ITI 調査研究シリーズ
No.156ＡＳＥＡＮ の 新 輸 出 大 国 ︑ ベ ト ナ ム の 躍 進

No.
71

課題と展望

Expansion and Penetration:
Influences of the Chinese actors in the Thai
Economy in the Post-COVID 19 era
Trin Aiyara
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics,
Thammasat University

２018年3月
一般財団法人 国 際 貿 易 投 資 研 究 所 ︵ I T I ︶（ITI）
一般財団法人 国際貿易投資研究所

2 0 2 4 年 3月

（ITI）
一般財団法人 国際貿易投資研究所
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT

競輪の補助事業

This publication was subsidized by JKA
through its promotion funds from KEIRIN RACE

https://jka­cycle.jp

Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
1. The situations of the impacts of the Chinese actors in the pre-COVID-19 period......... 3
2. Flows of Tradable Goods between Thailand and China................................................. 7
3. Flows of Capitals between Thailand and China ........................................................... 19
4. Flows of Human between Thailand and China ............................................................ 23
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 26

Expansion and Penetration: Influences of the Chinese actors in
the Thai Economy in the Post-COVID 19 era

Trin Aiyara
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University
Summary
In other words, this research project explains that the widespread of the COVID-19,
which reached its peak during 2020 and 2021, and the trade war have not altered ordeterred the expansion of Chinese presence in the Thai economy, except the decline in
the tourists from China due to the immigration restrictions. Despite the pandemic andthe international conflicts, China was still the biggest trade partner of Thailand between
2019-2022. On the contrary, these two phenomena have intensified the growing
numbers of Chinese actors, for example, relocated manufacturers and migrated
entrepreneurs, according to the statistics of BOI and descriptive data from various
sources. In summary, the research project would like raise the argument that the
COVID-19 and the trade war could not stop the trajectory of the increase in the Chinese
actors' influences in the Thai economy.

Introduction
The primary of this research project is to examine influences of the Chinese actors in theThai economy, especially after the renormalization of the economy affected by thewidespread of the COVID-19 virus. On the one hand, this project can be an updated
version of the author’s previous work titled “Purchases and Purveyors: Impacts ofChinese Actors on the Thai Economy” (Trin 2020). The project primarily attempts to
examine the question of whether and how the outbreak of the Corona Virus has changed
the pre-pandemic characteristics of the Chinese actors’ influences in Thailand. On theother hand, this project will focuses on different aspects of China-Thailand economic
relations. The previous version emphasizes the impacts of Chinese actors as one of the1most impactful purchasers and purveyors of the Thai counterparts. Notably, its main
objective is to investigate monopolistic and monopsonistic power of the Chinese actors.
The current version shifts the focal point from the utilization of the Chinese actors’ powerover markets to the flows of economic resources, namely, commodities, capitals, andhumans, between Thailand and China. The project, however, present some informationof economic flows between Thailand and other countries, particularly the United Statesof America and Japan, for the sake of the comparison.
Hence, the project will prioritize the contemporary period from 2019 to 2022 in somespecific activities, including trades of primary and secondary products, flows of foreign
direct investment (FDI), tourism, and higher education. Similar to the previous version,
the report employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate and evaluate
the Chinese actors’ influences in Thailand. The quantitative method, specificallydescriptive statistics can provide a general account of the Chinese actors’ scale and scopein the specific domains of the transnational flows of resources. Concomitantly, thequalitative method can reveal the real-world situations of these domains and theirunderpinnings. The project, specifically, examines and analyzes three domains oftransnational economic activities, namely, cross-border trades, international investment,
and trans-border human movement. The main argument of this project is that the
influences of the Chinese actors in different domains of transnational flows of economic
resources, represented by the mentioned economic activities, have depended on not only
economic factors but also political conditions, such as international conflicts or policiesof the host and foreign governments.
The project begins by summarizing the findings, described by the report of the previous
version. The description is about patterns and characteristics of the Chinese actors’
impacts on the Thai economy in the pre-COVID-19 period, especially between 2015 and2018 (Trin 2020). In that period, the Chinese actors employed both monopolistic andmonopsonistic power to enrich themselves that consequently changed some aspects in thelandscape of the Thai economy. In the similar fashion to the previous version, the project
specifically chooses to focus on flows of economic resources between China and Thailand
2

from 2019 to 2022, instead of presenting a general picture of China-Thailand economic
relations. These flows can reveal growing influences of the Chinese actors in particularsectors. Then, the project examines trends of exports and imports between China andThailand in selected products, both primary and secondary goods. The examination oftrends in China-Thailand trades can show a degree of the Thai economy’s dependence on
China as one the biggest markets for specific exporting goods and one of the largest
sources for imported particular products. This examination can also illustrate a status of
the Chinese actors as one of the biggest providers of particular goods in Thailand. Next,
the project investigates patterns of FDI of the Chinese actors, who have started to divest
their funds into some special economic zones, particularly Eastern Economic Corridor(EEC). This investigation argues that the diversion of the Chinese funds has been driven
by not only economic factors but also political conditions, especially in the international
level. After the international trades and investments, the project explores continuities andchanges of mobility of humans across the borders of Thailand and China. Notably, this
exploration can answer the question of how the widespread of the COVID-19 has affected
the sectors of tourism and education whose incomes have substantially relied on Chinese
people. Finally, the project restate its main arguments, presents concluding remarks, andproposes some suggestions for further studies.

1. The situations of the impacts of the Chinese actors in the pre-COVID-19
periodAccording to Trin (2020), the Chinese actors had some substantial impacts on all three
economic sectors, consisting of primary, secondary, and tertiary ones, of the Thai
economy. The impacts resulted from the status of the Chinese actors in the Thai economy
since they were one of the most influential purchasers and purveyors in Thailand. In otherwords, the Chinese actors were able to exploit their monopolistic and monopsonistic
powers to alter the trajectory of the markets in Thailand. The rise of the Chinese actors as
the powerful buyers and sellers had a root in the signing on China-ASEAN 1 Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) in 2002. CAFTA has served as a foundation of the later bilateralagreements of trade, services and investment between China and Thailand (Liu and3

Jayanthakumaran 2016). The series of these China-Thailand bilateral economic
agreements have paved the ways for the Chinese agencies to expand their businesses inand penetrate into Thailand’s markets.
Historically, the expansion and penetration of the Chinese actors are new phenomena for
the Thai society, regarding the facts on China-Thailand relations during the Cold-War era.
China and Thailand limitedly formed a diplomatic relation when the Communist Party of
China (CPC), based in Beijing, supported the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)’s
insurgencies in Thailand’s rural areas, notably in the region of Northeast (Hewison 2018,
118-120). China and Thailand substantially improved their relations during the 1997-8
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). China assisted the troubled Southeast Asian countries by
not depreciating her exchange rate and participating in the program of the ASEAN plus
(APT) 2 . These assistances have accordingly changed China’s images from theCommunist mastermind into the benevolent neighbor of ASEAN’s members. In few years
before the pandemic outbreak, China has introduced Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI)
which has aimed to improve connectivity of China and other countries by constructing
transnational infrastructure networks. Particularly, the BRI has encouraged both China
and Thailand to take advantage of the latter’s geographical location as the center of themainland Southeast Asia (Piratorn and Jiranuwant 2018).
The influences of the Chinese actors as monopolistic and monopsonistic actors existed
and expanded in three sectors of the Thai economy. Firstly, the Chinese actors dominatedmarkets for particular products in the primary sector (see more details from Trin 2020,
106-111). With the help of the liberalization of Thailand-China trade, Chinese middlemenbrought a vast amount of cheaper temperate fruits, such as apples, grapes, and citruses,
as well as garlics into Thailand via land transportation. These cheaper temperate fruits
and garlics crowded out the local grown products. Specifically, China-origin apples,
grapes and citruses, accounted for around 70-85 percent for the quantity of total imported
apples, grapes, and citruses in 2018, according to the statistics from UN Comtrade
database (2019). The cheaper prices of the China-origin products incentivized Thaiconsumers to bought goods from the Chinese purveyors. This situation accordingly hurt4

some Thai farmers, particularly garlic growers.
Likewise, the Chinese purchasers heavily controlled prices and supply chains of somefruits, particularly durians. In recent years, the Chinese purchasers became themonopsonistic figures in the Thai durian industry. They could directly deal with ownersof durian orchards, whose products could be sold at higher prices. This practiceconsequently enabled the Chinese purchasers to prevent Thai middlemen having anaccess to durian supplies (Wannarat and Nattapon 2018). The higher price of durians,
offered by Chinese purchasers, also encouraged the Thai farmers to change their farms
into durian orchards. This change would inevitably enlarged quantities of durians in theThai market. The expanded numbers of durian farmers and products would enhance theChinese purchasers’ negotiating power in the Thai durian industry. In other words, thehigher number of durian orchards in Thailand could increase monopsonistic power of theChinese middlemen who would have more choices of suppliers.
In a similar fashion to the primary sector, the Chinese agencies were one of the mostimportant sellers and buyers in the secondary sector, especially manufacturing products(see more details from Trin 2020, 113-116; 118-119. On the one hand, the Chinesepurveyors used a pricing tactic to penetrate the Thai markets of various manufacturing
products, including textile, electric and electronic goods. Because of the lower price of
the Chinese products, some Thai entrepreneurs started to import manufacturing goods
from factories in China instead of buying from the Thai producers. The Chinese purveyors
also opened their stalls in particular provinces, for example, Bangkok and Udon Thani,
the regional center in the Northeast, to sell textiles and apparels (Lin and Keeratiporn
2017, 59). Additionally, some of Chinese purveyors attempted to sell their manufacturing
products, especially heavy industrial goods like cements and steels, by involving in theconstruction of the high-speed railway (HSR) project linking Bangkok and Nakhon
Ratchasima, a regional center in the Northeast.
Simultaneously, the factories, located in China, became one of the biggest purchasers ofThailand’s intermediate products, such as electronic integrated circuits and parts of5

computers. The US-China trade war unsurprisingly damaged Thai manufacturers, who
produced these intermediate goods, since a demand for these goods from China decreased.
The decreased demand for the China-origin goods resulted from the trade policy of theAmerican government which imposed several barriers on imported goods from China. In
contrast, The disruption of a supply of Thai intermediated goods could negatively affected
the Chinese factories, which needed to purchase these goods to do their businesses, as
happened in the case of Thailand’s massive flood in 2011 which disrupted production ofhard-disk drives. The chinse factories, hence, needed to import hard-drive disks from
Malaysian sources to continue production processes of personal computer plants in China(Abe 2014, 149).
In the tertiary sector, the influence of Chinese agencies as purveyors and purchasers was
also clearly manifested via several incidents, although the statistics might not apparently
illustrated the monopolistic and monopsonistic power in this sector (see more detail from
Trin 2020, 123-127). On the supply side, the Chinese purveyors played a limited role in‘traditional’ services in retails, for instance, convenient stores or shopping malls. But they
dominated retail activities on an online platform as the platform like Lazada or Shopee
became household names for Thai consumers who started to be familiar with online
shopping. The domination in the online shopping partially resulted from the policy that
tried to promote e-commerce as a part of China-ASEAN bilateral trading activities (seeexample from Hua 2016, 34.1).
Furthermore, the Chinese purchasers became the key players who was able to determine
the situations in some service markers, namely, higher education and tourism. In 2013,
Chinese students accounted around 35 percent of total foreign students enrolling in Thai
universities (Sukanya 2017). The Chinese businesspersons even took over some Thai
universities, e.g., Krirk University and Stamford International University. The inflows ofChinese students into the Thai universities was driven by not only educational reasons
but also economic objectives since several Chinese students aimed to grasp commercial
opportunities in Thailand after they graduated (Wannachok 2018). For tourism sector, theChinese tourists was the biggest group of the foreign tourists in Thailand for many years
6before the outbreak of COVID-19. Despite some contributions to the Thai economy, theactivities relating to the Chinese tourists caused particular troubles for the Thai society. A
case in point was “low-cost tourism” that offered the Chinese travelers a low price tourist
package in exchange of buying overpriced goods in specific shops. The low-cost tourism
inevitably damaged Thailand’s image and overlooked benefits of the Thai people who
hardly gained from this activity (Chairirk 2015, 55-58).
Based on this part’s description, the project initially tackles the question of whether thewidespread of COVID-19 and the trade war between China and the United States ofAmerica have altered the status of the Chinese agencies as one of the most influential
purchasers and purveyors in Thailand. This project, however, adds other aspects of crossborder economic resources apart from movement of tradable goods. The project
specifically analyses flows of capitals and humans in the new normal era created by the
COVID-19.

2. Flows of Tradable Goods between Thailand and China
The flows of tradable goods between Thailand and China did not significantly change by
the widespread of COVID-19 regarding to the statistics of trade between 2018 and 2022.
Specifically, Details of flows of tradable goods, both export and import, between Thailand
and China are derived from the statistics collected by the Center of Information
Technology and Communication, the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministryof Commerce and Thai Customs (2023). According to the statistics, China was Thailand’s
biggest partner between 2018 and 2022, in terms of values of trade. In this period, theproportion of Thailand’s trade with China to total trade was around one-fifth (20%) to
one-fourth (25%). In other words, situations of trades with China could substantiallyaffect trajectory of Thailand’s international trades.
Likewise, Japan and the United States of America were the second-largest and the thirdlargest trade partners of Thailand, respectively, from 2018-2021. But, in the 2022, theUnited States of America became the second-largest while Japan went down to the thirdlargest. The proportions of Thailand’s trade with Japan and the United States of America
7were around 10 to 18 percent. Statistically, the proportion of Thailand’s trade with thethree biggest partners was about 30 to 40 percent in the period of 2018 to 2022. Hence,the economic and trading situations of China, Japan, and the United States of America
could have a significant impact on Thailand’s economy and trading activities, since thesecountries accounted for nearly half of Thailand’s total trade with the world.
The status of China as the biggest partner of Thailand in recent years, to some extent,
reflected the Thai elites’ perceptive towards changes in international politics and economy.
The Thai elites, especially during the military-dominated Prayuth government (20142023), perceived China as the benevolent central kingdom because the Chinese
government committed to non-interference principle and gave political support to thejunta (Cogen 2019, 38). Notably, the Thai elites utilized China to counter the interferenceof the American government, which occasionally asked the junta to organize the election
to give power back to civilians. When the Pentagon decided to scale-down Thailand-U.S.
joint military training, the Chinese, on the contrary, enlarged the military exercise. The
Thai government under the junta shifted from balancing strategy to being accommodate
with China’s interests that sometimes compromise the national interest of Thailand.
In addition to the changing relation with the United States of America, the Thai state also
adjusted its relation with Japan due to the Japanese government’s strategy and Thai
people’s perception towards the latter. Japan relied on the soft power tactics, which mainly
consisted of persuasive methods. Japan, thus, could maintain her friendly and stable
image but these tactics prioritized “geographical status-quo” in the regional level rather
than recreating Japan as the alternative power, apart from China and the United States ofAmerica (Carminati 2020). In contrast, China adopted the soft power strategies in a more
active fashion with economic linkages, despite being risky. The Thai state started tocooperate with the Chinese agencies in some areas, such as high-speed railway
development, in a higher degree. Furthermore, according to the survey, the sampled Thai
people would not support Japan to strengthen her presence in the region since these people
realized that China was the biggest trade partner (Saifullah, Narut, and Zakiul 2023). The
Thai people explained that the Japanese initiative to counter China’s presence could8disrupt peaceful environment and damage Thailand’s economy whose revenues
increasing relied on the Chinese market.
Thailand’s trading relation with China and the World

Table 1: Thailand’s trade with China (Unit: million baht)
Activities/Year

2019

2020

2021

2022

Trade (China)

2,480,419

2,494,287

3,301,717

3,678,998

Export (China)

902,188926,646

1,173,761

1,191,875

Import (China)

1,578,231

1,567,640

2,127,955

2,487,122

Trade Balance (China)(676,043)(640,993)(954,194)(1,295,247)

Source: Comprised from the Center of Information Technology and Communication, the Officeof the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs (2023)

Table 1 shows details of trading statistics of Thailand-China trade. From 2019 to 2022,
Thailand and China needed to impose more strict control measures on borders to containthe widespread of the COVID-19. These measures, however, did not have any negative
impacts on Thailand-China bilateral trade, as illustrated by Table 1. The volume of
Thailand-China trade substantially increased from around 2.4 trillion baht in 209 to 3.6
trillion baht in 2022. Similarly, the value of Thailand’s export to China gradually
increased from around 0.9 trillion baht in 2019 to about 1.2 trillion baht in 2022. Despite
the pandemic causing both countries to strictly control the borders, the value of Thailand’s
trade with and export to China did not decline in any year in the period of 2019-2022. But
the value of Thailand’s import from China slight decreased from about 1.57 trillion baht
in 2019 to 1.56 trillion baht in 2020. The import’s values recovered to around 2.1 and 2.4
trillion baht in 2021 and 2022, respectively. From the perspective of Thailand, the concernof her trade with China should be the growing values of trade deficits, which sharply
increased from around 0.67 trillion baht in 2019 to 1.3 trillion baht in 2022. In other words,
the trade with China might not bring benefits, in terms of gains of foreign exchanges, toThailand.
Thailand’s trade deficits with China resulted from massive amounts of inflows of Chinese
9goods. With the help of the online platform, such as TikTok, some Thai purveyors choseto import cheaper Chinese goods to sell it to Thai consumers. These cheaper goods from
China outcompeted the Thai products as the Chinese manufacturers, notably in textiles,
had lower costs of production and ability to produce in a large scale. The inflows ofcheaper goods, consequently, deteriorated revenues of Thai Small-and-Medium
Enterprises (SMEs), which had to ‘unfairly’ compete with Chinese goods(Prachacharthurakij, April 12, 2023). The leading figure of the Thai SMEs’ association
requested the government to inspect whether these Chinese imported goods comply withThailand’s regulations.
As of April 2023, the top ten Chinese imported goods in the Thai market consisted of (1)electric machines and parts, (2) electric appliances, (3) chemical products, (4)machineries and parts, (5) computers, (6) equipment and parts, (7) irons/steels andproducts, (8) minerals, metal scraps, and products, (9) metallic products, and (10) vehicles
and electronic circuits (Prachacharthurakij, April 12, 2023). Briefly, the list of Thailand’s
top ten imported goods from China indicated that Thai people bought a huge amounts ofmanufacturing goods from China, in terms of values. This situation, to some extent,
implied that the Thai manufacturers lost their competitive edge against the Chinesecounterparts.
Inflows of Chinese goods to Thailand were additionally increased by the introduction of
new regulations in other markets, such as the United States of America or European Union(EU). A case in point was Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) imposed by
EU on goods exported to the European market. The EU’s authority has started to enforce
CBAM since the first of October of 2023 to importers of six groups of goods, both
upstream and downstream ones. These groups of goods include (1) iron and steel, (2)aluminum,(3)

cements,(4)

fertilizer,(5)electricity,

and

(6)

hydrogens(Prachachartthurakuj, December 14, 2023). CBAM makes the imported goods in thesegroups become more expensive in the European market because CBAM will act likecarbon taxes applied to the importers. As a consequence of the application of CBAM, theChinese manufacturers have shifted their export destinations from European countries to10Southeast Asian ones, including Thailand. The shift in export markets has led to increase
in inflows of Chinese manufacturing goods, according to the above list, to Thailand. Thissituation has worsened Thailand’s trade deficits with China.
According to the statistics of the Center of Information Technology and Communication,
the Office of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs(2023), Thailand’s exporting goods to the Chinese market were mainly primary products,
minerals, intermediated goods like parts and components. In 2022, Thailand’s top fifteen
exporting goods to China were (1) fruits (fresh, chilled, frozen, and dried), (2) rubber
products, (3) plastic pellets, (4) cassava products, (5) computers, parts and components,(6) chemical products, (7) rubbers, (8) woods and wood products, (9) other manufacturing
products, (10) coppers, (11) electronic circuits, (12) machineries, parts and components,(13) agricultural manufacturing goods, (14) motorcycles, parts and components, (15)
automobiles, parts and components. The values of these fifteen exporting goods
accounted for around 77 percent or more than third-fourth of the total value of Thailand’s
export to China in 2022.
Table 2: Thailand’s trade with the World (Unit: million baht)
Activities/Year

2019

2020

2021

2022

Trade (World)

15,054,049

13,659,853

17,094,524

20,526,714

Export (World)

7,628,400

7,183,567

8,568,939

9,957,072

Import (World)

7,425,648

6,476,267

8,525,584

10,569,641

Trade Balance (World)

202,751

707,300

43,355(612,569)

Source: Comprised from the Center of Information Technology and Communication, the Officeof the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs (2023)

Table 2 illustrates details of trading statistics of Thailand’s trade with the World. Between
2019 and 2020 when there was no effective way of vaccination against the COVID-19,
the value of Thailand’s trade with the world market decreased from 15.05 trillion baht to13.66 trillion baht. Specifically, in the same period, the value of Thailand’s export
decreased from 7.63 trillion baht to 7.18 trillion baht and the value of Thailand’s import11also decreased from 7.43 trillion baht to 6.48 trillion baht. The value of Thailand’s tradestarted to rise subsequently as the value reached 17.09 trillion baht and 20.53 trillion baht
in 2021 and 2022, respectively. The values of Thailand’s export also rose to around 8.57
trillion baht in 2021 and 9.96 trillion baht in 2022. Thailand’s import values
simultaneously increased to 8.53 trillion baht in 2021 and 10.6 trillion baht in 2022.
Somewhat similar to trades with China, Thailand’s trade balance with the World
continually deteriorated overtime. Remarkably, the value of Thailand had a surplus intrade with the world in 2020 when its value reached 0.7 trillion baht. But the surplus got
smaller to the level of just 0.43 trillion baht in 2021 before Thailand confronted with a
trade deficit, whose value was around 1.3 trillion baht, in 2022. This situation can raise
the question of how and why the widespread of COVID-19 has related to the deteriorationof Thailand’s trade balance with the world. The answer of this question does not relate toimpacts of the pandemic but related to a consequence of the effectively recovery from the
COVID-19.
Thailand’s trade deficit was primarily caused by imports of energies, especially oils,
whose prices substantially rose in recent years. In 2022, the value of imported fuel goods
increased by 67 percent, compared with 2021 (Thansetthakij, October 15, 2023). The
value of Thailand’s imports of fuels and energies reached around 2.1 trillion baht in 2022.
The increase in imported fuels’ values resulted from not only rising demands of energies,
caused by the normalization of economic activities in various parts of the world, but also
the invasion of Russia to Ukraine that worsened the situation of high energy prices(Prachachartthurakij, March 6, 2023). The growing deficit of Thailand’s trade with theWorld illustrated that the Thai economy heavily relied on imported resources, particularly
oils and fuels. This situation could implicitly pinpoint the Thai economy’s vulnerability.
After illustrating the bird’s eye view picture of Thailand-China trade, the project discusses
some specific goods which can reflect some changes in economic relationship between
Thailand and China. These goods consist of fruits, material goods, capital goods,
automobiles, and military goods.

12Fruits

Between 2019 and 2022, China was the biggest market of Thailand’s export ofagricultural goods, including crops, livestock, and fishery products. The values of theseexports were about 0.19 trillion baht to 0.36 trillion baht, according to the statistics of theCenter of Information Technology and Communication, the Office of the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs (2023). Likewise, Japan andthe United States of America were the second-biggest and third-biggest markets of theThai agricultural goods in the same period. As mentioned earlier, Thailand’s biggest
exporting goods to China were fruits (fresh, chilled, frozen, and dried), in terms of value.
In 2022, the value of exports of Thai fruits to China accounted about 14 percent ofThailand’s total export to the Chinese market. In terms of the proportion to Thailand’s
total export of agricultural goods to China, the exports of fruits gained around 46 percent
or nearly half of the total value of this kind of export.
A case in point of Thailand’s exporting fruits to China was durians, regarded by several
people as the king of the fruits. The values of Thailand’s exports of durians skyrocketedfrom about 26.34 billion baht in 2019 to 106 billion baht in 2022. Based on this statistics,
the widespread of the COVID-19 had limited or no effects on Thailand’s exports ofdurians. This situation means that durian exports accounted for 29 percent or around onethird of Thailand’s total exports of agricultural products to the Chinese market. The top
five destinations of Thailand’s durians in 2022 were China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Malaysia, and the United States of American but China gained the lion’s share as themarket for Thailand’s durian exports. In 2022, the value of Thailand’s export of durian to
China was around 106 billion baht which accounted for 96 percent of the Thailand’s total
value of durian exports. In other words, nearly all of Thai durians were exported to theChinese market that consequently made the export of Thai durians become vulnerable tosituations in the Chinese market.
The vulnerability of the Thai durians to the situations in China can be obviously seen
during the peak of the pandemic, although the value of Thailand’s durian exports

13increased. As the Chinese government under Xi Jinping employed “zero-COVID’
measures that seriously controlled and monitored cross-borders, the Thai durians andmiddlemen were damaged by these measures. Notably, the zero-COVID measuresindirectly forced the middlemen, both Thai and Chinese, to lower their buying prices fromdurian farmers, in spite of the preexisting agreement of the prices (Prachachartthurakij,
February 15, 2020). In details, the zero-COVID measures presented a huge cost and risk
to the exports of Thai durians and other fruits because of higher logistic costs. Following
the strict measures, every truck and container needed to be inspected by the Chinese
officers at the borders (Thansettakij, April 30, 2022). If the Chinese authorities at theborders found the defection infection of the corona virus in the exporting durians
frequently, the authorities would be able to close the border for Thailand’s exports.
Material goods

Between 2019 and 2022, the value of Thailand’s imports of material goods from China
gradually increased from 534.8 billion baht to 986.23 billion baht, according to thestatistics of the Center of Information Technology and Communication, the Office of thePermanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs (2023). Similar tothe case of durian exports, the COVID-19 seemed to have limited impacts on material
good imports. Unlike the export of Thai durians, China did not gained the lion’s share ofthis activity since the imports of Chinese material goods accounted for about 22 percent
or one-fifth of Thailand’s total imports of material goods in 2022. However, China wasstill the biggest sources of Thailand’s material goods in this period. The ratios of Japanand Taiwan in material good imports of Thailand were about 13 percent and 7 percent,respectively, in 2022.
According to the report of the Office of the National Economic and Social Development
Council (NESDB), the increase of material good import was a result of the rising in global
demands of particular products, such as electric and electronic goods. This condition
expanded the import of raw material goods, for example, electronic parts, to cope withthe production for rising demands. This situation could imply that the increase in14

Thailand’s imports of material goods from China related to the recovery of the global
demand for electric and electronic goods. Even before the outbreak of the COVID-19,
Thailand began to import material goods from sources in China and Southeast Asia that
had replaced Japanese counterparts (Upalat 2019, 7). In recent years, Thailand has
increased imports of material goods than China since her producers have climbed inhigher position in global value chains (GVCs).
In contrast, China was not the biggest market of Thailand’s material goods, particularly
minerals and fuels. In 2019, China imported minerals and fuels from Thailand around31.61 billion baht and was the fourth-largest importer. But the value of China’s importsof minerals and fuels from Thailand sharply decreased to merely 18.38 billion baht in
2022 and China became the ninth-largest importer. In a similar fashion to mineral andfuel exports, Thailand also confronted with the decrease of exports of other material
goods, particular plastic pellets, due to the lowered demands of Chinese consumers. The
lowered demands were results of the collapse of big Chinese real estate firms, especially
Evergrande, and the rising living costs in the Chinese market (Praphasri 2023).
Capital goods

Between 2019 and 2022, the value of Thailand’s import of capital goods from China
increased from 534.8 trillion baht to 871.45 billion baht, according to the statistics of theCenter of Information Technology and Communication, the Office of the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs (2023). In 2022, the share ofimported capital goods from China accounted for around 37 percent of Thailand’s total
imports of capital goods. This situation, hence, meant that Thailand significantly reliedon the Chinese capital goods. But the value of Thailand’s export of machineries to China
was in the range of around 17 billion baht to 23.65 billion baht in the same period. From
2021 to 2022, Thailand’s exports of machineries hardly grew as their values just merely
increased from around 23.1 billion baht to 23.65 billion baht or the values just increased
only 2 percent.
Simultaneously, Japan and the United States of America were the second-largest and15third-largest sources of Thailand’s imported capital goods mostly between 2019 and 2022.
Except for 2021, the United States of America was the fourth-largest sources of capital
goods while Malaysia replaced the former as the third-largest one. But in this period,
Malaysia was mostly the fourth-largest sources of imported capital goods. In 2022,
Japanese and American sources accounted for 17 percent and 7 percent of Thailand’s total
values of imported capital goods, respectively. Statistically, the value of Chinese capital
goods in the Thai market was higher than the sum of the Japanese and Americancounterparts in 2022.
This kind of situation in imports of capital goods in Thailand also happened in other
Southeast Asian countries. According to Tanuwidjaja and Santoso (2023), ASEAN
members imported a vast amount of electric machineries and equipment as well as othercapital goods for specific activities. Tanuwidjaja and Santoso also describes that thesecountries imported machineries and mechanical appliances from Japan. The imports ofcapital goods played an important role in creating ASEAN countries’ trade deficits with
China and Japan. Compared to other countries in the region, Thailand experienced the
deepest deficits with China; Thailand’s deficit reached 9.8 billion UDS, approximately,in 2022.
Despite the potential of growing trade deficits partially caused by imports of capital goods,
Thailand inevitably relied on these imported products from China and Japan. These
capital goods were crucial for producing manufacturing goods, which have been among
Thailand’s most important exports. When demands for these exporting products in foreign
markets increased, the factories, located in Thailand, needed to import a higher quantitiesof these capital goods. For instance, the value of Thailand’s import of iron processing
machines reached 23.47 billion baht in the first nine month of 2023 (Thamonton 2023).
The import of these machines grew by around 4.6 percent, compared to last year. China
and Japan were in the top five of the largest sources of these machines, along with Taiwan,
Germany, and South Korea. The growth of the imports of these machines related toincreases in Thailand’s exports of automobiles, especially trucks, whose values reached
297 billion baht in the same period.
16Automobiles

Between 2019 and 2022, the value of Thailand’s imports of automobiles and equipmentfrom China increased from 84.48 billion baht to 97.1 billion baht, according to thestatistics of the Center of Information Technology and Communication, the Office of thePermanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs (2023). In thisperiod, the peak year of Thailand’s import of Chinese automobiles and equipment was
2021 when the value reached 103.84 billion baht. China-made automobiles andequipment accounted for around 22.64 percent of the total value Thailand’s imports ofautomobiles and equipment in 2022 while this ratio had been only 18 percent in 2019. In
brief, the proportion of China’s automobiles in total imported automobiles in Thailandrose in this period. This situation enabled China to enjoy her status as the second-largest
sources of import automobiles and equipment in Thailand.
In contrast, the value of Thailand’s imports of automobiles and equipment from Japanslightly decreased from 144.43 billion baht in 2019 to 120.33 billion baht in 2022. Similar
to China-made automobiles and equipment, the peak year of Thailand’s imports of thesegoods from Japan was 2021 when the value reached 130.68 billion baht. Japan-madeautomobiles and equipment accounted for around 27 percent in 2022 but this value had
been 30 percent in 2019. This situation, hence, illustrated that Japan-made imported
automobiles and equipment faced a substantial decline in both absolute and relative terms.
Although Japan were the largest sources of Thailand’s imports of automobiles andequipment in the period of 2019-2022, her quantities of imported products and ratios ofthe market sales got smaller.
To some extent, the rise of China-made vehicles and equipment and the relatively declineof these products from Japan correlated to the growing popularity of Electric Vehicles(EVs) among Thai consumers. Based on the report of Silarom (2022b), the quantity ofimported EVs from China was around 59,735 units of EVs in the first-nine months of2022. This quantity indicated increase in Chinese EVs by 176 percent, compared to thesame period in 2021. Because of the growing market in Thailand, some Chinese EVs

17producers, such as BYD (Build Your Dreams), GWM (Great Wall Motor), and Hozon
Auto planned to relocate some of their production plants to Thailand. These Chinese EVs
producers also took advantage of zero rate of import taxes based on China-ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement (Thansetthakij, October 27, 2021). The Japanese counterparts
expressed the opinion that the practice of zero import tax would not led to the faircompetition in the automobile market.
However, the losing competitive of Japanese automobile producers in Thailand wasderived from not only policies on import taxes but also their inability to compete in thedevelopment of EVs technologies. Silarom (2022a) explains that the Japanese automobile
producers developed and adapted to EVs production slowly, compared to the Chinesecounterparts. The slow development and adaption of the Japanese companies could causesome problems to Thailand since her economy relied on the networks of the Japanese
automobile production and assembly.
Military goods

Between 2019 and 2022, the value of Thailand’s imports of military goods from China
skyrocketed from around 4.59 billion baht to 52.16 billion baht, according to the statisticsof the Center of Information Technology and Communication, the Office of thePermanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Thai Customs (2023). But thevalue was quite unstable in this period. For example, this value increased from around4.59 billion baht in 2019 to 5.63 billion baht in 2020 before decreasing to about 2.93
billion baht in 2021. These unstable values, thus, made the ration of imported China’s
military goods to the total value of Thailand’s import of these goods being fluctuated. For
instance, this ratio was just 8 percent to Thailand’s imports of military goods in 2020 but
rose to 38 percent in 2022. Notably, China was the biggest source of Thailand’s military
goods in 2022 while the United States of America were the third-largest source, despite
being the largest source for many years.
On the contrary to China, the United States experienced a decline of their exports ofmilitary goods to Thailand. The value of the former’s military good export to Thailand
18

decreased from 72.76 billion baht in 2019 to 14.58 billion baht in 2022. The share ofAmerican military goods to total value of Thailand’s imported military goods sharply
from 84 percent in 2019 to merely 10 percent in 2022. From 2019 to 2020, the UnitedStates of America was the largest source of the Thailand’s imported military goods. The
turning point was 2021 when China slightly outcompete the American counterpart by themargin and became the largest source. Nevertheless, in the period of 2019-2022, the valueof Thailand’s imports of military goods reached the lowest point in 2021. This situation
was a result of the widespread of the COVID-19 virus which drove the government to cut
budgets of military affairs, including purchases of military goods (Thansetthakij, January
12, 2022).
The growing values of Thailand’s imports of military goods from China correlated withthe close ties in military affairs between two countries since the Prayuth government hadcome to power in 2014. Between 2014 and 2019, the Thai and Chinese militaries
organized joint-training programs regularly and settled more than 10 major arm deals,such as submarines and battle tanks (Fulco and Chen 2023). The surge of exports ofChinese military goods to Thailand also indicated the improvement of China’s capacity
in providing high-tech military equipment with lower prices. In contrast, as recent as May
of 2023, the American entity refused to sell F-35 to the Thai Air Force on the basis oftraining and technical issues (Reuter, May 25, 2023). Some commentators interpreted therefusal to sell F-35 as a sign of declining security relations between Thailand and theUnited States of America.

3. Flows of Capitals between Thailand and China
The flows of capitals between Thailand and China, particularly capital inflows from thelatter to the former, dramatically changed in the closing period of the 2010s. According
to Statista (2023), the values of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows from China
varied from about 400 million USD to 1,100 million USD between 2012 and 2018.
However, the values of Chinese FDI inflows to Thailand were never lower than 1,200
million USD in the period of 2019 -2022. The peak year of China’s FDI inflows to19

Thailand was 2020 when its value was 1,882.88 million USD while this value reachedthe lowest point of 1,271.8 million USD in 2022. Even the lowest value of the period of
2019-2022 was still higher than the peak year of the previous period covering from 2012
to 2018. The total value of China’s FDI inflows just illustrates a faction of the changes inflows of Chinese capitals to Thailand.
Regardless of increase in FDI inflows from China, Japan stills provided a higher amountof FDI inflows of Thailand between 2019 and 2022, according to the statistics of the Bankof Thailand (2023). The values of the Japanese FDI inflows were volatile in this period.
In 2019, the value of Japan’s FDI inflows was 85.34 billion baht before this value declined
to 41.44 billion baht in 2020. The value of the Japanese FDI inflows, nonetheless, rose toaround 106.77 billion baht in 2021, but this value went down to the level of 64.43 billion
baht in 2022. Likewise, the inflows of the United States of America to Thailand increased
from minus 96 million baht to 46.09 billion baht in 2022. However, in 2019 and 2022,
Singapore was the biggest provider of FDI inflows to Thailand as it provided more than
100 billion baht of FDI inflows in both years. Remarkably, the values of Singapore’s FDI
inflows to Thailand were 161.75 billion baht in 2019 and 132.75 billion baht in 2022.
These data illustrated that China was not the biggest source of FDI inflows to Thailand
since her values of FDI inflows were lower than Singapore and Japan, although the valueof China’s FDI was rising.
Another aspect of the situation of capitals between Thailand and China can be seen fromthe statistics of numbers of foreign investors which applied for the promotion from theBoard of Investment (BOI). The primary aim of the BOI is to encourage foreign investors
to conduct economic activities in Thailand by giving some kinds of promotion, especiallytax reduction and exemption for some amounts of time. In 2019, there are 227 Japanbased projects applying for the BOI’s promotion of the foreign investors. These Japanbased projects accounted for 23 percent of the total numbers of the foreign projects
applying for BOI’s promotion. In the same year, Chinese companies applied 203 projects
for the BOI’s promotion (Board of Investment, 2020). However, the value of the Chinese
investment projects, which applied for BOI’s promotion, was higher than the Japanese
20

counterparts in 2019. Specifically, the values of the Chinese and Japanese projects were261.71 billion baht and 73.10 billion baht, respectively. The value of the Chinese projects
was nearly four times higher than the value of the Japanese projects. The value of theChinese projects accounted for 52 percent of the value of every project of foreign
investors applying for the promotion of BOI.
In 2022, there are 293 Japan-based projects applying for the BOI’s promotion of theforeign investors. These Japan-based projects accounted for 27 percent of the total
numbers of the foreign projects applying for BOI’s promotion. In the same year, Chinesecompanies applied 158 projects for the BOI’s promotion (Board of Investment, 2023).
The numbers of the Japanese projects was higher than the amounts of the Chinesecounterparts by nearly hundred percent. However, the value of the Chinese investment
projects, which applied for BOI’s promotion, was higher than the Japanese counterparts
in 2022, similar to the situation in 2019. Specifically, the values of the Chinese andJapanese projects were 77.38 billion baht and 50.77 billion baht, respectively. Different
from 2019, the value of the Chinese projects was higher than the value of the Japanese
projects by merely fifty percent in 2022. The value of the Chinese projects accounted for
18 percent of the value of every project of foreign investors applying for the promotionof BOI. The location of the BOI-promoted foreign projects were primarily concentrated
in Cholburi and Rayong, the coastal provinces in the East, and Phra Nakorn Sriayudhya
in the Central Plain because these locations have had important industrial estates.
The statistics of China’s FDI inflows to Thailand and the Chinese projects applying for
BOI’s promotion in the period of 2019-2022 indicated that the widespread of COVID-19
had limited impacts on the flows of capitals between China and Thailand. When thesituation of COVID-19 hit rock bottom in 2020 and 2021, the inflows of Chinese FDI
still entered the Thai economy. In this year, the activities of Chinese FDI included
manufacturing products, such as rubber tyres and tubes, automobiles and parts, as well as
financial services (Aranya and Banu 2021). Different from the Japanese FDI inflows
which aimed to maintain their well-established production bases in Thailand, the Chinesecounterparts intended to utilize the location of Thailand as a hub to expand their outreach21

to market in Southeast Asian countries and other regions (Aranya and Banu 2021).
Notably, the Chinese investors could gain from Thailand’s location in the center ofSoutheast Asia to extend their commercial opportunities.
In addition to the location, the Chinese investors allocated their capitals to do specificbusinesses in several Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the border towns, such as, Nong
Khai, Nakhon Phanom, and Mukdahan in the Northeast, Chiang Rai in the North, Tak andKanchanaburi in the West, and Songkhla in the South (Aranya and Banu 2021). The SEZs
attracted Chinese capitals by presenting well-developed infrastructure, favorable tax
practices, and abundant supplies of cheap labors to the Chinese investors. Each SEZ
became a hub for particular businesses of the Chinese investors. For example, theseinvestors focused on the production of rubber manufacturing goods in Songkhla SEZ
while the electric manufacturing companies mainly operated their production in Nakhon
Phanom SEZ.
Furthermore, the situation of China’s FDI inflows to Thailand was not only unaffected by
the pandemic, but also blessed by trade war between Washington D.C. and Beijing. In thecondition of the trade war, the American government imposed a higher rate of importtaxes on Chinese goods. For instance, the Trump administration raised rates of importtaxes for Chinese furniture and appliance from 10 percent to 25 percent. As reported by
Apronrath (2020), the practices of trade war by the American state incentivized theChinese companies to relocates their plants and factories into Thailand. The relocation to
Thailand resulted from the Chinese companies’ attempts to avoid the tougher American
import taxes. Concomitantly, the Thai government also implemented a set of incentives
policies to attract the relocated Chinese capitals. The Thai government, additionally,organized a roadshow to invite the Chinese companies to allocate some of their resources
to Thailand. Other Southeast Asian countries, particularly, Vietnam also experienced thesimilar situation of the relocation of the Chinese firms which wanted to evade the higher
rate of American tariffs (Onichi and Cho 2019).
Along with the relocation of the Chinese companies, the trade war encouraged the22

Japanese capitals, particularly in automobiles and electronic goods, to inject moreinvestment funds in Thailand (Huang 2019). One of the most important destination ofthese Japanese companies’ products is the American marker. In other words, the trade war
encouraged both Chinese and Japanese companies to relocate from China to Thailand.
The higher rate of import tax, imposed by the American government, on Chinese products
made China-origin goods more expensive in the eyes of consumers in the United Statesof America.
Moreover, the flows of Chinese capitals also occurred in other domain, such as real estateowning and hot-pot restaurants. Between 2018 and 2021, Thailand was the first choicesof Chinese investors in residential properties, according to the survey of the top ten
destination for living of Chinese buyers (Lee 2023). The flourishment of Chinese
investment of residential building not only reflected the closer economic ties between
China and Thailand, but also raised the prices of properties and encouraged theconstruction of high-end residences in Thailand (Prem 2023).The position of Thailand asa favorable location for living, nonetheless, fell to the fourth and fifth position in 2022
and 2023, respectively (Lorenzzo 2023). The decline was caused by China’s domestic
economic problems, such as stagnation, youth unemployment, and lower exports. These
problems conditioned the Chinese investors to reconsider about their decisions to allocate
funds in foreign countries, including Thailand.
Likewise, some Chinese businesses, particularly small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs),
started to open restaurants and convenient stores (Wilawan, 2023). A case in point was
the expansion in the numbers of the Chinese-owned Sichuan-style hot-pot restaurants in
Bangkok. Remarkably, several Chinese businesspersons owned and operated hot-pot
restaurants in Yaowarat, dubbed as the “first China-town,” and Huai Khwang, known as
the “second China-town.” Nowadays, these hot-put restaurants have become one of themost popular choices for dining out in Bangkok.

4. Flows of Human between Thailand and China
Similar to other countries where were confronting with the pandemic, the flows of human23across the borders of Thailand and China was negatively disrupted by stricter measuresof border controls. Between 2019 and 2022, the numbers of Chinese tourists travelling toThailand dramatically decreased from 11,138,658 people to just 219,421 people, basedon the statistics of the Ministry of Tourism and Sports (MOTS) summarized by Thai PBS(December 29, 2022). The peak year of Chinese tourists in terms of number was 2019
when the Thai economy could generate revenues from inflows of these travelers from
China to the level of more than 530 billion baht. Similarly, Thailand received around 10
million Chinese tourists in 2018 that generated incomes more than 520 billion baht. The
data of numbers of Chinese tourists and the incomes from their arrival explicitly
illustrated that Thailand became highly dependent on revenues generated by inflows ofChinese travelers in recent years. Remarkably, Thailand experienced the lowest numbersof the Chinese tourists in 2021 as only 13,043 of Chinese people travel to Thailand. The
widespread of COVID-19, hence, damage Thailand’s revenues gained from inflows of
the Chinese tourists because of restrictions of international travels imposed by both theThai and Chinese governments.
Due to the importance of the Chinese tourists to the Thai economy, the Thai government
repeatedly launch a campaign to invite and incentivize the Chinese tourist to revisit
Thailand. Recently, the current Thai government of Srettha Thavisin from Puea Thai Party
has just implemented the policy of free visa for Chinese tourists since September of 2023
(BBC Thai, September 25, 2023). Srettha even went to welcome the first groups of thefree-visa Chinese tourists by himself. The Srettha government also allowed tourists from
Kazakhstan to travel to Thailand without visa. The policy of free visa has aimed tostimulate the numbers of Chinese tourists in Thailand by loosening immigration controls.
The number of Chinese tourists started to recover even before the free visa policy, but
their expenditure per head declined since these Chinese tourists chose to live in Thailand
with the cheaper way (BBC Thai, September 25, 2023). In summary, Thailand has started
to receive a higher numbers of Chinese tourists but not gained revenues back to the preCOVID level because of declining expenditures.
Apart from the short of expectation in gaining revenues from the Chinese travelers,24

Thailand have not met the expected numbers of Chinese tourists because of changes intheir behaviors and regulations of the Chinese government. Based on the information of
the Thai guide, the Chinese tourists faced hardships from adverse conditions of economic
recession, caused by COVID-19, and fewer numbers of low-cost airline services (Head2023). These conditions have reduced the Chinese tourists’ incentives to travel toThailand. The incentives of Chinese tourists have been also reduced by the movies “NoMore Bets,” which portrays Southeast Asia as a dangerous region (Head, 2023). The
movies has led to the fear of the Chinese tourists’ fear toward Thailand. Additionally, theChinese tourists have tended to take a vacation in their countries instead of spending
holidays abroad due to the government policies (Thairath, November 23, 2023). These
policies includes the promotion of domestic tourism and issues of a new passport in alimited amount. These policies have made traveling abroad become less attractive. In
short, the Thai government’s policies to attract the Chinese tourists have been partly
nullified by the economic conditions and government policies in China.
As mentioned in the previous section, the flows of human from China to Thailand also
happens in the form of investment by Chinese entrepreneurs who have sought commercial
opportunities in Thailand. For instance, several Chinese entrepreneurs have opened
Sichuan-style hot-pot restaurants in particular areas, such as Yaowarat or Huai Khwang,in Bangkok (Wilawan, 2023). These Chinese-owned hot-pot restaurants have enjoyedadvantages over Thai competitors because the former can have an access to the Chinese
suppliers, who provide ingredients, utensils, and decorations from China with low
shipping costs (Manager, January 13, 2023). This kind of practices of the Chinese
restaurants hardly leads to spillover to the Thai people, who was nearly cut out of thecircuit.
However, the owners of these Chinese restaurants need to find some Thai persons asnominees since the foreign-owned entities could not register in Thailand formally(Manager, January 13, 2023). Notably, these owners mainly started their restaurants when
they had held a tourist visa, not a business one. This kind of situations has been even more
intensified in particular provinces, such as Bangkok, Phuket, and Chiang Mai after the25

Chinese government has loosened measures on COVID-19 controls. Taking Chiang Mai
in the post-COVID-19 era as an example, the Chinese investors have started to open andexpand their businesses in specific sectors, namely, hotels-accommodations, tours,
restaurants, logistic services, and real estates, according to Panlop Saejiw, the Presidentof the Council of tourist industry in Chiang Mai (Prachachartthurakij, February 6, 2023).
These Chinese investors have also received assistances in legal issues from the Thaibusiness partners.
Thailand is stills a popular destination for Chinese students who want to study aboard in
higher education level, similar to the pre-COVID situation. A case in point of a Thai
university is Krirk University in which Chinese investors have held 49 percent of share,
the maximum level allowed by the Thai law. The Krirk University’s Chinese students
took online courses during the peak of COVID-19 widespread and, then, they have begun
to study onsite when some COVID-19 control measures were lifted (Thanyaporn 2023).
In 2022, there were 36,060 foreign students in universities of Thailand. In the same year,
the Thai universities had 21,906 Chinese students which accounted for about 60 percent
of total foreign university students in Thailand. Remarkably, some universities,
particularly privately-owned institutions, primarily rely on revenues from the Chinese
students’ enrollment. For instance, Chinese students constituted nearly 70 percent of total
students in Krirk University (Thanyaporn 2023). The Chinese investors’ acquisition of
the Thai universities has changed the pedagogy practices of these universities. These
Chinese-acquired universities have changed the primary language in the classes from Thai
to Chinese (Thairath, April 9, 2023). These universities have recruited Chinese students
who fail an examination into public universities in China and want to acquire additional
economic opportunities and social prestige from the status of foreign graduated.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the project argues that the widespread of the COVID-19 virus has had
limited impacts on flows of commodities and capitals between Thailand and China but
the outbreak of the virus, on the contrary, disrupted flows of human across the borders of26

both countries for a year or couple. Initially, the continuous growth of commodity flows
between the Thai and Chinese economies implied that Chinese purchasers, particularly intropical fruit market, can maintain their monopsonistic power, similar to the pre-COVID
situation. The Chinese purveyors can concomitantly can preserves their shares in somecommodities, such as material goods and capital goods, and become a new important
players in specific sectors, for example, automobiles and parts as well as military goods.
The values of China-Thailand bilateral trade continuously grew in this period, along withthe widened Thailand’s trade deficits with China.
Furthermore, the outbreak of the corona virus, which simultaneously happened as thetrade war between China and the United States of America, has not led to the reductionof China’s FDI inflows to Thailand. In contrast, there was increase in inflows of Chinese
FDI during the times of COVID-19 due to the trade war, which made Chinese goods more
expensive in the American market. Different from the pre-COVID era, a higher numberof Chinese investors and commercial projects strategically relocated to Thailand to extend
their businesses in Southeast Asia. Despite the growing value of China’s FDI inflows toThailand, Singapore and Japan were still among the largest sources of FDI in Thailand.
Moreover, the COVID-19 heavily disrupted the flows of people between Thailand andChina since both countries’ measures against the pandemic prevented them from travelingacross the borders. As expected, the lift of some measures dealing with COVID-19 hasrecovered human flows, particularly the inflows of Chinese people into Thailand.
However, these inflows have been primarily driven by economic and educational
opportunities, instead of leisure travel. In several occasions, the flows of human between
Thailand and China can be rarely separated from the trans-border capital mobility of bothcountries. Recently, the inflows of Chinese capitals have begun to cause anxieties among
the Thai people, especially the business owners directly competing with newcomers from
China.
Finally, the project would like to finish by raising a question of economic relations
between china and Thailand in the coming years when we can comfortably manage the27living with COVID-19, regarded as the “new normal” by some commentators. In a
specific manner, the report would like to inquire that whether the Chinese actors will havehigher power over several markets in the Thai economy or not. This inquiry is based on
the facts that these actors from China have expanded and extended their presences inThailand as we can see increase in values of bilateral trades, FD inflows, and numbers ofChinese immigrants.
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29https://www.nesdc.go.th/nesdb_en/article_attach/article_file_20220815090518.pdf.
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Asia.” Nikkei Asia Review, June 10, 2019. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade-war/Tradewar-steers-Chinese-investment-toward-Southeast-Asia.

“Phawa baht on Thai khaddul khankha pung paed duaen tidloblaew samjudha saenlan [Afraid ofdepreciation of Thai baht, Thailand’s trade deficit continues for 8 months reaching the level of 0.35
trillion baht” Thansetthakij, October 15, 2023. https://www.thansettakij.com/business/tradeagriculture/578576.



Piratorn Punyaratabandhu and Jiranuwat Swaspitchayaskun. 2018. “The Political Economy ofChina-Thailand Development under the One Belt One Road Initiative: Challenge andOpportunities.” The Chinese Economy 51 (4): 333-341.

Praphasri Osathanont. 2023. “Songok thai pai chin sorveudpao langsettakij danmungkon puentuacha[Thailand’s export to China tends to miss the target as the Chinese economy faced slow recovery].”
Krungthepthurakij, August 26, 2023.https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/business/economic/1085382.

Prem Singh Gill. 2023. “Thailand’s real estate boom: The impact of Chinese investment.” The
Diplomat, October 4, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/thailands-real-estate-boom-theimpact-of-chinese-investment/.



Saifullah Akon, Narut Charoensri, and Zakiul Alam. 2023. “South and Southeast Asian
Perceptions of Japan’s Strategic Rise for a Balanced Indo-Pacific: A Cross-National case Studyon Bangladesh and Thailand.” East Asia. DOI: 10.1007/s12140-023-09405-9.

“Sathiti sib pee yonlung nuktongteaw chin ma thai [Statistics of Chinese tourists travelling toThailand in a last decade (2012-2022].” Thai PBS, December 29, 2022.
https://www.thaipbs.or.th/now/infographic/67.



Silarom 2022a. “Lok kumlungpai EV tae yanyong Thai kaitai pungpa tae yeepun kaengsuchin-indo
maidai [The World is moving towards EV technologies but the Thai automobile sectors is walking
dead as they heavily rely on Japan that makes them lose their competitive edge with China andIndonesia].” Workpoint TV, April 27, 2022. https://workpointtoday.com/kkp-research-automobillthai-vs-global-ev/.



Silarom. 2023b. “‘Thai’ sue roteevee maksub nai ASEAN numkhao jak chin pung nungroy
jedsibhok percent nai khao duaen [Thailand is the biggest buyer of EVs in ASEAN as it imported
from China that increased by 176 percent in the first-nine months of 2022].” Workpoint Today,
November 3, 2022. https://workpointtoday.com/thai-ev-asean2022/#:~:text=ล่าสุด%20ใน%209%20เดือนแรก,เบลเยียมและสหราชอาณาจักร.

“Sinkhachin hnee CBAM talak khao Thai khaddulpung [Chinese goods avoided CBAM to theThai market causing a huge trade deficit].” Prachachartthurakij, December 14, 2023.
https://www.prachachat.net/economy/news-1458356.

“Sinkhachin talak khaiphan TikTok thaikhaddulchin pung 1.3 lanlanbaht [Chinese goods sold via
TikTok causing trade deficits of 1.3 trillion baht].” Prachachatthurakij, April 12, 2023.

30

https://www.prachachat.net/economy/news-1260883.
“Song ngobjudsur arwud sam laotub yuk rattaban bigtu [Investigation of arm purchase budget ofthree military organisations in the era of the Prayuth government].” Thansetthakij, January 12,2022. https://www.thansettakij.com/politics/509987.



Statista. 2023. Annual Flows of Foreign Direct Investments from China to Thailand between 2012 and2022 (in million U.S. dollars). https://www.statista.com/statistics/720401/china-outward-fdi-flows-tothailand/#:~:text=This%20statistic%20shows%20the%20annual,around%201.27%20billion%20U.S.
%20dollars.



Sukanya Lewis. 2017. “Karn khaoma khong nuksuksa tangprathet kab phonkathob tor prathet
Thai [Inflows of foreign Students and their Impacts on Thailand].” Thansettakij, July 5, 2017.
https://www.thansettakij.com/content/173979.

Tanuwidjaja, Enrico and Agus Santoso. 2023. ASEAN: Deepening Trade and Financial InterConnectivity for Sustainable Growth – Macro Note. UOB, June 8, 2023.
https://www.uobgroup.com/web-resources/uobgroup/pdf/research/MN_230608.pdf.

“Thai khaddul khankra morkhor songhahokhok kwa seejudhok punlanlaen sungsud nairob sib
pee [Thailand’s trade deficit in January of 2023 was more than 4.6 billion USD, the highest in
the decade]. Prachachartthurakij, March 6, 2023. https://www.prachachat.net/economy/news1222311.

“Thailand air force says U.S. has denied request to buy F-35 jets.” Reuters, May 25, 2023.
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/thailand-air-force-says-us-has-deniedrequest-buy-f-35-jets-2023-05-25/.

Thammonton Marketeer. 2023. “Thai numkhao kaengjak paeruproha to seejudhakhao percent
sumphan songbook rotyon chead samsaenlarn [Thailand imported metal processing machines
grew 4.59 percent correlating with increase in automobile exports reaching 300 billion baht].”
Marketeer, March 11, 2023. https://marketeeronline.co/archives/328706.



Thanyaporn Buathong. 2023. “Yan chin mai Bangkhen-Ramindra kub karnruk kuebkhaoma
khong thunchin nai mahawittayalai Thai [New Chinese district of Bangkhen-Ramindra and thepenetration of Chinese capitals into the Thai universities].” BBC Thai, December 23, 2023.
https://www.bbc.com/thai/articles/c03ymvpev74o.

“Thunchin buk chiangmai robmai yud thurakij tongthaew – jee sakad nominee “The new waveof Chinese capitals’ invasion that is dominating tourism industry – Asking the Thai state tocontain the practice of nominee].” Prachachartthurakij, February 6, 2023.
https://www.reic.or.th/News/RealEstate/456969.

“Thunchin yud mahawittayalai thai khaeruaen phaseesungkhom dungdud chin runmai ma thai[Chinese capitals is taking over Thai universities, which attract new generation of Chinese
students to Thailand by tuition fee and social prestige].” Thairath, April 9, 2023.
https://www.thairath.co.th/scoop/interview/2676163.

Trin Aiyara. 2020. “Purchasers and Purveyors: Impacts of Chinese Actors in the Thai Economy.”31In タイ経済とメコン ( Thai Economy and Mekong – ITI Research Series 100) , edited by
Takahashi Yoshi, 100-139. Tokyo: ITI (Institute of Trade and Investment).


United Nations. 2019. UN Comtrade Database. https://comtrade.un.org/data/.



Upalat Korwatanasakul. 2019. Global Value Chains in ASEAN: Thailand (ASEAN-Japan Centre
Paper 10 (March 2019)). Tokyo: ASEAN-Japan Centre.
https://www.asean.or.jp/ja/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/GVC-in-ASEAN-paper-10_Thailand.pdf.

“Virus COVID-19 ponpit longchin kodrakha durian yudrubsur “rungnok-kung [COVID-19
negatively impacts, Chinese middlemen drove durian’s prices down and stop buying of” bird nestshrimp].” Prachachartthurakij, February 15, 2020.https://www.prachachat.net/local-economy/news421696.



Wannachok Chaisaard. 2018. “‘Kayun mungmun huakarnkha’ mue nuksuksachin ma ruean
maung Thai [“Diligent, Determined, and Business-Minded” When Chinese Students Study inThailand].” Post Today, January 11, 2018. https://www.posttoday.com/politic/report/534883.



Wannarat Tantrakonnsab and Nattapon Tantrakoonsab. 2018. “Thai Export of Durian to China” In
Impact of China’s Increasing Demand for Agro Produce on Agricultural Production in the Mekong
Region, edited by Koji Kuba and Shozo Sakata. Bangkok: Bangkok Research Center, JETRO
Bangkok/IDE-JETRO. https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Download/Brc/pdf/21_05.

Wilawan Watarasakvej. 2023. “porkha markhai thai dinron su tunchin ruk chinatown [Thai merchants
are struggling against the invading Chinese capitals].” Benars News (Thai), March 24, 2023.
https://www.benarnews.org/thai/news/th-bangkok-chinatowns-chinese-investors03242023170726.html.

“‘Zero-COVID’ Chin tub durian Thai songok saenlan lunratuk [China’s “Zero-COVID” damaged
Thai durians putting risks to exports of 100 billion baht].” Thansettakij, April 30, 2022.
https://www.thansettakij.com/economy/523060.

1

ASEAN is the interstate organizations of the Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, the Phillipines, Brunei, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

2

These three countries consists of China, Japan, and South Korea.

32

〔禁無断転載〕

Expansion and Penetration: Influences of the Chinese
actors in the Thai Economy in the Post-COVID 19 era

発行日2024 年 3 月

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