Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women:
The Case of Migrant Filipina Entertainers in Japan

Rhacel Salazar Parrenas

The article examines the migration process of entertainers from the Philippines
to Japan. It establishes the conditions of trafficking that leave foreign entertainers
in a position of debt bondage and indenture vis‑a‑vis middleman brokers. Then,itshows how laws established to protect entertainers in the process of migration infact make prospective migrants vulnerable to trafficking. This is because suchprotective laws, which are espoused by the culture of benevolent paternalism thatsurrounds the migration of women in Asia and the rest of the world, preclude theindependent migration of entertainers.

Key Words: M igration Policy, Entertainers, Philippines, Japan.

One afternoon,I paid a visit to Cindy,a 21‑year‑old mother of two who was soon completingher six‑month contract to work as an “entertainer”in Japan. She was returning to the Philippines
in a few days and could not help but share her anxiety over the unlikelihood of her return to Japanand the grim outlook of her jobless future in the Philippines. Cindy has only ever worked as ahostess in Japan,but recent changes in visa requirements for foreign “entertainers”is closing thedoor to her possible job renewal and resulting in the denial of many visas for prospective migrants
and return migrants like Cindy. Cindy vaguely understood the changes in policy to be forced by
the United States,but for reasons unknown to her. Figuring I would know,she then asked me“
Ate(big sister), why is your government making our lives difficult? Is it because they want us to becaregivers?” Recently, the government of Japan opened its doors to a limited number of elderly
caregivers from the Philippines,but I told her that I do not think that the United States is involved
with this bilateral agreement between the Philippines and Japan. Responding then to her question
over the role of the United States in the tightening ofvisa requirements for“
entertainers”in Japan,
I said,“I think they are doing it to protect you.” Perhaps not sure of how denying her reentry toJapan could possibly protect her,Cindy then gave me a puzzled look,because for Cindy the denialof her re‑entry only means her inability to do the job she has learned to like and the only job that
she has known in her young adult life.
In 2000,the United States put into law the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act(hereafter referred to as VTVPA). This law is not only of relevance to domestic issues in the
United States as it also designated to the Department of State the job of monitoring the anti

1Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women‑trafficking activities of other nation‑states. The Department of State specifically has to monitor
whether or not other nation‑states have put into law and practice the U.S. universal solutions totrafficking of the 3‑Ps‑prevention, protection, and prosecution‑and 3‑Rs‑rescue, rehabilitation,and reintegration. Nations who do are placed in the Tier 1 list;those who make an effort to put
these solutions into place but albeit unsuccessfully are placed in the Tier 2 list;and those who do
not try to meet the anti‑trafficking action plan set forth by the United States are placed in the Tier
3 list. Possibly succumbing to the pressures imposed by the release of the annual Trafficking in
Persons Report, Japan, as indicated by the anxieties of Cindy, has recently tightened its visa
requirements for foreign entertainers and disqualified the reentry of experienced entertainers suchas Cindy. Japan did so after it dipped down from a ranking of Tier 2 in the 2004 Trafficking in
Persons Report to the Tier 2‑Watch List in 2005. Explaining the demotion of Japan, the 2005
Trafficking in Persons Report had specifically cited the U.S.Department of State suspicion that theflow of entertainers to Japan was a backdoor to prostitution.
I use the story of Cindy and her concerns over the policy changes prompted by VTPVA in
Japan as the springboard to address the culture of protectionism and benevolent paternalism incurrent migration policies in regards to the labor migration of women. VTPVA gives us anexample of the culture of benevolent paternalism that surrounds the global migration of womenand more specifically for the purposes of this paper,the migration of foreign entertainers to Japan.
Paternalism in the most recent O.E.D.refers to “
the policy or practice of restricting the freedoms
and responsibilities of subordinates or dependants in what is considered or claimed to be their bestinterests.” In the case of migrant women, it seems “their best interests”would refer to theprotection of their presumed moral values and consequently their protection from immoral jobs,
specifically hostess work, i.e., the work of serving men on the table, or any form of sexually
explicit jobs. Benevolent paternalism aptly captures the culture of protecting foreigners withentertainer visas in Japan from their work as hostesses,which is ironically work that most of themknow they will perform once in Japan.
The protection of womenʼs moral values,as illustrated byNana Oishi (2005),shapes migration
policies of sending countries and subsequently controls the movement of women. The protectionof womenʼs safety and moral values motivates nations to establish a minimum age for migrant
women or limit the types of jobs that their female citizens can pursue abroad. For instance,
Bangladeshi women are barred from entering domestic work in foreign countries,India sets fortha minimum age requirement for its nurses,and the Philippine government has likewise repeatedly
debated and changed its minimum age requirement for overseas performance artists bound to
Japan.

In contrast, no country worries about the morals of its male migrant workers andaccordingly limits the types of jobs that its male citizens can seek outside its territories.
In this paper, I build from Nana Oishiʼs use of moral values as a category of analysis forunderstanding womenʼ
s migration. I examine the culture of benevolent paternalism in the
migration policies that concern the flow of“entertainers”from the Philippines to Japan. My cross2

ジェンダー研究 第10号

2007

‑national analysis of migration policies in Japan,the Philippines,and the United States shows howeach of these three countries project a culture of benevolent paternalism that espouses traditional
moral values concerning women. The collusion among nations in regards to the culture of
benevolent paternalism surrounding womenʼ
s migration points to a universal moral standard
across nations concerning the need to protect women. Notably,not all womenʼ
s rights advocateswould not all frown against this culture of protectionism. Across the globe, feminists have longfought for the greater protection of women against various forms of violence including female
genital mutilation, sex trafficking, and domestic violence. From transnational feminist efforts
there has also emerged an “international consensus around particular norms regarding womenʼsrights”.

In the era that calls for “womenʼ
s rights as human rights,”few would argue against theclaim that the need to protect migrant women from abusive work conditions is one such norm.
Yet,the call for womenʼ
s protection has led to gender distinctions in the treatment of men andwomen migrants with women having to circumvent more restrictive laws against their freemovement across nations. Women cannot move freelybecause their movement unlike those ofmen
are monitored and controlled by the state. In the case of the United States, we see this in theprotectionist stance that it takes towards the “
severe human trafficking”of women and children(notably, not men) worldwide. In the case of Japan, the restriction imposed on the migration of
hostesses as well as the subsequent response of Japan to U.S. pressures to implement an anti
‑trafficking program illustrate the stateʼ
s attitude of benevolent paternalism towards migrant
women. Notably, Japan did not revisit its laws that control labor migration flows dominated bymen. In the Philippines,the culture of benevolent paternalism is illustrated by the strict impositionof labor requirements for emigrants by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
Prior to migration,“entertainers”must ease doubt ofthe likelihood oftheir participation in hostesswork once in Japan by establishing their skills as performance artists to a government commissioned panel in the Philippines.
In this paper, I unravel the culture of benevolent paternalism concerning the migration ofFilipina entertainers so as to illustrate how this culture that is in place in various laws acrossnations does not protect women but ironically increases their vulnerability towards trafficking. In
this paper, I follow the U.N. definition of trafficking, which refers to......the recruitment,transportation,transfer,harbouring or receipt of persons,by means of thethreat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of theabuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person,for the purposeof exploitation. Exploitation shall include,at a minimum,the exploitation of the prostitutionof others or other forms of sexual exploitation,forced labour or services,slavery or practices
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
The first part of my paper explains how protective migration laws in both the Philippines and3

Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant WomenJapan actually institutionalizes trafficking conditions in the process of migration. Protective lawsthat espouse the culture ofbenevolent paternalism place migrant entertainers in a highlydependent
position on middleman brokers that leave them in a relationship of debt bondage. Protectionist
laws encourage middleman brokers to take a paternalistic stance that in its extremity borders
indenture. After I establish how migration policies in Japan and the Philippines make migrant
entertainers indentured vis‑a‑vis middleman brokers,I move to discuss the hegemonic impositionof VTVPA towards the universal protection of migrant women from trafficking. I show how thislaw, its cross‑national operation as U.S.foreign policy,and its universal imposition of American
moral principles regarding trafficking fails to solve the conditions of trafficking for Filipina
migrant entertainers in Japan. Instead, VTVPA exacerbates the conditions of trafficking forforeign entertainers. They leave prospective migrant entertainers more vulnerable to be indentured by middleman brokers.

JAPAN, THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE LAWʼS INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TRAFFICKING
In this section, I describe the process of migration from the Philippines to Japan for migrantlaborers entering with an entertainer visa. Stringent visa requirements for prospective entertainers in both the Philippines and Japan create a culture of benevolent paternalism that leaves
migrant entertainers in a dependent relationship vis‑a‑vis middlemen brokers. For migrant
entertainers from the Philippines,the process ofmigration to Japan is not a simple process ofgoingfrom A to B but instead involves multiple negotiations with middlemen brokers. It begins with aprospective migrant signing on with a talent manager who then takes the prospective migrant toan audition usually in Manila with a labor placement agency, otherwise known as a promotion
agency, and the subsequent selection of the prospective migrant by a Japanese promoter at theaudition. The Japanese promoter then places the prospective migrant in a club in Japan without
much input from the club owner on the entertainers they decide to send to Japan. Notably,the clubin Japan is not the employer of the migrant entertainer even though the migrant entertainer istechnically working for the club owner. Instead, the promoter and promotion agency act as theemployer of the migrant entertainer.
What explains this complex migration process (See Figure Migration Process)? Whythe needfor middleman brokers such as the promoter or promotion agency? Ironically,the law mandates
their services for the protection of migrant entertainers from unscrupulous club owners who (ifnot
monitored) are assumed could force them into prostitution. For instance, the work of thepromotion agency in the Philippines is to make sure that the prospective migrant meets theprofessional qualifications required of entertainers in Japan,while the promoter has the responsibility of placing the entertainer in a club that meets the guidelines set forth by the government ofJapan for clubs that hire foreign entertainers.

Can migrant entertainers ever circumvent thisprocess and negotiate directly with the club, i.e., their workplace, in Japan? What sort of4

ジェンダー研究 第10号

2007

dependent position vis‑a‑vis middleman brokers does the current migration process leave migrant
entertainers? As I show, protectionist measures in the law of both Japan and the Philippines
threaten the independence of prospective migrant entertainers as they ironically force theirdependency on middleman brokers.
M IGRATION PROCESS

We first see how protective measures force the dependency of migrants on middleman brokers
if we look at the implementation of Japanʼ
s professional certification requirements for entertainers. The government of Japan maintains specific qualifications for prospective migrants
seeking entry with an entertainer visa. As I noted earlier, these qualifications became more
stringent after Japan implemented an anti‑trafficking program mirroring the universal template of
VTVPA.

Prior to the changes in policy made by the government of Japan in M arch 14, 2005,

prospective migrants would qualify for an entertainer visa if they meet any one of the following
three criteria:(1) The applicant meets the standards as set bya foreign national or local government agency
or an equivalent public or private organization.
(2) The applicant has spent a minimum of2 years at a foreign educational institution studying
subjects relevant to the type of performance in which he or she will engage.
(3) The applicant must have a minimum of 2 yearsʼexperience outside Japan in the type of
performance in which he or she will engage.
Only upon meeting any of the above criteria does one become eligible to be a performance
artist in Japan. Once in Japan,foreigners with an entertainer visa cannot legally engage in hostesswork, i.e., sit with and entertain customers at a table, but instead one can do no more than sing
and/or dance on a stage that is no less than 13 square meters.

Social interactions between

customers and entertainers inside the club are strictly prohibited.

By limiting the job of for-eigners with an entertainer visa to public entertainment, the government of Japan protects theprofessional status of the job and maintains its policy of barring the entry of non‑professional

5Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women

labor migrants to Japan.
The government of Japan has historically not recognized the standards established by mostforeign national or local government agencies. Instead,it has selectively recognized only those set
by certain foreign countries,particularly Korea and the Philippines,which have historically been
its two largest sources of foreign entertainers.

This agreement across nations should not comeas a surprise,for it leaves both sending and receiving nations in a win‑win situation. The numberof eligible migrants increases, thus allowing Japan to meet the consumer demand for foreign
entertainers and ensuring Korea and the Philippines a secure source of foreign remittance fromJapan. Perhaps to maximize its number of eligible emigrants, the government of the Philippines
has chosen not to require two years of training for its overseas performance artists. Instead,overseas performance artists could qualify to apply for an entertainer visa to Japan if they could
obtain a Certificate of Eligibility (COE)from the government ofthe Philippines,which prospective
migrants could secure via audition after the completion of their training to be a performance artist
in a training center accredited by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority(TESDA).

Training for dancers usually lasts no more than six months and is even briefer for

singers. To obtain a COE, one must pass the audition at TESDA. Singers must perform two of
five pre‑selected songs in front of a panel of professional judges and dancers must successfullycomplete a five‑minute dance performance that shows their adeptness in a variety of dances
including ballet, modern dance, and, sometimes, traditional folk dances of the Philippines.
The dependency of overseas performance artists on talent managers and promotion agencies
begins with the preparation for the audition. This is because the Philippine government requires
prospective migrants to seek training at a TESDA certified training center, which are often
promotion agencies,before they can audition with TESDA. While training,prospective migrants
often accumulate debt to their promotion agencies or talent managers. The debt includes the costof training as well as food and lodging. Notably,in interviews,promotion agency representatives
and talent managers claim not to charge women for food and lodging during the time the womenare fulfilling the requirements of the government mandated training program for entertainers or
they only charge the bare minimum costs of 200 pesos a day ($5). In contrast, most of the 61
Filipino migrant entertainers who I interviewed in Tokyo mentioned accumulating a significant
amount of debt to their talent managers or promotion agencies prior to migration. They usually
accumulated debt while training, as they were often required to live in the premises provided byeither their talent manager or promotion agency. The largest debt among myinterviewees reached200,000 pesos ($4000), but most debts ranged from 10,000 to 50,000 pesos ($200 to 1000).
Promotion agencies can impose fees on prospective overseas performance artists because thelaw of supply and demand works on their side.

There is an abundance of prospective migrants

seeking work in the nightlife industry of Japan. The 50 women who audition every Friday at oneof the largest promotion agencies in M anila testify to their large number. In contrast, there are
only approximately 50 promotion agencies accredited by the Philippine Overseas Employment

6ジェンダー研究 第10号

Administration to train and deploy overseas performance artists to Japan.

2007

Accreditation

requires an initial capital of approximately 2,000,000 pesos and additionally requires the businessto secure a Special Power of Attorney granted by a Japanese promoter for the recruitment agency
to hire on their behalf a minimum of 50 overseas performance artists from the Philippines within
one year.

In Japan,most clubs do not employ more than 25 overseas performance artists. Thismeans most clubs cannot directly hire prospective migrants even if through a promotion agency inM anila. Instead, clubs have no choice but to employ the services of a promoter who could meetthe requirement of hiring more than 50 overseas performance artists by being a job placer for
multiple clubs.
The government of the Philippines requires promoters to guarantee a large volume of placement, i.e. 50 individuals per year, so as to protect prospective migrants from fly‑by‑night operations or small scale establishments in Japan,where the government assumes women would be more
likely vulnerable to unscrupulous labor requirements, one of them being hostess work. Yet, thisprotective stance taken by the Philippine government does little to protect overseas performance
artists as it only complicates their migration process and places them a greater degree of separation from their employer in Japan, i.e., the club owner. Thus, the requirement of limiting promoters,i.e.,those with power to hire women for a club in Japan,to only those who can guarantee
jobs to 50 overseas performance artists often prevents clubs from directly hiring overseas performance artists. Under this law, the promoter technically becomes the employer of migrant entertainers, which then give promoters a slice of the earnings gained by entertainers in the club.
Yet, promoters are not only those who take a slice of the earnings of entertainers. Talentmanagers and promotion agencies also do. Current laws in the Philippines prevent overseas
performance artists from directly negotiating with promoters but they can only secure jobs
through promotion agencies. As noted earlier, promotion agencies, as they have been granted aSpecial Power of Attorney by promoters,hire performance artists on behalf of the promoter fromJapan. Promotion agencies ensure that promoters in Japan comply with labor laws in thePhilippines, or at least labor conditions set forth in the contract certified by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. The Philippine government also imposes this requirement
to protect overseas performance artists.
However, promotion agencies usually do more than just broker the work arrangement
between migrants and club owners. Prior to brokering that first contract,promotion agencies havemade it a common practice to place prospective migrants in a binding relationship of indenture,requiring the prospective migrant to commit to completing at least four or five contracts to workin Japan through their agency for the next five years before they secure the very first job
placement of that overseas performance artist. For each contract,the promotion agency obtains
a percentage of the salary of the overseas performance artist. In the Philippines, promotion
agencies can legally obtain up to 40 percent of the overseas performance artistsʼminimum monthly
salary of 200,000 yen.

This means overseas performance artists are not made legally entitled to7

Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women

their 200,000 monthly minimum salary but only 120,000 yen of it.
Overseas performance artists do not only maintain a relationship of indenture with promotion
agencies. They also do so with talent managers. Often, staff members of promotion agencies
double as a talent manager for a prospective migrant. The law does not mandate overseas
performance artists to work with talent managers. However,the many hurdles entailed in meetingthe eligibility requirements for prospective overseas performance artists have led to the role oftalent managers. Talent managers who recruit prospective overseas performance artists often
based not on their artistic talents but their physical features introduce prospective migrants topromotion agencies usually contingent upon them signing a contract that they will share theirearnings with the manager for the next five years. M y interviewees in Tokyo describe “nice”
talent managers as those who only take $200 of their monthly salary for the next five years andunscrupulous managers as those who earn a 50 percent cut of their wages. To ensure thedependence of the migrant worker on them,talent managers usually confiscate the passports andother travel documents of the overseas performance artist when in the Philippines.

They

maintain this relationship until the end of their five‑year agreement. This relation of indenture
will be hard to justify in court but talent managers have been able to maintain an unequal
relationship with overseas performance artists by forcing them to sign blank checks prior to
departure or blank contracts, which they will later fill in the blanks if they ever have a disagreement with the performance artist. Talent managers are a big reason why overseas performance
artists get paid so little. When talent managers take a 50 percent cut of a performance artistʼssalary,which would be no more than 120,000 yen after the promotion agency takes its share of 40
percent, then the artist would be left with no more than 60,000 yen in monthly salary, which issignificantly less than the minimum wage requirement of 200,000 yen for foreign entertainers.
Notably,most first time contract workers in the nightlife industry of Japan earn around 50,000 yen
a month. Second time contract workers earn not much more,taking home 60,000 yen per month,while a third time contract worker could expect a salary of no more than 70,000 yen per month. As
the salaries of entertainers increase after they gain more experience in Japan so does the commission of their talent managers and promotion agencies.
Looking at the cuts taken by the talent manager,promotion agency and promoter,we can seethat the inability of clubs to hire overseas performance artists directlyresults in much lower wages
for the performance artist than is the minimum wage requirement in Japan. Overseas performance
artists can eventually circumvent the reduction in their salary by various middleman brokers when
they become a “freelancer,”i.e., someone who brokers for their salary directly with a promotion
agency and not through the services of a talent manager. However,they are still technically notfree because they still have to broker their wages through a promotion agency and a promoter. As
I noted earlier, the law in the Philippines requires overseas performance artists to enlist theservices of such middleman brokers so as to ensure that the club in Japan complies with labor
standards for overseas workers set forth by the Philippine government as overseen by the8ジェンダー研究 第10号

2007

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and itʼs accredited representative of the promotion agency. However, requiring overseas performance artists to negotiate labor contracts withclubs owners in Japan through middleman brokers only illustrates how protective laws in place for
migrant workers in the Philippines inadvertently puts them in a relation of debt bondage andindenture prior to migration.
Protective laws should be in place to ensure the rights of migrant workers. Promotion
agencies likewise should be in place to ensure that overseas employers recognize labor standardsof the Philippines. However, the government should also monitor the activities of promotion
agencies more closely. The fees that they maintain,the terms and duration of their contracts withperformance artists,and the percentage of salaries that they obtain should be kept to a minimum.
M oreover, promotion agencies should not be allowed to bar overseas performance artists fromnegotiating with other promotion agencies, for instance by securing a five month contract agreement with prospective migrants prior to their departure, but instead they must give artists theflexibility to work with other agencies every time they go to Japan so as artists they may secure
the most optimal work conditions in a club in Japan. If overseas performance artists were given
the flexibility to choose promotion agencies,then promotion agencies would have to offer the bestlabor conditions to prospective migrants. At the moment, many promotion agencies do not.

THE U.S. ANTI‑TRAFFICKING CAMPAIGN AND ITS UNIVERSAL SOLUTION TO TRAFFICKING
In Japan, the moral panic over the migration of Thai, Filipino, Columbian, and Eastern
European “entertainers”has been exacerbated by U.S. Department of State suspicions that theentry of migrant entertainers to Japan is a backdoor to prostitution.

However, hostess work−

while entailing the insinuation of sex−does not require the act of sex between “entertainers”andcustomers.

Still, many, particularly nongovernmental organization representatives, would dis-

agree with me. For instance,most view the job requirement of a dohan,a financially compensateddate,as “prostitution in disguise”and “an obvious channel for trafficking”(39 ).

While a hostessis more vulnerable to the unwanted sexual advances of customers outside the club,a dohan is notnecessarily prostitution.
As I have established in previous work, prostitution is not part of the job of migrant
entertainers in Japan. Still, suspicions of trafficking are based on the speculation that migrant
entertainers engage in prostitution. Notably, the U.S. Department of State has not looked at therelationship of middleman brokers and migrant entertainers in their identification of the latter as
trafficked persons.

In this section, I look closely at whether or not the U.S. anti‑trafficking

campaign addresses the conditions of trafficking for Filipino migrant entertainers. I argue it does
not, simply for the reason that the United States fails to recognize the actual conditions oftrafficking for foreign entertainers in Japan. Additionally, I look at the actual impacts of anti
‑trafficking laws on foreign entertainers,particularlyexamining the situation ofFilipina migrants.

9

Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women

In the implementation of anti‑trafficking laws, are foreign entertainers given alternative job
options? Are they eased of their dependence on talent managers and promotion agencies? As I
show,the measures taken by Japan to abide bythe U.S.anti‑trafficking campaign have significantly reduced the flow of overseas performance artists from the Philippines to Japan,but without thecushion of alternative jobs in the Philippines,it aggravates the conditions of trafficking for the few
migrant Filipina entertainers able to return to Japan. The latter occurs because anti‑trafficking
measures have increased the dependence of migrant entertainers on middleman brokers.
Filipinas have historically comprised the majority of migrant entertainers in Japan.

Simplybecause of their larger numbers,they are the ones most suspected in the U.S.Trafficking of Persons
Report of falling trap to forced prostitution in Japan.

This is despite the fact that local non‑governmental advocacy groups who I met with in 2005 claim that the wider support networks in
the Filipino community of Japan make its members less vulnerable to trafficking than theircounterparts from Thailand, Columbia and other senders of “entertainers”to Japan. Still, thegovernment of Japan has clamped down on the entry of Filipinos with an “entertainer visa.”
Consequently, their numbers declined drastically from nearly 80,000 in 2004 to approximately
36,000 in 2005 and only 8,000 in 2006.

The decline occurred after Japan amended its eligibility

requirements for entry with an entertainer visa to Japan, which as I noted earlier occurred after
the United States demoted Japan to the Tier 2 Watch List in its 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report.
The prevention of migration for overseas performance artists poses a short‑term solution to
the problem of trafficking. After all,the demand for their entertainment in the nightlife industry
remains. Hence, overseas performance artists who find themselves ineligible for reentry haveresorted to illegal means of entry to Japan. As the number of overseas performance artists
entering with an entertainer visa has declined in the last year, the number of those entering witha visiting family visa, tourist visa, and marriage visa have accordingly increased.

In the past,

those entering with non‑entertainer visas have been identified as more susceptible to trafficking.
We can only assume that they still are today. Despite their greater vulnerability to trafficking,themajority of overseas performance artists in Japan have not been able to return to Japan. Without
much job options in the Philippines,they have notably not been targeted by the government in its
highly touted reintegration program for return migrants that the government administers throughthe Overseas WorkersʼWelfare Administration. As suggested by the lack of government intervention on the plight ofʼ
displacedʼoverseas performance artists,we can speculate that recent changes
in policy made in response to VTVPA by Japan have left most of them without economic optionsin the Philippines. This is more likely the case if we consider the fact that most overseas
performance artists are without a college education unlike most other groups of migrant workers
from the Philippines.
As I noted earlier,Japan recently implemented changes in its policies concerning the entry of
foreigners with an “entertainer visa.” Changes were most likely made in response to VTVPA.
Since the passage of VTVPA, the U.S. Department of State has been required to submit a report10

ジェンダー研究 第10号

2007

to the U.S. Congress an annual report−the TIP Report−which describes the efforts of foreign
governments to eliminate human trafficking. Foreign governments in turn have been pressured tosubmit records and reports on their anti‑trafficking activities to the United States. According to
the U.S. Department of State,［The TIP Report］is intended to raise global awareness and spur foreign governments to takeeffective actions to counter all forms of trafficking in persons−a form of modern day slavery...... A country that fails to take significant actions to bring itself into compliance with theminimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons receives a negative “Tier 3”
assessment in this Report. Such an assessment could trigger the withholding of non‑humanitarian, non‑trade‑related assistance from the United States to that country. In assessing
foreign governmentsʼefforts, the TIP Report highlights the “three Pʼ
s”−prosecution, protection, and prevention. But a victim‑centered approach to trafficking requires us equally toaddress the “
three Rʼs”−rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration.
According to TVPA, foreign countries must prohibit and punish severe forms of trafficking;punish so as to deter trafficking;and demonstrate sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking.

Ifcountries do not comply with these basic requirements−in other words fail to implement the 3‑Ps
campaign, they receive a Tier 3 ranking and become ineligible to receive “nonhumanitarian,nontrade related foreign assistance.” This means countries become ineligible for development
assistance from international agencies such as the World Bank and International M onetaryFund.
Countries also become ineligible from receiving military protection from the United States. The
denial of aid as a means of deterring trafficking ironically seems to aggravate one of its central
causes−poverty. If punishment is the denial of aid,then would not the country be in greater riskof poverty, which would then heighten the economic desperation of individuals and in turn pushthem to willingly take the risk of being trafficked? Regardless, the United States threatens
countries with the denial of aid for their non‑compliance with VTVPA. This tells us thatprevention is conditional to prosecution as the failure to prosecute puts countries at risk ofreceiving a Tier 3 ranking.
For richer countries not in need of foreign aid such as Japan,a low ranking in the annual TIP
Report translates to social ostracism in the international community as well as social exclusion.
Richer countries with a Tier 3 ranking become ineligible to partake in cultural exchanges with theUnited States. As stated in VTVPA, “in the case of a country whose government received nononhumanitarian,nontrade‑related foreign assistance from the United States during the previous
fiscal year, the United States will not provide funding for participation by officials or employeesof such government in educational and cultural exchange programs for the subsequent fiscal year
until such government complies with the minimum standards of making significant efforts to bringitself into compliance.”
Perhaps out of pressure or maybe in agreement with the government of the United States,the11Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women

government of Japan has designed a solution that follows the 3Ps and 3Rs models of the UnitedStates. As of March 15, 2005, Japan imposed new visa requirements for migrant “entertainers”
from the Philippines, in response to the recommendation by the U.S.Department of State for theJapanese government to impose the higher scrutiny of visa requirements and implement greater
screening procedures “for repeat applicants and sponsors.” Since the release of the annual TIP
Report,Japan has scored no higher than a Tier 2 ranking. Yet,in 2004,Japanʼ
s ranking dipped to
the Tier 2 watch list, harboring slightly above the dreaded Tier 3 ranking.

Notably, the TIP

Report explicitly calls attention to the migration of Filipino “entertainers”as a central reason forthe low ranking of Japan.
The most relevant change in policy concerning foreign “entertainers”involves the evaluationof artistic skills and the disqualification of the Philippine government to evaluate the artistic
ability of “entertainers”they deploy to Japan. Japan eliminated the first of three earlier citedprovisions for determining the eligibility of foreign entertainers and removed the abilities offoreign governments to accredit the performance artistry of its migrant workers. This comes in
direct response to the recommendation of the United States for Japan to impose a closer scrutinyof visa requirements. As the government of Japan notes:
It has been recognized that not a few people who have entered Japan with the status ofresidence as “entertainer,”have become victims of trafficking in persons, in particular those
who have entered the Japan having fulfilled the criteria for landing permission by holding acertificate issued by the Government of the Philippines, which testifies that the holder is an
artist, but as a matter of fact do not have capability as an artist. Given this situation, theparagraph below the description of the activities of entertainers−“The applicant who isqualified by a foreign national or local government agency or an equivalent public or private−will be deleted from the［law］.
organization”
This change in policy has resulted in more stringent landing and resident examinations,withthe most striking change being the extension of the training required of “overseas performance
artists”from six months to two years,making it nearly impossible for experienced “entertainers”
to re‑enter Japan as those with past experience in Japan are not given exemption.
experience in Japan does not qualify for training purposes.

Work

This means that an experienced“entertainer”can now be ineligible to renew her visa if she had received training to be an overseas
performance artist for less than two years outside of Japan. As noted earlier, since this change,
there has been a drastic decline in the number of eligible “
entertainers”entering Japan from thePhilippines, which the government considers to be indicative of the artistic ineligibility of mostcontract workers hired in the past.
In its implementation of an anti‑trafficking platform, the government of Japan directly
responded to the accusation that “entertainers”are supposedly prostitutes by implementing more
stringent criteria for evaluating the professional skills of foreign “entertainers.” Increased

12ジェンダー研究 第10号

2007

professionalism, according to the government, translates to the less likelihood of prostitution.
In reward for its efforts, Japan was taken out of the Tier 2 Watch List and reinstated in the
Tier 2 category in the 2005 TIP Report.

Notably,the U.S.Department of State explicitly lauded

Japan for its decision to curtail Filipino migration, which suggests that Japan is unlikely to easeits borders for Filipino “entertainers.” As the latest TIP Report states: “During the reporting
period, the government undertook major reforms to significantly tighten the issuance of “entertainer”visas to women from the Philippines,a process used by traffickers to enslave thousands ofPhilippine women in Japan each year.”

For the U.S. Department of State, the curtailment ofFilipino migration is considered a prevention measure against trafficking. Interestingly,the U.S.
State Department explicitly describes the Philippines and not the other sending countries of“entertainers”including Thailand, a greater source of trafficking, to be a “major source oftrafficking victims”in Japan.

Perhaps this is because of the greater number of migrant “enter-tainers”from the Philippines.
Nongovernmental organizations in the Philippines applaud the recent changes in immigration
policy of Japan. In a press release aptly titled “
Why we support Japanʼ
s new immigration policyon entertainers,”Carmaletia Nuqui,the executive director of Development Action Network of thePhilippines, an advocacy group for entertainers and Filipino‑Japanese children, expressed its
support for the new migration law that “
requires Filipino entertainers to complete at least two
years of formal courses in music,dancing or singing,or have at least two years experience in theentertainment industry before they can be qualified to work in Japan.” This supposedly ensuresthat Filipino women “will really be working as singers and dancers in Japan.”In the press release,DAWN proceeded to critique the Philippine government for failing to deal
with corruption in the emigration process,alluding to the relation of indenture between promotion
agencies, talent managers, and overseas performance artists, but ironically DAWN, in doing so,does not recognize how the increased professionalization of the job may in fact not protect
overseas performance artists but instead make them more vulnerable to trafficking. The longer
training required of “entertainers”translates not necessarily to the validity of their professional
status as so argued by representatives of DAWN and the government of Japan, but it could alsomean the longer duration of training for overseas performance artists under the control ofmanagers in the Philippines. This means their greater likelihood of indenture. The possibility of
their aggravated indenture highly suggests that the solutions posed by Japan do not necessarily
prevent trafficking but instead places prospective migrants in a greater position of being trafficked.

13

Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women

CONCLUSION
We could find irony in the allegiance between DAWN, a nongovernmental organization
touting radical feminist views,and the United States,a government spreading its moral authority
over other nations when it comes to the protection of migrant women. How these strange
bedfellows came in agreement with Japanʼ
s implementation of restrictive measures against the
migration of foreign entertainers from the Philippines however is not at all surprising if we look
more closely at their beliefs regarding the work of women or more accurately the “proper”workof women. DAWN, the United States, and Japan all share the belief that entertainers should notwork as hostesses. They view such work as degrading to women.
While hostess work is not a preferred job for most Filipina migrants who perform it in Japan,
they however morally accept this job. But they can only do this job with the assistance ofpromotion agencies and talent managers, as these two groups are those who monitor overseas
performance artists so they do not become prey to illicit or immoral job situations. Yet, in the
disagreement over the morality or immorality of hostess work, what has been overlooked is therelation of indenture between promotion agencies, talent managers and overseas performance
artists. This severe condition of trafficking, which is much more threatening than the risk of
prostitution,is ironically what is ignored in the overzealous protection of hostesses from prostitution. How did such an oversight occur in the campaign against the trafficking of Filipina
entertainers in Japan?
My cross‑national analysis of migration policies and anti‑trafficking measures concerning
Filipina overseas performance artists in Japan shows the underlying concern over the moral valuesof women in policies espoused by the Philippines,Japan,and the United States. But in protecting
womenʼ
s moral values,laws have created conditions of trafficking. In the Philippines,for instance,laws have left women dependent on the assistance of middleman brokers who take advantage ofsuch dependence by maintaining a relation of debt bondage with migrants. However,in protecting
women from trafficking, new laws have remained focused on the issue of womenʼs moral values,
ignoring the problem of debt bondage that confronts Filipino overseas performance artists.
As I have argued in this essay,the new laws implemented to protect women from trafficking
could aggravate the condition of debt bondage for overseas performance artists. This is because
the new laws ignore the nuances and particularities in the conditions of trafficking for migrantFilipina entertainers. The new laws do not confront the premise upon which the conditions oftrafficking for migrant Filipina entertainers are founded in the first place,which as I had describedin this essay are the protectionist measures taken by Japan and the Philippines towards migrant
entertainers. Instead, the new laws blindly protect migrant entertainers as they aggravate theeffects of existing protectionist measures. The new policies enforced by Japan and supported byNGOs in the Philippines maintain the culture of benevolent paternalism surrounding womenʼsmigration, continue the protective stance that governments take towards migrant women, and14

ジェンダー研究 第10号

2007

support the protection of womenʼs moral values, particularly against prostitution. After all theanti‑trafficking measures enforced in recent years, we still need to protect migrant entertainers
from the threat of trafficking. Benevolent paternalism is the foundation that we need to dismantle
to confront the issue of trafficking of migrant Filipina entertainers.
（Rhacel Salazar Parrenas, Professor, Asian American Studies,
University of California, Davis)

Notes
１

The generous support of the Institute for Gender Studies in Ochanomizu University allowed me to complete
the research for this project. I thank Pauline Chu for her editorial assistance.

２

The government of Japan refers to migrants employed in the nightlife industry as “entertainers”and accordingly grants them an “entertainer visa”for entry. An “entertainer”is technically a professional skilled in theperformance arts. See http://www.mofa.go.jp/j info/visit/visa/appendix1.html. Last verified on December 26,
2005.

３

H.R. 3224;106 Congress.

４

See U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report (2003, 2004, 2005).

５

Ibid.

６

U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report (2004, 2005).

７

U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report (2005), at 132.

８

Oxford English Dictionary, Web Edition. See http://www.oed.com/. Draft revision June 2005. Last verified
on July 29, 2006.

９

In 2005, I interviewed 61 overseas performance artists in Tokyo. I base this claim on my interviews.

10 Nana Oishi (2005). Women in Motion. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
11 Ibid.
12 Aili Mari Tripp,“
The Evolution of Transnational Feminisms: Consensus,Conflict,and New Dynamics.” pp.
51‑75 in Global Feminism: Transnational Womenʼ
s Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights,New York,New
York: New York University Press, at 51.
13 United Nations, Article 3, UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL TO PREVENT, SUPPRESS, AND PUNISH
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supplementing the United Conventions against Transnational Organised Crime(2000).
14 See A Guide to Japanese Visas,Appendix 1 Ministerial Ordinance to Provide for Criteria pursuant to Article
7,Paragraph 1(2) of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Ministry of Justice Ordinance No.
16 ofMay24,1990). See http://www.mofa.go.jp/j info/visit/visa/appendix1.html. Last verified on July31,2006.
15 See Japan Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons. December 7,2004. See http://www.vitalvoices.org/
files/docs/japan%20action%20plan.pdf. Last verified on July 31, 2006.
16 See A Guide to Japanese Visas,Appendix 1 Ministerial Ordinance to Provide for Criteria pursuant to Article
7,Paragraph 1(2) of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Ministry of Justice Ordinance No.
16 of M ay 24, 1990). See http://www.mofa.go.jp/j info/visit/visa/appendix1.html. Last verified on July 31,
2006.
17 Ibid.
18 M eeting with Ministry of Immigration Officials, Tokyo, Japan, November 11, 2005.
19 Ibid.

15

Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Benevolent Paternalism and Migrant Women

20 TESDA is a branch of the Department of Education in the Philippines.
21 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration M emorandum Circular No.12. Series of 2004. “Guidelines on
the Certification of Overseas Performance Artists.” (August 25, 2004).
22 For a similar description of relations between prospective migrants and recruitment agencies to Taiwan,see
Pei‑Chia Lan (2006). Global Cinderellas, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
23 Interview with representative of Philippine Overseas Employment Agency,Marketing Mission Office (July 14,2006).
24 M emorandum Circular No.10. Series of 1997. “GUIDELINES ON THE ACCREDITATION OF JAPANESE
PRINCIPALS HIRING FILIPINO PERFORMING ARTISTS (OPAs).” (M ay 5, 1997).
25 M emorandum Circular No.10. Series of 1997. “GUIDELINES ON THE ACCREDITATION OF JAPANESE
PRINCIPALS HIRING FILIPINO PERFORMING ARTISTS (OPAs).” (M ay 5, 1997).
26 The government of the Philippines has identified the practice of confiscating passports as illegal. See POEA,
M emorandum Circular 15 (2001), “Custody of the Artist Record Book,”www.poea.gov.ph/docs/M Cs/mc%
202001/M C15%20S2001.doc (Verified on August 8, 2006).
27 See “A Guide to Japanese Visas”(1990).
28 U.S. Department of State (2004).
29 See a previous article in which I give a more thorough description of the nature of “entertainment”work inJapan among Filipina migrant workers. Rhacel Salazar Parrenas. “Trafficked? M igrant Filipina Entertainers
in Tokyoʼs Nightlife Industry.” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 17(2)(Spring 2006).
30 M aria Angela C.Villalba. GENPROM WORKING PAPER NO.8 Series on Women and M igration,Philippines:
Good Practices for the Protection of Filipino M igrant Workers in Vulnerable Jobs. Geneva: Gender Promotion
Programme International Labour Office. See www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/download/swmphi.pdf (Verified on May 15, 2006).
31 Rhacel Salazar Parrenas (2006). “Trafficked? Filipino Hostesses in Tokyoʼ
s Nightlife Industry.” 18 Yale
Journal of Law and Feminism 145.
32 See U.S. Department of State (2004, 2005).
33 Nana Oishi. Women in Motion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
34 U.S. Department of State (2005).
35 Interview with the Executive Director of BATIS, M anila, Philippines (July 25, 2006).
36 Interview with representatives of PARADA and PEEPA, two promotion agency organizations, M anila,
Philippines (July 20,2006). Increased vulnerability for undocumented workers is also cited in a recent International Labor Organization study: “OPA status is made more hazardous for migrant women because,more often
than not, they are “undocumented”and thus deprived of medical, legal, and professional attention in the hostcountry. Thus, if they contract HIV/AIDS or STDS they have no recourse but to return home, when they are
not likely to get adequate care, either”(51). Maria Angela C.Villalba. GENPROM WORKING PAPER NO.8
Series on Women and Migration, Philippines: Good Practices for the Protection of Filipino M igrant Workers
in Vulnerable Jobs. Geneva: Gender Promotion Programme International Labour Office. See www.ilo.org/
public/english/employment/gems/download/swmphi.pdf (Verified on M ay 15, 2006).
37 See Nicole Constable (1997). Maid to Order in Hong Kong, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
38 U.S. Department of State (2005), at 5.
39 H.R. 3244, 106 Session, Section 108(a).
40 H.R. 3244, 106 Session, Section 110(a).
41 H.R.3244,106 Session,Section 110(d)(4). Note that the United States has kept exception to keep providing
aid “notwithstanding the failure of the government of the country to comply with minimum standards for theelimination of trafficking”if it is “in the national interest of the United States.”16

ジェンダー研究 第10号

2007

42 H.R. 3244. 106 Session, Section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii).
43 Tony M cNichol, The showʼs over, JAPAN TIMES, April 26, 2005.
44 U.S. Department of State (2005), at 14.
45 U.S. Department of State (2004), at 96.
46 Government of Japan. Japanʼ
s Action Plan of M easures to Combat Trafficking in Persons. 13 Economic
Forum, Prague, Czechoslovakia (M ay 23‑27, 2005), at 4.
47 Immigration Bureau,Ministry ofJustice. Amendment ofthe Criteria for the Landing Permission for the Status
of Residence “Entertainer,”Tokyo, Japan (February 2005).
48 Ibid., p.1.
49 M eeting with Ministry of Immigration Officials, Tokyo, Japan, November 11, 2005.
50 Interview with Government Officials, Japan M inistry of Justice, in Tokyo, Japan (November 11, 2005).
51 U.S. Department of State (2005).
52 U.S. Department of State (2005), at 132.
53 Ibid., p.133.
54 Nuqui, Carmaletia. “Why we support Japanʼ
s new immigration policy on entertainers,”Cyber Dyaryo,
January 11, 2004. See http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/commentary/c2005 0111 01.htm (Last verified on M ay 11,2005).

17