Journal of Socio-Informatics
Vol.11, No.1

Sep. 2018[Refereed Research Note］
Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the AsianContext

Sang-Mi KIM,
Tetsuro KOBAYASHI[Translation］
Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General
Election

Hitoshi FUJIWARA

The Society of Socio-Informatics

Journal of Socio-Informatics
Vol.11, No.1

Sep. 2018◆CONTENTS◆[Refereed Research Note］
Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the Asian Context

Sang-Mi KIM,
Tetsuro KOBAYASHI…   1[Translation］
Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General
Election

Hitoshi FUJIWARA…  16

Refereed Research Note
Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge
Gap in the Asian Context
Keywords:
Knowledge gap hypothesis, socioeconomic status, digital divide, inequality, political information, East
Asia

Sang-Mi KIM, Nagoya University
Tetsuro KOBAYASHI, City University of Hong Kong

Abstract
Knowledge and information translate into social power. Lack of knowledge can result in
exclusion from social resources, thus leading to a lack of social power and eventually undermining
democracy. Previous findings demonstrate that the gap in political knowledge based on
socioeconomic status (SES) is produced by the difference in newspaper reading between classes.
Some findings have indicated that the Internet is reproducing the existing patterns of politicalcommunication, further increasing the gap between social classes. Although these results havebeen extensively confirmed outside Asia, the cultural context of Asian countries can often be
sufficiently distinctive to differ from tendencies in other parts of the world concerning the social
context of media use. This study examines whether different forms of news media function toincrease the gap in political knowledge between socioeconomic classes in East Asia. In particular,
given the significant rise in the number of Asians who rely on the Internet for political information,
we focus on the effect of the use of Internet on the knowledge gap between socioeconomic levels.
We find that Internet use appears to significantly increase SES-based gaps in political knowledge
in Japan, but not Korea.

1Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the Asian Context

KIM et alincrease or decrease knowledge gaps, depending

1. Introduction

upon the medium involved (e.g., newspapers
The Internet continues to engender new forms

versus TV news).

of communication that are significantly altering

Here, we need to recognize that digitalthe contours of the social landscape for individuals

inequality does not entail simply a dichotomy ofwith ample access to information resources

access versus no access (Robinson, 2008), but(Castells, 2000). In the context of politicalrather involves the degree to which people can

education,

offer

access various and complex levels and forms ofopportunities to learn information beyond what

information created by information technology.

is already available in other media (Tewksbury,

Does the Internet reduce the gap by making2003). Political information from the Internet

political information more available, accessible,

gives citizens a platform to explore the views ofand easier to follow, particularly among the less-organizations whose opinions and goals do noteducated lower classes (Anderson, Bikson, Law,

conform to those expressed by the mainstream& Mitchell, 1995)? Or, on the other hand, do

media

these

people in the upper classes surf the Internet

organizations’ perspectives can be published andmore often and use it more effectively, furthertransmitted without requiring support from thewidening the gap between the information-richgovernment or a commercial entity. However,and information-poor (DiMaggio & Hargittai,

although much scholarship on the Internet touts

2001)? The present study addresses this issue inthis somewhat utopian view of the Internet’s

detail, looking at whether each form of news

benefits, many economically underprivileged

media functions to widen or narrow the SES-

people remain excluded from these new media

based gap in political knowledge. In addition, thisresources, because they do not enjoy consistent,

study analyzes the effect of Internet use as a

let alone equal, access to information technologies

source of political information, looking at whether(Van Dijk, 2005; DiMaggio et al., 2004; Hargittai,

the Internet may contribute to political learning

2008; Hargittai & Walejko, 2008). Thus, attention

beyond the function of traditional news media.

theInternetindustry.

is

seen

Furthermore,tomust be paid to the ways in which the Internet

Although the knowledge gap phenomenon

can produce and reinforce knowledge gaps.

most likely exists around the world, most

Research on knowledge gaps suggests thatsegments

ofthepopulation

withresearch on it has taken place in the United

higherStates. Japan and South Korea offer suitablesocioeconomic status (SES) acquire media-

settings to examine whether the knowledge gap

transmitted information at a faster rate thanhypothesis can be applied to other cultural areas

lower-SES segments (Tichenor, Donohue, &with different political and cultural traditions.

Olien, 1970). The media, therefore, may function

These two countries are also among the mostto increase societal gaps in various forms of

wired nations in the world, thus providing a greatknowledge, including knowledge about politics.

opportunity to test the effects of Internet use.

On the other hand, some researchers (Kwak,
1999; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Jerit, Barabas,& Bolsen, 2006) argue that news media can either
2Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

gap in knowledge. News media, therefore, may

2. Literature review

mediate the well-supported link between SES(1) The Knowledge Gap Hypothesis and theand knowledge of politics (Scheufele, Shanahan,

exposure of News media& Kim, 2002). In other words, the upper classes

According to the knowledge gap hypothesis

are more politically knowledgeable largely(Tichenor et al., 1970), mass media function to

because they use the news media more often andexpand, rather than narrow, the gap in knowledge

in different ways, thus acquiring more information

between social classes. As the infusion of mass

about public affairs.

media information into a social system increases,(2) SES and the Knowledge Gap

the segments of the population with higher SES
tend to acquire this information at a faster rate

The knowledge gap hypothesis might bethan lower-SES segments, so that the gap inexpressed operationally in at least two different

knowledge between these segments tends toforms. One would expect the knowledge gap toincrease (Tichenor et al., 1970, pp. 159-160). Thisbe especially prominent when one or more ofmeans that people with higher SES tend to be

the factors theorized as contributing to it are

more able to acquire information, leading to an

operative. Tichenor et al. (1970) discussed fiveincreasing division of society into two groups:

potential factors that could account for the

better-educated people who know more about

increase in the size of knowledge gaps due to themost things, and those with low levels of

input of media information. Four of these factors

education who know less.

are the differences between high- and low-SES

There are several reasons why the predictedgroups in (a) relevant interpersonal contacts, (b)knowledge gap should appear and widen with

communication skills, (c) prior knowledge, andincreasing levels of media input. One factor is the(d) selective exposure, acceptance, and retention.

difference between social classes with regard to

To the extent that these four factors are engaged;

their use of media. In general, the upper classes

the gap should widen as the flow of mass media

use the media more often for information,

information continues (Tichenor et al., 1970).

therefore gaining greater knowledge (Tichenor

Tichenor et al. also discussed the nature of the

et al., 1970). People in the upper classes have amedia system itself as a fifth factor potentiallygreater stake in what happens in the economy

contributing to increasing the knowledge gaps

and politics, and they are thus more motivated to

between high- and low-SES segments of society.

become well informed in the first place (Eveland

The role of relevant interpersonal contacts in& Scheufele, 2000; Moore, 1987). Most printincreasing gaps would be to allow people ofmedia sources, where much of the available

higher SES to engage in conversations withinformation about public affairs and scienceothers who are knowledgeable about important

appears, are geared toward the tastes of the

topics in the news. Higher levels of education are

upper and middle classes, because these are thegenerally associated with a broader sphere of

key(Donohue,everyday activity, a greater number of reference

Tichenor, & Olien, 1986). Over time, thisgroups, and more interpersonal contacts, all ofdifference in media use results in an increasing

which increase the likelihood of discussing publiccustomersofadvertisers

3

Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the Asian Context

KIM et alaffairs topics with others. These conversations

pay attention to different types of information

could provide additional opportunities for learning

than those of high SES. Therefore, for instance,

beyond direct media exposure. Also, high-SES

those of low SES are more likely to focus on theindividuals could be more motivated to seek out

sports section of a newspaper, whereas those of

information if they believed that it would be ahigh SES are more likely to pay attention to the

topic of conversation among their friends andnews and analysis pages (Newspaper Associationneighbors (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000).

of America, 1998). It might make sense to assume

Differences in communication skills, and inthat those with greater existing knowledge would

information processing ability more generally,

gain more information from any given media

between high- and low-education groups represent

source, thereby further widening the knowledge

a key cognitive explanation for increasinggap.

knowledge gaps. People with a higher level of(3) T elevision Viewing, Political Learning, andformal education have had more exposure to thecomprehension abilities necessary to acquire

Gaps in Political Knowledge

public affairs or science knowledge and integrate

Acquisition of political knowledge from thethat information. They are thus likely to havemass media is moderated by social status,

better reading ability and to be more capable ofparticularly by education level. When exposed

selecting and storing key points of information

to the same information in the media, persons

from a given news story. They are also morewith higher education gain knowledge more

likely to engage in elaborative processing ofeffectively, so that the initial gap between classes

mediated information, which is a key determinant

increases even further. The knowledge gapof learning identified by psychologists andhypothesis thus appears to be a fundamental

educational researchers (Eveland & Scheufele,

explanation for the mass media’s apparent failure2000).

to inform all of the public (Tichenor et al. 1970).

A third factor contributing to knowledge gaps

Researchers have argued that viewers of TV

is the impact of prior knowledge resulting fromnews are often passive and unmotivated and thus

previous exposure to the topic through mass

may not learn as much from the programs as do

media or from formal education itself. Persons

self-selected and motivated newspaper readers

who are already better informed are more likely(Robinson & Levy, 1986). Moreover, as Blumber

to be aware of a topic when it appears in the masssuggests that although television is not expected

media and are better prepared to understand it.

to influence the uninterested more strongly thanPrior knowledge has been shown to facilitate thethe interested, the political coverage of television

processing and recall of new information (e.g.,

may be absorbed more readily by more interested

Rhee & Cappella, 1997).

viewers. However, they may also be harder toDifferences in selective exposure, acceptance,

persuade (Blumber, 1970). In contrast, otherand retention depending on education level also

researchers have in fact reported significant

suggest a gap in the use of news media

learning from TV news (Garramone, 1983; Zhao

information by people of low SES. When lower-& Chaffee, 1995; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000). As

status individuals do use news media, they often

research on passive learning suggests (Krugman
4

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

& Hartley, 1970) that even unmotivated exposure

Some researchers found that television could

to TV news seems to produce meaningful

function as a “knowledge leveler” (Neuman,learning (Graber, 1990).

1976). Because television presents information in

As for Internet use, results are varied as tocognitively less demanding ways, even thosewhether its learning effects can be equivalent towith weaker cognitive skills and less priorthose derived from using traditional news media.

knowledge may gain significant information

Certainly, Internet users can obtain essentially(Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Prior, 2005).

unlimitedwithSophisticated and educated viewers, on the otherrelatively little effort, enabling them to investigate

hand, may find little to learn beyond what they

important issues in much greater depth (Bimber,already know because the hard news content of2001). As Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) point out,

television is so limited and superficial (Eveland &however, availability of information does not

Scheufele, 2000; Jerit et al., 2006). Consequently,

always lead to greater use or understanding.

television may actually decrease the knowledge

DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001) also note that the

gap between classes. Studies have provided

Internet is a supplementary medium throughsupport for this knowledge-leveling function,

which traditional news organizations redistributeshowing that the gap between high- and low-their information. Therefore, given that mosteducation groups is smaller among heavy viewers

users of online political information are alsoof TV news than among light viewers (Kwak,

heavy users of traditional news media (Althaus &1999; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000).

information

about

politics

Tewksbury, 2000), it is somewhat questionable

Since the Internet incorporates video, audio,

how much learning may occur beyond what isgraphic, and text features in a mixed arrangement,already obtained from newspapers and television

the format of its journalistic and partisan

news. Nonetheless, a few studies have reported

information sources is in general closer to that ofsignificant learning from the Internet, even after

text-based newspapers than to visual media like

controlling for newspaper reading and television

television (Kim, 2008, Norris & Sanders, 2003).

viewing (Norris, 2002; Norris & Sanders, 2003).

Effective online information seeking requires

Newspapers are known as a major source ofsuch skills as purposeful searching, evaluation of

information about current issues (Stamm,source credibility, construction of interpretative

Johnson, & Martin, 1997; Berkowitz & Pritchard,frames, and a certain level of literacy, all of which1989), election candidates (Kim et al., 2005), andare also prerequisites for reading a newspaper

political parties (Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner,(Bonfadelli, 2002). It is therefore reasonable to1994). Not surprisingly, research has firmly

expect that people with higher education will

established that one’s education level moderates

gain greater knowledge from the Internet,

how much one can learn from reading a

resulting in a larger knowledge gap between

newspaper. In general, highly educated readersclasses. That is, the gap between high- and low-tend to gain more knowledge from news articles,

education groups should be larger among heavy

thus increasing the gap between socioeconomic

users of political websites than among light users.

classes (Tichenor et al., 1970; Gaziano, 1984; Jerit

However, most Internet users nowadays get

et al., 2006).

their news mainly via portal sites that integrate
5Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the Asian Context

and transmit various categories and aspects of

KIM et al

websites) more often than those of low SES.

social affairs, including but not limited to political

H3: Heavy users of news media will be more

aspects. Thus, we might assume that in fact theknowledgeable about politics than light users.

politically uninvolved may indeed happen to

Finally, the next three hypotheses examine

encounter political information while using thewhether the degree of political learning fromInternet. That is, due to the mixed-content naturenews media is moderated by education level.

of portal sites, users cannot avoid exposure toHere, it is suggested that newspapers increase

persuasive messages. This fact could suggest

the knowledge gap whereas television and thethat people of low SES could learn new

Internet function as knowledge levelers in theinformation while on the Internet that would help

two countries examined in this paper.

them catch up with high-SES people in terms of

H4: The knowledge gap between high- andpolitical knowledge.

low-education groups will be smaller among
heavy viewers of television news than among

3. Research Hypotheses

light viewers.
H5: The knowledge gap between high- and

The first step in testing the knowledge gap is to

low-education groups will be smaller among

examine whether there is indeed a gap inheavy users of political websites than among

knowledge between social classes at all. The firstlight users.

hypothesis holds that people of higher SES―

H6: The knowledge gap between high- andtypically operationalized by education level―are

low-education groups will be larger among

more politically knowledgeable than their less-heavy users of a newspaper than among lighteducated counterparts.

users.

H1: People with higher education will be more

4. Methods

knowledgeable about politics than the lesseducated.
The next two hypotheses examine the extent

Immediately following the 2009 lower houseto which news media can contribute to producing

election in Japan, we conducted a random-sample

knowledge gaps. It is hypothesized that people

survey in two East Asian capital cities. Data werewith higher levels of education will be more likely

collected from respondents in Seoul (N=700) andto use news media, in turn allowing them toTokyo (N=838). Sampling was conducted inacquire greater knowledge and creating a

different ways in each country. In Japan,

widening gap between social classes. If we arerespondents

wererandomly

sure that a knowledge gap exists, then we shouldsystematic

sampling

frominspect first whether there is a significant

registration lists in 23 wards provided by thedifference between classes in their news media

Tokyo Election Administration Commission. A

use and whether there is a relationship between

questionnaire was sent to respondents aged 20 tonews media use and political knowledge.

69 who were eligible to vote. It asked them toselected
official

byvoter

H2: Highly educated citizens will use news

answer the questions and return the questionnaire

media (newspapers, television news, and politicalby mail. The response rate in Japan was 27.9％.
6

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

The survey in Japan was conducted between

These three items were also combined into a single

October 16 and November 1, 2009.

measure of civic knowledge (α=0.23, N=800,

As for the survey in Korea, also using

M=1.33, SD=0.93 in Japan; α=0.33, N=700,

systematic sampling, trained surveyors visited

M=1.15, SD=0.88 in Korea). The actual wording

several households (addresses) in each allocatedof the questions is provided in the appendix.

ward and obtained responses via face-to-faceSocioeconomic factors. In this paper, we useinterviews. The response rate in Korea waslevel of education as our socioeconomic yardstick.

19.6％. These respondents were also interviewed

Education was measured by asking respondents

between 1October 16 and November 1, 2009.

to indicate the highest level of schooling that

Even though the capital cities of Japan andthey had completed or in which they were

Korea may represent a typical urban lifestyle, thecurrently enrolled. The question was asked

highly developed nature of these Asian cities

differently according to the official institutional

makes it hard to generalize the survey findings

education system of each respective country.

beyond the specific locations. For example,

Japanese respondents could choose from themedia use may be higher in these cities than infollowing options: 1 for completing education

other parts of the two countries.

through junior high school; 2 for high school; 3

The main items contained in the surveys arefor junior college, professional school, or old-

described below.

education-system high school; 4 for college,

Political Knowledge. Traditionally, researchers

university or graduate school (N=829, M=3.23,

have categorized political knowledge as either

SD=0.88). Korean respondents were asked togeneral or domain-specific (Delli Carpini &choose either 1 for junior high school or less, 2

Keeter, 1992). In this study, nine country-specificfor a high school degree, 3 if attending college orquestions were used to assess respondents’university, 4 for a college or university degree, 5knowledge of politics in Japan or Korea. Theseif currently in graduate school, or 6 if they had

questions can be divided into two categories ofcompleted graduate school (N=700, M=3.69,

political knowledge: issue knowledge and civic

SD=1.13 in Korea).

knowledge.

Newspaper reading. Newspaper reading was

The first six questions covered current issues

measured by asking respondents, on a five-pointthat have been controversial in recent elections.

scale, how often (0=never; 4=almost every day)

These six items were then combined into a single

they read nationwide newspapers, both in Japanmeasure representing knowledge pertaining toand in Korea (N=827, M=2.71, SD=1.62 in Japan;

current issues (α=0.57, N=805, M=4.30, SD=1.19

N=700, M=2.91, SD=1.28 in Korea).

in Japan;α=.59, N=700, M=2.62, SD=1.54 in

Television news viewing. The styles of

Korea).

television news differ between the two countries.

The other three questions measured traditional

In Japan, TV news shows are formatted so that

civic knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1992), i.e.,

issues and concepts can be easily understood,

respondents’ awareness of political institutions andusing visual aids and extensive explanations ofprocesses, rather than domain-specific knowledge

key points. In contrast, Korea adheres to a moreof particular issues and policies (Jerit et al., 2006).

traditional news broadcasting format in which
7

Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the Asian Context

news is reported matter-of-factly. Television news

KIM et al

5. Results

viewing was measured by asking respondents, on(1) Political knowledge, Media usage anda five-point scale, how often (0=never; 4=almost

SES

every day) they watch the news on TV. Japanese
TV news viewing was measured using two items

First, the results in both countries indicated(α=0.53), on NHK (N=832, M=2.90, SD=1.34)

that people with higher SES (as operationalized

and commercial TV news (N=835, M=3.33, SD =by higher levels of education) scored higher in1.01), respectively. The Korean survey contained(1) issue knowledge and (2) civic knowledge

three separate questions (α=0.75), asking about

than their less-educated counterparts. Thus, H1viewing newscasts on KBS (N=700, M=3.09, SD=

was clearly supported by this study (Table 2).

0.95), MBC (N=700, M=3.03, SD=1.04), and SBS

As for H2, the study found that lower-educated(N=700, M=2.80, SD=1.05).

people in the Japanese survey are heavier viewers

Internet use for political information. Internetof television, but this pattern was not evident in

use for acquiring political information was

the Korean sample (Table 3). Conversely, withmeasured by asking respondents in bothregard to newspaper reading, there was acountries, on the same five-point scale, howstatistically meaningful association with SES

often(0=never; 4=almost every day) they usedin Korea, but not Japan. Lastly, there was aonline news sites about politics, politicians or

significant difference in Internet use for politicalelections (N=821, M=1.91, SD=1.61 in Japan;

information between classes in Korea, with the

N=700, M=2.30, SD=1.38 in Korea).

highlyeducatedusing

political

websites

As shown in Table 1, the Korean respondents

considerably more often than the less educated.

read the newspaper and used the Internet

Similarly, lower-educated people in Japan werefor political information more frequently thansignificantly less active in terms of seeking

the Japanese respondents. On the other hand,political information through the Internet.

the Japanese participants watched television

Our

significantly more frequently than the Koreans.

international

surveythus

providesempirical evidence of a relationship betweensocial status and the amount of exposure topolitical information transmitted by various news
media.

Table 1. Media Exposure of Japanese and Korean
Respondents

8Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

Table 2. Differences between High & Low SES in Political Knowledge

Table 3. Differences between High & Low SES in Media Use

difference between heavy and light users of the(2) Interaction effects of News Media use and
SES

Internet, with heavy users demonstrating greater

We also hypothesized that exposure to media

issue and civic knowledge in both countries.

would be positively related to higher levels of

Television news viewing had reverse impacts

knowledge. We ran a regression model thatin the two countries. It was positively associatedaddedwith the acquisition of civic knowledge in Japan,

threedemographic

variables(age,​

gender, and socioeconomic level) and three

but was a negative factor in Korea. We did not

media exposure variables (newspaper reading,conduct further analysis into this difference, but

television news viewing, and Internet use for

it is notable that television can be a two-edged

political information) as predictors. We found a

media source with regard to helping viewers tosignificant relationship between exposure to all

understand civic matters.

three types of media-newspaper reading, TV

To examine how media consumption wasnews viewing and Internet news-and issue

affected by education level, we added threeknowledge in Japan (Table 4 & Fig 1). In Korea,

interactional variables (newspaper reading x

only TV viewing did not show a significant

SES, TV news viewing x SES, and Internet use forrelationship with issue knowledge (Table 5 &political information x SES) and ran a regression

Fig 2).

model (Model 2 in Tables 4 and 5). To avoid

The Internet has contributed significantly

multicollinearity, standardization was conducted

toward the acquisition of civic knowledge in bothjust before we crossed each interactional variable.

Japan and Korea. Overall, there was a significant

The results of the regression model show the9Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the Asian Context

KIM et al

Table 4. Predictors of Political Knowledge in Linear Regression (Japan)

Table 5. Predictors of Political Knowledge in Linear Regression (Korea)

interaction effects of news media use and SES on

findings indicated that the knowledge gap is

two forms of political knowledge.

greater among heavy Internet users. No

As shown in Figure 1, when exposed to issue-

significant interaction effect was found for TV

related political information on the Internet,

news and newspaper reading. As shown in Table

people with higher education tend to learn a lot

4, people with higher education were notmore, conspicuously widening the gap between

significantly different from the less educated asclasses in Japan. However, Table 4 shows that theto how much they learned from TV news. Theinteraction was statistically significant only forinteraction was not statistically significant for

issue knowledge in Japan. For civic knowledge ineither issue or civic knowledge. H4 and H6,

the two countries, it was not significant. Thus, H5

therefore, were not supported in either country.

was partially supported only in Japan, where the10

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

Fig 1. Interaction effects of SES & Internet use (Japan)

Fig 2. Interaction effects of SES & Internet use (Korea)
increase or decrease the gap in political

6. Conclusion

knowledge between socioeconomic classes. In
We found that people with high SES are indeed

particular, differences in Internet use and SES

more knowledgeable about politics than the lesswere indeed correlated with differences in

educated. This difference can be explained bypolitical knowledge in this study, but the degree

their greater tendency to read newspapers andto which Internet use widened the knowledge

access the Internet. This result supports thegap varied between the two countries, being

contention of Chaffee and Frank (1996) thatstatistically significant in Japan but not in Korea.

newspapers function as the primary source ofNotably, this distinction remained even whenpolitical information. In Japan, highly educateddemographics and individual forms of media

people tend to watch less TV news than lower-

were included in the model.

educated people do. However, television viewing

Summarizing the main results of our survey,

also has a positive association with education.

first, we found that Japanese people with higher

The more people consume television media, theeducation access the Internet to get politicalmore knowledgeable they are about politics.

news more often than the less educated and thus

In addition, this study examined whether

learn more about political issues. Even whendifferent forms of news media functioned to

exposed to the same information, the highly
11Revisiting the Hypothesis of the Political Knowledge Gap in the Asian Context

KIM et aleducated upper classes learn more effectively

that the Internet has a “trapping” effectthan the less educated, further increasing the(Shoenbach & Lauf, 2004), which earlier

gap between classes. A similar tendency was

researchers have proposed mainly with regard toindicated in Korea, as shown in Table 3.

the effect of television. The trapping effect refers

Second, our findings show that Internet use isto the presumed impact of a medium on people

a more powerful contributor than newspaper

who are not very interested in politics. We canreadership to the widening knowledge gap

also presume that the theoretical frameworks of

between the upper and lower classes in Japan.

“incident learning” (Culbertson & Stempel,

The results suggest that the upper classes in1986), “passive learning” (Krugman & Hartley,

Japan are more knowledgeable largely because

1970), and “peripheral routes” to persuasion

they get more political information via the(Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) may apply to Internet

Internet. This finding supports the idea thatusers. That is, all these frameworks assume that

Internet news reading might mediate a link

only if it is sufficiently abundant. uninterested or

between SES and knowledge of public affairs. As

relatively uninvolved people can learn from theprevious researches have pointed out, the effectInternet, even if they were not initially looking forof SES on political knowledge seems to depend

that information.

on a host of communication variables, such as

One limitation of our research lies in the lackuse of the Internet or of news media in generalof clarity regarding the differing ways in which(Verba et al., 1995; Scheufele et al., 2002).

different cultures interact with online news

We found that Koreans in general tend to

media. There are many ways in which a consumer

access political information on the Internet more

can interact with specific content on the Internet,

often than the Japanese, as shown in Table 1. In

ranging from standard news articles to political

addition, we noted that use of the Internet to

discussion bulletin boards. It has been shown, forobtain political information neither widened nor

example, that with regard to their Internet

narrowed the gap between educational levels in

behavior, Korean media consumers are more

the Korean sample. However, we should also

active and more willing to participate in politicalconsider the fact that the turnover of information

discussions or produce political content online

in online news media is such that before a low-than Japanese consumers (Kim, 2009). The

SES viewer can learn and understand existing

resultingissues, new issues have already begun to takeinformation could cause Koreans of lower SES totheir place (Tichenor et al., 1970), thus in fact

be more captivated by political information and tonegating any positive learning opportunities.

understand political matters more readily than

The inconsistencies between the two countries

abundanceofonlinepolitical

their Japanese counterparts.

are of particular being focused on. The Korean

In future research, we hope to verify thedata in this study indicated that it is possible for

specific conditions required to reinforce political

low and high SES groups to learn approximately

learning,

the same amount of knowledge about politics via

persons, so that we can further explore thethe Internet. But this internet effect was notaffirmative function of the Internet as a politicalindexed in Japanese situation. We could suggest

knowledge leveler.
12especiallyamong

less-educatedJournal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

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15

PublicOpinionTranslationRole of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study ofthe 2013 General Election
Keywords:
Bhutan, Monarchy, Democracy, Information Society, Media

Hitoshi FUJIWARA, Waseda University.

Abstract
The Kingdom of Bhutan, located in the Himalayas, closed its doors to foreign countries until
the 1960s. After it reopened, Bhutan was a modern state for half a century. In 2008, the King of
Bhutan decided to relinquish his power and democratize the country. It was an unprecedented
event in history.
On the other hand, there was no mass media in this tiny country until the 1990s. In 1999, theKing lifted the ban on information technology such as television and the Internet. It was a rarecase where television broadcasting and Internet services commenced at the same time.
This study illustrates the history of democracy and the media in Bhutan and examines thecorrelation between them. Before commencing with such an examination, the theoretical streamof the relationship between democracy and the media in modern history should be reviewed.
The primary section of this paper comprises field research and analysis regarding the National
Assembly election of Bhutan in 2013, as a case study of the practice of democracy. The researchquestions are as follows: ‘What was the role of Bhutanese media in this election?’; ‘What kind of
information led Bhutanese voters to decision making?’
In conclusion, the theoretical model and the Bhutanese practical model of the relationshipbetween the government, media, and citizens are compared. This comparison shows the progressof democracy and the role of the media in modern-day Bhutan.

16

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

determine the present situation of media and1. Introduction

democracy in Bhutan through a case study of a
The Kingdom of Bhutan underwent the change

general election, the most practical scene of thefrom a monarchy to a parliamentary democracy

dynamics between media and politics.

in 2008. Surprisingly, it was led by the King

The methodologies are as follows. First,

himself, the ruler. The first parliament finishedprevious research on the relation between

its term in 2013. The second general election,

democracy and the media in modern andheld in the same year, was ‘the first election by

postmodern politics is reviewed. Second, theevaluating the democratic government’.

modern history of democracy and the media in

Generally, the mass media plays an important

Bhutan is examined via primary and secondaryrole in elections. However, there was no such

sources. The history could describe that theexperienced media in Bhutan when the first anddemocratisation process was signposted by thesecond general elections were held. Television

penetration and privatization of the media andbroadcasting services only started in 1999, andICT by the Bhutanese government. Third,

radio broadcasting services and newspapers

through a case study of the general election in

were privatized in 1992. Internet services also

2013, the ‘role of the mass media in the election’started in 1999. This means that internet media

and the ‘information gathering and decision

was present in the country before democracy.

making of voters’ are revealed with consideration

Thus, Bhutan does not need to care about theof the effect that the election period and therestriction of online election campaigns.

transition issue had on the media.

In 1999, the fourth King declared the

Finally, the present situation of democracy andintroduction of television and Internet during an

the media in Bhutan is determined as a correlation

address to the nation at the silver jubilee

between the government, media, and citizens

celebration of his enthronement. His Majesty

through a comparison between the theoreticalsaid, ‘I trust that you will exercise your goodmodel of modern democracy and the practicalsense and judgment in using the Internet andmodel of Bhutanese democracy.

television’ in considering both the positive and

2. Relation between Democracy and Media

negative impact they would have on Bhutanesesociety . This address shows that the introduction
1

2.1. Modern Democracy and Mass Mediaof media and ICT in Bhutan was part of the
preparation process for democratisation in the

What are the required conditions for modern

near future. Media and ICT literacy is considered

representative

democracy?

Dahl(1998)

to be a fundamental skill of citizens of a democratic

suggested six political institutions as follows:country.

‘elected officials’, ‘free, fair, frequent elections’,

This study does not aim to discuss whether the‘freedom of expression’, ‘access to alternative

process of social reform in Bhutan was right orsources of information’, ‘associational autonomy’,wrong, nor to evaluate whether the electionand ‘inclusive citizenship’. In terms of the media

system or information and communication policy

and information, ‘freedom of expression’ andwas good or bad. The purpose of this study is to‘access to alternative sources of information’ are17

Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General Election

important, and the former was defined as ‘a right

FUJIWARA

should not be considered as a necessity.

to express themselves without the danger ofMeanwhile, Cardon (2010) valued the role ofsevere punishment’, and the latter as ‘a right tothe Internet as an institution of ‘access toseek out alternative sources of information’ byalternative sources of information’. He mentioned

Dahl.

that the Internet contributed to the widespread

A strong relationship between democracy anddistribution of valuable information defended by

the media, especially between modern democracy

technical, legal, institutional, and commercial

and mass media, is considered to be a known

breakwaters, and that this alternative source offact. The ‘Democracy Index ’ measures the state

information enabled the widening of the space forof democracy in each country, and the ‘Press

political criticism. However, he also suspected

Freedom Index ’ measures the degree of freedom

the unfairness of the Internet. Active citizens canin each country; the two show a high correlation

enjoy democracy, while silent and isolated

coefficient . It is no wonder there is a strong

citizens are in danger of losing their rights andrelation between the ‘Democracy Index’ and thepower.

2

3

4‘Press Freedom Index’, because both surveys

2.2. Postmodern Media and Democracy 2.0

include common questions related to ‘freedom of
expression’ and ‘access to alternative sources ofIn the early 2010s, the ‘Arab Spring’ and theinformation’.

‘online election campaign’ were key topics

However, Herman and Chomsky (1988)

relating to new movements of democracy in thewarned about the deep ties between the media

postmodern era.

and democracy. Their ‘propaganda model’

The democratisation movement in Arab

explains that private media has not played thecountries, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ whichrole of a watchdog of political power, due to their

attracted the world’s attention, started from thetendency to sell their products (readers and‘Jasmine Revolution’ in Tunisia. Since 1987,

audiences) to consumers (advertisers) rather

Tunisia had realised miraculous economic

than pursuing and delivering quality news to thegrowth by achieving an average economic growth

public. Especially in the United States, theyrate of 5 to 6% over 20 years under the Ben Ali

classified five types of news filters into

regime. However, there were shadows of‘ownership’, ‘advertising’, ‘sourcing’, ‘flak’, anddictatorship, including high unemployment rates,‘anti-communism and fear’.

political corruption, and information censorship.

Incidentally, with the progress of new sources

Tunisia was ranked 164th among 178 countries inof information technology, the movement to seek

the ‘Press Freedom Index’ before the revolution

out alternative forms of modern democracy isand criticized as ‘Enemies of the Internet’.

spreading all over the world. Sunstein (2001)

The Ben Ali regime, which had controlled

noted that an institution of ‘freedom of expression’‘freedom

was no longer monopolized by mass media after

censorship, could not stop the wave of thethe penetration of the Internet. From therevolution that dominated public opinion not only

perspective of human history, mass media is stillin Tunisia but also in foreign countries througha new player in our industrial society, and itsocial media such as Facebook, triggered by a18

ofexpression’

throughstrongJournal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

young Tunisian’s suicide in December 2010. The

election act, and ‘progressive improvement’, thepresident, Ben Ali, escaped the country and thetechnological nature of the Internet. He also

government was overwhelmed in one month.

explained that the ideology of modern democracy

While some media theorists have called thishad to be reconsidered in the era of the Internet.

revolution a ‘social media revolution’, others

Of course, in terms of today’s media ecosystem,

persisted in scepticism and argued that we should

the Internet era does not mean the occupation of

not simplify it and view it as a technology-driven

media space by the Internet after the end of mass

revolution . Regardless, it should be noted that a

media domination. Endo (2011) noted that the

dictator cannot stop democratisation movements

emergence of new media formed simultaneous,by dominating mass media as an institution ofparallel, or multi-layered communication spaces.

political propaganda in the 21st century.

Old media has never been expelled, and the5Another case on lifting the ban on ‘online

interaction between various forms of media

election campaigns’ was brought forward inconstitute a so-called ‘intermedia society’. She

Japan in 2013. In the previous Japanese election

also argues that the interaction between press

act, only offline documents and drawings such as

coverage, public opinion, and politics wasposters and flyers were available for election

actualized especially during election periods.

campaigns, and the use of the Internet had been

The concept of an ‘intermedia society’ is linked

severely restricted. Compared to the Japaneseto the argument by Cardon (2010) about thesituation, cyberspace has become one of the main

effect of the anonymity brought about by thebattlefields of election campaigns in the United

early stages of the Internet and the effect of theStates since the 1990s, and in South Korea since

return to real name brought about by social

the early 2000s. Even in Japan, the possibility of

media. He stated that the early Internetan ‘online election campaign’ had been discussed

recommended anonymity which had beenintermittently since the late 1990s, and finally, ineliminated in traditional public spaces, andApril 2013, the election act was revised. In Julycyberspace

2013, the election of the House of Councillors,

dogmatic points of view, freewheeling remarks,

the first national election after the lifting of the

obscure remarks, poetic messages, and emotionalban, was carried out.

opinions. Social media, regarded as the driver ofJapanese media theorists considered thisaccepted

first

persontalking,

the dual revolution, broadened the rights of open

political situation as not only adjusting thedebateinpublicandabsorbed

institution to the latest technology, but also

conversation into the public sphere.

privatereforming democracy itself. According to Azuma

3. Modern History of Democracy and Media in(2011), the penetration of ubiquitous computing

Bhutanand social media has created a completely new
governance system called ‘democracy 2.0’; Tsuda

3.1. History of Democracy(2012) sympathised with his idea. Nishida (2013)stated that the series of struggles until the lifting

In this section, the history of democracy andof the ban was a conflict between ‘homogeneous

media in Bhutan will be outlined. It is noted thatfairness’, required in the previous Japanesethe King himself politically promoted the transfer
19Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General Election

FUJIWARA

of power to the people and the creation of the

The fourth King, Jigme Singye Wangchuckinstitutes of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘access(Reign 1972–2006), was crowned at the age ofto alternative sources of information’.

only 17 in 1972 due to the sudden death of his

The Kingdom of Bhutan, with a population offather, the third King. He followed his father’saround 0.7 million, is located on the southern

way of governance, both in terms of diplomacy

slope of the Himalayas, surrounded by steep

and domestic affairs. Contrary to his father, hemountains. After the establishment of the modern

decided to take an extremely cautious attitude

dynasty in 1907, Bhutan had been considered totowards democratisation. For a young and

be a substantially isolated country for half ainexperienced King, to let go of his own

century. This tiny country is placed in a difficult

sovereignty at an early age meant that he risked

geopolitical position due to being sandwichedlosing control of the Kingdom.

between two giants, China in the north and India

In 1998, when the King was confident that hein the south.

had a firm foothold, he gave the National

A step toward democratisation began with theAssembly

(old)

the

allowance

for

the

reign of the third King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck

impeachment of the King, and he decided to(Reign 1952–1972). In 1953, the ruler establishedappoint ministers as a result of a confidence

the National Assembly (old) and delegated avoting system by the parliament. The authority ofpart of his own legislative authority. However,

the National Assembly (old) was strengthened,according to Rose (1977), the King still had an

and the nation steadily progressed towards

absolute veto and had the right to make the final

democratisation. In 2005, the fourth Kingdecision in all legislative enactments. In 1968, thedeclared that the constitution would be enacted

King abandoned this veto and final decision right.

within three years, and that the Kingdom would

Members of the National Assembly (old)shift from a constitutional monarchy to aconsisted of bureaucrats, monks, and national

parliamentary democracy. In the following year,

representatives.

the

6

In

terms

of

national

fifth

King,

Jigme

KhesarNamgyelrepresentatives, the way elections worked was

Wangchuck, succeeded to his father’s throne

quite different from today’s democratic election

after the fourth King believed in the birth of asystem. Rose (1977) revealed that they were

democratic nation. The fifth and present King

elected by a consensus based on tradition. Whencalled himself ‘the King to serve the people’, anda consensus could not be reached, anotherhe has worked toward achieving a true

method, such as throwing dice, was adopted.

democratic state.

In addition, in 1968, the Royal Advisory Council

In 2008, under the constitution which was

was established and the ruler’s administrative

promulgated for the first time in history, a generalauthority was delegated. As the King still had theelection of the new National Assembly took place.

right to appoint ministers, his power was not

Political parties, Druk Phuensum Tshogpa

reducedappointed(DPT) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP),

ministers certainly played an important role inwere organized, and they contested the firstthe administration as the heads of each ministryelection. DPT won 45 seats out of 47.

substantially.

However,(Rose, 1977).

Democratisation in Bhutan led by the King was20

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

realized through a very different process from

3.2. History of the Media and ICT

the civil revolutions that are part of modern

First, the Royal Government of Bhutan had

Western history, or the ‘Arab Spring’ mentioned

been cautious about the negative impact that theearlier. A very strange sentence, ‘democratization

media and ICT may have on Bhutanese society.

refused by the people’, shows its specificity. The

Currently, a national development project infourth King travelled all over the country, as the

Bhutan relies on the development philosophy

finishing touch of democratisation, to preach to‘GNH (Gross National Happiness)’, advocated by

the people about the benefits of democracy andthe fourth King in the 1970s. Bhutan noticed thatthe dangers of a dictatorial monarchy. There are

economic

anecdotes that some villagers begged the King tomodernisation

rule by his intelligence, while others cried andenvironment and traditional culture in many

appealed for him to stop the process and finish

developed countries. Thus, ‘GNH’ emphasized

his reign.

psychological well-being as the most important

benefits
hadthroughtechnologicalharmedthenaturalThe fourth King made many excellent politicalfactor. However, as ‘GNH’ received high praise

decisions over a long period of time and had

and Bhutan increased its presence internationally,

garnered tremendous trust and respect from theironically, the country was urged to open its

people. However, ironically, it is undeniable thatnation to the media and ICT.

such great works had prevented the people fromIn 1967, Kuensel newspaper, Bhutan’s first

fostering an awareness of political participation.

newspaper, began as a government gazettepublishing articles on national development
projects (Five Year Plan). Kuensel became
independentandbecameBhutan’s

firstnewspaper corporation in 1986. Radio services

Table 1. Modern History

were launched in 1973 by a private volunteer
organization

calledthe

National

Youth

Association of Bhutan. In 1979, it was decided
that it should be under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Communication as a public service.
Next, the Bhutan Broadcasting Service (BBS)
wasestablishedasapubliccorporation

responsible for the radio broadcasting businessin 1986.
In 1992, by edict of the fourth King, both
Kuensel and BBS were privatized. Since then, thebusinesses of both companies have gradually
expanded, such as weekly newspaper publications
and the expansion of radio broadcasting times.
They steadily grew from small media into national
media. Even after privatization, a large subsidy by21

Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General Election

FUJIWARA

the government was (and still is) provided torate of mobile phones reached 86.3% and theboth companies .

Internet penetration rate reached 46.9% (Figure

7

Until the 1990s, the Bhutanese media, a tiny1).

newspaper editorial office and radio station, did

Regarding mobile phones, the penetration

not have the function of mass communication andrates are not directly proportional to the number

public opinion. According to Wangchuk (2007),of users, considering the unique situation of‘It can, therefore, be concluded that the growth of

Bhutan. For example, mobile phones became

media has been in consonance with the socio-

popular as a household telephone instead of fixedeconomic development of the country.’ The initiallines at the beginning of the service. Similarly,role of the media in Bhutan was to help theInternet penetration rates do not include users

government spread statements of development.

who access the internet from workplaces or

Its nature was also quite different from the massschools.

media found in other countries.
In 1999, the ban on television and the Internet
was lifted, and Bhutan stepped into theinformation

age.

In

terms

of

television

broadcasting, the BBS played the same role asradio services. Since television was introduced, it
became possible to watch foreign channels
including those from India via the cable television

Figure 1. Transition of ICT Penetration Ratio8

system. This means that Bhutan opened its doors
to the world. Meanwhile, with regard to the

Incidentally, until the early 2000s, BhutaneseInternet, in the early 2000s, expensive usage fees

media had been monopolized by Kuensel paper

delayed the spread of this service, especially inand BBS broadcasting. In 2006, in order tothe private sector. The use of the Internet

improve this situation, the government started toremained only for public use such as government

accept the entry of media services by the private

agencies and educational institutions.

sector. As of March 2014, 12 newspapers andFrom the end of 2003 to 2004, mobile phone

seven radio stations were in service. Thus far, noservice by Bhutan Telecom Ltd. began, and theprivate television station has been established. In

spread of mobile phones started. Mobile phones

terms of social media, there is no service solely

were introduced to each household as a substitutetargeting Bhutan. Many people use global media,

for the fixed lines that had not made muchespecially Facebook. As of December 2011, theprogress. As mentioned, Bhutan is a mountainous

number of users reached 80,220, reaching 11.46%

country; thus, the cost of installing andof the population and 81.25% of Internet users at

maintaining mobile phones was cheaper thanthat time9.

fixed line services. Since around 2010, when

The biggest characteristic of Bhutan’s media

mobile Internet access became possible, theand ICT is that every service has been promoted

Internet penetration rate to the private sector has

as a national policy. In Bhutan, 60% of people stillrisen rapidly. As of the end of 2014, the penetration

engage in agriculture even in the 21st century.
22

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

Thus, the industry is weak and the market isreligious officials are not given the right to vote.

extremely small. Therefore, it is extremely

Candidates for parliament must be between the

difficult for the domestic media and ICT-related

ages of 25 and 65, and are required to hold acompanies to earn a profit through advertising

university degree. Spouses of non-Bhutanese

and

the

people, civil servants, and corporate officials aregovernment had to lead such services as national

subscription

not eligible for election. Regarding the constraint

projects. Since 2006, private enterprises havethat candidates must hold a degree, it was

been struggling to secure revenue sources, andcriticized as unacceptable and as a violation ofsome companies have already abandoned their

human rights in a report by the election

services.

observation team dispatched during the 2008

Currently,

income.

theInevitably,

communication

media

election10.

environment of Bhutan is forming an ‘intermedia

In the parliament, the National Council issociety’ (Endo, 2014) centred on newspapers,

equivalent to the Upper House, and the National

television (radio), and the Internet (Figure 2).

Assembly is equivalent to the Lower House. The

The following case study analysis is based on thisterm of office is five years. Twenty of the 25

figure.

members of the National Council are elected asregional representatives selected from all 20
Dzongkhags (prefectures), and the remaining
five are directly nominated by the King. It is
unique that the King maintains a portion of thelegislative

power.

While

National

Councilmembers are prohibited from belonging topolitical parties, National Assembly members are
obliged to do so. In the National Assembly

Figure 2. Structure of Media and ICTelections, if more than three parties run, twoparties are elected in the preliminary round.

4. Case Study: General Election in 2013

After that, during the final round, 47 members intotal are elected from each of the 47 small

4.1. Election Systemconstituency districts nationwide. Next, theThis section includes a case study of the 2013

Prime Minister is appointed from the National

general election. First, the characteristics of theAssembly members and the cabinet is organized.

election system of Bhutan as stipulated by the

In terms of adopting a parliamentary cabinet

constitution promulgated in 2008 are describedsystem and small constituency system together,

below.

it can be said that it is an orthodox modern

Voting rights are granted to those who are 18

democracy system following the example of theyears of age or older, possess Bhutanese

UK. However, it is a significant feature that thenationality, and have lived in the electoral district

constitution stipulates that the two major politicalfor at least one year. Moreover, it is clearly statedparties are elected intentionally. Morohashi

in the constitution that the royal family and(2013) points out that ‘there is no similar case in23

Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General Election

FUJIWARA

other countries that the number of parties in thedate for the preliminary round was 31 May 2013,

parliament is specified preliminarily’.

and the final round took place on 13 July.

Dahl (1998) noted that there is no such system

The main election campaigns of each party andthat completely satisfies the criteria for aneach candidate were composed of open debates

electoral system. Thus, Bhutan’s election systemamong candidates on the BBS television channel

also has several problems. The most severe point

or BBS’s official YouTube channel, rallies byis the inconsistency problem between thepolitical parties, and door-to-door visit bypercentage of votes and the number of seats. Mr.

candidates. There were no street speeches or

Kunzang Wangdi, Secretary of the Election

electoral cars, which was a major battlefield in

Commission of Bhutan (ECB), emphasised thatJapan. It means there were few opportunities toall Dzongkhags had to be equal to dispatch at

touch on information on the election in the street,leastother than by posting election posters.

two

representative

each

under

the

constitution. He added that ‘As the first step in

In addition, election campaigns using thepracticing democracy, the Royal Government ofInternet which were rarely seen in the previous

Bhutan adopted the electoral system including

election were actively carried out (Table 2). All

two major political parties and the small

political parties had a website where they posted

constituency’, and pointed out the possibility ofmanifestos and other issues, and also placedchanging the system in the future.

official pages on Facebook to exchange opinions

11

with voters. Three parties excluding DCT sent

4.2. Story of the Election Period

messages through twitter, and three parties apart

On 28 April 2013, the National Assembly
dissolved, and the election campaign began. In

Table 2. Online Campaign Sites by Party

this election, three new political parties, Bhutan
Kuen-ngyam Party (BKP), Druk Chirwang
Tshogpa (DCT), and Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa(DNT), offered candidates in addition to the twoformer parties, DPT and PDP. The first conflict inthe election campaign of each party started in thecandidate selection stage. There was a blatantbattle about matters such as offering a candidate
for election who had been defeated in the National
Council election on 23 April. Nonetheless, BKP
was disqualified as it failed to meet therequirement

to

offer

candidates

in

all

constituencies before the deadline of thepreliminary deputy application. The remaining
four parties started their election campaigns forthepreliminary

round

which

was

not

implemented in the 2008 election. The voting24

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018from PDP acquired Google+ user accounts.

Bhutan Times) related to the election from 1

Moreover, DCT and DNT had official YouTube

June (the day after the preliminary round) to 13

channels. However, many of these online

July (the day of the final round) are examined.

campaign sites were not being used. The

These articles show how the issue of elections

utilization of social media for elections was still inhas changed in mass media.

a trial stage. As of 2013, Facebook was the mainFirst, the issue of the first half of the election

venue for online election campaigns in Bhutan.

was about the problem of candidate replacement

Of course, most Facebook users formed part ofby PDP. PDP who came second after DPT in thethe younger generation, and the battle on

preliminary round, took an unexpected measure

Facebook was only one of the local battles being

towards achieving victory in the final round;fought over the course of the entire campaign.

namely, the replacement of candidates from each

The results of the preliminary round (voter

party who had lost in the preliminary round. In

turnout: 55.3%) were as follows, and the top twoparticular, DNT lost seven candidates including

parties advanced to the final round.

the party leader, and five of them won in the final①

DPT 93,949 votes (44.5%)

round. Since many candidates who belonged to②

PDP 68,650 votes (32.5%)

the losing party in the preliminary round③

DNT 35,962 votes (17.0%)

accepted transfers to the other party, there was④

DCT 12,457 votes (5.9%)

no sense of party loyalty. DPT accused PDP of

In the final round (voter turnout: 66.1%), PDP

injustice on this issue. However, when DPT was

gained victory in 32 of the 47 small constituencies,

obliged to replace a candidate due to illegalities,

securing more than two-thirds of the seats,

they ceased their criticism.

although the voting rate was as follows.

In

mid-June,thewebsite‘Bhutanomics’①

PDP 138,558 votes (54.9%)<http://bhutanomics.com/>②

DPT 113,927 votes (45.1%)

acute criticism of the DPT regime, became thewhich

included

It must be noted that the results of thesubject of conversation. Many Bhutanese sharedpreliminary and final elections are reversed. In

this site on Facebook. DPT argued that the posts

the preliminary round, PDP only won in 12

on the site had to be considered not only as

constituencies. Surprisingly, they expanded theircriticism but also as being against the national

support in only one and a half months andinterests, and DPT wanted to know the identity ofachieved victories in 20 more constituencies.

the owner. However, The Bhutanese and otherIn the next section, the reason why such anewspapers violently protested against thissignificant reversal had occurred will be explored

request for infringing on ‘freedom of expression’.

by examining issues relating to the media during

As a result, DPT had compromised its reputation

the election period.

in the campaign.

4.3. Transition of Electoral Issues in the Mediaa tremendous disturbance happened in relation

In this section, articles from the six main

to India. Bhutan had been strongly dependent on

newspapers (Kuensel, Bhutan Observer, The

India, especially economically, as most of its fuelBhutanese, Bhutan Today, Business Bhutan, andincluding gas and kerosene had been imported

From the end of June to the beginning of July,25

Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General Election

from India. The fuel had also been supplied at low

FUJIWARA

interviews.

prices due to subsidies by the Indian government.

First, I asked each company about the media’s

When Indian newspapers reported that theattitude toward the election. Mr. Ashok Moktan,

Indian government decided to abolish thisgeneral manager of BBS, said, ‘Simply, we aresubsidy, Bhutanese papers immediately picked

reporting facts and live voices only. The influence

up on it. Fuel prices in Bhutan soared. Althoughof television media is significant, and we are also

DPT announced that the relationship between

responsible for educating the audience.12’ This

India and Bhutan was irrelevant in the election, it

shows that BBS still takes pride in their role as a

was a common view that the DPT regime’s

form of national public media. Mr. Chencho

diplomatic failures caused the situation.

Tshering, editor-in-chief of Kuensel newspaper,

It can be said that all of these articles acted as

answered, ‘Kuensel always maintain a neutrala counterbalance against DPT. These issues inposition and never reports anything biased.

the mass media may have contributed to the

Bhutan is based on a small community, so we pay

voting reversal in the final round.

attention to balance.13’ His statements emphasised

Mass media in the modern democratic state is

the media’s position as a coordinator of therequired to play the role of widely notifying eachelection. On the other hand, Mr. Needrup

citizen of the manifestos that are publicised by

Zangpo, editor-in-chief of the Bhutan Observer

each party, and to present electoral issues to thenewspaper, stated, ‘We ask politicians about their

However, in this election, even if there was apolitical ideology and leadership. Since the

manifest introduced in the newspaper, it was

Bhutan Observer is not a tabloid (gossip) paper,

never the primary issue. This is because

our articles only have reliable and serious

Bhutanese mass media had no experience as a

topics.14’ Despite his insistence, a bitter caricaturewatchdog of power because of its short history. It

was posted as the main visual in almost every

could also be because the manifests presented byissue. It seems private media is pursuing

the parties were very similar, and they neverpopularity and topicality.

clarified why their policies were better than those

Next, I asked about the characteristics of thisof their rivals.

election campaign. Mr. Moktan of BBS mentioned
the negative campaign between the candidates,

4.4. The Role of Mass Media in the Election
This

section

is

based

on

and said, ‘What candidates talk about in the

unstructured

media is up to them, and how to judge theinterviews conducted with members of thecontents is up to voters. The media cannot have

Bhutanese media. The roles that mass media

the responsibility.’ Similarly, Mr. Tshering ofplayed in this campaign are expressed in thisKuensel responded, ‘The media is quietlysection. The interviewees were BBS and Kuensel,

observing negative campaigns.’ In either case,the major media players in Bhutan, and thethe Bhutanese media did not think that controlling

Bhutan Observer as a representative of private

negative

media. In these interviews, the author maderesponsibilities.

campaigns

was

part

of

their

appointments in advance, visited the media

Finally, we talked about the relationshipcompanies in person, and conducted face-to-facebetween the media and the ECB. Mr. Moktan of26

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

BBS denied information control and said,

said, ‘The candidates are not favourable because‘Basically, election coverage acts in accordance

they use bad words’ (by a 62-year-old man/with the ECB guidelines, but it does not mean the

security guard). Some voters were unhappy withmedia is controlled by ECB.’ According to Mr.

the negative campaigns.

Moktan, ‘ECB, the media, and the political parties

Next, I asked about voting behaviour andare monitoring each other.’ In the opinion of Mr.

decision making. To the question of why they go

Zangpo of the Bhutan Observer, ‘The ECB

to vote, the majority answered, ‘to choose a better

guidelines include merely proclaiming theleader’ or ‘to organize a good government’. On

freedom, fairness, and transparency that every

the other hand, there were also some who said,

journalist should originally have.’‘Because it is the second chance in my life’ (by a54-year-old man/unemployed), and ‘Democracy

4.5. Information Gathering and the Decision

is a gift from the former King’ (by a 63-year-old

Making of Votersman/construction industry). These messages

In this section, information sources and theshow the feeling of joy that is obtained fromvoting behaviour of voters are described. Fromvoting, and not one person was indifferent to

11 to 14 July, excluding 13 July, the day of thepolitics as in Japan. However, responses such as

final round of voting, semi-structured street‘I do not vote, because the monarchy before 2008

interviews were conducted at five locations in thewas good’ (by a 27-year-old woman/sales

capital city Thimphu. Data on a total of 42 peoplebusiness) were also recorded. These messages

with voting rights (62% male, 38% female,show that some Bhutanese still doubt the value of

response rate 100%) was collected.

democracy.

First, I asked about the news sources that

5. 
Present Situation of Democracy and the

respondents judged to be significant sources ofMedia

information relating to the election. The details of
the 39 active respondents were as follows:

5.1. Analysis

television = 27, newspapers = 15, and social media= 14 (including 0 respondent over the age of 30).

In this section, the analysis of the case study‘I was able to know the pledges of political parties

illustrates the relationship between democracy

from television and newspapers, but I think weand the media in Bhutan.

could debate constructively on social media’ (byFirst, according to the press coverage during

a 21-year-old man/student). Some voters usedthe election campaign and the role of the mass

the right media at the right time.

media gleaned through interviews, the function

Particularly effective sources of informationof Bhutanese mass media swayed between

were public debates on television or in person.

neutral and critical. As a result, the mass media

Surprisingly, 38 out of the 40 active respondents

becamewatched or participated in public debates onparticipant when a negative campaign began.

more than one occasion. Many of them stated a

Therefore, it can hardly be said that the massfavourable impression and said that they weremedia had any constructive abilities. This issatisfied with the public debates. One respondent

expected to improve in the future.
27

a

mere

bystanderoraggressiveRole of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General Election

FUJIWARA

Meanwhile, the mass media was strongly

government, the media, and citizens should beconscious of the ideal role for ‘freedom of

considered as the stable model of modern

expression’ during the 2013 election campaign.

democracy. The government and citizens are

Wangchuk (2007) noted that ‘freedom ofconnected by four institutions of ‘elected officials’,expression’ had been rather severely restricted‘free, fair, frequent elections’, ‘associationalin the past, and he also stated as follows: ‘Not so

autonomy’, and ‘inclusive citizenship’. In short,much as state policies, but rather as personal‘citizenship’ directly links the government and its

considerations or individual decisions. Perhaps it

citizens. Meanwhile, the media becomes ‘accessis owing to the feudal past, or maybe it is because

to alternative sources of information’ for citizens,of the Bhutanese modesty and humility at work.’

and the media can be granted ‘freedom of

After 2008, democracy changed such a situation,

expression’ from the government. Both theand the media had to try to adjust to its role ingovernment and citizens are indirectly linked

this new age.

through the media as a mediator. The cyclic

Second, the political participation by voters isfeedback structure by these three agents can beanalysed. In this election, from the preliminary

defined as the Theoretical Model of Modern

round to the final round, many voters vacillated

Democracy (Figure 3).

between one party and another due to articles in
the media. It is difficult to say that the political
literacy of every citizen was established. This is
attributable to the fact that the history of themedia and ICT is still short, and it seems that
only time will solve this problem.
On the other hand, the lack of understandingof democracy itself is more serious. Due to thecountry’s peaceful democratization, Bhutanesepeople were less aware of the transfer ofsovereignty. They are indifferent to the idea of

Figure 3. Theoretical Model of Modern

ideal citizens and citizenship (democratic rights

Democracyof citizens) in modern democratic countries.
Initially, there was no premise that democracy

In Bhutan, both the media and democracy

was good. It is quite natural for the sense of

have rapidly developed, and were ‘given by thenostalgia for the monarchy to become stronger

King’. As the analysis in the previous section

when the democratized government loses control

shows, the newborn democratic government,of governance.

media, and citizens are engaged in an extremely
unstable balance. The current structure is drawn

5.2. The Government, Media, and Citizens

based on binomial relations as follows.

We are once again reminded of the six

First, both the government and media were

institutions of modern democracy mentioned bytrying to remain faithful to the law. The

Dahl (1998). The balanced structure of thegovernment regulated the media through the28

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

ECB and demanded that they remain neutral

Supreme Court chief, and the ECB chairperson.

towards each party. The mass media maintained

However, the right to impeach the King, which

the principle of ‘freedom of expression’ and was

was granted to the National Assembly (old) instrongly aware of fact-based reporting. However,

1998, has been transferred to the present National

the mass media was too conscious of neutrality.

Assembly. This means that the government canThus, there was also a risk of becoming a passive

exert a certain amount of influence on the

bystander. In addition, among the mass media,

invincible royal power of the King. The Bhutanese

BBS and Kuensel had been subsidised by theroyal family is completely different from the royalgovernment, so they still maintained all thefamily in the UK or the imperial family in Japan,

characteristics of state-run media.

which are ‘symbolised’ and clearly excluded fromIn Bhutan, by law, there is little distinction

the power games of politics.

between mass media and social media. In fact,

Finally, in terms of the relationship between

surveillance of social media is almost impossible.

the media and citizens, the media was unable toIn the future, if the mass media gains more

provide useful information to help citizens makeneutrality, there is also the possibility that social

decisions, and citizens could hardly distinguishmedia will replace government monitoring

helpful information from tremendous news in thefunctions.

themedia. As Fujiwara (2012) pointed out, because

government was noticeable in past postings, bothof the lack of an industrial market in Bhutan,in the mass media and on social media. Many

‘productive information’ had never been thought

critical caricatures appeared as the top article into be useful. For citizens, the media is a source ofnewspapers.

few‘consuming information’ such as entertainment

constructive commentaries to evaluate theprograms. In addition, since the mass media andperformance of the current government.

social media started simultaneously, many

However,criticism

Conversely,

there

againstwere

Second, let us examine the relationshipcitizens had not considered the mass media as a

between citizens and the government. Among

reliable source of information.

citizens, there is scepticism towards democracy,
and a dependence on the King. Many citizens still
believe that the King will save the country in theevent of a governmental crisis. Voting behaviour
was based on the idea that the opposition party
who had not yet taken control could be given the
chance. Thus, it is difficult to say that voters’
choices were the results of deep reflection andexamination.
Third, the King, the father of media anddemocracy in Bhutan, is still attractive to citizens.
Constitutionally, the King still has legislative andjudiciary power, such as the right to nominate

Figure 4. P ractical Model of Bhutanese

five members of the National Council, theDemocracy
29

Role of Bhutanese Media in Democracy: Case Study of the 2013 General Election

FUJIWARA

The Practical Model of Bhutanese Democracy

relations, especially its relationship with India.

is shown in Figure 4. The government has

Bhutan’s economic dependence on India allows

problems with the unique democratic system,

for political influence by India. This is an

including the King. The media also has difficulties

extremely serious situation for any sovereign

with economic vulnerability, and citizens arestate. From now on, Bhutan must seriously aim

troubled by information literacy.

for economic independence.
In modern democracies, religion and politics

6. Conclusion

are separate. Even in the constitution of Bhutan,
religious officials are restricted from having

In the 21st century, Bhutan adopted thepolitical power. However, in the past, Buddhistclassical modern democratic system consisting

priests retained a certain amount of authority,of two major political parties. By mimicking thesuch as being given seats in the National

way that many modern democratic states had

Assembly (old). Even today, after Bhutan became

traversed democracy, the political system wasa democratic state, the relationship between

carefully evaluated regarding whether it could be

religion and politics should be taken into account.

adapted to modern society in Bhutan. Democracy

According to Dorji (2007), ‘Our scholars now

in Bhutan is currently in a magnificent andremind us of the centuries-old media that we hadpractical learning phase.

in Bhutan; the mani walls, prayer flags, theOn the other hand, as mentioned above, thefestivals and dances. This concept gives us a newbinary relationship between modern democracy

depth of values to draw on as we develop theand mass media is considered to be a relic of the

Bhutanese media today.’ His statement suggests

20th century, and the social systems in many

that Buddhist media is still part of Bhutanesecountries will be drastically reformed. In Bhutan,‘intermedia society’.

modern democracy and the mass media were

The Buddhist faith and respect for the royal

introduced at the same time as cable televisionfamily is a social norm for Bhutanese people. If

and social media in the early 21st century. Thisreligious and royal power are removed fromstudy describes in detail a kind of chaos that no ofpolitics too rapidly through the introduction ofother country has experienced. However, themodern democracy, the government will lose

future prediction of Bhutanese democracy andcontrol. In Bhutan, another democratic system

the media is never deliberated.

should be built, one that accepts traditional

In addition, two important factors that were notinfluences. When tradition, democracy, and thementioned enough in this paper should be

media are merged, Bhutan can jump from one ofpointed out. The first is Bhutan’s relationshipthe last countries to have adopted modern

with neighbouring India, and the second is thedemocracy, to one of the latest countries to havepolitical aspect of Buddhism.

reached another iteration of democracy.

First, India’s halt of the subsidy for fuel exports

Footnotes

was one of the major issues at the end of theelection campaign. This showed that politics in1.

Bhutan could not stand alone without diplomaticS ource: Bhutan Times, ed. (2007) “Immortal
Lines: Speeches of the fourth Druk Gyalpo

30Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 11 No. 1 Sep. 2018

14. S
 ource: interview by the author at the office of

Jigme Singye Wangchuck”, p. 162.

2.

Biannual ranking published by the Economist

Bhutan Observer in 12 July 2013.

Intelligence Unit.

3.

Annual ranking published by Reporters Without

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Editor’s Notes
We are very pleased to announce the publication of Volume 11 of Journal of Socio-Informatics.
Through the peer review process, one of the three submitted papers has been accepted as a Research
Note.
This issue has also a translated paper from the Japanese version of Socio-Informatics (Shakai-JohoGaku).
We want to provide a kind of fruitful public space open to every researcher who has interest in socioinformatics from all over the world. We are inviting you, our readers, to submit papers on socioinformatics or other related fields. The Call For Papers of next volume of JSI is available on http://www.
ssi.or.jp/eng/index03.html/.
Cordial greetings,

The Editor

Editorial Board of The Society of Socio-Informatics
Editor in Chief
Takafumi HAYASHI, Niigata University
Kenichi ITO, Gunma University
Editor in Subchief
Morihiro OGASAHARA, Kansai University
Yorio KITAMURA, Ritsumeikan University

Editorial Board Members
Kunikazu AMAGASA, Showa Women’s University
Yasufumi IGARASHI, Fukuoka University
Tomoko KANAYAMA, Institute of Advanced Media Arts and Sciences
Nobuaki KAWAI, Jissen Women’s University
Shigeo KAWASHIMA, Aoyama Gakuin Women’s Junior College
Tadamasa KIMURA, Rikkyo University
Atsushi KOTERA, Toyo Eiwa University
Sayaka MATSUMOTO, Otsuma Women’s University
Tetsuo NODA, Shimane University
Akiko OGAWA, Nagoya University
Atsuhiko OHKUNI, Sapporo Gakuin University
Syungo SAKAKI, Tokyo University of Technology
Seiichiro SAKURAI, Meiji Gakuin University
Masahito SHIMAZAKI, Akita Prefectural University
Akashi SUGIYAMA, Kyushu University
Toru TAKAHASHI, Chuo University
Yuko TSUCHIYA, Hiroshima University of Economics
Yasuhiro TSUKAHARA, Meiji University
Hitoshi YAMAMOTO, Rissho University
Shaoyu YE, University of Tsukuba

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol.11, No.1
Sep. 2018
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