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The Rise and Fall of the Icelandic Constitutional Reform Movement:
The Interaction Between Social Movements and Party Politics
SHIOTA Jun＊

Abstract
This article traces the rise and fall of the Icelandic constitutional reformmovement, which emerged following the financial crisis of 2008. The movement grewout of the popular protest that arose in face of the crisis. We draw on the politicalprocess approach to examine how the movement declined despite some remarkable
initial progress, such as the championing of a participatory drafting process. We findthat the movement had serious challenges in terms of social control, collective
attribution, movement network, and political opportunities. The movement faced toughsetbacks partly derived from the traditional rural-capital dynamics in Icelandic politics.
Moreover, the linkage with institutional actors was weak although ratification by
parliament is necessary for the implementation of a new constitution. The populistic
movement frame motivated the participants in the beginning, however this was later
impeded by the anti-foreign debt protests. The 2013 election was the final straw
because the left-wing government, which supported the movement, was replaced by aright-wing government which was hostile to the new constitution. In conclusion, thepaper finds that recognizing the dynamic interrelation between social movements andinstitutional politics is important if we are to understand today’s social changes.
Keywords：Iceland, Constitutional reform movement, Political process approach,Party politics, Financial crisis＊ Ph.D student in Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University.

Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.27, No.1（2019.7）

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Introduction
The financial crisis which unfolded in 2008 and the following austerity politics
triggered massive social mobilization in many European countries. The mobilizations
emerged not only due to a deterioration of living conditions but also from a mistrust in
the existing representative democratic systems. One of the characteristics of these
protest movements is that they aimed to reform the existing political system
pragmatically（Flesher Fominaya, 2014; Gerbaudo, 2017）. Some of them took the formof participatory practices using the institution of direct democracy, for instance,
referendum initiated by citizens（della Porta, O’Connor, Portos, & Ribas, 2017）. This
paper focuses on the Icelandic constitutional reform movement as representative ofsuch practices at the time of the Great Recession. The reform movement showedremarkable progress, until it was put on hold in 2013. This paper explains the rise andfall of the movement through a description of the interactions both inside and outsideof parliament. The Icelandic constitutional reform process has been studied mainly inconstitutional studies with a few exceptions（for example, della Porta et al., 2017;
Vogiatzoglou, 2017）. This paper describes the process from the perspective of social
movement studies as well as, to some extent studies on party politics.
Iceland was one of the first countries to be hit by the financial crisis of 2008. This
crisis awakened the Icelandic civil society which had lain dormant since the protest
movements that were generated around 1968（Bernburg, 2016; Júlíusson & Helgasson,
2013; Vogiatzoglou, 2017）. Although, the Icelandic popular protest, or so-called the‘pots and pans revolution,’attracted attention as an early starter of global protests
during the Great Recession（Bernburg, 2016; Flesher Fominaya, 2014; della Porta &Matoni, 2014）, the protest also needs to be characterized in terms of its development,
into the constitutional reform movement（Vogiatzoglou, 2017）.
The constitutional reform movement started in 2009, and it gained remarkableprogress with legislative support from the left-wing government which was alsoestablished in that year. The movement and the government formed the National
Assembly, which was a meeting composed of over 1,000 Icelandic citizens randomly
selected to craft a blueprint for a new society. Subsequently, a Constitutional
Assembly（later re-named the Constitutional Council）was formed in which twentyfive elected citizens drafted a proposal for a new constitution. The proposal was finally

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approved with 64.2% support in an advisory referendum held on October 20, 2012
（Elster, 2016; Fillmore-Patrick, 2013; Gylfason, 2013, 2016; Landemore, 2017; Ólafson,2016）. However, the bill to implement the new constitution was not put to the vote inparliament even though ratification by the parliament is necessary to change theconstitution in Iceland. In the general election of 2013, constitutional reform was nolonger the main issue for voters（Thorarensen, 2016 p. 247）. This election resulted in a
win for the right-wing parties which were hostile to constitutional reform and theconstitutional reform argument was shelved.
This paper mainly applies the political process approach which allows us tounderstand the social movement as political, and can therefore grasp the relationshipbetween the social movement and structural features in a political context（Hallgrímsdóttir & Brunet-Jailly, 2014; McAdam, 1999）. It is important to note that, inthe case of the Icelandic constitutional reform movement, politicians or political parties
as legislators are essential actors for the movement’s success（Thorarensen, 2016, p.
239）. Therefore, this paper looks at the political process of the movement from 2009 to
2013, focusing on political opportunity, movement frame, movement network and thepolitical reactions from the opposition followed by conditions for emergence anddevelopment or decline of a social movement as proposed by Doug McAdam（1999）.
The Icelandic constitutional reform movement is still ongoing, yet it is also truethat the process was suspended once in 2013. Thus, this paper traces the politicalprocess of the movement from 2009 to its suspension in 2013. To describe the process,the author conducted interviews with seven people who were both movement actors
and politicians as institutional political actors. Additionally, this paper utilizes statistical
data as well as document data, such as articles written by the activists, parliamentary
documents, party documents, and secondary resources.
Socio-economic and political impacts of the Icelandic financial crisis
Iceland had a strictly regulated economy, but this changed rapidly after 1990 andon into the 2000s as the government implemented privatization and liberalization of
the economy and expanded the financial sector. Joining the European Economic Areas（EEA）agreement, which came into effect in 1995, profoundly changed the country’s
economy because it allowed the Icelandic financial sector to participate in international

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financial markets（Ólafsson, 2011a）.
The financial industry became the driving force of the rapid expansion of the
Icelandic economy from the late 1990s to the first half of the 2000s. The country’s
three main banks, Kaupþing, Glitnir, Landsbanki were privatized during this time, andthey aggressively entered the international financial markets using their own
currency, the Icelandic Krona. However, an awareness of risk facing the Icelandic
economy had already become apparent around the mid-2000s1. In October 2008, whenthe Icelandic Krona crashed, the three major banks went into bankruptcy with a debt
of about 700% of GDP and Iceland faced a financial crisis（Zoega, 2016, p.23）. The factthat these three big banks held 97% of the banking assets of Iceland（Johnsen, 2016,p.41）,meant that most of the country’s economic activity was temporarily stopped.
Thus, this financial crisis had an enormous impact on the lives of the people ofIceland. The unemployment rate almost tripled, from 2.3% in 2007 to 7.6% in 2010. GDP
growth, which was positive up until the crisis, crashed to -6.8%. The Icelandic
currency lost most of its value. Ólafsson（2011b, p. 9）points out that‘the most visible
effect of the crisis for the general public is the cut in living standard affected by thefall of the Icelandic Krona’. Many households suffered even more since their housing
loans were made in foreign currencies. While the value of their wages was reduced tohalf, their debts had doubled in the international markets. In addition, since Iceland
largely relied on imports almost all consumer product prices, including gasoline,
doubled overnight（Palsson & Durrenberger, 2015, p.xvii）.
The economic crisis led not only to deterioration of living conditions but also to anincreasing mistrust in politics and politicians. A survey by Gallup2 precisely shows acrisis of legitimacy of political institutions and politicians. According to the survey, thecredibility of the parliament dramatically decreased from 44% in 2003 to 13% in 2009.
One of the factors seems to be an increasing awareness of political corruption as a3
survey of the Iceland National Electoral Study（ICENES）
about political corruption

shows. The survey asks‘how widespread do you think corruption is among
politicians’. Although only less than one-third of the population（28.3%）responded‘very’or‘rather’widespread in 2003, it explosively increased to 72.2% in 2009 after
the crisis. According to another survey, also by the ICENES, people who thought
politicians were not‘trustworthy’increased from 16% in 2003 to 40.7% in 2009. This

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mistrust led to an instability of party politics.
Icelandic party politics had been basically considered to be a stable four-party
system consisting of the conservative Independence Party（IP）, the center-right
Progressive Party（PP）which was born as a peasant party, the Social Democratic
Alliance（SDA）, and the Left-Green Movement（LGM）made up of the previous
socialist party and the communist party. Unlike other Nordic countries, Icelandic party
politics was characterized by the fact that the conservative IP had been in power for along time while the social democratic party had been relatively weak（Arter, 1999;
Jahn & Oberst, 2012; Kristinsson, 1996）. Especially during the neoliberal period, from1990s to the 2008 financial crisis, the IP had always been in power and made coalitions
with the PP most of that time to ensure their position（Ólafsson, 2011a p. 22）.
However, as Figure 1. shows, after the financial crisis of 2008, this stable party systembegan to fluctuate, and this led to the establishment of the first left-wing coalition
government in Icelandic political history（Indriðason, Önnudóttir, Þórisdóttir &Harðarson, 2016; Jonsson, 2016）. It was especially symbolic since the IP, which had
been the ruler of the country, lost massive support, the LGM, which had been amarginal party before the crisis, rapidly increased. Hence, the financial crisis was a
critical juncture.
Figure 1. Electoral results and government coalition 1999-2013
45
40
35
30
IP

25

PP

20

SDA

15

LG

10
5
0
1999
IP - PP2003
IP - PP2007
IP - SDA2009
SDA - LG2013
IP - PP

4
Source: Hagstofa Ísland（Statistics Iceland）.

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Cognitive liberation and creating a movement network in the popular protest
The constitutional reform movement followed from the popular protest, and we
can see its strong connection in the cognitive frame and organizational network of the
movement. In October 2008, soon after the crisis, there was a massive social protest.
Although constitutional reform was not an official goal of the protest movement, there
were at least voices for it in the popular protest（Gylfasson, 2013, p. 380; Jónsdóttir,
2011）.
The claim for a new constitution had existed, and also most of the ideas in thecontents of the proposal for the new constitution had been argued prior to 2008. The
Republic of Iceland was founded in 1944 when Iceland got complete independence
from Denmark. Because the Icelandic constitution was originally given from theDanish Kingdom, it was almost the same as the old Danish constitution which was
founded 19 centuries5. Some politicians were calling for a new constitution before 2008,
but their voices were very small. However, after the crisis of 2008, the claim for a new
constitution became explosively widespread in Icelandic society. IC3 who is a memberof the Icelandic Pirate Party6 said that
Since independence, many politicians have wanted to improve the constitution, oreven rewrite it completely. But until the crash of 2008, I don't think it captured
the popular imagination or was mainstream enough to be in a party platform ...
But what happened since 2008 was that demand for the new constitution became
mainstream（Interviewee IC3）.
The ultimate aim of constitutional reform has been considered as a way to avoid
what Iceland experienced in 2008 through a profound reform of the system throughcitizen participation（Thorarensen, 2016; Vogiatzoglou, 2017）. It is however also
important to note, that from the activist’s perspective, the implantation of a new
constitution was crucial for a redistribution of power. The activists recognized thedomestic authorities, who were assumed to be the culprits of the crisis, as theiradversaries. For instance, Jon Elster（2016, p. 191）and Jón Ólafson（2016, pp. 257-258）
point out that one of the most significant motivations for a new constitution was theperception that it would break the corrupting relationship between political elites andP157-塩田.indd

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business elites which they conceived as a primary cause of the 2008 financial crisis.
IC4 who is an activist mentioned about the participatory methods of the constitutional
reform:What we needed was more power to the people, what we needed was to have amore democratic society which we had not felt. It was very important because in
the collapse, in the protest we have felt like it’s my country, it's not their [thepeople in power] country（Interviewee IC4）.
Also, Birgitta Jónsdóttir（2011）, an information activist and later a co-founder of
the Pirate Party, defines the people by saying that‘‘We’meaning the 99%, not thepoliticians who had failed’. Then, she mentioned that the new constitutional proposal‘has been rewritten by the people for the people … Once it is passed, our new
constitution will bring more power to the people and give us proper tools to restrain
those in power’. This kind of populistic discourse emerged in the popular protest. Jón
Gunnar Bernburg（2016, pp. 72-74）mentions that one of the main discourses of theprotest was that‘political corruption’in the country led the financial crisis and the‘problem was thus defined as an established pattern of flawed governance, a problem
that, in the light of the crisis, called for democratic reform’. The popular protest was
the beginning of a cognitive liberation, and the idea of the new constitution came to beconsidered crucial for what the protesters called‘New Iceland’. This sort of antiestablishment sentiment and aspiration for popular sovereignty were reflected in thedesire for constitutional reform. IC7 who worked for the new constitution and later
became a member of the Pirate Party said
There was so much distrust in the political establishment and political elites.
People wanted to say direct power influence over this fundamental matter. There
were huge demands and calls for increased democracy, direct democracy,
participation, and people's power after the crash … the National Assembly, theConstitutional Committee with experts, the public consultation meeting, thedirectly elected Constitutional Council, the referendum, all part of this trying tomeet this demand and general desire for improvement or reforming ourP157-塩田.indd163

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democracy after the crash（Interviewee IC7）.
The constitutional reform movement was not a‘protest’but it should still beseen as contentious politics. The constitutional reform movement indeed took over the
populistic cognitive frame which emerged in the popular protest as well as its
organizational network. As Markos Vogiatzoglou（2017, p. 49）notes,‘all of the key
actors of the protests were involved in the drafting process’. Some of them were
elected to become members of the Constitutional Council, some worked in organizing
the National Forum as volunteers, and some suggested many good ideas about the
new constitution to the Council. Not only in such kind of open events but also they had
a lot of the debates‘in just coffeehouse’（Interviewee IC3）
. The existent network
which was established in the popular protest contributed to the emergence of theconstitutional reform movement. Therefore, we can see the popular protest as an‘eventful protest’which produced social movement capital, collective identity, andknowledge for another movement（della Porta, 2008, p. 30）.
The emergence of political opportunities
The constitutional reform process was genuinely popular, and its process, such as
the National Forum, the Constitutional Assembly/ Council, and the referendum, were
all legally carried forward. In this regard, the left-wing government which supported
the movement was first and foremost an important political opportunity. Sydeny
Tarrow（1994, p. 85）defines political opportunity structure as‘consistent — but notnecessarily formal or permanent — dimensions of the political environment thatprovide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their
expectations for success or failure’. McAdam, McCarthy and Mayer（1988）show thatchanges in political context are crucially influenced by political opportunity structure
shifts in the social movement field. From this perspective, we can assume that political
opportunity structures for the Icelandic constitutional reform movement shifted inconjunction with the changes in party politics.
Between 2009 and 2013, the positions of the political parties with regards toconstitutional reform, were divided. The conservative IP and the PP were strongly
against constitutional reform, whereas the ruling coalition, the SDA and the LGM,

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were in favor. Even though the PP professed a desire for constitutional revision in
their 2009 electoral manifesto, they reversed their position after the election.
After the election in April 2009, the new constitution was widely seen as a crucial
step toward breaking away from political corruption which was assumed to be theprimary cause of the crisis. The government passed a bill for the National Forum, theConstitutional Assembly and a referendum. They promoted constitutional reform
inside parliament up until 2012. In particular, it should be emphasized that the newprime minister of the left-wing government, Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, the leader of the
SDA, was a champion of constitutional reform. She had been a supporter throughout
her long political career. As IC7 explained
The left-wing government got power with the very clear kind of mandate andpromise to change a lot of things fundamentally … and Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir,
the prime minister, had always been for new constitution … she had a personal
will for that（Interviewee IC7）.
Therefore, in 2009, there was the promise of civil society which proclaimed for a
new constitution on the one hand, as well as a government with a new pro-constitution
prime minister established on the other produced political opportunities for the
movement allowing them access to power.
In sum, the constitutional reform movement emerged in 2009 in part thanks to theprevious popular protest, since the movement actors had broad networks in the social
movement field, and they could also use the populistic frame to mobilize theparticipants. Furthermore, the left-wing government, especially the prime minister,Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, created a political opportunity as an influential ally. Therefore,
the conditions for the emergence of the movement were all fulfilled in 2009. With thelegislative support from the left-wing government, the movement showed that a
constitutional reform process‘that relies almost exclusively on civil society during thedrafting phase can, in fact, function’（Fillmore-Patrick, 2013, p. 16）. However, themovement was rapidly contested in the first half of 2013.

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Contestation of the constitutional reform movement
McAdam（1999, p. 52）proposed four conditions of development or decline ofprotest movements: shifting political opportunities, organizational strength, collective
attribution, and social control, the three formers are conditions of emergence, while thelatter is set in motion by the emergence of the movement. Social control refers to
responses from other actors, such as setbacks from opposition. We draw a contestation
process of the Icelandic constitutional reform movement along these conditions.
Political conflict over constitutional reform
There were tough setbacks to constitutional reform from the opposition. The
conservative IP especially had always been against a new constitution. The mostvisible incident occurred after the national election of the Constitutional Assembly in
November 2010, twenty-five citizens were elected as members from 523 candidates.
However, after the election, three men filed a lawsuit seeking to disavow theeffectiveness of the election, and on January 25, 2011, the Supreme Court decided thatthe election was null and void, granting their action. The three initiators of the lawsuit
were connected with the IP（Fillmore-Patrick, 2013, p. 12; Gylfason, 2016, p. 207）. The
left-wing government reacted to this annulment with a bill which the Constitutional
Assembly renamed the Constitutional Council and the parliament appointed thetwenty-five citizens to be members. Despite the IP and the PP being against this bill, it
was passed. It is evident that the government rescued the reform process with theirlegislative action.
However, this caused a rupture in the coalition of governing parties. A few MPsfrom the ruling parties, the SDA and the LGM, expressed their displeasure with theconstitutional reform after the decision by the Supreme Court. For example,Ögmundur Jónasson, an LGM politician, stated that he was firmly against the
governmental resolution for a Constitutional Assembly which he condemned as illegal（Jónasson 2011）. Five other MPs in the ruling parties abstained when the bill was put
to a vote in the Constitutional Council. IC1, a member of the LGM, said that in theparliamentary groups of the ruling parties constitutional reform‘wasn’t one of their
top priorities for many of them, but all of them agreed to go enter the process. But
then things started going wrong with the Supreme Court especially … It was a big

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point in the process（Interviewee IC 1）’. The decision of the Supreme Court offered areason to oppose constitutional reform, not only by the opposition parties but also bysome members inside the ruling parties.
It may be that political conflict over the new constitution stems from a conflict
between rural areas and urban areas, Reykjavik. A survey in 2017 conducted by
7
Market Media Research（MMR）
shows that the inhabitants of the capital area（61%）

are more likely to agree with constitutional reform than those living in rural areas（47%）. A point of contention is an article which proposes‘one-person, one-vote’in the
proposal for the new constitution. The Icelandic parliament has been pointed out tohave overrepresentation of rural areas（Kristinsson 2000）. Traditionally, theconservative parties, the IP and the PP, and to some extent the LGM have benefited
from this. For the political elite, especially those from rural areas‘has always had astrong incentive to oppose constitutional change - the self-interest of safeguarding theoverrepresentation of the regions’（Meuwese, 2013, p. 474）. However, the rural
constituencies also worried about‘one-person, one-vote’. In fact, they were clearly
against‘one-person, one-vote’in the referendum（Gyflason, 2016; Meuwese, 2013）8.
The reason why the constitutional reform process started easier was that the SDA
had gotten strong support in Reykjavik and could form a coalition without theconservatives. However, during the process, the traditional rural-capital dynamics in
Icelandic politics resulted in a conflict in the constitutional reform argument.
Weak linkage between those inside and outside of parliament
As mentioned above, constitutional change cannot be made without ratification by
the parliament. However, from the perspective of an organizational network, thelinkage between the movement and the political parties was weak.‘The politicalparties, whose credibility suffered a major blow as a result of the crash, were excluded
from the preparation and drafting stage of the new constitution’（Thorarensen, 2016,p. 239）. For instance, members of the parliament could not run in the election for theConstitutional Assembly. Also, the Council’s members did not have any communication
with parliament members during their work. IC2 who was a member of the Council
explained

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I’ve never talked to any politicians during a time we wrote the constitution …
The way it［the Constitutional Assembly/Council］was designed, the way it was
structured, and the way of the atmosphere in the society at the time, it［talking
with politicians］made no sense … at the time we were writing it［the proposal］,
they had no right to interfere（Interviewee IC2）
The movement actors considered that it was not necessary to communicate with
the institutional actors and such an idea correlated with the mistrust of politicians
triggered by the crisis. IC5 who was a member of the parliament from 2009 to 2013referred to pressure from the public:
At that time there was no trust in politics … it was, in the eyes of the people, sovital that this［the new constitution］was made by just ordinary people … But at
the same time, in the political party I was working in, the feeling of this antiestablishment went too far … when we became professional politicians, we weresuddenly part of the establishment, and they hated us for it.（Interviewee IC5）.
It is evident, that to some extent, the weak linkage between those inside andoutside of parliament stemmed from their motivation to drafting the new constitution‘by the people for the people.’
Interception of the populistic frame and the loss of influential allies
Another challenge for constitutional reform was that parliament had to deal withother political issues which stemmed from the crisis in parallel with constitutional
reform. In addition, they had little time to examine and amend the proposal before
dissolution in March 2013（Thorarensen, 2016）. These issues not only cut the time but
also had an impact on the movement frame.
A foreign debt issue, the so-called Icesave dispute,9 influenced the movement’s
cognitive frame. One of the biggest Icelandic private banks, the Landsbanki wasnationalized after the crisis and the accounts were frozen. Iceland had 3.8 billion euros
in foreign debt which was equivalent to 44% of the Icelandic GDP（Hallgrímsdóttir &Brunet-Jailly, 2016, p. 105）. The Icelandic authorities decided to repay the Icesave debt

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soon after the crisis, and even the new left-wing coalition government, established in
April 2009, also agreed with this decision. However, the Icelandic public strongly
opposed the repayment of the Icesave debt. According to a survey conducted by
MMR in June 2009, 45.6%‘strongly disagreed’and 17.5%‘rather disagreed’to thequestion,‘Do the Icelandic people have to take responsibility for overseas Icesave
depositors?’. Hence, we could say that actually 63.1% of the public opposed therepayment of

the Icesave debt. On the other hand, only 23.8% answered‘agree’or‘rather agree’. This issue triggered massive protests, and it finally led to referenda in2011 and 2012. In both referenda, the Icelandic public refused repayment, and theEuropean Free Trade Association（EFTA）Court acknowledged and legitimized therefusion at the end. The repayment of Icesave debt was not precisely a bail-out which
other European countries implemented during the financial crisis, but it was still along
the same lines in terms of offsetting the failure of private banks with public funding（Hallgrímsdóttir & Brunet-Jailly, 2014, p. 88）.Bernburg（2016, p. 36）points out that forthe public,‘it seemed as if the authorities had allowed the banks to take enormous
risks at the expense of the Icelandic public’. During the battle over the Icesave debt,
the movement’s populistic frame was intercepted by the anti-Icesave protest. People
were mobilized more for anti-Icesave and criticism of the left-wing government thanconstitutional reform. The IC2 said
I think it [the Icesave dispute] impacted in the way that people just went theconstitutional reform downer in the agendas. That’s the most obvious part of thewhole puzzle because so much energy has gone from the public into all thatmatters（Interviewee IC2）.
This interception of the cognitive frame was highly interrelated with the closureof political opportunities. Hallgrímsdóttir and Brunet-Jailly（2016, p. 112）note that
‘Icesave was simultaneously the site of real and sincere politics around reforming
democracy in Iceland as well as the vehicle for the cynical manipulation of the centerleft coalition government that had been elected after the crash’. The Icesave disputedelegitimized the left-wing government despite the fact that the country experienced arapid economic recovery from the financial crisis under this government（Ólafsson,

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2016）. The percentage of valid votes of left-wing parties in the 2013 general election
decreased by half from the last election（Indriðason et al., 2016）.Moreover, the Icesave
dispute contributed to the popularization of right-wing parties which had strongly
opposed the repayment of debt and it enabled them to get back into power（Thorarensen, 2016, p. 247）. This change in the political opportunity structure wasdecisive in the contestation of the movement because they lost their strong politicalallies in power.
In addition, The SDA, which had been their strongest institutional ally, became
detached to constitutional reform after a change in leadership in February 2013.
Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir who had championed the new constitution, resigned, and ÁrniPáll Árnason became the new party leader. This change influenced party policies withregard to constitutional reform. At the conclusion of the party’s general meeting in
2013, they did not even refer to the new constitution, although it had been emphasized
as of‘great importance’at the conclusion of the 2011 meeting（Samfylkingin 2011,2013）. It is obvious that the movement lost a big part of their institutional allies. Manyinterviewees mentioned this change as crucial for the movement（Interviewees IC2,
IC3, IC5, IC6, IC7）.
Conclusion
Although suspended in 2013, the Icelandic constitutional reform movement
demonstrated the effectiveness of participatory practices using the institution of direct
democracy. If we view the popular protest and the constitutional reform movementfrom the perspective of a protest cycle, the former produced movement networks andthe cognitive frame for the later. In addition to this, the historical political change, theestablishment of the first left-wing government in 2009, opened political opportunities
for the movement. However, the movement was always faced with some challenges.
The movement faced tough setbacks partly derived from the traditional rural-capitaldynamics of Icelandic politics. Moreover, the linkage with institutional actors remained
weak although ratification by the parliament was understood to be necessary in orderto implement the new constitution. In the beginning, the populistic movement frame
motivated the participants, but this was intercepted by anti-foreign debt protests later
on. In terms of political opportunities, the most influential ally, the SDA, became

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detached due to changes of party leadership, and the 2013 election became the final
straw as the left-wing government which supported the movement was replaced by aright-wing government hostile to the new constitution.
The emergence and decline of the Icelandic constitutional reform movement
cannot be explained from the single perspective. National sociopolitical dynamics, suchas rural-capital conflicts, or the country’s history of independence, the configuration ofpolitical parties and international factors are always interconnected. The fact is thatthe movement was obviously influenced by the impact of the global Great Recession.
We must remember the emergence of popular protest and the national importance of
the Icesave dispute（della Porta et al., 2017）. Our research shows that social
movements should be considered from a perspective that has a view of the integrationof national and transnational contexts. Besides, although the reciprocal relationshipbetween social movements and party politics is often overlooked in social movement
studies（Hutter, 2014）, our research suggests that we need to pay more attention to
the dynamic interrelation between social movements and institutional politics.
Finally, it must be noted that the Icelandic constitutional reform movement has
not come to a close, but is still very active today. Therefore, it will be necessary to
study how the movement has maintained its primacy, in future research.
List of interviewees

IC1, Parliamentarian/ member of the Left-Green Movement, 12 February 2019, Reykjavik
IC2, ex-member of the Constitutional Council/ executive member of the Constitutional Society,
15 February 2019, Reykjavik
IC3, member of the Pirate Party, 17 February 2019, Reykjavik
IC4, activist/ member of the Women for the New Constitution, 18 February 2019, Reykjavik
IC5, ex-parliamentarian/ member of the Social Democratic Alliance, 21 February 2019, Reykjavik
IC6, Parliamentarian/ member of the Pirate Party, 23 February 2019, Reykjavik
IC7, member of the Pirate Party, 4 March 2019, videotelephone

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Note
１

For instance, the 2006 report of the International Monetary Fund（IMF）regarding the
Icelandic economy warned that because of its huge external debt alongside the country’s
rapid economic growth in the early 2000s, the Icelandic economy was in an unstable situation（IMF Country Report No. 06/296）.
２ Gallup á Íslandi. https://www.gallup.is/.
３ Iceland National Electoral Study. http://fel.hi.is/Icelandic_national_election_study_icenes.
４ Hagstofa Ísland（Statistics Iceland）. https://hagstofa.is/.
５ The Icelandic politicians have tried to change the constitution several times after 1944 yetthese were only small amendments in terms of electoral constituencies.
６ The Icelandic Pirate Party is a new political party which was founded at the end of 2012.
The party is strongly connected with the constitutional reform movement. For instance, manyof their members came from the movement and one of their main political agendas is theconstitutional reform. The party became the loudest voice for the issue in the parliament afterP157-塩田.indd

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they had seats in the 2013 election.
Market Media Research. https://mmr.is/.
The six questions asked in the referendum. See the Icelandic government website: https://www.government.is.
９ Icesave was an online saving account with Iceland's high-interest rate that Landsbanki, oneof the biggest banks in Iceland before the crisis, opened in the U.K. and Holland. It had
approximately 400,000 customers in the two countries. Yet, because the Landsbanki wasnationalized after the crisis and the accounts were frozen, both the British and the Dutch
governments implemented their own deposit-guarantee scheme for the depositors in theirown countries. After that, they claimed a refund including interest to Iceland.
７８

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