NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
December 2022

Deciphering Russia's Mystifying and
Ruthless Invasion of Ukraine
A General Overview
Kazuko Kawamoto

Adjunct Senior Fellow, NIRA /Research Associate, Russian Research Center, Instituteof Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin effectively initiated a war
against Ukraine, leading to Russia's invasion of the country. The origins of this conflictremain complex and puzzling. This project aims to shed light on the underlying causesof this perplexing war through the insights of five experts specializing in Russia andUkraine.
The contributors and their respective topics are as follows: Professor Kimitaka
Matsuzato analyzes the causes of the crisis that led to the war, taking into accounthistorical factors, contemporary security concerns, and the situation in the Donbas
region of eastern Ukraine. Professor Mihoko Kato examines Russia's military andforeign policies before the invasion, explains the reasons for the diverse international
reactions to the war, and highlights the possible emergence of a world of blocs. Professor
Shinichiro Tabata focuses on the sanctions imposed on Russia, their immediate andlong-term effects, Russia's responses to these measures, and prospects for the futuretransformation of the international economic order. Professor Mari Aburamoto
examines the nature of Russian politics, which is difficult to see from the outside, by
clarifying how changes in presidential approval ratings, the orientation of politicalelites, and the degree of repression of dissidents occurred before and after the invasion.
Professor Yu Koizumi, after discussing the characteristics of the ongoing war, positions
this war as a classic type of war influenced by considerations of nuclear deterrence, andidentifies lessons that Japan, with nuclear powers as potential adversaries, shoulddraw from the war.
Among the many issues explored by the contributors, two common themes will be
discussed at the end of this paper. The first is the causes of the outbreak of the war.
While there are nuanced differences in understanding the impact of Ukraine's pursuitof NATO membership, there is a certain consensus on what brought about the war. The
second is the issue of Russian national identity. Each contributor approaches Russia's
complex self-image in different manners.
While there are nuanced differences in understanding the impact of Ukraine's pursuitof NATO membership, there is a certain consensus on what brought about the war. The
second is the issue of Russian national identity. Each contributor approaches Russia's
complex self-image in different manners.

*This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese in December, 2022.

Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement
This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese. NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation
presented here.

NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
December 2022

1. Introduction
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on
Ukraine, launching a full-scale invasion. More than nine months have passed since thewar began, and fighting continues to this day. Such a prolonged period of fighting does
not appear to have been anticipated, at least on Russia’s part. Both the Ukrainian andRussian military forces have suffered significant losses, while Ukrainian civilians haveendured immense suffering. However, the determination of both sides to continue the war
makes it impossible to expect peace negotiations in the foreseeable future.
The outbreak of this war came as a considerable shock. Why Russia decided to wage sucha war is undoubtedly a mystery. What was the objective of the Russian leadership in thewar? How did the Russian political elite and Russian society react to the war that had
suddenly begun, albeit after unproductive diplomatic negotiations? Why have somenations, such as the United States and other Western nations, condemned this war andimposed economic sanctions on Russia, while not a few others have not joined the West in
this? What effect will economic sanctions have? How will Russia respond? The course of
the war itself is certainly a constant focus of attention. Why have the Ukrainian forces
been much more effective than expected, and why has their supposedly powerful Russiancounterpart fallen short of expectations? And how will the war change the world? What
are the implications and lessons for Japan's national security policy?
The list of questions is endless. This war will be a subject of study for a long time to come.
With the help of five experts on Russia and Ukraine, our project will attempt to unravel
the mysteries of this war as we witness both the ongoing conflict and the international
political and economic events that accompany it, in order to point the way for future
research.
Obviously, this project alone cannot address all the problems. Therefore, each contributor
was asked a simple question in order to prevent the discussion from becoming too diffuse.
Nevertheless, they have developed these simple questions in a multi-layered manner,constructing arguments that will be well worth the reader's attention.
The contributors and the issues addressed in their papers are as follows: Chapter 1, byProfessor Kimitaka Matsuzato of the University of Tokyo's Graduate Schools for Law and
Politics, clarifies the background of the crisis that led to the war in terms of historicalfactors, contemporary security problems on both sides, and the situation in the Donbas
region of eastern Ukraine. Chapter 2, by Dr. Mihoko Kato, a lecturer at the Hiroshima
Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University, examines Russia's military and foreign
policies prior to the invasion and suggests reasons for the international community's lackof a unified response to Russia's invasion, while warning of the coming division of the16
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presented here.

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December 2022
world into blocs. Chapter 3, by Professor Shinichiro Tabata of Hokkaido University's
Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, discusses the sanctions imposed on Russia, their shortand long-term effects, and the measures Russia has taken in response, and offers an
outlook on the future transformation of the international economic order. Chapter 4, byProfessor Mari Aburamoto of Hosei University's Faculty of Law, compares changes inpublic support for Russian President Vladimir Putin, trends among political elites, andthe degree of repression of dissidents before and after the invasion began. In doing so, she
explores the nature of Russian politics, a subject regarding which it can be difficult toobtain clear information from the outside. Chapter 5, by Yu Koizumi, a lecturer at The
University of Tokyo's Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, discusses
the character and nature of the current war, positioning it as a classic type of war underinfluenced by considerations of nuclear deterrence. The paper then clarifies the lessons
that Japan, which considers nuclear powers to be its potential adversaries, should draw
from this war.
Below is a summary of each of these discussions.

2. The Origins of the Ukrainian Crisis
Professor Kimitaka Matsuzato (Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, The University ofTokyo) is a leading expert who has conducted research in Ukraine for many years,
including in Crimea and the Donbas, both before and after the Maidan Revolution,
secession movements, and Russian intervention. His research extends not only to current
local information, but also to a wide range of historical data. Here, Professor Matsuzato
discusses a broad scope of the background and the factors behind the Russian invasion of
Ukraine, from historical events to up-to-the-minute information at the local level,
enabling the reader to gain an understanding of the situation that connects the historicalwith the present.
Looking first at the historical situation, Professor Matsuzato begins by addressing thecomplex issue of how the peoples of the region have been categorized. The most important
point is how the ethno-recognition frameworks for the three East Slavic peoples - Russians,
Ukrainians, and Belarusians - have been changed by politics.
Professor Matsuzato points out that the Russian right wing, including President Putin, isextremely dissatisfied with the ethnic policies of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet
period, each ethnic group was perceived as a separate entity, self-governing in its own
territory. This meant that the Soviet power denied the multi-layered ethnic identities thatexisted during the imperial period. The Soviet way, an artificially fixed system of ethnic
groups governing their own republic or territory, created the conditions for the division of3
Copyright Ⓒ 2022 by Nippon Institute for Research Advancement
This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese. NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation
presented here.

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December 2022
the greater Russian state, which has now caused the anger of the right wing. The Russian
right wing believes that the scope of the Russian people should be more expansive than it
was in the Soviet era.
After describing the historical background mentioned above, Professor Matsuzato
discusses Russia's goals in the current war, which involve issues of national security.
Although Russia's claims regarding its goals have changed, its main stated goal before theoutbreak of the war was to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. A territorial dispute
between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea and the Donbas, which erupted in 2014, mustalso be included among the issues.
When it comes to national security issues, domestic politics and diplomacy have mutually
influenced each other. Professor Matsuzato clearly shows the emergence of a downward
spiral created by repeatedly adopting a hard-line diplomatic stance in order to win indomestic politics, which in turn led to a deterioration of diplomatic relations. Russia has
categorically opposed NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, while Ukrainianpoliticians have used the security issue of joining NATO to help them win elections.
It was the violence of the Euromaidan uprising that triggered the separation of Crimea
and the Donbas. The uprising grew out of protests against then-Ukrainian President
Yanukovych's last-minute cancellation of an association agreement with the EU. Russia
annexed Crimea while leaving the Donbas within Ukraine, hoping that the region would
prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, but the Minsk 2 agreement that would have madethis possible never materialized. Russia began acting against the spirit of Minsk 2 byissuing Russian passports to Donbas residents, and the Ukrainian side was no longer
willing to implement it.
Professor Matsuzato's final message urges us to reflect. We have to watch and observe
Ukraine per se. We have been so used to thinking of Ukraine in terms of relations with
Russia that pointing out Ukraine's problems has often been understood as taking Russia'sside. This is unfortunate not only for us but also for Ukraine.

3. Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Asia
Dr. Mihoko Kato (Lecturer, Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University) is ayoung, rising scholar known for her research on Russia's Asia-Pacific policy andmultilateral diplomatic relations involving Russia. Here she discusses a wide range ofissues, including the changes in Russia's foreign policy and its outcomes, President
Putin's worldview, the reasons why the international community has not responded
uniformly to the invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the future world order and4
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presented here.

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December 2022
Japanese diplomacy.
Dr. Kato discusses the changes in Russian foreign policy in the decade before the invasion,noting that Russia has escalated its cross-border military interventions, beginning withthe 2008 war in Georgia. At the same time, Russia has intensified its Eastern diplomacy,
becoming active in the broader regions of the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, andNortheast Asia, and establishing itself as a power broker in these regions.
During this period, Vladimir Putin, who was in a position to determine foreign policy,
expressed his dissatisfaction that the unilateral actions of the United States had shaken
the existing world order. Such dissatisfaction is not limited to Russia, but is widespreadthroughout the world. However, Russia has come to consider that its sovereignty extends
beyond its borders and has intervened militarily on this basis, and thus is no longer in aposition to simply criticize the United States for such actions.
Putin gives a distinctive nuance to sovereignty: a sovereign nation can ensure its own
security and economic growth without the assistance of other nations. His worldview canbe understood as a multipolar order in which the world is composed of several poles, eachconsisting of a fully sovereign nation and smaller nations dependent on it, with the poles
competing with each other.
The world’s nations are divided in their responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Western nations have condemned Russia and imposed sanctions, while other nations
have condemned Russia but not imposed sanctions. Other nations have neither
condemned Russia nor imposed sanctions, although certain of them have distanced
themselves from Russia since the invasion. Each of these reactions is based on theinterests of the respective nations. This very division could be seen as the result ofRussia's Eastern diplomacy.
Dr. Kato predicts that the war will be prolonged and that distrust of Russia will continue,that the world may become increasingly bloc-oriented, with the West positioned against
China and Russia, and that dialogue across blocs may become difficult. Under thesecircumstances, Japan, as a member of the West, must participate in sanctions against
Russia. However, Japan needs a strategy to integrate Russia into the regional orderwhile maintaining a close relationship with the United States, because Japan and Russia
have issues to resolve, such as territorial disputes, fisheries, and energy.

4. Economic Sanctions against Russia and Their Impact
Professor Shinichiro Tabata (Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University) is a5
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This is a translation of a paper originally published in Japanese. NIRA bears full responsibility for the translation
presented here.

NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
December 2022
leading researcher specializing in the quantitative and institutional analysis of the Russian
economy, focusing on issues such as Russia's dependence on oil and gas. In his paper,
Professor Tabata examines the economic sanctions imposed on Russia in response to theinvasion of Ukraine, Russia's response to them, and their short- and long-term effects on
the Russian economy, and he also predicts their long-term effects on the world economicorder.
Professor Tabata begins by pointing out that the sanctions against Russia following theinvasion of Ukraine, which include bans on the export of high-technology goods and theimport of oil and gas, are far more severe than previous ones. Russia has responded byensuring supplies to the domestic market through export controls, preventing the ruble
from collapsing through exchange controls, reducing inflation by raising the policy interest
rate, and avoiding financial collapse by using the National Wealth Fund, which is financedby oil and gas revenues.
Professor Tabata then discusses the impact of the sanctions from a short- and long-term
perspective. Negative GDP growth, reduced oil and gas exports, inflation, depreciation of
the ruble, and falling stock prices were expected as short-term impacts in 2022. Of these,
inflation and currency depreciation have improved due to policy responses. On the other
hand, the long-term impact will be on public finance. If the war drags on and export
revenues from oil and gas decline, it will be difficult for the Russian National Wealth Fundto make up for the budget deficit. This also means that Russia will not be able to maintainan economic system based on oil and gas exports as it has in the past. Russia will be cut off
from the global economy and will be connected to the world exclusively through China. In
this case, import substitution is expected to progress, but the quality of products will
inevitably deteriorate as technology transfers from abroad are drastically reduced.
Professor Tabata extends the discussion further to the global economic order. Russia's
invasion of Ukraine showed that Russia was outside the U.S.-centered global economicorder and that India and other countries that did not participate in the sanctions were notsufficiently integrated into that order. With the U.S. not comprehensively acting as theguardian of the global economic order, the creation of a new order will be fraught withdifficulties. Therefore, we need to build a system in which the U.S. and the rising nations,such as China, cooperate economically even as they engage in political confrontation.
Professor Tabata warns that if such a system cannot be established, there will either be noorder or an existing order that is no longer functional.

5. The Invasion of Ukraine and Russian Domestic Politics
Professor Mari Aburamoto (Faculty of Law, Hosei University) is a talented Russia
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presented here.

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December 2022
specialist who studies Russian domestic politics at both the central and local levels. She
discusses whether and how domestic politics changed after the invasion of Ukraine. She
has chosen three topics to assess possible changes: presidential approval ratings,
tendencies among the political elite, and the approach to anti-regime dissidents.
Professor Aburamoto tries to reveal the elusive realities of Russian politics by comparing
the situation before and after the invasion.
We often find rumors, speculations, and wishful thinking in news and articles concerning
Russian politics because it is not easy to access enough information. Therefore, Professor
Aburamoto argues that we need to collect and analyze the scattered information
regarding Russian politics carefully in order to understand it more accurately. Based on
this idea, Professor Aburamoto chose the three topics mentioned above to explore Russian
domestic politics.
President Putin's approval rating rose sharply after the annexation of Crimea in 2014,
following which it fell in the summer of 2018 with an increase in the pension age.
However, Putin did not lose power after 2018. The presidential approval rating rose once
again following the invasion of Ukraine. For now, the majority of the public seems to
support Russia's military action. Yet, Professor Aburamoto notes that the fervor thatswept Russian society at the time of the annexation of Crimea is absent on this occasion.
Professor Aburamoto points out that the trends in the elite class and its subdivisions are
inherently difficult to observe. Before the invasion, conservative ideologues were on therise, but it cannot be concluded that liberals have declined in influence. Liberals and nonconservative technocrats appear to have maintained their autonomy. Since the invasion,
there has been little deviation from the government line among the Russian elite,
although some reports indicate that cracks are emerging. At this stage, however, there
have been no significant changes.
Dissidents are groups, media, and ordinary people who, in the authorities' view, do notconform to the official discourse, but rather challenge it. The suppression of dissidents
has intensified since Putin's third term. There have been anti-war demonstrations andprotest campaigns since the invasion, but these have been met with repression. Some
citizens have fled the country, but their numbers should not be overestimated. Control ofthe media has also been tightened. On the other hand, there are limits to this control.
For example, the administration does not have complete control over access to theInternet.
As indicated above, the foundations of Putin's rule have not yet been shaken. However,
the invasion has created uncertainty among the political elite. Excessive tightening ofcontrols over the political opposition could make it rather difficult for the authorities to7
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presented here.

NIRA RESEARCH REPORT
December 2022
monitor Russian society.

6. Russia's War against Ukraine
Yu Koizumi (Lecturer at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The
University of Tokyo) is a prominent Russia specialist who began his career studying theRussian military and expanded into national strategy and Russian society. Here hediscusses the overall characteristics of the war against Ukraine, Russia's operational
failures and changes in strategy, Western support for Ukraine, the future course of thewar, and its implications for Japanese security policy.
In terms of the characteristics of the war, Professor Koizumi describes it as a classic typewar influenced by considerations of nuclear deterrence. While the use of new technologies
such as drones has attracted attention, the approach to warfare itself has not changed.
Professor Koizumi sees the invasion as motivated more by Putin's nationalist ambitions
than by the issue of Ukraine's potential NATO membership. Operational failures have
led to changes in Russia's strategic goal of replacing the Zelenskyy government andbringing the nation under Russian control. The Russian government had underestimatedUkraine's defensive capabilities. Moreover, while the Ukrainian armed forces are
passionately committed to defending their country, the Russian side lacks such a passion
for offensive operations.
Western aid is vital to Ukraine's war effort. The West has gradually increased its support
as the war has progressed, albeit with the constraint of Russia's nuclear deterrence.
Nevertheless, it is considered militarily and politically difficult for Ukraine tosignificantly escalate the war into the territories occupied prior to a full-scale invasion
by Russia or into Russian territory. Professor Koizumi also points out that while Russia's
nuclear weapons constrain the West from greater involvement, Russia is at the sametime constrained by the unpredictability of developments in the event of the actual use
of nuclear weapons.
This war will continue under conditions of nuclear deterrence, and the antagonism
between Russia and the West will remain. When the war is over, the issues of Ukraine's
abandonment of the goal of NATO membership and neutrality will once again come tothe fore. However, neutrality alone will not adequately ensure Ukraine's security;
credible military guarantees will be essential.
Concerning Japan's security, Professor Koizumi notes that all of Japan's potential
adversaries possess nuclear weapons. In other words, if a war were to break out involving

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presented here.

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December 2022
Japan, it would likely begin as a classic type of war under conditions of nuclear
deterrence, as in the case of the current war. Learning from the lessons of the Ukraine
war, Japan should ensure U.S. extended deterrence, anticipate a scenario in which theJapan-U.S. Security Treaty ceases to function, and strategically disseminate
information, as Ukraine is doing.

7. Conclusion
Although there is little overlap in the topics discussed in this volume, as each contributor
focuses on his or her area of expertise, one of the most important of the common themesis the cause of the outbreak of the war. Professor Matsuzato, Professor Kato, andProfessor Koizumi each touch on this subject. It is of considerable interest that they differ
in their assessment of the significance of NATO enlargement for Russia.
Professor Matsuzato argues that NATO expansion would be unfavorable to Russia, andin particular that NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia was a step beyond thelimits of Russian patience. Professor Kato believes that rather than NATO expansion,
the cause of the war was Russia's rejection of a U.S.-centered unipolar world order andits determination to defend its sovereignty. In other words, she emphasizes Putin's
rejection of the U.S.’ ability to intervene globally and unilaterally. Professor Koizumi
stresses that Ukraine's NATO membership was not expected to be achieved rapidly, andinstead attributes the cause of the war to Putin's nationalist ambitions.
These differences reflect the individual perspectives and interests of the contributors.
Nevertheless, they do not appear to be ultimately contradictory. Professor Matsuzatoemphasizes the strength of Russia's attachment to Ukraine rather than the possibility of
Ukraine joining NATO; indeed, he argues in another paper that Ukraine's NATOmembership is unrealistic (Matsuzato, 2022). Professor Matsuzato’s "Russia's
attachment to Ukraine" and Professor Koizumi’s "Putin's nationalist ambitions" most
likely refer to the same idea. In addition, it can be said that the unipolar world system
discussed by Professor Kato constitutes the background to the NATO expansion.
Given that Ukraine was unlikely to join NATO immediately, why did Russia decide touse military force and invade Ukraine at this particular time? NATO's cooperation with
Ukraine may provide a clue. Ukraine received military assistance from the U.S. without
joining NATO; while the Obama Administration refused to provide lethal weapons, theTrump Administration made it possible for Ukraine to acquire them. In other words, with
U.S. or NATO assistance, Ukraine's military capabilities could be expected to become
more robust over time, and the creation of a U.S.-backed and militarily strong Ukraine,even without NATO membership, would itself seem to be worth preventing for Russia.
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presented here.

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December 2022
There is another common theme in the contributions to this volume, which is Russia's
national identity. Having lost the Soviet Union, a territory it had held for centuries,
Russia needed to reassert its national identity. There was a possibility that Russia could
see itself as a European nation. However, NATO's eastward expansion complicatedRussia's integration into European security arrangements and discouraged Russia fromidentifying itself as part of Europe or the West. Moreover, because Russians believed
there was a promise that NATO would not expand, the actual eastward enlargement
became a symbol of betrayal by the West and consequently a source of hostility toward
the West. Russia's diplomatic eastward shift discussed by Professor Kato took place
during a period of confrontation with Western nations. This shift may include an attempt
to establish a non-Western identity.
Contrary to the security issues, Russia has deep economic ties with Europe, especially as
an oil and gas exporter, and was considered to have established comparatively good
relations with the European nations. This is precisely why the Russian invasion of
Ukraine, which was sure to antagonize the West, was received with surprise. However,as Professor Tabata points out, the invasion demonstrated that Russia was outside theexisting economic world order. For Russia, which had not acquired an identity as part of
the West and had not been integrated into European security arrangements, economic
interdependence with the West was something that could be replaced.
Since the outbreak of the war, Putin has orchestrated a break with Western values, forexample, by expressing hostility toward the West's tolerance of the LGBT community.
The reaction of the Russian political elite to this aggressive stance may influence future
political developments. According to Professor Aburamoto, there is a great diversity
among the elite surrounding Putin, from those who would prefer to cooperate with theWest to those who would like to sever such ties. The wide range of attitudes among
Russia's elite suggests the absence of a core Russian identity that helps determine
national interests. Professor Aburamoto also points out that discord may have emerged
among the elite after the war began, despite the fact that they initially presented a united
front. We need to pay close attention to which group gains power.
It is also important to note, as Professor Matsuzato and Professor Koizumi have pointed
out, that Russia's goals in this war have changed several times. Russia's failure to
maintain its goals was primarily due to the inability of the Russian military to realize its
goals, but it is also possible that these goals were unclear from the beginning. Thisinability to define clear goals can be attributed to an uncertain identity. The Russian
leadership could only express resentment and hostility toward the West but could notprovide a distinct identity on which to base strategies. Without defined goals, it would be
difficult for Russia to even decide when to end the war. Uncertainty about Russia's

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identity may be one of the reasons why Russia's actions often seem to lack a rational
purpose.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has a clear and stable goal of regaining its territory, namely
Crimea and the Donbas. Western nations supporting Ukraine also have a clear goal ofpreserving the international order, including maintaining territorial integrity, incontrast to Russia's shifting goals. Although it is difficult to assess how this contrast willaffect the course of the war, the lack of clarity regarding Russia's goals contributes to
Ukrainian suspicions that even if a ceasefire is reached, Russia would not strictly observe
it and would soon attack again. Of course, as Ukraine continues to try to regain all of its
territory, there is no reason to stop fighting now. Neither a ceasefire nor an end to thewar is in sight.

Reference
Matsuzato, K. (2022), “Mikan no kokumin, kontesutaburu na kokka: Roshia/Ukuraina
sensou no haikei” (“Unfinished Nation-Building, Contestable State: The Background to
the Russo-Ukrainian War”), Sekai (World), No. 957.

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presented here.