TACKLINGTERRORISM
TOGETHER
VIGILANCE, PREVENTION,
AND PROTECTION AGAINSTTHE TERRORIST THREAT

VI
G

IP
IR
AT
E

December 2016 edition

1

2

«

We are a free people.
We do not yield to any pressure,and we are not afraid,
because we carry an idealthat is greater than us
and that we are capableof defending wherever peaceis threatened.”
Address by the President of France
to the Nation following the eventsof 7 and 8 January 2015 –9 January 2015»

PREFACE

S

ince 7 January 2015, a wave of attacks of particularly dramatic intensity has been unleashed against
our country. Unfortunately, using such methods of spreading intimidation and horror is not something
new in our history. Nonetheless, there is a need to note a change of scale and of nature in theterrorist violence that we face. The brutality of the means used attests to the will (which, as it happens,has been made clear) to indulge in mass killing in an indiscriminate manner. Moreover, the profiles ofthe perpetrators of those acts confirm a double threat, one that is projected from abroad and nourishedfrom within via propaganda from terrorist organisations that seek to turn our fellow citizens against theirown country.
To counter that terrorist risk, France is taking firm, resolute action. While our country continues to be
fully involved abroad, both diplomatically and militarily, our internal security arrangements have been
considerably hardened. Legally, institutionally, and financially, a considerable effort has been made toincrease and improve the means at our disposal, in order to strengthen the co-ordination of our riposte
and to ascertain the full set of factors that feed the phenomenon of radicalisation.
At the heart of that response made by the public authorities, the VIGIPIRATE plan occupies a special
place. Set up in 1978, and triggered for the first time in 1991 during the Gulf War, the plan is an
essential instrument of vigilance, prevention, and protection against the terrorist threat. Designed for allstate actors, it offers them operational measures and a mobilising framework to enable them to anticipate
and respond to that threat. Based on its approximately 300 measures, some of which are additional
and, thus, only triggered when needed, it constitutes a complete tool that can be fine-tuned to meetcircumstances.
To further consolidate that instrument and adapt it to changes in the threat, rewriting the VIGIPIRATE
Plan nonetheless became a necessity. That was done with the ambition of widely disseminating a cultureof security amongst our fellow citizens. In its new approach, the plan intends to better inform each oneof us on terrorism, the mechanisms deployed to deal with it, and the actions and behaviour that protect
and save. Faced with a diffuse, polymorphic threat, the State’s duty of protection must not lead to citizens
becoming disengaged. On the contrary, each person must make an individual commitment to collective
security, because each person is responsible for everyone.
Make a contribution to mobilising the Nation against terrorism: that is the ambition of this new plan,
which is supported by the Secretariat General for Defence and National Security.

Louis Gautier
Secretary Generalfor Defence
and National Security

3

4

CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Part 1. The VIGIPIRATE plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Principles and objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1. A government plan for vigilance, prevention, and protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2. One plan, many actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2. The various actors of national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1. The State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2. Local authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3. Businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4. The citizenry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5. Actors abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3. A security arrangement that is under permanent adaptation . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1. Assessing the threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2. Knowing the vulnerabilities of targets in order to reduce them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3. Adapting the VIGIPIRATE stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Partie 2. Tous impliqués . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Getting ready . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.1. As a citizen, what can I do? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2.Directors and heads of sites that deal with the public, how can you get ready? . . . 25

2. Prevention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.1. Preventing and flagging up cases of radicalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2. Preventing the move to take violent action, and flagging up suspicious situations . 36

3. Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1. What can be done in the event of an armed attack? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2. What can be done in the event of a cyberattack? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3. What can be done in the event of an attack using a toxic product? . . . . . . . . . . 48

4. Managing the post-attack situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1. If you have witnessed a terrorist attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2. If you have been the victim of a terrorist attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Part 3. Areas of action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1. Alerting and mobilising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2. Protecting mass meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3. Protecting installations and buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4. Protecting dangerous installations and materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5. Ensuring cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6. Protecting the air sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7. Protecting the maritime sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8. Protecting land transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9. Protecting the health sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
10. Protecting the food chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
11. Protecting networks(communications, water, electricity, hydrocarbons, gas) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
12. Controlling borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
13. Protecting French nationals and interests abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
For more information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

CO
N

TE
N

TS

Useful numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

5

6

INTRODUCTION
The VIGIPIRATE plan is at the heart of the nationalarrangement for protection against the terrorist threatIn the first line of threats identified in the national security strategy1 there appears the terrorist
threat, regardless of whether it is applied on national territory, against our nationals and interestsabroad, or in cyberspace. To face up to it, France has a complete national arrangement that includes
the VIGIPIRATE plan.
This decision-making support tool is provided to the Prime Minister. It brings together all national
actors (the State, local authorities, public and private operators, and citizens) in an initiative thatcombines vigilance, prevention, and protection.

VIGIPIRATE: a national plan and global security arrangement

T

he State must be able to react and to take necessary measures in the event of a threat being madeagainst the population or against the regular functioning of the country’s institutional, economic,
or social life.

To that end, the State has a set of plans. Those planning documents are developed at local or
national level in preparation for wide-ranging crises and catastrophes.
Around twenty plans are in existence, and there are the same number of specific variants. They are
divided into two broad categories: national plans and territorial plans.
Drawn up under the ægis of the Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN– Secretariat General for Defence and National Security), national plans are decision-making
support tools for the highest authorities of the State. In the event of a major crisis, they facilitate theco-ordination of all the actors concerned, in the first line of which stand the various ministries.

VIGIPIRATE is the only
national plan that is permanently
implemented. Thus, VIGIPIRATE isa planning document as well asa national security arrangementthat is in constant development.

1- Introduced in 2008 by the White Paper on defence and national security. See the “For more information” section, page 70.

Faced with the terrorist threat, a set of complementary plans, the PIRATE family plans, was drawn
up. Of those anti-terrorist plans, VIGIPIRATE is the only one to be permanently active, because it
implements a vast arrangement for vigilance, prevention, and protection that involves a very large
number of actors: ministries, internal security forces, public and private operators, and the citizenry.
The other PIRATE family plans are intervention plans. Their purpose is to be activated in the event ofa terrorist attack, in a specific context, such as the air or maritime environment or cyberspace; those
are the NRBC, PIRATAIR-INTRUSAIR, PIRATE-MER, PIRANET, and METROPIRATE plans2.

Architecture and functioning of the VIGIPIRATE planThe VIGIPIRATE plan includes 300 measures that apply to 13 wide areas of action, such as transport,
health, and networks (detailed in part 3). Those measures are spread out between a core ofpermanent measures and a set of additional measures. Those measures can be activated based on
the development of the threat and vulnerabilities.

Based on the terrorist-threat assessment made by the intelligence services,
the SGDSN circulates interministerial directives (the “VIGIPIRATE stancememos”) that determine the measures that must be implemented by theactors concerned by vigilance, prevention, and protection in the faceof terrorist-action threats.
Those stances are circulated: at certain specific periods of the year: the start of theacademic year, the end-of-year holidays, etc.;
 as part of large national events: the celebrations
marking the 70th anniversary of the Normandy
landings, Euro 2016, COP21;300
13

mesuresareasof action

 following an attack in France or abroad, in order to urgently adapt the national protection
arrangement.
The initiative is based on three main principles: a cross-analysis of the threat and vulnerabilities;

 organisation by area of action, identifying the levers that enable a reduction in thevulnerabilities of the large sectors of the country based on the intensity of the threat;

IN
TR
OD

UC
TIO
N

 an approach based on security objectives that enables the most suitable measures to be
selected, together with their application procedures.

2- See the “For further information” section, page 70.

7

IN
TR
OD
UC
TIO

N

8

The terrorist threat remains at a high levelon a persistent basis

Terrorism
In its 2013 White Paper on defence and national security, France defines terrorism as “a mode ofaction used by adversaries that do not abide by the rules of conventional warfare.” Terrorism iscomplex; “[it strikes] civilians indiscriminately, and the violence [that is uses] aims first at taking
advantage of the effects that its brutal irruption produces on public opinion in order to constrain
governments.”
Defined as such, terrorism is widespread around the world and comes in many forms. Its constantdevelopment makes it particularly difficult to grasp.

Today, a phenomenon that is mainly Jihadist-inspired
Terrorism is a phenomenon with a very long history, and it can be linked to arrange of claims. Overthe last few decades, organisations making nationalist claims or linked to decolonisation, as wellas groups upholding extremist ideologies with a political or religious basis, have committed attacks
on national territory.
The 1995 attacks in France revealed the terrorist nature of the Jihadist threat, which moved onto
the world stage on 11 September 2001. Taken to an unprecedented level around the world, it isembodied in particular by Al Qaida, Daesh, and their affiliated networks, whose plan is to use
violence to impose an Islamist ideology. Since 2015, the terrorist threat has persisted at a very highlevel in Europe, especially in France.

The terrorist threat in France
French nationals and French interests being exposed to the terrorist threat, on national territory or
abroad, is explained in particular by the values and lifestyle promoted by the French Republic.
The attacks that hit France in 2015 and 2016 showed us the need to incorporate that phenomenon
into our daily life.
Three major characteristics of that development should be highlighted:

 the multiplication of the types of actors (isolated radicalised persons, operational teams
deployed in Europe); the diversification of operating methods (opportunistic attacks, planned attacks);
 the multiplication of targets (infrastructures, gatherings, symbolic places, etc.).

Terrorist attacks can also induce knock-on and imitation effects. Some individuals with extreme ideas
seeking social revenge or identity claims, or who sometimes suffer from psychological disorders,can be encouraged to take action.

Operating methods used by terroristsW

ith the aim of hitting France or its interests, terrorists use a wide range of means and different
operating methods, based on their level of preparation.

Possible operating methods3:

 mass shootings (with the possible use of explosive charges); the follow-up attack following an initial attack, in order to strike rescuers, the police, or thegendarmerie at the scene; the assassination of public figures (political, religious, representative of the security forces,
military personnel, etc.);
 the use of booby-trapped cars, parcels, or letters; the use of toxic chemicals;

 the destruction of symbolic infrastructures;

 wide-ranging cyberattacks, taking account of the developments of information technology
and of digital technology in daily life; hostage-taking; multiplying false bomb alerts, or announcing fake attacks, with the aim of establishing a
climate of fear.

The types of weapons used:

IN
TR
OD

UC
TIO
N

Terrorists use a vast range of weapons, ranging from knives to explosive devices and including
targeted weapons (ram-vehicles, etc.).

3- This list is not exhaustive, because terrorist operating methods constantly change and adapt, and they can be combined.

9PART 1

THE VIGIPIRATE PLAN

11

12

1. PRINCIPLESAND OBJECTIVES
1.1. A government plan for vigilance,
prevention, and protection
The VIGIPIRATE plan rests on three pillars:
1. vigilance is linked to knowledge of the terrorist threat andto its due recognition, in order to adjust the behaviourof each individual and the protection measures;
2. prevention is based on raising awareness of theterrorist threat amongst State agents, operators, andcitizens, on their knowledge of the organisation of
the national arrangement, and on the good
preparation of means of protection andresponse; and, finally,

Vigilance
Prevention
Protection

3. protection is based on a wide range ofmeasures that must be constantly adaptable
to the situation in order to reduce
vulnerabilities without inducing disproportionate constraints on the economic and social lifeof the Nation.
The plan defines thirteen areas of action, i.e. twelve areas covering national territory and one
area covering matters abroad. An area of action is made up of an activity sector or a family ofpotential targets. The various areas of action contain descriptions of: characteristics, challenges, and actors;

 security objectives specific to the sector;

 permanent vigilance and protection measures to be implemented in all
circumstances, and that form the permanent basis for vigilance, prevention, andprotection;

 additional measures that are likely to be implemented on the basis of the assessmentof the terrorist threat or during periods of particular vulnerability.
Where permanent or additional, measures can be recommendations or they can be compulsory,
as provided for in law.

The VIGIPIRATE plan’s 13 areas of action

Air sector

Maritime
and riversectorCybersecurity

HealthDangerous
installations
and materials

Food chain

Installations
and buildings

Networks (communications,water, electricity,hydrocarbons, gas)

Gatherings

Alert
and mobilisationLandtransport

Border controls

Threatanalysis+

Population-protection
measuresAbroad(protecting
French nationals
and interests)

1.
AN LESD PRIOB NC
JEC IPL
TIV ESES

In some areas, the VIGIPIRATE plan is supplemented
by specific intervention plans that implement specialist means(the NRBC, PIRATAIR-INTRUSAIR, PIRATE-MER, PIRANET,
and METROPIRATE plans).

13

1.
AN LESD PRIOB NC
JEC IPL
TIV ESES

14

1.2. One plan, many actors

T

he VIGIPIRATE plan is made up of a set of documents aimed at various actors.
It comes in two parts, a public part and a “confidential defence” classified part.

A public document (this document) enables public and private businesses, local authorities, andeach citizen to understand the functioning of the VIGIPIRATE plan. An educational tool and accessible
to all, the public part of the plan contributes to developing a culture of collective security.
Some information and the plan’s implementation procedures must be protected, so they areclassified, in particular to stop potential adversaries from exploiting them. The “confidential defence”
part of the VIGIPIRATE plan includes two documents:
 the plan itself, which details strategy, objectives, and measures for all areas of action;

 an annexe made up of all of the measures sheets. The latter are emergency instructions that
aim at helping the operational implementation of measures, and specifying their legal
framework of application.

A public part: a document presenting the VIGIPIRATE planand setting out advice for behaviour, aimed at the citizenry
and at security professionals

TACKLING
TERRORISM
TOGETHER
VIGILANCE, PREVENTION,
AND PROTECTION AGAINSTTHE TERRORIST THREAT

VI
G

IP

IR
AT
E

December 2016 edition1

A “confidential defence” part:the full plan, aimed at State institutions
and some private operators

CONFIDENTIEL D FENSE

Plan gouvernemental de vigilance, deprévention et de protection face aux menaces
d’actions terroristes« VIGIPIRATE »FICHES MESURES
Edition 2016
Pris dans sa totalité, ce document est classifié « confidentiel défense ». Pour chaque ficheprise individuellement, c’est le degré de classification mentionné sur la fiche qui
s’applique.

1

1.
AN LESD PRIOB NC
JEC IPL
TIV ESESCONFIDENTIEL D FENSE

15

16

2. THE VARIOUS ACTORS OF
NATIONAL SECURITYT

he VIGIPIRATE plan is a tool to mobilise the whole Nation in the face of the terrorist threat. With
the State at the centre, it gathers up the various categories of actors who represent potential
targets for terrorists.

2.1. The StateThe Prime Minister decides on the implementation of the provisions and measures set out in the
VIGIPIRATE government plan. The SGDSN, which is attached directly to the Prime Minister, steers
the VIGIPIRATE plan.
The Minister of the Interior, who is responsible for internal security, public order, protecting people,
and safeguarding installations and resources of general interest, oversees the proper operational
execution of the measures activated or implemented across the whole territory.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development oversees the implementation of specificmeasures when the threat is aimed at French nationals, representations, assets, or interests abroad.
The Minister of Defence engages the armed forces in land, sea, air, and cyberenvironments, as partof the government’s overall manœuvre to fight terrorism on national territory.
Each minister implements the appropriate instructions and measures in the directorates,
establishments, central departments, and decentralised departments, and passes them on tooperators of vital importance, public services, large businesses, and professional bodies thatintervene in the minister’s areas of competence.
At local level, the département prefects (under the co-ordination of the prefects of defence andsecurity areas) ensure that information is given to various public and private actors. In addition,
they ensure consistency in implementing measures in territories in compliance with their respective
competences and responsibilities.

2.2. Local authorities
Local authorities exercise responsibilities in several sectors of the economic and social life of the
Nation. The implementation of the VIGIPIRATE plan concerns them in several ways:
 protecting their installations, infrastructures, and networks;

 the continuity of public services for which they are responsible;
 protecting their agents;

 the security of cultural, sports, or festive gatherings that they organise or host.
In that way, local authorities, in liaison with the prefect, enable continuity of the general arrangement
for vigilance, prevention, and de protection.

2.3. Businesses
Certain businesses are designated “Opérateurs d’Importance Vitale”4 (OIV – Operators of Vital
Importance). They are legally required to implement specific protection measures contained inregulations relating to the security of activities of vital importance and in the VIGIPIRATE plan.
Generally speaking, all public and private businesses must ensure their own security and, whereappropriate, the security of people whom they host. They implement measures adopted subject tothe prerogatives they are granted by law.

2.4. The citizenry
Responsible behaviour by all citizens contributes to vigilance and to prevention, as well as toprotecting the community against terrorist threats. The VIGIPIRATE public plan familiarises citizens
with the behaviour to be adopted in the event of a terrorist threat.

2.5. Actors abroad
The security of all French nationals abroad is, in the first instance, the responsibility of their hostState. Nonetheless, all operators and all businesses are required to ensure the security of theiremployees.

4- See the “Glossary” section, page 73..

2.
OF THENA VA
TIO RIONA US
L S AC
EC TO
UR RS
ITY

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development passes on its instructions to all
diplomatic missions, which in turn pass those instructions on to the French community, employers,
local media, and host States.

17

18

3. A SECURITY ARRANGEMENT THATIS UNDER PERMANENT ADAPTATIONThe VIGIPIRATE plan enables permanent adaptation of the vigilance, prevention, and protection
arrangement in the face of threats of terrorist action. To that end, directives called “VIGIPIRATE
stances” are regularly circulated by the entire ministerial and prefectoral chain.

Those stances are prepared by the SGDSN in close co-ordination with the departments of all
ministries. They are circulated at certain specific times of year (the start of the academic year, theend-of year holidays, the summer period, etc.), as part of preparations for large national events (the70th anniversary of the Normandy landings in 2014, COP21 in 2016, Euro 2016, etc.), or after
an attack.
Implementing the VIGIPIRATE plan combines three approaches:
1. assessing the terrorist threat in France and against French nationals and interests abroad;
2. knowing the vulnerabilities of potential targets of a terrorist attack, in order to reduce themand to take preventive action to limit the effects of such an attack;3. determining a security arrangement that responds to the level of risk arising from the crossover
between the vulnerabilities with the state of the threat.

3.1. Assessing the threat
The assessment of the terrorist threat is made by a specific working group that brings together all
the intelligence services, mandated and facilitated by the national intelligence co-ordinator.
It provides a regular assessment based on current events. That assessment can be supplemented bythematic assessments, applied to sectors, areas of activity, or subjects of particular interest.
These analyses are used to prepare VIGIPIRATE stance memos.

3.2. Knowing the vulnerabilities of targets
in order to reduce them
The plan defines thirteen areas of action5, twelve covering national territory and one covering mattersabroad. An area of action is made up of a sector of activity or a family of potential targets, whichallows a consistent response strategy to be defined.
Hence, in relation to each area of action, a description is given of a strategy that details thevulnerabilities of the setting concerned, and defines the security objectives to be implemented toreduce their weaknesses in the face of the threat.

5- See the list of areas, page 13, as well as part 3, “Areas of action”.

Each security objective is based on operational measures that are ranked by the degree of constraint
involved in implementing them. Two types of measures are distinguished: permanent measures (or base measures), which constitute the permanent security stance; additional measures, of which some can be very constricting, and which are implemented
on a case-by-case basis as well as being limited in time, to face up to the worsening of thethreat and / or vulnerabilities.
Some measures, whether permanent or additional, are compulsory.
Other measures come under best practice in security matters, of which the implementation isrecommended by the VIGIPIRATE plan. They are the subject of adapted communication that aims at
encouraging the actors concerned to apply them.
Most measures are placed in the public domain for ease of circulation. Only a few additional
measures are confidential, because their publication may facilitate terrorist action.
The conditions for implementing measures (especially in the legal domain) are detailed in
implementation-support sheets called measures sheets, which are attached to the “confidential
defence” plan.

3.3. Adapting the VIGIPIRATE stance
The VIGIPIRATE stance is an interministerial directive determined by the Prime Minister; it adapts
the vigilance, prevention, and protection arrangement. It includes the VIGIPIRATE level, the security
objectives selected, active measures, and government communication items. It specifies basemeasures and mentions the additional measures decided upon, with, where appropriate, details of
their context and their application procedures, as well as the duration for which they are
implemented.
It is set out in a confidential document that also contains the assessment of the terrorist threat. It isvalidated by the Prime Minister and circulated by the SGDSN. The stance is applied by each ministry
through specific directives.

3.3.1. The VIGIPIRATE level3.
IS A SEUN CU
DE RIT
RP Y
ER ARRMA A
NE NGENT M
AD ENT
AT TH
AT AT
ION

The VIGIPIRATE level is made public. It is aimed at indicating the vigilance of the Nation in the faceof the terrorist threat, and, if needed, putting the country on alert in the face of a situation involving
a verified threat or an attack that has been carried out. It covers only national territory and the
DOM-COM (Départements et Collectivités d’Outre-Mer – Overseas Départements and Authorities).
It is determined by the Prime Minister following the assessment of the terrorist threat made by thecrossover between the threat and vulnerabilities.
The arrangement chosen must be strictly dimensioned in line with the assessment of the threat.
Three levels are distinguished:“vigilance”, “reinforced security – attack risk”, and “attack emergency”.

19

3.
IS A SEUN CU
DE RIT
RP Y
ER ARRMA A
NE NGENT M
AD ENT
AT TH
AT AT
ION
20

LevelsLevel-activation
principles

Implementation
conditions

Types of measures
activated

Vigilance

This level relates tothe permanent security
stanceThis level is valid everywhere
and at all times.

Implementation of allpermanent measures(base).

Reinforced
security– threatriskThis level expresses
the State’s response
to a heightened levelof terrorist threat.

This level can apply
to the whole of national
territory, or it can be targetedon a geographical area
or a particular sectorof activity. This level does nothave a set time limit.

Reinforcementof permanent measuresand activation of additional
measures.

This level triggers
a maximum stateof vigilance and protection,either in the eventof a documented andimminent terrorist attack
threat6, or immediately
after an attack.

This level can be activatedacross the whole of national
territory, or across a defined
geographical area.

Permanent measures
reinforced and additional
measures activated.

SECURITE RENFORCEE
RISQUE ATTENTAT

AttackemergencyP

URGENCE ATTENTAT

Activating this level enables
the protection arrangement
to be adapted to prevent
any risk of a follow-up
attack.

The “attack emergency” level
is of short duration, and can bedeactivated at the end of crisis
management.

This level is associated withconstricting additional
measures, and with areinforcement of the alertthat can be coupled withinformation being
circulated using the SAIP7
telephone application, thevarious institutional web
sites, and radio.
Behavioural advice can also
be circulated to the
population in case of therisk of a follow-up attack.

6- The definition of the imminence remains subjective. Objectivity, on the basis of information issued by the intelligence community, involves
giving precise answers to at least two of the following four questions: who? where? when? and how?
7- SAIP: Système d'alerte et d'information des populations (Population Alert and Information System, a smartphone application).
See “For further information”, page 71, and “Glossary”, page 73

3.3.2. Circulating VIGIPIRATE stance instructions
In accordance with instructions given by the Prime Minister, each ministry gives instructions within
its own field of competence. The Ministry of the Interior plays a leading role in national territory
through prefects, the national police, the national gendarmerie, and civil security. Measures are
implemented by a wide variety of actors: State actors (administrations, decentralised departments),
local authorities, public and private businesses, professional federations, etc. Citizens are also called
upon to be actors in certain simple vigilance measures.

Circulation circuit of VIGIPIRATE stance memos and instructions

SGDSN

Secretariat Generalfor the Sea

GovernmentIntelligence
Service

Ministryof the Interior/ SFHD

Centraladministration
directorates

Area prefects

Département
prefects

All ministries /SHFDS8Centraladministration
directorate
and departments

Operatorsof vital
importanceLocal
authorities

Regional
directorates
and agencies

Professional
federations

Heads
of cultural bodies

Interministerial
départmental
directorates

Territorial
units

Publicand private
operators

Prefectoral chain
Transmits
the posture or
its application

Co-ordinates and ensures consistency

8- SHFDS: Service du haut fonctionnaire de défense et de sécurité(Department of the Senior Officer of Defence and Security).

Business chain

3.
IS A SEUN CU
DE RIT
RP Y
ER ARRMA A
NE NGENT M
AD ENT
AT TH
AT AT
ION

Internal
security forces

21

PART 2

EVERYONE IS INVOLVED

23

24

1. GETTING READY
1.1. As a citizen, what can I do?
1.1.1. Why should you be an attentive citizen?

M

ost of the time, terrorists act with a political, identity, or ideological objective. To reach it, theyseek to break the unity of societies that they attack by breaking the fundamental links thatmake up those societies.

Concern over security must lead us to reinforce our collective vigilance, but we must not be wary of
everyone. The true resilience of the Nation rests on all citizens adhering to common values and not
to evicting a few people.
Being attentive means: maintaining an open rather than a fearful view of others; acting for the security of all by flagging up any risky situation or behaviour; prevent any individuals from tipping over into criminal behaviour by flagging them up, outof a concern for protecting the population and for protecting those individuals fromthemselves;

 ensuring that our own behaviour does not endanger the security of others (false rumours, etc.),
and that it does not nurture a climate of fear.

Be attentive
to others
and to one’s
environment

1.1.2. How can I be an attentive citizen?
Get to know your daily environment well: get to know the configuration of the living areas
and of the sites that you usually frequent: building,street,neighbourhood,buildinglayouts,
development of spaces, emergency routes andexits;
 get to know to whom you must report unusual
behaviour and situations; get into the habit of observing your environment
carefully, especially when you are in areas ofheavy traffic (stations, public transport, large
gatherings, etc.).
Get ready and anticipate emergency situations: rely on your intuition;

 get ready to experience a potentially violent situation:• for each place in which you find yourself, think of the most appropriate reaction in caseof attack;• identify emergency exits;• establish an evacuation route from all enclosed places or places where large gatherings
are held (cinemas, swimming pools, shopping centres, etc.);

 always have emergency numbers with you;

 download the SAIP application to your smartphone9.
Always behave responsibly: ensure that your attitude or your behaviour do not make people think that you may havemalicious intent (masking your face by wearing a motorcycle helmet within a public building,using fake weapons or disguising yourself in paramilitary clothing along public roads, false
bomb alerts, verbal threats of a terrorist nature, etc.);
 do not take photos near sites where photography is prohibited; comply with recommendations and instructions from public authorities, law-enforcement
agencies, and security officials (inspecting bags, packets, hand luggage, security pat-downs,
complying with security parameters); do not point out the control devices put in place by law-enforcement agencies (high-beam
flashes along the road to signal a roadblock, etc.);
 do not pass on false rumours; do not leave personal effects (bags, luggage) unattended;

1.
G

ET
TIN

G

RE
AD
Y

 when travelling, do not agree to take responsibility for an item of luggage, an object, or a
package from someone you do not know.

9- See “For further information”, page 71.

25

1.

GE
TT
IN
G

RE
AD
Y

26

Get first-aid training: alerting the emergency services, performinga cardiac massage, and treatinghæmorrhages are essential procedures thatcan be carried out during situations of
exceptional seriousness. Those essential
procedures can save lives;

 several accredited civil-security associations
teach first aid and provide first-aid training.
Accreditation is granted after the
associations’ competences have beenverified; if you wish to receive first-aid training, see the list of associations accredited for first-aid
training10.
Preparing for journeys abroad:
Before each journey abroad: check http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/conseils-aux-voyageurs for advice that is updated
regularly; make an entry for your journey on the Ariane portal,
https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fildariane/dyn/protected/accueil/formAccueil.html, toreceive any alerts;

 if going abroad on a long-term basis (i.e. for more than 6 months), French nationals and theirfamilies must have themselves entered in the register of French nationals living abroad, anddo so at the competent French consulate.

1.1.3. Cybervigilance
Acquire good internet habits:
The lives of businesses, administrations, and our fellow citizens are henceforth dependant on digitaltechnology and ICT resources on a daily basis. Those tools can form a powerful vector for terrorists
who want to attack society as a whole. For that reason, it is essential to protect yourself by acquiring
good habits:
 protect your personal, and professional information as well as your digital identity;
 always be careful when you click on links and attachments;
 choose passwords composed for each account; keep your passwords secret, and never reveal them to anyone; never reveal your payment-card number by e-mail; make your payments using secure sites; protect your data when travelling; give preference to secure WiFi access and personal removable supports (USB sticks);

 regularly update the software installed on your computers, smartphones, and tablets,
especially your antivirus software; deactivate wireless interfaces when they are not necessary;

10- See the list of accredited associations at http://www.gouvernement.fr/risques/se-former-aux-premiers-secours make regular back-ups;

 consider making your internet box secure; flag up suspicious web sites and social networks, or those that advocate terrorism11.
You will find recommendations and best practices at the ANSSI website: for administrations: http://ssi.gouv.fr/administration/bonnes-pratiques
 for businesses: http://ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/precautions-elementaires

 for individuals: http://ssi.gouv.fr/particulier/precautions-elementaires
 for everyone: le site http://www.risques.gouv.fr

Knowing how to protect your identity and your personal information:
The internet offers many opportunities for sharing moments from your private life. The increase insocial networks enables you to keep in touch with your family and friends, but those networks are
not risk-free for your security. Moreover, when you use them, keep in mind that an ill-intentioned
person may make criminal use of the information that you publish.
When you work in a profession that may be a terrorist target, it is strongly recommended that you
do not divulge information about where you live and about your habits, that you always think of
the use that can be made of your details, and that you preserve the confidentiality of your private
life as much as possible.
Your digital identity is precious, and the traces that you leave by publishing your personal information
will remain accessible almost indefinitely.

G
ET
TIN

1.
G

Consequently, protect yourself and those close to you by being careful about what you publish on
the internet.

RE
AD
Y

Terrorists use data on the internet to get to know their targets
better and to reach them better

11- Report matters at https://www.internet-signalement.gouv.fr/

27

1.

GE
TT
IN
G

RE
AD
Y

28

1.2. Directors and heads of sites that welcome the public,
how can you get ready?

All heads of establishments that deal with the public are encouraged to apply the VIGIPIRATE planas part of their own business security plan. This plan sets out the measures to be taken in theevent of a threat or an attack, or in the case of risks like discovering abandoned objects.

It sets out the special arrangements to be applied in matters of surveillance, organisation, andcontrol. Individual company officials are informed of what they must do as part of the business plan.
The State particularly encourages establishments that deal with the public to establish reaction
procedures in the event of a terrorist attack, and to raise awareness amongst their employees.
To that end, the authorities, in liaison with the actors concerned, have prepared a set of guides tobest practices12 aimed at the heads of establishments that deal with the public, which set out theindividual and collective behaviour to be followed to prepare for a terrorist attack.

Good prior organisation ofyour establishments and adapted reactions
from staff can save lives.
1.2.1. Preparing your organisation for a malicious or terrorist act

Several pieces of advice are set out below. Some would be difficult to apply by all sites, so theymust be adapted to the situation.

a) Developing relationships with external partners
The various external partners:

 prefects and prefectoral departments. They assess the threat level and establish the vigilanceand protection measures to be adopted as part of implementing the VIGIPIRATE plan; mayors and municipal departments. They supplement action taken by the police and thegendarmerie. Along public roads, they carry out development work that is needed forprotecting exposed installations;
 the police and the gendarmerie. They can use their security references to provide security
advice to heads of sites with respect to reinforcing their security measures. Regular meetings
with the police and the gendarmerie are part of mutual knowledge. For sites that are
particularly sensitive, building plans can be passed to the security forces in order to facilitate
an intervention in the event of an attack.

12- See the sector guides to best practices at http://www.gouvernement.fr/reagir-attaque-terroristeb) Analyse your establishment’s vulnerabilities

 identify what makes your establishment a target (a site for large gatherings of people, a site
representing the country’s institutions, a site symbolising the Western way of life or the valuesof the French Republic, a place of worship, etc.);

 identify what could be targeted in your establishment: staff, infrastructures, specific equipment,
information or products that could be stolen with a view to terrorist action;
 identify the establishment’s physical vulnerabilities (number of access points, doors that do
not lock, unsupervised delivery access points, etc.);
 consider possible means of action (cold weapons, automatic weapons, ram-vehicles, boobytrapped parcel or vehicle); take account of the internal threat (for example, radicalisation that can turn violent).

c) Get organised
Reinforce site protection:

 limit the number of access points for better flow surveillance, without reducing evacuation
capacity for your employees and for the public; deploy a video-protection system; put in place a system of access badges;

 install an interphone system with a camera if possible;
 ensure that there is lighting at access doors to the site; regularly change the codes of Digicode-type alphanumeric keyboards / keypads;
 put in place a filtering and search system at access points;

 protect the site’s external access points against all chances of a ram-vehicle attack (installingstuds, flowerboxes, concrete blocks, mobile portcullises, etc.);
 ensure that there is co-ordination between you and surrounding establishments or businesses;

 ensure that the site’s communal areas and technical areas are kept clean, and that abandoned
parcels cannot be hidden there; check the availability of emergency exits.
Put in place specific means of alert: Alert within the organisation. It is essential that each organisation is able to sound the alert
in the event of a terrorist attack. The alert system governs the reaction of all persons occupying
the site, and must be different from the fire alarm, because the expected reaction is not thesame. Such a system cannot be improvised, and it is recommended that the system be set up
in consultation with the staff of the establishment. Everyone must know those means of alert,
which must be tested regularly during drills and exercises.

RE
AD
Y

 For the alert procedure to be complete, two systems must be put in place:• a decentralised alert system that enables each person to sound the alert once the1.
G

if it is extensive): an audible alarm that is different from the fire alarm, a message
broadcast by loudspeaker, a warning light, telephone text message, foghorn, etc.

ETTIN

• a centralised alert system that allows a warning to be given to the whole site (especiallyGmalicious act has been noted (whistle, landline, telephone text message, beeper system,
radio, etc.);

29

1.

GE
TT
IN
G

RE
AD
Y

30

 The aim of the alert is to prevent an attack. Ideally, two types of attack must be distinguished,because they do not call for the same reactions:• an external attack against the site or close to it (containment recommended);• an attack at the site (evacuation or containment, based on the location of persons in thebuilding). In the event of an internal attack, it is not recommended that a single reaction
be used for the whole of the site concerned. Some people may be able to escape easily
given the location of their premises, others may not be able to escape easily and must,
therefore, place themselves in containment. Consequently, it is preferable to leave theinitiative to persons occupying the site.
Different audible or visual codes can be used to distinguish the two types of attack (internal andexternal). For example, an external attack can be indicated by 3 long ringing tones, whilst an attackon at the site can be indicated by 6 long ringing tones. Similarly, if the alert is sounded by text
message, the message must specify if the attack is internal or external to the site.
 Send an alert outside the organisation: security forces, sensitive external establishments(hospitals, schools, etc.). The sooner the alert is given, the sooner internal security forces canintervene.
 Make your employees aware of the fact that each one must feel responsible and must give awarning in the event of an attack. The message to be sent out is as follows: “Don’t think that
others have sounded the alert. Do it yourself.”
Be prepared: a crisis kit with the telephone numbers of persons to be contacted and the plans of the sitethat can be given to security forces in case of an attack; reaction procedures adapted to various malicious acts:• bomb alert (give preference to the same reaction as a fire alert);• an attack within the site (evacuation or containment);• an external attack that is close to the site (prefer containment);

 evacuation itineraries (which are not necessarily emergency exits – for example, a roof may
offer protection);
 containment rooms that are known to everyone. Door closures can be reinforced at low cost.
Raise awareness amongst staff:
Inform staff:

 inform officials of the threat and of the various best practices to be followed in the event of aterrorist threat; develop an internal awareness-raising strategy by displaying the poster (see page 43) andby showing the video entitled (How to react in the event of a terrorist attack”13. Guides tobest practices that are specific to certain professional sectors can also be distributed;
 make staff aware of complying with security and vigilance measures;
 give reminders of procedures and of each person’s role:• inform officials of the procedure for flagging up suspicious behaviour (employees whoshow signs of holding extreme and potentially violent thoughts);• encourage employee vigilance in order to detect and flag up suspicious behaviour.

13- See http://www.gouvernement.fr/reagir-attaque-terroriste

Train staff:

 encourage first-aid training; ensure that everyone knows about means of alert and how to use them; encourage site knowledge by organising “exploratory reconnaissance missions” in order to
identify routes, emergency exits, possible obstacles, and anything that may offer protection;
 organise simple drills and collective exercises that may possibly incorporate the various
partners, and by systematically exploiting feedback from those exercises.

1.2.2. Prepare for a gathering14

E

vent security cannot be improvised. Seek advice from professionals. To prepare for a gathering ofpeople, you must:a) Identify threats and vulnerabilities
Assess the sensitivity of the gathering in conjunction with the State’s services. Why may terrorists
target the gathering? In what way is it a symbol of the Western way of life and of the values of the
Republic? Does the gathering have media coverage that may give a high level of visibility to terrorist
action?
Consider the various possible attacks: throwing or depositing an explosive device, a booby-trappedvehicle parked on the approaches to the site, a ram-vehicle, shooting, a cold-weapon attack, etc.
Put in place partnerships with local public actors:

RE
AD
Y

 organise relationships with administrative police authorities (prefects and mayors) in order toassess the threat as well as vigilance and protection measures to be adopted as part of thegathering;1.
G

If the requirements for public security cannot be satisfied or if circumstances demand it, the organiser
can cancel the event.

ET
TIN

G

 co-ordinate with police forces, gendarmerie, municipal police, and firefighters.

14- See also sheet 2, page 55.

31

1.

GE
TT
IN
G

RE
AD
Y

32

b) Organise security for the event
The periphery: prohibit the parking of any vehicle in the area immediately around the site of the gathering; put signage in place to guide pedestrians at the site of the event and to divert the flow ofvehicles; identify urban furniture that could be used to conceal explosives, remove that furniture, reduce
its use, or put in place verification rounds;

 call upon law-enforcement agencies or the municipal police to carry out patrols, or even to
set up checkpoints and filtering points;
 identify high-rise points of vulnerability (overhanging buildings) and make them secure,possibly by using human presence; if possible, put in place a video-protection system that covers the site’s access points as apriority.
The perimeter: install a physical boundary for the event using interconnecting barriers;
 install barriers to organise a route to the checkpoint; separate entry and exit flows; at access points, set up checkpoints operated by security officers in sufficient numbers to makeentry as easy as possible for members of the public (the quality of filtering can be increasedby using magnetometers or walk-through metal-detection equipment);
 raise awareness amongst private security
officers (vigilance instructions, etc.), anduse daily briefings to give reminders ofreactions to be adopted in the case of asuspect event, an ill-intentioned act, or
terrorist attack. Everyone must know theprocedures for raising the alarm andunderstand them; provide security agents with radio
equipment;

 at public access points (entry and exit),
set up arrangements (concrete blocks,etc.) aimed at stopping any intrusion by
a ram-vehicle;

 use human presence to control exit points
so that they cannot be used for intrusion; set up a sufficient number of emergency
exits based on the significance of theevent, so that the public can be
evacuated swiftly in the event of danger
within the area.

Inner areas: appoint a head of security who will be the sole contact person for police forces, thegendarmerie, and emergency services in the event on an intervention on the site; call upon the skills of private security companies to ensure the security of such an event; when the area is closed to the public, secure it by setting up a human watchkeeping service; plan for a central security post to be set up at the heart of the site. That post must be manned
24 hours a day by at least one operator, who will view images from the video-protection
system put in place; amongst collaborators and exhibitors, raise awareness of threat levels, terrorist operating
methods, and detecting identification action. That awareness-raising must be supplemented
by information on the behaviour to be adopted in the event of attack; install screens and loudspeakers that can broadcast an alert (pre-recorded if possible); organise and check deliveries.

1.2.3. Carry out gradual exercisesE

xercises involving reaction to an armed attack must be gradual, and they must always give rise tocollective feedback that enables lessons to be drawn and procedures to be improved.

Types of exercises:
1. a straightforward reminder of procedures and of each individual’s role, given by the head of thesite or its head of security;
2. a tabletop exercise in a room and during which employees present the reaction that they would
have in the event of an attack. The session must be given a setting (place, number of assailants
identified, and their weapons);
3. technical test of the alert system;
4. organising exploratory reconnaissance missions (evacuation sites, containment rooms, etc.);

1.
G

ET
TIN

G

RE
AD
Y

5. drills with persons simulating intrusion. Employees must be told that the drill will be held, but theymust not necessarily be given its exact date. To avoid any panic, a way must be found to makeeveryone understand that it is a drill. Police forces and the gendarmerie must be informed thatsuch a drill is being carried out, and they can be invited to it to contribute their expertise. For
such an exercise to be successful, the objectives to be attained must be clearly determined inadvance, and a rigorous assessment method must be drawn up. The latter is essential for
appropriate lessons to be drawn, and it must be based on a team of assessors who observe theprogress of the entire exercise.

33

34

2. PREVENTION
2.1. Preventing and flagging up cases of radicalisationR

adicalisation is characterised by “a change in behaviour that may lead some people to extremismor terrorism”15.

a) Why should I flag up a case of radicalisation?
Radicalisation concerns all types of ideologies that may lead individuals to choose violent action in thename of convictions to which they adhere without any possible compromise. That violent action can cause
the deaths of other members of the society of which the values and way of life they reject unconditionally.
Thus, we speak of a gradual process of radicalisation, with adherence to an ideology and breaking
away from one’s usual environment. Radicalisation appears as a phenomenon that is deeply linked
to exploitation of conflicts of identity, or frustrations, and of weaknesses. In particular, some terroristgroups seek to enrol individuals who have lost their bearings and who are vulnerable.
The strength of an ideology and its power of attraction must not be under-estimated. Individuals
who have developed hatred of our society can adhere fully to a discourse that gives meaning totheir frustrations or feeling of humiliation.
Radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that is amplified by the development of social networks.
The propaganda carried by individuals or groups touches a range of profiles: delinquents, vulnerable
people seeking an identity, people with psychiatric problems, etc. Thus, radicalisation, which isdifficult to identify and treat, is a major challenge for national security.

a) How can I identify radicalisation?
Taken in isolation, one of the behaviours listed below does not indicate that radicalisation has occurred.
It is the combination of several behaviours that gives a sort of consistency, and that ought to cause surprise.
Some combinations of behaviour or of character traits are strong signals of radicalisation, and theyought to draw your attention16, whether in your daily environment or in your place of work.

CONSISTENCY  SURPRISE  FLAGGING UP

The signs of breakdown: physical changes and changes in clothing; asocial statements;

 sudden move to hyper-ritualised religious observance:
 rejection of authority and of life in the community; brutal rejection of daily habits;
 turning in on oneself;

 self-hate, rejecting oneself, displacing self-hate onto another person;
 rejecting society and its institutions (school, etc.);
 distancing oneself from family and loved ones;
 sudden modification of centres of interest.

15- Information leaflet against radicalisation, a Ministry of the Interior document (MI/SG/DICOM - 04/2015), URL:
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Dispositif-de-lutte-contre-les-filieres-djihadistes/Assistance-aux-familles-et-prevention-de-laradicalisation-violente, consulted 12/07/2016.
16- Interministerial guide for the prevention of radicalisation, document of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime, March
2016, page 103.

The individual’s personal environment:

 a weak or even deteriorated paternal or parental image and a weakened environment; relationships networks that are already based on dependence on a person, a group, or web
sites;
 immersion in a radicalised family.
Theories and discourse:

 conspiracy theories such as references to the end of the world, conspiracy references, andvictim-status references; veneration of terrorists; using hate speech and very violent speech towards a community or a religion;
 proselytising; taking part in sectarian religious groups or radical thought circles; taking part in conferences given by extremist religious preachers; binary behaviour that distinguishes “pure” from “impure”.
Techniques: using virtual or human networks;

 strategies involving concealment or duplicity; planning journeys to war zones.

b) Why launch a flagging-up initiative?
It is a matter of preventing or even avoiding a tip-over into violent behaviour, as well as
supporting young people and families using adapted cells within the prefectures of the
département in which they live.
The aim of flagging up is to protect the persons concerned by preventing them from committing
a criminal act (to remove those persons as early as possible from the path they have chosen,
perhaps in spite of themselves), and to protect the population from possible violent behaviour17.
Taking the initiative by calling the Freephone number is a straightforward act of flagging up. It
will be for specialists to assess the seriousness of the case.

c) What happens after a situation has been flagged up?
If the situation is deemed to be of concern by the services of the State, the person who is the
subject of the flagging-up and her / his family will receive specialist support tailored to theirsituation.

TIO
N

Complete the online form:
http://www.stopdjihadisme.gouv.fr/
une-question-un-doute.html

VE
N

Flagging up a situation will never beheld against you. It is never too late
to flag up radicalisation.

Call the freephone number:
0 800 005 696

2.
PR
E

Your identity will not be revealed; flagging up
is strictly confidential. Even if you are not sureof having recognised combinations of signsof suspect behaviour, you may save lives.
Hence, it is preferable to quickly call the
Freephone number. Specialists will takecharge of qualifying the situation as
being of concern or not.

17- Interministerial Guide for the Prevention of Radicalisation, op. cit., page 7

35

2.

PR
EV
EN
TIO

N

36

2.2. Preventing the move to take violent action,and flagging up suspicious situations

Every citizen has a role to play in preventing the move to take violent action. By flagging up
dangerous behaviour, you can avoid a criminal act being committed or limit its scope, and thus
save lives. All citizens have the right to be protected, but they all have the duty to act.

2.2.1. Why flag up a suspect situation?

In a particularly heightened context of terrorist threat, it is more than ever necessary to be attentive
on a daily basis to the world around us.

Organising an attack most often requires preparation work as well as human and material means.
Most terrorist attacks first involve terrorists getting their bearings to identify the security measuresthat have been put in place so that they can be bypassed, access routes, etc. In the course of thevarious phases of setting up such an operation, the terrorists are forced, at one time or another, toreveal themselves.
By being attentive to their daily environment, all citizens can note and flag up facts, objects, or
behaviours that could indicate a possible move to action. Experience has shown that simple signs
identified by a passer-by or a neighbour could help prevent a terrorist act.

Attention paidby each person
to simple details
saves lives.

2.2.2. How can a suspicious situation be detected?

C

ertain behaviour or situations may seem inconsistent in a given environment. You must question
those inconsistencies and wonder if they are worthy of being flagged up.

Preparing for a terrorist act is not always as perfect as one may imagine, or as one may see on
television. Inconsistencies appear, and you can detect them. Call upon your common sense andyour intuition.
Thus, detecting suspect behaviour is a matter of knowing how to question the inconsistency between
a detail and a situation, or the mismatch between a person’s attitude and a place. Any inconsistency
that makes you think that a violent act is being prepared must make you take note, it must makeyou question, and it must lead you to flag it up.
Hence, you must learn to observe your environment (neighbourhood, professional life, public
transport, etc.).

INCONSISTENCY  QUESTIONING  FLAGGING UP
How is a terrorist act planned?
Understanding how a violent act is planned can help you to identify some signs of preparation.
Regardless of terrorists’ level of experience, they will prepare for their act as follows: choice oftargets, preparing for the act, and setting up.

Preparation work for a terrorist act leaves
a set of clues that, like the pieces of a puzzle,
can be assembled by the security forces
to frustrate a planned attack.

a) The choice of targets

2.
PR
E

VE
N

TIO
N

Terrorist acts can be aimed at symbolic targets (personalities, a community, a trade representing theState, etc.) or they can be indiscriminate (the population as a whole), to create a climate of fear
and affect the economic interests of the country.

37

2.

PR
EV
EN
TIO

N

38

b) Preparing for the act

Terrorists necessarily carry out reconnaissance work relating to the intended target, in order to
identify vulnerabilities and to determine the method of action that will enable them to attain theintended objective:
 physical reconnaissance of the site targeted, alone, in tandem, or in a group (possible
communication by gestures, timing, a single person present at the same place several times
for no apparent reason, a vehicle parked for long periods with people in it, etc.);
 gathering a maximum amount of information on the target:• seeking internal collusion;• requests for information concerning security measures through apparently innocent
conversations;• observing how security checks are carried out, or even testing those checks by using
false alarms (of the bomb-alert type);• taking pictures (photography or film) of the infrastructures of the site targeted and of the
security arrangement put in place (a ministry’s entrance door, soldiers on patrol, etc.);• making notes on security arrangements (site plan, positions of surveillance cameras,
entry and exit doors, etc.);• searching for information on the internet (social networks, aerial layouts and views, etc.);

 using concealment or camouflage techniques (that can be identified by the immediate circle):using pseudonyms or multiple forms of identification with different names, using pre-paid
telephone cards or several mobile telephones, etc.
c) The phase before action
An individual who is on the point of committing a terrorist act may conceal weapons: a knife, anassault rifle, a handgun, an explosive belt, ammunition, etc. Hence, that person will wear adaptedclothing, and may: carry a bag that is abnormally heavy, or that is mis-shaped by a weapon;
 wear protection (knee pads, a bullet-proof jacket); wear clothing that is wrong for the season, or sufficiently bulky to conceal a weapon;

 conceal a weapon behind the back to cross a checkpoint that involves opening jackets withno pat-down; show signs of nervousness or wariness in contrast with the environment.

An attack involving explosives can also be carried out. Certain situations should alert you:

 a letter or parcel with a badly-written address, that bears marks, or that gives off odours may
contain explosives;
 an abandoned parcel or bag. A bag left in a main passageway must be flagged up;

 a vehicle that has been left parked for a long time near a place where people gather (amarket, a place of worship, etc.) or a sensitive site (town hall, embassy, etc.). A booby-trappedvehicle will never be put in place at random; it will be near the target aimed at. A vehicle
without number plates should make you take notice.

2.2.3. How can I flag up and react?
a) For all citizens
If you witness suspicious behaviour, remain discreet. Do not show the person identified that her/ his attitude surprises you. Observe and memorise objective elements that can be passed on to
the police or to the national gendarmerie (registration plates, vehicle model, precise descriptionof individuals, direction of flight, etc.). So that your description can also be useful to internalsecurity forces, the objective elements that you give are absolutely essential.

OBSERVE  MEMORISE  FLAG UP
Call the internal-security forces by dialling 17, 112, or 114 (for people with hearing or speechdifficulties).
In the event of an emergency aboard a train: call 31 17 or send a text message to 31 177. If you call using the Alerte 3117 app, the person
who deals with your call will geolocate you. Describe the place of the attack: the train number
or its geographical position, the wagon number, etc.
b) For employees of a sensitive site or a site that deals with the public
Internal procedures must allow a description to be passed up the chain swiftly.
If an employee observes suspicious actions or behaviour, she / he: can strike up an informal conversation with the individual whose behaviour has been noted;
 must inform her / his superiors.

By asking open questions18, the employee will be able
to determine if the individual identified by her / his
behaviour is concealing ill intentions. In the event thatan individual is preparing to carry out an illintentioned act, that individual may behave in anelusive, nervous, or aggressive manner.
For example, if an unknown individual is found inside
an area that is not open to the public, the employee
may ask whom that person wishes to meet. Similarly,
if an individual takes photos that give the impressionof reconnaissance being carried out, the employee
can ask what has aroused the individual’s interest.
Employees, especially those in charge of the securityof assets and of people, must be made aware, to theextent possible, of those types of situations and of thereactions to adopt.

2.
PR
E

VE
N

TIO
N

Operators must raise awareness amongst theiremployees by specific drills that enable them toacquire good reactions and attitudes.

18- Questions that you cannot answer by saying “yes” or “no”.

39

2.

PR
EV
EN
TIO

N

40

Example of a decision-making support for an employee of a sensitive site or asite that deals with the public, and who is faced with suspect behaviour.

Does an individual’s
behaviour raisequestions in your mind?

No

Yes
Do you feel able
to approach the person.

No

Yes
Enter into a conversation
with the personby asking open questions.
Look for inconsistencies
in the discourse.

Yes
Has the conversation
answered your questions?
Has your concern
been eased?

No
Memorise objective elementsthat enable the individual
to be recognised / described.
Speak of the individual
to your superiors, and follow
pre-established directives.

Yes
Urgently flag up
suspicious behaviour(heads of security, 17).
Without revealing yourself,
try to maintain contact(at least visually) with theindividual until the arrivalof heads of security and /or law-enforcement forces.

Return to
your usual duties.

2.2.4. What can be done about drone overflights?

Drones are considered toys, but they are a threat that must be taken very seriously. Ill-intentioned
persons can use them to collect information with a view to preparing to commit a terrorist act.
Moreover, we must not forget that a drone can also be used as a weapon because of its carrying
capacity (grenade, chemical or biological weapon, etc.), or even an improvised weapon.

a) What is an ill-intentioned drone?
Civilian aircraft operating without anyone on board, commonly called drones, are governed by two
decrees passed on 17 December 201519. By virtue of the latter, and except any derogations, it isespecially prohibited to cause a drone to overfly public areas in built-up areas, and to cause adrone to overfly anywhere at night.
Thus, a drone overflying a gathering of people of operating at night must be considered potentially
ill-intentioned. Only potentially, because it may be case of an unintentional act of negligence orclumsiness on the part of a “leisure” remote pilot20.

b) Who should be warned?
In the event of an abnormal situation, alert the security forces (17).
However, take care not to burden the authorities. Information must be relevant, especially in thecase of night overflights.

c) What must be described? (non-exhaustive list) Where? When? What? How many?

 The flight altitude, its departure point, and its direction.

 The type of drone (multirotor or flying-wing, electric propulsion or thermal propulsion, type oflights).
 Is it carrying an external load (camera or other)?

19- On those 2 decrees, see “For further information” section, page 70.
20- The remote pilot is often within sight of her / his drone, i.e. within a radius of less than 500 m of the device.
Depending on her / his behaviour, it may be possible to determine the nature of the overflight.

2.
PR
E

VE
N

TIO
N

 If the remote pilot has been found, provide a physical and behavioural description.

41

42

3. REACTION
3.1. What can be done in the event of an armed attack?

An armed attack is one that is carried out by one or more individuals whose intention is either
to cause a maximum number of victims indiscriminately or to specifically target certain persons
or symbolic places.

The attackers can mainly use firearms, cold weapons (knife, axe), or explosive belts.
The recommendations that you will read below will be easier to apply if drills have been carried out
beforehand.

3.1.1. General case
Determine the most appropriate response to the situation. That situation is not a fixed one, it changes,
so adapt your methods of reaction to circumstances.
If the attack is external to the site where you are, it is recommended that you remain sheltered.
If the attack takes place within the site where you are, comply with the security instructions given
below.

a) EscapeCondition 1: Be certain that you have identified the exact location of the danger.
Condition 2: Be certain that you can escape without risk.
In all cases: do not set off the fire alarm; leave all your belongings behind; do not reveal yourself (bend over, lean forwards);
 take the least exposed and closest exit; use a known route; if possible, help others toescape; warn / alert other people
around you; dissuade anyone from entering
the danger area

3.

RE
AC
TIO

N

44

b) Lock yourself in If you cannot escape, lockyourself in, barricade theentrance, hide yourself in aplace that is beyond the reachof the attackers;
 block the door , if it has nolock, by blocking the handle
with whatever you can(furniture, etc.);
 switch off the lights;

 move away from walls, doors,
and windows;

 lie down on the ground behind several solid obstacles(projectiles shot through partitions can reach the inside of theroom where you are); maintain complete silence (mobile telephones in silent mode withno vibrator) and disconnect landlines telephones;
 remain close to people showing signs of stress and reassure them;
 await intervention by the security forces.

c) Alert
Once you are safe: warn the security forces [17, 112, or 114 (for people with hearing or speech difficulties)],and try to provide essential information:• Where? Give your position and that of yourattackers;• What? The nature of the attack (explosion,shooting, hostage-taking, etc.), type of weapon(firearm, cold weapon, explosives, etc.),
estimated number of victims;

17, 112ou 114• Who? Estimated number of assailants,
description (sex, clothing, facial features,
distinguishing marks, etc.), attitude (how are they
behaving, are they watching television, do they
have means of communication, etc.). Estimatednumber of wounded persons and of persons
hiding around you.

 If you cannot speak, call and leave the line open sothat the security forces can be warned.

DON’T THINK THAT OTHERS HAVE
GIVEN THE ALERT – DO IT YOURSELF!

d) Resist
If remaining hidden or carrying out an evacuation are impossible, and if your life is directly
threatened, then to the extent possible, resist as a last resort.
Collective action to take the upper hand over an isolated adversary can turn the situation around.
Simple actions can help to interrupt or neutralise the threat, as follows: distract the adversary (shout out) and attack; take advantage of a moment of vulnerability affecting the attacker (changing a charger, etc.);
 throw objects / use improvised weapons.

Be careful. Hostage-taking is different from a mass shooting. Do not seek to confront terrorist, andcomply with their instructions.

e) Facilitate intervention by the security forces and the emergency services
In order to facilitate intervention by the security forces and the emergency services: stay locked in until the security services carry out the evacuation;
 evacuate calmly, with your hands open and in full view so thatyou are not seen as a suspect; do not run towards the security forces; point out the wounded and their location, and if you havereceived first-aid training, provide first aid;

 do not leave the location straight away, as your evidence may
help the enquiry.

3.1.2. Special casesa) In the event of an attack with a cold weapon
 run away; if you cannot run away, protect yourself using an improvised shield (bag, chair, an item ofclothing rolled around a forearm, etc.); use an improved weapon that enables you to extend your reach; attack as a group: one person can attract the attacker’s attention whilst another tries toneutralise her / him.
An attacker with a cold weapon can be put off balance by a group reaction from victims or nearby
people. To the extent possible, get together to plan before attack, and launch a surprise attack.

b) In the event of an explosion or of an explosive risk
 protect yourself / take shelter behind a solid obstacle (a second explosion close to the site of
the first and aimed at the emergency services or the security forces is possible); await intervention by the emergency services.

3.
R do not touch anything (object, abandoned bag, debris);

EA
CT
IO
N

 move away from the site of the explosion;

45

3.

RE
AC
TIO

N

46

c) In the event of an attack on a train
Hide
Lie down under the seats, or crouch down.
Alert
Call 31 17 or send a text message to 31 177. If you call using the Alerte 3117 app, the person
who deals with your call will geolocate you. Describe the place of the attack: the train number
or its geographical position, the wagon number, etc.
ResistAs a last resort, if your life is in danger, impede or neutralise the terrorists’ actions with the helpof people hiding around you.
EscapeDo not leave the train unless you can do so without crossing a railway line.
Facilitate intervention by the security forces and the emergency services
When the law-enforcement agencies arrive, put your hands in the air and stand still.

d) In the event of an attack on an underground railway
Call 31 17 or send a text message to 31 177.
Use the calling points on station platforms to make contact with officials.

e) In the event of an attack on a vessel at sea
Get away from the threat if the size and architecture of thevessel allow it, get away from theplace of the attack and leave yourbelongings behind; do not jump into the water.

Follow onboard instructions.
Hiding if you are far from your cabin, hide, lock yourself in, and avoid crowds;
 if you are near your cabin, lock yourself in your cabin; if you have managed to lock yourself into a room, block the entry, close the doors, hide, anddo not open the doors for any reason;
 conceal your presence: turn off all sources of light and sound.
ATTENTION: Do not switch off your telephone. Put it into silent mode

3.2.What can be done in the event of a cyberattack?
During an attack
In the event of a cyberattack,report the facts quickly to thespecialist services via the
PHAROS21 platform, or bytelephone to the dedicatednumber.

After an attack
If you have been the victim of a cyberattack, in addition to making a report, lodge a complaint at
a department of the national police or the national gendarmerie, or send a letter to the State
Prosecutor at the competent High Court.
Provide yourself with a maximum amount of information on the attack observed. Thereafter,
specialist departments will take over the investigation. Do not hesitate to check the “risques.gouv.fr”
web site for information on the various behaviours to adopt based on the type of attack of which
you may have been a victim.
Finally, be attentive to instructions and recommendations given by the authorities concerning bestpractices to be adopted on the internet.

Cybervigilance
In a crisis, information circulation is an essential part of good management of events. Being
cybervigilant also means taking care not to circulate wrong information that may change themanagement of the crisis. During an attack, do not pass on rumours under any circumstances.
 Be attentive to instructions from official sources:• the government information service, the Ministry of the Interior (gendarmerie, police,
prefecture), and local authorities;

3.
R• other ministries affected by the crisis.

EA
CT
IO
N

• the Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (ANSSI – National Agency
for the Security of Information Systems): technical recommendations following acyberevent;21- Reporting site: https://www.internet-signalement.gouv.fr/

47

3.

RE
AC
TIO

N

48

3.3. What can be done in the event of an attack
using a toxic product?

S

everal toxic products are used in industry (chlorine, for example). Some of them have alreadybeen diverted by terrorist groups for warfare purposes. These products are likely to be intentionallyreleased in high-traffic areas.

Toxic products can penetrate the organism in different ways. Through inhalation, contact with theskin or the eyes, or by swallowing, they can cause serious injuries: burns, pulmonary œdema,
asthma, etc. Those injuries can be limited or even prevented by adopting the useful steps detailed
in the infographic on the following page: remain calm, and move to a safer place as soon as possible whilst helping more vulnerable
people (images from 1 to 4); limit poisoning by getting undressed and by washing yourself, in order to reduce or eliminate
the toxic product so that it no longer constitutes a risk. Prevent it from spreading to otherpeople (image 5);
 contact the emergency and medical services as soon as possible by calling 15, 18, 112, or
114 (image 6);

 stay where you are so that you do not contaminate other people, including emergency andmedical staff, wait for the emergency services so that they can give you first aid (images 7
and 8);
 in all cases, do not drink anything, do not rub your face, do not eat, do not smoke, and avoid
contact with other people (image 9).

50

4. MANAGING
THE POST-ATTACK SITUATION
4.1. If you have witnessed a terrorist attackContact the police and the gendarmerie to report what you saw at the site of the attack, and give
all the details that may help with the investigation. Any photos or video footage that you manage
to take during an attack should only be passed on to the authorities.

4.2. If you have been the victim of a terrorist attackF

ollowing a terrorist attack, victims are dealt with by the emergency services. Thereafter, they
benefit from a strengthened arrangement for providing help to victims, and they receive
compensation. That arrangement is steered by the Secretariat of State tasked with helping victims.

4.2.1. Being dealt with in an emergency
At the site of the terrorist attack or nearby, you can make yourself known to the police and thegendarmerie or to the emergency services. Medical / psychological assistance cells are tasked withdealing with you and to carry out an initial intervention, the main aim of which is to reduce the risksof post-traumatic shock.
In the event of a large-scale terrorist attack, the Prime Minister can activate the Celluleinterministérielle d’aide aux victimes (CIAV – Interministerial Cell for Supporting Victims). It is tasked
with informing victims and their families of the arrangements that have been put in place and of
their rights. A reception centre for families and various centres for offering medical / psychologicalhelp may be set up.

4.2.2. Help for victims of terrorism
To respond to victims’ expectations and needs, a Secretariat of State tasked with helping victims,
placed under the authority of the Prime Minister, was set up in France in March 2016. It is tasked
with protecting and ensuring victims’ rights. In the event of a terrorist attack, victims are offeredspecific and protective arrangements.
To obtain information, receive an explanation of what to do based on the situation (losing someone
close, physically- / psychologically-wounded, someone close to a wounded person, etc.), to receive
guidance (receive psychological help, lodging a complaint, making funeral arrangements,
compensation for damage, organising the inheritance, etc.), and compile a file, you can:check the web site set up to simplify formalities for victims of terrorist acts:
http://www.gouvernement.fr/guide-victimes

The site allows victims to: get to know the formalities and to carry them out on line; make and monitor a request to the Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme etd’autres infractions (FGTI – Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of Terrorism and other
Offences) and to the Office national des anciens combattants et des victimes de guerre(ONAC-VG – National Agency for Armed-Forces Veterans and for Victims of War); find contact details for victim-assistance associations.

Call 08 842 846 37 (7 days a week)
The platform is a single entry point for all victims, and will guide you to one of the 132 victimassistance associations accredited by the Ministry of Justice across the whole territory. The
professionals of those associations, jurists, psychologists, and social workers, are tasked withattending to you free of charge to: listen to you and provide you with information on all the entitlements that you enjoy, on thefunctioning of the law, and on the compensation arrangements for victims of terrorist acts;
 facilitate the formalities that you have to carry out with bodies such as the FGTI, the ONACVG, the CPAM (Caisse primaire d'assurance maladie – Primary Health Insurance Fund), theCAF (Caisse d'allocations familiales – Family Benefits Fund), and the tax administration;

 offer you psychological support following on from the emergency help that you may havealready been given; guide you towards professionals (lawyers, medical consultants, etc.).

Contact SAMU (15)Victims of a terrorist attack can receive medical / psychological support everywhere in France. Bycalling 15 (24 hours a day), SAMU (Service d’Aide Médicale Urgente – Emergency Medical
Assistance Service) will redirect your call to a cellule d’urgence médico-psychologique (CUMP –Medical / Psychological Emergency Cell). The CUMP will be able to deal with you, and, if needed,
it will be able to offer you long-term monitoring in your département’s public structures.

4.2.3. Compensation for victims of a terrorist act: the FGTI
Under certain conditions, victims of a terrorist act can receive compensation from the Fonds degarantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions (FGTI).

4.2.4 Lodging a complaint

TH
EP 4
OS . M
T-A AN
TTA AGCK ING
SIT
UA
TIO
N

For further information, go to:
http://www.fondsdegarantie.fr/actes-de-terrorisme

In France, you can lodge a complaint at the police judiciaire (Criminal Investigation Department)
office that is closest to your domicile. To find out where that office is, you can telephone the police
station or the gendarmerie brigade that is closest to your domicile to be given the details of theclosest police judiciaire office.

51

PART 3

AREAS
OF ACTION
This part aims at detailing the specificitiesof each of the VIGIPIRATE plan’s areas ofaction.

53

54

1. ALERTAND MOBILISE
Description of the area
Giving the alert aims at passing
information on urgently to all theactors concerned, in order toimmediately mobilise means ofintervention and adapt protection
measures. It also involves getting
the population on side by using
messages to maintain constantvigilance and to bring aboutpublic mobilisation in the event ofa serious event.
Some activity sectors have theirown chains. Those alert chainsconnect the ministries concerned,
the State’s decentralised administrations and departments, andoperators. Operators of vital importance have specific legal obligations in matters of alerting andintervening.

Security strategy
The security strategy is a response to a dual purpose of information and responsiveness. It aims atalerting and communicating as widely as possible, whilst mobilising specialist national means (suchas the ability to fight the threat of spreading toxic products).
By way of example, as part of preparations for Eurofoot 2016, significant specialist means involving
civil security, the internal security forces, the SAMU, and the armed forces were placed on alert or
deployed.

2. PROTECTINGMASS MEETINGS
Description of the area
A gathering involves a public groupingof a significant number of people in an
open space. Protecting gatherings
involves several types of actors: theorganisers, the administrative authority(mayors, prefects), law-enforcement
agencies (police, gendarmerie, municipal
police).
Organisers are responsible for the generalsecurity of the gathering, especially the
security of participants. An in-housesecurity service must ensure that thegathering proceeds appropriately(access-filtering, checking people,
security guards), and will liaise with lawenforcement agencies. The security
service may be drawn from the private
sector.
The administrative authority is responsible for public order. It checks the measures planned by theorganisers in light of the nature of the gathering, the number of members of the public expected, thesite configuration, and the circumstances that are unique to the event. In the event of a risk of breachof the peace or of a particular threat to a gathering, the administrative authority can prohibit thegathering by means of a ruling that it notifies immediately to the organisers.
Law-enforcement agencies can be used subject to a decision by the administrative authority, andbased on the nature or vulnerability of a gathering, for work involving traffic management, crowd
management, and general surveillance.

Security strategy
The strategy involves setting up surveillance and control arrangements based on the principle of indepth defence. As a last resort and based on the threat, the decision can be taken to restrict or evenprohibit the gathering.
To determine the level of protection of a gathering, it is essential to assess the threat to which it is
exposed. Thus, particular attention must be given to gatherings that involve large numbers of people,
tourist significance, and cultural, religious, or political symbolism. VIGIPIRATE stance memos havethe particular aim of identifying the most sensitive categories of gatherings for a given period.

55

56

3. PROTECTINGINSTALLATIONSAND BUILDINGS
Description of the area
The area that covers installations and buildings
involves all buildings that may be potential
targets, whether because of their symbolic,economic, political, or ecological value, or
because of the public that they deal with. Certain
infrastructures that are specific to precise areasof activity are given specific protection that is
described in the classified chapters of the
VIGIPIRATE plan that cover them. That is the casefor transport, dangerous installations, networks,
the food chain, and health.
The public authorities are tasked with providing
external protection, which they do throughsurveillance, traffic management, and parking
management. The arrangement is tailored to thetype of installation, its configuration, and thethreat assessment. It can use various lawenforcement agencies: local services, municipal
police forces, the national police, the national
gendarmerie, or even the armed forces.
The heads of installations and buildings aretasked with internal protection and with accessto buildings.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at adapting external security by acting on surveillance as well as on parking andtraffic conditions around installations, the security of access points, and flow control. It is based on
the principles of in-depth defence and of responsibility shared between the operators of installations
and public authorities. The VIGIPIRATE stance memos specify the categories of buildings that must
be covered by particular vigilance or protection.
Finally, to traditional measures for the security of buildings must be added procedures that are known
to all and that enable the best possible reaction by all staff in the case of an ill-intentioned intrusion
or even a terrorist attack. The quality of an establishment’s preparation work affects the quality of
its reaction in a crisis.

4. 4PROTECTINGDANGEROUS INSTALLATIONS
AND MATERIALS
Description of the area
The VIGIPIRATE plan covers
industrial activities as well as
the storage and transport ofcertain materials, due to therisks they cause because of
their dangerous nature.
The public authorities define theregulation that is applicable inthis area, check that it isproperly applied, and grant
operating permits.
In the particular case of the civil
nuclear sector, verification isdone by the Autorité de sûreté
nucléaire (ASN – Nuclear
Safety Authority), which is anindependent authority.
The VIGIPIRATE plan brings together businesses in the area that have security obligations: those thatare classified as SEVESO “Lower Tier” and “Upper Tier”, those with activities that are subject toauthorisation, and those that transport dangerous materials. In particular, they are businesses in thechemical, hydrocarbon, and nuclear sectors.
The general public is also covered by regulation on the marketing and use of products that can beused to make explosives.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at protecting dangerous installations, places where dangerous or sensitive
materials are stored, and the transport of those materials.
In addition, protecting those installations involves ensuring that no ill-intentioned act can have major
consequences on populations and the environment.

57

58

5. ENSURINGCYBERSECURITY
Description of the area
In the age of digital technology
and dematerialisation, information
systems have become a choicetarget for terrorists. Furthermore,
attempts to disrupt their proper
functioning through informationtechnology attacks can have heavy
consequences
nationallybyattacking the lives and the healthof citizens, by disrupting or
disorganising society, by causing
significant financial losses, and by
upsetting the functioning of oureconomy.
To protect that vital sector, acybersecurity arrangement that is
specific to the VIGIPIRATE plan has been put in place. It involves several actors:

 The Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (ANSSI) organises and coordinates the implementation of the cybersecurity part of the VIGIPIRATE plan. It is based on
the ministry that co-ordinates each of the sectors of vital importance;

 opérateurs d’importance vitale (OIV)22 apply information-technology security measures thatare specific to their sector, and they must also ensure that those measures are applied
appropriately by their subcontractors;
 administrations as a whole, as entities responsible for the State’s information systems,
implement the instructions of the VIGIPIRATE plan that are incumbent upon them; local authorities and non-OIV operators are encouraged to implement the VIGIPIRATE plan; citizens who, on a daily basis, in their professional or private lives, deal with information
systems, are invited to apply the essential rules of precaution and vigilance.

Security strategy
The strategy consists of a permanent security stance (cybersecurity), as well as incorporating
reinforced-protection measures tailored to changes in the threat (cyberdefence).

22- For further details, see the “Glossary”, page 73.

6. PROTECTING
THE AIR SECTOR
Description of the area
The air sector covers activities that
protect or use national airspace,
all associated infrastructures, and
all French and foreign aircraft, as
well as air-transport users andprofessionals.
The State is a major actor in its
protection. The Minister of Transport
is the competent authority inmatters of civil-aviation security. In
that regard, the Minister is
responsible for co-ordinating withthe other administrations concerned,
draws up and facilitates State
policy, and ensures that it isapplied by the various air-transport
actors and operators. The Minister
represents the government inEuropeanandinternational
consultative bodies.
Implementing security measures is the responsibility of private actors (aerodrome operators, airtransport companies, accredited agents), with the surveillance of that implementation being carriedout by the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of the Budget.
Under the direct authority of Prime Minister, the air force defends national airspace and its
approaches. That mission consists of enforcing sovereignty and opposing its use by a possible
aggressor. That arrangement is supplemented by bilateral agreements with bordering countries.
The VIGIPIRATE plan brings together several actors beyond the scope of the State alone, actors that,to varying degrees, have obligations in matters of safety and security or who can contribute to them.
They may be covered by national regulations, by directives, or by specific recommendations as partof protection against the terrorist threat. In particular, they are air-transport businesses, aerodrome
operators in Metropolitan and Overseas France, security services, and services with national
competence in matters of air navigation and of meteorology.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at protecting users and professionals of air transport and aeronautical installations,
national airspace, and aircraft, as well as ensuring that areas accessible to the public and to airport
professionals receive the requisite level of vigilance.
The objective is to ensure the best possible consistency of protection measures relating to the various
components of the air sector, as well as protecting passengers, accompanying persons, and airsector professionals.

59

60

7. PROTECTING
THE MARITIME SECTOR
Description of the area
Maritime areas under Frenchsovereignty cover almost 11 million
km2 across the regions of the world.
Maritime transport covers the activities
of vessels and infrastructures, ports,
and port-based support installations.
Protecting the maritime sector brings
together various actors. The
representatives of the State (maritime
prefect in Metropolitan France,
prefect or high commissioner of the
Republic overseas) ensure themaintenance of France’s sovereignty
over its maritime areas, and theyco-ordinate the work done by the various administrations that intervene at sea. The commander ofa sea area is responsible for implementing the maritime defence of the territory. In that regard,
she / he ensures the surveillance of the approaches.
The VIGIPIRATE plan brings together actors beyond the scope of the State alone, actors that, tovarying degrees, have obligations in matters of safety and security or who can contribute to them:public and private port operators whose infrastructures provide management of the land / vesselinterface, persons responsible for management of their vessels, and all activities dedicated to vessels
and ports.
The maritime transport of goods represents 90% of worldwide exchanges, so it plays a strategicrole in France’s economic activity. Its main vulnerabilities are linked directly to the commercial natureand international dimension of its activities, as well as the nature of its infrastructures: the high levelof passenger and goods flows, deadline requirements, the number of containers and their generaluse, ease of access to port installations, insertion of ports into towns and cities, and freedom of
movement around vessels.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at protecting the maritime area of territorial waters, vessels, reserved areas, andthe sensitive components of ports and port installations, as well as ensuring that the public areas ofthose ports receive the requisite level of vigilance.

8. PROTECTING
LAND TRANSPORT
Description of the area
The area of land transport includes
all means and bodies involved inpublic and rail transport, as well as
linear transport infrastructures.
The infrastructures include not only
physical infrastructures (roads andrailways) but also information
systems used to operate them(signalling, traffic management,
information for users, and pricing)and nodal interchanges.
The Minister of Transport oversees
the various actors of the area that allplay a role in protecting it to theextent of their responsibilities, and that are essentially infrastructure administrators and businesses
with an activity that is national in scope.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at protecting
passengers in stations, trains, andurban public transport. It also aims
at protecting the sensitive componentsof land transport as well as certain
stations.

61

62

9. PROTECTING
THE HEALTH SECTOR
Description of the area
The health sector brings together all
actors and activities that provide
healthcare, health supervision andsecurity, as well as the production
and distribution of healthcare
products, enabling prevention, and,
where necessary, to deal on a
massive scale (including from a
medical / psychological perspective)
with people following a terrorist act(including NRBC-E23).
Protecting the sector involves various
actors. The Ministry of Health coordinates the functioningof the sector through its directorates
general (Directorate General of Health, Directorate General of Healthcare Provision, etc.) andthrough the work of health agencies (regional health agencies and regional agencies offering healthexpertise). Biomedical and toxicology laboratories also play a role in the supervision arrangement.
Pharmaceutical businesses and wholesale distributors are involved in securing the supply ofhealthcare products. Finally, self-employed healthcare professionals are the first link in the healthcare
chain, which includes a wide variety of public and private medical / social establishments.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at:

 encouraging the general use of internal security plans in healthcare establishments, and“health – security – justice” agreements”, which are a permanent stance of vigilance andsecurity in the healthcare sector;
 adapting the health-supervision and health-security arrangement to the risks that our country
has to deal with; securing the capacity to produce and distribute healthcare products, as well as water intended
for human consumption.

23- See “Glossary”, page 72

10. PROTECTINGTHE FOOD CHAIN
Description of the area
The food chain is defined as all
businesses involved in production
and transformation, as well as
centres for bringing to market
products intended for human or
animal nutrition.
The agrifood sector is now highlyinternationalised, and is experiencing
growing complexity in production
systems, constant changes in supply
modes, and constant technologicaldevelopments. It is characterised bya wide diversity of sectors that
include a large number of small
businesses beside large businesses,
including many multinationals.
The essential sectors include: agrifood industries, which account for over 13,000 businesses except for commercial craft
products, with a significant place being reserved for transforming livestock products;
 large-scale food distribution, involving 10 large national groups and over 12,000
establishments in Metropolitan France.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at encouraging the general use of plans de sécurité interne (PSI – Internal Security
Plans)24. Those plans cover six areas: the physical protection of access points, the control of traffic
follows (people, vehicles, and products), the safety of the staff of the establishment, and stock
management, as well as information-technology processes and security.
In businesses of the sector, those plans form a permanent stance of vigilance and security. In addition,
they can be adapted based on alerts and / or a more precise characterisation of the threat.

24- For further details, see the “Guides to best practice” section, page 71.

63

64

11. PROTECTING
NETWORKS
11.1. Protecting electronic-communication
and audiovisual networks
Description of the area
The area of electronic-communication
and audiovisual networks includes all
activities, operators, and installations
that route electronic communications, i.e.
the broadcasting, transmitting, andreceiving of signs, signals, written material,
images, and sound electromagnetically(fibre optic, cable, terrestrial, or satellite).
It includes fixed-line and mobile
telephony, fixed and mobile dataservices, including access to the internet
and to so-called “social” networks, andthe broadcasting of television and radio
programmes.
Two actors contribute to protecting the area:

 the Commissariat aux communications électroniques de défense (CCED - Defence Electronic
Communications Commissariat), which comes under the Ministry for Electronic
Communications. It ensures that electronic-communication requirements are met as they relate
to defence and public security, and that operators apply legislative and regulatory
requirements in matters of defence and public security;

 the Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (ARCEP – Electronic
Communication and Postal Regulatory Authority) is the independent administrative authority
tasked with regulating electronic communications in France.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at avoiding long-term interruption of electronic communications. Particular attention
is paid to malfunctions and to anomalous use of software, because they can be ill-intentioned inorigin. In that regard, cybersecurity objectives apply in full to the area of electronic communications.

11.2. Protecting water networks
Description of the area
This area covers all activities that involve
health monitoring and distribution of waterto various public and private consumers incompliance with the rules of the Public HealthCode. It includes drinking-water pumping,production, storage, and supply systems.
The permanent health monitoring of eauxdestinées à la consommation humaine (EDCH– Water for Human Consumption), whichguarantees health security, includes healthchecks implemented by agences régionales
de santé (ARS – Regional Health Authorities)
as well as surveillance
carried out by the personne responsable de la production ou de la distribution de l’eau (PRPDE –Person Responsible for the Production and Distribution of Water). Health control is carried out
independently of the PRPDEs. It enables checks to be made of compliance with legislative andregulatory provisions relating to the health security of EDCH. Surveillance involves the regularverification of measures taken to protect the resource and the functioning of installations, as well as
carrying out analyses at various points.
The production and distribution service that provides drinking water to the population comes underthe municipality, the group of municipalities, or the drinking-water supply union (project manager ofthis public service). Those bodies can either manage the service directly, or delegate its management
through a lease contract or a concession contract (based on the degree of delegated authority)
granted to a specialist private business.
The public drinking-water service is distinguished by the geographical dispersal across the wholeof national territory of over 25,000 drinking-water distribution units (UDI, network part of the physicaldistribution network that provides high-quality water that is deemed homogenous, of the same origin,
having the same owner and the same operator). Those UDIs vary in size (ranging from supplying a
few tens of people to several hundreds of thousands of people), and they are rarely interconnected.
Not all water distributed is treated.

Security strategy

11
.P

RO

TE

CT

ING

NE

TW

OR

KS

The strategy aims at protecting water networks, ensuring that operating those networks receives therequisite level of vigilance, and ensuring continuity of distribution.

65

11
.P

RO

TÉ

GE

RL

ES

RÉ

SE

AU

X

66

11.3. Protecting electricity networks
Description of the area
This area covers activities that ensure thecontinuity of electricity distribution to the
population and to all activities. The area’s threemain functions are electricity production,transporting electricity across the whole of theterritory and in interconnection with othercountries, and electricity distribution to all users.
Several actors contribute to protecting the area:

 the Commission de régulation de l’énergie(CRE – Energy Regulation Commission) is
the independent administrative authority
tasked with overseeing the proper functioning of the electricity and gas markets in France; the State’s services issue operating permits based on opinions from the CRE;

 operators are liable for the continuity of services for which they are responsible: production,transport, or distribution.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at maintaining the continuity of services by protecting electricity networks and by
ensuring that their operation receives the requisite level of vigilance.

11.4. Protecting hydrocarbon networks
Description of the area
This area covers the importing, refining, distribution, and delivery of liquid hydrocarbons to various
public and private consumers. All those activities are contained in logistics chains that are interlinked.
Several actors contribute to protecting the area:

 the State’s services (the Direction générale de l’énergie et du climat (DGEC – Directorate
General for Energy and Climate)) decide on the possible use of strategic stocks as part ofagreements linking the Member States of the International Energy Agency, in accordancewith European regulations; operators from the oil sector are many and of variable size, and they are distributed
according to their more-or-less-integrated logistics activities;
 large operators acting in integrated activity networks;

 independent operators that carry out some oil-related activities (distribution and storage); large and medium-sized supermarkets, which have 56% of the market in petrol pumps;
 distributors of domestic fuel.

The challenges of protecting the area are linked to the very sensitivity of the hydrocarbons stored
and transported along networks. Protecting a certain number of infrastructures comes under the planthat covers dangerous installations and materials. Protecting hydrocarbon networks covers, above
all, the sensitive components that ensure the functioning and the continuity of transport anddistribution services.

Security strategy
The strategy aims at maintaining the continuity of services by protecting hydrocarbon networks andby ensuring that their operation receives the requisite level of vigilance.

11.5. Protecting gas networks
Description of the area
This area covers the transport, storage,
and distribution of gas, enabling imports
to be used to ensure the continuity ofsupply to various public and private
consumers, either through an oil pipeline
or in the form of liquefied natural gas(LNG) from methane terminals.
Several actors contribute to protecting thearea: The Commission de régulation del’énergie (CRE) oversees the proper
functioning of the gas and electricity
markets in France, as well as theindependence of administrators;

 the State’s services issue operating permits based on opinions from the CRE;

 operators are liable for the continuity of the service for which they are responsible: transport,
storage, or distribution.

Security strategy

11
.P

RO

TÉ

GE

RL

ES

RÉ

SE

AU

X

The strategy aims at maintaining the continuity of services by protecting gas networks and by
ensuring that their operation receives the requisite level of vigilance.

67

68

12. CONTROLLINGBORDERS
Description of the area
This area covers land borders (road and rail), including river and lake borders, maritime borders,and air borders under French sovereignty. France has 132 points de passage frontaliers (PPF –Border Crossing Points) at external borders, and it has identified at least 285 points de passage
autorisés (PPA – Authorised Crossing Points) that it can activate at internal borders in case of need.
Implementing VIGIPIRATE border-control measures applies in two contexts:

 preventive actions: some crossing points can be controlled if a national event is organisedthat requires reinforced protection, or if there is identification of a serious and imminent threat
to public order or internal security;
 reacting to an attack: some crossing points can be controlled in the event of a terrorist attack,in order to avoid perpetrators leaving the territory or any accomplices entering the territory.

Several actors contribute to protecting the area:

 State actors that are responsible for border control: the central directorate of the border police
and the directorate general of customs and indirect taxes;
 State actors intervening as back-up: national
gendarmerie, national police, armed forces,
directorate general of infrastructures,transport, and the sea, regional directoratesof the environment, spatial planning, andhousing; actors outside the scope of the State: airportand port operators, the European Commission
as well as other European States, and theEuropean Border and Coastguard Agency(Frontex).

Security strategy
The security strategy aims at encouraging interministerial planning and organising the deploymentof units engaged in border-control work as part of the fight against terrorism.

13. PROTECTING
FRENCH NATIONALSAND INTERESTS ABROAD
Description of the area
The foreign area of the VIGIPIRATE plan covers all countries where France has a presence, whichhost French nationals, and which are likely to receive French travellers. French presence includes
diplomatic and consular missions, military units stationed abroad or on operations, military personnel
on co-operation missions, cultural institutes, educational, cultural, and research establishments, andbusinesses. France ensures that French nationals are protected, whether they are resident or justpassing through.
Under the authority of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Development defines and implements security measures that apply to diplomatic posts, and provides
interministerial co-operation in matters affecting the security of French nationals and interests.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has authority over diplomatic missions. The latter are convergencepoints for all information and ability to take action in the event of a threat abroad. They provide
their expertise on each country and provide local liaison with nationals, the network of educational
establishments, businesses, local political authorities, and the diplomatic representatives of othercountries.
Other ministries are stakeholders in protection abroad. The Ministry of Defence is responsible fordefining and implementing protection measures for military units stationed abroad or on operations,as part of agreements signed with host countries. The Ministry of the Interior provides a permanent
protection and security mission in a certain number of diplomatic representations. The Ministry ofTransport plays a role in protecting air and maritime transport abroad, and liaises with the operatorsconcerned.
Businesses are responsible for the safety of their employees.
The terrorist threat abroad is very varied in its origins and in its manifestations. It can come fromorganisations or networks that are more or less independent locally or internationally, or even fromisolated individuals. It can stem from political and religious ideologies, or from criminal or Mafialike motivations. It can manifest itself following clearly posted intentions or on an opportunistic basis,
based on local political and economic situations and the foreign-policy positions of France and its
allies. Modes of action can be greatly varied. Potential targets can be grouped into three maincategories: French nationals, missions representing France, and French businesses.

Security strategy
To respond to those challenges abroad, the VIGIPIRATE plan aims at protecting French residents,
vulnerable people, travellers, State employees, aircraft and the aerodromes where they land, andvessels and the ports where they dock. Moreover, it aims at reinforcing vigilance around missions
representing the State and French businesses.

69

70

FOR MORE INFORMATIONThe other PIRATE plans
Plans activated in the event of a terrorist attack that uses a specific meansof aggression: the NRBC plan (nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical) sets out the procedures forintervening in the event of a threat or of verified execution of an ill-intentioned action or an
action of a terrorist nature using NRBC materials, agents, or products;
 the PIRANET plan enables intervention in the event of an information-technology crisis.

Plans activated in the event of a terrorist attack in a particular setting: the PIRATAIR-INTRUSAIR plan is an intervention plan that aims at controlling verified orimminent illicit acts in matters of aviation security (PIRATAIR) and air sovereignty (INTRUSAIR); the PIRATE-MER plan enables intervention against maritime terrorism and piracy, and, moregenerally, against any ill-intentioned act at sea that could be linked to hostage-taking; the METROPIRATE plan enables intervention in the event of an attack on underground rail
public transport.

Documentation
 Interministerial guide for the prevention of radicalisation, document of the Interministerial
committee for the prevention of crime, March 2016

 2008 White Paper on defence and national security, available on line at:
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000341.pdf
 2013 White Paper on defence and national security, available on line at:
http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/

 Information leaflet against radicalisation, document of the Ministry of the Interior(MI/SG/DICOM - 04/2015), available on:
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Sg-CiPDR/Prevenir-la-radicalisation/Prevenir-la-radicalisation
 Decree of 17 December 2015 relating to the use of airspace by aircraft flying with nohumans aboard

 Decree of 17 December 2015 relating to the design of civil aircraft flying with no humans
aboard, their conditions of use, and the skills required of the people using them
 9 May 2016 action plan against radicalisation and terrorism.

Web sites
 www.gouvernement.fr

 http://www.risques.gouv.fr

 http://www.encasdattaque.gouv.fr

 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/conseils-aux-voyageurs

 https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fildariane/dyn/protected/accueil/formAccueil.html
 http://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1527
 http://www.ssi.gouv.fr
Reporting platforms:

 http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/une-question-un-doute.html
 http://internet-signalement.gouv.fr

Guides to best practices
 All sectoral guides to VIGIPIRATE best practices can be consulted at:
http://www.encasdattaque.gouv.fr

 Guide to information-technology hygiene aimed at businesses, available at
http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/

 Guide to recommendations for protecting the food chain
against the risks of ill-intentioned, criminal, or terrorist actions, available at
http://agriculture.gouv.fr/sites/minagri/files/documents/pdf/guide-2014_140214_V2

SAIP app
More information at http://www.gouvernement.fr/appli-alerte-saip

FO
R

MO
R

EI
NF
OR

MA
TIO
N

To download the app, please go to http://appstore.com

71

72

GLOSSARY
ANSSI

Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (National Agency for
Information-System Security). Attached to the SGDSN, tasked with protection andprevention in the face of cyberthreats. It organises and co-ordinates the implementationof the cybersecurity part of the VIGIPIRATE plan.

ARCEP

Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (Electronic
Communications and Postal Regulatory Authority) is the independent administrative
authority tasked with regulating electronic communications in France.

CCED

The Commissariat aux communications électroniques de défense (Defence Electronic
Communications Commissariat) comes under the Ministries of the Economy and
Finance. It ensures that communications needs are met in relation to defence and public
security.

CIAV

The Cellule interministérielle d’aide aux victimes (Interministerial Cell for Help forVictims) provides real-time centralisation of information on the state of victims. It informs
and supports their loved ones, and co-ordinates the work of all intervening ministries,
in relation with associations and the prosecution. It comes under the authority of thePrime Minister, who decides when it is activated and when it is closed down.

CNR

Coordonnateur national du renseignement (National Intelligence Co-ordinator), whoworks beside the President of the Republic. Co-ordinates the work of the intelligence
services and ensures that they co-operate appropriately.

CRE

The Commission de régulation de l’énergie (Energy Regulation Commission) is theindependent administrative authority tasked with overseeing the proper functioning of
the gas and electricity markets in France.

FGTI

The Fonds de garantie (Guarantee Fund) is tasked with compensating victims by way
of national solidarity. It carries out recourse actions against the parties responsible fordamage.

FrontexThe European Border and Coastguard Agency. Its mission is to co-ordinate operational
co-operation between Member States at the external borders of the European Union inmatters of the fight against clandestine immigration.

ISPS

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.

NRBC

Nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical. Generic term used to designate
unconventional weapons or technological risks of which the effects are difficult tocontrol and contain due to their power or their environmental-dissemination ability.

Security
objective

Effect to be obtained in terms of vigilance and protection to counter threats and reduce
vulnerabilities in a particular area of activity.

Certain operators are described as being of vital importance when their activity sector
is one that “can be substituted and replaced with difficulty in the production of essential
goods and services, or can present a serious danger for the population.” Those services
must be essential for satisfying essential needs for the life of populations, exercising
State authority, the functioning of the economy, maintaining defence potential, or the
security of the Nation.

Résilience

The 2008 White Paper defines resilience as “the will and ability of a country, society,and public authorities to resist the consequences of an aggression or a major
catastrophe, then swiftly re-establish their ability to function normally, or at least in asocially acceptable manner. It covers not only public authorities but also economic
actors and the whole of civil society.”

SAIP

Système d’alerte et d’information des populations (Population Alert and Information
System). Following attacks in France in January and November 2015, and at the Prime
Minister’s request, the Ministry of the Interior and the government intelligence service
launched a smartphone-based mobile alert app: SAIP, the Population Alert andInformation System.

SAIV

Sécurité des activités d’importance vitale (Security of activities of vital importance). A
security arrangement that gives a legal framework to operators of vital importance tomake them co-operate in protecting their critical installations against any threat,
especially of a terrorist nature.

SIG

Service d’information du gouvernement (government intelligence service). A Prime
Ministerial department directorate placed under the Prime Minister’s direct authority. It
analyses changes in public opinion and media treatment of government action. It
informs the general public of the work carried out by the Prime Minister and thegovernment. It steers and co-ordinates government communication at interministerial
level.

SGDSN

Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (Secretariat General for
Defence and National Security), a Prime Ministerial department that is tasked, inparticular, with steering the VIGIPIRATE plan.

SHFDS

Service du haut fonctionnaire de défense et de sécurité (Department of the Senior
Officer of Defence and Security). The Senior Officer is part of the senior civil service.
Set beside the Minister, the Senior Officer facilitates and co-ordinates policy in mattersof defence, vigilance, crisis prevention, and emergency situations.

UCLAT

Unité de coordination de la lutte antiterroriste (Unit for co-ordinating the fight against
terrorism). Placed under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior, it co-ordinatesvarious departments tasked with the fight against terrorism.

GL
OS
SA
RY

OIV

73

74

USEFUL NUMBERS
In the event of an attack or to report an abnormal situation17112
114 (for persons with hearing or speech difficulties)

In a train or on public transport31 17
orText message 31 177
or
Alerte 3117 app

In the event of an attack with a toxic product15 (SAMU)
18 (firefighters)112
114 (for persons with hearing or speech difficulties)

Victim of a terrorist attack
15 (SAMU)
08 842 846 37 (7 days a week)

Make a report
Freephone number
0 800 005 696

Photo and illustration credits: Government intelligence service, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of
the Environment, Energy, and the Sea, Ministry of the Economy and Finance, Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health, Ministry of Agriculture.

NOTES75

SECRÉTARIAT GÉNÉRALDE LA DÉFENSE ET DE
L A S É C U R I T É N AT I O N A L E

51, boulevard de La Tour-Maubourg
75700 Paris SP 07
01 71 75 80 11
sgdsn.gouv.fr

Formatting and printing: Pôle Conception graphique-Fabrication – DSAF/DPL – December 2017.

TACKLING TERRORISM TOGETHER
VIGILANCE, PREVENTION,
AND PROTECTION AGAINSTTHE TERRORIST THREAT