名古屋高等教育研究 第 18 号 （2018）

University Governance in the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Japan:
Autonomy and Shared Governanceafter New Public Management Reforms
Donald F. WESTERHEIJDEN*＜Abstract＞
Comparing and contrasting reforms of governance arrangements
in higher education systems in Europe (the United Kingdom and theNetherlands provide two very different examples) with those inJapan, the paper focuses on the consequences of state-levelgovernance reform for shared governance in the university. It givesa systematic comparison based on the ‘autonomy scorecard’ andapplies notions from the ‘governance equalizer.’
The paper considers major New Public Management (NPM)governance reforms in the three countries. It shows that universities
remain mostly autonomous in the UK, while ‘post-NPM’ mixed
governance predominates in Japan and the Netherlands, with eachcountry affecting institutional autonomy differently. In all cases,
institutional autonomy increased in some respects and diminished inothers.

Concisecomparisons

are

made

for

four

dimensions(organisation, finance, staffing and education) and per underlying
indicator. Executive heads’ (Presidents’) appointments and quality
control over education are taken as strategically important indicatorsfor shared governance within institutions. Managerial and externalguidance grew more strongly in the two European countries than inJapan, though academic self-governance declined in all three.

Senior Research Associate, Center for Higher Education Policy Studies,
University of Twente, the Netherlands(Visiting Professor, Center for the Studies of Higher Education, Nagoya
University)

199

1．Rationale and Aim of Paper
Knowledge is higher education’s core business: ‘However broadly or
narrowly we define it, knowledge is the material. Research and teaching
are the main technologies’ (Clark 1983: 12). The increased demands on
universities1) due to the rise of the knowledge society since the late 20th
century threaten to lead to ‘mission stretch’ (Enders and de Boer 2009)
beyond ‘research and training’ and many have argued that for universities
to play their enhanced role well, they must become more responsive, moreautonomous, and more flexible. Governance relations between national
authorities and public universities, but also within universities, needed
adapting to enable universities to do so, politicians and critics argued. Sucharguments, applying to the whole public sector at the end of the 20th
century, became known as ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). From its
invention in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, NPM
soon became a model around the world (Meyer 2000). In this short article,
I analyse how NPM affected shared governance in higher education inthree countries.
1.1

Governance Concepts

Governance is defined as ‘a set of general postures, assumptions andguidelines that appear to be followed when a government, without
necessarily excluding other stakeholders…, steers the decisions andactions of specific societal actors according to the objectives thegovernment has set and by using instruments the government has at its
disposal’ (F. van Vught and de Boer 2015: 38). A governance perspective‘provides a general analytical framework for studying all kinds ofcoordination problems among actors’ (de Boer, Enders, and Schimank 2010:138). Governance encounters specific issues in higher education for two
interlinked reasons. First, the principal (ministry at system level, or
leadership within institutions) cannot know in detail what makes good
‘products,’ as education and research are credence goods, whose
contribution to the principal’s utility cannot be fully known evenafterwards (Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). Second, the ‘production200

University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japanfunction’ of education and research relies on professionals (teachers andresearchers), hence the process is largely under professional control of
those professionals, leading to ‘bottom-heavy,’ fragmented organisations(Mintzberg 1979). For the principal, steering such agents is highly
uncertain, involving many partially independent, loosely-coupled agents.
From the agent’s point of view, collaboration with colleagues is necessary(professors cannot run whole degree programmes singly, and often cannot
do a research project alone) and to provide common resources (funding!) as
well as coordination, a principal is needed. In sum, there is mutual,asymmetrical dependence between principal and agent, as well as among
agents.
The reasoning above implies a chain of principal - agent relations inhigher education: state – university (leadership) – teachers/researchers.
With each step, uncertainty about control is multiplied. The amount of
options open to an agent under the control of the principal may be calledautonomy. In higher education, procedural and substantive autonomy are
distinguished (Berdahl 1990). The former concerns procedures andconditions for operation (organisation, quality assurance, funding, etc.), thehow. The latter concerns ‘the power of the university … to determine its
own goals and programmes - if you will, the what of academe.’ Berdahl
adds: ‘Governmental actions that affect substantive goals affect the heartof academe.’ Consequently, substantive governance affects teachers andresearchers directly, while procedural governance affects the university
through its leadership (Figure 1).

University
Procedural
governanceState

Leadership
Substantive
management

Proceduralmanagement

Substantive
governance

Teachers / researchers
Figure 1

Governance and Autonomy in Higher Education201

In briefest summary, autonomy is about ‘who decides what?’ Ever sincehigher education studies emerged, this has been a question of interest.
Clark (1983) invented the triangle of hierarchical state coordination,
academiccollegial

decisionmakingandprice-regulated

marketcoordination to show that in every country a balance was reached among
hierarchy, market and the peculiarly academic coordination of collegial
decisions among peers.2) In an updated and more detailed analysis, de Boeret al. (2010) distinguished five coordination mechanisms in their‘governance equalizer’: state regulation, stakeholder guidance, managerial
self-regulation, academic self-regulation and competition. They added new
stakeholders (intermediary bodies, employers), showed more clearly than
Clark that actors and coordination mechanisms do not coincide (the state
uses hierarchy and competition; external stakeholders use competition but
also normative guidance) and made the multi-level nature of governanceexplicit (distinguishing state hierarchy from institutional managers’
hierarchy). Moreover, they emphasised that in any system at any moment,each coordination mechanism could be present at different levels ofintensity, thus distinguishing low-governance from high-governancebalances.
1.2

MethodTo compare European developments most effectively with Japan’s, myanalysis will be more focused than the ‘governance equalizer.’ First, at thesystem level, my analysis is largely limited to changes in state regulationand its complement of institutional autonomy. Government’s regulation
affects the power of stakeholder guidance and it also largely defines towhat extent competition plays a role. Second, I analyse consequences ofsystem-level reform for governance within the university. What happens
to shared governance, i.e. the balance between managerial and academic
self-governance inside the university? Simultaneously, my analysis is morerefined than the governance equalizer and takes the distinction between
procedural and substantive autonomy further, by applying the multidimensional methodology of the ‘autonomy scorecard.’
The autonomy scorecard’s designers emphasise that ‘Institutional

202

University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan

autonomy cannot be measured objectively’ (Estermann, Nokkala, andSteinel 2011: 18) and they developed a set of indicators to make expert
judgments comparable. They performed an exercise in 2010, updated witha second round in 2016, 3) mapping institutional autonomy in 29 higher
education systems across Europe, 4) with the aid of the European
University Association (EUA) and national rectors’ conferences. Especiallyregarding procedural autonomy, the scorecard is detailed (www.
university-autonomy.eu, Estermann et al. 2011, Pruvot and Estermann2017), it shows what autonomy universities have regarding finance,
organisation

andpersonnel (19indicators).

Regarding

substantive

autonomy, it contains 9 indicators about education (none for research).
Through questionnaires and interviews with the national rectors’
conferences, the universities’ autonomy in the higher education system
was mapped. Mapping for Japan is tentatively done by this article’s author,
after consultation with several Japanese higher education specialists fromuniversities and national organisations.
For the governance equalizer, comparable information was collected on
two issues of strategic importance for the institution: appointment andauthority of leadership (a procedural matter that determines much of theinternal balance), and quality control of education (a substantive issue
affecting teachers and administrators). Regrettably, similar comparable
information on the other main substantive issue, research, was notavailable. These two issues constitute complex, qualitative pointers.
Concerning Japan, this paper is limited to national universities. They aremostaffectedbygovernancereform.

Besides,although

privateuniversities supply most undergraduate education (around 75%), national
universities dominate post-graduate education and research. Moreover,this limitation mirrors the available European data: there, the autonomy
scorecard is limited to public doctoral-granting universities, too.
Limitations due to the instruments used include that particularly theautonomy scorecard centres largely on legal options rather than practices.
For instance, it hardly captures the negotiated state control of universities’
strategic plans and performances through Mid-Term Plans in Japan(Huang 2006). The governance equalizer is more flexible, but is less203

articulated operationally.

2．Government−University Relations: Areas of Autonomy
2.1

Selection of Countries

To compare with governance developments in Japan, two European
countries are selected that introduced managerially-oriented governancereforms early, i.e. where experience has accumulated. The United
Kingdom was the first European country that applied NPM to higher
education, from 1979 on. The Netherlands was among the first countries
on the Continent to follow NPM examples from the USA and UK, thoughinterpreted through the perspective of its own, more governmental yet
also more network-style governance traditions (Enders and Westerheijden2014). Empirically, the UK proves to be the country with the highest
degree of institutional autonomy, while the Netherlands provide an
example of the mixed situation on the European continent.
2.2

The United Kingdom

Unlike other European countries, universities in the UK were highly
autonomous before the 1980s, e.g. with the University Grants Committee(UGC) distributing funds, buffering universities from political steering
through academic self-governance. NPM in the UK meant an increase ofstate control (Berdahl 1990, de Boer et al. 2010). The government increased
inter-university competition by opening the system completely topolytechnics, especially to let them compete on equal footing withestablished universities for research funds. However, the distribution ofresearch funds became much more competitive by concentrating it
increasingly on top-rated research groups, and few polytechnics madeserious inroads on old-university dominance of research funds - in facteven many universities lost out (Leisyte and Westerheijden 2014). Quality
assurance of education has been subject to many, sometimes contested,changes over the years, but seems to have settled on recognition of it
being the responsibility of universities, while a governmental agency
evaluates how they discharge their responsibility through institutional

204

University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japanaudits.
In a radical reduction of teaching grants from the government,
universities were allowed to increase their tuition fees in 2012, thoughwith a maximum of £9,000 per annum - more or less at a full-cost level.
This replaced quasi-markets experimented in the 1980s, e.g. withinstitutions bidding for government funding for certain numbers ofstudent places.
Universities retained their previous autonomy regarding staffing,salaries and ownership of buildings.
Expanding from these few highlights, in the European comparison, on
the autonomy scorecard website the British universities come in ‘the “high”
group … in all four areas of institutional autonomy’ (Figure 2; data in
Annex).

source: www.university-autonomy.eu

Figure 2UKʼs Autonomy Scorecard

205

2.3

The Netherlands

After strong government interventions in the early 1980s, the seminal
policy paper ‘Higher Education: Autonomy and Quality’ inaugurated lessex ante control of institutions, and block grants, in exchange for ex post
evaluations giving accountability for quality of performances (education
and research). Evaluations of university education were first inspired by
the network governance usual in the country with the associations of thecollective institutions acting as buffer bodies between state anduniversities by coordinating the process. Concerning education, evaluation
turned into programme accreditation and became more state-controlled toconform to European compatibility requirements since the 1999 Bologna
Declaration.
The ‘philosophy’ of governmental ‘steering at a distance’ inspired
national higher education policies ever since (Westerheijden, de Boer, andEnders 2009). Concerted development with national development plans atfour-year intervals (one standard government term, even if many
government coalitions between 1984 and 2012 fell earlier) became the main
form of guidance, recently called the minister’s ‘strategic agenda.’ A major
addition coming after the data collection for the autonomy scorecard,ostensibly intended to increase autonomy and diversity of the system, but
at the same time bringing central control back in, were the performance
contracts in 2012-2016: control was exerted through a set of sevenindicators of efficiency and quality of education every institution had toattend to, though they could choose their own ambition levels. Financial
consequences were attached to setting the ambitions and to not reachingthem (Vossensteyn and Westerheijden 2016).
The social-democrat principles of open and free access to higher
education changed into open access but with every student paying asymbolic fee since the 1970s; nationally-determined fees increased rapidly
in the 2000s, against governmental cut-backs. Fees and student support
remained political issues ever since, with strict state control.
Following NPM deregulation, academics lost civil servant status andbecame university employees. Universities maintained uniform nationalsalary levels in collective agreements with labour unions, as in most206

University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan

sectors of the Dutch economy.
Accordingtotheautonomyscorecardsummary(Figure3),‘Organisational, financial and staffing autonomy are rated as “medium high”
in the Netherlands. Academic autonomy is more limited and therefore
rated as “medium low.”source: www.university-autonomy.eu

Figure 3

2.4

The Netherlandsʼ Autonomy Scorecard

Japan

The major reform moment in governance of Japan’s national
universities was their change from public agencies under the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology (MEXT) to ‘national university
corporations’ (NUCs) in 2004. With this ‘incorporation,’ universities were
given more procedural autonomy. In earlier NPM-like reforms, substantive
autonomy had been enlarged in 1994–1998, i.e. more autonomy was given
to shape study programmes in exchange for introducing self-evaluation
and, later external evaluation and accreditation at the institutional level(Varghese and Martin 2013).

207

Discussion focuses on the position and powers of the university
presidents, which have been enlarged much through the incorporation.
The president has become like a company’s CEO and with the team ofvice-presidents and advisors is responsible for autonomous decisions
especially regarding budget expenditure, staffing and salaries. In thefinancial area, however, most decisions require approval by MEXT, justlike in academic areas (starting study programmes, fee levels). Moreover,
ex ante regulation has been replaced by six-year Medium-Term Plans,
which need prior approval by MEXT, which are subject to strict
accountability with annual reporting and ex post evaluation on behalf of
MEXT (Oba, 2013) and where failure to achieve annual goals entails
financialconsequences.

The

formally-existing

level

of

proceduralautonomy as shown in the scorecard may be experienced as rather lower
by the national universities. In Figure 4 the relatively large degree of
autonomy regarding staffing is remarkable. In other areas, some indicatorsshow ‘spikes’ of high autonomy amid moderately high state control onothers.

source: author

Figure 4

208

Autonomy Scorecard Japan

University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan

2.5

Comparison of Findings

The findings regarding the three countries can be summarised
graphically (Figure 5). Even at the abstract level of whole dimensions it
becomes clear that the UK and Japan have such high scores that they
dominate5) the Netherlands regarding staffing. On organisation andacademic autonomy, the UK dominates. Within this dimension, Japan
weakly dominates the Netherlands on student admission indicators andquality assurance. Concerning programme design (and termination) andlanguage of instruction the situation is reversed. On financial autonomy,both European countries seem to dominate Japan. Drilling down to theconstituent indicators, the UK proves most autonomous regarding tuition
fees; the Netherlands dominates weakly on the other indicators of financial
autonomy.
Organisational
100%

75%

50%

25%
Academic

0%

Financial

UK (England)
Netherlands
Japan

Staffing
Figure 5Comparison of Autonomy by Dimensions

209

3．Governance within the University: Managerial and Academic
Self-GovernanceConsequences

of

the

level

of

autonomyforintra-institutional

management, especially the balance between managers and academics
will be treated through two strategic issues: appointment of executive
head officers and control over quality of education. Collegial, shared
governance has been held up as beneficial for education (and research)throughout university history (de Ridder-Symoens 1992). What happened
to it under NPM with its stress on management?
3.1

United Kingdom

Regarding intra-university governance, a ‘managerial turn’ took place(de Boer et al. 2010), and the ‘donnish dominion’ by senior academics cameto an end (Halsey 1982). Managers see themselves as buffers between
academics and society, thus maintaining some degree of academic
self-governance (de Boer et al. 2010).
The ‘CEO’ of a British university is usually called Vice-Chancellor (VC),
often appointed for five years. Each university may develop its own
regulations including appointment procedure for VC’s,6) but they typically
apply the following pattern (Kolster, Vossensteyn, de Boer, and Jongbloed2016). The Council (the highest administrative body of a university, withinternal representatives, but with a majority of external stakeholders)appoints a search committee, often chaired by the Council’s chairperson.
After public announcement, and sometimes with aid of head-hunters, ashortlist of candidates is drawn up. After interviews of shortlisted
candidates with academics, administrative staff, students and others, thesearch committee advises a candidate to the Council, which appoints the
VC. Often, candidates are found outside the university, sometimes outsideacademia.
The VC is often mandated by the Council to appoint other executives
and deans. It has become increasingly rare that academics elect faculties’
deans (Kolster et al. 2016).
Quality assurance of education was a spearhead area for NPM reforms

210University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japanin the UK. Eventually, institutional audit emerged as the core evaluation
method since 2002 (QAA 2009). Audits focus on how the university itself
manages its quality, which strengthens managers in comparison withacademics.

Programme-levelassessments

aremainlylimitedtoaccreditation of professional studies. In other areas too, national
qualifications frameworks limit the freedom of curriculum design, but thisexternal guidance is ‘filtered’ through institutional managers.
In sum, external stakeholders seem to dominate the appointment of theVC, while VCs and their administrators seem to dominate academics insubstantive matters.
3.2

The Netherlands

Within universities, post-1968 democratic structures with electedleadership were replaced with managerial ones through the 1997 ‘MUB’
law. Institutions were put at a distance from the Ministry, becoming
accountable to a lay Supervisory Board, which appointed the (usually
three) members of the Executive Board: President, Rector (approximately:
VP Academic Affairs) and third member (usually: VP Finance). The
appointment procedures are regulated by each university separately(Kolster et al. 2016). Usually, the Executive Board sets up a searchcommittee with senior representatives from within the university andsubmits a proposal to the Supervisory Board, who make the formal
appointment.
The power balance between president and rector varies depending on
local circumstances and personalities. The Executive Board appoints
faculty deans. Presidents tend to be recruited outside universities. Rectors
and most deans are professors though not necessarily from the same
university; academic legitimacy is important for their functioning withacademics. Academic management is becoming a career path for some
professors.
University and faculty senates, with 50% academic representatives and50% students, have been reduced from strong controlling councils to,largely, advisory bodies, while ‘decisions about academic matters havebeen centralized within universities’ (de Boer et al. 2010: 143).

211

Since 2003, quality of education is mainly regulated through programme
accreditation under rather strict assessment frameworks. Institutional
audits are only supplementary and may make programme accreditation
less onerous but still obligatory (NVAO 2016). Between 1987 and 2003,
external quality assurance had been coordinated by the collective
universities with strong disciplinary input, i.e. dominated by academics(and management). Since 2003, the public accreditation agency’s guidance
became dominant.
Thus, external stakeholder guidance has increased in substantive
matters; academics feel less empowered than previously and management
has gained power in procedural areas but not so much in education.
3.3

Japan

The ministry of education (MEXT) formulated amongst its aims for
2013-15 and beyond: ‘Enable university presidents to exercise leadershipabilities and build governance’ (MEXT, s.a. [2016]). Also JANU advocated‘strengthening presidents’ (JANU 2013: 22). Apparently, the 2004 reforms
have not been sufficiently successful in this regard. The appointment
procedure gives some hints in this direction, too. First, Presidential
Selection Committees are constituted by the lay-majority Administrative
Council and the internally constituted senate. Second, elections are held in
virtually all national universities like before 2004, though now as
non-binding consultations. Presidential Selection Committees rarely
deviate from the academics’ preferences. Hence like before, mostpresidents hail from large faculties within the university and emerge
because of their academic reputation. They typically have had academic
leadership experience, e.g. as faculty deans, or vice-presidents. Yet, outside
appointmentscharacterise

especiallysmaller

universities,

where

maintaining good network relationships with MEXT - the main source ofinstitutional income - incites to appointing former civil servants aspresidents. The minister of education formally appoints the president.
Evaluation procedures by independent, state-accredited agencies mostly
focus on the institutional level (NIAD-UE 2014) and oversee all areas ofactivity, not just education’s quality. Professional accreditation exists in212

University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan

selected areas. Introduction of six-year ‘Mid-Term Plans’ with previous
approval, annual monitoring and ex post evaluation re-instated close
control by MEXT simultaneous with universities’ incorporation (Huang
2006, NIAD-UE 2014), although universities may negotiate their own
indicators and ambition levels. The (financial) need to achieve the goals set
increases management’s internal power.
In sum, within universities, management has strengthened considerably
in procedural matters (Christensen 2011, Oba 2013), while in substantive
issues, academic self-governance through the faculties’ kyoju-kai remains
strong (Yonezawa 2014).
3.4

Comparison of Findings

In the two European countries as in Japan, managerial power has
evidently increased since introduction of NPM governance reform to thedetriment of academic self-governance within the university in procedural
matters. In substantive matters, Japanese academics have retained more
power than their European colleagues; traditions apparently have astronger hold in Japan than in Europe. In the UK, management dominates
also in substantive matters, while in the Netherlands external stakeholder
guidance has intensified concerning substantive control.

4．Conclusion
The large changes in the UK have been ascribed to the ‘drastic’
Thatcher government and to the late massification of Britain’s higher
education (de Boer et al. 2010: 149). Nevertheless, British universities
continue as the most autonomous in Europe. A new class of powerfulmanagers has arisen there, reducing the academic self-governance that
had stood out perhaps ever since the founding of the University of Oxford(Halsey 1982, de Ridder-Symoens 1992, F. A. van Vught 1994). The
Netherlands exemplifies a mixed approach to NPM, with strong network
governance tendencies, i.e. a neo-Weberian state (Pollitt and Bouckaert2011). The Netherlands’ mixed picture in the autonomy scorecard
resembles Japan’s ‘post-NPM’ (Christensen 2011) situation of strong213

autonomy in parts of some areas and state control either throughregulation (perhaps more typical for Japan) or external stakeholder
guidance (perhaps more prominent in the Netherlands, though the
Mid-Term Plans are conspicuous illustrations in Japan). Possibly at thecost of a high degree of bureaucratisation of internal management,
Japanese academics have retained more of their previous academic
self-governance than Dutch and British colleagues. In Japan, ‘the “old”
university system was characterized by low formal autonomy but highactual autonomy’ (Christensen 2011: 511) - a case of low-intensity on all‘sliders’ of the governance equalizer, or laissez-faire. With higher education
becoming increasingly central in the knowledge economy, laissez-faire wasno longer an option even for (neo-)liberal governments.
Academic self-governance, also called collegial decision making (Clark
1983) or shared governance (Shattock 2002), is often portrayed as the ideal
for long-term beneficial development of higher education. Governancereform is often based on (admittedly highly relevant!) short-term
governmental desires regarding knowledge transfer for innovation andeducation for employment. It goes beyond this article to study if suchgovernmental desires are realised through the reforms in the UK, theNetherlands or Japan. It has been shown, though, that shared governancehas deteriorated in all three countries, while managerial self-guidance
tended to increase and external stakeholder guidance partly replaced
governmental

regulation

but

also

made

inroadsonacademic

self-governance.

Notes1) I use the term ‘university’ as a shorthand for any type of higher education
institution.
2) Not quite the more common triangle of market, hierarchy and networks(Powell 1991), although network mechanisms certainly play a role inpeer-based collegial decision making.
3) The 2016 version retained all indicators of 2010 and added qualitative
information helpful in interpreting the quantitative indicators, partly

214

University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japanbecause ‘Autonomy is a concept that is understood very differently acrossEurope; associated perceptions and terminology tend to vary quite
significantly’ (Pruvot and Estermann 2017: 11).
4) Four higher education systems were only present in the 2010 version (CY,
CZ, GR, TR), to be replaced by four others (BE-FR, HR, RS, SI) in the 2016
version of the autonomy scorecard (Pruvot and Estermann 2017). The twosystems of interest in this paper participated in both versions, though, andshowed very few (UK) to no (NL) differences in the two versions.
5) In ordinal comparison, weak dominance of A over B is defined as A scoringhigher than B on at least one indicator and equal to B on all others.
6) Universities’ internal regulations require approval from the national
government (Privy Council).

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The Palgrave International Handbook of Higher Education Policy andGovernance, pp. 38-56, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Acknowledgment
The author is grateful to Prof. Natsume Tatsuya, CSHE and the Universityof Nagoya for their support in the preparation of this paper. The usual
disclaimer applies that all remaining errors are the author’s.
Thanks are due to the higher education specialists who discussed
governance of Japan’s national universities with me: Prof. Yumika Hada
(Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima), Prof. Masato Kitani (Japan
Association of National Universities, JANU, Tokyo), Prof. Yukari Matsuzuka(Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo) and Prof. Akiyoshi Yonezawa (Tohoku
University, Sendai).

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University Governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Japan
Annex

Autonomy Scorecard Comparison

Indicator
Organisational

UK
Netherlands(England)

Japan

100%

76%

79%

Selection procedure for executive head

100%

0%

0%

Selection criteria for executive head

100%

100%

100%

Dismissal of executive head

100%

100%

100%

Term of office of executive head

100%

100%

100%

External members in university governing bodies

100%

29%

50%

Capacity to decide on academic structures

100%

100%

50%

Capacity to create legal entities

100%

100%

100%

90%

78%

67%

Length of public funding cycle

60%

60%

60%

Type of public funding

100%

100%

100%

Ability to borrow money

90%

100%

80%

Ability to keep surplus

100%

100%

80%

Ability to own buildings
Tuition fees for EU students at Bachelor level

100%

100%

60%

40%

0%

40%

100%

0%

40%

100%

100%

40%

100%

100%

40%

100%

100%

40%

100%

100%

40%

96%

72%

96%

Financial(Japan: national students)
Tuition fees for EU students at Master's level(Japan: national students)
Tuition fees for EU students at doctoral level(Japan: national students)
Tuition fees for non-EU students at Bachelor level(Japan: international students)
Tuition fees for non-EU students at Master's level(Japan: international students)
Tuition fees for non-EU students at doctoral level(Japan: international students)
Staffing
Recruitment procedures for senior academic staff
Recruitment procedures for senior administrative
staff

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Salaries for senior academic staff

67%

67%

100%

Salaries for senior administrative staff

100%

67%

67%

Dismissal of senior academic staff

100%

20%

100%

Dismissal of senior administrative staff

100%

20%

100%

Promotion procedures for senior academic staff
Promotion procedures for senior administrative
staff

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

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Academic

97%

57%

52%

Overall student numbers

60%

0%

60%

Admissions procedures at Bachelor level

100%

40%

50%

Admissions procedures at Master’s level

100%

60%

100%

Introduction of programmes at Bachelor level

100%

40%

40%

Introduction of programmes at Master’s level

100%

40%

40%

Introduction of programmes at doctoral level

100%

100%

40%

Termination of degree programmes

100%

100%

100%

Language of instruction at Bachelor level

100%

100%

50%

Language of instruction at Master’s level

100%

100%

50%

Selection of quality assurance mechanisms

100%

0%

0%

Selection of quality assurance providers

100%

0%

33%

Capacity to design content of degree programmes

100%

100%

100%

※ Data for UK and the Netherlands taken from www.university-autonomy.eu (last accessed2017-03-28). Summary scores per dimension: unweighted. Estimates for Japan by paper’s
author.

220

名古屋高等教育研究 第 18 号 （2018）

イギリス・オランダ・日本における大学のガバナンス−NPM 手法による改革後の大学自治とシェアド・ガバナンス−ドナルド F.ウェスターハイデン*＜要

旨＞

本稿では、ヨーロッパと日本の高等教育制度におけるガバナンスに関する改革を比較・対照しつつ、国家レベルでのガバナンス改革が大学のシェアド・ガバナンスに与える結果に焦点をあてて検討する。ヨーロッパ諸国ではイギリスとオランダを取り上げるが、両国の事例は相互に大きく異なっている。検討を通じて、「大学自治スコアカード」に基づいて体系的な比較を行うとともに、「ガバナンス・イコライザー」を用いて応用的な概念を抽出する。これらの指標を用いて、組織、財政、教職員、教育の４領域で簡単な比較を行う。
英・蘭・日 3 カ国における NPM 手法による主要なガバナンス改革についてみると、以下の点が明らかになる。英では大学自治の余地がまだ大きいのに対して、蘭・日ではポスト NPM 手法の改革とミックスしたガバナンスが支配的であり異なった形で機関レベルの自治に影響を与えている。機関レベルの自治の幅は、3 カ国とも拡大している面と縮小している面の両方がみられる。執行責任者（学長）の選出・任命や教育の質保証システムは、機関におけるシェアド・ガバナンス
にとって戦略的に重要な指標と考えられる。管理的かつ外部からの圧力は、日本よりも英・蘭の方がより強いが、3 カ国とも大学自身による自律的ガバナンスは後退している。

オランダ トウェンテ大学・上席研究員
名古屋大学高等教育研究センター・客員教授

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