DP2011-12

Environmental Outsourcing
Matthew A. COLE
Robert J.R. ELLIOTT
Toshihiro OKUBO

March 16, 2011

Environmental Outsourcing
Matthew A. Cole1, Robert J.R. Elliott1 and Toshihiro Okubo2
1
Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, UK
2
Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Japan

Abstract
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of firms shifting stages of theirproduction processes overseas. In this paper we investigate whether firms outsource the dirtierstages of production to minimise domestic environmental regulation costs – a process broadly
consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis. We develop a theoretical model of environmental
outsourcing that focuses on the roles played by firm size and productivity, transport costs andenvironmental regulations. We test the model’s predictions using a firm-level data set for Japan anddo find evidence of an ‘environmental outsourcing’ effect.

JEL: F18, F23, L51, L60, Q56, R3

Keywords: Environmental regulations, trade, outsourcing, outsourcing, firm-level.

Acknowledgements: This research is partly financed by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research and Japan’s ResearchInstitute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI). Access to official micro-data was arranged by RIETI. We are
grateful for the support of the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation grant number 7741/7948 and the Leverhulme Trust
grant number F/00 094/BH. We thank Toshiyuki Matsuura for assistance with data preparation and Tony Venables,
Peter Neary, James Markusen, Beata Javorcik, Eric Strobl, Toby Kendall, Facundo Albornoz and participants at a RIETI
meeting for helpful comments and suggestions.

11. Introduction

The complex relationship between international trade and the environment has been thoroughly
investigated in recent years often with differing conclusions drawn (Antweiler et al. 2001, Cole andElliott 2003, Frankel and Rose 2005 and Lovely and Popp 2011). Central to the debate in the
popular press is the concern that stringent environmental regulations in developed countries damage
the competitiveness of firms. If true, it is claimed that the result will be pollution ‘leakage’ aspollution intensive firms either physically relocate to low regulation economies or are simply
displaced by similar firms in low regulation countries. A large number of studies have examined this
proposition, commonly referred to as the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), either by studying
foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns (see e.g. Eskelund and Harrison 2003 and Cole et al. 2006)or net trade patterns (see e.g. Ederington et al. 2005). The findings of this literature are decidedly
mixed. 1
In this paper we address an aspect of the PHH that has been ignored within the trade-environment
literature to date, the notion of outsourcing; that is the increasing tendency of firms to subcontract
parts of their production process to other firms that are often based overseas. Outsourcing hasreceived considerable attention in the trade literature with studies such as Feenstra and Hanson(1999) and (2006), Grossman and Helpman (2005), Grossman et al. (2005), Hsieh and Woo (2005)
and Tomiura (2007) typically focusing on the potential positive impact of outsourcing on domestic
firm productivity. However, neither this literature, nor the trade-environment literature, has made1 A related literature looks directly at the impact of environmental regulations on productivity (see for example Aiken etal. 2009 and Greenstone et al. 2011).

2reference to the possibility that firms may outsource the pollution intensive parts of their production
process as a means of avoiding stringent domestic regulations. 2
There are several reasons why it may be helpful to examine the impact of regulation costs on
outsourcing as opposed to net trade or FDI patterns. First, with regard to net trade patterns, it isclear that international outourcing would influence, and be included within, such net trade patterns
and these patterns have been examined at industry-level in the previous literature (see for example
Ederington et al. 2005). However, it is quite likely that the specific impact of a firm’s outsourcing
would be highly diluted within an industry’s overall net export figures. If outsourcing turns out tobe a direct mechanism through which firms respond to changes in regulation costs then this may be
missed if the focus is on overall trade patterns at the level of the industry, perhaps explaining therelatively weak evidence of pollution have effects provided by the net trade literature. With regard
to FDI, a number of attempts have been made to theoretically explain the various factors that may
make a firm choose between outsourcing and FDI. Attention has typically focused on the roles
played by incomplete contracts, the thickness of markets, the cost base of the firm and strategic
considerations more generally (Grossman and Helpman 2003 and Spencer 2005). Regarding thelatter, Leahy and Montagna (2009) go as far as to argue that ex ante identical firms may choose
2 The international trade literature regularly refers to the concept of ‘offshoring’ (e.g. Grossman and Rossi 2008) andseveral recent papers have attempted to address whether the US is ‘offshoring’, or displacing, its pollution (Kahn 2003
and Levinson 2010). It should be noted that such offshoring captures all firm activity undertaken abroad and hence theoffshoring of pollution refers to pollution emanating from all of these activities. These activities include FDI, joint
ventures and arms length trade with affiliates and non-affiliates. International outsourcing however refers only to arms
length trade between firms where parts of the production process are undertaken by unrelated firms abroad.
Outsourcing is therefore a much more precise concept than offshoring. The studies that do look at US offshoring also
do so at the level of the industry rather than the firm and all seem to find no evidence that the US has beensystematically offshoring pollution.

3

different internationalization options (i.e. FDI or outsourcing) purely as a result of strategic
considerations. To some extent this literature is in its infancy, with little by way of strong empiricalevidence to support the various assertions as to how firms choose between these different avenuesof internationalization. Given this uncertainty, and the presence of increasing trends of both FDI
and outsourcing, there seems no reason to necessarily assume that firms’ environmental regulation
costs will necessarily affect their decisions whether or not to undertake FDI in the same way as thedecision to undertake international outsourcing. While several studies have examined the impact ofsuch costs on FDI flows, none has yet examined the impact on outsourcing. The specific focus inthis paper is therefore on firm-level international outsourcing and the theoretical and empiricalmechanisms through which it may be influenced by environmental regulation costs. 3
We therefore believe this to be the first paper to consider the link between outsourcing and theenvironment and believe it provides a clean mechanism for indentifying pollution haven consistenteffects.

To introduce the concept of environmental outsourcing we first build a model ofoutsourcing with heterogeneous firms that concentrates on the roles played by firm size andproductivity, transport costs and environmental regulations. We then test the model’s predictions
using Japanese firm-level data. Japan provides an excellent setting in which to test our model given
the considerable levels of outsourcing and FDI undertaken by Japan in recent years. Significant
parts of the Japanese supply chain now occur overseas, particularly in China and other developing
Asian economies. The Japanese economy is also increasingly dependent on imports of intermediate

3 While firms may undertake domestic or international outsourcing, our focus is on international outsourcing given thefact that regulatory differences between Japan and many developing economies are likely to be much greater than any
regulatory differences within Japan. For the remainder of the paper we use the term outsourcing to refer to international
outsourcing (although we do consider domestic outsourcing in our sensitivity analysis).

4goods. Our analysis of over 12,000 Japanese firms reveals evidence to support the existence ofenvironmental outsourcing and hence provides evidence consistent with a pollution haven effectalthough transport costs remain a significant deterrent to this process.
This paper has potentially important policy implications. First, the net effect of environmental
outsourcing is likely to be detrimental to the global environment if production that formerly
occurred within the highly regulated Japanese economy now occurs in countries with less stringent
regulations where production techniques are less clean. However, even if the environmental costs
and benefits in the home and foreign country cancel out, outsourcing is still likely to lead to a netincrease in pollution due to the increase in the transportation of goods around the world.
It is clear that any equitable climate change policy will need to address outsourcing as a possible
transmission mechanism for pollution ‘leakage’. For example, the Chinese government may object
to pressure from the West to reduce emissions if a proportion of these emissions are as a result of
supplying dirty intermediate goods to Western firms especially if the final product is then exported
back to China. It is important that we understand these potentially complex trading relationships
when designing climate change policy.
More positively, the implications for a country of increasing environmental regulations may be lesssevere than first thought. Instead of firms relocating or closing down in light of an increase inenvironmental regulations firms may simply adjust to a change in their cost structure and outsource.
Whilst this will involve job losses in the intermediate good production there may be more highskilled jobs created in the headquarters or other domestic plants following an increase in overall

5production and profitability. Indirectly, these new jobs could be considered as part of the muchheralded ‘green jobs’ revolution.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides some theoreticalconsiderations and presents our model. Section 3 outlines our empirical methodology and data
while Sections 4 and 5 provide empirical results and conclusions respectively.

2. Theoretical Considerations and Model
To our knowledge this is the first paper to theoretically model firm-level environmental outsourcing.
The current international trade literature models a relationship between export behavior andproductivity in the presence of firm heterogeneity, so-called heterogeneous-firm trade models (seee.g. Melitz, 2003 and Helpman et al. 2004). The recent proliferation of trade models based onheterogeneous firms was motivated in part by the empirical studies on firm size, productivity andexport behavior by Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), Bernard et al.
(2003), Aw et al. (2000), Pavcnik (2002) and Eaton et al. (2004).
The recent trade literature has begun to pay more attention to outsourcing.

Grossman andHelpman (2002 and 2005) and Antras (2003) use the incomplete contract model of Grossman andHart (1986) to model global outsourcing and intra-firm trade. The main issue relates to firmboundaries and the decision to outsource versus the decision to integrate foreign intermediate
production processes within overall production processes.
Empirically, the main contribution to date has been to consider the relationship between
outsourcing and productivity, with a positive correlation often found. Research includes Egger and6

Egger (2006) for a sectoral analysis in the EU, Amiti and Wei (2005, 2009) for service sector
offshoring in US and Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008) for the case of Italy. For Japan, a body ofresearch has emerged that uses similar firm-level data to our own to consider the relationshipbetween productivity and outsourcing (see e.g. Tomiura 2005, 2007 and 2008, Wakasugi et al. 2008
and Hijzen et al. 2010).
In this paper our focus is on whether firms facing stringent environmental regulations outsource
production to foreign countries or simply maintain domestic production but pay the abatement
costs associated with the resulting pollution. A key feature of our model is marginal cost differences
due to different labor productivities across firms with the result that more productive firms makegreater profits. In our model firms face a trade-off between incurring abatement costs when all
stages of the production process are undertaken domestically and the costs of outsourcing a dirty
stage of the production process which are the transport costs for the re-import of the intermediate
good and some fixed costs associated with finding a suitable foreign producer and maintaining andsupervising this arms length activity.
Our focus is on the characteristics of outsourcing firms in the presence of environmental regulations.
In contrast to previous studies we are not therefore concerned about issues relating to the impact oftrade liberalisation on entry or exit; productivity issues; or issues relating to the number of exporters
and the effects on profits. Thus our model is intentionally simple in order to highlight outsourcing
when firms are heterogeneous. First, for simplicity we assume a small open economy (Home) andthe rest of the world where all firms are exporters with the assumption of no export fixed costs.
Hence, we make no distinction between local producers (non-exporters) and exporters; second, we
assume no entry or exit (no non-producers), no dynamic effects (no growth), and no R&D
7investment stage before operation.

The environment is introduced by an assumption thatabatement costs are incurred by a firm in response to government regulation in the Home country.
Finally, we assume that firms can outsource any part of their production processes by paying an
outsourcing fixed cost and trade costs associated with importing the intermediate dirty product for
final product assembly in the Home country. The key results of our simple model persist even if weabandon these simplifications and add more factors to be closer to Melitz (2003) and Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004).
Our model is a heterogeneous-firm model with environmental regulations and outsourcing within a
Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework. Firms are heterogeneous in labor productivity.
In equilibrium we have two types of firm. First, firms that emit pollution as a by-product of the
production process and are required to pay abatement costs in order to meet government set
environmental regulations (abatement firms). Second, firms that outsource part of the production
process to mitigate the need to pay abatement costs (outsourcing firms).
Our model explains why and how firms could potentially outsource their dirty production stage andthe competing factors that make domestic production with abatement costs more attractive thanoutsourcing.
Basic model
Suppose we have M sectors, m = 1 … M where each sector, m, has a number of varieties, i. The
demand side of our model has a representative consumer who has the following utility function:M

1 /( 1-1/ )U   Cmm , where Cm    c11 /  di 
 i


,

  1 1  m  0

8(1)

which is a Cobb-Douglas function across sectors and is a CES function across varieties in eachsector, m.  m is expenditure share on sector m goods, ci is consumption of the variety i and Θ is theset of all varieties consumed.  denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between any twovarieties.
Firm heterogeneity comes only from the supply side. Labor and capital (human or physical) are theonly two factors of production. Each firm requires one unit of capital fixed costs and requires aunits of labor as a variable cost. 4 As variable a is firm specific it follows that labor productivity,
given as 1/a, differs across firms (heterogeneous productivity). Hence, each firm has a firm-specificmarginal cost (labor requirement). For a firm j, the marginal costs are given as the wage rate, w,
multiplied by a firm-specific labor requirement, aj. Note that w is measured at the national or
sectoral level whilst a is firm specific. Assume a is a priori exogenously distributed subject to aprobability density function.
To introduce the environment into the model we assume that each firm has a pollution intensive
production process which incurs an abatement cost in order to satisfy government regulations. Aslong as firms domestically operate all stages of the production process then they are required to pay
abatement costs which are defined as D units of labor per unit of output (marginal abatement costs)
and A unit of labor per firm (fixed abatement costs). Thus, total abatement costs (TAC) can be
written as wAm  wDm xmj . Average (per-unit) abatement costs are hence

4wAm
 wDm , where x mj is
xmj

Our two-factor model adopts the cost function of Martin and Rogers (1995). In keeping with Martin and Rogers ourmodel does not allow for entry and exit because the capital endowment is limited and one unit of capital creates one firm.
As a result of the entry and exit assumption all pure profits can be considered as capital returns.

9

output for firm j. For simplicity suppose D and A are identical across firms but differ across sectors
although in reality pollution intensive sectors are more likely to be strictly regulated or require thepayment of higher abatement costs and hence will have larger D and/or larger A. The implicationof our model is that as labor productivity increases so does output so that TAC increases while perunit abatement costs decrease.
In sum, total costs including abatement costs for firm j in sector m are given by
TC mj   j  wa j xmj  w( Am  Dm xmj ) , where the first term is fixed costs, requiring one unit ofcapital and thus  j denotes the (per-firm) capital reward, the second term encompasses the variable
costs while the final term relates to the abatement costs incurred. As this is a simple model weabstract from an endogenous firm distribution, thus assuming away any dynamic factors such as
entry and exit, R&D investment before operation, the survival rate of firms and economic growth.
This simplification allows us to focus on the relationship between labor productivity (size),
environmental regulations and outsourcing.

Abatement firms
Assume a small open economy (Home) that trades with a range of Foreign countries (s = 1 … S).
Our focus is on the Home economy. Utility maximization results in a CES demand function.
Consumption of the variety produced by firm j in sector m in the Home country is given by:


cmj 

p mj  m E
Pm

1

S


; Pm    p1mi di     p1mh dhs 
hs 
s 1
 i


10

1 /(1 ),   t 1

(2)

where E is the total expenditure on all varieties and P is the CES price index, where i is varieties
produced domestically and hs are the (imported) varieties produced in a Foreign country s. Tradecosts, t (  1 ), are of the traditional iceberg type. The freeness of trade, φ, is defined as   t1 .
This implies that free trade, t = 1, can be expressed asφ= 1 whereasφ= 0 represents autarchy (t =). Without loss of generality we assume identical trade costs for each foreign country. Likewise,
the consumption of the variety produced by Home firm j by a representative firm s is given by:

c 
s
mj

(tpmj )   m E s( Pms )1

1 /(1 )S 1; P     p1mi di     p1mh dh   p1mhs dhs 
i
h
hs 


s
m

(3)

where E s is total expenditure and Pms is the CES price index in country s, where the first term is thenumber of imported varieties into a Foreign country s from Home, the second term refers toimports from other Foreign countries (S-1 countries) and the third term refers to domestically
produced products. Dixit-Stglitz monopolistic competition implies (consumer) prices in the Homeand a representative Foreign country s for firm j with labor requirement aj produced in Home are
given by:pmj (a j  Dm ) w
1  1/ s tpmj and pmjt (a j  Dm ) w
1  1/ (4)

We note that higher productivity (lower aj ) firms charge lower prices and have a higher demand fortheir product. The operating profit, which is the capital reward, and the output for a representative
firm (in the Home country) can be obtained by utilizing (2), (3) and (4) to give:
S
S




 m (a j )   Bm  Bms  m p1mj  wAm   Bm  Bms  m  1 (a j  Dm ) w1  wAm
s 1
s 1





11

(5)

where;E
Es
1s
Bm  1 , Bm  s 1 ,  Pm( Pm )
1 1/ 

and
S
S






xm (a j )   Bm  Bms  m pmj  Bm  Bms  m  (a j  Dm ) w
s 1
s 1





(6)

Two important features are central to the following analysis. First, all firms earn positive operating
profits when abatement costs are moderate. 5 Second, the highest labor productivity firms with aj=0,
i.e. the firms with the lowest labor requirement and thus low marginal cost and lowest price, are themost profitable and are hence the largest producers. Thus more productive (smaller a) firms sellmore domestically and export more. 6 Likewise, less labor intensive and relatively more capitalintensive firms are more profitable (i.e. smaller labor requirement aj).
We define the capital-labor ratio as the ratio of capital rewards to all wage payments including
abatement costs:
5

Remember that the model has a condition to ensure no entry or exit. Even without abatement costs, all firms canalways operate and thus no exit occurs because the least productive firms always make positive pure profits. However,once we take abatement costs into account, to guarantee positive profits for all firms we need to assume that abatement

costs A and D satisfy:  m (1)   Bm 



6

S

  1  m

s 1



Bms  S(1  Dm )w1  wAm  0 .



 S



B  p    B    (a  D ) w






The level of exports is given by; export  

s 1

s
m

m

12

1
mj

s 1

s
m

1

1

m

j

m

S
   1
1
(a j  Dm ) w  wAm
 Bm  Bms  m (a j )s 1 KL(a j ) 1
Sw(a j  Dm ) x j  wAm s   m(a j  Dm )w1  wAm
 Bm  Bm 
s 1
 


Differentiating equation (7) we get

(7)

dKL
d
 0. Hence,
 0.
da j
dKL

Now we consider firm-level pollution. We assume that a given stage of the production processemits a level of pollution and, in the face of government regulation, firms have to pay abatement
costs. We assume that for abatement firms, one unit of production emits z units of pollution. 7
Thus, total emissions for firm j, G( xmj ) , can be written simply as G( xmj )  zxmj

Hence, total emissions increase with firm size and productivity. Total abatement costs are therefore
given by:STACm (a j )  w( Am  Dm xmj )  wAm  wDm  Bm  Bms  m  (a j  Dm ) w
s 1



(8)

As >1, emissions are inversely proportional to aj. Hence, larger firms have higher emissions andthus incur greater TACs.

7

The government regulations set z per unit of output a priori. To satisfy z, firms pay abatement costs which when paid

reduces z to zero.

13

Outsourcing firms
We now allow firms to outsource part of the production process which will reduce emissions andhence allow the firm to avoid the payment of abatement costs. If firms outsource their emission
intensive production process to a foreign country, which for simplicity is assumed to have noenvironmental regulations, then the pollution intensive production process is relocated outside of
the firm. As a result, outsourcing firms are no longer subject to [1] abatement costs associated witha pollution intensive production process, i.e. D=0 and A=0 and wages w for domestic production.
However, in the absence of abatement expenditure and pollution production, the firm incurs, [2]trade costs from foreign outsourcing  m  1 and a foreign wage which we assume is lower thanHome, w*  w and [3] fixed costs related to the costs associated with the monitoring andsupervision of the foreign supplier, Om. When the benefits of outsourcing [1] exceed the costs [2]and [3] then a firm will decide to outsource.
To be precise, outsourcing incurs two types of cost, per-unit intermediate import costs of  m w* (>1) and a fixed cost Om. For simplicity, import costs consist of the trade costs associated with
importing intermediate products and the wage in the foreign countries. 8 By outsourcing the dirtiest
part of the production process firms can avoid the production costs associated with this part ofproduction costs (a decrease in the labor requirements D) and avoid having to pay thecorresponding abatement costs. Thus, the marginal costs for outsourcing firms are  m w*  a j w .
Labor

8

productivity

increases(i.e.

marginal

costs

decrease)withoutsourcing,

Without loss of generality we assume the wage in the foreign country is normalized to unity and intermediate goods areproduced under perfect competition and constant return to scale in the foreign country.

14 m w*  a j w  ( a j  Dm ) w and is supported by the empirical evidence that suggests outsourcing
significantly enhances firm (labor) productivity (Egger and Egger 2006, Amiti and Wei 2005 and2009). On the other hand, outsourcing requires additional fixed supervisory costs. To be more
precise we assume that Om  Am . Hence, although marginal costs are lower due to lower foreign
wages and what we assume to be relatively low trade costs, outsourcing can involve fairly highsupervision costs.
Profits and output for outsourcing firms are given by:m 1
 (a j )  ( B  B )( m w*  a j w)1  wOm

s1
o
m

S

s

(9)

and
S

x (a j )  ( B  B s )  ( m w*  a j w) 
o
m

(10)

s 1

Note that profit and production decreases in a j and are thus positively related to labor productivity
as is the case for the non-outsourcing abatement firms discussed above.

Two types of firms
We assume that there is a cut-off level of aj after which an abatement firm will begin to outsource
which we denote as a o . For  mO (ao )   m (ao ) the cut-off level between abatement and outsourcing
firms a o is determined so a firm will choose higher profits. Using (5) and (9), the profit gap
between outsourcing firms and abatement firms is given as:
15

S mO (a j )   m (a j )  ( B  B s )s 1

 1 m((a j w   m w* )1  (a j w  Dm w)1 )  ( wOm  wAm ) .


(11)

The cut-off a o is determined by  mO ( a 0 )   m ( a 0 )  0 . 9 We can now derive some key outcomes andtestable hypotheses.

 ( O   )First, considering size we show that differentiating (11) we get 0 which indicates thata j

as firms become larger they are more likely to outsource. 10 Since large firms are more likely toexport we also expect a positive relationship between exporting status and outsourcing. Second, in
terms of the capital-labor ratio, the capital intensity of a firm is increasing as a j falls. Hence, we get ( O   ) 0 inferring that capital (or R&D) intensive firms are more likely to outsource. With
KL ( O   )reference to environmental regulations (our key variable) we can show that 0 andAm ( O   ) 0 so that more stringent regulations incur higher (total and/or marginal) abatement
 Dm
costs meaning that a firm is more likely to outsource.
demonstrate that

Relating to transport costs we can ( O   ) 0 which means that higher trade costs associated with the import of m

the intermediate product reduces the incentive to outsource. Finally we consider wages and showthat9

 ( O   ) 0 so that given our assumption that D is not large (see footnote 5) we expect thatw

In our model ( m w*  a j w)1  ( a j w  Dm w)1 always holds as long as Om  Am and  O    0 holds for a certain a.

If Om  Am then all firms outsource because  O   A  0 . To keep our case interesting we assume that Om  Am .
10

In

more

detail: ( O   )  1  m E

(1   ) w{( a j w  w * )   ( a j w  D m w)  }  0
a jP 1

( a j  Dm ) w  a j w  w* and   1 .

16

becausethe higher the wage in the Home country the more likely firms are to outsource. Note that themarginal change in A, D, τ and w happens only in the Home country. The model assumes that there
are a large number of foreign countries and thus the marginal change in A, D, τ and w in Home
never affects the price indices in B and B S in  O   .
To illustrate the relationship between outsourcing and abatement figure 1 plots profit in terms of
productivity 1/a and illustrates how the cut-off allows us to distinguish between our two types offirm.

4. Data and Methodology
In the empirical section of this paper we utilize a firm-level dataset entitled Kigyou Katsudou Kihon
Chousa Houkokusho (The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities)
from the Research and Statistics Department, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of International Tradeand Industry (MITI). This dataset provides information on over 22,000 Japanese firms for the years
1996 to 2000 although our variables of interest are available for only 12,335 firms for 1998 and 1999.
To be eligible for inclusion in the survey firms must have more than 50 employees and capital ofmore than 30 million Yen. Firms are then selected to be representative. The dataset provides
detailed information on the activities of each firm including whether or not they outsource activities
overseas.

Crucially, the dataset also includes information on firms’ environmental activities

discussed in more detail below.
To investigate which firm level characteristics are correlated with the decision to outsource we
express the odds, or likelihood, that a firm undertakes outsourcing as the ratio of the probability that17

outsourcing will be undertaken (Pr) to the probability that it will not be undertaken (1-Pr). We
estimate a logistic transformation of this ratio, the logit of Pr, defined as: Pr 
logit Pr OUTSOURCE   1  log
 1  Pr 

(12)

Since we are particularly interested in the role played by environmental regulation and transport
costs, our equation to be estimated is of the form:
logit Pr OUTSOURCE i   1     j   ERi   TRANS i  TARIFF j   ' Z i   i(13)where OUTSOURCE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm undertakes overseas outsourcing and 0
otherwise, ER is a measure of environmental regulation, TRANS is transport costs, TARIFF is tariff
revenues as a share of imports, Z is a vector of other firm characteristics and δ is an industry specificdummy variable and subscripts i and j denote firm and industry, respectively. 11 Industry controls
are included for two reasons.

First, our model is a multi-sector model in which firms may differ

across sectors in terms of their abatement costs. To be consistent with our theoretical model wetherefore need to control for such differences. Second, the industry dummies are intended tocapture other unobserved industry-level factors that may influence the decision to outsource. Whilemost determinants of outsourcing are expected to be firm specific and are controlled for in vector Z,

11 Although our dataset does provide the level of outsourcing undertaken by each firm, our interest is in the decision

whether or not to outsource and the factors that influence this decision. We have therefore converted the level ofoutsourcing into a simple dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm undertakes any outsourcing and 0 otherwise. In asensitivity analysis we report results based on the level of outsourcing and they are consistent with the main reported
results. Unfortunately, our dataset does not provide the country that each firm outsourced to but simply the total valueof overseas outsourcing. Note also that our outsource variable is unable to indicate which part of the production
process is outsourced.

18

some such factors may be industry specific, for example an industry as a whole may require
expensive skilled labor. To reduce contemporaneous correlation, explanatory variables are reported
in 1998 while the dependent variable is reported in 1999. Since our specification includes firm andindustry level variables we cluster our standard errors by our industry classification to adjust themfor unobserved industry attributes (Moulton 1990).
The challenge in a study of this kind is to find a firm-level measure of environmental regulation
costs. While no direct measures of such costs are available our dataset does provide information on
firms’ environmental activities which, the previous literature tells us, are likely to be highly correlatedwith firms’ abatement costs. 12 The survey from which our data emanate requires firms to answer
seven questions relating to their environmental activities as listed below:
Q1. Does your firm explicitly refer to consideration of the natural environment in your management policy?
Q2. Does your firm have a specific environmental action plan to reduce environmental damage?
Q3. Does your firm produce an environmental report that is publicly available?
Q4. Does your firm re-use waste products and utilize recycled products and equipment where possible?
Q5. Has your firm developed technology to increase the degree of recycling?
Q6. Has your firm utilized equipment and technology to reduce energy use?
Q7. Has your firm developed technology to reduce energy use?
Previous studies have shown that the firms most likely to adopt environmental management typepractices such as those above are typically those firms that generate more pollution per unit ofoutput and hence have higher abatement costs per unit of output (see e.g. Cole et al. 2005 and Cole
12 Although some firm-level abatement cost data are available for Japan, the firms in the sample do not match those in

our sample, nor do they provide sufficient industry coverage to provide industry-level observations.

19

et al. 2006). Indeed, if we rank the 115 industries in which our firms reside in terms of the
proportion of firms who answered ‘yes’ to at least one of these seven questions we find that theresults conform to our expectations. Table 1 provides the top 10 industries in this ranking andcompares them to the top 10 (again out of 115) US industries in terms of pollution abatement costs
per unit of value added, based on data reported in Cole and Elliott (2005). 13[Table 1 about here]
Although Japan and the US use different industry classifications, which prevents a direct comparisonof each industry, it is clear that the majority of the US industries with the highest pollution
abatement costs per unit of value added are the same industries that appear in the Japanese ranking.
Industries common to each ranking include Petroleum, Non-Ferrous Metals, Chemicals, Paper &Pulp, Chemicals, Iron & Steel, and Plastics & Rubber. Similarly, a ranking of UK industries bypollution intensity and by environmental operating expenditure per unit of value added by Cole andElliott (2007) reveals a very close correlation with the industries listed in Table 1. 14 In sum, it does
appear likely that differences in firms’ responses to the seven environmental variables do provide us
with information regarding differences in the environmental regulation costs that they are likely toface. For our empirical analysis we create six different variables from the responses to thesequestions which we define in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here]

13 Ranking our industries in terms of other combinations of the seven questions provides almost identical rankings.
14 The Japanese industries with the least number of firms answering the environmental questions are also very similar to

US and UK industries with the least pollution abatement costs per unit of value added and include industries such as
Clothing and Publishing.

20In our sensitivity analysis we utilize the US pollution abatement operating expenditure per unit ofvalue added (PAOC) referred to above and, using a specially constructed concordance between US
SIC industry codes and Japanese industry codes, we create industry-level observations for Japan.
While it is clearly far from ideal to use US abatement costs as a proxy for Japanese costs, thefindings of Cole and Elliott (2005) and (2007) and others indicate that the ranking of industries interms of abatement costs per unit of value added are very similar across countries, at least for thosecountries for whom data are reported (e.g. US and UK). It is therefore likely that Japanese and US
industry-level abatement costs will be broadly similar, in an ordinal sense at least.
To measure the theoretical cost of outsourcing we include two variables. First, transport costs(TRANS), expressed as a percentage of total sales, to capture the likely cost to the firm of importingintermediate inputs if it did decide to outsource them. 15 Second, TARIFF is included to control forthe impact of domestic tariffs on imports, measured as tariff revenue in Yen as a share of imports at
the industry level. We also include a range of control variables based on the theoretical frameworkoutlined in Section 3. In line with the theoretical predictions of our model, since large firms may be
more likely to outsource than smaller firms, we include the number of workers (SIZE) to capture thescale effect (which corresponds to productivity in the model). WAGE captures wages per worker asa measure of workforce quality. Capital per worker (KL) is included to control for the capitalintensity of a sector.

15 We acknowledge that a firm’s transport costs will be a function of both the weight of the product being shipped andthe distance that the product has to travel and are likely to relate to the firm’s final product rather than intermediate
inputs. Nevertheless, if we assume that the weight of intermediate inputs are correlated with the weight of the final
product, and if the final products of firms are shipped similar distances, then transport costs are likely to provide someindication of the potential cost to the firm of importing intermediate inputs.

21

We also include the value of each firm’s exports (EXP) and research and development (R&D)
expenditure measured as research and development expenditure as a percentage of sales. Finally, we
include advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales (ADV). This variable is included to proxy
the public profile of a company and hence the level of public scrutiny that a company is likely toexperience from various stakeholders and non-governmental organizations.
A key econometric concern is that of simultaneity bias between regulation costs and outsourcing.
Whilst the cost of environmental regulations may cause firms to outsource their production it could
also be argued that outsourcing could itself impact upon those regulation costs for two reaons. First,
if a country is concerned about job losses associated with outsourcing, governments may reduce
environmental regulation costs in certain sensitive industries. Second, once a firm does outsource apart of its production process its regulation costs are likely to fall.

While we utilize lagged

explanatory variables to attempt to mitigate this endogeneity problem, it should also be borne inmind that both of these simultaneity arguments suggest a negative relationship between outsourcing
and regulation costs, in contrast to the positive relationship predicted by our model. This therefore
suggests that the estimated coefficients on our environmental regulation variables are likely to beconservative estimates of the true impact of regulations on outsourcing (having been mitigated by
the negative effect of outsourcing on regulation costs).
Appendix 1 provides definitions of our non-environmental variables while Appendix 2 provides
summary statistics and compares the mean values of our variables for firms that outsource and thosethat do not. 16

Appendix 2 revels that outsourcing firms are, on average, larger than non-

16 Appendix 2 indicates, for example, that the mean of the OUTSOURCE dummy is 0.061 implying that 6.1% of thefirms in our sample undertake international outsourcing. Similarly, 26% of firms answered ‘yes’ to the environmental

22

outsourcing firms, as predicted by our theory, and face lower transport costs. Outsourcing firms
also have higher capital-labor ratios, pay higher wages, have a larger share of exports in total sales
and have greater R&D and advertising expenditure as a share of sales. In all cases, outsourcing firms
appear to undertake a greater degree of environmental management and hence, we would argue, arelikely to face greater pollution abatement costs per unit of value added.

4. Results
In Table 3 we report the odds ratios emanating from our estimation of equation (13) but havesubtracted one from each odds ratio to ease interpretation. The environmental variable is the
ENVdumall measure, defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a firm answers ‘yes’ to any of theseven environmental questions and zero otherwise. All models include our environmental andtransport cost measures and firm size, with additional explanatory variables added incrementally. In
all models we find the odds ratio (minus 1) of ENVdumall and SIZE to be positive and that of
TRANS to be negative, and both are statistically significant. Taking the example of model (6), this
implies that a firm that answers ‘yes’ to one of the environmental questions is 5.3% more likely tooutsource than a firm that does not. In contrast, a 1 unit increase in transport costs as a share ofsales reduces the likelihood of a firm outsourcing by 27%. To put this in context, the mean value oftransport costs as a share of sales across all firms is 2.41 and hence a 1 unit increase represents aquestion 1, 2 or 3, 43% answered ‘yes’ to the questions 4, 5, 6 or 7 and 57% answered ‘yes’ to at least one of thequestions 1 to 7.

23

large proportional change. Therefore, to express this another way, if TRANS increased by 10% for
the mean firm in the sample, the likelihood of that firm outsourcing would decrease by 6.6%. 17
Firm size is statistically significant in all models and increases the likelihood of outsourcing. Inmodel (6) we find that an increase in SIZE (the number of workers) by one hundred workers
increases the likelihood of the firm outsourcing by 1.4%. Wage is also statistically significant in allmodels in which it is included and again increases the likelihood of outsourcing. An increase in theannual average wage of a firm by one million Yen increases the likelihood of outsourcing by 9.4%. 18
To express this differently, if the wage level increased by 10% for the mean firm in the sample, thelikelihood of outsourcing would increase by 4.6%. 19
In terms of the other variables, we find no statistically significant relationship between tariffs andoutsourcing. However, the level of exports and the share of R&D expenditure all increase thelikelihood of outsourcing in a statistically significant manner. The capital-labor ratio consistently
reduces the likelihood of outsourcing, although this relationship is not statistically significant. While
our model highlighted the role of physical or human capital in influencing outsourcing, our empiricalresults suggest that the latter, perhaps captured by our R&D variable, is the more important of thetwo in this context.
In Table 4 we check the sensitivity of our results by testing our alternative environmental measures.
Columns (1) to (6) include the alternative measures of ENVdum1, ENVdum2, ENVcount1,
17 0.049 = 0.273*(2.41 * 0.1) where 0.273 is the odds ratio (minus 1) on TRANS and 2.41 is the in sample mean value of

TRANS.
18 1 million Yen = US $12,000 approximately (exchange rate $1= 83 Yen, Feb 2011).
19 0.046 = 0.094*(4.855*0.1) where 0.094 is the odds ratio (minus 1) on WAGE and 4.855 is the mean level of wage inour sample.

24

ENVcount2 and ENVcountall alongside ENVdumall for means of comparison. 20 As a further testof our environmental variables we utilize the US pollution abatement operating expenditure per unitof value added (PAOC), referred to earlier, concorded to Japanese industry codes to create industrylevel observations for Japan. Column (7) provides estimation results with this measure (denoted as
USpaocva) included. As can clearly be seen, no matter how we define our environmental variable, itremains a positive and statistically significant determinant of the likelihood of outsourcing. The
results in columns (1) to (6) suggest that firms that undertake these various environmental activities
are between 2.1% and 4.2% more likely to outsource than firms that do not. The coefficient on
USpaocva indicates that a 1 unit increase in pollution abatement costs as a share of value added
increases the likelihood of outsourcing by 13.3%. To put this in context, if USpaocva increased by
10% for the mean firm in the sample, the likelihood of that firm outsourcing would increase by
11%. 21
In column (8) of Table 4 we replace our discrete dependent variable with a variable measuring thelevel of outsourcing as a percentage of sales which we estimate using OLS. It can be seen that thecoefficient on ENVdumall remains positive and statistically significant. Finally, column (9) returns
to a discrete dependent variable, but this time capturing whether or not the firm undertakes domestic,
as opposed to international, outsourcing.

Since there is little variation in the stringency ofregulations within Japan (relative to the international differences) we would not expect the decision

20 These variables are defined in Table 2.

We also performed a battery of sensitivity and robustness checks with various

combinations of controls which did nothing to alter the general pattern of results. Space prevents us reporting themhere.
21 0.11 = 0.133*(8.29*0.1) where 0.133 is the odds ratio (minus 1) on USpaocva and 8.29 is the mean level of USpaocva

in our sample.

25

to domestically outsource to be influenced by a firm’s regulation costs. Column (9) confirms this tobe the case, with ENVdumall having a statistically insignificant effect on the domestic outsource
decision.
To summarise, our empirical analysis provides compelling support for the predictions of ourtheoretical model by indicating that regulation costs, firm size, wages, and KL or R&D all increase
the likelihood of a firm undertaking overseas outsourcing while transport costs reduce the likelihoodof outsourcing.

5. Conclusions
In this paper we develop a heterogeneous-firm model with environmental regulations and thepossibility of outsourcing. In equilibrium we have two types of firm. First, firms that produce
domestically and pay abatement costs on the level of pollution emitted as part of the production
process (abatement firms). Second, outsourcing firms that outsource part of their production
process thereby reducing the need to pay abatement costs at home (outsourcing firms).
Using a sample of over 12,000 Japanese manufacturing firms, we then empirically test the
implications of our model and find results to be supportive of the model’s findings. First, firms that
undertake environmental activities are more likely to outsource. Given the very close association
between such activities and the likely abatement costs per unit of value added of firms, we interpret
this as meaning that high regulation cost firms are more likely to outsource. Second, we find that
trade costs, in the form of transport costs, decrease the likelihood of a firm outsourcing. Thissuggests that there is a tradeoff between paying transport costs and paying abatement costs locally.
26

An increase in regulations or a fall in transport costs will both affect the extent to which domestic
firms outsource dirty production. Of our other variables we find that the likelihood of a firm
outsourcing increases with the size of the firm. Other things being equal, large firms are more likely
to outsource.
The results of this paper have potentially important implications and reveal another transmission
mechanism by which domestic regulations may influence trade and production patterns. In addition
to the relocation or displacement of the entire production processes of firms, we observe that it ispossible for just parts of the production process to be relocated in response to increases in domestic
regulations - leaving a large and profitable headquarters in the home country. In this sense, increases
in environmental regulations can increase the health of local citizens without the large job losses
associated with wholesale relocation or closure predicted by industry lobby groups. On the other
hand, the existence of pollution haven consistent effects may lead to calls of exploitation fromdeveloping countries whose environment is being despoiled for the profit of foreign multinationals.
This is a particular worry for large producers such as China and India and provides an additional
level of complexity to multi-country negotiations on the environment. Failure to make progress inthe future will be hampered by the knowledge that environmental outsourcing or ‘dirty leakage’appears to exist, at least for the case of Japan.

27

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Figure 1. Outsourcing Equilibrium

33

Table 1. The top 10 Japanese industries based on their responses to seven environmental questions
compared with the top 10 US industries in terms of pollution abatement costs.
Japanese Industries
Industry

US Industries
Percentage

Industry

PAOC

1. Rubber tires and inner tubes

100

1. Petroleum refining

12.3

2. Petroleum refineries

89.6

2. Primary smelting of non-ferrous metals

9.0

3. Chemical fertilisers

78.4

3.Pulp and paper

8.8

4. Non-ferrous metals

75.5

4.Secondary smelting of non-ferrous metals

6.7

5. Pulp and paper

74.2

5. Organic chemicals

6.0

6. Soap and detergents

74.1

6. Cement production

5.9

7. Chemical products

73.7

7. Paper mills

5.5

8. Other oil and coal products

70.8

8. Paperboard mills

4.9

9. Plastics and plastic products

70.2

9. Iron and steel

4.6

10. Iron and steel

67.7

10. Plastics and rubber

3.5

The Japanese industries stem from a ranking of 115 industries in terms of the percentage of firms in eachindustry answering ‘yes’ to at least one of seven environmental questions. The US industries stem from aranking of 115 three-digit US SIC industries in terms of average pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC)
per unit of value added (in thousands of 1990 US dollars) over the period 1989-1994 based on data reported
in Cole and Elliott (2005). Note that Japan and the USA use different industry classifications and hence thetitles of industries do not precisely match.

34

Table 2. Definitions of Environmental Variables
Variable nameDefinition

ENVdum1

A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm answers yes to questions 1, 2
or 3 and zero otherwise

ENVdum2

A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm answers yes to questions 4, 5,
6 or 7 and zero otherwise

ENVdumall

A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm answers yes to any of thequestions and zero otherwise

ENVcount1

A variable that counts the number of positive answers to questions
1, 2 and 3.

ENVcount2

A variable that counts the number of positive answers to questions
4, 5, 6 and 7.

ENVcountall

A variable that counts the number of positive answers to allquestionsUSpaocva

Pollution abatement operating costs per unit of value added basedon US industry-level data for 1994 from US Department ofCommerce, Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures.

The Japanese variables are from Kigyou Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho (The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business
Structure and Activities) prepared by the Research and Statistics Department, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI).

35

Table 3: Main Estimation Results

ENVDUMall
TRANS
TARIFF
SIZE
WAGE
KL

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.062***(5.9)-0.324***
(6.3)
0.009
(0.0)
0.00023***(4.5)

0.057***(5.3)-0.333***(6.2)-0.171(0.2)
0.00020***(4.1)
0.138***(5.1)

0.057***(5.3)-0.330***(6.2)-0.327(0.2)
0.00021***(4.0)
0.146***
(4.9)
-0.29
(1.0)

0.056***(5.0)-0.288***
(6.0)
0.248
(0.3)
0.00016***(3.0)
0.110***
(4.4)
-0.34
(1.3)
0.058***(10.2)

0.053***(4.8)-0.273***
(5.6)
0.316
(0.4)
0.00014***(2.6)
0.094***(4.1)-0.316(1.2)
0.054***(9.8)
0.078***(3.8)

0.053***(4.8)-0.273***
(5.6)
0.286
(0.3)
0.00014***(2.6)
0.094***(4.1)-0.314(1.2)
0.054***(9.8)
0.078***
(3.8)
0.008
(1.3)
12335
0.12

EXPORTS
R&D
ADV

Observations
12335
12335
12335
12335
12335
0.091
0.010
0.12
0.12
0.12
Pseudo R2
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm outsources or not. These results stem from the estimation ofequation (8). Industry dummies included. For each variable we report the estimated odds ratios minus 1.

36

Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis (Robust z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)(1)
ENVdum1
ENVdum2
ENVdumall
ENVcount1

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.065**(2.0)

0.00021(0.8)

0.032***(3.0)
0.042***(3.4)
0.053***(4.8)
0.026***(3.9)

ENVcount2

0.029***(4.9)

ENVcountall

0.021***(5.8)

USpaocva

0.13**(2.0)-0.257***-0.277***-0.27***-0.27***-0.083***-0.20***
TRANS-0.261***-0.273***-0.273***
(5.3)
(5.5)
(5.6)
(5.3)
(5.8)
(5.7)
(4.9)
(3.7)
(5.6)
TARIFF
0.407
0.285
0.286
0.349
0.223
0.201
0.14
-0.075
0.12
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.4)
(0.3)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.5)
SIZE
0.00014**0.00014**0.00014***0.00013**0.00011**0.00010*0.00015*** 0.0044***0.000084
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.6)
(2.3)
(2.0)
(1.8)
(2.7)
(3.5)
(1.3)
WAGE
0.097***
0.097***
0.094***
0.094***
0.091***
0.087***
0.095***-0.0930.13***
(3.8)
(4.0)
(4.1)
(3.8)
(3.8)
(3.8)
(4.1)
(0.7)
(4.3)
KL
-0.291-0.315-0.314-0.296-0.365-0.363-0.039-0.020-0.49***
(1.2)
(1.2)
(1.2)
(1.2)
(1.5)
(1.5)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(4.5)
EXPORTS
0.054***
0.054***
0.054***
0.054***
0.054***
0.054***
0.052***
0.043***-0.0001(10.1)
(9.7)
(9.8)
(9.9)
(9.6)
(9.6)
(9.2)
(11.6)(0.02)
R&D
0.080***
0.078***
0.078***
0.079***
0.077***
0.075***
0.081***
0.00240.045**
(0.2)
(2.2)
(3.9)
(3.8)
(3.8)
(3.8)
(3.6)
(3.6)
(3.7)
ADV
0.008
0.008
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.008
0.00800.049
0.0057
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(1.3)
(0.9)
(0.7)
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.071
0.093
Pseudo R2
N = 12335. In columns (1) to (6) the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm outsources or not. In column (8) the dependent
variable is a measure of outsourcing as a percentage of sales, estimated using OLS. In column (9) the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating
whether the firm domestically outsources or not. Industry dummies included. In columns (1) to (7) and (9) we report the estimated odds ratios minus 1.

37

Appendix 1: Data definitions and sources
Variable nameDefinition

OUTSOURCE

A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm undertakes any outsourcing
and 0 otherwise

TRANS

transport costs as a share of sales

TARIFF

Tariff revenue in Yen as a share of imports, at industry level

SIZE

Employment, in workers

WAGE

Annual wage per worker in millions of Yen

KLPhysical capital stock per worker in hundreds of Yen

EXPORTS

Value of exports as a percentage of sales

R&D

Research and Development expenditure as a percentage of sales

ADV

Advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales.

All variables are from Kigyou Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho (The Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business
Structure and Activities) prepared by the Research and Statistics Department, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI).

38

Appendix 2. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Outsourcers

Non-Outsourcers

ENVdum1

0.35

0.21

0.44

0

1

ENVdum2

0.53

0.35

0.50

0

1

ENVdumall

0.67

0.47

0.49

0

1

ENVcount1

0.52

0.26

0.63

0

3

ENVcount2

0.87

0.46

0.84

0

4

ENVcountall

1.39

0.71

1.18

0

7

0.24

0

1

OUTSOURCE

0.061

TRANS

1.73

2.45

1.30

0.79

6.33

TARIFF

0.05

0.04

0.11

0

0.71

SIZE

1249.84353.271595.78

50

71154

WAGE

5.38

4.78

1.62

0.070

47.48

KL

0.13

0.12

0.25

0.000011

14.64

EXPORT

5.79

1.11

5.59

0

39.94

R&D

1.58

0.46

1.87

0

59.56

ADV

0.76

0.63

1.44

0

42.76

USpaocva

8.48

5.34

9.5

1.12

40.90

Note: For the ENVdum variables mean values provide the proportion of firms answering ‘yes’ to the different
groups of environmental questions. For the ENVcount variables the mean values provide the average numberof questions that firms answered ‘yes’ to within each group of questions. See Appendix Table 1 for more
information

39