_

Research Report

FY2023 Maritime Security Study Group Report
Building Response Procedures and a Multilateral Joint Posture
to Deter a Taiwan Contingency
Part 1: Analysis of the European Hybrid CoE Conceptual
Model, Assumptions for Developing a Research Model, andHybrid Threat Case Studies

Maritime Security Study Group
March 2024

Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1
1 Research Outline ..............................................................................................................1
2 Research in FY2023 .........................................................................................................2
Section 1: Analysis of European Hybrid COE Concepts and Models .....................................4
1 Overall Conceptual Model ................................................................................................4
2 Conceptual Model Framework ..........................................................................................5
Section 2: Assumptions for Analysis Using the Conceptual Model .......................................13
1 Definitions of Hybrid Warfare ..........................................................................................13
2 Possible Scenarios China could take for Hybrid Warfare Aimed at Unifying Taiwan

15(1) Hardline approach ................................................................................................... 15(2) Conciliatory approach ...............................................................................................16
Section 3: Methods, Activities, and Case Studies .................................................................18
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 22

Introduction
1 Research Outline
Over the three-year period from FY2023 to FY2025, the Maritime Security Study Group is
working to develop a comprehensive checklist for addressing hybrid threats from People’s
Republic of China (PRC) that would likely be organized as a complex set of tools aimed at
the unification of Taiwan. The Study Group will also propose measures to deter escalation
to a full-fledged military invasion and examine a multilateral joint deterrence posture thatputs the items on the checklist into practice.
Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the possibility of an invasion of
Taiwan by China has become a focus of attention, and many research institutes have been
engaged in research on various scenarios and impacts related to a Taiwan contingency.
Although some of these studies have focused on China’s unification operations over the
Taiwan front, many of them limit their analytic scope to certain areas, such as cyber andintelligence. As a result, studies into new domains, such as space and electromagnetic waves,
where the arms race among major powers including Russia and China is significant, or
economic and social aspects where so-called hybrid warfare could be widely deployed
before the start of military aggression, remain scarce or are totally unreported. These gaps
make it challenging to gain a good understanding of the overall picture of hybrid threats.
Given the prolonged war in Ukraine and its serious impact on war casualties and the global
economy, deterrence of the use of force will be the No. 1 priority for Japan’s diplomacy inresponding to a Taiwan contingency. At the same time, it is also important to be able toeffectively address hybrid threats in gray zone situations. In this context, it is essential tosystematically analyze hybrid threats in all domains, military and non-military, and todevelop specific countermeasures.
In other words, deterring a Taiwan contingency must include not only directly
preventing the use of force against Taiwan itself but also effectively dealing with hybrid
threats at an earlier stage. Failure to do so would raise two risks. The first risk is that China
would be allowed to achieve its objectives unilaterally while avoiding the use of force, andthe second is allowing China to create an environment favorable to the use of force in its
various forms. This study attempts to capture a broad view of a Taiwan contingency and will
focus in particular on hybrid warfare response within that context, examining and analyzing
the corresponding strategies.
Therefore, with the “40 tools of hybrid threat activity” and “13 affected domains”
enumerated as a checklist in the Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis said to havebeen used by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid
1
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

CoE) during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Study Group will conduct a threat analysis
pertaining to hybrid warfare against Taiwan. The applicability of the “40 tools of hybrid
threat activity” to multiple scenarios and the specific cases that could be targets of activity
in the “13 affected domains” will be verified. Through the verification, the Study Group willdevelop a unique framework specific to Taiwan, bearing in mind the differences in the
security environment between Europe and East Asia (Figure 1). In this way, the specificthreats that may arise in each domain of the framework are applied, organized, and analyzed
to obtain an overall picture of the hybrid threat.
Moreover, the Study Group will submit a comprehensive policy proposal that can beadapted to a variety of situations including a method to utilize the above 40 tools tocontinuously monitor the situation together with a list of specific diplomatic and security
response measures that Japan should undertake in the case that escalation in multiple
domains is observed.
Furthermore, building on these response measures and the shared security interests androle-sharing with the United States and Australia as the primary partners, the Study Groupwill propose a competitive strategy in which Japan’s diplomacy would play a leading role inmaintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
2 FY2023 Research
The Study Group will apply the hybrid threat analysis framework to analyze how the 40
various tools (hereafter referred to as “tools”) of hybrid threat activity presented by Hybrid
CoE intertwine and affect the target domains (hereafter referred to as “domains”). The study
attempts to analyze the process by which these tools increase social unrest and disrupt orchange the decision-making of the target government, which is considered to be one of theultimate objectives of hybrid warfare. The analysis of the process will be based on specificcases to enhance understanding and visualization of the process to as great an extent as
possible.

2
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

Figure 1 Hybrid Warfare Analysis: Tools, Domains, Objectives

Source: Prepared by the Maritime Security Study Group.

3
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

Section 1: Analysis of European Hybrid CoE Conceptual Model
During the 2014 Crimean crisis, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea almost bloodlessly,using irregular methods (blocking communication networks, spreading fake news, and usingsocial networking service (SNS)) to manipulate public opinion prior to the military invasion
by regular forces. A similar development was predicted when Russia launched its invasionof Ukraine in February 2022, but the hybrid warfare by Russia was not successful, and, in
contrast to the invasion of Crimea, a military invasion of Ukraine was conducted. One
possible factor that contributed to the difference in understanding the invasions in 2014 and2022 is the “Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis” (hereafter referred to as the“Conceptual Model”). The Conceptual Model was developed by Hybrid CoE, in cooperation
with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, over a period of about two
years starting in July 2018, and is believed to have been used to systematically understandthe various events that occurred during Russia’s invasion in 2022. In this research, using thisConceptual Model as a reference, we first analyze the outline and concept of the Conceptual
Model as follows.1
1 Overall Conceptual Model
The overall Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis (Figure 2) is as follows:
Figure 2 Overall Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis

Source: European Commission and Hybrid CoE, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A
Conceptual Model Public Version, 2021, p. 13.

Takashi Kawashima, “Haibriddo Kyoi Bunseki no Furemuwaku: Oshu Haiburiddo Kyoi Taisaku Senta no
Konseputo Moderu o Tsujite [A Framework for Hybrid Threat Analysis: Through the Conceptual Model ofthe European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats]” (Japanese), NPI Commentary, 2022.
1

4
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The analytical framework for this Conceptual Model has four pillars: (1) actors, (2) tools,(3) domains, and (4) activities. The framework is outlined below.
2 Conceptual Model Framework(1) Actors
Actors are divided into two categories: state actors and non-state actors. The term “state
actors” here refers mainly to authoritarian states that are hostile to the democratic countries
that make up the EU, NATO, etc. Maintaining the regime’s power and harboring a fear of
democratic states tend to be the main characteristics of these states.2 Russia, China, Iran, andNorth Korea are cited as specific examples, with Russia and China, in particular, identified
as key actors in hybrid threat activity.3
A non-state actor is an entity that plays a part in international relations and that exercises
sufficient power to interfere, influence, and cause change without any affiliation to theestablished institutions of a state. A characteristic feature is that states, through non-state
actors, often conduct activities for hostile purposes against other states. 4 Representative
examples include Hezbollah, Islamic State (IS), and Private Military Companies (PMCs).5
In addressing hybrid threat, besides identification of state and non-state actors, asmentioned above, it is important to analyze the strategic objectives of the actors.6
2) Tools
Tools are the methods used by state and non-state actors to exert hybrid threats on a target.7
In the Conceptual Model, 40 tools are presented based on past cases. Actors combine thesetools to generate hybrid threats.
3) Domains
In the Japanese security context, the term “domains” is translated to “ryoiki” in Japanese,
generally meaning “territory/sphere,” but here it means groupings of instruments of national
power; in other words, a “domain” is any of a number of diplomatic, intelligence, military,economic or other national instrument of power that may be targeted by an actor conducting

European Commission and Hybrid CoE, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public
Version, 2021, pp. 16-18, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/conceptual_frameworkreference-version-shortened-good_cover_-_publication_office.pdf (last accessed May 1, 2022).
3
Ibid. p. 16.
4
Ibid. p. 22.
5Ibid. p. 16.
6
Ibid. p. 15.
7
Ibid. p. 33.
2

5
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hybrid threat.8 Actors target a domain with hybrid threats to ultimately achieve their goals.
As shown in Figure 3, there are 13 domains listed that form politics, economics, and society,such as infrastructure and cyber, in addition to military/defense. Actors combine multiple
tools belonging to each domain in the attempt to achieve their goals (center of figure).
Figure 3 Domains and Actors’ Goals

Source: European Commission and Hybrid CoE, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A
Conceptual Model Public Version, 2021, p. 27.
In this Conceptual Model, it is explicitly stated that currently there is no theoretical basis forgrouping the domains: “there is no prevailing or universal approach to structuring
instruments of national power” and that as an “open list,” review and revisions are required
depending on each case.9⚫

Tools and affected domains of hybrid threat activity

Table 1 below shows an indicative list of tools that can be used by a hostile actor to achieve
its objective, together with the potentially affected domains.

89Ibid. p. 26.
Ibid. pp. 26-27.

6The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

Table 1 List of Tools and Potentially Affected Domains
Tool1

Physical operations against
infrastructure2

Creating and exploiting
infrastructure dependency(including civil-militarydependency)

3

Creating or exploiting economic
dependencies

4

Foreign direct investment

5

Industrial espionage

6

Undermining the opponent’s
national economy

7

Leveraging economic difficulties

8

Cyber espionage

9

Cyber operations

Affected domains (underlines added byauthor for emphasis)
Infrastructure, Economy, Cyber, Space,
Military/Defence, Information,
Social/Societal, Public Administration
Infrastructure, Economy, Cyber, Space,
Military/Defence, Public Administration

Economy, Diplomacy, Political, Public
Administration
Economy, Infrastructure, Cyber, Space,
Military/Defence, Public Administration,
Intelligence, Information, Political, Legal
Economy, Infrastructure, Cyber, Space,Intelligence, Information
Economy, Public Administration,
Political, Diplomacy
Economy, Public Administration,
Political, Diplomacy
Infrastructure, Space, Cyber,
Military/Defence, Public Administration
Infrastructure, Space, Cyber,Social/Societal, Public Administration,
Military/Defence
Military/Defence, Social/Societal,
Political, Diplomacy
Military/Defence, Social/Societal,
Political, Diplomacy

10 Airspace violation
11 Territorial water violation
12 Weapons proliferation
Armed forces conventional/sub13
conventional operations
Paramilitary organizations
14(proxies)

Military/Defence
Military/Defence
Military/Defence
Military/Defence, Diplomacy, Political,
Societal
Political, Diplomacy, Social/Societal,
Culture, Intelligence, Information

15 Military exercises
16

Engaging diasporas for
influencing

17

Financing cultural groups andthink tanks

Societal, Culture, Political, Diplomacy
7

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Exploitation of sociocultural
18 cleavages (ethnic, religion andculture)Social/Societal, Culture

19 Promoting social unrest

Infrastructure, Social/Societal,
Economy, Political

Manipulating discourses on
20 migration to polarize societies andundermine liberal democracies
Exploiting vulnerabilities in public
21 administration (including
emergency management)
Promoting and exploiting
22
corruption
Exploiting thresholds, non23 attribution, gaps and uncertainty inthe law

24

Leveraging legal rules, processes,
institutions and arguments

25
26
27
28
29

Intelligence preparation
Clandestine operations
Infiltration
Diplomatic sanctions
Boycotts

30 Embassies
Creating confusion or acontradictory narrative
Migration as a bargaining chip in
32
international relations
Discrediting leadership and/or
33
candidates
31

Social/Societal, Culture, Political, Legal

Public Administration, Political,
Social/Societal
Public Administration, Economy,
Legal, Social/Societal
Infrastructure, Cyber, Space, Economy,
Military/Defence, Culture,
Social/Societal, Public Administration,
Legal, Intelligence, Diplomacy,
Political, Information
Infrastructure, Cyber, Space, Economy,
Military/Defence, Culture,
Social/Societal, Public Administration,
Legal, Intelligence, Diplomacy,
Political, Information
Intelligence, Military/DefenceIntelligence, Military/DefenceIntelligence, Military/Defence
Diplomacy, Political, Economy
Diplomacy, Political, Economy
Diplomacy, Political, Intelligence,
Social/Societal
Social/Societal, Information, Diplomacy
Social/Societal, Information, Political
Political, Public Administration,
Social/Societal
Political, Public Administration,
Social/Societal

34 Support of political actors
Coercion of politicians and/or
government
36 Exploiting immigration for
35

Political, Public Administration, Legal
Political, Social/Societal
8

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political influencing
Information, (Media) Infrastructure,
Social/Societal, Culture
Social/Societal, Information, Political,
Cyber, Culture, Public Administration

37 Media control and interference
Disinformation campaigns andpropaganda
Influencing curricula and39
academia
Electronic operations
40(GNSS jamming and spoofing)38

Social/Societal, Culture
Space, Cyber, Infrastructure, Economy,
Military/Defence

Source: Prepared by the authors based on European Commission and Hybrid CoE, The
Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, 2021, pp. 33-35.
The above Table 1 lists the tools used in past cases that Hybrid CoE has observed. Actors
have used these tools to affect one or more domains or to target vulnerabilities in a domain.
In addition to the effect on the domain directly targeted, there may be a “cascade effect” that
impacts other related domains. 10 It is important to note that just because there areindications of use of a tool listed in this table it does not necessarily mean that it is ahybrid threat. For example, cyber operations may be conducted in conjunction with othermethods as part of a hybrid threat activity or on their own. 11 When a hacker launches acyberattack, it is essential to analyze whether it is related to actors with strategic objectives
and whether the cyberattack works in conjunction with other tools used by that actor. Early
prediction on the overall impact that could result from the combination of these tools isnecessary.
4) Activities
The intensity of hybrid threat activity in which the various tools are used is divided into thefollowing three phases.12 The activities performed in each phase are organized by the Study
Group as shown in Table 2 below.
The relationship between phases and activities in Table 2 is not completely fixed. It isthought that each hybrid threat activity using each tool will be combined to construct hybrid
warfare suited to each phase. The “priming” phase consists mainly of interference and someinfluence, the “destabilization” phase is mainly influence and partly operation, and the“coercion” phase consists mainly of operation. The details of each phase are described below.

Ibid. pp. 11-12.
Ibid. pp. 32-33.
12
Ibid. p. 10.
1011

9
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

⚫

Priming phase13

During the priming phase, the actor “interferes” with the target country with activities
employing various tools. The actor’s ultimate goal in this phase is to lead the target country
to a situation in which it loses situational awareness and its leaders “voluntarily makeharmful choices and decisions” in the actor’s favor.14 The next activity after “interference”
is “influence.”15 Activities in this priming phase are difficult to immediately assess as hybrid
threats and are ambiguous and unobtrusive. Therefore, in addressing hybrid threats it iscritical to detect early signs by using the Conceptual Model and to predict the developmentof the situation, including cascading effects to other domains, by analyzing the actors’
objectives.16⚫

Destabilization phase17

The destabilization phase is the stage in which the actor intensifies activities using various
tools in each domain. Activities become overt and more aggressive and may involve multiple
physical operations and violence, but the actors themselves are expected to conceal theirinvolvement. The following scenarios are possible examples of the transition from thepriming phase to the destabilization phase. When an armed conflict or skirmish occurs,
reports of casualties and comments from bereaved families and injured soldiers, etc. aremade public (interference). Then, as reports of rising casualties and comments from bereaved
families increase, the anxiety of the families sending off soldiers increases (influence).
Furthermore, as this unrest spreads throughout society, distrust of the government’s response
increases, and activities fueling demonstrations become more widespread. The goal of theactors in the destabilization phase is to destabilize the target country to a level at which it
can be shaken and easily subdued. However, if the desired effect is not achieved, “the activity
either reverts to priming to wait another and better opportunity, to tailor a better combination[of tools] or create new vulnerabilities….”⚫

Coercion phase18

This phase involves a “combination of covert and open military operations, combined with
political and economic measures, subversion, information/disinformation operations andpropaganda/fake news, the covert or open deployment of special forces,” and military

Ibid. pp. 37-40.
Ibid. p. 37.
15
Ibid. p. 38.
16
Ibid. p. 5.
17
Ibid. pp. 40-41.
18
Ibid. pp. 41-42.
13
14

10
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

assistance to hostile forces within the target country. The ultimate objective is to compel orcoerce strategic objectives on the target country. Operations using hybrid threat tools
potentially targeting all domains are conducted. Limited military means such as terror,
sabotage, subversion, guerrilla warfare, etc. are also utilized.
Furthermore, it is envisioned that a full-scale military war may be initiated with hybrid
threat tools employed to take further advantage. In this sense, although war may also be
described as an activity in the coercion phase, the use of hybrid threat tools in such a fullscale war should be discussed as part of a cross-domain operation within the military sphere.
This research categorizes it as such and excludes it from the scope of this study.

11
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

Table 2 Relationship between Phases and Activities
Chronological phase

Hybrid threat activity
Interference= Use hybrid threat tools to disrupt the activities

Primingof the adversary in the target domain and lay thegroundwork for destabilization.
Influence= Use hybrid threat tools to create destabilization

Destabilizationand facilitate operations by influencing theactivities of the adversary in the target domain.
Operation= Exercise a combination of hybrid threat tools tocoerce the adversary into taking a desired action
and achieve an objective.

Coercion
War/warfare= Use hybrid threat tools in military warfare togain an advantage in military warfare.
Source: Prepared based on European Commission and Hybrid CoE, The Landscape ofHybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, 2021, p. 13.

12
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Section 2: Assumptions for Analysis Using the Conceptual Model
This section will first define hybrid warfare and then conduct an analysis using theConceptual Model to discuss possible scenarios about the hybrid warfare that China could
engage in its efforts to unify Taiwan.
1 Definitions of Hybrid Warfare
In recent years, the term “hybrid warfare” has become increasingly prevalent in securityrelated discussions. However, the meaning of this term varies according to the analyst, andtherefore, the implications for security also differ according to the intended definition. To
this end, this section will first clarify the definition of hybrid warfare in this report.
The term “hybrid” was originally used in thremmatology, or the science of breeding
domesticated animals and plants, to refer to the crossing of two different lineages, 19 but theterm has since evolved to describe the use of multiple means in combination, such as hybrid
vehicles powered by both gasoline and electricity. Faithful to this etymology, the term
“hybrid warfare” is thought to refer to a type of warfare that combines traditional militarymeans of warfare with various non-military means of warfare. The views of many analysts
are in general agreement on this point.
However, what varies greatly among analysts is how to position hybrid warfare in
relation to full-scale military war. Full-scale military war here refers to high-intensity
conflict between the regular forces of two or more states, each using their own firepower
capabilities. As shown in Figure 4, the definition of hybrid warfare in relation to full-scale
military war can be divided into three categories.

A.S. Hornby, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.
425.
19

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Figure 4 Three Definitions of Hybrid Warfare

Source: Matsumura Goro, “The Essential Mechanism of Hybrid Warfare: ‘Fight in the
cognitive space’ integrating military and non-military means to achieve the ultimate
objectives,” 2023, p. 2. *In this discussion, “hybrid warfare” is used as a synonymous
term with “hybrid war.”
The broadest definition shown here is Definition 3, which includes everything from fighting
in normal times and gray zone situations that do not escalate to full-scale military war, as
well as the use of various hybrid methods in full-scale military war. For example, Hirose
Yoko, in her book Haiburiddo Senso: Roshia no Atarashii Kokka Senryaku [Hybrid Warfare:
Russia’s New National Strategy] (in Japanese) uses the term in this broad sense of hybrid
warfare.20 Definition 2, on the other hand, is based on the premise that the term “war” itself
is used for high intensity armed conflicts. Therefore, the use of hybrid methods in situations
that have not risen in intensity is not included within this category of hybrid warfare. Fromthe same perspective, there are also those who argue that analyzing a category that consistsof the framework of hybrid warfare is itself misleading. Instead, the perspective should be
the use of cross-domain operations (sometimes referred to as all-domain operations or multidomain operations), within the framework of full-scale military war. 21 Advocates of thisapproach take the position that the essence of warfare will continue to be the use of force,
primarily firepower, and that new and diverse methods will be employed most effectively
within the realm of military war. Definition 1, in contrast, defines hybrid warfare as the useof various military and non-military means in situations that do not escalate to full-scale

Yoko Hirose, Haiburiddo Senso: Roshia no Atarashii Kokka Senryaku [Hybrid Warfare: Russia’s New
National Strategy] (Japanese), Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, Kodansha Ltd., 2021.
21
Yoshikazu Watanabe, Takeshi Inoue, and Takahiro Sasaki, Puchin no “Chogensen”: Sono Zenbo to Shippaino Honshitsu [Putin’s “Unrestricted Warfare”: Its Whole Picture and the Essence of Failure] (Japanese), Wani
Books Plus, Wani Books Co., Ltd., 2022, pp. 7-11.
20

14
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military war, or in situations intentionally meant to avoid becoming a full-scale military war,to achieve an objective. This is a term used by many analysts.22 Even if full-scale militarywars do not completely disappear in the future, new methods of warfare that do not lead tofull-scale military war will become important. In this context, clearly distinguishing between
the concept of hybrid warfare as introduced in Definition 1 and full-scale military war would
contribute to a more clear and precise discussion.
In this research, the focus will be on the emergence of states and non-state actors that
aim to achieve objectives previously achieved through full-scale military war by various
methods, including military and non-military means, without resorting to full-scale militarywar. Therefore, this report will use the term “hybrid warfare” in the sense of Definition 1 inorder to examine hybrid methods as the main focus.
2 Possible Scenarios China could take for Hybrid Warfare Aimed at Unifying Taiwan
In the Taiwan presidential and legislative elections in January 2024, the Democratic
Progressive Party’s (DPP) Lai Chung-te was elected president, while in the Legislative Yuan,
the DPP was relegated to the position of the second-largest party behind the Kuomintang(KMT). As a result, for the next four years, Taiwan will continue to experience a government
divided between the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan.
From China’s perspective, continuation of the DPP government signifies Taiwan’s
ongoing wariness toward China, a situation that presents challenges for China’s efforts topromote pro-China sentiment and proceed with its unification agenda. On the other hand,the emergence of a government divided between the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan
could lead to an intensification of political conflict in Taiwan in the future. This situation
could create opportunities for China to exploit.
Taking into account this political situation in Taiwan, the following two scenarios could
possibly be used by China to launch hybrid warfare aimed toward Taiwan unification in the
future without reaching the threshold of a full-scale military invasion.
(1) Hardline approach
The hardline approach scenario would involve China’s use of various methods to intensify
political conflict within Taiwan and create extreme political instability. In such a scenario,

In Junjiro Shida, Haiburiddo Senso no Jidai: Nerawareru Minshushugi [Hybrid War Era: Enduring Threats
to Democracy] (Japanese), Namiki Shobo publisher, 2021, the adoption of Definition 1 is appropriate afterreferring to many previous studies, pp. 11-62. Hybrid CoE, jointly established in Helsinki, Finland, in 2017by NATO, the EU, and their member states, works to address hybrid threats in situations that do not lead tofull-scale military war under a similar recognition. “Hybrid threats as a concept,” Hybrid CoE, https://www.
hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon/ (last accessed September 13, 2023).
22

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pro-China factions could resort to civil war to seize power and then request that China sendin security forces or military troops to thereby achieve de facto unification.
If this approach is taken, various tools of hybrid threat activity would be used against
Taiwan to achieve the following objectives in each phase.
⚫ Priming phase-Inducement of escalation of pro-China and anti-China confrontation-Undermining of economic activities, etc., and creating social dissatisfaction and unrest-Decline in government credibility-Cultivation of pro-China puppet forces (covert infiltration operations until needed without
revealing them publicly)⚫ Destabilization phase-Promotion of social unrest originating from disruption of social and economic activities-Weakening of the government’s administrative and security capacity-Manufacture of domestic dissent, inciting violence, etc.
-Preparation of puppet force (including within the Taiwan military)-Promotion of distrust of the U.S.
⚫ Coercion phase-Paralysis of various functions, etc., and loss of government authority-Establishment of pro-China illegitimate government by puppet forces-Creation of a state of civil war, shaping of public opinion calling for assistance from China-Military intervention in stages (escalating from covert to open)-Manipulation of the international situation that does not allow U.S. intervention(2) Conciliatory approach
The conciliatory approach scenario involves increasing Taiwan’s dependency on China,
mainly in economic terms, and creating a situation in which Taiwan’s economy could notexist without China. If China succeeds in raising the momentum toward economic benefits
to overcome resistance in Taiwan to the one country, two systems idea, it is possible that,rather than utilizing a confrontational carrots and sticks tactic to escalate internal division
within Taiwan, China could take a conciliatory approach in an attempt to guide Taiwan as awhole in a pro-China direction. This approach would involve showcasing benefits, including
false promises, while simultaneously making known the risks of not complying.
The goals for the use of hybrid methods against Taiwan at each phase of the process
could be as follows.
⚫

Priming phase-Cultivation of pro-China sentiment at the grassroots (including information manipulation)-Strengthening interdependence through trade, investment, etc. between China and Taiwan
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-Trade and investment support for developing countries, etc.
-Cultivation of pro-China political forces (including covert infiltration operations, funding,etc.)-Promoting skepticism and distrust towards democracy⚫ Destabilization phase-Open and covert interference in elections-Discrediting anti-China political forces-Open support for pro-China political forces (economic and diplomatic support as “carrots”)-Fostering distrust of the U.S., Japan, etc., and creating diplomatic friction and confrontation-Interference in trade, investment, etc. with countries in conflict with China⚫ Coercion phase-Crafting the establishment of a government that advocates unification with China-Support for the suppression of anti-China forces in Taiwan-Formation of international public opinion in favor of absorption and unification
The difference between the two approaches is that the hardline approach employs a hybrid
strategy of both carrots and sticks simultaneously to exert pressure on the Taiwan
government to create intense confrontation, including not ruling out armed conflict in
Taiwan. On the other hand, the conciliatory approach aims to present exaggerated benefits
and to mislead the Taiwanese people into believing that not aligning with China involves
risks, thereby steering Taiwan as a whole toward a pro-China direction.
Regardless of the approach China takes, it is expected that Taiwan’s political system
will always be affected by China’s use of hybrid methods. In the priming phase, dependingon the success or failure of the approach and the global political and economic situation at
the time, there may be a shift back and forth between the two approaches. If Taiwan sways
in favor of China, China might take a more conciliatory approach and, conversely, Chinamight take a more hardline approach if the situation were to swing in the opposite direction.
If China foresees success in either direction, it is believed that hybrid warfare would escalate
from the destabilization phase to the coercion phase, becoming more intense.
Furthermore, if despite China’s taking a hardline approach and proceeding to thecoercion phase, even leading to the deployment of the People’s Liberation Army,
establishing a pro-China regime takes too long, the possibility of a shift from hybrid warfare
to a full-scale military invasion cannot be ruled out.
As this possibility suggests, whether China adopts a hardline approach or a conciliatory
approach in the future is likely to change as the situation evolves. It is important to recognize
here that the objectives of China’s hybrid warfare against Japan may vary between a hardline
approach and a conciliatory approach.
17
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

In the case of a hardline approach, with the eventual possibility of a full-sale militaryinvasion in mind, the primary objective would be to thwart U.S. military intervention, and,
when necessary, drive a wedge between Japan and the United Stares to prevent cooperation
between Japan and U.S. military action. This could involve using various hybrid methods,
possibly involving Japan directly, to achieve these objectives.
In contrast, in the case of the conciliatory approach, hybrid methods may be used tocreate distrust in Taiwan toward both Japan and the U.S. Rather than causing division
between Japan and the U.S., the aim may be to create a sense of skepticism towards
supporting Taiwan in Japan and in the United States so that Taiwan would be isolated.
As mentioned above, China’s options for Taiwan are thought to actually fluctuate
between a hardline approach and a conciliatory approach. In this research, however, in orderto clarify the characteristics of the case in which a hardline approach is adopted and the casein which a conciliatory approach is adopted, the Study Group will make a distinction
between the two approaches for future discussion.
Section 3: Methods and Activities and Case Studies
Based on the 40 tools presented in the Conceptual Model, the methods and activities that
could be implemented in response to a Taiwan crisis were examined with reference to pastcases. These data are compiled in a separate casebook.
Since the “methods” and “activities” identified are expected to become importantelements in the process of deepening hybrid warfare study in the future, the Study Group has
selected examples from the casebook and included them in this report to enhance thevisualization of hybrid warfare.
In the process of creating the casebook, in our overview of Japan’s strategic environment,
the Study Group questioned whether these 40 tools were sufficient and whether there are any
mismatches. Although the methods and activities derived from the tools are still incomplete,
we believe that the methods and activities will be helpful in grasping the overall picture of
hybrid warfare.

18
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

Figure 5 Example of Methods and Activities (excerpted from the casebook)

Source: Prepared by the Maritime Security Study Group.

19
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

1 Physical operations against infrastructure
Tool: 1-1
Fishing boats, surveying vessels, merchant vessels, submarines,
Methodunmanned air vehicles (UAVs)
Activity
Cutting submarine electric cables
2 Creating and exploiting infrastructure dependency (including civil-militarydependency)
Tool: 2-1
Creating dependency on energy supply (electricity, natural gas,
Methodoil)
Activity
Exploiting vulnerability from dependency on energy supply
3 Creating or exploiting economic dependencies
Tool:3-1
MethodCreating economic dependencies
Promoting, restricting, or swaying economic activity andActivity
expanding one’s influence
4 Industrial espionage
Tool: 5-1
MethodCyberattack
Exploiting sensitive information such as advanced technology
Activitythrough cyberattacks
6 Undermining the opponent’s national economy
Tool: 6-1
MethodRegulation by government and other public agencies
Import and export restrictions (strategic mineral resources,
Activity
agriculture, forestry and fisheries resources)
9 Cyber operations
Tool: 9-1
MethodCyberattacks on financial institutions
Activity
Financial transaction failures
11 Territorial water violation (including exclusive economic zone (EEZ))
Tool:11-1
MethodGovernment ships (including warships)
Repeatedly violating territorial waters and attempting to make
Activity
territorial claims a fait accompli
14 Paramilitary organizations (proxies)
Tool: 14-1
China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel
MethodInterference with vessel activities
Activity
15 Military exercises
Tool: 15-1
Preparation and execution of military exercises
MethodMilitary threat
Activity
18 Exploitation of sociocultural cleavages (ethnic, religion and culture)20
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

Tool: 18-1
MethodExploitation of the sociocultural cleavages
Exploiting contradictions regarding social superiority
Activity(discrimination) that come from historical circumstances
20 Manipulating discourses on migration to polarize societies and undermine liberal
democracies
Tool: 20-1
Spreading disinformation and fake news
MethodSpreading disinformation and exaggerated news reports about
immigrants, promoting unrest and hostility. This activity
Activity
promotes conflict within society and undermines liberal
democracies.
22 Promoting and exploiting corruption
Tool: 22-1
Corruption against military personnel
MethodAcquisition of military intelligence
Activity
23 Exploiting thresholds, non-attribution, gaps and uncertainty in the law
Tool:23-1
MethodActivity

Influence on issues of legal interpretation that divide national
opinion (e.g., survival-threating situation)
Delaying decision-making as a nation

26 Clandestine operations
Tool: 26-1
Clandestine operations targeting Taiwan’s military bases
MethodExploring vulnerable points in Taiwan’s armed forces
Activity
27 Infiltration
Tool: 27-1
Leveraging a network of operatives
MethodPromoting social unrest and dividing national opinion
Activity
28 Diplomatic sanctions
Tool: 28-1
Diplomatic pressure on the countries concerned to prevent themfrom recognizing the target country as a state or building an
Methodalliance
International isolation of the target country
Activity
29 Boycotts
Tool: 29-1
Boycotts from recognition of state or alliance building
MethodInternational isolation of the target country
Activity
30 Embassies
Tool: 30-1
Exploiting extraterritoriality of embassies
MethodExploiting as a base for various hybrid threat activities
Activity21
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

31 Creating confusion or a contradictory narrative
Tool: 31-1
Transmitting convenient narratives by public organizations
MethodMixing lies and unilateral claims with historical facts
Activity
32 Migration as a bargaining chip in international relations
Tool: 32-1
Migration as a bargaining chip in international relations
MethodPromoting public anxiety and discontent
Activity
33 Discrediting leadership and/or candidates
Tool: 33-1
Revealing scandals
MethodRevealing scandals and discrediting politicians and others
Activity
34 Support of political actors
Tool: 34-1
Advertising and propaganda
MethodUsing disinformation and propaganda to deliberately manipulate
Activity
domestic public opinion in favor of a particular political actor
35 Coercion of politicians and/or government
Tool: 35-1
Bribes (financial assistance)
MethodBribing (funding) politicians and government officials to
Activity
influence policy and decision-making accordingly
37 Media control and interference
Tool: 37-1
International media acquisitions and influence
MethodAcquiring overseas media companies and publishers and using
their influence through advertising and investment to spread one’s
Activity
own country’s message
38 Disinformation campaigns and propaganda
Tool: 38-1
Creating massive fake accounts and explosively spreading
Methoddisinformation through SNS social media
Spreading disinformation through SNS social media
Activity
40 Electronic operations (GNSS jamming and spoofing)
Tool: 40-1
Interception of cell phone location information (GPS) and call
Methodcontent
Identifying attack targets and gathering information
Activity
Conclusion
In FY2023, the Study Group conducted the following research activities:⚫

Analysis of the Conceptual Model setting the guidance of this research project;⚫

Organization of the concept of hybrid warfare as a baseline for the Study Group’s own
conceptual model related to a possible Taiwan crisis; and,22

The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

⚫

With reference to the 40 tools introduced in the Conceptual Model, extraction ofactivities using tools and past cases and their compilation into a casebook.

In FY2024, the Study Group will analyze how the phases (stages of escalation) of methods
and activities and “Possible Scenarios China could take for Hybrid Warfare Aimed at
Unifying Taiwan” obtained in the process of compiling the casebook intertwine. Based onthat analysis, an original conceptual model will be developed. This conceptual model willencompass hybrid threats directed toward Japan and the United States (including othercountries in what is referred to as a maritime alliance, as necessary) with Taiwan as the focal
point.
In the final fiscal year, the Study Group will conduct research on how to deter andaddress hybrid threats multilaterally based on the conceptual model.

23
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

Maritime Security Study Group

Members (honorifics omitted)
Chairman: Saito Takashi, Former Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, JSDF
Fukumoto Izuru, Former President, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Command andStaff College
Tokuchi Hideshi, Research Advisor, Nakasone Peace Institute; President, ResearchInstitute for Peace and Security
Hirata Hidetoshi, Former Commander, Air Training Command, Japan Air Self-Defense
Force
Matsumura Goro, Former Commanding General, Northeastern Army, Japan GroundSelf-Defense Force
Nakamura Susumu, Senior Research Fellow, SFC Research Institute, Keio University
Sato Koichi, Professor, Oberlin University
Murakami Masatoshi, Associate Professor, Kogakkan University
Yamamoto Katsuya, Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
Yoshida Yukari, Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies
Kawashima Takashi, Senior Research Fellow, Nakasone Peace InstituteYasue Mariko, Senior Research Fellow, Nakasone Peace Institute24
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.