FNCA Newsletter No.9
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management

C o nte nts
March 2015

The 2014 RS&RWM Workshop
P.1 – P.2

Issued by
Nuclear Safe ty
Research Association(FNCA Secretariat,
JAPAN )

Topics from participating countries
P.3 – P.21
List of Project Leaders P.22
FNCA Framework

The 2014 FNCA Workshop on
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management (RS&RWM)
9‐12 September, 2014, Astana, Kazakhstan

The FNCA 2014 Workshop on
Radiation Safety and Radioactive Waste
Management (RS&RWM) was heldfrom September 9 to 12 2014, in Astana,
Kazakhstan. This workshop was hosted
by the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology(MEXT) of Japan and National Nuclear
Center of Republic of Kazakhstan(NNC). Fifteen researchers and experts
from Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia,
The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam
participated in the workshop.
On the first day, member countries
gave
acountryreporton
nuclear/radiologicalemergency
preparedness and response detailingregulatory
framework,
zonation,emergency classification, on-site andoff-site response, and local government
preparedness, training and education
personnel and radiation monitoring plan.
Participants then discussed onframework of Consolidated Report on
Nuclear/Radiological
Emergency
Preparedness and Response.

Fig1: The 2014 RS&RWM Workshop

On the second day, participants had adiscussion on challenges faced by FNCA
participating countries in the area of
RS&RWM such as 1)radiation safetyissues in uranium mining, 2)challenges
in RS&RWM in RI facilities/nuclear
power plant, 3)plans for NPP
introduction, and 4)status and plans for

1

P.23

On the last day, participants discussed
future plans for the next three years.
There was an agreement that member
countries cooperatively work toward thecompletion of the first draft of theconsolidated
reporton
Nuclear/Radiological
Emergency
Preparedness and Response. With theclosing remarks from Mr.Sergey Berezin,
Deputy Director, National Nuclear
Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan
and Prof. Toshiso Kosako, the workshop
was officially adjourned.
In the afternoon, A technical visit to
Education and Research Complex,
Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) was
conducted. Participants visited a heavy
ion accelerator DC 60 and learned about
the activities carried out by the complex.

low level waste disposal facilities/longterm storage facilities.
An open seminar on Radiation
Protection in Nuclear and Radiation
Facilities was held at Nazarbayev
University on 11 September. The
opening remarks were made by Prof.
Baigarin Kanat, Director, Institute of
Innovative Technologies, Nazarbayev
University and Prof. Toshiso Kosako,
Nuclear Professional School, Graduate
School of Engineering, The Universityof Tokyo. Four presentations were
provided on each topic of radioisotopes
application, IAEA safety standard and
ICRP recommendation, basics ofradiation safety, and FNCA activities
and MEXT programs supporting HRD
for nuclear energy and radiation
utilization in Asian countries. In theafternoon, there were two roundtablediscussion on safety management of
NORM and safety management ofradioactive
sources
inmedicalinstitutions with the participation of
Mr.Timur Zhantikin, Deputy Chairman,
Committee of Safety in Power andNuclear Industry.

Fig2: Open Seminar at Nazarbayev University

2

Fig3: Technical Visit to Central Geological Laboratorysupply of Mo-99,
technetium-99maprecursor

Topics from Participating Countries

to(Tc-99m) used for the diagnosis ofcancers, heart disease, muscular andskeletal conditions, is under a real threat.

Australia
Ms Lynn Tan
Australian Nuclear Science &Technology Organisation (ANSTO)ANSTO’s Waste Upgrade Project in
Support of the Australian Nuclear
Medicine (ANM) Facilities
The ANSTO Nuclear Medicine (ANM)
Project
Australia is set to become a major
world supplier of radiopharmaceuticals
with the announcement by the Australian
government in 2012 for a new ANSTO
Nuclear Medicine (ANM) facility.
Situated in the ANSTO Lucas Heights
site, the $168.8 million ANM Project
includesanuclearmedicine
manufacturing plant (Figure 1) and awaste treatment plant (Figure 2) to treat
by-products for permanent, safe storageat a national waste repository.

Fig2: The ANM Synroc Waste Treatment Facility

As a signatory at the ministerial-level
Joint Declaration of the security ofSupply of Medical Radioisotopes,
Australia’s new Mo-99 manufacturing
plant will play a major role in ensuring
the long-term reliability of theradioisotope supply in an economicallysustainable
andproliferation-proof
manner. Once fully operational, ANSTO
will triple its production of Mo-99,
enabling it to supply up to 25-30% of
global demand.
ANM Waste Upgrade Project
An ANM Waste Upgrade Project
was established to ensure that both the
ANM Mo-99 Production Facility andSynroc Waste Treatment Facility areadequately supported by systems thathave the capacity to safely manage theincreased waste volumes, as well as newwaste streams, that will be generated byboth facilities. A review of ANSTO’s
existing waste management services andsupport infrastructure was undertaken
and the following are just some of theitems identified as requisite for safe,
effective waste-end support for the ANM
Project.

Fig1: The ANM Mo-99 Production Facility

With more countries developing
modern medical systems, the world’s
demand for nuclear medicine is growing.
It is estimated that Molybdenum-99(Mo-99) is used in around 45 million
procedures worldwide each year anddemand is growing particularly in the
Asia-Pacific region. However the globali.

3

New Intermediate Level Solid
Waste Bins

ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

New Intermediate Level Solid
Waste (ILSW) Flask
New Flask Transport Truck
Enhanced shielding for the SpentUranium Filter Flask
Upgrade of Hot Cells Safety
Interlocks

New Intermediate Level Solid Waste
Flask
The project also decided to design a
new intermediate level solid waste(ILSW) flask to service the new facilities
as the review of the existing flask, which
was built in 1990s, revealed several
operational, maintenance and safetyissues which would require costly
upgrades and extended downtime torectify.

New Retrievable Waste Bins
In the Synroc waste treatment facility,intermediate level liquid wastes from the
Mo-99 production process is mixed,
dried and calcined with Synroc
precursors prior to being sealed in a
specially designed can for hot isostaticpressing (HIP) at high temperatures. This
HIPingprocess
immobilises
theradionuclides within a stable glassceramic matrix and provide substantial
volume reduction of the final waste form.
The cans before and after the HIPing
process can be seen in Figure 3.

Furthermore, the existing flask could
not accommodate the new taller waste
bins required for the SYNROC process
and the hoist system will not be able toreach ANSTO’s new deeper waste
storage pits. The existing flask control
system is also not compatible withinterlock requirements of th e ANM Mo99 and Synroc facilities.

Fig3: Pre- (left) and Post- (right) HIPed cans

The existing waste bins will not beable to contain the HIPed cans from the
HIP process, hence taller waste bins
(Figure 4) were designed for the taller
and heavier waste packages.

Fig5: A model of the new ILSW Flask with improved
safety interlock system, designed to accommodate newtaller waste bins and access deeper storage pits.

Hence a new ILSW flask withincreased internal capacity to handle thelarger Synroc waste bins was designed
for manufacture (Figure 5). The newflask will have a Dangerous Goods
Rated hoist with a 10 m useable reach
cable, an increased lead shield thickness
to 130 mm, and fitted with a Safety
Integrity Level 2 programmable logic
controller. The control system willinterface smoothly with the new ANM
Mo-99 and Synroc facilities, with nomajor infrastructure upgrades to existingbuildings necessary for its use.

Fig4: Wastes bins of various heights designed for use
by the ANM Facilities

4New Waste Transport Truck
The improved design and shielding
resulted in the increased overall weightof the ILSW flask, thereby necessitating
the purchase of a higher carryingcapacity truck. A specially designed tray
with anchor points for securing the 10
ton flask during transport will bemounted to the truck. The dimensions of
the new truck (Figure 6) were reviewed
to ensure access to existing buildings, aswell as the new ANM facilities, forwaste collection and storage, aremaintained.

Fig7: Shielded adaptor for the vertical posting port to
reduce shine path caused by the existing design of the
SUF Flask

Upgrade of Building 41 Hot Cells
Safety Interlocks
The encapsulation of the SpentUranium Filters takes place inside the
Building 41 hot cells. Multiple entries
into the hot cells are required throughout
the process for decontamination,equipment setup and other interventions.
The project designed a safety upgrade
system for the existing hot cells (built in
the 1960s) to commensurate theincreased risks posed by the increased
operational activities expected in these
hot cells from the new ANM Mo-99
production facility.

Fig6: A new truck was purchased to transport the newheavier ILSW flask, sized to ensure access to existing
and future facilities.

The proposed upgrades to the hot
cells include a captive key interlock
system for the building overhead cranefor use with the various waste flasks.
This is to prevent accidental lifting of theflasks during waste transfers causing
exposure to staff.

Enhanced shielding for SUF Flask
The Spent Uranium Filters (SUF)from the Mo-99 production process aretransported using the SUF flask to the
Building 41 hot cells for encapsulation
prior to being transferred to theretrievable storage pits for interim onsite storage.

Radiation monitors will also be
mounted inside the hot cells to prevent
opening of a rear cell doors when unsafe
level of radiation is detected inside thehot cells.

The existing adaptor that is used toalign the flask during positioning by thebuilding crane above the vertical posting
port of the loading platform lacks
shielding. A new adaptor (Figure 7) was
therefore designed to provide leadshielding at the transition between theflask and the loading platform tocompensate for any shielding weakness
during the transfer of the SUF cups out
from the flask.

Interlocks will also prevent the
opening of the inter-cell doors when therear cell door of an adjacent hot cell isopen, which usually coincides with staff
working in the adjacent cell. An
interlock between the inter-cell doors
and the in-cell crane will also be
available to prevent damage from
accidental closing of the door onto the5crane. The rear cell posting port (Figure8) will also be interlocked to prevent
concurrent opening of both the internaland external doors.
Audible and visual alarms will be
provided at the rear of cell area and all
entry points into the rear cells area whena radiation level set-point is exceeded.

Fig8: Hot Cell posting port to be fitted with a safety interlock.

This hot cell interlock system iscontrolled by an Allen Bradley Guard
Logix PLC and a display panel will be
provided at the front and back of thecells to allow control and operator
feedback of the status of the Hot Cellinterlock system and radiation monitors.

More information on the ANM Mo-99
and SYNROC project can be found on
the ANSTO’s website.

Radioactivity Testing and Monitoring
Laboratory Facility was established in
the port-city of Chittagong. However,
the gradual increase of routing work inpeaceful application of atomic energy
and considering importance of radio
ecologicalresearch,
environmental
monitoring and assessment of pollution
induced by aquatic and air borne
radioactivity around the marine &coastal areas, Establishment of Atomic
Energy Centre Chittagong, project was
included in the ADP for the year 20052006. Consequently, Establishment of amodern Atomic Energy Centre at
Chittagong has become an importanttask for future development of thecountry.
In July 2006, the Ministry of Scienceand Technology of Government of
Bangladesh (GOB) approved theEstablishment of ‘Atomic Energy Centre,
Chittagong, project, under ADP of GOB.
The Government of the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh allocated budget
to implement the project in the port cityof Chittagong within the time framefrom July 2006 - December 2013.

Bangladesh
Dr M. Moinul Islam
Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC)

Establishment of Atomic Energy
Centre, Chittagong
Safety of food and environment isthe demand of all nations and taking
necessary measures to ensure that theindividuals, society and environment areprotected from the harmful effect ofionising radiation. The Government of
the People’s Republic of Bangladesh in a
Gazette Notification declared thatradioactivity test is mandatory for allimported foodstuff according to Nuclear
Safety and Radiation Control Act 1993
& Rules-1997 which has been replacedbyBangladesh
AtomicEnergyRegulatory Act 2014 and Rules. Since
Bangladesh has to import a sizeable
amount of food materials from different
countries, therefore it is necessary tocontrol and regulate the levels ofradioactivity in all food materials forsafety of the pubic from harmful effectsof radiation. To support implementationof the regulatory requirements,
6

Fig1: Two storied laboratory building Support to the law enforcing agencies
to protect illicit trafficking/transit ofnuclear and radioactive materials
 Emergency service during radiologicalincidents/accidents Surface water hydrology using nuclear
technology Marine and coastal
radioactivity study

Fig2: Atomic Absorption Spectrometer

The target of the project is toestablish a modern centre with state-ofart laboratories for the routine, researchand development activities on problemsof natural resources, protection of humanand environment using nuclear andradiation technology. The main purposesof the centre are:

 Education and teaching: which will
help enhancing indigenous R&D
capabilities and in ongoing different
courses/training on radiation safety andcreating awarenessThe inauguration took place on 23
October 2013, marking the start ofoperations of the facilities. Under the
Establishment of Atomic Energy centre,
Chittagong project construction of a twostoried laboratory building has beenequipped with a number of laboratory
facilities e.g., HPGe Detector, Portable
Gamma-ray Spectrometers, Double
Beam Atomic Absorption Spectrometer(AAS) etc.
As a result of the successful
implementation of the project, it has
been possible to achieve sustainable
program for radioactivity analysis ofimported and exportable materials, radio
ecological research, and environmental
pollution study and radiation protection
service. The newly built Atomic Energy
Centre at Chittagong will function underordinance promulgated for the BAEC.

 Radioactivity analysis of imported
food and environmental samples,
which is an important component ofpublic exposure control
 Radioactivity analysis of exportable
food and allied materials
 Radioecologicalresearch,
environmental
monitoringandassessment of pollution induced byaquatic and air borne radioactivity
 Promotion
occurring(NORM)

of R&D on naturally
radioactive
materials

 Measurement of radiation level ofscrap materials
 Radiation protection services to theindustries

Through the testing and fixing up of
the radiation level for imported andexportable food items population of thecountry will be benefited. The project
has strengthened the research and service
related facilities on radioactivity analysis
of food and environmental samples,
which will impact on socio-economic
development of the country.

 Safety measures during transportationof the imported radioactive/nuclear
materials
 Providing service to Sea Port andCustoms Authorities in examination of
consignment containing radioactive
materials
 Airparticulatemonitoring
radiological pollution

environmentfor7

any appropriate and safe site(s) occurs(or not) in Jawa Island, and becomes
important input for long-term of national
radwaste policy in Indonesia.

Indonesia‐①
Dr Budi SETIAWAN
National Nuclear Energy Agency(BATAN)OBJECTIVE
Objective of the program is toinvestigate some interested areas andfind out the potential (suitable) areas andsafe site(s) for dispose radwaste in Jawa
Island.

Siting Programfor Radwaste Disposal in Jawa IslandIndonesia
INTRODUCTION
Research activities and nuclear
application on industrial and medical
sectors has been generated radwaste in awide range of activity levels, and an
introduction plan of NPP in Jawa Island
in near future is predicted contribute
more radwastes.
Moreover publicawareness to radwaste management
program especially on the disposal
program raises the environment safetyconcern. BATAN as the executive bodyon the application of nuclear science andtechnology in Indonesia should assure to
public on the safety aspects upon theimpacts on its activities and a safe
location for dispose radwaste should beconsidered and initiated correctly. To
assure to the public on the safety aspectsof radwaste disposal, BATAN initiates toprepare The Siting Program of Radwaste
Disposal in Jawa Island to supports theintroduction of NPP program inIndonesia.
Jawa Island was chosen due to thedominantly of radwaste volume exist inIndonesia (from industrial, medical andresearch activities) and the first NPP isplanned in Jawa Island. The disposal site
is better placed in Jawa Island to
closeness to the source of waste
generators or treatment facility and it’s
could
minimizetheradwastetransportation system risk.
Also toanticipate the land acquisition problem
that becomes more expensive andcomplicated in future due to highpopulation density problem. Through theprogram we also could confirm whether

METHODOLOGY
Siting steps from IAEA guidance andexperiences from other countries whichhave siting programs were reviewed,
modified and adopted. To obtain thepotential areas, some standards andcriteria has been arranged andestablishedforexcludingandcomparative evaluation of interestingareas to find out the potential area/site(s).
Arrangement of standards and criteria
refer to the important parameters or
aspects which were issued by IAEA
safety guides and mixed with someNational Regulations (Chairman of
BAPETEN Regulation, and Ministry ofEnvironment) to meet the local
conditions. Both criteria and standards
as exclusion and comparative factors
will consist of geologically and nongeologically considerations from safety
point of view. Up to now we haveexclusion and comparative criteria forfind out the potential areas.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Since Jawa Island has high rainfall
rates (see Fig. 1) and cracky character
for its soil-rock, a host rock with low
hydraulic conductivity (10-7 cm/s) typesuch as clay was proposed for host of
Radwaste Disposal facility.
Clayrock/soil
withimpermeablecharacteristic hopely can control
groundwater flow, and then with its goodability to absorp radionuclides will givean advantage as host rock of Radwaste
Disposal facility. From desk-top study8

(cabinet works) to region of interest in
Jawa Island, we found some potential
areas with clay type based such as inWest Jawa region: Karawang, Subang,
Sumedang, Majalengka, Central Jawa
region: Rembang, Muria Peninsula andin East Jawa region: Tambakrogo, Tuban,
Madura, and Serpong Nuclear ResearchCenter (vulcanic rock), totally we have
10 potential areas to be recognized andthen evaluated.

Since FY 2009 investigation ofpotential areas through field survey has
been performing to recognize the interest
areas in Jawa Island (see Fig.2). Some
informations of interest areas related tothe standars and criteria had beencollected and then the data wereclassified and evaluated carefully to findout potential areas. Screening process isdoing to potential areas by using
exclusion and comparative factors tofind out the potential sites. The results
showed that from 10 interesting areas
were selected become 5 potential(suitable) areas: Karawang, Sumedang,
Rembang, Tuban and Serpong areas.
However Serpong area was chosen as adesignated site for the demonstration
disposal facility.

CONCLUSION
Introduction of first NPP will increase
public awareness to environment safety
problem, i.e. disposal program. By
reviewed, modified and adopted
procedures from IAEA guidance, somecountries siting report and National
Regulation, the preparation of siting
program for radwaste disposal in Jawa
Island has been discussing intensively.
Due to local condition in Jawa Island,clay rock was considered as host rockfor radwaste disposal. Since 2009 FY
some information of interest areas has
been collected and evaluated to find out
the potential areas. From 10 interestingareas were selected become 5 potential(suitable) areas: Karawang, Sumedang,
Rembang, Tuban and Serpong areas.
However Serpong area was chosen as adesignated site for the demonstration
disposal facility.

Fig1: Map of annually rainfall rates in Indonesia

facility for very low level radwaste witha half-life very short (less than 5 years)
which are now being storage in theinterim storage facility. Through acertain sorting system, some waste
packages in the interim storage facility
can be moved and placed at thedemonstration disposal facility in the
future.

Fig2: Flow chart of the siting program

9
Fig3: Situation at the field

2010 on The Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness and Response, that each
installation uses radioactive substance
must
make
nuclearemergency
preparedness and response programme.
The programme determined is base on
the assessment of radiological potential
hazard appropriate with radiologicalhazard category.

Fig4: One of natural clay rock in Subang area

Indonesia‐②
Mr Cecep Cepi H.
National Nuclear Energy Agency(BATAN)
Fig1: Sliding Bridge of TC-ISSF

According to The Regulation of
BAPETEN Chairman mentioned above,
CRWT installations is included into
category II that is the installation or
facility has danger potential to generateradioactive release having dose exceeds
the limit dose but the dose does not givedeterministic effect seriously out of site.
Government Regulation number 54 year
2012 on The Nuclear Installation Safety
and Security mentioned that every
licencee must hold nuclear emergency
exercise on facility level, and ensure that
nuclearemergency
preparedness
programme can be done, licensee must
hold nuclear emergency exercise on
facility level at least once in a year.
Base on the regulation above, then
CRWT
held
nuclearemergency
preparedness and response on TC-ISFSF.
Hopefully this exercise can increase thecapability of personnels on nuclear
emergency preparedness and response,and it can also be known existing
infrastructure condition and somethingelse must be present on emergency
condition.

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness andResponse Exercise on Transfer
Channel- Interim Storage for Spent
Fuel (TC-ISFSF)– National Nuclear
Energy Agency of Indonesia(BATAN)
Spent fuel and radioactive waste
management is conducted by National
Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) as
operator, it is contained in The Act
number 10 year 1997 on The nuclear
Energy, whereas one of center in
BATAN that has task to manage spent
fuel and radioactive waste is Center forRadioactive Waste Technology (CRWT)
in accordance with The Regulation of
BATAN Chairman number 14 year 2013
on The Organization and Working
Procedure of BATAN.
Center forRadioactive Waste Technology has 2(two) installations those are radioactive
waste
treatment
installation
forprocessing low and intermediate level
radioactive waste, and the transfer
channel installation storage for spent
fuel from research reactor.
According to The regulation of
BAPETEN Chairman Number 1 year

10

emergency scale and announced to all
CRWT workers about emergency, afterthat reported immediately this accident
to Head of Center for nuclear strategic
Area and Informatic utilization as amanager of nuclear Serpong area,
BATAN chairman, and BAPETEN
Chairman.
All emergency teams reported toOperation Manager (OM) appointed byOperation Control (OC) and thendiscussed how to handle this emergency.
After the discussion and got advice from
OM and Radiological Assessor (RA)emergency teams work according totheir task and function.
After victim was handled and thecondition returned safely, then head of
CRWT declare that emergency was over.
This nuclear emergency preparedness
and response exercise were attended byrepresentatives of BAPETEN (regulator),
Center for Quality and Nuclear
Standardization, Center for Nuclear Fuel
Material Technology, Center for Scienceand Technology of Advanced Materials
as observer, and representatives ofCenter for Multipurpose Reactor andCenter for Nuclear Strategic Area andInformatic Utilization as evaluator. This
exercise was held in 2 days, first day for
preparation and coordination and thesecond day was the real exercise. The
activity of exercise was ended withevaluation session from evaluator,
observer and all participants. The goal ofevaluation is to know shortage of ourfacility and to improve our poorness
forward, so if there is a real emergency
condition we will have been ready. The
evaluation covers implementation of
SOP, existing of SOP, availability ofmaterial and instrument and method ofcommunication.

Fig1: Evacuation of victim

The scenario of this exercise was
accident at pool of TC-ISFSF duringtransferring spent fuel from rack on thepool to intermediate stage before
inserted to transfer hood. There were 4(four) operators that transfered a spent
fuel, 2 operators operated handling tool,
one operator operated balancer and thelast one was radiation protection officer.
The position of 3 operators were on
sliding bridge and radiation protection
officer conducted monitoring from sideof the pool. During processing oftransferring of spent fuel, suddenly slingbalancer was broken so that handling
tool fell down to break spent fuel which
was being carried and spent fuel on the
rack. Handling tool operator reflexed tohold it but failed and the operator instead
fell into the pool.
Radiation Protection Officer (RPO)
saw that accident then threw the ringbuoy to the victim , RPO helped thevictim to reach intermediate stage. A few
moments later gamma area monitor
alarm was ringing to indicate that theradiation on pool area increased.
RPO immediately reported to Security
Officer about that accident, then Head of
Security reported immediately to Headof CRWT, and activated emergency
team, then gave instruction to rescue andsecurity team to go to location thenfollowed by the other teams.
Head of Security as Operation
Control (OC) contacted immediately allhead division to assembly at crisis centerroom. Head of CRWT determined11

In the interest of providing a nucleus
for research and development aimed atacquiring technologies and expertise forthe activities outlined above, CRIEPI has
established the NRRC to more
effectively harness the human resources
and research infrastructure in related
fields it has collected to date.
Further, in the interest of fostering acycle that combines research anddevelopment with utilization of results
together with the electric power industry
and the broader industrial sector, CRIEPI
has created a framework for joint studies
by various levels of the management
hierarchy, including the Chief Nuclear
Officers Conference.
Additionally, in view of theimportance of strengthened international
cooperation within the NRRC’s activities,
CRIEPIhas
invitedworld-classauthorities of nuclear safety with strong
leadership experience to serve as the
NRRC’s executives.

Japan
Prof Toshiso Kosako
University of TokyoDr Takatoshi Hattori
Central Research Institute of ElectricPower Industry
On the Establishment of
the Nuclear Risk Research CenterIn the interest of creating a center for
research and development necessary for
utilities to improve safety of nuclear
power on their own initiative, the Central
Research Institute of Electric Power
Industry (CRIEPI) established the
Nuclear Risk Research Center (NRRC)
on October 1, 2014.
In light of the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station accident, it isvital to continually strive for even higher
levels of safety in the use of nuclear
power generation. To that end, it will benecessary for nuclear utilities themselves
to go further than simply meeting theregulatory requirements and to pursue
sustained commitment to reduce nuclear
risk.
To reduce risk, it will be imperative toimplement appropriate measures tocounter natural disasters involving large
earthquakes, massive tsunamis, andtornados, as well as other events that areof low frequency, yet have the potential
to cause significant damage. Similarly
important are measures to mitigate any
damage if an accident does occur. For
that purpose, it will be necessary to
predict the progression and behavior of
accidents at power stations that havebeen caused by such events, andformulate countermeasures. Moreover,because the focus is on events that are of
low frequency and involve substantial
uncertainty, it is necessary to verify theeffectiveness of measures based oncomprehensive risk assessments utilizing
PRA and other probabilistic methods.

Fig1: The Activities of Nuclear Risk Research Center

Fig2: Outline of the Organization12

After work stoppage as well as
technologicalprocess
shutdown
radioactive wastes were remained in 22
and 22a operating workshops: in tanks
and pipelines in form of technologicalsolutions, punching machines andcollecting tanks in form of solid wastes.

CRIEPI Press Release "On the Establishment of the
Nuclear Risk ResearchCenter" Oct.1, 2014
http://criepi.denken.or.jp/en/publications/pressreleas
e/20141001.pdf

Kazakhstan
Dr Erlan Batyrbekov
National Nuclear Center of RK

Completed Operations
Within the period from 2004 to 2014
the National Nuclear Center of RK
performed substantial volume ofoperations on: search, removal anddisposal of ionizing radiation sources(IRS), solid and liquid radioactive wastes,
detectingofcontaminatedsitesboundaries and elimination of radiation
hazardous situation at the territory of
ICMP, radioactive waste disposal sites
and adjacent territories.

Operation conduction on radiation
hazardous situation liquidation at the
territory of the former Irtysh
Chemical and Metallurgical Plant,
radioactive waste disposal area as wellas territories adjacent to them
BackgroundThe
IrtyshChemicalandMetallurgical Plant (ICMP) wasconstructed and put into operation in the
period from 1958 to 1961.
Raw material, reprocessed Loparite
mineral contained rare earth element(hereinafter
REE):
Cerium,Neodymium, Praseodymium, Samarium,
Gadolinium, Europium and others. Raw
material upon high temperature andinteraction with gaseous chlorine passinto soluble concentrate: REE chloride
melt, natural thorium content in which
composed 0.3-0.9%. 10 tons of raw
materials were reprocessed per a day.
During REE removal in condition ofclosed technological cycle in 22 and 22a
operatingworkshops,
accumulated
radioactive wastes (RW) led to theiraccumulation in solutions. Insoluble
residue remained in volume of about 320
ton/year, of specific activity – (420)107 Bq/kg. Residue was then mixedin special engineering structures atradioactive waste disposal site (RWDS),
located at the territory adjacent to ICMP.
Another residue (cake) was obtained
after solution reprocessing with specificactivity of 1.5 108 Bq/kg in quantity of
20 ton/year since RW was disposed at
RWDS.

In 2004• Radiation survey of 90000 m2
was realized at RWDS territory
and RW storage sites locatedthere. Areas contaminated byradioactive substances of total
area of ~200 m2 were detected,(contaminated soil thickness
composed 0.1-0.5 m). Threecontainers with encapsulated
ionizing radiation sources (EIRS)
and 19 EIRS without containers
were also found at the territory
surveyed.
• Detailed survey, RW and IRS
removal from storage tank wererealized.
Duringwork
performance 69 m3 of RW (total
weight of about 120 tons) werestudied. 86 packages with EIRSand RW were removed from thetank.
• 306 EIRS (including: 1 neutron
source, 12 beta-sources and 293
gamma-sources)
and35
containers with EIRS weredetected.
Allradioactive
materials (RM) delivered to“Baikal-1” Research Reactor
Complex (RRC) were packed
13into special
disposed.

containersand• Collection, transportation of
EIRS and RW detected at thesurface and their long-term
storage to “Baikal-1” RRC werecarried out. Contaminated soil
from 36 spots (7.8 m3) wasremoved.
• Based on data of radiation
surveys of operating workshops
22 and 22 A, technologicalprocess was developed.
• Remediation
activities
atcontaminatedterritories
adjacent to RWDS and ICMP
detected
in
2005
were
conducted.

In 2005• Radiation survey of territory
adjacent to RWDS at a distance
up to 500 m (total area of 144 ha)from RWDS fencing was carriedout. During the survey, 1440000
measurements of equivalent
gamma-ray dose rate and 3600
measurements of alpha, betaparticles flux density and neutron
equivalent dose rate were made.
In this regard, 50 contamination
spots with radioactive substancesat territory were detected. Total
contamination area after removalof small spots comprised 17400
м2, total volume – 8700 м3(gamma-rays were ranged from
0.7 to 130 µSv/h, alpha-particles
flux density was from 1 to 160
part/(mincm2),
beta-particles
flux density was from 10 to
900000 part/(mincm2).
• Radiation survey of ICMP
operating shops 22, 22A andadjacent territory was carried out,
about 4400 m2 of total area ofpremises (~7200 m2) hadradioactive contamination higher
allowable limits.
• Based on data received in 20042005, technical proposals andlong-term work program on
liquidation of radiation hazardous
objects located in controlled
territory of ICMP as well as at
the territory of RWDS weredeveloped.

In 2007• Radiation survey of territory
aroundPervomayskiy
settlement was carried out, 9contaminated regions with total
area of 238 m2 were detected.
In 2008• Operations on establishingsystem for underground anddischarged water radiation
monitoring at territory of ICMP
and Pervomaiskiy settlement
were completed, monitoring
operations were conducted.
• Environmental and remediation
activities at trench disposal
areas detected in 2005 werecompleted. Six regions at the
territory adjacent to ICMP andhavingradioactive
contamination with total area of
13360 m2 were cleaned up.
Removed radioactive soil in theamount of 2590 m3 (low active
radioactive waste) was placed in
special prepared earth trenches.
The integration of operations onradiation hazard elimination had
begun.
• The operations on dismantlingof contaminated equipment in
operating workshop 22A and its
transportation to “Baikal-1”

In 2006• Radiation survey of 78 ha ofterritory adjacent to ICMP fromwest and north at a distance up
100 m from fencing and territory
within ICMP fencing was
carried out. During the survey,
85 contamination spots withradionuclides were detected.
14

RRC were commenced. 30 m3
of solid radioactive wastes weredismantled,
packagedandtransported to “Baikal-1” RRC.

In 2014• Solid radioactive wastes inamount of 210 tons were accepted
for long-term storage at “Baikal-1”
RRC. Totally 1500 containers forsolid RW were produced.

In 2009• Irrigation system of radioactive
wastes storage site was created.

Totally in 2004-2014 more 1400 tonsof RW and more 300 EIRS weretransported and placed for the storage at“Baikal-1” RRC.

In 2010• The operations on monitoring ofground and discharge waters at
the territory of ICMP and
Pervomayskiy settlement werecarried out.
• Liquid RW in amount of 90 m3
were reprocessed.
• Solid RW in amount of 342.54
tons (construction materials,
detailsoftechnologicalequipment, metal structures,etc.) and 325.01 tons ofreprocessed liquid RW weredismantled, packaged into PU-1
type containers, transported andplaced for the storage at“Baikal-1” RRC.

Fig1: The loading of casks with cemented
RW into cargo truck

In 2011• Solid RW in amount of 288.86
tons were packaged into PU-1
type containers, transported andplaced for the storage at“Baikal-1” RRC.
• Liquid RW in amount of 60 m3
were reprocessed. Reprocessed(cemented) liquid RW in
amount of 241.34 tons were
packaged in casks, transported
and placed for the storage at“Baikal-1” RRC.

Fig2: Radiation survey in operating workshop

Fig3: Loading of containers with solid radioactive
wastes into cargo truck

In 2013• Additional radiation survey was
carried out that showedlocations contaminated with
RM in amount of ~578 m2.
• Approximate
volumeofcontaminated soil is ~133.4 m3.
• The areas for containers
containing RW were arranged.

Fig4: Radiation survey of adjacent territories
near radioactive wastes disposal site (RWDS)

15

equipment in place. Minor adjustments
were made on shielding and placementof equipment.

Malaysia
Mr Nik Marzukee Nik Ibrahim
Dr Mohd Abd Wahab Yusof

Malaysian Nuclear Agency
Preparation for Conditioning ofDisused Sealed Radioactive Sources(DSRS) for Final Disposal in Malaysia
Malaysia has been actively involvedin projects for ensuring safety andsecurity in management of radioactive
waste,
includingdisusedsealedradioactive sources (DSRS). A national
activity was implemented for the on-thejob training of personnel tasked with theconditioning of DSRS, from 13th to 17th
October 2014 at the Waste Technology
Development Centre (WasTeC) facilities.
This is part of “cradle-to-grave” controlof radioactive sources to protect theworkers and public from the hazards ofionizing radiation.

Fig2: Selection of DSRS for conditioning(Storage Area)

Prior
segregation
andcharacterization of DSRS were done in
the storage facility – based onradionuclide, type of devices, common
features, etc.

This was implemented under the
RAS9071 “Establishing a Radioactive
Waste Management Infrastructure”. The
training workshop was organized incollaboration with the IAEA. It was
attended by (managers, operators andtechnicians) from several groups in
Nuclear Malaysia and the Atomic
Energy Licensing Board (AELB).

DSRS Holder

Fig3: Discussion with the IAEA experts(Conditioning Area)

Ascertained type of DSRS, locationin device and suitable tools or
equipment needed for dismantling
DSRS from device. Specific tools may
be needed for different type of devices.

Fig1: Discussion with the IAEA experts(Conditioning Area)

Prior discussion was made with theexperts on the conditioning area and the16
Fig4: Separating, cutting, transferring to shielded capsule

The first day of the training was
focused on discussion with the experts
on DSRS conditioning aspects. This
includes the working area layout,
operational
procedures,radiation
protection aspects and capsule welding
techniques. The next 4 days werededicated to training for the local team,covering
preparations
beforeconditioning and operational aspects
during and after conditioning activities.
Shielding was erected on theworking areas for each operation (DSRS
receiving area, encapsulation, welding,leak-testing). The welding machine
tested and operated by qualified welders
trained in tungsten inert gas (TIG)
welding techniques for stainless steel
capsules. The radiation doses expectedduringthe
DSRS
conditioning
operations were estimated and all safety
aspects were discussed. The IAEA
experts verified that the working
conditions fully met the requirements forthe conditioning exercise. Work wasdone on rotational basis among the staff
to reduce the dose received.
Two encapsulated capsules weregenerated after the training workshop.
The main DSRS encapsulated during thisexercise were mainly Cs-137, Co-60 and
Sr-90. The main significant activity isfrom Capsule 1 which contains Cs-137(55 units, 92.5GBq) while activity in
Capsule 2 is lower. Overall, this exercise
managed to improve our understandingon the technical aspects, preparation,
unexpected possibilities and also
improvement
neededfor
futureconditioning activity of DSRS.

DSRS were separated from holders(by cutting, when needed). The serial
number of each DSRS confirmed as ininventory. DSRS were transferred into astainless steel capsule, which is placed
inside a lead container shielding.

Fig5: Welding of capsule and leak testing of welded
capsuleWelding of the capsule was done
remotely to minimize dose to theoperators. The welded capsule wasallowed to cool before undergoing leaktesting under 0.25 atm in ethylene-glycol.
No leakage was recorded.

Fig6: Placement of capsule into temporary storage drum

The capsules were then transferredintocement-lined
200-L
drums,
complemented by layers of lead sheet.
Dose rates were recorded and the drum
were transferred to temporary storage
area prior to placement within the mainstorage facility

17

The Philippines
Mr Carl M. Nohay
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute(PNRI)The Joint Workshop of the Philippine
Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI)
and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency(AEA) on Radiological Emergency
Preparedness and Response

Fig1: Mr. Teofilo V. Leonin, Chief of the Nuclear Regulatory
Division, gave an overview of the National Radiological
Emergency and Response Plan as part of topic given in
the course.

Five (5) participants from thePhilippine Nuclear Research Institute(PNRI) and twenty (20) from thedifferent
cooperating
government
agencies, namely: Office of Civil
Defense of the National Disaster Risk
Reduction Management Council, Bureauof Fire Protection (Quezon City),
Philippine National Police (Quezon City),
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalionof the Philippine Army, Health
Emergency Management Bureau of the
Department of Health, Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority, andQuezon City Disaster Risk Reduction
Office, took part in this five-day
preparedness and response workshop,
which included a field exercise..
During the exercise, participants
conducted radiation monitoring andenvironmental sampling and analysis.
They measured the contamination levelof the ground surface and conductedgamma spectrum analysis and vehiclebased monitoring – activities that are
conducted following any nuclear orradiological incident or emergency.
Results were then compared amongst
participants.

The joint National Workshop on
Nuclear and Radiological Emergency
Preparedness and Response and theFollow-Up Training Course on Nuclear
andRadiological
Emergency
Preparedness was conducted at thePhilippine Nuclear Research Institute on
February 9 – 13, 2015. This activity was
undertaken in cooperation with the
Nuclear Human Resource Development
Center (NuHRDeC) of the Japan Atomic
Energy Agency (JAEA). It aimed tofurther strengthen the radiologicalemergency preparedness and response
capabilities of the PNRI and its
participating organizations in dealing
with accidents or incidents involving
nuclear or radiological materials such as
dirty bomb used for sabotage.
The key learning areas of theworkshop were to clearly establish thegoals of the emergency preparedness andresponse, to impart the roles andresponsibilitiesofthedifferent
participating agencies and the scope ofthe response structure, to learn theeffective use of radiation detection
equipment, and other related tools, toshare relevant international and national
guidance, decision-making criteria, andprocedures, and to understand the correctand efficient emergency response
techniques.

18

medical care, determination of the extent
of contamination, controllingthe crowd,
and planning for recovery and clean-up
operations. The scenario exercise wasabout act of terrorism whereby unknown
terrorist group used a radioactive
dispersive device.

Fig2: Mr. Seiichi Kanaizuka of JAEA, gives advice inthe proper wearing and taking off of the personal
protective suit.

The workshop also provided an
opportunity to practice coordination
between and among the various
radiological and nuclear response teams
and helped learn how the different teams
can work together and learn from eachother in order to provide immediate
assistance
under
the
National
Radiological Emergency Preparedness
and Response Plan (RADPLAN).

Fig5: Part of the field exercise is to demonstrate
how each participating response and action teamwill respond properly to an emergency.

ThailandMs Nanthavan Ya-anantThailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)
Radiological Emergency Exercise:
Megaports Initiative Project at Laem
Chabang Port Laem Chabang Port,
Chonburi, Thailand

Fig3: The participants actively play part of thesurface contamination monitoring anddecontamination at the former PNRI Gamma
Garden.
th

Exercise objectives
The aims and objectives of the
Exercise of the Magaports initiative
project at Laem Chabang Port (LCP), areas follows:
1) To implement the workflow in thedeveloped Standard Operating Procedure(SOP) of Magaports system at LCP
which are related to the various agencies,
develop information sharing mechanisms,
and plan the deployment of respondaction during a radiological materials
found at LCP.
2) To conducted as a facilitateddiscussion or analysis of the detection
and response to alarms events in a stressfree
environment
that
promotes
discussion on how to resolve problems

The 5 day of the workshop served
as the highlight of the workshop where
the participants had to undergo theintegrated radiological emergency field
exercise to test their knowledge andskills on their ability to demonstrate their
responsibilities and procedures including
implementation of appropriate decisionmaking criteria.
The exercise demonstrated the following
activities: life saving actions, setting-up
security
andsafetyperimeters,
implementation of immediate protective
actions,
determinationof
air
contamination, application of immediate
Fig4: Dramatization of a radiological emergency
response from a terrorist attack using aradiological dispersal device. The first response
team carefully placed down and monitored one of
the casualties.

19

or issues with existing operational plansor procedures.
3) Validate plans and procedures byutilizing a hypothetical scenario to drive
participant discussions.

Participated Agencies
Agency-level response depends on the
Nuclear/Radiological threat analyzed of
the alarm events. The scenarios need theplayer and evaluator only 4 agencies asfollows:
1. Laem Chabang port Customs
Bureau2. Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP)
3. Thailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)
4. Laem Chabang Port
Remarks: National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), USDOE andChulalongkorn University are worked astechnical supports.

Fig1: Picture of Leam Chabang Port

Participants will have 2 kinds ofexercises as follows;

Scenarios
Two scenarios are designed for
detection and response. These scenarios
consisted of two different themes of theexercise.

Tabletop Exercise (TTX) – designed tobring one or more agency together toevaluate and improve existing plans,
policies, and procedures by testing those
products in response to reality-based
exercise scenarios. These discussions
are informal and not time constrained.

1. The alarm event from high radiationlevel orphan radioactive source inscrap metal is imported to LCP or isexporting from LCP.
2. The alarm event from stolen nuclear
materials masked with Cerium ore isexporting from LCP.

Full-Scale Exercise (FSE, also known
as FTX) – the most complex event, isdesigned to evaluate and validate plans,
policies, and procedures across all levelsof engagement using reality-based
exercise scenarios. The exercise isconducted in real time using field
personnel and may also include
functional play from participants at othersites such as operations command center,and other agency coordination centers.
Results: The Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) is developed as shownin Figure 3-5.

Fig2: Magaports System Operation20

Fig3: SOP of Alarm Response

Fig4: SOP of Treat Response

Fig5: SOP of Source Recovery

21

The FNCA RS&RWM Project Leaders
Australia

Bangladesh

Ms Lynn TAN
Project Transition Leader
Waste Projects and Strategic
Planning
Australian Nuclear Science andTechnology Organisation

Dr Moinul Islam
Principal Scientific Officer,
Health Physics & Radioactive
Waste Management Unit,
Atomic Energy Research
Establishment (AERE), Bangladish
Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC)

China

Indonesia

South Korea

Malaysia

Director,
Radioactive Waste
Management Policy Office,
Korea Radioactive Waste
Management Corporation(KRMC)Dr Mohd Abdul Wahab
Yusof
Senior Research Officer,
Waste Technology &Environment Division,
Malaysian Nuclear Agency(Nuclear Malaysia)

Mongolia

Dr Zhang Jintao

Ms Oyuntulkhuur
Navaangalsan
Head,
Radiation Regulatory
Department,
Nuclear and Radiation
Regulatory Authority,
Nuclear Energy Agency

Deputy Director General,
Department of Safety, Protection
and Quality,China National
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)

Mr Suryantoro

Dr Chang Lak Kim

Ms Maria Visitacion B.
Palattao

Director of Center forRadioactive Waste Technology,
National Nuclear Energy Agency
of Indonesia (BATAN)

Philippines

Prof Toshiso Kosako

ThailandHead, Radioactive Waste
Management Section,
Radioactive Waste
Management Center,
Thailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)

Vietnam

Dr PHAM Quang Minh
Director, Department for
Planning and R&D
Management,
Vietnam Atomic Energy
Institute (VINATOM)Japan

Professor,
Nuclear Professional School,
Graduate School of Engineering,
The University of Tokyo

Kazakhstan

Mr Yevgeniy TUR
Technical and Economic
Assessment Department
National Nuclear Center of the
Republic of Kazakhstan

22

Head, Regulations andStandards Development
Section, Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute (PNRI)

Ms Nanthavan Ya‐anant23