AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL ECONOMICRESILIENCE USING MACROECONOMIC DATA BEFORE AND
AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISISIn this paper, an empirical analysis investigates whichcountries were resilient after the crisis, and what features thosecountries have. We use macroeconomic data of Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
before and after the great recession. The results from thecorrelation analysis imply that determinants such as “sudden
expansion of exports”, “inflation rate”, “dependence on fuelimports”, and “dependence on manufactured exports” canexplain the economic resilience of the major advanced countries
including Germany, Japan and the US.
Keywords: cross-country analysis, economic resilience, financial
crisis.
JEL Classifications: O11, O47
Introduction
There are an increasing number of discussions on the current recession triggered by thefall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Rossi and Aguilera (2009) focused on risk
mitigation in relation to financial crises while making it clear that the effects of thecurrent recession are different among the developed countries. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti(2010) examined the determinants of the economic slowdown over 2008- 9 bycomparing the annual GDP of the pre-crisis period of 2005-7. They find that increases
in the ratio of private credit to GDP and current account deficits have negative impacts
on demand growth. Claessens et al. (2010) examined the events and timeline of therecession and addressed the necessity of regulatory arrangements for cross-borderactivities. Groot et al. (2011) investigated the effects of financial markets andinternational trade linkages not only on GDPs but also on unemployment changes in
Europe. Although these literatures stress the importance of mitigating economic
volatility, they are still based on economic growth theory, i.e., they are posited on theconcept that the reverse effects of growth engines brought on the recession.

On the other hand, Aiginger (2009, pp.310) presented the concept of “economic
resilience” and defined it as “the ability of an economy to reduce the probability offurther deep crisis or at least to mitigate the effects of a crisis”. The concept introduces
the vulnerability of socio-economic structures and stresses the importance of the
mitigation of economic shocks. The objectives are not only to maximize utilities
through economic growth but also to minimize economic shocks.
Despite the importance of the concept of resilience, it has not frequently been applied
by practitioners to assess the performance of national economies, especially indeveloped countries. Other indexes such as economic growth, unemployment rate, CPI,
income equality and so on have much more frequently been used.
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate relations between socio-economic
features and effects of the financial global crisis in line with previous studies, and to
derive policy implications in terms of economic resilience.
In the next chapter, we review previous studies on economic resilience, and define it as“the ability of a national economy to reduce the probability of a crisis, to mitigate theeffect of a crisis, or to recover quickly after a crisis,” while referring to previous
research. In the third chapter, we explain the data used in this study. In the fourth
chapter, we show the results of the factors that affect national economic resiliencethrough an analysis of macroeconomic data of 32 countries belonging to theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) before and after thecrisis in August 2010. In the last chapter, we propose four economic policies that will
make national economic structures more resilient based on the empirical findings of thisresearch, i.e., 1) to escape deflationary environments, 2) to refrain from major
expansions of export and to alter the expansion of domestic demand, 3) to avoid
dependence on manufacturing exports such as capital goods or durable goods, and 4) toreduce dependence on strategic imports such as fuel.
The concept of resilience
Resilience denotes “the ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape;elasticity” (Oxford Dictionary, 2011). However ， the meaning of resilience differs
among disciplines. For example, in terms of disaster prevention research, it is defined as
the comprehensive ability to prevent disasters, including both prevention and mitigation.
Business organizations such as the Council on Competitiveness (2007, 2008) haveproposed the idea of corporate resilience for business continuity. At a national level,
resilience is a key concept in the promotion of comprehensive homeland security
strategies. In the field of psychiatry, it is defined as “the ability of personal

psychological elasticity to prevent deeper mental disease or to recover from mental
disease even in the face of difficult situations” (Ishige & Mutou. 2003, pp.243). Hence,
although the concept of resilience differs among disciplines, we can basically clarify it
into two key concepts: “shock-absorption” and “shock-counteraction”.
Literature review of economic resilience
Previous studies of economic resilience have described the concept as two sided, basedon its characteristics. For example, Briguglio et al. (2005, pp.5) defined it as “coping
ability: enabling a country to withstand or bounce back from external shocks”. Duval etal. (2008, pp.3) defined it as “the ability to maintain output close to potential in theaftermath of shocks”. Moreover, Aiginger (2009, pp.310) considered it to be the abilityof an economy to reduce the probability of further deep crisis or at least to mitigate theeffects of a crisis. Since it is commonly defined as the ability to reduce the damage
inflicted by some kind of economic shock, we also define economic resilience as theability of a national economy to reduce the probability of shocks, or to mitigate theeffects of shocks.
It should be noted that economic resilience is also related to the recovery process(Brigugulio et al., 2005; Simme & Martin, 2010), but we focus on the damage process,i.e., after the shock and before the recovery phase. This is due to the data availability, as
noted by Groot et al. (2011). As Duval et al. (2008) have noted, the flexibility of
economic structures makes it possible to recover quickly from the recession. This can be
regarded as the recovery phase of economic resilience, but we conjecture that thenegative shocks and the recovery are asymmetric and that socio-economic damage toeconomic agents is irreversible. In our paper, taking irreversible adjustment costs after
the recession into account, we concentrate on analyzing the damage process and seek
more effective policy arrangements to mitigate the negative shocks.
In addition to studies by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), Claessens et al. (2010), andGroot et al. (2011), there are some remarkable studies related to economic resilience.
Some studies measure economic resilience (e.g., Brigugulio et al., 2005), while others
analyze the effects of resilience on economic growth and research the determinants ofeconomic resilience (e.g., Duval et al., 2008; Aghion & Howitt, 2009).
Bristow (2010) analyzed the relations between resilience and regional strategies.
Simmie and Martin (2010) regarded resilience as a four-phase adaptive cycle model.
Similar to our awareness of the issue, Rossi et al. (2009) focused on the national
economic structures surrounding the crisis. Suzuki (2009) investigated the structures oftrade and verified why Japan suffered serious effects from the current crisis.

Duval et al. (2008) investigated the determinants of economic resilience as stated, butthey focused on policy variables related to economic policies such as fiscal policies ormonetary policies and on system variables related to labor and product market
regulations. They did not examine the structures of economy or trade that Rossi and
Suzuki focused on.
In this paper, based on the literature review above, we empirically investigated whichcountries were resilient after the crisis, and what features those countries have, using
macroeconomic data, which can clarify structures of the national economy and trade.
Methodology
We investigate the determinants of economic resilience through an analysis ofmacroeconomic data of 32 countries belonging to OECD, before and after the financial
crisis, August 2010.
There are two reasons for using data of OECD countries for our analysis. First, thesecountries maintain precise macroeconomic data. Second, it is possible to compare
countries with similar national economic structures.
Measurement of the effect of the recession
In the past studies (see Ramey & Ramey, 1995; Fatas & Mikov, 2006; Hnatkovska &Loayza, 2005), economic growth or stability was measured by real GDP growth rates orvolatility measures (a measure for variations of GDP). However, Olaberria and Rigolini(2009, pp.4) reported that “output growth volatility is usually estimated using a five- or
10-year rolling window”, and therefore it seems to be too early to use volatility
measures for estimating economic resilience at this stage. Hence, in this paper,
economic resilience is measured not by volatility measures but by real GDP growth.
Moreover, annual GDP includes decline patterns after the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. The data on quarterly real GDP are used for analysis.
Figure 1 shows GDP growths of major countries from Q1-2000. GDP growths declined
from Q1-2008 because the subprime mortgage crisis was becoming clear at that time.
After AIG, the so-called “Lehman Shock” hit the world market in September 2008. The
GDP of each country dropped dramatically. Hence, peak-to-trough changes, from Q32008 to Q1-2009 in GDP, are used for a measurement of the effect of the recession.
Figure 2 shows the rates of GDP change in OECD countries. Respective fundamental
statistics are shown in Table 1.

Extractions of explanatory variables
In this section, we choose the explanatory variables related to the structures of national
economy and trade from previous studies (Briguglio et al., 2005; Knack & Keefer,
1997; Rossi et al., 2009)
Economic openness
Briguglio et al. (2005) focused on economic openness to determine economic
vulnerability. Based on his work, (1) Sum of imports and exports (% of GDP) is used
for indicating economic openness. Countries with high rates of economic openness,
which are often shown in small countries, could be vulnerable in relation to financial
crisis, and less resilient.
Moreover, countries that expanded exportation dramatically along with globalizationand depended on foreign demand could be less resilient against a sudden decrease offoreign demand (Suzuki, 2009). Therefore, (2) Export value rate (1997-2007) is used
to indicate the trade tendencies of a country before the crisis.
Dependence on strategic imports
A country with a heavy dependence on strategic imports such as food or fuel could be
relatively vulnerable to the crisis. Therefore, (3) Net exports of fuel (% of GDP), (4)Net exports of food (% of GDP), and (5) Self-sufficient rate in energy are used toindicate dependence on strategic imports.
Though it is obvious that a country depending on strategic imports is vulnerable, wecannot be confident that agricultural or resource-supplying countries are resilient. In the
1980s after the second oil crisis, countries such as Mexico and Argentina suffered froma serious debt crisis and economic slackening because the recession in developed
countries had lasted for a long time and demands for fuel or food had decreased
suddenly (Cabinet Office 1982, Cabinet Office 1984). Therefore, it should be noted that
resource-supplying countries or agricultural countries are less resilient against a drop in
demand for primary products. We consider the results of our analysis from these pointsof view.
Dependence on manufactured exports
Rossi and Aguilera (2009) pointed out that countries with high dependence on global
cyclical industries such as Japan and Germany have been hit by the impact of thecurrent crisis severely. Hence, countries depending on manufactured exports are lessresilient against the crisis. (6) Net Manufactured exports (% of GDP) can be used toindicate dependence on manufactured exports.
Macroeconomic stability
Briguglio et al. (2005) focused on macroeconomic stability in measuring resilience, so
we also used the variables of (7) CPI change rate (1997-2007) and (8) GDP Deflator
to indicate macroeconomic stability.
Government size
Government size affects macroeconomic stability (Minsky, 1986). Therefore (9)Government expenditure (% of GDP) variables were used to indicate the size of thegovernment.
Social development(10) Human Development Indicator (HDI) has been used to indicate social
development, (e.g., Briguglio et al., 2005). HDI is a comparative measure of per capita
GDP, life expectancy, and education standards. To use HDI, per capita GDP is excluded
because it may affect the dependent variable, GDP change rate, as explained in the lastsection. Moreover, we use two social capital variables to explain social development.
The first one is (11) TRUST and the second one is (12) CIVIC. These variables wereused in the study by Knack and Keefer (1997). They verified the correlation between
economic growth and social capital. (11) TRUST is the percentage of respondents ineach nation replying “most people can be trusted” to the question: “Generally speaking,would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can‟t be too careful indealing with people?” (12) CIVIC is assessed from responses in each nation toquestions concerning, “claiming government benefits that you are not entitled to,”“avoiding a fare on public transport,” and “cheating on taxes if you have the chance.”
Respondents addressed these issues by choosing a number from 1 (never justifiable) to10 (always justifiable). We reversed these scales and summed values to create the scale(CIVIC). This value indicates the strength of norms of civic cooperation.
Infrastructure
Public investment has an important role in stabilizing the national economy. Therefore,
we also used a variable related to infrastructure investments, (13) Public investment(% of GDP).
OthersWe also used two variables of (14) Financial Depth to indicate the depth of financial
sector in each national economy and (15) GDP growth (1997-2007) to indicate thetendency of the dependent variable before the crisis.
The variables (1), (3)-(6), (8)-(10) and (13) are the average ratio before the crisis, fromthe years 2006 and 2007. Variables (2), (7), and (15) show the percentage changes from1997 to 2007. Variable (14) is the value in 2000. Variables (11) and (12) reflect the latest
data available.
Table 1 shows the fundamental statistics of explanatory variables. Data sources andcalculation methods are described in the Data Appendix.
Analysis of 32 countries
Table 3 shows the correlation between GDP change rates and each explanatory variable
for all 32 countries. It is indicated that countries with high rates of fuel-sufficiency, highvalues of HDI, and deeper financial sectors tended to experience smaller drops in GDP.
Meanwhile, countries that had high rates of manufactured exports and that expanded
exportation before the crisis experienced bigger drops in GDP.
It was also shown that there is not a strong correlation between GDP change rates and(8) GDP Deflator. However, from the scatter plot shown in Figure 3, GDP change rates
and GDP deflator seem to have a strong positive correlation in the major advanced
countries such as the G7 members. Then, we divided the 32 countries into the majoradvanced countries and the quasi-developed countries.
Analysis for the major advanced countries and the quasi-developed countries
As implied by Figure 3, correlations in the major advanced countries like Germany,
Japan or the US, and in the quasi-developed countries such as Hungary or Mexico, aredifferent. Moreover, it is preferable to compare among the countries with similar levelsof development in order to understand economic resilience for respective countries,
because the economic structures and determinants of economic resilience might bedifferent even among the developed countries.
Therefore, we classified the 32 countries according to level of economic development
into the major advanced countries and the quasi-developed countries according to GDP
per capita (Table 4). Fundamental statistics of the dependent variable and explanatory
variables for the major advanced countries and those for the quasi-developed countries
are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
As can be seen in the results of the correlation analysis shown in Table 7, there aresignificant positive correlations between GDP change rates and (3) Net fuel exports (%of GDP) and (5) Self-sufficient rate in energy for the major advanced countries. These
results indicate that, especially for the major advanced countries, a country with a highrate of fuel exportation in GDP and of self-sufficiency in energy tended to experience
only a small downfall in GDP. This result implies that: (A) a country that depends on
strategic imports such as fuel is less resilient, and (B) a country that tends to export fuel,i.e., a resource-supplying country, has high resiliency. (A) supports the notion stated by
Briguglio et al. (2005) that a country with a tendency to depend on strategic imports isvulnerable against the rise of food or fuel. Meanwhile, (B) disproves the historical factthat resource-supplying countries were vulnerable against declining demands forprimary products, as indicated in Latin America in the 1980s. This could be caused by
the following two reasons. First, there were global imbalances of trade between
countries, that is, some developed countries, including the United States as the mosttypical example, run large current account deficits, while emerging countries such as
China have maintained a large surplus after the crisis. Countries that traded actively
with the US have experienced great damage from the current crisis, because of thesudden decline of the demand for the goods and services that had been consumed in the
US. Meanwhile, resource-supplying countries such as Australia and Norway had mainly
traded with China, a country with remarkable recent economic growth (AustralianGovernment, 2011). The economies of these countries were sustained by this emerging
country, the economic growth of which in 2009 was 9.1% (WDI, 2010). Second, oilprices increased dramatically and reached the highest level before the crisis due to an
influx of speculative money. Additionally, the globalized financial market andcommodities such as oil and primary products were expected to become financial
products. Therefore, when the subprime mortgage crisis came to a head in the US in
2007, hedge funds tried to escape from the financial panic, and speculation moneys
flowed into the oil futures market. Hence, resource-supplying countries such as
Australia and Norway met with economic bubbles before the crisis. These are expected
to be reasons explaining why the GDPs of these countries fell less sharply, as comparedto other countries.
The results also show the significant negative correlation between GDP change ratesand (6) Net manufactured exports (% of GDP), especially for the major advanced
countries. This result indicates that countries that depended on manufactured exports
tended to experience a larger downfall in GDP after the crisis. This result might, again,
be explained by global imbalances. Exportation to the US accounts for 20.1% of Japan‟sexports and 9.1% of Germany‟s exports (Ministry of Japan, 2010; JETRO, 2010). Thesecountries were vulnerable against the sudden decline of demand for cyclical products
consumption in the US. Also, in the major advanced countries, the tendency of a sudden
expansion in exportation before the crisis is revealed, and the dependency on foreign
demands corresponds to a larger downfall of GDP. This implication confirms the points
Rossi and Suzuki mentioned.
Furthermore, there was significant positive correlation between GDP change rates and(7) CPI change rate (1997-2007) and (8) GDP Deflator for the major advanced countries.
On the contrary, in quasi-developed countries, (7) CPI change rate (1997-2007) has asignificant positive relationship. These results indicate that for the major advanced
countries, countries with a high inflation rate experienced a smaller downfall in GDP,
while for the quasi-developed countries, countries with a high inflation rate experienced
a larger downfall in GDP. In future research, we need to disentangle why the impact ofhigh inflation was different and why it has led to different levels of GDP downfall
between the major advanced and the quasi-developed countries.
Among the quasi-developed countries, there is a significant correlation between GDPchange rates and (10) HDI. Correlation coefficients between the GDP change rates and(11) TRUST and (12) CIVIC for the quasi-developed countries were larger than thevalues for the major advanced countries. In addition, as shown in Tables 6 and 7, themean values of (10) HDI, (11) TRUST and (12) CIVIC for the major advanced
countries are larger, as compared to those for the quasi-developed countries. Therefore,a country with high social development and social capital tends to experience a smaller
downfall of GDP among the quasi-developed countries, while there was no such relation
among the major advanced countries. From this analysis, there could be a non-linear
relationship between high standards of education, trust in people, and civic norms
enhancing economic resilience to some extent, but the effects are faint.
It can also be noted that there is a significant positive correlation between GDP change
rates and (14) Financial Depth for the quasi-developed countries, while there was nosuch relationship for the major advanced countries. This result indicates that there is a
non-linear relationship between these variables as shown in measures related to social
development.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate which countries were resilient after the crisis in order tounderstand the features those countries have, through measuring the economic resilienceof each country by using quarterly real GDP. We also extracted explanatory variablesfrom previous studies and analyzed the correlations between them. The analysis

indicates some significant findings.
First, the results indicate that countries that expanded exportation suddenly before thecrisis and depended on manufactured exports had low economic resilience against thecurrent crisis. This supports the points that Rossi and Suzuki raised. Second, resourcesupplying countries were resilient against the current crisis. Third, countries with highinflation were resilient among the major advanced countries, while these countries were
not resilient among the quasi-developed countries.
These findings imply that the following four policy strategies may enhance economic
resilience against the exogenous crisis for the major advanced countries: (1) avoiding
deflation, (2) switching to expanding domestic demand and refraining from a sudden
expansion of exportation, (3) avoiding excessive dependence on exports of cyclicalmanufactured products such as capital goods or durable goods, and (4) reducing
dependence on strategic imports such as fuel.
Analysis of economic resilience using data from the Asian Financial Crisis or from thetwo energy crises in the 1970s, in addition to the analysis presented in this study using
data from the current financial crisis, may provide more general findings. We also needto analyze regional economic resilience by using macroeconomic domestic data. It is
important to accumulate research into economic resilience and what determines it.
Moreover, resilience against exogenous shocks such as war, terrorism, and natural
disasters should be considered seriously in future studies. However, we believe thisresearch provides empirical findings that are helpful in understanding what kind ofnational economy is resilient and in selecting economic policies to increase resilience.

Endnotes
The English in this document has been checked by at least two professional editors,
both native speakers of English.

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The
World
Bank
(2010)World
Development
Indicators.

1.6

1.5

1.4

Japan
FranceUnited Kingdom

1.3

United States
Germany
Denmark

1.2

Netherlands
Sweden
Korea

1.1

1

Figure 1. GDP before and after the financial crisis
Source: OECD Quarterly National AccountNote1: Seasonally real GDP (national currency)
Note2: Based on GDP of Q1-2000 in each country

-12

-10
-8

TurkeySlovenia
Finland
MexicoIreland
Slovak Republic
Japan
SwedenIcelandGermany
Hungary
Italy
Czech Republic
United Kingdom
Korea
Luxembourg
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
Netherlands
Portugal
FranceUnited States
Chile
Spain
CanadaSwitzerland
GreeceNew Zealand
NorwayAustralia
Poland

-6
-4
-2

0

%

2

Figure 2. GDP change rate (08Q3-09Q1)
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts

Figure 3. Scatter plot of GDP Deflators

Table 1. Fundamental statistics for 32 countries
Obs
Variable
GDP change rate
32
(08Q3→09Q1)
Sum of imports and exports (% of
1
32
GDP)
2 Export value rate (1997-2007)
32
3 Net exports of fuel (% of GDP)
32
4 Net exports of food (% of GDP)
32
5 Self-sufficient rate in energy
32
Net Manufactured exports (% of
6
32
GDP)
7 CPI change rate (1997-2007)30
8 GDP Deflator
32
9 Government expenditure (% of GDP)
32
10 HDI32
11 TRUST
32
12 CIVIC
32
13 Public investment (% of GDP)25
14 Financial Depth
25
15 GDP growth (1997-2007)
31

Mean

Min

Max

SD

-4.39 -10.8

0.0

2.66

95.9

28.3

317.8

57.3

95.7
-4.9
3.3
0.8

16.2 239.3-26.6 61.6
-8.4 44.0
0.0
7.7

57.0
14.8
11.1
1.3

-2.1

-61.9

39.0

25.9

34.8
3.3
18.3
0.8
0.3
25.7
3.1
1.1
40.2

-2.2
-0.8
10.0
0.7
0.1
7.2
1.1
0.1
12.1

105.8
8.9
25.9
0.9
0.7
28.5
5.0
2.4
91.7

26.2
2.0
4.4
0.1
0.2
3.8
1.1
0.6
16.9

Table 2. Correlations in 32 countries
Variables

Obs

r

p

1 Sum of imports and exports (% of GDP)32

-0.1390.448

2 Export value rate (1997-2007)32-0.3250.069 *

3 Net exports of fuel (% of GDP)

32

0.290

0.108

4 Net exports of food (% of GDP)

32

0.199

0.275

5 Self-sufficient rate in energy

32

0.339

0.058 *

6 Net Manufactured exports (% of GDP)

32

-0.4120.019 **

7 CPI change rate (1997-2007)30-0.2780.137

8 GDP Deflator

32-0.0340.855

9 Government expenditure (% of GDP)

32

0.084

0.649

10 HDI

32

0.470

0.007 ***

11 TRUST

32

0.220

0.227

12 CIVIC

32

0.292

0.105

13 Public investment (% of GDP)25

-0.161

0.442

14 Financial Depth

25

0.338

0.098 *

15 GDP growth (1997-2007)31-0.206

0.266

Dependent Variable: GDP change rate(08Q3→09Q1)*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 3. Fundamental statistics for major advanced and quasi-developed countries
Major Advanced Countries

Variable
GDP change rate
(08Q3→09Q1)
1 Sum of imports and exports (% of GDP)
2 Export value rate (1997-2007)
3 Net exports of fuel (% of GDP)
4 Net exports of food (% of GDP)
5 Self-sufficient rate in energy
6 Net Manufactured exports (% of GDP)
7 CPI change rate (1997-2007)
8 GDP Deflator
9 Government expenditure (% of GDP)
10 HDI
11 TRUST
12 CIVIC
13 Public investment (% of GDP)
14 Financial Depth
15 GDP growth (1997-2007)

Obs

Mean

Min

Max

Quasi-developed Countries

SD

Obs

Mean

Min

Max

SD

16

-4.1

-8.6

0.0

2.4

16

-4.7

-10.8

0.0

3.0

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
15
15
15

103.6
76.9
-0.4
0.3
1.1
2.2
19.0
2.6
19.5
0.9

28.3
16.2
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
-10.9
-2.2
-0.8
10.9
0.8
0.2
24.3
1.1
0.4
12.1

317.8
150.1
22.7
3.1
7.7
16.3
31.5
5.5
25.9
1.0
0.7
28.4
4.2
2.4
91.7

70.2
36.5
6.6
1.4
1.9
7.4
8.0
1.5
4.2
0.0

16 88.3
16 114.4
16 -3.3
16
0.9
16
0.5
16 -3.0
14 52.9
16
4.0
16 17.1
16
0.8
0.2
16
16 24.7
10
3.8
10
0.8
16 43.9

50.0
31.5
-6.8
-2.1
0.2
-23.0
24.5
1.0
10.0
0.7

173.6
239.3
2.4
8.7
1.4
11.7
105.8
8.9
24.3
1.0

41.6
68.0
2.2
3.3
0.3
9.0
28.3
2.3
4.3
0.1

0.4

26.7
2.6
1.2
36.2

0.2

1.2
0.9
0.6
20.3

0.1

0.5

0.1

7.2
1.9
0.1
15.5

28.5
5.0
1.5
61.3

5.1
1.1
0.5
12.3

Table 4. GDP per capita
Major advanced countries
Luxembourg
NorwaySwitzerland
Denmark
IrelandNetherlands
United States
Austria
Australia
Finland
Belgium
SwedenFranceGermany
CanadaJapan

106,277
78,404
63,07555,944
49,63748,07845,67445,56844,922
44,576
43,666
43,20941,08040,672
39,59939,530Quasi-developed countries
IcelandUnited Kingdom
Italy
Spain
GreeceNew Zealand
Slovenia
Portugal
Czech Republic
Korea
Slovak RepublicHungary
PolandChile
TurkeyMexico38,02235,10935,05931,87728,751
27,292
24,076
21,902
18,103
17,07816,167
12,847
11,287
11,287
8,561
8,117

Source: OECD Annual National Accounts Database
Note: 2009, US$
Table 5. Correlation in major advanced and quasi-developed countries
Major Advanced Countries
Variables
1 Sum of imports and exports (% of GDP)
2 Export value rate (1997-2007)
3 Net exports of fuel (% of GDP)
4 Net exports of food (% of GDP)
5 Self-sufficient rate in energy
6 Net Manufactured exports (% of GDP)
7 CPI change rate (1997-2007)
8 GDP Deflator
9 Government expenditure (% of GDP)
10 HDI
11 TRUST
12 CIVIC
13 Public investment (% of GDP)
14 Financial Depth
15 GDP growth (1997-2007)

Obs

r

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
15
15
15

-0.131-0.723
0.500
0.261
0.544
-0.8100.494
0.604-0.1990.276
0.050-0.027-0.2070.151-0.210p

0.629
0.002 ***
0.048 **
0.330
0.029 **
0.000 ***
0.052 *
0.013 **
0.461
0.300
0.855
0.921
0.459
0.591
0.453

Quasi-developed Countries
Obs

r

p

16
16
16
16
16
16
14
16
16
16
16
16
10
10
16

-0.221-0.131-0.1190.212-0.085-0.259-0.592-0.309
0.251
0.559
0.354
0.360
0.064
0.634
-0.192

0.410
0.628
0.662
0.431
0.754
0.332
0.026 **
0.244
0.348
0.024 **
0.179
0.171
0.860
0.049 **
0.477

Dependent Variable: GDP change rate(08Q3→09Q1)*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Data Appendix: Sources of variables used in analysis
No. Variables
1 GDP change rate (08Q3-09Q1)
1 Sum of imports and exports (% of GDP)
2 Export value rate (1997-2007)

3 Net exports of fuel (% of GDP)

4 Net exports of food (% of GDP)

5 Self-sufficient rate in enrgy

6 Net Manufacture exports (% of GDP)

7 CPI change rate (1997-2007)
8 GDP Deflator
9 Government expenditure (% of GDP)
10 HDI
11 TRUST

Series name
"VOBARSA: Millions of national currency, volume
estimates, OECD reference year, annual levels,seasonally ajusted""Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)","Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)""Exports of goods and services (constant 2000 US$)""GDP (current US$)","Merchandise exports (current US$)","Merchandise imports (current US$),"Fuel imports (% of merchandise imports)","Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)""GDP (current US$)","Merchandise exports (current US$)","Merchandise imports (current US$),"Food imports (% of merchandise imports)","Food exports (% of merchandise exports)""Energy production/TPES"

Data sourcenOECD Quartely National Accounts

32

World Development Indicators 2010

32

World Development Indicators 2010

32

World Development Indicators 2010

32

World Development Indicators 2010

32

Energy balances of OECD countries 200932

"GDP (current US$)","Merchandise exports (current US$)","Merchandise imports (current US$),World Development Indicators 2010
"Manufactures imports (% of merchandise imports)","Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)""Consumer price index (2005 = 100)"
World Development Indicators 2010
"Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)"World Development Indicators 2010
"General government final sonsumption expenditure (% ofWorldGDP)"
Development Indicators 2010
"Education index"
Human Development Report 2010
"Life expectancy at birth index""(V23)Most people can be trusted"

WVS 2005-2008, WVS four-wave aggregate of Values Studies

32

32
32
32
32
32

13 Public investment (% of GDP)"(V198) Justifiable: claiming government benefits","(V199) Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport", WVS 2005-2008, WVS four-wave aggregate of Values Studies"(V200) Justifiable: cheating on taxes""Public investment"
OECD Going for growth 201014 Financial Depth"Financial Depth"

IMF International Financial Statistics

25

15 GDP growth (1997-2007)
16 GDP per capita"GDP (constant 2000 US$)""GDP per capita (US$)"World Development Indicators 2010
OECD Annual National Accounts Database32
32

12 CIVIC

32
25