June 2012

Strategic Forum
National Defense University

Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Senior Research
Fellow in the Center for Strategic
Research, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, at the National
Defense University.

Key Points◆◆ China’s antiaccess/area-denial capabilities resulted in the Pentagon
writing an Air-Sea Battle concept as
part of its Joint Operational Access
Concept. Missing is a discussionof an appropriate strategy if theentirely undesirable Sino-American
conflict occurs.

◆◆ Effective strategies include a coherent ends-ways-means formulation.
Current budget issues place definite limits on U.S. means. China’s
nuclear arsenal restricts the choiceof ways. Thus, to be achievable,
the ends must be modest.

◆◆ This paper proposes Offshore Control as a military strategy. It recognizes that any conflict with China
will be measured in years, notweeks or months. Offshore Control
aligns U.S. strategic requirementswith the resources available; takes
advantage of Pacific geography toprovide strategic, operational, andtactical advantages for U.S. forces;
and provides a way for the conflictto end that is consistent with previous Communist Chinese behavior.

◆◆ By reducing reliance on space andcyber domains, Offshore Control isdesigned to slow a crisis down andreduce escalatory pressure in a crisis and potential ensuing conflict.

Offshore Control:
A Proposed Strategy for
an Unlikely Conflictby T.X. HammesAs America ends its military commitment to Iraq and continues

its drawdown in Afghanistan, a lively discussion has emerged onwhat future challenges the Nation faces. High on every list is therequirement to deal with a rising China. In his remarks to the AustralianParliament on November 17, 2011, President Barack Obama stated, “As weend today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make ourpresence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.”1 As part of this rebalancing to Asia, the administration has stated that it seeks “to identify andexpand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust,and to encourage China’s active efforts in global problem-solving.”2 Clearly,

the United States seeks prudent and coordinated political, economic, andmilitary actions to further integrate China into the international system.

The Pentagon’s new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:

Priorities for 21st Century Defense, reinforces this approach and states that theUnited States and China “have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asiaand an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship.”3 At the sametime, the document acknowledges both China’s military buildup and the U.S.
commitment to maintaining regional access.

As expected, this strategic guidance has accelerated the ongoing discussionof how America will allocate resources among the military Services. An integral

part of this discussion is the idea that the United States has focused on the Armyand Marine Corps for the last decade of conflict and that now it is time to shift

spending to the Navy and Air Force. Proponents of this approach note the rising power of China and the fact that the Pacific theater is primarily a naval andair theater. Reinforcing this perspective is the Air-Sea Battle concept recently
revealed at the Pentagon. According to Chief of Staff of the Air Force General

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SF No. 278

1Center for Strategic ReSEARCH

About the AuthorBecause it is a nation that relies on maritime trade to sustain its economic growth, China is at a disadvantage because thegeography of the “first island chain” restricts its access to the region.
Norton Schwartz and Chief of Naval Operations Ad-

the operational aspects of Air-Sea Battle outside any

Services organize, train, and equip to maintain opera-with China, however unlikely, is not being publicly dis-miral Jonathan Greenert, Air-Sea Battle will help theirtional access in sophisticated antiaccess/area-denial environments. Other proponents note that this concept
4

will be of particular importance in the western Pacific

Ocean, where China is building its own antiaccess/areadenial capabilities in an effort to deny the U.S. entry in
its near-seas.

5

While intentionally vague, the Pentagon’s state-ments about Air-Sea Battle lead analysts to conclude

strategic context. What strategy might work in a war

cussed. Many media reports have confused the issue
by suggesting that Air-Sea Battle is the strategy. Fortunately, the Pentagon’s own Joint Operational Access
Concept states that “It is important to note that Air-Sea Battle is a limited operational concept that focuseson the development of integrated air and naval forces in
the context of antiaccess/area-denial threats.”6

In fact, Air-Sea Battle is the antithesis of strategy.

that the concept contemplates attacks that penetrate

It focuses on the tactical employment of weapons sys-nese antiaccess/area-denial networks. Unfortunately,

Air-Sea approach to favorable conflict resolution. To be

Chinese airspace to eliminate key elements of the Chirather than exploring potential strategies in the eventof conflict with China, the discussion has focused on

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tems with no theory of victory or concept linking thefair, the absence of a stated strategy made it impossible
for the drafters of the Air-Sea Battle concept to express

www.ndu.edu/insshow they could support such a strategy. In the absenceof such a strategy, it is impossible to determine if investment in Air-Sea Battle logically advances or retards

America’s strategic goals—or whether alternative ap-

capability. Any U.S. military strategy for Asia mustachieve five objectives:◆◆ access for U.S. forces and allied commercial interests

proaches might be both more effective and more suitable.

◆◆ assurance to Asian nations that the United States

undesirable, the Nation requires a military strategy◆◆ deterrence of China from military action to resolve

While a major conflict is unlikely, and, of course,

for a conflict with China for two reasons. First, an essential element of military planning is to consider all
possible options—even ones with remote possibilities

of occurring. Second, strategy should drive the force
structure and supporting procurement plan that support the particular conflict. If we are going to structurea significant segment of the Armed Forces for a pos-sible conflict with China, we need to develop a corresponding military strategy first.

Outline for a Strategy
There are a number of useful models to guidestrategists. Professor Eliot Cohen stated that a strat-

is both willing and able to remain engaged in Asia
disputes◆◆ victory with minimal risk of nuclear escalation in

the event of conflict◆◆ credibility in peacetime.

Looming budget cuts require that the United States

also consider a strategy for the Asia-Pacific that signifi-

cantly reduces the cost of maintaining U.S. influence inthe region. The challenge is to achieve peacetime savings

while leaving the United States well-postured in the region, and to defend its interests in the event of war.

It is essential also to understand that there is noegy should include critical assumptions, ends-ways-“good” strategy for a conflict between the United Statesof victory. Without listing, examining, and challenging

confronted other nuclear powers, the strategist is forcedmeans coherence, priorities, sequencing, and a theory
assumptions, it is not possible to understand a strategy. With assumptions identified, coherence in ends7

ways-means becomes possible. These elements should

not be treated separately. If goals are selected that ex-

and China. As has been the case when the United States
to look for a “least bad” strategy.

A Proposed Strategy
The strategy of Offshore Control works with willing

ceed available means, we do not have a strategy. Pri-

Asia-Pacific nations to ensure that the United States canresources to do everything at once. Sequencing flows

industrial exports, while protecting our partners.

orities are required because a nation will not have thefrom priorities. Finally, a strategy must have a theoryof victory—an answer to the question “how does thisend?” It must express how the strategy achieves war
termination on favorable terms.

Requirements for a Strategy
While military strategy is often seen only as

creating cohesion between ends, ways, and means ina military conflict, its role as a deterrent and alliancebuilder prior to the conflict is also important. It is evenmore important against an enemy with thermonuclear
www.ndu.edu/inssinterdict China’s energy and raw material imports andFive Key Assumptions. The statement of clear as-

sumptions is fundamental to good strategy planning. Off-shore Control is predicated upon five explicit assumptions.
China starts the conflict. While it is possible to envi-

sion scenarios where the United States would initiate amajor conflict with China, such scenarios lie at the ex-treme range of credibility. By initiating conflict, China
seizes the initiative, maximizing political and militarydifficulties for the United States.

There is a high probability that a conflict with China

would be a long war. For the last 200 years, wars between
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major powers have generally run for years rather than

the robust use of space and cyber capabilities is inherent-

wars have not seen nuclear powers face each other except

to strike first, it would be at a disadvantage in the war.

months. Obviously, the big difference is that previous

through proxies. Having no experience with large-scale
armed conflict between nuclear powers, we cannot say
whether this factor will shorten the war (as the case of

the minor conflict between the Soviet Union and China)
or lengthen the war because neither side can seek adecisive outcome with conventional forces. The UnitedStates would find a protracted conflict most challenging.
Too often in the past, military planners have begun

ly destabilizing in a crisis. Each side knows that if it fails
Of even more importance, the United States should notinitiate major actions in space or cyber domains because

the Chinese might consider such actions to be attacks
on strategic systems and thus escalatory. If the UnitedStates does not strike first, it must assume both spaceand cyber assets might be severely degraded in an initial
Chinese strike.

Ends, Ways, and Means Coherence. The combina-

prosecuting a war assuming that it would be short. Thetion of decreasing defense budgets and rapid increases

I, World War II, the Korean War, the Soviet and U.S.

strategy for conflict with China should assume limited

obvious examples are the U.S. Civil War, World War
invasions of Afghanistan, and U.S. operations into Iraq.

the United States must accept that
China’s nuclear arsenal imposes
restrictions on the way American
forces might attack Chinese assets
Any major conflict between the United States and China

would result in massive damage to the global economy. The

in procurement costs for new weapons suggests that ameans, at least to start. In addition to limited means,
the United States must accept that China’s nuclear ar-

senal imposes restrictions on the way American forces
might attack Chinese assets. The United States mustselect ways that minimize the probability of escalation
to nuclear conflict simply because no one can win amajor nuclear exchange. With limited means and re-stricted ways, the ends selected therefore also should
be modest. They must attain U.S. strategic goals but notrisk a major nuclear exchange.

This logic leads to the concept of Offshore Control.

United States would cut Chinese trade simply because

Operationally, Offshore Control uses currently avail-trade with China while U.S. forces are suffering signifi-a distant blockade on China. It establishes a set of con-the American population would not accept continued
cant casualties. China would respond with military, fiscal,and economic actions.

The United States does not understand China’s nuclear

decision process. Therefore, it is critically important that the

U.S. strategic approach minimize escalation. If escalationis required, deliberate and transparent escalation is bet-

ter than a sudden surprise that could be misinterpreted.
This approach certainly violates the generally acceptedable but limited means and restricted ways to enforce

centric rings that denies China the use of the sea inside
the first island chain, defends the sea and air space of thefirst island chain, and dominates the air and maritime
space outside the island chain. No operations would

penetrate Chinese airspace. Prohibiting penetration isintended to reduce the possibility of nuclear escalationand to make war termination easier.

Denial as an element of the campaign plays to U.S.

precept that escalation in war must be violent and sud-strengths by employing primarily attack submarines,

developed before the advent of offsetting nuclear arsenals.

island chain. This area would be declared a maritime exclu-

den to achieve maximum effect. However, that maxim was

In space or cyber domains, a first strike provides majoradvantages. Thus, any operational approach that requires
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mines, and a limited number of air assets inside the firstsion zone with the warning that ships in the zone could

be sunk. While the United States could not initially stop
www.ndu.edu/inssall sea traffic in this zone, it could prevent the passage of

These ships also are the easiest to track and divert. Nat-China’s export trade, which is essential to China’s economy.

possibilities are the Panama Canal and the Strait oflarge cargo ships and tankers. In doing so, it would cripple

The defensive component would bring the fullrange of U.S. assets to defend allied soil and encourage

allies to contribute to that defense. It would take advantage of geography to force China to fight at longer

ranges while allowing U.S. and allied forces to fight aspart of an integrated air-sea defense over their own territories. Numerous small islands from Japan to Taiwan

and on to Luzon would provide dispersed land-basing

options for air and sea defense of the gaps in the firstisland chain. Since Offshore Control relies heavily on
land-based air defense and short-range sea defense toinclude mine and countermine capability, we can encourage potential partners to invest in these capabilities
and exercise together regularly in peacetime. In keeping with the concept that the strategy must be feasible

in peacetime, the United States would not request of
any nations the use of their bases to attack China. The
strategy would only ask nations to allow the presenceof U.S. defensive systems to defend that nation’s land,sea, and air space. The U.S. commitment would include

assisting with convoy operations to maintain the flowof essential imports and exports in the face of Chineseinterdiction attempts.

urally, China would respond by rerouting, but the only
Magellan—or, if polar ice melt continues, the northernroute. U.S. assets could control all these routes. While
such a concentric campaign would require a layered ef-

fort from the straits to China’s coast, it would largely befought at a great distance from China—effectively outof range of most of China’s military power. Furthermore, this phase can employ surface search radars andhigh frequency radio if U.S. space and cyber capabilities
are severely degraded.

the dominate phase of the campaign
would be fought outside therange of most Chinese assets anduse a combination of ground,naval, air, and rented commercial
platforms to intercept and divert
the supertankers and post-Panamax
container ships essential to
China’s economy
That leads us to modest ends. Offshore Control

The dominate phase of the campaign would be

is predicated on the idea that the presence of nuclear

use a combination of ground, naval, air, and rented

Communist Party (or its surrender) too dangerous tofought outside the range of most Chinese assets andcommercial platforms to intercept and divert the supertankers and post-Panamax container ships essential to
China’s economy. Eighty percent of China’s imported
9

oil transits the Strait of Malacca. If Malacca, Lombok,
Sunda, and the routes north and south of Australia were
controlled, these shipments could be cut off. The UnitedStates must recognize, however, that the dramatic reduction in China’s trade would significantly reduce its
energy demands. Thus, energy interdiction would not

be a winning strategy. Exports are of much greater im-

portance to the Chinese economy. Those exports rely

on large container ships for competitive cost advantage.
www.ndu.edu/inss

weapons makes seeking the collapse of the Chinesecontemplate. The United States does not understandthe Communist Party decisionmaking process forthe employment of nuclear weapons, but it does

know the party is adamant that it must remain incontrol. Thus, rather than seeking a decisive victory

against the Chinese, Offshore Control seeks to use awar of economic attrition to bring about a stalemate

and cessation of conflict with a return to a modified
version of the status quo.

Priorities and Sequencing. The priority in execution

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U.S. forces would establish a distant blockade. Next, U.S.

Korea, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. It allows Chi-the first island chain and finally dominate the area outside

thus end the conflict. By forgoing strikes that destroy

forces would establish the maritime exclusion zone inside
the first island chain to ensure the continued flow of trade
to our allies while tightening the blockade against China.

Sequencing would follow priorities. However, it

should be noted that due to the different forces required
for each of the steps, further study might find that multiple steps could be initiated simultaneously.

Offshore Control seeks terminationof the conflict on U.S. terms through
China’s economic exhaustion
without damage to mainland
China’s infrastructure
Of particular importance is the peacetime prepa-

ration necessary for the strategy to succeed. Any strat-

egy must be both feasible and credible in peacetime
and in war. In peacetime, both enemies and potential allies must be able to see that the United States isproviding sufficient training and forces to execute its
strategy in time of war. A number of relatively inex-

pensive and highly visible steps could commence im-mediately that reinforce Offshore Control. Maritime
prepositioning of defensive assets in theater adds bothna to declare that it “taught the enemy a lesson” andChinese facilities or economic infrastructure on themainland, Offshore Control reduces the probability ofescalation and makes it easier for the Chinese to declare that they did not lose politically. Offshore Con-

trol does not seek decisive victory in the traditional

military sense but secures U.S. objectives effectively. It

recognizes the fact that the concept of decisive victory
against a nation with a major nuclear arsenal is fraught
with risks, if not entirely obsolete.

Inherently Offensive. While this strategy seems

to focus on defense, it is inherently offensive. The realsource of a nation’s strength—particularly in a long
war—is its economy. This strategy strikes at that Chi-nese foundation by cutting off raw material imports
and the wealth created by exports. The geography of

the region lets Offshore Control capitalize on the ad-vantages of an integrated defense versus the limited
inventory of long-range Chinese strike assets. In pe-

riods where the defense gained a tactical advantage in
warfare, successful commanders often sought to be on

the strategic and operational offensive while fighting
defensive tactical actions.

Potential Chinese Responses
In evaluating any strategy, we must consider aa rapid reinforcement capability and a reason to con-wide range of potential enemy responses. Every con-could also encourage Japan’s current reinforcement ofnesses to exploit and makes its own mistakes. Whenduct exercises with friendly nations. The United States

its defensive capabilities in the Ryukyu Islands as wellas assist the Philippines in establishing defenses in theislands between Luzon and Taiwan.

Theory of Victory. Offshore Control seeks termi-

nation of the conflict on U.S. terms through China’s
economic exhaustion without damage to mainland

China’s infrastructure or the rapid escalation of theconflict. It seeks to allow the Chinese Communist

Party to end the conflict in the same way that China
ended its conflicts with India, the United Nations in

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flict brings surprises as each side seeks enemy weakcomparing the effectiveness of two different strategies,
we must consider not only the potential effectivenessof an enemy response but also the likelihood of sucha response against the specific strategy. If alternative

strategies are likely to provoke the same response,
then the effectiveness comes down to a question ofwhich strategy best prepares the United States to deal
with that attack. To date, America has not proposeda military strategy for a conflict with China. Thus, we
can only evaluate possible Chinese actions against

www.ndu.edu/inssthe proposed Offshore Control strategy. However, ansile, submarine, and mine threats. Furthermore, the al-work against a strategy that uses Air-Sea Battle as its

on America’s side. Offshore Control uses U.S. forces

analyst can also consider how Chinese actions might
operational approach.

This paper divides Chinese reactions into conven-tional and unconventional responses. Chinese writings

indicate that China will use a range of options simultaneously in any major conflict. Thus, planners should consider
how China might use any combination of or all of thepossibilities noted herein. Nor should planners assume
that China could select only from this menu.

Conventional Responses. China could select from anumber of conventional responses.

China conducts a peacetime intimidation campaign.

Traditional Chinese wisdom recommends attacking an

enemy’s strategy and alliances. If China believed that regional bases are essential to U.S. strategy, it would seek

to defeat the U.S. strategy by intimidating regional states.
Nations would be subjected to Chinese efforts to pre-vent any agreements that would allow U.S. basing. China
would also pressure South Korea, Japan, and Australia

to reduce their cooperation with U.S. forces and perhaps

even ban the use of their bases in a conflict with China.
China would gain little in separating these nations fromthe United States in the event it confronted a strategy
of Offshore Control. Since Offshore Control does not
require allied basing rights except in Australia, China
would risk alienating regional nations without gaining
much strategic benefit.

lies could participate without a commitment to fightin South Korea and Japan only to defend those na-

tions from attack. While assisting in the defense ofSouth Korea and Japan would require U.S. resources,
the highly capable South Korean and Japanese forces

would add great capability to the allied side. China
would then have to decide whether adding the mili-tary, economic, and political power of South Korea andJapan to the U.S. side is worth the gains of attacking

U.S. facilities in those nations. Peacetime combined,
integrated defensive exercises should provide China

with vivid demonstrations of the additional challenge
they would face. This level of challenge, combined withthe fact that U.S. forces stationed in these nations are
not attacking China, could convince the Chinese thatthe benefits are not worth the complications of bringing South Korea and Japan into the war.

since Offshore Control does not
require allied basing rights except
in Australia, China would risk
alienating regional nations without
gaining much strategic benefit
China imposes a blockade on allied states. If China

China conducts direct air and missile strikes against

were to do so, an obvious question is how the allies

China with a strategic dilemma. The only bases thatconflict. While the maritime exclusion zone inside theU.S. allies. In this case, Offshore Control presents
the United States requires to sustain the operation are
either on U.S. territory or in Australia. China none-

theless might seek to pressure the United States by
striking at U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan as wellas the port and fuel facilities that support them. Suchattacks risk bringing those countries into the conflict.
As a hedge, the United States could conduct peacetime combined, integrated defensive operations with
South Korea and Japan specifically to address air, miswww.ndu.edu/inss

would sustain South Korea and Japan during a long

first island chain means that all of South Korea andthe west coast ports of Japan are in the exclusion zone,
this fact does not mean they cannot be sustained. If

China conducted an antishipping campaign, convoy
operations would be required. Here again, geography

favors the United States. Both South Korea and Ja-

pan have east coast ports that could be destinations forconvoys. To attack convoys bound for Japan, Chinese

air and missile attacks would have to fly over defended
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Japanese air space or take a long detour around it.

clearing.10 Thus, an obvious Chinese response to a U.S.

For South Korea, convoys could enter the Sea of Ja-

blockade would be to use commercial shipping to mineproach South Korea’s east coast ports. Air or missile

this would cause a disruption of trade, it would be apan (East Sea in South Korea) from the north and apattacks would have to fly over the Korean Peninsula.
They would either fly into the range of allied air defens-es or detour north to fly over North Korea. Fortunately,
Korea’s major east coast ports are in the south—Pusan
and Pohang. Geography also provides the allies an advantage in antisubmarine warfare. To reach the convoy

routes, any Chinese submarines must transit relatively
confined waters and operate outside the Chinese land-

based antiaircraft umbrellas. Therefore, allied antisub-South Korean, Japanese, and even U.S. ports. While
manageable problem. It would also present a difficult

challenge for China. Lacking sea superiority, China
would have to risk laying most of the mines prior to thecommencement of hostilities. Although sophisticatedmodern mines greatly reduce the probability of an un-intentional, premature attack, it is always a possibility.
Thus, China would risk tipping its hand for the dubious
benefit of mining a foreign port.

Drone attacks. The massive growth in drone capa-

marine aircraft should be able to operate safely. The

bility, decrease in cost, use of additive/desktop manu-

antisubmarine assets should provide enough protection

capabilities presage the emergence of large numbers

geographic advantage combined with superior allied
for convoys to reach South Korean and Japanese ports.

since a blockade does not dependon space or cyber domains for
operational success, Offshore
Control reduces the Chinese
incentive to conduct attacks
in those domains

facturing, and dramatic increase in drone autonomousof cheap, autonomous drone aircraft.11 Using Global
Positioning System–aided navigation and improved

explosives, even small drones can damage key components in power and transportation systems. Besides
attacking fixed infrastructure, small drones with limited intelligence can seek out the radars of combatants

to degrade allied air defenses. The long-range, long-

endurance subsurface oceanographic research drones

in use around the world could be modified for use in
naval warfare.

Space and cyber attacks. Chinese strategists are

Unconventional Responses. China could also selectaware of the advantage of the offense in each domain

Global sea-denial campaign. While China currently

on U.S. capabilities. However, a blockade could be con-from a number of unconventional responses.

lacks the resources to conduct a sea-control campaign
outside the range of shore-based air support, it could

attempt a sea-denial campaign using a combination ofsubmarines and surface raiders (armed merchant ships).

Surface raiders have been used repeatedly in history and,while a nuisance, have never been particularly effective.

and the massive impact successful attacks could haveducted using surface search radar and high frequency
radio communications. Since a blockade does not de-pend on space or cyber domains for operational success, Offshore Control reduces the Chinese incentive to
conduct attacks in those domains.

Financial actions. Another area of lively debate is

In contrast, Chinese submarines would be a challenge.

the ability of China to use its fiscal reserves, in particularin an antisubmarine campaign.

or even the global economy. From this author’s read-

However, as noted, a number of factors favor allied forces
Mining U.S. and allied ports. Admiral Greenert

has acknowledged the U.S. Navy’s deficiency in mine-

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its ownership of U.S. debt, to attack the United Statesing, there is no consensus among economists of whether
China could use these tools without causing massive
www.ndu.edu/inssdamage to its own economy. In any case, the decision to

openly discussed nor exercised. If critical capabilities

States chooses.

will not even be able to suggest it has that capability.

do so is unlikely to be driven by what strategy the United“Three warfares.” China has suggested that it

would use legal, media, and psychological warfare in
conjunction to defeat opponents. To these efforts weshould add diplomatic. China could engage in both
legal and diplomatic maneuvering in any conflict with
the United States. If the United States employs Off-shore Control, a key question would be the legality ofthe blockade and in particular the legality of placing
U.S. troops aboard merchant ships to ensure that they

do not trade with China. We can assume China would

also attempt a diplomatic offensive to bring European

nations to pressure the United States to cease inter-lie within Special Access Programs, the United States

This fact creates a dilemma since both deterrence andassurance are rooted in a confidence that the statedstrategy can be executed.

the idea that a conventional strike
campaign can defeat a continentalsize power in a short war is dubious
at best and certainly ahistorical
In contrast to Air-Sea Battle, the United States canfering with trade and separate Asian allies from thedemonstrate Offshore Control’s feasibility in peacetime

augment China’s efforts to neutralize U.S. military

in the protection of their own sea and air space. Any na-

United States. Media and psychological efforts would
power. However, if China engaged in military attacks
on other Asian nations, it would complicate those ef-

forts. Conversely, if the United States conducted re-peated strikes on the Chinese mainland, it would simplify China’s efforts in this area.

Advantages of Offshore Control
No strategy for fighting China can promise agood outcome. We are simply seeking to achieve ourstrategic goals while minimizing the damage incurredin such a conflict.

Increases Deterrence and Assurance Due to Fea-

exercises. Partner states will only be asked to participate
tion is free to declare neutrality. Offshore Control fo-

cuses resources on air and sea defense of allies rather

than investing heavily in defeating China’s increasingly
capable antiaccess/area-denial network.

Such an approach has two benefits. First, it is po-

litically more acceptable to most nations if they train to
defend only their own territory. Second, by making it

clear that their participation is not a requirement for a

successful U.S. strategy, it takes away the Chinese optionof “attacking the enemy’s strategy” by pressuring regional
states to refuse U.S. basing rights.

Lowers Probability of Rapid Escalation. Current

sibility and Transparency of the Concept. In peace-strategic discussions in the United States highlighta viable strategy if we regularly exercise the necessaryconvince China that the United States can overcome

time, it is easier to convince another nation we haveforces and operational techniques. To date, the only
U.S. approach being discussed openly for a potential

U.S.-China conflict seems to be based on Air-Sea
Battle. Unfortunately, the idea that a conventional

strike campaign can defeat a continental-size power

in a short war is dubious at best and certainly ahistorical. Furthermore, many of the necessary Air-Sea

Battle technologies are classified. They can neither be
www.ndu.edu/inss

two possible ways to deter China. The first way is to

China’s antiaccess/area-denial capabilities to place
China at risk. Unfortunately, this operational approach

depends heavily on U.S. space and cyber capabilities.
This creates the unintended consequence of raising

the value of a first strike. To reduce the perceived
value of a first strike, the United States must create
redundant systems that can immediately restore lost
systems. This redundancy is expensive and, since much
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of the U.S. command network depends on commercial

the China–Soviet Union Zhenbao Island incident, andU.S. space and cyber systems remain a vulnerable anddone slowly and openly. Each crisis ended without trig-

cyber and space assets, may not even be possible. Thus,
high-payoff target.

Offshore Control does not require extensive use

India-Pakistan Kargil crisis—in each case escalation was
gering a wider conflict.

In contrast, space and particularly cyber escalationof space or cyber systems. While these systems aretake place in seconds and thus would drive decisionmak-

relatively inexpensive backup systems to create tacti-

ently de-escalating since the strategy cannot be defeated

air-breathing platforms. With limited investments inallies would only need to rebuild cyber and surveillance

useful, the United States and its allies can develop
cal networks using a mix of older technologies andalternative systems and a training program, Offshore
Control could be executed even if China conducted ahighly successful first strike in the space and/or cy-

ber domains. Because of its transparency, this capa-

ers in unpredictable ways.13 Offshore Control is inher-

by a first strike on space and cyber assets. Furthermore, theassets over and outside the first island chain. Geography
would make establishing and defending such a network
much easier, further reducing the value of a first strike.

Lowers Peacetime Cost to Maintain U.S. Capabili-

bility could be demonstrated in peacetime exercises.

ties to Fight Such a Campaign, thus Increasing Its De-

increase the deterrence value through reducing the in-strategy be economically sustainable in the current and

By devaluing the first strike, such an approach could
centive to start a war. This is particularly important ina crisis. The premium attached to a strategic first strikecreates a great deal of escalatory tension. Each side’s

military leaders would be obligated to inform their civilian leaders that failure to strike first would placethem at a significant military disadvantage.

12

Offshore Control matches thecapabilities required for its
execution to reduced U.S. defense
resources while increasing the cost
to China to respond effectively

terrent Effect. Credibility and feasibility require that a

projected peacetime U.S. political environment. Due tolack of transparency, it is impossible to say for certain,
but it seems the Air-Sea Battle concept requires major

new procurement programs. In contrast, Offshore Control could be executed based on current capabilities while

guiding future investments away from large numbers of

expensive penetrating platforms. For instance, instead ofanother aircraft carrier, the United States may choose topurchase six more Virginia-class submarines for roughly

the same investment. Rather than building a system that
could provide rapid replacement of surveillance and connectivity over China, the United States would only haveto build systems that provide coverage and networks overfriendly territory.

Reverses the Cost Imposition Formula. To pen-

Expands Decision Space and Timelines. While a dis-etrate Chinese airspace the United States must spend

would take hold only over a period of weeks. This would

onus of penetrating integrated air defenses to the Chi-tant blockade is an escalation, its execution and impact
give diplomats time to seek a solution free from the de-mand for sudden escalation in space or cyber. The idea ofslowing escalation and making it transparent seems to
defy military wisdom and the history of conflict. But if

we examine those confrontations where nuclear powers

faced each other—for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis,10

SF No. 278

a great deal on advanced platforms. By shifting thenese, Offshore Control reverses the cost imposition. It
would cost the Chinese much more to create sufficient

long-range assets to achieve sea control than it would
cost the United States to achieve sea denial inside thefirst island chain. As part of his confirmation process,
Admiral Samuel Locklear III, commander of U.S.
www.ndu.edu/inss

Pacific Command, spoke before the Senate Armedto the fight by intercepting and controlling major com-

China’s goals as “building the capability to fight andmake up over one-third of the global merchant fleet ca-

Services Committee in February 2012 and assessed

win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its

periphery.”14 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta madethe same statement in his confirmation hearing.

15

A

U.S. approach that envisions an extended conflict at
a distance from China could neutralize much of theChinese investment in this capability. In short, Off-shore Control matches the capabilities required for its
execution to reduced U.S. defense resources while increasing the cost to China to respond effectively.

Reverses the Geographic Advantage. Rather thanengaging the Chinese over their home territory where

almost all Chinese assets can participate and concentrate
their effects, Offshore Control forces the Chinese to

send their limited number of long-range assets into U.S.
and allied integrated land, sea, and air defenses.

Allows Higher Probability for China to Declare Vic-

tory (Saving Face) and End the Conflict in much thesame way it ended its intervention in Korea, invasion ofVietnam, and border conflicts with Russia and India. If

the United States has conducted numerous strikes into
mainland China, it would be much more difficult for

mercial ships. By mid-decade, roughly 869 new ships willpacity when delivery is complete.16 While the total cargocapacity is growing steadily, the total number of ships
is decreasing as older container ships that hold 5,000

TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) or less are being

replaced by ships holding up to 18,000 TEU.17 Clearly,
the U.S. Navy has insufficient ships to control the almost
1,500 very large commercial ships projected to be in use

by 2015. However, these numbers can be controlled by
U.S. amphibious shipping projecting Army and Marine

boarding parties that will travel with the ships to ensure

they do not enter the maritime exclusion zone. Commercial shipping and helicopters could be contracted tosupport the distant efforts, thus reducing the stress on
the amphibious fleet.

any war between the United States
and China would devastate
the global economy
Minimizes Economic Losses. As noted in the as-

Chinese leadership to decide to end the conflict. His-

sumptions, any war between the United States andthe war started, and direct attack on a homeland has been

consideration for any strategy must be how to shorten

torically, passion often became the driving forces once
most likely to stir that passion.

Plays to U.S. Strengths. Offshore Control does not

focus on the few systems necessary to destroy China’s
antiaccess/area-denial systems and achieve sea control
inside the first island chain. Instead, it is built on U.S. su-

periority in submarines and, with proper investment, sea
mines to achieve sea denial inside the first island chain. It

then adds highly capable U.S. ground- and sea-based air/
missile defense to the battle for air superiority over key

battlespaces above allied nations. It also moves the allied
antisubmarine campaign to the restricted gaps in the firstisland chain and outside the first island chain, where U.S.
air assets could participate in the antisubmarine warfare

effort. Finally, it allows U.S. ground forces to contributewww.ndu.edu/inss

China would devastate the global economy. Thus, a key
the war and minimize economic damage. Given thecontinental size and wealth of both the United States
and China, the only path to a short war is for one side
to terminate the conflict by deciding it is not worth thepotential gain. This author believes a distant blockadethat does not strike the Chinese mainland offers China’s

leaders the best opportunity to choose to terminate theconflict. Furthermore, the maritime geography would

allow the rest of the world to rebuild trading networks
without China. Thus, China would be faced with a de-teriorating economic situation and accumulating ero-sion of trade relations. The longer the war, the longer it
would take China to rebuild the trust essential to trad-

ing networks. Furthermore, avoiding passion-inducing
SF No. 278

11direct attacks on China, while presenting Chinese lead-

The Cuban Missile Crisis highlights the pattern ofprovide a path to a shorter war.

when nuclear-armed powers found themselves in aers with an ever worsening economic outlook, might
Allows for the Rebuilding of the World Trade System

During the Conflict. Sustainability in a long war would
largely be based on rebuilding trade networks during theconflict. The U.S. geographic position and maritime na-

cautious and relatively transparent actions taken
growing crisis. Leaders on each sides avoided sudden
escalatory moves or offensive actions that could havebeen misinterpreted as a major attack.

Given this historical record, strategists should beture of global trade means the rest of the world economy

cautious about building a concept that requires politi-

has little prospect of rebuilding via a new Silk Road. The

minor surreptitious deployments. The timeline required

could rebuild around the perimeter. In contrast, China

U.S. control of the sea lanes clearly favors the UnitedStates in an extended conflict.

cal decisionmakers to move quickly or make more than
to execute Offshore Control allows decisionmakers to bedeliberate and transparent.

Taiwan-China Conflict?
strategists should be cautious aboutbuilding a concept that requires
political decisionmakers to movequickly or make more than minor
surreptitious deployments
Previous Conflicts Between
Nuclear Powers
An essential part of developing a strategy is tothink through how the conflict might develop. Historical precedence would not provide a formula for

The most discussed, researched, and wargamed

conflict between the United States and China is a
Chinese attack on Taiwan. While highly unlikely, it ismilitarily feasible and requires continued research. An

obvious question is “How does Offshore Control workin that case?” More pointedly, one might ask, “If theUnited States adopted Offshore Control, could China
present a fait accompli by a sudden invasion of Tai-wan?” Moreover, “Would the United States be willingto employ such a long war strategy to drive Chinese
forces out of Taiwan?”

China has the capability to conduct a short-notice,success but would illuminate issues to consider. For-

overwhelming missile campaign against Taiwan. Since

between nuclear-armed states. The 1969 Sino-Soviet

wanese forces or be stationed in Taiwan, there is little thetunately, to date there have only been two conflicts
border conflict and 1999 Kargil conflict between Paki-

stan and India each saw nuclear-armed states actually fighting. Rather than escalating, the leadership oneach side responded to the original crisis cautiously.
Military moves were announced and essentially trans-parent. While two examples represent an extremely
limited field, they are the only examples of military
action overshadowed by nuclear arsenals.

In addition to these two active conflicts, wehave decades of history showing how the UnitedStates, Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and India havedealt with crises between and among themselves.

12

SF No. 278

U.S. forces are not allowed either to exercise with Tai-

United States can do to stop or even mitigate a sudden

offensive. Even if U.S. airpower is present in the region,
the historical experience of air forces trying to detect andattack mobile launchers is not encouraging. Simply put,
Taiwan must be prepared to absorb the thousands of mis-siles that China has placed within range of the island as

well as a simultaneous sustained Chinese air campaign.
The good news is that despite Douhet’s predictions, it isdifficult to bomb a nation into submission.

Thus, if Taiwan, with the assistance of the UnitedStates, could prevent a Chinese amphibious landing, it
could retain its independence. To achieve this, Taiwan

www.ndu.edu/insswould need to invest in hardening its own society as wellthat such a conflict would trigger surprises. In particu-

focused on defeating an amphibious operation. Mines,

ties such as medicines, food, and energy. The initial

as developing its own antiaccess/area-denial capability
mobile antiship missiles, submarines, and air defense
systems could create the same barriers for China that

China’s antiaccess/area-denial creates for the UnitedStates. These systems could deny China the possibility of a quick victory as long as Taiwan’s government
refuses to capitulate. This defense combined with ef-

forts to keep supplies flowing to allied nations provides

Taiwan’s most feasible course of action for maintaining
its sovereignty.

The alternative is for the United States to make thelarge investments necessary to develop Air-Sea Battle tothe point that it could defend Taiwan on short notice.
This approach requires major forces continuously deployed well forward in theater. It is difficult to see Con-

gress approving large expenditures to provide a limited

capability to respond to this low probability contingency.

lar, we must examine the impact on critical commodi-

economic focus would be on U.S. and Chinese abilities
to sustain a long conflict, but it must also examine thepotential responses of other nations whose economies

are affected. Of particular importance for the Offshore
Control concept is the speed with which the global

economy could reestablish itself around the blockadein the absence of Chinese financing and production.

Offshore Control is designed toslow a crisis down to allow weeks,
not seconds, for decisions
concerning escalation
An important issue is the impact of Offshore

It also requires a change of policy to allow U.S. forces

Control on other nations in the region. China is cur-wan. And, of course, it would require going down theIndonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam.18 Any

both to train with the Taiwanese and to be based in Taiescalatory path of Air-Sea Battle.

Critical Continuing Research
The fiscal situation resulting from a Sino-Ameri-can conflict and its longer term economic impact needmuch deeper research. Both areas lie well outside theexpertise of this author and scope of this paper. However, in examining the viability of any strategy in a

rently the single largest trading partner for Australia,
conflict would cause major damage to these economies. The key question for them becomes what strategic approach is likely to cause the least direct damage

and bring the most rapid conclusion of the conflictand resumption of trade.

SummaryThis paper is just the start of what should be a deep,

China conflict, the Pentagon must examine the range

wide-ranging discussion of potential strategies for a con-on the impact of a long conflict on the global fiscal

ibility of the proposed strategies both in peace and inof possible fiscal outcomes with particular emphasis
situation as well as the ability of each nation to sustain
the conflict fiscally.

The integration of the global economy meansthat economic issues must be closely examined whendeveloping a viable strategy for conflict with China.
Obviously, any serious study must examine global sup-ply chain interdependencies. The wide-ranging impactof the recent Japanese tsunami is pointed evidence
www.ndu.edu/inss

flict with China. The debate should examine the credwar. While conflict with China is highly unlikely, it isin fact driving many of the Pentagon’s investment deci-

sions today. This paper seeks to test whether or not thosedecisions are consistent with U.S. strategic interests in aperiod of austerity and to examine if they are tied to acoherent strategy.

One of the central criteria of any strategy for a po-

tential conflict with China is the presence of China’s
SF No. 278

13nuclear arsenal. It cannot be ignored or idly wishedaway. Concepts and strategies should not compress thedecision timeline. In particular, any approach must ex-

amine the degree to which the strategy fuels escalation

in a prewar crisis or in a war. Furthermore, the strategy
must be affordable in peacetime and executable in wartime—even if China should strike first. It should shape

the operational/tactical fight to provide geographic andtemporal advantages to U.S. forces. And it must provide
a theory of victory.

By reducing reliance on space and cyber and main-taining transparency in peace, crisis, and war, Offshore

Control reduces the escalatory pressure on decisionmak-ers while meeting the other criteria. It is designed toslow a crisis down to allow weeks, not seconds, for deci-

sions concerning escalation. Moreover, Offshore Control
is designed to better align strategic requirements withavailable resources as well as place U.S. and allied forces

in favorable tactical positions if it comes to a fight. Final-

ly, it provides for conflict resolution that does not require
an unobtainable “decisive” victory.

Notes
1

“Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,”
Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011, available
at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>.

2
Department of Defense (DOD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: DOD, January 5, 2012), 2, available at <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>.
3
4

Ibid., 3.

Norton A. Schwartz and Jonathan W. Greenert, “Air-Sea
Battle: Promoting Stability in a Period of Uncertainty,” The American
Interest, February 20, 2012, available at <www.the-american-interest.
com/article.cfm?piece=1212>.

5

J. Randy Forbes, “America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision,”
The Diplomat, March 8, 2012, available at <http://the-diplomat.
com/2012/03/08/americas-pacific-air-sea-battle-vision>.
6

DOD, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0, January 17,
2012, 4, available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%20
2012_Signed.pdf>.

7
For a discussion on why assumptions are critical, see T.X.
Hammes, “Assumptions: A Fatal Oversight,” Infinity 1, no. 1, available
at <www.infinityjournal.com/article/1/Assumptions__A_Fatal_Oversight>.
8David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, Sino-American
Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability, INSS Strategic Forum
273 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, January 2012), 3.

9
Post-Panamax is the designation for ships that were too large
to transit the Panama Canal before it was expanded.

10
Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Iran Mine Threat Scares Navy: CNO
Scrambles to Fix Decades of Neglect,” AOL Defense, May 4, 2012,
available at <http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/04/iran-mine-threatscares-navy-cno-scrambles-to-fix-decades-of-ne/>.
11

Additive manufacturing uses three-dimensional printing fromdigital files to produce parts of entire systems.

12
For a deeper discussion of Chinese thinking on escalation, see
Forrest E. Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalationin the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), available at<www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG614.pdf>.
13

For a thorough discussion of the implications of cyber andspace capabilities on the Sino-American relationship, see David C.
Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: SinoAmerican Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington,
DC: NDU Press, 2011), available at <www.ndu.edu/press/paradox-ofpower.html>.
14
Richard Halloran, “The Rising East: U.S. Admiral Identifies
China’s Capabilities and Objectives,” Honolulu Civil Beat, February
13, 2012, available at <www.civilbeat.com/articles/2012/02/13/14874the-rising-east-us-admiral-identifies-chinas-objectives>.
15
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Hearing to consider the nomination of: Honorable Leon E. Panetta to be Secretaryof Defense,” June 9, 2011, available at <http://hongkong.usconsulate.
gov/uscn_dod_2011060901.html>.
16“Global Merchant Shipping Fleet Continues to Grow,”
Shippingplatform.com, August 3, 2011, available at <www.shippingplatform.com/News_Details.aspx?id=1269&head=Global%20merchant%20shipping%20fleet%20continues%20to%20grow>.

17
One TEU represents the cargo capacity of a standard intermodal container: 20 feet (6.1 meters) long and 8 feet (2.44 meters) wide.
18
The Economist, Pocket World in Figures 2012, comp. Burgess,Andrea et al. (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2011), 115, 171, 217, 241.

Institute for National Strategic Studies
The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for
National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, andunified combatant commands through studies, reports,
briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed
research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge
research and analysis in related areas.
Nicholas Rostow
Director
Center for Strategic Research

14

SF No. 278

The Strategic Forum series presents original researchby members of NDU as well as other scholars andspecialists in national security affairs from the UnitedStates and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of thecontributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal
Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.
Hans Binnendijk
Director
INSS

Francis G. Hoffman
Director
NDU Press

www.ndu.edu/inssNew & Forthcoming fromNDU Press

For online access to NDU Press
publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force:
Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities(forthcoming)
Edited by Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has undergone a rapid transformation since the 1990s

into a formidable, modern air force that could present major challenges to Taiwanese and U.S.

forces in a potential conflict. To examine the present state and future prospects of China’s air force,a distinguished group of scholars and experts on Chinese airpower and military affairs gathered in

Taipei, Taiwan, in October 2010. This volume is a compilation of the edited papers presented at

the conference, rooted in Chinese sources and reflecting comments and additions stimulated by the

dialogue and discussions among the participants. Contributing authors include Kenneth W. Allen,
Roger Cliff, David Frelinger, His-hua Cheng, Richard P. Hallion, Jessica Hart, Kevin Lanzit, Forrest

E. Morgan, Kevin Pollpeter, Shen Pin-Luen, Phillip C. Saunders, David Shlapak, Mark A. Stokes,
Murray Scot Tanner, Joshua K. Wiseman, Xiaoming Zhang, and You Ji.

The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic
Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability
By David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon

the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically,
despite each country’s power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. A clearer understanding of thecharacteristics of these three domains—nuclear, space, and cyber—can provide the underpinningsof strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. David Gompert

and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.-Chinese competition in these domains and recommend that the United States should propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint

whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. This mutual restraint

regime may not take the form of binding treaties, but patterns of understanding and restraint may
be enough to maintain stability.

www.ndu.edu/inss

SF No. 278

15

Other titles fromNDU Press

For online access to NDU Press
publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu

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David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 277,
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an Age of Vulnerability(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives
No. 7, September 2011)

David C. Gompert and Michael Kofman(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 274,
January 2012)16

SF No. 278

www.ndu.edu/inss