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Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global
Governance for the Fight against Corruption
NISHITANI Makiko*Abstract
With an increasing number of regime complexes experienced in the past decade,a serious question has arisen as to how to create consistency and harmony out of potential
discordance among diverse goals, interests, and norms in a congested regime complex.
International organizations’ orchestration may provide an answer to this question. The global
anti-corruption governance is a transnational polycentric regime complex, with regulations andframeworks created and promoted by multiple actors at multiple levels, in multi-sectoral settingsand over multiple issues. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime（UNODC）is one of the
major orchestrators for countering corruption and has many partnerships with public, private
and civil sectors. This paper discusses some problems of the orchestration theory developedby Kenneth W. Abbott, Duncan Snidal and others, and proposes a concept of “collaborative
orchestration” as a promising model for polycentric governance. Then it examines conditions for
UNODC’s orchestration and a case of collaborative orchestration in enhancing the effectiveness of
the United Nations Convention against Corruption（UNCAC）.

＊ Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University.
Earlier versions were presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Atlanta,
March 16–19, 2016 and at the workshop “Orchestration in Polycentric Governance: Possibilities andChallenges,” Kobe, June 23–24, 2017. My deep appreciation goes to Kenneth W. Abbott, Peter M. Haas, Duncan
Snidal, Yaacov Vertzberger, and Atsushi Yamada for their helpful comments. This paper is largely based on
the chapter “Orchestration in Polycentric Governance: International Organization’s Role in Implementation of
Anti-Corruption Norms,” in Makiko Nishitani ed., How are International Norms Realized: Dynamic Process ofComplex Global Governance, Minerva Shobo, 2017（in Japanese）, but the theoretical part was substantiallyrevised and one of the case studies were deleted, based on the feedback at the workshop. This work was
supported by JSPS KAKENHI（B）（Grant No.15H03321）.

Journal of International Cooperation Studies, Vol.26, No.1（2018.7）

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Keywords:
Global Governance; Orchestration; Polycentricity; Regime Complex; Fight against Corruption;
United Nations Convention against Corruption（UNCAC）; United Nations Office on Drugs andCrime（UNODC）; UNCAC Coalition

１．Introduction: How can governance actors create synergy in decentralized
global governance?
Since the mid-1990s, we have seen an increasing number of global polycentric
governance systems characterized by decentralized structures in which there are multiple
centers of authority operating at multiple scales1 with a diversity of stakeholders, including
civil society organizations（CSOs）, private sector organizations, international governmentalorganizations（IGOs）, and states. These governance systems are often observed in regime
complexes, defined as “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governinga particular issue-area,”2 situated on a continuum between highly integrated and hierarchicalregulations at one extreme and fragmented, decentralized institutions with few or no linkages
among them on the other.3
Many scholars of the regime complex theory argue that decentralized or fragmented
structures could result in inefficiencies due to inconsistencies, duplications, and gaps among
diverse institutions and ineffectiveness due to behaviors like forum-shopping and regime-shifting.4
Scholars working on institutional interplay have pointed out, more positively, that synergistic
institutional interactions are rather prevalent in global environmental governance.5 Still others
have argued in a more nuanced way that the flexibility and adaptability of regime complexes are
preferred, under certain conditions, for their political feasibility.6
While we have no definitive answer as to how to solve the problem of inefficiency
and ineffectiveness, especially in a congested regime complex,7 Kenneth W. Abbott emphasizes
benefits of decentralized and fragmented regime complexes, including complementary regulations,multifaceted approaches and solutions to problems, and a broader range of choices for actors. He
argues that these benefits are likely to be enhanced while the costs of fragmentation are minimized,
if local activities are coordinated by public authorities in a manner that maintains the coherence
and consistency of a polycentric governance system.8 This specific mode of governance is called“orchestration,” which he sees as key for effective management of a decentralized regime complex.

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Furthermore, we have to cope with a legitimacy problem in terms of input legitimacy（democratic procedures）and output legitimacy（efficient management and effective problemsolving）in global governance.9 As Michael Zürn argues, the traditional mode of international
governance led by the US and international financial institutions, which he terms “executive
multilateralism,” has been seriously challenged by transnational protests against their lack oflegitimacy and accountability, as decision-makers of IGOs and Western powers have not been held
accountable for wrong decisions they have made at the international level.10 On the other hand,
the UN system as a whole has faced problems of legitimacy, caused by a lack of transparency
and frequent occurrences of serious corruption. However, there could be a tradeoff between input
and output legitimacies, as a plethora of incompetent participants and cumbersome procedures
could lower performance. 11 Therefore, we have to find a way to enhance input legitimacy
without damaging output legitimacy. Orchestration might mitigate these legitimacy problems byfacilitating participation by diverse actors.
Orchestration has been observed in various fields, from environmental management,
development, commerce, health, and human rights to security.12 It may also be seen in anticorruption efforts, as global governance in the fight against corruption is characterized bya highly fragmented regime complex consisting of multi-level and multi-sector norms andinitiatives created by diverse actors, including states, governmental agencies, IGOs, CSOs, andbusiness organizations. We argue that governance actors prefer to engage in a specific type oforchestration to promote the implementation of anti-corruption norms by promoting coordinationand synergy among diverse actors.
The paper proceeds as follows. It first reviews the concept and theory of orchestration,and criticizes some of the hypotheses that have been advanced. Subsequently, it proposes a
specific type of orchestration that is assumed to be prevalent and preferred in polycentric
governance: “collaborative orchestration”. It also discusses conditions under which IGOs prefercollaborative orchestration and examines them in the case of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime（UNODC）,an anti-corruption orchestrator.

２．Orchestration: A soft and indirect governance mode（1）O-I-T Model
The concept of orchestration was recently introduced in the field of international

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Figure 1: Simple orchestration: O-I-T model

Source: Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard
Zangl, eds., International Organizations as Orchestrators, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015, p.4.

relations by Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal as an essential component of New
Governance, which is characterized by participation of “decentralized” actors, be they public or
private; a regulator’s reliance on their regulatory expertise; and the regulator’s preference for theusage of orchestration and soft law.13 An orchestrator sets a governance goal, convenes, supports
and steers relevant stakeholders toward achieving the goal.14
This definition has gradually changed; in an edited volume, International Organizations

as Orchestrators（hereafter, “AGSZ”）, orchestration generally refers to the orchestrator’s working
through intermediaries to indirectly govern targets（the O-I-T model）,15 emphasizing an indirect
and soft aspect. In some cases, O, I, and T are mutually overlapping: the orchestrator can serve asa secretariat for the intermediary, or target members can serve as members of the intermediary.
There are other forms of indirect governance, including trusteeship, delegation, andcooptation, but they are different from orchestration in terms of the governor’s authoritative
control over intermediaries. 16 In orchestration, intermediaries voluntarily cooperate without
being controlled by the orchestrator with hard measures. This kind of soft governance is usuallyconsidered ineffective compared to the hierarchical mode of governance, and academics andpractitioners tend to dismiss its impact. However, orchestration is indeed observed in diverse
issue-areas and can enhance capabilities, legitimacy, and the focality of actors involved in a
dynamic process while strengthening a regime complex as a system.17（2）Conditions under which IGOs are likely to orchestrate
While governments can work through diverse actors in domestic governance with“directive orchestration,” which involves mandatory rules, public regulators（states and IGOs）
in the global arena tend to rely on “facilitative orchestration,” or enlisting and supporting
diverse actors with soft instruments to engage in regulatory activities. Facilitative orchestration
is expected to reinforce capabilities and legitimacy of orchestrators and intermediaries, andsimultaneously enhance Transnational New Governance（TNG）as a system by reducing gaps

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and overlaps among multiple regulations, resolving collective action problems, reducing forumshopping and forum-shifting behaviors, and promoting learning and innovation.18 IGOs prefer touse facilitative orchestration, as they can achieve regulatory goals within their capacities andcompetence outside of member states’ control over IGO mandates.19
However, given that the TNG suffers from an “orchestration deficit” compared todomestic governance,20 under what conditions are IGOs likely to orchestrate? The AGSZ isdedicated to pursuing this question. It argues that governance actors are likely to orchestrateunder the following conditions: First, if they lack certain capabilities, such as regulatorycompetence, operational capacity, or legitimacy, they tend to orchestrate （orchestrator
capabilities hypothesis）. Whereas a governance actor with no capabilities could not orchestrate,
an actor with extensive capabilities would not need orchestration. Second, orchestration is likely
if an actor is focal in the issue-area, in a sense of having “single and uncontested governanceleadership”（focality hypothesis）.21 Major sources of focality include authority, legitimacy,
operational competence, available resources, expertise, path-dependence, and charismaticorganizational leaders. Third, if the actor has an entrepreneurial culture that favors collaboration
with diverse actors and experimentation with innovative approaches, there is a motivation toorchestrate（entrepreneurship hypothesis）.22 In addition, orchestrations are likely when multiple
intermediaries that share the orchestrator’s goal and have complementary capabilities areavailable（intermediary availability hypothesis）. When there is only one potential intermediary, agovernance actor would be rather reluctant to orchestrate it. However, this hypothesis is rather
weak, because an orchestrator could catalyze a new institution quite easily in the event that anintermediary is unavailable.
When the orchestrator is an IGO as an agent subject to control by principals（member
states）, the divergence of goals among member states or between the IGO and member
states and weak institutional oversight by member states are hypothesized to increase thepossibility of IGO orchestrations（the goal divergence hypothesis and state oversight hypothesis,
respectively）.23
These hypotheses have been examined and broadly corroborated with some revisions incase studies of the European Union（EU）, the World Trade Organization（WTO）, the Group of
Twenty（G20）, the Global Environment Facility（GEF）, the World Health Organization（WHO）,
the United Nations Environment Programme（UNEP）, the International Labor Organization（ILO）,and other organizations.

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第 26 巻 第 1 号（3）Challenges of orchestration theory
While this collaborative study provides insightful hypotheses about conditions for IGO
orchestration, there are some theoretical and empirical shortcomings, as some case-study chapters
point out. First, focality co-varies with capabilities, making the impact of respective independent
variables as well as the value of the dependent variable indeterminate. If an IGO has extensive
capabilities, its performance and focality will improve, but its likelihood of orchestration will
decrease according to the capabilities hypothesis. On the other hand, an IGO’s shortage of certain
capabilities（capability deficit）may lower its focality but increase the likelihood of orchestration.
This presumption contradicts with the focality hypothesis that argues focality will increase thelikelihood of orchestration. Thus, the value of dependent variable（likelihood of orchestration）canbe indeterminate due to the contradictory predictions.
Second, the divergence of goals co-varies with the tightness of state oversight, especiallywhen issue salience is high; this also makes the value of the dependent variable indeterminate, as
there is a possibility that the effect of one variable（goal divergence）could be counterbalancedby the effect of another variable（state oversight）. Divergence of goals may lead to tighter
oversight that negatively affects IGO orchestration, even though the hypothesis assumes that goal
divergence motivates IGOs to orchestrate. The interaction effects between goal divergence andstate oversight is discussed in the concluding chapter as well as in the case of the WTO,24 andchapters on UNEP and the ILO point out that issue salience can increase state oversight whengoals are divergent.25
Although the covariation of state oversight and goal divergence is rather an
empirical question, it could be said that the indeterminacies discussed above is derived frominappropriately defining the dependent variable. Therefore, we argue that dependent variables
should be differentiated according to independent variables. As is discussed in a case study on
EU regulation, goal divergence seems to illuminate variations of orchestration or designs ofintermediaries（loose/close networks）rather than explain the likelihood of orchestration, whereas
the capabilities hypothesis explains why actors orchestrate.26 We put it in another way: whereas
capability deficit explains why, focality and goal divergence combined with state oversight are
more likely to determine how actors orchestrate, more specifically, how deep they engage with
the intermediary. When focality is high, orchestrators are able to deeply engage in orchestration.
If IGO’s goal is divergent from that of member states over a controversial issue, it will be difficult
for the IGO to orchestrate deeply against the will of the states.

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Last but not least, there is another empirical problem: the focality defined as having asingle, uncontested leadership is not common in today’s regime complexes. As a regime complex
comprises multiple issue-areas and institutions, each of which involves a governing body as acenter of authority, we often see multi-center systems. For instance, several IGOs together playa leading role in each area of the Millennium Development Goals（MDGs）: the World Bank,
UNICEF, and UNESCO in primary education; the United Nations Development Programme（UNDP）, the World Bank, the UN Women, UNESCO in the empowerment of women; and so on.27
Especially in regime complexes crowded with powerful IGOs, states（or state agencies）, and nonstate actors, diffused focality is not an exception; it prevails. A potential orchestrator can be focal
in a specific, differentiated area, but it usually cooperates with other potential orchestrators tocope with complex issues. Therefore, it is realistic to think that multiple orchestrators that share
focality coexist, compete, or collaborate with each other in a congested regime complex.
Taking the above points into account, in the following section, we discuss variations oforchestration that promote coordination and synergy in fragmented polycentric governance.

３．Orchestration models in a polycentric governance system（1）Orchestration under diffused focality: Collaborative orchestration
In a congested regime complex, focality tends to be diffused among multiple governors,
and coordination problems accompanied by high uncertainty easily come to the surface. As
the low focality will lower the depth of orchestration, potential orchestrators are tempted tocooperate with each other to complement respective lack of focality and capabilities. Even
UNEP, often referred to as a typical orchestrator that has pioneered the TNG,28 co-orchestrates
with another governance actor when focality is low, such as in the field of Corporate Social
Responsibility（CSR）. As discussed in the case of UNEP’s co-orchestration with the UN Global
Compact（UNGC）of the Principles for Responsible Investment（PRI）, “…orchestration may be
more likely in crowded issue areas…where focality is less obvious, where issue-linkage is thenorm and where the realities of complex interdependence may very well require co-orchestrationby two or more IGOs.”29 Low focality motivates an IGO to orchestrate with another orchestrator
instead of orchestrating alone. While the original O-I-T model focuses on vertical synergy
between orchestrator and intermediary, the collaborative orchestration model sheds more lighton horizontal collaboration between orchestrators.

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Co-orchestration and multi-orchestration
The AGSZ conceptualizes that O, I, and T can each be a set of actors respectively.30
When two or more actors work as an orchestrator jointly as a set, we call this type ofcollaboration between orchestrators “co-orchestration.” In the above PRI case, UNEP and the
UNGC jointly orchestrated from the same orchestrating position during the same period of time;they jointly engaged in convening, assisting, endorsing, and coordinating throughout the course of
preparing, launching, and expanding the PRI.
On the other hand, we suggest another form of collaboration by multiple orchestrators:
multi-orchestration. Contrary to co-orchestration, multiple orchestrators orchestrate theintermediary from different orchestrating positions by using different orchestration techniques.
The simplest form of multi-orchestration is dual-orchestration: for instance, Orchestrator A（CSO）convenes and coordinates a civil society network as an umbrella network organization,

Figure 2: Collaborative orchestration

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whereas Orchestrator B（IGO）gives official endorsement and material support to the umbrellaorganization to apply pressure to member states. A more complicated case is that of tripleorchestration, as in the case where Orchestrator A（a business association）organizes aprivate regulatory standard scheme that is endorsed by Orchestrator B（CSO）and funded byOrchestrator C（IGO）.
The first feature of multi-orchestration is that orchestrators collaborate through a clear
division of labor without a high level of coordination between different sectors, in which civilsociety actors coordinate the civil society network, IGOs coordinate among international andstate bodies, national governments coordinate domestic networks, and business actors coordinate
private sector regulation. In this way, orchestrators can facilitate efficient coordination andnetworking among different sectors while maximizing the autonomy of each sector. The multiorchestration model illustrates the mechanism of polycentric governance where diverse actors, bethey public or private, work as orchestrators simultaneously.
The second feature is different degrees of engagements by orchestrators. In theabove case of dual-orchestration, Orchestrator A is deeply committed to orchestrating the civilsociety network, whereas Orchestrator B orchestrates that network only shallowly from theoutside. Here, deep orchestration requires substantial, continuous, and direct management of anintermediary through mobilizing, initiating, coordinating/steering, and giving costly endorsement,
whereas shallow orchestration involves only supplementary and external support, including theprovision of opportunities for advocacy, material assistance, and low-cost endorsement. In otherwords, deep orchestration requires a more costly commitment than does shallow orchestration.
We should note, however, depth of orchestration is a relative concept, and cannot bemeasured in absolute terms. Exactly which techniques should be perceived as shallow or deep
is dependent on degrees of relevant actors’ and public awareness on the salience of the issue,
private or civil sector’s influence, institutional congestion, available financial resources, etc., all ofwhich affect orchestrators’ focality and capabilities.31

Difference between co- and multi- orchestrations
The multi-orchestration can be differentiated from co-orchestration in terms oforchestrators’ orchestrating positions and their engagement with a joint project; more precisely,with regards to a sense of ownership and a degree of coordination. When governance actors coorchestrate, they share not only a joint goal but also ownership of the project from the same

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orchestrating position. They have to be involved in high degree of coordination among conflicting
interests and of integrated policy and agree on such terms of contract as memorandum of
understanding over the joint project.
When governance actors are involved in multi-orchestration, on the other hand, they
don’t share the same level of ownership and responsibilities. Neither do they necessarily sharethe same set of goals; respective orchestrators usually have their own agenda aside from theoverall goal of the project. They orchestrate from different orchestrating positions at different
distance from the intermediary; therefore, each orchestrator would be involved in different
depth of orchestration. As only a little coordination is required, multi-orchestration can be easily
performed and provide a wide range of options for orchestrators.
In short, whereas co-orchestration takes place when orchestrators are involved injointly planned and designed project as a collective governor or on the basis of agreed division oflabor, multi-orchestration is characterized by the lack of joint ownership and different depth ofengagements from different orchestrating positions. However, there can be continuity between
both types of collaborative orchestration; multi-orchestration can change into co-orchestration andvice versa, according to changing relationships, goals, and degree of coordination.

（2）Conditions for collaborative orchestration
The antecedent condition for collaborative orchestration is the availability of multiple
potential orchestrators with complementary capabilities and a willingness to collaborate;“orchestrator availability,” so to speak. As the multiplicity of centers of authority is characteristicof polycentric governance, we posit that there should be multiple orchestrators in polycentric
system, though the multiplicity as well as diversity of orchestrators is not well discussed in the
AGSZ. Furthermore, powerful actors that have enough capabilities to serve as intermediaries canturn into an orchestrator over the course of orchestration; orchestration by ex-intermediaries isoften observed, as the chapter on the WHO orchestration demonstrates.32
The role of orchestrator is not limited to IGOs and states. CSOs, business entities, andlocal governments can potentially play the role of orchestrator. According to a study conductedby Global Solution Networks, whereas almost half of orchestrators are IGOs, states account for
one-third, and CSOs account for about 15 percent of the total number of orchestrators.33 As nonstate actors try to make up a shortage of legitimacy and capabilities, they are inclined to rely onorchestration on a daily basis. Thus, an increasing number of IGOs encourage powerful CSOs toCollaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

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orchestrate civil society coalitions and facilitate public-private partnerships and multi-stakeholder
initiatives.
In general, a governance actor would be motivated to orchestrate collaboratively withother orchestrators, if it lacked certain capabilities combined with focality to steer intermediaries
single-handedly. Furthermore, when an orchestrator is an IGO, a combination of high goal
divergence and tight state oversight would increase the likelihood of the IGO to engage in shallow
orchestration in a multi-orchestration setting, whereas a combination of high goal divergence andloose state oversight would likely result in the IGO’s single- or co-orchestration.34 For example, an
IGO that aims to facilitate civil society involvement under tight oversight by some member states
attempting to exclude civil society actors from decision-making process would be tempted torestrain from deep orchestration of civil society, so as to avert ex-post sanctions by the member
states. By keeping distance from civil society and engaging in shallow orchestration, IGOs canlegitimately facilitate the participation of civil society actors within their own competence, andat the same time, mobilize such civil society actors efficiently, allowing civil orchestrators toengage in deep orchestration of civil society. It could be said that multi-orchestration is a way offacilitating multi-sector involvement even under goal divergence between the IGO and member
states accompanied by tight state oversight.
The concept of collaborative orchestration questions some of the hypotheses discussed
in the AGSZ, namely, the hypotheses concerning focality, goal divergence, and state oversight.
First, contrary to the hypothesis that low focality would not induce orchestration, low focality
would encourage orchestrators to be involved in collaborative orchestration. Second, despite the
AGSZ’s finding that high goal divergence combined with tight state oversight would decrease thelikelihood of IGO orchestration,35 this combination could increase an IGO’s preference for multiorchestration, using shallow orchestration techniques. These two variables co-vary when the issue
is salient, and goal divergence determines the depth of orchestration rather than likelihood, as
was mentioned in the previous section. Considering the covariation under issue salience, it would
be more accurate to treat state oversight as an intervening variable.

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４．Overview of the global anti-corruption governance（1）Decentralized regime complex for the fight against corruption
The global governance for the fight against corruption is characterized by a polycentric
system with diversity of actors, multi-level institutions, and diverse regulations with hard and soft
instruments. Multi-level public regimes operated by the UN, regional organizations, international
clubs such as G20, and national as well as sub-national governments, co-exist with private or
multi-stakeholder regimes initiated by the International Chamber of Commerce（ICC）,the UNGC,
and so on.
In addition, institutions link with each other in “embedded,” “nested,” “clustered,” and“overlapping” relations in a dense regime complex, as shown in Figure 3.36 The United Nations
Convention against Corruption（UNCAC）is firmly embedded in the principles of sovereignty
and non-intervention in domestic affairs. Institutions in sub-fields of UNCAC, such as the Stolen
Asset Recovery initiative（StAR）, a special institution for assisting the recovery of stolen asset,
are nested in the UNCAC regime. Furthermore, as corruption problems relate to many issueareas including crimes, development, environment, security, etc., institutions dealing with different
topics have been clustered and easily overlap with other issue-areas. Thus, the regime complex
includes thematic schemes such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative（EITI）, andmulti-issue institutions including the Financial Action Task Force（FATF）40 Recommendations,aiming to regulate money laundering and corruption.

（2）Multi-level and diverse regulations
Corrupt practices had come to the fore as a serious issue by the 1970s. The US
adopted in 1977 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act（FCPA）, which would be extraterritoriallyapplied. As US businesses lobbied for international regulation to level the playing field, the US
led international legalization at the United Nations Economic and Social Council（ECOSOC）.
However, legalization efforts at the UN failed due to disagreements between industrializedcountries, which were in pursuit of regulations for a level playing field, and developing countries,
which were wary of interference in their domestic affairs and prioritized economic growth byinviting foreign investment with loose regulations.
In the 1990s, scandals involving grand corruption committed by major politicians andcorporations were frequently reported on and attracted attention worldwide. Major development

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Figure 3: Regime Complex for the Fight against Corruption（Major Elements）

Note: Ellipses indicate issue-areas and boxes indicate institutional elements（norms or schemes）. Boxes withdark shadows denote hard legal instruments, and those with lighter shadows denote soft institutions. IGOs as
agents, including regime or scheme secretariats, are not included in this figure.

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organizations including the World Bank began to declare their resolve to combat corruption. The
US pushed the issue forward at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development（OECD）instead of the UN, and under its leadership, the OECD adopted a recommendation
against bribery（hereafter, the OECD Recommendation）, followed by the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions（hereafter,
the OECD Convention）in 1997. Since then, the OECD Convention regime has been one of thecore institutions in the anti-corruption regime complex. The period from the 1990s through theearly twenty-first century saw the proliferation of regional legal instruments against corruptionin Europe,37 the Americas,38 Africa,39 and the Middle East.40 In Asia-Pacific, the Anti-Corruption
Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific（hereafter, ADB-OECD Action Plan）jointly promulgated by
the Asian Development Bank（ADB）and the OECD has served as a regional legal framework.
At the global level, corrupt practices committed by public officials were criminalized
in the United Nations Convention against Organized Crime（UNTOC）in 2000. During thenegotiation of UNTOC, an international consensus was built on the negotiation of a comprehensive
treaty directly pertaining to corruption,41 and consequently, UNCAC was adopted in 2003.
UNCAC is the only universal and comprehensive treaty against corruption. To recap, there was ageographical expansion of public regulations from national to regional and from regional to global
legalization.
On the other hand, as the definition of corruption and the scope of criminalized practices
significantly vary from country to country, there is also a demand for soft regulations, which
are expected to reduce sovereignty costs, build a normative consensus, and lay the groundworkfor hard institutions.42 In parallel with the geographical expansion of public legislation, privateand multi-stakeholder regulations to fight against corruption were also expanded and enhancedin the 2000s. Combating Extortion and Bribery: ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations,issued by the ICC in 1977（hereafter, the ICC Rules）, was substantially updated. The anticorruption principle was incorporated in the 10th Principle of the UNGC, a central institution in
the transnational regime on the Corporate Social Responsibility（CSR）. In addition, the Business
Principles for Countering Bribery（hereafter, Business Principles）were created in 2013 through amulti-stakeholder process orchestrated by Transparency International（TI）.43
The private regulations described above were designed to generate a synergistic
effect. The first ICC Rules were created for the purpose of complementing the prospective
UN Convention, which was not adopted at that time. Subsequently, they were updated inCollaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

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1996 and 1999 to correspond with the OECD Convention, followed by a couple of amendments
corresponding to key legal instruments including UNCAC, in 2005 and 2011.44 As the ICC has along history of advocacy relations with the OECD, UN, and CoE, the ICC Rules were purposefully
designed to complement public legislation by promoting self-regulation by business.45 The UNGC
10th Principle was also intentionally introduced in order to correspond with UNCAC. These
private regulations are expected to improve the effectiveness of hard law.

（3）Diverse actors and diffused focality
Due to a decentralized governance structure, focality is diffused among majororganizations. The primary IGOs working against corruption include the UNODC, the UNDP, theWorld Bank Group and its institutes, the UNGC, the OECD, the European Commission（EC）,CoE,and so on. Since UNCAC was adopted, the UNODC has led global anti-corruption activities as the
Secretariat for UNCAC and UNTOC. In addition to promoting the ratification and implementationof these two conventions, it works as a coordinator of global campaigns, an information hub
on corruption, and an organizer of conferences and global events such as International AntiCorruption Day. The UNDP has tackled corruption since the early 1990s from the perspective ofhuman and sustainable development. As one of major partners of the UNODC, it has co-organizedglobal campaigns against corruption since 2004. In the field of development, the World Bank also
has been an eminent leader for the fight against corruption, having placed the issue of corruption
at the top of its agenda in the mid-1990s.46 The OECD also has led international anti-corruption
activities, since it adopted the OECD Convention and relevant recommendations.
In addition to IGOs, a number of influential CSOs have worked on anti-corruption
measures; among such CSOs, TI, the Basel Institute on Governance, the ICC, Transparent Agentsand Contracting Entities International（TRACE）, and the Control Risks Group are recognized
as the most influential. Whereas TI is a leading NGO in the anti-corruption movement, the ICC,TRACE, and Control Risks are all business organizations working mainly for the private sector.
There are also large-scale, active multi-stakeholder and non-state initiatives andnetworks, including the EITI, the most promising public-private initiative for increasing revenue
transparency in extractive industries; the World Economic Forum Partnering against Corruption
Initiative（WEF-PACI）, a cross-industry platform for anti-corruption and transparency in theprivate sector; the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption（GOPAC）, a
global network of parliamentarians; the UNICORN International Network Limited（UNICORN）,

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a global multi-sector network of trade unions; Publish What You Pay（PWYP）, a civil society
network aiming at enhancing revenue transparency in extractive industries; and the UNCAC
Coalition, a civil society network for promoting UNCAC implementation, which will be detailed
later in this paper.
The abovementioned organizations and initiatives all function as independent authorities
and network hubs, though their actions have been moderately coordinated by forming
transnational polycentric networks.47 It could be said that focality in anti-corruption governance ishighly diffused under a decentralized and congested regime complex.

（4）Challenges in coordination of the regime complex
Although international legal instruments work in a relatively harmonious manner,
domestic law as well as law in international organizations has not yet been sufficiently harmonizedwith international law. UNCAC, as the sole universal and comprehensive hard law, may appear
to sit on the top of the legal hierarchy and align other legal instruments. In reality, however,there are difficulties in the domestic implementation of UNCAC, as UNCAC is embedded in theprinciples of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in domestic affairs.
Many provisions of UNCAC are non-mandatory, vague, or qualified, as a result of acompromise between the principles of non-intervention and anti-corruption. In fact, more thanhalf of criminalization provisions are non-mandatory and most provisions on prevention andinternational cooperation are qualified with wordings such as “as appropriate,” “as necessary,”and “subject to the basic concepts of its legal system.” Thus, states parties are allowed to refer tothe irreconcilability of domestic legal systems with some controversial provisions, such as “public
reporting”（Article 10）, “participation of society”（Article 13）and the criminalization of “illicit
enrichment,” “trading in influence,” and “abuse of function”（Articles 17 to 19）as justifications for
non-implementation.48 They comply with provisions while not actually implementing them.49 Even
the provisions on mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation necessary for asset
recovery, which are the biggest characteristics of UNCAC, allow member states not to cooperate
when these provisions are irreconcilable with domestic law. One of the reasons why more than180 countries ratified the Convention might be these soft provisions.
In addition, the international review mechanism（IRM）has remain weak since its
inception six years after UNCAC was signed, compared with review mechanisms of other anticorruption regimes such as the OECD Convention and CoE Conventions: country visits by review

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teams, cooperation with society in the preparation of and during the review process, and making
full country reports public are all non-mandatory.50
Since the Convention reflects compromises during tough negotiations and is regarded
as an end product in the form of a comprehensive and binding treaty, there is no political will tomake weak provisions mandatory or to negotiate a new, stronger treaty. The evolution of theConvention can be said to be already “frozen.”51 In this sense, it could be said that disagreements
over the balance between anti-corruption and non-intervention principles, and over controversial
issues, are already institutionalized in UNCAC.
Furthermore, in the field of technical assistance, a plethora of programs operated
by more than 50 major organizations without coordination caused terrible congestion, andthe necessity of aid coordination and harmonization to reduce duplications and gaps has been
repeatedly pointed out since the early twenty-first century.52 Moreover, as states are regulated bymultiple regimes, they are overburdened by the monitoring requirements of every review regime,
causing a problem called “monitoring fatigue.”53 There were also mounting criticisms against theoverall anti-corruption industry for its mushrooming budget.54 Thus, there has been an increasing
demand for coordination to reduce inefficiencies among anti-corruption programs and among theimplementation mechanisms of different regimes; the UNODC was designated to cope with these
difficult tasks.

５．Conditions for orchestration by the UNODCThe UNODC is perceived as one of the centers of global authority for the fight against
corruption as the Secretariat for UNCAC and UNTOC. Its primary anti-corruption mandate
is to promote the ratification and implementation of UNCAC and UNTOC; it is the Corruption
and Economic Crime Branch that is predominantly tasked with this job. To achieve this goal,
the Office manages the Conference of States Parties（CoSP）and its subsidiary bodies, including
the Implementation Review Group（IRG）and working groups; provides technical assistance tomember states; and creates and manages anti-corruption knowledge. Its mandates also include
the facilitation of coordination among diverse institutions and collaboration with private sector
and civil society, which encourage the Office to engage in collaborative orchestration. In thissection, we analyze the conditions that enable the UNODC’s orchestration.

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The UNODC’s focality in the anti-corruption regime complex was not very strong,partly due to its institutional origin and mandates. The United Nations Office on Drug Control
and Crime Prevention（UNODCCP）, the predecessor of the UNODC, was established by merging
the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Center for International Crime Prevention（CICP）of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme in 1997. The
governing body is the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice under ECOSOC,
which was created in 1992.
The CICP launched three Global Programmes against criminal activities in 1999,
including the Global Programme against Corruption（GPAC）, which provided and facilitatedtechnical assistance, research and policy formulation, interagency coordination, and judicial
integrity.55 As major anti-corruption programs had come into being by the end of the 1990s, thelaunch of GPAC was rather late and the CICP was forced to compete with powerful organizations
like the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development（USAID）, theOECD, the UNDP, and TI, all of which already had a much stronger presence in the anticorruption industry prior to the CICP’s involvement.
Furthermore, the UNODCCP, which was tasked with the programs related to drug
and crime, was initially placed in a disadvantageous position in the fight against corruption,
as corruption had been addressed mainly in the context of development. Major development
organizations had already substantially incorporated anti-corruption policies in their programs
throughout the 1990s. The Office had only weak focality and operational capabilities over anticorruption issues except for those related to crime prevention and criminal justice. It had lessexperience on development issues than did development agencies. In fact, the CICP had to carveout a niche in the anti-corruption industry in order to get an advantage from its expertise, which
resulted in the creation of programs specializing in judicial integrity.56
However, the UNODC’s focality has been strengthened since the early twentyfirst century, as the focus of anti-corruption industry gradually shifted away from awarenessraising and capacity- and institution- building led by major development agencies and TI toward
international cooperation among law enforcement and judicial agencies.57 This trend boosted the
focality of the Office, which already had sufficient expertise and connections with law enforcement
and judicial agencies around the world to work as an authoritative hub of networks of bothgovernmental and non-governmental experts and institutes. CoSP and subsidiary bodies alsoCollaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

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provide opportunities for networking among officials and have reinforced the UNODC’s role as a
hub of expert networks. In addition, the Office frequently organizes symposia and workshops for
networking, information sharing, and mutual learning, which also strengthen its focality.
Nevertheless, while actors and institutions have continued to expand and diversify, the
UNODC has only a moderate influence in the private sector and civil society in the area of anticorruption. Therefore, it could be fair to say that the UNODC’s focality is high in the area ofcrime prevention and criminal justice, whereas its focality in civil society, the private sector, anddevelopment issues is relatively low.

（2）Capabilities
The UNODC’s expertise is highly evaluated by both public sector and civil society. With
this high level of expertise, the Office initiates many projects for standard setting and promotion,technical assistance, and knowledge management and creation. It facilitates the implementationof the Conventions by producing specialized tools, including legislative and practical guides,
guidelines and guiding principles, model laws and provisions, thematic reports, computer-based
self-assessment and writing tools.
Nevertheless, the UNODC has constantly suffered from a lack of funding. The Office is a
middle-sized agency with about 1,500 personnel and an annual budget of approximately US $300
million on average since 2012.58 The size of its budget is relatively small compared to that of theUNDP, which was earmarked more than US $5 billion for fiscal year 2015.59 The number of staff
is insufficient for meeting every demand from member states for technical assistance.
In addition, over the past decade, there has been a steady decline in general purpose
funds that could be used for the core activities of executive management and basic research.
Although the Office has made efforts to streamline, expand its donor base, and diversify financial
sources, “UNODC effectiveness is undermined by an unsustainable funding model.”60 Tightbudgetary constraints coupled with a shortage of human resources have apparently induced
the organization to rely on collaborations including co- and multi-orchestration with partnerorganizations to make up for shortages of focality and capabilities.

（3）Entrepreneurship
The UNODC’s preference for partnership is attributed not only to its moderate focality
and fiscal constraints but also to an entrepreneurial culture that stresses partnership and

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intellectual endeavors. The Drugs Programme and the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Programme both have emphasized partnership since their inception, and have actively engaged ininter-branch collaborations as well as close cooperation between the headquarters and field offices.
Staff members have also regularly attended meetings as observers of major partner organizations,
including the OECD Working Group on Bribery（WGB）, the UNGC Anti-Corruption Working
Group, the Task Force on Improving Transparency and Anti-Corruption of the Business 20.
It has actively collaborated with civil society as well, including with NGOs, experts,
academics, grassroots movements, trade unions, and community groups, as their abilities toinvestigate, advise, raise awareness, empower, and educate are highly valued in the fight against
drugs and organized crime. In particular, the Drugs Programme has been eager to engage withcivil society; the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme has followed suit.61 Thus,
civil society actors are officially involved in the implementation review mechanism of UNTOC byparticipating in the review process as well as attending CoSP subsidiary bodies as observers.
Furthermore, it developed online platforms for dissemination of knowledge: TRACK（Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge）for anti-corruption and SHERLOC（Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime）for crime prevention. Both of these platforms
provide information on convention implementation, comprehensive databases of legislation（legal libraries）, analytical materials and tools, bibliographies, and directories of competent
national authorities. In addition to providing this information, the TRACK portal is intended to
be “a community of practice for partner institutions and practitioners,”62 and contains tools andresources co-developed with partner institutions including the UNDP, the OECD, the UNGC, theStolen Asset Recovery initiative（StAR）, and the Group of States against Corruption（GRECO）.
TRACK was thus created through a combination of partnership and knowledge creation.
It could be said that orchestration methods that promote partnership, knowledge
building and innovation have been deeply embedded in the Office’s basic strategy and action
repertoires. Such a strong propensity for entrepreneurship might offset the negative impact oftight state oversight on orchestration.

（4）Goal divergence and tight state oversight
As mentioned above, the UNODC has been constrained by its tight budged, most ofwhich are contributed by major donor countries for special purposes. Nearly 90 percent of the
UNODC budget comes from voluntary contributions, and 90 percent of this is earmarked forCollaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

61

special purposes, leaving little room for the Office to effectively undertake tasks such as research
and analysis, advocacy, human resource management, independent evaluation, and auditing.63 Thismeans that the use and amount of funds is largely controlled by the will of major member state
donors, including Colombia, the EU, the US, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Japan, Brazil, andMexico.64 Therefore, in general, there remains little room for the Office to expand its activities at
its discretion beyond member states’ expectations.
The divergence of goals among member states and between the UNODC and member
states over specific issues also affects the Office’s inclination for orchestration. As stated in
the previous section, disagreements among States Parties concerning the priority of the anticorruption principle over the non-intervention principle in addition to other controversial issues
are legitimately allowed in the current UNCAC regime. In other words, goal divergence oversalient issues among member states is institutionalized in the UNCAC regime, making stateoversight tight over specific issues. In particular, if the issue is directly related to the stabilityof political regime and culture of the country—for example, the issue related to participation ofsociety（Article 13）or the principle of transparency and accountability（Article 10 on public
reporting）—a country can strongly resist any attempts to facilitate intervention in domestic
affairs. The UNODC, therefore, is assumed to prefer shallow orchestration in collaboration withsocial actors on these sensitive issues.

（5）Intermediary and orchestrator availability
A number of competent and cooperative actors working as centers of authority seem toenable collaborative orchestration in the fight against corruption. There are many collaborations
between civil society and the public sector, as exemplified by the process of drafting the AU
Convention in which the African Union（AU）invited civil society to actively participate.65 Multistakeholder initiatives like the EITI and the UNGC also illuminate the value of public-private
partnerships. Certain powerful private actors serve as either intermediaries or orchestrators,
depending on their focality, capabilities, and availability of intermediaries/orchestrators. They
can sometimes play a role of intermediary and orchestrator simultaneously in a chain oforchestrations. A case in point is TI.
TI has been working as a hub of diverse anti-corruption networks and has positioned
itself as an expert activist organization operating in partnership with both public and privateorganizations as well as individual experts and academics.66 TI serves as a network hub of

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experts on development economics, international commerce, criminal law, human rights, business
management, etc., and launched the Anti-corruption Solutions and Knowledge（ASK）network, apool of recognized experts and practitioners around the world.67 In addition, most staff membersof TI have enough expertise and networks in the areas mentioned above to be affiliated withmultiple institutions.
TI’s function as a multi-network hub is illustrated by its role as the Secretariat for theInternational Anti-Corruption Conference（IACC）, a global multi-stakeholder conference thatbrings together CSOs, private sector, public agencies, and individuals fighting against corruption
all over the world. The IACC serves as “the premier global forum for the networking and crossfertilisation”68 and as an iconic conference that symbolizes the solidarity of the global community
against corruption.69 In addition, TI co-orchestrated a multi-stakeholder process involving
businesses, trade unions, civil society, and academics to create the Business Principles, together
with the Social Accountability International（SAI）.
Highly focal and capable organizations like TI can be orchestrators as well asintermediaries, but cannot dominate the focality in a congested system. Furthermore, thecredibility of major organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, and TI came into
question for their principally neoliberal policies. Thus, these orchestrators have found a common
interest in collaborative orchestration to mutually complement their partial lack of focality andcapabilities.

６．Collaborative orchestration by the UNODC（1）Inclination for collaborative orchestration
The UNODC has orchestrated a number of intermediaries for various functions,
including setting and promoting norms and standards; providing technical assistance for legal
support, policy development, and institution- and capacity-building; and creating and managing
knowledge, as shown in the table below.
While the UNODC single-handedly orchestrates networks and groups related tocrime prevention and criminal justice, including the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Programme Network of Institutes（PNI）and the Judicial Integrity Group（JIG）,it also frequently
engages in collaborative orchestration in areas with low focality, including the Stolen Asset
Recovery initiative（StAR）, the Regional Working Group on Business Integrity in ASEAN

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Table 1: UNODC’s orchestration for the fight against corruption（intermediaries）
functionStandard setting andpromotion

Technical assistance

Knowledge
management

Macro（Regime complex;
Global level）

IGAC70RoLCRG71

IGAC
PNI72
IACA
ACAD73

IGAC
PNI
IACA
ACAD

Meso
（Thematic institutions;Regional level）

UNCAC Coalition
ICCWC74
JIG75
WGBI76

UNCAC Coalition
StAR77
ARAC78IAACA79

StAR
JIG
ARAC

Micro
（Programs/projects;
Local level）

Programs/projects for technical and financial assistancescale（WGBI）,the Anti-Corruption Academic Initiative（ACAD）,and the International Anti-Corruption
Academy（IACA）.
As discussed in the previous section, a combination of high expertise, a shortage ofresources, a relative lack of focality, strong entrepreneurship, and orchestrator/intermediaryavailability is assumed to have encouraged the Office to engage in collaborative orchestration. In
addition, high goal divergence over sensitive issues is assumed to have motivated the Office toengage in multi-orchestration with shallow orchestration techniques.
However, it is not good for a public agency to collaborate with a private organization
whose credibility is somewhat in doubt. Through cooperation with an umbrella organizationconsisting of multiple organizations, this criticism can be avoided. There had been already manyumbrella networks of non-state organizations in the field of anti-corruption, including GOPAC,UNICORN, the PWYP, and the UNCAC Coalition. Therefore, the UNODC prefers to work closelywith umbrella organizations, including the Vienna Non-Governmental Organization Committee（VNGOC）, the NGO Alliance on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and the UNCAC
Coalition.80 Its partnerships with umbrella organizations have laid the groundwork for multiorchestration.

（2）Multi-orchestration: The UNCAC Coalition
The UNODC intended to orchestrate an intermediary to ensure input from civil society
in the deliberations of CoSP subsidiary bodies, but it was hardly able to initiate or coordinate

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civil society intermediaries due to a lack of focality in civil society; the Office’s partnership withcivil society in the area of anti-corruption was not strong compared to its partnership over drug
issues.
Furthermore, it was under tight oversight by some States Parties. Civil society
actors are not allowed to participate in the meetings of the IRG and working groups, eventhough the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat recommended IRG to take positive
steps on this issue81 and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association
publicly criticized the exclusion of civil society from the IRG.82 The issue of the civil society’s
observer status in the CoSP subsidiary bodies has been highly controversial and has not todate been settled. Some civil society actors criticized the UNODC for its barring of civil society
representatives from the meetings of subsidiary bodies, having yielded to pressure from theStates Parties, “without putting the question to the members of those bodies as required by therules of procedure.”83 This illustrates the fact that tight state oversight constrained the Office somuch that it was unable to steer civil society to pressure States Parties for the participation of
CSOs in the subsidiary bodies.
TI, on the other hand, has broad influence over civil society, and with its high focality
and capabilities, it was able to mobilize and convene civil society actors to initiate the UNCAC
Coalition. It was launched in 2006 by Gillian Dell of TI and Kirstine Drew of UNICORN, primarily
for the purpose of coordinating inputs from civil society to States Parties’ deliberations. To
better pursue advocacy activities, the Coalition was registered as an independent NPO in Vienna,
Austria, in October 2016. TI has been deeply involved in the orchestration of the Coalition,and has served as the Secretariat and the permanent member of the Coalition Coordination

Figure 4: Multi-orchestration through UNCAC Coalition

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Committee（CCC）since the Coalition’s inception.
Approximately 120 members（as of January 2018）participate in the coalition, including
major CSOs and umbrella organizations that have a long cooperative partnership with TI such as
Christian Aid, Global Witness, the Basel Institute on Governance, and the Tax Justice Network,
as well as parliamentarians and academics. The members of the Coalition are from diverse
fields, including governance, development, human rights, labor rights, environment, and peaceand security. The members’ countries of origin are also diverse: about 20% are from Sub-Sahara
Africa, about 35% from Europe, about 10% from South Asia, 6% from Asia-Pacific, 8% from theAmericas, 6% from the Middle East and North Africa, and about 10% act on a global basis.
Despite diverse backgrounds, members are fairly unified for the purpose of promoting
the ratification and implementation of UNCAC.84 Coalition policy is coordinated by the CCC, which
consists of eight regional seats, two international seats, one individual seat, and the Secretariat,
which is served by TI.85 Through geographically equal representation, it can adjust for regional
differences and facilitate global solidarity beyond regions. The CCC sets goals and organizes
collective activities, including advocacy activities at CoSP and participation in side events andtrainings. While the CCC invites members to join such activities, doing so is voluntary.
For the UNODC, the Coalition was a convenient partner in terms of legitimacy; itappears neutral as an umbrella organization of a wide range of civil society actors, and the plan
to launch the Coalition was endorsed at a meeting of the UN inter-agency coordination bodyfor anti-corruption programs.86 The Civil Society Team of the UNODC has engaged in shallow
orchestration of the Coalition due to its lack of focality in civil society and tight state oversight.
First, it gives legitimacy to the Coalition as a civil society representative by endorsing it as an
official partner. Second, it grants financial support to the Coalition, which has no stable funding
source.
Third, as the Secretariat for CoSP, the Office hosts side events on the margins of
CoSP meetings and briefing sessions on the margins of IRG. In both, the Coalition is allowed
to present views and exchange opinions with delegates. Side events on the margins of CoSP
meetings consist of panel sessions organized by states, IGOs, branches of UNODC, CSOs, andmulti-stakeholder groups. The number of sessions has increased with each meeting, with 5-10
sessions held per day, totaling 33 sessions during CoSP 6 in 2015. Some sessions, including thoseon Sustainable Development Goals（SDGs）, were held as part of high-level meetings, providing
some input into the formal decision-making process. Briefing sessions on the margins of IRG

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provide an opportunity for the Coalition to organize panel sessions accompanied by Q&A sessions
with delegates. At the first IRG briefing in 2012, almost 40 civil society representatives and
100 delegates attended and actively took the floor. Whereas some delegates criticized CSOs byquestioning their qualifications, including their professional capabilities and neutrality, others
considered it an opportunity to have a constructive dialogue. Some civil society representatives
have felt trust being built between governments and civil society as a result of these briefing
sessions.87
Fourth, the Office and the Coalition have jointly organized trainings for CSOs to build
professional capabilities to participate in the preparation of and during the UNCAC review
process.88 Nearly 150 CSOs in total were trained in Austria, South Africa, and Senegal from2012 to 2013.89 These trainings were highly evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Unit,and so, a three-year extension for the project was approved.90 The trainings were organizedthrough a division of labor: the Office convened the training sessions and provided financial andadministrative support while the Coalition was substantively tasked with training.91 Fifth, theCoalition and the UNODC co-organized multi-stakeholder workshops on UNCAC and its review
mechanism for governments, civil society, and the private sector from 2014 to 2016.92 These
workshops were highly praised as serving as a platform for trust building and mutual learning.93
Thus, the UNODC has been making efforts to bridge the gap between governmentand civil society and to facilitate the participation of civil society by using multi-orchestration
techniques under tight state oversight and a lack of focality. The capabilities and focality of bothorganizations have been strengthened through multi-orchestration. For instance, some CSOs
participating in the trainings later joined the Coalition as active members, such as I WATCH, a
Tunisian NGO, which became a new CCC member in 2015.94 The UNODC’s connections in civilsociety and the private sector have been significantly increased compared to those in the earlytwenty-first century.95

７．Conclusion
The ultimate question this paper seeks to answer is how to improve coordination andsynergy in a decentralized and congested regime complex, in which the focality of governance isdiffused among multiple actors, a plethora of programs or schemes operate in an uncoordinatedfashion, and issue-linkages frequently occur. This paper attempts to answer the question

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by proposing the collaborative orchestration model, including co-orchestration and multiorchestration, which could enhance the focality, capability, and legitimacy of orchestrators aswell as intermediaries under diffused focality. Even under high goal divergence coupled withtight state oversight, multi-orchestration, in which multiple orchestrators engage with thesame intermediaries from different orchestrating positions, may improve input legitimacy bypromoting the participation of diverse stakeholders without involving too much cost. It may also
promote problem solving by facilitating the spontaneous and efficient development of networks inrespective sectors, yielding an increase in multifaceted approaches and a wider range of options
for governance actors. This analysis demonstrated why and how the UNODC strategicallyorchestrated intermediaries to create synergy among major governance actors while facilitating
the participation of a broad range of stakeholders through multi-orchestration.

Theoretical implications
This paper gives a new insight into the theoretical hypotheses concerning focality, goal
divergence, and state oversight. First, contrary to the focality hypothesis, orchestration techniques
are likely to be chosen under low focality, which is often the case in a congested regime
complex, in a collaborative form of orchestration. In general, governance actors are motivated toorchestrate collaboratively when an orchestrator lacks a combination of certain capabilities andthe focality to orchestrate an intermediary that could be orchestrated by another orchestrator.
In addition, we suggest “orchestrator availability,” i.e., availability of multiple orchestrators, as anantecedent condition for collaborative orchestration.
Second, it is the combination of goal divergence and state oversight that determines thedepth of orchestration, rather than likelihood. Contrary to the AGSZ’s findings, the paper argues
IGOs prefer shallow orchestration under the condition of high goal divergence accompanied bytight state oversight over controversial issues, as in the case of the UNODC’s engagement inshallow orchestration in a multi-orchestration setting with TI as another orchestrator, concerning
the issue of civil society participation in CoSP subsidiary bodies.

Effectiveness of orchestration
This paper eschews discussion of the effectiveness of orchestration, which should be
investigated in future research. Here, we touch on three things to be considered when discussing
effectiveness: dynamic process, organizational interest, and possible combinations with other

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modes of governance.
Considering the dynamic process of orchestration, an orchestrator’s focality andcapabilities would be undermined over time if intermediaries and other orchestrators are able tostrengthen their focality and capabilities through competition, and challenge the orchestrator. To
ensure that orchestration is sustainable, effective coordination among competitive intermediaries
and orchestrators is thought to be indispensable. This might be one of the reasons why the
UNODC orchestrates the UNCAC Coalition, as the Coalition is well coordinated by TI as anorchestrator of civil society. Hence, it is essential to assess dynamic effectiveness over the courseof orchestration in the long run.
Second, conflict between public interests and organizational interests must be considered.
IGOs use orchestration to serve their own organizational interests, including expanding
resources while reducing costs, enhancing focality and legitimacy, and enhancing autonomy frommember states’ control. Orchestration is helpful also for mission creep（expansion into otherareas）, because IGOs can gain experience and expertise through orchestration without heavyorganizational investments.96 When an orchestrator’s organizational interests are incompatible
with certain public interests, its orchestration may lose its effectiveness.
Finally, it would be inappropriate to assess the effectiveness of orchestration separatelyfrom other factors, especially in a “Prisoners’ Dilemma” situation, which induces opportunistic
behaviors. Considering the possibility of growing conflicts of interests among organizations, it may
be better to complement the soft mode of governance with the hard mode of governance in orderto enhance the effectiveness of coordination. It is worth discussing which types of orchestrationand modes of governance should be combined for achieving specific goals.

Notes
1 Elinor Ostrom, “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change,” Global Environmental Change 20, 2010, pp.550-557.
2 Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,”
International Organization 58（2）,2004, p.279.
3 Robert O. Keohane and David Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives
on Politics 9（1）, 2011, p.7, p.8. They use a more relaxed definition: “non-hierarchical but loosely
coupled systems of institutions” without an overall umbrella structure that controls theinstitutions.
4 Raustiala and Victor, op.cit, pp.277-309; Laurence R. Helfer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPs
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking,” Yale Journalof International Law 29, 2004, pp.1-83; Marc L. Busch, “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shoppingand Dispute Settlement in International Trade,” International Organization 61（4）, 2007, pp.735-

Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

69761; Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, “The Politics of International Regime Complexity,”
Perspectives on Politics 7（1）,2009, pp.13-24.
5 Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür, “Comparative Empirical Analysis and Ideal Typesof Institutional Interaction,” in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring eds., Institutional

Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU
Policies, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, p.318; Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke eds.,
Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change, Cambridge:

MIT Press, 2011; Thomas Gehring and Benjamin Faude, “The Dynamics of Regime Complexes:
Microfoundations and Systemic Effects,” Global Governance 19（1）,2013, pp.119-130.
6 Keohane and Victor, op.cit., esp., p.9, pp.13-16.
7 For the inefficiency problem in congested environmental governance, see Edith Brown Weiss,“International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World
Order,” Georgetown Law Journal 81, 1993, p.697.
8 Kenneth W. Abbott, “Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Environment andPlanning C: Government and Policy 30（4）, 2012, pp.571-590, esp., p.582, pp.586-587; Elinor Ostrom,“Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change,”
Global Environmental Change 20, 2010, pp.550-557.
9 Fritz W. Sharpf, “Introduction: The Problem-Solving Capacity of Multi-Level Governance,”
Journal of European Public Policy 4, 1997, pp.520-538.
10 Michael Zürn, “Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems,” Government and Opposition, 39（2）,
2004, pp.260-287.
11 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate
Tools of Transnational Governance?” in Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly eds., Complex
Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century, Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2005, pp.195-216, esp., pp.208-213.
12 Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale, “Orchestrating Global Solution Networks: A Guide for
Organizational Entrepreneurs,” Global Solution Networks, 2014, p.5; Kenneth A. Abbott, Philippe
Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl, eds., International Organizations as Orchestrators,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p.355.
13 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Strengthening International Regulation throughTransnational Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit,” Vanderbilt Journal ofTransnational Law 42, 2009, pp.501-578.
14 Ibid., p.510.
15 Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., p.4.
16 Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl, “TheGovernor’s Dilemma: Managing the Varieties of Indirect Governance,” a paper presented at theInternational Studies Association annual meeting, Atlanta, March 19, 2016.
17 Kenneth A. Abbott, Philippe Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl, “Orchestrating
global governance: from empirical findings to theoretical implications,” in Abbott, Genschel,Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., pp.349-379.
18 Abbott and Snidal, op.cit., pp.558-559.
19 Ibid., p.564.
20 Ibid.
21 Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., p.24.
22 Ibid., p.25
23 These hypotheses are summarized in the framework chapter: Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp
Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl, “Orchestration: Global governance throughintermediaries,” in Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., pp.3-36.
24 Manfred Elsig, “Orchestration on a tight leash: State oversight of WTO,” in Abbott, Genschel,

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Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., pp.65-87.
25 Cornis van der Lugt and Klaus Dingwerth, “Governing where focality is low: UNEP and thePrinciples of Responsible Investment,” in Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., pp.237-261,
esp., p.259; Lucio Baccaro, “Orchestration for the ‘social partners’ only: Internal constraints on
the ILO,” in Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., p.281.
26 Michael Blauberger and Berthold Rittberger, “Orchestrating policy implementation: EU
governance through regulatory networks,” in Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., pp.3964, esp., p.64.
27 Helmut Reisen, “The Multilateral Donor Non-System: Towards Accountability and EfficientRole Assignment,” Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 4（5）, 2010, pp.124.
28 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “International regulation without international
government: Improving IO performance through orchestration,” Review of International
Organization, 5, 2010, pp.315-344, esp., p.334.
29 Cornis van der Lugt and Klaus Dingwerth, “Governing where focality is low: UNEP and thePrinciples of Responsible Investment,” in Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., pp.237-261,
esp., p.258.
30 Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., p.4.
31 In particular, the effect of endorsement may significantly differ depending on the degreeof congestion caused by a number of private authorities. For instance, in the issue-area ofenvironmental management, crowded with private regulatory schemes, an official endorsementby the public sector is supposed to have a big influence, whereas in other cases with fewer
private authorities, official endorsement may not be so crucial, though endorsement against thewill of member states would be costly.
32 Hanrieder, op.cit., pp.191-213.
33 Abbott and Hale, op.cit., pp.4-5. Among others, UNEP, the World Bank, the World HealthOrganization, the US government, the UK government, and the World Wildlife Fund（WWF）
have been predominantly involved in the orchestrated initiatives identified in the study. On theother hand, approximately one-third of intermediaries are corporations, and states and CSOs
account for 20 percent each.
34 For findings that a combination of high goal divergence and loose state oversight induces
IGO-initiated orchestration, whereas low goal divergence coupled with tight state oversighttends to result in state-initiated orchestration, see Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, Zangl, op.cit., p.372.
35 Ibid., pp.372-373.
36 Oran Young, “Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives,” Global
Governance 2（1）, 1996, pp.1-23. An institution can be “embedded” in basic principles ofinternational society such as the respect for sovereignty; “nested” in a superior andcomprehensive norm according to a legal hierarchy; “clustered” with institutions dealing withother topics; and “overlapping” with different issue-areas.
37 For example, the Council of Europe（CoE）the Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on
Corruption（hereafter, the CoE Conventions）
38 For example, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption （hereafter, OAS
Convention）.
39 For example, the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption（hereafter, AU
Convention）.
40 For example, the Arab Convention against Corruption（hereafter, Arab Convention）
41 A/54/128 “Action against corruption”; A/55/383 “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to
Eleventh Sessions.”Collaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

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Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” inInternational Organization 54（3）,pp.421-456.
43 Business Principles for Countering Bribery: A Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Led by Transparency
International, Berlin: Transparency International, 2013.
44 International Chamber of Commerce, The ICC Rules on Combating Corruption, 2011 edition.
45 Fritz Heiman and François Vincke, Fighting Corruption: International Corporate Integrity Handbook,2008 edition., International Chamber of Commerce, 2008, p.8.
46 In 1995, then-President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn addressed “the cancer of
corruption” at the annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund;since then, the issue of corruption has been at the forefront of international development
assistance. Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of World Bank President James D.
Wolfensohn, 1995-2005, Washington: World Bank, p.50.
47 Makiko Nishitani, “The Coordination of the Global Anti-Corruption Governance via Hybrid
Polycentric Networks,” in The Study of Global Governance, 2, 2015, pp.48-67.
48 Cecily Rose, International Anti-Corruption Norms: The Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal
Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.97-132.
49 Ibid., p.127.
50 Only 40 percent of States Parties have published their full review reports online, since theimplementation review mechanism was launched in 2009.
51 Rose, op.cit., p.116.
52 ODCCP, Report on the Second United Nations Interagency Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Meeting,
Vienna, July 1-2, 2002, p.4; UNODC, Report on the Fifth Meeting of the International Group on AntiCorruption Coordination（ IGAC）, Merida, December 11, 2003, p.5.
53 UNODC and Asian Development Bank（ADB）, Report on the Seventh Meeting of the International
Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination（ IGAC）, Bangkok, April 21-22, 2005, p.13.
54 According to the estimates of Bryane Michaels and Donald Bowser, the size of the anticorruption industry was approximately $100 million in 2003 and mushroomed to almost $5
billion by 2009. Bryane Michaels and Donald Bowser, “The evolution of the anti-corruption
industry in the third wave of anti-corruption work,” in Sebastian Wolf and Diana SchmidtPfister, eds., International Anti-Corruption Regimes in Europe: Between Corruption, Integration, andCulture, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010, p.161.
55 CICP, Value Added of Partnership in the Fight against Corruption, conference paper, Vienna, March
2001, p.21.
56 UNODC, Report on the Fourth United Nations Interagency Anti-Corruption Coordination Meeting,
Vienna, July 24-25, 2003, p.12.
57 Michaels and Bowser, op.cit., pp.164-166.
58 UNODC, Annual Report 2014, p.120; “Staff” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/
employment.html?ref=menutop; “Field offices” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/field-offices.
html?ref=menutop（accessed June 1, 2017）
59 “Our projects,” http://open.undp.org/#2015（accessed June 1, 2017）
60 UNODC, Annual Report 2014, p.66.
61 UNODC, Annual Report 2010, p.38.
62 Corruption and Economic Crime Branch of UNODC, Anti-Corruption Update, Issue 1, February
2012, p.2.
63 UNODC, Annual Report 2010, p.63.
64 UNODC, Annual Report 2014, p.122.
65 Gillian Dell, Anti-Corruption Conventions in Africa: What Civil Society Can Do to Make Them Work,
Berlin: Transparency International, 2006.
66 TI has formal partnerships with 35 public or private organizations. “Institutional

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Relationship,”https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/accountability/governance/0/（accessed June 1, 2017）
67 “Network of Experts,” http://www.transparency.org/experts_network（accessed August 30,
2015）
68 http://iacconference.org/en/about/about_iacc（Accessed March 1, 2014）
69 Comments on the IACC given by Ms. Gillian Dell, who has served on the Secretariat for along time. Author’s interview with Ms. Gillian Dell, July 23, 2012.
70 International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination
71 Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group
72 UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program Network of Institutes
73 Anti-Corruption Academic Initiative
74 International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime
75 Judicial Integrity Group76 Regional Working Group on Business Integrity in ASEAN
77 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative
78 Academia Regional Anticorrupción para Centroamérica y el Caribe
79 International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities
80 Ms. Mirella Dummar-Frahi, the Civil Society Officer, and the Leader of the Civil SocietyTeam of the Corruption and Economic Crime Branch, emphasized that the Office cooperates
with umbrella organizations from the perspective of legitimacy. Author’s interview with Ms.
Frahi in Vienna, June 24, 2016.
In fact, at the first IRG briefing, some delegates questioned TI’s professional capability,
neutrality, and other qualifications. Matti Joutsen, “Civil Society Organizations and UNCAC:Do CSOs Have a Seat at the Table?” presentation material distributed at the Civil Society
Organizations Fighting Corruption: Theory and Practice Workshop, held at the University ofSurrey, UK, July 9-10, 2012.
81 CAC/COSP/IRG/2010/9 “Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Affairs,” para 16.
82 A/69/365 “Rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.”
83 UNCAC Newsletter 10, November 2013, p.6.
84 Interview with Ms. Dell, July 23, 2012. She remarked that they had not had major conflicts
within the network. Indeed, according to the minutes of CCC meetings, internal conflicts were
not on the agenda.
85 “Coalition Governance,” http://uncaccoalition.org/en_US/about-us/coalition-governance（accessed August 30, 2015）. Its responsibilities include policy coordination, promoting theactivities of the Coalition, communicating to the external audiences, approving and excluding
members, and giving assistance to members that are under attack.
86 UNODC, Report of the Ninth Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination（ IGAC）, Dead Sea, Jordan, December 15, 2006, p.5.
87 Matti Joutsen, “Civil Society Organizations and UNCAC: Do CSOs Have a Seat at the Table?”,presentation material distributed at the Civil Society Organizations Fighting Corruption:
Theory and Practice Workshop, held at the University of Surrey, UK, July 9-10, 2012. Also,
author’s Skype interview with Ms. Dell, August 12, 2016.
88 The trainings were conducted as part of a civil society project launched in 2010: “Looking
Beyond: Towards a Strategic Engagement with Civil Society on Anti-Corruption, and Drugs
and Crime Prevention”（GLOU68）.
89 “Empowering CSOs to Better Fight Corruption through the UNCAC,” http://www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN9-Empowering-CSOs-to-better-fight-corruption-through-the-UNCAC.
html（accessed August 30, 2015）
90 UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit, Independent Project Evaluation of the “Strengthening theCollaborative Orchestration in Polycentric Global Governance for the Fight against Corruption

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Capacity of Civil Society Organizations in Africa to Combat Corruption and Contribute to the UNCAC
Review Process,” July 2013.

91 Author’s interview with Mr. Manzoor Hasan, Chair of the UNCAC Coalition, in Panama City,
December 3, 2016.
92 “African Governments and Civil Society Come Together to Work against Corruption,”
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN18-African-Governments-and-civil-society-cometogether-to-work-against-corruption.html（accessed October 10, 2016）“African Civil Society and Governments Working Together on Anti-Corruption Issues,”
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN14-African-civil-society-and-governments-workingtogether-on-anti-corruption-issues.html（accessed October 10, 2016）“Bringing Governments and Civil Society Together to Better Fight Corruption in Asia,”
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN13-Bringing-governments-and-civil-society-togetherto-better-fight-corruption-in-Asia.html（accessed October 10, 2016）“Empowering CSOs to Better Fight Corruption through the UNCAC,”
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/CN9-Empowering-CSOs-to-better-fight-corruptionthrough-the-UNCAC.html（accessed October 10, 2016）“The First Multi-Stakeholder Workshop on the UNCAC Second Cycle Review Created
Synergies Between Africa and Southeast Europe,”
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/CSOs/cn22_african-and-see-gov-and-cso-learning-andcooperating-together-for-the-preparation-of-the-uncac-second-cycle-review.html （accessed
October 10, 2016）
93 This observation was confirmed by Mr. Hasan, in the author’s email inquiry, December 23,
2016.
Especially the regional workshop held in Malaysia in 2014 was highly evaluated, and as
a result, the Presidential UNCAC Inter-Agency Committee was established in Philippines.
UNODC, Annual Report 2014, p.78.
94 UNCAC Newsletter 13, July 2015, p.10.
95 An observation by Ms. Frahi made during an interview in Vienna, June 24, 2016.
96 Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, and Zangl, op.cit., p.356.