30

McCrae, Scratching Beneath the Phenomena

Scratching Beneath the
Phenomena: P4C as the Practiceof Comparative Philosophy
JAMES MCRAE

In their essay, “Saving the Phenomena,” Ji-yuan Yu andNicholas Bunnin argue for an Aristotelian method ofcomparative philosophy in which seemingly incommensurable systems of thought can engage in a constructive dialogue with one another. The practice of Philosophy
for Children provides an opportunity to both teach and actively pursue a critical, philosophical inquiry in a dynamic
dialectic with other people. In this paper, I argue that Philosophy for Children is a method of engaged comparative
philosophy according to the Aristotelian comparative
method of Saving the Phenomenon outlined by Yu andBunnin. This essay is divided into two sections. In the first,
I offer a summary of Yu and Bunnin’s notion of Saving the
Phenomena, along with a critique of the possible limitationsof this method of comparative philosophy. In the second
section, I describe Philosophy for Children as it is practiced
by Thomas Jackson at the University of Hawaii and offer an
explanation of how this practice can be understood as the
dynamic application of Saving the Phenomena. By offering
an arena in which both children and adults can engage in acreative, philosophical dialectic, philosophy for children
can be understood as the active practice of the Aristotelian
method of comparative philosophy.
Saving the Phenomena
Yu and Bunnin argue that the discipline of comparative
philosophy can be understood according to the Aristotelian
method of Saving the Phenomena. Aristotle’s method is an
outgrowth of the Socratic dialectic, but, unlike Socrates,
Aristotle is not satisfied to let his dialectic end in aporia (nosolution). For Aristotle, bringing such aporiai to light isonly the first step; the philosopher must strive to reconcile
the differences in the apparently conflicting views that leadto aporiai. This is done through a three step process inwhich one first establishes the phenomena in question, thenanalyzes the conflicts between them, and finally seeks toreconcile the truth contained in each into a coherent andsystematic whole 1 .
The word “phenomena” comes from the Greek phainomena and refers to the commonly held beliefs of individuals in a particular context. Within the genus of phainomena is the differentia of eudoxa, which “includes views
which are not commonly accepted but are held by a small
number of wise people or even by a single wise person.”
Saving the Phenomena thus has two spheres of inquiry: it
can examine either commonly held beliefs or those views
endorsed predominantly by the wise. For Aristotle, comparative philosophy begins by bringing together views fromtwo (or more) philosophical traditions to see if there is acommon ground of “similar theoretical or practical concerns.” It is important to note, however, that this is not mereeclecticism; the goal of Saving the Phenomena is to reconcile the truth contained in different traditions, not to simply
make empty, superficial comparisons.2 Comparative philosophy as a discipline is often criticized for lacking a philosophical purpose. Aristotle circumvents this objection by
providing a practical value for comparative studies. By analyzing and comparing various philosophical traditions, we
can discover the relative strengths and weaknesses in these
traditions and seek to ameliorate our own philosophicalviews.
“Establishing Comparable Phenomena”
The first step in Saving the Phenomena is to determine
whether a comparison is possible between two points ofview or philosophical systems. Although two phenomena
might seem quite similar, it is necessary to determine
James McCrae (jemcrae@aol.com) is a Ph.D. candidate in comparative philosophy at UH/Manoa. His specialties include ethics and thephilosophy of the person. He has worked with P4C for the past year
as a graduate teaching assistant and has used P4C methodology forthe past two years in teaching undergraduate philosophy courses.

Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 17, Numbers 1 & 2

whether they indeed address “the same sort of theoreticaland practical issues.”3 One must not presuppose that a comparison exists because of superficial similarities of scope or
terminology. Furthermore, one must not impose the philosophical system of one tradition upon the other tradition
being compared. One should not try to fit Confucian ethics
into an Aristotelian box by striving to find the Confucianequivalents of the golden mean or the virtues of prudence,
wisdom, courage, and justice. Though both thinkers mightendorse systems of virtue ethics, these systems are uniqueand must be treated as such. Any similarities between the
two lie at a deeper level, and it would thus be irresponsible
to try to interpret one system according to the tenets of another.
“Articulating Differences”
After one has established that two systems contain similar comparable phenomena, one must seek to articulate thedifferences between these phenomena. It is at this stage that
one must systematically elucidate the aporiai, the“difficulties and contradictions that are presented to us by
the phenomena.”4 By clearly stating the tensions between
the traditions, one can seek either to resolve these tensions
or to explain why it is important that they cannot be resolved. Often, the differences between two traditions are
more interesting and more consequential than the similarities. There are three reasons for this. First, by articulating
the differences in two traditions, we avoid the constructionof straw-man fallacies or stereotypes. We strive to understand each tradition on its own philosophical terms andwithin its own socio-historical context, rather than interpret
all traditions according to our own philosophical schemes.
Second, by articulating the differences among traditions weare provided with multiple perspectives on a single philosophical issue. Third, this articulation of differences prompts
us to scrutinize our own views on the issue and question our
implicit assumptions that might otherwise have gone unexamined. Such a questioning goes both ways; each philosophical system brings to light the “elusive presuppositions”
of the other. 5“Saving the Truth in Comparable Phenomena”
After articulating the differences between phenomena
and using these differences to examine the implicit assumptions of each tradition, one must “save the truth” of the phenomena by synthesizing the eudoxa into a coherent, systematic whole. This final stage reconciles aporiai by appealing
to a more fundamental level of truth reflected in both traditions. Though each tradition might approach this truth, neither can convey the full meaning alone. It is only throughthe dialectic between multiple, alternative traditions that we
may uncover this truth. It is this final stage of Saving the
Phenomena that makes comparative philosophy more thanjust a historical discipline; by acting as a means throughwhich traditions might criticize and inform one another,31

comparative philosophy becomes a constructive discipline
capable of contributing new insights to the field of philosophy. Saving the Phenomena is more than just a simple synthesis of the valuable parts of two traditions. It is a “processof reworking and creating” in which the philosopher uses
his or her own unique insights to add to the synthesis of traditions.6
Problems With Understanding Comparative Philosophy
As Saving the Phenomena
Although Yu and Bunnin’s analysis of Saving the Phenomena is an extremely valuable comparative methodology,
its emphasis upon the pursuit of a single, fundamental Truthis potentially problematic. The notion of creativity that is sostrongly emphasized at the end of the article makes little
sense when Aristotle thinks there is one right answer to befound. While Aristotle’s methodology apparently encourages the pursuit of an Ultimate Truth, Yu and Bunnin seemto suggest that the goal of comparative philosophy is not toachieve one right answer, but to engage in a creative dialogue between traditions.
In his article, “Rationality and Traditions,” Eliot
Deutsch offers an understanding of truth in comparative
philosophy that solves this conundrum. Like Yu and Bunnin, Deutsch argues that comparative philosophy is a process of understanding another tradition on its own terms:
We inevitably bring our own “prejudices”
or predispositions to interpret and judge
what is initially alien to us, as these areinformed by our cultural and personal experience and then, through letting as far as
we can the other tradition speak to us in its
own terms, develop a negotiating process,as it were, between our prejudgmental
forms and patterns and the content andconceptual structures of that tradition. We
aim then to alter our prejudices in the lightof that negotiation or encounter. 7
This approach to comparative philosophy parallels Aristotle’s method of Saving the Phenomena in that by coming
to genuinely understand another tradition, we are forced to
critique our own views and creatively evolve. However,unlike Aristotle, Deutsch does not suggest that the goal ofcomparative philosophy is to produce a single, fundamental
Truth. Rather, it is possible that there might be many rightways of approaching the same problem.
Often, there is such a fine line between relativism andpluralism that dynamic pluralisms such as this are abandoned because they lack criteria through which one can distinguish the good views from the bad. As a result, many
philosophers, like Aristotle, end up endorsing a hard-line
view of truth that excludes all non-compatible claims.
Deutsch, however, offers a way out of this trap by suggesting criteria through which a dynamic pluralism might befounded through the elimination of invalid philosophical32

systems. He argues that there are exclusionary principles
that apply to truth such that we can exclude certain epistemic practices as fundamentally irrational and incapable ofproducing truth-knowledge. The law of non-contradiction is
one such exclusionary principle; without it, it is impossible
for rational discourse to take place at all. 8
Deutsch draws a distinction between two kinds of exclusionary principles. The first are foundational exclusionary
principles, which, when followed, wholly prevent an irrational system from engaging in rational discourse. A systemthat violates the law of non-contradiction cannot participate
in rational discourse because if everyone were free to contradict themselves at any time, dialogue would be impossible. The second type of exclusionary principle is operational: these principles define what constitutes sound reasoning within a particular, historically-embedded epistemic
tradition. Modern Western philosophy holds that a belief
system must be coherent, falsifiable, and sharable, but theseexclusionary principles might not be held by other, nonwestern traditions.9 To be a member of a particular community of inquiry, one must follow that community’s rules
for rational inquiry, rules that are delineated by operational
exclusionary principles.
Deutsch argues that the process of criticizing and evaluating beliefs takes place in two stages. The first stage determines whether the belief is rational according to the negative criteria of foundational and operational exclusionary
principles. If the belief is determined to be potentially trueby the first stage of analysis, it passes into a second stage inwhich the positive criteria for truth that are held by the particular community of evaluators are applied to the belief todetermine the degree to which it may be said to be true. 10
Stage One of Saving the Phenomena, in which both traditions are examined to see if a comparison is warranted, andStage Two, in which the traditions evaluate the validity of
one another’s arguments, can benefit from this notion of
exclusionary principles. If one of the traditions in question
violates the foundational exclusionary principles, a comparison is rendered impossible because the violative tradition does not qualify as philosophy. Once a comparison isdeemed possible, operational exclusionary principles dictate
whether the precepts of one tradition might be adopted by
the other.
These exclusionary principles lead to a dynamic pluralism in which rationally invalid theories are rejected, and yet
multiple rational theories can participate in a constructive
dialogue with one another. Deutsch’s notion of exclusionary principles allows us to engage in comparative philosophy without the demand that such comparisons result in asingle Truth. These principles allow us to explore a creative
pluralism without the danger of sliding into relativism. The
relativist assertion that comparative philosophy is impossible because all critiques are made on the basis of one’s own
culturally-embedded concept of truth is refuted by the notion of universal exclusionary principles that can be used asa basis for constructive criticism and dialogue between tra-McCrae, Scratching Beneath the Phenomena

ditions.11 Exclusionary principles allow us to enter into discourse, but do not suggest a single, right way to approach aparticular philosophical problem. In such a pluralism, the“process of reworking and creating” that Yu and Bunnin
describe becomes possible. As I demonstrate in the next
section, it is just this kind of creative, dynamic, and pluralistic comparative thought that is at the heart of the practiceof Philosophy for Children.
Philosophy for Children as Engaged
Comparative Philosophy
In this section, I argue that Philosophy for Children canbe understood as the practice of engaged comparative philosophy in the manner outlined in Section I. First, I give an
overview of Philosophy for Children as it is practiced byThomas Jackson in the Hawaii Philosophy in the Schools
Program. To elucidate the concept of a community of inquiry, I draw from David Bohm’s understanding of dialogue. Second, I explain how Philosophy for Children’s notion of inquiry can be understood as a dynamic practice ofcomparative philosophy.
Philosophy for Children as a Reflective
Community of Inquiry
1. Community
Thomas Jackson states that the practice of Philosophy
for Children12 involves the formation of a “reflective community of inquiry.”13 This consists of three main components: community, reflection, and inquiry. Jackson defines acommunity as “an intellectually safe place,” by which hemeans an environment in which people feel free to share
their ideas without fear of being mocked or verbally assaulted for expressing their beliefs. Without such safety, it
is impossible for a philosophical discussion to take place,since the participants in the discussion will, out of fear of
reprisal, be unwilling to contribute new, original, and creative ideas that deviate from the accepted norms of thinking.
Thus, an intellectually safe place is one that contains thefollowing four characteristics. First, all of the members of
the community must have respect for one another as persons. Second, it must be okay for a member of the community to ask any question or make any statement he or she
feels is relevant to the discussion. Third, there must be anappreciation for a diversity of viewpoints, no matter how
unconventional these views might be. Fourth, listening toothers is just as important as speaking—every member ofthe community must pay attention and respond to what theother members are saying, rather than simply trying to put
forward his or her own opinion.14
2. Reflection
A community must be reflective in the sense that it exhibits an “[e]xplicit, ‘metacognitive’, reflective, consciously

Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 17, Numbers 1 & 2

articulated awareness of the standards and criteria that are atwork in the community.”15 By metacognition, Jacksonmeans the constant self-awareness of the ways in which one
is thinking. The community must continually critique its
own ability to act as a community and to conduct a successful inquiry.
3. Inquiry
The type of inquiry pursued in Philosophy for Children
is “co-inquiry.” No individual in the group has the one,right answer to the question the group is pursuing. Rather,
the answer develops progressively as the whole group contributes to the discussion. However, the fact that everyone’s
point of view is heard and respected does not mean thateveryone’s point of view is right. This is why Jackson has
developed the Good Thinker’s Toolkit 16 as a methodology
for conducting productive inquiry. The Toolkit allows themembers of the community to examine each point of viewin detail according to the principles of sound reasoning.
A Philosophy for Children Session has two main goals:(1) to function well as a reflective community and (2) tohave a successful inquiry. The success of the inquiry is
judged on the basis of whether or not the community“scratched beneath the surface” of the issue, which can occur in three different ways. First, the community discovers
the complexity of the issue and is able to articulate theproblem it is discussing to a greater degree. Second, thecommunity is able to make connections between several
different ideas or viewpoints that are raised. Third, an answer emerges to the problem that is discussed. The Good
Thinker’s Toolkit is used specifically to assist this processof scratching beneath the surface, facilitating inquiry by offering a methodology through which constructive inquiry
might take place. 17 The Toolkit allows the community tocriticize specious arguments and identify valid points ofview among the many that are being compared.
David Bohm’s notion of dialogue is a helpful means ofunderstanding the kind of inquiry that takes place in a Philosophy for Children session. Bohm understands inquiry as
dialogue, which he defines as a creative stream of shared
meaning that exists between the members of a community.
Bohm contrasts this understanding of dialogue with“discussion,” by which he means an adversarial argument inwhich each person struggles to prove the superiority of hisor her own point of view. Whereas dialogue is about inquiry, discussion is about winning; in a discussion, only thebest orator is victorious, while in a dialogue, every memberof the community wins because the group’s efforts towards
inquiry produce an answer from which the whole community benefits.18 This reflects the importance of community
in Philosophy for Children. The goal of dialogue is not todebate a particular issue, but to scratch beneath the surfaceof that issue through a progressive, unified inquiry.
Why is it important to engage in a dialogue with otherpersons in the first place? Bohm argues that the power of a33

group is in its collective focus upon a specific issue. He
compares this power of focus to a laser beam. Ordinary, incoherent light consists of waves that are all moving in different directions, and is thus not particularly powerful. A
laser beam, however, consists of light that is coherent, inwhich all of the waves are focused in a single direction toachieve maximum strength. A community of thinkers, when
focused upon a single inquiry, can attain a level of philosophical power that is far beyond the capabilities of a groupengaged in disjointed, argumentative discussion.19
Bohm argues that the most basic component of dialogue
is the questioning of assumptions. We all have “basic assumptions” about the nature of the world and how we oughtto act in it, and we naturally defend these assumptions “withan emotional charge” when they are challenged. Bohm calls
such basic assumptions “opinions,” and he differentiates
between two different kinds of opinions. The first are rational opinions, which are based on evidence and solid argumentation. The second are unexamined opinions, which
are formed by the socio-cultural environment in which anindividual lives. These assumptions are not supported byevidence or argument, yet they are an integral part of ourself-identities, which is why we defend them so rabidly
when they are questioned. Such fanaticism leads to heateddiscussions and thereby prevents genuine dialogue fromtaking place. 20 The questioning of assumptions plays an essential part in a Philosophy for Children session. Community members use the [A] card to bring assumptions to lightand then employ the remaining six cards to determine
whether these assumptions are rational (based on evidence
and argumentation) or simply based on opinion alone. By
exposing irrational assumptions as soon as they are raised,
the community can remove them from the discussion andthereby maintain its focus on rational inquiry.
For Bohm, the purpose of dialogue is to first bring theassumptions of the group out into the open and then examine them from a neutral point of view:
Then what is called for is to suspend thoseassumptions, so that you neither carrythem out nor suppress them. You don’t
believe them, nor do you disbelieve them;
you don’t judge them as good or bad. You
simply see what they mean—not only yourown, but the other people’s as well….
This is part of what I consider dialogue—
for people to realize what is on eachother’s minds without coming to any conclusions or judgments. 21
On the surface, this view seems potentially problematic because it gives no criteria for judging which assumptions arebad and which are good. In Philosophy for Children, there
is a distinction drawn between inquiry and simply having a
conversation. Both involve a dialogue between members of
the community, but only the former contains within it themeans to determine which beliefs are valid and which arenot. If we only lay our beliefs on the table, we make no pro-

34

McCrae, Scratching Beneath the Phenomena

gress—the session is nothing more that an airing out of ourvarious assumptions. To truly have inquiry, we must scratch
beneath the surface to determine which of these assumptions are true and whether the arguments that are derived
from them are valid. Bohm does not offer any such criteria
for judging the truth-value of people’s assumptions. However, this is not to say that he does not have such criteria inmind. What is important here is that when an assumption israised by a member of the group, it is not immediately dismissed as ridiculous, no matter how unconventional it
might be. Often, another person’s point of view only appears outlandish because we are so set in our own ways ofthinking we are unwilling to consider alternative views.
We must cons ider each point of view raised by members of
the community as if it were true—we must give it our fullLevel of Inquiry Saving the Phenomena(Scratching
Beneath theSurface)
The Surface
Phenomena (eudoxa)
Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

respect and attention—and then use the community’s criteria for truth to determine whether, in fact, this is the case.
Philosophy for Children as Engaged
Comparative Philosophy
Philosophy for Children can be understood as the practice of engaged comparative philosophy according to themodified form of Saving the Phenomena I have outlined in
Section I of this paper. As Yu and Bunnin argue, Saving the
Phenomena takes place in three stages: Establishing Comparable Phenomena, Articulating Differences, and Saving
the Truth in Comparable Phenomena. A Philosophy forChildren session examines phenomena according to thissame procedure, though in practice there is a dynamic interplay between stages as the dialogue progresses. Table 1

Philosophy for Children

Examples from an Actual
Philosophy for Children
SessionStatement of Unquestioned Killing animals is wrong!
BeliefEstablishing
Framing the question. Es- QQ: Why is killing animals
Comparable Phenomena; tablishing multiple points of wrong?
Application of Foundational view in response to theQuestion: Is killing animals
Exclusionary Principles
question
wrong?
Multiple Points of View:• Killing animals is always
wrong• Killing animals is sometimes
wrong
Articulating Differences; Ap- Toolkit used to analyze mul- (W): Define terms
plication of Operational Ex- tiple points of view for truth (A): What assumptions are you
clusionary Principles
and validity.
making? Are they justified?
(R): Are there reasons for yourassumptions or are they justopinions?
(T): Is your point of view true?
(E): Can you give examples tosupport your point of view?
(I): Are you making valid inferences?
(C): Are there counterexamples to question certain
assumptions or inferences?
Saving the Truth in Compa- Keep good parts of previousKilling animals is sometimes
rable Phenomena; Creative beliefs, now justified bywrong for certain types of aniDialogue Amongst a Plural- good arguments. Creative mals and/or under certain cirism of Beliefs
synthesis of multiple points cumstances, but it is not alwaysof view.
wrong.

Table 1: Philosophy for Children as the Practice of Comparative Philosophy

Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 17, Numbers 1 & 2compares the stages of Saving the Phenomena to Philosophy for Children’s understanding of inquiry as scratching
beneath the surface.
The inquiry of a Philosophy for Children session often
begins at the level of the “surface” with the statement of aparticular belief. At this level, the belief is, as Bohm says,
an unquestioned assumption about a particular issue. In theright-hand column of the chart, I use an example drawn
from one of my recent sessions, in which we discussed themorality of killing animals. The session began with a statement made by one of the children that it is wrong to kill animals (a belief also
held by many adults,
including animal
rights activists andvegetarians). Here, aparticular phenomenon is established to
begin the inquiry.
Now, the dialogue moves into thefirst real level of inquiry. The statementthat has been given isrephrased as a question. Often, a statement is rephrased as
QQ, or a question
within a question.
“It’s wrong to kill
animals!” becomes“why is it wrong tokill animals?,” butthis type of question
is not yet sufficient
to begin an inquiry
since it relies upon
the assumption thatkilling animals is
wrong. The QQ is
stripped down to asingle question, freefrom assumptions,that frames the issue
at hand: “is it wrong
to kill animals?” At this point, other members of the community respond by stating their own points of view on theissue. This stage reflects the establishment of comparable
phenomena that specifically relate to the issue. Foundational exclusionary principles are used to weed out thosepoints of view that immediately violate the most basic lawsof reasoning. The multiple points of view, in this case, canbe grouped into three categories: (1) killing animals is always wrong, (2) killing animals is sometimes wrong, depending upon the animal and the circumstances, and (3)killing animals is never wrong. Since Hawaii represents a

35

true melting-pot of different cultures and traditions fromboth East and West, the children in the community provided
a multitude of different eudoxa on the issues. Once thesebasic eudoxa have been established, the dialogue moves
down into the second level.
At the second level of inquiry, the toolkit is used to critique the views established in Level One. This represents
the level of Articulating the Differences in Saving the Phenomena. Here, the toolkit functions as a set of operational
exclusionary principles to discard those aspects of a partic ular point of view that are problematic. Some points of viewmight be completely dismissed
because they arefound to be based
upon false assumptions. Others
might be only partially dismissed
and the community
builds upon thevalid aspects ofthese points ofview to construct a
response to thequestion. As Yu
and Bunnin state,“Each of a conflicting array ofphenomena cannot
be completely
right, but eachmight be partly
right. A view
would be rejectedby Aristotle if it
contradicted all thephenomena or wasincompatible with
universally endorsed beliefs.”22This process ofcritical examination leads to thethird stage of inquiry.
At the third level, the community draws from the var ious points of view that have been critically examined using
the toolkit to construct an answer to the question posed at
Level One. This level is comparable to the third level of
Saving the Truth in Comparable Phenomena in that it looks
to establish a creative synthesis of the valid points of multiple systems of belief. It is important to note that, as mentioned earlier, the goal of scratching beneath the surface canbe achieved in three ways: (1) the community finds that theissue is extremely complicated and that none of the phe-

36

McCrae, Scratching Beneath the Phenomena

nomena examined answer the question, (2) although a single answer does not develop, connections are establishedbetween different points of view, and (3) an answer to thequestion is formulated. Oftentimes, multiple points of vieware creatively synthesized into a single response to the question. However, it is not necessary that only one answer begiven. As Deutsch argues, it is possible to have a dynamic
pluralism of beliefs, none of which violate the exclusionary
principles of philosophy. Thus, it might be possible that two
or more “right” answers to the question are given at the endof the session.
One might object that, although Philosophy for Children
and Saving the Phenomena share a similar method of inquiry, Philosophy for Children is not comparative because it
does not draw from both Eastern and Western philosophicalsources. However, this objection is founded upon a misinterpretation of both comparative philosophy and Philosophy
for Children. There are two things that make a particular
philosophy comparative: (1) its methodology and (2) its
subject matter. As I have shown above, Philosophy forChildren shares a similar methodology to established formsof comparative philosophical inquiry. If this were the only
similarity, we could say that Philosophy for Children is amethod of comparative philosophy, though not necessarily
East/West comparative philosophy. This is why subject
matter is important. The Philosophy for Children programin Hawaii can be said to pursue comparative philosophy for
two reasons. First, Hawaii is a true melting pot of culturesfrom around the globe, including many Eastern and Pacificcultures. Every Philosophy for Children session thus includes viewpoints from children of a variety of bac kgrounds, and these points of view enter into a dynamic dialogue with each other through the process of inquiry. Second, the University of Hawaii at Manoa’s Department of
Philosophy focuses primarily upon comparative philosophy.
Thus, the teac hing assistants and professors that engage in
the Philosophy in the Schools Program are trained in East/
West comparative studies and can bring such content into
the Philosophy for Children sessions. It is important to notethat this is not necessarily a Hawaiian phenomenon; anyfacilitator can do this, regardless of his or her location.
Eastern concepts can be discussed by children in New Jersey as well as they can by kids in Honolulu. Eastern philosophy can be used as a source for eliciting “Plain Vanilla”
discussion questions in each session just as easily as Western sources. Thus, because it parallels comparative philosophy in both methodology and subject matter, Philosophy forChildren can be understood as a practice of comparative
philosophy.
In Conclusion
The inquiry of a Philosophy for Children session progresses in a manner similar to Aristotle’s three-stage process of Establishing Comparable Phenomena, Articulating
Differences, and Saving the Truth in Comparable Phenom-

ena. However, unlike Aristotle, Philosophy for Children
allows for the development of a creative dialogue amongst apluralism of beliefs, similar to Deutsch’s understanding ofcomparative philosophy. Thus, Philosophy for Children canbe understood as an engaged method of comparative philosophy according to a modified form of Aristotle’s Saving
the Phenomena.
Notes
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Yu, Ji-yuan and Nicholas Bunnin, “Saving the Phenomena: An
Aristotelian Method in Comparative Philosophy,” Two Roads to
Wisdom: Chinese and Analytical Philosophical Traditions, Ed.
Bo Mou (Chicago Open Court, 2001), p. 293.
Ibid. 295.
Ibid. 303-5.
Ibid. 306.
Ibid. 307-8.
Ibid. 310-12.
Deutsch, Eliot, “Rationality and Traditions,” The Empirical andthe Transcendental: A Fusion of Horizons, Ed. Bina Gupta(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 242-3.
Ibid. 245.
Ibid. 246-7.
Ibid. 247.
Ibid. 248-9.
Although it goes by the name “Philosophy for Children,” thismethodology can be readily used by adults to conduct inquiries
into a variety of different subjects. I have used many of Jackson’s techniques in teaching undergraduate ethics courses at the
University of Hawaii with extremely positive results.
Jackson, Thomas. Philosophy for Children, Philosophy in the
Schools Project: A Guide for Teachers (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii, 2001), p. 2.
Ibid. 2-3.
Ibid. 3.
For an explanation of the Good Thinker’s Tool Kit and the Plain
Vanilla procedure, please see Thomas Jackson’s article in thisvolume.
Jackson, 19-25.
Bohm, David, “On Dialogue,” Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children, 14.1 (1998), p.2.
Ibid. 4.
Ibid. 2-3.
Ibid. 6.
Yu and Bunnin, 299.

Bibliography
Bohm, David. “On Dialogue.” Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy
for Children. 14.1 (1998): 2-7.
Deutsch, Eliot. “Rationality and Traditions.” The Empirical and theTranscendental: A Fusion of Horizons. Ed. Bina Gupta. Oxford:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
Jackson, Thomas. Philosophy for Children, Philosophy in the
Schools Project: A Guide for Teachers. University of Hawaii,
2001.
Yu, Ji-yuan and Nicholas Bunnin. “Saving the Phenomena: An Aristotelian Method in Comparative Philosophy.” Two Roads to Wisdom: Chinese and Analytical Philosophical Traditions. Botton, ed.
Open Court, 2001.