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Framing Japan’s Disputed Past
Memories in the United States
Kevin James QUINN*KIMURA Kan**
Abstract
This study looks at the discourse surrounding Japan’s disputed past memories byfocusing on the way stories have been framed in the international media to articulate
and contest that discourse. In particular, this research seeks to explain the origin anddevelopment of the“orthodox”frame that is prominent in the U.S. media. The present
examination of the origin and development of this framing in the international news
media is focused on U.S. newspaper coverage during the 1980s and 1990s.
This research demonstrates that this“orthodox”understanding originated inJapan itself, where the issue was highly contested. It was also found that the frame was
accepted and developed in the United States due to the broader“Japan problem”framethat was forming by the time Japan’s disputed war memories started to be discussed.
This frame called on past views of Japan and presented Japan as an economic andexistential“threat”that was taking advantage of the United States through“unfair”
practices. This frame both supported the acceptance of the“orthodox”frame and was
supported by it. The process of establishing the“orthodox”frame can be explained as a
typical example of this mechanism.

＊ International Program Coordinator, LIMRA LOMA.
＊ ＊ Professor, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University.

Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.27, No.2（2020.1）

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Chapter 1 ―IntroductionJapan has repeatedly expressed feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during
the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in ourhearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbors—those in Southeast Asian
countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and China,
among others—and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of theregion since the end of the war (Abe, 2015).
On August 14, 2015, just one day before the 70th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in
World War II, Prime Minister Abe delivered his statement on the war and colonial rule
by Japan. In what would later be called the Abe Statement, he expressed“profoundgrief and [his] eternal, sincere condolences ... before the souls of all those who perishedboth at home and abroad.”
However, this statement of apology was not accepted as a serious one ininternational society. The international media reacted indifferently to Abe’s apologies.
For example, CNN reported on the statement as follows:Overall, Abe appeared unrepentant, outsourced contrition to his predecessors, and failed theapology test. It is naïve to assume that an apology is the magic wand of regional reconciliation in
Northeast Asia, but equally naïve to think that it is not crucial to the process. (Kingston, 2015)
Why was Abe’s statement not taken seriously by international society? It is notdifficult to find the answers to this question in his own previous political statements
and behavior regarding Japan’s past. Since the 1990s, Abe has been known as oneof the most important nationalistic political figures in Japan（Suzuki, 2013）, andhis revisionistic messages on the war and colonial rule have repeatedly irritatedneighboring countries, such as China and South Korea, which experienced Japaneseinvasions（Bukh, 2014）.
However, here we have to remember one important thing: such negative reactions
by the international media to this Japanese political leader’s apologies were no different
from reactions to earlier apologies of other Japanese political leaders.

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As is well-known, Abe’s apologies in his 2015 statement were by no means thefirst official apologies tendered by major Japanese political leaders about the war andcolonial rule（Yamazaki, 2006）. Such apologies by Japanese political leaders regarding
the war and colonial rule have been repeated since as early as the 1950s（MOFA,
1951）, including the Prime Minister Murayama’s statement on the 50th anniversary of
the war’s end, in 1995（MOFA, 1995）.
However, the international media did not view such apologies during this period
in a positive light. For example, United Press International reported on the Murayama
Statement as follows:	Many groups said the apology, while courageous and going further than any previous statement,

appeared to be a personal expression by Murayama, rather than representing the Japanese
government or its people. (Perry, 1995).  
The unfavorable reception of Murayama’s apologies was certainly not due to his
record of nationalism, as in the case of Abe. Murayama was known as one of the mostinfluential leftist political figures in Japan in that period（Shinomiya, 1994）. Hence, his
political stances cannot possibly explain why his apology was not accepted as serious.
Why have the international media always reacted negatively to the apologies ofJapanese political leaders? One of the keys to understanding this phenomenon is thatthe international media have always interpreted the various apologies by different
political leaders according to the same logical framework, one that frames the apologies
as“not sincere”and“not serious,”as will be discussed later on this paper. This is theframework Seaton（2006）called“orthodox.”
But how did the international media come to see Japan in terms of such aframework, and how was the framework established? This paper will explore thesequestions and the process by which the international media formulated the discourse.
Chapter 2 ―Literature Review and Methodology
2.1 “Orthodox”Framework
What, then, is the“orthodox”framework? Here, Seaton（2006）gives us a compact

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and clear picture of it. He argues that“the orthodoxy is critical of Japan through thefollowing pattern of arguments:”

1. Japan was an aggressor nation and committed numerous atrocities during the Asia-Pacific
War and therefore bears a heavy war responsibility;
2. the Japanese government has not properly addressed these war responsibility issues;
3. Japanese people, like their government, fail to adequately acknowledge Japanese aggression;and4. as a result, “Japan” needs to do more to address the past. In practical terms, the litmus test forJapanese people “adequately” remembering the war will be their government saying and doing
the “right” things (Seaton, 2006, p. 2).
The articles reviewed for this study have been categorized using this definition ofthe“orthodox”frame constructed by Seaton（2006）and his critique of it.  
However, Seaton’s study focused mostly on the discourse within Japan’s own
media to show the“orthodox”frame as being unrepresentative of reality, and he did
not explain in detail the mechanisms that led to the formation of the“orthodox”frame.
Soh（2007）examined in greater detail the origins of the way Japan’s disputed past
memories have been framed, but only for specific issues.
Soh（2007）, for instance, looked at the framing of the“comfort women”issue indifferent contexts, noting four different frames. Soh argued that within these frames,
the“comfort women”issue emerged as a human rights issue due to the increased
importance given to human rights in the post-Cold War era（Soh, 2007, p. 33）.Soh notedthat the issue gained even more weight as a result of the human rights violations thatwere occurring in Bosnia at the time（Soh, 2007, p. 33）.  
Though Soh’s work is insightful, it did not expand to encompass the framing ofJapan’
s disputed past memories or how the framing of Japan’s disputed past memories
might have been affected overall by the way the“comfort women”issue was framed.
Similarly, Yoshida（2006）studied the framing of the“Rape of Nanking”in the UnitedStates. He came to similar conclusions as Seaton, describing something akin to Seaton’s“orthodox”frame. Like Seaton, he also noted how this kind of coverage in the UnitedStates has empowered revisionists by portraying them as typically Japanese andFRAMING JAPAN’S DISPUTED PAST MEMORIES IN THE U.S.

65

providing them with proof that Japan is being treated“unfairly”（Seaton, 2006; Yoshida,2006）.
So, while these studies contribute to our understanding, they do not provide a
broader picture. This is where the present study will try to expand our understandingof how Japan’s disputed past memories have been framed. To this end, this study
analyzes how the framework in question was formulated. This analysis falls within the
study of discourses, focusing on the connection between van Wolferen’s framing of the“Japan problem,”which he sees as underlying the economic conflicts between Japanand the United States（van Wolferen, 1986）, and what Seaton（2006）calls the“orthodox”
framing of Japan’s disputed past memories. In this way, it expands into new areas ofstudy regarding Japan’s disputed past memories by showing the connection between
several levels of frames and how lower-level frames can be more easily understood
through this chain of frames than by directly connecting to meta-narratives.
2.2 Methodology
Building on the studies outlined above, this research looks comprehensively at
the framing of Japan’s disputed past memories in the international media. This paper
seeks to explain the origin and development of the“orthodox”frame that Seaton
described. To this end, this research will determine where the frame originated andhow it developed by studying the effects of changes in society, international relations,and the economy, with a special focus on the effect of other frames, such as Soh’s（2007）“feminist humanitarianism and sex slave”frame（p. 33）and the wider framing of Japan.
To begin the process of analysis, the present study first focuses on the way theframing of Japan’s disputed past memories developed in U.S. newspaper coverageduring the 1980s and 1990s as the United States is a global news leader and has a great
impact on the flow of news internationally（Herbert, 2001, p. 45）. This time period waschosen because the pertinent issues first started to seriously emerge globally in the
1980s and continued to build significantly in the 1990s as new scandals involving historic
memory emerged and several significant war anniversaries took place.
In order to study this unique situation, this study relies on newspaper articles
supplements them with other sources, including magazine articles, documentaries,
academic articles, and academic books from before Japan’s disputed past memories

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became an issue of interest in the United States until today. Articles from The New

York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe were used to track the origin anddevelopment of the way Japan’s disputed past memories were represented in the U.S.
media in the 1980s and 1990s.
In addition, to provide comparison with the U.S. media discourse, this study also
examines The Guardian to see how the situation developed in a U.K. newspaper andto discover the similarities with and differences from U.S. newspaper articles. Whilethe newspapers selected do not represent all U.S. and U.K. newspapers, they are what
Entman（2004）calls“top news organizations whose cues are followed by the rest of
the media”（Entman, 2004, p. 10）.
Articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Guardian wereretrieved from the Lexis database, while articles from The Boston Globe were retrieved
from the ProQuest database1. To a lesser extent, articles prior to the 1980s were also
examined to determine if there was any significant coverage in the years leading
up to the 1980s. These databases were searched for three purposes, although if thecategorization of the articles is included, this can be considered a four-step process.
First, the databases were searched to find articles that discussed Japan’s disputed past
memories, which were then tracked and categorized as either presenting an“orthodox”
frame or not. Next, the databases were checked to determine the total number ofarticles that discussed Japan, so that the articles which discussed Japan’s disputed past
memories could be viewed as a proportion of the total. Finally, they were searched toprovide insight into the way Japan was framed in general. Each of these steps will be
explained in more detail below.
In order to examine the articles that discussed Japan’s disputed past memories, alarge number of database searches were first executed to find articles that discussed
such memories. Several combinations of keywords were used to narrow these searches2.  
Many of the articles retrieved during the searches were not categorized for various
reasons, although the main reason for the exclusion of articles was that they did not
discuss Japan’s disputed past memories or they only had a single line discussing the
topic that was disconnected from the rest of the article. The articles were categorized
as they were retrieved. After retrieving all of the articles, they were checked by year
to eliminate duplicates.

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Then, using Seaton’s（2006）definition of the“orthodox”view of Japan’s disputed
past memories, 465 U.S. articles from the beginning of 1980 to the end of 1999 werecategorized as either representative of the“orthodox”frame or not. An additional 158
U.K. articles from the beginning of 1984 to the end of 1999 were checked. Furthermore,
87 articles from The New York Times from 2014 and 2015 were looked at to gain a roughunderstanding of changes that occurred since the end of the 1990s. Additionally, to help
determine how the coverage changed based on where the articles were written, they
were categorized by where the authors wrote their stories: in Japan, the United States,or other countries. Furthermore, where necessary, internal document text searches
were used to drill further down into the sources in order to find patterns. Word counts
were also compiled to determine the level of coverage, the most significant of which are
noted throughout this paper.
Of course, doing a simple count of the number of stories that discussed Japan’sdisputed past memories and presented the“orthodox”view would not accurately
account for changes in the overall coverage of Japan. So, to adjust for these changes
and to provide a more realistic representation of the coverage of Japan’s disputed past
memories, the articles are looked at as a proportion of the total coverage by year. To
determine the total coverage of Japan in these newspapers, three kinds of searches
were completed for each year: searches related to Japan’s economy, politics, and both.
The results of the first two searches were added by year, and the result of the third
was subtracted.
Finally, searches were carried out to assess how Japan was viewed in the UnitedStates and to better contextualize the development of the framing of Japan’s disputed
past memories. These databases searches were also expanded to other publications,such as Newsweek, and were supplemented by journal articles, books written duringthat time period, books written since, and documentaries made during the time period
studied.
Chapter 3 ―Trends of Newspaper Articles
3.1 U.S. Media Trends
Assessing trends of major U.S. newspaper articles is also key to understanding

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Figure 1.1.  Percentage of Coverage by Origin（USA）（Presenting the“Orthodox”Frame）.

Percentage of Total Coverage of Japan

Percentage of Coverage by Origin(Presenting the "Orthodox" Frame)
0.800%
0.700%
0.600%
0.500%

Japan

0.400%
US

0.300%

OtherCountries

0.200%

Total

0.100%
1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

‐0.100%1980

0.000%

This graph shows The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe articles
from 1980 through 1999 categorized as having an“orthodox”frame as a percentage of thetotal coverage of Japan for each year. The New York Times and The Washington Post articles
were gathered through http://lexis.com, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017. The Boston
Globe articles were gathered through https://secure.pqarchiver.com/boston/advancedsearch.
html, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017.

the framing of Japan’s disputed past memories. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the changes
in the percentage of coverage that Japan’s disputed past memories received in relation
to the total coverage. Figure 1.1 shows the articles that were classified as presenting
an“orthodox”frame, and Figure 1.2 shows all of the stories that discussed Japan’sdisputed past memories.
This research found that the most significant shifts in the amounts and types ofcoverage occurred in 1985, 1991, and 19953. In 1985, the issue can be seen as gaining
in interest while the“orthodox”frame became dominant in the coverage coming out
of Japan. 1991 was the first year in which there was a significant amount of domestic
interest in the topic and the domestic coverage was overwhelmingly“orthodox.”Of all
the years covered, 1995 had the most stories related to Japan’s disputed past memories,
the most domestic coverage, and the most coverage that was predominantly“orthodox.”
At first, the coverage in 1995 appears to run counter to the argument that the“Japan problem”frame led to an acceptance of the“orthodox”frame. It appears thisway because Japan’s economy ceased to be perceived as a“threat”in the way it once
was and the“Japan problem”frame had diminished somewhat in significance by this

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Percentage of Coverage by Origin (AllArticles on Japan's Disputed War Memories)
0.800%
0.700%
0.600%
0.500%

Japan

0.400%

US

0.300%

Other Countries

0.200%

Total

0.100%
1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

0.000%
1980

Percentage of Total Coverage of Japan

Figure 1.2.  Percentage of Coverage by Origin（USA）（All Articles on Japan’s Disputed Past Memories）.

This graph shows The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe articles
from 1980 through 1999 that discussed Japan’s disputed past memories as a percentage ofthe total coverage of Japan for each year. The New York Times and The Washington Post articles
were gathered through http://lexis.com, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017. The Boston
Globe articles were gathered through https://secure.pqarchiver.com/boston/advancedsearch.
html, which was last accessed on 06/29/2017.

time.
However, there are several reasons for the persistence of the“orthodox”frame.
Frames in general are persistent—once they are created they do not die easily—and
this is true for both the“orthodox”and the“Japan problem”frames. So, despite thefact that the“Japan problem”frame allowed for greater acceptance of the“orthodox”
frame, the latter was not dependent on the former to continue existing once thelatter was established. Additionally, the“orthodox”frame was able to sustain itself
because events continued to occur that kept the topic in the news. Furthermore, thedevelopment of new issues that were framed negatively for other reasons also fit
within the“orthodox”frame and supported it. Specifically, according to Soh（2007）, the“comfort women”issue was viewed within a“feminist humanitarianism and sex slave”
frame, which fit within and supported the“orthodox”framing of Japan’s disputed past
memories（Soh, 2007, p. 33）.
3.2 Comparison with U.K. Media
However, coverage in the U.S. and U.K. media were rather different in terms of
the peak years of coverage and how coverage developed. While the“orthodox”frame

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was dominant in the United Kingdom and originated in Japan, much like in the UnitedStates, the development of the“orthodox”frame in the United Kingdom followed asignificantly different path. In the U.K. media, there was a strong connection between
the“orthodox”frame and the efforts of British POWs to receive compensation andapologies from the Japanese government and Japanese businesses. The efforts by POWs
also had a connection to the“comfort women”issue and what Soh（2007）called the“feminist humanitarianism and sex slave”framing of the“comfort women”issue（Soh,2007, p. 33）as well as the greater importance attributed to human rights abuses aroundthis time. This theme in stories about POWs began in 1993 after Morihiro Hosokawa’sapology was triggered by the emergence of the“comfort women”issue and there wasan expectation that compensation would follow the apology（Weale, 1993）.
In response to this apology, Martyn Day, one of the lawyers advising the Japanese
Labour Camp Survivors Association of Great Britain, said:“Although I wouldn’t expectto be getting my clients a cheque overnight, the chances are we should get somewherein the next two or three years”（Weale, 1993）. This statement highlights the effect ofthe“comfort women”issue on the development of the“orthodox”view in the United
Kingdom, as does the fact that from 1984 till 1993, when this story broke, there were
only eight stories about POWs in The Guardian, none of which mentioned compensationor human rights. However, from the time the story broke until 1999, there were 73
articles involving POWS, many of which discussed the issues outlined above. Thesestories gained a domestic connection as war anniversaries occurred and the issue ofcompensation as well as apologies to POWS developed throughout the rest of the 1990s.
Much like in the United States, this allowed for a connection to be drawn to wartime
Japan and the prejudices that existed during the war.
These findings are also supported by Figure 1.3 above. In this graph, the shift
in the number of articles can be seen as starting in 1993. In that year, the number ofdomestically produced articles rose to the most significant level to date, as did thetotal coverage. This was followed by a rather steep incline in the years that preceded
the emergence of the“comfort women”issue and the apologies made by Kono and
Hosokawa. It is also worth noting that as the issue became tied to the United Kingdom’sown disputes for compensation and apologies for Japan’s wartime acts, POWs issues inparticular, the percentage of coverage that Japan’s disputed past memories received, asFRAMING JAPAN’S DISPUTED PAST MEMORIES IN THE U.S.

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(U.K.) Percentage of Coverage by Origin (All Articles on Japan's
Disputed War Memories)
1.80%
1.60%
1.40%
1.20%

Japan

1.00%
0.80%

UK

0.60%

Other Countries

0.40%

Total

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

0.00%

1993

0.20%
1980

Percentage of Total Coverage of Japan

Figure 1.3.  Percentage of Coverage by Origin（U.K.）（All Articles on Japan’s Disputed War Memories）.

This graph shows the number of The Guardian articles gathered through http://lexis.com,
last accessed on 06/29/2017, that discussed Japan’s disputed war memories from 1984 to 1999
as a percentage of the total coverage of Japan for each year. The percentages were calculatedusing the figures in Table 1.2（after adjustment for origin of articles）and Table 1.4 in Section 9.

a proportion of the total coverage, far exceeded that of the United States in any year in
the 1980s or 1990s, with the gap growing significantly wider in the years immediately
following 1993.  
It could be argued that this difference in coverage demonstrates that the situationin the United States was not unique and could be simply attributed to the fact that incountries that had a direct connection, the coverage was significant. However, even if
the U.S. coverage did not reach the same level of that the United Kingdom, the U.S.
case still has unique qualities. In the United Kingdom and the other Allied countries,
the“orthodox”framing of Japan’s disputed past memories could be directly connectedto their own domestic demands for compensation and repentance from Japan. However,this was not the case for the United States. Although there was still some resentment
from the war, there were fewer calls for compensation or apologies in the United States
for the actions Japan took and little coverage of such demands.
However, these are interpretations inferred from only very rough statistical data.
Do details from the articles in the U.S. media support these interpretations? In the next
chapter, a more detailed analysis answering this question is presented.

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Chapter 4 ―Origin of the“Orthodox”Frame in the U.S. Media
4.1 The Roles of Foreign Correspondents in Japan
How, then, was the“orthodox”frame formulated? There are many possible
explanations that could be explored. For example, it would be very natural to assume
that this perspective somehow came from South Korea or China since these countries
and their citizens were engaged in direct disputes with Japan over its wartime acts andthe way Japan’s government and some Japanese citizens had atoned for and discussed
them. However, this does not appear to be the case. In fact, somewhat unexpectedly,
the“orthodox”frame appears to have originated in Japan, where it became dominant in
1984; only then did it receive significant coverage, starting in 1985, in the United States.
As can be seen in Figure 1.1 above, the“orthodox”frame predominantly emerged
from stories written by foreign correspondents in Japan; such stories originating in the
United States and other countries only started to become prominent in the 1990s. It canalso be seen that prior to 1991, there were no more than six stories in any year thatemerged from the United States or other sources. Additionally, no more than five of thestories originating outside of Japan presented the“orthodox”frame in any single year.
The majority of these came out of the United States, with fewer coming out of China
and South Korea. Prior to the 1990s, most of the stories written outside Japan tended to
be shorter in length than stories written by foreign correspondents in Japan, especiallythose from the United States. Furthermore, as new stories emerged, the“orthodox”
frame tended to be presented by foreign correspondents in Japan prior to appearing in
the coverage originating outside Japan.
The“orthodox”framing by foreign journalists can be partially explained bytheir place within the structure of Japan’s media. In the 1980s and 1990s, foreign
correspondents were outsiders in Japan’s media system, and they continue to be
today, as noted by Feldman（1993）; Farley（1996）; Krauss（1996）; McNeil（2016）; andHerbert（2001）. Moreover, it is well documented that this created certain limitations
and opportunities for them when gathering information. Researchers have found thatjournalists were limited in their ability to gather information from the main power
holders, such as politicians and business elites（Feldman 1993; Farley 1996; Krauss
1996; and McNeil 2016）. However, previous studies have determined that foreign

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73

correspondents had access to outsiders that the domestic media covered less（Farley
1996; Krauss, 1996; and McNeil, 2016）. Based on most of the quotes in articles about
Japan’
s disputed past memories, it is clear that many of these outside sources were
either critical of the Japanese government’s handling of certain situations4 or werequoted in articles to demonstrate the extreme views held by some, which were often
presented as being representative of the views of all Japanese people. This helped
create the impression that Japan is dominated by extreme revisionists and that there
was no discussion within the country over how the war should be remembered.
The place of foreign correspondents in Japan’s media system was further
complicated by the foreign correspondent system in the United States. In the 1980s andeven throughout the 1990s, most U.S. journalists in Japan were only stationed within the
country for a short period of time; therefore, they could not develop advanced Japanese
language skills or networks, further limiting their ability to gather information5. It is
probable that this deficiency led to a greater reliance on Japanese newspapers, fixturesthat could explain the situation to them, and The Foreign Correspondents’Club ofJapan.
4.2 Impacts of Japanese MediaThe reliance of foreign correspondents on Japanese media appears to have had asignificant impact, since the coverage of Japan’s disputed past memories tended to berather critical in Japan, especially in the more left-leaning newspapers. In particular, theAsahi Shimbun, Japan’s most left-leaning mainstream newspaper, was noted by Seaton（2006）as being very critical of the way the Japanese government handled Japan’sdisputed past memories.
This paper also appears to have been a favorite of foreign journalists as thereferences to the Asahi Shimbun outnumber those of all other Japanese newspapers
combined, followed by the Mainichi Shimbun, which, according to Seaton（2006）, alsoleaned more to the left of the spectrum than other Japanese newspapers 6 when
discussing Japan’s disputed past memories. Moreover, these liberal newspapers would
cover Japan’s disputed past memories more than other newspapers and occasionallydiscussed issues related to them that were not covered or barely covered in the other

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newspapers, such as the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Sankei Shimbun, as reported by Seaton（2006）7. This means that regardless of preference, the greater reliance might not havebeen by choice but out of necessity. Since journalists could not get information on somestories about Japan’s disputed past memories from the Yomiuri Shimbun or the Sankei

Shimbun, they had to reference the Asahi Shimbun or the Mainichi Shimbun.
The more critical view that these left-leaning newspapers had of the war had
been building for years prior to disputes over Japan’s past memories gaining interest
internationally. For example, in 1971, Honda Katsuichi wrote a series of articles on the
topic:“After traveling in China for nearly two months and interviewing more than 100
Chinese survivors of the war, Honda reported Japan’s atrocities in China, supplementing
his work with photographs.”（Yoshida, 2006, p. 81）. Seaton（2006）noted that thesearticles were so influential that they were a“trigger for the patriotic education
movement that led to the 1982 textbook controversy.”（Seaton, 2006, p. 44）. Anotherexample is the book Akuma no hoshoku（The Devil’s Gluttony）, written by Morimura
Seiichi in 1981, which focused on Unit 731’
s human experiments. These more critical
portraits that came out prior to the Western media picking up on the topic of Japan’sdisputed past memories allowed for the“orthodox”frame to form.  
4.3 Continuity of Discourse
As noted above, the“orthodox”frame originated in Japan; however, this does
not explain how the“orthodox”frame spread to stories produced domestically within
the United States or why foreign correspondents in Japan were so receptive to it.
This can mainly be explained by the fact that the“orthodox”frame fit within andsupported an already existing framing of Japan, the“Japan problem”frame. This
frame, which includes macro-level images of Japan and the Japanese, has deep roots,
but they are most easily visible in the perceptions of the Japanese that were formedin America during the buildup to WWII and the war itself, as Seaton（2006）insists.
These views saw a revival in the late 1960s and continued to grow until the early
1990s. This is interpreted as a product of the economic conflicts that started to become
more prominent between Japan and the United States and the perceived“threat”thatJapan’s growth posed to the latter8.
Already by the end of the 1960s, Japan’s economy had recovered to such a

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degree that its trade with the United States was starting to create friction, which
continued to worsen into the 1970s. This tension continued to build as Japan’s economy
thrived, despite several efforts by the United States to decrease the trade imbalance.
Japan’
s economic rise was viewed as a“threat”and as resulting from Japan’s“unfair”
economic activities. For example, Packard（1972）captured well the connection between
the perceived“threat”of Japan and the rediscovery of anti-Japanese sentiments in anarticle discussing a book that was newly translated from Japanese:

The Pacific Rivals…. The title is unfortunate, rivalry is not what this book is all about (theJapanese title was, simply, Japan and America. But it reveals our penchant for contriving
simplistic wrappings in which to rediscover Japan. In World War II, the Japanese were treacherous
and cunning. In the 1950s, they were dispirited and grateful for our benevolence, hanging likejuicy plums outside the Communist world’s backyard, ripe for the seizing. In the 1960s, wewere warned that left-wing elements might take over Japan from within. In the 1970s, as thependulum swings back in favor of the Chinese, the rumblings of distant thunder are heard:
competition, unfair trade practices, economic animals, Pacific Rivals (Packard, 1972).
Packard highlights how Japan was being viewed as different from the UnitedStates. He illustrates the growing perception that the Japanese were“unfair”and“uniquely different”from“us Americans.”They were viewed as“rivals”who were
only concerned with economic growth, and their growth was viewed as a direct“threat”
to the United States.
This perceived“threat”of Japan’s rising economy to the United States that built
up and evolved throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s created a broad frame（or what Reese（2001）called a“cultural”frame）that drew on earlier representationsof Japan（Reese, 2001, p. 6）. In them, Japanese people, Japanese businesses, andtheir government were often portrayed as inscrutable, different from“us,”“unfair,”“deceptive,”and“not playing by the rules.”This understanding of Japan has been
noted by many researchers, such as Dower（1986）, Morris（2011）, Packard（1987）,
and Vogel（1979）. This frame was labeled the“Japan problem”frame in 1986 by van
Wolferen（van Wolferen, 1986）.
The“Japan problem”frame did not solidify overnight but rather was built up by

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drawing upon preexisting prejudices from the war era as Japan’s economy continued
to grow. As noted, it is what Reese（2001）called a“‘cultural’frame [which] do [esn’t]stop with organizing one story, but invite[s] us to marshal a cultural understanding andkeep on doing so beyond the immediate information”（Reese, 2001, p. 6）. Reese（2001,2010）claimed that once a strong“cultural”frame is formed, it does not disappear
easily—it may therefore outlive the reason for its creation9.
Reid（1991）claimed that the“Japan problem”frame not only gained popularity inthe press but also among many scholars10. He traced this back to a negative backlash to
the line of thought that Ezra Vogel pioneered in his work, Japan as Number 1: Lessons for

America. As the title suggests, Vogel argued that the United States had much to learn
from Japan. Reid noted the following:In the mid-1980s, a new breed of analysts, called “revisionists” in academic circles and “Japan
bashers” in the press, came to the fore. Their argument—that Japan is an unfair trader taking
a free ride at America’s expense—has now flourished in the marketplace.… “It’s easier to get
published if you complain about the Japanese,” says Ronald Morse, a Washington-based Japan
expert who falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. “It’s easier to get an advance, to get into
magazines, if you beat up on Japan” (Reid, 1991).
To summarize, when Japan’s disputed past memories started to be discussed in
the 1980s, the“Japan problem”frame, which portrayed Japan as“unfair,”was alreadydeveloping. This frame became more prominent throughout the rest of the 1980s andthe early 1990s, coloring the way Japan’s disputed past memories were understood. How
Japan remembers the war and its atonement for it only really started to be discussed
in the U.S. media in the 1980s, in response to the disputes in Northeast Asia. However,at this time, the discussion of Japan’s disputed past memories mostly emanated fromcorrespondents in Japan, with little domestic discussion taking place within the UnitedStates. For example, in 1982, only 25%（six out of twenty-four）of the sampled articles
published in 1982 were written in the United States, the longest of which was only 775
words long. This trend continued, and the number of articles written within the UnitedStates that looked at Japan’s disputed past memories never exceeded six until 1991.

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4.4 “Japan
Problem”Framing of Economic Conflicts and“Orthodox”Framing ofJapan’s Disputed Past Memories
In order to understand the context of the formation of the“Japan problem”frame,
it is important to discuss how Americans perceived Japan as it recovered from WWII.
At the end of WWII, Japan’s economy was in ruins. However, despite this, the country
was able to recover quickly to the point where it was already being seen as a serious
economic“threat”to the United States. One of the important points here is that in the
United States, it was generally believed that this was partially due to the assistance theUnited States provided11, which led to further frustration within that country over the
economic disputes with Japan（Shapiro & Hiatt, 1989, p. 2）. As Japan’s economy grew,
it was seen as“taking advantage”of the United States“after all the United States did
for Japan.”This was viewed as a betrayal by many, and it was a continuing theme inthe discourse, with the argument often being made that Japan had“lost the war but
won the peace”at the expense of America（Morley, 1985）.
The declining willingness of Americans to keep their economy open to Japan
was another sign of the growing frustration with Japan’s progress in industries that“threatened”U.S. jobs（Reischauer, 1988）.Again, this situation created fear and made iteasy to think of the outsiders, the Japanese, as beating“us”by being“unfair”and“unlikeus”（Lee, 1979）.
Morris（2011）also clearly highlighted the fact that Japan was already being seen
as a“threat”in the early 1970s in the passage below:

[As] Willard Price and others began to point out in the early 1970s, Japan’s “miracle” appeared
to be a peril for other countries. This view was especially evident in the United States, which had
seen its bilateral trade deficit blow out from US$380 million in 1970 to $2.5 billion in 1971
and then $3 billion in 1972, each year in Japan’s favour. Such figures revived the perception thatJapan might be an economic “threat” to the United States, if not the entire world. For example,
President Richard Nixon described this Japanese “threat” in 1971 as “far more serious than thechallenge that we confronted even in the dark days of Pearl Harbor” (Morris, 2011, p. 21)
Japan continued to be viewed as a greater“threat”as the 1970s continued andinto the 1980s（Bergsten, Ito, & Noland, 2001, p. 16）. This perception that Japan was

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Lee（1972）in which“Nixon’s chief trade negotiator”is quoted as“describing Japan asa country that plays‘dirty’in international trade.”
As these kinds of statements and economic conflicts continued throughout the
1970s and 1980s, so did concerns in the United States. As noted by Hayes（1985）,
some, such as former foreign minister Saburo Okita, went as far as saying that theatmosphere in the situation in the United States“is like that before the outbreak of awar.”Ronald A. Morse（1984）also demonstrated the prevalence of this point of view
when stating that“the U.S. has identified Japanese economic competition and lack of
trade reciprocity as signs of unfairness and insularity. Japan is increasingly seen as
an economic threat to the United States with all its potential implications for national
security”（Morse, 1984, p. 29）.
This statement was actually made as the“Japan problem”frame was starting
to solidify. As Morris（2011）mentioned, it was in the mid-1980s when the“Japanproblem”started to solidify. However, another important point to note here is that
also during this period, the“Japan problem”frame on economic conflicts started toinfluence the U.S. media’s discourse about historical issues related to Japan. One of theearliest demonstrations of the link between the“Japan problem”framing of economic
conflicts and the“orthodox”frame representation of these historical issues is included
in an article written by Vogel（1983）published in The Boston Globe. In the article, which
discusses Nakasone’s prospects as Prime Minister, Vogel states:	While other East Asians are enraged at Japanese textbook changes that play down World War II

aggression, many Japanese reading their own press are more concerned that Japanese are victimsof irrational emotional pressure from Asians demanding textbook changes. In the case of Hitachi
and Mitsubishi Electric accused of stealing secrets from IBM, although it is hard for Americans toimagine how Japanese could be the victims, in the Japanese press and public opinion, IBM is not
the victim. Rather, Japanese are the victims of American entrapment. (Vogel, 1983)
The article highlights the idea that Japan had become the economic“aggressor,”just as they were the military“aggressor”in the past. Furthermore, it shows Japan
claiming that it is the victim of“unfair”characterizations over historic disputes, just

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as it is a victim of“unfair”economic aggression, protestations that run counter towhat many Americans argued at the time. This is a view that many Americans would
have seen as another example of Japan’s“underhanded”tactics. In this way, when the“orthodox”frame emerged, it was already being influenced by the“Japan problem”
frame that was forming. As time passed, the links between these two frames only
strengthened as the“Japan problem”frame solidified and took on a greater significance.
However, in the early 1980s, the negative image of Japan in economic disputes wasjust loosely related to the negative image of Japan with regard to historical issues. In
the following years, though, the linkage between two frames was consolidated.
Chapter 5 ―Solidification of the“Orthodox”Frame
5.1 Competing Frames
The important point to note here is that the“Japan problem”frame formed in the
mid-1980s, which was before Japan’s disputed past memories had become a subject of
discussion and great controversy. As we saw in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, it was only in 1991
that U.S. media reports about Japan’s historical issues increased significantly; however,the“Japan problem”frame around economic disputes was firmly established by theend of the 1980s. As is well-known, the late 1980s were the heyday of the Japanese
economy, and the criticisms leveled against Japan on economic issues reached its peakin that period.
Hence, the“Japan problem”frame, which had formed earlier based on economic
disputes in the 1980s, had to cast a long shadow to reinforce the later frame related toJapan’
s historical issues. For example, in an article discussing how Japan remembers
the war, published in The Boston Globe on July 29, 1985, Tom Ashbrook wrote as follows:	Forty years after its surrender, Japan’s war shrines may be quiet relics of history, but its economic

advances still have the flavor—often deliberately cultivated by Japanese executives—of military
campaigns.… “For the Japanese, business is a continuation of war,” said Edward Seidensticker,
Columbia University professor of Japanese. “For all this talk of peace, I don’t think the Japaneseever really stopped fighting.” (Ashbrook, 1985)

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In the article cited above, connections between World War II and Japan’s economyat the time not were not only drawn but connected to the way in which Japan viewed
its history. It was therefore simple enough for a further connection to be made: thatjust as Japan fought WWII“unfairly,”it would fight its economic wars“unfairly.”
At this point, it should be noted once again that even as the“Japan problem”and“orthodox”frames were forming, there were other competing arguments made against
them. For example, in War Without Mercy—Race and Power in the Pacific War, John Dower（1986）warned against the kind of prejudices that were building at the time overeconomic concerns and drew upon the extreme rhetoric of WWII.  Many other authors,
including Edwin O. Reischauer and George R. Packard, also spoke against these frames,and for it were attacked as“Japan sympathizers”and members of the“Chrysanthemum
Club”by revisionist supporters of the“Japan problem”and“orthodox”frames12. Even
though the“Japan problem”and“orthodox”frames were not the only existing frames,
they were nonetheless pervasive within the news media. But how could such frames
have dominated other frames?
5.2 The Unique Situation of 1991
To answer that question, we have to consider in detail the situation of Japan-U.S.
relations in the early 1990s. There are several important points to keep in mind to help
understand the situation at that time. Internationally, it was the era just after the end of
the Cold War, and the United States no longer had any serious concerns about Russia.
In contrast, although Japan was already sinking into a prolonged recession after 1990,
the economy still looked very strong, and the recession was predicted to be a very
short one. China was still struggling under the controversial situation created by the
Tiananmen Incident in 1989, and the threat of terrorism was not nearly as serious asin the 2000s. As a result, much of the U.S. media at that time still regarded Japan—not
Russia, China, or terrorism—as the major threat facing the United States. The Gulf War
drew to an end in the same year, a war in which Japan was viewed as“not doing its
fair share.”
The year 1991 was also unique regarding the historical issues of Japan. It was
well-known that Kim Hak-sun had come out in Seoul as a former“comfort woman”inAugust of that year, after which“comfort women”issues started to escalate. However,FRAMING JAPAN’S DISPUTED PAST MEMORIES IN THE U.S.

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the U.S. media also had their own domestic reason to report on the historical issues
of Japan, namely, that 1991 was the 50th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor,and many U.S. media outlets were preparing to make special reports about the war in
December.
Primarily for these two reasons, the sense of Japan as a major threat to the UnitedStates and the coming war anniversary, the U.S. media dramatically increased reports
on problematic Japanese historical issues in 1991. In this situation, it was very naturalfor the U.S. media to report on the dual issues of the Japanese economy and Japanese
history in ways that overlapped, using the logic of the“Japan problem.”
One Frontline13 episode that originally aired on November 19, 1991, captured how
extreme the perceived“threat”of Japan had become as well as the negative viewsof Japan that came along with it. The Emmy-award-winning Frontltine episode entitled

Losing the War with Japan was as critical of Japan as the title suggests（Koughan, 1991）.In
the episode, Japan is described as perhaps the greatest“threat”the United States has
ever faced, with the narrator and those interviewed making the following claims: the U.S.
military was becoming dependent on Japanese technology; one in three U.S. cars wasmade in Japan; Japan had unfairly dominated sunrise industries, such as the flat panel
display industry, through dumping; and Japanese companies were able to prevent any
blowback from the United States through lobbying its lawmakers.
The Frontline episode overwhelmingly represents Japan as homogenous andextremely“unfair.”This is best captured by one businessman appearing in the episode,Al Pace, who ran a manufacturing plant that went out of business. Pace blamed Honda
for his company’s bankruptcy, claiming that Honda went into business with him with
the intention of putting him out of business and replacing the parts he supplied withthose supplied by a Honda subsidiary. In the episode, Pace declared,“No Japanesebusiness is an individual; when you talk to a Japanese businessman, you might aswell be talking to their government, to their finance ministers in banking, to theirtrade representatives, to their industry representatives. You’re dealing with a plan, a
blueprint.”（Koughan, 1991）. Later in the episode, Pace has the last word:“We need a
Desert Storm for American industry.”This Frontline episode appeared toward the endof 1991 after most of the articles presenting the“orthodox”frame had been published
for the year, so it did not have a direct effect on the coverage for that year. Despite

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this, it was effective in capturing the prevailing mood in the United States at that time:the view that Japan was“beating”the United States and threatening to destroy it by“cheating.”
This growing discontent was apparent in how visible the“Japan problem”frame
and the“orthodox”frame were in the contemporary media coverage. In one of the first

Newsweek articles looking at Japan’s disputed past memories, written by Powell（1991）
and entitled“Sweeping History Under the Carpet”with the highlight The Japanese haven’t

confronted their wartime past—or the way it still shapes attitudes toward Japan Inc., the“orthodox”
frame is shown as not only being influenced by the“Japan problem”frame but also
fitting within it. Moreover, it highlights how the“orthodox”frame had reinforced the“Japan problem”frame.
An American ambassador in Asia states flatly that, at best, the attitude toward
Japan is an unstable amalgam of trust and worry.“Nothing hurts the Japanese more
today out here than their singular inability to come to grips with the war,”he says.
“Germany was allowed to reunify because it has gone through that process. Japan
still makes people nervous because it hasn’t.”Japan’s tortured interpretations of the
war also help prop up the suspicions that linger in American union halls and executive
suites that Tokyo has simply harnessed its intrinsic martial instincts and directed them
toward commerce（Powell, 1991）.
The connection between the two frames that is highlighted in the above article isfairly apparent in many articles on the subject of Japan’s disputed past memories. For
example, in the article below, written by Colin Nickerson in 1993, Japan is described as
seeing itself as a“victim”and unable to accept the past, just as it saw itself as the“unfair
victim”of the United States at that time.
	Deep down, World War II still haunts the Japanese far more than most Americans. Possibly

because America has won—and lost—more wars since. More probably because Japan has neverquite come to grips with Taiheiyo Senso, the Great Pacific War.… Today, in the great trade debate
between the United States and Japan, Japanese tend to see themselves almost entirely as victims ofAmerican bullying while reflecting little on the economic damage their aggressive export policies
have caused American workers. (Nickerson, 1993)

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These representations and connections were fairly common up until the declineof Japan’s economy became apparent. Thus, as the“Japan problem”frame reachedsomething of a peak, the“orthodox”frame solidified in the domestic stories written
about Japan’s disputed past memories. However, as Japan’s economy started to decline
and the strength of the connection declined, new issues emerged that supported the“orthodox”framing of Japan and helped that frame maintain its dominant position.
5.3 Independence of“Orthodox”from“Japan Problem”Frame
Japan’
s economy started to falter in the early 1990s, but the continuing perceptionthat it was“unfair,”supported by its perceived“threat”status, did not instantly
disappear. As Gilpin（2003）pointed out,“the revisionist charges against Japan havenot disappeared from the American political agenda and, in fact, resurfaced in the late
1990s”（Gilpin, 2003, p. 300）. However, before Japan’s supposed“threat”could subside
to even a small degree, a new frame emerged along with new issues that reinforced
the“orthodox”frame. In particular, the“comfort women”issue became the mostinternationally recognized and most sympathetically viewed of Japan’s disputed past
memories.
Soh claimed that when the“comfort women”issue emerged in 1992, it wasframed as being a“feminist humanitarianism and sex slave”issue due to the changing
importance of human rights in the post-Cold War world. This argument is also
supported by others, such as Lee（2015）, and Hicks（1994）. It is clear in the coveragethat the response to this issue both fit within and reinforced the“orthodox”frame bymaking human rights violations in general and women’s rights in particular much moresalient issues in the discourse. For example, the proportion of articles in the sample thatused the phrase war crimes doubled since the“comfort women”issue emerged, and overa third of all stories since 1992 mentioned“comfort women,”many of which were notfocused on that issue in particular.
The stories that mentioned or focused on“comfort women”often evoked a great
deal of sympathy as the individual stories of comfort women were told. For example,
Nickerson’s（1993）article in The Boston Globe recounted the experiences of Kang Soonae, a former“comfort woman,”as follows:

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I was dragged from my home at age 14 and cruelly forced into a military brothel,” recounted
Kang Soon Ae, now 67, one of scores of Korean women who recently have broken decades ofshamed silence to describe their ordeals. Kang spoke in Tokyo at an academic forum on World War
II atrocities. “I had to provide sex for 30 Japanese soldiers every day,” she said. “When I cried for
my home, I was beaten. I cried so often that by the end [of the war] every tooth was knocked frommy head. (Nickerson, 1993)
The impact that these stories make and the way they reinforce the“orthodox”
frame cannot be ignored. Similar stories were told prior to this when discussing
other issues, such as the 1937 capture of Nanjing by the Japanese army or the humanexperiments conducted by Unit 731. However, the particular timing of when the stories
discussing“comfort women”were released into the international community coincidedwith a wave of enthusiasm regarding the promotion of human rights. Rape was now
being viewed as a war crime and not just a part of war. This change in perceptions
gave these stories a salience that they would not have had if they had emerged in an
earlier period. However, the“comfort women”issue alone cannot be viewed as solely
responsible for the continuation of the“orthodox”frame.
After the influence of the“Japan problem”frame began to wane in the mid-1990s,
Japan’
s disputed past memories continued to receive more interest domestically, withother significant spikes after 1991. Such large spikes in U.S. coverage predominantly
presented Japan’s disputed past memories in an“orthodox”frame and occurred in
1995, 1998, and 1999. The continuation of the“orthodox”frame after the decline insignificance of the“Japan problem”frame shows how persistent frames are. However,
the recurrence of issues that kept related stories in the news as well as a number ofsignificant events allowed for the“orthodox”frame to solidify its dominant position.
Some of the events that had a significant impact will now be discussed in detail.
Focusing first on 1995, it is not surprising that there would be, as in 1991, a peak indomestic coverage since it was the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII. This opened
up the possibility of drawing connections between Japan’s disputed war memories
in Asia and in the United States. However, this alone could not explain the spike incoverage. Rather, it was mostly due to domestic stories that could be linked to Japan’sdisputed past memories. In particular, the 1995 dispute over the Enola Gay exhibit atFRAMING JAPAN’S DISPUTED PAST MEMORIES IN THE U.S.

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the Smithsonian Museum made the issue of Japan’s—and the United States’—pastmemories salient in a way that they would not otherwise have been. There were also
a number of events that kept Japan’s disputed past memories in the news, such as
Murayama’s statement and revisionist statements of conservative politicians in Japan.
On the other hand, 1998 saw a somewhat unexpected jump in the number ofstories written, rivaling even 1991. This can be linked partially to the publishing of Iris
Chang’
s book, The Rape of Nanking—the forgotten holocaust of World War II, which stimulated
a lot of discussion within the United States. That year also saw a large number ofissues related to Japan’s disputed past memories which kept them in the news, such as
Akihito’s visit to the United Kingdom, the apology to Tony Blair, the written apology
to Kim Dae-jung, and the failure of Jiang Zemin to receive a written apology. However,
it is still surprising that there would be so much domestically produced coverage,
particularly“orthodox”coverage since there was little that could be linked directly to
the United States occurring that year. This change points to a broadening acceptanceof the“orthodox”frame and to the development of interest in Japan’s disputed past
memories.
Like 1998, 1999 saw some discussion of The Rape of Nanking. That year, thediscussion mostly revolved around the fact that the book was not being released inJapan. There were also a number of books written on Japan and Japanese disputed
historical memories as academic interest was growing. Another incident that gainedsome attention was the Japanese government’s refusal to provide the records of Unit
731 veterans to the U.S. Department of Justice. However, there was once again little
that linked the stories to particular domestic interests, again suggesting that interest in
the subject had increased along with the acceptance of the“orthodox”frame.
It is also worth mentioning that there were large spikes in the number and ratioof stories in these years that emerged from the United States in line with the“orthodox”
frame; however, the number of stories from countries outside Japan and the UnitedStates remained rather flat. This suggests minimal influence from other Asian countries
on how the stories were framed. The total number of stories related to Japan’s disputed
past memories that were produced outside the United States and Japan only amounted
to 15% in the 1990s, down from 16% in the 1980s. On the other hand, the percentage
of stories written in the United States had risen from 19% in the 1980s to 29% in the

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1990s. This increase in the number of stories being produced in the United States was
also accompanied by much more in-depth stories being written in the 1990s.
However, this still does not explain the increase in the coverage inside Japan. Thiscan be explained fairly simply as a reaction to news events in Asia and by the linkageof these recurring events that maintained the“orthodox”frame and increased theamount of coverage in line with it. That is why the years with the most coverage fromJapan are the ones in which the most events related to Japan’s disputed past memories
occurred; in those years, prior events relating to Japan’s disputed past memories
were often cited in articles to give them more impact. Of course, the impact of theincreased interest in this topic within the United States cannot be ignored; this certainly
influenced the amount of coverage the topic received from foreign correspondents inJapan as well.
Looking at the more recent years of 2014 and 2015, the number of stories emerging
from outside the United States and Japan had greatly increased. This is likely due tothe increasing interest in other countries, in particular China, as its economy rises.
The articles from the United States, China, and South Korea show a predominantly“orthodox”frame, but American articles originating in Japan are no longer dominatedby the“orthodox”frame. This decline in the“orthodox”frame is likely due to theway in which the U.S. foreign correspondent system has changed. Since the late 1990s,
more journalists have been staying long term within Japan, allowing them to develop
extensive networks and strong Japanese skills that were not obtainable under the oldstyle of journalism（Herbert, 2001）. A similar drop off can be seen at the end of the
1990s in the ratio of stories that present the“orthodox”frame coming out of Japan.
To summarize, it is clear that even though the“Japan problem”view of Japan
still exists, it is not as prevalent as it once was. However, the“orthodox”frame hascontinued to dominate in domestically produced U.S. media. One of the main reasons the“Japan problem”frame waned is that Japan’s economy slowed down and its perceived“threat”was overtaken by more pressing issues, such as China’s economic“threat”
and the“threat”of global terrorism. Nevertheless, certain perceptions inherent in the“Japan problem”frame still exist today. The“orthodox”frame, on the other hand, hasmanaged to persist, kept alive by repeated incidents and new frames that have allowed
for a continuation of the narrative as well as a lack of any new narrative that can neatly

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supplant it. Additionally, the“orthodox”frame fits well within the perception that Japanis“unfair,”which appears to be the most persistent holdover of the“Japan problem”
frame, as U.S. President Donald Trump demonstrated so well14. The next section willsummarize this paper and clarify that the coverage in the United States was distinct
and did not merely follow the coverage in Japan.
Chapter 6 ―Conclusion
To summarize, using a framing analysis to examine the discourse surrounding
Japan’
s disputed past memories, the present study has shown how the“Japan problem”
frame, which was established in reaction to economic disputes, affected the formation ofthe“orthodox”frame that shapes the discourse on Japan’s disputed past memories.
In this process in which one frame influences the other, two elements areimportant. First, the“Japan problem”frame was established in the 1980s, before the“orthodox”frame around Japan’s disputed past memories was established in the early
1990s; hence, it was natural for the former to influence the latter. Second, the“Japanproblem”frame entails a general image of Japan and Japanese people; therefore, as themore general frame, it would of necessity influence the frame that affected discourse on
issues regarding the nation.
However, the fact that the previous and more general frame affected the formationof the following and narrower frame does not mean that the later one had to be
influenced by the earlier one after its establishment. Because of the Japanese economic
recession after the 1990s, there was a decrease in the number of reports in the U.S.
media criticizing Japan in line with the“Japan problem”frame. However, even while
the“Japan problem”frame waned, the“orthodox”frame, which shapes the discourse
on Japan’s disputed past memories, was maintained. One of the reasons was the impact
of newly emerging historical issues regarding human rights, such as“comfort women”
issues. With the emergence of such issues, controversies around Japan’s disputed past
memories began to be framed not simply as Japan-related but also as tied into universal
human rights. As a result, the“orthodox”frame enjoyed a degree of independence fromthe image of Japan itself.
However, a more convincing reason for the persistence of the“orthodox”frame

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may be the persistence of cognitive frames themselves. As Karla and Joseph（2010）
mentioned, once cognitive frames about an issue are established, people tend tounderstand the changing of the environment around the issue in accordance withthose established cognitive frames. Therefore, changing elements that do not fit into
the cognitive frames are unconsciously overlooked, allowing the cognitive frames to bepreserved.
Accordingly, the situation with regard to today’s international discourse about
Japan’
s disputed past memories is a typical product of the persistence of cognitive
frames. However, the cognitive frame in question was established in the early 1990s,
more than a quarter century ago, in a very different international situation. Not only
Japan but also international society has experienced tectonic shifts during those years.
However, the United States and other international media have been satisfied to simply
echo arguments appropriate to past situations with little revision to accommodatechanges over time.
Of course, it is not within the scope of this paper to pass judgment on thesincerity or insincerity of Japanese efforts to apologize. The point made here is thatthe international media have always received Japanese apologies in the same way.
As can be easily seen through the comparison of the Murayama Statement and the
Abe Statement, each has its own distinct background and intentions; hence, in could
be expected that the media would interpret the different apologies differently basedon their own merits. In doing so, the international media could support and stimulate
the efforts of those Japanese leaders who sincerely want to deliver apologies from thebottom of their hearts, as Murayama did. Through the kind of international pressurethat the Japanese term gaiatsu, the international media has a unique influence on Japan（Penpel, 1999）that they might use to play a more positive role in assisting Japanand the Japanese government in offering sincere apologies. However, thus far, theinternational media has been content with the“orthodox”frame and viewed such
efforts inside Japan with suspicion. Greater progress might be made, however, if themedia would examine more scrupulously their own cognitive biases.

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Notes

1 On the reliability of media databases such as Lexis and/or ProQuest, please see Entman（2008）,Entman（2010）,Inoue and Patterson（2007）,and Smith, N. W. and Joffe, H.（2008）.
2 Some of the phrases searched for included: Japan and Yasukuni; Japan and Unit 731; textbook
and Japan and history;“Prisoners of war”and Japan; Nanjing and war and Japan; Nanking
and war and Japan; Japan and apology and war; Japan and“comfort women”; Japanese andYasukuni; Japanese and Unit 731; textbook and Japanese and history;“Prisoners of war”andJapanese; Nanjing and war and Japanese; Nanking and war and Japanese; Japanese and apology
and war; and Japanese and“comfort women”.
3 We also see some shifts in 1982. However, most of the articles in that year were short anddid not include messages regarding the“orthodox”frame; hence, we excluded that year’sarticles from the analysis in this paper. See Figure 1.1.
4 One typical example of this can be seen in Susan Chira’s（1988）article, in which she quoted
Ienaga Saburo in 1988 as stating,“There is the inclination in teaching children to avoid the badsides, and there isn’t a willingness to learn a lesson from past mistakes.”
5 According to an interview with an anonymous Western journalist in Tokyo（March, 2017）.
The short length of journalists’stays was also confirmed by looking at how long journalists
reporting for The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe stayed in Japan during
the 1980s and 1990s.  
6 The Asahi Shimbun accounted for 74% of all references to Japanese newspapers in the sample
from 1980 to 1989 and 57% from 1990 to 1999. If the references to Kyodo are accounted for, itchanges to 65% from 1980 to 1989 and 50% from 1990 to 1999. The Mainichi Shimbun accounted
for 17% of all references to Japanese newspapers in the sample from 1980 to 1989 and 24%
from 1990 to 1999. If the references to Kyodo are accounted for, it changes to 15% from 1980 to
1989 and 21% from 1990 to 1999. Also, when executing general article searches through lexis.
com, the Asahi Shimbun is referenced more than any other Japanese newspaper.  
7 It is also worth noting that the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Sankei Shimbun were not as nationalistic
at the time as they are now.
8 See also Dower（1986）.
9 We also can see the impact of the frame, for example, in the speeches of Donald Trump. See
Soble and Bradsher（2016）.
10 However, it should also be noted that there were a lot of academic works that stood in
opposition to the“Japan problem”frame, such as Hamamoto（1994）.
11 On the contribution of the United States to the Japanese economic recovery, see Reischauer（1988）and Gordon（2009）.

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12 For example, Pat Choate（1990）launched a scathing attack on Packard and what he andothers have called the“Chrysanthemum Club.”He claimed,“While most of them hold theirviews honestly, almost all are stroked, supported, and promoted by the Japanese, who recognize
the enormous value of having earnest American defenders who will make Japan’s case.”13 Frontline is a highly respected documentary series that first aired on PBS in 1983 andcontinues even today.
14 Please see the previous reference to Trump’s views on Japan.