F N C A N e w s le t t e r N o . 5
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management
C o n te n ts
 Report of FNCA Workshop2012
P.1 ‐ P.2

Marc h 2 0 1 2

 Topics from participating countries
P.3 ‐ 21

Issued by
Banglad esh A to mic
EnergyCommiss ion/N uclear
Safe ty Re search
Asso cia ti on(FNCA Se cre taria t,
JAPAN)

 Introduction of Project Leaders
P.22
 FNCA Framework

P.23

The FNCA Workshop on
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management (RS&RWM)
12 st ‐15 th December, 2011, Dhaka, Bangladesh

The FNCA 2011 Workshop on
Radiation Safety and Radioactive Waste
Management was held from December
12 to 15th 2011, in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
This Workshop was hosted by the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT) of
Japan and Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission(BAEC).
Fifteenrepresentatives from ten FNCA member
countries, namely Australia, Bangladesh,
China, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Malaysia, Mongolia, Thailand andVietnam participated in the workshop.

At Opening Session, Mr. A.S.M
Firoz, Chairman of BAEC, FNCA
Coordinator of Bangladesh gave thewelcome speech. Finally, Prof. Toshiso
Kosako, Professor of the University ofTokyo, Project Leader of Japan,
delivered the opening speech anddeclared the workshop opened. The
participants then presented their country
report detailing new information for the
FNCA consolidated report drafted in2010 as well as updates on RS&RWM intheir countries followed by questions andanswers.
In the morning of the second day, theparticipants made presentation on thechallenges of radiation safety and waste
management issue. In the afternoon,
participant discussed lesson learned from
Fukushima and other Nuclear/Radiation
accidents,
emergency
radiation
monitoringandresponse
plans.
Participants from Thailand delivered apresentation referring to lesson learned
from radiological accident. Prof. Toshiso
Kosako explained radiation effect after
the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP
accident. Participants from Indonesia,

The 2011 RS&RWM Workshop in Dhaka, Bangladesh

1Fourth day started with the session
VI:
titled Wrap-up Discussion–
Summary of Workshop and Future
Proposals. All sessions were reviewed
and the participants agreed that
information sharing through thisworkshop was beneficial and fruitful.
Information was exchanged with newmember countries, Mongolia andKazakhstan, bringing wider points ofview. It was also stressed that sharing
lessons learned from Fukushima andother nuclear accidents were meaningful
and would contribute to further
improvements in safety assurance ineach country. The future steps andschedule for project activities 2011-2012
were discussed. Participants agreed tokeep the report updated by providing
new information and work together
toward completion of its 2nd edition of
consolidated report, which is scheduled
to be released during this phase (20112013). Drafted Reports from Kazakhstan
and Mongolia would be reflected to theexisting report and uploaded on the
FNCA website by the end of March
2012. The workshop minutes weredrafted and agreed by all the participants.

Malaysia and Vietnam gave a talk on
lesson learned, response and spent fuelcrisis to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
NPP accident. Each presentation was
followed by a discussion on the key
points raised.
On the third day Session IV & V:
Technical Tour–Case Study of Atomic
EnergyResearch
Establishment(AERE)– Participants visited 3MW
MARK-II research reactor, Central
Waste Processing and Storage Facility(CWPSF), Tandem Accelerator Facilities,
Radio Isotope Production Laboratory(RIPL), Institute of Radiation andPolymer Technology and Secondary
Standard
Dosimetry
Laboratory.
Comments were made by member
countries on improvements they could
recommend to Bangladesh and also theimprovements that they could makehaving seen the Bangladesh facilities.
There
were
discussions
aboutinteragency co-operation between FNCA
and the IAEA and recruitment andtraining of staff with the development in
the nuclear power within the region.
There was a focus on safety
improvements necessary.

Radio Isotope Production Laboratory

Tandem Accelerator Facilities
2Topics from Participating Countries
In the past 12 months 5000 L ofliquid waste has been evaporated to a dry
volume of 300 L. The wastes processedusing the drum dryer include low levelaqueous liquid wastes generated on site,
some of which contain high chloride
levels. The potential corrosion risk has
been addressed through the use ofstainless steel drums.

Australia
Mr. Lubi Dimitrovski
Australian Nuclear Science & Technology
Organisation (ANSTO)

Update on ANSTO Radioactive
Waste Management Process and
HIFAR Decommissioning

The DD has also been used to dry
sludges and spent resin which needs tobe dried before long term storage.
Around 24 drums of resin and 50 drumsof concrete sludge (from Moata
decommissioning) have been dried in thepast 18mths. Issues identified from thecommissioning process include elevateddose rates due to the concentration ofactivity.

Current drum dryer operations on
LLLW and future for Mo99 LLLW
ANSTO
has
completedcommissioning of a drum dryer for thetreatment of low level liquid wastes
generated on site. The drum dryer units
are comprised of a clam shell typeheating element in which 200 L steel
drums are enclosed and mounted on aflat bottom heating element. Liquid
waste is fed through the lid of the drum
dryer and the vapour is extracted as thewaste evaporates to a dry solid undervacuum. The volume reduction achieved
is approximately 94%.

The drum dryer is being investigated
for the treatment of liquid waste from thesecondary separation stage in Moly-99
production. This waste is very active but
will decay relatively quickly as it
contains mainly short lived radionuclides.
The liquid waste is currently being
collected/stored and will be transferred
into the new B20B facility for treatment
when it is operational. The drum dryer
will provide a volume reduction of 80%,based on current solid loadings. The
concentrated dried material in the drum
will be classified as ILW and will
require shielded storage pending final
packaging for the repository.

B20B Waste Treatment andConditioning upgrade projects
Segmented Gamma Scanner
A Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS)
has been installed and commissioned in
the upgraded B20B waste processing
facility. The device can automaticallyscan 200 L drums on a conveyor belt
system prior to the drum being supercompacted for final packaging.

Figure 1: Drum dryer units

3

The SGS can handle drums withhigher dose rates; it has a shutter which
automatically adjusts to reduce the deadtime of the detector and corrects themeasurement accordingly. The automatic
input and output conveyors reducemanual handling and dose to theoperators of the SGS and increases theprocess throughput.

Proposed LLSW packages
As Australia does not yet have a low
level waste repository, there is no Waste
Acceptance Criteria for a repository.
ANSTO has commenced discussions
with the regulator ARPANSA to
introduce a generic WAC to allow for
the start of commissioning ANSTO
waste. There are several options that
ANSTO is investigating, but the main
package will be a type A package which
will hold around 1200L of waste andsealed with grout. The package will holdsuper-compacted 200L drums.

HIFAR decommissioning
Australia’s first research reactor,
HIFAR was operated from 1960 to 2007.
The 10MW reactor utilised 25 fuelelements and was cooled and moderated
by heavy water (D2O). The reactor was
shut down in 2007 following thecommissioning of the replacement
reactor OPAL. Staged decommissioningof HIFAR is to be carried out in thefollowing stages:
Phase A – Closure

Figure 2: Segmented Gamma ScannerPhase B – Care & Maintenance
Permacon Decontamination Centre

Phase C – Decommissioning

A new decontamination centre(Permacon) is being built in B20B andwill be constructed of modular stainlesssteel panels. The structure will becomprised of separate chambers to allow
the use of different decontamination
techniques, such as blasting (water, grit,
CO2, etc.) and acid soaking, etc. The
centre is designed to enable shipping
containers of material to be directly
unloaded from the truck and brought into
the building. The contents of theshipping container can then be placed
directly into the decontamination facility
for processing. This reduces the amountof handling required, as well as theamount of radioactive waste generated.

Phase D – Return to Green Field
Phase A of the decommissioning
process is substantially complete. Thiswas commenced in February 2007 withthe removal of the fuel to cooling pondstorage. In the first 12 months following
shut down the core was fully unloaded,fuel sheared and removed, the heavy
water drained, control arms removed andshift staffing ceased.

4

Bangladesh
Dr. Moinul Islam and Md.Abu Haydar
Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission(BAEC)

Environmental Radiation
Monitoring around the AERE
CampusTaking into account the possible
impact of a powerful tsunami generated
by a magnitude-9.0 earthquake out at sea
slams into the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant, damaging four ofsix reactors at the site, Bangladesh
atomicenergy commission took
initiative to conduct an extensive
background radiation survey programme
in several important locations around thecountry.
As a part of national radiation
monitoring programme gamma dose
rates measured daily in ten important
locations around Atomic Energy
Research Establishment (AERE), Savarsite. The maximum average gamma
dose rates remain at (0.08-0.18)Sv/h,whilst the measured values for thesurface activity were reported ranging
from(0.14-0.34)
Bqcm-2.
The
background radiation survey programme
has been performed by using calibrated
radiation survey meter e.g, Graetz X5
DE, Serial No.: 53079, Germany,
Radionuclide
Identifinder(identiFINDER, Serial No: 3555 –304,
Germany), Austral Rad Mini 8-in-1,
Serial No-1123 and Contamination
Monitor (DKS-96, No-029 2003). All
the measured values were found within
the range of local natural backgroundradiation levels.

Fig 1. Map of background radiation monitoring andsampling location for the land area within 5 km of the
AERE campus (courtesy: Shanjib Karmaker)
LocationsGamma Dose
Rate (µSvhr-1)

AERE Rubber Garden
AERE School & College

0.10
0.08

Surface
Activity(Bqcm-2)0.34
0.30

National Institute of
Biotechnology Gate
Mid Point F & E Type
Quarters
Training InstituteCafeteria
AERE Main Gate
Mid Point of NMU, EI &SIUInstitute of Food &Radiation Biology (IFRB)
Institute of Nuclear science& Technology (INST)

0.07

0.14

0.08

0.30

0.08
0.07
0.18
0.08

0.32
0.14
0.34
0.29

0.10

0.32

0.09

0.31

Table: Gamma dose rates and surface activity at
different locations around AERE Campus

5In addition, different environmental
samples (e.g, rainwater, lake water, grass,vegetables, fruits, soil, etc) were alsocollected on March 15, 2011 to till todate from in and around AERE campus.
The environmental samples wereanalysed by using a 40% relative
efficiency of HPGe detector. The gamma
spectral of all of the environmental
samples did not show any dominant  lines due to artificial radionucldes.
It is also reported that radiationlevels did not exceeded the normal
background limit around the country. No
remarkable
impactofradiation
distribution was observed at any location
around the country due to Fukushima
Daiichi NPP accident.

Japan(1)Prof. Toshiso Kosako,
University of Tokyo,
Mr. Hiroyuki Murakami,
Japan Atomic Energy Agency

Activities of Japan Atomic Energy
Agency on Human Resources
Development in the fields ofnuclear and radiation engineering
The history of Human Resources
Development (HRD) in the field of
nuclear energy in Japan was initiated at
the Radio-isotope School of Japan
Atomic Energy Research Institute(JAERI) in 1958. Since then, it has been
carried out persistently by the Japan
Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA),
established by the integration of JAERIand Japan Nuclear Cycle Development
Institute (JNC) in 2005, and Nuclear
Human Resource Development Centre(NuHRDeC) has been taking a leadingrole of its activities as one of JAEA’svital missions. The HRD activities at
NuHRDeC are conducted in line withgovernmental policy and programs, aim
at comprehensive nuclear education andtraining. The main missions at
NuHRDeC are composed of 1)
Education and training for national
nuclear engineers, 2) Cooperation with
universities 3) International training andcooperation and 4) Activities for Japan
Nuclear HRD Network.

Fig 2. Analysed Gamma spectrum of anenvironmental sample obtained from HPGe 
spectrum detector

1.
Education and Training for
National Nuclear Engineers
Table 1 shows the annual program ofnational training courses conducted at
NuHRDeC for nuclear engineers, RI &radiationengineersandnational
examinees. The total number ofparticipants from industries, researchorganizations
andcentral/local
government amounts to approximately
110,000 since 1958.

6

Training Course for Radioisotope and Radiation Engineers
Basic

Basic Radiation Course
15 days: once/yRadiation Safety Management Course
14 days: once/ySpecialRadiation Protection Basic Course
4 weeks: once/yst
1 Class Radiation Protection/Supervisor Course 5 days: 8 times/y
Legal Qualification
3rd Class Radiation Protection/Supervisor
2 days: 3 times/yCourseTraining Course for Nuclear Engineers
General Nuclear
Nuclear Beginner’s Course
4 weeks: once/yReactor Engineering
Reactor Engineering Course
3-6 months: once/ySpecialIntroductory Neutron Experiment Course
3 days: once/yTraining Course for National Examinees
Reactor Engineering
Licensed Reactor Techniques Supervisor
10 days: twice/y
Nuclear and Radiation
Professional Engineer on Nuclear and Radiation 10 days: once/ySpecial Radiation
Radiation Protection Supervisor
7 days: once/ySpecial Nuclear Fuel
Nuclear Fuel Protection Supervisor
8 days: once/yTable 1 National Training Courses

2. Cooperation with Universities
Making effective use of facilities andvast human resources at JAEA,
NuHRDeC coordinates many activities
withuniversities,
forinstance,
dispatching of visiting professors andlecturers, accepting students for researchstudies, cooperation with Professional
Graduate School of the University ofTokyo and promoting a remoteeducation system, named Japan Nuclear
Education Network (JNEN).

Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Thailand and Vietnam. The purpose of
ITC is to develop self-sustainable
instructors in Asian countries, who are
expected to disseminate knowledge andtechnology of nuclear energy in theircountries (Photos 1 and 2). FTC is
combination with ITC, dispatching
Japanese experts to Asian countries togive technical supports at training
courses organized by local instructors.
NuHRDeC is also actively involved in
the wide spectrums of cooperative
activities in radiation application andnuclear power fields, under theframeworks of Forum for Nuclear
Cooperation in Asia (FNCA) by Japan
Atomic Energy Commission, and Asian
Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN) andAsian Network for Education in Nuclear
Technology (ANENT) of IAEA.

3.
International
training
andcooperation
NuHRDeC is also focusing on theinternational nuclear HRD through aunique program named “Instructor
Training Program (ITP)” under special
budgets of the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports and Technology (MEXT)
since 1996. ITP consists of three
categories; Instructor Training Course(ITC), Follow-up Training Course (FTC)and Nuclear Seminars (see Table 2).
Currently, ITP is applied to various
Asian countries; Bangladesh, China,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia,

7Instructor Training Program in Japan
Reactor Engineering
Environmental Radiological Monitoring
Nuclear and Radioactive Emergency Preparedness Course
Follow up Training Course in Asian countries
Reactor Engineering Course
Environmental Radiological Monitoring Course
Nuclear and Radioactive Emergency Preparedness Course
Nuclear Seminar in Japan
Reactor Plant Safety Seminar
Administration Seminar
Site location for Reactor Facility Seminar
Basic Knowledge on Radiation and Emergency medicine for School
Education

8 weeks: once/y
6 weeks: once/y
6 weeks: once/y

1-2 weeks:
once/y4 weeks: once/y3 weeks: once/y
1 week: once/y2 weeks: once/yTable 2: Instructor Training Programand academia in its field has increasingly
become an important aspect of HRD
activities. In order to conduct andpromote national and international HRD
activities in strategic and integrated
manner, effectively and efficiently inclose collaboration with internationalorganizations, the Japan Nuclear HRD
Network (JN-HRD Net) was establishedin November 2010, and NuHRDeC plays
an important role in hub as Secretariat of
JN-HRD Net in cooperation with Japan
Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF).

Photo 1: Reactor Simulator (JRR-1) Training (ITC)5.

HRD Activities after Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Accident
Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident inMarch, 2011, has brought serious
impacts on various fields. But theaccident made us realized that thenuclear HRD is quite important andshould have high priority for keeping
worldwide nuclear facilities safe andstable. HRD in the fields of radiationand nuclear safety is now muchemphasized
andpromoted.
The
cooperation among Nuclear HRD relatedorganizations in Japan and cooperation
with foreign countries and internationalorganizations are being set forward.

Photo 2: Exercise on Environmental
Radiological Monitoring (ITC)

4. Japan Nuclear HRD Network
As global expansion of nuclear
power utilization, promoting further
cooperation among industry, government

8

NuHRDeC, JAEA has conducted HRD
activities for radiation workers at
Fukushima nuclear power plant anddecontamination workers in the area of
Fukushima prefecture since August,2011. In Japan, it is also quite important
to disseminate the knowledge onradiation into ordinary people, and thus
NuHRDeC is also putting emphasis on
holding some basic radiation seminars
for them.

Fukushima area. The electric companies
are also offering supplies to Fukushima
area and the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant.
Main activities are as follows:○ Manpower assistanceA large amount of radioactive
materials were released inside/outside of
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant immediately after the TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
accident. Led by the Fukushima Support
Headquarters, the power companies, incollaboration with TEPCO and thecentraland
local
governments,
conducted activities such as screening
for radioactive contamination forworkers engaged in recovery work on
their way out of the NPP at a distance ofmore than 20 km away from the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP. In addition, abody surface radioactive contamination
screening for people of Fukushima
prefecture was carried out in various
places in Fukushima prefecture.
Since the emission of radionuclides
from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP
decreased,
environmental radiation
monitoring had been weekly conducted
at about fifty locations inside the 20km
No-Entry Zone. In August 2011, theresidents whose houses were locatedwithin 20km No-Entry Zone werepermitted to pay a temporary visit totheir home, and some of them broughtback their cars. In accordance with it, aradioactive contamination screening of
the human body and belongings was
implemented.

Figure 3: Training for Decontamination Workers
in Fukushima Prefecture

Japan(2)Prof. Toshiso Kosako,
The University of Tokyo,
Mr. Yasushi Nakamura,
The Japan Atomic Power Company

An industry organization of electricutilities called Federation of ElectricPower Companies of Japan set up an
Fukushima Support Headquarter with theaim of expanding the assistance in field
activities carried out in Fukushima areaby electric power companies as well as
addressing mid and long term technicalissues such as treatment and disposal ofradioactive waste generated from the
Tokyo
ElectricPower
Company(TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant with a unified
efforts by the industry.
Led by the Fukushima Support
Headquarters, each electric company has
been providing manpower assistance inFigure 1.
Environmental
Radiation
Monitoring9

○Influence of released radioactive
materials on other nuclear power
plantsFigure 2. Radioactive contamination
screening○Provision of supplies
Led by the Fukushima Support
Headquarters, the power companies
have been providing supplies such asradiation protection suits, masks, andradiation measuring devices for therecovery work at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Radioactive materials released
from the TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi NPP were detected bynation-wide
environmental
monitoring.
Monitoring
posts
showed an increase in air dose rate
at Tohoku-Electric Power Co.
Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant,
located 100 km away from theTEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP, aswell as at some nuclear facilities in
Ibaraki prefecture such as The
Japan Atomic Power Company(JAPC) Tokai No.2 Power Station.

Graph 1. Readings at Monitoring Post of Nuclear Facilities
around TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP after the Accident
Onagawa NPP
Kashiwazaki-Kariya NPP
Tokai No.2 NPP
Hamaoka NPP
Oui NPP
Fugen
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
Nuclear Fuel Industries. Ltd.(Tokai works)
Nuclear Fuel Industries. Ltd.(Kumatori works)
Global Nuclear Fuel JapanAir Dose Rate

Onagawa NPP

Tokai No.2
NPP

Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd(Tokai Works)

10

Air Dose Rate increased at
Onagawa, Tokai No.2, andprocessing facilities in
Ibaraki Prefecture

SPORO-97.Activities are realizedaccording to license :- RAW treatment, GLA # 0002458 of
29.07.2010.
RAW Acceptance and transportation are
performed due to Protocol “Transfer andstoring radioactive waste from RK
companies and institutions to CRR
Baikal-1” # 2035 of 23.11.2007.

Kazakhstan
Mr. Yuriy ALEINIKOVNational Nuclear Centre of the Republic of
Kazakhstan

Treatment with Radioactive Waste.
RAW Location, Transportation andLong-term storage at the Complex of
Research Reactors «Baikal-1»

RAW Long-term storing consists of:- IAE auto vehicle;- Radiation-protection chamber;- RAW temporary storage;- RAW long-term storage;- Transport-and-technological system.
RAW is transported
in shipping
casks of special-equipped auto cars
intendedforregularRAW
transportation. Each car has sanitarycertificate. Officers of the Ministry ofInternal Affairs accompany cars if
required. Special Car is equipped withradiation protection –screening device,items to fix packages, enclosed van-typebody, emergency set and remote jaw.

CRR Baikal-1 is located at the areaof former Semipalatinsk Test Site, 65
km far to the South from Kurchatov.

In 1993 the Ministry of Science and
New Technologies
held a meeting
where it was decided to setup Storage ofspent Ionization Radiation Sources (IRS)
on the basis of Test Bench Baikal-1 ,Institute of Atomic Energy, National
Nuclear Center RK (Kazakhstan).
In January, 1995
phase 1 oftechnological complex Baikal-1 was put
into operation to store IRS and solidradioactive waste.
Activities related to RAW transportationand long-term storagearerealized in compliance withthefollowing normative legal documents on
RAW treatment:- Atomic Energy Usage Law (1997);- Public Radiation Safety Law (1998);- Radiation Safety Rules , NRB-99»;-Sanitation-and-epidemiologicalrequirements to provide radiation safety
SETORB-2010»;- Sanitary rules to treat with RAW,IAE vehicle to transport RAW

11

Loading-unloading RAW casks

RAW temporary storage

Radioactive-protective chamber (RPC)
Transferring party prepared and loaded RAW
casks with present of IAE representative.

Measuring object
RAW packaging:On the surface
Against the surface 1m far
Special vehicle:
In any point of external surface
2m far from any point of
external surface
In driver's cab

Technical characteristics of build357:
thickness of the outer walls – 800 mm;
thickness of the inner walls - 600 mm;
thickness of reloading hatch plugs – 600
mm;
length of a big cell – 15 m;
width of a big cell - 5 m;
the construction height - 8 m.

accepted level
mSv/h (mR/h)
2,0 (200)
0,1 (10)2,0 (200)0,1
0,011 (1,1)

Gantry crane –Accepted levels of exposure rate

Gamma- therapeutic ends andKolos, Stebel-type facilities with highactivity IRS were accepted anddisposed for long-term storing at CRR
Baikal-1.
SpecialLong-term RAW storage facility

12
Special constructions and equipment

Creation of radiation protective chamber
and the long-term storage of radioactivelProject “Creation of the radiation
protective chamber and the long-term
storage facility of SRAW (solidradioactive wastes) at CRR “Baikal1”” IAE NNC RK
A Feasibility Study for the project“Creation of the radiation protective
chamber and the long-term storage
facility of SRW (solid radioactive
wastes) at CRR “Baikal-1”” IAE NNC
RK is developed to increase the volume
and nomenclature of RAW accepted forprocessing and storage. According to2005 costs the project implementation
cost is 4 320 mln. tenge.
Complex ofprocessing
andstorage of radioactive wastes is supposed
to be created on the basis of the existing
infrastructure for radioactive and nuclear
materials treatment of the Instituteof Atomic
Energy,National
Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan ("Baikal1“ site).

13

1. National Workshop on PublicInformation and Involvement in
Low Level Radioactive waste
Repository development, 10-12
January 2011

Malaysia
Dr. Norasalwa Zakaria
Dr. Mohd Abd Wahab Yusof
Malaysian Nuclear Agency

Speakers:
Mr. Lumir Nachmilner from
IAEA
ii. Ms. Marie Dufkova, Public
Relations Specialist from Czech
Republic.
iii. Ms. Irena Daris from ARAO,
Agency for Radwaste
Management Sloveniai.

Public Information and Public
Acceptance Development
Program For Low Level Waste
Disposal
Learning from our own pastexperiences in managing disposal of
NORM and low level radioactive waste,
Malaysia recognized the need of
involving the public in the course ofdeveloping a sustainable waste disposal
program in Malaysia.
At times, it may be seems difficult tounderstand the uppermost issues andconcerns of the members of the public
relating to safety and radioactive waste
disposal. Often, the perspective from thetechnical persons clashed with those oflay persons. This has led to creation ofvarious syndromes such as NIMBY (Not
In My Backyard), and BANANA (Built
Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near
Anyone), to name a few. Waste disposal
is indeed a national issue but requires alocal solution. Therefore communicating
the information, the risks and thebenefits to all the stakeholders areimperative as to assist them understandthe overall scenario while at the sametime the sensation of fear, worry andemotions are equally addressed. Public
understanding and communication holdthe key towards public acceptance.
In this spirit, two workshops on
PublicInformation
andPublicAcceptance were organized in 2011 atnational and international level with theassistance of IAEA. The details of theworkshop are summarized as below.

2. IAEA Workshop on Building
Partnership in Waste Disposal
Programme 31 Oct- 2 November
2011
Speakers:
i. Mr. Peter Omai from IAEA
ii. Ms. Meritxell Martell from
Merience Strategic Thinking,Spainiii. Mr. Veijo Ryhanen, Corporate
Advisor from TVO Finland
The first workshop was conducted at
the national level while the second
workshop was conducted at international
level with participants from Egypt,
Poland, Indonesia, Pakistan, Romania,
South Africa, Turkey, Philippines andMalaysia. Many interesting topics were
presented and discussed, among those
were:
i.

Challenges in public communication
for radioactive waste disposal issue
ii. Concept of partnershipiii. Societal aspects in radioactive waste
disposal program
iv. Understanding attitudes and relation
towards acceptancev. Siting and local/ community
partnershipvi. Stakeholder
involvement
anddisposal programvii. Stakeholders motivation

14

partnership is to provide opportunities tohelp shape the project to the benefit andwell being of its residents, today and in
the future. It is also a platform for formal
or informal arrangements for joint
problem solving and a platform fordiscussions on how the project cancontribute to the overall good of hostcommunity.
The IAEA workshop on building
partnership concluded with a mock up of
public communication session with theparticipants role play as the Greenpeace
activists, local community, waste
disposal agency representative andtechnical experts. It appears to be a very
effective way of applying the knowledge
gained throughout the workshop. A
successful program on partnershipenables real progress to take place while
reducing the amount of time spends,
saving costs and other resources.

viii. Economic incentives to support
selecting site and construction ofwaste management facilities
Communicating the waste disposal
program to the public although may lookcomplicated and challenging, but surely
is not an impossible mission. This could
be achieved via several strategies thatcan be adopted and followed.
Nevertheless, one of the important
aspects in the communication is themessage send to the public. Hence, thisrequires a communication plan to beproperly designed, tailored to the target
audience, including those of supporting
programs such as education at schooland etc.
Again, at this point, it is clearly
understood that the success of PublicInformation and Public Acceptance inwaste disposal program requires soft
sk ill like communicat ion. Equall yimportant is to acknowledge values andfears in the society pertaining radioactive
waste management. Only then, theco nflict ing int erest is harmo nized.
Once the conflicting interest isharmonized, the waste disposal project
developer and the potential hostcommunity can work together in thespirit of partnership. The aim ofpartfffffff

15

The Philippines

Figure 1 shows the preferred site
selected for the co-location project. The
site is a public domain, permanent forest
with no tenurial application and issituated approximately 400-km north of
Manila. Project site is underlain byandesitic volcanic rocks and has about
34 hectares of potential land use
development.
Preliminary
safetyassessment indicated no major obstacles
that will support the continuous
investigation of the site.

Ms. Maria V. B. Palattao
Mr. Carl M. Nohay
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute(PNRI)

Challenges of Site Investigation
for the Co-location of a Deep Boreholeand Near Surface Radioactive Waste
Facilities in the Philippines
The Philippines has been undertaking
a radioactive waste repository project
designed for its radioactive waste
generated throughout the years. The
repository will accommodate mostly low
level radioactive waste from the various
non-power applications of radioactive
materials.
High active radioactive
sources including radium needles arealso present in the inventory but cannot
go into the surface repository fortechnical reasons. Additional source ofwaste will be from the ongoing
decommissioning of the Philippine
Research Reactor. The reactor waste is
expected to be mostly low level and will
be accommodated in the near surface
facility.
Initially, the site is being
evaluated for a near-surface facility(NSF) only.
However, to optimize
resources and take advantage of thebenefits
providedbysharedinfrastructures
and
R&D
work,
notwithstanding the current program andvolume of waste produced in the country,
the co-location of two disposal concepts
is being explored.

The next step of the investigation
program involved finding monolithic
bedrock at the site to co-locate the deep
borehole facility. The location of themonolith should be contained within thesame general vicinity or footprint of the
NSF. At the same time, care must be
taken that one facility should not affectthe other as far as potential discharges
occur into the far future. This proved to
be a challenge as all the previous
boreholes that have been drilled so far
have revealed fractured bedrock. This
has also been observed in the generalvicinity where landslide scars aboundand is indicative of weak bedrock. Given
these conditions, an application of a 2dimensional electrical resistivity survey
involving two almost parallel 1-km longelectrical resistivity lines (Lines 1 and 2)
was undertaken. The aim of the study
was to verify geological structures andlithological profiles of the site. The 2
resistivity lines are a combination of 20
individual electrical resistivity lines
conducted at 205 meters surface length
to cover the displacement of data
analysis at every edge of the profile.
Both lines traversed the undulating toplateau-peak and side slope terrain
where the vaults are to be constructed.
Refer to Figures 2 and 3. Results of thesurvey ware analyzed using 2-D Wenner
Inversion Technique.
Geologicalfractures were identified by the verticalresistivity layers and locations withhigher resistivity profile with no

Figure 1. The preferredsite locatedapproximately 400-km
north of Manila
16suspected geological fractures wereconsidered for the purpose. No evidenceof fault or displacement was detectedalong the 2 lines.

NPP incident. Although the community
hosting the preferred site provided its
initial consent and support, this does notnecessarily translate to outright andsmooth approval of the project.
Different perceptions and anxieties areagain experienced from the local
government and members of the generalpublic towards the continuous evaluationand investigation of the site. A step up
approach in doing a more aggressiveawareness seminars, coordination andinteraction should be pursued in all
sectors of society starting from thegrassroots to the higher echelons of thegovernment. The extent of the program
and the availability of resources, notonly financial but also on the design of
public acceptance program including the
choice of experienced and appropriate
speakers, are challenges that need full
support for the project to see the light in
the near future.

Figure 2. Layout of the 2-resistivity lines

Acknowledgment:This project is being carried out withtechnical
assistancefrom
theInternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).

Figure 3. Part of the electrical resistivity ofLine 2.

In parallel with the on-going
technical investigations, efforts need tobe escalated to address the societal
impact of the project. The Philippines
with a relatively small nuclear program
has been faced with the same issues andproblems besetting radioactive waste
repository projects.
Added to thisproblem is the recent Fukushima-Daichii

17

Thailand
Ms. Nanthavan Ya-anant
Mr. Chanatip Tippayakul
Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology(TINT)

Safe Management of Radioactive
Waste from the Maintenance of theThai Research Reactor
Fig.1 View of the TRR-1/M1 on operation

Introduction
The Thai Research Reactor, TRR1/M1 has been used for radio-isotope
production, gem colorization, and otherresearch and development at theThailandInstituteofNuclearTechnology (TINT).
The TRR-1/M1 pool is located in thereactor building. The pool is rectangularin shape and divided into two sections
by means of a removable watertightaluminum gate. The main experimental
section is 3.2 m long, 3.5 m wide
and 8.5 m deep (as referred by“small-section”). The second section is
5.5 m long, 3.5 m wide and 8.5 m
deep (as referred by“large-section”). The photo of the TRR1/M1 (when it was operated) is shownin Figure 1.
In the early 2012, the “smallsection” pool was scheduled during the
mid of February until the mid of
March forthe maintenancebycleaning the pool surface (as shown in
Figure 2), and re-painting the wall,
included removing foreign objects andhighly activated materials from the pool.

Fig.2 Cleaning the pool surface complex

During typical operation, the reactor
core is positioned in the small-section
which is the main experimental area.
There are a number of fixed irradiation
facilities in the small- section. These
include thermal column, void tank andneutron beam ports. The thermalcolumn is a pile of graphite blocks
enclosed in aluminum housing. The voidtank is simply an aluminum structurewith two irradiation facilities. Fourneutron beams are attached to the voidtank and go through the pool walls. The
materials of these facilities are constantly
activated during typical irradiation.
Most of the irradiation facilities are
made from high purity aluminum alloy
with few small parts (bolts and nuts)
made from stainless steel. The over viewof Thai Research Reactor TRR-1/M1
system is shown in Figure 3.

18

R/hr. These hotspots are from the bolts
and nuts which align the void tank andneutron beams in their designed
positions. It is believed that the bolts
and nuts are made from stainless steel.
Those 4 sets of bolts and nut were
removed and became radioactive
wastes. The instrument identified that
Co-60 is the main nuclide in those
activated parts (SS). Those highactivity parts were taken into a leadcontainer and placed into concrete
shielded container (200 L drum) as
shown in Figure 5, and thentransported to the storage facility atRadioactive
WasteManagement
Center (WMC). The waste streams
from the whole maintenance project
are estimated, and radioactive waste
management activities are performed
as described in Table1(page 21 and 22).

Fig.3 Overview of Thai Research Reactor
TRR-1/M1 system

Management of Radioactive Waste
from the Maintenance of TRR-1/M1
The
Radioactive
WasteManagement Center (WMC) is incharge of safe managing ofradioactive wastes which generated
during the maintenance operation.
The project policy is to minimize
theradioactive
wastebyappropriate measures and goodplanning. These measures include: Reusing personal protective
clothing as much as possible
 Segregating
non-radioactive
waste from radioactive waste Optimizing work plan andactivities in terms of radioactive
waste generation
 Controllingspreadofcontamination by contamination
monitoring measures
Radioactive
Waste
from
the
activation products in the pool
The measured dose rate showshigh radiation field in the in-poolarea. There are two main hotspots (asshown in Figure 4) which haveradiation dose of approximately 20

Fig 4. Two hot spots in the reactor pool
19

Fig 5. Activated Parts (SS) in shielded container and storage at WMC

Table 1 Waste Streams and Radioactive Waste Management
Waste Stream

SourceRadioactive
ConstituentsVolumeor Weight

Characterization
MethodPackaging

Upper
Fraction Pool
Water

Draining ofreactor PoolNone

60 m-3-Pool Chemistrydata-Radiologicalanalysis by
gamma
spectrometer(MCA) andgross alpha/beta
by gasproportionalcounter-Pool Chemistrydata-Radiologicalanalysis by
gamma
spectrometer(MCA) andgross alpha/beta
by gasproportionalcounter-Radiologicalanalysis by
gamma
spectrometer(MCA) andgross alpha/beta
by gasproportionalcounter
Radionuclide
analysis by
gamma
spectrometer(MCA)
GM meter and
Identifier

None

Bottom thirdof pool water

After 4 sets ofbolts + nuts
removalCo-60 +
othersResidual Pool
Water

Final rinse ofpool

Co-60 +
othersIon Exchange
ResinsPool watercleanup

Co-60
potentiallyhigh doserate

50 literPre-filter

Pre-filter for
filtering of poolwater before
Ion Exchange

Co-60
potentiallyhigh doserate< 1 kgAppropx2’
x 2’

Background)

30 m-310 m-320

Treatment or
disposition
MethodRelease toenvironment
after retention
pool

Drain
through
Underground
Tank
(WMC
facility)

If less thandischarge
limit thenrelease/ If
abovedischarge
limits treat in
WMC
treatment
facilityDrainthrough
Underground
Tank
(WMC
treatment
facility)

If less thandischarge
limit thenrelease/ If
abovedischarge
limits, treat in
WMC

Plastic bag
and place
into 200 L
drum

Storage andHold forconditioning

1 Plastic
Bags andplace into
200 literPlaced indrum andstored at
WMC

ActivatedParts (SS)ResinsReplacement of
4 sets ofactivated bolts
and nuts

Co-60,
significant
activityhigh dose
20-30 R/hr

< 500gtotal

GM meter and
Identifier

drum.
lead
shieldedcontainers

over-packed
by concrete
shieldedcontainer
200 L-drumstored at
WMC
over-packed
by concrete
shieldedcontainer
200 L-drumstored at
WMC
Storage at
WMC / ordecontaminate
some tools

Degraded
washers(corroded)

Replacement ofactivated bolts
and nuts

Co-60,
significant
activity
20 R/hr< 500gtotal

GM meter and
Identifier

lead shieldedcontainers

VariousEquipment&
Contaminatedmetal

Wet/dry
vacuumBolt catcher
Small tools
Other support
items
From drainingof pool sludge
may accumulate
at bottom

Co-60,
activity
50000 cpm
1000 timesofbackgroundCo-60 +
others1 drums

GM meter andsurfacecontamination
MonitorPlastic Bag
and place
into 200 liter
drum.

1 drums

Plastic Bag
and place
into 200 liter

stored at
WMC/ Holdfor
conditioning

Disposable PPE
worn duringdecontamination
operations
Plastic sheeting,step off pads
ect.

VLLW

1 drumRadionuclide
analysis by
gamma
spectrometer(MCA)
Health Physics
to assign value

Incineration
Hold ashes forconditioning

VLLW

1 drumHealth Physics
to assign value

Plastic
Bags(20L)
and then in
drum
Plastic Bags
and then in
drum

Air Filter at
Reactor
Building

VLLW

1-2 drums

GM meter andSurface
Contamination
Monitor

11Plastic
Bags andthen in drum

Incineration/
Compaction

SludgePPEContamination
control waste

Filter and
Flame

Incineration
Hold ashes forconditioning

Conclusion
The management of radioactive waste is one of important activities of themaintenance project. The project policy on minimization of waste is the best strategy for
waste management. Appropriate measures were planned by Planning and Support
Supervisor before the operations. All could not be successful without the cooperation of
Reactor Operation team, Radiation Safety team and Radioactive Waste Management
team.

21

The FNCA RS&RWM Project Leaders
Australia

Bangladesh

China

Indonesia

Japan

Kazakhstan

Dr. Lubi Dimitrovski

South Korea

Manager,
Waste Operations
Safety and Radiation Servic
Australian Nuclear Science &Technology Organisation(ANSTO)

Dr. Moinul Islam
Principal Scientific Officer,
Health Physics & Radioactive
Waste Management Unit,
Atomic Energy Research
Establishment (AERE), Bangladish
Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC)

Malaysia

Deputy Director General,
Department of Safety, Protection
and Quality,China National
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)

Philippines

Mr. Yuriy Aleinikov
Head of Laboratory,
Department of Reactor Research,Institute of Atomic Energy,
National Nuclear Centre of the
Republic of Kazakhstan

22

Ms.Oyuntulkhuur
Navaangalsan

Ms. Maria Visitacion B.
Palattao
Senior Science ResearchSpecialist, Nuclear Regulations,
Licensing and Safeguards
Division, Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute (PNRI)

Prof. Toshiso Kosako
Professor,
Nuclear Professional School,
Graduate School of Engineering,
The University of Tokyo

Dr. Mohd Abdul Wahab
Yusof

Head,
Radiation Regulatory
Department,
Nuclear and Radiation
Regulatory Authority,
Nuclear Energy Agency

Mr. Syahrir
Head of Safety and Environment
Division, National Nuclear Energy
Agency (BATAN)

Director,
Radioactive Waste
Management Policy Office,
Korea Radioactive Waste
Management Corporation(KRMC)

Senior Research Officer,
Waste Technology &Environment Division,
Malaysian Nuclear Agency(Nuclear Malaysia)

Mongolia

Dr. Zhang Jintao

Dr. Chang Lak Kim

Thailand

Mr. Sutat Thiangtrongjit

Vietnam

Dr. Le Ba Thuan

Director,
Radioactive Waste
Management Center,
Thailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)

Director,
Institute for Technology ofRadioactive and rare Elements,
Vietnam Atomic Energy
Institute (VINATOM)FNCA Consolidated reports on RS&RWM and Task Group Reports are available on FNCA Website.

[URL]: http://www.fnca.mext.go.jp/english/rwm/e_projectreview.html

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