Cyberspace
and theChanging Nature of Warfare
Kenneth Geers

Real World vs Cyberspace• What’s the difference?
• Now integral part of every pol/mil conflict– Propaganda, espionage, reconnaissance,even warfare• The Internet’s amplifying power– Victories in cyberspace can become
victories on the groundCyber Warfare• Nuclear, Chemical, Biological … Digital?
• Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)– IP-enabled personnel, munitions, sensors,logistics• Before, during, after fighting– I&W, D&D, e-mail campaigns, blog poisoning• Assassination of computer geeks?

Cyber Warfare Strategy
1. The Internet is vulnerable to attack
2. High return on investment
3. Inadequacy of cyber defenses
4. Plausible deniability
5. Participation of non-state actors

S1 The Internet is Vulnerable• Imperfect design– Hackers can read, delete, modify
information on or traveling betweencomputers• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
database grows daily– Difficult to guard all holes into your network

S2 High Return on Investment• Common attack objectives– Research & Development data
– Sensitive communications– Limited only by the imagination• The elegance of computer hacking– Less expensive– Less risk

S3 Inadequacy of Cyber Defense• Still an immature discipline• Traditional skills inadequate– New skills highly marketable• Investigations slowed by international natureof Internet– Cultural, linguistic, legal, political barriers– No help for state-sponsored operations

Understanding C. Crime

Information Protection Laws

Anthology
Information Security in Russia
Computer Criminals
C. Crime Units
SORM

Send an E-mailLibraryForum

http://www.cyberpol.ru/

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International CorrespondenceЗдравствуйте, уважаемый Kenneth Geers!
Можем дать следующие ответы на Ваши вопросы.
Вопрос: Получали ли вы в прошлом запросы об информации из-за рубежа?
Ответ: Да. Каждый день 89 подразделений Национального центрального бюро Интерпола России по Email получают и обрабатывают много поручений и запросов от правоохранительных организаций стран членов Международной организации уголовной полиции Interpol.
Вопрос: Что мешает улучшению международного сотрудичества?
Ответ: Разные правовые нормы в действующих национальных законодательствах. Требуется ихчастичная унификация.
Вопрос: Вы думаете было-бы трудно найти общую почву чтобы поделиться информацией?
Ответ: По международным соглашениям мы без особых проблем обмениваемся разведывательной и инойинформацией о преступлениях и правонарушениях со специальными службами зарубежных государств. Впоследнее время часто проходят совместные совещания, семинары и конференции наших сотрудников ссотрудниками FBI (USA).
Вопрос: Вы думаете что боязнь утери национального суверенитета –непреодолимое препятствие?
Ответ: Обмен информацией на основе двухстороннего или многостороннего Договора (юридическогоакта) не опасен для национального суверенитета.
Спасибо за вопросы. Были рады Вам помочь.
С уважением, ...

Foreign Relations Law (U.S.)• “It is universally recognized, as acorollary of state sovereignty,
that officials in one state may not
exercise their functions in theterritory of another state without
the latter's consent.”

S4 Plausible Deniability• Maze-like architecture of Internet– Investigations often find only hacked box• Smart hackers route attacks through ...
– Poor diplomatic relations– No law enforcement cooperation• The problem of the last hop, retaliation

S5 Non-State Actors• Nation-states like to control international conflict• Transnational subcultures spontaneously
coalesce online, influence political agendas– Report to no chain-of-command• Globalization, Net aid in following, shaping events• Challenge for national security leadership:– Could it spin delicate diplomacy out of control?

www.youtube.com

OpenNet

Internal Security First• The East German dilemma• Computers to the Rescue– Processing power, databases,automated analysis,decryption, speech recognition,transcription, ArtificialIntelligence, neural networks

Cyber Warfare Tactics
1. Espionage
2. Propaganda
3. Denial-of-Service (DoS)
4. Data modification
5. Infrastructure manipulation

T1 Espionage• Second oldest profession, v 2.0– Elegance of remote intelligence collection• Old vulnerability, new advantage?
– Convergence, speed, practical crypto, steg, OSINT• Danger not in data theft, but giving to “handler”– Old methods: Brush passes, car tosses, dead drops– New methods virtually the same• Targeted collection: how would you fare?

The New Espionage• Universal media and intelligence gathering– Binoculars, satellites, mass media, NMAP?
– Territorial sovereignty not violated– Metadata and reading between the lines– Picture taking, not physical invasion … right?
– If indefensible, normally not espionage!

T2 Propaganda• Easy, cheap, quick, safe, powerful– Audience is the world– Drop behind enemy lines• Does not need to be true
• Recruitment, fund raising, hacktivism– Censored information replaced in seconds• Tech expanding rapidly (multimedia, Skype, etc)
• Appearance of technical prowess

Zone-H StatsT3 Denial-of-Service (DoS)• Simple strategy– Deny computer resource to legitimate users– Most common: flood target with bogus data so itcannot respond to real requests for services/info• Other DoS attacks– Physical destruction of hardware– Electromagnetic interference designed to destroy
unshielded electronics via current or voltage surges

T4 Data Modification• Extremely dangerous– Legitimate users (human or machine) may makeimportant decisions based on maliciously alteredinformation• Website defacement– “Electronic graffiti” can carry propaganda ordisinformation• Holy Grail– Weapons, Command and Control (C2) systems

T5 Infrastructure Manipulation• Critical infrastructures connecting to Net• SCADA security may not be robust• Electricity especially important• Infrastructure in private hands• Seized hard drives: Microstran, Autocad, etc• White House briefed on certain 0-days

Case Study #1
Russia and Chechnya: 1994

Push and Pull
• World Wide Web– Real-time, unedited news from the war front– Net aids in following and shaping current events• Average Net user
– More information than heads of state ten years
ago– Increasingly important role in international
conflicts

Examples• Most effective info not pro-Chechen but anti-Russian– Digital images of bloody corpses, POWs
– Real photos and fake photos used
– Kremlin occasionally caught off-guard• War funds bank account in Sacramento, CA• As tech progressed, streaming videos– Ambushes on Russian military convoys

Government Reaction• 1999: PM Vladimir Putin:– “we surrendered this terrain some time ago ...
but now we are entering the game again.”– Introduction of “centralized military censorship
regarding the war in the North Caucasus”– Sought Western help to shut down kavkaz.org

Case Study #2
NATO and Kosovo: 1999• 1999: first major
NATO militaryengagement• First Cyber war!
– ;)KosovoBlack Hand 1.0

Black Hand 2.0

Hacker Achievements• NATO war website down, email down
– “Line saturation” caused by “hackers in Belgrade”• White House website defaced– Secret Service investigation• Virus-infected email– 25 strains detected• “Owned” U.S. Navy computerCase Study #3
Middle EastCyber War: 2000

www.hizbulla.org: October 25, 2000

www.wizel.com
webmaster@hezbollah.org
www.pna.net

downloads

www.wizel.com

Pro-Palestinian Counterattack• Immediate, much more diverse• Key difference: economic targets– Bank of Israel, e-commerce, Tel Aviv
Stock Exchange– At least 19 countries: AIPAC, AT&T
• During 2006 Gaza fighting– 700 Israeli Internet domains shut down

Resistanceportal“You will attack…”…these IPs:
and…
Bank of Israel
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange
Prime Minister’s Officewww.wizel.com

www.ummah.com/unity• Due to complaints, moved and renamed:– http://defend.unity-news.com– http://members.tripod.com/irsa2003– http://members.tripod.com/irsa2004

Case Study #4
Sino-American“Patriotic Hacker War”: 2001

April 26, 2001: FBI Advisory• “Citing recent events between the United States andthe People's Republic of China (PRC), malicious
hackers have escalated web page defacements overthe Internet. This communication is to advise network
administrators of the potential for increased hacker
activity directed at U.S. systems … Chinese hackers
have publicly discussed increasing their activity
during this period, which coincides with dates ofhistoric significance in the PRC…”

Downed EP-3 on Hainan Island

Critical Infrastructure Attack• FBI investigated a Honker Union of China(HUC), 17-day hack of a California electric
power grid test network– Widely dismissed as media hype• 2007: CIA informed industry leaders that atangible hacker threat to critical infrastructure
is no longer theoreticalCase Study #5
Estonia: 2007

The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington DC, 4 April 1949

• Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them
all ... each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith ... such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force,to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.

Red Square, 1945

Tallinn, Estonia

Ethnic Composition of Estonia
Ethnicity

Population% of total

Estonian

921,062

68.6

Russian344,280

25.6

Ukrainian

28,1582.1

Belarusian

16,134

1.2

Finn

11,035

0.8

The Russian BorderRelocation: April 26, 2007May 9: Victory Day• «Премьер-министр просит прощения! Премьер-министр
Эстонии и эстонское правительство просят прощения увсего русского населения Эстонии и берут на себяобязательства по возвращению памятника бронзовомусолдату на место.»Estonian Retaliation?

NATO: Dawn of Cyber• 1999 Washington Summit (new “Strategic Concept”)– No mention of cyber• 2002 Prague Summit:– “strengthen ... to defend against cyber attacks”• 2004 Istanbul Summit:– No mention of cyber• 2006 Riga Summit:– “protect information systems ... against cyber attacks”– “develop a NATO Network Enabled Capability”

Centre of Excellence, Tallinn

Strategic Thoughts• Nation-states lose some control over conflict• Geopolitical analysis required– Cyber conflict mirrors fighting on ground• Attribution and the false flag
– Concept: People’s War• Is national security at risk?
– As with WMD, defense strategies unclear– As with terrorism, success in media hype

Tactical Thoughts• Assume Breach!
• Collection/transmission of evidence• Asymmetric advantage works both ways
• Set realistic goals• Focus on core problems• Blend art and science• w/o competent ctrmeasures, much worse...

The Future is Unknown

But It Begins Today

Cyberspaceand theChanging Nature of WarfareKenneth Geers