Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.

A STUDY ON A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPTO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE REGIONAL
FIRE FIGHTING VALIDITY-Case Study in Bangkok, ThailandKeerati SRIPRAMAI1, Yasushi OIKAWA2, Hiroshi WATANABE3
and Toshitaka KATADA4
1Doctoral Student, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Eng., Graduate School of Eng., Gunma University(1-5-1, Tenjin-cho, Kiryu, Gunma 376-8515, Japan)
E-mail: kee999@hotmail.com
2Member of JSCE, Associate Prof., Research Center for Disaster Prevention in the Extend Tokyo Metropolitan Area,
Dept. of Civil and Environmental Eng., Graduate School of Eng., Gunma University(1-5-1, Tenjin-cho, Kiryu, Gunma 376-8515, Japan)
E-mail: oikawa@gunma-u.ac.jp
3Member of JSCE, I. D. A Co. Ltd., Institute of Social Technology(1-1-28, Higasihisakata, Kiryu, Gunma 376-0053, Japan)
E-mail: watanabe@ida-web.jp
4Member of JSCE, Professor, Research Center for Disaster Prevention in the Extend Tokyo Metropolitan Area,
Dept. of Civil and Environmental Eng., Graduate School of Eng., Gunma University(1-5-1, Tenjin-cho, Kiryu, Gunma 376-8515, Japan)
E-mail: katada@gunma-u.ac.jp

Generally, in order to improve some regional fire fighting validity, indispensable strategies are not onlya reinforcement of the governmental fire fighting ability, but also a strengthening of the cooperative relationship between governmental and non-governmental fire fighting ability. However, for practical purposes, the effective strategy should be different depending on the actual situation in the subject area. So, in
this study, we grasp the actual state and background of the problems that need to be solved for the improvement of the regional fire fighting validity in Bangkok as a case study, and examine the appropriate
solution focusing on the relationship between official and voluntary fire fighting.
Through some practicable activities such as interviews, investigations, and making the regional firefighting validity map, it became clear that the problems of uncooperative relationship and the lack of trust
between stakeholders should be solved first and foremost.
Key Words : fire fighting, volunteers, cooperative relationship, risk communication

ation will be of universal application for other regions like our study area, Bangkok. Accordingly, it
seems that the process to make clear about what thefundamental problems are in the subject area is essential for examination of such solutions as above.
If we outline the recent Japanese situation from theabove point of view, we can find the highly developed fire fighting system which can extinguish a fire
immediately except for a large number of simultaneous fires in a major earthquake. It can be considered that there is an effect of a smooth cooperative
relationshipbetweengovernmental
andnon-governmental fire fighting. In. the Japanese

1. INTRODUCTION
Generally, in order to improve some regional firefighting validity, indispensable strategies are not
only a reinforcement of the governmental fire fighting ability, but also a strengthening of the cooperative relationship between governmental andnon-governmental fire fighting ability. However, forpractical purposes, the effective strategy should be
different depending on the actual situation in thesubject area. As a matter of course, there is no
guarantee that some strategies or countermeasures
based on the common-sense values of Japanese situ-

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Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.
Table 1 Information of Tokyo and Bangkok Official Fire Stations2), 3) ,4).
2

Area (km )Population (thousands)Fire
Stations

The number of fire stations(government)(voluntary)
Area (km2/station)
allocation
Population (thousands of people /stations)
The number of fire officers(government)(voluntary)
Area (km2/officer)
allocation
Population (thousands of people /officers)Tokyo

Bangkok

1,750
12,989
387
289
98
4.522
33.56344,445
17,967
26,478
0.039
0.292

1,568
5,702
46
35 (main), 11 (sub*)-unidentified34.087
123.957
1,500
1,500-unidentified1.045
3.801*note: sub stations just only like a parking on the streets without full-time officers

system, it is worth specially mentioning that thevoluntary fire fighting plays a part in the official firefighting on a legal basis.
On the other hand, it is unusual for some developing countries to have such a highly-developed firefighting system even Bangkok which is our study
area, the biggest city with a large population. So, asurban function advances, the improvement of theregional fire fighting validity becomes one of themost crucial topics today.
In this study, starting with the basic recognition as
above, we grasp the actual state and background of
the problems that need to be solved for the
im-provement of the regional fire fighting validity in
Bangkok, and examine the appropriate solution
fo-cusing on the relationship between official andvol-untary fire fighting. Furthermore, we try to makeand propose the Regional Fire Fighting Validity Map
on a trial basis as a practical tool for risk communica-tion.
In the past, indeed there were some researches1)
about volunteers activities in Thailand, but it is
dif-ficult to find other studies about solutions for the
improvement of the regional fire fighting validity,
especially, studies focusing on the relationship between official and voluntary fire fighting.

Fire and Rescue Department was carried out inJanuary 2010. The summary of the process for thisinterview is shown below.
At an early stage before some interviews, as one of
the authors comes from Bangkok, we could have arough impression of the state of fire fighting system
in Bangkok which are discussed in the following
paragraphs. However, thorough some interviews
with some acquaintances in various circles who lived
in Bangkok including general public and fire fighters, we could recognized that such impression was
not simply our personal consideration but was analmost common knowledge. Additionally, we also
get the impression that practical and effectivesolu-tions for the improvement of the regional firefight-ing validity were not found out yet at the actual
lo-cation. After such preliminary investigations,thor-ough the good offices of the fire fighters who
sym-pathized with our opinion, we could get an opportu-nity to have an above-mentioned meeting inJanuary 2010. The information obtained from theseinterviews is described in the paragraphs that follow.
(2) Background of a delay of governmental firefighting
It can be considered that the most fundamental
problem is a fatal delay for governmental firefight-ing to arrive at the fire scene. Consequently, at
pre-sent, enough spraying water by governmental
fire fighting cannot be in anticipation.
Needless to say, the fundamental solution is toestablish more fire stations. However, it is difficult torealize the solution in a short period for the reason
that the procurement of a revenue source and abuilding lot are difficult. Therefore, in fact, it isconsidered that the improvement of its potential
abilities is badly needed.
Table 1 shows the basic information of Tokyo and
Bangkok fire stations, and Fig.1 shows the dis-

2. THE STATE OF FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM IN BANGKOKIn this chapter, first of all, we give an outline of thestate of fire fighting system in Bangkok, mainly
based on some information obtained from the inter-views with the Bangkok Fire and Rescue Department and the relevant.
(1) Outline of the interviews
The interview with 15 executives of the Bangkok

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Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.

Chao Phraya river(3) Non-governmental fire fighting activity
As mentioned above, it seems that it is difficult forgovernmental fire fighters to gain confidence fromresidents. As a result, in Bangkok, a while before thegovernmental fire fighters arrive at the site of fire, avoluntary fire fighting groups in the region play avery important role. Unlike the governmental firefighters, as members of voluntary fire fighting groups
are the residents, the advantage of a voluntary firefighting groups is the speed of action after all. However, we should pay attention to some points of difference between Japanese voluntary fire fighting
groups and Bangkok ones.
In Japanese case, as mentioned above, thevolun-tary fire fighting groups take part in the official fire fighting together with the governmental firefighting based on a legal basis. On the other hand, in
Bangkok case, voluntary fire fighting group does nothave such an official role, and is no more than asponta-neous activity by residents. The qualities of
the ac-tivity and equipment of each voluntary firefighting group are not at the same level depending on
its ef-fort, determination, and economic conditions.
Moreover, there are not any periodical training andofficially disposition of equipment by municipality.
As matters stand, the fact is that we can see only a
few highly-developed voluntary fire fighting groups
which are not at all inferior to the governmental firefighting while many voluntary groups still havein-ferior knowledge, skills and activity.
For example, the following cases which arecapa-ble of leading the residents’ distrust of the inferior voluntary groups can be seen frequently.
Firstly, the crowds of the volunteers’ cars frequently
obstruct the governmental fire fighting activity at asite of fire. Secondly, there are thieves at a site of fire
pretending to be voluntary fire fighters. Thirdly, forthe reason that they can receive a reward according to
the number of the injured bodies which are carried bythem to hospitals, some volunteers concentrate on
just only scrambling for injured bodies without any
first aid and fire extinguishing. Another point isabout some volunteers’ cars with fake sirens ringing
to dodge through some traffic congestion.
Moreover, in actual state, it is difficult forgov-ernmental fire fighters and residents to distinguish between the sensible volunteers and inferiorones, between voluntary fire fighters and governmental fire fighters, or between volunteers and residents, for the reason that some volunteers wear theimitation of the governmental uniforms and somevolunteers wear ordinary clothes. As a result, it
seems that such an actual state makes building up
reliance on various voluntary fire fighting groups
much more difficult.

Bang Khae District.
Fire Station.
0

10

20 km

Gulf of Thailand.

Fig.1 Distribution of official fire stations in Bangkok4).

tribu-tion of fire stations in Bangkok. As seen from
Table 1 and Fig.1, compared with similar areas inboth regions, the number of official fire stations in
Bangkok is much fewer than that of in Tokyo. As for
Bangkok official fire fighting, as a result of a small
number of the official fire stations and the long
dis-tance from fire stations to the sites of fire, it becomes more difficult for the fire fighter to be wellaware of the regional road networks in every corner.
Actually, the government fire-trucks, which areturning back or losing way, can frequently be seen.
From the actual situation above, as a logical consequence, the time required from the official fire stations to the scenes of fire extends.
To make matters worse, the confirmed traffic
congestion in arterial roads and the parking on thelocal streets also mean delay of the government
fire-trucks arrival to the site of fire.
Additionally, the following matters often lead tothe delay of starting time for spraying water when thefire fighters arrive at the site of fire. For example,
frequently, it is difficult for fire fighters to find any
fire hydrants for the reason that the stalls items
sometimes cover and hide the fire hydrant.
More-over, the lack of governmental fire officers’
knowl-edge also leads to delay. With a backgroundof the lack of knowledge, we have to point out that
there was a major reorganization which moved the
duty of fire protection from the police authority to the
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) in
November 1, 20035). For that reason, the new firefighters whose knowledge and experiences are notenough account for almost 70 percent of all current
governmental fire fighters (BMA).
With these states as background, the delay of thegovernment fire fighting returns to normal, and thefact is that the residents cannot expect enough water
discharged only by official fire-fighting when a fireoccurs.

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Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.

3. THE FEASIBILITY OF AN ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COOPERATIVERELATIONSHIP

Table 2 Summary of the Questionnaire Survey Design.
Governmental
Voluntary
PeopleFire Fighter
Fire Fighter
Date
February-March, 2010
Area
Bangkok (Bang Khae District)
Interview andDistribution
handing the questionnaire
Recording
Returnpicking up later
Sample10110880(1) Summarizing the investigation design
As the mentioned-above, in order to improve theregional fire fighting validity, it is considered that thesmooth relationship between the governmental firefighting and the voluntary is very important.
Fur-thermore, it is necessary for each group to win
an-other’s confidence.
Certainly, on some basic laws6) in Thailand, we
can find some descriptions on the establishment of
the cooperative relationship between government
and volunteers for not only the fire event but also thewhole disasters. However, through the above inter-views, at least for the fire event, we also have an
impressions that any essential and effective practices
for the establishment of the cooperative relationshipbetween them have never been done successfully.
Practically, it can be said that such an cooperative
relationship does not exist at all.
Therefore, in order to investigate the feasibility ofan establishment of the cooperative relationshipbetween governmental and voluntary fire fighters,
we carried out the questionnaire survey. As shown in
Table 2, Bang Khae District is selected as the main
subject area of 50 districts in Bangkok. The subjectsof this investigation are the governmental firefight-ers in Bang Khae fire station, the voluntary firefighters and the general public in this area. Bang
Khae District is located in the western of central
Bangkok; its area is almost 46.55 km2. Its populationis Bangkok’s highest rank, approximately 193,448
people7). The population density is 4,156 people perkm2. It is difficult to completely grasp the number ofvoluntary fire fighting groups and voluntary firefighters. The summary of the process for thisques-tionnaire survey is shown below.
Generally, it can be said that it becomes very hard
to do such a questionnaire survey in some developing
countries. However, it seems that the reasons why
these questionnaires were carried out smoothly forthe most part were as follows. First, when wede-cided to select Bang Khae District as the main
sub-ject area, we could get some quite helpful sugges-tions from the above fire fighter who were like a
mediator for the meeting in January 2010. Second, atthe meeting in January 2010, we could get a
per-mission of directors to distribute the questionnaire survey sheets among the fire fighters in Bang
Khae fire station. Third, when we selected one voluntary fire fighting group as a subject, we also could
get an opportunity to become acquainted with theliaison person of this voluntary group with an introduction from the above fire fighter. Even if it was

unsuc-cessful at first, after four or five times contacts
by phone from Japan, it was successful in obtaining
the liaison’s consent to distribute the questionnaire
survey sheets among the voluntary fire fighters in thisgroup finally. Fourth, as it can be said that the questionnaire has not really taken root in developing
countries, for the general public part of thisques-tionnaire survey, we desided to switch the way
to the interview method which was carried out on theroadside.
According to the actual situation mentioned inabove chapter, in order to investigate the feasibilityof an establishment of the cooperative relationshipbetween governmental and voluntary fire fighters, it
is considered that it becomes important to investigate
the following points of issue: how each groups
rec-ognize the own and the another side’s ability forfire fighting, each groups’ attitudes toward sharing
common ideas to one another, and whether eachgroups hold in common the quite fundamental
pur-pose of “saving Life” in the first place or not.
These points of issue are discused in the following
para-graphs.
(2) Abilities
The first point of issue is concerned with the ability of the governmental fire fighter and the voluntary
one. On this point, it is considered that there are twosides; they are “the rapidity of reaching the site offire” and “the fire fighting ability at the site of fire”.
According to the information mentioned in above
chapter, at present, it is assumed that “the rapidity ofreaching the site of fire” is higher for the voluntary
fire fighting groups than for the government. On theother hand, “the fire fighting ability at the site of fire”
is higher for the governmental fire fighting than thevoluntary groups. These conjecture almost can be
confirmed in Fig.2(1).
Fig.2(1)a) shows the survey result concerned with“the rapidity of reaching the site of fire” for the bothsides of the governmental fire fighters and the voluntary one. According to these results, it can be said
that there is significant difference between the both
recognitions (p=0.000)[1]. Therefore, it is clear thatthe recognition which the voluntary group is superior

58

Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.
(1) Results for the Ability of the G overnmental and the Voluntary Fire Fighting
a)

b)

0%

20 %

d)

80 %

1.9 n=101

29.7

24.8

0.9 n=107

39.3

25.2

34.6

11.9 3.0 n=67

34.3

50.7

47.1

31.8

n=100

0.9 n=108

25.9

46.3

8.2

100%
8.0

60.0

43.6

[fire fighters] Do you have enough tools when you go to the event?
[volunteers] Do you have enough tools when you go to the event?

[volunteers] Do you think your orga nization is more effective tha n the fire department?

60%

26.9

[fire fighters] Do you think your organization is more effective than the voluntary groups?
c)

40%

30.0

[fire fighters] Can you reac h the event before volunteers come? 2.0[volunteers] Can you reach the event before fire fighters come?

12.9

n=85

[people] Do you think the fire department can efficiently help people when disaster occurs?

25.3

49.4

19.0

6.3

n=79

[people] Do you think the voluntary groups can efficiently help people when disaster occurs?

25.0

47.5

18.8

8.8

n=80

(2) Result for the Attitudes toward Sharing Common Ideasa)b)[fire fighters] Do you want to coodinate and share information with the voluntary groups?

31.7

31.7

[volunteers] Do you want to coodinate and share information with the fire fighters?

34.6

20.6

[fire fighte rs] Do you want to follow what the voluntary groups inform you?
[volunteers] Do you want to follow what the fire officers inform you?

3.0

25.0

[volunteers] Do you think the fire officers will follow your instruction?

10.2

9.3

39.8

6.5 n=108

33.3
25.7

n=101

26.9

n=108

18.8

3.0
1.0 n=101

61.4
24.1

n=107

10.0 n=101

62.0

20.4

[fire fighters] Do you think the voluntary groups will follow your command? 1.0 11.9c)

2.0 n=101

34.7
35.5

38.9

(3) Result for the Fundamental Purposea)b)[fire fighters] Do you want to help people when disaster occurs?

77.2[volunteers] Do you wa nt to help people when disaster occurs?

65.7

4.6
0.0n=10829.6[fire fighters] Can you c ollaborate with the volunteers?

39.1

35.9

23.9

1.1 n=108[volunteers] Can you collaborate with the fire fighters?

42.2

34.3

22.5

1.0 n=102

No te: [square brackets] mean the subject type o f the investigation.

yesrather yes

rather nonoFig.2 Results of the Questionnaire Survey.

in the rapidity is in common among the both sides.
On the other hand, Fig.2(1)b) shows the survey result
concerned with “the fire fighting ability at the site offire”. The questions are in self-awareness form, notrelative comparison form. According to these results,
for each group, the percentage of respondents who
recognize that own tool is enough is less than 50
percent. Therefore, it can be said that the expansionof each group’s facilities becomes an important issue
for the present. Additionally, it can be seen that sucha tendency is slightly remarkable in the voluntarygroup more than in the governmental group, although
it cannot be said that there is a significant difference
between them (p=0.167)[1]. Moreover, according to
Fig.2(1)c), it can be said with a statistical significance (p=0.000)[1] that the recognition which the own
organization is more effective than the other side islower in the voluntary group than that of the governmental group. From the above, it can be said thatthe following matters are confirmed. The both groups
recognize that the voluntary group is superior to thegovernment one in “the rapidity”, and also recognizethat the government group is superior to the voluntary one in “the fire fighting ability”.
Additionally, we have shown the survey result
from the viewpoint of the general public about an
overall expectation of the ability for each sides in
Fig.2(1)d). According to this result, the generalpublic can put their hope on neither the voluntarygroup nor the government one, rather than have great

expectation on only one side of the two groups(There is no significant difference between them at alevel of 5% (p=0.784)[2].).
(3) Attitudes toward sharing common ideas
The second point of issue is concerned with theeach groups’ attitudes toward sharing common ideas
to one another. According to the information mentioned in above chapter, it is assumed that the greaterpart of governmental fire fighters and voluntary ones
may not necessarily have positive attitudes towards
sharing common ideas. This conjecture almost can be
confirmed in Fig.2(2).
According to Fig.2(2)a), it can be said that thepercentage of approval opinions about sharing information in common is not so high on each groups(There is no significant difference between them at alevel of 5% (p=0.407)[1].). Especially, according to
Fig.2(2)b), the percentage of approval opinions
about following the information of another group isvery low (There is a significant difference between
them at a level of 5% (p=0.000)[1], but the fact that theapproval opinions is a small minority is basicallycommon.). Additionally, according to Fig.2(2)c),from the opposite viewpoint, the percentage of approval opinions about the prospect of another group’s
following a command or instruction from my own
organization is also very low (There is a significant
difference between them at a level of 5%(p=0.032)[1], but the fact that the approval opinions is

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Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.

a small minority is basically common.).
From the above, for an establishment of the cooperative relationship such as sharing common information, it can be said that both groups’ opinions
are mostly negative. Namely, it also seems that it canbe assumed as if such a negative attitude towardsharing common ideas is caused by an overwhelming
lack of confidence.

sense, it can be said that there is a glimmer of hope.
Therefore, in order to increase this feasibility, as afirst step, it can be said that it is important for both tounderstand the validity of the establishment of thecooperative relationship after understanding thestrong and weak points of both. However, it seems
that it is difficult to understand how much theseemingly slight difference such as the establishmentof the cooperative relationship has an influence on an
improvement of the regional fire fighting validity.
Accordingly, it can be said that some countermeasures which can lead the well understanding for theabove influences are needed. In this chapter, “TheRegional Fire Fighting Validity Map” will be madeon a trial basis and proposed as a practical tool forrisk communication in order to improve each group’s
understanding about the effect of the establishmentof the cooperative relationship. According to theaims of this mapping, it seems that this mapping canbe called ‘the Solution-Oriented Mapping’.

(4) Fundamental purpose
The third point of issue is concerned with the quite
fundamental purpose of “Saving Life” in the firstplace.
According to the above results, it must be considered that it is difficult to establish the cooperative
relationship between each group in the present circumstances. However, granting the expectation ofability and the attitudes toward sharing common
ideas are negative among each other, if the eachgroups hold in common the quite fundamental purpose of “Saving Life” in the first place, it still can beconsidered that it is possible for each groups to establish a smooth cooperative relationship from a longterm viewpoint.
From this point of view, according to Fig.2(3)a), it
is clear that both groups are active for the quite
fundamental purpose of ‘Saving Life’. Namely, it iseasy to be confirmed that the quite fundamental
purpose of each group is identical (There is no significant difference between them at a level of 5%(p=0.078)[1].).
However, from Fig.2(3)b), it is also confirmed thatthe percentage of approval opinions about the establishment of the cooperative relationship is not so highon each group (There is no significant difference
between them at a level of 5% (p=0.684)[1].). Namely,
it is considered that these results should be explained
as follows: There are plenty of problems that need tobe solved at present. Still more, the most serious
problem is the recent situation that neither of eachgroup recognize the other’s opinions correctly. It is,therefore, exceedingly important that each group
recognizes that their fundamental purpose is identical.

(2) Fundamental conditions in mapping
Basically, in Tokyo, there is a high potential risk of
spreading fire by reason of high density of wooden
houses. Moreover, Japan is subject to frequent
earthquakes. Accordingly, the target of typicalmeasurements against fire disasters is always
spreading fire risk caused by large earthquake. In
fact, at present, all so-called ’fire hazard map’ inJapan is made under conditions such as the above twokinds of risks.
In contrast, in Bangkok, except for slum areas, thedensity of wooden houses is not so high, and the
spreading of fire risk is not so serious. Therefore, it
can be said that the safety in the region is settled by“the causing fire risk itself” and “the regional firefighting validity”. Among these factors, the former
has a quite considerable uncertainty. Consequently,
this mapping assumes that “the causing fire risk itself” is constant and can be neglected. Therefore,
only the latter “the regional fire fighting validity” isconsidered in this mapping.
To evaluate the regional fire fighting validity, we
set a [cumulative spraying water amount] as anevaluation index. This amount is defined as the total
amount of water supplied by both the governmental
fire fighting and the voluntary fire fighting at a given
time TV.
The governmental fire fighters always turn out
from each fire station with the prescribed equipment
when they receive an emergency call. In Bang Khae
district, there is just only one fire station. However, if
a fire occurs in Bang Khae district, some support fireengines will come from neighboring 6 main fire stations and 1 sub fire station.
On the other hand, the voluntary fire fighters’

4. THE REGIONAL FIRE FIGHTING VALIDITY MAP(1) Basic stanceAccording to the above, at present, it seems that
there is very little feasibility of an establishment of acooperative relationship between the governmental
fire fighters and voluntary ones. On the other hand, it
is also confirmed that the fundamental purpose of firefighting activity is the same for both groups. In this60

Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.
Table 3 Expression of fire fighting activity process in this mapping.
Subject
PeopleProcess

Note

Emergency callTurningout
Approach

After an outbreak of fire, time required to emergency call is indicated as ‘tp1 (sec.)’. (tp1=300, as adefault)
Governmental
After receiving an emergency call, time required to turning out is indicated as ‘tg1 (sec.)’. (tg1=180,
fire fighting
as a default)
After turning out, time required to arrive at a site of fire is indicated as ‘tg2 (sec.)’. The approach
routes are chosen by the shortest distance within the utilizable roads limited by a fire engine’s width,an obstruction by parking on local streets occurs at a rate ’p1’ and an obstruction by crowds of thevolunteers’ cars. The moving distance is indicated as ‘x (km)’. The prescribed properties of firestations and fire engines are as follows:
Cars (per one event, per one fire sta.)
Speed (v: km/h)
WarmingLoadage Width
CapacityTypeupneighbor fire sta.
Arterial roadLocal
(liter)(m)(liter per min)Bang Khae(sec)(main)*(sub)**
normal crowded street
Large
2
2
0
10,000
2.5
590
300
40
5
20
Medium
2
2
1
5,000
2.5
590
300
Small
1
1
0
1,500
2.2
590
0
[*note: 6 main fire stations, Bang Khun Thain, Dao Ka Nhong, Bang Khun North, Thon Buri, Tarad Phu, Talingchan] [**note: 1 sub fire station, Nong Khaem]

Preparation

Spraying
water

Voluntary firefighting

Turningout
ApproachPreparation

Spraying
water

Accordingly, ‘tg2’ is expressed as ‘tg2=360*x/v’.
(p1=0.3, as a default)
After arrival, time required to research the conditions is indicated as ‘tg3 (sec.)’. (tg3=120, as adefault)
After arrival, time required to connect some hoses is indicated as ‘tg4 (sec.)’. This value depends on
the necessary number ‘y’ of hoses. The ‘y’ is divided by the distance between the fire engine and thesite of fire. Time required to connect one hose is fixed as 8 seconds. The length of one hose is 20
meters. Accordingly, ‘tg4’ is expressed as ‘tg4=8*y’. (an upper limit of ‘y’ is set as 10)
After arrival, at first, try to find the nearest available hydrant. But, actually, some wrong matters
happen at a constant rate ’p2’, for example, breakdown, fail to find because of items hiding thehydrant, and so on. Granting that the finding is success, moreover, if there is no cooperative relationship, volunteers often keep the hydrant to themselves and the governmental fire fighters can notconnect it. The possibility of such an obstruction case is defined as ’p3’. In any case, if not successful to connect to the nearest hydrant, try the next nearest hydrant. (p2=0.2, p3=0.4, as a default)
After research conditions and connecting hoses, spraying water starts using the loadage water.
Therefore, the time required since the outbreak fire to starting spray water is as follows:
tp1+tg1+tg2+MAX( tg3, tg4 )So, [cumulative spraying water amount] by one fire engine is expressed as follows:
Capacity·MIN[ Tv-{ tp1+tg1+tg2+MAX( tg3, tg4 ) }, Loadage/Capacity ]After empty the loadage water, if already finished the connecting to the nearest hydrant successfully, spraying water can be continued. But if not successful, the fire engine has to try the next
nearest hydrant.
After succeeding in an interception, time required for turning out is indicated as ‘tv1 (sec.)’. (tv1=60,
as a default)
After turning out, time required to arrive at a site of fire is indicated as ‘tv2 (sec.)’. The behavioral
rules in approach is the same as the government one, except for some properties as follows: Type:pick-up truck with a small pump, Cars: 2 cars per each base, Loadage: none, Width: 2.0 meters,
Capacity: 350 liters per sec., Speed: the same as the governmental one.
After arrival, time required to research the conditions is indicated as ‘tv3 (sec.)’. (tv3=60, as a default)
After arrival, time required to connect some hoses is indicated as ‘tv4 (sec.)’. The behavioral rules is
the same as the government one, except for some properties as follows: 1)There are not obstruction
matters. 2) an upper limit of ‘y’ is set as 4.
After research and connecting to the hydrant, spraying water starts. Therefore, the time requiredsince the outbreak fire to starting spray water is as follows:
tp1+tv1+tv2+MAX( tv3, tv4 )So, [cumulative spraying water amount] by one voluntary fire truck is as follows:
Capacity·[ Tv-{ tp1+tv1+tv2+MAX( tv3, tv4 ) } ]whereabouts are exactly unknown. However, it istrue that the voluntary fire fighters exist at a fixed

rate. And it is also fact that they turn out from somebases which are dotted about the region (refer to61

Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.

these 5 factors have an influence on the regional firefighting validity.
Table 4 also shows the setting values which wereused in the calculations for the drawing the Regional
Fire Fighting Map. The following paragraphs give
additional explanations of the above factors. Incidentally, these setting values include some real values based on the survey for the actual situation andsome values as an assumption. These values should
be used as sensitivity analyses in order to express theeffects of the improvement of the above 5 factors
related to cooperative relationship.
a) Time loss from the misunderstanding of theemergency telephone number
In Bangkok, almost seven years ago, the emergency telephone number “191” for a fire station was
the same number as for a police station. Until November 1, 2003, with the reorganization which
moved the duty of fire prevention from the police
authority to BMA, the emergency telephone number
was then separated into “191 (police)” and “199 (firestation)”. However, at present, without the announcement of this change, there is a tendency formost people to dial “191” when a fire breaks out. As aresult of this harmful vertical division, when thepolice are informed of fire, it takes much more time
for the nearest fire brigades to get the information
and reach the site of fire. In this mapping, the value of‘tp1’ which indicates the time loss by the people’s
misunderstanding of the emergency telephone
number is assumed as 300 seconds.
Incidentally, as this factor is not concerned withthe establishment of the cooperative relationship, it isassumed that this value of ‘tp1’ does not change under
the improved scenario.
b) Traffic congestion on arterial roads
The traffic congestion on arterial roads has astrong influence on the rapidity of reaching the site offire, and the traffic congestion improvement is, actually, quite difficult. So, in both scenarios, the valueof ‘v’ which indicates the speed of fire engines isassumed as 5 km per hour.
c) Obstruction by parking on local streets
The fire engines frequently cannot go throughsome local streets, and sometimes has to turn backbecause of the obstruction of parking. So, in thismapping, the value of ‘p1’ which indicates the incidence of such obstruction of parking is assumed as
0.3.
Incidentally, as this factor is not concerned withthe establishment of the cooperative relationship, it isassumed that this value of ‘p1’ does not change under
the improved scenario.
d) Time loss by failure to find the available hydrants
When governmental fire fighters try to set theirThon 27 (Bang Waek Road) [2]
Nakhon Lung (Soi13) [2]Bang Khae Fire Station

Fire Station.
Voluntary Base.
Fire Hydrant.
[ ] Num. of Voluntary cars.
0

1

2

3 km
Thon 24 (Bang Khae 3) [2]
Thon 30 (Bang Khae 1) [2]Bang Khae Sum Phan(Phet Kasem 66/1) [2]
Lat Cha Montree (Phet Kasem 62/1) [2]Bang Aye (Phet Kasem 69) [none]

Fig.3 Location of hydrants and voluntary groups’ basesin Bang Khae District.

Fig.3) or each of their homes. Among them, theformer volunteers from some bases go by one or two
pick-up trucks with a fire pump, but the latter volunteers come directly from each of their homes do
not have any effective extinguishers. Therefore, thespraying water by voluntary fire fighters starts assoon as the fire pump arrives. Consequently, in caseof the evaluation on [cumulative spraying wateramount], it is enough to consider only the former
volunteer’s activity. Incidentally, the departure timing is divided depending on the timing of the interception of a radio message among the governmental
fire fighters.
The details of the parameters which express thegovernmental fire fighting ability and the voluntary
one are shown in Table 3. Some settings of values inTable 3 are based on some information obtained
from the above interviews. Moreover, as there aresome stochastic factors, the Monte Carlo method isadopted in this mapping in order to stably obtain thevalue of [cumulative spraying water amount].
(3) Obstructive factors and improved scenario
Referring to the above, if we rearrange the parameters affecting the [cumulative spraying wateramount] as obstructive factors, the list is as shown in
Table 4. Among them, it can be said that the factors
which can be influenced by the establishment of thecooperative relationship are the 5 factors from (e) to(i). Therefore, as a first step, it is important for eachgroups to understand how much the improvement of62

Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.
Table 4 Summary of actual and improved scenarios.
in actual situation
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)*
(f)*
(g)*

Time loss by misunderstanding of the emergency telephone number
Traffic congestion on arterial roads
Obstruction by parking on local streets
Time loss by failure to find the available hydrants
Lack of cooperation on the scene of connecting to hydrant
Lack of volunteers’ equipment (Num. of fire engines with tank)
Obstruction by crowds of the volunteers’ cars

tp1=300 sec.
v= 5 km/h.
p1=0.30p2=0.20p3=0.40
none
Obstruction(h)*Time loss for gathering information at the site of fire

tg3=120 sec.

(i)*

Loss of human resource for watching out for stealing fire fighting
equipment

in improved scenario

p3=0.00
1 (type: small)Moving aside, making
it possible for the governmental fire engines
to access
tg3=30 sec.

No loss of human reLoss of 2 or 3 humansource, and the govresource from the governmental team canernmental team. So, tg3
concentrate on theand tg4 increase one-anda half times.
fundamental activity.
*: factors which can be influenced by the establishment of the cooperative relationshipequipment, some obstructing matters often occur, forexample, breakdown of hydrant, fail to find the hydrant because of hiding it by some items, and so on.
Accordingly, in this mapping, the value of ‘p2’ whichindicates the failure incidence of finding the nearest
available hydrants is assumed as 0.2.
Incidentally, as this factor is not concerned withthe establishment of the cooperative relationship, it isassumed that this value of ‘p2’ does not change under
the improved scenario.
e) Lack of cooperation on the scene of connecting
to hydrant
When governmental fire fighters try to connect
their equipment to the available hydrant, voluntary
fire fighters who came earlier than governmental one
frequently keep the hydrant to themselves. Therefore,
the governmental fire fighters can not connect it. In
this mapping, the value of ‘p2’ which indicates theincidence of such an obstacle is assumed as 0.4.
Needless to say, as this factor is concerned with theestablishment of the cooperative relationship, it isassumed that the value of ‘p3’ is reduced to 0.0 under
the improved scenario.
f) Lack of volunteers’ equipment
The volunteers’ equipment for fire extinguishing ishardly enough. Especially, when there are not any
hydrants available, then most volunteers have nothing to do with the fire extinguishing. Therefore, inthis mapping, the number of fire engines with watertank in each voluntary base is assumed as zero. On
the other hand, it can be said that it is possible toincrease the fire engines with water tank in eachvoluntary base with efforts in the future. So, it isassumed that this number is increased to one under
the improved scenario. This assumption meanscomplete integration with governmental fire fighting

and the voluntary one.
g) Obstruction of the crowds of volunteers’ cars
If the greater part of governmental fire fighters andvoluntary ones have positive attitudes towards sharing common ideas to one another, it can be said thatthe obstructing incidence of the crowds of volunteers’ cars will be reduced. So, under the improved
scenario, it is assumed that such an obstruction will
not occur.
h) Time loss for gathering information at the siteof fireWhen arriving at a site of fire, firstly, the firefighters spends time researching conditions andgathering information. However, if governmental firefighters can get such information immediately fromthe volunteers who can reach the site of fire earlier, it
seems that it is possible to shorten the time required.
So, in actual situation, the value of ‘tg3’ which indicates the time required to gather information at thesite of fire is assumed as 120 seconds. On the other
hand, under the improved scenario, it is assumed that
this value is reduced to 30 seconds.
i) Loss of human resources for watching out for
fire fighting equipment theft
In actual situation, the loss of 2 or 3 human resources from the governmental team is unavoidable.
So, in this mapping, it is assumed that the value of‘tg3’ which indicates the time required to gather information at the site of fire and the value of ‘tg4’
which indicates the time required to connect hoses
are increased one-and-a half times. However, if thegreater part of governmental fire fighters and voluntary ones have positive attitudes towards sharing
common ideas to one another, it can be said that more
efficient allocation of human resources can be put
into practice. So, under the improved scenario, it is63

Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.
a) T V=10min.

b) T V=20min.

c) TV =30m in.

(1)
actualsituation

Cumulative
Spraying Water
Amount(litter)0～2,000～
4,000～
6,000～
8,000～
10,000～12,000～14,000～16,000～18,000～20,000～(2)
improved
scenario

Difference of
Cumulative
Spraying Water
Amount(litter)0～2,000～(3)difference

4,000～
6,000～
8,000～
10, 000～
0

1

2

3 km

Fig.4 The regional fire fighting validity map under the two scenarios.

intervals of 100 meters. Additionally, the lowest row
shows the difference between the actual situation andthe improved scenario.
Basically, it can clearly be seen that the remarkablebetterment of [cumulative spraying water amount] is
produced, if it is possible to establish cooperative
relationship between the governmental fire fighting
and the voluntary fire fighting as shown in Table 4.
In details, we can see that the marked betterment
occurs at the sites which are close to the governmental fire station, voluntary fire fighting bases andfire hydrants. However, it seems that such a betterment is partially limited since the local road networks
are not functionally linked. Of course, it is consideredthat the heavy traffic congestion on arterial roads also

assumed that the values of ‘tg3’ and ‘tg4’ are not increased.
(4) Mapping examples to show the effects of theestablishment of the cooperative relationshipThe example of the regional fire fighting validity
map in Fig.4 is to show the effects of the establishment of the cooperative relationship. The upper row
shows the mapping under the actual situation and thesecond row shows the mapping under the improved
scenario. In both mapping, the [cumulative spraying
water amount] as an evaluation index can be indicated by a shade as shown in the legend. This shade ismapped out by an interpolation based on the 8,527
evaluation points which are dotted on the roads at64

Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.

obstructs the spread of the betterment of [cumulative
spraying water amount].
At any rate, it can be said that such a regional firefighting validity map as shown above will be helpful
for each stakeholder to understand how effective theestablishment of the cooperative relationship is.

in the past. As a practical matter, it seemed that such a
discussion was just unthinkable matter for them before. Therefore, it can be said that our approach is thefirst contact in Bangkok. After having our purpose ofthis study explained to the above liaison person andsome leaders, most of them changed their attitudes
and admired our purpose, although they were almost
negative in having any discussions with the governmental fire fighters before. In this sense, there is
no guarantee that such a positive change will occur
for common members, but it can be also said that
there is a glimmer of hope to have some discussion
about this matter with the voluntary fire fighters andthe governmental fire fighters in the future.
Secondly, if it is successful in Bang Khae District
as a case study, we, therefore, propose that it shouldbe necessary to expand such practicable activities
into other districts. Moreover, with reference to theseresults and outcomes, it is important that the strategy
which was nothing but an impractical proposition
before will be changed into the practical activity.

5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION(1) Conclusion
Needless to say, since a certain solution does not
apply to every case, it is essential to investigate andmake clear what the fundamental problem is in thesubject area. Even if in our study area, it became clearthat the actual situation about regional fire fighting is
totally different between Bangkok and Japan.
Through some practicable activities such as interviews, investigations, considerations and making theregional fire fighting validity map, it became clearthat there are many obstructive factors for improving
the efficiency of fire extinguishers in Bangkok as
follows: a small number of fire stations, heavy traffic
congestion, lack of effective fire fighters and volunteers, and so on. Especially, it is considered that the
problems of uncooperative relationship and the lackof trust between stakeholders should be solved firstand foremost.
Moreover, through making the regional firefighting validity map, it illustrates how effective theestablishment of cooperative relationship between
each stakeholder is. It surely seems that it is difficult
to establish such a cooperative relationship at thepresent, but it is also true that each stakeholder holdin common the fundamental purpose of “Saving
Life”. Therefore, we can say that it is surely possible
to establish a smooth cooperative relationship from along term viewpoint. Accordingly, in order to obtaineach stakeholder’s understanding of the effectivenessof the cooperative relationship to achieve the fundamental purpose of “Saving Life”, it is consideredthat some practicable activities like a risk communication will hereafter become important more andmore. At that time, it seems that some tools such as
the regional fire fighting validity map as above will
be helpful.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: We would like to express
our grateful thanks for the valuable contribution offire officers and fire volunteers in Bang Khae district,
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, and respondent people in our questionnaire survey, who kindly
supported our project.
NOTE:[1] These statistics are the Mann-Whitney U test8). It
is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test. It
can be applied to the comparison of two independent random samples whose measurement
scales is ordinal.
[2] These statistics are the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test9). It is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis
test. It can be applied to the comparison of a pair ofsamples whose measurement scales is ordinal.
REFERENCES
1)

2)
3)
4)

(2) Discussion
The future plan and the prospect are as follows.
Firstly, this is to set some opportunities to discuss
the establishment of the cooperative relationship witheach stakeholder in the study area. Toward this, infact, we have already started to contact with somevoluntary fire fighting groups in Bang Khae District
as mentioned above. According to this approach, itbecame clear that nobody tried to solve this problem

5)

6)

7)

65

Khunteetao, S.: Ethics of the volunteers in a relief agency: acase study of the Ruamkatanyu Foundation, Master’s thesis
in Mahidol University, 2007. (in Thai)
Tokyo Fire Department: Fire service in Tokyo, 2009.
(http://www.tfd.metro.tokyo.jp/ts/sa/index.html)
Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior, Thailand, 2010. (http://www.dopa.go.th) (in Thai)
Department of City Planning, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Thailand, 2010. (http://cpd.bangkok.go.th) (inThai)
Bangkok Fire and Rescue Department, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Thailand, 2010. (http://www.
bangkokfire.com)
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act 2007, Royal Gazette, General Release No. 124, Part 52A, Dated on 7 September 2007.
Bang Khae district, 2010. (http://office.bangkok.go.th/bangkhae) (in Thai)

Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser.
F5 (Professional Practices in Civil Engineering), Vol. 67, No. 1, 55-66, 2011.
8)

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Mann, H. B., Whitney, D. R.: On a test of whether one of
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Biometrics Bulletin, Vol.1, pp.80-83, 1945.
(Received November 10, 2010)66