Joint NGO Reportfor the Human Rights Committee
in response to the List of Issues
Prior to Reporting
CCPR/C/JP/QPR/7<PART 1>

submitted by Japan NGO Network for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ERD Net)
November 2020

Japan NGO Network for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ERD Net) is a
network of NGOs working for the elimination of racial discrimination in Japan. Since the launch of
networking in 2007, it has continually intervened the review of human rights situations of Japan by
the HR Committee, CERD and other UN human rights mechanisms.
Contact: International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR）
imadrjc@imadr.org

NGOs contributing to the Report
The International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR)
Japan Network towards Human Rights Legislation for Non-Japanese Nationals & Ethnic Minorities
Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ)
Human Rights Association for Korean Residents in Japan

Research-Action Institute for Ethnic Korean Residents (RAIK)
Korea NGO Center
Center for Minority Issues and Mission
Buraku Liberation League (BLL)
Association of Indigenous Peoples in the Ryukyus (AIPR)All Okinawa Council for Human Right (AOCHR)JNATIP Japan Network Against Trafficking In Persons
Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees
Kanagawa MINTOREN
Yokohama City Liaison Committee for Abolition of the Nationality Clause
Hyogo Association for Human Rights of Foreign Residents
National Network for the Total Abolition of the Pension Citizenship Clause(in random order)1

Joint NGO Report of ERD Net <PART 1>

Table of CONTENTS

reference

issue

page

LOIPR para 2

Ratification of the 1st Optional Protocol

3

LOIPR para 4

Establishment of national human rights institution

4

LOIPR para 5

Comprehensive law on anti-racial discrimination

6

LOIPR para 6

Hate speech

8

LOIPR para 6

Buraku discrimination

16

LOIPR para 10

Gender-based violence against migrant women18

LOIPR para 19

Trafficking in persons

20

LOIPR para 20

Technical intern training

24

LOIPR para 21

Treatment of aliens, including refugees and asylum seekers

27

LOIPR para 27

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty of a human rights defender in Okinawa

32

2

1. Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 2, constitutional and legal frameworks within which the Covenant
is implemented. (Article 2)
2. Issues: The government's reluctance to ratify the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant for the individual
communication procedure
3. Suggested recommendations:
1)State party is recommended to immediately ratify the First Optional Protocol.

2)

State party is recommended to identify obstacles that have stood in the course towards the ratificationand indicate possible solutions for the challenges.

4. Background:
3)

In February 1919, when the Covenant of the League of Nations was written in Versailles, theGovernment of Japan proposed the addition of a "clause on the elimination of racial discrimination"
to the draft Covenant without success. This attempt was made in the hope that discrimination
suffered by Japanese immigrants abroad would be eliminated.

4)

After World War II, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR) in 1948, and it was followed by the adoption of a series of human rights treaties, introducing
the monitoring system including the periodic reporting, review and individual communication
procedures. The Government of Japan, in response to the arrival of "Vietnamese Refugees" in 1975,
began ratifying a series of human rights treaties. It has so far ratified major eight human rights treaties
except the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families.

5)

The Government of Japan has ignored the repeated recommendations by treaty bodies to correct theissue of the exclusion of Korean schools from the High School Tuition Support Fund Program.1
There have been five court cases brought by local Korean high school authorities. Three out of five
have so far been dismissed by the Supreme Court. With no individual communication procedures
accepted by the State party, victims have lost means of bringing the case before justice.
report6)** See thepage about the exclusion of Korean High School from the Tuition Support Fund Program.

It has been more than 40 years since the Government of Japan ratified the ICCPR in 1979. As of
March 2020, 116 countries have ratified the First Optional Protocol. Since the Government replied
to the Committee that it was holding a "Study Group of Ministries and Agencies Related to theIndividual Communication Procedures", on July 10th, 2020, we requested for the disclosure of all
minutes of the study group's proceedings since the last review by the Committee in August 2014.
Initially, the Government answered that it would disclose the information by August 11th. However,it was partially postponed until September 8th while the rest was postponed until March 31st, 2021,
making it impossible for civil society to comment on the Government’s course of consideration.

5. Prepared by: Hiroshi Tanaka

1

CERD/C/JPN/CO/3-6, para 22(e), CERD/C/JPN/CO/7-9, para 19, CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11, para 22, CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5 para 39

3

1. Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 4, legal frameworks for the implementation of the Convention, Art
2
2. Issues: Reluctancy of the Government of Japan to establish a national human rights institution
3. Suggested recommendations:
1) State party is recommended to establish an independent national human rights institution (NHRI) in the full
conformity with the Paris Principles. In designing of an NHRI, it should be taken into consideration that it is
responsible to deal with human rights abuses committed by public figures including government officials andpoliticians.
2) Noting its acceptance of the recommendations to accelerate its efforts toward the establishment of an
independent national human rights institution in the 2017 Universal Periodic Review, the State party is urged toclarify the present situation and challenges it faces in regard to the establishment, address such challenges toaccelerate its efforts and make the information on such a process available to the public.
4. Background:
The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly recommended the State party to establish an independent national
human rights institution (NHRI) in its concluding observations in 1998 (CCPR/C/79/Add.102. para 9), in 2008
(CCPR/C/JPN/5, para 9) and in 2014 (CCPR/C/JPN/6, para 7). Nevertheless, the State party has not made any
significant progress toward the establishment since November 2012 when the bill to establish a NHRI was
scrapped due to the dissolution of the Lower House. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination(CERD) also recommended the same in its 2018 concluding observations (CERD/C/JPN/10-11, para 12) anddesignated the paragraph 12 as a one-year follow-up recommendation. During its 101st session in August 2020,
the CERD considered the follow-up report of Japan and concluded its evaluation by stating, “an appropriate
action has not been taken to implement its recommendation, and (it) considers that the response of the State
party is not satisfactory.”
In its report to the Human Rights Committee under the LOIPR (CCPR/C/JPN/7), the State party explains, “theGovernment continues to conduct an appropriate review of the framework for a human rights remedy system,
while bearing in mind the discussions conducted thus far.” However, no information about the discussions havebeen made public, nor any specific reply has been made to inquiries about the progress from civil society
organizations.
In 2016, Japan enacted the Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech andBehaviour against Persons Originating from Outside Japan (Act for the Elimination of Hate Speech) and the
Act on the Promotion of Elimination of Buraku Discrimination. Both Acts do not contain a sanction clause but
place educational efforts at the center of the Acts. Essentially, these educational efforts should have been
assumed by a NHRI.

4

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted minority communities as well as the general public causing a certain
degree of constraint in their practice of the rights concerning travel, freedom of assembly or freedom of
expression. Under a pandemic-like situation, a NHRI is expected to perform important functions including
monitoring impact on human rights, reporting and advice to the government accordingly and making a necessaryintervention. Without a NHRI, no adequate monitoring and evaluation of an impact of the pandemic on humanrights have been made, thus failing to share it with the Committee.
5. Prepared by: International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR)

5

1． Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 5, Non-Discrimination, COs para 11 (CCPR /C/JPN/CO/6)
and Articles 2 and 26
2. Issues: No comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation and comprehensive policy to eliminate racial
discrimination
1) Facts about discrimination against foreigners in JapanThe Government of Japan (hereafter the Government) stated in its periodic report to the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) of 2017 (para 101, CERD/C/JPN/10-11) that “Japan regulates
racial discrimination, and we do not recognize that it must adopt a comprehensive legislation prohibiting racial
discrimination as the concluding observations urge.”
Meanwhile, the Analytical Report of Foreign Residents Survey, the first official survey done in 2016 in the
country, indicates that for the past five years 40 percent of respondents had experienced discrimination whenseeking to rent housing, 25 percent had experienced discrimination in employment and 30 percent had
experienced personal contempt. The survey conducted by the Government clearly demonstrates the prevalenceof serious discrimination against foreigners threatening their life and safety and the disfunction of existing
regulations on discrimination.
Besides discrimination in the private sphere, it also exists in the public sphere. Foreign nationals are noteligible to be public officials at the national level. At the local level, many local governments have a nationality
clause to exclude foreign nationals in their employment practices. If not, those local governments that employ
foreign nationals still do not permit them to be promoted to managerial positions. In the education sector, foreignschools or ethnic schools are not recognized as regular schools, and among them, the Government strictly keeps
its position to exclude Korean schools from any public assistance. In addition, a similar exclusive attitude ispresent in the national pension scheme, medical care system, and life assistance system, showing grave
discrimination by the State and in society.
2) Absence of a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, in particular anti-racial discrimination legislation
Despite the recommendation made by the Human Rights Committee under the para 11 of its concluding
observations of 2014, Japan has still failed to adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation thatprohibits direct, indirect and intersectional discrimination including in the private sector.
The State party has been slow in addressing discrimination based on nationality or ethnicity. While it accededto the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1995, it
has not yet developed a policy or plan to eliminate discrimination, neither comprehensive nor basic. It does nothave any bureau or section that is specifically responsible to work for the elimination of discrimination. It has
no specific legislation to prohibit discrimination.
In response to the paragraph 5 of LOIPR, the Government referred to several laws that aim to eliminate
discrimination under the Constitution. However, the Constitution is an abstract norm to bind the State, and not
applicable to discrimination in the private sector. While Article 3 of the Labor Standard Act prohibits
discriminatory treatment in working conditions on the grounds of nationality, belief or social status, its grounds
and applicable areas are very limited, thus this particular article has rarely been used with few judicial precedents.

6

The Basic Act on Education stipulates the basic national policies, and it includes no clause to prohibit
discrimination.
At the national level, the Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech andBehavior against Persons Originating from Outside Japan (or “Hate Speech Elimination Act”) was adopted in2016. However, with no clause to prohibit hate speech, the Act just remains as a basic law to declare its
commitment to work for the elimination of hate speech both at the national and local levels. It is hard to consider
it as a law to ban discrimination.
Japan has repeatedly been recommended to adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation by UN
treaty bodies including CEDAW in 2016 (CEDAW/C/JPN/O/7-8, paras 12 and 13), CERD in 2018
(CERD/C/JPN/ CO10-11, paras 7 and 8) , and CRC in 2019 (CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5, paras 17 and 18(a)). At the
Universal Periodic Review of Japan in 2017, 9 Member States recommended for the adoption of acomprehensive anti-discrimination legislation (A/HRC/37/15).
3. Suggested recommendations:
State party is recommended to immediately adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislature that defines
direct, indirect and multiple forms of discrimination, and establishes an independent institution to provide anaccessible remedy to victims of discrimination.
4. Backgrounds:
Japan has failed to properly make apology and compensation for what it has done during the colonial ruleand occupation of Korea which were ended by the defeat of Japan in the Second World War in 1945. Rather, it
took away the Japanese nationality without any choice from those Korean people who had resided in Japan till
the war-end. Korean people were then imposed to carry an alien registration document with them all the time toenable the authorities to easily monitor them. They were also excluded from public programs such as medical
insurance, pension scheme, public housing, education and employment in government offices. Through thecontinued struggle by Korean residents, they have partially won their rights step by step, but discrimination still
remains in the public sphere.
In 2002, Japan and the DPRK had the summit meeting. The state head of DPRK officially admitted the
kidnapping of Japanese and made an apology. Since then, the Government and mass media started the extensive
Korean bushing, contributing to create the general atmosphere that Koreans were not trustable or they had toaccept anything said against them. This still continues today.
The Second Abe Administration formed in December 2012 declared the exclusion of Korean high school
students from the tuition waiver program two days after its cabinet was created. This constitutes a systemic
discrimination. Taking advantage of the Government attitude and discriminatory policies, racist groups havebeen activated in the private sphere.
5. Prepared by: Japan Network towards Human Rights Legislation for Non-Japanese Nationals & Ethnic
Minorities

71. Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 6 on the hate speech, para 12 of CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6 and
ICCPR articles 2, 20 and 26
2. Issues: “Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech and Behaviour
against Persons Originating from Outside Japan” (so-called “Hate Speech Elimination Act”) is noteffective in addressing hate speech and hate crimes in Japan
3. Suggested recommendations:-

State party should prohibit hate speech by law including those against unspecified groups. Serious
and grave cases of hate speech such as inciting genocide should be prohibited with criminal sanctions.

-

State party should develop legislation to address hate crimes, to set up a specific body dealing with
the issue, to carry out comprehensive survey and research, and to reform legislation so that crimes
committed with racially discriminatory motives are dealt with as hate crimes.

-

State party should promptly conduct a study to grasp an actual situation of hate speech in the internet
and adopt a comprehensive legislation to deal with the hate speech in the internet including the speedy
provision of remedies to the victims.

-

State party should consult representatives of the media, publishers and internet providers, andencourage them to take concrete and effective measures against hate speech including self-regulation.

-

State party, as well as local authorities, should promptly and publicly condemn serious cases of hatespeech and hate crimes as soon as they occur.

-

The police should set up a specific team dealing with hate speech, conduct thorough andcomprehensive training among all officers on how to address hate speech, stop excessive protectionof hate demonstration participants and excessive guard against counter demonstration participants,
provide remedial measures for victims of hate speech and hate crimes, and rigorously deal with theperpetrators of hate speech if any criminal acts are involved.

-

State party should, in order to eliminate hate speech, and based on the views of minority
representatives and experts dealing with the issue of discrimination, develop and implement a
concrete plan of education for the elimination of racial discrimination, including the history and actual
situation of racial discrimination as well as related international standards.

-

State party should, instead of general human rights training, conduct more specific and comprehensive
training for all public servants, including judges, public prosecutors, and officers at the immigration
bureau, in order to appropriately understand the issue of racial discrimination including hate speechand hate crime as well as the international human rights standards addressing them, and to effectively
deal with actual cases of discrimination.

4.The current situation of hate speech (paragraph 6 first question):
1) Hate demonstration / street propaganda
From 2000s, with the development of the Internet, anonymous hate speech in Japan has significantly
increased. In January 2007, a racist group named “Citizens’ group not allowing the privileges of ethnic
Korean residents in Japan (so called “ZAITOKUKAI” in Japanese)” was formed by several individuals
gathered through the Internet. They have increased their supporters mainly through repeated hate8

demonstrations, street propaganda and meetings as well as uploading the videos of these activities on theInternet. According to the first survey on hate speech carried out by the Government of Japan in autumn 2015,
there were in total 1152 hate demonstrations and street propaganda activities in the period of three and a halfyears from April 2012 to September 2015 (among which the number of hate demonstration was around 100),
one case per day on average.1
In June 2016, “The Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech andBehavior against Persons Originating from Outside Japan” (hereafter the Hate Speech Elimination Act) 2,
was enacted and the number of hate demonstrations decreased to 21 in 2019. However, there were still 211
cases of street hate propaganda which has not decreased much. As to the character of the speech and behaviourof the perpetrators, the clear case of such acts as defined by the Hate Speech Elimination Act (1. Threat, 2.
Salient insult, 3. Exclusion) has decreased but is still continuing.
For example, below are some cases of hate speech in 2019 in Tokyo officially registered as such inaccordance with Article 12 of the “Ordinance of Tokyo for the realization of the principle of respect forhuman rights in line with the Olympic Charter” (enacted in April 2019) 3:-

20 May 2019: Street propaganda activity using loudspeakers in Nerima ward, containing phrases suchas “Throw Koreans into Tokyo Bay” and “Kick out Koreans from Japan, beat them to death”-

16 June 2019: A demonstration in Taito ward, using phrases such as “Kick out Koreans”-

15 September 2019: A demonstration in Sumida ward, using phrases such as “No benefit but harm
having anti-Japan ethnic Korean residents, go back to Korea”, “Criminal Koreans go out from Japan”,
and “Kick out Koreans from Japan who continue limitless harassment to Japan”-

27 October 2019: A demonstration over Chiyoda, Bunkyo and Taito wards, using phrases such as“Kick out Koreans” and “Cockroach Koreans, go back to Korea”-

3 November 2019: Street propaganda using phrases such as “garbage, cockroach, fake human being
Koreans are staying, it must be prohibited” and “Want to massacre all ethnic Korean residents inJapan with gas chamber”

2) Racist groups becoming a political party
The founder of the “Zaitokukai” has stood as a candidate for the election of the governor of Tokyo in July
2016. Although his candidacy failed, he has obtained around 113,000 votes (1.7% of votes). In October in thesame year, he founded “The Japan First Party”. In July 2020, he stood again as a candidate from this party
for the election of the governor of Tokyo and obtained 178,000 votes.
Not only “Zaitokukai”, but also other racist groups have carried out hate speech activities in the name of“election campaign” and some of their members became members of a ward assembly such as in Katsushika
ward, Tokyo.
3) Hate speech by public figures

1

Japan's first-ever hate speech probe finds rallies are fewer but still a problem (the Japan Times, MAR 30, 2016),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/30/national/japans-first-ever-hate-speech-probe-finds-rallies-arefewer-but-still-a-problem/2

http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001199550.pdf

3

2 anti-Korean rallies 1st to run afoul of Tokyo hate speech rule (The Asahi Shimbun, October 18, 2019)http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13059690

9

Hate speech by public figures are also continuing. For example, Taro Aso, the Deputy Prime Minister ofJapan, has made comments such as: “Results matters (in politics). So it was failure of Hitler to kill millions,although his motive was right” in August 2017;4 “it might be armed refugees. Deploy police force, or selfdefence force. Shoot them dead. We have to seriously think about it” regarding the possibility that refugees
from Korean Peninsula might come to Japan in September 2017;5 “it is only this country, where for two
thousand years, only one place, one language, one ethnicity, one dynasty of the emperor continues. It’s sucha good country” in January 2020; and calling the novel coronavirus as “Wuhan virus” in March 2020.
However, despite these public comments made by him, no action was taken by the then Prime Minister,Shinzo Abe, or the Justice Minister, and he remains as the Deputy Prime Minister until today under new Sugaadministration.
4) Hate speech in the media/publications
Incitement to discrimination against Koreans, ethnic Korean residents and Chinese in TV, newspapers andpublications has become more common. A number of anti-Korean and anti-Chinese books are sold atbookstores and the advertisement of weekly tabloid magazines in trains are flooded with headings inciting
discrimination. For example, a book named “The tragedy of Chinese and Koreans controlled by Confucianism”
written by Kent Gilbert and produced by a major publisher sold more than 400,000 copies, despite its
discriminatory content saying “Chinese and Koreans are liar and selfish”. In September 2019, a weekly
magazine called “Weekly Post” (major publisher, a circulation of around 400,000 copies) made a special
feature titled “We don’t need Korea” which contained several articles such as the one named “Pathology of
Koreans who cannot control their anger”. 65) Hate speech on the Internet
The Internet is flooded by anonymous hate speech. In 2017, there were more than 45 million twitter users
in Japan, where the daily and massive amount of anonymous hate speech against minority groups andindividuals is affluent which is causing a quite serious impact.7
In July 2015, the server of the Immigration Bureau of Japan went down due to the large number ofanonymous reports through emails that informed about whereabouts of ethnic Korean residents. Senders were
urged by a fake news that ethnic Korean residents would be deprived of their residential status and deported.
When a disaster, accident or other incident occurs, discriminatory false rumour is almost always circulated
via twitter that Koreans or Chinese are the perpetrators, or they are committing crimes taking advantage of
those incidents.
At the time of the Great East Japan earthquake in 2011, discriminatory rumours such as the one that
affected places were infested with gangs of Chinese thieves were circulated in the social media. It was
4Japanese minister Taro Aso praises Hitler, saying he had 'right motives' (the Guardian, 30 August, 2017)https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/30/japan-minister-tara-aso-praises-hitler-right-motives
5
Aso asks whether SDF should shoot North Korean refugees fleeing hypothetical Korean contingency (the Japan
Times, 24 September 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/24/national/politics-diplomacy/aso-askswhether-sdf-shoot-north-korean-refugees-fleeing-hypothetical-korean-contingency/
6

Editorial: Japanese weekly magazine's anti-S. Korea feature totally out of order (The Mainichi,
September 4, 2019) https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190904/p2a/00m/0na/010000c
7
Twitter Japan is Not a Safe Space for Minority Users (Adbox, 15 December 2017 )https://advox.globalvoices.org/2017/12/15/twitter-japan-is-not-a-safe-space-for-minority-users/

10

reported by some researchers that about 90% of the people who obtained that information actually believed
it.8
The survey on foreign residents in Japan carried out by the Ministry of Justice in 2016 revealed that 40%
of foreign residents, who regularly use the internet, have seen cases of hate speech there, and that among
them, 19.8% have reduced the internet usage due to the widespread hate speech. Of them, 47.8% were Korean,
and 38.8% were R.O. Korean.96) Posters on the street
Following the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, it was reported that posters were hung by restaurants,
barbers, souvenir shops or other shops saying “No Chinese Allowed”. 10
Shortcomings of the “Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech
and Behaviour against Persons Originating from Outside Japan” (Hate Speech Elimination Act)(para 6 second question)
The Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech and Behaviour against
Persons Originating from Outside Japan” (Hate Speech Elimination Act) does not have any provision toprohibit or punish acts of hate speech. As such, the Act is totally ineffective to stop acts of hate speech,
including the cases that clearly fall within the acts listed in article 2 of the Act.
Moreover, the Act only targets “persons originating from outside Japan” who have valid residential status.
The Act does not set out any policy direction and plan or framework for concrete actions to be taken toeliminate hate speech. No reference is made with regard to a regular survey, appointment of a department incharge, training of public servants, setting up of expert bodies, budget framework etc.
In August 2018, the delegation of Japan before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) stated that effectiveness of the Act, with only two years’ implementation, could not
be measured then. Now with more than 4 years passed since the enactment, the Act has made only quite
limited impact on the situation indicating an absolute necessity to revise or replace with a new legislation.
1) Current status of “Hate Speech Prohibition Act”
At the national level, there is still no law that prohibits incitement to discrimination.
Several local authorities adopted ordinances that prohibit discriminatory behaviour, but until recently no
ordinances had a criminal sanction.
After the enactment of the “Hate Speech Elimination Act”, Kawasaki city, Kanagawa prefecture, has
strengthened educational and awareness raising measures for the purpose of elimination of discrimination
including hate speech. However, as hate propaganda activities did not stop, in December 2019, the city
adopted an ordinance named “Kawasaki City Ordinance for development of human rights based city without

8

Rumours after 2011 Japan earthquake pinned blame on Chinese, Koreans for crimes that didn’t happen (The South
China Morning Post, March 17, 2017) http://www.scmp.com/print/news/asia/east-asia/article/2079137/rumoursafter-2011-japan-earthquake-pinned-blame-chinese-koreans
9Ref. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/JPN/INT_CERD_AIS_JPN_30363_E.pdf,
p.49, 2.5.2 Use of the Internet (Survey Question 3-2)
10
‘No Chinese allowed’: Japanese shop criticised for coronavirus sign (the Week in Asia, 22 Jan, 2020)
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3047144/no-chinese-allowed-japanese-shopcriticised

11

discrimination” that for the first time in Japan, had criminal sanctions (up to 500,000 JPY fine) on malicious
cases of hate speech in public space 11.
In the 7th periodic report of Japan (CCPR/C/JPN/7), para 23, it was argued as if current law is sufficient
to deal with acts of racial discrimination, but this is misleading. Some discriminatory treatment of specificindividuals or groups, such as rejecting to provide services or employment, or to rent rooms based on ethnicity
or nationality, are deemed illegal under the general provision of the civil law and compensation for damage
can be claimed. However, even in such cases, civil court case is the only option, due to the lack of specificlegislation prohibiting discrimination, and the victim carries the burden of proof with regard to the violationof their rights. In such a case, it usually takes 2 years for the first hearing and 3 to 4 years for the second andfinal hearing, with costs of several hundred thousand yen including the fee for the lawyer. Such trials are
public and the victims usually have to face further attacks by the perpetrators. Because of all these factors,
many victims do not dare to bring the case to the court and are left without any remedies. For example,
although almost half of the foreign nationals in Japan are experiencing discrimination when renting rooms,
only few cases were actually brought to the court in the last 70 years.
If acts of discrimination include cases of criminal intimidation or forcible obstruction of business, thevictim can use the penal code to lodge a complaint, but only the public prosecutors can indict the perpetrator
and the prosecutors are usually quite reluctant to take up cases of discrimination.
There is no law that prohibits or illegalises discrimination against a group of unidentified individuals, andtherefore, currently no legal responsibility is carried by those who organise or participate in hatedemonstrations calling for massacre of a certain ethnic group. As such, shop owners putting posters saying“no foreigners allowed” are not treated as violators of rights, thus regarded as legal as there is no law thatillegalises this kind of act.
2) Restriction on Hate Demonstrations
Currently there is no law that directly restricts hate demonstrations, nor that illegalises or criminalises
hate speech.
Previously, the police were rather protecting the organisers and participants of hate demonstrations,whereby arresting more participants in the counter demonstrations than the ones in hate demonstrations. Afterthe enactment of the Hate Speech Elimination Act, the police have started giving instructions not to engage
in acts of hate speech, when notification of a demonstration is submitted, or on site of the demonstration.
However, hate demonstration itself is still legal, and every time it happens, the police deploy a large number
of officers, several times more than those participating in hate demonstrations, who accompany the hatedemonstration and protect the participants from the participants in counter demonstrations.
At the same time, as referred in above, Kawasaki City has, for the first time as a local authority, made an
ordinance that prohibits hate speech with punishment. The target of prohibition is limited to three types ofmost serious and obvious expression among others that are included in the Hate Speech Elimination Act, andif these types of hate speech are carried out three times, even after warning orders by the mayor, the mayor
will lodge a criminal complaint.

11

EDITORIAL: Ordinance on hate speech welcome but needs monitoring (Asahi Shimbun, December 13, 2019)http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13055700

123) Survey by the national authority
After the enactment of the Hate Speech Elimination Act, several civil society organisations haverepeatedly requested the Government of Japan to conduct a new survey on the actual situation, but so far theGovernment rejected for the reasons of the lack of budget. It is absolutely needed to examine the exact impactof the Hate Speech Elimination Act while cases of hate speech continue even after more than four years since
its enactment.
4) Education / Awareness raising
The national education curriculum does not have any item on the elimination of racial discrimination.
Currently, nothing is taught at school about minorities in Japan, their history, language or culture, or cases of
discrimination against them (CCPR/C/JPN/7, para 29).
The awareness raising campaign of the Ministry of Justice is nothing more than merely conveying amessage “Don’t allow hate speech” in general. Civil society organisations have requested the Ministry thatsuch message should be sent out to specific cases, for example, when groundless discriminatory accusations
are made after a disaster saying that “Koreans are the perpetrator”. However, the Ministry remains silent,
whereby avoiding to specify cases, and therefore the impact of the campaign remains quite minimum(CCPR/C/JPN/7, para 30).
No specific training is carried out for public prosecutors, judges or police officers regarding racial
discrimination in Japan including hate speech in general, or training to increase their capacity to identify casesof discrimination. There are still many police officers who are deployed at the site of hate demonstrations but
do not know anything about the Hate Speech Elimination Act.
Civil society organisations have been asking the government about what kind of trainings are carried out
with regard to hate speech, and what kind of programme, materials and trainers are provided. However, noanswer has been given so far (CCPR/C/JPN/7, paras. 31-32).
5) Hate crime
Current law in Japan does not have any concept or system addressing hate crimes. There is no specificbody, no survey or research conducted, and no measures are taken for education and awareness raising, thus
the issue of hate crimes is completely unaddressed.
The Government of Japan is arguing (CCPR/C/JPN/7, para 33) that racially discriminatory motives canbe considered as an aggravative factor when assessing the case and it is “given due consideration”, but thisargument is almost equal to a deception. As actually explained by the Government of Japan itself(CCPR/C/JPN/7, para 34), the concept of hate crime is not established and “the government does not haveany statistics on the number of hate crimes or the subsequent investigations and convictions”, therefore there
is no ground at all for the argument that racially discriminatory motives are actually given due consideration.
Even the cases, in which racially discriminatory motivation is recognised by civil courts, are rarely given due
consideration to such motivation in the criminal trials, not resulting in the increase of sentences.
The situation of hate crimes, concerning its content as well as the number, has been deteriorating. Below
are cases reported after the last review of Japan by the Human Rights Committee in 2014.

13

In March 2015, an arsonist, who set fire on the Korean Cultural Center in Tokyo and other threelocations12, was sentenced to 2 year imprisonment by the Tokyo district court in November same year for thecrimes of causing damages to buildings, destruction of properties, and intrusion into buildings. The court
stated that “any negative feelings towards specific country or nationals of that country cannot be expressedin a form of indiscriminate arson”.
In July 2016, a person, who put fliers with discriminatory content against ethnic Korean residents in Japanin several locations such as toilets in department stores in Fukuoka prefecture, was sentenced to 1 year
imprisonment with suspended sentence of 3 years for the crime of intrusion into buildings by the Fukuoka
district court.
In May 2017, an arsonist, who put fire on a credit union of Korean origin in Nagoya, Aichi prefecture
because of his frustration over the attitude of the South Korean government towards the issue of “comfort
women”, was convicted.
In February 2018, two right wing activists, who have been carrying out numbers of hate demonstrations
and street propaganda activities against ethnic Korean residents in Japan, drove to the headquarters of theGeneral Association of Korean Residents and shot five bullets into its front gate 13. The two men were arrested
and in August same year, sentenced to 8 to 7 years imprisonment respectively for the crime of a violation of
the Firearms and Sword Possession Law.
In May 2018, a man, who has been harassing an ethnic Korean woman, whose name was reported by the
media as one of the persons protesting against hate demonstrations against ethnic Korean residents, for 21
months through discriminatory tweets every week, was turned over to the office of Yokohama district publicprosecutor’s office in Kawasaki city, charged with the crime of intimidation. However, in February 2019, theprosecution decided not to indict him. The victim has lodged another complaint for the violation of Kanagawa
prefectural ordinance for the Prevention of Nuisance. In December 2019, the perpetrator was indicted and thesummary court ordered him to pay the fine of 300,000 JPY 14.
In June 2018, more than 50 properties owned by Kawasaki city such as benches were covered bydiscriminatory graffities against ethnic Korean residents. It was investigated as a crime of damage toproperties, but no one is arrested.
In December 2018, the perpetrator of discriminatory blog posts against an ethnic Korean junior highschool student in Kawasaki city was indicted for the crime of contempt and fined with 9,000 JPY (summaryorder).
In January 2019, two perpetrators of discriminatory posting against an ethnic Korean company in Okinawa
were fined with 100,000 JPY (summary order) for defamation.
In July 2019, a letter saying “go out from Japan” with bullets were posted to the embassy of South Korea
in Tokyo, but no perpetrator is identified.

12

Arson attempted at Tokyo Korea Cultural Center (the Korean Herald, Mar 26, 2015)
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150326001044
13
Japanese police arrest 2 men suspected of shooting up a pro-North Korean compound (BUSINESS INSIDE, 23
FEBURARY 2018) https://www.businessinsider.com/japanese-police-arrest-2-suspected-of-shooting-pro-northkorean-compound-2018-2
14Man, 51, fined for racist tweets against ethnic Korean woman(The Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2029,
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13056030)

14

In November 2019, the former senior member of “Zaitokukai” was fined 500,000 JPY for the crime ofdefamation concerning a discriminatory street propaganda activity in front of a Korean school in Kyoto 15.
In January 2020, several threats such as “massacre of ethnic Korean residents” and “explosion of the
facility” were sent to a public facility in Kawasaki city aimed for cultural exchanges between Japanese andforeign residents16. The perpetrator was arrested in July 2020.
In February 2020, a person, who put a number of fliers on electric polls in Kyoto saying “infected Chinese,
don’t come to Japan”, was arrested for the violation of Kyoto City Ordinance on Public Space Advertisement.
In March 2020, letters saying “Chinese are germs, garbage, devil” were sent to several shops in China
Town in Yokohama. Perpetrator is not identified17.
There are a number of cases of hate crimes that do not result in arrest of perpetrators or trials. For example,
since 2002, students of Korean schools have increasingly stopped wearing their ethnic school uniforms
outside the school from the fear of being a target of hate speech and hate crimes. Cases of physical assault or
bodily injury were reported by Korean students to the police, but few resulted in arrest of perpetrators.
Ethnic Korean residents, especially women, who protest against hate speech are often facing a large
number of intimidations, defamation and contempt, in both online and offline. However, even whencomplaints are lodged on those cases, the police are reluctant to take any action and almost all victims haveto drop the matter after all. Many have stopped using the internet.
5. Prepared by Japan Network towards Human Rights Legislation for Non-Japanese Nationals & Ethnic
Minorities

15

Former senior member of Zaitokukai fined ¥500,000, but escapes prison term over anti-Korean hate speech (theJapan Times, November 30, 2019) https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/30/national/crime-legal/zaitokukaifine-prison-anti-korea-hate-speech/16
New Year's card threatening to 'massacre' Korean residents sent to Kawasaki facility (the Mainichi, January 24,2020), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20200124/p2a/00m/0na/011000c
17
Racist letters sent to Yokohama Chinatown restaurants amid Japan coronavirus fears (the Mainichi, March 7,2020), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20200307/p2a/00m/0na/004000c

151. Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 6, Non-discrimination and prohibition of advocacy ofnational, racial or religious hatred (arts. 2, 20 and 26)
2. Issues: Elimination of Buraku discrimination
3.

Suggested recommendations:

1) State party is recommended to revise the Act on the Promotion of the Elimination of Buraku Discrimination
to include provisions that prohibit discrimination and provide punishment for the act of discrimination
2) State party is recommended to recognise that Buraku discrimination is based on descent.
3) State party is recommended to take all measures to solve the Buraku problem including through provisionof sufficient budget, improvement of consultation service at local authorities, and increasing the quality ofeducation and awareness raising measures.
4. Background:1) Based on the Act on the Promotion of the Elimination of Buraku Discrimination, article 6, the Governmentof Japan has carried out a study on the actual situation of Buraku discrimination, for which an outcome report
was published in 2020. The report in its conclusion points out that “[a]lthough certain progress is made in the
promotion of correct understanding among population about Buraku discrimination, prejudice anddiscriminatory attitude still remains. There is a possibility that these prejudice and attitude are contributing to
the discrimination in marriage and relationship. Furthermore, one of the characteristics of the increasing
discrimination in the Internet is that certain websites are focusing on the provision of information that assist
identification of Buraku people, including location of Buraku districts, as well as slanders and libels against
them.” Perpetrators are knowingly committing these acts of discrimination and ignoring the government’s
request for the deletion of such information from the websites, and therefore any educational or awarenessraising measures are ineffective against them. The only way that is currently available and possible for thevictims to address the issue is to file a case and go through court procedure. However, it requires a lot of timeand costs, whereby the victims have to bear heavy burden and psychological suffering. Therefore, provisions
that prohibit discrimination and set out punishment are necessary.
2) It is the first time that the Government of Japan officially used the term “the Dowa Issue (discrimination
against the Burakumin)” (CCPR/C/JPN/7, para 19). So far, the government has failed to clearly define who the
Burakumin is. However, in the outcome report of the abovementioned study provides a definition of Buraku
discrimination as “Dowa issue is a human rights problem particular in our country, whereby a particular groupof Japanese nationals have been, for a long time, forced to be in a economically and socially inferior position
due to the class discrimination system established in the historical process in Japanese society and discriminatedagainst in daily life, e.g. at the time of employment or marriage, because of the fact that they are from Dowa
districts, where Buraku people were forced to reside”. Therefore, it is clearly a form of discrimination based ondescent and should be properly and officially recognised as such by the Government of Japan.

163) Articles 4 and 5 of the Act on the Promotion of the Elimination of Buraku Discrimination deals with
consulting services, education and awareness raising. The report of the abovementioned study made it clear that
consulting services provided by the national government are not really functioning but majority of the services
are provided by local authorities/ municipalities. Similarly, with regard to the educational and awareness raisingmeasures, much more efforts are made by local authorities/ municipalities than the national government.
Provision of specific budget to local authorities/ municipalities was stopped after the completion of the special
measures act in 2002, and the municipalities are facing financial difficulties. Therefore, the Government ofJapan should provide sufficient budget, build capacity of officers of the local authorities who provide consulting
services, and increase the quality of education and awareness raising measures in order to comprehensively
eliminate Buraku discrimination.
5．Prepared by: Buraku Liberation League

17

1. Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 10, gender-based violence and domestic violence
Articles 2, 3, 24, and 26
2. Issues: The absence of protective/assistive measures for minority women (including migrant women)
domestic violence victims and residence status (visa) guarantees
3. Suggested Recommendations:➢➢

The State party is recommended to conduct national-level research/investigations into the current
realities of domestic violence against minority women including migrant women, and implement
protective and assistive measures based on those results.
The State party is recommended to revise the system that gives rise to the precarious residence status(visa) standings of migrant women (including the procedures to revoke a spouse’s [e.g., a victim ofdomestic violence] residence status stipulated in Section I, Article 22-4 of the Immigration ControlAct) so that migrant women domestic violence victims can escape and receive public protection andassistance.

4. The Current Situation (after the previous concluding observations (CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6) in August
2014)
In the previous concluding observations, regarding violence and domestic violence against minorities
such as migrant women and same-sex couples, it was recommended that the realities-on-the-ground be
fully investigated, and that there be improved access to necessary protections for victims including theguarantee of residence status to migrant women victims (Para. 10 CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6 ).
However, since August 2014, such investigations necessary for drafting measures for domestic
violence and violence against minority women including migrant women, have not even been
conducted/publicized, and no new measures have been taken to address violence against migrant women.
It is known that due to their vulnerabilities, minority women including migrant women are subject tohigh risks of violence. Even in Japan, when looking at data on the number of people receiving temporary
protection from domestic violence as well as the population ratio of foreign national women to Japanesenational women, it has become clear that migrant women are given protection at close to five times therate of Japanese national women. Although the Act on the Prevention of Spousal Violence and theProtection of Victims claims to “respect their [victims’] human rights regardless of their nationality”(Article 23[1]), no national minimum standard exists on concrete policy measures to realize this. Evenfunding for the provision of basic assistance such as language interpretation is not guaranteed by thenational government and is left up to the efforts of individual local governments, and with the exceptionof a portion of progressive localities, the implementation of assistive measures for migrant women
victims has been lagging.
Following the concluding observations (CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6) of 2014 regarding the guarantee ofresidence status to migrant women domestic violence victims, the same recommendation has been echoedby CEDAW (CEDAW/ C/JPN/CO/7-8) and CERD ( CERD/C/JPN/CO/7-9 and CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11).
In particular, in its 2014 Concluding Observations (CERD/C/JPN/CO/7-9), CERD specifically noted
its concern over the impact that the procedures allowed under the revised Immigration Control Act torevoke a spouse’s residence status would have on women who are subject to domestic violence, andissued a recommendation for improvement, stating that it “is particularly concerned that, under theprovisions of the revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act of 2012, the authorities may
revoke the residence status of foreign women who have been married to a Japanese national or a foreignerwith a permanent residency status if such foreign women ‘fail to continue to engage in activities as spouse
while residing in Japan for more than six months’, as provided under Section I, Article 22 -4 of the
Immigration Control Act” (para. 17).
The problem with procedures allowing for the revocation of a spouse’s residence status is that –despite the limited actual cases of such revocations (19 cases in in 2017; 24 cases in 2018) – the mere18

possibility itself places fear in the hearts of the many migrant women who reside with a residence status
for a spouse of a Japanese national or a permanent resident and are at risk of being subject to such
revocations, and gives rise to hesitation to escape from the harms of domestic violence, thereby further
compounding their suffering.
Moreover, the Japanese government has stated that domestic violence victims are exempt from thisresidence status revocation procedure, but notices about this exemption have not been circulated among
those who need this information. In addition, it is difficult for these individuals to explain their situations
to immigration authorities. Therefore, NGOs report cases in which a victim’s residence status was
revoked even though the individual was married, had suffered domestic violence, and was abandoned.
Although this revocation procedure requires that authorities conduct hearings on the affected individual’sviews prior to revocation, information on how these hearings are conducted has not been disclosed at all.
Additionally, in recent years, there has been a rapid increase in reports concerning cases in which the
spouses and children of migrants who enter Japan with work-related residence statuses (i.e., visas), enter
Japan with a “dependent” residence status, and while living in Japan, are subject to domestic violence by
their spouses (number of registered foreign nationals with the “dependent” residence status: 201,423[December 2019, Ministry of Justice figures]). However, even if one is subject to domestic violence
because of the precarious nature of one’s “dependent” residence status which entails dependence on one’s
spouse, there are many instances in which access to mid- to long-term social welfare assistance after
temporary protection is not available, resulting in the non-receipt of public protections or assistance.
Because of the precarious nature of their residence status, these individuals fall completely outside of theframework of public assistance for victims, just like in cases of domestic violence among couples
awaiting refugee recognition application results. In this way, to improve this situation in which migrant
women fall through the cracks of public protection and assistance because of their precarious residence
status, revisions to residence status and relevant welfare provisions are necessary so that residence status
is guaranteed to women subject to domestic violence and public assistance and protections for domestic
violence are obtainable regardless of residence status.
5. Prepared by: Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ)

19

1. Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 19, Trafficking in Persons (Article 8, Prohibition ofslavery, Forced Labour, Trafficking in Persons)<Para 19 (a) Enhance victim identification procedures, particularly with regard to victims
of forced labour >2. Issues:
Failure to enhance identification procedures of victims of labour exploitation
Failure to identify victims of labour exploitation
3. Suggested recommendations:
1) State party is recommended to establish a division in the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare
that deals with human trafficking. Deploy officials to deal with human trafficking in every
Labour Standards Inspection Office.
2) State party is recommended to provide training – specifically on human trafficking – to all labour
standards inspectors.
3) State party is recommended to develop and implement measures to protect and support humantrafficking victims of labour exploitation.
4. Background:Paragraph 157 of the Government Report mentions its Action Plan and its Council for the
Promotion of Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons; however, it does not answer the questionin the LOI.
Paragraph 158 of the Government Report does not mention any enhancements in victim
identification procedures.
Paragraph 158 of the Government Report mentions “Methods to Deal with Trafficking in
Persons (Measures for Identification of Victims)” in which points for the identification of victims
are listed regarding actions, means, and purposes of human trafficking. However, they are merely
terminological explanations of the Human Trafficking Protocol in Article 3, and do not offer
concrete measures. These “Methods” mention the responses to human trafficking cases that “labourrelated administrative agencies” should take, and regarding victim identification, it states: “(a)Response at each contact point: If a Labor Standards Inspection Office or other labor-related
administrative agency receives a request for consultation or protection from a trafficking victim ora related person, it should positively and appropriately respond to the request. (b) Discovery of a
victim during the control process: Efforts should be made to discover trafficking in persons during
the process of controlling foreigners’ violation of the Labor Standards Act.” However, no further
direction is provided, so it lacks specificity.
Although Annex 7 (1) (ii) in the government’s report states that adequate training is provided
to labour standards inspectors, the actual extent to which such training is provided is questionable
as there is no division or officer established in the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare or
Labour Standards Inspection Office that specifically deals with human trafficking.
There have been no trafficking victims identified by the Labour Standards Inspection Office.
There are some trafficking victims of labour exploitation identified by the Police and Immigration
agencies, but very few. (There were zero in 2019, 2 in 2018 [a host and a worker in a massage
parlour], 3 in 2017 [a street vendor, a restaurant worker, and a guest house worker], 4 in 2016 [2utility workers, 1 construction worker, and 1 unknown], and 7 in 2015)
Thus, it is certain that the identification procedures for victims of labour exploitation have notbeen enhanced.
Incidentally, the aforementioned “Methods to Deal with Trafficking in Persons” states thatlabour related administrative agencies should respond in the following way: “(c) Protection of
victims: When a labor-related administrative agency identifies a trafficking victim, because thevictim is highly likely to be harmed by a violent employer, broker, et al., the agency should notify

20the police and the Immigration Bureau and cooperate with relevant administrative agencies to takeappropriate measures for protecting the victim, if needed.” However, the Japanese Government
does not provide any specific measures for protection or support for trafficking victims of labour
exploitation.
“(b) Provide specialized training to relevant officials”
2. Issues:-Non-disclosure of the number of participants in, and the contents of such specialized training-Failure to execute specialized training for prosecutors, judges, and officials of women’s
consultation centers and child consultation centers
3. Suggested recommendations:
1) State party is recommended to provide specialized training to a larger number of officials
including prosecutors, judges, and officials of women’s consultation centers and child consultation
centers.
2) State party is recommended to publicize the details of specialized training (hours, number ofsessions, details on the lecturers, handouts, method of implementation) and require the invitationof NGO personnel as lecturers.
4. Background:Paragraph 159 of the Government Report asserts that they provide training to officials of 5
ministries/agencies. However, only 23 participated in specialized training at the Immigration
Services Agency, and the numbers are not disclosed for the other ministries and agencies. Detailed
information on specialized training (hours, number of sessions, details on the lecturers, handouts,
method of implementation) is not disclosed, and it is unknown whether or not the training iseffective for the identification and protection of trafficking victims. As for specialized training forlabour standards inspectors, a frontline inspector could not confirm its implementation.
Moreover, there is no specialized training provided for prosecutors, judges, and officials of
women’s consultation centers and child consultation centers. These service providers should betrained, not only to realize adequate protection and support for victims, but also to punish
perpetrators with penalties commensurate with the seriousness of the acts committed.

“(c) Investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators with penalties commensurate with theseriousness of the acts committed (please provide relevant statistics on investigations,prosecutions, convictions and sanctions imposed since July 2014)”
2. Issues:-Unsatisfactory provision of legislation in accordance with the definition of trafficking in the
Trafficking Protocol-Non-disclosure and underutilization of the “Handbook on Measures against Trafficking in
Persons”-Failure to punish perpetrators with penalties commensurate with the seriousness of the acts
committed and failure to report sufficient statistics on sentences and penalties
3. Suggested recommendations:
1) State party is recommended to provide a law that ensures a crackdown on all cases involving“the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability” as defined in the Trafficking Protocol.
2) State party is recommended to utilize sufficiently the government-produced handbook wheninvestigating and arresting perpetrators of human trafficking cases. Disclose the contents of the21

handbook as much as possible.
3) State party is recommended to make the penalties for trafficking perpetrators commensurate withthe seriousness of the acts committed, and to abolish sentences with suspended terms or fines only,
and impose actual prison sentences.
4. Background:1) Although paragraph 160 of the Government Report claims that “all of the acts that constitutetrafficking in persons as defined in the Protocol are considered crimes in Japan”, there is ample
evidence that suggests otherwise. For example, in the Protocol, the means of trafficking include“the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability,” but in Japan, it is unclear which penal statutecriminalizes such abuse. Although there is no indication that this ambiguity was addressed anddiscussed in detail when revisions were made to the Penal Code in 2005, such abuse seems to fallunder the category of "intimidation" – which already existed in the Penal Code prior to theamendment, hence suggesting that the new provision is unnecessary. “Intimidation” is defined in
Article 222 of the Penal Code as “a threat of harm to one’s own life, body, liberty, reputation orproperty or the same for one’s relatives.” Foreign workers in Japan suffer from slave-like
exploitation due to the double bind of “debt borne in the home country” and “threat of forced
repatriation.” Is this considered “intimidation”? Under the legality principle, the elements of acrime should be strictly interpreted, so this remains an open question. The reason why there arefew arrests for labour trafficking in Japan may lie in the fact that “abuse of power or of a positionof vulnerability” is actually not criminalized.
2) Paragraph 161 of the Government Report says that they “produced the “Handbook on Measuresagainst Trafficking in Persons,” which summarizes information such as the laws applicable totrafficking in persons and specific examples of the application of these laws and that “it is actively
utilized by the police, the ISA, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Labour Standards Inspection
Offices, and the JCG in conducting investigations and other activities.” However, the content of
the Handbook is unknown. The government (police), in response to NGOs’ questions regarding how
they identify human trafficking victims, have always said that they “judge individually andcomprehensively in accordance with the definition by the Protocol Article 3, and based on thesubject person’s nationality, reason of entry in Japan, status of residence, working situation, age,debt in the home country, living condition, etc.” (Oct. 21, 2016) and have never clearly stated thatthey refer to the Handbook. If this Handbook contains the applicable laws and examples ofapplication, they should disclose the contents of the Handbook as much as possible and explain
what laws can be applied and what examples there are, especially to answer the question raised in1) above.
3) Although being asked to provide relevant statistics “since July 2014”, paragraph 163 of theGovernment Report provides statistics only for 2018. Furthermore, the number of actual prison
sentences is cleverly obscured. In reality, in 2018, of the 29 suspects found guilty, only 10 weresentenced to actual prison terms, 17 were sentenced to suspended terms, and 2 were only fined. By
way of comparison, in 2019, there were 32 indictments, 23 of which were confirmed guilty (only 5in prison, 17 with suspended terms, and 1 who only received a fine) with 9 pending trial.
In addition, there is the question of whether the lengths of prison terms are “commensurate withthe seriousness of the acts committed.” (According to the US Department of State’s “Trafficking
in Persons Report”, a prison term of at least 4 years is recommended.)
In 2018, as reported by the government, the average of the 10 prison sentences was 2 years and9 months. As for the 17 suspended sentences – of which very few were revoked and changed to
imprisonment – perpetrators served approximately 18-month sentences in most cases. In 2019,because the 5 cases of actual prison sentences included 2 individuals who were sentenced to 10 and
8 years, the average increased to 4 years and 7 months. The suspended sentences ranged from 1 to22

3 years in prison. Furthermore, perpetrators usually do not serve full terms and are released fromprison earlier. Therefore, it is questionable that the extent of punishment for perpetrators iscommensurate.
“(d) Ensure effective victim protection and support measures, including adequate
interpretation services and legal support for claiming compensation”
2. Issues:-Non-implementation of training for interpreters to further understand human trafficking-Lack of quality interpretation services that governmental bodies (other than the police andimmigration offices) and private support organizations can use-Lack of public dissemination of available legal support services-Lack of any merit for the victims who utilize the legal (financial) aid system and restitution ordersystem (because of the inability to accurately ascertain the situation of the perpetrators’ assets)-Lack of support measures for victims who hope to live and work in Japan
3. Suggested recommendations:
1) State party is recommended to implement training for interpreters to further understand humantrafficking. Set up quality interpretation services that the governmental bodies (other than thepolice and immigration offices) and private support organizations can use.
2) State party is recommended to publicly disseminate information about available legal support
services. Establish a system that allows victims to easily and accurately collect information on
perpetrators’ assets or confiscate the proceeds from their crimes and use them to fund restorations
for victims’ damages.
3) State party is recommended to establish a support system for victims who hope to live and workin Japan.
4. Background:
The “Methods to Deal with Trafficking in Persons (Measures for Protection of Victims)” thatare referred to in paragraph 164 of the Government Report mentions to a certain extent the points
of attention and measures for protecting victims. However, regarding “assistance with multiple
languages”, although the immigration and police agencies secure interpreters, their quality is notnecessarily guaranteed. Furthermore, there is no system for other governmental agencies andprivate support organizations to secure and use quality interpreters.
Victims are not even adequately informed of the available “legal aid” that is mentioned in Annex
7 (2) (i) and (iv) of the Government Report. In addition, the situation of the actual usage of the“civil legal aid system” (Annex 7(2)(i)) is unknown. Because it is difficult for victims to both go
to lawyers and ascertain the perpetrators’ assets, it appears that this system is rarely used inpractice. Furthermore, the “restitution order system” (Annex 7 (2)(iv)) is limited in terms of thecrimes for which it can be used, and is not available when the perpetrator is charged with violating
the Anti-Prostitution Act, the Child Prostitution and Child Pornography Prohibition Act, the Child
Welfare Act, the Immigration Control Act, the Employment Security Act, or the Labour Standards
Act. Even if the court issues a restitution order, there is no special system to ensure its execution.
It is impossible to ensure the execution of the order without grasping the situation of a perpetrator’s
assets, even through general compulsory execution. NGOs argue that the government should
establish a system in which the proceeds obtained through a crime are confiscated from theperpetrator and used to compensate the victim, but the government has not considered this.
Even though there are support measures for victims who want to return home, there are no
support measures available for victims who hope to stay and work in Japan.
5. Prepared by: JNATIP, Japan Network Against Trafficking In Persons

23

1. Related paras and articles: LOIPR para. 20 - Technical Intern Training (Article 8)
2. Issues: Effective Improvement Measures for the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP)
3. Suggested Recommendations:
Despite the 2009 revision to the Immigration Control Act and the establishment of the TechnicalIntern Training Act in 2016, there have not been fundamental improvements to human rights violationsin the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). Given the fact that it has evolved into a system toaddress labor shortages instead of “international cooperation through the transfer of technical knowledge
and skills,” it is imperative that serious consideration is given to establish a new foreign worker admission
system that ensures that foreign workers are not subject to heavy debt burdens and the threat of forced
return against their will, and are fully guaranteed all their rights as workers, including the freedom tochange jobs.
4. Background:
1) The Current Situation of the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP)
According to the Statistics on Foreign National Residents, there were 2,933,137 foreign nationals(2.3% of the total population) living in Japan at the end of 2019, with permanent residents composing
the largest group at 793,000, followed by technical intern trainees at 411,000. Although in 2019, thenumber of technical intern trainees increased by 83,000, by the end of March 2020, there were only 3,987
foreign nationals with the “Specialized Skills” residence status which was newly established in April ofthe same year to alleviate labor shortages. Furthermore, of the foreign nationals with this “Specialized
Skills” residence status, 90% are former technical intern trainee s who transferred from that Program,indicating that the “Specialized Skills” residence status is largely dependent on the Technical Intern andTraining Program (TITP). On the other hand, since July 2010, the “Trainee” residence status has
continued to be used specifically for official (i.e., government-sponsored) training and training that isstrictly off-the-job, so the transfer of technical skills, etc. should be fulfilled through this “Trainee”
residence status.
2) Fundamental Problems with the Technical Intern and Training Program (TITP)
There are three fundamental problems with the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP): no freedom
to change jobs, exorbitant debt, and forced return.
In other words, because the TITP’s objective is the transfer of technical skills, etc., technical interntrainees do not have the freedom to change jobs, and are required to contin ue and complete their on-thejob training at the same company. Additionally, before coming to Japan, many have taken out loans
amounting to several years’ worth of salary to pay for exorbitant fees that that they are told are necessary
for processing, training, and traveling fees. Because of this, if they were to return to their home countries
before completing their technical intern training contract, they would be left with exorbitant debt. In
order to avoid this, they have no other choice but to continue working even if there are problems with
their working conditions, living environments, etc. within Japan . It is not uncommon for technical interntrainees to endure debt servitude-like conditions. Furthermore, when technical intern trainees muster up
the courage to assert their rights against illegal working conditions and poor living environments, forced
return – or the repatriation of technical intern trainees to their home countries in mid-contract against
their will – is often used as an everyday deterrent by personnel in the supervising and sendingorganizations.
These are the fundamental reasons underpinning the poor working conditions and human rights
violations in this Program. As a result, low pay, unpaid wages, unjust deductions for rent and utilities,
and the prohibition of pregnancies, are among the various instances of restrictions, physical and verbal
abuse, power harassment, sexual harassment and sexual violence, etc. that technical intern trainees
experience in their daily private lives.
Furthermore, while the Technical Intern Training Act stipulates that supervising organizations – who
supervise the technical training and are at the core of the TITP – cannot collect fees and earnings fromtechnical intern trainees or implementing organizations, supervising fees to cover expenses can becollected from those implementing organizations. It is common for these supervising fees to amount to24

¥30,000 to ¥50,000 per technical intern trainee, and because this poses increased financial burdens onthese implementing organizations, there have been cases in which these costs have been “passed on” totechnical intern trainees through low pay and unpaid wages, unjust deductions for rent and utilities, etc.
As a result of this, in practice, it is the supervising organizations – which are technically nonprofit
corporations – that benefit the most from the TITP.
Furthermore, in recent years, even large enterprises have come to utilize the TITP and have caused
problems. In January 2019, Mitsubishi Motors Corporation was issued an order for improvement as wellas an accreditation revocation of its technical intern training plan, and in September of the same year,
Hitachi, Ltd. was also issued an order for improvement. Both cases involved the engagement of technicalintern trainees in activities outside of the occupations approved for technical training, indicating that
abuse of the Program has extended to large enterprises.
Moreover, it has also become clear that the main reason behind the disappearances (i.e., “runningaway”) of technical intern trainees is poor working conditions. Even in the report released in March 2019by the Ministry of Justice’s “Technical Intern Training Program Operation Project Team,” “violations inovertime work hours, etc.,” “unpaid overtime wages,” “excess deductions from wages,” “minimum wage
violations,” etc. are raised as the main reasons for disappearances.
However, the various regulatory measures implemented in line with the Technical Intern Training
Act, only go as far as to address issues that surface and become visible but cannot address the problem
at the core. It has been close to three years since the implementation of the Technical Intern Training Act,but there are absolutely no signs that there will be any improvements to the Program.
3) Fact Checking of the Japanese Government’s Report (LOI para. 20)(a) On Forced Return
In the Government’s report, regarding forced returns, it is asserted that “it is possible to know ofthese acts beforehand.” However, in Article 19 and Article 33 of the Technical Intern Training Act, it isstipulated that “when it becomes difficult to carry on technical intern training [a notice should be given]
without delay,” but nowhere is it stipulated that this must be done “beforehand.” Additionally, thesestipulations are simply about reporting difficulties in carrying out technical intern training and are notabout forced return. Furthermore, because it is the supervising organizations who are not only the entities
who report such violations, but also often the entities involved in forced return, it is unthinkable that anyof these organizations would list ”forced return” as the reason for return to one’s home country. Therefore,
the assertion that it is possible to become aware of forced returns beforehand, is simply a false claim.
Although, to check for forced returns, a “Verification of Will” government form is issued at air andseaports to technical intern trainees returning home in mid-contract, of the over 20,000 individuals who
returned home in mid-contract during the two years since this check began in September 2016, there ha ve
only been 36 technical intern trainees who have claimed forced return, and there has not been a single
case in which forced return was recognized. This check carried out through the “Verification of Will”
form has not been an effective measure. Moreover, the disclosure of such data has ceased since 2019.
Incidentally, the supervising organizations, the resident staff of sending organizations in Japan, etc.
possess various means of preventing technical intern trainees returning home in mid-contract fromclaiming that they are being forcefully returned. These include convincing technical intern trainees notto object to forced return by agreeing to waive much of the exorbitant debt accrued from fees; making
them sign forms that state they are returning by their own volition; trying to make it difficult for them toreturn to Japan by telling them to do things like temporarily return to their home country to discussmatters with their families; etc.
(b) Regarding Low Wages
In the Japanese government’s report, it is stipulated that technical intern trainees are to receive wages
that are equal to or above those of Japanese nationals, and this is also explicated in the Technical Intern
Training Act. This was also stipulated in the ministerial ordinance for landings, even before thepromulgation and implementation of the Technical Intern Training Act, but these guidelines have notbeen effective at all, and the realities in which technical intern trainees were being paid less than their
Japanese counterparts, have not seen improvements even after the implementation of the Technical Intern
Training Act.
The first study into the wages of foreign workers was conducted in fiscal year 2019, and found thatwhile the average monthly wage for foreign workers (overall) was ¥223,100, for technical intern trainees

25

it was much lower at ¥156,900; and looking at their hourly wages, the amount was lower than that of thepart-time wages of international students. The government’s judgment in recognizing this as “equal to or
above the wages of Japanese nationals” should be questioned.
(c) (d) The Number of Inspections
In fiscal year 2018, the Organization for Technical Intern Training (OTIT) conducted 7,886
inspections on implementing organizations and 2,483 inspections on supervising organizations. At theend of the same fiscal year, the number of implementing organizations was close to 50,000; so at thisrate, it is hard to imagine that the OTIT will be able to fulfill its goal of conducting inspections once
every three years. On the other hand, during the same period, the number of supervising organizations
was close to 2,500, and the goal of conducting inspections once every year has almost been reached.
Moreover, by June 2020, the number of cases involving permission revocations against supervisingorganizations was 8, and there was 1 case involving an order for improvement. By the same month,
permission revocations against implementing organizations totaled 42 companies (585 cases), and there
were 3 cases involving orders for improvement. Many of the legal violations pointed out are done so in
the form of “directives,” and administrative punishments such as revocations and orders are still not
sufficient.
(e) Complaints Filed by Technical Intern Trainees
The number of complaints by technical intern trainees submitted to the OTIT in fiscal year 2018 was
90. Given that there were over 320,000 technical intern trainees at the end of 2018, the number of filed
complaints is markedly small, and it is difficult to conclude that the complaint filing procedures arefunctioning as sufficient checks on the TITP.
5. Prepared by: Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ)26

1．Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 21, Treatment of aliens, including refugees and asylum seekers (arts.
7, 9, 10 and 13)
Government’s report: Paragraphs 178 to 180, and 183, detention of asylum seekers
Paragraph 189, deportation of asylum seekers
Paragraph 194, prolonged periods of immigration detention
Paragraph 195, proper recognition of refugee status for a person eligible for refugee status
2. Issues:-

Government’s reluctance on refugee recognition-

Government’s move for law reform against the principle of non-refoulement-

Detention of a person with procedures for refugee protection pending-

Arbitrary immigration detention of undocumented immigrants

3. Suggested Recommendations:-

No asylum seeker shall be deported without due process and consideration by an independent body that
upholds fair standards consistent with the opinions of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

-

Ill-treatment of detainees during deportation procedures shall be prohibited; the Immigration Facilities
Visiting Committee should be empowered and its independence should be ensured.

-

Examination of permission to stay for undocumented immigrants should be performed with due
considerations of human rights and humanitarian grounds and with due process including the notification ofreasonings for rejection.

-

Undocumented immigrants shall not be treated as criminals or anti-social entities nor be seen as targets ofsequestering for security purposes.

4. The Current Situation (after the previous concluding observations in August 2014) :-While Paragraph 195 states that, “… the Government…properly identify people who should be recognized as
refugees”, the Immigration Control Agency in charge of refugee status determination (RSD), however, isreluctant on refugee protection; the refugee recognition rate is unreasonably low, compared to most of the Treaty
countries. (Exhibit 1)-

While Paragraph 189 states that, “Under the Immigration Control Act, deportation is suspended even for persons
to whom a written deportation order has been issued during the process of an application for recognition of
refugee status or of a request for review”, in several cases, the refugee division of the Immigration Control
agency coordinated with the division in charge of deportation on the notification date of the rejection of refugee
status, and enforced their deportations on the same day.
Moreover, since September 2015, the Ministry of Justice has been trying to create exceptions for thesuspension of deportation while one’s RSD process is pending, and has convened a non-statutory, nonindependent "Expert Group" in September 2019. The Minister of Justice will consider detainees and parolees(including many refugee status applicants) who have been issued a deportation order and have not returned on
their own accord. The Minister of Justice labeled the detainees and persons under the provisional release(including many applicants for refugee status) who had been issued a writ of deportation order and refused toreturn to their country of origin as "deportation evaders”, and explained that "deportation evaders in immigration
detention should not be released for the sake of security”, and distributed documents containing statistics on the27

arrest records of persons under provisional release to the committee members while further making thisinformation available on the website (without mentioning whether the individual had actually been prosecuted).
In June 2020, the members of the Expert Committee formulated a set of recommendations, including the creationof an offence to punish deportation evaders and a policy to partially lift the suspension of deportation while the
RSD process is pending (hereinafter, the "Recommendations"). The Ministry of Justice intends to amend the law
on the basis of these Recommendations.
-Paragraphs 178-180 state that " Applicants for recognition of refugee status staying legally in Japan at the timeof application are not detained. An applicant for recognition of refugee status without status of residence isgranted permission for provisional stay and not detained unless he/she is recognized as falling under certain
grounds such as a case where he/she is likely to flee”. The Ministry of Justice, however, has overextended thescope of the "likely to flee". Of the 133 people who applied for refugee status at a port of entry in 2017, none
were granted provisional permission to stay. 115 persons were rejected provisional stay, of which 100 cases
were rejected on the ground of “likely to flee”.
Additionally, although the government report does not mention it, when a person without legal residence
status applies for refugee status before the issuance of a written deportation order and is not granted permission
for provisional stay, he or she is issued a tentative written deportation order (with his/her country of origin as
the designated country of deportation), but the execution of his or her deportation is automatically suspended,and his or her RSD process continues, during which the Immigration Control authorities put him or her inimmigration detention as a matter of principle. Therefore, a large number of persons whose RSD procedures are
pending are being detained indefinitely.

-

Paragraphs 180 and 194 state that “to people for whom particular humanitarian considerations are needed,” or“(w)hen there are unavoidable circumstances such as a detainee getting sick,” “maximum consideration is
given” “by flexible implementation of provisional release”.
There is, however, no judicial involvement in the disposition regarding immigration detention andprovisional release, and the immigration control authorities do not give reasons for the disposition. Furthermore,since around 2018, the system has been rigidly operating with no provisional release except for those with serious
illnesses that could not withstand the detention. The period of immigration detention rapidly lengthened; forexample, of the 316 detainees in the detention center in Ibaraki Prefecture, at the end of June 2019, 180 had beendetained for more than two years (about half were subsequently released due to the novel coronavirus). The
Ministry of Justice has no intention of legally codifying a time limit for immigration detention, which is alsodenied in the aforementioned “Recommendations" of the Expert Committee.
In addition, since 2015, the Immigration Control authorities have specified a condition prohibiting"occupation, activities with remuneration" when granting provisional release, and detained those who breached
the condition. Those under provisional release are also excluded from social security benefits. In particular, as
for the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), except for medical expenses for infected persons, public assistance todeal with the novel coronavirus excludes those under provisional release, and as a result, they are in a diresituation.

-

While Paragraph 183 states that the Government is making its utmost efforts to thoroughly ascertain the healthconditions of the detainees in immigration detention facilities, the Immigration Facilities Visiting Committee
has repeatedly requested, for example, the detention center in Ibaraki, to reduce the time between a request for
medical attention and the receipt of medical treatment, but no improvement has been confirmed. Other serious
cases of unfair treatment have continued, as shown in Exhibit 2.

28

-

The Japanese government has never implemented a collective regularization of undocumented migrants and has
no intention to do so.

-

As for the "special permission to stay" system, which allows regularization of individual undocumented
migrants, no reasons for rejections are given, despite the fact that laws and regulations require transparency in
its implementation. In addition, the Ministry of Justice has published guidelines on the implementation of thesystem, encouraging those who are married to a Japanese person and those who have extended their stay tovoluntarily declare their marital status, but not only are the considerations listed in the guidelines not sufficientfrom the standpoint of human rights and humanitarian treatment, the guidelines are also not even fully complied
with, and this has led to a decline in the approval rate for special permission to stay (Exhibit 3). In some cases,
the fact that a person is married to a Japanese national but has no children was considered to be a negating factor,
and special permission to stay was rejected.
5．Prepared by: Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees

Exhibit 1
RSD decisions in 2019
First Instance (FI)- 4,979 persons (among them 43 persons were given refugee status.)
Administrative Review (AR) - 6,022 persons (among them 1 person was given refugee status.)
Decisions at FI by country of origin
2019

Sri Lanka

Sum of 2006 to 2018

Rejected

Recognized

1,006

1

Rejected

Recognized(after 3,585

4

judicial
review)
Philippines

846

0

5,414

0

Nepal

761

0

6,966

2

Turkey

436

0

4,774

0

Myanmar

382

0

5,331

214

Exhibit 2
Case 1. At the detention center in Ibaraki Prefecture, a male detainee, who had been held for five months,
had been complaining of chest pains and other symptoms since February 2014, and received a medical
examination on March 27. The detainee was then moved to a solitary confinement cell to be observed byguard(s) who were outsourced by the immigration authorities. The detainee was suffering since the nightof March 29th, rolling around on the floor and repeatedly saying "I'm dying", but the guard(s) did notcontact the doctor, and as a result, he was confirmed dead (from illness) the next morning.

29

Case 2. At the detention center located in Tokyo, on 3 June 2017, a male detainee, who was an applicant
for refugee protection and had been detained for one year and two months by that time, complained ofstomach pain, but was only moved to a solitary confinement cell without medical examination; and when
he complained loudly about his pain late at night the same day, he was only reprimanded by a staff member
for his bad attitude and was not taken to seek a medical examination. The next afternoon he was rushed tothe hospital and diagnosed with peritonitis and underwent emergency surgery.
Case 3. In July 2017 at the detention center located in Osaka Prefecture, a male detainee, who was anapplicant for refugee protection, became frustrated with the attitude of the guards and threw a book against
the wall after which he was taken away to isolation where he was knocked down on his back by seven oreight guards, held down to the floor by his head, torso, and legs, handcuffed behind his back, held down
for approximately one and a half minutes, and, as a result, suffered a broken right arm.
Case 4. On 26 April 2019, a male detainee, who was an applicant for refugee protection, complained of
testicular pain in the detention center located in Ibaraki Prefecture. A physician at the detention center
presumed a testicular tumor and ordered medical treatment by a specialist, but three months and 20 days
passed without a specialist's consultation. The detainee in question was permitted provisional release after
going on a hunger strike, during which time he was found to have testicular cancer that had metastasized
and underwent quasi-urgent surgery. He had been detained for three years and three months.
Case 5. On 19 January 2019, at the detention center located in Ibaraki Prefecture, a male detainee, who
was an applicant for refugee protection and had been held for two years and eight months by that time,
had his hands cuffed behind his back, the painful points at the base of his neck pressed, and arms forced
upward by immigration officers. Upon the detainee's complaint, the director of the detention center
acknowledged the unfair treatment of the detainee, but no action was taken against the guards and nocompensation was given to the detainee, and the guards continued to be in charge of the detainee. Soon
after, the detainee made repeated suicide attempts.
Case 6. On 25 June 2019, a male detainee who had been held for approximately two years and sevenmonths in the detention center located in Nagasaki Prefecture died of starvation after a hunger strike, withthe country of nationality and Japan unable to execute repatriation due to the inability to reach an
agreement on a repatriation method. Neither medical examination nor assessment on his condition had
been made by a doctor during the seven days before he starved to death. Staff at the center did not notice
the imminent danger of death. In October of the same year, the Immigration and Naturalization Service(ICNES) indicated its stance that hunger strikers would be subject to compulsory medical treatment in the
future.
Case 7. On 25 April 2020, at the detention center in Tokyo, dozens of security officers, including men,
suppressed and segregated several female detainees (one of whom was an applicant for refugee protection
who had been detained for two years and three months by that time) after they protested that the issuanceof provisional release permission to combat the novel coronavirus was arbitrary. The detainees claimed
that they were subjected to excessive violence and sexual insults.

30

Case 8. A transgender detainee at the Tokyo-based detention center, who had been held since September
2019, from the beginning of their detention to August 2020, was kept in a solitary cell for 22 hours a day,and although they were able to leave the cell for two hours to go to the common area, their free time wasstaggered relative to the other detainees’ free time, and because of this, they could not meet with otherdetainees and the individual has therefore been kept in solitary confinement-like conditions. The detainee
was not allowed to receive hormones from the beginning of their detention until approximately April 2020.
The detainee was diagnosed with depression while in custody.
Exhibit 3
Trends: Special Permission to Stay
12,000100.0%
95.0%

10,000

90.0%
85.0%

8,000

80.0%
6,000

75.0%
70.0%

4,000

65.0%
60.0%

2,000

55.0%
-

50.0%

permitted

no ground

31

ratio

1

Related paras and articles: LOIPR para 27, Article 21 (Freedom of association)

2

Issues:

3

2.1
2.2

Arbitrary deprivation of liberty of a human rights defender in Okinawa
Excessive surveillance of the protest in Okinawa

2.3

Restriction on Press

Suggested recommendations:
3.1 State party shall respect and implement the Opinion 55/2018i adopted by the United Nations Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention. State Party shall conduct the independent investigation on the arbitrary
deprivation of liberty of Mr. Yamashiro Hiroji, the leader of peaceful protest movement in Okinawa, and provide
Mr. Yamashiro with compensations and reparations in conformity with international human rights standards
without delay.
3.2

State party shall comply with Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peacefulassembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on
the proper management of assembliesiiand the General Comment No. 37 on the right to peaceful assemblyiii, andensure that the private security companies do not violate the freedom of association and expression of citizens
through surveillance and investigation on protesting citizens.
3.3 State party shall respect and ensure freedom of press including drone reporting and ensure citizens’ accessto information.
4

Background:
4.1 Arbitrary deprivation of liberty of a human rights defender in Okinawa

Mr. Yamashiro, the Chairperson of the Okinawa Peace Movement Center, was arrested on
October 17th, 2016 for allegedly cutting two strands of barbed wire from a fence during his
protest against the construction of U.S. military facility in Higashi village, Okinawa. He wasthen detained for five months without trial during which he was not allowed to see anyone
including his family but his lawyers.
He was found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison with hard labour suspended for three
years by the Naha District Court on 14 March 2018. He then appealed to the Fukuoka High
Court Naha Branch, but the court upheld the verdict of the first trial and dismissed Mr.
Yamashiro’s appeal on 13 December 2018. He made an appeal to the Supreme Court on 19
December 2018, but his appeal was dismissed, making his sentence confirmed.
Concerning the case of Mr. Yamashiro, the UN working Group on Arbitrary Detention adopted
the Opinion No.55/201815 on 27 December 2018. In its Opinion, the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention concluded that the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Yamashiro was arbitrary
and discriminatory based on his political opinion. The Working Group also urged theGovernment of Japan to conduct a full and independent investigation on this case and to remedy
the situation by according him an enforceable right to compensation and reparations. It has been
more than a year since the Opinion was adopted, but it has not been implemented.

32

The arrest and prolonged detention of Mr. Yamashiro, the leader of peaceful protest movementof Okinawa, not only violates his right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, but also
threatens the right to peaceful assembly of citizens by spreading chilling effect among them.
4.2

Excessive surveillance of protests in Okinawa

In 2016, more than 500 riot police were dispatched to the Takae district of Higashi village,
Okinawa Prefecture, with a population of merely 140 people, and violently remove protesting
citizens from the area to proceed the construction of a U.S. military facility.iv Since then, thephysical removal of protesters by the police has continued, but recently there has been a marked
increase in surveillance of protesters via private security companies.
The Mainichi Shimbun Newspaper reported on 28 January 2019 that a private security company
had made a list of 60 protesters in Okinawa with photos and personal information, on the request
by the Okinawa Defense Bureau of the Ministry of Defense.v The existence of such a list had
been known since the Okinawa Times, a local newspaper, reported it in 2016, vi but theGovernment had denied its involvement in its Cabinet decision in 2016. The Mainichi Shimbun
obtained internal documents of the private security company and its report confirmed theJapanese government's involvement in the surveillance of the protesters. Following the coverage,
the Defense Ministry conducted an internal investigation and announced on its website that "noevidence was found which indicated that the Okinawa Defense Bureau officials instructed thecompany to create a list or delete personal information,"vii but the details of the investigation
have not been made public, nor have the security companies been interviewed.
In addition, from July 17 this year, security guards at the new Henoko base construction sitebegan to wear small cameras on their chests, strengthening the surveillance of citizens.viii
As stated in the Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peacefulassembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions on the proper management of assemblies, the practice of law enforcement officers
recording participants has the chilling effect on the exercise of various rights, including
freedom of assembly, association and expression, and needs to be regulated by law, bearing in
mind the legality, necessity and proportionality.ix In Okinawa, private security companies are
performing police duties and intelligence gathering, but private security companies should not
be tasked with police duties at rallies in the first place. Furthermore, the Japanese government
is not exempted from responsibility for the violations of human rights by non-state actors, as"[a] State can incur responsibility for violations of human rights by non-State actors if it:
approves, supports or acquiesces in those acts"xand it was a private security company with acontractual relationship with the Okinawa Defense Bureau of the Ministry of Defense thatcollected the protesters' personal information and compiled the list in this case.
4.3

Restrictions on the press
Regarding the restrictions on the press, restrictions by laws have been added to the physical interference.xi
One example of them is the revision of the drone regulations law which came into effect in June 2019.

33

The legislative intent of the law was originally explained that the law would be for counter-terrorism
measures in preparation for the Tokyo Olympics and the Rugby World Cup. However, in fact, therestrictions include the airspace over the military bases of the Japan Self Defense Forces and the U.S.
Forces designated by the Ministry of Defense of Japan.
At Henoko where the land reclamation of Oura Bay has continued for constructing the new base, media
outlets and civilian groups often used drone flights over the base as effective ways to monitor the progressof the construction. However, now that shooting aerial photos by drone flights over the base without theconsent of the U.S. military is considered illegal by the law, it places significant limitations on monitoringby the press. Furthermore, there have been some cases where two local Okinawan newspapers are
excluded from some of the media coverage opportunities by the U.S. military, but the Government ofJapan has left the situation as it is.
The two Okinawa-based local newspapers have harshly criticized the U.S. military for their repeatedcriminal cases, aircraft and other accidents, as well as environmental issues, including noise and land
pollution. The U.S. military gives a wide berth to these two newspapers and sometimes makes obvious
choices reflecting the attitude in offering media coverage opportunities to media outlets. For example,
the two Okinawan newspapers were also excluded from both opportunities, when the U.S. Air Force
opened its aerial refueling training to five media outlets headquartered in Tokyo and Okinawa in
November 2019, and also when the U.S. Marine Corps invited Tokyo-based media outlets to a meetingin July 2020 to exchange views on the COVID-19 countermeasures.

5iPrepared by: All Okinawa Council for Human Rights

A/HRC/WGAD/2018/55

ii

A/HRC/31/66
CCPR/C/GC/37
iv
https://imadr.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Joint-report-Targeted-attack-on-freedom-of-expression-in-Okinawa_27SEP2016.pdfv
The Mainichi (28 Jan 2019), Japan gov't ordered security firm to list Okinawa base demonstrators: records, available at:https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190128/p2a/00m/0na/003000c
vi(Original source in Japanese) Okinawa Times (30 June 2016), “Purchase of the security company’s list of protesters in Henoko. Citizens allege“Government’s involvement”, last accessed on 5 August 2016 at: http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/34252
vii
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2019/08/09c.html
viii(Original source in Japanese) Ryukyu Shimpo (18 July 2020) “Security guard wearing small-sized camera. Filming civilians?” last accessed on 29
July, 2020 at: https://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/entry-1158458.html
iii

ix

A/HRC/31/66

x Ibid, para 87.

xi

https://imadr.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Joint-submission-Violation-of-freedoms-of-expression-and- peaceful-assembly-inOkinawa_11Dec2015.pdf

34