SECTION TITLE

Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine
Microgrids
The Silver Lining in Information Warfare
Optimizing Security Forces Operations
Remaining a Day-One Player: FASF and USAF

JOURNAL NAME  SEASON YEAR   iVol. 2, No. 3 - Fall 2023

Department of the Air Force

Air & Space Operations Review
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Lt Gen Brian S. Robinson, USAF
Commander and President, Air University
Lt Gen Andrea D. Tullos
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Dr. Mark J. Conversino
Director, Air University Press
Dr. Paul Hoffman

Journal Team
Editor in Chief
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Advisory Editorial Board

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James W. Forsyth Jr., PhD     Christina L.M. Goulter, PhD
Kelly S. Grieco, PhD       Michael R. Kraig, PhD
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Nicholas M. Sambaluk, PhD     Heather P. Venable, PhD
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FALL 2023

Air & Space Operations Review

VOL. 2 NO. 3

3 From the Editor
AIRPOWER LESSONS FOR NATO FROM UKRAINE

4 Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine
Matthew S. Galamison
Michael B. Petersen

ADVANCES IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FORCE STRUCTURE

20 Microgrids

Energy Security for Overseas BasesNathan P. Olsen

34 The Silver Lining in Information Warfare
Lauren McQuone

43 Optimizing Security Forces Operations
Employing Risk-Based Strategies
Brandon L. Dinkins

FROM OUR FRIENDS

51 Remaining a Day-­One Player

The French Air and Space Force and the US Air ForceDavid Pappalardo
Andy Hamann

BOOK REVIEWS

59 The Air War in Vietnam

Michael E. Weaver
Reviewed by Brigadier General Chad T. Manske, USAF, Retired

60 The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied
Strategy during World War II
Alexander G. Lovelace
Reviewed by Robert S. Burrell, PhD

61 The Polar Pivot: Great Power Competition in the Arctic and Antarctica
Ryan Patrick Burke
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel James M. Davitch, USAF, PhD

64 U.S. Go Home: The U.S. Military in France, 1945–1968
M. David Egan and Jean Egan
Reviewed by Bradley F. Podliska, PhD

66 Modern South Korean Air Power: The Republic of Korea Air Force Today
Robin Polderman
Reviewed by Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, USA, Retired

68 Wars of Ideas: Theology, Interpretation, and Power in the Muslim World
Edited by Ilan Berman
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Jason Baker

69 Russia’s Path to the High-­Tech Battlespace
Roger N. McDermott
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel J. Alexander Ippoliti

FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Reader,
Despite a year marked by increasing global turmoil, barbarism, and climate-­­related
challenges, we continue to see important advances in science, technology, and organizational management. Integrating these advances into force modernization, analytical systems, physical infrastructure, and human systems will improve the ability of the UnitedStates and its Allies and partners to work together in defense against adversaries whoseek to destabilize a democratic world order. Our Fall 2023 issue considers some lessons
we are learning from today’s conflicts and highlights the benefits of recent scientific andtechnological research and development.
In our lead article, Matthew Galamison and Michael Petersen delve into Russian aerospace forces’ (VKS) technological capabilities, training, doctrine, and operational concepts,
revealing significant deficiencies. As NATO nations modernize their air forces, they canand should learn the lessons behind Russia’s air campaign failures in Ukraine.
Turning to renewable energy, Nate Olsen argues the best way to ensure energy grid sustainability and readiness at overseas US military bases is to generate power through renewablemicrogrids. Multiple forms of renewable energy, tailored to specific geographic regions, will
provide the United States and its Allies with uninterrupted power to maintain power down
range. As the world pays increasing attention to climate change, Lauren McQuone assertsthat advances in meteorological analysis can highlight differences between adversary andfriend vulnerabilities. An assessment of capabilities, risk, and behavioral norms and anomalies
can help our forces determine the marginal advantage in operational planning.
Threats—climate or otherwise—to installations are persistent today. Brandon Dinkins
argues a new US Air Force Security Forces framework is needed to modernize the forces
and create a comprehensive security posture for our physical installations. This framework will mitigate personnel shortfalls as well as mental and physical health factors that
impede the readiness and capabilities of our Defenders.
Adding further context and the view of an Ally to the questions posed by Galamison andPetersen for NATO, our issue concludes with a contribution focused on France’s participationin US and Allied air and space operations. David Pappalardo and Andy Hamann remind us
of France’s key role in the Alliance in providing critical airpower capabilities, and they highlight the importance of interoperability and potential future collaboration in space efforts.
As always, thank you for taking the time to read this issue of Air & Space Operations
Review. We hope you find it engaging and informative.
~ The Editor

AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW   3

AIRPOWER LESSONS FOR NATO FROM UKRAINE

Failures of the Russian Aerospace
Forces in Ukraine
Matthew S. Galamison
Michael B. Petersen
Russian thinking on Russian aerospace forces’ capabilities prior to the invasion of Ukraine reveals
the force faced interconnected and unresolved challenges, including a mistaken strategic priority on defensive over offensive operations, a failure to develop sufficient capacity and capability
for large-­scale operations, and comparatively undeveloped operational concepts. As European
NATO partners modernize their forces in the coming years, these critical shortfalls provide
lessons related to acquiring specific technologies and platforms, engaging relevant operational
concepts, and committing to extensive, ongoing training.

S

ince the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, one of the enduring
questions of the conflict has been why Russian airpower has failed to establish air
superiority against a seemingly less capable adversary. Failing to establish air superiority—or even air supremacy—over Ukraine, Russia’s leadership has limited its Russian
aerospace forces (VKS) to conducting long-­range cruise missile and drone strikes fromwithin the bastion of its national borders, or worse, to dangerous low-­altitude strikes in
the heart of man-portable air defense and air defense artillery engagement zones.
Starting a war without controlling the electromagnetic spectrum is tantamount to defeat.

Anatoly Tsyganok, director of the Center for Military Forecasting, Moscow1

Why has Russia not taken advantage of its numerical and technological air advantage
over Ukraine? This article examines Russian sources to argue intellectual biases among
Russian defense planners have resulted in technical shortcomings, an absence of operational
concepts especially in the critical area of suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) anddestruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD), and a force that is too poorly trained for the
combat environment found in Ukraine. Many Russian-­language airpower experts under-

Commander Matthew Galamison, USN, serves as the executive officer for Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 142, “The Gray
Wolves,” Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Washington, and holds a master of arts in defense and strategic studies from the US
NavalWar College.										Michael B. Petersen, PhD, is the founding director of the Russia Maritime Studies Institute and a professor at the US Naval War College.

1. Anatoly Tsyganok, “Применение сил и средств РЭБ в войнах и конфликтах ХХI века” [Theuse of forces and means of electronic warfare in wars and conflicts of the XXI century], Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
last modified September 20, 2019, https://nvo.ng.ru/.
4   AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW

Galamison & Petersenstood these gaps, which at least in the trans-­Atlantic community, were papered over by
massive military investment and credulous analysis of that investment.
Russia’s struggles in the air also offer lessons for NATO’s procurement efforts. As
European alliance members invest in critical tactical air capabilities, they must consider
the observed gaps in Russian airpower capability. One of the most serious is the lack of atactical-­level, dedicated electronic attack aircraft capable of both intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR), and SEAD/DEAD. Current European procurement efforts,
even of the F-35 Lighting II, do not completely fill this gap.
In addition, European air forces must be wary of believing that technological innovation
equals improved battlefield outcomes. As procurement efforts progress, developing practicaloperational concepts and practices will be imperative as the number of strike aircraft increases.
Failure to do so will place European air forces in the same conundrum Russia currently finds
itself. Finally, European NATO partners must commit to sufficient training and aircraft
maintenance to enable Alliance air supremacy in a potential conflict with Russia.

Perspectives on Russian Airpower
A number of authors have examined the problem of the so-­called “disappearance” of theRussian air force in the Ukraine conflict.2 Studies that reflect longer-­term analyses of theRussian war in Ukraine began emerging in late 2022, less than a year into the conflict. Thusfar, the two most thorough examinations of the air war in Ukraine indicate Russia’s failuresin large part stem from the inability of the VKS to consistently suppress or destroy Ukrainianground-­based air defense systems at the outset of the conflict.3
These analyses describe Russia’s success in the opening week of the war when Ukrainiansurface-­to-­air-­missile (SAM) systems could be well-­mapped and few defensive measures
were taken to enhance their survivability. But once this initial flurry subsided, the VKS
began to stumble. Inadequate Russian SEAD/DEAD and Ukraine’s ability to sustain its
ground-­based air defense denied air superiority to Russia and resulted in a deadlocked air
conflict. Both sides became limited to tentative jabs, small-­scale tactical innovation(Ukraine), and reliance on long-­range precision strikes (Russia) against fixed targets.
Yet these otherwise thorough works offer little in the way of Russian-­language evidence to support their case. Further, these perspectives reveal critical flaws in Russian
capabilities. As this article will demonstrate, many reliable Russian-­language airpower
2. Justin Bronk, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), February 28, 2022, https://rusi.org/; Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “What Happened to Russia’s
Air Force? U.S. Officials, Experts Stumped,” Reuters, March 2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/; and Dougal
Robertson, “Getting It Wrong: The Missing Russian Air Campaign over the Ukraine,” Australian Defence
Business Review, September 2, 2022, https://adbr.com.au/
3 Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for
Air Defence (London: RUSI, 2022), 1, https://rusi.org/; and Justin Bronk, Russian Combat Air Strengths andLimitations: Lessons from Ukraine (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], 2023), https://www.
cna.org/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  5

Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine

sources observed before the war that for all of Russia’s technological improvements inairborne ISR and electronic attack, it had yet to translate those improvements into effective operational practice.
Piecing together prewar Russian thought on VKS operations reveals a set of interwoven challenges that Russia had not yet solved by the outbreak of the war. This includes a
strategic priority on defensive over offensive operations, failure to develop sufficient capacity and capability for operations at this scale, and comparatively immature operational
concepts. These lessons have critical implications as NATO partners undergo major force
modernization over the next several years.

The Defensive Bias
An analysis of Russian military doctrine reveals the VKS is primarily anchored to Russia’s
enduring military priority of defending “Mother Russia” from a so-­called “aerospace blitzkrieg”
by NATO, to the detriment of sustained, strategic offensive air operations.4 “Russia has nointention to assault anyone,” ran one Russian analysis of the Aerospace Defence Forces—thepredecessor of the VKS—in 2019.5 Politically expedient or not, this sentiment has influenced
the VKS’ strategic emphasis and prioritization of tasks. As a result, Russia’s military spending priorities did not accentuate operational concepts such as suppression and destructionof enemy air defenses, a critical requirement for gaining air superiority over a contested areaof operations, and thus an essential element of any air campaign.
Most Russian operational planning in the post-­Soviet period has focused on defense
against NATO aerospace attacks, especially in the “initial period of war . . . the mostcritical and decisive period of conflict when countries launch strategic operations withalready deployed forces.”6 In Russian assessments, the initial period of war for a NATOattack on Russia would consist of what Russia terms a massed missile-­aviation strike, now
more commonly referred to as an integrated massed air strike.7 The concept of this massed-­aerospace assault has driven much of Russian thinking on air operations. As Russian
thinkers have emphasized the need for aerospace defense at the operational level of war,
they have commonly landed on these integrated massed air strikes as a primary threat tonational security.
This, in turn, has pushed the state’s military-­technical development, procurement, andtraining into integrated air defense rather than more offensively oriented air dominance
operations. While Russia demonstrated an increase in offensive air operations in recent
conflicts such as Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and Syria in 2015, “the fundamental
4. Thomas Withington, “Defending Mother Russia’s Skies,” RUSI, July 13, 2022, https://rusi.org/.
5. S. N. Borisko and S. A. Goremykin, “Analyzing the State of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, Development
Projects,” Military Thought 28, no. 1 (2019).
6. Michael Kofman et al., Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts (Arlington,VA:
CNA, 2021), 3.
7. Kofman et al., 21.
6  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Galamison & Petersen

orientation and posturing of the Russian military over the years still remains centered on
defending its heartland and vital industries and cities, using layered and integrated air
defense.” 8 Even if Russian military theory posits a mixture of offensive and defensive air
actions, as prominent Russian airpower theorists have noted, “it can be assumed that in
the general concept of aerospace defense, the main semantic load still falls on the conceptof ‘defense.’ ”9Because of this cognitive prioritization on integrated air and missile defense, Russian
airpower strategists have spent less intellectual capital on preparation for complex, offensive air superiority and air dominance campaigns. Retired US Air Force Lieutenant
General David Deptula has noted “Russia has never fully appreciated the use of airpower
beyond support to ground forces,” and “as a result, Russia, in all its wars, has never conceivedof or run a strategic air campaign.”10
Russian military strategy has generally prioritized the defense of critical infrastructure
and close air support of ground troops rather than power projection in defended airspace.
Because of this, the development of operational concepts and doctrine for air dominance
operations, including SEAD/DEAD, has suffered. The cognitive defensive bias has led,
intentionally or not, to the deprioritization of the planning, practice, and execution of
offensive operations to gain air superiority in contested airspace.

Inadequate Procurement
While Russia has conducted a thorough reform of its military since the Georgian War
of 2008, it is unclear at this point if the rubles have been spent wisely for a twenty-­first-­
century conflict. One Russian defense analysis points out that while established Russian
hardware designs experienced successful growth, only marginal progress was made in
producing completely new weapons and platforms such as fifth-­generation aircraft.11 Since
2010, the VKS has received approximately 350 modern strike-­fighter aircraft, most ofwhich are upgraded designs of older platforms, including Su-30SM multirole fighters,
Su-35S air-­superiority fighters, and Su-34 bombers.12 But this investment in upgraded
8. Diptendu Choudhury, “Russia’s Military Understanding of Air Power: Structural and Doctrinal Aspects,” Vivekananda International Foundation, May 23, 2022, https://www.vifindia.org/.
9. Valentin Dybov and Yuri Podgornykh, “Всесторонне проработанной теории ВКО пока нет”
[There is no comprehensively elaborated theory of WSC yet], VKO, last modified December 2015, http://
www.vko.ru/.
10. Phillips Payson O’Brien and Edward Stringer, “The Overlooked Reason Russia’s Invasion Is Floundering,” Atlantic, May 9, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/.
11. Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, “Russian Rearmament: An Assessment of Defense-­
Industrial Performance,” Problems of Post-­Communism 65, no. 3 (October 19, 2016), https://doi.org/; andJulian Cooper, Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of Implementation
2011–2015 (Stockholm: FOI [Swedish Defence Research Agency], 2016), 48, https://www.foi.se/.
12. Justin Bronk, “Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?,” RUSI,March 4, 2022, https://rusi.org/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  7

Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine

strike platforms has masked the underinvestment and underdevelopment of less flashy
but critically essential systems necessary to overcome Ukrainian ground-­based air defenses
as part of a successful air campaign.
Russia’s own military experts may not believe Russia has put its money or focus on theright technology. Airpower observers have noted the defense industry has failed to develop
capability and capacity, especially in ISR and electronic attack, for the purpose of SEAD
and DEAD. For example, a 2021 article published in Military Thought—the English
translation of the journal of the Soviet Union’s and Russian Federation’s Ministry of
Defense—made a tacit admission that Russia is still lagging in the development of a wide
variety of platforms, including “advanced fixed-­wing and rotary, low-­altitude and stratospheric, reconnaissance and reconnaissance-­strike, fighter and jammer, and relay and radar
surveillance and guidance UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle].”13 This indicates a defense-­
focused semantic load evident in the doctrine that has resulted in capability gaps incritical offensive air dominance capabilities such as SEAD and DEAD.
Like any kill chain, SEAD and DEAD rely highly on timely, accurate ISR. As of2022, Russia’s most prolific airborne ISR platforms are the Ilyushin Il-20 Coot and theSu-24MR. The Il-20, a Cold War-­era turboprop built in the 1970s, is almost entirely
unsuited to operations in a contested environment, while the Su-24MR is a modificationof the 1980s fighter-­bomber. Both aircraft can collect and classify electronic intelligencefrom ground-­based radar systems, but they lack electronic suppression systems. Additionally, the Su-24MR can generate synthetic aperture radar imagery.14 Yet in the 2008
Georgia War, the Su-24MR was ineffective against Georgian air defense systems, which,like Ukraine’s, were Soviet-­produced.
Operations there also revealed Russian aircraft could not accurately locate enemy radars
with available electronic intelligence technologies. Su-24MR crew training was also
considered to be subpar.15 Currently, it is assessed that Russia has a global inventory of 10
operational Il-20s of various configurations, and 48 Su-24MRs are believed to be still
operated by the VKS as of January 2023.16 It is not clear how many of each aircraft areallocated to Ukraine operations, but given global demand, whatever the number, it is almost
certainly too few.
Notably, Russia has recently attempted to modernize its strategic ISR force with the
Tu-214R. Russia currently operates only two of these modern ISR aircraft, with a third
still in development. Russian sources claim the Tu-214R can detect radar systems out to
13. S. N. Kurilov, A. N. Kiryushin, and Yu. N. Moiseyev, “Current Problems of Air Forces Tactics andWays to Solve Them,” Military Thought 30, no. 3 (September 30, 2021): 22.
14. Piotr Butowski, Russia’s Warplanes: Russian-­made Military Aircraft and Helicopters Today (Houston,
TX: Harpia Publishing, 2015), 178, 192.
15. Tsyganok, “Применение сил.”16. “An In-­Depth Review of Russia’s Current ISR Aircraft,” Key.Aero (website), May 18, 2022, https://www.key.aero/; and “Su-24 Inventory,” Janes, accessed January 21, 2023, https://www.janes.com/.
8  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Galamison & Petersen

400 kilometers, but development issues have plagued the platform.17 Russian military
bloggers have been especially critical of the delayed development of the Tu-214R, asserting if Russia had been able to field the Tu-214R on time and in sufficient numbers forthe invasion of Ukraine, then the “resistance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would havebeen suppressed long ago.”18
For all its publicly claimed capabilities, it seems the VKS has been disappointed in theperformance of the Tu-214R and has canceled further production.19 This program cancellation leaves the Russian aerospace forces with a few dozen legacy aircraft and three poorly
performing modern ISR aircraft. Russian unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Orlan-10
have filled in gaps but are operated by Russian ground forces and do not appear to provide
rapid and reliable ISR mapping for SEAD/DEAD missions.20
There is also little evidence to show the VKS has fully developed the proper capabilities
for electronic attack in support of SEAD/DEAD. First, Russia has no dedicated tacticalairborne electronic attack aircraft to nonkinetically suppress adversary SAM systems. The
Il-22PP is equipped with a standoff electronic warfare suite, but the airframe is based onan Il-18D airliner.21 Unsurprisingly, an airframe based on an antiquated airliner makes
for a poor tactical SEAD asset in a dynamic SAM environment, where standoff jammingis insufficient, and speed and maneuverability are required to maintain jamming alignment
with supported strike aircraft. One Russian military analyst has noted that the use of theIl-22PP for electronic attack is “not the ideal solution.”22
To compensate, the VKS currently fields the RTU 518-PSM electronic warfare suite on
its Flanker family of aircraft.23 This wing-­mounted pod, also known as the Khibiny familyof jamming pods, is reported to be highly capable of detecting and defeating adversary SAM
radars, utilizing what appears to be digital radio frequency memory technology.24
While the Su-34 can be configured with Khibiny pods to act in an escort jamming role,
open-­source reporting alludes to the fact that the Khibiny pods primarily operate in an
17. Boyoko Nikolov, “Russia is Testing a Tu-214R Reconnaissance Aircraft over Ukraine,” BulgarianMilitary.com, last modified September 24, 2022, https://bulgarianmilitary.com/; and “Russian Military
Confident in Tu-214R Capabilities after ELINT Missions in Syria,” Air Recognition, last modified 2015,
https://airrecognition.com/.
18. Andrey Mitrofanov, “Ту-214Р в специальной военной операции на Украине: не прошлои года” [Tu-214R in a special military operation in Ukraine: Less than a year], TopWar, last modified
September 27, 2022, https://topwar.ru/.
19. “Tu-214ON/Tu-214R,” Janes, last modified August 2, 2022, https://www.janes.com/.
20. Bronk, Russian Combat, 17.
21. “In-­Depth Review.”
22. Nikolai Litovkin, “Russia Receives First Il-22PP Porubschik Electronic Countermeasures Planes,”
Russia Beyond, November 9, 2016, https://www.rbth.com/.
23. Joseph Trevithick, “Ukraine Just Captured One of Russia’s Most Capable Aerial Electronic Warfare
Pods,” Drive, September 12, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/.
24. Roman Skomorokhov, “Комплекс РЭБ «Хибины» чудо-­оружие армии России?” [Complex
EW “Khibiny” miracle weapon of the Russian army?], TopWar, last modified October 31, 2017, https://en.topwar.ru/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  9

Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine

autonomous mode, with pod software detecting, classifying, and transmitting a jamming
signal back to the threat radar.25 In effect, they provide only self-­protection jamming foraircraft, not electronic suppression of threat radars required for SEAD/DEAD. There areindications the VKS may have developed escort-­jamming abilities to suppress enemy
radars, but this capability is not confirmed, nor is there any indication that it has mastered
the concept.26
Ukrainian air defenses have shot down at least one Su-35 and one Su-30SM equippedwith Khibiny pods since the start of the conflict.27 This is not altogether unsurprising,
given the deficiencies of digital radio frequency memory jamming against modern SAM
systems. The frequency agility of modern radar-­guided SAMs can make it difficult forsuch a jammer to consistently replicate a return signal sufficient to mask the jamming
aircraft continually.28 The vital lesson regarding how the VKS utilizes these pods is thatthey are likely most beneficial when defending against a surface-­to-­air engagement andshould not be relied on as a substitute for dedicated escort SEAD.
Finally, Moscow must also contend with the fact it requires adequate high-­end forcesin case of a conflict with NATO, and losses in Ukraine have put great pressure on theforce. As one Russian observer has noted, “The more modern a vehicle we send to huntfor Ukrainian air defense systems, the less likely it will be shot down, but the more painful the loss will be.”29
Given this, Russia’s use of high-­performance aircraft to conduct electronic attack forforce-­packaged groups of aircraft is perhaps technically possible but of limited capability
and capacity and still immature in practice. As one 2016 analysis argues, “Substantiationof the necessity to mount electronic warfare equipment on the operational tactical aircraft,is . . . a prospective trend in military scientific research, requiring an immediate practicalsolution.”30 While Russia’s experience in Syria’s uncontested skies did provide relevant
experience, considering the current performance of VKS tactical aircraft in SEAD/DEAD
missions, it appears Russia has made little progress in the years since.
The lack of a high-­performance, dedicated electronic attack platform leaves Russia withfew options to nonkinetically suppress an adversary’s integrated air defense system. Withlimited nonkinetic options, the only choice that remains is to try and eliminate threat
SAM systems kinetically. With limited precision-­guided standoff munitions to engage
25. Butowski, Russia’s Warplanes, 85–86.
26. Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Advances in Electronic Warfare Capability,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16,
no. 135 (October 2, 2019), https://jamestown.org/.
27. Trevithick, “Ukraine.”
28. Reuben F. Johnson, “Russian EW Weaknesses Endure While Other Nations Innovate,” AIN Online, June 16, 2019, https://www.ainonline.com/.
29. Andrey Mitrofanov, “Неудобные вопросы: господство в воздухе над Украиной и егопоследствия” [Awkward questions: Air supremacy over Ukraine and its consequences], TopWar, lastmodified June 24, 2022, https://topwar.ru/.
30. V. I. Vladimirov and V. I. Stuchinsky, “Rationale for Combat Use of Aircraft EW Equipment at
Operational Depth to Gain Information Superiority,” Military Thought 25, no. 2 ( June 30, 2016): 29.
10  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Galamison & Petersen

and destroy adversary SAM systems, the VKS has few options to target an enemy’s integrated air defense system.31 One of the primary methods observed throughout the Ukraine
conflict thus far has been the use of antiradiation missiles.
Designed to acquire and guide on the radar signature emitted by SAM radar systems,
antiradiation missiles can be an effective tool if employed correctly. Russian Su-35S and
Su-30SM aircraft have been observed flying combat sorties against Ukraine with load-­outsof Kh-31 antiradiation missiles.32 Yet based on videos appearing on social media, theemployment altitude, flight profile, and ranges observed are unlikely to maximize thedesired effects.33
Russian fighters have also been observed firing salvos of antiradiation missiles and thenescaping the weapons engagement zone. Savvy radar operators can defend against this byblinking their radar system off and back on. With no radar emissions in the air, the missile
loses its primary method of guidance and goes “dumb.” While radars may temporarily be
suppressed, the effect can often be measured in seconds. Surface-­to-­air missile operators
will simply turn the radar back on once the antiradiation missile threat has passed andcontinue prosecuting aircraft. This tactic underscores the need for layered ISR, strike, andjamming capabilities. In addition, Russian pilots require well-­developed operational
concepts that are rigorously practiced with the right platforms. None of these requirements
are present at scale in the VKS.

Poorly Developed Operational Concepts
Even successful modernization efforts in Russia over the last decade presented themilitary with a newer and equally challenging conundrum that remained unsolved on theeve of war in Ukraine. Russian aerospace forces made the cognitive and technological leap
into sophisticated electronic attack capabilities, but translating those twenty-­first-­century
developments into operational practice has revealed itself to be another challenge altogether.
Russia went into the Ukraine conflict with immature operational concepts for both ISR
and electronic attack.
For example, rapid, coordinated ISR for emergent target mapping and battle damage
assessment is crucial in modern combined arms campaigns, especially in SAM-­dense
environments. Given the technical capabilities described above, VKS forces should havethe ability to rapidly turn emergent SAM radar detections into strike operations on the
31. Bronk, “Mysterious Case.”
32. Justin Bronk, “Getting Serious about SEAD: European Air Forces Must Learn from the Failure of
the Russian Air Force over Ukraine,” RUSI, April 6, 2022, https://rusi.org/.
33. Justin Bronk (@Justin_Br0nk), “Interesting footage showing use of Su-35S air superiority fighter
purportedly over #Ukraine with a mixed air-­to-­air and Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) missile
load (Kh-31). Also carries Khibiny self defence pods. Still only looks like a singleton sortie, however,” Twitter, March 7, 2022, 2:35 a.m., https://twitter.com/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  11

Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine

fly. But NATO officials have indicated Russia’s ISR and targeting processes have not been
up to the task in this conflict.
British Air Marshal Johnny Stringer, deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command, noted that “the transformation in US and NATO airpower over the last five decades
has no equivalent in the VKS [Russia’s air force], nor do the Russians have anything likethe ISR-­led strike capabilities of NATO Air Forces, nor the targeting processes to exploit
them.”34 Indeed, analysts have observed it takes the Russian military at least 48 hours toprocess actionable intelligence and assign it to a strike platform.35 This is wholly inadequate
in a dynamic surface-­to-­air missile environment.
Russian airpower theorists were, in fact, aware of this problem well before the Russian
war in Ukraine. In the 2008 Georgia War, the Russian air force conducted small raids
using two to four aircraft. It did not use escort reconnaissance aircraft to detect pop-­up
SAM threats, nor did it employ electronic warfare to suppress detected Georgian air
defense systems. In addition, it did not allocate special aircraft to destroy any detected air
defense systems, and it could not conduct post-­strike battle damage assessment.36
In this regard, operations in Syria may have provided some experience, but a review of
the journal Aerospace Forces: Theory and Practice, the leading journal of airpower in Russia,
reveals the VKS had not yet solved the problems exposed by the Georgia War.37 Interestingly, the creation of fused intelligence over multiple combat platforms, so vital to effective
emergent target mapping and battle damage assessment, was considered especially challenging; space-­based ISR for tactical strikes was considered even more difficult.38
The failure to solve these problems poses a conundrum for Russian pilots in Ukraine.
Russian military analysts themselves noted this in 2021:
It has become more difficult to avoid destruction from the fire of mobile andcovert low-­altitude air defense systems. Climbing to medium altitudes calls formore effective neutralization techniques—jamming countermeasures against
34. Tim Martin, “Russia’s Air Campaign Hampered by Poor ISR Based Strikes and Target Processing:NATO Official,” Breaking Defense, November 4, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/.
35. Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, Russian Air War, 28.
36. Tsyganok, “Применение сил.”37. For example, see V. A. Vasiliev et al., “Otsenka urovnya razvedyvatl’nogo obsespecheniya udarnykh
dystviy aviatsii” [Assessment of the level of support for air strike operations], Vozdushno-­Kosmicheskiye Sily:
Teoriya i Praktika, no. 15 (September 2020): 52–62.
38. N. T. Shevtsov and A. N. Moor, “Sposob dorazvedki ob’jektov protivnika pri vedenii boyevykh
deystviy smeshannaoy aviatsionnoy diviziyey” [Enemy objects reconnaissance method during the conduct of
combat operations by a mixed aviation division], Vozdushno-­Kosmicheskiye Sily: Teoriya i Praktika, no. 19(September 2021): 57–73; and V. A. Vasiliev et al., “Analiz vozmozhnostey kosmicheskoy razvedki po informationnomu obespechniyu upravleniya aviatsiyey pri vypolnenii ognevykh zadach” [Analysis of space intelligence capabilities for information support of aviation management in the performance of fire missions],
Vozdushno-­Kosmicheskiye Sily: Teoriya i Praktika, no. 17 (March 2021): 47–56.
12  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Galamison & Petersen

detection and targeting assets of medium-­range air defense systems. However, as
altitude increases, aircraft bombing accuracy diminishes to an unacceptable level.39
Further complicating the issue is that for all the Russian failures to effectively execute
SEAD and DEAD in the Ukraine conflict, a host of additional contributing factors haveleft the VKS unable to conduct sustained, complex air operations to gain control over theskies above Ukraine.

Insufficient Training and Maintenance
Equally essential to understanding Russian airpower deficiencies is an analysis of Russian air force training, aerospace doctrine, and aviation maintenance programs.

Training and Doctrine
For any pilot, training, proficiency, and experience are at the forefront of a list of factorsthat contribute to success or failure in combat. VKS pilots log fewer than 100 flight hours
annually for currency and proficiency.40 This is approximately half of what US and UK
aircrew receive for annual flight time. Indeed, Royal Air Force and US Air Force leadershiphave expressed concern about their aircrew’s ability to maintain combat readiness with180 flight hours per year.41 Russia’s low training rate is evident in the Russian war in
Ukraine. Poor performance as a result of pilot training problems identified in the 2008
Georgia War has apparently continued. If the VKS focus on integrated air and missile
defense occupies the majority of the 100 annual training hours, supporting missions like
SEAD and DEAD are likely left on the cutting room floor. Further compounding theissues of aircrew ability is the rigidity of Russian tactical doctrine concerning the employment of VKS aircraft.
As demonstrated in the Zapad 2021 exercise, VKS aircrew are primarily trained to act insupport of ground forces when not conducting long-­range strike missions.42 Unlike in
Western doctrine, however, VKS pilots are heavily constrained in the execution of thesetypes of strike operations. Russian airborne strike doctrine emphasizes the use of groundcontrollers to direct aircraft and “enslaves combat pilots to preplanned target sets.”43 Thisrigidity can often result in wasted ordnance on a mobile target that moves from where it
was originally located. It does not provide flexibility for aircrews to engage emergent targets.

39. Kurilov, Kiryushin, and Moiseyev, “Current Problems,” 24.
40. Piotr Butowski and Thomas Newdick, “Russian Aggressor Squadron Gets Its First Su-35S Fighter
Jets,” Drive, October 4, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/.
41. Bronk, “Mysterious Case.”
42. Michael Kofman, “Zapad 2021: What We Learned from Russia’s Massive Military Drills,” Moscow
Times, September 23, 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/.
43. David Axe, “The Russian Air Force Is Back in the Fight in Ukraine. But It’s Not Making Much ofa Difference,” Forbes, September 16, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  13

Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine

In contrast, Western aircrew frequently train in dynamic targeting and have moretactical flexibility. For most of the war, Russian tactical airstrikes have been carried out
using traditional ground-­control intercept tactics with unguided bombs and rockets against
predesignated targets. Against SAM systems, VKS forces have also resorted to crude salvo
tactics with antiradiation missiles against predesignated SAM radars.44

Aircraft MaintenanceTraining and doctrine are not the only VKS deficiencies. Based on recent history, basic
aircraft maintenance also appears to be a challenge. Recent catastrophic mishaps havehighlighted a potential shortfall in Russia’s ability to maintain combat aircraft. In April 2023,
a MiG-31 jet burst into flames in flight and crashed near Murmansk. In September 2022,
a Su-25 crashed shortly after takeoff, followed by an October 2022 incident where a Su-34
bomber experienced an apparent engine failure and crashed into an apartment building.45
One Russian aviation maintenance professional has noted serious shortcomings, including
delays in signing contracts with co-­contractors; constant increases in cost beyond
the scope of state service contracts and delayed processing of repair and components
supply requests due to an excessive number of intermediaries involved in theorganization of maintenance service; incomplete fulfillment of the entire volumeof service requests; low revolving stock of spare parts; inadequate organization of
aircraft repair shops for prompt repairs and troubleshooting; a poor claims
mechanism for dealing with breaches of contract; lack of the necessary operationaland repair documentation; and underqualified engineering and technical personnel or their shortage, including in field service teams.46
The cumulative impact of all these maintenance failures leaves little doubt the Russian
aviation maintenance program is fundamentally broken. Maintaining a peacetime air force
is in and of itself a significant challenge. Yet, since February 2022, Russia’s aviation
maintenance personnel have had to add an exponential increase in aircraft flight hours,
parts wear, and battle damage to an already expansive workload.

The NATO Lens
Thus, Russia’s air war in Ukraine offers crucial lessons for European NATO partners
as they increase defense spending and embark on systematic upgrades across their joint
forces, especially the air forces. The growing sentiment among European nations that the
44. Bronk, Reynolds, and Watling, Russian Air War, 1.
45. Thomas Newdick, “Su-25 Attack Jet Crash May Point to Wider Russian Airpower Issues (Updated),”
Drive, September 12, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/; and Emma Helfrich, “Russian Su-34 Fullback Jet Slams
into Apartment Building in a Ball of Fire (Updated),” Drive, October 17, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/.
46. Z. G. Omarov, “Problems of Aviation Equipment Operation at the Present Stage,” Military Thought
31, no. 3 (September 30, 2022): 125.
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Galamison & Petersen

EU and NATO are too reliant on the United States for defense is reflected in statements
such as that of French president Emmanuel Macron, who has championed the conceptof “strategic autonomy,” the idea that European countries must invest in their own defense
to diminish their reliance on NATO and, in turn, the United States.47
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has only exacerbated Europe’s need to come to terms with
NATO’s overreliance on the United States for defense. But for all the bloviating about
European strategic autonomy, are European NATO Allies taking action to decrease
military dependence on the United States? Will NATO be prepared to execute effective,
large-­scale air campaign operations against Russia without the United States’ full support?
Air dominance operations—and their necessary SEAD/DEAD component—are a
critical case in point. Euro-­Atlantic strategists have long pointed out the challenges
presented by Russian integrated air and missile defense bastions in the Baltic states region,
the Black Sea region, and elsewhere.48 Suppressing and destroying these bastions will be
the essential centerpiece of any military campaign against Russian aggression. But as the
Ukraine case shows, a failure to enact focused procurement efforts for specific technologies
and platforms, develop operational concepts, and provide extensive, ongoing training, canlead to strategic failure.

Procurement
Due to its increase in defense spending shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
Germany serves as an excellent case study highlighting NATO member military modernization efforts. In February 2022, German chancellor Olaf Scholz announced Germany
would dedicate €100 billion to modernize the German military and meet the NATO goalof 2 percent of gross domestic product spending dedicated to defense.49 A portion of thisinvestment was set aside for the purchase of new strike-­fighter aircraft for the German
air force.
Seeking to replace its aging fleet of Panavia Tornados, Germany initially favored thepurchase of a combination of 30 F/A-18 Super Hornets and 15 EA-18G Growlers.50 The
Growler would have served as a fitting replacement for the electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR) variant of the Tornado, continuing to fill the critical SEAD and DEAD
role for the German air force.
47. Handan Kazanci, “ ‘Europe Needs to Gain More Autonomy on Technology and Defense Capabilities, Including from the US,’ Says French President,” AA [Anadolu Agency], last updated December 22,
2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/.
48. Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, and Michael Jonsson, Bursting the Bubble: Russian A2/AD in theBaltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications (Stockholm: FOI, March 2019), https://www.foi.se/.
49. Matthew Karnitschnig et al., “Inside Olaf Scholz’s Historic Shift on Defense, Ukraine and Russia,”
Politico, March 5, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/.
50. Grant Turnbull, “NATO Investment Brings Electronic Warfare Back into Fashion,” Global Defence Technology, https://defence.nridigital.com/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  15

Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine

In December 2022, however, Germany announced it would instead spend $8.4 billion
on 35 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighters.51 This abrupt change highlights what
has become a recurring pattern by European countries looking to modernize their air
forces. Since 2018, Belgium, Poland, Switzerland, Finland, the Czech Republic, andGermany have pledged to purchase the F-35A Lightning.52
To its credit, Lockheed Martin has done an excellent job marketing the F-35 globally.
It is currently the only exportable fifth-­generation fighter in the world and, by the company’s proclamation, capable of executing “any and all mission[s]” required of a modern-­day
military aircraft, including SEAD/DEAD and electronic warfare.53 At first glance, theF-35 is especially appetizing for a NATO nation looking to modernize its air force witha fifth-­generation, multirole fighter.
Any procurement decision for modernization includes a critical analysis of cost versus
capability. Currently, one of the biggest driving factors behind European F-35 procurement
is that the total cost of ownership for the platform is dramatically lower than its closest
competitors. An assessment of Denmark’s 2016 decision to purchase 28 F-35s reveals
there is more to procurement decisions than the per-­unit cost of the aircraft.
For example, Denmark compared the aircraft’s service life across the three-­competing
contracts. While the F/A-18 Super Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon are advertised ashaving a service life of 6,000 flight hours, the F-35 has an advertised service life of 8,000
hours.54 This service life gap between the F-35 and the F/A-18 helped sway Denmark’s
decision to purchase the F-35 instead of the F/A-18. Because of the longer service life,
Denmark purchased 10 fewer aircraft than it would have if it had chosen the F/A-18 or
the Eurofighter. This translates into a more modern, more reliable, more capable aircraft
for less than the price of a fleet of older, fourth-­generation fighters.
But even if the current economic landscape makes the F-35 the most cost-­effective
modern fighter jet to procure, NATO countries must remain aware of the vulnerabilities
of a Swiss-Army-knife fallacy: the idea of a one-­stop-­shop platform that can dominate
all mission sets. Just because the F-35 can execute SEAD does not mean that it should
be a primary asset for the suppression of adversary SAM systems.
Of Germany’s 35 new F-35 aircraft, how many will be dedicated to executing airborne
electronic attack against the Russian integrated air defense systems in a conflict, and are
European countries willing to utilize fifth-­generation fighters to conduct SEAD in support of fourth-­generation aircraft? For every F-35 allotted to SEAD, one less aircraft
51. Sebastian Sprenger, “Germany Clinches $8 Billion Purchase of 35 F-35 Aircraft from the US,”Defense News, December 14, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/.
52. Vivienne Machi, “How the F-35 Swept Europe, and the Competition It Could Soon Face,” Defense
News, September 4, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/.
53. “Air-­to-­Everything,” Lockheed Martin, accessed January 21, 2023, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/.
54. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “F-35 Wins Denmark Competition: Trounces Super Hornet, Eurofighter,”
Breaking Defense, May 12, 2016, https://breakingdefense.com/.
16  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Galamison & Petersen

executes an air-­to-­surface strike on a critical target or consummates air-­to-­air intercepts
against Russian fighters and long-­range bombers in contested airspace.
Although Germany ultimately decided against investing in the EA-18G, Berlin has
acknowledged the importance of a dedicated tactical SEAD platform in a modern-­day
air force. In March 2022, German leadership announced a continued partnership with
Airbus to develop the Eurofighter ECR as a replacement for the Tornado ECR.55 This
two-­seat version of the Eurofighter would fill the role of a dedicated tactical SEAD/
DEAD platform capable of escort and stand-­off jamming. Germany expects delivery ofthese Eurofighters between 2025 and 2030, but as of January 2023, the aircraft was stillin development.56

Operational Concepts
As seen with the VKS, however, just because hardware modernization is ongoing does
not mean NATO’s operational concepts have been suitable for success in the past. In
NATO’s 2016 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, for example, a resources
allocation table shows only a 10 percent allocation to SEAD in each of the first six daysof a conflict.57
Realistically, at the outset of a conflict with Russia, a thorough integrated air defense
system rollback will be necessary, requiring robust SEAD/DEAD prioritization. As Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights, failing to prioritize SEAD/DEAD operations in
the initial period of war can lead to devastating consequences and a failure to achieve air
dominance over the battlefield. Fortunately, however, NATO has identified that SEAD
has been underprioritized and is taking steps to correct it.
In April 2017, NATO released a SEAD vision paper acknowledging deficiencies andoutlining a plan to modernize its operational concepts: “By 2030 we want to be able tohave a tiered force able to deliver multiple full effects across the full spectrum of an enemy’s
air defense system.”58 The first goal of this SEAD modernization process consisted of acapability audit that was to be completed by the summer of 2019, followed by a capabilities gap analysis to be completed by the following year. The audit began in June 2023 andis expected to take 18 months to complete.59 The capabilities gap analysis is now forecast
55. Gaston Dubois, “Confirmed! F-35 and Eurofighter ECR to Replace Lufwaffe’s Tornado,” Aviacionline, March 14, 2022, https://www.aviacionline.com/.
56. Ricardo Meier, “Germany to Order 15 Electronic Warfare Eurofighters in Addition to F-35s,” Air
Data News, March 16, 2022, https://www.airdatanews.com/.
57. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (London, UK:
NATO Standardization Office, 2016), 4-19, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/.
58. Tim Fish, “NATO Ponders SEAD Modernization as Russia Fields New Threats,” Journal of Electronic Defense 41, no. 5 (May 2018): 26.
59. Richard Scott, “NIAG Study Group Explores Future SEAD Capability Options,” Janes, June 30,
2023, https://www.janes.com/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  17

Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine

to be concluded by 2025.60 With this modernization plan now three years behind, it isunclear if NATO will be able to meet its 2030 goal of being able to deliver “full spectrum
effects” against an enemy’s integrated air defense systems.

Training
Training must be factored into this equation as well. Just as Russian pilots suffer incombat proficiency from a lack of flight hours, the same effect may occur for NATO F-35
aircrew, who are expected to be proficient in the myriad mission sets the F-35 is capableof flying. In 2020, only 512 of the Luftwaffe’s 875 pilots were able to meet the NATOtarget of 180 flight hours.61 While this flight-hour deficiency was explained by Luftwaffe
leadership as a result of maintenance issues with aging aircraft, it highlights a common
problem for pilots of multirole aircraft. When facing flight-­hour uncertainty, every flighthour a pilot spends on SEAD/DEAD training is an hour not spent practicing air-­to-­airintercepts.
While one would assume the loss of flight hours due to maintenance would subside
once German pilots have their new, more reliable F-35s, the fact remains that training
must be split across all mission sets, ultimately resulting in a deficiency in one or more ofthese areas. A dedicated SEAD/DEAD platform means those aircrew become experts intheir mission set instead of trying to be jacks-of-all-trades.

Other Challenges
Additional challenges unique to a regional alliance such as NATO are compounding
the delay of NATO’s SEAD study. First, trust between nations is a sensitive and dynamic
issue and may be inconsistent from country to country. Second, nations are constantly
walking a tightrope of budgetary balance between national defense financial allocationand cooperative contribution. Third, duplication of effort becomes a concern where it canbe difficult to determine how much of one capability should exist across all of NATObefore it becomes cost prohibitive. Finally, there is the concern of “cross-­contamination”
of capabilities, where it becomes a liability for a country like Turkey to own and operatesensitive technology from both Russia and the United States.62

Conclusion
The Russian aerospace forces failure in Ukraine demonstrates that the success ofmodern-­day air dominance operations comes down to more than just the hardware at
60. Richard Scott, “Rebalancing AEA/SEAD Capability in NATO,” Journal of Electromagnetic Dominance (JED), April 2022, https://www.jedonline.com/.
61. Michael Peck, “Bad News NATO: German Pilots Aren’t Getting Enough Flight Time,” National
Interest, August 19, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/.
62. Stephen “Muddy” Watters, “Strengthening NATO AEA,” JED 43, no. 1 ( January 2020): 12.
18  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Galamison & Petersen

one’s disposal. While Russia’s defensive-­biased doctrine may have led to the undervaluingof offensive air operations, the effectiveness of modern ground-­based air defense systems
ensures it is more difficult than ever to build a sanctuary for aircraft to operate as safely
and effectively as possible in combat. Any nation seeking to conduct successful air dominance operations in the twenty-­first century, let alone achieve air superiority, must havethe technology available to do so, aircrew with relevant training and experience, and soundoperational doctrine.
Additionally, there must be an expanded emphasis on SEAD and DEAD operations
across the joint and coalition forces. In Ukraine, Russia has proven that its air force isincapable of success in this arena. Thus far, NATO has shown it understands this requirement; although it currently lacks requisite airpower capabilities, it is taking steps to fill
the seams and gaps. These questions remain: Will NATO effectively learn from Russia’s
failures, and will it be ready in time for the next major conflict? 

AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  19

ADVANCES IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Microgrids
Energy Security for Overseas BasesNathan P. Olsen
Russia’s targeting of Ukraine’s power grid by Iranian drones and recent increases in natural disasters have highlighted the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and electrical systems worldwide.
Disruptions to the power grid from an attack or natural disaster can pose a serious threat tomilitary operations and readiness. To defend against this possibility, Congress needs to direct the
Department of Defense to establish renewable microgrids at overseas bases, augmenting efforts
already underway by the US Army. Such microgrids will ensure Joint Force resiliency by providing a reliable power source immune to attacks, extreme weather events, and energy market volatility. More importantly, these overseas microgrids will sustain the United States’ global militaryadvantage and the defense of US national interests and those of its Allies and partners.

Power grid disruptions from natural disasters or attacks against overseas military
installations can pose serious threats to military operations and readiness. Congressional language directing the Department of Defense to establish renewable microgrids, or small local power grids, at overseas locations and authorizing and appropriating the requisite funds will ensure the military’s ability to defend US national interests
and those of its Allies and partners.
Operating independently of the host nation’s electrical grid will provide the military
with a reliable power source immune to attacks, extreme weather events, and energy
market volatility. More importantly, installing microgrids at overseas locations will makethe Joint Force more resilient and capable of ensuring US military advantage and securing
the nation’s top priorities.1

US Power Grid Vulnerability
The severity of threats to power grids at overseas bases is best appreciated by a better understanding of broader domestic power grid vulnerabilities despite the United States’ relative
geographic isolation from its adversaries. One vulnerability comes from the United States’
reliance on fossil fuels for energy production. Approximately 79 percent of domestic energy

Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Olsen, USAF, serves as the special assistant to the executive director, Systems Engineering & Architecture, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering. He holds a master of science in engineering management from the Air Force Institute of Technology and a master of science in military operational art and science studies from the
Air Command and Staff College.

1. Lloyd J. Austin III, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS) (Washington,
DC: Department of Defense (DoD), October 17, 2022), 18.
20   AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEWOlsenproduction comes from fossil fuels that could be impacted if pipelines fail in an attack or
natural disaster.2 Based on persistent—daily—monitoring of cyber threats to the US power
grid by the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the greatest cyber threats to the grid are intrusions focused on manipulating the industrial
control system networks.3 These intrusions typically result in malware taking over theindustrial control system networks.4 In fact, concern over vulnerabilities in the US electrical grid drove President Donald Trump to issue Executive Order 13920, declaring a national
emergency concerning the threat of foreign adversaries creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in the US bulk-­power system.5
The United States’ energy infrastructure is also susceptible to extreme weather events.
California residents struggled through a historic heatwave during the summer of 2022
when they were asked to conserve power in the early evening to prevent blackouts. As
temperatures soared, energy officials were concerned the increase in air-­conditioning use
would overload the energy grid. In fact, power outages from severe weather have doubled
over the past two decades across the United States.6
These extreme weather events also affect the US military. In February 2021, the Texas
power grid failed in the face of Winter Storm Uri.7 During the storm, several military
installations experienced limited power because they relied on local utility providers as
their primary source of power.8 Bases in the region were without power for multiple days,
and the outages caused mission impact at each of the bases.
The Biden administration recognized the significance of climate change on national
security and issued Executive Order 14008 on January 27, 2021. The executive order statesclimate considerations would be an essential element of US foreign policy and national
security.9 Specifically, it directs the secretary of defense to consider the implications ofclimate change in developing strategic guidance documents for the Department of Defense.10
The executive order was a precursor to the National Security Strategy, which identifies

2. US Energy Information Administration, “Consumption and Production, U.S. Energy Facts Explained,” last updated August 16, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/.
3. Richard J. Campbell, Electric Grid Cybersecurity, R45312 (Washington, DC: Congressional ResearchService, updated September 4, 2018), 8, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
4. Campbell, 9.
5. Exec. Order No. 13920, 85 Fed. Reg. 26591 (April 30, 2020).
6. Associated Press, “US Power Outages from Severe Weather Have Doubled in 20 Years,” Guardian,
April 6, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/.
7. Rachel S. Cohen, “Winter Storm Uri Spotlights Gaps in Military Base Preparedness,” Air Force
Times, March 26, 2022, https://www.airforcetimes.com/.
8. Installation Resiliency: Lessons Learned from Winter Storm Uri and Beyond, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee of Armed Services House of Representatives, 117th Cong., 1st session(March 26, 2021) (statement of Brigadier General John J. Allen, commander, Air Force Civil Engineering
Center, Air Force Materiel Command, Department of the Air Force), https://www.congress.gov/.
9. Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 ( January 27, 2021).
10. Exec. Order No. 14008.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  21

Microgrids

climate and energy security as the “existential challenge of our time.”11 Furthermore, inlate September 2023, the Department of Energy provided grants to 11 states, tribes, andterritories, the latest in over $1 billion in grants this year that are part of the Biden administration’s $2.3 billion program to promote power grid resiliency.12
The US military is cognizant of the impacts of weather, energy market volatility, andattacks on the energy grid. In its Fiscal Year 2020 Annual Energy Management and Resilience
Report, the Department of Defense reported 3,018 unplanned utility outages at military
installations worldwide (87 percent were electrical) due to various issues.13 Of the 3,018
outages, 649 lasted eight hours or longer.14 Unplanned outages have increased each year overthe past three years and cost the government an average of $10.2 million annually.15
In 2021 the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine acknowledged that
because there is no way to make power systems completely invulnerable to intentional or accidental physical or cyber disruptions and to the effects of extreme
weather events, the nation must move aggressively to create systems that cancontinue to provide basic services as they recover from disruption.16

Power Grid Vulnerability in Conflict
Shortly after the implementation of sanctions on Russia in mid-2022 due to its war in
Ukraine, Russia’s majority state-­owned energy corporation Gazprom reduced its natural
gas flow to Europe to 20 percent of its pipeline’s capacity.17 Gazprom claimed the shutdown
was required to complete critical repairs to the pipeline. Later, in September 2022 thepipeline shut down completely for additional repairs. The situation grew even more direafter two Gazprom natural gas pipelines located in the Baltic Sea were damaged by explosions on September 26. The disruptions to the pipelines caused natural gas prices to surge
and created panic across the European Union.
The disruptions to the natural gas pipelines caused many to speculate Russia was using
its natural gas exports as a weapon to combat the sanctions placed on them and influence
11. Joseph R. Biden Jr., National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022), 27,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
12. Scott Patterson, “U.S. Rolls Out Grants for Power Grid,” Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2023, A3.
13. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (OASD [Sustainment]), Departmentof Defense Annual Energy Management and Resilience Report (AEMRR) Fiscal Year 2020 (Washington, DC:
DoD, September 2021), 25, https://www.acq.osd.mil/.
14. OASD (Sustainment).
15. OASD (Sustainment).
16. Committee on the Future of Electric Power in the US, Board on Energy, and Environmental Systems Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, The Future of Electric Power in the United States: A
Consensus Report of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, Medicine (Washington, DC: National
Academies Press, 2021), 15, https://doi.org/.
17. Associated Press, “Russia to Cut Gas through Nord Stream 1 to 20% of Capacity,” AP News,
July 25, 2022, https://apnews.com/.
22  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Olsenpublic opinion about its conflict with Ukraine. Russia’s actions put the EU in a difficult
situation because it relies on Russia for 35 percent of its natural gas.18 European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated, “This is not only a war unleashed by
Russia against Ukraine, but this is also a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war
on our values, and a war on our future.”19
Russia took its battle against energy a step further when it launched extensive attacks
against Ukraine’s infrastructure. Russian drones struck power plants and substations,creating electricity, heat, and hot water shortages in many cities.20 As a result of the attacks,
Ukrainians were warned to prepare for blackouts and urged to ration energy, because over
30 to 40 percent of the country’s total power infrastructure had been impacted.21

Global Power Grid Vulnerability
Unfortunately, these are not isolated incidents. Extreme weather has exacted a toll onelectrical infrastructure across the world. The flooding that occurred in Libya on September 10 and 11, 2023, is just one of many weather events this year that have killed thousands,
displaced millions, and devastated electrical infrastructure throughout the world.
And these threats have implications for US bases overseas. One outage of note createda significant mission impact at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in 2016. During the attempted
coup in Turkey, the base lost power, resulting in a reduced number of combat missions
flown out of the base in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.22 The base received its
power from the local energy grid and had to rely heavily on its emergency generators
during the outage. Without the full complement of power on the base, combat operations
were reduced, threatening broader American strategy in the region and having impacts
beyond just the one installation.23
Undoubtedly, US overseas bases are in a situation where they are predominately dependent on host-­nation and local energy supplies. Diversifying energy sources and moving toward a localized, US-­run energy source—a microgrid—would lessen this vulnerability and increase overall reliability and resiliency. In addition to increased security and
18. Nina Chestney, “What are Europe’s Options in Case of Russian Gas Disruption?,” Reuters, January 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/.
19. Emily Rauhala and Beatriz Rios, “E. U. Proposes Emergency Energy Measures as Russia’s War
Tests Europe,” Washington Post, September 14, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
20. Dalton Bennett et al., “The Scale of Russian Attacks on Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure, Visualized,” Washington Post, updated October 17, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
21. Phil McCausland, “Ukraine Energy Minister Says Russia Has Hit Half of Country’s Thermal Generation Capacity,” NBC News, October 21, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/.
22. Graham H. Haydon, “Microgrids on Department of Defense Installations: Energy Policy’s Impact
on National Security” (master’s thesis, Johns Hopkins University, December 2019), 5, https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/.
23. Haydon.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  23

Microgrids

resiliency, microgrids will reduce transmission and distribution losses and the impacts ofvolatility in the energy market.
Although the National Defense Strategy and executive orders push the military services
to build resilience in the face of climate change’s significant threat, the military andCongress are not moving fast enough to overcome vulnerabilities to DoD electrical supply and systems.24 Congress needs to authorize and fund renewable microgrids at DoD
overseas installations as soon as possible.

Microgrids
In 2011, General David Petraeus bluntly summarized the military’s dependency on power:“Energy is the lifeblood of our warfighting capabilities.”25 To put this into perspective, theDepartment of Defense is the largest consumer of energy in the United States.26 Additionally,
it is the largest property owner and energy purchaser in the United States with 281,780 buildings encompassing 2.3 billion square feet, generating an energy bill of more than $4 billion
annually.27 Such a high dependence on energy is a major vulnerability for the US military.
With its dependence on energy, the military is constantly searching for a resilient andreliable source of energy to support its mission. The Defense Department has historicallyrelied on host-­nation power and stand-­alone generators to provide emergency backup power
for buildings. In the event of a host-­nation power outage, installations have a single backup
generator hardwired into the facility at every building housing a critical load.28
On large installations, there are often more than 100 small generators dedicated toproviding power for facilities during outages. If a base generator fails during an outage, thebuilding is without power until the generator is repaired or replaced, or until power is restored.
These generators require monthly preventative maintenance and access to fuel. Installations
typically have centrally managed diesel fuel stockpiles that contain enough fuel to run basegenerators for two to seven days.29 In a contested area or if fuel shortages exist, it is difficult
to secure enough fuel to maintain operations without mission interruption.
The Department of Defense realized the current electrical configuration was a vulnerability and tasked the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to study the effectiveness of
backup power systems used on DoD sites in the United States and Canada.30 The study
24. Austin, NDS, 8.
25. Bill Lynn, “Energy for the War Fighter: The Department of Defense Operational Energy Strategy,”
White House, President Barack Obama (blog), June 14, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/.
26. Neta C. Crawford, The Pentagon, Climate Change, and War: Charting the Rise and Fall of U.S. Military
Emissions, Costs of War Project (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2022), 2.
27. OASD (Sustainment), AEMRR, 6.
28. Jeffrey Marqusee, Sean Ericson, and Don Jenket, Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability and Installation Energy Security (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory [NREL], 2020), 4, https://www.nrel.gov/.
29. Marqusee, Ericson, and Jenket, 4.
30. Marqusee, Ericson, and Jenket, 2.
24  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Olsendiscovered well-­maintained generators have a reliability of 80 percent after two weeks ofrun time.31 Based on this information, the study determined a single, well-­maintained
emergency generator cannot guarantee emergency power for critical loads over multiday
outages.32 One way to overcome this vulnerability is for the military to isolate itself fromthe national power grid: installations can operate microgrids using renewable energy sources
as their primary sources of power and use backup generators if the microgrids are impacted.
A microgrid is a localized group of electricity generators with the ability to operate
independently from the host nation’s electrical grid. The combination of electricity generators, advanced controls, and an energy storage system composes a single, independent,
integrated power system. The electricity generators in a microgrid come from a variety ofsources, including emergency generators, prime generators, combined heat and power
plants, renewables, and batteries.
The ability to separate and isolate itself seamlessly with little or no disruption to loads
within the microgrid during a grid disturbance is a key feature of this technology. Microgrids
are often considered significant to improving energy resilience for critical infrastructureand services, especially those related to national security and critical community functions.33
The term microgrid first officially appeared in the late 1990s when the Department ofEnergy started to examine electrical grid reliability and resiliency.34 The Department ofEnergy started to invest significant money into the concept when it initiated the Smart
Grid Research & Development Program. In an effort to optimize grid operations, theprogram kicked off several demonstration projects aimed at meeting peak load reduction,achieving renewable energy mandates and directives, and maintaining energy surety andreliability at critical facilities, including military installations.35
In 2010, the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy entered into amemorandum of understanding to enhance energy security, including grid security.36 But
US interest in microgrids truly blossomed after Hurricane Sandy hit the US East Coastin October 2012.37 Heightened interest in microgrids stemmed from the results Princeton
University received from its microgrid throughout the storm. During the hurricane,Princeton was able to disconnect from the main power grid and maintain power and
31. Marqusee, Ericson, and Jenket, 17.
32. Marqusee, Ericson, and Jenket.
33. US Department of Energy (DoE), Microgrid and Integrated Systems Program (Washington, DC:
DoE, 2022), 6, https://www.energy.gov/.
34. Martin Anderson, “Microgrid: History, Definition, and Uses,” Bridgestone Associates Limited(website), June 25, 2020, https://brdgstn.com/.
35. Dan T. Ton and Merrill A. Smith, “The U. S. Department of Energy’s Microgrid Initiative,” Electricity Journal 25, no. 8 (2012), http://dx.doi.org/.
36. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Departmentof Defense Concerning Cooperation in a Strategic Partnership to Enhance Energy Security, July 22, 2010,https://www.energy.gov/.
37. Anderson, “Microgrid.”
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  25

Microgrids

operations within its own microgrid without any interruptions.38 The microgrid allowed
the campus to serve as a “place of refuge” where police, firefighters, paramedics, and otheremergency-­service workers staged and charged essential equipment.39 The success of
microgrids during Sandy spawned microgrid programs of varying size and complexity inall the states affected by the storm.40 As of October 2023, there were approximately 687
operational microgrids capable of producing 4,357 megawatts.41

Elements of a Microgrid
Storage
One of the most important components of a renewable energy microgrid is an energy
storage system. Renewable energy sources like the sun and wind are unpredictable andoften suffer from supply interruptions. The nature of renewable sources creates a dependence
on storage requirements.42 The energy storage system works as a buffer and absorbs power
when there is a surplus and releases power when there is a deficit.43
Having a storage system ensures power quality and availability are not interrupted.
Renewable power systems with an integrated storage system can overcome supply interruptions and provide reliable power to its users. It is even possible for a renewable microgrid
equipped with a storage system to increase electrical power resilience with better outcomesthan using a backup diesel generator.44

Control and Load
Microgrids are typically managed through a central controller that monitors the system’s
operating parameters, coordinates power generation sources, and balances and controls
electrical loads. This controller can also connect or disconnect the system from the main
grid.45 In a microgrid with storage, commercial off-­the-­shelf charge controllers link all power
38. Lisa Cohn, “History of Microgrids in the US: From Pearl Street to Plug-­and-­Play,” Microgrid
Knowledge (website), July 22, 2019, https://www.microgridknowledge.com/.
39. Morgan Kelly, “Two Years after Hurricane Sandy, Recognition of Princeton’s Microgrid Still
Surges,” Princeton University Office of Communications, October 23, 2014, https://www.princeton.edu/.
40. John Kliem and Dennis McGinn, “Ingredients for a Microgrid at U.S. Department of Defense Installations,” IEEE Electrification Magazine 8, no. 4 (2020), https://doi.org/.
41. DoE, “US Department of Energy Combined Heat and Power and Microgrid Installation Databases,” US DoE, December 31, 2022, https://doe.icfwebservices.com/.
42. Thomas Price et al., “Microgrid Energy Management during High-­Stress Operation,” Energies 15,
no. 18 (2022), https://doi.org/.
43. Beth Burmahl, “Let the Sun Shine: Argonne Technology Enhances Solar Option during Outages,”
Argonne National Laboratory (website), April 1, 2022, https://www.anl.gov/.
44. Janice Mallery, Douglas L. Van Bossuyt, and Anthony Pollman, “Defense Installation Energy Resilience for Changing Operational Requirements,” Designs 6, no. 28 (2022), https://doi.org/.
45. Chuck Kirnik et al., Financing Microgrids in the Federal Sector (Washington, DC: DoE, 2020), 1,
https://www.energy.gov/.
26  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Olsensources and smartly combine them to meet user demand. If the renewable power source is
not meeting demand, the control system draws from the battery storage or from anotherpower generator. The controller prioritizes essential loads and prevents mission-­critical loads
from being shed or interrupted.46 These control systems also ensure energy is used as efficiently
as possible and strive to deliver seamless performance.

Microgrid Energy Sources
Each microgrid is unique in its configuration and energy sources and is designed to solvea specific challenge or meet specific goals.47 Ultimately, the load on the system defines the
microgrid and what energy sources it needs. A microgrid with renewable energy as its primarysource is an ideal solution for the military because it reduces the military’s reliance on fossil
fuels.48 Few countries are able to produce useable fossil fuels in high quantities. Moreover,relying on other countries for fossil fuels to generate energy creates a dependence that can
prove dangerous. Indeed, as climate-­related natural disasters become more frequent andsevere, microgrids can serve as increasingly valuable resources in support of uninterrupted
power for military bases. Additionally, a sustainable microgrid helps the US military reduce
its logistical footprint and protects it from attacks on the host-­nation electric grid.

Regional
The US military has installations worldwide. The best source for a base’s renewableenergy microgrid depends on its location. One positive aspect of renewable energy sources
is the rapid progress in the field. For example, the Middle East, primarily known as aregion committed to fossil fuels, is building renewable energy capabilities. In fact, renewable electricity generation doubled in the Middle East between 2010 and 2020 and isanticipated to double again by 2024.49
The United Arab Emirates also plans to receive half of its energy from nonfossil fuelsources by 2050, and Egypt recently completed one of the world’s largest solar farms,
capable of producing 1.5 gigawatts of energy—enough to power over one million homes.50
Some of this surge is attributed to the amount of sunlight received in the area and thevast, unpopulated desert, both of which are optimal for collection. As such, the Middle
East provides the US military with several potential energy sources for microgrids.
46. Mallery, Van Bossuyt, and Pollman, “Installation Energy Resilience.”
47. Julieta Giraldez et al., Phase I Microgrid Cost Study: Data Collection and Analysis of Microgrid Costs in
the United States (Golden, CO: NREL, October 2020), 2, https://www.nrel.gov/.
48. Edward Anuat, Douglas L. Van Bossuyt, and Anthony Pollman, “Energy Resilience Impact of Supply Chain Network Disruption to Military Microgrids,” Infrastructures 7, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/.
49. Blain Brownell, “The Coming Renewable Energy Revolution in the Middle East,” Architect, February 24, 2022, https://www.architectmagazine.com/.
50. “Arab States are Embracing Solar Power,” Economist, May 7, 2020, https://www.economist.com/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  27

Microgrids

Solar
Clearly the most cost-­effective, reliable, and abundant renewable energy source comesfrom solar photovoltaics. This technology is attractive because it offers a payback on investment in 2 to 15 years.51 Generally, the more electricity used on the site and the higher the
price for traditional electricity in the area, the shorter the payback period. Costs forphotovoltaic systems have decreased by nearly 70 percent in the past 10 years, making
them even more attractive.52 Furthermore, these systems typically require very little
maintenance, and while they might be targeted by enemy strikes, solar panel fields can bedispersed and hardened to limit their vulnerability.

Wind
Wind turbines are another renewable energy source available to the US military. Theseversatile machines can operate independently or be connected to a larger grid or energy
system. Wind turbines are one of the fastest-­growing energy sources in the world.53 One
reason for the recent growth of wind power generation is that wind is one of the lowest-­priced
energy sources available today. Furthermore, cost competitiveness in the field continues toimprove with advances in science and technology.54 Much like solar photovoltaics, thecost-­effectiveness of the system depends on environmental conditions in the area.

Biomass
Waste disposal and management are critical issues at US military installations andtherefore offer another attractive potential source of energy. Recent progress in the waste-­to-­energy field provides the military with multiple ways to generate energy from wastewith minimal impact on health and the environment. The most common method is toincinerate waste with energy recovery. This process generally involves burning waste toboil water, which powers steam generators that make electricity and heat. This regulated
method to generate electricity could help resolve security and safety issues caused bytransporting waste from the base, while also providing a waste solution that is not harmful to military personnel. Adoption of this method of energy production will depend on
its ability to reduce its operating costs and on technology increases.55
51. Will Kessler, “Comparing Energy Payback and Simple Payback Period for Solar Photovoltaic Systems,” E3S Web of Conferences 22 (2017), https://doi.org/.
52. “Documenting a Decade of Cost Declines for PV Systems,” NREL (website), February 10, 2021,
https://www.nrel.gov/.
53. Wind Energies Technology Office, “Advantages and Challenges of Wind Energy,” DoE (website),
accessed November 30, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/.
54. Wind Energies Technology Office.
55. DoE, “Biomass Explained: Waste-­to-­Energy from Municipal Solid Wastes,” DoE, last updated
December 28, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/.
28  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

OlsenNuclearAnother autonomous power option for the US military is a nuclear microreactor.
Microreactors use a small amount of low-­enriched uranium to boil water and create steam,which spins a turbine to produce electricity. Placing a small microreactor—one the sizeof a standard shipping container—into a microgrid would likely provide all the power
needed for an entire base. A study conducted on the feasibility of nuclear power at US
military installations estimated a 40-megawatt microreactor could meet the electricity
needs of about 90 percent of all military installations.56
Microreactors gained significant momentum in early January 2021 as a result of Trump’s
Executive Order 13972, which promoted the advancement of small modular reactors to
support national defense and energy security.57 Today, the Department of Defense isworking with private energy companies to install microreactors at its facilities. For example, a pilot program at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, calls for a five-­megawatt reactor
to augment the existing coal and oil power plant and is scheduled to come online in 2027.58
Yet while this may be a potential microgrid energy source at US bases, it may be politicallyunfeasible overseas, where proliferation concerns are paramount—though the use of low-­enriched uranium limits the risk—and the potential for a direct strike by adversaries exists
even if the microreactor is hardened.

Employing Microgrids Abroad
The Department of Defense is working diligently to gain energy security through microgrids
at domestic installations. In 2012, it initiated the Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration
for Energy Reliability and Security Programs (SPIDERS) to aid in this process. Since its
inception, more than 40 bases have carried out a preliminary study on installing a microgrid,developed plans for installation, or have a microgrid already in place.59
In 2018, the Army commissioned a major microgrid project at US Army Garrison
Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. The project, which integrated generators and photovoltaics to produce 2,000-kilowatt hours of energy, provides the base with a microgrid fully independent of the island’s energy grid.60 The success of this project and others led the US
Army to identify microgrids as a priority in its strategy to address the impact of climate
56. Thomas Joseph Alford, “Off the Grid: Facilitating the Acquisition of Microgrids for Military Installations to Achieve Energy Security and Sustainability,” George Washington Journal of Energy & Environmental
Law 8, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 116.
57. Exec. Order No. 13972, 86 Fed. Reg. 3727 ( January 5, 2021).
58. SAF/IEE Installation Energy, “Eielson AFB Announced as Site for Air Force Micro-­Reactor Pilot,” Energy, Installations, and Environment, US Air Force (website), October 15, 2022, https://www.safie.hq.af.mil/; and Kelsey D. Atherton, “A Remote Air Force Base in Alaska Is Getting Its Own Nuclear Reactor,” Popular Science, September 13, 2023, https://www.popsci.com/.
59. Alford, “Off the Grid,” 108.
60. Lisa Cohn, “Inside a $40M Army Energy Efficiency Project and Microgrid on the Marshall Islands,” Microgrid Knowledge, February 16, 2018, https://www.microgridknowledge.com/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  29

Microgrids

change on the force. The Army intends to install a microgrid on every installation by 2035 andto pursue enough renewable-­energy generation and battery-­storage capacity to make its
critical mission self-­sustaining on all its installations by 2040.61 The Army is setting theexample for the other services to follow in the fielding of microgrids at installations.
Critics of the proposal to install renewable microgrids on military installations say the
military’s budget should be spent on other priorities to modernize the force and keep pacewith China.62 Yet significant long-­term savings in transmission costs and energy efficiency
outweigh the short-­term costs of installation.63 Specifically, certain components of a microgrid
can be justified economically and paid for out of energy savings or avoided costs.64
Furthermore, the United States can look at potential cost-­sharing ventures with hostnations. Many overseas military installations are shared bases, with United States andhost-­nation forces occupying portions of the base. Creating a microgrid for all these forces
would bolster the national security capabilities of each country. Pursuing this course ofaction also increases cooperation with US regional and global partners, which results intheir increased ability to deter and defend against potential aggression.65
Each potential microgrid site is different and requires specific analysis and evaluation
to determine how best to implement a microgrid. For example, an old or poorly maintained
existing distribution system can impact the reliability of the microgrid system.66 A recent
National Renewable Energy Laboratory study reviewed cost information for 80 microgrid
projects and determined associated costs varied, depending on the market segment andcomplexity of the microgrid.67 The team concluded the more complex a project, the more
expensive it is. Yet while the cost of a microgrid project is important for the military toconsider, it would not outweigh the cost of national security and mission impact due topower loss, which is difficult to quantify monetarily.68
To overcome potential high microgrid installation costs, the military should conduct a
risk and mission analysis assessment of its overseas bases to identify the risk to mission if
a power outage occurs at each of its installations. The military has significant expertise inperforming these analyses and has most of the necessary information to conduct them
61. Department of the Army (DA), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations,
Energy and Environment, United States Army Climate Strategy (Washington, DC: DA, 2022), 6, https://www.army.mil/.
62. Mike Glenn, “Navy Must Speed Up Shipbuilding, Modernization to Keep Pace with China, Russia
at Sea, Analysts Say,” Washington Times, October 30, 2021, https://www.washingtontimes.com/.
63. Rich Castagna, “Microgrids Deliver Resiliency, Security and Savings,” IoT World Today (website),
January 16, 2020, https://www.iotworldtoday.com/.
64. Kirnik et al., Financing Microgrids, 1.
65. Austin, NDS, 8.
66. Kirnik et al., Financing Microgrids, 4.
67. Giraldez et al., Phase I, v.
68. Christopher J. Peterson et al., “Analyzing Mission Impact of Military Installations Microgrid for
Resilience,” Systems 9, no. 3 (2021): 1, https://doi.org/.
30  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Olsenquickly. Addressing the most critical installations first ensures the United States is using
its money for the greatest benefits.
Part of this risk assessment should consider the energy production, sustainability, andenergy storage of a potential microgrid as well as the installation’s weather, purpose, size,and distance from the local utility provider.69 An analysis of these factors provides decisionmakers with an understanding of the impact a microgrid will have on the base’s energy
resiliency before determining the type of microgrid to install.70
Once the bases are identified, the military must evaluate each base and identify its
critical facilities. At each base, the military should identify the mission each facility contributes to, the load associated with conducting the mission, and the impact any loss of
power would cause on mission accomplishment.71 The second step in this analysis involves
determining the set of scenarios that could disrupt the power supply and estimating theprobability of each event occurring.72 Performing this second level of analysis helps microgrid
designers understand how to develop a microgrid capable of ensuring the highest probability of mission accomplishment.
One critical scenario for any military base is the potential for attack. Large solar
photovoltaic fields and wind turbines are attractive targets for enemy forces. Hardening
the electrical infrastructure or dispersing it to various locations throughout the base areways to overcome this vulnerability. One possible way to disperse a photovoltaic field is
to place solar panels on buildings throughout the base. Not only does dispersal make thegrid a harder target to hit, but it also increases the ability of a base to provide power reliably and redundantly to its critical facilities.
Lastly, one major benefit of the burgeoning renewable energy sector is the decreasing
cost of such systems due to its prevalence in the energy sector. The US Energy Information
Administration reported electricity generation from renewable energy exceeded coal forthe first time in April 2019. Even with the increase in prices for materials, shipping, andlabor, the cost of renewable energy systems is roughly 40 percent less than building a coalor gas plant.73 Battery energy storage systems are also decreasing in price, and the average
global lithium-­ion battery pack price has declined significantly since 2010.74
Microgrid costs are also trending downward as the system gains popularity in thecommercial sector. Currently, microgrids make up 0.2 percent of the electricity generationof the national electrical infrastructure, but 2016 to 2019 saw a yearly increase of 62 to 68
69. Haydon, “Microgrids,” 17.
70. Haydon.
71. Peterson et al., “Analyzing Mission Impact,” 4.
72. Peterson et al., 5.
73. David R. Baker, “Renewable Power Costs Rise, Just Not as Much as Fossil Fuels,” Bloomberg, June 30,
2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/.
74. Eric Lightner et al., Voices of Experience: Microgrids for Resiliency (Golden, CO: NREL in conjunction with Smart Electric Power Alliance, 2020), 42.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  31

Microgrids

percent in the numbers of microgrids installed.75 Furthermore, Department of Energy
research and development targets for microgrids anticipate electricity generation capacity
will be more distributed in nature, with capacity in 10 years likely being 30 to 50 percent
distributed energy assets.76

Conclusions
Department of Defense policy dictates all military bases must insure they have reliable
power to carry out their critical missions.77 Russia’s war in Ukraine highlights the vulnerability of relying on nonrenewable sources of energy for national security. Russia is using
energy as a weapon against the resolve of the EU and its allies and partners and attacking
the Ukrainian electrical infrastructure. If key US bases around the world are not able toaccess power, they will not be able to support combatant commanders in the defense ofnational interests and the safety and security of US Allies and partners. Although the
Department of Defense recognizes the importance of reliable power, it is not implementing innovative solutions like microgrids quick enough.
Congress can help increase energy security and reliability in the military by mandating
microgrids at overseas bases and providing funding to enact this mandate. US code alreadyencourages the Department of Defense to “consider, when feasible, projects for the production of installation energy that benefits military readiness and promotes installation security and energy resilience.”78 The code elaborates on the direction provided and defines
ways to increase security and energy resilience as “incorporation of energy resiliencefeatures, such as microgrids, to ensure that energy remains available to the installationeven when the installation is not connected to energy sources located off the installation.”79
These statements are helpful but need to be more directive, like the language in the US
code regarding energy security for military installations in Europe. The Fiscal Year 2020
National Defense Authorization Act directed the secretary of defense to “ensure that eachcontract for the acquisition of furnished energy for a covered military installation in
Europe does not use any energy sourced from inside the Russian Federation as a meansof generating the furnished energy of the covered military installation.”80 The language
provides the defense secretary an opportunity to waive the requirement as long as the
Defense Department requires the energy to meet mission requirements and the risks
associated with the decision are evaluated.
75. Summer Ferreira et al., DOE OE 2021 Strategy White Papers on Microgrids: Program Vision, Objectives, and R&D Targets in 5 and 10 years–Topic Area #1 (Washington, DC: DoE, April 2021), 10, https://www.energy.gov/.
76. Ferreira et al., 5.
77. Marqusee, Ericson, and Jenket, Emergency Diesel, 3.
78. 10 U.S.C. § 2911(h).
79. 10 U.S.C. § 2911(h)(B).
80. 10 U.S.C. § 2911.
32  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

OlsenOnce Congressional language is in place, the first place to start is the most mission-­criticaloverseas bases. Based on the National Defense Strategy, it is likely these bases will be in areas
with the most impact on the United States’ great power conflict with China and Russia. For
example, the US Air Force is increasing the number of its bases across the Pacific over the
next decade, to spread out and become more survivable in conflict.81 Adding a microgrid tothese new bases will increase survivability and the Air Force’s ability to generate an air
tasking order if the base encounters host-­nation power interruptions.
Some countries where US bases are located are highly interested in international investment in solar projects.82 This presents the United States with an opportunity to invest in
solar projects on military bases and share the technology with its Allies and partners.
Evidence of this occurred in early November 2022 when the United Arab Emirates andthe United States signed a partnership to spur $100 billion of investments in clean energy
projects and add 100 gigawatts of clean energy globally by 2035.83 The agreement pushes
each country to assemble and stimulate private and public sector funding for clean energy
innovation, carbon and methane management, advanced reactors, and industrial andtransport de­carbonization.84
Power grid interruptions from a natural disaster or attack pose a risk to military operations
and readiness. Congressional language authorizing and funding renewable microgrids atoverseas locations will ensure the US military continues to defend our national interests andthat of our Allies and partners. Operating independently of the host nation’s electrical grid
will provide the military with a reliable power source immune to attacks, extreme weather
events, and energy market volatility. Ultimately, powering overseas installations with microgrids
will enable Joint Force resiliency and secure continued US military advantage.85 Q
81. Audrey Decker, “Air Force Expanding Number of Bases in Pacific over Next Decade,” Defense One,
August 29, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/.
82. Samuel Humphries, “A Bright Future: The Middle East’s Solar Revolution,” American Security
Project (website), June 30, 2020, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/.
83. “UAE and U.S. Reach Deal for $100 Billion in Clean Energy Projects,” Reuters, updated November 2,
2022, https://www.reuters.com/.
84. “UAE and U.S.”
85. Austin, NDS, 18.

AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  33

ADVANCES IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FORCE STRUCTURE

The Silver Lining inInformation Warfare
Lauren McQuone
Despite significant progress in the field of meteorology over the past six decades, military leaders, planners, strategists, and operators are failing to embrace its current capabilities. Advanced
meteorological analysis highlights the difference between adversarial and friendly vulnerabilities—given capabilities, risk delimitations, and behavioral norms and anomalies—thereby determining the marginal advantage: the silver lining. The contemporary utility of meteorologicalanalysis is as novel a capability as it is an offensive one.

T

echnological advances are bounded by decisionmakers’ cognitive limitations of
how to best use them. In near-­peer conflict fought within the margins and where
advantages are marginal, users’ lack of knowledge will cost the United States andits Allies. For example many decisionmakers wrongly assume that weather’s best, if not
only utility is in its most perishable form, such as area forecasts, flight weather briefings(DD Form 175-1s), and three-­day forecasts. Despite exceptional progress in the field thesepast 60 years, meteorology’s use by military leadership, strategists, planners, and operators
has failed to progress apace, relegating an evolved capability to dated functionality.
The redeeming factor is that although this mindset seems to be a postmodern norm,
time and preparedness are relative in conflict. There are, however, no assurances that theUnited States or those friendly to it will be the first to acclimatize to weather operations
in a true information warfare context. If information warfare is to advance, decisionmakers’ preconceptions about the sophistication and utility of weather knowledge must evolve.1
Unlike time and preparedness, a constant in conflict is that terrestrial and space
weather often exacerbate vulnerabilities across all domains with zero partiality to actors;
moreover, weather drives behavior. Advanced meteorological (met) analysis delineates
the difference between adversarial and friendly vulnerabilities—given capabilities, risk
delimitations, and behavioral norms and anomalies—thereby determining the marginaladvantage: the silver lining. The contemporary utility of met analysis is as novel a capability as it is an offensive one.

Lieutenant Colonel Lauren “Q” McQuone, USAF, is the commander of 2d Weather Squadron, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

1. US Air Force (USAF), USAF Strategy for Information Warfare (Washington DC: Headquarters
USAF, July 8, 2022).
34   AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEWMcQuone

Seize, Signal, and Subsist
In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity.

John Archibald Wheeler2

Timing is everything in warfare. Advanced met analysis in Joint intelligence preparationof the operational environment ( JIPOE), especially in informing the Joint targeting cycle,
can impose costs, just as its absence can incur costs. Thus, met analysis represents a valuable
yet underused tool in information warfare. For example, with pattern-­of-­life and risk
analysis of activities correlated to winds and sea states, the Department of Defense could
better estimate adversarial courses of action and detect anomalous behavior of enemy
aircraft. Such information could inform defensive actions ahead of an attack, or better yet,could be leveraged to expend enemy resources and time.
In another example, advanced early warning radars and integrated air defense systems(IADS) with detection ranges beyond 150 nautical miles (nm), paired with missiles thatreach similar distances, pose standoff and targeting challenges to the suppression of enemy
air defenses aircraft.3 But all-­weather radar sensing technologies and aircraft are subject
to corrosion—for example, sea spray and sand accelerate corrosion processes in the presence of abundant oxygen and humidity.4
On average, a diurnal sea breeze extends 50 nm inland in the middle latitudes and asmuch as 150 nm in the tropics.5 Corrosion is in fact among the largest life-­cycle component costs for weapons systems sustainability.6 These costs include reduced sensor reliability, lifespan, maintenance and repair downtime, and replacement acquisition, ultimately
decreasing combat readiness. Patterned sheltering or relocation of assets can be indicativeof deliberate offset. Additionally, the downtime critical to preventative and corrective
maintenance cannot be eliminated for fixed early warning radars and IADS. This is where
there are exploitable windows of opportunity if factored into friendly decision calculi,
specifically attrition strategy and tactics science.
Weather can drive initiative—the choice to take the offensive and make exigent threats—in
the physical environment. Deliberate and dynamic targeting could exploit sheltering, relocation,and downtime by planning to attack when an opponent’s counterair assets are either diminished
2. John Archibald Wheeler, “The Outsider,” Newsweek 93, no. 11 (March 1979): 67.
3. “Worldwide Equipment Guide,” OE Data Integration Network (ODIN), accessed May 15, 2023,
https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/.
4. Multiple authors, “Corrosion Management Meeting Proceedings,” NATO Science and Technology
Organization, November 29, 2018, https://www.sto.nato.int; and Eric Herzberg et al., “Estimated Impact ofCorrosion on Cost and Availability of DoD Weapon Systems,” LMI, March 2019, https://www.dau.edu/(full database).
5. Karolina Slamova et al., “Mapping Atmospheric Corrosion in Coastal Regions: Methods and Results,” Journal of Photonics for Energy 2, no. 1 ( June 2012), https://doi.org/.
6. Eric Herzberg and Rebecca Stroh, “The Impact of Corrosion on Cost and Availability of U.S. Department of Defense Weapon Systems,” NATO Science and Technology Organization, November 29, 2018,https://www.sto.nato.int.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  35

The Silver Lining in Information Warfare

or delayed. Climatologically informed deliberate targeting is straightforward, albeit untapped.
Still, training to such targeting can be alternatively effective if it elicits behavior changes,
specifically if the target audience trades greater environmental exposure for quicker response
times, attritting its fleet with compounding corrosion. Meteorologically-­leveraged dynamic
targeting offers the element of surprise—which is achieved through intellectual edge, not ironalone—and creates opportunities to seize the initiative and influence tempo.
Imposing costs involves compelling an opposing (red) force to cease belligerent behavior, because the costs of that behavior exceed accepted benefits and/or are counterproductive. Nevertheless, successful cost imposition can itself incur costs to the blue force as aresult of unexercised alternatives. Additionally, it is not a technological or numericaldisparity that determines winning outcomes, as the 1979 Sino-­V ietnamese War andRussia’s current war in Ukraine have demonstrated, but rather a timely so-­called “wisdom
differential” between actors. Wisdom is the use of knowledge—distilled from learned
information—in a profound way. Classical theorist Alfred T. Mahan wrote that “in war,
the defensive exists mainly [so] that the offensive may act more freely . . . [and] a coast
fortress defends the nation to which it belongs chiefly by the fleet it shelters.”7 A wisdom
differential, then, is when decisionmakers use knowledge better than their opponent, resulting in actions that are at once timely, relevant, and costly to the opponent.
Because environmental uncertainty is central to human activity, advanced met analysis
must be included when blue forces are deciding how to impose costs on red force lines ofcommunication (LOCs) and logistics. Red defenses—be it fleet, IADS, or other—are
effective insomuch as they protect the means to threaten blue LOCs and logistics.8 Yet,
due to the epochal shift of information warfare that began in January 1995 with theformation of the first DoD information warfare executive board, the effectiveness of red
defense is equally dependent upon its ability to protect its own LOCs and logistics.

Unifying Weather, Cyber, and Data Science in JIPOE—Data
Prioritization
Refined domain awareness is a precondition for decision advantage, and it entails
weather-­leveraged predictive analytics (in mission management) and retrospective analysis of red force cognitive processes and behavior. Decision advantage in today’s complex
postmodern environment exists only when assisted by speeds beyond human capacity. One
should assume going forward that command and control, physically and functionally, hasbeen and continues to be under persistent disruption. Despite this, there is an overrelianceon signals intelligence (SIGINT). But this also presents an opportunity to capitalize on
the hardship that disruption causes if military requirements are viewed not just as tangible assets but also as available cognitive capabilities.
7. Jakub Grygiel, “Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities,” Parameters 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015), https://press.armywarcollege.edu.
8. Grygiel.
36  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

McQuoneSIGINT
More sensors and feeds paradoxically amount to an infinitesimal value because data
volume exceeds processing power and goes unused, overlooked, or referenced and filed.
For compounding SIGINT volume, variety, and velocity to be actionable, collection,dissemination, and analysis prioritization coupled with data acceleration—assisted bynumerical modeling, automation, and artificial intelligence (AI)—is vital. Such prioritization and data acceleration are possible where chaos and game theories intersect, expertisethat resides within Joint force weather, cyber, and data science specialties.
Signals intelligence sensors, platforms, and dissemination signals by and large aresubject to weather; thus, economical mission management cannot be divorced frompredictive analytics. Knowing what sensors, platforms, and frequencies can be used canlead to the better use of limited blue resources. Further, met analysis also informs on red
SIGINT options, increasing blue’s ability to predict red maneuver and platform availability. Useful interception of red LOCs is entwined with conserving blue LOCs for when
and where they make the greatest contributions to combatant command theater strategy.
For example, tasking SIGINT collection of adversary signal sources during specific terrestrial or space weather conditions could inform red force thresholds, capabilities, andalternate courses of actions, if any.

AI and Predictive Analytics
As deliberate plans approach their execution window, combined game-­theory-­based
artificial intelligence and predictive analytics should drive dynamic retasking by first eliminating less useful data and then accelerating trend and anomaly discovery via algorithm. This
allows planners to elevate operational and tactical situations post-­analysis by prioritizing
missions with higher collection usability and lower lost link rates, but this is in contraventionof standing deliberate plans where weather is an afterthought in the targeting cycle.

Electromagnetic Spectrum
Accelerating electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) information integration to provide
commanders “scalable options to control conflict escalation” necessitates first addressing
scalable situational awareness.9 Due to congressional limits, the Department of Defense
cannot expand in size to meet increasing demands, so given big data and bandwidth
challenges—EMS, throughput, human capital, and cognitive capacity—scalability must
instead be addressed by modernizing dated internal processes.
9. Mark Esper, Department of Defense (DoD) Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy 2020 (Washington, DC: DoD, October 2020), https://media.defense.gov.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  37

The Silver Lining in Information Warfare

Improved Processes
Further, the convergence of weather with other information warfare components necessitates changes internal to the weather community. In order to scale processes, software
solutions must be decentralized to formulate courses of action, thereby decreasing cognitive complexity. This will enable operational and tactical personnel to make quick decisions.
Converging weather and intelligence capabilities begins with determining the impartial
uncertainty—environmental (weather) conditions—but requires a departure from static
times-­series graphics and time-­consuming manual PowerPoint and Excel production.
Available automation expertise makes the latter virtually unnecessary, and the Air Force
Weather Virtual Private Cloud makes decentralization possible. Nonetheless, static graphics and manual production linger because planners and operators, weather personnel andotherwise, have grown accustomed to it.
The manpower and time required to generate disruptive innovation, which would increase
the United States’ military competitiveness, is tied up in short-­term repetitive tasks, focusedon responsiveness at the cost of progress. Sustainable, expediting software must eliminate
multiple touches by weather personnel, be available on demand (integrating automation
and AI algorithms), and be intuitive. Further, valuable metrics that inform present insights
and future strategies, as opposed to vanity metrics, should be considered from inception
in the software development process.
All forces are subject to weather, so the question is not if but how red forces decide andbehave in certain environmental conditions and what their limitations and risk tolerance
are in training and operations. Differentiating between red and blue forces’ cognitive
processes and behaviors under similar environmental conditions and determining actionable opportunities begin with advanced met analysis of how environmental information
or live conditions situationally influence forces. Retrospective met analysis is challenging
in this respect, however, because meteorology is predominantly future-­oriented, data archiving saps resources, and career field silos persist.10
Software-­augmented analysis prioritization, near real-­time analysis—essentially mission
watch, and collocated integration of information-­warfare-­versed weather specialists within
intelligence teams and other subunits—are ways to work around those challenges. Game
theory is predicated on the assumption that decisions are interdependent. Data that would
illuminate routine versus anomalous behavior patterns and wisdom differentials in operational art (and then better inform tactics, techniques, and procedures) lie not with one
specialty but where weather and intelligence converge. Still, neither function can providethat knowledge at a speed of relevance without cyber capabilities, nor can they measure
its value to draw insights for improvement without data science. The ability to act on such

10. John G. Grimes, DoD Information Sharing Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: Office of theAssistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer,
April 2009), https://dodcio.defense.gov/; and USAF, Strategy for Information Warfare.
38  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

McQuoneknowledge is power. But to render its effects that frequently manifest in conventional ways
into a cognitive outcome is profound.

Getting at the Will to Fight
Met analysis long reduced environmental uncertainty for blue forces, yet the capability,
including the ability to anticipate warfighting challenges, remains underutilized in Joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and in plans and operations.
Decisionmakers tend to fixate on destroying or neutralizing red capabilities and view
diminishing will as the consequence rather than the aim, losing sight that the will to fightis fundamental to war.11 Cutting-­edge technologies are useless sans the will to employ
them as casualties rise.12 Effectiveness in conflict is highly dependent upon the ability toprotect one’s logistics, and an actor that cannot sustain critical logistics risks mortality
rates that come at the costs of the combatant’s and general population’s will to fight.13
One example of this is exemplified by the management of the blood supply during crises.
An estimated 25 percent of combat deaths between 2001 and 2011 in Iraq and Afghanistan were solely due to exsanguinating hemorrhage—the severe and rapid loss ofblood—and yet, these were potentially preventable with the timely evacuation to a definitive care location.14 Associated discussions of time tend to focus on the golden or resuscitative hour, within which medical intervention—often involving blood transfusions—is considered to offer the best chance of trauma survivability.15 Yet crises sometimes
coincide with inadequate blood supply and when direct blood transfusions are either
impractical or insufficient. Blood supplies are protected under medical neutrality but notfrom the environment. Time and weather, in effect, can beget the endgame. Climate andweather predictions of adversarial blood supply chain effects could improve JIPOE.
There is a narrow margin for error in transporting and storing blood, a temperature-­
hypersensitive substance, lest its chemical composition is compromised, risking safe
transfusion or wastage. First, the time of year—that is, seasonal ambient temperaturefluctuations—combined with distribution equipment suitability can pose challenges tomaintaining blood integrity, especially the greater the diurnal temperature variation. Although blood products can be stored frozen to extend shelf-­life, thaw time for whole blood
11. Ben Connable et al., “Will to Fight: Returning to the Human Fundamentals of War,” RB-10040-A(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), https://doi.org/.
12. Connable et al.
13. Russ S. Kotwal et al., “The Effect of a Golden Hour Policy on the Morbidity and Mortality of
Combat Casualties,” JAMA Surgery 151, no. 1 ( January 2016), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov.
14. Robert L. Mabry, “Challenges to Improving Combat Casualty Survivability on the Battlefield,” Joint
Force Quarterly 76 ( January 2015), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/.
15. Leslie Waghorn, “New Research Shows Golden Hour Trauma Care Saves Lives on the Battlefield,”
Vital Record: News from Texas A&M Health, November 4, 2015, https://vitalrecord.tamhsc.edu.
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The Silver Lining in Information Warfare

or its components is typically prohibitive in emergencies, and refrigerated or room-­temperature blood must be transfused within specific timeframes or discarded.16
Second, inclement weather at donation sites—locations which may dually serve civilian
needs—can delay supply replenishment. Third, weather can delay transport timelines and,in extreme situations, jeopardize temperature-­controlled storage when power outages
extend beyond backup generator capacity. Casualties are tactical-­level effects, but tacticalsupport like blood supply readiness, or lack thereof, can give rise to results of strategic
proportions. Enough past wars’ lessons reinforce that outcomes are not decided in acontest of technologies but that of wills. As a human endeavor, war demonstrates there
are limits to society’s acceptance of compounding loss of human life.17
In conflict, all initiatives and responses come at a cost. Prudent calculi considers whether
an objective’s value outweighs the price of the encounter and the appropriate utility ofavailable capabilities in vying for the initiative. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative are contingent upon thorough, advanced preparation.

Weather in Training
Knowledge is always fundamental to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.
But prescient knowledge of environmental conditions, correlated with adversary inclinations, choices, and limitations creates an offensive paradox: opportunities to operate offensively in an unrestricted manner multiply in inclement weather. Further, the ability todisclose what an adversary cannot do presents a unique opportunity to degrade theirmilitary power projection. In the context of airpower, the conventional perspective of an
offensive action is that an F-22A, F-35A, B-21, or other aircraft delivers the munitions.
The dissident perspective of the same action is that opportune weather delivers the aircraft.
In a highly-­contested battlespace between next-­generation aircraft and sophisticatedanti-­access and area-­denial capabilities, visual flight rules conditions are neither conducive
to seizing the initiative nor guaranteed if the adversary commences the attack. It is betterto err on the assumption that air superiority will be local and temporary at best. Increasing that probability necessitates exploiting time frames when freedom of action is exclusive, reversing what are deemed favorable, marginal, and unfavorable flying conditions.
Like a rain-­wrapped tornado, aircraft advancement might be detectable given existing
technology, but it is more difficult for an adversary to react as effectively at the time.
Risk in warfare is a certainty, not a probability. Nonetheless, if the political object is thegoal, and warfare a means to reach it, then the most significant risk is not losing an asset,
battle, or even the war, but falling out of play to terms unfavorable for the United States and
16. Matthew Bradley et al., “Combat Casualty Care and Lessons Learned from the Past 100 Years ofWar,” Current Problems in Surgery 54, no. 6 ( June 2017), https://www.sciencedirect.com.
17. Connable et al., “Will to Fight.”
40  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

McQuoneits Allies and partners.18 It is a measured risk to train to and operate between and behindinclement weather rather than the way the Air Force does it now, in more stable environmental conditions. Such a hazardous posture is further complicated by the maturation ofadversarial cyber and electromagnetic pulse capabilities, making communications delays andblackouts inevitable. Still, it is a posture that offers audacity, surprise, and a means to alter
an operations tempo that will otherwise be rare in a future near-­peer conflict.
Past high-­intensity peer warfare preceded modern meteorology; thus, actors daringly
played against the odds with a rudimentary understanding of weather. Today, prevalent
norms are to avoid weather, so deviating and leveraging over 60 years of meteorologicaladvances makes for calculated audacity.19 The prerogative of surprise complements bold
action; the unpredictability of time, place, and direction affords an adversary little to no
physical and psychological respite. Within those moments of an adversary’s unpreparedness and reactivity are opportunities to disrupt their operations tempo, interfering with
their decision cycles while protecting one’s own. But this depends on being more prepared.
Risk acceptance in practice lends itself to risk transference to an adversary during a conflict.
Future conflicts will not involve pure high-­intensity air combat but a hybrid approachwith nonkinetic first strikes meant to affect information superiority well before any kinetic
response, making it more consequential to recognize an unconventional offense. Althoughsome actions may not bear doctrinal hallmarks, the purpose behind them is the betterdelineator. For example, consider a disinformation campaign exaggerating the severity ofdrought and the extant water shortages and food insecurity to trigger human displacement
and instability within an adversary’s borders. The action is intended as an offense play, but
is unconventionally audacious, concentrated, surprising, and paced (tempo).
The purpose of any offense is to deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, or destroy a target or
target audience with real-­world impacts to achieve broader military objectives. Leveraging
coincidental timing of solar flares, geomagnetic storms, and damaging terrestrial storms
for dayside operations is one example of influencing or annulling an adversary’s decisioncalculus. Where satellite communications are nonviable or otherwise impaired and whenhigh-­f requency (3–30 MHz) beyond-­line-­of-­site alternatives are disrupted, command-­and-­control options are limited to a period of minutes to days.20
Moreover, since high frequency is often the fallback for civilian emergencies, a state actor
must prioritize its military and civilian needs and infrastructure recovery while encumberedby degraded communications. Another example is to leverage weather dictating the typesof red forces employed and for which they are the least prepared, such as nonclimate-­controlled
18. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 87.
19. Eric Berger, “Modern Meteorology Was Born 60 Years Ago Today,” Ars Technica, April 1, 2020,
https://arstechnica.com.
20. Nathaniel Frissell et al., “High-­Frequency Communications Response to Solar Activity in September 2017 As Observed by Amateur Radio Networks,” Space Weather 17, no. 1 ( January 2019), https://doi.
org/.
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The Silver Lining in Information Warfare

aircraft at heights or ground components that prolong personnel exposure to the elements.
Still, meteorological information flow is the proverbial double-­edged sword of kinetic andnonkinetic wars, imperative to seizing any initiative militarily and, therefore, an early target.
Knowledge cuts through the fog of war, “the state of ignorance in which commanders
frequently find themselves as regards the real strength and position, not only of their foes,
but also of their friends.”21 Other national weather data availability will likely be sparseor unreliable preceding and in wartime, drastically affecting both sides’ forecast accuracy.
Yet the advantage will lie with whichever side possesses better modeling for and working
weather knowledge of the contested region; specialists, not generalists, will be indispensable. Weather itself is inherently neutral and neutralizing, impartial to all actors, andubiquitous to the point of being domainless. Still, it can be disarming in any battlespaceof any time for those who use it effectively. The United States insists on the ability to
inflict temporary or permanent effects at a time and place of its choosing, but for that to
be true, there cannot be an exception for inclement weather.

Conclusion
The weapon of choice is knowledge. Military strength and position limits lie not in thephysicalities of warfare but in cognitive biases. Environmental uncertainty is central toand a constant in human activity. Therefore, if any advantage is to be ascertained, muchless exploited, in near-­peer conflict, then military decisionmakers must break rigid preconceptions about the utility of weather. Defeat is often discussed as a cognitive outcome.
Yet emphasis on tangible technological and numerical disparities obscures that the aimof any physical action is to influence perceptions and, thereby, attrit will. So, while conventional forms of attack may indirectly affect will, information warfare is the sole meansof a direct attack on an adversary’s will to fight.22
If the United States is to remain a global leader, particularly when key resources fall short,then its military must scale its cognitive approach. The determinants of military victory depend
upon leadership, strategists, planners, and operators fully considering available capabilities,
including accepting offensive paradoxes such as the concept that opportunities to operateunrestricted multiply in inclement weather. Every difficult situation offers an advantage; every
cloud has a silver lining. The point is to make wise decisions at timely speeds. But this hinges
on preparedness that takes time, and nothing can compensate for the loss of time. Q
21. Lonsdale Hale, The Fog of War (London: Edward Stanford, 1896), XIX, 522.
22. J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008), https://press.armywarcollege.edu.

42  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

ADVANCES IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Optimizing Security Forces Operations
Employing Risk-Based Strategies
Brandon L. Dinkins
A new Security Forces framework will modernize the forces and establish a comprehensive
security posture that will in turn alleviate manning shortages and mitigate detrimental mental
and physical health factors for Defenders. Key elements to the new framework include changing
policy restrictions, reallocating resources, and improving protective standards.

S

ecurity Forces (SF) deficiencies negatively impact the Air Force mission and SF
members’ physical and mental wellbeing. As such, Security Forces need a new security framework that utilizes personnel and resources to build a more modernized
and comprehensive security posture, one that alleviates manning shortages and mitigatesdeleterious effects on individuals’ mental and physical health. Currently, no publishedworks address SF’s programmatic process and security requirements to show how they
influence a sustainable security model. Operational efficiencies can be improved by changing policy restrictions, reallocating resources to more prominent threats, and creating new
protective standards. A less manpower-­extensive and more comprehensive approach tobase security will avoid levying additional burdens on SF members.

Introduction
The US Air Force Security Forces, also known as Defenders, are the service security
and police forces that conduct 24/7 operations to protect personnel and critical national
defense resources. Defenders, representing the largest career field in the Air Force withmore than 38,000 members, provide installation security efforts at home stations andoverseas, including in hostile theater locations. As the service’s law enforcement body, SF
is primarily responsible for securing resources that provide strategic airpower and protect
assets vital to US interests worldwide. Defenders’ duties are physically and mentally demanding, and members accomplish many tasks, ranging “from writing tickets to investigating on-­base incidents to make sure everyone and everything on every base is protected.”1

Senior Master Sergeant Brandon L. Dinkins, USAF, PhD, is the superintendent, operations and training, 45th Security Forces
Squadron, Patrick Space Force Base, Florida.

1. “Enlisted Security Forces,” US Air Force (website), accessed December 17, 2022, https://www.air
force.com/.
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Optimizing Security Forces Operations

Air Force missions largely depend on these individuals to protect their vital warfighting
capabilities. For decades, Security Forces have applied a consistent security methodology toprovide installation security and base defense capabilities. Yet this has led to security deficiencies and has negatively impacted missions and SF members. The Air Force can improve efficiency
by reducing SF policy restrictions, reallocating resources to more prominent threats, and creating new protective standards. Security Forces need a new framework to utilize personnel andresources more effectively to build a more modernized and comprehensive security posture.
By and large, the SF foundation is rooted in requirements-­driven policies that significantly
restrict commanders from adequately utilizing their forces and forming an adaptive security
posture. This method significantly limits how decisions can be made at the tactical level, andseveral areas of mandated regulatory compliance can form unintended installation vulnerabilities to active shooter attacks, unmanned aerial threats, or complex coordinated terrorist
attacks. These inefficiencies routinely impact operational readiness and often require SF units
to rotate in and out of 12-hour shift schedules. The threat is always evolving. Because Air
Force installations vary in size as well as complexity, SF units require independent security
posting strategies to leverage their existing manpower constructs more effectively.
Effectively adapting to threats by integrating security systems and trained SF members
requires commanders to track crime and threat metrics, prioritize risks, and create comprehensive security plans. Maximizing SF operations involves methods that systemicallybuild installation-­specific strategies. These tailored strategies utilize SF members more
effectively, apply appropriate levels of protection to critical resources, and create a sustainable security model that does not jeopardize Defenders’ mental and physical readiness.
Today, many SF members at Air Force installations worldwide have limited operational
effectiveness due to redundant security concepts and restrictive security procedures. A new
security management approach for SF posting and response can help create a more lethal,
educated, effective, and ready force to meet the dangerous threats of today.

Culture Shift
Many policies that drive SF security operations have not changed since the Cold War.
In addition, a wide range of requirements drive SF response priorities, and recent SF
leaders such as Deputy Director of Security Forces Tim Gerald have pursued positivechange for the entire force. Yet a culture-­wide shift to address the many limitations ofrequirements-­based security and the constraints in SF capabilities needs to be made inorder to ensure effective and efficient security operations.
In his introductory video presentation to Defenders, Director of Security Forces
Brigadier General Thomas Sherman emphasized the importance of a culture of change
in today’s force, addressing the current global environment, peer competition, and theability of Security Forces to operate in various settings.2 Sherman describes how culture
2. Tom Sherman, “Brig Gen Sherman’s Message to Defender Nation,” Defender Nation, March 10,2023, YouTube video, 10:20, https://www.youtube.com/.
44  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Dinkins

can shape the path of SF in determining what is needed for airbase defense. Highlighting
the need to use technology, equipment, and innovation to transform the Security Forces
into a system of record to manage the current battlespace, Sherman notes that Defenders
must build the appropriate resources and acquisitions processes to sustain operations.
Sherman acknowledges the use of innovation is imperative to shape future operations andcreate a more agile and comprehensive security posture.

The Problem with Integrated Defense
Procedural installation security guidance is defined primarily in Department of the Air
Force Instruction (DAFI) 31-101, Integrated Defense.3 The pacing threat and advancementof technological modernization involve ongoing efforts to improve security requirements
and procedures. DAFI 31-101 provides a conceptual framework for the baseline standardsof security implementation and defense strategies. Integrated defense is the governing
policy that primarily directs how Security Forces implement specific security procedures
on installations. It addresses establishing security for protection-­level resources, installation
access control requirements, and electronic security system implementations.
Yet these requirements often do not account for individual situations at installations;instead they represent a holistic application of security at a foundational level. Many units
have unique mission sets with different geographic considerations, which creates challenges
for SF commanders—often interchangeably known as defense force commanders (DFC)—
to implement strategies unique to their missions. Deviations from integrated defense
policies usually require higher-­level waiver authority. The SF climate is not accustomed
or conditioned to seeking those waivers, especially when it deals with securing protection-­level resources. Therefore, higher-­level policy should allow for more installation-­level
decisions to be made by DFCs and in coordination with installation commanders. Fostering a culture where DFCs have more influence to make changes at their level, applying a
preponderance of evidence from threat intelligence to create security strategies, can significantly shift SF operations to a more efficient operational climate.
In addition to the challenges posed by a one-­size-­fits-­all security strategy approach, innovation within the SF career field lags behind that of modern aviation and cyber systems acrossthe rest of the Air Force. The Security Forces’ innovation and advancement cycle is limited toyesterday’s institutionalized standards and compartmented strategies. Defenders use anabundance of manpower to secure resources, critical assets, and airfields rather than integratetechnology that augments or even replaces the need for manned security operations. DAFI
31-101 restricts commanders’ ability to adapt security standards away from the prescribed
requirements. The security convergence of technology and airbase defense can utilize systems
to control installation access, surveil and monitor sensitive areas, and deter adversaries. Former
Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Charles Q. Brown Jr. stated the Air Force will not grow
3. Department of the Air Force (DAF), Integrated Defense, DAF Instruction (DAFI) 31-101 (Washington, DC: DAF, 2020).
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  45

Optimizing Security Forces Operations

bigger in number; instead, the service must adapt to win wars.4 Air Force Security Forces
cannot continue to operate at their current manpower-­driven capacity; instead, they must
innovate and align with current technology to drive a more robust security posture.

A New Strategy
As within many military organizations, institutional inertia against change tends topersist in Security Forces. Some SF leaders remain steadfast with the status quo and refuse
to adopt any new way of thinking. Yet SF leaders have the power to develop a morecomprehensive model that reduces manpower requirements while still meeting the appropriate level of base defense and resource protection. Defender units are currently implementing a requirements-­based security strategy where their forces are often dedicated tosecurity resources within an inner restrictive area inside an Air Force installation perimeter. Those perimeters contain comprehensive security systems, high-­occupancy buildings,
structural deterrence, and low threats of hostile actors.
But this strategy requires a security presence that limits other policing activities, creating considerable vulnerability to other installation threats including gate runners, volatile
domestic disputes, and active shooters in high-­occupancy buildings outside the restricted
area. Due to manpower constraints produced by the current security philosophy, as little
as one patrol may be responsible for policing areas outside of the priority resources.
Conversely, a more suitable strategy would include expanding security efforts across theinstallation while implementing a priority response matrix for those patrols instead ofrestricting them to areas with other delay-­and-­detect systems.
The requirements-­based security strategy is the standard security process across the SF
enterprise. Gaps in perimeter security have allowed a host of intruders to circumvent
procedures at installation access control points. Early 2023 intrusions at Joint Base Andrews,
Maryland, have highlighted the limitations in adequately securing Air Force installations,allowing perpetrators to access highly secure areas, even onto aircraft designated for senior
US leaders.5 These security deficiencies can create devastating consequences for high-­value
assets and disrupt critical mission operations. As one solution, robotic advancements canhelp strengthen security efforts without increasing the need for manpower.
Technological automation, such as surveillance, can be an effective security solution as it
can relieve SF of monotonous and dangerous duties allowing them to provide services inother needed security areas.6 Defenders at Patrick Space Force Base, Florida, use dog-­like
4. Stephen Losey, “Gen. Brown: The Air Force Isn’t Getting Bigger; To Win Wars It Must Move Airmen into Undermanned Jobs,” Air Force Times, August 31, 2020, https://www.airtforcetimes.com/.
5. “Intruder Breaches Base of Air Force One, Shot Fired,” CBS News Baltimore, updated February 7,
2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/.
6. Roman Prykhodchenko, Rui P. Rocha, and Micael Couceiro, “People Detection by Mobile Robots
Doing Automatic Guard Patrols,” in 2020 IEEE International Conference on Autonomous Robot Systems andCompetitions (ICARSC), Ponta Delgada, Portugal, April 15–17, 2020, ed. Nuno Lau et al. (New York: Institute of Electronic and Electrical Engineers, Inc., 2020), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ .
46  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Dinkins

quadruped unmanned ground vehicles (Q-­UGVs) to assist in repetitive tasks like security
patrolling around the installation and damage assessments, “saving significant man hours.”7
This augmentation is an example of integrating technology with new-­age security
solutions to expand Defender capabilities without increased manning positions. These
tools and complementary features are force multipliers and transition away from the staticand predictable security model prescribed within DAFI 31-101. Using Q-­UGVs is justone of many opportunities to increase security capabilities and reduce the manpower-­driven
standards correlating to existing SF policy. This strategy aligns with Sherman’s intent tocapitalize on technological advancement in the career field.

Evaluating Risks
Data consolidation and analysis are a cornerstone for driving informed decision-­making.
A cognitive approach with an evidence-­based strategy can aid in creating a mission-­capablesecurity plan. Defense force commanders are mandated by Air Force policy to mass security efforts based on prioritized Air Force resources. Much of the security infrastructureis layered and augmented by a defense-­in-­depth philosophy where fencing, alarm sensors,and cameras, for example, enhance security integrity. Physical barriers and intrusion detection capabilities significantly enable responding forces to meet hostile actors before they
enter protected areas. Yet the lack of innovative security concepts has created many static
posts where Defenders are limited in their ability to provide security across different
mission areas. A security response team is routinely required to provide inner and outersecurity for critical- and protection-­level resources. But as a result, the team usually cannot
provide additional coverage in other installation jurisdictions where a higher threat topersonnel is more feasible.
Tracking criminal trends and threats allows DFCs to utilize their force more effectively,
thus reducing inefficient policing and security posting. DFCs can reallocate forces to otherbase patrolling activities and not restrict area security patrols to resources where infrastructure and layered defense can deter and delay adversarial threats. Like the Departmentof Homeland Security’s operations strategy, SF must rely on “timely and actionable intelligence” to evaluate and prevent threats accurately.8 Directed patrolling, focused deterrence,and joint intelligence fusion can provide a comprehensive security construct that does not
require additional manpower to support current posting requirements at SF squadrons
around the globe. DFCs should be able to develop a well-­defined defense strategy basedon current threats and resource priorities.
Such a strategy encompasses more than armed Defenders—hence, the need to use technological detection capabilities and automated systems to augment many posts where complacency
7. Brett Tingley, “US Space Force Test Robot Dogs to Patrol Cape Canaveral,” Space.com, last updated
August 8, 2022, https://www.space.com/.
8. “Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats,” Department of Homeland Security (website),last updated May 30, 2023, https://www.dhs.gov/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  47

Optimizing Security Forces Operations

can build over time, especially when coupled with a high operational shift schedule and 12- ormore-­hour tours of duty. Formalizing an optimal and sustainable shift schedule can significantly
reduce risk to installation personnel, resources, and Defenders. As noted by one research study,
police officers who worked 12-hour shifts had a lower level of alertness and increased fatigue
than those who worked 8–10-hour shifts, thereby creating the possibility of additional security
risks and vulnerabilities.9 Sleep deprivation can have a profound influence on officer safety andsurvivability by reducing core motor functions and cognitive acuity.10

The Risk-­Analysis Process
Integrated defense policy significantly focuses on securing installations from external
threats and bolstering security for priority resources. Yet increasing evidence shows thatprioritizing risk from internal and external threats is a better utilization of forces and a more
efficient method of preventing security incidents. Prioritizing risks requires leaders to analyze
data and build a security framework that provides critical protection while not significantly
detracting from other operational areas. The willingness to assess risk and apply a meticulous
security plan for SF must not outweigh the cost of impacting members’ overall mental andphysical wellbeing. Therefore, commanders should also evaluate the risk to the wellbeing
and effectiveness of SF in addition to the risk to resources and personnel.
Policing strategies should routinely adjust to the changing society and incorporate
technology within constitutional parameters.11 By more efficiently focusing security efforts,prioritizing risk ensures the readiness and modernization of base security aspects. Using
intellectual energy to enhance the performance of Defenders as opposed to the oldmanpower-­driven security philosophies can increase readiness by providing a more alert,
trained force to meet current challenges.
The use of technology in the twenty-­first century has changed the dynamic of warfighting and policing. Indeed, the use of technology and real-­time monitoring can greatly
enhance policing activities and augment SF to reduce specific manning requirements,
better prioritizing risk. Unfortunately, Security Forces have had a “do everything” approachand continue to acquire other operational missions without allocating the appropriate
resources to utilize capabilities effectively. For example, the use of counter-­small unmanned
aerial systems is a critical defense asset; however, many SF units are employing this critical capability with organic manpower and may not acquire additional manning billets toemploy the system without detracting from other mission areas.
9. Karen L. Amendola et al., Shift Length Experiment: What We Know about 8-, 10-, and 12-Hour Shifts
in Policing (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2011), 14, https://www.policinginstitute.org/.
10. Rex M. Scism, “Human Fatigue in 24/7 Operations: Law Enforcement Considerations and Strategies for Improved Performance,” Police Chief Magazine, accessed December 10, 2022, https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/.
11. Thomas J. Cowper and Michael E. Buerger, “Improving Our View of the World: Police and Augmented
Reality Technology,” 12, Federal Bureau of Investigation (website), February 2003, https://www.fbi.gov/.
48  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Dinkins

Air Force Defenders have remained a superb fighting force. Nonetheless, their current
functionality is not a sustainable model for future base defense strategies. Prioritization
creates an accurate assessment methodology to better identify installation vulnerabilities.
This can also create more synergy across SF program areas and better integrate security
systems into routine operations.

Addressing Security and Policing Limitations
Identifying each aspect of critical systems and assets that require a certain level of protection is paramount to safeguarding them and establishing remedial actions that correspondto each vulnerability. Defenders can use security assessments to identify actions to reduce
the risk whenever security gaps occur. Sometimes a collective effort is necessary to close
those gaps and provide an analysis process to determine the best solution. A holistic view ofprogram management is important, as well as developing operational compliance standards
along the way. Many SF commanders have attempted to implement a modernized methodof base security; however, this is not codified across the Air Force. In addition, SF commanders seeking to change the security response efforts must rely on installation commander
approval to accept any risk associated with deviation from requirements.
The adaptable capabilities of terrorism have brought a whole new arena of threats, whichhave forced comprehensive strategies that have interconnections between different geographic locations. Furthermore, not all terrorist traffic and communication are detectable.
The more contemporary methods that inspire lone-­wolf actors and sympathizers to carryout hostile attacks against soft targets make prevention even more challenging. These
threats in the United States and globally have dramatically increased, and of course many
terrorist organizations have acted on them.
Military installations have seen more than their share of insider attacks and lone-­wolf
shooters as well. Notable attacks on military installations have revealed weaknesses insecurity capabilities and the need for a restructured methodology to prevent hostile internal attacks in addition to external ones. Nidal Hasan’s Fort Hood attack in 2009 marked
the beginning of “a new adaptation challenge for the Defense Department: rethinking
what ‘force protection’ meant.”12 This attack style further shows the need to preemptively
address security limitations rather than wait for a significant event to occur.
The military has encouraged and mandated active-­shooter training and preparedness
across base populations. This strategy does help to foster a mindset shift in the event ofan active-­shooter attack. Nevertheless, significant responsibility for stopping an active
shooter and saving lives falls into the hands of Defenders. In active-­shooter attacks, every
second matters, and all too often, manning limitations impact the timeliness of responses.
Moreover, the available patrols may be directly allocated to priority resources. Realistically,
SF can employ an “all hands on deck” approach to these types of incidents and has, but
12. Amy Zegart, “Insider Threats and Organizational Root Causes: The 2009 Fort Hood Terrorist Attack,” Parameters 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 39, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  49

Optimizing Security Forces Operations

this is more the exception than the rule.13 Developing a strategy that allows a more flexible response capability to incidents can generate a rapid response to such high-­level incidents. Allowing Defenders to transition beyond their restrictive protection-­level post
limits expands SF’s capability to transition effectively when incidents occur.
Well-­developed mitigation plans help build a formidable defense against attack as theevolving environment demands operational efforts exceed the level of existing actual andperceived threats. More resilience in physical security and efficient operations is the ultimate goal; however, enhanced standards have not always translated to foolproof and viable protection methods for those military installations and assets that support national
defense. Still, enhanced standards and technology through layered defense allow Defenders to pursue other patrolling activities. Security Forces can utilize patrols as high-­visibility
deterrence, which helps increase the probability of detecting and deterring criminal acts
and security breaches. In addition, such patrolling activity can have secondary beneficial
effects by increasing public awareness of the installation and providing additional community enforcement services. This process takes dedicated response teams from static
positions and deploys them across a range of security responsibilities, thus increasing theircapability to defend the installation and still provide a response to high-­priority resources.

Conclusion

Defenders continually answer the call to serve our nation. Their dedication to duty helps
instill a feeling of safety throughout the installation and of assurance in the Air Forcemission. Providing a comprehensive approach to base defense requires examining appropriate strategies to help build a more effective security and policing framework.
Current security posting requirements are deeply rooted in headquarters policy and reduce
mission effectiveness at the installation level. Applying an intelligence-­driven operational
methodology allows Security Forces to transition from reactive strategies to a proactive
framework. Refining planning and risk-­management strategies against more sophisticatedthreats is necessary to organize SF manpower and acquire a complementary security
system. No single security strategy or detection system will work for every SF unit.
Therefore, defense force commanders should identify which methods of security complements and enables their mission without negatively impacting the quality of workforce
factors and the individual wellbeing of Defenders. 
13. Headquarters, DAF, Active Shooter, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS (Maxwell AFB, AL: Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, February 11, 2018),
https://static.e-­publishing.af.mil/.

50  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

FROM OUR FRIENDS

Remaining a Day-­One Player
The French Air and Space Force and the US Air ForceDavid Pappalardo
Andy Hamann

While roughly a tenth of the size of the US Air Force, the French Air and Space
Force (FASF) is considered by some to be the Air Force’s most near-­peer
partner—a fully capable, full-­spectrum air force, backed by the political willingness to act. Admittedly, France remains a junior partner to the United States in any
Washington-­led coalition, and asymmetry will remain a structural feature of the transatlantic tie for the foreseeable future.
In Allies That Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare, French professor of politicalscience Olivier Schmitt explains that the utility of a junior partner’s contribution depends
on “whether the junior partner has a high degree of standing in the international systemor on whether its military contribution is both integrated . . . and of a sufficient technological quality to cooperate with US forces.”1
Although a junior partner, France is an Ally that counts, as much as for its politicalstanding and willingness to use its forces abroad, as for the high-­end, full-­spectrum capability of its forces. This explains why French Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastien
Lecornu and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin signed a renewed joint statementin November 2022, reaffirming “the need to enhance our defense cooperation in order toenable our forces to jointly address the array of threats we face.”2This statement is also in line with former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General
Charles Q. Brown Jr.’s “Integrated by Design” approach, where the United States works
with its Allies and partners through the coordination of people, policies, and processes.
As Brown notes, Allies, including the FASF and the US Air Force, need to “collaborate

Colonel David Pappalardo, Armée de l’air et de l’espace, serves as the French Air and Space Force attaché in Washington, DC.
Colonel Andy Hamann, USAF, Retired, served as the US Air Force attaché in Paris, France, from July 2019 to August 2023.

1. Olivier Schmitt, Allies That Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 12, https://doi.org/.
2. Joint Statement of Intent between Mr. Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense of the United States ofAmerica and Mr. Sébastien Lecornu, Minister of the Armed Forces of the French Republic, signed November 30, 2022, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/.
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW   51Remaining a Day-­One Player

and make decisions together on interoperability, resource investment, information sharing,
force development, and strategy from the very beginning.”3
The French Air and Space Force has long been a day-­one player in coalitions andconflicts along with the US Air Force and has started to collaborate more closely with the
US Space Force. This relationship must not be taken for granted, because there is risk ofan interoperability gap between the two sides as increasing numbers of European nationsacquire the F-35 platform. As such, in today’s advanced coalition operations, the two airforces must keep pushing hard to operate effectively together in a consistent and mutually
reinforcing manner. Although progress continues, there is still many a slip ‘twixt the cup
and the lip to overcome the existing barriers.

Strong Partners AlreadyInteroperability: The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achievetactical, operational, and strategic objectives.4

As America’s oldest ally, France has a long history of cooperation with the United Statesthat it can continue to build on. Epitomized by American ace Eddie Rickenbacker, who,
during World War I, flew the French Nieuport 28 and the SPAD XIII in the “Hat-­in-­the-­Ring” Squadron, and Eugene Bullard, who joined France’s Lafayette Flying Corps in1916 as one of the first African American military pilots, the United States’ and France’s
combined aeronautical roots run deep.
Similarly, World War II saw French airmen at the controls of US warplanes, partnering
together across the breadth of air missions. More recently, operations in Iraq (1991),
Bosnia (1992–95), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2002–13), Libya (2011), and the Levant(since 2014) highlight that the French Air and Space Force and the US Air Force havecontinued this tradition of fighting alongside each other into the twenty-­first century.

Exercises and Operations
In Operation Hamilton in April 2018 the French Rafale held the overall mission commander role, with US Air Force B-1s, F-15s, F-16s, and F-22s along with Royal Air Force
Typhoons engaging in combined air strikes on Syria, following the use of chemical weapons
by the regime. This operation demonstrated the FASF’s day-­one player prowess and serves
as a model of interoperability, both in the planning and in execution of real-­world present-­
day kinetic warfare, albeit without a credible air or ground defense from the adversary.
3. Mackenzie Eaglen and Charles Q. Brown Jr., “Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. on Air Force Defense
Strategy and Innovation,” American Enterprise Institute, August 29, 2022, YouTube video, 58:02, https://
youtu.be/; and Charles Q. Brown Jr., keynote address, Global Air & Space Chiefs’ Conference, London, UK,
July 2022, 2, https://www.af.mil/.
4. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms(Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 2021), 110, https://irp.fas.org/.
52  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Pappalardo & Hamann

In both the US Central Command and US Africa Command areas of responsibility,
the French Air and Space Force is performing combat operations and conducting combat
support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and tactical airlift missions throughout these theaters in close collaboration with the US Air Force and US Joint forces.
Additionally, since 2018 the FASF has annually sent Rafale fighters, KC-135s, A330
multi-­role tanker transports (MRTTs) air-­to-­air refueling aircraft, and its new A400M
airlift aircraft to the US Indo-­Pacific Command area of responsibility to perform high-­
intensity training in French territories as well as training, security cooperation, and strategic
messaging, much like its US counterpart. In 2021, the FASF conducted the HEIFARA
mission, which sent three Rafales, two A400Ms, and two A330 MRTTs to French Polynesia in less than 48 hours and immediately generated fighter sorties after a projection of morethan 17,000 kilometers. After this initial phase, the FASF conducted air maneuvers with
US Pacific Air Force’s F-22As during WAKEA exercises to increase interoperability.
In July 2023, the FASF conducted the annual PEGASE mission, which consisted ofan airpower projection of 18,000 kilometers in the Indo-­Pacific region with 10 Rafale, 4A-400M, 5 MRTTs, and 320 airmen. The crews departed France on June 25 and reachedsoutheast Asia in 30 hours.
Notably, the FASF took part in the Mobility Guardian exercise in Guam and flew with
US Pacific Air Force’s F-35 during Northern Edge 23-2 to reinforce their interoperability. Three of the Rafales deployed in Guam landed in Palau on July 7 for exercises in
distributed operations and agile combat employment and to strengthen cooperation.
In addition, the French Air and Space Force engaged with other French partners
throughout the region, with security cooperation stops in Singapore, Malaysia, the United
Arab Emirates, South Korea, Japan, and the French territories in the South Pacific, intending to strengthen France’s cooperation in the Pacific region while supporting its citizens
and interests, per its Ministry of Armed Forces’ Indo-­Pacific policy.

Further Bilateral Cooperation
Overall, the two air forces share a common strategic vision that uncontested air
dominance is no longer assured. As such, they must adapt to win in highly contested
environments and contribute effectively to the joint warfighting effort. Beyond exercises
and operations, the current operational framework of bilateral cooperation includes operational engagement talks with proposals for a similar construct in the A5 plans andrequirements lane as well as annual vice air chief talks.
Strong synergies exist between US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and the FASF, particularly in USAFE’s 603rd Air Operations Center and the FASF’s command and control
node in Lyon—the Commandement de la défense aérienne et des opérations aériennes—
reinforced by a trilateral France-­United Kingdom-­United States (FRUKUS) air force
partnership. In 2021, for instance, under this trilateral strategic initiative, France hosted
an Atlantic Trident exercise with 12 US Air Force F-35s at a French airbase for over amonth, the first time F-35s operated from a non-­F-35 country. In the fall of 2023, theAIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  53

Remaining a Day-­One Player

UK will host the next Atlantic Trident exercise, featuring F-35s and Rafales employing
advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures in a full spectrum of mission sets.
France and the United States have also long been partners in the space domain. France
is considered a top priority by the US Space Command in terms of cooperative efforts.
Indeed, France has capabilities and a strong industrial basis all along the space spectrum,
not to mention strategic locations throughout the globe that serve as useful real estate forground-­based space situational awareness capabilities. Most importantly France and theUnited States “have a common assessment of threats and share the ambition to confront
them accordingly,” as recalled in the November 2022 joint statement of intent.5 For allthese reasons, France and the United States are constantly enhancing their cooperationin the space domain and have since 2009 “leveraged the Space Cooperation Forum toadvance shared objectives, such as information-­sharing, developing mutual education andtraining opportunities, and building towards combined operations.”6

Balancing Integration with Autonomy
If the French Air and Space Force is to continue to play its part, it must not be complacent nor rest on its laurels. By the same token, the US Air Force must strive to make
Brown’s integrated by design imperative a reality rather than an aspiration that does nothold under scrutiny. These parallel efforts are paramount to overcome the existing barriers
to a deeper and wider collaboration.
First, the word integration may be understood differently from the two sides of theAtlantic. As Brown explained during the September 2022 International Air Chiefs
Conference in Washington, DC, “ ‘Integrated by Design’ is the US Air Force’s approachto developing people, policies, and processes, starting with Allies and Partners in mind.”7
The core idea is not new, but the approach emphasizes execution rather than discussions
to “collaborate and make decisions together on interoperability, resource investment, information sharing, force development and strategy from the very beginning.”8 In otherwords, it aims to increase integration at institutional and tactical levels, to maintain theleading edge over competitors. France is of course supportive of this philosophy and iseager to see it become a reality, as evidenced by the signing of the aforementioned jointstatement of intent.
But integration also entails industrial risks for France as a junior partner—albeit a very
important one—to the United States when integration and interoperability consist ofproviding Allies and partners with more American military equipment. This is why France
is careful about the concept of interchangeability, a term coined by UK Chief of the
5.
6.
7.
2022.
8.

Joint Statement of Intent.
Joint Statement of Intent.
Charles Q. Brown Jr., speech, International Air Chiefs Conference, Washington, DC, September 15,
Brown, keynote address, 2.

54  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Pappalardo & Hamann

Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin to refer to moving “beyond interoperability” into
an area of greater sharing and synergy.9
Admittedly, interchangeability would be “the holy grail of tactical integration because
it would dramatically ease the burden of planning coalition operations,” but it would alsocome with a high level of dependence vis-­à-­vis the United States.10 In addition, US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) complicate cooperation between France
and the United States at the industrial level, because they limit the exchange of technicaldata and give the United States a vote on France’s arms sales policy.
In short, these regulations and the ever-increasing US defense industrial muscle shedlight on the difficulty for France in overcoming the conundrum between a better integration with the United States in all warfighting domains and the preservation of its strategic autonomy. The latter must not be understood in terms of decoupling, but rather ofself-­sufficiency—that is, the ability to provide more resources and the willingness to takeon more responsibilities for its own defense. Indeed, a state can be part of an alliance andyet be seeking self-­reliance in the face of new threats and security issues. As Florence Parly,
former French minister of armed forces, stated, “Hesitating between strategic autonomy
and Atlantic alliance is a bit like asking a child if he prefers his mother or his father.”11
For France, interoperability with the United States in particular is essential to be able
to continue to operate together seamlessly like both nations have over the last 100 years.
One of the biggest challenges for the FASF will be to remain a day-­one player with the
US Air Force while preserving its ability to act independently, when necessary, especiallyin the nuclear deterrent mission.
Yet this challenge is daunting with the significant acquisition of the F-35 acrossEurope, which makes it more difficult for France, as the FASF will not operate Lockheed
Martin’s flagship. There are currently over 150 F-35s in the European theater, with wellover 500 more planned for the region. Interoperability with the French Rafale andRafale exports is critical for coalition operations. It is a challenge for France; it is achallenge for NATO. As the retired French Vice Chief of the Air Staff General FrédéricParisot regularly warned, with the resurgence of near-­peer competitors, NATO cannot
afford to have divided airpower—between the F-35 community and the others—within
the current operating environment.
Added to this current challenge of interoperability between the French Rafale frontline
fighter, the growing F-35-capable nations, and the Joint all-­domain command and control/
9. Richard R. Burgess, “U.S., UK. Naval Leaders Cite Advances in Interchangeability,” Seapower Magazine, October 20, 2020, https://seapowermagazine.org/.
10. Stacie Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser, No I in Team: Integrated Deterrence with Allies and Partners (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, December 2022), 11–12, https://s3.us-­east-1.amazonaws.com/; and Megan Eckstein, “U.S., U.K. Navies Working to Achieve ‘Interchangeability’ in Carrier Forces,
Collaboration on Unmanned and AI,” US Naval Institute, October 20, 2020, https://news.usni.org/.
11. Florence Parly, minister of the armed forces of France (statement, Defence Summer Universities,
Paris, France, September 2018).
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Remaining a Day-­One Player

advanced battle management systems command and control networks is the fact that boththe United States and France are working on the next generation of fighter, commandand control, and networked systems-­of-­systems. It is critical that these advanced systems
are not developed without integrating by design from the start.

New Framework
The time has come to focus on implementation. In September 2023, the FASF and US
Air Force signed a letter of intent “that elevates and intensifies cooperation across thebilateral spectrum to help achieve integration by design.”12 More specifically, Generals
Stéphane Mille and Brown decided to strengthen their cooperation along several lines ofengagement to face the challenges ahead, enhance day-­zero interoperabilty, be ready to
win as a team in highly contested air and space environments, and contribute effectively
to the joint warfighting effort.
The first line of engagment concerns bringing in the concept of partner interoperability at the beginning—at strategy and doctrine development, well before aircraft are fielded.
Indeed, interoperability is not only about technology and datalinks.
Future operational concepts and analysis through efforts such as wargames, scenarios,
table-­top exercises, or combined planning can help fix the gap in mutual understanding
and include discussions of theories of airpower. Far from being exhaustive, the list ofconcepts includes (1) human-­to-­autonomy teaming; (2) collaborative combat aircraft;(3) resilient basing and agile combat employment; (4) Joint all-­domain command andcontrol and advanced battle management systems; and (5) near-­space operations.
Concerning the last issue, China’s spy balloon that floated across the United States inearly February 2023 could introduce a new avenue of cooperation between the US Air
Force and the FASF, as France is about to release its strategy of Higher Airspace Operations—operations within the unregulated near-­space area—while at the same time
President Joseph Biden has announced that an interagency review is underway “to study
the broader policy implications for detection, analysis, and disposition of unidentified
aerial objects that pose either safety or security risks.”13
Also, information-sharing is vital to the success of multinational and bilateral operations,as discussed earlier. Consequently, the FASF and US Air Force can work on overcoming
institutional barriers to change the information-­sharing paradigm to allow more routine
operational exchange of information.
12. Charles Q. Brown Jr. (@GenCQBrownJr), “I was very pleased to join my French counterpart, Gen.
Stéphane Mille,” X (Twitter), September 19, 2023, 8:01 a.m., https://twitter.com/.
13. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-­Pierre and National Security Council Coordinatorfor Strategic Communications John Kirby,” White House (website), February 13, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/; and Christina Mackenzie, “France Considering Options for ‘Unexploited’ Higher Airspace Region,” Breaking Defense, January 13, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/.
56  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Pappalardo & Hamann

The two services acknowledge the dual value of common exercises, both for readinessand strategic signalling. As such, they can better synchronize planning whenever it ispossible and desirable. The French Air and Space Force’s participation in the recent US
Indo-­Pacific Command-­led Large Scale Global Exercise 2023 offered a threefold opportunity that was capitalized on: increase interoperability, test agile combat employment
concepts with US Pacific Air Forces, and signal France’s commitment to protect its interests in the region. Atlantic Trident 2023 and other future exercises offer similar opportunities in the European theater.
Education and training are also critical lines of effort—whether through professional
military education, combined training, or specific courses—as well as expanding exchange
and liaison officers’ positions within each other’s operational units and staffs.
Additionally, the US Air Force and FASF could strengthen their cooperation in termsof capability development (including innovation) in relationships between, for example,
the French Procurement Agency and US Air Force/A5, and within the joint Cooperative
Oversight of Programs process to consider the incorporation of each other’s priorities,
technology, and systems much earlier in the development process, such as with the French
Future Combat Air System/Next Generation Fighter and the US Air Force’s next generation fighter as well as other advanced and future systems.
In parallel, the FASF and the US Space Force and US Space Command will continue
to advance partnerships in the framework of the terms of reference signed in 2022 todevelop information-­sharing at increased levels of security classification, establish mutual
education and training opportunities, and build towards combined operation in space.

Conclusion
The French Air and Space Force and the US Air Force must continue working together
to be more integrated by design. Yet integration does not mean assimilation, and FASF
will have to balance the need to strengthen integration with the preservation of its autonomy, for nuclear deterrence, for its industrial policy, and in terms of strategic signaling.
Admittedly, as the authors know and have witnessed, France is a demanding Ally, but it
is reliable as much for its capabilities as for its will to use force when necessary.
This is particularly true in the air and space domains where France is—and must stay—a day-­one player alongside the United States. In short, France and the United States must
continue to foster comprehensive reflection on air and space domains, discuss threats andchallenges, and above all, put forward concrete policy orientations. To hedge against amore demanding future, four key words must shape strategic thinking: readiness, preparedness, sustainability, and interoperability.
The new framework, signed this September, is an opportunity to nourish ourselves oneach other’s experiences and perspectives in order to facilitate future military engagement
and protect common security interests. France and the United States can only be stronger
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  57

Remaining a Day-­One Player

together. In the words of the famous French airman and writer Antoine de Saint-­Exupéry,“There is only fertile the great collaboration of the one through the other.”14 Q
14. Antoine de Saint Exupéry, Citadelle (Paris: Gallimard, 1948).

58  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

BOOK REVIEWS

The Air War in Vietnam

Michael E. Weaver. Texas Tech University Press, 2022, 640 pp.

Just when you think you have read all there is to know about the war in Vietnam, particularly the
air war there, a skilled academician—in this instance Michael E. Weaver—pens a persuasive historical tome using previously classified materials and documentary policy evidence in a new comprehensive work. Weaver, currently an associate professor of history at the US Air Force’s Air Commandand Staff College at the Air University in Alabama, breaks down his analysis of the air war via six
mission sets: aerial refueling, air superiority, reconnaissance, airlift, close air support, and coercion
and interdiction. Rather than plow old ground, Weaver skillfully looks at each of these mission sets
not through the lens of sortie counts, missions flown, and bombs dropped—which have been argued
to be the worst measures of success in this war, and any war for that matter—but via true effectiveness markers grounded in the mission objectives of the specific campaign or operation and filteredthrough the lens of US policy goals for the overall war. In this context, The Air War in Vietnam is aunique and new contribution to the historical account.
Shortly after beginning the book, most readers will intuit the notion that the Air Force’s use of
airpower in the prosecution of the war was mostly successful. It was the waging of the war as awhole that was a failure, and Weaver soberly sets out establishing why. With effectiveness as thebook’s unifying theme—the author rightly notes how he and his colleagues “wrestle constantly”
with this, as there is no agreed-­upon definition of effectiveness—Weaver posits that America
simply forgot the lessons of its past fighting victories. The total war mentality leading to WorldWar II’s triumph was a high-­water mark that was never to be reached again because of restrictions
placed on potential targets. In numerous cases time and again, Weaver explains how field commanders were prohibited from attacking not only specific general target categories, but also specific targets themselves. Airspace constraints, too, limited airpower’s effective reach and power
because of limitations shackling air commanders. Limitations that might incite overt involvementby the Soviet Union and China were assiduously avoided at nearly all costs, which resulted in the
micromanagement we are all familiar with, and sadly, in a war that fell short of national goals.
As noted previously, Weaver uses established policy goals outlined in the State Department’s
Foreign Relations of the United States series to specifically link air operations to national policy andstrategy goals, something never done before in scholarship. This dynamic is often overlooked in
narrow examinations of war histories and analysis because the two are inextricably linked and atreatment of one is not complete without the other. As a strategist and former commandant of the
US National War College, the premier Joint and interagency strategy war college, I teach mystudents to think about strategy as Weaver would. Holistic approaches that incorporate and analyze all the instruments of power and their interrelationship along with the war’s ends, ways, andmeans, while assessing costs and risks, is a proven methodology for analyzing success in the
broader context of national security strategy, which is exactly what Weaver has accomplished here.
Weaver explains the Vietnam War at its core as a siege of North Vietnam. Paring back his evidence and arguments reveals the truth of that supposition as the United States prosecuted a containment strategy in the hopes it would not expand into open conflict with the North’s satellite patrons.
As strategically sound as this idea may have been, its execution was akin to fighting with both hands
tied behind the back, and it frittered away the tactical and operational gains made on a regular basis.
For example, when a US bombing campaign or other supporting operation had the North on theropes, policy dictated a pull back or cease-­fire to allow for negotiations to take place. This would often
result in the North promising to negotiate a certain peace it never intended to keep while it generated forces for the next battle. This cycle repeated itself numerous times during the war, and theUnited States never learned, let alone applied, this lesson. Weaver notes that as a result of the existential way the North fought to survive and win, the United States was never going to win because
limited war always results in limited outcomes—and that is exactly what happened.
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Ultimately, for the United States, Vietnam contributed to larger Cold War geopolitical goals,
according to Weaver. Over hundreds of meticulously researched pages, he aptly demonstrates thisnuanced point. America needs to realize yet again that limited war prosecution will often result in
limited results, and that if victory is truly the purpose, defining goals and objectives more narrowly
in the context of participation is a requirement that can never be overlooked. This book will add
measurably to the historical record and is a must-­read for all Vietnam War and airpower enthusiasts and scholars.
Brigadier General Chad T. Manske, USAF, Retired

The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during
World War II
Alexander G. Lovelace. University Press of Kansas, 2022, 400 pp.

Alexander G. Lovelace, a scholar at the Contemporary History Institute of Ohio University,
has made an excellent contribution to history with The Media Offensive: How the Press and Public
Opinion Shaped Allied Strategy during World War II. This book argues that in their concern overpublic opinion, the media—encompassing print, radio, and reporting by uniformed personnel—
and the military significantly influenced strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of warfare.
This proved particularly true in the case of the US Army, which encompasses Lovelace’s focus
of investigation. In essence, he claims that nationalizing warfare on an industrial scale carried the
public into the conflict simultaneously as participants and stakeholders. This caused World War II
to witness a “media revolution,” where the power and speed of radio, print, and movies “massively
increased” media influence over the population (18). Lovelace argues that maintaining public support via the news developed into a national line of effort influencing many important decisions in
the Pacific and European theaters, a trend which previous scholars have understudied.
The book generally works chronologically from the outbreak of the war in 1941 through thedefeat of Germany in 1945. The examples are primarily from the European theater, although
General Douglas MacArthur’s use of media outlets to influence popular US opinion to support
his return to the Philippines is also discussed. Lovelace claims the media had a symbiotic relationship with the military and each used the other—the military to gain support on the home front,
and the media to write stories that captured the nation’s attention. Yet since both the military’s andthe public’s common goal remained the defeat of the Axis, these interests between the populationand state aligned. For example, to better serve the public’s desires, the US military conducted operations like the Doolittle Raid, the invasion of North Africa, and the seizure of Rome—indirect
and perhaps inefficient uses of resources, but operations which nevertheless demonstrated its ability to respond to threats quickly and with success in a way the American public appreciated.
Throughout the text, Lovelace analyzes the strategic decisions of historical figures, such as
George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and many other generals. Lovelace
argues that total war facilitated an evolution in the perceived prominence of media stories due tothe importance of public support required to prosecute such wars. Consequently, news stories influenced military decision-­making to a point not previously experienced in American history.
In the final section, Lovelace argues that the close bond between the US Army and the American media that developed during World War II would not carry on to later limited wars, like theproxy wars utilized to combat communism on the Korean Peninsula or in Indochina in the 1950s
and 1960s. These Cold War conflicts resulted in a strained relationship of distrust between the
military and the media. Instead, the media grew to be skeptical of the information provided by the
military, which was perceived as deceptive propaganda. Meanwhile, military leaders came to disdain reporters as biased and self-­serving. The contrast with the earlier dynamics might leave thereader to believe the media/military relationship was irreversibly altered following World War II.
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Yet the prospect of total war remains in the twenty-­first century, as demonstrated by the Russian
war in Ukraine. As such, this book provides lessons still applicable to today and the future.
Although The Media Offensive is an excellent read, there are a few limiting aspects of thiswork. Lovelace admits that his study does not include the media’s influence over Marine Corps
operations in the Pacific, a topic rich with scholarly opportunities and iconic moments. Perhaps
he might return to that subject in a future project. He also confesses that the media’s influence
over combat operations had limits and was not always the decisive factor in the decisions made.
Correspondingly, the narration often describes the many factors influencing decisions without
clarifying if military objectives or media publicity had the greater effect on the decided outcomes. This makes it difficult for the reader to assess exactly what influence the media—or
public opinion—had or if certain strategic decisions simply made practical military sense. Additionally, while the introduction and the conclusion are written masterfully, some of the chapters’ content reads more like a narration of events rather than an analysis providing the same
powerful arguments exemplified in the beginning and closing portions. Nevertheless, Lovelace
does circle back in at least one chapter to draw out his main arguments about media influence,
which provides an enhanced and scholarly perspective on those events. This methodology might
have worked better if used throughout.
This book will prove interesting to a wide audience. Consequently, I highly recommend it forhistory buffs but also for current practitioners of military science as well as international affairs
and political science. The lessons revealed about how the media can influence military decision-­making can be applied as a case study to compare with other periods of time. Lovelace only briefly
utilizes this methodology in his short comparison with the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In
contrast, there remains ample opportunity to examine this nascent time frame in World War II
and the application of those lessons learned in the modern era, an age where the term “media” hasbecome so prolific and influential that it increasingly requires numerous qualifiers to define. Radio,
print media, and film have been compounded with other digital forms, like social media, social
networking, and social medium platforms, to name a few. In short, this work enters into a richacademic space with further opportunities to explore. Lovelace’s contribution will prove foundational to future studies on strategic influence.
Robert S. Burrell, PhD

The Polar Pivot: Great Power Competition in the Arctic and Antarctica
Ryan Patrick Burke. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2022, 261 pp.

In 1947, America was beginning to reckon with an Arctic paradox. The polar reaches were atonce a valuable strategic location for the United States and also a site of American vulnerability.
The first chief of staff of the nascent US Air Force, General Carl Spaatz, described this paradox:“Through the Arctic, every industrialized country is within reach of our strategic air. America issimilarly exposed. We are, in fact, wide open at the top.”1 Ryan Patrick Burke’s new monograph,
The Polar Pivot, revisits this opportunity/vulnerability dichotomy. Burke shows that today, more sothan in the period following World War II, the polar regions should be a primary focus of American security discourse because they are the most likely venues for competition and conflict.
Burke brings an impressive resume and background knowledge to the task of redefining thestrategic importance of the polar regions. He is currently a professor and deputy department headin the Military & Strategic Studies department at the US Air Force Academy, where he is the
1. James Reston, “Pact with Canada Affirms Agreed Defense Principle: Stations Were Discussed Last
Summer, but Appropriation Has Been an Issue,” New York Times, February 13, 1947, 17.
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research director for the Homeland Defense Institute, its joint partnership with US Northern
Command. Since January 2021 he has been the co-­director of the Modern War Institute at West
Point’s Project 6633, a platform for discussion and debate about polar security. The publication of
Burke’s book coincides with that of his Project 6633 co-­director, Elizabeth Buchanan. While
Buchanan’s work focuses on Russia’s Arctic strategy under President Vladimir Putin, Burke’s bookoutlines the threats to US security in the polar regions from both Russia and China while also
proposing a strategy for the United States to adopt. One of the main contributions of Burke’s
research to the body of scholarly debate is to describe the security considerations in the Antarctic
and the Arctic, the former often neglected in favor of the latter.
Burke’s overall argument is that the high latitudes should be more of a focus for international
security dialogue as both will likely become contested geographies in the future. In support of thisoverall point, he makes three subordinate claims. First, he claims that the polar regions are not
newly relevant but have historically been geopolitically significant. Burke describes the relevant
recent history of great power competition in the Arctic and Antarctic—a useful exercise which
grounds his later theorization and recommendations in a historical context. His chronological accounting highlights the ways in which the liberal order and its international institutions provided
security and rules-­based norms during the Cold War. He takes this approach to contrast the ways
in which America’s revisionist peer competitors challenge those norms today.
Burke’s second claim establishes why the polar regions are so important. To this end he evaluates certain categories that will be more influential than others in terms of future polar security.
Through an alliterative device that anchors his independent variables, he describes the “four polarCs” of regional security: commons, claims, covenants, and cosmos. Burke defines the commons as“regions of shared access and activity” and asserts that freedom of action within the commons is
an enduring American interest (46). While the United States was distracted by other geopoliticalevents during the preceding 20 years, Russia and China have leveraged advantages created bywarming oceans to challenge free and open access to the polar regions. Some of the ways in whichthose states do so is through territorial claims of ownership. Burke argues that contrary to theliberal internationalist contention, international institutions like the Arctic Council and Antarctic
Treaty are not sufficiently credible to maintain the status quo.2 This is because no mechanism is inplace to ensure compliance. Thus, he argues, the resulting international agreements are groundedin wishful thinking.
Burke states that Russia and China will become economically incentivized to break international laws and customs in accordance with neorealist theory, which posits that states pursue
power amidst the anarchy of the international system. Burke argues that the United States must
be prepared to secure its own interests because America exists within a state system where no legally binding agreements will prevent its enemies from pursuing what is in their own national
interests. Therefore, Burke suspects that the covenants—his third C—may be less useful in the
future than they were during the Cold War period of liberal hegemony. Burke’s cosmos, his fourthC, refers to the celestial commons where he sees increasing competition for access, specificallywith respect to the polar infrastructure that allows for space-­based communication capabilities.
Burke’s third claim is that some states will have greater influence in the polar regions than others and that they have agendas which are evident from their present behavior. He delineates theinternational players, grouping them into a typology consisting of four categories depending on
intent, comprised of posture and policy, and capability, comprised of presence and power. According to this distribution, only three states fall into the polar power category denoting the strongest
2. G. John Ikenberry, “Why American Power Endures: The U.S.-Led Order Isn’t in Decline,” Foreign
Affairs, November 1, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.
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powers: China, Russia, and the United States. One strength of Burke’s analysis is that it avoids
simply grouping China and Russia together. While both are dissatisfied with a status quo thatfavors the United States, they have divergent motivations and goals. This nuanced presentationsuggests that different policy approaches may be necessary depending on the region (Arctic versus
Antarctic) and actor (China versus Russia).
The pivot in the title of Burke’s work recalls the Mackinderian phrase familiar to political geographers, that the so-­called Eurasian heartland represented decisive terrain around which the
future of the world order pivoted.3 Perhaps a more fitting allusion, however, is to the would-­be“Pacific pivot” of the Obama administration.4 Burke argues that the United States should turn its
attention geographically from Europe and the Pacific but also intellectually from its default inclination toward liberal approaches to international relations.
In place of this approach, Burke suggests a transactional style of international politics alignedwith the neorealist playbook. This, he argues, will prevent America from falling into a Thucydideanpolar trap. A strength of this approach is that it moves the United States from a knee-­jerk militaristic response yet allows America to still demonstrate its assertiveness and leadership. One outstanding
question with Burke’s recommendation, however, is whether this policy prescription will result in
Russia and China willingly assuming the status of a subaltern power. The answer to this question
may deal more with whether the United States is in close competition with China, as Burke suggests,
or whether it retains unchallenged unipolarity, as others argue in the neorealist camp.5
Perhaps the strongest point in Burke’s presentation is that it avoids becoming mired in a climate debate and instead takes anthropogenic change as a given. Rather than debating the science
he substitutes two relevant questions: 1) What are the geopolitical security implications for all
countries of a warmer Earth?; and 2) What should the United States do about it? To the first question, Burke believes the most pressing implication will be the rush to secure economic interests in
newly navigable areas of the North and South Poles. To the second, Burke recommends the UnitedStates develop a realistic polar strategy now, while it can, rather than later, when it must (202).
The framework of Burke’s polar pivot strategy encompasses what he calls projection, protection, prevention, and preservation. Of these four, the most fully articulated is projection, which heargues will allow the United States to demonstrate its commitment to the region. To this end,
Burke proposes somewhat counterintuitive suggestions—for example, to stop focusing on building icebreakers, and instead build ships with ice-­hardened hulls—and other novel ideas. To thelatter point, Burke articulates an interesting idea to create a new US Polar Command or POLCOM that would encompass territory above and below 60 degrees latitude north and south. This
new combatant command would cover two independent areas of responsibility and address what
Burke sees as a design flaw in the current unified command plan. According to Burke, the plan iscluttered in the North and confusing in the South due to competing responsibilities amongst current regional combatant commands.
The Polar Pivot is an important, interesting, well-­researched, well-­reasoned, and logically argued
presentation of an increasingly important and often neglected geopolitical region. Burke presents
rational arguments in support of his transactional approach, which fits comfortably within the current scholarly debate about where the United States should invest its attention and finite resourcesin a world of strategic competition. In contrast with authors who point to the Indo-­Pacific, or others
3. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Putting Mackinder in His Place: Material Transformations and Myth,” Political
Geography 11, no. 1 (1992), https://doi.org/.
4. “Pacific Pivot,” Harvard Political Review, November 2, 2012, https://harvardpolitics.com/.
5. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power’s Staying Power,” Foreign Affairs, April 18, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.
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who suggest Europe, Burke makes a compelling case that the future of great power competition will
be in the polar extremes. It then follows that the United States should begin planning and posturing
for strategic competition there today. Burke’s blueprint for American polar defense, security orientation, and influence is a vital contribution to this important debate.
Lieutenant Colonel James M. Davitch, USAF, PhD

U.S. Go Home: The U.S. Military in France, 1945–1968

M. David Egan and Jean Egan. Schiffer Publishing, 2022, 608 pp.

U.S. Go Home is a twofold adventure for readers. First, it offers a nuanced view of life for
Americans in post-­World War II France, as known on a personal level by authors M. David Egan
and Jean Egan. David Egan was stationed at Trois-­Fontaines in northeastern France as commander of the 39th Ordnance Company in the early 1960s. Second, it is a thoroughly-­sourced
monograph, as the Egans channel Edward Gibbon and his six-­volume work, The History of the
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, to detail and then detail some more the who, what, where,
and when of the US military presence in a country that was the keystone of European Cold War
defense. At 608 pages, the level of such detail is both extraordinary and pedantic. Indeed, as an
example, a reader learns the address of the dependent school at Fontainebleau (Villa Lavaurs at
88, rue St.-Honoré), the cost of a school lunch there in 1952 (30 cents), and how and where
American student drivers were tested (“In Spring 1966, Compagnie républicaine de sécurité personnel arranged red and white striped traffic cones to form a large figure-­eight driving circuit behind
the warehouse and hospital buildings at Lariboisiére”) (201).
Unfortunately, however, the why is lacking. Why did France force the United States to leave inthe late 1960s, after nearly two decades of infrastructure and supply buildup following World War
II? The subject of strategic cooperation is broached in the second chapter of the book, where theauthors discuss the American and Allied decision to station US troops permanently in Europe andrearm Europe to deter the Soviet Union, and the essential leadership of General Dwight Eisenhower to the nascent NATO buildup. In a war with the Soviets, NATO expected to have to fallback to the Rhine River and launch a counterattack through France’s Rhône valley. As for specificity on why the United States was in France, the chapter begins with analytical promise: “Theenormous US Army logistics system and the US Air Force’s forward-­based, nuclear-­capable jet
aircraft that would be located in France were essential components of the military strength of the
new [NATO]” (31). Yet any further discussion of the Franco-­American relationship and its deterioration is postponed until the book’s final chapter.
In that chapter, the authors chronicle the United States’ abrupt change in direction to conclude
in its forced withdrawal from France. Likewise, the Egans themselves make an abrupt change:
whereas, seemingly every installation, exercise, and daily life anecdote are covered in minutiae fornearly 500 pages, an analysis of why French President Charles de Gaulle ordered the withdrawal
is a mere four pages. The reader learns that a series of social and political blunders and miscommunications, including French concerns about sovereignty infringements and the US closing of
27 installations in France, resulted in de Gaulle announcing on March 7, 1966, that the UnitedStates must be out of France by April 1, 1967. Interestingly, de Gaulle’s demand matched Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s own plan to withdraw US forces from France.
In Operation FRELOC (“fast relocation”), the United States faced an unprecedented challenge: withdrawing more than 70,000 personnel and dependents, relocating 728,000 tons of matériel, rebasing more than 180 Air Force aircraft, closing more than 190 installations, and moving
eight headquarters. The Egans conclude that Operation FRELOC was successful “[b]y most measures” (508). They also offer 10 reasons why the withdrawal weakened the defense of Europe, themain reason being lost strategic depth.
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Book Reviews

Despite the omission of the rationale behind the US withdrawal, the book—titled after communist propaganda from a Korean War disinformation campaign—provides a well-­researchedhistory of the US military in France. The first chapter sets the stage by describing the damage fromWorld War II, the redeployment and occupation of US troops, and the Berlin blockade and airlift.
The Korean War and its impact on US forces is highlighted, but notably and seemingly unnecessarily, the Soviet-­American air war in Korea is introduced to the unsuspecting reader. The chapter
concludes with the formation of NATO and the 1948 bilateral agreement to station US troops inFrance. The latter is stated as fact with the analysis confined to a sentence: “France . . . was militarily weak and depended on NATO and the United States for its security” (28).
The authors then highlight the importance of France. With its Atlantic ports and distancefrom the Soviet Union, France was to “become the operational headquarters and logistical hub forthe defense of the West” (67). Interestingly, but perhaps unnecessarily, the third chapter diverts tochronicle the training and Atlantic crossing of 1950s Army personnel. France offered 39 Armyand 21 Air Force locations to the United States to establish a permanent presence. France was also
instrumental to NATO war plans, as it approved the locations for 14 dispersed operating bases,
which had the purpose of preventing the Soviets from destroying entire wings. Chapter 4 thenturns to the struggle in terms of labor, materials, and political disputes to construct US militaryfacilities and infrastructure in France.
In chapter 5, the Egans provide a historical account of the selection of Camp des Loges for US
European Command headquarters, the service of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and the US
diplomatic, military presence in the Paris area. Chapter 6 focuses on the establishment of Allied
Air Forces Central Europe at Camp Guynemer in Avon and Allied Forces Central Europe at
Fontainebleau. NATO routinely conducted exercises to practice aerial combat, nuclear bombing
runs, and coordinated air-­land operations. The chapter concludes with de Gaulle notifying NATOin 1966 that France would withdraw from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.
Chapter 7 is about military installations at Orléans, including the US Army Communications
Zone (ComZ) headquarters at Caserne Coligny, an organized zone of logistical installations designed to support forward-­based combat troops in Germany. Chapter 8 details the location andpurpose of medical facilities in France, including the construction of dual-­purpose standby hospitals—
barracks and classrooms during peacetime and hospital wards during wartime—and the subsequent haggling over the sale price of those hospitals as the United States withdrew from France
in 1967.
Chapter 9 focuses on the Advance Section, tasked to supply US troops during a crisis. The
chapter starts with the section’s establishment of its headquarters at Caserne Maginot in Verdun
and then describes the dozen major depots extending eastward from Vitry-­le-­François to Metz.
Chapter 10 covers the west coast of France, where military officials planned to use ports at Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes, Brest, Cherbourg, and Lorient to offload supplies in time of war.
Forty-­eight offshore discharge exercises were conducted to determine the best methods to quickly
offload and avoid Soviet targeting. The chapter includes an interesting diversion on the filming of
the war classic The Longest Day on an island off the coast of La Rochelle. Chapter 11 covers theBase Section installations, which included ports and depots in Bordeaux, La Rochelle, and Poitiers.
Base Section was responsible for supplying war reserves to Seventh Army in Germany.
Certainly, U.S. Go Home is an impressively researched monograph. No fact concerning logistics
or the individuals involved seems to be left out, as evident until the end with the book’s concluding
sentence: “First Lt Robert A. Hefferman, Commanding Officer of the 77th Trans Co from Ingrandes, rode ‘shotgun’ on the last FRELOC truck out of France” (519). The book is a culminationof more than 400 interviews and research from 50 archives. Most chapters have over 200 references, and the reference section of the book totals 63 pages.
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Yet to the dismay of any student of international relations or Cold War history, the overabundance of research does not carry over to the sentiment behind the book’s title, U.S. Go Home. Fourpages of analysis and one top 10 list represent a dearth of evidence for why the United States
withdrew from France. It is clear that the communists in France wanted the United States out, butthere is no mention of the impact of these domestic malcontents on de Gaulle’s decision-­making.
In fact, as noted, when the United States withdrew, there was a significant negative impact on the
French economy. The reader is left to fill in the gaps about why the United States went home: Wasde Gaulle’s decision based solely on US missteps? Or was it based on domestic political factors?
Or both? Perhaps it was part of de Gaulle’s grand strategy?
Still, in terms of the who, what, where, and when of the 22 years the US military was in France,
U.S. Go Home sets the standard. It is definitive, unmatched, and a necessary inclusion in the scholarship of military history.
Bradley F. Podliska, PhD

Modern South Korean Air Power: The Republic of Korea Air Force Today
Robin Polderman. Harpia Publishing, 2021, 256 pp.

Modern South Korean Air Power: The Republic of Korea Air Force Today by Robin Polderman
provides a detailed and timely look at the aircraft and armament used by the South Korean Air
Force in a region that is home to some of the most influential powers in the world. Since the early
1950s, the heavily industrialized nation of South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) has seen
steady growth and is now the world’s seventh-­largest exporter and 11th-­largest economy. As theCold War on the Korean Peninsula gathered momentum, the development of the Republic ofKorea Air Force (ROKAF) became one of the nation’s top priorities. While initially dependent on
the United States for its aircraft, South Korea’s aviation industry has matured rapidly, andROKAF’s use of indigenously manufactured equipment is on the rise. Since 1949, the ROKAF
has served as a core power of the republic’s national defense, and its importance has grown evenmore as twenty-­first century technology has helped level military playing fields around the region.
The nucleus of the ROKAF—officially established as an independent air force on October 1,
1949, by Presidential Decree No. 254—was formed by an air unit of the Department of Internal
Security, which received 10 Piper L-4 Grasshoppers on September 4, 1948, delivered straightfrom the United States and assembled by South Korean technicians, a foretaste of things to comefor many years. When the Korean War began five years after the republic’s independence when
North Korean armed forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the ROKAF could field no more than 22
aircraft, including the aforementioned L4s, and two additional L-5 Sentinel light observation
aircraft and 10 AT-6 Texan trainers imported from Canada. To help bolster the ROKAF, South
Korea was provided F-51D Mustangs, formerly known as P-51Ds, as US and UN air and groundforces began their drive against North Korean and eventually Chinese Communist forces backnorth across the 38th Parallel.
During the 1950s and ’60s the ROKAF was equipped with more modern jet aircraft like theF-86 Saber, F-4 Phantom, and F-5 Tiger fighters. Additionally, forward air control and short-­
range transport aircraft, a vital component to any in-­depth defense of the Korean Peninsula, werefielded to the ROKAF during this period. The Vietnam War, which saw the Republic of Korean
Army committed to ground operations in defense of South Vietnam, also saw the ROKAF support Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) forces with a transfer of 41 F-5s to the South Vietnamese Air Force. Since the 1980s, the ROKAF, organized and structured along US Air Forcelines, has participated in both internal defense, playing a standby role in the 1980 Gwangju student riots, and external operations, supporting coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War and Global
War on Terrorism in the Middle East. The ROKAF, manned by 65,000 personnel, operates a force
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Book Reviewsof 720 combat aircraft using both foreign and indigenous built airframes and defensive missile
systems, primarily as a strategic counter to its North Korean Air Force counterparts. Modern South
Korean Air Power highlights—through 177 high-­quality maps and photos, along with in-­depth
analysis—cover the full spectrum of ROKAF combat aviation power.
The author provides eight chapters and two appendices detailing ROKAF origins, the ROKAF
today, South Korea’s national airpower strategy over the Korean Peninsula and defense against its
near abroad interests like Communist China and Russia, ROKAF aircraft, and the future of ROKAF programs. Students of the ROKAF “Hot and Cold War” will note the author’s descriptionof ROKAF’s transition from exclusively American-­made aircraft sold, like the F-35, under termsof a mutual ROK-­US defense treaty to the procurement of Russian aircraft like the Kamov Ka-32
helicopter and the development of indigenous built aircraft like the Daewoo Heavy Industries
KT-1 Woongbi (“Great Leap” in Korean) trainer—a transition made to address both the age ofUS-­built aircraft and to reduce operating costs. The author’s approach highlights that while US
designs still dominate the ROKAF’s fleet, like a number of US long-­term Allies, South Korea istaking steps to diversify its force to produce and project a world-­class airpower.
Of particular interest to readers is the book’s detailed description of Korea Aerospace Industries and Indonesian Aerospace’s joint development program of the supersonic fighter aircraft, theKF-21 Boramae (“Fighting Hawk” in Korean). The South Korean-­led development program endeavors to produce an advanced multirole fighter for both nations’ air forces. An aircraft stealthierthan any fourth-­generation fighter that does not carry weapons internally like its many fifth-­
generation contemporaries, the KF-21 is expected to be armed with a range of air-­to-­air and air-­to-­surface missiles, and possibly even air-­launched cruise missiles. The twin-­engine fighters will
come in single- and two-­seat versions. The first test flight was conducted on July 19, 2022, after
publication of this book, with manufacturing scheduled to begin in 2026. At least 40 aircraft areplanned to be delivered by 2028, with South Korea expecting to deploy a total of 120 aircraft by
2032. The Boramae will also be available for export, and Poland has already expressed an interestin joining the program. The book highlights, with the development of the KF-21, South Korea’s
ambition of becoming one of the top seven nations in the aviation industry by the 2030s.
At a time of great geopolitical instability between great powers as seen by Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, Modern South Korean Air Power’s analysis of ROKAF current and future air
weapons systems and platforms is both relevant and timely, given how the Ukrainian military has
leveraged modern western technology against a numerically superior, but technologically lagging,Russian armed forces. Finally, in Chapter 8, the author provides an excellent synopsis of North
Korea’s threats, of ROKAF’s dealings with violations of South Korea’s airspace by nuclear-­capablestates China and Russia, and of standing disputes with neighboring Japan.
For military air planners, the information Polderman provides on South Korean airpower will
prove useful in the post-­Operation Enduring Freedom planning and doctrine development environment. Yet what is missing from an otherwise professionally written book is a chapter on tactical air traffic services and aviation maintenance organizations, as well as fuel/ammunition support
equipment vital to the employment of modern combat rotary winged platforms. Correcting thisomission of ROKAF support organizations would provide a clearer picture of how South Korean
air commanders might employ their assets in the heart of East Asia. Otherwise, Polderman’s bookprovides a solid picture of how ROKAF operates within an extremely dynamic and complex security environment in which South Korea has long since realized that it can secure a lasting peaceon the peninsula only by preparing for war.
Like all Harpia Publishing books, the print quality of Modern South Korean Air Power is excellent, and the book is worth the read. The chapter on ROKAF aircraft is as in-­depth as any aviation
enthusiast would like, and the book’s chapters provide detailed descriptions of how ROKAF airpower serves as an integral part of South Korea’s role in providing stability to the Asia-­Pacific
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region. Like Harpia’s other series of books on airpower in Asia—including Modern Chinese Warplanes: Chinese Air Force – Aircraft and Units; Modern Taiwanese Air Power: The Republic of China
Air Force Today; and Red Dragon “Flankers”: China’s Prolific “Flanker” Family—Polderman’s work
offers an insightful overview of combat airpower in an economically important, but volatile regionof the globe.
Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, USA, Retired

Wars of Ideas: Theology, Interpretation, and Power in the Muslim World
Edited by Ilan Berman. Rowman & Littlefield, 2021, 172 pp.

After nearly 22 years since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States now finds itself
with a military force and workforce with individuals born after the attacks occurred, including
those just joining the service or already serving for a handful of years, and recent college graduates
starting careers in national security and foreign policy. At the same time, a large portion of current
and soon-­to-­be senior military leaders have spent all or a majority of their careers fighting the war
on terror. But as Ilan Berman argues in his introduction to his edited work Wars Of Ideas, despite“an explosion of academic and professional interest in counter-­terrorism since 9/11,” the UnitedStates has yet to adequately address the “struggle for salience” within the Muslim world that motivated the attacks, having instead focused “extensively on militarily defeating malign extremist
actors” (1–2). Berman sees the “wars of ideas” as the struggle between extreme radical and moderate Islam that constitutes the “intellectual battlefield” the United States confronts today (2).
Berman is the senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council and a Middle East
regional security expert who has consulted for the CIA, Department of Defense, and State Department. In Wars of Ideas, Berman has edited a collection of six essays, with two of his own bookending the collection with an opening essay on the Islamic State and a closing essay on learningfrom Allies. Contributions discussing Central Asia, Morocco, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia fill the space between. Berman’s assembled authors are experts intheir areas: religious scholars, professors, security analysts, and think tank fellows.
Like the book as a whole, each section is relatively brief and provides an overview and history,
followed by an analysis and assessment of the modern situation. Svante Cornell’s Central Asia
chapter is of interest in the current geopolitical environment, as it touches on the evolution ofIslam in the region, then the rediscovering of its ties with the rest of the Muslim world after thefall of the Soviet Union. For a time, this movement sought secular statehood and government,
something changing in Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogăn.
Another interesting section is Azyumardi Azra’s essay on Indonesia, a vital discussion given its
status as the world’s largest Muslim nation and the third-­largest democracy. An analysis of Indonesia’s “Third Way” Islam—“which is distinct from, and more inclusive than, its Arabic counterpart”—fits nicely into a book seeking to break down a war of ideas (77).
As the discussion of the world’s largest Muslim population being a democracy is noteworthy,
so is one on the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites and its post-­Salafist trajectory. Kamran Bokharistates in his section, “No country in contemporary history has played as significant a role in the
struggle for the soul of Islam as has Saudi Arabia” (123). This section is the strongest of the book,providing a history of the initial two failed attempts and the third and final successful attempt thatcreated the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. It offers as thorough a history as possible in a
few pages. Growing cooperation with America and the West is focused on the First Gulf War andthe reaction and fallout from 9/11. A good deal of writing centers on attempts at reform, modernization, and the conflicting priorities of the kingdom’s religion along with its push toward Vision
2030, its masterplan to transform the state through broad social and economic reforms. While the68  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Book Reviews

book is a few years old, the writing provides a solid background for those seeking to understandthe stories currently in the news.
Berman has edited a work that does what it sets out to do to bring a better understanding ofmodern Islam and its struggles with extremism beyond discussions of terror tactics and militaryresponses. Wars of Ideas also demonstrates well that while Islam, specifically Sunni Islam, is one
faith, different states and regions are impacted by the issue of extremism and handle it differently.
Many points of the book, especially Berman’s closing chapter, discuss the need to learn from andwork with partners to understand Islam and its approach to its radical adherents. The focus oncooperation is essential and commendable in the current world.
An area for improvement is one that Berman himself acknowledges and addresses on the very
first page of content. Berman points out that Islam is the world’s fastest-­growing faith, with over
1.8 billion followers, an overwhelming 85 percent that is Sunni. While Berman identifies that
there is indeed extremism that comes from Islam’s Shia, he states that Iran’s role in Islamic radicalism “is unique . . . and beyond the scope of this work” (iii). While Berman is quite correct in thisassessment of Iran’s role, the chapters discussing the Islamic State and the Gulf countries—specifically
Saudi Arabia—may have benefited from a brief discussion regarding the relationship between
Shia beliefs and extremism. Or, more simply, how do reactions to Shia beliefs and actions affectthe issue at hand?
Wars of Ideas is well worth the read for those seeking to understand better the battlefield ofideas regarding the struggle against radical Islam. At only 172 pages, including references, acknowledgments, and contributor biographies, the book is a quick and highly accessible read for
those seeking to gain understanding beyond the kinetic struggles that occur. The work is also
highly beneficial as a primer for those wishing to learn more about what specific countries andregions are doing to address the issue.
Lieutenant Colonel Jason Baker

Russia’s Path to the High-­Tech Battlespace

Roger N. McDermott. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2022, 470 pp.

Roger McDermott fills a gap in the literature on the West’s perception of Russian combat
capabilities with Russia’s Path to the High-­Tech Battlespace, demonstrating how the Russian military has created the military theory, command and control (C2), and advanced weapons tocontinue threatening US and Western interests. He provides key insights into Russian decision-­making, C2, and military modernization. McDermott’s work is exceptionally well researched,drawing extensively from Russian primary sources, especially professional military journals,
general news outlets, and specialized military news sites. As McDermott demonstrates, despite
missteps and apparent setbacks from its overt invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia
remains a potent military power. It may not reach parity with the West, but it retains the theoretical, organizational, and technological potential to continue disrupting the international order for the foreseeable future. This book is a useful overview for military and policy professionals confronting Russian aggression.
McDermott is a leading Western expert on the Russian military. He serves as a senior fellow in
Eurasian military studies with the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, DC, and is a visiting
senior research fellow at the department of war studies at King’s College in London. Further, heis an assistant editor for the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. He has authored numerous articles
and books, including The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces (2011).
Russia’s Path to the High-­Tech Battlespace continues his research tracking Russian military modernization. His work nests in the body of English-­language literature on Russia’s military, providing details not available in other sources. Bettina Renz and Igor Sutyagin have written on Russian
AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  69

Book Reviews

military reform but with greater focus on the military overall, especially new weapons and logistics. Several researchers evaluate ongoing Russian military performance, notably Dmitri Trenin,
Justin Bronk, and Michael Kofman, but McDermott provides the foundation to better understandthe military actions those writers describe. Finally, much like McDermott, researchers such as
Timothy Thomas and Charles Bartles present concepts from the Russian point of view; however,
McDermott emphasizes how the Russian military is achieving its own vision of future warfare.
McDermott organized Russia’s Path to the High-­Tech Battlespace in two main parts. His first fourchapters review Russian military theory, outlining the modernization of the Russian military basedon its updated doctrine, then providing specific case studies of Russian military modernization. Thissection culminates with a chapter evaluating Russia’s performance in Syria as a case study to understand to what degree the Russian military has reached its own modernization goals. Then McDermott dedicates each of the last three chapters to Russia’s most advanced weapons: hypersonic missiles, electronic warfare, and unmanned aerial vehicles. He considers these in light of Russian
warfare theories, their planned employment, and examples of fielding and use. These chapters give
context to the media hype involving Russian advanced weapons, where technical specifications are
sometimes confused for capability. Understanding how the Russian military plans to use such
weapons sets expectations for Western military planners who may confront them.
McDermott concludes that Russia can indeed perform advanced warfare tasks using modern
systems, but only in limited operations. Russia’s C2 is sufficient to steer limited operations, suchas in Syria, but does not have the depth for large-­scale combat operations. His conclusion stems
from the link between Russia’s beliefs in the changing nature of war and its battlefield outcomes.
The Russian military understands warfare development in terms of generations. According to
Russian military discourse, civilization has progressed through multiple generations with advancesin technology and improvements in military art. Advanced nations are now fighting in the sixth
generation of warfare, characterized by high precision weapons and a quickened reconnaissance-­
strike contour. Nations which have achieved the level of network connectivity required for sixth-­
generation warfare control the speed and timing of combat operations. Conventions of earlier
generations of warfare may still be necessary in specific contexts, such as with counterinsurgency
or what the West terms low-­intensity conflict, but a nation possessing superior sixth-­generation
capabilities can choose the time and pace of war to be successful. From Russia’s own analysis, as
McDermott describes, it has not fully realized sixth-­generation warfare. It has the advanced weapons, though not always with the C2 networks to make it fully effective.
Airpower exemplifies Russia’s incomplete progress towards sixth-generation warfare. Advanced
airpower is an essential element of sixth-­generation warfare, though Russia views it almost exclusively in the form of precision strike. Airpower allows combatants to apply force with greater rapidity and lethality than other platforms. This leads Russian analysts to describe sixth-­generation
warfare as noncontact war, where precision munitions could affect targets with minimum risk.
From the Russian perspective, in contrast to Western theories, airpower is considered purely avehicle for precision-­guided munitions. Neither McDermott nor any of the Russian theorists hequotes discuss the requirement for air superiority. Russia’s failure to consider air superiority, andMcDermott’s lack of discussion regarding Russian air theories, illustrates the doctrinal shortfalls
which have perhaps led to Russia’s poor performance. In terms of real battlefield outcomes, Russia
has proved unable to gain air superiority during its conflict in Ukraine. In turn, this has reduced
the Ukraine war to an attritional, high-­contact campaign, with significant losses of manpower andmateriel. Without air superiority, Russia has been unable to fight the kind of war it planned, as
McDermott describes.
Since Russia’s Path to the High-­Tech Battlespace was published just as Russia was invading
Ukraine in 2022, McDermott did not have the opportunity to review his assessment. In the foreword, Bartles briefly touches on that disconnect, noting the impact operations in Ukraine may
70  VOL. 2, NO. 3, FALL 2023

Book Reviews

have on Russia’s future development. That the Russian military struggled to employ its advanced
systems in a large-­scale conflict proves McDermott’s point that its military modernization was
uneven and incomplete. As Bartles notes, however, over the next decades the Russian military may
absorb and implement the lessons it is learning in Ukraine to continue its path forward.
Beyond its insight into the Russian military mind, Russia’s Path to the High-­Tech Battlespacehighlights the importance of beliefs in shaping the conduct of wars. Russian theories regarding
sixth-­generation warfare are closely linked to the Western concept of the revolution in militaryaffairs. This concept, popularized in the 1980s and 1990s, posited the nation that can gather andexploit information the fastest will be the most successful in combat.
Over the past three decades, the US military has achieved an advanced level of network-­centricwarfare. Nowhere is this more evident than in the robust American networks providing C2, as well
as sensor-­to-­shooter links. The US military’s information dominance is arguably its greatest
strength. Yet recent struggles to implement joint all-­domain C2 illustrate that Western militaries
should not take this advantage for granted. Constructing networks, weapons, and the training to
use them effectively will take deliberate effort. Despite the work McDermott describes Russia hastaken to achieve this level of warfare, its struggles underscore how important it is to get it right.
Lieutenant Colonel J. Alexander Ippoliti

AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS REVIEW  71

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