Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 32, Number 2, 2011, pp89-97

Public Reviews and Trust Formation in Disaster Risk Management

Tsuyoshi HATORI,*
Kiyoshi KOBAYASHI,**Hayeong JEONG****Ehime University, 3 Bunkyo-cho, Matsuyama-shi, Ehime, 790-8577, Japan
Email address: hatori@cee.ehime-u.ac.jp**Kyoto University, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan
Email address: kkoba@psa.mbox.media.kyoto-u.ac.jp***Kyoto University, Katsura, Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto, 615-8540, Japan
Email address: hayeong@psa2.mbox.media.kyoto-u.ac.jp(Received January 25, 2011 Accepted March 21, 2011)
ABSTRACTThis paper investigated two roles of public reviews in disaster risk management: 1)
providing information to a policy maker about the desirability of a disaster risk management
plan and 2) promoting stakeholders’ trust in policy maker’s decision. Our analysis was
conducted by formulating two linked communication games, which described, respectively,
information transmission from public reviewers to a policy maker and trust formation
between the policy maker and an individual. It was shown that there exists an externality
between the two games, and the policy maker accordingly faces a trade-off between thetwo roles of public reviews. Due to this trade-off, trust formation between the policy makerand the individual might be prevented. Finally, alternative institutional design for realizing
trust formation between the policy maker and the individual through public reviews was
discussed. It was pointed out that a communication protocol that disciplines the way inwhich reviewers express their opinions has to be designed in order to realize the two rolesof public reviews.
Keyword: trust formation in disaster risk management, public reviews, subjective games

deliberate the desirability of a disaster risk management plan. Public reviews are expected to carry out avariety of functions from raising democratic potential
to learning stakeholders’ opinions of a disaster risk
management plan. Among them, this paper examines
two roles of public reviews in disaster risk management: 1) providing information to a policy maker(local government) about the desirability of a disasterrisk management plan [1][2][3][4] and 2) supporting
stakeholders’ trust in a policy maker’s decisions [5][6]1 Introduction
Disaster risk management is often discussed aroundan extremely sophisticated judgment, which puzzles
even local government in finding a clear solution. In
this context, the use of public reviews in the development and determination of a disaster risk management
plan has become increasingly widespread. Indeed,
recently, local government often holds a public forum in which various experts and interested parties89

T. HATORI, K. KOBAYASHI, H. JEONG[7][8]. First, a policy maker frequently fails to solve
disaster risk management problems involving environments of high uncertainty and ambiguity. In thiscontext, a policy maker can reduce this uncertainty byconsulting public reviewers. As a professional, a reviewer’s judgment is indispensable in evaluating theappropriateness of disaster risk management from thestandpoint of technical expertise.
Second, a regional policy maker is often confronted with the difficulty of convincing many
stakeholders that the disaster risk management planthat she proposes is in their interests. Even if an innovative project is proposed by regional planners, itcannot be realized without community acceptance. To
gain stakeholders’ acceptance, the policy maker has
primarily to be trusted by them. In this context, by introducing public reviews, stakeholders might be given
reason to trust the policy maker. Thus, a trust relationship between the policy maker and stakeholders might
be formed through public reviews.
The two roles of public reviews, however, cannot always be fulfilled [5][6]. We consider the problem of cognitive dissonance between a policy makerand a stakeholder [9]. Cognitive dissonance refers
to the state resulting from inconsistency between
individuals’ internal representations by which theydescribe and make sense of real-world situations. A
policy maker, who operates within a local area andis engaged in disaster risk management, is likely todescribe a decision-making problem using technicalterms or special terminology, while a non-professional stakeholder who lacks the relevant expertise might
describe the issue using the ambiguous, general terms
that make up the lexicon of his or her daily lives [10].
In other words, although they communicate with eachother concerning the same management issues, theyrecognize these issues using different descriptions.
Due to this cognitive dissonance, the policy makermight face a trade-off between the two roles of public
reviews. On the one hand, in order to obtain the relevant information to carry out an appropriate disasterrisk management plan, the policy maker needs toextract technical expertise such as accurate data anddefinite evidence from the reviewers. On the other
hand, in order to gain stakeholders’ trust in a disasterrisk management plan, the policy maker needs to consult reviewers to persuade them to support the projectfrom the standpoint of their daily lives remote fromthe scientific world. However, these two requirements
might not be satisfied simultaneously. Accordingly,
the trade-off is likely to raise the problem of miscommunication and as a result, the optimal plan for disaster risk management might not be realized.
This paper elaborates a theoretical framework for
examining the validity of the two roles of public reviews, i.e., information provision and trust formation,by using communication game theory. The remainderof this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
the basic concept regarding the theoretical model isdiscussed. In Section 3, the basic model that describes
information transmission from public reviewers to apolicy maker is presented. In Section 4, we consider
a situation where the policy maker has to persuade an
individual in order to realize a disaster risk management plan as the extended model.
2 Basic Concepts
2.1 Concept of linked communication games
Our analysis is conducted by formulating two linked
communication games, which describe, respectively,
1) information transmission from public reviewers
to a policy maker and 2) trust formation between apolicy maker and an individual who represents various stakeholders related to a disaster risk management plan. In what follows, we especially call thelatter game the “trust game” [8][11][12]. Let us consider a situation where a policy maker must make adecision about a disaster risk management plan. The
policy maker can choose between two alternatives,
alternative X (undertaking a project) and alternative
Y (maintaining the status quo), while she is uncertain
about the properties of the project and cannot judge
which alternative is better for her interests. Then, as
will be described in the next section, public reviewers
send their messages about the desirability of the twoalternatives to the policy maker. The alternative thatthe policy maker selects after receiving the messagesof the reviewers cannot be realized as a public choice
unless it is accepted by the individual. The trust gameanalyzes whether the individual accepts the policy
maker’s decision.
As explained in the introduction, we consider asituation in which a policy maker and an individual
recognize a disaster risk management plan by using
different cognitive schemes. In this context, the policy
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PUBLIC REVIEWS AND TRUST FORMATION IN DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

maker might be confronted with a trade-off with regards to the two roles of the public reviews. On the
one hand, the policy maker is able to reduce the uncertainty that she is faced with by consulting public
reviewers to provide information about the technicalissues related to the management plan. Furthermore,
information transmission between the policy makerand public reviewers may improve through the mechanism of check and balance among multiple reviewers[13]. On the other hand, a trust relationship betweena policy maker and an individual can be realized byintroducing public reviewers who examine the management plan from the standpoint of the individual’s
daily life. However, if the policy maker discloses theresults of public reviews to the individual, it is possible that the reviewers will express their own opinions
in a strategic fashion and try to prevent a desirable
disaster risk management plan. As a result, the checkand balance mechanism among reviewers might not
be functioning well.

the players choose the corresponding alternative inthe columns as a collective choice. In both subjective
games, both players can obtain a positive payoff, x > 0,
if a desirable project is selected and a negative payoff,x < 0, otherwise. The payoff from the status quo is assumed to be zero.
We should emphasize two key concepts of thesubjective game, i.e., 1) property labels and 2) subjective payoffs. Firstly, it is assumed that the propertiesof alternative X can be represented by two different
languages. On the one hand, a policy maker engaged
in disaster risk management practices within a local
area describes a disaster risk management projectwith real, specific terms that represent the technicalconditions regarding the management plan. For example, she might evaluate each alternative by calculating
the probability and impact of a natural disaster on thebasis of scientific knowledge about the characteristics
of disaster risks. On the other hand, the individual
uses virtual, general terms that represent the influenceon his realm of imagination of the disaster risk management plan. He might be concerned about environmental preservation matters from a global standpoint.
We call the technical terms that the policy maker uses
“technical property labels.” Technical property labels
are denoted by R1 and R2. Similarly, let non-technicalterms be called “non-technical property labels,” which
are represented by V1 and V2. Each player recognizes
the projects properties by means of his or her property
labels, and they do not know how the other player
will describe them. We assume a one-to-one correspondence between the two property labels. There exist the following possible correspondences:
Correspondence 1: R1-V1, R2-V2;
Correspondence 2: R1-V2, R2-V1.
(1)Here, the former (correspondence 1) denotes the truecorrespondence between the two labels, while the

2.2 Concept of subjective games
A disaster risk management project (alternative X) is
characterized by the properties of the project, whilea policy maker and an individual recognize theseproperties by different cognitive schemes. This paper
describes the cognitive dissonance between the policy
maker and the individual as they play different subjective games [8][14][15]. Figure 1 shows the subjective
framework of the trust game proposed in this paper.
The left-hand side of this figure denotes the subjective game of the policy maker, and the right-hand side
denotes the subjective game of the individual. Each
entry in the matrix represents the payoffs to the twoplayers (left for policy maker’s payoffs, right for individual’s payoffs) if the properties of the project are
set by the corresponding properties in the rows andSubjective gameof the policy maker

Project
properties

Subjective gameof the individual

Alternative

Alternative

X

Y

X

Y

R1

x, x

0, 0

x, x

0, 0

R2

x, x

0, 0

x, x

0, 0

Project V1
properties

V2

Figure 1. Subjective games of communications between a policy maker and an individual91

T. HATORI, K. KOBAYASHI, H. JEONG

latter (correspondence 2) denotes the false correspondence. The true correspondence is assumed to be unknown to the two players. The policy maker and theindividual have a preference over the property labels.
Let us assume that the two players have common interests, and the most preferred properties are R1 andV1. The policy maker and the individual, however, areuncertain about which properties are to be realized
by the project. What kind of label each player uses
depends on his or her knowledge, experience, otherpsychological factors, and so on. In this paper, theselabels are treated exogenously, and we shall not attempt to explain the process through which property
labels are formed. The following analysis focuses on
the question: Given property labels, what choices will
each player make through a communication process?
Secondly, it is assumed that each player will
maximize subjective payoffs in his or her subjective
game. Let us consider a situation where the individualholds the stereotyped belief that the policy maker always makes no effort to reduce disaster risks, while
in practice, the policy maker is sincere in making aneffort for the individual. Subjective payoffs describedon the left- and right-hand side of Figure 1 are set
to represent such a situation. The reason that we
impose these strong assumptions with regard to anindividual’s stereotyped beliefs is for the analysis of
an institutional design under which an individual withstereotyped beliefs about a policy maker’s behavior
tends to trust the policy maker who is motivated to
conduct disaster risk management activities in accordance with the individual’s will. Each player who
mentally organizes the world by using his or her subjective game cannot understand the subjective gameof the other player. Furthermore, since the two players
describe the situation using different languages, thepolicy maker has no means to inform the individualthat she is making the optimal decision. The trust
game proposed in this paper focuses on the problemof whether the individual trusts the policy maker insuch a situation.

ability of a disaster risk management project depends
upon the project’s properties, which are unknown tothe policy maker. The model assumes a situation inwhich project properties R1 and R2 (V1 and V2) are
realized by the management plan (alternative X) to bestate “s1” and “s2,” respectively. The policy maker isassumed to hold the incorrect subjective belief about
the true state of the world. It is assumed that in theinitial state before receiving the messages of public
reviewers, she chooses to maintain the status quo. In
this context, the public reviewers make announcements to a policy maker about the desirability of adisaster risk management plan. The reviewer is supposed to be an expert or an interested party related tothe management plan. For example, we can consider
that a local government holds a public forum where
several reviewers evaluate disaster risk management
activities. In the model proposed in the following
subsections, we assume that public reviewers havethe ability to correctly evaluate the optimal alternative for a policy maker. This means that they possess
perfect information about the state of the world. Afterobserving the true state, reviewers send their messages to the policy maker about which alternative thepolicy maker should choose. As this section focusesupon a situation where the policy maker consults
public reviewers to seek advice on the optimal alternative from a technical standpoint, it is assumed thatthe reviewer’s message is represented by the technical property labels. Thus, a reviewer’s message isdenoted by m = R1 or R2. This assumption is removed
in the next section, where the public reviewers areable to send their messages directly to the individual,
who describes a disaster risk management plan using
non-technical property labels. However, reviewers
might have private interests in conflict with the policy
maker. Furthermore, the model allows reviewers tosend their messages strategically to the policy maker.
Accordingly, they are able to manipulate the optimalalternative. Let us define a reviewer’s message asa “correct message” if the message corresponds tothe true state, and a “wrong message” otherwise. It
is assumed that reviewers are differentiated into two
types depending upon their interests 1) a reviewer
who prefers alternative X regardless of the true stateand 2) a reviewer who prefers alternative Y regardlessof the true state. The first type can be regarded as aprogressive reviewer who aims to promote a disaster

3 Model of Public Reviews
This section analyzes a simple game as the basicmodel in which a policy maker and public reviewers
communicate with each other regarding a disaster risk
management plan. As explained previously, the desir92

PUBLIC REVIEWS AND TRUST FORMATION IN DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

risk management plan, while the second one can be
regarded as a conservative reviewer who is skepticalof the project. The first and the second reviewer are
hereafter called the “progressive reviewer” and the“conservative reviewer,” respectively. The progressive
reviewer obtains a positive payoff normalized to unity
if the policy maker chooses alternative X, while thereviewer obtains payoff zero otherwise. The reverse
holds for the payoffs of the conservative reviewer,that is, the payoff of the reviewer is unity if the policy
maker chooses alternative Y, and zero otherwise. It
is assumed that there is mutual knowledge about thetypes of reviewers among all the players.
As mentioned above, the present model allows
for the possibility of reviewers behaving manipulatively. In reality, however, reviewers may not necessarily be motivated to manipulate the optimal alternative because they otherwise would suffer punishment
or lose reward afterward. On the other hand, it might
be difficult for the policy maker to evaluate and control reviewers’ behavior completely, especially in thecase where reviewers are discussing a technical judgment for disaster risk management that is difficult
even for the policy maker to understand. Also, even
if all reviewers have sincerely proposed the optimalalternative, it is possible that the policy maker andthe individual cannot understand this and will thendistrust the reviewers’ opinions. Accordingly, it isimportant to develop a robust institution that is proof
against reviewers’ manipulation even if such dishonest reviewers were involved or against players’ incorrect beliefs regarding reviewers’ manipulation evenif such reviewers were not involved in reality. This is
our motivation behind the assumption of manipulative
behavior of reviewers.
The strategy of the policy maker is denotedby probability ȡ that she chooses alternative X. The
strategy of the reviewer is denoted by ır (r = P, C),
which denotes the probability that the progressive andconservative reviewer will send message R1. Since
the choice of the reviewer is conditioned on stateof the world sk (k=1, 2), we denote the strategies of
the two reviewers as ıP(sk) and ıC(sk). The choice ofpolicy maker depends on the messages of reviewers.
Therefore, the strategy of the policy maker is represented by ȡ(mr) for the case of a single reviewer, andȡ(mP, mC) for the case of multiple reviewers. In what
follows, we first analyze the basic model by a single

reviewer, and then by multiple reviewers.
1) Single reviewer
Before studying the model with multiple reviewers,
it is instructive to show that the policy maker can extract no information about the true state of the worldfrom a single reviewer. In this game, the reviewers
have no reason to be truthful, irrespective of their
type. This is because the reviewer has an incentive tomanipulate the desirability of the alternatives if thepolicy maker decides which alternative to choose according to the message of the reviewer. More precisely, the progressive reviewer would like to inform thepolicy maker that alternative X is better by sending
message R1 even if the true state is s2. On the other
hand, the conservative reviewer attempts to make thepolicy maker choose alternative Y, despite the factthat state s1 is realized. Since both reviewers lack themeans to send a truthful message to the policy maker,
the policy maker remains skeptical of the reviewer’s
judgment. Eventually, the policy maker cannot trust
the reviewers’ judgments, and as a result, she chooses
the status quo.
2) Multiple reviewers
Analysis of the policy game with a single reviewer
shows that as long as the reviewer evaluates the alternatives independently, the policy maker does notbelieve what the reviewer says. To overcome this issue, we introduce a peer review system that comprises
two types of reviewer. In particular, the mechanismof check and balance between reviewers is examined.
The mechanism of check and balance forces two reviewers to be truthful through having one reviewer’s
statement checked against the other reviewer’s statement. Under the mechanism of checks and balances,both reviewers cannot but send a correct message
about the true state of the world. We assume that in
the peer review system, each reviewer can obtain additional positive payoff ȝ > 0 if the messages of thetwo reviewers coincide with each other. Payoffs ȝ arereferred to statement rewards hereafter. Statement
rewards represent both pecuniary rewards that a local
government pays reviewers for the results of evaluation and non-pecuniary rewards such as prestige andreputation. Let us assume that the result of the communication game is more important for each reviewer
than statement rewards, i.e. 1 > ȝ > 0.5.
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T. HATORI, K. KOBAYASHI, H. JEONG

In the basic model with multiple reviewers, thepolicy maker chooses the following strategy:ρ ∗ (R1P , R1C ) = 1,

shown in proposition 1, the policy maker can choose
the optimal alternative (alternative X) based upon thereviewers’ messages in her subjective game describedon the left-hand side of Figure 1. Therefore, this section focuses on the individual’s choice in his subjective game. Analysis of the model shows whether theindividual who has stereotyped beliefs about a policy
maker’s behavior can trust the policy maker. However, emphasis should be placed on the fact that theequilibrium strategies employed in what follows areappropriate only in an individual’s subjective game. It
does not mean that each player selects the equilibrium
strategies in respective subjective games. In particular, an equilibrium strategy of the policy maker in an
individual’s subjective game might differ from theactual policy maker’s choice in her subjective game.
The strategy of the individual is represented
by probability Ĳ that he chooses to accept the policy
maker’s proposal. The strategies of the policy makerand reviewers are denoted by ȡ and ır (r = P, C), respectively, in the same way as in the basic model. In
this model, there exists a unique equilibrium, where
the individual chooses not to trust the policy maker.
In what follows, we call this equilibrium distrust equilibrium. In the distrust equilibrium, policy maker’s
strategy is ȡ(sk)* = 1 regardless of state sk (k=1, 2).
Therefore, the individual does not trust the policy
maker, that is Ĳ* = 0.
In extended model A, the individual conceives
the idea that the policy maker would constitute a moral hazard if he trusted her. The equilibrium strategyof the policy maker represents the stereotyped beliefsof the individual about the policy maker’s behavior.
As a result, the individual distrusts the policy maker,
although the policy maker chooses optimal alternative
X in practice. In this model, the policy maker is assumed to describe the game using technical property
labels that cannot be understood by the individual.
Yet, even if the policy maker uses the same languageas the individual (i.e., non-technical property labels),
the individual cannot trust in the policy maker as longas he holds the stereotyped beliefs with respect to thepolicy maker’s payoffs. In sum, unless the individual
is able to understand that the policy maker chooses
the desirable disaster risk management plan, he does
not trust her regardless of her actual choice.

ρ ∗ (R 2P , R 2C ) = 0 ;PCρ ∗ (m P , mC ) = 1 / 2 : if the other messages (m , m ) are sent.

(2)
Thus, the policy maker selects alternative X (Y) if
both reviewers recommend alternative X (Y). In casereviewers’ messages do not satisfy the consistency
condition, the policy maker chooses a mixed strategy
because she cannot judge which message is correct.
On the other hand, reviewers’ strategies are represented by(3)
σ r ∗ (s1 ) = 1, σ r∗ (s 2 ) = 0 (r = P, C ).
Receiving the messages of reviewers who follow theabove strategies, the policy maker can obtain perfect
information about the desirability of the alternatives.
In this game, the mechanism of checks and balances works well, and the message of one reviewer
is always checked against the message of the otherreviewer. As a result, any deviation from the equilibrium is worse for both reviewers, and accordingly,
each reviewer is forced to be truthful.
Proposition 1: Under the mechanism of check andbalance among multiple reviewers, the policy maker
can obtain perfect information about the desirabilityof a disaster risk management plan.
4 Model of Trust Formation
4.1 Trust formation in disaster risk management
As the previous analysis shows, if the check and balance mechanism among multiple reviewers is working
well, the policy maker can obtain perfect information
about the desirability of a disaster risk management
plan. For simplicity, in what follows, we assume thetrue state is s1, and that alternative X is optimal for thepolicy maker and the individual. In many situations,however, the policy maker’s proposal has to be approved by individuals. This section examines the extended model that describes trust formation between
the policy maker and the individual in addition to thecommunication process between the policy maker andthe public reviewers. As a preliminary analysis, let us
consider a situation where the review process is notconducted in public and the check and balance function among reviewers is working well. We call themodel presented in this section extended model A. As
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PUBLIC REVIEWS AND TRUST FORMATION IN DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

The above strategy means that the individual follows
the judgment of the only conservative reviewer who
shares the same language as the individual. But thisstrategy gives the conservative reviewer an incentive to deviate from sending the correct message tosending the wrong one represented by non-technicalproperty labels. This deviation, in turn, makes theindividual disregard the message of the reviewer. Furthermore, the policy maker who cannot understandnon-technical property labels cannot evaluate which
message is correct. As a result, the individual who has
no information about the action of the policy makerdoes not trust her. Therefore, a distrust equilibrium isobtained as a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
the strategies of the policy maker and the individual
are given by ȡ* = 0 and Ĳ* = 0, respectively. Since reviewers cannot affect the behavior of the policy maker or the individual, they are indifferent about which
message to send. Equilibrium strategies of reviewers
are represented byσ r ∗ = const. (r = P, C ) ,(5)
where const denotes the constant value given independently of the true state of the world. We have thus
established the following proposition:
Proposition 2: In extended model B, the mechanismof check and balance among multiple reviewers is notworking well, and as a result, the individual distrusts
the policy maker.

4.2 Disclosure of public reviews
In extended model A, the policy maker cannot maintain trust relationships with the individual as long as
the individual holds stereotyped beliefs regarding thepolicy maker’s behavior. In this context, the policy
maker has to persuade the individual that she is able
to carry out a disaster risk management plan to meetthe individual’s expectations. In this section, we focus
upon the second role of the public review, that is tosay, supporting individual’s trust in the policy maker’s
decision. We consider a scenario where the policy
maker makes the result of the public reviews open
to the public and consults reviewers to persuade theindividual. In what follows, the model is referred tothe extended model B. If the individual understands
that the policy maker decides on a disaster risk management plan according to reviewers’ messages, hemight trust the policy maker. In extended model B, it
is assumed that reviewers can choose which property
labels they use for sending their messages.
The strategies of the policy maker, the individual, and reviewers are set by ȡ, Ĳ, ıP, and ıC respectively. In this model, the individual observes themessages of two reviewers. Accordingly, the individual’s strategy is denoted by Ĳ(mP, mC). Apparently,
an individual’s trust is more likely to be generated bydisclosing public reviews to the individual, since theindividual can obtain more information about the actions of the policy maker. As will be shown, however,the difference in languages between the two reviewers invalidates the mechanism of check and balance
and leads to a distrust equilibrium, which is the same
result as that of extended model A.
To understand the rationale behind this result, let
us assume a situation where the mechanism of checkand balance is working well as shown in the basicmodel. In this context, the strategy of each reviewer
is represented by (3). Since reviewers send a correct
message, the policy maker selects the strategy (2).
However, although the individual is observing correct messages of public reviewers, he is unable tounderstand the technical property labels. As a result,
he might not accept the policy maker’s proposal. Furthermore, even if the individual accepts the plan on
observing the reviewers’ messages, this behavior is
not robust against players’ deviations. In this case, theindividual’s strategies are represented by(4)τ ∗ (m P , V1C ) = 1, τ ∗ (m P , V2C ) = 0.

4.3 Design of a communication protocol
The result of extended model B suggests that the disclosure of public reviews has the potential to subvert
the first role of reviewers, i.e., information provision
to the policy maker. The drivers behind the inefficient
outcome are that the language of reviewer’s message
is used arbitrarily. As the public reviewers are allowed
to freely decide the property labels with which to send
their messages in extended model B, they express
themselves in a strategic fashion and try to prevent adesirable disaster risk management plan. As a result,public reviewers communicate with each other byusing different languages, and the check and balance function among reviewers is not working well.
In order to realize the check and balance mechanism
among them, introducing a communication protocolin the review process that makes reviewers follow
a fixed procedure for sending their messages is required. As extended model C, we consider a situation95

T. HATORI, K. KOBAYASHI, H. JEONG

in which reviewers have to be coordinated in discussion with each other by using a common language.
For example, it is considered that the coordinator or
the facilitator in charge of guiding the discussion forum examines reviewers’ statements and shows clear
differences in their viewpoints. In what follows, sucha situation is modeled as there are two peer review
systems in which reviewers are limited to using thecommon language respectively. We call the review
system that imposes constraints on using technical(non-technical) property labels upon reviewers insending their messages “panel A (B).” Thus, the messages of reviewers in panel A are represented by mAr =R1 or R2 (r=P, C). Similarly, the messages of reviewers
in panel B are represented by mBr = V1 or V2 (r=P, C).
The strategies of the policy maker, the individual, reviewers in panel A, and reviewers in panel
B are set by ȡ, Ĳ, ıAr , and ıBr (r=P, C), respectively. In
this model, the policy maker and the individual canobserve the messages of four reviewers. Accordingly,
their strategies are denoted by ȡ(mPA, mCA, mPB, mCB,) andĲ(mPA, mCA, mPB, mCB,). Extended model C has an equilibrium where the policy maker obtains the correct
information from panel A and the individual trusts
the policy maker according to reviewers’ messages
in panel B. In equilibrium, the third reviewers follow
strategy (3) to send the correct message. Receiving
the messages of reviewers in panel A following thisstrategy, the policy maker can obtain perfect information about the desirability of alternatives. The strategyof the policy maker is represented byρ ∗ (R1P , R1C , m BP , m BC ) = 1, ρ ∗ (R 2P , R 2C , m BP , m BC ) = 0 ;Therefore, the individual trusts the policy maker if
and only if both reviewers in panel B inform him thatthe alternative is in the individual’s interest. He does
not trust the policy maker if both reviewers recommend the status quo. In case the reviewers’ messages
do not satisfy the consistency condition, the policy
maker and the individual choose a mixed strategy, because they cannot judge which message is correct.
In this equilibrium, the mechanism of check andbalance is working well, and the message of one reviewer is always checked against the message of theother reviewer. The check and balance mechanism issustained by the constraints of a common language.
Proposition 3: In extended model C, the policy maker obtains perfect information about the desirabilityof a disaster risk management plan, and the individual
trusts the policy maker.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined two roles of public reviews in
disaster risk management: 1) providing information
to a policy maker about the desirability of a disasterrisk management plan and 2) supporting stakeholders’trust in a policy maker’s decision. Our analysis was
conducted by formulating two linked communication
games, which described, respectively, 1) informationtransmission from public reviewers to a policy makerand 2) trust formation between the policy maker andan individual. It was shown that there is an externality
between the two games, and the policy maker accordingly faces a trade-off between the two roles of public
reviews. As a result, this might preclude trust formation between the policy maker and the individual.
Finally, an alternative institutional design for realizing trust formation between the policy maker andthe individual through public reviews was discussed.
It was pointed out that a communication protocol thatdisciplines the way in which reviewers make theirstatements has to be designed in order to realize thetwo roles of public reviews. An important role of a coordinator or a facilitator in public debate is to manage
such a communication protocol to prevent reviewers’
manipulation and thereby to make different languages
common to stakeholders.
The following subjects still remain for future
study. First, the analytical results obtained in thisstudy stand upon several assumptions about players’ρ ∗ (m AP , m BC , m BP , m BC ) = 1 / 2 : if the other messages(mAP, mAC, mBP, mBC) are sent.

(6)
Thus, the policy maker chooses one alternative if andonly if the reviewers’ messages in panel A are consistent with each other. On the other hand, from the reviewers’ messages in panel B, the individual can judge
whether the policy maker’s recommendation is betterfor her. Accordingly, the individual trusts the policy
maker. The individual’s strategy is represented byτ ∗ (mAP , mCA , V1P , V1C ) = 1, τ ∗ (mAP , mCA , V2P , V2C ) = 0 ;τ ∗ (mAP , mBC , mBP , mBC ) = 1 / 2 : if the other messages(mAP, mAC, mBP, mBC) are sent.

(7)
96PUBLIC REVIEWS AND TRUST FORMATION IN DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

knowledge and languages. The framework presented
in this study can be extended in various directions.
For example, it is possible that, in contrast with theassumptions of the present model, reviewers possess
limited information about the state of the world orcannot understand the language of the individual (i.e.,
non-technical property labels). Analysis of regional
learning and trust formation processes under a variety of assumptions about knowledge and language
structures across agents might provide further insightfor disaster risk management [16]. Second, while wehave highlighted the important role of a coordinatoror facilitator of having a common language used, how
they can and should make different languages common to participants has not been sufficiently explored.
For this issue, discourse analysis of an actual debate
might contribute to an empirical understanding of
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