2023
Being
Chinesein Australia

Public opinion in Chinese
communities
JENNIFER HSU

Published by LOWY INSTITUTE
31 Bligh Street
Sydney NSW 2000
Copyright © Lowy Institute 2023

Contents
Executive summary

4

Introduction

5

The Australian way of life6

Belonging and community

9

Media use and news habits

14

Trust in countries and confidence in world leaders

20

Security and foreign policy

24

Foreign interference

31

Relations with China and the United States

35

Methodology

39

Acknowledgements

42

Tables43

About the author
Jennifer Hsu is a Research Fellow and the Project Directorof the Multiculturalism, Identity and Influence Project at the
Lowy Institute. She is the lead author of the Lowy Institute’s
Being Chinese in Australia: Public opinion in Chinese
communities survey report.

published widely in these areas. Jennifer provides regularcommentary to Australian and international media outlets
including, ABC, BBC, CNN and NHK Japan.

After completing her PhD at the University of Cambridgein Development Studies, she researched and taught indevelopment studies, political science and sociology inuniversities in North America and the UK. Jennifer is alsoa Senior Visiting Fellow at the Social Policy and ResearchCentre at the University of New South Wales.
Her research expertise broadly covers Chinese state-society
relations, Chinese civil society, the internationalisation ofChinese NGOs and the Chinese diaspora and she has          3Executive summary

In this third nationally representative survey of the Lowy
Institute’s Being Chinese in Australia series, we asked
Chinese-Australians about Australia and the world. As in
the two previous surveys, we explored three broad themes:
how Chinese-Australians see Australia and their place in it;
how they consume news and information; and how they view
the wider world. The survey also compares the sentiments
expressed by Chinese-Australians with those of the broader
Australian population.
Most Chinese-Australians have a positive view of Australia.
A majority say that Australia is a good place to live andare proud of the Australian way of life and culture. Threequarters say they feel a moderate or strong sense of
belonging — an increase from the 2021 survey. Fewer
Chinese-Australians say they have been called offensive
names or physically threatened or attacked because of theirheritage in the last year.
The survey also found an increase in support for democracy
as a form of government. Almost half of Chinese-Australians
say that democracy is preferable to any other kind ofgovernment, an increase of 14 points since 2021.
A majority of Chinese-Australians use WeChat for theirEnglish and Chinese-language news but usage of the app
has declined since 2021.
Chinese-Australians have varying degrees of trust in theinformation they consume. Most trust the English-language
media in Australia to report news accurately and fairly. But
they are divided as to whether Australian media reporting
about China is too negative or fair and balanced. Despite
relatively high usage of WeChat among Chinese-Australians,
just under half doubt the fairness and accuracy of the news
and information it provides. Approximately two-thirds saythey are confident in their ability to recognise made-up news
or disinformation.

4                Like the broader population, the issue that most worries
Chinese-Australians is a severe downturn in the global
economy. But Chinese-Australians are less likely to see China
as a military threat than the rest of the population.
There are also significant differences in opinion between
Chinese-Australians and the broader population regarding
Australia’s alliance relationships. Only a slim majority ofChinese-Australians believe that the US alliance is importantto Australia, compared to almost 90% of the broader
population. Few Chinese-Australians think AUKUS andthe Quad make Australia or the region safer. A significant
majority of Chinese-Australians believe that Australia shouldbe neutral in any conflict between the United States andChina, compared to just over half of the general population.
Chinese-Australians are less likely than the broader
population to be in favour of using Australian militaryforces in other parts of the world. This is particularly thecase in relation to China. Most oppose using Australian
military forces if China invaded Taiwan and the UnitedStates decided to intervene, or for conducting freedom ofnavigation operations in the South China Sea and otherdisputed areas claimed by China.
When it comes to the countries and leaders ChineseAustralians trust most, Australia tops the list, and no leader
we asked about was more trusted than Prime Minister
Anthony Albanese. The United Kingdom was the next mosttrusted country. Former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda
Ardern was the second-most trusted leader. ChineseAustralians trust China and President Xi Jinping less thanthey did in 2021, but still more than the broader Australian
population does.

     Introduction

There are now some 1.4 million people with Chinese
ancestry living in Australia, comprising 5.5% of the
population.1 According to the 2021 census, of Australia’s
top five ancestries, the only group to have grown since thelast census in 2016 was Australians with Chinese ancestry.2
The Chinese have a long history in Australia. Some aredescendants of Chinese migrants who came to Australia
during the gold rush of the nineteenth century. Others are
more recent migrants from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan andacross Southeast Asia.
Understanding the views of such a significant, long-standing
community is a worthwhile endeavour. But it is even more
important at a time when the effects of growing geopoliticalcompetition are being felt in Australia. In recent years,
Chinese-Australians3 have come under greater scrutiny.
Questions have been raised about the ties of particular
individuals to the government in Beijing. Some ChineseAustralians have had their loyalty to Australia questioned.
Grasping the impact that these and other issues are havingon how Chinese-Australians see their place in Australiansociety is critical, therefore, not least to the country’s social
cohesion.

It was during the first two years of the survey that Australia
called for an international inquiry into China’s handling of
the Covid-19 outbreak and China imposed punitive trademeasures — formal and informal — on Australia. The period
covered by this third survey, however, has seen a relative
improvement in ties, with the resumption of high-levelgovernment-to-government contact.
As in the previous two years, this survey explores threebroad themes: how Chinese-Australians see Australia andtheir place in it; how they consume news and information;and how they view the wider world, including growing
geopolitical tensions between China and the United States.
The survey also compares the sentiments expressed by
Chinese-Australians with those of the broader Australian
population.

This is the third annual Being Chinese in Australia survey,
part of the Lowy Institute’s Multiculturalism, Identity and
Influence Project. All three nationally representative surveys
cover a period of tension in the Australia–China relationship.
Australian governments have been blunter and more public
about their concerns over Chinese intentions and behaviour.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Cultural Diversity: Census”, 28 June 2022, https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/people-and-communities/
cultural-diversity-census/latest-release.
2
Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Cultural Diversity of Australia”, 20 September 2022, https://www.abs.gov.au/articles/cultural-diversity-australia.
3
For the purposes of reporting the results of the survey, all respondents are referred to as Chinese-Australians. The respondents were all Australian
citizens, permanent residents or long-term visa holders who self-identified as having Chinese ancestry. It should be noted that when asked, not all
respondents identified as ‘Chinese-Australian’. Others preferred to be identified as ‘Chinese’, ‘Australian’ or ‘Australian-Chinese’ — see Table 4, p 44.
1          5The Australian
way of life

The Australian way of life
In 2022, a majority of Chinese-Australians continue torate Australia favourably as a place to live and, to varying
degrees, express pride in the Australian way of life andculture. Ninety-two per cent of Chinese-Australians regard
Australia as a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ place to live, a 15-point
increase since 2020 when polling began, and a nine-point
increase compared with 2021. Half now rate Australia as a‘very good’ place to live (51%).
Age and the length of time spent living in Australia correlatebroadly with positive views of the country. Of those whoarrived in Australia between 1970 and 2010, 57% rate
Australia as a ‘very good’ place to live. By contrast, of thosearriving after 2010, 50% regard Australia as a ‘very good’place to live. Of those aged 45 and over, 56% rate Australia
as a ‘very good’ place to live.
Three-quarters (74%) of Chinese-Australians take pridein the Australian way of life and culture to a ‘great extent’or ‘moderate extent’, a three-point increase from 2021,
although still a ten-point decline from the 2020 result.
To put this result into context, we compared it to the samequestion asked of the broader Australian population in the
Scanlon Foundation’s Mapping Social Cohesion 2022

Figure 1:
Australia as a place to live

4
5

survey.4 According to that report, 83% of Australians takepride in Australia’s way of life and culture to a ‘great extent’or ‘moderate extent’.5 This means that the gap between theviews of Chinese-Australians and the broader population on
this question is 9%, although it has narrowed since 2021
when it was 16%.
As with the previous question, age and time spent livingin Australia seem to correlate with more positive feelings:
those aged 45 and over (31%) are more likely to take pridein Australian life and culture to a ‘great extent’ than younger
Chinese-Australians. Similarly, those who came to Australia
before 2010 (36%) are more likely than those who arrived
after 2010 (21%) to take pride to a ‘great extent’.
One notable change in 2022 compared to previous surveys
is in attitudes to democracy. Close to half (48%) of ChineseAustralians say that democracy is preferable to any otherkind of government, an increase of 14 points since 2021.
Preference for democracy does not differ greatly between
those born in Australia (50%) and those born in an Asian
country (47%). Those who say that in some circumstances a
non-democratic government can be preferable declined bynine points to 36%. The number of Chinese-Australians who
say it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have also
declined, from 21% to 15%.

The overwhelming majority of Chinese-Australians continue to
see Australia as a good or very good place to live.

The Mapping Social Cohesion 2022 survey was in the field from 11 to 24 July 2022.
James O’Donnell, Mapping Social Cohesion 2022, (Melbourne: Scanlon Foundation).

          7THE AUSTRALIAN WAY OF LIFE BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 2:
Pride in Australian life and culture

Three-quarters of Chinese-Australians report pride in Australian
life and culture in 2022.

Figure 3:
Views on democracy

Survey data over the last three years show that increasing
numbers of Chinese-Australians see democracy as preferable toany other kind of government.

8                     Belonging &communityBelonging and community
In the 2022 survey, as in previous years, we asked ChineseAustralians about their identity. Four in ten self-identify
as Chinese-Australian (41%), 32% as Chinese, 18% asAustralian-Chinese and 5% as Australian.
Three-quarters (75%) of Chinese-Australians report a ‘great’or ‘moderate’ sense of belonging to Australia — an increaseof 11 points from 2021. The percentage of ChineseAustralians who report a connection to their local community
also grew by six points since 2021 to 67% in 2022. Those
reporting a sense of belonging to ‘the Chinese people’
experienced a three-point decline to 66%. Those who reporta ‘great’ or ‘moderate’ sense of belonging to China fell six
points to 56%.

of belonging to Australia (‘great’ and ‘moderate’) is similar
across all three language groups: English 80%, Mandarin
75% and Cantonese 76%. When it comes to a sense of
belonging to the local community, Chinese-Australians
report the following across the three language groups:
English 77%, Mandarin 64% and Cantonese 72%. There isgreater differentiation between the three language groups
when looking at Chinese-Australians’ sense of belonging to
China: English 54%, Mandarin 67% and Cantonese 46%. A
sense of belonging to the Chinese people is equally varied:
English 56%, Mandarin 75% and Cantonese 61%.

Chinese-Australians’ sense of belonging to Australia and totheir local community does not differ significantly whether
they use English, Mandarin or Cantonese at home.6 A sense

Figure 4:
Self-identification

6

Six in ten identify as Chinese-Australian or Australian-Chinese.

Data on main language other than English used at home is regarded as a measure of an individual’s active association with their cultural or ethnic

group. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, “1249.0 — Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups (ASCCEG), 2016”, 18 July 2016,
https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/allprimarymainfeatures/EFAAAA766091FE94CA2584D30012B99D?opendocument=.

10				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA BELONGING AND COMMUNITY

Figure 5.0:
Sense of belonging

Figure 5.1:
Sense of belonging

In 2022, three-quarters of Chinese-Australians feel a sense of
belonging to Australia.

Chinese-Australians’ sense of belonging to their local community
increased in 2022, but attachment to China declined.

          11BELONGING AND COMMUNITY BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Personal experiences of discrimination
In 2022, one-third of Chinese-Australians (35%) report being
treated differently or less favourably in the last 12 months
because of their Chinese heritage. On the other hand, athird (33%) also say someone expressed support for thembecause of their Chinese heritage. Both of these results
remain unchanged since the 2021 survey.
One in five (21%) Chinese-Australians say they were called
offensive names because of their heritage in 2022. This isdown four points from 25% in 2021, and down ten points
from 31% in 2020.
A key finding of the 2020 survey was that a sizable minorityof Chinese-Australians (18%) reported being physicallythreatened or attacked because of their Chinese heritage.
This figure remained the same in 2021 but declined four
points to 14% in 2022.

In 2022, more Chinese-Australians under the age of 45
report being treated differently or less favourably than those
aged 45 and over (38% vs 32%). Similarly, more ChineseAustralians under the age of 45 report being called offensive
names than those aged 45 and over (24% vs 18%). Thereis no significant age difference when it comes to those whoreport being physically threatened or attacked.
More Chinese-Australians born in Australia reportexperiences of discrimination than Chinese-Australians bornin China (including Hong Kong and Macau): 30% vs 19%
report being called offensive names; and 20% vs 14% reportbeing physically threatened or attacked.

Fewer Chinese-Australians in 2022 have been called offensive
names or been physically threatened or attacked because of theirheritage.

Figure 6.0:
Personal experience of
discrimination

12				

Across all three surveys to date, there has been a decline in
the number of Chinese-Australians reporting that they havebeen called offensive names, or physically threatened or
attacked because of their Chinese heritage.

		BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA BELONGING AND COMMUNITY

Figure 6.1:
Personal experience of discrimination– by age group and country of birth

To obtain greater detail of Chinese-Australians’ experiences of
discrimination, we look at age and country of birth as factors.
Younger Chinese-Australians and those born in Australia are more
likely to report an experience of discrimination.

          13Media use & news
habitsMedia use and news habits
One key theme of the survey is understanding how ChineseAustralians consume news and social media and theirconfidence in the veracity of various sources of information.
The three most popular social media platforms used ona daily basis by Chinese-Australians (combining ‘several
times a day’ with ‘about once a day’) are: YouTube at 58%,
Facebook at 49% and WeChat at 47%. There is a nine-point
difference between WeChat and the fourth-most popularsocial media site, Instagram, with 38% using it on a daily
basis.
Just over a quarter (26%) of Chinese-Australians use TikTok(or Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok) daily. Aroundfour in ten (37%) Chinese-Australians never use TikTok/
Douyin. A quarter (25%) use Twitter daily, 17% use LINE(a communication app favoured by those from Taiwan)
and 16% use Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter).
When respondents were given the opportunity to identify
other social media they use frequently, Little Red Book/
Xiaohongshu — roughly equivalent to Instagram — was themost popular social media platform cited.
Given the ubiquity of WeChat in China, it is unsurprising thatthose born in the People’s Republic of China are its mostfrequent users. Seventy-six per cent of those born in China
indicate that they use WeChat daily. In general, younger
Chinese-Australians use WeChat more than older ChineseAustralians: 54% of all Chinese-Australians aged 18 to 44
use WeChat daily, compared with 34% of those aged 45 andover.
Those Chinese-Australians who use Mandarin or Cantoneseat home use YouTube more frequently than those who use
English at home (65% and 63% respectively vs 47%). More
Chinese-Australians who use English or Cantonese at home

7

use Facebook than those who use Mandarin at home (58%
and 54% respectively vs 44%). More Chinese-Australians
who use Mandarin at home engage with WeChat on a daily
basis (66%) compared to those who use English at home(22%) and Cantonese at home (40%).
WeChat continues to play a central role as a source ofnews for Chinese-Australians, although its importance has
declined compared to the previous survey. Three-quarters(75%) say they ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ get their news fromthe app, down 11 points from 2021. Fifty-eight per cent ofChinese-Australians ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ get their Englishlanguage news via WeChat, a decline of five points since2021.7
Confidence in the Australian media’s reporting of China
has improved in 2022. The number of Chinese-Australians
who believe Australian media reporting about China is
too negative has declined 15 points, from 57% to 42%.
The number who believe the Australian media is ‘fair andbalanced’ is up nine points to 42% from 33%. Indeed, there
has also been a small increase in those who feel Australian
media reporting of China is too positive, up from 9% to 13%.
Trust in sources of information differs from outlet to outlet.
Trust in Australian-based media outlets, whether in English
or Chinese, has increased slightly over the past year. Threequarters (76%) of Chinese-Australians trust English-language
media in Australia ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to reportnews accurately and fairly — a jump of five points. Nearly
two-thirds (64%) trust Chinese-language media outlets
based in Australia — a smaller increase of three points. Trustin Chinese-language media outlets based in China remains
steady at 55%, and trust in news that is shared on WeChat
Official Accounts declined by three points to 46%.

Those who answered as having used WeChat in “Now thinking about the social media sites you use…About how often do you visit or use…” wereshown “Thinking just about WeChat. Please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your English/Chinese-language news.” Thus,
82% of the surveyed Chinese-Australians answered the latter question.

          15

MEDIA USE AND NEWS HABITS BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIAWe also asked Chinese-Australians for their views on madeup news,8 or what is commonly referred to as ‘fake news’or false information. The circulation of ‘fake news’ and/or
false information was a particular concern of the AustralianElectoral Commission during the 2022 federal election
campaign.9 The survey asked Chinese-Australians whether
they encountered any made-up news during the campaign
period: 27% indicated they had.

WeChat and YouTube are equally popular among ChineseAustralians, with nearly the same percentage of people who use it
several times a day.

Figure 7:
Social media usage and frequency

8

Many Chinese-Australians report having taken actions toeither verify reports or reduce their potential exposure to
made-up news. More than half (54%) say they check thefacts themselves, and 54% say concern over made-up news
led them to stop getting news from a specific outlet. Around
45% say they reduced their usage of news sites overall, and
46% changed the way they use social media. A third (34%)
say they reported or flagged a story they thought was madeup.

The survey questions on ‘made-up news’ are modelled on the Pew Research Center. Therefore, the survey and this report do not deviate from the term

‘made-up news’. See for example, Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Mason Walker and Sophia Fedeli, “Many Americans Say Made-Up
News is a Critical Problem that Needs to be Fixed”, Pew Research Center, 5 June 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2019/06/05/manyamericans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/.
9Australian Electoral Commission, “AEC Launches Disinformation Register ahead of 2022 Poll”, Media Release, 7 March 2022, https://www.aec.gov.

au/media/2022/03-07.htm.

16				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA MEDIA USE AND NEWS HABITS

Figures 8:
WeChat and English/Chineselanguage news

WeChat remains frequently used to access English and Chineselanguage news but there is a decline in its usage since 2021.

Figure 9:
Australian media reporting
about China

Increasing numbers of Chinese-Australians say that Australian
media reporting about China is fair and balanced.

          17MEDIA USE AND NEWS HABITS BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 10:
Trust in sources of information

Australian media outlets are most trusted to report news
accurately and fairly.

Figure 11:2022 Federal election

A quarter of Chinese-Australians say they encountered made-up
news during the federal election of 2022.

18				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA MEDIA USE AND NEWS HABITS

Figure 12:
Made-up news

Two-thirds of Chinese-Australians are confident in recognisingmade-up news.

Figure 13:
Made-up news and taking action

Chinese-Australians are more likely to stop getting news from a
specific outlet and check the facts of news stories in response to
the issue of made-up news.

          19

Trust in countries& confidence inworld leadersTrust in countries and confidence in world leaders
Chinese-Australians largely report similar levels of trustin major powers as they did in 2021 with a few notable
exceptions: trust in Australia has increased, while trust in
China and Russia has decreased (see Table 14.0, p. 49).
Of the ten countries listed, Australia is the most trusted toact responsibly in the world. Three-quarters (75%) trust it ‘agreat deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to act responsibly, a seven-point
increase since 2021. This places Australia well ahead of thenext most trusted countries: the United Kingdom on 62%,
and China on 61%. Trust in China declined by six points
compared to the 2021 survey.
The following four countries and territories are trusted bymore than half of the Chinese-Australian population: Taiwan
at 54% (up slightly by three points), Hong Kong (54%), theUnited States (53%), and Japan at 51% (down four points
compared to 2021).
Only 37% of Chinese-Australians trust Indonesia and Russia‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’ to act responsibly in the world,with Russia recording an eight-point decline compared to2021. India (32%) continues to sit at the bottom of the list as
the least trusted country.
Some key differences emerge when comparing the trust
Chinese-Australians have in particular countries with thebroader population (as recorded in the 2022 Lowy InstitutePoll).10 While 61% of Chinese-Australians say they trust
China ‘a great deal’ or ‘somewhat’, only 12% of the Australian
population say the same. While 37% of Chinese-Australians
trust Russia, only 5% of the broader Australian population
feel similarly.

10

With respect to world leaders, Chinese-Australians havemore confidence in Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony
Albanese to do the right thing in world affairs than any otherworld leader they were asked about. Six in ten ChineseAustralians (60%) have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ confidence in Prime
Minister Albanese. The next most trusted leaders are former
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern (who was prime
minister at the time of fieldwork) at 49%, and Chinese
President Xi Jinping at 42%. Sitting in the middle of thespectrum are French President Emmanuel Macron on 37%
and US President Joe Biden on 34%.
Chinese-Australians have similar levels of confidence in
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (32%), TaiwanesePresident Tsai Ing-wen (32%) and Hong Kong Chief
Executive John Lee Ka-chiu (31%). These are followed by
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (29%) and Russian
President Vladimir Putin (29%). At the bottom of the list sits
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at 17%.
In 2022, a quarter of Chinese-Australians (25%) haveconfidence in Opposition Leader Peter Dutton. In the2021 survey, we asked Chinese-Australians about theirlevel of confidence in the then Leader of the Opposition
Anthony Albanese. In that survey, four in ten (44%) ChineseAustralians had confidence in him.

The 2022 Lowy Institute Poll was in the field between 15 and 28 March 2022.

          21

TRUST IN COUNTRIES AND CONFIDENCE IN WORLD LEADERS BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 14:
Trust in major powers

22				

Chinese-Australians trust Australia more than any other country
to act responsibly in the world.

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TRUST IN COUNTRIES AND CONFIDENCE IN WORLD LEADERS

Figure 15:
Trust in political leaders

Chinese-Australians express the highest confidence in theAustralian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

          23Security &foreign policySecurity and foreign policy
Chinese-Australians have consistently ranked a severe
downturn in the global economy as the top, or equal top,
threat to Australia’s vital interests over the last three years.
In 2022, nine in ten (90%) Chinese-Australians say a severe
downturn in the global economy is a ‘critical’ or ‘an important
threat’.
While half of the Chinese-Australian population (51%) in
2021 said Australia–China relations were a ‘critical threat’to Australia’s vital interests in the next ten years, this figure
dropped to 37% in 2022. Those who see foreign interferencein Australian politics as a critical threat remained stable at36%.
Just over a third of Chinese-Australians (36%) say a military
conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan isa ‘critical threat’ to Australian interests.
Thirty-five per cent of Chinese-Australians see politicalinstability in the United States, climate change, Covid-19
and other potential epidemics as a ‘critical threat’. While
there was a 13-point increase between 2020 and 2021 inthose who saw climate change as a ‘critical threat’, this figure
dropped by eight points in 2022. Concern about Covid-19
and other potential epidemics also dropped by a substantial
21 points between 2021 and 2022.
The number who saw the dissemination of false information
or fake news as a ‘critical threat’ (32%) dropped by sevenpoints from 2021, while the number concerned aboutcyberattacks rose slightly by three points (32%). A quarter(27%) of Chinese-Australians see North Korea’s nuclear
program as a ‘critical threat’ to Australia’s vital interests, aslight increase of two points.

When compared with results from the 2022 Lowy InstitutePoll, the Being Chinese in Australia survey shows someinteresting similarities and differences between the threat
perceptions of Chinese-Australians and the broader
Australian population. The two groups are most similar in
their view of the threat posed to Australian vital interests
by a severe downturn in the global economy and politicalinstability in the United States.
When it comes to the foreign policies of other countries, thedifferences in threat perceptions are more marked. Twentyeight per cent of Chinese-Australians consider China’s
foreign policy as a ‘critical threat’, compared to 65% of thebroader population. A quarter (25%) of Chinese-Australians
see Russia’s foreign policy as a ‘critical threat’, compared to
68% of the broader population.
Chinese-Australians are also less concerned about Russia’s
activities in the world: 60% say they are ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’
concerned about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, comparedto 92% of the broader Australian population. Less thanhalf (47%) of Chinese-Australians are ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’
concerned about Russian cooperation with China, compared
to 87% of the broader Australian population. Around fourin ten Chinese-Australians (43%) are concerned about
India–Russia cooperation, compared to 72% of the broader
Australian population.
Fifty-seven per cent of Chinese-Australians say they are‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ concerned about China potentially
opening a military base in a Pacific Island country. There ismuch greater concern among the broader population about
this possibility, with 88% saying they are ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’
concerned.

          25SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

There are also significant differences when it comes to two ofAustralia’s security partnerships: AUKUS and the Quad.
Twenty-seven per cent of Chinese-Australians say the AUKUS
trilateral security partnership established in 2021 between
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will
make Australia safer. Around one in four (26%) say AUKUS
will make Australia less safe, and the same number say it
makes no difference. By contrast, more than half (52%) theAustralian population say AUKUS will make Australia more
safe, and just under half (49%) say it will make the region
more safe.
When considering the Quad — a partnership between
Australia, India, Japan and the United States — a third ofChinese-Australians (33%) say it will make Australia more
safe, with similar numbers saying it will make Australia lesssafe (34%) or that it will make no difference (32%). Whenit comes to the impact of the Quad on the region, 33% say
it will make the region safer, 35% say less safe, and 32%
believe it makes no difference. By contrast, just over half thebroader Australian population say that the Quad will makeAustralia (53%) and our region (52%) more safe.

There are important differences between ChineseAustralians and the broader population over how to deploy
Australian military forces. Only 41% of Chinese-Australians
are in favour of deploying Australian forces to conduct
freedom of navigation naval operations in the South China
Sea and other disputed areas claimed by China, compared
to 60% of the broader population. Just over a third (36%)
of Chinese-Australians favour the use of Australian militaryforces if China were to invade Taiwan and the United States
decided to intervene, compared to 51% of the broader
population.
However, a majority of Chinese-Australians are in favour of
deploying the Australian military to stop a government fromcommitting genocide and killing large numbers of its own
people (63%), or to restore law and order in a Pacific nation(59%). A slim majority of 53% are supportive of using theAustralian military to fight against violent extremist groups in
the Middle East.

26													BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Figure 16.0:
Threats to vital Australian interests

For Chinese-Australians, a severe downturn in the global economy
consistently ranks as one of the most critical threats to Australia’sinterests over the past three years.

          27SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 16.1:
Threats to vital Australian interests

Chinese-Australians and the broader population are most similarin their perceived threat of political instability in the United States
but differ on Russia’s and China’s foreign policies.

28													BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Figure 17:
Concern about world events:
Russia and China

When it comes to the roles of Russia and China in world affairs,
Chinese-Australians are less pessimistic than the broader
population.

Figure 18:
AUKUS

Chinese-Australians are evenly divided about AUKUS and its rolein national and regional security.

          29SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 19:
The Quad

Chinese-Australians are evenly divided about the Quad and its
role in national and regional security, as with AUKUS.

Figure 20:
Use of Australian military forces

When compared to the broader population, Chinese-Australians
are less favourable on the issue of using Australian military forces,
with the exception of fighting against violent extremist groups in
the Middle East.

30				

		

Foreign
interferenceForeign interference
Concerns about foreign interference in Australia largely
focus on Australians of Chinese ancestry and their real or
perceived connections with the Chinese government or
Chinese community groups. In their ranking of threats toAustralian interests, just over a third of respondents (36%)
say that foreign interference is a ‘critical threat’, a result
similar to previous years (see page 27).
In terms of interactions with the Chinese state in Australia,
the 2022 results continue to show low levels of contact
with the Chinese embassy or consulates among ChineseAustralians. More than half (54%) of Chinese-Australians
report no contact at all over the last 12 months, andonly 15% as having had some contact ‘regularly’ and‘occasionally’.

In 2022, there has been an interesting change in ChineseAustralian perceptions of how much attention is being given
to the issue of foreign interference by politicians, the media
and the public. Fewer Chinese-Australians now say thatthe attention given to foreign interference is ‘about right’compared to 2021. But the change is split between those
who think ‘too much attention’ is given to the issue of foreigninterference and those who think ‘too little’ attention is given.
In 2022, the number of Chinese-Australians who saypoliticians give the ‘right amount’ of attention to the issue
of foreign interference is down 21 points from 50% to 29%.
The number who say politicians give ‘too much’ attention to
the issue is up 12 points from 31% to 43%, and ‘too little’attention is up nine points from 19% to 28%.

Just under half of the respondents (46%) say they hadinteractions with Chinese community and culturalorganisations ‘every few months’ or ‘once or twice’ in thepast 12 months. Twenty-eight per cent say they had noengagement at all. These numbers have remained consistentover the past three years of the survey.

Four in ten (40%) Chinese-Australians in 2022 believe themedia gives too much attention to foreign interference,an increase of six points, while the category ‘about theright amount of attention’ decreased by 15 points to 35%.
However, ‘too little attention’ increased by nine points to
25% in 2022.

In a notable shift in 2022, around six in ten (62%) ChineseAustralians are concerned about the influence of the UnitedStates on Australian political processes, an increase of 26
points. This is only a little higher than the broader Australian
population, with just over half (54%) expressing similar
concerns about the United States. But when it comes toChinese influence on Australian politics, the difference ismore significant. Just over half (54%) of Chinese-Australians
say they are concerned, compared to 86% of the broader
Australian population.

Fewer Chinese-Australians now believe the public gives ‘toomuch’ attention to the issue of foreign interference (27%)
than those who believe the public pays ‘too little’ attention(38%). Those who believe ‘about the right amount ofattention’ is given dropped 23 points to 35%.

32				

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Figure 21:
Contact with the Chinese embassy
or consulate

Chinese-Australians continue to report low levels of contact with
the Chinese embassy or consulate.

Figure 22:
Interaction with Chineseorganisations

Chinese-Australians’ interaction with Chinese community andcultural organisations has remained consistent over the past three
years.

          33FOREIGN INTERFERENCE BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 23:
Foreign influence in Australianpolitical processes

Around half of Chinese-Australians are concerned about foreign
influence on Australia’s political processes from China, while nearly
two-thirds are concerned about the influence of the United States.

Figure 24:
Amount of attention on foreigninterference

The number of Chinese-Australians who say foreign interference
is receiving about the right amount of attention in Australia has
dropped over the past year.

34				

Relations with
China & the US

Relations with China and the United States
Seven in ten Chinese-Australians (71%) see China as more ofan economic partner than a security threat, with only 26%
seeing China as more of a security threat. This is largely
unchanged from 2021. When asked whether China will
become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years,
a majority (61%) say it is ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ unlikely. Only
23% of the broader Australian population indicate that China
will be ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ unlikely to be a military threat toAustralia in the next 20 years.

Figure 25:
China as economic partner or
security threat

36				

Nevertheless, more than half (53%) of Chinese-Australians
regard Australia’s alliance with the United States forAustralia’s security as ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important, up five
points since 2021. This is still significantly lower than the
broader population of whom 87% say it is important.
Seven in ten (71%) Chinese-Australians say Australia should
remain neutral in the event of a military conflict between
China and the United States, compared to 51% of thebroader population. Only 13% of Chinese-Australians say
Australia should support the United States, and 13% say
Australia should back China.

Most Chinese-Australians continue to see China as more ofan economic partner to Australia, in contrast to the broader
Australian population that see China as more of a security threat.

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

Figure 26:
Importance of the United Statesalliance for Australia’s security

The majority of Chinese-Australians see Australia's alliance with
the United States as important for Australia’s security, but placeless importance on it than the broader Australian population.

Figure 27:
China as a military threat

Chinese-Australians are far less likely to see China as a military
threat when compared to the broader population.

          37RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Figure 28:
Military conflict between China andthe United States

38				

Around seven in ten Chinese-Australians believe Australia
should remain neutral in the event of a military conflict between
China and the United States, a view shared by five in ten of theAustralian population as a whole.

Methodology
2023 Being Chinese in Australia: Public Opinion in Chinese
Communities reports the results of a national survey of 1200
adults in Australia who self-identify as of Chinese heritage.
The survey was conducted between 27 September and
10 December 2022. The Social Research Centre (SRC)
conducted the non-probability online survey using panel
providers Multicultural Marketing and Management (MMM)
and The Online Research Unit (ORU).
Chinese-Australians constitute a population that is dispersedand diverse, including recent immigrants from multiple
countries with different native languages who may havedifficulty completing a public opinion survey in English.
Increased attention paid to Chinese-Australians by both theAustralian and Chinese political classes may have also madesome potential respondents more reluctant to cooperatewith a survey request. Collectively, these characteristics
present significant challenges to anyone wishing to survey
this population.
The questionnaire was developed by the author and thenrefined in consultation with the SRC. The order of questionsin the questionnaire was different from the order presented
in this report.
The survey respondents included citizens, permanent
residents and visa holders (excluding tourist visa holders)
who identified as having Chinese ancestry. A total of 1721
panel members engaged with the survey and of those, 1200
(69.7%) completed the survey. Quotas based on country ofbirth and age were set to minimise the over-representationof younger, highly acculturated, second-generation
respondents.
The sample design was representative of the Australian
population of adults over the age of 18 who reported
Chinese ancestry as either their first or second responseto the 2021 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census
question. The profile of survey respondents was comparedwith ABS TableBuilder 2021 benchmarks across age,gender, location and country of birth to determine the extent,
if any, of response bias.

To achieve the desired quotas, the SRC provided MMM withseven sets of links to recruit participants via six different
forms of social media. Prospective respondents were asked
to supply information such as gender, age and country ofbirth via email to allow MMM to screen for those in scope
before being provided the survey link. Where a respondent
had completed the 2021 survey, they were excluded by
MMM. ORU were sent their own unique set of links andpromoted the survey via their own panel and targeted panel
members that had been pre-screened for country of birth(see Table A).
Respondents had the option to complete the questionnairein English, Simplified Chinese or Traditional Chinese. A very
high proportion chose to complete in a language other thanEnglish, with 56.5% selecting Simplified Chinese, 8.6%
selecting Traditional Chinese and 34.9% completing thesurvey in English.
Given approximately 5.5% of the Australian population
identify as of Chinese ancestry in the 2021 Census,
randomly recruiting a sample of 1200 Chinese-Australians
would have required interviewing and screening more than
20,000 Australians. This approach would not have beenpractical, and so the SRC worked with non-probability
responses to build a representative sample.
To address potential bias in the sample, weighting wasapplied. The design weights were adjusted so that they
matched external benchmarks of key demographic
parameters likely to be correlated with the survey outcomes
and the likelihood of response. The survey collected a rangeof characteristics about the respondent for which population
totals can be obtained from the ABS. Having this range ofdata meant that we could try different model covariates witha view to aligning the weighted sample as closely as possible
with the population totals for available characteristics.
The final choice of covariates was determined from two
considerations: minimising the bias and maximising theeffective sample size (as measured by weighting efficiency).

          39METHODOLOGY BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIAThe variables that best met the criteria for inclusion in theweight were age by education, gender, language spoken
at home other than English, country of birth, and state or
territory of residence (see Table B). The overall weighting
efficiency is 86.1% and a margin of error of 3.0%.
To address data quality and the results being potentiallybiased, an IP address check was built into the survey toreject any address that was outside Australia. Quality
checks around verbatims, speedsters and nonsensical orcontradicting responses were also implemented.

A question about the partnership between Australia, India,
Japan and the United States (the Quad) was added to thequestionnaire in 2022, with ‘not sure’ and ‘never heard of the
Quad’ responses being displayed on a second screen. Thisdiffers from how data were collected for the same questionin the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll (‘not sure’ and ‘never heardof the Quad’ responses displayed on the same screen).
This explains the differences seen in the proportion who
answered ‘not sure’ and ‘never heard of the Quad’ between
surveys.

The question regarding ‘Confidence in global leaders’
was administered differently in 2021 and 2022. In 2022,
online respondents were able to select ‘never heard of theperson’ or ‘don’t know’ on the first response screen. In 2021,
respondents were only offered these responses if they
declined to answer at the first response screen. This resulted
in a significant difference in the number of respondents who
said they had ‘never heard of the person’ when compared to
2021.

Table A: Social media channels by demographics

Total

ORU panel MMM panel

Community
networks

Forums& online
platforms

WeChatEdu.
institutes
networks

Facebook
WhatsApp
networks

LINE

Country of birth
Australian born

24.1

46.3

5.8*

17.6

21.9

31.6

10.0*

0.0

42.6

44.4*

Overseas born

75.9

53.7

94.2

82.4

78.1

68.4

90.0*

100.0*

57.4

55.6*

18-24

12.9

19.6

17.4

12.0*

5.0*

6.1*

26.7*

16.0*

5.2*

44.4*

25-44

49.6

57.5

65.6

32.4

27.9

57.9

73.3*

52.0*

55.7

0.0

45+

37.5

22.9

17.0

55.6

67.2

36.0

0.0

32.0*

39.1

55.6*

Age group40				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA METHODOLOGY

Table B: Covariates used in model for establishment weights, with population distributions
Characteristic

Benchmark target (#)

Benchmark target (%)

18-34 years — Bachelor degree or higher

241,869

21.54

18-34 years — Less than Bachelor degree

167,871

14.95

35-44 years — Bachelor degree or higher

169,668

15.11

35-44 years — Less than Bachelor degree

71,191

6.34

45+ years — Bachelor degree or higher

177,079

15.77

45+ years — Less than Bachelor degree295,206

26.29

Male

502,939

44.79

Female619,94455.21

No

196,505

17.5

Yes

926,37882.5

Australia

170,341

15.17

China

508,105

45.25

Other

444,325

39.57

New South Wales

472,285

42.06

Victoria

342,367

30.49

Queensland

130,928

11.66

South Australia

47,049

4.19

Western Australia

92,189

8.21

Tasmania

10,7800.96

Northern Territory

5,839

0.52

Australian Capital Territory

21,335

1.9

Age group by Highest education

Sex

Language other than English spoken at home

Country of birthState or Territory of residence          41Acknowledgements
Several questions in this report were modelled on thosedeveloped by other polling organisations, including the
Pew Research Center, OmniPoll and Scanlon Foundation.
Fieldwork was managed by Karly Day and Tina Petrouliasof the Social Research Centre (SRC). Dr Benjamin Phillips,
Andrew Ward and Jack Barton of the SRC provided design
and weighting advice. John Davis of OmniPoll provided
independent consulting and reviewed the questionnaireand earlier versions of the report. Natasha Kassam, formerlyof the Lowy Institute, contributed to the design of thequestionnaire. Ian Bruce of the Lowy Institute updated andrefreshed the website interactive with contributions from
Brody Smith. Richard McGregor and Sam Roggeveen of the
Lowy Institute read and commented on earlier versions of
the report, as did Anthony Bubalo. Jack Sato of the Lowy
Institute provided data checking assistance. Clare Caldwellof the Lowy Institute copyedited the report.
This report is part of the Lowy Institute’s Multiculturalism,
Identity and Influence Project, funded by the Australian
Department of Home Affairs. Responsibility for the views,
information or advice expressed in this report is that of theauthor. The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Lowy Institute or the Australian government.

42				

		

Tables

Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Table 1: Australia as a place to live
Overall, how would you rate Australia as a place to live?
2020

2021

2022

Very good

45

42

51

Good

32

41

41

Total: Very good/good

77

83

92

Average

20

15

7

Poor

2

2

0

Very poor000Total: Poor/Very poor

2

2

0

Table 2: Pride in Australian life and culture
To what extent do you take pride in the Australian way of life and culture?
2020

2021

2022

To a great extent

45

22

27

To a moderate extent

39

49

47

Total: To a great extent/moderate extent

84

71

74

Only slightly

13

25

23

Not at all

2

4

2

Total: Only slightly/not at all

15

29

25

Not sure/prefer not to say

1

0

1

          43TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 3: Views on democracy
Please say which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.
2020

2021

2022

Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government

36

34

48

In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable

41

45

36

For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have

22

21

15

Not sure/Prefer not to say

1

0

1

Table 4: Self-identification
Overall, do you think yourself as…?
Chinese-Australian

41

Chinese32

Australian-Chinese

18

Australian5

None of the above

3

Table 5: Sense of belonging
And to what extent do you have a sense of belonging to… (ranked by total indicating ‘to a great extent’ and ‘to a moderate
extent’)To a great extent

To a moderate
extentTotal: To a great/
moderate extent

Only slightly

Not at all

Total: Only slightly/
not at all

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

Australia

26

17

22

45

47

53

71

64

75

26

31

22

2

5

2

28

36

24

Your local community

23

16

20

46

45

47

69

61

67

24

33

30

6

6

3

30

39

33

Chinese people

29

32

22

39

37

44

68

69

66

25

25

26

8

6

9

33

31

35

China

23

24

18

42

38

38

65

62

56

25

27

27

10

11

16

35

38

43

44				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TABLES

Table 6.0: Personal experience of discrimination
For each of the following, please indicate if you have, or have not, personally experienced itin the last 12 months in Australia?
People have treated you
differently or less favourably
because you are of Chinese
heritage

Someone expressed support You have been called offensive You have been physicallyfor you because you are ofnames because you are of
threatened or attacked
Chinese heritage
Chinese heritage
because you are of Chinese
heritage

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

Yes, has happened to mein the last 12 months

37

34

35

40

33

33

31

25

21

18

18

14

No, has not happened tome in the last 12 months

63

66

65

60

67

67

69

75

79

82

82

86

Table 6.1: Personal experience of discrimination – by age group and country of birth
For each of the following, please indicate if you have, or have not, personally experienced itin the last 12 months in Australia?
People have treated you
differently or less favourably
because you are of Chinese
heritage

Someone expressed support You have been called offensive You have been physicallyfor you because you are ofnames because you are of
threatened or attacked
Chinese heritage
Chinese heritage
because you are of Chinese
heritage
Yes, has happened to me in the last 12 months

Age: 18-29

38

36

28

16

Age: 30-44

38

33

21

15

Age: 45-59

33

32

16

13

Age 60 & over

26

26

23

11

COB: Australia

38

38

30

20

COB: China, Hong Kong,
Macau

35

32

19

14

          45TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 7: Social media usage and frequency
Thinking about the social media sites you use. About how often do you visit or use…
(Ranked by total of ‘several times a day’ and ‘once a day’)Total:
SeveralA few times a Every few
times a day/
week
weeks
once a day

Total:
A few times
week/every
few weeks

Less often

Never

Prefernot to say

9

29

7

4

3

15

13

28

10

11

2

47

11

10

21

15

15

3

16

38

16

11

27

12

21

3

14

12

26

13

9

22

12

37

3

Twitter

11

14

25

13

12

25

14

33

3

LINE

7

10

17

10

8

18

11

49

4

Weibo

6

10

16

12

11

23

21

39

3

Other*

4

2

6

3

3

6

6

51

31

Severaltimes a day

Aboutonce a day

YouTube

35

23

58

20

Facebook

31

18

49

WeChat36

11

Instagram

22

TikTok/Douyin*Xiaohongshu or Little Red Book is the most frequently used ‘other’ social media site as determined by ‘several times a day’

Table 8.0: WeChat and English-language news
And now thinking about WeChat in particular. Please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get yourEnglish-language news.
2020

2021

2022

Often

13

15

11

Sometimes

51

48

47

Total: Often/sometimes

64

63

58

Never

36

37

38

Not sure/Prefer not to say

1

0

5

46				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TABLES

Table 8.1: WeChat and Chinese-language news
And please indicate if you use WeChat often, sometimes or never to get your Chinese-language news.
2020

2021

2022

Often

34

36

25

Sometimes

50

50

50

Total: Often/sometimes

84

86

75

Never

16

14

19

Not sure/Prefer not to say

1

0

5

Table 9: Australian media reporting about China
Overall, would you say Australian media reporting about China is…
2020

2021

2022

Too negative

50

57

42

Too positive

19

9

13

Fair and balanced

31

33

42

Not sure/Prefer not to say

0

1

3

Table 10: Trust in sources of information
How much do you trust the following sources to report news accurately and fairly?
(ranked by total indicating ‘a great deal’ and ‘somewhat’)A great deal

Somewhat

Total:a great deal/
somewhat

Not very much

Not at all/not sure

Total: not at all/not very much/not
sure

2021

2022

2021

2022

2021

2022

2021

2022

2021

2022

2021

2022

English-language media
outlets in Australia

14

23

57

53

71

76

21

21

7

3

28

24

Chinese-language media
outlets in Australia

8

14

53

50

61

64

32

29

7

7

39

36

Chinese-language media
outlets in China

9

9

47

46

56

55

32

32

12

13

44

45

News that is shared on
WeChat Official Accounts

6

6

43

40

49

46

35

37

16

17

51

54

          47TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 11: 2022 Federal election
During the federal election held on Saturday 21 May 2022, did you see any stories about politics or the electionthat seemed completely made-up news?
Yes

27

No

68

Not sure

5

Table 12: Made-up news
How confident are you in your own ability to recognise news that is made-up news?
Very confident

10

Somewhat confident

54

Total: confident

64

Not very confident

30

Not at all confident

4

Total: not confident

34

Not sure

3

Table 13: Made-up news and taking action
Has the issue of made-up news and information led you to do any of the following?
Yes, have done thisNo, have not done thisCheck the facts of news stories yourself

53

47

Stop getting news from a specific outlet

54

46

Change the way you use social media

46

54

Reduce the amount of news you get overall

45

54

Report or flag a story that you think is made-up

34

66

48				

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TABLES

Table 14.0: Trust in major powers
How much do you trust the following countries or territories to act responsibly in the world?
(ranked by total who trust ‘a great deal’ and ‘somewhat’)A great deal

Somewhat

Total: a great deal/
somewhat

Not very much

Not at all

Total: not verymuch/not at all

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

Australia

27

20

27

47

48

48

74

68

75

23

27

20

2

6

5

25

33

25

United Kingdom

-

16

13

-

49

49

--

65

62

-

30

31

-

6

7

-

36

38

China

22

22

16

50

45

45

72

67

61

21

26

28

7

7

12

28

33

40

Taiwan

-

15

11

-

36

43

-

51

54

-

33

35

-

16

11

-

49

46

Hong Kong

-

12

10

-

42

44

-

54

54

-

35

37

-

11

10

-

46

47

United States

13

13

13

44

38

40

57

51

53

34

35

35

9

14

12

43

49

47

Japan

14

13

13

40

42

38

54

55

51

39

32

38

7

13

10

46

45

48

Indonesia

-

9

5

-

27

32

-

36

37

-

45

48

-

18

15

-

63

63

Russia

-

9

5

-

36

32

-

45

37

-

40

39

-

14

24

-

54

63

India

8

9

5

33

25

27

41

34

32

43

41

50

16

25

18

59

66

68

Table 14.1 Trust in major powers
How much do you trust the following countries or territories to act responsibly in the world?
(ranked by total percentage of Chinese-Australians who trust ‘a great deal’ and ‘somewhat’)(Comparison between Being Chinese in Australia [BCIA] 2022 and Lowy Institute Poll ([LI] 2022)
Total: a great deal/
somewhat

Not very much

Not at all

Total: not verymuch/not at all

A great deal

Somewhat

CA*

AP*

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

United Kingdom

13

29

49

58

62

87

31

10

7

3

38

13

China

16

2

45

10

61

12

28

39

12

48

40

87

United States

13

16

40

49

53

65

35

26

12

9

47

35

Japan

13

27

38

60

51

87

38

10

10

3

48

13

Indonesia

5

4

32

47

37

51

48

40

15

9

63

49

Russia

5

1

32

4

37

5

39

17

24

77

63

84

India

5

5

27

51

32

56

50

35

18

8

68

43

*CA = Chinese-Australians*AP = Australian population          49TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 15.0: Trust in political leaders
For each, please indicate how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs — a lotof confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all. (ranked by total saying ‘a lot’ and ‘some’confidence)(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)

A lot

Some

Total: aTotal: not too
Not sure who
lot/some Not too much None at all much/none
the person is
confidence
at allNot sure

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

Australian Prime Minister
Anthony Albanese

18

-

42

-

60

-

22

-

7

-

29

-

5

-

6

-

New Zealand Prime Minister
Jacinda Ardern*

13

58

36

29

49

87

22

6

13

5

35

11

9

1

7

1

Chinese President Xi Jinping

11

2

31

9

42

11

23

26

24

56

47

82

5

3

6

4

French President EmmanuelMacron

7

15

30

52

37

67

32

17

13

6

45

23

10

5

10

5

US President Joe Biden

6

13

28

45

34

58

34

26

21

14

55

40

5

0

6

2

Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskyy

9

-

23

-

32

-

28

-

23

-

51

-

9

-

9

-

Taiwanese President Tsai
Ing-wen

7

-

25

-

32

-

30

-

23

-

53

-

7

-

8

-

Hong Kong Chief Executive
John Lee Ka-chiu

5

-

26

-

31

-

28

-

21

-

49

-

13

-

8

-

Russian President Vladimir
Putin

6

2

23

4

29

6

26

9

32

83

58

92

6

0

7

2

Japanese Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida

5

14

24

51

29

65

31

12

17

3

48

15

13

10

10

10

Australian Opposition leaderPeter Dutton

5

-

20

-

25

-

28

-

28

-

56

-

11

-

8

-

North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un

3

2

14

3

17

5

28

12

40

80

68

92

8

1

7

2

*The survey was in the field prior to Jacinda Ardern announcing her resignation on 19 January 2023.

50				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TABLES

Table 15.1: Trust in political leaders
For each, please indicate how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs — a lotof confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all. (ranked by total saying ‘a lot’ and ‘some’confidence)(Comparison between BCIA 2021 and BCIA 2022)

A lot

Some

Total: alot/some
confidence

Not too much

None at all

Total: not too
Not sure whomuch/none
the person isat allNot sure

2021 2022 2021 2022 2021 2022 2021 2022 2021 2022 2021 2022 2021 2022 2021 2022
New Zealand Prime
Minister Jacinda
Ardern*

22

13

46

36

68

49

26

22

6

13

32

35

0

9

0

7

Chinese President Xi
Jinping

24

11

41

31

65

42

26

23

10

24

36

47

0

5

0

6

US President Joe
Biden

11

6

31

28

42

34

42

34

15

21

57

55

0

5

0

6

Taiwanese President
Tsai Ing-wen

15

7

28

25

43

32

30

30

27

23

57

53

0

7

0

8

Russian President
Vladimir Putin

16

6

35

23

51

29

35

26

14

32

49

58

0

6

0

7

North Korean leader
Kim Jong-un

11

3

22

14

33

17

35

28

33

40

68

68

0

8

0

7

          51TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 16.0: Threats to vital Australian interests
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. Do you see this as a critical threat, an
important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all? (ranked by percentage saying ‘a critical threat’)An important but notcritical threat

Critical threat

Total: critical threat/
important threat

Not an important threat
at all

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

A severe downturn in the
global economy

41

49

49

49

41

41

90

90

90

10

10

10

Australia–China relations

-

51

37

-

37

48

-

88

85

-

12

15

Foreign interference inAustralian politics

29

35

36

59

46

50

88

81

86

12

19

14

A military conflict between
the United States and China
over Taiwan

32

37

36

49

45

49

81

82

85

19

17

15

Political instability in the
United States

-

-

35

-

-

51

-

-

86

-

-

14

Covid-19 and other potential
epidemics

51

56

35

39

34

49

90

90

84

10

10

16

Climate change

30

43

35

56

41

46

86

84

81

14

16

19

The dissemination of false
information or fake news

40

39

32

46

47

54

86

86

86

14

15

14

Cyberattacks from othercountries

36

29

32

48

50

52

84

79

84

17

21

16

China’s foreign policy

-

-

28

-

-

53

-

-

81

-

-

19

North Korea’s nuclear
program

-

25

27

-

47

52

-

72

79

-

28

22

Russia’s foreign policy

-

-

25

-

-

56

-

-

81

-

-

19

52				

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TABLES

Table 16.1: Threats to vital Australian interests
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. Do you see this as a critical threat,
an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all? (ranked by percentage of Chinese-Australians saying ‘acritical threat’)(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)
Critical threat

An important but not Total: critical threat/
critical threat
important threat

Not an important
threat at all

Not sure/
Don’t know

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

A severe downturn in the
global economy

49

55

41

42

90

87

10

3

0

0

Australia–China relations

37

-

48

-

85

-

15

-

0

-

Foreign interference inAustralian politics

36

49

50

45

86

94

14

6

0

0

A military conflict between
the United States and China
over Taiwan

36

64

49

32

85

96

15

4

0

0

Political instability in the
United States

35

34

51

56

86

90

14

9

0

0

Covid-19 and other potential
epidemics

35

42

49

48

84

90

16

9

0

0

Climate change

35

62

46

27

81

89

19

11

0

0

The dissemination of false
information or fake news

32

-

54

-

86

-

14

-

0

-

Cyberattacks from othercountries

32

64

52

33

84

97

16

3

0

0

China’s foreign policy

28

65

53

32

81

97

19

3

0

1

North Korea’s nuclear
program

27

58

52

35

79

93

22

7

0

0

Russia’s foreign policy

25

68

56

26

81

94

19

5

0

0

          53TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 17: Concern about world events: Russia and China
Now thinking about world events. To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about… (ranked by total percentage ofChinese-Australians saying ‘very’ and ‘somewhat’ concerned)(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)
Very
Concerned

Somewhatconcerned

Total:
concerned

Not tooconcerned

Not at allconcerned

Total: notconcerned

Not sure

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

Russia's invasion of Ukraine

15

69

45

23

60

92

33

4

7

3

40

7

0

0

China potentially openinga military base in a PacificIsland country

15

60

32

28

57

88

37

9

15

3

52

12

0

1

China–Russia cooperation

13

56

34

31

47

87

40

9

14

4

0

13

0

0

India–Russia cooperation

8

28

35

44

43

72

42

22

15

6

0

28

0

0

Table 18: AUKUS
Thinking now about Australia’s partnerships in the world. Do you think AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia,
the United States and the United Kingdom, will make…
(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)
More safe

Makes nodifferenceLess safe

Never heard of
AUKUS

Not sure

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

Australia

27

52

26

7

26

22

15

8

6

11

Our region

24

49

25

8

29

24

14

8

7

11

Table 19: The Quad
Do you think the Quad, the partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, will make…
(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)
More safe

Makes nodifferenceLess safe

Never heard of
the Quad

Not sure

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

Australia

33

53

34

4

32

20

0

12

0

10

Our region

33

52

35

5

32

21

0

12

0

11

54				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TABLES

Table 20: Use of Australian military forces
There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using Australian military forces in other parts of
the world. Please give your opinion about the following situations. Would you personally be in favour or against the use ofAustralian military forces … (ranked by percentage of Chinese-Australians saying ‘in favour’)(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)
In favour

Neither in favour
nor against

AgainstNot sure

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

To stop a government from committing genocide and killing
large numbers of its own people

63

79

37

19

0

1

0

2

To restore law and order in a Pacific nation

59

75

41

23

0

0

0

1

To fight against violent extremist groups in the Middle East

53

41

47

57

0

1

0

1

To conduct freedom of navigation naval operations in theSouth China Sea and other disputed areas claimed by China

41

60

59

38

0

0

0

2

If China invaded Taiwan and the United States decided tointervene

36

51

64

47

0

1

0

2

If Russia invaded one of its neighbours

35

40

65

58

0

1

0

2

Table 21: Contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate
Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any contact with the Chinese embassy or consulate in your state or
territory?
(Comparison between BCIA 2020, 2021, 2022)
2020

2021

2022

Regularly2

42

Occasionally

14

14

13

Total: Regularly/Occasionally

16

18

15

Once or twice

39

23

28

Not at all

45

59

54

Not sure/Prefer not to say

0

0

3

          55TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 22: Interaction with Chinese organisations
Over the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you had any interaction with Chinese community and culturalorganisations?
(Comparison between BCIA 2020, 2021, 2022)
2020

2021

2022

At least once a week

7

7

6

About once a month

18

14

15

Total: At least once a week/about once a month

25

21

21

Every few months

26

23

25

Once or twice

21

26

21

Total: Every few months/once or twice

47

49

46

Never

28

29

28

Not sure/prefer not to say

0

0

4

Table 23.0: Foreign influence in Australian political processes
Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia’s politicalprocesses?
Yes, concernedNo, not concerned

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

United States

33

36

62

67

64

38

China

46

50

54

54

51

46

Japan

55

53

43

45

47

56

India

54

55

38

46

45

62

Table 23.1: Foreign influence in Australian political processes
Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia’s politicalprocesses?
(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)
Yes, concernedNo, not concerned

Not sure/Don’t know

CA

AP

CA

AP

CA

AP

United States

62

54

38

45

0

1

China

54

86

46

13

0

1

56				

		

BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA TABLES

Table 24: Amount of attention on foreign interference
Do you personally think too much, too little or about the right amount of attention is given to the issue of foreign interferenceby each of the following groups?
Too much attention

Too little attention

About the right amountPrefer not to say/not sure

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

Politicians

44

31

43

30

19

28

26

50

29

0

0

0

Media

45

34

40

28

16

25

27

50

35

0

0

0

Public

30

19

27

39

23

38

31

58

35

0

0

0

Table 25: China as economic partner or security threat
In your own view, is China more of an economic partner to Australia or more of a security threat to Australia?
(Comparison between BCIA 2020, 2021, 2022 and LI 2020, 2021, 2022)
Chinese-Australian

Australian population

2020

2021

2022

2020

2021

2022

More of an economic partner to Australia

66

73

71

55

34

33

More of a security threat to Australia

34

27

26

41

63

63

Both equally

0

0

1

3

1

3

Neither/Not sure

0

1

2

1

1

1

Table 26: Importance of the United States alliance for Australia’s security
Thinking now about the United States. How important is Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States for Australia’s
security?
(Comparison between BCIA 2021, 2022 and LI 2021, 2022)

Chinese-Australian

Australian population

2021

2022

2021

2022

Very important

12

16

47

60

Fairly important

36

37

31

27

Total: Very/fairly important

48

53

78

87

Somewhat important

42

37

20

11

Not at all important

10

8

2

2

Not sure

1

3

0

0

          57TABLES BEING CHINESE IN AUSTRALIA

Table 27: China as a military threat
How likely do you think it is that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years?
(Comparison between BCIA 2022 and LI 2022)
Chinese-Australian

Australian population

Very likely

632

Somewhat likely

30

43

Total: likely

36

75

Somewhat unlikely

40

17

Very unlikely

21

6

Total: unlikely

61

23

Not sure

4

1

Table 28: Military conflict between China and the United States
In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, please say which one of the following statements
comes closest to your own personal view.
(Comparison between BCIA 2021, 2022 and LI 2021, 2022)
Chinese-Australian

Australian population

2021

2022

2021

2022

Australia should remain neutral

74

71

57

51

Australia should support China

14

13

1

1

Australia should support the United States

11

13

41

46

Not sure/Don’t know

1

4

1

2

58