TOGETHER WE CAN
THE COVID-19 IMPACT
ON STATELESS PEOPLE& A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE

1Cover Images: Ramadhan Azmi @unsplash;
Vonecia Carshwell @unsplash
PART 1 image: Amit Jane @unsplash
PART 2 image: Swarnavo Chakrabarti @unsplash
PART 3 image: Visual Karsa @unsplash© CESF CONSORTIUM
June 2021, info@institutesi.org
www.institutesi.org

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, translated or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion. Whilst the authors, editors and publisher have tried to ensure theaccuracy of this publication, the publisher, authors and editors cannot accept responsibility for any errors, omissions,misstatements, or mistakes and accept no responsibility for the use of the information presented in this work.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSMESSAGES 										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 								

46PART 1: INTRODUCTION, CESF CONSORTIUM& ROADMAP FOR CHANGE 							

11INTRODUCTION 									THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY STATELESSNESS FUND CONSORTIUM
TOGETHER WE CAN: A ROADMAP TO ADDRESS THE COVID-19 IMPACT
ON STATELESS PEOPLE 								

12
14PART 2: THEMATIC OVERVIEW 							

20RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION & LEGAL STATUS		
EQUALITY & NON-DISCRIMINATION 						RIGHT TO HEALTH 									SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 								CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 							

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32
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PART 3: COUNTRY OVERVIEWS 							

38BANGLADESH 								CENTRAL ASIA 									DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 								INDIA 											KENYA 										MALAYSIA 										MONTENEGRO 									NEPAL										NORTH MACEDONIA 								ROHINGYA IN REFUGEE SITUATIONS 						

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49
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55
57
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS								LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 								

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MESSAGESStatelessness does not only exist in history but is ongoing, in real time and in practically every corner ofthe world. Even though statelessness intersects with every other human rights violation, it remains largely
unknown and misunderstood. The large statelessness knowledge gap, even among prominent development,
migration, humanitarian and human rights actors, is a challenge and burden for stateless people like me,
globally. We are not just a collection of stories. We are our own advocates and experts through our lived
experiences. This report recognises stateless people as leaders who must shape the vision and makedecisions about the priorities that directly affect our lives, our families and our communities. The roadmap
offers a way forward for our allies to check their statelessness blind-spots, centre us in their actions andbe accountable us when delivering their mandates. We cannot end statelessness by ourselves. Together
we must work to envision a world where nobody is deprived of nationality based on their race, ethnicity, sex,
gender, or religion. A world where everyone’s human right to nationality is protected and upheld, and wherestatelessness is truly relegated to the history books.

KARINA AMBARTSOUMIAN-CLOUGH,
FOUNDING MEMBER &EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATELESS

Letting nationality determine access to services, including healthcare and vaccination, is detrimental to
everyone’s right to life and is a threat to public health as a whole. This report demonstrates why prioritizing
the integration and inclusion of the furthest behind is crucial for international relations and public health.
It highlights the consequences of statelessness on health and wellbeing, bringing us closer to promoting
and achieving health for all. By providing a snapshot of the challenges associated with statelessness, thereport and roadmap greatly contribute to the conversation and global efforts to make the vulnerabilities
and needs of some 15 million stateless persons, and tens of millions whose nationality is under threat,visible and heard, during the pandemic and always.
SANTINO SEVERONIDIRECTOR, GLOBAL HEALTH
AND MIGRATION PROGRAMMEWORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATIONThis report reminds us that stateless people were among the most vulnerable before COVID-19 hit the world,and remain so during the pandemic, as their conditions worsen. This, once more, should move us to action.
If we want to truly leave no one behind, we ought to work closely with countries and territories to expand
global and regional capacities to meet the needs of stateless people and make inclusion and integrationa reality for everyone.

Injustice, inequality, and exclusion drive and perpetuate the marginalisation of vulnerable and stigmatised
populations, including stateless communities. These factors have led to devastating consequences during
the COVID-19 pandemic, as stateless people, the majority of whom live in poverty, are forced to work in
unsafe environments without access to health care, testing or vaccines. All of us in the public health andhuman rights community have a duty to protect the right to health care for all populations, irrespectiveof their citizenship or immigration status. Thus, it is crucial that we understand and respond to the ways
in which the pandemic has aggravated the already grave statelessness crisis. This report and roadmap
provide an excellent guide to more inclusive approaches to addressing the crisis incumbent on multiple
stakeholders, and they are an important starting point for all health and human rights actors dedicated toan equitable, inclusive, and effective response to the pandemic.

SAM WOLTHUISASSOCIATE VICEPRESIDENT OF PROGRAMSAMERICAN JEWISH WORLD SERVICE
4MICHELLE WILLIAMS
DEAN, HARVARD T.H. CHANSCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH

While we knew that COVID-19 would have a disproportionate impact on stateless people, we did not
anticipate the devastating extent to which the pandemic and its secondary effects could have exacerbatedinequality for this population. As the CESF Consortium has outlined in this comprehensive report, the crisesthat stateless communities are currently facing demonstrate the extent to which the pandemic has further
jeopardized their rights such as access to health and to vital documentation essential to accessing crucial
government support schemes; all while rising authoritarianism around the world threatens to cause evenmore harm. Although it is very apparent that statelessness is a human rights issue that intersects withthe most pressing humanitarian issues of our time, INGOs and donors continue to largely overlook thispopulation. It is imperative that funders and implementers alike, take up the clear and holistic calls toaction and roadmap for change put forth by the CESF Consortium in this report and fulfill our obligation to
support stateless populations around the world.

This is an enormously important report. It highlights the structural causes of statelessness, focuses a sharp
human rights and anti-discrimination lens on its consequences, and shows how the COVID-19 pandemicheightens risks for the most vulnerable, even though there are possibilities of change. The report’s greatvalue is in bringing together the larger drivers with the mid-level factors, made tangible through rich datafrom a host of countries and contexts.
GITA SEN
DIRECTOR, RAMALINGASWAMI
CENTRE ON EQUITY AND SOCIALDETERMINANTS OF HEALTH,
GENERAL CO-COORDINATOR,DAWN FEMINISTMONETTE ZARDDIRECTOR, PROGRAM
ON FORCED MIGRATION AND HEALTH
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY MAILMAN SCHOOLCOVID-19’s disproportionate impact on marginalized groups around the world has highlighted how
structural inequities across societies shape and influence the enjoyment of all human rights, including theright to health. Nowhere is this more true than in the context of stateless persons. This excellent and timely
report carefully documents how challenges around access to health are magnified for stateless people,
and it shows us the way forward through programming that is grounded in the words and perspectives ofstateless persons themselves. This valuable addition to the field will help advance our understanding of
how to effectively address the rights and needs of this particularly vulnerable group.

As a CESF Committee Member, I have noted great initiatives undertaken by Consortium members aroundthe world. These include paralegal community outreach, door-to-door awareness raising, radio shows
educating people of their rights, podcasts and interviews targeting stateless communities, documentaries
showcasing the exclusion of stateless people and direct support through providing food rations and otheremergency relief. These innovative projects have been driven by community-led organisations to speak
directly to affected communities and support them to raise their voices. Further, the research undertaken
by Consortium members on the impact of COVID-19 on communities affected by statelessness underpins
this important report. The roadmap for change has also emerged from the experiences of Consortium
members. It is a great example of a bottom-up approach to pursuing change and is grounded in the realities
and experiences of stateless people. I hope that UN agencies, states, donors and other actors will rise to
the challenge and respond to the roadmap. All of this has been possible due to ISI’s efforts to secure funds
and constitute a panel of great minds from different fields. I am honored that I was invited to serve on thecommittee that supported these great community outreach initiatives.

MUSTAFA MAHMOUD YOUSIFSENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER,
CITIZENSHIP
NAMATI

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The COVID-19 pandemic and state responses to it have had a significant negative impact on the
lives, wellbeing, and rights of the approximately 15 million stateless people around the world who
have been denied a nationality, as well as tens of millions whose nationality is at risk. The devastating impacts of exclusion and denial of fundamental rights, including healthcare, during the pandemic relate to much deeper structural problems – the historic and systemic exclusion, deprivationand marginalisation of communities that have been made stateless as part of wider discriminatory
political acts, or pursuant to dominant, discriminatory ideologies. This report documents these
impacts, providing an evidence base for further action.
COVID-19 has shone a light on these challenges and also presents a unique opportunity to raise
visibility, address the structural causes of statelessness, and secure lasting change, through working directly with stateless people and being accountable to them. The report also proposes a practical 3-step Roadmap for relevant stakeholders, to protect the right to nationality and the rights ofstateless people, during times of COVID-19 and beyond.
Below, is a summary of the Roadmap in Part 1 of the report, the key findings of the five thematic
chapters in Part 2, and ten calls to action. This Executive Summary does not cover the findings orcalls to action of the CESF country chapters in Part 3 of the report.

TOGETHER WE CAN: A ROADMAP TO ADDRESSTHE COVID-19 IMPACT ON STATELESS PEOPLE
This practical 3-step Roadmap serves as a framework for resolving and addressing the structural discrimination and exclusion of stateless people, during times of COVID-19 and beyond. The
starting point is the belief that change is within our grasp, and can be achieved through creative,
committed and courageous action. Together we can and together we must address the structural discrimination underlying statelessness, protect the rights of stateless people and meet theiremergency needs.
Drawing on the experiences and expertise of CESF Consortium members in their COVID-19 work,
the Roadmap aims to inform and guide the necessary inclusive responses of multiple stakeholders: governments, parliamentarians and political parties, professional bodies, NHRIs, regional organisations, UN agencies and experts, diplomats, donors, international organisations, NGOs, grassroots groups, activists, the media and concerned members of the general public.

1

CHECK FORINSTITUTIONAL BLIND-SPOTS

We invite states, UN actors, humanitarian groups and other stakeholders to engage in careful introspection, check for institutional blind-spots, and review and reform policies and practices toensure that stateless people are prioritised, their particular contexts and needs are understoodand addressed and they are not excluded or left behind through:
•
•
•
•

2

strengthening awareness of the issue at all levels;
acknowledging historical failures;
collecting and sharing information on statelessness and nationality rights deprivations; andresourcing the enhancement of capacities, collaborations and funding.

INCLUDE,
CONSULT & ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE

We invite activists and NGOs to make their expertise available and those in positions of power,
to have open consultation and meaningful and constructive dialogue with affected communities,
and commit to including stateless people on equal terms by:
•
•
•
•

6

consulting with activists and affected communities;building trust and strengthening solidarity with stateless communities;
meeting the needs and priorities of affected communities and ensuring their meaningful participation; andfacilitating wider discourse within society and institutions on equality, inclusion and the rightto nationality.

THE REPORT IS GROUNDED IN THE EXPERIENCES
AND EXPERTISE OF MEMBERS OF THE COVID-19
EMERGENCY STATELESSNESS FUND (CESF)CONSORTIUM, A GLOBAL CONSORTIUM
OF NGOS AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTSACTIVISTS, INITIATED BY THE INSTITUTEON STATELESSNESS AND INCLUSION (ISI) IN
JUNE 2020 TO RESPOND TO THE IMPACT OF
COVID-19 ON STATELESS POPULATIONS. IT
CARRIES A SIMPLE MESSAGE THAT TOGETHERWE CAN ACHIEVE CHANGE, PROTECT THE RIGHTTO NATIONALITY FOR ALL AND PROTECT THE
RIGHTS OF ALL STATELESS PEOPLE. THE REPORTDRAWS ON A MIX OF DESK RESEARCH AND THE
FINDINGS FROM RESEARCH-BASED ACTIONADVOCACY PROJECTS BEING IMPLEMENTED
BY CESF CONSORTIUM MEMBERS IN 13
COUNTRIES. IT COMPRISES THREE PARTS:PART 1INTRODUCTION, CESF CONSORTIUM AND
ROADMAP TO ADDRESS THE COVID-19
IMPACT ON STATELESS PEOPLE.

PART 2

THEMATIC FOCUS ON THE RIGHT TO
NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND
LEGAL STATUS; EQUALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION; THE RIGHT TO HEALTH;SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS AND CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS.

PART 3

CESF COUNTRY FOCUS CHAPTERS ON
BANGLADESH, CENTRAL ASIA, THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, INDIA, KENYA,
MALAYSIA, MONTENEGRO, NEPAL, NORTH
MACEDONIA AND ON THE ROHINGYA.

3

BUILD
BACK BETTER

We invite all actors to learn the hard lessons that the pandemic has taught us and invest in future-proofing, ensuring a lasting commitment to breaking down the pervasive injustice, indignity, inequality, deprivation and exclusion that stateless people face, focusing on:
•
•
•
•
•
•

implementing reforms to address discriminatory laws, policies and practices;
redressing the intergenerational disadvantage and legacy of statelessness;being accountable to stateless communities and activists;monitoring the performance and progress of states;
ensuring access to justice and reparations for stateless people; andsustainably investing in inclusive societies.

KEY THEMATIC FINDINGS
Below, are the key thematic findings of this report, with regard to the COVID-19 impact on the rights
and wellbeing of stateless people. Of the five thematic areas addressed, the right to nationality,
documentation and legal status and equality and non-discrimination represent the main structural challenges which have a cyclical and inter-generational impact on stateless people. People
are more likely to be deprived of other rights because they lack nationality, documentation or legal
status. Without ready solutions, their children are more likely to inherit the same (lack of) status.
Similarly, discrimination on the basis or race, sex and other grounds can cause and perpetuatestatelessness, and statelessness in turn can lead to more discrimination. The other three thematic
issues - the right to health, socioeconomic rights and civil and political rights - relate to some of
the main rights deprivations that stateless people endure, which have been further exacerbated
due to the pandemic. These challenges are all interrelated and mutually reinforcing, heightening
the cost of statelessness, generating new risks of statelessness and stifling efforts to promote theright to nationality and the rights of stateless people.

THE RIGHT TO HEALTH

The right to health should have universal application regardless of race, religion, legal status orother criteria. A year into the pandemic however, healthcare related challenges faced by statelesspeople have only heightened. The cost of healthcare continues to be an insurmountable hurdle formany stateless people, including in Central Asia, the Dominican Republic, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
Malaysia, Montenegro, Nepal, North Macedonia and South Africa. This is because stateless people
are excluded from healthcare plans, subsidies, insurance schemes and free healthcare that citizens
are entitled to. In countries such as Sweden, to procure a COVID-19 test, a digital ID is required
which many stateless people do not have; the lack of documentation has further prevented access to healthcare in Central Asia, India, Kenya, Libya and Thailand. Fear of arrest, detention andharassment by police or officials has also cultivated a culture of fear around accessing healthcare,preventing stateless people in countries including Kenya and Malaysia from seeking potentiallylife-saving treatments. The inability to carry out effective preventative measures including social
distancing and wearing PPE, as well as lack of access to sanitation and hygiene products andfacilities due to living and working conditions, also places stateless communities at great risk.
Many communities of stateless people and those whose nationality is at risk live in densely populated camps and settlements including the Rohingya, the Urdu speaking community in Bangladesh,
Nubians in Kenya and Roma communities in the Western Balkans. The mental health impacts oflockdowns, loss of livelihoods, exposure to health risks and starvation and exclusion from state
relief measures, are also significant.
There is an urgent need to ensure inclusivity in the roll out of COVID-19 vaccines, rising above vaccine nationalism. Unfortunately, we are already seeing a ‘citizens first’ approach to vaccine distribution and worrying initiatives including vaccine passports which would further exclude statelesspeople. In Central Asia and Kenya, stateless communities have not been included in the vaccine
roll out. There have been no announcements of vaccine allocations for the Rohingya communities
in Bangladesh, India and Malaysia. Further, in India it is mandatory to show a government issued
ID card to receive the vaccine; in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, five million Palestinians have been intentionally excluded from the vaccine plan; and in Cameroon, stateless people
are excluded with their lack of documentation reported as the barrier to access. According to official discourse in the Dominican Republic those deemed ‘illegal migrants’ and stateless people,
who lack Dominican documentation, are denied access to vaccines. However, at the local level,
arrangements have been made with decentralised public health services for these groups where
representations by affected parties have been met with positive responses. In a show of good practice, the Montenegrin government has changed its policy, and has placed the Roma as a priority
group for vaccination, and confirmed that all Montenegrin residents regardless of citizenship canreceive the vaccine.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTSCIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTSTHE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS

EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION

8

When the pandemic took hold in early 2020, state responses prioritised citizens to the exclusionand detriment of migrants, refugees and stateless people. Over a year into the crisis, there has
been hardly any shift in the approach to social and economic support by states and other actors.
The lack of documentation has resulted in exclusion from state relief in the Dominican Republic,
France, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Montenegro, Nepal, North Macedonia, South Africa and the United States. This is further compounded by reports of discriminatory exclusion of stateless people
from state relief in Bangladesh and Central Asia. Further, the stateless in Montenegro and North
Macedonia have been excluded from humanitarian relief efforts. There has been a significant impact on employment and income and consequently the loss of livelihoods amongst the statelessand those at risk of statelessness. CESF Consortium members from Bangladesh, Central Asia, theDominican Republic, India, Malaysia, Montenegro and North Macedonia as well as Rohingyas in
Bangladesh, India and Malaysia all cited the inability to access formal employment as a significant
factor to the loss of income. Jobs are mainly found in the informal sector which have been brought
to a standstill with the implementation of lockdowns and curfews. In Malaysia, North Macedonia,
the Dominican Republic and Thailand there are further barriers to education during lockdowns dueto the nature of online classes and the need for access to equipment and the internet.

In order to address the threat to public health, most States implemented restrictions which limit
civil and political rights. Most states have implemented COVID-19 restrictions in order to protect
public health. Some states have also introduced more permanent restrictions to rights. Statelesscommunities and those whose nationality is at risk continue to face ongoing restrictions and rights
violations which, due to pre-existing conditions are having a disproportionately devastating impact. In the CESF Consortium Project focus countries, arbitrary detention, the risk of arrest andfear of harassment by officials has impacted stateless populations and those whose nationality
is at risk in India and Malaysia as well as Rohingya communities in their country of refuge. For
those in detention during the pandemic, there is an increased risk of infection due to the inability
to adequately social distance or self-isolate. Reports of such issues have come from countries
including Australia, Malaysia and Thailand. Specific to Rohingya refugees, in the context of COVID-19, access to UNHCR or asylum procedures on arrival in their host county is limited, heightening
their risk of arrest and arbitrary detention. During the pandemic, countries including Malaysia andThailand have pushed boats of Rohingya back out to sea, using COVID-19 as an excuse to deny
entry and protection. Restrictions on freedom of movement have exacerbated the impacts of
COVID-19 including for those trying to seek healthcare outside of refugee camps in Greece; andin Abkhazia, with many ethnic Georgians residing in Abkhazia being prevented from crossing into
Georgia to access healthcare, livelihoods, education or family reunion.

COVID-19 related measures have impacted the right to nationality, documentation and legal status in deeply concerning ways. Disruptions to crucial civil registration procedures have resulted
in delays and backlogs leaving stateless people and those whose nationality is at risk in limbo,
completely vulnerable to the multiple effects of COVID-19. The report looks at the impacts of suchdisruptions in Central Asia, the Dominican Republic, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Kenya, Montenegro, Nepal, North Macedonia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Such documentation
and registration challenges also subject people to longer-term risks of statelessness i.e. unregistered births and subsequent non-issuance of IDs can heighten the risk of statelessness, particularly among minority and border communities and those with migrant heritage. There have been
disruptions to other procedures that provide legal status and access to basic rights to people withprotection needs. Asylum and statelessness determination procedures have been disrupted incountries including Bulgaria, Germany, Ukraine, South Africa and Colombia. Rohingya refugees’
access to UNHCR has been greatly restricted, diminishing their chances of being registered and receiving documentation, and correspondingly heightening the risk or arrest and detention. A numberof countries have also had disruptions to permanent residence applications, visa processes andother consular services, particularly impacting stateless migrants and families affected by gender
discriminatory nationality laws.

Discrimination continues to be an underlying and entrenched driving force behind statelessness
worldwide. The research looks more closely at various manifestations and consequences of discrimination in the context of the pandemic, including the increase in hate speech and intolerance
particularly targeting Roma communities in Bulgaria, Ireland, Montenegro and North Macedonia
and Muslims in India. There has also been a rise in xenophobia and racism against communities
including the Rohingya in Myanmar and their countries of refuge, those declared foreigners in Assam India, the Urdu speaking ‘Bihari’ community of Bangladesh, Nubians of Kenya, Dominicans ofHaitian descent in the Dominican Republic and refugees, migrants and stateless people in South
Africa. These minority and migrant communities have been vilified in populist political narratives
and used as scapegoats for the spread of infection, including to distract from the failings of political leaders. Gender discrimination has also had a significant impact. In Malaysia, for example,
where gender discriminatory nationality laws deny Malaysian nationality to children born to Malaysian mothers outside of Malaysia, there has been a sharp increase in the number of children denied
access to citizenship because their mother was unable to re-enter Malaysia to give birth. Increased
cases of gender-based violence have also been reported, including in Eswatini and Nepal, whereparticularly in the context of gender discriminatory nationality laws, women are unable to extract
themselves from unsafe situations.

TEN CALLS TO ACTION
Ultimately, it is states that have the responsibility, human rights obligations and the resources toaddress statelessness, protect the rights of all stateless people and protect everyone’s right toa nationality. The below Call to Action therefore primarily applies to states and governments. It
also applies to other stakeholders targeted by this report: MPs and political parties, professional
bodies, NHRIs, regional organisations, UN agencies and experts, diplomats, donors, internationalorganisations, NGOs, grassroots groups, activists and the media. It sets out our recommendations
in relation to the Roadmap and thematic challenges identified in the report. Most action points
directly build off recommendations in ISI’s 2020 Impact Report ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic’,2
an indication that concerns raised a year ago remain largely unaddressed and many situations havein fact worsened. All stakeholders are invited to consider how each individual call to action would
apply to their own context, obligations and mandate. Additional country-specific calls to action
are set out in each country chapter in Part 3. The CESF Consortium stands available to engage andsupport stakeholders as they take on board and respond to this Call to Action.

THE ROADMAP

1
2

RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND
LEGAL STATUS

EQUALITY &NON-DISCRIMINATIONRIGHT TO HEALTH

3

4

5
6

Reflect on, engage and act to internalise and implement the Together We Can: Roadmap toAddress the COVID-19 Impact on Stateless People; appoint focal points with the responsibility
and necessary resources to mainstream statelessness, ensure that statelessness and the rightto nationality is duly considered in all programming and collaborate with external partners andstakeholders.
Engage with the Roadmap as a tool to inform, shape and guide institutional responses tostatelessness in the context of COVID-19 and the longer term, by promoting and supporting
dedicated, intersectional and joined-up action to protect the rights of all vulnerable groups,
including stateless people; take steps to centre stateless activists, communities and NGOs, draw
on their expertise and insights, involve them in finding solutions, support their independent workand remain accountable to them at all times.

Treat civil registration, refugee and statelessness determination, naturalisation, consular and otherservices as essential; ensure that such services operate during the pandemic and that any backlogs
are expeditiously dealt with; extend the validity of nationality and residency documentation,
protection status and interim measures to protect those impacted by the closure or slowing downof services; combat intergenerational statelessness; and when encountering undocumented
people, desist from penalising them, but instead, provide them with documentation and nationality.

Recognise that discrimination is the primary driver of statelessness and that stateless people
face additional discrimination; desist from unfairly targeting or scapegoating minorities, migrants,
stateless and other groups; prosecute and penalise instigators of hate speech; ensure that statelesspeople and those who lack documentation are not discriminated against in access to healthcare,relief and other COVID-19 measures; combat gender discrimination and sexual and gender-based
violence impacting stateless women and girls; and acknowledge and dismantle root causes ofstructural discrimination that undermine the right to nationality.

Ensure that access to healthcare is equal and universal, and not based on nationality, documentationor legal status; remove all fees and other barriers to healthcare; ensure that public health imperatives
take precedence over immigration enforcement and other motives; strengthen initiatives toaddress the mental health impacts of COVID-19 on stateless people; invest in measures to addressenvironmental determinants of health, including poor sanitation and inability to socially distance;and ensure that public health measures and advice are effectively communicated to statelesspeople, taking into account location, language and literacy.
Taking into consideration the moral and public health imperative to protect everyone fromCOVID-19, and given that the only sustainable way of doing so is through achieving universal
vaccination, while also considering the heightened vulnerability of many stateless people due
to structural challenges; ensure that all necessary positive steps – including mobile clinics,
awareness campaigns and incentives - are taken to ensure that stateless people have equal
vaccine access, and that all barriers such as lack of nationality, documentation or legal status,
as well as technological and financial barriers are anticipated and addressed in vaccine roll out.

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SOCIOECONOMICRIGHTS

7
8

CIVIL ANDPOLITICAL RIGHTS

9
10

1
2

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Protect the livelihoods of stateless people and ensure that undocumented people and thoseengaged in informal labour are equally covered by COVID-19 relief measures; ensure that statelesspeople and other vulnerable groups can work safely; ensure that stateless children have equal
access to education and are supported to attend online lessons through the provision of relevant
tools, internet access and language support; and provide a robust safety net for all stateless people
who face poverty, starvation and homelessness as a result of COVID-19 and its wider societal
impacts.
Strengthen institutional awareness of statelessness, to ensure that humanitarian relief also covers
stateless and undocumented people; extend emergency support packages to all, on the basis ofneed (and not other criteria); distribute relief regardless of legal status, prioritising the furthest left
behind; and take special measures to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19 in densely populatedareas, such as camps, collective shelters and informal settlements.

Ensure that border closures do not result in family separation, including by allowing non-citizen
spouses and children to re-enter countries; ensure that stateless people with residence status orstrong ties to a territory are allowed to return; provide legal status and protection to those deemed
to be irregularly on the territory; and ensure that where livelihoods are damaged by the impositionof movement restrictions, those affected are adequately compensated.

Ensure that increased policing powers are proportionate and do not result in stateless people being
arbitrarily targeted; that immigration detainees are released with adequate status and support, andare not subject to burdensome reporting requirements; that stateless people, migrants and others
are not detained as part of COVID-19 responses; that COVID-19 measures are not used to clamp
down on the freedom of expression and assembly of stateless people and their allies and thatstateless people have equal and effective access to justice to challenge rights deprivations in timesof COVID-19.

For more information about the CESF Consortium, see: https://files.institutesi.org/CESF_Brochure_2021.pdf.
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report,’ (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.

PART 1INTRODUCTION,
CESF CONSORTIUM &ROADMAP FOR CHANGE

11

INTRODUCTION“Far from being “great equalizers,” diseases reflect and reinforce preexisting hierarchies.
Structural inequalities in wealth, housing, health care, employment and social capital place
the poor and the socially vulnerable at a higher risk of infection and death. At the same time,
the fear and suspicion engendered by epidemics exacerbate the vulnerabilities of thoseperceived as “other” or “outsiders,” populations whose survival and dignity are already compromised by social exclusion mechanisms such as legal invisibility, geographic ghettoization,and social ostracism.”1

PART 1The COVID-19 pandemic and state responses to it have had a significant negative impact on the
lives, wellbeing and rights of stateless people around the world. This report documents this impact,
providing an evidence base for further action. It also proposes a practical 3-step Roadmap forchange, which provides a framework for resolving and addressing the structural discrimination andexclusion of stateless persons, during times of COVID-19 and beyond. The report is grounded in theexperiences and expertise of members of the COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund (CESF)
Consortium,2 a global consortium of NGOs and citizenship rights activists, established by the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ISI) in June 2020 to respond to the impact of COVID-19 on
stateless populations. It carries a simple message that Together We Can achieve the change thatis so desperately needed. However, the simplicity of this message is not meant to simplify the scaleof the task ahead.

PART 2As the report will show, many of the challenges identified, including lack of documentation, exclusion from relief, denial of healthcare and vaccinations, increased exposure to the pandemic, loss of
livelihoods, ratcheting up of racism and hatespeech and heightened risks of arbitrary arrests anddetention, relate to much deeper structural problems: the historic and systemic exclusion, deprivation and marginalisation of communities that have been made stateless as part of wider politicalacts, or pursuant to dominant, discriminatory ideologies. Many of these structural challenges: discriminatory and arbitrary laws, policies and practices; the racism, sexism and xenophobia which
underpin them; and their damaging consequences have been brought more to light as a result of
the pandemic. Therefore, a meaningful response must respond to emergency needs and also address the structural challenges. This will only be possible through significant shifts in attitudes andpriorities, and a willingness to engage in introspection and pursue change. Ultimately, the virulent
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic should teach us that no one is safe until everyone is safe. Thisis a learning that must be taken and applied at all times.
A stateless person is someone who has no nationality,3 even though every person has the right toa nationality under international law.4 Statelessness is therefore, perhaps the most acute violationof the right to nationality, impacting an estimated 15 million people worldwide.5 Further, the nationality of tens of millions remains at risk, with COVID-19 adding to existing precarities. Even thoughfrom an international law perspective, most other human rights are not contingent on nationality, inpractice, nationality has evolved into a gateway right, which often serves as a prerequisite to accessother basic rights and to challenge other rights deprivations. Those denied their right to nationality
face greater barriers and challenges related to their enjoyment of civil and political rights, suchas the right to vote and to political participation, freedom of movement, freedom from detention,
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, equality before the law and access to justice; as well
as socioeconomic rights, such as the right to healthcare, food and water, education, right to workand to social security. During a global pandemic, the consequences of deprivation of the right tonationality are particularly hard hitting, and for many, irreversible.
In June 2020, 12 months before the publication of this report, ISI announced the establishmentof the CESF, a dedicated, timebound initiative to support a Consortium of NGOs and citizenshiprights activists at the frontline of the COVID-19 crisis.6 The Fund was created to respond to the“life threatening marginalisation, with potentially disastrous consequences”, that stateless people faced in the context of COVID-19, as warned of in the joint civil society statement In Solidarity
with the Stateless, issued by 84 organisations in June 2020.7 Many of the concerns articulated in
the joint statement were in turn documented and evidenced in ISI’s 2020 Impact Report Statelessin a Global Pandemic, also published in June 2020. As set out in the report:
The ability of states and the international community to deal effectively with the global health threat
posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and its wider fall-out for the economy, peace and security is boundup in the ability to include everyone, just as a successful humanitarian response relies on reaching
everyone on the basis of need…By design and default, many stateless communities face devastatingconsequences in relation to health and wellbeing; survival and livelihoods; hate speech, racism andxenophobia; border closures and movement restrictions; insecurity and detention; and new risks ofstatelessness. There are also concerns about wider impacts on sustaining engagement on statelessness and the right to nationality, as the structural underpinnings of statelessness remain in place andin some instances have been further entrenched as COVID-19 continues to spread.8
This report serves as a follow up, sister publication to the 2020 Impact Report. It is grounded in theinformation and experiences documented by Consortium members, highlighting in particular, the12

THE REPORT COMPRISESTHREE PARTS AS FOLLOWS:COMPRISES THIS INTRODUCTION, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE CESF CONSORTIUM AND ITS WORK, THE ROADMAP TOADDRESS THE COVID-19 IMPACT ON
STATELESS PEOPLE AND A RELATED CALLTO ACTION.

IS MADE UP OF FIVE THEMATICALLYORGANISED CHAPTERS WHICH PROVIDE A DEEPER DIVE INTO SOME OF THE
MAIN GLOBAL CHALLENGES FACED BY
STATELESS PEOPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF
COVID-19: THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS;
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION;
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH; SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS AND CIVIL AND POLITICALRIGHTS. EACH CHAPTER INCLUDES SPECIFIC CALLS TO ACTION.

PART 3

COVERS THE CHALLENGES FACED IN THE
CONTEXT OF EACH CONSORTIUM PROJECT, THE IMPACTS OF SUCH PROJECTSAND RELATED CALLS TO ACTION. MOSTPROJECTS FOCUS ON SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES WITHIN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES,WHILE SOME HAVE A MULTI-COUNTRY APPROACH. AS SUCH, THESE CHAPTERS DO
NOT PRESENT COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEWS OF COUNTRY SITUATIONS, BUT
DEEPER DIVES INTO THE IMPACTS ANDOPPORTUNITIES IN RELATION TO PARTICULAR COMMUNITIES. THERE ARE TENCHAPTERS IN PART 3 ON BANGLADESH,
CENTRAL ASIA, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, INDIA, KENYA, MALAYSIA, MONTENEGRO, NEPAL, NORTH MACEDONIA AND ON
THE ROHINGYA.

THE REPORT HAS BEEN STRUCTUREDSO THAT EACH CHAPTER SPEAKS TO
EACH OTHER, BUT ALSO SERVES AS A
STANDALONE PIECE. THEREFORE, FOR
EXAMPLE, THOSE INTERESTED ONLY IN
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, OR ONLY IN THE
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,CAN READ THESE CHAPTERS ALONE.
HOWEVER, WE URGE READERS TO READAS MUCH OF THE REPORT AS POSSIBLE,
AS A MORE COLLABORATIVE RESPONSE
TO THIS CHALLENGE IS SO URGENTLY
NEEDED. WE PARTICULARLY URGE READERS TO ENGAGE WITH THE ROADMAP, IN
ADDITION TO THEMATIC OR COUNTRY
CHAPTERS OF INTEREST. ALL ACRONYMS
USED ARE LISTED AT THE END OF THE
REPORT.

FIVE THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUTSTATELESSNESS AND COVID-19
1. STATELESS PEOPLE ARE MORE
LIKELY TO BE EXCLUDED FROMCOVID-19 RESPONSES, RELIEF,
HEALTHCARE AND VACCINATIONS.
2. STATELESS PEOPLE ARE DENIEDRIGHTS, ARBITRARILY DETAINED AND
SUBJECT TO XENOPHOBIA AND HATESPEECH AT HIGHER RATES IN THE
COVID-19 CONTEXT.

countries in which they operate. In addition to documenting challenges, the report identifies emerging
positive practice and concrete examples from the CESF project countries, which can be learnt fromand which also inform the Roadmap. It also draws on information from other countries, solicitedthrough an open call for information which ISI shared with partners and publicised on its website, regular tracking of news and information on COVID-19 and statelessness by the ISI team, as published in
ISI Monthly Bulletins,9 interviews and conversations with relevant partners, and dedicated desk-based
research conducted for this report. All desk research reflects public information available at the timeof writing. While we have made efforts to verify the ongoing nature of practices identified, this was
not always possible, and we welcome any updates or corrections from relevant stakeholders. All
information in this report, is up-to-date as of 25 May 2021. The report also complements a Joint Civil
Society Statement issued in June 2021,10 which has been endorsed by all CESF Consortium members and articulates many of the concerns and calls to action also presented here.

3. COVID-19 BRINGS TO LIGHT(INVISIBLE) STRUCTURALDISCRIMINATION THAT STATELESSPEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS ENDURED.
4. STATE RESPONSES TO COVID-19
ARE CREATING NEW RISKS OF
STATELESSNESS AS REGISTRATIONAND OTHER KEY ACTIVITIES ARE
STALLED.
5. COVID-19 PRESENTS A UNIQUEOPPORTUNITY TO RAISE VISIBILITY,ADDRESS THE STRUCTURAL CAUSESOF STATELESSNESS, AND SECURELASTING CHANGE, THROUGH WORKINGDIRECTLY WITH STATELESS PEOPLE
AND BEING ACCOUNTABLE TO THEM.

R. Chakraborty and J. Bhabha, ‘Fault Lines of Refugee Exclusion: Statelessness, Gender, and COVID-19 in South Asia’ Health and Human Rights Journal (16 May 2021), available at: https://www.hhrjournal.org/2021/05/faultlines-of-refugee-exclusion-statelessness-gender-and-covid-in-south-asia/.
2
For more information about the Consortium see https://files.institutesi.org/CESF_Brochure_2021.pdf.
3
According to Article 1.1. of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, “a stateless person is a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.”4
See for example, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also, ICCPR Art 24(3), CERD Art. 5(d)(iii), CEDAW Art. 9, CRC Arts. 7 and 8, ACHR Art. 20, ECN Art. 4, Arab Charter on Human Rights Art. 24, Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam Art. 7, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration para. 18, and CIS Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Art. 24.
5
There are considerable gaps in available statistical information on statelessness. According to UNHCR’s most recent statistics, there are 4.2 million recorded stateless people in the 76 countries for which statistics are available. Many countries with known large stateless populations do not report statistics and UNHCR has previously conservatively estimated the world’s stateless population to be around 10 million. This estimate excluded stateless
Palestinians under the UNRWA mandate and stateless refugees (other than Rohingya refugees in certain countries). Thus, ISI has estimated the total stateless population to be at least 15 million (including stateless refugees
and stateless Palestinians). For more analysis, see: https://files.institutesi.org/ISI_statistics_analysis_2020.pdf.
6
We are grateful to the donors who supported the establishment of the Fund and who have contributed to it since. All donors are listed in the Acknowledgements of this report.
7
Joint Statement, ‘In solidarity with the stateless’ (2020), available at: https://www.institutesi.org/resources/joint-statement-in-solidarity-with-the-stateless.
8
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report,’ (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
9
ISI Monthly Bulletins and other key resources can be viewed here: https://www.institutesi.org/resources
10
Available at: www.institutesi.org
1

13

THE COVID-19 EMERGENCYSTATELESSNESS FUNDCONSORTIUM

UNDER THE CONSORTIUM, PROJECTS HAVEBEEN IMPLEMENTED IN 13 COUNTRIES,ADDRESSING THE COVID-19 IMPACT ON
STATELESS PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS, EQUALITYAND NON-DISCRIMINATION, RIGHT TO HEALTH,SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS, AND CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, THROUGH VARIOUS
STRATEGIES INCLUDING:Over the year that has passed since the publication of the 2020 Impact Report ‘Stateless in a Global
Pandemic’, the CESF has been drawn on to implement research-based action advocacy, towards
the realisation of structural solutions, to challenge the exclusion of stateless people from COVID-19
responses, and to recognise and break down the barriers they face. The CESF Consortium covers
all regions and has been the basis for innovative and life-saving work which can and must be built
upon.1 Further, it serves as a pivotal evidence base on the impact of COVID-19 on stateless populations and through its work, has helped identify key steps that can be taken to strengthen protection
and inclusion of stateless people. These experiences have all informed the roadmap for change.

COMMUNITY OUTREACH: AWARENESSRAISING THROUGH INTERVIEWS,
FOCUS GROUPS, PODCASTS, RADIO
PROGRAMMES, DOCUMENTARIES ETC.

PARALEGAL SUPPORT TO NAVIGATE ACCESSTO DOCUMENTATION AND COVID-19
RELIEF MEASURES.

RESEARCH AND MAPPING STATELESSCOMMUNITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSESAND THE IMPACT OF COVID-19.

Created by Vectors Point
from Createdthe NounbyProject
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ADVOCACY FOR INCLUSION OF STATELESSCreated by Vectors Point
from the Noun Project

Created by Vectors Point
from the Noun Project

Created by Vectors Point
from the Noun Project
Created by Vectors Point
from the Noun Project
Created by Vectors Point
from the Noun ProjectPERSONS IN COVID-19 RELIEF EFFORTS
AND OTHER SERVICES.

Created by Vectors Point
from the Noun Project

Created by Vectors Point
from the Noun Project
Created by Vectors Point
from the Noun Project

ADVOCACY FOR LAW AND POLICY CHANGE TOADDRESS STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATIONAND EXCLUSION.

EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AS AN
INTERIM RELIEF MEASURE.

BANGLADESH

MALAYSIA

Setting up a rights advocate system to addresscommunity exclusion.
Community outreach; Advocacy for law and policy

Advocating for evidence-based policy reform to end
discrimination against Malaysian transnational families.
Advocacy for law and policy change; Community outreachBANGLADESH/MYANMAR/INDIA/MALAYSIAMONTENEGRO

Raising awareness on COVID-19 amongst Rohingya refugees.
Community outreach
Publications: COVID-19 Protection monitoring andadvocacy Rohingya refugees in India

Storytelling and awareness raising for the Roma community
through a documentary.
Research & Mapping; Advocacy for inclusion of statelesspersons in COVID-19 relief efforts, and other services

INDIA

NORTH MACEDONIA

KENYACreating a civil society nationality rights network in the context ofmass nationality deprivation and disenfranchisement in Assam.
Paralegal support; Advocacy for law and policy change
Publications: Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam

A help desk for excluded Romaduring the pandemic.
Research and Mapping; Community outreach

Providing legal and psychosocial support to minority communities who risk further exclusion through a digital ID scheme.
Paralegal support; Community outreach

NEPAL
Raising awareness on citizenship rights and supporting mental
health of stateless communities through a dedicated podcast.
Community outreach; Research and Mapping

CENTRAL ASIA (KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, UZBEKISTAN)
Understanding the exclusion of stateless minorities
in order to provide evidence for reform.
Research and Mapping; Advocacy for inclusionof stateless persons in COVID-19 relief efforts,
and other services

Through the work of the CESF Consortium, we have gained invaluable comparative insights into
the way COVID-19 continues to disproportionately impact stateless communities and those whose
nationality is at risk. We have also seen how existing structural discrimination has increased andcome to light as a result of the pandemic, how state responses have either directly or indirectly
discriminated against the stateless and how the every-day deprivations that stateless people face,
now have life and death implications.
14

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Empowerment and demonstration of capacities of thestateless through supporting stateless entrepreneurs.
Advocacy for law and policy change; Paralegal support

The CESF Consortium also stands as a powerful testament to the change that can be achieved– both big and small – through community-based action, resilience and solidarity. The impacts
that various Consortium members have made through their work, have contributed to changes inlaw and policy, better documentation and services for their communities, better awareness andacknowledgment of the challenges faced by government authorities and UN agencies and stronger
community organisation. They have also given us insight into how the pandemic has unfolded overthe course of a year, how states and societies have responded, and how stateless communities andthose whose nationality is at risk, have been affected. As such, the work of Consortium members
collectively serves as a rich source of information and evidence, through which to document andbetter understand the impacts of the pandemic, as well as a testing ground of ideas and innovations, of what can and must be done in response.
The work of the Consortium over the course of the last year has been carried out in extremely challenging and at times dangerous contexts, with many Consortium members being exposed to realrisks as they operated at the frontline of the crisis. Despite taking available precautions, a numberof Consortium members themselves contracted COVID-19, as a result of exposure through theirwork, or had to adapt their plans due to serious community outbreaks and related lockdowns. Manyothers faced risks that were not directly related to COVID-19, but which further complicated theiroperations. The following are all examples of different challenges and risks faced:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Two Consortium members endured targeted hate speech campaigns, both online and offline,
as a direct result of their activism on women’s rights and against racism respectively.
Two Consortium members faced police intimidation in relation to their work to protect minorities and refugees, and in particular, for exposing arbitrary arrests, detentions and efforts todeport stateless persons.
One community supported by a Consortium member endured state-sponsored evictions andthe destruction of their property, while another was targeted in a similar manner, by thugs who
acted with impunity.
One Consortium member had its office vandalised and damaged, in response to its work topromote the equality and inclusion of a minority group at risk of statelessness.
One Consortium member was personally targeted by local gangs and had to go into hiding,for the role they played in assisting community members to report gang violence and intimidation.
A number of Consortium members had to find ways around increasingly repressive state legislation, aimed at cracking down on civil society space making it more difficult for NGOs andcommunity groups to operate independently.
One Consortium member went into hiding due to the breakout of war, and another had to
adapt plans due to a military coup.

Many of these experiences are illustrative of the types of risks that citizenship rights activists andstateless communities can be exposed to. The challenge presented by COVID-19 is layered on topof existing ones; there has been no respite or ‘amnesty’ to deal with COVID-19, before returning to
the everyday problems people face. This is also why for any response to be sustainable, it must
be cognisant of the bigger picture – the histories of injustice and exclusion, the everyday violence,
the intergenerational disadvantage and discrimination that contextualise the lived experience ofthe stateless and those whose nationality is at risk. Piecemeal ‘solutions’ which do not address
the real problems, or only address part of them, may make for good headlines, but will not have alasting impact.
There has been widespread recognition that the pandemic – through all its devastation – has given
humanity a moment to build back better. In the context of statelessness, this requires among otherthings, concerted efforts to address exclusive, discriminatory laws, policies and practices, dismantle unjust and unequal structures, centre stateless activists and communities in all discourse andaction related to the issues that impact them, ensure greater accountability and a stronger focus
on building truly inclusive societies.
15

The notion of building back better, is in part, based on the realisation that no one is safe until
everyone is safe, and it is therefore in everyone’s interest to include everyone. It is not just the
pandemic, but also other pressing global challenges like the climate crisis and the threat of risingauthoritarianism that must push us to do better for current and future generations. However, there
is deep scepticism by many, that those who hold power will not change their ways, and the criesof those far from sites of power will not be heard. The experience of the CESF Consortium leads
us to believe that together we can make the change that is needed, and indeed, together we must.
But this will not be easy and will require creative, committed and courageous action to overcome
likely resistance to any change that is viewed as counter to the interests of political power, profit
and institutional agendas.
A starting point towards such change is recognising and addressing institutional blindness towards statelessness. Statelessness has often been described as an ‘invisible’ issue. The perception of ‘invisibility’ derives from a position of institutional privilege. The prevalence or impacts ofstatelessness are certainly not invisible to those who have been subjected to statelessness throughthe denial and deprivation of their right to nationality. A more appropriate descriptor, which places
responsibility in the right place, would be of institutional blindness (at best) and erasure (in extreme
circumstances). Many institutions and individuals holding positions of power have historically been
blind to statelessness or have found it in their political interest to ignore statelessness.
This report, and the Roadmap set out next, are a contribution towards the discourse of buildingback better, drawing attention to the issue of statelessness, that continues to be a blind-spot for institutions, agencies and actors who wield responsibilities and obligations to respect, promote andfulfil rights, achieve sustainable development and provide protection and benefits to all.

FIVE COMMON CHALLENGES ACROSS CESF
FOCUS COUNTRIES
1. THE INSIDIOUS IMPACT OF ‘LACK OF DOCUMENTATION’
ON ALL AREAS OF LIFE – FROM ACCESS TO RELIEF,
HEALTHCARE AND VACCINATIONS, TO THE ABILITY TO
WORK IN SAFE AND NON-EXPLOITATIVE JOBS AND ACCESSJUSTICE WHEN DENIED RIGHTS.
2. THE REHASHING OF ‘LAZY AND CYNICAL NARRATIVES’ TO
SCAPEGOAT AND BLAME MINORITIES FOR THE SPREAD OF
THE VIRUS AND TO IMPOSE PUNITIVE AND DISCRIMINATORYLOCKDOWN MEASURES WHEN THE VIRUS MANIFESTS IN
SETTLEMENTS, SLUMS AND CAMPS INHABITED BY SUCHCOMMUNITIES.
3. THE COMBINED IMPACT THAT HIGH COSTS AND FEAR
OF AUTHORITIES HAVE ON STATELESS COMMUNITIESACCESSING LIFE-SAVING HEALTHCARE, AND THE KNOCKON DETRIMENT TO PUBLIC HEALTH.
4. THE GENERAL FAILURE BY GOVERNMENTS, UN
AND OTHER AGENCIES, TO RECOGNISE THE SPECIFIC
CHALLENGE OF STATELESSNESS AND TAILOR POLICIES TOADDRESS THIS CHALLENGE AND PRIORITISE STATELESSCOMMUNITIES.
5. LIFE GOES ON, DESPITE COVID-19, IN BOTH THE POSITIVE,
AND NEGATIVE SENSE. THE PANDEMIC HASN’T GIVENSTATELESS COMMUNITIES ANY RESPITE WITH REGARD TO
THE CHALLENGES, COMPLICATIONS AND INSECURITIESTHEY FACE REGULARLY. IT HAS ADDED A NEW SET OF
CHALLENGES ON TOP OF THE EXISTING ISSUES THEY DEAL
WITH ON A DAILY BASIS.

1

16

For a list of Consortium members, see the Acknowledgements at the end of this report.

FIVE EXAMPLES OF ACHIEVABLE CHANGE FROM CESFCONSORTIUM PROJECTS
1. BY SUPPORTING PARALEGAL WORK AND COMMUNITY
ORGANISERS, AFFECTED GROUPS CAN RECEIVE MUCH
NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION IN THEIR OWNLANGUAGE, TO ACCESS DOCUMENTATION, RIGHTSAND SERVICES AND HEALTHCARE, AND TO CHALLENGE
DEPRIVATIONS.
2. PRACTICAL REFORMS TO IMMIGRATION REGULATIONSAND IMPROVEMENTS TO CONSULAR SUPPORT CAN
FACILITATE FAMILY UNIFICATION, ENSURE LEGAL STATUS
AND PROTECT EQUAL RIGHTS.
3. PROVIDING MICRO-FINANCE LOANS AND OTHERFORMS OF ASSISTANCE TO MEMBERS OF STATELESSCOMMUNITIES DENIED GOVERNMENT RELIEF, CAN
STRENGTHEN RESILIENCE WHILE ALSO COUNTERINGNEGATIVE STEREOTYPES AND NARRATIVES ABOUT THESE
COMMUNITIES.
4. COVID-19 HAS SHOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKINGMENTAL HEALTH SERIOUSLY, BREAKING SILENCES AND
STIGMAS AND GIVING STATELESS COMMUNITY MEMBERSACCESS TO MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS. THE MENTALHEALTH IMPACT OF THEM WITH THE DOCUMENTS THEYSHOULD HAVE.
LOCKDOWNS ON WIDER SOCIETY ALSO CREATES ANOPPORTUNITY TO GENERATE EMPATHY BETWEEN NONSTATELESS AND STATELESS PERSONS, AS THE LATTEROFTEN ENDURE SUCH RESTRICTIONS EVEN IN ‘NORMAL’TIMES.
5. INSTEAD OF VIEWING THE LACK OF DOCUMENTATION AS
A BARRIER TO ACCESSING RIGHTS AND SERVICES, THOSE
WHO HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF DOCUMENTATION CAN BE
GRANTED ACCESS AT THE POINT OF CONTACT, WHILE ALSOUSING SUCH CONTACT WITH RELEVANT AUTHORITIES,AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE
DOCUMENTS THEY SHOULD HAVE.

TOGETHER WE CAN: A ROADMAP TOADDRESS THE COVID-19 IMPACT
ON STATELESS PEOPLE
The exclusion or marginalisation of the stateless in
COVID-19 responses is characteristic of how they
have always been treated. Historically, state-stateless relationships have ranged between enforced
invisibility and indifference, bureaucratic violenceand exclusion and targeted persecution or evengenocide. Unless the status quo is urgently challenged, the COVID-19 impacts on the statelesswill be immense, and for many, irreversible. The
challenge is ensuring continued engagement on
longer-term structural causes, while recognisingand addressing the COVID-19 crisis and its immediate (and lasting) impact on the stateless.
The pandemic also presents a unique opportunity
to raise visibility, address the causes of statelessness and secure lasting change, through working
directly with stateless people and being accountable to them. In many areas of life, we have seen innovations and improvements spurred by the crisis,
which have the potential to enhance equality andthe quality of life in the longer term.
The Roadmap has been drafted for this purposeand draws on the experiences and expertise of
CESF Consortium members in their COVID-19 workand longer-term research, advocacy, activism andengagement on the right to nationality and rightsof stateless people. It aims to inform and guide theresponses of multiple stakeholders who have responsibilities, obligations and mandates, which willremain unfulfilled as long as statelessness exists
and stateless people are marginalised and excluded. Ultimately, it is states that are obiligated to andhave the resources to address statelessness, protect the rights of all stateless people and protect
everyone’s right to a nationality. Other stakeholders include MPs and political parties, professional
bodies, NHRIs, regional organisations, UN agencies and experts, diplomats, donors, internationalorganisations, NGOs, grassroots groups, activists
and the media. The Roadmap challenges stakeholders to think beyond institutional priorities andpush beyond comfort zones.
The starting point is the belief that change is within
our grasp, and can be achieved through creative,
committed and courageous action. Together we
can and together we must address the structural
discrimination underlying statelessness, protect
the rights of stateless people and meet their needs
arising from the COVID-19 emergency. Importantly,
this requires a centring of communities and individual activists directly affected by statelessness inthe conversations, consultations and actions that
relate to their interests.

WHAT COVID-19 SHOWS US IS POSSIBLE
THE PANDEMIC HAS EXPOSED THE LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND THE
INJUSTICES OF THE STATUS QUO. WE HAVE SEEN WHAT CAN BE, IF ONLY THERE IS
POLITICAL WILL TO MATCH:•

THE UNPRECEDENTED SPEED AT WHICH MEDICAL RESEARCHERS DEVELOPED, TESTED
AND MADE AVAILABLE FOR MASS-PRODUCTION, A NUMBER OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE
COVID-19 VACCINES, WAS ONLY POSSIBLE DUE TO THE SHARING OF GENOME
SEQUENCES AND THE STREAMLINING AND EXPEDITING OF VARIOUS STAGES OF THE
PROCESS. IT APPEARED THAT THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPERATIVE TRUMPED THE PROFIT
MOTIVE, THOUGH SUBSEQUENT RESTRICTIVE MEASURES RELATED TO PATENTING
ETC., HAVE EXCLUDED MOST PEOPLE IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH FROM THE BENEFITS.

•

THE GENEROSITY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS TO PUT PROFITS ON HOLD AND PROVIDEFREE INTERNET AND MOBILE DATA FOR CHILDREN TO ACCESS ONLINE SCHOOLS,GAVE US A GLIMPSE OF A FUTURE IN WHICH EVERYONE HAS FREE ACCESS TO
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY.

•

EXTENSIVE STATE RELIEF PACKAGES TO UNDERWRITE INDUSTRIES AND PROTECTJOBS SHOWED THAT IT IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT ALSO ECONOMICALLY SOUND TO
ENSURE ROBUST SOCIAL WELFARE SAFETY NETS.

•

MORATORIUMS ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION UNDERSCORED THE VIABILITY OF
COMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION, AS BEING FAIRER, RIGHTSRESPECTING AND MORE ECONOMICAL THAN THE MASS-SCALE DETENTION INDUSTRY
THAT IS TAKING ROOT AROUND THE WORLD.

•THE NEGOTIATION OF NUMEROUS CEASEFIRES IN LIGHT OF THE PANDEMIC SHOWED
THAT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO PUT THE COMMON GOOD ABOVE ENTRENCHEDDIFFERENCES AND POLITICAL INTERESTS.

•

THE ENFORCED CHANGES TO WORK AND TRAVEL PRACTICES SHOWED THAT WE CANREDUCE OUR COLLECTIVE CARBON FOOTPRINT AND EFFICIENTLY WORK ACROSSGEOGRAPHIES AND TIME ZONES, IN WAYS THAT ARE MORE INCLUSIVE AND COSTEFFICIENT.

•WE LEARNT – OFTEN THROUGH RESISTANCE AND ROBUST EXCHANGES – THAT WE
MUST CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO REACH A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES AND THE COMMON GOOD, THAT THESE TWO CONCEPTS ARE BOTH
MUTUALLY REINFORCING AND IN TENSION WITH EACH OTHER, AND THAT MOSTPEOPLE ARE WILLING TO MAKE COMPROMISES IF THEY RECEIVE INFORMATION AND
EVIDENCE BEHIND WHY CERTAIN PUBLIC POLICY MEASURES ARE TAKEN.

•

AUTHORITARIAN LEADERS WHO CAME TO POWER THROUGH POLITICS OF HATE WEREEXPOSED FOR NOT HAVING THE ANSWERS OR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH COMPLEX
CHALLENGES, WHILE POLITICAL LEADERS WHO PUT PEOPLE FIRST, HAVE PERFORMEDSIGNIFICANTLY BETTER.

WHILE WE CAN DRAW INSPIRATION FROM THE ABOVE, AS THIS REPORT EVIDENCES, THE
OVERWHELMING PICTURE HAS BEEN MUCH DARKER. FURTHER, THERE ARE SIGNS THATTHESE IMPROVEMENTS WILL NOT BE PERMANENTLY IMPLEMENTED OR INSPIRE LONG-TERM
CHANGES, AS SHORT-TERM POLITICAL GAIN AND MARKET DYNAMICS RECALIBRATE AND
PUSH FOR A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO.
FOR MANY – INCLUDING THE WORLD’S STATELESS – THE IDEA OF ‘RETURNING TONORMALCY’ IS NOT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THE ‘NORMAL’ HAS ALWAYS BEEN RIDDLED
WITH INJUSTICE, INDIGNITY, INEQUALITY, DEPRIVATION AND EXCLUSION. WE MUST BUILDBACK BETTER, BUT WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE WORLD’S STATELESS, AND WHATNEEDS TO HAPPEN, IN ORDER TO MAKE THIS A MORE REALISTIC AND ACHIEVABLEPROSPECT?

In line with the logic and purpose behind the CESF
Consortium, this Roadmap is not restricted to the
COVID-19 response, but rather, is about addressing structural discrimination and achieving change
for stateless persons and those whose nationality
is at risk, in the context of COVID-19. The change
we seek must be meaningful and sustainable,
strengthening the right to nationality and rights ofstateless persons, but also improving the ways we17work with each other and are accountable to each other. This is a call to action for governments,
UN agencies, NGOs, donors, affected communities and others to find new ways of working together, because the old ways are not adequate and we have so far failed to rise to meet the immense
challenges before us. CESF members remain available and willing to directly engage and support
any stakeholders interested in responding to the crisis of statelessness, through sharing our technical expertise, perspectives, information and networks. We hope this roadmap, will help catalyse
action to address the structural discrimination and exclusion of stateless persons, during times of
COVID-19 and beyond:

THE ROADMAP
There are three components to the Roadmap. However, it does not require a sequential or linear approach. Simultaneous action across all areas is needed. Depending on the specific context, some
aspects may be more important than others, or require greater attention.

1

CHECK FORINSTITUTIONAL BLIND-SPOTS

THE ROLE OF UN AGENCIESAND MANDATE-HOLDERS

We invite states, UN agencies and experts, humanitarian groups and all other stakeholders withobligations and responsibilities to monitor and respond to the impact of COVID-19, protect the rightto nationality and uphold the rights of stateless people, to engage in careful introspection, checkfor institutional blind-spots, and review and reform policies and practices to ensure that statelesspeople and those whose nationality is at risk are prioritised, their particular contexts and needs areunderstood and addressed and they are not excluded or left behind.
This report documents how statelessness continues to be a blind-spot for institutions, agencies andactors who wield responsibilities and obligations to respect, promote and fulfil rights, achieve sustainable development and ensure protection to all. This was the case before COVID-19 and it is areality that permeates the response to the pandemic. The starting point for change in this context,
must be:••••strengthening institutional awareness of statelessness, its impacts and manifestations;acknowledging historical failures to prioritise and address the issue, or contributions to creating and perpetuating statelessness and associated disadvantages;
collecting and sharing information on the histories and socio-political contexts behind statelessness and nationality rights deprivations, the scale of the problem, causalities and statistics;
resourcing a cohesive response by enhancing capacities, strengthening collaborations and increasing funding.

THE POWER OFCOMMUNITY ACTION
IN KENYA, CESF CONSORTIUM MEMBER NRF
HAS BEEN USING A WEEKLY RADIO SHOW TODISSEMINATE INFORMATION ABOUT COVID-19
AMONG THE NUBIAN POPULATION. THROUGH
SOCIAL MEDIA, NRF ALSO REACHES THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ON PLATFORMS INCLUDINGFACEBOOK AND TWITTER.
IN BANGLADESH, CESF CONSORTIUM MEMBER,
COM, HAS DIRECTLY HELPED REGISTER PEOPLE
ONLINE FOR VACCINATIONS AND ACCOMPANIED THEM TO THEIR APPOINTMENTS. SUCHCOMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES HOLD THE
POWER TO REACH GROUPS THAT RISK BEING
LEFT BEHIND IN THE PANDEMIC RESPONSE
BECAUSE OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP STATUS. THEY
ARE ALSO A DIRECT SOURCE OF CRITICALINFORMATION AND EVIDENCE ABOUT GAPS IN
COVERAGE OR BARRIERS TO INCLUSION FOR
STATELESS PEOPLE AND OF GOOD PRACTICESAND CREATIVE SOLUTIONS.

18

2

SINCE THE OUTSET OF THE PANDEMIC, THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS IN EVERYONE’S INTEREST TO INCLUDE EVERYONE HAS PERVADEDTHE UN RESPONSE. REACHING VULNERABLEGROUPS HAS BEEN A CONSIDERATION OF UN
EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE SPREAD OF THE VIRUS, MITIGATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF LOCKDOWNS, ADDRESS FOOD INSECURITY
AND SUPPORT THE ROLL-OUT OF VACCINES.
UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS WHO HAVE MONITORED AND ISSUED GUIDANCE IN RELATIONTO STATE RESPONSES HAVE ALSO PAID CLOSE
ATTENTION TO WHO IS BEING LEFT BEHIND.
YET STATELESSNESS REMAINS A BLIND SPOT.
WHILE UNHCR HAS BEEN ENTRUSTED WITH A
MANDATE IN RELATION TO STATELESSNESS,
THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HAS AFFIRMED
THAT “ALL UN ENTITIES SYSTEM-WIDE HAVE AN
IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN TACKLING THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF STATELESSNESS.” ENSURING THAT STATELESS PEOPLE
ARE PRIORITISED IN THE COVID-19 RESPONSE
IS THEREFORE A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY OF
MAY UN AGENCIES AND MANDATE HOLDERS,
WHO SHOULD ALSO SCRUTINISE WHETHERTHEIR WORK PAYS SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO
THE SPECIFIC CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH
STATELESSNESS.

INCLUDE,
CONSULT & ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE

We invite activists and NGOs to make their expertise available and those in positions of power,
including states, UN agencies, donors and IGOs to have open consultation and meaningful andconstructive dialogue with affected communities, and commit to including stateless people onequal terms in shaping and directing their response.
This report shows the powerful impact of initiatives developed by CESF Consortium members, who
belong to stateless communities or have direct access to them and enjoy their trust. Their deep, localised insight is a critical source of knowledge. History teaches us that sustainable change almost
always comes with meaningful input and buy-in from the communities at the forefront. Relevant
stakeholders have obligations towards:••••

consulting with activists and affected communities, to better understand their experiences, perspectives, priorities and recommendations for change;building trust and strengthening solidarity with stateless communities, through honest engagement;
meeting the needs and priorities of affected communities as articulated by them, and ensuring
their meaningful participation;
facilitating wider discourse within society and relevant institutions on the moral, legal, politicaland socio-economic imperative of equality, inclusion and the right to nationality for all, and thebenefits of these for all.

3

PLACING STATELESS PEOPLE
AT THE CENTRE

BUILD
BACK BETTER

We invite all actors to learn the hard lessons that the pandemic has taught us and invest in future-proofing, to ensure that as ‘normalcy’ returns, there is a lasting commitment to breaking down
the pervasive injustice, indignity, inequality, deprivation and exclusion that stateless people face.
In many ways, this report shows us nothing new. Stateless people have long faced injustice and exclusion, but as the report documents, the impact that this has on people’s lives has been magnified
by COVID-19 and related measures. Any stopgap measures to protect and include stateless people
in the context of the pandemic, will be rendered meaningless if not followed by long-term structuralreforms and changes. This requires:
•

•
•
•
•
•

implementing reforms to address the discriminatory impacts of laws, policies and practices: inparticular, those which create and perpetuate statelessness through discrimination on the basisof race, religion, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, disability, national origin and other characteristics protected by law;redressing the historical and intergenerational disadvantage and legacy of statelessness
through positive action and other targeted measures;
being accountable to stateless communities and activists, by ensuring regular direct communications with communities, opportunities for dialogue and information sharing, and forums
through which actions can be scrutinised;monitoring the performance and progress of states through international human rights anddevelopment oversight mechanisms;
ensuring access to justice and reparations, to compensate stateless people for past injustices
and denials of the right to nationality and other rights; andsustainable investment in a vibrant civil society community, dedicated to promoting the right tonationality and the rights of stateless people.

WHEN EVIDENCE FIRST STARTED TO EMERGE
THAT, IN THIS TIME OF CRISIS, THE RIGHT TO
A NATIONALITY CAN MEAN THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH, A NUMBER OF PHILANTHROPIC ORGANISATIONS CAME TOGETHERIN SOLIDARITY WITH STATELESS PEOPLE BY
SUPPORTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
CESF.
OVER THE PAST YEAR, THE WORK OF THE
CESF CONSORTIUM HAS PROVEN CRITICAL
TO THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL
SOCIETY ACTION ON STATELESSNESS IN LIGHT
OF EVOLVING NEEDS. THE CESF HAS ALSOHELPED SUSTAIN WORK ON THE RIGHT TO A
NATIONALITY IN CONTEXTS WHERE THIS WASTHREATENED BY RECEDING DONOR SUPPORTOR SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE. IN A SHORT TIMESPAN AND AN EXCEEDINGLY CHALLENGINGENVIRONMENT, THE CESF CONSORTIUM HAS
DELIVERED IMPORTANT LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE. STEPPING UP SUPPORT FOR LOCALLYDESIGNED AND DRIVEN, BUT INTERNATIONALLYCONNECTED INITIATIVES THAT PLACE THE REALNEEDS AND PRIORITIES OF STATELESS PEOPLE
AT THE CENTRE, WILL BE KEY TO BUILDINGBACK BETTER.

CALL TO ACTION
The CESF Consortium stands available to engage and support stakeholders as they take on board
and respond to this Road Map and makes the following Call to Action towards its implementation:

1
2

REFLECT ON, ENGAGE AND ACT TO INTERNALISE AND IMPLEMENT THE TOGETHER WE CAN: ROADMAP TO ADDRESS THE COVID-19 IMPACT ON STATELESS PEOPLE; APPOINT FOCAL POINTS WITH THE
RESPONSIBILITY AND NECESSARY RESOURCES TO MAINSTREAM STATELESSNESS, ENSURE THATSTATELESSNESS AND THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY IS DULY CONSIDERED IN ALL PROGRAMMING AND
COLLABORATE WITH EXTERNAL PARTNERS AND STAKEHOLDERS.

ENGAGE WITH THE ROADMAP AS A TOOL TO INFORM, SHAPE AND GUIDE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO STATELESSNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF COVID-19 AND THE LONGER TERM, BY PROMOTING ANDSUPPORTING DEDICATED, INTERSECTIONAL AND JOINED-UP ACTION TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF
ALL VULNERABLE GROUPS, INCLUDING STATELESS PEOPLE; TAKE STEPS TO CENTRE STATELESSACTIVISTS, COMMUNITIES AND NGOS, DRAW ON THEIR EXPERTISE AND INSIGHTS, INVOLVE THEM IN
FINDING SOLUTIONS, SUPPORT THEIR INDEPENDENT WORK AND REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO THEM AT
ALL TIMES.

A. de Chickera, ‘As the world washes its hands of the stateless, they risk facing COVID-19 alone’, Open Democracy (27 April 2020), available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/world-washes-its-hands-stateless-they-riskfacing-covid-19-alone/?mc_cid=1e3463bb60&mc_eid=28e52effdb.
1

19

PART 2
THEMATIC OVERVIEW

20RIGHT TO
NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION& LEGAL STATUS“The right to nationality is a fundamental human right, and in thistime of crisis it can mean the difference between life and death.”1
UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, Filippo Grandi
In 2020, we reported on
the numerous ways inwhich the pandemic was“EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO
affecting access to naNATIONALITY. NO ONE SHALL BE
tionality and legal identity.
ARBITRARILY DEPRIVED OF HIS
Civil registration and other
NATIONALITY NOR DENIED
identification and protecTHE RIGHT TO
tion procedures were put
CHANGE HIS NATIONALITY.”
on hold; as were civil society efforts to promote the
UDHR, ARTICLE 15
right to nationality, withmany organisations suffering from funding cuts,
staff shortages and lockdown related challenges.2 As such, we called
for a renewed commitment to realising the right to a nationality for all,and recommended that relevant stakeholders:Treat registration services as essential, and ensure that birth registrationand documentation services continue to operate during the pandemic; extend the validity of nationality and residency documentation even if people cannot apply at this time; combat intergenerational statelessness; andwhen encountering persons without documentation, desist from penalising them for this (through detention, denial of relief and access to healthcare etc.), but instead, provide them with documentation and nationality.
A year later, we are seeing the ramifications of disruptions to crucial
civil registration procedures. Delays and backlogs have had a knock-on
effect on families and have left stateless people in limbo, completely
vulnerable to the multiple effects of COVID-19. Of the CESF Consortium
Project focus countries, disruptions to civil registries have disproportionately impacted stateless populations and those whose nationality
is at risk, in Central Asia, the Dominican Republic, Kenya, Montenegro,
Nepal and North Macedonia. Curfews and lockdowns have also impacted access to documentation and registrations in the Dominican Republic, Kenya, Montenegro and Nepal. Such documentation and registration challenges not only exacerbate immediate problems in relation to
the pandemic, but also
subject people to longerterm risks of statelessness. When births go
unregistered and ID
CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTS
cards are not issued, this
HAVE HAD POSITIVE IMPACTS ON
can heighten the risk of
CIVIL REGISTRATION AND OTHER
statelessness, particuBUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES. IN
larly among minority and
MALAYSIA,3 NON-CITIZEN SPOUSES
border communities and
AND THEIR CHILDREN – WHO
those with migrant herPREVIOUSLY WERE DENIED ENTRY
itage, who already face
OR RISKED DETENTION AFTER THE
barriers to establishing
EXPIRATION OF THEIR VISAS, ARE
their nationality. Groups,
NOW ABLE TO RENEW OR APPLYsuch as Dominicans offOR VISAS AND PERMITS WITHOUT
Haitian Origin, Nubian
HAVING TO LEAVE THE COUNTY, WITH
Kenyans or Nepalis fromONLINE APPLICATION PROCESSES
the Terai Belt region
BEING SET UP TO FACILITATE THEIR
are disproportionately
APPLICATIONS.

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT THE
IMPACT ON BIRTH REGISTRATION AND OTHERPROCEDURES, AND MAKES THE FOLLOWINGCALL TO ACTION:

TREAT CIVIL REGISTRATION, REFUGEE AND STATELESSNESSDETERMINATION, NATURALISATION, CONSULAR AND OTHERSERVICES AS ESSENTIAL; ENSURE THAT SUCH SERVICESOPERATE DURING THE PANDEMIC AND THAT ANY BACKLOGSARE EXPEDITIOUSLY DEALT WITH; EXTEND THE VALIDITY
OF NATIONALITY AND RESIDENCY DOCUMENTATION,PROTECTION STATUS AND INTERIM MEASURES TO PROTECTTHOSE IMPACTED BY THE CLOSURE OR SLOWING DOWN OFSERVICES; COMBAT INTERGENERATIONAL STATELESSNESS;
AND WHEN ENCOUNTERING UNDOCUMENTED PEOPLE, DESISTFROM PENALISING THEM, BUT INSTEAD, PROVIDE THEM WITH
DOCUMENTATION AND NATIONALITY.

impacted. In the Dominican Republic, the outgoing and incoming Presidents have authorised the naturalisation of a total of 799 Dominicansof Haitian ancestry but there is no clear administrative path for this to
be materialised.4
Asylum procedures, statelessness determination procedures and visa
renewals have also been impacted, along with access to other formsof documentation, due to the closure of consulates and embassies,
and delays in naturalisation ceremonies. Further Rohingya refugees,
have faced greater restrictions in access to UNHCR registration procedures.5
Even as the pandemic draws attention to the challenges that flow fromthese disruptions, there is also an opportunity to step-up engagement
to promote the right to nationality and the rights of stateless people.

“The pandemic has shown more than ever the need for inclusion
and the urgency to resolve statelessness. A pandemic doesn’t discriminate between citizens and non-citizens. It is not in any state’s,society’s or community’s interest for people to be left stateless andliving on the margins of society.”6
UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, Filippo Grandi

BIRTH REGISTRATION“New risks of statelessness have emerged [as a result of thepandemic] such as lack of access to services, border closure, ashrinking protection space, the disruption of civil registration
services, and rising xenophobia.”7
Associate Director and Global Chiefof Child Protection for UNICEF, Cornelius Williams

21

Birth registration legally establishes the place of birth, proof of age andparental affiliation, thereby serving as important documentary proof toacquire the parents' nationality or the nationality of the state in which
the child is born. Providing birth registration for all children – regardless of the legal status of their parents – is an essential step towards
preventing
statelessness,8 and protecting
child rights.
AFRICAN UNION & UNICEF:“NO NAME CAMPAIGN”
Suspension of birth registration during the panTHIS CAMPAIGN AIMS TO ENCOURAGE
demic has undermined
RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF
the right to nationality of
COMMITMENTS BY THE AFRICAN UNION
many children and has
MEMBER STATES, TOWARDS UNIVERSAL
resulted in a backlog
REGISTRATION OF CHILDREN AT BIRTH.
of applications in many
THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSIONER
countries. In Zimbabwe,
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS HAS STATED
the pandemic created
THAT: “THERE ARE CHALLENGES OF
a backlog of around
BIRTH REGISTRATION ON THE CONTINENT
200,000 births as of AuTHAT HAVE BEEN WORSENED BY THE
gust 2020, as birth regCURRENT PANDEMIC. HOWEVER,
istration services were
THERE ARE IMMEDIATE AND LONGTERM OPPORTUNITIES THAT WE COULD
not deemed ‘essential’
EXPLOIT IN THE MIDST OF THIS CRISIS.
and therefore suspendONE SUCH OPPORTUNITY IS TO HAVE
ed. There are reportedly
CIVIL REGISTRATION OFFICES PREPARE
hundreds of thousands
CONTINGENCY PLANS TO MEET POSTof stateless persons in
PANDEMIC DEMAND AND BACKLOG FOR
the country – mainly
9
BIRTH REGISTRATION.”
descendants of migrant
workers who settled
in Zimbabwe pre-independence, as well as survivors of the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres.10 Although the Birth andDeath Registration Act requires registration within 42 days of the birth,
it was stated that no penalties would be applied for late registrations.11
Following the relaxation of lockdown measures, the government announced the recommencement of the issuance of birth certificates,
beginning with children born in March 2020.12
In South Africa, birth registration must be completed within 30 days, orrisk incurring late registration penalties. COVID-19 has resulted in disruptions to birth registration for babies born just before, or during, thepandemic; but has also resulted in difficulties for the government to resolve cases of missed birth registration pre-COVID-19.13 LHR have expressed their concerns in relation to a large numbers of clients whosebirths were not registered. Over the past five years, LHR’s Statelessness Unit has received over 2,000 birth registration queries.14 This has
been significantly exacerbated by COVID-19. The lockdowns in South
Africa led to the slowingof an already massive
backlog. From 26 MarchHAMOKED, AN ORGANISATION
2020, only essential serFIGHTING FOR THE RIGHTS OF
vices were allowed to
PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED
operate. It was during
TERRITORIES, TELLS THE STORY OF A
this time that the DHA
WOMAN NAMED RANIA, WHO ARRIVED
halted the birth registraIN THE WEST BANK IN JANUARY, ANDtion process for three
GAVE BIRTH TO A SON IN MARCH
months.15 On 1 June
2020. DUE TO THE PANDEMIC, SHE
2020, DHA re-opened
WAS UNABLE TO REGISTER THE BIRTH
services provided includUNTIL AFTER THE PA HALTED ITS
ing birth registration,16
COORDINATION WITH ISRAEL. WHEN
but it was not a smooth
SHE TRIED TO LEAVE THE WEST BANKtransition. According to
IN LATE JULY TO RETURN TO HER
LHR, “a large number of
HUSBAND AND OTHER SON IN JORDAN,
clients have been pushed
SHE WAS TURNED AWAY BY THE
from pillar to post withISRAELI BORDER AUTHORITIES, AS HER
out assistance.” ThereBABY WAS NOT REGISTERED. SHE WAS
are reports of people
NOT OFFERED ANY ASSISTANCE
being turned away due
BY EITHER THE PA OR
to services operating at
THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES.
a slower pace with the
DHA operating on a rotational basis.17
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, a communication breakdown
between the PA and Israel caused a disruption of services. The PA,
which is normally responsible for coordination with Israel on civil matters, stopped all updates to Israel regarding the registration of births,
marriages, and deaths in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.18 Thiswas further exacerbated by COVID-19, which had already resulted ina disruption of civil registries. As of September 2020, around 33,000
22babies had been born in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the halt incoordination in May 2020. This figure excludes those born before May,
whose birth registration was delayed due to COVID-19.19 This dispute
resulted in many Palestinian families being stranded abroad. For example, Ahmed al-Kurdi, his wife and three children left the Gaza strip in2020 to seek medical attention for one of the children. They were subsequently stranded in Jordan due to the dispute. “It’s very hard, not justfor us but for the other Gazans in Jordan who want to go back and can’t,”said Ahmed. “This is a humanitarian situation. The political situation
shouldn’t enter into it.”20 At the time of writing this report, indiscriminate
violence in Gaza and Israel have caused the deaths of over 200 Palestinians, including many children, and created a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. UN Human Rights experts have raised concern about Israel’s “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians andcivilian property” that “likely violate the laws of war and constitute a war
crime”. They have highlighted that “in particular, Israel's duties as theoccupying power require it to allow humanitarian aid – including food,
fuel and medical supplies – to enter unhindered into Gaza”. UN experts
said that Palestinian armed groups firing rockets into Israel, also violate international law. 21
In the Dominican Republic,22 where those of Haitian ancestry suffer
multiple forms of discrimination and denial of nationality, disruptions
to civil registration further complicates access to nationality and canentrench statelessness.23
Documentation
renewal for migrant parents ofstateless children and nat“STATELESS PEOPLE OFTEN FACE
uralisation procedures for
MORE OBSTACLES TO FORMALLY
stateless people were also
ESTABLISH THEIR IDENTITY. THE
affected. The economic
COVD-19 CRISIS HAS HIGHLIGHTED
impact of the pandemic
HOW HARD-TO-REACH AND MARGINexacerbated the poverALIZED POPULATIONS NEED TO BE
ty that Haitian migrants
INCLUDED IN CIVIL REGISTRATION
and stateless people are
AND VITAL STATISTICS SYSTEMS
already living in, pushing
IN ORDER TO BUILD RESILIENCE TO
civil registries further out
CRISES. UNIVERSAL CIVIL REGISTRAof reach.24
TION IS A KEY BUILDING BLOCK FOR
ENSURING NO ONE IS LEFT BEHIND."
COVID-19 has also createdunexpected new barriers
to birth registration. In MaTANJA SEJERSEN
laysia,25 due of COVID-19,
STATISTICIAN,
e-payment (debit or credit
LEAD OF THE INITIATIVE
card) for registration be"GET EVERYONE IN THE PICTURE,
came a requirement, withUN ESCAP
cash payments no longer
26
accepted.
Many stateless people do not haveinternet access or bank accounts. Lack of access to technology resulting in difficulty navigating online registration systems has previously
also been reported in both the UK and France.27 Backlogs and severe
delays to birth registration have also been reported in the UK, which
has had a knock-on effect on families.28
DISRUPTION TO OTHER PROCEDURES
In some countries, the issuance of identity documentation has beensuspended, affecting the confirmation of nationality, and extension orvalidity of documents.29 In 2020, Colombia temporarily suspended services and procedures by national authorities affecting access to documentation and, consequently, access to rights, particularly for Venezuelan refugees and migrants. The Legal Clinic for Migrants reported thatfor Venezuelans, “their migratory status and the impossibility to accessa regular status in Colombia are the first obstacles that we encounter inassisting them and responding to their legal and humanitarian needs”,30
which has been become more difficult during COVID-19. In early 2021,
Colombia offered TPS for ten years to approximately 1.7 million Venezuelans, including residence, which also paves the way for access tovaccines, and, as a statelessness prevention measure, facilitates theaccess of children born to Venezuelans to Colombian nationality.31
Deadlines for examining claims have also been extended, causing
further delays in decision-making. In several European countries, including Ukraine, Germany and Bulgaria, disruptions to asylum andstatelessness determination procedures, the closure of courts or rescheduling of court hearings, and limited operations of competentauthorities has been reported during the pandemic.32 In Austria, thepandemic has resulted in an increase in discrimination, and impacted the ability of stateless persons to access legal aid and or continue
with legal proceedings.33 In India,34 the NRC process was suspended,
FTs were temporarily halted, disrupting access to legal aid and leaving

those declared foreigners in a state of limbo, with no forum for appeal.35

of slavery including those who are stateless or at risk of statelessness
increases barriers in access to legal status and hinders the ability tointegrate into society. COVID-19 has exacerbated these difficulties dueto the slowing of legal proceedings coupled with no set plan to help the
judicial process recover from the effects of the pandemic.39

In South Africa, since March 2020, applications for citizenship by naturalisation and applications for permanent residence by exemption– a process through which those at risk of statelessness can receive
documentation – have been halted, as have refugee determination
Court hearings regarding acquisition or confirmation of nationality
procedures. As a result, many permits are expiring, and despite a blanhave been suspended, or rescheduled, in some cases.40 In the US, there
ket government extension, refugees and stateless people continue toare severe delays to naturalisation ceremonies. Non-citizens have been
be arrested and detained.36 Further, those whose ID cards have been
prevented from obtaining permanent status or US citizenship due toblocked cannot approach the Home Affairs office without the assisthe refusal to enable them to complete certain requirements remotetance of civil society groups.37 Citizenship by naturalisation applicaly.41 In January 2020, the ‘public charge’ rule was implemented, allowtions have not been processed during lockdown, severely impacting
ing the Department of Homeland Security to refuse citizenship to immichildren born in South Africa to parents who are neither permanent
grants who rely on monetary or nonmonetary government assistance.42
residents or citizens, who have lived in South Africa their whole lives
This has prevented immigrants from accessing medical care for fear ofand have reached the age of majority. A large number of children borndeportation. The issuance of green cards was also temporarily halted43
in South Africa of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers asfrom June 2020, until the Biden administration reinitiated it in February
well as those at risk of statelessness rely on this provision in the law to2021.44 Many consulates and embassies have suspended registration
obtain documentation.38 This is further compounded by the halting ofservices. At the beginning of the pandemic, all ‘routine visa services’permanent residence by exemption applicaat US embassies and consulates worldwide
tions, which allow for foreign children born
were suspended, including cancelling alloutside South Africa to be granted permavisa appointments.45 As of June 2020, there
nent residence by exemption based on spewas a backlog of around 1.7 million people
GOOD PRACTICE
cial circumstances, for example, children
waiting for passports due to the closure of
who have been abandoned by their parents,
consular services.46 As of April 2021, the US
IN ITALY, STATELESSNESS APPLICATIONS
children of parents who have passed away
Embassy in Israel had a backlog of 15,000
CAN STILL BE SUBMITTED BY MAIL.48
and those who have no other ties with their
passports and birth registration processes
parents’ country of origin. In Mauritania, thefor around 1,000 babies born in Israel to US
lack of formal protection afforded to victims
citizens during the pandemic.47

UNHCR, ‘UNHCR warns stateless people risk being left behind in coronavirus response’, UNHCR, (11 May 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2020/5/5eb952222ec/unhcr-warns-stateless-people-risk-behind-coronavirus-response.html.
2
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
3
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
4
Dominican@s por Derecho letter to President Abinader, (23 May 2021).
5
See further Chapter on Rohingya in Refugee Situations in Part 3 of this report.
6
UNHCR, ‘UNHCR urges states to end limbo for stateless people by 2024’, (11 November 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2020/11/5faa51004/unhcr-urges-states-end-limbo-stateless-people-2024.html.
7
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Webinar: Covid-19 and Childhood Statelessness. Promoting every child’s right to nationality’, YouTube, (28 August 2020), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AIqOxsKrpUE.
8
UNHCR, ‘Good Practices Paper on Ensuring Birth Registration for the Prevention of Statelessness’, (2017), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/11/Good-Practices-Paper-on-Ensuring-Birth-Registration-for-the-Prevention-of-Statelessness.pdf.
9African Union, ‘COVID-19 threatens to reverse progress in birth registrations: strategies for counter-actions’, (17 August 2020), available at: https://au.int/ar/node/39108.
10
Amnesty International, ‘Zimbabwe: Statelessness crisis traps hundreds of thousands in limbo’, Amnesty International News, (16 April 2021), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/04/zimbabwe-statelessness-crisis-traps-hundreds-of-thousands-in-limbo/.
11
L. Dzenga, ‘Zimbabwe: COVID-19 creates birth certificate backlog’, AllAfrica, (31 August 2020), available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202008310870.html.
12Centre for Innovation and Technology, ‘Covid-19: Birth Certificate Seekers to be Vetted Online’, Kubatana.net, (29 September 2020), available at: https://kubatana.net/2020/09/29/covid-19-birth-certificate-seekers-to-be-vetted-online/.
13
wwP. Rulashe, ‘Birth registration gaps leave South Africans in limbo,’ UNHCR, (10 December 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2020/12/5fcf43df4/birth-registration-gaps-leave-south-africans-limbo.html.
14
T. Mothapo, T. Fish-Hodgson, ‘Human rights in jeopardy: Some SA born-frees are still denied their right to birth registration’, (22 March 2021), available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-03-22-human-rights-in-jeopardysome-sa-born-frees-are-still-denied-their-right-to-birth-registration/.
15
M. Zuzile, ‘Lockdown leaves thousands of newborns without birth certificates’, TimesLive, (15 May 2020), available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-05-15-lockdown-leaves-thousands-of-newborns-without-birthcertificates/.
16
South African Government, ‘Home Affairs on additional services during the COVID-19 Coronavirus Level 3 lockdown’, (1 June 2020), available at: https://www.gov.za/speeches/home-affairs-additional-services-during-covid-19-coronavirus-level-3-lockdown-1-jun-2020.
17
ISI Appeal for Information on Covid-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
18
Statement made by J. Montell, Executive Director of HaMoked, (2020), available at: https://hamoked.info/newsletters/non_existent_babies_sept_2020_eng.php?user_uuid=2c56c96d8313ad6afd9103fc508886fa&uid=2c56c96d8313ad6afd9103fc508886fa.
19
J. Krauss, ‘Gazans left stranded abroad by Israeli-Palestinian standoff,’ AP News, (30 September 2020), available at: https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-jordan-ap-top-news-international-news-west-bank-e756d2f8b39b6977262e76205f131569.
20
Ibid.
21
OHCHR, ‘Gaza-Israel escalation: End violence now, then work to end occupation, say UN experts’, OHCHR Media Centre, (18 May 2021), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27102&LangID=E.
22
See further Chapter on the Dominican Republic in Part 3 of this report.
23
See further Chapter on the Dominican Republic in Part 3 of this report.
24
B. Wooding and A. Petrozziello, ‘Research Brief: Impacts of COVID-19 on the Haitian migrant population and their descendants in the south of the Dominican Republic’, (2021), available at: http://obmica.org/.
25
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
26
K. Inus, ‘COVID-19: It’s appointments only now at Sabah NRD offices’, The Star, (30 September 2020), available at: https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/09/30/covid-19-it039s-appointments-only-now-at-sabah-nrd-offices.
27
Internal member survey conducted by the European Network on Statelessness (2020).
28
F. Gillett, ‘Coronavirus lockdown: Parents ‘frustrated’ by birth registration delays,’ BBC, (10 July 2020), available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-53365503.
29
UNHCR, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Stateless Populations: Policy Recommendations and Good Practices’, (2020), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5eb2a72f4.html.
30
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Monthly Bulletin’, (December 2020), available at: https://mailchi.mp/fcf69192f18f/monthly-bulletin-december-2020.
31
OBMICA, ‘One of the most important humanitarian gestures of the last decade: Welcoming the Venezuelan population’, (2021), available at: http://obmica.org/index.php/actualidad/346-uno-de-los-gestos-humanitarios-mas-importantes-de-la-ultima-decada-acogiendo-la-poblacion-venezolana.
32
Internal member survey conducted by the European Network on Statelessness (2020).
33
Asylkoordination Österreich, Diakonie Flüchtlingsdienst, European Network on Statelessness, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 37th Session of the Universal Periodic Review:
Austria’, (09 July 2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR37_Austria.pdf.
34
See further Chapter on India in Part 3 of this report.
35
Right to Nationality and Citizenship Network and DAJI, ‘Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam: A study into the exclusion of those at risk of statelessness in COVID-19 responses and social security provisions’, (2021), available at:https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DP5GRma4utgd25Oa61VuURVAMeMNq84x/view. See further Chapter on the India in Part 3 of this report.
36
See further Chapter on Civil and Political Rights in Part 2 of this report.
37
ISI Appeal for Information on COVID-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
38
P. Marais, C. Kreuseur, ‘Naturalised citizenship in SA limbo land: Not today, tomorrow or the foreseeable future’, dailymaverick, (19 May 2021), available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-19-naturalised-citizenship-in-sa-limbo-land-not-today-tomorrow-or-the-foreseeable-future/.
39
Association des femmes chefs de Famille, SOS-Esclaves, Anti-Slavery International, Minority Rights Group International, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the
Human Rights Council at the 37th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Mauritania’, (09 July 2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR37_Mauritania.pdf.
40
UNHCR, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Stateless Populations: Policy Recommendations and Good Practices’, (2020), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5eb2a72f4.html.
41
J. Loweree, A. Reichlin-Melnick, and W. Ewing, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Noncitizens and Across the U.S. Immigration System’, (2020), available at: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_impact_of_covid-19_on_noncitizens_and_across_the_us_immigration_system.pdf.
42
B. Salamacha, ‘Supreme Court denies challenges to ‘public charge’ rule during COVID-19 crisis’, Jurist, (26 April 2020), available at: https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/04/supreme-court-denies-challenges-to-public-charge-rule-duringthe-covid-19-crisis/.
43
T. Klan, ‘Trump signs order temporarily limiting immigration during pandemic,’ Jurist, (24 April 2020), available at: https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/04/trump-signs-order-temporarily-limiting-immigration-during-pandemic/.
44
The Associated Press, ‘Biden lifts Trump-era ban blocking legal immigration to US’, NBC News, (25 February 2021), available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/biden-lifts-trump-era-ban-blocking-legal-immigrationus-n1258817.
45
J. Loweree, A. Reichlin-Melnick, and W. Ewing, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Noncitizens and Across the U.S. Immigration System’, (2020), available at: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_impact_of_covid-19_on_noncitizens_and_across_the_us_immigration_system.pdf.
46
L. Jakes and T. Richter, ‘Virus delays passports for 1.7 million Americans’ The New York Times, (12 June 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/us/politics/coronavirus-passport-delays.html.
47
L. Harkov, ‘US Embassy in Israel has 15,000 passport backlog due to COVID rules,’ The Jerusalem Post, (19 April 2021), available at: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/us-embassy-in-israel-has-15000-passport-backlog-due-to-covidrules-665662.
48
UNHCR, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Stateless Populations: Policy Recommendations and Good Practices’, (2020), available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5eb2a72f4.pdf.
1

23

EQUALITY &NON-DISCRIMINATION“State policies responding to COVID-19 must guarantee equal andnon-discriminatory treatment of all persons, irrespective of theirimmigration and citizenship status or the fact of theirdisplacement.”
Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees,
and other Displaced Persons, Article 1
Although the causes of statelessness are complex and multi-faceted,in many cases, statelessness is not an accident; rather, it is the resultof direct, or indirect, discrimination.1 For many communities, statelessness arises from a long history of exclusion, marginalisation andtargeting, whereby states use nationality as a tool to exclude thoseperceived as ‘other’.2 Minority groups make up more than 75% of the
known stateless population.3 Discrimination causes and perpetuatesstatelessness, and stateless persons are subject to more discrimination in a vicious cycle.
In 2020, we reported on the increased indirect impacts of gender discriminatory nationality laws during the pandemic.4 We also reported
on the numerous ways in which the pandemic was being leveraged toscapegoat minority groups, such as the Roma or the Rohingya;5 blaming them for the spread of the virus and instrumentalising COVID-19
to bolster certain discriminatory stereotypes associated with them. In
this regard, we recommended that relevant actors:
Desist from unfairly targeting or scapegoating minorities, migrants,
stateless and other groups; prosecute and penalise those who perpetuate hate speech; and take steps to acknowledge and dismantle the root
causes of structural discrimination.
Sadly, a year later, we continue to see the same issues at play, leading
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet to call for
greater equality as a ‘prerequisite’ for overcoming the global crisis of
COVID-19,6 and UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi,
to call on states to take active steps to combat racial discrimination.7“Political responses to the COVID-19 outbreak that stigmatize,
exclude, and make certain populations more vulnerable to violence
are inexcusable, unconscionable, and inconsistent with States’international human rights law obligations.” 8
UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume
Discrimination is the underlying driving force behind cases of statelessness in most CESF Consortium project countries. Malaysia and
Nepal have large stateless communities as a result of gender discriminatory nationality laws.9 Anti-Haitian rhetoric in the Dominican
Republic underpins the ‘La Sentencia’ ruling10 which stripped Dominicans of Haitian decent of their nationality.11 Discrimination against the
Rohingya, ‘legalised’ by the implementation of the 1982 CitizenshipLaw by the Myanmar State, has provided a framework which allows forState sanctioned exclusion, crimes against humanity and genocide.12
The implementation of the arbitrary and nationalist NRC in India has
deemed millions as ‘non-citizens’, predominantly targeting Muslimsand Hindus of Bengali decent.13 In Bangladesh, despite the Urdu speaking community being recognised as citizens of Bangladesh, deep rooted systemic discrimination prevents them from accessing their rights14
and in Kenya members of the Nubian community are required to apply
for citizenship through a discriminatory vetting process.15 Discrimination and intolerance towards Roma communities is also prominent inMontenegro and North Macedonia,16 and have been heightened in thecontext of the pandemic.
24

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT HATESPEECH, XENOPHOBIA & RACISM TARGETINGMINORITIES AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION &GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, AND MAKES THE
FOLLOWING CALL TO ACTION:

RECOGNISE THAT DISCRIMINATION IS THE PRIMARY DRIVER
OF STATELESSNESS AND THAT STATELESS PEOPLE FACE
ADDITIONAL DISCRIMINATION; DESIST FROM UNFAIRLYTARGETING OR SCAPEGOATING MINORITIES, MIGRANTS,
STATELESS AND OTHER GROUPS; PROSECUTE AND PENALISE
INSTIGATORS OF HATE SPEECH; ENSURE THAT STATELESSPEOPLE AND THOSE WHO LACK DOCUMENTATION ARE NOTDISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE,RELIEF AND OTHER COVID-19 MEASURES; COMBAT GENDERDISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASEDVIOLENCE IMPACTING STATELESS WOMEN AND GIRLS;
AND ACKNOWLEDGE AND DISMANTLE ROOT CAUSES OF
STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION THAT UNDERMINE THE RIGHTTO NATIONALITY.

HATE SPEECH, XENOPHOBIA &RACISM TARGETING MINORITIES“States should ensure that neither their actions nor the actions ofothers stigmatize or incite violence against persons on accountof their actual or perceived health status, in particular when suchstigmatization is linked to nationality or immigration status.”
Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees,
and other Displaced Persons, Article 3
In certain cases, COVID-19 has been weaponised and used to further
target minority groups, or those perceived as ‘other’.17 There have been
widespread reports of an increase in xenophobia, racism and otherforms of discrimination, particularly in relation to refugees, migrants
and stateless people. Increased racism and related intolerance has
also been fuelled by political rhetoric, mainstream media, and/or social media, blaming and scapegoating those perceived as carriers of
COVID-19, further exacerbating intolerance towards these groups.18
Those who are perceived as highly mobile, such as nomadic groups,
are perceived to be at higher risk of contagion, which is cited as ‘justification’ for scapegoating and blaming.19 According to the UN Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume, “politicalrhetoric and policy that stokes fear and diminish the equality of all people is counterproductive. To treat and combat the spread of COVID-19
effectively, individuals must have access to accurate health advice andsufficient healthcare without fear of discrimination”.20“We have seen a rise in discriminatory and xenophobic attitudes…
Even before the pandemic, we were witnessing a worldwide increase in negative stereotypes against certain groups.”
UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet
In various countries in Europe, minority groups have reported an increase in hate speech, racism, antigypsyism and discrimination. Thishas particularly been the case amongst Roma21 and Irish Traveller
communities, ethnic Russians, refugees and migrants. In Ireland andBulgaria for example, hate speech against the Roma and travellercommunities has been reported, with politicians blaming these communities for the spread of the virus.22 In North Macedonia,23 a CESF
Consortium member organisation which works to strengthen the capacity of the Roma community had their offices vandalised.24 In Croatia, some migrants trying to cross the border from Bosnia-Herzegovina
were spray painted with red crosses on their heads by the authorities,
who claimed that this was the ‘cure’ against coronavirus.25

nationality rights face hard-hitting consequences as a result of theirunequal status in society. In such contexts, women who reside abroadwith a foreign spouse can face insurmountable barriers when trying
to leave abusive relationships, since their children’s citizenship is dependent upon the abusive spouse’s status. This has a knock-on effecton children denied of nationality, enhancing their vulnerability to childmarriage, since legal status may be a pre-condition for marriage.40

In South Africa, there has been a rise in xenophobia against refugees,
migrants and stateless people, with several recent attacks in the Kwa
Zulu Natal province motivated by xenophobic sentiment. Stateless persons also continue to be arrested.26 In India,27 a huge rise in Islamophobia, exacerbated by the pandemic, has been reported, with a seriesof online misinformation campaigns targeted at Muslims.28 For the
Rohingya29 in India, fake news and information on the internet poseserious challenges.30 After a gathering in Delhi organised by a Muslim
organisation, numerous people tested positive for COVID-19, following
which the Rohingya faced extensive government scrutiny, and somerefugees were quarantined. False narratives led to forced evictions,threats and abuse.31

Globally, gender-based violence has greatly increased during the pandemic.41 Simultaneously, more abusive people (primarily men) aretaking out frustrations on partners, and there is less scope for victimsof abuse to escape. Lockdown measures and movement restrictions
have confined people to their homes, as well as reduced community
interaction and worsened socioeconomic conditions.42 In line withdiscriminatory patriarchal structures, in most countries the caregiving responsibilities of women have increased significantly during the
pandemic.43 Survivors of violence are left even more vulnerable during
lockdown due to reduced psychosocial support, and inability to reportabuse or seek help. For the stateless, or undocumented, the impacts
can be even worse, as many are denied access to crucial support, leaving them without a safety net during this time of crisis.44

In the Dominican Republic,32 anti-Haitianism has increased during the
pandemic.33 IOM Haiti reported over 200,000 spontaneous returns to
Haiti by Haitian migrants in 2020 because of dire health and economic
issues in the Dominican Republic.34 Official figures from the Dominicanauthorities affirm over 20,000 deportation events by land in 2020, once
deportations were resumed in September 2020.35 Political scapegoating rhetoric targeting Haitians is not uncommon. They are blamed formany things including unemployment, social crises and diseases.36“We need to pay urgent attention to the protection of refugee, displaced and stateless women and girls at the time of this pandemic.
They are among those most at-risk. Doors should not be left open
for abusers and no help spared for women surviving abuse andviolence.”45

Structural discrimination against minorities can also affect accessto rights and services. In Libya, this has affected the Tabu and Tuareg communities. The Tabu are an ethnic minority who live in areas of
Sudan, Niger, Chad and southern Libya. Many were denied documentation to prove their citizenship during the Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi rule,and have been subjected to forced evictions, arbitrary arrest and detentions. The Tuareg are an ethnic minority group living in southwest
Libya, as well as Mali, Niger, Chad and Algeria. Some have reported
barriers in accessing citizenship, which has created obstacles in accessing education, health and jobs. Many cities in the south of thecountry have been historically segregated based on tribal affiliationand ethnicity. Due to lack of documentation, these groups face barriers accessing medical care, with potentially fatal consequences in
the context of COVID-19. Moreover, occasional outbursts of violence
between different tribal militia groups hinders the movement of people,
affecting access to healthcare when hospitals are in areas which arecontrolled by rival groups.37
GENDER DISCRIMINATION &GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE“States must ensure the protection of the rights of displaced women, girls and gender-non-conforming people, and should identify
and mitigate particular threats to their health, safety, and well-being in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees,
and other Displaced Persons, Article 11
Gender discrimination in nationality laws is a primary cause of statelessness, and results in a wide range of human rights violations.38
The link between gender discrimination and gender-based violence
has also been well-documented,39 and women who are denied equal

UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner
for Protection, Gillian Triggs
In Eswatini, one of the 25 countries globally that deny women theequal right to confer nationality upon their children, domestic and gender-based violence has increased during the pandemic. Due to somechildren’s inability to access their mother’s nationality, women face barriers in extracting themselves from abusive relationships, which is further exacerbated by stay-at-home orders during lockdown.46 There has
also been an increase in child marriage during the pandemic, which
can be attributed to school closures leaving children vulnerable to such
harmful practices.47 Those living close to the border areas are also atrisk of human trafficking and sexual exploitation. The pandemic has
also increased children’s vulnerability to exploitation, abuse, neglect
and violence by directly affecting their caregivers or causing the loss of
their families’ and communities’ livelihoods.48
In Lebanon, which also denies women equal nationality rights, non-citizens are not entitled to COVID-19 relief. For example, Layal el Hallakand her family were denied an aid package of 400,000 Lebanese lira(about $267), as her husband is Palestinian. The family did also notreceive any aid from UNRWA, the UN agency mandated to protect Palestinian refugees.49 In the context of COVID-19, as well as the growing
economic crisis, exacerbated by the Beirut explosion,50 many families
in urgent need have been denied vital aid, as a result of gender discrimination. In Kenya, GBV continues to be a huge challenge to many stateless communities. Stateless communities and communities at risk ofstatelessness face challenges as they cannot report cases of GBV due
to their lack of legal Identity. Women are vulnerable to unwanted pregnancies while others are at risk of contracting diseases such as HIV
and AIDS. The fear of being detained in police custody is also a risk
which results in many choosing not to report these cases. In Nepal
there are increased incidences of domestic and sexual violence. Withno access to legal aid or even legal remedy most of these cases havenot been investigated and many women are forced to continue residing
with their violent partners.51

Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Citizenship and Statelessness: (in)equality and (non)discrimination’, (2018), available at:https://files.institutesi.org/Statelessness-and-discrimination.pdf. See also Minority Rights Group International, ‘Minority Stories: Introduction’, available at: https://stories.minorityrights.org/statelessness/chapter/introduction/.
2
UN HRC, ‘Minority Issues: Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues,’ A/HRC/40/64 (2019), available at: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/40/64. See also A. Spitálszky, ‘Denial and denigration: How discrimination feeds statelessness,’ ENS Blog, (31 October 2017), available at https://www.statelessness.eu/updates/blog/denial-and-denigration-how-discrimination-feeds-statelessness.
3
UNHCR, ‘“This is Our Home” Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship’, UNHCR, (2017), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/59e4a6534.html.
4
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
5
Ibid.
6
United Nations, ‘Greater equality a ‘prerequisite’ for overcoming global crises: Bachelet,’ UNNews, (12 October 2020), available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/10/1075212.
7
UNHCR, ‘High Commissioner’s Message on the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, UNHCR, (21 March 2021), available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/3/6054d8804/high-commissioners-message-international-day-elimination-racial-discrimination.html.
8
OHCHR, ‘States should take action against COVID-19-related expressions of xenophobia, says UN expert,’ OHCHR Media Centre, (23 March 2020), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25739&LangID=E.
9
See further Chapter on Malaysia and Chapter on Nepal in Part 3 of this report.
10
SENTENCIA TC/0168/13, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20150812200410/http://tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentos/Sentencia%20TC%200168-13%20-%20C.pdf.
11
See further Chapter on Dominican Republic in Part 3 of this report.
12
See further Chapter on Rohingya in Refugee Situations in Part 3 of this report.
13
See further Chapter on India in Part 3 of this report.
14
See further Chapter on Bangladesh in Part 3 of this report.
125

See further Chapter on Kenya in Part 3 of this report.
See further Chapter on Montenegro and Chapter on North Macedonia in Part 3 of this report.
Progressive Voice, ‘A Nation Left Behind: Myanmar’s Weaponization of COVID-19’, Progressive Voice Myanmar, (2 June 2020), available at: https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2020/06/02/a-nation-left-behind-myanmars-weaponization-of-covid-19/.
18
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation assessment of statelessness, health, and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.
pdf.
19
UNHCR, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Stateless Populations: Policy Recommendations and Good Practices’, (2020), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5eb2a72f4.html.
20
OHCHR, ‘States should take action against COVID-19-related expressions of xenophobia, says UN expert’, OHCHR Media Centre, (23 March 2020), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25739&LangID=E.
21
See further Chapter on Montenegro and Chapter on North Macedonia in Part 3 of this report.
22
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation assessment of statelessness, health, and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.pdf.
23
See further Chapter on North Macedonia in Part 3 of this report.
24
See further Chapter on North Macedonia in Part 3 of this report.
25
L. Tondo, ‘Crosses on our heads to ‘cure’ COVID-19: refugees report abuse by Croatian police’, The Guardian (28 May 2020), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/28/they-made-crosses-on-our-headsrefugees-report-abuse-by-croatian-police.
26
ISI Appeal for Information on COVID-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
27
See further Chapter on India in Part 3 of this report.
28
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf. See further the Chapter on India in Part 3 of this report.
29
See further Chapter on Rohingya in Refugee Situations in Part 3 of this report.
30
ISI Appeal for Information on COVID-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
31
C. Kapoor, ‘Hate campaign haunts Rohingya refugees in India,’ AA (24 August 2020), available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/hate-campaign-haunts-rohingya-refugees-in-india-/1951269. See further Chapter on Rohingya in
Refugee Situations in Part 3 of this report.
32
See further Chapter on the Dominican Republic in Part 3 of this report.
33
See further Chapter on the Dominican Republic in Part 3 of this report.
34
IOM, ‘Flow Monitoring - Monitoring of migratory flows between Haiti and the Dominican Republic: Monthly Report 2 – March 2021’, (2021), available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IcSP_Flow%20Monitoring_Montly%20Report_2_31%20March%202021%5B7887%5D.pdf.
35
R. Castro, ‘Mas de 20 mil extranjeros fueron repatriados en 2020,’ La Republica, (3 February 2021), available at: https://listindiario.com/la-republica/2021/02/03/655454/mas-de-20-mil-extranjeros-fueron-repatriados-en-2020.
36
D. Shaw, ‘Dominican Wall of Anti-Haitianism Keeps Neocolonial Inequity Alive,’ Council on Hemispheric Affairs, (29 March 2021), available at https://www.coha.org/dominican-wall-of-anti-haitianism-keeps-neocolonial-inequity-alive/.
37
Amnesty International, ‘Libya: Historic discrimination threatens right to health of minorities in the south amid COVID-19’, Amnesty News (20 April 2020), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/libya-historic-discrimination-threatens-right-to-health-of-minorities-in-the-south-amid-covid19/.
38
Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, UNHCR, UNICEF, Coalition on Every Child's Right to Nationality, ‘Gender Discrimination and Childhood Statelessness’, (2019), available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Gender-discrimination-childhood-statelessness-web.pdf.
39
Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, ‘The violence of gender discrimination in nationality laws,’ available at: https://equalnationalityrights.org/news/76-gender-violence-discrimination-nationality-laws.
40
Catherine Harrington, ‘Gender Discriminatory Nationality Laws: Impact on Women’s Livelihood and World of Work’, Centre for Women’s Global Leadership, available at https://16dayscampaign.org/2020/03/31/gender-discriminatory-nationality-laws-impact-on-womens-livelihood-and-world-of-work/.
41
UN Web TV, ‘António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) on Gender-Based Violence and COVID-19’, (5 April 2020), available at: http://webtv.un.org/watch/ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-un-secretary-general-on-gender-based-violence-and-covid19/6146979361001/?term=.
42
UNHCR, ‘Displaced and stateless women and girls at heightened risk of gender-based violence in the coronavirus pandemic’, UNHCR, (20 April 2020), available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/4/5e998aca4/displaced-stateless-women-girls-heightened-risk-gender-based-violence-coronavirus.html?mc_cid=1e3463bb60&mc_eid=28e52effdb.
43
UN Women and Women Count, ‘Whose Time to Care? Unpaid Care and Domestic Work During Covid-19’, (2020), available at: https://data.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Whose-time-to-care-brief_0.pdf.
44
See further, Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
45
UNHCR, ‘Displaced and stateless women and girls at heightened risk of gender-based violence in the coronavirus pandemic’, UNHCR, (20 April 2020), available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/4/5e998aca4/displaced-stateless-women-girls-heightened-risk-gender-based-violence-coronavirus.html?mc_cid=1e3463bb60&mc_eid=28e52effdb.
46
CANGO, Youth Sustainable Development Centre, Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council
at the 39th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Eswatini’, (25 March 2021), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR39_Eswatini.pdf.
47
Ibid
48
Ibid
49
A. Sewell, ‘Lebanese women with foreign spouses denied coronavirus aid’, Saudi Gazette, (9 May 2020), available at: https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/592870.
50
E. Blair, ‘Explainer: Lebanon’s financial meltdown and how it happened’, Reuters, (17 September 2020), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-lebanon-crisis-financial-explainer/explainer-lebanons-financial-meltdown-and-how-it-happened-idUKKBN268223.
51
G. d’Orlando, Gender-based violence in Nepal: the long road to healing’, Equal Times, (3 May 2021), available at: https://www.equaltimes.org/gender-based-violence-in-nepal-the#.YLABAahKg2w.
15
16
17

26

RIGHT TO HEALTH“The spread and impact of COVID-19 have shown more than ever
how rights are interdependent. The pandemic’s disproportionate
impact on Black people, indigenous peoples and other raciallypersecuted groups, such as the Rohingya and Roma, specificallythose located in the global South, is rooted in historical and current
systems of oppression.” 1
UN Special Rapporteuron the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physicaland mental health, Tlaleng Mofokeng
The right to healthcare is afundamental human right,
which is also interdepend“THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE TO THE
ent upon other rights.2
ENJOYMENT OF THE HIGHEST
The right to healthcare
ATTAINABLE STANDARD OF
should have universal apPHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH”
plication, with access tohealthcare services enICESCR, ARTICLE 12
sured to everyone regardless of race, religion orother criteria, including legal status. However, mostnational healthcare systems privilege citizens, undermining the right tohealth of stateless persons and those with insecure legal status, withparticularly hard-hitting ramifications during the pandemic.
In 2020, we reported on the multifaceted ways in which COVID-19 hascompounded the structural and discriminatory barriers to healthcare
and related health risks faced by stateless persons. This report recommended that all relevant stakeholders:
Ensure that access to healthcare is equal and universal, and not based
upon nationality or legal status; that all fees and other barriers to accessare removed; that public health imperatives take precedence over immigration and other motives which may place vulnerable communities
at risk; and that all public health measures and related advice are communicated to all groups, including stateless persons and those at risk ofstatelessness, taking into account location, language, literacy and communication channels.3
One year on, the challenges have heightened, with devastating consequences. Equal and universal access to healthcare is more important
than ever – both from a human rights and public health perspective.
Of the CESF Consortium focus countries, the cost of healthcare has
proved a significant barrier to stateless communities in Central Asia,
the Dominican Republic, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Montenegro, Nepal
and North Macedonia. The lack of legal identity has prevented accessto healthcare in Central Asia, India and Kenya, and the risk of detention
or harassment by police, has deterred people from seeking healthcare
in Kenya and Malaysia. Now, with the rollout of vaccines, and the possibility of controversial vaccine passports, the stakes are even higher,
particularly as stateless populations are rarely explicitly included in
vaccination plans, as is the case in, for example, Central Asia and India.

“Understanding health as a human right creates a legal obligation
on states to ensure access to timely, acceptable, and affordable
health care of appropriate quality as wellas to providing for the
CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTS
underlying determiHAVE ALSO HAD POSITIVE IMPACTS
nants of health, such as
ON ACCESS TO VACCINATIONS. IN
BANGLADESH, THE COUNCIL OF
safe and potable water,
MINORITIES HAS BEEN RAISING
sanitation, food, housing,
AWARENESS ON COVID-19
health-related informaVACCINATIONS, HELPING PEOPLE TO
tion and education, and
REGISTER ONLINE AND ACCOMPANYING
THEM TO RECEIVE VACCINATIONS. 42
gender equality.”4

PEOPLE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN ASSISTEDIN THIS MANNER.

World Health Organisation

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT BARRIERSTO ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, ENVIRONMENTAL
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH
IMPACTS, AND ACCESS TO VACCINATIONS, AND
MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO ACTION:

ENSURE THAT ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE IS EQUALAND UNIVERSAL, AND NOT BASED ON NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION OR LEGAL STATUS; REMOVE ALL FEES AND
OTHER BARRIERS TO HEALTHCARE; ENSURE THAT PUBLICHEALTH IMPERATIVES TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER IMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENT AND OTHER MOTIVES; STRENGTHENINITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THE MENTAL HEALTH IMPACTS
OF COVID-19 ON STATELESS PEOPLE; INVEST IN MEASURESTO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH,INCLUDING POOR SANITATION AND INABILITY TO SOCIALLYDISTANCE; AND ENSURE THAT PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURESAND ADVICE ARE EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATED TO STATELESSPEOPLE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LOCATION, LANGUAGE AND
LITERACY.

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE MORAL AND PUBLICHEALTH IMPERATIVE TO PROTECT EVERYONE FROM COVID-19,
AND GIVEN THAT THE ONLY SUSTAINABLE WAY OF DOING SO
IS THROUGH ACHIEVING UNIVERSAL VACCINATION, WHILEALSO CONSIDERING THE HEIGHTENED VULNERABILITY OF
MANY STATELESS PEOPLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES;ENSURE THAT ALL NECESSARY POSITIVE STEPS – INCLUDING
MOBILE CLINICS, AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS AND INCENTIVES- ARE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT STATELESS PEOPLE HAVE EQUALVACCINE ACCESS, AND THAT ALL BARRIERS SUCH AS LACKOF NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION OR LEGAL STATUS, AS
WELL AS TECHNOLOGICAL AND FINANCIAL BARRIERS ARE
ANTICIPATED AND ADDRESSED IN VACCINE ROLL OUT.

(BARRIERS TO) ACCESS TO HEALTHCAREThe 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Universal Health
Coverage5 emphasises that those furthest behind must be prioritisedin order to achieve greater health equity. IOM and UNHCR have also
stated that COVID-19 underlines the urgent need for universal healthcoverage,6 stressing that health services must be “inclusive of all people, including migrants, refugees and internally displaced and statelesspeople, if we are to build robust systems that protect us all.”
The right to healthcare includes the right to a system of health protection, equality of opportunity for everyone to enjoy the highest attainable level of health, and equal and timely access to basic health services. Non-discrimination and equality are fundamental human rights
principles and critical components of the right to health.7 However, inpractice, there is significant inequality in access to healthcare, and thestateless are among the most disadvantaged. A report by the European
Network on Statelessness has found that stateless persons in Europe
face multiple barriers to accessing healthcare, including their lack of27

documentation, identification or health insurance; are restricted only
to accessing emergency medical care; and are unable to afford highfees. Other barriers include institutional mistrust, and discrimination byhealthcare providers.8 According to the WHO, undocumented migrants
and Roma are denied certain health services in several countries andare only entitled to urgent medical care.9
During the pandemic,
the reconfiguration of
GOOD PRACTICE
services to an online
format, has caused
IN IRELAND, THE GOVERNMENT CREATED
digital exclusion. In
A FIREWALL BETWEEN HEALTH SERVICES
Sweden for example,
AND IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES DURING
those requiring a COVTHE CRISIS, ALLOWING UNDOCUMENTED
ID-19 test had to have
MIGRANTS TO ACCESS SERVICES
a digital ID; excluding
WITHOUT FEAR THAT THEIR
many stateless peoINFORMATION WILL BE SHARED.10
ple who lack digital
ID. Other barriers include lack of accessto information. Manystateless persons were not reached by the general public health guidance, heightening health risks, vulnerabilities, and social exclusion.
Where language barriers, as well as digital barriers exist, many rely on
NGO-led communication using remote technologies and mobile health
units.11“Migrants, refugees, and other displaced persons have a right toinformation about COVID-19, including information related to symptoms, prevention, control of spread, treatment, and social relief. Theinternet is an indispensable source of information, and blocking orinterfering with access during a pandemic is not justifiable.”
Principles of protection for migrants, refugees,
and other displaced persons, Article 9
Fear of approaching the authorities is also a barrier. In Malaysia, stateless individuals are reportedly too fearful of authorities to visit thedoctor or hospital.12 In some countries, the Roma have been cast as
a health and safety threat. In Slovakia, the government sealed off entire Roma communities, and introduced military personnel to carry out
testing.13 In Bulgaria, the government imposed roadblocks and police
checkpoints in several Romani neighbourhoods, despite no evidence ofa COVID-19 outbreak.14
Lack of documentation presents a significant barrier. In Thailand the
pandemic slowed the process of obtaining identity documentation,
which in turn has limited access to health coverage.15 In Libya, ethnic
minority groups at risk of statelessness, such as the Tabu and Tuareg,
face discrimination in access to healthcare. Moreover, some membersof these groups lack identity documents or family identity booklets toprove Libyan citizenship, which is required to access the free publichealth system.16 In Indonesia, the Ministry of Health included refugees
in COVID-19 treatment and testing, but civil society groups reported
that the costs are only covered if the individuals test negative.17
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH“States must take effective measures to mitigate COVID-19 transmission among migrants, refugees, and other displaced persons
living in camps, collective shelters, and settlements.”
Principles of protection for migrants, refugees,
and other displaced persons, Article 8
Crucial to the enjoyment of the right to health are the underlying determinants of health. These include a wide range of socio economic
factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life,
such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable waterand sanitation, safe working conditions, and a healthy environment.18

28

Many stateless persons live in densely populated areas, including
camps, collective shelters and informal settlements, while others havebeen detained,19 in conditions conducive to the fast spread of the virus.
In Mauritania, for example, the majority of the Haratine community,
who are descendants of former slaves and at risk of statelessness, livein the capital in barracks, hangars or tents, without protection or space
to socially distance. No specific measures have been taken to protect

this population during the pandemic.20 The Gaza Strip also has highlevels of COVID-19, due to the low quality of Gaza’s health infrastructure, low resource security and widespread poverty.21
Many stateless persons are also refugees. The infrastructure in refugee camps is not conducive to housing large numbers of people in
the long term, in a manner that allows for social distancing. In many
refugee camps there is a lack of sanitation facilities and physicalspace.22 In Greece’s Moria camp, conditions have been described ashaving “one tap, with no soap for every 1300 migrants, and people living
amongst rubbish with poor or no sewage systems.” Personal hygieneis also hard to maintain with up to “5000 people currently without any
access to water, showers, toilets or electricity”.23 In March 2021, a large
fire broke out in Kutapulong camp in Bangladesh, home to hundreds ofthousands of Rohingya. At least 15 people died and 45,000 were again
displaced.24 "[...] people in the camps are so scared. They cannot sleep
at night for worrying. They are afraid because they are not sure how thefire started, how it spread so quickly and why there was no fire service
that could control the fire”, said Khin Maung from the Rohingya Youth
Association.25
MENTAL HEALTH
COVID-19 has also had an acute impact on mental health, with UNHCR
warning that COVID-19 is not just a physical health crisis, but is also
now triggering a mental health crisis.26 According to a 2020 survey ofrefugees and migrants conducted by the WHO, 50% of the respondents
indicated that COVID 19 brought about greater feelings of depression,anxiety and loneliness. One in five respondents also reported increased
drug and alcohol use.27 Other studies have shown that lockdowns haveresulted worldwide in deterioration in the mental health of vulnerable
groups, coupled with a reduction in numbers of patients accessing
mental health services due to COVID-19 related restrictions among
populations who already have difficulty accessing healthcare.28 In
Kenya,29 in the Dadaab refugee camp there are reports of deteriorating
mental health and in Nepal the insurmountable restrictions faced bystateless people throughout their lives have resulted in mental healthissues.30
RIGHT TO VACCINATIONS“If 2020 has taught us something, it is that ill health is a universal
issue that does not distinguish based on nationality; so, to be truly
effective, neither should our health coverage, including in upcoming COVID-19 vaccination efforts.”31
IOM Director General,
António Vitorino
The WHO has warned that the world is on the brink of “catastrophic
moral failure”32 urging vaccines to be made available as a global public
good, as “equity in access [to the vaccine] will lead to equity in health forall,”33 This is a moral and public health imperative as the ramificationsof exclusion are far reaching, no one is safe, until everyone is safe. IOM
and UNHCR have urged governments to include migrants, refugees,
IDPS and stateless people in vaccine rollout plans and ongoing healthservices.34“The inequitable distribution of vaccines is not just a moral outrage. It’s also economically and epidemiologically self-defeating.
Some countries are racing to vaccinate their entire populations —while other countries have nothing.”35
WHO Director General,
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus
From the beginning of the vaccine roll-out in 2021, vaccine nationalism
was apparent. Countries in the global north are more likely to be able tosecure vaccines, and as of 17 February 2021, only ten countries had administered 75% of the world’s vaccines.36 Localised effects of vaccine
nationalism can also be seen in many countries which prioritise nationals for vaccines. Stateless people are doubly impacted: the majority
reside in countries where vaccines are less accessible, but even when
acquired, they are deprioritised, forgotten, denied for lack of documentation or excluded on discriminatory grounds. These barriers predate
the pandemic, since stateless persons generally experience lower levels of vaccination compared to citizens.37

IN 2020, THE WHO ESTABLISHED THE
COVAX FACILITY, AIMED AT ADDRESSINGGLOBAL INEQUALITY IN VACCINEPROCUREMENT BY ACCELERATINGDEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURE AND
EQUALISING ACCESS.38 PUBLIC HEALTHGROUPS HAVE BEEN LOBBYING COUNTRIESTO COMMIT A PORTION OF VACCINE
SUPPLIES TO A ‘HUMANITARIAN BUFFER’, TO
INOCULATE THOSE LIVING IN REBEL-HELDTERRITORIES, REFUGEE CAMPS AND OTHERSUNLIKELY TO RECEIVE VACCINATIONSFROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS.39 THE
WHO’S CAMPAIGN FOR #VACCINEQUITY,PROMOTES EQUITABLE VACCINATIONSFOR STRUGGLING COMMUNITIES IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS. BY DAY 100 OF THE#VACCINEQUITY CAMPAIGN, 38 MILLION+
COVAX DOSES HAD BEEN SHIPPED TO MORE
THAN 100 COUNTRIES. JORDAN WAS THE
FIRST COUNTRY TO INCLUDE REFUGEESIN VACCINATION EFFORTS.40 SINCE THEN,
OTHERS HAVE FOLLOWED SUIT, INCLUDINGRWANDA41 AND NEPAL.42 HOWEVER, IT IS
STILL UNCLEAR IF THESE EFFORTS INCLUDE
THE STATELESS.

“Unfortunately, it seems that some Governments have secured
vaccines for their citizens only. Health policies and procurement
procedures that are isolationist in nature are inconsistent withinternational human rights standards.”43
UN Special Rapporteuron the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physicaland mental health, Tlaleng Mofokeng
The controversial ‘vaccine passport’ may leave those with unequal access to vaccines even further behind. Accessing documentation forthe stateless and those at risk of statelessness is difficult during ‘normal’ times. Additional documentation – especially digital documentation – in the form of a vaccine passport, will widen pre-existing societal
divides and inequalities. Professor of immunology at Imperial College
London, Danny Altmann, stated vaccine passports will open “an enormous can of worms”, as such documents may “create a tiered societyof vaccinated, and unvaccinated.”44 Moreover, it could create further restrictions on movement for those who are unvaccinated.
In Kenya,45 stateless communities have not yet been included in vaccine rollout plans. Lack of ID cards, poverty and distance to hospitals,
also impact access to vaccines. In Cameroon, the stateless have been
excluded due to lack of documentation.46 In Europe, the Platform forInternational Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants is tracking inclusion of the undocumented in vaccine rollouts.47 They have identified
inclusion commitments from Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the UK. It
is unclear what strategies will be adopted to
THE GLOBAL ‘APART TOGETHER’
ensure undocumentSTUDY, CONDUCTED BY THE WHO, ON
ed populations are
SELF-REPORTED IMPACTS OF COVID-19
reached in practice.
ON REFUGEES, MIGRANTS, AND THE
Vaccineallocations
STATELESS FOUND THAT FOR 17.8% OF
for the Rohingya comTHOSE SURVEYED, NGOS WERE THE MAIN
munities in India and
SOURCE OF COVID-19 INFORMATION.
Malaysia have also
MOHIB, A ROHINGYA REFUGEE IN COX’S
not been announced.
BAZAAR, BANGLADESH, REFLECTED ON
In India, it is mandaNGO INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMATION
tory to provide an ID
PROVISION AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
card to be vaccinated.
AT THE OUTSET OF THE PANDEMIC:
Ali Johar of the Ro“LOCAL NGOS USED TO PROVIDE
hingya Human Rights
US REMINDERS ABOUT PHYSICAL
Initiative stated “We
DISTANCING AND NATIONAL HEALTH
are afraid that our
GUIDELINES PROVIDED BY BANGLADESHI
community in India will
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, BUT
be excluded from the
NOWADAYS, THE RATE OF PUBLICITY AND
vaccination process as
48
AWARENESS HAS DECREASED.”
we don't possess any

documents issued by Myanmar, the Indian Government does not recognise refugee cards issued by UNHCR as proof of identity. In this case,we will be completely dependent on the international community.”49 In
Bangladesh, it was reported in March 2021 that Rohingya refugees
would be included in the national vaccine rollout, although implementation of vaccinations for this community was not yet underway at thetime of writing.50
Israel’s vaccination programme excluded five million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In February 2021, more than halfof Israel’s citizens were fully inoculated while most Palestinians livingin the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not.51 By neglecting Palestinians,
Israel violated international law, including the Geneva Convention (Article 56) which delegates occupying powers the responsibility to ensure
public health and hygiene in occupied territories, to “combat the spreadof contagious diseases and epidemics."52 Physician and member of thePalestinian Parliament, Dr. Mustafa Barghouti, commented that “Israel
is violating international law because it is denying its responsibility as an
occupying power. This is a crime against Palestinians…a crime against
the health of Israelis…it is a crime against medical ethics, which says
nobody should be discriminated against.”53 Amnesty International alsocommented “The Israeli government must stop ignoring its international
obligations as an occupying power and immediately act to ensure COVID-19 vaccines are equally and fairly provided to Palestinians living under
its occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”54 In January 2021,
the WHO urged Israel to make vaccines available to Palestinian healthworkers. Israel did not comply citing shortages for their citizens55 despite sending vaccines to allies. Heavy scrutiny led Israel to cease thispractice in February 2021.56 As of March 2021, Israel had vaccinatedcertain Palestinians – relatives of people in Jerusalem and Palestinian
prisoners in Israeli jails and committed to vaccinating 110,000 Palestinian day laborers in Israel. Palestinian officials have faced obstacles
including funding and infrastructure to launch their own vaccination
campaign. As of May 2021, Gaza had received around 250,000 vaccine
doses from other states, with some donated through the COVAX facility. However, as of 5 May 2021, only 3.6% of Palestinians had received
at least one dose, andless than 1% were fully
vaccinated, and thesefigures exclude PalesGOOD PRACTICE
tinians in Israel.57 “Not
only is vaccine availIN MAY 2021, THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH
ability a problem but
IN MONTENEGRO, ORGANISED A
we are worried about
VACCINATION CAMPAIGN IN SEVERAL
the skepticism and
LOCATIONS, WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT
misinformationthat
OF AN APPOINTMENT, INCLUDING FOR
is spreading in Gaza”
THOSE
WITH NO DOCUMENTATION.59 IN A
said the Head of the
ROMA
SETTLEMENT,KONIK, A PREVIOUSICRC office in Gaza, IgLY UNPLANNED VACCINATION CAMPAIGN
nacio Casares. At the
WAS ALSO ORGANISED, FOR THE ROMA
time of writing, ICRC,PEOPLE. ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE
in collaboration with
RED CROSS, AND HELP, FACILITATED THIS
the Palestinian MinPROCESS AND AN ESTEEMED DOCTOR
istry of Endowments
VISITED THE SETTLEMENT, TO RAISE
and Religious Affairs
AWARENESS ON THE
and the Ministry of
BENEFITS OF VACCINATION.60
Health in Gaza wereconducting a campaign to encourage
vaccine uptake.58
In early 2021, Dominican Republic President, Luis Abinader, stated thatthose deemed ‘illegal immigrants’ (those of Haitian origin and Venezuelans) will be denied vaccines. Amnesty International’s Americas
Director, Erika Guevara-Rosas, said that the statement is “alarming
and irresponsible”, highlighting “fears that migrants worldwide could
be excluded by “vaccine nationalism”. OBMICA Coordinator, Bridget
Wooding, stated that barriers to vaccines include “negative statementsfrom authorities on who is a priority, lack of information/misinformation
regarding the danger of vaccines, and relative invisibility to the state”.61
Mistrust of authorities is also a deterrent. The UK, for example, announced no checks on immigration status for the vaccine but reports
show that hundreds of thousands of migrants still fear deportation
stemming from the government’s hostile policies and are less likely to seek the vaccine. Co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Groupon Hate Crime warned that telling undocumented people they do notneed a National Health Service (NHS) number to receive the vaccine“wouldn’t allay any fears”. 140 groups called for a ‘firewall’ to prevent
patient information being shared with authorities, a public information
campaign on right to vaccinations, as well as GPs registering everyone,
regardless of legal status.62 In the United States, stateless people fear
29

IN FEBRUARY 2021, THE UK ISSUEDA DRAFT RESOLUTION TO THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDING A
GLOBAL CEASEFIRE ALLOWING FOR
DISTRIBUTION OF THE VACCINE, URGINGOTHER COUNTRIES TO ADMINISTERTHE VACCINE TO “THOSE AT A HIGHERRISK OF DEVELOPING SEVERE COVID-19
SYMPTOMS, AND THE MOST VULNERABLE,
INCLUDING [AMONGST OTHERS]…
REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACEDPEOPLE,AND STATELESS PEOPLE”.64

approaching authorities, or being asked forIDs.63In April 2021, the Malaysian government
announced the eligibility of foreigners,
undocumented workers and refugees for
vaccination, pledging
they would not facedetention when seeking vaccines.65 In 2020
however, when theyencouraged
undocumented migrants to get tested for COVID-19 this was immediately
followed by arbitrary immigration roundups causing fear and distrust.
A Malaysian source stated “The government has done nothing for stateless people, and I would caution against praising them for inclusive vaccination rollout until it actually happens. Last year they received lots ofpraise for saying undocumented migrants would not face repercussions
for seeking healthcare, but we saw no evidence of this being implemented and it was followed by mass raids and detentions of migrants. The
government has actively hampered efforts by civil society to provide
aid.”66 Despite promises of inclusion, the government has adopted acitizens first approach assuring Malaysian citizens "they would be prioritised for the vaccine…with undocumented migrants, refugees and thestateless possibly receiving their shots towards the end of the mass vaccination drive."67 Further concerns include vaccines reaching statelesspeople68 living in hard-to-reach areas including the migratory, maritime
Bajau Laut native to Sabah. They have low levels of health literacy,
are hesitant, distrustful towards the authorities and refuse to accept
vaccines due to misinformation and disinformation.69 In Lebanon, thepre-vaccination registration portal required inputting a nationality for
vaccine registration. Stateless persons could therefore not register.
Sami Haddad, a stateless Lebanese activist and his organisation Oummal, successfully advocated for a ‘statelessness’ option to be added
to the portal, allowing stateless persons to register. However, it wasalso required to provide an ID number, and many stateless persons
lack ID documents. These difficulties come on top of other barriers that

affect marginalised communities in the country, including low levels ofawareness, and practical barriers such as inability to access the internet, in order to register for the vaccine. Sami’s organisation has beenfurther campaigning for equal access to the vaccine, including throughadvocating for the national hotline for vaccine enquiries to add an extension code, that will help stateless people register.
Good Practice: The Australian government announced the provision offree vaccines to all categories of visa holders, namely refugees, asylum
seekers, temporary protection visa holders, and those on bridging visas. Those in detention are also eligible, including those with cancelledvisas.70 Parsu Sharma-Luital JP, a formerly stateless refugee, who has
subsequently acquired Australian citizenship, has been at the forefrontof advocacy efforts towards the Australian government for inclusion
within vaccination efforts. He shared the following reflection:“During the first lockdown, I was part of the team from the Refugee Communities Association of Australia, delivering emergency food relief toasylum-seekers and refugees. Many were living without food for dayson end, as they were wary to buy food, for fear of reprisal, or to accept
food from unknown agencies. As a former refugee and stateless person,
this has made me reflect on my own situation, where my family and I
were dependent on receiving food aid from the refugee agency’s foodbank. I therefore took every opportunity to raise the lived experiencesof refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless people in Australia with thegovernment, and they have responded positively.”
The South African government was initially silent on including stateless people and irregular migrants in vaccine roll outs. In February
2021, the President announced asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants would be included. However, the first step of theregistration process for the vaccine requires a permit number for thosewith asylum/refugee permits, an ID number for citizens and a passportnumber for other categories of migrants.71 LHR accessed the portal
and entered zeros in place of ID numbers to allow stateless persons toregister. However, it is unclear if documentation will be required at thetime of vaccination. LHR wrote an open letter questioning this, highlighting the lack of transparency in the process, and requesting a clearer vaccine strategy inclusive of stateless and undocumented people.72

UN HRC, ‘Minority Issues: Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues’, A/HRC/40/64, (March 2019), available at: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/40/64.
OHCHR, ‘CESCR General Comment No. 14: Article 12 (The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health)’, available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf.
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
4WHO, ‘Human Rights & Health,’ WHO Fact Sheets, (29 December 2017), available at: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/human-rights-and-health.
5
Ibid.
6
UNHCR, ‘IOM and UNHCR chiefs stress that COVID-19 underlines the urgent need for universal health coverage’, UNHCR, (11 December 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/12/5fd35fc94/iom-unhcr-chiefs-stresscovid-19-underlines-urgent-need-universal-health.html.
7
OHCHR, ‘OHCHR and the Right to Health’, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/Pages/Health.aspx.
8
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation assessment of statelessness, health, and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.pdf.
9
B. Varga, ‘Access to healthcare services for the Roma and undocumented migrants in the EU in light of the COVID-19 pandemic’, International Journal of Roma Studies, vol.2(2), (2020), available at: https://hipatiapress.com/hpjournals/index.
php/ijrs/article/view/5952.
10
M. Goodfellow, ‘The hostile environment is creating a coronavirus crisis for Britain's migrants’, The Guardian, (30 March 2020), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/30/hostile-environment-covonavirus-crisis-britain-migrants.
11
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation assessment of statelessness, health, and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.pdf.
12Internal Survey conducted by Nationality for All, Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020).
13
E. Holt, ‘COVID-19 lockdown of Roma settlements in Slovakia’, The Lancet Infectious Diseases, vol.20(6), (2020), available at: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30381-9/fulltext.
14
M. Matache and J. Bhabha, ‘Anti-Roma Racism is Spiraling during COVID-19 Pandemic’, Health and Human Rights Journal, vol.22(1), (2020), available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7348427/.
15Internal Survey conducted by Nationality for All, Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020).
16
Amnesty International, ‘Libya: Historic discrimination threatens right to health of minorities in the south amid COVID-19’, Amnesty International News, (20 April 2020), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/libya-historic-discrimination-threatens-right-to-health-of-minorities-in-the-south-amid-covid19/.
17
Internal Survey conducted by Nationality for All, Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020). UNHCR card holders can reportedly also request reimbursement for COVID-19 services from the Government/local
authorities as per a Circular Note issued by the Ministry of Health on 10 June 2020 (No.YR.03.03/III.3/1820/2020).
18
OHCHR, ‘CESCR General Comment No. 14: Article 12 (The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health)’, available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf.
19
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation assessment of statelessness, health, and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.pdf.
20
Association des femmes chefs de Famille, SOS-Esclaves, Anti-Slavery International, Minority Rights Group International, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human
Rights Council at the 37th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Mauritania’, (9 July 2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR37_Mauritania.pdf.
21
K. Stephens, ‘Gaza’s Health Infrastructure: How COVID-19 Affects a Stateless Nation’, Borgen Magazine, (14 November 2020), available at: https://www.borgenmagazine.com/gazas-health-infrastructure/.
22
E. Raju and S. Ayeb-Karlsson, ‘COVID-19: How do you self-isolate in a refugee camp?’, International Journal of Public Health, vol.65, (2020), available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00038-020-01381-8.
23
S. Hargreaves, B. Kumar, M. McKee, L. Jones, and A. Veizis, ‘Europe's migrant containment policies threaten the response to covid-19’, The BMJ, vol.368(1213), (2020), available at: https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1213.
24
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Monthly Bulletin’, (April 2020), available at: https://mailchi.mp/a774093d7de6/monthly-bulletin-april-2021.
25
See further the Rohingya Youth Association Facebook page, available at: https://www.facebook.com/RYA.Rohingya/.
26
UNHCR, ‘UNHCR urges prioritization of mental health support in coronavirus response’, UNHCR, (14 May 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/5/5ebcfd784/unhcr-urges-prioritization-mental-health-support-coronavirus-response.html.
27
WHO, ‘Apart Together Survey: Preliminary Overview Of Refugees And Migrants Self-Reported Impact Of Covid-19’, (2020), available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9789240017924-eng.pdf. According to WHO,
stateless persons were also included in this survey, and “indicated that the pandemic has had a significant impact on their access to work, safety and financial means, as well as on their social and mental well-being.”
28
M. Aragona, A. Barbato, A. Cavani, G. Costanzo and C. Mirisola, ‘Negative impacts of COVID-19 lockdown on mental health service access and follow-up adherence for immigrants and individuals in socio-economic difficulties’, Public Health,vol.186, (2020), available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7409736/.
29
See further Chapter on Kenya in Part 3 of this report.
30
See further Chapter on Nepal in Part 3 of this report.
31
UNHCR, ‘IOM and UNHCR chiefs stress that COVID-19 underlines the urgent need for universal health coverage’, UNHCR, (11 December 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/12/5fd35fc94/iom-unhcr-chiefs-stresscovid-19-underlines-urgent-need-universal-health.html.
32
E. Farge, ‘Vaccine nationalism puts world on brink of ‘catastrophic moral failure’: WHO chief’, Reuters, (18 January 2021), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-who-idUSKBN29N0TB.
33
United Nations, ‘WHO chief warns against COVID-19 ‘vaccine nationalism,’ urges support for fair access’, UN News, (18 August 2020), available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070422.
34
UNHCR, ‘IOM and UNHCR chiefs stress that COVID-19 underlines the urgent need for universal health coverage’, UNHCR, (11 December 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/12/5fd35fc94/iom-unhcr-chiefs-stresscovid-19-underlines-urgent-need-universal-health.html.
35
R. Millard, ‘Growing vaccine gap between rich and poor countries is ‘grotesque’: WHO’ The Times of Israel, (23 March 2021), available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/growing-vaccine-gap-between-rich-and-poor-countries-is-grotesquewho/.
36
AP News Wire, ‘UK urges UN resolution for pause in conflicts for virus jabs’, The Independent, (20 February 2021), available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk-urges-un-resolution-for-pause-in-conflicts-for-virus-jabs-covid19-un-resolution-conflicts-people-b1804988.html?mc_cid=c0d319096c&mc_eid=28e52effdb.
37
UNHCR, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Stateless Populations: Policy Recommendations and Good Practices in Relation to Vaccine Access and Civil Registration’, (May 2021), (forthcoming).
38
WHO, ‘The COVAX facility: Global procurement for COVID-19 vaccines’, (2020), available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/the-covax-facility.
39
M. Safi, ‘Global health groups urge countries to donate COVID vaccines to humanitarian stockpiles, protecting stateless people in asylum camps’ Genetic Literacy Project, (15 January 2021), available at: https://geneticliteracyproject.
org/2021/01/15/global-health-groups-urge-countries-to-donate-covid-vaccines-to-humanitarian-stockpiles-protecting-stateless-people-in-asylum-camps/.
40
UNHCR, ‘Refugees receive COVID-19 vaccinations in Jordan’, UNHCR, (14 January 2021), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/1/5ffffe614/refugees-receive-covid-19-vaccinations-jordan.html.
41
APO Group, ‘Coronavirus: Rwanda vaccinates refugees and asylum-seekers against COVID-19’, Africa News, (12 March 2021), available at: https://www.africanews.com/2021/03/12/coronavirus-rwanda-vaccinates-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-against-covid-19/.
1
2
3

30

UNHCR, ‘In a first in Asia Pacific, refugees in Nepal receive vaccinations against COVID-19’, ReliefWeb, (19 March 2021), available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/first-asia-pacific-refugees-nepal-receive-vaccinations-against-covid-19.
43
UN HRC, ‘Strategic priorities of work: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Tlaleng Mofokeng’, A/HRC/47/28, (April 2021), available
at: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/47/28.
44
M. Hutton, ‘Vaccine passports ‘an enormous can of worms’ that will widen societal divides’, Post Magazine, (24 March 2021), available at: https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/travel/article/3126659/vaccine-passportsenormous-can-worms-will-widen.
45
See zrther Chapter on Kenya in Part 3 of this report.
46
ISI Appeal for Information on COVID-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
47
Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, ‘The COVID-19 Vaccine and Undocumented Migrants: What are European Countries Doing?’ PICUM News, (11 February 2021), available at: https://picum.org/covid-19-vaccines-undocumented-migrants-europe/?mc_cid=82a14e9d0b&mc_eid=28e52effdb.
48
WHO, ‘Apart Together Survey: Preliminary Overview Of Refugees And Migrants Self-Reported Impact Of Covid-19’, (2020), available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9789240017924-eng.pdf.
49
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Monthly Bulletin’, (April 2020), available at: https://mailchi.mp/a774093d7de6/monthly-bulletin-april-2021. See further Chapter on Rohingya in Part 3 of this report.
50
L. Donovan and I. Yeasmine, ‘Rohingya refugees and local Bangladeshis benefit from inclusive COVID-19 response’, (18 March 2021), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2021/3/60531db51d/rohingya-refugees-local-bangladeshis-benefit-inclusive-covid-19-response.html.
51
M. Kennes, ‘Palestinians left out of Israel’s Covid-19 vaccination success story’ Doctors Without Borders, (22 February 2021), available at: https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/story/palestinians-left-out-israels-covid-19-vaccination-success-story.
52
ICRC, ‘Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries,’ available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5; J. Zitser, ‘Israel, the Palestinians, and the COVID-19
vaccination rollout: The legal and moral obligations,’ Business Insider Australia, (10 January 2021), available at: https://www.businessinsider.com.au/israel-palestine-and-covid-19-vaccines-legal-and-moral-obligations-2021-1.
53
Democracy Now, ‘“Medical Apartheid”: Israeli Vaccine Drive Excludes Millions of Palestinians in Occupied Territories’, Youtube, (05 January 2021), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TWNHnTMPvUY&feature=youtu.
be&ab_channel=DemocracyNow%21.
54
Amnesty International, ‘Denying COVID-19 vaccines to Palestinians exposes Israel’s institutionalized discrimination’, Amnesty International News, (06 January 2021), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/01/denying-covid19-vaccines-to-palestinians-exposes-israels-institutionalized-discrimination/.
55
B. Trew, ‘Israel rebuffs WHO vaccine request for Palestinian medics, amid outcry over disparity’, The Independent, (08 January 2021), available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-palestine-coronavirus-vaccine-b1784474.html; D. Estrin, ‘Israeli Health Officials To Government: Vaccinate All Palestinians’, NPR, (1 March 2021), available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/03/01/972573521/israeli-health-officials-to-government-vaccinate-all-palestinians.
56
R. Ayyub, S. Farrell, A. Rabinovitch, ‘Israel freezes programme to send vaccines abroad, defence minister says’, Reuters, (25 February 2021), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-israel-vaccines-diplo/israel-freezes-programme-to-send-vaccines-abroad-defence-minister-says-idUSKBN2AP2KE.
57
L. Berman, ‘Israel may toss millions of vaccines. Why won’t it give them to the PA instead?’, The Times of Israel, (5 May 2021), available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-may-toss-millions-of-vaccines-why-wont-it-give-them-tothe-pa-instead/.
58
ICRC, ‘Religious leaders, health officials and ICRC launch campaign in Gaza to combat COVID-19 vaccine mistrust’, Reliefweb, (6 May 2021), available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/religious-leaders-healthofficials-and-icrc-launch-campaign.
59
A. Đukanović, ‘Imunizacija protiv korona virusa’, Roma Net, (6 May 2021), available at: https://romanet.me/vijesti/pocela-vakcinacija-romskog-stanovnistva-na-koniku/.
60
Biro za odnose s javnošću Glavnog grada Podgorica, ‘Dr Nebojša Kavarić - "Značaj vakcinacije", Konik’, Youtube, (5 May 2021), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZyG0SI_UIX0&ab_channel=Birozaodnosesjavno%C5%A1%C4%87uGlavnoggradaPodgorica.
61
A. Moloney and N. Bhalla, ‘’Invisible’ migrants risk being last in line for vaccination’ Gulf Times, (25 January 2021), available at: https://www.gulf-times.com/story/683191/Invisible-migrants-risk-being-last-in-line-for-vac?mc_cid=c0d319096c&mc_eid=UNIQID. See further Chapter on the Dominican Republic in Part 3 of this report.
62
J. Stone and M. Bulman, ‘Coronavirus ‘amnesty’ to get undocumented migrants vaccinated will not be enough, ministers warned’, The Independent, (08 February 2021), available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
coronavirus-immigration-amnesty-vaccine-b1799280.html.
63
ISI Appeal for Information on COVID-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
64
AP News Wire, ‘UK urges UN resolution for pause in conflicts for virus jabs’, The Independent, (20 February 2021), available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk-urges-un-resolution-for-pause-in-conflicts-for-virus-jabs-covid19un-resolution-conflicts-people-b1804988.html?mc_cid=c0d319096c&mc_eid=28e52effdb.
65
Y. Palansamy, ‘Putrajaya says refugees, migrant workers to be vaccinated in third phase around June, even if undocumented’, Malay Mail, (19 April 2021), available at: https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/04/19/putrajayasays-refugees-migrant-workers-to-be-vaccinated-in-third-phase-aro/1967711.
66
ISI Appeal for Information on COVID-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
67
Malay Mail, ‘Vaccinating migrant community crucial to Malaysia’s bid to wrest control of Covid-19 pandemic, says experts’, Malay Mail, (28 April 2021), available at: https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/04/28/vaccinating-migrant-community-crucial-to-malaysias-bid-to-wrest-control-of/1969987.
68
Code Blue, ‘Galen: 35% Covid Vaccine Coverage May Take A Year’, Code Blue, (30 December 2020), available at: https://codeblue.galencentre.org/2020/12/30/galen-35-covid-vaccine-coverage-may-take-a-year/.
69 Bilateral survey conducted with Iskul Sama Dilaut Omadal (March 2021).
70
V. Kumar, ‘'I am relieved': Government announces all visa holders will get COVID-19 vaccine free of cost’, SBS Hindi, (4 February 2021), available at: https://www.sbs.com.au/language/english/i-am-relieved-government-announces-allvisa-holders-will-get-covid-19-vaccine-free-of-cost.
71
The South African official registration portal for COVID-19 vaccination available at: https://vaccine.enroll.health.gov.za/#/
72
T. Mothapo ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, and so does the right to be vaccinated against Covid-19’, Daily Maverick, (10 February 2021), available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-02-10-south-africa-belongs-toall-who-live-in-it-and-so-does-the-right-to-be-vaccinated-against-covid-19/.
42

31

SOCIOECONOMICRIGHTS“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.”
ICESCR, Article 2
Under international law, “states must avoid different standards of treatment with regard to citizens and non-citizens that might lead to the unequal enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights”.1 In practice,denial of the right to nationality results in the denial of myriad socioeconomic rights. During the COVID-19 crisis, the consequences of suchdenials are disastrous. Many stateless people have lost livelihoods,
been excluded from government support and humanitarian relief, while
dealing with poor living conditions and impacts on their children’s education, cumulatively posing a threat to basic survival.
When the pandemic first took hold, states tended to adopt a ‘citizens
first’ approach to the exclusion of the stateless and those with insecurelegal status. Cognizant of the risks, ISI’s 2020 Impact Report recommended that stakeholders:
Extend emergency support packages to all, on the basis of need (and notother criteria); distribute relief regardless of legal status, prioritising first,
the furthest left behind; take special measures to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19 in densely populated areas, such as camps, collective
shelters and informal settlements.
Over a year into the crisis, there has been markedly little shift in the
response by states and other actors. Of the CESF Consortium projectfocus countries, exclusion from state relief due to lack of documentation has been reported in the Dominican Republic, Kenya, Malaysia,
Montenegro, Nepal and North Macedonia, with reports of exclusionfrom state relief due to discrimination in Bangladesh and Central Asia.
Further, the Roma communities in Montenegro and North Macedonia
have been excluded from humanitarian relief efforts. There has been asignificant impact on employment, leading to lost livelihoods among
the stateless and those at risk of statelessness. Consortium members
from Bangladesh, Central Asia, the Dominican Republic, India, Malaysia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, and Rohingyas in Bangladesh,
India and Malaysia all cited the inability to access formal employment
as a significant factor, as informal employment has been brought to a
standstill due to lockdowns and curfews.
Partners in Malaysia
and North Macedonia
CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTS HAVE
further reported barriALSO HAD POSITIVE IMPACTS. IN NORTH
ers to education durMACEDONIA, BAIRSKA SVETLINA HAS
ing lockdowns due to
DISTRIBUTED 100 HUMANITARIAN
classes going online,
PACKAGES TO FAMILIES IN NEED AND
compounded by inabilFURTHER ASSISTED 130 FAMILIES TO
ity to access internet
SUCCESSFULLY APPLY FOR
and afford devices for
SOCIAL BENEFITS.
online classes.
In spite of clear warnings that no one must be left behind if states areto successfully overcome the public health and wider socioeconomic impact of the pandemic,2 a ‘citizens first’ approach is often still thedefault. In the meantime, the economic resilience of many people has
been weakened, while their needs have only grown.

“I am deeply concerned that decision makers will step away fromtheir promises to reduce inequalities between and within countries
during the current fight against the coronavirus pandemic, by

32

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT LOST
LIVELIHOODS, EXCLUSION FROM EMERGENCYRELIEF, FOOD INSECURITY AND DISRUPTEDEDUCATION, AND MAKES THE FOLLOWINGCALL TO ACTION:PROTECT THE LIVELIHOODS OF STATELESS PEOPLE AND
ENSURE THAT UNDOCUMENTED PEOPLE AND THOSE ENGAGEDIN INFORMAL LABOUR ARE EQUALLY COVERED BY COVID-19
RELIEF MEASURES; ENSURE THAT STATELESS PEOPLE
AND OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS CAN WORK SAFELY;ENSURE THAT STATELESS CHILDREN HAVE EQUAL ACCESSTO EDUCATION AND ARE SUPPORTED TO ATTEND ONLINELESSONS THROUGH THE PROVISION OF RELEVANT TOOLS,INTERNET ACCESS AND LANGUAGE SUPPORT; AND PROVIDEA ROBUST SAFETY NET FOR ALL STATELESS PEOPLE WHO FACE
POVERTY, STARVATION AND HOMELESSNESS AS A RESULT OF
COVID-19 AND ITS WIDER SOCIETAL IMPACTS.

STRENGTHEN INSTITUTIONAL AWARENESS OF
STATELESSNESS, TO ENSURE THAT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
ALSO COVERS STATELESS AND UNDOCUMENTED PEOPLE;
EXTEND EMERGENCY SUPPORT PACKAGES TO ALL, ON THE
BASIS OF NEED (AND NOT OTHER CRITERIA); DISTRIBUTERELIEF REGARDLESS OF LEGAL STATUS, PRIORITISING THE
FURTHEST LEFT BEHIND; AND TAKE SPECIAL MEASURES TO
MITIGATE THE TRANSMISSION OF COVID-19 IN DENSELYPOPULATED AREAS, SUCH AS CAMPS, COLLECTIVE SHELTERS
AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS.

adopting policies which may reinforce and exacerbate vulnerabilities that already exist.”
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Development, Saad Alfarargi 3
LOST LIVELIHOODS“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right towork, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity togain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and willtake appropriate steps to safeguard this right.”
ICESCR, Article 6

The associated socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic on statelesspeople are far-reaching and intersectional. Country-wide lockdowns
and movement restrictions have affected employment and incomes.4
According to the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations at UNHCR, Raouf Mazou, the loss of livelihoods has acted as a catalyst to adomino chain of ‘side-effects’ that “are pernicious and devastating – on
education, mental and physical health, food security, gender-based violence, community relationships and beyond”.5
Even before the pandemic, stateless people struggled to obtain work
permits and access formal employment, due to their insecure legal
status presenting barriers – both bureaucratic and discriminatory. The
ILO observed that informal economy workers have been the hardest

hit – as of April 2020, the ILO estimated a pandemic-related decline inearnings for informal workers of up to 82% in low and lower-middle-income countries, where most internally displaced people, refugees, andstateless communities are located. The ILO has continued to emphasise the disproportionate impact on low-paid jobs, including in the informal economy.6
In Malaysia, hundreds of refugees and stateless people living in Selayang were deprived of their only source of income as they were all
workers at the local wholesale market (Pasar Borong).7 They were left
with no resources to sustain their basic needs such as food, healthcare
and housing.8 In South Africa, the lockdown exacerbated the unequal
treatment of asylum
seekers,
refugeesand stateless people.
Those working in the
A BRIEFING PAPER BY THE
informal sector could
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
no longer do so as
JURISTS SETS OUT HUMAN RIGHTS
only essential workPRINCIPLES ON THE RIGHT TO WORKers were only allowed
FOR STATELESS PEOPLE IN SOUTH
to move around, parAFRICA.9 ACCORDINGLY: “EVERYONE,
ticularly
impacting
REGARDLESS OF CITIZENSHIP STATUS,
irregular migrants and
HAS THE RIGHT TO WORK IN SOUTH
statelesspersons,
AFRICA UNDER, AMONG OTHERS, THE
who rely on selling
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
fruits, vegetables, and
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
clothes on the side
RIGHTS AND THE AFRICAN CHARTERof the street for their
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS.”
income. Although the
FURTHER, “THE RIGHT TO WORK
government included
PROTECTS BOTH FORMAL AND
citizens, refugees, and
INFORMAL WORKERS, INCLUDING
later asylum seekNON-CITIZENS.”
ers, within economic,
poverty, and hunger
alleviation schemes,
stateless people were not included. Exclusion from national response
safety nets may lead to negative coping strategies causing mental
health and secondary health concerns.10 While UNHCR has stepped
in to provide assistance, this appears to have been limited to asylum
seekers. Among stateless people, women have been most impacted,
especially those who are the heads of households, who also had to findalternative ways to support their children as their work in the informal
sector ground to a halt.
EXCLUSION FROM EMERGENCY RELIEF“Millions of people around the world are denied a nationality andthe legal rights endowed with it. At such a critical time, in the
middle of a global pandemic, they now are at great risk of being left
behind in the response.”12
UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, Filippo GrandiStateless people are often excluded from state relief efforts. Other
key actors, such as UN agencies and humanitarian actors, may also
exclude stateless people, particularly if they require identification toaccess humanitarian aid. In North Macedonia, for example, where the
Red Cross acts as the official government conduit for humanitarianrelief, undocumented members of the Roma community have been
excluded.13 In this way, stateless people who are already impacted byhistorical institutional blindness, now also suffer greater exclusion andvulnerability.
A report published by the European Network on Statelessness foundvery few examples of state aid packages being available to statelesscommunities in Europe; and no examples of active inclusion within financial assistance measures.14 In most countries, assistance isconditional upon legal status, with aid being restricted to nationals,
specific vulnerable groups with residence permits, or permanent residence holders. In France, for example, additional financial support wasprovided to lower income households and young people who were already receiving help from other financial services. Individuals who holdstateless status as per the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiéset Apatrides were included in this support system if they met certain
criteria.15 However, for the most part, these benefits did not extend toasylum seekers and communities of irregular migrants, which also include stateless people. In Croatia, there have been reports of hygiene

and sanitation measures reaching some stateless people as well as
masks and sanitisers distributed to segregated Roma settlements.16
In Estonia, stateless pensioners received face masks.17 However, mosthave depended on community groups and NGOs to provide essential,
lifesaving, support.18
In Indonesia, the government expanded the scope of welfare and unemployment benefits. While not explicitly limited to citizens, legal identity documents are required to receive these benefits, excluding manystateless people.19 In Lebanon, the government excluded non-citizens
from emergency support; and in some cases, Lebanese women withforeign spouses have also been denied emergency aid.20 UN agencies,
local and international NGOs have stepped in to provide assistance.
However, these actors have been focusing on other marginalised
groups like vulnerable Lebanese communities and refugees. Althoughthese efforts have reached some stateless people – specifically Palestinian refugees – others have been mostly excluded. Many are notaware if they are entitled to these relief packages.21 In Bangladesh,the Urdu speaking community living in camps — who have historically
been impacted by statelessness and are still discriminated and denied
equal access to documentation — did not receive government support
throughout the pandemic, despite extra government support being
provided to citizens.22 In the US, stateless people who lack immigration status are generally excluded from federal, or state-funded insurance, and are also ineligible for COVID-19 relief stimulus payments.23
Although undocumented immigrants may be able to qualify for certain
relief programmes, undocumented stateless persons are unlikely to beable to access them.24"In the US, stateless persons - especially those who are completely
undocumented, can be highly impacted by the pandemic. There isan assumption that everyone can have an ID, even an undocumented immigrant can provide one (from their respective country). ID
requirements and their arbitrary enforcement is a potential barrier
to accessing a vaccine for those of us who have no country, andconsequently no embassy or consulate to ask for help. Also, despite
being some of the most vulnerable, stateless persons are often ineligible for benefits or relief programs that are aimed at vulnerable
populations."
Founding member ofUnited Stateless, Ekaterina E
FOOD INSECURITY
With sources of income drying up and food systems disrupted by COVID-19, the WFP estimated in November 2020 that 271.8 million people,
across 79 countries, face acute food insecurity due to the compounding effects of COVID-19.25 The prognosis for 2021 is bleak, with the
expectation that “unemployment, wage loss and reduced remittances
will continue to drive increased hunger throughout this period” and “vulnerable households will be disproportionately affected”.26 Such vulnerable households are resorting to skipping meals, taking on more debt,
selling assets and cutting short their children’s education.27 Yet, discrimination against stateless people in access to food relief is all too
common. Most often, the problem lies in lack of legal documentation,
which results in denial of access to food packages. In other cases, it
stems from deeper, systemic and targeted discrimination and sometimes persecution.28
In Malaysia, for the Bajau Laut community, lack of documentation has
meant exclusion from government relief efforts.29 In India, while thegovernment created welfare packages for citizens, declared ‘foreigners’ in the controversial Foreigner Tribunals have had their ration cards
cancelled and access to welfare packages removed.30
DISRUPTED EDUCATION
When the pandemic initially broke out, many countries closed schools,
affecting 1.6 billion children. In April 2020, UNESCO estimated that 91%
of those enrolled in formal education had been affected.31 As of January 2021, over 800 million students – more than half the world’s student population – still faced significant disruptions to their education.32
Before the pandemic, schools in numerous countries “denied non-nationals entry to the classroom or demanded fees applicable to foreigners, rendering an education beyond reach [while] in others, stateless children were refused admission to final exams or had their diplomas andgraduation certificates withheld”.33 School closures have created new33

problems, with many stateless children excluded from virtual learning
programmes because they do not have access to the necessary electronic devices and online connectivity.
In West and Central Africa, all governments decided to temporarilyclose schools during the first stages of the pandemic. This impacted
over 120 million children. The interruption of their education also meant
the loss of a safety net that schools provide, leaving them exposed to ahigher risk of neglect, violence, and exploitation. This may create a systemic problem, as the longer marginalised children are out of school,
the less likely they are to return, increasing their risk of unemployment
and poverty.34 In Malaysia, remote and online learning became a barrier
to accessing education for stateless and undocumented children.35 In
Thailand, the remote location of many stateless communities and children directly impacted their ability to access online education. Wherechildren do have access to a computer or electronic device, language
barriers of the children’s parents can also undermine access. With limited proficiency in the Thai language, parents have been struggling toadequately support their children with virtual classes.36 In Lebanon,
the government provided a stipend to families with children in publicschools, but this scheme only covered children of Lebanese nationality,
excluding Syrian refugees and stateless children.37 In Bangladesh, thelack of internet inside urban refugee camps has restricted access toclasses for children from the Urdu speaking community.38

OHCHR, ‘The Rights of Non-Citizens’, (2006), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/noncitizensen.pdf.
A. Guterres, ‘This is the moment to step up for the vulnerable’, United Nations, (23 March 2020), available at: https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/moment-step-vulnerable?mc_cid=a950ea47e8&mc_eid=%5BUNIQID%5D.
3
UN HRC, ‘”Leave no one behind” – Don’t forget your commitments in your response to the COVID-19 crisis, UN expert urges States’, Reliefweb, (9 April 2020), available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/leave-no-one-behind-don-t-forgetyour-commitments-your-response-covid-19-crises-un.
4
UNHCR, ‘Livelihoods, food, and futures: COVID-19 and the displaced’, available at: https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/4b999f79628644df84ccb7c10a9edd9e.
5
UNHCR, ‘Data reveals impact of COVID-19 on livelihoods and futures’, UNHCR, (02 February 2021), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2021/2/6017c7744/data-reveals-impact-covid-19-livelihoods-futures.html.
6
ILO, ‘ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Seventh edition’, (2021), available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767028.pdf.
7
ISI Appeal for Information on Covid-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
8
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
9
International Commission of Jurists, ‘Promoting Non-Citizens’ Right to Work in South Africa’, (2020), available at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/South-Africa-Non-Citizens-Right-to-Work-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2020ENG-.pdf.
10
F. C. Mukumbang, A. N. Ambe, B. O. Adebiyi, ‘Unspoken inequality: how COVID-19 has exacerbated existing vulnerabilities of asylum-seekers, refugees, and undocumented migrants in South Africa,’ International Journal for Equity in Health,vol. 19(1), (2020), available at: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32819364/.
11
ISI Appeal for Information on COVID-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
12
UNHCR, ‘UNHCR warns stateless people risk being left behind in coronavirus response’ UNHCR, (11 May 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2020/5/5eb952222ec/unhcr-warns-stateless-people-risk-behind-coronavirus-response.html.
13
See further Chapter on North Macedonia in Part 3 of this report.
14
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation assessment of statelessness, health, and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.
pdf.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Internal survey conducted by Nationality for All in collaboration with Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020)
20
Met-Emma, ‘Lebanese Women With Foreign Spouses Denied Coronavirus Aid’, Met-Emma, (13 November 2020), available at https://met-emma.nl/lebanese-women-with-foreign-spouses-denied-coronavirus-aid/.
21
Collective for Research & Training on Development- Action, My Nationality is a Right for Me and my Family (Campaign), Ruwad alHoukouk Frontiers Rights, Salam for Democracy and Human Rights, Equality Now, Global Campaign for
Equal Nationality Rights, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 37th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Lebanon’, (9 July 2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/
UPR37_Lebanon.pdf.
22Internal survey conducted by Nationality for All in collaboration with Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020). See further Chapter on Bangladesh in Part 3 of this report.
23
Internal Revenue Service, ‘Questions and Answers about the First Economic Impact Payment — Topic A: Eligibility’, available at: https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/questions-and-answers-about-the-first-economic-impact-payment-topic-a-eligibility.
24
A. Hargett-Robinson, ‘As COVID-19 relief vote nears, undocumented immigrants struggle with no aid’, ABC News, (4 March 2021), available at: https://abcnews.go.com/US/covid-19-relief-vote-nears-undocumented-immigrants-struggle/
story?id=76141285.
25
WFP, ‘WFP Global Update on COVID-19: November 2020’, (2020), available at: https://www.wfp.org/publications/wfp-global-update-covid-19-november-2020.
26
Ibid.
27
UNHCR, ‘Data reveals impact of COVID-19 on livelihoods and futures’, UNHCR, (02 February 2021), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2021/2/6017c7744/data-reveals-impact-covid-19-livelihoods-futures.html.
28
L. van Waas and O. Spearman, ‘The life-or-death cost of being stateless in a global pandemic,’ Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, (9 July 2020), available at: https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/life-or-death-costbeing-stateless-global-pandemic.
29
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
30
See further Chapter on India in Part 3 of this report.
31
UNHCR, ‘Livelihoods, food, and futures: COVID-19 and the displaced’, available at: https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/4b999f79628644df84ccb7c10a9edd9e.
32
UNESCO, ‘UNESCO figures show two thirds of an academic year lost on average worldwide due to Covid-19 school closures’, UNESCO, (25 January 2021), available at: https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-figures-show-two-thirds-academicyear-lost-average-worldwide-due-covid-19-school.
33
UNHCR, ‘I am here, I belong. The urgent need to end childhood statelessness’, (2015), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/2015-10-StatelessReport_ENG16.pdf.
34
UNHCR, ‘Impact of COVID-19 on the protection of displaced and stateless populations – West and Central Africa’, (2020), available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/impact-covid-19-protection-displaced-and-stateless-populations-west-and-central-africa.
35
Internal survey conducted by Nationality for All in collaboration with Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020).
36
Ibid.
37
Collective for Research & Training on Development- Action, My Nationality is a Right for Me and my Family (Campaign), Ruwad alHoukouk Frontiers Rights, Salam for Democracy and Human Rights, Equality Now, Global Campaign for
Equal Nationality Rights, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 37th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Lebanon’, (9 July 2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/
UPR37_Lebanon.pdf.
38
Internal survey conducted by Nationality for All in collaboration with Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020). See further Chapter on Bangladesh in Part 3 of this report.
1
2

34

CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS“The ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom
and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights.”
Preamble to the ICCPR
Civil and political rights include the right to freedom of movement,
liberty and security, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
Most states have imposed COVID-19 restrictions, including lockdowns,
curfews and travel bans, which limit the enjoyment of these rights. According to Article 4 of the ICCPR, derogation from protection of theserights can occur in times of public emergency, but only if such derogation is in line with international standards and is non-discriminatory.1 It
is of deep concern that some states have deployed emergency powers
with little consideration for the disproportionate impact upon vulnerable groups such as the stateless.
In 2020, we reported on the disproportionate impact that COVID-19
restrictions such as border closures, movement restrictions and detention, have on the stateless.2 We recommended that key stakeholders:
Ensure that border closures do not result in family separation, including
by allowing non-citizen spouses and children to re-enter the territory; ensure that stateless persons with strong ties to a territory, including residence status, are allowed to return; provide legal status and protection to
those deemed to be irregularly on the territory; and ensure that where livelihoods are damaged by the imposition of movement restrictions, thoseaffected are adequately compensated.
and

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT
MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS, ARBITRARY DETENTION
AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
ASSEMBLY, AND MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO
ACTION:ENSURE THAT BORDER CLOSURES DO NOT RESULT IN FAMILYSEPARATION, INCLUDING BY ALLOWING NON-CITIZEN
SPOUSES AND CHILDREN TO RE-ENTER COUNTRIES; ENSURE
THAT STATELESS PEOPLE WITH RESIDENCE STATUS ORSTRONG TIES TO A TERRITORY ARE ALLOWED TO RETURN;PROVIDE LEGAL STATUS AND PROTECTION TO THOSE DEEMEDTO BE IRREGULARLY ON THE TERRITORY; AND ENSURE THAT
WHERE LIVELIHOODS ARE DAMAGED BY THE IMPOSITION
OF MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS, THOSE AFFECTED ARE
ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED.
AND
ENSURE THAT INCREASED POLICING POWERS AREPROPORTIONATE AND DO NOT RESULT IN STATELESS PEOPLE
BEING ARBITRARILY TARGETED; THAT IMMIGRATIONDETAINEES ARE RELEASED WITH ADEQUATE STATUS ANDSUPPORT, AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO BURDENSOMEREPORTING REQUIREMENTS; THAT STATELESS PEOPLE,MIGRANTS AND OTHERS ARE NOT DETAINED AS PART OF
COVID-19 RESPONSES; THAT COVID-19 MEASURES ARE NOTUSED TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND ASSEMBLY OF STATELESS PEOPLE AND THEIR ALLIES; AND
THAT STATELESS PEOPLE HAVE EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE ACCESSTO JUSTICE TO CHALLENGE RIGHTS DEPRIVATIONS IN TIMESOF COVID-19.

Ensure that statelessness determination procedures and asylum processes continue to operate during the pandemic; that increased policing
powers are proportionate and do not result in the arbitrary targeting ofvulnerable groups including the stateless; that immigration detainees are
released with adequate status and support; and less persons, migrants
and others are not detained as part of the COVID-19 response.
A year later, ongoing restrictions and rights violations continue to havea devastating impact on stateless people across the world who are
confronted with the direct impact of these measures and must deal
with weakened resilience as the crisis endures. Of the CESF
Consortium Project focus countries, arbitrary detention, the risk of arrest and fear of harassment by officials has impacted stateless groups
and those whose nationality is at risk in India, Malaysia and among
Rohingya communities.

“Emergency declarations based on the COVID-19 outbreak should
not be used as a basis to target particular individuals or groups,
including minorities. Measures taken must not involve prohibited
discrimination on any grounds such as race, colour, sex, sexual
orientation and gender identity, disability, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth orother status.”3
The Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights
MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONSThe ICCPR affirms that everyone has the right to free movement, toleave any state and to return to their own country.4 This right also extends to stateless people who, even in the absence of nationality, havea country that is their ‘own’.5 Restrictions to free movement may beprovided for by law, in times of public emergency and situations wherethese are necessary to protect national security, public order or publichealth, but only if such measures do not discriminate and are otherwise
in line with international law.6

After a year of restrictive measures implemented by governments
worldwide, it has become clear just how closely freedom of movement is linked to citizenship or legal status. The mobility prospects ofgroups with insecure legal status or who lack nationality, have been
severely curtailed, in stark contrast to citizens, who have been prioritised by states in their COVID-19 responses.7 In many cases, borders
have remained open only for citizens; with mobility restrictions having an evidently differential impact on different categories of non-citizens.8 The pandemic is changing our conception of citizenship,9 withnew movement restrictions widening the gap between ‘movers’ and‘non-movers’ – i.e. between those with resources, opportunities andlegal status who can move freely, and those whose movement is restricted by COVID-19-related or pre-existing travel and visa restrictions,and limited resources.10 Now, with the controversial roll-out of ‘vaccine
passports’ in some countries,11 mobility may be further restricted for
those who cannot access the vaccine – leaving vulnerable populations
such as the stateless even further behind.12
Early on in the pandemic, border closures caused particular problems
for families impacted by gender discriminatory nationality laws in
Malaysia,13 as non-citizen or stateless family members were unable
to return to reunite with their families.14 These discriminatory policies
did not take into consideration other factors such as residence, strong(e.g. family) ties to the state or the long-standing denial of access tonationality. Those who previously moved to another country for work
also face an increased risk of deportation. Over the course of the lastyear, the civil society has worked tirelessly to address this issue engaging in extensive lobbying and setting up online application portals
for non-citizen spouses and children of Malaysians to appeal to enter
Malasia. Their work resulted in hundreds of family reunifications sinceJune 2020.15
35

“A state’s pursuit of legitimate health goals must respect thefundamental principle of non-refoulement, including non-return
to a real risk of persecution, arbitrary deprivation of life, torture,or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”
Principles of Protection
for Migrants, Refugees,
and Other Displaced Persons, Article 6
Some COVID-19 management tools, such as border closures, travel
restrictions, and bans on asylum,16 can have potentially fatal consequences for vulnerable populations such as the stateless, migrants
and refugees.17 Reports of various countries, including Malaysia andThailand,18 pushing back boats of Rohingya refugees out to sea, is an
example of states justifying stark failures to protect, on the basis of
COVID-19.19 In Europe, over 2,000 refugee deaths have been linked toillegal push backs by EU member states of those seeking protection,
again, using COVID-19 as a ‘justification’ to deny entry.20 Further, in
Greece, mobility restrictions for those living in refugee camps or asylum centres, including the stateless, meant that the provision of healthservices was extremely limited, as people could not travel to accessquality healthcare.21“In responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, states must respect
the liberty of movement of all persons within their territory.”
Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees,
and Other Displaced Persons, Article 5
COVID-19 has also increased the socioeconomic vulnerabilities22 of
those who depend on movement for survival. This particularly affects
stateless people with insecure legal status, who tend to work in informal sectors that are most impacted by lockdowns and movement
restrictions.23 In Malaysia,24 for example, members of the Bajau Lautcommunity, who depend on fishing for their livelihoods, are afraid of
being detained and deported if they go to the sea to fish.25 In somecases, the consequences of violating restrictions, even when necessity
dictates, can be severe as states have also used COVID-19 as an excuse to justify stronger powers.26
Movement restrictions between the territory of Abkhazia and the territory of Georgia have caused multiple problems for ethnic Georgians
residing in Abkhazia, many of whom have been denied documentation
and whose nationality is at risk. Many have been attempting crossing
into Georgia during the pandemic to access healthcare,27 for livelihood
purposes, to access education, family reunification or to renew their
GOOD PRACTICE
Georgian social card,
which enables access to
IDP allowance.28 However,
IN CANADA, THE CBSA RELEASED MORE
due to the authorities in
THAN HALF OF ITS DETAINED MIGRANTS,
Abkhazia closing border
WITH MANY RELEASED INTO ATDS.29
checkpoints at the beginning of the pandemic,
many have been forced
to cross the border illicitly
by way of a dangerous river crossing. Several people have died while
attempting this journey. In March 2021, authorities in Abkhazia partially lifted movement restrictions to allow socially vulnerable people tocross from Georgia to Abkhazia. However, those in Abkhazia also facerestrictions put in place by Georgian authorities; and those travellingfrom Abkhazia are required to quarantine for five days.30
ARBITRARY DETENTION“Detention of migrants, refugees, and other displaced persons
is impermissible where such detention would expose them toserious risks to their health and life due to the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Principles of Protection for Migrants, Refugees,
and Other Displaced Persons, Article 7

36

Article 9 of the ICCPR asserts that nobody should be arbitraryly detained.31 Identifying stateless people and ensuring adequate protection
are necessary prerequisites for the respect of their right to liberty andsecurity.32 Despite this, stateless people often face prolonged, or indefinite detention.33
Conditions in detention centres are of particular concern during a global
pandemic. People in detention are at high risk of infection due to crowded conditions, inability to practice social distancing and limited access topreventive measures.34 In Australia, stateless people in immigration detention risk being infected due to the lack of social distancing, inability to
self-isolate and lack of protective equipment.35 Many of those detained
have pre-existing health conditions,36 leaving them more vulnerable tocontracting COVID-19; moreover, long-term detention also contributes toparticularly poor health.37 38.3% of detainees have been detained for an
average of two years.38 The Commonwealth Ombudsman issued a statement in June 2020 expressing concern regarding the high numbers of
GOOD PRACTICE
people in detention.39 In
Thailand, many Rohingya
are held in detention andON 22 MAY 2021, THE US
many have tested posiRE-DESIGNATED TPS FOR HAITIANS FOR
tive due to overcrowded
A PERIOD OF 18 MONTHS, BECAUSE
facilities, poor sanitation
OF THE ADVERSE SECURITY SITUATION
and hygiene.40 In the US,
IN HAITI. THIS COULD POTENTIALLY
stateless persons with
HERALD A RECONSIDERATION FROMno temporary protection,
THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION OF THE
DACA, or any immigration
CONTINUED DEPORTATION REGIME
status are vulnerable to
FOR HAITIANS, REMEMBERING THAT AT
detention. Many noncitLEAST ONE STATELESS PERSON WAS
izens have remained in
INCLUDED IN DEPORTATIONS
detention in crowded con
TO HAITI FROM THE UNITED
ditions, unable to socially
STATES IN EARLY 2021.41
distance and self-isolate
due to the authorities’
refusal to release them,
despite alternatives being available.42 In South Africa, repatriation centres and prison stations are prone to overcrowding and are now high-risksites for the spread of disease.43 Human rights groups have called for a
moratorium on the detention and deportation of migrants.44 LHR’s Detention Unit has identified the arrest of an undocumented stateless migrant
during lockdown. South Africa does not have an SDP, so in cases of undocumented people being arrested, they are often referred to as ‘irregularmigrants.’ There is therefore little data of the true extent of how manystateless people have been arrested and detained during COVID-19.
Due to concerns of overcrowding, and poor conditions, some European
countries, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden,
have released people from immigration detention. However, adequate
support is not always provided to former detainees, who are not provided accommodation and risk homelessness and poverty.45 Some countries have denied access to independent monitors to monitor detention
conditions.46 In Malaysia,
more than 700 children
were reported to be held in
detention facilities, without access to UNHCR.47“FREEDOM OF OPINION AND
In the Netherlands, there
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
was a reduction in medARE INDISPENSABLE
ical care within refugee
CONDITIONS FOR THE FULL
camps and immigration
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON.
detention centres, where
THEY ARE ESSENTIAL
some stateless people reFOR ANY SOCIETY.”side, due to lack of NGO
access.48

FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION
AND ASSEMBLY
Everyone has the right offree speech and peacefulassembly, as set out in
Articles 19 and 21 of the
ICCPR. The pandemic has
been used as an excuse
to restrict these rights bycracking down on protests
and silencing people. For

CCPR GENERAL COMMENT NO. 34:
FREEDOMS OF OPINION
AND EXPRESSION, ARTICLE 19“THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN
RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
ENABLES INDIVIDUALS TO EXPRESSTHEMSELVES COLLECTIVELY TO
PARTICIPATE IN SHAPING
THEIR SOCIETIES.”
CCPR GENERAL COMMENT NO. 37:
THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY,
ARTICLE 21

example, in Kyrgyzstan,49 the authorities reportedly used apps designed
to track COVID-19 cases to also listen in on people’s conversations.50 In
February 2021, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle
Bachelet, recalled the importance of the UN Guidance Note on protecting and promoting civic space during the COVID-19 crisis.51 However,ongoing restrictive measures have constricted civil society space foractivism on the rights of stateless people and the right to a nationality.
In Kuwait, the Bidoon, who have been arbitrarily denied access to Kuwaiti nationality, face human rights violations due to the impossibilityof expressing themselves and meeting freely. In early 2021, two Bidoon
activists were sentenced to ten years of imprisonment for organising apeaceful demonstration and publishing information on social media.52

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), Article 4(1).
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
OHCHR, ‘Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance’, (2020), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/EmergencyMeasures_COVID19.pdf.
4International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), Article 12.
5
OHCHR, ‘CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement)’, available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139c394.pdf.
6International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), Article 4.
7
M. Benton, J. Batalova, S. Davidoff-Gore and T. Schmidt, ‘COVID-19 and the State of Global Mobility 2020’, (2021), available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi_covid19-impact-global-mobility_final.pdf.
8
S. Mezzadra and M. Stierl, ‘What happens to freedom of movement during a pandemic?’, Open Democracy, (24 March 2020), available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/what-happens-freedom-movement-during-pandemic/.
9
J. Dzankic and L. Piccoli, ‘How COVID-19 is altering our conception of citizenship’, LSE Blog, (17 March 2020), available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/03/17/how-covid-19-is-altering-our-conception-of-citizenship/.
10
M. Benton, J. Batalova, S. Davidoff-Gore and T. Schmidt, ‘COVID-19 and the State of Global Mobility 2020’, (2021), available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi_covid19-impact-global-mobility_final.pdf.
11
BBC, ‘COVID passports: What are different countries planning?’, BBC News, (26 March 2021), available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56522408.
12
M. Benton, J. Batalova, S. Davidoff-Gore and T. Schmidt, ‘COVID-19 and the State of Global Mobility 2020’, (2021), available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi_covid19-impact-global-mobility_final.
pdf. See further Chapter on Right to Health in Part 2 of this report.
13
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
14
nstitute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
15
See further Chapter Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
16
Migration Policy Institute, ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources, available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/topics/coronavirus.
17
S. Mezzadra and M. Stierl, ‘What happens to freedom of movement during a pandemic?’, Open Democracy, (24 March 2020), available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/what-happens-freedom-movement-during-pandemic/.
18
E. Schwartz, ‘Myanmar’s Neighbors Must Protect Those Seeking Refuge’, Refugees International, (13 April 2021), available at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/4/13/myanmars-neighbors-must-protect-those-seeking-refuge.
19
See further Chapter on Rohingya in Refugee Situation in Part 3 of this report.
20
L. Tondo, ‘Revealed: 2,000 refugee deaths linked to illegal EU pushbacks’, The Guardian, (5 May 2021), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/05/revealed-2000-refugee-deaths-linked-to-eu-pushbacks?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
21
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation Assessment of Statelessness, Health and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.
pdf.
22
See further Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
23
M. Benton, J. Batalova, S. Davidoff-Gore and T. Schmidt, ‘COVID-19 and the State of Global Mobility 2020’, (2021), available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi_covid19-impact-global-mobility_final.pdf.
24
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
25
ISI Appeal for Information on Covid-19 and Statelessness (February 2021)
26
The Economist, ‘Would-be autocrats are using Covid-19 as an excuse to grab more power’, The Economist, (23 April 2020), available at: https://www.economist.com/international/2020/04/23/would-be-autocrats-are-using-covid-19-asan-excuse-to-grab-more-power.
27
OC Media, ‘Second man dies after swimming Enguri from Abkhazia,’ OC Media, (23 September 2020), available at: https://oc-media.org/second-man-dies-after-swimming-enguri-from-abkhazia/.
28
Democracy Research Institute, ‘Part of the population of the Gali district can no longer receive the IDP allowance and is on the verge of the humanitarian crisis’, DRI Media Center, (14 July 2020), available at: http://www.democracyresearch.
org/eng/349.
29
International Detention Coalition and HADRI/Western Sydney University, ‘COVID-19 Impact on Immigration Detention: Global Reponses’, (2020), available at: https://idcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/COVID-19-Impacts-on-Immigration-Detention-Global-Responses-2020.pdf#page=19.
30
S. Kincha, ‘Four dead attempting to swim Enguri’, OC Media, (07 April 2021), available at: https://oc-media.org/at-least-three-dead-attempting-to-swim-enguri/.
31
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1966), Article 9.
32
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Statement to the High Commissioner’s dialogue on protection challenges by the European Network on Statelessness’, (2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/5fd227554.pdf.
33
T. Burki, ‘Statelessness in the COVID-19 pandemic’, The Lancet, vol.397(10284), (2021), available at: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33894821/.
34
OHCHR, IOM, UNHCR and WHO, ‘The rights and health of refugees, migrants and stateless must be protected in COVID-19 response’, UNHCR, (31 March 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/3/5e836f164/rightshealth-refugees-migrants-stateless-must-protected-covid-19-response.html.
35
Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness, Statelessness Network Asia Pacific, Refugee Advice & Casework Service and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 37th Session of the
Universal Periodic Review: Australia’, (9 July 2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR37_Australia.pdf.
36
Refugee Council of Australia, ‘Leaving No-One Behind: Ensuring People Seeking Asylum and Refugees are Included in COVID-19 Strategies’, RCA News, (18 April 2021), available at https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/priorities-covid-19.
37
J. Green and K. Eagar, ‘The Health of People in Australian Immigration Detention Centres’, Medical Journal of Australia, vol. 192(2), (2010), available at: https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2010/192/2/health-people-australian-immigration-detention-centres.
38
Refugee Council of Australia, ‘Leaving No-One Behind: Ensuring People Seeking Asylum and Refugees are Included in COVID-19 Strategies’, RCA News, (18 April 2021), available at https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/priorities-covid-19.
39
Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Statement by the Commonwealth Ombudsman Michael Manthrope on the Management of COVID-19 Risks in Immigration Detention Facilities’, (2020), available at: https://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0017/111950/1-July-2020-Statement-by-the-Commonwealth-Ombudsman-Michael-Manthorpe-on-the-management-of-COVID-19-risks-in-immigration-detention-facilities.pdf.
40
J. Lovelock, ‘Pandemic spreads in Thailand’s immigration detention centres’, UCA News, (24 March 2021), available at: https://www.ucanews.com/news/pandemic-spreads-in-thailands-immigration-detention-centers/91864.
41
N. Miroff, ‘Biden administration grants protected status to thousands of Haitian migrants’, The Washington Post, (22 May 2021), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/biden-haitians-temporary-protected-status/2021/05/22/ae7fe5a4-bb44-11eb-bb84-6b92dedcd8ed_story.html.
42
J. Loweree, A. Reichlin-Melnick, and W. Ewing, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Noncitizens and Across the U.S. Immigration System’, (2020), available at: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_impact_of_covid-19_on_noncitizens_and_across_the_us_immigration_system.pdf.
43
P. Ragunanan, ‘“South Africa belongs to all who live in it”, COVID-19 showed it does not’, OpenDemocracy, (2 July 2020), available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/pandemic-border/south-africa-belongs-to-all-who-live-in-it-covid19-showed-it-does-not/.
44
S. Ngqakamba, ‘COVID-19: This is not the time to discriminate against migrants, say human rights centres’, News24, (16 April 2020), available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/covid-19-this-is-not-the-time-todiscriminate-against-migrants-say-human-rights-centres-20200416.
45Internal member survey conducted by the European Network on Statelessness (2020).
46
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
47
Human Rights Watch, ‘Malaysia: end abusive immigration detention’, HRW News, (20 November 2020), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/20/malaysia-end-abusive-immigration-detention.
48
European Network on Statelessness, ‘Situation Assessment of Statelessness, Health and COVID-19 in Europe’, (2021), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/2021-04/ENS_Health_Situation_Assessment_Europe.
pdf.
49
See further Chapter on Central Asia in Part 3 of this report.
50
E. Lemon and B. Jardin, ‘Across Central Asia, police states expand under the cover of COVID-19,’ World Politics Review, (14 July 2020), available at: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28910/across-central-asia-police-statesexpand-under-the-cover-of-covid-19.
51
OHCHR, ‘Bachelet updates Human Rights Council on recent human rights issues in more than 50 countries’, OHCHR Media Centre, (26 February 2021), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26806&LangID=E.
52
Human Rights Watch, ‘Kuwait Events of 2020’, (2020), available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/kuwait.
1
2
3

37

PART 3
COUNTRY OVERVIEW

38

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION;
RIGHT TO HEATH AND SOCIO-ECONOMICRIGHTS,1 AND MAKES THE FOLLOWINGCALL TO ACTION TO THE GOVERNMENTAND OTHER RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS:BANGLADESH
This chapter focuses on the COVID-19 impact
on the Urdu speaking community commonly referred to as the ‘Bihari’, who experienced many
decades of statelessness, the legacy of which
endures to this day. Their situation is exploredthrough the lens of the work of CESF Consortium Member, CoM. Please note that hundreds ofthousands of stateless Rohingya refugees also
live in Bangladesh.2
This community mostly fled to Bangladesh
from Bihar, during the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. Many of this community choseto side with Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh
Liberation War, leading to their loyalty to the newstate being questioned. Bangladeshi authorities
later recognised them as waiting to be ‘repatriated’ back to Pakistan. As a result, they were notrecognised as Bangladeshi and most were rendered stateless. In 2008, Bangladesh’s Supreme
Court recognised Biharis’ right to Bangladeshi
citizenship and ordered the issuance of ID cards
and their inclusion on voter rolls. However, they
still face discrimination in access to citizenshiprights, with many unable to access civil registration services or passports. The community still
endures structural inequality and is subjected
to prejudice which prevents its members fromenjoying the rights and services they are entitled to. They face poor sanitation conditions,
inadequate access to clean water, inadequate
housing, high levels of poverty and unemployment and poor access to education.3 At present,
there are nearly 300,000 members from the Urdu-speaking community residing in Bangladesh,approximately 151,000 of them living across
116 urban ‘refugee camps’4 established after1971.
The conditions within which the Bihari are forced
to live have been aggravated by the COVID-19
pandemic. On 26 March 2020, Bangladesh implemented its first national lockdown which waslater extended to 30 May.5 The country has sincegone through various waves of COVID-19 withthe latest lockdown being implemented on 14
April 2021. Bangladesh has a high poverty rate,
high population density, poor public health infrastructure and a lack of clean water and other life
resources which increases the risk of COVID-19
transmission. The Urdu speaking community, inparticular, those living in the ‘refugee camps’,
are at heightened risk because of their living
conditions and lack of access to services.

EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
There has been a rise in discrimination and intolerance directed towards those living in thecamps since the beginning of the pandemic.
Pre-pandemic, the Bihari faced social alienation
because of their ancestry, including mockery,harassment and discrimination. Many Biharis
try to hide their identity by speaking only Bangla
in public, but their national identification cards
list their camp address. Employers often decline
to employ Biharis, particularly for government
jobs, or demand large bribes for positions andthe difficulties in accessing formal employment
often compel Bihari parents to remove their children from school so they can earn income.

“In April, a COVID-19 positive case was identified in Hatikhana Camp, Saidpur. After that
new, local people did not want to ride on Rickshaw of [a] Biharis camp dweller. Before [they]ride on the Rickshaw they ask “are you Bihari
or Bengali”?”6

ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO COVID-19 VACCINATIONS TO ALL RESIDENTS, INCLUDING MEMBERS
OF THE BIHARI COMMUNITY AND ALL OTHER
STATELESS PEOPLE AND REFUGEES.

RIGHT TO HEALTH

ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO ALL HEALTHCARE- EMERGENCY AND ROUTINE, COVID-19 AND
NON-COVID-19 - TO THE BIHARI COMMUNITY AND ALL OTHER STATELESS PEOPLE AND
REFUGEES.

FGD Participant, Female,36, Hatikhana Camp, Saidur

In the second week of April 2020 two residentsof Geneva Camp7 tested positive for COVID-19.
They were not allowed to isolate in government
quarantine centres.8 Community leaders believe
this is due to discrimination against this minority group. Further, neighbourhood hospitals haverefused to admit COVID-19 patients. They havereportedly also denied healthcare to non-COVID-19 patients from the Geneva camp. As of
July 2020, camp residents were granted accessto government hospitals, however, they still do
not have information or access to government
run quarantine centres.

“My 6-year-old daughter was sufferingfrom a cold and severe ear pain. I went togovernment hospital for treatment, but I
did not get the hospital ticket when I said
my address was Mirpur Bihari camp. The
registrar refused me and said, “camps andcamp dwellers are most vulnerable for thecorona virus”.9

FGD participant,Female, 39, Mirpur

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: During the
lockdown, Bihari camp residents were generally
excluded from government relief schemes. For
example, in April 2020 the government launcheda cash distribution scheme for those living inpoverty, but most in the ‘refugee camps’ were
excluded on the basis of their camp address
and being identified as members of the Urdu
speaking community. The government implemented a low-cost food relief scheme for daily
wage earners to purchase rice at reduced cost.10
However camp residents reported that they did
not benefit from this scheme.11 The local Bengali and Diaspora Bengali and Bihari community,
as well as a few NGOs, provided food support tothe camp dwellers who were unable to provide
it for themselves.
Lost Livelihoods: TThe disproportionately severe impact on Urdu-speaking people’s livelihood during this pandemic has been in part, due
to the discriminatory social and legal structuresthat confine them to the informal work sector.
Many members of the community are barbers,
butchers, rickshaw pullers, domestic workers,
drivers and handicraft workers and a large number of the women work as housemaids outsideof the camp. During the lockdowns the majorityof those working as maids lost their jobs due to

ENSURE THE BIHARI COMMUNITY AND ALL
OTHER STATELESS PEOPLE AND REFUGEES HAVEEQUAL ACCESS TO QUARANTINE FACILITIESIN CASES OF POSITIVE OR SUSPECTED CASES
OF COVID-19 AND HAVE ADEQUATE ACCESS TO
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PPE INCLUDING MASKS,
SOAPS AND HAND SANITISER IN REFUGEECAMPS ACROSS BANGLADESH.

PROVIDE EQUAL ACCESS TO STATE RELIEF
EFFORTS REGARDING FOOD SECURITY FOR THE
BIHARI COMMUNITY AND ALL OTHER STATELESSPEOPLE AND REFUGEES.

REVISE THE 2016 DRAFT CITIZENSHIP BILL TO
ADDRESS ALL ISSUES REGARDING THE RIGHTTO NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS AND PRODUCE A BILL WHICH ALIGNS WITH ALL RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS.

39

a common perception among employers thatthe camps are high risk areas.12 Others working
in the informal sector also lost their jobs when
the first cases were reported in the Geneva
camp. Most people in the refugee camps live
below the poverty line and continue to struggle
to ensure basic necessities for survival including food and face a real risk of starvation.

Urdu speaking community specifically, this Billis viewed as a big threat to the 2008 judgment,
as Section 3 stipulates that the Bill shall prevail
if there are inconsistencies with any other legal
instrument, decree, judgment etc.20 If the 2008
judgment is overthrown, the citizenship of the
Bihari community will be, once again, under review.

“I work as a handicraft worker in a boutique
house along with three other local Bengali
staff members. After the lockdown, the ownersaid to stop [coming to] work and [that shewill] call [me] after the lockdown. After the
lockdown she called the three local Bengali
staff, but she did not call me. Then, I went to
the workplace to join the work, she [told meto] get out and said [it was because] you areliving in [the] camp and [the] camps are [the]most vulnerable areas of Corona virus”. 13

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTThis project, carried out by CoM, is working towards understanding the impact of COVID-19 on
the Urdu speaking community. By conducting research through a baseline survey the project has
gained a better understanding of the impact of COVID-19 on the community. The research findings
are being used to train paralegals and volunteers to become ‘rights defenders.’ Rights advocates
undertake casework in which they will assist community members through legal procedures,
bridging the gap between the community and the government. Their work facilitates access toessential government services and provides support to the formerly stateless Bihari community,
stateless persons or those at risk of stateless through a variety of social challenges such as domestic violence. This project aims to collaborate with legal organisations, engage with key stakeholders including District Commissioners and representatives of local government, the National
Human Rights Commission, the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, Members of Parliament andrelevant UN Agencies, including UNHCR and UNDP. By working with and advocating before suchstakeholders, the project aims to promote the prioritisation of this community in COVID-19 relief
and raise concerns regarding the 2016 Draft Citizenship Bill.

FGD Participant,Male, 37, Mohammadpur“The Bihari Urdu speaking camp dwellers are
an extremely poor community in Bangladesh
because they tend to work in the informal
sector. Due to COVID-19 now they are living
under the poverty line.”

Council of Minorities (CoM) is a human rights organisation working towards helping different minority groups in Bangladesh to realise their human rights. Since 2013, the organisation has been
advocating for the rights of the Urdu-speaking, formerly stateless people held in various detention
centres across Bangladesh.

CoM Chief Executive,
Khalid Hussain

Impact
The project thus far has appointed ten human rights defenders in Mohammadpur, Mirpur, Rangpur
and Saidpur. They are tasked with daily door to door outreach inside the camps and disseminating
information on COVID-19, for example how to protect against infection, using masks and PPE
correctly and how to maintain social distancing where possible in the camps. To date, 24,970
camp residents have been reached through their efforts. To date they have further organised 50
community group meetings in the camps reaching 750 residents. They have further been raisingawareness on COVID-19 vaccinations; helping to register people online so they can access thevaccine and subsequently have, to date, taken 42 residents to government hospitals to receive
their vaccines.

Disrupted Education: One of the consequencesof the lockdowns implemented as a result of
COVID-19 is the move to remote online learning.
In Bangladesh, the lack of internet inside camps
means that children from the Urdu speaking
community have limited access to online classes.14

Case Study
In January 2021, Bangladesh began the roll out of the COVID-19 vaccine for those aged 40 andabove. In order to secure a vaccination appointment one must register online. Mr. Mohammad
Hashmat is a 55-year-old resident of Geneva Camp and a tailor by profession. He wanted to get
the COVID-19 vaccine but did not know how to register online. As part of the CoM outreach activities, human rights defender, Mr. Sojib, visited Mr. Hashmat and helped him to register. Four days
later, Mr. Sojib returned to take Mr. Hashmat to the hospital to receive his first dose of the vaccine.

STATELESSNESS AND THE RIGHTTO NATIONALITY IN BANGLADESH40

The laws governing citizenship and nationality
in Bangladesh are the 1972 Constitution15, 1951
Citizenship Act,16 and 1972 Bangladesh Citizenship Order17 (later amended by the Bangladesh
Citizenship Rule 1978).18 Article 2B of the 1978
Citizenship Rule provides that an individual is
not allowed to acquire citizenship if he ‘owes,
affirms or acknowledges, expressly or by conduct, allegiance to a foreign state’, regardlessof whether an individual was a resident of pre1971 Bangladesh or not.19 This provision was
utilised to deny the Bihari community their rightto nationality. In its landmark ruling in the 2008
case of Md. Sadaqat Khan and others v. Chief
Election Commissioner, the Bangladeshi Supreme Court affirmed the citizenship rights of
the Urdu-speaking community. The judgment
further ordered the Election Commission to include the community in the electoral rolls andprovide them with National ID Cards. However,the community still faces difficulties in exercising their citizenship rights in practice. In
February 2016, the Cabinet of Bangladesh presented a Draft Citizenship Bill which can cause
statelessness as it clashes with the existing
domestic legal framework, including the rights
of citizens prescribed by the Constitution. The
Draft Bill does not contain safeguards againstchildhood statelessness; children born abroadand not registered within two years are denied
Bangladeshi nationality, and children can be denied nationality if a parent engages in an act of
war or other activity against the state. For the“Due to your work, we have learn[ed] how to protect ourselves,use masks and maintain social distance while we gather outside.
I have even been able to get my first dose of the vaccine.”
CoM CESF project outreach recipient,
Mohammad Hashmat

See further Chapter on Equality and Non-Discrimination, Chapter on Right to Health and Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
See further chapter on Rohingya in Refugee Situations in Part 3 of this report.
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and Statelessness Network Asia Pacific, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights council at the 30th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Bangladesh’, (5 October 2017), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR30_Bangladesh.pdf.
4
Other commonly used terms for these camps are ‘refugee camps’; ‘Bihari camps’; ‘urban camps’; ‘urban settlements’.
5
GardaWorld, ‘Bangladesh nation-wide lockdown extended until May 30 as COVID-19 spreads to Cox’s Bazar refugee camps / update 12,’ GardaWorld, (15 May
2020), available at: https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/342516/bangladesh-nationwide-lockdown-extended-until-may-30-as-covid-19-spreads-to-coxsbazar-refugee-camps-update-12,
6
K. Hussain, ‘Focus Group Discussion (FGD) COVID-19 Impact on The Bihari – Urdu Speaking Linguistic Minority of Bangladesh’, (2020), unpublished, on file with ISI.
7
Geneva Camp is the largest refugee camp in Dhaka.
8
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
9
K. Hussain, ‘Focus Group Discussion (FGD) COVID-19 Impact on The Bihari – Urdu Speaking Linguistic Minority of Bangladesh’, (2020), unpublished, on file with ISI.
10S. Mamun, ‘Rice at Tk10/kg: Will the real destitute get the benefit?’ Dhaka Tribune (3 April 2020), available at: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2020/04/03/rice-at-tk10-kg-will-the-real-destitute-get-the-benefit.
11
K. Hussain, ‘Focus Group Discussion (FGD) COVID-19 Impact on The Bihari – Urdu Speaking Linguistic Minority of Bangladesh’, (2020), unpublished, on file with
ISI.
12
Ibid
13
Ibid
14
Internal Survey conducted by Nationality for All, Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network, (2020).
15
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, (1972), available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367.html
16
The Citizenship Act, (1951), available at: https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=543d0d724.
17
The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, (1972), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b51f10.html.
18
Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Rules (1978), available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=&p_isn=87973.
19
R. Hoque, ‘Report on Citizenship Law: Bangladesh’, (2016), available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44545/EudoCit_2016_14Bangladesh.pdf .
20
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and Statelessness Network Asia Pacific, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights council at the 30th Session of the
Universal Periodic Review: Bangladesh’, (5 October 2017), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR30_Bangladesh.pdf.
1
2
3

CENTRAL ASIA
“In the context of a severe economic crisis aggravated by a pandemic and subsequent isolation
both at the country level and at the level of the individual, each state tries to focus, first of all, on
the needs of its citizens, and this is a reality that is reflected in the actions of governments. But
the experiences of the pandemic have shown that, first of all, in order to effectively ensure humanrights on the one hand, while combatting the pandemic and improve the situation on the other,each country needs measures aimed at creating an equitable mechanism for distributing equal
assistance to everyone, regardless of the status of people.”
UNHCR Nansen Award Laureate,
Coordinator of Central Asian Network on Statelessness, Azizbek Ashurov
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 andconsequent independence of the five Central
Asian states led to an increase in migrationand large-scale statelessness. After its dissolution, 280 million people lost their citizenshipincluding 60 million in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The
statelessness problem in the region is largely aresult of state succession with thousands leftstateless or with undetermined nationality after
failing to acquire the nationality of the stateswith which they had ties through birth, decent or
habitual residence. Also impacted were labour
migrants, who, on trying to move back to theirethnic homelands were no longer consideredcitizens as they left these homelands when they
were citizens of Soviet Russia with Soviet documentation and therefore were not consideredcitizens of / did not hold documentation of theterritories as they were re-formed to be.2
Those with nationality issues in Central Asia
have faced significant hurdles during the COVID-19 pandemic. They were excluded from relief
measures, as governments adopted a citizens
first approach.
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
The imposed COVID-19 measures in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were introduced via states of emergency. This affected
the public documentation system, leading to theclosure or significant reduction of civil registration services in some regions. As a result of actions of the civil sector and foreign consular offices, positive steps were taken in Kazakhstan3
and Kyrgyzstan4 where measures were taken to
simplify the registration of foreigners (including
stateless, undocumented persons and thosewith underdetermined nationality etc.), exempting them from renewing registration during
quarantine.
RIGHT TO HEALTH
While the stateless, undocumented or thosewith undetermined nationality issues with resident status do have access to medical services
if they have health insurance, the cost of medical services and products have risen significantly. They tend to work in the informal sector
with a low income, the cost of healthcare wasalready a barrier to access pre-COVID-19. The
lack of documentation excludes many from accessing health services except in emergencies.
Even in emergencies, all follow-up medical careis inaccessible. This has remained the same
during COVID-19 despite the increased need foraccess to medical services and the likelihood of

prolonged healthcare needs. Kazakhstani legislation does provide foreigners and statelesspersons access to free medical care when afflicted with acute diseases which pose a threat
to others.5 Plans for universal vaccination inCentral Asian countries have not yet been approved. Many people in Central Asia who havenationality issues are not currently included in
the vaccination plan in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, with civil society groups dedicating their focus to strengthen such campaigns.
It is encouraging that the governments of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have already included
asylum seekers, refugees and stateless people
in their national vaccination plans against COVID-19 on an equal basis with citizens.6
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: Due to a
combination of deep-rooted structural discrimination, a lack of awareness and administrative
problems, those without documentation are
excluded from relief measures, including UN
initiatives carried out via government bodies.
Throughout the pandemic, governments haveadopted a citizens first approach, excluding thestateless, those at risk of statelessness, the undocumented and those with underdeterminednationality from all forms of government help
including food and financial support, protective
measures, medical tests, social services andeconomic stimulus packages. Governments
have not defined the categories of people who
may need additional support during the pandemic and therefore by default, such support
has been provided only to those who alreadybenefit from social support, including for example, the disabled.

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELYAT RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS; RIGHT TOHEALTH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS,1
AND MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO
ACTION TO RELEVANT GOVERNMENTS
AND OTHER RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS:ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FOR
ALL THOSE WITH NATIONALITY ISSUES AND
EQUAL ACCESS TO SOCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMMES IN RESPONSE TO COVID 19.

IMPROVE STATELESSNESS DETERMINATIONPROCEDURES TO EFFECTIVELY IDENTIFY AND
DOCUMENT STATELESS PEOPLE. IN THE CASE OFKYRGYZSTAN, DEVELOP A STATELESSNESS DETERMINATION PROCEDURE TO LEGALISE STATUS
AND ENSURE RIGHTS.

ENSURE FULL AND EQUAL ACCESS TO ALL
STATELESS AND UNDOCUMENTED PEOPLE AND
THOSE WITH UNDETERMINED NATIONALITY IN
COVID-19 VACCINATION PROGRAMMES.      INTRODUCE PROVISIONS IN HEALTH LAWS THATENSURE THAT STATELESS AND UNDOCUMENTEDPEOPLE AND THOSE WITH UNDETERMINEDNATIONALITY ARE GUARANTEED FREE MEDICALCARE ON AN EQUAL BASIS WITH CITIZENS ANDREFUGEES.

Central Asian states have set up various programmes to prevent the spread of COVID-19,
but many with nationality issues have been
excluded. Governments provided educational
materials and tools for children of vulnerable
groups when schools switched to distancelearning models, but the children of statelesspeople were excluded. An exception should be
noted in Uzbekistan, where low-income stateless families were also included. Stateless andundocumented people have generally received
some assistance from NGOs in the form of legal
advice, small grants and sanitary supplies.
Lost Livelihoods: As a result of COVID-19, thosewith nationality issues have been cast into aneven more precarious economic situation. Lackof formal documentation means they do nothave work permits and cannot access formal
employment. They are more likely to work in
the informal economy in construction, factories,
41

public markets, agriculture etc. Due to lockdowns and quarantines, many lost their jobs,
severely impacting their livelihoods and qualityof life. Further, working in the informal economy
precludes access to state benefits and support.

to ensure all children are registered, including
those born to undocumented parents. In December 2020, President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev,
announced that in 2021 the government would
strengthen its efforts to end statelessness.19 He
reported on a new initiative which will enablearound 20,000 people who moved to Uzbekistan
before 2005, to become citizens.20

STATELESSNESSAND THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITYIN CENTRAL ASIA
The primary mode of acquisition of citizenshipin all Central Asian states is by descent. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, a child born to stateless parents automatically acquires citizenship at birth, if the parents
have permanent residence status.7 In Tajikistan,a child born to stateless parents on Tajik territory will acquire citizenship regardless of theparents’ residence status. Tajikistan is also the
only state in the region to safeguard against
statelessness in cases where a child is born toforeign parents, who cannot confer their nationality to the child.8 In all five states, citizenship is
automatically acquired by a child found in thestate territory with unknown parents.9 Citizensof the former USSR who have not yet acquired
the citizenship of the Central Asian states,
can access procedures to acquire nationality
through restoration (determination).10 This procedure is similar to naturalisation, requiring anapplication and presidential approval. In Kyrgyzstan, the procedure is further simplified andfalls under the competency of local citizenshipdetermination commissions. Below, are somefurther country specific details:

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTThis project, carried out by the Central Asia Network on Statelessness, aims to document and understand the exclusion of stateless people within Central Asia in the context of COVID-19. The datacollected will be used as an advocacy tool to engage decision makers and place statelessness on
the political agenda. The findings will also be used to raise awareness within stateless communities and those without documentation about the importance of acquiring documentation andinstructing them on what they can do. The data recorded will be utilised to raise public awarenesson statelessness. Furthermore, this project will entail an international component, expanding thescale of dialogue and contributing to global conversations on addressing statelessness.

“The outbreak of COVID-19 in the countries of Central Asia, has exposed the problem thatalong with officially recognised stateless persons, there are also many thousands of people
who have difficulty confirming their citizenship who do not have official status and identity
documents. While the Central Asian countries have official statistics on stateless persons,
there is no information about de facto stateless people, and they remain invisible to the statesystems. They remain excluded from COVID-19 emergency relief and measures. This raises
great concerns about the fate of these vulnerable groups. We call on all parties to take aunified approach of "society is protected when everyone is protected." Do not leave statelesspersons behind.”
UNHCR Nansen Award Laureate,
Coordinator of Central Asian Network on Statelessness, Azizbek Ashurov

Kazakhstan: As of 2018, Kazakhstan was home
to 7,690 stateless persons. In October 2020, thegovernment with the help of UNHCR launcheda country-wide campaign to identify statelesspersons and address their situation through theconfirmation of their nationality or registration
as stateless.11

The project is led by FVLWB, a Kyrgyzstan based NGO and active member of CANS. CANS is a
network of organisations within the Central Asia region that promotes dialogue for the exchange
of information to prevent and reduce statelessness.
Impact
The research component of this project focused on the exclusionary impact of government policies and COVID-19 relief measures. Research findings will be collated in a report that will beshared publicly in national-level advocacy efforts to raise awareness about statelessness and theimpact of COVID-19 on vulnerable communities. The project has attracted wider public attention
to the problem of statelessness and the impact of COVID-19 on stateless persons. During the
research phase, relevant authorities were contacted in a bid to understand how stateless persons
were being included in their respective COVID-19 responses. This outreach has raised the profileof statelessness and the specific issues impacting the stateless among these specific targets.

Kyrgyzstan: In July 2019, Kyrgyzstan became
the first country to resolve all known cases ofstatelessness.12 In 2014, the Kyrgyz Republic initiated the pilot campaign “Door-to-door” aiming
to register and document all stateless persons.
13,707 stateless persons were identified, and13,447 persons were granted citizenship anddocumentation.13 Further, Civil Acts entered into
force in the Kyrgyz Republic to ensure the rightto birth registration and the provision of birthcertificates, regardless of the parents’ possession of documents.14
Tajikistan: In July 2014, the Tajik government
in collaboration with UNHCR and civil society
partners launched a project to address statelessness.15 A campaign launched in November
2020 aims to raise awareness about a recently
enacted Amnesty Law16 which will facilitate theresolution of the most complex cases of statelessness, allowing thousands of stateless people to obtain residence permits, and providing
a potential three-year route to citizenship. As
of January 2021, 50,171 persons with undetermined nationality have been registered in threetarget regions (15 districts) of Sughd, Khatlon
provinces and Districts of Republican Subordination (DRS).17
Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan has one of the largest
known stateless populations in the world, with
97,346 documented cases. But, thanks to newlegislation which came into effect in April 2020,
those who had been granted permanent residency in Uzbekistan before 1995 are now eligible to become citizens.18 Uzbekistan recently
also amended its birth registration procedures
42

See further Chapter on Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Right to Health and Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
UNHCR, ‘Statelessness in Central Asia,’ (2011), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/4dfb592e9.pdf.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘Notice for foreign citizens residing in Kazakhstan,’ (22 March 2020) available at: https://www.gov.kz/
memleket/entities/mfa/press/news/details/o-voprosah-prebyvaniya-inostrannyh-grazhdan-na-territorii-rk-vo-vremya-chrezvychaynogo-polozheniya?lang=en.
4
Government of Kyrgyz Republic, ‘Foreign citizens can leave the territory of Kyrgyzstan without registration of any documents’, (28 March 2020), available at:https://www.gov.kg/ru/post/s/chet-eldik-zharandar-ech-kanday-dokument-tarizdebesten-kyrgyzstandyn-aymagynan-chygyp-kete-alyshat.
5
Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Public Health and Healthcare System, Article 88(5), (2009), available at: https://www.sabin.org/sites/sabin.org/files/documents/Publichealthlaw.pdf.
6
UNHCR, ‘UN Refugee Agency expresses gratitude to Central Asian countries for providing asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons with access to
COVID vaccinations,’ UNHCR in Central Asia, (14 May 2021), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/centralasia/14101-unhcr-commends-central-asia-for-providing-asylum-seekers-refugees-and-stateless-persons-with-access-to-covid-vaccination.html.
7
United Nations Country Team Kazakhstan, ‘COVID-19 Socio-Economic Response & Recovery Plan,’ (2020), available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/KAZ_Socioeconomic-Response-Plan_2020.pdf.
8
UNHCR, ‘Statelessness in Central Asia,’ (2011), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/4dfb592e9.pdf.
9United Nations Country Team Kazakhstan, ‘COVID-19 Socio-Economic Response & Recovery Plan,’ (2020), available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/KAZ_Socioeconomic-Response-Plan_2020.pdf.
10
UNHCR, ‘Statelessness in Central Asia,’ (2011), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/4dfb592e9.pdf.
11
UNHCR, ‘The 2019 – 2021 Regional Strategy for Central Asia’, (2019), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/centralasia/wp-content/uploads/sites/75/2019/09/
Regional-Strategy_compressed.pdf.
12Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘The World’s Stateless: Deprivation of Nationality,’ (2020) available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5f4e178c4.pdf.
13
A. Ashurov, ‘Tackling Statelessness in Kyrgyzstan and the Wider Central Asia Region – The Importance of Networking,’ (28 February 2019), available at: https://www.statelessness.eu/updates/blog/tackling-statelessness-kyrgyzstan-and-wider-central-asia-region-importance-networking #:~:text=In%202014%2C%20the%20
Ferghana%20Lawyers,a%20project%20in%20the%20region.
14
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘The World’s Stateless: Deprivation of Nationality’, (2020) available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5f4e178c4.pdf.
15
UNHCR, ‘Tajikistan: Fact Sheet February 2016’, (2016), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/operations/500017969/tajikistan-fact-sheet.html.
16
Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Amnesty Related to Legalization of Stateless Persons and Foreign Nationals Illegally Residing in the Territory of Tajikistan(2019), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e7086664.html.
17
UNHCR, ‘Tajikistan: Fact Sheet March 2021’, (2021), available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Tajikistan%20fact%20sheet%20
March%202021.pdf.
18
UNHCR, ‘Uzbekistan to end statelessness for 50,000 people’, (17 March 2020), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/3/5e70b9474/uzbekistan-end-statelessness-50000-people.html.
19
President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ‘President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Address to the Oliy Majlis, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan’, (29 December 2020),
available at: https://president.uz/en/lists/view/4057.
20
A. Pikuliicka, ‘A whole new world has opened in front of me,’ UNHCR, (20 January 2021), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2021/1/600800b84/whole-new-world-opened.html.
1
2
3

DOMINICAN REPUBLICIn the Dominican Republic, large-scale statelessness (affecting over 130,000 persons) has
been caused by the denial and deprivation ofnationality of Dominicans of Haitian descent.
The watershed and discriminatory 2013 Constitutional Court decision known as ‘La Sentencia’,excluded citizens of foreign ancestry (mainly
Haitian descent) from the jus soli system ofcitizenship acquisition with retroactive effect.2
Law 169-14, adopted in 2014 to palliate the effects of the ruling, is inadequate in scope andhas been implemented timidly. As reflected by
Beneco Enecia, “23 May 2021 sees the seventh
anniversary of the so-called naturalisation law
169-14. Distressingly, under half of those eligible to have Dominican documents restored haveachieved this. Despite 799 persons of Haitian ancestry being authorised for naturalisation, we arein the dark as to how this can happen.”3
Deliberately working within a system of entrenched systemic discrimination perpetuating
inequality, racism and xenophobia against Dominicans of Haitian descent, the government
denies birth certificates and other essential
documents to those of Haitian descent born on
Dominican soil. Important but slow progresshas occurred in that under half of eligible persons have regained their Dominican documents,
but nobody has had their naturalisation materialised among the group of persons who were
never registered. Birth certificates are required
to get married, obtain school diplomas, start abusiness, get a driver's licence or passport, anda ‘cédula’, the national ID card essential for voting and banking. This has created a multi-generational problem, where entire families lackdocumentation. These circumstances confine
Dominicans of Haitian descent to conditions ofpoverty and exclusion, with many living in isolated and impoverished ‘bateyes’.4 Women andgirls are especially vulnerable to violence andmarginalisation, including forced prostitution,
human trafficking and underage marriage. In recent years, racist and xenophobic rhetoric hasgrown within mainstream media and flourishedon social media. Human rights defenders, journalists and groups who condemn ‘La Sentencia’face growing hostility and threats.
Exceptional COVID-19 measures inherited fromthe previous government continue under the
Abinader administration which took power inAugust 2020. Lack of documentation is a barrier
to social protection. Affected persons lack medical insurance and clean drinking water, while
conditions are dire in impoverished communities. Many beneficiaries of Law 169 have theirfiles in process and are unable to apply for government assistance.5 Civil registry disruption
has exacerbated barriers to birth registration.

“Those who are stateless and at risk of statelessness in the Dominican Republic face amultitude of additional challenges that havebeen exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic
due to their lack of documentation. Dominicans affected by the Constitutional Court
ruling (CR 168-13) who have not been able tosee their Dominican nationality confirmed
or acquired, have also not been formally

included in the country’s social protection
programmes implemented to mitigate thenegative effects of the pandemic.”
UNHCR Representative for
the US and the Northern Caribbean,
Matthew Reynolds
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
In the Dominican Republic, civil registration
services were suspended during the initial stages of the pandemic from March till May 2020,
resuming in June 2020. This included civil registration offices in hospitals.6 In October 2020,
OBMICA conducted qualitative field researchon the impact of COVID-19 on Haitian migrants
and their descendants in the border region. It
conducted 50 in-depth interviews with parentsof stateless children and two focus groups, aswell as consulting with key stakeholders. The
findings show that lockdowns, curfews andother limitations on mobility prevented Haitian
migrants and their descendants from being
able to retrieve civil registration documents forthemselves and their children. For example, theprocedures for the renewal of regularisation
documents for migrant parents, which could
eventually favour the naturalisation of theirstateless children, were cumbersome under
the pandemic. Further, COVID-19 prevention
measures limiting the number of people who
can gather have complicated the process ofdelivering and receiving services. Haitian migrant parents reported difficulties in obtaining
passports / renewing regularisation status due
to pandemic-related office closures which not
only puts them at risk but also impacts theirability to meet documentation requirements forregistering their children’s birth.
Civil registration services were suspended
from March to June 2020, creating a backlogof birth registrations. Late declarations of birthincrease the risk of statelessness, especially fora population whose belonging is already questioned, due to onerous and costly requirements
for late birth declarations. The government isaddressing the existing backlog by offering registration services in decentralised locations andextending operating hours;7 and in an example
of good practice the Dominican government
extended the time allowed for registering vital
events in a timely fashion. Presidential Decree137-20 modified the time allotments so any vital events between 21 January and 3 July 2020
could be registered without a late penalty up to
60 days after 3 July 2020. Many report that financial constraints have continued to affect thepossibility of obtaining overdue documents.

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION
AND LEGAL STATUS; RIGHT TO HEALTHAND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS,1 AND
MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO ACTION
TO THE GOVERNMENT AND RELEVANTSTAKEHOLDERS:FACILITATE LEGAL CHANNELS TO ENSURE
ACCESS TO NATIONALITY, BASED ON NONDISCRIMINATORY POLICIES AND PRACTICES,WHICH PROMOTE MORE INCLUSION OF
DOMINICANS AFFECTED BY SENTENCE 168-3.

SHARE UP TO DATE INFORMATION ON THE GROUPA BENEFICIARIES OF LAW 169-14 WHO HAVERECEIVED ID AND ELECTORAL DOCUMENTS,
WITH OTHER STATE DATA BASES SUCH SIUBEN,TO GUARANTEE THAT THOSE ELIGIBLE TO
BENEFIT FROM RELEVANT SOCIAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMMES, ARE ACCORDINGLY INCLUDED.

OFFER EQUAL ACCESS TO VACCINATIONS TO ALLRESIDING IN THE COUNTRY AS A STATE POLICY,INDEPENDENTLY OF THE DOCUMENTARY STATUS
OF THE PERSON CONCERNED, TO CONTAIN AND
CONTROL COVID-19.

NATURALISE ALL DESCENDANTS OF HAITIANMIGRANTS REGISTERED IN DUE FORM (GROUP B)
WHO ARE ENTITLED TO NATURALISATION AFTERTWO YEARS OF OBTAINING A MIGRANT STATUS
UNDER THE OPERATION OF LAW 169-14.

ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT-CIVIL SOCIETY
WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE AND PROVIDESOLUTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS EXCLUDED FROMTHE CIVIL REGISTRY WHO ARE RECEIVING LEGALACCOMPANIMENT AND ASSISTANCE FROM NGOS.

EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
During the pandemic, anti-Haitianism has increased.8 President Luis Abinader announcedplans to build a wall along the Dominican-Haitian border, declaring that the ‘dividing line’
would put an end to “serious illegal immigration
problems, drug trafficking and the transit of stolen vehicles”, as well as achieving “protection
43

of territorial integrity… sought since independence.”9 While facilities were available for Haitian
migrants to renew or change their status under
the pandemic, official messaging on this was
opaque, services were centralised and affected
persons had other priorities in a context of limited mobility given the health crisis. Moreover,there were some 200,000 spontaneous returns
to Haiti during the pandemic in 2020. Sadly, theDominican authorities restarted cross-borderdeportations of Haitians in late September after
which, according to official figures, over 20,000
deportation events took place in 2020. Given
the sluggish implementation of Law 169-14 fordenationalised Dominicans of Haitian ancestry,
intended for affected persons to regain Dominican documents, there is a danger of unwitting
expulsions of stateless persons with the rightto stay in ‘their own country’ where they wereborn. The very real dangers of this happening
were demonstrated in the 2014 jurisprudenceof the IACtHR.10 Political scapegoating rhetorictargeting Haitians is not uncommon in the Dominican Republic. They are blamed for manythings including unemployment, social crises
and diseases.11
RIGHT TO HEALTHStateless persons in the Dominican Republic
have access to basic healthcare services free ofcharge, however, most are uninsured and live inpoverty which means they lack the resources topay for any prescribed medicines or treatment
out of pocket. Many report discriminatory attitudes of healthcare staff and having to wait
until insured citizens are treated first. Accessto sexual and reproductive health services for
women is hindered by nationalist, anti-Haitianrhetoric raising concerns about the cost to thestate of providing service to ‘Haitian migrant’women. This has led to a policy proposal of the
Dominican Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists to charge for services.12 In November
2020, President Luis Abinader claimed the Dominican health care system cannot sustain thecost of attending so many pregnant ‘Haitian’women.13 In recent years, there have also been
military and border security inspections of hospitals in the border region, searching for pregnant women who may be ‘illegally’ using services. While there have been no reports of specific
COVID-19 related abuse directed at migrants
or stateless persons, the official discourse of
excluding undocumented persons from the national vaccine campaign14 is creating a hostileenvironment which is fostering vaccine hesitancy by those who may already have concerns
about getting vaccinated.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: Migrants
and stateless persons lacking Dominican documents have been excluded from the expanded
programmes of social protection operated during the pandemic, including a stimulus to mitigate the loss of earnings from businesses andindividuals, especially to protect employment,
state subsidies for formal workers (Programa‘FASE I y II’) and informal workers (‘Quédate en
Casa’ y ‘Pa’ Ti’). Inclusion in these measures depends on the documentation and legal statusof the person or family member. Some of those
who are ineligible, have received support from
NGOs and international organisations. It appears that the government has shifted responsibility towards such groups and expects NGOs
and international organisations to provide for
them.
44

Lost Livelihoods: Stateless persons were already in a precarious economic situation prior
to the pandemic. The lockdown and curfew
measures have impacted their livelihoods inseveral ways. There is less work available (carpentry, construction, transportation, domesticwork), and those in informal work such as itinerant sales (lottery tickets, food) are not able to
make a living as there is less money circulatingin the community. Domestic workers were sent
home temporarily. Salaries have been cut forsome working in agriculture and selling lottery
tickets, though they are expected to work thesame number of hours. Many families are unable to buy basic provisions.
Case Study
Nadia,15 a 25-year-old stateless woman andmother of three stateless children, laments the
exclusion of undocumented people from government programmes to mitigate the economic
impact of COVID-19. Despite having registeredfor naturalisation following the passage of Law
169-14 in 2014 and receiving a regularisation
card, the government has yet to deliver on its
promise to naturalise over 7,000 stateless descendants of Haitian migrants. Their regularisation card is now expired, with unclear procedures in place for renewal or naturalisation as
Dominican citizens. She states:“In this pandemic the government has helped
many people. Those who have an identity
card are getting food and monthly deposits
of funds. Any kind of help goes to those with
documents, and those without get nothing. My[Dominican] mother-in-law and neighbours
receive funds on their card [governmentsocial assistance programme]. Wheneverthey are going to distribute something, they
say it’s for people with documents and those
without shouldn’t come. I feel so bad. Sometimes it really weighs on me. Sometimes I say,look how the people with identity cards are
getting food, and if I had gotten my ID, I would
be getting funds and food for my children.”
STATELESSNESS AND RIGHT TO
NATIONALITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Nationality and citizenship in the Dominican Republic are governed by the 2010 Constitution,16
the Migration Law 295-04 (2004),17 and the relevant constitutional case law. The descendants

of Haitian migrants risk being made statelessdue to nationality deprivation and denial. Professor, Brad K. Blitz, summarises the dual problem "…the problems of statelessness in the Dominican Republic are the result of both the denial
and deprivation of citizenship and a deliberatelack of access – in this setting, requirements are
imposed as a way to prevent access to nationality".18
The 1929 Constitution confirmed the right tonationality for Dominican-born descendants of
migrants unless they were born to persons intransit. The former 1939 Migrant Law further
stipulated that ‘in transit’ meant persons in thestate for ten days or fewer. The current 2004 Migrant Law expanded the definition of ‘in transit’
to all non-residents. This has been reconfirmed
in Article 18.3 of the 2010 Constitution, whichstates that children born to parents “residing illegally in the Dominican territory” are not entitledto nationality.
Over the past seven years, the Dominican government has re-written its Constitution, re-interpreted old laws and passed new ones. In 2013,‘La Sentencia’ was ruled by the Constitutional
Court, which retroactively stripped the nationality of tens of thousands of Dominicans, primarily
affecting those of Haitian descent. The judgment ruled that those whose parents were irregular migrants at the time of their birth shall be
deprived of Dominican nationality regardless ofwhether their citizenship was recognised under
the law between 1929 and 2007.19 Following international and domestic outcry, Law 169-14, introduced in 2014, was enacted in an attempt torectify some of the injustice caused by the 2013
‘La Sentencia’ ruling. The Law divides the affected persons into two groups, in which Group A
have birth registration and Group B do not but
had the right to Dominican nationality under
the Constitution when born. Although Law 16914 offered the chance of review, leading to thepossible confirmation of nationality, for persons
in Group A and the opportunity to naturalise forGroup B, the Law has come under criticism forthe lack of transparency in application procedures and the lack of clear solutions for part ofGroup B. The enshrining of these Laws and theongoing cases of statelessness are not isolated
events; rather, they are the consequences of along legacy of systemic discrimination towards
Dominicans of Haitian descent over multiple
decades which have left many stateless andvulnerable to human rights abuses.20

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECT
The aim of this project, carried out by DxD is to document and map specific cases of those whohave been excluded from state relief, in order to better understand the evolving needs of thestateless community and develop appropriate longer-term engagement strategies for the DxD
platform.
DxD is a platform made up of civil society organisations with a long history of service in the
Dominican Republic in human rights, education, health, sustainable development and strategic
research and litigation. Notably since Sentence 168-14, this platform has helped Dominicansof Haitian descent advocate for social inclusion, community development and better working
conditions as well as access to civil registration and the right to Dominican nationality.
Under the project, DxD is working with 250 individuals and families who have been excluded
from emergency aid in order to better understand their circumstance and to gather concrete
evidence of their exclusion. Mapping the impact of disruptions to civil registration during the
pandemic, in the context of the broader exclusions faced, the platform is interviewing 50 people.
This project is contributing to a wider study mapping the impact of disruption to civil registries
during the pandemic. To alleviate some economic burden, the platform has also granted loans

to select stateless entrepreneurs to start small scale enterprises. The goal of this effort is tosupport their endeavours and to showcase their capacities, demystifying the claim that stateless people are a drain on the economy. This project is aiding key advocacy efforts with key
stakeholders, including government officials and the UN to encourage more inclusive pandemic
relief measures. In particular, the project aims to engage with:
•

•

•
•

Junta Central Electoral (Central Electoral Board), which operates the Civil Registry in the
Dominican Republic. While it has been undergoing important modernisation in recent
years, some argue that this led to greater discrimination against children born to Haitian
migrants. As of February 2021, the CEB has circulated draft legislation intended to improve
the operation of the Civil Registry in the Dominican Republic.
Ministerio de Interior y Policía (Ministry of Interior and Police), which is the umbrella ministry for the Direccion General de Migración (Migration Management). The Ministry has aparticular role in facilitating the naturalisation of those who registered under Law 169-14.
There have been calls for the MIP to take a lead in ensuring that the Presidential Decree(July 2020)21 of outgoing President Medina and a subsequent decree by President Abinader in April 2021 to fast track the naturalisation of 799 affected persons are materialised.
Dominican Congress, which is responsible for passing relevant laws such as the Anti-discrimination Law which has been circulating in draft form for several years.
Ministerio de Salud Pública (Ministry of Public Health), which has a key role in promoting
and implementing the current national vaccine campaign. Dialogue between key civil society actors and hard to reach populations with the Ministry is necessary to ensure the widest
possible outreach and effectiveness of the campaign.

Impact
The project has helped support those Dominicans of Haitian ancestry eligible for naturalisation
by keeping them informed of the Presidential Decrees of July 2020 and April 2021 respectively
to fast track the naturalisation of some 799 persons, which should provide a precedent for theoperation of Law 169-14 in this respect. Overtures have been made directly to the MIP with aview of materialising this. However, the situation is complicated to the extent that there has
been little movement on the original 749 persons (mainly children) while a second decree has
been issued covering a further 50 persons but with continued uncertainty on not just how thismay be judicially materialised but, crucially, whether the political will exists to do so. Accompaniment of affected persons under the pandemic is providing the evidence base for re-establishingpolicy dialogue with the Dominican authorities, accounting for the extra layer of difficulty posedby the health crisis where both mobility constraints and economic problems have made it evenmore difficult to engage in civil registration processes on the part of affected persons. Those
selected for small-scale economic initiatives are demonstrating the resilience possible even instrained circumstances, when due to lack of documentation, they are normally excluded fromofficial loans.

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Right to Health and Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘The World’s Stateless: Deprivation of Nationality’ (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/WORLD's_STATELESS_2020.pdf.
Beneco Enecia, Coordinator of the Dominican@s por Derecho civil society Platform.
4‘Bateyes’ is the name for the area between sugar cane fields where many of the DR stateless populations live.
5
SICA-COVID-19 Regional Observatory, Decrees and measures adopted by the Dominica Republic, (2021), available at: https://www.sica.int/coronavirus/observatorioSICACOVID19/medidas/republicadominicana.
6
UNHCR, OEA Más Derechos Para Más Gente, CLARCIEV ‘Emergency Response of Civil Registry and Identification Offices during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Good Practices, Mechanisms and Facilities Implemented in the Americas’ (2020)
available at: http://www.oas.org/es/sap/dgpe/puica/docs/Respuesta-emergencia-RC-pandemia-COVID-19.pdf.
7
Ibid.
8
M. C. Fumagalli and B. Wooding, ‘Stranger than Fiction: Opportunities for a new narrative in Dominico-Haitian relations under Covid-19,’ Human Rights Centre Blog, (8 July 2020), available at: https://hrcessex.wordpress.com/2020/07/08/
stranger-than-fiction-opportunities-for-a-new-narrative-in-dominico-haitian-relations-under-covid-19/.
9
J. Pandian, ‘Dominican Republic: a wall of division,’ Latin America Bureau, (20 April 2021), available at https://lab.org.uk/dominican-republic-a-wall-of-division/.
10Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v The Dominican Republic, (2014), available at: http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_282_ing.pdf.
11
D. Shaw, ‘Dominican Wall of Anti-Haitianism Keeps Neocolonial Inequity Alive,’ Council on Hemispheric Affairs (29 March 2021), available at: https://www.coha.org/dominican-wall-of-anti-haitianism-keeps-neocolonial-inequity-alive/.
12
R.I. De León, ‘Tomorrow the curfew will be from 7:0 pm and there is no grace for circulation’ El Día, (30 December 2020), available at: https://eldia.com.do/manana-el-toque-de-queda-sera-a-partir-de-la-700-p-m-y-no-hay-gracia-para-circulacion/.
13
La Republica ‘Luis Abinader: “Dominican health cannot and does not support the number of Haitian (pregnant) women”’ La Republica (25 November 2020), available at: https://listindiario.com/la-republica/2020/11/25/645670/luis-abinader-la-salud-dominicana-no-puede-y-no-soporta-la-cantidad-de-parturientas-haitianas.
14
Agencia EFE ‘Excluded from vaccines, Haitians suffer a new stigma in the Dominican Republic’ Agencia EFE, (11 March 2021), available at: https://www.efe.com/efe/america/sociedad/excluidos-de-las-vacunas-los-haitianos-sufren-un-nuevo-estigma-en-republica-dominicana/20000013-4485548.
15
A pseudonym of one of the interviewees in the research. See B. Wooding and A. Petrozziello, ‘Research Brief: COVID-19 Impacts on Haitian migrants and their descendants on the southern border of the Dominican Republic’, (June2021), available at: http://obmica.org/.
16
Dominican Republic Constitution, (2010), available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2010.pdf.
17
Ministerio de Interior y Policía Republica Dominicana, ‘LEY General de Migración NO. 285-04: Reglamento de Aplicación Decreto No. 613-11’ available at: https://mip.gob.do/transparencia/images/docs/Publicaciones_Oficiales/Libros_y_Revistas/Ley%20de%20Migraci%C3%B3n/LEY%20DE%20MIGRACION.pdf.
18
B. Blitz, ‘Forced Migration Policy Briefing 3: Statelessness, protection and equality,’ (2009), available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4e5f3d572.pdf.
19
SENTENCIA TC/0168/13, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20150812200410/http://tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentos/Sentencia%20TC%200168-13%20-%20C.pdf.
20
Dominican@s por Derecho, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, and CEJIL, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 32nd Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Dominican Republic, (12 July 2018), available at:https://files.institutesi.org/UPR32_DominicanRepublic.pdf.
21
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Monthly Bulletin’, (September 2020), available at: https://www.institutesi.org/resources/monthly-bulletin-september-2020.
1
2
3

45

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELY AT
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION
AND LEGAL STATUS; RIGHT TO HEALTH;SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS; CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS,1 AND MAKES THE
FOLLOWING CALL TO ACTION TO THE
GOVERNMENT AND OTHER RELEVANTSTAKEHOLDERS:

INDIA
There is a crisis of statelessness in Assam,
India. In August 2019, 1.9 million people weredeemed ‘non-citizens’ and deprived of their nationality following the arbitrary and highly discriminatory NRC2 which sought to remove thenames of alleged undocumented migrants fromthe voters list and update the National Registryof Citizens, predominantly targeting Muslimsand Hindus of Bengali ethnicity.3 There has
further been a significant rise in racist and Islamophobic sentiment exacerbated by the pandemic.4
Those excluded can appeal to quasi-judicial
bodies or foreigner tribunals, tasked with determining the nationality of those with disputed citizenship5 and have the ultimate power todeclare a person a ‘foreigner’. As of December
2019, more than 110,000 individuals had been
declared foreigners and more than 1000 arbitrarily detained.6 There are other cases of statelessness in India including the long-standing situation of the Chakma and Hajong communities
who arrived in India as refugees from the CHT of
Bangladesh in the 1960s. These communities
have few resources and have been affected by
the loss of employment due to the pandemic. It
was only with intervention of highest authorities
that the local administration included them in
COVID-19 response, and they were given accessto food.7 There are also many Rohingya whohave sought refuge in India after fleeing persecution in Myanmar.8
Stateless persons in India’s Assam tend to livein poverty, in remote areas such as riverbanks
and islands. Social distancing is difficult which
increases the risk of exposure to COVID-19, putting an already vulnerable population at further
risk. In Assam, most of those excluded from the
NRC live in poverty and have been neglected
and excluded from COVID-19 state relief andrecovery efforts. By mid-April 2021, the second
wave in India was reporting more than 300,000
cases everyday - the highest number of dailycases reported by any country. As of 25 May
2021, there have been a total of 27,157,795 cases and 311,421 deaths.9
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
The NRC process has had devastating impacts
on those living in Assam. After publishing theresults of the NRC, the process has been put on
hold. The government had announced that the
NRC excluded can appeal their exclusion at theFTs, but this process has not yet started evenafter 22 months, leaving the 1.9 million excluded in a state of limbo, with no forum for appeal.
Further, access to legal aid has also been disrupted due to the pandemic as the FTs stopped
functioning from April-June 2020. However,from July onwards the FTs began sending notices to register new cases and re-action pendingcases. During the second wave of April 2021,
the FTs have also continued to issue notices.
The combined consequences of COVID-19 withthe requirement to appear before the FTs andthe associated financial costs of this has resulted in huge difficulties for declared foreigners.
46

RIGHT TO HEALTH
Access to vital public healthcare services havebeen hindered by movement restrictions andlack of documentation. Private healthcare services are inaccessible due to high costs andgovernment hospitals which are farther from
communities, are harder to access. Those declared ‘foreigners’ by the FTs in Assam, have
limited access to healthcare, and the resources it takes to fight their cases in court means
less ability to afford healthcare. Access to PPE
is not possible for all,10 and the stateless often
avoid seeking medical attention from government hospitals or clinics for fear of contact withthe authorities. The vaccination programme
was rolled out in mid-January 2021. Initially,
India used domestically produced vaccines but
as the second wave hit the country there wasan acute shortage and the government started
importing vaccines. By 25 April, India provided
more than 139 million persons with at least one
dose of the vaccine. This amounts to 10% of
the population, one of the lowest rates of vaccination distribution in the world.11 To receive
the vaccine, individuals must show their Aadhar
ID card which is a barrier for refugees andstateless persons who often do not have these
documents. Further, the stateless and those declared foreigners have also not been explicitly
included in India’s vaccination plan.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: The stateless in India have not received economic relief
packages provided by the government for anumber of reasons including not having a bankaccount or proof of citizenship. COVID-19 has
intensified the challenges faced by those arbitrarily denied their right to citizenship throughthe NRC process and those declared foreigners
by the FTs. While the Indian government created welfare packages for struggling low-income
earners, farmers, the homeless and migrant
workers, none of these initiatives apply to declared foreigners. Once a person is categorized
as a ‘declared foreigner’ their ration cards arecancelled.
Lost Livelihoods: The pandemic induced lockdown and the subsequent economic crisis has
severely impacted the livelihoods of statelesspersons. The disenfranchised of Assam tend towork in the informal sector, but during the lockdowns, access to these types of employment
has been severely restricted. Those who sellgoods in markets for example were no longer
able to trade resulting in the total loss of theirincome.12
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Arbitrary Detention: In order to curb the rapid
spread of COVID-19 and prevent overcrowdingin jails the Supreme Court13 ordered the releaseof certain class of prisoners. In Assam throughanother order the Court ordered that those declared foreigners who had already completed
two years of detention be released on bond,with weekly reporting requirements at thenearest police station.14 Mandatory reporting

ENSURE FREE AND EQUAL ACCESS TO COVID-19
VACCINATIONS TO ALL PEOPLE ON THE
TERRITORY, INCLUDING STATELESS PEOPLE AND
REFUGEES, WITHOUT REQUIRING A NATIONAL ID
CARD.

IDENTIFY AND REACH STATELESS PEOPLE AND
OTHER VULNERABLE AND OVERLOOKEDGROUPS, THROUGH ALL STATE AND
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES TO
COVID-19, TO PROVIDE THEM WITH CRITICALINFORMATION, HEALTHCARE AND RELIEF.

IMMEDIATELY STOP THE NATIONAL REGISTRATIONOF CITIZENS PROCESS, THE DETENTION OF
THOSE DECLARED ‘FOREIGNERS’, BURDENSOMEPOLICE REPORTING PROCEDURES FOR RELEASEDDETAINEES AND TAKE STEPS TO REMOVEBARRIERS TO THEIR INCLUSION IN SOCIALWELFARE AND RELIEF PROGRAMMES.

IMMEDIATELY CEASE EFFORTS
TO DEPORT REFUGEES AND STATELESS PEOPLE.

UN AGENCIES SHOULD QUESTION AND RESPONDTO HARMFUL AND DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES
WHICH VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCREASE
THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS FOR CERTAIN
GROUPS.  

to police stations from remote areas withouttransport facilities and loss of livelihoods has
placed severe hardship on stateless people,
exacerbated by government mandated restrictions on movement. Many released detainees
found themselves having to walk long distances to report to police stations as per their bailterms which were not relaxed even during the
lockdown. Stateless persons who are not yet
identified by the Border Police live in constantfear of arrest and even though there are noformal restrictions, there is a fear of migrating
for work in case of apprehension, detention orharassment by the police and vigilante groups,
particularly if they have to migrate beyond Assam into neighbouring states. Those still in detention live in inhumane living conditions withinadequate medical facilities.

“Despite the raging pandemic, the Assam
Border Police Organisation continue to send
persons declared as foreigners and at riskof statelessness to detention centres. The
Supreme Court has acknowledged the risk
detention centres pose to the spreads of thedeadly COVID-19, so why is there still thispressing need to detain declared foreigners?
There should be a complete ban on detention
during the pandemic.”
Lawyer specialisingin legal support to people at risk ofstatelessness in Assam, Aman Wadud“I still live in the fear of being taken back to
the detention camp. We have suffered a lot inthese last 12 years and our struggle just got
worse with the pandemic. I do not know how
to rebuild my life now.”15
Case Study: Maijaan Nessa, 38, belongs to
Assamese Muslim ethnicity. She is married toMomresh Al, a Bengali Muslim form the Barpeta
District of Assam. She was marked as a doubtful voter and eventually had to appear before a
FT which declared her a ‘foreigner’ in 2015. She
was called to the police station to give her thumbprint so that the case would be dismissed but instead was arrested and detained without any prior notice and without being allowed to inform herfamily. She was detained in Kokrajhar Detention
Camp for four years and ten months.
Maijaan has three daughters and two sons. Her
eldest son was 18 years at the time of her detention and unable to deal with the stress of his
mother’s detention, the trauma of which led to his
untimely death. Her other children were minors
at the time. She and her husband are illiterate
and from very poor socio-economic background.
Her husband works odd jobs including as a rikshaw-puller, carpenter and daily wage worker.
Fighting Maijaan’s legal battle has been traumatic and financially devastating for the family.

“My husband and my children even begged
and borrowed for my sake to pay for our legal
cases in the High Court and Supreme Court. It
is not fair for us to go through this hardship.
I am still seen as an illegal Bangladeshi bypeople in my village and this has affected notjust me but my whole family.”

Maijaan was released from detention after theSupreme Court ordered the release of those
who have been detained for two or more years.
She must now report to the police station every
week. Her husband migrates for work, but she
cannot go with him because of this reporting
requirement. This has significantly impacted her
livelihood, placing the family in a very precarious
situation as they have to repay the loan they took
to fight her legal case.
STATELESSNESS AND
THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY IN INDIA
The 1949 Constitution of India16 (rev. 2016) andthe Citizenship Act 195517 (last amended 2019)set the rules for citizenship in India. According
to the Citizenship Act, there are five ways ofacquiring Indian Citizenship: birth, descent, registration, naturalisation and the incorporationof territories.18 In 1986 the Citizenship Act wasamended stating that a child born in India canonly get Indian citizenship if at least one parent
is an Indian citizen and the other is not an ‘illegal migrant’. Another amendment made in 2003
stated that a child born in India was eligible
for citizenship acquisition only if both parents
were Indian citizens at the time of the child’sbirth. In 2003 the Act was amended again in
Section 3(1)(b) stating that persons born after
1 July 1987 in India shall be a citizen if either
parent is an Indian citizen. This does not however provide safeguards against stateless forindividuals born after 1 July 1987 to non-citizen
parents.19 Indian law also does not provide extra safeguards against new cases of childhood
statelessness in such situations.
Another risk of statelessness is posed by Section 5 of the Citizenship Act. This provision
provides for individuals without citizenship who
are residing in India to acquire citizenship byregistration if certain criteria are met.20 However, this provision excludes those deemed as‘illegal migrants’.21 As a consequence, many
residents without citizenship remain at risk ofstatelessness. In 2019, the government passed
the contested Citizenship (Amendment) Act
2019, which facilitates citizenship to six specified communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan that entered India before
31 December 2014. However, the Law is discriminatory on the basis of religion, excluding
Muslims.22 Consequently, Muslim migrants or
refugees from the above-mentioned states facea greater risk of statelessness. The Act also
discriminates against Sri Lankan refugees of
all religions who have been in India for the last
thirty years. In August 2019, the Supreme Court
ruled that a child born after 3 December 2004
will not be included in the NRC if either parent
is considered a ‘doubtful voter’ or declared a‘foreigner’23 thus making them ineligible for Indian citizenship and putting the child at risk ofstatelessness.

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECT
The aim of this project, carried out by DAJI, is to empower communities at risk of statelessness toaccess COVID-19 relief, social protection services and legal aid. At the state level, this project aims
to increase access to COVID-19 relief measures and social services for people affected by FTs
and the NRC in Assam. DAJI provides legal aid to those fighting cases in the FTs. At the national
level, this project aims to strengthen the RNCN that aims to campaign and advocate for the rightto nationality as a human right. RNCN-DAJI are undertaking several documentation, research andadvocacy efforts related to COVID-19 response, detention and FTs. These include documenting
the impact of FTs in the context of COVID-19 on individuals and families through engagement withclients and their lawyers. This project is currently pioneering three different advocacy campaigns:
on the child’s right to nationality, inclusive COVID-19 responses and social security and on fair andjust trial procedures in the FTs. As such, the project aims to engage and advocate before different
stakeholders, including the Office of the NRC Coordinator in Assam, the National Human Rights
Commission and UN agencies including UNHCR and UNICEF.
DAJI works with marginalised communities to empower them to realise their rights, access services and protect their freedoms. DAJI works with refugees, minorities, displaced people and people
at risk of statelessness through community mobilisation, education, training and humanitarian support.
Impact
The RNCN/DAJI report24 on the exclusion of stateless people from COVID-19 response and social
security provisions of the state has been disseminated to many national and international stakeholders. The report was launched in a webinar in February 2021. Highlights of the report wereposted on RNCN social media accounts and reached over 500 followers. DAJI has further supported more than 600 families in Assam to reach out to authorities on birth registrations, particularlyof children born during the pandemic, and reached out to government authorities and UNICEF in
Assam to facilitate corrective steps. DAJI is also advocating for access to other social security
provisions including subsidised food, pensions for the elderly and disabled persons. DAJI is currently supporting 40 stateless persons to challenge the charges against them in the FTs. Lawyers
and paralegals associated with legal aid efforts have been trained and the community has been
supported by them to address problems they are likely to face when challenging their exclusionfrom the NRC. The RNCN network is further being strengthened to include people with expertise ofdifferent disciplines related to citizenship.

47

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Right to Health, Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights and Chapter on Civil and Political Rights in Part 2 of this report.
Right to Nationality & Citizenship Network and DAJI, ‘Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam: A study into the exclusion of those at risk of statelessness in COVID-19 responses and social security provision’, (2021), available at: https://drive.
google.com/file/d/1DP5GRma4utgd25Oa61VuURVAMeMNq84x/view.
3
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘The World’s Stateless: Deprivation of Nationality’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/WORLD's_STATELESS_2020.pdf.
4
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
5
Right to Nationality & Citizenship Network and DAJI, ‘Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam: A study into the exclusion of those at risk of statelessness in COVID-19 responses and social security provision’, (2021), available at: https://drive.
google.com/file/d/1DP5GRma4utgd25Oa61VuURVAMeMNq84x/view.
6
BBC News, ‘Statelessness in Assam’ BBC News, (16 December 2019), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=veeJFuluaJ0&t=591s.
7
S. Purkayastha, ‘Before COVID, Chakma, Hajong tribes of Arunachal battled stormy migration’, The Federal, (4 May 2020), available at: https://thefederal.com/covid-19/before-covid-19-chakma-hajong-tribes-of-arunachal-battled-a-stormy-migration/.
8
See further Chapter on Rohingya in Refugee Situations in Part 3 of this report.
9Worldometer, ‘India,’ Worldometer, (2021), available at: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/india/.
10
Right to Nationality & Citizenship Network and DAJI, ‘Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam: A study into the exclusion of those at risk of statelessness in COVID-19 responses and social security provision’, (2021),
available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DP5GRma4utgd25Oa61VuURVAMeMNq84x/view.
11
J. Holder, ‘Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World,’ New York Times, (3 May 2021), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html.
12
Right to Nationality & Citizenship Network and DAJI, ‘Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam: A study into the exclusion of those at risk of statelessness in COVID-19 responses and social security provision’, (2021),
available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DP5GRma4utgd25Oa61VuURVAMeMNq84x/view.
13
Business Today, ‘Coronavirus: Supreme Court orders release of prisoners to decongest jails,’ Business Today, (23 March 2020), available at: https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/coronavirus-supreme-court-orders-release-of-prisoners-to-decongest-jails/story/398982.html.
14
Express News Service, ‘Coronavirus: SC orders release of those lodged in Assam detention centres for 2 yrs or more’ The Indian Express, (14 April 2020), available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/assam/coronavirus-supremecourt-orders-release-of-those-lodged-in-assam-detention-centres-for-2-yrs-or-more-6361305/.
15
Mamiran Nessa, 43, mother of three, was detained in 2010 after an FT declared her a ‘foreigner’ despite lack of legal representation. Her daughter had to drop out of school to take care of the household in Mamiran’s absence. Her youngest son was
only three years old when she was detained. Mamiran was pregnant when she was sent to the detention camp and after torture at the hands of female police officers inside the detention camp, gave birth to a still born child. Her husband fought her
legal battle but passed away two years before her conditional release. She was not informed about her husband’s death and was not permitted to see him before he died or attend his funeral. The economic hardship of fighting the legal battle has had
a long-standing impact on the family that they are still struggling with which has been exacerbated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
16
The Constitution of India (1949), available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/India_2016?lang=en.
17
The Citizenship Act of India (1955), available at: https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4210/1/Citizenship_Act_1955.pdf.
18
Ibid.
19
S.Kakarala, D. Prakash, and M. Tiku, ‘India and the challenge of statelessness: A review of legal framework to nationality’, (National Law University, Delhi Press 2012), available at: http://nludelhi.ac.in/download/publication/2015/India%20and%20
the%20Challenges%20of%20Statelessness.pdf.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Right to Nationality & Citizenship Network and DAJI, ‘Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam: A study into the exclusion of those at risk of statelessness in COVID-19 responses and social security provision’, (2021),
available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DP5GRma4utgd25Oa61VuURVAMeMNq84x/view.
23
Livelaw News Network, ‘Assam: Children Born After Dec 3, 2004 Not To Be Included In NRC If Any Of The Parent Is A ‘D’ Voter, Declared Foreigner Or Pending Case,’ Livelaw News Network (13 August 2019),
available at: https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/assam-nrc-children-born-after-december-3-2004-dv-df-pft-147161.
24
Right to Nationality & Citizenship Network and DAJI, ‘Marginalised and Impoverished in Assam: A study into the exclusion of those at risk of statelessness in COVID-19 responses and social security provision’, (2021),
available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DP5GRma4utgd25Oa61VuURVAMeMNq84x/view.
1
2

48

KENYA“It is so unfortunate to realise that the Nubians are still facing challenges on access to nationality
and citizenship. This has limited them from accessing services such as healthcare, securing
job opportunities or even ownership of land which has further increased their vulnerability bothsocially and economically.”

Member of Parliament Kisumu Town East,
Hon. Shakeel Shabbir

Kenya is home to an estimated 18,500 statelesspersons and approximately five million Kenyans
who face discrimination and barriers in accessing nationality documentation.2 Various minority communities are impacted, including thePemba, Galjael, Shona and those of Burundian,Congolese, Indian and Rwandan descent. Nubians and some Kenyan Somalis whose access to
Kenyan identification documents is limited, also
face challenges with documentation.3 These minority communities experience institutionalised
discrimination in the issuance of documents
and are subjected to a vetting process, basedon ethnicity, in order to acquire an identity cardor passport.
Kenya’s moves toward digital identification,brings with it, further threats to the inclusionof these excluded communities. Kenya recently introduced the National Integrated Identity
Management System which has made accessto public services conditional on access to a
HudumaNamba (identification number). Those
who are denied a HudumaNamba because they
are undocumented or stateless, will be denied
basic human rights including access to universal healthcare, education, employment and accessing government services.4
Kenya has been heavily impacted by the pandemic. This chapter focuses specifically on
the Nubian community, who faced significant
challenges before the pandemic, which havebeen greatly exacerbated by COVID-19. The
Nubian community are denied their equal rightto nationality, as they were not recognised as
citizens at the time of independence,5 meaning
they were required to apply to register as citizens (through a highly discriminatory vetting
process), rather than automatically acquiring it.6
As a result, many remain without recognition or
documentation of citizenship. Nubians reside
in various parts of Kenya, such as Kisii, Mombasa, Eldama Ravin, Kakamega, Kilifi, Kisumu
and Bungoma counties, but the majority live inKibera, the largest slum in Nairobi, with a population of over 500,000 people.
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
During lockdown, various registration and government offices closed, leaving a backlog of
unregistered births, deaths, marriages and ID
and passport applications. This prevented Nubians from beginning the process of obtaining
IDs and resulted in pending applications being
put on hold. Civil registration offices have since
opened with limited capacity, but Nubians andother stateless communities continue to facechallenges accessing and acquiring documentation because of the backlogs of applications
which have built up during office closures.
These challenges have been caused by thesuspension of vetting which led to increased

number of applicants waiting to be vetted.
RIGHT TO HEALTH
Kibera is a hotspot for the spread of COVID-19
due to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions(including lack of water and hygiene products
including soap), where social distancing andgood hygiene practices are difficult to follow.
Stateless persons and those at risk of statelessness face many barriers in accessing
healthcare services. The lack of legal identity
is a barrier to accessing inpatient treatment
from government and private hospitals, withhigh costs also preventing access to private
healthcare. As a result, many are left to dependon herbal medicines. The fear of police harassment, arrests and detention due to lack of documentation further decreases the likelihood ofseeking medical help. At the time of writing, theNubian community living in areas where local
NGO, NRF, operates had not been included in
the national vaccination plan. Due to the limited
number of vaccines available, lack of legal documentation, remote geographical location andpoverty, those with nationality issues currently
have very little access to the vaccine.
Mental Health: There are reports of deteriorating mental health in Dadaab refugee camp, arise in suicides and a 50% rise in psychosocial
consultations. Cash and food transfers have
dropped by 10 to 30%, and refugees suffer fromanxiety and uncertainty about the future, especially in the context of COVID-19.7

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELYAT RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS; RIGHT TOHEALTH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS,1
AND MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO
ACTION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS:ENSURE THAT STATELESS COMMUNITIES ARE
INCLUDED ON AN EQUAL BASIS IN THE COVID-19
VACCINATION PLAN.

WORK WITH CIVIL SOCIETY, UNHCR, THE RED
CROSS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS TO ENSURE
THAT STATELESS COMMUNITIES ARE INCLUDEDON AN EQUAL BASIS IN THE COVID-19 ACTION
PLAN AND ARE PROVIDED WITH FOOD AND
OTHER RELIEF ACCORDING TO NEEDRECOGNISE STATELESS COMMUNITIES IN
KENYA, FACILITATE THEIR EQUAL ACCESS TO
NATIONALITY AND REMOVE BARRIERS TOACCESSING LEGAL DOCUMENTATION.

IMMEDIATELY STOP FORCED EVICTIONS OF THE
NUBIAN COMMUNITY, WHO FACE DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESSING NATIONALITY AND ARE AT
HIGH RISK OF CONTRACTING COVID-19.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: The National Hygiene Programme, locally known as‘KaziMtaani’8 is designed to cushion the mostvulnerable but able-bodied citizens living in
informal settlements from the impact of COVID-19. The programme provides income generating opportunities by recruiting residents ofthese settlements to carry out projects aimed
at improving the environment, service delivery
and infrastructure development. In Nairobi,
more than 12,000 Kenyans living in Mathare,
Kibera, Mukuru and Korogocho have benefited
from this initiative. Despite the reach of this programme, only those with ID cards are recruited,
excluding many Nubians and stateless persons
from its benefits. Further, to receive a weekly
stipend of 1000 shillings under this programme,
one must be in possession of a registered SIM
card.9Lost Livelihoods: Prior to COVID-19, the Nubian community experienced difficulties in accessing services due to lack of documentation
which has been exacerbated by the pandemic.
The community continues to face challenges
accessing government aid such as food relief, medical care and PPE. The government
offers basic services and cash transfers done49

primarily through mobile phones which areinaccessible to many Nubians and statelesspeople, as they cannot register and use a SIM
card without providing an ID card. As a result of
lockdowns, job opportunities have been scarceand where work is available, the lack of documentation acts as a barrier to employment. This
has resulted in an increase in poverty, malnutrition and the inability to acquire basic necessities. A general lack of awareness of the impact
of COVID-19 and prevention measures amongstateless communities and the general public,
further heightens their risk.
STATELESSNESS AND THE RIGHTTO NATIONALITY IN KENYA
The 2010 Constitution,10 2011 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act11 and 2001 Children

Act12 all contain provisions pertaining to citizenship in Kenya. Accordingly, citizenship is mainly
acquired at birth on a jus sanguinis basis, if at
the time of birth, one parent was recognised asa citizen of Kenya.
The causes of statelessness can be grouped
into two broad categories – legal and administrative.13 Legally, there are no adequate safeguards to prevent statelessness. The 2010
Constitution, for example, states that Kenyans
acquire citizenship at birth; however, this only
applies if at least one parent was registeredas a Kenyan citizen at the time of birth.14 The
Constitution and the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act15 both further contain provisions
regarding the renunciation of citizenship andthe deprivation of citizenship which do not safeguard against statelessness.16 Administratively
speaking, many Kenyans do not have access to

identification documents due to gaps in registration, identification and citizenship procedures.17
This is compounded by a lack of awareness of
the importance of birth registration.18
In practice, ethnic minorities including Kenyan
Nubians, Kenyan Somalis and the Coastal Arabs
are disproportionately threatened by the risk ofstatelessness.19 Obstacles include difficulties
in obtaining documents such as identity cards
or passports.20 Moreover, children from thesecommunities face a higher risk of statelessness
as birth certificates cannot be used as proof of
citizenship.

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTThis project, carried out by the Nubian Rights Forum, entails monitoring and responding tohuman rights violations, documentation issues and challenges faced by the Nubian community during the pandemic. Through evidenced based advocacy, the project aims to end thegovernment-led vetting process that Nubians must undergo, which hinders their acquisitionof identity documentation. This project aims to raise awareness about statelessness and theimpact of COVID-19 through media outreach utilising local Kenyan TV and radio stations andsocial media. This project disseminates information about COVID-19 in the community; ensuring accurate information is accessible to all. The project focuses on building partnerships
and networking to improve the situation. In collaboration with Kibera Food Drive, the projectprovides food relief assistance in the form of small food packages and sanitation supplies
to those without access to COVID-19 state relief measures. Finally, the project provides legal
support to Nubians applying for their identity documents and legal counselling and mental
health support to those who have suffered human rights abuses during the pandemic.
NRF is a human rights organisation dedicated to promoting the rights of the Nubian community in Kenya by assisting stateless persons within the community with their applications for
identity and citizenship documents. NRF trains and supports community-based paralegals
who aim to empower those at risk of statelessness by navigating the Kenyan legal system.
ImpactThrough a weekly radio show, NRF has been spreading awareness about statelessness anddisseminating information about COVID-19. Through dedicated social media work, NRF hasgrown their supporter base and are now reaching thousands of people on platforms including
Facebook and Twitter. Through their radio show and social media presence they have beenable to raise awareness within the Nubian community on COVID-19, its impacts and preventative, life saving measures. NRF has gathered information on how the pandemic has affected stateless Nubians so they can offer bespoke assistance and gather an evidence base tostrengthen advocacy against the discriminatory identity documentation vetting process.

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Right to Health and Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘The World’s Stateless: Deprivation of Nationality’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/WORLD's_STATELESS_2020.pdf.
UNHCR, ‘Stateless Persons’, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/ke/stateless-persons.
4
K.Abuya, ‘Huduma Bill 2019 Proposes Mandatory New Identity Issuance, Tied to All Gov’t Services’ Techweez (18 July 2019) available at: https://techweez.com/2019/07/18/huduma-bill-2019/.
5
GLOBALCIT, ‘Report on Citizenship Law: Kenya’, (2020), available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/66749/RSC_GLOBALCIT_CR_2020_7.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
6
Ibid.
7
F. Nyasuguta, ‘Covid-19 fuels mental health crisis in Dadaab’, The Star,(13 October 2020), available at https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/north-eastern/2020-10-13-covid-19-fuels-mental-health-crisis-in-dadaab/.
8
Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development, KaziMtaani, (2020), available at: https://housingandurban.go.ke/national-hygiene-programme-kazi-mtaani/.
9
Ibid.
10
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya,(2010), available at: http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010.
11
Kenyan Citizenship and Immigration Act,(2011), available at: https://admin.theiguides.org/Media/Documents/ImmigrationCitizenshipAct2011.pdf.
12Children’s Act,(2001), available at: http://kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=No.%208%20of%202001.
13
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and UNHCR ‘Out of the Shadows Towards Ensuring the Rights of Stateless Persons and Persons at Risk of Statelessness in Kenya’, (2010), available at: http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/CivilAndPoliticalReports/Statelessness%20Report.pdf.
14
Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘The Status of Stateless Communities in Kenya’, (2021). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHVIXcFfaQQ&t=306s.
15
Kenyan Citizenship and Immigration Act,(2011), available at: https://admin.theiguides.org/Media/Documents/ImmigrationCitizenshipAct2011.pdf.
16
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and UNHCR, ‘Out of the Shadows Towards Ensuring the Rights of Stateless Persons and Persons at Risk of Statelessness in Kenya (2010), available at: http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/CivilAndPoliticalReports/Statelessness%20Report.pdf.
17
M.Medi,‘A Call to Action to End Statelessness in Kenya’ KHRC, (24 January 2019), available at https://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/blog/675-a-call-to-action-to-end-statelessness-inkenya.html.
18
Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘The Status of Stateless Communities in Kenya’, (2021). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHVIXcFfaQQ&t=306s.
19Children’s Act,(2001), available at: http://kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=No.%208%20of%202001.
20
Ibid.
1
2
3

50

MALAYSIA“The Impact of Statelessness can be seen through many facets; one being the most crucial isthe dire need to earn a living without being discriminated through low wages, long hours anddangerous jobs. Other impacts are evident through the unavailability to get access to healthcare
services while children are not allowed to enrol in schools. They are often denied basic rights andthe reflection of many attitudes towards the stateless community results in them living in fear
while making it almost impossible to earn a livelihood and survive.”
SUHAKAM, Children’s Commissioner,
Professor Dato’ Noor Aziah Mohd Awal
There are various groups who are stateless orat risk of statelessness in Malaysia. In 2010, it
was estimated that 66,000 of a population of
2.6 million indigenous persons were statelessor undocumented in Sarawak.2 Other groups at
risk include members of the Indian Tamil community in West Malaysia,3 and the Bajau Laut in
Sabah, East Malaysia: a traditionally maritime
migratory people.4 There are also many Rohingya refugees in Malaysia.5 Malaysian nationality
law is gender discriminatory: women, as a resultof systemic and nationalised discrimination do
not have equal rights to confer citizenship totheir children and spouses. Children born outside Malaysia to Malaysian mothers may only
acquire Malaysian citizenship at the discretionof the government by registering at a Malaysian Consulate or the National Registration Department in Malaysia and applying via Article
15(2) – citizenship by registration – which is aprocess fraught with delays, repeated rejections
without reasons and no guarantee of approval.6
At the same time, men do not have equal rights
to transmit nationality to their children who areborn out of legal wedlock.7 Stateless people in
Malaysia are more likely to endure discrimination, marginalisation and xenophobia as a resultof their exclusion from society, perpetuating
their vulnerabilities and exacerbating the consequences of statelessness in time of pandemic
and in times of ‘normality’.
The stateless and those at risk of statelessness
were, prior to COVID-19, vulnerable to humanrights abuses. In the wake of COVID-19, thesevulnerabilities have been sharply exacerbated.
The lack of access to documentation and inability to acquire Malaysian legal identity hasheightened the precarity of stateless persons
and non-citizens, during the pandemic. Non-citizen spouses and children continue to face barriers to entering Malaysia due to border closuresand travel restrictions. Families with special
circumstances have also not been allowed into
the country, including families who lack financial
resources, and those with family members withphysical and mental disabilities. It is anticipatedthat there will be an increase in the number ofchildren of Malaysian women without accessto citizenship because of the inability of theirmothers to return to Malaysia to give birth.
Along with medical facilities being less accessible, civil registration offices have either closed
or restricted services, making it much harder toregister births.
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
As a result of an increase in COVID-19 cases,
the National Registration department switchedto only allowing e-payment (debit or credit card)for registration, as opposed to cash payments.8

This is problematic as many stateless persons
do not have access to the internet or a bank account.
RIGHT TO HEALTH
Throughout the pandemic, healthcare services
have been largely inaccessible to stateless communities in Malaysia. Increased medical fees
and the risk of arrest faced by undocumented
migrants who seek treatment from government
health institutions, are significant barriers.9 At
the beginning of the pandemic, the Ministry of
Health claimed all persons, regardless of status
could and should seek testing and not fear arrest or detention, however, it subsequently failed
to protect those rounded up during raids by the
Ministry of Defence.10 Non-citizen spouses andchildren of Malaysians who faced difficulties
accessing immigration services during the national lockdown due to closure of offices, long
delays in booking appointments, sometimes formany months and appointments being highly
competitive also faced these risks associatedwith accessing healthcare, if their visas, passes or permits had expired as a result of thesedelays.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: Statelesspersons and non-citizens have not been included
in government relief measures. However, somefaith groups and civil society organisations haveprovided humanitarian aid to refugees, migrants
and stateless people. For the Bajau Laut community, for example, the lack of documentation
has meant exclusion from government relief
efforts. Government food baskets were only given to those with citizenship during the MCO in
April 2020 and October – December 2020. This
forced NGOs to step in, but navigating the MCO
order presented challenges, further complicated by an order from the government that only
allowed authorities to distribute aid. The MCO
also interfered with the ability of the Bajau Lautpeople to acquire their own food, as they rely
on fishing as their main source of sustenance,
which they were prohibited from doing during
the lockdown. The community further reported
fear of detention and deportation if they were tofish. An organisation that works with Bajau Lautchildren in Sabah, Iskul Sama Dilaut Omadal,
worked with the community to distribute food tofamilies in need.11

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELYAT RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS, RIGHT TOHEALTH, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTSAND CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,1 AND
MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO ACTION
TO THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS:

IMPLEMENT TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURESTO ENSURE ALL CHILDREN HAVE EQUAL ACCESSTO MALAYSIAN CITIZENSHIP WHEN BORNOVERSEAS, PARTICULARLY IF TRAVEL TO
MALAYSIA AND MARRIAGE REGISTRATION WASNOT POSSIBLE DUE TO BORDER CLOSURES AS A
RESULT OF COVID-19.  

ENSURE NON-CITIZEN SPOUSES AND CHILDREN
OF MALAYSIANS ARE NOT DENIED ENTRY TO
MALAYSIA, BEARING IN MIND THAT LONG-TERM
FAMILY SEPARATION IS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF CHILDREN AND UNDERMINES THE RIGHTTO FAMILY LIFE.

GUARANTEE EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN COVID-19 VACCINATION SCHEMES,TESTING AND TREATMENT TO NON-CITIZEN
SPOUSES AND CHILDREN OF MALAYSIANS,MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND
STATELESS PEOPLE.       GRANT ALL NON-CITIZEN CHILDREN OF MALAYSIANS AS WELL AS STATELESS CHILDREN, ACCESS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION AND HEALTHCAREFACILITIES ON AN EQUAL BASIS TO MALAYSIANCITIZENS.  

LISTEN TO AND CONSULT GRASSROOTS COMMUNITIES AND NGOS TO FIND SUSTAINABLE
SOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS COVID-19 IMPACTS
ON STATELESS COMMUNITIES AND MALAYSIANBINATIONAL FAMILIES.  

Lost Livelihoods: Due to the lack of legal status,
the stateless mainly have access to informal
sector employment. As a result of lockdowns,
many lost their jobs and incomes. There has
also been an increase in socio-economic marginalisation faced by Malaysian binational families due to general restrictions on employment
51

of non-citizen spouses. With a recent rise inxenophobic sentiments there are greater restrictions to holding licenses to open and run
businesses or access other employment opportunities. Hundreds of refugees and statelesspeople living in Selayang have been deprivedof their only source of income as they were all
workers at the local wholesale market (Pasar
Borong). They are now left with no more resources to sustain basic needs such as food,healthcare and housing.12 While some Malaysians have been allowed intermittently back towork, amidst multiple strict MCOs, refugees andstateless people were not allowed to return towork in markets. Anti-immigrant rhetoric has resulted in difficulty accessing work in wholesalemarkets, construction sites and some factories.

basis as legally married Malaysian men in binational marriages,21 leaving them with an unequal access to Malaysian legal status, and/or
putting them at risk of statelessness. The Constitution also does not allow Malaysian men to
confer citizenship where a child is born outsideof a legally recognised marriage.22 Even though
there are a number of legal safeguards against
statelessness, they are rarely strictly applied
resulting in statelessness and the risk of statelessness being an ongoing issue.23

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECT
While there are numerous groups affected by statelessness in Malaysia who all face deprivations
as a result of COVID-19, the CESF Malaysia project focuses on the impact of Malaysia’s gender
discriminatory Citizenship Law. The project aims to mobilise the reform of gender-discriminatory
citizenship laws, policies and practices to address both the unequal treatment of Malaysians inbinational marriages (the rights of Malaysian women to confer citizenship to their spouses andtheir children born overseas) and inequality faced by non-citizen spouses during COVID-19.

“The COVID-19 pandemic has led to adevastating loss of livelihoods and income,threatening vulnerable communities withhunger and heightened risks for women andchildren in binational marriages with noblueprint for recovery. Sustainable solutions
are required with the coming together ofgovernments, communities and civil society
to navigate successfully into the future of2021 and beyond.”13

The project initially gathered evidence on bureaucratic inconsistencies and challenges facedby Malaysians, their non-citizen spouses and children during COVID-19, especially due to thelack of access to a Malaysian legal identity among non-citizen spouses and children. Throughevidence-based engagement with policymakers and strategic litigation, the project makes thecase for law reform and increased awareness among policymakers. The project will build on
research findings to also increase awareness within affected communities, the public and key
stakeholders. Further, the project creates alternative avenues to address the increased need forsupport and information as a result of COVID-19.

Disrupted Education: Accessing education has
also been impacted due to enhanced barriers
for stateless and undocumented children. These
challenges have been exacerbated by the shift
to online and remote learning which requires access to the internet and IT equipment.14
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Arbitrary Detention: In May 2020, hundreds of
undocumented immigrants were rounded up,
arrested and detained, leading to condemnationby the UN.15 As of December 2020, Malaysia’s
Ministry of Health reported at least 735 positive cases of COVID-19 in immigration detention centres nationwide. The high-risk nature ofdetention centres for the spread of COVID-19
was acknowledged by the Director General of
Health.16 In January 2021, prison overcrowding resulted in clusters of COVID-19 within detention facilities, exacerbated by the inability
to social distance, causing cases to surge.17 In
October, more than 700 undocumented children
were reported to be held in detention facilities,
which the government did not allow UNHCR
access to. Non-citizen spouses of Malaysians
have also been detained, after initially being
charged for non-immigration related offences;
as seen in the case of the detention of a Vietnamese non-citizen spouse18 and the prolonged
detention of a Nigerian spouse, Simon Adavize
Momoh.19 Despite possessing valid visas, these
non-citizen spouses’ were detained, raisingconcerns about the liberty of those who cannot
renew, extend or apply for visas, due to disruptions caused by the pandemic.
STATELESSNESS AND
THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY IN MALAYSIA
According to the Constitution, citizenship canbe acquired by birth, registration or naturalisation.20 The Constitution prohibits gender-discrimination while containing gender discriminatory provisions which increase the risk ofstatelessness. The Constitution does not allow
legally married Malaysian women in binational
marriages to confer their citizenship on theirchildren born outside Malaysia, on an equal
52

Impact
The project has successfully initiated engagement with policymakers and received acknowledgement from the offices of the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Minister of Women, Family andCommunity Development and the National Security Council. As a direct result of evidence-based
engagement and constant media presence, the project has successfully lobbied for non-citizen
spouses and their children to renew or apply for visas and permits without having to leave thecounty; non-citizen spouses and their children (including those without LTSVP) to enter Malaysia
upon approval from Immigration; and the setting up of a systematic online application portal
for non-citizen spouses and children of Malaysians to appeal to enter or exit Malaysia. Finally,
as a direct result of these interventions, the campaign to bring home non-citizen spouses of
Malaysians led to the Malaysian government allowing spouses to return, resulting in hundreds offamily reunifications since June 2020.

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Right to Health, Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights and Chapter on Civil
and Political Rights in Part 2 of this report.
Rosa Luxembourg Siftung, ‘Atlas of the Stateless: Facts and Figures about Exclusion and Displacement’, (2020), available at: https://www.rosalux.de/en/
publication/id/43022/atlas-of-the-stateless.
3
Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas Malaysia, Voice of the Children, Yayasan Chow Kit, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, Statelessness Network Asia Pacific and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 31st Session of the Universal
Periodic Review: Malaysia’, (29 March 2018), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR31_Malaysia.pdf.
4
R. M. Razali, ‘Addressing Statelessness in Malaysia: New Hope and Remaining Challenges’, (2017), Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Statelessness
Working Paper Series No. 2017/9, available at: https://files.institutesi.org/WP2017_09.pdf.
5
See further Chapter on Rohingya in Refugee Situations in Part 3 of this report.
6
UNHCR, ‘Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and Statelessness’, (2020), available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5f0d7b934.pdf.
7
Free Malaysia Today, ‘Federal Court rules illegitimate child not entitled to citizenship’ (28 May 2021), available at: https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2021/05/28/federal-court-rules-illegitimate-child-not-entitled-to-citizenship/.
8
K. Inus, ‘COVID-19: It’s appointments only now at Sabah NRD offices,’ The Star, (30 September 2020), available at https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/09/30/covid-19-it039s-appointments-only-now-at-sabah-nrd-offices.
9Internal Survey conducted by Nationality for All, Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020).
10
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic: Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
11
ISI Appeal for Information on Covid-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
12
Ibid
13
Ibid
14
Internal Survey conducted by Nationality for All, Open Society Justice Initiative and Refugee Solidarity Network (2020).
15
FMT Reporters, ‘UN warns police raids will push migrants into hiding,’ FMT Reporters, (2 May 2020), available at: https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2020/05/02/un-malaysia-warns-police-raids-will-push-migrants-into-hiding/.
16
Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘Malaysia must pursue alternatives tom immigration detention for children immediately,’ (8 December 2020), available at:https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/APRRN-Statement-on-Malaysia-Immigration-Detention-of-Children.pdf.
17
I. Lim, ‘As COVID-19 sweeps through lock-ups, govt moves to temporarily house inmates at National service camps,’ Yahooo!news, (26 January 2021), available
at: https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/covid-19-sweeps-lock-ups-075743896.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAIwY6APwxfhW0BGK9vo7iO1FxkR3rkHftjNkzVth2ck7fOowzaaQOJGo8sK2jMaqiXg3037-vYi2qM7PqJ4zjTMAyJPbiifiqEFXnrgglBnyTEgiwOznuWVKdzzZ18RxlZLnWepCXW5IogHjpLDbHwIIAeU431fIdwdfO5V7Ppqu.
18
FMT Reporters, ‘UN warns police raids will push migrants into hiding,’ FMT News, (2 May 2020), available at: https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2020/05/02/un-malaysia-warns-police-raids-will-push-migrants-into-hiding/.
19
I. Lim, ‘Nigerian Simon Momoh files court challenge against Immigration Dept’s deportation order, Malaysian wife appealing to home minister,’ Malay Mail, (21April 2021), available at: https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/04/21/nigerian-simon-momoh-files-court-challenge-against-immigration-depts-deport/1968195.
20
Federal Constitution of Malaysia, (1957), (Rev. 2007), available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malaysia_2007?lang=en.
21
Part II Section 1 of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, (1957), available at: http://www.commonlii.org/my/legis/const/1957/17.html.
22Part II Section 17 of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, (1957), available at: http://www.commonlii.org/my/legis/const/1957/17.html.
23
Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas Malaysia, Voice of the Children, Yayasan Chow Kit, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights, Statelessness Network Asia Pacific and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 31st Session of the Universal
Periodic Review: Malysia’, (29 March 2018), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR31_Malaysia.pdf.
1

2

MONTENEGRO"Our goal is clear: in times of COVID-19 aid should be distributed to all vulnerable groups, regardless of documentation, and we should reopen the public call to resolve legal status and simplify
the entire procedure. These are not simple steps, but either way we have to do it, for the sake ofpeople who over the last few decades have been denied basic human dignity."
Phiren Amenca Executive Director,
Elvis BerišaStatelessness in Montenegro is underreported,and Montenegro has been criticised for its inadequate study of statistical data. The majorityof stateless people in Montenegro belong to theRoma community who were disproportionality
impacted by the fall of the Yugoslavian republicin the 1990s, the subsequent forced displacement from Kosovo in 1999,2 changes in the determination of citizenship and the destructionof civil registers during the Kosovan Conflict.3
Other minority groups at risk of statelessness inMontenegro include ethnic Egyptians.
Unresolved documentation is a decades-longproblem that the people of the Roma community live with in Montenegro. Many Roma arewithout legal status as they missed the timeframe within which such applications could be
made. Although the Strategy for Social Inclusion of Roma and Egyptians 2016-20204 aimed
to register people with unresolved legal status
and assist in this process, in reality, lack of realistic and credible data on statelessness, aswell inadequate steps to address it, mean thatthese schemes do not work in practice. As a result, the Roma are discriminated against, marginalised and face the threat of deportation to
Kosovo and elsewhere. Lack of access to birth
registration is a leading cause of statelessness
and risk of statelessness in Montenegro. Whilethe birth registration process has improved inrecent years, the procedure to register births
is diverse and complex among both the Romaand Egyptian communities. Very often, parents
who do not have documentation must travel to
Kosovo to register a child as a citizen of Kosovo,
following which they can return to Montenegro.
The procedure is costly and complicated, withburdensome evidentiary requirements.
In 2018, Montenegro introduced a statelessness determination procedure in a bylaw to
the Law on Foreigners.5 As of January 2021,
only five people had secured stateless statusthrough the procedure.6 The consequences of
the conditions they are forced to live in havebeen worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic andinstitutional blindness has resulted in an increase of their vulnerabilities, as well as a very
real threat to health and safety.
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
The Roma community faces significant challenges in accessing legal status, which disproportionately affect Roma children. To registera birth, an authorised person (generally parent
or legal guardian) must attend the municipal
registry office and provide official proof of theidentity and civil status of both parents.7 Thiscan be an impossible requirement for Roma parents living with unresolved status. Further, often
parents who do not have regulated citizenshipmust travel to Kosovo to register the child there.

During the pandemic, the ability to do this was
significantly impacted by movement restrictions and the cost of COVID-19 testing prior totravel. Those Roma who do hold IDs are also atrisk when their documents expire. It is common
for the Ministry of Internal Affairs to put the individual ‘on hold’ without any further indication ofwhen their documentation will be renewed. This
impacts the ability to secure employment, ultimately impacting livelihoods. During COVID-19
there has been no official suspension of birth
registration services. However, the services are
slow and complicated, making it more difficult
for Roma and Egyptian minorities to accessthem.
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATIONEver since the pandemic began, public manifestations of antigypsyism have increased, asRoma and Egyptians have been perceived as
carriers of the virus. The state reacted to news
of one confirmed COVID-19 infection in thesettlement of Vrela Ribnička, by strictly locking
down the settlement for two weeks, with all
movement prohibited.8 Strong public reactions,
including online hate speech, exemplified public approval of this discriminatory treatment.
The lockdown segregated an already isolated
community and disrupted much of the progress
made in the last decade in combatting discrimination.
RIGHT TO HEALTH
Discrimination in access to healthcare is common in Montenegro. The stateless and those atrisk of statelessness are entitled to free emergency healthcare, but are often required to pay
a fee. The stateless can access private healthcare, but the high costs make these services inaccessible to many. The National Immunization
Strategy originally stated that stateless people
will be the last people to receive the vaccine.9 In
a show of good practice, the new Montenegrin
Government changed the policy and placed theRoma in a priority group, adding that they do
not have to be insured by the Health Insurance
Fund of Montenegro, and also that all Montenegrin residents, regardless of citizenship status,
can receive the vaccine. The Institute of Public
Health has clarified that this includes persons
who are in the process of resolving their legal
status and those who have no documents at
all.10“Given low computer literacy as well as accessing electronic services, the implementation of immunisations in the Roma population
is being carried out without prior appointment at all vaccination points. Work is being
done to open vaccination centers to improve
both health education and the healthcare of
the Roma population.”11

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELYAT RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS; EQUALITYAND NON-DISCRIMINATION; RIGHT TOHEALTH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS,1
AND MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO
ACTION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS:

EXTEND STATE RELIEF, INCLUDING FINANCIAL
RELIEF, FOOD RELIEF PACKAGES AND HYGIENEITEMS TO STATELESS AND UNDOCUMENTED PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT REGISTERED AT THE CENTERFOR SOCIAL WORK AND CARE.

PROVIDE EQUAL ACCESS TO FREE HEALTHCARETO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ROMA AND EGYPTIANCOMMUNITY.

PROVIDE DIGITAL TOOLS FOR ONLINE LEARNING,
SUCH AS TABLETS AND FREE WI-FI, TO ALL ROMAAND EGYPTIAN CHILDREN, INCLUDING THOSEWHO ARE UNDOCUMENTED OR STATELESS.      REOPEN THE 2015 PUBLIC CALL FOR APPLICATIONS TO PROVIDE A FACILITATED PATHWAY
TO LEGAL STATUS AND NATIONALITY, FOR ALL
PEOPLE WITH UNRESOLVED LEGAL STATUS.

SIMPLIFY THE PROCEDURE TO ADDRESSUNRESOLVED LEGAL STATUS AND NATIONALITY, THROUGH REDUCING PAPERWORK, AND
IMPROVING DIGITAL COOPERATION BETWEENNEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.

53

practices for children abandoned by their mothers, or whose mothers are without ID.19 Further,in 2018 a bylaw to the Law on Foreigners introduced an SDP20 giving stateless people theopportunity to formalise their stateless status
and thus acquire legal residence and access tobasic rights.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: During the
COVID-19 pandemic, those without resolved
legal status have not been able to benefit fromgovernment measures. The government rolled
out four levels of financial help for Montenegrin
citizens.12 Each level only applied to Roma with
documentation and did not sufficiently accountfor their needs. The first level of financial help
was the distribution of €50 to persons who receive social assistance via the Center for Social
Work; the second level was also €50 to assist
those officially recorded as unemployed at theLabor Office within the Employment Bureau; thethird and fourth instalments of €100 or €200
also applied to people on the records of theCenter for Social Work. The increase in financial
aid at the third level coincided with the Montenegrin general elections. Roma who lack documentation were denied access to these financial relief programmes. Those living in informal
settlements were completely excluded because
they do not have any official identity documents.

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECT
The project “Learn My Name”, carried out by Walk With Us -Phiren Amenca, aims to tackle
statelessness in Montenegro by documenting the exclusion of the Roma community within
Podgorica via evidence-based research, and developing a better understanding of the impact
of exclusionary COVID-19 relief policies on the stateless. The findings of this project will be
used as a basis for advocacy, initiating dialogue with humanitarian and government actors,
calling for the simplification of procedures and improving regional collaboration. In particular,
the project will engage the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which is responsible for regulating thelegal status of the Roma and Egyptian communities; the Ministry of Economic Development,
which is responsible for the distribution of financial assistance; the Ministry of Finance andSocial Welfare, which is responsible for the distribution of assistance packages, and the Red
Cross.

Undocumented Roma communities were also
not fully reached by humanitarian organisations.
For example, the official humanitarian organisation in Montenegro, the Red Cross, did not include those without documentation in its relief
efforts, as it relies on government data, due to
its role as the official conduit of the government
relief fund. In cooperation with the Red Cross,the state provided aid packages, some of which
did reach people with resolved legal status andin some cases, this type of assistance also
went to people with unresolved legal status.
However, this was only if they lived close to theareas where assistance was given, for example
in Camps 1 and 2 in Vrela Ribničk. Such relief
has only been provided once or twice since thepandemic started and has not been sufficient toalleviate its impacts.
Lost Livelihoods: The stateless, and those atrisk of statelessness are generally unable toaccess formal employment due to their lackof legal documentation. They tend to therefore
work in the informal economy. As a result of the
lockdowns, many lost their sources of income
pushing them further into poverty. The Romacommunity is very aware of the pandemic andthe health risks. However, due to lack of government assistance and state failures to ensure
food and clean water for all individuals, they
are forced to continue working, if they can, toensure survival.
STATELESSNESS AND THE RIGHTTO NATIONALITY IN MONTENEGROThe Constitution of Montenegro 2007,13 Law
on Montenegrin Citizenship 2008,14 and Law on
Foreigners 2018,15 collectively set out the rules
related to citizenship. The 2008 Citizenship Acts
stipulates that Citizenship can be acquired via
origin; birth on the territory; naturalisation andinternational agreements and treaties.16 Due tothe nexus between lack of birth registration andthe risk of statelessness, in 2015, the Law on
Non-Contentious Proceedings17 was amended
to establish a procedure to register the date andplace of birth of those born outside the formal
health system. This amendment has improved
the situation of late birth registration in Montenegro and reduced the risk of statelessness.18
By December 2020, Montenegro had also begun
the implementation of new birth registration

54

Roma Youth Organization “Walk with us- Phiren Amenca” is a non-profit organisation that actsin the best interest of the Roma and Egyptian community in Montenegro, monitoring policies
and actively improving conditions for this community in the areas of employment, education,
housing, health, legal status, safety and equality. This organisation creates opportunities for
non-formal education and dialogue in order to challenge prevalent stereotypes and antigypsyism. It aims to integrate and actively engage young Roma and Egyptian men and women
into Montenegrin society, strengthen institutional capacities for the inclusion of Roma andEgyptian communities and reduce negative attitudes and discrimination against Roma andEgyptians in Montenegro.
Impact
The impact of this project is primarily reflected in obtaining more accurate data on the number of people with unresolved legal status, as well as understanding how the distribution of
COVID-19 aid took place and how many people were left out.21 In discussions with relevant
institutions, there have been visible shifts and sensitisation on the issue, as well as a clear
intention and recognition of the necessity to reopen the public call to submit requests for the
resolution of legal status in Montenegro, which originally closed in January 2015. The project
has also placed additional pressure on the Montenegrin Government to honor its pledges toengage in European political activities to end statelessness.

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Equality and Non-Discrimination, and Chapter on Right to Health andSocio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
2
S. Baftijari ‘Bez dokumenata, bez budućnosti’, Roma Net, (29 June 2020), available at: https://romanet.me/vijesti/bez-dokumenata-bez-buducnosti/.
3
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, European Network on Statelessness and the European Roma Rights Centre, ‘Roma Belong: Statelessness, Discriminationand Marginalisation of Roma in the Western Balkans and Ukraine, (2017), available at: http://www.errc.org/uploads/upload_en/file/roma-belong.pdf.
4Montenegro Ministry of Human and Minority Rights ‘The Strategy for Social Inclusion of Roma and Egyptians in Montenegro 2016-2020’, (2016), available at:https://www.rcc.int/romaintegration2020/files/admin/docs/516f4f38750495e5df7c9596503cf7e4.pdf.
5
Rulebook on the Procedure Initiated upon Request for Statelessness Determination, Bylaw to the Law on Foreigners (2018), available at: https://www.refworld.org/
docid/5c2f72804.html.
6
UNHCR, ‘The Campaign to End Statelessness January – March 2021 Update,’ (2020), available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/607852747.pdf.
7
UNHCR offices in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (and Kosovo: SCR 1244) – Bureau for Europe,‘Report on Statelessness in South Eastern Europe’ (2011), available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/514d715f2.pdf.
8
Al Jezeera Balkans, ‘Marinović: U samoizolaciji 23 zgrade u podgoričkom naselju Vrela Ribnička’, Al Jazeera Balkans, (6 April 2020) available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWyLWdrE-CI; see also P. Milić ‘Montenegro: 201 people tested for coronavirus, infected and three police officers’, VOA, (4 April 2020), available
at: https://www.glasamerike.net/a/crna-gora-koronavirus-slu%C4%8Dajevi/5360221.html.
9Institute of Public Health Montenegro, ‘Montenegro: National Strategy for the Introduction, Distribution and Administration of COVID-19 Vaccines’, (2020), available
at: https://www.ijzcg.me/me/publikacije/nacionalna-strategija-za-uvodenje-distribuciju-i-prmjenu-covid-19-vakcina.
10
Aleksandar, ‘Immunization of the Roma Population: Mediators and new vaccination points for more accessible immunization of the community’, RomaNet, (28April 2021), available at: https://romanet.me/vijesti/medijatori-i-novi-vakcinalni-punktovi-za-pristupacniju-imunizaciju-re-zajednice/.
11
Institute of Public Health, Montenegro.
12
Ministry of Economic Development, Measures to Support the Economy and Citizens for the II Quarter of 2021, (2021).
13
The Constitution of Montenegro, (2007), available at: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/me/me004en.pdf.
14
Law on Montenegrin Citizenship, (2008), available at: https://data.globalcit.eu/NationalDB/docs/Law%20on%20Montenegrin%20Citizenship%20(consolidated%20
2016)%20EN.pdf.
15
Foreign Nationals Law, (2018), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5552f8384.html.
16
J. Džankić, ‘Country Report: Montenegro’, European University Institute, Florence, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory,(2010), available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19627/Montenegro.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
17
Law on Non-Contentious Proceedings, (2006), available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5552036d4.pdf.
18
UNHCR, ‘Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 29th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Montenegro, (January 2018), available at: https://www.
refworld.org/docid/5b0819d54.html.
19
UNHCR, ‘Montenegro Fact Sheet: February 2021,’ (2021), available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Bi-annual%20fact%20sheet%202021%20
02%20Montenegro.pdf.
20
Rulebook on the Procedure Initiated upon Request for Statelessness Determination, Bylaw to the Law on Foreigners (2018), available at: https://www.refworld.org/
docid/5c2f72804.html.
21
Walk with us - Phiren Amenca, ‘Roma without regulated legal status in the time of pandemic COVID-19,’ (2021), available at: http://phirenamenca.me/?content=docs&mod=publics&tip=single&id=303.
1

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELYAT RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS; RIGHT TOHEALTH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS,1
AND MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO
ACTION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND
OTHER RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS:

NEPAL
Due to gender discriminatory nationality laws, apatriarchal social structure and low birth registration rates, Nepal may have one of the largest
stateless populations in the world.2 Hundredsof thousands of persons who should be recognised as Nepali citizens, have no legal identity
or status. Without status, Nepal’s ‘non-citizens’
face disadvantage, exclusion and discrimination
throughout their lives, forced to live in the margins of society. They cannot own or inherit land,
travel freely, study, practice certain professions,open a bank account or even get a sim card.3
Although there are no up-to-date and accurate
statistics of statelessness in the country, thescale of the issue remains significant, with nosignificant progress being made to address it.4
In Nepal it is projected that around 6.7 million
people do not have citizenship certificates, ofwhich, an unconfirmed number of the population are actually stateless.5
Statelessness and the risk of statelessness iscaused and exacerbated by Nepal’s gender-discriminatory Constitutional provisions and the
Citizenship Act of 2063 (2006).6 The Act wasrecently amended through an ordinance thathas neither expanded nor restricted the constitutional provisions.7 The law denies Nepali women equal rights in conferring nationality to theirchildren. The Constitution of Nepal8 states thata child born in Nepal to a Nepali mother whose
father cannot be traced, can acquire citizenshipby descent, however if it is later determined thatthe father is a foreigner, the child will lose theircitizenship by descent and must become a naturalised citizen. The legal procedure requires the
Nepali mother to submit a self-declaration stating that the father of the child cannot be traced
and is not a foreigner. If the statement is later
found to be untrue, the nationality of the child iscancelled. Additionally, street children and otherfoundlings who are not raised in an orphanage
do not have legal means to apply for nationality
and are stateless.
Statelessness is also a product of the xenophobic attitudes of the government officials
and the jingoistic political agendas of the central political parties. The Madheshi community
and in particular the Madheshi Dalits are mostaffected by this as they have the least accessto citizenship certificates.9 As Nepal shares anopen border with India and there is a culture ofcross-border marriage, there are a number ofchildren born to such mixed nationality marriages who are at risk of statelessness because of
the chauvinistic bureaucracy which is dominated by the hilly ethnic groups.
Other groups who are stateless or are at riskof statelessness include the ‘Lhotshamps’ whowere deprived of their Bhutanese nationalityand displaced from Bhutan to Nepal during
the 1990s. The total number of displaced Lhotshamps is over 100,000; 19,573 of whom still reside in refugee camps in Nepal. Descendants ofTibetans exiled from Tibet in the 1950s are also
at risk. Despite many being born in Nepal, they
are still at risk of statelessness.10
The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown policies have had a negative impact on the

livelihood of those who are stateless and at riskof statelessness in Nepal, exacerbating theirpre-existing vulnerabilities as a result of theirlack of nationality.

“The statelessness issue is a very pressing
issue even without the pandemic. Thispandemic has hit us in two ways. First, weare stuck and have not been able to do any
substantial lobbying at the policy making
level. Second, it has hit us hard and caused
a crisis of survival. The stateless have been
pushed further into marginalisation. Survival
has become a priority and has affected
citizenship-less people at every angle.”
CAPN Founder,
Deepti Gurung
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
During the first lockdown (24 March to 21 July2020), CDOs were closed, causing delays to citizenship application processes. Those with applications pending were further unable to reachout to government offices to follow-up on theircases.11 Following the lockdown, civil documentation and other government offices reopened.
During this time, people were able to register for
citizenship certificates. This however was short
lived – as the second wave of pandemic hit Nepal, all the government offices closed again.

“Due to lockdown CDO offices are closed. I
would have started my master’s degree aftergetting citizenship and had plans to find ajob. At this time of pandemic and lockdown,
nothing can be done to pressure government
regarding citizenship and waiting for things
to get normal and stay at home doing nothing
about my problems is actually very stressful.
I wish the lockdown ends soon so that I cancontinue the procedures for the citizenship.”12
CAPN Field Study Respondent,
Bikash Mandal, 22

ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO FOOD AND ALL OTHER
RELIEF MEASURES FOR THOSE WORKING IN THE
INFORMAL ECONOMY AND THOSE WHO HAVELOST THEIR INCOME DUE TO COVID-19.

ENSURE EQUAL AND FREE ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE AND MENTAL HEALTHCARE SERVICESFOR STATELESS PEOPLE, THOSE AT RISK OF
STATELESSNESS AND OTHER MINORITIES,INCLUDING BY ALLOCATING ADEQUATE SPACE
IN GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS TO THOSE WHO
CANNOT AFFORD PRIVATE HEALTHCARE.

IMMEDIATELY REMOVE IDENTIFICATIONREQUIREMENTS AND ASSOCIATED FEES TO
RECEIVE COVID-19 AND NON-COVID-19 HEALTHCARE IN GOVERNMENT HOSPITALS, INCLUDINGCOVID-19 TESTING AND VACCINES.

AMEND ARTICLES 11(3), 11(5) AND 11(7) OF THE
NEPALI CONSTITUTION TO REMOVE GENDERDISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS AND ENSURE
WOMEN CAN CONFER CITIZENSHIP TO THEIR
CHILDREN AND SPOUSES ON AN EQUAL BASISAS MEN.

IMMEDIATELY AMEND THE 2006 NEPAL
CITIZENSHIP ACT TO ELIMINATE ALL GENDERDISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS AND BRINGIT INTO COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS.

RIGHT TO HEALTH
Private healthcare in Nepal is available to those
who are able to afford it. Those with citizenshipissues tend to work in the informal economy
and earn daily wages. Access to healthcare is
therefore often limited as the financial cost is abarrier. Government hospitals are offering freehealthcare for pandemic related treatment, however due to the rates of infection the hospitals
are unable to cope with the number of people requiring care. Officially, proof of citizenship is notmandatory to receive vaccinations in Nepal. Any
form of ID is acceptable and in situations where
an individual has nothing to provide i.e., they
do not have a workplace ID or a school ID, they
can be issued a letter from a Ward Office with asimple directive that they can receive a vaccination. The acquisition of this letter from a Ward
Office does not require documentation. Despite55

this however, people are still being asked topresent their citizenship certificates and Ward
Offices are working at a limited capacity due tolockdowns, especially during the second wave.
This has increased the difficulty for statelesspersons and those without documentation toreceive these letters from the Ward Offices, affecting their access to vaccinations.
Mental Health: The COVID-19 pandemic andlockdown are helpful tools to explain statelessness to those who do not understand or
cannot comprehend the experiences of stateless persons. During lockdown, Nepali citizens
are facing discomforts and restrictions, whichhave led to many people developing serious
mental health issues that demand professional intervention; stateless people live in a stateof perpetual lockdown with very limited (if any)
access to equal rights and opportunities. The innumerable restrictions faced by stateless people throughout their lives (which extend past theparameters of the COVID-19 lockdowns) haveresulted in mental health issues that have neverbeen addressed, with prominence given to thelegal aspect only. There has always existed animmense need to provide mental well-being services alongside legal services to those without
citizenship certificates, but now, in the context
of COVID-19 and in the context of lockdowns
being lifted and restrictions eased, it is essential to provide referral services to those in need.
Further, the continual delay of the proposed
amendments to the Citizenship Act has led toincreased stress and pressure on individuals
with uncertain legal status due to the uncertainty of the incorporation of effective legal remedies into national legislation, which they hope,
will increase their chances of acquiring citizenship.13

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: Following
the national lockdown imposed by the government in March 2020, the government made it
mandatory for Nepalis to produce citizenshipcertificates in order to receive state relief packages, thereby excluding stateless persons fromthis relief. The impact on stateless persons
was drastic and compounded by the adverse
psychological impact of being ignored by theirown government during a national emergency
and global crisis. In response to this exclusion,
Nepalese civil society litigation resulted in theSupreme Court of Nepal issuing an interim order to the government to grant relief regardlessof citizenship or documentation. The court referred to the “right to live with dignity of every
person” and stated that “there is no doubt relief
should be provided without discrimination.” Despite this ruling, those without citizenship in Nepal continue to be largely excluded from relief
and it is unclear to what extent the order is being
adhered to.14 There have been no recent government announcements regarding the distributionof relief packages.
STATELESSNESS AND
THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITY IN NEPALThe Constitution of Nepal15 and the 2006 Nepal
Citizenship Act16 are the relevant laws regarding citizenship. Citizenship can be obtained
through birth or naturalisation. Article 10 of theConstitution recognises the right to citizenshipas a fundamental right and states that no one“shall be denied the right to acquire citizenship.”
Article 11(2) regulates who shall be deemed citizens of Nepal. It includes those “who have theirpermanent domicile in Nepal” and “whose father
or mother was a citizen of Nepal at the birth ofsuch person” as citizens by descent. However, Article 11(3) of the Constitution confirmsthat children whose parents are both citizens
are eligible to apply for citizenship by descentafter becoming an adult. This limits the abilityof women to confer citizenship independently.
Secondly, Article 11(5) stipulates that children
born in Nepal to Nepali mothers may acquire
citizenship by descent if their fathers cannot be
traced, but if later the father is confirmed as aforeign citizen, the citizenship of children willchange to naturalised. This rule does not apply
to children of Nepali fathers, which means theirnationality will not change depending on themother’s nationality. Thirdly, Article 3(1) of the2006 Citizenship Act provides similar rights as
Article 11(2) of the Constitution, however, Article 3(2) and Article 5(2) deem that children born“out of wedlock by a Nepali female to a foreign
national” can only acquire citizenship throughnaturalisation, with extra criteria and a procedure to be followed. On 21 May 2021, an ordinance amending the 2006 Nepal Citizenship Act
was passed. The ordinance offers nothing new
and simply amends certain provisions in the
Act to make it consistent with Article 11(3) and(5) of the Constitution. The passing of the Bill
however means that children of Nepali mothersborn in Nepal whose fathers cannot be traced
can finally apply for Nepali citizenship. Without
the amendment in the Act, this provision was
limited to the constitution and the procedures
were not laid down. The Act now stipulates that
if the child and the mother present a self-declaration stating that the father cannot be traced,
they will be able to acquire Nepali citizenship bydescent.

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal
Status, Chapter on Right to Health and Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights
in Part 2 of this report.
2
In 2015 the Forum for Women Law and Development estimated the number of people lacking citizenship certificates in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014
using the population grow rate determined by the 2011 census and the total
number of citizenship certificates distributed each year. From this they werethen able to project the amount of people without citizenship certificates in
the forthcoming years. In 2021, their projection was 6.7 million, see Forumfor Law, Women and Development, 'Acquisition of Citizenship Certificate
in Nepal: Estimation and Projection’, (2015), available at: https://fwld.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Acquisition-of-Citizenship-Certificate-in-Nepal-Estimation-and-Projection.pdf.
3
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic:
Impact Report,’ (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_
Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
4
Citizenship Affected Persons Network, Community Action Centre Nepal,
Dignity Initiative, Nepal Institute of Peace, Statelessness Network Asia
Pacific, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council, atthe 27th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Nepal’, (9 July 2020),
available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR37_Nepal.pdf.
5Forum for Law, Women and Development, 'Acquisition of Citizenship
Certificate in Nepal: Estimation and Projection’, (2015), available at: https://
fwld.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Acquisition-of-Citizenship-Certificate-in-Nepal-Estimation-and-Projection.pdf.
6
Nepal Citizenship Act 2063, (2006), available at: https://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en/archives/category/documents/prevailing-law/statutes-acts/
nepal-citizenship-act-2063-2006.
7
R. K. Kamat, ‘President issues ordinance to amend citizenship act’, The
Himalayan, (24 May 2021), available at: https://thehimalayantimes.com/
nepal/president-issues-ordinance-to-amend-citizenship-act-5185.
8
Nepal’s Constitution, (2015), available at: https://www.constituteproject.
org/constitution/Nepal_2015.pdf.
9Forum for Women, Law and Development, ‘Acquisition of Citizenship Certificate in Nepal: Understanding Trends, Barriers & Impacts.’ (2014), available
at: https://fwld.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Acquisition-of-Citizenship-Certificate-in-Nepal-Understanding-Trends-Barriers-and-Impacts.pdf.
10
Citizenship Affected Persons Network, Community Action Centre Nepal,
Dignity Initiative, Nepal Institute of Peace, Statelessness Network Asia
Pacific, Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council, atthe 27th Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Nepal’, (9 July 2020),
available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR37_Nepal.pdf.
11
Citizenship Affected Persons Network, ‘Field Study Report on Understanding and Responding to the COVID-19 Impact on Stateless People through a
Dedicated Podcast Series’, (2020), unpublished, on file with ISI.
12
Bikash Mandal, 22, in Citizenship Affected Persons Network, ‘Field Study
Report on Understanding and Responding to the COVID-19 Impact on
Stateless People through a Dedicated Podcast Series’, (2020), unpublished,on file with ISI.
13
Citizenship Affected Persons Network, ‘Field Study Report on Understanding and Responding to the COVID-19 Impact on Stateless People through a
Dedicated Podcast Series’, (2020), unpublished, on file with ISI.
14
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Stateless in a Global Pandemic:
Impact Report’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_
Stateless_Impact_Report.pdf.
15
Nepal’s Constitution, (2015), available at: https://www.constituteproject.
org/constitution/Nepal_2015.pdf.
16
Nepal Citizenship Act 2063, (2006), available at: https://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en/archives/category/documents/prevailing-law/statutes-acts/
nepal-citizenship-act-2063-2006.
17
Musahar are a Dalit community in the Terai region of Nepal.
1

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECT
Following an extensive research phase, this project carried out by CAPN aims to respond to
the impacts of COVID-19 on stateless people in Nepal and spread awareness about statelessness among the public. To achieve this, CAPN is creating an audio-visual podcast series
to engage in dialogue about how COVID-19 is impacting stateless people, while simultaneously raising awareness about statelessness and spreading accurate information about
COVID-19. CAPN has also created a phoneline offering a referral service that provides users
with guidance and support on mental wellbeing, as well as legal advice and support. The
project is designing several tools to raise awareness, including a programme on Nepal’s national radio FM station and social media accounts to expand outreach across national andglobal audiences. To boost further advocacy, a research report will be published and sharedwith relevant stakeholders in a strategic advocacy push for change.
The project is implemented by CAPN. Formed in 2015 by individuals severely affected by
the discriminatory nationality law, CAPN was established prior to the promulgation of the
new Constitution of Nepal in order to give a voice to affected people, facilitate dialogue, andlobby for equal citizenship rights. Over 1800 affected persons currently belong to CAPN,
through which they find powerful ways to advocate for equal citizenship rights and the eradication of statelessness.
ImpactWhen COVID-19 first hit, CAPN initially distributed humanitarian relief to 40 Musahar17 families. Following this they carried out similar relief activities for a further 40 people including
2 post-natal cases. In the initial stages of their project, CAPN researched the impact of
COVID-19 on stateless communities in Kathmandu, Pokhara and the Terai regions and theadverse effects on mental health as a result of being left out of government relief initiatives,
through interviews and surveys. This research helps bridge a gap between Nepali citizens
and the stateless regarding issues of equal citizenship laws and also enabled CAPN to
identify and address the practical issues faced by stateless people, such as their mental
health and legal needs. This in turn, has shaped follow up activities described above. Seven
individuals with citizenship issues have reached out to CAPN for support. Due to the pandemic, pursuing legal action is not currently an easy avenue so the CAPN team provided
direct support and three of the clients have been referred to the Forum for Women Law
and Development for legal advice. As soon as court resumes two of these clients’ written
petitions are ready to be filed in court.
56

NORTH MACEDONIA
There is no accurate data on the number ofstateless people in Macedonia. The main causes of statelessness are the dissolution of theformer Yugoslavia, barriers to birth registration
and unregulated civil status. The stateless andthose most at risk of statelessness include persons of Roma, Albanian, Ashkaeli and Egyptian
decent. Statelessness and the risk of statelessness disproportionality affects the Roma in theregion who were minority citizens of the former
Yugoslavia republic. As a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent changes
to citizenship laws, destruction of civil registers and conflict resulting in large-scale forced
displacement in the 1990’s, the Roma wereviewed as outsiders, excluded and discriminated against by the newly established territories.
The Roma and other stateless communities
live in poverty and are routinely marginalised.
Barriers to civil registration, including poverty,lack of awareness and discriminatory attitudesof registry officials, increase the prevalence ofstatelessness, especially among the Roma2 aswell as influencing public perceptions of thiscommunity perpetuating intolerance.
The vulnerabilities of the stateless have been
exacerbated by COVID-19. The identified issues
in this chapter were provided predominantly byRoma NGO ‘Bairska Svetlina’ operating in thesouthwest of North Macedonia. The informationis therefore localised to the parameters of theiroperations. They cannot access state and humanitarian relief, experience significant difficulties accessing work, healthcare, education andcivil registration services and are subjected toincreased antigypsyism and related intolerance.
10% of Roma households do not have access toclean drinking water inside their home, and 18%
do not have access to a sewer system. These
poor conditions make them more susceptible
to infection. Many Roma do not have access toor cannot PPE also increasing their risk of infection.3
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
In February 2020, the Law on Unregistered Persons in the Birth Register was adopted, offering
a solution for those who have been unable to obtain personal identification documents. The law
provided for undocumented persons to submit
applications within six months of the date of the
adoption of the law (i.e. up until August 2020).
Due to the pandemic, and the closure of services, this was not implemented and the institutions responsible for dealing with applications
are still not equipped to register these people
according to the law.4
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATIONAs a consequence of the pandemic, there has
also been a rise in hate crimes and general intolerance towards stateless persons and theRoma community. During a three-month period
in 2020, there were four recorded instances ofhate crimes committed against members of
the Roma community. On one occasion, victims
were beaten by police, and in the other cases,
they were assaulted by Macedonians. The officeof Bairska Svetlina was extensively damaged
with vandals breaking the doors and windows
and graffitiing xenophobic slurs on the walls fortheir work with the Roma community.
RIGHT TO HEALTH
The healthcare system in North Macedonia has
collapsed under the pressure of COVID-19. Prior
to the pandemic, stateless persons did not qualify for state healthcare, and this has generally
remained the same throughout the pandemic.
However, through Decree no. 92/20, the government declared that all persons that are not covered by health insurance will be able to receive
health services in healthcare facilities related tothe diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19 at theexpense of the Health Insurance Fund of North
Macedonia.5 The stateless and undocumented
are further able to access private healthcare,however, the cost makes it inaccessible to most.
North Macedonia has not yet been able to procure vaccines. Without an established vaccination campaign, the entire population, including
the stateless remain vulnerable to contracting
COVID-19.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Exclusion from Emergency Relief: On 18 March
2020, a state of emergency was declared. The
government has received financial assistance of€160 million from the EU and €176 million fromthe International Monetary Fund.6 Coordination
bodies have been set up in all municipalities
and at state level, to facilitate humanitarian actions to help vulnerable citizens.7 The state also
issued payment cards with which unemployedcitizens could obtain groceries to the value of€150.8 However, stateless persons and those atrisk of statelessness, who are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 in the southwest of North
Macedonia have been excluded from these initiatives, as access is dependent on the provisionof IDs. The government has also provided financial assistance to those financially affected by
COVID-19, but these measures required accessto a bank account, making them inaccessible
to stateless persons who cannot open bank accounts without documentation.

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELYAT RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS; EQUALITYAND NON-DISCRIMINATION; RIGHT TOHEALTH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS,1
AND MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO
ACTION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS:ENSURE THAT ALL STATELESS AND UNDOCUMENTED PEOPLE HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO VACCINES AND CAMPAIGN TO RAISE AWARENESS OF
THE IMPORTANCE OF COVID-19 VACCINATIONS.

ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICESFOR ALL STATELESS AND UNDOCUMENTED
RESIDENTS.

CREATE SPECIAL MEASURES TO ENSURE AN
ECONOMIC SAFETY NET FOR THE ROMA COMMUNITY DURING COVID-19, INCLUDING THROUGH
CREATING FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FORENTREPRENEURSHIP.

ENHANCE COOPERATION AND COLLABORATIONBETWEEN GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER ACTORSIN THE WESTERN BALKANS, TO FIND DURABLEREGIONAL SOLUTIONS AND APPROACHESTO STRENGTHENING NATIONALITY RIGHTS,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS OF ROMAPEOPLE.

DEVELOP CAMPAIGNS TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION AND HATE SPEECH AGAINST ROMA PEOPLE
AND TO PENALISE THE INSTIGATORS OF HATESPEECH.

The Roma community in the southwest of thecountry has also not been adequately reachedby humanitarian actors, further heightening theirvulnerabilities. While some have received foodand hygiene products from the UNDP and Red
Cross, there is insufficient coordination of suchsupport and no register of people entitled tosuch relief. Consequently, one household may
receive several packages from different organisations while others do not receive any. The firstorganisation to provide direct support to Romacommunities, was OSF Macedonia, which provided hygiene packages and supplements to
those affected by the pandemic. In cooperation
with the Red Cross Skopje, by the end of 2020,
2,188 supplements were distributed to 11,000
Roma citizens.9 These packages were distributed to people who were legally recognised by
the state and already beneficiaries of state social assistance. They did not include statelesspeople and those without legal documentation.
57

The biggest support for stateless persons in thesouthwest was provided by diaspora Roma andRoma NGOs, who through their donors and collaborators, were able to provide direct support.
Lost Livelihoods: Prior to the pandemic therates of employment within stateless communities were very low. Those who did work tended
to work in the informal economy in jobs suchas waste collection and the collection of plastic
bottles. As a result of lockdowns, many companies and enterprises closed or operated at a reduced capacity.10 Some had to make significant
reductions in their labour force and members of
the Roma community were the first to be maderedundant. Many lost their only sources of income as a result.
Disrupted Education: Many Roma children
cannot access education due to the inability toattend online classes. Education in Macedonia
has moved online but many stateless children
have no access to the internet, computers, tablets etc.
STATELESSNESS AND
THE RIGHT TO NATIONALITYIN NORTH MACEDONIA
Deprivation of Macedonian citizenship is prohibited by Article 4 of the Constitution.11 In
2004, Macedonia adopted a new CitizenshipLaw.12 Accordingly, the criteria for acquiring
citizenship include registered permanent residence in Macedonia at the time of independence, regular means of subsistence and at least
15 years of uninterrupted legal residence. These
excessive requirements created barriers for theRoma community as they struggle to provide
evidence of registration and residence. The
law does however provide a safeguard againstchildhood statelessness, stipulating that a child
who was found or born in the territory of Macedonia whose parents are unknown, have unknown citizenship or are stateless, may acquire
citizenship. Despite this safeguard, the law has
not been implemented consistently in practice,particularly with regard to children of Romaparents. Further, it does not safeguard against
statelessness where parents cannot confer
their nationality i.e. in cases of gender discriminatory nationality laws.13

THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTThis project, carried out by Bairska Svetlina, aims to unpack and document the systemic exclusionsof stateless persons or those at risk of statelessness in Macedonian society in the context of
COVID-19. Bairska Svetlina is functioning as a Help Desk for the Roma community, offering
information and legal advice to support people with applications for government food cards,
help packages by the Ministry of Labour, understanding quarantine regulations and applying for
documents. The project has launched a campaign to raise awareness, share information andpromote the Help Desk office by using social media, printed materials and direct communication
with community members. Specific cases of COVID-19 exclusion are documented throughinterviews, which function as a two-way information exchange. Data collected will be used as
an advocacy tool to engage relevant stakeholders such as the government (in particular the
Ministry of Justice), relevant parliamentarians including representatives of the Roma community,
international organisations and hospitals to raise awareness of the issue and place statelessness
on the agenda.
This project is implemented by Bairska Svetlina, an NGO that works towards strengthening thecapacity of Roma communities, improving their socio-economic status, developing the skills ofyoung Roma activists, and improving their quality of education. Bairska Svetlina aims to help theRoma community based in North Macedonia to enjoy their basic human rights while working on
inclusion and integration into Macedonian society.
Impact“The Roma community, NGOs and the authorities need to collaborate to raise awareness,
identify needs and provide direct assistance to the Roma people. In the long run, greater
effort is needed to ensure that Roma are included in society and have equal access to basic
needs, improving infrastructure, access to healthcare, housing, employment and education.
The vulnerabilities and needs of the Roma should be considered by the EU, the European
Parliament, donors and all other stakeholders to ensure this community are able to copewith the effects of COVID-19.”
Bairska Svetlina President,
Remzi Medik
Thus far the project has raised awareness of the needs of the stateless in North Macedonia
and identified approaches to solving their problems. Bairska Svetlina has functioned as a Help
Desk to assist members of the Roma community to address issues they are facing during the
pandemic. The Roma community and institutions have recognised the role of the Help Deskin contributing to the improvement of their situation. To date, 100 families have been suppliedwith humanitarian packages and 50 children were gifted with New Year packages donated by
the mayor of Bitola. Further, 130 families have been successfully assisted in applying for social
benefits.

In 2018, the Law on Foreigners14 was adopted
which provided that former citizens of Yugoslavia who continued to live in Macedonia after
8 September 1991 may apply for permanent
residence if they register their stay within three
years of adoption of the law. This development
thus removed the costs and obligations to renew temporary residence permits for those wholost their citizenship due to state succession.
This had previously been a problem for manyas the burdensome requirements resulted inbreaks in legal stay in Macedonia, which in turn,affected access to naturalisation.15

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Equality and Non-Discrimination, Chapter on Right to Health and Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights in Part 2 of this report.
Macedonian Young Lawyers Association, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, European Network on Statelessness, European Roma Rights Centre and Minority Rights Group International, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the32nd Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Macedonia’, (12 July 2018), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR32_Macedonia.pdf.
3European Policy Institute – Skopje, ‘Challenges facing Roma during the crisis caused by COVID-19,’ (2020), available at: https://epi.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/roma_kovid-19_eng.pdf.
4European Policy Institute – Skopje, ‘Challenges facing Roma during the crisis caused by COVID-19’, (2020), available at: https://epi.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/roma_kovid-19_eng.pdf.
5Ibid. See also COVID-19 Health System Response Monitor, ‘North Macedonia’, (2021), available at: https://www.covid19healthsystem.org/countries/northmacedonia/livinghit.aspx?Section=4.1%20Health%20financing&Type=Chapter.
6
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Transition Report 2020-21 The State Strikes Back Country Assessments: North Macedonia,’ (2020), available at: https://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/transition-report/transition-report-202021.html.
7
Government of the Republic of Macedonia, ‘Decision to Adopt a Coordination Headquarters during the COVID-19 Pandemic’, (2020), available at: https://koronavirus.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/%D0%9E%D0%B4%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B
A%D0%B0-%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%9A%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D1%88%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B1.pdf.
8
Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, ‘Economic measures for dealing with the consequences of COVID-19’, (2020), available at: https://koronavirus.gov.mk/merki/ekonomski-merki.
9Open Society Foundation Macedonia, ‘The foundation Open Society – Macedonia donates humanitarian aid packages to Roma families directly affected by the health crisis,’ Open Society Foundation Macedonia, (10 December 2020), available at:https://fosm.mk/en/current-project/the-foundation-open-society-macedonia-donates-humanitarian-aid-packages-to-roma-families-directly-affected-by-the-health-crisis/.
10
International Labour Organisation, ‘Impact of pandemic requires massive state intervention in North Macedonia: ILO and EBRD advise government on labour market after coronavirus’ ILONews, (28 May 2020), available at: https://www.ilo.org/
budapest/whats-new/WCMS_746165/lang--en/index.htm.
11
North Macedonia (Republic of)’s Constitution, (1991), with Amendments through 2011, available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Macedonia_2011.pdf?lang=en.
12
Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, (1992), available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3f54916b4.pdf.
13
Macedonian Young Lawyers Association, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, European Network on Statelessness, European Roma Rights Centre and Minority Rights Group International, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the32nd Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Macedonia’, (12 July 2018), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR32_Macedonia.pdf.
14
North Macedonia: Law on Foreigners, (2019), available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/44b2668a4.pdf.
15
Macedonian Young Lawyers Association, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, European Network on Statelessness, European Roma Rights Centre and Minority Rights Group International, ‘Joint Submission to the Human Rights Council at the32nd Session of the Universal Periodic Review: Macedonia’, (12 July 2018), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/UPR32_Macedonia.pdf.
1
2

58

ROHINGYAIN REFUGEE SITUATIONSThe Rohingya are an ethnic community belonging to Rakhine State Myanmar, whose histories
in Rakhine, now on the borderlands of Myanmar, by far pre-date modern nation-states andborders. The arbitrary deprivation of nationality
by Myanmar, which was initiated under militaryrule, is a key element in the decades-long persecution of Rohingya. The persecution of Rohingya
in Myanmar and their lack of protection as refugees outside Myanmar are strongly linked to
Myanmar’s systematic production of Rohingya
statelessness. Myanmar’s 1982 ethno-centricand exclusionary Citizenship Law, together withthe arbitrary implementation of citizenship rules,
provided a domestic framework that sanctioned
discrimination, persecution and expulsion.
The clear exclusion of Rohingya from accessto citizenship by right - as opposed to a highly
discretionary and arbitrary naturalisation procedure - was a deliberate next step towards theratcheting up of abuses against the group. As
such, the Rohingya have fled institutionalised
discrimination and persecution in Myanmar
over decades resulting in a large and scatteredrefugee population world-wide. It is estimatedthat three quarters of the Rohingya population
currently live outside Myanmar.2
There are now approximately three-quarters ofa million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh andhundreds of thousands of Rohingya in othercountries such as Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in
the Middle East; Pakistan, India and elsewhere
in South Asia; Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia andelsewhere in Southeast Asia. A smaller number of Rohingyas have settled in Australia and
New Zealand, Europe and North America. Within the contexts of the Middle East, South andSoutheast Asia, Rohingyas have experienced
inter-generational statelessness and continue
to live in situations of protracted displacement
without access to legal status or the legal rightto work. This has prevented children and youths
from accessing education and skills training andhas driven men and women into precarious workin the informal sectors of the economy with few
safety standards and no social safety nets. In
times of pandemic or other external shocks, Rohingya families are at heightened risk of hunger,
illness and violence. Family members in Myanmar and elsewhere who rely on remittancesfrom those working overseas are also increasingly vulnerable to these impacts.
ROHINGYA IN MYANMAR
Myanmar’s imposed statelessness on the Rohingya is related to restrictions on a range offundamental human rights including freedomof movement, right to work, access to education
and right to marry and have children. Since themass expulsions of Rohingya in 2017, there areapproximately half a million Rohingya remaining
in Rakhine State Myanmar.3 Most are containedin North Rakhine State, with others living in IDPor “detention camps” elsewhere in RakhineState. Restrictions in Rakhine State have beenfurther compounded by the conflict that has

escalated in the past two years between the
Myanmar army and the Arakan army, an EAO
operating in Rakhine State. Numbers of Rohingya elsewhere in Myanmar are hard to estimate
since they are not allowed to self-identify as Rohingya. On 1 February 2021, a group of top generals seized absolute power in a military coup.
Since then, the CDM has gained momentum
across the country, with protestors, civilians and
EAOs being targeted with violence, killings andarbitrary arrests. Internet shut down’s, curfews
and the closure of media outlets have been imposed. Myanmar has descended into escalating
civil war and has been labelled a failed state.4
Myanmar doctors and medical staff have also
been at the forefront of the strikes and CDM
movement. The result is a near shut down of
the government health system.5 Mobile COVID-19 vaccination centres have been converted
into mobile hospitals. 139 doctors have beenarrested and charged for participating in the
CDM. Hospitals have been occupied by militaryforces. Concerns have been raised over the impact during a time of pandemic, but since there
is little reporting of incidents of COVID-19 anddeaths, the impact remains unreported and unclear.6 This is particularly alarming due to thedramatic rise in COVID-19 cases in neighbouring
India, Bangladesh and in the region generally.7
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY,
DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS
Asylum and Refugee Situation: This chapter focuses on the countries where the CESF Consortium has a programmatic focus – Bangladesh,
India and Malaysia. There are approximately
884,000 Rohingyas registered as refugees with
UNHCR in Bangladesh, 18,000 in India and103,000 in Malaysia.8 Numbers of unregistered
Rohingya refugees are harder to estimate. In
Bangladesh refugees are largely contained inpoor conditioned camp settings, whilst in Malaysia and India refugees are largely urban-based
and scattered throughout the country. These
camp and urban-based settings make for different challenges in COVID-19 responses. Noneof these countries are signatories to the 1951
Refugee Convention. Although UNHCR provides
refugee registration processes in each of thesecountries, the governments do not formally recognise refugee status. As such, Rohingya refugees are officially categorised by governments
as irregular or ‘illegal’ migrants. There are no
opportunities to regularise legal status overtime, so the precariousness of work, education,
health and legal situations for stateless Rohingyas is experienced across multiple generations.
As refugees, they have no access to work within
the formal economies. There is very limited access to formal education and certification. However, non-formal religious and refugee schoolingis accessed by some children. In Bangladesh,
refugees access health care through NGOs
working within the camps. In Malaysia and India, refugees are officially able to get discounted
health care using their refugee cards. However,during the pandemic, Rohingya refugees have

THIS CHAPTER LOOKS MORE CLOSELYAT RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION AND LEGAL STATUS, EQUALITYAND NON-DISCRIMINATION, RIGHT TOHEALTH, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTSAND CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,1 AND
MAKES THE FOLLOWING CALL TO ACTION
TO RELEVANT GOVERNMENTS AND OTHERSTAKEHOLDERS:ENSURE THAT ALL ROHINGYA ON THEIRTERRITORIES HAVE ACCESS TO COVID-19
TESTING, HEALTHCARE AND VACCINATIONSCHEMES ON AN EQUAL BASIS TO CITIZENS.

PROVIDE ALL ROHINGYA, REGARDLESSOF THEIR LEGAL OR IMMIGRATIONSTATUS, EQUAL ACCESS TO SOCIAL SAFETY
NETS TO ADDRESS FOOD INSECURITY,HOMELESSNESS AND ILLNESS DURING
COVID-19 AND BEYOND.  

CONSULT ROHINGYA COMMUNITY MEMBERS,ESPECIALLY WOMEN, WHEN CONCEPTUALISING
COVID-19 RELIEF SCHEMES AND PUBLIC HEALTH
INITIATIVES.       WORK WITH UNHCR TO PROTECTROHINGYA AND OTHER REFUGEES ON THEIRTERRITORIES, INCLUDING FROM ARBITRARY
AND INDEFINITE DETENTION AND FORCED
REPATRIATION.

PROVIDE ROUTES FOR STATUS REGULARISATION FOR ROHINGYA AND ENSURE ACCESS TO
FORMAL EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT.

59

reported increased and disproportionate difficulties in accessing essential work, educationand healthcare.9
Access to Asylum and Arbitrary Detention:
Additional immigration measures and pandemic-related lockdowns have also left Rohingya
in India and Malaysia vulnerable to arrest anddetention on arrival and in the country. Withlimited access to UNHCR or asylum procedures
for arrivals and increased difficulty in travelling
to registration centres, there are concerns that
COVID-19 measures are further eroding refugeerights. In the context of increased border controls and increased incidents of xenophobia andhate speech during the pandemic, Rohingya inthese countries have been rounded up and detained without recognition of their refugee status. UNHCR provides refugee status determination and refugee cards that should provide some
protection from arrest or can help to secure release when Rohingya are detained as irregularmigrants.10 However, during the pandemic it has
been increasingly difficult for detainees to gain
access to UNHCR in detention. COVID-19 regulations have also meant that UNHCR mobile
registration facilities have been more limited. In
Malaysia, as a direct response to COVID-19, immigration sweeps took place during Ramadan
in 2020. Many Rohingya were arrested and detained. New arrivals that managed to disembark
in Malaysia were also detained.11
Hundreds of Rohingya are detained in immigration detention centres, prisons, juvenile detention centres and other detention facilities inIndia and Malaysia. There are also Rohingya detained in Bangladesh and elsewhere.12 Rohingyaarrested on immigration charges or on other minor charges are often unable to secure release
once they have served out their sentences. Considered “illegal immigrants” and unrecognised
as citizens of Myanmar, most are not deported
through formal channels either.13 As such manyremain in indefinite detention. In India and Malaysia, the detention of Rohingya has increased
since the pandemic began, as they struggle totravel and gain access to refugee registration.
In February this year, Rohingya in Jammu andKashmir were told by Indian authorities to join a‘verification’ exercise. During the exercise, over
170 Rohingyas were rounded up at random anddetained. Many said they had faced difficulties
updating their refugee registration during the
pandemic. A Supreme Court ruling rejected apetition against their deportation, paving theway for deportations to Myanmar and prolonged detention.14
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
Gender Based Impact“Women are often the primary carers in
the family and involving women in healthinitiatives is crucial, so they can keep
themselves and other household members
safe from disease. Rohingya women in thecamps need services delivered in their own
Rohingya language, which is not the sameas Chittagonian. This means involving thecommunity in delivering health informationand health services.”			Rohingya Community Worker in Bangladesh,
Sabrina Chowdhury Mona
Globally, there has been a rise in domestic andintimate partner violence during the pandemic.
60

There are already high levels of domestic violence within Rohingya communities and heightened concerns about the impact of lockdown
and unemployment within households. The
increased time spent at home together andstresses related to loss of work and income
profoundly impact the mental health of family
members, which in turn increases the levelsof domestic violence. The lockdown prevents
victims of domestic violence from leaving theirhomes to seek help either through their informal networks or through services.15 Around theglobe in times of food shortage or food insecurity, children and women within households
tend to suffer disproportionately from hunger
and malnutrition.
With more limited access to the public sphere,
often with little mobility beyond the home, andmore language barriers to overcome, womenare disproportionately impacted by the restrictions.16 Rohingya women are more likely thanmen to lack up-to-date and accurate healthinformation in Rohingya language. As primarycarers within the household it is vitally important that Rohingya women are not just reached,
but centrally included and consulted in publichealth and health education initiatives. This will
ensure that women are able to effectively protect themselves and their household from disease and are able to seek medical advice andservices when needed.17
RIGHT TO HEALTHCamp environments in Bangladesh and India
are densely populated, with limited access tosanitation. Sometimes families occupy a single
room, with water and washing facilities shared
between many households. Social distancing,handwashing and following other virus prevention measures have proved difficult. Such conditions leave people vulnerable to the spreadof the virus and have created environments ofanxiety and fear. In response to concerns about
the spread of the virus, the Bangladeshi government and international aid agencies put in place
important health measures, including making
testing available and providing quarantine facilities.18 The restrictions placed on mobile phone
and internet access for refugees in Bangladesh
in 2020, as well as lockdowns that limited campaccess to NGO staff, made it difficult for all
members of the Rohingya community to accesshealth information and to engage in important
community-based responses.19 Rohingyas inIndia and Malaysia faced barriers to accessing
healthcare prior to the pandemic, including alack of Rohingya language interpreters and female interpreters, risks of arrest and health carecosts for undocumented and refugee populations. The lockdowns and reduction in non-COVID related health services, together with theincrease in xenophobia towards Rohingya has
further impeded access to healthcare. This has
particularly impacted Rohingya with pre-existing and long-term health conditions. It has also
impacted pregnant women, who have more limited access to maternity care.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Lost Livelihoods and Food Insecurity:“Since the arrival of COVID-19, xenophobia
has increased. Rohingya in Malaysia are
barred from Mosques and markets. They aresystematically excluded from employment
and evicted from their homes. We don’tknow what will happen to our community in
Malaysia without work.”
Founder and Directorof the Rohingya Women
Development Network, Sharifah Shakira
Lockdowns in both camp-based and urban
refugee situations have resulted in the loss of
livelihoods and food security within Rohingya
households. This also has a knock-on impact
on Rohingya in Myanmar and elsewhere whoare reliant on remittances from their families
abroad. Without legal status and work permits
in Bangladesh, India and Malaysia, Rohingyas
are only able to access precarious work in theinformal economies. Without legal status, there
are few social safety nets and no social security
in situations of external shock. The COVID-19
pandemic and resultant lockdowns have hit Rohingya families hard, resulting in loss of income,loss of homes and food shortages.20 Some Rohingya have been compelled to continue working despite the lockdown, putting themselves
and their families at greater risk of infection.
In Malaysia, historically Rohingya have founda relatively safe refuge with some living therefor 30-40 years. Since the start of the COVID-19
outbreak, Rohingya in Malaysia are facing unemployment and homelessness. Refugees in
Malaysia live mostly in urban environments
and, without humanitarian aid, they are reliant
on work in the informal economy for householdincome. Malaysian employers stopped hiring
foreigners and explicitly refused to hire Rohingya. The Malaysian Immigration Department
placed banners in public places, threatening
fines or imprisonment for anyone found to behiring, protecting or renting properties to refugees. The rise of hate speech and xenophobia
has led to attacks on Rohingya refugees in theirworkplaces or on the way to work. This hascaused homeless Rohingya to move in with other families, creating conditions of overcrowding
and thus increasing the risk of COVID-19.21 In
India, fake news and information on the internet
pose a serious challenge for the community.22
Following a gathering in Delhi organised by aMuslim organisation, where numerous people
tested Covid-19 positive, the Rohingya in Delhi,
Hyderabad, and Mewat faced extreme government scrutiny, and some refugees were quarantined based on discriminatory assumptions ofthem carrying COVID-19. False narratives led toforced evictions, threats and abuse.23
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Border Closures and Dangerous Journeys: Thelack of security and protection, viable livelihood
opportunities and a sense of hopelessness forthe future, drives onward migration for Rohingya. Without access to documentation, there are
no legal routes to cross borders either by sea
or land. There are also few options for secure,safe and decent work. As a result, building family lives and supporting households can be aconstant struggle.24 The closure of borders due
to COVID-19 has not halted cross-border movements. Instead, the restrictions have increased
the human and financial costs for Rohingya attempting the journeys.25 COVID-19 related border closures have left refugees stranded at sea
and in a situation of acute humanitarian need,lacking food, water and fuel. Hundreds havelost their lives.26 States have failed to cooperate to save lives and provide basic protections,leaving some Rohingyas stranded for indefiniteperiods on boats in the sea.27 Travellers andtheir families are also increasingly vulnerable
to extortion and exploitation by brokers andtraffickers. The lives of those onboard the boats
were also threatened in order to extort moneyfrom their families.28 Rohingya boat travellers
who were turned back to Bangladesh, were initially detained on Bhasan Char island as a COVID-19 quarantine measure in 2020. Bhasan Charis a remote and unstable island off the coast of
Bangladesh. However, they have not been allowed to return to their families in the refugee
camps and have remained on the island despite
protests. Bangladesh has continued to relocate
Rohingyas from the camps to Bhasan Char.29
Due to the adverse social and political situationin Bangladesh, in February 2021, a group of 90
Rohingya refugees, mostly women and children,
have drifted to Andaman and Nicobar Island of
India while allegedly fleeing to Malaysia to reunite with their family members on a fishing boat.
The boat suffered an engine failure and was
drifting on the sea for a week. Eight Rohingya
lost their lives on the boat, and others reported
suffering from severe malnutrition and dehydration. The Indian navy approached the vessel with food, water and medical aid. However,no initiatives were taken by the government todisembark the refugees safely. As of now, thewhereabouts of the Rohingya remain unknown,
and no official statement has been released by
the authorities.

ABOUT THE CESF CONSORTIUM PROJECTS
There are two CESF Consortium projects focussed on the Rohingya community. The first is aregional project, and the second provides support to Rohingya communities in India:
The objective of the first project, carried out by RWDN is to strengthen the capacity of vulnerable
Rohingya refugees by mobilising the community to engage in discussions and resolutions ofchallenges faced by the Rohingya as well as taking part in mitigating the spread of COVID-19.
Under this project, refugees and stateless persons in 34 camps in Bangladesh are taking partin an on-the-ground COVID-19 awareness raising campaign which includes the distribution ofhygiene and sanitation packages. This project further seeks to paint a complete picture of the
impact of COVID-19 on vulnerable Rohingya communities by gathering data through small-scaleinterviews, case studies and testimonies from affected people. The ultimate goal is to amplify
discussion at the national level on the current situation of the Rohingya community, engaging
experts, researchers, scholars and leaders from within the Rohingya community to represent thegroup and work to increase dialogue about Rohingya human rights. Further, the project has a regional component, through which these discussions are also brought to Rohingya communities
in other countries.
To date 24 volunteers from the community have been trained to carry out COVID-19 awarenessraising trainings and 40 awareness raising sessions have been organised for women in groupsof five-six. Participants of these training sessions receive hygiene kits which include soap, facemasks and feminine hygiene products. The team has further reached out to 30 Mosques in thecamps and distributed hygiene packages inclusive of soap, face masks, hand sanitisers andguidance on how to include COVID-19 safety information when addressing the crowds during
times of worship. 1,300 informative COVID-19 posters combined with the Ramadan calendar
have been distributed around the camps and two webinars have been carried out reaching approximately 15,000 people worldwide.
RWDN one of the first female, Rohingya led organisations was created to support the Rohingya
community. Founded by Sharifah Shakirah in 2016, to empower women and grow female leadership in society, their mission is to strengthen and empower Rohingya communities througheducation, skills training and advocacy.
The second project, carried out by R4R, is centred around an awareness raising campaign targeting the Rohingya community in India. The main objective is to develop training and informationmaterials on COVID-19 and its impact, access to healthcare, mental healthcare, and education
as well as access to WASH in the Rohingya language. Through building the capacity of selected
Rohingya trainees, the project supports the Rohingya community and raises awareness of theseissues in Delhi, Haryana, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. The project aims to empower the
Rohingya community by training representatives to carry out field work and educate them on
COVID-19 related health and social distancing measures. These training workshops and informational products are accompanied by a small-scale distribution of hand sanitisers and PPE.
R4R is a local, non-governmental, non-profit organisation formed by young Rohingya activists in
New Delhi in 2017. They are committed to promoting the human rights for all beings, especiallypeople from the Rohingya community residing in Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Their mission
is to highlight human rights violations of minorities, especially among the Rohingya community.
R4R operates in India while also closely monitoring the living conditions of Rohingyas all aroundthe world.

See further Chapter on Right to Nationality, Documentation and Legal Status, Chapter on Equality and Non-Discrimination, Chapter on Socio-Economic Rights, Chapter on Right to Health and Chapter on Civil and Political Rights in Part 2 of this report.
UNHCR, ‘Rohingya crisis needs lasting solutions,’ UNHCR, (21 August 2020) available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2020/8/5f3e60124/unhcr-rohingya-crisis-needs-lasting-solutions.html.
UNHCR, ‘Global Focus: Myanmar, 2020-2021,’ UNHCR, (2021) available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/myanmar.
4
Financial Times, ‘Economic collapse amid escalating conflict: Is Myanmar becoming a failed state?’, Financial Times, (21 April 2021), available at https://www.ft.com/content/6189a752-6f68-4d61-99ea-9e83137a1d3d.
5
A. Lalley, ‘From Covid-19 to the coup, Myanmar doctors are risking their lives’, The Diplomat, (15 March 2021), available at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/from-covid-19-to-the-coup-myanmars-doctors-are-risking-their-lives/.
6
UN News, ‘Myanmar: Attacks on healthcare jeopardising Covid-19 response, UN team says’, United Nations, (5 May 2021), available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1091312.
7
See further Chapter on Bangladesh and Chapter on India in Part 3 of this report.
8
UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Data’, UNHCR, (2021), available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/data.html.
9Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Human Rights and Covid-19: What now for Rohingya?’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_The_Rohingya_Briefing_Paper.pdf.
10
D. Thomas and Y. Puteri Nor Ariane, ‘The impact of Covid-19 on refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia’, LSE Blogs, (8 October 2020), available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/seac/2020/10/08/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-refugees-and-asylum-seekersin-malaysia/.
11
See further Chapter on Malaysia in Part 3 of this report.
12
One of five Rohingya households in the Bangladesh camps have a family member in prison. See X-Border Local Research Network, ‘Beyond Relief: Securing Livelihoods and Agency for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, (2020), available at:https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/X-Border_Securing-Livelihoods-and-Agency-for-Rohingya-Refugees-in-Bangladesh_Brief.pdf.
13
The exception are three groups of Rohingya deported from India since 2018.
14
P. Pillai, ‘International Law Omissions: Rohingya deportation order of the Supreme Court of India,’ OpinioJuris, (19 April 2021), available: https://opiniojuris.org/2021/04/19/international-law-omissions-rohingya-deportation-order-of-the-supreme-court-of-india/.
15
R4R, ‘Covid-19 protection monitoring and advocacy for Rohingya refugees in India’, (February 2021), on file with ISI. See also UNHCR, ‘Covid-19’s impact on Rohingya and Bangladeshi adolescents in Cox’s Bazar,’ UNHCR Blogs, (21 December 2020),
available: https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/covid-19s-impact-on-rohingya-and-bangladeshi-adolescents-in-coxs-bazar/.
16
For analysis of women’s mobility outside the home, see X-Border Local Research Network, ‘Beyond Relief: Securing Livelihoods and Agency for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, (2020), available at: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/X-Border_Securing-Livelihoods-and-Agency-for-Rohingya-Refugees-in-Bangladesh_Brief.pdf.
17
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Human Rights and Covid-19: What now for Rohingya?’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_The_Rohingya_Briefing_Paper.pdf.
18
UNHCR, ‘Bangladesh/Rohingya situation: COVID-19 Response,’ (December 2020), available: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20COVID19%20Update%20December%20-%20Bangladesh.pdf.
19
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Human Rights and Covid-19: What now for Rohingya?’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_The_Rohingya_Briefing_Paper.pdf.
20
R4R, ‘Covid-19 protection monitoring and advocacy for Rohingya refugees in India’, (February 2021), on file with ISI. See also UNHCR ‘Covid-19’s impact on Rohingya and Bangladeshi adolescents in Cox’s Bazar,’ UNHCR Blogs, (21 December 2020),
available: https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/covid-19s-impact-on-rohingya-and-bangladeshi-adolescents-in-coxs-bazar/.
21
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Human Rights and Covid-19: What now for Rohingya?’, (2020), available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Covid19_The_Rohingya_Briefing_Paper.pdf.
22
ISI Appeal for Information on Covid-19 and Statelessness (February 2021).
23
C. Kapoor, ‘Hate campaign haunts Rohingya refugees in India’, AA, (24 August 2020), available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/hate-campaign-haunts-rohingya-refugees-in-india-/1951269.
24
X-Border Local Research Network, ‘Beyond Relief: Securing Livelihoods and Agency for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, (2020), available at: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/X-Border_Securing-Livelihoods-and-Agency-for-Rohingya-Refugees-in-Bangladesh_Brief.pdf.
25
ASM Suza Uddin and P. McPherson, ‘Traffickers demand payments for Rohingya stranded at sea’, Reuters, (15 June 2020), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKBN23M2BT.
26
Human Rights Watch, ‘Malaysia/Thailand: Allow Rohingya refugees ashore,’ Human Rights Watch, (12 June 2020), available: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/12/malaysia/thailand-allow-rohingya-refugees-ashore.
27
S. Nagchoudhury, ‘Fate of 81 Rohingya adrift at sea for weeks hangs in limbo, rights group says,’ Reuters, (25 March 2021), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-rohingya-boat-idUSKBN2BH30X.
28
ASM Suza Uddin and P. McPherson, ‘Traffickers demand payments for Rohingya stranded at sea’, Reuters, (15 June 2020), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-idUSKBN23M2BT.
29
Fortify Rights, ‘Bangladesh: Halt relocation of Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char’, Fortify Rights, (3 December 2020), available: https://www.fortifyrights.org/bgd-inv-2020-12-03/.
1
2
3

61

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report is a publication of the CESF Consortium, and was made possible through the collective
effort of all Consortium members including: Bairska Svetlina (North Macedonia); Citizenship
Affected Persons Network (Nepal); Central Asia Network on Statelessness; Council of Minorities(Bangladesh); Development and Justice Initiative (India); Dominican@s por Derecho platform(Dominican Republic); Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion; Nubian Rights Forum (Kenya);Phiren Amenca (Montenegro); Rohingya Human Rights Initiative (India), and the Rohingya Women
Development Network (Malaysia).
The report was drafted and edited by Amal de Chickera, Georgia Field and Ottoline Spearman.
Additional editorial input and review by Grant Mitchell, Laura van Waas and Vera Karanika. Designand layout by Alena Jascanka. We are grateful to Hannah Gordon and Subin Mulmi of Nationality
for All, for reviewing the draft. Many thanks go to ISI interns including Khanagar Bayagud,Santal Tacconi and Stefania Tantimonaco for research assistance and help with the collation of
information.
All country chapters benefited from inputs, material and review of the following CESF Consortium
members and partners, who also reviewed the full report: Ali Johar; Allison Petrozziello; Arjun
Shah; ASCALA CEDESO; Azizbek Ashurov; Beneco Enecia; Binda Pandey; Bridget Wooding; Deepti
Gurung; Denis Dzhivaga; Elvis Beriša; Khalid Hussain; Mallika Balami; MOSCTHA; MUDHA; Najiba
Shirinbekova; Neha Gurung; Nevenka Kapič; OBMICA; Phiren Amenca field workers; Ravi Hemadri;
Reconoci.do movement; Remzi Medik; Saba Banu; Sabin Shrestha; Serdar Malikovski; Sharifah
Shakirah; Shukhrat Ganiev; Suraj Hazzare Dahal; Uzurdjan Malikovska and Yassah Kimei.
With special thanks to Gita Sen; Karina Ambartsoumian-Clough; Michelle Williams; Monette Zard;
Mustafa Mahmoud Yousif; Santino Severoni and Sam Wolthuis for your thoughtful endorsement
messages, which have been included in the report.
We are also grateful to several partners for providing information, including by answering ourquestionnaire, reviewing case studies and chapters and providing quotes to be included in thereport.
We are deeply appreciative of the continued support of the CESF funders: American Jewish World
Service; DLA-Piper; Dunn Family Foundation; Oak Foundation; Sigrid Rausing Trust and Stichting
Weeshuis Der Doopsgezinden.

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WE SALUTE THE COURAGE AND FORBEARANCE
OF ALL THE STATELESS PEOPLE AND THOSE
AT RISK OF STATELESSNESS WHO TOOK THE
TIME TO SHARE YOUR STRUGGLES WITH OURCESF CONSORTIUM AND HAVE ENGAGED WITH
US ALONG THE WAY. WE HOPE THIS REPORTCAPTURES SOME OF YOUR EXPERIENCES AND IS
A USEFUL TOOL IN OUR CONTINUED COLLECTIVE
EFFORTS TOWARDS PROTECTING EVERYONE’S
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY AND ALL OTHER RIGHTSOF STATELESS PEOPLE. WE DEDICATE THISREPORT TO YOU ALL.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSFULL REPORT1954 Convention - 1954 Convention Relating to the Status ofStateless Persons
1961 Convention - 1961 Convention on the Reduction ofStatelessness
ATD – Alternatives to Detention
CBSA – Canada Border Service Agency
CCPR – Human Rights Committee
CEB - Junta Central Electoral (Central Electoral Board)
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness FundCANS – Central Asia Network on Statelessness
CAPN – Citizenship Affected Persons Network
CCPR – Human Rights Committee
CDM – Civil Disobedience Movement
CDO – Civil Documentation Offices
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
CHT - Chittagong Hill Tract
CoM – Council of Minorities
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child
DACA – Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
DAJI – Development and Justice Initiative
DHA – Department of Home Affairs
DxD - Dominican@s por Derecho platform
EAO – Ethnic Armed Organisation
EU – European Union
FT – Foreigner Tribunal
FVLWB - Ferghana Valley Lawyers Without Borders Association
GBV – Gender based violence
IACtHR – Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
RightsICRC - International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
ID - Identity Document
IDP – Internally Displaced Person(s)IFRC – International Federation of Red Cross and Red CrescentSocieties
IGO – International Governmental Organisations
ILO – International Labour Organisation
IOM – International Organization for Migration
ISI – Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion
LHR – Lawyers for Human Rights
LTSVP – Long-Term Social Visit Pass
MIP - Ministerio de Interior y Policía (Ministry of Interior and Police)
MCO – Movement Control Orders
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
NHS – National Health Service
NRC – National Registration of Citizens
NRF - Nubian Rights ForumOBMICA - Caribbean Migrants Observatory
OHCHR - Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSF – Open Society Foundation
PA – Palestinian Authority
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment
R4R – Rohingya Human Rights Initiative
RNCN – Right to Nationality and Citizenship Network
RWDN – Rohingya Women Development Network
SDP - Statelessness Determination Procedure
SUHAKAM – Human Rights Commission of Malaysia
TPS – Temporary Protection Status
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UN HRC – United Nations Human Rights Council
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees in the Near East
US – United States
USSR – Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
WASH – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP – World Food Programme

PART 2: THEMATIC OVERVIEW
RIGHT TO NATIONALITY, DOCUMENTATION
AND LEGAL STATUS
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child
DHA – Department of Home Affairs
FT – Foreigner Tribunal
LHR – Lawyers for Human Rights
NRC – National Registry of Citizens
PA – Palestinian Authority
TPS – Temporary Protection Status
UN – United Nations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s FundUS – United States
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATIONCESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
GBV – Gender-based Violence
NRC – National Register of Citizens
UN – United Nations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees in the Near East
RIGHT TO HEALTHCESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
IOM – International Organization for Migration
NHS – National Health Service
IDP – Internally Displaced Person
ID - Identity Document
ICRC - International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
RightsOHCHR - Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
IFRC – International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
UN HRC – United Nations Human Rights Council
WFP – World Food Programme
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization
ILO – International Labour Organisation

63

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTSMALAYSIA

ATD – Alternatives to Detention
CBSA – Canada Border Service Agency
CCPR – Human Rights Committee
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
DACA – Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
EU – European Union
ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP – Internally Displaced Person(s)LHR – Lawyers for Human Rights
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
SDP – Statelessness Determination Procedure
TPS – Temporary Protection Status
UN – United Nations

CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
LTSVP – Long-Term Social Visit Pass
MCO – Movement Control Orders
SUHAKAM – Human Rights Commission of Malaysia
MONTENEGROCESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
ID - Identity Document
SDP - Statelessness Determination Procedure
NEPAL

PART 3: COUNTRY OVERVIEW
BANGLADESHCESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
CoM – Council of Minorities
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
CENTRAL ASIACANS – Central Asia Network on Statelessness
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
FVLWB - Ferghana Valley Lawyers Without Borders Association
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
UN – United Nations
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USSR – Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
DxD - Dominican@s por Derecho platform
IACtHR – Inter-American Court of Human Rights
CEB - Junta Central Electoral (Central Electoral Board)
MIP - Ministerio de Interior y Policía (Ministry of Interior and Police)
OBMICA - Caribbean Migrants Observatory
INDIA
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
CHT - Chittagong Hill Tract
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
DAJI – Development and Justice Initiative
FT – Foreigner Tribunal
NRC – National Registration of Citizens
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment
RNCN – Right to Nationality and Citizenship Network
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s FundKENYA
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
ID - Identity Document
NRF - Nubian Rights Forum
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

64

CAPN – Citizenship Affected Persons Network
CESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
CDO – Civil Documentation Offices
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019NORTH MACEDONIACESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
EU – European Union
OSF – Open Society Foundation
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
PPE – Personal Protective Equipment
ROHINGYACESF – COVID-19 Emergency Statelessness Fund
CDM – Civil Disobedience Movement
COVID-19 – Corona Virus Disease 2019
EAO – Ethnic Armed Organisation
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
R4R – Rohingya Human Rights Initiative
RWDN – Rohingya Women Development Network
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene65