IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Power Outage: “How Can
Japan Safely Restart Its
Nuclear Energy Program
Post-Fukushima?"

Dr. Charles CastoIEEJOctober 10, 2014TokyoIEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Black Swan Events
 High impact – Hard to predict – Extreme Outliers Complex disasters Mother Nature + Physics = Unpreventable &Unpredictable Fukushima = Black SwanIEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

A Cascading Event Natural Event leads to Artificial Event, a Human Tragedy, and leads
to a Crisis Systems Failure Earthquake damaged Infrastructure - Large scale disaster management(DM) needs Began isolation of nuclear plant Tsunami = Loss of 1st responders Stretched DM resources – Lost sea ports
 Nuclear plant further isolation and destruction
 Human Tragedy Increased scale of DM
 Loss trust/confidence

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Crisis Systems Failure Overwhelmed Onsite
 National Government & Corporate Stepped in to take command Caused additional complexities

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Crisis Systems Failure The symptoms of crisis systems failure Leadership confusion (panic/confusion/vacuum & plant isolationism) Who has the ultimate decision authority? Unified command?
 Responding to the impossible
 Response incrementalism, i.e., keeping up, instead of keeping ahead ofthe crisis
 Failure in the capability curve

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Crisis Systems Failure Leadership Lack of clarity at the top
 No formal communication between government representatives at siteand senior government leadership Island/isolated response at site Confused mission clarity

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Lessons Learned
Black Swans are Real and Crisis Systems
Failure Happen
Overwhelming local/prefectural & Nationalresources
Must have a fundamental belief (possibilisticanalysis)
Worse on worse drills/exercises
Organism chart v. organizational chartLeadership inversion from collaborative toauthoritarian needed to cope with system failure

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Lessons Learned
 Emergency Management Issues
 Stretch capability curve both technical and human Capability response centers Plan for long-term response Lifeline for other technical resources Resilience Evacuations much more difficult than thought beforehand, e.g. contaminationof bodies
 Include the population affected to assist– avoid victimology

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Learning Lessons (Learned lessons) Learn right lessons of the past otherwise built-in Latent Organizational
Weaknesses Learning the wrong lessons can be worse than learning no lessons

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Learn tomorrow's lessons
today Consider Emotion state of leaders Improve Crisis leadership skills
 One lesson is contingency planning. Have we thought through thecrisis leadership abilities of the nuclear industry and government?
 Social media/transboundary nature of crisis Need scholarly research No more heroes Daini heroism

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Crisis Systems Failure Insights
Cynefin Framework
CoreConditions

Mitigation

Source: HBR A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making, Snowden and Boone, Nov
2007

Evacuation

Humanneeds

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Decisions in MultipleContexts

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Crisis Event ResponseCrisis

Emotions

Decision
MakingCrisisResponse

Sensemaking

Leadership

SimpleLow

Collaborative

Readiness

Positive

Collaborative

ComplexHigh

Naturalistic

Resilience

Collective

Authoritarian/
non-linear

Chaotic

Death
Anxiety

Instinctual

Situational

Doubt &Pessimism

Warrior Ethos

Source: Casto 2014

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Continuing Policy Crisis

Source: Post Crisis: Engage – or Fly Low? Moran and Gregory,Brunswick Insight 2014

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Policy Crisis
CrisisPolitical

PublicActionRecoveryRoutineCollaborative

Latent public:
Problem is there, butpublic does notrecognize it
Disinterested &disengaged
UnawarePositive

Collaborative

Extreme

Authoritarian &nonpartisan

Aware public:
Groups recognizes
that a problem exists
Interested &engaged

Hesitant

Trust/Confidence/Co
operation

Dangerous

Leadership Panic

Active public: Group
is aware of theproblem andorganizes torespond to it.

Frozen in inaction

Stop the bleeding
reduce severity
Openness
Crisis Response (unity)
Still in crisis

Advocacy
References: 4 types of publics Tench, R. & Yeomans, L. (2006). Exploring Public Relations. England: Pearson Education Limited.
Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, T (1984). Managing Public Relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Clarke, L., & Chess, Caron
leadership panic Kasperson, R. SARFIEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Government Actions
 Cleanup Fukushima is essential to restart Must provide oversight to the NRA….this is key!!!!!!!
 Develop a Risk Policy Statement through public hearings
 Develop a Safety Culture Policy Statement Still in a policy crisis

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Government Actions
 Establish a “backfit” process along with a 50.59 process to reviewcurrent or updated analysis and determine whether the plants should
be retrofitted based upon the new information.
 Establish a requirement for a full safety evaluation every 10 years(international community does this) to reconfirm the plant safety
analysis.
 Impose severe accident management requirements on the industry
Add a requirement that each nuclear plant have a specific control
room simulator, that is, a “site specific” simulator.

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Utility actions
 Independent oversight in control room Create Independent/External Safety Review Boards.
 Require a “severe accident advisor” in each control room. This
person would be extensively trained in severe accidents and wouldprovide advice to the control room operators in the event of asevere accident. This would be temporary until secondary
assessments are completed and appropriate countermeasuresinstalled.
 Train operators NOW on extreme events

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

NRA Actions
 Convey risk Policy Statement
 Improve the employee pipeline source and competence of NRA
 Most importantly, establish an “international regulator academy” toeducate new and experienced regulators on the techniques ofregulation and inspection from international partners

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

NRA Actions
Implement a “change managementprogram” for the employees at the newNRA. Including revising the mission, values
and vision statements.
Add one site inspector for an interim period
specifically to inspect severe accident
management activities. This would be
temporary until secondary assessments arecompleted and appropriate
countermeasures installed.

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

NRA Actions
 Boost the quantity and competence of on-siteinspectors. Improved training programs for this staff
and require more stringent competence criteria. Also,
compare the number of on-site inspectors to those inother nations to ensure that the number of inspectors
assigned to the site is appropriate.
 Establish a “hotline” for accepting public comments
and respond to those questions.
 Enhance severe accident training requirements for onsite inspectors.

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Enhancing PublicConfidence

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

The Domestication of the Second Fire
Only the elites hadaccess totechnology

The
Sorcerer’sapprenticeovertaken byhis own
invention
Source: The Domestificationof the second fire: Pretre

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

The Domestication of theSecond Fire
Nature wasuntainted
anduntoucheduntil nuclear
power
Seemingly nosolution to
nuclear energy
and waste – noacceptable andaccepted
solutionIEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Public OppositionIEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Controlling fear & panic
 How societal constraints impact solutions (socialsolutions v. technical solutions) Having the “will” to communicate with the public Releasing SPEEDI – panic or rational behavior?
 Managing optimistic bias & defeatism
 The Role of Emotional Intelligence Victimology: responders as victims

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Risk Perceptions Between American
Students and Japanese Students –Much Alike, Some different

Cognitive Representation of Risk Perceptions : A Comparison of Japan and the United States
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 1991 22: 11 Randall R. Kleinhesselink and Eugene A. Rosa

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Americans – Unknown, newJapanese – Known, old
Both - DreadIEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Gaining Public Trust,Confidence & Cooperation
There are two forms of public trustRelational
ConfidenceStudies conclude shared values immensely
important to public trustStudies conclude that the function of confidence
is control, based on knowledge of the past or
constraints on the future.
Earle TC, Siegrist M, Gutscher H. Trust, risk perception, and the TCC model of cooperation. Chapter 1 in Siegrist M, Earle TC,
Gutscher H (eds). Trust in Cooperative Risk Management London: Earthscan, 2007.

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Public Trust, Confidence &Cooperation
General Trust

Value
Similarity

Past
Performance

SocialTrustConfidence

GeneralConfidence

Familiarity
Earle TC, Siegrist M, Gutscher H. Trust, risk perception, and the TCC model ofcooperation. Chapter 1 in Siegrist M, Earle TC, Gutscher H (eds). Trust in
Cooperative Risk Management London: Earthscan, 2007.

Cooperation

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

NRA chairman questions utilities'attitudes toward nuclear safety
Kyodo News 2 July 2014The utilities "have not taken theaccident that occurred in Fukushima
seriously enough," Nuclear Regulation
Authority Chairman Shunichi Tanaka
said at a press conference, addingthat such an attitude has in partcaused the delay in the NRA safetyassessment of reactors.

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Actions to improve Public
Confidence
 Media tours/access/Embedded media (full access) Record all calls/video commitment to release future accidents
transcripts

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Actions to improve Public
Confidence Fix emergency preparedness
 Using social media…Twitter information sharing transparency
 Enhance sheltering procedures
 Realistic emergency planning & Realistic evaluation drills
 Real-time Telemetry of environmental conditions (radiological)
 Text message for reactor shutdowns/emergency
classifications/abnormal conditions/directions e.g.
sheltering/evacuation (much like the earthquake notificationsystem.
 Flex stockpile equipment (KI/dosimeters/Radiation
pagers/PC’s etc)
 Annual notification of emergency preparedness status/actions
 Written certification/legal accountability/commitment fromthe government that the emergency measures are in place

IEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

University Research National competition on explaining health effects ofradioactivity (scholarships)
 Research on impacts of Article 9 & crisis leadership University research: Moving from “peacetime
leadership to a war-footing”; collaborative, adaptive &authoritative leadershipIEEJ : October 2014. All Rights Reserved.

Conclusions
 What is regulator's role for restarting and safety operation ofnuclear power in Japan?
 Technical Evaluation
 Confirmation of nuclear safety
 Listening to the public - How can Japanese government and nuclear energy industry
restore the confidence of general public especially women?
 Demonstrating shared values
 Constraints on the future operation of nuclear power (risk acceptance) - How can we make nuclear energy safe enough?
 Conversations with the public on the level of risk acceptance National government must provide oversight to the NRA on the level ofrisk acceptanceContact : report@tky.ieej.or.jp