Security Issues in the post September 11th worldVice-Amiral Giraud
Japanese Institute for International Affairs
Tokyo - October 18th

Mr Ambassador, …
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very happy and very honoured to be here with this distinguished audience ofJapanese officials from the Gaimusho, Defense Agency and other institutions together with
Researchers of Institutes. I would like especially to thank the Japanese Institute ofInternational Affairs for his occasion to talk about security issues in the post September
11th context.

The attacks of September 11th struck us with horror.
We will remember for a long time these events, all the victims of that tragic day and also
the many marks of solidarity conveyed throughout the world to our American friends.

These attacks have had immediate implications: the war to defeat Al-Qaida and its
networks was conducted in Afghanistan. It will be pursued elsewhere in the world because
this plague needs to be eradicated.

France immediately supported the United States in this struggle.
Our forces participated actively in the military operations in Afghanistan by solidarity andby conviction of the necessity to eradicate quickly the networks of the international
terrorism.
But the repercussions of September 11th 2001 go well beyond these military
operations in central Asia: they are of a global nature and will have importantconsequences on our Security strategies.
Our perception of risks and threats strongly evolved after September 11.

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We now understand that our developed societies are particularly vulnerable to aggressive
and determined groups. We also understand that terrorist violence will continue and takemany forms.
Extremist groups will take full advantage of opportunities provided by technology, newmeans of communication and by the general environment of freedom of our liberalsocieties.
We will face dangerous threats.
Our sense of safety and security has disappeared.
We were probably never totally safe but this reality takes today a new meaning; it will
have long lasting repercussions on our Security concepts and strategies.

The United States reacted strongly.
While launching a large-scale Military operation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, they
redefined their strategy, developed new concepts, issued a new preventive doctrine.
If we support the struggle against terrorism, the new ideas of preventive Military operations
raises many questions for us.
In this context of uncertainties where the conditions of the international security
seem more difficult to establish there is a strong need for new thinking before
elaborating new strategies :-We should first reassess our perception of the nature of risks and threats ;-We should then analyse current trends in Security and Military strategies and try tofind the best ways to conciliate efficiency and the acceptance by the international
community;-

We cannot hope to face these new challenges without a strong support from a large
coalition of nations.

Facing up to these evolutions and challenges, each of our nations has to find the rightanswers at the national level and also in the multinational frameworks to which webelong.

Today, I would like to address this topic in summarizing the various responses already set
or under preparation:-

At the French level,2-In the international frameworks to which we belong, namely the European institutions
and the Atlantic Alliance,-

And, last but not least, at the level of the international community and the United
Nations.

1) National answersa) At the national level, our priority is to take account of the evolution of the international
context and of the nature of threats. This was done in our major Defense planning
exercise conducted every five or six years. A new Military programme law was
prepared during the last 12 months.

The French government has updated its Defense choices.
New orientations have been set for the period 2003 to 2008, which is the period coveredby this new Military programme law approved by the government on September 11th 2002,
a symbolic date as your understand.

Our Defense strategy remains based on the fundamental principles embedded in the1994 White paper updated in 1996 with the objective of achieving the large reformand upgrading of our armed forces over the period to 2015.

The first stage of the reform, based on ending the draft and having a fully professionalized
career military, was achieved in 5 years from 1997 to 2002.
Today our strategy and the model of Army "2015" are being adjusted to answer tothe new threats and challenges.
We recognise that it will be necessary to face threats of asymmetric nature, more than it
was the case in the past. These threats include, among others, international terrorism anda variety of proliferation's phenomena that lead to increased risks of use of radiological,
biological, chemical or nuclear means or weapons.
It is likely that these threats can strike our territory.
Our territorial organisation is basically well shaped to respond since it is based on aregional response under a strong central direction, but the modalities and the means to
respond need to be updated.

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Therefore, we are revising Defense and civil protection plans at a governmental andinterministerial level to adjust our responses and modernise or increase the means
allocated to the protection of the territory and of the populations. This is a task where allministerial department are involved. The Ministry of Defense missions include especiallythe protection of air and maritime approaches.

These threats can also aim at our armed forces when they are deployed overseas.
The development of asymmetric threats leads our Ministry of the defence to prepare newmeans of protection for our forces. New programmes have been introduced in the new
Military programme law. They include special efforts in the field of biological Defense anda first programme of theatre missile Defense against missiles of a reach of the order of
600 km.
b) If we improve specific means to respond to asymmetric threats like biological,
chemical attacks, our strategy has a wider scope. It is based on a global concept
where military means are only a part of the whole.

First, the French approach to international security and Defense is based on a global
concept, enshrined in a 1959 "ordonnance".
National answers to threats to our security combine a large variety of responses including
diplomatic means, police and judicial responses, the use of international instruments, and,in the last resort, the use of force and Military action.
Second, in what concerns our military strategy, our defence is organised and based onfour major functions or strategic modalities:-

Nuclear deterrence, which constitutes our ultimate guarantee to protect our vitalinterests,-

Prevention which allows to monitor threat evolution through intelligence and to engage
unstable regions through Defense diplomacy,-

Projection and action through which we are able to project in the distance a
substantial volume of Military forces to participate in crisis management operations,mostly in the a multinational framework and under UN mandate or, sometimes, in anational only framework.

-

Protection which aims at protecting our territory and its approaches.

4c) The French President and the government have taken a strong commitment toincrease French Defense spending.

The past decade was perceived, wrongly, as a new era of peace dividends. This wastranslated, as it was also the case for most of our partners and allies, by a verysignificant fall in our Defense spending.

The new Military programme law marks the strong determination of the Frenchauthorities to reverse this trend because international instability remains high and our
security interests can be threatened.

The new law, which reflects the will of the President of the Republic, marks a major break :over the next six years, the capital resources allocated to Defense investments will be
increased by 14 % on average compared with previous budgets voted on in the period
1997-2002.

This increase is justified by:-

The international context and the evolution of the threats-

The need to accelerate the modernisation of our forces-

The political will to restore the operational capability and availability of our armed forces

Priorities will be the acquisition and development of major key defense programs.
These major programs will see their resources heightened by 20 % on average overthe period 2003-2008 compared to resources assigned in the finance law for year 2001.

Priorities in equipment are put on the four big « strategic functions » on which ourdefense strategy is based : deterrence, prevention, projection - action, and protection.

Our deterrence force will continue to be modernized.

Prevention will represent about 8 % of the major defense programs.
Our strategic intelligence capabilities will be strengthened with the deployment of new
observation satellites and increased cooperation with Germany and Italy to connect oursystems and receive satellite images from each other.

5Projection and combat capabilities will have the biggest part of the effort.
This domain will represent almost 60 % of the financial effort assigned to the major
defense programs.

Protection will represent 18 % of the resources assigned to major programs.
New defense capabilities to fight against nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical risks
will be implemented. A program of theater antimissile defense will be launched.

d) The French armed forces will in this way see their capabilities modernised andincreased. They will be able to continue to be deployed abroad in large numbers as
they have been for the last few years.

In the logic pursued when we decided to fully professionnalise our armed forces, our
Military have been widely engaged abroad for the last few years.

They are mostly deployed within the framework of international coalitions and for the
purpose of peace operations, but they can also be occasionally used in a strictly nationalframe, for instance with regard to our Defense agreements in Africa or in the Middle East.
For the last 2 years, France deployed overseas, on average and in an almost
continuous way, 18.000 Military servicemen in addition to those based permanently
in our overseas territories.

About half of these 18.000 servicemen are prepositionned forces, a third of them inAfrica and about 1000 in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, the rest being in Germany.
Our forces deployed in Ivory Coast have recently been strengthened at the level of 1000
men because of the present crisis situation in this country and to bring assistance toFrench or foreign nationals.
The other half of the 18.000 is deployed within the framework of a large number ofsmall to medium size UN operation, in Afghanistan where we have today 500 Military,
and in the Balkans.

6With 7000 people, our participation to the stabilisation of the Balkans is thestrongest contingent representing about 15 % of the total1 of the international Militarypresence in the region.

After the United States and the United Kingdom (with their still large presence in Germany),
France is the third nation of the western world by the dimension of its outside
military commitments.

The intensity of our commitment in the operations Enduring Freedom was very high.
This is an important point worth emphasising. It shows how closely our forces havebeen working with American forces in Afghanistan.
At the "peak" of our participation, about (3000) military were deployed, the biggest partbeing within the framework of our naval action force projected in the Indian Ocean.
The carrier group Charles de Gaulle fulfilled 10 % of the combat missions and up to 30 %of aerial surveillance ( 2 HAWKEYE E-2C) of Enduring Freedom during its presence of**4** months in the region.

2) The response of the European Union
Confronted by this rapid evolution of risks and threats, the European Union has
responded by concentrating first on the police and judicial dimensions in order toreduce drastically international terrorist activities.

a) The European Union has already set up and implemented a large number ofmeasures to respond to international terrorism.
Following to September 11th, an action plan was adopted by the Fifteen nations to fightagainst terrorism. This plan comprises 64 measures, the majority of which are embeddedin the third "police and judicial" pillar of the Union Treaty.
Among these measures, I shall quote the organization of systematic exchanges of
information regarding terrorist activities, a new European warrant for arrest, a12000 for the SFOR in Bosnia, for the total of 16 000 - 5000 for the KFOR in Kosovo on a total of 32 000 - 200 in

Macedonia for a total of 1000.

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European common definition of terrorism, measures to strengthen the fight against
financial aspects of terrorism, the development of the Shengen information system and the
deepening of controls at the outside borders of the Union.
These measures have their scope embraced in what we call the 3 rd pillar of theUnion. I Will come that notion of pillar again in a few moments.
Other measures relate to the "1-st pillar" like the reinforcement of air safety on thebasis of common standards.

c) At his stage, perhaps should I describe the European Union in some more detail
before reaching the topic of European defense.

The European Union covers three major domains which our jurists usually call thethree "pillars".

Two of these pillars, the first one - which covers mainly economic and financial
aspects - and the third - which covers police and judicial dimensions - are of civil
nature. They are the main instruments concerned for the implementation and thedevelopment of the antiterrorist fight.

The second pillar covers Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the European
Defense and Security Policy (ESDP).
This second pillar, which is still largely to be built, include a civil diplomatic dimension(foreign Policy) and a Military dimension, that we usually call European Defence or"Europe de Défense".
The European Defense, which was slow to start for many years, made major steps
forward from 1998 onwards following to a strong impulse built on a Franco-British accord
in Saint-Malo.

The major result is the consensus of the Fifteen member states in adopting a common
objective for the constitution of a European Rapid Reaction Force that can be
deployed in 60 days for a year with a strength of 60.000 men.

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Besides this very concrete objective, new mechanisms were created in Brussels toallow to the European Union to decide, to plan and to deploy the Rapid Reaction Force.
- A Political and Security Committee, which gathers the 15 ambassadors representing
member states, is now in charge of making the decisions.
- A Military Committee, gathering the representatives of the 15 Chiefs of Joint Defense
Staff, is in charge of advising the political security Committee on Military options.
- A European Military Staff is in charge of assisting the Military Committee in theevaluation of situation and the analysis of the options.

c) What are the missions of the European Reaction Force and when will it beoperational?

The missions of the European cover a large spectrum from humanitarian missions to
Peace making Operations. We cal them Petersberg missions because they were agreed
at a European Summit in Petersberg, in Germany,.
The EU missions do not yet include high intensity combat operations of the kind we
encounter for example in a Regional conflict, but this is the next step which we arepressing our partners to take.
The European force was declared operational in December 2001 at the Laeken
Summit.
But a number of important capabilities are still lacking. Another caveat is due to the factthat a majority of Europeans attach a specific importance to the implementation of anagreement concluded between NATO and the EU called Berlin plus.

I will perhaps not go into details about this point. Technically the European Union lacks
certain capabilities which are available in NATO like Military planning facilities, and anumber of communication and air surveillance assets.
As you may know, France advocates strongly that the European Union uses quickly
its Military capacities for example by taking the commanding role after the departure ofNATO from Macedonian ( TFF) in Macedonia.

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We believe that the sooner we start to use the considerable assets of European nations
both military and civilian, the greater will be Europe's distinctive contribution to peaceand stability.

Politically and practically, the commitment of the Europeans has strong
implications.
The Europeans have all to respond to the financial challenge presented by the decisions tocreate the 60.000 men strong reaction force.
There are still numerous capability gaps to be filled before its Force is fully operational for
the whole mission spectrum.
These gaps mainly consist of strategic transport assets, means of communication,
information and intelligence.
It will cost a lot of money to provide the necessary means. But we will, I am sure albeit itwill take time, succeed.
d) You perhaps have heard or some sort of opposition between European Defense
and NATO.

I would not deny that there can be political differences among Europeans inappreciating the need and the urgency of the European reaction force or European
Defense.
This is true.

But beside that political issue, the strong reality is that the European Military forcesthat constitutes the European Defense and the European part of NATO are very
similar if not the same, taken apart the fact that NATO allies are not members of EU andreciprocally, but these nations do not provide a lot of rapidly deployable forces. Without
Europe, NATO would be half of what it is today in terms of available forces.
You may have difficulty in Tokyo to appreciate the point and measure all thenuances of the articulation between European forces and forces of NATO.
The forces are largely the same, but the decision making process are different andseparate.

10Therefore, the heart of the debate among Europeans and with the US has been focusing
for some years on whether it is necessary or not to duplicate at the level of the EU thecentres of commands, economic planning and communication of NATO.
[This debate comes from the fact that NATO possesses two characteristics which do not facilitate the deploymentof the European Defense and of the European Force: NATO was created in 1949 and is largely developed, single
issue (security) organisation.
It has the weight of a long established organisation. NATO possesses a large number of personnel and a few strategic
assets in the field of planning, communications, air surveillance (AWACS).]

If a number of our allies remain rightly reluctant to duplicate NATO assets in their entirety,
France is advocating for a duplication of some important key assets in order toallow to the EU to act militarily, in time, when it is necessary.

It is not a question of competing with NATO or of acting against the interests of theUnited States.
But it is necessary in our view to make the Europeans more strongly aware of their
responsibilities vis-à-vis their own security and with regard to international security ingeneral.
If they were capable of deciding and acting by themselves, they would be more inclined toshare the burden of international security as the United States says and wishes.
To conclude on this topic of a the European Defense and Security Issue :European Defense is a long-term job that we wish to conduct in good harmony with
the United States and NATO, taking also into account the fact that a majority ofEuropean nations share the view of the need to combine Diplomacy, Soft and Hard
Security in a measured way.

113) The Responses of the Atlantic alliancea) As a preliminary point relating to the relationship between NATO and France, I
think it is useful to remind the audience, because it is sometimes not correctly
understood, that France never left the Atlantic Alliance since its signature of the
Washington Treaty in of 1949, which institutes, in its article 5, the mutual assistanceprinciple in case of aggression of one of its member.
We have always been and remain fully committed to the defense of our Allies, as theNorth Atlantic Treaty requires.

But France withdrew in 1966 from the integrated Military structure of NATO because
belonging to this structure implied an automatic military response including nuclear ofNATO as a whole to an attack.
We were not prepared to accept the principle of the automatic response.

But, we remained fully committed to the political commitments of the Alliance and its
transatlantic dimension and have always been represented in its key organs,
excluding the integrated command structure already mentioned.

In the second part of the Nineteen-Nineties (1990's), we got closer to NATO's military
structure without joining it, following to the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia and our Militarycontribution and commitment in the region.
With the approval of the US and the Allies, we made an arrangement to participate fully
in all meetings at the Head of states level and at Ministerial level, except the few
meetings related to NATO Defense planning.

The next summit of the Head of states of the alliance, in which France will
participate, will be held in Prague on November 21-22, 2002.

The agenda will cover mainly NATO enlargement (7 countries + Albania .etc.), thereorganisation of the command structures, the setting up of a NATO Response Force,a new Defence Capabilities Initiative aimed at strengthening European capabilities witha specific accent on war against terrorism and rapid deployment capabilities.

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***
NATO enlargement will be wider than expected 2 years ago. There are seven prime
candidates for membership, and France supports the enlargement of NATO to include allof them, France has been for some time supporting the idea of including nations like
Romania in the Eastern Balkans so as to strengthen security and stability in South East
Europe. A decision by the Alliance at the Prague Summit in favour of a broad enlargement
will be welcomed by France.
The reorganisation of the command structures responds to the need of a morereactive, more responsive, NATO able to engage in a large variety of crisis situations
where the security interests of the Allies are at stake.
It will probably lead to a lighter and reduced structure that will also take into accountchanges occurring in the US command organisation. NATO’s Command Structure stillreflects many of the features and procedures of the Cold War. We believe that the
Alliance needs to modernise itself, by reducing further its extensive and now unnecessary
layers of Command, designed for responding to a major attack from the East which we
believe is improbable in the foreseeable future. For example, we expect a confirmation of
the disappearance of the second strategic command, SACLANT, based in Norfolk on
the US West Coast.

A major US proposal for the Summit is the creation of a new NATO Response Forcethat would be capable of rapid deployment over long distances, around the world. This is
another move in the direction of a flexible military tool highly responsive. It would beequipped with up-to-date technology. It would be a highly capable intervention force able
as the US imagine it of operating alongside US forces. The aim is to have it ready for theyear 2006.

I will perhaps not go into more details on the discussions at NATO on theses proposals at
this stage.
Much debate has yet to take place to prepare the Prague Summit and I already covered
part of the topic when I explained the main challenges for the Europeans.
The success of the Prague Summit will depend largely in the response of its
European members. Prague presents us with many challenges. These challenges

13are partly of a financial order and oriented towards an increase in projection and combat
capabilities and partly in the field of organisation.

Improving projection capabilities is an expensive business. But the challenges are notimpossible. Drastic improvements are needed in the way Europeans spend theirmoney and avoid duplications in certain areas, like in ground forces, and put a priority inother areas like air transport and communications.

c) France is supporting the Prague initiatives as long as they allow NATO to be
more responsive and to adapt to new challenges. But we insist on the respect of anumber of key principles that we see as essential.

We are not opposed to the concept of a NATO Response Force and we will support NATO
Military operations in this framework.
But we see NATO intervention as a case by case question and we will commit
ourselves to a specific operation if it respects three main conditions:-

NATO should act on a legal base in conformity with the United Nations Charter.
In practice, it can be either under legitimate Defense (article 5 of the Treaty ofWashington) or under a UN mandate (Bosnia in 1995,-

The opportunity and the need for a NATO Military action in the specific crisis underconsideration are to be recognised and agreed by the members of the Alliance ;-NATO has the appropriate Military means to fulfil the political objectives of theoperationc) As a faithful ally, France supports the transatlantic relationship in a co-operativeway.

France is associated with most of the debates in NATO, except those few related todefence planning and the technicalities of the integrated structure. We also wish to play
our full role in the new phase of restructuring of NATO, which is going to take place inthe years to come.

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But we continuously insist on the need to commit our forces only after a politicalagreement has been reached, on a case by case basis, at the level of the Atlantic
Council. This means no automatic commitment, and no automatic response to events.
France thus remains consistent with its longstanding policy, that there should be no action
by NATO without full and proper debate and consultation.

Here I would like to emphasise one point. France is committed to both projects –modernising NATO and constructing a real European Defense. We do not see themin any way as competitive, nor do we think that that one process should dominate theother.
Appropriate arrangements have therefore to be found so that the new NATO response
force will not reduce the dynamic of the European Reaction Force, which is acomplementary project. As I said a moment ago, the stronger the Europeans, the more
effective will NATO be.
I am confident that these aims can be reached by sufficient consultations between
the two organisations.

4) Responses of the United Nations and the international communitya) The United Nations have also to adapt to the new security context which ischaracterised by new threats, requires military alliances to work more in a new
flexible coalition mode.

The superiority of the American power can sometimes bring nations to lose their sense of
belonging to a world community, or feel unable to play a significant role in the debate oninternational security issues.

Paradoxically, the new challenges require even greater international cooperation than
before. The struggle against terrorism and against the continuing proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction need improved responses from the international community.
b) Military power will remain certainly a major element structuring international
relations.

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It is not only a reality but also in some respects a factor for change and dynamism. We
still need military forces to protect vulnerable states against aggression, including terrorist
aggression.
However it is neither possible nor desirable to conclude that the force in itself will beenough to settle crisis situations.

Military force alone will be vain if it is not accompanied with increasing requirements indemocracy, in the respect for the rule of law and the implementations of longer term
stabilisation policies.
The temptation to solve complex problems by exclusively military means should be
avoided.

As we have seen, particularly in the Balkans, the phases of reconstruction after any crisis
situation are important if not essential – more important even than the military phase. I
should add here that France is very conscious and grateful for the considerable help thatJapan has given to Japan’s significant financial contributions to the reconstruction of theBalkans.
But sometimes, the use of force to end a crisis becomes necessary and unavoidable.
Confronted with new threats, the modes and the means used by the Military tend to
evolve.
The speed of reaction, the efficiency of the strike over long distance is turning military
action increasingly into a step on the search for negotiated solutions or the
management on the ground of the situations of conflict.

Such actions can sometimes be necessary. But, in our view, there is a risk ofslipping towards very aggressive strategies, in particular when some evoke strategies
of preventive actionc) We share, I believe, in Japan and in France, this deep conviction that UN is an
essential institution as pivot and guarantee of the international law.

[The debate on the need or not to launch a military operation against Iraq illustrates the
new questions put to the international community].

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The role of multilateral institutions must be increased. But, the difficulty of overcoming the
problems linked for instance with proliferation should urge the international community tofind the way of improving the effectiveness of treaties and regulations agreed in this field.
We may have to find more informal ways, more ad hoc mechanisms to engage withnations that tend not to respect rules, and avoid using military force unless where
absolutely necessary.
This is not just wishful thinking.
Real crises show the need for the modernisation of international mechanisms.
It is essential that a wide part of the international community, and, if possible, theinternational community in general, unites to fight against international terrorism.
More generally we have to fight against the growing threats coming from various
proliferations that might lead one day to the use of mass destruction means bydeterminate extremist groups.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this speech, I described in some detail how we are looking (in France, in
Europe and NATO) for new answers to the new strategic questions that confront us.

• To conclude, I would like to say that we share in our two countries, a number ofinterests and concerns.

You are, as we are, strongly committed to your alliance with the United States.

You are, as we are, confronted with the need to adapt our responses to the future threats
to our regional security.
In addition to the major terrorist developments in Southeast Asia, North Korea
represents a long lasting challenge for you and for the international community.

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According to a number of (American) experts, North Korea seems to continue its effort todevelop weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear weapons.
Moreover, it is very difficult to evaluate the risk of the autocratic regime in Pyongyang
using such weapons.
In the Near and Middle East, we are also facing major risks linked either tounresolved crisis situations or to the continuing development of Weapons of Mass
Destruction.

Difficult discussions are under way, as you know in New York regarding the future of Iraq.

• We know that the world faces today major challenges.
• But it may well be that we are reaching a crucial point, which will have heavy
implications for you in Asia as well as for us in Europe.

• At world level, three major changes seem to have the potential longlasting
consequences:-

we have definitely left the bipolar world without having still entered amultipolar system.
During the cold war, the Soviet Union created a constraint. It was not a constraint that
we wanted; but it de facto limited the risks of adventurous military actions. Such
constraint has vanished and is not yet replaced by a new balance of power.

-

the asymmetric threats can strike in a much more immediate way than was
the case in traditional confrontations.
The nature of today’s threats encourages either the temptation to withdraw into
national politics and allow international politics to develop according to their own logic,or the temptation to act unilaterally and in a pre-emptive way.

-

the United States have an overwhelming military power. They have thepossibility and the means to conduct wars alone without the military support oftheir Allies.

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These changes introduce a strategic rupture with regard to the last fifty years.

We may be reaching a point where the international system faces a destabilisation
process initiated by new practices in the use of force.

Facing such a risk, it seems essential that our two countries and a large part of theinternational community remain attached to a number of key principles:• First, it is necessary to continue to provide the maximum space possible formultilateralism.

We practise multilateralism within the European institutions and the Atlantic alliance.

You practice it within the framework of your strategic relations with the United States,
Korea and China, although in a less formalised way compared with our European way.
This multilateral approach seems essential to alleviate the risks of unilateral
action and also to help the necessary convergence of political wills to fight
together against the asymmetric threats. It is our view in Europe that multilateralism
strengthens the fight against terrorism, because only international cooperation can
reduce the potential of transnational terrorist networks.

• Secondly, we need to continue to resort to all diplomatic, economic instruments
and tools of influence before resorting to force.

The Japanese government also promotes non-military options in his relationship with
North Korea.

• Thirdly, the use of force, for which our armies should always be ready (it is part oftheir missions), should remain the means of last resort, when alternatives have nochance of success.

19• In addition to this fundamental rule of the international system based on The United
Nations charter, when the use of force is considered, it is indispensable that the militaryplanning be prepared on the basis of scenarios discussed in multilateral format.

These scenarios of action should have been beforehand under weighed so that the
choice goes to the one that will offer the best chance of success in the short andmedium term: it is often the middle term that makes the difference between the goodplan and the bad one.
[Ladies and] Gentlemen: I thank you for your patience in listening to my analysisof the challenges that face us. I have spoken from a French and European
perspective. But as I have tried to show, these challenges and dangers are of a
global nature. No-one can escape the consequences of the major changes in thestrategic context that we are now experiencing.

However, as I have also tried to show, there are many points in common between
us in Europe and you in Japan. We both contribute significantly to global
stability through development and stabilisation programmes through the United
Nations and other organisations; we are both engaged in active multi-lateraldiplomacy; and we both believe that intensified international cooperation canhelp defeat asymmetric threats and protect our peoples against the new dangers.
We have much in common. We must continue to work together to create a safer
and better world.

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