コロナ対策におけるデータ活用の可能性と課題：
公衆衛生・プライバシー・イノベーション
鎗目 雅 YARIME Masaru
Associate Professor, Division of Public Policy, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Honorary Associate Professor, Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP),
University College London
東京大学 公共政策大学院 客員准教授
緊急WEBシンポジウム「新型コロナ感染症対策におけるIT活用とプライバシー」
2020年7月30日

共同研究・協力• The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology– Veronica Qin Ting LI, Division of Public Policy– Gleb PAPYSHEV, Division of Public Policy– XIE Siqi, Division of Public Policy– LUO Ning, Division of Public Policy– WU Xun, Division of Public Policy– Kira MATUS, Division of Public Policy– ZHU Pengyu, Division of Public Policy– LU Zhongming, Division of Environment and Sustainability• City University of Hong Kong
– JIN Mushan, School of Energy and Environment– ZHANG Qingpeng, School of Data Science• The University of Tokyo– WU Jing, Graduate School of Frontier Sciences2

各国におけるコロナ対策• Singapore - High Policy capacity but societal blind spots regarding foreign workers negatively affected thenational-level COVID-19 response.
• South Korea - Organizational learning from recent past experiences with similar events such as SARS-CoV-1,
H1N1 and MERS led to effective anti-COVID-19 measures.
• Hong Kong - Social values, community resilience and experience with similar diseases and other crises led to aneffective response.
• Israel - The COVID-19 response was colored by local politics and a history of deliberate over-reactions tothreats for electoral and other purposes.
• Italy - Existing poor policy design and institutional arrangements favoring discord along with no recent relevant
experience with similar diseases• Sweden - Social values and governments favoring nudging combined with health decentralization undermined
co-ordinated national action and led to a more ‘laissez-faire’ approach to pandemic management.
• Canada - Well-functioning federalism and lesson-drawing from SARS-CoV-1 and H1N1 but with a serious blindspot towards vulnerable senior populations in long-term care facilities led to a less than satisfactory response.
• USA - The vagaries of federalism led to disjointed responses across the nation and ineffective responses to thepandemic.
Capano, Howlett, Jarvis, Ramesh, and Goyal (2020)3

中国におけるコロナ対策• Not well prepared to deal with the virus when it first appeared.
• Had enough recent experience with similar diseases such as SARS-CoV-1
and H1N1 to realize the danger it faced.
• As the first country stricken by the COVID-19 pandemic, its policy
response featured chaos at the start and effectiveness in the end.
• The pandemic was an exogenous shock which overcame the normal
policy logic followed by Chinese policy actors, resulting in some initial
policy inconsistency.
• When centralized control was re-asserted, the policy mix adopted in thecountry comprised of traditional public health measures such as strict
community lockdowns, cross-jurisdictional mobilization of resources andthe firing of poorly performing officials contributed to the country’s
eventual return to effectiveness.
Mei (2020)4

コロナ対策におけるデータの活用• Extent of infection among the population– Indispensable for understanding the current situation accurately and forming reliablepredictions about the spread of the disease in the future.

• Tracing of the movement of people– Use a vast amount of data on the mobile phones they possess and the sensors
installed across the city
– Make it possible to identify and isolate those who are infected or likely to get
infected more precisely, avoiding full-scale lockdown.

• Supplies of personal protective materials such as masks and medical devices
such as ventilators– Provide valuable information for developing and executing plans to match thedistribution of critical resources with the locations where there are urgent demands.

• Combining with other types of data, including geographical andenvironmental data
– can contribute to improving decision making by policy makers in tackling thecoronavirus disease.
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COVID-19感染者のトレーシング• Taiwan– Identification of the location of people in quarantine by GPS• South Korea– Tracking and tracing of patients and contacted people through the locational data of mobilephones, surveillance cameras, and credit card uses
• Hong Kong
– Monitoring of the locational date of people in home quarantine with wristbands• Singapore– TraceTogether as a mobile app used for individuals‘ contact recording via Bluetooth in the phone,
SafeEntry as a check-in system to record one's visits to public places such as supermarkets andrestaurants, and a wearable device for contact tracing also distributed to the country's vulnerable
seniors• Israel– HaMagen app "The Shield" taking location data, identify possible contacts• Effective in tracking and tracing patients and potential contacts in Asia
• United States, United Kingdom, European Union– Considering contact tracing with digital tools• How to make a balance among facilitating innovation, publish health, and privacy in utilizing data fortackling COVID-196

中国におけるコロナ対策でのデータ活用の分野

Xu, Chinese Academy of Information and Communications Technology (2020)7

中国における健康コードの開発• As the virus spread rapidly across China in early February, the ability todistinguish the suspected cases and people who may have been in close
contact with the confirmed cases was critical for controlling the virus
infection.
• Health code apps for contact tracing were developed in several cities,
such as Hangzhou and Shenzhen, in early February 2020.
• Subsequently adopted nationwide in less than a month.
• Using a smart phone, users simply fill in the required information via theapp.
• The mastermind back-stage algorithms quickly decide whether the user
could “free-pass” or should be “quarantined” by assigning codes ofdifferent colors.
Shi, Shi, Wu and Ma (2020)8

健康コード（杭州）• Alibaba’s payment system as a platform– e-registration– Travel history– Real-time location– Online inquiry• Evaluating individual risk of infection• Alipay and WeChat• Limiting personal movement depending on risk
– Green code: Can move around unrestricted– Yellow code: Seven-day quarantine– Red code: Two-week quarantine• Person’s location and an identifying code number sent to the server9中国における健康コードの開発• Much of the attention focused on trade-off between effectiveness and protection ofprivacy with the use of health code apps.
• Limited understanding of the circumstance in which health code apps originated andflourished.
• While often assumed that health code might be a product of top-down approach tosmart cities, it was actually the exact oppose.
• First developed by Yuhang District of Hangzhou City, responding to the street-level
officials’ request of a technological tool to relieve their imploding burden of workand to improve the efficiency of managing the mobility both inter- and intra-district.
• Within days a prototype was developed under the name of “Yuhang Health Code”,
as it was adopted by the District showing good results.
• Recommended to and adopted by Hangzhou City, quickly followed by Zhejiang
Province, changing its name to “Hangzhou Health Code” and “Zhejiang HealthCode”.
Shi, Shi, Wu and Ma (2020)10

健康コードの効率性・正確性• Efficiency– The code is embedded within the Alipay and WeChat apps.
– Unlike SafeEntry, which opens up a webpage on the mobile device, the health code appears
as a native app on the phone.
– Makes it more convenient to use, because opening a mobile app is much faster than loadinga webpage on the mobile device.

• Complete information both real-time and past
– The health code acts as a de facto digital health ID, reflecting both one's travel history andreal-time location.
– Any risks posed by possible asymptomatic virus carriers can be managed, which is thegovernment's ex-ante action towards eliminating any potential Covid-19 transmission.

• A high adoption rate, compared to TraceTogether– The health code now used by more than one billion Chinese among the 1.4 billion populationand covers most cities and many rural areas– Main tool via which one gains entry to public venues.
– Installed in Alipay and WeChat, the two biggest mobile apps used in China– Easy to learn and use. With one click, the colored health code can be showed and scanned
automatically, working well with both Android and iOS systems.
Zhu and Wu (2020)11

グリッド管理システムの機能（武漢）CDC recommended
building an information
sharing mechanism among
the communities,
community health service
center, and local CDC sothat information on newly
diagnosed COVID-19 cases,
suspected cases, patientswith fever, and close
contacts could be sharedpromptly and would help
recognize high risk
populations and decrease
delays for hospitalizationand quarantine.

Zhang, Gao, Wang and Wu, China CDC Weekly (2020)

コミュニティー出入登録システム

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重要医療物資調達システム

http://www.miit.gov.cn/n973401/n7674704/index.html

14医療物資供給・需要プラットフォーム

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https://dhrp.3incloud.com/#/home感染データと健康データの結合の可能性と課題

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香港政府ダッシュボード

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香港一般市民によるダッシュボード

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香港ー中国のクロス・ボーダー・データ移転• In Hong Kong, the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (PDPO) was introduced in 1995 and tookeffect from December 1996 as a comprehensive data protection law, applicable to both theprivate and the public sectors.
• The Data Protection Principles (DPPs) in PDPO outline how data users should collect, handle anduse personal data.
• The Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (PCPD) is a statutory body created toenforce PDPO and would be working on how privacy-friendly approaches can be deployed byincreasing transparency and accountability in data governance.
• PDPO has a section about a general prohibition of transfers of personal data to places outside
Hong Kong.
– Has not come into operation since its enactment in 1995, due to some difficulties identified forbusinesses, especially small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

• No clear rule in place to regulate cross-border data transfer to outside Hong Kong, including
mainland China, creating a significant degree of ambiguities and concerns in the public.
• A robust, trustworthy system for data governance would help Hong Kong establish itself as a data
center hub in the Greater Bay Area
– Properly regulating cross-border data flow while providing adequate protection of privacy and security inthe framework of one country, two systems.
20香港ー広東間の交流再開に向けた健康コード・システムの導入

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今後に向けた可能性と課題• データの結合・統合– 感染に関するデータと他の健康状態などに関するデータ• 国際的なデータの連携・標準化– 香港ー広東間でのアプリの相互認証– 海外との交流再開に向けた仕組み• 社会実験を通じたイノベーションの促進– スマート・シティ、スーパー・シティにおける規制のサンドボックス

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G20 Global Smart Cities Alliance on Technology GovernanceWorking Group for Policy Framework

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Privacy and transparency
Security and resilience
Openness and interoperability
Operational and financial sustainability
Equity, inclusion and social & environmental
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