The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 63

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from
Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding
to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster
BENIYA Shohei＊

I. Introduction
1. BackgroundIn the Japanese disaster management system affected municipalities areforemost responsible for assisting affected residents as first responders against
disasters, and the affected prefectures should assist the municipalities if they do
not have the capability to adequately handle the disaster. In practice, affected
local governments often fail to properly handle the disaster’s aftermath. This is
likely because major disasters rarely occur and most local governments have notexperienced major disasters or have insufficient knowledge and resources. Japanese
local governments need to develop their abilities to cope with disasters.
This article focuses on two major issues that will improve local governments’disaster response abilities. The first is the business continuity management oflocal governments; the second is assistance from the national government’s onsite
organizations.
The former, business continuity management, refers to establishing amanagement system and plan to properly address and prioritize actions during
disasters in chaotic and under-resourced situations. Although Japan’s Cabinet Officepublished guidelines (Japan Cabinet Office, 2010) for the establishment of local
governments’ business continuity plans (LGBCPs or otherwise known as continuityof operations plans (COOPs)) in 2010, many local governments had not establishedthe plans before the Great East Japan Earthquake (i.e., Tohoku earthquake) of March2011 (Japan Cabinet Office and Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2010).
The latter, assistance from the national government’s onsite organizations,
was legally promulgated after the 1995 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Disaster by the＊ Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University.

Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.23, No.2（2016.1）

国 際 協 力 論 集

64

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amended Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (Kohata, Saruwatari, and Maeba,
1999). If required, the national government should support local governments. An
onsite national government disaster management headquarter (onsite HQ) seems aneffective tool for this purpose. However, a detailed system relating to the onsite HQ
had not been discussed or established until the 2011 Tohoku earthquake.

National

Figure1. National
government
assistancesystem for system
local governments
the response
phasetheFigure1. National
government
assistancefor local during
governments
duringresponse phase

2. Purposes
Firstly,
this paper provides the background of LGBCPs just prior to the Tohoku earthquake (EQ) and2. Purposes
examines theFirstly,
initial effects
and provides
challenges theresultingfrom the2011 toregarding
local
this paper
backgroundof Tohoku
LGBCPsEQ
justinprior
the Tohoku
governments’continuity
operations.
Local
operations
faced seriousresulting
consequencestoearthquake(EQ) ofand
examinesthegovernment
initial effects
and challenges
fromduethethe lackof LGBCPs
the timeof the unforeseen
great tsunami. continuity
However, there
have been veryfew
TohokuEQ inat2011
regarding
local governments’of operations.
Local
studiesgovernment
focused on theeffects of LGBCPs.
operations
faced serious consequences due to the lack of LGBCPs at theSecondly,
discussesgreat
the tsunami.
process andtransitionthereof thenational
onsitetime ofthis
thepaperunforeseen
However,havebeen government’s
very few studies
organizations
the period ranging from the Hanshin Awaji EQ to the Tohoku EQ,
focusedduringon thedisasters
effectsfromof LGBCPs.
examines theSecondly,
onsite organization
systemduring thethe
TohokuEQ, andthe effectivenessof thethis paper
discusses
process
andvalidates
transitionof the national
onsitegovernment’sorganization. Assistancefrom the national
government
andfrom
unaffected
local governments
playedonsite organizations
duringdisasters
the periodranging fromthesignificant
rolesAwaji
in responding
to theaffected
local
governments
during the
Tohoku EQ.system
Some previous
Hanshin
EQ to theTohokuEQ,
examines
the onsite
organization
duringstudiesthesuchas thoseby andSakamoto
et al.theor Satoet al. refer toother local governments.
TohokuEQ,
validates
effectivenessof assistancethe onsitefrom
organization.
Assistance
However,study
other thana few governmental
reports local
has discussed
assistancefrom significant
the national
fromnothe
national
government
and unaffected
governments
playedgovernment’sorganizations.
roles inonsite
responding
to the affected local governments during the Tohoku EQ. Some
previous studies such as those by Sakamoto et al. or Sato et al. refer to assistance

II. Methods
Firstly, this study reviews Japan’s disaster management system that existed prior to the Tohoku EQ. In
Section 3, the disaster management planning system and countermeasures to improve LGBCPs are

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 65

from other local governments. However, no study other than a few governmental
reports has discussed assistance from the national government’s onsite organizations.
II. Methods
Firstly, this study reviews Japan’s disaster management system that existed
prior to the Tohoku EQ. In Section Ⅲ , the disaster management planning system andcountermeasures to improve LGBCPs are discussed based on literature reviews. In
Section Ⅳ , the disaster-related Japanese onsite organization system and its transition
process from the Hanshin Awaji EQ to the Tohoku EQ is discussed based onliterature reviews and interview surveys conducted in 2008 of officials in the Cabinet
Office, Shizuoka Prefecture, and Osaka Prefecture.
Next, in Section Ⅴ , this study examines the circumstances and challenges
faced by local governments during the Tohoku earthquake, especially from theviewpoint of business continuity. It is based on a validation survey report in 2012 of
the Miyagi prefectural government conducted by the Disaster Reduction and Human
Renovation Institute (DRI). This author was a member of the validation survey teamthat interviewed over 300 people in approximately 100 departments and agencies in2011 and 2012. In order to analyze the challenges and lessons learned by the local
governments’ COOPs during the Tohoku earthquake, this study uses ten “elementsof a viable continuity capability for non-federal entities” as set forth in the Continuity
Guidance Circular 1 (CGC1) (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009) fromthe United States. The CGC1 is a set of continuity guidelines for non-federal entities(including local governments in the U.S.), which was published in 2009 by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Thirdly, in Section Ⅵ , this study explains the national government’s onsite
organization system during the Tohoku EQ that was used to assist affected local
governments. This author was a member of the DRI support team for Miyagi
Prefecture and the onsite HQ of the national government and was intermittently
dispatched to the Miyagi Prefectural Offices from March to June 2011. Section Ⅵ
is based on this author’s observations at that time, literature reviews, and interview
surveys of two officials from the Cabinet Office and Miyagi Prefecture in 2011.
Fourthly, in Section Ⅶ , this study evaluates the onsite organization system thatthe Tohoku EQ that was used to assist affected local governments. This author was a member of the DRI
support team for Miyagi Prefecture and the onsite HQ of the national government and was intermittently
dispatched to the Miyagi Prefectural Offices from March to June 2011. Section 6 is based on this author’s
66
国 際reviews,
協 力 and論 集
第 23surveys
巻 第 1of号two officials from the Cabinet
observations
at that time, literatureinterview

Office and Miyagi Prefecture in 2011.
Fourthly,
Section7, thisthe
studyevaluates
onsitethatgovernments.
was in place during
was in inplace
duringTohokuEQthe
fromtheorganization
viewpointsystemof localThistheTohokuEQ fromthe viewpointof local surveys
governments.
Thisofficials
section isfrom
basedtheon interview
of twosectionis basedon interview
of twoCabinet surveys
Office andofficials
CabinetOffice andinone
fromasMiyagiin 2011,
as wellas questionnaire
literature reviews
one fromfrom theMiyagiPrefecture
2011,
well Prefecture
as literature
reviews
andand surveys
questionnaire
surveys ofheavily damaged
municipalities
in theMiyagiandIwate
Iwate Prefecturesin 2011.
of heavily
damagedmunicipalities
in theMiyagiandPrefectures
in
The2011.
questionnaire
survey was sent
via post
to 15
coastalmunicipalities
in Miyagi
Prefecture andin12
The questionnaire
surveywassent
via post
to 15 coastal
municipalities
coastalmunicipalities
Iwate
Prefecture,
and a total inofIwatesix municipalities
in Miyagi
five
MiyagiPrefectureinand
12 coastal
municipalities
Prefecture, anda total andof sixmunicipalities
in Iwateby fivepost.municipalities in Iwate responded by post.
municipalities
in responded
Miyagi and

Beforethe Tohoku
earthquake(2011)

During andafter
the Tohoku
earthquake(2011)

Section Ⅲ
Japan’s disaster management
planning system and LGBCP-Literature review

Section Ⅳ
Transition of the onsite organization
system of the Japanese government-Literature review, Interview survey

Section Ⅴ
Challenges to local governments
during the Tohoku EQ-Interview surveys, Analysis with
CGC1 framework

Section Ⅵ
Role of national government onsite
organizations-Observation surveys, Literature review,
Interview surveys

Section Ⅶ
Evaluation of onsite organization during the Tohoku EQ-Interview surveys, Literature review, Questionnaire survey

Figure2.
2. Content
Content andmethods
Figureandresearchresearchmethods
III. Japan’s Disaster Management Planning System and the LGBCPIII. Japan’s
DisasterManagement
Planning
Systemand theLGBCPA disastermanagement
planning
system is
an important
countermeasurefor
Aresponding
disaster management
planning system
is andisaster
important management
countermeasureplan
for responding
to catastrophes.
A local(LDMP) tois catastrophes.
the only
mandatory plan for local governments in Japan under the Disaster Countermeasures

3

Basic Act of 1961. All prefectures and municipalities are required to create an LDMP
and revise it every year. The most important part of an LDMP is the response plan,
which outlines the local government’s roles and responsibilities and explains what
each division should do to assist individuals and affected businesses. Despite theseobligatory plans, local governments often fail to properly handle disasters. One of
the reasons is a lack of an LGBCP that prepares local governments for building
an appropriate working environment and managing resources. Local governments’
LDMP dictate what should be done after a disaster occurs, but the question of howplan, which outlines the local government’s roles and responsibilities and explains what each division
should do to assist individuals and affected businesses. Despite these obligatory plans, local governments
often fail to properly handle disasters. One of the reasons is a lack of an LGBCP that prepares local

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 67

governments for building an appropriate working environment and managing resources. Local

governments’ disaster management plans dictate what should happen after a disaster occurs, but thethose response efforts should unfold has not been considered in depth.
question of how those response efforts should unfold has not been considered in depth.
What should be done?

How should it be done?

Local Disaster Management Plan
・Mandatory according to the Disaster
Countermeasures Basic Act of 1961

Governmental Business Continuity Plan
(COOP)
・Recommended by the Guideline andInstruction Manual in 2010

Define roles and responsibilities for assisting
survivors and the affected businesses

Build an appropriate working environment
within the government for response efforts

Figure 3. Differences between a Local Disaster Management Plan and an LGBCP

Figure 3. Differences between a Local Disaster Management Plan and an LGBCP

Private Japanese companies began paying attention to Business Continuity
Private Japanese companies began paying attention to Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) after the 9/11
Plans (BCPs) after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 because they were found to
terrorist attacks in 2001 because they were found to be effective in helping companies continue to operate
be effective in helping companies continue to operate during chaotic situations. The
during chaotic situations. The Cabinet Office drafted a set of business continuity guidelines for private
Japan’s Cabinet Office drafted a set of business continuity guidelines for private
institutions in 2005. Business continuity was a critical issue not only for the private sector, but also for the
institutions in 2005. Business continuity was a critical issue not only for the private
government sector. Japan’s main government headquarters are located in Tokyo’s central district, which
sector, but also for the government sector. Japan’s main government headquarters
faces serious future risks for another great earthquake. Japan’s Central Disaster Prevention Council
are located in Tokyo’s central district, which faces serious future risks for anotherdrafted the Outline Plan for Countermeasures to address the aftermath of the Tokyo Earthquake (Central
great earthquake. Japan’s Central Disaster Prevention Council drafted the Outline
Disaster Prevention Council 2005) in 2005 and the Response Plan for the Tokyo Earthquake (Central
Plan for Countermeasures to address the aftermath of the Tokyo Earthquake (Central
Disaster Prevention Council 2006) in 2006. This required forming a BCP for departments and agencies inDisaster Prevention Council, 2005) in 2005 and the Response Plan for the Tokyo
the national government. During the Tokyo earthquake, BCPs were essential to managing resources andEarthquake (Central Disaster Prevention Council, 2006) in 2006. This required
continuing the operations of the national government’s high priority businesses. Japan’s Cabinet Officeforming a BCP for departments and agencies in the national government. During thedrafted the guidelines for the government’s BCP in 2007, and every designated government department
Tokyo earthquake, BCPs were essential to managing resources and continuing theand agency drafted its own BCP by 2008.
operations of the national government’s high priority businesses. Japan’s Cabinet
Reflecting the national government policy, some local governments started to form BCPs. For example,
Office drafted the guidelines for the national government’s BCP in 2007, and every
Tokushima Prefecture and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government drafted a BCP in 2008, and Osaka
designated government department and agency drafted its own BCP by 2008.
Prefecture and Aichi Prefecture followed suit in 2009. However, most local governments, especially
Reflecting the national government policy, some local governments started
municipalities, had not drafted BCPs by that time. A national survey (Japan Cabinet Office and Fire andto form BCPs. For example, Tokushima Prefecture and the Tokyo Metropolitan

4 and Osaka Prefecture and Aichi Prefecture
Government drafted their BCP in 2008,
followed suit in 2009. However, most local governments, especially municipalities,

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had not drafted BCPs by that time. A national survey (Japan Cabinet Office and Fireand Disaster Management Agency, 2010) reported that only one municipality had a
BCP to address earthquake disasters, and 169 municipalities were in the process ofcreating BCPs in November 2009. In order to provide recommendations on forming
an LGBCP, the Cabinet Office published LGBCP Guidelines (Japan Cabinet Office,2010) to respond to Earthquake Disasters in April 2010, approximately one year
before the Tohoku earthquake.
IV. Transitions in the Onsite Organization System for Natural Disaster
Management by the Japanese Government
1. The Hanshin Awaji EQ
Onsite organizations including onsite HQs and onsite support centers arecomprehensive contact centers of the national government for affected local
governments during disasters that they are unable to cope with situations alone. In
general, onsite organizations gather damage and demand information from affected
local governments, convey this information to the HQ in Tokyo, and coordinate
assistance countermeasures with the HQ. During the Great Hanshin Awaji EQ in 1995,
the Japanese national government set up a Major Disaster Management Headquarters
in Tokyo based on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, and also establishedan Onsite Major Disaster Management Headquarters (onsite HQ) from January 21 toApril 4, 1995. This onsite HQ was established in the Hyogo Prefectural Guest House
following cabinet approval, not by a formal law. This was because there were noformal rules regarding onsite organizations in the Disaster Countermeasures Basic
Act at that time.
The onsite HQ supported Hyogo Prefecture’s responses for a period of one
month. The roles of the onsite HQ were to maintain contact and coordination withaffected local governments, collect information and determine the needs of thosein affected areas, provide information regarding countermeasures form the national
government, and assist in the implementation of the affected local governments’policies and programs (Kohata, Saruwatari, and Maeba, 1999). After the Hanshin
Awaji EQ, the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was amended in 1995. It instituted
onsite HQ systems in affected areas during major or extreme disasters. However,centers of the national government for affected local governments during disasters where they are unable
to cope with situations alone. In general, onsite organizations gather damage and demand informationfrom affected local governments, convey this information to the HQ in Tokyo, and coordinate assistance
The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 69
countermeasureswith the national government. During the Great Hanshin Awaji EQ in 1995, the Japanesenational government set up a major Disaster Management Headquarters in Tokyo based on the Disaster
Countermeasure
Basic Act,and HQs
also establishedOnsite After
Major theDisasterManagement
the details regarding
onsitewere not an
decided.
amendment,
the Headquarters
onsite(onsiteHQ) fromsystem
Januaryhad
21 tobeen
April discussed
4, 1995. Thisfrom
onsitetwo
HQ viewpoints.
was establishedin the
Hyogo
PrefecturalorganizationOne
waspractice
Guest
House
followingcabinet approval,
nototherby a formal
law. This was because
therewere no formal
duringmid-scaledisasters,
and thewas preparedness
againstlarge-scale
rules
regardingonsiteorganizations in the Disaster Management Basic Act at that time.
disastersin thefuture.

National Government HQ (Tokyo)

Hyogo Prefectural Office

Support

HQ of Hyogo Pref.

Set upOnsite HQ
SupportAffected Municipalities

Figure4. Onsite
systemduringtheHanshin
HanshinAwaji
Awaji EQ
EQ
Figure4. Onsite
HQ HQ
systemduringtheonsite HQtosupported
Hyogo Prefecture’s
2.The
Responses
Medium-scale
Disastersresponses for a period of one month. The roles of major
onsite HQs
were toHQ
maintaincontact
and coordination
with affected
local governments,
The onsite
at majordisasters
was institutedby amending
the Disastercollectinformationand determine
the needsof thosein affectedareas,organization
provide information
Countermeasures
Basic Actin 1995;
however,the onsite
system regardingforcountermeasures
the national
government,
assist in theInimplementation
affected
medium-scale form
disasters
was not
clearly andestablished.
the case of ofthetheMt.
Usu local
governments’policiesinandprograms(Kohata, government
Saruwatari, andMaeba 1999).
theHQ
HanshinAwaji EQ,
volcanic eruption
2000,
the national
establishedan Afteronsitein Date’stheCountermeasures
Basic Act wasin 1995. It instituted
onsitecritical
HQ systems
in affected
cityDisasterhall andheld joint conferences
to amended
share informationand discuss
issuesinhandling the disaster with affected local governments (Japan Cabinet Office, 2006).

5

On the other hand, in the case of the Nigata ken Chuetsu EQ in 2004, the national
1

government set up an “onsite contact and coordination center” in the Nigata
Prefectural Office. The name of the center was changed to “onsite support center”

2

two days after its establishment (Japan Cabinet Office, 2006). A policy for the onsite
organization system for medium-scale disasters was not instituted at that time, andthe national government started to discuss the onsite organization system. As pera national report in 2006 (Japan Cabinet Office, 2006), if necessary, the national
government can establish onsite support centers and support affected municipalities
directly, but not through prefectural governments.
In practice, the national government set up onsite support centers at theoffices of affected municipalities during the Noto Hanto EQ and the Nigata ken

国 際 協 力 論 集70

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Chuetsu-Oki EQ in 2007, as well as the Iwate Miyagi inland EQ in 2008. In the caseof the Noto Hanto EQ, the national government and Ishikawa prefectural government
set up their onsite HQs at same place and assisted affected municipalities. Directcommunication between the national government and municipalities was effective
in communicating the needs of those affected and in the smooth implementation of
special assistance programs.

National Government HQ (Tokyo)
Prefecture HQ

Set upSet upAffected Municipality Office
Onsite HQ of

OnsiteSupportPref.

National Government.
SupportCenterofSupportAffected Municipalities

DirectCommunication
between thenational
government andmunicipalities

FigureOnsitesystemduringHanto
EQ theandNigata
the Nigata
ken Chuetsu-Oki
Figure5. 5.
Onsite
HQHQ
systemduringthe the
NotoNoto
Hanto
EQ andken Chuetsu-Oki
EQ EQ
in 2007

3. Preparations for Wide Area Major Disasters
The otherapproach to onsite
preparingfor Disasters
future wide area major disasters such as a
3. Preparations
for organizations
Future WideisArea
Major
Metropolitan EQ,Tokai approach
EQ, or a Tonankai-Nankai
EQ. The isJapanese
National
Government
Thea otherto onsite organizations
preparingfor futurewide hasarea
responsemajorplans forthese threepotential
great earthquakes
DisasterCouncil 2006a,
disasterssuch
as a Metropolitan
EQ,(Central
a Tokai
EQ, orPrevention
a Tonankai-Nankai
EQ.
2006b, 2006c).
The plans National
state that thenational government
will set plansup an onsite
HQ inthree
Shizuoka
for a
The Japanese
Government
has response
for these
potential
Tokai EQ,
an onsite
HQ in Tokyo
for a Tokyo
Metropolitan
EQ,Council,
and three2006a,
onsite HQs
in Aichi,Osaka,
great
earthquakes(CentralDisasterPrevention
2006b,
2006c).
The
and Kagawa
a Tonankai
NankaiEQ. Thenational government
decidedupon locations
for the onsite
plansforstatethat thenational
government
will set up
an onsite
HQ in Shizuoka
for a
HQs for Tokaia TokaiEQ,
EQ anda TokyoHQ
Metropolitan
locations of EQ,
the three
for thean onsitein Tokyo EQ.
for However,a Tokyo theMetropolitan
and onsite
threeHQs
onsiteHQs
TonankaiinNankai
were notdetermineddetailas of 2010. Nankai EQ. The national government
Aichi,EQ
Osaka,
andKagawainfor
a Tonankai
decided upon locations for the onsite HQs for a Tokai EQ and a Tokyo Metropolitan

Tablethe1. Proposed
HQs
for potential
futurefor
wide
EQs
EQ. However,locationsonsite
of thethree
onsite HQs
theareaTonankaiNankai EQ weredetail room
as of at2010.
Tokai EQnot determined
A inmeeting
least 500 m2 in the Shizuoka Prefectural Office with

120–130 staff members.
Tokyo Metropolitan

An operation hall at least 1,000 m2 for 180 staff members, in the Main Wide

EQ

Area Disaster Management Base, Ariake area, Tokyo.

Tonankai Nanaki EQ

Onsite HQs will be set up in three prefectures, Aichi, Osaka, and Kagawa,which are the backland prefectures to coastal areas. Details were not decided as

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 71

Table 1. Proposed onsite HQs for potential future wide area EQs

Tokai EQ

2

A meeting room at least 500 m in the Shizuoka Prefectural
Office with 120–130 staff members.
2

Tokyo Metropolitan

An operation hall at least 1,000 m for 180 staff members,

EQ

in the Main Wide Area Disaster Management Base, Ariake
area, Tokyo.

Tonankai Nanaki EQ

Onsite HQs will be set up in three prefectures, Aichi, Osaka,and Kagawa, which are the backland prefectures to coastal
areas. Details were not decided as of 2010.

V. Challenges of Local Governments during the Tohoku Earthquake
On March 11, 2011, a great earthquake with a magnitude (Mw) of 9.0 occurred,
and a giant tsunami impacted an extensive stretch of coastline ranging from the
Tohoku region to the Kanto region. The disaster caused the death of approximately
20,000 people and destroyed 400,000 homes. Consequences of the Tohoku
earthquake included catastrophic damage to coastal societies, simultaneous damage
covering multiple prefectures in a wide-ranging area in eastern Japan, and theinability of the national government to assist local governments.
The Miyagi Prefectural Government had problems managing resources andresponding to the disaster(Table 2). Working environments in local governments were
not well-organized. Food and water for teams and materials and fuel for response
efforts were in short supply for over a week. Local governments had agreementswith private companies such as supermarkets or gas stations, but these agreements
were not viable directly after the earthquake because they only covered “reasonable”
efforts and there were no penalties if the agreements were breached.
Table 3 shows the challenges and lessons relevant to an LGBCP during the
Tohoku earthquake, organized according to “elements of a viable continuity capability
for non-federal entities” as set forth in the Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (FEMA,
2009) of the United States.

72

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Table 2. Major Problems in Miyagi Prefecture

Resource
Management

・ Lack of preparedness for relocation to alternative operation
centers
・Inadequate working environment with lack of food and water anddamaged facilities
・Insufficient human resources, especially professionals and experts
・Lack of workable assistance agreements with private companies
・Lack of preparedness for accepting assistance teams

Information
Management

・Lack of information without communication systems
・Difficulties in organizing and sharing collected information among
departments in local governments
・Insufficient public relations through the media

Management
System・Lack of a total management system in local governments basedon common objectives and operational perspectives
・Confusion within chains of command and in communication
・ Lack of a coordination system between departments ingovernment
・Lack of logistical preparedness

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 73

Table 3. Challenges faced by the Miyagi Prefectural Government in continuity ofoperations during the Tohoku earthquake
Essential Functions ・ Miyagi Pref. did not decide upon priority businesses before thedisaster.
・Miyagi Pref. made ad hoc decisions regarding its priorities at an
executive meeting during the disaster.
Orders of
Succession

・Miyagi Pref. decided upon the orders of succession of leadership.3

Delegation of
Authority

・Authority was informally delegated to subordinates during thedisaster.

Continuity
Facilities

・ Office buildings, instruments, and communication systems wereheavily damaged, not only by the tsunami but also those inland due tolarge quakes.
・ One branch office of Miyagi Prefectural Government had aplan to establish an alternative operations center with a mobile
communication system at the time of the disaster so that staff could
respond smoothly to the consequences of the earthquake. However,
the other branch did not have an alternative plan.
・The emergency power generator did not work in some buildings due
to a lack of fuel and mechanical failures.

Continuity
Communications

・ Just after the earthquake, some municipalities could not collectinformation without their communication systems malfunctioning.
Satellite cell phones were effective in these municipalities.

Essential Records
Management

・Towns heavily damaged by the tsunami lost important records anddocuments.

Human Resources

・Many public officers in some of the local government devastated by
the unforeseen great tsunami died while responding to the disaster.
This interrupted response and recovery efforts.
・Given their limited manpower, public officers in local governments
had too many tasks after the catastrophe.
・Affected governments had not sufficiently prepared beforehand forreceiving and managing support teams.
・The support staff did not work effectively right after the earthquake.

Tests, Training,and Exercise

・Miyagi Prefecture conducted tests, then trainings and exercises.
However, the scale of the assumed damage in the trainings andexercises was smaller.

Devolution ofControl and
Direction

・ There was no devolution system between municipalities andprefectures or between the national government and prefectures
before the earthquake.

Reconstitution
Operations

・Miyagi Prefecture should change its response-focused system to arecovery-focused system.

(Source: Beniya, 2014)

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VI. The Role of National Government Onsite Organizations during the Tohoku
Earthquake
Just after the Tohoku EQ, the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarter
was established in Tokyo by the Japanese government, based on the Disaster
Countermeasures Basic Act. The Japanese government started to gather damage
information and to assist affected local governments. They sent an emergency
assessment survey team to Miyagi Prefecture on the day of the EQ, and sent teams
to Fukushima and Iwate Prefectures on the second day. The emergency assessment

Iwate survey
Prefectures
onset
theupsecond
The emergency
assessment
survey teams
became set
onsiteteams
onsite day.
organizations.
As a result,the national
government
uporganizations.
As aHQ
result,the national
government
one onsite
HQtwo
in Miyagi
with 45
one onsite
in Miyagi
Prefecturewithset45uppersons,andonsite Prefecture
support centerspersons,
twoPrefecture
onsite support
centers
Iwate Prefecturewith 20 persons
and Fukushima
in and
Iwate
with
20 in
persons
and Fukushima
Prefecturewith 30 Prefecture
personswith 30
persons 2013).
(Kotaki Two
2013).onsite
Two onsite
supportcenterswere
were systematicallyunder
the controlof the(Kotaki,supportcenters
systematicallyunder
the control
onsite of
HQ
MiyagiHQ(Figure6), and(Figure
they were
expectedcollaborate,
buttoincollaborate,
reality, independent
thein onsite
in Miyagi6), andthey towere
expected
but inresponses
to thesituation werenoted. toThe
HQ werecontrolledonsitereality,
independent
responses
theTokyosituation
noted.and
ThecoordinatedTokyo HQthreecontrolledorganizations(Kotaki 2013).
and coordinatedthree onsite organizations (Kotaki, 2013).

6. Organizationalof Disasterthe Extreme
DisasterHeadquarter,
Management
Headquarter,
Figure 6. Figure
Organizational
relations of relations
the Extreme
Management
onsiteorganizations
onsite organizations
and local governments
duringthe Tohoku Earthquake
and local governments
during the Tohoku
Earthquake

The maximumof staffat theofonsite
in Miyagi
60 approximately
persons. It was
The number
maximum
numberstaff HQat theonsite was
HQ approximately
in Miyagi wasapproximately
half theIt recommended
number forthetheproposed
onsite HQ fora futurefor
Tokaior Tokyo
60 persons.
was approximately
half
recommended
numbertheEQ
proposed
Metropolitan
putTokyoforth a Metropolitanrough responseEQ.
planThefor theTonankainankai EQ
onsite EQ.
HQ Thefor anational
future government
Tokai EQ or
national
government
with three onsite HQs with over 100 staff members at each location. However, the national government
was not well-prepared for setting up three onsite organizations. Staff members at the onsite HQ were fromthe head office in Tokyo and the Tohoku Regional Offices of the national government. Most members
were from the general staff of various ministries and agencies, not experts in disaster management. The

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 75

put forth a rough response plan for the Tonankai nankai EQ with three onsite HQs
with over 100 staff members at each location. However, the national government
was not well-prepared for setting up three onsite organizations. Staff members at theonsite HQ were from the head office in Tokyo and the Tohoku Regional Offices of thenational government. Most members were the general staff of various ministries andagencies, not experts in disaster management. The organizational structure of theonsite HQ is shown in figure 7.

7. Organizational
structureof Disasterthe Onsite
Disaster Managementat Miyagi
Figure Figure
7. Organizational
structure of
the Onsite
Management
HQ at Miyagi HQPrefectural
OfficePrefectural Office

As a basic procedure during extreme disasters, prefectures should set up prefectural onsite HQs inheavily damaged
However,due extreme
to extensive
damage andlack of resources,
As a municipalities.
basic procedure
duringdisasters,
prefectures
shouldprefectural
set upgovernments
couldonsite
not establish
onsitedamaged
HQs in affectedmunicipalities.
The onsite
and support
prefectural
HQs intheirheavilymunicipalities.
However,due HQ
to extensive
centersof the national
government
should prefecturalcollect informationand support
not only
prefectural
damageand lackof resources,
governments
could
not affected
establish
theirgovernments
but also
municipalities
in coastal
onsite HQs
in affectedaffected
municipalities.
Theareas.
onsite HQ and support centers of theTheonsite organizations’
majorroles collectwere as follows:
information
gathering, notreportingthe HQ innational
government
shouldinformationand support
onlytoaffectedTokyo,
coordinating
between thebut
national
government
and affected in
local
governments,
prefectural
governments
also affectedmunicipalities
coastalareas. operation andcoordinationTheof theprovisionof human resourcesmaterials,
sheltermanagementof national
facilities,
onsiteorganizations’major and
roles
were asfollows:
information
gathering,and coordinationof field
investigations
by coordinating
national government
officials
CabinetOffice 2011).
reporting to
the HQin Tokyo,
betweenthe(Japan
national
government
andaffected local governments, operation and coordination of the provision of humanresources and materials, shelter management of national facilities, and coordination
field investigations
by national
government
officialsthe(JapanCabinetOffice, 2011).
VII.ofEvaluationof Onsite
Organizations
duringTohokuEarthquake

1. Assessments by municipalities based on questionnaire surveys
A questionnaire survey of affected coastal municipalities in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures was
conducted in October 2011. Six municipalities out of fifteen in Miyagi Prefecture and five municipalities
out of twelve in Iwate Prefecture replied. Because onsite HQ in Miyagi Pref. was with more human

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VII. Evaluation of Onsite Organizations during the Tohoku Earthquake
1. Assessments by municipalities based on questionnaire surveys
A questionnaire survey of affected coastal municipalities in Miyagi and Iwate
Prefectures was conducted in October 2011. Six municipalities out of fifteen in
Miyagi Prefecture and five municipalities out of twelve in Iwate Prefecture replied.
Because onsite HQ in Miyagi Pref. was with more human resources compared toonsite support center of Iwate Prefecture, the replies were counted according toprefectures. The results are follows.
Regarding communication between affected municipalities and onsite
organizations, seven affected municipalities including all Iwate municipalities
communicated with onsite organizations directly through site visits by an official fromthe onsite organization. On the other hand, three municipalities in Miyagi Prefecture
had communication with onsite organizations at a working-level.

0

2

4

Almost no communication

6

8

Miyagi Pref.
Iwate Pref.

No direct communication, indirectcommunication through prefecture
Direct communication during site
visits from the onsite organization
Direct ommunication during site visits
and at the working-level

Figure8. 8.
Communication
nationalgovernment
government
onsiteorganizations
FigureCommunicationstatus
status with
with national
onsiteorganizations

Regardingwithtypesandof coordination
demands andcoordination
municipalities
Regardingissues withissues
types ofdemandsfrommunicipalitiesfrom
to onsiteorganizations,
to responses
onsite organizations,many
responses“Provisionof materials,
food,
many
included “Provisionof materials,
food,included
medical supplies,oil, etc.,”“Coordinationof sitemedicalsupplies,oil, etc.,”site visits
and field
and invisitsand field
investigations,”
and “Coordination“Improvement ofofshelter
environment.”
In investigations,”
general, municipalities“Improvementof issues
shelterenvironment.”
general, municipalities in Miyagi Pref. had
MiyagiPref. had more
to discusswith onsiteInorganizations.
more issues to discuss with onsite organizations.
0

Provision of materials, food, medical
supplies, oil, etc
Rescue efforts
Medical service, support for vulnerable
peopleDebris removal

2

4

6

8

Regarding issues with types of demands and coordination from municipalities to onsite organizations,many responses included “Provision of materials, food, medical supplies, oil, etc.,” “Coordination of site
The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 77

visits and field investigations,” and “Improvement of shelter environment.” In general, municipalities in
Miyagi Pref. had more issues to discuss with onsite organizations.
0

2

4

6

8

Provision of materials, food, medical
supplies, oil, etc
Rescue efforts
Medical service, support for vulnerable
peopleDebris removal
Improvement of shelter environment
Colaboration with NGO、volunteers
Coordination of site visits and field
investigations
Temporary housing
Other

Miyagi Pref.
Iwate Pref.

Figure9. Issues
coordinate oror discuss
discuss withgovernment
onsiteorganizations
Figure9. Issues
totocoordinate
withthethenational
national
government
onsiteorganizations
Municipalities positively assessed the role of onsite organizations,linking
damagedmunicipalities
and
0
1
2
3
4
5
the national government HQ byQuickly
respondingwithanswers such as “Quickly reporting needs and requests
reportingto National
Government HQ (Tokyo)

to the national government
HQ” and “Appropriate assessment of the situation.” The onsite organizations
Making special decisions that exceededauthorityof localmunicipalities
governments to understand their needs and circumstances, andconducted field surveys of
the affected
Appropriate material provisions
reported their findings to Tokyo.
Appropriate support of human resources
Coordination with other organizations
Provision of disaster response expertise
12
Quickly responding to questions orrequests
Appropriate assessment of situations
Consideration for reduction of local
governments' burden
Adequate decision right of onsite
organizations

Miyagi Pref.
Iwate Pref.

Other

Figure10. 10.
Positive
evaluations
frommunicipalities
FigurePositive
evaluationsofofonsite
onsite organizationsorganizations frommunicipalities

On the other hand, affected municipalities pointed out problems with onsite organizations such as“Delays in making special decisions that exceeded the authority of local governments,” and “Increase of
local government burdens.”

Coordination with other organizations
Provision of disaster response expertise
Quickly responding to questions or
国 requests
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Appropriate assessment of situations
Consideration for reduction of local
governments' burden
Pref.
Adequate
decisionright of onsite
damaged municipalities
andthe national
government HQ byIwate
responding
with answers
organizations

Municipalities positively assessed the role of onsite
organizations,linking
MiyagiPref.

such as “Quickly reporting needs and requests to the national government HQ” andOther“Appropriate assessment of the situation.” The onsite organizations conducted fieldsurveys of
the affectedmunicipalities
to understand
their
needs
and circumstances,
Figure
10. Positive
evaluations of onsite
organizations
frommunicipalities
and reported their findings to Tokyo.
On thehand,
affected municipalities
pointedout
problems
with onsite
On the other
hand,otheraffected
municipalities
pointed out problems
withonsiteorganizations
such asorganizations
such as“Delaysmaking thespecialdecisionsexceeded andthe “Increaseauthorityof“Delaysin making special
decisionsthatinexceededauthorityof localthat
governments,”
local governments,”
and “Increase of local government burdens.”
localofgovernment
burdens.”

0

1

2

3

4

Slow Report of needs and requests to
National Government HQ
Delays in making special decisions thatexceeded the authority of local governments
Insufficient material provisions
Insufficient support of human resources
Insufficient coordination with otherorganizations
Insufficient provision of disaster response
expertise
Slow response for questions or requests
Insufficient assessment of situations

Miyagi Pref.
Iwate Pref.

Increase of local government burdens
Insufficient decision right of onsite
organizations
Other

Figureonsiteorganizations
municipalities
Figure11.
11.Negative
Negative evaluations
evaluations ofofonsite
organizations
fromfrommunicipalities

13

2. Assessment by Miyagi Prefecture based on interview surveys and observational
research
Table 4 evaluates onsite HQ based on interview surveys to officials of theJapanese Cabinet Office and Miyagi Prefecture and on observational research from2011 and 2012. Linking function of onsite HQ between prefectural governments,

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 79

affected municipalities, NPO/NGOs, the national government HQ in Tokyo, and theJapan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) was highly evaluated. This was especially true
regarding the direct high-level coordination system between the governor, thechief of the onsite HQ, and the HQ in Tokyo, which was effective in making special
decisions and smoothly implementing those decisions (Figure 12). In addition, theexecutive staff of the onsite HQ stayed in Miyagi prefectural office through the end.
This helped to build a relationship of trust between the prefectural government andthe national government.
Table 4. Evaluation of the onsite HQ by Miyagi Prefecture

Positive Factors

・Smooth and direct communication between affected local
governments and the national government in Tokyo,
including informal and unconfirmed information.
・Consultation for countermeasures from the viewpoint of
the affected local governments.
・Fast and direct high-level coordination of interagency
issues through the onsite HQ and between prefectures
and the national government.
・Building trust with local governments due to long-termpresence of national executives.
・Coordination between various organizations including
NPOs/NGOs and local governments.

Issues to be improved

・ Information lags and miscommunication between thenational and local governments.
・Insufficient human resources and frequent changes ofministry officials in charge.
・ Insufficient preparation of local governments forreceiving an onsite HQ from the national government andcoordination with NPOs/NGOs.
・ Poor relations between the onsite HQ and support
centers. One onsite HQ per prefecture is preferable.

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Figure 12.
12. Direct
through
OnsiteHQHQof National
Government
FigureDirect High-level
High-levelCoordination
CoordinationSystem
Systemthrough
Onsiteof National
Government

VIII.
Conclusion
VIII.
Conclusion
1. Conclusion
1. Conclusion
theAwajiHanshinAwaji
in orderto support
affected local
governments
After the After
Hanshin
EQ, inorderEQ,
to support
affected
local governments
duringdisasters, theduringdisasters,
the national
government
improved
disaster LGBCPs
management
systemnational
government
improved
the disastermanagement
system bythe
encouraging
and establishingby encouraging
and establishinga national
government
onsitesuch
organizationa national
government LGBCPs
onsite organization
system. The
Tohoku EQ
occurred before
efforts weresystem. The Tohoku EQ occurred before such efforts were made.
made.
the Tohoku
earthquake,all heavily
local
governments
lackedDuring theAtTohoku
earthquake,all heavily damaged
localdamaged
governments
lackedLGBCPs, which
posed
LGBCPs,whichtoposed
challenges
localandgovernments.
Theysignificant
challenges
affectedsignificant
local governments.
They tolostaffectedstaff members
facilities for response
lostdidstaff
andfacilities
for response
efforts,
did not
communicate
with
each
efforts,
not members
communicate
witheach other,
did not collectsufficient
resources,and had to
work
in a
other,
did not collectsufficient
resources, and had to work in a difficult environment
difficultenvironment
without foodand water.
withoutprefectures
food and neededwater. assistance from the national government. During the Tohoku EQ, theAffected
Affectedestablishedprefectures
assistancethe twonational
national government
one needed
onsite HQ
in Miyagi from
Pref. and
onsite government.
support centersDuring
in Iwate
EQ,
theInnational
established
one HQ
onsiteHQaninimportant
Miyagi Pref.
Pref.theand Tohoku
Fukushima
Pref.
the case governmentof Miyagi Prefecture,
the onsite
playedrole inandthetwo
onsitesupport centers
Pref.
and Fukushima
Pref.
In Thethe onsite
case oflinking
national
governmentin Tokyo into Iwatethe local
governments
in affectedareas.
HQ

determined the needs of affected people and local governments and coordinated the provision of food anddaily necessities and the application of special support countermeasures. High level communication
between the governor of Miyagi Prefecture as chief of the prefectural HQ, vice ministers as deputy chiefsof national government onsite HQ, and ministers as members of government HQ in Tokyo were

The Challenges of Local Governments and Assistance from Onsite Organizations of the National Government in Responding to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Disaster 81

Miyagi Prefecture, the onsite HQ played an important role in linking the national
government in Tokyo to the local governments in affected areas. The onsite HQdetermined the needs of affected people and local governments and coordinatedthe provision of food and daily necessities and the application of special support
countermeasures. High level communication between the governor of Miyagi
Prefecture as a chief of the prefectural HQ, vice ministers as deputy chiefs of national
government onsite HQ, and ministers as members of government HQ in Tokyo were
especially effective in smoothly implementing inter-ministerial special measures.
Onsite HQ of the national government often conducted site visits to affectedmunicipalities to collect information on the needs of residents and to encouragecoordination between the municipality, JSDF, and NGOs instead of relying on theheavily damaged prefectural governments.
However, the national government was not adequately prepared to run
three onsite organizations in three prefectures. Human resources at the onsite
organizations were insufficient, which represented half or less than the proposed
scale of onsite HQs for future earthquake disasters such as a Tokyo earthquake or a
Tokai earthquake. Municipalities in Miyagi Prefecture evaluated onsite organizations
more highly than Iwate Prefecture. One reason may be that the scale of onsite
organizations in Miyagi was approximately twice that of Iwate prefecture.
2. Remaining Problems
Since the Tohoku earthquake, the national government has been reforming
the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and the Basic Disaster Prevention Plan
based on the lessons learned from the disaster. The reformed plan dictated that
local governments and other relevant organizations should create BCPs. In addition,some prefectures have begun assisting municipalities to form LGBCPs. However,since the law and the plan were reformed, many local governments, especially small
municipalities, still have not drafted BCPs due to limited budgets, staff, and expertise
regarding the drafting of an appropriate LGBCP. Japan’s Cabinet Office reformed
the LGBCP guidelines in 2015, and also published a simple LGBCP leaflet for small
4

municipalities.

The second amendment of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act in 2013

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allowed for the national government to directly assist heavily damaged municipalities ina variety of different fields. The number of officers for disaster management departments
in cabinet offices increased from 58 to 76 after the Tohoku EQ (Kotaki, 2013). However,they are not experts in emergency management, having only general knowledge
and a few years of experience. Local governments are also, as yet, unprepared forreceiving national government onsite organizations. Japan will create a workable local
government response system and onsite national government assistance system torespond to future disasters.
Notes
1 Original Japanese name is“Genchi renraku chosei shitsu”in Japanese.
2 Original Japanese name is“Genchi shien taisaku shitsu”in Japanese.
3 In the case of the town Otsuchi, in Iwate Pref., the tsunami killed the mayor; the vice mayor then took the
mayor’
s place and responded to the catastrophe as the chief of headquarters.
4 The author was a committee member for making LGBCP guidelines and simple LGBCP leaflet in 2015.

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