Roberto Blancarte

Populism, Religion, and Secularity
in Latin America and Europe
A Comparative Perspective

Working Paper #27

Working Paper Series of the Centre for Advanced Studies
in the Humanities and Social Sciences (CASHSS)“Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”
ISSN 2700-5518#27: Roberto Blancarte. “Populism, Religion, and Secularity in Latin America
and Europe: A Comparative Perspective.”
Leipzig University, 2023.
© Roberto Blancarte
This Working Paper has been published online and can be downloaded fromwww.multiple-secularities.de/publications/working-papers or ordered in print
via email to multiple-secularities@uni-leipzig.de.
The CASHSS’s Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the results of workin progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas andacademic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the Working Paper Series should not
limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors.
Please cite as:
Blancarte, Roberto. “Populism, Religion, and Secularity in Latin America andEurope: A Comparative Perspective.” Working Paper Series of the CASHSS“Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 27. Leipzig
University, 2023.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36730/2020.1.msbwbm.27

Leipzig University
CASHSS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities“
Nikolaistraße 8–10
04109 Leipzig
Germany
The CASHSS is part of Leipzig University and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

Contents

1 Introduction.............................................................................................................. 3
2 Fascism...................................................................................................................... 12
3 Populism ............................................................................................................................... 16
4 Populism and Religion............................................................................................. 20
5 Classical Populism in Action.................................................................................. 22
6 Contemporary Populism......................................................................................... 26
7 Popular Religion and the Cult of the Leader........................................................ 30
8 Europe and the Legacy of Fascism......................................................................... 36
9 Concluding Remarks: Populism, Political Contexts and the Secular................ 42
10 Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 50

1

Populism, Religion, and Secularity
in Latin America and Europe
A Comparative Perspective
1 Introduction
So much has been written in the past few decades about populism that mostscholars approaching the subject feel obliged to begin by justifying theirwriting of yet another text. In this paper, the situation is somewhat different:
whilst our analytical gaze is cast upon populism (and fascism, as a precursor
or closely related social phenomenon), this is only indirectly the case.1 Our
primary focus is, instead, on the relationship that populism has with religion
and secularity. Or, more precisely, the relationships of diverse populisms
with different religiosities and various secularities. While the religious andthe secular are mentioned in numerous studies about populism, these topics
have rarely been adequately elaborated. Even when they are discussed, they
are treated only in a marginal way.2 The purpose of this work is, therefore,
to highlight the complex and multi-faceted way that populisms in Europe
and Latin America have related to religion and religiosity. A second, parallel

1

2

The bibliography on populism is enormous. Some of the works that have guided
me are: Manuel Anselmi, Populism: An Introduction (Key Ideas) (London:
Routledge, 2018); Cas Mudde, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A
Very Short Introduction (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017); Cas
Mudde, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds., Populism in Europe and theAmericas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2012); Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); John Bellamy Foster, “This is
not Populism,” Monthly Review – An Independent Socialist Magazine 69, no. 2(2017); Karl Aiginger, “Populism: Root Causes, Power Grabbing and Counter
Strategy,” Intereconomics 55, no. 1 (2020); New York Times Editorial Staff, eds.
Populism (New York, NY: New York Times Educational Publishing, 2019);
Annie Collovald, “Populisme,” Quaderni 63 (2007); Paul Marschall, and Stephan
Klingebiel, “Populism: Consequences for Global Sustainable Development,”
Briefing Paper 8, Bonn, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2019; JanWerner Müller, “Populism and the Claim to a Moral Monopoly,” interviewed byNiels Boel, Carsten Jensen, and André Sonnichsen, Politik 20, no. 4 (2017).
Two examples of this are: Michael Hoelzl, “The New Visibility of Religion and
Its Impact on Populist Politics,” Religions 11, no. 6 (2020), where he focuses on
the incompatibilities of religion and theology with populism, and Walter Lesch,“Visible Religion and Populism: An Explosive Cocktail,” Religions 11, no. 8 (2020).
3

objective of this work is to reflect on the particular relationships populism
establishes with different understandings of the secular, specifically within
the political sphere, i.e. ‘political secularity.’ Following the differentiation
paradigm, another term one might see used for this is ‘laicity’ (laïcité inFrench, laicidad in Spanish). I understand this to refer specifically to thesecularisation of the state and the areas of society which come under its
control. The best example of the latter is education, insofar as public schools
exist, or as the programmes of private schools are regulated by the state.
Public health is another good example.
Populism is not a new social phenomenon, either in Europe or Latin
America. It has been present in both continents, albeit with varying
characteristics, since at least the early 20th century, with precursor
manifestations (that one might label ‘proto-populisms’) in Russia and the US
at the end of the 19th century.3 Some characteristics are common to current
politicians and their political parties or movements on both sides of theAtlantic: anti-globalism, nationalism, nativism, protectionism, anti-migrantand xenophobic discourse, and other elements of a political culture based inanti-liberal, anti-democratic and isolationist ideals.
There has also been a long debate around the diffusion and reappropriation of fascist ideology among closely related political movements,
such as Germany’s Nazism or Spain’s Francoism.4 It is not the purpose ofthis paper, however, to participate in this enlightening and captivating
discussion. We instead want to emphasise the ideological kinship between
fascism and populism, and the current repercussions of that link.
3

4

See some of the articles that were published on the subject at the end of the
19th and the beginning of the 20th century, edited by the New York Times
Editorial Staff, such as Harold Williams, “’Bolshevism seen as New Religion,’
Petrograd, January 9, 1918,” in Populism, 39–42 (New York, NY: New YorkTimes Educational Publishing, 2019).
Renzo De Felice, often considered to have been the pre-eminent scholar of fascism,highlighted the need for analysis of this issue: It is time, he said, “to establish once
and for all what we understand by fascism. We must elaborate a model to which we
can refer with reasonable certainty; and decide whether we may consider it a unique
phenomenon dictated by a particular historical moment in specific countries,
determined by contingent and non-repeatable circumstances, or whether, instead,
it should be considered one of the possible forms of socio-political organisationof mass societies in a specific stage of their development,” Le interpretazione delfascismo, 2nd ed. (Roma-Bari: Editori Laterza, 1995), 17. Unless otherwise noted,
all translations from Spanish, French, Portuguese, German and Italian are my own.
4

On the other side of the Atlantic, there is also debate about thehistorical connection between regimes that developed after the fall ofeither oligarchical or imperial regimes in Latin America and Europe. This
process began with the fall of the Brazilian Empire in 1889, continued
with the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1929, and was deepened by theGreat War and the Great Depression. Fascism and Nazism in Europe were,
evidently, a consequence of these latter social tremors. Similarly, the fallof the oligarchical regimes in Latin America brought about massive socialand economic change, an upheaval which resulted in a surge of nationalCatholic populist regimes in countries such as Brazil or Argentina. Equally,
just as fascism advanced in Europe, Mexico developed its own form of
populist corporatism, in which all productive sectors (peasants, labourers,
or even small entrepreneurs) were almost compulsorily affiliated to theofficial national party after 1929. Although Europe and Latin America saw
a divergence in the outcomes of such social movements, as a result of theSecond World War and the specificity of national political cultures, theirsocio-political configuration remained nonetheless related. After 1945,
Latin America’s populist ‘first wave’ expanded and strengthened, while
European neo-fascism was left to linger several decades in obscurity, before
it could later re-emerge under more favourable political circumstances. We
can thus advance the idea that this social phenomenon started in Europe,
travelled to Latin America, where it established its own political culture,and then re-blossomed in Europe, connecting the extreme right andpopulist neo-fascism. In this regard, everything centred around the vague
and nebulous concept of ‘the people.’5
Religion has played an ambiguous role in populist regimes. It has beenfrequently used as an identity tool, to establish a national culture and toreject others who are seen as ‘foreign intrusions’ or ‘internal enemies.’
Even the most ‘secular populisms’ have had a complex and ambivalentrelationship with religious groups and institutions, using them politically,
and integrating them into their ideological schemes. Populists haveestablished both formal and informal alliances with religious groups andinstitutions, though these pacts have mostly ended in open conflict.

5

An example of theoretical discussions around this concept is the work of post5

Nevertheless, according to most scholars, populism presents itself asa ‘good’ moral force, detached from institutional religion, set against anelite which is perceived as corrupt and self-serving. It introduces a binary
worldview, in which everything is divided into friends and foes, allies andenemies, with no room for intermediate positions. Those that are viewed
as enemies are not attributed valid positions or different priorities; they
are the evil and the corrupt, to be decimated or eliminated. Morality andreligion tend to be travel companions. But in most cases populist regimes
end up at least attempting to substitute traditional religious institutions
with a form of government based on a new ‘moral order.’ Whether thissituation is particular to populism, or an essential element of the modern(Western or not) state, is a matter of debate.6
In our comparative perspective, at first glance we can observe that
European populist political leaders such as Boris Johnson, Matteo
Salvini, Marine Le Pen, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and Victor Orbán have many
characteristics in common with Jair Bolsonaro, Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, Evo Morales, Hugo Chávez, or Nicolás Maduro in Latin America.
They have reintroduced the religious or the sacred into the sphere of thestate in various ways, as a consequence of either sincere religious belief
or cynical political calculation. In this regard, identitarianism may drive
an unequal treatment of religions: for example, an appeal is made to a
Christian past, and against an ‘invasion’ of Muslims. In most cases thisreintroduction has meant a new approach to the role of religion in politics,
although not necessarily through traditional churches. It has instead
mostly involved an individualised religion, emerging from a process of‘bricolage,’ in which a variety of religious traditions are recycled andremixed, then presented and utilised as a new legitimising force. This can,paradoxically, be seen as either a secular or post-secular trend (depending
on how we define those concepts): society is continuously secularised,
whilst the state is colonised by religion. The reintroduction also leads us

6Marxist Lacanian Ernesto Laclau, especially influential in Latin America;
particularly his book La razón populista [On Populist Reason] (Buenos Aires:
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005).
I make reference here to the notion of biopolitics, from Foucault’s works on‘biopower,’ which is the application of power to ‘biological’ aspects of human
life. According to this idea, modern states would then be the substitute fortraditional religions, in their regulation of the human body.
6

to the idea of the sacredness of the state, the leader, or the people, whichbecome substitutes for institutional religions, as well as to the complex
relationship between traditional religions and the new populist leaders or
movements, as there is a transfer of the sacred.7
In Latin America, populism displays other political characteristics,
particularly ‘clientelism’ (exchanging political support for material goods),
which creates political dependence, particularly in electoral terms. This
leads to an ‘infantilising’ of the most marginal and fragile social sectors, andpaternalistic postures. The ‘good people’ must be led and protected from evil
agents who cause them harm. In many cases, this results in the emergenceof ‘caudillism’ (from caudillo, a term for a strongman leader) or messianic
tendencies. The leader appeals to religious or sacred sources to legitimise his
power, becoming a kind of ‘high priest’ – pronouncing moral judgements atthe same time as running the civil aspects of government.
In Europe, religion’s role in populism is somewhat different. Antisemitism
and Islamophobia have transformed the secular landscape, reintroducing
the historical role of Christianity into societal discourse. This has fuelled areconsideration of identity and pluralism; populists have even questioned therole of democratic institutions. Furthermore, nationalism and isolationism
have shaken the authority of traditional religions, and transformed the wholepolitical culture of many countries. Though Western European societies appear
to be secularised, and beyond direct intervention from religious institutions,the ‘religious’ factor still seems to play a role on the level of identity, andprovides an unrecognised reference with regard to public morality. In otherwords, ‘religion’ now appears covertly in the form of moral standing.

7‘Religious’ and ‘sacred’ are related concepts but are not synonyms. Durkheim,
in his classical book, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, Quadrige
Grands Texts (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), explained – briefly
put – that religions are communal beliefs transformed into social cohesive
institutions, while the sacred is that which is considered separate from orabove everything else. That is why an animal, a concept (the fatherland) or aperson (the leader) can be sacralised. This basic distinction is important for
identifying the possibility of sacred secular (non-religious) things, persons, or
regimes. Durkheim connects the ideas of religion and the sacred, in defining
religion as: “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things,
that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite
into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere tothem.” Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires, 65.
7

Thus far, this paper has treated concepts such as religion, secularity,and laicity only vaguely. They all require more formal definition in orderto understand this article’s proposals.
I understand ‘religion’ in a predominantly Durkheimian way which canbe summarised with the phrase ‘religion is society.’ As the French sociologist
explained in his book The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, societies cannot
exist or reproduce themselves without the creation of an ideal.8 In order tomaintain their cohesion, they therefore produce what we have labelledas ‘religion.’ That is why we can understand a wide variety of new social
phenomena as ‘religious’ (from Durkheim’s civil religion, to beliefs in intelligent
extra-terrestrial life connected to chosen groups on Earth, to an emotional
gathering) even if it doesn’t follow the traditional understanding of such. If it
creates social cohesion through recurrent emotion around an ideal, in a certain
group, and through a set of repeated rituals, then it may be called a religion.
I understand, as many of my colleagues do, secularity and secularisation
as the continuous outcome of a process of differentiation between thespheres of life, which were, at a certain point, both undifferentiated from,and dominated by, the religious perspective. Through this differentiation,these spheres then developed as autonomous in terms of values and modes ofaction. For the purposes of this research, it is immaterial whether this process
began at the moment that Jews established a covenant with God, in the Axial
Age, or when Martin Luther (supposedly) nailed his 95 theses at Wittenberg’sCastle Church, or indeed at any other moment in history. The point here isthat, as Olivier Tschannen explained in an article published almost 30 years
ago, the nucleus of the secularisation paradigm contains three basic elements:
rationalisation, differentiation and worldliness, with differentiation being
the most important of all.9 A few years later, José Casanova confirmed in his
seminal work that “the thesis of the differentiation of religious and secularspheres is the still defensible core of the theory of secularisation.”10
Nevertheless, if we follow not only a Durkheimian but also a Weberian
understanding of the relationship between the religious and the secular89Durkheim, 603.
Olivier Tschannen, “The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization,” Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion 30, no. 4 (1991).
10 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (London: The Universityof Chicago Press, 1994), 6–7.
8

spheres, we can also understand how religion has produced, and is still able
to produce, the secular. We also see that the secular is permanently ‘swamped’by the religious, generating a permanent tendency towards sacralisation
in society. There is a long tradition of scholars who, without rejecting thedifferentiation of society, speak of the secular aspects produced by a specific
set of religious ethics and, ultimately, of secularisation as a religious change.
Max Weber, for example, refers to Judaism understanding the world as “ahistorical product,” and developing a highly rational set of religious ethics,
which “still underlies the contemporary European and Middle Easternreligious ethic.”11 His famous work on protestant ethics is a clear theoretical
exercise designed to show the impact of religious ethics in the economic
sphere.12 Peter Berger follows the Weberian explanation, considering theWestern religious tradition (initiated by Israel and transmitted throughChristianity) to carry “the seed of secularisation.”13 Other authors
consider this relationship bi-directionally. Karel Dobbelaere wrote about
secularisation as a multi-dimensional concept, with religious change andreligious involvement included as expressions of the phenomenon. Whilereligious involvement “refers to individual behaviour and measures thedegree of normative integration in religious bodies,” religious change“expresses change occurring in the posture of religious organisation –churches, denominations and sects – in matters of belief, morals andrituals, and implies also a study of the decline and emergence of religious
groups.”14 Instead of understanding secularisation as a religious pathology
to be measured by the shrinking reach of the churches, Dobbelaere explains,
a focus on emergent forms of religiosity (for example, the so-called ‘newreligious movements’) enabled an understanding of secularisation asa process of religious change.15 In the same theoretical vein that views
secularisation not as a phenomenon completely separated from religion, butrather as both a product and a producer of it, Danièle Hervieu-Léger states:

11 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Tübingen: UTB, 1988
[1921]), 1:6.
12 Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze, 1:17–206.
13 Peter Berger, Para una teoría sociológica de la religión [The Sacred Canopy], 2nded. (Barcelona: Editorial Kairós, 1967), 159.
14 Karel Dobbelaere, “Secularization: A Multi-dimensional Concept,” Current
Sociology 29, no. 2 (1981): 12 (emphasis mine).
15 Dobbelaere, “Secularization,” 4.
9

we must understand that secularisation is not the disappearance of religion
in the modern world. It is the ensemble of processes of rearrangement ofbeliefs, which are produced in a society whose propulsive engine is thenon-fulfilment of expectations that it provokes, and whose daily conditionis the uncertainty tied to the interminable quest for the means to satisfy it.16

The entanglement is easier to understand and to differentiate, when we
understand that the religious and the secular are distinct but also permanently
interrelated: a two-way street producing specific arrangements in which‘the religious’ is still present – either as civil religion, political religion, or
diverse forms of sacralisation of the secular – whilst the ‘the secular’ transforms
religion or produces rearrangements of beliefs. In some cases, the new formsof religiosity seem subordinated to a secular social logic. More rarely in ourcontemporary society, the religious aspects may become predominant. This
does not eliminate or diminish the thesis of the differentiation of spheres. On
the contrary, it helps us to explain the complexity and the variation in timeand space of those arrangements. Here I will focus on the creation of politicalreligions, and the process of sacralising secular entities, such as ‘the people.’
Thirdly, we have the concept of ‘laicity,’ which is mainly used in ‘Latin’countries, where the Catholic church was religiously monopolistic andpolitically powerful, and in certain ways is still culturally hegemonic.
The concept has, in many cases, been used as a synonym for ‘secularity,’
but, as mentioned before, I will limit its use to the political sphere of thesecularisation process. As has been the case for secularity, the concept oflaicity has been much debated, particularly in France, but also in Mexico,
Québec, and Turkey.17 In previous work, I proposed a definition centred on
the changing legitimation of political authority, which could be explained
through the transition from sacred to democratic (understood to denote
16 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Le pèlerin et le converti: La religion en mouvement(Paris: Flammarion, 1999), 42. In fact, Hervieu-Léger proposed this thesisin the 1980s in her book Vers un nouveau christianisme? Introduction à lasociologie du christianisme occidental (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1986), 198.
17 In 2005, three scholars from France (Jean Baubérot), Canada (Micheline Milot)
and Mexico (myself) wrote the pompously titled “Universal Declaration of Laicity/
Secularity in XXI Century,” to facilitate a common denominator in the comprehensionof the concept, beyond our different cultural and historical approaches to it.
The declaration was endorsed by many colleagues and has been translated into
several languages. An English version of the declaration can be found at: https://vancouversun.com/news/staff-blogs/universal-declaration-on-secularism
10popular sovereignty) sources of political legitimacy: “Laicity is a regimeof social coexistence, whose political institutions are mainly legitimatedby popular sovereignty, and no longer by sacred or religious sources.”18
Laicisation is therefore the secularisation of the state (political sphere), butalso of cultural, scientific and educational institutions, insofar as the stateexerts authority over those realms (public health and public education being
typical examples). The ‘lay state’ is then a political-juridical instrument
serving liberty, in a society that recognises itself as plural and diverse.
The advantages of this definition of laicity are that it clearly formulates
the secularisation or laicisation of the political sphere as a process centredon the changing legitimacy of political authority, that it does so without aspecific beginning or end, that it does not follow a specific model (such as
the French one), and that it relates clearly to modern democracy (throughthe concept of popular sovereignty or popular will). It also shows that,like democracy, laicisation can never be fully attained, and can always bereversed. Just as democratisation is never complete, the transition fromsacred to ‘peoples’ sovereignty’ forms of legitimacy of power is neverfinished. At least a remnant of the sacred remains, in even the most secularsocieties, as even the lay state tends to sacralise itself. Laicity should thus
be understood to not refer to a full and complete separation between thestate and religious institutions. This definition allows us to recognise
the complexity of the process of laicisation in many countries. This isparticularly relevant in countries where, in spite of formal separation,
the Catholic church and some evangelical churches are still politically
influential. Equally, many countries house regimes that either ignore theidea of separation between religion and politics, or reject the concept of theautonomy of the state from a particular religion or philosophical doctrine.
In other cases, even though institutional religion does not directly govern
politics, its moral codes still play a role. This is, in any case, the general
conceptual framework in which we situate our research.

18 Roberto Blancarte, ed., Laicidad y valores en un Estado democrático (México: El
Colegio de México – Secretaría de Gobernación, 2000).
11

2 Fascism

Is populism related to fascism? Or was fascism a unique social phenomenon
that should not be conflated with other socio-political developments?
In his book on the interpretations of fascism, Renzo De Felice mentions
several conditions that have been variously advanced as causes of fascism:weakness of the liberal-democratic tradition, deficiencies of the political andbureaucratic classes, nationalism, the desire for strong government resulting
from a limited socio-political conscience, the moral crisis of European
society, late processes of economic development and national unification,a final stage of imperialist capitalism, the product of class struggle, etc.19 He
insisted on the need to observe fascism as a modern phenomenon, but, at thesame time, following Ernst Cassirer, to recognise its mythic quality:
Pre-modern in many aspects, fascism has, nevertheless in many other senses
been a typically modern phenomenon […] perhaps the most modern among
those that have characterised the first half of our century, in the way in which
it has intuitively sensed the enormous potentiality of mythical power in atransitional crisis, and used it to exert political power over the masses.20

The reference to mythical power is not accidental. It points to a central
characteristic of fascism, as well as of certain populist regimes. De Felice
established a typology of the forms of power of the fascist phenomenon.
According to him, fascism imposes itself through: 1) A mystical (myemphasis) conception of politics and of life in general. This is based in theprinciple of irrational activism (trust in direct and revolutionary action),and the denigration of the common individual set against an exaltation of
the national collectivity and of extraordinary personalities (elites and theÜbermensch). From this exaltation descended the myth – essential in fascism– of the capo (leader). 2) A political regime of the masses (in the sense of acontinual mobilisation of the masses, and a direct relationship between theleader and the masses, without intermediaries) based on a one-party system
and a party militia. The authority of the regime is enforced through a police
state, and through the regime taking control of all sources of information and
19 De Felice, Le interpretazione del fascismo, 293. See also, by the same author,
Breve storia del fascismo, con i due saggi “Il problema dell’identità nazionale” e“Dall’eredità di Adua all’intervento” (Milano: Mondadori, 2018 [2000]), 148.
20 De Felice, Le interpretazione del fascismo, xxi.
12

propaganda. 3) A verbally revolutionary standing, coupled with a substantial
conservatism mitigated by a series of social welfare measures. 4) A desire tocreate a new ruling class, existing as an expression of the party and, therefore,of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. 5) The creation and valorisation of astrong military apparatus. 6) An economic regime based on private enterprise,
but characterised by a tendency towards the expansion of the public sector,
by a shift in economic control from capitalists and entrepreneurs to highfunctionaries of the state, and by state control of the major aspects of economic
policy. The latter includes taking an increasing role as a mediator in labour
controversies (corporatism), and a trend towards autarky.21
There exist, of course, many other descriptions and interpretations of the
fascist phenomenon. What I want to emphasise here is the mythical, quasireligious aura or open sacralisation of fascist leadership on the one hand, and,on the other, the central role of the leader himself, with his direct relationshipwith the masses.
There are, in fact, several ways of understanding the relationship thatfascism had with religion or with the sacred in general. Some scholars haveadvanced the idea of a close relationship between fascism and a certain
type of religiosity. In the case of Italy, the relationship between the Catholic
church, specifically the Holy See, and the fascist regime has already beenthoroughly studied, and dissecting this relationship is not the objective ofour research. Let us therefore mention only the Lateran Treaty of 1929 as
the high point of the entente between them. In more concrete terms, as
Giordano Bruno Guerri explains:
The solidarity between fascism and the Vatican cannot come as a surpriseeven whilst fascism promoted itself as a religion. The Church and theregime had in common the same set of enemies: democracy, liberalism,
communism, freemasonry. The authoritarian and mystifying modelthat Mussolini wanted corresponded to that desired by the Church.22

We will later observe similar features in the connection between institutionalreligion and the political regime in modern populist regimes, which generate
a similarly ambiguous relationship between them.
21 De Felice, 24–25.
22 Giordano B. Guerri, Antistoria degli italiani: Da Romolo a Giovanni Paolo II(Milano: Mondadori, 1997), 313.
13

Fascism’s relationship with religion extended beyond the domain
of institutional beliefs. There is a stronger connection to the concept of
neo-pagan sacredness of ‘secular’ regimes.23 An abundant bibliography
already exists around the idea of a political religiosity of the fascist politicalexperiment.24 I would like to emphasise this as one of the characteristics
that populism has inherited from fascism, as we will later observe.
“We strive to translate into reality that which was Giuseppe Mazzini’s
aspiration: to give Italians ‘the religious concept of their own nation,’” said
Mussolini in December 1920.25 The fascist leader had long expressed theneed for a religious belief in spiritual-secular values, even in his period
as a socialist: “Humanity needs a credo. It is faith that moves mountains
because it gives the illusion that mountains move. Illusion is perhaps the
only reality in life.”26 Mussolini himself represents the typical politician
that will evolve in populist contexts: whilst personally a non-believer,and even furiously anticlerical, he does not hesitate to make pragmaticconcessions and compromises with institutional religion when necessary.
In the long run, he nonetheless maintains an open dispute with religion
over the organisation of society, as eventually the political regime will seek
to control all forms of social organisation, including those (for example,
youth organisations) of the religious institutions.
Guerri, explains this transformation of a civil religion into a politicalreligion27:
23 Richard Steigman-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity,
1919–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), discusses the vast
bibliography on this subject in the introduction.
24 See, for example, Michael Burleigh’s trilogy, The Third Reich: A New History;
Earthly Powers: The Conflict between Religion and Politics from the French
Revolution to the Great War, and Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and
Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror.
25 Quoted from Guerri, Antistoria degli italiani, 278.
26 Guerri, 281.
27 The concept of civil religion, initially proposed by Jean-Jaques Rousseau, andlater variously revised by Émile Durkheim and others, relates to a substitution of
traditional religious symbols and values for civic or patriotic symbols and secularvalues. See Jean-Jaques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, écrits politiques, vol. 3 ofOeuvres completes, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 460–70.
Émile Durkheim referred to the French Revolution, and how many things were“by nature” transformed into sacred things by public opinion: “la Patrie, la Liberté,la Raison” (‘fatherland, liberty, reason’), Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires, 305.
The French sociologist Raymond Aron, spoke of “secular religions” (religions14

An evaluation of the religious crescendo of fascism is possible even throughthe work of the secretaries of the Party, diverse in personalities andpurposes, but all working towards the sacralisation of the regime Roberto
Farinacci (Secretary in 1925-1926) talks about the Dominican faith offascism, to justify the depuration-inquisition of the dissidents-heretics.
Augusto Turati (1926-1930) affirmed the need to “believe in fascism, in theDuce, in the Revolution, as one believes in Divinity.” And to accept “thesedogmas, even if it’s shown that they are wrong […] without discussion.”
Turati diffused a true catechism of “fascist doctrine” that was synthetised
into the motto “Believe, Obey, Combat” under his successor Giovanni
Giurati (1930-1931), who was particularly attentive to youth formation.
Finally, Achille Starace (1931-1939) codified the religious liturgy of theregime with a maniacal rigor, intensifying it up to the grotesque.28

Not every mention of religion or religiosity should be taken as granting
its existence a new form. There are, of course, multiple metaphors or
metonymies. But we must take into consideration the creation of new
beliefs, even though they come in secular disguise. We should consider
their capacity to create and recreate an ideal that enables a particular groupor society to maintain a certain consistency, and to reproduce itself.29
We do not have the space here to develop this argument, which has, at
any rate, already been successfully expanded elsewhere. It is our purpose
only to insist on the religious aspect of fascism, coming either from thecult of the leader, or from the new civil or political faith that the regimelaïques). Robert Bellah, following the Durkheimian interpretation, wrote about
the concept of “transcendent universal religion of the nation,” in an article titled“Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96, no. 1 (1967). The concept of politicalreligion also deals with substitution of religion, particularly by totalitarian
antireligious forms of faith. The term’s use was extended in the 1930s by theGerman professor (exiled in the USA) Eric Voegelin, as an explanation of theCommunist and Nazi regimes. For a history of the concept, see the introductionin Michael Burleigh’s book, Earthly Powers: The Conflict between Religion and
Politics from the French Revolution to the Great War (London: Harper Press,
2005). The relationship between both concepts is still a matter of discussion.
28 Guerri, Antistoria degli italiani, 281.
29 An example of this point can be seen in an early description of bolshevism. In
an article written for the New York Times in January 1918, Harold Williams
responded positively to the observations of one writer, who saw bolshevism as a
new religion, comparing it’s form “as a mass movement with early Christianity.”
Williams insisted: “there certainly are points of semblance, for instance inthe fanatical sectarianism and the apocalyptic tendency.” Harold Williams,“Bolshevism Seen as New Religion,” 39–42.
15

promoted among its followers. Finally, there is also the aspect of social
mobilisation and corporatisation, where this new faith faced and collided
with institutional and established faiths. We will return to this idea when
we examine populism and its conflicts with organised religion.
3 Populism

What aspects of its relationships with religion and secularity did populism
inherit from fascism? Once again, the debate about the relationshipbetween fascism and populism is not new. We will instead concentrateon the continuities between the two social phenomena regarding theirrelationship with religion and the secular. Based on his historical analysis,
Federico Finchelstein has proposed that populism is the post-war successorof fascism, though renouncing violence and accepting formal democracy.
Populism does not only ‘play the game’ of democracy, but depends upon
it for the assertion of its legitimacy. Fascism as a regime ended with defeat
in the Second World War, though it has reappeared through extreme-rightgroups and parties in the past few decades. Most contemporary politiciansin this vein have distanced themselves from the term ‘fascism,’ but not fromits theory or practice. Fascism, Finchelstein writes, is “not only a blurryghost from the past but also a once-defeated historical ideology that has
clear populist and neofascist repercussions today.”30 In other words:
Populism is the key term for understanding the fascist soundings of eventsand political strategies that reformulated the legacies of fascism for new
democratic times. In the guise of postfascist forms of antiliberal democracy,
fascism continued its legacy through various combinations of populism andneofascism.31

This analysis is not the proposition of someone coming from a radical left
perspective, which would rather wholly equate populism with fascism as
expressions of the same phenomenon.32 It instead shows lines of transmission
30 Federico Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism in History (Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 2017), 14.
31 Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism, 7–8.
32 John Bellamy Foster, for example, would suggest that Trumpism is anexpression of neofascism. According to him, following neo-Marxist theory,“neofascism is the inevitable product of the crisis of monopoly-finance capital.”
John Bellamy Foster, “This is not populism,” Monthly Review: An Independent16

or “transcontextual connections.”33 The crucial difference between fascism
and populism is the latter’s renunciation of the use of violence as a legitimate
political tool. Violence in fascism was, by contrast, conceived as sacred:“National myths inspired and legitimised violence as a key dimensionof the fascist political religion […]. Central to this conception was themessianic leader as a warrior who would lead the people into holy contests
against internal and external enemies.”34 The central idea of this argument,
which we want to stress here, is the notion of continuity between extreme
right pre-populist movements and fascism. Equally, we stress the use offascist ideas of the community, the people, the leader, and the nation as
foundational elements of modern populism. After the Second World War,
however, “populism often reformulated or even at times rejected thesefeatures, especially those related to fascism’s extreme political violence andits totalitarian overthrow of democracy,” not restricting itself to the politicalright.35 In regard to Latin America, the latter point is an important element,as populism has often presented itself in the region as a progressive or leftist
political option, opposing ‘neoliberal,’ ‘oligarchic’ or ‘conservative’ forces. I
stress here the great difficulty that many populisms, particularly those based
in a leftist perspective, have in accepting formal representative democracy.
They instead have a tendency to cling to their own rule, ignoring the basic
rules of transparency, accountability, and transmission of power.
The second crucial element inherited from fascism by populism,
particularly in Latin America, is the ‘cult of the leader,’ something thathas fundamental consequences for the democratic system, and thedeterioration of its structures of checks and balances. As Finchelstein states,“the single truth of populism is that the leader and the nation make up awhole.”36 Finchelstein considers common features of populism to include“an extreme form of political religion,” “an apocalyptic vision of politics,”“a political theology founded by a messianic and charismatic leader of theSocialist Magazine 69, no. 2 (2017).
33 Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism, 125.
34 Finchelstein, 17.
35 Finchelstein, 17–18.
36 Finchelstein, 5.
17

people,” and “a mythical idea of history, and the ritual nature of political
spectacle,” all features linking populism to fascism.37
Identifying the links, inheritances or historical similarities between
fascism and populism is important for the purposes of our research.
But, still, we need a comprehensive understanding of the latter politicalphenomenon to enable accurate comparisons. Fortunately, we are not
the first to undertake a comparative analysis of populisms in Europe andLatin America. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, two of themost important scholars on populism, have published several importantworks on the subject in recent years. Both authors are mostly concernedwith “the effects of populist actors in liberal democracies” and “underwhich circumstances […] populists constitute a corrective or a threat tothe liberal democratic system.”38 Whilst this is not, of course, our main
focus, it is certainly a related topic. Most important, however, have been
their efforts to arrive at a minimal definition of populism, as a basis fromwhich to proceed with empirical research. This minimal definition arises
from a discussion of populism as a movement, as a political style, and as a
discourse, in the contexts of Latin America and Europe. In the process, theyreject several previously established ideas. For example, they show that: 1)“scholars have convincingly demonstrated that populism in Latin America
is compatible with both neoliberalism, and state-centred development,”such that populism is not tied to a specific economic regime; 2) “populism
and clientelism are not synonymous,” although in many cases we seethem together, particularly in Latin America; 3) “the formation of multiclass alliances is not a defining attribute of populism, but rather a central
element of mass politics”; 4) there is a “propensity to conflate demagogy
or opportunism with populism”; 5) Laclau’s theory is extremely abstract
and “proposes a concept of populism that becomes so vague and malleable
it loses its analytic utility”; 6) “at least implicitly almost all concepts of
populism share the idea that the latter always alludes to a confrontation
between ‘the people’ and ‘the establishment.’”39
They finally arrive at the following minimal definition: Populism is “athin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into
37 Finchelstein, 103, 125.
38 Mudde, and Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas, 2.
39 Mudde, and Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas, 2.
18

two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ v ‘the corrupt
elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (general will) of the people.” Most relevantly to our research, they
add: “This means that populism is, in essence, a form of moral politics,
as the distinction between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ is first and foremost
moral (i.e. pure against corrupt), not situational (e.g. position of power),socio-cultural (e.g. ethnicity, religion) or socioeconomic (e.g. class).”40
Moral politics, however, is related to grander ideas of right and wrong or
good and evil, which are religion-related concepts. This opens the gateway
to advancing the idea that populism has also a concealed (or, at least,
non-overt) kinship with the religious or the sacred, though these furtive
religious elements tend to rapidly develop an ambiguous relationship withthe regime’s allegedly secular goals.
According to Mudde and Rovira, the notion of populism competes inthe social arena with the idea of elitism, but it inverts elitism’s values (elitists
believe that the people are dangerous, dishonest and vulgar, while theelite are superior, morally, culturally and intellectually). Pluralism, on theother hand, opposes both perspectives of reality, and affirms that society
is composed of superposed groups with different ideas and interests, adiversity which constitutes its strength. Therefore, pluralists believe thata society should have many centres of power, and that politics ought toreflect their interests through consensus and compromises.41
The notion of ‘the people’ is central to all of the various forms andrealisations of populism. It is most frequently used to express any of threemeanings: the people as sovereign, as commoners (or common people),and as the nation.42 Arguably, populist parties or regimes in Europe tend
to promote the idea of the people as the nation, while the idea of common
people as the base of political support is emphasised more often in Latin
America. However, it is the idea of popular sovereignty which connects
more closely with the general conception of democracy and, as we have seen,
with our own definition of laicity (or political secularity). Laicity is thus
associated with various forms of legitimacy of power. The greater the degree

40 Mudde, and Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe and the Americas, 8.
41 Mudde, and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 7.
42 Mudde, and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 9.
19

of a transition away from the sacred and towards a predominant grounding
in the popular will that this involves, the stronger the form of laicity.
The central question is thus: What are the new conditions that populism
introduces in democratic regimes, and how do they affect the relationship withreligions in particular? Also, how does this reconsideration or reintroductionof religious elements transform the idea of secular governments based on
popular will and not on sacred or religious sources? In other words, what
relationship does populism have with religion and secularity?
Let’s begin with the relationship between populism and democracy.
There are, broadly speaking, three conceptions of this relationship. The
first considers populism as a corruptor of democracy. The second considers
populism as the true direct democracy, without intermediaries. The third
considers populism as a corrective adjustment to democracy, althoughfailing to reinforce it in the long run. Some propose populism as a synthetic
combination of all these ideas, depending on context and circumstances.43
As an example, Mudde and Rovira Kalwasser suggest that populism
tends to play a positive role in the promotion of a minimal or electoral
democracy, but a negative one when it concerns the advancement of acompletely deployed liberal democratic regime. As a consequence, while
populism tends to favour the democratisation of authoritarian regimes,
it also ends up diminishing the quality of liberal democracies.44 Others
would say that we are simply facing two distinct forms of democracy:
liberal-representative and populist-participative, in the midst of a “crisis ofpolitical intermediation.”45
4 Populism and Religion

How does populism affect the relationship between religion and politics,
and consequently the secularity of the state? There are at least three strands
to the answer to this question.
Populism has a binary political logic and discourse, in which society is
divided into two unequal parts: the people, who are morally good, and theelites, who are abusive and corrupt. As a consequence, there is a tendency
to deny rights to the elites, on the moral basis that they are judged to be
43 Manuel Anselmi, Populism: An Introduction, 121.
44 Mudde, and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 95–96.
45 Anselmi, Populism: An Introduction, 3.
20

parasitic and rapacious.46 In the effort to recover rights for the majorities,
such rulings can easily devolve into the denial of rights to all others
considered to be outside of ‘the people.’ There is also a temptation (touse religious terminology) among populist leaders to submit questions ofhuman rights to popular referenda, though these are considered by some to
be inalienable, for example women’s rights or LGBTQI rights. Experiencehas shown that those rights are better guaranteed where secular institutions
have been created to protect minority rights, whilst also considering third
party rights and public order. In populist regimes, those rights depend on
the changing will of the majority or, worse, that of the leaders. There isnot, in any case, a stable constitutional framework protecting those rights
according to an established political philosophy.
Another characteristic of populist regimes is that, as society is divided
into good and bad, pure and corrupt, the people and the elite, the government
considers any criticism or opposition as a threat to its stability. This results inincreased pressure on the press in particular, and freedom of expression in
general. It also results in the elimination of counterweights to the executive
power, either from the parliament, the judiciary or other forces such as
entrepreneurs, churches, unions, or even non-governmental organisations.
A third element is the so-called ‘moralisation of public life,’ which
distorts the role of the state, endangering individual freedoms. The
establishment of moral guidelines for the citizens, based on religious
doctrines or loose ideas of sacred principles (the nation, the flag, the people,
traditional values), tends to lead to the denial of the moral autonomy of theindividual, essential in any pluralistic society. Because of their Manichean
perspectives, populist governments tend to establish moralising rulings,
and are inclined to dictate collective and individual behaviours, trying
to pronounce what is good and bad in social terms, beyond formal law.
On occasion, public moral judgments (in general, through the media)
substitute legal judgments. Individuals or organisations are classified
according to their political positions, their obedience to the guidelines of
the new doctrine, and their adoption of behaviour in conformance withthe will of the people, as expressed by the party organs or government
46 Jan-Werner Müller puts this point very clearly: “the populist immediately
claims that the issue at stake is entirely moral.” Müller, “Populism and theClaim to a Moral Monopoly,” 72.
21

guidelines. The establishment of a public moral order frequently comes into
conflict with intellectual and scientific groups, whose opinions are openly
demonised (to again use religious terminology). Even religious institutions
and their leaders, insofar as they express opinions independent from thegovernment, are accused of forming part of the previous regime, whichrefuses to disappear. It is common to witness the formation of a new kindof priesthood, normally lay or secular but nonetheless moralising, whose
members see themselves as substituting the traditional religious order.
This new ‘priesthood’ is normally led by the head of the executive branch,or by one of their most prominent followers, who dictates the terms of the
new public moral order.
As we can observe, the main point of collision between populism andthe established form of secularity comes from the former’s typical formof leadership. Most populist regimes are headed by an undisputed leader,
who ends up concentrating power and making decisions about all sortsof things, placing themselves above democratic institutions and the legal
framework. As a result, the religiosity or the secularity of the state isdecided according to the particular and changing opinion of the leadership.
In other words, when the popular sovereignty is concentrated in a person
or a small group of individuals, the character and shape of secularity of
the regime depends solely on them, in a sort of regression to the times ofmonarchical absolutism. Therefore, if the leadership decides to introduce
religious aspects into their way of governing, the system built to transfer
sources of power from religion to the popular will, and the associatedlegal and political framework, simply crumble. This has occurred in many
populist regimes, to varying degrees.
5 Classical Populism in Action

The historical reference of populism in Latin America is Peronism, following
the government of Colonel Juan Domingo Perón, whose rule in Argentina
began with his involvement in a military coup in 1943, followed by terms asa president legitimised by electoral means, from 1946 to 1955, until he wasousted by another military coup. Federico Finchelstein maintains that there
is a closeness between fascism and populism, which “belong to a converging

22

political and intellectual history”47 and argues that Perón, in a search forlegitimacy, “created the first form of modern populism.” Describing the great
historical fluctuations of Peronism, he shows how “populism, as it constantly
searches for absolute majorities, demands total allegiance to authoritarian
forms of leadership, and last but not least, challenges not only liberalism but
also popular forms of radical democracy.”48
Peronism’s relationship with religion was very similar to that offascism with religion, both institutional and the vaguer understandings
thereof, with the common denominator being ambiguity. Prior to theadvent of fascism in Italy, the so-called ‘Roman question,’ a dispute over
the temporal power of the papacy within the new Kingdom of Italy, hadpoisoned the relationship between Italy and the Vatican (where the Pope
had been secluded) since 1870. The Pope had thus prohibited Catholics
from participating in politics (with the exception of local politics later on),but as time passed, both parties sought a solution. Liberal governments
never accepted any terms of agreement that would reverse the situation,
but the First World War transformed the political landscape. The
Catholic hierarchy hesitantly accepted the constitution of a Catholic Party(significantly named ‘Partito Popolare,’ showing the popular aspirations of
the Church), run by a priest (Luigi Sturzo); but once fascists took power,
the Pope preferred to negotiate with Mussolini, whom he would name‘l’uomo della Providenza’ (‘the man of Providence’). It didn’t matter that
il Duce was an anticlerical atheist, as long as he gave the Church what it
wanted. The Lateran Treaty of 1929 gave the Catholic church not only
territorial and political sovereignty, but enormous economic resources andthe confirmation of many measures that favoured the religious institution,such as the reintroduction of military chaplains even in peacetime,the introduction of the crucifix in schools and tribunals, money for thereconstruction of churches, and, above all, the introduction of Catholicteaching in primary schools. The only real conflict with fascism occurred
when Mussolini pushed for the assimilation of the Catholic associations
into the corporate state. After a period of great tension, both parties backed
down, although the situation would ultimately benefit the Catholic church.

47 Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism, 108.
48 Finchelstein, 110–11.
23Peron, who had been a military attaché at the Argentinian Embassy inRome in 1939-1941, understood the sacralising tendencies of the fascist
regime, and reproduced them in many ways. He and his wife Eva (‘Evita’ tothe couple’s followers) became objects of adoration. As Finchelstein affirms:[…] the constant interaction between democratic realities and authoritarian
tendencies led postwar populism to present a dual source of legitimation:
the leader is the leader because of electoral representation but populist
political theology also requires a firm belief in the leader as a transcendental,
charismatic figure whose legitimacy goes beyond electoral representation.49

Finchelstein goes on to emphasise that “the religious dimensions of thePeronist populist doctrine were intimately linked with the alleged religious
nature of Perón’s leadership […]. The constant blurring of the profane
and the sacred was continuously pushed to its limits.”50 An example ofthis was the formal designation of Evita Perón as ‘Spiritual Leader of the
Nation,’ upon her death in 1952. From then on, all of the country’s radio
stations were obligated to say that Evita “passed to immortality,” in a dailycommemoration marking the hour of her passing.51 Before this, Evita had“told her close advisor, the hardcore cleric-fascist Father Virgilio Filippo,
and others in 1951, that Perón was the God of the Argentines.”52 In any
case, Evita became a ‘popular saint,’ without official recognition from thechurch, but nonetheless well incorporated into the collective imaginaryof the masses.53 Many scholars have identified sacred-religious elementsof Peronism, not only through its status as “a political religion” with an“autonomous reinterpretation of the Christian doctrine,” but also in its
religious structure, its prophetic standing, its Messianism or call for a new

49 Finchelstein, 230.
50 Finchelstein, 231.
51 Pablo Sirvén, Perón y los medios de comunicación: La conflictiva relación delos gobiernos justicialistas con la prensa 1943–2011 (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Sudamericana, 2011).
52 Finchelstein, 231.
53 The complex relations in the construction of popular saints in Latin America isapproached in Kristín Gudrún Jónsdóttir, “Bandoleros santificados en México,”in Diccionario de Religiones en América Latina, coord. Roberto Blancarte,
Sección de Obras de Antropología (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica - El
Colegio de México, 2018), 27–34. See also, in the same volume, José Manuel
Valenzuela Arce, “Mística y santos populares transfronterizos,” 389–95.
24

order, the rituals of the socio-political movement, the virtual canonisationof Evita, and its moral competition with the established churches. 54
Competition for the soul of the Argentines eventually became themain reason for Perón’s conflict with the Catholic church, and his resultant
downfall. The paradox is that Perón’s government had reinstated theideal of a Catholic nation, through a variety of concrete measures. These
included the restoration of religious instruction in schools, and theconferring of considerable economic support and institutional privilegeson the church. Above all, Perón re-established a national Catholic identity
and culture, which combined the sword and the cross, fighting side by sideagainst foreign enemies represented either by red bolshevism or protestantliberalism.55 But Peronism, just like fascism in Europe, increasinglycompeted with Catholic organisations to establish its primacy in the newcorporate state. Inevitably, mounting tension with the Catholic church
erupted into conflict, ultimately provoking the fall of Perón. Some scholars
have argued that this increasing dispute with the Catholic hierarchy was
one of the main causes (if not the primary one) for the end of Perón’s
government. Despite this, Peronism remained an essential element ofArgentinian political culture for the rest of the century and beyond, bothas a social political force, and through the ideal of the Catholic national
identity, sustained by conservative forces (whether Peronist or otherwise).
Brazil’s path to populism, sparked as a reaction to the crisis of 1929, wassimilar to Argentina’s in many ways, with a series of military coups backed
by civilian groups propelling Getulio Vargas into power. The eventual
dismantling of the liberal state also came along with a new conception ofnational Catholicism overseen by the army, in alliance with the Catholichierarchy. This understanding would later be called a ‘moral concordat.’
Getulio Vargas, who was president from 1930 to 1945 and from 1951
to 1954, became the central figure of a ‘New State’ (Estado Novo, 1937),
ruling (almost unchallenged) by non-democratic means. He abolished

54 See Roberto Bosca, La Iglesia nacional peronista: Factor religioso y poder político
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1997), 397. Also, Susana Bianchi,
Catolicismo y peronismo: Religión y política en Argentina 1943–1955 (Buenos Aires:
Trama Editorial/Prometeo libros, 2001).
55 See Loris Zanatta, Perón y el mito de la nación católica: Iglesia y Ejército en los orígenes
del peronismo 1943–1946 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1999), 452.
25

the National Congress, took control of the legislature and the judiciary, andeliminated the free press. It was only for his final term, from 1951 to 1954, that
he was formally elected, at the end of which he committed suicide before hecould be ousted from government. A sympathetic witness to his rule gave an
accurate portrayal of his political tendencies in 1944, at the height of his power:
Vargas declared himself president, set aside the constitution of 1934,
replaced it by a document that was only gradually put into effect, andorganized a semi-fascist state, which he called the “New State.” The
individual was to live as a part of a society which only the state could
represent and embody. The state was entrusted with definite functions
in social life, and sought to guide the people for the common good.
By dispensing with the intermediary of political parties, it tried tointerpret directly the feelings, anxieties, and reactions of the masses[…]. He thinks he is democratic. The people call him democratic. For
the population is not regimented and he intends to give Brazilians
democratic institutions as soon as they are ready for them. 56

As in the case of Perón, Vargas would eventually lose his power through amilitary coup, but would leave a political heritage that endured many decades
beyond. Populism (the “semi-fascist” phenomenon in the above quotation)
would become a permanent characteristic of Brazilian politics. The Catholic
church was its privileged partner for many decades. This partnership ended
following the repression of Catholics in the early 1970s, and the church’s
deepening engagement with issues of social justice and human rights.57
6 Contemporary Populism

Upon coming to power, the attitude of most populist governments in Latin
America (and fascist governments in Europe) towards the Catholic church
tends to initially be obsequious, due to the prestige and high credibilityof the religious institution in the region. Once members of the Catholichierarchy pronounce any sort of criticism of the government, however, the56 Lillian E. Fisher, “Getulio Vargas, the Strong Man of Brazil,” Social Science 19,
no. 2 (1944): 84, and 86.
57 See Kenneth P. Serbin, Secret Dialogues: Church-State Relations, Torture, andSocial Justice in Authoritarian Brazil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2000).
26

state’s reactions are harsh and inclined towards forms of anticlericalism.58
In that sense, although rightist populists in particular tend to build initial
informal alliances with institutional religions, in the long run both theyand leftist populists end up colliding with them. When a populist leader
faces opposition from a church, there are two common reactions: 1) A
direct attack on the clergy, with accusations of all possible evils in society,from laziness to paedophilia. As in other cases, members of the clergy
are lumped together with other supporters of the elite, accused of being
overly accustomed to privileges. 2) Identification with a so-called ‘real
Christianism,’ where the populist leader embraces a closeness to a versionof Christ who fought for the poor and socially deprived.59
Populism was a major characteristic of many Latin American countries
following the economic collapse of 1929 and the fall of oligarchic agroexporter liberal elites. The most important cases, though, were thoseof the two biggest countries in South America. In most cases, populist
governments in South America came to power by the hands of, or
accompanied by, the military. Symptomatically, these political experiments
were also interrupted by military coups, such as in Argentina in 1945, andin Brazil in 1964. The Cold War and the fear of communist or sociallyradical revolts, heightened by the Cuban Revolution of 1959, solidified
the alliance between the military apparatus and the Catholic church. Evensome reformist programmes in Bolivia in the 1950s and in Peru in the
1970s were undertaken by military governments, with the implicit or open
support of the Catholic hierarchy. Direct military presence in politics lasted
until the 1970s, with the Chilean and the Argentinian cases being the mostnotable for the ‘dirty wars’ that ensued, involving extensive repression, withtens of thousands of victims. The 1980s witnessed, for the first time, a real
democratisation of the political systems in Latin America. It was with thisnew establishment of truly democratic institutions that a second wave of
populism arrived. First, in the form of neoliberal experiments (Menem in
58 This was very clear in the case of Peronism, see Susana Bianchi, Catolicismo yperonismo.
59 In Venezuela, this was presented as “Bolivarian Christo-Marxism,” see Guillermo
T. Aveledo Coll, “Venezuela: Chavismo e Iglesia católica,” in Diccionario dereligiones en América Latina, coord. Roberto Blancarte (Mexico City: Fondo deCultura Económica, 2018), 650.

27

Argentina, Collor de Mello in Brazil), and later through leftist governments
at the end of the millennium.
A second expression of populism can be seen in the government of Hugo
Chávez, a lieutenant colonel of the Venezuelan army, who, despite having
headed a failed coup against the civilian government in 1992, was electedpresident six years later. By reforming the constitution, he enabled his
repeated re-election, maintaining power until his death in 2013. Chávez has
become the epitome of new Latin American populism. Although theoreticallymore respectful of democracy, using it to acquire legitimate power, this new
kind of populism manipulates institutions in order to remain in power. It
does this primarily by the removing or weakening of the legislative andjudicial branches, and other possible counterweights, particularly the mass
media, and any other possible opposition. As a result, and because populist
governments need to construct a holistic social project to present as analternative to the previous socio-political situation (frequently liberalism or
neo-liberalism), their relationship with institutional religion is frequently
either ambiguous or openly negative.
In the case of Venezuela, a country with a political secularist tradition, amajoritarian Catholic population (around 70%) and a growing evangelicalpresence (around 20%), the relationship between populism and religion
reproduces the main characteristics that we have already discussed.60 The
central concept defining this relationship is ambiguity. First of all, some dealingsof the populist government with the hegemonic religious institution are tense.
The Chávez government experienced rising tensions with the Catholic bishops
almost from the beginning, after accusing the Catholic hierarchy of being on
the side of the elites (which probably was true). Nonetheless, in his momentof crisis, when he was temporarily ousted from power and his life was indanger, it was the archbishop of Caracas that he called to beg for help, which heobtained. Once back in power, facing questions from the bishops concerning
the possibility of a shared social project instead of a revolution, he answered
them: “I know that you don’t like the word ‘revolution.’ Call it whatever you
want, but it is unstoppable. And ask God to be peaceful. It doesn’t depend on
me. If you don’t let me, it’s going ahead anyway.”61 Later, the bishops criticised
60 A brief description of historical and contemporary Venezuelan Church-state
relations can be found in Aveledo Coll, “Venezuela: Chavismo e Iglesia católica.”
61 Juan G. Bedoya, “El calvario de los obispos en la Venezuela chavista,” El País 228the concentration of power, the increasing authoritarianism, and the Marxist
orientation of the government. Chávez responded that such declarations were“shameful” and “morally unacceptable.”62 In another moment of tension,
Chávez also displayed the second common populist reaction to criticism fromreligion, telling Catholic bishops: “we are the real Christians. You are not. You
are the devil himself.” Then he said that Venezuela had a secular state (estado
seglar) and threatened a revision of the treaties with the Vatican.63 When
Cardinal Jorge Urosa, Archbishop of Caracas, said in 2010 that the country
was “heading towards being a socialist state of the Marxist-communist type,”
Chávez reacted furiously calling the cardinal a “troglodyte” and bishops “bums”
who should work for once. But, facing elections in 2012, Chávez reaffirmed hisdesire to have a good relationship with the bishops, offering to work together
for the good of the country: “The church can contribute a lot, together with thegovernment, in the fight against poverty, misery and delinquency […] as longas each one plays its corresponding role in society based on mutual respect.”64
A third variant of populism in Latin America, ethnopopulism, has been
observed in Bolivia and Mexico. In ethnopopulism, the populist leader
appeals to ancient (precolonial) religious traditions (which, in the case of Latin
America, is always mixed with Catholicism). This clears the way for a nativist
perspective, in which institutional religion is criticised, and a new source of thesacred is introduced into the public arena. Because most of the ‘ancient’ rituals
are reinvented, there is a tendency to include a variety of esoteric and New
Age beliefs. Paradoxically, these beliefs are a sign of a certain secularisationof society, inasmuch as they represent a particular bricolage of beliefs that
individuals construct to create a new worldview narrative.

(2019), https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/01/ideas/1549033010_821919.html
62 César Paredes, “¿Por qué es tan complicada la relación Iglesia - Chávez en
Venezuela?,” Semana, October 23, 2007, https://www.semana.com/on-line/
articulo/por-que-tan-complicada-relacion-iglesia-chavez-venezuela/89041-3/
63 In Spanish the word ‘seglar’ (as opposed to ‘secular,’ which also exists) refers
to lay people within the church, or someone that has not received religious
orders. In this case, however, the meaning can be extended to an idea of secular.
Venezuela, like many countries in Latin America, has concordats with the Holy
See, in which some privileges are accorded.
64 Associated Press, “Chávez dispuesto a mejorar relación con Iglesia católica,”
Actualidad Radio, July 11, 2012, http://actualidadradio.com/noticias/chavezdispuesto-a-mejorar-relacion-con-iglesia-catolica/29

7 Popular Religion and the Cult of the Leader

Some scholars have identified a close relationship between popular religiosity
and some populist regimes.65 There is much still to be researched on thiscomplex subject, and this is not the place to develop arguments on the topic,
but it is clear that there is a connection that explains at least part of the people’s
politico-religious involvement, particularly that of the disadvantaged masses.
At the very least, we can state that this was the Latin American experience.
The descamisados, the impoverished followers of Perón, for example,
transformed the political revolution into a socio-religious fight, with the helpof the movement and the compliance of the government.
As in the case of Peronism, populism in Venezuela did not die with thedeath of Chávez in March 2013. His successor, Nicolás Maduro, promoted theveneration of Chávez as a saint of the people, in accordance with a traditionof popular saints rooted in Latin American culture (as in the example of Eva
Perón). During Maduro’s first term as president, a scandal erupted when amodified Lord’s Prayer, substituting ‘our Father’ for ‘our Chávez,’ was recited
at a meeting of the official United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido
Socialista Unido de Venezuela).66 Maduro’s own religious background ismixed: he was raised Catholic, with paternal Jewish origins, and is also afollower of an Indian guru.67 This bricolage is a sign of contemporary
religious populism in secular times.
There is not enough space in this text to describe the multiple examplesof Latin American populism, going from leftist to moderates to right-wing,from very religious to theoretically secularist. To name but a few examples,
we could include Lula da Silva or Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Rafael Correa
in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, or Vicente Fox and Andrés Manuel

65 See, for example, the case of Peronism and popular religiosity as outlined in:
Bosca, La Iglesia nacional peronista, and Bianchi, Catolicismo y peronismo.
66 Matt Roper, “Let us pray... to Hugo Chavez! Venezuela’s Socialist party creates own
version of the Lord’s Prayer invoking the deceased leader,” Daily Mail, September
3, 2014, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2742698/Venezuela-s-Socialistparty-creates-version-Lord-s-Prayer-invoking-deceased-leader.html
67 Maduro “also has a mystical side. He has been a follower of the late Indianguru Sathya Sai Baba. Mr. Maduro and Ms. Flores visited the guru in India
in 2005.” William Neuman, “Waiting to See if a ‘Yes Man’ Picked to Succeed
Chávez Might Say Something Else,” The New York Times, December 22, 2012,https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/world/americas/nicolas-madurochavezs-chosen-successor-draws-mixed-opinions.html
30

López Obrador in Mexico. The common denominator between them,
however, is a personalist conception of power, the use of religious symbols
to legitimise their authority, a tense and ambiguous relationship withinstitutional religion, and a diffused personal religious bricolage. Most
importantly, there is an idea of a ‘moral mission.’ Populist leaders seethemselves as moral leaders, beyond particular religions or spiritual
traditions. They become, in a way, high priests of their country. They see
themselves as combatants against the corruption and immorality of theelites or the establishment, whilst simultaneously sacralising ‘the people,’
who they impersonate. In this way, they open the way for their own
sacralisation through the cult of the leader. This connection of leaderswith popular religiosity (whilst these leaders’ personal beliefs can range
from atheistic to agnostic to deeply religious) is essential to understanding
their connection with the masses, at least in Latin America.
The specific connection populist leaders have with popular religiosity
depends on the religious culture of the country or the region where it
develops. Evo Morales, for example, promoted the separation of churchand state in the new (2009) Bolivian constitution. He did this not because
he wanted to separate religion and politics, but rather because he felt that
popular religion in Bolivia (which is a highly syncretic religion) shouldhave more independence and freedom from the doctrinal yoke of theCatholic church. The Vatican has, after all, battled the ‘superstitious’practices rooted in popular religiosity for centuries. Morales could thenreconnect with public rituals of traditional indigenous beliefs in public
ceremonies. This shows, in any case, why separation of church and state
is not necessarily an indicator of secularity, particularly in contexts likethe indigenous one in Latin America, where worldviews or ‘cosmogonic
visions’ are inclined to be holistic. The idea of separation is sometimes
confounded with a long history of disenfranchisement from the religious
and political tutelage of the Catholic church.
Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, on the other hand, has associated himself withthe most conservative sectors of society: the military, the Catholic right,
and conservative evangelicalism, which is highly intolerant of indigenous
and African-American beliefs and practices. These conservative groups
propose a fundamentalist version of the scriptures, defining traditional
gender roles and refusing to grant equal rights to LGBTQI persons.
This type of evangelicalism has been accused by some scholars of being31

a barely disguised form of Catholic popular religiosity.68 This judgement
seems a little hasty, as, in fact, the latter tends to be more understandingof ‘deviations’ from the norm. In any case, this accusation indicates how
undifferentiated popular religious practices can be, and how unimportant
doctrine can be in daily religious life.
Bolsonaro has been part of the increasing ‘buffoonism’ in politics,
and is the epitome of the most vulgar and conservative positions in Latin
America. A former captain in the Brazilian army, and then a congressman
for many years, he was known for his crude and obnoxious statements to themedia. In a television debate, he told a congresswoman that he would neverrape her, because she was not worthy of it. He also said he opposed equalpay for men and women, and attributed homosexuality to drugs or women
working. He contributed to fake news, claiming the existence of a ‘gay kit’
including a baby bottle with a nipple in the form of a penis.69 Much has been
said about the influence of evangelicals on Bolsonaro’s triumph. Indeed,
the president of the largest South American country courted their support
in many ways: he announced his presidential candidacy as a member of
the Social Christian Party,70 was baptised in an evangelical ceremony in
the River Jordan in Israel, and used the campaign slogan “Brazil above all
and God above everyone.” He said in his first appearance after winning theelection that he would be guided by three books: The Bible, the Brazilian
Constitution, and an abridged version of Churchill’s Second World War
68 Jean-Pierre Bastian, “La recomposition religieuse de l’Amérique latine dans lamodernité tardive,” in La modernite religieuse en perspective compare: Europeamérique latine, ed. Jean-Pierre Bastian (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2001).
69 Sandra Fisher, and Aline Vaz, “Populismo no Brasil de contrapositores: Manipulação
do autêntico e profanação do contrario,” Agenda Política: Revista de Discentes deCiência Política da Universidade Federal de São Carlos 8, no. 1 (2020): 131–56, 143, 148.
70 In fact, in his 18 years as a legislator, he has moved through various parties
on liberal-conservative or national conservative lines. See Lucia Caruncho,“Partidos de derecha y estilos de liderazgo: Notas sobre el PRO argentino y
el PSL brasileño,” Colombia Internacional 103 (2020). Trindade argues that
Bolsonaro’s right-wing political coalition involves the following components:a) national authoritarianism, the successor of the Brazilian positivist tradition,b) the Catholic right wing, and c) the integralist right wing, which, it has beenargued, may be the politico-ideological movement closest to European fascism.
Hélgio Trindade, Integralismo: O fascismo brasileiro na década de trinta (SãoPaulo: Difusão Europeia do Livro, 1974), quoted in Fabio Gentile, “Populism andBrazilian Social Sciences: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges,” Conhecer:
Debate entre o Público e o Privado 10, no. 24 (2020): 53.
32

memoirs. Nonetheless, the exact influence of evangelicals in Bolsonaro’s
government, particularly from Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal churches,
has yet to be fully measured. Other scholars have placed more emphasis
on cultural transformations (including that of Pentecostals) and theirimpact on the political system. In any case, Brazil is still the country withgreatest number of Catholics in the world, at around 130 million, 60% of
the population, while protestants and evangelicals make up only a quarter.
So, Bolsonaro has to deal with conservative religious support that is a mix
of Catholic and Pentecostal. His agenda is clearly based around a particular
Christian conservative perspective of the world as he seeks a crusadeagainst ‘social evils’ as dictated by his particular moral judgment. He looks
to fight what is referred to as ‘cultural Marxism,’ meaning a battle against
four morally determined enemies: corruption, delinquency, communism
and the so-called ‘gender ideology.’ He views cultural Marxism as an evil tobe fought, with these four elements as its expression.
The idea of the ‘good people’ having been corrupted by modern andliberal values is not new. An interesting facet of recent developments,
however, is supposedly leftist or progressive movements or governments
evoking a nostalgic idea of the past (before neoliberalism). They look backto a posited time in which the ‘good people’ lived in peace and harmony,following their traditions (among them, their religions), around thenucleus of the family, in an undisrupted social fabric.71 But, as has been
witnessed around the world since the arrival of modernity, rural areas
tend to be more conservative than urban ones. A call for a mythical ora bucolic past therefore becomes a plea for a more traditionalist andconservative society, in most cases anti-liberal. Just as in the case of protopopulisms like Russian Bolshevism, a glorification of ‘the people’ turns intoa demonisation of the elites and their knowledge, as well as science andother aspects of modernity. In contemporary times, this has led to a denialof minority rights, particularly women’s or LGBTQI rights. In the case of
Brazil, this has occurred alongside a suppression of marginal religions,such as African-American or indigenous ones.
71 It is interesting how this element has been explored in other cases of politicalmovements and particularly in populist discourse. See Robert Gould, “Vox
España and Alternative für Deutschland: Propagating the Crisis of National
Identity,” Genealogy 3, no. 4 (2019): 10.
33

Mexico, the second most populous country in Latin America, hasalso recently seen the rise of populism. The phenomenon had previously
appeared sporadically (in 1934-1940 and 1970-1976) but had been kept atbay via the increasing institutionalisation of the 1910 revolution, throughthe hegemony of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The PRI
is a basically anticlerical and secularist conglomerate of revolutionary
factions, which established limits to the military and the Catholic church
throughout most of the 20th century. The end of the hegemony of theauthoritarian state, and the installation of a real democracy saw the returnof the influence of religion.
In 2000, the PRI’s long hegemony was broken by a right-wing populist,
Vicente Fox, who introduced religious symbols (which are prohibited) into
his campaign, and, from the first day of his presidency, tried to dissolve thestrict separation of religion and politics. However, not only did the structureof the secular state in Mexico remain unchanged, but a reaction amongliberal groups ended up cementing a formal secularity of the republic in
the constitution. In 2018, a new type of populism, this time supposedly
leftist, came to power. As with most populisms, this political organisation,
structured through a party called Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional(MORENA), formed several alliances with other parties, including Partido
Encuentro Social (PES), led by conservative evangelicals. Both names playon religious symbols, as ‘morena’ (Spanish for ‘brown’) is how Mexicans
refer to the Virgin of Guadalupe, the most venerated religious symbol in
Mexico, and ‘PES’ sounds like ‘pez,’ Spanish for ‘fish,’ one of the symbols
of Christianity. Beyond the use of religious symbols, the new president,
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (better known as AMLO) exactly fits the
populist model. However, his is not exactly a leftist populism, which is one
reason why his case is of interest to us.
López Obrador sees himself as someone who is going to save,and spiritually and materially heal, the country. The great enemy is‘neoliberalism’ and the elites, whom he calls ‘the mafia of power.’ According
to him, corruption has been imposed on the ‘good people,’ who are, on
the contrary, a source of great moral values. The president opposes not
only abortion and gay marriage, but even divorce, which he claims is a
product of neoliberalism. Instead, he echoes the traditional discourse of
the conservative parties, emphasising the importance of family, fighting
delinquency and the breakup of the social fabric, and thus ‘saving Mexico.’34

López Obrador has a bucolic and utopic image of rural life: “In the rural
areas there is still a healthy way of life, full of moral and spiritual values.
To return to the countryside means to strengthen a cultural identity of
the highest human quality.” 72 For him, “the truth is Christian and the lie
is of the Devil.”73 The Mexican president has become a preacher, telling
people that they must behave well and help the poor, so that they can go
to church or a temple at peace with themselves, in the knowledge thatthey are good Christians.74 In his speech accepting his candidacy from theevangelical party, he promised “a moral constitution,” which he continues
to push, though it has been rejected by most commentators from a varietyof academic disciplines and social groups for multiple reasons. There is notenough space here to develop the particular mixture of religion and politics
that López Obrador has brought to the public arena. The crucial elementthat we want to advance here is that he is a leader that has aspirationsof ‘converting’ people, ‘cleaning’ the state and society from corruption,‘purifying’ politics, and ‘saving’ the country. He wants to convince
everyone that, when used to engage with social causes, Christianity cantransform the consciences of the people, and be a source of cultural andspiritual values. He acts simultaneously as the president of the republic anda kind of high priest to the nation, mixing Catholic, evangelical and otherhumanistic-esoteric beliefs with indigenous rituals and practices.
Precisely because political leaders become ‘high priests’ of their own
cult, and are increasingly venerated by the people, they tend to consider
themselves above the law, and increasingly free to choose whether to bypass
or accommodate it. There is thus a tendency to become authoritarian andintolerant to any form of opposition, such that the judiciary, the legislature,
the media, intellectuals and scientists are commonly targeted as enemies
posing a threat to the transformations heralded by these governments.
We are dealing here with the search for a new ‘public morality,’ a senseof good and evil or right and wrong, to be imposed on the whole society.
Because ‘the people’ are conceived as a single uniform entity, space forplurality is simply reduced.
72 Bernardo Barranco, and Roberto Blancarte, AMLO y la religión: El Estado laico
bajo amenaza (México: Grijalbo-Random House, 2019), 24.
73 Barranco, and Blancarte, AMLO y la religión, 26.
74 Barranco, and Blancarte, 26.

8 Europe and the Legacy of Fascism

It is in the sphere of public morality where we can find the closest
resemblance between Latin American and European populism. Outsideof this, there are several key differences separating the two politicalphenomena, which we will examine presently. We will focus mainly on two
parties, Vox in Spain and Alternative für Deutschand (AfD) in Germany,
although similar characteristics appear in many other European parties
classified as extreme-right, conservative-right or plainly populist parties.75
We have here at least four connections of European populism to religion:1) as a sacralised idea of nation; 2) as an identification with a specificreligion (in this case, Christianity as a whole for Germany, and specificallyCatholicism for Spain); 3) as islamophobia; and 4) as conservative morality
in matters of gender and sexuality, emanating from a religious background.
Vox, a nationalist centralist Spanish party founded in December 2013,
declares: “Our project comes down to the defence of Spain, of family andlife; by reducing the size of the state, by guaranteeing equality among
Spaniards and by the expulsion of government from your private life.”76
Some of its leaders have refused to condemn the Francoist dictatorship,
taking the line that “we are his heirs” and “history is what it is.”77 In its
foundational manifesto, Vox explicitly calls all Spaniards “that wish a Spain
united in permanent progress, material and moral.”78 Although it states that
this project “is based in democratic convictions and the values pertaining
to open society,” it also maintains the existence of a crisis affecting
Spain’s “institutions, its national unity and its collective morality.”79 Vox
75 See, for example, Robert Gould, “Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland.”
Gould compares the two parties in order to show “how very different parts ofthe European continent which achieved stable democratic government after aperiod of extreme-right/fascist rule have now produced and are propagating very
similar right-wing views on national identity—a term which includes among
other topics culture, the family, the relationship to Europe, and immigration,” 2.
76 Vox España, “Quiénes somos,” 2014, https://www.voxespana.es/espana/que-esvox, accessed January 16, 2020.
77 “Se recupera un vídeo viral que Vox no quiere que veas: ‘No condenamos elfranquismo porque somos sus herederos,’” El plural, July 2, 2020, https://www.
elplural.com/comunicacion/protagonistas/recupera-video-viral-vox-no-veasno-condenamos-franquismo-herederos_243187102
78 Vox España, “Manifiesto fundacional,” 2014, https://www.voxespana.es/espana/manifiesto-fundacional-vox, accessed January 16, 2020.
79 Vox España, “Manifiesto fundacional.”
36

emphasises “the defence of the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation,”
the need for a centralised government, meaning a rejection of the regional
autonomies, and consequently the enforced use of the Spanish (Castillian)language throughout the whole country. That is why the party statutes
refuse any possibility of an alliance with separatist parties.80 As Robert
Gould affirms, “Vox presents a quasi-sacralised vision of the Spanish
nation.”81 In sum, this party is an extreme reaction to the separatism of
the regions, particularly Catalonia, but also to linguistic and cultural
particularities, to migration, and to what some see as the bureaucratic
dictates of the European Union. Concerning religion, Gould points outthat “the Christian element is restricted to Roman Catholicism” and also:“Importantly, for Vox hispanidad strongly correlates with religion and can
imply or include an element of islamophobia or maurophobia [phobia ofthe ‘Moors’].”82 And he maintains: “In the name of its insistence on theChristian foundations of European culture and values, Vox asserts that‘political deals’ and ‘ideological prejudices’ have contributed to the current
crisis and ‘have built a Europe alienated from its spiritual foundations.’”83
Another element that has marked the discourse of Vox’s leader, Santiago
Abascal Conde, and many of its closest followers, is the attack on ‘genderlaws,’ meaning the collection of reforms allowing abortion, homosexual
marriage, and other norms concerning women’s or LGBTQI rights. One
of Vox’s best-known proposals in this regard is the failed initiative ofthe ‘parental pin’ or ‘parental veto,’ which contends that parents should
be asked for prior consent for any teaching concerning sexuality, gender
identity, feminism or LGBTQI diversity in public schools.84 This idea has
already been exported to other countries, particularly to Latin America.
The regional government of Murcia, controlled by other right-wing parties
but needing one vote from Vox for their budget, has already imposed sucha measure, which has been contested by the central educational authorities

80 Vox España, Estatutos de Vox, 2015, https://www.voxespana.es/wp-content/
uploads/2016/05/ESTATUTOS-VOX-Aprobados-18-10-15.pdf, accessed January
16, 2020.
81 Gould, “Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland,” 8.
82 Gould, 9.
83 Gould, 10.
84 María H. Pérez, “Pin Parental,” La sexta, October 9, 2020, https://www.lasexta.com/
diccionarios/politico/pinparental_202010095f8087fb6a828b000110d502.html
37

in Madrid.85 The truth about whether religious considerations really doform the core of Vox’s political programme was, in a way, exposed in theirjustification of a meeting between their leadership and Steve Bannon, thenadvisor to Donald Trump: “He thinks that the great battle that has to befought in the world involves those who are pro-nationalists in the face ofillegal immigration and in the defence of their religious roots.”86
Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) was also founded in 2013,
and is a perfect fit for the populist label. In their programme, for example,
they affirm (without evidence) that “behind the scenes a small and powerfulelite within the political parties is secretly in charge, and is responsible for the
misguided development of past decades.”87 The AfD also claims, wrongly,that “Germany has the lowest birth rate across Europe.”88 This claim isdemonstrably false: in 2015, the year before the manifesto was written (andthus the latest figures available at the time), Germany’s fertility rate was higher
than many other European countries including Portugal, Cyprus, Poland,
Greece, Spain and Italy. In fact, in 2016, Germany recorded its highest fertility
rate since 1973.89 The AfD received its biggest political boost with the mass
arrival of refugees from Muslim countries, particularly those fleeing from thewar in Syria in 2015. As with Vox, the AfD’s politics centre around a rejectionof migrants and Muslims in particular, with a particular conception of theChristian foundations of European culture, even if the subject itself is not of
fundamental importance to them, and is mostly used for strategic purposes.

85 “¿Qué es lo que Vox llama ‘pin parental’?,” El País, January 17, 2020, https://
elpais.com/sociedad/2020/01/17/actualidad/1579258136_624639.html
andAna Torres Menárguez, “El gobierno recurrirá en los tribunales el ‘pin parental’
impuesto en los colegios de Murcia,’” El País, January 16, 2020, https://elpais.
com/sociedad/2020/01/16/actualidad/1579186618_845143.html?rel=mas
86 Natalia Junquera, “Qué tienen en común Vox, el jefe de campaña de Trumpy Le Pen,” El País, December 5, 2018, https://elpais.com/politica/2018/12/04/
actualidad/1543949909_697562.html
87 Alternative für Deutschland, “Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programmeof the Alternative for Germany,” 2016, 7. https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/
sites/111/2017/04/2017-04-12_afd-grundsatzprogramm-englisch_web.pdf,
accessed January 16, 2020.
88 Alternative für Deutschland, “Manifesto for Germany,” 36.
89 Eurostat Press Office, “Births and Fertility: Over 5 Million Babies born in the
EU in 2015,” news release no. 41/2017, March 8, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/documents/2995521/7898237/3-08032017-AP-EN.pdf/b17c1516faad-4e65-b291-187826a7ac88
38

Some scholars have identified points of contact between Christianreligious positions and right-wing political activism, identifying thepersonal religious and ideological trajectories of some of the leaders.90
Andrea Althoff searches for similarities and differences between
conservativism, conservative Christianity, right-wing populism, and rightwing extremism. It is evident that they are intermingled in many ways,
and she finds a nexus between “Christian conservatism,” “right-wing
populism” and “right-wing extremism.” Religion as a belief, however, was
not an important marker for the founders of the AfD. According to Althoff,“in May 2016, Alexander Gauland, co-leader of the AfD parliamentarygroup, stated to the newspaper Christians and the World (Christ und Welt):‘We are not a Christian party. We are a German party that tries to safeguard
the German interests’ […]. Nevertheless religion was an element that wasnever absent. Either it was used as a positive identity marker that wasunder threat, namely the ‘Christian tradition,’ or as a negative reference
to the Muslim-Other, a group which was and is portrayed as embodying
this threat.”91 Althoff finds some connections between the ideology of the
AfD and the individual religious trajectories of some right-wing leaders,
who were either members of or connected to the party (Bernd Lucke,
Götz Kubitschek, Maximilian Krah, Frauke Petry, Markus Pretzel, Michael
Frisch, etc.). Equally, the AfD has connections to religious media outlets,
particularly through links with religious presence groups such as ‘Christiansin the AfD.’92 Issues we have identified as relating to ‘public morality’ play
an important role in these connections. As Althoff identifies: “Typical
positions among conservative Christians are a defence of traditional genderroles.” These positions would include “an emphasis on the importance ofthe traditional family, an anti-homosexual stance, a rejection of same-sex
marriages, (including child adoption by same-sex-couples), and opposition

90 See Andrea Althoff, “Right-Wing Populism and Religion in Germany: Conservative
Christians and the Alternative for Germany (AfD),” Zeitschrift für Religion,
Gesellschaft und Politik 2 (2018).
91 Althoff, “Right-Wing Populism and Religion,” 344.
92 This could lead us to other possible discussions that we can’t pursue beyond
the scope of this research. For example the debate about around secularisation
and “religionisation.” See Markus Dreßler “Modes of Religionization: A
Constructivist Approach to Secularity,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS
“Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 7, Leipzig, 2019.
39

to abortion.”93 The overlap of all types of conservatism and right-wing
populism “clearly consists of belief in the central tenets of authority (anemphasis on law-and-order policies and the primacy of security) andcommunity (contrasting to individualism).” Althoff concludes that “moregenerally speaking, the radical-right movement and conservativism share,in a socio-political sense, anti-liberal and anti-modern positions (e.g. thedefence of the traditional family and traditional gender roles).”94
The AfD’s political programme is clear on many of these aspects. In
its preamble, it advocates “direct democracy,” “family values, and German
cultural heritage.”95 The programme states that “the AfD is committed to the
traditional family as a guiding principle” and that “there is a misconceived
view of feminism, which favours women with a career above mothers
and housewives.” The programme also criticises the approximately one
hundred thousand abortions that take place each year in Germany for“so-called ‘social reasons.’”96 The AfD advocates “respect for life, where thesafeguarding of life starts with the embryo.” Accordingly, “the AfD opposes
all attempts to downplay abortions, government support for abortions, orto declare abortions as a human right.”97The programme states that AfD
members “maintain an open mind towards other nations and cultures,
but wish to be and remain German at heart.” Therefore, the programme
proclaims, “we shall continuously strive to uphold human dignity, support
families with children, retain our western Christian culture, and maintainour language and traditions.”98 Along with these propositions, the AfD
declares that “gender ideology, early sexualisation, governmental fundingof gender studies, quota systems and the deprivation of the German
language with gender-conforming words have to be terminated.”99
In specific matters of religion, the programme promotes a particularconception of religious freedom. For example, it affirms that national
security “ensures that citizens can live together in peace in an open and

93 Althoff, “Right-Wing Populism and Religion in Germany,” 341.
94 Althoff, 341.
95 Alternative für Deutschland, “Manifesto for Germany,” 5.
96 Alternative für Deutschland, 40.
97 Alternative für Deutschland, 43.
98 Alternative für Deutschland, 43.
99 Alternative für Deutschland, 54.
40

free society irrespective of origin or religion.”100 At the same time, however,the AfD strongly associates “religion” with “German as the predominantculture” (Leitkultur).101 This culture, the AfD states, is derived from threesources: 1) the religious tradition of Christianity; 2) the scientific andhumanist heritage “whose ancient roots were renewed during the period
of Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment,” and, 3) Roman law. These
traditions shape, among other things, “the relationship between the sexes.”
Although the AfD “pledges its unconditional support to the freedom offaith, worship and conscience,” it immediately states that this freedom ofworship must take place “within the limits of public laws, human rights
and our value system.” It then openly proclaims its anti-Islamic stance:“The AfD firmly opposes Islamic practice which is directed against ourliberal-democratic constitutional order, our laws, and the Judeo-Christianand humanist foundations of our culture.”102
Althoff explores whether there is a convergence of conservative
religious and right-wing populist beliefs, and what the content of such an
overlap would be. Following the trajectories of some of the AfD’s leaders,
Althoff believes that “not only are political convictions important forthe success of the AfD leaders, but also, to a certain extent, middle-classinstitutional Christian backgrounds and related experiences.”103 Yet, for
Althoff, the most direct connection between right-wing populism andconservative Christianity in the case of Germany “is the AfD’s reference to
the Christian tradition as the main ingredient of the German culture.” For
the AfD, Althoff writes, this German culture and Christianity are under
threat from Muslim immigrants.104 The radical variant of this stance is set
out by one of the leaders of the extreme right: “If you want to hear this now

100 Alternative für Deutschland, 23.
101 The concept of ‘Leitkultur,’ which can be translated either as ‘dominant’or ‘predominant’ culture, does not necessarily indicate a legal or politicalpreference. Some would also use the term in the sense of a ‘majoritarian’culture. Deeper research is needed to understand how it is perceived by
AfD militants. A possible guide for this discussion is the insightful articleof Niklas Luhmann, “Religion als Kultur,” in Das Europa der Religionen:
Ein Kontinent zwischen Säkularisierung und Fundamentalismus, ed. Otto
Kallscheuer (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1996).
102 Luhmann, “Religion als Kultur,” 47.
103 Althoff, “Right-Wing Populism and Religion in Germany,” 358.
104 Althoff, 358.
41

from a believer in Christ: The German people is a design of God. It is a
special way to go through history in all its heights and lows.”105
9 Concluding Remarks: Populism, Political Contexts and the Secular

The main difference between Latin American and European politicalsystems is that in the former all political systems are ‘presidential’ whilein the latter most political systems are ‘parliamentarian,’ or at least semiparliamentarian (or semi-presidential) as in France.
Some scholars have already considered the political conditions thatgenerate or enable certain forms of populism. Mudde and Rovira explainthat populist actors do not operate in a political vacuum, as politicalcontexts establish the conditions and incentives for different types of
populist mobilisations. Furthermore, they assert that “probably themost relevant factor” for which type of populism emerges in a system
is whether the system is parliamentarian or presidential. They maintainthat, in general, presidential systems reinforce personal leaderships, while
parliamentarian systems incentivise the emergence of political parties.
Consequently, in a presidential system, populist leaders, even without aconnection to a party, can rise and even win executive power, while inparliamentarian systems the person who controls the executive is namedby one or more political parties represented in the parliament. It is not acoincidence that “almost all populist forces in Europe are more or less wellorganized political parties.”106 We could thus propose this distinction as afirst element of differentiation between Latin America and western Europe:
while in the latter populism tends to appear more in the form of parties, inthe former, populism is more likely to be personalist in its conception. As aresult, a populist leader is much more common in Latin America, tending
to concentrate power in their own hands.
Nevertheless, it is important to remark that parliamentarian systems are
not completely immune to personalist leaderships, which are, on occasion,able to distort or undermine the system in question, using the party as an
instrument of control. Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany are theclearest and best-known historical examples of this. More recent cases, like

105 Götz Kubitschek, as quoted by Althoff, 345, 358.
106 Mudde, and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 58.
42

that of Boris Johnson in Great Britain, clearly show how, even in the mosttraditionally democratic systems, the arrival of populist leaders is always
possible. Eastern Europe is also home to several parliamentarian systems,
for example in Poland and Hungary, wherein the governments have become
prone to personalist politics and unchecked authoritarianism. Therefore,
we could conclude that, while differences in this regard exist between Latin
America and Europe, possibilities of populism with neo-fascist tendencies
are nonetheless present everywhere.
Populist regimes (which advocate participative democracy) are more
inclined to introduce religious elements in their political performance thanrepresentative democratic ones, which tend to be more secularised. Thisis because the latter are designed to respect established institutions andsafeguard plurality. Populist governments tend to favour non-institutional
rule, and are therefore prone to personalist and fluctuating policies. To
summarise the situation, the religious elements typically introducedby populist regimes are: ambiguous (and consequently tense) relations
with religious institutions (using them, establishing alliances with them,
integrating them into ideological schemes); the use of religion or religious
symbols as instruments of an exclusivist identity; a tendency to establish
a sacredness of the state or of the leader themselves (who in some cases
becomes a kind of non-denominational ‘high priest’ of the nation); and an
aim of substituting traditional religious teachings with a new public ‘moral
order,’ which is frequently related to a bucolic and nostalgic, and therefore
conservative, vision of the past. This new moral order does not reproduce
the doctrine of a specific or particular religion, but is instead the expressionof a secularised and individualised religion,107 formed through a work of‘bricolage,’ in which a variety of religious and/or philosophical traditions arerecycled, combined and remixed, and then presented and utilised as a newlegitimising force. The new public morality can therefore be interpreted asa manifestation of the secular trends in society. As it is frequently associatedwith the individual conceptions of the leader, it is not uncommon to witness

107 Thomas Luckmann developed the idea of an individualised religion in Das Problem
der Religion in der modernen Gesellschaft (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1963), latertranslated into English as The Invisible Religion (London: Macmillan, 1967). Roberto
Cipriani developed the concept of “diffused religion” in a theoretical discussion
with Luckmann, see Cipriani, Diffused Religion (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
43

a mixture of public religiosity (religiosity in the political sphere) andsecularised social trends.
As a consequence of this phenomenon, populism and the secular have acomplicated relationship. First of all, such secularising trends don’t indicate thedisappearance of religion, only its transformation, as Danièle Hervieu-Léger
argues.108 This transformation supports a popular or individualised religiosity,that, in turn, supports a sacralised state or government, which simultaneously
seeks political legitimacy among religious groups and a diffused religiosity.
We therefore have a double paradox, whereby in an increasingly
secularised society there are populist leaders who reintroduce religion
into the public sphere, even though they are themselves an expression ofthis secularity (thanks to a moral order coming from an individualised
religious bricolage). Religion is not introduced openly or straightforwardly,
but rather disguised under the cover of ‘public morality,’ or a new ‘moral
order,’ which can be a revolutionary-Christian popular doctrine, a mythicalnational-popular creed, or any other worldly transformational ideology ormixed transcendental credo. Therefore, public morality becomes a place inwhich the secular and the religious can coexist.
It is a truism, but we have to acknowledge that in the same way that we
do not find ‘religion,’ but ‘religions,’ and not ‘populism,’ but ‘populisms,’ there
are also many types of ‘secularities’ and many forms of ‘secularisms.’109 In
the cases we have examined, it is clear that populist regimes coexist withinstitutional religions, albeit in a tense relationship, whilst in many cases
simultaneously developing an alternative ‘political religion.’ This politicalreligion can evolve into more or less secularist positions, depending on
the context. The whole process of secularisation allows people to distancethemselves from organised religions, instead taking up a faith that is either
highly individualised or synthesised in an act of bricolage. In fact, the so-

108 See this publication, 10n16.
109 Here I follow the discussions that inform the Multiple Secularities project.
See Christoph Kleine, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research Programme of
the HCAS ‘Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities,’”Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West,
Beyond Modernities” 1, Leipzig, 2016. Also Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, and Marian
Burchardt, “Revisiting the Secular: Multiple Secularities and Pathways toModernity,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond
the West, Beyond Modernities” 2, Leipzig, 2017.
44

called ‘popular religion’ or ‘popular religiosity’ in both Europe and Latin
America has always been a type of bricolage, mixing, adapting, and resisting
through syncretic behaviours and beliefs. How can we classify these different
ways of blending populisms and secularities?
Populisms, we now appreciate, can arise in any kind of society. Inequalities
play an important, though not defining, role in their birth and development.
This is primarily because inequalities are relative. In the USA or Europe, forexample, the inequalities that have created the conditions for populism are
the differences between rural and urban, traditional and modern, nativist
versus cosmopolitan (or pluralist). These inequalities need not necessarily
be economic in nature. In Latin America, by contrast, class, ethnic andeconomic inequalities have played a greater role in the creation of populisms.
Laicity, the secularity of the political sphere, has many ways of reacting
to the various relationships populism forms with religion. It is not always thecase that we see religiously inclined populist parties defending religiously
conservative positions. In some cases, they can present secularist positions
in a covert defence of a hidden religious perspective. For example,
regarding the veil and other Islamic garments, the AfD supports the mosthard-line secularist positions of French laïcité, as does Rassemblement
National (the new name of Le Pen’s Front National). The AfD advocates
not only the prohibition of the burqa and the niqab, but also proposes thatpublic servants, teachers and students should not be permitted to wear aheadscarf, “thereby following the French model.”110
A few years ago, Jean Baubérot and Micheline Milot proposed atypology of laicity, distinguishing ideal types based on concrete and diverse
experiences. They highlighted the various forms’ different interpretationsof laicity’s core defining elements: freedom of conscience, equality, and theautonomy of politics from religion. The various laicities they defined were:
1) “separatist laicity,” where the idea of separation (between religion andpolitics, state and church, and public and private) is seen as a goal in itself;
2) “anticlerical laicity,” typical of the cases where religions or churches havedominated social life, provoking a combative reaction against the powerof the religious establishment; 3) “authoritarian laicity,” which sees anintervention of the state in the internal affairs of organised religions, and

110 Alternative für Deutschland, “Manifesto for Germany,” 49.
45

a limitation of freedom of expression and protest; 4) “laicity of civic faith,”
where there is implicit pressure on minority religions to culturally integrate
and share the values of the religious majority; 5) “laicity of recognition,”
which is based on the moral autonomy of each person (central to thenotion of freedom of conscience) and gives priority to social justice and to
the respect of individual decisions; and 6) “laicity of collaboration,” where
the state is considered autonomous from religious authorities, but requests
their collaboration in different fields.111
If we apply this typology to historical populisms, there could be a debate
as to whether there has ever been a true secularity (or laicity) of the politicalsphere, with potential candidates all having their own ties to religion insome way. The Brazilian Vargas government in the 1930s, for example,
established a sort of ‘national Catholicism’ which lasted for at least half acentury. If we accept that the regime was a secular and not a Catholic one,however, then we could speak either of a laicity of civic faith or a laicity
of collaboration in this case. The case of Argentina is similar, although
Peronism did endure a dispute with the Catholic hierarchy over control ofsocial organisations. As in the case of Italian fascism, this dispute led to an
end to the collaboration between the populist regime and the hegemonic
Church, provoking a final rupture in which a laicity of collaboration gave
way to an anticlerical laicity. In the end, however, national Catholicism wasdeeply ingrained in Argentine culture, and endured for many decades. In
some ways, it is still the dominant feature of the system.
The new Latin American populisms also have an oscillatory behaviour.
They can swing from being obsequious to Church leaders, to making
harsh anticlerical statements and calls for rebellion or for the constructionof indigenous churches or doctrines. However, new circumstances havechanged the balance of power: the Catholic church, although still wielding
great political influence in the region, has, like many other institutions,lost membership and moral authority. Protestantism, evangelicalism, andparticularly Pentecostalism, have established a strong footing in the region,
increasing politico-religious competition. Other marginalised religions,such as indigenous or Afro-American cults or generalised popular religion,

111 Jean Baubérot, and Micheline Milot, Laïcités sans frontières (Paris: Le Seuil,2011), 87–117.
46

have also become part of the accepted Latin American religious mainstream.
Populist leaders distance themselves from traditional religious institutions,and tend to become a sort of high priest of a new public morality based ona bricolage of mixed religious components. This morality, an expression of
post-modern secularity,112 can also vary greatly, insofar as political power isconcentrated in a single leader, or in few hands. The regime, impregnatedwith religious elements, can fluctuate from a secularity of cooperation toan authoritarian or an anticlerical secularity.
In the case of European populisms, the relationship with religion ismarked either by reference to a Christian cultural background, which
nevertheless gives way to the populists’ own understanding of public
morality (for example, concerning women or gay rights), or by a focus on
rejecting Islamic populations, which are seen as a threat to national andcultural identity. This is why, in most cases, European populisms advocate
a secularity (or laicity) of civic faith or one of the anticlerical type. The AfD,
for example, seeks to introduce “the French model” in Germany, while Vox
promotes a laicity of civic faith, which demands Muslims integrate into
Spain’s Catholic culture. There is, nevertheless, a misunderstanding at play
here: the “French model,” far from being a single fixed philosophy, has
always been subject to debate.113 There are some in France who do indeed
push for a laicity of civic faith, but there are many others who advocate fora laicity of recognition, and even a few who, following the German model,
propose a secularity of cooperation.114

112 The concept of post-modern secularity was debated by many Italian and Frenchscholars at the end of 20th century (for example, J.F. Lyotard or G. Vattimo).
A good summary can be found in Stefano Martelli, La religione nella societàpost-moderna tra secolarizzazione et de-secolarizzazione (Bologna: Edizione
Dehoniane, 1990), 384–416.
113 A recent example of this is the public debate surrounding the “Observatoirede la laïcité” in France. See Jean Baubérot, “Pourquoi je soutiensl’Observatoire de la Laïcité,” L’Obs, October 28, 2020, https://www.nouvelobs.
com/idees/20201028.OBS35302/jean-bauberot-pourquoi-je-soutiens-lobservatoire-de-la-laicite.html
114 See, for example, the debate between Baubérot and Willaime in the ASSR:Jean Baubérot, “Pour une sociologie interculturelle et historique de la laïcité,”Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 146 (2009), 183–99, and Jean-Paul
Willaime, “Pour une sociologie transnationale de la laïcité dans l’ultramodernité
contemporaine,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 146 (2009): 210–18.
47

In the end, populisms, in their plurality, have different ways ofapproaching religion; using it, integrating it, manipulating it, accepting
it or rejecting it, and relating to it in countless other ways. Populist
movements and leaderships can also be a product of secularisation, whilst
simultaneously enabling the introduction of religion into public, state, or
political spheres. The type of political system, political culture, and social
structure all have an impact on the secularity of populist movements,
as does whether the movements are in power or in the opposition. The
possible outcomes are numerous and varied. One constant in populism,
however, is that the places of religion and the secular are constantly being
redefined. The meanings of religion and the secular, and the boundaries
between them, are structurally established, whilst also dynamic, being
constantly reshaped by social and political actors.115

115 See, for example, Christoph Kleine, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research
Programme of the HCAS ‘Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond
Modernities.’” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond
the West, Beyond Modernities” 1, Leipzig, 2016.
48

10 Bibliography
Aiginger, Karl. “Populism: Root Causes,
Power Grabbing and Counter Strategy.” Intereconomics 55, no. 1 (2020):
38–42.
Alternative für Deutschland. “Manifesto for Germany: The Political
Programme of the Alternative forGermany.” Approved at the Federal
Party Congress, Stuttgart, 30th
April to 1st May, 2016. https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/
sites/111/2017/04/2017-04-12_
afd-grundsatzprogramm-englisch_web.pdf, accessed January 16, 2020.
Althoff, Andrea. “Right-Wing Populism
and Religion in Germany: Conservative Christians and the Alternative
for Germany (AfD).” Zeitschrift für
Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik 2(2018): 335–63.
Anselmi, Manuel. Populism: An Introduction (Key Ideas) (London: Routledge,2018).
Associated Press. “Chávez dispuesto a
mejorar relación con Iglesia católica.”
Actualidad Radio, July 11, 2012,
http://actualidadradio.com/noticias/
chavez-dispuesto-a-mejorar-relacion-con-iglesia-catolica/
Aveledo Coll, Guillermo T. “Venezuela: Chavismo e Iglesia católica.” In
Diccionario de religiones en América
Latina, ed. Roberto Blancarte, 647–754.
Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica El Colegio de México, 2018.
Barranco, Bernardo, and Roberto
Blancarte. AMLO y la religión: El
Estado laico bajo amenaza. Mexico:
Grijalbo-Random House, 2019.
Bastian, Jean-Pierre. “La recomposition
religieuse de l’Amérique latine dansla modernité tardive.” In La modernite religieuse en perspective compare:
Europe-amérique latine, edited by

Jean-Pierre Bastian, 181–97. Paris:
Éditions Karthala, 2001.
Baubérot, Jean. “Pour une sociologieinterculturelle et historique de lalaïcité.” Archives de Sciences Sociales
des Religions 146 (2009): 183–99.
Baubérot, Jean. “Pourquoi je soutiensl’Observatoire de la Laïcité.” L’Obs,
October 28, 2020, https://www.
nouvelobs.com/idees/20201028.
OBS35302/jean-bauberot-pourquoi-je-soutiens-l-observatoire-de-la-laicite.html
Baubérot, Jean, and Micheline Milot. Laïcitéssans frontières. Paris: Le Seuil, 2011.
Baubérot, Jean, Micheline Milot, andRoberto Blancarte. “Universal Declaration of Laicity/Secularity in XXI
Century.” Vancouver Sun, February
29, 2012, https://vancouversun.com/
news/staff-blogs/universal-declaration-on-secularism
Bedoya, Juan G. “El calvario de losobispos en la Venezuela chavista.”
El País, February 2, 2019, https://
elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/01/
ideas/1549033010_821919.htm
Bellah, Robert. “Civil Religion in America.”
Daedalus 96, no. 1 (1967): 1–21.
Berger, Peter. Para una teoría sociológica dela religión [The Sacred Canopy]. 2nd
ed. Barcelona: Editorial Kairós, 1967.
Bianchi, Susana. Catolicismo y peronismo: Religión y política en Argentina
1943–1955. Instituto de Estudios
Histórico Sociales. Buenos Aires: Trama Editorial/Prometeo libros, 2001.
Blancarte, Roberto, ed. Laicidad y valores
en un Estado democrático. Mexico:
El Colegio de México-Secretaría deGobernación, 2000.
Bosca, Roberto. La Iglesia nacional peronista: Factor religioso y poder político.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1997.

50

contrario.” Agenda Política: Revista deDiscentes de Ciência Política da Universidade Federal de São Carlos 8, no. 1(2020): 143–48.
Foster, John Bellamy. “This is not
Populism.” Monthly Review – An
Independent Socialist Magazine,
June 1, 2017, https://monthlyreview.
org/2017/06/01/this-is-not-populism/
Gentile, Fabio. “Populism and Brazilian Social Sciences: Theoreticaland Methodological Challenges.”
Conhecer: Debate entre o Público e oPrivado 10, no. 24 (2020): 49–65.
Gould, Robert. “Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland: Propagating the
Crisis of National Identity.” Genealogy
3, no. 4: 64 (2019).
Guerri, Giordano B. Antistoria degli
italiani: Da Romolo a Giovanni Paolo
II. Milano: Mondadori, 1997.
Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. Vers un nouveau
christianisme? Introduction à lasociologie du christianisme occidental.
Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1986.
Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. Le pèlerin et leconverti: La religion en mouvement.
Paris: Flammarion, 1999.
Hoelzl, Michael. “The New Visibility of
Religion and Its Impact on Populist
Politics.” Religions 11, no. 6: 292 (2020).
Jónsdóttir, Kristín G. “Bandoleros santificados en México.” In Diccionario
de Religiones en América Latina,
coordinated by Roberto Blancarte,
27–34. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura
Económica - El Colegio de México,2018.
Junquera, Natalia. “Qué tienen en
común Vox, el jefe de campañade Trump y Le Pen.” El País,
December 5, 2018, https://elpais.
com/politica/2018/12/04/actualidad/1543949909_697562.html
Kleine, Christoph, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr. “Multiple Secularities: Beyond
the West, Beyond Modernities.” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple

Caruncho, Lucia. “Partidos de derecha
y estilos de liderazgo: Notas sobre el
PRO argentino y el PSL brasileño.”
Colombia Internacional, no. 103(2020): 85–109.
Casanova, José. Public Religions in theModern World. London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Cipriani, Roberto. Diffused Religion:
Beyond Secularisation. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Collovald, Annie. “Populisme.” Quaderni,
no. 63 (2007): 71–73.
De Felice, Renzo. Le interpretazione delfascismo. 2nd ed. Roma-Bari: Editori
Laterza, 1995 [1969].
De Felice, Renzo. Breve storia del fascismo.
Milano: Mondadori, 2018 [2000].
Dobbelaere, Karel. “Secularization: A
Multi-Dimensional Concept.” Current
Sociology 29, no. 2 (1981): 3–153.
Dreßler, Markus. “Modes of Religionization: A Constructivist Approach to
Secularity.” Working Paper Series ofthe HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities”
7, Leipzig, 2019.
Durkheim, Émile. Les formes élémentaires
de la vie religieuse. Quadrige Grands
Textes. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1960.
Eurostat Press Office. “Births andFertility: Over 5 Million Babies bornin the EU in 2015.” news release no.
41/2017, March 8, 2017,https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7898237/30803201
7-AP-EN.pdf/b17c1516-faad-4e65b291-187826a7ac88
Finchelstein, Federico. From Fascism toPopulism in History. Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 2017.
Fisher, Lillian E. “Getulio Vargas, theStrong Man of Brazil.” Social Science19, no. 2 (1944): 80–86.
Fisher, Sandra, and Aline Vaz. “Populismo
no Brasil de contrapositores: Manipulação do autêntico e profanação do

51

Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond
Modernities” 1, Leipzig, 2016.
Laclau, Ernesto. La razón populista [OnPopulist Reason]. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005.
Lesch, Walter. “Visible Religion and
Populism: An Explosive Cocktail.”
Religions 11, no. 8: 401 (2020).
Luckmann, Thomas. Das Problem derReligion in der modernen Gesellschaft.
Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1963.
Luckmann, Thomas. The Invisible Religion. London: Macmillan, 1967.
Luhmann, Niklas. “Religion als Kultur.”
In Das Europa der Religionen: Ein
Kontinent zwischen Säkularisierung
und Fundamentalismus, edited by
Otto Kallscheuer, 291–315. Frankfurt
am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1996.
Marschall, Paul, and Stephan Klingebiel.
“Populism: Consequences for Global
Sustainable Development.” Briefing
Paper 8, Bonn, Deutsches Institut für
Entwicklungspolitik, 2019.
Martelli, Stefano. La religione nella societàpost-moderna tra secolarizzazione
et de-secolarizzazione. Bologna:
Edizione Dehoniane, 1990.
Menárguez, Ana T. “El gobierno recurrirá
en los tribunales el ‘pin parental’
impuesto en los colegios de Murcia.”
El País, January 17, 2020, https://
elpais.com/sociedad/2020/01/16/
actualidad/1579186618_845143.
html?relmas
Mudde, Cas. Populist Radical Right
Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds. Populism in Europe andthe Americas: Threat or Corrective for
Democracy? New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira
Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very ShortIntroduction. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2017.

Müller, Jan-Werner. “Populism and theClaim to a Moral Monopoly.” Interviewed by Niels Boel, Carsten Jensen,
and André Sonnichsen. Politik 20,
no. 4 (2017): 71–85.
Neuman, William. “Waiting to See
if a ‘Yes Man’ Picked to Succeed
Chávez Might Say Something Else.”
The New York Times, December
22, 2012, https://www.nytimes.
com/2012/12/23/world/americas/
nicolas-maduro-chavezs-chosen-successor-drawsopinions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
New York Times Editorial Staff, eds.
Populism. New York, NY: New YorkTimes Educational Publishing, 2019.
Paredes, César. “¿Por qué es tan complicada la relación Iglesia-Chávez
en Venezuela?” Semana, October23, 2007, https://www.semana.com/
on-line/articulo/por-que-tan-complicada-relacion-iglesia-chavez-venezuela/89041-3/
Pérez, María H. “Pin Parental.” La
sexta, October 9, 2020, https://www.
lasexta.com/diccionarios/politico/
pinparental_202010095f8087fb6a828b000110d502.html “¿Qué eslo que Vox llama ‘pin parental’?” El
País, January 21, 2020. https://elpais.
com/sociedad/2020/01/17/actualidad/1579258136_624639.html
Roper, Matt. “Let us pray... to Hugo
Chavez! Venezuela’s Socialist party
creates own version of the Lord’s
Prayer invoking the deceased
leader.” Daily Mail, September 3,
2014, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2742698/Venezuela-s-Socialist-party-creates-version-Lord-s-Prayer-invoking-deceased-leader.html
Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. Du Contrat Social,écrits politiques. Vol. 3 of Oeuvres
completes. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.
Paris: Gallimard, 1964.

52

Serbin, Kenneth P. Secret Dialogues:
Church-State Relations, Torture, andSocial Justice in Authoritarian Brazil.
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000.
“Se recupera un vídeo viral que Vox noquiere que veas: ‘No condenamos
el franquismo porque somos sus
herederos.’” El plural, July 2, 2020,
https://www.elplural.com/comunicacion/protagonistas/recupera-video-viral-vox-no-veas-no-condenamos-franquismo-herederos_243187102
Sirvén, Pablo. Perón y los medios decomunicación: La conflictiva relaciónde los gobiernos justicialistas con laprensa 1943-2011. Buenos Aires:
Editorial Sudamericana, 2011.
Steigman-Gall, Richard. The Holy Reich:
Nazi Conceptions of Christianity,
1919-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
Trindade, Hélgio. Integralismo: O
fascismo brasileiro na década detrinta. São Paulo: Difusão Europeia
do Livro, 1974.
Tschannen, Olivier. “The Secularization
Paradigm: A Systematization.” Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion 30,
no. 4 (1991): 395–415.
Valenzuela Arce, José Manuel. “Mística ysantos populares transfronterizos.” In
Diccionario de Religiones en América
Latina, coordinated by Roberto
Blancarte, 389–95. Mexico: Fondo deCultura Económica – El Colegio deMéxico, 2018.
Vox España. “Manifiesto fundacional.”
2014. https://www.voxespana.es/
espana/manifiesto-fundacional-vox,
accessed January 16, 2020.
Vox España. “Quiénes somos.” 2014.
https://www.voxespana.es/espana/que-es-vox, accessed January 16, 2020.
Vox España. “Estatutos de Vox.”
2015.https://www.voxespana.es/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/

ESTATUTOS-VOX-23-02-2019.pdf,
accessed January 16, 2020.
Weber, Max. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur
Religionssoziologie. 3 vols. Tübingen:
UTB, 1988 [1921].
Willaime, Jean-Paul. “Pour une sociologietransnationale de la laïcité dans
l’ultramodernité contemporaine.”
Archives de Sciences Sociales desReligions 146 (2009): 210–18.
Williams, Harold. “’Bolshevism Seen as
New Religion,’ Petrograd, January 9,1918.” In Populism, edited by New
York Times Editorial Staff, 39–42.
New York, NY: New York Times
Educational Publishing, 2019.
Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika, and Marian
Burchardt. “Revisiting the Secular:
Multiple Secularities and Pathways
to Modernity.” Working Paper Seriesof the HCAS “Multiple Secularities– Beyond the West, Beyond
Modernities” 2, Leipzig, 2017.
Zanatta, Loris. Perón y el mito de lanación católica: Iglesia y Ejército
en los orígenes del peronismo
1943–1946. Buenos Aires: Editorial
Sudamericana, 1999.

53