(Field Survey: May 2007)
Ex-Post Monitoring of Completed ODA Loan Projects
Evaluator: Hajime Sonoda (Global Group 21 Japan)
Project Name: India - Teesta Canal Hydroelectric Project (I), (II) (L/A No. ID-P40, ID-P72）
Loan Outline
Loan Amount/Disbursement Amount
Loan Agreement
Loan Completion
Ex-Post Evaluation
Executing Agency

:
:
:
:
:

8,025 million yen/7,882 million yen (Phase 1), 6,222 million yen/6,121 million yen (Phase 2)
December 1986 (Phase 1), January 1991 (Phase 2)
March 2000 (Phases 1 and 2)
FY 2002
West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (WBSEDCL)(Split off from the initial executing agency, West Bengal State Electricity Board (WBSEB),
on April 1, 2007)

Project Objective
The project built 67.5MW hydroelectric power stations which use the falls of the Mahananda Main Canal in West Bengal State, with the aimof stabilizing power supply in five northern districts of West Bengal State, and thereby contributing to the advancement of regional
development.
Consultants: None
Contractors: Sumitomo Corporation (Japan), Telk Engineering (India), M/S Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. (India), others
Overview of Results

1

Item
Effectiveness andImpactAt time of Ex-post evaluation

Effectiveness(1) Performance of the project facility
Hydroelectric power stations were built at threelocations in West Bengal State. Three generating units(7.5MW each) were installed in each power station(total 67.5MW). They were commissioned to the
executing agency consecutively from October 1997 to
October 1999, and formal commercial operation began
at all three power stations in November 1999. These
power stations were built on the Mahananda Main
Canal (MMC), and use water taken into the MMC via
the Mahananda Barrage from the Teesta River and theTeesta-Mahananda Link Canal to generate power. The
table below shows the performance of the project
facilities by fiscal year. 310m3/sec. to 330m3/sec. ofwater flow is required for full operation, but actual
water flow of the MMC is far below this level.1

At time of Ex-post monitoring
Water discharge was restricted to avoid the risk of collapse of
canal revetments (protective walls on the canal banks) andlevee breaches, and water discharges were halted in the dry
seasons since FY2003 for rehabilitation construction. This has
led to water discharge shortages, and power generation has
been one third of the plan over the past four years. Powergeneration is expected to recover after rehabilitation work iscompleted in 2008.
(1) Performance of the project facility
Since FY2001, water discharge of the Mahananda Main Canal(MMC) has been only about one third of the maximum planned 330
m3/sec., and water discharge has been halted due to canal rehabilitation
for an average of nearly six months per year during the four years
FY2003-FY2006. Thus, power generation has been under one third of
the amount planned at the time of appraisal. Especially in 2006, water
discharge was halted for a long period for MMC rehabilitation, so
power generation in FY2006 was only 11% of the plan.
About 150m3/sec. of water discharge was planned for the rainyseason (July to October) in FY2007, but rehabilitation construction
work will also continue until September 2008, so power generation is
expected be only about 100GWh. After construction ends, if large
problems do not arise on the rehabilitated canal, it will be possible toincrease water discharge in the rainy season to 200-220m3/sec., andpower generation is forecast to recover.

<Table 1: Performance Indicator of the Project1

The following “reasons for water shortages” were confirmed at the time of ex-post evaluation: (1) Decreased water flow function of the MMC accompanying its deterioration, (2) Lack of discharge capacity of canals

and rivers on the downstream section of the MMC, (3) Accumulation of silt on the canal bed and in the power station intake area, (4) Blockages of the power station intake gate due to large volumes offloating/submerged trash, etc. (*Details and improvement measures are explained in the Sustainability column below)

2Facilities by Fiscal Year (1)>

Gross
PS-1
EnergyPS-2
Production PS-3
(GWh) Total
Peak
PS-1
Load
PS-2
(MW) PS-3
Plant
PS-1
Load
PS-2
Factor
PS-3
(%)
Water
Avg*
Flow in the Max
MMC atPS-1 (m3/s) Min*

Original
TargetLevel**
109.9
107.3
102.7
319.9
22.5
22.5
22.5
55.8
54.4
52.1

19971998

19981999

19992000

1.17
1.17
7.7
1.74
-

5.03
1.86
6.89
11.0
7.5
4.76
1.74
-

17.34
19.78
11.58
48.71
13.2
7.6
11.8
16.08
18.58
11.38

34.85
37.93
44.85
117.64
13.4
10.8
13.6
32.16
35.89
45.19

194.3
332.0

45
50

85
110

95
120

110
145

56.6

40

60

70

80

<Table 3: Performance Indicator of the Project Facilities
by Fiscal Year (2)>20002001

Gross Energy
Production

PS-1
PS-2
PS-3
(GWh)
Total
Peak Load
PS-1
PS-2
(MW)
PS-3
Plant
PS-1
Load Factor
PS-2
(%)
PS-3
Average water discharge*(m3/sec.)
Annual period discharge
halted

01/02
52.8
54.2
62.1
169.1
12.0
13.8
13.6
48.05
50.49
60.54

02/03
50.0
57.7
56.5
164.1
9.7
12.0
10.5
45.46
53.75
53.02

03/04
28.1
32.4
32.5
93.0
9.5
10.7
10.6
25.54
30.23
31.71

04/05
32.8
37.8
36.6
107.2
11.4
13.1
12.4
29.85
35.20
35.65

05/06
31.4
36.7
33.2
101.3
8.5
10.0
9.4
28.59
34.16
32.34

06/07
9.5
12.9
12.1
34.5
8.4
10.3
10.4
8.68
11.98
11.74

140

110

110

130

90

90

1 mo.

1 mo.

5 mo.

3 mo.

5 1/2
mo.

9 mo.

Source: WBSEDCL* Average water discharge is the average annual water discharge in the MMC
water intake barrage, excluding periods when water discharge is halted.

Source: WBSEB

The power stations of this project solely rely on water discharge ofthe MMC, but water discharge is determined by the Irrigation andWaterways Department, which is implementing the Teesta Barrage
Project. Although this department receives requests from the power
stations to increase water discharge, it has restricted water discharge
for the following reasons. (A detailed explanation of the current
situation and future outlook is given in the section on Sustainability)(i) Collapse of MMC revetments: Water flow is restricted due tofears of revetment damage and collapse.
(ii) Rehabilitation construction on MMC: Water discharge is halted
for long periods for fundamental rehabilitation construction.
(iii) Insufficient discharged capacity in the lower reaches: Lack of
capacity downstream due to incomplete irrigation canals.
3Furthermore, to manually remove floating/submerged matter(including household garbage) from the water intake of the power
station conducting canal, water inflows to the power stations are
reduced every few hours, and when there is a lot of floating/submerged
matter, power generation must be halted to remove such matter. Thereis a lot of floating/submerged matter in the rainy season. During thisseason, about 30% of power generation is lost at Power Station No.1,
which is the first to receive water. Similar but lesser problems also
occur at Power Stations No. 2 and No. 3. This was not foreseen at thetime of this project’s planning. It is thought that the population in thecanal’s surroundings has increased, leading to increased garbage being
thrown in the canal. To prevent losses, WBSEDCL is investigating
introduction of equipment to efficiently remove garbage, and plans tocontract a consultant for installation of suitable equipment to perform adetailed investigation.
Impact(1) Social and economic impacts(1) Social and economic impacts(northern regions of state)(i) Contribution to improvement of the power supply/demand balance(i) Contribution to improvement of the power
West Bengal State had nearly a 10% power shortage in the earlysupply/demand balance
1990s. Power shortages exceeded 20% during peak hours, with several
Power shortages in northern regions of the state were daily power totaling up to 10 hours in the state capital Kolkata.
very severe until the time the project was finished.
Since FY1998, power demand has shown rapid 9% annual growth,Thus, industries which strongly rely on electricity and but power shortages have been relieved by increasing power generation
general households are troubled by repeated load capacity and facility utilization rates, and by decreasing electrical
sheddings and unplanned power blackouts. In the transmission and distribution losses, etc. (Table 4). There is still a small
future, power stations built by this project are expected shortage of supply during peak hours, and load sheddings are also
to contribute to improvements in the power situation of required, but blackouts in Kolkata city are at most once or twice per
the northern regions.
week, at most about 30 minutes each time. Also, as a result of progressin improvements of the electricity transmission network, the powersituation in the north of the state has greatly improved, and differenceswith the southern areas of the state (including Kolkata) have almost
4been eliminated.
<Table 4: Power Supply/Demand Trends in West Bengal State>
98/99

01/02

02/03

03/04

04/05

05/06

Power demand (GWh)

16,319 20,670 20,551 22,091 23,115 24,936

Power supply (GWh)

16,778 20,575 20,249 21,608 22,789 24,509
-2.80

0.50

1.50

2.20

1.60

1.70

Power demand in peak hours (MW)Shortage (%)

2,981

3,614

3,752

3,836

4,117

4,743

Power supply in peak hours (MW)

2,808

3,414

3,418

3,652

3,965

4,599

5.8

5.5

8.9

4.8

3.7

3.0

Shortage (%)

Source: Power Sector Profile, Eastern Region 2006, Ministry of Power, Gov. of India

The greatest amount of annual power generated by this project up
until now was 169GWh in FY2001. This was only 0.8% of power
demand in West Bengal State that year. Thus this project made a slightcontribution to improvement of the power supply/demand balance.
However, power demand in West Bengal State is forecast to growby 7.1% per year over the next 10 years, with peak demand growing
5.2% per year. Continual expansion of power generation capacity isrequired to maintain stable power supply. Thus there are expectations
that the amount of power generated by this project’s power stations
will recover, thereby making a certain contribution to the state’s supplyof stable power.
Furthermore, this project is connected to the national grid, so powerfrom these power stations can also be delivered beyond the state’s
northern areas to the entire state, and even other adjoining states.
Therefore, there is no need to limit to the northern state thecontributions of this project to improvements in the power
supply/demand balance.

5

(ii) Contribution to promoting the rural electrification
The average rural electrification ratio in West Bengal
State was 77.3% as of the end of March 2000, lower
than the national average of 86.3% on the same period.
With a view to promoting rural electrification within
the state, the West Bengal Rural Energy Development
Corporation Limited (WBREDC) was set up in
November 1999 as part of the power sector’s
restructuring efforts in the state. By the end of 31st
March 2002, the company aims to achieve an 85% rural
electrification ratio.

(ii) Contribution to promoting the rural electrification
In West Bengal State, the village electrification ratio rose from 79%
at the end of FY2000, to 91% at the end of FY2006. Electrification of
all villages is planned to be completed in FY2008 (the national village
electrification ratio was 80% in December 2005). At the end of
FY2006, the state’s rural household electrification ratio was 32%.
Also, per capita power consumption was 414kWh in FY2004, about
2/3 of the national average.
Village electrification ratio (end FY2006)

W. Bengal State
Northern W. Bengal
Rural household electrification ratio (end FY2006) W. Bengal State
Northern W. Bengal

90.7%
90.8%
32.1%
23.9%

As described above, this project supplies less than 1% of power
demand in West Bengal State, so it contributes very little to rural
electrification when viewed from the aspect of the amount of power.
On the other hand, transformer facilities (33kV) are installed at eachof the three power stations of this project, and power generated bythese power stations and national grid power is delivered to thesurrounding villages directly or via other transformer facilities(currently five locations, which can be increased as necessary). In thisway, even when this project is not generating electricity, it isfunctioning as transformer facilities, and supports part of theelectrification of surrounding villages.

(2) Environmental impact
There are no reports of negative impacts on theenvironment by the power stations.
(environmental monitoring system is not installed)(2) Environmental impact
No undesired impacts on the environment were seen. In contrast,
removal of floating/submerged garbage from the canal during power
generation is thought to contribute to conservation of the downstream
environment. Environmental monitoring is not being done.
6Sustainability

There is proper maintenance of the power stations, and there are no
problems with the technical aspect, organizational structure, or
financial aspects of West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Co.
Ltd., which performs operations and maintenance. In particular, its
financial situation has dramatically improved since the time of the
ex-post evaluation. After the end of canal rehabilitation in fall nextyear, it is expected that about 2/3 of planned water discharge can beobtained in the rainy season, but it is unclear how much water
discharge can be secured in the dry season.
(1) Technical aspect：
In each power station, there is an organization of four
operation groups formed from five people each (oneassistant engineer, two operators, two assistants) whichworks in three shifts to operated each facility. A
support organization is also established with 9 to 10
employees of subcontractors, under the direction of themaintenance engineer. There are no special problems
with technical levels.

(1) Technical aspect：
Each power station is operated by three shifts of four person groups(one junior engineer, one operator, two assistants). Compared to at thetime of the ex-post evaluation, one person was eliminated, but themaintenance staff organization is almost the same as at the time of the
ex-post evaluation. No problems were seen in technical levels.
In FY2002, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System(SCADA) was introduced in Power Station No.1, with the aim of more
efficient power station operation. SCADA uses a PC console to enable
monitoring in real time of the operating situation of the power
generation, transmission, and all power generation operations can behandled at the PC. In FY2006, SCADA was also introduced into
Power Stations No. 2 and No. 3, and incorporated into the same
system. Power generation has halted due to canal rehabilitation, so trial
operations have not yet been carried out, but this is expected to enable
more efficient operations.

(2) Organizational structure:(2) Organizational structure：
Operation and maintenance of the power stations is
As part of power sector reform aiming at sustainable improvements
performed by the West Bengal State Electricity Board in commercial efficiency and service, in April 2007 the West Bengal
7

(WBSEB).

State Electricity Board (WBSEB) was split into West Bengal StateElectricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (WBSEDCL) and West Bengal StateElectricity Transmission Co. Ltd. (WBSETCL). WBSEDCL has theformer hydroelectric power business of WBSEB, and performs
operation and maintenance.
(In 1998, the state government drafted a power sector reform plan,and in 2001 it concluded a memorandum with the central government
and formulated an action plan, and is moving forward with reforms
such as splitting the WBSEB organization, rationalizing rates, securingtransparency of the rate structure, and reducing losses from electricaltransmission and distribution, while receiving financial assistance fromthe central government)(3) Financial status:
The West Bengal State Electricity Board is expectedto achieve at least a 3% rate of return, and WBSEB was
achieving this rate of return up until FY1997-98, thanks
to relief measures such as subsidies from the state
government. But since FY1998, ordinary income
suddenly worsened, and even with subsidies from thestate government, its rate of return became negative(-102%). Also, electricity rates were raised under theguidance of the West Bengal Electricity Regulatory
Commission, which played a role in improving thefinancial situation, but its rate of return was stillnegative in FY1999-2000, and one can say that there
are great concerns about its financial situation. (*Clear
causes and reasons for the worsened financial situation
were not noted in the ex-post evaluation report)(3) Financial status:
According to a survey by the Ministry of Power “State Power Sector
Performance Ratings” (June 2006), the efforts noted at the time of the
ex-post evaluation bore fruit, and WBSEB’s finances improved due topower sales to other states, reduced electricity transmission anddistribution losses, higher rate of recovery for power charges, etc., inaddition to large results from reform of the electricity distribution
division. Since FY2001, subsidies from the state government also
became unnecessary. In FY2003, operating income became positive,
and in FY2005, its commercial profit (operating income – depreciation– interest payments) reached 810 million rupees for the first time in its
51-year history (the negative profit after tax that fiscal year shown in
the table below resulted from its recording 3.36 billion rupees out of its
accumulated losses as expenditures that fiscal year).
Further, by splitting the company into WBSEDCL and WBSETCL,
accounting is also split up, beginning in FY2007, and there are
discussions on whether the state government will at this time cancel
part of the debt owed by it to the former WBSEB.
8

<Table 2: WBSEB Profit & Loss (1)> (unit: million rupees)<Table 5: WBSEB Profit & Loss (2)>

1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00
A. Revenues

13,737

14,82918,851

18,92523,381

Revenues

Revenue from Sales of 13,579

14,552

18,416

18,625

21,334(Power

00/01

01/02

02/03

03/04

04/05

05/06

23,02924,10027,11942,79844,24352,72019,75523,586

23,64133,34032,50938,785

4,060

4,186

4,276

6,698

7,540

Income -2,521-5,067-2,321

3,000

5,036

6,395

Sales

+

Other)

Power

158

Other revenue

277

436

300

2,047

Power Purchases

B. Expenditures

14,382

17,102

20,49327,96733,669+ Fuel Expense

Purchase of Power

9,022

10,335

13,991

17,164

17,474

Personnel Expense + 4,244

Cost of Sales

4,738

6,162

6,935

8,047

9,033

Management

Periods -1,483-1,538-3,073

-212

3,971

ExpenseNet(unit: million rupees)

Prior

CreditOperating

Depreciation & Interest 2,010

3,624

4,202

5,253

5,931

（EBDIT）-1,561-1,640-2,350-2,835

Depreciation

1,864

1,808

1,974

2,435

3,005

3,522

Capitalized

Profit After Tax-8,881-17,129 -9,153-3,050-2,851-2,568Others

96

25

78

65

95

Subsidies & Grants

2,154

2,391

0

0

0

Net Income After Tax-645-2,273-1,642-9,042-10,288

Source: WBSEB Annual Report

Subsidy & Grants

817

2,455

1,843

1,864

4,440

Surplus/(Deficit)

172

183

201

-7,178-5,848Less:

Expense 0

Source: WBSEB

Reform measures including the following are being
undertaken in order to improve the financial situation of
WESEB: (1) Energy audit on receivables, which isundertaken to identify and reduce transmission anddistribution losses in order to attain a level of 20% for
FY2004-05, (2) Organizational system on regional linesof the electricity distribution division of WESEB inorder to produce profits, (3) Boosting of revenue
collection management to reduce receivables
90outstanding.
(4) Maintenance situation of the project facilities
Overhauls of the facilities are performed with thecooperation of a local company which supplied theequipment. A maintenance organization was built tocarry out tasks including maintenance of facilities
based on the frequency and methods specified inmanuals distributed by the contractor.
During the field survey of the ex-post evaluation, amechanical problem arose in Unit 5 of Power Station
No. 2, and its operation was halted for two months. It
was confirmed that a similar problem arose during thecommissioning test of Unit 6.

(4) Maintenance situation of the project facilities
The maintenance situation and maintenance organization areunchanged from the time of the ex-post evaluation, and no large
problems were seen. The turbine governor problem at Power Station
No. 2 which was reported at the time of the ex-post evaluation was
resolved by exchanging parts. After that, there have been no serious
failures in the generator facilities, with almost no halts in generation
due to mechanical failure.
Imported spare parts purchased through this project still remain, but
new purchases of some types are required, so a list was made andquotes are being requested from suppliers.
Further, WBSEDCL is doing proper maintenance including
removing sedimentation from canals pertaining to the power stations
which were built by this project (conducting canals, discharge canals,
escape canals), and the facilities are in good condition.i(5) Operation and maintenance situation of irrigation
canals
Maintenance of irrigation canals has the following
problems, and it is pointed out that they are preventing
achievement of results from this project.

(5) Operation and maintenance situation of irrigation canals<Water discharge to the MMC>The Teesta Barrage Project influences the success or failure of thishydroelectric project. The Barrage project began in FY1975 as aproject of the state Irrigation and Waterways Department. The initialplan was to build the Teesta High Dam on the Teesta River, and alsobuild the Teesta Barrage downstream, then provide irrigation via
branch canals connecting to the Teesta Mahananda Link Canal (Teesta
River left bank: west side), and to the Teesta Jaldhaka Main Canal(right bank: east side). Later, in order to utilize the water discharged
into the Mahananda River which flows downstream, the Mahananda
Barrage, Mahananda Main Canal (MMC), Dauk Barrage, Dauk Nagar
Main Canal (DNMC), etc. were added to the plan, together with theconception of generation of power of canal electric generation (this(i) Deterioration of Mahananda Main Canal (MMC)
Since water began flowing in this canal, many
problems are arising, such as repeated collapse of
concrete revetment walls. The Irrigation andWaterways Department takes urgent measures eachtime at the place that a problem occurs, but it is not
resolving the fundamental problems.

10(ii) Insufficient discharged capacity in the lower
reaches of the Mahananda Main Canal (MMC)
The power stations require 310-330m3/sec. of waterflow to operate at full capacity, but the Dauk River
does not have more than a maximum discharge capacityof 205m3/sec.. This has a serious impact on utilizationof the power stations.
(iii) Deposition of silt on the bed of the Mahananda
Main Canal (MMC)
1.0-1.5m of silt has accumulated on the canal bed,
which is reducing the canal’s discharge capacity. As
described in (ii) above, the canal’s actual water flow issmall, so silt carried there keeps accumulating, and notmuch flows downstream.
(iv) Stack of floating/submerged trash at the intake gate
The inflow of large volume of floating/submerged trash(mainly vegetation) washed into the Mahananda Main
Canal (MMC) blocks the grate on the power station’s
water intake, promotes settlement and accumulation ofsilt, and obstructs water flow into the power station.

project) which uses the falls of the MMC.
With completion of the MMC and its connecting branch canals anddownstream irrigation facilities (Dauk Barrage, Dauk Nagar Main
Canal, and branch canals connecting to them), this project generates
power by using the potential energy available at Fall Structure in the
MMC.
The Teesta Irrigation Project is East India’s largest irrigation project,with a final planned irrigation area reaching 920,000ha. But there havebeen long delays in its execution, and construction in progress covers
only about 150,000ha. One can consider that at the time of appraisal ofthis project (1986), the Teesta Barrage and Teesta Mahananda Link
Canal were already completed, but the Mahananda Barrage, MMC, andDauk Barrage were under construction (water flowed later, in 1995),
the DNMC was being planned or was under construction (it is still
incomplete)ii. Moreover, the dam plan for the Teesta River was passed
over in the early 1990s due to issues including inability to resolve thesedimentation problems.
The direct causes of inability to obtain water discharge volume
required for this project’s power generation are: the fact that theconstruction of the Teesta Irrigation Project did not progress asplanned, and the insufficient quality and maintenance of the canals
which were built. Various issues were in the background of these
problems, such as inadequate project planning and operation
management, budget shortages, the area’s remoteness, site acquisition
problems, and various local problems.iii
The specific reasons for restricting the volume of water discharge ofthe MMC and efforts on this issue by the Irrigation and Waterways
Department are as follows.
(i) Collapse of MMC revetments
In the 5.5km from Mahananda Barrage to Power Station No.1
and for several kilometers further downstream, small concrete11panels and waterproof sheets are used as canal revetments, butalmost all of these revetments have collapsed before reachingeven half of the 30-year lives they were designed for. Also, 2km
to 3km upstream from Power Station No. 2, levees breached inboth 1999 and 2005. There is also deterioration of concrete
panels, plant growth in joints, etc. in other canal sections, and if
these other sections are left as is, places remain where it isfeared that the problems will progress until these revetments alsocollapse.
If a large volume of water is discharged, damage and decay oflevees will progress, with increasing danger of eventual breach.
This is why the Irrigation and Waterways Department is careful
regarding increases in water discharge volume, with discharge
restricted to about one third of the MMC’s 345m3/sec. maximum
designed discharge volume for almost all the time until today.
On many sections of the MMC until Power Station No. 2, in
filling zones where the canal bed is higher than the surrounding
elevation, levees are made of piled earth, which furthermore hasa sandy composition, so there is a need for sufficiently strong
levees and revetments. Based on the experiences describedabove, the Irrigation and Waterways Department is improving
the width of levees and revetment structures in rehabilitation
construction work currently being done. After rehabilitation
construction work is finished, it is first necessary to confirm
performance of the revetments, while slowly increasing water
discharge volume over one to two months.
It is thought that the quality of construction work is also a
problem due to various reasons such as construction
management, competence of contractors, and improper
construction materials. The insufficient maintenance budget isalso a serious problem. Insufficient work is being done toremove plant growth from concrete panel joints (revetments will
12eventually be damaged if left as is), remove sedimentation fromthe canal bed, repair and replace deteriorated concrete panels,
etc. An annual budget of about 10 million rupees is allocated to
the Teesta Irrigation Project, which is less than one tenth of therequired amount. Thus facilities are maintained by securing
budgets each year under the categories of repairs, rehabilitation,etc.
(ii) Rehabilitation construction work on MMC
After the ex-post evaluation field survey in September 2001,
based on a proposal from JBIC in December 2001, a conference
was held under the Hon’ble Chief Minister, West Bengal with
the Power Department Minister, Home Department Minister,Irrigation and Waterways Department Minister, and Teesta
Irrigation Project Chief Engineer. It was confirmed that: (1)Regarding the necessity of rehabilitation of the MMC, WBSEB
and Irrigation and Waterways Department would perform a joint
inspection by January 2002, (2) The Irrigation and Waterways
Department would accelerate discharge canal construction inorder to secure discharge capacity (described below), (3) These
measures aim to enable an initial discharge of 220m3/sec., with
330m3/sec. in the long term.
Moreover, due to another proposal from JBIC, a similar
conference was also held the following year in September 2002,
under the West Bengal State Chief Secretary. It was thenconfirmed that the Irrigation and Waterways Department would
accelerate construction and rehabilitation of drainage canals.
As a result, rehabilitation work on levees has been carried out
every year since 2003, with continued suspensions of water
discharge for long periods.

13June-July 2003
December 2003 – June 2004
December 2004
April-June 2005
February-July 2006
November 2006-June 2007 (plan)
November 2007-September 2008 (plan)

Rehabilitation
construction
work
upstream from Power Station No.1
(same as above)(same as above)
Rehabilitation work after levee breach
Rehabilitation work between Power
Stations No.1 & No. 2(same as above)(same as above)

These construction projects are not emergency measures.
These are for fundamental rehabilitation work, and are originallyrequired in 2020-2025 when the canal’s age exceeds the 30
years of useful life it was designed for. Due to budget
restrictions, restrictions on construction work (securing sites
along the canal required for work), etc., the Irrigation andWaterways Department has no choice but to proceed with work
on different canal sections in succession each year, anddischarge from the MMC is halted each time.
Rehabilitation construction work has been scheduled to avoid
the rainy season, when large amounts of water flow in the rivers.
Thus a certain amount of water discharge and power generation
have been possible in the rainy season, but the water discharge
stoppages, which stretch over several months, are resulting in
great losses of power generation from this project.
All rehabilitation work on the MMC is expected to becompleted by September 2008. Rehabilitation is still required insome remaining locations of its downstream sections (DaukNagar Main Canal), and rehabilitation construction work may bedone after FY2009. In that case however, it is thought thatdischarge into the MMC will not be completely stopped becausea certain amount of water discharge into the Dauk River would
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be possible.
(iii) Insufficient discharged capacity in the lower reaches
Downstream water consumption for irrigation was originally
included in the 330m3/sec. maximum water discharge from theMahananda Barrage which this project expected. Only 40% of
branch canals which are to connect to MMC have been
completed, and water is also not flowing in the incomplete Dauk
Nagar Main Canal. Thus water discharged into the MMC islimited to about 30m3/sec. for irrigation water consumption via
the MMC, in addition to 180m3/sec. of water which can bedischarged via the Dauk River, for a total limit of about
210m3/sec..
There are no forecasts for completion of the Dauk Nagar
Main Canal, so in 2005 the Irrigation and Waterways
Department completed a drainage canal which extends about
5km from the Dauk Nagar Main Canal’s Dauk Barrage to the
Doloncha River which is several kilometers downstream. Thisdrainage canal can discharge 70m3/sec.iv, and its operation isplanned to begin in FY2008, when rehabilitation construction
work on the MMC finishes and a maximum water discharge ofabout 220m3/sec. begins. This will enable a theoreticalmaximum discharge of 280m3/sec..
However, the volume which can actually be discharged into
the Dauk River is also influenced by the water volume of the
Dauk River itself, and if poor conditions occur simultaneously,
flooding will occur downstream. 70m3/sec. of discharge
previously created flooding downstream in the Dauk River. The
Irrigation and Waterways Department gives this as a reason forbeing very careful regarding large increases in water discharged
into the MMC.
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In this way, the Irrigation and Waterways Department has spent timeworking on the issues of rehabilitation of the MMC and securing
outflow volume which were pointed out at the time of the ex-post
evaluation. Due to results from these efforts, this department is
considering discharging about 150m3/sec. in the 2007 rainy season(July-October), and over 200m3/sec. depending on the water volume
enabled by using the Teesta Barrage after September 2008 whenrehabilitation of the MMC is complete. On the other hand, WBSEDCL
is expecting a maximum discharge of 220m3/sec., based on thediscussions of 2002.
Completion of the Dauk Nagar Main Canal and the start of irrigation
are conditions for the MMC to obtain a maximum discharge of
330m3/sec. as initially planned. After 45km of the total 80km of thiscanal were built, construction was suspended for 20 years due to siteacquisition problems and budget restrictions, but construction towards
the 67.5km point was to be restarted this fiscal year as a national
projectv. However, there must be progress in land acquisition for new
branch canal construction in order to begin irrigation use, so it isunclear when water will flow in this section and irrigation will begin.vi
On the other hand, the following new facts and recognition
regarding the possibility of restrictions on discharge were presented by
the Construction Chief Engineers for the Teesta Barrage project.vii· The Teesta Mahananda Link Canal transports water from the Teesta
Barrage to the MMC. This canal’s capacity has been steadily lost
due to sedimentation over many years. Sedimentation has neverbeen removed from this canal, so according to engineers, current
capacity has decreased to about 180m3/sec., less than half of its
designed capacity. However, from visual inspections in the field,
these figures are rather hard to believe at first glance, so moreobjective verification is required.
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· Flow volume of the Teesta River has decreased, so there is apossibility that flow volume will be restricted, except for in therainy season. However, reliability of the data shown by the
Irrigation and Waterways Department is unclear, and further
verification is required based on data of the Central Water
Commission, etc.
· By restarting irrigation development on the Teesta River’s left bankwhich was suspended due to not obtaining environmental clearance,a maximum of about 70m3/sec. of irrigation water will be required
after two to three years. It is possible that discharge into the MMC
will be reduced by this amount.
· The Teesta River flows downstream into Bangladesh, and until now
there has been no clear agreement with Bangladesh regarding waterrights, but Bangladesh built a new barrage downstream from theTeesta Barrage, and discussions on water use rights have reopened.
Depending on results of those discussions, there is a possibility that
total water volume which can be taken from the Teesta Barrage will
be restricted in the dry season.
Considering the above items, if the rehabilitation construction work
currently being done is completed as planned, one can at least expectthat about 200-220m3/sec. can be secured in the MMC during the fourmonths of the rainy season. However, the Irrigation and Waterways
Department is taking the position that discharge volume through theyear depends on the amount of flow that can be used at the Teesta
Barrage, and cannot necessarily provide guarantee for much exceeding
discharge volume required for irrigation. Also, there are many
undefined factors at the current time, so one cannot have too strong
expectations that the volume of discharge into the MMC will be
increased further in the future.
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<Silt accumulation on the MMC bed>
The Irrigation and Waterways Department does not do silt removal
work frequently, so accumulation of silt on the MMC bed isprogressing further. For now, there are no plans to carry out silt
removal work.
This silt also accumulates in the approach canals of the power
stations, but power stations continually use a method of emergency
efforts by workers who use hoses which shoot in compressed air tocreate movement within the approach canal, thereby minimizing theaccumulation. The power stations expect that this problem will be
resolved if the discharge volume of the MMC increases, and are notparticularly considering long term measures. Moreover, silt
accumulation has not reached the point where it greatly reduces the
MMC’s capacity, and it passes through the turbines without problems
as it is extremely fine sand, so it has not been an obstacle forgeneration up until now.
<Stack of floating/submerged trash at the intake gate>
Even large volumes of floating/submerged matter are not an obstaclefor irrigation, so the Irrigation and Waterways Department is nottaking particular countermeasures against floating/submerged matter.
However, as mentioned above, work to remove floating/submerged
matter reduces power generation by about 30% in the rainy season, andmore efficient removal methods are being investigated at WBSEDCL.

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Lessons
Learned,Recommendations,
Information
ResourcesandMonitoring
Methods(1) Follow up
on lessons
learned andrecommendations made in
ex-postevaluation
report or inlater
evaluations(2) Proposals
for securing
sustainability
and
instructions
given at timeof follow-up
monitoring(Lesson learned) At the time of appraisal, in addition to the ODA
loan project, similar attention must also be paid to other projects
which become conditions for determining the success or failure of
the ODA loan project.
(Recommendations) The West Bengal State government works tosecure an appropriate maintenance budget for the Irrigation andWaterways Department to move forward with rehabilitation of thecanal. WBSEDCL improves its floating/submerged matter removal
methods. The India government and West Bengal State government
monitor discharge volume, and take initiatives to resolve problems
as necessary.
(1) Lesson learned(1) Lesson learned
In hydroelectric power projects which use a canal, if the · If there are other projects which become conditions for determining
institution which implements maintenance of the canalthe success or failure of the ODA loan project, especially if they areis not the project’s executing agency, it is possible thatat the planning and implementation stage, attention must also be
the canal’s maintenance institution will also have apaid to these other projects in the appraisal, similar to the ODA loan
large impact on the project’s sustainability. Thus for
project. Expertise to examine the other projects must be included insimilar projects, at the time of planning, it is necessary
such an appraisal mission.
to sufficiently investigate the overall framework ofmaintenance.
(2) Recommendations(i) This project has not achieved its expected results
due to various problems. Measures to resolve problems
were proposed, but approvals for actual implementation
were not confirmed in the ex-post evaluation fieldsurvey. Urgent implementation of thesecountermeasures is desirable.

(2) Recommendations· The West Bengal State government works for the Irrigation andWaterways Department to move forward with rehabilitation
construction work as planned, while taking care regarding work
quality. The government also works to secure an appropriate
maintenance budget. WBSEDCL researches efficient removal of
floating/submerged matter, and implement when found to beappropriate.
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(ii) With the exception of rehabilitation of the MMC,WBSEB should be responsible for securing funds andimplementing countermeasures. Regarding
rehabilitation, it is desirable that the Irrigation andWaterways Department bears its sole responsibility for
implementation.

· The India government and West Bengal State government monitor
progress of the canal rehabilitation and discharge volumes
thereafter. If at least 200m3/sec. of discharge cannot be secured in
the rainy season, or if annual power generation does not exceed the
maximum achieved in the past (about 170GWh), understand thereasons, and take appropriate initiatives to resolve problems via
discussions between the WBSEDCL and the Irrigation andWaterways Department.

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i

ii

iii

iv
v
vi

vii

At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the Irrigation and Waterways Department was to construct the escape canal of Power Station No. 2, but as a result of technical investigations, a conclusion was reached that
this construction is not necessary, as there are multiple irrigation drainage canals downstream from Power Station No.2 and there is sufficient drainage capacity, so its construction was halted.
According to interviews with Irrigation and Waterways Department staff. Documents have not been stored from the time of the appraisal, so we were unable to confirm details of the progress, planning, etc. forirrigation projects at that time.
According to interviews with Irrigation and Waterways Department staff, major reasons that the Teesta Irrigation Project did not move forward were: (1) Due to a worsening relationship between the central
government and West Bengal Stage government, the budget could not be obtained from the central government for a period of time, (2) Due to the remoteness of the area, the Chief Engineer did not want to live onsite, and stayed in Kolkata (currently, the Construction Chief Engineer is not same person as the Chief Engineer, and lives on site).
However, it is has not been completed because some portions such as the gate’s seals will be completed before start of operation.
Regarding the plan for downstream beyond the 67.5km point, arrangements have not been made for moving to implementation.
In recent years, there have been increasing social problems surrounding site acquisition for industrial estates in West Bengal State, so residents increasingly do not want to sell land to the government, and there arestrong fears that site acquisition for this project will also be a difficult process.
With a limited budget, it is not easy to constantly maintain in good condition large-scale and complex water use facilities. One can also understand that it is influenced by the external conditions of river flow
volume and water use rights. However, in this survey, some engineers of the Irrigation and Waterways Department have the understanding that the main objective of discharge into the MMC is for irrigation. The
Irrigation and Waterways Department has the actual authority to determine discharge volume, and some people are not necessarily focused on water discharge which exceeds the amounts for irrigation use, for the
purpose of power generation. On the other hand, as the current goal of 220m3/sec has not been achieved after such a long time, WBSEDCL authorities are increasingly discontented with the long-term halts topower generation that are made unavoidable, and have deeply seated mistrust of the Irrigation and Waterways Department. The Irrigation and Waterways Department’s engineer in charge of the MMC frequently
receives requests from the power stations for increased water discharge volume, but feels that the power stations do not sufficiently understand the current situation of the Teesta Barrage Project and the various
conditions which restrict water discharge, and make unrealistically difficult and excessive requests.

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