February 16, 2024

“Information Warfare” by Russia:
Focus on its Strategies, Objectives, and Case Studies
Research Project for the Risks in Information Sphere
Implementation Report
On February 16, 2024, the Research Project for the Risks in Information Sphere at Nakasone Peace Instituteheld a discussion based on a report by Mr. Sasaki Takahiro, former Defense Attaché at the Embassy of Japanin Russia (retired rear admiral, Maritime Self-Defense Force). The summary is as follows.
The word “safe” in the strict sense of the word does not exist in the Russian language, and the closest equivalentis said to be a word implying “a state of being free from danger.” The Russian nation is very sensitive to thestate of “no danger” in its relations with other countries. This sensitivity has led to an excessive sense ofdefensiveness toward other countries, an expansion of buffer zones, and expansionism. The current war against
Ukraine is “all-domain warfare (hybrid warfare),” which includes information warfare and cyber warfare.
Besides Russia, there are various “information spheres” in other countries around the world that
disseminate propaganda that favors their own nation or agenda to their citizens and the world. Therefore, it isimportant to compare conflicting “information spheres” to discern the truth.
Taking the Russia-Ukraine war as an example, information and news reports originating from Ukraine arevisible primarily in Western countries. In these reports, Russia is shown as the evil aggressor, while the Westsupports an invaded Ukraine and protects democracy from authoritarianism. On the other hand, informationand news reports originating from Russia cannot be viewed in Western countries. These reports portray Ukraineas well as the U.S. and NATO, which support Ukraine, as evil, while Russia is shown as having legitimacy.
These reports label the actions of the West as a double standard. Because most Russian citizens belong to the“Russian information sphere” the problem is that most Russian citizens believe such information disseminatedby the Kremlin without questioning.
Information warfare can be broadly divided into two categories: “strategic information warfare,” which is
conducted to influence national policies, decision-making of state and military leaders, and to manipulate
public opinion on the one hand; and “operational and tactical information warfare,” which is conducted tounderstand the enemy’s situation from an operational and tactical standpoint and to obscure its own actions
during a contingency, on the other.
In Russia, President Vladimir Putin said in February 2012 that he recognized the effectiveness of
information warfare as comparable to nuclear weapons, and Chief of the General Staff General Valery
Vasilyevich Gerasimov, in his February 2013 speech entitled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,”
recognized that information warfare as the mainstream of modern warfare. Former Chief of the General Staff
Yury Baluevsky also stated in February 2017 that information warfare can paralyze all the enemy state’s powerstructures.
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Russia’s emphasis on information warfare in terms of security is evident in a number of strategic
documents, such as the “ Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation” and the “Conceptual Views
Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Information Space.” Russia
views information warfare not only as a battle for information security but also as a battle targeting political,
economic, and social systems by broadly using the information spheres, and thereby as a “battle in the cognitivedomain” involving the psychological manipulation of state decision makers.
In the war against Ukraine, Russia conducted influence operations within Russia, in Ukraine, the West,and the international community in a battle in the cognitive domain. However, compared to the annexation ofCrimea in 2014, influence operations in 2022 can be said to have largely failed, except for those conductedwithin Russia.
By spreading a large amount of disinformation prior to the outbreak of the war, Russia sought to emphasize
the legitimacy of its military action against Ukraine and to create public opinion favorable to Russia. After thewar began, a large amount of disinformation intended to demoralize the Ukrainian people and incite anxiety
was confirmed. In addition, influence operations aimed at dividing Ukraine from its allies were conducted inorder to hasten the end of the war.
What is distinctive compared to 2014 is that in 2022 Russia focused on domestic propaganda toconsolidate domestic public opinion in favor of the regime. This is, so to speak, an information warfare
campaign with the goal of impressing upon the Russian public that information other than that issued by theRussian authorities cannot be trusted. However, as was seen in the broadcast of a female staff member of thestate-run TV Channel One holding up a placard calling for opposition to the war shortly after its outbreak,there are signs of a breakdown in the control of information in Russia, and this could become a future risk
factor for the Putin regime.
Currently, Russia is not only fighting an information war by spreading disinformation but is also
conducting a battle of narrative proliferation.
Information warfare using disinformation spreads and utilizes “false information” that is convenient to thestate. Therefore, it is possible to respond to this by fact-checking. On the other hand, narrative-based
information warfare combines “facts” that are convenient for the state to shape and then utilizes a narrative of“national ideals” as an interpretation of the facts. The result of this process cannot be addressed by factchecking. Therefore, an approach that is distinct from the response to disinformation and that has a different
dimension from just fact-checking will be required in the future.
In response to this information warfare by Russia, Ukraine has been able to gain support not only fromthe Ukrainian people but also from the Western countries supporting Ukraine and the international community
through strategic dissemination of information using factual information. In addition to identifying Russianforces through its own intelligence in the current war, the Ukrainian military has also been able to locate
Russian forces by fusing information collected from civilians to utilize this information in its attacks.
Meanwhile, like Russia, Ukraine is conducting media control not only toward its own citizens but also towardforeign countries. In fact, there are facilities called “media centers” in Lviv and Kyiv cities, where militaryrelated interviews are allegedly possible for those with government-issued press cards. However, there are2

opinions voiced that “Conversely, this means that Ukraine can show what it wants to show and not show what
it does not want to show.” It is also true that some have said that they felt they are being taken advantage of.
Further, it can be said that Russia and Ukraine are the same in that they both conduct domestic surveillance forthe purpose of maintaining national security and public order.
Regarding Russian information warfare against Japan, it is possible that Russia will further engage in
influence operations to divide Japan and the U.S. by shaping public opinion in Russia’s favor, such as bycreating negative public opinion about U.S. forces in Japan and suggesting that a peace treaty can never beconcluded with Japan if it continues its support for Ukraine. In fact, there are already cases in which Russian
government-affiliated media outlets have been conducting information operations aiming to solidify public
opinion against Japan in Russia, such as adding to and altering the comments section of Yahoo Japan’s “YahooNews” when translating it into Russian. In addition, there have been several confirmed cases of Japanesenationals leaking classified information to officials of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia.
Countermeasures to respond to Russian information warfare include (1) halting dissemination ofinformation from state-sponsored sources, (2) responsible response from platforms, (3) promoting factchecking and fostering information literacy, (4) strategic dissemination of information, and (5) Hunt Forward
Operations (HFO) by the United States to neutralize Russia’s influence operations (since 2018, the U.S. has
been sending cyber operations experts to allied countries to probe adversaries’ intelligence and strategically
expose malicious behavior), all of which face a variety of challenges that must be overcome.

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