J Extreme Events, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2017) 1650011 (29 pages)© The Author(s)DOI: 10.1142/S2345737616500111

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope forTransition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Maiko Nishi*,||, Mark Pelling†, Masumi Yamamuro‡,
William Solecki§ and Steven Kraines¶*Columbia University, USA†King’s College London, UK‡

The University of Tokyo, Japan§

University of New York, USA¶

Tokyo City University, Japan||mn2626@columbia.edu
Published 2 February 2017

Coastal megacities are highly vulnerable to climate change due to asset concentration andhazard exposure, but have potential for innovative risk management taking advantage oftechnological, economic and political capacities and cultural assets. Tokyo is the center of
one of the world’s largest urban agglomerations and one of the most hazard prone global
cities. Having experienced repeated extreme events and resultant devastation, Tokyo has
deployed a strategy of high technology based risk management. In the face of climate risks
that amplify ongoing threats from catastrophic earthquakes, it is unclear whether the current strategy and its attendant culture and administrative structures are an enabler or abarrier for climate change adaptation. Based on 24 expert interviews, this paper examines
Tokyo’s readiness to transition from its current risk management orientation aimed at
disaster prevention towards more resilient of transformative states. We ﬁnd the current risk
management regime has been moving towards resilience planning promoted by the national
policy architecture and the leadership of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government by incorporating self-help and community-cooperation into a long-standing strategy of resistance.
This strategy continues to be dominated by technological, rather than social policy and so
misses an opportunity for a broader contribution to sustainable development. The current
approach may work for the near future but is perhaps less well suited to long-term risk
management which includes highly uncertain future climate risks and potential social||Corresponding author.

This is an Open Access article published by World Scientiﬁc Publishing Company. It is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY) License. Further distribution ofthis work is permitted, provided the original work is properly cited.
1650011-1

M. Nishi et al.

change. Transition is impeded by structural bottlenecks in the city authority while strategic
partnerships between different stakeholders can facilitate transition of public values. Realizing this ﬂexibility will position Tokyo’s risk management regime to better play a role inlonger-term sustainable development.
Keywords: Climate adaptation; Risk management; Transition; Tokyo; Sustainable development.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

1. Introduction
Tokyo is one of the world’s largest urban agglomerations (UN 2015). At its center isthe jurisdiction of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). TMG, a politicalcenter as the national capital, administers a population of 13.6 million (TMG 2016a)
and a growing share of Japan’s national economic activity (Sassen 2013). At thesame time, since its founding Tokyo has been one of the world’s most hazard
exposed cities having experienced repeated devastations associated with earthquakes, ﬁres, aerial bombings and other hazards over the past four centuries (Seidensticker 1983, 1990). Evolving from disaster management combined with
infrastructure development, particularly since the Great Kanto earthquake and ﬁre of1923, Tokyo has developed a sophisticated risk management system equipped with“an arsenal of engineering technologies” (Mitchell 1999: 56). This was alreadyobserved by the end of the last century in the face of a series of urban challenges suchas high land costs, substandard housing, trafﬁc congestions, terror gas attacks and thepotential for a major earthquake anticipated in the near future. The system featured
not only the use of high-technology instruments to deal with high-impact natural
hazards, but also a centralized decision-making process with “widespread public
acceptance and cooperation” (ibid. 57), with earthquake risk as its primary concern.
The centralization of Tokyo’s risk management regime is not unquestioned(Aldrich 2012, 2013). Longstanding struggles between citizens and the state, haveplaced activists including NGO leaders, scientiﬁc experts and young liberal politicians in leadership roles for civil society (Avenell 2016; Aldrich 2008; Hasegawa
et al. 2007). The 1990s were a particular period of civic resurgence met by state
cooption (Ogawa 2004). Since this period, bottom-up, community-based approaches for risk management and wider development agendas have become moreprevalent and gained government support having proven themselves efﬁcient indisaster reduction and recovery (Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Aldrich and Sawada
2015; Aldrich 2016; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). The so-called ‘3/11’ disasters
following the Great East Japan earthquake, tsunami and nuclear incident in 2011,
quickly led to a popular questioning of the role of central government, science,
corporate private sector interests and citizens in strategic decision-making for risk
management and its relationship with development. However, such questioning of1650011-2

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

fundamental roles and responsibilities soon gave way to a more superﬁcial but
pragmatic mobilization around disaster risk volunteering, citizen science. This hashelped to build increased trust between citizens (Aldrich 2012, 2013; Veszteg et al.
2014; Hommerich 2012). Thus, despite the expectation of the post 3/11 Japan tobreak away from top-down, technocratic decision-making processes evidenceshows limited institutional change towards a more inclusive national institutionalframework (Samuels 2013; Aldrich 2011, 2016; Avenell 2016). If, as it seems, thepost 3/11 era regime in Tokyo is rejecting fundamental transitions how ﬁt is a still
centralized and techno-centric risk management regime for anticipating the risks ofclimate change extremes?
City-level responsibility for managing the adverse effects of climate change
gained momentum following Local Agenda 21 in 1992, and further the amendmentof the Act on the Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures in 2008 (Onishi2010). Most attention to date on Tokyo’s climate change governance has focusedon mitigation (e.g., Aoki and Motoki 2007; Aoki 2010; Baba 2010; Oono 2010).
More recently, adaptation to climate change has gained currency in the scientiﬁcand policy arenas in Japan. While the National Plan for Adaptation to the Impactsof Climate Change was released in November 2015 (Government of Japan 2015),
formal policy mechanisms at the local level are still in development. A handful ofstudies have evaluated local adaptation strategies in Japan (Tanaka et al. 2011;
Shirai and Baba 2014; Shirai and Tanaka 2015). Yet, it remains unclear how
climate change adaptation is prioritized in the overall context of risk management
and to what extent the city incorporates future climate risk management in pursuing its development goals.
Tokyo continues to be in peril of a possible powerful inland earthquake and otherurban hazards. Whereas the risk management system has been continuously framedby these extreme events, it is unclear how far current governance culture andstructures enable or constrain adaptation to climate change extremes. Both vulnerability and hazard are emergent properties and less prominent in Tokyo’s historicallyoriented risk management vision and planning. Risk in Tokyo continues to be
overwhelmingly understood through historical antecedents — less through futureoriented risk modeling. This arguably distorts the policy balance between climate
and other hazards and makes difﬁcult a clear vision for adaptation policy and the roleof development priorities in generating or reducing vulnerability and risk.
This paper investigates challenges and opportunities for adaptation in Tokyo asa coastal megacity. Analysis draws on 24 key stakeholders interviews and respondent views on how Tokyo might best position itself to manage future vulnerability to climate extreme events such as heat waves and ﬂooding. The study
explored the following questions:
1650011-3

M. Nishi et al.

(1) How does the city approach urban hazard and associated risks?
(2) What is the current risk management regime particularly applied to heat wave
and ﬂooding?
(3) What scope is there for transitioning the regime to be better positioned to
manage future development and risk contexts?
The next section introduces the methodological framework. The subsequent
section presents results and discussion which are summarized in conclusion to
draw out primary elements of Tokyo’s contemporary risk management regime
status, potential for and any observed direction in transition.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

2. Theoretical Framework and Methods
A risk management regime is an established set of institutions, norms and behaviors that dominate a pattern of risk management, wherein a set of assumptions andassertions concerning the conceptualization of risk and the roles and responsibilities of various governance structures are embedded (Solecki et al. in press). To
describe the process of regime change, we use the transition framework (Solecki
et al. in press). The transition framework outlines four states of risk management
regime: collapse (no strategic planning), resistance (planning for stability), resilience (ﬂexible planning) and transformation (planning for fundamental change). In
particular, our study distinguishes the four regime states resting on different aims:(1) to provide stability for planning and business so that development is notinterrupted by risks or risk management (resistance); (2) to help planners andbusiness learn how to accept some impacts of hazard risk in order to avoid major
losses (resilience); (3) to change current planning and business practices that are
seen as being unﬁtted and as causes of risks (transformation); and (4) to haveno strategic policy, where any activity is highly fragmented and uncoordinated(collapse). With this framework, the study seeks to identify the current risk
management regime for Tokyo and its limitations and potentials for transitioning
towards alternative states for urban coastal adaptation.
Data were collected in August 2015. Interview schedules followed a designcommon to aligned studies being undertaken in Kolkata, Lagos, London and
New York (see bel-truc.org). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with
24 urban risk management experts identiﬁed through snowball sampling that beganwith academic contacts and a multi-stakeholder network of the R!SE initiative
engaged in disaster risk-sensitive investment. The sample consisted of: 14 academics; 2 TMG ofﬁcials, 2 national government ofﬁcials, and 6 private-sector
experts. The study was constrained by respondent access which was skewed towards academics involved as advisors or consultants in city risk management
1650011-4

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

planning and practice. This has inﬂuenced the ﬁndings which emphasize sciencepolicy relations in processes that drive or constrain innovation in planning for risk
management.
3. Results and Discussion

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

3.1. Political priorities across urban hazards
How does Tokyo approach climate risk management in the face of various urban
hazards, interests and needs? The overarching policy goal of TMG under theMasuzoe administration (2014–2016) was ofﬁcially expressed as Tokyo, theworld’s best city with emphasis on three themes: welfare, economy, and the 2020
Summer Olympics (TMG 2014a). As one of its eight Strategies, the ‘Safe andSecure’ Strategy uses the terminology of resilience (e.g., to ensure a high level ofdisaster resilience) (TMG 2014a). Yet, operationally, the Strategy largely involves
resistance-type measures characterized by ﬁreprooﬁng, and the seismic and water
resistance of infrastructure to protect existing assets, to which resilience mechanisms of self-help and mutual assistance are attached as secondary mechanisms.
Provided with the largest budgetary share among all eight strategies (more than one
third of the total budget for the ﬁrst 3 years), considerable ﬁnancial resource has
been funneled into risk management. This has been oriented to a range of hazards
including earthquake, torrential rainfalls, landslides, street crime, cyber-attack andorganized crime (TMG 2014a).
Budget share gives some insight into the prioritization of each hazard typethough risk management costs depend on the type of hazard and its countermeasures (e.g., often a larger cost for infrastructure development than public
relations), while the effects of a policy may overlap between different hazards (e.g.,urban renewal projects addressing both ﬁre and earthquake). Nevertheless, thebudget breakdown for the ﬁscal year of 2016 shows higher investment in ﬁre andearthquake, followed by coastal and rainfall ﬂooding and then heatwave, withmuch less investment into street crime and terrorism (TMG 2016b).1 This is1

Accounting for about one-ﬁfth of the total budget for the major policies, the budget for safety andsecurity (JPY 346.2 billion, approx. US$ 3.3 billion as 100 percent) is broken down into measures
addressing: (1) ﬁreproof and quake-proof of crowded blocks of wooden dwellings (27 percent), (2)heavy rainfall (19 percent), (3) tsunami and storm surge (15 percent), (4) empowerment of communities (14 percent), (5) quake-proof of public buildings (11 percent), (6) roads for emergency
transportation (10 percent), (7) street crime (1.6 percent), (8) terrorism and cyber-attack (0.8 percent),and (9) disaster medical care (0.3 percent). In addition, as part of the budget for long-term city
development beyond 2020, a budget of JPY 17.7 billion (i.e., equivalent to about a half of the above
budget for roads for emergency transportation) is allocated for measures against global warming andthe heat island effect.
1650011-5

M. Nishi et al.

Heatwave
Sreet crime
Rainfall flooding
Earthquake
Coastal flooding
Terrorism
Fire
0

4

8

12

16

Most Important

In btw Most & Very

Very Important

In btw Very & Moderate

Moderately Important

Not Important

20

24

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Do not know

Figure 1. Importance of Hazards (Policy Priorities)

consistent with respondents’ views of city priorities (Figure 1) and largely with
their own professional judgments (Figure 2), indicating consistency in public andtechnical discourse. Exceptions are heatwave, and coastal and rainfall ﬂooding.
Some 25 percent of respondents (n ¼ 6) perceived less policy priority given to
heatwave than their own judgment, and one forth (n ¼ 6) and one ﬁfth (n ¼ 5) ofrespondents saw less policy priority given respectively to rainfall and coastal
ﬂoods, leading respondents to express concerns for the regime’s strategy for climate risk. In particular, many emphasized the exposure of areas below sea level tocoastal ﬂooding. One challenge for Tokyo is to shift from an earthquake centric toa fully multi-hazard approach to risk management.

Heatwave
Street crime
Rainfall flooding
Earthquake
Coastal flooding
Terrorism
Fire
0

4

8

12

16

Most Important

In btw Most & Very

Very Important

In btw Very & Moderate

Moderately Important

Not Important

Do not know

N/A

20

Figure 2. Importance of Hazards (Professional Judgment)
1650011-624

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

TMG has no ofﬁcial climate change adaptation policy. Although Hijioka et al.
(2016) argue that 44 percent of standing TMG policies can be described in terms ofclimate change adaptation, these have not yet been brought together under a coherent policy regime. Our interviews revealed that policy considerations concerning climate change adaptation have been underway at TMG since theircommitment to the C40 Tokyo Conference held in October 2008. The slow speedof policy development was explained by the long time taken for an initial study ofclimate change impact, the need to adjust the administrative structures at TMG
following a change in leadership, and increased public concern on earthquake risk
following the Great East Japan earthquake of 2011. Perhaps part of a reluctance toplan for future risk is based in current framings of risk which are grounded inhistoric — not projected — extremes. TMG continues to review and upgrade
measures against ﬂooding and heatwave based on recorded extremes in river ﬂow
and urban temperatures. In this connection, a senior manager at an environmental
division of TMG stated:
Having observed the increased frequency of intense rains exceeding 100 mm/h falls over the preceding 30 years, we developed
the “Small and Medium River Maintenance Policy” in 2012
where the target rainfall was raised from 50 mm/h to either
65 mm/h or 75 mm/h depending on the areas. The previous target
was determined based on the estimate that the Isewan Typhoon in
1959 was likely to be the largest typhoon into the future. But thetrends have changed, and accordingly the target was raised. The
frequency and intensity of rainfalls may change in the future, but
we have not yet taken into account such future risk change indeveloping plans and policies. . . .It is what we do as usual that wedevelop and implement our interventions based on the records
with the assumption that climate trend is more or less stable.
3.2. Current risk management regime
Respondents characterized the contemporary climate risk management regime forTokyo as approaching an inﬂection point, moving from resistance to resilience(Figure 3). Resistance was illustrated by Tokyo’s pursuing risk management
largely through the accumulation of infrastructure. Some respondents saw this as asound policy for a highly engineered megacity with expectations that public
spending would continue. The emerging resilience approach in Tokyo was framed
not as an alternative to the stability seeking of resistance, but as an extension

1650011-7

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

M. Nishi et al.

Figure 3. Dominant Approachto resistance. Resilience was alternatively referred to as self-help ( jijo in Japanese)or community cooperation (kyojo), to be prepared for risks associated with unforeseeable extreme events or future climate change. As exempliﬁed in policy
documents, TMG has increasingly promoted empowerment of individuals for selfhelp and communities for mutual assistance through disaster drills, information
provision and educational campaigns (TMG 2014a). Thus, there is movement fromresistance to resilience. Yet, resistance approaches remain at the base of Tokyo’s
risk management orientation, and are positioned to provide stability and support
development, with ﬂexibility at the level of citizens and communities rather than inbusiness models or infrastructure planning.
This dynamism in the relationship between resistance and resilience generated
some ambiguity. A respondent from the TMG agency described their current position as being one where planners were actively incorporating resilience into
resistance. More emphatically, a respondent from academia with expertise in hydrology highlighted the absence of a boundary between resilience and resistance inJapanese thinking, stating:
The concept that “development not to be interrupted by risks orrisk management” does not apply to Japanese words. As life
[security] and economy always go along together, we don’t have asense of either life or economy. Tokyo certainly has pursued
economic development as seen in reclamation land there. But
development has promoted employment, and even with job boost
there is no case of more than threefold income disparity between
employers and employees. We have historically shared efforts andpains, and worked in collaboration. Though a lofty policy maker

1650011-8

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

may develop a plan with clear-cut aims, people at work including
government ofﬁcials make efforts somberly to turn out to be both
stable and ﬂexible in balance to the fullest.
The depth of coupling between economic development and social wellbeing inJapanese consciousness and language has important implications for understanding
Tokyo’s adaptation-development nexus. Trading economic ﬂexibility for social
gain through risk management is less important than economic security in acontext where levels of inequality and poverty are popularly understood to be low.
In fact, the relative poverty rate of Japan is on the rise and has been above theOECD average since the mid-2000s, with Japan’s Gini coefﬁcient today higher
than the OECD average (OECD 2014). Further, the proportion of the population
living in absolute poverty increased by 5 percent between the mid-1980s and 2000
(Jones 2007). Despite this a lower proportion of the population is concerned about
income inequality in Japan than in other countries with similar levels of Gini
coefﬁcient (Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare 2011). High levels of employment (OECD 2014) and equitable income distribution continuing since thepost-war period have led to a long-held self-perception of Japan as an egalitarianand classless nation (Abe 2011). This highlights the stability of cultural values, butalso raises the potential of a break in these values should increasing poverty andinequality continue to rise, and the implications of this process as a determinant ofpolitically acceptable risk management strategy. Though Japan’s ‘rediscovery’ ofpoverty is lagging behind its experience (Pantazis 2014: 63), it may affect popularand political thinking on the preferred balance of economic and social interests indevelopment and their expression in risk management. As discussed later for future
trajectories, it might not be beyond imagination that emphasizing resilience making
to be the responsibility of vulnerable populations — who may also be increasingly
seen as unequally poor — is less tenable in the future, or will require stronger state
support as a mechanism for wealth redistribution, for example through a review ofsocial or property insurance policy. Social transformation outcomes of risk management that act to correct development injustices as a means for and outcome of
reducing vulnerability may become more politically attractive in this future.
3.2.1. Drivers leading to the contemporary regime
Respondents reported that the most important elements contributing to the shapingof the contemporary regime included science and technology, and national policy
steering through legal jurisdictions and budget allocation. As shown in Figure 4,
respondents pointed to hazard information as an essential element for policymaking. At the same time, as seen in Figure 5, the national government has had a
1650011-9

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

M. Nishi et al.

Figure 4. Factors Leading to City Policy Priorities

Figure 5. Actors Establishing the Dominant Approachconsiderable top-down inﬂuence on city policy through national policies, legal
systems and budgetary procedures, wherein knowledge held by academia, as wellas public opinion inﬂuenced by business concerns and popular priorities, weredrawn on for policy-making. A national ofﬁcial in the water sector highlighted
TMG’s role as a city manager, through which the national government has
mainstreamed the resilience approach using legal reform:
The mainstreaming of resilience is underway at the national level,
as seen in the recent legislative changes. It is the massive tsunami
following the Great East Japan earthquake that served as theimpetus for current movement. We recognized that such a giant
tsunami can actually occur even though neither anyone had experienced nor any historical record had mentioned it. In response,
1650011-10

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

the national agencies together with academia have been discussing and creating a movement for a resilience society. For
legislative change, national politicians have also worked with us.
In addition, other stakeholders are all important, allowing us to
introduce new policies to society.
The high priority given to (earthquake) risk management in popular and political discourses meant there was no discernable, individual political party leadership on this issue — all agreed it was important and none had yet concretely
extended from earthquake to climate change hazard agendas. Individual leadership,
however, did make a difference in TMG: the Governor of Tokyo leads TMG andinﬂuences its strategy, and to some extent Metropolitan Assembly members who
inﬂuence speciﬁc measures, but not overall TMG strategy. A senior manager at
TMG pointed out that the Governor served as the ultimate decision maker in policy
making, with city ofﬁcials playing a role as technicians and administrators inpolicy development and implementation:
As the governor does not always have knowledge and information
across all the different sectors and ﬁelds to make a ﬁnal decision,
it is the ofﬁcials who offer well synthesized and timely information,
including suggestions of when and what issues should be prioritized and undertaken. For example, press launches for new
strategies are presented in the presence of the governor. It is thegovernor who has the last word, and the press launch is inﬂuential
only because the governor is present. There are also, but not so
often, very informal cases that ofﬁcials draw on support from city
politicians to pursue some measures for goodwill depending on
the circumstances.
Mirroring national political culture, TMG is a centralized authority but one thatdraws in selected external contributions. Reﬂecting on the evolution of the risk
management regime a national ofﬁcial of the environment sector described theprocess as experience-based and bottom-up referring to environmental policies inJapan as continuously responding to emerging environmental and social problems.
Responsiveness led an academic architect to describe policy formation as muddlingthrough, in which policy was decided in response to the emergence of problems
reﬂecting public opinion. These views conﬁrm studies highlighting the limited
opening of spaces for external inﬂuence and the contribution of civil society actors
in shaping public discourse on speciﬁc risk issues such as nuclear power development and environmental pollution (Hasegawa et al. 2007; Avenell 2015, 2016).
1650011-11

M. Nishi et al.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Despite legal support for decentralization, including change to electoral institutions in 1994, the passage of the Non-Proﬁt Organization Law (NPO Law), 1998
and the Decentralization Law, 2000, the risk management regime remains largely
technocratic and top-down rather than innovative and proactive (Aldrich 2016). A
senior manager at TMG summarized the common practices of policy making at
TMG:
Objective information such as hazard information, demographics
and economic status is always analyzed and incorporated into
policy making. Given analyzable objective information, political
will essentially drive policy making. In addition, the city agency’s
capacity determines whether policies can be implemented andenforced, while the governor makes a decision also referring to
the citizens and the metropolitan assembly. National politicalpriorities do not directly drive local policy making, but control it
through budget allocation. Business and private sector concerns
either directly affect the governor’s will or indirectly inﬂuence itthrough national political priorities. There are few cases of external pressure from the international community inﬂuencing disaster management in Tokyo.
The centralized national and TMG regime was critiqued by respondents fromacademia who raised concerns over the transparency and credibility of policymaking this brought. In particular, although scientists’ direct participation in discussion sessions were sometimes drawn on for policy deliberation, a few
respondents questioned the degree of inﬂuence and legitimacy held by scientists,suggesting that their participation may only give cosmetic legitimacy to ongoingpolicy processes. A respondent from academia commented:
It is not easily visible from outside the agency how local policy
priorities are actually decided. I guess TMG may have a strong
will to pursue policies not necessarily following the national
government. However, the contents of the policies seem to be
determined according to the opinions of the people with theloudest voices at the time such as prominent scholars in a waythat maintains the TMG’s overall direction or independence. For
example, if social awareness of heat grows stronger, related
studies will increase and then TMG will take an initiative todevelop countermeasures against heat island effects. When it
comes to what measures should be taken, they will develop the1650011-12

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

measures . . . exactly following what a prominent scholar suggests.
But there are often cases that actual validity and justiﬁcation ofsuch measures are unclear or questionable.
The response from TMG explained the rationale behind this opaque process, describing that the city government often internalized or informalized policy-making
processes for efﬁciency and effectiveness in the face of budgetary constraints andthe traditional hierarchical structures of academia. On one hand, ‘informal’ study
meetings with experts from government, private sector or academia allowed forexchange and supported innovation. On the other, there was a strong culturalpreference for respecting existing academic hierarchies when engaging with science, limiting the diversity of science voices. The TMG also commissioned private
consultants or research institutes to draw on external intellectual resources where
TMG saw a speciﬁc need. But the choice of consultants was seen to be based
overly on price rather than quality, which may be hard to judge in areas of
emergent policy. Together these administrative and cultural factors produced apolicy environment that while based on trusted expertise was less adept at surfacing emerging ideas to inform policy deliberation, this may serve contemporaryrisk management well (based on historically grounded earthquake risk) but is of
more questionable utility when planning might also require a future lens to captureTokyo’s emergent multiple hazards and social change.
3.3. Future trajectories in risk management
Finally we ask, what management approach could the city deploy to address futureclimate risks? First, to explore future risks, respondents were presented with four
scenarios that might emerge over the next 20 years (towards 2035). These were:(A) a doubling of the current frequency of climate hazard events (i.e., ﬂooding andheatwave) and their impacts; (B) a doubling of the population over the age of 65 inaddition to doubling climate hazards; (C) a doubling of the level of income inequality in addition to a doubling of the aged population and of climate hazards;and (D) halved resources expended per capita on disaster risk reduction in addition
to a doubling of inequality, the aged population and climate hazards.
Scenarios were ﬁrst discussed for relevance (Figure 6). Population aging wasperceived as most likely to inform policy. Given the positioning of inequality (andpoverty) as triggers for regime change in risk management, the belief that inequality was unlikely to increase in the next 20 years inferred a belief also instability in the policy regime. This said, decline in government capacity andsomewhat the progress in population aging were signaled as most likely to leadtransition towards transformative regimes where development policy would itself
1650011-13

M. Nishi et al.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Figure 6. Most Plausible Scenario

Figure 7. Degree of Change to Be Madebe a target for risk management. Figure 7 shows the importance of social dynamics
in forcing a transition. Respondents felt a doubling of hazard could be dealt withthrough minor adjustments to the existing regime, but any large increase in vulnerable populations would require a transition in risk management.
Tokyo does face an aging population, it is estimated that one in three citizens inTokyo will be over the age of 65 by 2035 (with an increase from 24.2 percent
in 2015 to 30.7 percent in 2035) (TMG 2015). TMG has taken aging into accountin its existing policies, encouraging some respondents to suggest little change
would be required in the future. For around half the respondents, however, moreradical changes were suggested including the need to develop compact city or
national land plans to optimally locate the aging population to secure public services provision. Others proposed a political decision to determine an acceptablelevel of risk associated with aging indicating the ethical and value-judgments
needed. In particular, an expert in medicine commented:
We very often accept elderly critical-care patients suffering fromheat disorder and any other diseases. . . .What would be the best
1650011-14

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

solution to the elderly and who should decide it? Their family
usually want the elderly to be saved, but it may not be possible forthem to recover 100 percent. The urban environment does notallow the elderly to be appropriately cared for at home, as
housing is small and family members are busy with their own jobs.
While outside the scope of the presented scenarios, a number of respondents
volunteered concerns about the opportunities and threats of migration as a response
to aging (the potential of securing a workforce set against possible cultural tensions), and that this may be more important than aging as a driver for demographic
change. For some respondents both population aging and economic stagnation
were plausible in the coming decades, potentially threatening stability in government. Under this interpretation, many respondents called for transition. Suggestedchanges included innovations in the means for self-help and community cooperation such as non-residential zoning and relocation from hazardous areas, private
insurance, new living arrangements including shared accommodation. Some evenconsidered large-scale relocation of core Tokyo functions. Several respondents
raised arguments for deeper transition in policy making processes and politicalstructures: a respondent from academia argued that such a scenario would cause
the opening of a public debate on minimum standards of social wellbeing withpotentially transformative consequences for risk management and development in
the city, and beyond:If economic inequality signiﬁcantly grows, there may be somepeople who cannot afford an air conditioner even when the AC
installation is promoted. If so, we will need a societal consensus
about what society Japan seeks to attain. As for the right to life
guaranteed in Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan, we will needto specify what kind of living is the minimum. Our awareness of aminimum standard was not high when Japan was an economic
power with a fat tax revenue, but I don’t think the society will
tolerate any further the cases that people receiving welfare havemore income than workers earning minimum wage. . . .Neither
minor nor major change may be meaningfully made unless thecontents of the right to life are well discussed. . . .If the government capacity largely diminishes additionally, the soft approach
involving the change in public values will be further more critical.
As examples of self-help, people are only encouraged not to live ina dangerous location or to purchase insurance for their own risk
management.
1650011-15

M. Nishi et al.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

3.3.1. The emerging direction of changeWith the above future risks in mind, the majority of respondents perceived thecurrent direction of transition in the risk management as moving further towards
resilience (Figure 8). Some foresaw continuation of efforts to mainstream resilience into disaster management, under the assumption that political structures andﬁnancial constraints would make difﬁcult any deviation from support for resistance. Others pointed to the increasing emphasis on ﬂexibility at the individualand community levels to prepare for unprecedented disaster risk as an indicatorthat resilience was gaining momentum. In either case, transition was not seen as
breaking away from economic stability as the primary goal for risk management,with the recognition that existing infrastructure should be at least maintained in theface of Tokyo’s dynamic hazard risks. The primary factors shaping this transition
towards resilience included extreme events and economic change enabled byadministrative structures, with more than two thirds of respondents describing
these three pressures as the most important (Figure 9). Speed of transition was
described as slow, but consistent with transition being detected over the last
20 years.
While Tokyo’s risk management has long been oriented towards resistance, its
expression has changed over time and the emerging incorporation of elements ofresilience in the regime can be traced over several periods. Importantly though,past reforms have tended to follow catastrophic events and not been built on futurerisk or sustainable development prospects reinforcing the challenge for Tokyo as itenters an era of climate risk combined with present earthquake risk. Historicalprecedents include response to the Great Hanshin earthquake (1995). The impactsof this earthquake inﬂuenced both the concept of administrative planning of Tokyoand the role of civic actors in risk management nationally. As part of this reform,
TMG initiated ‘pre-disaster’ planning for the ﬁrst time, putting in place planning

Figure 8. Current Direction of Change
1650011-16

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Figure 9. Factors Shaping the Current Direction of Change

and administrative manuals for post-disaster urban restoration (Aiba et al. 2007)
along with plans for urban improvement focused on high vulnerability crowded
wooden dwellings under the Ordinance of 2000 (Nakabayashi 2008). Also, withthe lessons that about 98 percent survivors were saved on their own or byneighbors (Fire and Disaster Management Agency 2016: 262), the preamble ofthis Ordinance introduced to ofﬁcial policy documents for the ﬁrst time in Japanthe three-fold concept of self-help ( jijo), community cooperation (kyojo) andgovernment assistance (kojo), which has gained currency in disaster management
nationwide (Iwasa 2008). These reforms show residents, residential land-use andcommunity groups as the target for reform and arguably for steps towards a
resilience transition with commercial and industrial behavior not addressed
directly.
Business life, and especially supply chains were the target of reform following the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami (2011). Besides the widened trust deﬁcit between citizens and the state (Aldrich 2012), the unparalleled,extensive disasters stemming from this earthquake exposed the vulnerability ofTokyo’s reliance on electric power and materials from other regions (Numata
et al. 2011; TMG 2011). In particular, the disaster signaled for Tokyo thecriticality of supply chains as well as severity of hazards that exceed infrastructure based on the principle of resistance (disaster avoided). In response,
TMG revised the Local Plan for Disaster Prevention (2012) to include preparedness for an unprecedented large-scale disaster with emphasis on partnerships among actors (TMG 2014b). Measures for self-help and community
cooperation were further strengthened for risk reduction, and also continuity
planning in government and business sectors.

1650011-17

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

M. Nishi et al.

Historic climate extremes have also begun to act as drivers of change in risk
management and its relationship to development. Several large-scale ﬂoods caused
by unusually intense rainfall have led to increased standards for ﬂood control,
monitoring, information provision and evacuation processes. The torrential rainfalls in summer 2008 served to coin the term “guerrilla storms” (gerira gou), andled to improved precipitation monitoring for faster and more accurate information
provision for individuals. Flash ﬂooding in Tokyo in 2008 gave rise to earlywarning operational process at sewerage construction sites at TMG. International
processes also inﬂuenced TMG’s risk management as TMG embarked on policymaking for urban heat island effects and global warming as a ‘double warming,’
following Japan’s agreement to the Kyoto Protocol (1997). Yet, more substantively, recent hot summers, particularly the high death toll nationwide (1,745 fatalities) associated with the extreme heat in 2010 (Ministry of the Environment2014), were perceived to have led to a departure from earlier government-led
measures such as roof greening incentives, towards a preference for measures
aimed at directly managing heatstroke. In this regard, a respondent from medicine
described:
Although the death toll from heat disorder had never exceed 1,000
fatalities before 2010 even during the extremely hot summer in
2007, it reached 1,700 fatalities in 2010. This was a shocking
event. In the following summer after the nuclear explosion in
Fukushima in 2011, we were worried about numerous fatalities
under the planned saving electricity, but the death toll turned out
to be below 1,000 because of the cooler summer. Yet, since thistime around, we have become busy and the initiatives to tackle
heatwave have been actively promoted. I guess we have come tonotice symptoms, as we recognize much hotter in summer today
than 10 years ago, obviously feeling stronger sunlight. . . .Rather
than the public authority, grassroots actors such as private doctors, care staff, civil society, . . .and of course including publichealthcare facilities and public doctors, have been increasingly
acting on this with better capacities. We see better diagnostic andtherapeutic capabilities of these actors, and increased citizens’
knowledge of expedient treatments in the past couple of years.
This statement underlines the capacity of local actors that have been given
increased responsibility to manage risks, but limited scope to inform policy.
Administrative structures have been formed in response to, not in anticipation of1650011-18

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

such extreme events. An academic emphasized the historical context that gave rise
to contemporary policy-making culture:
In Japan, things tend to be decided by government leadership,
while citizens tend to place their expectation with the government.
Compared to Western cities, citizens’ sense of participation inpolitics may be lower. This may be in part due to the historicalcontext that Japanese cities were not created by citizens, butrather they gathered around people with authority. Even today
local residents protest against the adverse effect of a high-risebuilding on scenery only when such a building is about to beconstructed nearby, but normally they tend to see the government
as being supposed to manage the creation of scenery and it is not
the place of the citizens to raise their voices. The government has
the awareness needed by this role to handle a matter before
problems emerge, and generally citizens have no question of there
being any problem in policy making under government leadership.
Within this context, administrative agencies were largely seen as responsible,
interacting with economic and business activities (that were coupled with social
wellbeing) and with support from science and technology to progress disastermanagement. Despite a lack of transparency in mechanisms for integrating scientiﬁc knowledge into policy-making, the response of TMG ofﬁcials suggested
that scientiﬁc information was a major input in policy development. The use ofscience has been strengthened following the call from the Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 for an ‘evidence-base’ and ‘improved understanding’ of disaster risk in national policy. Albeit still largely a government-led
regime, a more inclusive approach involving the general public has been promoted
following the heightened public attention to self-help and community cooperationin the aftermath of the 3/11 disasters.
The engineering solutions of disaster management encouraged economic development in the post-war years (e.g., dams and levees) but these physical structures have now begun to decay and come themselves to pose threats to the city. For
example, a roadway accident in the Sasago Tunnel, 2012, resulted in nine fatalities.
This event increased attention to dilapidated infrastructure nationwide, and led todisaster management being better integrated with the maintenance or renewal of
decaying infrastructure. More general physical infrastructure of the post-war years(e.g., mass housing, and water supply and sewerage systems) also limits risk
management options, for example by making difﬁcult the relocation of vulnerable
residential districts or the creation of an evacuation space in Tokyo.
1650011-19

M. Nishi et al.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Contemporary economic stagnation was also seen as a potential driver that
could contribute to a shift in risk management from resistance towards resilience.
This may happen if public spending for disaster management was reduced with
policy shifting responsibility for adaptation further onto individuals and communities. The threat is real enough for Olympics risk management planning to have an
enhanced element of self-help and community cooperation. Speciﬁcally with theprospect of the 2020 Olympics, the Tokyo Disaster Prevention Plan was publishedin 2014 to speed up pre-disaster planning including a potential Tokyo inland
earthquake and wind and ﬂood damage (TMG 2014c). This plan also placed anemphasis on individual behavior and community resilience building on direction ofchange initiated in the post 3/11 decade.
3.3.2. Challenges and opportunities for transition
Tokyo’s risk management regime deploys social resilience to enhance the resistance to risk of economic activity. What challenges might Tokyo face if transition
towards a more resilient or transformative regime were preferred? A major challenge highlighted by interviewees was the incorporation of future reforms intoplanning and policy-making at TMG. Elaborating on uncertainty associated withclimate risk a respondent from academia noted:
One of the major challenges in risk management is the fact that
there is no way to validate whether a certain plan actually gives
an effect. We can know the effect only after risk becomes turned
into reality. We can demonstrate possible effects only by a drill atbest... But such drills are rarely conducted appropriately. In
conventional environmental management, the effect can be conﬁrmed through the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle and thus a plan canbe improved. However, for risk, the PDCA cycle does not apply.
Some types of risk that more frequently become reality are moreeasily recognized, while others rarely actualized or not easily
measurable in potential damage are less recognized. It is very
difﬁcult to deal with the latter types.
Challenges to transition were observed in standing administrative structures.
A respondent with expertise in economics highlighted the desirability of a morejoined-up and prevention oriented mission for risk managers:
To govern risk resulting from interactions between hazard, exposure and vulnerability, there should be multiple layers ofplayers even in one agency. Some experts scientiﬁcally assess
1650011-20

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

hazards, some evaluate risks based on data of hazards together
with others related to exposure and vulnerability, and someallocate budget or issue evacuation orders taking into accountfuture or immediate risks. These different players are expected tosystematically engage in different functions, while there could be aposition that considers all the functions and strategize comprehensively. Besides, a channel to reﬂect on citizens’ needs andexpectations is to be secured. Some tasks of hazard assessment
may be outsourced to a research institute, but the government
should be clear about roles and responsibilities.. . .There is aposition of crisis manager at most prefectural governments with afocus on initial reaction to emergency situations, but no ex-ante
vision overall to reasonably allocate budget and prioritize different risks.
For transition, integrated policy-making structures were seen as a key to cope withemerging uncertainty presented by climate change. A respondent from TMG indicated scope to learn from the experience of climate change mitigation planningunder a former Environmental Executive that instituted agency-wide, cross-sector
meetings to discuss emerging environmental problems such as heat island effects.
This practice was unusual across local governments in Japan, but has been conducted somewhat as a norm at TMG. Beyond this innovation, day-to-day operations were considered to be constrained by a lack of integration reinforced throughrelatively rigid budget allocation. As another respondent from TMG stated, thisroutine practice is unlikely to lead to comprehensive long-term policy development
to prepare for future risks unless a Governor’s command is delivered, thus lockingin TMG to top-down cycles of innovation that may fail to move operational levels:
When the governor does not focus on climate change, the executive ofﬁcials are unwilling to give themselves up to the issues thatseem not to be well received. Risk of failure is larger and the
response is not an easy one. So, a bar is set high for all thebureaus to take an initiative for adaptation. It is easier when there
is a command from above, but we need to take our own career risk
if we take own initiative to appeal to the governor. If it fails, weneed to take all the responsibilities, so no one is willing to do so.
No one thinks there is no need for adaptation, but as uncertainty
associated with climate risk is very high, we cannot help but bewary of developing a plan particularly for infrastructure that

1650011-21

M. Nishi et al.

requires large budget allocation, without knowing when and how
much impact emerges.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Structural difﬁculties for innovation emerging from within TMG were further
challenged by regular personnel rotation. Respondents described rotation as apractice discouraging ofﬁcials from changing administrative practices as well as
impeding institutional memory. Rotation creates a cadre of competence rather than
excellence, and it provides an administration able to deliver but not to innovate
policy. Highlighting this, a respondent from academia with expertise in civil engineering stated:
I hear often from government ofﬁcials of the difﬁculties withlean resource allocation for infrastructure improvement for adaptation. . . .Effective and efﬁcient policy making also requires atool to understand needs of citizens and stakeholders and continuously monitor them, but I guess the ofﬁcials are not able toeasily grasp such needs under the two-to-three year personnel
rotation. One scholar was saying that the public administration
does not create a “Superman.” The regular rotation allows any
ofﬁcial to act as a substitute, . . .instead of relying on a certain
Superman, so as not to centralize authority. On the other hand,such a system impedes the deepening of individual ofﬁcial’s
knowledge and the accumulation of institutional memory. There
are few ofﬁcials who deeply understand each policy together withthe contexts and background and monitor the trends for a longterm. It is often scholars, instead, who relay the knowledge continuously to new ofﬁcials. As some scholars study a certain riverand follow the related policies, and continuously monitor thetrends, government ofﬁcials interview such experts when needed
for policy processes.
The responses from TMG somewhat conﬁrmed this statement. As a norm for many
local governments, three-year personnel rotation is repeated within a certain Bureau besides a temporal assignment outside the agency that is generally for ﬁve
years in the case of TMG. Thus, despite a lack of continuous engagement in a
speciﬁc section, ofﬁcials become professionals to the extent that competence grows
in a certain expert ﬁeld. Nevertheless, systematic challenges in bureaucracy impede
effective knowledge transfer and creation, as a respondent from TMG indicated:
To study new issues, I prefer organizing informal meetings rather
than commissioning studies to external institutes, as we keep
1650011-22

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

having a savage system of price competition for brainwork. In
order to organize such informal meetings, a network of personal
contacts is important, but there is no system to secure such a
network. As corruption or graft is the biggest problem ingovernment, ofﬁcials are systematically prevented from being at
the same position for long. Even though it is the logic for therotation, a few key persons turn out to be more or less in similarareas continuously. Such key persons are actually critical toeffectively draw on limited resources, but this is not a norm.
Mainstreaming of resilience in risk management has been promoted by national
government leadership. At the local level, the resource management system (e.g.,
personnel rotation and budget allocation) designed to decentralize the authority
appeared to impede local innovation to address emerging needs. Some respondents
called for a new role of TMG in risk management. A respondent from a foundation
with expertise in meteorology expressed the expectation for goal change within
TMG:
We assume that the government provides administrative services
for us. Such a role will remain, but their role will need to be more
focused on increasing the capacity of individuals by providing
scientiﬁc information comprehensively for the stakeholders including citizens. I think the government won’t be able to address
future challenges merely on their own. It’s about time to stop
saying they can provide all the services, and instead, disclose thelimit of the authority and then urge people to make a decision andact on it. To do so, the government is expected to clearly andpublicly explain the problems, potential impacts, response
options, and scenarios if no response is taken, with concrete
examples and without delay. When bottom-up capacity development doesn’t work, a political decision should be required.
An ofﬁcial from TMG provided the view that the current government-led risk
management would work over the next 20 years, given investment in highstandard engineered infrastructure. In the more distant future, however, the respondent emphasized a need for change in TMG mission making and its planningapproach to address risk that may be largely different from those planned for today:
As lots of efforts and investment have been made, the current
approach may work at the utmost with minor change in 20 years
unless a huge, dreadful event occurs. Paradoxically it is the1650011-23

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

M. Nishi et al.

problem of Tokyo. For further future, say by 2050, . . .we should
be clear about how to communicate the message such that the
government cannot address the problem on its own, how to makea decision on governmental roles and responsibilities, and what to
do with evacuation when disaster cannot be prevented. We should
start changing the approach to planning or mission making evenfrom today, but our engineers still ought to do everything. As the
traditional approach won’t work further with the already negative
legacy of the economy, we would need at least leadership todrastically change. The initiative should be taken by politicians,
media or academia. We also talk about such a change internally,
but I don’t think the city agency will change from inside. . . .It is
actually good that the engineers have lost conﬁdence. Previously
they had been overconﬁdent about the high-standard infrastructure, but we had the Great Hanshin earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear accident. . . .It is very good we all have become
unsure about ourselves and the ofﬁcials have become humbled. In
the ﬁeld of civil engineering, academia is also hierarchical andengineers and scholars don’t make an argument . . . But if all feels
deﬂated, it may change the status quo.
Respondents suggested reform could not easily be led from inside the structures ofgovernment given its jurisdictions and embedded culture. Instead, they were expectant of leaders such as the Governor or of external experts like scholars who
may advise and facilitate transition to reﬂect external needs. Further, fundamental
change in public values across stakeholders was desired. Many respondents noted
the root barriers to transition in contemporary popular and professional culture,compounded by a lack of basic education on risk and risk management, the lowlevel of citizen participation in politics, declining social ties within communities,
and the proﬁt-seeking behavior of business and industries which undermined thecoupling of economy and society despite this being held onto in popular attitudes.
Less clear in any process of future change were the roles of civil society andbusiness. To foster momentum for transition, some respondents pointed to businessas a key stakeholder. The case for more involvement from business speaks to thecloseness of social beneﬁt and economic activity in the Japanese imagination.
Business groups were expected to underpin social and economic activities andprovide technical as well as tax resources to government. Although the proﬁt
motive is accepted, business is seen to have some strengths to offer future regimes:
with its larger ﬁnancial base and technical resource (Avenell 2016). As a model
1650011-24

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

case, a scholar in urban planning pointed to the potential of area management in thebusiness districts such as Marunouchi where community-based urban renewal
projects involving business entities have included disaster management.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

4. Conclusion
The disaster risk management regime in Tokyo has gradually expanded fromresistance to include elements of resilience. Policy has increasingly promoted selfhelp and community-cooperation approaches within existing strategy that combines both development and disaster management.
Perhaps most striking in shaping potential for transition is the strength of
established values and their institutionalization.
Popular values include:
trust in authority and its technical expertise;a belief in the inseparability of economic and social wellbeing;. a belief in a low inequality of Japanese society.
.
.

Professional values include:.
.

respect for hierarchy in science and policy;
a desire to build policy from past experiences.

In response to past extreme events, the regime has undertaken largely reactive
policy-making adjusted within a national policy framework and directed by theGovernor of Tokyo. Continued high public trust in government limits spontaneous,
local innovation that might give rise to alternative risk management priorities orpractices. Trust may be undermined if inequality and poverty continue to growrevealing a break in received notions of coupled economic and social wellbeing.
Under this current administrative regime, structural challenges to transition
include the slow take-up of forward looking climate risk assessments and a cultureof policy-making that is more comfortable with historical hazard and risk assessment methodologies associated with earthquake risk management. Common
administrative practices relying on sectoral divisions and relatively rigid budget
allocation also make it difﬁcult for mid- and senior-level administrators to innovate
more joined-up approaches to risk management and development planning. Regular rotation of administrative personnel impedes institutional memory for effective
reﬂection on longer-term trends, including emerging needs. While some external
experts continuously pass context-speciﬁc knowledge down throughout the rotations, there are challenges to effectively draw on scientiﬁc and intellectual
resources from outside TMG. Administration’s customary reticence upon academic
1650011-25

M. Nishi et al.

structures limits the diversity of science voices in policy-making, and price competition can prevent the best commercial consultancy input.
Though earthquake risks have been the major focus for risk management todate, climate risk has gained increasing attention over the past two decades.
However, management continues to be framed by past events rather than projectedrisk, and it is the reproduction of this outlook through administrative structure andgovernance culture that characterize Tokyo’s constrained operating room for risk
management and potential for transition.

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Acknowledgments
Research reported in this paper was undertaken as part of the Belmont Forum
funded Transformation and Resilience on Urban Coasts (TRUC) project. This
project was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, the UK
Natural Environment Research Council and Economic and Social ResearchCouncil (NE/L008971/1) the German Research Foundation (GZ: BI 1655/1-1),
The Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India (MoES/01-CZM/Truc/2013)
and US National Science Foundation (ICER-1342966).
References
Abe, AK (2011). The Myth of egalitarian society: poverty and social exclusion in Japan.
In: P Saunders and R Sainsbury (eds.) Social Security, Poverty and Social Exclusion
in Rich and Poorer Countries, Mortsel: Intersentia Publishing, pp. 175–199.
Aiba, S, Ichiko T and Nakabayashi I (2007). Pre-disaster measures for post-disaster recovery planning from the next Tokyo earthquake: Through earthquake disaster recovery measures and its drills with communities. Journal of Geography, 116(3/4):
557–575. (in Japanese).
Aldrich, DP (2008). Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and theWest. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Aldrich, DP (2011). The power of people: social capital’s role in recovery from the 1995
Kobe earthquake. Natural Hazards, 56(3): 595–611.
Aldrich, DP (2012). Post-crisis Japanese nuclear policy: From top-down directives tobottom-up activism. Asia Paciﬁc Issues, 103, 1–12.
Aldrich, DP (2013). Rethinking civil society–state relations in Japan after 3/11. Polity,
45(2): 249–264.
Aldrich, DP (2016). It’s who you know: Factors driving recovery from Japan’s 11 March2011 disaster. Public Administration, 94(2): 399–414.
Aldrich, DP and Meyer M (2015). Social capital and community resilience. American
Behavioral Scientist, 59(2): 254–69.
Aldrich, DP and Sawada Y (2015). The physical and social determinants of mortality in the
3.11 tsunami. Social Science and Medicine, 124: 66–75.

1650011-26

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

Aoki, K (2010). Policy process analyses of the Japanese local governments’ progressive
low carbon measures: Based upon the ﬁndings obtained from multiple case studies.
The Fudai Keizai Ronshu: The Journal of Economic Studies, Toyama University,
56(2): 337–371. (in Japanese).
Aoki, K and Motoki Y (2007). A policy process analysis of the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government’s global warming prevention measures: Importance and implications of
the policy dynamics emerging from the progressive local initiatives. The Fudai
Keizai Ronshu: The Journal of Economic Studies, Toyama University, 53(2):247–297. (in Japanese).
Avenell, S (2015). Transnationalism and the evolution of post-national citizenship inJapan. Asian Studies Review, 39(3): 375–394.
Avenell, S (2016). Antinuclear radicals: Scientiﬁc experts and antinuclear activism inJapan. Science Technology and Society, 21(1): 88–109.
Baba, K (2010). Effectiveness and diffusion of local climate policy: A case of GHG
emission reporting system. Energy and Resources, 31(2): 1–9. (in Japanese).
Fire and Disaster Management Agency (2016). Heisei 27 Nendo Shobo Hakusho (Fiscal
Year 2015 White Paper on Extinguishing Fire). http://www.fdma.go.jp/html/
hakusho/h27/h27/index3.html [October 31, 2016]. (in Japanese).
Government of Japan (2015). National Plan for Adaptation to the Impacts of Climate
Change. http://www.env.go.jp/earth/ondanka/tekiou/siryo1.pdf [August 16, 2016].
(in Japanese).
Hasegawa, K, Shinohara C and Broadbent J (2007). The effect of ‘social expectation’ on
the development of civil society in Japan. Journal of Civil Society, 3(2): 179–203.
Hijioka, Y, Takano S, Oka K, Yoshikawa M, Ichihashi A, Baba K and Ishiwatari S (2016).
Potential of existing policies of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for implementing adaptation to climate change. Regional Environmental Change, 16(4): 967–
978.
Hommerich, C (2012). Trust and subjective well-being after the Great East Japan Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown: Preliminary results. International Journal ofJapanese Sociology, 21: 46–64.
Iwasa, M (2008). A viewpoint of culture of disaster: Self-, mutual- and public-help.
Journal of Liberal Arts, Seijoh University, 4: 5–13. (in Japanese).
Jones, RS (2007). Income Inequality, Poverty and Social Spending in Japan. OECD
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 556, OECD publishing.
Nakagawa, Y and Shaw R (2004). Social capital: A missing link to disaster recovery.
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 22(1): 5–34.
Ministry of the Environment (2014). Environmental Health Manual on Heat Strokes.
http://www.wbgt.env.go.jp/heatstroke manual.php [August 16, 2016]. (in Japanese).
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2011). Fiscal Year of 2012 White Paper on
Health, Labour and Welfare. http://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/kousei/12/ [August
16, 2016]. (in Japanese).
Mitchell, JK (1999). Crucibles of Hazard: Mega-Cities and Disasters in Transition.
Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Nakabayashi, I (2008). Earthquake vulnerability assessment and anti-earthquake disastercity planning in Tokyo. Journal of Urban Science, (2): 69–81. (in Japanese).
1650011-27

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

M. Nishi et al.

Numata, M, Kondo S, Inoue M and Meguro K (2011). Comparative analysis of Regional
Disaster Prevention Plan for regional cooperation framework. Seisan Kenkyu, 63(6):755–763. (in Japanese).
OECD (2014). Society at a Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators. OECD Publishing.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/soc glance-2014-en [August 16, 2016].
Ogawa, A (2004). Invited by the state: Institutionalizing volunteer subjectivity in contemporary Japan. Asian Anthropology, 3: 71–96.
Onishi, T (2010). Teitanso-Shakai ni Machete Machizukuri (City planning towards towards
a low-carbon society). In: T Onishi and H Kobayashi (eds.) Teitanso-Toshi: Korekara no Machizukuri (Low Carbon City: Future Urban Planning) Kyoto: Gakukgei
Shuppansha, pp. 8–29. (in Japanese).
Oono, T (2010). Teitanso-Toshi eno Tenkan wo Mezasu Tokyo no Torikumi (Actions ofTokyo aiming at transition towards a low-carbon city). In: T Onishi and H Kobayashi(eds.) Teitanso-Toshi: Korekara no Machizukuri (Low Carbon City: Future Urban
Planning), Kyoto: Gakukgei Shuppansha, pp. 179–197. (in Japanese).
Pantazis, C (2014). Introduction: Comparative perspectives on poverty and inequality:
Japan and the United Kingdom. Social Policy and Society, 13(1): 63–67.
Samuels, R (2013). 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Sassen, S (2013). Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Revised Edition). Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Seidensticker, E (1983). Low City, High City: Tokyo from Edo to the Earthquake. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Seidensticker, E (1990). Tokyo Rising: The City since the Great Earthquake. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Shirai, N and Baba K (2014). The situation and barriers on the implementation of climatechange adaptation in local governments of Japan. Environmental Science, 27(5):324–334. (in Japanese).
Shirai, N and Tanaka M (2015). Analysis of ideal directions of climate change adaptationand problems in implementing them for local Japanese governments. Journal ofDisaster Research, 10(3): 420–428.
Solecki, W, Pelling M and Garschagen M (2017). Transitions between risk management
regimes in megacities, Ecology and Society, in review.
Tanaka, M, Shirai N, Yamamoto T and Kimura H (2011). Issues and trends on global
warming adaptation policy in Japanese local governments. Proceedings of 39th
Annual Meeting of Environmental Systems Research, Japan Society of Civil Engineers, pp. 309–314. (in Japanese).
TMG (2011). Tokyo-To Bosai Taio Shishin (Tokyo Metropolitan Government Disaster
Response Guidelines). http://www.bousai.metro.tokyo.jp/taisaku/1000061/1000368.
html [August 16, 2016]. (in Japanese).
TMG (2014a). The Long-Term Vision for Tokyo. http://www.seisakukikaku.metro.tokyo.jp/
tokyo vision/vision index/ [August 16, 2016].
TMG (2014b). Chiiki Bosai Keikaku (Tokyo Local Plan for Disaster Prevention). http://
www.bousai.metro.tokyo.jp/taisaku/1000061/1000903/index.html [August 16, 2016].
(in Japanese).
1650011-28

J. of Extr. Even. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
by 223.25.160.37 on 02/14/17. For personal use only.

Risk Management Regime and Its Scope for Transition in Tokyo

TMG (2014c). Tokyo no Bosai Puran (Tokyo Disaster Prevention Plan). http://www.
bousai.metro.tokyo.jp/taisaku/1000061/1001592.html [August 16, 2016]. (inJapanese).
TMG (2015). Koreisha no Kyoju-Antei Kakuho Puran (Plan for Securing Stable Housing
for the Aging Population). http://www.metro.tokyo.jp/INET/KEIKAKU/2015/03/
70p3r200.htm [August 16, 2016]. (in Japanese).
TMG (2016a). Statistics of Tokyo. http://www.toukei.metro.tokyo.jp/jsuikei/js-index.htm[August 16, 2016]. (in Japanese).
TMG (2016b). Heisei 28 Nendo Tokyo-To no Yosan-An no Gaiyo (The Budget Plan ofTokyo Metropolitan Government for the Fiscal Year of 2016). http://www.zaimu.
metro.tokyo.jp/syukei1/zaisei/20160210 heisei28nendo tokyotoyosanangaiyou/
28nendoyosanannogaiyou.pdf [August 16, 2016]. (in Japanese).
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015).
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, (ST/ESA/SER.A/366). https://
esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Report.pdf [August 16, 2016].
Veszteg, R, Y Funaki and A Tanaka (2014). The impact of the Tohoku earthquake andtsunami on social capital in Japan: Trust before and after the disaster. International
Political Science Review, 36(2): 119–138.

1650011-29