Photo Credits, clockwise from top left:
E. Millstein, Myanmar 2017 / B. Hoffman, Ukraine 2015 / M. Samper,
Guatemala 2012 / Mercy Corps, Kenya 2013

SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT:UNDERSTANDING RISKS ANDRESILIENCEAn Applied Framework for Analysis
JULY 2021

Acknowledgements
This paper, and the related Research Findings paper, were authored by Keith Proctor, currently Technical Advisor andTeam Lead, Evaluation and Research, at the International Republican Institute. The third publication in the series, thePolicy Brief, was produced by Will Ferroggiaro at Mercy Corps. Adrienne Brooks, Lisa Inks, Adam Lichtenheld, andWill Ferroggiaro provided technical direction and guidance to the entire project, and all three publications benefited
from the inputs and insights of other members of the Peace and Conflict, Technology for Development, Research andLearning, and U.S. and European Policy and Advocacy teams as well as Country Teams in Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar
and Nigeria.
We would especially like to thank: Melaku Yirga, Country Director, and Aschalew Tekle, Peacebuilding Advisor(Mercy Corps Ethiopia); Danjuma Saidu Dawop, Head of Conflict and Social Cohesion, Mercy Corps Iraq; Mathieu
Rouquette, Country Director, and Jonathan Bartolozzi, Director of Programs (Mercy Corps Myanmar); Ndubisi
Anyanwu, Country Director, Phebe Banu, Program Management Officer, and David Gatare, Chief of Party for
Community Initiatives to Promote Peace (Mercy Corps Nigeria); and from our global team members, Emma Whitaker,
Peace and Conflict Advisor; Richmond Blake, Senior Director of Policy and Advocacy (U.S.); Ommera Ahmed, Senior
Policy and Advocacy Advisor (UK); and Sasha Davis (Director, Corporate Partnerships). Many thanks to Heather
Cummings for graphic design.
The author and Mercy Corps would also like to thank all of the individuals in Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar, and Nigeria
who participated in interviews and questionnaires to inform these reports.

Citation:
Proctor, K. 2021. Social Media and Conflict: Understanding Risks and Resilience; An Applied Framework for Analysis.
Washington, D.C.: Mercy Corps.

MERCY CORPS SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT: Understanding Risks and Resilience: FrameworkA2

By Keith Proctor6

The weaponization of social media is transforming conflict in the world’s fragile states. From disinformation
campaigns to electoral manipulation and online recruitment by violent extremist organizations, digital threats
exacerbate conflict drivers, open new avenues for spoilers, and increase polarization, complicating efforts toprevent or counter violent conflict.
Peacebuilding initiatives therefore need to incorporate a digital lens. Addressing this challenge requires a sound risk
assessment framework to empower local actors, international partners, and social media companies to anticipate andprevent harms arising from the interplay between digital ecosystems and off-line conflict dynamics.
Building on case studies examining the
emergence of digital threats in Ethiopia, Iraq,
Myanmar, and Nigeria, Mercy Corps’ Peace& Conflict and Technology for Development
technical support teams developed this report toinform approaches and methods for addressing
the weaponization of social media, as well as
advancing online and off-line social cohesion
and peace. This research focused on qualitative
community-level assessments to better understandhow the interplay of online and off-line dynamics
creates opportunities for social media narratives
to gain traction and contribute to conflict.
Photo Credit: J. Zocherman / Mercy Corps / South Sudan 2014

With extensive reference to the case studies andto secondary research, this framework employs six categories of analysis to understand pathways to violence between
the online and off-line space by way of different risk factors:
1. The Information Architecture describes how information flows between on- and off-line spaces. Relevant factors
include internet access, dominant platforms, the regulatory environment, and user characteristics.
2. Key Influencers who can shape perceptions and mobilize on- and off-line constituencies.
3. Underlying Conflict Drivers that are susceptible to social media platform manipulation, such as intercommunal
conflicts and community-state tensions.
4. Windows of Risk during which vulnerabilities to online harms are most pronounced. Examples include elections,religious festivals, and public health crises.
5. Accelerating Characteristics describe the mechanisms by which social media appears to transform conflict
dynamics, for example by heightening perceptions of threat, normalizing hate speech, or facilitating mobilization.
6. The Sources of Resilience that appear to mitigate digital threats, such as online and off-line civil society actors whocounter dis- and misinformation.

6	Keith Proctor is currently Technical Advisor and Team Lead, Evaluation and Research, at the International Republican Institute.

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For key findings from the case study countries that emerged through the process of refining this analytical framework,
please refer to the Research Findings report from this research. In addition, a Research Summary and Policy Brief casts
the framework and case studies in a policy light and concludes with a set of recommendations.
Methodology. This framework is based on a review of secondary literature; Mercy Corps research on social media
and conflict; case study research, including key informant interviews (KIIs) and questionnaires, by the author in
Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar, and Nigeria in 2020; and KIIs conducted by the author in Nigeria’s Middle Belt in 2019 that
explored the intersection of social media and off-line conflict trends.

A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING RISKS ANDRESILIENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICTKEY INFLUENCERS
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1. Information Architecture
How information flows between online and off-line spaces
This research assessed social media platforms7 not as a series of closed or discrete spaces, but as part of a larger
information ecosystem, one in which the (highly localized) interplay of online and off-line dynamics create new realities
for users and non-users alike. Social media does not operate in a vacuum. Identity and context frame how social media
narratives are received, and which stories gain traction and which do not. The character of the information ecosystem is
key to assessing how and where social media weaponization is likely to succeed.

7

Platforms assessed included Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, WhatsApp (and other messaging platforms), and any other social media relevant to the case study country context.

MERCY CORPS SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT: Understanding Risks and Resilience: FrameworkA4

In addition to outlining key findings and considerations, this section concludes with a list of relevant factors for futureassessments.
A Social media threats are not restricted to social media users. As connectivity grows, opportunities forsocial media weaponization increase. The falling price of SIM cards and the expansion of telecommunications
coverage in Myanmar rapidly magnified the risks of hate speech and disinformation. But even when internet
penetration is low or confined to urban centers, the impact of social media can reach far beyond the user base.
This research documented cases in which online narratives appeared to “spill over,” reaching populations withlimited or no internet connection. According to respondents across multiple country contexts, social media is
shaping perceptions and driving discourse in off-line spaces, from church pulpits to newspapers, TV, and radio,
reaching those who are illiterate, do not have smartphones, or lack social media accounts. False or inflammatory
narratives that become popular online travel by word of mouth or text. In public spaces—football fields,
restaurants, the market—non-social media users hear stories second-hand or gather around a peer’s device
to watch a video or to listen to someone read a story off of their phone. In many cases, social media is driving
news, with print outlets, radio, and television stations recycling online stories. In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, ruralparticipants described religious leaders echoing online conspiracy theories while preaching to their congregants.
Among traditional media actors, such as radio stations or newspapers, the desire to stay relevant in the faceof competition from bloggers and e-journalists leads some editors to publish stories from the internet without
verification or fact-checking. “Lots of people don’t use social media here,” said a youth in a rural community. Still,
he said social media shapes the information landscape. “The radio stations,” he said, “just pick up and repeat thestories on Facebook.”
A Off-line social networks inform trust in social media narratives. Across the case studies, social media
was generally either the primary or secondary source of news for social media users. However, research
participants were not naive to the problems of online mis- and disinformation. They expressed skepticism
about many of the stories circulating on social media platforms. Most emphasized the importance of checking
a story’s sources. In general, however, validating a story’s source simply meant considering who was
forwarding it. Social relationships provide a shortcut for assessing the plausibility of social media news stories:
an online story was more likely to be believed if it had been implicitly validated by a friend, family member, or
respected peer.8 “If people trust the messenger, they trust the message,” said an Ethiopian participant. “People
never actually bother to check the veracity of the story.”
A Social media access and vulnerability vary across class, age, gender, and geography. Internet
penetration varied across the case study countries, from 17.8 percent in Ethiopia to 75 percent in Iraq. Social
media use generally lags behind these numbers.9 The most prevalent and savvy social media users are younger(generally age 40 and under). Most users are concentrated in urban centers, although this is beginning tochange as networks expand into rural areas. Internet penetration and network robustness influence platform
popularity. For instance, while YouTube is a prominent channel for posting inflammatory videos, it may have
limited reach in poorer communities where data costs are relatively high.
User characteristics, such as age, gender, and geography, shape opportunities and vulnerabilities to platform
manipulation. For example, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, a focus group of Salafi Muslim women emphasized that social
media was a “lifeline” providing social connection for wives confined to the home by conservative husbands, but thisdependence also increased susceptibility to online disinformation and misinformation.

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In general, and across the country contexts, stories traveling by word-of-mouth were the most highly trusted sources of news.
The exception is Myanmar, where the data-cheap Facebook app is, for many, the most cost-effective way to access the internet. The vast majority of users there continue toaccess the internet via social media, and analysis from January 2020 suggests the number of social media users approximately matches the internet user population at 22
million people. See: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-myanmar

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A Some risks are platform-specific. For example, in Nigeria the popularity of WhatsApp has confoundedefforts to regulate or counter political manipulation and digital hate speech. Closed WhatsApp discussion
groups, in which members are vetted by moderators, reduce opportunities for external monitoring and help
ensure the ‘echo chamber’ effect that contributes to polarization. Social media influencers who sow online
disinformation on behalf of political leaders preferred to use WhatsApp given the potential for creating
multiple online identities: given that WhatsApp accounts are tied to mobile phone numbers, an influencer canhave as many proxy accounts as he has SIM cards.
Violent online content flourishes where it is unpoliced. In Ethiopia, e-activists working to flag dangerous online content
for removal said they found YouTube far slower to act upon complaints than other platforms. Crackdowns also drive
content to more accommodating (if less popular) channels; VKontakte (VK), Russia’s most popular social media
platform, has been a haven for Myanmar influencers banned from Facebook for inciting violence.
A Government policy, liberalization, and crackdowns. Government policies open and close spaces forsocial media activities. In 2018, the Ethiopian government liberalized media policies, lifting restrictions onpress freedoms, releasing jailed journalists and bloggers, and restoring access to more than 200 news sitesthat had been blocked for years. The reforms opened up opportunities for Ethiopian TV channels from abroad,many of which also have a strong social media presence, to broadcast more freely within the country. This
has expanded the reach and influence of the Ethiopian Diaspora to more directly influence political discourse
inside the country.
However, Ethiopia—like other countries—has retained the ability to block social media usage, and during periods of
instability has shut down internet access entirely. In Myanmar, telecommunications law authorizes the government toblock websites during an “emergency,” a power it has used to shut down websites maintained by critics or activists;since the February 1 military takeover, the military has ordered social media blocks, and throttling and shutdownsof fixed-line and mobile internet. Journalists may also be jailed under a counter-terrorism law. And the government
has utilized selective shutdowns of 3G and 4G services to reduce access to real-time news and increase information
dependence on official announcements arriving by SMS.
Across the case studies, there has been an observable uptick in state-led efforts to police online content. The Iraqi
parliament has introduced a cybercrime law under which “harming the reputation of the country online” would carry a life
sentence. Similarly, in Nigeria the “Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill,” introduced in 2019, would
empower authorities to imprison and/or fine individuals who transmit online statements that are deemed false, likely to
influence an election, and/or are “prejudicial to the security of Nigeria.”10 These efforts are popular in some quarters,
due to a growing recognition of the dangers of digital hate speech and disinformation. However, anti-hate speech laws
may be used to curtail speech, muzzle journalists, and silence online dissent.
A Social media narratives fill the gaps left by eroded trust in traditional sources of information. Acrosscountry contexts, relative measures of trust appeared to be important. Online conspiracy theories flourish
where traditional sources of information—governments or news organizations—lack credibility. While many
participants viewed online stories with some skepticism, they distrusted other media and political leaders more.
In Ethiopia, long-standing suspicions of state-dominated media have fostered an appetite for alternative, nonofficial sources of information. When competing narratives cannot be reconciled, these dynamics can be selfreproducing. The deficit of faith in official sources reduces elite capacities to counter false narratives. Acrosscontexts, this appeared to drive potentially dangerous cynicism. In Iraq, online rumors and disinformation10

https://africlaw.com/2019/12/05/a-socio-legal-analysis-of-nigerias-protection-from-internet-falsehoods-manipulations-and-other-related-matters-bill/

MERCY CORPS SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT: Understanding Risks and Resilience: Framework

A6about COVID-19 had potentially crippling effects on legitimate public health messaging. A June 2020
assessment in Anbar and Ninewa found that 43 percent of respondents indicated they had been inundated byconflicting information about the virus and were unable to distinguish between rumor and fact.11
Relevant factors for information architecture assessments.
A Levels of digital connectivity, including internet and smartphone use, broadband subscriptions, costs,
infrastructure coverage, and connection speeds.
A How social media use varies by class, age, gender, and geography.
A Relative trust and influence of information sources in the community. Relevant indicators might include attitudes
toward traditional media and/or official news sources, reliance on social media as a primary or secondary
news source, etc.
A Relative popularity of social media platforms (Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, etc.) and how the design featuresof popular platforms shape digital threats.
A Marketplace and infrastructure shifts that may expand coverage (e.g., the falling price of SIM cards,
telecommunications expansions).
A Social media impacts on off-line information channels, including ways in which social media narratives moveonline and off-line, and how they reach communities with limited digital connectivity.

2. Key Influencers
Key influencers are individuals, organizations, and institutions with the capacity to shape perceptions and mobilize key
constituencies. Motives, methods and tactics may vary widely. Those with an ethnic or sectarian following may be more
likely to deploy digital hate speech as a method to drive division. Social media’s low barriers to entry can empower online
militants who may sideline customary leaders or traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution. Authoritarian political elites
may engage in political manipulation to influence the media, silence dissent, or undermine reformers. External actors,
keen to meddle in internal affairs or shift balances of power between groups, may utilize online information campaigns topromote economic or political interests. Yet, given the potential for anonymity online, it may be difficult to discern who ispushing a narrative, or why. “On social media, ethnic conflicts can be created by ghosts,” said an Ethiopian participant.
“It’s like these people do not even exist.”
Where possible, these case studies attempted to map key social media influencers, both violent and non-violent. Amongthe latter, peace-oriented influencers, such as digital activists or online religious leaders, may be sources of resilience todigital threats, but they can also be lightning rods that attract attacks. For example, Iraqi youth activists have used online
platforms to mobilize peaceful anti-government protests, but these have spawned a violent backlash from the movement’s
enemies, including Iranian-backed militias and prominent religious leaders associated with the government.
Key influencers vary, though some archetypes are common. This research identified categories of online influencers
with the ability to mobilize key constituencies either to promote social cohesion or to sow division. Examples common
across these contexts include:
A Online diaspora communities, many of whom are well-resourced, digitally-savvy, and shielded from
retaliation by living abroad. Social media has long provided opportunities for Ethiopia’s global Diaspora—11

Mercy Corps (2020). Connecting or Dividing Communities? The Impact of COVID-19 in Iraq. August.

MERCY CORPS SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT: Understanding Risks and Resilience: FrameworkA7numbering over two million, according to some estimates—to help shape domestic politics. Operating fromthe safety of the U.S. or Europe, this Diaspora, many of whom fled the country amidst political turmoil, wield
substantial influence as a source of remittances and as vocal political activists utilizing social media andsatellite TV to shape events.
A State actors, including military or security sectors, who use social media to spread propaganda, identify andprosecute critics, or, via service denials and internet blackouts, use their authority and capability to reduce
communications and the visibility of ongoing conflicts. In Iraq, the state security sector and its allies, including
Iranian-backed militias, appear to have used social media to identify and target bloggers and digital activists
who were part of the 20 October Revolution. Given the low cost and minimal infrastructure needed, evenpoorer countries may have security apparata that deploy ‘digital armies’ against internal and external critics.
A Non-state armed actors, including violent extremist organizations and insurgent groups. Nigeria’s BokoHaram, and its offshoot the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have used various social media
platforms—including Facebook, WhatsApp, SnapChat, Instagram, and YouTube—to attack the state andWestern aid organizations, spread disinformation about COVID-19, and publicize acts of violence. In Iraq,
ethnic militias operating as Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) trawl online platforms to identify and target
enemies or supposed ISIS sympathizers.
A Politicians and political parties who use social media as a tool for politics and campaigning. In the worst
cases, they use social media to attack rivals, intimidate opposition constituencies, and flood the internet withpropaganda. In Nigeria, politicians are almost universally cited as the Middle Belt’s most divisive figures.
Prominent politicians are routinely central figures in ongoing social media conflicts, either as catalysts or
targets, or both. For example, the governor of Kaduna state, Nasir El-Rufai, appears to make extensive use ofboth traditional and social media to shape opinion, according to respondents, but this has also made him amagnet for online attacks, which in turn galvanize his supporters, and thus, negative feedback loops ensue.
A Religious leaders and their followers who are active on social media and use the platform variously toadvance interfaith understanding or to sow ethnic and sectarian divisions. Myanmar’s Buddha Dhamma
Parahita Foundation (BDPF) is an ultra-nationalist Buddhist organization and the successor of the Ma Ba Tha.12
BDPF leaders, such as Ashin Wirathu, utilize social media platforms to drive ethno-sectarian hate speech,much of it targeting the country’s Muslim Rohingya minority.
A E-activists, primarily youth, who use social media platforms to mobilize protests and advocate for politicalchange. For example, Nigerian youth activists protesting police profiling and unjust arrests perpetrated by
the government’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) have used the #EndSARS hashtag to mobilize massive
protests. In central and southern Iraq, digital youth activists have made extensive use of social media toorganize anti-government protests in 2019 and (to a lesser extent) in 2020. Government supporters, including
Iranian-backed militias, have responded with violent crackdowns and a number of prominent activists havedisappeared.
An assessment of key influencers can shed light on the nature and scope of social media risks in a given context. Where
possible, assessments should identify specific individuals and organizations. An assessment of key influencers should
encompass:
A Interests and incentives, which may be ideological, financial, political, etc., and how the actor fits into existing
patterns of risk and grievance.

12

The Ma Ba Tha was associated with driving some of the worst anti-Rohingya hate speech, online and off-line, in the lead-up to the 2017 crises. Disbanded in the aftermath ofthe crisis, the group was reborn as the BDPF.

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A Operational capacities,
which include
organizational attributes,
links, and social networks
that facilitate mobilizationand outreach (including
an influencer’s social
media following).
A Relevant communication
channels, including
online and off-line
platforms.
A Transnational links withorganizations and actors
outside the state that offer
resources or support, or
enhance the actor’s status.

Photo Credit: M. Madukwe / Mercy Corps / Nigeria 2019

A Methods and tactics, particularly the types of social media operations the actor employs (e.g., information
operations, political manipulation, digital hate speech, radicalization and recruitment).
A Competition from other key actors for the same base of support. Where competition is intense, acts andrhetoric may escalate, promoting more radical or hard-line views (e.g., toward out-groups or the state), a
process described as “outbidding.”13

3. Underlying Conflict Drivers
The social, economic, and political issues susceptible to platform manipulation
Social media risks are rooted in context. The local environment encompasses the social, economic, cultural, andhistorical issues that govern intercommunal and state-society relations. While these relations can be amplified, oreven transformed, in social media, the socioeconomic and political conditions provide the raw material for digitallymediated conflicts. Social media manipulation is more likely to succeed where it capitalizes on existing divisions,frustrations, and fears. Where social cohesion—defined as “a sense of shared purpose and trust among members ofa given group or locality and the willingness of those group members to engage and cooperate with each other tosurvive and prosper”—is weak, societies may be vulnerable to social media weaponization.14
While the purpose of this research was not to reiterate conflict drivers, the case studies highlighted a number of subthemes relevant to the study of social media and conflict.
A Ethnic and sectarian tensions appear particularly vulnerable to the weaponization of social media.
Across the case studies, online platforms routinely fueled communal tensions centered on ethnic and sectarian
identities. In Ethiopia, inter-ethnic tensions provide ready fodder for online conflicts that have spilled over into
13
14

Mia Bloom describes this phenomenon in the context of violent extremist groups. See Bloom, M. (2005). Dying to kill: The allure of suicide terror. New York: Columbia University Press.
Working with the World Bank, Mercy Corps elaborated a conceptual framework for measuring social cohesion. Relevant components include: (i) trust; (ii) shared purpose,including belonging, common identity, and attitudes towards out-groups; (iii) a capacity for collective action, due to shared beliefs, norms, and commitments; and (iv) civic
engagement, which measures individual and group commitments to cooperate to improve local conditions and shape the community’s future. See Kim, J., Sheely, R., &Schmidt, C. (2020). Social Capital and Social Cohesion Measurement Toolkit for Community-Driven Development Operations. Mercy Corps & The World Bank, February.

MERCY CORPS SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT: Understanding Risks and Resilience: FrameworkA9off-line violence. In Myanmar, years of deliberate disinformation campaigns by Buddhist nationalists helped
build resentment against the Muslim Rohingyas in Rakhine state, setting the stage for a brutal campaignof ethnic cleansing in 2017. Anti-Muslim speech continues to circulate today. In Iraq, ethnic and sectarian
tensions play out routinely in online spaces, with conflict actors utilizing disinformation to attack minorities, orto gain the sympathy and support of the oppressed. For example, the ISIS media network has circulated online
videos of Shia or Kurdish militias perpetrating alleged human rights abuses among Sunni communities as partof an outreach campaign to potential supporters.
A Multiple identities may overlay an existing conflict—which can offer multiple entry points for useof social media as a weapon. For example, what begins as resource competition may exacerbate otherintergroup differences, such as tribal or religious divides. According to participants, social media appears
to be a space in which conflict-prone identities are nurtured and activated. In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, amid
the decades-long conflict between farmers and herders, discourse around resource competition has been
politicized along ethnic and sectarian lines, eroding social cohesion. Participants highlighted declines in trust
and positive intergroup interactions, as well as the increasing politicization of religious identity. Online rumorsof sectarian killings, perceived insults to one’s faith, highly publicized acts of conversion from one religion toanother, or prohibited interfaith marriages can all become viral online events that quickly spiral. Meanwhile,
local ethnic militias and community vigilante groups increasingly appear to be better-resourced and betterarmed. Such hair-trigger environments are ripe for platform manipulation.
A Where governing systems are
dysfunctional, oppressive, or
weak, they foster grievances
and trust deficits that social
media may exacerbate. In
the midst of an emergency, suchas the Ebola crisis or the current
COVID-19 pandemic, citizens
may be persuaded by online
conspiracy theories to discountguidance from state and healthauthorities. Videos and stories
shared on social media may
highlight repressive actions by
Photo Credit: D. Evans / Mercy Corps / Guatemala 2019state security forces—providing
a welcome source of transparency, but also one that may be manipulated. In Northeastern Nigeria, ongoinginsecurity has sapped faith in the security sector and has fed online theories that elites have a vested interestin prolonging the conflict, as it enables them to siphon funds from the massive annual budget of international
humanitarian aid. Boko Haram has attempted to capitalize on frustrations by claiming that efforts to mitigate
COVID-19’s spread—e.g., the suspension of pilgrimages to Mecca, modifications to Ramadan observances—
are really part of a war on Islam. In Iraq, frustrations with government corruption, unemployment, and poor
services have fueled outrage on social media, including condemnations of the government, and off-line protests.
In October 2019, social media activists in central and southern Iraq ignited a mass protest movement against
government corruption, a lack of jobs, and meddling by Iran and the U.S. in Iraqi affairs. The “20 October
Revolution” lasted months, paralyzing cities in central and southern Iraq, and helping prompt the resignation ofPrime Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi.
A Frustration with security forces is a prominent flashpoint on social media. Oppressive security actors,
police profiling, government-sanctioned violence, and unjust arrests animated social media narratives acrossthe country contexts. In some cases, they have erupted into off-line demonstrations (which can draw further
MERCY CORPS SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT: Understanding Risks and Resilience: Framework

A10retaliatory action by the state). In Nigeria, the research highlighted a number of online movements targetingthe security sector. In urban areas, frustration with the police profiling of marginalized youth, particularly by
the government’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), have led to popular condemnations on Twitter—via thehashtag #EndSARS—and widespread off-line protests. Similarly, in the Northeast simmering frustrations withthe security forces fighting Boko Haram are reaching a boiling point on social media, which have provided afora for highlighting human rights abuses perpetrated by the military. On Twitter, the hashtag #SecureNorthhas provided a focus for online discourse demanding an end to rampant insecurity.
Relevant factors for assessing conflict drivers and their relationship to social media:
A Intergroup perceptions that are shaped by social media. Online platforms can amplify perceptions of
threat and vulnerability, in turn influencing off-line interactions. Upticks in digital hate speech targeting an
ethnic or sectarian minority may reduce intergroup interactions, undermining social cohesion, and reducing
peacebuilding opportunities.
A Online misinformation and disinformation may inflame perceptions of unfairness or inequality. Examples
include unequal access to natural resources, land, employment, or government assistance vis-a-vis otheridentity groups.
A Attitudes toward violence, both generally and toward outgroups, which may be fostered and licensed in
online ‘echo chambers.’ Measures include respondents’ professed acceptance of the use of violence against
the other group under a range of situations, such as to protect their family or avenge past aggressions.
A Prevalence of online hate speech and conflict triggers, including routinely deployed false narratives, pejorative
terms, and insults.
A Social media impacts on conflict dynamics, with an emphasis on shifting intragroup and intergroup dynamics.
Examples include perceptions of increased polarization, online mobilization leading to violence, and hatespeech driving the isolation of vulnerable groups.

4. Windows of Risk
When vulnerabilities to online harms are most pronounced
Windows of risk describe events or periods in time during which an uptick in online and off-line tensions make violence
more likely, providing malign actors with increased opportunities for escalation. While windows of risk are apparent inany conflict environment, they are often amplified by social media. For example, a high-profile act of violence, such as
an assassination or a terrorist attack, may spawn a wave of disinformation, hate speech, scapegoating, and/or calls
for reprisal. Similarly, an economic or climate change-driven shock may imperil livelihoods and increase intergroupcompetition, catalyzing spikes in digital hate speech that further aggravate tensions.
Windows of risk highlighted in the case studies include:
A Elections and political campaigns are often characterized by spikes in partisanship and contests between
groups. Across the country contexts, politicians and their supporters employed social media to smear
opponents and orchestrate intergroup conflict to drive (or depress) turnout. During elections in Nigeria’s
Middle Belt, politicians employ digitally-savvy youth—“e-rats”—to drive disinformation targeting political
opponents. According to participants, social media is becoming so central to political campaigns that somedescribe a social media “arms race” among candidates who hire the services of “e-rats” to attack and defend
themselves in social media spaces.
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A Cultural celebrations and religious festivals can also be opportunities for magnifying or exploiting
differences between ethnic or sectarian identity groups, sparking online and off-line confrontations. According
to Ethiopian participants, celebrations associated with particular ethnic or religious groups may promptsocial media attacks, but they also present opportunities for disinformation.15 Examples include Irreecha,
the Oromo festival of thanksgiving in October; Timkat, the Orthodox celebration of Epiphany in January; orChambalaalla, the new year festival for the Sidamas. In Myanmar, Ramadan is typically characterized by an
uptick in anti-Muslim hate speech and disinformation.16 In Nigeria, public celebrations of Ashura by the Shia
minority are typically flashpoints, especially in urban areas.
A Viral acts of violence, including terrorist attacks or assassinations. For example, the killing of renowned
Ethiopian musician and activist Haacaaluu Hundeessaa in 2020 catalyzed widespread conflict principally
fueled through social media and fomented by political leaders, activists, and the global Diaspora.17
A Periods of resource-gathering, particularly where land use or access is a flash point. In Nigeria’s Middle
Belt, planting and harvest seasons routinely see an uptick in intergroup hostilities between farmers and herdersthat also play out in the digital space. Following the wet summer and the onset of the dry season, herders movesouth, towards greener pasture land and water supplies, often moving across farm land, which can spark
confrontations. In addition, some participants suggested that harvest season is a time of increased criminality—
mature crops, in addition to providing cover, may tempt thieves. The rise in criminality provides increased
opportunities for identity-based
scapegoating. As during the planting
season, spikes in conflict may be
exaggerated, or even manufactured,in online spaces, spawningintercommunal retaliation.
A Politically-salient anniversaries,
including the deaths of prominent
leaders or past acts of violence.
In Jos, Nigeria, the 7 September
anniversary of the 2001 crisis—which
saw bloody clashes between Muslims
and Christians—has perennially beena day of intercommunal rancor in
online and off-line spaces. In Ethiopia,
the Tigrayan holiday of Yekatit 11
Photo Credit: M. Roquette / Mercy Corps / Egypt 2021
celebrates the onset of armed struggle in1974 that eventually overthrew Ethiopia’scommunist military regime in 1991. According to participants, the anniversary celebrations emphasize Tigrayan
identity and are associated with an uptick in digital hate speech across ethnic groups.
A Public health crises, such as COVID-19, appear particularly well-suited to social media weaponization.
Across the case study countries, disinformation about COVID-19 exacerbated intergroup tensions andcommunity-state relations. For example, in Nigeria, the perceived inadequacy of government assistance has
exacerbated community-state frustrations and fed conspiracy theories that COVID-19 is a hoax perpetrated
by government officials and shadowy outsiders. In Myanmar, fears associated with the pandemic appeared

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The infamous events of the 2016 Irreecha celebration, and subsequent online disinformation and misinformation, provide a prime example. For more, see: https://www.pri.
org/stories/2018-02-22/social-media-america-are-stoking-ethiopias-ethnic-violence
Government actors have played to the popular will by suppressing Islamic religious activities, e.g., canceling public prayers or shutting mosques.
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/aug/03/how-a-musicians-death-unleashed-violence-and-death-in-ethiopia

MERCY CORPS SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT: Understanding Risks and Resilience: FrameworkA12to drive social media attacks on
ethnic and sectarian minority
groups, including Muslims andChristians. “Social media use
has increased a lot during the
pandemic, because everyone isstaying home,” said a Myanmar
participant. “And we havewitnessed an explosion in online
propaganda, hate speech, andrumors.”A International disputes may
also supply an accelerant toonline conflicts. For example, theinternational dispute between
Egypt and Ethiopia over theGrand Ethiopian RenaissanceDam (GERD) is fueling jingoistic
Photo Credit: E. Millstein / Mercy Corps / Nigeria 2018
rhetoric online. In Myanmar, the2017 ethnic cleansing of Muslim Rohingya is now a genocide case before the International Court of Justice(ICJ). Some analysts fear future rulings have the potential to further stoke Buddhist nationalism and antiRohingya sentiment.18
Steps for assessing windows of risk and their impact on digital threats include:
A Identify likely cyclical windows of risk that can intensify existing intergroup and/or community-state tensions.
While previous incidents of tension or conflict associated with these cyclical events may serve as a guide, they
may be insufficient as events, conflict drivers, relevant actors, and the character of the digital ecosystem may
all have evolved.
A Sporadic windows of risk may be identified through conflict analysis exercises, based on existing sources ofrisk, to assess the types of events that produce or exacerbate existing tendencies for harm.
A Identify the key influencers (local and external) who have the motives, resources, and followers to capitalize
on identified windows of risk.
A Relevant sources of resilience (e.g., respected leaders, peace-builders) who may counter or prevent violent
conflict during periods of elevated tensions (for more, see “Sources of Resilience” below).

5. Accelerating Characteristics
The mechanisms by which social media appears to transform conflict dynamics
Social media reduces the costs of violent incitement. Low barriers to entry, combined with relative anonymity andgeographic flexibility, empower influencers to reach new constituencies, push disinformation, or incite conflicts. It
also allows disparate individuals to feel a part of something they perceive as unifying, successful, or bigger than18

https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-international-court-justice

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13themselves—whether or not those are true. Connections fostered through social media may reduce the isolation ofwould-be extremists, enabling them to connect with like-minded others, or practice digital hate speech in a mannerwith little personal risk.
Critically, social media does not simply provide an additional communication channel; rather, social media spaces—byvirtue of their mobilizing, value-setting, and perception-shaping powers—shape how conflicts manifest. Social media
appears to increase the emotional salience of conflict, expand audiences, and speed up processes of provocation andreaction. Events that might not otherwise turn violent, might spiral uncontrollably in digital space. In short, social media
is transforming how, when, and whether conflicts manifest.
This research aimed, in part, to document different pathways by which social media influences behaviors, erodessocial cohesion, and influences perceptions (of self and other) in a manner that heightens risk of conflict. The following
factors, while not exhaustive, may inform a subsequent typology of social media and conflict.
A Online ‘echo chambers’ intensify perceptions of threat. Social media naturally creates insulated
information environments that promote consensus-building and polarization. Particularly in environments ofintergroup conflict or community-state tensions, social media spaces appeared to intensify perceptions of
threat, raise emotional stakes, and lend urgency to calls for action. By appearing to confirm existing fears andbiases, social media may catalyze shifts in intragroup and intergroup dynamics that make conflict more likely.
In Myanmar, fears associated with COVID-19 have fed online scapegoating narratives targeting ethnic andreligious minorities. Christian communities, some of which have allegedly held religious gatherings in spite oflock-down orders, are being blamed on social media for spreading the virus. Similarly, a subsequent outbreakthat appeared to originate in Rakhine state prompted accusations online that Muslim Rohingya there areintentionally spreading the virus.
A The speed of disinformation can manufacture new realities. The impulse to share alarming or incitefulstories is often automatic. Verification and correction simply take too much effort and may not be timely.
Conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria’s Middle Belt often have a “wag the dog” dynamic, withfake stories online about intergroup attacks catalyzing rapid off-line retaliation. The fake stories may eventually
be debunked, but not before catalyzing real acts of violence and sowing new sources of hostility. “Even if you
can eventually correct a story,” said a civil society leader, “by the time you do, it’s too late. The damage has
been done.”
A The breadth of communication facilitates mass mobilization. The diffusion of peer-to-peer communication
has reduced the costs of information-sharing and collective action, providing a channel for identity-based groups
to coordinate across geographic space. An inciting event, which might otherwise have fizzled out or remained
highly local, can now spread virally online. As noted above, online conspiracy theories surrounding the 2020
assassination of Haacaaluu Hundeessaa in Ethiopia, a prominent Oromo singer, triggered bitter intercommunal
conflicts. Oromo and Amhara influencers and their followers attacked one another online, there were calls forrevenge attacks, and Diaspora influencers piled on, hyping up the emotional salience and identifying culprits.
Waves of violence engulfed the country; mobs assembled via social media clashed with government security
forces. Following a three-day rampage, at least 178 people had been killed, hundreds more injured, and over
9,000 people arrested.19
A Online hate speech can heighten the perceived vulnerability of marginalized groups, undermining
social cohesion. Social media can have a chilling effect on real-world interactions across intercommunal
divides. Respondents described how hate speech reduced off-line interactions, for example by dissuading

19

https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-political-crisis-plays-out-in-the-regions-why-its-a-federal-problem-144893

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vulnerable groups from visitingneighborhoods they perceived
as increasingly unsafe. Whencasual interactions between
communities become rare,
it is easier for one side to
demonize the other. Where
online hate speech exacerbates
perceptions of vulnerability,
it may accelerate ethnic or
sectarian sorting like that
evident in Nigeria’s Middle
Belt. For instance, in Kaduna,
Christians increasingly live inthe southern part of the city,
Muslims in the north. Similarly
in Jos, the Congo-Russia
Photo Credit: C. Robbins / Mercy Corps / Greece 2015neighborhood is sharply
demarcated by Christian and Muslim neighborhoods that are “no go” zones for members of the other group.
According to respondents in these communities, the rise in sectarian hate speech online has helped drive theperceptions of threat and vulnerability that are leading local minorities to emigrate to safer neighborhoods. As
communities become more homogeneous, isolation from other groups deepens, leading to further deterioration insocial cohesion.
A Online platforms incentivize not only connection but performance. Influencers competing for clicks
or constituencies might amp up online rhetoric attacking marginalized groups, or a live-streamed act ofvandalism can win accolades and imitators. Social media communities may give license to violent behavior,and online platforms can provide a venue for militants to practice hate speech in a personally low-risk manner.
In Nigeria, a Sunni man described responding to an online call to violence against the minority Shia. He
joined a group to burn down the Shia leader’s house, afterward proudly posting photos documenting thecrime. When asked if he was afraid of being prosecuted, he said no. “Everyone is aware that the Shia areagainst our country,” he said. “Everyone talks about it online....they are criminals.”
A Social media may accelerate tit-for-tat. Social media provocations tend to escalate into dynamics of
one-upmanship between antagonistic groups. For example, amid the ongoing dispute between Egypt andEthiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive hydroelectric project that potentiallythreatens Egypt’s downstream water access, Egyptian and Ethiopian social media influencers have engaged
in spiraling rounds of provocation. According to participants in this research, popular opinion inside Ethiopia
is becoming more militant online and off-line as people rally around nationalist themes. Videos shared on
Instagram—in which Ethiopians threaten to cut off Egypt’s water, and Egyptians threaten retaliation—rack
up tens of thousands of views. Ethiopian respondents reported that the ratcheting up of online tensions isfeeding dangerous nationalist discourses. On Twitter, prominent Ethiopia-based influencers have advocatedfor construction of the dam whether or not a diplomatic solution is reached, while prominent Egyptians have
tweeted threats of war.20

20

https://www.arabnews.com/node/1702516/media

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6. Sources of Resilience
Factors that appear to mitigate digital threats
Social media does not solely divide. Social media can promote peace-building by forging connections between
communities, improving awareness about conflict prevention, and empowering grassroots actors. Platforms offer
spaces for marginalized or publicly maligned groups to “correct the story” and offer their own version of events. The
diffusion of mobile devices, and the existence of social media platforms, expand opportunities for individuals andgroups to hold political elites accountable, document discrimination and violence, and share information with theoutside world. In Nigeria, a group of female activists emphasized that social media has opened vital new spaces for
public engagement. “Social media,” said one, “provides a way for us to demonstrate our value.”
Resilience in international
development refers to theability of people and systems
to advance and protect
community well-being in
the face of complex shocks
and stresses, such as violent
conflict, an economic
downturn, or a climate-based
disaster—events that may be
exacerbated or weaponizedin social media.
Resilience factors may bediverse in type, encompassing
people, institutions, andnorms. And many resilience
factors that are common in
Photo Credit: Mercy Corps / Gaza 2013
peacebuilding generally may
reduce opportunities for, andthe impact of, platform manipulation. For example, online hate speech may be less likely to drive a wedge between
communities where robust off-line intergroup peacebuilding mechanisms exist. Examples of conventional resilience
factors include:
A The presence of respected, peaceful local leaders, such as religious leaders and social media influencers, who
can counter social media weaponization in online and off-line spaces.
A Non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms that effectively facilitate resolution of intergroup tensions.
A Inclusive governance and policy making, including community-informed processes for defining service andinfrastructure priorities.
A Interfaith organizations that build bridges across sectarian or ethnic divides.
A Presence of community groups, which provide a channel for civic engagement and opportunities forintergroup collaboration.
A A culture of positive intergroup interactions, as evidenced by trade, social interactions, intermarriage, etc.

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In addition, the case studies highlighted sources of resilience that are more specific to social media.
Examples include:
A Off-line actors who correct online rumors, including civil society organizations working to counter
digital threats, particularly disinformation and hate speech. In Nigeria, interfaith groups and some traditional
media—such as Unity FM Radio in Jos—work to mitigate digital threats by fact-checking misinformation anddisinformation circulating in social media.
A Online fact-checkers working to counter false narratives in real time, flag inflammatory content for removal
by social media companies, and/or provide non-partisan online spaces for intercommunal engagement.
Examples include Ethiopia’s Ethio Check or Myanmar’s “Real or not?” online service.
A Digital reformers who are pushing social media companies to address hate speech and disinformation. In
Myanmar, a Facebook reform campaign is being spear-headed by civil society organizations to push thetechnology company to reform its practices and commit greater resources to combating disinformation andhate speech.
A Online discussion boards and marketplaces that promote positive intergroup interactions. In northern Iraq,
female participants described how online platforms facilitate local economic activity—by connecting buyers
and sellers of used goods—and provide spaces where people can seek advice, share tips, and engage inthe kinds of peaceful transactions that are critical to social cohesion and yet are difficult to promote in off-line
spaces.
A Respected, non-partisan traditional media, such as radio and newspapers, that adhere to professional
journalistic standards, carefully vet stories, and counter disinformation and misinformation. For example,
Myanmar participants highlighted Myanmar Now and The Myanmar Times for their integrity and relative lackof bias.
A Institutions that promote journalistic integrity. For example, the Nigerian Press Council (NPC) organizes
seminars to train journalists to identify fake stories and authenticate sources before publication.
A Online fora that promote intergroup dialogue. Mediated online fora can create opportunities for different
ethnic and sectarian groups to connect. For example, in Nigeria, the Kaduna Youth Forum was founded in2012 to create a non-partisan Facebook page for young people from different backgrounds to communicate.
The Forum now has 92,000 members.
A Digitally-savvy youth. Across the country contexts, participants highlighted their large, growing youth
populations, as vulnerable to conflict risks but also as providing potential opportunities. The rising generation
tends to be more technically literate and skeptical of disinformation campaigns, and may represent an
important bulwark against future efforts to weaponize social media.
A Even-handed internet and media regulations. While a number of central governments have moved
toward implementing hate speech laws that would likely be counterproductive, many participants believed
there is space for more limited internet and media regulation that could reduce the volume of disinformation.
However, they emphasized that such efforts should be transparent, moderate, and the result of proactive
dialogue with civil society and grassroots actors.

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CONTACTADRIENNE BROOKS
Digital Communities Advisor |Technology for Development
abrooks@mercycorps.org
WILL FERROGGIARO
Senior Specialist | Peace and Technology
wferroggiaro@mercycorps.org
ADAM LICHTENHELD, PHD
Senior Researcher | Peace and Conflictalichtenheld@mercycorps.org

About Mercy Corps
Mercy Corps is a leading global organization
powered by the belief that a better world is possible.
In disaster, in hardship, in more than 40 countries
around the world, we partner to put bold solutions into
action — helping people triumph over adversity andbuild stronger communities from within.
Now, and for the future.

45 SW Ankeny Street
Portland, Oregon 97204
888.842.0842
mercycorps.org

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