Ahmet Kerim Gültekin

Kurdish Alevism
Creating New Ways ofPracticing the Religion

Working Paper #18

Working Paper Series of the HCAS
“Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”#18: Ahmet Kerim Gültekin. “Kurdish Alevism: Creating New Ways of Practicing the
Religion”
Leipzig University, 2019.
© Ahmet Kerim GültekinThis Working Paper has been published online and can be downloaded fromwww.multiple-secularities.de/publications/working-papers or ordered in print via
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Please cite as:
Gültekin, Ahmet Kerim. “Kurdish Alevism: Creating New Ways of Practicing the Religion.” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West,
Beyond Modernities” 18. Leipzig University, 2019.

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Contents

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 3
A Brief Socio-Historical Framework for Several Identity-Driven Notions:
Kurdishness, Alevism, Kurdish Alevism and Dersim .................................. 6
A Brief Summary of Socio-Religious Organisation: Raa Haqi ................. 12Creating New Ways of Maintaining Religion .............................................. 17
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 23
Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 25

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Kurdish Alevism

Creating New Ways of Practising the Religion

Introduction
This paper will examine the transformation dynamics of social change in
Kurdish Alevi communities, while mostly focusing on the increasing sociopolitical and religious role of talips. Until the end of the 20th century, thesocio-religious structure of Kurdish Alevis was dominated by two hereditarysocial positions, much like a caste system: on the one hand, the membersof the sacred lineages (ocaks), who embody the religious authority, and on
the other hand, the talips who are subordinated to the sacred lineages. Thissocio-religious structure provided a framework for Kurdish Alevi socioreligious organisations.
Large-scale destruction in the course of the 20th century greatly affected
Kurdish Alevi tribal communities, destroying their cultural institutions, andtearing apart religious relationships between sacred lineages and their followers. Over time, talips were able to take the initiative with regard to theorganisation of the religion and identity politics. This paper will analyse
the reformation of religious practices from the theoretical perspective ofreligion-making.1 For around two decades, talips have been instrumentalising sacred places – a core component of Kurdish Alevi belief – in a way that
reproduces Dersim cultural identity. This has led to an intriguing example ofa religion-making process, in which some Western notions of both religion
and politics have taken hold. While struggling against the Turkish state for
official recognition of their religious and national identity, Kurdish Alevis
began to form new religio-political institutions, theological discourses andeven rituals that included some modern notions and ideas. For example, theyclaimed gender equality, social harmony, environmentalism, modernism (inthe sense of living a Western lifestyle) and secularism (in the sense of being
politically opposed to Islam, which the AKP regime in Turkey represents) as
core discourses and distinguishing features of the religion.
1

Markus Dreßler, “Modes of Religionization: A Constructivist Approach to Secularity,”
Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 7 (Leipzig: 2019): 3–16.
3While the transformation and re-making of Alevi religious identity has been a popular topic in international academia since the religious
revival of Alevism began in the 1990s, the case of the Kurdish Alevis stillrequires further attention. The cultural transformation dynamics of contemporary Kurdish Alevism reveal unique sociological examples in termsof religion-making processes. Kurdish Alevis have experienced large-scalesocio-cultural changes in recent decades. They have spread around theworld, with many moving to Western Europe. Their lifestyles have changed
dramatically; they have faced forced evacuations because of the war between armed guerrilla groups and the Turkish state. With their geographic
area mostly destroyed, they have had to leave behind rural lifestyles. This,in turn, resulted in the disintegration of Kurdish Alevis’ socio-religiousorganisations and practices. Nevertheless, Kurdish Alevis still maintainclose contact with their sacred and beloved land, Dersim. While the socioreligious obligatory relations between sacred lineages and their followers(talips) have almost vanished, sacred place beliefs have become increasingly
important in maintaining the ability to practise the religion and are representative of the cultural identity. More importantly, in my view, while sacredplaces have always been seen as a practical way of practising the religion,
talips have taken the initiative with regard to re-producing2 the religion.
Tunceli, a small, Kurdish-Alevi-dominated province in Eastern Turkey,
has played an important role in the revival of Kurdish Alevism. The province
can be regarded as a socio-cultural centre, whose significance is acknowledged far beyond the region’s borders. The historical name for the region was
Dersim, a name that has been pushed to the fore with the revival of Kurdish
Alevism. Although Tunceli and Dersim are used synonymously, I use Dersim
to refer to the cultural geographic area, that is, the area that Kurdish Alevis
associate with their re-invented ethno-religious identity. Nowadays, Dersim is
not only a powerful symbol, but also serves as a reflection of transnational
Kurdish Alevi communities. Today’s Tunceli province should be regarded
as a religious/sacred centre of the community. Kurmanci- and Kırmanckispeaking Kurdish Alevis, who can be considered sub-communities of thelargest religious minority in Turkey (the Alevis), constitute the majority ofthe population of Tunceli.
2

I understand ‘re-producing religion’ to be part of ‘re-producing culture’, that is, the ideathat social relations and structures are continuously renewed.
4Despite Alevism and Kurdishness being popular topics in international
academic circles since the 1990s,3 Kurdish Alevism remained less known
until the turn of the century. Kurdish Alevi identity involves intersected
cultural boundaries between Alevism and Kurdishness. Its cultural spherecreates a unique cultural identity, in that both identities gain new sociopolitical and ethno-religious aspects. Kurdish Alevis share many similarities with other Alevi communities. However, they have their own socioreligious organisations, sacred place practices, mythological discourses
and rituals. Although Kurdish Alevis now tend to define themselves as
Kurds, their cultural heritage gives rise to many differences compared withother Kurdish communities and Kurdish nationalist politics.
During the early republic, some state-related amateur researchers described Kurdish Alevis as the assimilated descendants of pre-Islamic Turks.4
This interpretation focuses on religious identity to define the particularity of
Kurdish Alevis. Others, who claim that Kurdish Alevis have entirely different
ethnic origins and a unique cultural origin that is referred to as Zaza, prefer
to focus on the language (Kırmancki) as a defining feature of their sociological particularity. These differing definitions reflect the fact that Kurdish
Alevism involves two sometimes conflicting cultural formations, namely
3

4

For the first detailed edited volume about Kurdish Alevis (for English readers), see: Erdal
Gezik and Ahmet Kerim Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis and the Case of Dersim: Historical andContemporary Insights (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019). There are also some academic
works (for English readers) that deal with religious, political, and historical aspects ofKurdish Alevis’ cultural identity. See: Besim Can Zırh, “Kırmančiya Belekê: Understanding Alevi Geography in Between Spaces of Longing and Belonging,” in Alevis in Europe:
Voices of Migration, Culture and Identity, ed. Tözün Issa (London, New York: Routledge,2017); Martin van Bruinessen, “Between Dersim and Dâlahû: Reflections on Kurdish
Alevism and the Ahl-i Haqq Religion,” in Islamic Alternatives: Non-Mainstream Religion in Persianate Societies, ed. Shahrokh Raei (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2017); Lokman
Turgut, “An Inside View of the Kurdish Alevis: Diwana Heq of Pir Ali Bali,” in Religious Minorities in Kurdistan: Beyond Mainstream, ed. Khanna Omarkhali (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2014); Janroj Keles, “The Politics of Religious and Ethnic Identity among
Kurdish Alevis in the Homeland and Diaspora,” in Religious Minorities in Kurdistan: Beyond Mainstream, ed. Khanna Omarkhali (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2014); Martin van
Bruinessen, “ ‘Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!’: The debate on the ethnic identity of theKurdish Alevis,” in Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East, ed. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, and Anke Otter-Beaujean (Leiden: Brill, 1997);
Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, Turkey’s Alevi Enigma (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003);
Peter J. Bumke, “Kızılbaş-Kurden in Dersim (Tunceli, Türkei): Marginalität und Häresie,”
Anthropos, no. 74 (1979).
Sabır Güler, Ötekinin Ötekisi – Etno-Dinsel Bir kimlik Olarak Alevi Kürtlüğün İnşası
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2019), 125.
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Kurdishness and Alevism. Given that Alevism and Kurdishness are not officially recognised religious or ethnic identities in the Republic of Turkey,
Kurdish Alevis have faced discrimination, oppression, alienation and forced
assimilation for centuries. Thus, both Alevi and Kurdish politicisation processes, which began in the early 1990s, have had significant multi-faceted
impacts on the re-producing of a Kurdish Alevi cultural identity.
The data analysed in this paper is drawn from long-term ethnographicalfieldwork conducted in Dersim in 2015 and 2016.5

A Brief Socio-Historical Framework for Several Identity-Driven
Notions: Kurdishness, Alevism, Kurdish Alevism and Dersim
Alevism is a highly controversial religious belief. Most scholars agree thatit can be defined as a unique religious system or a form of Islamic heterodoxy in Turkey. Debate surrounding Alevism seems to focus on the fivepillars of Islam6, especially when it comes to defining who a Muslim is.
Alevis do not follow the five pillars, although they have maintained certain
discourses and practices associated with the household of the prophet ofIslam for centuries particularly Ali (the prophet’s paternal cousin) and his
descendants – to define their religious identity. Kurdish Alevis emphasisesemi-deific characteristics of their hereditary sacred lineages rather thanIslamic historical figures in order to define the uniqueness of their religion.
Alevi communities mainly live in a wide geographical area that reaches
from the Balkans to the Middle East. Additionally, a sizeable number havebeen living in Western Europe for over half a century. They speak different
languages, have diverse historical backgrounds, belong to various ethnic
5

6This paper provides an abbreviated framework of some arguments from the larger project
report which will be published in Turkish. Ahmet Kerim Gültekin, Kemeré Duzgı’dan Düzgün
Baba’ya Dersim Aleviliğinde (Raa Haqi İnancında) Kutsal Mekânın Toplumsal Yeniden Üretimi– Kültürel Süreçlerde Süreklilik Halleri (İstanbul: Bilim ve Gelecek Yayınları, forthcoming). I
would like to thank Markus Dressler for his constructive feedback on this paper.
The five pillars of Islam refer to the five rules that are accepted as mandatory. These areshahadah, to accept Muhammed as a prophet of one, true God; salat, to pray five times
a day; zekat, to donate 2.5% of one’s income to the poor; sawm, to fast during Ramadan(the month of fasting) and hajj, to go to Mecca on pilgrimage. While there are differences
between how the main sects of Islam practise the five pillars, it is agreed that these acts
define what a Muslim is. Alevi communities also have different ways of understanding
and practising these pillars. However, the majority, and particularly Kurdish Alevis, do
not follow them.
6

identities and have different citizenships. They also have diverse religious
customs. Today, most Alevis live in Turkey. They are the main socioreligious and political actors of today’s multiple Alevisms7. Alevis in Turkey
are still struggling to gain official recognition from the Republic of Turkey,
despite being granted formal status as an Islamic sect or an independent religion by some European countries. Due to this contradictory position, they
have become a much-discussed topic between Brussels (EU) and Ankara(Turkey), especially given that Turkey is pursuing EU membership. Oncedefining Alevism became a matter of international politics and a legal criterion for earning constitutional rights, academic work relating to Alevism
started to gain importance.
Alevism, as a defining term, covers heterogeneous ethno-religious
communities throughout a vast geographic area and the term refers to various social, political, historical and religious contexts.8 Dressler establishes
four primary historical meanings of the term Alevi.9 First, Alevi is used to

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9

I use this term to include political and religious differences among Alevi communities. Fora brief understanding of various political orientations among Alevi associations, see: Tahire
Erman and Emrah Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 36,
no. 4 (2000).
For a comprehensive understanding of Alevism, see: Markus Dressler, “Alevīs,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 3, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas,
and Everett Rowson (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Celia Jenkins, Suavi Aydın, and Umit Cetin,
Alevism as an Ethno-Religious Identity: Contested Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2018);
Benjamin Weineck and Johannes Zimmermann, Alevism Between Standardisation andPlurality: Negotiating Texts, Sources and Cultural Heritage (Frankfurt a. M.: PL Publishers, 2018); Suavi Aydın, “The Emergence of Alevism as an Ethno-Religious Identity,”
National Identities 20, no.1 (2018); Issa Tözün, Alevis in Europe: Voices of Migration, Culture and Identity (London, New York: Routledge, 2017); Çakır Ceyhan Suvari and Elif
Kanca, “The Alevi Discourse in Turkey,” in Studies on Iran and The Caucasus, ed. Uwe
Bläsing, Victoria Arakelova, and Matthias Weinreich (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Talha Köse,“Ideological or Religious? Contending Visions on the Future of Alevi Identity,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 19, no. 5 (2012); Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Elise
Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Ali Yaman and Aykan Erdemir, Alevism – Bektashism: A
Brief Introduction (Istanbul: Barış Matbaacılık, 2006); Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga,
and Catharina Raudvere, Alevi Identity – Cultural, Religious, Social Perspectives (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 2005); Özlem Göner, “The Transformation of the Alevi
Collective Identity,” Cultural Dynamics 17, no. 2 (2005); David Shankland, The Alevis in
Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition (London: Routledge, 2003); Whiteand Jongerden, Turkey’s Alevi Enigma.
Dressler, “Alevīs.”
7refer to a member of the sacred lineage10 of Ali, who is a paternal cousin(and also son-in-law) of the prophet of Islam. Second, it defines a political
position for individuals who support Ali and the struggle that occurred
immediately following the prophet’s death. Third, as a result of this political aspect, the term refers to religious heresy. State-associated Islamic
authorities have described Alevism as heretical for centuries. Needless tosay, Islamic authorities represent Sunni domination (orthodoxy).11 Fourth,
Alevi is a product of Turkish modernism. This final understanding provides
the contemporary socio-political and religious framework for state-related
intellectual debates on Alevi communities in Turkey.
The term Alevism should be considered here as a result of the specificmodernisation processes Turkey underwent during the 20th century.12 Afterthe Republic of Turkey was established, intellectuals and ideologists ofTurkish modernism argued that the religious practices of Alevi communities were rooted in pre-Islamic Turkish traditions. Academics and politicians used Alevism to demonstrate that Arabic Islam was alien to modern
Turkish national and historical identity. Since the early Turkish Republic,
the heterogenic cultural dimensions of Alevi communities in Turkey havebeen classified, with Turkish/Turkmen Alevism, Arabic Alevism and Kurdish
Alevism established as the main classification categories. Accordingly, Alevis
10 Sacred lineages are a common phenomenon among Muslim societies and Alevis. Descendants of the family of Muhammad are also called Sharif or Sayyid. Kurdish Alevis use
the term Seyyid. Alevi families that claim descent from Muhammad are usually known asocaks (meaning hearth in Turkish). For more information, see: Kazuo Morimoto, Sayyids
and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet (London: Routledge,2012). See also: Sarah Bowen Savant and Helena de Felipe, Genealogy and Knowledge in
Muslim Societies: Understanding the Past (London: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
For sacred lineages in various Kurdish societies, see: Martin van Bruniessen, “Religion in
Kurdistan,” Kurdish Times 4, no. 1–2 (1991).
11 The terms ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy’ are controversial, particularly when used in relation to Alevism. They are often used to label politically unequal positions as more orless ‘correct’. For criticism of orientalist notions of ‘heterodoxy’, see: Mark Soileau, “Conforming Haji Bektash: A Saint and His Followers between Orthopraxy and Heteropraxy,”
Die Welt des Islams 54, no. 3–4 (2014); Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, “The Vefā’iyye, the Bektashiyye and Genealogies of ‘Heterodox’ Islam in Anatolia: Rethinking the Köprülü Paradigm,” Turcica, no. 44 (2012–2013); Markus Dressler, Writing Religion, 186–239; Janina
Karolewski, “What is Heterodox About Alevism? The Development of Anti-Alevi Discrimination and Resentment,” Die Welt des Islams, no. 48 (2008); Markus Dressler, “Howto Conceptualize Inner-Islamic Plurality/Difference: ‘Heterodoxy’ and ‘Syncretism’ in the
Writings of Mehmet F. Köprülü (1890–1966),” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
37, no. 3 (2010).
12 Dressler, Writing Religion, 1–31.
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in contemporary Turkey claim to have different ethnic orientations (Turkish/
Turkmen, Kurdish13 and Arabic). In addition, since Kurdish Alevis speak
two main languages – Kurmanci and Kırmancki – they are usually defined as
Kurds or Zazas. Kurmanci is well known as Kurdish and Kırmancki is mostly
known as Zazaki in contemporary Turkey. The majority of Kurdish Alevis
speak Kırmancki; the others speak both languages or only Kurmanci.14
Kurdish Alevis live in several eastern provinces of Turkey. Due toforced migration they also live in central and western parts of Anatolia.
Moreover, economic reasons have resulted in continuous migrations toWestern Turkey and Western Europe since the 1950s.15 Tunceli is locatedin the Eastern Anatolia region and is the only (Kurmanci-, Kırmancki- andTurkish-speaking) Alevi-majority province in Turkey, bordered by a tall
mountain range and a huge dammed lake. It could be said that the mountains and the lake create a psycho-geographical boundary for Kurdish
Alevis. So much so that they define the territory as a sacred land. The
Munzur Mountains run along its western and northern borders, while
the Bingöl Mountains are to the east, and the Keban Dam is to the south.
These geographic borders all separate Kurdish Alevis from the SunniMuslim-dominated world. In my previous works, I emphasized this region
13 Some researchers distinguish Kurds and Zazas as separate national identities when considering language, namely Kurmanci (Kurdish) and Kırmancki (Zazaki). For detailed ethnographic and historical information, see: Gezik and Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis, xx–xxiii.
14 The heated debate goes on between those who claim that Kurmanci and Kırmancki aredifferent dialects of Kurdish, and those who believe them to be entirely different languages (Kurdish and Zazaki respectively). On one side of the debate there is the Kurdish
nationalist position, which argues that Kırmancki is a dialect of Kurdish. On the otherside, people who do not pursue a Kurdish nationalist agenda describe Kırmancki and its
various dialects as Zazaki, and consider it to be a separate language to Kurmanci. Accordingly, Zazas (and the Alevis who speak Zazaki) are ethnically different from Kurds
as well as Turks. For a brief overview of the respective debates, see: Michiel Leezenberg,“Kurdish Alevis and the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s,” in Turkey’s Alevi
Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, ed. Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003); Paul J. White, “The Debate on the Identity of the Alevi Kurds,” in Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, ed. Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden(Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003). Ultimately, all ethnic terms, such as Turk, Kurd, Zaza andKırmanc, are directly related to religious identities in Tunceli and the surrounding regions.
Being a Sunni or an Alevi determines ethnic definitions. For more information, see: Ahmet
Kerim Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak: Ulusal ve Yerel Kimlik Öğelerinin Tunceli Pertek’te
Etnolojik Tetkiki (Istanbul: Berfin Yayınları, 2010), 49–74; Erdal Gezik, Dinsel, Etnik ve Politik Sorunlar Bağlamında: Alevi Kürtler (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 26–32.
15 Gezik and Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis, xix. See also: Keles, “The Politics of Religious andEthnic Identity,” 189.
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as inner-Dersim to emphasise that this is the core of the cultural geography of the Kurdish Alevi identity, constituting its historical and religious
centre.16 It is still the central reference point for their cosmology and theirritual practices. Inner-Dersim’s other names are Jaru Diyar (the SacredLand) or Herdu Dewres (the Land of Saints).17 These terms refer to a cultural belonging to a specific region, which stems from ancestral ties andtraditional religious knowledge. All sacred lineages of the Kurdish Alevis
trace themselves back to this territory.

Map of Tunceli province, the only (Kurdish) Alevi-dominated province in Turkey. The distribution of
local Sunni minority communities throughout the province is marked in black. Illustration by ÖmerAkyüz.18

From the 16th to early 20th century, Dersim was the name of an Eastern
Ottoman province. Until the Ottoman Empire was reorganised in the 19th
century, the large Dersim province encompassed today’s Tunceli and someof the surrounding provinces. The residents of Dersim province, Kurdish
16 Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak, 30.
17 While such terms as Kırmanciye Beleke (emphasising a multi-cultured social sphere),
Hardu Dewres (the Land of Saints) and Jaru Diyar (Sacred Land) are used to identify the cultural geography of Dersim, Raa Haqi (the Path of God/Truth), Ewladê Haq(the Children of God/Truth), Ewladê Raye (the Children of the Path) are used for selfidentification. There is obviously a strong symbolic tie between geography, sacredness
and socio-cultural belonging.
18 For more about Sunni communities of Dersim, see: Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak.
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Alevi tribes, were famed for their warrior characteristics and religious
heresy.19 Following the Ottoman-Safevid wars, the Çemizşgezek principality(the south-western district of Tunceli province today) was granted autonomy.20 This created relative autonomy for Kurdish Alevi tribes, who lived in
the mountainous (inner-Dersim) areas. Within a few centuries, the tribes
expanded their power and population (from the 16th century to the end of
the 19th century) to other regions through their famous plunder economy.
In contrast with their rising hegemony, Ottoman administrative reforms
started restricting the tribes to inner-Dersim, and gradually cut their relations with other tribes from the beginning of the 19th century.21 Due tothe ongoing skirmishes between the state and tribes in the region, Dersim
was defined by the Ottoman, and later the Turkish, bureaucracy as a place
to discipline, conquer, colonise and forcibly Sunnify.22 This was a hundredyear-long process, which culminated in the last rebellion in 1937 and the1938 massacre.23 Tunceli is the formal name of the province now, and wasgiven by the Turkish government following the unsuccessful rebellion.
19 Yalçın Çakmak, “II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kızılbaş/Alevî Siyaseti (1876–1909),” unpublished PhD Dissertation, Hacettepe University, 2018, 375–77.
20 Gezik, Alevi Kürtler, 67.
21 Gezik, Alevi Kürtler, 63–73.
22 Hüseyin Aygün, Dersim 1938 ve Zorunlu İskân, (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2009). The
Kurdish-Alevi-dominated population of Dersim was usually defined in Ottoman Turkish
as ahali-i gayr-i mutîa (‘disobedient people’) and the people who lived near the Kurdish
Alevi tribes were labelled ahali-i mutîa (‘obedient people’), namely Turkish- or Kurmanci-speaking Sunnis. For reports on Dersim written by civil and military officials, see also:
Faik Bulut, Dersim Raporları (Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2013).
23 The 1938 massacre was the main breaking point for the traditional socio-religious institutions of Dersim Alevism, and a foretaste of forced integration policies in the modern
era. It has decisive consequences for the evaluation of today’s ethnic identity politics andreligious aspects of Kurdish Alevism. See: Özlem Göner, “Histories of 1938 in Turkey
Memory, Consciousness, and Identity of Outsiderness,” International Review of Qualitative Research 9, no. 2 (2016); Hayal Hanoğlu, “Formation of Genocide Consciousness in
Dersim Society,” unpublished MA Thesis, University of London, 2015; Yıldız Yıldırım,“Cultural Memory in Post 1937–1938 Dersim Laments: Reflections On Trauma and Violence,” unpublished MA Thesis, Istanbul Technical University, 2013; Özlem Göner, “ASocial History of Power and Struggle in Turkey: State, Memory, Movements, and Identityof Outsiderness in Dersim,” unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Massachusetts,
2012; Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Dersim Massacre, 1937–1938,” Violence de masse et Résistance– Réseau de recherché, 27 July, 2011, https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr; Martin van Bruniessen, “The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion
in Turkey (1937–38),” in Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion
in Turkey (1937–38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988), ed. George J.
Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
11

It means bronze hand and symbolises the ultimate victory of the republic
over the tribes. The subject of identity in the region came to the forefront
again in the 1990s with the Kurdish Alevi uprisings and military campaigns.
It can be said that Dersim – both sociologically and spatially – characterises
the Kurdish Alevis of Tunceli and a vast area inhabited by Kurmanci- andKırmancki-speaking Alevis. 24

A Brief Summary of a Socio-Religious Organisation: Raa Haqi
Raa Haqi25 (in Kırmancki, the Path of Truth) is the traditional name for the
belief system of Kurdish Alevis. It is mostly called Kurdish Alevism today, arelatively new term that puts the focus on the ethno-religious identity.26 The
coherence of beliefs of nature and hereditary kinship relations are the uniquefeatures of Raa Haqi. In this system, the central role is held by sacred lineages. The obligatory religious relations between the sacred lineages, who
are themselves organised as tribes, and follower (talip) tribes, structure thesocial, political, economic and religious spheres of Kurdish Alevism. The
second major axis defining the peculiarity of Raa Haqi is the beliefs andpractices shaped around sacred places, namely jiare (in Kırmancki). Similarly, the rituals of Kurdish-Alevi beliefs also have two main dimensions. One
is related to sacred lineages and talips. Here, cem ceremonies27 and visiting
24 It is worth noting that, until 1915, Dersim was home to a large number of Armenians. As
a result of the Armenian Genocide, the population in the region decreased dramatically.
See: Raymond Kevorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History (London, New
York: I.B.Tauris, 2011). See also: Dressler, Writing Religion, 106–12.
25 See: Dilşa Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System, ReyaHeqi/Raa Haqi: Structure, Networking, Ritual and Function,” in Kurdish Alevis and the Case of Dersim: Historical andContemporary Insights, ed. Erdal Gezik and Ahmet Kerim Gültekin (Lanham: Lexington
Books, 2019); Erdal Gezik and Hüseyin Çakmak, Raa Haqi – Riya Haqi/Dersim Aleviliği
İnanç Terimleri Sözlüğü (Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2010); Erdal Gezik, “Rayberler, Pirler
ve Mürşidler,” in Alevi Ocakları ve Örgütlenmeleri, ed. Erdal Gezik and Mesut Özcan
(Ankara: Kalan Yayınları, 2013); Hüseyin Çakmak, Dersim Aleviliği: Raa Haqi (Ankara:
Kalan Yayınları, 2013).
26 For a brief insight into such new terms that aim to explain the uniqueness of the ethnic identity as well as the belief system of Kurdish Alevis, see: İmran Gürtaş, “Dersim
Alevilerinde Kimlik İnşası ve Travma,” in Kızılbaşlık, Alevilik, Bektaşilik Tarih-Kimlik-İnanç-Ritüel, ed. Yalçın Çakmak and İmran Gürtaş (Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2015),
309–27.
27 Cem ceremonies are the fundamental social and religious practices of Kurdish Alevi communities, which follow a particular procedure, though there may be some differences
12the ocaks of sacred lineages are the main characteristics of the socio-religious
aspect. The second is worshipping nature-based sacred places such as trees,
mountains, rocks, caves, rivers, lakes, fountains, the sun and the moon. Eachjiare is connected with a particular semi-deific being. They may be either
male or female and may have a kind or malicious character. Some of them
are related to sacred lineages.
MythicalAncestorsAşiret(Tribe)SacredLineages
positions

ActualAncestors

Ezbet(Subtribe)

Hane(Extended
Families)

Ezbet(Subtribe)

Hane(Extended
Families)

Hane(Extended
Families)

KurmanciandKırmancki
speaking
KurdishAlevisMürşid(the master)
Pir(the spiritual guide)
Rehber(practical guide)

Ocak(Tribe of
SacredLineages)

Talip(followers)
Talip(Tribe)Tribal structures and religious positions among Kurdish Alevi tribes.

The socio-religious formation of Kurdish Alevism can be likened to acaste system. Starting at the bottom and working upwards, first, there are
talips. They are the followers of sacred lineages. Talips mostly speak Kırmancki, but there are also Kurmanci- and Turkish-speaking talips andocaks in Dersim.28 To better understand current religion-making process,between the cem ceremonies of different Alevi communities. They are performed according to a religious calendar or on special occasions. All men, women, elders and children canparticipate in the ceremony, and it must be conducted under the strict religious and social
authority of the pir (this title may also be called baba, dede or seyit). During these gatherings, ritual practices are performed, and socio-political matters are discussed to make communal decisions. There may be punishment, yet violence (in the sense of killing) is strictly
forbidden. The utmost punishment is ex-communication. See: Çakmak, Dersim Aleviliği,66–113; Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System,
30” 45–75.
28 Ocaks are usually associated with missionary saints, such as Hacı Bektaş-i Veli, from the
9th to 13th century. According to this point of view, some pioneer Alevi creeds and theirfounders were turned into veli (saint) beliefs as well as socio-religious organisations intime. This process is reflective of demographic, economic and political factors which
continue to affect the formation of the socio-religious sphere of Alevism. For more information on processes of Islamisation of non-Turkish speaking communities such as
Kurds, Armenians, Anatolian Greeks etc., see: Ahmet Karamustafa, “Anadolu’nun İslamlaşması Bağlamında Aleviliğin Oluşumu,” in Kızılbaşlık Alevilik Bektaşilik – Tarih
Kimlik İnanç Ritüel, ed. Yalçın Çakmak and İmran Gürtaş (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları,
2015); Ahmet Karamustafa, “Yesevilik, Melametilik, Kalenderilik, Vefailik ve Anadolu
13

Talip
(Tribe)it is crucial to understand the social roles and the flexible characteristics
of relations between talips and pirs. Talips represent the majority of thecommunity. They live in tribal organisations and have sacred bonds toocaks, which they gain through birth (and which are unalterable). Deniz29
defines this relational system through the notion of receiving as well as
providing a religious service.30 She emphasises that while talips receive thereligious service, raybers, pirs and mürşids both receive (among themselves) and provide. Pir-talip relations could create a non-spatial element,
which can be re-produced anywhere and at any time. In fact, they havealready been re-produced in the metropoles of Turkey and in Europe inrecent decades.31 Second, there are raybers, who can be considered as local,
practical guides as well as consultants on religious issues. If the symbolismof Raa Haqi is considered a path to follow, guides are needed. A rayber’s
duty is to arrange meetings of pirs and talips. He collates crucial sociopolitical issues to be discussed during the cem ceremonies. He teaches religious ethics, informs about social rules and also holds a religious authority
as a consultant for socio-religious matters. Third, there are pirs (who need
to be seyits). Pirs are the spiritual guides of their followers, as well as the embodiment of the sacred lineage. They are believed to perform miracles (keramet) and to possess magical, mystic healing powers, as did their mythological forefathers. Some ocaks are especially well-known for their pirs, whofall into a trance during cem ceremonies. They are also the keepers of certain
holy objects32 that mostly belong to the mythological ancestors of sacred

29
30

31

32

Tasavvufunun Kökenleri Sorunu,” in Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf ve Sufiler, ed. Ahmet
Yaşar Ocak (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2005). We must question how some
Kurdish tribes converted to Alevism, while others followed Sunni sects, with both groups
viewing their socio-religious organisations as being shaped by the sacred lineages, whoclaim to have blood ties with the prophet’s household. It should also be noted that thisclaim is the main bond between Islamic cosmology and Kurdish Alevism.
Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System,” 55.
The service, traditionally, was carried out annually by pirs, who travelled (on foot) fromvillage to village to visit their talip communities in different regions. At every stop, a cem
ceremony was held under the pir’s leadership. These meetings are still essential for practising the religion, as well as maintaining social relations between talips and pirs.
See: Annika Törne, “Dedes in Dersim: Narratives of Violence and Persecution,” Iran and
the Caucasus 16, no. 1 (2012); Annika Törne, “On the Grounds Where They Will Walk
in a Hundred Years of Time: Struggling with the Heritage of the Past in post-Genocidal
Tunceli,” European Journal of Turkish Studies, no. 20 (2015); Tina Hamrin-Dahl, “The
Alevi and Questions of Identity, Including Violence and Insider/Outsider Perspectives,”
Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis no. 19 (2006).
There are different kinds of sacred objects in Dersim. They could be a cup, a glove or a14

lineages. They visit their followers annually and these journeys are sacred,too. It is a true reflection of following the path for both pirs and talips. Pirs
have the right to collect çıralık33 on these journeys. There is also a constantpopulation increase of sacred lineages and talip tribes, which is a direct
result of the growing population, as well as migration to different regions
and re-establishing the same socio-religious organisation. Finally, there aremürşids (or the pirê piran, pir of the pirs), who hold a superior position with
judicial authority among the ocaks. Ocaks also have similar obligatory relations between one another, as is the case between talips and pirs.34 The four
positions (talips, raybers, pirs and mürşids) symbolise four doors and forty
levels35, which should ideally be passed during a lifetime. This path can only
be followed with the help of a member (pir) of a sacred lineage for talips andpirs, too. Therefore, practically every member of this system is a talip, andshould have a rayber-pir-mürşid network to follow the path. This is where
the ikrar (sacred loyalty or sacred contract)36 comes in. It creates crucial religious and social bonds between individuals and ocaks as well as tribes. Some

33
34
35

36

piece of parchment. Some famous ones are called tarix. These are thin wooden sticks,
each one featuring a unique anthropomorphic character and each having a special name.
They are capable of special miracles and can transform into a snake (or dragon) during
cem ceremonies. They are also called jiare, the name that is also given to sacred places.
Accordingly, not only are they highly valuable, but also dangerous, mystic objects thathave to be kept by raybers or pirs and mürşids. They are used to heal, and are commonly
employed to treat people who are paralysed or suffering from psychological problems.
For more information, see: Gezik and Çakmak, Raa Haqi – Riya Haqi, 193.
A material or financial contribution to the pir, given by his talips. Sometimes talips pay
this contribution by undertaking work for pirs.
See: Gezik and Gültekin, Kurdish Alevis, xv–xxvii; Gezik, “Rayberler, Pirler ve Mürşidler,” 11–78.
Dört Kapı Kırk Makam (Four Doors and Forty Levels) is a metaphor for the spiritual
path. It refers to the four specific stages (şeriat, tarikat, marifet, hakikat) of the divine
path, and ten separate sub-stages for each one which must be passed under guidance of apir. Şeriat defines ten strict rules, defining orthopraxy to the believers. Tarikat defines asacred brotherhood, which means being a member of a creed. Marifet refers to mysticalknowledge about God/Truth, and finally Hakikat refers to being one with the ultimate
Truth. The aim of an Alevi individual is to follow the path, and try to reach the final
point, insan-ı kâmil (a person who is united with the ultimate truth). However, in the caseof Kurdish Alevism, all individuals pass the first, second and third Kapıs by right of birth.
Afterwards, by entering the ikrar-based sacred relationship musahiplik (see footnote 38),
they automatically reach the fourth stage. For more information, see: Gezik, Alevi Kürtler, 38–41. See also: Gezik, “Rayberler, Pirler ve Mürşidler,” 19.
For a more extensive explanation of the term ikrar, see: Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief
System,” 45–75.
15religious institutions, such as kirvelik37 and musahiplik38, which show thesocial and religious aspects of ikrar.
To summarise, Raa Haqi depends on a religious and socio-politicallyenclosed tribal organisation, which emerges through real and fictional kinships in relation to a tribe and an ocak (sacred lineage). The belief system
also has strong symbolic and functional institutions, such as kirvelik andmusahiplik. Interestingly, the social relations between talips and pirs seem
flexible. Taking socio-religious relations as a whole, the Raa Haqi belief
system can be examined within two main dimensions in the sense of practising religion: ikrar-based obligatory religious relations, and the worshipof sacred places. Ikrar-based obligatory religious relations establish social
relations between pirs and talips, as well as some obligatory relations between ocaks. The worship of sacred places could be said to provide more
space for individual piety given the fact that worshipping nature-basedsacred objects does not require any religious guidance or authority.
In the 20th century, Kurdish Alevis faced two major incidents that hada catastrophic impact on their social organisation. The first was the 1938
massacre. Almost all sacred lineages were severely affected: most were
killed and the survivors were exiled. This was the main breaking point for
the traditional socio-religious institutions of Dersim Alevism. Until the
1990s, Kurdish Alevis were able to re-organise the religious order, eventhough it was not quite the same as before 1938. Despite criticism from37 Kirvelik is a crucial fictional kinship among Kurdish Alevis and also a common tradition
within other Kurdish-speaking religious communities. It may be considered as a godfather relationship between two families. It is also a vital institution for social solidarity
in the region. It is based on male circumcision. See: Gültekin, Tunceli’de Sünni Olmak,
173–95. Kirvelik is also a way of establishing social, economic and even political alliancesamong different religious (Sunnis, Alevis, Christians, etc.) communities throughout the
Middle East, especially Kurmanci- and Kırmancki-speaking Kurdish communities. See:
Martin Strohmeier and Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, Kürtler: Tarih, Siyaset, Kültür (Istanbul:
Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013); Ayşe Kudat, Kirvelik: Sanal Akrabalığın Dünü Bugünü(Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 2004).
38 In Raa Haqi, the institution of musahiplik has a central importance. It is a fictional kinship, similar to kirvelik, and the most important way of establishing ikrar. One can only
be musahip to another Kurdish Alevi individual. Choosing a musahip from outside of
the community is forbidden. It is an obligatory ritual brotherhood for all Kurdish Alevis.
Every talip or rayber, pir, mürşid must has a musahip to be able to follow the divine path.
It is created through a ritual brotherhood of two young male members of the community.
Its actual purpose is to strengthen solidarity through strict social, religious and economic
obligations. See: Deniz, “Kurdish Alevi Belief System,” 45–75; Gezik and Çakmak, Raa
Haqi – Riya Haqi, 123–28.
16

the new generations who were greatly involved in armed socialist struggles
during the 1970s, pirs and talips (who survived the 1938 massacre) werestill in contact. In 1994, after clashes between armed guerrilla groups andthe Turkish state intensified, almost the entire area occupied by Kurdish
Alevis was forcibly evacuated. This was the second incident and seems
to have had a detrimental impact on traditional pir and talip relations.39
Nonetheless, sacred places remained unchanged. Shortly after the turnof the century, they became instruments for reinventing Dersim cultural
identity. This time, talips – who have always practised rituals at sacred places – have taken on a major role in recreating the socio-religious sphere, andmanaging the politics of cultural identity.

Creating New Ways of Maintaining Religion
Many Kurdish Alevis are still heavily involved in multi-sided politicalmovements, which are mostly related to socialist views and Kurdish nationalism. In recent decades, some Kurdish Alevi intellectuals have taken adifferent approach, which could be termed Dersim ethnicism. They argue
that Dersim Alevism or Raa Haqi seems to be a unique cultural system withunique religious, linguistic, historical, sociological and anthropologicalelements. They point to rare rituals, cosmological discourses, mythicalnarratives and the unwritten historical past of Kurdish Alevi tribes.40 This
new ethno-cultural discourse has been welcomed primarily by younger
generations and popularised through popular cultural materials such as
ethnic Dersim music rather than through political arguments.41
39 Forced evacuations and environmental destruction have played a specific role in the historical development of Kurdish Alevi communities. See: Martin van Bruniessen, Forced
Evacuations and Destruction of Villages in Dersim (Tunceli) and Western Bingöl, Turkish
Kurdistan September-November 1994 (Utrecht: Utrecht University Repository, 1995);
Joost Jongerden, “Resettlement and Reconstruction of Identity: The Case of the Kurds in
Turkey,” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 1 (2001); Jacob van Etten et al., “Environmental Destruction as a Counterinsurgency Strategy in the Kurdistan Region of Turkey,” Geoforum 39, no. 5 (2008); Joost Jongerden, “Village Evacuation and Reconstructionin Kurdistan (1993–2002),” Études Rurales 2, no. 186 (2010).
40 See: Gürtaş, “Dersim Alevilerinde Kimlik İnşası ve Travma,” 309–27.
41 On the role of music and media as identifiers of Dersim ethnic identity during the Alevi
Renaissance/Awakening, see: Leyla Neyzi, “Zazaname: Alevi Renaissance, Media andMusic in the Nineties,” in Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview, ed. PaulJ. White and Joost Jongerden (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003). Erdemir points out several
17

After the millennium, sacred places also gained very wide popularity
in line with the rise of Dersim ethnicism42 among Kurdish Alevis. They
became powerful indicators of cultural identity and symbols of Kurdish
Alevism. The practices surrounding sacred places also have strong political
implications. For example, the most influential argument against planned
dam projects on the rivers of Dersim in the mid-2000s43 drew on the ideaof defending sacred lands. With rural life in Dersim already destroyed,
Kurdish Alevis regarded the dam projects as another threat to the survivalof sacred land. Tunceli therefore became the only city where almost every
inhabitant marched to protest against the dam in 2014 – the largest marchseen in Turkey to this day in defence of the environment.
The aspect of social transformation in Kurdish Alevism that has attracted
the most attention is the increasing social and political role of lay individuals(talips) compared to the members of sacred lineages. Talip activities seemto be reshaping some conventional cultural institutions and obligatory religious relations, such as being member of the boards of the Alevi associations,which are also acting in the name of Alevism as a religion. This reveals that,
under certain conditions, individual social agency may have contributed to a
new type of religion-making process. It should be acknowledged that members of sacred lineages are also trying to use political activities to take advantage of their socio-political status for the purpose of re-establishing theirreligious prestige. For this to be achieved, pirs are instrumentalising sacredplaces via the cemevis that have been built in the region in recent years.
Cemevis gained importance among political Alevi movements after theymigrated to the metropoles of Turkey and Europe.44 Cemevi is the name forhistorical and social events to analyse increasing attention on Alevism among politicians
and intellectuals, which took place in the 1990s. The Alevi Awakening has also been
described as a process of discovery, enlightenment, innovation, coming out, revival, remaking, re-politicisation and the explosion of Alevism. See: Aykan Erdemir, “Tradition
and Modernity: Turkey’s Ambiguous Terms and Turkey’s Ambivalent Subjects,” Middle
Eastern Studies 41, no. 6 (2005); see also: Mehmet Ertan, Aleviliğin Politikleşme Süreci –Kimlik Siyasetinin Sınırlılıkları ve İmkânları (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017).
42 Some researchers refer to this as ‘Dersim revival’; see: Besim Can Zırh, “1980’ler Alevilik,
2000’ler Dersim: Uyanışı Anlamak,” Alevilerin Sesi 161 (2012), with reference to Alevi
Awakening.
43 See: Celal Cahit Agar and Steffen Böhm, “Towards a Pluralist Labor Geography: Constrained Grassroots Agency and the Socio-Spatial Fix in Dȇrsim, Turkey,” Environment
and Planning 50, no. 6 (2018).
44 At the turn of the century, cemevis became the main argument used by Alevi organisations to claim equal constitutional rights and official recognition from Turkey and the18the associations and buildings that have been established by almost all Alevi
communities since the 1990s to bring the community together to practise themost important Alevi ritual: cem ceremonies. They are also used for social
events, such as funerals and weddings. However, their political symbolism
implies much more than the provision of social services. Re-forming Alevism as a modern religion with a view to gaining official recognition requires
certain systematic rituals to be established, spatially redesigned sacred places
and rewritten theology and history, too. Various definitions of Alevism inannual EU Commission reports on Turkey have played an important role for
Alevi associations – both in Turkey and the EU – and impacted their political and religious discourses.45 The question of Cemevi has taken the central
position within these heated debates, explicating political stances and thus
revealing different faces of multi-Alevism.
Talips’ socio-religious interpretations are creating a new socio-religious
sphere. Talips are also using sacred places as signifiers of cultural identity.
Moreover, cemevis – whether as legal (EU) or de-facto (Turkey) institutional spaces of Aleviness in the 21st century – at sacred places create historicaland social continuity and give talips the chance to be a religious, politicalauthority which they had never been. In the following, I would like to shedlight on how sacred places became a determining factor for increasing thesocietal, political and religious roles of talips.
EU. Cemevis were presented by Alevis as undeniable proof of the religious uniquenessof Alevism. This policy quickly yielded results in the 2000s in some European countries(first in Germany) but not in Turkey. For the first time, Alevism was officially recognised
as an independent religious community. Despite Turkey’s negative attitude towards Alevism, the official status of Alevism in Europe had a large-scale sociological and political impact among all Alevi communities. Looking into Cemevis may provide potential
perspectives on religion-making processes in secularist contexts in the EU. For further
information on these processes and debates, see: Murat Es, “Alevist Politics of Place andthe Construction of Cemevis in Turkey,” unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University,
2006; Elise Massicard, “Alevi Communities in Western Europe: Identity and Religious
Strategies,” in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen et al. (Leiden: Brill,2010); Martin Sökefeld, “Alevis in Germany and The Politics of Recognition,” New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 28–29 (2003); Derya Özkul, “The Making of a Transnational
Religion: Alevi Movement in Germany and the World Alevi Union,” British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 2 (2019); Ali Çarkoğlu and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, “A Precarious Relationship: The Alevi Minority, the Turkish State and the EU,” South European
Society and Politics 16, no. 2 (2011); Besim Can Zırh, “Euro-Alevis: From Gasterbeiter toTransnational Community,” in The Making of World Society: Perspectives from Transnational Research, ed. Remus Gabriel Anghel, Eva Gerharz, Gilberto Rescher, and Monika
Salzbrunn (Bielefeld: transcript, 2008).
45 See: Besim Can Zırh, “Euro-Alevis,” 103–30.
19

Firstly, as a consequence of forced modernisation as well as politicalconflicts in the 20th century, the socio-religious relations between talips andpirs fell apart. Sacred places, however, remained. They had always playeda crucial role in providing a space for everyday religious practices. Kurdish
Alevis go to sacred places frequently as individuals or with householdgroups. These practices play a significant role in everyday religious life in
Dersim. All religious needs are supplied through such nature-based worship.
While the socio-religious organisations, which depend on the caste systemof talips and pirs, cover the collective ritual sphere, the sacred-place practices
give more independence to individuals, creating a shared sense of practising
religion without religious authorities. There was therefore no essential needfor cultural institutional relations between pirs and talips to practise rituals at
sacred places. For 21st-century talips seeking to strengthen their social position, sacred-place practices thus opened up the possibility of independence
from religious authority. In addition to this, sacred places gained decisive
importance for the enculturation of new generations. While rituals werebeing practised at sacred places, constituent elements of cultural identity
were reshaped in line with the talips’ perspective. Their everyday social cultures, political attitudes and religious tendencies started to fill the gaps that
had opened during the absence of the representatives of the sacred lineages.
The lack of traditional religious knowledge among the new generationsof Kurdish Alevis as well as the political activities of some pirs affected thisprocess. Increasingly, talips started to demand well-organised, systematic,
functional cultural knowledge of Alevi identity in terms of history, theology, linguistics and even sociology. In addition, heated debates and political tensions surrounding Alevism and the Kurdish issue in Turkey resulted
in a need to re-organise cultural heritage, re-positioning it in accordancewith contemporary transnational circumstances. This socio-political context put substantial pressure on the pirs. In order to maintain their religious prestige, they had to adjust to the political positions of their talips’
organisations or at least felt obliged to follow the political tendencies of
their talips. In addition to widely heterogeneous, complex social tribal aswell as individual networks among ocaks and their talips, multiple views
regarding Alevi politics developed. These diverse religio-political trends
are evident in the activities of associations, political parties, journals, etc.
Pirs thus face many challenges that they have to overcome if they want toobtain a political voice.
20

In the new context of post-1990 transnational Kurdish Alevism, pirs
were no longer the only representatives of the socio-religious cultural
sphere. New actors had emerged as a consequence of the politicisationof Alevism in the 1990s. These were talips, who had become involved in
re-inventing Kurdish Alevi identity. In addition, leading Alevi associations
engaged in negotiations with Turkish and European state authorities onbehalf of the Alevis. Thus, the religious part of Alevism (for example, the pir
and his duties), in the sense of acting and leading rituals, became more andmore separated from social and political aspects. This could be interpreted
as a kind of mutually beneficial agreement between talips and pirs.
Alevi associations’ numbers have increased as a result of politicisation.
At the same time, the pirs’ social and religious role has been reformulatedwith their authority restricted to religion. Some pirs have chosen to focus
on religious service only, and started to build their own cemevis at particular sacred places or in their villages.
Secondly, following the main break-down of socio-religious relations
between talips and pirs, sacred places remain as places where one can practically experience Kurdish Alevi cultural identity. Given that sacred places
always played a key role in everyday life, the pirs’ service was not necessarily required, except for cem ceremonies. Consequently, even Kurdish Alevis
living in places like Western Europe did not find it difficult to continue
their daily religious practices. Today, many Kurdish Alevis in Europe use
churches or even their own homes to light candles if they have no opportunity to go to a cemevi. Besides, being a member of a cemevi community candepend more on political than on religious positions.
Thirdly, there has always been a hidden tension between the sacredplace beliefs of talips and the religious authority of sacred lineages.46 Thistension could be interpreted as a way in which the talips justify theiroccasional resistance to their pirs’ decisions. There is therefore competition between pirs and talips over religious prestige and authority. In
some cases, talips have rejected pirs’ decisions, while legitimising theirown practices based on their own mystic interpretations of sacred places.
Today, ocak members are beginning to use popular sacred places in orderto re-establish their religious authority vis-à-vis their talips.
46 For some ethnographical data regarding the issue, see: Ahmet Kerim Gültekin, “Bir Derleme ve Bazı Notlar: Ahmet Dede ile Görüşme,” Munzur – Dersim Etnografya Dergisi, no.
19 (2004).
21

Pirs are also trying to provide religious services not just to their own
talips, who have to follow their ocak according to the cultural ideal, butalso to other talips. There is thus a transformation of obligatory hereditary
tribal religious relations with institutions being re-interpreted in line withnew organisational standards as well as changing socio-spatial contexts.
In other words, the religious institutions which used to depend on hereditary talip-rehber-pir-mürşid relations, are being abandoned and replaced byvoluntary membership in an Alevi association. Today, many Kurdish Alevi
talips can choose to be a member of any of the Alevi associations, or cemevi, and participate in activities regardless of who their inherited ocak is.
The information above is commonly outlined by academics writing
about societal change in Alevism. Below, I will briefly evaluate some preliminary outcomes of my project.
Fourth, talips’ new secular, political and social spheres, which have especially developed in Western European countries, have started to reshape sacred places spatially as well as socio-religiously. Pirs had to follow talips within this new religious-spatial context. As an example, owing to the Turkishauthorities’ continued discrimination against Alevis, the only way of gaining
planning permission to construct cemevis near to sacred places in Dersim isto establish them as legal associations. The boards of management of theseassociations are comprised of both talips and pirs, something that would
have been unthinkable in the hierarchical order of traditional Alevism. At
the same time, the growing prestige of sacred places and increasing numbersof cemevis has led to competition between different pirs, who seek to attract
followers’ attention in order to strengthen their religious authority.
The talips’ relatively autonomous religious sphere has gained new features in Western Europe. Following their successful efforts to gain formal
recognition in Europe (in contrast to their counterparts in Turkey), Alevi
associations were eager to take advantage of opportunities that opened
up to them. This quickly resulted in a situation that might be described as
multi-Alevism. Each association, as a religious-political agent, started tocreate its own Alevi discourse, in terms of history and even theology. The
social-political heterogeneity of Alevi communities – with local differencessuch as customs, languages etc. – undoubtedly fed the competition between them.
Fifth, the socio-cultural backgrounds of talips have changed almost
completely. This is closely related to the new generations who were born22

in Western Europe and educated about religion following Western secular notions. Knowledge concerning the distinction between religious andnon-religious spheres has strongly influenced all ritual-related aspects. For
example, the construction of cemevis near sacred places is intentionally related to re-shaping these sacred places. According to the new way of thinking, if Alevism (Raa Haqi) is a religion, it should have buildings of worshipthat can reflect the sacredness of the Alevi cosmology. If not, sacred places
should be spatially well-organised and should have a proper religious appearance.
The tensions between Alevis and other Islamic communities in Europe
and in Turkey also need to be considered as factors in the transformationof Alevism. Most Alevis want well-organised sacred places to represent
their religion to others. It is important to remember that the spatial planning of sacred places began long before the establishment of cemevis. It waswith the increasing effects of modern religious contexts on Alevism thatnew constructions – such as cemevis – began to appear on sacred places.
This was mostly a societal and political necessity resulting from a new understanding of Alevism.

Conclusion
The significance of the role played by sacred places in contemporary
Kurdish Alevism comes to the fore when talips obtain a position where
they can be considered as the carriers of the religion. As a result of conventional caste relations falling apart during the 20th century, the members ofsacred lineages started following their talips all around the world and began
to adhere to their talips’ new social, political and religious tendencies. The
secularisation process can be understood as a re-conceptualisation of theKurdish Alevis’ cultural identity. Within this transformation process, there-organisation of sacred places plays a crucial role.
Kurdish Alevi sacred place practices have never required a religious
guide. They depend on personal or communal practices without any written rules or systematic instructions. In view of the disintegration of conventional caste relations, sacred places have served more and more as personal religious spaces. With the politicisation of Kurdish Alevi communities
in Turkey and Western Europe, these spaces have become increasingly
23suited to new actors, namely talips. Different Alevi associations have used
the spaces as symbols of Kurdish Alevi cultural identity.
Talip-dominated Kurdish Alevi socio-political practices and discourses about sacred places appear to be a relatively recent phenomenon.
An example of religion making from below,47 this transformation appears
to serve to secure cultural continuity and create a strong socio-political position for the subordinated Kurdish Alevi identity. By instrumentalising sacred places, talips seem to be able to influence pirs and use
cemevis to practise religion in a new way. Thus, while it should be
acknowledged that pirs are also trying to gain political capital from thedescribed transformation, one of the most important outcomes of thisera is talips’ increasing domination of Kurdish Alevism. The transformation of Kurdish Alevism can be understood as a reconceptualisationof cultural identity linked to sacred places, which reflects a new socioreligious order between pirs and talips.

47 Dreßler, “Modes of Religionization,” 12.
24

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