143RD INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Judith B. Wish*

I. INTRODUCTIONThe United States Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) was created in 1975
as one response to the ethical abuses and misconduct committed by Justice Department officials during theWatergate scandal. OPR’s mission is to hold accountable Justice Department attorneys, and law enforcement
agents who work with those attorneys, who abuse their power as prosecutors or otherwise violate the highethical standards required of the nation’s chief law enforcement agency. OPR’s mission is also to exonerate
those who have been wrongfully accused of misconduct. OPR is an independent office that reports to the
Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. It is staffed and led by career Justice Department
attorneys.
In this article, I describe the history of OPR. I also discuss major reform legislation enacted in 1978,
including the Ethics in Government Act, the Civil Service Reform Act, and the Inspector General Act,
directed also at preventing the abuses of power that occurred during Watergate. With respect to the JusticeDepartment particularly, in addition to OPR, there are four other components and offices that focus on
ensuring that Department attorneys adhere to the highest ethical standards. They are the Public Integrity
Section of the Criminal Division, the Office of the Inspector General, the Professional Responsibility
Advisory Office, and the Department’s Ethics Office. I discuss the function of each of these offices, as wellas the Department’s substantial training programme for its attorneys. In addition, I detail the sources of
ethical and professional obligations with which Department attorneys must comply. Finally, I describe theorganization and function of OPR, the most common kinds of misconduct Department attorneys commit andthe types of attorneys who most often engage in misconduct, as well as various kinds of cases handled by
OPR.

II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
By way of brief background, there are three components of the federal system of government in the
United States. The Legislative Branch, consisting of the Congress, which enacts the laws, including thecriminal laws; the Executive Branch, consisting of the President and Executive Agencies and Departments,
including the Justice Department, which is primarily responsible for ensuring that the laws are enforced; andthe Judicial Branch, including all federal courts, which hear cases involving alleged violations of federal laws,
arising in both criminal and civil cases.
All federal prosecutors as well as most of the attorneys who represent the United States in civil litigation
are employed by the Justice Department. The Justice Department is headed by an Attorney General who
is appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The Attorney General is a member of the
President’s cabinet. The current Attorney General is Eric Holder. He previously served as Deputy Attorney
General from 1997 – 2001, during President Clinton’s administration. There are an additional thirtyseven political appointees who, like the Attorney General, are nominated by the President and confirmedby the Senate, and who head up various offices and divisions within the Justice Department. Most of theprosecutors and other Department attorneys are career civil servants. That is, their employment does notdepend on which political party is in power. Indeed, it is unlawful to consider the political affiliation of these
employees in any personnel decisions.
* Deputy Counsel, Office of Professional Responsibility, Department of Justice, USA.

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The federal judiciary is a separate and independent branch of government. Prosecutors, the Justice Department
and the Executive Branch have no power to tell judges how to handle cases, or to prescribe or enforce rules ofconduct or ethics for judges. Congress enacted the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges but the Judicial Conference of
the United States, not the Justice Department, enforces it. However, if a judge engages in criminal conduct suchas taking a kickback or a bribe, the Justice Department has authority to investigate and prosecute the criminal
conduct as it does with respect to any person who violates the law.
Justice Department attorneys direct criminal investigations and handle prosecutions involving alleged
violations of federal laws. Department attorneys also defend the United States government in nearly all civil
actions brought against the government and its agencies. In addition, they provide legal advice to investigators,
Executive Branch agencies and the White House. There are about 10,000 Department attorneys, and about
110,000 Department employees in all. Criminal investigations are often handled by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), which is a component of the Justice Department. The FBI employs about 25,000 people,
including 10,000 special agents stationed in FBI Field Offices throughout the country. The Justice Department
has hundreds of offices throughout the United States, including ninety-four separate U. S. Attorneys’ Offices,each located in its own district and each headed by a U.S. Attorney who is nominated by the President andconfirmed by the Senate. The U.S. Attorney is the chief law enforcement officer within the district. The
attorneys who work in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices are called Assistant U.S. Attorneys. With such a large
number of offices and attorneys in the Justice Department, it is very important to have clear ethical rules
and policies to govern the exercise of prosecutorial power and the day-to-day actions of prosecutors. It is alsoessential to ensure that those rules are enforced fairly and administered consistently throughout the country.
When similar issues are handled differently by the same or different offices, there is a substantial possibilityof creating a perception among the public and within the Justice Department of injustice, unfairness and(possibly) even corruption.

III. HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY
The creation of the Office of Professional Responsibility dates back to one of the more infamous
episodes in modern American history: the events that led to the resignation of then President Richard
Nixon and that involved the unprecedented misuse of the Justice Department by the White House forpartisan political purposes. On New Year’s Day in 1975, a former Attorney General of the United Statesand head of the Justice Department from 1969 to 1972, John N. Mitchell, along with other former JusticeDepartment officials, was convicted of conspiracy, perjury and obstruction of justice in connection with the
break-in and bugging of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) Headquarters located in the Watergate
Office Building in Washington, DC, and the subsequent cover-up of those crimes. What became known
as the Watergate scandal began in June 1972, when five men were arrested after breaking into the DNC
Headquarters at the Watergate. It was later discovered that this was the second of two break-ins at the
DNC Headquarters to plant electronic listening devices its offices to gain intelligence for the Republicanpresidential campaign. At the time of the arrests, one of the men was carrying an address book containing
the name and telephone number of E. Howard Hunt, a White House aide who worked for a high-ranking
assistant to President Nixon.
The subsequent investigation into that break-in brought to light an immense pattern of corruption andabuses of government power by President Nixon and his aides, including campaign fraud, political espionage
and sabotage, illegal break-ins, improper federal tax audits by the Internal Revenue Service, illegal
wiretapping on a massive scale by the FBI, and a secret “slush fund” laundered in Mexico to pay those
who conducted these operations. It was a grand scheme to use the power of the government for improperpartisan political purposes, that is, to keep the Republican Party and President Nixon in power.
After nearly two years of investigation, the fact that President Nixon had tape recorded conversationsin the White House during his years in office came to light, and Archibald Cox, who had been appointed
special prosecutor to conduct the Watergate investigation, issued subpoenas for certain of the tapes. A
special prosecutor from outside the Justice Department had been named precisely because of concern overactual and perceived conflicts of interest if a Justice Department prosecutor handled the investigation. Aftera lengthy legal battle involving broad claims of Executive Privilege by the White House, the U.S. Supreme

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Court ruled that President Nixon was required to turn over the tapes for use in the special prosecutor’s
criminal investigation. The incriminating tape recordings were used in subsequent prosecutions ofgovernment officials, and cited by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in its
articles of impeachment against President Nixon. Before the full House of Representatives could vote on
impeachment, President Nixon resigned and was succeeded by then Vice President Gerald Ford. Shortly
after assuming office, Ford pardoned Nixon of “all offenses against the United States which he, Richard
Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in . . . .”.
As a result of the various schemes that were discovered, two Attorneys General were convicted or pledguilty to crimes. As noted, President Nixon’s first Attorney General, John Mitchell, was convicted of conspiracy,
obstruction of justice and perjury. The tape recordings proved that Mitchell had participated in planning theWatergate break-ins and had repeatedly assisted in trying to cover up the White House’s involvement in thescheme after the arrests.
Richard Kleindienst was Deputy Attorney General under John Mitchell. When Mitchell stepped down
to run Nixon’s campaign for reelection in 1972, Kleindienst was nominated to succeed Mitchell as Attorney
General. During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Kleindienst testified in
response to questioning that no one in the White House had interfered with his decision making while he
was Deputy Attorney General in an antitrust case against International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). ITT
had, at about that time, offered to make a very large contribution to help pay for the Republican National
Convention at which President Nixon would be nominated for re-election. Kleindienst had testified to
the Committee, “In the discharge of my responsibilities as Acting Attorney General in [the ITT case], I
was not interfered with by anybody at the White House. I was not importuned. I was not pressured. I was
not directed.” NY Times , 17 May 1974. During the Watergate investigation, the White House’s directrole in Kleindienst’s decision came to light and he was forced to resign as Attorney General, and in 1974,
Kleindienst pleaded guilty to testifying falsely to Congress. In entering his guilty plea, Kleindienst admitted
that President Nixon had telephoned him and ordered him to drop the antitrust case against ITT. In the taperecording of that call, now on the Internet, Nixon ordered Kleindienst to drop the case, not to file a brief due
in court the following day, and to “stay the hell out of it.”Kleindienst’s successor, Attorney General Elliot Richardson, held office for only a few months. In whatbecame known as the Saturday Night Massacre because the events occurred on a Saturday, Richardson
resigned rather than follow President Nixon’s order to fire special prosecutor Cox, who was then insisting
on being given access to the incriminating White House tape recordings. Richardson’s Deputy Attorney
General, William Ruckelshaus, also resigned rather than fire the special prosecutor. The official who wasthird in command of the Justice Department at the time, Solicitor General Robert Bork, ultimately fired
Cox. President Nixon then promptly abolished the special prosecutor’s office and directed the FBI to seal
its records. The public outcry and Constitutional crisis created by the Saturday Night Massacre forced theWhite House to agree to the appointment of a second special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, and ultimately led
to the resignation of President Nixon.
Upon assuming office, President Ford inherited a Justice Department that was demoralized and widelydisrespected. A 1975 law review article (50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 382 1975) observed: “Except, perhaps, for the
Presidency itself, no government institution suffered greater dishonor from Watergate revelations than
did the Justice Department. The criminal conduct of incumbent and former Attorneys General, the earlymishandling of the Watergate investigation and discrediting testimony before the Watergate Committee such factors produced a widespread perception that politics and Justice had become intolerably intertwined.”
As a first step toward turning the Justice Department around, President Ford appointed Edward Levi to
be Attorney General. Levi was a well-respected university president and distinguished legal scholar with nobackground in politics. He was not a stranger to Washington, however. He had experience working in the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department earlier in his career, and working in Congress as Chief Counsel
to the House Committee on Monopolies and with the White House on two White House task forces in the
1960s.
Attorney General Levi was immediately faced with competing proposals, from Congress and elsewhere,

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about how the Justice Department should be restructured to prevent Watergate-style abuses of prosecutorial
power in the future, and to give the Department a measure of independence from the White House. These
proposals included taking the Attorney General out of the President’s cabinet and the Justice Department
out of the Executive Branch so it would not report to the President. Another would have required theAttorney General, the Deputy Attorney General and the several Assistant Attorneys General (who headup various offices and components within the Department) to belong to a different political party than the
President. A third proposal would have split the Department into two parts, one headed by the Attorney
General which would serve as legal advisor to the President and the other headed by a Chief Prosecutor
responsible for law enforcement. Yet another would have established a permanent Special Prosecutor
outside the authority of the Attorney General and the Justice Department.
In his first year in office in 1975, as one response to the Watergate abuses and to these proposals,
Attorney General Levi issued an order creating the Office of Professional Responsibility and directed it
to “receive and review any information or allegation concerning conduct by a Department employee that
may be in violation of law, regulations or orders, or applicable standards of conduct or may constitutemismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to publichealth and safety.” The mission of OPR was “to ensure that Departmental employees continue[d] to performtheir duties in accord with the professional standards expected of the nation’s principal law enforcement
agency.” To head the office, Attorney General Levi appointed Michael Shaheen, a career Department ofJustice lawyer. Shaheen served as the Counsel for Professional Responsibility and head of OPR for morethan 20 years, until retiring from that post at the end of 1997.
The Attorney General also created the Public Integrity Section within the Criminal Division to strengthen
the Department’s ability to combat corruption through the prosecution of elected and appointed public officials
at all levels of government, state and federal, who are involved in actual violations of federal law. The Public
Integrity Section also has exclusive jurisdiction over allegations of criminal misconduct by federal judges
and monitors the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and conflict-of-interest crimes. Thus, Public
Integrity Section attorneys prosecute selected cases against federal, state and local officials, and are available
as a source of advice and expertise to other Justice Department prosecutors and investigators throughout thecountry.
The Public Integrity Section has been highly successful in handling such cases. Most importantly, thecreation of a special unit in Washington has had the effect of removing potential conflicts of interest that
may exist when local prosecutors investigate local lawyers and officials, and of increasing public trust in
the system of justice as it is applies to public officials. Because the office consists of career prosecutors
who make decisions based on an objective set of standards, the Public Integrity Section can and does makecritical decisions without regard to political considerations. It also brings uniformity to the investigation ofcorruption charges involving federal, state and local officials throughout the country.
With these affirmative steps, Attorney General Levi was able to resist Congressional attempts to split
the Justice Department or establish prosecutorial and other law enforcement authority outside of the
Executive Branch and the control of the President.
Following the election in 1976, Democratic President Jimmy Carter came into office and he, along with a
newly elected Congress, was intent on reforming the federal government to prevent the abuses of Watergate
from recurring. Three very important reform measures were enacted in the same month in 1978, and require
mention here to put OPR’s role in perspective. The first was the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Pub. L.
No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978)). In addition, Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Pub. L.
No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978)), and the Inspector General Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101
(1978)). Each of these laws has had a significant impact on preventing the abuse of government power so
evident in Watergate, and the Ethics in Government Act and the Civil Service Reform Act provide many of the
ethical obligations with which Department attorneys must comply and which OPR enforces.

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IV. POST-WATERGATE MAJOR REFORM LEGISLATION
A. Ethics in Government Act
The Ethics in Government Act was intended to “increase public confidence in the level of integrityof federal government officials, to deter conflicts of interest from arising, and to stop unethical persons
from entering public service.” Through the creation of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), theAct formalized and institutionalized a consistent, ongoing programme to provide all federal government
employees with clear rules of conduct, access to professional ethics advice and procedures to resolve
questions of conflict of interest as they arose. The OGE is headed by a Director who is appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, and serves a five year term. The fact that his appointment is fora term of years, rather than at the pleasure of the President, confers a measure of independence on the
director.
The Ethics in Government Act has several important parts. First, in order to guard against and identify
potential conflicts of interest, the law mandates annual public financial disclosure reporting for senior
government officials, both political and career. OPR’s Counsel and Deputy Counsel are among those whomust file such reports. The annual reports must include the listing of certain gifts, financial holdings, outside
income, positions in organizations and debts. The annual reports must also include the sources of a spouse’s
income, and certain assets bought, sold or held by a spouse or dependent child of the employee. The
reports are reviewed by the employee’s supervisor and by ethics officials in his or her agency to identify
potential conflicts of interest with respect to the work each employee performs. These detailed reporting
requirements, for example, would quickly disclose to the Justice Department whether an employee wasmaking official decisions that could affect his or her finances or was making investment decisions basedon official information concerning a specific individual or entity. In addition, these financial disclosure
forms must be available, upon request, to the public and news media. Although intrusive, these reporting
obligations are deemed necessary to guard against conflicts of interest by highly-placed officials. The
reporting requirement also applies to Members of Congress, federal judges and certain senior staff membersof both, although the OGE is not responsible for the contents or enforcement of those reports.
Certain other government employees are required to file annual confidential and more abbreviated disclosure
reports. With respect to the Justice Department, a Confidential Financial Disclosure Report must be filed by
all non-executive employees whose duties require them to participate personally and substantially throughdecision or the exercise of significant judgment in a matter which could have an economic impact on a nonfederal entity. This includes any employee involved in contracting or administering grants, regulating or auditing
any non-Federal entity and, in some cases, investigating or prosecuting a case. All OPR attorneys fall within
this category and must file the annual report. The reports are reviewed by the head of their offices to identify
possible conflicts of interest with their work assignments. The reports remain confidential, however (5 U.S.C. §2634.907).
Second, the OGE is responsible for reviewing the financial disclosure forms prepared by persons the
President nominates for appointments that require the consent of the Senate, including all cabinet members
and the politically appointed executives who report to them. The law requires that nominees to positions that
require confirmation by the Senate transmit their financial disclosure reports to OGE. The Director of OGE
reviews the forms, advises the nominee if corrective action is necessary and then, as appropriate, certifies
to the Senate that reports filed with the OGE are “in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.” This
process has become so much a part of the “vetting” of nominees that the Senate confirmation committees
normally do not schedule a hearing on the candidate until the Director of OGE certifies that the nominee’s
financial disclosure report is in order.
Third, the Ethics in Government Act amended and expanded the legal restrictions on the jobs federal
employees may accept after leaving government employment and on their future dealings with thegovernment. Those restrictions generally prevent the employee from “switching sides” after leaving
government service. Thus, a former employee is permanently prohibited from representing anyone else
before the government on a particular matter involving specific parties in which the employee participatedpersonally and substantially while working for the government. A former employee is prohibited for two years
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even if he did not participate in the matter himself. In addition, a senior employee is generally prohibited for
one year from representing another person before the agency in which he or she served during his last year ofgovernment service.
Finally, the law gives OGE the authority to develop additional standards regarding conflicts of interest
and ethics in the Executive Branch. The OGE did so in the form of regulations entitled Standards of EthicalConduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Standard of Conduct) which are applicable to all executive
branch employees.
Finally, the law provided for the appointment of an Independent Counsel who would, under specified
circumstances, investigate allegations of wrongdoing by certain members of the Executive Branch, including
the President. That provision, reenacted several times, has since expired.

B. The Civil Service Reform Act
The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) was the second piece of major reform legislation enacted in 1978. Amongthe high crimes and misdemeanours with which President Nixon was charged in the articles of impeachment
voted by the House Judiciary Committee in July 1974, was the use of governmental power to harass and intimidate
political opponents. The Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
addressed abuses in grant and regulatory programmes directed at punishing the “enemies” of the president.
Employees were ordered to install illegal wiretaps, to improperly award contracts, and to release grant funds tounqualified recipients. After committee hearings, Congress concluded that there had been extensive violations ofcivil service laws and procedures.
The Civil Service Reform Act sought to correct that situation by protecting federal employees and restraining
the ability of officials to abuse governmental power in the future. First, the Act articulates aspirational “Merit
System Principles” intended to condemn abuses of authority for political or other improper purposes. In brief, theprinciples call for recruitment, selection and advancement in employment based on ability, knowledge and skills,
after fair and open competition. They specify fair and equitable treatment of all applicants and employees without
regard to political affiliation, race, colour, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping
condition, and with regard for their privacy and constitutional rights. They further provide for protection of
employees from arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes. They also
provide protection for “whistleblowers” who lawfully disclose information pointing to mismanagement, waste orviolation of any law, rule or regulation. Finally, they prohibit any government official from using official authority or
influence for the purpose of affecting the results of an election.
The law also establishes a list of “Prohibited Personnel Practices,” which form enforceable standards.
These principles forbid any official with authority to make or recommend personnel actions to discriminate
against an employee or applicant based on race, colour, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicapping
condition, marital status or political affiliation. They also prohibit the consideration of employment
recommendations based on factors other than personal knowledge or records of job-related abilities
or characteristics. They forbid the coercion of political activity of any person, and prohibit the willful
obstruction of anyone from competing for employment and improperly influencing anyone to withdraw
from competition. They also prohibit reprisal for whistleblowing. In addition, they prohibit nepotism anddiscrimination based on personal conduct which is not adverse to on-the-job performance.

C. The Inspector General Act of 1978
The third piece of reform legislation was the Inspector General Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92
Stat. 1101 (1978)). In the United States’ system of government, Congress has the authority to appropriate
funds for all government agencies and programmes, and the oversight power to ensure that those funds areproperly expended. In a series of hearings in 1977, Congress concluded that “fraud, abuse and waste in theoperations of federal departments and agencies and in federally-funded programmes are reaching epidemic
proportions,” and further that “[t]he federal government has . . . failed to make sufficient and effective
efforts to prevent and detect fraud, abuse, waste and mismanagement in federal programmes.” S. Rep.
95-1071, S. Rep. No. 1071, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1978, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 1978 WL 8639 (Leg. Hist.).
The Inspector General Act was enacted to correct these problems. The law created Inspectors General inthirteen executive agencies with the authority to, among other things, conduct, supervise, and co-ordinate272

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audits and investigations relating to the programmes and operations of the agency; make recommendations
to improve the economy and efficiency of programmes and operations administered by the agency; andkeep the agency head and Congress “fully and currently informed . . . concerning fraud and other serious
problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programmes and operations, . . .
recommend corrective action concerning such problems, abuses, and deficiencies, and to report on the
progress made in implementing such corrective action” (5 U.S.C. App. 3, § 4).
The Act gave Inspectors General their own staffs and budgets and a level of independence from theagency head to which he or she reported. Although appointed by the President with the consent of the
Senate, Inspectors General may not be removed by the President unless the agency head gives written
notice to Congress of the reason for the removal. The Act also limits the authority of the agency head vis-avis the Inspector General such that the agency head “shall not prevent or prohibit the Inspector General frominitiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subp[o]ena during thecourse of any audit or investigation.” The act also requires all Inspectors General to issue semiannual reportsof their activities to the agency head, and the agency head must transmit the Inspector General’s report toCongress within thirty days. The agency head may comment on the Inspector General’s report, but may notchange it.
The Inspectors Generals’ relationship with Congress has been a source of controversy since the Act
was passed. In 1978, the Justice Department successfully argued that it would be inappropriate to place
an Inspector General, a law enforcement official with reporting obligations to the legislative branch, in an
executive branch agency whose business is law enforcement, an inherently executive branch function, andwhose head, the Attorney General, is the highest ranking law enforcement official in the country. In addition,
the Justice Department argued that OPR already existed and had broad authority and responsibility to
conduct investigations and “monitor the integrity and professionalism of the Department.”
Nearly a decade later, however, in 1986, Congress again proposed to establish an Inspector General in
the Department of Justice along with several other agencies that also had been exempt from the original
Act. For similar reasons, the Department opposed the change. In a compromise, the Congress in 1988
created an Inspector General for the Justice Department, but reserved to OPR jurisdiction over certain
misconduct (Pub. L. 100-504). Thus, the Act requires the Inspector General to “refer to the Counsel, Officeof Professional Responsibility of the Department, for investigation, information or allegations relating
to the conduct of an officer or employee of the Department of Justice employed in an attorney, criminal
investigator, or law enforcement position that is or may be a violation of law, regulation, or order of the
Department or any other applicable standard of conduct . . . .” (5 U.S. C. App. 3, sec. 8E).
Thus, in 1988, the mission of OPR was codified by statute and narrowed to focus on the most serious
types of allegations against attorneys and criminal investigators and agents working with those attorneys. In
the 1990s, further refinements were made to OPR’s and the Inspector General’s respective jurisdictions. As
a result, OPR’s current jurisdiction extends to “allegations of misconduct involving Department attorneys
that relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate or provide legal advice, as well as
allegations of misconduct by law enforcement personnel when such allegations are related to allegationsof attorney misconduct within the jurisdiction of DOJ-OPR.” In addition, OPR has authority to pursue
special investigations as assigned by the Attorney General; allegations of reprisal against any employee forreporting misconduct to OPR; and complaints by FBI employees of retaliation for whistleblowing.
As I will discuss more fully below, many of the obligations imposed by the Ethics in Government andCivil Service Reform Acts provide the basis for misconduct investigations conducted by OPR, the OIG and
the Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department.

V. ETHICS ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEAs the history of abuses of governmental power that led to the creation of OPR and enactment of thereform legislation detailed above makes clear, ethics enforcement is essential to ensure that Department
officials working with career Justice Department attorneys do not abuse for partisan political or otherimproper purposes, the unique power they exercise as prosecutors, but rather exercise it fairly and

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impartially. Ethics enforcement is also important to ensure that Department attorneys conduct themselvesin accordance with the myriad other professional obligations governing their day-to-day activities as
attorneys. Equally important, ethics enforcement is essential to demonstrate to the public that the JusticeDepartment adheres to the rule of law and not to the will of the officials who happen to hold office whenthat will contravenes the rule of law. Thus, ethics enforcement is important both to ensure that JusticeDepartment attorneys act ethically in performing their jobs and that the public knows that they do so.
The Justice Department’s commitment to the maintenance of high ethical conduct by its attorneys isdemonstrated by the fact that it has five separate offices that handle ethics issues, as well as a significant
training programme. I have already discussed the creation of the Office of Professional Responsibility, thePublic Integrity Section in the Criminal Division, and the Office of the Inspector General. Those offices
primarily focus on investigating allegations of ethics violations that have already occurred. The Professional
Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO) and the Department Ethics Office, on the other hand, are focused onproviding ethics advice to all Department employees prior to any allegations having arisen. In addition, theDepartment makes available throughout the year a large array of training courses for attorneys in a variety
of settings, and recently adopted a policy of mandatory annual Professionalism Training.

A. Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO)This office of about twenty-five attorneys and support staff was established by the Department in 1999 toensure the provision of prompt and consistent advice to Department attorneys on issues related to professional
responsibility. By law and Department policy, all Department attorneys must be duly licensed and authorized
to practice law as an attorney by at least one state bar and they must comply with that state bar’s Rules ofProfessional Conduct as well as the rules of the court before which they appear. PRAO was created to provide
Department attorneys with advice concerning compliance with the various state bar rules. For example,
most state bar rules prohibit an attorney from contacting a person about a matter regarding which the person
is represented by a lawyer unless the lawyer consents or the contact is authorized by law. If a prosecutor isnot sure whether it would be considered “authorized by law” under a particular state’s rules to allow a law
enforcement officer working undercover in an investigation to remain in contact with a criminal suspect
who has a lawyer, PRAO is available to advise on whether and how the prosecutor may do so. Each U.S.
Attorney’s Office and other component within the Department has an attorney who serves as a Professional
Responsibility Officer, or PRO, trained by PRAO, who provides advice within the office and acts as a liaison to
PRAO.
If a Department attorney seeks advice from PRAO, provides all relevant information pertaining to theissue in question, and follows all the advice given but is later found by a court, or is otherwise alleged tohave engaged in misconduct, OPR will not hold that attorney responsible for any wrongdoing. This policy isintended to encourage Justice Department attorneys to seek counsel and advice from PRAO or their PRO to
do the right thing before they act, rather than taking a chance and running afoul of the ethics rules.

B. Justice Department Ethics Office
As noted, the Office of Government Ethics promulgated the Standards of Conduct and provides ethics
advice and opinions with regard to those standards. Those standards cover such areas as receipt of gifts
and entertainment, travel, conflicts of interest, financial disclosure requirements, outside employment
and activities, political activities, procurement integrity, misuse of position and government resources andrestrictions on post-government employment.
The standards may be supplemented by agencies with OGE’s approval and the Justice Department
has adopted several additional standards that specifically relate to attorneys. They include a provisionprohibiting an employee from participating in a criminal investigation or prosecution if the employee has apersonal or political relationship with any person or organization substantially involved in the conduct thatis the subject of the investigation or prosecution; or with any person or organization which the Department
attorney knows has a specific and substantial interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of theinvestigation or prosecution.
An employee who believes that his or her participation might be prohibited by the rule must report thematter to his or her supervisor. If the supervisor agrees, he or she must relieve the employee from further

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participation in the matter unless the supervisor determines, and records in writing, that the employee
can remain impartial and professional, and that his or her participation would not create an appearance of aconflict of interest likely to affect the public perception of the integrity of the investigation or prosecution.
Another pertinent Justice Department standard of conduct prohibits employees from engaging in outside
employment that involves the practice of law, without obtaining a waiver from the Department, unless thework is uncompensated and in the nature of community service, or unless it is on behalf of the employee,
his or her parents, spouse or children. It also prohibits employees from engaging in any criminal matter,litigation, investigation, grants or other matters in which the Justice Department is or represents a party,
witness, or litigant, investigator or grant-maker.
The Justice Department’s Ethics Office is also responsible for administering the Department-wide ethics
programme and for implementing policies on ethics issues. That office also provides individual advice
and periodic training to all Department employees on compliance with the Standards of Conduct and theDepartment’s supplemental standards. Similar to the PRAO structure, each component and office has a Deputy
Designated Agency Ethics Official (a DDEO) who is responsible for administering the ethics programme within
the component, and who acts as a liaison to the Department’s Ethics Office.

C. Ethics Training for Department of Justice Attorneys
As noted, Department attorneys are required to be licensed to practice law by at least one state bar
licensing authority. Many state bar licensing authorities have annual continuing legal education (CLE)requirements, such that licensed attorneys in that state must fulfill a certain number of hours of legal
training, often including ethics training. The Justice Department has a training center, the National Advocacy
Center (NAC), in Columbia, South Carolina, which offers training year round in a variety of subjects,
including ethics, many of which provide CLE credit for the attorneys attending.
In addition, in 2008, the Department adopted a new policy on Professionalism Training for its attorneys. In
announcing the new policy, the Attorney General noted, “[t]here are few priorities that are more important to
the Department’s mission than ensuring that we are properly trained so that we may continue to demonstrate
the highest levels of ethical conduct and professionalism for which the Department is known.” The newpolicy applies to most Department attorneys and requires them to take at least four hours of professionalism
training each calendar year, including at least two hours of Justice Department professional responsibility, onehour of government ethics, and one hour of sexual harassment and non-discrimination or equal employment
opportunity training. The Professionalism Policy is a Department requirement and not tied to the requirementsof any individual state bar. Department attorneys may satisfy the Professionalism Policy’s requirements
through training conducted by their component, courses at the NAC, or by watching training videos offered by
the Department’s Office of Legal Education and available via each attorney’s desktop computer. Department
attorneys are required to certify at the end of each calendar year to their component’s management that they
have complied with the Professionalism Policy and its requirements.
In addition, the Department provides training targeted at specific issues as they arise. For example,
earlier this year, in a much-publicized decision, Attorney General Holder dismissed the prosecution against
former Alaska U.S. Senator Ted Stevens, in which he was charged with making false statements in his
financial disclosure report (discussed above). While Senator Stevens had been convicted by a jury of all
the charges against him, the Department later learned that, prior to trial, prosecutors apparently had notdisclosed to the defence all impeachment evidence, as is required by the Constitution, state bar rules andDepartment policy. In this case, they did not turn over to defence counsel notes that contradicted testimony
from an important government witness. As a result, defence counsel did not have those notes available
at trial for their cross-examination of the witness. Under the U.S. system of justice, the question is notwhether Senator Stevens was in fact guilty; the question is whether he had been fairly convicted under
our Constitution and the rules of criminal procedures. Because these assurances of a fair conviction werelacking since not all impeaching evidence had been disclosed, the Attorney General dismissed the case.
Two consequences flowed from the Senator Stevens case for our purposes. First, OPR is conducting an
investigation to determine whether the prosecutors committed professional misconduct. That investigationis on-going. Second, the Department has begun a programme of re-training its prosecutors with regard
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Department policy to avoid the recurrence of such a case. In addition, the Department has created working
groups to consider new policies to govern criminal and civil discovery.

VI. ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND STANDARDSIn addition to the duty not to abuse the unique power of prosecutors for improper purposes, which abuse
led to the creation of OPR, attorneys are subject to a myriad of professional obligations that govern theirconduct as attorneys. Specifically, Department attorneys are subject to obligations imposed by the U.S.
Constitution and case law, federal laws, state bar and court rules of professional conduct, the Standards ofConduct, and Justice Department regulations, policies, and procedures. In our legal system, many of theserules and regulations are designed to ensure that our criminal justice system is fair and that the rights of
the accused are protected. In helping to guarantee that Department attorneys respect, and do not abuse,
the power they have, making certain that they scrupulously adhere to these rules and regulations is an
important part of OPR’s mission.

A. Obligations Imposed by the Constitution and Case Law
The Constitution establishes numerous rights for criminal defendants with which Department attorneys
must comply. For example, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no one may be compelled
to testify against himself in a criminal case. That right has been extended by case law to prevent a prosecutor
from suggesting during a criminal trial that the defendant should have testified. Thus, if the defendant chooses
not to testify, which the defendant has an absolute right to do, a prosecutor may not ask the jury to draw aninference of guilt from the defendant’s failure to testify.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. courts requires prosecutors
to provide to the defence all exculpatory evidence they may have gathered during an investigation – forexample, police notes, witness statements, scientific tests and other evidence that might raise doubts as tothe defendant’s guilt. By case law, this right has been extended to include impeaching evidence. The rightalso applies to certain kinds of pretrial proceedings as well as trials. The remedy for failing to turn over suchinformation can be severe; a judge can reverse a conviction if he or she finds that, had the evidence been
disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.
In addition, the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy against government
intrusion. Under that right, a prosecutor must first obtain a search warrant issued by an independent judge
showing that the government has probable cause before authorizing a search by law enforcement officers.

B. Federal Laws
Federal laws impose a variety of ethical obligations on Department attorneys. For example, in 1957,
Congress enacted the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which gives a criminal defendant in a federal prosecution
the right to discover any witness statement against him which is relevant to the witness’s trial testimony andwhich is in the possession of the government. The law extends to police notes, memos, reports, summaries,
letters or verbatim transcripts used by government agents or employees to testify at trial.
Also, in 1968, Congress enacted Title III, prohibiting private citizens from using certain electronic
surveillance techniques, but exempting law enforcement agents so long as they complied with explicit
directives that controlled the circumstances under which the agent’s use of such surveillance would bepermitted. Although many of the restrictions were required by the Fourth Amendment, several of Title III’s
provisions are more restrictive than that Constitutional protection. One of the statute’s most restrictive
provisions is the requirement that federal agencies must submit requests for the use of certain types ofelectronic surveillance to the Justice Department for review and approval before applications for suchinterception may be submitted to a court for an order authorizing the interception.

C. Court Rules
Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence and local federal
court rules also impose obligations on Department attorneys. For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require government attorneys well before trial to allow the defendant to inspect any exhibitsthat the government intends to use at trial. And Rule 6(e) prohibits government attorneys from disclosing

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matters occurring before a grand jury. These various rules also set deadlines and rules affecting the pretrial
disclosure of evidence. Thus, for example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow each party to a civil
suit, during the discovery phase of a case, to serve upon the opposing party written requests for admissionsof fact. Under the rules, if the opponent admits a fact, the party is relieved from having to prove the fact attrial. The Federal Rules specify that answers to such requests must be filed within thirty days.
In addition, courts establish obligations for government attorneys in particular cases. For example, courts
frequently adopt a scheduling order governing pre-trial discovery and pleadings. On occasion, courts issue
pre-trial rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence or that limiting the purpose for which such evidence
may be admitted. Such rulings and orders bind the prosecutor in that case.

D. State Rules of Professional Conduct
This is a source of rules and obligations that has become more important for Department attorneys inrecent years: the professional rules of conduct developed by state bars and adopted by state supreme courts
or enacted by state legislatures. Some time ago, there had been uncertainty as to whether Department ofJustice attorneys were bound by such rules, because of the constitutional doctrine known as preemption.
According to this doctrine, federal authorities are not bound by state rules that interfere with federal laws.
In 1998, Congress clarified this issue by enacting the Citizens Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B, that
explicitly requires federal prosecutors to abide by the rules of the court before which they appear. The
Citizens Protection Act was a response to a concern by certain Congressmen that Justice Department
prosecutors had to be reined in and made subject to the same professional standards applicable to private
attorneys. Most federal courts have their own local rules which incorporate the rules of professional conductof the state bars in which they are located. This law then clearly requires federal prosecutors to comply
with the rules of professional conduct of the states in which they appear in court. These state provisions
are a significant source of the rules that bind Department attorneys. Typically, such rules include provisions
requiring reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, providing objective and independent
legal advice, guarding the confidentiality of information received from a client, and compliance with theclient’s lawful instructions. Such rules also normally require candor to the court and opposing counsel aswell as correction of testimony later discovered to be false. They also normally prohibit prosecutors from
communicating with parties they know are represented by an attorney unless the party’s attorney consents,and from communicating with the court unless the opposing lawyer is present (ex parte communications).

E. Department of Justice Regulations and Policies
The Department has its own extensive regulations and policies that impose professional obligations on
Department attorneys. For example, because of the sensitive Constitutional rights at issue, there are regulations
that require prior approval by the head of the Criminal Division before a Department attorney may issue a
grand jury subpoena to a reporter [First Amendment] or a lawyer [Sixth Amendment]. There are also rules
requiring certain types of plea agreements to be approved by a supervisor who stands in the shoes of the client
for this purpose. The Department also has extensive regulations governing the kinds of information that can beprovided to the news media while a case is pending, in order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
In some cases, the Department imposes rules that are stricter than those imposed by state bars or courts
and the Constitution. For example, the Department recently adopted provisions governing the disclosureof exculpatory information before a criminal trial that are considerably more expansive - - that is, theyrequire more information to be disclosed - - than the Constitution requires. In addition, while state bar rules
typically prohibit prosecutors from prosecuting a criminal case if they know the charges are not supported
by probable cause, the Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution prohibit a prosecutor from indicting
a defendant unless a stricter standard is met – namely, that he believes that the admissible evidence willprobably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.
The Department’s regulations limit the exercise of a prosecutor’s discretion in other ways as well. Thus, indetermining whether to commence prosecution, or take other action against a person, Department regulations
provide that the prosecutor should not be influenced by a person’s race, religion, sex or national origin, or
political association, activities or belief, the attorney’s own personal feelings concerning the person, his
associations or the victim; or the possible effect of the decision on the attorney’s professional or personal
circumstances.

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VII. HOW OPR CONDUCTS INVESTIGATIONS AND DISPOSES OF THEM
A. OPR’s Jurisdiction
As noted, when it was created in 1975, OPR had jurisdiction over all Department employees and all
allegations of misconduct as well as fraud, waste and abuse. The office effectively served as both OPR andthe Inspector General at the time. The office consisted of only a few attorneys and conducted relatively
few investigations itself; rather, it oversaw investigations conducted by the internal affairs offices of thevarious components and agencies within the Justice Department such as the FBI and Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). From time to time, an allegation of abuse of prosecutorial or investigative power by
Department officials at the direction of the White House arose, necessitating OPR’s direct involvement in
the investigation, sometimes with the assistance of the FBI, such instances were not the norm, however.
For the most part, OPR served in an oversight capacity on behalf of the Department’s leadership.
After an Inspector General was established for the Department in 1988, OPR’s jurisdiction became more
focused on the conduct of attorneys acting as attorneys and on law enforcement agents assisting them.
Thus, since 1994, OPR has had jurisdiction to investigate allegations that Department of Justice attorneys
engaged in misconduct in the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate, or render legal advice. OPR’s
jurisdiction includes attorneys assigned to the various components of the Justice Department, including theFBI, DEA, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Bureau of Prisons, and the U.S. Marshals Service. OPR
also investigates allegations of professional misconduct made against Department attorneys who serve as
immigration judges and enforce the Immigration and Nationality Act. Further, OPR investigates misconduct
allegations against Department of Justice law enforcement agents when Department attorneys are involvedin the alleged misconduct. Other allegations of misconduct against attorney and law enforcement agents areinvestigated by the Office of the Inspector General – example, for off-duty misconduct, voucher fraud, andthe like.
OPR is an independent office, not within any of the Divisions or components of the Justice Department,
and reports directly to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General. As noted, the office is headed
by a Counsel for Professional Responsibility and a Deputy Counsel. Throughout the decade of the 1990s,
and at the direction of then Attorney General Janet Reno, OPR grew in size from seven to twenty-fourattorneys along with additional support staff. Its attorneys also began to conduct many more investigations
themselves and the investigations focused largely on compliance by Department attorneys with theirnumerous professional obligations. Currently, there are four Associate Counsel who oversee the work oftwenty-two Assistant Counsel and eight support staff members. Five of the Assistant Counsel are Assistant
U.S. Attorneys on detail to OPR from U.S. Attorneys’ Offices across the county. Most of the permanent OPR
attorneys have prior experience as Assistant U.S. Attorneys or as Department of Justice litigators. Within
the Justice Department, OPR’s investigations are uniformly regarded as fair and thorough. However, theoffice continues to be understaffed and as a result is not able to complete the investigations it conducts inas timely a manner as the attorneys who are subjects of the investigations, the Department, and the public
deserve.

B. Sources of Complaints
Department employees have a duty to report to an appropriate supervisor, any evidence or non-frivolous
allegations of misconduct concerning themselves or their colleagues. The supervisor must evaluate whether
the misconduct allegation at issue, if true, is serious. If so, the supervisor must report the matter to OPR. Anystatement by a judge indicating a belief that a Department attorney has engaged in misconduct must be reported
to a supervisor and he must report it to OPR if he determines it to be a non-frivolous allegation of serious
misconduct. The duty to report is not limited to instances where the court uses the term “misconduct” because
courts do not always use that term when an attorney fails to abide by his professional responsibilities. In
cases where a judge finds that a Department attorney committed misconduct or requests an inquiry into
possible misconduct, the attorney or his supervisor must immediately report the matter to OPR, even if thereporting attorney considers the judge’s action to be frivolous. Such matters are usually tracked for full andoften expedited investigations.
As a result of that reporting requirement, about half of all allegations of misconduct against Department
attorneys are brought to OPR’s attention by Department sources. These include self-referrals and referrals

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complaints received by OPR come from a variety of sources, including private attorneys, defendants,
inmates and civil litigants, other federal agencies, state or local government officials, congressional referrals,
and media reports.
In addition, OPR regularly searches the Westlaw (legal) database for cases involving judicial criticism andfindings of misconduct, and reviews such matters that have not already been referred to OPR to determine
whether an investigation is warranted.

C. Miscellaneous Matters and Inquiries
OPR receives about 1,100 letters, emails and other forms of communication each year, asking for assistance.
Many complaints are frivolous on their face, vague and unsupported by any evidence, or not within OPR’s
jurisdiction. For example, a prisoner might complain about jail conditions, or about the public defender who
represented him, or the judge who presided over his case. Such complaints are referred to the appropriatecomponent within the Department or the complainant is directed to an office or agency outside the Department
for assistance.
About twenty-five percent or 250 of the complaints are determined to be serious enough to require OPR
to open inquiries into the allegations. Typically in such cases, OPR asks the subject attorney to provide awritten response to the allegations, one that is written by him and not edited by anyone in his office or the
Department, along with relevant documents. A large majority of these inquiries are closed with a finding of
no misconduct based on a review of these materials and the individual bringing the matter to our attention
is advised by letter that his complaint did not warrant further investigation. However, if in the course of an
inquiry, OPR determines that further investigation is needed, the matter is converted to an investigation,
the conduct of which is described below. In addition, we open some matters as investigations from the outset
due to the serious nature of the allegations. For example, a finding of misconduct or serious judicial criticism
of a Department attorney by a court is normally opened as a full investigation.

D. Investigations
In a typical year, we initiate between 80 and 100 full investigations. When a matter is handled as aninvestigation, two OPR attorneys are assigned to the matter. Normally the case file is reviewed and each
witness with information about the allegations is interviewed. The interviews are recorded with a digital taperecorder. If the matter is an administrative investigation, and nearly all OPR investigations are administrativein nature, the subject of the allegations is required to sit for an interview on the record under oath with a court
reporter transcribing the interview. The subject attorney is later given an opportunity to review the transcript
and provide additional information in writing regarding the allegations. All Department attorneys have a duty
to co-operate with an OPR investigation. Employees who do not co-operate may be formally disciplined,
including termination of their employment with the Department (28 CFR § 45.13 (2006)). In administrative
investigations, OPR will normally permit the subject to have privately retained counsel present at his or herinterview as long as the counsel does not interfere with the questioning. OPR administrative investigations
are occasionally hampered by the fact that we cannot compel non-Department witnesses to participate in OPR
administrative investigations and some refuse to do so. Because the investigation is not criminal, OPR cannot
conduct a grand jury investigation and serve grand jury subpoenas to compel participation.
If the allegations are criminal in nature and OPR is deemed the appropriate office to investigate, thesubject attorney is notified of that fact and is not required to participate in the investigation. Thus, if adecision is reached to try to interview him because it would advance the investigation, he or she is told thathe or she is not required to submit to an interview and that, if he or she does, his or her statements may be
used against him or her in a subsequent criminal trial. Under these circumstances, the subject attorney has
a right to be represented by counsel. A Department attorney cannot be fired for refusing to participate in acriminal investigation, but if the investigation is conducted administratively and he or she is compelled totestify, he or she can be disciplined administratively for what he or she admits to.
At the conclusion of an investigation, the assigned OPR Assistant Counsel prepares a report outlining
the results of the investigation and findings and conclusions as to whether the subject attorney committed
professional misconduct, exercised poor judgment, made a mistake or acted appropriately under thecircumstances.

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E. Overview of Disposition of Investigations, 2001 to 2009
1. OPR Findings and Conclusions
In analyzing whether a Department attorney committed professional misconduct, OPR first determines
whether the attorney violated the obligation or duty at issue. For example, if an attorney is alleged to haveviolated his duty of candor toward the court by making a false statement or failing to correct a statement he
subsequently learned was false, OPR first determines whether the attorney in fact breached his duty. OPRthen determines whether that conduct constituted professional misconduct, poor judgment, mistake, or wasappropriate under the circumstances.
OPR finds that an attorney committed intentional professional misconduct if it finds that the attorney
acted with the purpose of violating his or her obligation, or knowing that the natural and probableconsequences of his or her action will be to violate the obligation.
OPR finds that an attorney committed misconduct in reckless disregard of the attorney’s professional
obligation when the attorney knows, or should know, of the obligation and that his or her conduct involves asubstantial likelihood that he or she will violate the obligation, and the attorney nonetheless engages in the
conduct, which is objectively unreasonable under all the circumstances.
Even if an attorney did not breach an obligation, OPR may find that he or she exercised poor judgment
when, faced with alternative courses of action, the attorney chose a course of action that is in marked
contrast to the action the Department may reasonably expect an attorney exercising good judgment to take.
Alternatively, OPR may find that the attorney made an excusable human error, or a mistake, despite his or
her exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances.
2. Different Roles for OPR and the Courts
Between January 2001 and June 2009, OPR found professional misconduct in twenty-four percent of
the investigations it completed during these eight years, and found poor judgment in eleven percent. OPR
made no negative findings in sixty-five percent of the investigations it closed in the last eight years. Amongthe sixty-five percent are many involving serious criticism or findings of misconduct by the courts. It isnoteworthy that OPR disagrees with courts frequently. It does so for several reasons, including the fact thatthe roles of OPR and the courts in addressing possible misconduct by Justice Department attorneys are
significantly different. The courts’ interests are in protecting the rights of defendants, enforcing the court’sorders and maintaining decorum, and imposing sanctions for rule violations. In fashioning an appropriate
course of action, a court is limited to the record in the case before it, and often does not permit the individual
prosecutor to address his or her individual culpability.
OPR, on the other hand, focuses on the individual attorney’s personal responsibility to uphold thestandards of professionalism established by the Constitution, statutes, court and bar rules, and Department
regulations and policies. In so doing, OPR takes a more in-depth look at what led to the court’s criticism,and delves into the entire background of the case and the scienter level of the attorney. Thus, in making
an assessment of the attorney’s culpability in handling the matter, we look at such factors as the attorney’scommunications with the client agency, investigators, and supervisors, what the attorney knew or shouldhave known based on his or her level of experience and the obvious applicability of the rule to the situation,and his or her options for dealing with unexpected problems. In addition, courts use varying definitionsof what constitutes “professional misconduct” and often criticize attorneys without using that term at all.
For example, a court may use the term “professional misconduct” to describe conduct that OPR refers
to as “poor judgment” or a “mistake.” Or, conversely, a court may describe as an “error” conduct that wedetermine constituted reckless misconduct.
3. Most Frequent Allegations and Findings of Misconduct
As noted, much of the day-to-day work of OPR involves ensuring that Justice Department attorneys
adhere to the highest standards of professionalism and do not allow anything, including a zeal to convict,to compromise those standards. Between January 2001 and June 2009, the most common allegations of
misconduct by Department attorneys were that an attorney made misrepresentations to the court or
opposing counsel, and that an attorney failed to act diligently in performing performed his or her duties as a
Department attorney, including neglecting assigned cases or committing discovery violations.

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Attorneys were also alleged to have made improper remarks to a grand jury or a petit jury, madeunauthorized disclosures of client secrets or confidences or of non-public information, failed to comply with
Department rules and regulations, missed court deadlines, or failed to perform some other obligation in atimely manner.
As to findings of professional misconduct during the same period, allegations of failure to diligently perform
duties resulted in the most findings of misconduct, followed by allegations of making misrepresentations to thecourt or opposing counsel. OPR also made findings of misconduct for failure to comply with Department rules
or regulations, for making unauthorized disclosures, for making improper remarks to a jury, and for discovery
violations.
4. Investigations Involving Allegations of Misuse of Power
From time to time, OPR is called upon to investigate allegations of misuse of prosecutorial power by
Department officials and line attorneys. As noted, such investigations have been part of OPR’s mission since
the office’s creation in the aftermath of Watergate. Since the early 1990s, OPR has investigated and whereappropriate found misconduct in cases involving allegations that criminal prosecutions were started, or
terminated, for partisan political purposes, and the FBI’s investigative powers were misused to benefit theincumbent administration.
More recently, OPR along with the Department’s Inspector General, jointly investigated allegations thatseven U.S. Attorneys were simultaneously removed from their positions, and two others were removed ashort time before, for improper partisan political purposes. We focused on the reasons for the U.S. Attorney
removals and whether the U.S. Attorneys were removed by the Department’s leadership, in conjunction
with the White House, to influence an investigation or prosecution or to retaliate for their actions in any
specific investigation or prosecution for partisan political purposes. We found substantial evidence thatpartisan political considerations played a part in the removal of several of the U.S. Attorneys. Because
several White House officials and former Department officials refused to be interviewed by us and the WhiteHouse refused to provide internal White House documents related to the removals of the U.S. Attorneys,
we recommended that a counsel specially appointed by the Attorney General conduct further investigation,with a grand jury and subpoena power, to determine whether the evidence demonstrates that any criminal
offense was committed with regard to the removal of any U.S. Attorney.
We also found evidence that several other U.S. Attorneys were viewed as mediocre performers andwere removed because they also lacked political support of their home state Senators, while other mediocre
performing U.S. Attorneys were not removed because they had such support and removal would haveresulted in a fight between the White House and the Senators. We noted that while U.S. Attorneys are
Presidential appointees who may be dismissed for any lawful reason or for no reason, they may not bedismissed for an illegal or improper reason. U.S. Attorneys should make their prosecutorial decisions basedon the Department’s and the Administration’s priorities and the law and the facts of each case, not on a fearof being removed if they lose political support. If a U.S. Attorney must maintain the confidence of home state
political officials to avoid removal, regardless of the merits of the U.S. Attorney’s prosecutive decisions,
respect for the Justice Department’s independence and integrity will be severely damaged and every U.S.
Attorney’s prosecutive decisions will be suspect. The longstanding tradition of integrity and independentjudgments by Department prosecutors will be undermined, and confidence that the Justice Department
decides who to prosecute based solely on the evidence and the law, without regard to political factors, will
disappear.
The Attorney General accepted our recommendation, and appointed a counsel to conduct an investigation
which is on-going. OPR and the OIG also examined allegations of politicized hiring at the JusticeDepartment by several officials in the Office of then Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez and concluded
that such officials in fact considered political and ideological affiliations of candidates for career attorney
positions and for other personnel actions concerning Department attorneys in violation of the Civil Service
Reform Act and Department policy. Again, the danger of such misuse of power is that the Department will
be perceived as staffed by prosecutors with an ideological or political perspective that will influence theprosecutive decisions they make rather than the facts and the law.
In addition, OPR has been conducting an investigation into whether the attorneys who drafted memoranda
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independent legal advice or instead provided the advice they knew their client wanted. OPR also conductedinvestigations into allegations that certain investigations and prosecutions were initiated selectively against
political opponents while public officials of the President’s party who engaged in similar conduct were notprosecuted. Such allegations undermine the American government’s promise of a fair, unbiased, and politically
blind criminal justice system and, obviously, require prompt and thorough investigations.

F. Who Gets in Trouble with OPR
The types of lawyers who tend to get in trouble with OPR are, it appears, the kinds of lawyers who tend
to get in trouble wherever they work. These are some common categories that such lawyers seem to fall
into: the over eager, the under eager and the uninformed Department attorney. For the over-eager attorney,or “the Zealot,” winning is everything. This can be the result of believing that the outcome of a particularcase is so important that corners may be cut to gain a conviction. This attorney is so aggressive that heimproperly tries to gain advantage by failing to disclose information that by law must be provided to thedefendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ,Department regulations and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Or he violates his duty of candor to thecourt by failing to disclose material information that is adverse to a position advanced by the Department
attorney. Or he misstates the evidence, impugns opposing counsel, makes improper remarks to the jury or
breaches plea agreements.
The under-eager attorney, or the “minimalist,” does not appreciate and respect the importance of representing
the United States as his client. He may fail to charge a case timely or meet discovery or other disclosure
obligations because he failed to review all of the files in a timely manner. Or he may fail to obey a court orderbecause he did not prepare the memorandum or pleading timely. In essence, he does not diligently represent his
client, the United States.
There are also, unfortunately, some Department attorneys who do not know the rules and, “blissfully
ignorant,” fail to master the Rules of Professional Responsibility, Evidence, or Criminal or Civil Procedure in
the manner required to carry out their important function. These attorneys fail to keep up with new laws orcourt decisions, fail to review slip opinions, and do not bother to read new Department policies such as theone dealing with disclosure of exculpatory evidence. As noted, OPR considers an attorney’s experience levelin evaluating misconduct allegations, but knowledge of the rules is expected and required even for attorneys
lacking significant experience.

VIII. CONSEQUENCES OF A PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT FINDING BY OPR
In cases where OPR concludes that a Department attorney committed professional misconduct, a report
is sent to the head of the office or division where the attorney works with a recommendation of a range of
discipline for the component head to consider in proposing discipline. OPR is otherwise not involved in thediscipline process. Discipline can range from a written reprimand, suspension without pay, up to terminationof employment. At the conclusion of the discipline process, pursuant to Department policy, OPR notifies therelevant state bar of which the subject attorney is a member of its finding of misconduct. We share with thebar a copy of OPR’s report upon request.
OPR is charged with providing advice to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General concerning theneed for changes in policies and procedures which become evident during the course of OPR’s investigations.
OPR moreover, tracks misconduct findings in order to detect developing trends, and recommends remedialtraining for individual attorneys and changes in institutional training programmes to address patterns ofviolations. OPR also recommends changes in Department policies and procedures.
OPR reports are usually not made public. Even within the Department, they are shared on a needto-know basis. This is because they contain sensitive information about the subject attorney and other
witnesses referred to in the report who are protected by the Privacy Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (The Privacy
Act establishes special requirements for the Executive Branch with regard to disclosure of information on
individuals it has collected pursuant to its mission.) In addition, the report may contain other sensitive law
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before a grand jury.
Occasionally, however, the subjects of a report are high-ranking public officials and the subject matter isof such importance to the public that the public’s interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interests ofthe subjects. Thus, the joint OIG/OPR reports I referred to regarding the U.S. Attorney removals and theDepartment’s hiring practices were deemed to be so important in terms of restoring public confidence in the
Department and the morale of its employees, that the reports were made public.
Lastly, OPR may share information with other government agencies and officials for law enforcement
purposes; with individuals and agencies in order to elicit information relevant to the investigation or anotherpending proceeding, in a court, grand jury, regulatory or administrative proceedings; with other federal
agencies when requested in connection with hiring or retention of an employee, the issuance of a security
clearance, or the reporting of an investigation of an employee; with complainants to the extent necessary
to inform them of the progress or results of OPR’s review of their complaints; and to the subject of an OPR
investigation or inquiry to further the investigation or inquiry or to give notice of the status or outcome of
the matter.

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