NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
August 2021

Economy, Society and Culture,
and Globalization
Masaki Taniguchi

President, NIRA
Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics,
The University of Tokyo

Jiro Mizushima

Adjunct Senior Fellow, NIRA
Professor, Graduate School of Social Sciences,
Chiba University

Table of Contents
Introduction - Party Politics in Developed Nations in 2020

1

Masaki Taniguchi

President, NIRA /Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics,
The University of Tokyo

Chapter 1

France16

Toru Yoshida

Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University

Chapter 3

Germany

17

Sho Niikawa

Associate Professor, Graduate School of Intercultural Studies,
Kobe University

Chapter 4

Italy

19

Hirohito Yasoda

Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Kyoritsu Women's University

Chapter 5

The Netherlands

21

Jiro Mizushima

Adjunct Senior Fellow, NIRA /Professor, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Chiba University

Chapter 6

Spain

23

Sho Muto

Professor, School of Law and Politics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Chapter 7

Northern Europe

24

Mitsuo Koga

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Chuo University

Chapter 8

The United States

26

Takayuki Nishiyama

Professor, Faculty of Law, Seikei University

Chapter 9South Korea

28

Jeyong Sohn

Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law and Politics,
Rikkyo University

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presented here.

NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
August 2021

Introduction - Party Politics in Developed Nationsin 2020

Masaki Taniguchi

President, NIRA
Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics,
The University of Tokyo

The period from the 2010s to the early 2020s saw three changes in party politics
in developed nations.
The first was a change in the established political parties. For example, theRepublican Party in the US, which had traditionally favored small government and free
trade, underwent a major transformation with the advent of Donald Trump. The Trumpadministration withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), reconsidered the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and allowed the budget deficit to expand evenprior to the COVID-19 crisis. At the same time, Germany's historically conservative party,
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), became more liberal under Chancellor Angela
Merkel, as evidenced, for example, by her tolerant acceptance of refugees and abolition of
nuclear power.
Second, and related to this, was the growth of populist parties in advanced
nations. In 2017, Marine Le Pen of the National Front (now the National Rally) reached
the runoff in the French presidential election, and, in the German federal election, theAlternative for Germany (AfD) rapidly became the third largest party in the Bundestag.
But populism is not the exclusive domain of the right; Italy's leftist populist party, theFive Star Movement, became the largest individual party in the 2018 general election
and realized the government of Giuseppe Conte.
The third change was the upset to the trend of globalization. In the United States,
a nation-first orientation began to rise; the United Kingdom left the European Union in
2020. In 2020 also, COVID-19 swept through every nation in the world, cutting off theflow of people and goods, and casting a dark shadow over every level of the system ofinternational cooperation, including cooperation in measures against the disease itself.

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NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
August 2021

NIRA has reported on the political situation in various nations through such
publications as Hints – Kadai “kaiketsu” senshinkoku wo mezase (“Hints – Towards
becoming a ‘Problem-solving’ Advanced Nation”) (Jiji Press, 2017), supervised by Masaki
Taniguchi, and Populism no Honshitsu – Seijiteki sogai wo kokufuku dekiru ka (“TheNature of Populism: Can We Overcome 'Political Alienation'?”) (Chuokoron-Shinsha,
2018), edited by Masaki Taniguchi and Jiro Mizushima. This report represents acontinuation of these books, discussing the latest trends in party politics in major nations
while taking into consideration the three changes mentioned above.

1. Method of Comparison
Each nation's party system is a reflection of its own political system and the
direction of its economy and society, and thus depends to a significant extent on factors
unique to that nation. For example, in Japan, when words such as “left” or “right” areused to describe a political position, a major factor is agreement or disagreement with therevision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution; needless to say, there is no Article 9
issue in other nations.
However, despite this, it is a commonly accepted axiom in comparative politics thata certain number of similar elements will be found in the political spaces of nations undercomparison, in particular among the western European nations. For this report, therefore,
we established common axes of policy positions between the parties in each nationconsidered, or in other words “measures” of the same scale, and asked experts in the fieldof politics in each nation (referred to as “experts” below) to evaluate the policy positions ofeach party being analyzed using these measures. In addition, we asked the experts toprovide supplementary explanations of unique factors that were not encompassed by theframework provided by the measures.
The following three axes of policy positions (the “measures”) are assumed in thisreport.
The first was the axis of policy positions in relation to economic issues. This entails
two positions: the left, which is characterized by phrases such as big government and social
democracy, and the right, to which the labels small government and neoliberalism are often
attached. With respect to concrete methodology, items in the 2017 edition of the Chapel

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August 2021

Hill Expert Survey, a study of the policy positions of parties in European nations,1 to which
the variable denominator LRECON had been applied. The policy positions (mean values)of each party under consideration as measured following the instructions below were
presented to the NIRA-commissioned experts in each nation.
LRECON = position of the party in 2019 in terms of its ideological stance on economic
issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues such asprivatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Parties
on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on
the economic right want a reduced role for government. Please enter a whole number
between 0 and 10, where 0 is the extreme left position, 5 is the center position, and 10
is the extreme right position.
The experts also made corrections as necessary in light of new circumstances that
had arisen and the development of their own opinions since 2017.
The second axis concerned social and cultural issues. There is a conservative/rightwing position to traditional social values, and a liberal/left-wing commitment tominimizing the constraints of these values on people. Specifically, the parties’ policy
positions were measured based on the items in the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey towhich the denominator GALTAN had been applied, i.e., the values operationalized using
the instructions below. Specifically, the policy position of each party was measured byinclusion of the views of each expert in the values operationalized using the instructions
below (the GALTAN items).

GALTAN = Position of the party in terms of their views on democratic freedoms andrights. “Libertarian” or “post-materialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms,
for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater
democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject theseideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government
should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Please enter a whole

1 The research is being carried out by Gary Marks and his colleagues at the University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill. A research project to evaluate the policy positions of major political parties in EU member
states and other nations by experts in each nation's politics.
Survey data is available at https://www.chesdata.eu/.

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August 2021

number between 0 and 10, where 0 is libertarianism/postmaterialism, 5 is the center
position, and 10 is traditionalism/authoritarianism.
The third axis was policy position in relation to globalization. As mentioned above,
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey specifically focuses on European nations; while it measures
the position on the EU of each party considered, it does not include questions on
globalization in general. Therefore, for this report, we formulated the following original setof instructions and requested the experts to indicate the position of each party based on thesame guidelines as in the case of the axes of economic and social/cultural policy.
Please classify each party according to its position on globalization. Multilateralism
considers globalization, including economic globalization, as inevitable, and isproactive in the liberalization of trade and finance, and the creation of aninternational order through regional and multilateral cooperation. Unilateralism isreluctant to accept these ideas and seeks to increase the autonomy of the state.
Please answer as a whole number from 0 to 10, where 0 is unilateralism, 5 is thecentrist position and 10 is multilateralism.
In this report, the parties are plotted in a three-dimensional space consisting of theabove three axes of policy position, but in reality each axis is not independent of the other.
In general, parties that have an economic affinity with neoliberalism often adopt a sociallyand culturally conservative stance, and are relatively positive concerning globalization.
Conversely, parties committed to economically large government are often socially andculturally liberal, and perhaps more cautious with regard to globalization. The conventionalview is that the three axes of policy position can be integrated in a straight line, x = y = z,from the left-most party, (0, 0, 0), to the right-most party, (10, 10, 10), i.e. a onedimensional left-right axis of policy position.
However, as will be shown in the analysis in the next chapter, not all politicalparties in all nations can be placed on the aforementioned straight line. While there areradical parties at both ends of the social and cultural policy axis, there are also nations inwhich these parties do not diverge significantly with regard to economic policy. In other nations,the parties are socially and culturally liberal while adopting a neoliberal stance in economic
policy. In addition, it is not uncommon for globalization to be a consensus issue for parties,
in particular in small nations for which the benefits of trade are significant. Another aim

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NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
August 2021of this report is to understand such variations between nations and parties.

2. Summary of Analysis Results
Here we provide an overview of the characteristics of party politics in each nationconsidered based on the three axes of policy position. For greater detail, please refer tothe relevant chapters below.
In the United Kingdom, in terms of the economic and social/cultural axes, theparties are basically arranged in the following order, from left to right: Labour, theScottish National Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Conservative Party, and Reform UK.
However, when discussing the globalization of the UK, it is necessary to consider the
existence of a global market beyond the Commonwealth and the EU, and the (politiciansof) the Conservative Party, which effected the withdrawal from the EU, are, in fact, profree trade. With this in mind, it is little wonder that Britain’s pro-Brexit Prime Minister
Boris Johnson signed the Japan-UK Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
and applied to join the TPP.
In France also, the economic and social/cultural axes of policy position converge
largely on one dimension. What makes France different from the UK is that La France
Insoumise, the party which is furthest left in relation to the most leftist party on theeconomic issues, and the National Rally, the most conservative party with regard to socialand cultural issues, are both clearly opposed to globalization. It has been said that the
French voters have been divided into three groups since the late 1990s: “left,” “right,” and“bottom.” The National Front (the forerunner of the National Rally) and La France
Insoumise have won the support of the “bottom,” or voters who do not embrace theestablished parties.
Similarly in Germany, with the two (former) major parties, the center-left Social
Democrats and the center-right Christian Democratic Union at the center, we have the Left
Party and Alliance 90/The Greens on the left side, and Alternative for Germany on the rightside. However, the Liberal Democrats, who are on the right in terms of economic policy but
are considered to be closer to the left in terms of social and cultural issues, have historicallyoften played the role of the key party in coalition governments. With regard to antiglobalization parties, in the specific sense of skepticism towards European integration, we
can indicate Alternative for Germany and the Left Party, at the twin poles of right and left.
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August 2021

In recent years, the rate of support for Alliance 90/The Greens has continued to exceed thatfor the Social Democrats, and the results of the general election in fall 2021 will be closely
watched from the perspective of the future of the two-party (bloc) system that has been
maintained for so long in the post-war period.
With regard to the characteristics of party politics in the Netherlands, the following
points can be indicated. First, similar to the Liberal Democrats in Germany, theNetherlands also has a party called Democrats 66, which is on the economic right and thesocial and cultural left. Second, the center-left Labour Party lost ground in the 2017 generalelection, while the economically furthest left Socialist Party expanded its power. And third,
the right-wing populist Liberal Party, which is economically center-right and socially andculturally somewhat conservative but anti-EU and anti-immigration, became the second
party. However, the Netherlands is an export-oriented nation, and the party does not seek
to sever economic ties with the nation’s neighbors.
In the northern European nations of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway also, there is acorrelation between the placement of each party on the economic and social/cultural axes ofpolicy position. However, on the social/cultural axis, the parties in the northern European
nations are generally liberal. In addition, with the exception of Sweden, the oppositional
scheme of leftist bloc versus rightist bloc, including radical parties, is becoming fixed. The
distinctive feature of these nations is to be found on the axis of position in relation to
globalization; as small nations, the northern European nations have no choice but to assume
the global economy in their considerations whether they wish to or not, and antiglobalization parties have fundamentally not been viable in these nations.
In Italy, the 2018 general elections resulted in a major shift in the traditional twoparty bloc of a center-left coalition led by the Democratic Party versus a center-rightcoalition led by Forza Italia. While both these parties have lost power, the left-wing Five
Star Movement and the right-wing Lega have risen in Italian politics. Both of these
populist parties are characterized by their negative stance towards globalization. It is
important to note, however, that the Italian economy cannot exist without the EU andthe euro, and the anti-globalization and anti-EU stance of these parties does not imply
that any movement will actually develop urging Italy to leave the EU. The Contegovernment, which was supported by the Five Star Movement, gave up power due tointernal conflicts, in the case of the first Conte Cabinet, with the withdrawal of support
by Lega, and in the case of the second Conte Cabinet, with the resignation of the Italia
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Viva ministers in the coalition.
The major political parties in Spain are also largely positioned on a straight line,from left to right, in terms of both economy and society/culture. However, on the axis ofpolicy position in relation to globalization, the emerging force Vox and Unidas Podemos,
which are respectively located at the right and left ends of the economic andsocial/cultural axes, are anti-globalization, while the two major parties, including thecenter-left Spanish Socialist Workers Party, are both pro-globalization. However, despite
being anti-globalization, both Vox and Unidas Podemos are focused on opposition toausterity policies and do not advocate leaving the EU. In Spain, the Spanish Socialist
Workers Party and the People’s Party have long alternated in power, but the November
2019 general election resulted in the formation of the first coalition government between
the Spanish Socialist Workers Party and Unidas Podemos since the nation’s
democratization.
In the U.S., the system makes it difficult for parties other than the two major
parties to emerge, but both the Democratic and Republican parties have a wide range ofpolicy preferences among their members. In the Democratic Party, we find moderates
such as President Biden, but the left is also strongly-rooted, as exemplified by Senator
Bernie Sanders, among others. On the other hand, in the Republican Party, the centerright mainstream was previously challenged by the right-wing Tea Party faction, while
the emergence of the Trump faction, which lacked logical consistency in its pursuit of tax
cuts while expanding public spending, caused disturbance within the party. With regard
to globalization, the general impression tends to be that the Republican Party supports
free trade, while the Democratic Party resists it. However, in recent years, with the
exception of the Trump administration, it has been the case that the governing party has
promoted free trade, while the non-governing party has been cautious in this regard.
In South Korea, the conservative People Power Party is on the right in terms ofboth economic and social/cultural issues, while the ruling Democratic Party of President
Moon Jae-In is center-right or left-leaning in comparison. Mutual overlap between these
two axes of policy position can therefore be observed. However, more than this, the issues
that make up the main axes of policy position in South Korean politics are North Korean
relations and the reform of “power agencies” such as the Prosecutors' Office and the
National Intelligence Service. With regard to globalization, although there was once a
conflict over the ratification of the U.S.-ROK FTA, the policy of aiming for economic
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August 2021

growth through free trade, i.e., the promotion of exports, has become a generally agreedupon issue, at least among the two major political parties.

3. JapanHow, then, were we to approach the interpretation of Japanese party politics? In
the case of other nations, we attempted to ensure the objectivity of the evaluation byhaving the experts make necessary adjustments based on the results of the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey. However, Japan was not one of the target nations for that survey. We
therefore decided to objectively evaluate the policy positions of each Japanese political party
based on the guidelines shown below, using the data provided by successful candidates in the2019 election for the House of Councillors from among the politicians surveyed in the UTokyoAsahi Survey (jointly conducted by Professor Masaki Taniguchi of The University of Tokyo and
the Asahi Shimbun at the time of the election).
For the axis of policy position over economic issues, the average of responses forthe following three items was obtained for each political party.

⚫

Do you agree or disagree with the opinion that a small government that costs lessmoney is better, even if government services such as social welfare become worse?
(Reverse scored from 1 = Agree – 5 = Disagree)⚫

Which of the following statements is closer to your opinion? A: Even if there is somesocial disparity, priority should be given right now to improving economic
competitiveness / B: Even if there is some sacrifice of economic competitiveness,priority should be given right now to correcting social disparity (reverse scored from
1 = Closer to A – 5 = Closer to B)⚫

Which of the following statements is closer to your opinion? A: Economic regulations
should be comprehensively relaxed in order to encourage technological andmanagement innovation by the private sector / B: We should be cautious regarding
the relaxation of economic regulations in order to protect existing industries andconsumers (Reverse scored from 1 = Closer to A – 5 = Closer to B)
Next, we matched the dimensions of the UTokyo-Asahi Survey (5-point scale) andthe Chapel Hill Expert Survey (11-point scale). For the above three items, all the successful
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candidates from the Social Democratic Party answered “Disagree” or “Closer to B.” Because
no more left-leaning position could be taken, this party could be evaluated as being at thefurthest left position, i.e., 0, on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey scale.
The average of responses for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on the above
three items was 2.9 (following the reverse scoring on the 5-point scale (1 to 5)). On theother hand, when the experts were requested for the LDP's score when the shared 11point scale was applied, the average value was 4.8. Based on these results, we applied avalue of 1 (Social Democrats) and 2.9 (Liberal Democrats) from the reverse-scored 5-point
scale to the value of 0 (Social Democrats) and 4.8 (Liberal Democrats) respectively on the
11-point scale using a first-order conversion equation, and by also applying this method
for parties other than the LDP and the Social Democrats, we obtained the policy positionsof each party on economic issues on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey scale (0 = Extreme
left – 10 = Extreme right).
Similarly, in the case of the axis of policy position in the area of social and culturalissues, the average of the responses to the following three items was determined for eachpolitical party.
⚫

It is natural to restrict privacy and individual rights in order to protect public safety(Reverse scored from 1 = Agree – 5 = Disagree)⚫

The law should allow couples to continue to use their premarital surnames following
marriage if they so desire (1 = Agree – 5 = Disagree)⚫

Marriage between men and marriage between women should be recognized by law(1 = Agree – 5 = Disagree)

The Japanese Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, and Reiwa
Shinsengumi, all of whose successful candidates answered “Disagree” to the firststatement (restriction of privacy and individual rights) and “Agree” to the second
statement (retention of surname following marriage) and the third statement (same-sex
marriage), were positioned at 0 on the 11-point scale. The policy scores (on the 11-point
scale; the higher the number, the more conservative) for social and cultural issues of theother parties were then sought to enable the results to be scaled to those of the LDP,
which averaged 3.24 on the 5-point scale (following reversal of the scale for restriction of

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August 2021

privacy and individual rights) and was rated 8.8 on the 11-point scale by the experts.
Turning to the axis of policy position in relation to globalization, the following
question from the UTokyo-Asahi Survey corresponds to this area:⚫

Which of the following is closer to your opinion? A: Domestic industry should beprotected / B: Liberalization of trade and investment should be promoted (1 = Closer
to A – 5 = Closer to B)

Here, all representatives of the Social Democrats and Reiwa Shinsengumi
answered “1 = Closer to A”; the average value for the LDP representatives was 2.9, while
the experts’ rating for the LDP based on the 11-point scale was 6.9. Based on the above,
the policy positions of each party on globalization (0 = Unilateralism – 10 =Multilateralism) were calculated by converting the average value for each party on the
5-point scale to the 11-point scale, such that the figure for the Social Democratic Partyand Reiwa Shinsengumi would be 0 and the figure for the LDP would be 6.9.

Figure 0-1 Policy positions of Japanese political parties

The policy positions of each party obtained through the above procedure are plotted

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in Figure 0-1 in the same manner as in the case of other nations.
Although the Social Democratic Party, Reiwa Shinsengumi, and the Communist
Party are all at or near 0 on the axis of policy position in relation to economic issues, thethree parties combined won only 10 seats in the 2019 elections for the House of Councillors,
or just over 15% of the votes cast in proportionally represented constituencies. There are noright-wing parties above the third quartile (7.5), and most of the parties, including the LDP
and the Constitutional Democratic Party2 are concentrated in a narrow space between thecenter-left and the center. Despite the fact that they seem to be at odds with each other onindividual issues such as economic measures and taxation, the positions of the parties are
relatively close when they are grouped into the principle of small government/neoliberalism
versus big government/social democracy3.
In contrast, on the social and cultural issues axis, not only did the Social Democratic
Party, Reiwa Shinsengumi and the Communist Party score 0, but the Constitutional
Democratic Party, the primary opposition party, also took a radical liberal position and received
a score of 1.6. On the other hand, the Liberal Democratic Party received an evaluation of 8.8, aposition which would be termed the furthest right in other nations, indicating a polarized multiparty system, in contrast to the economic axis. The fact that the LDP, which has been in power
for almost the entire period since its formation in 1955, has adopted extreme policy positions
from the perspective of comparative politics is one reason why Japanese society lags behind interms of women's participation and multiculturalism. At the same time, this may have hindered
the growth of right-wing populist parties – rather than forming a new party to critiqueestablished parties, the politicians who are most conservative in relation to social and culturalissues are more likely to join the LDP in order to realize their policy goals.
On the axis of policy position in relation to globalization, the top five parties following
the 2019 elections for the House of Councillors (the LDP, the Constitutional Democratic Party,
the Komeito, the Democratic Party for the People, and the Japan Innovation Party), andincluding the Constitutional Democratic Party (5.3), are all rated as being more multilateralist
than the neutral point (5). In particular, the Japan Innovation Party and the Democratic Party
for the People are more positive regarding globalization than the LDP; a distinctive feature here

2 The former Rikken DPJ before it became the current Constitutional Democratic Party in 2020. The same

applies to the National Democratic Party.
3 See also Taniguchi (2020), Chapter 5, which draws similar conclusions through a different method ofanalysis.

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is the fact that globalization is not a point of contention among relatively large parties. On theother hand, the significant gap between the Constitutional Democratic Party and theCommunist Party, the Social Democratic Party, and Reiwa Shinsengumi suggests a potential
hurdle for cooperation between opposition parties in future elections.
As many readers may already have noticed, the opposition between reformers anddefenders of Japan’s constitution, and between hawks and doves in the nation’s foreign andsecurity policy, has not appeared in the above discussion. The fact that the economic axis ofpolicy position (or the axis of policy position that integrates the economic and social/culturalaxes into one dimension) does not constitute the primary axis of opposition in the policy space,but rather that the axis of policy position on which the emphasis is on constitutional issues andforeign and security policy – once termed the opposition between “hoshu (conservatism)” and“kakushin (reform),” now variously termed the opposition between “left” and “right,” “liberals”
and “conservatives,” etc. – appears before the other axes is a unique feature of Japanese politics.
However, outside of Japan there are other important axes of policy position, such as English
nationalism in the United Kingdom and policy toward North Korea in South Korea, and thesecan influence the outcome of elections. I hope that this report will assist the reader in gaining a
deeper understanding of the politics of each nation considered, including these unique aspectsof policy commitment.

References
Masaki Taniguchi, 2020, Gendai Nihon no daihyousei minshu seiji: yuukensha to seijika(“Representative Democracy in Contemporary Japan: Voters and Politicians”),
University of Tokyo Press.
Masaki Taniguchi (supervisor), 2017, Hints – Kadai “kaiketsu” senshinkoku wo mezase(“ Hints: Towards becoming a ‘Problem-solving’ Advanced Nation”), Jiji Press.
Masaki Taniguchi, Jiro Mizushima (eds.). 2018. Populism no honshitsu – “seijiteki sogai”
wo kokufuku dekiru ka (“The Nature of Populism: Can We Overcome 'Political
Alienation'?”), Chuokoron Shinsha

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Appendix: Instruction Sheet for Experts

Q1 What are the policy positions of the major political parties (parties that received atleast 5% of the vote in the most recent election or parties that are expected to receive atleast 5% of the vote in the next election)?
(1) Please classify the parties according to their position on economic issues. Those on
the economic left want the government to play an active role in the economy. Those on
the economic right want to reduce the role played by the government in the economy,
for example through privatization, reduction of taxes, deregulation, and the reductionof government expenditure and welfare spending. Please enter a whole number
between 0 and 10, where 0 is the exterme left position, 5 is the center position, and 10
is the extreme right position.
(2) Please classify the parties based on their positions on social and cultural issues.
“post-materialist” or “libertarian” parties are pro-abortion, pro-death with dignity, progay marriage rights, pro-participatory democracy and seek to realize greater freedom
for people. “Traditionalist” or “authoritarian” parties are opposed to such ideas, respect
the values of order, tradition and stability, and believe that government should be astrong moral authority with regard to social and cultural issues. Please answer as awhole number from 0 to 10, where 0 is post-materialism/libertarianism, 5 is the center
position and 10 is traditionalism/authoritarianism.
(3) Please classify each party according to its position on globalization. Multilateralism
considers globalization, including economic globalization, as inevitable, and isproactive in shaping the international order through regional or multilateral
cooperation. Unilateralism is reluctant to accept this way of thinking, and seeks toincrease the autonomy of the state. Please answer as a whole number from 0 to 10,
where 0 is unilateralism, 5 is the center position, and 10 is multilateralism.
Note 1: Please indicate your evaluation at the time of the most recent election or as ofthe end of 2019 (i.e., prior to the impact of COVID-19). The same applies up to andincluding Q5 below.
Note 2: Basically, please use the position of the party leader (or the person effectively

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holding the highest position in the party) as the policy position of the party. If there
are powerful opposition forces within the party, please add a separate entry.
Note 3: (1) and (2) are based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES); we haveindicated the scores provided by experts on national politics for the nations covered by
the 2017 CHES. You may skip (1) and (2) and answer only (3) if you agree with thesurvey results.
Q2 Please indicate the axes of policy position that are unique to the target nation.
(1) Please indicate whether there are major axes of policy position other than“Economy,” “Society and Culture,” and “Globalization,” which you evaluated in Q1, if
any, in addition to the position of each party on these axes.
(2) Please indicate if there is any common understanding in the area of politicalresearch regarding the axes of policy position in the target nation (e.g., “there is asignificant correlation between the economic axis and the social/cultural axis and they
are understood as a single left-right axis” or “the axis of globalization has a strong proEU vs. anti-EU character and is the most important domestic axis of policy position”).
Q3 Please tell us about the recent political situation in the nation.
(1) Please indicate the results of the most recent elections (House of Representatives
elections for nations with a parliamentary system / House of Representatives andpresidential elections for nations with a presidential system).
(2) In the case of parliamentary elections, please provide a very brief explanation of theelectoral system.
(3) If any political changes have occurred since the elections, such as a change inadministrators, the formation of a coalition, etc., please explain the circumstances.
Q4 Please tell us about anti-globalization parties (parties that scored 0-4 for Q1 (3) andstrongly advocate this position).
(1) Please describe the political profile of each party, including the type of people(socioeconomic status, characteristics of political awareness, etc.) who support the
party.

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(2) If the political party in question has participated in a government, please explain(1) the circumstances of its participation in the government, (2) the form of its
participation in the government (e.g., administrative role, junior partner in a coalition
government, cooperation outside Cabinet, etc.), (3) the measures taken by thegovernment, and (4) how the administration ultimately ended.
Q5 Please tell us about anti-globalization trends in the target nation.
(1) Please explain any political events (e.g., Brexit, Greek crisis) or social movementsthat have not been mentioned up to this point or that you think should be describedin more detail with regard to political trends related to globalization.
(2) Please indicate whether there are influential anti-globalization movements among(established) political parties that were not mentioned in Q4, or if existing policies andcommitments have been affected by anti-globalization parties or social movements.

Q6 Up to and including Q5, we have asked about the period up to the end of 2019, but
we are aware that the political situation in each nation may be changing in response to
the global outbreak of COVID-19 since January 2020. If you have noticed any politicalchanges since the spring of 2020, please indicate those changes.

Q7 Finally, we would like to ask you for your general evaluation.
With regard to the political response to globalization in the target nation,(1) What is your general evaluation, and(2) What is your outlook for the future?
(3) In addition, we are also interested in populism. We would be grateful if you could
tell us(1) Whether the anti-globalization parties you mentioned above can be called
populist, and(2) Whether there are so-called “left-wing populist parties” in your nation, and if so,
your opinion regarding their evaluation (i.e., how they differ from right-wing
populism).

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Chapter 1
Toru Yoshida

FranceProfessor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Doshisha University

Summary
During the conflict between conservatives and progressives in the 1970s and theconfrontation between proponents of big and small government that commenced in the
1980s, French politics revolved around the existing political parties of the left and right.
However, due to the issue of European union which has been ongoing since the 1990s,
anti-EU groups have split off from both conservative and progressive parties due to intraparty conflict, producing a fragmented multi-party system. As a result, conflicts between
political parties have shifted from the traditional economic issues to sociocultural issues
such as immigration and security, and to arguments over globalization.
These political conflicts, and the results of two referendums in 1992 and 2005,
produced a tripartite division of the “electoral market” in France. The right-wing populist
the National Front (now National Rally) has gained the support of the “bottom” tier ofvoters who do not identify with the politics of either the established left or right politicalparties. On the left-wing side, the party La France Insoumise has foregrounded an antiglobalization stance, gaining support mainly from young people and the educated classes,
enabling it to solidify its position in the left-wing camp. The growing support for populist
parties on both the left and right demonstrates that there exists a significant number ofvoters in France that support calls for opposition to globalization.
The centrist party in power in France, Emmanuel Macron’s La République En
Marche!, has taken a clearly pro-EU and pro-globalization stance in opposition to theseanti-globalization groupings. This is because it has been able to gain an advantage overboth the existing conservative and progressive parties, given that the National Rally
cannot build cooperative relationships with the existing right-wing parties. In the future,whether or not it is able to transform France’s middle class, which is in decline due toglobalization, into active supporters, will be key to the success of the party. At the sametime, the emergence of voters who are not represented by established parties or even theleft and right populist parties, such as those involved in the Gilets Jaunes movement orvoters supporting the Greens, whose numbers are increasing throughout Europe, may be
a harbinger of further political change.

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Chapter 3
Sho Niikawa

Germany
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Intercultural
Studies, Kobe University

Summary
In Germany, two major political parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), have to date been the major parties
on the left and right of the nation’s administration. However, the 2017 German federal
election represented a significant shakeup, with Alternative for Germany (AfD), a
populist party that attracted considerable attention, becoming the nation’s third highestpolling party, in addition to taking more than 20% of the vote together with the left-wing
party Die Linke.
While both the established left and right parties, the CDU and the SPD, arecomparatively centrist with regard to both economic and sociocultural issues, on
economic issues the right-wing populist AfD initially staked out the most right-wing
position, for example by favoring economic liberalism, in addition to making its
opposition to the Euro a major policy position. However, in the wake of the European
migrant crisis in 2015, groups split off from the AfD, and the party began to foregrounda nationalist, “Germany-first” stance. Given that it is the successor to the former East
German Communist Party, the left-wing Die Linke is closer to a centrist position onsociocultural issues than the Green Party, which campaigns for environmental
protection, but as the Greens shift towards a more moderate and pragmatic stance, theparty is now positioned as the nation’s most economically left-wing.
On the issue of globalization, the left-wing Die Linke has staked out an antiglobalization stance, while the right-wing AfD has critiqued European union via focal
points such as the Euro crisis, making this a political issue. Die Linke has indicated that
it is opposed to economic globalization, and is gaining support from voters in the westernpart of Germany who reject other political parties and from voters in the eastern part ofthe country who actively support Die Linke itself. The AfD has differed in its support
base from the more standard supporters of populist parties, and has been characterized
by a strategy of attracting support from a wide range of voters, including those
identifying as anti-Euro, anti-immigrant/refugee, and anti-established parties.

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Having previously been termed “the sick man of Europe” due to its low level of
economic growth, Germany is now characterized as “winner takes all” as a result of thesuccess of the economic recovery that it focused on from the early 2000s. However, sincethe 2010s, problems related to globalization have become apparent due to the Euro crisis,
the refugee crisis, and issues of EU unity. The coalition government of the establishedpolitical parties cannot deal with these problems. Germany’s two major parties have been
weakened, and a coalition between new political parties will be sought in the future.

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Chapter 4
Hirohito Yasoda

Italy
Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Kyoritsu
Women's University

Summary
In Italy, a politics formerly centered on two major parties on the left and right has
transformed into a politics in which populist parties (the left-wing Five Star Movement(M5S) and the parties of the right-wing alliance, or Lega) have joined the main actors.
The increasing power of left and right populist parties has resulted in a scramble to win
support bases and produced a type of familial antagonism between parties with similar
policy positions. Against this background, in the 2018 general election, the M5S and theLega became the nation’s first and second parties, and formed a left-right populist
coalition government. Despite the fact that the M5S, which advocates support for thepoor through universal basic income, and the Lega, which advocates tax reductions via aflat tax, stressed opposed policy positions, the two parties displayed commonalities in not
adopting a strict stance with regard to realizing EU goals and favoring a generous
redistribution of finances to the electorate. Following this period, the M5S dissolved the
populist coalition government with the Lega and formed a coalition with the Democratic
Party, an existing left-wing political party that is closer to the M5S in terms of policy.
In Southern European countries such as Italy, there are political parties that are
critical of the EU and the euro. However, given the financial support and oversightprovided by the EU, voters see leaving the Union as a matter of “fiction” rather than arealistic policy. As a result, the coalition government between the M5S and the
Democratic Party has transitioned to emphasizing relations with the EU, while retaining
populist tendencies.
More recently, the approval rating of the M5S has dropped, while the approval
rating of the Lega has increased. Despite solid support for its response to the COVID-19
pandemic, the M5S has suffered defeats in local elections, while the Democratic Party isfinding its feet and once again becoming the mainstay of Italy’s left-wing. The current
Dragi administration has positioned technocrats who are experts in a variety of fields as
key bureaucrats overseeing its administration. When the crisis of the COVID-19
pandemic has been resolved, it is expected that there will be fierce competition between

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political parties before the next general election, with responsibility shifted to suchtechnocrats to deal with difficult matters. As this plays out, the right-wing will bedominant. The key for Italy’s left will be whether it is able to realize electoral coalitionsin the nation’s central and southern areas.

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Chapter 5
Jiro Mizushima

The Netherlands
Adjunct Senior Fellow, NIRA
Professor, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Chiba University

Summary
Over the course of the 20th century, the Netherlands was overwhelmingly buoyed
up by the three classical European forces of Christian democracy, social democracy, andliberalism. But with the emergence of liberal left and green parties supported by theurban middle class in the 1980s, and right-wing populist parties in the 21st century, avariety of political antagonisms have formed in opposition to these established politicalparties.
On the axis of political antagonism regarding globalization, the positions of theestablished parties are being influenced by parties with issue ownership that advocate
radical policies. In particular with regard to immigration issues, influenced by the claimsof the right-wing populist parties Party for Freedom and the Forum for Democracy, theNetherlands took measures to inhibit the influx of migrants during the European
migrant crisis, and the nation’s level of acceptance of migrants was rather low in Western
Europe. Globalization is a particularly important issue in understanding trends in Dutch
party politics in recent years, but the importance of economic and sociocultural issues
remains unchanged in relation to medium- to long-term policy conflicts.
In the 2017 general election, the Labour Party, a social democratic party, took acentrist path by joining a coalition government, receiving as a result only approximately
5% of the vote, and the ruling party suffered a significant defeat. At the same time, theParty for Freedom, a right-wing populist party, made a dramatic jump to become thenation’s second party by increasing its criticism of the ruling administration. As a result,
Dutch party politics became fragmented, for example through the formation of a fourparty coalition government that included minor parties in addition to the first and third
parties.
On the other hand, as the Party for Freedom’s chances of joining the coalition
diminished, public support shifted to the Forum for Democracy, which still had apossibility of joining. In addition, a stratum of non-voters who were indifferent to politics
came to attention, with the result that the Forum for Democracy became the first party
in the 2019 Senate elections.
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There will be no rejection of economic globalization in the Netherlands today or in
the future. At the same time, there is strong opposition to globalization in the form, forexample, of an influx of immigrants and refugees. The current situation is that the publicholds an unfavorable image not only of Islam, but also of Central and Eastern Europe.
As an aspect of this, there is support for the image of a “small EU” that seeks to promote
the integration of the northern European nations rather than the nations of southern
Europe. There is also support for policy positions that differ from the former valorizationof globalization, seeking a smaller economy and a type of globalization realized throughsmall-scale cooperative relationships. However, as is the case in other European nations,
it is unlikely that a political party taking a position opposed to economic globalization
position will arise in the Netherlands.

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Chapter 6

Spain

Sho Muto

Professor, School of Law and Politics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Summary
Since Spain’s democratization, the nation’s two major political parties, the Spanish
Socialist Workers' Party and the People’s Party, have alternated terms in power. In
recent years, a number of new parties such as Unidas Podemos, Vox, and Ciudadanos
have emerged; these parties take an anti-globalization stance, in opposition to theestablished political parties, which actively advocate globalization. In the most recent
election, the two major parties retained their support. Among the emerging parties,
Ciudadanos suffered a devastating defeat, while Vox became the third leading party.
Again among the emerging parties, Unidas Podemos expanded its power with the supportof the younger generation, residents of metropolitan areas, and far-left voters in the wakeof the 2008 financial crisis.
What makes Unidas Podemos different from left-wing populist parties in othercountries is that it actively values frameworks of international cooperation such as theEU, while also taking an anti-globalization stance. Vox, also an emerging party andconsidered to hold a position bordering on right-wing populism, has expanded its support
by changing its stance from the rejection of immigrants to opposition to Catalan
independence.
The results of the November 2019 general election saw a coalition government
formed between Unidas Podemos and the Socialist Workers’ Party. This coalition
government had a certain level of opportunity to resolve the political instability that has
seen four general elections held since 2015, but because the COVID-19 crisis occurred
immediately afterwards, results are difficult to evaluate. While there are antiglobalization parties in Spain, as is the case in other southern European countries, there
are no parties that take a medium- to long-term anti-globalization stance, entirely
rejecting frameworks for international cooperation such as the EU. Although antiausterity stances have been bruited, this has not led to any anti-globalization rhetoric.
In addition, although Unidas Podemos and Vox are anti-globalization parties, they also
display certain features that cannot be evaluated as belonging to populist parties.

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Chapter 7
Mitsuo Koga

Northern Europe
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Chuo University

Summary
In the Nordic nations, political parties representing left and right positions haveformed large left and right political blocs, competing for voters closer to a centrist
position. However, this political composition has changed significantly since the 1990s.
What this means is that against the background of increasing support for radical rightwing and populist parties, it is no longer possible for existing parties to take power alone,
and the left and right blocs are clearly becoming fixed. In the Nordic nations attempts
have been made to form consensuses between all political parties by minority cabinets.
However, the emergence of a radical right-wing has made it difficult for agreements tobe reached between political parties, and there is a strong tendency for resolutions to bepassed based on the agreement of a majority.
The Scandinavian radical right-wing promotes expansionary fiscal policy andserves as a home for anti-globalization and anti-austerity opinions. At the same time,
there are numerous aspects of these parties in which their tendencies differ from the farright parties observed in other European nations. In addition, because northern
European nations basically favor small and open economies premised on globalization,
there are no anti-globalization parties as found in other European nations. Ultimately,
given the focus on globalization, conflicts arise due to differences in opinion regarding
the form in which globalization should be promoted, and the specific characteristics ofpolitical parties are mainly reflected in differences in issues such as their degree of
acceptance of immigration and their distance from the EU.
In general, radical right-wing parties in Europe have an approval rating of about
10% to 25%. As in other European nations, the radical right-wing in Scandinavia has abedrock support stratum of around 10%. However, given that policy in Scandinavia ispremised on globalization, there is little support from the “losers” in the globalization
process that is said to exist in many countries. Like other Scandinavian political parties,
the Scandinavian radical right has formed a network of supporters and consolidates theopinions of those supporters as a representative of their interests. In addition, theformation of left and right blocs, of which the radical right-wing will be a part, will force

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voters to question which bloc they support, and this will provide an important perspective
in considering the future of populist parties in Scandinavia.

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Chapter 8

The United States

Takayuki Nishiyama

Professor, Faculty of Law, Seikei University

Summary
The US Democratic Party has a moderate center-left faction and a left-wing thatis closer to a social democratic position, while the Republican Party has a mainstream
center-right faction, the Tea Party faction, and a Trump faction that represents a factor
promoting a certain level of disorder. As this indicates, a variety of opinions coexist
within the two major parties in the US. In the case of the issue of globalization, theRepublicans have been viewed as positive, while the Democrats have on the contrary
been seen as negative. However, since the Obama administration, the Republican Party
has been skeptical of free trade, while the Democrats have tended to promote it. In
addition, a tendency for the two major parties to promote globalization while in power,
and to adopt an anti-globalization stance when not in power, became more pronounced
from the time of the Clinton administration, but more recently both major parties havebecome increasingly skeptical regarding globalization.
The United States has promoted globalization, but the progress of globalization
has weakened domestic trade unions. In addition, the Democratic Party's promotion of
globalization has robbed workers of their political voice. Against the background of thesechanges, the Trump faction among the Republicans argued that the increase in
unemployment among white workers in the Rust Belt region, in which there is a highproportion of manufacturing workers, is due to both legal and illegal immigrants and theglobal elite, a stance that garnered support from voters. However, because the Trump
faction was also trying to create conditions that were favorable to the US predicated on
globalization, the result was a strengthening of the mood of anti-globalization among its
supporters.
In the 2020 presidential election, in addition to winning the presidency, theDemocrats effectively won a majority in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate, a so-called “triple blue” scenario. At the same time, the COVID-19 issue has
increased the visibility of factions within the two major parties that seek an expansion ofsocial security. The Democratic left and the Trump faction of the Republican Party sharean anti-globalization stance, but they also have significant disagreements in opinion.

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There is a possibility of cooperation with regard to the Green New Deal policy, but given
the current “triple blue” status, it is extremely unlikely that this will become a significant
movement.

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Chapter 9
Jeyong Sohn

South Korea
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law and Politics,
Rikkyo University

Summary
In South Korea, the policy positions of the two major political parties, theconservative People Power Party and the progressive Democratic Party of Korea, areexpanding and becoming more polarized. In economic policy, the People Power Party
takes a “small government” stance, while the Democratic Party takes a big government
stance; similar conflicts have arisen with regard to sociocultural policy. The Democratic
Party is closer to a centrist position than the liberals, but in recent years the party’s
progressive tendencies have been becoming more pronounced. Nevertheless, the conflicts
between political parties in South Korea emphasize the nation’s unique axes of policy
antagonism. The policy positions of the two major parties in relation to globalization have
converged, and this therefore no longer functions as an axis of policy antagonism in thenation. For the two major parties, moves towards trade liberalization such as the USKorea FTA have become a consensus issue, and there is now no difference in immigration
policy between the parties, given their promotion of multiculturalism.
The political focus on the two major parties also showed signs of change as thePeople Party made a dramatic leap to become the nation’s third party in the 2016
parliamentary elections. In addition, the impeachment and dismissal of former President
Park Geun-hye in 2017 inflicted severe damage on South Korea’s conservative politicalparties, a situation that became known as the “downfall of the conservatives.” In the 2020
general election, conservative parties saw their number of seats reduced, but more
recently the tendency towards a resurgence of the two-party system is once again gaining
momentum. South Korea’s electoral system was reformed in 2020. This reform attempted
to increase the allocation of seats to the minor parties, but the two major parties each
formed satellite parties, taking advantage of loopholes in the system, which reduced thenumber of seats for the minor parties and increased the weighting for the two major
parties.
The two-party system is strong in South Korea, and it is difficult for emerging
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political arena. On the other hand, presidents, regional governors and mayors tend tomanipulate criticism of mainstream political cliques and utilize their political authority
to mobilize populist support, appealing broadly to the general public while maintaining
the support base of the two major parties. One of the characteristics of South Koreanpolitics is that parties often try to renew their image and make a new start, as seen for
example in changes to the names of the two major political parties. However, despite
repeated changes of party names, supporters remain loyal to the image of the party, andas a result there is virtually no change in approval ratings or political partisanship. Suchparty name changes continue in order to appeal to newness and renew the image of theparties, given the fact that the nation’s politicians align and realign factionally for thepresidential elections.

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