The 90th General Meeting of the English Literary Society of JapanMay 19, 2018 (Tokyo Woman’s Christian University)

In Search of the Origins of Merge, Labeling (, and the Lexicon) in the
Evolution of the Faculty of Language: A Neo-Lennebergian Approach
Koji Hoshi
Keio University
khoshi@a7.keio.jp
1. Introduction
Concerning the nature of the faculty of language (FL), Hornstein (2009: 4)
remarks that:[I]t is of recent evolutionary vintage. A common assumption is that language arose in
humans in roughly the last 50,000―100,000 years. This is very rapid in evolutionary terms. I
suggest the following picture: FL is the product of (at most) one (or two) evolutionary
innovations which, when combined with cognitive resources available before the changes
that led to language, delivers FL.1 (the emphasis by K.H.)(1) Darwin’s Problem/Wallace’s Problem:
How did the faculty of language (FL) emerge in the spieces?
(cf. Boeckx 2009, Hornstein 2009, Chomsky 2010, Bickerton 2014,
Berwick & Chomsky 2016)(2) Chomsky’s Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT):
SMT: Merge + Interfaces = Language(Chomsky 2010: 52)
To be more specific and correct:(3) Decomposition of SMT:
Merge + “atomic conceptual elements” (of the lexicon) + labeling + (mappings to)the interfaces with the C-I system and the SM system = (the capacity for) humanlanguage (= FL)
Chomsky (2005: 4) expresses the following view (see also Bickerton 2007 forvirtually the same view):“… at least two basic problems arise when we consider the origins of the faculty oflanguage and its role in the sudden emergence of the human intellectual capacity: first,
the core semantics of minimal meaning-bearing elements, including the simplest ofthem; and second, the principles that allow infinite combinations of symbols,
1

Berwick & Chomsky (2016) speculate that the faculty of language emerged between 200, 000 and 60, 000
years ago in light of recent archaeological/paleoanthropological evidence. Ike-uchi (2016) makes a more
specific claim that the faculty of language emerged as early as 130,000 to 150,000 years ago on the basis ofrecent archaeological/paleoanthropological and genetic evidence.

1hierarchically organized, which provide the means for use of language in its many
aspects.” (the emphasis by K.H.)

Also, Chomsky et al. (to appear: 19) clearly state that “M[erge] and the inventoryof lexical atoms it operates over must be part of UG and as such represent evolutionary
innovations specific to the human linguistic mind.”(4) The Biolinguistic Questions on the Evolution of the FL to Be Addressed:(i) What is the origin of Merge?
(ii) What is the origin of the requirement of labeling?
(iii) What is the origin of the “atomic conceptual elements” of the lexicon?
*In terms of evolutionary adequacy (Fujita 2009) or evolvability (Bolhuis et al. 2014,
Berwick & Chomsky 2016), it would be more interesting if all the three in (i)-(iii) aresomehow systematically interrelated in the evolution of FL. The main purpose of thispaper is to suggest a possibility that this might be indeed the case.
2. On the Origin of Merge
2.1. Previous Proposals
2.1.1. No Precursor to Merge (Chomsky 2004, 2005, 2011 inter alia.)
Chomsky has been consistently holding the view that Merge emerged as a resultof slight re-wiring of the brain presumably due to some small genetic mutation without
any obvious precursor (Chomsky 2004, 2005, 2011 inter alia.) See Berwick & Chomsky
2016 for a concrete proposal to the effect that the emergence of the whole neural fiber“ring” connecting the dorsal and ventral pathways in the neocortex is responsible forthe rise of Merge). See also Hickok & Poeppel (2007) and Friederici (2017a,b) inter alia.
for more on the dorsal and ventral pathways.
Å Fujita’s (2012, 2014) criticism: To the extent that a biological trait, such as thefaculty of language, is a descent with modification, Merge should have its evolutionary
precursor, though.
I agree with Fujita’s (ibid.) point and at the same time I agree in part with
Chomsky (ibid.) in thinking that there must have been some genetic mutation forgiving rise to Merge.
2.1.2. Motor Control Origin of Merge (Fujita 2014, 2016 inter alia.)
Fujita (2014, 2016 inter alia.) put forth the motor control origin hypothesis ofMerge on the basis of Greenfield’s (1991, 1998) theory of Action Grammar (Action
Merge in his term).
(8)a. Pairing Strategy: Pa, Pb => (Pb (Pa))
b. Pot Strategy: Pa, Pb, Pc => Pa, (Pc (Pb)) => (Pc (Pb (Pa)))2

c. Subassembly Strategy: Pa, Pb, Pc => (Pb (Pa)), Pc => (Pc (Pb (Pa)))
Furthermore, Fujita (2014, 2016) notes that chimpanzees’ sequential action forcracking nuts with a stone anvil and a stone hammer can be described by means ofMerge as follows:(9)a. Merge (NUT, ANVIL) => {NUT, ANVIL}
b. Merge (HAMMER, {NUT, ANVIL})=> { HAMMER, {NUT, ANVIL}}

2.1.3. Possession Origin of Merge (Ike-uchi 2010)
Ike-uchi (2010), on the other hand, put forth the hypothesis of the possession
origin of Merge, which claims that the precursor to Merge is the action of physicalpossession and management of valuables and its underlying concept of possession andmental manipulation. In this hypothesis, it is assumed that valuables were grouped
into sets with labels with a hierarchical structure. Observe (10).
(10) a. {{v1, v2, v3} = A’s}b. {{{{v1, v2, v3} = A’s}, {{v4} = W’s}} = A’s}c. {{{{{{v1, v2, v3} = A’s}, {{v4} = W’s}} = A’s}, {{v5, v6} = B’s}} = A’s}
2.2. Some Considerations on the Motor Control Origin Hypothesis and thePossession Origin Hypothesis
2.3. New Proposal: A Neo-Lennebergian Approach
2.3.1. Lenneberg (1967)
Lenneberg (1967: 374) makes the following conjecture on the relation between
categorization and the cognitive function underlying language in the context of
evolution of language.
(11) Lenneberg’s Conjecture on the Evolution of the Capacity for Language“The cognitive function underlying language consists of an adaptation of a ubiquitous
process (among vertebrates) of categorization and extraction of similarities. The
perception and production of language may be reduced on all levels to categorization
processes, including the subsuming of narrow categories under more comprehensive ones
and the subdivision of comprehensive categories into more specific ones. The extractionof similarities does not only operate upon physical stimuli but also upon categories ofunderlying structural schemata.” (p.374) (the emphasis by K.H.)“This capacity [= the capacity for language--- K.H.] may be due to structural innovations
on a molecular level.” (p.72)(12) Neo-Lennebergian thesis on the biological evolution of the FL:
In the course of evolution of language, Merge, labeling and the lexicon in human3language all derived from categorization with a certain modification inconnection with the C-I system.
2.3.2. Comparison between Merge and Categorization(13) Merge (X, Y) = {X, Y} ( X, Y is either a lexical item or a SO already formed byMerge) (Chomsky 2013a, 2015 inter alia.)(14) Differentiation & Interrelation: Two Aspects of Categorization (Lenneberg 1967)
Differentiation
Categorization
Interrelation
C3

C1

C2

Syntax: Phrase-structure rules Å differentiation
Transformational rules Å differentiation & interrelation(cf. Chomsky’s (1965) Standard Theory)=============================================================================
If κ is a label, it can be taken as a sort of characteristic function that applies to any
element indicated by x that either “satisfies” the label or not, as defined as (15):
1 if x ∊ κ(15) κ(x) =0 if x ∉ κ
I will assume that Categorize as the operation of categorization is an n-ary unordered
set-formation under a particular label specified by κ as follows (see Tallerman 2009 forthe point that labeling is significant for categorization):(16) Categorizeκ(x1, …, xn) = {x1, …, xn} (xi ∊ κ)
(xi is a target element for categorization and κ is a label, where the n-ary sequencein the set uniformly contains either a series of entities or a series of sets as thevalue of x)
It is to be noted that the operation Categorize can target either n-ary of entities or n-ary
of sets already constructed by Categorize.
(17) Category Formation Patterns with Merge and Interrelational Categorization:[i] Merge:a binay unordered set is formed Æ the label is determinedÆ a new category is formed
4

[ii] Interrelational Categorization:
the label is determined Æ an n-ary unordered set is formed
Æ a new category is formed(cf. Cohen & Lefebvre (2005) for detailed overview and discussion of
categorization in a variety of cognitive domains.)(18) Crucial Properties of Merge and Interrelational Categorization (Int.Cat):(The differences are in red and the similarities are in black.)
Merge

Int.Cat(a) input cardinality

binary/dyadic

n-ary/n-adic(b) output cardinality

unary

unary

(c) output set

unordered set

unordered set(d) labelingunlabeledlabeled(e) recursivity

recursiverecursive(f) external/internal

Bothonly external

availability
Under this scenario, it is conceived that the well-known characteristic propertiesof Merge listed in (18) was derived from interrelational categorization as follows:[i] unordered set-formation: inherited from interrelational categorization[ii] recursivity: inherited from interrelational categorization. Note, however, therecursivity in Merge is completely unrestricted, while the recursivity ininterrelational categorization is restricted by availability of labels for categorization.
[iii] output singularity and input binarity: the former stems from the output singularity
of interrelational categorization, but the latter does not follow from it per se (notethe n-ary input nature of interrelational categorization). While the boundary
condition that n > 1 should come from the very nature of interrelational
categorization (you need more than one element for interrelation in the first place),
the binarity n = 2 should be due to computational minimality in the third factor(Chomsky 2008), which was presumably imposed upon Merge, when it wasderived from categorization in evolution. The mutation in question might not havenecessarily involve the coding DNA, but might well have been related to thenon-coding DNA, which regulates expressions of the coding DNA (see Berwick &Chomsky 2016 and references cited therein).
[iv] label-free nature & internal option: I will point out later on a possibility that a
particular change in the nature of interrelational categorization would have
led to the label-free nature of Merge, opening up a novel potential for the5

“internal” option in Merge.
2.3.3.

Re-capturing

Lenneberg’s

Conjecture

from

the

Perspectiveof

Minimalism.
(19)

a. On the Origins of Merge and the Necessity of Labeling:
In the course of language evolution, Merge emerged based on the C-I system
by reversing the order of labeling and set-formation in the interrelating
aspect of categorization, due to the effect of a small genetic mutation alongwith the imposition of binarity and minimal search for identification of labelsby the third factor principle of minimal computation (MC).
b. On the Origin of (the Initial State of) the Lexicon:
In the course of language evolution, atomic conceptual elements (gradually)
emerged based on the C-I system by differentiating aspect of categorization
along the line of the Disintegration Hypothesis (Fujita & Fujita 2016, Fujita et
al. forthcoming), presumably due to the increase of cognitive power ofdifferentiation and distancing from the immediate, direct sensory-perceptual
environmental influence (Hurford 2007, Bouchard 2013). With respect to theemergence of the atomic conceptual elements in the human lexicon, it does
not seem to be realistic to assume sudden appearances in the event of theevolution of the FL, unlike Merge. Given that those elements are input
elements for Merge, they should have evolved prior to the emergence ofMerge (Chomsky 2010, 2012a,b, Berwick & Chomsky 2016. See also Bickerton2007).
Criticizing Miyagawa et al.’s (2013) Integration Hypothesis (IH) (see also

Miyagawa et al. 2014, Nóbrega and Miyagawa 2015, Miyagawa 2017), Fujita & Fujita(2016) and Fujita et al. (forthcoming) propose an alternative called Disintegration
Hypothesis (DH) (see also Fujita 2016, Narita et al. 2014 and Tallerman 2017 for a
critique of the IH).
(20) The Disintegration Hypothesis (DH) (Fujita & Fujita 2016, Fujita et al.
forthcoming):
a. In animal communication,E(xpressive) and L(exical) systems

are not separated.
b. Human language came into existence by the disintegration
into E and L systems.
c. This disintegration enabled human language to possess the creativity
independent of mind-external materials.
(adapted from (26) in Fujita et al. forthcoming,
6

with the translation by K.H.)
They assert that the disintegrated two systems have evolved into functional categories
and lexical categories (or root elements) in the biological evolution in the hominin
lineage. I agree with this view and will incorporate this idea later in section 4.
2.3.4. How Would Interrelational Categorization Have Yielded Merge and How
Would It Have Changed the Nature of Categorization in Humans: A
Speculation
Since the cognitive ability of categorization continue to exist in humans as well,even if Merge was derived from categorization, the latter function must be somehow
preserved in the event of evolution of the FL.
Bouchard (2013: 53) notes the following point:“Biological systems evolve through a mix of introducing redundant duplication in theorganism’s structure and losing bits of structure. Duplication provides a safety net forthe system, but it also provides an opportunity for change. A gene optimized for aparticular function may remain stable, but its copy may undergo random variations
which turn out to be advantageous for adaptation and give rise to a new function (Gould& Lewontin 1979, Dawkins 1986, Sterelny et al. 1996, Sterelny 2001, to name but a few).”(21) A Speculation on the Relevant Change:
Some genetic change via duplication (in either the coding or the non-coding
DNA?) occurred in our hominin ancestor, which resulted in reversing the orderingof labeling and set-formation in interrelational categorization with involvement of
the third factor principle(s), leading to creating a re-wired new neural circuitry inthe human brain.
3. The Architecture of the Faculty of Language Reconsidered
3.1. Standard Model of the Architecture of the Faculty of Language (FL) in the
Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995 et seq.).
(22) Standard Model of the Architecture of the Faculty of Language (FL) in the
Minimalist Program2

2

See Chomsky et al. (2002) proposed to divide the whole system of language-related cognitivecompetence into two sub-systems called the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN) and thefaculty of language in the broad sense (FLB) (see also Fitch et al. 2005 for further clarifications on
the distinction.)7

NS w/SM System

C-I System

Merge

SM Interface

C-I Interface& Mapping& Mapping

3.2. An Alternative View of the Architecture of the FL
3.2.1. Architecture of the Precursor for the Language Faculty in Animal/Non-human Primate
Cognition and Behavior
With respect to animal communication systems, Chomsky (2013a: 44) states asfollows, citing Gallistel (1990):[I]t appears to be the case that animal communication systems are based on a
one-one relation between mind/brain processes and “an aspect of the environment
to which these processes adapt the animal behavior.”(23) The Architecture of the Precursor to the Faculty of Language
Proto SM System

Proto C-I System
Old Interface(possibly w/ a prior phonological systemfor vocal learning animals)

Bouchard (2013)(24) Level 1: the level of the mapping from reality to the mental processes involved insensory perception (hearing, vision, smell, touch, taste).
Level 2: the level of the mapping from sensory perception to categorization.
(= close to Hurford’s (2007) notion of proto-concepts, classes of input
stimuli.)
Level 3: the level of the mapping from categorization to the formation of concepts,
being “abstracted from any sensory input or immediacy.”
See Chomsky (2013b) for recent discussion on the non-referential nature of wordsof human language in a philosophical context.

8

(25) The New Proposal on the Architecture of the FL
C-I Interface

CS

Human CI System

Merge &WS
SM Interface

Old Interface3

Human SM System

4. Further Biolinguistic Considerations
4.1. Chomsky’s (2013a, 2015) Analysis Reconsidered(26) Chomsky’s (2013a, 2015) Labeling Algorithm and Its Miscellaneous Nature of
the Labeling System(i) {H, XP} Î Label of {H, XP} is H.
(ii) {<XP>, YP} (without agreement; either XP or YP in the set will undergo IM) Î Labelof {<XP>, YP} is Y.
(iii) {XP, YP} (with agreement between X(P) and Y(P) in the set) Î Label of {XP, YP} is<φ, φ> or <Q, Q>, depending on the agreement relation.
(i) illustrates cases of categorial labels of the head elements such as v, n, a, p, D, T,
C in the head-complement structure.
(ii) illustrates the cases of the categorial labels for the subject-predicate
construction {<DP/nP>, vP} (in English) and for the intermediate landing-site{Wh-DP/nP, CP} of successive-cyclic wh-movement.
(iii) illustrates the cases of the non-categorial labels for the final landing-site{Wh-DP/nP, CP} of successive-cyclic wh-movement.
Å From the perspective of symmetry, it seems rather undesirable to havemiscellaneous types of labels for interpretation of syntactic objects (SOs) at the C-I and
SM interfaces in Chomsky’s (2013a, 2015) labeling algorithm. This “disjunctive” state ofaffairs in labeling of SOs suggests that the statuses of “categorial labels” and“agreement-related labels” need to be re-examined from the perspective ofminimalism.

3

I assume that the neural connection realizing the “old interface” Interface 1 between the C-I system andthe SM system still remains in the modern human brain, given the fact that Broca’s aphasics display afinite-state linear grammatical behavior, due to the operational unavailability of Merge (Fujita 2016).

94.2. The Revision of the Notion of Label(ing)
4.2.1. Anti-lexicalism(27). . . vP
…

v’
v

√EATP

CAUSE
√EAT

…

eat [i:t] (Å eat as a “word”
with its morpho-phonological realization)(see Marantz 1997, Harley & Noyer 2000, Embick & Noyer 2007, Embick & Marantz
2008, Borer 2005a,b, 2013, 2017, Harley 2014 inter alia.)
The important biolinguistic question to be posed is this: are syntactic labels suchas verbal, nominal, and adjectival, etc. biologically primitive as has been standardly
assumed in the literature?
In fact, as Chomsky (2001) himself remarks, from the perspective of minimalism,
it would be more desirable if we could eliminate language-specific notions such as
grammatical categorial features from linguistic theory. To the extent that functional
elements such as n, v, a, p virtually encode such categorial information, they should be
eliminated from the theory of the FL as well in terms of minimalist desideratum.
Furthermore, Leivada (2017) argues that grammatical categories such as nounand verb (and hence those categorial features as well) do not exist, following the leadin Lenneberg’s (1967, 1975) claim that syntactic categories of syntactic objects aredefinable only contextually, and on the basis of Barner & Bale’s (2002) neurolinguistic
evidence that case studies of apparently category-specific impairments in aphasia andother pathological phenotypes do not demonstrate any relevance of categorial features
per se, favoring “lexical underspecification.”
Baker (2003: 294): “the lexical category distinctions correspond not so much toontological distinctions in the kinds of things that are out there in the world, but rather
to the different perspectives we can take on those things, the different ways our
linguistic capacities give us of describing them.”
Panagiotidis (2011, 2015) characterizes categorizers such as n and v as“perspective”-providing elements (sortal and entending-into-time perspectives,
respectively) for typing the root materials in their complement, postulating categorial
10

features like [N] and [V] in n and v.
(28) Labeling by Minimal Search of a Relevant Function as a Head at the C-I
Interface:
At the C-I interface, if minimal search of a syntactic object (SO) finds a relevant
function F specified by a head H, it is counted as serving the purpose ofdetermining the label of the SO.
(29) The Relevant Mappings via Function-application in the “Lexical Domain”:
Following, extending and modifying Baker’s (2003) and Panagiotidis’s (2011,2015) ideas, I propose the following mappings in the lexical domain.
The function F’s in the lexical domain as atomic perspective conceptsi) F[entity-concept] (root-concept √R) = “nominal”ii) F[eventuality-concept] (root-concept √R) = “verbal”iii) F[property-concept] (root-concept √R) = “adjectival”iv) F[temporal/spatial/causal relation-concept] (root concept √R) = “adpositional”
e.g.) F[entity-concept] (√BOOK) = book(n) “book as a nominal”(30) The Relevant Mappings via Function-application in the “Functional Domain”:i) F[(definite/indefinite-concept] (“nominal SO”) = “definite/indefinite nominal SO”ii) F[finite/non-finite tense-concept] (“eventuality SO”) = “finite/non-finite eventuality SO”iii) F[force-concept] (“finite/non-finite eventuality SO”) = “finite/non-finite propositional SO
with a force”
4.3. Other Implications
4.3.1. Chomsky (2013a, 2015)
4.3.2. Saito (2014, 2016)
4.3.3. Oku (2017)

5. Summary & Conclusion(31) Answers to the Biolinguistic Questions in (4)Formation of Atomic Conceptual Units
Proto-categorization

Merge
Labeling

Æ Human-unique categorization was enabled by formation of atomic conceptual
units, emergence of Merge & human-unique labeling.
(32) The Drastic Two Changes of the Nature of Labels of Categorization in Evolution(33) Methodological Implication
Others:(34) Human Language Has Functions All the Way Up and All the Way Down!
11

Merge is a “super-meta” binary recursive function that takes two functions as its
arguments, generating SOs, which are “functions” themselves.
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