CPSEC-WP-2020002
Building Trust in Supply Chains
Report Two:
Trust Building Technology

January 2020
Cyber Physical Security Research Center
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)

Abstract
In recent years, there have been many reported incidents (including security incidents)that damage the trust of products and services in supply chains. This paper, which is thesecond part of a white paper entitled “Building Trust in Supply Chains - Report One:Analysis of Incidents that Damage Trust and Basic Approach to Trust Building,” describes
technology for building trust that prevents such incidents. First, we introduce the basic
concept of trust building and describe in detail the requirements for trust building and thepresentation of evidence. Next, we describe the technology for realizing trust between
companies and chain of trust along the supply chain, which are core technical processes
for trust building. Furthermore, we describe the benefits of this technology by referencing
and describing incident cases. Lastly, we explain that our basic policies for building trust
share the same approach as “trust” described in the information technology (IT) field.
1.

Basic Approach of Building Trust

In recent years, there have been reports of incidents (including security incidents) thatdamage the trust in products and services in diverse industrial fields, ranging fromtelecommunications equipment such as servers and routers to social infrastructure suchas automobiles, railroads, and buildings.
With the globalization of trade and logistics, supply chains for products and services are
increasing in size and complexity. Additionally, advancements in IT have led to therealization of the concept of the Internet of things (IoT), with hybrid systems calledcyber-physical systems (CPS), which combine information and mechanical systems at ahigh level, becoming increasingly widespread.
As systems that support global supply chains become larger and more complex, there are1
Copyright (C) 2020 National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) All Rights Reserved.

concerns that the probability of manufacturing or operational troubles or failures and therisk of damaging the trust of systems will both increase. Additionally, CPS have a greater
attack surface (sum total of all targets of attacks), which is pointed out as increasing thechances of being attacked.
In White Paper - Report One [1], we investigated incident cases that damaged the trust of
the supply chain; these involved various products and services, including CPU boards,
foods, and aircraft operations. We analyzed the cases that we collected and obtained thefollowing common characteristics.
Characteristics of Supply Chain Incident Cases(1) Incidents occurred because of either a defect in the necessary work rules or aviolation of the rules when executing business processes relating to the design,
procurement, manufacturing, distribution, or operation of products and services.
(2) Incident causes can be created and incidents can arise in any business process along
the supply chain. Additionally, incident causes can be created and incidents can arise
in different organizations.
White Paper - Report One presents the basic approach to realizing trust building in the
supply chain, as shown in Figure 1, based on the above analysis results.
(1) Trust Building between Organizations
Trust between organizations that deliver and receive products and services is built by
the acquiring organization requesting the requirements related to the trust andfunction of products (“Request trust requirements” in Fig. 1), and as necessary, thesupplying organization returning evidence that its own process is sufficient for therequirements (“Return evidence” in Fig. 1). In this paper, trust requirements refer torequirements that encompass trust-related requirements in addition to functional
requirements.
(2) Trust Building in the Entire Supply Chain
Trust of products and services in an entire supply chain is built by the organizations
participating in the supply chain chaining the trust between organizations (“Chaining
trust along a supply chain” in Fig. 1).

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Supplying
organization B

Trust building

Acquiringorganization A

Requesttrust requirements
Products/services(Return evidence)

Trust between organizations
Organization C

Organization B
Organization F

Organization A

Organization E

User

Organization G
Organization D

Chaining trust along a supply chain

Figure 1. Basic Approach of Trust Building
The following constitutes the trust building technology that realizes the above basic
approach. Chapter 2 describes the request of trust requirements, the return of evidence,and the building of trust of the entire supply chain, which are key to the basic approach totrust building for products and services. Since the chapter includes a detailed discussion,read and go through it as necessary. Chapter 3 describes the technology process for trust
building between two organizations in the supply chain. Chapter 4 describes thetechnology process for trust chain building in the entire supply chain.
2.
2.1.

Considerations for Trust Building
Request of Trust Requirements of Acquiring Organizations

The acquiring organization requests the trust requirements for the products or services(hereafter collectively “products”) it procures, as described in Chapter 1. Various necessary
requirements concerning functions and properties are included in the normal
requirements encompassed in trust requirements.
Trust-related requirements encompassed in trust requirements are those that concern the
degree of certainty of supplying the product functions and properties needed by theacquiring organization. For example, if the product is a cryptographic module, theinternational standard ISO/IEC 19790: 2012 Security techniques — Security requirements
for cryptographic modules can be cited as a technical requirement. Requirements that seek

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assurance that the technical requirements stipulated by this standard are properly
designed and implemented are trust-related requirements.
Aside from technical requirements, it is important for manufacturing operations to comply
with management system standards for the product manufacturing and operating method,equipment, and personnel, etc., as shown by the analysis results for the incident cases inWhite Paper - Report One. Examples of management system standards are ISO/IEC 27001:
2013 Security techniques — Information security management systems — Requirements inthe field of security, and ISO 9000 Quality management systems in the field of quality
control. Requirements that seek assurance of manufacturing according to suchmanagement system standards are also trust-related requirements.
The examples given above are all international standards, but in some cases, industry
standards are used as requirements. In addition, in some instances, requirements arepresented as nonpublic arrangements appended to agreements between the acquiring andsupplying organizations, rather than public standards information such as international
and industry standards.
2.2.

Return of Evidence of Supplying Organizations

The supplying organization manufactures products that meet the trust requirements of theacquiring organization. The supplying organization further returns evidence that the
products, etc., were manufactured to meet the trust requirements. This section describes
the processes executed by the supplying organization to perform manufacturing andreturning evidence, as per Figure 2.
The first process is extraction of the product requirements (1. in Fig. 2). If the products are
manufactured to order, the supplying organization prepares the product requirements inaccordance with the trust requirements of the acquiring organization in 2.1. If the
products are off-the-shelf or consumer products, the supplying organization has productspecifications as the product manufacturer. Based on the product specifications or trust
requirements of the acquiring organization, the requirements definitions for the productare prepared.
The second process is analysis of the requirements (2. in Fig. 2). To manufacture theproducts in accordance with the requirements in the requirements definitions, thesupplying organization prepares operating procedures that detail what is processed, how
it is processed, to what degree, and by whom or what it is processed, to a level that can be
implemented. The supplying organization further decides what to measure and whatshould be preserved as the evidence data that manufacturing was performed inaccordance with the operating procedures.

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The third process is agreement on the operating procedures (3. in Fig. 2). The supplying
organization engages in discussions with the acquiring organization to confirm that thecontents of the prepared operating procedures satisfy the trust requirements of theacquiring organization and reaches agreement on the contents of the operatingprocedures.
The fourth process is the manufacturing and inspection of products (4. in Fig. 2).
Manufacturing and inspection personnel manufacture and inspect the products inaccordance with the operating procedures and preserve evidence of it. The supplying
organization ships the products to the acquiring organization and returns evidence.
In some cases, the supplying organization may limit the evidence that can be disclosed tothe acquiring organization among preserved evidence data, taking into account its own
business constraints. For example, if the operating procedures themselves constitutebusiness secrets or know-how that is specific to the organization, then it cannot disclose
evidence data that reveal the operating procedures. The supplying organization mustreach prior agreement with the acquiring organization regarding the suitability of theevidence data to disclose in the above process of reaching agreement on the operatingprocedures.
Supplying organization B

Acquiring organization A
Requesttrust
requirements

Product specifications

1. Extract requirements

Trust
requirementsof acquiringorganization

Requirements definitions
International
standard
National
standard
Industry bodystandard

2. Analysis ofrequirements

Operating procedures

Regulations of
the organization
Intellectual
assets of theorganization
Reach
agreement

3. Agreement on
operating procedures

4. Manufacturing,inspection

Products

Shipment

Agreement on
operatingprocedures

Products( Return
Evidence )Legend:Document

Process

Figure 2. Analysis of Requirements of Supplying Organizations

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2.3.

Trust Building in the Entire Supply Chain

Figure 1 shows how, for example, an end product manufactured by organization A consistsof components and products supplied by organizations B through F. As described in 1.,
trust between organizations is constructed by each organization presenting trust and trust
requirements in the ordering and delivery of components and products. Constructing thisrelationship in the entire supply chain constructs trust in the entire supply chain. Thisshows that by shifting the perspective from organizations to products and components, thetrust of an end product is achieved by the trust of all components that comprise theproduct. Constructing trust in the entire supply chain is nothing less than holding evidence
as proof of the overall trust of the components and products that comprise the end productin the entire supply chain.
Conventionally, even if the trust of the end product were confirmed, the trust of thecomponents and products that comprise the end product could only be inferred. However,
if trust is constructed in the entire supply chain as described in 1., it is possible to arrive atevidence of the trust of the components and products that comprise the end product.
Specifically, using the example in Figure 1, organization B not only presents evidence toorganization A, but also is presented with evidence from organization C, so that it ispossible to create an association between the two pieces of evidence. By applying this tothe entire supply chain, it is possible to arrive at overall evidence for the components andproducts that comprise the end product.
3.

Technical Process for Trust BuildingThis chapter describes the technical process for trust creation implemented to construct
trust between organizations that deliver and receive products and services. In thefollowing explanation, the business process that relates to design through procurement,
manufacturing and inspection, distribution, operation, and maintenance implemented byan organization to realize the supplying products, etc., is referred to as the value creation
process (VCP) [2].
Trust building is realized through steps (1) to (4) below. Each step is explained inaccordance with Figure 3.

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Supplying organization B
Figure 2.

Acquiring organization A
Requesttrust
requirements

Product
specifications
1. Extract
requirements

Trustworthiness
requirements ofsupplyingorganization

Requirements
definitions
2. Analysis ofrequirements
Operatingprocedures
VCP modeling

VCP
model

VCP
execution log
data

Reach
agreement

3. Agreement on
operating procedures
Measurement

4. Manufacturing,inspection

Product

Conformity
verification

VCP conformity
verification result

Preparecertificate

Preserve digital
evidence

Agreement on
operatingprocedures

Shipment

Product( Return
evidence )Verificationof certificate

Registercertificate

Legend:Certificate

Trust Store
Document

Process

Figure 3. Technology Process for Trust Building(1) VCP modeling: Design a proper VCP and prepare a VCP model.
- Supplying organization B analyzes the trust requirements contained in therequirements definitions and prepares a VCP model. Using a process model description
language, the VCP model describes the correct operating procedures to manufacture
products that meet the trust-related requirements. The VCP model is a reference model
for verification of cyberspace IT systems to determine if business for physical spaces(VCP) is being implemented properly.
- The VCP model is prepared by analyzing the target business from the following
perspectives: the business implementers (people, organizations), raw materials(things), standards (data), procedures (procedures), and facilities (systems). This isbecause business is an activity wherein organizations and people realize products andservices in accordance with business procedures using systems that encompass thingsand data [2].
- The decision of the evidence data that people and things are properly executing the7
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business was described in 2.2. Furthermore, the supplying organization must decide on
the measurement method for the evidence data. For example, data regarding the
conduct of people in business processes can be obtained by capturing video footage of
the worksite. In addition, the use of things such as tools, etc., in accordance with thework rules can be judged through data measurement using the IoT device function ofthings (for example, tightening torque data for torque wrenches).
(2) VCP conformity verification: The supplying organization, as shown below, verifies
whether its own VCP execution status conforms with the VCP model.
- The evidence data are measured at the manufacturing site and collected as the VCP
execution log data. The VCP execution log data are the basic data for verifying that the
VCP is being executed according to the work rules in operating procedures.
- The VCP execution log data are compared with the VCP model from (1) to verify that the
VCP execution status conforms with the VCP model. This result is called the “VCP
conformity verification result.”(3) Preservation of digital evidence: The supplying organization, as indicated below,
prepares the evidence using the VCP conformity verification result.
- Using the VCP model and VCP execution log data used for conformity verification in (2)and the VCP conformity verification result, prepare the digital evidence that the VCP
conformity verification was performed.
- Typically, the supplying organization does not disclose the digital evidence to third
parties. However, if a dispute, etc., arises due to an incident involving trust, it isanticipated that the digital evidence would be disclosed in accordance with the requestof a third party such as an appropriate institution, etc., and used as evidence of theconformity of the executed business.
(4) Preparation of certificate: Use the digital evidence to prepare certificates in a standard
format.
- The supplying organization, as shown in Figure 3, uses the VCP digital evidence toprepare a certificate in a standard format. The prepared certificates are stored in a
certificate trust store that can be read and written to according to the authorities of theorganization participating in the supply chain. Lastly, the supplying organization
returns the certificate as evidence that the business was executed in conformance withthe trust requirements of the acquiring organization. The acquiring organization
verifies the certificates to verify whether the delivered products, etc., conform with its
own trust requirements. The certificate verification by the acquiring organization
completes the cycle for forming trust between organizations, which began with the8
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acquiring organization presenting its trust requirements.
- There are two possible organizational mechanisms for preparing a certificate with trust.
Figure 3 shows the method whereby the supplying organization prepares the certificate.
This method requires trust based on the assumption that the acquiring organization
recognizes beforehand that the supplying organization has constructed a system forverifying VCP conformity, as shown in 3. Technical Process for Trust Building. Under thisassumption, the acquiring organization trusts the certificate prepared by the supplying
organization and verifies the conformity of the products, etc. This method is amechanism for the supplying organization to perform first-party authentication of theconformity of its own products, etc.
- As a separate organizational mechanism for preparing certificates with trust is themethod whereby a third-party organization that can be trusted (trusted third party[TTP]; not shown in Figures 3 and 4) prepares the certificate. In this case, theaforementioned assumption of trust in the supplying organization must be substituted
with the assumption of trust in the TTP. Under this assumption, the acquiringorganization trusts the certificate generated by the TTP so that the conformity of the
products, etc., is verifiable. This method is a mechanism for third-party authenticationof the trust of the products, etc., of the supplying organization by the TTP. The TTP
implements the conformity verification using the digital evidence and prepares thecertificate. Accordingly, the supplying organization must disclose the digital evidence tothe TTP.
4.

Technology Process for Trust Chain BuildingThis chapter explains the technology process for trust chain building implemented by eachorganization involved in the supply chain to form the trust of products and services in theentire supply chain. Trust chain building is realized through steps (1) and (2) below. Eachstep is described in accordance with Figure 4.

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Component supplying
organization C

Product supplying
organization B

S04) Receive order forcomponent cS05) ManufactureS06) Prepare andregister certificate
Cert̲cS08) Ship component c,present certificate
Cert̲c and storage
locationS02) Receive order for
product bS03) Issue order for componentcS09) Perform acceptanceinspection for componentcS10) ManufactureS11) Prepare certificate Cert̲bS13) Ship product b, present
certificate Cert̲b andstorage locationS07) Register certificate
Cert̲c, obtainstorage location

Certificate forcomponent c:
Cert̲cRequesttrust
requirements
Component c( Return
evidence )Storagelocation forcertificate(Adr̲Cert̲c)S12) Register certificate
Cert̲b, obtainstorage location

Certificate for
product b: Cert̲b
S15)

Certificate link management
information: Adr̲Cert̲c

Product acquiringorganization A
Requesttrust
requirements
Product b( Return
evidence )Storagelocation forcertificate(Adr̲Cert̲c)S01) Issue order for
product b
S14) Perform
acceptanceinspection for
product bS15) Verify certificate
Cert̲b for productbS15) Verify
certificate
Cert̲bTrust Store

S15) As needed, follow the link
and verify certificate Cert̲c
for component c

Figure 4. Technology Process for Trustworthy Chain Construction(1) Inter-certificate chaining: Relating trust links in the supply chain to certificate links- The trust between a pair of organizations involved in issuing and receiving orders is not
sufficient to construct the trust of an entire supply chain. Consequently, it is necessary
to build a trust chain, as described in 2.3. The following describes the mechanism for
managing the certificate links, in accordance with Figure 4, which shows the steps forlinking certificates between three parties comprising product acquiring organization A,
product supplying organization B, and component supplying organization C, as
indicated in sequences S01 through S15.
- Product supplying organization B registers the prepared certificate Cert_b in the trust
store (S12) and presents it to product acquiring organization A (S13). The trust store isa storehouse of certificates that can be read and written to in accordance with theindividual authorities of the organizations involved in the supply chain. Productsupplying organization B, when returning evidence, returns storage location Adr_Cert_b
in the certificate trust store to product acquiring organization A. All supplying
organizations involved in the supply chain register certificates in the trust store andreturn the certificate storage location to acquiring organizations.
- When product supplying organization B prepares certificate Cert_b for its own productb (S11), storage location Adr_Cert_c for certificate Cert_c of component c that was used
is stored in certificate Cert_b as certificate link management data. The process

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expresses the trust link between organization B and organization C on the supply chain
as the link between certificates Cert_b and Cert_c in the trust store. When productsupplying organization B performs the acceptance inspection for component c (S09),
component supplier organization C presents location position Adr_Cert_c so that it canbe stored in the above certificate Cert_b.
(2) Verification of trust chain: The acquiring organization verifies the product certificates.
- The abovementioned mechanism for linking certificates makes it possible for theacquiring organization to verify whether the organizations involved in manufacturing
implemented the manufacturing in conformance with the respective trust requirements
across the entire supply chain of the products.
- This mechanism makes it possible to verify the trust of intermediate components, etc.,
even in the intermediary stages of manufacturing in the supply chain, in addition to
verifying the trust of the end products or services.
It should be noted that the contents described in 3 and 4 are universally applicable,
regardless of whether the products are made-to-order.
5.

Benefits of Trust Building Technology and Issues

This chapter describes the benefits and issues when applying trust building technology toactual incident cases. Table 1 shows describes and presents the characteristics of six of theincident cases introduced in White Paper - Report One.

Table 1. Case Studies of Incidents That Damaged Trust
No.

Case

Description

Relationto RulesMain Actor

Fraud/
Negligence

1

Excessive drinking by
airplane copilot before
boarding flight [3]Inebriated pilot evades alcohol
detection test and operates aircraft

Violation

Employeeacting alone

Fraud

2

Fraud in inspections
for industrial rubber
products [4]Inspector neglects to perform someof his/her inspection duties

Violation

Employeeacting alone

Fraud

3

Suspicions of backdoor
tool installed on
network routers [5]Third party opens product while it isin transit with outsourcing shipping
company and installs malfeasant tool

Violation

Third party

Fraud

Noncompliant products
labeled Halal-certified

Insufficient review during
manufacturing process design leads
to manufacturing of non-Halal
products

DefectInternalorganization

Negligence

Automaker manufactures defective
vehicles through malfeasant design,
manufacturing, and inspection at
the organizational level

Violation

Internalorganization

Fraud

4

[6]

5

Fraud related toexhaust gas emissions
for diesel vehicles [7](attack)

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6

5.1.

Suspicions of
information-leaking
chips embedded inserver motherboards [8]Malfeasant motherboards
containing information-leaking
chips manufactured by outsourcing
motherboard manufacturer at theorganizational level

Violation

Outsourcing
organization

Fraud(attack)

Benefits of Trust Building Technology

Cases No. 1 and No. 2 in Table 1 are incident cases caused by rules violation. The incident
causes were created by the intentional fraud of a company employee acting alone. In thesecases, the things that need to be stipulated in the management work rules of the operatingprocedures are simple and obvious, for which our trustworthiness construction
technology is highly effective as a countermeasure. The company can combine technicalmeans and business process improvements to prevent fraud in these cases. Specifically, forCase No. 1, technical means such as alcohol detectors, etc., can be combined withimprovements to the boarding roll call business process to prevent a person who has been
drinking from wrongly evading an alcohol test. For Case No. 2, technical means such as
surveillance cameras and inspection device monitoring., etc., can be combined withimprovements to the inspection task process to prevent an inspector from intentionallyneglecting inspection tasks.
In Case No. 3, a third party opened the product packaging while in transit with theoutsourcing shipping company and installed a malfeasant tool. This case involved an
intentional attack by a third party, and is an example of exploiting a vulnerability in abusiness process. Our trustworthiness construction technology is an effective
countermeasure for this attack case. The outsourcer manufacturer can request theoutsourcing shipping company to prevent an attack by third-party malfeasant access to
products by incorporating into the transportation business process technical means suchas surveillance cameras and devices to prevent packages from being opened. The
outsourcing company presents a certificate that indicates the proper implementation of
the outsourcing business to the outsourcer, enabling the verification of malfeasantbehavior during distribution.
In summary, trust building technology can be said to have a certain degree of effectivenessin preventing fraud.
5.2.

Issues with Trust Building Technology

Unlike the rules violation cases described in 5.1, the incident cause of Case No. 4 in Table 1
was a defect in the regulations. The incident cause was created by the organization thatcreated the work rules and operation procedures, and by negligent conduct in the form ofanalysis oversights or errors in the operating procedures. In this case, since the Halal

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certification is not easy to understand, there could have been oversights in the
manufacturing processes and operational rules so that products not conforming with Halalcertification were manufactured. The food manufacturer must have carefully examined the
manufacturing work process and combined it with technical means in an attempt torealize manufacturing processes that conformed with Halal certification. Typically, if there
is an insufficient understanding of the certification requirements, it is difficult to prepare
proper business processes. It also becomes difficult to construct systems that verify the
conformity of VCP properly.
Unlike Cases No. 1 through No. 4, the incident cause of Case No. 5 was created byorganizational fraud by the company. The organization itself cannot be expected to prevent
such organizational and intentional fraud. Our trust building technology is not an effective
countermeasure when the technology is intentionally used to generate false evidence.
Organizational fraud of this kind probably cannot be prevented except by having an
authoritative third-party institution strictly implement inspections to verify the
conformity with the legal regulations for the product.
The incident cause of Case No. 6 was created by organizational and intentional fraud by theoutsourcing manufacturer. As in Case No. 5, the organization itself cannot be expected toprevent such organizational and intentional fraud. Accordingly, our trust building
technology is not an effective countermeasure for malfeasance of this kind.
In summary, the construction of a system for VCP conformity verification is limited by theknowledge of the constructing organization, and it is difficult to counteract fraud that
intentionally attempts to embed evidence that differs from the facts. These limitations inapplicability are a future issue.
6.

Relation to the Conventional Approach to Trust

Trust building technology is technology for build trust in supply chains. While there is“trust” and “trustworthiness,” the former is a broader concept and closer to what is
discussed in this paper. Trust and trustworthiness have been considered for more than 20
years in the field of IT.
[Quotation 1] National Research Council. “Trust in Cyberspace”. 1999. [9]The degree of confidence one has that the system performs as expected in respect
to all the key system characteristics in the face of environmental disruptions,human errors, system faults and attacks.
Additionally, an IoT-related industry body from recent years defines “trustworthiness” asfollows.

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[Quotation 2] Industrial Internet Consortium. “Vocabulary”. V2.1, August 2018. [10]Degree of confidence one has that the system performs as expected withcharacteristics including safety, security, privacy, reliability and resilience in theface of environmental disturbances, human errors, system faults and attacks.
The common core description from these two quotations is “Degree of confidence one hasthat the system performs as expected.” This is nearly the same as in Figure 1. BasicApproach of Trust Building.
Figure 1 shows the building of trust of an acquiring organization by the supplying
organization presenting the acquiring organization with evidence that the system
performs as per the requirements of the acquiring organization. In this diagram, if“requirements” is substituted with “expectations” and “present evidence” with “grounds orevidence,” the trust building diagram can be seen as enhancing the “degree of confidence”
mentioned in the two quotations.
[Quotation 3] NIST. “Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems”. Release 1.0.,
May 2016. [11]Trustworthiness is the demonstrable likelihood that the system performs
according to designed behavior under any set of conditions as evidenced bycharacteristics including, but not limited to, safety, security, privacy, reliability andresilience.
In this quotation, if we think of “requirements” as “design (requirements)” and “present
evidence” as a “demonstrable likelihood that the system performs,” it is nearly the same as
the diagram for trust building.
As indicated above, the approach to trust building in this report is nearly the same as theconventional approach to trust and trustworthiness.
7.

Summary

Lastly, this chapter describes what added-value trust building technology creates and how
it contributes to a cyber-physical age.
In addition to establishing trust in supply chains, trust building technology is expected toenhance the efficiency of overall business processes, bringing about added value by
reducing costs. As we described at the start of this paper, modern supply chains continue
to increase in complexity and are becoming more globalized. By using CPS to manage
real-world manufacturing and operational work, it is first of all possible to reduce business
management costs at manufacturing sites. Furthermore, even if an incident that damages
the trust of products or services were to arise, downtime in production processes and the14
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cost of the incident response can be minimized by rapidly investigating the incident causes
and simplifying the drafting of countermeasures.
The ultimate contribution of trust building technology to a cyber-physical age is therealization of a world that is friendlier and more livable for people. Trust building
technology establishes the trust of products and services. The aforementioned IIC defines“trustworthiness” as the “degree of confidence one has that the system performs as
expected with five characteristics—safety, security, privacy, reliability, and resilience—in
the face of environmental disturbances, human errors, system faults, and attacks.” When
products and services that support our lives continue to behave as expected with respect
to these five characteristics in the face of various disturbances and attacks as mentionedby the IIC, it is certain to support the realization of a world that is friendlier and morelivable for people.
8.

Acknowledgments

This research is partly conducted by the Cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion
Program (SIP): Cyber-Physical Security for an IoT Society (management entity: New
Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization [NEDO]) led by the Cabinet
Office, Government of Japan.
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Flight Inebriated and Was Jailed in the U.K.” November 30, 2018.
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https://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/articles/1405/15/news096.html[6] Ajinomoto Co., Inc. “Announcement Concerning Halal Issue in Indonesia.” January 6,
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https://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/articles/1906/10/news049.html

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