1
May 24, 2022

CSH Policy Brief
Austria without Russian natural gas?
Expected economic impacts of a drastic gas supply shock and mitigation
strategies
As the war in Ukraine continues, there is an increasing threat of a drastic reduction of Russian gas
supply to the European Union (EU). A sudden drop in gas trade between EU countries and Russia could
arise from an EU-imposed import embargo, a Russian export embargo or by pipeline malfunction due
to the military conflict. Natural gas imports from Russia account for 80% of Austria’s annual gas
consumption, and for roughly 38% of the EU’s gas consumption. This policy brief discusses the likely
short-term impacts on the Austrian economy resulting from an immediate import stop of Russian
natural gas, as well as possible actions for mitigation and their effects.
Approach. We assume a total stop of Russian gas exports to the EU starting on June 1, 2022 and analyze
the resulting impacts on Austria’s economy. Our results are based on three modeling steps.
(1) Detailed analysis of the possible countermeasures on the supply and demand side to mitigate theimmediate shortfall in Russian gas supply.
(2) Mapping the net reduction in gas supply to industrial sectors to quantify direct economic shocks andexpected relative reductions in gross output.
(3) Use these direct economic shocks to initialize a dynamic out-of-equilibrium macroeconomic inputoutput model to estimate overall economic impacts (direct shocks + indirect effects through supply
relations between industry sectors).
We distinguish and analyze two opposing scenarios on how the shortfall in Russian gas supply is dealt
with: (A) EU-wide cooperation and (B) an uncoordinated scenario.
Results. The main results are presented in Table 1.
●

●

●

●

●

Total consumption. In 2021 Austria consumed 9.34 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas. A
Russian gas supply stop would mean an 80% decrease in availability of 7.47 bcm to 1.87 bcm
for Austrian consumption. See Section 1.
Additional imports. In Scenario A, 5.20 bcm (corresponding to 55.7% of annual consumption)
could be imported from alternative sources other than Russia to Austria within the next year.
In Scenario B only 2.65 bcm (28.4%) could be imported additionally. See Sections 2.1.
Storage. We estimate total storage levels of the EU and Austria to be 58.02 bcm and 3.56 bcm,
respectively, on June 1 when the hypothetical Russian import stop starts. In Scenario A, Austria
would be allocated 0.64 bcm of the gas extracted from its storage (6.9% of annual
consumption), while it might extract 1.40 bcm (15%) in Scenario B. See Section 2.2.
Aggregate gas shock. Taking additional imports and storage extraction into account, the total
aggregate gas shock is reduced from –80% to –17.4% and –36.6% in Scenario A and Scenario
B, respectively.
Fuel switching. Independent of the scenario, there is a high potential to reduce gas

2

●

●

●

●

●

consumption by switching gas power plants to oil in the short-term, possibly in the order of
10.5% of Austria’s annual gas consumption (0.98 bcm). See Section 2.3.
Other savings. Behavioral changes, like a 1°C reduction in average room temperature inhouseholds, have the potential of saving around 0.11 bcm of gas demand. Reduced supply ofnatural gas also reduces gas needs for operating pipeline infrastructures by another 0.05 bcm
and 0.11 bcm in Scenario A and B, respectively. See Sections 2.4–2.5.
Total gas shortfall after demand and supply side measures. In total this means a reduction ofgas availability for Austria over the coming year of 0.49 bcm (5.2% of annual consumption) in
Scenario A, and 2.21 bcm (23.7%) in Scenario B. See Section 2.6.
Industry gas supply reduction. After serving protected customers, such as households andpower plants, the remaining gas is allocated to the industry. For Scenario A we observe a
reduction of 10.4% of gas supply for the Austrian industry, due to a strong and coordinatedpolicy response. For Scenario B we find a 53.3% reduction of industry gas supply compared tonormal levels. See Section 2.7.
Direct economic output shock. The 10.4% gas supply reduction to industry in Scenario A
amounts to a direct aggregate output shock of –1.1%. In Scenario B the direct aggregate output
shock amounts to –5.6%. For industry-specific output shocks, see Section 3.1.
Total economic impact. Taking into account indirect effects, we arrive at an estimate of –1.9%
for total aggregate output reduction in Scenario A. In Scenario B the total aggregate output
reduction is –9.1%. See Section 3.2.

Our results are subject to several limitations which are discussed in Section 4.
Scenario A
EU-cooperation
Annual gas consumption (Austria 2021)– Russian import stop

Scenario B
Uncoordinated

100% (9.34 bcm)
–80% (–7.47 bcm)

+ Additional imports

55.7% (5.20 bcm)

28.4% (2.65 bcm)

+ Storage

6.9% (0.64 bcm)

15.0% (1.40 bcm)

–17.4% (–1.63 bcm)

–36.6% (–3.42 bcm)

Aggregate gas shock+ Fuel switching (electricity and CHP)

10.5% (0.98 bcm)

+ Savings heating (excluding industry)

1.2% (0.11 bcm)

+ Savings from operating pipelines

0.5% (0.05 bcm)

1.2% (0.11 bcm)

Gas shortfall after demand and supply
measures–5.2% (–0.49 bcm)

–23.7% (–2.21 bcm)

–10.4% *–53.3%*

Industry gas supply reduction

3

Direct aggregate output shock–1.1% **

–5.6%**

Total aggregate output impact–1.9% **

–9.1%**

Table 1. Summary of scenarios and results. Reported percentages are expressed with respect to annual gas consumption
when deriving aggregate gas supply reductions. *Percentages of Industry gas supply reduction refers to the relative reductionsin industry gas supply after room heating-related measures have been considered. **Economic impacts in % refer to relative
reductions in aggregate gross output from the pre-shock state. CHP is short for combined power and heat.

Conclusions
Our results suggest that in the EU-cooperation Scenario A, losses for the Austrian economy are
noticeable, but manageable. Overall economic impacts result in a decrease of gross output of 1.9%
which translates to 1.11 billion EUR per month. These losses are significantly smaller than the economic
impact of the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, where GDP in the second quarter of 2020 was –14%
smaller compared to pre-shock levels. In the uncoordinated Scenario B, economic impacts are more
severe, resulting in a 9.1% reduction of Austrian gross output. This amounts to a loss of about 5.31
billion EUR in gross output per month. We point out, however, that losses could be substantially larger,
if no strong measures are put in place to mitigate the initial gas supply shock.
The amount of natural gas that can be supplied to industry in the scenario of a 100% loss of Russian
gas imports is highly sensitive with respect to the aggregate gas supply reduction after alternative
sources are considered. For a wide range of plausible scenarios, an additional reduction in aggregate
gas availability of 1% translates into an additional 2.2% reduction in industry gas supply.
Impacts on aggregate gross economic output are sensitive with respect to aggregate gas supply
reductions. For modest aggregate shocks to gas supply (below 12%) we observe no adverse impact ongross output, given the implementation of adequate countermeasures. For plausible ranges of gas
shocks an additional 1% reduction in gas supply leads to a 0.3% reduction of aggregate gross output.
The expected economic impacts resulting from a Russian gas import stop strongly depend on the
mitigation measures that will be put in place. These results highlight the importance of EU-wide
cooperation and the wide range of specific policy measures that mitigate adverse economic
consequences. We list several policy implications below and discuss them in detail in Section 5.2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Need of EU-wide coordination in gas supply policies
Prepare for fuel switching of power plants over the summer wherever possible
Incentivize changing production processes to less gas intensive production
Incentivize changing heating systems to heat pumps, and geothermal heating and biomass
Incentivize investments in renewable energy technologies and storage
Encourage the population to actively engage in gas saving behavior
An embargo on Russian gas could be economically viable given the immense costs of war

CSH scientists: Anton Pichler, Jan Hurt*, Tobias Reisch*, Johannes Stangl*, Stefan Thurner* These authors contributed equally.

4
Acknowledgements
We greatly appreciate the continuous support of Maria del-Rio Chanona and Christian Diem whose
inputs substantially improved this policy brief. We are also grateful to Stefan Kitzler, François Lafond,Marco Pangallo, Frank Neffke, Joern Huenteler, Karl Steininger and Kavita Surana for helpful feedback.
We thank Philip Rodemeyer (AGCS) and Alexander Kirchner (Wien Energie) for providing us with theirexpertise and background information. Finally, a special thanks goes to Liuhuaying Yang and Verena
Ahne for their help with visualizing and preparing this policy brief for publication.

About the CSH
The Complexity Science Hub Vienna was founded with the aim of using Big Data for the benefit ofsociety. Among other things, the CSH systematically and strategically prepares large data sets so thatthey can be used in agent-based models. These simulations allow the effects of decisions in complex
situations to be tested in advance and systematically assessed. Thus, the CSH provides fact-based
foundations for evidence-based governance.
CSH Policy Briefs present socially relevant statements that can be derived from CSH research results.

5

Results in detail
1 Gas consumption overview
1.1 Austria’s dependence on Russian gas in the European context
EU-wide gas consumption amounted to 412 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021 (4% increase to 2020)of which Austria’s gas consumption accounts for 2.3% (Figure 1, left panel), corresponding to 9.34 bcm
in 2021 (5% increase to 2020).1 While 155 bcm (38%) of EU’s annual consumption comes from Russia,
Austria’s dependency is considerably higher – Austria imports 7.2 bcm from Russia, accounting for 80%
of Austria’s overall gas consumption2 and 18.5% of Austrias primary energy consumption (Statistik
Austria, 2022a). Without taking any further mitigation measures, Austria’s high exposure towards
Russian gas could dramatically compromise its short-term energy security in case of a sudden Russian
gas supply stop. Its relatively small share of EU-wide gas consumption, however, indicates that
European cooperation measures can considerably mitigate economic impacts.
1.2 Natural gas consumption in Austria
Austria’s annual gas consumption has remained relatively stable between 8.7 and 9.5 bcm over thelast six years (Figure 1, right panel). A large share of natural gas is used for heating and power
generation, in particular in the winter months, leading to a strong seasonal component in the intraannual gas consumption (Figure 1, right panel inset). This seasonality means that the timing of a
possible gas supply shock is crucial in how strongly it will impact society.

Figure 1. (Left) EU-27 gas consumption in 2021. Austria only accounts for slightly above 2% of EU’s consumption but ranks
among the countries with the highest Russian gas dependency. (Right) Aggregate gas consumption over time. Over the last
six years Austria’s annual consumption of natural gas fluctuated between 8.7 and 9.5 bcm. (Inset): There is a strong
seasonality in gas consumption. The gray shade indicates the monthly min–max range between 2014–2021; the red line is
the monthly consumption in 2021.

Figure 2 shows the gas consumption in Austria across consumer types. The right chart shows relative
consumption shares of consumer types according to the energy balance (Statistik Austria 2022b). The
1

Data from the Eurostat natural gas supply statistics (data code: nrg_cb_gasm, accessed 05 May 2022).
Using data from the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), we estimate
Austria’s gas dependency on Russia (Russian imports as share of total inland consumption) to be 80.02% in 2019.

2

6largest share of 44.1% is used by industry, followed by households (19.5%), combined heat and power(CHP, 17.5%), and electricity (8.8%). The remaining 10.1% are split between the service and public
sector, transport in pipelines, and heating plants. The chart on the left shows the gas usage in theindustry, according to official statistics (Statistik Austria 2022a). The largest share, 61.7%, is used forprocess heat, followed by 27.8% for room heat, and 10.4% for non-energetic uses (e.g., as a chemical
reactant).

Figure 2. Relative gas consumption across consumer types. Data from Statistik Austria 2022b. “CHP” stands for combined
heat and power, “Pipelines” refer to the distribution of gas, and “Service” includes the service sectors and the public sector.
The left chart zooms into industry-specific consumption types, where we allocated “non-energetic use” to the industry sector
ourselves. The numbers for room and process heat are from Statistik Austria 2022a.

2 Supply and demand measures for mitigating gas import reductions
Here we consider a complete halt of Russian gas imports, which translates into an 80% shock toAustria’s annual consumption. While this provides an upper bound to the gas supply shock, the realized
supply shock will be lower due to mitigation measures that can and will be put in place, including
additional imports of liquified natural gas (LNG) and gas from different trade partners, storage
management, and fuel switching in the power and heat sector.
We focus on two main scenarios: In an EU-cooperation scenario (Scenario A), additional natural gas
resources on the EU-level are distributed in a coordinated way to avoid excessively high import shocks
for particularly exposed countries. In this scenario storage levels are also cooperatively managed. In
this scenario every member state must bear reductions in its gas consumption, even if not highly
exposed to Russian gas imports. We argue that this scenario is nevertheless plausible given that sucha policy could avoid large economic downturns of several member states with likely negative
repercussions to non-exposed countries via trade relationships and the common currency.
In an uncoordinated scenario (Scenario B), Austria mitigates the Russian import shock by buying gas
from alternative sources without coordinating with other EU member states and manages its gas
storage capacities individually. Below we present the main pillars of the two scenarios but present thedetails of our calculations in the online technical appendix (Pichler et al., 2022).
2.1 Alternative gas imports
To assess the potential of imports from alternative sources, we build upon the recently proposed EU

7Commission strategy to reduce Russian gas imports by 2/3 until the end of the year (European
Commission (2022). This goal involves importing an additional 50 bcm of LNG this year, as well as
importing an additional 10 bcm via existing pipeline infrastructure from Norway, Azerbaijan, andAlgeria. The proposed strategy on tapping alternative import sources has been considered as highly
ambitious, but feasible in principle (Fulwood et al., 2022). The International Energy Agency (IEA)
estimates a technical potential of an additional 60 bcm of LNG imports in the near-term (IEA, 2022).
We take a moderately conservative approach and assume that the EU falls 10% short of its goal of 50
bcm of additional imports of LNG by the end of 2022, while it realizes its additional 10 bcm pipeline
import goal. Thus, additional EU-wide gas imports amount to 55 bcm, compensating for more than athird of Russian gas imports.
While we take the European gas imports as given, we distinguish two cases of how much of theadditional EU-wide gas supply can be accessed by Austria.
●●

In the EU-cooperation Scenario A we assume that member states face a common shock anddistribute existing and additional gas resources such that every country faces the same relative
reduction in its gas supply. Given the overall reduction of 100 bcm and EU-wide gas
consumption of 412 bcm, the gas supply reduction for every country amounts to 24.3%
compared to usual levels. The gas supply shock to Austria is then reduced from 80% to 24.3%,
resulting in 55.7% or 9.34 bcm * 55.7% = 5.20 bcm of additional imports.
In the uncoordinated Scenario B each member state individually tries to substitute its current
Russian imports from other countries. This means that Austria would demand 7.47 bcm of gas
from the market. Since only 55 bcm of 155 bcm of Russian gas can be compensated on an EUwide level, we assume Austria would only receive 7.47 bcm * 55/155 = 2.65 bcm (28.4% ofannual demand). This corresponds to a scenario, where each member state places demand
equaling its Russian import shortfall on international markets. Due to constrained supplies,
however, every member state is rationed on a pro-rata basis. 2.65 bcm of additional imports
might be optimistic in an uncooperative scenario, as Austria depends strongly on available
capacities of pipeline and LNG port infrastructures of other countries, which might not be
willing to pass through gas to foreign consumers.

The difference in additional gas imports between the uncoordinated and the EU-cooperation scenario
is substantial, amounting to about 27.3% of Austria’s annual gas consumption. This emphasizes highuncertainty associated with any estimate of economic impacts from a sudden Russian gas import stop.
Both scenarios, and any outcome in between, could arguably materialize. Since the realized scenario
depends largely on political factors that are impossible to predict, the extent to which Austrian gas
availability will be reduced is not merely a question of market mechanisms and technical feasibility,
but also a key policy variable.
2.2 Storage management
To mitigate gas shortages, the EU and Austria have passed laws that aim at filling storage levels to 80%
of capacity before the coming winter3. Austria’s gas storage accounts for almost 9% of EU total storage

3

For the EU regulation see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022PC0135. See
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVII/BNR/BNR_00531/index.shtml for the Austrian Energielenkungsgesetz (both links accessed on May 20, 2022).

8capacities4, and given its 2.3% share of EU gas consumption, has a comparatively large capacity tosmooth out varying gas in- and outflows. To understand the storage management potential for shock
mitigation, we use a simple storage model, which we briefly discuss below, but present in full detail inthe online appendix (Pichler et al., 2022). We again distinguish between the EU-cooperation Scenario
A and the uncoordinated Scenario B. In the former we assume that the Austrian gas storage is onlyused for managing national consumption, while in the latter we assume that the usage of gas storage
is coordinated on a European level.
Our gas storage model assumes that natural gas imports and Austria’s own gas exploration is constantthroughout the year, i.e. the net inflow does not show a seasonality between summer and wintermonths. In the uncoordinated scenario we use the nine-year average from 2012–2021 consumption
on a daily resolution5 to model the annual outflow. The difference of daily in- and outflow corresponds
to the storage injection or extraction, respectively, and allows us to predict daily storage levels. For the
calculations below, we assume that the shortfall of Russian gas starts on June 1, 2022 with anestimated storage level of 3.56 bcm (32.7% full), predicted by extrapolating the average injection ratesince May 1, 2022. We use the reduced in- and outflow as described in Table 1 and set the net
extraction between June 1, 2022 and May 31, 2023 to 2.11 bcm. The net storage extraction is chosensuch that the minimum storage level in our model is well above the historic minimum of 1.35 bcm inMarch 2022. According to the model we hit a minimum storage level of 1.40 bcm in April 2023.
Note that we assume that the Austrian storage is only used to provide natural gas for inland
consumption which is currently not the case. For example, Germany has rented parts of Austrianstorage – a fact that we neglect in the uncoordinated Scenario B. Thus, our estimate of the extent towhich storage can be used for mitigating import shortfalls might be optimistic. Note that, in a truly
uncoordinated scenario, if Austria would cut off Germany from its rented storage, Germany could
retaliate by not allowing Austria to use its pipeline infrastructure to import LNG. This scenario
highlights that cooperation among European countries is essential.
To simulate storage levels on the EU level we rely on monthly data provided by the Eurostat natural
gas supply statistics. We average over the last two years for consumption and inflow levels.
Extrapolating with the average injection rate since May 1, we estimate the EU gas storage to contain
58.02 bcm (46.2% of maximum capacity) on June 1, 2022. Again, using the reduced in- and outflows,
as described in Table 1 and Section “Alternative gas imports”, we predict monthly injection andextraction rates and the monthly storage level. We set the net extraction from June 1, 2022 to May 31,
2023 to 28 bcm. Our model predicts a minimal gas storage level of 22.04 bcm (17.4%) in March 2023,
which is similar to the historic minimal gas storage of 22.10 bcm (17.5%) in March 2018. Assuming a
proportional distribution in the EU-cooperation scenario, Austria is allocated 28/412 * 9.34 bcm = 0.64
bcm.
2.3. Fuel switching
Our analysis indicates that switching gas power plants to alternative fuels, such as oil, can substantiallyreduce gas demand in the short run by around 10.5% of total annual consumption (0.98 bcm). We
emphasize, however, that fuel switching entails high environmental costs, as well as additional

45Computed based on the Aggregate Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI): https://agsi.gie.eu/ (accessed: May 14, 2022).
Based on data by the Austrian clearing agency (EnergyMonitor.at, 2022).

9
economic costs.
Electricity generation and district heating plants are among the largest consumers of gas in Austria.
Gas is currently the only non-renewable source in Austria’s power mix (besides non-renewableelectricity imports). Gas consumption in the electricity sector also exhibits a high seasonal component.
Gas power plants burn natural gas mostly during the winter months to compensate for the higher
electricity demand, lower production from renewable sources, and to stabilize the grid. Based on
Austrian Power Grid dispatch data (APG, 2022), total electrical energy reserves for stabilizing the gridwere 0.32 TWh in 2019. To obtain a conservative estimate of fuel switching potentials, we assume that
all electrical energy dispatched for stabilizing the grid is produced only by gas turbines. Assuming anefficiency of 35% of gas turbines6, this equals 0.32 TWh/0.35 = 0.9 TWh, corresponding to around 0.09
bcm of gas, needed per year for stabilizing the grid. This likely overestimates the gas needed for gridstabilization, since not all reserves are necessarily provided by gas power plants and we would expect
much higher conversion efficiency (approx. 60%) if combined cycle plants are used. We assume thatgas-based grid stabilization cannot be substituted from other sources in the short-term consideredhere. Thus, in our scenarios we require a minimum of 0.09 bcm gas as inputs to the electricity sector
to always guarantee the functioning of the power grid.
Some Austrian gas power plants have the potential to run on both, gas and oil, and therefore are
candidates for fuel switching in case of a serious shortage in gas supply. We estimate that Austria canreduce gas used for generating electricity by around 40% through these substitutions. To arrive at thisestimate, we assume that a total gas power capacity of 800 MW can be switched to other oil-based
fuels or coal. 800 MW amount to the capacity of the “Wärmekraftwerk Theiß” which, as of 2020, wasstill able to switch between oil and gas fuels (EVN 2020). We assume that in a scenario of limited gas
availability, the power plants that can be switched to alternative fuels will be switched on preferably
over gas power plants. Using historical data on electricity generation from fossil sources (in 15 minintervals) for the years 2016–2021, we integrate the power output exceeding the switchable 800 MW
to estimate the amount of energy which must be provided by gas power plants. The procedure isillustrated in Figure 3 for 2017, where we highlight the electricity provided by gas power plants in red.
The gas saving potential corresponds to the amount of energy produced by the plants running on
alternative fuels, i.e., the blue area below the 800 MW intercept. Our method estimates potential
annual gas savings between 40% and 50%. In the following we use the smallest saving of 40%,
corresponding to 0.98 bcm per year, or equivalently, 10.5% of total consumption. A related study inGermany found a reduction potential of 43% (IEK, 2022).
We acknowledge the possibility of practical limitations that may make fuel switching difficult butemphasize its large potential for reducing gas demand. For example, by switching power plants, witha combined capacity of 350 MW, which would be equivalent to Simmering’s Block 3 (Wien Energie
2021), Austria could save an additional 0.40 bcm per year. If such a switch is technically possible, thesecosts are likely small compared to the industrial production that could be saved with these measures(see Figure 6). Fuel switching requires the deployment of climate-damaging fuels, counteracting
previously set emission targets. However, if the reduction of the economic shock can be reduced, partsof higher GDP can be committed to the installation of additional green capacity and thereby reducing
emissions in the mid-term. Our findings show that fuel switching is, at best, a short-term solution that6

https://www.energy.gov/fecm/how-gas-turbine-power-plants-work10must be accompanied with increased investments in renewable energy and storage technologies.

Figure 3: Seasonal electricity production from gas for the year 2017 (Fraunhofer 2022). The horizontal line is the assumed
capacity of 800 MW which could be provided from other fossil sources (oil or coal). The red shaded part indicates electricity
production from gas exceeding 800 MW, which we assume cannot be replaced by alternative fuels, it represents around 40%of the total fossil electricity produced.

2.4 Savings in heating
Given the drastic scenario of an immediate 80% gas supply shock, we assume that demand side
measures will be implemented that target a reduction of gas usage for room heating. We assume thata price increase, on the one hand, and pleas to the solidarity of the public by policymakers, on theother hand, could motivate behavioral changes, like an average room heat reduction of approximately
1°C. On average, it can be assumed that these lead to a 5% reduction of gas requirements (DOE, 2022).
We assume that the reduction in room heating applies to industry and services, households and the
public sector. The savings in household heating amount to 0.11 bcm, and the savings in industry roomheating before rationing amount to 0.06 bcm.
2.5 Pipelines
Natural gas is used as the main energy carrier to operate pipeline infrastructures. The distribution ofgas through existing pipelines in Austria required 0.29 bcm in 2021, representing 3.1% of the total gas
consumption. As consumption falls, also pumping needs and, consequently, gas usage for operating
the infrastructure declines. We assume that gas usage for pipeline operation scales with total
consumption by a fixed factor of 3.1%. This amounts to 0.05 bcm and 0.11 bcm of savings in scenario
A and B, respectively.
2.6 Aggregate gas supply reductions
Combining the initial gas supply shock, resulting from a Russian gas import embargo, with thecountermeasures discussed above in place (alternative imports, storage management, fuel switching,savings in heating and pipeline operation), we estimate the aggregate gas supply shock for bothscenarios. We calculate that the aggregate gas supply shock amounts to 0.49 bcm (5.2%) in the EUcooperation Scenario A and to 2.21 bcm (23.7%) in the uncoordinated Scenario B.

11
Given the high Austrian dependency on Russian gas imports, engaging individually in the international
markets for alternative gas sources is suboptimal compared to an EU cooperative scenario. This holds
true even if more storage can be used for own consumption in the uncoordinated scenario.
2.7 Industry-specific gas supply reductions
The Austrian industry currently uses 44.1% of the total gas, i.e., 4.12 bcm per year7. Other consumers,
like households, services and the public sector, power plants, and pipelines, are considered asprotected in this scenario, in accordance with the recent communications of the infrastructure ministry(BMK, 2020; BMK, 2022). This means, while we consider some savings in these sectors, like reducing
room heating by 1°C, industry has to bear the bulk of the gas shortfall.
To calculate the gas available for industry consumption, first we compute the consumption byprotected consumers after all consumption reducing measures have been applied. This comprises
household consumption (after lowering room temperature), electricity generation (reduced by fuelswitching), and consumption in pipelines (with reduced throughput). Second, we subtract this number
from the gas supply to Austria in the respective scenario (A or B), resulting in the amount of gas that isavailable for industry. As mentioned before, 29.6% of industry consumption is attributed to roomheating. We assume that industry also reduces the average room temperature by 1°C, resulting in a
reduction of overall industry gas demand of 0.06 bcm (–0.61%). Moreover, due to lack of better
information, we assume a scenario, where the gas supply is distributed proportionally to all industries.
Figure 4 shows how the aggregate gas supply shock translates into industry gas supply shocks when
taking these assumptions into account. Our results show that there is a 10.4% shock to industry gas
supply in the EU-cooperation Scenario A, whereas there is a 53.3% shock to industry gas supply in the
uncoordinated Scenario B. These results underline the large value of coordination in the distributionof limited gas to mitigate the gas supply shock to the industrial sector.
In the extreme case of very large shocks above 58%, the gas supply is less than the demand byprotected consumers and no gas is available for industry consumers. The slope of the curve for shocks
between around 12% and 58%is 2.2. In this region an additional percent aggregate gas supply shocktranslates into an additional 2.2% industry gas supply shock, indicating the sensitivity of industry gas
supply reduction with respect to overall reductions in the country’s gas supply.

7

Note that we use Eurostat gas volume data which can be different from national statistics.

12

Figure 4. Mapping aggregate gas shocks to gas supply shocks for the industry. The x-axis shows the possible range ofaggregate gas shocks. The y-axis is the gas supply shock in % of pre-shock industry gas usage. We find ranges where no
aggregate shock is transmitted to the industry due to measures like savings or alternative imports. On the other hand,industries experience a 100% shock already for aggregate shocks of 58% and higher, due to prioritization of other customers.

3 Economic analysis
3.1 Sector-specific output shocks resulting from gas shortages
We use the gas supply reductions for industrial sectors as the main input into an economic model toquantify overall economic impacts. Since different industries exhibit different dependencies on gas
inputs, we first estimate the gas exposure of each industrial sector. Note that there exists intra-industry
heterogeneity: while some firms rely on the use of gas in their production processes, others do not. In
the case of a gas supply shock, companies depending on gas in their production need to reduce their
output accordingly, while firms independent of gas can continue production. Thus, to quantify the
direct economic shocks resulting from a gas supply reduction to industrial sectors, we first estimate
the share of companies in a given sector that uses gas in their production process (we assume gas tobe non-substitutable in the short run).
We achieve this step by matching the input statistics (“Gütereinsatzstatistik”) (Statistik Austria 2022c)
and the structural business statistics (“Leistungs- und Strukturstatistik”) (Statistik Austria, 2022d).8 The
Gütereinsatzstatistik reports the annual natural gas consumption for one to four digit levels of thefollowing OENACE sectors: B (Mining), C (Manufacturing), D (Energy), E (Utilities) and F (Construction).
The total gas consumption in each sector refers to the gas consumed by firms whose annual revenues
exceed 10 million EUR and employ at least 20 workers, resulting in 1,388 reports. The number of gasusing firms allows us to compute the average gas consumption of a given sector, conditional on thesize threshold. The structural business statistics contains industry-specific information on the total

8

We have the Gütereinsatzstatistik of 2020, while the most recent year of the Leistungs -und Strukturstatistik is
2019. This will introduce errors to the presented procedure, although we expect them to be small due to
expected high time correlations of industry statistics.

13
number of firms, as well as a rough employment-based firm size distribution. The gas consumption
reported in the input statistic only accounts for 81.3% of the total industry gas consumption reported
in the energy balance (Statistik Austria 2022b). The remaining 18.7% can be attributed to firms thatfall below the reporting threshold of 10 million EUR turnover and 20 employees. We estimate the shareof firms depending on gas in each sector by dividing the number of firms per sector that report the useof gas by the number of firms in the same sector that are in principle subject to the reporting
obligation9. We assume that the same ratio of gas-using to non-gas-using firms also holds for smallerfirms and distribute the remaining 18.7% accordingly.
The left panel of Figure 5 shows the estimated gas dependency, i.e., the share of firms in an industry
that uses gas, against the relative output share. The figure makes it clear that sectoral gas dependency
is highly heterogeneous. Based on our estimates, “Manufacturing basic metals” with more than 70%
of its firms using gas exhibits the largest gas exposure amongst all industrial sectors. The exposure isalso high for the “Manufacturing paper and furniture” industries. Every industrial sector uses natural
gas to some extent, with the smallest gas dependency being in the “Manufacturing wood” and,interestingly, the largest sector, “Construction”.

Figure 5. (Left) Gas dependency. Share of firms using gas in a sector plotted against the relative sector size. (Right) Direct
sectoral supply shocks in the uncoordinated scenario B. We assume that output scales linearly with gas inputs for gas-usingfirms. The letter “M” in the labels refers to manufacturing.

We use the overall gas shock to industry, and the industries’ gas dependency, to estimate direct shocks
to the relevant sectors. We assume that the reduced supply of gas for industries is distributed
proportionally among them, according to their gas intensity, i.e., the gas supply to each gas-using firm
is reduced by the same relative amount. We further assume a linear relation between the production
capacity of a gas-using firm and its gas inputs, where an X-% reduction in gas inputs leads to an
immediate X-% drop in output. Firms that are not using any gas in their production, however, do notexperience any direct decline in their production capacity (they could be affected by indirect impacts).

9Since we can match the two datasets only on employment numbers, even though the gas reports also include
a revenue threshold, we only consider the reporting criterion of employing more than 20 workers. This mightcause a downward bias in our estimates of the share of gas-using firms in a given industry. We have experimented
with manually correcting for this bias and found that our results are robust against slightly higher share estimates.

14
Note that in the EU-cooperation Scenario A, where there are strong countermeasures put in place, theshock to the industrial sector amounts to 1.1%. In the uncoordinated Scenario B, however, industries
face a direct shock to output, amounting to 5.6%. The right panel of Figure 5 shows the resulting direct
output reductions for the different sectors. In line with intuition, industries that face the highest gas
dependency experience the largest adverse hits to economic production. Note that the “Electricity”
sector does depend on gas, as shown in the left panel in Figure 5, but it doesn’t experience a directshock, shown in the right panel. As discussed in Section 2.3, the Electricity sector is a protectedconsumer and, therefore, not exposed to a gas shock.
3.2 Economic impact analysis
To quantify total economic impacts, i.e., direct shocks plus indirect impacts, we use a dynamic out-ofequilibrium input-output model which has recently been used to successfully forecast the economic
impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom ahead-in-time (Pichler et al., 2021). We adapt
this model for gas shortages by explicitly considering industrial gas usage in production and calibrating
gas usage according to the Austrian economy. In this model the economy initially rests in a steady state
until it experiences exogenous shocks, in this case due to shortages in gas inputs.
This model was designed to understand the upstream and downstream propagation of the industryspecific demand and supply shocks and was inspired in part by previous work on the response tonatural disasters (Hallegatte, 2008; Henriet et al., 2012; Hallegatte, 2014; Inoue & Todo, 2019). The
model includes a new functional form for industry-specific production functions based on a survey ofindustry analysts, and incorporates inventory dynamics, consumption, and labor market effects. For
the details of the model, we refer to the technical online appendix (Pichler et al., 2022).
In contrast to standard general equilibrium models as used, for example, in Bachmann et al. (2022),
our model is dynamic and simulates the economy on a 63 industry level on a daily resolution. We apply
the gas shocks to industries on June 1, and let the model evolve over two months. We report therelative reductions in gross output after two months, compared to pre-shock levels as our main results.
We simulate the model with different production functions and show results of estimated gross output
reductions in the blue ribbon in Figure 6 where the area indicates lower and upper bounds of economic
impacts10. Our model yields an upper bound of aggregate output reduction slightly above 16%
compared to pre-shock levels once the maximum shock to industry gas supply has been reached; see
Figure 4. The direct shocks hit an upper limit of slightly above 10% aggregate output reduction.
The figure illustrates the potential adverse economic consequences resulting from aggregate gas
shocks and indicates which impacts can be expected under different scenarios. We indicate the two
scenarios discussed in this policy brief with the two dashed vertical lines. The left line, indicating theEU-cooperation Scenario A, represents a –17.4% aggregate gas shock. These aggregate gas shocks
translate into a –1.1% direct shock to output and a –1.9% total aggregate impact after indirect effects
have been taken into account For the uncoordinated Scenario B, we observe a –5.6% direct shock togross output and a –9.1% overall negative impact on gross output.

10

The lower bound represents a linear production function, the upper bound a Leontief production function. The
relatively small distance between lower and upper bounds indicates that our model predicts limited downstream
shock propagation in the input-output network.

15

Figure 6. Aggregate economic impacts resulting from an aggregate gas shock. The x-axis denotes the overall reduction ingas supply, the y-axis the reduction in total gross output. The red line is the aggregate direct shock to gross output, the blue
ribbon indicates the range of total economic impacts predicted by the economic model. The lower bound of the ribbon is
obtained from simulating the model with a linear production function, the upper bound from a Leontief production function.
The dashed vertical lines indicate the two scenarios considered in this policy brief. The left line is the EU-cooperation ScenarioA, with an estimated 17.4% aggregate gas supply shock that leads to a 1.9% reduction in gross output. The right line is theuncoordinated Scenario B, where a 36.6% gas supply shock translates into a decline in economic production of 9.1%. The
model runs on a daily resolution and values presented here are obtained from simulating the economy for two months whena new steady state has been reached.

4 Limitations and uncertainties of our analysis
We emphasize that the present analysis is subject to several limitations. We divide them into
limitations concerning the supply and demand shock mitigation scenarios, and limitations in theeconomic analysis.
4.1. Supply and demand shock mitigation scenario limitations.
Note the large uncertainty between the cooperative and uncooperative scenarios. Policy makers on
the EU level have publicly stated plans to cooperate (European Commission, 2022) and cooperation inprevious crises, such as EU-wide coordinated Covid-19 vaccine procurement, suggest that thecooperative scenario is plausible. Further uncertainties arise around the EU plans to acquire additional
50 bcm LNG and additional 10 bcm gas through existing infrastructure in the next year. The assessmentof global liquifying and shipping potentials, as well as European re-gasification and transport
capabilities is beyond the scope of this policy brief. However, based on a detailed analysis of Fulwood
et al. (2022), the EU import goals seem possible. Here we assume – very conservatively – that the EU
only receives an additional 45 bcm of LNG within the next year, falling 10% short of their stated plans.
It is important to note that the scenarios presented here assume that one gas power plant in Austria,
the thermal power plant in Theiß, or equivalently, several plants with total generation capacities ofsimilar size, can be switched to oil in the short-term. In principle, several Austrian gas power plants
could be retrofitted to use different fuels. Thus, we assume some flexibility in switching fuels, but

16
acknowledge that there might be practical limitations to fuel switching that are not factored into theanalysis. Conversely, there might be additional fuel switching possibilities that we have not considered.
For example, due to a lack of more information, we did not consider fuel switching for district heating
which accounts for another 2.3% of gas consumption. To estimate gas savings through fuel switching
we employ a very simplified view of the Austrian power grid. For example, we do not take into accountthe possibility of importing electricity.
Given the short-term focus of the present study, technological adaptations or the possibility of a
massive ramp-up of renewable energy technologies are not considered. However, continuing highprices of natural gas will encourage substantial technological adaptations. Similarly, high gas prices
incentivize investments in renewable energy capacities which could substantially contribute to
reducing Austria’s dependency on natural gas in the mid- to long-term.
4.2. Economic model limitations.
Imperfect production functions. The second large source of uncertainty in the outcomes arelimitations in the economic analysis. Due to limited availability of data, we had to estimate the gas
dependency for each sector based on firm counts, which is obviously imperfect. Similarly, without
further details on underlying production functions, we assumed a linear relation between production
capacity and gas inputs for gas-using firms, even though in reality we expect substantial heterogeneity
across firms. While these estimates are imperfect, we stress that they can be improved as additional
information on gas usage in firms becomes available, for example through surveys.
Imperfectly observed supply networks. Since we use an economic model on the industry-level, we
assume that each industry produces a homogenous good. As a consequence, goods produced by nongas-using and gas-using firms are indistinguishable, which substantially reduces the potential ofdownstream shock propagation in the production network. If a gas-using firm produces very specificgoods, which are critical inputs to other firms, we are likely to underestimate the amplification of gas
supply shocks. We note, however, that this limitation is not specific to our study, but applies toessentially every macroeconomic model. Detailed data on firm-level supply network relationships areusually not available and are very hard to include in general equilibrium models. We emphasize that
our model could incorporate more fine-grained production network data and firm-level details if thedata were available.
Prioritizing some sectors. Due to the lack of detailed statistics on gas usage, we did not consider directshocks to the “Agricultural”, “Service”, and “Public sector”. For simplicity, these sectors are prioritizedover industrial sectors and thus are always served first. In case of gas shortages they could also be
considered for rationing which would free up additional gas for the industrial sectors.
Static prices. We point out that our analysis assumes time-invariant prices, no shifts in consumer
preferences, and no changes in international trade. An EU embargo of Russian gas would likely drive
prices for natural gas up, incentivizing firms to reduce demand and invest in alternative energy sources.
Similarly, households have an incentive to switch to alternative heating systems, such as heat pumps.
These effects would reduce the gas supply shock, although their magnitude and time-dependence are
difficult to quantify. We note that we have incorporated these effects to some extent exogenously by
assuming reductions in gas demand in industry and households, e.g., for heating.
No short-term substitution of gas inputs. Given the lack of additional data, we assume no possibility

17
of fuel switching in the industry, except for the energy sector where we assumed fuel switching forsome plants to help mitigate the initial gas supply shock. Other reductions in industrial gas dependency
most likely require retrofitting of gas-burning machines or substantial shifts in production mechanisms
in case of non-energetic gas use. We argue that our assumption is reasonable for the short time horizon
considered here but obviously wrong in the long run. In fact, substantial reductions in the gas
dependency is key for achieving the Paris climate goals and feasible over the next few years (AEA,2022).

5 Conclusion
5.1. Summary
In this policy brief we analyzed the possible economic impacts resulting from a sudden stop of Russian
gas imports to Austria. We first estimate the additional availability of natural gas for Austria in two
scenarios, an EU-cooperation Scenario A and an uncoordinated Scenario B, where Austria tries tosecure additional gas individually. We then quantify the likely reduction of natural gas available forindustrial production and simulate the overall economic impact on the Austrian economy with adynamic out-of-equilibrium input-output model.
Results show that through coordinated policy measures on the supply and demand side, a gas shock
can be substantially reduced. The economic damages to the economy are –1.9 in the EU-cooperation
scenario, but amount to a substantial reduction in gross output of roughly 9.1% in the uncoordinatedscenario. A similar economic shock size for the non-cooperation scenario is within the range ofpreviously reported studies, e.g., for Germany (Bachmann et al., 2022; Krebs, 2022; Bundesbank,2022). The estimated impact is comparable but somewhat lower than the effects from the Covid-19
pandemic where we have observed a 14% loss in GDP in the second quarter of 2020 (Eurostat, 2021).11
Therefore, a mix of previously used economic policy interventions like furlough schemes (“Kurzarbeit”)
can be repurposed to cushion the effects of the gas shock.
The model results imply a high sensitivity of gross output reduction depending on the aggregate gas
availability. For a reasonable range of aggregate gas shocks, an additional 1% decrease in aggregate
gas supply translates into a 0.3% decrease in gross output. Note that Austrian gross output amounted
to roughly 700 bn EUR in 202012, indicating that even policies leading to small improvements of gas
availability can have substantial positive effects on the economy, even when these measures are costly.
Note that even EU countries that are not dependent on Russian gas can benefit from cooperation withmore exposed countries. By accepting manageable reductions of their gas supply, countries
independent of Russian gas can avoid likely large economic downturns of highly exposed countries,
and, consequently, avoid potential EU-wide supply chain disruptions and adverse impacts on trade.
5.2. Policy implications
To cushion potential gas supply shortages, we identify several policies to mitigate possibly large
adverse economic impacts.

11Note, however, that our analysis is based on gross output, not GDP.
Obtained from Eurostat (code: naida_10_gdp) by summing gross value added and intermediate consumption(current prices).

1218
1. Need of European coordination in gas supply policies. In case of successful coordination on
the EU-level, Austria might experience only small adverse economic impacts. Ensuring
alternative sources of gas supply, as well as intelligent storage management, will prove key forcounteracting a sudden embargo of Russian gas.
2. Prepare power plants for fuel switching over the summer. Fuel substitutions in gas-poweredplants represent large potentials for mitigating gas shortfalls. The summer months, when gas
usage in electricity and heating is low, should be used to prepare for gas shortages in the wintermonths by ensuring flexibility in fuel switching for at least some of the largest power plants.
3. Incentivize changing production processes. Austria and the EU should incentivize the change
from gas-based production to gas-independent technologies, ideally to renewable energy
technologies to avoid counteracting long-term decarbonisation plans. Possible examples could
be investment subsidies or provision of cheap financing.
4. Incentivize changing heating systems. Austria and the EU should encourage the replacementof gas-based heating with renewable heating systems, including heat pumps and biomass.
Measures should be targeted at households, industries, and district heating plants. Possible
examples could be investment subsidies, provision of cheap financing and banning gas heaters
in new homes.
5. Investments in green energy technologies. The electricity sector is currently the largest single
user of natural gas which could be decarbonised fairly quickly by renewable energy
technologies and storage. Noting that renewable energy technologies by now represent thecheapest form of electricity (IEA, 2020), a massive ramp-up of these technologies would entail
large positive economic effects beyond reducing gas dependency (IRENA, 2014).
6. Encourage gas savings. Reducing room temperature, saving electricity, and reducing theconsumption of gas-intensive services and materials can mitigate the gas supply reduction toindustry. Compliance might be improved by clearly communicating that saving gas andelectricity can support the economy, and consequently saves jobs. A successful example isJapan after the Fukushima disaster where large public campaigns contributed to significant(interestingly persistent) savings in electricity consumption (Kimura, & Nishio, 2016).
5.3. Wider perspective
We complete our discussion by putting the potential consequences of a gas embargo in context withthe consequences of the ongoing war in Ukraine. In 2021 Austria imported Russian gas worth of 3.6 bn
EUR13 and the EU imports of Russian gas since the outbreak of the war have been estimated to almost
24 bn EUR at the time of writing (May 22, 2022) (CREA 2022). Europe’s imports of Russian gas therefore
are a major source of funds for the Russian attack in Ukraine.
As a consequence of the war, the IMF GDP forecasts for the EURO area have been revised downward
from January to April by 1.1%, resulting in more than 130 bn EUR (annualized) lost (IMF, 2022). Since
the beginning of the Russian invasion in February, the EU supported Ukraine financially and militarily
with more than 4 bn EUR, and rebuilding costs in Ukraine are in the range of trillions (Reuters, 2022).
These financial burdens do not compare to the human suffering that Ukrainians have endured andcontinue to endure as long as the war goes on. On top of this, the war exacerbates already record-high13

Official trade balances only show imports from regions, not countries. In 2021 Austria imported 3.6 bn EUR
from CIS of which Russia is a subset. Using data from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),
Austria’s gas dependency is fully explained by imports from Russia, Germany and its own production (in 2019).
Thus, most likely all of the 3.6 bn EUR has gone to Russia.

19levels of acute food insecurity with the potential of triggering further humanitarian crises across theglobe (FAO, 2022).
Our results suggest that adverse economic impacts could possibly be large if no sufficientcountermeasures are taken. However, in case of strong policy commitment, adverse consequences
could be substantially mitigated and, given the high costs of the ongoing war, also be a viable economic
strategy for the EU and its member states.

References
AEA (2022). Strategische Handlungsoptionen für eine österreichische Gasversorgung ohne Importe aus
Russland, Austrian Energy Agency, Technical report.
AGCS – Gas Clearing & Settlement (2022). Österreichischer Biomethanmarkt (Stand Anfang 2022),
https://www.biomethanregister.at/de/statistik, (accessed: 18.5.2022).
AGORA (April 2022), Energiesicherheit und Klimaschutz vereinen – Maßnahmen für den Weg aus der fossilen
Energiekrise. https://static.agoraenergiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2022/2022_03_DE_Immediate_Action_Programme/AEW_252_DE_Immediate_Programme_WEB.pdf.
APG (2022). Statistik der Netzregelung in der Regelzone APG,
https://www.apg.at/de/markt/netzregelung/statistik.
Bachmann, R., Baqaee, D., Bayer, C., Kuhn, M., Löoschel, A., Moll, B., Peichl, A., Pittel, K., Schularick, M. et al.
(2022). What if? The economic effects for Germany of a stop of energy imports from Russia, Technical report,
ECONtribute Markets & Public Policy.
BMK 2020. Notfallplan gemäß Artikel 8 und Artikel 10 der VERORDNUNG (EU) 2017/1938 DES EUROPÄISCHENPARLAMENTS UND DES RATES vom 25. Oktober 2017 über Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung der sicheren
Gasversorgung und zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 994/2010, https://www.bmk.gv.at ›NP_2019_V10_Clean_DE.
BMK, 2022. Energieversorgung in Österreich: Energielenkungsbeirat einberufen,
https://www.bmk.gv.at/service/presse/gewessler/20220225_energielenkungsbeirat.html.
CREA (2022). EU Member state spending on fossil fuel, https://beyond-coal.eu/russian-fossil-fuel-tracker/.
DOE (2022). How much energy could be saved by making small changes to everyday household behaviours? US
Department of Energy & Climate Change
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/128720/6
923-how-much-energy-could-be-saved-by-making-small-cha.pdf.
EnergyMonitor.at (2022). Gasverbrauch pro Stunde,
https://www.energymonitor.at/de/gas/consumption/hour/hour_aut.
European Commission (2022). REPowerEU: Joint European action for more affordable, secure and sustainableenergy, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511. Retrieved March 8th, 2022.
Eurostat (2021). Vorläufige Schnellschätzung für das vierte Quartal 2020. Pressemitteilung Euroindikatoren.
17/2021 – 2. Februar 2021.

20

EVN 2020. EVN Wärmekraftwerke GMbH – Wärmekraftwerke Umwelterklärung (2020),
https://www.evn.at/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=9c7a4344-f366-46dc-a5ff-eb0d68d0d440.
FAO 2022. Global Report on Food Crises, Technical report, May.
Fraunhofer IS (2022). Net electricity generation in Austria, https://energycharts.info/charts/power/chart.htm?l=en&c=AT&stacking=stacked_absolute_area.
Fulwood M., Honoré A., Sharples J., Hall M., OIES (2022). The EU plan to reduce Russian gas imports by twothirds by the end of 2022: Practical realities and Implications, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/theeu-plan-to-reduce-russian-gas-imports-by-two-thirds-by-the-end-of-2022-practical-realities-and-implications/.
Hallegatte, S. (2008). An adaptive regional input‐output model and its application to the assessment of theeconomic cost of Katrina. Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 28(3), 779-799.
Hallegatte, S. (2014). Modeling the role of inventories and heterogeneity in the assessment of the economic
costs of natural disasters. Risk analysis, 34(1), 152-167.
Henriet, F., Hallegatte, S., & Tabourier, L. (2012). Firm-network characteristics and economic robustness tonatural disasters. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36(1), 150-167.
Holz, F., Sogalla, R., von Hirschhausen, C. R. and Kemfert, C. (2022). Energieversorgung in Deutschland auchohne Erdgas aus Russland gesichert, Technical report, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW).
IEA (2020). World Energy Outlook. Technical Report.
IEA (2022). A 10-Point Plan to reduce the European Unions Reliance on Russian Natural Gas,
https://www.iea.org/reports/a-10-point-plan-to-reduce-the-european-unions-reliance-on-russian-natural-gas.
IEK (2022). Wie sicher ist die Energieversorgung ohne russisches Erdgas? Daten, Fakten und
Handlungsempfehlungen. Institut für Techno-ökonomische Systemanalyse (IEK-3), Technical Report, Jülich.
IMF (2022). World Economic Outlook, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/04/19/worldeconomic-outlook-april-2022, April.
Inoue, H., & Todo, Y. (2019). Firm-level propagation of shocks through supply-chain networks. Nature
Sustainability, 2(9), 841-847.
IRENA (2014). The Socio-economic Benefits of Solar and Wind Energy,
https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2014/Socioeconomic_benefits_solar_wind.pdf
Kimura, O., & Nishio, K. I. (2016). Responding to electricity shortfalls: Electricity-saving activities of households
and firms in Japan after Fukushima. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 5(1), 51-72.
Krebs, T. (2022). Auswirkungen eines Erdgasembargos auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktion
in Deutschland, Technical report, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
McWilliams, B., Sgaravatti, G., Tagliapietra, S. and Zachmann, G. (2022). Preparing for the firstwinter without Russian gas, accessed: 2022-05-10. https://www.bruegel.org/2022/02/preparing-for-the-firstwinter-without-russian-gas/ Bruegel-Blogs.
McWilliams, B., Sgaravatti, G. and Zachmann, G. (2022). European natural gas imports,
https://www.bruegel.org/publications/datasets/european-natural-gas-imports/ accessed: 2022-05-10.
Müller, S., Peter, F., Saerbeck, B., Burmeister, H., Heilmann, F., Langenheld, A., Lenck, T., Metz, J. and Steitz, J.
(2022). Energiesicherheit und Klimaschutz vereinen – Maßnahmen für den Weg aus der fossilen Energiekrise,21
Technical report, Agora Energiewende.
Nickel, M. and Bantle, C. (2022). Kurzfristige Substitutions- und Einsparpotenziale. Erdgas in Deutschland,Technical report, Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW).
OECD (2022). OECD Economic Outlook. Economic and social impacts and policy implications of the war in
Ukraine, Technical report, Interim Report March.
Pichler, A., Hurt, J., Reisch, T., Stangl, J., Thurner, S. (2022). Online technical appendix. Austria without Russian
natural gas? Expected economic impacts of a drastic gas supply shock and mitigation strategies. In preparation.
Reuters 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-plans-9-bln-euros-joint-borrowing-ukraine-morereconstruction-2022-05-18/ (accessed: May 22, 2022).
Statistik Austria (2022). Gütereinsatzdaten,
https://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/wirtschaft/produktion_und_bauwesen/guetereinsatzdaten/index.
html, (accessed 19.05.2022).
Statistik Austria (2022a). Gesamtenergiebilanz Österreich 1970 bis 2020
https://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/energie_umwelt_innovation_mobilitaet/energie_und_umwelt/en
ergie/energiebilanzen/index.html.
Statistik Austria (2022b). Nutzenergiekategorien Österreich 1994 bis 2020,
https://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/energie_umwelt_innovation_mobilitaet/energie_und_umwelt/en
ergie/nutzenergieanalyse/index.html.
Statistik Austria (2022c). Gütereinsatzdaten,
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/wirtschaft/produktion_und_bauwesen/guetereinsatzdaten/index.
html.
Statistik Austria (2022d). Leistungs- und Strukturdaten,
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/wirtschaft/produktion_und_bauwesen/leistungs_und_strukturdat
en/index.html.
Stolten, D. (2022). Wie sicher ist die Energieversorgung ohne russisches Erdgas? Technical report.
Wien Energie (2021). Umwelterklärung 2021, https://dokumente.wienenergie.at/wpcontent/uploads/umwelterklaerung-2021.pdf.
WKO (30.5.2022). Energie aus der Tonne, Wirtschaftsnachrichten, https://news.wko.at/news/wien/energieaus-der-tonne.html, (accessed: 18.5.2022).

AppendixTechnical details on the economic model and methodological approach used to derive these results
are presented in the online supplementary information.