Fukushima in Fatehabad:
What a Nuclear Accident at
Delhi’s Doorstep Will Mean

Research Study Report for Takagi Fellowship
for Citizen Scientists 2014

Kumar Sundaram

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgment
Abbreviations
Introduction
I. Research Question
II. Research Methodology
III. Structure of the Research Study Report
Section I
Lessons–

Fukushima: The Ongoing Accident and Its

1.1 Ongoing radioactive contamination
1.2 Irreparable humanitarian impacts
1.3 Lessons from Fukushima: various assessments and citizens’
perspective
1.4 Lessons from Fukushima
Section II – Gorakhpur Nuclear Power Project: Danger at
Delhi’s Doorstep
2.1 Location of proposed nuclear plant
2.2 Project Status
2.3 Proposed township for the staff of Gorakhpur NPP
2.4 Local resistance against the project
2.5 Grave risks in Gorakhpur
2.6 First-of-its-kind scaling up of PHWRs
2.7 Inadequate water supply: invitation to major accidents
2.8 Disconcerting Absence of Any Disaster Preparedness
2.9 Nuclear Liability for Gorakhpur
2.10 Political parties take turns to support the project which they
had labelled ‘risky’
Section III –Fukushima

India Unprepared: In Dangerous Denial of

3.1 DAE in Denial of Fukushima
3.2 Nuclear Accident: Irreversible, Long-term and Wide-ranging
Consequences
3.3 Liability and Compensation
3.4 Evacuation, Rehabilitation and Justice
COCLUSION

Acknowledgments
I am extremely indebted to the Takagi Fund for Citizen
Science and its senior officials for this research, without
whose kind support and patience it could not have been
made possible.

I am also really thankful to activists andcommunity members in villages in Fatehabad district inHaryana, India. For their immensely valuable inputs andguidance for this research, I am feel heartily grateful to
Ann-Elise Lewallen and Sonali Huria.

Abbreviations
AEC–

Atomic Energy Commission

AERB

–

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

BARC

–

Bhabha Atomic Research Center

CANDU

–

CANada Deuterim Uranium type reactors

CIC–

Central Information Commissioner

DAE–

Department of Atomic Energy

EIA–

Environmental Impact Assessment

GHAVP

–

Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut Pariyojna

GNPP

–

Gorakhpur Nuclear Power Project

IPPNW

–

International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear

Weapons
LOCA–

Loss of Cooling Accident

NDMA

–

National Disaster Management Authority

NPCIL

–

Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited

NSRA

–

Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority

PHWR

–

Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor

PSR–

Physicians for Social Responsibility

RTI–

Right to Information

TEPCo

–

Tokyo Electric Power Company

UCIL

–

Uranium Corporation of India Limited

Introduction
The unprecedented triple nuclear meltdown at Fukushima,
whose fallouts and human consequences continue to unfold, has
evoked a wide array of questions and responses across the world.
These

range

from

the

risk

inherent

innucleartechnology,

insurmountability of nuclear accidents even in most advanced
countries, and the sheer inability of their administrative structures
to respond to the humanitarian impacts, additional sufferings,
stigmatisation and discrimination against vulnerable sections ofsociety like workers and immigrants, to the economic, political, andculturallimitationsofmodernrisk

societies

which

remainstructurally in denial of these issues underpinning them.
Fukushima has forced a number of technical experts, policy
makers, social scientists, artists, and activists to summarise its
lessons through their own prism and come up with relevantprescriptions. In India, however, while the government remains incomplete denial of Fukushima and has turned its post-Fukushimasafety audit to a ridiculously complicit exercise, it has resorted tosilencing and even brutal repression against independent experts
and citizen groups raising questions pertaining to nuclear powerand safety after Fukushima.
India is one of the few countries which continue to pursue
nuclear power in the post-Fukushima world. It has one of theearliest nuclear programs with a closed nuclear cycle from uranium
mining to reprocessing, and its nuclear industry remains insulated
from public scrutiny as it possesses both civilian and militarycapabilities.

In

fact

the

Indiangovernment’s

readinesstoaccommodate the interests of the global nuclear lobbies – devise
ways to exempt them from nuclear liability, easily granting
environmental and regulatory clearances and subsidising themthrough various direct and indirect ways – has made it an attractive
destination for newer nuclear projects. The nuclear industry
worldwide, amid general and terminal financial crises, continues to
pin its hopes for a ‘nuclear renaissance’ on countries like India.
India has ambitious nuclear expansion plans and its overall
long-term objective remains generating 275GWe, or 25% of its
energy mix, by the year 2052 from nuclear power. 1 Most recently,
the government has announced setting up 10 new Pressurised
Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) of 700 MW capacity each by 2032. 2
It is in the backdrop of India’s ambitious nuclear plans thatsafety concerns acquire even greater significance.

I.

Research Question
The present research, undertaken with the support of the

Takagi Fellowship for Citizen Scientists 2014, is an attempt to study
a hypothetical scenario of a Fukushima-like accident in India. In
order to envisage such a scenario and analyse the potential
implications, the study has broadly identified three key areas inwhich it looks at the accident in Fukushima and builds up scenariosof a similar, hypothetical disaster in Fatehabad: (a) the accident inFukushima and continuing attempts to stem it; (b) the responses by
1 Arvind Gupta, “India's Nuclear Energy Programme: Prospects and Challenges” Strategic Analysis, Vol 35, No 3, May
2011, http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/35_3/IndiasNuclearEnergyProgramme_agupta
2 “Cabinet approves construction of 10 units of India's indigenous Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR)”
Business Standard, May 17, 2017 http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-cm/cabinet-approves-construction-of10-units-of-india-s-indigenous-pressurized-heavy-water-reactors-phwr-117051700997_1.html

the government and operating company to rehabilitate andcompensate the affected people; and (c) safety and regulatory
cultures.
This study has chosen Fatehabad as a hypothetical casestudy. The Gorakhpur Atomic Power Project, currently underconstruction in Fatehabad district in the Indian State of Haryana isimportant mainly for three reasons – (a) it is at a very short distancefrom Delhi and the researcher has been engaged with the local
communities for almost 8 years now, (b) the Indian government issetting up 4 ‘indigenous’ CANDU-type reactors here, and it is more
likely that the construction will begin soon and proceed without
external hindrances, unlike in the case of the imported reactors
planned in other parts of the country, and (c) it is relatively easy toenvisage a loss-of-coolant (LOCA) accident in Fatehabad due tocertain site-specific issues, which have been explained later in thisreport.
A Fukushima-like nuclear accident in India would likely get
amplified and complicated manifold by the sheer density of
population. Fatehabad district has a population of more than
9,40,000 and emergency evacuation and rehabilitation in Fatehabad
would be an insurmountable challenge given the bureaucratic
cobweb and its unaccountability. In general, the lack of independent
nuclearregulator

andpublicexperts,

absenceofadequate

administrative emergency responses, and largely uninformed andabjectly poor people would mean that any serious accident would
become unmanageable.
A case study of what would be the implications of a Fukushima-

like accident in the Indian context has been attempted, taking into
account the response in Japan at various stages of the accident andits implications. The experience and lessons of the Fukushima
accident–

evacuation,

beginning
to

the

from

initialattempts

toemergency

responseandcontainaccident

andthedecontaminate the area, and the relief and rehabilitation of theevacuees – have also been used in this hypothetical study toanalyse the potential consequences of a similar accident inFatehabad.

II.

Research Methodology

This research study is, in large part, predicated on anassessment of

the documents related to the Gorakhpur Nuclear

Power Project (GNPP) available on the websites of the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and acquired through the Right
to Information Act, 2005, interviews with independent experts,
including former head of India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board(AERB) about safety of the proposed project, consultations withlocal administrative officials of Fatehabad District about emergency
preparedness and site-specific safety challenges, as well as
discussions with local activists and community leaders in villages
and towns in the 30 km radius of the upcoming project.
The booklet, recently published on the fourth-year anniversaryof the accident by the Fukushima Booklet Publication Committee,
the report of the Citizens Commission on Nuclear Energy, and theIndependent Committee`s report on Fukushima, have been used as
basic resource materials to build a model based on four major
themes – (a) technological response to the nuclear accident, (b)emergency

responseforthepeople,(c)evacuation

andrehabilitation, and, (d) the social and psychological effects.

III.

Structure of the Research Study Report

This Report has three sections:
1.

Fukushima: An Ongoing Accident and Its Lessons

2.

Gorakhpur Nuclear Power Project: Danger at Delhi’s

Doorstep3.

India: In Denial of Fukushima, Unprepared for Nuclear

Disasters

SECTION I
Fukushima: The Ongoing Accident and Its
Lessons
Nuclear accidents tell us something unique about nuclear
technology. Nuclear meltdowns don't have anniversaries. In almost
every other kind of industrial accident, repair, reconstruction andresumption of normal life can start from the next day. In case of a
nuclear accident however, the radiation spewing from damaged
reactors makes any semblance of normalcy impossible for decades.
In other words, effects of nuclear accidents cannot be limited intime and space, unlike other industrial accidents of the modern
time.
It is more than six years of the nuclear accident in Japan, whichstarted on 11 March 2011 with a 9.0 magnitude earthquake in the
Tohokuregionofthecountry.

Theearthquake

causedanunprecedentedly strong tsunami that knocked off crucial coolingsystems of Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power station, which hosted
six reactors with a total capacity of 4,696 MW. 3
Subsequently, hydrogen explosions were caused in threereactors over the next week as the extremely hot and radioactive
reactor fuel started melting and the Zirconium foil around the fuelrods reacted with sea water poured to cool the plant as a desperatemeasure. This further compounded the accident and damaged thereactor buildings.4
3“Japan Earthquake & Tsunami of 2011: Facts and Information ” Live Science, May 7, 2015,
http://www.livescience.com/39110-japan-2011-earthquake-tsunami-facts.html
4 “Six years on, Fukushima disaster is still unfolding. Why does India refuse to heed the warning?” Kumar Sundaram,
Scroll.in, 10 March 2017, http://www.catchnews.com/international-news/six-years-on-fukushima-disaster-is-still-

As far as 250 km from the crippled nuclear plant in Fukushima,huge quantities of highly radioactive substances like Strontium,
Caesium, Plutonium and radioactive Iodine were released in theatmosphere and have been found.5 According to rather conservative
estimates of the Tokyo Electric Power Company, which operated the
Fukushima plant, between 20 trillion and 40 trillion becquerels ofradioactive Tritium has been leaked into the Pacific Ocean. 6 This
January, Toshiba sent the most sophisticated robot inside thebuilding to gauge the status of the melted fuel, which died within
hours.7

1.1 Ongoing Radioactive Contamination
Till this day, TEPCo continues to pour hundred tons of water
every day to keep the crippled plant's temperature under control. 8800,000 tonnes of highly contaminated water has been stored inabout 1,200 massive tanks scattered around the plant area over the
past six years. Almost 300 tonnes of water is leaking every day outof these tanks and threatens to contaminate the entire Pacific
Ocean9. TEPCo has arbitrarily dumped 850 tonnes10 of this water
into the sea by labelling it less contaminated. Understandably, thisunfolding-why-does-india-refuse-to-heed-the-warning-54116.html
5 “The Fukushima Disaster: a chronology” WISE International, https://wiseinternational.org/campaign/fukushimadisaster6 “Japan’s TEPCO discloses extent of nuclear plant leak” Live Mint, 04 August 2013,
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/31FHymkn59aD1rrpMCl0jO/Japans-TEPCO-discloses-extent-of-nuclear-plantleak.html
7 “Dying robots and failing hope: Fukushima clean-up falters six years after tsunami” The Guardian, 09 March 2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/fukushima-nuclear-cleanup-falters-six-years-after-tsunami
8 “'Fukushima catastrophe ongoing: Leakage on a daily basis’ ” Russia Today, 07 February 2017,https://www.rt.com/op-edge/376607-leakage-radiation-fukushima-japan/
9 “Radioactive Water Leaks from Fukushima: What We Know” Live Science, 13 August 2013,https://www.livescience.com/38844-fukushima-radioactive-water-leaks.html
10 “850 tons of ‘decontaminated’ Fukushima water dumped into ocean ” Russia Today, 15 September 2015,
https://www.rt.com/news/315350-fukushima-decontaminated-water-ocean/has invited angry reactions from independent experts.11 TEPCostartedbuildingahuge

undergroundice-wallcosting$320

millions12, purportedly to prevent this daily massive leak fromwashing off the entire plant into the Pacific, but the ice-wall proved
ineffective13 and had to be abandoned in September 2016.
While the TEPCo made profit from the reactors, the financial
burden of the accident has been passed on to the Japanese
taxpayers.

Theestimated

cost

of

Fukushimaclean-up

isexceptionally high for any human-made disaster in history – it could
take 40 years14 and about $188 billion15. And we are talking only
about the immediate plant site. The financial, ecological and social
costs involved just begin to unfold.

1.2 Irreparable Humanitarian Impacts
In the aftermath of Fukushima tragedy, nearly 200,000 people
lost their livelihoods and were displaced as an area of 20-km radiusaround the plant had to be evacuated immediately. Thousands ofheart-wrenching stories of broken families and shattered lives,
administrative apathy and deception, efforts by the government tofind alibis to reduce and deny compensation, and the resilient spiritof the common Japanese people are part of the larger story ofevacuation in Fukushima.

11 “Is it safe to dump Fukushima waste into the sea? ” The Guardian, 13 April 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/13/is-it-safe-to-dump-fukushima-waste-into-the-sea
12 “Japan’s $320 Million Gamble at Fukushima: An Underground Ice Wall”, New York Times, August 29, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/science/fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-plant-cleanup-ice-wall.html?
13 “Fukushima ice wall failing to deliver on promise”, Nikkei Asian Review, 28 September 2016,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Tech-Science/Tech/Fukushima-ice-wall-failing-to-deliver-on-promise
14 “Five years on, cleanup of Fukushima's reactors remains a distant goal ” The Guardian, 11 March 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/11/fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-reactors-decommission-cleanupjapan-tsunami-meltdown
15 “Japan nearly doubles Fukushima disaster-related cost to $188 billion” Reuters, 9 December 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tepco-fukushima-costs-idUSKBN13Y047

Till this day, around 100,000 people continue to be displaced
and they face unimaginable problems in coping up with life –
economic hardship with subsidies slashed as time passes 16,
psychological stress due to the ever-haunting fear 17 of radiationborne diseases appearing on their bodies as well as social ostracismand marginalisation.18 These immense economic, social and legal
battles that the people of once sleepy towns and villages are now
faced with were not their choice.
The nuclear accident has proved to be insurmountable even ina technologically advanced country like Japan. The corporation
operating the reactor - the Tokyo Electric Company(TEPCo), hasbeen found making every effort since the accident to underplay it,
minimizing responsibility by using under-counting the victims, andvirtually blackmailing the authorities to let it go off the hook bythreatening to disrupt electricity in Tokyo. In brief, TEPCo is too big
to fail and the political system in Japan has rushed to save it at the
tax-payers' expense.
A worldwide reckoning that the consequences of major nuclear
accidents are insurmountable and nuclear technology is inherently
prone to such disasters has followed the Fukushima nuclear
disaster. Besides, the nexus between the nuclear industry and thepolitical system has also been thoroughly exposed.19

16 “Thousands of Fukushima evacuees face hardship as slash of housing subsidies nears” Japan Times, 17 january
2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/17/national/thousands-fukushima-evacuees-face-hardship-housingsubsidies-slashed/#.WajRktRLdzA
17 “Psychological impact of nuclear disasters like Fukushima more damaging than the risk from radiation, experts say”
The Independent, 30 July 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/psychologicalimpact-of-nuclear-disasters-like-fukushima-more-damaging-than-the-risk-from-radiation-10428096.html
18 Jacobs, Robert “Social Fallout: Marginalization After the Fukushima Nuclear Meltdown” Japan Focus: The AsiaPacific Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 28, Number 4, 11 July 2011, http://apjjf.org/2011/9/28/Robert-Jacobs/3562/article.html
19 “Japan's atomic disaster due to "collusion:" panel report” Reuters, 05 July 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/usjapan-nuclear-report-idUSBRE8640K420120705

1.3 Lessons from Fukushima: Various Assessments andCitizens’ Perspective
Since Fukushima, many studies have been conducted to look
into various impacts and implications of the nuclear accident. This
includes the official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission20 at the behest of the
National Diet of Japan, the report jointly published by theInternational Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
and Physicians for Social Responsibility(PSR)in 2016 21, the 2013
study by SciencesPo into the disaster evacuation22 and the study
conducted by Greenpeace23 about the ecological impacts on the 5 thyear of the accident.
The report of the Independent Investigation Commission on the
Fukushima accident, submitted to Japan’s National Diet in July 2012,
was a wake-up call. Calling the Fukushima accident “man-made”,
the report held that the “accident was the result of collusion
between the government, the regulators and TEPCO… They
effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear
accidents”.
In 2013, UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Health, Anand
Groverpublishedhisreportafter

visiting

Fukushima

and20 “The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission” National Diet ofJapan, http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/
21 “5 Years Living With Fukushima Summary of the health effects of the nuclear catastrophe”, IPPNW/PSR Report
http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/fukushima-report.pdf
22 “Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident” 13 May 2013,
SciencesPo, http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/STUDY0513_RH_DEVAST%20report.pdf
23 “Radiation Reloaded: Ecological Impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident” Greenpeace International,
March
2016,
https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/gpj-_fukushimaradiation_reloaded_report_issue_040316_lr_2.pdf

unequivocally laid out the discrepancies in the official narrative of
post-Fukushima responses.24 While his report describes how thegovernment in Japan colluded with the industry in a systemic denialof the affects of the accidents on common people, it also assertsthat a holistic view can be only obtained by putting citizens’ right tohealth at the centre of discourse. He scathingly criticized theJapanese government’s contempt for the people’s right to health. It
underlined the inefficient handling of the evacuation and clean-up
process and inadequate response on serious questions of health,safety and employment faced by lakhs of Fukushima evacuees who
have no hopes of returning.
In March 2014, a group of civil society organisations, inconsultation with local communities and independent produced areport titled “10 Lessons of Fukushima: Reducing Risks andProtecting Communities from Nuclear Disasters”. 25 This report by
Fukushima Booklet Committee is brief but comprehensive as itcovers the entire range of implications and lessons starting fromsafety aspects to the experiences of sufferings evacuees andenormous difficulties that they face in finding a new life andclaiming their compensation and reparations. The report lists 10 key
lessons of Fukushima as:
1. Do not be fooled by “Nuclear Power is Safe” propaganda
2. During an emergency, the basic premise is to run away
3. Access to information and leaving records is vital
4. People

affectedbythedisaster

have

the

right

to

a

comprehensive health survey and disclosure of information
24 “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard ofphysical and mental health, Anand Grover, Mission to Japan ( 15 - 26 November 2012 )” Office of the UN Human
Rights Commission, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A-HRC-2341-Add3_en.pdf
25 “10 Lessons from Fukushima Reducing risks and protecting communities from nuclear disasters” Fukushima
Booklet Committee, http://fukushimalessons.jp/assets/content/doc/Fukushima10Lessons_ENG.pdf

5. To ensure food safety and to protect agriculture, forestry andfishery industries, citizens must participate in measurement.
Information disclosure is also vital
6. Complete decontamination is impossible
7. The accident cannot be brought to a conclusion unless workers
are given better treatment and healthcare
8. Rebuilding the daily lives and community of those affected isessential
9. Calling for participation of those affected by the disaster in theenactment and implementation of laws that are designed toprotect them
10.

Taxpayers are being made to bear the compensationcosts

1.4 Lessons from Fukushima
A key lesson to be drawn from Fukushima is that the accident
could have easily been worse. It was nothing but sheer luck thatprevented much greater levels of human population impacts andcontamination. Most of the radioactive materials released went overthe Pacific Ocean because of the direction of the wind during theworst phase of the accident. By another such coincidence, the water
filled pool in Fukushima Daiichi plant contained the irradiated spent
fuel from Unit 4. This Unit had been shut down when the accident
took place and its entire fuel was inside the pool. It started heating
after the cooling loop was crippled and the pool’s water almost
started boiling.26
Minister Naoto Kan was cautioned that a fire in pool 4 could
26 Richard Stone, “Near miss at Fukushima is a warning for U.S, Science 27 May 2016: Vol. 352, Issue 6289, pp.
1039-1040 http://science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6289/1039

require compulsory relocations out to 110−170 kilometres from thereactor site and voluntary relocations out to 200–250 kilometres. 27
This message, sent to the Japanese Prime Minister by Shunsuke
Kondo, the chairman of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission, on 25
March 2011, meant that the people in Tokyo might have been forced
to evacuate. This would have been a logistical nightmare.
The water levels in this pool had come close to below the topof the fuel rods, according to a model developed by the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences. 28 The prevented water levels wereluckily prevented from dropping further low by the water leakage
from the reactor. There could have been a fire leading to the releaseof large amount of radioactivity if the excessive heating had
generated fire.
Another lesson is that nuclear accidents of serious naturecannot be confined in time. Fukushima, as Arjun Makhijani of theInstitute for Energy and Environmental Research phrased it, “ispossibly the longest running, continuous industrial disaster inhistory”.29 Radioactive contamination from such accidents might live
for decades. Responses to such nuclear accidents are not just about
repairing the infrastructural damage.
A crucial pointer to the complexity of the ongoing effort to deal
with the Fukushima meltdowns is the recent discovery of high levelsof radiation within Unit II. These levels are so high that even robotic
27 Frank N. von Hippel, Michael Schoeppner, "Reducing the Danger from Fires in Spent Fuel Pools," Science &GlobalSecurity24,
no.
3(2016):
141-173,
http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/2016/09/reducing_the_danger_from_fires.html
28 “Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants”
National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/21874/lessons-learned-fromthe-fukushima-nuclear-accident-for-improving-safety-and-security-of-us-nuclear-plants
29 “Radiation Spikes At Fukushima” interview with Dr. Arjun Makhijani, Living on Earth, 17 February 2017,
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=17-P13-00007&segmentID=6

cameras cannot operate in that environment for long.30
TEPCo’s early promise31 that it would start removing themelted fuel from these reactors by 2021 is bound to fail. As
Safecast pointed out “The process of removing melted fuel debris
from the damaged reactors at Fukushima Daiichi is expected to takedecades, and these recent findings remind us once again thatTEPCO has little grounds for optimism about the challenges of thismassive and technically unprecedented project”.32
Tens of thousands of people who were evacuated from theregions surrounding Fukushima are yet to return to their homes.33
The lesson is that the human and social impacts of nuclear
accidents are also long lived. Japan’s government and plant
authorities would like to reduce this number soon using their callous
methods34. This is because of the rising financial responsibilities aswell as the enormous public image-building exercise that Japan isundertaking in the wake of the upcoming 2020 Olympics games.
Japanese authorities are removing the restrictions for people tomove back to areas that were earlier deemed contaminated.
However, this comes with a condition that this would end housing
subsidies for such evacuees. 35 People are moving to areas with
30 “Fukushima

Daiichi
NPS
PromptReport”
TEPCO
Holdings,
10
February2017,
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2017/1375551_10469.html
31 “Mid-and-long-Term Roadmap towards th e Decommissioning of Fu kushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4,
TEPCO” 21 December 2011, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111221e10.pdf
32 “No, radiation levels at Fukushima Daiichi are not rising” Safecast Blog, 4 February 2017,https://blog.safecast.org/2017/02/no-radiation-levels-at-fukushima-daiichi-are-not-rising/33 “Recovery and Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake” japan Reconstruction Agency,
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/index.html
34 “The 2020 Olympics, Fukushima and Trust” WISE International, 10 October 2013,https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/769/2020-olympics-fukushima-and-trust-%E2%88%92-mv-ramana
35 “Financial crunch time looms for Fukushima’s ‘voluntary evacuees’” Japan Times, 7 March 2017,https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/07/national/social-issues/financial-crunch-time-looms-fukushimasvoluntary-evacuees/#.Waj3HdRLdzBrelatively high radiation levels as a consequence. 36
Besides human beings, animals were also affected by theaccident as evacuees in Fukushima were not allowed to take theirpets with them. Many of the abandoned pets starved to death but
some animals are still alive. They are trapped in the exclusion zone
and are probably contaminated. Some volunteers have saved
hundreds of animals in Fukushima. 37 On birds like barn swallows,
studies have shown negative impacts.38 Much like Chernobyl, forest
areas around Fukushima have also been contaminated; 39 Fires inthese abandoned forests in subsequent years have also become an
additional source of risk for spread of radioactivity.
Learning from the triple meltdowns in Japan, a number ofcountries have moved away from nuclear power generation. The
2016 World Nuclear Industry Status Report40

underlined thisterminal and irretrievable decline of the fortunes of nuclear lobbies.
The downfall has only been further exacerbated by the nearcollapse of French and Japanese nuclear giants like Areva andToshiba in recent months41 as well as decisions by countries such as
Taiwan42 and Vietnam43 to shun nuclear power and scrap nuclear
36 “Fukushima evacuees face 'forced' return as subsidies withdrawn” The Guardian, 10 March 2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/10/japan-fukushima-nuclear-disaster-evacuees-forced-return-homeradiation
37 Japanese Animal Rescue Fund-Raiser, https://www.gofundme.com/JapanAnimalRescue
38 “Abundance and genetic damage of barn swallows from Fukushima” Scientific Reports 5, Article number: 9432, 02
April 2015, https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09432
39 Winifred A. Bird and Jane Braxton Little, “A Tale of Two Forests: Addressing Postnuclear Radiation at Chernobyl
and Fukushima”, Environment and health Perspectives,
40 World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016, https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/-2016-.html
41 Green, Jim. “Nuclear Power Is In Crisis As Cost Overruns Cripple Industry Giants ” New Matilda, 26 February
2017, https://newmatilda.com/2017/02/26/nuclear-power-is-in-crisis-as-cost-overruns-cripple-industry-giants/
42 “Taiwan joins global anti-nuclear trend” Asia Times, 18 January 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/taiwan-finallyjoins-anti-nuclear-movement/
43 “Vietnam abandons plan for first nuclear power plants” Reuters, 22 November 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-politics-nuclearpower/vietnam-abandons-plan-for-first-nuclear-power-plantsidUSKBN13H0VO

deals.

Section II
Gorakhpur Nuclear Power Project: Danger at
Delhi’s Doorstep
The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited(NPCIL), India’s
state-owned nuclear operator, is setting up a huge nuclear power
plant comprising of four on ‘indigenous’ CANDU-type heavy water
reactors in Haryana, the state neighbouring New Delhi, the national
capital of India. This nuclear plant would have a total capacity of
2,800MWe, with four reactors of 700 Mwe each.

2.1 Location of Proposed Nuclear Plant
The final selection of site for the nuclear plant was approved inearly 2010 after a to the villages of Gorakhpur, Kumharia & Kajal
Heri in Fatehabad district by a high level land selection committee
from NPCIL, comprising of engineers & managers. In the first phase,
two nuclear reactors are planned. Initially, the name proposed was“Kumharia NPP” but it was later changed to Gorakhpur NPP, as mostof the land to be acquired is from Gorakhpur village.
Gorakhpur is about 210 kms by road from Delhi, but thestraight-line distance is just about 150 kms. Gorakhpur village has
an old history and is quite big in size. Famous religious saint Baba
Gorakhnath was born in this village in 11 th century and the village
remains a significant site of pilgrimage for the followers of his sect.

A small part of land has also been acquired from ‘Kajal Heri’, abeautiful village inhabited by Bishnoi community.
Gorakhpur is at a distance of 22
kms

from

the

headquarter
Fatehabad

districtFatehabad.

town

and

its

surrounding villages were given
the status of a district in 1997.
The town houses the district
headquarters

and

other

governmental offices, besides
colleges,schools

and

other

institutions. As per the 2011
census, the Fatehabad district
has a population of 941, 522, roughly equal to the nation of Fiji. 44
Its population growth rate over the decade 2001-2011 was 16.79%. Fatehabad has a sex ratio of 903 females for every 1000 males
and a literacy rate of 69.1 %. Fatehabad has a history dating backto the 14thcentury, when Delhi’s emperor Feroz Shah Tughlaq
founded it and named it after his son Fateh Khan. The district
thrives on a well-grown farming economy and the town is an
important centre for agricultural trade. Most of the arable land in
the district produces three crops a year and an affluent farming
community is the key contributor to its rising economy. It is said tobe the biggest pesticides market in Haryana. The climate of the
district is of tropical type with intensively hot summer and cool
winter, with a temperature of 47º in June and 2º celsius in
December and January. The average rainfall of the district is 400
44

District
CensusHandbook,
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/dchb/DCHB_A/06/0610_PART_A_DCHB_FATEHABAD.pdf

Fatehabadmm. The district is home to many small and medium sizedindustries, mostly catering to the local agriculture and trade. 45

2.2

Project Status
Land (1600 acres) has been acquired and preliminary work is

on. Compensation amount ranging from Rs. 12,00,000 to 44,00,000bper acre was used to effectively bribe the land owners in the area.
About 1313 acres from Gorakhpur village, about 185 from Badopal
village, and 3-5 acres from Kajal Heri have been acquired. The first
notification to acquire the land – was issued on July 29, 2010 under
Section 4 (urgency clause) of the archaic & colonial Land Acquisition
Act 1894.

In 2013, the Chandigarh High Court dismissed a writ

petition filed by a small section of the landowners against
acquisition.46

45 “ Brief Industrial Profile of Fatehabad District”

MSME-Development Institute, Karnal, Haryana

http://dcmsme.gov.in/dips/har_fatehabad.pdf

46“HC rejects petitions against nuclear plant in Haryana village” Times of India, May 17, 2013
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/HC-rejects-petitions-against-nuclear-plant-in-Haryanavillage/articleshow/20100088.cms

Illustration 1: location map of the proposed Gorakhpur Nuclear Power Plant

2.3 Proposed Township for the Staff of Gorakhpur
NPP
In 2013, the principal bench of the National Green Tribunal
ordered a stay on fencing of the 185 acres of land near Badopal
village, which the NPCIL had acquired for construction of a townshipfor the staff who would work at the proposed Gorakhpur nuclear
plant. With a population of around 20,000, this village dominated by
Bishnoi community had been resisting the township since its
inception. The Bishnoi community has a traditional reverence forthe black buck and other animals in the locality. The community
leaders had moved the National Green Tribunal seeking removal of
fencing as it killed several black-bucks. The Bishnoi community also

gave an ultimatum to the district administration in this regard. 47 The
Wildlife Institute of India, entrusted with preparing a conservation
plan for blackbucks, had told NPCIL to vacate the land acquired by it
for its residential colony.48 As of now, only pre-project activities areunderway – construction of two water storage tanks with a capacityof 45.5 million litres, a few approach roads, a meteorology lab andprefab offices.

Illustration 2: A model of GNPP (Image courtesy: The Tribune)

Lacking this clearance, the construction on the site has notstarted even after more than 3 years of foundation-laying ceremonyby the previous Prime Minister. Haryana’s Principal Secretary(Power) was quoted by the media saying that the government was
suffering a financial loss of Rs 7 to 8 crore per day for the delay ofthe project.49
47 “Nuclear

threatto
Badopalwildlife”
Timesof
India,
July
17,
2013,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/flora-fauna/Nuclear-threat-to-Badopalwildlife/articleshow/21113136.cms
48 “Ground Zero at Gorakhpur” The Tribune, 7 May 2017, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sundayspecial/perspective/ground-zero-at-gorakhpur/403248.html

49 “Year on, construction yet to begin on Gorakhpur N-plant” 11 Jan 2015,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/haryana/year-on-construction-yet-to-begin-on-gorakhpur-nplant/28814.html

This also is a brazen violation of the norms of Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board which disallow any habitation of over 10,000
people within the ‘sterile’ zone, 5 kms from the boundary of any
nuclear plant. There are densely populated towns like Fatehabad,
Ratiya and Tohana nearby where tens of thousands of people will beendangered in case of a major radioactive leak or accident. Even
Hisar, a city with with a population of over 200,000, is only around40 kilometers away.

2.4 Local Resistance Against the Project
Hopingthat the nuclear project would bring jobs anddevelopment in the area and the land prices will go up, initially thevillagers welcomed it. However, starting August 2010 they arestrongly resisting the project, and a struggle committee of local
farming community - Kisan Sangharsh Samity - was formed. It
started a continuous sit-in protest in front of the mini-secretariat at
Fatehabad town, which lasted more than 3 years. Both anunderstanding of loss of agricultural livelihood in the longer term
and awareness about potential risks of having a nuclear power plantin the vicinity worked behind this resistance. In spite of a sharp
increase in the offered compensation by the Haryana Government,
the Kisan Sangharsh Samity kept its determination not to give land
for the NPP until the end of 2013. The authorities were able to breakthe movement using stick and carrot policy. Besides, the villages
whose land was acquired, several peripheral villages also joined theresistance after becoming aware of the unacceptable risks they will
face from the nuclear plant. A number of civil society activists andindependent experts from across India have visited Fatehabad toextend solidarity to the ongoing movement.

Fatehabad district has a thriving agricultural economy, andmany small industries and trades centred around its agriculture
contribute substantially to the district’s prosperity. Wheat, mustard,
rice and cotton are primary agricultural products in Fatehabad. Rich
harvests in the district sustain a number of agro-based industries
like rice mills, cotton ginning units, oil extraction mills etc.
Vegetables are also grown, along with orchards being developed insome areas. The district is said to be the largest pesticides market
in the state of Haryana.
Bhakra branch canal came in this region in early 1970s. With
its plentiful water supply, it has proved to be the lifeline of thewhole area. Farmers in Fatehabad district produce three crops a
year in the region, despite less than 400mm annual rainfall,
primarily because of this canal. Productivity of the land can beguessed from the fact that absentee landowners rent the land totillers at the rate of Rs.30,000 – 45,000 per acre annually, compared
to about Rs.20,000 in most other areas of Haryana. The green coverin Fatehabad is also much denser than other districts in Haryana or
Punjab.
Another direct benefit of these lush green surroundings is theabundance of wild life in the area, compared to relatively biodiversity-barren landscapes of most of Haryana and Punjab. Large
numbers of birds including a variety of Kingfishers are seen aroundhere. The area – Bishnois being a large presence in many villages –also boasts of the presence of several hundred Black-bucks, which
are seen roaming around fields and tree covered areas freely. This
area deserves to be declared a people’s wild-life sanctuary, in view

of its bio-diversity importance in Haryana. If the NPP is allowed tocome up in this “Kashmir of Haryana” (as local activists call it), allthese remnants of a beautiful landscape will be lost forever.
The proposed site being hardly 150 KMs from Delhi as-thecrow-flies, in case of any major radioactive leakage, or accident, thewind patterns will easily bring the radioactive release to thedoorsteps of Delhi and NCR. Radioactive fall-out in the case of
Fukushima reactor accidents were minimised because of the Pacific
Ocean and the prevailing wind blowing into it.

Gorakhpur inFatehabad is surrounded by thickly populated villages & towns,
Hissar being the closest large town with a population of over
200,000. The district of Fatehabad has a population of well over
8,00,000, and the wind – whichever direction it blows – will carry allthat radioactive contamination into densely populated areas,
including Delhi & NCR.

Not a very attractive prospect for us

indifferent urbanites either.
Realising these grave dangers and against the insane drive fordangerous nuclear (fission) power, many groups – both from
Haryana and from elsewhere in the country, including Delhi, have
got together to support and strengthen the resistance struggle leadby the farmers of Fatehabad district.

A large no of discussion

meetings in villages around the site, and also in many towns ofHaryana, have been organised jointly – to make people aware of theextreme dangers, about various aspects of nuclear power and theimminent threat to the vibrant agro-economy of the area.
30

villageshave

passedresolutions opposing the

Nearlyproposed

Gorakhpur NPP, and expressing their determination not to allow it tocome up here and spoil their beautiful land.

Many prominentcitizens in Fatehabad and other districts of Haryana have also joined
this struggle against destructive nuclear power. In the weeks andmonths to come, the outcome will be decided by how many moregroups and people rise up against this and resist this dangerous
plant with what strength.

2.5 Grave Risks in Gorakhpur
The under-construction plant in Fatehabad poses real risk ofundergoing major accident due to 3 main reasons:
1. The NPCIL has no experience in constructing and running
reactors with capacity higher than 550 MWe. Gorakhpur would
be first of its kind construction, a major scaling-up of thePressurised Heavy Water designs that the NPCIL mastered byreverse-engineering CANDUs that it got from Canada in 1950s
and 60s, and now calls them indigenous designs.
2. The water supply to the reactor is inadequate and in the eventof an accident it would escalate the severity, potentiallyleadingtomajor

Loss-of-Coolant

accident(LOCA)

like

Fukushima.
3. Regulatory and disaster response structure in Fatehabad inparticular and India in general is unreliable, unaccountable andgrossly unprepared to handle a nuclear emergency.

2.6 First-of-its-kind scaling up of PHWRs
The GNPP reactors would be modelled after NPCIL’s existing
reactors at the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station in Gujarat. In a
recent interview, R K Khera, GNPP’s Project Director, said that thedesign is technically tested at KAPS, the model can be replicatedand construction can start at Gorakhpur. 50
50“Ground Zero at Gorakhpur” The Tribune, 7 May 2017,
special/perspective/ground-zero-at-gorakhpur/403248.html

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday-

However, the PHWR design of 550 MW capacity at Kakrapar –India’s largest operating reactor so far, has come under severe
criticism after a major accident last year. The accident took placecoincidentally on the 5th year anniversary of Fukushima – 11 March2016. Actually, the accident in Kakrapar Unit-2 which led to an onsite emergency and reactor shut down, might ironically have been aresult of using sub-standard equipments during the post-Fukushimasafety enhancement carried out by the NPCIL. 51
While

the

accident

in

KAPS

was

underway,Dr.

A

Gopalakrishnan, the former head of the Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board(AERB)

cautioned:““Somereports

indicate

that

the

containment has been vented to the atmosphere at least once, if
not more times , which I suspect indicates a tendency for pressurebuild up in that closed space due to release of hot heavy water andsteam into the containment housing . If this is true, the leak is not
small, but moderately large, and still continuing. No one confirmsthat any one has entered the containment (in protective clothing)
for a quick physical assessment of the situation , perhaps it is not
safe to do so because of the high radiation fields inside...all thispoints to the likelihood that what Kakrapar Unit-1 is undergoing is asmall Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) in progress. It is most likelythat one or more pressure tubes (PT) in the reactor (which containthe fuel bundles) have cracked open, leaking hot primary systemheavy-water coolant into the containment housing” 52

51 Kumar Sundaram, “Nuclear leak in Kakrapar may be more serious than the government is telling us” Scroll, 11
March 2016, https://scroll.in/article/805119/nuclear-leak-in-kakrapar-may-be-more-serious-than-the-government-istelling-us
52 “Kakrapar Nuclear Plant Is Likely Undergoing A Loss-Of-Coolant Accident: Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan” DiaNuke.org,
12
March
2016,
http://www.dianuke.org/kakrapar-nuclear-plant-likely-undergoing-loss-coolant-accident-drgopalakrishnan/

The KAPS also underwent a severe accident in 2004, when thecontrol rods were irreparably damaged during maintenance work.
Another leak of heavy water, on March 11, 2011, led to a shutdown.
Actually, the Unit-1 of Kakrapar reactor was commissioned in 1993
without proper testing of its Emergency Core Cooling System, which
is a major source of its vulnerability. 53
Another ‘teething trouble’ than could become a reason for
major potential accidents in future is the loose soil beneath theground in Gorakhpur, with water table at 3-4 meters at the site.
Although the Project Director of GNPP has told the media that thesoild will be treated and the issue will be sorted, independent
experts believe that rocky soil is more suitable for nuclear reactors.

2.7 Inadequate Water Supply: Invitation to Major
Accidents
Gorakhpur project would consist of 4 reactors of 700MW each.
This will be India’s largest indigenous nuclear power project built sofar. The reactor complex would require 320 cusecs of water forcooling and other purposes. But the entire project will depend forwater on a small Canal, Fatehabad branch of the Bhakhra Canal,
which is the main source of water for irrigation in the region. This isperhaps the only project in the world to have such limited andunreliable source of water supply. Water would pose three hugeproblems in Gorakhpur: the water will be inadequate even for thecooling of reactors in their normal operation; in case of an accident,
the situation could be worse than even Fukushima due to non53 T S Subramanianm, “Safety concerns”, Frontline magazine, Vol 21, Issue 13, June 19-July 2, 2004
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2113/stories/20040702003809900.htm

availability of water, and the high temperature of the discharge
water from the reactor would destroy the agriculture in thedownstream of the canal which dozens of villages depend use for
irrigation.
A regulatory requirement of the Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board (AERB) is that “if the minimum water supply required for longterm heat removal from the core cannot be ensured under all
circumstances,

then

the

site

shall

be

deemedunsuitable.

Availability of adequate quantity of water to maintain the reactor
under safe shutdown state for at least thirty days needs to beensured under all circumstances.”54
For more than 20 days in the summer of 2013, the Bhakhra
Canal was closed for maintenance. The canal was almost dry andboth Fatehabad town and surrounding villages are reeling underacute water crisis. When local activists raised their concerns aboutrisks of dangerous accidents in such situations, the NPCIL officials
came

up

with

the following contradicting and unconvincing

assurances in the vernacular media:
 We are researching for reactors which will consume less water We will take water from the western Yamuna canal. That is 200
kms away from the proposed site and if people on the otherside of Haryana come to know about this plan, there will bemajor unrest against it.
 We will store water for one month. Even the EIA talks of only 1
week of water storage.
 In a meeting with the local activists, the District Collector
54 Amita Bhaduri, “Fatehabad nuclear project: a Fukushima in the making?” DiaNuke.org, 28
August 2017, http://www.dianuke.org/fatehabad-nuclear-project-fukushima-making/apparently

said

off-the-record

that

he

will

recyclethe

Fatehabad sewage water and supply it to the reactor!
For its enormous water requirement, this large nuclear power
plant will be entirely dependent on the Bhakhra Canal, as the area
has no perennial rivers or any other water-bodies like a dam or lake.
Nuclear energy consumes 400 gallons/MWh with once-throughcooling and 720 gallons/MWh with wet cooling towers. 55 Coal
consumes less, ranging from about 300 gallons/MWh for plants withminimal pollution

controls and once-through cooling to714

gallons/MWh for plants with advanced pollution control system andwet cooling towers. Water supply to the under construction nuclear
power plant in Gorakhpur, from the Bhakhra canal is inadequate,
and would have dangerous consequences in case of an accident.
The nuclear plant in Gorakhpur would take around 320 cusecs
of water from the Bhakhra Branch Canal. As per the original Bhakra
water sharing agreement of 1959 between Punjab and Rajasthanwater is meant only for irrigation and hydel power generation.
Therefore diverting a huge quantity of 320 cusecs, meant to irrigate
over 130,000 acres (allocation of 2.25 cusecs per 1000 acre) for anuclear power plant is illegal and violative of Right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution. Some other significant questions
concerning water in GNPP are listed below 56:i.

Bhakra Water Sharing Agreement 1959 between Punjab andRajasthan restricts the use only for irrigation and generation ofhydel power. It is in the opening para itself.

ii.

The allotment for irrigation in the culturable command area

55 Bahman Zohuri, Patrick McDaniel, “Thermodynamics In Nuclear Power Plant Systems” Springer 2015, page-444
56 Devasahayam, MG, “Haryana’s Nuclear Power Plant: Inviting Disaster” DiaNuke.org, 30 December 2013,
http://www.dianuke.org/haryana-nuclear-power-plant-inviting-disaster/

according to the Agreement is 2.25 cusecs per thousand acresiii.

2800 MW GNPP water requirement, to be supplied from theFatehabad Branch is 320 cusecs. According to the allotment
this quantum that can irrigate about 142, 000. Even if we take
into account 30% of water that would be returned to the canalafter cooling the irrigated area lost would be about 99,000
acres.

iv.

Can such a huge quantum of water be diverted for generating
nuclear power, which is not provided for in the Agreement, atthe cost of irrigation.

v.

In the alternative can Haryana get extra allocation to provide
water for nuclear power generation? Even if Haryana gets
extra water can it be conveyed to the project site?

vi.

There is contradiction in the claims of NPCIL. Passage marked
in red talks of returning 50% of water to the canal while theactual quantum mentioned in the passage marked in green is
only 30%. Is this not deliberate misleading?

vii.

As per nuclear experts residual water after cooling the reactor
will have radiation and therefore unfit for irrigation anddrinking water downstream.

viii.

Water is the most critical, but most constrained input for the
nuclear plant with several adverse ramifications and effects.
While other issues have been dealt with in great detail in the
EIA, water issue has been dealt with in less than two pages inan almost arbitrary and dismissive manner.

ix.

Commitment letter from Government of Haryana (Annexure III)looks abrupt and signed by an Executive Engineer referring tosome decision by CM. Is it tenable and legally valid?
x.

Haryanaletteris not sure about the dependabilityofFatehabad Branch supply and talks of alternative supply
through Sirsa Canal. This has not been dealt with properly in
the EIA, leaving the critical water issue high and dry.
xi.

This is for the normal operation/reactor cooling. In case of any
accident during operation huge quantum of water on acontinuous basis would be requires as it happened in the
Fukishima case. From where will this water come.

xii.

EIA talks of 15 day closure of Fatehabad Branch once in 10
years. But as per media reports there have been frequentclosures. This canal was lying closed almost for the entire
month of April.

xiii.

There are reports that Gobindsagar dam itself is facing water
storage problems due to sedimentation and poor rains andtherehave beenfrequent

reductions

in

water

release.

Agriculture at least can adjust. But it will be disaster for a 2800
MW nuclear plant in operation. This has not been addressed at
all.
xiv.

Radiation and other impacts on downstream land, farming,
drinking water for human and animals have not beenaddressed. This is a serious flaw.

2.8 Disconcerting
Preparedness

Absenceof

Any

DisasterIn 2013, the Ministry of Forest and Environmental Affairs(MoEF) awarded environmental clearance to the Gorakhpur projectwith several conditions, including one which requires the NPCIL to
make an emergency evacuation plan at the earliest. 57
The foundation stone of the Gorakhpur nuclear power plant
was laid on 13 January 2014 by the then Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh. The NPCIL then estimated that construction of
first phase of the plant – consisting of two reactors – would finish by
the year 2021.58 The estimated cost of the plant is Rs. 20,594 Crore.
The state government has also been announcing it with pride, as itis the first Nuclear Power Plant in Haryana. While laying thefoundation stone, the Prime Minister claimed that GNPP would fulfil
the State’s energy needs, but the reality is that Haryana is already apower-surplus state.59 In presence of the Chairpersons of NPCIL and
AEC, the Prime Minister promised that no one will be displaced forconstruction of this plant. However, later, when local farmers
actually refused to move away from the acquired land, they were
evicted brutally by using police force.60
Stipulations of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board also
require NPCIL to submit detailed emergency evacuation plans, but itis yet to materialise. The AERB has given a formal siting consent forthe project in July 2015.
57 “Proposed Haryana nuke plant gets environment ministry's conditional nod” Times of India, 30 December 2013,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/developmental-issues/Proposed-Haryana-nuke-plant-getsenvironment-ministrys-conditional-nod/articleshow/28117870.cms
58 "Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan sigh Lays Foundation Stone of 2800 MW Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut
Pariyojana (Nuclear Power Project)". Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 13 January 2014,
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=102476
59 “Power-surplus Haryana struggles to find buyers ” Hindustan Times, 17 October 2013,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/chandigarh/power-surplus-haryana-struggles-to-find-buyers/storyQ5A32m16tGjOm3HwbV9MIO.html
60 “Police evict farmers from land for nuclear plant” The Tribune, 28 May 2015,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/haryana/community/police-evict-farmers-from-land-for-nuclear-plant/86187.html

This is a major concern as the area around the upcoming
project is densely populated, consists of hundreds of thousands offarmers with no vehicles of their own and even roads in the area
might not be enough for emergency evacuation at such mammoth
scale. Local activist Yashveer Arya, during an interview for thisresearch, said - “we have been knocking at the doors of authorities
for a credible evacuation plans so that people in the region could be
relocated swiftly in case an accident takes place. We have to run
from one bureaucracy to the other, from the district administration
to the state level officials, from NPCIL office to filing Right toInformation queries to the AERB. But so far, the authorities havefailed to give us any such plans. All we have are empty assurancesthat the government can handle a nuclear accident situation. But
what we know for sure is that there is no area with sparse
population in the whole state or even neighbouring states wheretens of thousands of people could be evacuated in case of a major
catastrophic accident.”
The ‘exclusion zone’ of 1.6 KMs from the plant boundary will beoutside this land acquired in Gorakhpur village. However, the local
population has been traditionally using this land for grazing cattle
and other common purposes and it will lose control of large parts ofland in the vicinity even without formal acquisition as this land will
become difficult to access. The ‘sterile zone’, an area of 5 kms as
per AERB norms where artificial growth of population must not beallowed once the reactors come up, also already contains a large
population, which will face adverse health impacts of the nuclear
power plant and will live in constant fear of a catastrophe.

Besides, an ‘Emergency Preparedness Zone’ of 16 kms is also
stipulated by the AERB for which an emergency evacuation plan has
to be drawn by the local authorities in consultation with the NPCIL
and AERB. Broadly, this zone is divided into 16 parts and in case ofan accident, these segments have to be evacuated or shifted as per
the circumstances. The AERB’s rule is clear that emergency
preparedness plans must be in place before the NPP’s operation islicensed. There are 2 major kinds of emergencies – on-site and offsite.
As per the existing norms, off-site emergencies have to behandled by state authorities with technical inputs from the nuclear
operator. This researcher, along with local activists and doctors,
approached local authorities but they either refused to give any
details at this stage or responded that the NPCIL is yet to provide
them with an emergency plan.

Zones aroundnuclear reactors
in India(as per AERB
norms)

Area

Permissible
population

Exclusion Zone

1.6km

Sterilised Zone
(Controlled
Population Zone)

5kms

Less than 20 thousand

Emergency
Preparedness Zone

16kms
(Primary –8km/secondary16kms, divided into
16 sectors)

Distance of population
centres (>10000
persons) should be
more than 10km

Environmental
survey zone

30km

Distance of large
population centers(>100000 persons)should be more than 30km
Sources:
1) AERB Chairman SS Bajaj’s presentation at the US NRC, September 2014 https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0425/ML042540084.pdf
2) Answer in parliament by Minister of State for PMO, 1 December 2011,
http://www.dae.nic.in/writereaddata/rsus1094_011211.pdf

2.9 Nuclear Liability for Gorakhpur
In 2016, the NPCIL sought fresh bids from suppliers ofequipments for Gorakhpur Nuclear Power Plant, based on new
definition of suppliers laid down in the 2011 Nuclear Liability Rules.
“We have gone the extra mile to address the concerns of equipment
suppliers,” S K Mazumder, Executive Director for contract andmaterial management at the NPCIL was quoted in a media
interview. “We now expect good support and understanding fromour suppliers. We don’t want to lose any more time to take thenuclear program forward.”61

The

NPCIL

last

sought

bids

from

local

equipment

manufacturers for the project almost two years ago. But few
component makers bid for the project then, as they felt the contract
didn’t provide enough safeguards against the liability law, according
to Y.S. Trivedi, senior vice-president for heavy engineering at Larsen& Toubro Ltd.

61 “NPCIL seeks new bids for Gorakhpur nuclear power plant” Live Mint, 28 July 2016,
http://www.livemint.com/Industry/2rOqsVXrbrTo79k4UgbXsJ/NPCIL-seeks-new-bids-for-Gorakhpur-nuclear-powerplant.html

Sekhar Basu, Secretary of India’s Atomic Energy Commission(AEC) said that the NPCIL will introduce clauses in tender
documents that will exclude component manufacturers for domestic
projects from liability provisions. These companies can’t be termed
as suppliers as they work under “our supervision and according toour design specifications, right from design to construction andfabrication,”
This weakening of nuclear liability would mean that in case ofan accident in Gorakhpur, the liability for the victims would be
ridiculously limited and they would not be able to sue the suppliers
directly.

2.10

Political Parties Take Turns to Support the Project
which they had Labelled ‘Risky’
Political parties in Haryana state have to heed to people’s

sentiments when they are in opposition. That is why the Bharatiya
Janata Party(BJP), opposed the nuclear project when it was in
opposition. But once in power, the BJP has made a complete u-turnand its Chief Minister Manoharlal Khattar started supporting thenuclear project soon after assuming power. 62

62 “CMtakes
U-turn, supports
Gorakhpur
N-plant” The Tribune,
20 December
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/haryana/cm-takes-u-turn-supports-gorakhpur-n-plant/24392.html

2014,Section III
India Unprepared: in Dangerous Denial of
FukushimaContrary

totheworldwide

reckoningoflessons

from

Fukushima, the Indian nuclear establishment remains in selfdelusion. While a number of countries have decided to roll backnuclear programs after the accident in Japan, or have at least set
up more stringent safety regulation, India has done no such rethink.
In

fact,

the

new

regulator,

Nuclear

SafetyRegulatory

Authority(NSRA) that the Indian government has proposed to
introduce after Fukushima, is more toothless, ineffective and nonindependent

than

the

existing

AtomicEnergyRegulatory

Board(AERB) as per its former head Dr. A Gopalakrishnan.63 The
newly proposed Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), which
will replace the existing Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB),
also seeks to amend the RTI Act64 and effectively deny any public
scrutiny.
3.1 DAE in Denial of Fukushima
When the Fukushima accident took place, India was the first
country to declare the Fukushima reactors safe, even before theJapanese government. When the situation at the nuclear site took aturn for the worse on March 14, the chief of India’s nuclear
establishment claimed in a press conference that no nuclear
63 A Gopalakrishnan,“A nuclear regulator without teeth”, DiaNuke.org,
https://www.dianuke.org/a-nuclear-regulator-without-teeth-a-gopalakrishnan/

19

September

2011,

64
Venkateshnayak, “Exempting Nuclear Safety from the Right to Information: Let’s say NO!” February 8, 2012,
DiaNuke.org. Available at http://www.dianuke.org/exempting-nuclear-safety-from-the-right-to-information-lets-say-no/

accident had occurred.

According to SK Jain, managing director of the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Limited, and Srikumar Banerjee, the thenchairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, all that was happening
in Fukushima was a just well-planned emergency preparedness
exercise.65 Later that year, the Department of Atomic Energy said
that there was zero chance – "one in infinity" – that a nuclear
accident could take place in India. 66
The mechanical denials have seeped into the entire systemnow. The recent Supreme Court judgment on Koodankulam also
suffers from the same anachronism. Going through its 250 pages,
most of which are long verbatim quotes from Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board (AERB) safety manuals for pressurized heavy
water reactors while the Koodankulam reactors are of an entirely
different design, one can only wonder if the Fukushima accident
ever happened. Justice Dipak Misra simply dismissed apprehensionsof far-reaching consequences of radioactive effects as having “nobasis”! The judgment says: “Nobody on the earth can predict what
would happen in future and to a larger extent we have to leave it to
the destiny …apprehension is something we anticipate with anxiety
or fear, a fearful anticipation, which may vary from person toperson.”The truth is, Indian nuclear expansion is taking place incomplete denial of the real and insurmountable risks inherent in
65 “No 'nuclear' accident in Fukushima, say Indian N-experts” India Today, 14 March 2011,
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/no-nuclear-accident-in-fukushima-indian-nuclear-experts/1/132416.html
66 “AEC chief puts odds of N-plant accidents at ‘1-in-infinity” The Hindu, 10 November 2011,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aec-chief-puts-odds-of-nplant-accidents-at-1ininfinity/article2615375.ece

nuclear technology, as revealed by the Fukushima disaster. Besides,
every form of democratic dissent and even the government’s own
norms are being

bulldozed by this one-dimensional nuclear

obsession. In August, the DAE joined political parties in demanding
exemption from the Right to Information (RTI). Interestingly, it said
that its “international commitments” require strict confidentiality.

While the Indian government did initiate a safety audit process
after Fukushima, it was conducted internally by NPCIL. The Atomic
Energy Regulatory Board, India’s nuclear regulator, is a toothless
body which comes under the Atomic Energy Commission that it isactually supposed to supervise. The recommendations of the
AERB’s post-Fukushima review of the Koodankulam nuclear power
station in Tamil Nadu were set aside to commission the reactor amid
massive protests by the local community.

On August 2008, the then Minister of State in the Prime
Minister’s Office (PMO), V Narayanasamy’s nonchalance in the Rajya
Sabha said that the possible impact on the affected population is“practicallyinsignificant”.

This

was

in

his

reply

to

a

parliamentarian’s question on the disaster preparedness of the
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). He expressed his confidence inthe bumbling National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA),
universally discredited for its abjectly inefficient handling of therecent ecological disaster in Uttarakhand. In his statement in
Parliament, he quoted selectively from the conservative reports of
the World Health Organisztion (WHO) and the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effect of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR),
published in February and May that year.

After Fukushima, India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)
has raised serious questions about nuclear safety in its 2012
report67 on nuclear safety regulation on the lack of democratic
oversight and transparency in India’s nuclear sector and underlined
the safety implications of such secretive safety culture.

The DAE remained silent also on the questions raised by the
Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) on nuclear safety in India
after Fukushima.68

After 31 years of the horrendous man-made accident in
Bhopal, the victim-survivor continue to struggle for justice andreparation, for basic decontamination and cleaning, and expanding
medical care beyond the arbitrarily and narrowly governmentidentified victims. The genetic impact of the Union Carbide disasterhas been revealed in several scientific studies69, but they have not
led to any serious effort by the state or central governments.
As the world approaches the 7th year of the accident in Japan's
Fukushima and the 34th year of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster inthe erstwhile USSR, India must stop and think if we are in a position
to deal with the a serious nuclear accident.

67
CAG Report on Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), available at http://www.dianuke.org/dianuke-documentscag-report-on-atomic-energy-regulatory-board-aerb/

68 M V Ramana and Suvrat Raju, “It’s better to be safe than sorry”, Hindustan Times, 05 February 2014,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-view/it-s-better-to-be-safe-than-sorry/story-QpSS9S571iXtn6SaYaOlXK.html
69 Rajan Patil, “Investigating genetic outcomes following 1984 Toxic Union Carbide disaster in India: epidemiologicalchallenges” , International Journal of Occupational Medicine and Environmental Health, Vol 23, Issue 4, January 2010,https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ijmh.2010.23.issue-4/v10001-010-0025-4/v10001-010-0025-4.xml

While scrapping the National Disaster Management Authority(NDMA) was one of the first thing the Modi government did after
assuming power, it is yet to come up with a better institution to
respond to calamities and their human consequences. However,preventing and responding to a nuclear accident is a much larger
issues and the imperatives go far beyond creating a new
bureaucratic behemoth. And contrary to the reassurances of thenuclear engineers and nuclear industry insiders, nuclear safety is
far beyond just the design safety.

3.2 Nuclear Accident: Irreversible, Long-term andWide-ranging Consequences

The most important factor to take into consideration whenbuilding a nuclear accident scenario are its consequences, which
are irreversible, long-term, genetic and essentially, unrestrained intime and space. The nuclear enthusiasts only reveal their rather
ideological commitment to the technology when they ridiculously
compare nuclear accidents to car accidents or any other industrial
accident. In other accidents, even if the immediate physical damage
and deaths might be higher, reconstruction and relief can start fromthe very next hour.

However, even after three decades, the 30-km zone ofChernobyl continues to host ghost cities like Pripyat which would
remain uninhabitable for coming centuries. Similarly in Fukushima,
once bustling cities like Namie and Futaba are now frozen in timeand radiation levels remain dangerously high.

Nuclear safety is an ever-evolving challenge. Besides theimmediate design safety, a country would also require a credible
safety culture, an independent regulator, a responsive and reliable
civic administration in general and a people-centric liability
mechanism to be able to provide an adequate response. On allthese counts, India comes across far more than wanting, rendering
a potential nuclear accident a nightmare.

The Indian nuclear industry is completely non-transparent andunaccountable. Operating directly under the Prime Minister's office,it enjoys complete insulation from public and democratic scrutiny.
Serious RTI queries are routinely rejected by deploying the 1962
vintage Atomic Energy Act evoking 'national security' clause,
despite the separation of the civilian sector after the watershed
moment of the Indo-US deal. In the course of Koodankulam
movement, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) refused to partwith basic documents like the Site Selection Report and the Safety
Assessment Report, which are normally put in public domain all over
the world. India's then Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) wrote
a letter to the PM, but even that didn't work.70

Nuclear safety regulation is another Achilles heel. India's
nuclear regulator Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which
depend on the same Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for funds
and human resource that it is supposed to monitor and supervise, isa toothless and non-independent entity. The last time when its
Chairman ordered a thorough safety audit of the entire sector, thereport was shelved with the central government putting a 'top
70 “Central Information Commissioner writes to PM, says don't dilute RTI act” NDTV, 29 March 2012,
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/central-information-commissioner-writes-to-pm-says-dont-dilute-rti-act-473876

secret' stamp on it. Dr. A K Gopalakrishnan, the former Chairman
behind that enquiry, has been a vocal advocate of a strong andindependent regulator since then and has proposed a moratorium
on imported nuclear power plants until that happens. 71 It isappalling that the Indian government chose to set aside the postFukushima recommendations of even this weak nuclear regulator
when it came to giving green signal to the Koodankulam project in
the Supreme Court. The AERB was forced to file an affidavit and callits own stipulations advisory and not mandatory. In the absence ofan independent regulator, India is setting up 6 EPR-design reactors
in Maharashtra's Jaitapur when the French regulator itself has raised
serious objections on the design.72
3.3 Liability and compensation
On the issue of liability and compensation, the Indian
government has shown scant regard to the potential victims.
Safeguarding the foreign suppliers from any liability has been aparamount concern. Nothing could be more absurd and ironical than
the fact that since the inception of the Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage Act 2010, the government has been busy finding a way toaddress the concerns of the foreign suppliers who want to acomplete indemnification. The clause 17(b), holding suppliers liable
albeit with severe limitations, was introduced under pressure fromthe parliamentary opposition and civil society by a reluctant
Manmohan Singh government. But Modi government has dumped
the earlier BJP position on nuclear liability and has tried to create an
insurance pool to channel the liability back to the exchequer andthus undermine the law.
71 Dr. A Gopalakrishnan, “Koodankulam Must Be Stopped: Dr. A Gopalakrishnan” DiaNuke.org, 19 April 2013,
http://www.dianuke.org/koodankulam-must-be-stopped-dr-a-gopalakrishnan/
72 “French nuclear safety agency warns of Flamanville EPR meltdown risk”, Mediapart, 8 June 2015,
https://www.mediapart.fr/en/journal/france/080615/french-nuclear-safety-agency-warns-flamanville-epr-meltdown-risk

K Sujata Rao, the then secretary in the ministry of health andfamily welfare while deposing before the Indian parliament’s
standing committee on science and technology, in the matter ofnuclear emergency, mentioned, “Since the response system to deal
with any kind of emergency of such type, the hospitals are not wellequipped, it is natural that mortality and morbidity due to multiple
burn, blasts, radiation injuries and psycho-social impact could be onvery high scale and medical tackling of such a large emergency
could have enough repercussions in the nearby areas of radioactive
fallout…”

She suggested while setting up nuclear plants consideration
may also be given to the fact that there should be hospital having
trained doctors near such establishments and arrangements should
also be made for free treatment of people who are affected byserious nuclear fallout.”73

This has been revealed in the committee’s report presented to
the Parliament. She confessed that Union health ministry is nowhere
to meet an eventuality that may arise out of nuclear andradiological emergencies. Admittedly, there is no provision andinfrastructure for health care during radiological emergencies in the
country.
India’s former nuclear regulator Dr. A Gopalakrishnan was alsointerviewed for this research, who added - “the Atomic Energy
Commission needs to do a major rethink before it goes ahead with anuclear plant which has such crucial vulnerability. Also, there must73 Quoted by Gopal Krishna, “Nuclear showdown in Delhi's neighbourhood” Intercultural Resources, 30 July 2012,
http://icrindia.co.in/mydirectory/2012/07/30/nuclear-showdown-in-delhis-neighbourhood/be transparency and far more stringent oversight in the safety
clearance for the 700 MW PHWRs.”
3.4 Evacuation, Rehabilitation and Justice
Even less promising is the Indian government reassurance ofadequate evacuation and post-accident scenario. All Indian nuclear
facilities are surrounded by dense populations which have onlygrown further with time. In most cases, the DAE doesn't reveal theemergency preparation arrangement and when it does it comes up
with ridiculous plans of relocating 50,000 people in a school
premises. The mandatory emergency drills before commissioning
reactors have turned out to be cruel jokes, with absurd instances
like the local officials 'evacuating' a few hundred people in buses bytaking them to nearby villages.74
The experience of Bhopal accident in India, worlds largest
chemical accident that happened in 1986, does not instill any
confidence in evacuation and rehabilitation capacity of the Indianstate, as its victims continue to struggle for medical help,
rehabilitation, decontamination and compensation even after morethan 30 years. When the Japanese Prime Minister visited India in
2016 to negotiate the India-Japan nuclear agreement, victim groups
from Bhopal, in a collective open letter, urged - “the victims of
Bhopal continue to struggle for justice, adequate compensation andproper medical, economic, social and environmental rehabilitation
In our city, we have a commemorative statue of a mother and herchild with “No More Bhopal, No More Hiroshima” written beneath it.
And in the fifth year of the ongoing disaster in Fukushima, we canidentify

with

the

continued

sufferingandstrugglesofits

74 Praful Bidwai, “Starting Koodankulam: When deception triumphs” DiaNuke.org, 21 July 2013,
http://www.dianuke.org/starting-koodankulam-when-deception-triumphs/

residents.....your nuclear deal with our country will bring windfall
gains to these huge corporations at the cost of the environment,labour and human rights of our people. And similar to what
happened in Bhopal, there will be 1000s of Bhopal happening
elsewhere

inthecountry

with

much

more

horrendous

consequences. We urge you to desist from this impending
agreement during your visit to India.”

Conclusion
A Fukushima-like accident in Fatehabad would be replete withinsurmountable technical, administrative and logistical difficulties
given the site-specific problems like design-related issues andinadequate supply of cooling water, the lack of clarity andaccountability about emergency-response mechanisms as well as
the larger issues plaguing the Indian nuclear sector such as nonindependenceofsafetyrefulator,

limitedliability

and

non-

transparency. The government of India should conduct a wideest
possible consultation with all stake-holders concerned – local
communities,

districtandstate-levelauthorities,

independent

experts and civil society and environmental groups, to re-evaluate
scenarios of potential accident and its consequences.