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Deep Disposal of Spent Fueland High-level Waste… Status and Issues in Safety Case and
Safety Regulation, and Implications for
Safety Research by Regulators
Claudio Pescatore, PhD

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Overview of presentation
Part I - The OECD and the NEA

Part II – CURRENT STATUS AND ISSUESPart III - FINAL REMARKS3

OECD/NEA
Membership
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Australia
Austria
Belgium
CanadaChile
Czech Republic
Denmark
FinlandFranceGermany
GreeceHungary

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Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
MexicoNetherlands
New Zealand
NorwayPolandPortugal
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Slovak Republic
Spain
SwedenSwitzerland
TurkeyUnited Kingdom
United States

Not member of NEA

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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) - OECD Strategic ObjectivesuPromote sustainable economic growth, financial stability
and structural adjustmentu

Improve human capital and social cohesion, and promote asustainable environmentuContribute to shaping globalisation through the expansionof trade and investmentuEnhance public and private sector governanceuContribute to the development of non-member economies

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The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency( NEA )To assist its member countries … the scientific,
technological and legal bases required for the use of nuclear
energyTo provide authoritative assessments and to forge
common understanding on key issues, as input togovernment decisions on nuclear energy policy, and as input
to broader OECD policy analyses

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7Management of Radioactive
Waste and Materials - Goal
nAssist members in the area of management of radioactive waste andmaterials, focusing on the development of strategies for the safe,
sustainable and broadly acceptable management of all types ofradioactive waste, and in particular long-lived waste, and spent fuel8

Radwaste and Decom at NEA
Radioactive Waste Management Committee
RWMC
Forum on Stakeholder
Confidence (FSC)

Integration Group for
the Safety Case (IGSC)

WP on Decommissioning
and Dismantling (WPDD)

Integrating Geologic
Information - AMIGO

Decommissioning
Costs Estimation
Group (DCEG)

Methods for
Safety Assessment(MeSA)

Task Group on R&D

Reversibility &Retrievability

Thermochemical
Database –(TDB IV) [*]Regulators ForumRWMC - RF

Expert Group on
Argillaceous Media –(Clay Club)

Co-operative
Programmeon Decommissioning(CPD) [*]

Sorption Project –(SORPTION III) [*][*] Co-operative projects

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The Regulatory System and Cycle.
Policy Planning
Objectives

Legislation /Regulation
Assessment / Feedback

Licensing

Enforcement

Compliance Control

Compliance
Promotion

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Many players in the regulatory system
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AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AIST, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science andTechnology
CRIEPI, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
JAEA, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
JNES, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
METI, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (NISA, ANRE)
MEXT, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
MLIT, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
NSC, Nuclear Safety Commission
NIRS, National Institute of Radiological Sciences
NSRA, Nuclear Safety Research Association
NUMO, Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan
Parliament (Diet)
RWMC, Rad. Waste Management Funding and Research Center
10…. REGIONAL and LOCAL Authorities

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All regulatory players need some researchto support …
nDevelopment or revision of policy and legislationn

Development or revision of regulationn

Review of license application and for tracking decisions● Development of understanding of major safety featuresn

Keep track of evolving scientific knowledge and societal
requirements, e.g., on the role of the major players
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There are constraints on the research to be
carried out by technical regulator …
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Be informed of, but not develop, process understanding and complex
modelsOk to checking on specific claims by the implementer, but no to taking
a lead in technical areas
Focus on safety-relevant aspects, and make sure it is the authority
views and not necessarily that of its support organisation. Exemple of
GPD in France.
Limited to certain (late) parts of the process
Technical support, for the most part.
Many important decisions are made by others, and notnecessarily on technical grounds. The regulator can only
vouchsafe that a given solution is “safe enough”, and notnecessarily “the best”.

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A case can be made for the regulator…
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To INITIATE research, in order to force industry to get intoa research topic, or to create a national or international
breeding ground for ideas and create a broader base ofexpert resources.

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To obtain additional technical support● when taking up new responsibilities● to prepare for carrying out future duties/tasks better

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Human resources are fundamental…
n… the regulator needs to employ experienced personnel
who know the strength and limitations of researchn…train and keep this personneln… ensure that lessons learnt and decisions made areproperly archived and transferredn[all of this may require some research by itself]14

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Success in Communicating Safety (安心) (it is instructive to replace“community” by “regulator” in this overhead, and “success” with“when the regulator is ready to communicate confidence”)

Success
Success

Community accepts
facility

Community believes
accepts
CommunityCommunity
Community believes
understands needfor facility
facility
will be thatsafethey will be kept
facility
and accepts
involved and informed
Communitysees
thatCommunity
Respected
sees thatCommunity
third parties
sees that
benefits
outweighrisks
Community
theretrusts
are independent
there is an acceptablesay that facility
similar facilities
proponent
processes in place
to casewill besafetyelsewhere
safe
have been
Effective and impartial
Proponent acts
in ansafetySafety case is easy
to to be safe
ensureshown
regulatory process isopen manner
understand
seen
to
be
in
place
Proponent’s
Effective
and impartial
Safety case is robust
representatives
appear
Proponent’s
past
EAand
process is seentoand showsthat facility
competent
recordinspiresbe in place
will be safe
trustworthy
confidence
Community
understands need forfacility and accepts
benefits outweigh risks

Community trusts
proponent

Community sees that
there are independent
processes in place toensure safety

Community believes
that they will be kept
involved and informed

Community believes
facility will be safeCommunity sees that
there is an acceptablesafety case

Respected third
parties say that facility
will be safe

Proponent acts in an
open manner

Effective and impartial
regulatory process isseen to be in place

Safety case is easy tounderstand

Proponent’s
representatives appear
competent andtrustworthy

Effective and impartial
EA process is seen to
be in place

Safety case is robust
and shows that facility
will be safeCommunity sees thatsimilar facilities
elsewhere have beenshown to be safe

Proponent’s pastrecord inspires
confidence

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Industry’s challenges in Communicating Safety (both安全and 安心) (They are challenges for the regulator too)
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Public lacks familiarity and comfort with things nuclear
Public does not have time to try to understand issues
Public has inherent reluctance to trust any proponent*
Conveying the concept that disposal facilities will be safe for thelong timeframes for which radioactive wastes can remain
hazardous**
The media often seeks to report on conflict and direconsequences to promote story interest, resulting in the public
not knowing whom to believe and becoming more apprehensive* but it may trust better the regulator ; ** challenges “from within”

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Part of the challenges come “from within”...
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Are we clear on what are “Safety, Protection ,Optimization, Health Detriment, Environment’’?
● These concepts are typically not (well) defined inregulation, especially disposal regulation

Are short term practices (and concepts) reallyapplicable to all time scales, or do they have tobe adapted or evolve ?
n Do we have clear understanding and objectives
for formulating regulatory criteria that aretransparent and implementable ?
n

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Challenges from within: The example of “dose”
nDose : As used in regulation it is “effective dose”; this is amanagement tool good for short term and not a direct/goodmeasure of health detriment. (ICRP)nCalculated effective dose is certainly not a measure ofhealth detriment beyond a few generations (ICRP, HPS)n

Dose criteria are just indicators of safety amongst others.
They are thus to be used in a comparative fashion and
not in the absolute, e.g., to convince of the quality of thesolution. The best solution is not necessarily the one
with lowest dose (ICRP)
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19… “safety indicators” (from IAEA 2007 Glossary)“Such quantities are most commonly used in situations where predictionsof dose or risk are unlikely to be reliable*, e.g. long term assessmentsof repositories. They are normally either:(a)Illustrative calculations of dose or risk quantities, used to give an
indication of the possible magnitude of doses or risks forcomparison with criteria+; or(b)

Other quantities, such as radionuclide concentrations or fluxes,
that are considered to give a more reliable indication of impact,
and that can be compared with other relevant data**.”* In fact even if they were reliable, they would not be a measure of healthdetriment ; + firstly among themselves; primarily, natural background

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Challenges from within: The example of “safety”…
n Safety in the technical sense is related to controlof sources and presence of regulator. What we dofor AN-ZEN (安全) (namely, quality assurance,
controls) is not extendable indefinitely in time.
n Safety: for a certain time it must also be AN-ZEN(安全), but it must be AN-SHIN (安心) all the time
(also of the regulators!)n AN-SHIN (安心) requires additional effort to
ANZEN (安全) [AN-SHIN refers both to thephysical system and to the decision making
system and its components]
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Challenges from within: possible research
priorities...
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Are fundamental concepts the same in the
short and in the long term? How do theychange with time scales? In particular● Effective dose ; potential dose
● “Safety”● Health detriment● Optimization● Environment (e.g., only man or also … plants?)● …

nImportant evolution in radiation protection
thinking during the past 15 years
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22“Safety” Case (IAEA glossary, 2007)nn“A collection of arguments and evidence in supportof the safety of a facility or activity. This will normally
include the findings of a safety assessment+ and astatement of confidence++ in these findings.
For a repository, the safety case may relate to agiven stage of development. In such cases, thesafety case should acknowledge the existence of
any unresolved issues and should provide guidance
for work to resolve these issues* in future
development stages.”* the fact that research is neverabandoned is a confidence factor;
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Challenges from within: Confidence by theregulator (direction:安心)•

The regulators have a special role in society: they havethe competence, the tools and mandate to do what societyneeds before it takes a decision – i.e., to determine how
confident we can be in a given solution•

The regulators must first determine their own confidence
and then communicate it.

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The regulators need to make the assessment processtransparent:••

which are the confidence criteria to be evaluated for the different
parts of the system and, in particular, for the safety case.
How these criteria are met in each case

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ASSESSMENT BASIS

from NEA Confidence document of 1999

SAFETY STRATEGY
Strategy defining the approach adopted to the building of a safety case

SYSTEM CONCEPT
Site and design

Suitability of site anddesign to provide
long-term isolation
capability

Favourability of siteand design toconfidence
in performanceassessment

Robustness of the system concept

ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
Available resources, including assessment
methods and models, site-characerisation
data and other information

Quality of theinformationon the repository siteand design

Quality of the methods
and model used toassessthe information

Quality of the assessment capability
and reliability of performance assessment

CONFIDENCE IN THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF LONG-TERM SAFETY

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NEA Peer Review Guidance questions
http://www.nea.fr/html/rwm/docs/2005/rwm-peer2005-2.pdf[also: Pescatore, 2005]
n We developed 40 questions which

regulators can ask to test the quality ofthe safety case and assess theirconfidence in itn See application of those questions in the

NEA peer review report of Nagra’s“Entsorgungsnachweis”
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26⌦ What is the strategy for achieving

safety (安全), i.e., an intrinsically safe
system (robust system concept)?
- through the choice of site, design, andmaterials, avoiding or forcing to low
probability or consequences mostphenomena and uncertainties that could be
detrimental to safety and its evaluation

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⌦ WHAT IS THE STRATEGYTO

ARGUE SAFETY (both 安全 and 安心)
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Declare role of barriers and system functions
Identify and explain assessment cases
Verify quality of tools, data, analyses
Explain that PA is for testing system performance
Analyse system beyond design basis andregulatory compliance points
Use other indicators of safety andperformance…..
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Confidence criteria of the regulator…
• … Confidence statement, etc.
• … Would be a good research area for preparing theregulatory review of safety cases and for preparing
statements directed to the implementers, public, andpoliticians.
• The preparation of these criteria would be a goodbasis also for interaction with the above
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A safety case …
nShould document understanding or lack thereofnUnderstanding will vary according to the time periods
consideredn

It is desirable to identify various time periods (or torequest such identification) during which specificsafety functions or processes may be relied upon.
● Implementers are doing this already; regulators could
encourage this practice.

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Safety functions by time period (SAFIR-2)…

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Safety processes by time period (Nagra) …

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“Early times… and far-away times”
nPost-closure safety analyses tend to focus on the
period between 1,000 and 1,000,000 yearsn

The periods beyond 1,000,000 years and before
1,000 years are however also important to regulatorsand the public for different reasons.
● Regulators will need to show interest here.

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Challenges from within: During the first
couple of hundred years …
n The full regulatory cycle can, should,

and will be applied.
n Three issues seem important and not
fully worked out:
● The position of the regulator regarding
retrievability till closure● The position of the regulator regarding
reversibility of decisions● The position of the regulator regarding themeaning of closure33

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Retrievability of waste packages…
nRegulators ought to be clear about their position:● Is retrievability a “safety” (安全 or 安心) feature during
operations ? Or not ?
● Should retrievability be mentioned as existing/required, orshould it be left as “understood” that during the operational
period “one will always be able to retrieve containers”?
● Can provision of retrievability during operations help better
fulfill the long-term safety (安全) potential of the repository?

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Reversibility of decisions …

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Reversibility of decisions …
nRegulators’ commitment to stepwise decision-making● A decision to move forward is fully meaningful only if otherpossibilities can also be envisioned.
● A decision to go forward actually contains two elements:
first, not to go back; second, to go forward on a specific path.
Is this reflected in regulatory policy?
● Does reversibility require retrievability?

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Meaning of closure …
nn

Is closing of the repository, the same as the definitive“closure of the problem”?
Or the beginning of a new phase? One of safeguards,
surveillance, monitoring, active memory keeping,…for as
long as possible* ?
● What kind of regulatory regime would apply? That of an
operating facility or that of “cleared” waste or that of exclusionfrom regulation?

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Can we be definitive now about a “walk away” policy at
closure?
● does national law indeed allow for a nuclear installation of a few Km-sq
to become a piece of waste to be “abandoned”? Is closure of repository
the same as releasing waste in Nature by dispersion?

*

Continued surveillance is the ICRP suggested policy and dose constraint criterion, otherwise aclearance regime may apply….

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Challenges from within: Period after closure andbefore 1000 yearsn

Period with great complexity of waste-environment interaction, but also one
where no radioactive release is expected from HLW repositoriesnPeriod when there is a chance that the regulatory cycle may be applied,
and that nuclear competences continue to existnPeriod of most interest to the local public.

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Should we decide now to cease, at closure, monitoring, application ofsafeguards, etc.?
● Why not consider that there is time to research monitoring schemes
and other technological provisions for surveillance and that future
regulators can assess their applicability?
● Why not to involve the local community and authorities in memory
keeping and in monitoring activities, which they typically demand?
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Challenges from within: Period beyond a few
hundred thousands years …
nnThere must be clarity, by the regulator, regardingwhether the waste will ever be benign
More research is needed, e.g.,● If undiluted, when would the HLW change waste category?
● When would the chemical toxicity of HLW be equal to, or greater
than, its radiological toxicity? “are we barking at the wrong tree?”● If the potential hazard persists, e.g., during millions of years, cannothing be done to reduce the probability of exposure? [e.g.,
subduction areas]● If the hazard will persist, what ethical principles should we apply
now -- even if uncertainties in predictions are high?

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Recent (German) data for unshielded HLW glass
cylinder …
Dose-rate 10-m away from the source at different times
Time[years]1.0E+3

1.0E+4

1.0E+5 1.0E+6 1.0E+7 1.0E+8 1.0E+9

Neutron Dose[μSv/h]1,60E+00

9,54E-02

2,25E-02

3,80E-02

2,00E-03

5,78E-05

4,02E-05

Gamma Dose[µSv/h]7,07E+01

3,65E+01

1,45E+01

3,04E+00

1,79E-01

2,29E-02

1,89E-02

Total Dose[mSv/h]7.2E-2

3.7E-2

1.4E-2

3.1E-3

1.8E-4

2.3E-5

1.9E-540

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Dose rate to intruder as function of time (40 cm fromsource; C2=HLW sample of 40-cm Height, 10-cm Radius)
…

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Culprits throughthe first 1.0E+7
years:
Pa-233; Th-229;
Bi-213; Tl-209“artificial chain
radionuclides

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Innovating for An-Shin with and forstakeholders - 1n

The public has confidence-needs similar to those of regulators.
● Like the regulators they are the receivers of the project and need tomake a judgement and to keep checking the well-foundedness of
their judgement over time.

nNote that radioactive waste has a profound, symbolic dimension,
highly visible to the public.
● www.intoeternitythemovie.comn

The public needs to know and feel that there exists a competentand technically independent regulator, and that this regulator is in
the service of the public.

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The regulator has to attend to the public needs.
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Innovating for An-Shin with and forstakeholders - 2nRegulator needs to be visible to the community and respond totheir questions● On 13th January 2010: the West Cumbria Partnership (UK) heard apresentation from the Health and Safety Executive and theEnvironment Agency about the role that these regulators would playin regulating a geological disposal facility if it is sited in West
Cumbria. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (theimplementer) also gave a presentation on the issue of retrievability● SKI ran an exercise (the DIALOGUE project) with mock hearings to
explain their role but also to understand it better.
● Large volume of Social Research activities in the Nordic Countries
to refine the understanding of the Regulators roles, but also to
become more visible and more accountable. Lately also in UK and
Germany. In France the Advisory Group to the regulator has an
NGO representative.
● The future may bring about a culture of co-decision. Which signs inJapanese society? How to prepare for it?
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CONCLUDING REMARKSnRadioactive waste disposal is a “new game” vis-à-vis other nuclear
regulatory activities: familiar concepts no longer apply unchanged; thetimescales for safety are unique; radioactive waste has bad press; theimplementation process is very long (challenge and opportunity)nRegulation and regulators are fundamental to creating An-shin. There
are many avenues for research into creating An-shin, they pertain bothto the technical field and to social system of decision-making.

nUltimately, the regulators’ expectations for judging and forcommunicating safety are not so different from those of the public.

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Regulators: consider your role not as an administrative
function, but as a formidable intellectual adventure in theservice of the public !
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Elements to be represented
EBS &host rock

HydrogeologicalsystemSurfaceenvironment
processes

Radiological
exposure modes

Changes acting on these elements
Geological change
Climatic change
Ecological change
human intrusion

Human activities
Individual habits

100

10’0001’000’000

Predictability of changes
into the future

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years
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