest making up 20% of the total savings of all financial institutionsin the whole country (S.Eijffinger, A.van Rixtel 1991). These banks provided a large amount ofshort-term capital for domestic enterprises and were ranked into top 25 biggest banks in theworld.

Figure 2.1: A classification of Japanese financial institution

35

.FIGURE 2.1: A classification of Japanese financial institution

Number of
Institutions

Amounts ofdeposits(Vbillion)

1-

City banks
Regional banks
Foreignl banks

13
64
82

172,817
120,522
1,463

Long-term credit banks
Trust banks

3
7

44,085’’
10,485

Sogo banks
Zenshinren bank
Shinkin banks
National Federation of Credit
Co-operatives
Credit co-operatives

68
1
455
1

47,732’’
9,533
65,574’’
2,635

419

16,287’’

Norinchukin Bank
Agricultural co-operatives

1
3,979

25,948’’47,275

Life insurance companies
Non-life insurance companies

24
23

-

Securities companies

210-

Postal Savings System

1

123,938

The Bank of Japane

Central Bank

Commercial banks
Depository
Institutions
Long-term financial
institutions
PrivateFinancial
Intermadiaries

Financial institutions
for small businessPrivateFinancial
Institutions
Financial institutions
for agriculture.
Forestry and fisheryNon-depository
Institutions

Insurance companies

Other Financial
Institutions
PublicFinancial
Institutions

Deposits + bank debentures issued
Deposits + installments
Deposits + savings36After the burst of the Japanese bubble economy, a series of banks and financial institutions
failed. From August 1995 with the collapse of Hyogo bank to March 2002, other 16 banks went
to bankrupt. To reorganize the collapsed banks, a large amount of money, up to 17,9 billion yen,were called, in which, about 10 billion yen came from the Government fund because the savings
insurance funds’ amount remained too low and not enough to cover.
For banks not going bankrupt, the reorganization still continued to be implemented. However,this process took place crucially in city bank sector because they played central role in theJapanese bank system. Typical examples were city banks in big cities such as Tokyo, Osaka andtheir branches in all over the country, all of which had close business relationships with large
enterprises. If in March 1990, the number of city banks were 13, then by March 2003, they
combined into 5 large groups. Four of that (Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Mizuho
Financial Group, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group and UFJ Holdings) were called 4 megabanks
because they held a system of companies and many bank branches.
Table 2.3: Banking Groups and Consolidated Assets(Billions of yen)
Consolidated
AssetsMarch 2003

New Groups

Major Subsidiary Banks

Former Banks

1. Mizuho Financial Group(MHFG)(Established in January 2003)

Mizuho Bank, Mizuho
Corporate Bank, Mizuho
Trust & Banking

Industrial Bank of Japan,
Daiichi Kangyo, Fuji,
Yasuda Trust Banks

134,033

2. Sumitomo Mitsui Financial
Group (SMFG)(Established in December
2002)

Sumitomo Mitsui
Banking Corporation(SMBC)

Sumitomo Bank, SakuraBank102,395

3.Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial
Group (MTFG)(Established in April 2001)

Banking of TokyoMitsubishi (BTM),
Mitsubishi Trust &Banking Corporation

Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi(BTM), Mitsubishi Trust
Bank, Nippon Trust Bank

96,532

4. UFJ Holdings(Established in April 2001)

UFJ Bank, UFJ TrustBank

Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank,
Toyo Trust & Banking

80,207

5. Resona Holdings(Established in December
2001)

Resona, Saitama Resona,
Kinki Osaka, Nara Banks,
Resona Trust & Banking

Asahi Bank, Daiwa Bank

42,892( Source: PRI- Japan’ banking system: from the Bubble and Crisis to Reconstruction)

37

For weaker local financial institutions in the bank reorganization process, they began cooperatewith each other.
Table 2.4: Number Changes of Private-Sector Financial Institutions by Business Type
3/19803/19903/20001/2005City Banks

13

13

9

7

Regional Banks

63

64

64

64

Second Regional Banks

71

68

54

48

Credit Associations

462

454

386

301

Credit Cooperatives

483

414

291

179

Source: Inoue (2003) and materials on Nikkins' website
This table shows the change in the financial institution quantity, including major banks, in theJapanese private sector at this time. Data from table 4 indicate that in 10 years, from 1980 to
1990, the number of credit co-operatives fell remarkably, in which, the number of other financial
institutions remained unchanged. In 10 years afterwards, from 1990 to 2000, however, the majordecline in quantity lied on city banks (from 13 to 9), making up 31%; credit co-operatives
reduced from 12 to 3 or 30% and Shinkin banks 15% although the deduction rate was not high.
In contrast, the number of local banks remained unchanged. In 5 years, from March 2000 to
January 2005, financial institutions continued to fall in quantity; city banks was only a half of theinitial quantity (from 13 to 7). The outstanding point here is that in 5 years, from 2000 to 2005,
the number of Shinkin banks and credit co-operatives fell significantly, 85 and 112 inrespectively.
4.2. Non- performing Loans
Non-performing loans are the loans by cash and valuable securities that their interest andprincipal are not paid as commitment. Similar to many other countries, it was the problem that
the Japanese bank system had to face in period of 1992-2004.
In fact, Japanese banks usually took land as collateral or mortgage when dealing with loans, but
because land price fell strongly, banks couldn’t recover lending amount by selling land.

38

Figure 2.2: Non-performing Loans and Write-off Costs by Japanese Banks( Source: Yamori, 2005)
Data from the figure state the total amount of non-performing loans and their settlement costs.
The total loss value jumped up to 15 billion yen in the highest. Fortunately, since 2002, becauseof the government’s financial system recovery programs which promoted main banks to actively
deal with non-performing loans, and the positive progress in the economic environment andstock price, bad debit balance decreased significantly.

39

Table 2.5: Outstanding Stock and Disposals of Non-Performing Loans(End of Fiscal Year)
Non-performing Loans:
Outstanding Stock
Loan Loss Provision:
Outstanding StockNPL Disposals
New Net LLP
Direct Write-offs
Other
Operating Profits
Total Loans:
Outstanding Stock
NPL/Total Loan (%)
Capital Adequacy Ratio(%)

FY1992-(12,774)-(3,698)-(1,640)-(945)-(424)-(271)
4,685
474,783

FY1993-(13,576)-(4,547)-(3,872)-(1,146)-(2,090)-(636)
4,439
477,150

FY1994-(12,546)-(5,536)-(5,232)-(1,402)-(2,809)-(1,022)4,484
477,801

FY199528,504(21,868)
13,293(10,345)
13,369(11,067)
7,087(5,576)
5,980(5,490)
302
(1)
6,753
482,701

FY1996
21,789(16,491)
12,334(9,388)
7,763(6,210)3,447(2,534)
4,316(3,676)0(0)
6,418
482,312FY199729,758(21,978)
17,815(13,601)
13,258(10,819)
8,403(6,552)
3,993(3,501)
863
(766)
5,503
477,979

FY199829,627(20,250)
14,797(9,258)
13,631(10,440)
8,118(15,490)
4,709(4,268)
804
(683)
3,129
472,610

FY199930,366(19,772
12,230(7,678)6,944(5,398)2,531(1,339)3,864(3,609)
548
(449)
4,675
463,484

FY200032,515(19,281)
11,555(6,939)6,108(4,290)2,732(1,371)
3,072(2,650)
304
(269)
4,768
456,965

---

---

---

5.91
--

4.52
--

6.23
--

6.27
10.06

6.55
10.88

7.12
10.75

(Unit: Billion yen)
FY2001 FY2002
42,02834,849(27,626) (20,433)
13,353
12,585(8,657)(7,897)
9,722
6,658(7,721)(5,104)
5,196
3,101(3,806)(2,042)
3,974
3,520(3,414)(3,038)
552
37
(501)
(25)
4,693
4,674
440,610 423,286
9.54
10.12

8.23
9.52

Note: (1) Data in the table are figures for the Banking Accounts of All Domestically Licensed Banks (i.e., city banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, andregional banks) while data in parentheses are those for city banks, long-term credit banks and trust banks. Data for operating profits and capital adequacy
ratios also include foreign trust banks.
(2) Non-performing loans in this table refer to “risk management loans” (losses＋loans more than 3 months overdue＋loans with term restructured), exceptthat the definitions prior to FY1997 are slightly different: they are losses + overdue loans for FY1992-94 and losses＋loans more than 6 months
overdue＋loans with interest reduced for FY1995-96.
(3) The capital adequacy ratio is the ratio of capital to risk assets.
( Source： Financial Services Agency; Bank of Japan.)40However, compared with 1990, the non-performing loans still remained high and how to settle
non-performing loans rested on the economic growth or decline rate. If the economy returned
to decline again, non-performing loans would continue to increase. Therefore, it was too soon to
say that the non-performing loan problem had been settled at this time.
4.3. Business profits of Japanese banks
In discussion of operational efficiency of commercial bank system, many people agree that low
profit in the business of Japanese banks was the concerned problem. This issue can be explainedon the following basics:- The change in relationship between main banks and enterprises
As analyzed above, the main bank system’s preeminence lies in the stable long-term relationshipbetween banks and companies. Through this relationship, the main banks usually provided
customers with consultancy and basic, essential and reliable information. In many cases, theseprovided information can save or help customer reorganize its activity. Moreover, when any
crisis signal occurs, the main banks would actively implement methods to prevent bankruptcy as
representative of creditors. For companies, it was regarded as insurance.
However, later on, the dependence of companies (mainly of capital demand) on banks
increasingly reduced and the soundness of banks becomes faded. All of these reasons resulted inchanges in relationship between main banks and companies. An example of this change was thefast and brief dissolution of cross stockholdings which previously were considered as symbol ofmain bank relationship. The lower dependence of enterprises on banks, as analyzed above,
meant the bank’s lower business profits.
- The government’s protection through low interest rate policy
In bank business, the major profit that every bank pays special attention to comes from theefficiency of credit business, especially the difference between lending and deposit rate.
However, this difference was so small in Bank of Japan (less than 2%), while it is 4% in the
United States. Besides, in comparison of bank profits in term of both ROE and ROA between
the United States and Japan, the profit of Japan’s banks is much lower than that of the UnitedStates.

41

Table 2.6: Profitability of Japanese Banking Sector

Note: Financial Statement of All Commercial Banks
Other revenue (B) includes all the other profit such as dealing profits and fees but excludes realized capital gains of stocks and real estates.
Realized capital gains include gains of stocks and real estates.
( Source: Japan Center for Economic Research )42

Figure 2.3: Banks’ ROE and ROA: US and Japan( Source: IMES Discussion paper series )In general, Japanese banks accepted a low-margin, high-volume strategy. In post-war period, theJapanese financial system developed upon the basic of indirect finance. This system was
improved and strengthened by low interest rate policy applying for not only lending but also
deposit rate. Moreover, this system got protective bank supervision under the auspices ofConvoy System. The government would guarantee the stability so that banks could gain fixedmarginal profit although it was at low rate. In the period of 1980s, the competition among banks

43

in attracting deposits was considered based on a so reasonable reserve rate that banks could meetcapital requirements and ensure the marginal profit by interest rate regulation.
However, the stability of bank’s profits as stated above and the bank management reduced
gradually under the impact of interest rate liberalization, the strong competition in the capital
market and the fall of promising loan applications due to the fact that the economy became
increasingly cautious. So, from this moment, Japanese banks couldn’t ensure enough profits tocope with borrower's credit risks and profit standards regulated for international banks.
Therefore, one fact was that banks can’t raise profits unless they raise capital, and of course, thecredit loans. On the other hand, the banks must strongly cut costs, increase lending margins andthen non-interest income by extending bank investment transactions. Banks mustn’t passively
wait for the companies because the companies have to make repayment beside borrowing,causing lower profits.
So, banks and financial institutions should think about a new business method. They should
actively boost ability to create capital for local customers, flexibly utilize information generated inmany years to consult and strengthen the relationships with customers. There is no other choice
if they want to survive and grow sustainably.
5. Reforms of the Japanese financial system
5.1. Actual situation
During 1980s, thanks to long-lasting residual current balance of payment, benefits gained fromyen appreciation boosted Japanese banking system to position that was on equal term with banks
of international standards of the United States and England. In term of total bank assets of theworld, Japanese banks made up 35%, more than double compared with American banks (insecond position with 15.8%), and four times with French banks (in third position with 8.3%) . It
was the appearance of Japan before 1990s, when the financial and banking system wasconsidered to be in the most prosperous period.
However, from 1991, Japan began falling into economic depressions. Along with the collapse of“bubble” economy, share and land price falling resulted in bankruptcy of series of companies
and marked an opening for the longest depression period in Japanese history from the Second
World War. In the unavoidable “misfortune”, it was the Japanese financial system that borne
most severe consequences.
5.2. Depression causes of the Japanese financial market
The first was the inefficient performance of stock market that manifested clearly in rapid
decline of share, stock and foreign currency trading. In the most prosperous period of theeconomy, the trading quantity of Tokyo Stock Exchange was 3 billion of shares per day but in1994 and 1995, it fell to 200 – 300 million shares or 10% of the estimated quantity1. Moreover,1

http//www.mof.go.jp/big-bang/bb32.h

44

trading fee of Tokyo Stock Exchange was very expensive, conditions for stock market entrance
was strict. Therefore, many domestic investors and monetary organizations didn’t find Japanesemarket interested anymore and then turned into other Asian country’s markets. If the number offoreign companies, in this period, entering into New York market was 290, London 533, Paris
187, it was only 67 in Tokyo market2.
The second was the mass collapses of financial institutions. The fact that the “bubble”
economy came to burst pushed Japanese economy into serious recession. Series of banks andfinancial institutions fell down; the most outstanding example were Kobe Bank with loan payableof 8 billion US dollars and the largest bank in the world – Sumitomo bank – with declaration of
3 billion US dollar loss in early 19953. This fact made both domestic and foreign investors lose
confidence in the Japanese financial market.
Besides, in mention of main reason why the Japanese banking system was so weak, it can’t beignored the Japanese financial institution’s habit of dependence on the State. In
comparison with other European and American colleges, Japanese financial institutions were
weaker in term of business competence and experiences, so when Japan was forced to liberalize
financial sector under pressure of Western countries, the Japanese financial system encounteredmany great risks and mistakes.

Non-performing loans and overdue debts were also problems that caused crisis of Japanesefinancial and banking system. In early 1980s, being affected by the United State’s dollar
devaluation for the purpose of improving trade deficit, yen was strongly appreciated; andespecially after the disturbance of the United State’s stock market in October, 1987, yen
immediately jumped. Small manufacturers of Japan, who met many difficulties in production
investment, turned to acquire short-term loan from banks to invest into shares and real estate,while the larger ones borrowed from banks to invest abroad. In this context, price of real estateand shares jumped significantly, real estate was used as collateral for new loans while Japanesebanks and financial funds lost ability of risk evaluation and management for new lending.
The weakness of management skills and accounting profession of Japanese banking system, as
stated above, was also rooted from so long protection of the State for this sector. In a long time,
the Japanese financial system used a different accounting mode without external control.
Meanwhile, banks tried to hide its poor performance by announcing debt at relative low ratecompared with the real rate published by Financial Services Act after its investigation.
5.3. The need for reform
It can be seen that for Japanese bank and financial system, there have been so many strict
regulations issued, implemented and seriously controlled. An example is the basic price typerating within the financial system, including bank deposit interest rate, commission for stock2
3

Nihon no kiuyukaikaku ni tsuite
Study on Japan – No. 6/1999, page 3

45

trading transactions, insurance fee, or requirements for establishment of bank, insurancecompany, new stock company.
In fact, these regulations curbed the competition among financial institutions, although theirimpacts on preventing financial institutions from failure or bankruptcy had been confirmed. In
1980s and early 1990s, the overregulation’ influences became so clear and under both domestic
and abroad pressures, the regulations on finance began to be abrogated but slowly. Besides, there
still existed some outstanding problems in the Japanese financial system that need settled. Theirdetails were as follow:- Financial and capital markets were hollowing out. Financial activities were shifted from homecountry to overseas due to some loose regulations or others; Japan’s derivative businessdeveloped very well at the abroad market while a large number of foreign companies whowanted to list on the Tokyo stock exchange were not allowed to do so…
- In the domestic financial market, the strain of bank’s non-performing loans became
increasingly clear and many financial institutions went to bankrupt.
- For many years, Japanese banks had been placed under the Convoy System, which began toshow many shortcomings under the reform pressure. The regulatory and supervisory authorities
were forced to be aware of the need of change from bank direct regulation and supervision
based on internal information to management and supervision mechanism based on market
principles corresponding to the current international trends.
- The country got older very fast, so financial guarantee for citizens when they retired was
required.
In the bleak situation of the economy in general and the financial system in specific as analyzed
above, the Japanese government saw that the step-by-step financial deregulation couldn’t solve
problems briefly and absolutely. Instead, it required the strong changes which have wide anddeep influences on the face of the whole country. And by November, 1996, the Japanesefinancial Big Bang initiated by Prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was issued.
5.4.

The main reform programs

5.4.1. The Japanese financial Big Bang
Before the unsatisfactory situation of the economy in general and the financial system in specific,
the Japanese government saw that step by step financial regulation removal couldn’t solve
problem promptly, thoroughly; instead, absolute changes with wide and deep impacts on total
appearance of the country were required. By November, 1996, the Japanese financial Big Banginitiated by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was issued. In financial sector, the Japanesefinancial Big Bang was, in nature, based on reforms implemented in the United Kingdom’s Stock
Exchange. The Japanese Prime Minister wanted to set out the “Japanese version” of thesereforms. Its main goal was to build a new, dynamic and global financial system of freedom,
equality, flexibility, and transparency that facilitated foreign financial organizations available in46

Japanese market to accept competition in “economic freedom” principle, and more importantly,
to help Japanese financial market compete with other markets of New York, London. To archive
this goal within 3 years, the Japanese financial Big Bang focused on implementing the 8following basic issues:
1. Floating entirely price and financial services
2. Opening foreign exchange market
3. Removing boundary among three industries including banking, insurance and stock
trading, as well as allowing banks, stock and insurance companies to penetrate into eachother’s field
4. Allowing capital flows to circulate freely in both domestic and overseas markets
5. Enforcing financial institutions to publish exact statistics of their business6. Step by step decreasing and then eliminating all kinds of tax that restrict real estate sales
and transfer
7. Boosting independence of the central bank
8. Abolishing discrimination against foreign players in the financial and monetary market.
5.4.2. The Postal Saving System Reform (2007)
As analyzed in previous chapter, one of the most important traits of Japanese financial system is
to be laid foundation on Postal Savings System.
Japanese Postal Saving System (PSS) is the largest financial organization in the world. In 2001,
there was about 2,4 thousands billion US dollar in cash and 250 thousand billion Yen as depositin this system. Japan has 24,000 post office, and each has a bank inside. PSS was established in
1875 based on the model of England created in 1861. In 19th century, it was hard for people
from rural areas to go to banks and banks also did not have modern system to protect money.
To solve this problem, the Government stared setting up bank equivalents in post offices. Since
then, PSS provided a series of services for people such as pension payment, insurance selling,and state bond selling. PSS has become an important saving system for many households. 85%
households have postal saving account. PSS plays a role as a financial organization that provides
saving services to people and contributes into personal accumulation through hard working todeal with any risk might be happen in their normal life.
Besides, the Government can invest in public project and provide capital to enterprises withpurpose of economic development by using money from PSS. It is asserted that the Households’
Invested Assets significantly contributed to the strength of Japanese financial system andeconomic development.
Although the benefit from PSS is significant, economic experts analyse that if PSS is privatized, it
will attract more capital than household’s saving. In addition, the Japanese population is getting47

older, and then it is necessary to improve social welfare by setting up a completed saving system
based on personal responsibility.
Thus, the privatization plan for PSS raised by President Koizumi was approved by Senate in
October 2005 that will be remaining in 10 years, from 2007. Based on this plan, Japanese Posting
Corporation has been divided into 3 companies and 1 bank named Yucho with large amount of
capital. Those 3 companies include 1 post Mail Company, 1 postal service company, and 1
insurance company. Together with Yucho, insurance company prepares for stock quotes in 2011.
Recently, Japanese Postal Corporation is the biggest employee in Japan with 400,000 staffs
working at 24,700 post offices.
However, it is early to make conclusion about result, effect, and benefit of this reform. The
reform has clearly showed Government’s policy viewpoint, leading by President Koizumi, on arenovation for postal sector in which PSS can bring significant effect to society.
Result of financial market reform really marked an opening for the unprecedented competition
among domestic and foreign companies in a field that had been for a long time strictly controlled
by the government; series of challenges for Japanese banking and financial system; and themutual elimination between Japanese and Western, especially American banks.

Successes of the reform
Firstly, the Japanese banking system was in process of restoring its position after many years
shrinking. Many large banks began declaring profits after a long time of loss. The pioneer of thisprocess was the largest trust bank in Japan - Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Group – whichannounced profits for the end of the fiscal year in March, 2000 of 126.5 billion yen (or USD. 1.2
billion) compared with the loss of 193.8 billion yen of the previous year.
Table 2.7: 10 largest banks in the world in 2000
Banks

Country

AssetsMizuho Financial GroupJapan

1.316.000

Sumitomo Mitsui Banking

Japan

955.738

Deutsche Bank AG
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group

Germany
Japan

843.879
836.271

Sanwa Tokai Tokyo Trust Group

Japan

808.852

Citigroup

The United State

716.937

BNP Paripas

France701.964

Bank of American Corp.

The United State632.574

UBS AGHSBC Holdings PLC

Switzerland
England614.558
569.139(Source: Vietnam Financial Times 10/2000)

48

Among ten largest banks in the world nowadays, Japan owns four ones (see in table). One ofthem is the giant banking group called Mizuho, the merging consequence of three commercial
banks including Daichi Kanggo Bank, Industrial Bank and Fuji Bank. It is the first group in theworld holding assets of more than 1 thousand billion US dollars.

Secondly, the relaxing monetary policy or the zero interest rate policy in pinnacle had great
impacts on the Japanese economic growth. In accordance with the reform, Bank of Japan carriedout many effective methods, including the adjustment of monetary policy. The monetary policy
was relaxed “in maximum”, which manifested clearly in interest rate policy. BOJ cut over-day
lending interest rate to the minimum of 0.25% per annum in September, 1998; 0.15% per annumin February, 1999 and 0.03% per annum on April, 1999 (this rate equalled management cost so
lending real rate was 0%.) In the context of interest rate deduction, disposable funds in themonetary market jumped strongly, leading to the significant improvement of capital turn-over intrading of enterprises. The difference of interest rate between Japanese and internationalmonetary market was also shortened, confirming that the Japanese financial system reforms werein right direction.

Thirdly, the Tokyo Stock Exchange became hot again. Trading quantity in the stock market
slightly rose from 555.70 million to 565.16 million shares4. The National Association of
Securities Dealer Automatic Quotation (NASDAQ-JAPAN) attracted more than 30 brokeragefirms including many famous ones such as Cyber Communication Inc – a online advertising
firm, Noda Soreen – a IC producer, in spites of its new birth in June, 2000.
By 2001, almost all of reforms were completed but unfortunately, they didn’t continue to be
implemented sufficiently to achieve the initial goal of building a financial institution which has
ability to compete in the international market.
II. JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY
1. The monetary policy by periods
For other countries in the world, their awareness and respect of Japan don’t limit to theeconomy of spectacular development in more than half of a century after the war but more
importantly, the reasons behind this success. As an indispensable part of the financial system,
Japanese monetary policy, before, in and after the war, had many great contributions to theeconomic development of the country.
After all, the monetary policy of any country, although its contents changed by the time, aimed atprice and financial market stabilization, domestic currency value guarantee and macro-economic
development of the country.
Based on Eijffinger (1986), the development and transmission mechanism of the monetary
policy was executed by the following channels:

4

Vietnam Economic Times 9/2000

49

Figure 2.4: The transmission mechanism of monetary policy
Instruments

Target(s)Indicator(s)Goal(s)( Source: S.Eijffinger and A van Rixtel , Serie Research Memoranda, 1991)
In case of Japan, the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy from early 1950s to now
has been divided into 3 main periods as following:
1.1. The period of 1953-1975: The traditional monetary policy
Since 1953, the Japanese economy experienced an excessive development and was called HighGrowth Period. In this period, the main financial supply source for enterprises was bank credit.
In other word, enterprises virtually depended on credit loans of financial institutions. The realityof the over-loan and the dominance of non-governmental organization’s credit supply wascreated by the underdevelopment of the capital market and the exist of the main bank system orso-called Keiretsu. Keiretsu was, in nature, the unofficial combination between financial andnon-financial institutions. Its members could borrow from Keiretsu in favorable terms. As
analyzed above, most enterprises had close relationships with at least one main bank and would
be supported by the main bank in any case. The structure of the main bank and Keiretsu remains
until today and still contributes to credit lending in Japan.
The Japanese traditional monetary policy in this period focused on the inter-bank market. Bankof Japan used inter-bank interest rate, short-term savings rate, and then bill discount rate since1971 as indicators. Through its lending policy, BOJ had a great impact on the inter-bank market.
Because of the significant importance of the bank reserve system in the policy, its impact
reserves up to now. In its turn, the commercial banks must keep a certain percentage of savingsas the non-interest bearing at BOJ. Therefore, in early 1980, BOJ owned a large amount ofreserve and most of them had become the bank’s credit source. So as a rule, BOJ’s lending policy
had great influence on financial institution’s reserve. By changing the credit amount in its bank,
BOJ could affect the financial institution’s total deposit reserve and inter-bank interest rate.
Figure 2.5: The traditional money policy
Amount of Bank of Japan credit
Discount rate
Reserve ratio operations
Securities and bills operations
Implicit interest rate regulation

Call and bill
discount rates

Broadly based
lending by banks

CPI
BOP

Window guidance

It can be said that BOJ’s lending policy was very efficient at the time implementing the
traditional monetary policy, which was mainly as a result of the macro situation of over-loan.
50This above fact shows that funding positions of the banks largely depended on the central bank
– BOJ and similarly, the inter-bank interest rate. Beside lending policy, BOJ also used manyother policy instruments to control the inter-bank interest rate such as valuable securities and billtransactions to balance the surpluses and deficits of the monetary market.
1.2. The period of 1975-1981: New monetary policy
In 1971, the international monetary system Bretton Woods collapsed. This event as well as theoil crisis negatively affected the world economy, including the Japanese economy. The decreaseof the economic growth rate forced the Japanese government to orient the economic
development policy as Keynesian oriented monetary and economic policy.
The economic decline led to the sudden fall of enterprise’s credit demands in the situation ofover-borrowing. At the same time, to support the currently issued economic-monetary policy, alarge amount of public bonds were issued. The large-scale bond issue meant the encouragementof stock market development and lower dominance of non-governmental financing, or in other
word, official financing increase. All of the above factors reduced the importance of credit in themonetary policy process.
At the same time, the financial liberalization was being deployed at Japan and this process, on
one hand, improved the flexibility of the interest rate but on the other hand, reduced theefficiency of channel between inter-bank interest rates and broadly based lending by banks of the
traditional monetary policy. The financial liberalization process was also the factor leading to theestablishment of more open non-regulated financial markets with more flexible interest rates.
To prevent inflation, the main goal of the new monetary policy was to obtain price stability. The
yen-USD exchange rate was the second goal proposed to prevent import inflation.
Figure 2.6: The new monetary policy
Amount of Bank of Japan credit
Discount rate
Reserve ratio operations
Securities and bills operations
Implicit interest rate regulation

Call and bill
discount rates

Money supply
Exchange rate

CPI

Window guidance

1.3. The modern monetary policy 1981
In May, 1981, BOJ sold financial bills to free market in order to improve the market liquidity
surpluses. This event was considered as a turning point, marked the development toward a newform of the monetary policy, the modern monetary policy. It was also the first time since theSecond World War that the central bank implemented valuable security selling and buying
51

transactions in the free market in order to directly intervene into the larger or smaller scale of themonetary market. These transactions were executed between BOJ and money creating financial
institutions, so they didn’t have direct impact on money supply. However, the indirect effectcouldn’t be avoided. It can be explained as follow:- Firstly, in the implementation of transactions, the total reserves of the financial institutions
would increase or decrease. On this situation, money creating institutions would readjust theirreserve in the inter-bank market, which resulted in the inter-bank interest rate change, forcing
the financial institutions change their lending and then change the money supply scale.
- Secondly, the inter-bank interest rate change would affect the interest rate in the free market
and finally the individual investment and money supply and demand.
The main reason why BOJ participated in the free market transactions was to develop a series ofopen, less regulated financial markets in Japan, such as the deposit certificate market, and thenthe market for banker’s acceptance and the Tokyo offshore market and so on. The interest ratein this market was mostly flexible, leading to strongly increasing market shares of free markets inthe total money market.
Beside the transactions of valuable securities and financial bills, BOJ also used various financial
instruments to implement their initiated open market policy such as treasury bills (1981),
certificates of deposit and commercial paper (1989). And to support BOJ to succeed in thispolicy, the Japanese Department of Finance issued treasury bills in August, 1989 and thencontinued in 1990.
Figure 2.7: The modern monetary policy
Amount of Bank of Japan credit
Discount rate
Reserve ratio operations
Securities and bills operations
Implicit interest rate regulation

Call and bill
discount rates

Money supply
Exchange rate

CPI

Open market
Interest rates

Open – market operations

Window guidance

Money supply(Source: Series Research Memoranda, 1991)
So, it can be seen that by implementing transactions in the open market in the period of themodern monetary policy execution, BOJ obtained some results: (i) money supply increase forfinancial institutions, (ii) development of open, less regulated financial markets.
The chart shows the money supply and yen-USD exchange rate policy were still considered to begoals of BOJ’s monetary policy. The Japanese central bank, on one hand, wanted to stabilize52prices through the money supply growth rate control, but on the other hand, wanted to keep yen
exchange rate at a reasonably higher than USD to prevent imported inflation.
2. Zero interest rate policy
In late 1990s, the monetary policy committee (took office in April, 1998) had to face thefinancial market’s changes: the average growth rate strongly decreased (about 1% from 1992);
financial institution system became weaker, in which, the main bank failed in November, 1997;
the financial market’s confidence was on the ebb; some weak financial institutions moved tolower ranks by ranking institutions were forced to pay premium higher than the inter-bank rate.
There were 3 factors contributing to the Japanese economy weakening in 1997-1998, including
the increased VAT, Japanese bank crisis in November, 1997 and the fact that Japanese financial
institutions had to pay premiums when borrowing U.S dollars in the London offshore markets.
In theory, to cope with the worsened economic situation, both financial and monetary policies
must be relaxed. In fact, however, the monetary policy wasn’t truly relaxed because the official
discount rate reduced to the lowest in the history at 0.05% and interest rate (short-term capitalinterest rate) was only slightly higher than the official discount rate.
Table 2.8: Change in the Official Discount Rate by Date
2/23/1987

2.50%

7/27/1992

3.25

5/31/1989

3.25

2/4/1993

2.5

10/11/1989

3.75

9/21/1993

1.75

12/25/1989

4.25

4/14/1995

1

3/20/1990

5.25

9/8/1995

0.5

8/30/1990

6

1/4/2001

0.5

7/1/1991

5.5

2/13/2001

0.35

11/14/1991

5

3/1/2001

0.25

12/30/1991

4.5

9/19/2001

0.1

4/1/1992

3.75

Note: Prior to January 2001, the rate for discount of commercial bills and the lending rate of theloans secured by government bonds or similar instrument; After January 2001, the basic discountrate and the basic lending rate
( Source: Yamori , 2005)
Table 2.7 indicates the official discount rate change from 1987-1987 marked the lowest rate:
2,5%. Then, in order to response with the excessive increase in the asset value, the official
discount rate raised from 2,5% to 6% during one year (from May, 1989 to August, 1990). From53

1991, the official discount rate reduced again due to the slower economic development, which
decreased to 0.5% in 1995).
In September, 1998, BOJ’s monetary policy committee decided to promote unsecured shortterm lending interest rate about 0.25% in average. So basically, the monetary policy remained
unchanged except the short-term capital interest rate deduction from 0.5% to 0.25% and thedecision allowing commercial paper monetary policy operation instruments.
In addion, when economic recovery goal wasn't achieved, in February, 1999, unsecured shortterm lending interest rate of around 0,15%” strategy was initiated and after that, along withmarket situations, the interest rate was reduced continuously, which resulted in zero interest rate
policy because total supplied capital and short-term lending interest rate decreased to near 0%.
At this time, the Policy Board accounced plan of keeping the lending zero interest rate until thesituation showed no worry of deflation.
The turning point was made in August, 2000. While almost all members of Policy Board thoughtthat it was time deflation came to an end and decided to raise unsecured short-term lending
interest rate to 0.25%, member of Ministry of Finance and economic and planning agency
supposed that it was too soon to adjust the zero interest rate policy at this time and asked todelay the vote of the Policy Board. However, the Policy Board, in agreement with thegovernment's request, implemented the vote and in accordance with the majority of affirmative
votes, the lifting of the zero interest rate policy was approved.
However, after the interest rate was raised, the economy turned back to decline. Therefore, after
only 6 months from the time of interest rate rising (February, 2001), “unsecured short-term
lending interest rate of around 0.15%” strategy was deployed again and then zero intererst ratecame into practice.
In February, 2001, Lombard-type lending was set out and implemented in March, 2001. As
specified in the plan, any financial institution which could provide valuable securities (such as
government bonds or corporation bonds) could borrow from BOJ at this rate.
Since the implementation of this plan, BOJ’s traditional lending (where lending term and value
were identified by BOJ) disappeared. By September, 2001, the official discount rate decreased
0.1%.
Similar to other developed countries, the main Japanese monetary policy instrument in thisperiod was open market activities. To obtain the policy’s purpose, BOJ regularly executedmonetary supervision and closely inspected the short-term capital rate in the short-term financial
market (especially the over-night savings rate of the unsecured short-term capital market).
On the other hand, since the economic recovery goal couldn’t be reached, the idea of “unsecured
short-term lending rate of around 0.15%” strategy was initiated in February, 1999 and then,
combined with market situations, the rate was decreased regularly. It was called the zero interest
rate policy because the total value of money supplied and short-term capital interest rate54

decreased up to about 0%. Also at this time, the policy committee declared that the zero interest
rate policy would continue until the deflation possibility was eliminated.
The basic turning point was in August, 2000. Most of the policy committee’s members thoughtthat the deflation occurred and decided to increase the unsecured short-term lending interest rate
to 0.25%. However, members of the Department of Finance and economic planning agency
claimed that it was too soon to adjust the zero interest rate policy at this time and request votedelay at the policy committee. However, the committee still follow the government’s
requirement to implement the vote and because the affirmative votes made up the majority, thelifting of the zero interest-rate policy was approved.
However, after the zero interest-rate policy was lifted, the economy became weakened again.
Therefore, only after six months from the time of interest rate increase (February, 2001), the“unsecured short-term lending interest rate increase of about 15%” plan was replaced again by
the zero interest rate policy.
Although the zero interest rate policy was raised one more than but it was easy to see that there
was not enough strength to recover the worsened economic conditions. Therefore, BOJ
continued to propose economic recovery methods at the conference of the monetary policy
committee on March, 2001. This strategy mainly controlled the monetary market by current
balance of payments managed by BOJ instead of the normal unsecured short-term lending
interest rate, and decided to increase current account about 5 billion yen in this period (thisincrease was 1 billion yen higher than the estimated of about 4 billion yen). It was called quantity
relaxation for the target amount replacing interest rate.
If the amount supplied through quantity relaxation raised to high rate, the interest rate – money
price – would strongly fall. In fact, due to the quantity relaxation, the unsecured short-term
lending interest rate began to decrease to about zero. When the rate reached zero, it was notnecessary for the zero interest rate policy to execute another relaxation. And then, the possibility
was that no longer would a policy that targeted interest rate (more exactly, nominal interest rate)
be accepted.
However, relaxation could continue to be implemented even when interest rate reached zero.
3. Exchange rate policy
In the monetary policy, the exchange rate policy always plays a special important part. It is themacro-economic variable that gives government a critical basic in planning and balancing themonetary policy’s goals. The exchange rate is regarded as a link between the domestic economy
and the overseas. Therefore, before the implementation of any foreign trade goal, it is necessary
for countries to consider cautiously and thoroughly a reasonable exchange rate policy: any
devaluation of domestic currency will promote export, decrease import volume and vice versa.
Many Asian countries have known how to apply flexible exchange rate policy to escape fromcrisis and obtain spectacular economic development as South Korea, China…
55

Fact shows that the currency devaluation policy is usually chosen among many developing
countries in the world because these countries orient to base on export to develop the economy.
In contrast, the currency appreciation can harm export of not only developing countries but also
the developed ones which own so hot growth rate such as Japan. From 1971 to now, the worry
about the yen appreciation compared with the US dollar became a big problem in the eye of theJapanese government. In the early 1970s, yen was fixed at 360 yen to 1 dollar. In 1995, the rate
jumped to 80 yen to 1 dollar.
Yen appreciation from 1971 to 1995 was mainly caused by pressure from the United States's
enterprises. Market shares of American manufacturers decreased because their goods couldn’t
compete with Japanese ones. At this time, the Japanese trade surplus was at the same rate as theUnited States’s trade deficit, resulting in numerous discussions in trade and JPY-USD echange
rate between the two countries.
- In 1989 - 1990, due to oil price increase in 1989 and then gulf crisis, BOJ had to turn intocurrency tightening policy and in late 1991, BOJ began relaxing monetary base supplement(through buying 5.9 billion US dollars from trade surplus) to expand investment, which caused
yen to be devaluated (140 yen for one US dollar).
Figure 2.8: The exchange rate JPY / USD in the period 1991 – 1997

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
97

Ju
ne

Ju
ne

96

95

Ju
ne

Ju
ne

94

93

Ju
ne

Ju
ne

92

91

Ju
ne

0
( Source: Nippon Facts and Figure, 1992, 1994, 1997)

However, the purpose of BOJ was not to allow a fast depreciation of Yen, thus BOJ thencontinued to increase money supply in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995
56

Table 2.9: Money supply to Japanese economics
Year
Rate
Monetarybase at theend of period(bil Yen )%changescomparedwith previous
year% changes ofmoney supply– M1% changes ofmoney supply
M2+CD

1991

92

93

94

95

1/95

3/95

6/95

9/95

12/95

39,88239,026

41,62642,88046,24437,56338,12739,39338,532

46,224

1,9

2,2

3,6

4,9

5,3

5,2

4,4

5,1

4,5

6,5

5,2

4,5

3,0

5,4

8,2

5,5

4,5

7,0

9,9

13,1

3,6

0,6

1,1

2,1

3,2

3,2

3,6

3,3

2,8

3,3

( Source: BOJ : Main economic indicators of Japan, April 1996)- After a strong fall in late 1991, yen kept being appreciated in these days. The main cause wasthat (i) the increase rate in currency value was still lower than the amount of USD flowing into
trade surplus, (ii) yen appreciation was supported by BOJ's low discount interest rate policy,
which increased investment and encouraged consumption, (iii) countries which continuously had
trade deficit with Japan, especially the United States, kept placing pressure on the country.
Table 2.10: Foreign trade balance and general payment accountUnit: Billion $US
Year
Rate

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

ImportExportForeign tradebalance

2,012.2
2,079.3

2,431.8
2,391.8

2,424.0
2,429.9

2,546.7
2,591.1

2,407.8
2,503.1

2,621.2
2,725.5

2,862.0
2,964.7

-40.9

-40.0

5.9

43.3

95.4

104.4

102.6

57.2

35.8

72.9

117.6

131.4

135.7

128.8

Payment
account( Source: IMF : World economic Outlook, October 1995)
In the context, the Japanese was so wise when intensifying on capital export, mainly to theUnited States’ market at the time of yen appreciation. With capital flowing abroad, the Japanese
desired to plug the Japanese flag into the United States market; by this exported capital, Japanese
factories would grow up in the United States and made finished goods for sales right in thismarket.
57

Table 2.11: FDI of Japan to overseas.
Fiscal year
Rate

FDI value% changes

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

28.45930.02540.40850.69448.01953.972

5,5

36,7

23,5

-5,3

12,4

( Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance – in Nippon Facts and Figures JETRO White Paper on Investments
1999)
After the Southeast Asian financial and monetary crisis in 1997, the Japanese economy fell into
serious decline, marked by strong fall of stock market, delayed production, record highunemployment rate during 45 years. Moreover, GDP was so low at – 0.7% in 1997 and – 1.8%
in 1998 while Yen fluctuation was great: the record high JPY-USD exchange rate was 144.68 yen
per dollar in June, 1998, creating a currency devaluation effect among many Asian countries tomaintain their competitiveness in the market. By July, 1998, the Japanese Central Bank and theFederal Reserve Board of the United States had to intervene to set out an exchange rate floor foryen. The cooperation between the two countries made USD-JPY exchange rate more flexible
and also prevented a so great yen appreciation or devaluation in the future. Besides, to avoid thesituation that JPY and USD decreased too much, Japanese nominal interest rate must be raised
to at least the same rate as that of the United States.
When the rate jumped to 144 yen to 1 dollar in January, 1999, the average yen appreciation from1971 to that time was about 4% per year. In fact, at this point, the market still expected yen
continued to increase at the same rate as the previous time. Evidence is that the interest rate ofdollar bonds was always 3 to 4% higher than yen bonds of the same term. It is because themarket continued to expect yen appreciation so they were willing to keep the Japanese
government bonds at the interest rate of only 1,7% while the US treasury bill’s interest rate was4,7%.
However, along with the yen appreciation was the deflation in Japan, which restricted bothindividual and organizational demands. At the time of yen appreciation, both citizens andenterprises would cut new consumption and investment plans because they were worried thatwhen yen devaluation happened, value of assets and investment would be reduced. The yen
devaluation also restricted the country’s competitiveness in the world market.
The Japanese central bank couldn’t relax the monetary policy to promote consumption demandin the context of negative exchange fluctuation and low interest rate. The nominal interest rate
couldn’t decrease to less than 0% (because at that rate, the citizens would keep cash instead ofbond) and the real interest rate remained high because of deflation.

58

So, how to put an end to the deflation? Currency devaluation was a smart choice for an economy
in the situation of inflation. However, the yen devaluation with high amplitude could lead to thedevaluation of a series of Asian currencies as domino effect, which was a concerning problem
for the United States who was sharing the relatively large trade deficit with Japan. Besides, theUS and Japanese government desired to deal with the root of the problem. The government ofboth countries reached an agreement providing that they would maintain the exchange rate of
the two currencies at 120 to 130 yen per dollar. However, specific figures were essentially not asimportant as a fixed exchange rate proposal in the long-term. So why did the United States
involve in a seem-to-be personal problem of Japan? From 1971 to 1995, it was the pressure ofAmerican enterprises that appreciated yen. Market share of the U.S producers and manufacturers
increasingly fell because they couldn’t compete with Japanese goods and the fact that theJapanese trade surpluses were equal to the U.S trade deficits caused a lot of controversy between
the two countries.
In order to avoid the trade sanction of the United States as well as restrict the competitiveness ofJapan in the world market, the pressure for yen appreciation increased more and more. The yen
appreciation had been implemented in a long time and led to the deflation as mentioned above.
By 1999, because trade surpluses of Japan rose again, it was predicted that the yen appreciationpressure would return. To avoid this possibility, the United States was forced to support Japanso that Japan could continue the fixed yen exchange rate policy. Therefore, both countries kept
on maintaining a reasonable exchange rate and in this case, Japan would have to keep yen at 120
yen per dollar. Before that time, in June, 1998, yen fell from 130 to 147 yen per dollar, whichcaused such an effect that many Asia countries wanted to devaluate their own currencies toensure the competitiveness in the market. By July, 1998, the Japanese central bank and the U.S
Federal Reserve Board had to intervene to establish a floor yen exchange rate. This
cooperativeness between the two countries made the USD-JPY exchange rate more flexible andalso prevented the significant yen devaluation or appreciation in the future. Besides, to preventthe great fall of real USD-JPY exchange rate, the Japanese nominal interest rate needed rising toat least equal with that of the U.S. The USD-JPY exchange rate agreement promoted
consumption in Japan because the citizens were confident in the stable asset value. Investors felt
safe to invest without worrying about profit loss and citizens could had a peace of mind to buy
house without being afraid that their house would lose value in the future.
However, after more than one bleak decade due to the collapse of the stock market and the
bubble real estate market combined with eight years trying to recover from the deflation and theslow-down economy, in finally, Japan reached a positive growth rate, equal with that of the precrisis period. GDP growth rate in 2005 was 4.5%, an impressive figure for such an economy as
the Japanese. The financial performance of the whole bank system was restored, enterprises
started to have recruitment and investment demands. Price still continued to fall but the scenariothat the deflation was settled could be seen clearly. Such economic stability helped Japan
contribute more to the world economic growth rate and adjust the imbalance of balance of59

payment. The Japanese current balance surplus decreased from USD 85.9 billion in the second
haft of 2004 to USD 82.8 billion in the first half of 2005, up about 12% compared with the same
period of the previous year. The yen real exchange rate increased 3.3% in the first half of 2005.
The yen devaluation at 7% in comparison with the U.S dollar in two years, 2004-2005, reflected
expectation of the U.S’s interest rate increase. The Japanese government didn’t intervene in theforeign exchange market in 2005 and in fact, stopped its participation from March, 2004. The
Japanese exchange reverses still remained unchanged, only rose about USD 1 billion or 0.1%, at
USD 825 billion in 2005.
4. The Japanese current financial system – problems and solutions

4.1. General evaluation of the Japanese current financial system
In general, the Japanese financial system is stable despite some effects of the global financial
crisis in 2008. The financial situation in term of lending to enterprises still signals positively aftersome bad news in the period from late 2008 to early 2009. However, long-lasting risks infinancial institutions related to bond holding and financial risk continue to rise. Especially, in
2008, under the impact of the financial crisis, the yen jumped 67% compared with GBP and 75%
compared with South Korea’s won. Therefore, export goods, especially the electronic devices(initially occupying 50% of the Japanese electronics turn-over) became more expensive forforeign consumers, leading to the lower export. Car sales in Japan came to the lowest point since1974. In an economic forum in January, 2009, the Japanese Minister of Finance, Mr Shoichi
Nakagawa, commented that “the Japanese economy is facing the fall of export and production.
Consumption is lower and lower and the economy is becoming worse.”

4.2. Challenges
Challenges for the Japanese financial system don’t occur for the first time but have accumulated
over the years.
- The Japanese financial institutions need to ensure the stability of basic profit, promote businessby active risk management and control.
- The financial institutions need to have countermeasures to cope with market risks which comealong with bond holding. One easy-to-see point is that unsecured bond holding can affect profit
and bank losses mostly come from bond holding which exceed the profits gained from main
business activities in the previous two years.
- The Japanese financial institutions should raise capital through recapitalization and profit
accumulation.
- In finally, the financial institutions should prepare sound basics for the management offinancial intermediary function. For the long-term economic development of Japan, the financial
institutions must re-identify their potential growth rate and provide financial services efficiently.

60

4.3. Countermeasure policy
In the context of worsened economic and financial situation, the government and BOJ has tried
their best to implement financial and monetary policies and stabilize the financial system until
the end of the financial year 2009.
- Firstly, focusing on unemployment problem, financial measures and front loading for public
works project in the “Policy Package to Address Economic Crisis” in April, 2009. One
important part of this project is to promote using special methods to strengthen financial
intermediary function.
- In order to support finance for small enterprises, Credit Guarantee Association provided 20
thousand billion yen as emergency guarantee instrument. The total value of these instruments are
30 thousand billion yen. The Japanese Financial Association also supplied 3 thousand billion yen
to ensure the security and efficiency of lending network. For this purpose, Shoko Chukin bankadded 2.4 thousand billion yen.
- In financial field, to support the economy, right after the 3rd quarter of 2008, BOJ proposedsome methods such as interest rate policy reduction, measures to stabilize the financial market,
finance supply to enterprises. BOJ also decided to resume its purchases of securities by otherfinancial institution’s help in March, 2009; by the end of 2009, the total purchase amount was
38.1 billion yen.
- Also in April, 2009, BOJ built principles and conditions for subordinated loans by allowing
financial institutions to maintain enough capital, which facilitates the financial institutions to dowell their financial intermediary function and stabilize the financial system. The bank also
consults and guides each main financial institution to pay special attention to risk management.
- For policies that are applied after April, 2009, the bank will extend types of eligible mortgages
for loans on deeds to the government and those with government guarantees.
These above solutions force the bank more active in financing and create more favorable
conditions for activities in the monetary market.
- Not only for the domestic financial market, BOJ also acts for the international financial market
development. For this purpose, BOJ proposed “Collateral Guidelines on Eligible Foreign
Bonds” on May, 2009, allowing government bonds of the United States, England, Germany, andFrance that are issued in the domestic currency to be used as quality collaterals.
- Beside the specific policies and measurements above, BOJ has carried out many studies andanalysis on the long-term stability of the whole system which don’t limit to the domestic businessenvironment but extend to the overseas to objectively evaluate the business conditions offinancial institutions. Moreover, with the long-standing cautiousness, the bank wants to assess
the current situation of the financial system and challenges that it has to face. In the opinion of
the bank, the evaluation will bring back a comprehensive look for strategy and policy planning,
thus, contributing to the stability and sustainability of the Japanese financial system.
61

CHAPTER 3
PRACTICAL LESSONS FOR VIETNAMESE FINANCIAL MARKET
Vietnam is still a developing country. Compared with many other countries in the world, theVietnamese economy has a low starting point, poor infrastructure, technology backward whileusually dealing with foreign aggressors. Therefore, although near 3 decades and a half havepassed since the war came to an end, up to now, economic achievements gained by Vietnam,
regardless of their changing effects on the country’s appearance, are still limited against
orientations and goals that the government has set out for the international economic integration
process. Vietnam still ranks 105th among poor countries in the world. One of the reasons why
Vietnamese economy is so deficient is the inefficient performance of the financial market.
Despite its life-line role in the economy, the Vietnamese financial system is still young andvulnerable to external environment and inexperienced of self-defense. Having suffered from theSoutheast Asian financial crisis in 1997 and most recently, the global financial crisis in 2008,
Vietnam has drawn many valuable lessons from collapses of many financial institutions in termof State’s management mechanism and implemented some methods to stabilize the financial
market and rescued the economy. However, all of them are still band-aid solutions and only
considered as the initial step for the market-oriented sustainable economic development strategy.
Therefore, learning from lessons of developed and experienced countries is very necessary.
The Vietnamese economic context and its movement nowadays own some commons withJapan’s in the previous four decades. The similarity of them is that both are war victims whobear many serious losses after the war came to an end. The difference is, however, that besides ahighly damaged infrastructure and ragging poverty that the Second World War left Japan,“western-style” economic development model penetrated the Japanese market which, combinedwith Japanese brain power, the government’s economic reconstruction and development
strategy, formed a foundation for many Japanese economic miracles. Meanwhile, the picture is sodifferent in Vietnam. With a close economy depending crucially on agriculture, poor andbackward infrastructure sunk in aggressive wars for a long time, the reconstruction anddevelopment process after the war has been started in conditions of much difficulty anddeficiency. It is partly reason why the Vietnamese economy has been so delayed after almost 35
years of reconstruction and development.
After studying the Japanese financial system development experiences in reflection with specificconditions of Vietnam, it can be drawn the five main following lessons:
1. The first lesson

It is important to define the independent role of the State Bank in market management
and regulation and the Government shouldn’t intervene excessively.

62

Before analyzing the role of BOJ in financial system management, viewpoints of central bank’s
relative independence on government must be clarified. Not limited to Japan but nowadays,
Vietnam and some other countries in the world still maintain two schools with two different
viewpoints of central bank’s organizational model. One school supposes that the central bankmust be an independent institution on government while the other considers central banks as abody under the government. Each country can find between them the most suitable central bankmodel for themselves or can combine reasonably the above two schools, however, in the context
of continuous social and economic development, reality and economic efficiency are the mostreliable measure and appropriate answer.
Bank of Japan was founded in 1982 in consistence with the model of National Bank of Belgium– a joint stock company, in which, since new birth, the State’s capital only made up 55 million
yen. However, from the beginning, BOJ has identified its guiding principle to be a banksupporting for the State and in reality, private shareholders were not allowed to raise opinions
about BOJ’s policies. By 1904, BOJ was reorganized in the manner of combination between
Reich bank’s structure and unique organizational form of Japan. To 1991, BOJ’s total assets were
up to 43.1 thousand billion yen (or USD 320.5 billion).
In many previous decades, especially in 1980s and 1990s, despite many great progresses inmonetary policy planning so that it would be suitable with each economic development stage andfacilitate growth targets, the Japanese economy, after all, fell into depression and crisis. There aremany reasons for the said consequence, one of which was BOJ’s undeniable dependence on thegovernment. Many decisions of BOJ on monetary policy were influenced by the government,
especial the Ministry of Finance. BOJ couldn’t independently inspect commercial banks, which
partly led to non-transparency of banking system. The Ministry of Finance had spies all over thecountry but was lack of firmness. Therefore, the government’s interventions were considered as“support”. For commercial banks, “mutual help” tradition was still maintained, in which, largebanks would assist the smaller ones when problems occurred. In last resort, the government
would show off to rescue by hundred billion yen drawn from tax funds. These relations createdambiguity between the government’s management function and enterprise’s business control
function, restricting the efficiency, competitiveness and flexibility of market mechanism.
It can’t be denied one positive fact that, although Japanese financial institutions didn’t really havepowerful internal force, they developed very fast under the government’s support. The
government’s protection methods made Japanese financial institutions more advantageous thanexperienced and potential western competitors. However, also under the government’s assistanceand due to deviation in pursuing economic profits, financial institutions spent much money inrisky investments such as real estate and raging lending. Meanwhile, the government carried out
so many market control regulations, many of which were against market principles. The
concentration of management on the Ministry of Finance gave this body so much power,
resulting in corruption and bribery that some economics considered to be one of the reasons of
the Japanese financial and monetary crisis. Besides, the financial liberalization was in strong63

progress and regarded as indispensable trend. Therefore, the Japanese financial market had to
implement reform to enter into a new development phase.
To separate BOJ from the government, revised Banking law was passed by by Japaneseparliament in July, 1997 and came into effect from 01st Aril, 1998. Accordingly, BOJ wastransformed into an entirely independent body which was entitled to directly inspect andinvestigate commercial banks. Ministry of Finance’s power and the government’s intervention in
BOJ was limited. In term of model, BOJ was reformed in the same manner as Bender bank ofGermany and in term of transparency, as Federal Reserve Board of the United States.
When discussing about the solution for enhancing the self-control of private banks, there is aquestion on which level the self-control should be?
There are 4 levels of the self-control of State Bank-

Self-control in setting up targets-

Self-control in building action plan-

Lower level: self-control in selecting monetary instrument-

Lowest level: limited self-control, or none self-control

Currently in Vietnam, the self-control of the State Bank is in the lowest level. The Government
makes policy, target, even the action plan and intervene into implementation process. It affects
the ability of the State Bank that plays the role as a Central Bank in the international integrationand globalization.
In additions, as analyzed in chapter 1, the existing Vietnamese banking system is a two-level one.
In this system, the State Bank (the central bank) is a body directly under the government; bankgovernor is a member of the government. Therefore, similar to Japan previously, thegovernment is both the rule maker and the player. It is the government – the central bank whoplanned monetary strategies and policies and it is also it who implemented policies such financial
and credit institution refinancing or open market operation… It is the main reason why in somany years, the Vietnamese financial market, especially the commercial bank system, has been so
passive, instable, unable to promote their competitiveness as financial institutions or operate inconsistence with market signals. Under the overprotection of the State, especially when
economic and financial crises happened in the world, commercial banks still maintains the habitof “dependence” on the State, resulting in low competitiveness and inefficiency.
In order to solve above problem, Vietnam have to speed up building a more seft-control Central
Bank. The 112 Decision approving the project on banking development to 2020 of theGovernment, the Prime Minister specified “the State Bank is independent on making policy andimplementing monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and interest rate policy”. State Bank should
initiatively control monetary policy to protect the strength of domestic currency and curb

64

inflation without depending on executive bodies. It is expected that the policy makers willconsider about this.
It can be said that up to now, lessons drawn from the Japanese financial system reforms which
made the central bank more independent in late 1990s remain valuable for Vietnam.
2. The second lesson

The monetary policy management mechanism should be flexible and efficient.
Suffering near five decades since the Second World War, the Japanese financial market in generaland the monetary policy in specific has made many positive contributions to the Japanese
economic recovery and development. Main cause of the monetary policy success is that BOJ
carried out flexible responses in monetary policy initiation and comprehensive implementation in
conformity with each economic development period.
1/ Interest rate policy
To adjust interest rate and interest rate structure suitably with supply-demand in the monetary
market, BOJ combined various policies such as the official discount rate policy, regulation policyby open market operation instruments and monetary base supply instrument, in which, thediscount rate policy played a central role, because similar to the United State, discount rate was
the guiding rate of bank rate and rate of monetary market.
Because the basic goal of the Japanese regulation policy was to promote growth in priority, BOJ
often maintained a low discount rate, which encouraged both domestic and overseas investment,changed the economic structure and helped Japan recover from depression and slow-down
period at ease.
Table 2.7 shows that the BOJ’s discount rate continuously fell from 6% (August, 1990) to 0.1%
(September, 2001). With determination to reduce interest rate to promote economic growth andrapidly adjust structure, the interest rate was fixed at the lowest rate in the history (near zero).
Up to now, it can be seen that Japan is the unique country that is consistent to pursue zerointerest rate policy in a long time (from February, 1999 to 2006) to cope with deflation andeconomic slow-down from early 1990. Although many members of BOJ’s Monetary Policy
Board argued about time and plan to raise unsecured short-term lending interest rate to near
15% (February, 2001), the zero interest rate policy was still maintained, because the economy
didn’t see any recovery signal. It was the capital sources with zero interest rate that helped
Japanese enterprises have enough capital to expand business, increase productivity, lower goods
price and then boost competitiveness of Japanese goods in the international market.
Corresponding with the discount interest rate deduction of BOJ, other interest rates in the entire
market decreased across the board. For example, when the discount rate fell to near 1%, shortterm interest rate also reduced to 2%, red-hot lending interest rate was only 0.38%, long-term
interest rate also set record with the low rate of 4%, 21.5% down compared with 1992.
65

Table 3.3: Impact of discount interest rate reduction on other interest rate
Year
Interest rate
Short- term
% changes compared withprevious year
Long-term% changes compared withprevious year

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

7,6

7,2

4,3

2,8

2,2

2,0

----

-5,2

-40,2

-34,8

-21,4

-10,0

7,0

6,3

5,1

4,0

4,6

5,1

----

-10,0

-19,0

-21,5

15,0

10,0

( Source : IMF : World economic outlook from May 1990 to May 1996 )Table 3.4: Market interest rate (IR) after adjustment policy on discount interest rate
Year
Rate
Shortterm IR

1/95

2/95

3/95

4/95

5/95

6/95

7/95

8/95

9/95

10/95

11/95

12/95

1/96

4,046

4,032

3,997

3,092

3,740

3,575

3,454

3,353

3,171

3,050

2,963

2,788

2,79

2,156

2,125

1,687

1,218

1,200

1,190

0,730

0,790

0,350

0,370

0,370

0,350

0,38

Interest
rate
hot

in

market( Source: Le Vinh Danh – Monetary policy and macro adjustment of Central Bank at developed countries)
Besides low interest rate policy, BOJ creatively used other instruments of monetary policy suchas open market operation (strictly monitoring and managing short-term interest rate in unsecured
short-term capital market); carrying out Lombard-type lending in February, 2001; shifting themonetary market control strategy from unsecured short-term lending interest rate to current
balance of payment managed by BOJ and increasing the current balance of payment to 5 billion
yens in this periods.
Continuously decreasing discount rate created favorable condition for Japanese investment:
overseas investment of Japan in 1993 was up to 10 billion yen, investment in accuracy, high-techindustries and high quality consumer goods began to dominate in domestic production.
So it can be seen that positive sides of the Japanese interest rate policy in this period includes:- The fact that the interest rate was maintained low and continuously reduced at decisive points
helped Japanese economy stand firm before negative effects of the world economic and politicalenvironment.
- The low interest rate facilitated investment, consumption, domestic production, resulting in the
sharp rise of export. Residual balance of foreign trade, in return, would support strongly for yen.
- Japanese policy makers were clearly aware of the close relationship between interest rate andinvestment, interest rate and growth. Therefore, when setting growth goal in priority, BOJ used
low discount rate to form interest rate policy for the general capital market, and considered it to66

be main instrument to orientate investment and affect production structure to provide potential
output.
- Through discount rate adjustments, BOJ’s fairness in policy management was manifested
clearly. BOJ was so consistent to pursue a policy that it considered to be beneficial to theeconomy but at the same time, also quick-witted to change its opinion when new change occurs
in the market. It was the firm and flexible management method that helped BOJ guide theJapanese economy out of the most difficult time.
For Vietnam, in many years, especially in two recent decades, the economy has still been in
conditions of undercapitalization, low growth rate, unstable inflation. Besides, similar to manyother countries in the region, Vietnam has to bear negative effects of the global economic andfinancial crisis.
Coping with both internal and external challenges, Vietnam has continuously implemented
flexible and market-oriented interest rate mechanism. After five changes, from positive realinterest rate in 1992 to interest rate frame in 1992 – 1995, interest rate ceiling mechanism in 1996
– 2000, basis interest rate accompanied with its band in 2000 – 2002, to negotiated interest rate
in 2002 – 2006, it can be said that the interest rate in Vietnamese market nowadays is stable.
Borrowing demand of enterprises is afforded better; savings continues to be deposited due to thehalt and downward signals of the stock and real estate market.
Figure 3.2: Progress of mobilized interest rate and VND lending interest rate in 2008 –2009.
23.0 %
21.0

21
20.5

20.5

20.5

19.0

19
17.5

17.0

16.5

16.5

17.7
17.2

16.7

17.4

17.3
16.4

15.5

15.0
14.3

13.0

12.8

12.6
12

11.8

11.4

11.0

11.4

10.3

9.0

10.1

9.9

9.2

8.8

7.7

7.0

7.4

7.7

5.0
1/8 2/8 3/8 4/8 5/8 6/8 7/8 8/8 9/8 10/8 11/8 12/8 1/9 2/9 3/9( Source: International workshop –The impact of the global economic crisis and policy
implications for Vietnamese banking and finance sector, Hanoi , June, 2009)
However, despite many efforts to drive interest rate to a low one, Vietnam, compared with many
countries in the region, still maintains a relative high rate. From success lessons of Japan (thezero interest rate policy), the State Bank of Vietnam should step by step change its thoughts andimplement suitable interest rate solutions.
Basic interest rate management mechanism was kept applying because it was a suitable solution
for macro-economic targets and capital supply and demand in the market. It could be said that67

basic interest rate was an indispensable instrument in implementation of monetary policy that
focused on macro-economic targets. As a macro-economic monetary instrument, basic interest
rate of the State Bank was considered to be a clear signal of monetary relaxation policy (fordepression prevention) or tightening (for inflation control) by commercial banks.
- Basic interest rate was kept cutting to facilitate commercial banks to reduce lending interest ratein the market, ensuring enterprises to approach capital at low cost so that they could decrease
production expanse, boosting economic growth.
- Money was injected into circulation in two channels: (i) lending commercial banks at low
interest rate so that they could reduce interest rate applied for enterprise to boost liquidity ofbanking system, and (ii) tax refunding to population to stimulate consumption demand in theeconomy.
2/ Exchange rate policy
Successful exchange rate management art of BOJ in many decades is a valuable lesson for not
only Vietnam but also many other countries in the world. It have to admit that yen position as
the third largest reserve currency (after US dollar and Deutsche Mark), continuously residual
balance of trade in many years since 1991 as well as increasing national reserve rest much on thecontribution of exchange rate policy. For such a hot developed economy as Japan, it is not easy
to build and manage an exchange rate policy to both increase export for foreign currencies andstabilize domestic market while gaining positive effects on international market before theexternal pressures. However, in last four decades, with remarkable efforts and firm will, theJapanese government and BOJ has step by step pursued right steps in financial market reform
planning including monetary policy.
Successes of Japanese exchange rate policy partly helped the economy recover and restore
growth rate that had been seriously ruined by the collapse of “bubble” economy in early 1980s, 8
years of deflations and especially the Southeast Asian monetary crisis in 1997 and the global
financial crisis in 2008. These successes can be summarized into the following points:- Single exchange rate implementation: Japan belongs to group of countries which own strong
currency such as the United States, England, and Canada and don’t set official exchange rate andits band limit. The exchange rate is identified entirely in basis of supply and demand law, and asingle exchange rate will be applied for all related economic and financial activities. BOJ onlyintervene through open market operation in case of necessary when the exchange rate has great
fluctuation compared with BOJ’s target. Being rooted from many historical reasons, Japan setsyen (JPY) in relation with USD; therefore, if BOJ wants to intervene in exchange rate, it has topurchase or sell USD to support the rate.
- The collaboration among monetary policy instruments for a economic growth. Similar to the interest rate
policy, the most important successes of the exchange rate policy are (i) the creative co-ordinationof monetary policy instruments (monetary base management rate, interest rate and open market
68operation, (ii) that the tightening or relaxing monetary policy is issued and implemented inappropriate times, facilitating goal of stabilizing domestic currency and promoting economic
development+ Monetary relaxation policy for economic recovery:
After the collapse of “bubble economy” in late 1980s and especially the Southeast Asian financial
and monetary crisis in 1997 which burned out in the South first and then spread into the North,the center of the Asian economy – Japan – a pride, successful symbol of the Asia - was directly
threatened. The crisis seriously ruined the financial and economic stronghold and by December,
1997, the Japanese government had to accept that the national economy was in depression andstandstill. To help the economy step by step recover from the crisis, a financial system reform oflarge scale and unprecedented stature – the Japanese Big Bang – was deployed. In this reform,
monetary liberalization and relaxation policy was one of the basic contents. After 3 years
implementing this program, although it hadn’t achieved expected results, the market showedsome positive signals. The financial and banking system came to stability, JPY-USD exchange
rate fluctuated in narrow margin at 119 – 120 yen per dollar.
+ Monetary tightening policy after economic recovery and inflation curb.
In March, 2006, BOJ made a turning-point decision to tighten monetary policy which,considered to be so easy, was maintained in five years, to restrict deflation. The Monetary Policy
Board passed by this decision after strategies showing signals of price rise and putting an end todeflation was announced. On 11th July, 2006, next to economic recovery signals, BOJ increased
basic interest rate to 0.25% for the first time after five years. Then, on 21st February, 2007, BOJ
decided to raise interest rate more to 0.5% when seeing signals of growth stability.
Although the interest rate hasn’t change significantly and its changes haven’t been great in theseyears, fact shows that any act of BOJ on interest rate have direct impact on yen. In details, after
decision of maintaining basic interest rate at 0.25%, which had been raised by BOJ on 18th
January, 2007, was announced, on 22nd January, 2007, yen was devalued 2.66% compared withthe early 2007 period (from 118,7 JPY per USD to 121,95 JPY per USD). Moreover, JPY/USD
exchange rate has borne great influence of FED’s interest rate policy. In specific, in 2005, when
BOJ still maintained fixed rate of 0%, FED raised rate continuously eight times, from 2.25% in
the beginning of the year to 4.25% in the end of the year (each time of 0.25%). It was the large
difference between the United State’s basis interest rate (5.25%) and that of Japan (0.25%) thatmade yen devaluated (from 103,34 JPY per USD in the beginning of the year to 118 JPY per
USD in the end of the year)

69

Figure 3.3: Exchange Rate of JPY / USD (2005)( Source : IMF (www.imf.com))
Despite this fact, BOJ was still cautious in basis interest rate increase decision. Governor of theJapanese central bank, Mr. Toshihiko Fukui, said that BOJ’s monetary policy would come closelywith the economic recovery rate.
- Different from many other countries, this second largest economy bears pressure of yen
appreciation in a long time from countries that usually has trade deficit with Japan. Underpressure of countries such as England, Germany and especially the United States, yen used toappreciate to the record rate of 86 JPY per USD. In this context, the Japanese government
responded by capital export to these countries to “cool” its so hot economy and to solve
decade’s long lasting “cold war” with the United States. This policy shows the firmness andflexibility of Japan in its monetary policy: it is really a tool to kill two births with one stone and
the Japanese gains success.
- In late 2008 and during 2009, in spiral of the global economic and financial crisis, the economic
growth rate of Japan came to halt, unemployment jumped, yen was appreciated strongly anddeflation signal came back. In this context, BOJ decided to more relax its monetary policy
though cheap loans. On 1st December, it made secret vote in consideration of the proposal of
financing commercial banks short-term loan of 10 thousand billion yen (equal with USD 115.8
billion) to boost liquidity and at the same time came back again to the basic interest rate of 0.1%.
Besides, BOJ was also placed under pressure to implement some methods to intervene into
deflation situation after many months of continuous price falling.
In case of Vietnam, the State Bank’s interest rate policy, in general, has come in right direction
and brought back favorable impacts on the economy. However, some economic experts supposethat the State Bank’s exchange rate management and policy has still been conservative and rigid
70and information transparency has not been well guaranteed. Therefore, to form and apply amore flexible and effective exchange rate policy, the State Bank of Vietnam should focus on
solving the following main issues:+ First and foremost, shortening gap between official exchange rate of the State Bank and theexchange rate in free market to lay foundation for a single exchange rate.
As mentioned above, a unique exchange rate was applied for all related activities in Japan, and it
was determined by supply and demand in the monetary market. In Vietnam, so many years ago
and up to now, two kinds of exchange rates has still been in force: the official exchange rate of
the State Bank and the exchange rate in free market. Although the State Bank has applied manymethods to shorten the gap between the two rates, the rate in free market is still higher, up to
19,000 Vietnam dongs per US dollars sometimes in late 2009, while at the same time, the official
exchange rate was approximately 18,500 Vietnam dongs per dollar (less than 2.7%). This fact
forces the State Bank to reconsider about exchange rate supply and demand and the general
trade balance of the country to set out more authentic methods.
+ Applying fexible exchange rate policy under control of the State now and in near future.
In current Vietnamese social and economic context, the application of one flexible exchange rate
under control of the State is appropriate. This mechanism can even last in a longer time. Because
up to now, the Vietnamese economy hasn’t been accepted to be a sufficient market economy.
Therefore, orientation for selection of suitable exchange rate policy must be based on theeconomy’s capacity, in which, the foreign currency reserve is required to be great enough tointervene into the market when neccessary to stablize purchasing power of the currency. So, theState Bank’s intervention is essential in the near future. In specific, the government needs tointervene to expand fluctuation band and then come to remove this band when all conditions fora supply-demand exchange rate mechanism are converging.
+ Implementing multi-foreign currency mechanism:
Experiences of Japan and Thailand in so many years, especially Thailand - a victim of a policythat strictly tied its domestic currency to USD – shows shortcomings of it. Because nature of the
fixed exchange rate policy was to creat stability, but when the standard that the rate is tied to is
no longer stable, then the stability can’t be obtained anymore, especially in the context that the
US dollar has been devaluated continuously and in a long time like now.
Vietnam is not an exceptional case. Up to now, Vietnam dong has been only tied to US dollar
without any other foreign currencies. Illustration is that trading quantity (including both current
and captial trading) in US dollars makes up a great proportion of the total trading quantity oftrade balance. In term of exchange rate identification and annoucenment method, Vietnam
dongs exchange rate is identified in basis of US dollar but separately from other foreign
currencies such as EUR, JPY, GBP and so on. It means that when there is any fluctuation of71

USD in the world, it will immediately affect USD/VND exchange rate and normarlly, in negativeway.
From the above analyses, Vietnam should obtain an exchange rate policy Band- Basket – Craw
(BBC) that ties the domestic currency to a group of strong foreign currencies of some countries
that Vietnam has the most close payment, commercial and foreign affair relations with such as
ERU, GBP, CAD, JPJ... to make payment and reserve and lay foundation for exchange rateadjustment. If so, stability of norminal exchange rate will be boosted and risk of exchange rate
fluctuation will be limited.
+ Step by step boosting Vietnam dong prestige, faciliating VND to be a convertible currency.
Now, Vietnam dong hasn’t been highly evaluated in the international financial and monetary
market. Therefore, almost all international payment activities between Vietnam and othercountries are made in USD (making up more than 70%) and a few other foreign currencies.
Accordingly, responsibility of the State Bank and the entire economy in improving Vietnam
dong prestige is so important. In term of current balance, free convertibility of domestic
currency will help national export and import more eventful, boost competitiveness of domestic
enterprises and approach of export goods to the international market. In term of captial
transactions, currency convertibility can have great impact on attracting foreign investment,
restricting dollarization which is so popular in Vietnam now.
Besides, free convertible currency can reduce direct intervention of the government in exchange
rate management policy and in term of exchange rate management, facilitate it to be more
effective.
3. The third lesson

Healthy financial institution system is the decisive factor for a stable and sustainablefinancial and monetary market.
The collapse of “bubble” economy in late 1980s was the crucial and direct cause of the Japanese
long-lasting economic slowdown and put an end to the miraculous development period of thesun-set country. It was the harsh time for the Japanese economy; although the Japanese
government and BOJ had made many efforts, in early 1990s, the economic growth rate was still
low while the financial-monetary system was nearly frozen. Under the government’s strong
overprotection policy toward financial institutions, strict and rigid regulations on exchange
management as well as reserve effects of low interest rate and yen appreciation policy (easy credit
financing and capital market gaps) made the Japanese financial and monetary market turn into
wrong direction, lose stability of a healthy financial and monetary market. All of the above
problems placed Japanese economy under request of a thought revolution and a structuralchange after many years of miraculous development

72

With goal of reforming the financial and monetary system in direction that made organizations
healthy and rehabilitated intermediate financial institutions, the reform focused on the following
issues:1/ Non-performing loan settlement
The low interest rate in early 1990s resulted in raging lending and risky investments such as realestate. The day by day increasing backlog overdue debt with devaluated collaterals upset Japan,
pushed financial institutions on verge of mass bankruptcy. To save the situation:*/ Japanese parliament passed by law on asset turn-over nominated by companies to set legal
foundation for financial institutions to comfortably liquidate over-due loans through debt
securitization.
*/ The government forced private banks and Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC)
to sell their loans at reasonable prices.
*/ The government issued new auditing mode to improve banks’ financial transparency,
especially for over-due debts.
*/ The government sold bad debts to foreign financial organizations. In two financial years, 1997
and 1998, the foreign financial organizations bought about 1,572.5 billion yen of over-due debts
from Japanese banks. Besides redemption and merge, in February, 1998, GE Capital of theUnited States bought Toho Life Insurance Company and in January, 1999, Daihyaku Life
Insurance Company was purchased by Canada Manulife Financial.
Table 3.1: Loan Sales of Japanese banks in fiscal years 1997 and 1998
Unit: billion Yen
Fiscal
year
1
9
9
7

1
9
9
8

BuyersSellers

Goldman Sachs & Co
Sumitomo Bank
Bankers Trust Co và Deustche Bank
Crown Leasing Co
Goldman Sachs & Co
Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi
Lone Star Opportunity Fund LP
Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi
Unknown
Sanwa Bank
Merrill Lynch & Co, Lone Star Opporrtunity Fund
Sakura Bank
LP
Secured Captital Corp., Credit
Mitsui Trust & Banking Co
Suisse First Boston
Sumitomo Bank
Daiwa Securities America Inc., J.P.Morgan & Co
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi
Merrill Lynch & Co, Lone Star Opporrtunity Fund
Sanwa Bank
LP
Merrill Lynch & Co, Lone Star Opporrtunity Fund
Fuji BankLP
Unknown
Daiichi Kangyo Bank
Unknown
Sumitomo Bank
(Source : The Nikkei Weekly, March ,1999)
73

Value
40,0
280,0
12,5
20,0
150,0
400,0
130,0
100,0
100,0
30,0
50,0
200,0
60,0

*/ The government decided to build a public fund of 60 thousand billion yen to assist
financial institutions to solve problems in bad debt settlement.
Figure 3.1: The distribution plan of 60 trillion Yen public fund.

Government

Deposit insurance organizations

7,000 billion Yen – bonds issue
53,000 billion Yen- Banks- Private financial
Institutions

Specialprofessionalfunds

To protect customers
in case of bankrupt offinancial institutions

Financialrebuild FundTo refund forintermediate banks

Financial
Consolidationfund

To consolidate financial
institutions( Source : Niho Keizai Shinbun, October,1998)
In Vietnam, the debt of financial banks, especial state banks, has been a big problem. The bad
debt settlement is given priority to the banking reform and improving banking system.
According to calculation, the result of banking reform in previous years has solved 60% overdue debt, reduced the bad debt from 14% in 2000 to 5% in 2005. However, according to IMF“over-due debt of Vietnamese banks is about 40% of total debit account, 8 times higher than
accepted level, in which 58% over-due debt is unrecoverable”. Thus, Vietnamese banks have to
make more risky reserve fund that affect to national budget and salary.
In order to solve bad-debt, it is necessary to establish a debt dealing company that independent
with commercial banks. This kind of company was setup before but it was depend oncommercial banks, thus it could not make bad debt settlement effectively. In addition, it should
separate policy lending and commercial lending. Finally, in credit policy, the mechanism of“asking-giving” has already existed for many decades, especially in the state enterprises. Those
enterprises are often given priority in both amount of debt and interest rate. It is not a fair gamefor SMEs and private enterprises.
2/ Transparency improvement, financial disclosure and inspection and risk prevention reinforcement*/ To restore confidence of both domestic and foreign investors, since March, 1998, financial
institutions must disclose their bad debts in consistence with standards of U.S. Securities and74

Exchange Commission (SEC). If they violated financial disclosure rules, they would be punishedin accordance with Japanese financial system reform law issued on March, 1999.
*/ In June, 1998, Financial Services Authority (FSA) was founded to supervise financial andmonetary market veraciously based on clear principles. In addition, FSA was also allowed bybanking law to request financial institutions to report self-inspection result; based on this, FSA
would consider and set out suitable solutions.
Solutions implemented by Japan as stated above transformed the Japanese financial system fromrisky, nontransparent market into a discipline, safe and reliable one.
In case of Vietnam, it lacks of clear regulations and specific actions in risk prediction and market
management and control to prevent negative external effects, in all circumstances, to the market.
Learning from Japan, Vietnam should foremost promote role of the National Financial
Supervisory Commission (NFSC) ( founded in…); intensify periodic check of financial reports
and real business performance of financial institutions; apply suitable international standards
when monitoring bank’s performance (Basel principle II). Banks can be free to operate but mustmeet three conditions: (1) sufficient capital, (2) reliable risk guarantee system and (3) market
principle conformity and information transparency. Besides, Vietnamese commercial bankshould actively build information system for management and risk prevention, don’t let grass
grow under feet like now.
3/ Purge, strengthening and settlement of financial institution’s bankruptcy
Economic depression led to collapse of series of financial institutions: many banks couldn’t meetcapital ratio as required, lose liquidity, while many others were on verge of bankruptcy.
Therefore, a series of prevention and settlement methods were carried on by the government:*/ The urgent adjustment program, backbones of prevention methods applied from September,1998 for banks who didn’t apply capital ratio, included three steps: firstly, requiring banks to
improve business conditions; secondly, forcing banks to follow methods as regulated by thegovernment; and thirdly, in case the situation got no improvement, requesting banks to stopbusiness.
*/ Finance additional conditional capitals to financial institutions who were capable to survive.
Applications for financing through share or stock purchasing or for additional loans must be
submitted to and examined by relevant authority. By early 1999, 13 among 15 Japanese largebanks were officially financed with the total capital of 7459 thousand billion yen (Index 5-3). In
returns, these banks must accept some conditions of the financial reconstruction committee suchas: cut twenty thousand jobs, closed 13% of their branches. Regardless of these conditions, after
these organizations were financed, their capital safety ratio went up to 11% (the ratio of equal or
above 8% was considered to be healthy). This result shows efficiency of implemented methods
and they are valuable lessons for Vietnam75

*/ For financial institutions which were on verge of bankruptcy, FSA would nominate its staff tobear management in these organizations as well as find private banks who accepted to purchaseor took over them. In case of not finding purchaser, FSA would transfer them to a deposit
insurance agency to settle. There were two settlement forms for financial institutions which came
bankrupt. First was to nationalize them into special public management banks and then sell them
to a private financial institution (Japan long-term credit bank and Nippon Saiken bank were
nationalized temporally in late 1998). Second was to transfer them into bridge banks and then,after two years, sell them to a private organization and in case no private organization wanted tobuy, the bridge banks would be dissolved in consistence with normal bankruptcy procedures.
In case of Vietnam, purge, strengthening and cleaning up financial institutions should begin by:*/ Reorganizing banking system in the direction that decreases quantity by rearranging joint
stock commercial banks; disposing, disclosing poor performance banks, merging inefficientbanks (in term of legal capital and administrative ability) into large banks to form financial
banking group which have high competitiveness in regional and international scale; not allowing
widely economic groups to establish commercial banks direct under them (Petrolimex bank, FPTbank) because once being manipulated by holding groups, these banks can be easily pushed tounsafe and highly risky situation.
*/ Improving financial ability for Vietnamese commercial banks. Compared with othercommercial banks in the world, the largest difficulty of Vietnamese commercial banks lays in its
internal force. With humble infrastructure, small capital scale, underdeveloped technology,
limited human resource and others, Vietnamese financial institutions are so vulnerable to strong
foreign banks now available in the market. By 2007, average own fund of a state-owned
commercial bank is 4,200 billion Vietnam dongs and the total amount of five state commercialbank only equal to that of a medium regional bank. Legal capital of Agricultural and Rural
Development Bank is at highest level with 5,000 billion VND, the Trade and Industrial Bank
with 2,500 billion VND. Average capital safety ratio of Vietnamese commercial bank is still low(below 5%), while as required by the State Bank and international practices, it must be 8%.
(Source: Doctor Le Quoc Ly ‘Vietnamese commercial bank development in integration context’,August, 2007). It should be noted that market shares of state owned commercial banks make up
75% of market-mobilized capital and 73% of credit market.
Thus, in order to ensure the minimum safety rate based on international standard (8% owned
capital/ total asset), the supplement capital must be 10,000 billion VND to ensure the averagedebit balance at 18% per year.
4/ The Japanese financial Big Bang is an important reform which set firm legal foundation for the recovery anddevelopment of a free, equal, active and integrated financial market.
One of the reasons of disturbance of the Japanese financial market in financial crisis period isthat there were so many regulations for financial institutions. These regulations bound andrestricted efficiency of activities in monetary market and became a barrier for transactions76

between domestic and foreign investors. Big Bang program with 8 contents was promoted
strongly and really brought back an absolute change, marking an opening for the harshcompetition and mutual elimination between Japanese banks and other western financial
institutions, especially ones of the United States, England, Germany and so on.
Vietnamese financial market now is repeating what Japan experienced. There are so many
overlapping legal documents and regulations, in which new ones continue to be issued with
contents denying that of the still valid old ones. In addition, many documents are not suitablewith integration requirements such as law on credit institutions, insurance business law…
Besides, to prevent the negative sides of financial liberalization, the Vietnamese government
needs to build a legal frame for foreign intermediate financial institutions which consists oftechnical barriers suitable with international practices and ensure the implementation ofinternational commitments on financial liberalization.
4. The fourth lesson

Close relationship between “main bank” and enterprises in capital allocation is an
important factor directly affecting Japanese economic growth rate.
Main bank system was originated before the war but became well-known only when newbanking law was born in 1928 and set out “one bank in one prefecture” principle. When eachbank was assigned self-control in one certain area, they created a close relationship withenterprises, regularly checking and capital financing to business of enterprises especially in themost difficult period. Not limited to capital financing, Japanese commercial banks were also
good consultants for enterprises about market information, risk anticipation methods andbusiness planning. This relationship was more strengthened when the Japanese government
made strong intervention by applying system of central control of financial resources, in which
BOJ played a central role. The government also carried out low interest rate policy in 1950s and1960s to help recover the economy in post-war period and create good conditions for the stabledevelopment of financial market.
All is reversed in Vietnam. In many years, Vietnamese commercial banks haven’t defined its roleas efficient supporter for enterprises. The situation can be explained that banks are special
business form and operate foremost for their own profits. Although it can be interpreted
through names of four large state-owned commercial banks (Joint stock commercial bank forforeign trade of Vietnam, Vietnam joint stock commercial bank for industry and trade, Vietnam
agriculture and rural development bank, and Bank for investment and development of Vietnam– now, two among these four banks have been capitalization) that each bank has own specificduty in its economic sector. However, in context of increasingly harsh competition nowadays,
the said interpretation about economic zoning becomes so uncertain. The government (the State
Bank) hasn’t applied “job assignment” principle for banks or regularly assisted banks throughcapital refinancing or low-interest rate like in Japan. Therefore, relationship between banks andenterprises in Vietnam isn’t so close; banks don’t perform for benefit of enterprises and their77

relationship, if any, is still customer relationship and for profits and safety of financial institution
only. Banks haven’t really cared about efficiency of their loans and enterprise’s businessperformance who are their customers. Moreover, capital allocation for economic sectors is notreally fair. Nowadays, state-owned commercial bank system makes up the majority in term ofboth scale and market share: 6 state-owned commercial banks now contribute up to 70% of
mobilized capital and credit (See in table 2), and normally, they crucially lend state-owned
enterprises; so it is hard for small and medium enterprises to approach their official capitalsources.
This fact creates many difficulties in shifting bank system’s operation to basis of real commerceto establish a fair play ground in banking field. The boom credit of Vietnamese commercial
banks has been increased in recent years, in which credit balance in 2007 accounted for 95% of
the GDP and nearly 100% in 2009, mainly focusing on state-owned enterprise loans. It isdifficult for successful businesses to borrow working capital. By contrast, the venture investment
activities with high level of speculation have been given more priority. Besides, large state
enterprises who contribute its capital to the majority of joint-stock banks, can exploit state assets
such as land and natural resources by getting advance in debt. More worryingly, the economic
corporations expanded their abuse and make lucrative on young finance companies
Table 3.2: Bank’s market shares in Vietnam (in late 2000)

Military commercial
banks
Joint stock commercial
banks
Branches of foreignbanks and joint venture
banks
People’s credit fundNumber of
institutions
6

Mobilized capital (% ofthe total system)
73.0

Credit (% of thetotal system)
71.2

48

10.6

10.5

30

15.0

16.5

948

1.4

1.8

(Source: Bank magazine – No. 8-2002)
This situation made many difficulties in the changing progress of banking system whichbased on the basic of trade and fair competitiveness in banking sector.
5. The firth lesson

Be patient on Public Financial System Reform
The characteristic of Japanese financial system shows that Public Financial System (PFS) has
played important role in economic development for many years. However, it is also criticized for
ineffectiveness and being prerogative as government institutions. At this time (2005), theKoizumi Cabinet was trying to persuade Cabinet council to conduct PFS reform plan. Finally,
this plan was approved by Senate in October 2005, remaining in 10 years from 2007.
78

Japanese PFS has been known as Fiscal Investment and Loan Program system (the FILP
system). Before the fundamental reforms in 2001, FILP system took the form of a huge indirectfinancial system. In this system, there were 2 financial models with different function. The firstmodel has function of accepting funds, named Entrance Organization, including Postal Savings,
Postal Life Insurance, Employees’ Pension Insurance and the National Pension Fund. At the endof fiscal year (FY 2000), this model was accounted for 90% of PILP funds. The second model
plays the role in fund investment, named Exit Organization. The formal name of this model is“FILP agencies” which have been owned by the Government.
In the old system, the Trust Fund Bureau (TFB) in Ministry of Finance functioned as a fundmanager. The Postal Savings, Employees’ Pension Insurance and National Pension Fund has
responsibility to send all reserve fund to this Bureau, while the reserve fund of Postal Life
Insurance was managed by Minster of Ministry of Post and Communication in the collaboration
with FILP. A large part of TFB was invested with FILP agencies; the rest was with Japanese
government bonds (JGBs).
FILP system was established in 1955 and as reportedly, made good effect in the fast economic
growth period (1950s- mid 1970s). However, it was also criticized because out of control theamount of absorb funds that Entrance Organization received. In addition, although there wasclear difference between function and objective of General Budget and the FILP Fund, they
have a close relation. People criticized that the complex twists between those funds havepromoted economic growth in public areas. This also contributed into the reform of publicfinancial system.

Main causes of public financial reform
1/ The Ballooning Public Financial Sector.
Starting by the finish of high economic growth, the fund supply with large scale happened withalmost Japanese industrial sectors. Early 1979, there was a abrogation of financial regulations
implemented before 1970s. Many corporation and big companies that had acquired enoughcapital from bank or local started to diversify their financial instruments. However, there weremany private banks facing with difficulties. In order to avoid negative impact in future’s
management, some large urban and regional banks turned to stock market and real estate. It ispity that the private banks could not made their benefit dream come true with the collapse offinancial “bubble” at early 1990s.
Ignoring the difficulties faced by private banks, public financial organization was criticized
depending on the Government’s support to limit opportunities of private financial organizations.
If the transition of the scale of FILP in 1955 only gained 0.3 trillion Yen, this number in 1965
was 1.6; 9.3 in 1975; 20.9 in 1985, 40.2 in 1995, 39.3 in 1999, and 37.5 in 2000.
2/ Lack of mechanism79

As analysed, the capital of FILP was shaped based on annual plan of the Government. However,the deposit of Postal Savings or contract of Postal Life Insurance was not counted in this system.
Besides, the disadvantage of mechanism was related to the risk in interest rate in which money
borrowed at low interest rate was paid at the time of high interest rate. This problem madesystem’s branches invested in repaid funds at low interest rate and obviously suffered aunfavourable interest rate differences.
3/ Negative impact on productivity and capital market
The public financial system has the function to support industrial sector in expanding production
and provide necessary capital for industrial development. However, the support for FILP such as
interest rate subsidization, tax preference did not encourage target production sector but reduce
their productivity.
In addition, it is realized that public financial system was not effective because it did not follow
the regulation of market mechanism.
Though the public financial system reform has not yet brought a great result but it made theobjective of this system more clear and a new method for Japanese enterprises approach capitalsources for development and production.
This lesson has significant practical value for Vietnam because:*/ The Government directly manage the public financial sector- The investment of State is high but the contribution to the growth is still low- There is a unbalance in FDI in areas and sectors. The investment in tourist significantly
reduced in compared with previous years.
- The government expenses still rambling and subsidized. The investment is not effective andwasteful. The public financial sours has been misused.
*/ For the deposit market- Although the deposit and capital mobilization market develop relatively fast in the recent
period in many forms with diversified and various products, the economy in general can’t affordenough capital. Idle money of population floating in free market is still high.
- It lacks of a persuasive mechanism and policy that makes population change their attitude andplay role as an economic engine in bank deposits. Moreover, in writer’s opinion, similar to Japanof previous years, even when source of the postal savings system of households is deposited in acommercial bank, it is necessary that the State controlled allocation and made decisions on
investment. To do this, the government or financial institutions should define fixed profits forhousehold deposit products as well as insure financial risks.
- Almost all of savings from populations consigned in banks are for interests; they are depositedeven in periods of high inflation or domestic currency devaluation, because people don’t have80

any other choice. Besides, sectors which can be invested such as real estate or especially stock
exchange usually change in negative directions, causing risks and unfavourable conditions forinvestors.
- Along with capital mobilization acceleration, banks should pay special attention to credit
quality. One recent fact is that banks tend to lend more easily, leading to higher risks. To restrictlending boom, a part from financial institution’s customer cautious inspection and classificationand loan safety evaluation, the State Bank should consider about regulations on compulsory
reserve ratio or increase regulations on acceptable risks. Coordination methods between the StateBank and financial institutions will abate pressure of capital flows and improve vulnerability ofbanking system.
The solution for those issues is ensuring savings and the effectiveness of public financial
expenses. It is necessary to enhance revenue source through development of production,
domestic income increase, and tax reform. The state enterprises and commercial banks should be
privatized based on market mechanism, especially unprofitable enterprises.

81

CONCLUSION
Having analyzed the situation of the Vietnam’s financial market before and after“ doi moi“ wehave come to understand that, Vietnamese financial system is stil young and vulnerable toexternal environment and inexperienced of self- defense. However, struggling with manydifficulties from the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis 2008,
Vietnam has drawn a lot of valuable lesson from developed and experienced countries in thewold and has implemented some tools to stabilize the financial market and rescued the economy.
The Japanese financial system has successfully passed economic problems related to deflationand the risk of tremendous frozen capital during the period. The Bank of Japan had approachedmany suitable and special monetary and financial policies such as reducing target interest rates tozero, expecialy the reform program, such as reform of Public Financial System to stabilize anddevelop the economy.
Based on the current policy analysis and experiences getting from Japan this paper has drawn 5
lessons for Vietnam, such as:-It is important to define the independent role of the State Bank in market management andregulation and the Government shouldn’t intervene excessively- The monetary policy management mechanism should be flexible and efficient.
- Healthy financial institution system is the decisive factor for a stable and sustainable financial
and monetary market. Healthy financial institution system is the decisive factor for a stable andsustainable financial and monetary market.
- Close relationship between “main bank system” and enterprises in capital allocation is an
important factor directly affecting Japanese economic growth rate.
- Be patient on Public Financial System Reform.
This paper also intends to provide some policy suggestion to stabilize and develop Vietnam’s
financial market. The author hope that the financial market will be successful in near future in
Viet nam.

82

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General Statistic Office of Vietnam: http://www.gso.gov.vn

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