NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017

The Evolution of ICT and
Monetary Policy
Ryuzo Miyao
Professor, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo

A recovery in the Japanese economy centering on the corporate sector is ongoing,and economic growth potential and competitiveness are steadily increasing. The
utilization of information and communications technology (ICT) is becoming
increasingly entrenched, and this has significantly reduced the cost of innovation andcommunication. There is no question that further promotion of investment in andutilization of intangible assets such as ICT and research and development will beessential to increasing Japan’s growth potential.
However, against the background of Japan’s shortage of labor power, it is possiblethat the entrenchment of ICT as a general-purpose technology will result in the future
replacement of numerous jobs and forms of labor by capital embodying new technologies.
If the potential for substitution by technology increases, it will be economically rational
for companies to control their allocation of funds to labor income. If this mechanism
becomes stronger, it could suppress an increase in the labor share despite the fact thatthe total economic pie increases. We must consider the possibility that this will sap the
momentum of the recovery in consumption and prices.
From the perspective of ensuring that Japan’s economic growth potential
continues to increase into the future, a 2% rate of inflation is a feasible target that weshould continue to aim towards. However, it is predicted that the realization of thistarget will require a considerable amount of time. The necessary orientation for futuremonetary policy will be to flexibly but tenaciously maintain the existing framework,
while also giving deeper consideration to both the effects and potential risk of adverse
effects associated with the prolongation of monetary easing.

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
Japan’s economy is continuing to display a recovery centering on the corporate sector, andthe nation’s economic growth potential and competitiveness are steadily increasing. The
utilization of information and communications technology (ICT) is becoming further entrenched,significantly reducing the cost of innovation and communication. At the same time, however,household consumption remains cautious, and it is predicted that the realization of the 2% pricestability target will require a considerable amount of time. In addition to discussing the diverse
mechanisms by which the evolution of ICT affects such factors as economic conditions, prices, andlabor share, this paper will examine the risk of adverse effects, for example in relation to publicfinance, which might arise from a prolongation of monetary easing. Finally, the paper will consider
the desirable future direction for monetary policy management.

The Japanese economy continues to display a recovery centering on the corporate
sector, but household consumption remains cautious
To begin, I would like to consider the current status of Japan’s recovering economy. Overall,Japan’s macro-economy is continuing to improve steadily (Figure 1). The corporate sector inparticular is leading Japan’s recent recovery. Corporate profits continue to improve, and domestic
capital investment has also recently been displaying an increase (Figures 2 and 3).
In addition to recovery in overseas economies, the ongoing development of information andcommunications technology (ICT), to be discussed in the following section, cannot be ignored as afactor in the background of this improvement in Japan’s corporate sector. Investment in ICT and
the utilization of the technology are becoming more broadly entrenched, and as a result the cost ofinnovation and communication has been significantly reduced. A continuing positive supply shockis occurring, and this is contributing to increasing Japan’s growth potential and productivity.
At the same time, however, household consumption remains cautious. From around 2012,
the momentum of recovery in consumption expenditure increased, and this drove an increase in
consumer prices. However, the anticipated ripple effect on wages was weaker than expected, andsince 2014 the overlapping effects of factors including an increase in consumption tax and a decline
in pension income (with the suspension of price indexation and the implementation ofmacroeconomic indexation) have also contributed to sapping the momentum of the upswing in
consumption (Figure 4).
The overall economic pie is steadily expanding, and labor income itself is also increasing(Figure 5A). At the same time, the part of overall income represented by labor income (the labor
share) is declining (Figure 5B). This means that many household budgets which rely exclusively
on labor income are not experiencing the full extent of the recovery observed in the economy as awhole. As will be discussed below, it is possible that the development of ICT is acting as a factor
suppressing increase in the labor share, and that this is exerting a heavy drag on the recovery of
consumption.

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
Figure 1 The Japanese economy as a whole is experiencing an ongoing recovery-Real GDP –（Trillion yen）

540
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(Source) Cabinet Office, National Accounts

Figure 2 Improvement in corporate profits is driving this recovery- Sales / Ordinary profits (All industries)-

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(%)

6
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(Source) Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
Figure 3 Domestic capital investment has also recently become more vigorous- Private sector capital investment (Real) (Trillion yen)

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(Source) Cabinet Office, National Accounts

Figure 4 Household consumption remains cautious
Private consumption expenditure (Real, Trillion yen)
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(Source) Cabinet Office, National Accounts

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
Figure 5 Labor income is increasing, but the labor share is displaying adecreasing tendency- A. Nominal GDP and employee compensation （Trillion yen）

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Nominal GDP

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Employee compensation

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- B. Labor share (Employee compensation / Nominal GDP)(%)

53.0
52.0
51.0
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49.0
48.0

1994
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47.0

(Source) Cabinet Office, National Accounts

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017

Factors including the development of ICT and investment in research anddevelopment are contributing to enhancing growth potential
A brief overview of the development of ICT is in order. The awareness of ICT as acontemporary general-purpose technology and as a driver of ongoing growth is no doubt broadly
shared. Today, mobile telephones and smartphones are widely diffused among the general public,
and the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” centering on elements including the Internet ofThings (IoT), Big Data, and artificial intelligence (AI), is progressing rapidly. The digitalization of
the economy has penetrated to numerous areas of corporate activities and economic transactions,and these tendencies are becoming stronger day-by-day. Technological progress is reducing thecost of using and developing ICT, and this fact promotes further utilization of the technology.
Aggregated data published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications show a highlevel of ICT-related investment, and a survey of ICT value added (real GDP) also indicatescontinuing increases (Figures 6 and 7).
Figure 6 ICT investment is maintaining a high level-Informatization-related investment (Real) (Trillion yen)

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(Note) Informatization-related investment = Computers + Software + Electronic communications
devices; 2011 prices(Source) Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2017 White Paper: Information andCommunications in Japan

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
Figure 7 ICT-related increase in GDP is also ongoing-Real GDP of information and communications industry(Trillion yen）

46
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(Note) GDP of information and communications industry = Communications industry, information andcommunications-related manufacturing and service industries, research, etc.; 2011 prices(Source) Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2017 White Paper: Information andCommunications in Japan

Additionally, investment in research and development is increasing in vigor in step with thedevelopment of ICT. At the end of 2016, GDP statistical standards were updated to the System of
National Accounts 2008 (2008 SNA), and investment in research and development was capitalized
and came to be included in domestic capital investment. Figure 8 compares the new data series
for corporate capital investment with the old series (1993 SNA, until 2nd quarter, 2016). The
difference between the new and old series in this figure corresponds to investment in research anddevelopment. It can be seen that investment in research and development began to increase fromaround 2012, and this increase contributed to an expansion in domestic capital investment.
Corporate research and development is further advancing trends including digitalization,
robotization, and the development of the IoT, and is resulting in the further entrenchment of ICT
in the economy. This is further driving down the cost of innovation, providing impetus to thedevelopment of new products and new services. Capital accumulation is proceeding against thebackground of this mutual influence of research and development and ICT, and this has createdan environment contributing to the enhancement of growth potential.

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
Figure 8 Investment in R&D is contributing to the invigoration of domestic capital
investment -Corporate capital investment – Old and new data series:
The difference represents investment in R&D –(Trillion yen)

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Capital Investment (New data series, 2008SNA)

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Capital Investment (Old data series, 1993SNA)

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(Note) New data series: 2008 SNA (1994-2017; 3rd quarter); Old data series: 1993 SNA (1994-2016; 2nd quarter).
The difference between the two data series can chiefly be attributed to investment in R&D(Source) Cabinet Office, System of National Accounts

If the mechanism of substitution of labor by capital as a result of technologicalprogress becomes stronger, it will suppress the allocation of resources to labor
incomeThe development of ICT is also promoting fundamental change in manufacturing
technologies. As has already been much discussed, routine jobs which would previously have been
performed by humans are being replaced by ICT capital (digital devices, information systems, etc.)
and automated. The advancement of technology is acting to reduce the cost of capital goods, andthis trend can be observed globally.
For companies seeking to maximize profit, it is rational to manufacture goods by making
greater use of cheaper capital. In the study of economics, the extent of the reaction in which theratio of labor and capital invested in processes changes as a result of changes in the ratio of wages
and the cost of capital goods (the relative cost of capital) is termed elasticity of substitution. When
this elasticity of substitution is higher than 1, the amount of capital invested by companies is
equivalent to or larger than the size of reduction of the cost of capital. As a result, the ratio ofincome allocated to capital services increases, while the ratio of income allocated to labor services(the labor share) decreases1. Recent research has shown empirically that approximately half of the
When elasticity of substitution exceeds 1, production technology is expressed using a more general CES production
function (usually, elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 1, based on the Cobb-Douglas production function). Whenelasticity of substitution exceeds 1, a CES production function indicates a decline in the ratio of labor income to capitalincome (and hence of the labor share) due to a relative decline in the price of capital goods.
1

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
cases of declining labor share which have been observed globally in recent years can be explainedon the basis of this mechanism2.
This paper will focus on the question as to whether the further advancement of technology(ICT, digitalization, etc.) is further increasing the substitutability of labor by capital in
manufacturing technology (i.e. the elasticity of substitution has exceeded 1 and is further
increasing), with the result that the mechanism discussed above is increasing in strength. In
Japan in particular, it is possible that the trend towards the replacement of relatively scarce andhigh-priced labor by cheap and abundant capital is increasing in strength, exacerbated by the preexisting labor shortage. In fact, capital investment which advances labor saving approaches anddigitalization is increasing in vigor together with investment in research and development, andthe trend towards the substitution of labor by capital is increasing in pace in industries in which
innovation is accelerating, such as the finance industry. In addition, it can be considered that theincreasing number of jobs and areas of labor being replaced by capital is resulting in excess
workers due to mismatches between jobs and workers (frictional unemployment withincompanies) and adjustment costs to companies in relation to reallocation of employees, and that
this is having an effect in suppressing increases in wages.
The continued action of this mechanism suppressing increases in wages and the labor sharewill also have an effect on household consumption. If households are able to access capital income(dividends, etc.), they will be able to adequately benefit from the fruits of growth generated by thedevelopment of ICT. However, as is well known, the proportion of stocks and investment trusts is
low among the financial assets of Japanese households. Just how low this level is becomes quite
clear in comparison with the US and Europe, with the percentage in Japan around 15% against
around 47% in the US and 27% in Europe3. The benefits of expansion of the economy as a wholetend not to be smoothly transferred to Japan’s middle class, which has limited access to capitalincome. In addition, if households anticipate that the mechanism of substitution of labor by capitalwill become stronger in future, while there may hypothetically be prospects for an expansion in
the economy as a whole, the future outlook for labor income will be for resistance to increase.
As Figure 5 showed, the labor share is declining in Japan; it is not possible to ignore thepossibility that the mechanism of substitution of labor by capital functioning against thebackground of the development of ICT is acting as a factor in this decline4. ICT is expected todevelop further in future, and ensuring that the benefits of growth are transferred to thehousehold sector more broadly and more smoothly will become even more important thanpreviously. Given this, it will be necessary to examine the application of measures that consider
the mechanism of substitution of labor by capital5. For example, it would be worth examining the
L. Karabarbounis and B. Neiman, “The Global Decline of the Labor Share,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1),61-103, 2014.
3 Bank of Japan, Flow of Funds – Overview of Japan, US, and the Euro Area, August 2017.
4 A number of other factors can be indicated as contributing to the decline of the labor share. These are: ① corporate
globalization (the offshoring of labor-intensive production processes); ② institutional factors in labor markets (adecline in the rate of unionization, etc.); and ③ the rise of “superstar companies” (the labor share demonstrates agreater decline in industries in which specific companies (Amazon, Facebook, etc.) have a high market share).
5 Excessive demands on companies for wage increases mean a further increase in the cost of labor relative to capital,
which presumably has the effect of strengthening the mechanism of substitution of labor by capital.
2

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
possibility of reducing taxation on income from interest and dividends as a means of increasing
the access of households to capital income.

The 2% price stability target: Realization will take time, but it remains a target
worth striving to achieve
I would like now to look at the conduct of monetary policy based on the considerations
outlined above.
Considering first the achievement of the 2% price stability target, we can assume that there
is a strong possibility that the achievement of the target will require a considerable amount oftime. The Bank of Japan’s latest economic and price projections (Outlook for Economic Activity
and Prices; October 2017), forecasts that the 2% price stability target will be achieved in fiscal
2019. This strong possibility of the target’s realization in the next approximately two years
represents the BOJ’s main scenario. However, if we take the mechanism of substitution of laborby capital into consideration, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether the target will be
realized within this period. It would not be at all surprising if the pace of development of ICT
accelerated, and the period for realization of the 2% target was further prolonged.
If a considerable period is necessary for the achievement of the 2% price stability target,
should the target itself be reduced? The thing that must be borne in mind is that even if the further
development of ICT will hypothetically suppress increases in the labor share and prices, theeconomic pie as a whole and growth potential are increasing. A joint government/BOJ statementin January 2013 indicated the following:“The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis
will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growthpotential of Japan’s economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the pricestability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer priceindex.”
In fact, the vigor of the Japanese economy and its growth potential have steadily increased
over this period in accordance with the recognition outlined in this joint statement. This can also
be surmised from the improvement in corporate profitability and the expansion in domestic capital
investment and research and development investment and other factors indicated by the figures
above. The 2% price stability target based on the recognition that the economy’s growth potential
and competitiveness will display an ongoing increase remains an achievable target, and one
towards which we should aim.

Future policy guidance has a powerful easing effect
The Bank of Japan should maintain its 2% price stability target, and tenaciously pursue its
existing monetary easing policy. In doing so, it will be essential for the Bank to focus more
intensively on both the effects and the secondary risks of a prolongation of large-scale monetary
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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
easing than has previously been the case.
Looking first at the effects, the continuation of monetary easing measures is expected tostrengthen policy effects in future. If capital investment and investment in R&D become steadyand the growth potential of the economy increases, the neutral equilibrium interest rate (thenatural rate of interest) will display a moderate increase. This will boost the effects of monetaryeasing.
Of course, as part of today’s unconventional monetary easing policies, national central banks
officially provide guidance regarding future policy (forward guidance regarding, for example,
policy interest rates and balance sheet policy), and these announcements themselves are employed
as a policy tool. The “overshoot commitment” in the BOJ’s current framework, which will see the
Bank continue to expand the monetary base until the actual inflation rate stably exceeds the 2%
target, is an example. By declaring that the BOJ will maintain its policy of expanding the futurebalance sheet in linkage with the 2% target (i.e. in an open-ended form, without setting apredetermined period), this guidance in itself is having a powerful easing effect. It can be assumed
that this strong easing effect is extending to financial conditions as a whole, including exchange
rates and stock prices.
Conversely, we must be sufficiently aware of the fact that correction of future policy
guidance or of the 2% target framework itself would compel correction of expectations already heldby individuals and already incorporated in the market, and this would create the risk of suddenchange in the financial conditions6. Both theoretical and empirical considerations support the viewthat contemporary unconventional monetary policy, in particular balance sheet policy involving
large-scale and open-ended purchase of government bonds, can have a clear and sustainable effecton the economy7.

The risk of adverse secondary effects, for example in relation to public finances,must be examined in greater depth
At the same time, it is essential to focus attention on the risk of adverse secondary effects
that may be produced by a prolongation of monetary easing. The main risks associated withunconventional monetary policy can be indicated as (i) financial imbalances (asset price bubbles,etc.), (ii) impact on the financial system (decline in profits for financial institutions, etc.), and (iii)
effects related to fiscal policy (risks related to monetary financing, etc.).
Risk (i), the impact on asset prices, is concomitant with policy effects. If we look at pastexperiences of the formation of bubbles, for example the Japanese bubble in the second half of the
1980s, the IT bubble in the early 2000s, and the US housing bubble that triggered the global
financial crisis, we see a common factor in each case: In the background an increase in productivity
or technological innovation improves economic fundamentals, and sentiment becomes bullish. In
The so-called “Bernanke shock,” the rapid spiraling of the long-term interest rate to close to 1% following a May 2013statement by the Federal Reserve Bank’s Chairman Ben Bernanke that suggested the Fed would correct its large-scaleasset purchase program, remains fresh in the memory.
7 See Miyao, R., Hidentouteki kin’yu seisaku (Unconventional Monetary Policies) (Yuhikaku Publishing, 2016), in
particular Chapters 2 and 3.
6

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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017
Japan at present, factors including an aging population and population decline act to suppress
growth, but positive factors also exist, including the increased growth potential andcompetitiveness of the corporate sector and the further development of ICT, as discussed in thispaper. The latter positive factor is also acting overseas. Against the background of an improvementin economic fundamentals, it will be necessary to exercise sufficient caution in relation to the riskof domestic or overseas asset price bubbles, monitoring to check that sentiment does not becomebullish and that this does not lead to expansion of credit.
Regarding risk (ii), if we take an overview of the financial system as a whole, stability has
been secured in terms of both equity capital and liquidity (Bank of Japan, Financial System Report,
October 2017). However, there is a possibility that the low-profit environment for financial
institutions will be structurally maintained, and it will be essential to carefully monitor whether
vulnerability increases.
I will consider risk (iii), risks related to public finance, in two parts. First, the concern thatefforts to realize fiscal soundness will lag behind as large-scale monetary easing continues, raising
the specter of monetary financing. With regard to this concern, the Japanese government has
clearly delineated its principles in relation to fiscal soundness, and the Bank of Japan maintains
independence from government finance and implements policy based on its own judgment. With
Japan’s current account balance maintaining a surplus and net foreign assets increasing, thepossibility that safe haven status will be maintained into the future is high. At present, it isdifficult to imagine an increase in risk to the credibility of Japanese government bonds or Japan’scurrency (liabilities issued by the government and the Bank of Japan).
At the same time, there is no guarantee that this situation can continue indefinitely.
Outstanding government debt cannot be increased infinitely, and there must be an upper limit to
the debt-to-GDP ratio (at present around 190%). Beyond this limit point lie the dangerous statesof fiscal dominance and fiscal inflation. Fiscal discipline would be lost, and monetary policy would
be subordinated to government finance, systemically forced to accept, for example, direct
underwriting of government bonds and helicopter money policy. The risk of falling into this state
can be considered low at present, but it cannot be entirely dispelled. In addition to further
strengthening the economy’s growth potential, it will be essential for the Japanese government tomaintain fiscal discipline.
One further concern in relation to government finance is the potential for worsening of the
Bank of Japan’s balance sheet and the consequent fiscal burden when an exit is sought in future.
If interest rates are increased at the exit, the cost of interest payments to financial institutions
will increase, and at the same time, because the interest rate on the BOJ’s government bondholdings is low, a negative spread may occur. Whether such a negative spread will actually occur,and its scale if it were to occur, depend on a variety of factors, including the future pace of purchaseof government bonds, the pace of increase in interest rates at the exit, and the level of long-term
interest rates. If, at the exit, the economy or prices become overheated to an extent that forces a
sharp increase in interest rates, there will be a consequent sudden increase in interest expenses.
However, taking into consideration factors including the inflationary trend and the pace of interest
rate increase in the US economy, the level of long-term interest rates in the US, and global
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NIRA OPINION PAPER
No.33 | December 2017sluggishness in increases in wages and prices, at least as far as it is possible to judge at present, amoderate exit scenario is considerably more likely than a sudden one.
In any event, the ultimate exit, involving the shrinking of the balance sheet, will come intoview only when we approach realization of the 2% target. Analysis and evaluation of the actual
economy and the status of prices will be essential to advancing a constructive and realistic
discussion regarding the exit. As has been emphasized in this paper, the development of ICT andsupply-side trends (growth potential, etc.) will be key factors in this process.

Monetary policy should play a role in undergirding the recovery of the economy
into the future
Viewing Japan’s economy and price situation broadly, while we are some distance fromrealizing the 2% price stability target, steady improvement centering on the corporate sector is
ongoing. Efforts to bolster growth potential and competitiveness are proceeding well, and thislooks set to continue into the future. Based on this view of the situation, a 2% inflation rate is anachievable target, and one which we should continue to aim towards.
As corporate performances continue to improve, monetary policy must continue to play arole in undergirding recovery in the Japanese economy. Recovery is continuing in overseas
economies, and the movement towards normalization of monetary policy in the US and Europe
is advancing. In Japan, “quantity” is no longer an official operational target, and there isalready an adequate margin with regard to the pace of JGB purchases operations. If domestic
and overseas economies remain steady, the adjustment of the operational target for the longterm interest rate (currently around 0%) will also finally become a possibility. What isdemanded of monetary policy in Japan is a flexible but tenacious maintenance of the current
framework, with careful attention to both the effects and the risks of the continuation ofmonetary easing measures.
Ryuzo Miyao
Professor Miyao took his Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University, and teaches in The
University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Economics. He is a former Member of the Policy Boardof the Bank of Japan (March 2010 – March 2015). His fields of specialization are monetary
economics and empirical macroeconomic analysis.

This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.

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