My Vision No.60
2022.6

The Feared Acceleration of Decline in Japan’s
Birthrate Due to COVID-19
Last year, the number of births in Japan reached a record low of approximately 810,000. The decline inJapan's birthrate was a serious matter even before the advent of COVID-19. What impact will the
pandemic have on this situation?

About This Issue
The Feared Acceleration of Decline in Japan’s Birthrate Due to COVID-19– Committing to Policies That Focus on the Young

Yuri Okina
Executive Vice President, NIRA／Chairperson, The Japan Research Institute, Limited

Against the background of more than two years of a global pandemic, the number of births in Japan in
2021 was approximately 810,000, the lowest figure ever recorded. The decline in Japan’s birthrate was aserious situation even before the advent of COVID-19, and the adoption of a wide variety of measures has
not proven successful in boosting it. Will the pandemic affect the ongoing decline in Japan's birthrate? Howshould we approach the problem of this decline? The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in widespreadchanges in the economy and social life. In this issue of My Vision, we asked experts their thoughts
regarding how we should think about the issue of Japan’s declining birthrate in light of the pandemic basedon a variety of factors.
Keywords…Declining number of births, trend of declining birthrate, youth-focused policies

Expert Opinions

The Feared Acceleration of Decline in Japan’s Birthrate Due to COVID-19
Will the pandemic affect the ongoing decline in Japan’s birthrate?
How should we approach the problem of this decline?

COVID-19 May Exacerbate Japan’s Low Fertility

Now is the Time to Broadcast a Message That
Emphasizes the Young

Noriko Tsuya

Fumio Ohtake

Distinguished Professor, Keio University / SeniorResearcher, Keio University Global Research InstituteSpecially Appointed Professor, Center for Infectious
Disease Education and Research

Keywords…Delayed childbearing, refraining fromhaving children, female population in their 20s and 30s

Keywords…Decrease in the number of marriages, social
norms, “elderly-oriented” society

Eliminate the Gender Gap Through Reform of Work
StylesChildcare Support Should Be a Concern of Society asa Whole as Part of Child / Family Policy, Not Simply
an Employment-Related Policy

Shintaro Yamaguchi

Shiro Yamasaki

Professor, Faculty of Economics, The University ofTokyo

Special Advisor to the Cabinet in charge of Social
Security and Population Policy

Keywords…Men’s participation in housework and childraising, working from home, measures to support
childcare

Keywords…An “aged nation”, Myrdal’s prophylacticsocial policy, universal child and family policy

Comprehensive Investment in People Rather Thanan Exclusive Focus on the Number of Births
Sawako Shirahase

Professor, Graduate School of Humanities andSociology, The University of Tokyo
Keywords…Opportunities to interact with people,
investment in human capital focusing on women, asociety that makes full use of the strengths of young
peopleInterview period：March - April, 2022
Interviewer : Kozue Sekijima (NIRA Research
Coordinator & Research Fellow), Ayumi Kitajima (NIRA
Research Coordinator & Research Fellow)

Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement

My Vision No.60
2022.6
About This Issue

The Feared Acceleration of Decline in Japan’s Birthrate Due to COVID-19– Committing to Policies That Focus on the Young
The number of babies born in Japan in 2021 is estimated tohave been approximately 810,000. The nation’s total fertility rate
dropped to 1.3. The number of births exceeded 1 million in 2015 andhas been declining rapidly since then. In fact, therefore, the number ofbirths in the nation had been steadily shrinking even before theoutbreak of COVID-19. Naturally, the government has adopted avariety of policies in response in recent years. The Abe administration
set a policy goal of realizing a desired birthrate of 1.8, and proactively
constructed nursery schools under a plan to accelerate the elimination
Yuri Okina
of waiting-lists for children’s admission; the administration also
Executive Vice President, NIRA
realized free early childhood education and childcare. The subsequent／Chairperson, The Japan
Suga administration moved to realize insurance coverage for infertility
Research Institute, Limited
treatment; in 2021, a new law to promote the taking of childcare leaveby men passed the Diet, and a variety of other efforts were made. However, unfortunately, the trend of thedeclining birthrate cannot be changed, and it has been pointed out that it may be further accelerated by
the effect of the spread of COVID-19 since 2020.

The Declining Birthrate Will Have a Severe Impact on the Economy and Social Security
Japan’s declining birthrate will have an extremely severe impact on the future of Japanese society.
As a result of the decline in the birthrate, not only will the domestic market shrink, but the number ofworkers will also decrease, which will affect the survival of the economy itself. In particular, it is predictedthat the decrease in growth potential with the decline in the working-age population over the next decadeor so will not be compensated for by the realization of increased productivity (for example throughdigitalization) alone. Because the demographic trend is visible over a long period of time, even at present,
companies have no choice but to adopt a cautious attitude to capital investment in consideration of theshrinking domestic market. Consumers are also anxious about the sustainability of social security, making
it difficult for them to actively spend. It will be necessary for the government to give earnest consideration
to approaches that will enable the desired birthrate of 1.8 to be achieved. For this issue of My Vision, wetherefore asked five experts in the area their opinions regarding the possible effects of the spread of
COVID-19 on the declining birthrate, how this should be approached, and policies for changing the trendof the declining birthrate.

What Are Our Interviewees Thoughts Regarding the Effects of COVID-19?
First, regarding the impact of the pandemic on the declining birthrate, Noriko Tsuya, a Professor
at Keio University, indicates that due to uncertainties about the future as a result of COVID-19, couples
may delay starting families or having more children. It is a concern that this refraining from having
children might lead to a further decline in the birthrate. In particular, the problem in Japan is that thefemale population in their 20s and 30s has been declining since before the pandemic, and in addition tothis, the tendency towards delayed childbearing is progressing. Professor Tsuya is sounding a warning bell
here, telling us that the postponement of having children due to COVID-19 may spur further population
decline. She points out that the progression in the declining birthrate associated with COVID-19 may havea significant impact in the long run. Further, Fumio Ohtake (a Specially Appointed Professor at Osaka
University), who participated in the government's Subcommittee on Novel Coronavirus Disease Control
and analyzed and proposed COVID-19 responses from the perspective of behavioral economics, expresses
concern regarding the impact of the government's COVID-19 measures on the declining birthrate. In
particular, while the evidence has shown that the risk of infection with the Omicron variant becoming
Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement

My Vision No.60
2022.6
serious is limited to the elderly and those with underlying conditions, in Japan, unlike countries such as
the United Kingdom, restrictions on activities were uniformly strengthened, irrespective of age. Professor
Ohtake fears that because it did not ease its restrictions on the activities of young people and children,
young people may have received the impression that Japanese society does not take them seriously.
Professor Ohtake believes that the government should send a message that emphasizes children and young
people, and make a strong commitment to rethinking all its policies based on that guideline. Looking backon the series of measures that were put in place in response to COVID-19, this is a convincing point.

What Measures Are Currently Required to Respond to the Declining Birthrate?
Shintaro Yamaguchi, a Professor at the University of Tokyo who is engaged in a variety of empiricalanalyses that seek to find a direction for concrete measures to respond to the declining birthrate, emphasizes
the necessity of working from the perspective of closing the gender gap and, above all, of rethinking the divisionof roles between men and women that is deeply-rooted in Japanese society. According to Professor Yamaguchi’s
analysis, when the number of men working from home increases, the time that they spend on childcare andhousework increases. It will therefore be essential to promote work style reforms. Telework was introduced toJapan semi-forcibly due to COVID-19, but it will be extremely important to take this opportunity to realize andentrench flexible work styles throughout society as a whole. Professor Yamaguchi also points out that it will beessential to increase childcare allowances and improve nursery schools. Financial resources will be necessary
for this. In this regard, Shiro Yamasaki, who oversees social security as a Special Advisor to the Cabinet, points
out that all citizens, including the elderly, should consider the provision of social support that provides financial
resources for children. Mr. Yamasaki indicates that preventive countermeasures are urgently required in orderto prevent society from becoming destabilized as young people become paralyzed by inertia or experience
psychological pressures due to population decline. In addition to this, it will also be important to establish a“universal child and family policy” that provides support for children throughout Japanese society. Mr.
Yamasaki urges in particular the necessity of realizing policies of this type in order to provide coverage to nonregular employees who are falling outside the current support measures. Discussions regarding financial
resources will be essential to full-scale measures in response to the declining birthrate, but this provides us
with a valuable perspective to consider.

Creating a Society in Which Young People And Women Can Manifest Their Abilities
As we see, this issue has presented a number of views concerning the necessity of recognizing, at
all levels, that further decline in the nation’s birthrate would represent a danger to the survival of Japanesesociety. Studying the issue from the perspective of sociology, Sawako Shirahase, a Professor at The
University of Tokyo, believes that there is no decisive factor in measures to respond to Japan’s declining
birthrate, and that rather than seeking an immediate solution in an increased number of births, ourhighest-priority policy should be to invest in young people, whose number is declining in Japan. She
explains the necessity for conducting investment in young people and women, who are afraid of
unemployment and job uncertainty, establishing an environment in which they are able to display theirabilities, and creating new and efficient models for the utilization of human resources. At the same time,
it will be necessary to provide systemic support that enables both men and women to balance these
activities with child-raising. Measures to counter Japan’s declining birthrate will require more than justpolicies that focus on the number of births. Professor Shirahase suggests that there will be a sustainable
recovery in the number of births only after Japanese society is transformed into one in which young people
and women, who have previously not been able to demonstrate their innate abilities, are able to flourish.
Dr. Okina is an Executive Vice President of the Nippon Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) and the Chairperson of
The Japan Research Institute, Limited. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Kyoto University. Dr. Okina serves innumerous public positions, including as a member of the Industrial Structure Council of the Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry and the Social Security Council of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement

My Vision No.60
2022.6
Expert Opinions

COVID-19 May Exacerbate Japan’s Low Fertility
The fertility impacts of COVID-19 can be divided into shortterm and long-term ones. The short-term effect is a temporary
postponement of childbearing due to the coronavirus crisis, while thelong-term effect is a complete stop of childbirth because of the pandemic.
However, the distinction between these two kinds of effects is largely
conceptual. In reality it is rather difficult to separate the two, as atemporary postponement often leads to ultimate abandonment of an
attempt to have children. Moreover, as coronavirus infections have notyet been successfully contained, it is extremely difficult to measure the
COVID-19’s effects on fertility at this point.
Noriko Tsuya
In any case, the pandemic often results in the loss ofDistinguished Professor, Keio
employment
and reduction in person-to-person contact, which in turn
University / Senior Researcher,willlikelycause
economic and psychological difficulties. And these
Keio University Global
hardships may lead to hesitation to have children, further depressing
Research Institutefertility, which has been very low in recent years. Women's fecundity(biological ability to have children) tends to be highest in their 20s to their early 30s, and the rate ofchildbearing declines significantly after age 35. For many years after World War II, the peak childbearing
ages among Japanese women were their late 20s. Since the 2000s, however, the peak ages have shifted to
women’s early 30s, and the tendency towards delayed childbearing has become increasingly pronounced.
If COVID-19 causes further postponement of childbirth, Japan’s fertility will likely become even lower. If
this happens, rapid shrinkage of the country’s population will accelerate further.
According to an international survey on attitudes regarding a low-fertility society conducted by
the Cabinet Office from October 2020 to January 2021, which sampled men and women aged 20 to 49 inJapan, Germany, France and Sweden, the lowest percentage of respondents answering that they expected
their living standards to improve was found in Japan (in particular among the younger respondents).
Further, when the Japanese respondents with no children or only one child were asked about attitudinalchanges associated with the pandemic, their desire for children was found to be in general weakened by
the pandemic. Though it is not possible at this point in time to ascertain whether this is a temporary
phenomenon, COVID-19-related anxieties regarding prospects for household finances and family life thatmany Japanese men and women are likely to be feeling should not be overlooked.
Japan’s female population at the peak marriage and childbearing ages of 20‒39 has been on along-term downward trend since the 1980s. Thus, even if there were no COVID-19, the number of births
in the country would certainly continue to decline. Nevertheless, to prevent further declines in the rate offertility due to the pandemic, effective policy and societal efforts are urgently needed to alleviate theanxiety that many Japanese men and women are likely to be feeling about their future life prospects. While
the recent policy change that allows infertility treatments to be covered by the national health insurance
is appropriate and helpful given the increasing delay in childbearing, it is also important and necessary toprovide comprehensive policy support to help women and couples who want to have children balance workand family life, and to make workplaces and the labor market more family friendly in consideration ofworking parents.
Professor Tsuya’s research focuses on demographic and family changes in Japan and Asia in long-term perspective. Her leadauthored book, Prudence and Pressure: Reproduction and Human Agency in Europe and Asia, 1700-1900 (MIT Press, 2010),
which was based on empirical analyses of a large amount of historical demographic and economic data in collaboration withgroups of international scholars, received the Population Association of Japan Award in 2013, and the Keio University Awardin 2014. She holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Chicago with a specialization in demography. She was formerlya research fellow of the Population Institute at the East-West Center in the U.S. She became professor, Faculty of Economics
at Keio University in 1998. From 2019 to 2020, she was the director of the Institute for Economic Studies, Keio University.
She was also a member of the Science Council of Japan in 2005–2014, and the president of the Population Association ofJapan in 2018–2020.

Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement

My Vision No.60
2022.6
Expert Opinions

Now is the Time to Broadcast a Message That Emphasizes the
Young

Fumio Ohtake
Specially Appointed Professor,
Center for Infectious Disease
Education and Research

The pandemic has greatly reduced opportunities for people tocome into contact with each other, and social customs and norms havechanged significantly. The decline in Japan's birthrate could be further
exacerbated as a result. In the two years of the pandemic, the number ofmarriages has decreased by approximately 10% against the expected
number based on past trends. This can be thought of as “postponement ofmarriage,” but there is an upper limit to the age at which women can givebirth, and delays in marriage could lead to a decrease in the number ofbirths. For everyone, there is an age range in which we have the greatest
potential to meet a partner, and it will be no easy thing for young people
to regain the chance for such encounters that they have lost as a result of
the restrictions on their activities. People for whom online dating is anacceptable choice will be in a better position than people who are moreused to face-to-face encounters. These latter people will not find it easy toreplicate that experience online.
In order to change this situation, one that has the potential to accelerate the decline in Japan’sbirthrate, we should take advantage of the social and lifestyle changes brought about by the COVID-19
crisis. For example, the increase in teleworking from home and the consequent expansion of child-rearing
experience among men has changed awareness of the gendered division of roles within the family. It is
certain that it has become easier to balance work and family than it was pre-COVID-19. In addition, theentrenchment of telework has reduced the necessity for commuting and promoted migration to areas
offering environments suitable for raising children. This is likely to contribute to the improvement of thebirthrate. It will therefore be important to form social norms to ensure that such trends are able to takeroot.
At the same time, the pandemic has revealed that Japanese society is oriented towards the elderly.
The risk of serious illness arising from the Omicron variant that characterized the 6th wave of thepandemic was lower than that from the variants encountered previously, and the risk was most prevalent
among the elderly and people with underlying conditions. However, restrictions on people’s activities were
uniformly tightened, irrespective of age. Japan’s restrictions on the activities of children and adults,
imposed in order to protect the health of the elderly, were put in place hastily and without sufficientconsideration. Britain initially took strict measures, but later questioned the negative impact that thesewere having on the lives of children and young people, and now emphasizes the importance of restoring
the nation’s society to its pre-COVID state. I think that young people took this difference as a sign thatJapanese politics disregards the importance of the lives of young people. It is necessary to transform
Japanese society into a youth-oriented society.
The Japanese government should make a strong commitment to sending out the message thatchildren and young people are important to society, and to reconsider all policy under that guideline.
Appealing to young people through this direction of policy development and a message such as this could
lead to the creation of a society in which young people recognize that they are able to have children andraise them with complete peace of mind.
Professor Ohtake specializes in labor economics and behavioral economics. He is a member of the Advisory Council on
Countermeasures against Novel Influenza and Other Diseases, and conducts empirical research on methods of promoting
behavioral changes in the context of countermeasures against COVID-19 from the perspective of behavioral economics. He
holds a PhD in economics from Osaka University. Following terms including as a professor in Osaka University’s Instituteof Social and Economic Research, he has been a professor in the university’s Graduate School of Economics since 2018. He
took his current position in 2021. He has served as the Executive Vice President of Osaka University, as President of theJapanese Economic Association, and as a government delegate. He won the Japan Academy Prize and the Suntory Prize forSocial Sciences and Humanities for Nihon no fubyoudou – kakusa shakai no gensou to mirai (“Inequality in Japan”) (Nikkei
Publishing, 2005).
Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement

My Vision No.60
2022.6
Expert Opinions

Eliminate the Gender Gap Through Reform of Work Styles
The decline in the number of births in Japan recorded in 2021
may be due to couples delaying the timing of childbirth as a result of
increased anxiety over the idea of raising children against thebackground of the COVID-19 pandemic. If it is indeed simply a matterof timing, when the pandemic declines in virulence, we will see a swing
in the opposite direction and the number of births will return to its
trend prior to the pandemic. However, it is possible that this may not
be the only problem. It is only natural that Japan’s worsening economic
situation makes it undesirable to assume the responsibility of a family
Shintaro Yamaguchi
and children. If economic uncertainty continues to increase into theProfessor, Faculty of Economics,
future, there will be little increase in the number of marriages, and thisThe University of Tokyo
may have a negative impact on the nation’s birthrate over the long term.
It remains difficult to predict the long-term effects of the pandemic.
We can say that the pandemic has generated progress in the use of telework, and this represents
a step towards closing the gender gap. Nevertheless, this is still a deep-rooted problem, and one whichcannot be solved by changing a single factor. In order to further promote men's participation in houseworkand childcare, it will be necessary to work on various areas of Japanese society (for example companies
and sites of education) simultaneously, in order to overturn stereotypical thinking regarding gender.
The concept of working from home, which has been introduced to Japan at a stroke due to thepandemic, may be an opportunity to correct the gender gap in relation to the burden of housework andchildcare at home. Promoting men's participation in housework and childcare was an important policy
issue even before the pandemic, but little progress has been realized. Japan’s system of childcare leave formen is, formally speaking, one of the best in the world; in reality, however, this childcare leave is not being
taken. Research conducted by my team found that increasing telecommuting by one day a week increased
the time men spent on housework and childcare by 6.2% and the time spent with their families by 5.6%.
As this indicates, if we take the opportunity provided by the pandemic to change the way we work acrossJapanese society as a whole, it could potentially have a positive impact on the nation’s birthrate over thelong term.
Getting married and having children must be an individual’s free choice. However, the rapid
decline in Japan’s birthrate and the aging of its population will profoundly increase the burden on theworking generations. Currently, the burden represented by the cost of raising children is enormous, andthis cost is not balanced with the benefit of doing so. The adoption of measures to respond to the declining
birthrate is essential. Research has shown that childcare support measures such as increasing the numberof childcare centers and the provision of childcare allowances have the effect of increasing the birthrate.
We must commence by responding to the problems that parents face immediately following the birth of achild, such as the issue of waiting lists for access to childcare facilities. The proportion of Japan’s spending
on support for children and child-raising is two-thirds of the OECD average, and only half that of the topspending nations of Europe. There is certainly still room for improvement by policy means.
Professor Yamaguchi specializes in the economics of the family and labor economics. Taking women’s active participation in
the labor market as his starting point, he conducts research that adopts an empirical approach to the challenges of marriage,
childbirth and childcare. Professor Yamaguchi holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has
held his current position since 2019, following terms as assistant professor and associate professor at McMaster University
and associate professor in the Graduate School of Economics of the University of Tokyo. He was a co-winner of the 41st
Suntory Prize in the category of Political Science and Economics for “Kazoku no shiawase” no keizaigaku – Deeta bunseki dewakatta kekkon, shussan, kosodate no shinjitsu (“Economics of Family Wellbeing”) (In Japanese; published by Kobunsha
Shinsho, 2019). He is also a member of the Cabinet Office’s Council for Gender Equality and a member of the editorial boardof the Asahi Shimbun.

Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement

My Vision No.60
2022.6
Expert Opinions

Childcare Support Should Be a Concern of Society as a Whole as Part ofChild / Family Policy, Not Simply an Employment-Related Policy
A feeling of resignation that the declining birthrate can no longer
be stopped seems to be becoming more widespread in Japanese society. For
a 10-year period from 2005, the nation’s fertility rate temporarily rose.
However, this was a temporary phenomenon caused by a spike in childbirththat produced what is termed in Japan the “second-generation baby
boomers” (born, roughly speaking, between 1971 and 1974). The trend ofbirths among subsequent generations is at the lowest level ever recorded,
and the pandemic has only further pushed the level down. Clearly, we are
not in a position in which it will be possible to reverse the trend of population
Shiro Yamasaki
decline. At the very least, however, the current precipitous decline must be
Special Advisor to the Cabinet
mitigated. The key will be the “prophylactic social policy” discussed by thein charge of Social Security andSwedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (Note). This way of thinking urges us to
Population Policy
adopt preventive policies before society faces a crisis due to population
decline.
If this situation is left unchecked, Japan will have a population of less than 50 million 100 years fromnow. This will be entirely different to the situation 100 years ago, when the nation also had a population of 50
million. At that time, despite its small population, Japan was a young country, and its rate of aging was 5%. By
contrast, Japan in the future will be an “aged nation,” in which the elderly make up 40% of the population. Thereis a strong risk that the domestic market will shrink, investment will decrease, and innovation will stagnate.
There is also the possibility of the intensification of intergenerational conflict as young people feel increasingly
hopeless against the background of a decline in productivity and motivation to work. It is essential that we takepreventive measures before we experience socioeconomic and political instability due to a declining population.
The reason that we have been unable to stop the decline in Japan’s birthrate up to the present isbecause we have put off dealing with the issue, and have failed to tackle it head-on. Because our current childrearing policies are a jumbled miscellany rather than a unified system, many young people are failing to benefit
from support measures. Childcare support for non-regular employees is one example. Childcare leave benefits,
funded by employment insurance, commenced in 1995, when there were not large numbers of non-regular
employees. Since then, the working environment has changed significantly, and now more than half of female
employees are non-regular employees. As a result, there are many cases in which childcare leave benefits underthe employment insurance system are not available. There is a limit to what can be achieved with employment
policies alone. Against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic also, the economic risks became apparent
among non-regularly employed young people and the parenting generation.
What is important now is a “universal child and family policy” that supports children throughout society.
We should provide seamless childcare support for all children. No matter what the employment situation of theparents, there should be no difference in the environment in which the child grows up. It will be desirable for all
generations to bear the burden, because the purpose is to stabilize society as a whole. There is honestly little
time left. Now is our last chance.
(Note) Gunnar Myrdal and his wife Alva were deeply involved in the process of formation of Sweden's welfare state in the
1930s. Opinions expressed in the text are the personal opinions of the author.
Mr. Yamasaki joined the Ministry of Health and Welfare (now the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) in 1978. He hasserved in positions including Director in General for Policies on Cohesive Society of the Cabinet Office, Executive Secretary
to the Prime Minister, Director in General of the Social Welfare and War Victims’ Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health,Labour and Welfare, and Commissioner of the Cabinet Secretariat’s Headquarter for Overcoming Population Decline andVitalizing Local Economy in Japan. During this time, he was involved in the planning and putting into effect of policy related
to long-term care insurance, even becoming known as “Mr. Long-term Care Insurance”. Following his retirement, he served
as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Lithuania. He then published Jinkou senryaku houan (“The Population
Strategy Bill”) (Nikkei Publishing, 2021), which proposed solutions to the problem of population decline. Drawing on his
abundant experience in the field of policy, in this book, which takes the form of a novel, Mr. Yamasaki depicts the innerworkings of the government as it strives to establish proposals for reform, while showing the harsh reality of the population
problem. Mr. Yamasaki has held his current position since January 2022.
Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement

My Vision No.60
2022.6
Expert Opinions

Comprehensive Investment in People Rather Than an Exclusive
Focus on the Number of Births
It is considered that the longer a man and a woman spend time
together, the more positive the effect on their fertility rate will be; whenworking hours were limited to 48 hours a week some years ago in the UK, thetotal fertility rate temporarily increased. However, in the midst of thepandemic, while people are spending more time with family members as aresult for example of restrictions on going out, the birthrate has declined evenin the United States. Psychological anxiety generated by the increase in
unemployment and employment insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic
has had a negative effect on birthrates, including in Japan. While a clear directcausal relationship among the macro-level economic situation, the COVID-19
pandemic, and individual behaviors/decision-making cannot be determined, it
Sawako Shirahase
appears that the current unfavorable situation, one which is closely associatedwith COVID-19, may, to some extent, be a shared factor associated withProfessor, Graduate School ofdeclining birthrates across nations.
Humanities and Sociology,
The fact that people have been deprived of situations in which they
The University of Tokyo
are able to physically interact with each other due to the COVID-19 pandemic
has created a variety of problems. For instance, young people have tended to delay or shy away from marriage
or having babies, looking at the future with a good deal of uncertainty. There are college students who havecompleted their higher education without in-person classes or discussions with classmates and professors.
Working together can represent a good opportunity to meet new colleagues and friends, but the current
pandemic has deprived students of these chances. Such a loss of opportunities to expand new networks may
cause serious problems for these students in the future. We have found that due to this insecure and anxious
situation, the number of babies being born, including premarital births, continues to decline.
Therefore, what I would like to recommend for coping with these global risks is investment in people,
rather than seeking an “increased number of births” as an immediate result. We should allow young people toface challenges and take risks rather than nipping this in the bud. It will be important to create a social
environment that allows challenges to be welcomed and the various potential risks that such challenges entail
to be shared together; this will make it possible for small buds to grow into large trees. We should help younger
and future generations to take up the challenge of innovative ideas and take all manner of risks, nurturing thepotential strengths of younger generations, who are declining in number at this point. To that end, it will be very
important to guarantee a variety of opportunities and options that are available regardless of gender, age,nationality, or disability. Society should be inclusive, guaranteeing equality in opportunities and the humanrights that will enable such opportunities to be enjoyed regardless of family background, gender, or age.
We can see an inverse relationship between the increase in higher education among women and thenumber of women who are engaged in professional and managerial jobs and fertility rates, but this is closely
related to the fact that women have not been guaranteed access to equal opportunities to their male counterpartsin a variety of ways in the labor market, and that conventional gender norms and relations have been embedded
firmly in fundamental social systems, including the family. Thus, the policy to be introduced with the highest
priority is to apply external pressure for the amendment, within a short period of time, of the significant gender
gap in occupations, wages, and promotions, and at the same time, encouragement of men to spend more time inhousehold chores and childrearing, similar to their female counterparts. More importantly, we should emphasize
the social responsibility for childrearing and make it more explicit, to ensure that every child can be guaranteeda decent life irrespective of family type, including single-parent families. There should be systemic support for
the realization of a balance between work and family for all, rather than this being a type of “blessing” that is
occasionally granted by someone in a relatively superior position who possesses an understanding of work-lifebalance. In the case of childrearing, it will be desirable to incorporate not only the women who give birth, butalso the men who raise children together with them, into such a system.
Human investment requires time until we determine the results that offer clear impacts, and it
involves the risk that such investment will not always result in the consequences that were hoped for from the
beginning. It will be necessary to create a social agreement concerning readiness to take risks in investing inpeople of all genders without seeking immediate profit. Understanding risks over the medium- to long-term will
determine the pros and cons of building a human resources development model that is efficient and possesses
significant potential as a result. This is the key point that will influence the future of Japan.
Professor Shirahase has led numerous large-scale research projects about Japan’s declining birthrate and aging population, andsocial inequality and disparity, as the main themes. She has made comprehensive policy proposals to assist Japan's measures in
response to its declining birthrate and aging population, seeking to achieve sustainable growth for Japanese society as a whole.
Professor Shirahase holds a DPhil in sociology from Oxford University. She took her current position in 2010, following a term as an
assistant professor at The University of Tokyo. From 2019 to 2021, she served as The University of Tokyo’s Executive Vice President
for International Affairs (overseeing international affairs, the president's vision, and public relations). Currently, she is also the
Director of the Tokyo Center for Contemporary Japanese Studies, and the Senior Vice-Rector of the United Nations University (giving
her the status of Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations).
Editor: Reiko Kanda, Maiko Sakaki and Tatsuya Yamaji. This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese.
NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation presented here. Translated by Michael Faul.
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement