Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

Chapter 4
The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense
KANEDA Hideaki
Introduction
One impact of global warming in recent years has manifested itself in the form of abnormalchanges occurring to the permanent ice in the Arctic Ocean, i.e. melting in the summertime, as aresult of which vessels with no icebreaking capability can now navigate there. This has opened
up a prospect associated with the Arctic Ocean, including using it as international sea lanes thatconnect Europe and Asia by the shortest distance and developing marine as well as seabedresources.

The Arctic Circle countries (eight countries: Russia, the US, Canada, Norway,

Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland and Sweden) and otherinterested countries (countries that have an intention of actually using the Arctic Ocean in somefashion) are faced with a strong need to work non-competitively on advancing such economic
benefits in accordance with internationally open, fair rules.
In the meantime, any security implications that can stem from the Arctic Ocean's drastictransformation also call for increasing attention. Already, some Arctic Circle countries, such as
the US, Russia and Canada, have developed a heightened sensitivity to security issues involving
the Arctic Ocean and, furthermore, China and other countries with a marked tendency to expand
into maritime areas have begun bickering about security concerning the Arctic Ocean.
Having witnessed such a state of affairs, Japan, both in the public and private sectors, has, albeit
belatedly, started turning to the Arctic Ocean but their perspective is for the most part focused on
marine transportation and resource development, leaving the level of interest in security anddefense still low. The main emphasis of this article is to analyze the impact of the Arctic Ocean'stransformation on Japan's security and defense and provide recommendations as to what actions
Japan should take in the future.
1. Impact of the Arctic Ocean's transformation on security and defense
Given the relatively slow pace of change in the Arctic Ocean’s natural environment and thecomparatively rapid increase among Arctic Circle countries and others in their interest in security-1-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

and defense matters, it would be best to study these phenomena from short-, medium- andlong-term perspectives in an attempt to analyze the impact of the Arctic Ocean’s transformation on
security and defense.
Over the short term, new sea lanes of international significance will continue to emerge. Arctic
Circle countries and others have already undertaken detailed studies and begun maritime transport
for commercial purposes (albeit only at a trial level), and economic use of the Arctic Ocean area isgarnering growing international attention.
Over the medium term, competition for Arctic Ocean resources is likely to intensify among
Arctic Circle countries and others, with the future course of resource development possibly
prompting new entrants from Europe and Asia to join in the development fray. The opening of
new sea lanes connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the shortest distance will haverepercussions beyond the economic realm, even triggering serious changes in the strategic
maneuver deployment capability of countries with an interest in global security and defense issues.
Reduced credibility of the US's extended nuclear deterrence and the emergence of security issues
on the periphery of the Arctic Ocean, including the sea territory surrounding Japan, are related
concerns.

Accordingly, new international rules concerning the Arctic Ocean, including rules

governing security matters, need to be established.
Over the long term, changes in the Arctic Ocean itself and in the global environment could haveincreasingly adverse effects, and an international framework to address these issues is thus
required.
(1) Emergence of new sea lanes of international significanceThe outlook that sea lanes of international significance are newly emerging has already drawn
acute attention from not only the Arctic Circle countries but also other stakeholder nations in
Europe and Asia, including Japan. Backed by considerable expectations that these countries havefor the use of the Northeast Passage (Russian coasts) in the Arctic Ocean, the navigation record has
already been building up in recent years, albeit not exactly on a full scale yet. What is particularly
remarkable is the level of enthusiasm that China and Korea, as well as some new emerging
maritime nations like India, have shown, which contributes, as a natural consequence, to thegrowing tendency of this issue being associated with resource development and security and-2-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

defense matters.
Currently, however, the use of the Arctic Ocean as sea lanes is not available throughout thewhole year but is limited to the summertime.

Moreover, a range of restrictions have been

imposed on navigation in the form of Arctic Circle countries applying domestic laws and charging
transit fees (Russia for the Northeast Passage), or declaring some area as internal waters (Canada
for the Northwest Passage (Canadian coasts)), which has generated uncertainty over the prospect ofconstant use of it.

Adding to those circumstances is the fact that the Arctic Ocean wastraditionally recognized broadly as a "sea closed in by permanent ice" and was hardly ever given
any thought, save for academic purposes, as a potential area for use as a sea lane or as a field of any
military operation and there is accordingly no international treaty or accord on the use of or rules
for the Arctic Ocean in the first place, a situation that explains a pile of issues lying ahead of us,which cannot be readily solved, for the purpose of using it as a sea lane that is economically viable
in a real sense or for use for military purposes.
Given, in any event, the present lack of general international rules, like in the form of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, the Arctic Council, an organization that is mainlycomposed of Arctic Circle countries (in addition to the fixed membership that consists solely of theeight Arctic Circle countries, indigenous peoples in the Arctic Circle have been granted a special
status to participate as Permanent Participants, while only six non-Arctic countries (France,
Germany, the UK, Holland, Poland and Spain) participate, together with NGOs and otherorganizations, as observers with a limited right to speak), is claiming oligopolistic authority overmatters associated with the Arctic Ocean, and it remains challenging for Japan and others to haveany part (currently, Japan, China, Korea, Italy, the EU, Singapore, India and Turkey are applying
for observer status, but it appears difficult to have consent formed; thus, they participate only incertain meetings as ad-hoc observers). Furthermore, the Arctic Council imposes strict restrictions
on ships using an Arctic route, including an obligation to build a ship that satisfies special
specifications for transiting the Arctic Ocean.
(2) Spats with a military aspect taking place in the Arctic Ocean
A look at spats with a military aspect that have taken place in the Arctic Ocean shows that one
factor behind them is territorial delimitation issues among the Arctic Circle countries, which is now
recognized as a real sovereignty issue even in cases that previously did not lead to a specific-3-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

political standoff. What will presumably become even more serious down the road is their impact
on actions towards strategic nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia, which may later becompounded with China's attempt to become further involved with the issue.
Among the Arctic Circle countries, Russia in particular has been developing a growing militaryinterest, as manifested in the creation of Arctic forces and new military bases, with the intention of
integrating its Arctic border defense functions so as to safeguard the use of the Northern Sea Routeand ensure its national interest in the Arctic Circle; it has restarted its surveillance and patrol flights
in the Arctic Circle, which it stopped after the end of the Cold War, and has also established new
Arctic brigades and embarked on strengthening its icebreaker fleet. Anticipating a possibility of
the US honing its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities by, for instance, expanding its
Aegis destroyer deployment to reach the Arctic Circle in the future as part of its enhanced nuclear
deterrence effort, Russia is acting preemptively by forcibly expressing its opposition, just as it hasdone with respect to the US's pursuit of enhanced BMD capabilities in Europe (EPAA or European
Phased Adaptive Approach).
Canada is similarly showing a high level of military interest, though its nature is different fromthat of Russia, and is working on equipping itself with aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle(UAV) forces adapted to its patrol, interception, transportation and rescue missions in the Arctic
Circle. It is also in the process of upgrading its patrol ships with an icebreaking capability as wellas enhancing the capabilities of its army deployed in the Arctic region.
While the level of military interests in the Arctic Ocean that the US currently appears to have is
not as substantial as those of Russia and Canada, it is indeed growing, though belatedly,
particularly in its army as can be seen in its move to develop a roadmap slated to be completed next
year and attention is growing as to what that will contain.
Among European countries, Norway shows the highest level of interest through its effort toimprove the capabilities of its forces as a whole, with the possibility of operations in the Arctic
Ocean in mind, and to enhance its ties with Russia. Sweden, with awareness of potential actionsin the Arctic Circle, is working to expand its military means particularly for its navy and air forces,
including Gripen fighter and reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. Denmark has, in its turn,established the new Arctic Command in Greenland and begun deploying F-16 fighter jets.

-4-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense(3) Fiercer competition for resources in the Arctic Ocean
The Arctic Ocean is believed to be home to 30% of the world's undiscovered natural gas and
13% of its oil, most of which are concentrated in the areas of shallow waters within Russia's
territory; as, however, Russia has difficulties in developing them with its currently limited
technological expertise, it is exploring cooperation with Norway, etc. A large number of issues
that remain to be solved in planning, taxation and other areas are stalling the progress of its
development plan, however.
The Arctic Circle countries are claiming a considerable extent of sovereign authority overresources in the Arctic Ocean and are increasingly strongly motivated to set their sights ondevelopment. Russia, in particular, is even eyeing the possibilities of developing a land transport
network in Siberia and building an intercontinental tunnel between Russia and Alaska, whichreflects its intention to connect the sovereignty claim with resources development on thecontinental shelf in the Arctic Ocean.
Emerging nations like China, Korea and India are now taking aim at resources in the Arctic
Ocean. Most notably, China has started to make a blatant attempt to approach member countriesof the Arctic Council in recent years, major examples being Prime Minister Wen's visit to Sweden
and Iceland and President Hu's visit to Denmark in 2012. China is paying more and more
attention to Iceland in particular, making moves such as establishing an embassy in Reykjavik,
Iceland, which have invoked a backlash from other Arctic Circle countries and other stakeholder
nations as they suspect that China might have a mind to position the harbor of the city as the hub
port that China could have exclusive use over for Arctic transportation purposes and might beworking on its development in that direction. As part of such a strategy, China had its icebreaker
Xue Long ("Snow Dragon") circumnavigate the Arctic Ocean during the ice-melting season in thesummer of the same year and had it make a call at the Reykjavik Port, among others.
In contrast, Japan is still lacking any comprehensive, national-level Arctic strategy, with both the
public and private sectors even to this date being left without the means to open up a prospect in its
endeavor to develop resources in the Arctic Ocean.
In any case, the Arctic Circle countries and other stakeholder countries are required to work
among themselves to establish some type of international rules for resource development in the-5-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

Arctic Ocean that could curb negative impacts on the Earth's environment.
(4) Changes in strategic maneuver deployment capabilities
While there are a wide range of military implications that can materialize if the Northern Sea
Route becomes available for use, improved strategic maneuver deployment capabilities linking
Europe with Asia will be particularly marked among them. A calculation of the number ofnavigation days from Rotterdam, Holland to Busan, performed from a perspective of the marinetransportation industry, shows that a voyage via the Arctic Ocean is estimated to lead to an
approximately 30% reduction in distance (roughly 40% for Tomakomai and 34% for Yokohama)compared to using the Suez Canal. While this number represents a significant difference in termsof the number of days at sea, which can be expected to bring economic benefits to the marinetransportation industry, it even more strikingly suggests the prospect of overwhelming advantages
from a military strategy viewpoint.
This would lead to a groundbreaking transformation of the global strategic environment. Firstof all, it would increase the areas of interest for NATO, which would then develop a tendency tohave its constant presence felt in the Arctic Ocean. If one looks at the US alone, it could mark a
noticeable improvement of its strategic maritime maneuvering performance capabilities
interconnecting the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean and become capable of performing
power projection tasks based in the Arctic Ocean.

These changes should give rise to changes in

the nature of its regional forces in charge of the Arctic region as well. What would likely happenis that the Arctic region, where there was previously no force assigned specifically, would be split,with the Northern Command taking charge of the Canadian side and the European Commandtaking charge of the Russian side, whereby the Pacific Command would provide force to theNorthern Command, which does not have real force. Assuming that this should be the case, itwould have a considerable impact on the military balance in the Asian and Pacific regions,increasing Japan's contributions as a result.
In any case, the Arctic Circle countries and other stakeholder nations will be faced with the needto develop military maritime strategies that extend to the Arctic Ocean, an area that previously has
been given no thought or has for the most part been left out of the picture in the spheres ofgeopolitical or military strategies.

-6-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense(5) Reduced credibility of the US's extended nuclear deterrence capability
Another major military implication that the Arctic Ocean's transformation has is the possibility
that the level of credibility of the US's extended nuclear deterrence capability might be diminished.
First of all, that would no doubt result in the longer period of operation and the greater patrol rangeof Russia's strategic nuclear submarines. On the other hand, that would also coincide with theextension of the period of operation and the patrol range of the US's strategic nuclear submarines
and attack nuclear submarines, of which operations may in turn provoke Russia to even further
extend the period of operation and the patrol range of its own attack nuclear submarines. While
the US outperforms Russia overall in nuclear submarine capabilities, it is Russia that isgeographically advantaged, including in terms of antisubmarine force deployment, a fact that will
likely work in Russia's favor at least for mission purposes.
In addition, one must also put into perspective China's move to deploy strategic nuclear
submarines for patrols (Jin class or post-Jin class strategic nuclear submarines) or attack nuclear
submarines (Song class or post-Song class nuclear submarines) in the not-so-distant future. It is awell-known fact that the US and the then Soviet Union used to engage in unnerving spats as acommon practice in relation to their patrol activities using strategic nuclear submarines andactivities of constantly following them with attack nuclear submarines, which peaked during theCold War. Even at present, relations between the US and Russia probably remain essentiallyunchanged in this regard.

If, further still, China eventually succeeds in developing ballistic

missiles to equip its strategic nuclear submarines with, and in upgrading them to a battle-readygrade, it would be no wonder to see Chinese strategic nuclear submarines, depending on theiractual range, engage in patrol activities in the Arctic Ocean on an everyday basis.
In any event, the Arctic Ocean's transformation could cause the US's nuclear deterrence
capability to deteriorate, depending on how the second strike capability situation between the US
and Russia may shift going forward. Given this and other circumstances, the US will in all
likelihood work on enhancing the development of its BMD network, with space-, air-, land- andsea-based deployments, a prospect that Japan cannot dismiss as somebody else's problem; Japan,
which relies 100% on the US's extended nuclear deterrence capability, has to take to heart thelooming necessity to pay great attention to a series of military issues that might emerge inconnection with strategic nuclear submarine deployments in the Arctic Ocean and to provide the-7-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

US with as much assistance as possible in this regard.
(6) Emergence of a wide range of security issues in surrounding waters
It is also an important point to make that a wide range of security issues may emerge in thewaters adjacent to the Arctic Ocean as a result of the Arctic Ocean's transformation even if they do
not have a direct connection with it. The growing use of the Arctic Ocean for navigation purposes
will naturally cause traffic to converge in shipping routes in the surrounding waters adjoined to the
Arctic Ocean as well. In the vicinity of Japan, traffic would converge in the Sea of Japan as wellas the three straits that serve as gateways to it (Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima). If, in addition tothis, the development of crude oil and natural gas in Russia's Eastern Siberia and the establishmentof maritime channels to Japan, etc. get underway, there will be a new, significant sea lane forenergy transportation that traverses the Sea of Japan, resulting in even further convergence ofmarine traffic in the Sea of Japan and the three straits. This will at the same time lead to theincreased use of the waters not only by Japan but also by China and Korea (North Korea), which
will likely augment the possibility of maritime safety and general security problems being
generated in the congested Sea of Japan and the three straits.
Heavier marine traffic in the Arctic Ocean and other northern seas may also pose new issues forthe region, including those associated with search and rescue, humanitarian aid and disaster relief,
and the Arctic Circle countries and neighboring countries will be faced with new international
responsibility for addressing them.

Japan should recognize that by appropriately making

contributions in these areas in a visible fashion, it could secure for itself a card to play in pushing
forward to its advantage any international talks on the use of the Arctic Ocean held in the coming
years. At any rate, what will likely come to surface as specific issues in the future includes
development and acquisition of ships, aircraft and other defense equipment, with possible
operations in the Arctic Ocean and other northern seas in mind as well, to provide for any
emergency or contingency in and around the region.
(7) Need to establish new international rules associated with the Arctic Ocean
As things currently stand, no international rules have been established yet in the areas of security
and defense in the Arctic Ocean, let alone in navigation and resource development. While wehave the present United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a series of-8-Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

international agreements on international navigation as well as the Antarctic Treaty, which is basedon an international agreement on the peaceful use of Antarctica, it is safe to say that there iseffectively no equivalent for the Arctic. As has been discussed, the Arctic Council is indeed up
and running but it is, at least for now, by nature an oligopolistic consultative body that concerns
itself with the use of the Arctic Ocean and other related matters, whose primary purpose rests withmaintaining vested rights of the Arctic Circle countries; from an international standpoint, therefore,
it is simply difficult for the time being to expect it to function as an impartial organization open to
all nations.
In that sense, what is needed is an internationally open, fair debate, one with the idea of
establishing a new Arctic Treaty and revising the UNCLOS on the agenda, but there is currently no
momentum for the formation of international consensus in that direction. If there is little hopethat the Arctic Council as it currently stands might contribute to such a move, Japan will need tosecure a leading position and advance, in its favor, discussions intended to establish internationalrules, which it should in order to secure a stable position from a perspective of international politics,
economy and industry, international marine transportation as well as security and defense; arealistic choice for Japan to make for that purpose is to work hand in hand with its ally, the US. In
the foreseeable future, the option for Japan will be maintaining close talks with the US, aninfluential member state of the Arctic Council, and mutually coordinating their respective stakes insecurity and defense, while carrying forward discussions at the Arctic Council through the US.
The US has a sore spot, however: it has not ratified the UNCLOS. The growing move in the US
in the direction of ratifying the Convention, triggered in connection with the "freedom ofnavigation" issue in the South China Sea, is a welcome development for Japan as well.
Presumably, therefore, what will be the best choice for Japan is to encourage the US, from thatperspective, to ratify the Convention and then vigorously support the US, being an influential
member of the Arctic Council, both directly and indirectly.
(8) Concerns about accelerating negative impacts of environmental changes
It is no longer possible to ignore impacts that the Arctic Ocean's transformation has on theenvironment in relation to security and defense as well.

Concerns about environmental

deterioration due to congestion of the Northern Sea Route and intensifying competition overresource development there must be shared, and some steps - ones that are sustainable and effective-9-

Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense- must be taken on an international scale. With the use of the Arctic Ocean, no matter what form
it may take, likely further boosting global warming, it will inevitably cause negative impacts on theecosystem.

This will drive up hopes for the development of new rules to protect against

environmental deterioration. For instance, this would involve a requirement to set navigation
qualifications by allowing only ships and aircraft conforming to Arctic specifications and to oblige
operators to acquire ice-covered sea operation license, etc. In this respect, extending the scope toinclude military ships and planes as well as official ships and planes would also be considered.
Further, it may become necessary to bring into view the possibility of imposing limits on the use of
ship fuels.
Since it will be necessary to develop an international system of search and rescue, humanitarian
aid and disaster relief in preparation against marine salvage, a certain set of obligations will have tobe imposed on stakeholder countries as a whole, not just limited to the Arctic Circle countries.
2. Actions that Japan should takeNow, then, what actions should Japan take in the face of changes in the international state ofaffairs as a result of the Arctic Ocean's transformation, from a perspective of security and defense?
In the short term, Japan would perhaps be best served by policies aimed at actively pursuing theuse of Arctic sea lanes, all the while carefully monitoring international developments.

In themedium term, it will be of vital importance that Japan as one of the world’s leading maritime
nations participate in the creation of international rules.

From this perspective, Japan’s foreign

policy with respect to the Arctic Ocean will need to be reconsidered and reinforced.
In conducting a security and defense policy review over the medium to long term, Japan needs
first of all to “re-examine its defense structure”, i.e., bolster its autonomous defense capabilities, asa maritime nation.

Secondly, reviewing the Japan-US security system, i.e., “deepening theJapan-US alliance”, will be essential.

Thirdly, pursuing security cooperation with relevant

friendly countries, i.e., “expanding maritime security coalition”, will be required.
(1) Promoting the use of the Arctic Ocean and a diplomatic policy in line with national
interests
From a perspective of Japan's security and defense, it is advisable to utilize the Arctic Ocean to- 10 -

Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

the fullest extent.

To that end, what Japan, as a nation whose survival and prosperity depend

entirely on oceans, should do first is promoting the use of sea lanes across the Arctic Ocean in linewith our national interest, all the while assessing any international trends. Bustling maritime
traffic that uses the Arctic Ocean will imply a potential opportunity for Japan to create once again adomestic hub port for maritime traffic serving the Northeast Asian region, which it has lost.
Depending on the negotiation with Russia, Japan might be able to obtain special treatment withrespect to the Northeast Passage transit fee that Russia is contemplating charging. Depending on
the circumstances involving the Northwest Passage, Japan could strike a negotiation with Canada
as well. In the meantime, it is imperative to build commercial vessels with Arctic specifications
and train sailors with education suitable to Northern Sea navigation.

For that purpose, themanpower of those who have been onboard a Maritime SDF icebreaker and have experience in
Antarctic exploration assistance, as well as icebreaker building technologies, could be used. The
pros and cons of building icebreaker carriers, tankers, etc. need to be examined carefully, however.
From a more downright security and defense standpoint, Japan will be required to provide
assistance to the US Navy in connection with the Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) initiative,
their ongoing global action to fight against international terrorism and piracy, in the Arctic Ocean
as well.
In any event, Japan, though not concerned with the Arctic Ocean as an Arctic State but as amaritime nation that depends on oceans for its survival and prosperity, must participate at an earlystage in any international undertaking for developing rules for the Arctic Ocean in an effort toachieve, by appropriate means of diplomacy, outcomes commensurate with Japan's national
interests. While it currently appears unlikely that the Arctic Council would play a central role inthe development of any fair international rules – considering that, for now, it remains not easy topenetrate how its significance may turn out in the future – it is critical for Japan to continue making
its presence constantly felt by first obtaining observer status to take part in it so as to show thatJapan is highly interested in the matter. If, then, a momentum for talks on the establishment of
new international law associated with the Arctic Ocean is generated within the Arctic Council, by
the Arctic Council in its developed form, or in any other fashion, Japan will need to actively takepart as a maritime nation. Until then, a wise course of action for Japan to take is, as has been
discussed, to increasingly participate in any initiative for the development of rules in line with our
national interests through our ally that is an Arctic Council member country: the US.

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Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

In terms of a foreign policy, Japan should, as described above, work on diplomacy so that itshould be able to exert a proactive function in the development of any international rules associatedwith the use of the Arctic Ocean; as, accordingly, the use of the Arctic Ocean as sea lanes grows, it
is advisable that Japan should act proactively in any effort directed to develop an international
rescue and humanitarian aid framework as well. While Japan needs to actively take part in the
Arctic Council to that end, it should recognize that it remains, for the time being, quite challenging
to expect too much from the Arctic Council, considering its nature; in that sense, it is critical for
Japan to ensure that it should forge a path of cooperation founded on interests and values
commonly shared with its ally that is an Arctic Council member country, i.e., the US, and withfriendly maritime nations in Europe and Asia, as emphasized repeatedly.
(2) Defense system reviews (reinforcing self-sufficiency in defense)
As a basic policy under the current Abe administration, work is underway to review theJapan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines, in which process how Japan and the US should
cooperate in a series of new issues associated with the Arctic Ocean should be discussed as one of
the urgent issues. At the same time, it is strongly hoped that outcomes of such discussion should
be carried into the work of reviewing the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term
Defense Program scheduled to proceed until the end of this year, as articulated as another policy ofthe current Abe administration.

In the meantime, reviews of the Guidelines will necessitate

reviewing associated domestic laws as well in order to ensure effectiveness of the new guidelines,
including establishing a new Security of Sea lines of Communication Act and revising the Act on
Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding
Japan and the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.
Needless to say, enhanced cooperation in areas of inter-agency information sharing and operations
will also become necessary.
As the foremost example of a specific idea for a reinforced self-sufficient defense system, above
all, developing a surveillance satellite, UAVs and C4ISR (Command Control Communication
Computer Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) etc with the aim of reinforcing strategic
information capabilities with the Arctic region covered is required. As its area of maritime
operations expands, strategic and theater antisubmarine capabilities will need to be expanded andenhanced, which requires strengthening military ships and planes as well as the effective use of- 12 -

Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

UUVs (unmanned underwater vehicles). Furthermore, ballistic missile defense capabilities will
also need to be expanded and enhanced, which implies the need to strengthen Aegis ships, among
other steps. When one thinks about ship and plane operations in the Arctic Ocean, meanwhile,what also looms is the need to set in place an icebreaker rescue ship and rescue plane operable inice-bound sea settings, develop ships and planes with Arctic or northern sea specifications and haveoceanic and meteorological information collection and analysis capabilities so as to ensure rescue
functions with an icebreaking capability.
It will also, as has already been mentioned, be necessary not only to enhance the defense
structure for the Sea of Japan and the three straits but also to strengthen operational capabilities in
the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the northern seas and the Arctic Ocean, for which a variety ofsteps will be required, including enhancing the information collection structure of the Self-Defense
Forces in those areas, developing C4ISR and improving and strengthening ships and planes
suitable to operations in the north in terms of equipment, logistics and operations.
(3) Reviews of the US-Japan security system (deepening U.S.-Japan alliance)
In 2009, the US Navy hammered out a policy of developing a roadmap to address the Arctic
Ocean issue and is planning to draw up a corresponding plan by 2013. This plan will incorporate
strategies, policies, missions and plans and include operations, training and exercises, weapons,
platforms, sensors, C4ISR and other military force development, strategic communication anddeployment, and environmental assessments and their predictions. The missions envisioned in thecorresponding plan include, among other things, maritime security, search and rescue, humanitarianaid, disaster relief, assistance to other authorities, strategic maneuvers, strategic deterrence and
BMD.
While the current Japan-US security system contains no consideration of the Arctic Ocean issue,building a close relation with the US, a member country of the Arctic Council, will have greatsignificance for Japan's use of the Arctic Ocean in the security and defense areas as well. This has
also another implication: the ability of Japan to provide multifaceted assistance to the US in theireffort to enhance their security architecture for the Arctic Ocean, including nuclear deterrence
capabilities, will, if realized, greatly contribute to raising the level of bilateralism in the Japan-US
security arrangements. For the purpose, further, of preventing China-Russia ties from further
growing, an idea of enhanced tripartite – Japan, the US and Russia - security and defense- 13 -

Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

cooperation focused on nuclear deterrence will also appear more real, and become far moresignificant, than before.
The sheer act of reviewing the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines will likely exert asignificant deterrence effect; what will be of particularly vital significance among the matters
covered is fostering greater defense cooperation in connection with security in the Arctic Ocean inareas such as strategic information sharing, C4ISR, BMD, antisubmarine warfare, search andrescue, humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

It should make a very meaningful step to further

deepen the Japan-US alliance through enhanced relations in these areas.
(4) Security cooperation with friendly nations (expanding maritime security coalition)
It is critical for Japan to work on establishing, in a way commensurate with its national interests,
a maritime security coalition with friendly maritime nations in Europe and Asia. This requires
following a path of cooperation in security and defense matters associated with the Arctic Ocean
issue as well.
Cooperative relations with relevant friendly countries must be maintained so as to ensure safety
in these vast sea lanes through broad and seamless maritime security cooperation, whereby Japan
can benefit its maritime traffic security, even in seas far remote from the member countries of themaritime security coalition and quite distant from Japan, by promising proactive assistance to theextent possible in search and rescue and other areas to those countries in the Arctic Ocean.
Conclusion
With regard to the Arctic Ocean, Japan is not itself one of the Arctic Circle countries and has not
obtained even observer status in the Arctic Council.

Although Japan has substantial potential

advantages from the use of the Northern Sea Route, it is, given the current state of affairs, notexactly placed in a favorable situation from a perspective of international politics, examples being
the oligopolistic nature of Arctic Council member countries, blatantly hegemonic diplomacy
exercised by countries like China and Japan's late start in action; against this backdrop,development of international rules is called for in areas such as environmental protection as the useof the NSR as a shipping route picks up, together with resource development and the level ofinterest in the region.

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Chapter 4 The Arctic Ocean and Japan's Defense

Under these circumstances, what is required of Japan now is, as has been emphasized in thisarticle, participating in any effort to develop international rules that are in line with its national
interests, which it should do on the basis of cooperation with the US, while it is also faced with theneed to adhere firmly to its defense and the Japan-US security system. It is quite welcome thatwith the start of the current Abe administration, reviews of the Japan-US Defense Cooperation
Guidelines, the National Defense Program Guidelines, and the Mid-Term Defense Program are
now actually carried forward as clear policy actions.

Therefore, it is hoped that reviews of thesepolicy papers should be advanced vigorously with the Arctic Ocean issue also put in perspective,
paying attention that the "Arctic Ocean issue" has significant implications not only in terms of theeconomy, including marine transportation and resource development, but in the areas of security
and defense as well.

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