July 1, 2023

Deterring a Taiwan Contingency— A Study of Japan’s Approach —Kawashima Takashi
Senior Research Fellow, NPI
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine possible approaches that Japan can undertake to deter a
Taiwan contingency.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Taiwan is being eyed as a potential
region for the next major conflict. A number of Japanese and U.S. research institutes haveconducted wargames on the scenario of a Taiwan contingency. Among them, a Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) Report even mentions the state of exhaustion between Taiwan,
the United States, and China after the resolution of a Taiwan contingency. This Report has been
widely covered by the Japanese media. Many of the wargames present a scenario in which apreemptive attack on U.S. military bases in Japan would be carried out in anticipation of China’s
invasion of Taiwan. In response to this Report, the U.S. House of Representatives SelectCommittee on the Chinese Communist Party has recommended policy measures such as thedispersal of U.S. military forces to the Indo-Pacific region and strengthening of base defense to
mitigate the damage.1
The potential economic damage to Japan from a Taiwan contingency would be incalculable.
Japan, which imports more than 90% of its oil from the Middle East, would not be able to use theconventional maritime route between Taiwan and the Philippines via the Bashi Channel, the South“Zainichi Beigunkichi no Kyoka o Teigen: Kaintokubetsui, Taiwan Yuji de [the U.S. House ofRepresentatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Recommends Reinforcing U.S. Basesin Japan in the Event of a Taiwan Contingency],” Sankei Shimbun newspaper, May 25, 2023,
https://www.sankei.com/article/20230525-DGHSUPK7OJP2DFJY3MRNV73QOA/ (Japanese). “U.S.
bases in the theater should be strengthened against the possibility of PLA attack,” Item 9 in Executive
Summary, House Select Committee report, TEN FOR TAIWAN Policy Recommendations to Preserve
PEACE and STABILITY in the Taiwan Strait, https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evosubsites/ selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/ten-for-taiwan-final-with-coverpage-2.pdf
1

1
The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nakasone Peace Institute.

China Sea, and the Strait of Malacca and would have to use a route that makes a major detour,
resulting in higher oil prices due to increased transportation costs. Moreover, depending on the
war situation, foreign crew members, who comprise the majority of the crew on Japanese merchant
fleet ships (estimated at nearly 60,000), may well refuse to board, and Japan’s oil import itself may
not be possible.
The impact on the global economy could be even more serious. Taiwan holds more than 60%of the global market share in the semiconductor contract manufacturing sector2 making it a key
location in the supply chain. The fact that the world’s most advanced, yet untapped technology inlogic IC manufacturing and the world’s only R&D and production base are located in Taiwan could
pose a global risk in the event of a contingency. In particular, the dependence of US companies on
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Taiwan’s leading semiconductor
manufacturer, is extremely high, and the impact of a hypothetical stop in product supply in theevent of a contingency could be catastrophic.3
The occurrence of a Taiwan contingency could cause unacceptable levels of economic loss
and disruption not only to Japan but also to the world, and it is essential to deter an invasion. Many
research institute reports, however, focus on the factors and effects of victory or defeat in a Taiwan
contingency and do not sufficiently address how a contingency itself could be deterred. For thisreason, Section 1 of this study introduces the types of deterrence measures that Japan can takefrom both economic and military perspectives. Section 2 discusses “punitive deterrence,” which
is one type of deterrence, and Section 3 examines each element that could contribute to “denial
deterrence,” which is likely to become more important in deterrence. Discussion is based on theabovementioned CSIS Report and Japan’s three security documents, i.e., National Security
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program. And finally, Section 4
addresses potential approaches in response to hybrid threat activity that could be used during thecourse of an escalation of a Taiwan contingency.
1. Types of deterrence measures
Generally, deterrence is defined as a military role that demonstrates a willingness to respondmilitarily and inflict damage in the event that the other party attacks, with the objective ofdissuading the opponent from initiating an attack. For deterrence to function, the deterring party
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Overseas Research Department, “Taiwan ni okeru
Handotai Sangyo ni tsuite: Taiwan no Kanren Seisaku to Shuyo Kigyo no Sapurai Chen Chosa [The
Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan: A Survey of Taiwan’s Relevant Policies and Supply Chains of Major
Companies],” 2022, p. 3.
3 Ibid, p. 14.
2

2

must have the intent and capability to execute a military response, and it is essential that this intent
and capability are correctly recognized by the other party. In order for these intents and capabilities
to be credible, it is believed that a variety of capabilities must be developed in accordance with thelevel of anticipated attack.4
These deterrence concepts are often categorized as punitive or denial deterrence.
(1) Deterrence by punishment
Punitive deterrence is a strategy that involves threatening the opponent with intolerable
consequences if it takes actions contrary to one’s own country’s interests. By working on the
opponent’s cost-benefit calculations, punitive deterrence forces the opponent to abandon an attack.
An example of punitive deterrence is generally the commonly used method of changing the
opponent’s will as a nation by forcing it to foresee the damage that would be inflicted by thedeterring party through economic sanctions or other means.
In examining the deterrence of a Taiwan contingency, we will focus on three resources thatare indispensable for waging war: energy, food, and semiconductors. We will analyze the impactof sanctions related to these three sectors on China, assuming to have launched an invasion of
Taiwan. Section 2 will examine whether such sanctions could contribute to deterring a Taiwan
contingency.
(2) Deterrence by denial
Denial deterrence is a strategy that relies on the ability to physically deter specific offensive actions
that an adversary could undertake. By working on the opponent’s calculations of the likelihood ofachieving its goals, denial deterrence causes the opponent to abandon the attack.5
In Section 3, a comparison of the military strength of Japan, Taiwan, the U.S., and China will
be made in order to objectively analyze the deterrence capabilities of Japan and the U.S. from theperspective of denial deterrence. In addition, we will focus on the results of a CSIS Report which
conducted wargames and analyzed the opponent’s potential to achieve its objectives in the eventof a Taiwan contingency. We will then examine the factors that could contribute to denial
deterrence. We will conclude this study by analyzing how the contents of Japan’s three security
documents issued in December 2022 and the recent moves of the Japanese government could“(Commentary) Deterrence,” Ministry of Defense website,
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2010/2010/html/mc323000.html (Japanese), viewed May 10,2023.
5 Ibid.
43

contribute to denial deterrence.
2. Effects of punitive deterrence
The effects of punitive deterrence need to be analyzed from various perspectives, including suchareas as financial sanctions. However, this section focuses on sanctions in three targeted areas:
energy, food, and semiconductors, which have a particularly large impact on the maintenance ofmilitary functions, and we will examine what would happen if sanctions were imposed on these
sectors in the case of a Taiwan contingency.
(1) Energy
As of 2019, China is the world’s 7th largest oil producing country and has the 13th largest provenoil reserves in the world, with a reserves-to-production ratio of 19 years. China is the world’s
second largest oil consumer after the United States. It accounts for just over 10% of global
consumption and imports 70% of its consumption; in 2017, it surpassed the U.S. to become theworld’s number one oil importer; as of 2019, China accounted for 23% of global crude oil trade.6
In the first half of 2022, crude oil exporters to China were Saudi Arabia (17%), Russia (15%),
Iraq (11%), Oman (9%), Angola (8%), UAE (6%), and Kuwait (6%), with a heavy reliance on the
Middle East and Russia.7 While U.S. sanctions on Iran’s crude oil imports have not been lifted,
China has increased its crude oil imports from Iran since the beginning of 2021. With China andIran agreeing and signing a “comprehensive cooperation plan” for a period of 25 years, China’s
crude oil imports from Iran may increase.8
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted China to seek to expand its RMB economic zone,
and, in December 2022, China and Saudi Arabia moved toward yuan-denominated oil trading.9
These facts of oil transactions with Russia and Iran as well as moves toward yuandenominated oil transactions with Saudi Arabia and other countries, suggest that the impact of
economic sanctions and other measures by the U.S. may be limited.

Mika Takehara, “Chugoku no Sekiyu ni okeru Sonzaikan [China’s Presence in the Oil Sector],” Japan
Organization for Metals and Energy Security, April 9, 2021,
https://oilgas-info.jogmec.go.jp/info_reports/1008924/1009008.html (Japanese).
7 “Chugoku no Genyu Yunyuryo ‘Roshiasan’ ga 2-kagetsu Renzoku Shui ni [China’s Crude Oil Imports‘From Russia’ Lead for Second Consecutive Month],” Toyo Keizai Online, August 9, 2022,
https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/609932 (Japanese).
8 Takehara, “Chugoku no Sekiyu ni okeru Sonzaikan [China’s Presence in the Oil Sector” (Note 6).
9 Koichi Iwama, “Beidoru Haken o Kuzusu Jinmingen-date Sekiyu Torihiki ni Genjitsumi wa Aru no ka? [Isthere any realistic prospect for yuan-denominated oil trading to undermine U.S. dollar hegemony?],”Economist online, January 30, 2023, https://weekly-economist.mainichi.jp/articles/20230207/se1/
00m/020/042000c (Japanese).
64Figure 1 Status of China’s Natural Gas Pipelines and Crude Oil Import Routes
Source: Tanaka Nobuhiko, “Chugoku to Roshia o Tsunagu Tennen Gasu Paipu Rain: Ukuraina
Senso de ‘Gyofu no Ri’ wa Aru no ka [Natural Gas Pipeline Connecting China and Russia:‘Profiting Possible While Others Fight’ in the War in Ukraine?],” NEC, March 25, 2022,
prepared by the author based on https://wisdom.nec.com/ja/series/tanaka/
2022032501/images/002.webp (Japanese).

Natural gas is not likely to be a decisive factor in economic sanctions, either. The figure above
illustrates the status of China’s natural gas pipelines and crude oil import routes. In 2021, China
surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest importer of natural gas. China also produces natural
gas domestically, but 90% of its needs depends on imports.10 Of these imports, 82% comes from
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, 8% from Myanmar, and the remainder from Russia,
making it likely that economic sanctions cannot be effectively imposed in coordination with Japan
Nobuhiko Tanaka, “Chugoku to Roshia o Tsunagu Tennen Gasu Paipu Rain: Ukuraina Senso de‘Gyofu no Ri’ wa Aru no ka [Natural Gas Pipeline Connecting China and Russia: ‘Profiting Possible While
Others Fight’ in the War in Ukraine?],” NEC, March 25, 2022,
https://wisdom.nec.com/ja/series/tanaka/2022032501/images/002.webp (Japanese).
105and the United States.
Making sanctions in the energy sector even more difficult are the transportation routes for oiland natural gas. In the case of natural gas, 40% is transported by land pipeline and 60% by oceantransport.11 About 50% of oil is imported from the Middle East via ocean transport.
In the past, China’s only maritime route for transporting oil from the Middle East was via theStrait of Malacca and the South China Sea, the same route as that used by Japan. Therefore, there
was a common belief that a Taiwan contingency would never actually occur, as such a situation
would prevent the aggressor itself from using this essential route, resulting in a devastating
stagnation in economic activity. However, as of 2023, an oil pipeline has been laid onshore along
the China-Myanmar natural gas pipeline, and crude oil brought by tankers from the Middle Eastand Iran is unloaded at the Kyauphyu port in Myanmar and sent to China via pipeline.12 This
allows China to import crude oil without having to go through the Strait of Malacca, which saves
a great deal of cost and time, and, at the same time, the impact of any difficulties in maritime
transportation in the South China Sea can be contained to some extent.
Thus, in the event of a Taiwan contingency, both Japan and China would face significant
difficulties in using the maritime route via the Strait of Malacca for oil imports, but since China
has transportation methods that do not depend on this route, it is not expected to be a major
deterrent factor.
(2) Food supply
China is the world’s largest food producer. In China, foodstuffs is defined as rice, wheat, corn,kaoliang (Sorghum nervosum), millet, and other minor grains, as well as potatoes and legumes.
Among these, rice, wheat, and corn account for about 90% of total foodstuffs production.13 In its
foodstuffs policy, China has emphasized self-sufficiency and has made it a national goal to be selfsufficient in foodstuffs as a whole, including feed grains; in 2014, this policy was partially changed
to allow partial import of corn for assuring a stable supply, while absolute domestic self-sufficiency
in rice and wheat would have to be ensured.14
In 2021, about 150 million tons of rice was produced domestically and 3% of that, or 4.96
million tons, was imported. Two years prior, in 2019, 2.55 million tons was imported, indicating

Ibid.
Ibid.
13 Shoichiro Kawahara, “Chugoku no Shokuryo Seisaku no Tenkai Katei to Kongo no Hoko [TheDevelopment Process and Future Direction of China’s Food Policy],” Nogyo Kenkyu [Journal of
Agricultural Research], No. 34, 2021, pp. 80-81.
14 Ibid, p. 87.
11
12

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an increasing trend in imports.15
Previously, some wheat was imported for feed, but in the past few years it has been mainly
for food use and has shown a sharp increase since 2020. The government explains that the imports
consist of high-grade wheat for processing while the country is self-sufficient in standard-grade
wheat.16
Corn imports increased in 2021 to 28.36 million tons. This increase in imports was due to tightdomestic supplies and high prices in China.17
The self-sufficiency rate of soybeans has declined significantly. China has been an importerof soybeans, a raw material for oil extraction and animal feed, since 1996. China describes itself
as completely self-sufficient in food soybeans.18
Production areas, volume of imports, and ratio of domestic production of China’s major
foodstuffs in 2021 are shown in Table 1.

Toru Nakamura, “Chugoku no Shokuryo Jikyu Taisei: Taitosuru China CO-OP no Yakuwari [China’s
Food Self-Sufficiency System: The Role of the Emerging China CO-OP],” Frontier Eyes Online,
December 6, 2022, https://frontier-eyes.online/china_food-self-support/ (Japanese).
16 Ibid.
17 The Agriculture & Livestock Industries Corporation, “Saikin no Chugoku no Tomorokoshi Jukyu no
Doko [Recent Trends in China’s Corn Supply and Demand],” ALIC Monthly, June 2022, p. 81.
18 Nakamura, “Chugoku no Shokuryo Jikyu Taisei [China’s Food Self-Sufficiency System]” (Note 15).
15

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Table 1 Production Areas, Volume of Imports, and Ratio of Domestic Production of China’s Major
Foodstuffs in 2021
Production
areas

Wheat

Corn

Soybeans

Volume ofRatio byVolume ofRatio byVolume ofRatio byimports

production

imports

production

imports

production

(ten

area

(ten

area

(ten

area

thousand(%)

thousand(%)

thousand

(%)

tons)

tons)

tons)

U.S.

273

28.08

1,983

69.94

5,811

60.20

Australia

273

28.14

0

0.00

0

0.00

Canada

264

26.14

0

0.00

0

0.00

France

141

14.50

0

0.00

0

0.00

Russia

10

1.07

0

0.00

0

0.00

Ukraine

0

0.00

824

29.05

0

0.00

Brazil

0

0.00

0

0.00

3,233

33.50

Argentina

0

0.00

0

0.00

375

3.89

Others

20

2.08

29

1.01

233

2.41

972

(6.6)

2,836

(9.4)

9,652

(88.8)

13,695(93.4)

27,255(90.6)

1,640(11.2)

Total
volume ofimports(importratio; %)Volume ofdomestic
production(domestic
production
ratio; %)Source: Prepared by the author based on Toru Nakamura, “Chugoku no Shokuryo Jikyu Taisei:
Taitosuru China CO-OP no Yakuwari [China’s Food Self-Sufficiency System: The Role of theEmerging China CO-OP],” Frontier Eyes Online, December 6, 2022, https://frontiereyes.online/china_food-self-support/ (Japanese).

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Regardless of the validity of the explanation that China is completely self-sufficient infoodstuffs, the small ratio of rice, wheat, and corn imports to domestic production, with the
exception of soybeans, suggests that even if the United States were to take the lead in imposing
economic sanctions on food, and even if certain effects of the sanctions are observed, the situation
would not reach a point at which the sanctions would seriously affect the lives of the citizens.
(3) Semiconductors
De facto sanctions are already in effect in this sector.
In October 2022, the U.S. Biden administration announced that it would tighten export
controls on semiconductor-related products that can be converted into weapons of mass destruction
or state-of-the-art military systems to China. These advanced semiconductors are positioned as
strategic assets essential for next-generation industries such as automated driving and themetaverse, in addition to high-tech weapons such as the latest missiles and fighter aircraft. The
U.S. has also sought cooperation from Japan and the Netherlands, which have a high market sharein manufacturing equipment such as “exposure systems” that burn circuits into semiconductormaterials.19
On May 23, 2022, the Japanese government promulgated an amendment to the Ministerial
Ordinance on Goods and Services under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, expanding
the scope of export control to include 23 items, including advanced semiconductor manufacturing
equipment. Although the 23 items are not subject to specific country or regional restrictions, theyrequire individual permits for export to all countries and regions, with the exception of 42 friendly
countries and regions, making exports to China more difficult.20 As a result, many experts at thistime believe that it will be extremely difficult for China to achieve the sophistication anddomestication of its semiconductor industry without technology from Western countries.21
In response, many Chinese semiconductor manufacturers have been buying large quantitiesof spare equipment and materials in anticipation of such restrictions. Some observers believe that

“Sentan Handotai Seizo Sochi Chugoku nado e no Yushutsu Tetsuzuki Genkakuka Naze [Why Stricter
Export Procedures for Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment to China and OtherCountries],” NHK website, March 31, 2023,
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20230331/k10014025251000.html (Japanese).
20 “Sentan Handotai no Yushutsu Kisei, 7-gatsu 23-nichi Shiko: Keisansho ga Shorei Kaisei [Export
Controls on Advanced Semiconductors to Take Effect July 23: METI Revises Ministerial Order],” Nihon
Keizai Shimbun newspaper, May 23, 2023.
21 Daisuke Minami, “Kasokusuru Beichu Dekappuringu: Beikoku Shudo no Taichu Handotai Yushutsu Kisei
to Sono Jigyo Eikyo [Accelerating U.S.-China Decoupling: U.S.-led Restrictions on Semiconductor Exports
to China and Their Business Impact],” PwC Japan LLC, April 3, 2023,
https://www.pwc.com/jp/ja/knowledge/column/geopolitical-risk-column/vol4.html (Japanese).
199

in the short term, due to China’s preparations, the impact of Japan’s tighter export controls will not
be significant. 22 Against this backdrop, reports are circulating that a prototype of the mostadvanced extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment, which has been developed jointly bya team of three Chinese research institutes, has been completed and is on track for development
within a few years. 23 In response to the U.S. regulations, the Chinese government is also
expanding its support for the semiconductor industry and is working to strengthen its domestic
industry by, for example, acquiring highly skilled semiconductor engineers in Taiwan. Thesemoves suggest that even if U.S.-led regulations are tightened in the future, there is still a possibility
that China’s industrial policy will be successful, and the domestic production of advanced
semiconductors will be realized.24
As of May 2023, more than a year has passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began.
Although export control on semiconductors to Russia is seen as imposing certain restrictions on
weapons manufacturing and development, Russia is adapting by combining parts of old weapons,
and so far there has not been enough impact from restrictions to significantly change the war
situation.
Thus, although export restrictions are estimated to have a certain effect, because they may beovercome by the development of alternative products or proprietary technologies, the restrictions
are not expected to have a decisive deterrent effect.
(4) Assessment: Effectiveness of punitive deterrence in preventing a potential invasion of
TaiwanBased on the above accounts, it can be argued that the deterrent effect of sanctions on individual
resources is likely to be limited. Therefore, punitive deterrence cannot be expected to havesignificant effects.
3. Effects of denial deterrence“Nihon no Sentan Handotai ‘Yushutsu Kisei’: Chugoku wa Do Miru no ka, Zairyo wa Taisho ni
Fukumarezu Tankitekina Eikyo wa Keibi to no Mikata mo [Japan’s Export Restrictions on Advanced
Semiconductors: How China Sees It, Materials Not Included, Some Believe Short-Term Impact Minimal],”Toyo Keizai Online, May 31, 2023, https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/675602 (Japanese).
23 Takeshi Hattori, “Chugoku Osorubeshi! Chugoku wa Supakon ni Tsuzuki Sentan EUV Roko Sochi mo
Jishu Kaihatsu ka? [Formidable China! China to Independently Develop Advanced EUV Lithography
Equipment Following Supercomputers?],” SEMICONPORTAL, May 11, 2023,
https://www.semiconportal.com/archive/blog/insiders/hattori/230511-chinaeuv.html (Japanese).
24 Minami, “Kasokusuru Beichu Dekappuringu: Beikoku Shudo no Taichu Handotai Yushutsu Kisei to Sono
Jigyo Eikyo [Accelerating U.S.-China Decoupling: U.S.-led Restrictions on Semiconductor Exports to China
and Their Business Impact]” (Note 21).
22

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The following section will examine the military perspective of the effects of denial deterrence byaddressing the conditions for deterring an invasion of Taiwan by China.
(1) Comparison of military strength
A comparison of the military strength of Japan, the U.S., China, and Taiwan as of 2022 is shownin Table 2.
Table 2 Comparison of Military Strength of Japan, U.S., China, and Taiwan
China
Total military strength (troops)

GroundforcesGround forces strength
Tanks, etc.

Approx. 2.04

power

Aircraft carriers,
destroyers, and frigates
Submarines
Marine corps

Air
power

Combat aircraftJapan
Approx.

million170,000

million

250,000

Approx.

Approx.

Approx.

Approx.

970,000

100,000

670,000

140,000

Approx. 6,200(approx. 2.24
million tons)

Naval

U.S.

Approx. Approx. 1.32

Approx. 750
Naval vessels

TaiwanApprox. 750 Approx. 6,300 Approx. 1,000
Approx. 250(205,000 tons)

Approx. 970(approx. 7.26
million tons)

Approx. 140(510,000 tons)

Approx. 90

Approx. 30

102

48

Approx. 70

4

69

22

Approx.

Approx.

Approx.

40,00010,000180,000

0

Approx. 3,030

Approx. 520 Approx. 3,500

Approx. 360

Modern fighter aircraft Approx. 1,270

Approx. 323 Approx. 2,400

Approx. 260

Source: Prepared by the author based on The Military Balance 2022, SIPRI Yearbook 2021, others.
The strength of China’s total military and ground forces already exceed those of the United States.
Naval power of the two countries is also nearly matched in terms of aircraft carriers, destroyers,
frigates, mainline naval vessels, and submarines. Air power is dominated by the United States.
However, the United States has nine joint forces around the world, and the United States Indo11

Pacific Command is the one in charge of Taiwan and Japan. The Command consists of about
300,000 troops, or about 20% of the total U.S. military, so China has an overwhelming advantage
in terms of the military strength that can be deployed in the vicinity of Taiwan.
Further, China is estimated to possess more than 2,200 various ground-launched ballistic andcruise missiles, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,500
kilometers, collectively referred to as the “carrier killer” for their anti-ship capabilities; the DF-26
medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers, known as the “Guam
Killer”; and the DF-17 hypersonic missiles. 25 These long-range precision strike systems that
China has developed are relatively inexpensive when compared to targeted U.S. naval and othervessels and are said to impose costs on the U.S.26
With the expansion of China’s military power, the U.S. is believed to be shifting its military
strategy guidance toward denial deterrence. Rather than relying on overwhelming China withconventional maritime-aerial dominance, the U.S. has shifted to a strategy using more costeffective assets such as stand-off weapons like stealth bombers, fighter aircraft, submarinelaunched long-range cruise missiles, and ground-launched missiles and unmanned vehicles toasymmetrically neutralize China’s large assets, its command and control, and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
(2) Conditions for deterring an invasion of Taiwan by China
On January 9, 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released The First
Battle of the Next War (the “Report”). The content of this Report examines wargame scenarios ofa Chinese landing operation on Taiwan in 2026.
The Report’s stated purpose is to examine the following questions and encourage discussionof the U.S. response:27(a) Would a Chinese invasion of Taiwan succeed in 2026?
(b) What would be the cost to both sides?
(c) What variables most affect that outcome?
Michael Pillsbury, translated by Kyoko Nonaka, China 2049: Himitsuri ni Suikosareru ‘Sekai Haken
100-nen Senryaku’ [China 2049: The Secretly Executed ‘100-Year Strategy for Global Hegemony’], Nikkei
BP publisher, 2015, pp. 235-238.
26 Aaron Friedberg, translated by Shigetoshi Hirayama, Amerika no Taichu Gunji Senryaku: Ea-shi Batoru
no Saki ni Aru Mono [Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia], Fuyo Shobo
publisher, 2016, pp. 57-62.
27 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese
Invasion of Taiwan, January 2023, p.40. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_g
ZQuSOQ
25

12

The following three subsections will examine the analytical results of the three questions in termsof how they might contribute to denial deterrence.
(a) Would a Chinese invasion of Taiwan succeed in 2026?
CSIS has conducted a total of more than 33.5 million simulations of 24 different battle scenarioswith varying settings. The results show that the U.S. won in 22 scenarios while China won in 2
scenarios.28
In the two scenarios in which China won, one scenario assumed that the U.S. did not intervene,
and the other scenario assumed that the U.S. did intervene but that Japan took a neutral positionand did not allow U.S. forces stationed in Japan to participate in the fighting.
In the remaining 22 scenarios in which the U.S. was victorious, the simulations were divided
into three categories: a base scenario, a pessimistic scenario, and an optimistic scenario. The detailsof these scenarios are undisclosed, and it is impossible to determine whether they actually match
the plans prepared by the Chinese side. However, the results of the analysis based on the vast
amount of data accumulated by the U.S. through the simulations indicate that the U.S. would win
in the majority of scenarios, including the pessimistic ones. This indication of the results in itself
has the effect of obscuring China’s war outcome forecasts and making it more challenging forthem to make a decision to launch an invasion. Even if the results of the Chinese simulations
indicate a strong possibility of a Chinese victory, this may have the effect of delaying decisionmaking by arousing suspicion that there may be flaws in China’s assumptions or in theirassessment of U.S. military capabilities, thereby contributing to denial deterrence.
(b) What would be the cost to both sides?
Item (a) above is a case of denial deterrence focused on the likelihood of a successful invasion. In
addition to this, predicting the post-invasion damage can also contribute to denial deterrence. As
shown in Table 3, according to the Report, the U.S. would suffer significant losses in terms offighter aircraft, while China would suffer significant damage to its naval vessels.

28

Ibid. pp. 85-105.

13

Table 3 U.S., Japan, and China
U.S.

Scenario
types

Japan

China

Fighter aircraft Naval vessels Fighter aircraft Naval vessels Fighter aircraft Naval vessels

Base
scenario
Pessimistic
scenario
Optimistic
scenario

270

17

112

26

155

138

484

14

161

14

327

113

200

8

90

16

18

129

Source: Prepared by the author based on The First Battle of the Next War, p. 94, Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) Report, January 9, 2023.
The reason for the above assessment of damage is that, with regard to fighter aircraft, the U.S. uses
mainly its military bases in Japan, which are few in number, making it easier for China to narrow
down the targets of attack, while the Chinese side has many airfields on the continent, making iteasier to limit the damage by deploying fighter aircraft to various bases. With regard to naval
vessels, the majority of the damage on the Chinese side would be amphibious assault ships used
to transport ground forces, perhaps because the naval vessels may have relatively lower defensive
capabilities.
The Report notes that in three weeks of combat around Taiwan, the U.S. would incur half thecasualties sustained from 20 years of U.S. combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. 29 It also states,“Victory is not everything. The United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suffering more in thelong run than the ‘defeated’ Chinese.”30(c) What variables most affect that outcome?
The Report lists the following conditions as necessary for deterring an invasion by China anddefending Taiwan.31 In other words, the Report tacitly recommends that each country concerned
clarify its position on the following conditions in order to maximize the effectiveness of deterrence

Ibid. p. 120.
Ibid. p. 4.
31 Ibid. p. 83.
29
30

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by denial.
(i) Taiwanese forces must hold the line
This condition means that Taiwan’s military will not surrender before U.S. forces enter the war32
and is an absolute condition for deterring China’s invasion of Taiwan.
(ii) U.S. forces must quickly engage in direct combat
Taiwan is separated from mainland China by the Taiwan Strait, in contrast to being connected byland as is the case of Russia and Ukraine. This makes it impossible for foreign countries to supply
arms to Taiwan in the event of a Taiwan contingency, as a naval blockade of Taiwan by the Chinese
military would be initiated if war were to break out. Therefore, the Report emphasizes that it isfirst necessary to strengthen Taiwan’s military before an invasion occurs.33 It also highlights that
U.S. forces would need to enter the war within a few days to prevent Taiwan from being isolated,once a battle is launched.34(iii) The United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations
In the U.S. military operation to deter an invasion of Taiwan, the most important mission will be
for U.S. military aircraft to attack Chinese ships. In this scenario, fighter aircraft stationed at U.S.
military bases in Japan will be used to attack Chinese ships and escort U.S. bombers from Guamin preparation for attack. If the U.S. bases in Japan were not available, the fighter aircraft would
have to launch from Guam or other distant bases, which would make it impossible for these assets
to re-launch in a short time after refueling and replenishing ammunition, etc. at the bases, thus
making it impossible to achieve sufficient effects.
The Report recommends not only the U.S. use of its military bases in Japan but also its use ofJapan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) bases and civilian airports in Japan to enhance the survivabilityof U.S. fighter aircraft.35(iv) The United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles
ASCMs (LRASM)
This operation requires that U.S. forces have sufficient stockpiles of air-launched, long-range anti-

Ibid. p. 3.
Ibid. p. 123.
34 Ibid. p. 3.
35 Ibid. pp. 126-127.
32
33

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ship cruise missiles (LRASM) in order “to strike the Chinese fleet rapidly and en masse” to hinder
Chinese amphibious operations. If these missiles are depleted, U.S. forces would have to use shortrange missiles to attack Chinese ships. In this case, the U.S. forces would have to enter the rangeof China’s surface-to-air missile and airborne early warning and control aircraft, resulting inincreased attrition on U.S. forces.36
The Report states that the key weapon to victory is the LRASM, and it estimates that the U.S.
Air Force and U.S. Navy will have a total of 450 missiles in 2026 and recommends mass
production and deployment of LRASMs.37(d) Conditions for deterring invasion of Taiwan from the perspective of denial deterrence
In terms of military strength, it may be difficult for U.S. forces to maintain a numerical advantage
over Chinese forces. However, denial deterrence can be expected to function through asymmetricattrition. In particular, possession of enough air-launched, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles(LRASM) would be a factor in deterring an invasion of Taiwan by China. In addition,
strengthening Taiwan’s military to be able to maintain the front line until the U.S. militaryintervenes, as well as enabling the U.S. military use of its military bases in Japan in the event of a
Taiwan contingency, would contribute to denial deterrence.
Since the Report also states that Japan’s involvement is an essential condition for deterring aninvasion of Taiwan, the next section examines Japan’s three security documents released in
December 2022 and the Japanese government’s trends in relation to these four conditions and how
they contribute to denial deterrence.
(3) Japan’s three security documents and trends in the Japanese government’s crisis
response approach
We will review the descriptions about the “Response to China” in Japan’s three security documents
approved by the Cabinet on December 16, 2022 and analyze how Japan can contribute to the denial
deterrence of an invasion of Taiwan by China from the viewpoints of two of the four conditions of
the aforementioned CSIS Report: “U.S. use of its military bases in Japan,” which is directly related
to Japan’s defense, and the “U.S. military’s possession of air-launched, long-range anti-ship cruise
missiles (LRASM).”(a) Response to China
36
37

Ibid. p. 137.
Ibid. pp. 137-138.

16

Of Japan’s three security documents, National Security Strategy, which defines Japan’s basic
security policy, refers to China’s security trends as follows: “China has intensified its attempts tounilaterally change the status quo by force in the maritime and air domains including in the Eastand South China Seas,” “China has not denied the possibility of using military force” against
Taiwan, and “China has been intensifying its military activities in the sea and airspace surrounding
Taiwan.” The National Security Strategy also refers to China as the “greatest strategic challenge
in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international
community” and should be addressed by Japan “in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries
and others.”38
Next, the National Defense Strategy (formerly the National Defense Program Guidelines),
which is the basic policy for missions performed by the Ministry of Defense and the JSDF, among
the policies related to security lists “to deter, through cooperation with our ally, like-mindedcountries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts” as a defense
objective, and, as one approach to achieving this goal, “Strengthening Japan and U.S. joint
deterrence and response capabilities” as one of the approaches.39 And as a necessary function andcapability to respond to new ways of warfare, the National Defense Strategy raises “stand-off
defense capability,” which is a long-range counterattack capability from outside the sphere of
threats.40
The “U.S. military air-launched, long-range LRASM” referred to in the previous section is asystem that forms part of this stand-off defense capability.
(b) Analysis of Japan’s policy corresponding to conditions listed by the CSIS Report(i) The United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations
The CSIS recommendations include the U.S. use of its military bases in Japan, improving theresilience of military bases, and the use of civilian airports. The National Defense Strategy callsfor efforts to “gain understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents aroundtheir [U.S. military] facilities [in Japan]41 and “initiatives to reinforce the readiness and resiliencyof U.S. Forces in Japan.42 In addition, since the Japan-U.S. 2+2 meeting held on January 11, 2023
agreed to consider the U.S. use of civilian airports and other facilities in Japan, 43 it can be
National Security Strategy, approved by the Cabinet on December 16, 2022, pp. 8-9.
National Defense Strategy, approved by the Cabinet on December 16, 2022, p. 7 (Japanese); p. 18(English).
40 Ibid, p. 8 (Japanese); p. 18 (English).
41 Ibid, p. 13 (Japanese); p. 18 (English).
42 Ibid, p. 15 (Japanese); p. 20 (English).
43 Ministry of Defense, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) (tentativetranslation),” January 11, 2023,
38
39

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evaluated that the CSIS recommendations and the direction of Japan’s policy are generally inagreement. Although whether U.S. military bases in Japan can actually be used by U.S. forces isultimately a matter of political decision-making, it can be evaluated that Japan and the U.S. haveestablished a common policy stance which will contribute to denial deterrence to deter an invasionof Taiwan.
(ii) The United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range ASCMs (LRASM)
The CSIS recommendation for U.S. military’s possession of enough air-launched, long-range
ASCMs (LRASM) has been clearly stated as a policy for introduction into the JSDF as a stand-off
defense capability.
Based on the National Defense Strategy, the Defense Buildup Program (formerly the Medium
Term Defense Program), which outlines the capabilities, budget, and personnel of the JSDF to be
developed and acquired over approximately the next five years, calls for the development andproduction of the prototype of upgraded domestic missiles and the procurement of foreign-madestand-off missiles. 44 Looking at procurement trends, the F-35A onboard Joint Strike Missile(JSM) will be acquired.45 The JSM is a Norwegian-made air-launched anti-ship or land attack
cruise missile. On the other hand, the introduction of the U.S.-made LRASM for the F-15 upgradedaircraft has been abandoned due to the high cost of refurbishment.46 By promoting the installationof air-to-ship missiles (JSM) on the F-35A (currently 27 aircraft), Japan will have an air-launched
LRASM strike capability similar to that of the U.S. military, albeit limited. However, this does notnecessarily mean that the JSDF will conduct operations similar to those of the U.S. military inactual operations. Nevertheless, the possession of this equipment will give Japan a potential
capability, which the target countries will have no choice but to consider as a threat assessment
factor and can therefore be evaluated as a positive factor for denial deterrence.
To sum up, the analysis of Japan’s three security documents and the trends in the Japanese
government’s policy development demonstrate their contribution to the denial deterrence of a
Taiwan contingency.
4. Response to hybrid threats
In Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the success or failure of thehttps://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/2023/0112a_usa-j.html (Japanese);https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2023/01/e595130b273955f65e436fa3a8150eb06bfc42a3.html (English).
44 “Defense Buildup Program,” approved by the Cabinet on December 16, 2022, pp. 2-3 (Japanese); pp.
6-7 (English).
45 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2022 (Annual White Paper), Nikkei Printing Inc., 2022, p. 249(Japanese); p. 249 (English).
46 “Kuji F-15J Noryoku Kojogata e no LRASM Tosai Chushi e [LRASM procurement to be canceled onJapan Air Self-Defense Force F-15J upgraded model],” Ships of the World, August 23, 2021,
https://www.ships-net.co.jp (Japanese).

18exercise of hybrid threat activity had a significant impact on the success or failure of the militaryinvasion. Therefore, appropriate response to the exercise of hybrid threat activity is considered
important in order to deter military invasion from other countries. In light of Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, it is widely believed that when China attempts to unify Taiwan, it will use various hybrid
threat activity against Taiwan, Japan, and the United States rather than launching a militaryinvasion from the outset. However, the scope of hybrid threat analysis conducted by various
research institutes thus far is generally focused on a few areas such as cyberattacks and information
warfare and does not cover new areas such as space and electromagnetic waves, where the arms
race among major powers including Russia and China is remarkable, or economic and social areas,
where hybrid warfare could be widely employed before a full-fledged military invasion begins,
making it a challenge to grasp a complete picture of the threats. Therefore, in order to analyze
potential hybrid threats against Japan, we consider it useful to conduct a threat analysis for a
Taiwan contingency using the Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis (Figure 2), which issaid to have been used by Hybrid CoE - the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid
Threats to analyze hybrid threats during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The model uses the “40tools of hybrid threat activity” and “13 affected domains” listed as the threat checklist.

Figure 2 Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis
Source: The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model Public Version, p. 13.
https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/conceptual_framework-reference-versionshortened-good_cover_-_publication_office.pdf

19

Below, we discuss the significance of utilizing this model and points to keep in mind when
applying it to a Taiwan contingency.
(1) Significance of using the conceptual model
Figure 3 summarizes examples of previous or existing studies of hybrid threats by China against
Japan in the event of a Taiwan contingency based on the abovementioned Conceptual Model for
Hybrid Threat Analysis. The areas surrounded by red squares are possible tools of hybrid threat
activity by China that have not yet been studied extensively and should be researched. By utilizing
the conceptual model, it is possible to identify areas that are under-researched and to get a complete
picture of the threats.

Figure 3 Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis and Research Status of China’s Hybrid
Threat against Japan
Source: Prepared by the author based on The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model
Public Version, p. 13 (https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/conceptual_frameworkreference-version-shortened-good_cover_-_publication_office.pdf)

If viewing the CSIS Report’s recommendations by applying this goal from China’s perspective,
one would see that China could be able to heighten a possibility of success in its operation to
invade Taiwan by influencing Japan to disallow the U.S. use of its military bases in Japan. In otherwords, China could potentially conduct a hybrid threat activity with an emphasis on the goal of20

disabling U.S. military bases in Japan. The Conceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis provides
more specific tools of hybrid threat activity that China could possibly use by applying China’s
more specific goal. In this case, a goal of “interference in the Japanese government decisionmaking process” can be further specified as “disrupting the U.S. use of its military bases in Japan”
as shown in Figure 3, allowing us to deliberate on the specific tools relevant to this goal.
(2) Points to keep in mind when applying the conceptual model to a Taiwan contingency
In applying this conceptual model to a Taiwan contingency, the following two points should be
kept in mind.
(a) Differences in the security environment between Europe and East Asia
The conceptual model presented by the Hybrid CoE was developed based on studies of Russia’s
use of hybrid threat activity against Ukraine. While Russia and Ukraine are neighboring countries
connected by land, China and Taiwan are separated by the sea, so their security environments aredifferent. Therefore, because the tools of hybrid threat activity may differ, the conceptual modelcannot be used as is. For example, the frequent disruption of submarine communication cables
near Taiwan by Chinese fishing vessels is a typical example of a tool of hybrid threat activity that
could destabilize Taiwanese society. Such a hybrid threat activity cannot be considered as a toolfor Russia to conduct against Ukraine because Russia and Ukraine are connected by land.
Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the differences in the security environments between
Europe and East Asia and, if necessary, to develop a unique framework specific to a Taiwan
contingency.
(b) The relationship between the use of hybrid threat activity and deterrence
During Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ukraine was said to have successfully responded to
Russia’s use of various hybrid threat activity. However, given the fact that even when the use of
hybrid threat activity was neutralized, Russia still decided to launch a military invasion, it is clearthat the conceptual model is not complete as a deterrence tool. As mentioned above, for deterrence
to function, the deterring party must have the intention and capability to execute a militaryresponse, and that intention and capability must be accurately recognized by the other party. For
this reason, it is necessary to consider strategies to both respond to hybrid threat activity as wellas to link them to deterrence.

21Conclusion
This study examines “punitive deterrence” and “denial deterrence” as potential means of deterringa Taiwan contingency referencing the CSIS Report and Japan’s three security documents
mentioned at the beginning of this study report. As a result, while punitive deterrence would be
unlikely to be effective in a Taiwan contingency, the CSIS Report presents the effectiveness ofdenial deterrence and suggests that a military-strategic response would deter both sides frominvasion or response. While there may be concerns about escalating tensions that could contributeto the security dilemma on the one hand, on the other, the Japanese government’s policy as set
forth in Japan’s three security documents should have a positive influence on the effect of denial
deterrence.
In addition, in responding to potential hybrid threat activity in the course of development intoa Taiwan contingency, establishing a system for detecting and analyzing indicators using theConceptual Model for Hybrid Threat Analysis could be effective. Although there are many
challenges to be addressed toward implementation, such as reflecting the differences in the security
environments between Europe and East Asia, development of countermeasures to respond to
specific hybrid threat activity, and examining appropriate information strategy to deter thesethreats, the conceptual model is useful to make assumptions regarding hybrid threat activity that
could be used in the development stage before a full-scale invasion of Taiwan and to systematicallyunderstand the situation in the event that hybrid threat activity is actually exercised. The conceptualmodel provides a perspective that could serve as a basis for envisioning Japan’s approach todeterring a Taiwan contingency, and further research is needed.

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