BRIEFTO:

Benjamin M. Wesson Jr., Esquire

FROM:

National Legal Research Group, Inc.
W. Andrew McCaughey, Senior Attorney

RE:

Virginia/Workmen's Compensation/Change In Condition/Causal RelationshipFILE:

57-26384-021

YOUR
FILE:

Patricia Jones v. Mary Adams Hospital

October 14, 1998

IN THECOURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIARECORD NO. 1582-98-2

MARY ADAMS HOSPITAL
andTHE INSURANCE RECIPROCAL,
Appellants,v.
PATRICIA B. JONES,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Benjamin M. Wesson Jr., Esquire
Trout & Wesson
1400 Princess Anne Street
Williamsburg, Virginia 22401
Attorney for AppelleeTABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENTI.

THE FINDINGS OF THE FULL COMMISSION WITHRESPECT TO A CHANGE IN CONDITION AND WITHRESPECT TO CAUSATION ARE CONCLUSIVE AND
BINDING ON THIS COURT WHEN SUPPORTED BY
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

II.

THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO INTRODUCE ANY
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS POSITIONTHAT MS. JONES HAS EXPERIENCED A CHANGE IN
CONDITION SUCH THAT HER CURRENT CONDITION IS
NO LONGER CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE ORIGINALCOMPENSABLE INJURY OF SEPTEMBER 7, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

III.

THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE FULL COMMISSION THAT THE
EMPLOYER FAILED TO ESTABLISH MS. JONES'S
ACCIDENT HAS NOT AT LEAST CONTRIBUTED TO HER
CURRENT DISABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

Barnes v. Wise Fashions, 16 Va. App. 108, 428 S.E.2d 301 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Batal Builders, Inc. v. Hi-Tech Concrete, Inc., 18 Va. App. 401, 444
S.E.2d 555 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bergmann v. L&W Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 278 S.E.2d 801 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 225 Va. 405, 302 S.E.2d 507 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8
E.C. Womack, Inc. v. Ellis, 209 Va. 588, 166 S.E.2d 265 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 365 S.E.2d 782 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Honaker, 9 Va. App. 336, 388 S.E.2d 271 (1990) . . . . . . . . . 12
Jules Hairstylists, Inc. v. Galanes, 1 Va. App. 64, 334 S.E.2d 592 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8
McPeek v. P.W.&W. Coal Co., 210 Va. 185, 169 S.E.2d 443 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Ohio Valley Construction Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 334 S.E.2d 554 (1985) . . . . . . . . 8
Pantry Pride-Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Backus, 18 Va. App. 176, 442
S.E.2d 699 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 339 S.E.2d 570 (1986) . . . . . . . 12
Sky Chefs, Inc. v. Rogers, 222 Va. 800, 284 S.E.2d 605 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Smith v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 224 Va. 24, 294 S.E.2d 805 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Wagner Enterprises, Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 407 S.E.2d 32 (1991) . . . . . . . 7, 8
Watkins v. Halco Engineering, Inc., 225 Va. 97, 300 S.E.2d 761 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Statutes
Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-706 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)
Other

Page

3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation§ 80.21 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Black's Law Dictionary at 366 (6th ed. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

iii

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Patricia B. Jones, while employed as a registered nurse, suffered a compensable injury
to her back while transferring a patient from a stretcher to a bed on September 7, 1994.
(App. at 4, 41.) Workers' compensation benefits were paid pursuant to an Award of theCommission entered November 14, 1997. (App. at 35.) On November 25, 1997, theEmployer filed an application alleging a change in condition and requesting thatcompensation benefits be terminated. (App. at 2.) In an Opinion by Deputy Commissioner
Phillips dated February 25, 1998, the Employer's application was denied, and compensation
pursuant to the November 14, 1997 Award of the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Commission was reinstated effective November 26, 1997. (App. at 35-40.) The Employer
sought review before the full Commission, and written statements were submitted to the fullCommission by both parties. (App. at 41-52.) In an Opinion by the full Commission dated
June 15, 1998, the Opinion of Deputy Commissioner Phillips was affirmed. (App. at 53-59.)
The Employer has brought this appeal seeking reversal of the decision of the fullCommission.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether any credible evidence supports the Commission's decision that the Employer
had not met its burden of proving a change in condition such that Ms. Jones's current
condition is not causally related to the original compensable incident of September 7, 1994.

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The determination that the Employer had failed to meet its burden of proving a change
in condition such that Ms. Jones's current condition is not causally related to the originalcompensable incident of September 7, 1994 was made on the basis of a review of Ms. Jones's
medical records. A significant fact that emerges from those records is that from the date ofthat incident to the present Ms. Jones has been able to obtain little or no relief from pain
experienced in her back and buttocks area. Ms. Jones's attending physician throughout her
ordeal has been orthopedist Andre Eagle Jr., M.D., who first saw Ms. Jones on September
9, 1994, two days after the work-related injury. (App. at 60.) In a report dated September
28, 1994, Dr. Eagle diagnosed Ms. Jones's condition as a lumbo-sacral spine sprain, which
he specifically indicated was due to the occurrence described by Ms. Jones, i.e., that she
injured her back helping transfer a patient. (App. at 69.)
On October 27, 1994, an MRI was conducted and compared to a previous MRI of
June 10, 1991. This October 27 MRI showed a broad-based herniated nucleus pulposus(HNP) at the L4-5 level, considerably more prominent than on the previous examination, anda somewhat smaller HNP at L5-S1, also more prominent than on the previous examination.
(App. at 71.) In a November 11, 1994 report, Dr. Eagle opined that Ms. Jones's injury
warranted about a 10% disability and noted, "Obviously, lifting a patient may have caused
the problem." (App. at 82.) On November 30, 1994, Dr. Eagle released Ms. Jones to return
to part-time, light-duty work with temporary lifting restrictions. (App. at 84.)
On July 28, 1995, Dr. Eagle noted that Ms. Jones's progress had been exceptionallyslow, and he thought that in reality she would never be able to be released to full-work status
2

and she would have a permanent disability. (App. at 108.) On November 20, 1995, he notedthat she was still having the "same kind of pain that she usually experiences," and he opinedthat most of the pain "sounds like it may be related to fibromyositis." (App. at 109.) On
January 26, 1996, he released her to full-duty secretarial work with a restriction of nobending at the waist and no lifting over 30 pounds. (App. at 109-10.)
In a report dated June 18, 1996, Dr. Eagle noted that Ms. Jones was in constant pain,
and he suspected that her primary pain problem is fibromyalgia. He believed that the backproblem was not fanning the fibromyalgia and that psychological factors were really moreof an influence on her pain than the mechanical back problem. He felt that she could return
to a level of work with restrictions such as not lifting over 30 to 40 pounds and avoiding a
lot of repetitive bending. He noted that he felt these restrictions were fairly permanent andwere based on her employment injury. He added that "fasciitis is a constant entity in her life
and a lot of her inability to return back to her work is due to the fibromyalgia, not themechanical back problem." (App. at 143.)
On September 5, 1996, Dr. Eagle stated that Ms. Jones had reached maximum medical
improvement and was in a chronic pain pattern, "the pain emanating from fibromyalgia,
chronic muscular pain, etc." (App. at 113.) He visualized no simple solution to her problem
as far as her ability to tolerate pain and her level of activity. (App. at 113.) On January 30,
1997, he noted that she was seeing two doctors at the pain clinic and he also referred her toa chiropractor. (App. at 118.) By March 18, 1997, he agreed that the pain clinic was nothelping her and that the chiropractor did not seem to be of any help. (App. at 118.)

3

On August 8, 1997, another MRI was taken for chronic left buttock pain. This
showed a slight increase in the size of the small central HNP at L5-S1, with no change in thecentral HNP at L4-5. (App. at 122.) On August 18, 1997, he noted that there was no
significant difference in the 1994 and 1997 MRI results. He did not believe she had asurgical back, but he agreed to refer her to two doctors at the pain clinic and to aneurosurgeon. (App. at 124.) She was seen by Dr. William R. White, a neurosurgeon, whooffered no new suggestions and recommended continuation of her ongoing treatment as thebest thing. (App. at 125-27.)
On October 9, 1997, Dr. Eagle noted his impression that Ms. Jones "has a chronic
pain problem and it's not really clear what the source of the pain is; that is, it could be related
to her chronic myofascial pain; it may be related to scar tissue in her back or just a chronic
muscular problem." (App. at 129.) He reiterated that she had reached maximum medical
improvement on September 5, 1996 and that she had not gained any improvement in all theyears of treatment. He rated her at 2% impairment of the whole person, which was a 5%
lumbar sacral spine impairment. (App. at 129.)
Despite Dr. Eagle's repeated observations in his reports that there were at least two,
if not more, possible sources of Ms. Jones's continuing pain, and despite his admission on
October 9, 1997 that he was not really clear what the source of her pain was, and without any
further examination of Ms. Jones or any additional medical input appearing in the record,on November 6, 1997, he contradicted himself and reported:
After treating Patricia Jones for several years and after evaluating her various
tests, her various second opinions, and watching the course of her treatment,4

I have concluded that her present pain is not related to her accident of
September 7, 1994.
She is suffering from a chronic pain problem that stems from her fibromyalgia.
I feel that this is a pre-existing condition and is not related to her industrial
accident of September 7, 1994.
(App. at 3.)
On November 13, 1997, Ms. Jones was seen by Dr. Dale W. Pixel, a neurologist, toevaluate persistent left buttock pain. He noted several possibilities as sources of her pain:
Left gluteal pain. Differential possibilities include strictly myofascial pain,
may be piriformis syndrome. Cannot rule out sacroiliac joint pain referral,
facet joint pain referral is a possibility and internal disk disruption would be
yet another theoretical possibility. I do not think it is neuropathic in origin
however.
.
(App. at 15.) He recommended a number of medical tests to be performed, stating: "Given
her widespread musculoskeletal pain, would like to look for other causes other thanfibromyalgia." (App. at 15.)On December 11, 1997, Dr. Pixel noted that the X-rays from Dr. Eagle's office
showed the disk space narrowing at L5-S1, and the MRI showed degenerative disks at L4-5
and L5-1 with some bulging both anteriorly and posteriorly, especially of L5-1. He decided
to have a somatosensory evoked potential (SSEP) done, noting that "if the SSEP is abnormal,then only nerve root impingement either through the piriformis or from the disk would
account for such an abnormality." (App. at 12.) In an addendum he noted: "The official
radiology report of her August 8, 1997 MRI shows a slight increase in the size of the small
HNP centrally at L5-S1. No change in the small central HNP at L4-5." (App. at 12.)5

On December 17, 1997, Dr. Pixel reported on the results of the SSEP test: "Abnormal
left sural SSEP. Such findings could be indicative of an abnormality between the point ofstimulation to the S1 lumbar nerve root and could be seen in an S1 radiculopathy on the left."(App. at 11.)
ARGUMENTI.

THE FINDINGS OF THE FULL COMMISSION WITH RESPECT TOA CHANGE IN CONDITION AND WITH RESPECT TO CAUSATIONARE CONCLUSIVE AND BINDING ON THIS COURT WHEN
SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
On this appeal, this Court is being asked to reverse the finding of the full Commissionthat Employer had failed to establish a change in condition such that Ms. Jones's current
disability is not causally related to the original compensable accident of September 7, 1994.
The function of this Court on appeal from a finding of the full Commission is todetermine whether credible evidence exists to support the finding of the Commission and,in making this determination, the appellate court does not retry the facts, reweigh the
preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination of the credibility of thewitnesses. E.g., Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 225 Va. 405, 302 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1983);
Wagner Enterprises, Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991); Jules
Hairstylists, Inc. v. Galanes, 1 Va. App. 64, 334 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1985). As held by the
Virginia Supreme Court in E.C. Womack, Inc. v. Ellis, 209 Va. 588, 166 S.E.2d 265 (1969),
a finding with respect to a change in condition is a finding of fact. See also 3 Arthur Larson& Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 80.21(b) at 15-656 to 15-666(1994), where Professor Larson states in relevant part: "It is the Commission's function to6

weigh the evidence and make findings on questions of fact, which includes such matters as. . . change in condition" (footnotes omitted).
The principles governing this Court's scope of review from a finding of fact by the fullCommission are well established under Virginia law. Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-706 (Michie
1991 & Supp. 1994) provides that an award of the full Commission entered after review ofan award at an initial hearing shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. The
Virginia courts repeatedly have stated and applied the rule that the Commission's findingsof fact are conclusive and binding on an appellate court if based on credible evidence. E.g.,
Ohio Valley Construction Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 334 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1985) (notingthat the Commission's finding with respect to a change in condition was a finding of fact,binding on appeal); Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 302 S.E.2d at 510; Sky Chefs, Inc. v.
Rogers, 222 Va. 800, 284 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1981); Batal Builders, Inc. v. Hi-Tech Concrete,Inc., 18 Va. App. 401, 444 S.E.2d 555, 557 (1994); Pantry Pride-Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Backus, 18 Va. App. 176, 442 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1994); Barnes v. Wise Fashions, 16 Va.
App. 108, 428 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1993); Wagner Enterprises, Inc. v. Brooks, 407 S.E.2d at
35; Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988); Jules
Hairstylists, Inc. v. Galanes, 334 S.E.2d at 595.
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that a determination by the fullCommission as to a causal relationship is conclusive and binding on appeal when theCommission's finding is supported by credible evidence. Watkins v. Halco Engineering,Inc., 225 Va. 97, 300 S.E.2d 761 (1983).

7

II.

THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO INTRODUCE ANY CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS POSITION THAT MS. JONES HAS
EXPERIENCED A CHANGE IN CONDITION SUCH THAT HER
CURRENT CONDITION IS NO LONGER CAUSALLY RELATED TO
THE ORIGINAL COMPENSABLE INJURY OF SEPTEMBER 7, 1994.
As a preliminary matter, it is noted that Black's Law Dictionary at 366-67 (6th ed.

1990) defines "credible evidence" as follows:
Evidence to be worthy of credit must not only proceed from a credible source
but must, in addition, be "credible" in itself, by which is meant that it shall be
so natural, reasonable and probable in view of the transaction which it
describes or to which it relates as to make it easy to believe it, and credible
testimony is that which meets the test of plausibility.
It is not suggested here that Dr. Eagle is not a credible source. However, it issuggested that, although the Opinion of the full Commission in this case does not contain an
express finding that the statement in Dr. Eagle's letter of November 6, 1997, in which heopined that Ms. Jones's condition at that time was a preexisting condition and was not related
to her industrial accident of September 7, 1994, was not credible evidence, the Opinion does
contain a clear inference that the Commission found this to be the case. In concluding that
the Employer had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Jones's
then-existing disability was unrelated to the September 7, 1994 compensable accident, thefull Commission noted:
In reaching this conclusion, we note that while Dr. Eagle is the treating
physician, he noted as late as October 9, 1997, that it was not clear what thesource of the claimant's pain was, and that it could be related to the chronic
myofascial pain, scar tissue in her back or muscular problems. The record
contains no medical report between that date and the doctor's November 6,
1997, letter indicating that the claimant's condition is solely unrelated to theaccident. We note in his November 11, 1997, office note, Dr. Eagle still
provides a diagnosis of chronic back pain.

8

(App. at 58.)
Now it may be that Dr. Eagle conducted additional medical examinations or tests or
consulted some additional medical information during the short time period of less than 30days between his notation of October 9, 1997 and his November 6, 1997 letter. If so, such
evidence was not brought to the attention of Deputy Commissioner Phillips or the fullCommission. On the evidence in the record in this case, Dr. Eagle suddenly changed his
opinion from that which he had held for over three years, that there was more than one
possible source of Ms. Jones's pain and that he was not sure what the source of her pain was,to the opinion that he knew precisely what the source of her pain was, without any indication
whatsoever of even the slightest basis for such a change in his opinion.
The Employer attempts to gloss over this problem by asserting that "Dr. Eagle's
October 9, 1997 office note is not in any way inconsistent with his November 6, 1997
opinion" in that, in both reports, he concludes that Ms. Jones suffers from a chronic pain
problem and his "unequivocal November 6, 1997 opinion simply represents his logicalconclusion regarding Ms. Jones's condition after studying her various second opinions andfollowing her course of treatment for several years, a part of which was his October 9, 1997
office note." (Brief of Appellants at 6.) However, when Dr. Eagle wrote his office note on
October 9, 1997, he also was expressing a logical conclusion regarding Ms. Jones's condition
after studying her various second opinions and after following her course of treatment forseveral years. The question arises as to what possibly could have caused Dr. Eagle to makesuch a drastic change in his opinion. The record is silent on this point, and logic and reason
are powerless to provide an explanation as to why such a significant change in opinion could
9be made in such a short period of time in the absence of some evidentiary basis that was not
before Deputy Commissioner Phillips or the full Commission.
It is submitted that the Commission recognized this fact and inferentially concluded
that Dr. Eagle's November 6, 1997 opinion simply was not credible evidence. This Court
also should hold that this evidence is not credible. Since it is the only evidence submitted
by the Employer in support of its position that Ms. Jones's current condition is not causally
related to the original compensable injury of September 7, 1994, there is a complete absenceof credible evidence on this point. The Employer's position that the Opinion of the fullCommission should be reversed should be rejected by this Court on this ground.
III.

THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF
THE FULL COMMISSION THAT THE EMPLOYER FAILED TOESTABLISH MS. JONES'S ACCIDENT HAS NOT AT LEASTCONTRIBUTED TO HER CURRENT DISABILITY.
It is well established in Virginia that, where a disability has more than one cause,

benefits will be allowed if it is proved that the employment is a contributing factor to thedisability. Smith v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 224 Va. 24, 294 S.E.2d 805 (1982); Bergmann v.
L&W Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 278 S.E.2d 801 (1981). It also is well established that it is solely
within the province of the Commission to decide what evidence, if credible, is entitled togreater weight. McPeek v. P.W.&W. Coal Co., 210 Va. 185, 169 S.E.2d 443 (1969); Island
Creek Coal Co. v. Honaker, 9 Va. App. 336, 388 S.E.2d 271 (1990). As stated by the
Honaker court:
As fact finder, the commission is charged with evaluating all of the evidence
presented, including the medical opinions, and reaching its decision based on
its reasoned review of the evidence. A greater number of medical opinions
does not necessarily constitute a preponderance of the evidence. In its review,
10the commission is entitled to decide what evidence, if credible, is entitled togreater weight. McPeek v. P.W.&W. Coal Co., 210 Va. 185, 188, 169 S.E.2d443, 445 (1969).
The commission's findings of fact, if supported by credible evidence,are binding on appeal. Dublin Garment Co. v. Jones, 2 Va.App. 165, 167, 342
S.E.2d 638, 638 (1986). A question raised by conflicting medical opinions isa question of fact. Eccon Constr. Co. v. Lucas, 221 Va. 786, 790, 273 S.E.2d797, 799 (1981).
388 S.E.2d at 273.
The Employer appears to argue that the Commission erred in giving consideration to
the medical opinions of other physicians, such as Dr. Pixel. The Employer notes the generalrule that the opinion of an attending physician will be given great weight when he is positivein his diagnosis of a disease. The Employer goes on to state that a "limited exception"
applies to this rule when the attending physician's diagnosis is shaded by doubt and there is
medical expert opinion contrary to the opinion of the attending physician, citing Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 339 S.E.2d 570 (1986). (Brief of Appellants at 4.)
However, it is noted that the rule states that the opinion of an attending physician will
be given great, not conclusive, weight. In addition, as discussed above, Dr. Eagle's opinion
is far more than merely shaded by doubt. Under these circumstances, the applicable rule is
the rule stated above, that it is solely within the province of the Commission to decide whatevidence, if credible, is entitled to greater weight. Thus, even if this Court should determinethat Dr. Eagle's opinion of November 6, 1997, that Ms. Jones's chronic pain problem stems
from her fibromyalgia and is not related to her industrial accident of September 7, 1994, iscredible evidence, the opinions of other physicians were entitled to consideration by Deputy
Commissioner Phillips and by the full Commission.
11

There is ample credible evidence to support the finding of the full Commission that
the Employer failed to establish that Ms. Jones's accident did not at least contribute to hercurrent disability. Dr. Eagle's medical opinions themselves are contradictory on this point.
Dr. Pixel indicates a number of possible sources for Ms. Jones's pain, including the fact thatthe abnormal SSEP indicates "an abnormality between the point of stimulation to the S1
lumbar nerve root." The Commission properly weighed the medical testimony presented inthis case and correctly concluded that the Employer had failed to carry its burden of proof.

12CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellee, Patricia B. Jones, respectfully requests thisHonorable Court to affirm the Order of the full Commission affirming the Opinion of Deputy
Commissioner Phillips reinstating, effective November 26, 1997, the November 14, 1997
Award of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission.
Respectfully submitted,_________________________
Benjamin M. Wesson Jr., Esquire
Trout & Wesson
1400 Princess Anne Street
Williamsburg, Virginia 22401
Attorney for Appellee

13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:19(e), the undersigned hereby certifies that seven (7)copies of Appellee's Brief have been filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of Virginia
and further certifies that three (3) copies were mailed via first-class postage to all counsel ofrecord on this the ____ day of October 1998.

___________________
Benjamin M. Wesson Jr.
COUNSEL SERVED:
Andrea Williams, Esquire
Brown and Williams, PLC
Suite 10015
7000 East Main Street
Post Office Box 1898
Norfolk, Virginia 23218(804) 678-9212
Counsel for Appellants