108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS

THE THREATS POSED BY TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES AND
ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPSFrank J. Marine*
I. INTRODUCTION
This conference is especially importantand timely because in the 1990s, theproblems to the world community posed bytransnational crimes and organized crimegroups have increased significantly and arelikely to continue to increase in the near
future. There are several principal reasonsthat account for this unfortunate increasein transnational and organized crime
activities.
First, the increased volume of trade
among nations, which of course has greatly
benefited legitimate business interests, hasalso generated greater opportunities forcriminals to criminally exploit suchbusiness and trade.
Second, the decrease in customs andother regulatory barriers to international
travel and business has also had theunintended effect of aiding criminals
engaged in smuggling of narcotics andother contraband.
Third, similarly, the proliferation of airtransportation connections and the easingof immigration, visa and travel restrictions
in many counties to promote legitimate
interests has also facilitated criminal
activity and the movement of criminals
across international borders.
Fourth, modern advanced
telecommunications and information
systems that are used in legitimate* Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section, Criminal Division, U. S. Department ofJustice, United States.

international commercial activity can also
be used by criminal networks to improvetheir own communications and to quickly
carry out criminal transactions, especiallymoney laundering.
For example, through the use ofcomputers, international criminals have an
unprecedented capability to obtain,
process, and protect information andsidestep law enforcement investigations.
They can use the interactive capabilities
of advanced computers andtelecommunications systems to plot
marketing strategies for drugs and otherillicit commodities, find the most efficientroutes and methods for smuggling andmoving money, and create false trails forlaw enforcement or banking security. The
use of computers has enabled Colombian
drug traffickers in particular to keep more
flexible and secure records of transactions
and money laundering activities.
International criminals take advantage ofthe speed and magnitude of financialtransactions and the fact that there are few
safeguards to prevent abuse of the system
to move large amounts of money without
scrutiny.
Fifth, international criminals are
becoming more sophisticated in theiroperations, using modern businesstechniques and technology to facilitate
their criminal activities and to thwart law
enforcement efforts. Such organizations
also employ individuals with specificexpertise to facilitate their criminal
activities, including transportation
specialists, computer experts, financial
experts to launder their money and manage

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
business investments, and attorneys toidentify loopholes in laws and regulations
that enable criminal networks to laundermoney and establish front corporations andbusinesses.
Sixth, unfortunately, consumption ofillegal drugs has increased in somecountries leading to greater problems posedby trafficking in illegal narcotics.
Seventh, the breakup of the Soviet Union
in 1991 and the related break up of theSoviet Bloc has led to the development ofmany organized crime groups that haverecently engaged in substantial criminal
activities, especially effecting the European
community and the United States.
Eighth, the new governments that haveemerged from the former Soviet Bloc aremaking significant advances, but still have
not yet had enough time to develop andimplement laws, regulations and businesspractices to adequately address the
problems of crime and public corruption
posed by organized crime groups.
In sum, these and other recent
developments and trends have contributed
to growing transnational criminal activities
and the expansion of organized crimegroups. The cost to the world community
caused by organized crime groups andtransnational crimes includes not only lossof billions of dollars, lose of life and physicalinjuries, but also entails substantial public
corruption. The combined effect of theseadverse consequences tends to undermine
the security and stability of governments
themselves. Indeed, the adverse
consequences of such criminal activities
can not be understated. It is therefore
essential that the international community
continue to work together closely to addressthese very serious problems facing us all.

26

II. DEFINITIONS
It is important to note that the conceptsof transnational crimes and organizedcrime are different and distinct, eventhough they are interrelated and overlap.
As I use the term, “transnational crimes”
refers to serious crimes that either
significantly affect more than one country
or are carried out across national borders
and thus involve criminal activity in morethan one country.
As I use the term “organized crime”, I
am not referring to a particular offense orcrime. Indeed, in the United States there
is no criminal offense designated“organized crime”; as in the United States
it is not a crime “per se” merely to be amember of an organized crime group. Thisis so because in the United States criminal
offenses are defined by the specific conductthat is made criminal, and not by thenature of the group that is committing theoffense. Therefore, it is a crime for anyone
to commit conduct that is made criminal
regardless of whether the offender is or is
not a member of an organized crime group.
M o r e o v e r, U n i t e d S t a t e s l a w
enforcement does not use any particularrigid definition of “organized crime”.
Rather, United States law enforcement
uses an extended list of criteria or
attributes that typically are shared byorganized crime groups. Thus, organizedcrime groups possess certain
characteristics which include but are notlimited to the following :(1) The groups have a hierarchicalstructure and continue over an
extended period of time and are selfperpetuating. That is, theorganization continues its illegal
affairs even after the death or
imprisonment of some of its leaders

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
and members.
(2) T h e i r i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s a r e
conspiratorial.
(3) In at least part of their activities, they
commit or threaten to commit acts ofviolence or other acts which are likely
to intimidate.
(4) They conduct their activities in amethodical, systematic, or highly
disciplined and secret fashion.
(5) They insulate their leadership fromdirect involvement in illegal activities
by their intricate organizational
structure.
(6) They attempt to gain influence ingovernment, politics, and commerce
through corruption, graft andlegitimate means.
(7) They have economic gain as theirprimary goal not only from patently
illegal enterprises such as drugs,
gambling and loansharking, but also
from such activities as laundering
illegal money through andinvestment in legitimate business.
As you can see by this criteria, UnitedStates law enforcement uses the term“organized crime” to refer to organizedcrime groups that reflect thesecharacteristics, and the term does not referto a particular offense or crime.
I realize that others may define“organized crime” differently and I do notmean to suggest that these criteria are theonly criteria for defining or describing
organized crime. Rather, I am only statingthat these are the criteria that federal law
enforcement uses in the United States.
By way of emphasis, the key attributesof an organized crime group are that thegroup has a hierarchical structure,continues its illegal activities over an
extended period of time, is selfperpetuating, and engages in diversified
criminal activities for profit.
It is also noteworthy that while virtually
all serious and sophisticated criminal
activity involves some degree of“organization”, and some degree of joint
conspiratorial undertaking, suchorganization, in my view, does notnecessarily make such criminal activity“organized crime”. If that were the case,then virtually all serious crimes would beconsidered “organized crime” because
virtually all serious crime involves“organization”.
It bears emphasis that, in my view, theterms “transnational crime” and “organizedcrime” are not synonymous. Althoughorganized crime groups may commit
transnational crimes, organized crimegroups also often engage in criminal
activities that mostly affect the country inwhich they operate with little direct effecto n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . C o n v e r s e l y,transnational crimes are not only
committed by organized crime groups, but
are also committed by offenders who are
not members of recognized crime groups.
I hope that the distinctions I am drawing
between transnational crimes andorganized crime will become clearer as I
discuss these concepts in more detail andillustrate my point by specific examples.
With these definitions in mind, I would
now like to briefly summarize the principaltransnational offenses that in my view
affect the United States and many othercountries. By no means does the list
necessarily contain all transnational
crimes, however, I would like to focus on
the principal ones in my view. Then, I

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
would like to briefly describe the principalorganized crime groups that are operatingin various countries that also have impact
on many countries.

methamphetamine, an illicit drug
associated with particularly violent
aberrant behavior, in their lifetime.
Every day, some 8,600 young try anillegal drug for the first time.

III. TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES
A. Drug Trafficking
The worldwide illicit narcotics industry
is one of the greatest threats to social
stability and welfare in the United States.
In addition to the terrible human cost of
addiction and associated health concernsincluding HIV and AIDS-endured by usersof illicit narcotics, drug abuse has asignificant impact on the social fabric that
affects all Americans. Drug abuse
undermines family cohesion and has aterrible daily and often lifelong effect on
the lives of children across the country.
Drug abuse also promotes antisocial
behavior and disrespect for laws andinstitutions. The drug trade brings with ithigh levels of street crime and violence byaddicts needing to pay for drugs and by
drug groups fighing for turf.
The economic costs to United States
citizens are high—lost productivity at thework place, medical care, spending for drug
rehabilitation and social welfare programs,
and in the financial and personnel
resources required by federal, state, andlocal law enforcement agencies and judicial
and penal systems to deal with drugrelated crimes.
• According to the most recent publicly
available survey data, about 13
million Americans—6.1 percent of thetotal population—used drugs on acasual, monthly, basis in 1996. The
survey data indicates that in 1995
there were approximately 3.3 million
chronic users of cocaine and some
810,000 heroin addicts in the UnitedStates. It is estimated that nearly 5
million Americans have tried28• In 1995, United States citizens spentapproximately $57 billion dollars on
drugs—including $38 billion topurchase cocaine and $10 billion on
heroin from overseas sources. The
economic costs to society are evengreater; in 1990, the total costs ofdrug abuse—including health carecosts, lost productivity, and the costsof crime—were estimated to be $67
billion, of which $46 billion was
related to crime and criminal justice.
• Drug use costs United States citizens
roughly $17.5 billion per year inhealth-related costs, according to a
recent estimate. The annual deathrelated costs of drug abuse accountfor an additional $3.2 billion. At least$6.3 billion of these costs are
estimated to be from AIDS
transmission driven by drug use.
• Drug use has a significant effect onwork place productivity. Drug users
are times more likely to be late forwork, 10 times as likely to be absent,
and five times more likely to fileworker’s compensation claims. They
are responsible for 40 percent of allindustrial fatalities and incur
medical costs three times as high as
their drug-free coworkers.
• There is a strong correlation between
drug abuse and crime. In 20 of 23
cities in 1996 in a program sponsoredby the National Institute of Justice,
more than 60 percent of adult males
arrested for crimes tested positive forat least one drug. In 1995, almost
255,000 people were incarcerated in108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
state prisons and nearly 52,000 infederal prisons for drug offenses,
about 60 percent of federal prison
population was there for drug-related
crimes.
To put it mildly, these costs in money andhuman suffering from use of, andtrafficking in, illegal drugs are deplorable.
There in no doubt that the United States
has a serious problem with the degree ofillegal drug use. Unfortunately, othercountries are also experiencing an increasein illegal drug use. For example, it isestimated that in the Peoples Republic ofChina the number of registered drug
abusers increased between 1990 and 1995
from 70,000 to 520,000. In Pakistan theheroin addict population is estimated tohave grown from virtually none in 1980 totwo million. Likewise, the use of cocaine
and other illicit drugs has substantially
increased in Russia and other countries ofthe former Soviet Bloc since the breakupof the Soviet Union.
This demand for illegal drugs drives the
supply. Regarding the supply, Southeast
Asia remains the greatest source region forheroin in the world, accounting for 60
percent of the world’s production. Burmais the world’s largest producer of illegal
opium and heroin, accounting for
approximately 50 percent of the world’s
illicit production. Laos is also a large
producer of opium and marijuana. Other
countries in Asia are transit routes for illicit
opium and heroin, including Thailand,
Vietnam, Cambodia and the People’s
Republic of China.
Colombia continues to lead the world in
cocaine production. Extensive drug cartels
use Mexico and Central America as staging
or transhipment areas for United Statesbound cocaine, which is smuggled into theUnited States primarily through thesouthwestern border and southeastern
United States.
Colombian drug organizations are
historically familial-based organizations
involved in cocaine trafficking and, to alesser extent, the trafficking of marijuana.
Distribution in the United States is
directed by sophisticated organizedstructured groups. Cocaine wholesale-level
distribution and money laundering
networks comprised of multiple cells
function in a number of major metropolitan
areas. These organizations are fully
equipped with the most up-to-datetechnology, including personal computers,
pagers, and facsimile machines for use in
their daily operations. United States
operations are coordinated on a daily basisby key figures in Colombia. Primary UnitedStates bulk cocaine distribution centers
include southern California, southern
Florida, southern Texas and New York City.
Recent cases indicate that Colombian
drug organizations are increasingly using
gangs operating in Mexico to provide drug
smuggling services. The terrible violence
associated with these drug cartels is wellknown. The violence and corrupting
influence of these drug cartels is sosignificant that they constitute direct
threats to the stability of governments inCentral and South American countries
where they operate.
Recently, Nigerian organized crimegroups have become major suppliers ofheroin to regions in the United States.
Cases that have been prosecuted indicatethat Nigerian drug organizations typicallysmuggle only small quantities of drugs at
a time using thousands of couriers, rather
than smuggling large bulk shipments as
do other drug trafficking organizations.
Illicit drug trafficking clearly poses
formidable problems for the law

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enforcement agencies of the United Statesand other countries. The Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) andthe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)are the principal federal law enforcement
agencies in the United States responsible
for combating illegal drug trafficking. Theirprimary strategy involves the targeting of
the largest or major drug trafficking
enterprises for investigation andprosecution so that the enterprise itself canbe dismantled or disrupted.
In addition to attacking the suppliers ofillicit drugs, it is also imperative to reducethe demand for illicit drugs.
The Director of National Drug Control
Policy in the United States has
implemented a comprehensive five year
strategy designed to reduce the demand forillicit drugs which includes: educational
and advertising programs to educate
children and parents about the harmful
effects of drugs, to persuade people to rejectillegal drug use; and to increase drug
treatment and rehabilitation efforts to help
people refrain from using illegal drugs.
B. Alien Smuggling
Sophisticated alien smuggling networks
traffick in “human cargo”. Alien smuggling
is fast becoming a global problem as
residents of many countries, particularly
Mexico, the Peoples Republic of China,
India, Pakistan and other counties seek
new homes and economic opportunities in
Canada, Japan, the United States, Western
Europe and other countries. According toa United Nations Study, in 1994, the profits
turned from smuggling illegal aliens acrossinternational borders approached $9.5
billion.
The United States is not alone inexperiencing a serious problem with illegal
immigration. In the last two years,
estimates indicate that more than half a30

million illegal immigrants were smuggled
into Western Europe. Japan has also
experienced an increase in illegal
immigration from other Asian countries.
The vast majority of migrants who enterthe United States and other countries
illegally are motivated by economic reasons- they seek jobs and greater economic
opportunity. In some cases, the aliens are
fleeing political persecution or are seeking
greater political freedom in other countries.
Therefore, there are substantial
humanitarian concerns and issues related
to the global problem of alien smuggling.
However, alien smuggling also poses
substantial problems for law enforcementin the United States and elsewhere.
According to the Immigration andNaturalization Service of the United States(hereinafter INS), approximately fivemillion illegal aliens reside in the UnitedStates. By reside, I mean persons who haveremained in the United States for morethan 12 months. Therefore, this five million
does not include many, perhaps hundredsof thousands, of temporary illegal migrants
who may come to the United States to work
for several months and then return to theirhome country, and does not include aliens
who stay a short period of time beyond thelegal limits of their admission. INS
estimates that about 54 percent of these
five million illegal aliens are from Mexico.
Although Mexico by far is the largest
source of illegal aliens in the United States,
other countries such as El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Haiti are also
principal sources of illegal migration in the
United States. Moreover, Central andSouth America are increasingly serving astransit zones for aliens from other areas,
including Asia and Eastern Europe. Alien
smuggling networks and routes have been
established throughout Central America tomove local migrants, as well as illegal

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
aliens from other areas. Tactics used byalien smuggling organizations run the
gamut of all available means oftransportation including large boatloads of
migrants, air travel of a few individuals tolarge groups of alleged tourists, tocommercial buses, trucks and vans.
The smuggling of aliens from thePeople’s Republic of China to the UnitedStates has posed particular problems forUnited States law enforcement. Between
1991 and 1997, the United States Navy andCoast Guard interdicted a total of 43 ships
carrying over 4,000 migrants, mostly fromthe Fujian province in the People’s Republicof China. A series of prosecutions in Boston,
New York, Honolulu, San Francisco and
Hawaii has established that an Asian
organized group known as the Fuk Chinggang that operates primarily in New Yorkand California was responsible for muchof smuggling of boatloads of aliens from thePeople’s Republic of China.
The dangers involved in such smuggling
ventures are highly significant. The
prosecutions I mentioned established thatin many instances the boats were
overcrowded, unsanitary, lacked adequate
food and supplies and were unsafe. In one
tragic incident in 1993, a ship, the Golden
Venture, carrying over 100 aliens from thePeoples Republic of China ran aground off
the coast of New York City and 10 aliens
died as a result.
In addition, these prosecutions haveestablished that the aliens and theirfamilies are exploited if the alien is
successfully smuggled into the UnitedStates. The smuggling fee of $20,000 to$30,000 per alien is clearly beyond themeans of a Peoples Republic of China
migrant to pay. Consequently, thesmugglers have threatened, kidnapped,
and assaulted aliens and their family
members to collect the smuggling fees andoften force the alien to work illegal
gambling or prostitution businesses, or
sweatshops in the garment industry until
the smuggling fees are paid.
Similar harmful consequences stem fromsmuggling operations involving migrants
from Central and South America. For
example, unsafe and overloaded vehicles
have contributed to accidents resulting indeath and injuries.
The costs to the United States associatedwith illegal migration is substantial. To
address alien smuggling and related
matters, the Immigration andNaturalization Service’s overall budget has
more than doubled within five years from
$1.5 billion in fiscal year 1993 to $3.1 billion
in fiscal year 1997.
A November 1997 report by the UnitedStates General Accounting Office indicatesthat illegal immigrant families receive over
one billion dollars in welfare payments andFood Stamps alone. One state, California,
alone spends about $830 million each year
to incarcerate illegal aliens who have been
jailed for criminal acts. The financial costs
associated with United States interdiction
and deportation procedures are also high.
For example, the costs exceeded $7 million
to deport 158 migrants and 11 crew
members seized in a boat carrying
migrants from the Peoples Republic ofChina destined for Hawaii in May, 1995. I
would imagine that other countries areexperiencing similar problems and costs
related to the global prolems arising fromillegal migration.
To address these problems, the UnitedStates has recently nearly doubled the sizeof INS border patrol agency. United States
law enforcement working with the Coast
Guard and Navy and other agencies has
increased its efforts to interdict boatloads
of illegal aliens and to repatriate them.

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Criminal penalties for alien smuggling
have been increased, a mandatory
minimum of three years’ imprisonment
upon conviction for smuggling an alien for
financial gain. For example, in January
1998, the ship’s captain and two crew
members convicted of smuggling a boatloadof over 100 aliens from the People’s
Republic of China were sentenced in Boston
to 12, 10 and 8 years in jail. INS also
continues to work with other countries to
identify alien smuggling networks and to
standardize entry and documentary
requirements for international travel tominimize the risks of counterfeit
documents.
C. Money Laundering
Money laundering is designed to prevent
governments and law enforcement
agencies from knowing the source of illegal
proceeds and from tracing the money to its
sources. The primary motive of professional
criminals is to obtain financial profits fromtheir varied criminal activities. Thus thecriminal activities that drive the need tolaunder money are very broad, ranging
from laundering illegal proceeds from drugtrafficking and racketeering enterprises towhite collar crimes such as commercial andbank frauds, bribery and tax evasion.
• The amount of funds generated
around the world by illegal activities
requiring legitimization is on theorder of hundreds of billions of dollars
annually; most estimates place theamount of money being launderedannually between $300 billion to$500 billion.
• In addition to drug trafficking
proceeds, substantial amounts ofmoney are transferred abroad to belaundered or otherwise hidden,
costing the United States
Government tens of billions of dollars
annually in tax revenue losses. A

32

1993 study on transfer pricing
concluded that the United States was
deprived of at least $30 billion—and
possibly as much as $100 billion—in
tax revenue that year as a result oftax evasion or money laundering
through transactions between UnitedStates firms and their foreign
partners.
The infrastructure for launderingcriminal proceeds, all of which must beplaced and “legitimized” in the legal
economy, is extensive and worldwide.
Banks, nonbank financial institutions —which include brokerage houses,
commodities dealers, currency exchange
services, and casinos — and other
legitimate businesses are part of the money
laundering network. Investment inlegitimate business enterprises provides
cover for criminal activities, as well as aplausible source of wealth and income todeny it was obtained illegally. Use of front
companies to launder illegal proceeds andto finance illicit transactions arewidespread by criminals worldwide.
The international banking and financial
system is routinely used by launderers tolegitimize and transfer illicit proceeds.
Once illicit proceeds are in theinternational banking system, electronictransfers of funds makes it difficult to track
how laundered money flows. Tens of
thousands of banks worldwide areconnected to electronic funds transfer
systems. The flow of illicit money, however,is only a tiny fraction of the trillions ofdollars that move daily through theinternational financial system, more than
$1 trillion moves daily through the UnitedStates-based Clearing House Interbank
Payments System (CHIPS), which handles
nearly all international dollar transfers. In
most cases, banking and other financial
institutions probably serve more as
avenues of opportunity for launderers

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
rather than willing participants.

occurred outside the United States.

Foreign banking systems that offer bankand corporate secrecy, or where there is
weak enforcement or an absence ofregulations against illicit financial
activities, are most appealing tointernational criminals seeking to launderillicit proceeds or to stockpile funds insecret accounts and shell companies.
Criminals also take advantage ofcorruption in many banking sectors, bothto place money into banking systems andt h e e c o n o m y, a n d t o h a m p e r a n yinvestigation of illicit financial activities.

The expansion of computer technology
throughout the world has also led toincreased opportunities for transnational
criminals to gain access to confidential
information and to use the interactive
capabilities of advances in computers andtelecommunications systems to facilitate
fraudulent schemes and the movement ofillicit money other assets.

D. Financial Fraud
Wide-ranging and complex financial
fraud schemes by international criminalorganizations are stealing billions of dollars
annually from United States citizens,businesses, and government programs.
Financial fraud crimes have become moreprevalent in recent years as criminalorganizations take advantage of thesignificantly greater amounts of personaland corporate financial information now
available and the ability to access that
information through computer technology.
The Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners estimated financial losses fromfraud perpetrated by domestic andinternational criminals in the UnitedStates at more than $200 billion per year.
A 1995 survey of personal fraud
victimization estimated the annual
tangible costs associated with fraud
schemes to be $45 billion.
Credit card fraud is another major
financial fraud that crosses international
borders. Chinese gangs in the UnitedStates particularly have been adept at
carrying out a wide variety of credit cardfraud, including counterfeit credit cards.
Major credit card issuers estimate fraud
losses to have been in excess of $2 billion
dollars in 1996, about one-third of which

E. Bank Fraud and Threats toInternational Banks andFinancial Institutions
The use of banks and other financial
institutions by international criminals tolaunder money, finance illicit transactions,or facilitate fraud schemes can underminet h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y, w i t h s i g n i f i c a n trepercussions for the international
financial system. Financial institutions
rely on their credibility in international
financial transactions—including loans,investments, large fund transfers, andmanaging stock and equity funds—and thefailure of a large institution can affectglobal makets. Allegations that a financial
institution is involved in criminal activity
raises the possibility that its services andbusiness practices are corrupt, scaring
away investors and customers.
Efforts by some countries to develop
modern banking systems can be greatly
inhibited by involvement in theirburgeoning financial sectors. In cash-andcredit-scarce countries like Russia, forexample, criminal groups can gain
influence over banks and access to loans
for their enterprises simply by threatening
to withdraw their funds from the bank.
Criminal organizations that acquire control
or significant influence in banks or otherfinancial institutions sometimes use themto make loans to front companies that are
not repaid, which can undermine thecredility and solvency of the banks,

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
sometimes forcing the international
financial community to come to the rescue.
The collapse of Latvia’s Bank Baltija inAugust 1995—the largest commercial bankin Latvia at the time of this failure—illustrates the threat posed by criminal
control of financial institutions. Criminals
used the bank to make loans to their own
front companies, which were not repaid,
and defrauded accounts of as much as $40
million. This massive fraud caused thebank to fail, provoking a major financial
crisis in Latvia.
F. Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting of United States currency
and the currencies of other nations remains
a long standing problem, especially withimprovement in copying and production
technologies.
G. Transnational Crimes Involving
Intellectual Property
Counterfeiting and other forms of
copyright, trademark, and patent
infringement and sale of pirated products
distort international trade, undermine thelegitimate marketplace, and cause
extensive losses of revenue to both domestic
and foreign industries. The illegal
duplication of United States films, compact
disks, computer software computer
software, pharmaceutical, and clothing
trademarks major—sectors of UnitedStates export earnings—causes annual toUnited States companies of up to $23
billion.
H. Corrupt and Criminal Business
Practices
Companies in the United States andother countries are victimized by the global
problem of corrupt business practices,
including commercial bribery to obtain
lucrative business and government
contracts. In a three-year period between
May 1994 and April 1997, foreign business34

companies were alleged to have offeredbribes for 180 contracts valued at $80
billion.
I. Illegal Arms Trafficking
International criminal networks that
are—or could be—used for illegal arms
trafficking and brokering deals andsmuggling sensitive materials andtechnologies related to weapons of mass
destruction threaten interests of theUnited States and many other countries.
Although United States prosecutions ofsuch cases have been relatively few innumber, they have been significant.
For example, in 1997, a group ofindividuals connected to employees ofstate- run arms companies in the People’s
Republic of China were convicted in
California of smuggling 2,000 AK47s andother arms into the United States.
J. International Car Theft Rings
A relatively recent and significant
criminal activity carried out by Russianand Asian organized crime groups involves
extensive networks to steal luxury cars byhijacking or through fraud in the UnitedStates. The cars are then smuggled out of
the United States for sale in foreigncountries in Asia and Europe.
K. Prostitution
Asian and Russian organized crimegroups are also significantly involved in
obtaining women from Asia and former
Soviet Bloc countries to work in the UnitedStates as prostitutes. Often the women arebrought to the United States throughfraudulent visas and passports under false
promises of assistance to obtain legitimate
employment. However, the women areforced into prostitution until they pay theorganized crime figures substantial
amounts of money under threats ofphysical harm and under threats to expose
their illegal alien status to the authorities.

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
In my view, these are the principal, but
by no means all, transnational offenses
that adversely affect the United States andother countries, and they pose formidable
problems to the global law enforcement
communities. I would next like to briefly
discuss the principal organized groups
operating in the United States and othercountries.
IV. ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS
A. United States—Based Organized
Crime Groups
As I stated earlier, United States
authorities use a multi-faceted criteria to
identify a group that constitutes “organizedcrime”. To briefly repeat, the central factors
are whether the group has a hierarchicalstructure, is self-perpetuating andcontinues over time and engages indiversified criminal activities for profit.
Under these criteria, La Cosa Nostra,
commonly referred to as the LCN, is themost significant organized crime group
operating in the United States. The LCN
is a nationwide criminal organization
divided into approximately 24 families that
operate in the major cities in United States.
Five families exist in New York City and19 other LCN families are centered in otherlarge cities in the United States. However,for most part, the LCN’s criminal activities
are focused in the United States and tosome extent in Canada and have little
direct effect on other countries. Of course
there are some notable exceptions
including, but not limited to, the LCN’s
involvement in narcotics trafficking, money
laundering and stock frauds which aresignificant transnational crimes. But, theseare exceptions to the general proposition
that the LCN’s criminal activities,
especially the LCN families outside of New
York City, involve matters largely confinedto the United States.

The same is true for Asian organizedcrime groups operating in the UnitedStates. Thus far, the evidence indicatesthat Asian organized crime groups in the
United States primarily operate in and arecontrolled in the United States without
substantial ties to foreign organized crimegroups. However, there are notable
exceptions, such as their involvement inalien smuggling, money laundering,
narcotics trafficking and trafficking instolen cars which are transnational crimes
with substantial ties to criminal associates
in countries outside the United States.
There may be other exceptions as well.
Having said that, it remains generally thecase that for the most part Asian organizedcrime groups in the United States consistof relatively small groups of various ethnic
Asians that lack the structure, long term
continuity and breadth of activities as does
the LCN. The evidence thus far indicatesthat the principal criminal activities ofthese ethnic Asian organized crime groups
in the United States include home invasion
robberies and burglaries, robberies andextortion of businesses, other extortions,gambling, credit card and other fraud andrelated crimes of violence that are focusedon the particular communities in the
United States where the gang members
live or operate.
B. The Boryokudan
I am sure most of us are familiar with
the Boryokudan, which are large organizedcrime groups operating in Japan. However,thus far the evidence does not indicate thatthe Boryokudan poses a substantial threat
in the United States. Indeed, over the past
15 years there have only been three or four
federal prosecutions in the United States
involving criminal activities in the UnitedStates by the Boryokudan.
C. Triads
Again as you may know, Triads are
relatively large criminal organized crime

35

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
groups operating in Hong Kong, thePeople’s Republic of China and Taiwan.
However, thus far the evidence indicatesthat Triads, as such, do not pose asubstantial threat to United States law
enforcement. Various Triad members havebeen prosecuted in the United States,
mostly for drug trafficking, and there isevidence that Triad members have usedtheir Triad affiliations to facilitate theircriminal activities in the United States.
However, thus far the evidence does notindicate that Triads are firmly entrenchedin the United States and does not indicatethat Triads have cells operating on an
ongoing basis in the United States.
Probably, the greatest threat in the UnitedStates posed by Triads involves their drugtrafficking activities.
D. Italian Organized Crime Groups
The principal organized crime groups
operating in Italy are the Sicilian Mafia or
Siclian Cosa Nostra, the Camorra based in
Naples, the ‘Ndrangheta based in Calabria
and the United Sacred Crown based in
Puglia. Although, these organized crimegroups engage in transnational crimes
affecting Europe and elsewhere, thus far
the evidence does not indicate that thesegroups engage in significant criminal
activities in the United States. In the mid
to late 1980’s there were several important
prosecuions in the United States of Sicilian
Mafia members and associates for drugtrafficking and money laundering offenses.
Since then, there has not been evidence inthe public record that Italian organizedcrime groups have a significant presencein the United States, although there
continues to be some drug trafficking andmoney laundering prosecutions of persons
tied to Italian organized crime.
E. South American Drug Cartels
As I previously stated, South American
Drug Cartels, such as the Cali and Medillin
drug cartels, continue to have a significant

36

impact on the United States through theirextensive drug distribution and money
laundering networks.
F. Russian Organized Crime Groups
United States law enforcement agencies
use the term “Russian Organized Crime”
to refer not only to organized crime groups
operating in Russia, but rather the term
more broadly encompasses two generalcomponents: First, Russian organizedcrime refers to organized crime groups
operating in or headquartered in countries
in Eastern Europe and Asia that wereformerly part of the Soviet Union and theSoviet Bloc, which for example would
include Russia, Poland, Hungary, Georgia,
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and others.
And second, Russian organized crime refers
to organized crime groups operating in the
United States that have a nexus to thecountries that formerly comprised theSoviet Bloc.
1. Outside the United States
I would like to first discuss the Russianorganized crime groups operating in or
which are centered in the former Soviet
Bloc countries. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the Soviet Bloc in 1991 createda vacuum of authority. As new governments
began grappling with the awesome
problems of developing laws, regulations
and business practices to govern emerging
private businesses, economic activities andgreater political freedom, criminals have
exploited both the new economic andpolitical opportunities and the absence ofcomprehensive legal structures. In
particular, Russia’s efforts to privatize theeconomy, that is—the sale of state-owned
industries to the private sector, has been
fertile ground for criminal exploitation.
In 1993, Russian President, Boris Yeltsin
declared that crime was “the number one
threat to national security.” Figures for1994 from the Russian Ministry of the

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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Interior, commonly referred to as the MVD,
indicate that there are over 8,000 criminalgroups in Russia with approximately
100,000 members. These criminal groups
operate in over 50 countries, they are firmly
entrenched in the Former Soviet Union andSoviet Bloc countries, and are expanding
to the United States, the Caribbean, SouthAmerica, Israel and the Middle East.
“Thieves-In-Law” represent the “oldguard”of these Russian organized crimegroups. The MVD estimates theirmembership to be roughly 750 to 800.
Thieves-In-Law is a loosely organizedgroup of elite criminal leaders whose roots
stem from organized gangs in former Soviet
prisons. Thieves-In-Law are selected bytheir prison peers for membership, observe
strict codes of conduct, engage in ritual
cermonies and sport physical markings. In
these respects the society of Thieve-In-Law
are similar to traditional organized crimegroups such as the Sicilian Mafia and the
LCN in the United States.

arises from the looting and illegal exportof natural resources and other assets, often
carried out with the assistance of corrupt
government officials.
A recent prosecution in the UnitedStates illustrates this. In January 1998, aRussian emigre was covicted in San
Francisco, California, on tax charges. The
charges arose from an investigation into
an elaborate scheme to sell in the UnitedStates approximately $180 million in gems
and precious metals obtained from theRussian Federation, with the assistance ofcorrupt officials in the Russian Federation.
The gems were supposed to be processedin the United States, but the conspirators
sold the gems and used the money to buy
expensive residences, real estate, cars andother assets. Several officials of theRussian Federation have been charged
with corruption offenses in Russia.

There are at least 20 to 25 major Russianorganized crime groups operating in orcentered in the former Soviet Bloc
countries. These are relatively largeorganizations, with key membership
ranging from several hundred to 1,000
active criminals. They have a hierarchicalstructure and are devided into brigades orcrews of members. These criminal
enterprises engage in a wide variety ofcriminal activities, including murder,
extortion, kidnapping, trafficking in drugs
and weapons, money laundering,
prostitution, fraud, theft and related public
corruption.

There are many other examples ofcorrupt capital flight from former Soviet
Bloc countries. In the United States, there
have been numerous investigations ofhighly suspicious wire transfers of
substantial sums of money, in some casesin the millions of dollars to hundreds ofmillions of dollars, from entities in former
Soviet Bloc countries to entities in UnitedStates where there is no apparent
legitimate explanation for these transfersof money. Although some of these cases
have led to successful prosecutions, manyremain unsolved because of the difficulty
to trace the money and to determine theultimate believed illiegal sources of themoney in the countries outside the UnitedStates.

I would like to briefly discuss a few ofthese criminal activities. Perhaps thegreatest threat to the stability of theRussian Federation and other new
govenments of the former Soviet Bloc thatis linked to Russian organized crime groups

Other kinds of fraud carried out by
Russian organized crime groups also arebecoming more prevalent. For example, in
1996, a group in Los Angeles was convicted
for a $4 million fraud against theGovernment of Kazakhstan on a contract

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
to sell Cuban sugar to Kazakhstan.
Advance payments were made by thegovernment of Kazakhstan to theconspirators in the United States, but thesugar was never delivered. Indeed, thefraud was quite brazen since it is not lawful
for companies in the United States to sell
Cuban sugar to anyone. Similar contract
fraud schemes have involved false promises
in the delivery of meat, alcohol, petroleum
and other products.
As previously stated, in the 1990’s
narcotics consumption increased in Russia
and other former Soviet Bloc countries.
There is evidence that Russian organizedcrime groups are responsible for much of
the drug trafficking and have formed
alliances with South American drugtrafficking organizations and Italianorganized crime groups to handle
distribution of narcotics in the former
Soviet Bloc countries.
Russian organized crime groups havebeen deeply involved in arms trafficking
with the assistance of current and former
corrupt government and military officials.
Several recent prosecutions in the UnitedStates, including a pending indictment in
Florida of a Russian emigre Ludwig
Fainberg, involved efforts sell illegal arms
allegedly obtained from Russia.
Some of these cases have also involved
offers to sell nuclear grade weaponsmaterials. However, thus far there havebeen no cases in the United States in which
nuclear grade weapons materials havebeen delivered. But, given the significant
dangers inherent in trafficking in nuclear
grade weapons materials, the UnitedStates will, of course, continue to vigorously
investigate possible cases of suchtrafficking.
2. In the United States
Next, I will briefly discuss Russian

38

organized crime activities in the UnitedStates. There are two general categories
of Russian organized crime groups
operating in the United States. The firstcategory consists of the traditional largeorganized crime groups based in Russia
and other countries of the former Soviet
Bloc that I have just discussed. Some ofthese groups are trying to establish afoothold in the United States, and arecarrying out criminal activities in the
United States through associates living in
the United States.
The Ivankov organization centered in
New York City illustrates the first category.
Vyacheslav Ivankov operated an illegalorganization in New York City involving
extortion of an illegal organization in New
York City involving extortion and fraud,
and the organization had direct ties to
Russian organized crime groups outside
the United States. In 1996, Ivankov wasconvicted on extortion charges in the
United States and sentenced to nearly tonearly 10 years in jail.
Another case illustrates the firstcategory. In January 1997, Ludwig
Fainberg was indicted in Miami, Florida,
on federal charges involving drugtrafficking efforts to smuggle cocaine from
Ecuador to St. Petersburg, Russia and forthe interstate transportation of stolen
property. The conspirators were also
attempting to purchase a Russian diesel
submarine to be used to smuggle drugs.
In another drug case, in December 1997,
Oleg Kirillov, a Russian organized crimeleader based in Russia, was indicted in afederal court in Miami, Florida, forconspiring to export cocaine from theUnited States to Russia.
The second category of Russianorganized crime groups in the UnitedStates commonly referred to as

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS“fraudsters”, are emigres from the former
Soviet Bloc countries living in the UnitedStates who engage in various kinds offraudulent and other criminal activities.
Fraudsters are smaller, less centralized
and less hierarchical groups of criminals
than the first category of more traditionalorganized crime groups. Moreover, while
fraudsters may have some ties to Russianorganized crime groups centered outside
the United States, for the most part the
fraudsters criminal activities are “homegrown”, that is, they focus on activities in
the United States with little or no direction
from groups outside the United States.
United States authorities are still not
sure how much of Russian organized crime
activity in the United States falls within
the first or second category. Russianorganized Crime activity in the UnitedStates is a recent development, and we still
have a lot to learn. Thus far, the evidence
indicates that most Russian organizedcrime criminal activity in the United States
falls within the second category, that is
fraudsters centered in the United Stateswith little or no direction from Russianorganized crime groups outside the UnitedStates. But, our assessment may change
as we learn more about fraudsters’
activities.
A few cases illustrate the activities of
Russian fraudsters. A series of successfulprosecutions in the late 1980s and 1990s,
in Los Angeles, New Jersey, New York andPhiladelphia established that Russianfraudsters formed an alliance with UnitedStates LCN members to defraud state
governments of many millions of dollars indiesel fuel excise taxes. The conspirators
carried out their scheme through extortionof businessmen and through establishing
sham gasoline companies that evaded thepayment of the excise fuel taxes.
The most notorious fraud scheme

perpetrated by a Russian organized crime
enterprise was the massive medical
insurance fraud conducted by the
Smushkevich brothers in Southern
California in the late 1980’s. Michael andDavid Smushkevich were emigres from
Lithuania who together with their spouses
and eight associates, embezzled private
insurers and the United States governmentof over one billion dollars. The brothers
operated mobile health care diagnostic
laboratories. Patients were solicited by
telephone to receive supposed “free”
examinations at their mobile clinics. The
patients were asked to sign forms giving
the clinics the rights to their insurance
benefits. The bills were then submitted toinsurers claiming that doctors had ordered
the tests. At its peak, the operation
involved 500 companies.
There are numerous other prosecutions
and investigations involving Russianfraudsters’ carrying out similar health carefraud schemes to defraud state and federal
governments. In addition to such fraud,money laundering by Russian fraudsters
in the United States is a very significant
problem. As I mentioned earlier, there are
numerous cases involving suspicioustransfers of hundreds of millions of dollars
from former Soviet Bloc countries to theUnited States that are under investigation.
As you can see, Russian organized crime isa very recent phenomenon that poses
increasing threats to the United States andmany other countries.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is clear thattransnational crimes and organized crimegroups’ criminal activities are very
comprehensive and pose formidable
problems for the global community.
Therefore, I am sure that you will agree
that it is imperative that we all continue
to work closely together to combat theseworldwide problems.
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54

UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO THE THREATS POSED BY
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPSFrank J. Marine*
I. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAWENFORCEMENT RESPONSES
In my first paper I described the natureof the principal transnational crimes andorganized crime groups affecting theUnited States and other countries, and thesubstantial threats to the world community
arising from these criminal activities. I
would now like to discuss some of theinvestigative techniques and prosecutive
tools and strategies that law enforcement
has used with some effectiveness in the
United States to combat such criminal
activities. I hasten to add, however, thatwhile I believe that these tools have beeneffective in the United States, they may not
be transplanted easily into other countries.
As we all know, there are differences among
the countries of the world regarding their
history, size in population and territory,geographical location, political, social andeconomic systems, cultural values andsocial structure that greatly influences theappropriate policies and procedures
adopted by any particular country toaddress criminal activities and otherproblems. Therefore, I do not mean tosuggest that the approaches of the UnitedStates are the only ways, nor do I mean tosuggest they are the best ways. Rather, it
is for each country to decide for itself on
appropriate course of action to combat
criminal activities.
Equally, I do not mean to suggest that
law enforcement is capable of completely
eliminating transnational crimes and* Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section, Criminal Division, U. S. Department ofJustice, United States.

40

organized crime activities. Such perfection
simply does not exist in the real world. But,
I firmly believe that working together we
can substantially reduce the threats posedby the adverse consequences of criminal
activities.
II. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
1. Electronic Surveillance
The single most important law
enforcement weapon against organizedcrime by far is electronic surveillance.
Virtually all the major federal UnitedStates prosecutions against the leadershipand members of the La Cosa Nostra (LCN)
over the past 20 years have involved
electronic surveillance. Electronic
surveillance is likewise becoming anequally important weapon against Asianand Russian organized crime groups.
The reasons are obvious. First, there isnothing as effective as proving the crime
through the words of the defendantthemself. There are often credibility
problems with co-conspirators as witnesses
since they are criminally involved andreceived some form of a deal orconsideration for their testimony. Whereas
electronic surveillance evidence provides
objective reliable evidence of crimes
through the statements of the participantst h e m s e l v e s . M o r e o v e r, e l e c t r o n i csurveillance enables law enforcement tolearn of conspirators plans to commit
crimes before they are carried out, whichenables law enforcement to surveil theactivities , such as delivery of contraband
and conspiratorial meeting, or to disrupt
and abort the criminal activities as

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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approriate. In that regard, electronic
surveillance is particularly helpful inpreventing crimes of violence fromoccurring.

must establish why such otherinvestigative techniques appear to beunlikely to succeed if tried, or will be too
dangerous to try.

Indeed, electronic surveillance isespecially helpful in transnational crimes
because it enables law enforcement tointercept conspirators in the United States
discussing their crimes with their criminal
associates in countries outside the United
S t a t e s . Wi t h o u t s u c h e l e c t r o n i csurveillance, it would be very difficult for
United States law enforcement to obtainevidence of such conspiratorial planningagainst the co-conspirators operating
outside the United States.

In executing the electronic surveillance,
the government must “minimize” theinterception of innocent conversations.
That is, the government must takereasonable steps to assure that only
conversations relevant to the crimes underinvestigation are intercepted and that
innocent conversations are not intercepted.
In practice, the monitors must turn off therecording machines when conversations
are not discussing matters relevant to thecrimes under investigation.

Although electronic surveillance isextremely valuable, it is also a very
sensitive technique because of legitimate
concerns for a person’s privacy interests.
Accordingly, United States law imposessignificant restrictions on electronic
surveillance. First, electronic surveillance
is authorized to obtain evidence of only
some specific serious offenses listed in thegoverning statute. To obtain electronic
surveillance, agents and government
attorneys must submit an affidavit to a
United States district court judge whichcontains specific facts establishingprobable cause to believe that subjects ofthe electronic surveillance are committing
certain specified offenses and that it islikely that relevant evidence of such crimes
will be obtained by the electronic
surveillance. Thus, the government mustobtain the approval of a neutral
independent judge to conduct electronic
surveillance.

Such court-authorized electronic
surveillance is limited to 30 days, the 30day period may be extended for additional30-day intervals provided that all therequirements are met every 30 days andapproved by the judge.

Moreover, before electronic surveillanceis permissible, the government must
establish probable cause to believe thatinvestigative techniques other thanelectronic surveillance have been tried andfailed to obtain the sought evidence, or we

2. Undercover Operations
When it comes to organized crime
control, undercover operations are second
only to electronic surveillance; indeed, thetwo techniques often go hand-in-hand.
In undercover operations, law
enforcement agents may portraythemselves as criminals such as drug
dealers, fences for stolen merchandise,money launderers or even hitmen willingto commit murder for hire. Through such
undercover operations, law enforcement
agents are able to infiltrate the highest
levels of organized crime groups by posing
as criminals because other real criminals
will discuss their criminal plans with theagents to get their assistance in committing
crimes.
The agents also gain the confidence ofcriminals, who will in turn often reveal
their past criminal activities to the agents,

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
as well as plot with the agents to engage
in additional ongoing criminal activities.
Combined with eavesdroping, theundercover approach provides
comprehensive coverage of the targets’ dayto-day activities. But this technique also
carries the potential for problems andrequires exceptional preparation. For one
thing, there is always the physical safetyof the undercover agent to consider. To
prevent the premature disclosure of his or
her identity , the agent must be provided
with a fully substantiated past history(called “backstopping”) and careful
briefings of the targets’ modus operandi.
Every conceivable scenario that mightmake the targets suspicious of or hostile
to the agent must be considered in advance.
And the undercover agent themself must
undergo careful testing (including, if
necessary, psychological profiling) toensure that s/he possesses the intangible
qualities whereby they will “fit”
comfortably into the new identity.

avoid harm to the public, our Departmentof Justice has set up Undercover Review
Committees, comprised of seniorprosecutors and investigators, to review,
approve, and control all sensitive
undercover operations. To be approved, an
undercover proposal must:

Another danger in undercover
operations involves potential danger —either physical or financial — to the public.
Undercover techniques need wide public
support to be successful. The quickest way
to lose public support for undercover
operations is to operate them in a way thatvictimizes the public. Unlike
eavesdropping, which is relatively passive,
undercover operations frequently deal with- and sometimes intentionally mislead —the public. For example, suppose there isan undercover business selling products tothe public while advertising itself
unofficially to criminal as a place wherestolen property can be taken. Not only
could the government be liable for any
defects in the products it sells to the public,
it might be indirectly responsible forencouraging thieves to steal property by
virtue of supplying them with an outlet.

Regarding such dangers, when law
enforcement learns of potential crimes ofviolence, law enforcement authorities are
required to take necessary steps to preventthe violence from occurring, which could
include warning the potential victim orarresting the subjects who pose a threat or
ending the undercover operation.

In order to balance these concerns and42

i. Be in writing;ii. Contain a full factual description of
the suspected criminal activity andthe participants therein;iii. Set out in detail the proposed
undercover scenario, the expertise of
the undercover team, the duration of
the project (not to exceed six months
unless extended), and the anticipatedlegal issues (such as entrapment) ;andiv. Evaluate the risk to the agents andthe public.

Undercover operations are especiallyessential and are very successful innarcotics trafficking cases because
traffickers always need customers to sell
their contraband. Agents, posing as buyers,
can obtain direct and substantial evidence
against the drug traffickers by buying theirproduct. Likewise, long term undercover
operations are essential to infiltrateorganized crime groups that continue theirillegal activities over many years. For
example, FBI agent Joseph Pistone worked
undercover for six years as a jewel thief
under the alias Donnie Brasco to infiltrate

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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the highest levels of the Bonanno LCN
family in New York City. This undercoverwork led to the convictions of many LCN
leaders and members. A recent film “Donnie Brasco” was made about his highly
successful undercover work.
3. Informants
Another critical law enforcement
technique involves the use of confidential
informants. I am a big fan of sherlock
Holmes, and as a law enforcement official,would love to think that we could solveorganized crime problems using ourdeductive reasoning powers to sift throughintricate clues and arrive at the correctconclusion “who done it” , like the famous
Sherlock Holmes. Unfortunately, Sherlock
Holmes is fiction. In reality, we do not solveorganized crime cases the Sherlock Holmes
way. Rather, we solve such crimes throughelectronic surveillance, undercover
operations and also through the third mostimportant tool, — the use of confidential
informants.
When United States law enforcement
uses the term confidential informant, werefer to an individual who is not willing totestify and who provides information or
assistance to the authorities under apromise that we will try to keep theiridentity confidential. We cannot absolutely
guarantee such confidentiality because inrelatively rare circumstances courts may
conclude that due process, or concerns offundamental fairness, require that a
confidential informant’s identity bedisclosed to a defendant charged with acrime where the informant can provide
evidence that could exculpate thedefendant. Absent such a rare case, we areable in most cases to keep an informant’s
identity confidential.
Confidential informants are typicallymotivated to provide information to theauthorities in exchange for money orlenient treatment regarding charges
pending against them or likely to bebrought against them. In many cases
confidential informants are themselves
engaged in criminal activities whichenables them to provide valuable direct
evidence of criminal activities by theircriminal associates. Confidential
informants frequently provide theinformation that enables law enforcement
officials to obtain judicial warrants
authorizing electronic surveillance. Many
successful prosecutions of the LCN
leadership have involved information
supplied by confidential informants who
provided information for many years about
the leadership of the LCN; indeed some of
the informants have been made membersof the LCN. Incriminating evidence by
informants who deal directly with the LCN
leadership is simply invaluable to breakthrough the layers of insulation that theleadership uses to conceal their activities.
However, there are high risks associatedwith the use of informants. Sometimes,
informants do not fully disclose their own
criminal activities, or they falsely implicate
their enemies in crimes, or they engage inunauthorized criminal activities. In thatlatter respect, under United States law, law
enforcement may authorize informants toparticipate in some forms of non-violent
criminal behavior that would otherwise beillegal, if they were not acting as
informants with authority to engage in theactivities. For example, depending on thecircumstances, in order to protect aninformant’s cover and to enable them to be
in a position to obtain incriminating
evidence against others, informants may
be authorized to participate in illegal
gambling, trafficking in stolen property,
and other non-violent crimes. Therefore, it
is important for law enforcement to closely
monitor the activities of informants tominimize the danger that the informant
would use their association with law

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
enforcement to shield their own
unauthorized criminal activities.

crime such as an LCN family, or an Asianor Russian organized crime group.

On balance, however, experience teaches
us that as a general rule, the benefits fromthe use of informants greatly outweigh therisks. But, we must be ever vigilant of therisks.

In one sense the RICO statute did notactually create a new offense because
murder, arson, extortion, and all sorts ofbusiness crimes (to name a few of RICO’s
46 predicate offenses) were already madecriminal when RICO was enacted in 1970.
But RICO was still a dramatic legislative
initiative because it permitted many ofthese generically different crimes to be
charged in a single indictment, even, in asingle count, so long as those crimes werepart of a defendant’s patttern of acts that
related to the enterprise.

III. PROSECUTION TECHNIQUESAND WEAPONS
1. The RICO Enterprise Theory ofProsecution
Obviously, the goal in every organizedcrime case is to convict the highest levelsof a crime organization. To do so,prosecutors need the proper tools. First andforemost, prosecutors need an “enterprise”
or “racketeering” statute designed
specifically for this purpose.
Several countries already have enacted
such legislation. Italy, for example, has ananti-Mafia statute; Japan, our host country,
recently enacted statutes derected against
the Boryokudan. Officials from Russia,
Great Britain, and from several countries
in Eastern Europe have recently shown
interest in “enterprise” legislation. An“enterprise” statute in this context is one
that explicitly prohibits participation in acrime group through specified unlawful
activity.
In the United States, the most famousof all anti-racketeering laws is called RICO,
an acronym for the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Statute. In
general, it provides heavy penalties (up tolife imprisonment under certain
circumstances) when a defendant conducts(or conspires to conduct) the affairs of anenterprise through a pattern of specified
acts known as “predicate” crimes. An“enterprise” can include anything from a
corporation, to a labor union, to a group ofindividuals working together to commit

44

In addition, there are some features of
RICO that are particularly effective inorganized crime cases. For example, as longas one of the predicate crimes alleged
against a defendant occurred within thelast 5 years before the indictment isbrought, the next previous crime in thepattern of racketeering need only be within
10 years of the most recent crime. The third
most recent crime need only have occurred
within 10 years of the second act and soon. The reach-back feature of RICO,
therefore, can extend 15 or 20 years or more
into the past. (Except for statutes like
RICO, indictmnts in the United States
generally cannot allege crimes that
occurred more than five years prior to thedate of indictment).
RICO’s reach is not only long, it is broad.
As noted, the predicate crimes which
qualify as RICO predicates run the gamut
from several forms of violence, robbery,
murder, extortion to fraud, securities
offenses, most forms of vice (gambling,
extortion, obscenity, prostitution, etc.), andillicit investment in legitimate businesses.
Were it not for RICO, most United Statesjudges would prohibit the prosecution ofsuch diverse crimes in a single case,especially if 10 or more defendants were108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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charged. Instead, the court would most
likely require a series of smaller trials,
which is exactly what crime groups hopefor, because they understand that the best
way to conquer a prosecution is to divide
it. In a series of smaller trials no one jury
gets to see the entire picture. Organizedcrime, by contrast, is a picture composedof many crimes, all linked by a single chainof-command to the same enterprise. Any
effective prosecution of a crime family
would thus necessitate proof of these many
crimes in a single trial. RICO permits this.
RICO allows the jury to see the entire
pattern of crimes committed by anorganized crime group. In bringing atypical RICO prosecution, for example, we
may charge six or more racketeers withperhaps a dozen of even more predicate
crimes covering a decade. In each allegedpredicate crime, some, but usually not all,of the defendants are named. In somecases, RICO indictments have charged
numerous defendants with committing
more than 50 offenses as part of a patternof racketeering activity.
As powerful as RICO is, very few RICO
prosecutions were actually brought againstorganized crime until the early 1980s eventhough RICO was adopted in 1970. Part of
the reason was that RICO has always beena very complicated and powerful
instrument; it took nearly 15 years forFederal prosecutors to feel comfortableenough-about RICO to make it thecenterpiece of mob prosecutions. Anotherreason was that the investigativetechniques necessary to build a suitable
RICO case, such as electronic surveillance
and undercover operations, were notroutinely used against organized crimebosses in the 1970s. To be sure, there werea lot of investigations and prosecutions ofracketeers for street crimes, but these cases
rarely pierced the insulation behind which
big organized crime bosses hid.

In the early 1980s, as already noted, theFederal Government (primarily the FBI)
made a determined effort to infiltrate thesecret headquarters of LCN bosses,
listening to their plans and reconstructing
their crimes. In turn, Federal prosecutors
agreed to bring more and more complicated
RICO charges. As a result, more successful
cases against organized crime bosses havebeen brought in the last 15 years than in
the prior 80 years. In fact, prosecutors
discovered that RICO worked equally wellwhether the defendants were mobsters
charged with murders and extortions, or
public officials charged with taking bribes.
Naturally, due to their sensational
revelations, RICO mob cases received
extensive media coverage. At this point it
is clear that control of organized crime in
the United States would be inconceivable
without RICO. In addition, RICO was the
key charge against panamanian dictator
Manuel Noriega and the Philippines’
President Ferdinand Marcos. RICO cases
have also been brought against hundredsof police officers, judges, and public officials
for official misconduct, and against
terrorist groups, radical hate groups, street
gangs, stock manipulators, and drug
cartels.
We are now successfully using RICO toattack newly emerging organized crimegroups such as Asian and Russianorganized crime groups, just as we didagainst the LCN.
Like any powerful tool, RICO could beabused. To protect against potential
abuses, the Organized Crime andRacketeering Section (OCRS) has a special
unit of attorneys who carefully review all
proposed RICO indictments for legal andfactual sufficiency. The unit also ensuresin every case that RICO is necessary; whenother, less powerful statutes would do justas well, the use of RICO charges is not

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
approved.
2. Organized Crime Strike ForceUnits
As I previously stated, the LCN is thenumber one organized crime problem in the
United States. The LCN is an extensive
nationwide criminal organization.
Therefore, it was essential to attack the
LCN through a closely coordinatedn a t i o n w i d e e f f o r t . H o w e v e r, l a w
enforcement is very fragmented anddecentralized in the United States. The
United States Department of Justice at thefederal level is divided into 94 different
United States Attorneys offices throughout
the country that operate with considerable
independence of the main JusticeDepartment located in Washington, DC. In
addition, there are literally hundreds,
perhaps over 1,000 state, county and city
prosecutors’ offices and police departmentsthat have criminal jurisdictions that are
totally independent of the federal
Department of Justice. This fragmented
prosecutorial authority makes nationwide
coordination difficult. These difficulties are
made even greater when you factor in thelarge territorial size of the United Statesand its relatively large population of over
260 million people.
To improve coordination of federal efforts
to attack organized crime, in the late 1960s
the Department of Justice created 24
specialized prosecutive units called
Organized Crime Strike Forces, located in
the cities where the 24 LCN families weremost active. These Strike Force Units werestaffed by career prosecutors who wereexperienced in electronic surveillance,
undercover operations, and long term
proactive investigations. Moreover, these
prosecutors are only allowed to work onorganized crime matters. To assure thatthey work only on organized crime mattersand to assure that the Strike Force cases
are properly coordinated from a national

46

perspective, supervising prosecutors inWashington, DC are able to maintain thefocus of efforts against the LCN and to see
to it that relevant information developedby one Strike Force office gets to anotheroffice in another part of the country that
may need it.
Moreover, because the supervisors inWashington, DC, are aware of all LCN
investigations and prosecutions in the
United States, they are able to reduce
duplication of efforts and coordinate
investigations and prosecutions conductedby more than one office.
The creation of these Strike Force Units
proved to be invaluable. Over the past 25
years, the vast majority of all the major
convictions of LCN bosses and members
were obtained by these Strike Force Units.
Although the LCN remains strong in themetropolitan New York City area whereroughly 80% of the LCN members operate,the LCN has been substantially weakened
in other parts of the United States particularly in San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Kansas City, Milwaukee, St. Louis, andother cities.
Although the Strike Force Units were
initially created to combat the LCN, their
mission was expanded in 1990 to combat
Asian and Russian organized crime groups.
In 1990, the Attorney General of the UnitedStates adopted a national strategy tocoordinate the federal attack against thennewly emerging organized crime groups
operating in the United States. The Strike
Force approach became the centerpiece ofthat national strategy since it had been so
successful against the LCN. The Strike
Force Units were well equipped to handle
the new challenges because of theirexperience, and also because the Strike
Force Units were already located in thecities where the Russian and Asian
organized crime groups were most active.

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Not surprisingly, the Russian and Asian
organized crime groups are active in thesame large cities as the LCN.
To implement this national strategy, theAttorney General created the Attorney
General’s Organized Crime Council, themembers of which are the heads of theFederal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), theDivision of Enforcement of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Secret
Service, the Marshals Service, the Customs
Service, the Postal Inspectors, and theInternal Revenue Service. The Council
meets as necessary, and at least once
annually, to set the official priorities of theFederal Government’s organized crime
program, which currently are LCN, Asian,and Russian organized crime. In order to
set these priorities, each agency and thecountry’s 94 top Federal prosecutors (called
United States Attorneys) are required eachyear to file written plans assessing the
problems posed by organized crime groups
in their districts and for attacking
organized crime groups in their districts.
The Department of Justice’s Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section thenreports its analyses of these plans to theCouncil. The most important feature of thissystem is control. It obligates the regional
prosecutors and agents to keep constantpressure on La Cosa Nostra and Asian andRussian crime groups, and prevents themfrom succumbing to periodic temptations
to assign prosecutors and agents to nonorganized crime cases.
Implementing this national strategy has
enabled the Federal Government tocoordinate its nationwide efforts againstorganized crime groups and to keep thepressure on them to prevent them fromexpanding their corrupt influences onsociety.

3. Witness Security
Another valuable asset of theprosecutor’s arsenal has been the federal
witness security program. Because of theviolent nature of organized crime, witness
intimidation is a significant problem. To
address that program, in 1970 theDepartment of Justice created the federal
witness security program. Witnesses areadmitted to the program when they areable to supply significant evidence inimportant cases and there is a perceived
threat to their security. Once in the
program, the witness and his or her family
are given new identities, relocated toanother part of the United States where
the danger to their security is lessened, andare given financial assistance until thewitness is able to secure employment.
Since the beginning of the witness
security program, 6,816 witnesses havebeen admitted into the program along with
8,882 family members for a total of 15,698
persons in the program. The average cost
is $75,000 per witness per year and$125,000 per family per year.
As you can see, the program is very
costly, but the results have made it worth
the cost. Since 1970, over 10,000
defendants have been convicted throughthe testimony of witnesses in the program.
Last year, 208 convictions were obtainedand 2 million dollars was seized.
The vast majority of protected witnesses,
about 97 percent, have criminal records.
However, the recidevist rate for witnesses
in the program is 21 percent, which is half
the rate of those released from prison.
4. Forfeiture
It cannot be overstated that making
money is the primary goal of organizedcrime and transnational criminal activities.
Therefore, it is imperative to take the profit
out of crime. Strong forfeiture laws do just47

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
that. Forfeiture is a criminal penalty formany offenses in the United States.
Generally speaking, upon conviction for an
offense that carries forfeiture as a penalty,
a defendant may be ordered to forfeit all
profits or proceeds derived from thecriminal activity, any property, real or
personnel, involved in the offense, orproperty traceable to the offense such as
property acquired with proceeds of criminal
activity. For example, if a defendant uses
a residence or car to distribute drugs, thatproperty is subject to forfeiture. Thus, aconvicted defendant may be ordered toforfeit all proceeds of the criminal activity
including money and other forms ofproperty.
In addition to criminal forfeiture, civil
forfeiture laws also allow the government
to obtain property used in criminal
activities. The principal difference between
criminal and civil forfeiture is that criminal
forfeiture is limited to a convicted
defendant’s personal interest in property
subject to forfeiture, whereas civil
forfeiture focuses on the property itself.
For example, suppose a defendantrepeatedly used a house to sell drugs, buts/he did not have an ownership interest in
the house. If convicted of drug dealing, thathouse is not subject to criminal forfeiture
because the defendant did not own thehouse. However, a civil forfeiture law suit
could be brought against the house as adefendant, even if the owner of the house
was not engaged in criminal activity. The
house, nonetheless, is subject to civil
forfeiture because it was repeatedly used
to facilitate criminal activities, and theowner did not take adequate steps toprevent their house from being used for
criminal activities.
There are various defenses to such civil
forfeiture, such as the “innocent owner
defense”, but I do not want to digress into48

the complexity of United States forfeiturelaw. To some extent I have generalized andoversimplified United States forfeiture law
which is complex, so as not to detract ourattention from the main point I am trying
to make. That is, that criminal and civil
forfeiture laws are powerful weapons in theprosecutors’ arsenal to take the profit outof crime.
5. Money Laundering
Strong money laundering laws go handin-hand with forfeiture laws to be powerfulweapons against criminal activities. Under
United States money laundering laws, it
is a crime to knowingly conduct a financialtransaction with the proceeds of certain
specified unlawful activity set forth in thestatute, with either the intent to promote
the specified unlawful activity or with theintent to conceal the specified unlawful
activity. The term transaction is broadly
defined to include “a purchase, sale, loan,pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or otherdisposition” and “with respect to a financial
institution includes a deposit, withdrawal,
transfer between accounts, exchange ofcurrency, loan, extension of credit,
purchase or sale of any stock, bond,certificate of deposit, or other monetary
instrument, use of a safe deposit box, or
any other payment, transfer, or delivery by,through, or to a financial institution, bywhatever means effected.”
As you can see, the money laundering
statute covers nearly every imaginable typeof transaction. Moreover, the penalties formoney laundering include forfeiture which
greatly enhances law enforcement’s efforts
to take the profit out of crime.
For example, in one recent case in
Boston, defendants were convicted oflaundering $136 million in drug proceeds
for Colombian drug traffickers. The
defendants received the cash drug
proceeds, and used it to buy money orders

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
cashiers checks, or gold to conceal theillegal source of the cash; this constituted
money laundering. The defendants argued
that they should only be required to forfeit
the 5% laundering fee (or roughly $7
million) that they charged the drugtraffickers since the $136 million belonged
to the drug traffickers. The court rejected
this argument and held that thedefendants were liable for forfeiture of theentire $136 million that they laundered.
Other examples of money laundering
illustrate the breadth of the statute. For
example , proceeds of fraud that are
deposited in bank accounts or otherfinancial institutions which is commingledwith legitimate money in accounts under
the names of nominees constitutes money
laundering subjecting, under somecircumstances, the entire amounts in theaccounts to forfeiture, including the money
obtained legally as well as the crime
proceeds.
In many cases, not just organized crime
cases, money laundering violations coupledwith forfeiture have proven to be powerfulweapons to take the profit out of crime.
6. Sentences
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss
United States sentencing laws. Fairpunishment upon convictions of crimes toprotect society is obviously the ultimate
goal of all prosecutions. Perhaps mostimportant is the protection afforded byincapacitating the convicted criminal
through incarceration. To be sure,
imprisonment substantially reduces, butdoes not totally eliminate, opportunities forcriminals to continue their their illegal
activities.
In 1987, the United States Federal
Government adopted a comprehensivechange in its sentencing laws to makepunishment more definite and more

uniform throughout the federal system.
First, federal parole was abolished.
Therefore, a sentence of 10 years in jailmeans a defendant will not be paroled at ashorter time and the defendant will
actually serve 10 years in jail, with somemodest reduction for good behavior whilein jail. Other changes involved substantial
restrictions on the discretion of judges in
imposing sentences. Pursuant to thechanges, sentences are now determined byapplication of a complex numericalweighing system. Under the formula,specific numbers are assigned to relevant
factors such as the type of offense, thenature of the underlying circumstances,the defendant’s role in the offense and thedefendant’s criminal history. The numbers
are added up and the defendant isgenerally sentenced to a guideline range
according to the resulting number. Again,
I am oversimplifying complex legal
provisions.
The end result of these reforms has beenthat more defendants have been sentenced
to prison for longer terms. According to datafrom the Department of Justice’s Bureauof Justice Assistance, the state and federal
prison population in the United States rose
50 percent from 1990 to 1997, and has been
increasing 6.5 percent annually. The stateand federal prison population in the UnitedStates is now 1.7 million prisoners. During
the last 25 years, the federal and state
inmate population has increased six foldfrom 200,000 in 1972.
The increases in the length of jailsentences and the number of defendants
imprisoned has been one important factor
contributing to the reduction of serious
crime in the Untited States. According to
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports released
in 1997, between 1992 and 1996, overall
crime in the United States dropped 10.3
percent, violent crime droped 16.3 percent,murder dropped 20.4 percent, robbery

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
dropped 23.2 percent, aggravated assault
dropped 12.1 percent and property crime
dropped 9.3 percent.
I recongnize that this drop in crime isdue to a number of factors and not justputting more people in jail for longer
periods of times. But career criminals do
not just commit the one crime they areconvicted for, rather they commit many
crimes each year. Therefore, it seems to me
that putting more career criminals in jailfor longer periods of time will prevent themfrom committing those crimes whichsignificantly contributes to a reduction incrime.
I would now like to turn my discussion
from the principal aspects of the UnitedStates domestic responses to transnational
crimes and organized crime to what we aredoing together with other countries in theinternational arena to combat suchcriminal activities.
IV. UNITED STATES RESPONSESIN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
1. Extradition
It is imperative that international
criminals be denied a safe haven.
International extradition treaties remain
the most effective legal mechanism toobtain the return of international fugitives.
In 1990, the United States sought theextradition of 1,672 accused or convictedcriminals. By 1996, that number had
jumped to more than 2,894, including
numerous fugitives wanted for murder,
major drug trafficking offenses, money
laundering, multi-million dollar financial
scams, and other serious crimes committed
against the United States.
The United States is currently party toover 104 such extradition treaties. The
United States Departments of State andJustice, with appropriate input from other50

law enforcement agencies, are involved inan active program to negotiate modern
treaties in order to replace old, outdated
instruments, to create extradition treaties
where none previously existed, and toensure that new crimes are covered byextradition treaties.
In the past five years the United States
has entered into new extradition treaties
with Spain (1993), the Bahamas (1994),
Jordan (1995), Malaysia, Bolivia (1996),
Philippines (1996), Hungary (1997),
Switzerland (1997) and Hong Kong (1997).
United States extradition treaties with thefollowing countries are pending approvalof the United States Senate: Antigua andBarbuda, Barbados, Cyprus, Dominica,
France, Grenada, Luxembourg, Poland, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Spain, and Trinidad andTobago.
The United States is also pursuingefforts to secure extradition without atreaty. We encourage the international
community to work together to deny safe
havens to international criminals throughprocedures consistent with domestic andinternational law.
2. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties(MLATS)
In light of the international nature oftransnational and organized crime
activities, it is also essential to be able totimely obtain the testimony of witnesses,
bank records, other financial records andother evidence from foreign countries, andin some cases from several different
countries, and for the United States to give
similar assistance to other countries.
Therefore, Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties have become important tools to
address international criminal activities.
Barely 20 yeays ago, the United Statesentered into its first MLAT. Today, there

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
are 19 MLATs in force that extend to 23
countries. In the 104th Congress, theSenate gave its consent to five additional
MLATs with Austria, Hungary, Korea, thePhilippines, and the United Kingdom. The
number of United States madeapproximately 928 requests for mutual
legal assistance in criminal matters. In
1996, that number had increased toapproximately 1,644 requests.
The United States Department of Stateand Justice have worked together innegotiating 14 additional MLATs that will
require ratification by the Senate,including agreements with Australia, Hong
Kong, and Poland. The United States also
has signed a multilateral MLAT with theOrganization of American States (OAS),
which potentially could create MLAT
relations between the United States andthe 33 other member states of OAS.
Where there is no MLAT in force, theUnited States is hopeful that law
enforcement agencies will be able toexchange information and provide mutual
assistance in ways that are fully consistent
with the laws of the countries involved.
Such joint cooperation is essential toeffectively combat the international
criminal activities of sophisticatedcriminals who seek to exploit thedifficulties inherent in international
investigations.
3. Expanding the Presence of UnitedStates Law Enforcement Agents
AbroadTough United States laws that protect
United States citizens and interests abroad
will be of little value if the United States
does not establish an investigative and law
enforcement infrastructure to pursue
violations of these laws. United States law
enforcement officials stationed abroad
work shoulder to shoulder with theirforeign counterparts to investigate crimes

against United States nationals committed
overseas. Where offenders are identified,these officials also work to locate,apprehend, and return the perpetrators ofsuch crimes through extradition, expulsion
or other lawful means. They also facilitate
the arrest and extradition of international
fugitives located in the United States andwanted abroad.
The need for a major United States law
enforcement presence abroad is well
documented. For example, in 1996 and1997, foreign offices of the United States
Customs Service handled over 3,850 cases.
Moreover, there is often a direct tie between
the work of these overseas offices anddomestic criminal investigations. For
example, over 80 percent of the 7,068 cases
pending in FBI Legal Attache offices
overseas at the end of 1996 originated from
United States FBI field offices. Also, thenumber of cases worked by FBI agents inthe new Moscow Legal Attache office grewfrom 20 in July 1994, to 289 through July
1997 — a fifteen-fold increase. In their firstyear, the new Customs Service offices in
Moscow and in Pretoria, South Africa,
handled over 50 and 30 cases, respectively.
A substantial number of these cases involve
fugitives from United States courts, crimes
committed abroad against United Statesnationals, and other serious violations ofUnited States criminal laws.
The United States would like to expand
its law enforcement presence in othercountries to work with the host countries
to respond to this growing need. For
example, the FBI hopes to establish new
FBI offices in 24 foreign nations and to
expand existing offices in an additional 23
countries. Similarly, the Customs Service
hopes to open 11 new offices in Europe,Asia, Australia, and the Americas,
complementing 26 existing offices. The
DEA hopes to augment its already sizeable
presence with further expansion into the51

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
Newly Independent States from the former
Soviet Bloc, Latin America and othercurrent and emerging centers of drug trade.
These expansions will bolster UnitedStates law enforcement abilities to arrestand punish fugitives who have committed
crimes against the United States, todismantle international organized crimerings, and to strengthen law enforcement
and judicial systems around the globe.
To complement the increasing numberof United States law enforcement
personnel overseas, it would be helpful toexpand the Department of Justice’s cadreof overseas attorneys. Their role includes
facilitating requests for extradition andmutual legal assistance, providing
substantive legal guidance on internationallaw enforcement and treaty matters, andincreasing cooperation between UnitedStates and foreign prosecutors. In 1990, theUnited States handled approximately
2,208 extradition and 1,784 mutual legal
assitance requests both to and from theUnited States. By 1996,those numbers had
nearly doubled, jumping to 3,963
extraditions and 3,407 mutual legal
assistance requests. Furthemore,
approximately 25 percent of all extradition
requests and 9 percent of all mutual legal
assistance requests were in support of stateand local prosecutors. This increasing
caseload requires United States attorneys
in other countries to respond to requests
for information, and to facilitate thetransfer of fugitives and evidence to andfrom the United States. Currently, theDepartment of Justice has prosecutors inBrussels, Mexico City, Paris, and Rome.
The planned expansion includes additional
attorneys in Manila, Brasilia, Athens, andAsia.
4. International Training
In 1995, the United States working with
Russia, Hungary and other countries in
Eastern Europe established the52

International Law Enforcement Academy(ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary. This
academy offers law enforcement officers
from Eastern and Central Europe an eightweek personal and professional
development program modeled after theFBI’s National Academy in Quantico,
Virginia near Washington, DC. The UnitedStates is working with other countries toestablish a similar training academy inAsia.
In addition, United States law
enforcement officials participate in a wide
variety of other training and technicalassistance with other countries concerning,among other matters, fraudulent document
detection, alien smuggling, border control
enforcement, narcotics trafficking,organized crime, money laundering andasset forfeiture. Such training is mutually
beneficial to the United States and otherparticipating countries because we are able
to learn about each others’ problems anddevelop strategies and techniques toaddress these problems. It affords avaluable opportunity to work together toaddress common law enforcement
problems and issues of mutual concern. The
United States is also working with the
Ukraine and other countries to develop
prosecutors’ units modeled after the UnitedStates Organized Crime Strike Force
Units.
5. Coordination with Internationaland Multilateral Organizations(1) The United States is currently working
together with the G8 nations and theUnited Nations in the initial stages ofdeveloping an international crime
convention addressing transnationaland organized crime activities.
(2) The G7/P8 Senior Experts’ Group on
transnational organized crime has
produced 40 recommendations tocombat transnational organized crime,

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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inventories of international
conventions and institutions relating totransnational crime and inventories ofmember countries’ relevant domestic
criminal laws.

analysis, we have no other choice but tocooperate, or else sophisticatedinternational criminals who do notrecognize international boundaries will
triumph.

(3) The United Nations International Drug
Control program (UNDCP) is currently
developing a global program on money
laundering that includes a model
money laundering statute and legal
and technical assistance and training
for Southeast and Southwest Asia.
Similarly, the United States, Japan,
and other countries created the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) toaddress international money
laundering.
(4) The United States also continues towork with many countries on bilateralefforts to combat transnational andinternational organized crime criminal
activities.
(5) Finally, the United States and over 170
other countries have long worked with
the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL) whichfacilitates a broad range of bilateraland multilateral police-to-police
cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the worldcommunity shares substantial common
problems posed by transnational criminals
and organized crime groups. Therefore, wemust continue to work closely together todevelop new techniques, as well as toimplement approaches that have proven tobe successful, in our common fight against
such international criminal activities . We
must share information and cooperate to
identify, investigate and prosecute the mostsignificant international criminals andorganized crime groups. In the final

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