Discussion Paper No. 973

ARE THE JAPANESE UNIQUE?
EVIDENCE
FROM HOUSEHOLD SAVING
AND BEQUEST BEHAVIORCharles Yuji Horioka

June 2016

The Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan

Are the Japanese Unique? Evidence from Household Saving and Bequest
Behavior1
Charles Yuji Horioka, Asian Growth Research Institute, Osaka University, and National Bureau
of Economic Research2
June 1, 2016
Abstract
In this paper, we attempt to shed light on whether Japanese households are rational or if their behavior is
influenced by culture and social norms by examining their saving and bequest behavior. To summarize our main
findings, we find that Japan’s household saving rate showed great volatility, was often low and even negative, andwas high only during the 25-year period from around 1960 until the mid-1980s (if we exclude the war years) andthat we can explain the high level of, and trends over time in, Japan’s household saving rate via various
socioeconomic and policy variables. This seems to suggest that the Japanese are not a saving-loving people andthat their saving behavior is not governed by culture and social norms. Moreover, the bequest behavior of theJapanese suggests that they are less altruistic toward their children and less reliant on their children than otherpeoples, suggesting that the alleged social norm of strong family ties in Japan is largely a myth, and the Japanese
do not appear to be appreciably more concerned about the continuation of the family line or the family businessthan other peoples, suggesting that the influence of the “ie” system is apparently not so pervasive either. However,
we argue that these findings do not necessarily mean that culture and social norms do not matter.

JEL Codes: D10, D14, D64, D91, E21, H55, J11, Z10

Key Words: Altruism; bequest behavior; bequest division; bequest motives; Confucianism; culture; economic
rationality; family ties; frugality; households; household behavior; household saving; “ie” system; Japan;
Nihonjinron; parent-child relations; rationality; saving; saving behavior; social norms; values

1

The author is indebted to Bruce Batten, Koichi Hamada, Yoshio Okubo, Yun Ren, Shinichi Yamamoto, and other participantsof seminars at the International House of Japan and J. F. Oberlin University and especially to Yoko Niimi for their valuablecomments. This work was supported by JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) KAKENHI Grant Number
15H01950, an Asian Growth Research Institute project grant, and a grant from the MEXT Joint Usage/Research Center for
Behavioral Economics, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
2 Research Professor, Asian Growth Research Institute, 11-4, Ohtemachi, Kokurakita-ku, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka 803-0814,
Japan; Invited Professor, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan;
Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Phone: 81-93-583-6202.
Facsimile: 81-93-583-6576. Email: horioka@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

1.

Introduction

Many economists assume that economic agents are “homo economicus” (economic man) and that they behavein accordance with economic rationality (i.e., that individuals or households behave so as to maximize their own
utility and that firms behave so as to maximize their own profits). By contrast, many Japanese and non-Japanesebelieve that the Japanese are unique and that their behavior is governed largely by culture and social norms (theso-called “Nihonjinron” school of thought; see, for example, Sugimoto, 2015).
To what extent do the Japanese behave in accordance with economic rationality? To what extent is the
behavior of the Japanese governed by culture and social norms? Are the Japanese unique in deviating from therationality assumption to a greater extent than other peoples and in being influenced by culture and social norms
to a greater extent than other peoples? The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to these questions based onevidence from household saving and bequest behavior.
In some earlier papers, I examined whether the Japanese are unique with respect to other aspects of householdbehavior. Horioka (1993a) examined whether or not the consumption patterns of the Japanese are unique andfound that they were in the past but that they were converging rapidly to Western patterns. For example, the shareof rice in total cereal consumption, the share of Japanese-style fresh cakes such as youkan and manjuu in total
fresh cake consumption, the share of green tea in total tea consumption, and the share of Japanese alcoholic
beverages such as sake and shouchuu in total alcohol consumption were very high just after the Second World
War but fell sharply throughout the postwar period.
As another example, Horioka (2012) examined whether or not the borrowing behavior of the Japanese isunique, as one might expect from their alleged aversion to debt. He found that debt levels were indeed relatively
low in Japan until the 1970s but that they increased sharply thereafter, becoming the highest in the Group of Sevencountries until at least 2000.
These limited examples as well as the other examples in Horioka (1994 and 2006) suggest that the Japanese
were indeed unique in the past but that their uniqueness has declined sharply over time. In this paper, we focus on
two other aspects of Japanese household behavior (saving and bequest behavior) to determine whether or not thisconclusion holds in the case of these behaviors as well.
To summarize our main findings, we find that Japan’s household saving rate showed great volatility, wasoften low and even negative, and was high only during the 25-year period from around 1960 until the mid-1980s(if we exclude the war years) and that we can explain the high level of, and trends over time in, Japan’s household

1saving rate via various socioeconomic and policy variables. This seems to suggest that the Japanese are not asaving-loving people and that their saving behavior is not governed by culture and social norms. Moreover, thebequest behavior of the Japanese suggests that they are less altruistic toward their children and less reliant on theirchildren than other peoples, suggesting that the alleged social norm of strong family ties in Japan is largely a myth,and the Japanese do not appear to be appreciably more concerned about the continuation of the family line or thefamily business than other peoples, suggesting that the influence of the “ie” system is apparently not so pervasive
either. However, we argue that these findings do not necessarily mean that culture and social norms do not matter.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we consider whether the saving behavior ofJapanese households is rational or influenced by culture and social norms, and in section 3, we do a similar analysis
for the bequest behavior of Japanese households. Section 4 is a brief concluding section.

2.

Household Saving Behavior

In this section, we present evidence on whether household saving behavior in Japan is rational or influenced
by culture and social norms.

2.1. Theoretical Considerations

What constitutes rational household saving behavior? If households are rational, they will save in order toreconcile differences in timing between income and consumption. For example, according to the so-called lifecycle model of saving, since households typically retire and experience a decline in income in old age, they will
work, earn income, and save a portion of their income when young in order to prepare for life during retirement,
and after they get old, they will retire and finance their living expenses by drawing down their previously
accumulated savings. Similarly, rational households will also save in order to overcome shorter term fluctuationsin their incomes. For example, farmers will save a large proportion of their income because they earn income onlyat harvest time but need to consume throughout the year. Moreover, rational households will engage inprecautionary saving to prepare for unexpected contingencies such as illness, accidents, unemployment, etc.
What are some possible ways in which culture and social norms may influence household saving behavior?
The Japanese may save relatively more (1) because they are a saving-loving people (it is part of their national
character), (2) because of the influence of Confucian teachings, which regard frugality and diligence as virtues2

(see, for example, Garon, 1996, pp. 164-165), and/or (3) because they are more risk-averse (worry more) thanother peoples.
How can we determine whether or not the saving behavior of Japanese households is explained better by
economic rationality or by culture and social norms? If the saving behavior of Japanese households is attributableto culture and social norms, (1) Japan’s household saving rate should be high both absolutely as well as relative
to that of other countries, (2) Japan’s household saving rate should be stable at a high level (since culture andsocial norms are presumably relatively stable over time), and (3) it should not be possible to explain the high levelof, and trends over time in, Japan’s household saving rate via socioeconomic and policy variables.

2.2. Data on the Level of, and Trends over Time in, Japan’s Household Saving Rate

Table 1 shows data on household saving rates (defined as the ratio of net household saving to net household
disposable income) in 1975, 1995, and 2015 for the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for which data are available. As can be seen from this table, in 1975, Japan
had an extraordinarily high household saving rate (22.8%), which put Japan in second place among the 18 OECD
countries for which data were available, with only Italy showing a higher household saving rate (26.9%). By 1995,
however, Japan’s household saving rate had fallen sharply to 12.2% and its rank had fallen to 10th among the 24
OECD countries for which data were available. Moreover, by 2015, Japan’s household saving rate had fallen
further to a mere 2.4% and its rank had fallen to 24th (3rd from the bottom) among the 26 OECD countries forwhich data were available, with only Denmark (-4.1%) and Finland (0.8%) showing lower household saving rates.
Thus, Japan’s household saving rate used to be one of the highest in the OECD (if not the world) but is now oneof the lowest in the OECD (if not the world).
Figures 1 and 2 show long-term trends in Japan’s household saving rate during the prewar and postwar periods,
respectively. As can be seen from these figures, Japan’s household saving rate has been very volatile during the
prewar as well as postwar periods. It was indeed high (defined as being in excess of 15%) during certain periods(for example, the war years of 1938-44 and the high-growth period from around 1960 until the mid-1980s), but it
was not always high and was often low and even negative. In particular, it has been declining steadily for the past
4 decades after peaking at 23-25% in the mid-1970s and has been negative since 2013. Furthermore, theextraordinarily high household saving rate during the war years (as high as 44%) was due primarily to forcedsaving arising from severe shortages of goods, rationing, moral suasion from the government, and the forced3

purchase of government bonds. Thus, it was only during the quarter of a century from around 1960 until the mid1980s that Japan’s household saving rate was high because of people’s own volition.
In sum, Japan’s household saving rate showed great volatility, was often low and even negative, and was highonly during the 25-year period from around 1960 until the mid-1980s (if we exclude the war years), which roughly
coincides with Japan’s high growth period. Since culture and social norms are presumably relatively stable overtime, we would expect Japan’s household saving rate to have been stable at a high level both absolutely as well
as relative to other countries if it were determined primarily by culture and social norms. Hence, the fact that it
was so volatile and often low or even negative suggests that it was not determined primarily by culture and social
norms.

2.3. Evidence on the Impact of Socioeconomic and Policy Variables on Japan’s Household Saving Rate

If Japan’s household saving rate is determined primarily by culture and social norms, socioeconomic andpolicy variables should not be able to explain the high level of, or trends over time, in Japan’s household savingrate. In this subsection, we will consider whether or not this is the case.
One factor that is often found to be an important influence on the household saving rate is the age structureof the population (see, for example, Horioka, 1989; Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara, 2012; and Grigoli, et al., 2014).
As explained earlier, the working-age population should save and the elderly population should dissave so theshare of the elderly in the total population should have a negative impact on the saving rate of the household sector
as a whole.
Table 2 shows data on the share of the elderly (those aged 65 and older) in the total population in the member
countries of the OECD in 1975, 2000, and 2015. As can be seen from this table, the share of the elderly in Japan’s
total population was the lowest in the OECD (7.9%) in 1975 if we exclude Korea, which was not yet a member
country of the OECD at the time. Moreover, Horioka (1989) found that the low share of the elderly was the maincause of Japan’s high saving rate at the time.
Since then, however, the share of the elderly in the total population in Japan has increased sharply and ranked
3rd in the OECD in 2000 (17.2%) and was the highest in the OECD in 2015 (28.9%). Horioka (1991, 1997)
found that the sharp increase in the share of the elderly is the main cause of the sharp decline in Japan’s householdsaving rate since the mid-1970s. Thus, the age structure of Japan’s population can explain not only the high levelof Japan’s household saving rate but also trends over time therein.

4

As for other socioeconomic and policy variables that affect the household saving rate, the fact that public
pension benefit levels were low, making it necessary for households to save in preparation for life during
retirement; the fact that housing loans and other forms of consumer credit were not readily available, making it
necessary for households to save in advance of housing purchase and other large purchases; and the fact that the
government engaged in a variety of saving promotion activities and adopted extensive tax breaks for saving suchas the maruyuu system can also help explain why Japan’s household saving rate was so high during the highgrowth period. Moreover, the fact that public pension benefit levels were greatly improved, the fact that consumer
credit became more widely available, and the fact that government saving promotion activities and tax breaks forsaving were largely eliminated can help explain why Japan’s household saving rate has declined so sharply inrecent decades (refer to Horioka, 1990, 1993b, and 2008, for a more detailed discussion and Garon, 1997 and2006, for more on government saving promotion activities).

2.4. Conclusion re Household Saving Behavior

Our analysis of the saving behavior of Japanese households showed that Japan’s household saving rate
showed great volatility, was often low and even negative, and was high only during the 25-year period from around1960 until the mid-1980s (if we exclude the war years) and that we can explain the high level of, and trends overtime in, Japan’s household saving rate via various socioeconomic and policy variables. All of these findings seemto suggest that the saving behavior of Japanese households is rational and is not influenced by culture and social
norms.
However, another possibility is that the saving behavior of Japanese households is influenced by social norms
but that social norms change over time, due in large part to changes in the socioeconomic and policy environment.
For example, perhaps the high-saving norm of past years arose partly due to the low level of public pension
benefits, the unavailability of consumer credit, and the prevalence of government saving promotion activities andtax breaks for saving whereas the current low-saving norm arose partly due to the improvement in public pension
benefit levels, the increasing availability of consumer credit, and the scaling back of government saving promotion
activities and tax breaks for saving.
Garon (1997 and 2006) shares my belief that social norms (e.g., the culture of thrift in many Asian countries)
are not immutable and that they are shaped by government policies and institutions, especially saving promotion .
He writes: “Thrift is not a timeless Asian value, nor is it unique to Asians. But influenced by the pervasive moral

5

suasion efforts of governments and allied groups, many Asian peoples have come to embrace thrift as what they
perceive to be an enduring Asian value, and a key marker of their national identities (Garon, 2006, p. 186).”

3.

Household Bequest Behavior

In this section, we present evidence on whether household bequest behavior is rational or influenced byculture and social norms.

3.1. Theoretical Considerations

What are some examples of rational household bequest behavior? (1) The individual does not leave a bequest
to his/her children because he/she wants to enjoy his/her own life. (2) The individual does not make special efforts
to leave a bequest to his/her children but leaves whatever is left over. (3) The individual leaves a bequest to his/herchildren as a way of inducing them to provide care and attention during old age (see, for example, Bernheim,
Shleifer, and Summers, 1985, who call this type of behavior the “strategic bequest motive”). (4) The individual
leaves a bequest to his/her children even if he/she gets nothing in return because he/she loves (cares about) his/herchildren (see, for example, Becker, 1991). All 4 scenarios are rational but they differ in important respects.
Scenarios (1), (2), and (3) presuppose a selfish individual whereas scenario (4) presupposes an altruistic
individual; the individual does not leave a bequest in scenario (1), may or may not leave a bequest in scenarios(2) and (3), and definitely leaves a bequest in scenario (4); there is a quid pro quo for leaving a bequest in scenario(3) but not in scenario (4).
What are some possible ways in which culture and social norms may influence household bequest behavior?
(1) Parents may leave bequests to their children (especially their eldest son), and children (especially the eldestson) live with, and take care of, their parents in Japan because family ties are strong due to the influence ofConfucian teachings. (2) Children may carry on the family line or the family business and parents may leave abequest to them as a quid pro quo for doing so in Japan because of the family (“ie”) system (a theoreticalformulation of this type of behavior is provided by Chu, 1991). (3) Children may live with, and take care of, theirparents in Japan because there is a culture of shame (“haji”) in Japan and children are afraid of being criticized byothers for not taking care of their parents.

6

3.2. Evidence on Bequest Motives and Bequest Division from a Household Survey

How can we determine whether or not the bequest behavior of Japanese households can be explained betterby economic rationality or by culture and social norms? In order to shed light on this question, we analyze datafrom the “Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University,” which was conducted by the 21st Century Centerof Excellence Program "Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments“ (2003-07) and the
Global Center of Excellence Program "Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics“ (2008-13). This
household survey was conducted simultaneously in China, India, Japan, and the United States and includes manyquestions about bequest motives and bequest division so it is ideally suited to the analysis at hand.
Tables 3 and 4 show the results from this survey concerning bequest motives and attitudes toward bequest
division, respectively. We will discuss only some of the results shown in these tables due to space limitations, butthese data are analyzed in more detail in Horioka, 2014 (see Horioka, et al., 2000, and Horioka, 2002 and 2009,
for similar data from other sources).

3.2.1. Evidence relating to the Strength of Family Ties

As can be seen from Table 3, the proportion of respondents who plan to leave a bequest to their children no
matter what is low in Japan (32.6%) and China (35.3%) and high in India (75.7%) and the United States (66.4%),
and conversely, the proportion of respondents who do not plan to leave a bequest to their children or do not plan
to make special efforts to leave a bequest to their children is by far the highest in Japan (58.6%) and much lower
in China (37.0%), the United States (28.5%), and India (3.8%). Similarly, as can be seen from Table 4, theproportion of respondents who plan to divide their bequest equally among their children (an altruistic behavior)
is high in all 4 countries but much lower in China (70.3%) and Japan (72.7%) than in the United States (92.6%)
and India (84.2%). All of these results suggest that Americans and Indians are much more altruistic than theJapanese and Chinese.
Another interesting result from Table 3 is that the proportion of respondents who plan to leave a bequest to
their children only if their children provide care or economic assistance during old age is relatively high in India(17.4%) and China (15.3%) but much lower in the United States (2.7%) and Japan (4.8%), suggesting that
Americans and the Japanese do not expect their children to take care of them during old age to the same extent as
Indians and the Chinese.

7Thus, the bequest behavior of Japanese households suggests that they are not very altruistic toward theirchildren and that they do not expect their children to take care of them during old age. This suggests that familyties in Japan are not any stronger than in other countries and that, if anything, they are weaker.

3.2.2. Evidence relating to the Strength of the “Ie” System

As can be seen from Table 3, the proportion of respondents planning to leave a bequest to their children only
if their children carry on the family business is by far the highest in China (7.5%) and much lower in India (2.4%),
Japan (1.1%), and the United States (0.3%). Similarly, as can be seen from Table 4, the proportion of respondents
planning to leave a larger bequest to children who carry on the family business or to their eldest son or daughter(who typically carries on the family line) is higher in China (8.1%) and Japan (7.9%) than in India (0.5%) and theUnited States (0.8%) but low even in Japan and China. Thus, the “ie” system affects bequest behavior in Japan tosome extent but only to a very limited extent and less than in China.

3.3. Conclusion re Household Bequest Behavior

Our analysis of the bequest behavior of the Japanese showed that they are less altruistic toward their children
and less reliant on their children than other peoples, suggesting that the alleged social norm of strong family ties
in Japan is largely a myth, and that the Japanese do not appear to be appreciably more concerned about thecontinuation of the family line or the family business than other peoples, suggesting that the influence of the “ie”
system is apparently not so pervasive either. It thus appears that the bequest behavior of the Japanese is not very
heavily influenced by culture and social norms.
However, there is another possibility—namely, that social norms matter but that they change over time largely
in response to changes in the socioeconomic and policy environment.3 For example, perhaps the social norm in
the olden days was for children to take care of their elderly parents partly because public pensions and othergovernment social insurance programs were underdeveloped, meaning that people had no choice but to rely on
their children. However, public pensions were greatly improved in 1973 and the public long-term care system wasintroduced in 2000, alleviating the need for the elderly to rely on their children, and this may have led to the3

In fact, there is some econometric evidence that social norms affect bequest behavior and parent-child relations (see, forexample, Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2009, and Horioka, et al., 2016).

8

weakening of the preexisting social norm.
With respect to the impact of the introduction of the public long-term care system in 2000, Tsutsui, et al.
(2014) found that there was a pronounced change in people’s attitudes as well as behavior after the introductionof this system, with the proportion of children feeling obligated to take care of their parents declining anddaughters-in-law (who used to be the primary caregivers) being less likely to take care of their parents-in-law.
This is an excellent example of a case in which changes in a country’s socioeconomic and policy environment (inparticular, its government policies) caused changes in the social norms of that country.

4.

Conclusion

In this paper, we attempted to shed light on whether Japanese households are rational or if their behavior is
influenced by culture and social norms by examining their saving and bequest behavior. Judging from our findings
concerning these aspects of household behavior, it appears that Japanese households behave rationally within thesocioeconomic and policy environment in which they are situated and that the impact of culture and preexistingsocial norms is relatively limited.
However, this does not necessarily imply that social norms do not matter. It could be that social norms matterbut that they are not fixed and that they change in response to changes in the socioeconomic and policy
environment. In other words, the socioeconomic and policy environment affects household behavior directly aswell as indirectly via their impact on social norms. Thus, my answer to my initial question “Are the Japaneseunique?” is “no.” They are the same as other peoples to the extent that they behave rationally in the context of thesocioeconomic and policy environment in which they are situated. If their behavior is different from that of otherpeoples, it is because they are faced with a different socioeconomic and policy environment, which leads to theemergence of different social norms.
The view that “people are rational” and the view that “people’s behavior is influenced by culture and social
norms” are not necessarily mutually exclusive and it is quite possible for both views to hold simultaneously. Thisis because social norms are not fixed, change in response to changes in the socioeconomic and policy environment,
and have a basis in rationality. Indeed, Japan is an excellent example of this.

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Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
CanadaCzech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
FinlandFrance (gross)Germany
GreeceHungary
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
NorwayPortugal (gross)
Slovak Republic
Spain (gross except 2015)
SwedenSwitzerland
United Kingdom (gross)
United States
OECD Mean

Table 1: An International Comparison of Household Saving Rates (% )
1975
1995
14.9
7
5.3
17
9.9
11
12.7
8T
16.5
5
16.4
4
12.7
8
9.3
14
NA
3
8.1
15
7.1
14
0.2
23
NA
4.2
21T
5.7
15
4.2
21T
20.2
3
15.7
5
15.1
6
11.2
12
19.0
4
NA
NA
14.4
6
NA
NA
26.9
1
16.6
3
22.8
2
12.2
10
NA
18.5
1
NA
NA
3.9
18
14.3
7
NA
-3.5
24
4.2
17
4.9
20
NA
12.7
8T
NA
5.0
19
11.8
9
17.4
2
4.7
16
7.5
16
7.6
13
12.1
11
11.4
10
9.4
13
8.9
12
5.2
18
12.4
9.8

2015
8.9
8.7
4.0
4.1
5.5
-4.1
2.9
0.8
14.9
9.5
NA
9.0
6.9
3.8
2.4
7.2
17.3
8.5
3.4
8.4
7.6
3.9
2.9
15.8
17.8
4.3
4.9
6.9

7
8
18
17
14
26
22T
25
4
5
6
13
20
24
12
2
9
21
10
11
19
22T
3
1
16
15

Notes: The left-hand figure for each year shows the household saving rate, which was calculated as the ratio of householdsaving to household disposable income, while the right-hand figure for each year shows each country's rank among the OECDmember countries for which data are available. "NA" denotes "not available," and "T" denotes "tie." All saving rate figures arein net terms except for those marked "gross."
Data Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015) and earlier issues of same13

Table 2: An International Comparison of the Share of the Elderly Population (% )
1975
2000
2015
Country
Australia
8.7
19T
12.3
19T
18.6
19
Austria
14.9
2
15.6
10T
24.3
7
Belgium
13.9
5
17.0
4T
23.7
8
Canada
8.5
21
12.6
18
20.7
17T
Czech Republic
12.9
9
13.8
16
23.1
10
Denmark
13.4
8
15.0
13
22.5
11
Finland
10.6
15
14.9
14
25.2
5
France
13.5
7
16.0
7T
22.2
12
Germany
14.8
3
16.4
6
24.6
6
Hungary
12.6
10T
14.6
15
21.2
16
Ireland
11.0
13
11.3
22
16.3
23
Italy
12.0
12
18.1
1
25.7
3
Japan
7.9
22
17.2
3
28.9
1
South Korea
3.6
23
7.1
23
16.9
22
Netherlands
10.8
14
13.6
17
21.9
13T
New Zealand
8.7
19T
11.7
21
18.5
20T
Norway
13.7
6
15.4
12
21.8
15
Portugal
9.9
18
15.6
10T
20.7
17T
Spain
10.0
17
17.0
4T
23.6
9
Sweden
15.1
1
17.4
2
25.4
4
Switzerland
12.6
10T
16.0
7T
27.1
2
United Kingdom
14.0
4
15.8
9
21.9
13T
United States
10.5
16
12.3
19T
18.5
20T
OECD Mean
12.6
16.0
24.4
Notes: The left-hand figure for each year shows the share of the elderly (the population aged 65 andolder) in the total population, while the right-hand figure for each year shows the rank of eachcountry among the OECD member countries included in the table. "T" denotes "tie."
Data Source: United Nations (2013)14

Table 3: An International Comparison of Bequest Motives
The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
China
India
Japan
U.S.
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what
35.25
75.66
32.58
66.41
I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances because doing so
2.15
0.14
1.41
0.56
may reduce their will to work
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care (including nursing care)
10.10
11.49
4.06
2.08
during old age
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide financial assistance during old
5.17
5.95
0.70
0.63
age
I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but will leave whatever
37.03
3.84
58.58
28.54
is left overI do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances because I want to
2.80
0.54
1.62
1.52
use my wealth myself
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they carry on the family business
7.50
2.38
1.06
0.26
Total
100.00100.00100.00100.00
Number of observations
2071
1866
3696
3034
Notes: The figures show the proportion of respondents excluding those who did not respond to this question and those who replied that they want toleave a bequest to their child(ren) but won't because they don't have the financial capacity to do so.
Data Source: Preference Parameter Survey of Osaka University, 2012 survey except for rural China, for which the 2010 survey was used. The results forthe urban and rural surveys for China and India were weighted by the proportions of the urban and rural populations in each country (52/48 percent in
China and 32/68 percent in India). Adapted from Horioka (2014).

Table 4: An International Comparison of Bequest Division
The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
China
India
I plan to divide my inheritance equally among my children.
70.28
84.17
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who has less earning
6.42
0.04
capacity.
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who has greater needs.

1.95

0.13

Japan
72.67

U.S.
92.55

4.39

1.38

3.90

3.06

I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) whom I like more.
0.90
0.00
0.75
1.43
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who lives with me.
4.11
6.99
14.38
0.94
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who lives near me.
1.84
4.63
4.07
0.74
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who helps me with
2.09
1.96
4.49
0.69
housework.
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who provides nursing care.
11.60
5.63
12.82
0.54
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who provides financial
2.56
1.25
4.85
0.59
assistance.
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who carries on the family
4.25
0.41
5.04
0.10
business.
I plan to leave more or all to my eldest son or daughter even if he/she does
not live with me, does not live near me, does not help me with housework,
3.82
0.07
2.83
0.74
does not provide nursing care, does not provide financial assistance, anddoes not carry on the family business.
Total
105.92100.46108.08100.94
Number of observations
733
1780
3118
2457
Notes: The figures show the proportion of respondents excluding those who did not answer the question about bequest motives,
those who replied that they would not leave a bequest, and those who have zero or one child. Those who responded that theywould divide their bequest unequally but did not answer the follow-up question about bequest division were assumed to have thesame distribution of answers for the follow-up question as those who answered the follow-up question.
Data Source: Preference Parameter Survey of Osaka University, 2012 survey except for rural China, for which the 2010 survey wasused. The results for the urban and rural surveys for China and India were weighted by the proportions of the urban and rural
populations in each country (52/48 percent in China and 32/68 percent in India). Adapted from Horioka (2014).

15

Figure 1: Prewar Trends in Japan’s Household Saving Rate (%)

50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
‐10.0
LTES

OldSNA

Notes: The household saving rate was calculated as the ratio of household saving to household disposable income, where
household saving was calculated as private saving minus corporate saving. LTES denotes Long-term Economic Statistics, and
OldSNA denotes Old System of National Accounts.
Data Source: Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979), pp. 261-270.

16

Figure 2: Postwar Trends in Japan’s Household Saving Rate (%)

30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0

2012

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

1967

1964

1961

1958

1955

1952

1949

‐5.0

1946

0.0

‐10.0
OldSNA

68SNA(1990)

93SNA(2000)

93SNA(2005)

Notes: The household saving rate was calculated as the ratio of household saving to household disposable income. OldSNA
denotes Old System of National Accounts, 68SNA(1990) denotes the New 1968 System of National Accounts with abenchmark year of 1990, 93SNA(2000) denotes the New 1993 System of National Accounts with a benchmark year of 2000,
and 93SNA(2005) denotes the New 1993 System of National Accounts with a benchmark year of 2005.
Data Sources: Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979), pp. 261-270, for the OldSNA data for 1946-1950; Economic Planning Agency(1978) for the OldSNA data for 1951-76; Economic Planning Agency (2000) for the 68SNA(1990) data; Economic and Social
Research Institute (2011) for the 93SNA(2000) data; and Economic and Social Research Institute (2016) for the 93SNA(2005)
data.

17