ISARIBI NO.87

ISSN1346-2512

ISARIBIJapan
Fisheries
Association Fishing Fire漁火

NO. 87, SEPT. 2015
Sankaido Bldg.,
9-13 Akasaka 1, Minato-ku,
Tokyo, Japan 107-0052
tel: 81-3-3585-6683
http//www.suisankai.or.jp

Views and Opinions of Japan’s Fisheries Industry

President’s message

Restoration from the DisasterF

our years have passed since the Great East Japan
Earthquake on March 11, 2011. The damage tofisheries amounted to 1.3 trillion yen, almost allof which was covered by the government’s budget.
Thanks to efforts made by those in the fishing industry,almost all sunken fishing ports (90%) have beenleveled up and nearly all fishing vessels (mainly small
vessels) have been restored (90%). This has resulted infish landings recovering to more than 80% of the predisaster level.
However, on the processing and distribution front,
restoration of lost sales channels has been slow due toa number of problems, including shortages of humanresources and ingredients. Only half of processing/
distribution businesses have managed to increase
their production capacity to more than 80% of theirpre-disaster level, and only 40% have boosted their
net sales to over 80% of their pre-disaster level. The
smaller the business scale, the slower the speed ofrecovery. Restoration efforts are still needed.
To restore the fishery processing industry in disasterhit areas as early as possible and regain lost sales
channels, we must take on new challenges based on
innovative ideas in addition to reviving processing
facilities and carrying out other conventional initiatives.
Specifically, we should host business negotiation
meetings for fishery and fishery processing businesses
in disaster-hit areas to address domestic seafood
demand, and support export promotion to promotedemand outside Japan.
On June 16 and 17, the Japan Fisheries Association
hosted an exhibition/business negotiation event in
Sendai for fishery businesses in disaster-hit areas. Our
aim was to help fishery processing businesses regain
and expand their sales channels and increase sales.
At the same time, the accident at the Fukushima
nuclear power plant is continuing to cause concern for
consumers due to leakage of contaminated water, andgroundless negative rumors are a serious obstacle to

JFA head Shirasu (center) visits a restored fish market in thedisaster area

the restoration of fisheries.
Fishermen have made tremendous efforts to conductongoing rigorous monitoring of radioactive cesium and pilot
fishery operations offshore of Fukushima. This is leading
to expansion of the fishing zone and more marketable fish
species.
The Japanese government is working to eliminate or
mitigate import restrictions imposed by other countries
against Japanese seafood. The Japan Fisheries Association
has also leveraged every opportunity available, including
Fishing Industry Consultations, FAO and other internationalsettings, to provide explanations on the safety of Japanese
seafood. As a result of these efforts, the international
community is showing increased understanding, and there
are signs of movement toward easing or lifting of therestrictions.
However, South Korea has been strengthening its import
restrictions since September 2013. In response, theJapanese government launched a complaint with the WTO
in order to expedite a solution, claiming that South Korea’s
actions violate the WTO agreement.
Japan will continue to rigorously monitor its seafood and

ISARIBI: First published by the Japan Fisheries Association in October 1992.
JFA President: Toshiro Shirasu; Editor: Masashi Nishimura

ISARIBI NO.87

SEPT. 2015

strive to prevent contaminated products from entering
the market.
In any case, Japan’s worldwide recognition for beinga major seafood supplier cannot be regained withoutachieving full restoration from the disaster. In addition
to providing consumers with a stable supply of seafood,the fisheries industry shoulders the important role ofsustaining local communities and developing national
land in a well-balanced manner. To fulfill this role, it
is crucial for the industry to attract people to local
areas and revitalize their regional fisheries industry by

widely publicizing their fishery resources and local foodspecialties.
The northern Pacific Ocean offshore Sanriku is said
to produce the highest amount of seafood among theworld’s top three fishing grounds. The area is indeed a “seaof treasure.” We must make the most of its abundantfishery resources to expand demand for seafood in andoutside Japan. At the same time, we should promote
tourism by leveraging seafood to attract people to andinvigorate local regions.

2015 Japan-Russia salmon fishery talks

Japan-Russia negotiations over salmon driftnet fisheries
in Russia’s EEZ for 2015
Yoshiyuki Shige, Managing Director
Japan Fisheries Association

Negotiations between Japan and Russia oversalmon driftnet fisheries by Japanese fishingvessels within Russia’s exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) for 2015 opened in a considerably strained
atmosphere, unlike the negotiations in past years,
because of the following turn of events.
First and foremost, one can point to the everi n t e n s i fy i n g s t r i f e w i t h i n R u s s i a c a u s e d b y t h edifferences of interest among regions in Russia as
well as the differences in fishing methods. This was apolitical confrontation at the central government-levelin Moscow between Sakhalin State--where driftnet
fisheries constitute the mainstay of salmon fishing (aswith Japanese fishermen)--and Kamchatka State-where coastal salmon catches largely depend on set-net
fisheries.
To date, Kamchatka State is lobbying the Moscow
government that driftnet fisheries should be prohibited
because the catch by set-net fisheries has been affectedby the stock decline caused by the catch of salmon in
the offshore area by driftnet fishing vessels. Sakhalin
State, on the contrary, insists that such an assertion is afalse accusation lacking scientific grounds. This disputehas continued, time after time, over the past years.
In face of this confrontation, Moscow had taken anegative stance toward the view supporting a ban
on driftnet fisheries on the grounds that the overall
production in set-net fisheries had been growing
smoothly and Russian scientific institutes are of theview that there is no problem of a salmon stock decline.
Further, the Russian President’s Office and the Foreign
Ministry have considered that a cautious approach tothis issue is necessary because the driftnet fisheries are
related to the fisheries relationship with Japan.
However, some new factors not observed in past years
emerged this year. First, the Senator who was the chiefflag waver for the driftnet ban in Kamchatka won to hisside the Speaker of the Russian Federal Parliament who
exerts strong influence in the Senate. This resulted inweakening the strength of the Parliament members from
Sakhalin who oppose the ban of driftnet fisheries.
Second, according to reports of the Russian mass
media, the proponents of the ban gained the strong
support of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) of
the United States that had earlier staged an extensive
campaign for the prohibition of driftnet fisheries on thehigh seas. Their stepped-up propaganda for the salmon
driftnet ban both in and outside the Russian Parliament-on a scale that had not been seen in the past--strongly
influenced the movement toward the ban.
The third factor was the shuffling of leadership within
the Federal Agency for Fishery (hereafter referred
to as the “Fishery Agency”). Andrei Krainy, who had
tremendous influence as the head of this independentagency, was ousted from his post. The Fishery Agency
was rearranged as a subordinate office of the Agriculture
Ministry, and Vice Minister Ilya Shestakov was named as achief of the agency. The new leaders, including Shestakov
himself, showed no understanding at all of the historical
diplomatic development of fisheries relations with Japan
nor to the past process of salmon fisheries negotiations.
The traditional views of the former negotiators at the
Fishery Agency and the Foreign Ministry were brushedaside, and the issue of salmon fisheries involving Japan

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ISARIBI NO.87
came to be handled based solely on
Russia’s domestic political situation.
For instance, the supporters of the banwere quite unacquainted with fish stock
science, and just parroted the unscientificclaims of conservationists supporting thedriftnet ban.
Earlier, the former leaders of theFishery Agency and researchers at thefisheries research institutes had claimed
from a scientific viewpoint that thesalmon stock is in a favorable conditionand opposed the claim of Kamchatka to
ban salmon driftnet fishing as misleading.
But they came to keep their mouths shutabout this issue once the new leaders of the Fishery
Agency set out their support of the driftnet ban bill.
The fourth factor was the deterioration of theinternational political climate surrounding the JapanRussia relationship. Last year, Japan joined in theeconomic sanctions against Russia, led by the European
Union and the U.S., in the wake of the annexation of
Crimea by Russia. At first, the domestic tenor of theargument within Russia did not regard Japan’s joining
in the sanctions as problematic as it could be a mere
gesture considering its relations with the U.S. However
the mood toward Japan took a turn for the worse fromaround the time when Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
turned down the invitation of President Vladimir Putin
to attend the ceremony marking the 70th Anniversaryof the Victory in World War II on May 9 in Moscow, andinstead chose to visit the U.S. to meet with President
Barrak Obama. By contrast, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry attended
the event in Moscow to meet with Putin. To make things
worse, Abe visited Ukraine, the country then openly
in conflict with Russia, around the time he attended
the summit meeting of seven industrialized nations inBrussels in June. The news of his talk with Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko was widely reported withphotos in the Russian media. Under such diplomatic
circumstances, it can be easily conjectured that theRussian government’s consideration for Japan--that had
once existed in the decision-making process regarding
the driftnet ban issue--has vanished into thin air.
On the domestic front in Russia, the Sakhalin State
government and salmon driftnet fishermen promoted
their lobbying activities enthusiastically to oppose thepassage of the driftnet prohibition bill in Moscow. The
Japanese government and particularly the Japanese
embassy in Moscow, on their part, acted on the Russianauthorities for this cause. Despite such efforts, however,President Putin signed the driftnet prohibition bill on
June 29. At the time of the passage of the bill, a highranking Russian government official expressed the viewthat this was not a retaliatory action against Japan’s
joining in the Western bloc’s economic sanctions.
Although it cannot be considered as a countermeasure

SEPT. 2015

against Japan’s sanctions, it is considered that, in an
overall perspective, political judgment should have largely
influenced the passage of the bill and the President’s
signature under the circumstances where there is no
problem with the fishery stock as such.
The annual Japan-Russia negotiations on Japan’ssalmon fishing in the Russian EEZ for 2015 opened at
the Fishery Agency in Moscow on May 14 amid thisunprecedented anomalous development over the driftnet
ban leading to its passage and signing by the President.
In the first place, setting of the opening date of thenegotiations on May 14 was exceptional. In previous
years, this consultation had customarily started in Marchor early April at the latest. Japan solicited Russia to set atime table for the negotiations, time after time, but Russia
did not respond. Late in April, Russia finally agreed to
begin the meeting on May 14. It can be well conjectured
that the Fishery Agency had been watching the course ofdeliberations on the salmon driftnet fishing ban bill thattook place at the Parliament from March to April.
Thus the start of the Japan-Russia negotiations in
Moscow over salmon fishing for 2015 was largely delayed
as compared with past years. At the meeting, the Russiandelegation insisted that terms of enforcement should
be discussed first, instead of fishing conditions, and left
the discussion to the officials of the Regulatory Divisionof the Fisheries Agency. As a result, discussion on thefishing conditions, including the catch quota, did not takeplace until May 20--one week from the start of the talks.
During the initial period, the discussion centered on thechange in the Russian enforcement scheme (i.e., the shift
from administrative supervisors to military inspectors)
which was apparently linked to Moscow’s anti-corruption
campaign in the Far East region.
The Russian negotiators representing the military staff(due to the change in the enforcement scheme) did nothave adequate knowledge on the fishing process, fish
species, and so forth, and tended to make proposals on
the implementation of rules that do not fit the actual
fishing situation. To this, Japan tried to explain the actual
fishing situation and sought understanding as muchas possible so that no obstacle may be created to theimplementation of the rules. In the end, despite somePage 3

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SEPT. 2015

difficult issues in terms of the principle, the Russians
agreed to cooperate in ways they considered feasible.
On the other hand, regarding the issues related tofishing conditions that fall under the responsibility of theFishery Agency, such as fishing fees, the catch quota,
the operation period and the number of fishing vessels,
the Russian side showed no gesture to positively
advance the consultations. It appeared as though themutual understanding that has been built over the years
by officials in charge of both countries on a working
level has utterly collapsed. The chief negotiator from the
Fishery Agency who represented the Russian delegation
did not seem to have any power to make decisions in
the negotiations. He tried to avoid specific discussions-which resulted in talking at cross-purposes. Only time
passed without producing any result. On top of that, theRussian head negotiator took a vacation in the chourseof the meeting and did not show up at the meeting.
The Director of the International Division of the Fishery
Agency, who was hastily arranged as the deputy chiefdelegate, took his place.
The meeting got into motion in the week of June 8-one month after the start of the meeting--when Russia
made a new proposal on fishing conditions in response
to Japan’s strong request to get the meeting going. An
agreement at this point would mean that the Japanesefishing vessels could start operation only from late Juneat the earliest. The medium-size fishing vessels (200-tonclass), which make the area off the Kamchatka Peninsula
as their main operation grounds, were compelled to giveup this year’s operation because most of salmon schools
have migrated past the area.
On the other hand, the small-size Japanese fishingvessels (30-ton class), which operate mainly in the area
closer to Japan, made clear their intention to operate
even from late June because the fishing grounds arenear, although the operation period was cut short. An
agreement was struck with Russia on June 11 for smallsize fishing vessels only (not including medium-size
vessels) by largely reducing the catch quota and fishingfees while the operation period was largely curtailed.
As stated in the foregoing, the Japan-Russia
negotiations over Japan’s salmon fishing in the Russian
EEZ ushered in a very severe result on the part ofJapanese fishermen. Due to the large delay of thestart of the fishing period because of diverse external
factors, both in Japan and Russia, that were beyond thefisheries relationship, the medium-size fishing vessels
had to give up their operation for this season, and thesmall-size fishing vessels had to accept a shorter fishing
period (half of that of ordinary years). Furthermore,
driftnet salmon fisheries within Russia’s EEZ will be
prohibited effective from January 1, 2016 as a result of
the enactment of the driftnet ban law. This will markthe end of traditional salmon driftnet fisheries in the
North Pacific which have been conducted from pre-war
days. The Japanese government now faces the need tobring relief to the salmon driftnet fishermen and landing

communities (such as Nemuro) that will be hit hard by the
Russian ban.
The difficult negotiations for this year that generated
unprecedented results can be summarized as follows.
1. Political pressures within Russia had a stronger
influence over dealing with domestic fisheries issues
conventionally administered by a group of fishery experts
at the Fishery Agency, and changed (or distorted) thenational policy toward fishery stock management andthe management scheme itself. For this reason, theconsistency of Russia’s fisheries policy was weakened, andad-hoc measures based on political judgment came to betaken.
2. As a result, with the support of foreign conservationgroups, the political propaganda promoted by fishermen in
Kamchatka, and politicians who support it, suppressed thescientific view on the fishery stocks within the government,
leading to the passage of a bill that incorporates views notbacked by scientific evidence and data.
3. This issue, in one respect, is a domestic issue ofRussia, but conservation groups intervened and succeeded
in enacting the driftnet ban bill through political clout onan unscientific basis. In order not to repeat this mistake,fishing nations should solidly establish their scientific stock
management for the survival of fisheries, and increase
supporters for fisheries both domestically and overseas,with the aim to ensure implementation of measures toavoid unscientific interventions by conservation groups on
fisheries issues.

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An outline of the result of Japan-Russia
negotiations on Japan's salmon catchwithin Russia's EEZ for 2015
(1) Catch volume: 1,961.75 tons (6,663 tons
in 2014)
Sockeye: 503.31 tons (2,886 tons)
Chum: 1,309.48 tons (3,485.4 tons)(2) Number of fishing vessels: 19 (small-size
vessels)(38 vessels: 20 small-size vessels and
18 medium-size vessels)(3) Catch allocation per vessel: 103.25 tons
(150 tons for 19-ton vessels; 164 tons for 29ton type vessels)(4) Fishing fee: Approx. 600 million yen(approx. 2 billion yen)
(5) Fishing period: June 27-July 27, 2015
(June 1-July 31, 2014)