THE LATEST REGIONAL TRENDS IN CORRUPTION AND EFFECTIVE
COUNTERMEASURES BY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITIESStephanie Chew *The focus of this paper is developments in sentencing for corruption offences in Singapore,with a particular focus on private sector corruption. In the course of this discussion, we will
highlight seminal cases that have set out the crucial sentencing principles, discuss recent
developments in case law interpreting relevant deeming provisions of the Prevention ofCorruption Act (the primary legislation in Singapore dealing with corruption offences) thatimpact sentencing, and finally, future potential developments.
The paper is structured as follows:a.

Sentencing principles in private sector corruption;b.

Recent developments in case law interpreting provisions of the Prevention ofCorruption Act regarding inchoate offences; andc.

Potential future developments including that of a sentencing framework for corruption
offences.

I.

INTRODUCTION: SENTENCING IN PRIVATE SECTOR CORRUPTION

The effective deterrence of corruption requires a multi-pronged approach. Stiff
imprisonment terms are usually meted out for offenders in public sector corruption, given theobvious harm and public interest in deterring such offences, which tend to undermine theintegrity of Singapore’s public administration.
However, this does not mean that private sector corruption offences are ipso facto lessserious than corruption in the public sector. Corruption in the private sector imposes hidden costs
to the economy and undermines the sanctity of contract and its role as a facilitative institution ina society governed by the rule of law.
Recent developments in sentencing practice have centred on private sector corruption, as
these form the vast majority of cases prosecuted. Further, there had previously existed aprevailing misconception that private corruption typically attracts fines (and not imprisonment),
which has been corrected through High Court precedents expounding upon the relevant
principles (as discussed in Part II). Our focus has therefore now turned to developing a broader
sentencing framework that can be applied to both public and private sector corruption, which*Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney-General’s Chambers, Singapore.

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takes into account how the harm of the offences and culpability of the offender should becalibrated against the full range of statutorily prescribed punishment (as discussed in Part IV).
II. SENTENCING PRINCIPLES IN CASE LAW – PRIVATE SECTOR CORRUPTION
Public Prosecutor v Ang Seng Thor [2011] 4 SLR 217 is a seminal decision concerning theprinciples to be applied in sentencing in private sector corruption. In that case, Ang Seng Thor(“Ang”), a Singapore citizen, was the CEO and joint-Managing Director of a company called
AEM-Evertech Holdings Ltd, which was listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. He wasprosecuted on two counts of corruptly giving gratification, one of which involved him giving abribe of S$50,000 in Malacca to a director of a Malaysian company in order to secure a deal for
6AEM. The other charge against Ang was for corruptly giving S$97,158 in cash in Singapore toan agent of another company as kickbacks for each purchase order raised by this company toAEM.
Ang pleaded guilty to both charges. At first instance, he was sentenced by the District Judge
to the maximum fine of $100,000 for each charge (i.e. a total sentence of a $200,000 fine). The
Prosecution appealed against this sentence on the basis that it was manifestly inadequate, andsubmitted that a custodial sentence should be imposed on Ang in addition to a fine anddisqualification from acting as a director.
The Prosecution’s appeal was allowed. On appeal, Ang’s sentence was enhanced to six
weeks’ imprisonment and S$25,000 fine per charge, with both imprisonment terms to runconsecutively. The total sentence was therefore 12 weeks’ imprisonment and a fine of S$50,000.
Significantly, on appeal, V K Rajah JA commented that the District Judge erred in finding
a distinction between public sector corruption and private sector corruption which justified
different sentencing benchmarks or starting points.
He further held that while there is certainly a public interest in preventing a loss ofconfidence in Singapore’s public administration which warrants a custodial sentence for public
sector corruption, this does not automatically mean that such public interest was not present inprivate sector corruption. More importantly, triggering the public interest is not the only way
that a custodial sentence may be imposed for private sector corruption. The custodial thresholdmay be crossed in other circumstances, depending on the applicable policy considerations andthe gravity of the offence as measured by the mischief of likely consequence of the corruption.
Furthermore, factors such as the size of the bribes, the number of people drawn into the web ofcorruption and whether such conduct was endemic are all relevant factors in determining
whether a custodial sentence is justified. It is important to dispel the misconception that private
sector offenders would not be punished to the same extent as public sector offenders – Thiswould undermine the anti-corruption regime in Singapore. This is especially when one
6NB: Though the bribe was handed over in Malaysia, Ang was prosecuted in Singapore pursuant to Section 37 ofthe Prevention of Corruption Act, which makes Singapore citizens liable for corruption offences committed outsideof Singapore and to be dealt with in respect of that offence as if it has been committed within Singapore.

- 127 -considers the limited deterrent value of the maximum fine against private sector offenders likeAng (who was of means).
The principles espoused in Ang Seng Thor were reaffirmed by Chief Justice Sundaresh
Menon in Public Prosecutor v Syed Mostafa Romel [2015] 3 SLR 1166, i.e. that “there is nopresumption in favour of a non-custodial sentence where private sector corruption isconcerned”, and the specific nature of corruption was of paramount importance in determining
the appropriate sentence to be imposed. Menon CJ found it timely to reiterate the Ang SengThor principles as they had not been consistently followed subsequent to that case. Moreover,Menon CJ remarked that the increased outsourcing of public services and the corresponding riseof the ability of private actors to influence the public interest required more accountability for
public monies spent. Accordingly, where the private sector corruption involved a) a significant
amount of gratification b) gratification which had been received over a lengthy period of time orc) compromised of one’s duty or a serious betrayal of trust, the starting point was likely to be acustodial sentence.
In this case, Romel was in charge of inspecting vessels seeking to enter an oil terminal byissuing inspection reports. If the defects identified were high-risk, the vessel would have torectify the defects before being permitted to enter the terminal. Romel corruptly solicited andreceived a total of US$7,200 over three occasions from two captains of marine tankers inexchange for favourable inspection reports. Romel pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an
aggregate of two months’ imprisonment. On appeal, his sentence was enhanced to six months’
imprisonment.
The Romel case is a landmark decision concerning the sentencing principles for private
sector corruption cases in Singapore, and has been instrumental in forging the way forward fordeveloping clearer guidelines for the prosecution of corruption offences in general, as will beconsidered in section IV below.
III. SENTENCING PRINCIPLES – INCHOATE OFFENCES
Recently, the Singapore High Court interpreted Sections 29, 30 and 31 of the Preventionof Corruption Act in Public Prosecutor v Lau Cheng Kai. The relevant sections read:
Abetment of Offences
29. Whoever abets, within the meaning of the Penal Code(a)the commission of an offence under this Act; or(b) the commission outside Singapore of any act, in relation to the affairs orbusiness or on behalf of a principal residing in Singapore, which if
committed in Singapore would be an offence under this Act, shall bedeemed to have committed the offence and shall be liable on conviction tobe punished with the punishment provided for that offence.

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30. Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable under this Act shall bedeemed to have committed the offence and shall be liable on conviction to bepunished with the punishment provided for that offence.
Conspiracy

31. Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy, within the meaning of the Penal

Code [Cap. 224], to commit an offence under this Act shall be deemed tohave committed the offence and shall be liable on conviction to be punishedwith the punishment provided for that offence.
[Emphasis in provisions added]

Lau Cheng Kai involved three staff and an associate of Global Marine Transportation Pte
Ltd (“GMT”) and a suspected buyback on the vessel Demeter Leader. The Prosecution had
proceeded to trial on a charge of criminal conspiracy under s5(b)(i) read with section 31
Prevention of Corruption Act, for a conspiracy to bribe chief engineers and surveyors forbuyback. The evidence showed that at least USD30,000 had been set aside for the payment ofsuch bribes, although there was no evidence that any part of the money had in fact been paid.
The accused was convicted, and he appealed against conviction and sentence. The Prosecution
cross-appealed on sentence.
The High Court dismissed the accused’s appeals and allowed the Prosecution’s crossappeal. The High Court interpreted the above-named provisions and held that their effect is todeem inchoate offences as completed for the purpose of sentencing. In other words, the accused
persons must be punished on the basis that the criminal conspiracy as planned was successfully
carried out, even though the bribes (or any part thereof) had not been paid/proven to be paid.
Accordingly, no mitigating weight or sentencing discount could be accorded on the basis thatthe corruption offence was factually not committed.
The High Court found that such an interpretation accorded with Parliament’s intent to“reduce the opportunities for corruption, to make its detection easier and to deter and punish
severely those who are susceptible to it and engage in it shamelessly.” The deeming provision(s)provide the Prosecution with an expanded arsenal with which to effectively target persons
involved in acts of corruption.
The High Court’s judgment is a welcome clarification of the law which emphasizes theseverity of corruption and judicial commitment to giving full effect to Parliament’s approbationof corruption offences.

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CORRUPTION OFFENCES AND AMENDMENTS OF THE PREVENTION OF
CORRUPTION ACT
Finally, we briefly consider potential future developments related to our efforts to develop ageneral sentencing framework for corruption offences.
The Singapore High Court has affirmed the principle that it is incumbent on a sentencing
court to calibrate punishment against the full range of prescribed punishment (PublicProsecutor v Hue An Li). Since then, the Singapore High Court has issued several guideline
judgments on sentencing for different types of criminal offences, adopting a variety ofapproaches – for example, an indicative sentence, a sentencing benchmark, a sentencing matrix
or sentence bands. In late 2018, Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon issued a guideline judgmentwith the first sentencing framework for a financial crime (albeit not corruption- related), forcheating at play under Section 172A of the Casino Control Act.
In line with these judicial pronouncements, around this time, the Prosecution had also
proposed a sentencing framework for corruption offences and had utilized it in three test cases.
The State Courts have accepted the Prosecution’s proposed sentencing framework in two ofthese cases but rejected it in the third. All three cases will be going on appeal before the High
Court.
The approval of a sentencing framework for corruption offences by the High Court will beof great utility in the fight against corruption. Further, the benefits of adopting a sentencing
framework include improving parity and consistency of sentencing, and ensuring that the fullrange of punishment (as prescribed by Parliament in statute) is utilized appropriately.
We are of the view that our efforts to develop a sentencing framework should beaccompanied by increases in the maximum punishment for such offences. Such would signal a
clear legislative intent to robustly deter corruption. Furthermore, it is necessary for the maximum
fines to be sufficiently stiff so as to adequately deter corporations.
These developments, taken collectively, will be useful tools in our efforts to deter,prosecute and adequately punish corruption.
V. CONCLUSION
Singapore has made significant developments over the past decades in the fight against
corruption – However, we are conscious of the need to continually strive to effectively combat
corruption and preserve our society’s zero-tolerance stance towards it. Sentencing principles
and practice are important aspects of the fight against corruption, and we will continue to work
to develop the law in this regard.

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