Osaka-Rochester Workshop
on Alternatives-to-markets Design
Friday, March 27, 2020
13:00 - 14:15

Matías Núñez ​(Ecole Polytechnique)

A Solution to The Two-person Implementation Problem(with Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver)

Hiroki Shinozaki ​(Osaka University)

Efficient and Strategy-proof Multi-unit Object Allocation with Money:(Non)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Quasi-linearity(with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa)

Sean Horan​ (​Université de Montréal)Game Forms for Strategy-proof Divorce(with Yves Sprumont)

14:15 - 14:45

Break14:45 - 16:00

Ryosuke Sakai ​(Osaka University)

Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Priority-augmented Object Allocation Problem
with Discrete Payments(with Shigehiro Serizawa)
Andrew McKenzie​ (​Maastricht University)
Menu Mechanisms(with Yu Zhou)

Roberto Serrano​ ​(​Brown University)

Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies(with ​Takashi Kunimoto)
16:00 - 16:30

Break

16:30 - 17:20

Hervé Moulin​ ( University of Glasgow)
Guarantees in Fair Division

Saturday, March 28, 2020
9:00 - 10:15

Madhav Raghavan​ (​University of Lausanne)
Transparency in Centralised Allocation(with ​Rustamdjan Hakimov)William Phan ​(​North Carolina State University​)
Partitionable Choice Functions(with Umut Dur and Thayer Morrill)

Thayer Morrill ​( North Carolina State University)
Ranking Objects That Rank Back

10:15 - 10:45

Break10:45 - 12:00

Umut Dur ​(​North Carolina State University)

A Market Design Solution to Unfair Distribution of Teachers in Schools

Peter Troyan ​(University of Virginia)

School Choice with Asymmetric Information: Priority Design and The Curse of Acceptance(with Andrew Kloosterman)

M. Bumin Yenmez​ ​(​Boston College​)

Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves(with Tayfun S​ö​nmez)

12:00 - 13:10

Lunch

Saturday, March 28, 2020
13:10 - 14:00

Eric Maskin​ (​Harvard University)
Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda(with Partha Dasgupta)

14:00 - 14:15

Break

14:15 - 15:30

Yoichi Kasajima​ (Waseda University)
Improvement of Rural Hospitals and Its Welfare Consequences(with Takashi Akahoshi and Manabu Toda)

Maciej H. Kotowski​ ​(Harvard University)

A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems

Guillaume Haeringer​ (Baruch College)
High Frequency Fairness

15:30 - 16:00

Break

16:00 - 17:15

Patrick Harless​ (​University of Arizona)
Robust Revenue Sharing in Hierarchies

Hiroo Sasaki​ (Waseda University)
TBA

William S. ​Zwicker​ ​(Union College)

Envy Free Fair Division of Tangled Cakes and Envy Free Division of Graphs up to k Items(with Ayumi Igarashi)

17:15 - 17:45

Break

17:45 - 19:00

Samson Alva​ (University of Texas at San Antonio)
Combinatorial Choice with Graded Criteria

Jingyi Xue​ (​Singapore Management University)
Resource Allocation with Ambiguous Needs

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak​ (Copenhagen Business School)
Samples and Choices

Sunday, March 29, 2020
9:00 - 10:15

Vasilis Gkatzelis ​(​Drexel University)

A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching(with Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, and Jason D. Hartline)

Sylvia P​á​pai​ (Concordia University)

Fairness Comparisons of Strategyproof and Efficient Matching Rules(with Pooya Ghasvareh)

Vikram Manjunath​ (University of Ottawa)
Strategy-proof and Balanced Exchange of Indivisible Goods under Coarse Preferences(with Alexander Westkamp)

10:15 - 10:45

Break

10:45 - 12:00

Rodrigo A. Velez​ (​Texas A&M University)
Empirical Strategy-proofness(with Alexander L. Brown)

Yu Zhou​ (​Kyoto University)
Serial Vikrey Mechanisms(with Shigehiro Serizawa)

Shigehiro Serizawa​ (Osaka University)
Strategy-proof Multi-object Mechanism Design: Ex-post Revenue Maximization
with Non-quasilinear Preferences(with Tomoya Kazumura and Debasis Mishra)