The Narrative Position of the Like Minded Developing Countries in Global Climate
Negotiations: A Policy-Oriented Narrative Approach to IR
This paper is a result of a report about the same topic delivered to The Nordic Working Group for
Global Climate Negotiations (NOAK), Nordic Council of Ministers, prior to COP20. The paper isprepared for and presented at the Earth System Governance Berlin Conference, 23-24 May 2016. This
paper is still work-in-progress.
Please do not cite or quote. For updates to the paper, please contact the lead authors.
Lead authors:
Lau Øfjord Blaxekjær, Postdoc, University of the Faroe Islands, laub@setur.fo
Tobias Dan Nielsen, PhD Fellow, University of Lund, Sweden, tobias.nielsen@svet.lu.se
Co-authors:Håkon Sælen, CICERO
Bård Lahn, Independent expert, Norway
Lucia Green-Weiskel, CUNY

Abstract
Yamin and Depledge (2004) argue that the UNFCCC regime is characterised by formal andinformal coalitions, alliances, and political groups. Blaxekjær and Nielsen (2014) havedemonstrated how new groups since COP15 have transformed the narrative positions andnegotiations space in the UNFCCC, creating bridges as well as new trenches between Northand South in relation to the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility. As the
UNFCCC regime readjusts after COP21, these new narrative positions and negotiations spaceshould be re-examined. Through original data such as official statements from groups,
observations at UN climate conferences (2011-2015), and interviews with delegates andexperts, the paper analyses the narrative position of the Like Minded group of Developing
Countries (LMDC), an influential political group under the UNFCCC established in 2012.
Following Blaxekjær and Nielsen’s (2014) policy-oriented narrative approach to IR the paper
analyses LMDC’s identity, the problems identified by LMDC and the solutions to these
problems, and the paper identifies five central characteristics of the dominant LMDC
narrative. The analysis also touches upon what narrative techniques are used in constructing
the LMDC identity. This framework reveals the embeddedness of narratives in practice as
they unfold in the formation of new alliances and ruptures in old ones. This paper contributes
to the emerging Narrative in IR research agenda with a policy-oriented model of analysis.
The paper also contributes to the broader research agenda on the post-Paris UNFCCC regime,
and argues that as long as CBDR/RC is a major unresolved issue – an essentially contested
concept – as long will the LMDC play a prominent role in the UNFCCC regime.
Keywords: UNFCCC, LMDC, narrative policy analysis, IR,
Word count: 8.118

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The Narrative Position of the Like Minded Developing Countries in Global Climate
Negotiations: A Policy-Oriented Narrative Approach to IR1
1. Introduction
From the inception of the UNFCCC, developing countries' participation in climate change
negotiations has been fundamentally shaped by their alliance as a 'Southern collective'(Najam 2005) through the Group of 77 and China (hereafter G77). Now comprising 133
countries, the G77 is marked by large and growing heterogeneity in terms of factors such asprosperity and political power, as well as GHG emissions and vulnerability to climatechange. This heterogeneity has given rise to many claims about an inevitable fragmentation
or 'split' within the G77 (Kasa, Gullberg, and Heggelund 2008; Roberts 2011), and the last
five years of negotiations has indeed seen a proliferation of groups and alliances amongdeveloping countries in UNFCCC negotiations (cf. Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2014). Throughout
the history of multilateral climate change negotiations, most developing countries havepursued a strategy of multiple, overlapping alliances; i.e. they have combined membership of
the G77 with membership in regional groupings such as the African Group, or more interestbased groupings such as OPEC or AOSIS.
Prior to COP15, the UNFCCC organizational landscape was relatively static in its
North–South divide. Annex I groups included the European Union (EU), the UmbrellaGroup2 and the Environmental Integrity Group. These groups had many disagreements on
issues such as binding targets, and Annex I was rather fragmented. The non-Annex I groups
included the African Group of Negotiators – the only active regional group, the Alliance ofSmall Island States (AOSIS), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBAin Spanish), the Central American Integration System (SICA in Spanish), Central Asia,
Caucasus, Albania and Moldova Group (CACAM), the Coalition for Rainforest Nations(CfRN), the League of Arab States, sometimes Arab Group (LAS), the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs), the Group of 77 and China (G77), the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). For in-depth
discussion of these groups, see Yamin and Depledge (2004, pp. 32-48). Since COP15, thelandscape has included the BASIC group, the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the Cartagena
Dialogue for Progressive Action, the Durban Alliance, the Mountainous Landlocked
Developing Countries, the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) and the Associationof Independent Latin American and Caribbean Countries (AILAC) (Blaxekjær and Nielsen2014).
In 2012, a group of ‘like-minded developing countries’ held its first official meetingon 18–19 October, hosted by China (IISD, 2012a). This was in the aftermath of the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action in which all of the parties recognized the need to draw up theblueprint for a universal, legal agreement to deal with climate change beyond 2020. A keyelement in the LMDC narrative in relation to LMDC identity is that universality is not thesame as uniformity and that CBDR/RC should remain, as it is also a key pillar for theConvention. The LMDC membership consists of an intrinsic part of G77, but the parties
behind the group’s statements and submissions are not completely fixed. The LMDC is a1

Part of this research was funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers.

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very vocal group with an increasing number of submissions and statements. Similar toBASIC, it promotes itself as unifying and strengthening the position of developing countries
in the UNFCCC. It presents itself as being closely aligned with G77 but appears to use amore direct approach in its criticism of the lack of action undertaken by the developed
countries. It should be noticed that Brazil and South Africa have not joined LMDC.
The emergence of the LMDC is an important part of this picture, and with participants
such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia, understanding the LMDC is key to any policy
analysis of the UNFCCC leading up to the 2015 deadline in Paris. Based on interviews withexperts and country representatives, our research suggests that the emergence of the LMDC
may be understood simultaneously as a sign of increasing fragmentation and divergence ofinterests and positions within the G77, and as an expression of the identity and historicalexperiences that contributes to a continued, and perhaps surprising, cohesion among Southerncountries in increasingly different economic and political circumstances. The LMDC does nothave a formal list of members, and statements and submissions only occasionally list
countries by which it is supported, Figure 1 shows the number of times different countries arelisted. The total number of ADP submissions and statements we have found is 35, but only
seven of those list supporting countries. The most recent country list is from the CRP dated
2014-06-03 by Malaysia and includes Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, China, Dominica,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Philippines, Qatar2, Saudi
Arabia, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. In addition, Mali, Sudan, the DRC, Pakistan and Thailand
have been included in at least four out of the explicit country lists the LMDC have provided
in submission, and have also tabled submissions or statements on behalf of the LMDC,
except for the DRC and Sudan3. Finally, Jordan presented LMDC submissions and statements
at ADP 2-6, so we include it as a central country, despite being listed only three times. Other
countries that have been associated at least one submission or statement are Libya, Paraguay,
Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Somalia,
Tunisia, Ghana, Lebanon and the Maldives. We consider these to be peripheral countries –some might even be included in the statement as a misunderstanding, e.g. the Maldives. The
numbers of explicit mentions per country are shown in Figure 1.

2

Qatar has been mentioned in the two lists that have been presented in 2014, but not in lists from previous
years.
3
The other statements and submissions we have got hold of were presented by Philippines (6), Venezuela (5),
Nicaragua (4), Pakistan (3), Egypt (3), Argentina (2), Saudi Arabia (2), Malaysia (2), Algeria, Bolivia, Cuba,
Dominica, Ecuador, India, Mali, Sudan, and Thailand. These figures include two statements presented bymultiple countries, and five statements to the SBs. On how countries are selected to present, one interviewee
said it is usually based on willingness and suitability, but sometimes just random selection.

3

Figure 1: Number of explicit mentions in LMDC submissions, statements, and conference
room papers in ADP negotiations 2012-2014.
2. Theoretical approach: Narrative policy analysis and narrative positions
The paper draws on Hendrik Wagenaar’s (2011) narrative approach further develop by
Blaxekjær and Nielsen (2014) to identify the dominant narrative of the LMDC in order to
map its position in the UNFCCC negotiations landscape. The basic assumption is that
language, through e.g. frames or narratives, profoundly shapes our view of the world andreality instead of merely being a neutral medium mirroring it (cf. Fischer and Forester, 1993;
Wagenaar, 2011). Hence, meaning is not given by a phenomenon in itself; instead, it isestablished through intersubjective, linguistic practices, such as narratives. Climate change
does not imminently produce (or call for) certain patterns of social change. Instead, actors’interpretations of climate change problems and proposed solutions – in our case, in UNFCCC
negotiations – are the outcome of political deliberations on climate change and are being
shaped by linguistic dynamics (cf. Demeritt, 2001; Pettenger, 2007; Nielsen, 2014).
We define narratives as means by which actors make sense of the world, a ‘mode ofknowing’, ‘providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality’, suchas an organization’s origin and identity (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 209). This way of ordering isfurther understood in a simple but recognized template given by Aristotle, where the narrative
brings ‘unity of action … from the linear sequence that runs from a beginning, in which theprotagonist of the story is faced with a challenge or puzzle, via a middle section in which theevents develop, to a final section in which the initial challenge is met or puzzle solved’4

(Wagenaar, 2011, p. 210). Narratives also serve a ‘larger purpose of allowing humans toaffirm and reaffirm identities’ (Cobley, 2001, p. 222), which is why it is relevant to apply anarrative analysis to new political groups, because narratives then allow us to understand thearguments (strategic rhetoric) of these political groups and examine how these arguments arealso expressed and reaffirmed in narrative form as identity through the very organization of
the political group, thus also reinforcing an identity-based imperative for certain action. This
leads to the development of the concept of narrative position, which allows us to combine
argumentative and organisational practices in the same analysis of a political landscape.
Narrative can mean many things, as it has also gained popularity in everyday
language and political analyses, and in many cases it is interchangeable with rhetoric or story.
However, in a more strict academic sense, narratives are understood as the way stories are
told – not the stories themselves and not the mere rhetoric or arguments used, but more thanthat. A story can be told in many different ways, but narratives are also ways of making senseof the world – ways of thinking, and ways of giving actors identity and purpose. Narratives
bring focus to characters, their relations, progression through time; past, present, and future;
problems and solutions. In other words, a narrative is a way of making a coherent connection
between identities and action. Strong narratives build on a series of techniques and practices
like using familiar templates (e.g. Good versus Evil or other cultural templates like fairy
tales, love stories, tragedies, epic battles, etc. often involving questions of justice andappropriate behaviour) and/or using enactment and story-telling; i.e. narratives have to be
iterated, reiterated and remembered by (many) actors to work effectively as identity
formation. Following Wagenaar (2011, p. 218), we focus on ‘the work that stories do in aparticular political or administrative context’ in order to ‘bring out the story’s impact onpolicy making’. Thus, narratives also imply the taking of certain actions (Wagenaar, 2011, p.
215) or, we might add, narratives imply a certain action space. The emergence of new
narratives shapes new understandings of what the goals of the UNFCCC negotiations ought
to be and ways of reaching them.
Theoretically, there are different types of narratives. Important for our analysis is thedistinction between dominant narratives and alternative narratives, which will help us
understand the fluid character of LMDC. Narratives can be strong and coherent, but also
emerging and more fluid. Dominant and alternative narratives also function at different
levels, i.e. the overall UNFCCC field and at the level of actor. In the overall UNFCCC field
there are several alternative narratives about climate change and negotiations, but none has
become the dominant narrative unquestioned by the majority of actors – except maybe thenarrative of “science has told us climate change is real and we have to act”. Here we focus on
the LMDC’s narrative about negotiations. In the UNFCCC negotiations, the LMDC is justone actor telling stories about the global South (the G77), the North (Annex I countries), andhow these characters are faring in climate negotiations; other actors (e.g. the USA, EU, orJapan) tell the same story, but differently: With a different beginning, middle, and possible
endings; with different characters playing different roles (e.g. hero and villain or the innocent
victim and perpetrator). A narrative policy analysis seeks to identify the characters, theirroles, and projected endings, how the stories are told – what is emphasised and what is leftout, how are the discrepancies, that “reality” is full of dealt with – and, if any, the cultural5

templates they are framed in – applied in a specific policy context focusing on specific policy
issues and decisions.
3. Model of analysis, methods and data
We seek to identify the dominant way that LMDC countries understand the LMDC, whatkind of identity they project and speak about, and what policy problems and solutions they
speak about. Getting direct access to observe and record the LMDC practices has not beenpossible for this study, firstly because of the time and geographical span of the LMDC, andsecondly, because LMDC meetings and other activities are closed to observers and media. As
with other studies of diplomacy, practices need to be interpreted from and through othersources. “The rationale is that, even when practices cannot be ‘seen,’ they may be ‘talked
about’ through interviews or ‘read’ thanks to textual analysis.” (Pouliot 2013, 49). We haveapplied a mixed methods approach based on observations, text analysis of first hand LMDC
sources and second hand descriptions of LMDC, and we have conducted several interviews
with LMDC and non-LMDC delegates as well as other UNFCCC observers and experts. See
also appendix.
We have approached this task from a social constructivist or post-foundational
perspective in International Relations emphasising “the mutually constitutive dialectics
between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality”, where“postfoundationalism is a metatheoretical commitment to the notion that, in the absence of
ontological foundations of knowledge, the best way forward for social science is to build on
the social facts that are already reified by agents”. Pouliot further helps differentiate between
methodology and methods: “while the same methods may be shared by various
methodologies, a methodology comprises a set of epistemological and ontologicalrequirements … that formulates its own scientific standards and truth conditions.” (2007:
360).
“[C]onstructivism is conceived as a ‘‘metatheoretical commitment’’ based on threetenets: first, that knowledge is socially constructed (an epistemological claim);
second, that social reality is constructed (an ontological claim); and third, thatknowledge and reality are mutually constitutive (a reflexive claim). Accordingly, thesocial construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality are two sidesof the same coin.” (2007: 361).
In this study we rely heavily on interviews, but not as objective representations of “big-T”
truth. This does not mean interviews are not valuable or useful. Interviews or informants’
answers are used as subjective expressions of the extent that informants are willing to let us
know how they relate to different issues in UNFCCC negotiations or how they perceive
LMDC to relate to these issues.
We gained access to informants through network and sometimes direct contact (Bonnsessions in 2014). We used several semi-structured interview guides (updated accordingly)
for all interviews with a focus on getting interviewees to describe the LMDC history andpurpose, as well as how LMDC functions throughout the year and during UNFCCC sessions.
Generally, it is our understanding that informants were very open. When issues were too
sensitive to talk about, they said so. Interviewees emphasized different aspects relating to6their personal experiences, which indicate that answers were not rehearsed and officiallysanctioned. We argue that interviewing is one of the best ways of getting access to knowledge
and stories about the LMDC and LMDC views of UNFCCC negotiations. This is because oflack of access to LMDC internal documents and meetings. Through interviews with LMDC
representatives and other observers of UNFCCC negotiations, we can try to get informationfrom which we can then create narratives of and by LMDC. These narratives are createdusing triangulation with other sources such as LMDC statements, submissions, and press
releases as well as other publicly available sources like interviews. By identifying patterns in
answers we create the coherent parts of narratives. We also identify alternative narratives, so
as to include other interpretations than the “dominant view”.
4. Narrative analysis of the LMDC
4.1. What are the problems according to the LMDC narrative?
Understanding key policy issues central to LMDC begins with analysing how the LMDC
speaks about the problems and solutions of UNFCCC negotiations. Many of these views are
not unique to LMDC, but have been made before by G77. However, they should be seen as
different from other emerging views of NA1 Parties from e.g. AILAC or Cartagena, andproblems and solutions are naturally tied to the LMDC identity put forward in the main
narrative (cf. Blaxekjær and Nielsen, 2014). A key problem frequently cited in the LMDC
statements is the global North’s historical responsibility and lack of actions in terms ofcommitments and actions to reduce GHG emissions. LMDC often refers to the scientificevidence that A1 countries bear, by far, the heaviest responsibility (Claudia Salerno, Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Presidential Delegate Ministry of the Peoples Power for
Foreign Affairs, High level segment 20.11.13).
“The Annex division is not out-dated, but based on scientific assessment of the historic
responsibilities. Although the world has changed in a number of ways during the past
two decades, the historical responsibilities of developed countries for causing climatechange remain unchanged.” (LMDC submission 24.09.13).
The firm stand on historical responsibility is also echoed in the LMDC view on Loss andDamage, in which developing countries are portrayed as victims of climate change. A second
part of the problem is the broader theme of lack of leadership of developed countries. This isoften expressed through criticism of ‘inadequate’ or ‘extremely disappointing’ efforts to
reduce emissions (mentioned by several interviewees from LMDC delegations, but also by
NGOs and other representatives of developing countries). The point is that developing
countries have yet to see A1 countries live up to their commitments, both in terms ofemissions reductions under the Convention and KP and the finance promised to support
developing countries in their efforts.
“It is not about aid, it is not about donations. It is about obligations. The developed
countries have not fulfilled their obligations about the deep cuts they needed to take;they need to live up to those. And on top of that, they haven't fulfilled their obligation7

of providing the support.” (Interview with large international NGO representative
06.06.14).
A recurring argument is that if A1 had lived up to their original commitments (or the 40%
reduction by 2020 discussed in Durban) NA1 would not have had to adapt to climate change
and there would be no ‘emissions gap’ (Interview with high-level LMDC negotiator24.10.14). Moreover, LMDC has often pointed out that several LMDC Parties are alreadydoing their part through climate change action at the domestic level. Even as they bear thedisproportionate burden of the impacts of climate change and continue to struggle with thechallenges of poverty eradication and achieving sustainable development (cf. LMDC
submission 04.06.14 for a list of country efforts). Indeed, the argument brought forward isthat the current pledges by NA1 countries are higher in terms of absolute tonnes of GHG
avoided than that of A1 countries is that NA1 Parties have signed up to (Gore and Jarju
2013). Furthermore, lack of leadership means that A1 Parties are evading their own
responsibilities and shifting them towards NA1 Parties (cf. high level segment COP 19
interventions by Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Malaysia amongst others). This argument isalso central in LMDC maintaining a need for annex-differentiation (CBDR/RC). Hence,
removing the annexes or ‘re-interpreting the principle of CBDR/RC is a way for A1 parties to‘backtrack’ on their obligations and leave the post-2020 framework toothless with Parties
having little and very vague obligations (interview high-level LMDC negotiators on 24.10.14
and 25.10.14).
A third part of the problem relates to the principle of equity. The LMDC have stressedthat its member populations, half of which live on less than US$ 2 a day, face severe
development challenges (Gore and Jarju 2013). The argument is that social and economic
developments and poverty eradication are still the first and overriding priorities of many
LMDC countries (LMDC submission 24.09.13). Developing countries, especially those whoare struggling to eradicate poverty and to pursue social and economic development, must be
given the opportunity to pursue development and not be hampered by mitigation obligations.
The principle of equity is (together with CBDR/RC) seen as an absolute precondition for a
future successful climate regime (Jayanthi Natarajan, Minister for Environment and Forests,
India, High Level Segment COP 19, 21.11.13). Equity ties together with another key issue,vulnerability. The LMDC claims to speak on behalf of some of the most vulnerable countries
to climate change; countries where the impacts of climate change have killed thousands ofpeople and set back poverty eradication and sustainable development efforts (LMDC
submission 24.04.13; see also High-Level Segment 20 November 2013, Laila Rashed
Iskander, Minister of Environment, Egypt – who proposed the UNFCCC establish a list of themost vulnerable countries).
4.2. What are the solutions according to LMDC narratives?
The LMDC has stated that it aims to find equitable and durable “win-win-win” solutions forthe people, the climate, and sustainable development under the Convention (LMDC
Submission 24.09.13). This will only be reached if certain actions are taken, including (in noparticular order) keeping the ADP negotiations being under the Convention and following the8CBDR/RC and equity principles as well as continuing the four pillars set out in the Bali
Roadmap. LMDC interviewees are all very clear on this.
“The work [on ADP] must now focus on the Convention’s four pillars for enhanced
action, i.e. mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, and the two otherelements that have been agreed to, i.e. capacity building and transparency of action
and support, which are also related to the four main pillars.” (LMDC submission
24.09.13).4
One interviewee was very critical to what he perceived as attempts from other groups/parties
to elevate the mitigation agenda over other issues such as: adaptation, finance capacity
building and technology (High-level LMDC negotiator 24.10.14).
For the LMDC, the basic structure of the (2020) climate framework is to continue theroute of the Convention and in particular the Bali Roadmap and the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol’s ‘system’ is the preferred option and is seen as a
“top-down science and rules-based mitigation regime for enabling ambitious emission
reductions in developed countries... Climate change requires global solutions arrived
at through a robust multilateral process. Strengthening the implementation of theConvention allows us to do so.” (LMDC Submission 18.11.13).
There are concerns that moving away from the Convention and the KP system will
significantly reduce successfulness of a future climate regime.
“What we have seen, especially during the past few years, is a pledge-and-review
system that has even worsened after Warsaw, where we are now talking about
contributions instead of commitments for all countries. That's dangerous because weneed legally binding agreements, legally binding targets, that countries must pursue.”(Interview with high-level LMDC negotiator 05.06.14).
One remark made is that developing countries have put faith in the process (the Convention)
believing that what was originally agreed on would be respected and implemented (MaryAnn Lucille Sering, Vice-Chairperson and Executive Director of the Climate Change
Commission, Philippines, High-Level Segment November 20, 2013).
CBDR/RC and equity are core elements of the solution, according to the LMDC
perspective. In the ADP, the LMDC has been very vocal on this matter with all of its
submissions and statements mentioning this issue. The ADP (Paragraphs 7 and 8 of decision
1/CP.17) does not specify that efforts to enhance ambition should be differentiated between
4

Other central issues include: capitalisation of the GCF, no unilateral trade measures or trade measures
disguised as climate change action, such as aviation emissions issue (strongly against IMO and ICAO); the useof non-market approaches to the reduction of emissions; establishment of a loss and damage mechanism;
addressing the economic and social consequences of response measures; and addressing the issue ofvulnerability to climate change (c.f. The Hindu interview with Jayanthi Natarajan, Union Environment andForests Minister, India).

9developed and developing countries, but rather call for “the highest possible mitigation
efforts of all Parties”. The LMDC has been particular vocal in arguing for CBDR/RC as the
bedrock of the ADP process, and against shifting responsibility for increasing mitigation
efforts from developed to developing countries. Hence, the primary means of raisingambition should be through increased commitments of A1 Parties to the second commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol, with parallel efforts by developed countries that are not Parties
to the second commitment period under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). LMDC notes that the total emissions reductions pledged
by developing countries linked to the Cancún Agreements are greater in absolute terms than
the reductions pledged by developed countries, and that if all developed countries increased
their 2020 pledges to 40 per cent below 1990 levels, this would close the emissions gap
entirely.
As such, CBDR/RC can be seen as a safeguard against binding commitments from
NA1. A key recurring argument of the LMDC is that universality is not the same as
uniformity, as is evident from one of their earliest submissions (Argentina ADP submission
25.05.12). Hence, when agreeing to the term ”applicable to all” in reference to the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action, LMDC argues that this means it is applicable to all Parties ina similar way to how the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol are applicable to all Parties.
However, this term does not mean that the outcome must be such that all Parties undertake
uniform or similar types and levels of obligations. LMDC emphasises that the ‘contributions’
made by NA1 as a result of COP 19 should not be subjected to review or the so-called twostep for review of efforts of developing countries. The reasoning is that any framework,
which seeks to determine for developing countries what they should contribute in any future
regime, is not acceptable and goes against the principles of equity, CBDR/RC, and historicalresponsibility (LMDC submission ADP 2-3 18.11.13). Instead developing countries have theright to prioritise development (poverty eradication, access to utilities etc.) over emissions
reductions. One observer also pointed out that some LMDC countries might have severe
difficulties in implementing a review process and thus do not want this added obligation(interview with representative of large NGO 23.10.14).
The LMDC wishes to stay with the Convention. Not ‘only’ to preserve the principles
of CBDR/RC and Equity, but also to secure proportionality (historical responsibility) in a
future agreement. LMDC argues that altering the Convention risks hampering developing
countries’ ability to combat climate change.
“It's still very relevant, and we think it should be protected. If it is set aside, we havenothing, and what we will have is a hugely disproportionate or biased agreement. It
will be something that will prejudice the interests of the most vulnerable nations on
Earth because the Convention is something we have not even fully implemented.”(Interview Yeb Sano, Philippines delegation, EENEWS).
This ties together with the LMDC’s firm stand against supplementary initiatives outside of
the UNFCCC – the “international co-operative initiatives”. The criticism is that previous
attempts to go outside the Convention have failed, that such new initiatives are no substitute10

for actions under the UNFCCC and the KP, and if they are considered as solutions they must
be consistent with UNFCCC principles (RTCC interview Claudia Salerno Caldera,
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 2013).
For the LMDC, the provision of finance, technology transfer and capacity-building
are also core aspects of the solutions to climate change (LMDC ADP Submission 13.03.13).
Actions on climate change by NA1 Parties must be supported by A1 through them. The
contributions by NA1 Parties (such as those made at Cancun, COP 16, 2010) depend upon
the support of A1. As such, the LMDC again stresses the leadership and responsibilities of
A1 as the sine qua non of a future climate regime. For LMDC countries in the African Group,
finance in particular is paramount, as it determines the level of ambition for these countries(Vincent Makonga, Minister of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism, DRC, HighLevel Segment November 21, 2013). Regarding finance, the LMDC frequently echoes thelanguage of ALBA members in stressing the need for non-market mechanisms (LMDC
submission 24.09.13) and that the role of the private market in GCF is only subsidiary(LMDC submission 18.11.13). Last but not least, LMDC is echoing other developing
countries and call for developed countries to do more on Loss and Damage. LMDC demands
that NA1 parties pay for developing countries’ necessary actions. A1 parties’ mitigation andclimate related finance should not be seen as a service, but as A1 repaying their carbon debt.
4.3. The dominant narrative and LMDC identity
We have identified five characteristics of the LMDC that form the coherent LMDC identity:
1) The LMDC is the true and natural representative of G77 interests. 2) The LMDC sees
itself as a guardian of the Convention and its principles, especially CBDR/RC and equity. 3)
The LMDC is not a formal negotiation group, but its existence is closely tied with the G77. 4)
The LMDC is not a “blocker”. And 5) Developing countries are the victims not the culprits.
1) The LMDC’s self-understanding and self-projection is couched in references to theglobal South – particularly to the G77 group – and to the Convention as the common ground.
The Elders might have played a central role in getting the LMDC together, but the image the
LMDC portrays is that a common identity based on common interests and solidarity has
existed for a long time. Furthermore, one Chinese interviewee (expert from NCSC) even sees
LMDC as “a formally organized coalition under the G77. It is a sub-group.” The image of
LMDC formally under G77 and based on common interests is a way of constructing the
LMDC as a natural and legitimate developing country community, thereby making it stronger
internally and externally, i.e. protecting it from attacks on its fluidity or the image of it asconsisting of blockers or hardliners.
2) The LMDC sees itself as protecting the Convention from being dismantled. In
LMDC participants’ view, developing countries agreed to agree on a post-2020 framework,
but not a re-negotiation of the Convention (high-level LMDC negotiator 25.10.14). In the
LMDC narrative the ‘re-interpretation’ of especially CBDR/RC towards ‘universal
applicability’ in the Durban Platform is a critical break with what they agreed to. Instead all
agreements must fall within the Conventions’ principles. In the view of the LMDC, changing
the rules of the Convention will pre-empt the outcome of the post-2020 framework. This will
deflate the responsibilities of A1, and dilute the whole UN process as such. “Parties would

11then do what they want, when they want, how they want" (high-level LMDC negotiator24.10.14).
3) The LMDC states that it is not a negotiation group, i.e. G77 is the formal
negotiation group. Again, this is a narrative technique that makes it difficult to attack the
LMDC, because it only exists informally in negotiations. The LMDC might have been
inspired by how the Cartagena Dialogue works – another new political group with a narrativeof not being a group. The technique allows these “groups” to move and act more informally,
which makes it difficult to pinpoint individual contributions to statements, submissions, etc.
However, whereas Cartagena is almost silent in terms of direct submissions and statements,
the LMDC is very active and vocal. This can be partly explained by the need to crowd out
others, so that it appears that the LMDC really represents G77. One informant said the
LMDC also applies this tactic of crowding out other perspectives within G77 meetings, but
the statement has not been confirmed. Over time, the organization and coordination of
LMDC have grown. One senior AILAC delegate said LMDC negotiators receive messages
on their screens during Plenaries to coordinate their statements. As evident from their regularcoordination meetings, LMDC statements and submission, they appear more and more as an
official political group.
4) The LMDC does not see itself as a “blocker” and reacts strongly to being called so.
As a counter-argument, LMDC is trying to portray itself as able to come up with solutions.
Despite different backgrounds and motives for participation, LMDC participants can all
subscribe to the elements of securing and strengthening the G77 unity and the Convention.
Their perspectives on climate negotiations are influenced by what they see as a lack of A1
action and issues of poverty and vulnerability to climate change on a domestic level. LMDC
solutions begin with the general issues in negotiations (see section on solutions below).
5) Lastly, in the LMDC narrative, developing countries are seen as victims of climatechange, having less (or no) historical responsibility. The character of victim also featuresstrongly in the narrative about neo-colonialism. As such, LMDC participants were lesseconomically developed and have contributed less to atmospheric CO2 concentrations (atleast on a per capita basis). Furthermore, several of our interviewees indicate that in many of
the LMDC participating countries there are clear neo-colonial connotations in the domestic
debate on climate change, which sometimes spills over into UNFCCC negotiations. In thiscontext, climate change politics is yet another example of the developed countries
determining what the developing countries should do. Developed countries are seen as
running away from their own responsibilities and instead hampering efforts on poverty
reduction and development, thereby breaching developing countries’ sovereign rights.
4.4. Alternative narratives in and about LMDC
We also explore some alternative narratives or variations in the main narrative. LMDC is adiverse group of countries and participating countries do come with different foci andinterests. In this section, we first investigate various views expressed on differentiation within
the NA1 category (through statements, submissions and interviews). We then discussquestions relating to LMDC identity and action as a group of blockers or whether or not
LMDC identity and action are based on genuine and legitimate developing country interests.

12Differentiation may be approached in a hierarchical fashion. At the first (and top)level LMDC highlights the need to uphold a strong differentiation between developed anddeveloping countries. The LMDC is very vocal on this, and it takes many forms in almost all
sub-negotiations with references to the Convention, CBDR/RC and equity, A1 countries’
historical responsibility, and that further burdens (i.e. because of the emissions gap) should
not be placed on developing countries. LMDC submissions and statements take a clear standin defence of the current binary differentiation, with frequent references to historicalresponsibility and equity (see above). LMDC wants to see developed countries show the way
forward and live up to their obligations (not deflect them onto NA1) before they can commit
to any form of climate action. Moreover, it is often pointed out that developing countries areindeed already doing much to combat climate change, despite the relative lower capacities to
do so, and have pledged greater emissions reductions following the Cancun Accord.
Now, and only after A1-NA1 differentiation is recognised, some LMDC members
include a second level of differentiation. There can be differentiation between developing
countries – and/or within a developing country with (great) differences in income
distribution. This approach is a based on a narrative of “a distribution of the right todevelopment.” Or what is sometimes referred to as “the greenhouse development rights
approach” (Interview with Yeb Saño, Philippines delegation EENEWS). Interestingly, someof the countries where we find this alternative narrative are China and India – and of course
the members of LDC and AOSIS. More research needs to be done on OPEC countries. We do
not expect Saudi Arabia to work for this type of differentiation, but a country like Qatar
might be more open to it as evidenced by Qatar’s investments in renewable energy andparticipation in green growth cooperation with Denmark, etc.
A Chinese negotiator said “we cannot treat China the same way as a Least Developed
Country. We cannot treat bigger developing countries, emerging economies like this. So, first
we would like the Nordic countries to admit the differences between developed anddeveloping countries, but it is also ok with us that the Nordic countries to agree that, torecognize the differentiation between developing countries.” (Interview with Chinese
negotiator 10.06.14) (Personal communications with another Chinese negotiator supports thatdifferentiation among non-Annex I countries is acceptable provided the distinction between
Annex I and non-Annex I is maintained.) The principle of equity would still need to beacknowledged and reflected, as well as the right to ‘inclusive growth’, but it could be that thenegotiations could look at a methodology by which NA1 also share some of the burden. The
focus would be more on the capacity of some developing countries to act than on their
historic responsibilities (Interview with high-level LMDC negotiator 05.06.14)
The LMDC has often been seen by others, especially developed countries, as a groupof blockers in the climate negotiations. This section takes a deeper look at this and discusses
the actions of the LMDC – are LMDC participating countries blockers or do they represent a
core narrative in the negotiations?
“Now, the role is clear. We want to preserve the convention. We also want to put
forward a very strong developing country voice, because, after all is said and done,
we arrive at a compromise...So if there is no strong developing country voice, we will
arrive at something that is disadvantageous to the poorest people in the world. We
13

don't want that to happen. So that's why we endeavour to constantly build a strong
developing country voice in the negotiations on every front.” (Interview with highlevel negotiator for the Philippines, 05 June 2014).
This quote suggests that there is a strategic agenda at play. From this view, the LMDC wasformed for a specific purpose – to keep a strong and unified NA1 position in the negotiations.
This can be seen as a reaction: to conflicting views on CBDR/RC amongst developing
countries; to a concern that the post-2020 framework will bring binding obligations to NA1
Parties; and to NA1 critique of BASIC not being inclusive enough.5 This view gives theimpression of a more reactive than proactive group (Conversation with NGO representativewith close ties to LMDC negotiators, 05 June 2014).
The LMDC can be seen as a powerful negotiation tool. They “spearhead the attack”
for the G77 on various issues in particular CBDR/RC and equity (Interview with India-based
NGO representative of large international NGO network, 5 June 2014). LMDC is a sort ofBASIC (plus) where a powerful group of countries set the agenda while less powerfulcountries provide legitimacy (Interview with India-based NGO representative 05.06.14).
Indeed, the LMDC appears, to some extent, to have taken over the role of BASIC as a groupof powerful developing countries putting pressure on A1 Parties (Blaxekjær and Nielsen2014). From this view the LMDC does not represent the views of developing countries atlarge, but mainly the hardliners and is a platform for them to keep a firm rhetoric on core
issues.
On the other hand, LMDC appears to capture an existing rhetoric and views held byseveral members of the G77 (when listening to their statements) indicating that the LMDC
rhetoric is not purely a strategic or reactive imperative, but also a movement that captures acertain core narrative amongst developing countries. Amongst several of the interviewees
there was a sense that the LMDC did not emerge in response to or in reaction to the Durban
Platform, but that they have been there for a while, and can perhaps be more connected to a
general dismay with A1 parties not living up to their commitments. Indeed, interviews with
non-LMDC members have stated that the LMDC does represent a voice that needs to be
there, and LMDC is not just a blocker (interview high-level AILAC negotiator 24.10.14). In
this view, the LMDC represents a forum and a platform that is based on a couple of sensitive
issues that strike a chord amongst several NA1 countries as well as other stakeholders. This
includes frustrations with a lack of leadership by A1 Parties“We are by no means a nay-sayer. We only object to any prescriptive policies that are
dictated to us by others who are actually not doing anything to combat climatechange.” (Interview by The Hindu with Jayanthi Natarajan, Union Environment andForests Minister, India, 11 November, 2013).

5

Notably former Sudanese Ambassador to the UN (lead G77 negotiator) Lumumba Di-Aping spoke out against
the exclusion of Africa from the final negotiations and compared the Copenhagen Accord to the Holocaust(Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Tuvalu were also vocal opponents) (Penetrante 2011).

14

There seems to be a general concern amongst the LMDCs that A1 Parties have not fulfilled
their obligations and instead now want more action from NA1 Parties.
“You can’t go down and say look I know I am not doing as much as I claim to do but
you better start doing more.” (RTCC interview with Nitin Desai, WWF).
LMDC members regard themselves as standard bearers of fairness and equity, holding richnations to account for their historical responsibility.
Furthermore there are indications that LMDC is engaged in active dialogue with otherNA1 groups. The LMDC has regular meetings with the LDCs, and even has bilateralmeetings with AILAC (e.g. in the Bonn session, October 2014). Another indicator is that both
AILAC and LMDC countries are listed in the recent ‘Education Submission’ (ADP 2-6,
October 30). One senior LMDC delegate stated that he was happy to see more conversions
amongst NA1 groups recently. He stated that there were some disagreement between
especially AILAC and LMDC earlier, but that things are changing and he emphasized that
there is not a big divide amongst NA1 groups as some people are proposing (interview
25.10.14). However, we cannot rule out that this is part of LMDC strategy to portray itself asa natural and legitimate group representing the “true” interests of G77.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the identified problems and solutions of UNFCCC negotiations seen from the
LMDC’s perspective, must be understood in relation to what we have identified as the core of
the LMDC narrative or the LMDC identity: 1) The LMDC is the true and naturalrepresentative of G77 interests. 2) The LMDC sees itself as a guardian of the Convention andits principles, especially CBDR/RC and equity. 3) The LMDC is not a formal negotiationgroup, but its existence is closely tied with the G77. 4) The LMDC is not a “blocker”. And 5)
Developing countries are the victims not the culprits. Furthermore, the LMDC is portrayedboth internally and externally through dominant narrative, however, an alternative narrative
have also been identified. The dominant narrative is a story about the LMDC as the strategic
spearhead of attack for G77 on especially CBDR/RC. The alternative narrative is a morevalue-based story where the LMDC is seen to capture a certain long-lasting critique of A1 notliving up to their commitments and preventing them from further backsliding on their
responsibilities, and which has found common ground amongst a diverse set of developing
countries. The LMDC itself acts in ways that are consistent with both narratives and certainlysome countries may see either of these LMDC characters as more prevalent. Any policy
analysis of the LMDC leading up to COP21 in Paris needs to critically reflect on thesedifferent perspectives on the LMDC’s narrative position in UNFCCC negotiations.

15

References
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new political groups under the UNFCCC, Climate Policy, published online 17 October 2014.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2014.965656
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Institutions and Procedures, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

16Appendix
Table 1: Overview of Observations and Interviews
Name ofPlace of event
Time of event
Name of observer
event
COP 17
Durban,South 28 November – 9
Lau Blaxekjær, Tobias Nielsen,
CMP7
AfricaDecember 2011
COP 18CMP8COP 19CMP9ADP 2.5
ADP 2.6

Doha, Qatar

COP20
CMP10

Lima, Peru

Warsaw, Poland
Bonn, Germany
Bonn, Germany

30 November – 7
December 201213–21 November
2013
4-15 June 2014
20-25
October2014
1-13
December2014

Lau Blaxekjær
Lau Blaxekjær, Tobias Nielsen,
Lau Blaxekjær
Tobias Nielsen

Lau Blaxekjær, Tobias Nielsen

List of LMDC first hand primary sources
LMDC, 2012, Joint statement on the closing plenary session of the ad-hoc working groupon the Durban Platform on Enhanced Action. Bonn, 25 May, 2012, [available athttps://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pd
f/adp_philippines_28052012.pdf]
LMDC, 2013a, Meeting of the Like Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (press
release), Geneva, Switzerland, 27-28 February, published 1 March, [available at
http://www.mmrree.gob.ec/imagenes/2013/lmdc_press_release_feb13_eng.pdf]
LMDC, 2013b, Implementation of all the elements of decision 1/CP.17, (a) Matters related
to paragraphs 2 to 6; Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action(ADP) Submission by the LMDC. 13 March. [available athttps://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pd
f/adp_lmdc_workstream_1_20130313.pdf]
LMDC, 2013c, LMDC Opening Plenary Statement for ADP Bonn Session, 29 April.
[available athttps://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2_lmdc_29042013.pdf]
LMDC, 2013d, LMDC view on Summary of Elements and Management of Work forWorkstream 1 in the ADP. 29 April. [available athttps://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pd
f/adp_lmdcs_workstream_1_20130531.pdf]
LMDC, 2013e, Closing Plenary of the Resumed 2nd Session of the ADP, Bonn, Germany, 13
June, 2013. [available at https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2013/insession/application/pdf/adp2-2_closing_plenary_statement_lmdc_pakistan.pdf]
LMDC, 2013f, Views of the Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (LMDC)
on Workstreams 1 and 2 of the ADP. 24 September. [available at17https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pd
f/adp_lmdc_workstream_1_and_2_20130924.pdf]
LMDC, 2013g, LMDC views on identification of elements in ADP Workstream 1. 18
November. [available at
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-3_lmdc_workstream_1_20131118.pdf]
LMDC, 2013h, LMDC Opening Statement for ADP – COP19. 12 November. [available at
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-3_like_minded_20131112.pdf]
LMDC, 2014a, Opening Statement ADP 2.4, 10 March. [available athttps://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pd
f/adp2.4_lmdc_20140310.pdf]
LMDC, 2014b, Closing statement ADP 2.4, 14 March. [available at
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp_2_4_20140314_lmdc.pdf]
LMDC, 2014c, Opening Statement for ADP, 4 June. [available at
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-5_statement_by_egypt_on_behalf_of_lmdc_20140604.pdf]
LMDC, 2014d, Submission on Elements of the 2015 Agreed Outcomes, March 8. [availableat
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_lmdc_ws1_20140309.pdf]
LMDC, 2014e, Conference Room Paper Proposal from the Like-Minded Developing
Countries in Climate Change (LMDC) Decision X/CP.20 Bonn June 3. [available at
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-5_submission_by_malaysia_on_behalf_of_the_lmdc_crp.pdf]
LMDC, 2014f, Conference Room Paper Proposal from the Like-Minded Developing
Countries. Bonn June 11. [available at
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp25_sybmission_by_lmdc_crp_20140611.pdf]
List of LMDC second hand primary sources
ENB, Bangkok Climate Talks Highlights: Thursday, 30 August, ENB, Vol. 12, no. 549,
pp.1–4.
ENB, Doha Highlights Monday, 3 December, ENB, Vol. 12, No. 563, pp. 1-4.
ENB, Summary of the Doha Climate Change Conference: 26 November–8 December,
ENB, Vol. 12, no. 567, pp.1–34.
ENB, Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference: 29 April–3 May, ENB, Vol. 12 no.
568, pp.1–19.
ENB, Bonn Climate Change Conference, Monday, 3 June, ENB, Vol. 12, No. 570, pp. 1-2.
ENB, Bonn Climate Change Conference: Tuesday, 4 June, ENB, Vol. 12, No. 571, pp. 1-4.
ENB, Bonn Climate Change Conference: Wednesday, 12 June, ENB, Vol. 12, No. 578, pp.
1-2.
18

ENB, Warsaw Highlights: Monday, 11 November, ENB, Vol. 12, No. 584, pp. 1-4.
ENB, Warsaw Highlights: Monday, 18 November, ENB, Vol. 12, no. 590, pp. 1-2.
ENB, Summary of The Warsaw Climate Change Conference, 11-23 November, ENB, vol.
12, No. 594, pp. 1-32.
Third World Network (TWN), 2012, PRESS RELEASE. Meeting of the Like Minded
Developing Countries on Climate Change. Beijing, China. October 18–19, 2012, [availableat
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20121005.htm]

19