A Mycle Schneider Consulting Project
Paris, September 2020
Status Report 2020

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |2The World Nuclear Industry
Status Report 2020
By

Mycle Schneider

Antony Froggatt

Independent Consultant, Paris, France

Independent Consultant, London, U.K.

Project Coordinator and Lead Author

Lead Author

With

Julie Hazemann

Ben Wealer

Director of EnerWebWatch, Paris, France

Research Associate, Workgroup for Economic
and Infrastructure Policy, Berlin University ofTechnology (TU Berlin), Germany

Documentary Research, Modelling and Datavisualization

Ali Ahmad
Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atomand International Security Program (ISP),
Harvard Kennedy School, U.S.
Contributing Author

Tadahiro Katsuta
Professor, School of Law, Meiji University,
Tokyo, Japan
Contributing Author

Contributing Author

Agnès Stienne
Artist, Graphic Designer, Cartographer,
Le Mans, France
Graphic Design & Layout

Friedhelm Meinass
Visual Artist, Painter, Rodgau, Germany
Cover-page Design, Painting and Layout

M.V. Ramana
Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human
Security with the Liu Institute for Global Issues at
the University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada
Contributing Author

Foreword byJungmin Kang

Frank von Hippel

Former Chair, Nuclear Safety & Security
Commission, South Korea

Professor Emeritus, Princeton University, U.S.

Paris, September 2020 © A Mycle Schneider Consulting ProjectWo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |3ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A difficult year. For so many people around the globe. Everything seems to be slower, needing more effort, as our attention andenergy is often deviated towards statistics on COVID-19 cases, deaths and combat strategies. Behind the numbers are people.
It is not only that the many human lives were lost, it is also many people that contracted the illness that have to cope with longterm health effects. Not to talk about the devastating social effects, many of which are yet to unfold.
The project coordinator is therefore particularly thankful to everyone who made the production of this year’s report possible,
the authors and data-manager, the designers and artists, the webmaster and all the supporters.
As for so many years now, a big thank you to Antony Froggatt for his conceptual ideas, his contributions, his reactivity and his
friendship.
At the core of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report (WNISR) is its database, designed and maintained by data manager andinformation engineer Julie Hazemann, who also develops most of the drafts for the graphical illustrations and manages muchof the cooperation with designer and webmaster. She expanded her contribution significantly over the past two years. As ever,no WNISR without her. Thanks so much.
The WNISR project can solidly count on the regular, reliable, professional and insightful contributions from M.V. Ramana,
Tadahiro Katsuta and Ben Wealer. Many thanks to all of you.
WNISR2020 greatly profits from a wonderful new contributing author, Ali Ahmad. We are very grateful for his excellent input.
We were lucky to have two outstanding top nuclear policy experts, Frank von Hippel and Jungmin Kang, providing a generous,
lucid foreword that puts the WNISR work into broader context. Thanks a million.
Many other people have contributed pieces of work to make this project possible and to bring it to the current standard. In
particular Shaun Burnie, whose multiple contributions again have been invaluable and are highly appreciated. Thank you also
to Caroline Peachey, Nuclear Engineering International, for providing the load factor figures quoted throughout the report.
Artist and graphic designer Agnès Stienne created the redesigned layout in 2017 and is constantly improving our graphic
illustrations that get a lot of praise around the world. Thank you.
Nina Schneider put her meticulous proof-reading and production skills to work again and added some helpful research.
Thanks so much.
A big thank-you to Arnaud Martin for his continuous, highly reactive and reliable work on the website, dedicated to the WNISR:
www.WorldNuclearReport.org.
For the second time, we owe the idea, design, and realization of the cover to renowned German painter Friedhelm Meinass,and designer Constantin E. Breuer, (“who congenially implements his ideas”) and who have also contributed the acclaimed
original artwork for the WNISR2019 cover. Thanks so much for this brilliant, thoughtful and very generous contribution.
This work has greatly benefitted from additional proofreading by Walt Patterson, partial proof-reading, editing suggestions,comments or other input by Pinar Demircan, Anton Eberhard, Jan Haverkamp, Christian von Hirschhausen, Gregory Jaczko,
Daul Jang, Lutz Mez, Olexi Pasyuk, Steve Thomas, and others. Thank you all.
The authors wish to thank in particular Matthew McKinzie, Eva van de Rakt, Tanja Gaudian, Rainer Griesshammer,
Andrea Droste, Rebecca Harms, Jutta Paulus and Simon Banholzer for their enthusiastic and lasting support of this project.
And everybody involved is grateful to the MacArthur Foundation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Heinrich Böll Foundation,
the Greens-EFA Group in the European Parliament, Elektrizitätswerke Schönau, Foundation Zukunftserbe and the Swiss
Renewable Energy Foundation for their generous support.
NOTE
This report contains a very large amount of factual and numerical data. While we do our utmost to verify and double-check,
nobody is perfect. The authors are always grateful for corrections and suggested improvements.

LEAD AUTHORS’ CONTACT INFORMATION
Mycle Schneider
45, Allée des Deux Cèdres
91210 Draveil (Paris) France
Ph: +33-1-69 83 23 79
E: mycle@WorldNuclearReport.org

Antony Froggatt
53a Neville Road
London N16 8SW United Kingdom
Ph: +44-79 68 80 52 99
E: antony@froggatt.net

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |4

TABLE OF CONTENTSACKNOWLEDGMENTS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3

FOREWORD

14

KEY INSIGHTS

18

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

20

REACTOR STARTUPS & CLOSURES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 20
OPERATION & CONSTRUCTION DATA .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 20
CONSTRUCTION STARTS & NEW-BUILD ISSUES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 22
NUCLEAR POWER IN THE AGE OF COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
MIDDLE EAST FOCUS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25
FOCUS COUNTRIES .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 27
SMALL MODULAR REACTORS (SMRs)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 29
FUKUSHIMA STATUS REPORT  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30
Onsite Challenges .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30
Offsite Challenges . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30
DECOMMISSIONING STATUS REPORT – SOARING COSTS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 31
NUCLEAR POWER VS. RENEWABLE ENERGY DEPLOYMENT  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 32

INTRODUCTION

34

GENERAL OVERVIEW WORLDWIDE

39

PRODUCTION AND ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 39
OPERATION, POWER GENERATION, AGE DISTRIBUTION  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 42
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT NEW-BUILD  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 46
CONSTRUCTION TIMES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 48
Construction Times of Reactors Currently Under Construction . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 48
Construction Times of Past and Currently Operating Reactors  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 48
CONSTRUCTION STARTS & CANCELLATIONS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 51
OPERATING AGE .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 54
LIFETIME PROJECTIONS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 57

NUCLEAR POWER IN THE AGE OF COVID-19

61

INTRODUCTION  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 61
OVERVIEW OF KEY SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 63
RESPONSE STRATEGIES TO COVID-19 BY OPERATORS AND REGULATORS AROUND THE WORLD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 66
GENERAL DIFFICULTIES AND MEASURES .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 67

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |5COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY OVERVIEW .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 69
Argentina .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 69
Armenia .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 69
Belarus  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 69
Belgium  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 70
Brazil . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 71
Canada  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 71
China  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 73
Finland  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 73
France .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 73
Germany  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 77
Hungary .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 78
Japan  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 79
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Netherlands  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 79
Romania . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 80
Russia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 80
Slovakia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 82
Slovenia .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 82
South Korea  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 82
Spain . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 83
Sweden  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 83
United Arab Emirates . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 84
United Kingdom .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 84
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 93
CONCLUSION ON NUCLEAR POWER IN THE AGE OF COVID-19  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 94

FOCUS COUNTRIES

96

MIDDLE EAST FOCUS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 96
Introduction  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 96
United Arab Emirates . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 101
Saudi Arabia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 105
Turkey .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 108
Jordan . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 112

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |6Egypt  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 115
Iran . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 116
The Evolving Role of Renewables and Natural Gas in the Middle East  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 118
Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Nuclear Programs in the Middle East  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 122
Barakah, a Model Replicable Throughout the Middle East? .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 123
CHINA FOCUS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 124
FINLAND FOCUS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 130
Olkiluoto-3 (OL3)  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 131
Faulty Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 134
OL3 Pressurizer Vibration  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 135
FRANCE FOCUS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 136
The Energy and Climate Bill and the Multi Annual Energy Plan . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 136
Two Reactor Closures, No Startup in Two Decades  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 137
French Nuclear Power Performance Still Worsening  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 138
Nuclear Unavailability Review 2019  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 139
Lifetime Extension, ASN and the Fourth Decennial Reviews  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 143
The Ongoing Flamanville-3 EPR Saga .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 145
A Damning Court of Accounts Report  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 147
JAPAN FOCUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Kansai Electric Bribery Scandal  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 151
Hiroshima Lawsuit  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 155
Multiple Reactor Shutdowns  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 156
Reactor Closures  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 157
Restart Prospects  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 160
Prospects for Nuclear Power  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 170
SOUTH KOREA FOCUS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 171
Permanent Closure .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 172
Containment Liner Plate Corrosion  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 173
Power Surge  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 175
Energy Policy . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 176
UNITED KINGDOM FOCUS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 176
Hinkley Point C  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 179
Other U.K. New-Build Projects  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 182
A New Funding Model for Nuclear New-build?  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 185

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |7UNITED STATES FOCUS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 187
Overview  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 187
Reactor Closures  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 191
Reactor Construction  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 195
Securing Subsidies to Prevent Closures  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 205
Conclusions and Prospects for Nuclear Power in an Election Year  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 208

FUKUSHIMA STATUS REPORT211

INTRODUCTION  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 211
ONSITE CHALLENGES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 211
Current Status of Each Reactor  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 211
Contaminated Water Management .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 212
Worker Exposure  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 214
OFFSITE CHALLENGES .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 215
Current Status of Evacuation and Legal Claims .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 215
Radiation Exposure and Health Effects  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 216
Food Contamination  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 217
Decontamination  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 217
CONCLUSION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 219

DECOMMISSIONING STATUS REPORT 2020

220

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 220
Decommissioning Worldwide . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .220
Elements of National Decommissioning Policies  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .220
Overview of Reactors with Completed Decommissioning  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 221
OVERVIEW OF REACTORS WITH ONGOING DECOMMISSIONING IN 11 SELECTED COUNTRIES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 223
Focus Country: United States . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 224
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 230
Canada  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 230
Japan  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 231
South Korea  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 233
France .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 233
Lithuania  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 236
Germany  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 237
Italy  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 239
United Kingdom .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 241

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |8Spain . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 242
Russia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 244
CONCLUSION ON REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 245

POTENTIAL NEWCOMER COUNTRIES

247

ASIA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 247
Suspended or Cancelled Programs  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 247
CONTINENTAL EUROPE  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 248
AFRICA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 252

SMALL MODULAR REACTORS254

ARGENTINA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 254
CANADA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 255
CHINA .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 257
INDIA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 258
RUSSIA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 259
SOUTH KOREA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 260
UNITED KINGDOM . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 261
UNITED STATES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 262
CONCLUSION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 265

NUCLEAR POWER VS. RENEWABLE ENERGY DEPLOYMENT

266

INTRODUCTION  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 266
INVESTMENT  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 267
TECHNOLOGY COSTS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 269
INSTALLED CAPACITY AND ELECTRICITY GENERATION  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 270
STATUS AND TRENDS IN CHINA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, INDIA, AND THE UNITED STATES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 273
China  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 273
European Union  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 276
India  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 280
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .281
CONCLUSION ON NUCLEAR POWER VS. RENEWABLE ENERGY  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 282

ANNEX 1 - OVERVIEW BY REGION AND COUNTRY

285

AFRICA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 285
South Africa  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 285
THE AMERICAS .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 287
Argentina .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 287

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 |9Brazil . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .289
Canada  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 290
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
ASIA & MIDDLE EAST  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 294
Bangladesh .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .294
China  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 295
India  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .296
Iran . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 300
Pakistan .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 300
South Korea  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 302
Taiwan .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 302
EUROPEAN UNION (EU27-28)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 304
WESTERN EUROPE  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 306
Belgium  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 307
Finland  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 311
France .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 311
Germany  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 311
The Netherlands  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 314
Spain  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 316
Sweden  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 318
Switzerland .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 321
United Kingdom .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 324
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 325
Bulgaria  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 325
Czech Republic  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 326
Hungary  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 328
Romania  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 329
Slovakia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 331
Slovenia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 333
FORMER SOVIET UNION .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 334
Armenia .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 334
Belarus  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 336
Russia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 336

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 10Ukraine .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 340

ANNEX 2 - STATUS OF CANADIAN NUCLEAR FLEET343

ANNEX 3 - STATUS OF JAPANESE NUCLEAR FLEET344

ANNEX 4 - STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE WORLD

346

ANNEX 5 - NUCLEAR REACTORS IN THE WORLD “UNDER CONSTRUCTION”

347

ANNEX 6 - ABBREVIATIONS

353

ANNEX 7 - ABOUT THE AUTHORS

358

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 11

TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 · Nuclear Electricity Generation in the World... and China  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  39
Figure 2 · Nuclear Electricity Generation and Share in Global Power Generation . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .41Figure 3 · Nuclear Power Reactor Grid Connections and Closures in the World .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 43
Figure 4 · Nuclear Power Reactor Grid Connections and Closures – The Slowing China Effect .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 44
Figure 5 · World Nuclear Reactor Fleet, 1954–2020 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 45
Figure 6 · Nuclear Reactors “Under Construction” in the World (as of 1 July 2020) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 47
Figure 7 · Average Annual Construction Times in the World .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 49
Figure 8 · Delays for Units Started Up 2018–2019 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 50
Figure 9 · Construction Starts in the World  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 52
Figure 10 · Construction Starts in the World/China .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .52Figure 11 · Cancelled or Suspended Reactor Constructions  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 53
Figure 12 · Age Distribution of Operating Reactors in the World  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 54
Figure 13 · Reactor-Fleet Age of Top 5 Nuclear Generators . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .55Figure 14 · Age Distribution of Closed Nuclear Power Reactors .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 56
Figure 15 · Nuclear Reactor Closure Age 1963–1 July 2020 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 57
Figure 16 · The 40-Year Lifetime Projection .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 58
Figure 17 · The PLEX Projection (not including LTOs) . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 59
Figure 18 · Forty-Year Lifetime Projection versus PLEX Projection  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 60
Figure 19 · “All Necessary Measures”? — No masks.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 70
Figure 20 · Rosatom’s DG Presenting a Weekly Overview of COVID-19 Cases at Rosatom . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 80
Figure 21 · Canteens at Hinkley Point C – Before and After Social Distancing .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 85
Figure 22 · Travel Trailers at the Cook Nuclear Plant—Just in Case .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 89
Figure 23 · Overview of the Status of Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 97
Figure 24 · Timelines of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Middle East  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 99
Figure 25 · Evolution of Solar PV and CSP Prices in the UAE During the Construction of the Barakah Project  .  .  .  .  . 104
Figure 26 · Public Opinion in Turkey on Nuclear Power  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 112
Figure 27 · Comparative Cost of Electricity in Jordan .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 114
Figure 28 · Iran’s 2019 Nominal Electricity Generating Capacity (by Source)  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 117
Figure 29 · Share of Natural gas in Power Generation in Selected Regional Countries in 2019  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 119
Figure 30 · Comparative Costs of Nuclear and Solar PV Projects in the Middle East .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 119
Figure 31 · Egypt’s Electricity Generation Mix Projections for 2022 and 2035 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 120
Figure 32 · Operating Fleet and Capacity in France (as of 1 July 2020)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 137
Figure 33 · Startups and Closures in France  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 138
Figure 34 · Reactor Outages in France in 2019 (in number of units and GWe)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 140
Figure 35 · Forced and Planned Unavailability of Nuclear Reactors in France in 2019  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 141

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 12Figure 36 · Scheduled vs. Realized Unavailability of Nuclear Reactors in France in 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142
Figure 37 · Age Distribution of the French Nuclear Fleet (by Decade)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 143
Figure 38 · Rise and Fall of the Japanese Nuclear Program  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 150
Figure 39 · Status of the Japanese Reactor Fleet  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 158
Figure 40 · Age Distribution of the Japanese Nuclear Fleet  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 160
Figure 41 · Age Distribution of the U.K. Nuclear Fleet .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 178
Figure 42 · The Hinkley Point C Construction Site .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 180
Figure 43 · Age Distribution of the U.S. Nuclear Fleet . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 189
Figure 44 · Timelines of Early Retirement in the United States .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 193
Figure 45 · Receiving and Sorting Facility and Soil Storage Facility, Okuma Town, Fukushima Prefecture .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 218
Figure 46 · Overview of Completed Reactor Decommissioning Projects, 1953–2020 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 222
Figure 47 · Progress and Status of Reactor Decommissioning .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 223
Figure 48 · Global Investment Decisions in Renewables and Nuclear Power, 2004–2019  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .268
Figure 49 · Regional Breakdown of Nuclear and Renewable Energy Investment Decisions 2010–2019 . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .268
Figure 50 · The Declining Costs of Renewables vs. Traditional Power Sources  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 269
Figure 51 · Variation of Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the World .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 271
Figure 52 · Net Added Electricity Generation by Power Source 2009–2019  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 271
Figure 53 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Installed Capacity and Electricity Production in the World  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 272
Figure 54 · Non-Hydro Renewables and Nuclear Electricity Production in the World .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 273
Figure 55 · Nuclear vs Non-Hydro Renewables in China 2000–2019  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 274
Figure 56 · Installed Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in China 2000–2019 . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 275
Figure 57 · Renewable Energy and Nuclear Power Generation in the EU28, 2010–2019 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 277
Figure 58 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the EU28 (Developments) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 277
Figure 59 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the EU28 (Absolute Numbers) .  .  .  .  .  . 278
Figure 60 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Installed Capacity and Electricity Production in India .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 281
Figure 61 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Installed Capacity and Electricity Production in the U.S .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 282
Figure 62 · Nuclear Reactors Startups and Closures in the EU27 1959–1 July 2020 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 305
Figure 63 · Nuclear Reactors and Net Operating Capacity in the EU27 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .306
Figure 64 · Age Distribution of the EU27 Reactor Fleet .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .306
Figure 65 · Age Distribution of the Western European Reactor Fleet (incl. Switzerland and the U.K.) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 307
Figure 66 · Main Developments of the German Power System Between 2010 and 2019 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 313
Figure 67 · Age Distribution of the Swiss Nuclear Fleet .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 322
Figure 68 · Age Distribution of the Russian Nuclear Fleet .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 338

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TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1 · Nuclear Reactors “Under Construction” (as of 1 July 2020) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 47
Table 2 · Duration from Construction Start to Grid Connection 2010–2019 .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 51
Table 3 · Typology of Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 98
Table 4 · Nuclear Technology Suppliers in the Middle East  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .100
Table 5 · Overview of the costs of nuclear power projects in the Middle East and economic indicators  .  .  .  .  . 101
Table 6 · Jordan’s SMR agreements (as of May 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Table 7 · Official Reactor Closures Post-3/11 in Japan (as of 1 July 2020)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 159
Table 8 · Status of Nuclear Reactor Fleet in South Korea (with scheduled closure dates)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 173
Table 9 · 15 Early-Retirements for U.S. Reactors 2009–2025  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 194
Table 10 · U.S. State Emission Credits for Uneconomic Nuclear Reactors 2016–2019 (as of 1 July 2020) . .  .  .  . 206
Table 11 · Fukushima Decommissioning: Evolution of the Medium- and Long-Term Roadmap  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 212
Table 12 · Status of Reactor Decommissioning in the U.S. (as of May 2020) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 226
Table 13 · Overview of Outsourcing of U.S. Decommissioning Projects . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .230
Table 14 · Status of Reactor Decommissioning in France (as of May 2020)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 235
Table 15 · Status of Reactor Decommissioning in Germany (as of May 2020) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 239
Table 16 · Overview of reactor decommissioning in 11 selected countries (as of May 2020)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 246
Table 17 · Vendor Design Review Service Agreements in Force Between Vendors and the CNSC .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 256
Table 18 · Vendor Design Review Service Agreement Between Vendors and the CNSC Under Development .  .  . 257
Table 19 · Scheduled Closure Dates for Nuclear Reactors in Taiwan 2018–2025 . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 304
Table 20 · Status of Belgian Nuclear Fleet (as of 1 July 2020) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 308
Table 21 · Legal Closure Dates for German Nuclear Reactors 2011–2022  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 314
Table 22 · Status of Canadian Nuclear Fleet - PLEX and Expected Closure  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 343
Table 23 · Status of Japanese Nuclear Reactor Fleet (as of 1 July 2020)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .344
Table 24 · Status of Nuclear Power in the World (as of 1 July 2020)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 346
Table 25 · Nuclear Reactors in the World “Under Construction” (as of 1 July 2020)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 347

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FOREWORD
By Frank von Hippel & Jungmin Kang1
The World Nuclear Industry Status Report (WNISR) has become an invaluable resource forthose interested in trends in nuclear power globally and in a more detailed understanding ofdevelopments in particular countries.
As this report makes clear, globally, nuclear power continues to be in stasis. In Western
Europe and the United States (U.S.), the rate of retirements is increasing while the few new
construction projects have had catastrophic cost overruns and schedule slippages.
In the U.S., Westinghouse – once the world’s leading designer of nuclear power plants – wentbankrupt in 2017 as a result of the huge cost overruns and schedule delays that resulted in
the termination of construction on two AP1000 reactors in South Carolina and a continuing
controversy over the construction of another two in Georgia. These fiascos have foreclosed forthe foreseeable future construction of new conventional 1000+ MWe nuclear power plants in
the United States.
After providing loan guarantees totaling US$12 billion for the Georgia plant, the U.S.
Department of Energy, has pivoted to support the development of a variety of “small modular
reactors” (SMRs) with individual unit outputs ranging from tens to hundreds of megawatts.
A few may be bought by the government to provide power to large government installations
such as army and navy bases and national nuclear laboratories but, as WNISR2020 concludes,“there is no need to wait with bated breath for SMRs to be deployed” on a large scale.
In Japan, almost a decade after the Fukushima accident, nuclear utilities continue to struggle
to meet the new regulatory requirements – typically pouring more than one billion dollars into
safety upgrades per reactor while struggling to reassure host communities and prefectures.
China continues to grow its nuclear capacity but at a slowing rate and Russia’s government
continues to finance Rosatom’s aggressive export of nuclear power plants to new nuclear
countries.
In South Korea, as in China, the cost of constructing new nuclear power plants has been kept
under better control than in West Europe and the United States. The Fukushima accidents
and falsification of safety certificates in South Korea’s nuclear industry turned a large
fraction of the population against nuclear power, however, and the Moon Administrationbanned the construction of new nuclear power plants after Shin Kori-6.2 New nuclear power
plant construction could find a more sympathetic ear in the Blue House3 , however, if theconservatives come back to power in the presidential election of 2022.
Under a US$20 billion deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), four South Korean-designed
APR1400 reactors are being built at Barakah by a consortium led by the Korea Electric Power1 - Jungmin Kang is South Korea’s member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials and was, during 2018, the Chairman of the
Korea Nuclear Safety and Security Commission.

Frank N. von Hippel is a Senior Research Physicist and Professor of Public and International Affairs emeritus at Princeton
University’s Program on Science and Global Security.
2 - Editor’s Note: Four units remain under construction in South Korea. Shin-Kori-6 is the last one scheduled to start up, in 2024.
3 - Editor’s Note: The Blue House is the official residence of the President of the Republic of Korea.

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Corporation. The project has not gone smoothly, however. Barakah-1 began feeding power into
UAE’s grid in August 2020, three years later than originally projected and concrete “voids” and“cracks” were found in the containment buildings of Unit 2 and Unit 3 in 2018. 4 As describedin WNISR2020, similar faults of containment buildings have raised significant safety issues
for a number of nuclear power plants in South Korea. In part, these defects reflect inadequate
inspections by safety regulators when the containments were built. China, which is stilldeveloping its nuclear regulatory regime, should take note.
UAE’s long-term energy plan does not include any additional nuclear capacity, at least before
2050. South Korea is cooperating on nuclear energy with Saudi Arabia but, will not be able tosell APR1400s there unless Saudi Arabia concludes a so-called 123 Agreement for Cooperation
on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy with the United States.
Overall, in terms of the cost of power, new nuclear is clearly losing to wind and photovoltaics.
As WNISR2020 shows, investment in new nuclear is about one tenth that in wind andphotovoltaics (Figure 49). The high capital cost of nuclear power plants requires that they
operate almost continually to bring down the capital charge per kilowatt-hour. They must
therefore compete directly with renewables most of the time or store their output to be usedduring cloudy, windless periods. Storage does not relieve the competition with wind and solar,
however, because, as renewables expand and storage costs come down, they too will haveincreasing incentives to store their excess output.
The biggest social argument for nuclear powerplants is that their carbon emissions are low.
Currently, existing nuclear power plants are usefully producing a little less than one thirdof global low-carbon-emission electric power. Increasingly, therefore, the issue is not one of
nuclear new-builds but nuclear life extension. Even there, however, nuclear is struggling. As
WNISR2020 makes convincingly evident, in some major countries such as the United States,
even 30-year-old plants whose capital costs have been paid off cannot compete economicallywith new renewable power plants, whose capital costs have been declining. The operating costsof nuclear plants are high in part because one to two hundred workers and guards are requiredon site per reactor at all times in case of accident or terrorist attack. Subsidies justified by their
low carbon emissions have become critical to the continued operation of many U.S. nuclear
power plants.
A recent event in South Korea has, however, raised concerns about sudden shutdowns in
nuclear power plants as a result of the extreme weather events that are becoming more
frequent as a result of climate change. On 3 September 2020, South Korea’s Nuclear Safety andSecurity Commission announced that four reactors at Kori Nuclear Power Plant had shut down
automatically early that morning because of typhoon impacts on their power transmission
lines. Prior to the shutdown, the four reactors had been providing about 7 percent of thecountry’s total power generation. Experts are concerned that, under different circumstances,
the sudden shutdowns could destabilize South Korea’s grid and cause large-scale blackouts.5

4 - Choi Ha-yan, “Cracks found in containment building of UAE nuclear power plant built by S. Korean companies”, The Hankyoreh,
17 December 2018, see http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/874728.html.
5 - Kim Jeong-su, “Busan’s Kori Nuclear Power Plant loses power due to Typhoon Maysak”, The Hankyoreh, 4 September 2020,see http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/960820.html.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 What about the arguments for phasing out fission faster than will happen naturally as
retirements exceed new builds? From our perspective, the most important consideration
is nuclear-weapon proliferation. Nuclear war remains an existential danger to civilization,comparable to the destabilizing dangers of climate change. The difference is that, while we
can see climate change happening gradually, nuclear war could come upon us suddenly, by
surprise, as a result of some terrible mistake, hacking or a deranged leader. The proliferation of
nuclear weapons to more countries increases the probability of such events.
Historically, the nuclear energy community’s early infatuation with plutonium breeder
reactors facilitated nuclear weapon programs in France, India, Israel and the United Kingdom.
Military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan started down the same
track but were delayed by external pressure long enough for anti-nuclear-weapon democratic
Governments to take over.
Thanks to the “invisible hand” of economics, the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism from plutonium separation have receded. The capital costs of sodium-cooled
plutonium “breeder” reactors are higher than those of light water reactors (LWRs) and using
plutonium as fuel in LWRs costs ten times as much as low-enriched uranium fuel. Yet breeder
advocates in China, France, India, Japan and Russia still succeed in persuading their gullible
Governments to keep plutonium programs alive and, in South Korea and the United States, areeven promoting new programs.
The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been campaigning for decades
for South Korea’s “right” to reprocess, like Japan. During the renegotiation of the U.S.-ROK
Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, the United States managed put the issue off
with a 10-year joint “feasibility study”, but that study is to be completed in 2021 and KAERI isstarting to press again.
KAERI’s advocacy has centered on its claim that reprocessing will solve the problem of theaccumulation of spent fuel in the pools of South Korea’s nuclear power plants. On-site drycask storage has dealt with this problem at the Wolsong nuclear power plant whose heavy
water reactors filled their pools years ago. Majorities in local communities and nuclear-energy
opponents strongly oppose on-site dry-cask storage at other nuclear power plants, however,fearing that the power plants will become permanent storage sites for spent fuel.
Some Government officials and members of the National Assembly also argue that reprocessing
could provide a latent nuclear deterrent against North Korea’s nuclear threats. Those voices
are much less significant in the Moon Administration than in the opposition but, in politics,
nothing is permanent.
In the case of uranium enrichment, the invisible hand has been facilitating proliferation.
Enrichment is required by most current-generation nuclear power plants. The advent of lowcost gas centrifuge enrichment plants made small enrichment plants affordable to Brazil, Iran,North Korea and Pakistan. All four sought those plants in order to produce highly enricheduranium for bombs. Fortunately, Brazil and Iran changed their minds, but they could change
their minds again and other countries could easily go down the same track.
The only answer to the spread of national enrichment plants is to put enrichment undermultinational or international control. The success of URENCO, jointly owned by Germany, the| 16

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Netherlands and the United Kingdom and owner of 30 percent of global enrichment capacity,shows that multinational enrichment is feasible. The global overcapacity of enrichment– with a resulting price for enrichment services insufficient to pay back the capital costs of
new investments even in large plants – shows that there is no economic justification for new
national enrichment plants. Hopefully, future issues of WNISR will include discussions ofdevelopments relating to reprocessing and enrichment.
The second argument for accelerating the phaseout of nuclear power is nuclear accidents.
Unlike nuclear war, these are not civilization-destroying events but, as the Chernobyl and
Fukushima accidents have shown, they have long-term consequences that are highly traumaticfor society. Witnessing those ordeals was enough to convince Germany and Taiwan toaccelerate the phase-outs of their nuclear power capacity and many other countries to cut backor cancel decisions to build new nuclear plants.
We congratulate the authors and editors of WNISR for their objective and in-depth coverageof a very controversial subject. We hope this effort will continue. The nuclear industry will bewith us for decades to come. How it evolves will impact the future of international security as
well as the future energy supply. It needs watching and we are grateful that WNISR is doing so.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 18

KEY INSIGHTS
Nuclear Powerin the Age of
COVID-19
Unprecedented
COVID-19 is the first pandemic
directly, significantly impacting thenuclear industry.

Large Outbreaks
Russia’s Rosatom reported about
4,500 infections, France’s EDF
about 600 cases. In the U.S., asingle reactor site undergoingrefueling reported 200–300
infections, and the only nuclear
construction site in the country
had over 800 cases. Most
operators/regulators have notreleased precise numbers.

World Operating
Fleet at 30-YearLow
As of 1 July 2020,31 countries operated 408 nuclear
reactors, a decline of 9 units
compared to mid-2019—10 lessthan in 1989 and 30 fewer than the2002 peak of 438.
In total, 31 reactors—including
24 in Japan—are in Long-Term
Outage (LTO).

Degraded Safety andSecurity
Many testing, maintenanceand repair activities have beencanceled or suspended or carriedout under improper conditions
with social distancing rules inplace. The effects of these will only
become evident in the months andyears to come.

Critical Staff Issues
Particular groups of staff highly
trained for a given specific facility(control-room operators, security
staff) are difficult to replace. They
remain at risk of infection.

Staff Shortages
EDF, for example, put two thirds of
its nuclear staff on remote work.
Subcontractors complained aboutlack of onsite oversight, leading toaccidental injuries at least in one
documented case.

3 units closed, not a single unit
started up in the first half of 2020.
The total operating nuclear
capacity declined by 2.2 percent
from one year earlier to reach
362 GW as of mid-2020.
The mean age of the world’s
nuclear fleet has increased steadily
since 1984 and now stands at
about 31 years with 20 percent
reaching 41 years or more.
Nuclear energy’s share of global
gross electricity generation
marked a break in its slow but
steady decline from a peakLong Work Hours
The U.S. nuclear regulator, forexample, granted operators
permission to impose up to
16 work hours in any 24-hour
period, up to 86 work hours in any
7-day period and 12-hour shifts up
to 14 consecutive days.

Onsite Inspections
by safety authorities weresuspended for weeks in several
countries.

Economic Crash
Nuclear utilities have been hard
hit economically as operationalcosts went up, while bulk prices
temporarily dropped andelectricity consumption plunged.

of 17.5 percent in 1996, with a
0.2 percentage-point increaseover the 10.15 percent in 2018 to
10.35 percent in 2019.

RussiaDrives Global
Constructions
Six reactors started up in 2019,
three in Russia, two in China, one
in South Korea, yet seven less thanscheduled at the beginning of theyear. Five units were closed.
Russia is involved in 15 of the 52
construction projects in 8 of the
17 countries building.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

China Short-Term
Driver, Long-Term
EnigmaIn 2019, nuclear power generationin the world increased by
3.7 percent of which half due to a
19 percent increase in China.
Three units were closed, not asingle unit started up in the firsthalf of 2020, including in China.
After declining for 5 years,
the number of units underconstruction increased by 6 to 52
as of mid-2020 (incl. 15 in China)
but remains well below the 69
units at the end of 2013.
In 2019, construction began on
6 reactors (incl. 4 in China), andon one in the first half of 2020 (inTurkey).
China will miss its Five-Year-Plan
2020 nuclear targets of 58 GW
installed and 30 GW underconstruction.
China still leads renewable energy
investments with US$83 billion.

GlobalConstruction
Delays Worsen
At least 33 of the 52 units underconstruction are behind schedule;
12 have reported increased delays
and 4 have had documented
delays for the first time over the
past year.
In 8 cases (15 percent), first
construction starts date back10 years or more, including twounits that had construction starts
35 years ago and one unit that goesback 44 years.

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Status of Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East
As of 1 September 2020

TURKEYSYRIACYPRUSLEBANONIRAQ

ISRAELPALESTINE

IRAN

JORDANpending commitment,
recent shift to SMR

KOWEIT

EGYPT

BAHRAINSAUDI
ARABIAsite preparation

QATAR

serious commitment
but no vendor chosen yet

UAE

Barakah-1 connectedto the grid in August 2020

OMAN

Status and number of reactors
Operating

YEMEN

Under Construction
Early Stages© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Middle East Focus
Six countries with nuclear powerinterests: Iran, UAE, Turkey,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia andJordan (by order of program
advancement). Natural gas
dominates power generation.
One operating reactor (in Iran)generating less than 2 percent
of electricity in the country. In
addition, Barakah-1 (UAE) started
up in August 2020, first reactor in
the Arab world.
Six units are under construction,
in UAE (3), in Turkey (2) and Iran (1).

Five are behind schedule and one
just started. At the most, one otherconstruction start could happen
over the year in the region (inEgypt).
Comparisons between nuclear
and solar options show a large
and widening gap. For example, acontract for 1.2 GW of solar power
at US$24.2/MWh, signed in 2017and connected to the grid in 2019,is 5–8 times cheaper than theinternational cost estimate fornuclear of US$118–192/MWh.

Renewables Continue to Thrive
A new record 184 GW (+20 GW)
of non-hydro renewables wereadded to the world’s power grids
in 2019. Wind added 59.2 GW andsolar‑photovoltaics (PV) 98 GW.
These numbers compare to a net
2.4 GW increase for nuclear power.
Total investment in new-renewableelectricity exceeded

US$300 billion, ten times thereported global investment
decisions for nuclear power.
Over the past decade, levelized
cost estimates for utility-scale solar
dropped by 89 percent, wind by
70 percent, while nuclear increased
by 26 percent.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 20

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONSThe World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2020 (WNISR2020) provides a comprehensive
overview of nuclear power plant data, including information on age, operation, production, andconstruction of reactors. A new focus chapter in this year’s report is Nuclear Power in the Ageof COVID-19 that assesses the safety and security implications of operating nuclear facilities
in a pandemic and provides a country-by-country overview of available information on staff
infections, impacts and measures. Another special focus is the chapter on Nuclear Power inthe Middle East that analyses the significance of the first operating nuclear power plant in the
Arab world and the status of nuclear programs in five other countries in the region.
The WNISR assesses the status of new-build programs in the 31 nuclear countries (as of
mid-2020) as well as in potential newcomer countries. WNISR2020 includes sections onseven Focus Countries representing about two-thirds of the global fleet. The Fukushima
Status Report looks at onsite and offsite impacts of the catastrophe that began in 2011. The
Decommissioning Status Report provides an overview of the current state of nuclear reactorsthat have been permanently closed. The chapter on Nuclear Power vs. Renewable Energy offers
comparative data on investment, capacity, and generation from nuclear, wind and solar energy
around the world. Finally, Annex 1 presents overviews of nuclear power in the countries notcovered in the Focus Countries sections.

REACTOR STARTUPS & CLOSURES
Startups. At the beginning of 2019, 13 reactors were scheduled for startup during the year;
only six made it, three in Russia, two in China and one in South Korea. No new reactor started
up worldwide in the first half of 2020, including in China.6
Closures. Five units were closed in 2019, of which two in the U.S., and one each in Germany,
Sweden and Switzerland. Eight additional reactors were officially closed in Japan (5), Russia (1),South Korea (1) and Taiwan (1); most of these had not generated power in years.7 In the firsthalf of 2020, three additional units were closed, two in France and one in the U.S.

OPERATION & CONSTRUCTION DATA8Reactor Operation and Production. As of 1 July 2020, 31 countries operating 408 nuclear
reactors—excluding Long-Term Outages (LTOs)—a decline of nine units compared to

6 - One unit was connected to the grid in China in August 2020, after more than a year without startups. One has to go back to
the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster in 2011 to find a period exceeding one year without a single startup in China.
Barakah-1 in the United Arab Emirates was also started up in August 2020.
7 - WNISR accounts for closures in the respective years of last electricity generation and adjusts statistics retroactively if units havenot generated power in the year in review.
8 - See Focus Countries and Annex 1 for a country-by-country overview of reactors in operation and under construction as well as thenuclear share in electricity generation.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

WNISR20199 —10 less than in 1989 and 30 fewer than the 2002 peak of 438. Of the 28 reactors
in LTO as of mid-2019, one was restarted, and one was closed; with five units entering the LTO
category, there is, as of mid-2020, a total of 31 units in LTO as of mid-2020,10 all considered
operating by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These include 24 reactors inJapan (no change), three in the U.K., two in South Korea, and one each in China and India.
The total operating capacity declined by 2.1 percent from one year earlier to reach 362 GW asof mid-2020.11
Annual nuclear electricity generation reached 2,657 net terawatt-hours (TWh or billion
kilowatt-hours) in 2019, a 3.7 percent increase over the previous year—half of which is due toChina’s nuclear output increasing by over 19 percent—and only 3 TWh below the historic peakin 2006.
The “big five” nuclear generating countries—by rank, the United States, France, China, Russia
and South Korea—again generated 70 percent of all nuclear electricity in the world in 2019. Two
countries, the U.S. and France, accounted for 45 percent of 2019 global nuclear production, thatis 2 percentage points lower than in the previous year, as France’s output shrank by 3.5 percent.
Share in Electricity/Energy Mix. Nuclear energy’s share of global commercial gross electricity
generation has marked a break in its slow but steady decline from a peak of 17.5 percent in 1996,
with a small 0.2 percentage-point increase over the 10.15 percent in 2018 to 10.35 percent in2019.
Nuclear power’s share of global commercial primary energy consumption has remained stablesince 2014 at around 4.3 percent.
Reactor Age. In the absence of major new-build programs apart from China, the average age of
the world operating nuclear reactor fleet continues to rise, and by mid-2020 reached 30.7 years.
The mean age of the world’s fleet has been increasing since 1984, when it stagnated.
A total of 270 reactors, two-thirds of the world’s operating fleet, have operated for 31 or more
years, including 81 (20 percent of the total) that have operated for 41 years or more.
Lifetime Projections. If all currently operating reactors remained on the grid until the end of
their licensed lifetime, including many that already hold authorized lifetime extensions (PLEX
Projection), and all units under construction scheduled to have started up, an additional
135 reactors or 105 GW (compared to the end‑of‑2019 status) would have to be started up or
restarted prior to the end of 2030 in order to maintain the status quo. This would mean, in the
coming decade, the need to more than double the annual building rate the past decade from
5.8 to 13.7. Construction starts are on a declining trend. The required number of new units
might be even higher because many reactors are being shut down long before their licenses are
terminated; the mean age at closure of the 17 units taken off the grids between 2015 and 2019was 42.4 years.

9 - Unless otherwise noted, all figures indicated reflect the situation as of 1 July 2020. One unit was connected to the grid in the United
Arab Emirates in August 2020 making it the 32nd country to operate nuclear power plants, and one in China.
10 - +2 startups +1 restart –5 new LTOs –7 closures = -9 net
11 - All figures are given for nominal net electricity generating capacity. GW stands for gigawatt or thousand megawatts.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Construction. Seventeen countries are currently building nuclear power plants, one morethan in mid-2019, as Iran restarted construction of Bushehr-2 site, originally launched in 1976.
As of 1 July 2020, 52 reactors were under construction—six more than WNISR reported for
mid-2019 but 17 fewer than in 2013—of which 15 in China with 14 GW of capacity, less than halfof the 5-Year target of 30 GW under construction by the end of 2020.
Total capacity under construction in the world increased by 8.9 GW to 53.5 GW. The current
average time since work started at the 52 units under construction is 7.3 years, on the rise forthe past two years from an average of 6.2 years as of mid-2017. Many units are still years awayfrom completion.
ɆɆ All reactors under construction in at least 10 of the 17 countries have experienced mostly
year-long delays. At least 33 (64 percent) of all building projects are delayed.
ɆɆ Of the 33 reactors clearly documented as behind schedule, at least 12 have reported
increased delays and four have reported new delays over the past year.
ɆɆ Thirteen reactors were scheduled for startup during 2019, but only six made it.
ɆɆ Construction start of two projects dates back 35 years, Mochovce-3 and -4 in Slovakia,
and their startup has been further delayed, currently to 2020–2021. Bushehr-2 originally
started construction in 1976, that is 44 years ago, and resumed construction in 2019 after a
40-year-long suspension. Grid connection is currently scheduled for 2024.
ɆɆ Five reactors have been listed as “under construction” for a decade or more: the Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) in India, Olkiluoto-3 (OL3) in Finland, Shimane-3 in Japan,
the Flamanville-3 (FL3) in France, and Leningrad 2-2 in Russia. The Finnish project has
been further delayed this year, grid connections of the French and Indian units are likely
to be postponed again, and the Japanese reactor does not even have a provisional startup
date.
ɆɆ Nine countries completed 63 reactors—with 37 in China— over the past decade, with anaverage construction time (start to grid connection) of 10 years.

CONSTRUCTION STARTS & NEW-BUILD ISSUES
Construction Starts. In 2019, construction began on six reactors—four in China and one
each in Russia and the U.K.—and in the first half of 2020 on one (in Turkey). These were thefirst construction starts of commercial reactors in China since December 2016. This compares
to 15 construction starts in 2010 and 10 in 2013. Construction starts peaked in 1976 at 44.
Over the decade 2010–2019, construction began on 67 reactors in the world. As of mid-2020,
only 18 have started up, while 44 remain under construction (5 cancelled).
Construction Cancellations. Between 1970 and mid-2020, a total of 93— one less than in
WNISR2019 as Bushehr-2 restarted construction in 2019—that is one in eight of a totalof 773 constructions were abandoned or suspended in 19 countries at various stages ofadvancement.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

NUCLEAR POWER IN THE AGE OF COVID-19
COVID-19 is the first pandemic of this scale in the history of nuclear power. Nuclear utilities
have been fast to point to the “crucial” role nuclear power played during the pandemic as asource of electricity. But the picture is more complex, with various safety and security routines
becoming more difficult or impossible during a pandemic:
ɆɆ Periodic and frequent testing is usually done at systems to provide assurance that vitally
important functions like the emergency control room operations, emergency electricity
supply or emergency core cooling are in good working order.
ɆɆ Normally periodic testing and inspections are performed under the four-eyes principle(at least two people have to be always present), which becomes challenging if social
distancing is followed.
ɆɆ Particular staff groups, like control-room personnel, with specific knowledge andqualification for specific facilities cannot easily be replaced.
ɆɆ Emergency situations like a fire or toxic gas buildup in the control-room could easily be
exacerbated by the need of social distancing; the challenge is even greater in the emergency
control-room.
ɆɆ Infections amongst security staff, a limited number of highly trained forces for specificfacilities, could rapidly lower the protection level.
Infections, and Operator Response Strategies. Systematic national reporting on infections
amongst nuclear staff did not happen anywhere, with the remarkable exception of Russia’s
Rosatom, whose Director General made weekly video presentations on the evolution of active
cases and recovered persons.
ɆɆ Russian Rosatom graphic illustrations indicate a total of about 4,500 infections in thegroup, with 1,200 still recovering as of the end of July 2020.
ɆɆ Only a handful of infections have been reported from nuclear facilities in Japan andSouth Korea.
ɆɆ French utility EDF in mid-June 2020 indicated around 600 cases amongst the nuclear
staff over a 12-week period, reaching around 2 percent at the peak of the pandemic.
ɆɆ The Swedish regulator reported “few cases” but did not give numbers.
ɆɆ At the U.K. Sellafield site about 1,000 employees self-isolated and the reprocessing plant
was shut down. At least one EDF Energy employee died of COVID-19 at the Hinkley Point C
construction site but no numbers have been published about tested/infected staff.
ɆɆ In the U.S., several nuclear power plant sites have reported up to dozens of infected staff(e.g. Limerick, Waterford). At the Millstone reactor, three operators were amongst thosethat tested positive. An outage at Fermi-2 may have led to 200-300 infections. Operator
DTE Energy refused to disclose exact numbers.
While numerous fuel-chain and research facilities were shut down, no country reported an
enforced shutdown of a nuclear power plant. Various measures were taken, including:| 23

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

ɆɆ Operators dramatically reduced staff levels in nuclear plants, e.g. in France, 15,000
employees (two thirds) of EDF’s Nuclear Generation Division were put on telework.
Reduced staff levels led to a lack of oversight of subcontractors.12
ɆɆ Regulators granted operators permission to impose strikingly long work hours. For
example, in the U.S., workers could work for up to 16 work hours in any 24-hour period and
up to 86 work hours in any 7-day period or 12-hour shifts for up to 14 consecutive days.
ɆɆ In some cases, e.g. in Russia and Sweden, control-room staff and essential personnel wereisolated, and/or onsite housing was provided for workers during outages (also in the U.S.).
ɆɆ Social distancing and remote working practices have been employed widely, but
implementation seems to have varied in degrees of speed and rigor. In some cases, tradeunions have reported practices very different from operator declarations, complaining
about lack of masks and insufficient social distancing. In France, workers walked off at least
three reactor sites considering their health and safety were not appropriately protected.
ɆɆ Force-on-force exercises in the U.S. as well as many other security and safety trainingsessions in several countries have been suspended during the pandemic, leading to adegraded readiness level.
ɆɆ In many cases, refueling and maintenance outages have been altered to eliminate “noncritical work” or were deferred entirely to the end of the year or even into 2021. In somecases, like at Germany’s Grohnde and Spain’s Trillo-1, outages have been stretched out toallow for a lower density of workers.
ɆɆ In some cases, e.g. at Canada’s Darlington-3 or Romania’s Cernavoda-1, planned major
overhaul has been rescheduled. In France, the installation of emergency diesel generators
at five reactors was delayed for a second time, to February 2021, two years after the firstdelay was granted.
ɆɆ The pace of construction in at least 12 of the current 17 countries building nuclear reactors
has been impacted, but apparently only in Argentina construction activities were entirely
halted (on CAREM-25). A large outbreak took place at the Vogtle plant in Georgia, the only
nuclear construction site in the U.S., where over 800 staff tested positive, with over 100
still affected as of late August 2020. As of late May 2020, about 100 cases were reported at
the Belarus Ostrovets site.
Infections, and Regulator Response Strategies. Very little information has been
made public about infections at national safety authorities and their Technical Support
Organizations (TSOs). Some examples of infection levels and measures include:ɆɆ French regulator ASN claims that as of early August 2020 not a single staff person had
tested positive. In late April 2020, the French TSO IRSN said 59 were “contaminated or
likely to be”, all of whom recovered, but strangely another IRSN spokesperson said in early
September 2020 that only nine people were actually tested positive and only 13 total of
1,800 staff were tested at all.13 Apparently, neither ASN nor IRSN have systematic testing
programs in place.
ɆɆ Safety authorities and their TSOs in several countries (e.g. Canada, Finland, France, U.S.)
decided to halt site visits (except in cases of emergency). ASN carried out about 6 percent
12 - E.g. lack of oversight led to two workers being injured during a hydrogen explosion and ensuing fire at the Belleville station in
April 2020.
13 - Audrey Lebeau-Livé, personal communication, IRSN, Email to Mycle Schneider, 1 September 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 of the number of inspections it carries out on average under normal circumstances. IRSN
also entirely suspended environmental sampling.
ɆɆ Regulators generally have been very “pragmatic” and “flexible” in their decision-making
and approved most operator requests for exemptions, exceptions and deferrals.
Degradation of Safety and Security. Nuclear officials in international organizations, industry
groups, utilities and regulatory authorities have claimed in one way or another that all thesemeasures were taken “while maintaining the required level of safety”, as ASN put it. The U.K.
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) found “no significant change to dutyholders’ safety andsecurity resilience”.
This confidence is difficult to comprehend because working conditions have clearly
deteriorated in many nuclear facilities, because scheduled repair and upgrading work wasoften not carried out or delayed for many months, and operators of many nuclear power plants
in the world were left without any physical regulatory oversight as inspectors stayed home. So
not only valves, joints, pipes and weldings were not checked by the operators as planned, but
no physical inspection actually made sure that operators were doing what they said they were
doing. Considering the long list of fraud cases in the industry (for a selection see Introduction
to Nuclear Power in the Age of COVID-19), fully operational independent regulators and their
TSOs remain a crucial ingredient to nuclear safety and security.
Even if the pandemic were to slow down—there is of course no guarantee that no second wave
hits nuclear countries—the situation will take time to significantly improve. Operators andregulators will be struggling to get back to operational modes that are closer to normality,
leave alone catching up on all of the delayed activities, which will likely take several years.
In addition, bulk prices plunged as operational costs went up, bulk prices dropped andelectricity consumption plunged. The financial viability of some of these utilities may be atstake. Indispensable cost cutting exercises will further exacerbate the pressure.
This is far from over.

MIDDLE EAST FOCUS
On the occasion of the first nuclear power plant entering the operational phase in an Arabcountry, i.e. Barakah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), WNISR provides an overview of thenuclear energy ambitions of six countries in the Middle East: Iran, UAE, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Jordan (ordered by level of program advancement).
The region mainly depends on natural gas for electricity generation with five of the six assessedcountries generating more than half of their power from gas; of these, three countries (Egypt,
Jordan, UAE) rely on gas for more than 75 percent of the electricity.
Iran has one reactor in operation and another one under construction as well as various
activities along the nuclear fuel chain. UAE has started up one unit in early August 2020, while
three more reactors remain under construction. Turkey has two units under construction. As
for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, nuclear plans are more or less advanced, but no construction
has yet begun. Egypt, Jordan and Turkey are struggling with high debt loads and unfavorable
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nuclear power particularly challenging, unless financing assistance from vendor countries isprovided. While Egypt and Turkey have benefited from Russian financial assistance, Jordan is
yet to obtain any financial aid.
IranɆɆ Construction had been disturbed by decades-long suspensions. Even after constructionof Bushehr-1 had restarted in 1996, the project was plagued by delays and connected to
the grid only in 2011, 35 years after construction first started, 15 years after construction
restart.
ɆɆ Production remains modest and in 2019, Bushehr-1 represented less than 2 percent ofelectricity generation in the country.
ɆɆ According to official estimates, Iran’s solar capacity potential is a stunning 40 TW(40,000 GW).
United Arab Emirates
ɆɆ Construction of the Barakah plant by the Korean Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) is about
three years behind schedule. Barakah-1 was planned to start up in 201714 , with Units 2, 3
and 4 following each other with one-year distance. Amongst the reasons for delays wereconstruction problems (cracks/voids in the containment) and difficulties in establishing a
local, trained operator workforce.
ɆɆ Cost comparisons between the nuclear and solar options show:•

The official cost estimate of Barakah power of US$72/MWh in 2012 was below thelowest level of Lazard’s international cost range for the year of US$78–114;•

A Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) for a 1.2 GW solar photovoltaic capacity signed
in 2017 at US$24.2/MWh; the plant was connected to the grid in 2019.

•

Earlier in 2020, a solar power bid was made by EDF/Jinko for 1.5 GW at US$13.5/MWh,five times lower than the no doubt underestimated original cost of Barakah power and
9–14 times below Lazard’s nuclear cost estimate for 2019 of US$118–192/MWh.

TurkeyɆɆ Construction at Akkuyu-1 was launched by Russian builder Rosatom in April 2018
followed by Akkuyu-2 in April 2020. Startup for the first unit was planned for 2023, whichis unlikely to happen. The Akkuyu project has been in the planning since the 1970s and wasdelayed countless times. The construction itself was hampered with technical problems
including cracks identified in the basemat that had to be repaired. Nuclear power has met
with fierce opposition, nationally and locally, concerned about nuclear safety, earthquake
risks and negative social impacts. Two thirds of Turkish people polled opposed nuclear
power in a 2018 survey.
ɆɆ Cost comparisons between the nuclear and solar options show that in 2018 solar PPAs
came in at US$65/MWh, almost half the cost for nuclear electricity estimated in 2012.

14 - It was finally connected to the grid on 19 August 2020.

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JordanɆɆ Project Planning. Eleven years after the first feasibility study for nuclear energy, in 2018,
Jordan pulled the plug on any project for large nuclear power plants and focused planning
on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). After signing cooperation agreements with potential
vendors from China, Russia, U.K. and the U.S. no further progress has been made.
ɆɆ Cost comparisons between the nuclear and solar options show a 2012-nuclear-costestimate at around US$100, compared to a 2017-PPA for 50 MW solar at US$59/MWhconnected to the grid in late 2019, and a bid at US$25/MWh in 2018. The country set a
20-percent target from renewable sources in the power mix for 2025.
EgyptɆɆ Project Planning. The Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission was established in the mid1950s and the idea of building nuclear power plants was explored as early as the mid-1970s.
But it took until 2016 to sign a loan agreement with Russia for the construction of fourRosatom reactors. In March 2019, a site permit was issued for Dabaa on the Mediterraneancost. Construction is planned to begin in 2020.
ɆɆ Cost comparisons show a 2015-estimate for nuclear power at US$110/MWh vs. a 2019PPA for solar power at US$24.8/MWh, four times cheaper. In 2016, the Government set
a 37-percent-share target for renewables in the electricity mix by 2035 vs. 3 percent for
nuclear energy.
Saudi Arabia
ɆɆ Project Planning. In 2018, the Government approved a nuclear program of two reactors
to be built in the 2020s, and possibly more later. However, no vendor has been chosen andno site selected. The Government has also been interested in the development of domestic
uranium mining and enrichment for fuel. The country has also shown interest in thedevelopment of SMR technology, without much tangible progress so far.
ɆɆ Cost comparisons between the nuclear and renewable energy options are not possible
because there are no cost estimates for nuclear power. However, a PPA for solar power at
US$16/MWh, signed in 2016, underlines the competitiveness of photovoltaic electricity inthe region.

FOCUS COUNTRIESThe following seven Focus Countries covered in depth in this report represent almost one
fourth of the nuclear countries hosting about two-thirds of the global reactor fleet. Key facts
for year 2019:
China. Nuclear power generation grew by 19.2 percent in 2019 and contributed 4.9 percent
of all electricity generated in China, up from 4.2 percent in 2018. Plans for future expansion
remain uncertain.
Finland. Nuclear generation reached a new record in 2019. The Olkiluoto-3 EPR project wasdelayed yet again, and, according to an announcement from April 2020, “regular productionof electricity” will not happen before February 2022; that constitutes nearly two years of| 27

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additional delay since the previous announcement only one year earlier, and 13 years after theoriginal planned startup date.15
France. Nuclear plants generated 3.5 percent less power than in 2018, representing 70.6 percentof the country’s electricity, the lowest share in 30 years. Outages at zero capacity cumulated
5,580 reactor-days or more than three months per reactor on average. All outages at 54 of the
58 units were extended beyond the planned duration, leading to an average 44-percent increaseof the outage time. A damning report by the Court of Accounts slams the lack of government
oversight of the Flamanville-3 EPR construction project that is at least 10 years behind scheduleand recalculated the cost at over €201519 billion (US$202020 billion) including financing.
Japan. Nuclear plants generated more power than in any year since Fukushima disaster began
in 2011 and provided 7.5 percent of the electricity in 2019. As of mid-2020, nine reactors had
restarted but that number has not increased since mid-2018. Four units were taken off the grid
again in mid-2020 for various reasons, and power output is expected to drop by up to half in
2020. A large bribery scandal involving KEPCO management including the president rattled
the industry.
South Korea. Nuclear power output recovered by 9 percent after a decline of 19 percent since2015 and supplied 26.2 percent of the country’s electricity. If adopted, a draft energy bill underreview would further reduce nuclear’s role to providing just 10 percent of power by 2034.
United Kingdom. Nuclear generation decreased again and provided only 14 percent of thepower in the country, down from 17.7 percent in 2018. The fleet’s aging units, over 36 years
on average, are struggling with many technical issues, in particular irreparable damage tomoderator graphite bricks leading to lengthy outages of the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors(AGRs). Three units newly qualified for the LTO category. While construction officially started
at Hinkley Point C-2, prospects for other new-build projects remain uncertain.
United States. Nuclear power plants generated a new historic maximum of 809 TWh(+1.4 TWh), while their share in the electricity mix remained below 20 percent (19.7 percent).
The continuous excellent productivity of the ageing U.S. fleet, average age 40 years, isintriguing and contrary to the performance of other early programs. The NRC issued its firstlicense extension to 80 years. But nuclear units have increasing difficulties to economicallycompete in the market. State subsidies have been granted to four uneconomic nuclear plants
to avoid their “early closure”. Following the revelation of an unprecedented corruption schemein Ohio, involving the State’s Speaker of the House, two of these “bailouts” might be reversed.
Many other units remain threatened with early closure for economic reasons. A series of othercriminal affairs involving the nuclear industry were revealed over the past two months.16

15 - TVO, “OL3 EPR regular production of electricity starts in February 2022”, Press Release, 28 August 2020, see https://www.
tvo.fi/en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/ol3eprregularproductionofelectricitystartsinfebruary2022.html,
accessed 4 September 2020. This latest announcement happened after the editorial deadline for the main body of this report.
16 - These developments happened after the editorial deadline for the main body of this report. See Introduction for the gist of thecases.

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SMALL MODULAR REACTORS (SMRs)
Following assessments of the development status and prospects of Small Modular
Reactors (SMRs) in WNISR2015 and WNISR2017, this year’s update does not reveal greatchanges.
Argentina. The CAREM-25 project under construction since 2014 is reportedly 55 percent
complete. A significant construction interrupted work in November 2019 complaining aboutlate payments and design changes. COVID-19 led to a complete construction stop.
Canada. Three provincial Governments have embraced the idea to promote SMRs for remotecommunities and mining operations. Various models are being investigated. The environmental
impact assessment process for the proposed first demonstration high temperature reactor isunderway.
China. A high-temperature reactor under development since the 1970s has been underconstruction since 2012. Startup has been delayed several times and is now planned for 2021,
four years later than scheduled.
India. An Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) design has been under development sincethe 1990s, and its construction start is getting continuously delayed. No major news since
WNISR2019.
Russia. Two “floating reactors” were finally connected to the grid in December 2019. As
construction started in 2007, it took about four times as long as planned. The costs were
estimated at US$740 million in 2015 (likely underestimated) or US$11,600 per installedkilowatt, significantly more expensive than the most expensive Generation III reactors.
South Korea. The System-Integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART) has been underdevelopment since 1997. In 2012, the design received approval by the safety authority, but
nobody wants to build it in the country, because it is not cost-competitive.
United Kingdom. Rolls-Royce is the only company interested in participating in the
Government’s SMR competition but has requested significant subsidies, including for investingin a factory. The Rolls-Royce pre-design is at a very early stage but, at 440 MW, it is not reallysmall. As of 1 September 2020, the design was not even under examination by the regulator.
United States. The Department of Energy (DOE) has generously funded companies promoting
SMR development. A single design by NuScale is in the final stage of the design certification
process.17 However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards identified some significant safety problems that will have to be resolved in
the future.
Overall, there are few signs that would hint at a major breakthrough for SMRs, either withregard to the technology or with regard to the commercial side.

17 - U.S.NRC, “NRC Issues Final Safety Evaluation Report for NuScale Small Modular Reactor”, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
28 August 2020, see www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2020/20-043.pdf, accessed 4 September 2020.

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FUKUSHIMA STATUS REPORTOver nine years have passed since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident(Fukushima accident) began, triggered by the East Japan Great Earthquake on 11 March 2011(referred to as 3/11 throughout the report) and subsequent events. The onsite situation is still
not stabilized and numerous offsite challenges remain.

Onsite Challenges
Spent Fuel Removal from the pool of Unit 3 started in April 2019. Only about one fifth had
been removed one year on. Units 1 and 2 have not gotten beyond the preparatory stage.
Fuel Debris Removal is now planned to start with Unit 2 by 2021. Further delays are likely.
Contaminated Water Management. Water injection continues to cool the fuel debris ofUnits 1–3. Highly contaminated water runs out of the cracked containments into the basements
where it mixes with water that has penetrated the basements from an underground river. The
commissioning of a dedicated bypass system and the pumping of groundwater has reduced
the influx of water from around 400 m3/day to about 170 m3/day. However, in FY2019, pumped
contaminated water increased again to 180 m3/day. An equivalent amount of water is partiallydecontaminated and stored in 1,000‑m3 tanks. Thus, a new tank is needed every 5.5 days. The
storage capacity onsite of 1.4 million m3 is expected to be saturated by the end of 2022. Plans
to release the contaminated water into the ocean are widely contested, including overseas.
Worker Health. As of March 2020, there were 7,000 workers involved in decommissioning
work on-site, 87 percent of whom were subcontractors; only the remaining 13 percent worked
for Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Maximum effective dose levels accepted for
subcontractors turned out eight times higher than for TEPCO employees.

Offsite Challenges
Amongst the main offsite issues are the future of tens of thousands of evacuees, the assessmentof health consequences of the disaster, the management of decontamination wastes and thecosts involved.
Legal Issues. In September 2019, the Tokyo District Court acquitted three former TEPCO top
managers accused of professional negligence resulting in injury or death. The ruling was widelycondemned as flawed, and the lawyers for the plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the Tokyo High
Court.
Evacuees. As of April 2020, almost 39,000 Fukushima Prefecture residents—not including“self-evacuees”—were still officially designated evacuees. According to the Prefecture, thenumber peaked just under 165,000 in May 2012. The Government intends to continue thelifting of restriction orders for affected municipalities. However, according to a recent survey,
only 1.8 percent of the people returned to Okuma Town and 7.5 percent to Tomioka Town.
Health Issues. Officially, as of February 2020, a total of 237 people had been diagnosed
with a malignant tumor or suspected of having a malignant thyroid tumor and 187 people| 30

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 underwent surgery. While the cause-effect relationship between Fukushima-related radiation
exposure and illnesses has not been officially established, questions have been raised about
the examination procedure itself and the processing of information. However, a 2019-study
concludes that “the average radiation dose-rates in the 59 municipalities of the Fukushima
prefecture in June 2011 and the corresponding thyroid cancer detection rates in the period
October 2011 to March 2016 show statistically significant relationships”.
Food Contamination. According to official statistics, among over 266,000 samples taken in
FY 2020, a total of only 157 food items were identified as being contaminated beyond legal
limits. As of March 2020, post-3/11 import restrictions remain in place in 20 countries (threeless than a year earlier).
Decontamination. The contaminated soil in the temporary storage area in Fukushima
Prefecture is currently being transferred to intermediate storage facilities in eight areas. As ofJune 2020, around 56 percent of the total amount of 14 million m3 had been shipped. The soil
is to be processed through various stages of volume reduction before being shipped to a final
repository.

DECOMMISSIONING STATUSREPORT – SOARING COSTS
As more and more nuclear facilities either reach the end of their pre-determined operational
lifetime or close due to deteriorating economic conditions, their decommissioning is becoming
a key challenge.
ɆɆ As of mid-2020, 189 reactors were closed, eight more than a year earlier, of which 169 are
awaiting or are in various stages of decommissioning.
ɆɆ Only 20 units have been technically fully decommissioned, one more than a year earlier:
14 in the U.S., five in Germany, and one in Japan. Of these, only 10 have been returned togreenfield sites.
ɆɆ The average duration of the decommissioning process is about 20 years, with a large range
from 6–42 years.
ɆɆ Progress in decommissioning projects around the world remains slow. In France, the two
Fessenheim reactors entered the warm-up stage and Superphénix entered the hot-zonestage. In Germany four reactors advanced to the hot-zone stage, while one additional
reactor entered the warm-up-stage. In the U.S., two more reactors entered the warm-up
stage, while one plant finished the technical decommissioning process.
ɆɆ Although they were early to start nuclear power programs, Canada, France, Russia andU.K. have not fully decommissioned even one reactor so far.

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NUCLEAR POWER VS. RENEWABLE
ENERGY DEPLOYMENT
Renewable energy deployment and generation has better resisted the impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic than the nuclear power sector. In the first quarter of 2020, renewables
increased output by an estimated 3 percent and its relative share in global generation rose by
1.5 percentage points, while nuclear output fell by about 3 percent.
Costs. Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) analysis shows that between 2009 and 2019, utilityscale solar costs came down 89 percent and wind 70 percent, while new nuclear costs increased
by 26 percent. The gap has continued to widen between 2018 and 2019.
Investment. In 2019, for the third time after 2015 and 2017, the total investment in renewableelectricity exceeded US$300 billion, almost ten times the reported global investment decisions
for the construction of nuclear power of around US$31 billion for 5.8 GW. Investment in nuclear
power is less than a quarter of the investment in wind (US$138 billion) and solar (US$131 billion)
individually. China remains the top investor in renewables, spending US$83 billion in 2019,
down 9 percent compared to 2018.
Installed Capacity. In 2019, a new record 184 GW (+20 GW) of non-hydro renewables wereadded to the world’s power grids. Wind added 59.2 GW and solar‑photovoltaics (PV) 98 GW,
both slightly below the 2017-levels. These numbers compare to a net 2.4 GW increase fornuclear power.
Electricity Generation. In 2019, annual growth for global electricity generation from solar
was 24 percent, for wind power about 13 percent and 3.7 percent for nuclear power, half ofwhich is due to China.
Low-Carbon Power. Compared to 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol on climate change wassigned, in 2019 an additional 1,418 TWh of wind power was produced globally and 723 TWhof solar PV electricity, compared to nuclear’s additional 394 TWh. Over the past decade,non-hydro renewables have added more kilowatt‑hours than coal or gas, twice as many ashydropower, and 22 times as many as nuclear plants.
Share in Power Mix. After experiencing the strongest annual growth on record, the share in
power generation from new renewables (excluding hydro) reached 10.39 percent, surpassing
nuclear energy’s share (10.35 percent) for the first time.
In China, electricity production of 406 TWh from wind alone again by far exceeded the
330 TWh from nuclear, while solar power is already at 224 TWh.
In India, generation from wind power (63 TWh) outpaced nuclear again, but for the first time,
generation from solar energy (46 TWh) exceeded the nuclear output of 41 TWh.
In the European Union, solar installed capacity for the first time exceeded the nuclear one in
the EU28 with 130 GW vs. 116 GW. Wind had outpaced nuclear already in 2014 and has sinceenlarged the gap. Renewables (incl. hydro) generated a record 35 percent of electricity, while
nuclear provided 25.5 percent. Hard coal generated electricity declined by an unprecedented
32 percent and lignite power by 16 percent, while natural gas increased by 12 percent. Windpower output grew by 14 percent and solar by 7 percent, while nuclear declined by 1 percent.

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In the United States, electricity generation from coal plunged to a 42-year low, and in
April 2019, for the first time since 1885, the renewable energy sector (hydro, biomass, wind,solar and geothermal) generated more electricity than coal-fired plants. While nuclear energy’s
share stayed stable, it is set to decline. With three reactors closed in 2019 and the first halfof 2020, and more closures expected, the nuclear capacity is shrinking. In 2019, for the firsttime, installed wind power exceeded installed nuclear capacity with 104 GW vs. 98 GW. Overthe past decade, wind + solar have quadrupled combined electricity generation while nuclear
production has not moved.

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INTRODUCTION
Since the release of the previous edition of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report (WNISR)
in September 2019, the world has changed dramatically and is undergoing the worst global
pandemic and the most devastating global economic crisis in a century. This is in addition to
the increasingly acute climate change emergency. And much has been said about the systemicinterdependencies between these crises, which is not the subject of this report.
It was an obvious choice for the WNISR-Team to elaborate a focus chapter providing apreliminary international assessment on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the
nuclear sector and the reactions of operators and regulators (see Nuclear Power in the Ageof COVID-19). The most striking outcome of the analysis is the display of confidence by themain stakeholders that “everything is fine”. While most outages for maintenance and repairs
were delayed, many nuclear facilities operated with a fraction of normal staffing levels, andvirtually all physical inspections by safety authorities were cancelled for at least two months.
Some of the large nuclear operators like the French EDF or the Russian Rosatom were hit withhundreds of COVID-19 cases. No information is publicly available about the impact on specificareas of work. How can regulators assure parliamentarians, citizens and Governments that theoperators were “maintaining the required level of safety”, as the French chief regulator put it18
if they have not been on the sites for weeks?
The in-depth assessment of the safety and security implications of the COVID-19 crisis—not
only in the past months, but also in the coming years, as outage schedules will be impacted
over the coming at least two years—would go far beyond the scope of this report. But there is amajor public interest in getting this analysis done, soon.
The second focus chapter of WNISR2020 is devoted to Nuclear Power in the Middle East. With
the first nuclear power reactor starting up in the Arab world, at the Barakah site in the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), it was an appropriate time to analyze the energy policies in the region
and the role of nuclear power. The deployment of nuclear energy projects in a region that has
a high security volatility raises additional questions such as the comparative vulnerabilityof energy infrastructure that are outside the scope of this report. The recent threat by the
Azerbaijani Government to bomb the Armenian nuclear plant was a reminder of the security
implications of an existing nuclear facility in cases of international conflict or terrorism. “TheArmenian side mustn’t forget”, Azerbaijani Defense Ministry spokesman Vagif Dargyakhly said
in a 16 July 2020 statement, “that the most advanced missile systems our army has are capableof launching a precision strike on the Metsamor nuclear power plant, and that would be a hugetragedy for Armenia”.19 Only two days earlier, Al Jazeera posted a video on twitter20 that raised
the possibility of attacks on the Barakah nuclear plant. Three weeks later, the first reactor of
the four-unit Barakah complex was connected to the grid.

18 - ASN, “ASN makes an assessment of its oversight since the beginning of lockdown”, 25 May 2020, see http://www.frenchnuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/ASN-makes-an-assessment-of-its-oversight-since-the-beginning-of-lockdown,
accessed 28 July 2020.
19 - NIW, “Baku Threatens Armenia’s Metsamor Nuclear Plant”, 17 July 2020.
20 - Al Jazeera, “When nuclear risks become nuclear reality, the consequences could be devastating”, Tweet posted 14 July 2020,see https://twitter.com/AJEnglish/status/1283068744512811008; and Al Jazeera, “Why is the Gulf going nuclear?”, Video posted
26 July 2020, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybdwXo14sQI&list=PLzGHKb8i9vTxodrArxXFPziklf0iqFdC5&index=1,
both accessed 29 August 2020.

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The WNISR deadline for statistical and major editorial information is 1 July. This year, July andAugust were particularly rich in nuclear and energy related information. Here are some news
items likely to be analyzed in more detail in the WNISR2021, some of which reflect a surprisinglevel of corruption and other illegal activities in the nuclear sector:
ɆɆ The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) lifted its long-standing
ban on funding of nuclear energy projects overseas.21 This makes the DFC one of the few
development banks that allow investment in new nuclear projects. The World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) amongst others do not permit funding of new nuclear
power projects.
ɆɆ The speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives, Larry Householder, was arrested by
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on charges of racketeering. Allegedly, heand his associates had set up a US$60 million slush fund “to elect their candidates, withthe money coming from one of the state’s largest electricity companies. (…) Prosecutors
contend that in return for the cash, Mr. Householder, a Republican, pushed through ahuge bailout of two nuclear plants and several coal plants that were losing money.”22 As aconsequence, in 2019, FirstEnergy’s Oak Harbor and Perry reactors were granted generous
US$1.3 billion of taxpayer-money support to keep their uneconomic units on the grid. The
conspiracy was “likely the largest bribery, money-laundering scheme ever perpetrated
against the people of the state of Ohio,” the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Ohio,David M. DeVillers, said in a news conference.23
ɆɆ The revelation of the massive bribery affair in Ohio came within days of U.S. federal
prosecutors in Chicago charging Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) with bribery anda US$200 million fine. ComEd, the largest electric utility in Illinois, paid at least
US$1.3 million in contracts, jobs, and other payments to associates of state House Speaker
Michael Madigan, a Democrat, and “in return received [US]$150 million in benefits
resulting from legislation that relaxed oversight of the utility”.24
ɆɆ In a different affair, Steve Byrne, former Vice-President of SCANA—the utility that in2017 abandoned construction of the V.C. Summer plant in South Carolina—pleaded
guilty to fraud charges in federal court. Peter McCoy, U.S. Attorney for South Carolina,
told the Federal District Court in Columbia that Byrne “joined a conspiracy with othersenior SCANA executives to defraud customers of money and property through... false
and misleading statements and omissions.” The guilty plea was the result of a three-year
investigation by the FBI and prosecutors at the Federal Attorney’s Office in Columbia. The
fraud charges he pleaded to can carry up to five years in prison. The company had spentover US$9 billion, much of it ratepayer money, prior to folding the project.25
21 - WNN, “USA lifts nuclear finance ban”, 24 July 2020, see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/USA-lifts-nuclear-finance-ban,accessed 24 July 2020.
22 - Justin Gillis, “Opinion—When Utility Money Talks”, New York Times, 2 August 2020,see https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/02/opinion/utility-corruption-energy.html, accessed 29 August 2020.
23 - Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, “Powerful Ohio Republican Is Arrested in $60 Million Corruption Scheme”, New York Times,
21 July 2020, see https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/larry-householder-ohio-speaker-arrested.html, accessed 29 August 2020.
24 - Akela Lacy, “Energy Companies Have Spent Billions on Projects That Go Nowhere”, The Intercept, 7 August 2020,see https://theintercept.com/2020/08/07/nuclear-power-energy-utility-bribery-scandal/, accessed 5 September 2020.
25 - John Monk and Joseph Bustos, “Top ex-SCANA official Stephen Byrne pleads guilty in SC nuclear fiasco fraud case”, The State,
23 July 2020, see https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article244429397.html; and Andrew Brown and Avery G. Wilks, “Former
SCANA executive pleads guilty to fraud charges tied to failed SC nuclear project”, Post and Courier, 23 July 2020,see https://www.postandcourier.com/business/former-scana-executive-pleads-guilty-to-fraud-charges-tied-to-failed-sc-nuclearproject/article_26e23ca8-c50b-11ea-8377-e7b39854212b.html, both accessed 25 July 2020.

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ɆɆ In the aftermath of the ComEd scandal, the company’s owner Exelon, operator of thelargest nuclear fleet in the U.S., was concerned its attempts to impose legislative change
to allow for subsidies for its uneconomic Byron and Dresden plants in Illinois could fail.
Exelon CEO Chris Krane stated: “If we can’t find... a path to profitability, we will haveto shut them down.”26 Three weeks later Kane announced the early closure of the four
reactors, the two 33- and 35-year-old units at Byron in September 2021 (although licensed
for another 20 years) and the 49 and 50-year-old units at Dresden in November 2021
(licensed for another decade).27
ɆɆ As a result of storm damage incurred on 10 August 2020, the Duane Arnold-1 reactor will
not return to service and will instead be permanently closed. It was previously scheduled
for closure on 30 October 2020. This is the second reactor closure in the U.S. and thefourth in the world since the beginning of 2020.28
ɆɆ EDF Energy is to close its Hunterston B plant in the U.K. in late 2021, at least two years
earlier than planned. Serious graphite cracking and other damage had been identified at thetwo 44- and 43-year-old Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) in 2018 and the units wereshut down over the past two years. Repairs for longer-term operation turned out impossible
or too costly.29.
ɆɆ The startups of the Franco-German nuclear projects in Finland and France have been
delayed for the nth time. While the first EPR started building in Olkiluoto in 2005 and was,at the time, scheduled to deliver power by 2009, “regular electricity generation” is now
planned for February 202230 (see Finland Focus); the second one in Flamanville started
construction in 2007 and was supposed to supply electricity by 2012 but power generation
is now not expected before 2023. Popular Mechanics concluded: “France’s Revolutionary
Nuclear Reactor Is a Leaky, Expensive Mess.”31
ɆɆ The French Financial Market Authority (AMF) imposed a fine of €5 million (US$6 million)
on EDF and a fine of €50,000 (US$60,000) on Henri Proglio, former CEO of EDF for“disseminating false information” on the Hinkley Point C project in the U.K. The AMF
ruled that by claiming in a news release of 8 October 2014 that earlier agreements remained“unchanged”, when there had in fact been “significant changes to the financing plan by

26 - Jeff St. John, “ComEd Bribery Scandal Clouds Picture for Exelon’s Illinois Nuclear Plants”, GreenTechMedia, 4 August 2020,see https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/comed-bribery-scandal-affects-exelons-illinois-nuclear-plants-ratemaking-policy,
accessed 29 August 2020.
27 - WNN, “Exelon announces early shutdown of four Illinois reactors: Corporate”, 27 August 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Exelon-announces-early-shutdown-of-four-Illinois-r, accessed 29 August 2020.
28 - WNISR, “Storm Damage Prompts Early Closure of Duane Arnold Nuclear Reactor in the U.S.”, 26 August 2020,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Storm-Damage-Prompts-Early-Closure-of-Duane-Arnold-Nuclear-Reactor-in-the-U-S.html,
accessed 30 August 2020.
29 - Severin Carrell and Jillian Ambrose, “Scottish nuclear power station to shut down early after reactor problems”, The Guardian,
27 August 2020, see http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/aug/27/hunterston-scottish-nuclear-power-station-to-shut-downearly-after-reactor-problems, accessed 29 August 2020.
30 - TVO, “OL3 EPR regular production of electricity starts in February 2022”, 28 August 2020, see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/
pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/ol3eprregularproductionofelectricitystartsinfebruary2022.html, accessed 4 September 2020.
This latest announcement happened after the editorial deadline for the main body of this report.
31 - Caroline Delbert, “France’s Revolutionary Nuclear Reactor Is a Leaky, Expensive Mess”, Popular Mechanics, 3 August 2020,see https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/a33499619/france-nuclear-reactor-epr-expensive-mess/,
accessed 5 August 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

guaranteed debt, EDF had disseminated false information likely to set the share price at anabnormal or artificial level”.32
While the nuclear industry was struggling with COVID-19 cases, dramatically reduced
workforces in operating plants and facilities under construction, the renewable energy industry
apparently suffered much less and shorter impacts of the pandemic. It is obvious that operating
solar plants or wind farms need significantly less maintenance by fewer workers than a nuclear
facility. Also, the construction of new generating facilities requires less workers on-site at any
given time in the renewable sector than in the case of nuclear. New renewables (excludinghydro) come in much smaller units, and therefore appear as a whole significantly more resilient
than in the nuclear sector.
ɆɆ The lowest ever commercial offer for solar electricity was issued in Portugal in August 2020
at €11.14/MWh (US$13.2/MWh), just below a July 2020 bid in Abu Dhabi at US$13.5/MWh(see Figure 25).33
ɆɆ Wind and solar electricity generation increased by 19 percent year-on-year in the first sevenmonths of 2020 across the Big-5 power markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, U.K.) withsolar power generation at an all-time high34 , while nuclear generation was on the decline inmany nuclear countries around the world.
ɆɆ China’s newly installed solar capacity has recovered quickly after a year-on-year decline
due to COVID-19 in the first quarter of 2020, and the half-year result is even slightly above
2019 (11.5 GW vs. 11.4 GW).35
ɆɆ In spite of COVID-19, wind power capacity additions in the first half of 2020 exceeded2019-results significantly in major markets including the E.U., Japan and the U.S. where
added capacity more than doubled to over 4 GW.36
ɆɆ In spite of COVID-19, global investment in new renewables increased year-on-year in thefirst half of 2020 by 5 percent to an estimated US$132 billion, driven by the tripling ofinvestments in off-shore wind to US$35 billion.37
And as a consequence of some of the development mentioned above:ɆɆ As of mid-2020, energy consumption in the U.S. fell to its lowest level in 30 years;
19 energy companies, mostly oil and gas, had filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. in these six

32 - AMF, “The AMF’s Enforcement Committee fines EDF and its former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer for disseminating
false information about the project to build a nuclear plant at Hinkley Point in the United Kingdom”, Autorité des Marchés Financiers,
30 July 2020, see https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news-releases/enforcement-committee-news-releases/amfsenforcement-committee-fines-edf-and-its-former-chairman-and-chief-executive-officer, accessed 30 August 2020.
33 - Emiliano Bellini, “Portugal’s second PV auction draws world record low bid of $0.0132/kWh”, PV Magazine, 24 August 2020,see https://www.pv-magazine.com/2020/08/24/portugals-second-pv-auction-draws-world-record-low-bid-of-0-0132-kwh/,
accessed 5 September 2020.
34 - PiE, “RES tracker: July wind, solar up 19% on year”, 10 August 2020.
35 - Taiyang News, “China Reports To Have Grid Connected 11.52 GW New Solar PV Capacity In H1/2020 Taking Cumulative
Capacity To 216 GW: NEA”, 31 July 2020, see http://taiyangnews.info/markets/nea-china-installed-11-52-gw-solar-pv-in-h12020/,
accessed 29 August 2020.
36 - Bruno Brunetti, “Despite COVID-19 disruptions, wind additions up 6% Y/Y in H1 2020 across major markets, with US andEurope leading” Tweet, S&P Global Platts, 24 August 2020, see https://twitter.com/bbrunettienergy/status/1297921898848956418,
accessed 29 August 2020.
37 - BNEF, “Colossal Six Months for Offshore Wind Support Renewable Energy Investment in First Half of 2020”, BloombergNEF,
13 July 2020, see https://about.bnef.com/blog/colossal-six-months-for-offshore-wind-support-renewable-energy-investment-in-firsthalf-of-2020/, accessed 30 August 2020.

| 37

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 months.38 (Already in April 2020, for the first time ever, oil was traded at negative prices
and producers paid shippers to get rid of it).
ɆɆ For the first time ever, the world’s coal power plant fleet ran at less than half of its capacity(47 percent) for six months in a row (January to June 2020) on average with China at
45 percent, the EU at 24 percent, India at 51 percent and the U.S. at 32 percent. Renewables
generated an estimated 10 percent. However, in spite of the significant impact of COVID-19
on electricity consumption and the rise of renewables, coal use dropped “only” by 8 percent
year-on-year over the first half of 2020, while it needs to fall 13 percent annually to reachthe +1.5°C climate goal by 2050.39
This is quite an amazing list of developments and revelations in just two months. In
WNISR2018, we started to assess the performance of the French nuclear sector reactor-byreactor and WNISR2019 provided a full picture of the year 2018. WNISR2020 offers an updateto that analysis. The average outage (at zero power, not including reduced output) per unit for
the 58 French reactors has increased by 10 percent in 2019, exceeding three months (96.2 days)
per year, totaling 5,580 reactor-days, up 500 days over the previous year (see France Focus). In
the previous editions, we were wondering about EDF’s declaration of planned vs. unplanned
outages and were intrigued about the principle ‘once planned, always planned’. Therefore, we
decided to analyze scheduled vs. real restarts and the result is staggering, with an average of
40 percent increase between scheduled vs. real outage times. EDF, the largest nuclear operator
in the world, has entirely lost control of outage planning.
In Japan, no new units have been restarted since mid-2018—four restarted in the first halfof 2018—and there are still only nine operating reactors in the country. As of mid‑2020,24 reactors remain in Long‑Term Outage (LTO) with uncertain prospects for restart, which isstill highly controversial amongst the Japanese public (see Japan Focus).
Small Modular Reactors or SMRs have made little progress ever since the first WNISR
assessment in 2015, as this edition’s update concludes: “delays, poor economics, and theincreased availability of low-carbon alternatives at rapidly decreasing cost plague thesetechnologies as well, and there is no need to wait with bated breath for SMRs to be deployed”(see Small Modular Reactors).
The WNISR’s overview of decommissioning of closed reactors identifies few major
developments. While eight additional reactors have been closed since WNISR2019, only one
more reactor finished the technical decommissioning process, bringing the total to 20 unitsof a total of 189 closed reactors in the world. The detailed analysis is in the Decommissioning
Status Report.
It has become a challenge to keep the traditional Nuclear Power vs. Renewable Energy chapter
up to date as developments have accelerated to a point that becomes difficult to account forin an annual report. It provides a global comparative overview on investment, deployment,
production of non-hydro renewables vs. nuclear power as well some country specific analysis,
including on China, India, the EU, and the U.S.
38 - Johnna Crider, “COVID-19 Bankrupts 19 Energy (Oil & Gas) Companies”, CleanTechnica, 5 August 2020,see https://cleantechnica.com/2020/08/05/covid-19-bankrupts-19-energy-oil-gas-companies/, accessed 7 August 2020.
39 - Dave Jones, Euan Graham and Pete Tunbridge, “Wind and Solar Now Generate One-Tenth of Global Electricity—Global half-year
electricity analysis”, Ember, 13 August 2020, see https://ember-climate.org/project/global-electricity-h12020/, accessed 30 August 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 39

GENERAL OVERVIEWWORLDWIDEPRODUCTION AND ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER
In 2019, the world nuclear fleet generated 2,657 net terawatt-hours (TWh or billion kilowatthours) of electricity40, a 3.7 percent increase over the previous year— half of this rise is due
to China’s nuclear output increasing by over 19 percent—and only 3 TWh below the historicpeak in 2006 (see Figure 1). Without China, global nuclear power generation slightly increased(+1.8 percent). The numbers illustrate that China continues to dominate the key indicators innuclear statistics.
Nuclear energy’s share of global commercial gross electricity generation in 2019 has marked abreak in its slow but steady decline from a peak of 17.5 percent in 1996, with a 0.2 percentagepoint increase over the 10.15 percent in 2018 to 10.35 percent in 2019. However, with non-hydrorenewables’ strongest annual growth on record, “their share in power generation (10.4 percent)also surpassed nuclear for the first time”, as BP notes in their annual statistical review. 41
Figure 1 · Nuclear Electricity Generation in the World... and China

Nuclear Electricity Production 1985–2019
in the World...

...and in China
and the Rest of the Worldin TWh (net) and Share in Electricity Generation (gross)in TWh (net)

Share
in %

1996
Maximum : 17.5%

2006
Maximum:
2,660 TWh

Nuclear Share
Nuclear Electricity
Production

15

2019
Production:
2,657 TWh
Share:
10.35%

2015–2017
Outside Chinaworld nuclear production
has declined...

10

5

5

0

0
85

1990

1995

2000

2005

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

2010

2015

2019
World production increased by 3.7%,
mainly due to a 19.2% surge in China(+1.8% outside China)

China
Rest ofthe World

19

2018...rose slightly, but remained
below the level of 2014.

TWh

TWh

2500

2500

2000

2000

1500

1500

1000

1000

500

500

0

85

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

0

19

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

42

Sources: WNISR, with BP, IAEA-PRIS, 202040 - If not otherwise noted, all nuclear capacity and electricity generation figures based on International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA), Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) online database, see https://prisweb.iaea.org/Home/Pris.asp. Production
figures are net of the plant’s own consumption unless otherwise noted, from https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/
NuclearShareofElectricityGeneration.aspx.
41 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020: a pivotal moment”, 17 June 2020, see https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/newsand-insights/press-releases/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2020-published.html, accessed 26 June 2020.
42 - BP stands for BP plc; WNISR for World Nuclear Industry Status Report.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

The nuclear contribution to commercial primary energy generation remained stable at
4.3 percent. It has been around this level since 2014. 43
In 2019, nuclear generation increased in 19 countries of the 31 countries operating commercial
reactors, declined in eight, and remained stable in four. 44 A remarkable eight countries(Argentina, Brazil, China, Finland, Hungary, India, Russia, U.S.) achieved their largest evernuclear production. As only two of these countries started up new units (China and Russia),
the others either restarted reactors after long outages, sometimes involving significant
overhaul including an increase in capacity or improved their performance through better plant
management.
The following noteworthy developments for the year 2019 illustrate the continuous volatile
operational situation of the individual national reactor fleets (see country-specific sections fordetails):
ɆɆ Argentina boosted output by almost 23 percent after one of their three reactors (Embalse)
returned to service following a four-and-a-half-year refurbishment-outage.
ɆɆ Belgium’s nuclear generation increased by 52 percent after a 32-percent plunge in 2018 dueto the extension of outages for maintenance, repair and upgrade.
ɆɆ China started up only two new units after having connected seven reactors to the grid in
2018, which helped increase output by 19.2 percent in 2019.
ɆɆ France’s nuclear generation decreased by 3.4 percent, remaining for the fourth year in a
row below the 400 TWh mark. In the 15 years between 2001 and 2015, this had happened
only once, in the crisis year 2009 (see France Focus).
ɆɆ India increased generation by just over 15 percent, following several years of stagnation,achieving an annual load factor of almost 74 percent, compared to a lifetime load factor of
60 percent.
ɆɆ Japan, that had restarted four more units in 2018, bringing the total of operating reactors
to nine, did not restart any additional units but boosted output by one third in 2019.
ɆɆ Russia reached a new peak in nuclear electricity generation and overtook China in thenumber of startups during the year (three vs. two).
ɆɆ South Korea increased nuclear production by 9.2 percent following a 10-percent decline
in 2018. In spite of the grid connection of a new reactor in April 2019, the country did not
return to 2017 generation levels.
ɆɆ South Africa increased generation by 28.4 percent but could not make up for the29.8 percent drop in the previous year.
ɆɆ The U.K. nuclear generation decreased by 13.7 percent, due to repeatedly extended, longoutages of some its reactors.
ɆɆ The U.S. improved its 2018, all-time highest nuclear electricity generation by another
1.3 TWh (0.2 percent). While the increase remains marginal, it is a remarkable achievement
as two more reactors were closed during the year (Pilgrim-1 in April and Three-Mile43 - Ibidem. Natural gas consumption increased by 2 percent, oil consumption by 0.9 percent, while coal consumption fell by
0.6 percent to its lowest share in primary energy consumption in 16 years. China accounted for more than three quarters of the modest
1.3 percent net global primary-energy consumption-growth, while the U.S. and Germany registered the largest declines.
44 - Less than 1 percentage point variation from the previous year.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 41Island-2 in September) and no new ones were started up since 2016. With the average age
hitting 40 years in 2020, the productivity of the U.S. reactor fleet is astounding and quite
contrary to the difficulties with ageing issues in other countries. 45
Figure 2 · Nuclear Electricity Generation and Share in Global Power Generation
Nuclear Production in 2018/2019 and Historic Maximumin TWh and Share In Electricity Production
TWh
800
2019

Percentage
600

400

200

0

0

2005
2019
2019

1994

2001

USA

FranceFranceSlovakia

China

UkraineRussiaHungarySouth Korea

Belgium

CanadaBulgaria

UkraineSlovenia

Germany

Czech Republic

Japan

1998
2004
2001
1999

SwedenFinland

Spain

SwedenUK

Armenia

Belgium

30

40

50

2019

India

Spain

TaiwanRussia

2015

1986
2002
2005
2013
1996
1986
1996
2009
1987
1989
2019
1995

2007

Switzerland

Romania

2009

2019

FinlandUK

Bulgaria

Canada

1997
1994

2019

Hungary

Taiwan2019

BrazilGermany

1989

Slovakia

Japan

1998

1988

1989

Romania

Argentina

2018

Pakistan

China

2019

2019

Argentina

Mexico2015

IranSlovenia
Netherlands
Armenia

80

2014

USA

Pakistan70

2005

Czech Rep.

Mexico60
2003

South Korea

South Africa South Africa© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

20

Switzerland

1998

2018

2018
2019
Historic Maximum
1998 Historic Maximum Year

10

1990

India

2011

Netherlands

1986

Brazil

2001

Iran

2017

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, and national sources for Germany and Switzerland, 202045 - This report does not discuss the question whether this performance is at least partially due to potentially lower safety andsecurity requirements than practiced in other nuclear countries. But the difference in productivity with countries like France and the
U.K. is indeed astounding. While the U.S. has achieved a load factor of over 90 percent in 2019, France and the U.K. remained below
70 percent, precisely because of extensive refurbishment outages.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 With remarkable stability, just as in previous years, in 2019, the “big five” nuclear generating
countries—by rank, the U.S., France, China, Russia and South Korea—generated 70 percent
of all nuclear electricity in the world (see Figure 2, left side). In 2002, China held position 15,
in 2007 it was tenth, before reaching third place in 2016. With another 15 reactors underconstruction, China will likely overtake France within the next few years. In the meantime,
the two top countries alone, the U.S. and France, accounted for 45 percent of global nuclear
production in 2019.
In many cases, even where nuclear power generation has increased in the past, the addition
is not keeping pace with overall increases in electricity production, leading to a nuclear share
below the respective historic maximum (see Figure 2, right side). Only two countries, China
and Russia, reached new historic peak shares of nuclear in their respective power mix, bothat small increases, +0.7 percentage points for China (reaching a share of 4.9 percent) and+1.8 percentage points for Russia (attaining 19.7 percent.)
However, in 2019, there were 12 countries that increased their nuclear share—three times as
many as in 2018—and 13 remained at a constant level (change of less than 1 percentage point),
while six decreased their nuclear shares.

OPERATION, POWER GENERATION,
AGE DISTRIBUTION
Since the first nuclear power reactor was connected to the Soviet power grid at Obninsk in
1954, there have been two major waves of startups. The first peaked in 1974, with 26 gridconnections in that year. The second reached a historic maximum in 1984 and 1985, just before
the Chernobyl accident, reaching 33 grid connections in each year. By the end of the 1980s,
the uninterrupted net increase of operating units had ceased, and in 1990 for the first time
the number of reactor closures46 outweighed the number of startups. The 1991–2000 decade
produced far more startups than closures (52/30), while in the decade 2001–2010, startups
did not match closures (32/37). Furthermore, after 2000, it took a whole decade to connect as
many units as in a single year in the middle of the 1980s (see Figure 3). Between 2011 and mid2020, the startup of 58 reactors—of which 35 (60 percent) in China alone—outpaced by two
only the closure of 56 units over the same period. As there were no closures in China over theperiod, the 56 closures outside China were only matched by 23 startups, a startling decline by
33 units over the period. (See Figure 4).
After the startup of 10 reactors in each of the years 2015 and 2016, only four units started up
in 2017, of which three in China and one in Pakistan (built by Chinese companies). In 2018,
nine reactors generated power for the first time, of which seven in China and two in Russia,
while three units were closed, of which two in Russia and one in the U.S. In 2019, six units
were connected to the grid, of which three in Russia, two in China and one in South Korea,
while five units were closed, of which two in the U.S., and one each in Germany, Sweden and
Switzerland (see Figure 4).
46 - With WNISR2019 we have introduced “closure” as general term for permanent shutdown, in order to avoid confusion with the useof “shutdown” for provisional grid disconnections for maintenance, refueling, upgrading or due to incidents. WNISR considers closure
from the moment of grid disconnection—and not from the moment of the industrial, political or economic decision—and as the units
have not generated power for several years, in WNISR statistics, they are closed in the year of their latest power generation.

| 42

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 43Figure 3 · Nuclear Power Reactor Grid Connections and Closures in the World

Reactor Startups and Closures in the Worldin Units, from 1954 to 1 July 2020

Reactor Startups

30

YearlyBalance25© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Reactor Closures

20
15
10
5

0 1954

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

-5
-10
-15
-20
-25

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Notes:
As of 2019, WNISR is using the term “Closed” instead of “Permanent Shutdown” for reactors that have ceased power production, as WNISR considers thereactors closed as of the date of their last production. Although this definition is not new, it had not been applied to all reactors or fully reflected in the
WNISR database; this applies to known/referenced examples like Superphénix in France, which had not produced in the two years before it was officiallyor the Italian reactors that were de facto closed prior to the referendum in 1987, or some other cases. Those changes obviously affect many of the Figures
relating to the world nuclear reactor fleet (Startup and Closures, Evolution of world fleet, age of closed reactors, amongst others.)

Not a single new unit was connected to the world’s power grids in the first half of 202047,
including in China, where no unit was started up since mid-2019. 48 It is not since the Fukushimadisaster in 2011 that there has not been a single startup in China for a full year. 49
Three reactors were closed in 2020 by mid-year, the two oldest units in France (Fessenheim-1
and -2) and one in the U.S. (Indian Point-2).
As of mid-2020, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to count 33 units
in Japan in its total number of 440 reactors “in operation” in the world. That is a significant
drop of 11 compared to mid-2019). The IAEA is counting four less “operating” units in Japan
than in mid-2019 with the four Fukushima Daini reactors finally considered closed.50 WNISR
has considered them closed since 2012, as the probability for restart were virtually zero with
47 - Two units started up in August 2020, one in China and one in the UAE.
48 - Tianwan-5 was connected to the grid on 8 August 2020, see WNISR, “First Reactor Grid Connection in the World in 2020—in
China”, 13 August 2020, see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/First-Reactor-Grid-Connection-in-the-World-in-2020-in-China.html,
accessed 22 August 2020.
49 - Quinshan 2-4 was connected to the grid on 25 November 2011 followed by Ningde-1 on 28 December 2012.
50 - IAEA, “Power Reactor Information System”, International Atomic Energy Agency, Undated,
see https://pris.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=JP, accessed 22 August 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 44

their location in the middle of the exclusion zone, at 15 km distance of the Fukushima Daiichi
disaster site. No nuclear electricity was generated in Japan between September 2013 andAugust 2015, and as of 1 July 2020, only nine reactors were operating (see Japan Focus), just as
in mid-2019. Nuclear plants provided only 7.5 percent of the electricity in Japan in 2019.
Figure 4 · Nuclear Power Reactor Grid Connections and Closures – The Slowing China Effect

Reactor Startups and Closures in the Worldin Units, from 1954 to 1 July 2020
30

Reactor Startups
China
Rest of the World

25

Reactor Closures
All Countries (No Chinese in Total)

20© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

15
10
5

0

1954

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

-5
-10
-15
-20
-25

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

The WNISR keeps reiterating its call for an appropriate reflection in world nuclear statisticsof the unique situation in Japan. The attitude taken by the IAEA, the Japanese Government,utilities, industry and many research bodies as well as other Governments and organizations
to continue considering the entire stranded reactor fleet in the country as “in operation” or“operational” is misleading.
The IAEA actually does have a reactor-status category called “Long-term Shutdown” or LTS.51
Under the IAEA’s definition, a reactor is considered in LTS, if it has been shut down for an“extended period (usually more than one year)”, and in early period of shutdown either restart
is not being “aggressively pursued” or “no firm restart date or recovery schedule has been
established”. The IAEA currently lists zero reactors anywhere in the LTS category.
The IAEA criteria are vague and hence subject to arbitrary interpretation. What exactly
are extended periods? What is aggressively pursuing? What is a firm restart date or recovery
schedule? Faced with this dilemma, the WNISR team in 2014 decided to create a new category

51 - See IAEA Glossary, at www.iaea.org/pris/Glossary.aspx, accessed 1 July 2016.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 45with a simple definition, based on empirical fact, without room for speculation: “Long-term
Outage” or LTO. Its definition:
A nuclear reactor is considered in Long-Term Outage or LTO if it has not generated any
electricity in the previous calendar year and in the first half of the current calendar year. It iswithdrawn from operational status retroactively from the day it has been disconnected fromthe grid.

When subsequently the decision is taken to close a reactor, the closure status starts with the
day of the last electricity generation, and the WNISR statistics are retroactively modified
accordingly.
Applying this definition to the world nuclear reactor fleet, as of 1 July 2020, leads to classifying
31 units in LTO—all considered “in operation” by the IAEA—three more than in WNISR2019,of which 24 in Japan (no change) and one in China (China Experimental Fast Reactor – CEFR).
Three units entered the category in the U.K. (Hunterston-B1, Dungeness-B1 and -B2), oneeach in India (Madras-1) and South Korea (Hanbit-3, with Hanbit-4 remaining in LTO). One
reactor in Canada (Darlington-2) restarted from LTO since mid-2019. One unit in Taiwan(Chinshan-2) moved from LTO to closed.
Figure 5 · World Nuclear Reactor Fleet, 1954–2020

Nuclear Reactors and Net Operating Capacity in the Worldin Units and GWe, from 1954 to 1 July 2020
1989
310 GWe
418 Reactors

2006
Maximum Operating Capacity
367 GWe2002
Maximum
Operating Units
438 Reactors

7/2020408 Reactors
362 GWe

Operating Capacity

GWe

400

400

Reactors in Operation
Operating Capacity

300

300

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

200

200

100

100

0

1954

1960

1965

1970

1975

GW

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

0

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Note:
Changes in the database regarding closing dates of reactors or LTO status slightly change the shape of this graph from previouus editions. In particular theprevious “maximum operating capacity” of 2006 (overtaken in July 2019) is now at 367 GW.

As of 1 July 2020, a total of 408 nuclear reactors were operating in 31 countries, down nineunits from the situation in mid-201952 . The current world fleet has a total nominal electric
net capacity of 362 GW, down by 7.5 GW (–2.1 percent) from one year earlier. The number ofoperating reactors remains by 10 below the figure reached in 1989 and by 30 below the 2002
52 - +2 startups +1 restart –5 new LTOs –7 closures.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 peak (see Figure 5). With three reactors closed in the first half of 2020 but none started up,
and four more units in LTO, the number of operating units and their installed capacity has also
declined since the end of 2019.
For many years, the net installed capacity has continued to increase more than the net numberof operating reactors. This is a result of the combined effects of larger units replacing smaller
ones. Thus, in 1989, the average size of an operational nuclear reactor was about 740 MW,
while that number has increased to almost 890 MW in 2020) and technical alterations raising
capacity at existing plants resulting in larger electricity output, a process known as uprating.53
In the U.S. alone, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved 164 uprates since1977. The cumulative approved uprates in the U.S. total 7.9 GW, the equivalent of eight large
reactors.54 No additional uprates were approved since April 2018 and there are no pending
applications as of mid-2020. Four additional applications were expected in 2019 but did notmaterialize.
A similar trend of uprates and major overhauls in view of lifetime extensions of existing
reactors has been seen in Europe. The main incentive for lifetime extensions is economic
but this argument is being increasingly challenged as backfitting costs soar and alternatives
become cheaper.

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT NEW-BUILD
As of 1 July 2020, 52 reactors are considered as under construction. After falling for five years
in a row, there are six more units than WNISR reported a year ago, but 17 fewer than in 2013
(five of those units have subsequently been abandoned).
Three in four reactors are built in Asia and Eastern Europe. In total, 17 countries are building
nuclear plants, one more than reported in WNISR2019, with Iran restarting construction on
Bushehr-2 (see Table 1). However, only four countries have construction ongoing at more than
one site (see Annex 5, Figure 6 for details).
Four new construction sites were launched in China, including two CAP1400 units at ShidaoBay where building started in April and October 2019 respectively, but that were not being
taken into account in WNISR2019 (for Unit 1) and have not been reported by IAEA-PRIS as of
mid-August 2020. One construction start took place in the U.K. with Hinkley Point C-2. The
only construction start reported in the first half of 2020 was Akkuyu-2 in Turkey.
The figure of 52 reactors listed as under construction by mid-2020 compares poorly with apeak of 234—totaling more than 200 GW—in 1979. However, many (48) of those projects listed
in 1979 were never finished (see Figure 6). The year 2005, with 26 units under construction,marked a record low since the early nuclear age in the 1950s. Compared to the situation
described a year ago, the total capacity of units under construction in the world as of mid-2020
increased by 8.9 GW to 53.5 GW, with an average unit size of 1,028 MW.

53 - Increasing the capacity of nuclear reactors by equipment upgrades e.g. more powerful steam generators or turbines.
54 - U.S.NRC, “Approved Applications for Power Uprates”, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Updated 2 April 2019,see http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/power-uprates/status-power-apps/approved-applications.html,
accessed 22 August 2020.

| 46

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 47

Figure 6 · Nuclear Reactors “Under Construction” in the World (as of 1 July 2020)

Reactors Under Construction in the Worldin Units, from 1951 to 1 July 2020

234

Construction Status
as of 1 July 2020
Construction Abandoned or Suspended

48

200

Construction Completed or Underway
Construction Starts
150© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

186

100
69

50

39

44

64

22

0 1951

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

51
50 52

15

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

10

2010

3 5
2015

61
7/20

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Notes:
This figure includes construction of two CAP1400 reactors at Rongcheng/Shidaowan, although their construction has not been officially announced(see China Focus). At Shidao Bay, the plant under construction since 2012 has actually two reactors on the site and is therefore counted as two units as of
WNISR2020.

Table 1 · Nuclear Reactors “Under Construction” (as of 1 July 2020)55
Country

Units

Capacity(MW net)Construction
Start

Grid
Connection

Units Behind
Schedule
6

China

15

13 842

2012 - 20192020 - 2025

India

7

4 824

2004 - 20172020 - 2023

5South Korea

4

5 360

2012 - 20182020 - 2024

4

UAE

4

5 380

2012 - 20152020 - 2023

4

Russia3

3 3152010 - 20192021 - 2023

1

Bangladesh

2

2 160

2017 - 20182023 - 2024

0Belarus2

2 218

2013 - 20142020 - 2021

2

Pakistan2

2 028

2015 - 2016

2021

1

Slovakia

2

880

1985 - 1985

2020 - 2021

2

Turkey2

2 2282018 - 20202024 - 2025

1

UK

2

3 260

2018 - 20192025 - 2026

0

USA

2

2 234

2013

2021 - 2022

2

Argentina

1

25

2014

2021

1

Finland

1

1 600

2005

2021

1

France

1

1 600

2007

2022

1

Iran

1

1 196

1976

2024

1

Japan

1

1 325

2007

?

1

Total

52

53 475

1976 - 2020

2020 - 2026

33

Sources: Various, Compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes: This table does not contain suspended or abandoned constructions.
This table includes construction of two CAP1400 reactors at Rongcheng/Shidaowan, although their construction has not been officially announced(see China Focus). At Shidao Bay, the plant under construction since 2012 has actually two reactors on the site and is therefore counted as two units as of
WNISR2020.
55 - For further details, see Annex 5.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

CONSTRUCTION TIMES
Construction Times of Reactors Currently Under Construction
A closer look at projects presently listed as “under construction” illustrates the level of
uncertainty and problems associated with many of these projects, especially given that mostbuilders assume a five-year construction period to begin with:
ɆɆ As of 1 July 2020, for the 52 reactors being built an average of 7.3 years have passed sinceconstruction start—an increase of more than six months compared to the mid-2019
average—and many remain far from completion.
ɆɆ All reactors under construction in at least 10 of the 17 countries have experienced mostly
year-long delays. At least 33 (64 percent) of the building projects are delayed. Most of theunits which are nominally being built on-time were begun within the past three years or
have not yet reached projected startup dates, making it difficult to assess whether or notthey are on schedule. Particular uncertainty remains over construction sites in Bangladesh,
China, Russia and the U.K.
ɆɆ Of the 33 reactors clearly documented as behind schedule, at least 12 have reported
increased delays and four have reported new delays over the past year.
ɆɆ WNISR2018 noted a total of 14 reactors scheduled for startup in 2019. At the beginning of
2019, two of these were already connected to the grid in late 2018, ten were still scheduled
for startup during the year, in addition to four reactors previously scheduled for 2018, while
the others were delayed at least into 2020. Only six made it in 2019.
ɆɆ Construction start of two projects dates back 35 years, Mochovce-3 and -4 in Slovakia,
and their startup has been further delayed, currently to 2020–2021. Bushehr-2 originally
started construction in 1976, that is 44 years ago, and resumed construction in 2019 after a
40-year-long suspension. Grid connection is currently scheduled for 2024.
ɆɆ Five reactors have been listed as “under construction” for a decade or more: the Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) in India, the Olkiluoto-3 (OL3) reactor project in Finland,
Shimane-3 in Japan, the French Flamanville-3 (FL3) and Leningrad 2-2 in Russia. The
Finnish project has been further delayed this year, grid connections of the French andIndian units are likely to be postponed again, and the Japanese reactor does not even havea provisional startup date.
The actual lead time for nuclear plant projects includes not only the construction itself but
also lengthy licensing procedures in most countries, complex financing negotiations, site
preparation and other infrastructure development. As the U.K.’s Hinkley Point C (HPC)
project illustrates, a significant share of investment and work was carried out long before evenentering the official construction phase (see United Kingdom Focus).

Construction Times of Past and Currently Operating Reactors
There has been a clear global trend towards increasing construction times. National building
programs were faster in the early years of nuclear power, when units were smaller andsafety regulations were less stringent. As Figure 7 illustrates, construction times of reactors| 48

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 49completed in the 1970s and 1980s were quite homogenous, while in the past two decades they
have varied widely.
Figure 7 · Average Annual Construction Times in the World

Average Annual Durations from Construction Start to Grid Connection

Duration in Years

by Grid Connection Date, from 1954 to 1 July 2020
16
Number of Reactors

1

5

10

20

14
12

30

10

10

8

8

6

6

4

4
2

2
© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting
1954

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

0

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

The nine units completed in 2018–2019 by the Chinese nuclear industry took on average
7.6 years to build, while the five Russian projects took a mean 16 years from first construction
start to grid connection, with Rostov-4 taking 35 years from construction start to finallygenerate power (see The Construction Saga of Rostov Reactors 3 and 4).
The case of the twin “floating” reactors Akademik-Lomonosov is particularly interesting.
These are small 30-MW reactors and they were meant to demonstrate a precursor to a newgeneration of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), smaller, cheaper and faster to build. However,construction has taken longer than any other reactor that has come on-line over the two-year
period (with the exception of Rostov-4) and about four times as long as originally projected; alittle before construction of the ship began in 2007, Rosatom announced that the plant would
begin operating in October 2010 and that it would complete five additional floating nuclear
plants by 201556. The first one finally started up only in December 2019. Not surprisingly, the“nuclear barge” has become more expensive, from an initial estimate of around 6 billion rubles(US$2007232 million)57 to at least 37 billion rubles as of 2015 (US$2015740 million),58 or close

56 - Rosatom, “The first offshore nuclear heat and electrical power plant of small capacity is planned to operate in October 2010 in
Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk district)”, Press Release, 15 December 2006; and IPFM, “Global Fissile Material Report 2007—Developing
the technical basis for policy initiatives to secure and irreversibly reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials”, Second
Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 1 October 2007,see http://fissilematerials.org/publications/2007/10/global_fissile_material_report_1.html, accessed 3 September 2020.
57 - WNN, “Russian floating reactor construction starts”, 17 April 2007, see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Russianfloating-reactor-construction-starts, accessed 3 September 2020.
58 - Charles Digges, “New documents show cost of Russian floating nuclear power plant skyrockets”, Bellona, 25 May 2015,see http://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2015-05-new-documents-show-cost-russian-nuclear-power-plant-skyrockets,
accessed 28 December 2015.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 50

to US$11,600 per installed kilowatt, significantly more expensive than the most expensive
Generation III reactors.59
The mean time from construction start to grid connection for the six reactors started up in
2019 was 9.9 years, improving from 10.9 years in 2018, confirming the trend towards an averageof around a decade. By mid-2020, no new unit had started up in the year anywhere in theworld.
Over the two years 2018 and 2019, there is only one unit that started up on-time, and thatis Tianwan-4 in China, a Russian-designed but mainly Chinese-built VVER-1000 (model
V-428M), that the designers claim to belong to Gen III classification, but few details are
known. The two Chinese units Yangjiang-5 and -6 were completed with minor delays in 4.7
and 5.5 years respectively. These are ACPR1000 reactors, designed by China General Nuclear
Corp. (CGN) that it claims contain at least ten improvements making them a Gen III design.60
Leaving the epic Rostov-4 case aside, the other six units that started up in China (four AP1000s,
two EPRs), the two large reactors in Russia (Leningrad 2-1 and Novovoronezh 2-2) and theone in South Korea (Shin-Kori-4) all experienced years-long delays and roughly doubled theirrespective planned construction time to 8.3–9.8 years, while the two floating reactors tookwith 12.7 years about four times as long to complete as planned (see Figure 8).
Figure 8 · Delays for Units Started Up 2018–2019
Expected vs. Real Duration from Construction Start to Grid Connection for Startups 2018–2019
in Years
China
Haiyang-1
Haiyang-2
Sanmen-1
Sanmen-2
Taishan-1
Taishan-2
Tianwan-4
Yangjiang-5
Yangjiang-6
South Korea
Shin-Kori-4
RussiaAkademik Lomonosov-1
Akademik Lomonosov-2
Leningrad 2-1
Novovoronezh 2-2
Rostov-4

4.8
4.8
4.5
4.8
4.1
4.5

5.1

8.9
8.3
9.2
8.7
8.7
9.2
Expected Construction Time

4.1
4.7
4.7
5.5

Construction Suspension
Delay
9.6

5
3.7
3.7

9.4
9.8

5
5

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

12.7
12.7
35.1

6

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Sources: WNISR with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Note
Expected construction time is based on grid connection data provided at construction start when available; alternatively, best estimates are used, based oncommercial operation, completion, or commissioning information.

59 - The current cost estimate of the Flamanville-3 EPR (excl. financing costs) is about US$9,000/kW (see France Focus).
60 - Caroline Peachey, “Chinese reactor design evolution”, Nuclear Engineering International, 22 May 2014,see https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurechinese-reactor-design-evolution-4272370/, accessed 14 August 2019.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 51

The longer-term perspective confirms that short construction times remain the exceptions.
Nine countries completed 63 reactors over the past decade—of which 37 in China alone—afteran average construction time of 10 years (see Table 2).
Table 2 · Duration from Construction Start to Grid Connection 2010–2019
Construction Times of 63 Units Started-up 2010–2019
Country

Units

Construction Time (in Years)
Mean Time

Minimum

Maximum

China

37

6.0

4.1

11.2

Russia

10

20.3

8.1

35.1

South Korea

6

6.0

4.1

9.6

India

4

10.4

7.2

14.2

Pakistan

3

5.4

5.2

5.6

Argentina

1

33.0

33.0

Iran

1

36.3

36.3

USA

1

43.5

43.5

World

63

10.0

4.1

43.5

Sources: Various, Compiled by WNISR. 2020

CONSTRUCTION STARTS & CANCELLATIONSThe number of annual construction starts61 in the world peaked in 1976 at 44, of which
12 projects were later abandoned. In 2010, there were 15 construction starts—including 10 in
China—the highest level since 1985 (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). That number dropped to fiveeach in 2017 and 2018. In 2019, WNISR accounts for six construction starts, four in China
and one each in Russia and the U.K. In the first half of 2020, only the Akkuyu-2 construction
was kicked off. Like most of the construction projects of the past decades, it was Government
owned or controlled companies that launched all of the reactors over the past 18 months.
Seriously affected by the Fukushima events, China did not start any construction in 2011 and2014 and began work only on eight units in total in 2012 and 2013. While Chinese utilities
started building six more units in 2015, the number shrank to two in 2016, only a demonstration
fast reactor in 2017, none in 2018, but four in 2019 (see Figure 10). While this increase could
mean a restart of commercial reactor building in China, for the time being, the level remains
far below expectations. The five-year plan 2016–2020 had fixed a target of 58 GW operatingand 30 GW under construction by 2020. As of mid-2020, China had 47 units with 45.5 GW
operating and 15 units with 13.8 GW under construction, far from the original target.
Over the decade 2010–2019, construction began on 67 reactors in the world, of which five havebeen abandoned. With 31 units, half of the building projects that were continued are locatedin China. As of mid-2020, only 18 of the 62 units have started up, while 44 remain underconstruction.
61 - Generally, a reactor is considered under construction with the beginning of the concreting of the base slab of the reactor building.
Site preparation work, excavation and other infrastructure developments are not included.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 52Figure 9 · Construction Starts in the World

Construction Starts of Nuclear Reactors in the Worldin Units, from 1951 to 1 July 2020
44

Construction Status
as of 1 July 2020
Construction Abandoned or Suspended
Construction Completed

1140

Under Construction...

30

32© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

20
15
10

10

0

8

6
1

1951

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

Bushehr-2

1985

1990

1995

2000

Mochovce-3
and -4

2005

PFBR
Olkiluoto-3

2010

2015

7/20

Kakrapar-3 and -4
Leningrad 2-2
Flamanville-3
Shimane-3

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Notes:
Construction of Bushehr-2, started in 1976, was considered abandoned in previous versions of this figure. As construction was restarted in 2019, it now
appears as “Under Construction”.
The Chinese reactor Shidao Bay-1 is now considered as two reactors, and construction starts in 2012 reflect this change.

Figure 10 · Construction Starts in the World/China

Construction Starts of Nuclear Reactors in the Worldin Units, from 1951 to 1 July 2020

44

40

China
Other countries
30© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

20
15
10

10
5

0 1951

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

10
7

8
6
2
2
2015

1

6
4
1
2
7/20

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Notes:
Construction of Bushehr-2, started in 1976, was considered abandoned in previous versions of this figure. As construction was restarted in 2019, it now
appears as “Under Construction”.
The Chinese reactor Shidao Bay-1 is now considered as two reactors, and construction starts in 2012 reflect this change.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 53

Past experience shows that simply having an order for a reactor, or even having a nuclear
plant at an advanced stage of construction, is no guarantee of ultimate grid connection andpower production. The abandonment of the two V.C. Summer units at the end of July 2017
after four years of construction and following multi-billion-dollar investment is only the latest
example in a long list of failed nuclear power plant projects.
French Alternative Energies & Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) statistics through 2002
indicate 253 “cancelled orders” in 31 countries, many of them at an advanced construction stage(see also Figure 11). The United States alone accounted for 138 of these order cancellations.62
Figure 11 · Cancelled or Suspended Reactor Constructions

Abandoned Reactor Constructions from 1970 to 1 July 2020
in Units by Cancellation Year and Country
Brazil - 1
Cuba - 2
USA - 42
Austria - 1
Bulgaria - 2
Czech Rep. - 2
Germany - 6
Italy - 3
Lithuania - 1
Poland - 2
Romania - 3
Russia - 12
Spain - 4
Sweden - 1
Ukraine - 6
Japan - 1
N. Korea - 1
Philippines - 1
Taiwan - 2
1970

Total - 93

1

1975

1980

2 1

Number of Reactors

1985

2 5 11 5 13

1

2

5

1990

3

1995

2000

9 3 12 3 2 9

11

2005

2010

2015 171
1
1 3 1 2 1
2
© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

The Americas

EuropeAsia and Middle East

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Note: This graph only includes constructions that had officially started with the concreting of the base slab of the reactor building.

Of the 773 reactor constructions launched since 1951, at least 93 units—one less than in
WNISR2019 as Bushehr-2 restarted construction in 2019 after 40 years of suspension—in
19 countries had been abandoned as of 1 July 2020. This means that 12 percent or one in eight
nuclear constructions have been abandoned in the course of things. The decade 2010–2019shows an abandoning rate of one-in-thirteen—as five in 67 building sites officially started
during that period were later given up at various stages of advancement.
Close to three-quarters (66 units) of all projects cancelled after official construction start
were in four countries alone—the U.S. (42), Russia (12), Germany and Ukraine (six each). Some

62 - CEA, “Elecnuc—Nuclear Power Plants in the World”, French Alternatives Energies and Atomic Energy Commission, 2002. The
section “cancelled orders” has disappeared after the 2002 edition.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 54units were actually 100 percent completed—including Kalkar in Germany and Zwentendorf inAustria—before the decision was taken not to operate them.

OPERATING AGE
In the absence of significant new-build and grid connection over many years, the average age(from grid connection) of operating nuclear power plants has been increasing steadily since
1984 when it stagnated, and as of mid-2020 it is standing at 30.7 years, up from 30.1 years in
mid-2019 (see Figure 12).63
A total of 270 reactors, two-thirds of the world’s operating fleet, have operated for 31 or more
years, including 81 (~20 percent) reaching 41 years or more.
In 1990, the average age of the operating reactors in the world was 11.3 years, in 2000 it had
advanced to 18.8 years and by 2010 it stood at 26.3 years. The different development stages
amongst the Top-5 nuclear fleets in the world illustrates the historic shift in the nuclear power
sector. The two leading nuclear nations are also leading the age pyramid. The U.S. passes the
40-year average age in 2020, and France’s fleet exceeds 35 years. Russia inversed the curvestarting in 2016 and its average fleet age of 28.5 years in mid-2020 remains one and a half years
below the 2015-average. South Korea’s reactors at just above 20 years remain half as old as
the U.S. fleet, and China is the obvious newcomer with an average fleet age of just 8.2 years.
(See Figure 13).
Figure 12 · Age Distribution of Operating Reactors in the WorldAge of World Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

Reactor Age

189

0–10 Years
11–20 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over

45
30

63

408 Reactors
Mean Age
30.7 Years

81

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

63 - WNISR calculates reactor age from grid connection to final disconnection from the grid. In WNISR statistics, “startup” issynonymous with grid connection and “closure” with withdrawal from the grid. In order to have a better image of the fleet andease calculations, the age of a reactor is considered to be 1 between the first and second grid connection anniversaries. For some
calculations, we also use operating years: the reactor is in its first operating year until the first grid connection anniversary, when it
enters the second operating year.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 55

Figure 13 · Reactor-Fleet Age of Top 5 Nuclear Generators
Mean Agein Years, as of
1 July 2020

Evolution of Mean Age of Top 5 Reactor Fleets in the World

USA 39.8

in Years, as of year-end 1954–2019 and mid-2020

France 35.1

35World 30.7

30

Russia 28.5
25

South Korea
20.7

20

15

10

China 8.2

5
© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting
1954

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Some nuclear utilities envisage average reactor lifetimes of beyond 40 years up to 60 andeven 80 years. In the U.S., reactors are initially licensed to operate for 40 years, but nuclear
operators can request a license renewal from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for
an additional 20 years.
As of mid-2020, 97 U.S. units had received a license extension. Six units with renewed licenses
were closed early, and two applications for three reactors were withdrawn as Crystal River
was closed and the other two at Diablo Canyon will close when their current license expiresin 2024–2025 (see United States Focus). Two additional applications for three reactors are
expected in 2021–2022.64
Only six of the 38 units that have been closed in the U.S. had reached 40 years on the grid.
All six had obtained licenses to operate up to 60 years but were closed mainly for economic
reasons. In other words, at least a quarter of the reactors connected to the grid in the U.S. neverreached their initial design lifetime of 40 years. None of them reached 50 years of operation.
On the other hand, of the 95 currently operating plants, 46 units have operated for 41 years ormore; thus, half of the units with license renewals have already entered the lifetime extension
period, and that share is growing rapidly with the mid-2020 mean age of the U.S. operational
fleet at about 40 years (see United States Focus).

64 - U.S.NRC, “Status of License Renewal Applications and Industry Activities”, Updated 3 March 2019,see http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html, accessed 23 August 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 56

Many countries have no specific time limits on operating licenses. In France, for example,
reactors must undergo in-depth inspection and testing every decade against reinforced safety
requirements. The French reactors have operated for 35.1 years on average, and most of them
have completed the process with the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) evaluating eachreactor allowing them to operate for up to 40 years, which is the limit of their initial design age.
However, the ASN assessments are years behind schedule. For economic reasons, the Frenchstate-controlled utility Électricité de France (EDF) clearly prioritizes lifetime extension to
50 years over large-scale new-build.65 EDF’s approach to lifetime extension is still under review
by ASN and its Technical Support Organization (TSO). ASN plans to provide its opinion on thegeneral assessment outline by the end of 2020. The program has cumulated various delays, and
it is somewhat ironical that Tricastin-1, the first unit to undergo the fourth decennial review,has done so in 2019 without the completion of ASN’s generic approval of the procedure. In
addition, lifetime extension beyond 40 years requires site-specific public inquiries in France.
Recently commissioned reactors and the ones under construction in South Korea do or will
have a 60-year operating license from the start. EDF will certainly also aim for a 60-year
license for its Hinkley Point C units in the U.K.
In assessing the likelihood of reactors being able to operate for 50 or 60 years, it is useful tocompare the age distribution of reactors that are currently operating with those that havealready closed (see Figure 12 and Figure 14). The age structure of the 189 units already closed(eight more than one year ago) completes the picture. In total, 74 of these units operated for
31 years or more, and of those, 30 reactors operated for 41 years or more. Many units of the firstgeneration designs only operated for a few years. The mean age of the closed units is 26.6 years.
Figure 14 · Age Distribution of Closed Nuclear Power Reactors

Age of Closed Nuclear Reactors in the World
as of 1 July 2020

Reactor Age

58
44

29

28

0–10 Years
11–20 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over

189 Reactors
Mean Age26.6 Years

30

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

To be sure, the operating time prior to closure has clearly increased continuously. The
mean age at closure of the 17 units taken off the grids between 2015 and 2019 was 42.4 years(see Figure 15).
65 - In fact, EDF does not have the choice as it does not have the financial capacity to engage into a major new-build program, as arecent report by the French Court of Accounts confirmed (see France Focus).

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Figure 15 · Nuclear Reactor Closure Age 1963–1 July 2020

Evolution of Nuclear Reactors' Average Closure Age 1963 – 1 July 2020

Age in Yearsby Closure Year

50
Number of Reactors

1

2

5

12

Average Closure Age
2015–201942.4 years

45
40

25

35

35

30

30

25

25

20

20

15

15

10

10

5

5
© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

1963 1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

As a result of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (also referred to as 3/11), questions have beenraised about the wisdom of operating older reactors. The Fukushima Daiichi units (1 to 4) wereconnected to the grid between 1971 and 1974. The license for Unit 1 had been extended foranother 10 years in February 2011, just one month before the catastrophe began. Four days after
the accidents in Japan, the German Government ordered the closure of eight reactors that had
started up before 1981, two of which were already closed at the time and never restarted. The
sole selection criterion was operational age. Other countries did not adopt the same approach,but it is clear that the 3/11 events in Japan had an impact on previously assumed extended
lifetimes in other countries, including in Belgium, Switzerland and Taiwan. Some of the main
nuclear countries closed their respective then oldest unit before age 50, including Germany atage 37, South Korea at 40, Sweden at 46 and the U.S. at 49. France closed its two oldest units inspring 2020 at age 43.

LIFETIME PROJECTIONS
Many countries continue to implement or prepare for lifetime extensions. As in previous years,
WNISR has created two lifetime projections. A first scenario (40-Year Lifetime Projection,
see Figure 16), assumes a general lifetime of 40 years for worldwide operating reactors—not
including reactors in Long-Term Outage (LTO). The 40-year number corresponds to the design
lifetimes of most operating reactors. Some countries have legislation or policy (Belgium,
South Korea, Taiwan) in place that limit operating lifetime, for all or part of the fleet, to 40 or
50 years. Recent designs, mostly reactors under construction, have a design lifetime of 60 years(e.g. APR1400, EPR). For the 81 reactors that have passed the 40-year lifetime, we assume they
will operate to the end of their licensed, extended operating time.

2020

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A second scenario (Plant Life Extension or PLEX Projection, see Figure 17) takes into accountall already-authorized lifetime extensions.
The lifetime projections allow for an evaluation of the number of plants and respective power
generating capacity that would have to come online over the next decades to offset closuresand simply maintain the same number of operating plants and level of capacity. With all units
under construction scheduled to have started up, installed nuclear capacity would still decreaseby 10.5 GW by the end of 2020. In total, 16 additional reactors (compared to the end of 2019status) would have to be started up or restarted prior to the end of 2020 in order to maintainthe status quo of operating units.
Figure 16 · The 40-Year Lifetime Projection

Projection 2020–2050 of Nuclear Reactors/Capacity in the World
General assumption of 40-year mean lifetime
Operating and Under Construction as of 1 July 2020, in GWe and Units
Capacity in GWe

YearlyBalance15
10Reactor Startups
Reactor Closures© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

50 20202020

Capacity Added
Capacity Closed

20252025

20302030

20352035

20402040

20452045

Number ofReactors
15
10
520502050 0

-5

-5

-10

-10

-15

-15

-20
-25
-30

2020
–16 Reactors–12 GW

2021-2030–176 Reactors–152.5 GW

2031-2040–78 Reactors–67.5 GW

2041-2050–27 Reactors–21 GW

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes pertaining to Figure 16, Figure 17 and Figure 18:
Those figures include one Japanese reactor (Shimane) and two Chinese 1400 MW-units at Shidao Bay, for which the startup dates were arbitrarily set to 2021
and 2025, as there are no official dates.
The restart of one reactor (Darlington-2) from LTO prior to 7/2020 appears as “startup”. Restart and closure of 31 reactors in LTO after 1 July 2020 are notrepresented here.
The figures take into account “early retirements” of five reactors in the U.S.; in the case of four additional reactors, the reversal of early retirements has
been maintained although they are likely to be repealed, and others might be added (see United States Focus, Table 9); as well as political decisions to close
reactors prior to 40 years (Germany, South-Korea).
In the case of French reactors that have reached 40 years of operation prior to 2020 (start-up before 1980), we use the limit date for their 4th periodic safety
review (visite décennale) as closing date in the 40-year projection. For all those that have already passed their 3rd periodic safety review, the scheduled dateof their 4th periodic safety review is used in the PLEX projection, regardless of their start-up date.

In the following decade to 2030, 176 additional new reactors (152.5 GW) would have to beconnected to the grid to maintain the status quo, three times the rate achieved over the past
decade (58 startups between 2010 and 2019).

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The stabilization of the situation by the end of 2020 is only possible because most reactors will
likely not close at the end of the year, regardless of their age. As a result, the number of reactors
in operation will probably more or less continue to stagnate at best, unless—beyond restarts—
lifetime extensions become the norm worldwide. Such generalized lifetime extensions—far
beyond 40 years—are clearly the objective of the nuclear power industry, and, especially in the
U.S., there are numerous more or less successful attempts to obtain subsidies for uneconomic
nuclear plants in order to keep them on the grid (see United States Focus).
Developments in Asia, including in China, do not fundamentally change the global picture.
Reported figures for China’s 2020 target for installed nuclear capacity have fluctuated between
40 GW and 120 GW in the past. The freezes of construction initiation for almost two years
and of new siting authorizations for four years have significantly reduced Chinese short-term
ambitions.
Figure 17 · The PLEX Projection (not including LTOs)

Projection 2020–2050 of Nuclear Reactors/Capacity in the World
General assumption of 40-year mean lifetime + Authorized Lifetime Extensions
Operating and Under Construction as of 1 July 2020, in GWe and Units
Capacity in GWe

YearlyBalance15
10Reactor Startups
Reactor Closures

Capacity Added
Capacity Closed

15
10© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

50

Number ofReactors

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

5
2050

0

-5

-5

-10

-10

-15

-15

-20
-25

2020
+2 Reactors+2.5 GW

2021-2030–137 Reactors–107.5 GW

2031-2040–91 Reactors–77 GW

2041-2050–71 Reactors–70.5 GW

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes: Refer to notes below Figure 16.

Every year, WNISR also models a scenario in which all currently licensed lifetime extensions
and license renewals (mainly in the U.S.) are maintained and all construction sites arecompleted. For all other units, we have maintained a 40-year lifetime projection, unless afirm earlier or later closure date has been announced. By the end of 2020, the net numberof operating reactors would increase by two units, and the installed capacity would grow by
2.5 GW.
In the following decade to 2030, the net balance would turn negative as soon as 2022, andan additional 137 new reactors (107.5 GW) would have to start up to replace closures.

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The PLEX‑Projection would still mean, in the coming decade, a need to more than double thenumber of units built annually over the past decade from 5.8 to 13.7 (see Figure 16, Figure 17
and the cumulated effect in Figure 18).
In the meantime, construction starts have been on a declining trend for a decade. Between
2010 and 2014, a total of 40 constructions were launched around the world, of which 18 in
China and five later abandoned, thus an average of seven units per year were launched andsustained. Between 2015 and 2019, constructions started at only 27 units, of which 13 in China,
thus an average of 5.4 construction starts per year, significantly less than half of the 13.7 thatwould be needed according to the PLEX Projection over the coming decade just in order tomaintain the current number of operating reactors in the world.
Figure 18 · Forty-Year Lifetime Projection versus PLEX Projection

World Nuclear Reactor Fleet
in Units, from July 2020 to 2050
7/2020Composition of World Fleet
400

LTO
Lifetime > 40 Years
Lifetime ≤ 40 Years

300© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

200
100
0

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes: This figure exclusively represents the evolution over time of world reactor fleet as it is currently operational or under construction. It does not take
into account any assumptions on potential further constructions or additional early closures beyond those currently decided.
For details refer to Notes below Figure 16.

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NUCLEAR POWER IN THE
AGE OF COVID-19“With the COVID-19 crisis, for the first time in its history, the nuclear
industry is confronted with crisis management involving safety challenges
that has not a technical cause linked to its activities as origin.”
Bernard Doroszczuk, President, ASN
29 April 2020

INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic had and continues to have severe global repercussions and thenuclear industry is no exception. Remarkably little information is available on COVID-19 cases
in nuclear facilities and amongst regulator staff. Virtually nothing is known about testingand its results. Nevertheless, industry representatives have not stopped claiming how wellthe establishment has coped with the crisis and how crucial it has been. The World Nuclear
Association’s Chair Agneta Rising stated late March 202066:
I would like to pay particular tribute to the utilities, their workers and their suppliers who are
keeping their reactors running during this public health crisis. Their work reminds us justhow crucial nuclear energy is as a source of 24/7 electricity supply.

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency’s Director General William Magwood pointed out in early
April 202067:
It is the norm in the nuclear sector to change processes and practices only after deliberate
analyses, with numerous viewpoints taken into account; but today’s crisis calls upon all
for quick responses. Decisions must be made rapidly in situations that have no complete
parallel. Regulators must adjust their plans for inspections. Operators will defer outages andmodifications to their plants.

In early June 2020, the European Commission issued an 8-page working paper on “Good
Practices to Address Pandemic Risks”68 stating confidently:
Nuclear power plant regulators and operators ensured that there was no adverse impact on
nuclear safety and supported continued Euratom Safeguard verifications by the European
Commission, as far as safely possible.

There is no explanation what restrictions were implied by “as far as safely possible”.
In fact, the consequences of COVID-19 on the nuclear industry and the regulators aresubstantial, and the impact will last for many months to come and well into 2021–2022. As
66 - Agneta Rising, “Message: Nuclear power in the fight against COVID-19”, World Nuclear Association, as published in
WNN, 27 March 2020, see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Message-Nuclear-power-in-the-fight-against-COVID19,
accessed 28 June 2020.
67 - WNN, “Magwood outlines Nuclear Energy Agency’s response to pandemic”, 9 April 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Magwood-outlines-Nuclear-Energy-Agencys-response, accessed 1 July 2020.
68 - European Commission, “Energy Security: Good Practices to Address Pandemic Risks”, Commission Staff Working Paper,
2 June 2020, see https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/1_en_document_travail_service_part1_v3.pdf, accessed 19 August 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

detailed below, refueling and maintenance outages were postponed, testing of key components
delayed, physical inspections by safety authorities halted altogether. Some fear shortages innuclear fuel supply due to logistical disruptions. These delays could lead to situations whenoutages need to be carried out in times of high demand.
The consumption of electricity, however, dropped significantly in some regions during theconfinement periods and is not likely to reach pre-pandemic levels for many months—if not
years, given the severe global recession—which will have a major impact on the financial andeconomic health of nuclear utilities, which were often already facing difficulties.
Permanent, independent oversight is crucial in any high-risk activity, for technical reasonsand because of the possibilities for human errors. Effective regulation and control are not onlyof primary importance because of the very large danger potentials involved and the overall
advanced ageing of the facilities. There is also a history of criminal wrongdoing, including in the
major nuclear countries. Systematic irregularities, including falsifications, of manufacturing
documentation has persisted for several decades at Creusot-Forge (now Le Creusot) in France69;
quality-control procedures have been twisted in Japan for years70 and a new bribery scandal
hit the country in the summer of 2020 (see Japan Focus); quality-guarantee certificates were
faked for thousands of pieces in the South Korean industry 71; in Brazil, a former President has
been jailed because he was involved in the bribery scheme of a nuclear construction project72;
in the U.S. state Ohio, prominent legislators were indicted for bribery related to legislation toprovide subsidies for uneconomic reactors,73 in South Carolina, the head of nuclear new build
pled guilty to fraud charges related to the canceled project V.C. Summer,74 and a Europe-wide
bribery system of nuclear waste shipments involving several European countries shook up
the industry in the late 1980s75. These are merely a few examples, some of which have beenthoroughly documented in various editions of the WNISR.
Physical inspections by regulatory authorities in nuclear facilities are therefore necessary.
Halting them altogether for many weeks is not without consequences.

69 - ASN, “ASN reviews the steps taken to deal with counterfeit, suspect and fraudulent items (CSFI)”, Information notice,
8 June 2018, see http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/ASN-reviews-the-steps-taken-to-deal-withcounterfeit-suspect-and-fraudulent-items-CSFI; and ASN, “AREVA has informed ASN of irregularities concerning components
manufactured in its Creusot Force plant”, Information notice, 4 May 2016, see http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/Newsreleases/Irregularities-concerning-components-manufactured-in-its-Creusot-Forge-plant; both accessed 28 August 2020.
70 - Elaine Kurtenbach and Mari Yamaguchi, “Kobe Steel Announces More Cases Of Faked Inspections Data”, Associated Press,
as published by Manufacturing Business Technology, 13 October 2017, see https://www.mbtmag.com/quality-control/news/13227522/
kobe-steel-announces-more-cases-of-faked-inspections-data, accessed 28 August 2020.
71 - Max S. Kim, “How greed and corruption blew up South Korea’s nuclear industry”, MIT Technology Review, 22 April 2019,see https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/04/22/136020/how-greed-and-corruption-blew-up-south-koreas-nuclear-industry/,
accessed 26 August 2020.
72 - Brad Brooks and Anthony Boadle, “Brazil’s ex-President Temer jailed, accused of heading ‘criminal organization’”, Reuters,
21 March 2019, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption/brazils-ex-president-temer-arrested-threatening-fiscalreform-idUSKCN1R21JW, accessed 26 August 2020.
73 - Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, “Powerful Ohio Republican Is Arrested in $60 Million Corruption Scheme”, New York Times,
21 July 2020, see https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/larry-householder-ohio-speaker-arrested.html, accessed 29 August 2020;
and Gregory Meyer, “Ohio corruption case throws focus on US nuclear plant troubles”, Financial Times, 22 July 2020,see https://www.ft.com/content/451324c6-9f9d-48a1-b2d9-76d731e99db6; both accessed 26 August 2020.
74 - Andrew Brown and Avery G. Wilks, “Former SCANA executive pleads guilty to fraud charges tied to failed SC nuclear project”,

Post and Courier, 23 July 2020, see https://www.postandcourier.com/business/former-scana-executive-pleads-guilty-to-fraud-chargestied-to-failed-sc-nuclear-project/article_26e23ca8-c50b-11ea-8377-e7b39854212b.html, both accessed 25 July 2020.
75 - Mycle Schneider, “Transnuklearaffäre—Über die Arbeit des Untersuchungsausschusses im EP”, November 1988.

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OVERVIEW OF KEY SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES
The following analysis focuses on nuclear power plants. However, this does not mean thatthe potential impact of a pandemic on other nuclear facilities can be neglected. In fact, theoperation of most of the nuclear fuel chain facilities considered non-essential for continued
short-term operation of nuclear power plants was halted in many nuclear countries, including
spent fuel reprocessing plants in France and in the U.K.
The operational status of a plant is crucial for any risk assessment. There is a clear difference ofthe risk level between operating power plants and plants in cold shutdown status.
Some of the following areas of concern are also applicable to other nuclear facilities, e.g.
reprocessing plants or larger research reactors:
ɆɆ Periodic testing with short time-intervals like several weeks. This type of testing isdone at systems to provide assurance that vitally important functions like the emergency
control room operations, emergency electricity supply, emergency core cooling or (atPWRs) emergency feedwater supply are in good working order. The test intervals had been
determined by failure probabilities derived from operating experience. Because of theirrisk importance, these test intervals are generally fixed by guidelines and/or plant specificprovisions; to follow these is a legal obligation of the operator. To prolong the test intervals
means a risk increase of unidentified failures of those systems and an increase of failure
probability in emergency situations, i.e. situations, where the systems are necessary to
prevent catastrophic accidents or to mitigate their consequences. If operators prolong thetest intervals without appropriate review and analysis either by the operator or regulator,
they violate their safety obligations. There can be—and in fact has been (see examples
hereunder)—a formal acceptance by the relevant regulatory authority of prolonged test
intervals because of an exceptional situation, like a pandemic. But in some of those cases
the authority violates the general principle of “nuclear safety first”.
ɆɆ Periodic inspections at low frequency like once in several years. These include detailed
inspections of many electrical and mechanical components in key areas of the plant. It
includes also ultrasonic testing of large components like reactor pressure vessels, primarycircuit components or steam generators at PWRs; the purpose is to follow the growth ofcracks or other weaknesses like wall-thinning up to potentially hazardous dimensions.
The information gained is necessary to decide whether a repair or a replacement of thecomponent must be implemented. Those tests and inspection walks are necessarily
performed during planned outages for maintenance and refueling as the components haveto be accessible in terms of temperatures, absence of high pressures and excessive levels ofradiation.
ɆɆ These outages typically involve significantly increased numbers of workers needed forthe preparation and implementation of the tests. The inspection intervals have also been
determined by failure probabilities derived from operational experience. To prolong theinspection intervals, for example by the decision to delay outages to avoid large numbersof additional workers on-site, means a clearly increased loss of control over weaknesses ofmechanical or electrical components.
ɆɆ Normally periodic testing and inspections—both low-frequency and high-frequency—
are performed under the four-eyes principle (at least two people have to be always
present). This implies close contact between the persons involved. If the rules are| 63

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

weakened due to social distancing needs caused by the pandemic, the probability of
mistakes grows, which means a higher risk of potential system failures.
ɆɆ In some countries, the relevant safety authorities and their Technical Support
Organizations (TSOs) have decided to halt site visits or to dramatically reduce theirfrequency. The U.S. NRC implemented a reduced inspection program, e.g. In countries
where the authorities rely on experts from TSOs or from third party inspectors, theanalogue reduction of inspections by these experts was or is being considered. Someregulators have shifted to just inspecting the paperwork (e.g. in France). However, there is asignificant difference between judging safety only on the basis of paperwork examinations
and the physical inspections of facilities; unreported situations might become visible
only in the presence of an inspector. Although the operator is entirely responsible for thequality of testing and maintenance, experience has shown that additional inspections
by regulators or other entities enhance the quality of the results, as more failures or
weaknesses are detected. The reason is clear: different people, especially when they comefrom different organizations, have different inspection methods and identify issues of noncompliance with standards and regulations. Experience also shows that during a physicalinspection sometimes irregularities are detected, which have not been the original focus
of a given specific inspection. A well-known example is the inspection in the US-plant
Davis Besse, where a strong degradation of the reactor pressure vessel lid was detected bychance. Limiting inspections to paperwork instead of the real plant can hide a lot of safety
weaknesses. Again, restrictions or reductions in inspection intensity and quality lead to anincreasing probability of major failures.
ɆɆ Special problems arise with the control room staff, people with very specific knowledge
and training and with a specific formal qualification. In most countries, a very limited
number of people have acquired this qualification. A pandemic needs reduction of social
contacts not just at work but in day-to-day life:•

The full staff of the control room has to be present in a limited space.

•

It is necessary to perform actions under the four-eyes principle, which is impossible
without at least two people being in proximity.

•

Each outgoing shift has to inform the incoming shift on all important developments ofthe previous hour.

ɆɆ If there is an infection or the need for quarantine amongst the limited number of qualified
control-room staff, this can reduce available operators below the necessary minimum. This
seems to be of particular concern for countries with only one (Armenia, Iran, Netherlands,
Slovenia) or a small number (<5) of operating reactors (e.g. 3 in Argentina, 2 each in Brazil
and Bulgaria, 4 each in Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Switzerland, Taiwan). However, in mostcountries shift staff in the control room are not licensed for all or even several reactors ina given country, as they have obtained a license only for a specific plant or for a groupof identical reactors. The reason is that the control features and systems often have big
differences between individual plants; that is specifically the case for those needed in an
emergency. In case of an emergency event, the control room staff must be aware of thesevery specific features to avoid failures. Therefore, in most cases, it is not possible to replacestaff impacted by a pandemic by staff from other plants, as those usually have no additional
license and training for various plants (with the exception of staff from identical “sisterplants”). This means, even countries with a large reactor fleet are faced with the sameproblem. The situation in France, Russia and Ukraine with a significant number of identical| 64

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 (or almost identical) plants is not typical for any other country with a large reactor fleet.
And even in the case of these three exceptions, a staff exchange would only be possible
within a group of one specific design, not for all reactors in the country. For example, theU.S. and Japan have many different designs of control room and emergency systems, even
if the nuclear steam supply system can be of a similar type. Even smaller fleets are often
surprisingly diverse, e.g. Germany’s remaining six reactors have four different designs, andSwitzerland’s four operating units are of three different designs.
Quarantining entire shifts—as was done in some cases—is not without risk either. The
IAEA stresses: “It is also important to note that there is potential for common cause
failure, as operators reside together in communities.”76
In terms of nuclear risk management, the cessation of reactor operation is unavoidable
once critical limits are reached and switch to shutdown mode, which requires less staff
in the control room. What to do, if even minimum staffing for the shutdown mode is notguaranteed, remains an open question. Fortunately, no such case has been reported yet.
ɆɆ Regarding possible nuclear emergency situations in times of a pandemic, it is clear thatrules of social distancing and imperatives of addressing the situation contradict each other.
This is especially the case, when a nuclear event needs quick response or densely staffedspaces, like the emergency control room or emergency staff rooms. The emergency control
room is a second control room in the nuclear power plant, from where it is possible toactivate and stop a number of the essential safety systems of the plant. It is implemented
for situations when the main control room becomes inaccessible, for example, because ofa fire or toxic gas buildup. In general, emergency control rooms are not very large andso incompatible with social distancing. The emergency staff room is separate from themain control room, but onsite. In case of an emergency, a group of additional specialists
and decisionmakers (emergency staff) that is collecting information on the situation forevaluation and decision making will be using this room. It is designed for many people tostand or sit side-by-side in a very limited space. The existing rules of procedure for both
emergency control rooms and emergency staff rooms do not reflect a situation where social
distancing is necessary. Therefore, in the future it would be crucial to have appropriate
rules of procedure in advance to deal with such conflicting issues in case of a nuclear
accident during a pandemic.
ɆɆ Offsite emergency response plans rely heavily on evacuating local population groups todesignated centers. These centers densely pack people into areas in which COVID-19 social
distancing rules would be violated. Moreover, large numbers of public safety officials must
coordinate the offsite response. Current plans, in the U.S., e.g., require large numbers ofofficials to meet and direct the response from centralized emergency response rooms withlimited ability to maintain social distancing.
ɆɆ Nuclear plants are highly sensitive for terroristic attacks because of the potential
consequences that could result from such an attack. Regarding plausible terroristic attack
scenarios, one has to differentiate between external attacks and attacks from inside. The
main impact of a pandemic on scenarios of external physical attacks is related to potential
reductions in available security forces. These are highly trained teams with particularknowledge of the facilities they have to guard. Similar to control-room staff, there are
76 - IAEA Board of Governors, “The operation, safety and security of nuclear and radiation facilities and activities during the
COVID-19 Pandemic”, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2020/8, 4 June 2020, see https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/
files/20/06/govinf2020-8.pdf, accessed 19 August 2020.

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only a limited number of specialized security personnel and contamination amongst theseforces could lead to a serious security deficit on-site. In some countries, e.g. the U.S.,
certain security trainings have been suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic.77
Attacks are also possible from the inside, be it mechanical or electronical. Scenarios for
those attacks include cases with step by step preparation of degradation of safety relevant
systems; with the objective that they do not protect adequately, when the attack itself starts.
In “normal” times, there is a certain probability that tests and walkdowns for inspection(or even for other purposes) in the respective areas detect such manipulations. If the tests
are reduced in number and if walkdowns were strongly reduced, then a potential terrorist
has a better chance to prepare an attack and go undetected.

RESPONSE STRATEGIES TO COVID-19
BY OPERATORS AND REGULATORSAROUND THE WORLD
Several international organizations have issued assessments of the impact andrecommendations for nuclear establishments how to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic. The
following section provides an overview of reactions by the IAEA, the OECD-NEA and otherinternational and national organizations.
On 4 June 2020, the IAEA’s Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the“operation, safety and security of nuclear and radiation facilities and activities” during the
COVID-19 pandemic.78
The 10-page paper stated:
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been far reaching. (…)
National policy decisions made by governments have direct and indirect repercussions
to organizations in the nuclear and radiological field, for example in the area of humanresources. Decisions in one country could have affected facilities in other countries, forexample through introducing supply chain difficulties in large scale projects such as
outage management, major refurbishment or new plant construction. (…) The stretching ofgovernment infrastructure capacity could also potentially have an impact on the emergency
preparedness of nuclear and radiation facilities.

The IAEA’s DG also pointed out that the crisis is without precedent: “COVID-19 is the first
pandemic of this scale in the history of the nuclear industry.” The Agency saw its role as a
facilitator of information exchanges between Members States and operators. It set up aninternational peer-to-peer network (COVID-19 OPEX Network) on nuclear plant operation.
The pandemic’s impact on training activities and human resources policies is to be discussed ata special meeting in October 2020. A number of meetings have been cancelled and rescheduled,including the Eighth Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and the 7th
77 - Christopher G. Miller, “Updated Implementation of resident inspector site coverage during COVID-19”, Division of Reactor
Oversight, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.NRC, Memorandum dated 6 April 2020,see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2009/ML20097E538.pdf, accessed 8 September 2020.
78 - IAEA, “The operation, safety and security of nuclear and radiation facilities and activities during the COVID-19 Pandemic”, Reportby the Director General, 4 June 2020, op. cit.

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Review Cycle of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (The Joint Convention).
While the IAEA noted multiple disruptions of ordinary schedules and procedures, 79 it
remarkably states: “No Member State reported the enforced shutdown of any nuclear powerreactors resulting from the effects of COVID-19 on their workforce or essential services suchas supply chains.” In fact, according to the IAEA, in Brazil, Finland, Iran, the Netherlands andSwitzerland, “generation is expected to exceed original 2020 estimates because outages were
either shortened or deferred to 2021”.80
In the EU, the European Commission recognizes that the energy sector “faces uniqueconstraints as regards the continuity of critical operations, safety and the immediate cascading
effects across sectors and Member States in case of incidents.”81 The Commission also stated:
It is worth noting that the steep reduction in electricity demand during the COVID-19
pandemic has led to a higher share of renewables in the electricity mix, while the electricity
system and balancing continued operating normally.

The Commission issued guidelines to allow for the free movement of workers to make sure thatrefueling of nuclear plants as well as other key activities in the energy sector (e.g. maintenanceof offshore wind farms) was not impacted. One of 20 “good practices” during the pandemic
stipulates a “pragmatic risk-based approach by national regulators, in particular the nuclear
sector”.82 Indeed, nuclear safety authorities seem to be handling the crisis in a very flexible andpragmatic manner, as illustrated in the overview below.

GENERAL DIFFICULTIES AND MEASURES
A range of measures to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic were taken by operators andregulators in most countries operating or building nuclear facilities, in many cases consistingin the reduction or elimination of activities judged non-essential, implementation of socialdistancing rules and the rescheduling of refueling and maintenance outages. The IAEA
received reports of outage impacts at nuclear plants in 26 of the 30 Member States with
operating reactors:83
In some cases, outage scopes were reduced by eliminating non-critical work to minimise
external staff brought on-site. In other cases, outages were extended to allow work to proceed
at a slow pace that accommodated physical distancing constraints. In still other cases entire
outages were deferred to next year. The full impact will play out over at least the next year as
future outage plans are revised to complete deferred work. 84
79 - A range of issues encountered are important but beyond the scope of the WNISR, e.g. the IAEA DG stated: „There has beensignificant disruption in the distribution of medical isotopes and radioisotopes.”
80 - IAEA, “The operation, safety and security of nuclear and radiation facilities and activities during the COVID-19 Pandemic”, 2020,
op. cit.
81 - European Commission, “Energy Security: Good Practices to Address Pandemic Risks”, Commission Staff Working Paper,
June 2020, op. cit.
82 - Ibidem.
83 - The 31st country with operating units is Taiwan, which is not an IAEA Member State.
84 - IAEA, “The operation, safety and security of nuclear and radiation facilities and activities during the COVID-19 Pandemic”, 2020,
op. cit.

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Other measures included regular medical screenings, travel restrictions, self-isolation andphysical meeting restrictions. Mitigation plans at some facilities resulted in a need for morelicensed personnel, which is being “satisfied by newly trained as well as previously qualified
staff, including recent retirees and instructors”, reports the IAEA. “However, this approach initself is facing challenges in maintaining the required quality and quantity of training in thecontext of other restrictions limiting the ability to assemble employees.”
Nuclear regulators have taken similar steps as the operators to mitigate the effects of thepandemic. These include virtual rather than face-to-face meetings internally and withregulators in other countries, moving from physical inspections to remote monitoring, andissuing exemptions to regulations. Trade journal Nuclear Intelligence Weekly (NIW) reported:
These exemptions—allowing significantly longer work weeks for plant employees anddeferring maintenance and inspection, in some cases for up to two years—are precisely why
regulators are encountering criticism. Beyond that, workers at some plants have complained
either publicly, or via media leaks, that operators aren’t doing enough at plant and/or
newbuild sites to prevent the spread of COVID-19. And health officials in some communities
have requested that refuelings be postponed. 85

NIW also published a compelling analysis on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the nuclear
fuel manufacturing industry and the risks to nuclear power plant operators and concluded that…for nuclear operators dependent on one single fuel fabricator, the risks are acute: a severe
localized COVID-19 outbreak could threaten the supply of fuel assemblies for whole fleets ofreactors in India, Russia, South Korea or the UK. Even for operators with more diversified
suppliers in Europe and the US there could be problems. 86

The state-by-state response to the COVID-19 crisis and a “dearth of leadership from the top”
make the U.S. supply chain “more vulnerable”, according to NIW:
Risks to factories are twofold: First, in areas under stay-home orders, their workers might not
be declared essential and therefore be forced to quarantine at home, and second—particularly
in regions where governments are more lax about quarantining—that a localized outbreaksickens too many employees for the facility to operate safely. 87

Reportedly, only Framatome and Westinghouse have requested exemptions to regulatory
obligations. According to an NRC spokesperson, “Westinghouse has requested to defer until
2021 an internal emergency planning audit because a Westinghouse corporate team cannot
currently go to the site” and a Framatome representative indicated that “although thecompany has reduced on-site staff at its Richmond plant by almost half, the company has all
the components it needs in stock to meet spring and fall refueling outages”.88
The pandemic also impacted the construction of new plants in at least 12 of the current
17 countries building nuclear reactors but apparently nowhere were construction activities
halted altogether (see also Middle East Focus).
85 - Jessica Sondgeroth and Gary Peach, “Safety: Nuclear Overseers Vary Response to Covid-19”, NIW, 5 June 2020,see http://www.energyintel.com/pages/eig_article.aspx?DocId=1074603&NLID=104, accessed 19 August 2020.
86 - Jessica Sondgeroth and Phil Chaffee, “Fabricators Prepare for Potential Supply Disruptions”, NIW, 17 April 2020.
87 - Ibidem.
88 - Ibidem.

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COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY OVERVIEW
The following section provides a country-by-country overview of reported COVID-19 cases at nuclear
facilities as well as countermeasures taken by operators and regulators.89 In fact, very few operatorsand regulators have published and regularly updated data about detected COVID-19 cases and theirhandling. The Swiss NGO Physicians for the Environment (Ärztinnen und Ärzte für Umweltschutz)
has openly criticized the refusal by the national regulator to respond to any questions about testingand positive cases in nuclear facilities in the country.90

Argentina
Measures and Impacts
Staff at the three operating reactors in the country work in staggered 14-day shifts, with
14 days off in between. Thermal imaging cameras at the entrances check for body temperatures
exceeding 37°C for anyone entering the plant. The nuclear power plant operators have been
seeking regulatory approval to reschedule all planned outages.91
Construction work on the Carem-25 was entirely stopped in March 2020 and had not restarted
in early July 2020. Work on the Atucha-1 dry storage project has been given permission tocontinue during the quarantine as the site is running out of storage space in the spent fuel pool.

Armenia
Measures and Impacts
The shutdown dates for preventive maintenance at Metsamor, the single operating reactor
in the country, were postponed for 45 days to 1 July 2020. Reportedly, “borders closures
have complicated the conclusion of agreements on the supply of necessary equipment andmaterials”.92

Belarus
Infections
As of late May 2020, the Ostrovets construction site counted around 100 confirmed COVID-19
cases amongst the workforce of about 4,000.

89 - Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section is based partially on IAEA, “The operation, safety and security of
nuclear and radiation facilities and activities during the COVID-19 Pandemic”, June 2020, op.cit., and on INRAG, “Nuclear Safety
and Security During a Pandemic”, Working Paper, 24 April 2020, see https://www.inrag.org/nuclear-safety-and-security-during-apandemic-2, accessed 16 July 2020.
90 - AefU, “Die Sicherheit der Atomkraftwerke darf keine Geheimsache sein!”, Ärztinnen und Ärzte für Umweltschutz/Médecins en
faveur de l’Environnement, Press Release, 23 March 2020 (in German), see http://www.aefu.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/aefu-data/b_
documents/Aktuell/20190506_AefU_MM_Corona_u_AKW_Sicherheit.pdf, accessed 18 July 2020.
91 - Phil Chaffee, “Nuclearelectrica Back in The Driver’s Seat”, NIW, 10 July 2020, see http://www.energyintel.com/pages/eig_article.
aspx?DocId=1077846, accessed 19 August 2020.
92 - NEI, “Armenian nuclear plant delays scheduled outage”, 28 May 2020, see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsarmeniannuclear-plant-delays-scheduled-outage-7936742, accessed 19 August 2020.

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Measures and Impacts“All the quarantine measures are being observed, but I would particularly like to ask ASE’s[Atomstroyexport’s] leadership and managers of the project to fortify measures even more,”
Rosatom Director Aleksei Likhachev said on 26 May 2020. However, NIW noted that “it isdifficult to gauge the extent of the virus’ spread given contradictory reports over the past
two months and questions raised about the quality of testing in Belarus, one of a handful ofcountries whose leadership has expressed skepticism about the gravity of COVID-19.”93
While the first fuel load had arrived on-site in May 2020, fuel loading of Ostrovets-1, wasdelayed and only started on 7 August 2020, which will likely lead to further postponing of theplant’s commissioning.94 It also remains to be seen what effect the recent strikes and opposition
movements will have on the project.

Belgium
Figure 19 · “All Necessary Measures”? — No masks.

95

Source: Electrabel, screenshot, 8 August 2020.

Note: The title of the picture says “Coronavirus: the Belgian nuclear power plants take the necessary measures”. The photo shows three Electrabel employees
without masks and no social distancing. The page has not been updated since 15 May 2020.

Measures and Impacts
Nuclear operator Electrabel delayed refueling outages over the next three years.
Basic measures include:ɆɆ The limitation of staff on the nuclear sites;ɆɆ Remote work to the extent possible;
93 - Gary Peach, “Belarus Prepares Reactor Launch Despite Covid-19 Surge”, NIW, 29 May 2020,see http://www.energyintel.com/pages/eig_article.aspx?DocId=1073935&NLID=104, accessed 19 August 2020.
94 - Reuters, “Belarus begins fuel loading at Astravets nuclear power plant -Rosatom”, 7 August 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/belarus-power/belarus-begins-fuel-loading-at-astravets-nuclear-power-plant-rosatomidUSL8N2F92KJ, accessed 24 August 2020.
95 - Electrabel, “Coronavirus: les centrales nucléaires belges prennent les mesures nécessaires”, Engie, Undated (in French),see https://nuclear.engie-electrabel.be/fr/news/coronavirus-les-centrales-nucleaires-belges-prennent-les-mesures-necessaires,
accessed 8 August 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 ɆɆ Respect of social distancing rules;
ɆɆ Wearing a mask “at strategic locations”;
ɆɆ Delaying of all “non-urgent” training, meeting and maintenance activities.
It is unclear how to interpret the term “strategic location”. The photo hereunder shows three
Electrabel employees without mask, and without social distancing (see Figure 19).

Measures by the Regulator
In mid-March 2020, the Belgian regulator Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire (AFCN)
halted all pro-active and scheduled inspections and its Technical Support Organization (TSO)
delayed all topical inspections and reduced periodical inspections. Training certificates fornuclear transport drivers and security advisers were extended up to nine months.96

Other
In mid-April 2020, in the EU country the worst hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, nuclear
operator Electrabel and its owner Engie requested a Government decision on the potential
lifetime extension of two of the country’s seven reactors “by the end of the year”. The move
did not go down well with Prime Minister Sophie Wilmès: “Bad timing, and if they don’t
understand English, I will tell them that it is really not the moment to speak about that”.97

Brazil
Measures and Impacts
Preparatory work in order to restart construction at Angra-3 has slowed but not stopped asa result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is likely to further impact upon the completion
schedule.98

CanadaInfections
No precise information is available. Industry representatives claimed that they were well
prepared and have had “no known cases of COVID transmission”.99 However, it was reported
that at least one worker tested positive at the Pickering plant in late March 2020.100

96 - AFCN/FANC, “Organisation adaptée à partir du 14/03/2020”, Updated 15 June 2020 (in French), see https://afcn.be/fr/
professionnels, accessed 20 July 2020; and AFCN/FANC, “Transport de matières radioactives”, Updated 30 April 2020,see https://afcn.be/fr/professionnels/transport-de-matieres-radioactives, accessed 19 August 2020.
97 - Belga, “Electrabel met la pression sur Sophie Wilmès pour prolonger le nucléaire”, as published by RTBF, 16 April 2020 (in French),see https://www.rtbf.be/info/economie/detail_electrabel-met-la-pression-sur-sophie-wilmes-pour-prolonger-le-nucleaire?id=10483138,
accessed 18 July 2020.
98 - BNamericas, “COVID-19: What next for Brazil’s Angra 3 nuclear plant?”, 15 June 2020, see https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/
covid-19-what-next-for-brazils-angra-3-nuclear-plant, accessed 15 June 2020.
99 - CNSC, “Nuclear power plants: Safe adaptation during COVID-19 (Part 1)”, Commission meeting held 17 June 2020,
published 10 July 2020, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPNf-wzTI2c&feature=youtu.be, accessed 28 July 2020.
100 - Maryam Shah, “Employee at Pickering nuclear station tests positive for COVID-19: OPG”, Global News, 29 March 2020,see https://globalnews.ca/news/6749184/pickering-nuclear-station-employee-covid-19-opg/, accessed 6 August 2020.

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Measures
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) requires nuclear operators “to develop andimplement a business continuity plan to ensure their facilities continue to operate safely at
all times, including during a pandemic. Business continuity plans address how to deal withpossible labour disruptions while maintaining key staffing positions.”101
The CNSC claimed:
We’re maintaining regulatory oversight of the measures licensees are taking to help fight the
spread of the virus, including staffing changes and modifications to non-essential work.

At the same time:
We’re being flexible with licensees, understanding that they will need more time to report to
the CNSC on issues that are not safety significant.102

Planned upgrade work on the Ontario Power Generation (OPG) Darlington Nuclear
Generating Station’s Unit 3 has been postponed. Work to enhance the safety of the plant in thecontext of the station’s plant life extension has been rescheduled for fall 2020 instead of spring2020.103
OPG has scaled back the number of staff at the local generating stations but has not planned to
shut down any of its reactors; indeed, its CEO has argued for continued operations of nuclear
plants.104 Further, Unit 2 of Darlington nuclear power plant, off-grid since October 2016,
completed refurbishment in the middle of the pandemic, reached first criticality in April 2020
and was reconnected to the grid in June.105

Measures at the Regulator
Effective 16 March 2020, “CNSC staff have been directed to stay home, while critical staff
continue to work to ensure effective regulatory oversight.” All physical site inspections ceased
entirely; commission meetings and public hearings have been postponed. On 5 May 2020,
limited on-site inspections resumed. A 16–17 June 2020 meeting scheduled was held virtually
and was accessible via webcast for the public.

101 - CNSC, “CNSC’s response to COVID-19”, 13 March 2020, Updated 10 July 2020, see https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/
emergency-management-and-safety/pandemic-preparedness.cfm, accessed 28 July 2020.
102 - Ibidem, April 2020.
103 - OPG, “OPG targets fall date for Unit 3 refurbishment in response to COVID-19”, Ontario Power Generation, 2 April 2020,see https://www.opg.com/news/opg-targets-fall-date-for-unit-3-refurbishment-due-to-covid-19/, accessed 12 July 2020.
104 - Jennifer O’Meara, “Lights on, masks up: OPG Darlington and Pickering step up during coronavirus”, DurhamRegion.com ,28 March 2020, see https://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/9917304-lights-on-masks-up-opg-darlington-and-pickering-step-upduring-coronavirus/, accessed 28 July 2020.
105 - OPG, “Darlington Unit 2 powers on—Refurbishment now complete on first unit”, 4 June 2020, see https://www.opg.com/news/
darlington-unit-2-powers-on/, accessed 28 July 2020.

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China
Very little is known about the COVID-19 crisis management at nuclear facilities in China andauthorities have stated that it will not impact nuclear reactor construction.106 However, there
are estimates that in January and February 2020, nuclear energy’s contribution to the grid
declined by 2.2 percent due to the pandemic.107

Finland
Measures and Impacts
The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) believes that nuclear power plants
have prepared adequately for the risks and can be operated safely. STUK, however, announced
that on-site inspections will “only be carried out at sites which are the most significant forsafety, and the health authorities’ guidelines on avoiding close contact will be taken into
account in the inspection arrangements”.108 STUK did not provide any definition of sites “mostsignificant for safety” and no details of the measures taken by the operators and the regulator
itself.
At Olkiluoto-3 (OL3), currently under construction, first fuel loading was planned forJune 2020. This schedule has been postponed. As a consequence of further delays of theOL3 commissioning, due to technical reasons and the COVID-19 pandemic, the credit-rating
agency Fitch revised owner TVO’s outlook to negative.109 At the same time, weaker electricity
prices, partially due to the COVID-19 pandemic, impact TVO. The Average Nord Pool systemprice in the first quarter 2020 was €15.4/MWh (US$16.9/MWh) compared with €46.8/MWh(US$52.5/MWh) for the same period in 2019.

FranceInfections
There is no systematic sector-wide information available.110 At the Belleville nuclear power
plant site, 29 COVID-19 cases had been confirmed as of the end of July 2020.111 Worker
representatives claim there are many more cases. On 20 March 2020, Reuters reported that
EDF had “declined to comment about the level of absenteeism or the number of confirmed
coronavirus infections among its staff” but had said that “its nuclear plants could operate for

106 - Muyu Xu and David Stanway, “China says virus outbreak will not impact nuclear power plant construction”, Reuters,
15 April 2020, see https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/business/story/China_says_virus_outbreak_will_not_impact_nuclear_power_
plant_construction-TR20200415nL3N2C311BX1/, accessed 27 May 2020.
107 - Xizhou Zhou, “Renewables Emerge as Winner During China’s COVID-19 Lockdown”, IHS Markit, 26 March 2020, see https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/renewables-emerge-as-winner-during-chinas-covid19-lockdown.html, accessed 27 April 2020.
108 - STUK, “The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) ensures its operations”, 20 March 2020,see http://www.stuk.fi/web/en/-/the-radiation-and-nuclear-safety-authority-stuk-ensures-its-operations, accessed 28 July 2020.
109 - TVO, “TVO - Fitch Ratings confirmed TVO’s long term credit rating at its current level BBB- and changed the
Outlook to Negative”, 20 April 2020, see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/
fitchratingsconfirmedtvoslongtermcreditratingatitscurrentlevelbbbandchangedtheoutlooktonegative.html, accessed 28 July 2020.
110 - EDF and Orano have not replied to our questions. ASN and IRSN have communicated partial responses.
111 - Gilles Reynaud, President of Ma Zône Controlée, personal communication, 30 July 2020.

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three months with a 25% reduction in staffing levels and for two to three weeks with 40% fewer
staff.”112
Mid-June 2020, EDF finally presented an overview of the numbers of infected staff, stating
that, at the peak of the epidemic, the share did not exceed 2 percent. A total of almost 600
infections were identified over a 12-week period.113
On 29 April 2020, the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), which
serves as the regulator’s Technical Support Organization (TSO), reported 59 active COVID-19
cases, all in the course of recovering.114 On 6 August 2020, regulator ASN reported that none ofits staff had tested positive so far.115

Measures and Impacts
The pandemic has had major impacts on France’s nuclear workforce. It was reported that of
22,500 employees of EDF’s Nuclear Generation Division 15,000 were put on telework.116
In late March 2020, after more than a dozen EDF workers walked off at least three reactor
sites over COVID-19 concerns, France’s Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) asked EDF to “ensurethat health and safety conditions are communicated and set up correctly on the sites for all
employees.”117
According to ASN, various precautionary measures have been taken to deal with the COVID-19
crisis:118
ɆɆ A large number of nuclear installations whose functioning is not vital for the continued
activity of the country, operated in particular by the French Alternative Energies andAtomic Energy Commission (CEA), Orano or the National Agency for the Managementof Radioactive Waste (ANDRA), have been shut down and are maintained in safe state.
Activities necessary for the functioning of the EDF nuclear power plants are neverthelessmaintained.
ɆɆ Examination work conducted by ASN in collaboration with its technical advisory body, theInstitute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), is continuing as normal.
At the same time, on-site inspections are suspended, except when judged indispensable.
On-site inspections are replaced by remote verifications, particularly concerning theexamination of documents relating to day-to-day operation accompanied by audioconferences with the licensee.
112 - Benjamin Mallet, “French nuclear plants tighten hygiene procedures over coronavirus worries”, Reuters, 20 March 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-france-nuclear-idUSKBN2172J1, accessed 28 July 2020.
113 - EDF, “Fonctionnement du Parc nucléaire durant la période d’urgence sanitaire Covid-19”, Presentation at the Plenary Meeting of
HCTISN, Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l’Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire, 16 June 2020 (in French),see https://www.hctisn.fr/article.php3?id_article=201, accessed 19 August 2020.
114 - Jean-Christophe Niel, Director General, IRSN, during a tele-video hearing at the National Assembly, 29 April 2020. In the middleof the hearing, Mr. Niel for over 2 minutes was unable to reconnect to the event, and the Assistant DG took the floor in the meantime. A
lot of things can happen in a nuclear facility in 2 minutes.
115 - Marinette Valiergue, ASN spokesperson, personal communication, email to Mycle Schneider, 6 August 2020.
116 - Frédéric de Monicault, “Coronavirus: EDF fait tourner ses centrales avec moins de personnel présent”, Le Figaro, 7 April 2020.
117 - NIW, “Nuclear Overseers Vary Response to Covid-19”, 5 June 2020, op. cit.
118 - ASN, “In response to the Covid 19 epidemic, ASN is adapting its method of functioning while maintaining its rigour in theoversight of nuclear installations”, Information Notice, 27 March 2020, see http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/Newsreleases/Covid-19-epidemic-ASN-is-adapting-its-method-of-functioning-while-maintaining-its-rigour, accessed 28 July 2020.

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ɆɆ As part of the post-Fukushima safety improvements, EDF is updating its on-site emergency
plans (Plan d’Urgence Interne or PUI) to include potential difficulties in gaining access tothe sites, which could render full deployment of the local emergency response teams more
complicated.
ASN later stated that the crisis management has been taking “a lot of time” (reorganizationof work mode, regulatory adjustments, reinforced oversight, etc). On-site inspections remain
impossible for the foreseeable future for inspectors that have a high-risk profile if with
COVID-19. Major interregional inspections have been cancelled or delayed.119
By late March 2020, IRSN had limited “to the strict service necessities the mobility of
its employees”. Non-essential research activities and environment surveillance had beensuspended (no environmental sampling was carried out).120
In the first week of the COVID-19 outbreak in France, EDF cut its staffing nuclear power plantsites by 70 percent, and even after the end of the lockdown in the middle of May 2020, staff
reductions were at 50–60 percent on average. Mid-June 2020 was set as target date to get backto reference staffing levels.121
Some staff cuts were more significant. At the Flamanville site, for example—Units 1 and 2 arein outage since January 2019 and September 2019 respectively with major maintenance, andUnit 3 under construction—EDF reduced its staff level from 800 to 100. Only people in chargeof safety and security remained on-site.122 At Unit 3, the EPR, “all construction activities havebeen temporarily interrupted between mid-March and early May”.123 At the Chooz site—with
one unit in operation and another one in decennial outage—EDF has reduced the number ofworkers on-site from 2,200 to 850.
The documentation requested by the French regulator from operators has been reduced to aminimum. ASN’s Chief Inspector Christophe Quintin stated: “In general, we are requesting tosee a great number of documents. Currently, we know that EDF’s teams work in a just-in-timemode. Therefore, we are going to the essential.”124 ASN’s President told the National Assemblyat the end of April 2020:
The resumption of the activities on-site, which will happen in a context of work overload
because of the delays and in a disturbed context for the employees, with the accumulation of
fatigue and stress, will have to be subjected to particular attention.125

119 - Christophe Quintin, “Les inspections de l’ASN pendant la crise COVID-19”, Chief Inspector, ASN, Presentation at the HCTISN
Plenary Meeting, Haut Comité pour la Transparence et l’Information sur la Sécurité Nucléaire, 16 June 2020 (in French),see https://www.hctisn.fr/IMG/pdf/Organisation_de_l_ASN_pendant_la_crise_COVID_cle8faa21.pdf, accessed 19 August 2020.
120 - IRSN, “COVID-19 : l’IRSN continue à assurer ses missions”, 27 March 2020 (in French), see https://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_
presse/Actualites/Documents/IRSN_27032020_Mesures_Covid-19.pdf, accessed 16 August 2020.
121 - EDF, “Fonctionnement du Parc nucléaire durant la période d’urgence sanitaire Covid-19”, Presentation at the Plenary Meeting of
HCTISN, 16 June 2020, op.cit.
122 - Bate Felix, “France’s EDF to reduce Flamanville nuclear plant staffing over virus”, Reuters, 16 March 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-france-nuclear-idUSKBN21322Q, accessed 28 July 2020.
123 - EDF, “2020 Half-Year Results”, Press Release, 30 July 2020, see https://www.edf.fr/sites/default/files/contrib/groupe-edf/
espaces-dedies/espace-finance-en/financial-information/publications/financial-results/h1-2020/20200730-h1-2020-cp-en.pdf,
accessed 19 August 2020.
124 - Frédéric de Monicault, “Coronavirus: EDF fait tourner ses centrales avec moins de personnel présent”, Le Figaro, 7 April 2020.
125 - Bernard Doroszczuk, President, ASN, during a hearing at the National Assembly, 28 April 2020 (in French),see http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20200427/atdd.html#toc2, accessed 19 August 2020.

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Mid-May 2020, ASN published a summary of activities during the lock-down period.126 Between
15 March and 15 May 2020, “a total of 18 on-site inspections were carried out: twelve on safety
and the possible consequences of the epidemic on the working of the facilities and six on labour
inspectorate subjects”. As a matter of comparison, in 2019, ASN carried out 1,800 inspections
or 150 per month on average. In other words, during lockdown, ASN carried out only 6 percent
of normal average inspections.
In the case of remote inspections, “ASN used new digital technologies, such as real-time andoff-line remote-examination of the physical operating parameters of the reactors. Some ofthese innovations will be retained permanently.” According to ASN, “both remote and on-site
inspections confirmed that Orano and EDF were able to implement appropriate organisations
to deal with the health risk (barrier measures, prevention plans) while maintaining therequired level of safety”.127
Considering the dramatically reduced level of on-site inspection and the large number ofdelayed outages and maintenance operations that is a remarkable statement.
The overall very positive reading of the French nuclear regulator clashes with the reporting of
the sub-contractor organization Ma Zone Contrôlée that, in an open letter dated 12 July 2020
to the Minister for the Ecological Transition128, in charge of nuclear oversight, claims thatɆɆ Until 27 April 2020, masks for contractors carrying out maintenance operations were
not systematically available. “Numerous sub-contractor colleagues have experienced
very humiliating and discriminatory situations, when, on certain sites, employees of theoperators EDF/Orano had masks at the disposal to protect themselves against the virus but
not us. Are we not equal?”
ɆɆ Some contractors made use of their right to withdraw. All of them “were subjected todisgraceful pressures by their respective hierarchy, job blackmailing, disciplinary threats”.
ɆɆ The remote surveillance carried out by ASN on strictly regulatory and administrative
aspects “makes us fear the worst”. Several maintenance interventions were carried out
without regulatory oversight under physical presence, as three-quarters of EDF staff werecarrying out remote work.
Following a COVID-19 outbreak at the Belleville site, the contractor organization requests
comprehensive testing on all sites, as they “all become potential clusters”.129
This is not the first time that Ma Zone Contrôlée has alerted the authorities. In a letter to
ASN dated 22 March 2020, they reported “large numbers of degraded working conditions
and increasing worries of employees”, including absence of hydroalcoholic gels and masks
for sub-contractors, lack of systematic disinfection of exit radiation monitoring devices
and dosimeters, impossibility to respect social distancing requirements in numerous places

126 - ASN, “ASN makes an assessment of its oversight since the beginning of lockdown”, 25 May 2020, see http://www.frenchnuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/ASN-makes-an-assessment-of-its-oversight-since-the-beginning-of-lockdown,
accessed 28 July 2020.
127 - Ibidem.
128 - Gilles Reynaud, President of Ma Zone Contrôlée, Letter to Barbara Pompili, Minister of Ecology, dated 12 July 2020,see http://www.ma-zone-controlee.com/lettre-ouverte-a-madame-la-ministre-b-pompili/, accessed 29 July 2020.
129 - Ibidem.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 (shuttle buses, locker rooms, cafeterias…).130 Three weeks later, the worker representatives senta follow-up letter to ASN protesting against unequal treatment for sub-contractors comparedto EDF/Orano staff now getting equipped with protective gear. While the entire country wasin lock-down “hundreds of employees of sub-contractor companies returned at the requestof client EDF in order to resume [work during] ongoing outages (Chooz, Civaux, Cattenom,
Nogent, Dampierre).” The group, considering the “abundant feedback from the sites remains
perplexed about the expected final good results of all ongoing interventions and their direct
impacts on the level of safety and security”.131
A particular point raised by the workers is the absence of usual oversight during interventions
as a large share of EDF staff, including oversight personnel, was on telework. Reportedly,
there were cases where intermediate checks during maintenance interventions were madeover the phone. An accident on 9 April 2020 during the replacement of a hydrogen rack at
Belleville-1 leaving two workers injured and leading to a fire that “could have had catastrophic
consequences” 132 was clearly due to lack of oversight and “numerous deficiencies” of various
types, as an ASN inspection revealed one week later.133
Some sub-contractor companies have refused to carry out certain work if the requiredconditions were not fulfilled. Workers from all parts of the country are hired for maintenancework and are often sharing housing with great contamination risks. They were notsystematically tested. It is unclear whether this has changed as of the end of July 2020.
The regulator constantly juggles between safety concerns and operational necessities. On
30 July 2020, ASN granted EDF a delay for the second time (after February 2019) for the
installation of emergency diesel generators for five reactors (Cattenom-4, Flamanville-1 and -2,
Paluel-1 and -2). The new deadline for the Paluel site is 28 February 2021, just short of the tenthanniversary of the beginning of the Fukushima disaster. The extra emergency power supply
was a requested measure in response to the Japanese catastrophe.
The La Hague spent fuel reprocessing plant was shut down for several weeks after employees
executed their “right to withdraw” (droit de retrait), a legal right that allows them to refuse
work under conditions they individually judge as dangerous. La Hague and fuel chain operator
Orano experienced “severe disruptions in service activities” and “interruption of supply chain
impacting CAPEX projects”.134

Germany
According to the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
Safety (BMU), nuclear oversight has continued to the extent deemed necessary. German
nuclear operators carry out pandemic plans, which were adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic.
130 - Gilles Reynaud, Letter to the President of ASN, dated 22 March 2020.
131 - Gilles Reynaud, Letter to the President of ASN, dated 10 April 2020.
132 - Ibidem.
133 - In fact, the alternator presented a hydrogen leak detected in October 2019 but never repaired, which has led to the frequent
need of storage tank replacement. ASN, Letter to the Director of the EDF Belleville Nuclear Power Plant, 23 April 2020 (in French),see https://www.asn.fr/content/download/170428/1748644/version/2/file/INSSN-OLS-2020-0702.pdf, accessed 31 July 2020.
134 - Philippe Knoche and David Claverie, “2020 Half-year results”, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, Orano,
31 July 2020, see https://www.orano.group/en/finance/publications-and-regulated-information-credit-update, accessed 19 August 2020.

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These include enhanced hygiene measures, stricter access control to the facility to identify
possible infected personnel and rearrangement of working procedures to reduce working
contacts to the minimum necessary.135
Until 2009, no clear regulation with respect to minimum workforce levels at nuclear facilitiesin Germany was in place. After an event in a German reactor, during which personnel from thecontrol room had to perform duties in their secondary function in the fire-fighting brigade,the German Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) issued recommendations with respect to thedetermination of the minimum workforce needed for safe operation.136 According to theserecommendations, not including security staff, a minimum number of eight people have to
be available on site at all times, five of which are control room staff. The determination of theminimum workforce required must take into account all potential states of the plant, including
severe accidents. A corresponding requirement to determine the minimum workforce are since2012 also included in German safety requirements for nuclear power plants.137
Major outages for nuclear power plants were planned for April and May 2020. The German
regulatory authority had forbidden the maintenance and refueling outage of the nuclear
power plant Grohnde as originally planned. The shutdown and related activities would havenecessitated about 1,000 additional staff beyond the 500 permanent employees for a periodof two weeks at the plant site. The outage was then reorganized and took an additional three
weeks, while restricting the necessary workforce to a maximum of 250. The reactor wasreconnected to the grid on 24 May 2020. Systematic testing for COVID-19 was carried out andno contamination was identified.138 It was expected that the schedule of planned outages atother plants would also change accordingly.
Transports of highly radioactive wastes from the Sellafield reprocessing plant in the U.K.,
planned for the spring of this year, have been postponed, as the required corresponding police
operation was not feasible.139

Hungary
Measures
In Hungary, the scope of planned 2020 outage activities have been reduced mainly due totravel restrictions of foreign vendor companies.

135 - BMU, “Gewährleistung der nuklearen Sicherheit während der Corona-Krise - BMU-Meldung”, Bundesministerium für Umwelt,
Naturschutz und Nukleare Sicherheit, 27 March 2020 (in German), see https://www.bmu.de/ME9001, accessed 31 July 2020.
136 - RSK, “Anforderungen an die Bestimmung der Mindestschichtbesetzung in Kernkraftwerken zur Gewährleistung einer sicheren
Betriebsführung”, Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission, Recommendation of the Reactor Safety Commission, 417th Meeting, 18 June 2009
(in German), see www.rskonline.de/sites/default/files/reports/epanlagersk417hp.pdf, accessed 15 August 2020.
137 - BfS, “Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants”, Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz, Edition 03/15, 3 March 2015.
138 - Preussen Elektra, “Revision in Zeiten von Corona: Verlängerter Anlagenstillstand des Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerks Grohnde
beendet“, 24 May 2020 (in German), see https://www.preussenelektra.de/de/unser-unternehmen/newsroom/pressemitteilungen/2020/
verlaengerteranlagenstilllstandkwgbeendet.html, accessed 2 August 2020.
139 - BMU, “Gewährleistung der nuklearen Sicherheit während der Corona-Krise—BMU-Meldung”, 27 March 2020, op. cit.

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Japan
Infections
No systematic information is available.
Three people, including one employee’s family member, were infected at TEPCO’s
Kashiwazaki Kariwa plant, and two employees were contaminated at its headquarters,interrupting the safety upgrading work to resume.140 Kyushu Electric Power Company’s Genkai
plant is constructing a facility for dealing with severe accidents. In April 2020, two workers
were confirmed to be contaminated. Consequently, about 300 workers were instructed toremain on standby at home and construction was suspended.141
As of 1 July 2020, there were no reports about workers infected with COVID-19 within the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.142 As countermeasures for contamination, workers
are obliged to have their temperature taken and wear a mask, but officially no change has been
made to the decommissioning plan.143
The evacuation plan for nuclear accidents (nuclear disaster prevention guidelines) formulated
after the Fukushima accident does not include measures against infectious diseases at
evacuation centers. Therefore, the Cabinet Office decided to include infectious disease control
measures in the guidelines in the future.144

MexicoMeasures and Impacts
The level of maintenance staff on shift was optimized to the level necessary to complete theminimum preventive and corrective maintenance activities.

Netherlands
Certain work scheduled for the country’s only nuclear reactor Borssele’s annual refueling andmaintenance, which began on 29 May 2020, has been postponed until the next planned outage
in 2021.145

140 - TEPCO, “Implementation of additional measures to prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus infection”, Press Release,
27 April 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.tepco.co.jp/kk-np/data/press/pdf/2020/2020042701p.pdf, accessed 15 May 2020.
141 - Genkai Town, “Message from the Mayor”, 21 April 2020 (in Japanese),see http://www.town.genkai.lg.jp/site/korona/35850.html, accessed 15 May 2020.
142 - TEPCO, “Covid-19 Countermeasures at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, 2 July 2020, see https://www.tepco.co.jp/
en/hd/decommission/information/newsrelease/reference/pdf/2020/reference_20200702_01-e.pdf, accessed 21 July 2020.
143 - Ibidem; and TEPCO, “Measures against the novel coronavirus at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, 28 May 2020
(in Japanese), see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/common/images/d200528_12-j.pdf, accessed 15 May 2020.
144 - NHK, “Evacuation plan for nuclear accidents: Considering measures against infectious diseases”, 14 May 2020 (in Japanese)see https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20200514/k10012429081000.html, accessed 15 May 2020.
145 - EPZ, “Nuclear power plant out of service for annual maintenance”, 14 April 2020,see https://epz.nl/actueel/kerncentrale-uit-bedrijf-voor-jaarlijks-onderhoud-1, accessed 10 June 2020.

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Romania
Measures and Impacts
In April 2020, the planned overhaul of Cernavoda-1 was delayed. This would have been done
during a planned maintenance which is performed every two years, during May and June andusually lasts 30 days.146 The outage has been delayed and started only 20 June 2020. The unit
was reconnected to the grid 4 August 2020 after an extended outage.147

RussiaInfections
In a quite unique manner, Rosatom’s Director General Alexey Likhachev has been doing
weekly video updates for months on numbers and locations of positive cases and recovered
staff148 (see Figure 20)149. Cumulating active and recovered cases on the graphic illustration
presented by Rosatom on 31 July 2020, the order of magnitude of total infections appears to bearound 4,500, a very large number compared to any other reported COVID-19 incidence at anuclear operator (e.g. about 600 at EDF). And while EDF has reported hardly any active cases
as of middle of June 2020, Rosatom still accounted for around 1,200 ill people as of the end of
July 2020.
Figure 20 · Rosatom’s DG Presenting a Weekly Overview of COVID-19 Cases at Rosatom

Source: Screenshot—Rosatom, “Обращение главы «Росатома» А.Е. Лихачёва (31 июля 2020)”, 31 July 2020

Note: Active (Red) and Recovered (Green) COVID-19 Cases at Rosatom as of 30 July 2020.

146 - Serbia Energy News, “Romania: Maintenance of NPP Cernavoda’s unit 1 postponed”, 10 April 2020,see https://serbia-energy.eu/romania-maintenance-of-npp-cernavodas-unit-1-postponed/, accessed 18 May 2020.
147 - SeeNews, “Romania’s Nuclearelectrica re-synchronizes Cernavoda NPP’s Unit 1 to grid”, 6 August 2020, see https://seenews.com/
news/romanias-nuclearelectrica-re-synchronizes-cernavoda-npps-unit-1-to-grid-709048, accessed 26 August 2020.
148 - NIW, “Nuclear Overseers Vary Response to Covid-19”, 5 June 2020.
149 - Rosatom, “Обращение главы «Росатома» А.Е. Лихачёва (31 июля 2020)”, 31 July 2020 (in Russian),see https://www.atomic-energy.ru/video/105932, accessed 16 August 2020.

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In April 2020, Rosatom raised concerns about the spread of the virus in the three “nuclear
cities” which host civil and military nuclear research. But no numbers were released.150 On
1 April 2020, Rosatom announced that four of its employees tested positive for COVID-19 but
did not specify the location.151 Consequently, at the Beloyarsk site, after one worker’s wife fell
ill, all employees were asked to move to special dispensaries and commute from there.

Measures and Impacts
On 26 March 2020, Rosatom issued a statement on its COVID-19 response:
At present, we have introduced additional measures at all of Russia’s nuclear power plants,
including regular health check-ups of our personnel. We have arranged for as many employees
as possible to work remotely and purchased personal protective equipment and hygienerelated products in bulk; we are constantly disinfecting our production facilities and vehicles
and have essentially cancelled all business trips. We are monitoring our employees’ health inclose cooperation with local authorities across our areas of operation. We have developed anumber of additional contingency plans for various scenarios of the coronavirus pandemic
that may have an effect on the health of our NPP [nuclear power plant] employees.152

A few days later, Rosatom subsidiary Rosenergoatom announced that nuclear power plantstaff would be isolated from the general public and required to live onsite at their respective
stations.153 In addition:[Rosatom] has created a kind of ‘mirror-management’ system so that if one manager falls illwith the virus, or any other sickness for that matter, their ‘duplicate’ can step in and continue
managing the project or operation.154

However, apparently, central management leaves broader decisions about staff quarantines up
to local authorities both in the Russian regions where Rosatom operates facilities as well as inother countries. On 6 April 2020, it pulled 178 of its employees from the Rooppur construction
site in Bangladesh. Rosatom stated: “When our employees find themselves abroad in thisdifficult situation and want to return to their homeland, we will accommodate their needs.”155
As more than 4,000 people are working at the site, Rosatom assumes no impact on the plannedschedule for the project because of the temporary relocation of its employees. It further cites
enhanced health care measures to protect people at the construction site, like measuring
employees’ temperatures, special disinfection of all office space and the issuing of masks to all
employees.156 But the withdrawal of such a large number of Russian staff, many of whom can
150 - Tom Balmforth, “Coronavirus threatens workforce in Russia’s nuclear cities - Rosatom”, Reuters, 28 April 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-russia-nuclear-idUSL5N2CG5CY, accessed 16 May 2020.
151 - Charles Digges, “Four nuclear workers test positive for coronavirus as Rosatom steps up pandemic response”, Bellona,
1 April 2020, see https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2020-04-some-russian-nuclear-workers-isolated-as-rosatom-steps-upcoronavirus-response, accessed 1 August 2020.
152 - Rosatom, “ROSATOM Director General Makes Statement on COVID-19 Situation”, 26 March 2020, see https://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/rosatom-director-general-makes-statement-on-covid-19-situation/, accessed 1 August 2020.
153 - Charles Digges, “Russia’s nuclear workers isolated onsite as coronavirus spreads”, Bellona, 3 April 2020, see https://bellona.org/
news/nuclear-issues/2020-04-russias-nuclear-workers-isolated-onsite-as-coronavirus-spreads, accessed 1 August 2020.
154 - NIW, “Nuclear Overseers Vary Response to Covid-19”, 5 June 2020, op. cit.
155 - Rosatom, “ROSATOM arranged the return of 178 employees from construction site of Rooppur NPP (Bangladesh) to Russia”,
7 April 2020, see https://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/rosatom-arranged-the-return-of-178-employees-from-constructionsite-of-rooppur-npp-bangladesh-to-rus/, accessed 1 August 2020.
156 - Ibidem.

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be presumed to be working at higher oversight responsibility levels, means that there could bequestions about how safely construction is being carried out.

Slovakia
Fuel loading of Mochovce-3, under construction since 1985, has been further delayed. Justprior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was expected at the beginning of the summer of 2020 with“in the worst case, it will be the end of 2020”.157 However, this schedule will not hold, as due tosocial distancing measures the number of workers allowed on the site halved in March 2020.,
even if it was said that “the situation gradually stabilized in April and May”.158 The national
regulator said in May 2020 that “it is impossible to estimate a precise delay for commissioningof the third nuclear unit.”159

Slovenia
Measures and Impacts
The Krsko nuclear power plant is considered a critical energy infrastructure facility. Following
the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, the operator reduced the activities to “providing
only those functions that are necessary to ensure the safe and stable operation of the plant”.160

South Korea
Infections
As of 1 July 2020, there were no reported cases of COVID-19 affected personnel working at
South Korea’s nuclear power plants. Two employees, one working at the headquarters of thenuclear operator and one security guard, were infected, and there were no reported cases oftransmission in nuclear power plants.161

Measures and Impacts
Schedule and duration of at least one unspecified reactor outage was adjusted to ensure worker
safety.

157 - Slovenske Elektrarne, “Mochovce 3: Nuclear authority issued a draft decision on fuel loading”, 18 February 2020,see https://www.seas.sk/article/mochovce-3-nuclear-authority-issued-a-draft-decision-on-fuel-loading/409, accessed 23 April 2020.
158 - vEnergetike.sk, “Completion of Mochovce NPP may be delayed again”, Webnoviny.sk, 18 May 2020, see https://www.webnoviny.sk/
venergetike/completion-of-mochovce-npp-may-be-delayed-again/, accessed 27 June 2020.
159 - vEnergetike.sk, “Mochovce NPP will be delayed, UJD confirms”, 26 May 2020, see https://www.webnoviny.sk/venergetike/mochovce-npp-will-be-delayed-ujd-confirms/, accessed 9 June 2020.
160 - Eurelectric, “Impact of COVID 19 on Customers and Society—Recommendations from the European Power sector”,
Updated 31 March 2020, see https://cdn.eurelectric.org/media/4313/impact_of_covid_19_on_customers_and_society-2020-030-021601-e-h-E7E407BA.pdf, accessed 20 August 2020.
161 - NSSC, “The NSSC Chairperson Visited Nuclear Power Plant to Check Response Against COVID-19”, Press Release, 26 May 2020,see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_CON/BoardView.do?pageNo=1&pagePerCnt=10&MENU_ID=90&CONTENTS_
NO=&SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_SEQ=45924&USER_NAME=&TEL_NO=&WRITER_DI=&_csrf=&SEARCH_
FLD=&SEARCH, accessed 3 June 2020.

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Measures at the Regulator
Meetings of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) have been held with limited
face-to-face interactions since 10 April 2020 by minimizing the number of attendees, checking
body temperatures, wearing masks and physically distancing (maintaining a distance of
2 meters) from each other. The head of the national regulator stated: “The NSSC will strictly
comply with the hygiene rules suggested by the disease control authorities and try to ensurethat safety regulations and nuclear power plant operation are normally conducted.”162

Spain
Measures and Impacts
Trillo-1 was taken offline for a refueling outage while the operator limited the number ofworkers onsite, resulting in an outage extension to 35 days.
“Low wholesale electricity prices in Spain mean the country’s fleet of seven power reactors iscurrently operating at a loss”, the Spanish Nuclear Forum said in a statement on 13 May 2020.
The nuclear lobby group has urged a review of the fiscal regime under which the reactors
operate.163
Market prices are depressed by the COVID-19 pandemic and are “failing to cover the operating
costs of the Spanish nuclear plants, not even the amount they pay in taxes and levies whichamount to €22/MWh (about US$24/MWh)”, Foro Nuclear President Ignacio Araluce said in thestatement.164

SwedenInfections
The national regulator, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SRSA), reported in June 2020,
that it had “so far seen few COVID-19 cases at plant sites”. 165 However, there are no precise
numbers.

Measures and Impacts
Measures included isolating control room staff and essential personnel, relatively isolated sites
and on-site housing for traveling workers during refueling outages.166

162 - NSSC, “Chairperson Uhm Had Virtual Meeting With Heads of Regulatory Agencies of Other Major Nuclear Countries to
Discuss COVID-19 Responses”, Press Release, 7 May 2020, see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_CON/BoardView.do?MENU_
ID=90&CONTENTS_NO=&SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_SEQ=45920&P_BBS_SEQ=&CATE_SEQ=&pageNo=2&SEARCH_
SEQ=&SEARCH_FLD=&SEARCH=&PREV_IDX=45922&NEXT_IDX=45920&MODULATE_KEY=%242a%2410%24UIapasTfrqWHlufh
AJH5iuiIwluEWqGqiXSoLpT2RVPAz01O3DUn6&_csrf=, accessed 1 August 2020.
163 - Gianluca Baratti, “Spain’s power reactors failing to cover operating costs: Foro Nuclear”, Nucleonics Week, 21 May 2020.
164 - Ibidem.
165 - NIW, “Nuclear Overseers Vary Response to Covid-19”, 5 June 2020, op. cit.
166 - Ibidem.

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United Arab Emirates
Measures and Impacts
Majority owner Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) has introduced measures suchas locking down the Barakah site with four units under construction167 and halting “nonessential” work in the wake of the pandemic.168 Additionally, ENEC’s Nawah company, thesubsidiary responsible for Barakah’s operation and maintenance, issued guidelines to reduce
the number of workers at the plant and enforce social distancing. Besides following strict
quarantine and other preventative procedures at Barakah, UAE’s nuclear regulator, the Federal
Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) and ENEC have also established critical staff andfunctions to manage a potential second-wave of COVID-19.169

Measures at the Regulator
FANR established a COVID-19 crisis management taskforce, which called for measures suchas asking employees to work remotely, leveraging digital means to conduct inspection andmonitoring activities, and reducing the number of on-site inspectors.170

United Kingdom
Infections
No comprehensive information is available. A Chinese national working at the Hinkley Point C
construction site tested positive for COVID-19 in early March 2020. Four of his co-workers
self-isolated but were later tested negative and have returned to work.171 Mid-March 2020, a
staff member of the Sellafield nuclear site had tested positive, followed by another employeewith suspected COVID-19 a day or two later who had begun self-isolation. Within days, thenumber of Sellafield employees self-isolating climbed to about 1,000. The Sellafield complex
has approximately 11,500 staff. In late March 2020, the operator decided to shut down the
Magnox reprocessing plant at the site.172 It only resumed full operation in the first week ofAugust 2020.173
EDF Energy mentioned in an 8 June 2020 statement the “tragic passing of one of our own
employees from COVID-19 in April” at Hinkley Point B.174 In late July 2020, the entire plant
167 - Barakah-1 went critical on 1 August 2020.
168 - WNN, “ENEC CEO: Barakah Plant to Start up ‘Very Soon’”, 7 May 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/ENEC-CEO-Barakah-to-start-up-very-soon, accessed 14 May 2020.
169 - NIW, “Nuclear Overseers Vary Response to Covid-19”, 5 June 2020, op. cit.
170 - Christer Viktorsson, “Viewpoint: Regulators are adapting to an unprecedented challenge”, WNN, 11 May 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Viewpoint-Regulators-adapt-to-an-unprecedented-cha, accessed 11 May 2020.
171 - Global Construction Review, “Covid-19 hits UK’s Hinkley Point C nuclear project”, 6 March 2020,see http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/covid-19-hits-uks-hinkley-point-c-nuclear-project, accessed 2 August 2020.
172 - Jillian Ambrose, “Sellafield nuclear waste site to close due to coronavirus”, The Guardian, 18 March 2020,see https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/mar/18/sellafield-nuclear-waste-plant-close-coronavirus-staff,
accessed 2 August 2020.
173 - Sellafield Ltd, “Green light to restart Magnox Reprocessing”, 3 August 2020,see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/green-light-to-restart-magnox-reprocessing, accessed 30 August 2020.
174 - EDF Energy, “Letter to the Hinkley Site Stakeholder Group - 8 June 2020”, 8 June 2020,see https://www.edfenergy.com/media-centre/news-releases/letter-hinkley-site-stakeholder-group-8-june-2020,
accessed 2 August 2020.

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of a key concrete supplier for the construction at Hinkley Point C was closed after 22 of the
90 employees tested positive.175

Measures and Impacts
According to the U.K. Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), “all sites have minimum staffing
levels, and contingency plans should they fall below these levels, to enable them to remain incontrol of activities that could impact on nuclear safety under all foreseeable circumstances,including pandemic disease.”176 In correspondence with independent experts, an ONR
representative stated early March 2020 that “staff rotas [schedules] at nuclear sites are resilient
to keep generation running in scenarios including pandemic or industrial action. If a generatingsite needed to be shut down for any reason, it would be shut down safely.”177
Figure 21 · Canteens at Hinkley Point C – Before and After Social Distancing

Photos: Canteens at Hinkley Point C, before and after social distancing measures, both pictures are from late March 2020. A local paper quoted workers assaying: “They’ve done their best, but when anybody moves, they’re inevitably immediately within two metres of someone else.”178

In early June 2020, EDF Energy described measures applied by and by at their nuclear sites179
including:ɆɆ Introducing remote working and split shift arrangements in a safe and controlled way,
which has reduced the overall daily footfall on the site by over 50 percent;ɆɆ Determining the level of risk associated with vulnerable and high-risk employees andbringing in appropriate measures to support them;

175 - BBC, “Concrete plant closed after Covid-19 outbreak”, 27 July 2020, see https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-bristol-53555062,
accessed 2 August 2020.
176 - ONR, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) - ONR Position [26/03/20]”, Office for Nuclear Regulation, 17 March 2020, Update issued
26 March 2020, see http://news.onr.org.uk/2020/03/coronavirus-covid-19-onr-position/, accessed 1 August 2020.
177 - David Lowry, “Corona-crisis Hits Nuclear Sector”, Energy Transition, 9 April 2020,see https://energytransition.org/2020/04/corona-crisis-hits-nuclear-sector/, accessed 2 September 2020.
178 - The West Country, “Social distancing fears in Hinkley Point C canteen despite EDF’s best efforts”,
see https://www.thisisthewestcountry.co.uk/news/somerset_news/18330262.social-distancing-fears-hinkley-point-c-canteen-despiteedfs-best-efforts/, accessed 2 August 2020.
179 - EDF Energy operates all 15 U.K. nuclear reactors.

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ɆɆ Increasing hygiene and cleaning arrangements in high footfall areas and introducing social
distancing measures across the site;ɆɆ The installation of thermographic cameras at the entrance and the purchase of COVID-19
immunity test kits.180
However, unlike at home, in France, where EDF rescheduled a large number of outages,
subsidiary EDF Energy went through with several refueling and maintenance outages,
including at Hartlepool-2 and Heysham-2.
Even after social distancing measures had been implemented, several environmental NGOs
and Local Authorities were not convinced and, in a letter dated 30 March 2020, urged ONR“to exercise your powers and responsibilities to close operations at Hinkley Point C until suchtime as work can be safely resumed”.181 Only two days later, national television news (ITV)
quoted a worker as saying: “At the moment I feel like the project is being put before my safety,
my family’s safety and everybody on that site’s safety. You’ve still got people in vans - three andup - and all the toilets are rammed. There’s an account that I know of where someone’s been
sent home with symptoms and the whole of their workforce - (the people) they work with andhave had prolonged contact with - have been told not to isolate.” An EDF Energy spokesperson
told ITV, it would be like everywhere else: “We’re actually learning as we go”.182 This sounds
a bit different from the “all prepared” message that ONR has been putting out from the start.
On 23 July 2020, EDF Energy issued an update to its COVID-19 measures at the Hinkley
Point C construction site:
That means that social distancing, the use of protective screens and extra cleaning continue
on the site and in our canteens and buses. Workers will continue to have their temperaturetaken before entering the site. Face masks are mandatory on our external busses, as they areon public transport in the rest of the country. Bus services for workers are focused on ourpark and ride sites and we are no longer picking up workers in the community. We are looking
to expand our testing capacity and aim to be able to test new starters for Coronavirus. We are
not planning for a full return to offices for those that have been successfully working fromhome. This will help us maintain social distancing.183

While the workforce at the Hinkley Point C site was cut to about 2,000 in March–April, by
July 2020 levels were back at 4,500, almost pre-crisis levels.

Measures at the Regulator
While dealing with significant restrictions at the nuclear facilities and at their own organization,
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) remained confident all along:

180 - EDF Energy, “Letter to the Hinkley Site Stakeholder Group - 8 June 2020”, June 2020, op. cit.
181 - NFLA, “NGO Forum Co Chairs and NFLA Secretariat issue letter over the ongoing construction work at Hinkley Point inSomerset”, Nuclear Free Local Authorities, 31 March 2020, see https://www.nuclearpolicy.info/news/ngo-forum-co-chairs-and-nflasecretariat-issue-letter-ongoing-construction-work-hinkley-point/, accessed 2 August 2020.
182 - ITV, “Continued concerns over conditions at Hinkley Point C amid coronavirus pandemic”, 1 April 2020,see https://www.itv.com/news/westcountry/2020-04-01/worker-at-hinkley-point-c-near-bridgwater-says-edf-is-putting-constructionproject-ahead-of-staff-safety, accessed 2 August 2020.
183 - EDF Energy, “Coronavirus update from Hinkley Point C - 23 July”, 23 July 2020, see https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/nuclearnew-build-projects/hinkley-point-c/news-views/coronavirus-update-hinkley-point-c-july-23, accessed 2 August 2020.

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On 26 March 2020
A number of inspectors will continue to travel to sites where required, but we will carry out
as much of our business as possible via phone, email and Skype. These measures will not havea severe impact on the effectiveness of our regulation of the nuclear industry.184
On 25 June 2020
We remain satisfied with industry’s response at this time and there has been no significant
change to dutyholders’ safety and security resilience.
(…)
ONR staff continue to work at home, primarily. We have considered our priorities,
deferred non-critical activities, and are carrying out as much of our work as possible via
videoconference, phone and email.
We are inspecting, assessing and permissioning [?] remotely so far as is practicable, although
we continue to go to site, as key workers, to conduct urgent and essential regulatory business,in accordance with public health measures.185

United States
Infections
No systematic information on COVID-19 cases in the U.S. nuclear industry or its regulator isavailable, therefore WNISR only reports on a selection of documented examples. It appears
that in a few cases, the outbreak was so large that it was impossible to avoid communication.
DTE Energy’s Fermi-2 in Michigan, in the middle of a refueling outage with more than
2,000 workers on-site, reportedly may have had 200–300 positive COVID-19 cases in May 2020,
which might have been the largest outbreak at any single place in Michigan. DTE has refused todisclose the number of positive cases among its workforce.186 But DTE did confirm that largescale testing had begun early May 2020 and by 11 May 2020 it had requested exemptions fromwork-hour controls (see hereunder).
At the Limerick-1 plant in Pennsylvania, two workers tested positive in the days prior to arefueling and maintenance outage began on 27 March 2020, and three additional workers
in the days after the outage started. Following these infections, an additional 44 of around
1,400 workers on-site were quarantined, with more than half of the quarantined personnel
presenting symptoms of the virus.187
On 1 April 2020, operator Exelon confirmed the first case at its Quad Cities plant. 188
184 - ONR, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) – ONR Position [26/03/20]”, 17 March 2020, op. cit.
185 - ONR, “COVID-19 (coronavirus) – ONR Position”, 25 June 2020, see http://news.onr.org.uk/2020/06/covid-19-coronavirus-onrposition/, accessed 2 August 2020.
186 - NIW, “Massive Covid-19 Outbreak at Fermi-2”, 15 May 2020.
187 - Andrew Maykuth, “More Limerick Nuclear Plant Workers Test Positive for Coronavirus; Refueling to Continue”,

The Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 April 2020, see https://www.inquirer.com/business/limerick-nuclear-plant-refueling-coronavirus-workersinfected-20200408.html, accessed 1 September 2020.
188 - ANS, “Coronavirus makes its way into U.S. nuclear plants”, American Nuclear Society, 10 April 2020,see https://www.ans.org/news/article-85/coronavirus-makes-its-way-into-us-nuclear-plants/, accessed 27 July 2020.

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On 4 April 2020, a contractor working at the Susquehanna two-unit plant, in Berwick,
Pennsylvania, prior to the Unit 1 spring refueling outage tested positive for COVID-19 andself-quarantined. Seven people who came into contact with the infected individual were also
quarantined.189
In early May 2020, ten workers at the Waterford nuclear power plant had tested positive for
COVID-19. Some of the 750 workers that were brought in for the refueling outage told reporters
they don’t think enough is being done to protect their health amid the pandemic.190
Another major outbreak was reported at the Vogtle construction site in Georgia. The first casewas confirmed on 6 April 2020. On 15 April 2020 it was announced that a “lower productivity
levels and a slower pace of completion prompted a 20% workforce reduction”.191 Nonetheless,three weeks after the first confirmed case, as of 28 April 2020, 153 workers had been tested
positive for COVID-19.192 By mid-June 2020, more than 200 positive cases were reported.193
As of 2 September 2020, while the number of infections were reported to be declining, morethan 800 workers on the project had been tested positive with over 100 active cases.194 On
10 July 2020, Tom Fanning, President and CEO of the builder’s parent company Southerntested positive.195
The Millstone plant, in Connecticut, had a first confirmed case of COVID-19 prior to thebeginning of its refueling outage in early April 2020, which drew 750 temporary workers onsite,
sparking concern and criticism from Millstone employees towards insufficient measures put
in place, including lack of personal protective equipment, cleaning and sanitizing.196 In earlyMay 2020, Dominion reported 10 employees had tested positive.197 On 18 May 2020, it was
revealed that 11 workers had tested positive, three of whom were control room operators.198

Measures and Impacts
The industry lobby organization Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) listed a number of measurestaken, which have been quite typical for any nuclear country:
Utilities are taking actions to limit the potential for infections, such as implementing
teleworking where appropriate, practicing responsible social distancing both at work and
189 - Ibidem.
190 - News 8, “10 workers at Waterford nuclear power station site test positive for coronavirus”, wtnh.com, 5 May 2020,see https://www.wtnh.com/news/connecticut/new-london/10-workers-at-waterford-nuclear-power-station-site-test-positive-forcoronavirus/, accessed 27 July 2020.
191 - NIW, “Covid-19 Cases Lead to 20% Workforce Reduction at Vogtle”, 1 May 2020.
192 - News Channel 6, “Updated COVID-19 case numbers for Plant Vogtle”, WJBF, 29 April 2020,see https://www.wjbf.com/lifestyle/health/coronavirus/plant-vogtle-reports-first-positive-coronavirus-case/, accessed 2 July 2020.
193 - NIW, “Vogtle Cost Up Another $1 Billion With 80% Component Failure Rate”, 12 June 2020.
194 - Matt Kempner, “Georgia nuclear project reports more than 800 COVID-19 cases to date”, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
1 September 2020, see https://www.ajc.com/ajcjobs/georgia-nuclear-project-reports-more-than-800-covid-19-cases-to-date/
P4BXNDI5ONHX7BSPCPTJYZNWYE/, accessed 2 September 2020.
195 - ANS, “Southern CEO tests positive for COVID-19”, 14 July 2020, see https://www.ans.org/news/article-343/southern-ceo-testspositive-for-covid19/, accessed 2 September 2020.
196 - Sten Spinella, “Millstone security employees criticize COVID-19 safety efforts”, The Day, 3 May 2020,see https://www.theday.com/article/20200503/NWS01/200509848, accessed 3 September 2020.
197 - NIW, “The Widening Impact of COVID-19”, 8 May 2020.
198 - Sten Spinella, “Millstone’s positive COVID-19 cases include control room operators”, The Day, 24 May 2020, see https://www.
theday.com/business/20200524/millstones-positive-covid-19-cases-include-control-room-operators, accessed 3 September 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 89home, and screening personnel allowed on-site. Specific actions by each plant will vary basedon the condition at that plant and its plant status. These actions may include, but are notlimited to:
F mechanisms to maintain awareness and communicate with staff;
F telling workers who don’t feel well to stay home and encourage them to seek medical

attention, liberalizing the sick-leave policy, developing or updating a policy on telecommuting;F setting up a screening point before people can enter the plant, to identify people who havesymptoms;
F making masks, hand sanitizer and gloves available within a plant to places where they will

be needed;
F focusing on extra disinfection of common areas;
F using paperless work processes to reduce human contact and teleconferencing whenpossible.199

While nuclear operators have identified some tasks that can be done remotely or be postponed,
some employees must still come to nuclear power plants on a daily basis because many
computers are not connected to the internet (so-called airgap). This is a cybersecurity measurerequired in operations by the NRC in order to prevent hackers from accessing critical computer
systems.200
Figure 22 · Travel Trailers at the Cook Nuclear Plant—Just in Case

Photo: Bill Downey, Cook Nuclear Plant, 2020

Based on pandemic plans established a decade ago, at least part of the nuclear plants have cots,blankets, chemical toilets and enough personal care items to sustain the operating crews at

199 - NEI, “The Nuclear Industry’s Response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19)”, Nuclear Energy Institute, 1 April 2020,see https://www.nei.org/news/2020/nei-coronavirus-covid-19-response, accessed 27 July 2020.
200 - For an example of a cyber-attack on a nuclear power plant, see M.V. Ramana and Lauren J. Borja, “The Computer Infection of
Kudankulam and its Implications”, The India Forum, 10 January 2020, see https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/computer-infectionkudankulam-and-its-implications, 10 January 2020.

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a plant for several weeks should such measures be necessary.201 Officials have suggested theymight isolate critical technicians at the country’s nuclear power plants and ask them to live
onsite to avoid exposure to the virus. In early April 2020, Cook Nuclear Plant staff preparedabout 80 travel trailers available through employees on the parking lot of the site—just incase.202
In reality, the measures have gone deep into work management. Following the large COVID-19
outbreak at Fermi-2 (see above), on 11 May 2020, DTE submitted a letter to the NRC seeking
significant exemptions from work-hour controls for staff, pledging that “these controls ensurethat covered workers are subjected to the following minimum controls” 203 . Three days later,
the NRC granted exactly what the industry had asked for:ɆɆ Individuals will work up to 16 work hours in any 24-hour period and up to 86 work hours inany 7-day period, excluding shift turnover;ɆɆ A minimum 10-hour break is provided between successive work periods;
ɆɆ 12-hour shifts up to 14 consecutive days;
ɆɆ A minimum of 6 days off are provided in any 30-day period; andɆɆ Requirements have been established for behavioral observation and self-declaration during
the period of the exemption.204
The Fermi-2 decision was not isolated. Between 3 April and 14 May 2020, the NRC granted
similar exemptions, typically for two months, from work-hour controls for at least 14 reactors(Beaver Valley-1&2, Braidwood-1&2, Fermi-2, Ginna, Limerick-1&2, Palo Verde-1&2&3,
Quad Cities-1&2, Seabrook-1).205
These are major exemptions to standard rules for essential staff members in the following
key workforce categories: operators, health physics and chemistry, fire brigade, maintenanceand security. Challenges to safety and security through additional stress and fatigue are likely
under those conditions.
The NRC has developed an ad-hoc process to review work hour limits, because the existing
regulations never considered a pandemic. Using existing exemption provisions, the NRC
will approve requests with minimal initial review. Industry observers pointed out that this“suggests that a certain amount of guesswork—and subjectivity—will be involved in decision-

201 - Iulia Gheorghiu, “Coronavirus could disrupt normal refueling practices for nuclear facilities as staffing concerns grow”, Utility
Dive, see https://www.utilitydive.com/news/coronavirus-could-disrupt-normal-refueling-practices-for-nuclear- facilities/574920/,
26 March 2020.
202 - Alexandra Newman, “Cook Nuclear Plant ready if critical employees can’t go home”, The Herald Palladium, 3 April 2020,see https://www.heraldpalladium.com/news/cook-nuclear-plant-ready-if-critical-employees-cant-go-home/article_5af88489-29c1-5f8e9666-035eff63bfbe.html, accessed 27 July 2020.
203 - Peter Dietrich, DTE, Letter to NRC, 11 May 2020.
204 - NRC, Letter to Peter Dietrich, DTE, 14 May 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2013/ML20133K055.pdf,
accessed 27 July 2020.
205 - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, “COVID-19 Regulatory Activities for Nuclear Reactors—10 CFR Part 26 Work Hour
Requirements”, U.S.NRC, Updated 27 May 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/covid-19/reactors/part-26-work-hour-req.html,
accessed 27 July 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 making, with outside observers and critics left mostly in the dark about how decisions arebeing made”.206
As Fermi-2 was shut down on 21 March 2020 and had not returned to service by 24 July 2020,
the 4-month outage is one of the longest in the plant’s history, and the longest since a major
fire left the plant seriously damaged in 1993.207
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has been scaling back some of its planned maintenance workat Watts Bar to limit the number of individuals on site and is performing health screenings of
all TVA employees and contractors coming to the plants.
Limerick-1 owner/operator Exelon presented the refueling outage as exemplary—and quite
the opposite of the Fermi-2 case. Lasting from 27 March to 13 April 2020, it was completed in aplant-record 16 days, and no additional COVID-19 infections were reported during the outage.
A contractor told media a different story. On 3 April 2020—in the middle of the outage—heclaimed that social distancing was not in place:
From the first day I got there, there were no less than 100 people in the training room being
processed. I have pictures from that day of people literally sitting on top of each other, no one
enforcing social distancing. There were computer labs for people to take the tests they needto get into the plant, people sitting at every computer elbow to elbow. So, I’ve been concernedsince the minute I walked in there.208

Measures Taken at the Nuclear Regulator
On 19 March 2020, the NRC changed its modus operandi in response to COVID-19 and updated
its guidance for resident inspectors on 6 April 2020 “to protect the health of inspectors andsite personnel, while maintaining oversight that supports reasonable assurance of adequate
protection of public health and safety”209:ɆɆ Deferring of baseline inspections requiring onsite presence such as force-on-force andoutage inspections.
ɆɆ Use of remote means of event response for “uncomplicated plant trips/transients”.
ɆɆ Practice of social distancing when on site and following site specific requirements for
COVID-19.
ɆɆ Remote access of operator information using all available technology (remote connectivity,
personal computer, phone, email).
ɆɆ Visiting each site “approximately once every three business days”.210

206 - NIW, “United States: NRC to Ease Regulatory Burdens During Pandemic”, 3 April 2020,see http://www.energyintel.com/pages/eig_article.aspx?DocId=1068608, accessed 28 July 2020.
207 - The Blade, “Most work done, but will virus keep Fermi 2 offline much longer?”, 15 July 2020.
208 - Pottstown Mercury, “Workers ‘terrified’ at Limerick nuclear plant amid coronavirus”, 5 April 2020, see https://www.pottsmerc.
com/news/coronavirus/workers-terrified-at-limerick-nuclear-plant-amid-coronavirus/article_934efb34-76a4-11ea-afbe-17495d88f209.
html, accessed 27 July 2020.
209 - Christopher G. Miller, “Updated Implementation of Resident Inspector Site Coverage During COVID-19”, Director, Division of
Reactor Oversight, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Memorandum to Ho K. Nieh, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
U.S.NRC, 6 April 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2009/ML20097E538.pdf, accessed 28 July 2020.
210 - Ibidem.

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On 28 May 2020, the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued a newmemorandum on “inspection guidance during transition from COVID-19 mandatory
telework”.211 The guidance was “intended to balance the importance of protecting the health andsafety of our inspectors and site personnel along with the need to conduct effective oversightthat supports NRC’s critical safety mission”.212 Many activities have been further delayedwith the objective to have them completed within the year. Concerning force-on-force (FOF)
security inspections the guidance states that “continued COVID restrictions may necessitate
further delays”.213 Early July 2020, nuclear industry representatives made it clear that they want
the NRC not to resume but cancel all FOF inspections this year (about 20 reactor sites).214 The
industry made the case that FOF “brings different challenges that lead to a higher possibility ofcross-contamination of a critical group of employees”.215 An NRC representative stated that theAtomic Energy Act “specifically highlights that this is a performance-based inspection whichcannot be accomplished through paperwork review or tabletop exercises”.216
A letter signed by 86 organizations to Vice-President Michael R. Pence in late April 2020217
asked for “urgent actions required to mitigate COVID-19 impacts in nuclear energy industry”.
The organizations expressed their concern that the NRC “has abdicated its legal responsibility
to protect public health and safety during the COVID-19 public health emergency, and to insist
upon immediate corrective action”. The appeal, sponsored by the Nuclear Information andResource Service (NIRS), and supported by a long list of well-known national NGOs including
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth points out:
As the near disaster resulting from the deferred inspection at the Davis-Besse reactor in
2001-2218 showed, every single delayed/deferred safety inspection coupled with fatigued andill workers clearly reduces the overall safety of the 96 [now 95] operating US nuclear powerreactors.

The organizations ask for a range of immediate measures including the establishment of aninteragency COVID-19 Nuclear Task Force “to develop plans and protective measures fornuclear workers and reactor operations.” The NRC brushed off any criticism: “As we’ve said inseveral forums, the NRC’s authority covers radiological health, not infectious disease health,”
NRC spokesperson Scott Burnell stated.219
211 - Ho K. Nieh, “Inspection Guidance During Transition from COVID-19 Mandatory Telework”, Memorandum, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S.NRC, 28 May 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2014/ML20141L766.pdf, accessed 2 September 2020.
212 - Ibidem.
213 - Ibidem.
214 - Edwin Lyman, Tweet, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 July 2020, see https://twitter.com/NucSafetyUCS/status/12812168797140
95104?s=20.
215 - NRC, “Considerations surrounding security oversight for nuclear power plants in relation to the COVID-19 public healthemergency”, Transcript of Public Meeting, Undated.
216 - Ibidem.
217 - Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Beyond Nuclear et al., “Letter from 86 Organizations to Vice President Michael R.
Pence: Urgent Actions Required to Mitigate COVID-19 Impacts in Nuclear Energy Industry”, 22 April 2020, see https://www.nirs.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Nuclear-COVID19-letter_WH-CoV-Task-Force_86-organizations.pdf, accessed 2 September 2020.
218 - A large, pineapple-sized hole was discovered in the reactor vessel head leaving only the liner as barrier. It was later calculated thatthe hole would have widened to the point where the liner ruptured in another 2 to 11 months of operation. Because Davis-Besse ran
18 months between refueling outages, had the damage been missed during the 2002 outage, it seems likely that a large loss of coolant
accident would have occurred. See Mycle Schneider, Georgui Kastchiev, Ed Lymann et al., “Residual Risk—An Account of Events inNuclear Power Plants Since the Chernobyl Accident in 1986”, May 2007, see http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2013/ph240/bechstein1/
docs/kastchiev.pdf, accessed 2 September 2020.
219 - NIW, “Nuclear Overseers Vary Response to Covid-19”, 5 June 2020.

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LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONSAs of mid-2020, the COVID-19 pandemic so far has not led to any interruptions of primaryenergy or electricity supply in monitored countries. The Council of European Energy
Regulatory (CEER) proudly stated:
No COVID-19 network congestion issues or problem with security of supply have beenreported. The EU regulatory framework of liberalised energy markets regulated byindependent regulators working for an integrated internal energy market has shown its
resilience.220

Eurelectric, representing the European electricity industry, at the end of March 2020
published a useful country-by-country overview of impact on the sector and measurestaken by Governments and companies.221 In general, most of the countries have experienced
significantly declining power consumption and lower prices. According to one estimate, thefive Western European countries France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom averageda drop of 8 percent in power demand over the first half-year 2020, ranging from –9 percent inGermany to –15 percent in France. The analysts expect demand remaining –4 to –8 percent(–10 percent in the U.K.) below 2019 levels222 Power prices plunged to around €20/MWh in the
EU as a whole.
The longer-term impact of low consumption and low prices on the finances of the electricity
utilities will be significant.
In France, massive outage rescheduling at the 56 nuclear reactors looks likely to extend into
the high-consumption winter months 2020-21, and the country will probably need to rely onmuch more expensive power from other suppliers including from other countries.
Operator EDF plans to shorten the duration of refueling and maintenance outages by up to
2.5 months at 23 reactors to ease some of the effect.223 Considering the operator’s incapacity torespect its outage schedules over the past years (see France Focus), it will be interesting to see
how EDF will perform.
Credit-rating agencies were quick to act. On 24 April 2020, Fitch revised EDF’s outlook tonegative from stable, reflecting “production cuts due to the pandemic” as a key rating driver.224
Two days later, Moody’s did the same, arguing reduced output projections in particular “as aresult of confinement and staff protection measures”.225 Standard & Poor’s went further and
220 - CEER, “Keeping the lights on saves lives – Energy sector and regulators guarantee energy supply during lockdown”, Councilof European Energy Regulatory, PR-20-02, 14 April 2020, see https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/-/-/9ab3bcce-b191-4414-4e1b97e6545c24fd, accessed 3 September 2020.
221 - Eurelectric, “Impact of COVID-19 on Customers and Society – Recommendations from the European Power Sector”,
31 March 2020, see https://cdn.eurelectric.org/media/4313/impact_of_covid_19_on_customers_and_society-2020-030-0216-01-e-hE7E407BA.pdf, accessed 2 September 2020.
222 - Andreas Franke and Jonathan Fox, “EU5 Q2 power demand down 12% on year at 367 TWh”, S&P Global Platts Analytics,
2 July 2020, see https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/070220-eu5-power-demand-for-q2down-12-on-year-at-367-twh, accessed 2 September 2020.
223 - Sophie Tetrel, “EDF shortens planned outages at 23 reactors”, Montel, 3 July 2020.
224 - Fitch, “Fitch Revises EDF’s Outlook to Negative; Affirms IDR at ‘A–’”, 22 April 2020, see https://www.fitchratings.com/research/
corporate-finance/fitch-revises-edf-outlook-to-negative-affirms-idr-at-a-22-04-2020, accessed 2 September 2020.
225 - Moody’s, “Rating Action: “Moody’s changes aoutlook on EDF to negative, affirms ratings”, 24 April 2020, see https://www.
moodys.com/research/Moodys-changes-outlook-on-EDF-Trading-to-negative-affirms-rating--PR_423223, accessed 3 September 2020.

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on 22 June 2020 downgraded EDF by one notch from A– to BBB+ stating that “the prolonged
lower nuclear availability reflects greater operational weakness, which will contribute to asignificant decline in profitability”.226
The lower ratings will make the service of the company’s debt more expensive. As of mid-2020,
EDF’s net debt had grown to €42 billion (US$47.5 billion). It lost about €1 billion (US$1.1 billion)
to the COVID-19 circumstances and its profit plunged by 56 percent. EDF warned that theconstruction interruption at the Flamanville EPR “could result in further delays and additionalcosts”.227
In Japan, the reduction in electricity generation from nuclear power in 2020 due to extended
shutdowns coincides with a significant decline in demand and wholesale prices due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.228 As reported by Reuters, day-ahead prices on the Japan Electric Power
Exchange (JEPX) dropped as low as ¥0.01 (US$c0.01) per kilowatt hour (kWh)—virtually
free power— in February 2020. The impact on the finances of the nuclear utilities could besubstantial.

CONCLUSION ON NUCLEAR POWER
IN THE AGE OF COVID-19
There is no comprehensive information available for any nuclear country concerning identified
cases of COVID-19 in the workforce of companies operating nuclear facilities and their supply
chain. Some nuclear operators—like EDF in France—have explicitly refused to publish any
data. There is no more information available on the situation at the national nuclear regulatorsand their technical support organizations. It remains entirely unclear to what extent andunder what rules staff are being tested or not for COVID-19, and thus it remains uncertain
how comprehensive the current knowledge of the impact of the pandemic in the nuclear sector
actually is.
Operators and regulators have implemented widespread measures including telework and social
distancing. In some cases, regulators stopped physical inspections almost entirely, and carriedout site visits only in urgent cases like incidents relevant to safety or security. Remote workraises cyber-security issues and has its limitations. Most of the computers in nuclear facilities
and at regulators are not connected to the internet and do not have any outside connection atall (airgap) in order to lower the possibility of hackers entering sensitive information systems
or control functions.
There is no doubt that the quality of oversight of operators of their subcontractors has been
seriously impacted, as witnessed by numerous workers. Many outages have been delayed or

226 - S&P, “French Utility EDF Downgraded To ‘BBB+’ On Prolonged Operational Weakness, Lower Output Due To COVID-19;
Outlook Stable”, 22 June 2020.
227 - EDF, “2020 Half-Year Results”, Press Release, 30 July 2020, see https://www.edf.fr/sites/default/files/contrib/groupe-edf/
espaces-dedies/espace-finance-en/financial-information/publications/financial-results/h1-2020/20200730-h1-2020-cp-en.pdf,
accessed 2 September 2020.
228 - Aaron Sheldrick, “Japan power prices hit zero as coronavirus hammers industrial activity”, Reuters, 13 May 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-japan-electricity/japan-power-prices-hit-zero-as-coronavirus-hammersindustrial-activity-idUSKBN22P0PA, accessed 19 May 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 shortened, which means certain periodical exams and maintenance operations have not been
carried out as scheduled.
While it is difficult to assess the degree, it is obvious that the cumulation of these circumstances
leads to a shrinking of safety and security margins. It is very surprising under these conditions
to see the respective national regulators assuring the public that everything is under control.

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FOCUS COUNTRIES
These “quick view”
indicators will be usedin the country sections
throughout the report.

The following chapter provides a special focus on nuclear programs in various stages in the
Middle East. The section covers six countries in the region, either operating, building orplanning for nuclear power plants. In addition, the chapter offers an in-depth assessment of
seven countries: China, Finland, France, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom (U.K.) and theUnited States (U.S.). They represent about two thirds of the global reactor fleet (60 percent of
the units and 67.3 percent of the operating capacity) and five of the world’s ten largest nuclear
power producers. For other countries’ details, see Annex 1.
Unless otherwise noted, data on the numbers of reactors operating and under construction andtheir capacity (as of mid-2020) and nuclear’s share in electricity generation in 2019 are fromthe International Atomic Energy Agency’s Power Reactor Information System (IAEA-PRIS)
online database.229 Historical maximum figures indicate the year that the nuclear share in the
power generation of a given country was the highest since 1986, the year of the Chernobyl
disaster. Unless otherwise noted, the load factor figures are from Nuclear Engineering
International (NEI).230

MIDDLE EAST FOCUS
Introduction
In the Middle East, despite decades-long plans to build nuclear power stations, little progresshas been achieved. Regional nuclear power projects have stagnated and are facing political andeconomic uncertainties. Currently, there are six countries in the region with nuclear power
ambitions—Iran, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan (inorder of program advancement). As shown in Figure 23, these countries are at very different
levels of commitment and progress.

229 - IAEA-PRIS, “Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation in 2019”,
see https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/NuclearShareofElectricityGeneration.aspx.
230 - NEI, “Load factors to end December 2019”, June 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 97

Figure 23 · Overview of the Status of Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East

Status of Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East
As of 1 July 2020

TURKEYSYRIACYPRUSLEBANON
ISRAELIRAQPALESTINE

IRAN

JORDANpending commitment,
recent shift to SMR

EGYPT

site preparation

KOWEIT

BAHRAINSAUDI
ARABIA

QATAR

serious commitment
but no vendor chosen yet

UAEof which one close
to grid connection

OMAN

Status and number of reactors
Operating

YEMEN

Under Construction
Early Stages© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Source: WNISR, 2020

Interest in nuclear power in Middle Eastern countries stems from various, often unspoken,
reasons. Officially communicated rationale to invest in nuclear power in the six countriesemphasizes the need to reduce reliance on fossil fuels to generate electricity.231 Additionally,some countries advocate nuclear power investments as a pathway towards achieving
localization of advanced technologies and creating a base of highly skilled workers.232 On theother hand, investments in nuclear programs across the region, especially in Iran and Saudi
231 - Ali Ahmad, “Energy Transitions in the Gulf: Key Questions on Nuclear Power”, January 2018, see https://www.aub.edu.
lb/ifi/Pages/publications/books/2017-2018/20180118_energy_transitions_in_the_gulf_key_questions_on_nuclear_power.aspx,
accessed 16 April 2020.
232 - Ali Ahmad, Reem Salameh and M.V Ramana, “Localizing Nuclear Capacity? Saudi Arabia and Small Modular Reactors”, Issam
Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, 2019, see https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Pages/
publications/working_papers/2018-2019/20190724-localizing-nuclear-capacity-saudi-arabia-and-small-modular-reactors.aspx,
accessed 11 April 2020.

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Arabia, are not isolated from the political tensions and their wider security and potential
military implications.233
Table 3 · Typology of Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East
Country

Nuclear Capacity

Grid size (Year)

Fuel Arrangements

Fuel Chain Activities

Iran

Operating: 915 MW
Under construction: 974 MW

83 GW (2020)

Russia to supply and take back spent fuelunder JCPOA terms

Uranium mining, milling,
conversion and enrichment; fuelfabrication

UAE

Under construction: 5.4 GW

31 GW (2017)

Diversified fuel supply (six contracts);
Long-term spent fuel policy
is being developed

None

TurkeyUnder construction: 2.2 GW“Committed”: 3.6 GW~91 GW (2019)

Russia to supply and take back spent fuel

None

Egypt

“Committed”: 4.8 GW

42 GW (2018)

Russia to supply and take back spent fuelNone

Saudi Arabia“Committed”: 2 GW

89 GW (2017)

Unknown

None

Unknown~5 GW (2017)

Unknown

None

JordanSources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes: UAE = United Arab Emirates; JCPOA = Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The scope and size of operations of nuclear programs across the region are not uniform. As
shown in Table 3, the Iranian nuclear program is the most developed with one operating reactor,
one more under construction and investments in uranium mining, conversion and enrichment
among other nuclear fuel chain activities. The uranium enrichment component has been thefocus of concerted international efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear proliferation potential. This had
been resolved through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under which Iran has
committed not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and to send it back to Russia.234 However, thefuture of the agreement looks bleak after the Trump administration pulled out of it.
As of mid-2020, Iran’s Bushehr-1 was the only operational reactor in the region (see Figure 24).
Seven further units are under construction, including the four in the UAE, two in Turkey andone in Iran. Assuming no further delays, the next reactor to be connected to the grid in theregion is the Barakah-1 reactor, which is undergoing final tests. When completed and all four
units are operational, the plant is projected to provide 25 percent of the country’s electricity
supply.235
Both the Iranian and Emirati nuclear power programs have experienced construction delays(more than 35 years in the case of Bushehr-1). In the case of Iran, delays were mostly due topolitical reasons, while for the UAE, it was primarily related to the need of further training of
local personnel and some unforeseen technical issues.

233 - Anne Neumann et al., “Democratic quality and nuclear power: Reviewing the global determinants for the introduction of nuclear
energy in 166 countries”, Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 63, May 2020, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S221462961930667X, accessed 20 April 2020.
234 - Arms Control Association, “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance”, May 2018,see https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance, accessed 13 April 2020.
235 - NEI, “Fuel loading completed at unit 1 of Barakah nuclear power plant in the UAE”, 3 March 2020, see https://www.neimagazine.
com/news/newsfuel-loading-completed-at-unit-1-of-barakah-nuclear-power-plant-in-the-uae-7805266, accessed 13 April 2020.

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Figure 24 · Timelines of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Middle East

Construction vs. Operation of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Middle East
As of 1 July 2020 - in Years
Grid Connection

Iran
Bushehr-1
Bushehr-2
UAE
Barakah-1
Barakah-2
Barakah-3
Barakah-4
TurkeyAkkuyu-1
Akkuyu-2

Expected
Grid
Connection© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting
50

40

Construction(Expected)

30

Construction
Suspension

Delay

20

10

0

Delay or
As expected at
Construction Start Further Delay

Operation

Remaining Construction Time

Timelines of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Middle East
As of 1 July 2020
1 July 2020

IranBushehr-1
Bushehr-2
UAE
Barakah-1
Barakah-2
Barakah-3
Barakah-4
TurkeyAkkuyu-1
Akkuyu-2© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting
1975

1980

1985

Construction(Expected)

1990

1995

Construction
Suspension

2000

Construction(Delay)

2005

2010

2015

2020

Operation

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes:

Iran: Construction of Bushehr-1 and -2 had originally started in 1975 and 1976. Their supplier, Siemens, suspended construction of both units in 1978

following the beginning of the Iranian Revolution. Construction of Unit 1 restarted in 1996, followed by Unit 2 in 2019. In the absence of an official precise
target date for startup of Unit 2, WNISR uses mid-2024 for illustrative purposes.

UAE: Construction of the Barakah reactors was expected to last 5 years each. For illustrative purposes, WNISR noted August 2020 for grid connection ofBarakah-1, followed by the other reactors with intervals of one year each.
Turkey: Construction of Akkuyu-1 and -2 was expected to last 5 years, but Unit 1 is already delayed by about one year.

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Reactor Suppliers
Russia’s Rosatom is the most pro-active reactor provider in the world and the Middle East is
no exception, with active projects in Iran and Turkey, and possibly in Egypt (see Table 4). The
Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) currently has the largest number of reactors
under construction in the region, with the development of the four-unit Barakah power plantin the UAE. Saudi Arabia has yet to select a nuclear supplier despite entering agreements withseveral vendors. Besides interest in large reactors, Saudi Arabia and Jordan have also shown
interest in Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), although this interest has not yet translated into
tangible actions.
Table 4 · Nuclear Technology Suppliers in the Middle East
Large Reactors
Iran

Rosatom (Russia)

UAE

KEPCO (South Korea)

TurkeyRosatom (Russia)

Egypt

Rosatom (Russia)

Saudi Arabia

Unknown
Small Modular Reactors

Saudi Arabia
JordanKAERI (South Korea)
Unknown
Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020.

Notes:
UAE: United Arab Emirates; KEPCO: Korea Electric Power Corporation; KAERI: Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute.

An overview of the latest cost estimates of the regional nuclear power projects and theirownership model is shown in Table 5. These cost estimates do not include, usually significant,indirect costs such as the costs for grid adaptation, of establishing supporting and regulatory
institutions, training of personnel, etc. In the six countries examined, and despite different
ratios of financing arrangements and ownership models, Governments (on both the recipientand vendor sides) are playing a central role in advancing the nuclear agenda in the region. Thisis very much in line with the business model of the nuclear industry globally, which is heavily
dependent on governmental support and interventions.236
The credit rating and debt-to-GDP numbers, also listed in Table 5, offer a glimpse of theeconomic environments in which the regional nuclear projects are to be established. Egypt andJordan stand out as the two countries with both low credit-rating score and high debt-to-GDP.
Turkey’s credit rating is also deep in “junk” territory (highly speculative). The combined effectof such unfavorable economic indicators increases the cost of financing, which will further
inflate the cost of the capital-intensive nuclear projects, unless the vendor country offers afinancial subsidy, such as loan guarantees or low interest rates.

236 - Nadira Barkatullah and Ali Ahmad, “Current status and emerging trends in financing nuclear power projects”, Energy Strategy
Reviews, 1 December 2017.

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Table 5 · Overview of the costs of nuclear power projects in the Middle East and relevant
economic indicators
Project Size
(GW)

Project Cost Estimate

Ownership Model

Credit Rating Score237

Debt-to-GDP

Egypt

4.8

US$29.4 billion

Joint venture

30(highly speculative)

83%

Iran

2.0

US$10 billion(Bushehr Unit 2 & 3)

Government

NA

32%

JordanUnknown

Unknown

Unknown

35(highly speculative)

94%

Saudi Arabia

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown76(upper medium grade)

19%

Turkey4.8

US$20 billion(Akkuyu)

Build-Own-Operate (BOO)

36(highly speculative)

29%

UAE

5.6

US$28.2 billion

Joint venture

90(high grade)

22%

Country

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020.

United Arab Emirates
Among the Arab countries with nuclear power ambitions, the UAE’s program is by far themost advanced one. The UAE established its nuclear power program in 2009, when it signed acontract with the Korean Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO). The deal initiated the constructionof four APR-1400 reactors with a total capacity of 5.6 GW at the Barakah site in Abu Dhabi, thefirst of which received its operating license in February 2020.238 In October 2016, KEPCO took
an 18 percent equity stake in the Nawah Energy Company that owns the four reactors, with
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) holding the remaining 82 percent.239
At the time of the contract signing in December 2009, ENEC said that “the contract forthe construction, commissioning and fuel loads for four units equaled approximately
US$20 billion”.240 However, cost estimates later increased to at least US$28.2 billion.241
Reportedly, financing was primarily supported by the Government of Abu Dhabi; Korean andother financing partners also contributed through equity and loan agreements.242

237 - The score is calculated from the ratings of the main rating agencies S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. Where available, DBRS Morningstar
ratings are also integrated. The maximum score is 100. Trading Economics, “Credit Rating - Countries”, 2020,see https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/rating, accessed 12 May 2020.
238 - WNA, “Barakah nuclear power plant takes a big step forward to delivering UAE’s clean energy future”, Press Release,
19 February 2020, see https://www.world-nuclear.org/press/press-statements/barakah-nuclear-power-plant-takes-a-big-step-forwa.
aspx, accessed 13 April 2020.
239 - NEI, “Kepco and Enec set up joint venture for Barakah NPP”, 25 October 2016, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/
newskepco-and-enec-set-up-joint-venture-for-barakah-npp-5647366/, accessed 22 April 2018.
240 - ENEC, “UAE Selects Korea Electric Power Corp, as Prime Team as Prime Contractor for Peaceful Nuclear Power”, Emirates
Nuclear Energy Corporation, 27 December 2009, see https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/uae-selects-korea-electric-power-corp-as-primeteam-as-prime-contractor-fo/, accessed 22 April 2018.
241 - WNISR, 2019.
242 - NIW, “Kepco takes 18% of Barakah”, 21 October 2016.

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In July 2010, a site-preparation license and a limited construction license were granted for thereactors at Barakah,243 40 km from the border with Saudi Arabia and 100 km from Qatar. A
tentative schedule published in late December 2010, suggested that—with construction starting
one unit per year between 2012 and 2015—Barakah-1 would start commercial operation in
May 2017 with Unit 2 operating from 2018, Unit 3 starting up in 2019, and Unit 4 following in
2020. However, the project has experienced several delays and is currently projected to startin the second half of 2020. In May 2020, ENEC’s CEO Mohamed Al Hammadi stated that the
Barakah plant will reach first criticality “within a month or so”.244
The delays can be linked to the following contributing factors:
ɆɆ Delays in establishing a domestic workforce that is trained and licensed to operate nuclear
reactors safely.245
ɆɆ Cracks or “voids” found in the containment building of Units 2 and 3.246
ɆɆ Precautionary measures in response to South Korean nuclear industry’s quality assurance
scandal.247
ɆɆ Delays in the commissioning of KEPCO’s reactors in South Korea, which are basis for the
UAE designs.248
In May 2017, ENEC admitted that the startup delay for Unit 1 from 2017 to 2018 was “toensure sufficient time for international assessments and adherence to nuclear industry safety
standards, as well as a reinforcement of operational proficiency for plant personnel.”249 The
issue of the delays in achieving an adequate level of personnel training seems to be compoundedby the multiplicity of cultures and languages among new personnel.250 As a recognition of thescale of the ongoing problem, EDF in November 2018 signed an agreement with ENEC toprovide services to support “operating and maintaining” the plant.251

243 - Arabian Business, “ENEC Welcomes Regulator’s License Approval”, 11 July 2010,see http://www.arabianbusiness.com/enec-welcomes-regulator-s-licence-approvals-306150.html, accessed 22 April 2018.
244 - WNN, “ENEC CEO: Barakah plant to start up ‘very soon’”, 7 May 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/ENEC-CEO-Barakah-to-start-up-very-soon, accessed 14 May 2020.
245 - Jane Chung and Geert De Clercq, “UAE delays launch of first nuclear power reactor”, Reuters, 4 May 2017,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kepco-emirates-nuclearpower-exclusive/exclusive-uae-delays-launch-of-first-nuclear-powerreactor-idUSKBN1801ZD, accessed 22 April 2018.
246 - Choi Ha-yan, “KEPCO undergoes repairs for cracks in nuclear reactor containment buildings in UAE”, The Hankyoreh,
17 October 2018, see http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/866228.html, accessed 19 May 2019.
247 - Max. S Kim, “How greed and corruption blew up South Korea’s nuclear industry”, MIT Technology Review, 22 April 2019,see https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/04/22/136020/how-greed-and-corruption-blew-up-south-koreas-nuclear-industry/,
accessed 13 May 2020.
248 - Anthony McAuley, “UAE nuclear project enters critical phase”, The National, 7 July 2015,see https://www.thenational.ae/business/uae-nuclear-project-enters-critical-phase-1.26641, accessed 13 May 2020.
249 - ENEC, “ENEC Announces Completion of Initial Construction Work for Unit 1 of Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant & Progress
Update Towards Safety-led Operations”, Press Release, 5 May 2017, see https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/latest-news/enec-announcescompletion-of-initial-construction-work-barakah-unit-1-progress-update/, accessed 18 July 2020.
250 - Stephanie Cook, “The Challenge of Barakah’s Multicultural Workforce”, NIW, 23 March 2018.
251 - EDF and Nawah Energy Company, “EDF and Nawah Energy Company sign operations and maintenance assistance agreement
for Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, United Arab Emirates”, Press Release, 22 November 2018, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/
dedicated-sections/journalists/all-press-releases/edf-and-nawah-energy-company-sign-operations-and-maintenance-assistanceagreement-for-barakah-nuclear-energy-plant-united-arab-emirates, accessed 9 April 2019.

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Worker safety has also been a challenge. According to one South Korean media report, there
have been a number of serious accidents at the construction site, resulting in deaths of workers
and KEPCO’s contractors were found to have “largely failed to ensure worker safety”.252
The problem of defects in the containment buildings was similar to a problem that had been
experienced in the 1990s at the Hanbit reactor in South Korea, where holes large enough fora small child were revealed.253 The discovery of such defects in Barakah raised concerns on
safety and project management. The safety concern is because the containment building is a
crucial barrier to stop potentially radioactive emissions escaping in the event of an accident.
The latter concern is because construction has not gone smoothly and raises the question of
possible other overlooked issues.
Further difficulties have emerged with the APR-1400 design, raising questions about thereliability of the pilot-operated safety relief valves (POSRV). These are designed to protect thepressurizers against overpressure and have been seen to be a problem for the design since 2016
when it inadvertently opened, during start-up of Shin-Kori-3 in South Korea. Then, possibly
during testing, in November 2017 the same problem occurred at Barakah-1, and the regulator
concluded that the valve did not meet its safety acceptance criteria.254
Nevertheless, the Barakah project has been moving toward completion. In December 2019, it
was reported, based on ENEC’s estimates, that the overall construction of the four units was
at more than 93 percent. Besides Unit 1, the construction of which is now completed, Units 2, 3
and 4 were reported at more than 95, 91 and 82 percent complete, respectively.255
The first group of operators at the plant received their certification in July 2019 after a threeyear training program.256 In September 2019, at the 24th World Energy Congress in Abu Dhabi,
Barakah One Company and KEPCO signed an agreement to explore opportunities to offer the“Barakah model” to foreign markets.257
In February 2020, the first unit at Barakah received its operating license from the UAE’s
Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), authorizing 60 years of operation. In
March 2020, fuel loading was completed in Unit 1, making UAE officially the first Arab country
with a nuclear power plant. Officials said that systems would be tested over the following few
months, with power production to begin once testing is completed. Grid connection had been
expected to take place before mid-2020, which did not happen.258
252 - Lee Hyo-sik, “KEPCO hit by safety lapses at UAE nuke plant site”, The Korean Times, 22 February 2017,see http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2017/02/367_224498.html, accessed 22 April 2018.
253 - Choi Ha-yan, “Controversy over Barakah power plant construction fiasco continues”, Hankyoreh, 18 December 2018,see http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/874896.html, accessed 9 April 2019.
254 - Stephanie Cook, “Shared POSRV Nightmares for KHNP and Enec”, NIW, 15 March 2019.
255 - Technical Review Middle East, “ENEC highlights nuclear energy and Barakah plant progress at public forum”, 2 December 2019,see http://www.technicalreviewmiddleeast.com/power-a-water/power-generation/enec-highlights-nuclear-energy-and-barakah-plantprogress-at-public-forum, accessed 13 April 2020.
256 - WNN, “First Barakah operators receive regulatory certification”, 8 July 2019,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/First-Barakah-operators-receive-regulatory-certifi, accessed 13 April 2020.
257 - GCR, “Korea and UAE sign nuclear know-how export deal”, Global Construction Review, 12 September 2019,see http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/korea-and-uae-sign-nuclear-know-how-export-deal/, accessed 13 April 2020.
258 - Barakah-1 was finally connected to the grid on 19 August 2020. C.f. WNISR, “Barakah, UAE: Grid Connection of First
Commercial Reactor in the Arab World”, 21 August 2020, see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Barakah-UAE-Grid-Connection-ofFirst-Commercial-Reactor-in-the-Arab-World.html, accessed 8 September 2020.

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The delays in the construction of the Barakah project have led to a significant increase in theconstruction and financing costs through, primarily, extended interest payments and deferred
revenues. As shown in Figure 25, these delays occur while solar power has made huge leaps in
the UAE towards cost effectiveness. The latest solar-photovoltaics (PV) bid in the fifth phaseof the Dubai solar park reached US$1.7 c/kWh in 2019, less than a quarter of the Barakah’s
projected levelized cost of energy (LCOE), estimated at US$2012 7.2 cents per kWh.259 Even
concentrated solar reached prices similar to the expected nuclear levels as early as 2017 in the
fourth phase of the Dubai solar park.
Figure 25 · Evolution of Solar PV and CSP Prices in the UAE During the Construction of the Barakah Project

Evolution of Solar vs. Nuclear Power Cost Estimates in the UAE 2012-2020
in US$/MWh
Barakah-1
Construction
Start

Barakah-2
Construction
Start

DSP Launch

DSP Phase 1
PV 13 MW
Grid Connection

Barakah-3
Construction
Start

Barakah-4
Construction
Start

DSP Phase 2
200 MW
Grid Connection

DSP Phase 3
800 MW
Grid Connection

Sweihan
PV 1.2 GW
Grid Connection

Barakah-1
Expected
Grid Connection

200

200

192
100 MW

150

136

114

L a z a r d100

N u c l e ar

P o w e r
97

77

50

C o s t59.8

72
Barakah

118
73
700 MW

100 MW

2013

Solar PV

t e s

58.4
200 MW© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting
2012

E s t i m a

29.9
800 MW24.2

24

1.2 GW

250 MW

17900 MW

13.5
1.5 GW

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

ACWA PowerDSP Phase 2

ACWA PowerDSP Phase 2

Masdar/
ASJ/EDFDSP Phase 3

DSP Phase 4

DSP Phase 4+

DSP Phase 5

EDF/Jinko

Marubeni /Jinko
SweihanSolar CSP Nuclear

CSP = Concentrating Solar Plant
DSP = Dubai Solar ParkLCOE = Levelized Cost of Energy
PPA = Power Purchasing Agreement
PV = Photovoltaics

Bid
PPA
LCOE

Sources: Multiple, compiled by WNISR, 2020.

Note: All numbers in nominal US dollars.

Since 2013, the UAE has been home to record-breaking prices of solar energy projects. Since
then, not only solar power became more cost competitive vis-à-vis nuclear, it has been
experiencing a diverging trend with dramatic cost reductions, while the cost of nuclear
electricity has increased in what can be described as “negative learning”.
259 - WNISR estimate (based on latest project cost of US$28.2 billion at 5 percent discount rate)

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The Barakah delays are in line with the global trend of lengthy lead and construction times ofnuclear power plants. They show that even in the UAE, with readily available financing andaccess to arguably the best consultants and technical experts in the world, problems and delays
are bound to happen with nuclear projects.

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s interest in acquiring nuclear power started to take shape in late 2006, initiallyenvisaged as part of a joint GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) effort.260 The King Abdullah City
for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE), which has been mandated with overseeing
the development of the kingdom’s nuclear power program, was set up in 2010. In June 2011,
KA-CARE announced plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors, with a total capacity target of
17.6 GW. The first two reactors were planned to be online ten years later and then two more
per year until 2030. However, these ambitious plans are no longer endorsed by the Saudi
leadership.
In March 2018, the Government approved a national nuclear program, with reports suggesting
contracts for the construction of two reactors by the end of 2018, 261 and planned commissioningin 2027.262 These contracts were not signed. However, Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih said in
January 2019 that his Government still planned to build two reactors in the next decade andthen expand the program once these were in operation.263 The kingdom also confirmed that it
had short-listed five nuclear technology vendors: Westinghouse, Rosatom, KEPCO, EDF/Orano,
and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).264 Amongst the bidders, KEPCO is thought
to be in a strong position, given its experience in the UAE.265
In mid-2018, the IAEA undertook an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) in the
country. Mikhail Chudakov, IAEA Deputy Director General, stated on the completion of thereview that Saudi Arabia had established a legislative framework to support the next stage of
nuclear development.266
Reuters reported in April 2019 that a full tender would be launched in 2020.267 Importing
equipment from the United States will require the signing of a Nuclear Cooperation
260 - Hassan M. Fattah, “Arab Nations Plan to Start Joint Nuclear Energy Program”, The New York Times, 11 December 2006,
see https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/middleeast/11nuke.html, accessed 10 April 2020.
261 - NEI, “Saudi Arabia approves national nuclear programme”, 19 March 2018, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newssaudiarabia-approves-national-nuclear-programme-6087593/, accessed 25 April 2018.
262 - NEI, “Saudi Arabia to prequalify NPP bids by May”, 18 January 2018, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newssaudi-arabiato-prequalify-npp-bids-by-may-6029868/, accessed 25 April 2018.
263 - Saudi Gazette, “Saudi Arabia to use N-energy for electricity production, asserts Al-Falih”, 16 January 2019,see http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/557047/SAUDI-ARABIA/Saudi-Arabia-to-use-N-energy-for-electricity-production-asserts-AlFalih, accessed 14 April 2019.
264 - Noura Mansouri, “Commentary: The Saudi Nuclear Energy Project”, King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center,
March 2020, see https://www.kapsarc.org/research/publications/the-saudi-nuclear-energy-project/, accessed 10 April 2020.
265 - Phil Chaffee, “Ka-Care Hopes to Choose from Five Bids by Year’s End”, NIW, 19 January 2018.
266 - IAEA, “IAEA Delivers Report on Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development to Saudi Arabia”, 25 January 2019, see https://www.
iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-delivers-report-on-nuclear-power-infrastructure-development-to-saudi-arabia, accessed 16 June 2019.
267 - Sylvia Westall, Rania El Gamal and Stephen Kalin, “Saudi plans to invite bids for nuclear power project in 2020: sources”,

Reuters, 4 April 2019, see https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-nuclear/saudi-plans-to-invite-bids-for-nuclear-power-project-in2020-sources-idUKKCN1RG1LL, accessed 9 April 2019.

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Agreement (123 Agreement). Within the United States, there is increasing pressure to include
a requirement to forego uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, which goes against
previous Saudi statements about their desire to control the fuel system.268 Despite this,Reuters reported in March 2019 that U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry had approved six secretauthorizations by companies to sell nuclear power technology. Perry’s approvals, known asPart 810 authorizations, allow companies to do preliminary work on nuclear power ahead ofany deal.269 Perry confirmed in October 2019 that talks were ongoing regarding U.S. support
for the Saudi nuclear program and potential signing of a 123 agreement.270
Concerns have been raised about the connection the Saudi leadership has expressed between
the civil nuclear program and the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. In March 2018, Prince
Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) told CBS News, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any
nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit assoon as possible.”271 In May 2020, Bloomberg reported that Saudi Arabia is continuing theconstruction of a research reactor without IAEA monitoring, which is a critical issue as
the reactor design-information verification has to be conducted while the reactor is beingcommissioned.272
In September 2019, Saudi Arabia’s energy minister said that the kingdom is “proceeding
cautiously” with plans for two nuclear reactors and added that the kingdom still wants to go
ahead with a full fuel chain nuclear program, including production and enrichment of uranium
for nuclear fuel.273 According to Saudi estimates, the kingdom has recoverable domestic
resources of around 60,000 tons of uranium ore.274
Alexander Voronkov, Rosatom’s vice-president, revealed in October 2019 that his country
is cooperating with Saudi Arabia and implementing a joint road map for building SMRs.
Additionally, he alluded to Rosatom’s proposal to support the kingdom in its nuclear fuel chain
activities, including training of Saudi personnel.275 Besides government talks, Rosatom alsoorganized several workshops in an attempt to build networks and relationships with Saudi
companies.276
268 - Timothy Gardner, “U.S. Senate proposal would block Saudi path to atomic weapon in nuclear deal”, Reuters, 13 February 2019,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-saudi/u-s-senate-proposal-would-block-saudi-path-to-atomic-weapon-in-nucleardeal-idUSKCN1Q12UT, accessed 9 April 2019.
269 - Timothy Gardner, “U.S. approved secret nuclear power work for Saudi Arabia”, Reuters, 27 March 2019,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-nuclear-idUSKCN1R82MG, accessed 4 May 2019.
270 - MEED, “US confirms nuclear energy talks with Saudi Arabia”, Power Technology, 30 October 2019,see https://www.power-technology.com/comment/us-confirms-nuclear-energy-talks-with-saudi-arabia/, accessed 10 April 2020.
271 - Aileen Murphy, M.V. Ramana, “The Trump administration is eager to sell nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia. But why?”, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, 16 April 2019, see https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/the-trump-administration-is-eager-to-sell-nuclear-reactors-tosaudi-arabia-but-why/, accessed 4 May 2019.
272 - Jonathan Tirone, “Saudi Atomic Reactor Progresses With Inspectors Still Frozen Out”, Bloomberg, 21 May 2020, see https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-21/saudi-atomic-reactor-progresses-with-inspectors-still-frozen-out, accessed 21 May 2020.
273 - Rania El Gamal and Alexander Cornwell, “Saudi Arabia flags plan to enrich uranium as U.S. seeks nuclear pact”, Reuters,
9 September 2019, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-energy-wec-saudi-nuclearpower/saudi-arabia-wants-to-enrich-uranium-fornuclear-power-minister-idUSKCN1VU168, accessed 10 April 2020.
274 - Sylvia Westall, “Saudi Arabia to extract uranium for ‘self-sufficient’ nuclear program”, Reuters, 30 October 2017,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-nuclear-idUSKBN1CZ1ON, accessed 10 April 2020.
275 - Alzaid Saleh, “see https://bit.ly/3fFezEM, accessed 10 April 2020.
276 - Asharq AL-awsat, “,see https://bit.ly/2ODIXUg, accessed 10 April 2020.

”, 1 4 October 2019 (in Arabic),”, 28 November 2019 (in Arabic),

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Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
Besides large reactors, Saudi Arabia is also exploring the option of SMRs. In March 2015,
KA‑CARE and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU) to study the feasibility of constructing two SMART reactors (Systemintegrated Modular Advanced Reactors) in the kingdom, with the cost of building the firstreactor estimated at US$1 billion.277 The agreement also mentioned that the two countries
would cooperate on the commercialization and promotion of SMART reactors to othercountries.
The progress of the collaboration between Saudi Arabia and South Korea on the SMART
venture has been slow. Five years after the initial agreement, a pre-project engineering
contract was signed between KA-CARE and South Korea’s Ministry of Science and Technology
in January 2020.278 The agreement formalized the establishment of a joint entity to undertake
activities related to the licensing and development of business models and infrastructure of
the SMART reactor in Saudi Arabia.
Similarly, in March 2017, a cooperation agreement was signed with China Nuclear EngineeringGroup Corporation (CNEC) on the development of High-Temperature Gas-cooled
Reactors (HTGR).279 So far, these collaborations have not progressed beyond the signing of
MoUs and cooperation agreements.
In its 2016 “Vision 2030” document, Saudi Arabia’s leadership emphasized the role andimportance of localizing energy supply chains. The strategy recognizes localization as pillarof a new and more diversified economy. In late 2016, the kingdom released the “National
Transformation Program 2020 (NTP2020)”. On the nuclear energy issue, the plan gave specificattention to SMRs, stating targets of nuclear localization as strategic objectives. These targets
can be summarized as follows:ɆɆ Develop needed qualitative human capabilities for atomic and renewable energy sector;
ɆɆ Localization of SMRs on the basis of SMART technology;
ɆɆ Localization of uranium production.
Since the release of the roadmap, little progress has been achieved. The nuclear localization
capacity vis-à-vis renewables in Saudi Arabia has been recently examined by three independent
experts who concluded that “when it comes to nuclear power, the kingdom presents low
technical capabilities, with moderate political support.”280 On the other hand, the reportdetails how the scope, speed and potential of Saudi Arabia’s investments in renewable energy

277 - WNN, “Saudi Arabia teams up with Korea on SMART”, 4 March 2015,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Saudi-Arabia-teams-up-with-Korea-on-SMART-0403154.html, accessed 14 May 2020.
278 - WNN, “Korea, Saudi Arabia progress with SMART collaboration”, 7 January 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Korea-Saudi-Arabia-progress-with-SMART-collaborati, accessed 14 May 2020.
279 - NEI, “Saudi Arabia looks to China and Korea for nuclear assistance”, 20 March 2017, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/
newssaudi-arabia-looks-to-china-and-korea-for-nuclear-assistance-5767240/, accessed 25 April 2018.
280 - Ali Ahmad, Reem Salameh and M. V. Ramana, “Localizing Nuclear Capacity? Saudi Arabia and Small Modular Reactors”,
Working Paper #51, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, July 2019,see https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/working_papers/2018-2019/20190708_localising_nuclear_capacity_KSA.pdf,
accessed 29 June 2019.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 value chain seem to surpass that of nuclear energy. For example, in March 2019, the kingdom
launched the second phase of its renewable energy program worth around US$1.5 billion.281
Unlike nuclear activities that have high decision-making centrality, investments in renewablesin the kingdom are done on both Government and private sector levels. On the Government
level, some serious investment efforts have been made to localize manufacturing solar PV
panels. In February 2019, LONGi, a Chinese solar technology manufacturing giant, revealed
that it is planning to open a US$2 billion solar panel production plant in Saudi Arabia.282
On the private sector level, Saudi-based companies, including ACWA Power—a regional heavy
weight energy company—are now involved in several flagship projects inside and outside
the kingdom. For example, ACWA Power is the developer of the 950 MW hybrid project(700 MW Concentrated Solar Power and 250 MW Photovoltaics) of the fourth phase of theMohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park, the largest single-site of concentrated solar
power plant in the world.283

TurkeyIn Turkey, three separate projects have been in the planning stage for many years, with threedifferent reactor designs and three different financing schemes. However, as of mid-2020,
construction only began on the first of these projects.

AkkuyuOver four decades after it was first proposed, construction of a nuclear power plant at Akkuyu
in the province of Mersin on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast started in April 2018.284 The
power plant is to be implemented by Rosatom of Russia under a Build-Own-Operate (BOO)
model. An agreement was signed in May 2010 for four VVER1200 reactors (Generation III+),
with construction originally expected to start in 2015. Only two months prior to the official
construction start, Rosatom’s Turkish partners, who were to hold 49 percent of the shares,
quit.285 However, Rosatom has stated that it would be able to complete the project even if it isunable to attract local investors.286 In April 2019, Rosatom stated that it was in talks with both

281 - Asharq al-Awsat, “Saudi Arabia Announces 7 Renewable Energy Projects Worth $1.5 Bn”, 12 March 2019, see https://english.aawsat.
com/home/article/1630351/saudi-arabia-announces-7-renewable-energy-projects-worth-15-bn, accessed 14 May 2020.
282 - Jason Deign, “Saudi Arabia Looks to China for Solar as Power Politics Shift”, Greentech Media, 2 May 2019,see https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/saudi-looks-to-china-for-solar-as-power-politics-shift, accessed 11 April 2020.
283 - ACWA POWER, “Noor Energy 1”, 2020, see https://www.acwapower.com/en/projects/noor-energy-1/, accessed 14 May 2020.
284 - Tuvan Gumrukeu and Orhan Coskun, “Turkey grants Rosatom construction license for first unit of Akkuyu nuclear plant”,
Reuters, 2 April 2018, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-russia-nuclearpower/turkey-grants-rosatom-construction-licensefor-first-unit-of-akkuyu-nuclear-plant-idUSKCN1H91OY, accessed 22 May 2018.
285 - AFP, “Un consortium turc se retire du projet de la centrale nucléaire d’Akkuyu”, Agence France Presse, 6 February 2018
(in French).
286 - Reuters, “Russia capable of building Akkuyu plant without partners: Minister”, as published in Hurriyet Daily News,
6 April 2018, see http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-is-able-to-complete-akkuyu-nuclear-power-plant-construction-russianminister-129886, accessed 6 April 2018.

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state-run and private Turkish companies, seeking to sell 49 percent of the project.287 So far,however, there is no evidence that such efforts were successful.
The financing of the project is supported by a 15-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), which
includes 70 percent of the electricity produced from Units 1 and 2 and 30 percent of Units 3
and 4. Therefore 50 percent of the total power from the station is to be sold at a guaranteed
price for the first 15 years, with the rest to be sold on the market. Currency fluctuation, and thefall in the value of the Turkish lira, makes the price guarantees in dollars (US$123.50/MWh)problematic.288
In October 2013, the Akkuyu project was announced to become operational by mid-2020.289
However, numerous delays have occurred (see previous editions of the WNISR), and by thetime construction started in April 2018, first electricity was expected to be generated in 2023
(the 100th anniversary of the founding of the modern state of Turkey), with all four units to be
operational by 2025.290
In March 2019, the project management announced that it had finished the concreting of thebasemat for the nuclear island for the first unit and that it was now expected that Unit 1 would
be physically completed in 2023, with generation coming at a later date.291 In September 2019,
Rosatom announced that the license for Unit 2 had been granted in the previous month, andthat it was preparing to install the first steel equipment on Unit 1 in the autumn.292 Russia’s
largest bank, Sberbank, had announced in August 2019 that it would provide a US$400 million
loan to Rosatom for the plant’s construction.293
In May 2019, it was reported that construction of Unit 1 had been “held up” due to the discovery
of cracks in the foundations, and after further cracks were discovered in the re-laid concrete,a larger section of the foundations had to be redone.294 As for Akkuyu’s Unit 2, Turkish media
sources in late June 2020 reported that construction has started that same month.295 Strangely,
as of early July 2020, Rosatom had not communicated about the event. It is only in late
July 2020 that the company confirmed and provided a date of April 2020 for first concretepouring.296

287 - Ahval, “Russia’s Rosatom in talks to sell 49 pct stake in Akkuyu nuclear plant”, 15 April 2019,see https://ahvalnews.com/akkuyu/russias-rosatom-talks-sell-49-pct-stake-akkuyu-nuclear-plant, accessed 18 April 2019.
288 - Phil Chaffee, “New Build, Revised 2023 Milestone for Akkuyu”, NIW, 29 March 2019.
289 - Orhan Coskun and Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkey’s first nuclear plant facing further delays - sources”, Reuters, 7 February 2014,see https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-nuclear-delay/turkeys-first-nuclear-plant-facing-further-delays-sourcesidUKBREA160P220140207, accessed 22 April 2018.
290 - NEI, “Construction of Turkey’s Akkuyu NPP begins”, 4 April 2018, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsconstruction-ofturkeys-akkuyu-npp-begins-6102914/, accessed 22 April 2018.
291 - Phil Chaffee, “New Build, Revised 2023 Milestone for Akkuyu”, NIW, 29 March 2019.
292 - Geert De Clercq, “Rosatom wins licence to build second nuclear reactor in Turkey -deputy CEO”, Reuters, 6 September 2019,see https://www.reuters.com/article/rosatom-nuclearpower-turkey-idUSL5N25X40O, accessed 14 April 2020.
293 - David Dalton, “Russia’s Sberbank To Provide $400 Million Loan For Turkish Reactors”, NucNet, 21 August 2019,see https://www.nucnet.org/news/russia-s-sberbank-to-provide-usd400-million-loan-8-3-2019, accessed 14 April 2020.
294 - Ahval, “Cracks discovered during construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant”, 6 May 2019,see https://ahvalnews.com/akkuyu/cracks-discovered-during-construction-turkeys-first-nuclear-plant, accessed 11 June 2019.
295 - Daily Sabah, “Construction starts on 2nd unit of Turkey’s 1st nuclear power plant Akkuyu”, 28 June 2020, see https://www.
dailysabah.com/business/energy/construction-starts-on-2nd-unit-of-turkeys-1st-nuclear-power-plant-akkuyu, accessed 28 June 2020.
296 - NIW, “Turkey: Rosatom Confirms Akkuyu-2’s April First Concrete Pour”, 24 July 2020.

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Sinop
Sinop is on Turkey’s northern coast and was planned to host a 4.4 GW power plant of four
units of the ATMEA reactor-design. If completed, these would have been the first reactors of
this design, jointly developed by Japanese Mitsubishi and French AREVA (now Framatome,
again).297 In April 2015, Turkish President Erdogan approved parliament’s ratification of theintergovernmental agreement with Japan.298
However, after three and a half years of unsuccessful attempts to renegotiate the deal
(see previous editions of the WNISR), in December 2018, the Japanese newspaper Nikkei
reported that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) had withdrawn, finally ending the project.299
Energy Minister Fatih Dönmez stated that the time schedule and pricing of Sinop fell shortof the ministry’s expectations after the results of feasibility studies, carried out by MHI. “Weagreed with the Japanese side to not continue our cooperation regarding this matter.”300
Reportedly, while there is neither an apparent nuclear builder nor an officially selected design,
the Turkish authorities have moved forward with an administrative Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA).301 The company that has submitted the EIA application on 30 March 2020 isAssystem ENVY Energy and Environmental Investment on behalf of EUAS International ICC
Sinop Nuclear Power Plant, Jersey Islands, Turkey Central Branch. The EIA report strangely
mentions the Flamanville-3 EPR reactor in France, currently under construction, as “reference
reactor”, while the original EIA from 2018 was based on the AREVA-Mitsubishi ATMEA design,
which has never gone beyond the design phase anywhere. Neither of the French companies
EDF or subsidiary Framatome (former AREVA NP) have communicated on the issue.

İğneadaIn October 2015, the Turkish Government suggested it was aiming to build a third nuclear
power plant, at the İğneada site. The most likely constructors would be Westinghouse andthe Chinese State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC). Chinese companies
have been said to be “aggressively” pursuing the contract, reportedly worth an estimated
US$22‑25 billion. In September 2016, China and Turkey signed a nuclear co-operationagreement similar to the mechanism used to develop the country’s other nuclear projects.
However, the financial collapse of Westinghouse effectively buried the project.

297 - WNN, “Turkish utility eyes large stake in Sinop project”, 12 May 2015,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Turkish-utility-eyes-large-stake-in-Sinop-project-12051501.html, accessed 22 April 2018.
298 - WNN, “Ground broken for Turkey’s first nuclear power plant”, 15 April 2015, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NNGround-broken-for-Turkeys-first-nuclear-power-plant-1541501.html, accessed 22 April 2018.
299 - Matsukubo Hijime, “Mitsubishi Heavy Industries withdraws from the NPP project in Sinop, Turkey ~NPP makers need to switch
to realistic track in the age of decommissioning~”, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, 30 January 2019,see http://www.cnic.jp/english/?p=4271, accessed 11 June 2019.
300 - NEI, “Turkey looks to cancel Japan Sinop project”, Nuclear Engineering International, 27 January 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsturkey-looks-to-cancel-japan-sinop-project-7653758/, accessed 13 June 2020.
301 - WNN, “Turkish utility to cooperate with Rolls-Royce in SMRs”, 20 March 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Turkish-utility-to-cooperate-with-Rolls-Royce-in-S, accessed 14 April 2020.

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Small Modular Reactors
In addition to the existing planned nuclear projects, Turkey is exploring the potential for
SMRs. In March 2020, the U.K.’s Rolls-Royce and Turkey’s state-owned EÜAS International
ICC signed an agreement to study the potential for small modular reactors from a technical,
licensing, commercial and investment perspective and the possibility of joint production of
SMRs in Turkey and globally.302

Public Attitudes and Social Implications
The spread of an anti-nuclear sentiment within the Turkish public dates back to the 1970s and isrooted in the country’s well-established environmental justice movements.303 Fueled by the fearof a repetition of disasters like Chernobyl or Fukushima, social mobilization against nuclear
power plants has been taking place in big cities and near the selected nuclear sites, protesting
safety threats, legality of waste disposal, high costs and administrative shortcomings among
other issues.304
Beside these well-known challenges that transcend the case of Turkey, the Akkuyu project isalso generating some serious social challenges, particularly on the level of the local population
living nearby the construction site. Although the construction of Akkuyu started only two years
ago, the nuclear power plant constitutes already a problem in the eyes of the local population.
According to recent field research, the Akkuyu construction site and its workers are negatively
impacting the safety, security and public health of local villagers as well as the state of theenvironment.305 Among the reported effects are the sharp increase in population in a very shortperiod of time due to the influx of workers and subcontractors, leading to increased events ofharassment against women, bullying and theft. Investigating the root cause of these issues, theresearch found that the Akkuyu construction workers themselves are not provided with decent
living conditions, where their social and psychological needs are met.
Since it was licensed in 1976, the choice of the Akkuyu site has been criticized for its seismic
risks, which have received more attention in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.306 Since then,various public surveys have been conducted to assess the public’s sentiment towards Turkey’s
nuclear power plans (see Figure 26). According to the latest survey in 2018, two thirds of theTurkish public do not support their country’s efforts to build nuclear power plants, stating that“it is clearly risky, nuclear power plants should never be built.”.307 The survey also showed thatthe anti-nuclear sentiment is across all political affiliations. Even within the AKP, the ruling

302 - WNN, “Turkish Utility to Cooperate with Rolls-Royce in SMRs”, 20 March 2020.
303 - Pinar Temocin, “Framing Opposition to Nuclear Power: The Case of Akkuyu in Southeast Turkey”, Institute for Peace andUnification Studies, Seoul National University, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, November 2018.
304 - Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power”, The Nonproliferation Review, September 1997;
and Mustafa Balat, “Energy and Nuclear Power Planning Study for Turkey”, Energy Exploration & Exploitation, 1 February 2006.
305 - Pınar Demircan, “Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant is already a problem”, Yeşil Gazete, 24 October 2019,see https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2019/10/24/akkuyu-nuclear-power-plant-is-already-a-problem/, accessed 30 May 2020.
306 - Julia Harte, “Building of Turkey’s First Nuclear Plant, Sited on a Fault Line, Facing Fresh Questions”, Reuters, 25 March 2011,see https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS122778134920110325, accessed 15 May 2020.
307 - Servet Yanatma, “Türkiye’de halkın üçte ikisi nükleer santrallere karşı”, euronews, 18 March 2019 (in Turkish),see https://tr.euronews.com/2019/03/18/turkiye-halkin-ucte-ikisi-nukleer-santrallere-karsi-ak-partililerde-destek-orani-yuzde-50,
accessed 15 May 2020.

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party in Turkey and an advocate of nuclear energy, half of its supporters are opposing nuclear
power.
In another public survey in 2018, when asked the question “Assuming that a power plant will
be built in the vicinity of your residence, which of the power plant options you oppose themost?” 67 percent of those surveyed selected nuclear.308 In March 2020, a group of Turkish
NGOs filed a court case against the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization to halt theconstruction work of the Akkuyu project because of the “lack of a valid environmental impact
assessment and generation license”.309
Figure 26 · Public Opinion in Turkey on Nuclear Power

Public Opinion on Nuclear Power in Turkey, 2011-2018
in %In Favor

43

Opposed2011 57

In Favor: "If necessary, nuclear
power plants should be built
to meet our energy needs."
37 2012 63

34 201866

Opposed: "It is clearly risky,
nuclear power plants
should never be built."© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Source: Euronews, 2019

310

Repeated public opinion polls show that a growing majority of the surveyed Turkish citizens
oppose the building of nuclear power plants in the country, regardless of political affiliations,as seen in Figure 26.

JordanIn 2007, the Government established the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) andthe Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission. JAEC started conducting a feasibility study on
nuclear power, including a comparative cost-benefit analysis.311
In September 2014, JAEC and Rosatom signed a two-year development framework for ascheme, which was projected to cost under US$10 billion and generate electricity costing
US$0.10/kWh.312 However, in May 2018, an unnamed Jordanian Government official revealed
to The Jordan Times that the plan to build two large reactors was not moving forward due

308 - İklim Haber and Konda Research, “Turkey Climate Survey”, June 2018,see https://www.iklimhaber.org/climatesurvey2018/, accessed 15 May 2020.
309 - Ali Ekber ŞEN, “Akkuyu Nükleer Güç Santrali’ne durdurma davası”, Hayat, 11 March 2020 (in Turkish),see https://www.sozcu.com.tr/hayatim/yasam-haberleri/akkuyu-nukleer-guc-santraline-durdurma-davasi/, accessed 15 May 2020.
310 - Servet Yanatma, “Türkiye’de halkın üçte ikisi nükleer santrallere karşı”, euronews, 18 March 2019, see https://tr.euronews.
com/2019/03/18/turkiye-halkin-ucte-ikisi-nukleer-santrallere-karsi-ak-partililerde-destek-orani-yuzde-50, accessed 26 August 2020.
311 - Mark Hibbs, “Jordan reactor siting study to be done in 2009, JAEC says”, Nucleonics Week, 27 September 2007.
312 - NIW, “Briefs—Jordan”, 18 April 2014.

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to financial difficulties and that Jordan “is now focusing on small modular reactors”.313 Thissuggests not only that Jordan was unable to secure its part of the financing for the two
1000 MW proposal (~ US$5 billion, equivalent to 50.1 percent of the estimated project’s cost)314 ,but also that Russia did not prioritize the Jordanian project, compared to the financing facilities
it offered Turkey and Egypt.
Since then Jordan has been focusing on small modular reactors. Jordanian officials reasoned
that SMRs would be a better fit for the country because of the greater ease of financing, while
their lower power capacity was also seen as more suited to Jordan’s small electricity grid(~ 4 GW in 2018).315 Additionally, the scarcity of water in Jordan seems to have contributed to
the rationale to replace large reactor plans with those of SMRs.316 It is reported that the chosensite for the SMR is Aqaba on the Red Sea, which had been previously ruled out, “due to its
proximity to industrial and transportation infrastructure”.317
Table 6 · Jordan’s SMR agreements (as of May 2020)
Vendor / Entity

Year

Purpose / Scope

Rosatom (Russia)

2017

Cooperation

King Abdullah City for Atomic
and Renewable Energy (Saudi Arabia)

2017

Cooperation / Feasibility study

Rolls Royce (U.K.)

2017

Feasibility study

CNNC (China)

2018

Cooperation framework

NuScale Power (USA)2019

Feasibility study

X-energy (USA)2019

Letter of intent
Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020.

Notes: CNNC = China National Nuclear Corporation.

Jordanian authorities have explored partnerships with several SMR vendors. Jordan hasentered discussions with U.S.-based NuScale Power, U.K.-based Rolls Royce, China National
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), South Korea’s Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute(KAERI), U.S.-based X-energy, and Russia’s Rosatom.318 However, it remains to be seen which,if any, of the partnerships will come to fruition. Additionally, JAEC has signed agreementswith Saudi Arabia’s KA-CARE, Rolls-Royce, and NuScale to carry out feasibility studies to

313 - Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan to replace planned nuclear plant with smaller, cheaper facility”, Jordan Times, 26 May 2018,see http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-replace-planned-nuclear-plant-smaller-cheaper-facility, accessed 1 June 2018.
314 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in Jordan”, Updated June 2019, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/
countries-g-n/jordan.aspx, accessed 29 June 2020.
315 - WNN, “IAEA launches project to examine economics of SMRs”, 26 March 2020, see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/
IAEA-launches-project-to-examine-economics-of-SMRs; and The Jordan Times, “93 per cent of Jordan’s electricity generated bynatural gas”, 5 May 2018, see http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/93-cent-jordan%E2%80%99s-electricity-generated-natural-gas,both accessed April 2020.
316 - Rod Walton, “Jordan, NuScale Partnering on SMR Nuclear Feasibility Study”, Power Engineering, 16 January 2019,see https://www.power-eng.com/2019/01/16/jordan-nuscale-partnering-on-smr-nuclear-feasibility-study/, accessed 11 April 2020.
317 - Joy Nasr and Ali Ahmad, “Middle East Nuclear Energy Monitor: Country Perspectives 2018”, Energy Policy and Security Program,Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, January 2019.
318 - NEI, “Jordan and X-energy agree to accelerate work on SMR”, Nuclear Engineering International, 22 November 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsjordan-and-x-energy-agree-to-accelerate-work-on-smr-7527332, accessed 11 April 2020.

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construct SMRs.319 Of course, since none of these designs are ready, especially Rolls-Royce’s,
these feasibility studies can only be based on hypothetical numbers. Jordan’s numerous SMR
agreements and their scope are listed in Table 6.

Jordan’s SMR Challenges
With its small grid size and limited financial resources, Jordan appears to be a textbook casefor SMRs. The number and diversity of Jordan’s SMR agreements shown in Table 6 signals
the appetite of international vendors to engage with Jordan on the development of SMR in
the country. Despite the enthusiasm, very little progress has been made in translating these
agreements into actions. Like the large reactor proposal, Jordan’s SMR venture is not without
its own challenges320, such as:
ɆɆ Higher per kWh costs compared to large reactors due to diseconomies of scale;ɆɆ None of Jordan’s SMR options are operational and many are first-of-a-kind designs;
ɆɆ US-based vendors (and technologies) would require Jordan to sign the so-called“123 Agreement”.
Figure 27 · Comparative Cost of Electricity in Jordan

Comparative Cost Estimatesof Electricity Generation in Jordan
in US$/MWh
Nuclear (2012)
Natural Gas (2020)*
Solar PV (2016)**
Solar PV (2018)***
0

20

40

60

80

100

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting* Estimate WNISR based on hypothesis of US$6 per million BTU** Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA)*** Lowest Bid

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

If Jordan decided to build a nuclear power plant today, it would likely take at least 15 years toestablish all the preconditions (legislation, safety authorities, trained staff, etc.), to constructand operate it. However, even at today’s costs, solar photovoltaics (PV) and natural gas provide
a cost-effective combination to generate electricity, lower than half of that generated by
nuclear power. If Jordan takes on the SMR option as it is currently advocating, nuclear costs
are expected to even grow substantially higher.

319 - WNN, “Jordan and Saudi Arabia team up on uranium, SMRs”, 29 March 2017, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/
Jordan-and-Saudi-Arabia-team-up-on-uranium,-SMRs; and WNN, “NuScale SMR to be considered for use in Jordan”, 15 January 2019,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/NuScale-SMR-to-be-considered-for-use-in-Jordan, both accessed 24 June 2019;
also WNN, “Rolls-Royce to conduct SMR study for Jordan”, 9 November 2017, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Rolls-Royceto-conduct-SMR-study-for-Jordan-09111702.html, accessed 24 April 2018.
320 - See M. V. Ramana and Ali Ahmad, “Wishful Thinking and Real Problems: Small Modular Reactors, Planning Constraints, andNuclear Power in Jordan”, Energy Policy, 2016.

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Additionally, other SMR challenges are inherited from the large reactor option. As shown in
Figure 27, electricity generated by nuclear power is not economically competitive vis-à-vis
renewables or natural gas. The new gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean signal Jordan’sability to reliably access relatively cheap natural gas. In 2019, Jordan signed a US$10 billion gas
deal with Israel that would supply the kingdom’s gas-fired power plants for the next 15 years.321
Like the large reactor option, SMR also face the challenge of public disapproval,322 especially inthe areas near the proposed site. In the current strained economic situation that has witnessedsome of Jordan’s biggest protests in recent history, pushing the nuclear option, large or small,
may provoke strong opposition and prove politically costly.

Egypt
The Egyptian nuclear vision began in the mid-1950s with the establishment of the Egyptian
Atomic Energy Commission (currently known as the Atomic Energy Authority). Egypt started
to explore the possibilities of building nuclear power reactors in the mid-1970s, when the
Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) was established. Initial plans envisioned 10 reactors
being operational by the end of the century.
Despite discussions with Chinese, French, German, and Russian suppliers, little development
occurred for several decades except for selecting in 1984 Dabaa on Egypt’s Mediterranean
coastline to host Egypt’s first nuclear power plant.323
In recent years, Egypt has stepped up its efforts and in February 2015, Rosatom and Egypt’s
NPPA signed a cooperation agreement, followed in November 2015 by an intergovernmental
agreement for the construction of four VVER-1200 reactors at Dabaa. In May 2016, it wasannounced that Egypt had concluded a US$25 billion loan with Russia for nuclear construction,at three percent interest for 85 percent of the construction cost, to be paid back through the saleof electricity. In December 2017, the total cost of the project was reported to be US$60 billion,
including US$30 billion for reactor construction. Three other deals were signed to cover
the supply of nuclear fuel for 60 years, operation and maintenance for the first 10 years ofoperation, and training of personnel.
The current phase is focused on site preparation and licensing. According to Anatolos Kovatnov,
the head of engineering work at the Dabaa project, Rosatom has submitted all the documents
required, and hopes to obtain the permits to start construction at the first unit of the Dabaa
plant in 2020. In March 2019, the Egyptian NPPA granted the site a permit for the reactors, thefirst step toward getting a construction permit.324

321 - Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan gets first natural gas supplies from Israel”, Reuters, 1 January 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/jordan-israel-gas-idUSL8N2960Q9, accessed 11 April 2020.
322 - Nadeem Goussous, “The Jordanian Nuclear Controversy”, Centre international de formation européenne, 2019.
323 - Joy Nasr and Ali Ahmad, “Middle East Nuclear Energy Monitor: Country Perspectives 2018”, Annual Report, Issam Fares Institutefor Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, January 2019,see https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/research_reports/2018-2019/20190103_middle_east_nuclear_energy_monitor_
country_perspectives_2018.pdf, accessed 25 June 2019.
324 - NEI, “Egypt’s El-Dabaa NPP granted site permit”, 16 April 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsegypts-el-dabaa-npp-granted-site-permit-7156405/, accessed 14 June 2019.

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In December 2019, Australian energy group Worley Limited was awarded a consultant
contract to advise Egypt in the building process.325 In February 2020, Atomstroyexport, asubsidiary of Rosatom, announced that three Egyptian firms—Petrojet, Hassan Allam, andAran Contractors—had won a tender for the first phase of work on the plant, expected to begin
in the summer of 2020 and continue through 2022. Earlier in the month, Atomstroyexport had
held a training for Egyptian engineers at the Kursk-II plant under construction in Russia.326
The Egyptian Government expects the Dabaa plant to be operational in 2026.327 However,questions have been raised as to whether the Egyptian Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory
Authority (ENRRA), established in 2010, will have the capacity and political independence toeffectively oversee the project. Additionally, while Egyptian officials estimate that the projectwill bring the country US$246 billion in revenues over 60 years, some experts have raised
concerns that the project will lead to a substantial increase in Egypt’s external debt.328 The
NGO Egyptian Initiative for Personal Right criticized the “persistent lack of transparency”
that accompanied the nuclear project since its inception.
From the perspective of nuclear security, Egypt’s nuclear program poses several challenges.
In recent years, “the rate, impact and sophistication of jihadi attacks in Egypt increased
significantly and it is not unthinkable for Egypt’s nuclear facilities to be targeted”.329

Iran
As of May 2020, Iran has the only operating nuclear power reactor in the Middle East
(Bushehr-1), which became operational in 2011, 34 years after construction began. In 2019,
the Bushehr-1 reactor generated 5.86 TWh, which is equivalent to 1.84 percent of the total
electricity generated in Iran.330
In terms of generating capacity, the 915-MW Bushehr-1 reactor represents 1.3 percent(see Figure 28) in a mix dominated by oil and gas with 81.3 GW or just under 81 percent. Until
Bushehr’s Units 2 and 3 come online, the nuclear share is expected to decline as Iran ramps up
its capacity of other sources to meet increasing electricity demand. Although the share of nonhydro renewables is just below 1 percent, it has doubled in one year.331

325 - NEI, “Worley wins contract to advise Egypt on nuclear plant construction”, 31 December 2019, see https://www.neimagazine.com/
news/newsworley-wins-contract-to-advise-egypt-on-nuclear-plant-construction-7581139, accessed 20 March 2020.
326 - GCR, “First contracts awarded for Egypt’s $25bn Dabaa nuclear power station”, Global Construction Review, 18 February 2020,see http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/first-contracts-awarded-egypts-25bn-dabaa-nuclear-/, accessed 20 March 2020.
327 - Al-Masry Al-Youm, “Three Egyptian companies win tender for Dabaa nuclear plant”, Egypt Independent, 17 February 2020,see https://egyptindependent.com/three-egyptian-companies-win-tender-for-dabaa-nuclear-plant/, accessed 20 March 2020.
328 - Warsaw Institute, “Russia Kicks Off Work On Egypt’s First Nuclear Power Plant”, 26 February 2020,see https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-kicks-off-work-egypts-first-nuclear-power-plant/, accessed 20 March 2020.
329 - Kareem Gerges and Ali Ahmad, “Egypt’s Nuclear Power Program: Security and Economic Risks”, Policy Brief #6/2018, Issam
Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, October 2018,see https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/publications/policy_briefs/2018-2019/20181018_egypt_nuclear_power_program.pdf.
330 - IAEA-PRIS, “Country Profile: Iran”, 2020, see https://pris.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=IR,
accessed 17 May 2020.
331 - BarghNews,see http://barghnews.com/fa/news/32512, accessed 18 May 2020.

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Despite Iran’s heavy economic and political investments in the nuclear program, nuclear power
contributes only 1.3 percent to the country’s electricity generating capacity—even private
prosumers have a large capacity installed.
Figure 28 · Iran’s 2019 Nominal Electricity Generating Capacity (by Source)

Iran’s 2019 Nominal Electricity Generating Capacity
by Source in %Auto-production**
1.8
Hydropower
14.7

Oil & Gas*
80.8

Total
NominalCapacity
81.3 GW

Non-hydro
Renewables
0.9

Nuclear
1.3
Diesel0.5*The specific oil and gas share in installed capacity
is not available. However, in 2017, about 84 percentof Iran's electricity was generated by natural gas.
**Auto-production refers to electricity generated
privately and consumed on-site, i.e. not tradedor injected into the grid.
© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

332

Source: ISNA, July 2019

Compared to other countries in the region, Iran went beyond the mere goal of acquiring
nuclear power reactors by investing in nuclear fuel chain activities such as uranium mining,enrichment and fuel manufacturing. Although Iran possess the capabilities to produce its own
enriched uranium it cannot do so under the restrictions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA). Although it remains to be seen if the agreement survives, Iran’s stockpile oflow enriched uranium is capped at 300 kg until 2030.
Beyond Bushehr Unit 1, in November 2014, Iran’s Nuclear Power Production andDevelopment Co. (NPPD) and Rosatom subsidiary Atomstroyexport signed a contract to build
Bushehr Units 2 and 3. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) projected that Units 2
and 3, would be completed within a 10-year timeline and cost around US$10 billion.333
Excavation for the foundation of the second unit at Bushehr—which is being built undera deal between Iran and Russia’s Rosatom—started on 31 October 2017.334 New basemat
concrete for the reactor building, which signals official construction start, has been poured in
November 2019. However, Unit 2 was originally part of the construction work of the Bushehr
power plant, which started in 1976. In fact, in 1994, the IAEA had listed both Units 1 and 2
as “under construction”.335 As of May 2019, Iranian authorities had maintained that “Bushehr
units 2 and 3 are to be completed in 2024 and 2026, respectively”.336 In April 2020, AEOI
332 - ISNA , “”, Iranian Students’ News Agency, July 2019,see https://www.isna.ir/news/98050401733/, accessed 18 May 2020.
333 - Darrell Proctor, “Iran Expands Plans for Nuclear Power”, POWER Magazine, 1 May 2019,see https://www.powermag.com/iran-expands-plans-for-nuclear-power/, accessed 13 April 2020.
334 - NIW, “Iran”, 3 November 2017.
335 - WNISR, “Iran: Construction Restart of Busheer-2”, World Nuclear Industry Status Report, 14 November 2019,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Iran-Construction-Restart-of-Busheer-2.html, accessed 18 May 2020.
336 - WNN, “Rosatom committed to Iranian plant project”, 9 May 2019,see http://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Rosatom-committed-to-Iranian-plant-project, accessed 13 June 2019.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

spokesperson claimed that Bushehr-2 was 30 percent complete and the construction of Unit 3
would begin within two years.337 As it is physically impossible to build almost one third of a
nuclear power plant within five months, this is an indication that the current project is wellbased on earlier construction efforts.
Additionally, in 2016, Ali Akbar Salehi, Head of the AEOI, hinted at talks with China to build
two more power plants in Darkhovain and on the Makran coast.338 Since then, however, there
has been no progress reported on these plans and their schedule, which is likely to be delayed
further given the current economic and political environment.
Saudi Arabia has in the past raised concerns that potential radioactive leakage from theBushehr plant could endanger the Gulf, including air, food and water supplies. Saudi Arabia,
the UAE and other Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC states have voiced their concerns
about Bushehr’s safety on various occasions, especially after earthquakes.339 In March 2020,
Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s ambassador to the Vienna-based international organizations,dismissed the Saudi concern as an attempt to politicize technical issues and maintained thatthe plant is meeting international safety standards.340 Gharibabadi pointed to the IAEA’s
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission at Bushehr in February 2020, the resultof which was “satisfactory”. He added that the IAEA delegation concluded that “Iran’s nuclear
safety system has the competence and capability to monitor nuclear activities”.

The Evolving Role of Renewables andNatural Gas in the Middle East
Like in many parts around the world, an electricity mix that is based on the coupling between
renewables and natural gas is gaining ground in the Middle East. In the six regional countries
with nuclear power ambitions, natural gas is the main source of power generation. In three
countries, natural gas contribution is more than 75 percent, in five over half (see Figure 29).
Development of renewable energy projects in the region is also thriving. Several world recordlow prices have been set in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in recent years.
As shown in Figure 30, Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) prices of solar PV projects, which
are naturally higher than the cost of generated electricity as they integrate a profit margin,
are much cheaper than the cost estimates of nuclear electricity. This is not surprising since thecosts of solar electricity (both for photovoltaic and concentrating solar plants) have witnessed
dramatic decline over the past decade, while nuclear costs have gone up. Additionally, theregion enjoys abundant solar resources, in terms of yield and number of sunny days per year,
thanks to its geographic and climatic characteristics.
337 - NEI, “Iran pushes ahead with nuclear development despite pandemic restrictions”, 15 April 2020, see https://www.neimagazine.
com/news/newsiran-pushes-ahead-with-nuclear-development-despite-pandemic-restrictions-7871976, accessed 16 April 2020.
338 - Tasnim News Agency, “China to Build 2 Nuclear Power Plants in Iran: AEOI Chief”, 19 January 2016, see https://www.tasnimnews.
com/en/news/2016/01/19/975906/china-to-build-2-nuclear-power-plants-in-iran-aeoi-chief, accessed 13 April 2020.
339 - Elizabeth Dickinson, “UAE and Saudi Arabia call on Iran to allay nuclear plant fears”, The National, 7 June 2013,see https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/uae-and-saudi-arabia-call-on-iran-to-allay-nuclear-plant-fears-1.478749;
and Amir Taheri, “Iran Earthquake Raises Concern over Nuclear Plant”, Asharq AL-awsat, 16 November 2017,see https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1085541/iran-earthquake-raises-concern-over-nuclear-plant, both accessed 18 May 2020.
340 - Tehran Times, “Iran dismisses Saudi claims over safety at Bushehr plant”, 10 March 2020,see https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/445953/Iran-dismisses-Saudi-claims-over-safety-at-Bushehr-plant, accessed 13 April 2020.

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Figure 29 · Share of Natural gas in Power Generation in Selected Regional Countries in 2019

Share of Natural Gas in Power Generationin Selected Countries in the Middle East
in 2019
97

76

63

58

19

UAE

Egypt

Iran

Saudi
ArabiaTurkey© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Source: BP, 2020

Notes: The BP data for 2019 does not include Jordan's value. In 2017, and according to the IEA, natural gas produced 83 percent of Jordan’s
electricity.

A recent study published in Nature Energy, analyzing the drivers of world record-low prices ofrenewable energy (especially solar PV) in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, found that among otherfactors favorable cost of capital and low taxes have played a significant role, emphasizing that“government policy remains an important element to remove barriers to PV deployment”.341
In all nuclear-aspiring countries in the region, natural gas is currently the dominating fuelused in power generation. Because of their operational and loading flexibility, natural gas-fired
power plants are complementary to the region’s growing investments in renewable energy.
Figure 30 · Comparative Costs of Nuclear and Solar PV Projects in the Middle East

Comparative Costs of Nuclear and Solar PV
Projects in the Middle East
in US$/MWh
110

2015

100

24.8

2019

2012

72

93

59

2018

2012 65
2018

2012

17

2019

16

2018

Egypt

JordanNuclearTurkeyUAE

Saudi
ArabiaSolar PV

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

The nuclear numbers are Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) estimates.
The solar numbers are Power Purchasing Agreements (PPAs).
The LCOE for Turkey is in US$2020, all other numbers in current US$.

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

In all the regional countries with nuclear power aspirations, renewables have made big strides
in recent years. Across the region, renewable energy targets are continually revised upwards.
341 - Harry Apostoleris et al., “Evaluating the factors that led to low-priced solar electricity projects in the Middle East”,
Nature Energy, 8 October 2018.

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In Egypt, the installed capacity of non-hydropower renewables (solar and wind) was around
2.7 GW, as of December 2019.342 In 2016, the Egyptian Government launched the “2035Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy”, according to which it plans to generate 42 percent of
the electricity through renewable energy sources, namely solar PV, concentrated solar-thermal
power and wind energy (see Figure 31).343 In the same strategy, the percentage allocated fornuclear energy is just 3 percent, raising questions about the real value for investing in nuclear
electricity that is only going to have such a small overall contribution to the national power
mix. In parallel, the Egyptian Government has launched a series of energy reforms such as afeed-in-tariff that incentivized private sector to get involved in the country’s electricity sector,
providing new financing pathways.
Egypt is also making strides in the development of a domestic and regional natural gas market.
Besides being host to Zohr, the largest gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean,344 Egypt has
invested in gas import and export infrastructure to position itself as regional hub, and in
the process, become self-sufficient. These developments will have a great impact on Egypt’s
electricity supply security as well as the future steps the country may take in shaping its energy
policy. Despite the prioritization on renewables and natural gas, the Egyptian Government
remains committed to building four nuclear reactors at the Dabaa site.
Figure 31 · Egypt’s Electricity Generation Mix Projections for 2022 and 2035

Egypt's Electricity Generation Mix in 2018
and Projections for 2022 and 2035
in %Renewables
9

3

20

2018
91

Nuclear2022

422035 55

80© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Thermal

Sources: Egypt’s New and Renewable Energy Authority, 2016 / IEA, World Energy Balances, 2019

By 2035, Egypt’s Dabaa nuclear power plant is projected to contribute only 3 percent of
the country’s electricity generation; a rather small share given the scale of investment(~US$60 billion – See section on Egypt above).
In the UAE, the Government released a long-term energy plan in February 2017, which proposesthat by 2050 renewable energy will provide 44 percent of the country’s electricity, with naturalgas 38 percent, “clean fossil fuels” 12 percent and nuclear 6 percent.345 The nuclear share is342 - Mohamed Farag, “Egypt will produce 61,000MW of renewable energy, of which 12,000MW concentrated solar power”,
28 December 2019, Daily News Egypt, see http://helioscsp.com/egypt-will-produce-61000mw-of-renewable-energy-of-which12000mw-concentrated-solar-power/, accessed 14 April 2020.
343 - MNREA, “”, 2016, see http://nrea.gov.eg/test/en/About/Strategy, accessed 14 April 2020.

344 - Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Egypt’s Zohr gas field output rises to 2.7 bln cubic feet per day - minister”, 21 August 2019,see https://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL5N25H1VW, accessed 14 April 2020.
345 - LeAnne Graves, “UAE Energy Plan aims to cut CO2 emissions 70% by 2050”, The National, 10 January 2017,see https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-energy-plan-aims-to-cut-co2-emissions-70-by-2050-1.51582, accessed 22 April 2018.

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in line with expected output from the Barakah nuclear power plant and in September 2017,
Government officials confirmed that there were no plans to build a second plant.346
In Jordan, where nuclear power plans continue to stumble, Energy Minister Hala Zawati
said in late 2018 that renewable energy should provide more than 20 percent of the country’s
electricity by 2020347, doubling the previous target,348 and in December 2019, Minister Zawati
said the soon-to-be-released energy strategy would include increasing the renewably electricity
share to 30 percent by 2030.349 In Jordan, the renewable energy market is one of the fastest
growing in the Middle East. In December 2019, ACWA Power, a Saudi Arabian energy group,
started the operation of a 50 MW solar power plant in Jordan with an electricity Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA) price of US$59/kWh.350 While the price level is significantly higher(yet) than in neighboring countries—mainly because of smaller unit size and higher financing
costs—it is only about half the estimated levelized cost of electricity for a large reactor, evenwith favorable assumptions.351 At the same time, the International Advisory Group, which istasked with monitoring Jordan’s progress in implementing its nuclear program, made anappeal for nuclear energy to remain part of the country’s energy strategy in the medium andlong term.352
In Saudi Arabia, the 300-MW Sakaka solar plant came on-line in November 2019, one monthand a half ahead of schedule. The project was tendered only in February 2017. Owner-operator
ACWA Power will sell electricity at US$23.6/MWh.353
Even in Iran, which has the region’s most advanced nuclear power program, and despite being
under heavy economic sanctions, renewable energy has been expanding. Iran’s wind power
capacity has grown from 92 MW in 2009 to 282 MW in 2018.354 Likewise, solar energy capacity
has gone from 1 MW in 2013 to 286 MW in 2018. However, this may be slowing because of
U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran. One report from August 2018 recorded that solar projects
amounting to 2.6 GW of capacity had been stalled because of U.S. sanctions.355
Sanctions aside, Iran has a high renewable energy potential. It has the advantage of thegeographic location, which gives it access to several sources of renewable energy, including
346 - Amena Bahr, “UAE Abu Dhabi Unlikely to Build a Second Nuclear plant”, NIW, 29 September 2017.
347 - The Jordan Times, “‘20% of country’s energy mix to be supplied from renewable sources by 2020’”, 11 December 2018,see http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/%E2%80%9820-countrys-energy-mix-be-supplied-renewable-sources-2020%E2%80%99,
accessed 23 July 2019.
348 - International Trade Administration, “Jordan - Renewable Energy”, U.S. Department of Commerce, Export.gov, 23 February 2017,see https://www.export.gov/article?id=Jordan-Renewable-Energy, accessed 7 May 2018.
349 - Jordan Times, “Gov’t to increase renewable energy contribution in 2020-2030 strategy”, 24 December 2019,see http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/govt-increase-renewable-energy-contribution-2020-2030-strategy, accessed 11 April 2020.
350 - Emiliano Bellini, “ACWA Power switches on 50 MW solar park in Jordan”, PV Magazine International, 12 December 2019,see https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/12/12/acwa-power-switches-on-50-mw-solar-park-in-jordan/, accessed 11 April 2020.
351 - Ali Ahmad, “Economic risks of Jordan’s nuclear program”, Energy for Sustainable Development, Volume 29, 1 December 2015,see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0973082615000897, accessed 11 April 2020.
352 - Jordan Times, “Nuclear energy vital in Jordan energy strategy — IAG report”, 29 December 2019,see http://jordantimes.com/news/local/nuclear-energy-vital-jordan-energy-strategy-%E2%80%94-iag-report, accessed 11 April 2020.
353 - Emiliano Bellini, “Saudi Arabia’s 300 MW Sakaka solar plant comes online”, PV Magazine International, 27 November 2019,see https://www.pv-magazine.com/2019/11/27/saudi-arabias-300-mw-sakaka-solar-plant-comes-online/, accessed 11 June 2020.
354 - IRENA, “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2019”, March 2019, see https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/
Publication/2019/Mar/IRENA_RE_Capacity_Statistics_2019.pdf, accessed 3 April 2019.
355 - Tsvetomira Tsanova, “US sanctions hit 2.6 GW of solar projects in Iran - report”, Renewables Now, 14 August 2018,see https://renewablesnow.com/news/us-sanctions-hit-26-gw-of-solar-projects-in-iran-report-623522/, accessed 13 June 2019.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 solar, wind, hydropower and geothermal.356 Recent studies have also shown that renewableenergy can contribute to complete decarbonisation in Iran by 2050 by powering water
desalination plants.357 Distributed renewables are particularly advantageous in rural regions
where the cost of transmission infrastructure and maintenance of centralized power plant arehigh.
In terms of its solar energy potential, Iran is exposed to approximately 300 sunny days per yearwith solar radiation average of 2,200 kWh per square meter.358 According to official estimates,
Iran’s solar energy capacity potential is 40,000 GW,359 an astonishingly high number.
Like Egypt, Iran continues to rely on natural gas as the main energy source which couples
well with the country’s renewable energy potential. Economically, this makes sense given theabundance of proven natural gas reserves and the impact of sanctions that prevents Iran fromselling its gas abroad. Based on 2017 numbers, Iran is the third largest producer of natural gas
and the fourth largest consumer in the world. However, the gas sector in Iran needs significant
investments for it to keep up with the country’s energy consumption. With the recent decline
in Iran’s economy due to tightening sanctions, Iran will find it difficult to finance in parallel asignificant expansion of its nuclear program.

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Nuclear
Programs in the Middle East
In the Middle East, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a varied impact on the regional nuclear
power programs.
Beside the safety concerns outlined below, the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to weaken
the already strained regional economies, putting further downward pressure on government
budgets. This may force governments to reconsider their commitments when it comes toinfrastructure spending such as on nuclear power programs. For example, Saudi Arabia is
expecting its budget deficit to widen to around US$61 billion in 2020 as its revenues were
hit hard by lower oil prices.360 Countries like Jordan, which has already been under pressing
economic conditions before the COVID-19 pandemic, will find it very difficult to invest in
nuclear power projects, regardless whether large or small.
In terms of country-specific issues, in the UAE, Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC)
has introduced measures such as locking down the Barakah site and halting “non-essential”
356 - Alireza Tavana et al., “Toward renewable and sustainable energies perspective in Iran”, Renewable Energy, Volume 139,
1 August 2019, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148119303271, accessed 13 April 2020.
357 - Narges Ghorbani, Arman Aghahosseini and Christian Breyer, “Assessment of a cost-optimal power system fully based on
renewable energy for Iran by 2050 – Achieving zero greenhouse gas emissions and overcoming the water crisis”, Renewable Energy,
Volume 146, February 2020, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148119309139, accessed 13 April 2020.
358 - Shiva Gorjian and Barat Ghobadian, “Solar Thermal Power Plants: Progress and Prospects in Iran”, Energy Procedia, Volume 75,
August 2015, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876610215012151, accessed 13 April 2020.
359 - Arash Mollahosseini et al., “Renewable energy management and market in Iran: A holistic review on current state and future
demands”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Volume 80, December 2017, see http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S136403211730881X, accessed 13 April 2020.
360 - Sam Bridge, “Saudi Arabia’s budget deficit forecast to widen to $61bn on virus, oil rout”, Arabian Business, 21 March 2020,see https://www.arabianbusiness.com/politics-economics/443369-saudi-arabias-budget-deficit-forecast-to-widen-to-61bn-on-virus-oilrout, accessed 17 May 2020.

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work in the wake of the pandemic.361 Additionally, ENEC’s Nawah company, the subsidiary
responsible for Barakah’s operation and maintenance, issued guidelines to reduce the numberof workers at the plant and enforce social distancing. On the other hand, FANR, the UAE’s
nuclear regulator, established a COVID-19 crisis management taskforce, which called formeasures such as asking employees to work remotely, leveraging digital means to conduct
inspection and monitoring activities, and reducing the number of on-site inspectors.362
In Iran, Turkey and Egypt, where Russia’s Rosatom is the nuclear technology vendor
and provider of other services such as operation, fueling and training, there have been noannouncements of COVID-19 impacts. However, some of Rosatom’s operations in thesecountries may have been impacted by the company’s announced COVID-19 measures, which
included accommodating the need of some of its international employees to return home.363
In Turkey, an MP representing the Mersin province, where the Akkuyu power plant site is
located, reported that one of the workers hads caught COVID-19, leading to some workers
leaving the construction site, which hosted more than 5,000 workers, due to safety concerns.364
Since then, members of local groups such as the Mersin Nuclear Platform have also voiced theirconcerns of the risks associated with continuing the construction works at Akkuyu during thisperiod.365
In Egypt, Grigory Sosnin, director of the Dabaa project stated that preparatory work on site
continues as planned and Rosatom “has taken a set of strict preventive measures” such as
restricting access to the construction site.366

Barakah, a Model Replicable Throughout the Middle East?
Despite delays, the UAE’s Barakah project has advanced faster than other regional projects; sowhy has the Emirati nuclear program progressed while other regional initiatives faltered?
The UAE, an oil-rich country with readily available financial resources and “high-grade” credit
rating, bypassed this challenge. In contrast, other Middle Eastern countries lack access toaffordable financing. Even for Saudi Arabia, a top oil-producer, which usually enjoys an easieraccess to capital, is under economic pressure due to the collapse of oil prices. In projects withvendor financing, like Egypt and Turkey’s deals with Russia’s Rosatom, there is a perceived
risk around Rosatom’s ability to deliver, especially if the Russian economy continues to sufferfrom the combined consequences of low oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Russian
361 - WNN, “ENEC CEO: Barakah Plant to Start up ‘Very Soon’”, 7 May 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/ENEC-CEO-Barakah-to-start-up-very-soon, accessed 14 May 2020.
362 - Christer Viktorsson, “Viewpoint: Regulators are adapting to an unprecedented challenge”, WNN, 11 May 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Viewpoint-Regulators-adapt-to-an-unprecedented-cha, accessed 11 May 2020.
363 - Rosatom, “Rosatom State Atomi Energy Corporation ROSATOM global leader in nuclear technologies nuclear energy”,
7 April 2020, see https://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/rosatom-arranged-the-return-of-178-employees-from-constructionsite-of-rooppur-npp-bangladesh-to-rus/, accessed 17 May 2020.
364 - HABERCi, “AKKUYU’DA COVİD-19 İDDİASI!”, Mersin Haberci Gazetesi, 22 April 2020 (in Turkish),see http://www.mersinhaberci.com/haber/21748/akkuyuda-covid-19-iddiasi.html, accessed 17 May 2020.
365 - Ali Ekber ŞEN, “5 binden fazla işçinin çalıştığı Akkuyu’da corona çıktı”, Sözcü, 10 April 2020 (in Turkish),see https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/5-binden-fazla-iscinin-calistigi-akkuyuda-corona-cikti-5740045/, accessed 17 May 2020.
366 - Mohammed Abdo Hasanein, “Egypt’s Nuclear Plant Project Continues Despite Virus Restrictions”, Asharq al-Awsat, 5 May 2020,see https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2268716/egypt%E2%80%99s-nuclear-plant-project-continues-despite-virus-restrictions,accessed 17 May 2020.

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Government has been subsidizing Rosatom’s projects overseas by providing government-togovernment loans as well as sovereign guarantees.
As early as 2009, ENEC, FANR, and the Khalifa University for Science, Technology andResearch (KUSTAR) announced a Nuclear Energy Scholarship Program for Emirati students,
promising graduates lucrative and prestigious positions in the nuclear industry.367 Officials
also held a number of public forums to provide information and updates on the project.368
Moreover, the UAE’s leadership made special efforts to build a wide network of institutions
and stakeholders with a vested interest in the success of the nuclear program, thus defusingmuch of the potential pushback. Efforts to sell the nuclear narrative to the public have been
either weak or non-existent in other countries in the region. In Jordan, Turkey, and, to someextent, in Egypt, the public has been vocal in its criticisms of proposed nuclear projects.
Some of the proposed nuclear projects in the region face political barriers related to nuclear
non-proliferation. The UAE bypassed much of the controversy associated with other nuclear
projects in the region by agreeing to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear
spent fuel.369 This has removed political and logistical challenges related to establishing abroader nuclear infrastructure, which otherwise might have delayed or halted the project.
In some respects, the UAE’s nuclear program can be perceived as a “counter-Iran” model,
wherein stripping the nuclear program of its most sensitive parts is “rewarded” by accessto state-of-the-art technologies and wider international support, especially from the UnitedStates. Egypt and Turkey seem to be contemplating a similar approach, since their respective
deals with Russia include fuel supply and take-back of spent nuclear fuel.
In conclusion, the expansion of nuclear power in the Middle East introduces more challenges
than opportunities in a region swept by conflicts, fragility and economic hardship. The region’s
weak institutions, especially the regulatory ones, and its geopolitical volatility pose serious
safety and security concerns that extend beyond the borders of the countries where nuclear
power plants are being built or projected. Economically, the region is already embarking on anenergy transition away from oil by investing heavily in a power generation capacity of natural
gas and renewables. Except for the case of the UAE, and based on the current electricity mix,
the addition of nuclear power does not seem to be contributing much to the region’s energy
transition.

CHINA FOCUS
China continues to expand its nuclear power sector, albeit at a much slower pace than thenation’s renewable sector. As of mid-2020, China had 47 reactors in operation, with a
total generating capacity of 45.5 GW. In addition, the 20-MW China Experimental Fast

367 - ENEC, “UAE Nuclear Energy Scholarship Now Accepting Applications”, 20 December 2010, see https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/
latest-news/uae-nuclear-energy-scholarship-program-now-accepting-applications/, accessed 13 April 2020.
368 - WNN, “UAE nuclear program reaches out to public”, 16 December 2014,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/UAE-nuclear-program-reaches-out-to-public, accessed 13 April 2020.
369 - However, the UAE does not yet have an adopted long-term spent nuclear fuel policy.

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Reactor (CEFR) remains in LTO. While in July 2019, Rosatom reported the delivery of a batchof fuel to the facility,370 there was no announcement of a restart of the reactor.
In 2019, nuclear power contributed 330 TWh of electricity production, which constituted
4.9 percent of all electricity generated in China. These figures have increased from the previous
year, by 53.1 TWh (+19.2 percent) and 0.7 percentage points respectively.
Despite this increase, there seems profound uncertainty about the future path of nuclear
power in China. Nuclear Intelligence Weekly (NIW) reported in July 2020 that “China’s ultimate
authority, the State Council, has mentioned almost nothing about newbuilds in its Government
work plan; while the National Energy Administration (NEA) provided no details of new nuclear
construction in its recent 2020 National Energy Work Guiding Opinions, unlike in previous
years”.371
This uncertainty is best illustrated by what is known (and unknown) about reactor
construction. The IAEA’s PRIS database indicated as of 4 May 2020 that there were 10 reactors
under construction with a total capacity of 9.4 GW.372 In the second half of May 2020, this was
updated to include the start of construction of Taipingling-1 (also called Huizhou-1). However,the construction start of this reactor actually took place in December 2019, and had been
publicly reported since at least January 2020.373 CGN Power (part of China General Nuclear
Power Corporation – CGNPC) also mentioned the construction start in its annual report in
April 2020.374
Even more mysterious is the inaugural CAP1400 project at Shidao Bay that is being built by
State Power Investment and that was first revealed by Nuclear Intelligence Weekly last year, basedon a list of all nuclear plants operating or considered as under construction as of 13 June 2019
put out by the National Nuclear Safety Administration.375 In January 2020, NIW noted that the
project had been “kicked off… in an unusually quiet fashion, with no official announcements
either from the government or the developer” and that there were “no announced target
dates for commercial operation”.376 As of 1 July 2020, IAEA-PRIS only reports the twin HighTemperature Reactors Pebble-bed Module (HTR-PM) as being under construction at the
Shidao Bay site. In previous WNISR editions, Shidao Bay-1 has been accounted for as one unit,
just as the IAEA’s PRIS indicates the plant as consisting of one 200-MW unit.377 However, itturns out that Shidao Bay-1 (also called Shidaowan-1) consists of two 100-MW reactors, and

370 - Rosatom, “TVEL Fuel Company of ROSATOM Supplied Fuel for China Experimental Fast Reactor”, Press Release, 9 July 2019,see https://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/tvel-fuel-company-of-rosatom-supplied-fuel-for-china-experimental-fast-reactor-/,accessed 25 July 2019.
371 - C.F. Yu, “Beijing’s Silence On Further Newbuilds”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 2 July 2020.
372 - IAEA, “Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) Database”, see http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/, accessed 4 May 2020.
373 - Miaosu Li, “China Nuclear News Roundup - January 2020”, Nicobar Group, 21 January 2020,see http://www.nicobargroup.com/news-views-1, accessed 6 May 2020.
374 - CGN Power, “Annual Report 2019”, China General Nuclear Power Corporation, April 2020, see http://en.cgnp.com.cn/encgnp/
c100882/202004/f3c20533b65c4cf3a41583190c02057c/files/a5bc0c2ac79c425398a2296b2b054005.pdf, accessed 2 April 2020.
375 - NIW, “Why the Secrecy Over Reactor Construction Start?”, 12 July 2019.
376 - C.F. Yu, “Can China Meet Bullish Nuclear Growth Targets?”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 10 January 2020.
377 - IAEA-PRIS, see https://pris.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=957, accessed 8 June 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 consequently, as of WNISR2020, they are considered separately, i.o.w. as two units underconstruction (Shidao Bay 1-1 and 1-2).378
The China Fast Reactor (CFR-600) has also reportedly been under construction since
December 2017,379 but is not listed by IAEA-PRIS as of mid-2020. Here again, there are various
reports that suggest that construction is ongoing. In January 2019, Russia’s TASS News Agency
reported that Rosatom subsidiary TVEL had signed “a contract for supply of nuclear fuelfor CFR-600 fast-neutron reactor which is currently under construction”.380 In May 2020, a
Chinese expert used satellite imagery to identify “the reprocessing plant [that] will supply
plutonium for the mixed-oxide fuels that will power the CFR-600 demonstration fast reactors
currently under construction”.381
Another sign of uncertainty about the future of nuclear power in China is the decline in
numbers. Even with these additional reactors counted by WNISR as being under construction,
the current number of 15 represents a continuous decline over the corresponding numbers of
17 reported in WNISR2018 and 21 in WNISR2017.382 The decline highlights the slowdown of
China’s nuclear power program, especially considering the target of the 5-Year Plan 2016–2020:
the 15 units combine less than 14 GW while 30 GW were planned for as under construction
simultaneously by the end of the period.
There are structural reasons for this slowdown. As previous issues of WNISR have discussed,
China has been confronting a combination of overcapacity in the power market and a reduced
rate of demand growth. These problems might be further compounded by the COVID-19
pandemic, which, as in other countries, had a significant impact on electricity demand.383
China experienced a 7.8 percent cumulative drop in power consumption in January andFebruary 2020.384 However, by May 2020, demand seemed to be back to pre-lockdown levels.385
A separate problem for nuclear power has been the Government’s lowering of electricity prices,
especially for industrial consumers, in recent years.386 In combination with nuclear construction
cost overruns, this makes the outlook for nuclear power “cloudier”.387 A more recent difficulty
has arisen with the strain in U.S.-China relations and the Trump administration’s ban on
378 - This is also in order to be coherent with the precedent of the Akademik Lomonosov, the Russian “floating” nuclear plant,
consisting of two 30-MW reactors, and identified as two separate units by IAEA-PRIS.
379 - WNN, “China begins building pilot fast reactor”, 29 December 2017,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-China-begins-building-pilot-fast-reactor-2912174.html, accessed 16 June 2019.
380 - TASS, “Rosatom eyes supplying nuclear fuel for China’s new fast neutron reactor”, 10 January 2019,see https://tass.com/economy/1039341, accessed 13 May 2020.
381 - Hui Zhang, “Pinpointing China’s new plutonium reprocessing plant”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5 May 2020,see https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/pinpointing-chinas-new-plutonium-reprocessing-plant/, accessed 13 May 2020.
382 - WNISR2020 is accounting for two instead of one Shidao Bay-1 units, which adds one unit to the WNISR2017–19 numbers
383 - Muyu Xu and Tony Munroe, “Electric Shock: China Power Demand Drops as Coronavirus Shutters Plants”, Reuters, as publishedin US News & World Report, 14 February 2020, see https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-02-14/electric-shock-chinapower-demand-drops-as-coronavirus-shutters-plants, accessed 31 May 2020.
384 - IHS Markit, “Power Demand Coming Back in China After Unprecedented Drop During COVID-19 Lockdown”, 30 March 2020,see https://news.ihsmarkit.com/prviewer/release_only/slug/2020-03-30-power-demand-coming-back-in-china-after-unprecedenteddrop-during-covid-19-lockdown, accessed 27 April 2020.
385 - IEA, “Covid-19 impact on electricity”, Statistics Report, Updated August 2020,see https://www.iea.org/reports/covid-19-impact-on-electricity, accessed 17 August 2020.
386 - Mo Yelin, “Quick Take: China Cuts Industrial Electricity Charges Again”, Caixin Global, 17 May 2018, see https://www.
caixinglobal.com/2018-05-17/quick-take-china-cuts-industrial-electricity-charges-again-101251692.html, accessed 31 May 2020.
387 - C.F. Yu, “Can China Meet Bullish Nuclear Growth Targets?”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 10 January 2020.

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most nuclear exports to China.388 This means that China is forced to avoid the use of any U.S.
suppliers. A number of new-build projects in China that planned to construct AP1000 reactors
are reportedly “caught in the political minefield of US-China relations due to their technology
choice”.389
Of the 15 reactors currently under construction, the two at the Shidao Bay 1 project have been
underway since 2012, six since 2015 (Fangchenggang-3, Fuqing-5 and -6, Hongyanhe-5 and -6,
and Tianwan-5), two since 2016 (Fangchenggang-4 and Tianwan-6), one since 2017 (CFR-600),
four since 2019 (Huizhou/Taipingling-1, Zhangzhou-1, and Shidao Bay 2-1 & 2-2390). Many ofthese are delayed (see Annex 5) and these delays may be part of the reason for not publicizing
new construction starts.
The last round of highly publicized construction projects involved the EPR and the AP1000
reactor designs, which were all quite delayed compared to initial projections, as detailed inprevious issues of the WNISR. Their performance after commissioning has also been somewhat
mixed, with Sanmen-2, one of the four inaugural AP1000 reactors, being shut down only six
weeks after commercial operations began in November 2018 because of water intrusion intoa reactor coolant pump.391 So far, the reasons for the pump malfunction have not been madepublic. China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) announced in November 2019 that the reactor
had “entered into the restart phase, with nuclear fuel already loaded into the reactor,”392 andthe PRIS database records that Sanmen-2 was online for a mere 817 hours (around 34 days)
during all of 2019.
Among the reactors under construction, CGN has announced that Hongyanhe Units 5 and 6,
both of the ACPR-1000 design, are expected to commence operations in the “second half of2021 and the first half of 2022” respectively.393 That is around one year later than predicted in
CGN’s Annual Report for 2015 (second half of 2020 and 2021 respectively).394
CGN has also announced that the Hualong units it is constructing at Fangchenggang (Units 3
and 4) are expected to “commence operations” in 2022.395 Again, this is delayed compared toearlier predictions of operations starting in 2020.396
CNNC’s Hualong projects at Fuqing, Units 5 and 6, also appear to be delayed. When concrete
was poured for Fuqing-6, the expectation was that they “would be completed in 2019 and 2020,

388 - Ramsey Al-Rikabi and Shawn Donnan, “U.S. Blacklists China Nuclear Firms Accused of Aiding Military”, Bloomberg,
15 August 2019, see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-15/u-s-blacklists-china-nuclear-firms-accused-of-aidingmilitary, accessed 31 May 2020.
389 - C.F. Yu, “Beijing’s Silence On Further Newbuilds”, NIW, 2 July 2020, p.5.
390 - Provisional names for the two reactors at Rongcheng/Shidaowan.
391 - C.F. Yu, “Sanmen-2 Restart Puts CNNC Out of Its Financial Misery”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 22 November 2019.
392 - NIW, “Sanmen-2 Prepares to Restart”, 15 November 2019.
393 - CGN, “Inside Information – Operation Briefings for the First Quarter of 2020”, 9 April 2020, see http://en.cgnp.com.cn/encgnp/
c20191226/202004/b6c32f917fe240549f40b9f150ec3352/files/e972209f38a44403ac1d5a030affdedf.pdf, accessed 20 April 2020.
394 - CGN, “2015 Annual Report”, 2016, see http://en.cgnp.com.cn/encgnp/c100882/201709/37ddeb8c24ba48d7a192b171d42a00d5/files/
60c25f8d89cd4ec4b8a8b62a71bb9382.pdf, accessed 8 June 2020.
395 - CGN, “Inside Information – Operation Briefings for the First Quarter of 2020”, 9 April 2020, see http://en.cgnp.com.cn/encgnp/
c20191226/202004/b6c32f917fe240549f40b9f150ec3352/files/e972209f38a44403ac1d5a030affdedf.pdf, accessed 20 April 2020.
396 - NEI, “China to build more Hualong One reactors”, Nuclear Engineering International, 25 February 2016,see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newschina-to-build-more-hualong-one-reactors-4821665, accessed 17 June 2016.

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respectively”.397 In a March 2020 update, CNNC announced that Fuqing-5 had cleared its first
hot performance test.398
CNNC’s Tianwan-5 and -6 are of the ACPR-1000 design and are reported to be scheduled forcommercial operation in 2020 and 2021.399 That remains in line with initial expectations whenconstruction started. 400
Finally, the twin High-Temperature Reactors (HTRs) being constructed at Shandong continue
to be delayed. Although the plant was supposed to start generating commercial electricity
by the end of 2017, according to a June 2020 presentation, “criticality and power operation”
are scheduled for 2021. 401 There appear to be no plans in China to construct any more HTRs,
certainly not of the same design. Economics is likely a key reason. The projected costs ofelectricity generation at the HTR are nearly 40 percent higher than at light water reactors, 402
without accounting for many additional years of delays and thus much higher financing costs
than anticipated.
Although the country was the first to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese
authorities maintain that it will not impact nuclear reactor construction. 403 This remains to be
seen.
Success of these Hualong construction projects is pivotal to plans to export the technology
to other countries, especially in Europe. The main prospect for such exports seems to be theUnited Kingdom. The U.K. Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) announced in February 2020
that it had completed Step 3 of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) of the Hualong, ormore precisely the U.K. version of the design. The review did not identify “any fundamental
safety or security shortfalls that would prevent” the reactor being given a Design AcceptanceConfirmation (DAC), ONR stated that it had identified “a number of areas for which further
substantiation is needed from the Requesting Party” and more generally “a lot of work by the
Requesting Party is still required”. 404
The progress in the U.K. was in contrast to what happened across the continent. In May 2020,
the Romanian Government “asked the state company Nuclearelectrica… to terminate
negotiations with…China General Nuclear Power Corporation…on the construction of nuclear
397 - WNN, “First concrete for sixth Fuqing unit”, 22 December 2015,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-First-concrete-for-sixth-Fuqing-unit-2212154.html, accessed 16 June 2019.
398 - Nuclear Energy Insider, “China’s CNNC Completes First Hot Performance Test at Fuqing 5”, Reuters, 18 March 2020,see https://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/node/55182, accessed 6 May 2020.
399 - NEI, “China delays operation of Hongyanhe 5&6”, Nuclear Engineering International, 9 January 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newschina-delays-operation-of-hongyanhe-56-7591603, accessed 31 May 2020.
400 - WNN, “Construction starts on sixth Tianwan unit”, 7 September 2016,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Construction-starts-on-sixth-Tianwan-unit, accessed 31 May 2020.
401 - Fu Li, “Chinese HTR Program”, Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology, Tsinghua University, Presentation at
the Webinar #4 – SMR Vendor Forum “An Open Discussion with Global Vendors to Review Designs and Benefits”, International
Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, 23 June 2020, see https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-06/
slides_deck_-_webinar_4.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.
402 - C. F. Yu, “CNEC-CFHI Deal — Boosting the HTGR Or Chinese Manufacturing?”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 9 September 2016.
403 - Muyu Xu and David Stanway, “China says virus outbreak will not impact nuclear power plant construction”, Reuters,
15 April 2020, see https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/business/story/China_says_virus_outbreak_will_not_impact_nuclear_power_
plant_construction-TR20200415nL3N2C311BX1/, accessed 27 May 2020.
404 - ONR, “UK HPR1000 progresses to next stage of assessment”, Office for Nuclear Regulation, 13 February 2020,see http://news.onr.org.uk/2020/02/uk-hpr1000-progresses-to-next-stage-of-assessment/, accessed 29 April 2020.

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reactors 3 and 4 at Cernavoda”. 405 The two companies had signed a “preliminary agreement
for the construction and operation of two new reactors” only in May 2019406 (see section on
Romania in Annex 1).
Meanwhile, renewable energy capacity in China continues to grow at a substantially higher
rate. Total installed renewable capacity increased by about nine percent from 2018 to 2019,going from 695 GW to 759 GW; wind capacity expanding from 185 GW in 2018 to 210 GW in
2019, and solar capacity from 175 GW in 2018 to 205 GW in 2019. 407
According to the China Electricity Council, the two forms of renewable energy provided
406 TWh (wind) and 224 TWh (solar) to the grid respectively. 408 These figures agree with thosereported by BP. 409 These have gone up by almost 11 percent and 26.6 percent compared to 2018.
Electricity generated by wind continues to exceed the nuclear contribution, and solar energy
is approaching two-thirds of nuclear energy’s contribution. (See Nuclear Power vs. Renewable
Energy). IHS Markit estimates that in January and February 2020, due to the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic, nuclear energy’s contribution to the grid declined by 2.2 percent whereas
renewables have remained resilient, with wind and solar energy growing by 0.9 percent and12 percent respectively. 410
In November 2019, the Government of China scaled back the subsidies offered torenewable power, from 8.1 billion yuan (US$1.2 billion) in 2019 to 5.67 billion yuan in 2020
(US$0.8 billion). 411 This is in part a recognition of the increasing economic competitiveness ofrenewable energy. In May 2019, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
announced that wind projects commissioned after 1 January 2021 will not receive subsidies
and will apply what it terms “grid price parity”, namely that it will be paid the same as coal. 412
A different development in the future might be the acceleration of offshore wind energy,
which has grown in installed capacity from 0.1 GW in 2010 to 5.9 GW in 2019. 413 Last year, theinaugural price competition for offshore wind development led to a winning bid of 620 yuan/
MWh (US$87.8/MWh) from China Longyuan, the wind development arm of China Energy
Investment Corporation. 414 The potential for offshore wind power is considerable and a recent
405 - Madalin Necsutu, “Romania Cancels Deal With China to Build Nuclear Reactors”, Balkan Insight, 27 May 2020,see https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/27/romania-cancels-deal-with-china-to-build-nuclear-reactors/, accessed 31 May 2020.
406 - Romania Insider, “Romania and China seal deal for Cernavoda nuclear plant expansion”, 9 May 2019,see https://www.romania-insider.com/index.php/romania-china-seal-deal-nuclear-plant, accessed 15 May 2020.
407 - IRENA, “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2020”, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020 (in English, French and Spanish),see https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Mar/Renewable-Capacity-Statistics-2020, accessed 24 April 2020.
408 - China Electricity Council, “2019 electricity & other energy statistics (preliminary)”, China Energy Portal, 21 January 2020
(English Translation), see https://chinaenergyportal.org/2019-electricity-other-energy-statistics-preliminary/, accessed 13 May 2020.
409 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020”, June 2020, see https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/
statistical-review-of-world-energy.html, accessed 17 June 2020.
410 - Xizhou Zhou, “Renewables Emerge as Winner During China’s COVID-19 Lockdown”, IHS Markit, 26 March 2020, see https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/renewables-emerge-as-winner-during-chinas-covid19-lockdown.html, accessed 27 April 2020.
411 - Muyu Xu and Dominique Patton, “China to cut renewable power subsidy to $807 million in 2020”, Reuters, 20 November 2019,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-renewables-subsidy-idUSKBN1XU0X8, accessed 27 April 2020.
412 - David Stanway, “China to end subsidies for onshore wind power by 2021”, Reuters, 24 May 2019, see https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-china-windpower-idUSKCN1SU0M1, accessed 13 May 2020; Joyce Lee and Feng Zhao, “Global Wind Report 2019”, Global
Wind Energy Council, March 2020, see https://gwec.net/global-wind-report-2019/, accessed 27 April 2020.
413 - IRENA, Renewable Capacity Statistics 2020, p.20.
414 - Yuki Yu, “China offshore wind bid under $100/MWh in first price contest”, Recharge News, 23 August 2019, see https://www.
rechargenews.com/wind/china-offshore-wind-bid-under-100-mwh-in-first-price-contest/2-1-659416, accessed 31 May 2020.

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study estimates that thousands of GW of capacity and over 10,000 TWh could be supplied atcosts lower than the estimated costs of generating nuclear power. 415
Another sign of the growing importance of renewable energy is interest among domestic
nuclear companies in wind and solar power. Two of the three traditional state owned
nuclear enterprises, the State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) and CGN are now thelargest solar photovoltaic power producer globally and the fourth-biggest wind developer
respectively. 416 CGN and China Huaneng, which is developing the HTR-PM (High-Temperature
gas-cooled Reactor Pebble-bed Module) in Shidaowan, also bid in the first offshore wind powercompetition but were unsuccessful. 417
These renewable energy acquisitions might also affect how these entities evolve in the
future, especially as the Chinese Government is trying to respond to the country’s economic
downturn by consolidating and restructuring the energy industry. 418 Such restructuring
could dramatically shape the future of the nuclear energy sector. Since the 1990s, the growthof nuclear power in China has been fueled by competition between the leading state-owned
enterprises involved in the development of nuclear power, CGN, SPIC and CNNC. 419 There is
now speculation about forging “a unified nuclear developer by consolidating all the nuclear
power assets of CNNC, CGN, and SPIC” or, as an alternative, having CGN’s nuclear units beabsorbed by CNNC while SPIC absorbs the renewable units. 420
China’s renewable energy push has also extended outside its borders. Since 2014, Chineseequity investment has supported a total of 12.6 GW of wind and solar projects in South andSoutheast Asia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. 421 Chinese companies also built and own
large renewable energy projects in various European countries.

FINLAND FOCUS
Finland operates four units which in 2019 supplied 22.9 TWh of electricity, the highest
production ever in the country. The nuclear share represented 34.7 percent of the nation’s
electricity in 2019, an increase of 2.3 percentage points over the previous year but remaining
below the highest share of 38.4 percent in 1986. Finland’s fifth reactor, the 1.6 GW EPR
at Olkiluoto (OL3), which has been under construction since August 2005, was originallyscheduled to begin operations in 2009, and during the past year has suffered further multiple

415 - Peter Sherman, Xinyu Chen and Michael McElroy, “Offshore wind: An opportunity for cost-competitive decarbonization ofChina’s energy economy”, Science Advances, 1 February 2020.
416 - C.F. Yu, “China’s Datang Approves Second Controlling Stake in a Newbuild”, NIW, 2 December 2019.
417 - Yuki Yu, “China Offshore Wind Bid under $100/MWh in First Price Contest”, Recharge News, 23 August 2019.
418 - C.F. Yu, “CGN Once Again at the Center of Restructuring Rumors”, NIW, 20 March 2020.
419 - M.V. Ramana and Eri Saikawa, “Choosing a standard reactor: International competition and domestic politics in Chinese nuclear
policy”, Energy, December 2011.
420 - C.F. Yu, “CGN Once Again at the Center of Restructuring Rumors”, NIW, 20 March 2020.
421 - Greenpeace International, “Chinese Equity Investments in Energy Reshape South and Southeast Asia”, Greenpeace International,
29 July 2019, see https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/23446/chinese-equity-investments-in-energy-reshape-southand-southeast-asia-greenpeace-analysis, accessed 24 April 2020.

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and commercial operation by 31 May 2021, 16 years after construction start and 12 years later
than originally planned. 423 The prospects are for further delays.
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO), which owns and operates the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant,
reported record generation for its Olkiluoto Units 1 (OL1) and 2 (OL2) reactors, with total
generation of 14.75 TWh and with load factors of 96.9 percent and 92.7 percent, respectively. 424
Fortum, the operator of the two reactors at Loviisa also reported record production at Loviisa
Unit 1, with total production from the plant of 8.2 TWh. 425
Finland has adopted different nuclear technologies and suppliers, as two of its operating
reactors are VVERs (Vodo-Vodianoï Energuetitcheski Reaktor) V213 built by Russian
contractors at Loviisa, while two are AAIII, BWR-2500 built by Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) at
Olkiluoto. The OL3 EPR contractor is AREVA. The average age of the four operating reactors
is 41.3 years. In January 2017, operator TVO filed an application for a 20-year license extension
for the respectively 39 and 37-year old units Olkiluoto-1 and -2. 426 On 20 September 2018, theCabinet approved the lifetime extension for TVO’s OL1 and OL2 to operate until 2038. 427
In March 2014, Russian state nuclear operator Rosatom, through subsidiary company RAOS
Voima Oy, completed the purchase of 34 percent of the Finnish company Fennovoima for an
undisclosed price, 428 and then in April 2014 a “binding decision to construct” a 1200 MW AES2006 reactor was announced. A construction license for the reactor is expected in 2021429 andconstruction is to begin in the same year, with operation of the plant currently scheduled for2028. As reported in WNISR2019, with construction of the nuclear plant not yet started, theHanhikivi-1 project is already nine years behind the original schedule. 430

Olkiluoto-3 (OL3)In December 2003, Finland became the first country in Western Europe to order a new nuclear
reactor since 1988. AREVA NP, then a joint venture owned 66 percent by AREVA and 34 percent

422 - YLE, “Third Olkiluoto nuclear reactor granted operating license”, 8 March 2019,see https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/third_olkiluoto_nuclear_reactor_granted_operating_license/10680697, accessed 9 July 2020.
423 - Roger Fry, “TVO reporte le démarrage d’Olkiluoto 3 (1,6 GW) à mai 2021”, Montel, 2 July 2020 (in French),see https://www.montelnews.com/fr/story/tvo-reporte-le-dmarrage-dolkiluoto-3-16-gw-%C3%A0-mai-2021/1128407,
accessed 12 July 2020.
424 - TVO, “The best production year ever for Olkiluoto 1 plant unit”, 2 January 2020, Press Release, see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/
news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/thebestproductionyeareverforolkiluoto1plantunit.html, accessed 10 July 2020.
425 - Fortum, “A good production year 2019 at Fortum’s Loviisa nuclear power plant - production record at unit 1”, Press Release,
3 January 2020, see https://www.fortum.com/media/2020/01/good-production-year-2019-fortums-loviisa-nuclear-power-plantproduction-record-unit-1, accessed 10 July 2020.
426 - TVO, “New operating license applied for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units”, 26 January 2017,see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2017/hNRykwgEO.html, accessed 13 August 2020.
427 - TVO, “Finnish Government Approves Extension Of Operating Licences For OL1 And OL2 Plant Units”, 20 September 2018,see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2018/h7tODvf1I.html, accessed 13 August 2020.
428 - Fennovoima, “Rosatom acquired 34% of Fennovoima”, Press Release, 27 March 2014.
429 - WNN, “Fennovoima changes spur progress with Hanhikivi project”, 25 March 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Hanhikivi-project-progresses-following-Fennovoima, accessed 10 July 2020.
430 - NEI, Fennovoima issues progress report on Hanhikivi 26 March 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsfennovoima-issues-progress-report-on-hanhikivi-7839412, accessed 10 July 2020.

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by Siemens, 431 was contracted to build the EPR at Olkiluoto (OL3) under a fixed-price, turnkey
contract with the utility TVO. After the 2015 technical bankruptcy of AREVA Group, in
which the cost overruns of Olkiluoto had played a large part, the majority shareholder, theFrench Government, decided to integrate the reactor-building division under “new-old name”
Framatome into a subsidiary majority-owned by state utility EDF. However, EDF made it clearthat it would not take over the billions of euros’ liabilities linked to the costly Finnish AREVA
adventure. 432 Thus, it was decided that the financial liability for OL3 and associated risks staywith AREVA S.A. after the sale of AREVA NP and the creation of a new company AREVA
Holding, now named Orano, that will focus on nuclear fuel and waste management services,very similar to the old COGEMA. In July 2017, the French Government confirmed that it hadcompleted its €2 billion (US$20182.3 billion) capital increase, 433 most of which was to cover thecosts to AREVA of the OL3 project.
The OL3 project was financed essentially on the balance sheets of the Finland’s leading firms
and heavy energy users as well as a number of municipalities under a unique arrangementthat makes them liable for the plant’s indefinite capital costs for an indefinite period, whether
or not they get the electricity—a capex “take-or-pay contract”—in addition to the additionalbillions incurred by AREVA under the fixed price contract.
OL3 construction started in August 2005, with operations planned from 2009. However, thatdate—and other dates—passed.
From the beginning, the OL3 project was plagued with countless management and qualitycontrol issues. Not only did it prove difficult to carry out concreting and welding to technicalspecifications, but the use of sub-contractors and workers from over 50 nationalities madecommunication and oversight extremely complex (see previous WNISR editions).
After further multiple delays, TVO announced in June 2018 that grid connection was plannedfor May 2019, and “regular electricity generation” in September 2019. 434 In April 2019 fuelloading was pushed further to August 2019. TVO’s plans for grid connection in October 2019and electricity generation by January 2020 were considered by WNISR2019 as highly
optimistic. 435
In July 2019, TVO announced that it had once again delayed operations for OL3 by six months. 436
The startup date was moved to July 2020 by nuclear plant supplier the AREVA-Siemens
Consortium. TVO announced that nuclear fuel was scheduled to be loaded into the reactor in
January 2020 and the first connection to the grid was to be in April 2020. “The re-baseline is
now more exhaustive which we believe will make it possible to improve project performance”,
431 - Siemens quit the consortium in March 2011 and announced in September 2011 that it was abandoning the nuclear sector entirely;
see WNN, “Siemens quits the nuclear game”, 19 September 2011, see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Siemens-quits-thenuclear-game, accessed 13 August 2020.
432 - Jean-Michel Bezat, “EDF pose ses conditions au rachat des réacteurs d’Areva”, Le Monde, 19 May 2015.
433 - Jean-Michel Belot and Richard Lough, “Areva says French state completes two billion-euro capital increase”, Reuters, 12 July 2017,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arevasa-capital-idUSKBN19X2S9, accessed 10 July 2020.
434 - TVO, “OL3 EPR’s regular electricity generation starts in September 2019”, Press Release, 13 June 2018,see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2018/hAZ20lOtQ.html, accessed 13 August 2020.
435 - WNN, “TVO starts work to resolve Olkiluoto 3 vibration issue”, 23 May 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/TVO-starts-work-to-resolve-Olkiluoto-3-vibration-i, accessed 10 July 2020.
436 - TVO, “OL3 EPR’s regular electricity generation starts in July 2020”, 17 July 2019,see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2019/h3BCeyaya.html, accessed 10 July 2020.

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said Jouni Silvennoinen, TVO’s director of the OL3 project. 437 By November 2019, the revised
schedule for OL3 start had slipped a further six weeks, according to TVO. 438 The delays werereported to be due to final verification of the mechanical, electrical and the Instrumentation
and Control (I&C) systems.
In December 2019, the AREVA-Siemens Consortium informed TVO that OL3 would beconnected to the grid in November 2020 with electricity generation from March 2021. 439
Nuclear fuel loading was planned for June 2020. The delays were reported to be due to slow
progression of system tests and shortcomings in spare-part deliveries. 440 Among other thingsin the tests of auxiliary diesel generators some faulty components were found. 441
On 8 April 2020, TVO announced that it had applied to STUK (Säteilyturvakeskus), the Finnish
radiation and nuclear safety regulator—for approval for fuel loading. 442 It was expected to taketwo months. At the same time, TVO revealed that as result of “significant amount of measurestaken to prevent the spreading of the coronavirus epidemic (COVID-19) in order to minimize
the effects of pandemic risk to the project. The coronavirus pandemic may have significantly
added uncertainty to the progress of the project.”443 As a consequence, fuel loading would nottake place in June 2020 as planned, and “it is possible that the regular electricity production
will be delayed respectively. AREVA-Siemens consortium will update the schedule for OL3 EPR
unit as soon as spreading and effects of the coronavirus pandemic are known.”444
The latest delay and uncertainty prompted a revision downwards of TVO’s credit rating by
S&P, with the timing and effect on OL3 commissioning “unclear” with expectations…that this will further increase project costs and postpone TVO’s deleveraging, increasing therisk that the AREVA (not rated) is unable to maintain sufficient funds for related obligations,
including the two-year guarantee period. The negative outlook reflects the risk that TVO’s
financial flexibility could diminish as a result of weaker counterparties or additional delays
that could further increase already-high financial leverage. 445

With the delay in fuel loading, and in a further sign of potential and additional financial risks
for delay in OL3 commissioning, Fitch revised TVO’s outlook from stable to negative, and437 - Ibidem.
438 - TVO, “Plant supplier updates the schedule of OL3 project”, 8 November 2019,see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2019/h0aOkf1fA.html, accessed 10 July 2020.
439 - TVO, “OL3 EPR’s regular electricity generation starts in March 2021”, 19 December 2019, see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/
pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/ol3eprsregularelectricitygenerationstartsinmarch2021.html, accessed 10 July 2020.
440 - Ibidem.
441 - YLE, “Olkiluoto 3 reactor delayed yet again, now 12 years behind schedule”, 20 December 2019, see https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/
news/olkiluoto_3_reactor_delayed_yet_again_now_12_years_behind_schedule/11128489, accessed 10 July 2020.
442 - TVO, “TVO has submitted OL3 EPR unit nuclear fuel loading permission application”, 8 April 2020, see https://www.tvo.fi/en/
index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/tvohassubmittedol3eprunitnuclearfuelloadingpermissionapplication.html,
accessed 10 July s2020.
443 - Ibidem.
444 - Ibidem.
445 - TVO, “Standard & Poor’s has downgraded TVO’s long term credit rating to BB”, 15 April 2020, see https://www.tvo.fi/
en/index/news/pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/standardpoorshasdowngradedtvoslongtermcreditratingtobb.html,
accessed 10 July 2020.

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stated that, “A significant delay could be negative for TVO’s cash flow as the company has toservice debt related to OL3”. 446 The ratings agency, noted that
There is a risk that the settlement agreement signed with the supplier consortium (AREVA
NP, AREVA GmbH, Siemens AG (A/Stable) and AREVA Group’s parent AREVA SA) in
March 2018 would not protect TVO from financial impacts should the start of power
production be delayed beyond June 2021, because the consortium has not yet assigned a newdate for the fuel loading. After this date, TVO would not be entitled to penalty payments fromthe supplier consortium under the settlement agreement anymore. 447

At the same time, weaker electricity prices, partially due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
impact TVO. The Average Nord Pool system price in the first quarter 2020 was €15.4/MWh(US$16.9/MWh) compared with €46.8/MWh (US$52.5/MWh) for the same period in 2019.
While Fitch reported that TVO’s current nuclear production costs are about €20/MWh(US$21.7/MWh) and that this is estimated to increase to about €30/MWh (US$32.6/MWh)when OL3 starts commercial operation. 448 Nord Pool futures for 2021–2022 currently trade
about €23–26/MWh (US$25.5–28.9/MWh) and Finnish area prices at slightly higher levels.
As reported by WNISR 2019 (see WNISR2019: Finland Focus), TVO and AREVA-Siemens
signed a settlement agreement in March 2018, which states that TVO would receive
compensation of €450 million (US$515 million) from the supplier consortium. The settlement
further includes a penalty mechanism, under which the supplier consortium pays additional
penalties to TVO in case of further delays beyond 2019. However, these are capped at€400 million (US$458 million), which would be reached in June 2021. With delays beyond
June 2021, the agreement would not cover the financial impact on TVO. It was reported in
April 2020, that AREVA was currently making arrangements in order to secure funding until
the end of the project (including the guarantee period). 449

Faulty Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves
On 9 July 2020, yet another potentially significant delay was announced in commissioning of
OL3. STUK reported that defects in the pressurizer safety relief valves had been identified. 450
The valve on which the leak was found was mechanically damaged and after further checks
similar cracks were detected in two of five other valves. STUK announced that the problem
was serious and should be fully investigated before proceeding with nuclear fuel loading.
The Sierion valves were disassembled, removed from OL3 and returned to the German
manufacturer for detailed analysis.

446 - Fitch, “Fitch Revises Teollisuuden Voima Oyj’s Outlook to Negative; Affirms at ‘BBB-’”, 20 April 2020,see https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/fitch-revises-teollisuuden-voima-oyj-outlook-to-negative-affirms-atbbb-20-04-2020, accessed 10 July 2020.
447 - Ibidem.
448 - Ibidem.
449 - Ibidem; and TVO, “OL3 EPR’s schedule work continues”, 2 July 2020, see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/
pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/ol3eprsscheduleworkcontinues.html, accessed 20 July 2020.
450 - onOZE, “Ponowne wstrzymanie budowy bloku elektrowni jadrowej Olkiluoto-3”, 9 July 2020 (in Finnish),see https://onoze.pl/2020/07/09/ponowne-wstrzymanie-budowy-bloku-elektrowni-jadrowej-olkiluoto-3/, accessed 10 July 2020.

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Pressurizer safety relief valves are F1A classified (must not fail) because it is necessary toreach a controlled state under Plant Condition Category (PCC) conditions. The EPR valves are
required to perform vital functions in both routine and accident conditions. 451
The safety relief valves type VS99 (Sierion) installed in OL3 were manufactured by the German
company Sempell, 452 and their quality was confirmed in 2016–2017 by Erlangen Center owned
by Framatome. As a result of the discovery, Sempell valves installed in the EPRs at Taishan-1
and -2 in China and Flamanville-3 in France are to be investigated. Sempell valves are also due
to be installed in the Hinkley Point C EPR. As of early July 2020, the only disclosure from TVO
was that “cracks were detected in the pilot valves of the pressurizer safety relief valves”. 453

OL3 Pressurizer Vibration
As reported by WNISR 2019 (see WNISR2019: Finland Focus), excessive vibration was detectedin the pressurizer surge-line which contains high temperature and radioactive reactor coolant
under high pressure. The vibrations were outside the permitted safety margin. 454 The Finnish
safety regulator STUK, while reporting to the Government in February 2019 that operation of
the OL3 would be safe, noted that before fuel loading could be authorized, technical solutions
needed to be applied to suppress the pressurizer surge-line vibration of the primary circuit.
STUK would “supervise the work and verify before the loading of fuel that the alteration works
have been performed and the operability of the solution has been tested.”455 On 23 May 2019,
TVO announced that it had “resolved” the surge-line vibrations. 456
However, in TVO’s July 2020 newsletter, it was stated that “all works have not progressedto plan and there has [have] been some technical problems. (…) Also, repair works related to
the failed components of the emergency diesel generators and the vibration problems of thepressurizer surge line are still ongoing.”457
OL3 was considered by the nuclear industry as a showcase for next-generation reactor
technology with TVO and AREVA predicting 56 months to completion. However, WNISR
envisaged over a decade ago that the project could lead to a crisis, 458 which has turned out to be
451 - UK-EPR, “Fundamental Safety Overview — Volume 2: Design and Safety — Chapter E: The Reactor Coolant System andRelated Systems — Section E.4.5. Pressuriser Relief Line”, 2007, see http://www.epr-reactor.co.uk/ssmod/liblocal/docs/V3/
Volume%202%20-%20Design%20and%20Safety/2.E%20-%20The%20Reactor%20Coolant%20System%20and%20Related%20
Systems/2.E.4/2.E.4.5%20-%20Pressuriser%20Relief%20Line%20-%20v2.pdf, accessed 10 July 2020.
452 - Emerson, “Sempell Nuclear Valves Secure leak-tight performance and 100% reliability for high pressure, high temperatureapplications”, Sempell Nuclear Product Brochure, VCPBR-03316-EN, 2017.
453 - TVO, “TVO Newsletter—Respirator masks worn at OL3”, 2 July 2020, see https://uutiset.tvo.fi/g/l/290020/0/0/2652/1012/7,
accessed 10 July 2020.
454 - Lefteris Karagiannopoulos, “Exclusive: Safety problem found at Areva’s Finnish reactor before start-up – regulator”, Reuters,
22 February 2019, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-nuclear-safety-exclusive/exclusive-safety-problem-found-at-arevasfinnish-reactor-before-start-up-regulator-idUSKCN1QB27O, accessed 10 July 2020.
455 - STUK, “Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK): Operating licence can be granted to Olkiluoto 3”, Press Release,
25 February 2019, see https://www.stuk.fi/web/en/-/radiation-and-nuclear-safety-authority-stuk-operating-licence-can-be-granted-toolkiluoto-3, accessed 10 July 2020.
456 - NW, “Vibration damping system being installed at Olkiluoto-3 in Finland”, 21 March 2019.
457 - TVO, “TVO Newsletter—Respirator masks worn at OL3”, 2 July 2020, op. cit.
458 - WNISR, “The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2009”, August 2009, see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/-2009-.html,
accessed 9 June 2019; and Steve Thomas, “The EPR in Crisis”, Public Services International Research Unit, Business School, Universityof Greenwich, London, November 2010, see https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/4699/3/(ITEM_4699)_THOMAS_2010-11-E-EPR.pdf,
accessed 4 June 2018.

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FRANCE FOCUS
The Energy and Climate Bill and the Multi Annual Energy Plan
On 9 November 2019, the French Energy and Climate Law entered into force. 459 It succeeds
the 2015-Energy Transition Law. The legislation provides orientation, framework and rhetoric
to the policy—e.g. the “ecological and climate urgency” makes its entry into the wording. A
broader document, covering construction, transport, agriculture, industry, energy and waste,the “National Low-Carbon Strategy” (“Stratégie Nationale Bas-Carbone” or SNBC) towardthe 2050-goal for carbon neutrality, was completed in March 2020. 460
Specific energy policy targets and strategies to 2028 are defined in the Multi-Annual Energy
Plan (Programmation Pluriannuelle de l’Énergie or PPE), a planning tool introduced in the2015-Law. The PPE sets the priorities of action for public authorities concerning all formsof energy generation as well as energy efficiency. It also determines the near-term future of
nuclear power in setting targets for installed capacity and therefore the potential closure ofa number of reactors. On 23 April 2020, the French Government published the PPE, together
with the SNBC, and it entered into force the following day. 461
The new policy, while maintaining the target to reduce the nuclear share in the power
production mix to 50 percent, moves it from 2025 to 2035. As of 2020, the renewable energy
share is to reach 23 percent (21 percent in 2019, incl. hydro), and by 2030 “at least 33 percent” infinal gross energy consumption and 40 percent in the electricity production.
At the same time, it raises the stakes on the phase-out of fossil fuels, increasing the 2030
target from –30 percent to –40 percent (baseline 1990) and thus reducing the overall
2050-greenhouse-gas emissions by a factor of more than six rather than four. The last coalfired power plant is to be closed by 2022. However, this could be delayed as the Flamanville-3
EPR will not be in operation until then (see hereunder).
According to the Government model, achieving a reduction to 50 percent of the nuclear sharein the electricity mix would lead to the closure of 12 reactors by 2035, in addition to the twooldest units at Fessenheim that were closed in spring 2020, and two to four additional units
by 2028. Achieving the 2025 target would have meant the closure of over 20 reactors over ashorter time span.

459 - French Government, “LOI n° 2019-1147 du 8 novembre 2019 relative à l’énergie et au climat”, Journal Officiel de la République
Française, No. 0261, 9 November 2019 (in French), see https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000039355
955&categorieLien=id, accessed 5 September 2020.
460 - MTES, “Stratégie nationale bas-carbone”, Ministère de la Transition Écologique et Solidaire, March 2020 (in French),see https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2020-03-25_MTES_SNBC2.pdf, accessed 9 August 2020.
461 - French Government, “Décret n° 2020-456 du 21 avril 2020 relatif à la programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie”, Journal Officiel
de la République Française n°0099, 23 April 2020. The same day, MTES released the full text of the SNBC and the PPE,
see https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/publication-strategie-francaise-lenergie-et-climat-france-confirme-engagement-verssociete-neutre-en, accessed 10 August 2020.

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The PPE—citing jobs, reduction in natural uranium use and spent fuel generation, as well as“a better containment for the final waste”—stipulates that the “spent fuel reprocessing andrecycling policy must be maintained”. 462
The incoming Minister of the Ecological Transition, Barbara Pompili, appointed during a
reshuffle of the Government under President Emmanuel Macron in July 2020, an outspoken
nuclear critic, will have to implement the PPE over the coming years. The nuclear establishment
can count for continuity on a member of the Corps des Mines—a small group of elitetechnocrats from France’s top-rated engineering schools that has elaborated, implemented
and controlled the civil and military nuclear programs since the Second World War—who has
been appointed to the position of energy and climate advisor in the Minister’s Office. 463 Pompili
will have to perform a difficult balancing act. Another nuclear critic in this position under
President Macron from 2017 to 2018, Nicolas Hulot, complained about the “wall of lobbies” inthe decision-making process (in various areas) and resigned two years ago. 464

Two Reactor Closures, No Startup in Two Decades
Until the closure of the two oldest French units at Fessenheim in the spring of 2020, the French
nuclear fleet had remained stable for 20 years, with the exception of the closure of the 250 MW
fast breeder Phénix in 2009 (see Figure 32).
Figure 32 · Operating Fleet and Capacity in France (as of 1 July 2020)

Nuclear Reactors and Net Operating Capacity in Francein Units and GWe, from 1959 to 1 July 2020
1999
Grid Connection
Civaux-2

Reactors in LTO

2009
ClosurePhénix1994
ClosureBugey-1

Reactors in Operation
Operating Capacity

2020
ClosureFessenheim-1 & -2

Units
GWe
60

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

50
40
30
20
10
1959

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

0

Source: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020462 - MTES, “French Strategy for Energy and Climate—Multi Annual Energy Plan—2019–2023—2024–2028”, April 2019, pp.126–127,
see https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/programmations-pluriannuelles-lenergie-ppe, accessed 5 September 2020. The plutonium separation
and use strategy is highly controversial but its discussion would be outside the scope of the WNISR. For information on reprocessing
and plutonium, see work by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) at fissilematerials.org.
463 - This position, as the equivalent positions in other relevant ministries and at the Prime Minister’s and the President’s offices, istraditionally held by the Corps des Mines, which allows for a long-term policy continuity.
464 - François Allard-Huver, “Nicolas Hulot, les lobbies et le macronisme”, Le Point, 29 August 2018 (in French),see https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/nicolas-hulot-les-lobbies-et-le-macronisme-29-08-2018-2246655_20.php, accessed 17 August 2020.

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Figure 33 · Startups and Closures in France

French Reactor Startups and Closures 1959 - 1 July 2020
in Units
8

Operating7

Closed
PWR

PWR

6

GCR

5

HWGCR

4

FBR

3
2
1
0 1959

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

-1
-2

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

1991
1996
ClosureClosureChooz A Superphénix

2009
ClosurePhénix

2020
ClosureFessenheim-1 & -2

Source: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

No new reactor has started up since Civaux-2 was connected to the French grid in 1999. The
first and only PWR closed prior to Fessenheim was the 300 MW Chooz-A reactor, which was
retired in 1991. The other closures were the first generation natural-uranium gas-graphite
reactors, two fast breeder reactors and a small prototype heavy water reactor (see Figure 33).

French Nuclear Power Performance Still Worsening
In 2019, 58 operating reactors465 in France produced 379.5 TWh, a 3.5 percent drop over theprevious year. It is the fourth year in a row that generation remained below 400 TWh, and2020 is likely to turn out significantly worse, partially due to the COVID-19 crisis. In 2005,
nuclear generation peaked at 431.2 TWh.
Nuclear plants provided 70.6 percent of the country’s electricity, 1.1 percentage points less thanin 2018, the lowest share since 1989. The share peaked in 2005 at 78.5 percent.
France’s load factor dropped by 1.5 percentage points to 68.1 percent. The lifetime load factor
remains constant below 70 percent (69.3 percent). There is not one French reactor in the top100 ranked units in the world.
According to operator EDF:
In 2019, generation performance was impacted by exceptional incidents and large-scalecontingencies (totaling approximately 12 TWh), longer outage extensions than expected(totaling approximately 12 TWh) and environmental constraints (totaling approximately
4 TWh, including the Le Teil earthquake, accounting for 2.3 TWh). 466
465 - All Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs), 34 x 900 MW, 20 x 1300 MW, and 4 x 1400 MW.
466 - EDF, “Universal Registration Document 2019— Annual Financial Report”, (formerly “The Reference Document”),
filed 13 March 2020, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/dedicated-sections/investors-shareholders/reference-documents,
accessed 6 September 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Environmental constraints—other than the Le Teil earthquake that led to the provisional
shutdown of the four Cruas reactors—refer to operating restrictions for several nuclear
plants because of lack of cooling water or excess water temperatures. The heat wave in thesummer of 2019 led to the closure or output reduction of several reactors, including the two
Golfech units and the two Saint-Alban units. Remarkably, in September 2019, Chooz-2 andCattenom-4 were shut down, while Bugey-2 and -3 as well as Chooz-1 and Cattenom-2 had
to reduce their generation for lack of cooling water. Droughts that can last for weeks impact
availability significantly more than heat waves that rarely exceed a few days (yet), concludes an
independent analysis. 467

Nuclear Unavailability Review 2019
The analysis of the unavailability of French nuclear reactors in 2019 shows:ɆɆ At least four reactors (4.8 GW) were down (zero capacity) simultaneously at any day of theyear.
ɆɆ A maximum of 24 (27.9 GW) of the 58 units were down at the same time.
ɆɆ On 303 days (83 percent of the year), at least 10 units were down during the same day.
ɆɆ On 94 days (26 percent of the year), 20 or more units were shut down for at least part of theday, cumulating 53 outage days in total.
The total duration of zero output of the French reactor fleet reached 5,580 reactor-days in 2019(up 500 days or 10 percent), an average of 96.2 days per reactor or an outage ratio of over aquarter of the time, not including load following or other operational situations with reduced
but above zero output e.g. as during the heat wave and drought. All 58 reactors were subject tooutages ranging from 5–356 days (see Figure 34 and Figure 35).
EDF’s declaration of “planned” vs. “forced” outages is grossly misleading. According to thatclassification, in 2019, 13 reactors did not have any “forced” outage, at seven units they lasted
less than one day, and at 30 between one and ten days, just eight reactors fall in the range
between 11 and 48 days of “forced” outage.

467 - Thibault Laconde, “Effet de la météo sur la disponibilité du parc nucléaire français : quelle réalité ?”, Energie & Développement,
28 July 2020 (in French), see http://energie-developpement.blogspot.com/2020/07/meteo-climat-disponibilite-nucleaire.html,
accessed 11 August 2020.

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Figure 34 · Reactor Outages in France in 2019 (in number of units and GWe)

Unavailability of French Nuclear Reactors in 2019
Reactors Offline the Same Day (Zero Output)in Units and Capacity
In 2019,
On 303 days—83% of the year—10 reactors or more did not provide any power at least part of the day, of which 94 days
—26% of the year—20 or more reactors.
The maximum number of reactors offline simultaneously was 24 (27.9 GW) and the minimum 4 (4.8 GW).
Twenty reactors or more were simultaneously offline during the equivalent of 53 days.
Half of French Capacity
30

Half of French Reactor Fleet
GW
Units

25

20

15

10

5

0

01/01

01/02

01/03

01/04

01/05

01/06

01/07

01/08

01/09

01/10

01/11

01/12

31/12

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

468

Sources: RTE, 2020 and EDF, “List of outages”, 2020.

Note: For each day in the year, this graph shows the total number of reactors offline, not necessarily simultaneously as all unavailabilities do not overlap, buton the same day.

468 - EDF, “List of outages”, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/who-we-are/activities/optimisation-and-trading/list-of-outagesand-messages/list-of-outages, last accessed August 2020.

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Figure 35 · Forced and Planned Unavailability of Nuclear Reactors in France in 2019

Unavailability of French Nuclear Reactors in 2019

Reactors
Bugey-5
St Alban-1
Penly-1
Bugey-2
Civaux-1
Paluel-3
Belleville-1
Cattenom-2
Chooz-1
Blayais-3
Chinon-4Dampierre-2
Nogent-2
Gravelines-6
Blayais-1
Bugey-4
Fessenheim-1
Civaux-2
Golfech-1
Golfech-2Dampierre-4
Tricastin-4
Fessenheim-2
Tricastin-3
Cruas-4
Blayais-2
Paluel-2
Gravelines-3
Dampierre-3
Chinon-1
St Alban-2
Chinon-2
St Laurent-1
Cruas-3Cattenom-4
Gravelines-4
Cruas-2
Cattenom-3
St Laurent-2
Cruas-1
Gravelines-2
Gravelines-1
Bugey-3
Tricastin-2
Dampierre-1
Blayais-4
Chinon-3Cattenom-1
Flamanville-1
Nogent-1
Gravelines-5
Chooz-2
Penly-2
Paluel-1
Belleville-2
Tricastin-1
Paluel-4
Flamanville-2

Cumulated Duration of Unavailability at Zero Power (in Days)

Planned Unavailability

Average full outage timeby reactor: 96.2 days

Forced Unavailability

In 2019, unavailabilities at zero power affecting the
French nuclear fleet reached a total of 5,580 reactor-days,or an average of 96.2 days per reactor.
All of the 58 reactors were affected, with cumulated
outages between 4.8 and 356 days.

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Cumulated Duration of Unavailabilities (in Days)

Sources: Compiled by WNISR, with RTE, 2019–2020.

Notes
This graph only compiles outages at zero power, thus excluding all other operational periods with reduced capacity >0 MW. Impact of unavailabilities on
power production is therefore significantly larger.
“Planned” and “Forced” unavailabilities as declared by EDF.

EDF considers an outage as planned whatever the number of extensions and whatever its total
duration. In fact, WNISR analysis shows that only one unit (Dampierre-3) restarted as planned
after a long outage of 82 days. Outages were shortened at the two Fessenheim reactors, whichwere closed in the first half of 2020, and at Nogent-1. All other outages at the 54 remaining units
were extended beyond planned grid reconnection dates. The unplanned delays ranged from 1.3
to 175 days. The additional unavailability added up to 1,705 days, an increase of 44 percent overthe expected outage duration. (See Figure 36).

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 142

Figure 36 · Scheduled vs. Realized Unavailability of Nuclear Reactors in France in 2019

Unavailability of French Nuclear Reactors in 2019
Scheduled vs Realized Outages

Reactors
Bugey-5
St Alban-1
Penly-1
Bugey-2
Civaux-1
Paluel-3
Belleville-1
Cattenom-2
Chooz-1
Blayais-3
Chinon-4Dampierre-2
Nogent-2
Gravelines-6
Blayais-1
Bugey-4
Fessenheim-1
Civaux-2
Golfech-1
Golfech-2Dampierre-4
Tricastin-4
Fessenheim-2
Tricastin-3
Cruas-4
Blayais-2
Paluel-2
Gravelines-3
Dampierre-3
Chinon-1
St Alban-2
Chinon-2
St Laurent-1
Cruas-3Cattenom-4
Gravelines-4
Cruas-2
Cattenom-3
St Laurent-2
Cruas-1
Gravelines-2
Gravelines-1
Bugey-3
Tricastin-2
Dampierre-1
Blayais-4
Chinon-3Cattenom-1
Flamanville-1
Nogent-1
Gravelines-5
Chooz-2
Penly-2
Paluel-1
Belleville-2
Tricastin-1
Paluel-4
Flamanville-2

Cumulated Duration of Unavailability at Zero Power (in Days)

Unavailability
Scheduled in 2019of which not realized

Extended Unvailability in 2019
Days Extended into 2020 with number of days realized in 2020

(provisionnal = number of days in 2020 as expected
as of 1 July 2020)
In 2019, unavailabilities at zero power affecting the French
nuclear fleet reached a total of 5,580 reactor-days.
(exceeding by about 1,700 days or 44% durations for2019 scheduled at beginning of outage).

→365 days (provisionnal)→ 26 days→ 5 days→ 93 days→ 305 days (provisionnal)→ 57 days→ 6 days→ 305 days
(provisionnal)

050© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

100

150

200

250

300

350

Cumulated Duration of Unavailabilities (in Days)

Sources: Compiled by WNISR, with RTE data, 2018–2020.

Notes
This figure shows the reactor outage durations for 2019 as scheduled at outage start vs. actual outage duration over the year, for both planned and forced
unavailability. In case a reactor was shut down in 2018 and due to be back on-line prior to 31 December 2018, the outage duration in 2019 is entirely considered
as extended unavailability. Extended duration into 2020 are signaled, but not represented on the graph.

“the outage extensions experienced in 2019 were caused in equalmeasure by maintenance and operational quality issues, technicalfailures and project management deficiencies”
These numbers are covering the year 2019 only and do not take into account outages thatreached into 2020, some of which are still ongoing as of mid-year. The Flamanville site is theworst performer, with Unit 1 cumulating 127 days and Unit 2 even 175 days of unscheduled
outage extensions as of the end of 2019. As of mid-2020, the two units were still unavailable
and are now expected to remain offline until October 2020, adding another 305 days to eachof the reactor’s unplanned outage extension. EDF continues to label the entire outage duration
for both units as “planned”, a policy that does not help the public and decision-makers tounderstand the real nature of plant management and performance by the largest nuclear
operator in the world.

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According to EDF, “the outage extensions experienced in 2019 were caused in equal measureby maintenance and operational quality issues, technical failures and project management
deficiencies”. 469

Lifetime Extension, ASN and the Fourth Decennial Reviews
By mid-2020, the average age of France’s 56 power reactors exceeded for the first time 35 years(see Figure 37). Lifetime extension beyond 40 years—46 operating units are now over 31 years
old—would require significant additional upgrades. Also, relicensing will be subject to public
enquiries reactor by reactor.
Figure 37 · Age Distribution of French Nuclear Fleet (by Decade)Age of French Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

Reactor Age

43

11–20 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over956 reactors
Mean Age35.1 Years

1

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class
3© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Operating costs have increased substantially over the past years. The bad performancewith outage durations systematically exceeding planned timeframes is particularly costly.
EDF’s net financial debt increased by €8 billion (US$9 billion) in 2019 and grew by another€1 billion (US$1.1 billion) in the first half of 2020, mainly due to the COVID-19 effect, to a
total of €42 billion (US$47 billion). 470 Until 2022, the COVID-19 effects might add a total of€5–10 billion (US$6–12 billion) to the company’s debt burden and increase the pressure forfurther cost savings. 471
Investments for lifetime extensions will need to be balanced against the excessive nuclear
share in the power mix, the stagnating or decreasing electricity consumption in France—it
has been roughly stable for the past decade—and in the European Union (EU) as a whole, theshrinking client base due to successful competitors, and the energy efficiency and renewableenergy production targets set at both the EU and the French levels.

469 - EDF, “Universal Registration Document 2019— Annual Financial Report”, filed 13 March 2020, op. cit.
470 - EDF, “2020 Half-Year Results”, Press Release, 30 July 2020, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/dedicated-sections/journalists/all-press-releases/2020-half-year-results, accessed 6 September 2020.
471 - Le Monde, “‘Mimosa’, le nouveau plan d’économies d’EDF”, 7 July 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

At the beginning of 2018, EDF claimed its power generating costs for existing reactors wouldbe €32/MWh (US$38/MWh)—including nuclear operating and maintenance costs (€22/MWhor US$201826/MWh including fuel at €5/MWh – US$20186/MWh) and all anticipated upgrading
costs for plant life extension to 50 years (10 €/MWh or US$201812/MWh)—and would remain
more economic than “any new alternative”. 472
However, there are serious questions about these numbers. Michèle Pappalardo, former senior
representative of the Court of Accounts, remarked during the National Assembly’s InquiryCommittee hearings that EDF’s calculation stopped mid-way in 2025, and recalled that the
Court had calculated a total cost of €100 billion (US$117 billion) for the period 2014–2030. 473
These estimates were based on the situation in early 2018, but EDF’s performance in 2018-19
significantly deteriorated with unprecedented outage extensions, thus low production levels
in a low-price, low-consumption market environment. The items had not been factored into
the 2018-cost calculations. The COVID-19 crisis led to a further degradation of the situation,
which will have repercussions including in 2021-2022 (see also Nuclear Power in the Age of
COVID‑19).
EDF will likely seek lifetime extension beyond the 4th Decennial Safety Review (VD4) for most
if not all of its remaining reactors. This is in line with the Government’s Multi-Annual Energy
Plan (PPE), which plans for no further reactor closures until 2023 (the current presidential
term runs until spring 2022) and only a limited number in the following years. This program
will be limited to 900 Mwe reactors, the oldest segment of the French nuclear fleet. The firstreactor to undergo the VD4 was Tricastin-1 in 2019, furthermore were scheduled Bugey-2
and -4 in 2020, and Tricastin-2, Dampierre-1, Bugey-5 and Gravelines-1 in 2021. Of course,
COVID-19 came by in the meantime.
While the President of ASN judged the VD4-premiere on Tricastin-1 “satisfactory”, hequestioned whether EDF’s engineering resources were sufficient to carry out similar extensive
reviews simultaneously at several sites. 474 Beyond the human resource issue, the experienceraises the question of affordability. EDF had scheduled an outage for Tricastin-1 of 180 days in
2019, which was extended by 25 days. Including further, unrelated unavailabilities, the reactor
was in full outage during two thirds of the year (232 days).
EDF expects these VD4 outages to last six months, much longer than the average of three tofour months experienced through VD2 and VD3 outages. However, as illustrated by the recent
outage history, many factors could lead to significantly longer outages. EDF, in fact, has alreadystarted negotiating with ASN for the workload to be split in two packages, with the supposedly
smaller second one to be postponed four years after the VD4. 475

472 - EDF, “Le parc nucléaire en exploitation en France : Exploitation, maintenance et Grand Carénage”, 11 January 2018.
473 - Barbara Pompili, “Rapport d’enquête sur la sûreté et la sécurité des installations nucléaires—N° 1122 tome II”, 28 June 2018
(in French), see http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/rap-enq/r1122-tII.asp, accessed 19 July 2018.
474 - Bernard Doroszsuk, Hearing at the National Assembly, 28 May 2020, see http://videos.senat.fr/video.1628244_5ecf547f8a96f.
audition-pleniere---autorite-de-surete-nucleaire?timecode=2963962, accessed 13 August 2020.
475 - ASN, “Réexamen périodique associé aux quatrièmes visites décennales des réacteurs du palier 900 MWe”, Presentation at a
meeting of the local information committee on the major energy facilities at Tricastin, Commission locale d’information des grandséquipements énergétiques du Tricastin (CLIGEET), 4 July 2018 (in French), see https://www.ladrome.fr/sites/default/files/5.2_
presentation_asn_vd4.pdf, accessed 23 March 2019.

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Detailed generic requirements for plant life extension have not been issued yet by the Nuclear
Safety Authority (ASN). Originally, these requirements were to be issued in 2016 but theirrelease has been postponed a number of times, due to the need for extended and often
unprecedented technical discussions. The general objective of ASN has been to bring thereactors “as close as possible” to the safety level required in new reactor designs, such as the
EPR under construction in Flamanville. ASN notes in its 2019-Annual Report:
The safety reassessment of these reactors and the resulting improvements must be carriedout by comparison with the new-generation reactors, such as the EPR, the design of whichmeets significantly reinforced safety requirements. 476

This is strikingly different from most other countries, where safety authorities merely request
to maintain a given safety level. ASN plans to issue its generic order by the end of 2020, which
is somewhat surprising as this is now one year after Tricastin-1 had completed the procedure.
ASN made it clear that while EDF’s suggested backfitting and upgrading program improvessafety, it is not there yet:
However, at this stage of the examination, ASN considers that these modifications alone areunable to meet all the targets set. In the absence of any additional proposals from the licensee
during the course of 2020, ASN will prescribe additional modifications. 477

And then there is the public:
ASN will also consult the public at the end of 2020 on the position it is to adopt on the genericphase of the periodic safety review. Pursuant to the law, a public inquiry will then be held,
reactor by reactor, after submission of the periodic safety review conclusions report for each ofthem. 478

The Ongoing Flamanville-3 EPR Saga

EDF has overestimated its project-management competence andorganized itself only very late to face the issue.
Court of Accounts, July 2020479

The 2005 construction decision of Flamanville-3 (FL3) was mainly motivated by the industry’s
attempt to confront the serious problem of maintaining nuclear competence.
In December 2007, EDF started construction on FL3 with a scheduled startup date of 2012.
The project has been plagued with design issues and quality-control problems, including
basic concrete and welding similar to those at the Olkiluoto (OL3) project in Finland, whichstarted two-and-a-half years earlier. These problems never stopped and in April 2018, it was
discovered that the main welds in the secondary steam system did not conform with the
476 - ASN, “ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2019”, 15 July 2020, see http://www.
french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/Publications/ASN-s-annual-reports/ASN-Report-on-the-state-of-nuclear-safety-and-radiationprotection-in-France-in-2019, accessed 17 August 2020.
477 - Ibidem.
478 - Ibidem.
479 - Cour des Comptes, “La filière EPR”, 9 July 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 technical specifications; so by the end of May 2018 EDF stated that repair work might again
cause “a delay of several months to the start-up of the Flamanville 3 European Pressurized
Water Reactor (EPR) reactor.”480 In fact, the delay will be several years, and the startup of FL3
is not expected before the end of 2022 at the earliest. However, that was the projection prior to
the COVID-19 crisis and additional delays are likely.
In a letter of 19 June 2019, ASN informed EDF that “in the light of the numerous deviations in
the production of the Flamanville EPR penetration welds, they would have to be repaired”481.
ASN pointed out in the letter, signed by the Chairman:
ASN considers that, given the number and nature of the deviations affecting thesewelds, their break can no longer be considered as highly improbable and that a breakpreclusion approach can no longer be applied to them. [Bold font in the original.]482

EDF would like to use “remotely controlled welding robots, designed to conduct high-precision
operations within the pipework in question”. However, this technology has been developed forthe fleet in operation and has not been qualified yet for reworking penetration welds. EDF aims
for this scenario to be qualified and approved by ASN “no later than the end of 2020”. A second
scenario, involving extraction and upgrading in auxiliary backup buildings, is presently being
kept as an alternative solution. 483
In July 2018, the owner-builder stated had adjusted the Flamanville EPR schedule andconstruction costs with the loading of nuclear fuel scheduled for the 4th quarter in 2019 andthe target construction costs “revised from €10.5 billion [US$12.3 billion] to €10.9 billion[US$12.7 billion]”. 484 EDF revised its position in July 2019 and announced that, concerning theFL3 steam line repair work, it “expects to communicate the schedule and cost implicationsof the selected scenario in the next few months”, already certain that “commissioning
cannot be expected before the end of 2022”. 485 One year later, in July 2020, EDF stated that
fuel loading would now be delayed to “late 2022” and construction costs re-evaluated at€12.4 billion (US$14.7 billion), an increase of €1.5 billion (US$1.8 bllion) over the previous
estimate. 486

480 - EDF, “Quality deviations on certain welds of the secondary circuit at the Flamanville EPR: the investigation continues”,
31 May 2018, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/dedicated-sections/journalists/all-press-releases/quality-deviations-on-certainwelds-of-the-secondary-circuit-at-the-flamanville-epr-the-investigation-continues, accessed 7 June 2018.
481 - ASN, “Deviations on the Flamanville EPR steam lines: the eight penetration welds will have to be repaired”, Information Notice,
20 June 2019, see http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Information/News-releases/Deviations-on-the-Flamanville-EPR-steam-linesthe-eight-penetration-welds-will-have-to-be-repaired, accessed 20 June 2019.
482 - ASN, “Letter to the Chairman of EDF”, 19 June 2019, see http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Media/Files/letter-CODEP-CLG2019-027253-UK-ASN-EDF-VVP-EPR, accessed 28 July 2019.
483 - EDF, “Annual Financial Report 2019 – Universal Registration Document”, March 2020, op.cit.
484 - EDF, “Welds in the main secondary system of the Flamanville EPR: EDF sets up corrective actions and adjusts schedule andtarget construction costs”, 25 July 2018, see https://www.edf.fr/en/edf/welds-in-the-main-secondary-system-of-the-flamanville-epredf-sets-up-corrective-actions-and-adjusts-schedule-and-target-construction-costs, accessed 25 July 2018.
485 - EDF, “Half-Year Results 2019”, 25 July 2019.
486 - EDF, “Annual Financial Report 2019 – Universal Registration Document”, March 2020, op.cit.

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The latest delays raised another legal problem. The construction license had already been
extended by three years in 2017 to 10 April 2020. 487 On 23 July 2019, EDF filed a new application
to amend the construction license. 488 On 25 March 2020, the Government passed a decree
extending the construction license by another four years. 489 Whether this will be sufficientremains to be seen. FL3 is currently over a decade behind schedule.

A Damning Court of Accounts Report
In July 2020, the French Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes) released a damning reportabout the EPR. 490 The 148-page report (including the traditional responses by the Governmentand companies involved) is not only an exceptional documentation of the failures andmishaps of project management, engineering and huge financial consequences, it is foremost
an unprecedented illustration of the total absence of state oversight and complacent, if
not negligent, commercial agreements with EDF’s contractors for the construction of theFlamanville-3 EPR. See citations below (translation by WNISR).
The Court reminds the reader that the decision to build Flamanville-3 had been taken in
June 2004 on the basis of an overnight cost estimate of €20012.8 billion (€20153.5 billion whichtranslates to US$20012.5 billion or US$20153.8 billion) and a construction time of 57 months (or67 months between the concreting of the basemat of the reactor building and commercial
operation). The reactor was supposed to generate power at €200136.2–41.1/MWh (€201547–53/
MWh). Since 2008, EDF has not publicly released any update to this cost range. In 2012, theCourt of Accounts estimated the generation cost range at €70–90/MWh ($201293–120/MWh),stating however, it would not validate any figure prior to a minimum of operating experienceand an examination of the accounts.
In addition to the overnight construction costs, as of December 2019, EDF indicated more than
€4.2 billion (US$20194.6 billion) for various cost items, including €3 billion (US$20193.3 billion)of financial costs. On 1 July 2023, latest provisional date for the startup of the reactor, these
additional costs could therefore reach €20156.7 billion (US$20157.4 billion). The latest construction
cost estimate given by EDF of €201512.4 billion would represent about two thirds of the total
thus estimated at €201519.1 billion (US$202020 billion).
On the basis of the updated cost estimates, the Court states that the Flamanville-3 electricity
could possibly be generated at €2015110–120/MWh, a cost range similar to the price range
negotiated for the Hinkley Point C project in the U.K.

487 - Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, in charge of International Relations on Climate, “Décret n° 2017-379 du
23 mars 2017 modifiant le décret n° 2007-534 du 10 avril 2007 autorisant la création de l’installation nucléaire de base dénommée
Flamanville 3, comportant un réacteur nucléaire de type EPR, sur le site de Flamanville (Manche)”, 24 March 2017 (in French),see https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=0385C6ECDD66D0F6D6896702526A28A5.tpdila22v_2?cidTexte=JORFTE
XT000034264985&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCONT000034264920, accessed 28 July 2019.
488 - EDF, “Half-Year Results 2019”, 25 July 2019.
489 - JORF, “Décret no 2020-336 du 25 mars 2020 modifiant le décret no 2007-534 du 10 avril 2007 autorisant la création del’installation nucléaire de base dénommée Flamanville 3, comportant un réacteur nucléaire de type EPR, sur le site de Flamanville(Manche)”, Journal Officiel de la République Française, 27 March 2020.
490 - Cour des Comptes, “La filière EPR”, 9 July 2020, see https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/la-filiere-epr.
All quotes in this section from this document, unless otherwise noted.

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All of these numbers do not take into account the COVID-19 effect, and EDF warned that theconstruction interruption at the Flamanville EPR “could result in further delays and additionalcosts”. 491
Quotes from the Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes) Report on the EPR492
On the client-supplier relationshipThe mechanisms serving to apply a risk matrix common to client and supplier respecting
the rules of public orders have not been implemented. (…)
On the absence of state control
Not one of the notes produced by the National Holdings Agency [APE]493 between
2004 and 2019 mentions concern or questioning of the APE about the project, itscost, its successive escalations and the risks that it represented for EDF and therefore
by consequence for the State. The minutes of EDF board meetings mention only one
intervention by the manager of the State participations in this project, concerning thefirst amendment to the contract with Bouygues. After that, successive cost escalationsat project completion did not even trigger a single reaction of APE representatives on
the EDF Board anymore. The shareholder appears like a spectator, including on theissues of quality defaults that he seems to know of only by the media.
The notes of the General Directorate for Energy494 (…) do not contain any morealarm signals to the ministers, or critical analyses of the EDF’s management of theFlamanville-3 construction site. Questioned about the basis for its favorable opinion on
the construction of the EPR, (…) it relied on the technical and economic evaluation of the
public company. The same way, in a note dated 9 December 2008, the General Director
for Energy and Climate took over the construction perspectives for the industrial
companies, without taking any distance.
For its part, the General Directorate of the Treasury495 has indicated to the Court not tohave elaborated any assessment of the economic value of the project.
In this context, it has not been established that the supervisory administrations carry out
the task of technical instruction sufficiently in-depth to enlighten the decision-makers.

491 - EDF, “2020 Half-Year Results”, Press Release, 30 July 2020.
492 - Trasnlation by WNISR; Cour des Comptes, “La filière EPR”, 9 July 2020,see https://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/publications/la-filiere-epr, accessed 15 August 2020.
493 - The “Agence des Participations de l’État” or APE was created in 2004 and manages the government shares in about 70 major
companies generally majority state owned.
494 - Originally part of the Industry Ministry, now as General Directorate for Energy and Climate (DGEC) part of the Ministry for the
Ecological Transition, in charge of the oversight of the national energy companies and the nuclear sector.
495 - Part of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance.

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On future nuclear construction projects
The situation of EDF, a listed company and already indebted, is incompatible with themassive investment needs the company would have to face in case of the deployment of
new reactors.
Nuclear projects present high risks and an insufficient profitability in order to attract
private investors under these conditions.
EDF cannot finance alone anymore the construction of new reactors. Thus, thisconstruction will not be done without public support in one form or another. The
burden, which in this case would be transferred to the consumer and/or to the taxpayer
would only be acceptable if nuclear energy, with respect to the national objectives in thefight against climate change and security of supply, is sufficiently competitive comparedto other electricity-production modes, renewables in particular.

JAPAN FOCUS
Japan’s nuclear industry has had a mixed year, with nine reactors operating through mostof 2019, leading to the highest electricity generation since 2011. However, in 2020, reactor
operations have been disrupted due to extended and unplanned outages as well as a further
damaging court ruling.
As of 1 July 2020, four of the nine operating reactors were shut down, two due to the failure
to complete construction work related to terrorism counter measures, one due to unresolved
steam-generator tube-damage, and one due to a court ruling. With an additional reactor(Takahama-4) due to be shut down in October 2020, again due to failure to complete
counterterrorism upgrading, Japan’s nuclear generation in 2020 is expected to decline by half.
During the past year Japan’s largest nuclear utility (in terms of number of remaining
operational reactors), Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO), was at the center of a bribery
and corruption scandal that has prompted reminders of the ‘nuclear village’ culture that
became wider known in the aftermath of 3/11. As in 2018, no additional reactors restarted in theyear to 1 July 2020 under the revised Nuclear Regulatory Authority’s (NRA) safety guidelines.
Restart dates for three reactors in Long-Term Outage (LTO) have already been pushed backinto late 2020 and 2021, but it remains doubtful that they will successfully meet these dates.
Lawsuits against nuclear plants have continued to destabilize reactor operations in Japan,
the most recent being in January 2020, which has forced the extended shutdown of the PWR
Ikata-3. This is the second time in the past 25 months that the reactor owner, Shikoku ElectricPower Company, was forced into extended shutdown of the reactor, after an unprecedented
high court ruling in December 2017 (see WNISR2018).

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No additional reactors have been declared for closure during the past year, thus the totalremains unchanged at 21 reactors (including the ten at Fukushima Daiichi & Daini). Thismeans that as of 1 July 2020, 24 reactors remain in LTO since none of these have generated
electricity during recent years. WNISR has considered for years that the four reactors at
Fukushima Daini will never restart. (See Figure 39 and Annex 3 for a detailed overview of theJapanese Reactor Program).
Figure 38 · Rise and Fall of the Japanese Nuclear Program

Rise and Fall of the Japanese Nuclear Program - 1963 to July 2020
Fleet (in GW) and Electricity Generation (in TWh)
Nuclear Fleet in GW

Electricity Generation in TWh

60

300

Generation
50

250

40

200

30

150

Nuclear Capacity
in Operation

20

100

50

10

1963 0 1965

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

0

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

In 2019, according to IAEA-PRIS, nuclear power in Japan produced 65.6 TWh contributing
7.5 percent of the nation’s annual output compared to 49.3 TWh and 6.2 percent in 2018. Thisis the largest share of nuclear generated electricity in Japan since 2011 (18 percent), comparedwith 29 percent in 2010 and the historic high of 36 percent in 1998. According to the Ministryof Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), solar PV generation in 2019 was 71.5 TWh, up
12.2 percent, outpacing nuclear production. 496
The reduction in electricity generation from nuclear power in 2020 due to extended
shutdowns, coincides with a significant decline in demand and wholesale prices due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. 497 As reported by Reuters, day-ahead prices on the Japan Electric Power
Exchange (JEPX) dropped as low as ¥0.01 (US$c0.01) per kilowatt hour (kWh)—virtually free
power— in February 2020.
496 - METI/ANRE, “Monthly Report on Electricity Statistics”, quoted by Renewable Energy Institute, “Energy Statistics”, 30 July 2020
(in Japanese), see https://www.renewable-ei.org/statistics/resources/, accessed 16 August 2020.

497 - Aaron Sheldrick, “Japan power prices hit zero as coronavirus hammers industrial activity”, Reuters, 13 May 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-japan-electricity/japan-power-prices-hit-zero-as-coronavirus-hammersindustrial-activity-idUSKBN22P0PA, accessed 19 May 2020.

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At the same time, the 1 April 2020 saw grid unbundling, whereby utilities were required toseparate their transmission and distribution (T&D) from their power generation and supply
businesses. Considered essential to increasing competition within electricity markets,
Japanese utilities have devised methods to limit the negative impact of the measures. However,as Moody’s noted, earnings for utilities have become more volatile while customers bases areshrinking, and that ongoing deregulation is credit negative for the electric utilities in Japan. 498
Additional debt has accumulated due to the costs of nuclear safety measures under prolonged
nuclear reactor shutdowns. As WNISR2019 reported, the industry has been working to counter
these unfavorable electricity market conditions. If implemented, the counter measures will
provide significant financial incentives for extending reactor operations beyond 40 years. In
particular, a capacity market is now planned to operate in Japan from 2021. 499 The principal
beneficiaries of this will be the utilities operating nuclear power and coal plants.500
As in previous years, a consistent majority of Japanese citizens, when polled, continue tooppose the sustained reliance on nuclear power, support its early phase-out, and remain
opposed to the restart of reactors.501

Kansai Electric Bribery Scandal
The past year revealed a decades-lasting bribery and corruption scandal in Fukui Prefecture
in western Japan that extended from local contractors, a former Takahama mayor, local
prefectural officials, a chapter of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and executivesof Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO), including the President.502 Long considered thenuclear peninsula of Japan, Fukui Prefecture hosts 11 KEPCO reactors, four of which are slated
for decommissioning. The disclosure of kickbacks to utility executives and officials raised
considerable public attention in the Kansai region and wider Japan. Although considered tohave implications for restart approval for three of the company’s reactors, the PWR Mihama-3,
Takahama-1 and -2, which were scheduled for operation between 2020 and 2021, the outcome
remains unclear given how embedded local support for nuclear power remains at elected
official level.
In September 2019 it was disclosed that the Kanazawa Bureau of the National Tax Agency (NTA)
review of the accounts of Yoshida Kaihatsu a civil engineering and construction company
based in Takahama showed the transfer of large sums of money exceeding ¥300 million
498 - Moody’s, “Japanese utilities’ strategies increasingly drive credit profiles as industry deregulates”, 6 February 2020,see https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Japanese-utilities-strategies-increasingly-drive-credit-profiles-as-industry-PBC_1213425; and AsianPower, “Japan utilities’ deregulation puts heat on earnings”, 12 February 2020,see https://asian-power.com/power-utility/news/japan-utilities-deregulation-puts-heat-earnings, both accessed 19 May 2020.
499 - Nobuyuki Yamaguchi, Nahako Totsuka et al, “Scenario analysis of balancing capacity market based on unit commitment”, E3S
Web of Conferences 152, University of Tokyo, PEEE 2019, 2020, see https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2020/12/
e3sconf_peee2020_02003.pdf, accessed 19 May 2020.
500 - Matsukubo Hajime, “The Capacity Market: An overview and issues”, Citizens Nuclear Information Center, 3 June 2019,see https://cnic.jp/english/?p=4435, accessed 19 May 2020.
501 - Kaoru Ohno, “JAIF Releases Results of Fact-Finding Survey of Japanese Nuclear Industry for Fiscal 2018”, JAIF,
27 November 2019, see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/jaif-releases-results-of-fact-finding-survey-of-japanese-nuclear-industry-forfiscal-2018/, accessed 29 May 2020.
502 - Japan Times, “LDP chapter led by ex-defense chief Inada got donations from firm with ties to man at heart of Kepco scandal”,
5 October 2019, see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/10/05/national/ldp-chapter-headed-tomomi-inada-got-donationssecurity-company-linked-former-takahama-deputy-mayor-eiji-moriyama/#.XsUenxNKjOQ, accessed 17 May 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 (US$2.85 million) in total to Eiji Moriyama, who was deputy mayor of Takahama town from
1977–1987. After retirement, he served in an advisory capacity and as a board member forconstruction and maintenance companies as well as security work in Fukui Prefecture503 .
During this time, he effectively acted as a middleman for companies in providing money andgifts to KEPCO executives. Moriyama died in March 2019. While the focus of the scandal
was bribery since 2011—due to the seven-year statute of limitations on taxation—Moriyama
had been deeply involved as a local fixer between KEPCO and Takahama based companies
since at least 1987,504 and it was known locally that he had played a leading role in securing
construction of the first Takahama reactors during the early 1970s. The NTA investigation
had been initiated in February 2018 with findings of corruption as early as June 2018, but
was not disclosed at the time.505 KEPCO senior executives were notified of the results of theinvestigation in September 2018, but chose not to publicly disclose it after they concluded that
nothing illegal had taken place.
In September 2019, a whistleblower, reportedly inside KEPCO, released details of theinvestigation to the media and citizens groups in the Kansai region, as well as the KEPCO
president, leaving the utility little choice. On 27 September 2019, KEPCO President
Shigeki Iwane told a news conference that 20 company officials, including himself, hadreceived a total of ¥320 million (US$3 million) worth of cash and gifts over the past sevenyears from “an influential man” in the local community (of Takahama) who once supported
the utility’s nuclear business. KEPCO officials on 27 September denied that contracts with thecivil engineering company Yoshida Kaihatsu had anything to do with gifts from Moriyama totheir executives.506
At the time, with all of KEPCO’s reactors shut down since 2013 it was imperative for thecompany to secure restart as rapidly as possible. In this environment Moriyama’s influence
grew as KEPCO considered his role as deputy mayor as critical in the restart of Takahama
reactors. The enormous potential for corruption as a result of the large-scale engineering
retrofits and decommissioning of nuclear plants initiated in Japan following 3/11 is clear when
the scale of investments made by utilities in recent years is understood. In January 2020,
Kyodo news reported that the total costs for utilities for all their engineering works, including
decommissioning, will reach around ¥13.46 trillion (US$123 billion) over the coming decades,with the prospects of further increases in the years ahead.507
Two companies for which Moriyama served as an adviser—Yoshida Kaihatsu, and a nuclear
power plant maintenance company with headquarters in Hyogo Prefecture—were awarded atleast ¥11.3 billion (US$104 million) in contracts between 2015–2018 for work related to KEPCO

503 - Ban Hideyuki, “Nuclear Mafia Exposed in Kansai Electric Power Co. (Kanden) Scandal ~ METI pleads ignorance of bribes andkickbacks driving the nuclear industry”, Citizens Nuclear Information Center, 3 December 2019, see http://cnic.jp/english/?p=4685,
accessed 17 May 2020.
504 - Eric Johnston, “A closer look at Kansai Electric and its gift-giving scandal”, Japan Times, 29 March 2020,see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/29/business/kansai-electric-gift-giving-scandal/#.XsUV5RNKjOQ,
accessed 17 May 2020.
505 - Kansai Electric, “Investigation Report from Third Party Committee on the Incident of Receipt of Cash and Gifts”, 14 March 2020,see https://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/ir/brief/pdf/2020_mar14_2.pdf, accessed 17 May 2020.
506 - Ibidem.
507 - Kyodo News, “Costs for managing Japan’s nuclear plants to total 13 trillion yen”, 15 January 2020, see https://english.kyodonews.
net/news/2020/01/8722fafaff9b-costs-for-managing-japans-nuclear-plants-to-total-13-trillion-yen.html, accessed 17 May 2020.

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reactors in the prefecture.508 Further disclosures in early October 2019 included KEPCO
executives at the Ohi nuclear plant admitting that they had received gifts and money from
Moriyama.509
In November 2019, the scandal escalated when it was disclosed by a Fukui prefecturalinvestigation panel that 109 employees of the Fukui prefectural Government, including
high-ranking officials, took cash, gift certificates, gold coins and various other gifts from
Moriyama, who advised a local engineering and construction company which received
contracts from KEPCO for work at the Takahama reactors.510 The current mayor of Takahama
town was also found to have accepted gifts from Moriyama,511—he was nevertheless reelected for a fourth term in April 2020.512 The investigation panel reported that it had foundno particular connection between the deputy mayor and the prefectural government’s safety
and environment department, which oversees nuclear safety measures. As the Asahi Shimbun
reported however, “at least one official in the scandal worked for the safety and environment
department after taking Moriyama’s gifts.”513
In late November 2019, it came to light that the town of Takahama had received “donations”
of least ¥4.3 billion (US$40 million) since around 1970 from KEPCO.514 Sixty percent of the
donations were given to the town just prior to the start of operations of Takahama-3 and -4
in 1984. Local municipal Governments are not legally required to report to the central
Government how donations from electric power companies are used. The donations are
separate from tax revenue and direct government financing to nuclear plant host communities.
In 2019, Takahama town received ¥2.4 billion (US$224 million) in subsidies from the central
Government.515 However, Takahama city officials said they do not know how contributions
were spent and that anonymous donors provided some of them.
Tatsuji Sugimoto, the pro-nuclear governor of Fukui Prefecture, stated at the time of the initial
KEPCO disclosures in September 2019, “that the whole act is so outrageous, as it did great harmto the relationship of trust with communities hosting (nuclear plants).”516 The general view wasthat approval by Sugimoto for KEPCO reactors Mihama-3, and Takahama-1 and -2, to restart
as scheduled in August 2020, June 2020 and February 2021 respectively, would be further
508 - The Asahi Shimbun, “Official worked both sides in Kansai Electric money scandal”, 2 October 2019,see http://wwaw.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201910020041.html, accessed 16 May 2020.
509 - Takeshi Terada and Ikuko Ando, “KEPCO execs at Oi nuclear plant also received gifts from neighboring town
official”, The Mainichi Shimbun, 8 October 2019, see https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20191008/p2a/00m/0na/005000c,
accessed 16 May 2020.
510 - Jiji Press, “109 Fukui Officials Took Gifts from Key Person in Nuclear Biz Scandal”, as published on Nippon.com,
22 November 2019, see https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2019112200427/109-fukui-officials-took-gifts-from-key-person-in-nuclearbiz-scandal.html, accessed 17 May 2020.
511 - The Mainichi Shimbun, “Election campaign starts for Fukui town at heart of gift-giving scandal”, 14 April 2020.
512 - Kyodo News, “Takahama mayor linked to Kepco bribery scandal re-elected”, as published by Japan Times, 20 April 2020,see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/20/national/politics-diplomacy/takahama-mayor-yutaka-nose-kepco-bribery-scandalreelected/#.XsUNrhNKjOQ, accessed 17 May 2020.
513 - The Asahai Shimbun, “EDITORIAL: Scandal over Fukui official’s shady gifts goes far and wide”, 25 November 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201911250032.html, accessed 17 May 2020.
514 - Kyodo News, “Kansai Electric Power Incorporated: repeatedly gave donations to nuclear plant host town”, as published by Market
Screener, 23 November 2019, see https://www.marketscreener.com/THE-KANSAI-ELECTRIC-POWER-6491273/news/Kansai-ElectricPower-Incorporated-repeatedly-gave-donations-to-nuclear-plant-host-town-29635018/, accessed 17 May 2020.
515 - Ibidem
516 - Ibidem.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 delayed unless there was resignations from KEPCO management.517 The disclosures that over
100 local officials working for Sugimoto’s prefectural government were also embroiled in the
scandal caused widespread condemnation across the Kansai region and wider Japan, once
again reminding the public of the operations of Japan’s nuclear village, seen as a major factor
in the Fukushima Daiichi triple reactor meltdown. As the scandal escalated in October 2019,
KEPCO Chair Makoto Yagi and four other company executives announced their resignation.518
The Third-Party Committee, which was established by KEPCO in October 2019, reported in
March 2020 that in fact 75 KEPCO officials had received payments and gifts amounting to¥360 million (US$3.4 million).519 The Committee concluded that multiple causes led to thecorruption, including “non transparent and incorrect “local orientedness” (that) justified
problematic behaviors” and that an underlying fundamental cause was “the introverted
corporate culture spreading throughout KEPCO…”520
Lawyers acting for NGOs and citizens across the Kansai region, Fukui Prefecture and wider
Japan criticized the limited scope of the Committee report.521 In late March 2020, the samelawyers filed an application to the Osaka District Prosecutor’s Office seeking a criminal
investigation into KEPCO.522 Attempting to put the scandal behind them, on 14 March 2020,
KEPCO announced that its Executive Vice President Takashi Morimoto, will replace President
Shigeki Iwane as a result of the corruption scandal.523
The negative impact on KEPCO’s operations was reflected in a downgrading of the company’s
credit-ratings outlook from stable to negative in late March 2020, which reflected Moody’s“concerns over Kansai Electric’s oversight, control and governance matters, which increases
risk to the ongoing operation of its nuclear reactors”.524
As the Citizens Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) reported, the public disclosures of the
KEPCO scandal are a glimpse into the Japanese electricity utilities off-the-book funding. As
detailed in the 2005-book “Tokyo Blackout” by Masataka Nakano, utilities award a contract
at a price 20 percent higher than the market price, and force local businesses to funnel backthe profits. The illicit funds are distributed not only to the utility but also to the Federation of
517 - WNISR2019 reported on earlier delays to restart announced by KEPCO during 2019, with expectation of further delays.
See KEPCO, “About the state of implementation of safety improvement measures construction of Takahama power plant 1 and
2 and Mihama power plant 3”, 4 February 2019 (in Japanese), see https://www.kepco.co.jp/corporate/pr/2019/0204_2j.html; andKEPCO, “State of Implemetation of safety improvement measures construction—Takahama Units 1 and 2, and Mihama Unit 3”,
4 February 2019, see https://www.kepco.co.jp/corporate/pr/2019/pdf/0204_2j_01.pdf, both accessed 18 May 2020.
518 - Kyodo News, “Kansai Electric chairman resigns to take responsibility for scandal”, 9 October 2019,see https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/10/a080f7b04b27-breaking-news-kansai-electric-endorses-chairmans-resignation-atboard-meeting.html, accessed 17 May 2020.
519 - Kyodo News, “Kansai Electric names new president following gift scandal”, 14 March 2020, see https://english.kyodonews.net/
news/2020/03/9859d9f74e2d-update1-kansai-electric-names-new-president-following-gift-scandal.html, accessed 17 May 2020.
520 - Kansai Electric, 14 March 2020, op. cit.
521 - Comity Decouncing the Fraudulent Money Transactions of the Kepco NPPs, “Statement on the final report of the third-party
committee”, 14 March 2020 (in Japanese), see http://kandenakan.html.xdomain.jp/seimei.pdf, accessed 21 May 2020.
522 - Various Organisation, “Offer upon receiving a report from a third-party committee”, 26 March 2020 (in Japanese), Letter to
KEPCO, see http://kandenakan.html.xdomain.jp/0326.html.
523 - Kansai Electric, “Personal Affairs of our Board Members”, 14 March 2020,see https://www.kepco.co.jp/english/corporate/ir/brief/pdf/2020_mar14_1.pdf, accessed 17 March 2020.
524 - Moody’s Investor Services, “Moody’s affirms Kansai Electric’s A3 ratings but changes outlook to negative”, 24 March 2020,see https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-affirms-Kansai-Electrics-A3-ratings-but-changes-outlook-to--PR_420254,
accessed 20 May 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Electric Power Companies, local governments, Diet members, and many others. The authorof the book dubbed this system the “Electric Power Monster System.” As CNIC concluded,“The Kanden (KEPCO) scandal has unveiled a part of this monster system”525 and that “Thegovernment should not consider this scandal as an isolated incident committed by KEPCO.
Instead, it should regard this as a problem inherent to the electric power industry. The numberof similar cases in which electric power companies placed construction and other orders withlocal dealers run by or affiliated with local influential persons is too numerous to mention.”526

Hiroshima Lawsuit
Shikoku Electric Power Company has had a troubled start to 2020. A power outage andtechnical failures during nuclear fuel removal combined with a legal ruling that has forced an
extended shutdown of its only remaining operational reactor, Ikata-3, located on the islandof Shikoku, has contributed to further doubts over the long-term sustainability of Japanese
nuclear policy. It will likely mean that Ikata-3 will remain idled for most of the remainder of2020.
On 12 January 2020, one control rod (out of a total of 48) was accidentally lifted out of the
Ikata-3 containment vessel. The reactor had been undergoing refueling and maintenanceat the time, having been shut down on 26 December 2019.527 On 25 January 2020 an “earth
ground,” a type of electrical fault, led to the plant depending upon an emergency generator.
The plant operated on emergency power for around 30 minutes. “In my view, the control
rod issue was the most risky,” NRA Chairman Toyoshi Fuketa said during a news briefing
on 29 January 2020, adding that “to the best of my knowledge, this was the first such event
anywhere in the world.”528 A series of investigations by Shikoku Electric into both, the loss of
power and control rod removal, were published between February and March 2020.529 Ikata-3
is one of four commercial reactors in Japan that has been operating with uranium-plutonium
Mixed Oxide fuel (MOX).
On 17 January 2020, the Hiroshima High Court ruled in favor of a lawsuit brought by local
residents within a 50-kilometer radius of the Ikata plant. In 2018, they had filed an injunction
against operation of Ikata-3 on the grounds that an active fault, the median tectonic line andJapan’s longest fault system, may lie only 600 meters off the coast of the reactor site. Shikoku
Electric had contested that sonic testing as had been carried out could confirm the presence ofactive faults in proximity to Ikata. The lawsuit argued that Shikoku Electric had underestimatedthe seismic threat at the plant, and that it could be two to three times more powerful than
anticipated. The plaintiffs had also presented evidence of a volcanic risk to the reactor site andthe court ruled that Shikoku Electric had underestimated the impact of a possible eruption of
525 - CNIC, “Nuclear Mafia Exposed in Kansai Electric Power Co. (Kanden) Scandal ~ METI pleads ignorance of bribes and kickbacks
driving the nuclear industry”, 3 December 2019, op. cit.
526 - CNIC, “Pre-arranged Conclusion: Kansai Electric Power Co.’s attempt to trivialize the scandal is impermissible”, Citizens
Nuclear Information Center, 3 October 2019, see https://cnic.jp/english/?p=4648, accessed 17 May 2020.
527 - Kyodo/Jiji Press, “Control rod mistakenly removed from Ikata reactor in Ehime during maintenance”, as published by The Japan
Times, 13 January 2020, see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/01/13/national/control-rod-mistakenly-removed-reactor-ikatanuclear-power-plant-shikoku-electric/#.XsRQ6xNKjOQ, accessed 15 May 2020.
528 - Nucleonics Week, “Shikoku Electric’s Ikata-3 may remain offline for most of 2020”, 30 January 2020.
529 - Shikoku Electric Power Company, “About continuous trouble at Ikata power station”, May 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.yonden.co.jp/publish/page_12.html, accessed 15 May 2020.

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Mount Aso.530 While the original injunction request was rejected in March 2019, the residents
appealed, and on 17 January 2020 the Hiroshima High Court ordered that the reactor should
not operate.531 In addition to accepting the plaintiffs case on the possibility of an active fault, thecourt also concluded that Shikoku Electric’s assessment on active faults was insufficient andthat the NRA either was in error or had failed to sufficiently evaluate risks, when it concluded
that there was no problem with Shikoku Electric’s research.532 The court ruling requires the
NRA to also conduct more robust inspections at Ikata. The company’s share value dropped by
6-percent in the following 24 hours.
It was the second time the court had ruled against operation of Ikata-3 (see WNISR2018), thefirst had been subsequently overturned on appeal. In the first case, the reactor was offline formost of 2018 until October when it was restarted. The reactor had operated for 14 months
until December 2019, when it was shut down for maintenance and refueling. It was due torestart operation on 27 April 2020, prior to the Hiroshima High Court ruling. Satoru Katsuno,
Chair of the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) stated that “(The ruling) is very
regrettable. With few energy resources in Japan, nuclear energy has a major role to play inproviding a stable supply of electricity and as a way to deal with global warming. Making every
effort to meet new safety standards, we will also do our utmost to improve explanations tothose living in host municipalities and general society”.533
Shikoku Electric on 19 February 2020 filed an appeal with the Hiroshima High Court seeking areversal of the decision,534 with the expectation that a judgement will be issued during the lastquarter of the year.

Multiple Reactor Shutdowns
The first forced shutdowns as a result of NRA emergency security regulations began in spring2020. Utilities in Japan were required to construct and install new emergency control-rooms,
standby power-supplies and reactor coolant-pumps, to enable cooling procedures via remotecontrol. The emergency off-site control rooms were to serve as back-up facilities to be usedin the event of a terrorist attack and to prevent fuel melt. The facilities and equipment wererequired to be in place no later than five years after each reactor received regulatory restart
approval. Described as a near total shutdown of Japan’s reactor fleet, the NRA decisioncontributed to a 19-percent plunge of the three utilities’ share value as of April 2019.535 All

530 - The Mainichi Shimbun, “Editorial: Court order to halt Ehime nuclear reactor serves as safety inspection warning”,
18 January 2020, see https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20200118/p2a/00m/0na/006000c, accessed 15 May 2020.
531 - The Asahi Shimbun, “Residents win appeal to halt Ikata reactor over safety fears”, 17 January 2020,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ202001170057.html; and Shikoku Electric Power Company, “Decision on temporary
suspension of operation of No. 3 operation of Ikata Power Station in Hiroshima High Court appeal”, 17 January 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.yonden.co.jp/press/2019/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/01/17/pr006_1.pdf; both accessed 15 May 2020.
532 - The Mainichi Shimbun, “Editorial: Court order to halt Ehime nuclear reactor serves as safety inspection warning”,
18 January 2020, op. cit.
533 - The Asahi Shimbun, “Residents win appeal to halt Ikata reactor over safety fears”, 17 January 2020,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ202001170057.html, accessed 27 August 2020.
534 - Platts Nuclear News Flashes, “Shikoku Electric appeals ruling keeping Ikata-3 offline”, 19 February 2020.
535 - Robin Harding, “Japan’s nuclear reactors face new near-total shutdown”, Financial Times, 25 April 2019,see https://www.ft.com/content/1b2c395e-6724-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056, accessed 29 April 2019.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 utilities have reported that they are behind schedule in the construction of their “contingency”
facilities.536
Kyushu Electric Power Company missed its deadline for its two reactors at Sendai. It was
required to finish installing counter-terrorism facilities at the Sendai-1 and -2 reactors by
17 March and 21 May 2020, respectively.537 As a result, Sendai-1 has been shut down since
16 March 2020538 and is scheduled for restart on 26 December 2020. While Sendai-2 was shut
down on 20 May 2020 after only operating for four months following its maintenance andinspection outage completed in January.539 It is scheduled for restart on 26 January 2021.
KEPCO’s Takahama-3, originally due to restart following maintenance and inspection
sometime between April and May 2020, has not been restarted as of 1 July 2020.540 During
its outage, damage to the steam-generator tube support-plate was identified.541 It wasscheduled to be shut down from 2 August to 22 December 2020 for completion of emergency
upgrades. Takahama-4 was shut down in September 2019 for maintenance and refuelingand was restarted on 26 February 2020.542 It is scheduled to be shut down from 7 October
to 10 February 2021. The shutdown of the Takahama reactors due to emergency measuresprovision is expected to cost Kansai Electric ¥33.7 billion (US$309 million).543
Shikoku Electric’s Ikata-3 reactor was due to be shut down in March 2020 as a result of the NRA
emergency measures. However, the reactor has not restarted after completing maintenancedue to the Hiroshima District Court ruling (see section on the Hiroshima Lawsuit).

Reactor Closures
No additional reactors were formally declared for decommissioning in the year to 1 July 2020.
The 11 commercial Japanese reactors now confirmed to be decommissioned (not including
the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) or the ten Fukushima reactors) had a total generating
capacity of 6.4 GW, representing 14.7 percent of Japan’s operating nuclear capacity as ofMarch 2011.544 Together with the ten Fukushima units, the total rises to 21 reactors and 15.2 GW
536 - The Yomiuri Shimbun, “NRA, power utilities should promote in-depth dialogue for nuclear safety”, The Japan News, 8 May 2019,see http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0005725420.
537 - Argus Media, “Japan’s Kyushu to shut Sendai reactor for eight months”, 18 May 2020,see https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2106140-japans-kyushu-to-shut-sendai-reactor-for-eight-months, accessed 18 May 2020.
538 - Kyodo News, “Kyushu Electric halts Sendai reactor due to delay in terrorism measures”, as published by The Japan Times,
16 March 2020, see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/16/national/kyushu-electric-halts-sendai-reactor/#.XsWCiRNKjOQ,
accessed 18 May 2020.
539 - Argus Media, “Japan’s Kyushu to shut Sendai reactor for eight months”, 18 May 2020, op. cit.
540 - KEPCO, “Operation results of nuclear power plants (FY2019)”, 3 April 2020,see https://www.kepco.co.jp/corporate/pr/2020/0403_1j.html, accessed 18 May 2020.
541 - KEPCO, “Regarding the periodic inspection status of Takahama Power Station Unit 3 (Continued report on the status ofinspection regarding damage to steam generator heat transfer tubes)”, 17 April 2020, see https://www.kepco.co.jp/corporate/
pr/2020/0417_2j.html; and KEPCO, “Periodic inspection status of Takahama Power Station Unit 3 (damage to steam generator heattransfer tubes)”, 18 February 2020, see https://www.kepco.co.jp/corporate/pr/2020/0218_2j.html; both accessed 18 May 2020.
542 - KEPCO, “(Notice) Resumption of full-scale operation of Unit 4 of Takahama Power Station”, 26 February 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.kepco.co.jp/corporate/pr/2020/0226_3j.html, accessed 18 May 2020.
543 - NEI Magazine, “Japanese reactor restarts delayed for safety upgrades”, 31 January 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsjapanese-reactor-restarts-delayed-for-safety-upgrades-7748324, accessed 18 May 2020.
544 - Based on a total installed capacity of 43.6 GW (not including the 246 MW Monju FBR and Kashiwazaki Kariwa 2–4) which were in
LTO in March 2011.

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or just under 35 percent of nuclear capacity prior to 3/11 that has now been permanently
removed from operations (see Figure 39 and Table 7).
Figure 39 · Status of the Japanese Reactor Fleet

Status of Reactors Officially Operational in Japan vs. WNISR Assessment
in Units, as of year end 2005–2019 and mid-2020
2006
KashiwazakiKariwa-5 in LTO
until restartin 201050

2007
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa2–4 in LTO;
never restarted after
Niigata Earth Quake2015
5 reactors :2 (2010) &3 (2011)2011
Fukushima
Daiichi 1–4
closed40

2014
Fukushima
Daiichi-5 & -6
(2011)

2016
Ikata-1(2011)

1 July 2020
Officially Operating
33 Reactors
2018
Ikata-2(2012)
Ohi-1 & -2,
Onagawa-1*(2011)WNISR Status
9 Operating:Sendai-1 & -2,
Ikata-3, Takahama-3 & -4,
Ohi-3 & -4, Genkai-3.

2019
Genkai-2,
FukushimaDaini-1–4(2011)

30

24 in LTO of which
Kashiwasaki-Kariwa 2–4
since 2007

YEAR: Officially closed(YEAR): last production year,
WNISR Closure

StatusOperatingLong Term Outageof which since2007 Earth Quake

20

10

WNISR Closed

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

* To be decomissioned, but notofficially closed yet© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: Various, Compiled by WNISR, 2020

TEPCO’s nuclear plant at Kashiwazaki Kariwa in Niigata Prefecture saw progress of sorts
during the past year towards possible decommissioning of one or more of the seven reactors
at the site. On 26 August 2019, at a meeting between Masahiro Sakurai, the mayor of
Kashiwazaki City and TEPCO’s President Tomoaki Kobayakawa, it was announced that thecompany would consider plans to decommission one or more reactors at the site within five
years of restart of Units 6 and 7.545 (See The Case of TEPCO's Kashiwazaki Kariwa).
The Japanese nuclear fleet’s mean age now stands at 29.4 years, with 13 units over 31 years(see Figure 40).

545 - The Asahi Shimbun, “EDITORIAL: Put state in charge of TEPCO’s plan for reactor restarts”, 10 September 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201909100038.html, accessed 20 May 2020.

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Table 7 · Official Reactor Closures Post-3/11 in Japan (as of 1 July 2020)
Operator

TEPCO

KEPCO

KYUSHU

Capacity
MW

StartupYear

ClosureAnnouncement(a)dd/mm/yy

Official
Closure Date(b)dd/mm/yy

Last
Production

Age(c)

Fukushima Daiichi-1 (BWR)

439

1970

-

19/04/122011

40

Fukushima Daiichi-2 (BWR)

760

1973

-

19/04/122011

37

Fukushima Daiichi-3 (BWR)

760

1974

-

19/04/122011

36

Fukushima Daiichi-4 (BWR)

760

1978

-

19/04/12

2011

33

ReactorFukushima Daiichi-5 (BWR)

760

1977

19/12/13

31/01/14

2011

34

Fukushima Daiichi-6 (BWR)

1 067

1979

19/12/13

31/01/14

2011

32

Fukushima Daini-1 (BWR)

1 067

1981

31/07/19

30/09/19

2011

30

Fukushima Daini-2 (BWR)

1 067

1983

31/07/19

30/09/19

2011

28

Fukushima Daini-3 (BWR)

1 067

1984

31/07/19

30/09/19

2011

26

Fukushima Daini-4 (BWR)

1 067

1986

31/07/19

30/09/19

201124

Mihama-1 (PWR)

320

1970

17/03/15

27/04/15

201040

Mihama-2 (PWR)

470

1972

17/03/15

27/04/15

201140

Ohi-1 (PWR)

1 120

1977

22/12/17

01/03/18

2011

34

Ohi-2 (PWR)

1 120

1978

22/12/17

01/03/18

2011

33

Genkai-1 (PWR)

529

1975

18/03/15

27/04/15

2011

37

Genkai-2 (PWR)

529

1980

13/02/19

13/02/13

2011

31

Ikata-1 (PWR)

538

1977

25/03/16

10/05/16

2011

35

Ikata- 2 (PWR)

538

1981

27/03/18(d)27/03/18

2012

30

JAEA

Monju (FBR)

246

1995

12/2016(e)05/12/17

LTS(f) since 1995

-

JAPC

Tsuruga -1 (BWR)

340

1969

17/03/15

27/04/15

2011

41

CHUGOKU

Shimane-1 (PWR)

439

1974

18/03/15

30/04/15

2010

37

TOHOKU

Onagawa-1 (BWR)

498

1983

25/10/18

21/12/18(g)

2011

27

SHIKOKUTOTAL: 22 Reactors /15.5 GWe
Sources: JAIF, Japan Nuclear Safety Institute, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes

BWR : Boiling Water Reactor; PWR : Pressurized Water Reactor; FBR : Fast Breeder Reactor; LTS: Long-Term Shutdown.
TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company; KEPCO: Kansai Electric Power Company; JAEA : Japan Atomic Energy Agency; JAPC: Japan Atomic Energy
Agency.

a – Unless otherwise specified, all announcement dates from Japan Nuclear Safety Institute, “Licensing status for the Japanese nuclear
facilities”, 26 February 2020, see http://www.genanshin.jp/english/facility/map/, accessed 27 July 2020.
b – Unless otherwise specified, all closure dates from individual reactors’ page via JAIF, “NPPs in Japan”, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum,
see http://www.jaif.or.jp/en/npps-in-japan/, as of 27 July 2020.
c – Note that WNISR considers the age from first grid connection to last production day.
d – WNN, “Shikoku decides to retire Ikata 2”, World Nuclear News, 27 April 2018,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Shikoku-decides-to-retire-Ikata-2-2703184.html, accessed 22 July 2018.
e – The Mainichi, “Japan decides to scrap trouble-plagued Monju prototype reactor”, 21 December 2016,see http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20161221/p2g/00m/0dm/050000c, accessed 21 December 2016.
f – The Monju reactor was officially in Long-Term Shutdown or LTS (IAEA-Category Long Term Shutdown) since December 1995.
g – The decision to close the reactor was announced in October 2018.

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Figure 40 · Age Distribution of the Japanese Nuclear Fleet

Age of Japanese Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

9 in operat
ion
Reactor Age

15

0–10 Years
11–20 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over

94
1

33 Reactors(24 in LTO)
Mean Age29.4 Years

4

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Restart Prospects
The Mainichi Shimbun reported in November 2019 that safety retrofit costs at nuclear power
plant were estimated by Japanese utilities to have increased fivefold since 2013 to ¥5.38 trillion(US$50 billion.546 In 2013, and before the newly created Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA)
applied revised regulatory conditions, the nine utilities with reactors had allocated together
just under ¥1 trillion (US$9.3 billion) for safety measures. The current cost estimate forJapanese reactors is higher than the total expenditure for post-Fukushima measures carriedout in 2016 for all the reactors in the world, according to a report by Platts Electric Power.547
The costs to TEPCO of safety upgrades at the seven-reactor Kashiwazaki Kariwa site in Niigata
were ¥1.17 trillion (US$10.9 billion), the highest for any utility. All of those the reactors remain
in LTO, with a possible restart of Kashiwasaki-6 and -7 from 2021—but only if local approvalis secured. TEPCO had estimated in 2013 that costs would be ¥70 billion (US$653 million).
For a number of utilities, the final cost of anti-terrorism upgrades had yet to be calculated,according to Mainichi. Clearly costs are continuing to rise; Nikkei for example had reported inJuly 2019 that utilities were estimating costs at ¥4.8 trillion (US$44.2 billion).548
All currently operating reactors in Japan are Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs)—thedestroyed Fukushima Daiichi units were Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). As of 1 July 2020,16 reactors remain under NRA safety review (out of a total of 25 that have applied since July 2013of which nine were restarted); 24 reactors remain in LTO. Not all of these will restart, withmany questions and disagreements over seismic issues, and many plants far back in the review
546 - The Mainichi Shimbun, “Japan nuclear plant safety costs increase 5-fold over 6 years to 5.4 trillion yen”, 16 November 2019,see https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20191116/p2a/00m/0na/004000c.
547 - S&P Global Insight, “Nuclear safety upgrades post-Fukushima cost $47 billion”, Platts Electric Power, 28 March 2016,see https://blogs.platts.com/2016/03/29/nuclear-safety-upgrades-post-fukushima/, accessed 20 May 2020.
548 - Nikkei Review, “Nuclear safety costs in Japan surge to staggering heights”, 9 July 2019,see https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Nuclear-safety-costs-in-Japan-surge-to-staggering-heights, accessed 20 May 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 and screening queue. There are officially two reactors under construction (Shimane-3 andOhma). WNISR has pulled Ohma off the list, as no active construction could be substantiated.
Restarts for Kansai Electric Power Company’s (KEPCO) Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs)
Takahama-1 and -2, and Mihama-3, which passed NRA review for respective upgrading plans
in 2016, have been further delayed. In March 2020, KEPCO announced that completion ofsafety retrofits would take four months longer than planned.549 These three reactors, which are46, 45 and 44 years old respectively, were granted lifetime operation approval to 60 years by
the NRA in 2016.550 Respective restart schedules have all been revised several times over recent
years. The latest delays would mean restart of Takahama-1 no earlier than September 2020,
with Takahama-2 in May 2021, and Mihama-3 no earlier than October 2020. All of theserestart dates look unlikely to be achieved. The impact of the NRA ruling requiring secondary
emergency control centers at nuclear reactors may impact the restart of the Mihama-3 reactor.
In June 2020, a Kansai Electric spokesperson stated that the company “has yet to form a newpolicy,” regarding the Mihama-3 restart.551 The NRA requires that the emergency safety centerat Mihama-3 be completed by 25 October 2021, and one option being considered is that thereactor remains in LTO until then or later. However, assuming that all three reactors will be
operating by the end of 2021, and other engineering work is completed at Takahama-3 and -4,
seven of the twelve reactors operating in Japan will be owned by KEPCO, with an installedcapacity of 6.25 GW. As reported, KEPCO has been at the center of a bribery and corruption
scandal during the last year, including specifically at engineering work conducted at the
Takahama reactor site. However, unless there are further revelations, it is unlikely that thisscandal will significantly affect restart of the Takahama and Mihama reactors.
On 26 February 2020, the NRA commissioners granted permission to Tohoku Electric Power
Company to make changes to the Onagawa-2 reactor (i.e. basic design approval).552 The
reactor, situated on the Ishinomaki peninsula on the Pacific coast of Miyagi Prefecture, was the
16th in Japan and the fourth BWR to win approval under the NRA’s new safety standards. This
major step in the approval of the safety of the reactor was reported as meaning that Onagawa-2
will be the first BWR to restart operations under the new guidelines, with completion of works
planned by the owner scheduled for 2021. However, two months after securing NRA regulatory
approval for its Onagawa-2 BWR, the President of Tohoku Electric Power Company announced
on 30 April 2020 a two-year delay in completion of construction work at the reactor site.553
Work is now planned to be finished by March 2023.554 Construction work at the reactor,
549 - Jiji Press, “Kansai Electric Puts Off Restart of N-Reactors in Fukui Pref.” 31 March 2020, see https://www.nippon.com/en/news/
yjj2020033100928/kansai-electric-puts-off-restart-of-n-reactors-in-fukui-pref.html, accessed 20 May 2020.
550 - Noriyuki Ishii, “NRA Approves Extensions of Operating Periods to 60 Years for Takahama-1 and -2, the First for Aging Reactors”,
JAIF, 22 June 2016, see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-approves-extensions-of-operating-periods-to-60-years-for-takahama-1-and-2the-first-for-aging-reactors/; and Noriyuki Ishii, “NRA Approves Extension of Operating Lifetime for Mihama-3 through 2036”, JAIF,
17 November 2019, see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-approves-extension-of-operating-lifetime-for-mihama-3-through-2036/; bothaccessed 26 April 2020.
551 - Platts Nuclear News Flashes, “NRA approves Kansai Electric’s Mihama-3 backup safety facility plans”, 3 June 2020.
552 - JAIF, “NRA Approves Changes to Reactor Installation for Onagawa-2 under New Regulatory Standards”, 27 February 2020,see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-approves-changes-to-reactor-installation-for-onagawa-2-under-new-regulatory-standards/,
accessed 21 May 2020.
553 - Tohoku Electric, “Overview of April Presidential Press Conference”, 30 April 2020,see https://www.tohoku-epco.co.jp/news/press/1214692_2560.html, accessed 20 May 2020.
554 - JAIF, “NRA Approves Changes to Reactor Installation for Onagawa-2 under New Regulatory Standards”, 27 February 2020,see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-approves-changes-to-reactor-installation-for-onagawa-2-under-new-regulatory-standards/,
accessed 20 May 2020.

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including a 29-meter extended seawall and additional seismic retrofit measures, according to
Tohoku Electric in February 2020, had been scheduled to be completed before March 2021,
to be then followed by pre-operational inspections by the NRA and restart, expected to be
towards the end of 2021. With NRA approval it was reported in February 2020 that Onagawa-2
would the first BWR to resume operations in Japan.555 As of November 2019, Tohoku Electric
had committed ¥340 billion (about US$3.1 billion) in safety retrofits at the site.556
Doubts persist over the actual condition of the Onagawa reactors, including unit 2. The
Onagawa site is the closest nuclear plant to the epicenter of the 3/11 earthquake. Unit 2 was
subcritical in startup mode on 3/11, while Units 1 and 3 were in full operation. In January 2017,
the utility disclosed to the NRA that the reactor building had sustained 1,130 cracks in thewalls and “lost an estimated 70 percent of structural rigidity” in the 3/11 earthquake.557 The
disclosures led Tohoku to push back restart schedule from 2018 to 2019 and then beyond
2020. The disclosures to the NRA followed an architectural investigation which identified
that structural rigidity, the ability to withstand earthquakes and other stresses from outside
without being distorted, was concentrated in the upper third of the reactor building with thethird floor only retaining 30 percent of its integrity compared with July 1995 when the reactor
began operation. It also confirmed a 25 percent loss of structural integrity in the two aboveground floors and three basement levels.
Significantly, the disclosure contrasts starkly with the assessment and conclusions of a highprofile IAEA mission to the plant in 2012.558 The IAEA mission included a “structures team”
assigned to observe and collect information on the performance of the structural elements ofbuildings. They reported that, as far as cracks in Unit 2 are concerned, they were “less than
0.3 mm, although at some locations there were cracks of approximately 0.8 mm. These minor
cracks do not affect the overall integrity of the structure.” The IAEA concluded: “The lack ofany serious damage to all classes of seismically designed facilities attests to the robustness ofthese facilities under severe seismic ground shaking”, and that, “the structural elements of the
NPS [Nuclear Power Station] were remarkably undamaged given the magnitude and durationof ground motion experienced during this great earthquake.”559
The NRA draft assessment of Onagawa-2 in November 2019, garnered 979 public submissions
where, “many local citizens expressed concerns over the threat posed to the plant by
earthquakes and tsunami but the NRA dismissed their comments.”560 In November 2019, agroup of Ishinomaki citizens filed a request with the Sendai District Court for an injunction
555 - Shota Ushio and Yuzo Yamaguchi, “Onagawa-2 to likely be first BWR to restart since Fukushima I accident”, S&P Global Platts,
26 February 2020, see https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/022620-onagawa-2-to-likely-befirst-bwr-to-restart-since-fukushima-i-accident, accessed 20 May 2020.
556 - Kahoku Shimpo, “Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant No. 2—Safety Measures ¥ 340 Billion”, 29 March 2019 (in Japanese),see https://www.kahoku.co.jp/tohokunews/201903/20190329_11016.html, accessed 26 April 2019;and The Mainichi Shimbun, “Editorial: Reactor restart OK a reminder Japan must abandon nuclear power”, 28 November 2019,see https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20191128/p2a/00m/0na/007000c, accessed 20 May 2020.
557 - The Asahi Shimbun, “1,130 cracks, 70% rigidity lost at Onagawa reactor building”, 18 January 2017.
558 - IAEA, “Mission To Onagawa Nuclear Power Station To Examine The Performance Of Systems, Structures And Components
Following The Great East Japanese Earthquake And Tsunami”, Mission Report to the Government of Japan, 30 July–11 August 2012,
Onagawa and Tokyo (Japan), IAEA Department Of Nuclear Safety And Security, Department Of Nuclear Energy,
see https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaeamissiononagawa.pdf, accessed 26 April 2019.
559 - Ibidem.
560 - The Asahi Shimbun, “Onagawa reactor passes screening under new NRA safety standards”, 26 February 2020,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13166013, accessed 21 May 2020.

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that, if granted, would prohibit the Miyagi Prefecture governor and the Ishinomaki mayor fromapproving restart to the reactor.561
As of 1 July 2020, the utility had not applied for NRA review of Onagawa-3 which began
operation in May 2001. Tokoku Electric’s President stated in November 2018 that they werein preparation for submitting a safety review application to the NRA for the reactor, without
specifying a date.562 There are suspicions that damage sustained at Unit 3 is more significant
than reported.
Other reactor operators remain in ongoing dialogue with the NRA over multiple issues at theirrespective reactor sites. Hokkaido Electric Power Company, for example, continues to present
evidence to the regulator claiming that the seismic risk to the Tomari site, which hosts three
PWRs, would be limited so that the reactors could safely operate. Further field investigations
into the geological structures around the site are ongoing as of April 2020.563 The utility is
struggling with a lower customer base, and continues like other Japanese utilities to rely on
debt financing to cover the costs of reactor retrofits.564 There are no near-term prospects forrestart of the Tomari reactors.
During 2019, the future prospects for the planned TEPCO twin Advanced Boiling Water
Reactors (ABWR) at Higashidori surfaced with reports of possible partnership with otherJapanese utilities. The TEPCO Higashidori-1 power plant in Aomori prefecture, referred
to as Higashi Dori-1 (TEPCO) in IAEA-PRIS, not to be confused with the Higashidori-1
reactor owned by Tohoku Electric (referred to as Higashi Dori (Tohoku) in IAEA-PRIS) andalso located at the adjacent site in Aomori, was due to be constructed from 2011. The initialproject was for two 1385 MW ABWRs. Granted a construction permit in December 2010,
TEPCO began site preparation in January 2011,565 but plans for formal construction to begin
in April 2011 was suspended following the 3/11 events. Commercial operation of unit 1 wasoriginally scheduled for March 2017.566 A seismic assessment was initiated in 2018 by TEPCO,
specifically looking at the possibility of an active fault line under the power plant site and which
was due to be completed in FY 2020.567 TEPCO has been seeking partners for covering thecost of construction without success since 2018, with Tomoaki Kobayakawa, the then company
President stating that, “It’s necessary to form a consortium for building a nuclear plant that is
excellent in safety, technology and economy”.568 At that time, other utilities listed as possible
partners were Tohoku Electric, Chubu Electric Power Co., and JAPCo, as well as Kansai Electric
561 - The Asahi Shimbun, “EDITORIAL: Safety concerns linger although Onagawa reactor cleared to restart”, 28 November 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201911290036.html, accessed 20 May 2020.
562 - NW, “Tohoku Electric preparing to apply to NRA for Onagawa-3 safety review”, 1 November 2018.
563 - Hokkaido Electric Power Company, “Documents to be submitted to the review meeting regarding compliance with new
regulatory standards for nuclear power plants”, 856th Nuclear Power Plant New Regulatory Standards Compliance Meeting, held April
16, 2020)”, see http://www.hepco.co.jp/energy/atomic/info/document.html#MEETING_856, accessed 21 May 2020.
564 - Moody’s, “Rating Action: Moody’s affirms Hokkaido Electric’s P-2 rating”, 13 March 2020.
565 - TEPCO, “Higashidori Nuclear Power Station—Construction Plan Overview”, Undated,
see https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/hd/ourbusiness/nuclear/higashi-dori/index-e.html, accessed 21 July 2020.
566 - NucNet, “Construction Of Higashidori-1 (Tepco) Begins”, 1 February 2011,see https://www.nucnet.org/news/construction-of-higashidori-1-tepco-begins, accessed 21 July 2020.
567 - Jiji Press, “Tepco to check for faults under site of new atomic plant eyed in Aomori”, as published in The Japan Times,
30 June 2018, see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/30/national/tepco-start-geological-survey-higashidori-nuclear-plantaomori/, accessed 21 July 2020.
568 - Ibidem.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Power. As the holder of the majority of TEPCO’s voting rights, the Japanese Government wasreported to be supportive of such a consortium. TEPCO claimed that it would reach agreementwith partners by FY 2020.569 Given the financial status of JAPCo, there are no prospects of it
contributing financing.
On 28 August 2019, TEPCO, Chubu Electric Power and two nuclear reactor vendors, Hitachi
and Toshiba signed an agreement to discuss potential collaboration for “BWR [Boiling Water
Reactor] business”.570 Though the agreement does not specifically name the constructionof the Higashidori plant, TEPCO officials had explained the agreement in that context. In
September 2019, Satoshi Katsuno, Chubu Electric’s president, stated that the agreement leaves
open the possibility of joint work on the Higashidori-1 project. Undoubtedly, the agreement
reflects the interests of those in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
determined to maintain nuclear power in Japan but conscious that the present structure isnot sustainable given the state of the industry with limited domestic reactor operations andthe extremely limited prospects for securing overseas contracts. A former METI official told
Nucleonics Week in September 2019 that, “it would be natural” for TEPCO, which is controlled
by the state, and Chubu Electric “to move to consolidate their nuclear operations.”571
Chubu Electric has yet to have any of its existing reactors at Hamaoka approved for operationby the NRA, as well as facing opposition to restart from the prefectural Government. METI’s
leverage of Chubu to join the Higashidori project is considerable, with one analyst stating thatit and may even mean that in addition to the Higashidori plant, the Hamaoka reactors may be
operated by the four parties.572
However, in December 2019 Toshiba indicated that it is uninterested in joint operationof the Higashidori plant, “Our stakeholders won’t accept it,” said Midori Hara, a Toshiba
spokeswoman.573 One issue cited was Toshiba’s concern that Japan’s nuclear liability law
maintains nuclear plant operators’ unlimited liability for compensation for accidents: “Unlessthe law is revised, we will remain reluctant to join the Higashidori project,” said Hara.574 On
13 December 2019, TEPCO president Tomoaki Kobayakawa stated: “We’re in talks with thepartners…But they may have different interests in this,” he added, noting that the Higashidori
project could not be pursued without the partnerships.575

The Case of TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki Kariwa
Prospects for the restart of TEPCO’s Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWRs) Kashiwazaki
Kariwa-6 and -7 in Niigata Prefecture have taken a step forward in the past year. In
November 2019, the mayor of Kashiwazaki city, one of the two host communities that must give569 - Kyodo News, “Tepco and other utilities eye joint nuclear plant project in Aomori Prefecture”, 16 March 2018,see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/16/business/corporate-business/tepco-utilities-eye-joint-nuclear-plant-project-aomoriprefecture/, accessed 21 July 2020.
570 - Toshiba, “Basic Agreement to Discuss Potential Collaboration for Nuclear Energy Business (Boiling Water Reactors)”,
28 August 2019, see https://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/press/2019_08/pr2803.htm, accessed 21 July 2020.
571 - NW, “Japan’s Chubu may join TEPCO in Higashidori-1 project: analysts”, 19 September 2019.
572 - Ibidem.
573 - NW, “TEPCO sees differing interests among potential partners in higashidori-1 project” 19 December 2019.
574 - Ibidem.
575 - Ibidem.

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their consent before restart, accepted TEPCO’s overall plan for considering decommissioning
one or more reactors at the site. This was a condition imposed on TEPCO by the mayor in 2017
requiring a commitment to reduce the number of operating reactors at the site in exchange forapproval by the mayor for restart of Units 6 and 7. Both reactors have been shut down since
March 2012 and August 2011 respectively. While TEPCO is aiming for a restart in March 2021,
significant obstacles and uncertainties remain.
When TEPCO submitted its first post-3/11 business plan to the Japanese Government in 2012,it predicted that restart of reactors at Kashiwazaki Kariwa would begin in FY2013. This wasnever credible. On 27 December 2017, the NRA approved the initial safety assessment of Units 6
and 7,576 the first BWRs to reach this stage of NRA’s review process.577 On 13 December 2018,
TEPCO submitted to the NRA a schedule for completion of its engineering work programon Unit 7, by which it aims to complete safety retrofits by December 2020.578 In its third
Special Business Plan in May 2017, it projected income from the reactors with three potential
restart dates of 2019, 2020 and 2021.579 WNISR2019 concluded that the earliest the reactors
could restart would be 2021, but only if TEPCO were to overcome significant obstacles. As of
1 July 2020, there are diminishing prospects for TEPCO succeeding in restarting the reactors,
as now planned, in March 2021.580
The Kashiwazaki Kariwa site has a history of major seismic activity, with repeatedunderestimates and non-disclosures of the seismic risks by TEPCO and resultant coverups.
At the time of the licensing of the Units 6 and 7 in 1991, TEPCO presented evidence to theregulator that the nearby fault lines were not active. This was then proven to be incorrect, withTEPCO’s own data showing that they were aware of active faults as early as 1980. None of thiswas made public until after the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-oki quake.581
There are multiple seismic fault lines in the area of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa site, including
through the site.582 There are large-scale submarine active faults offshore with four mainones, three of which run along either edge of the Sado Basin, a depression between Sado
Island and mainland Kashiwazaki.583 Seismologists have long warned about the threat frommajor earthquakes leading to a severe nuclear accident at Kashiwazaki Kariwa.584 Independent
576 - TEPCO, “Receipt of Approval of Revision for Reactor Installation Permit for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Units 6/7 to comply with
the New Regulatory Regulations”, Press Release, 27 December 2017.
577 - Justin McCurry, “Fears of another Fukushima as Tepco plans to restart world’s biggest nuclear plant”, The Guardian,
28 December 2017, see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/28/fears-of-another-fukushima-as-tepco-plans-to-restart-worldsbiggest-nuclear-plant, accessed 16 August 2020.
578 - Platts, “Tepco to finish engineering work program at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in 2020”, Nuclear News Flashes, 14 December 2018.
579 - TEPCO, “Outline of the ‘Revised Comprehensive Special Business Plan (The Third Plan)’”, 18 May 2017,see https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2017/1437151_10469.html, accessed 16 August 2020.
580 - TEPCO, “FY2017 Financial Results (April 1, 2017 – March 31, 2018) Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.”, 26 April 2018,see http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/presen/pdf/180426_1-e.pdf.
581 - Katsuhiko Ishibashi and Mitsuhisa Watanabe, “We demand that the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant be closed”, CNIC,
March-April 2008, see http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/pdffiles/nit123.pdf, accessed 27 April 2019.
582 - Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Fault Study Group, “Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station site and its surroundings—
Request for a rigorous scientific review on stratigraphy of Middle and Upper Pleistocene”, 22 May 2017 (in Japanese),see http://masatate.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-55.html, accessed 27 April 2019.
583 - CNIC, “We demand that the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant be closed”, Group of Concerned Scientists andEngineers Calling for the Closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant, 2008, see http://cnic.jp/english/?p=1200#intro,
accessed 20 May 2020.
584 - Ishibashi Katsuhiko, “Why Worry? Japan’s Nuclear Plants at Grave Risk From Quake Damage”, The Asia-Pacific Journal,
1 August 2007, Vol. 5, Issue 8, see http://apjjf.org/-Ishibashi-Katsuhiko/2495/article.html, accessed 27 April 2019.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 seismologists and citizens’ groups continue to oppose restart of the reactors, including
based on evidence that TEPCO has relied on flawed seismic assessments;585 meanwhile, legal
challenges seeking permanent closure are ongoing.
The Niigata governor election of 10 June 2018 led to the appointment of Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP)-backed candidate Hideyo Hanazumi.586 This did not automatically mean any earlyrestart for the Kashiwazaki Kariwa reactors. The elected governor, conscious that 65 percentof the Niigata population remains opposed to restart of any reactors at the plant, stated at
the time that “as long as the people of Niigata remain unconvinced, (the reactors) won’t berestarted.”587
Niigata has a long history of opposition to the nuclear power plant, but this was exacerbatedwhen in September 2002, following disclosures from a General Electric whistleblower,
TEPCO was forced to admit that the organization had deliberately falsified data for inclusion
in regulatory safety inspection reports of their reactors, a consequence of “systematic andinappropriate management of nuclear power inspections and repair work [over] a long time”.588
As a consequence, at the time, all 17 TEPCO reactors—the seven at Kashiwazaki Kariwa and theten at Fukushima—were shut down for extended periods, and TEPCO’s chairman, president,
and executive vice-president all resigned. The major seismic risks at the plant were exposed by
the 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-oki earthquake, which once again led to the extended shutdown of
all Kashiwazaki Kariwa reactors, while Units 2, 3 and 4 have not operated since then. It is quite
remarkable that official data like the IAEA-PRIS database continue to list these reactors as “inoperation” although they have not provided a single kilowatt-hour in the past 13 years.
In February 2019, the NRA announced it was investigating TEPCO for ongoing safety
violations, at Kashiwazaki Kariwa, as well as at Fukushima.589
In the aftermath of the 2002 falsification disclosures, the then governor of Niigata establisheda Technical Committee of 15 experts to review nuclear safety in the prefecture. This committee
is currently still reviewing the Fukushima Daiichi accidents, including causes as well as ongoingassessments of the safety of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa plant. This includes meetings with NRA,
where the regulator has been regularly challenged on its safety approval of the reactors.590
A second committee, established in August 2017 by then Governor Ryuichi Yoneyama, isreviewing the health impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and a third committee, alsoestablished under Yoneyama, is reviewing emergency planning in Niigata in the event of a585 - Niigata Nippo, “At Kashiwazaki Nuclear Power Station, ‘Incomplete fault investigation’ residents group proposed to TEPCO”,
26 January 2019 (in Japanese), see https://www.niigata-nippo.co.jp/news/national/20190126447009.html; and Tateishi Masaaki,“Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, doubt on TEPCO interpretation of the Terao fault outcrop”, 30 January 2019 (in Japanese),see http://masatate.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-64.html, both accessed 27 April 2019.
586 - The Asahi Shimbun, “LDP-backed candidate wins governor’s race in Niigata”, 11 June 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201806110049.html, accessed 27 April 2019.
587 - Eric Johnston, “If Niigata gubernatorial race was a litmus test, Abe and Nikai passed”, The Japan Times, 11 June 2018,see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/11/national/politics-diplomacy/niigata-gubernatorial-race-litmus-test-abe-nikaipassed/#.WzDaTxIzbOQ, accessed 27 April 2019.
588 - TEPCO, “Report on the Investigation into Inspection and Maintenance Problems at TEPCO’s Nuclear Power Plants,
pointed out by GE”, Press Release, 17 September 2002, see http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/02091701-e.html,
accessed 27 April 2019.
589 - Yusuke Ogawa, “TEPCO sat by idly on reports of fires, glitches at nuclear plants”, The Asahi Shimbun, 14 February 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201902140054.html, accessed 27 April 2019.
590 - Tadao Yabe, “Preventing the Restart of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station is Possible!”, Local Coalition Opposed to the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, CNIC, 2 August 2018, see http://www.cnic.jp/english/?p=4165, accessed 27 April 2019.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 severe accident at the Kashiwazaki Kariwa plant.591 The work of the Committees was linked tothe then Governor’s decision on the restart of Units 6 and 7, and the committees are expected
to conclude their investigations in mid-2020. The incoming Governor has affirmed since hiselection that he will await the conclusion of their investigations, while also suggesting that afurther election could be held specifically on whether to restart the reactors.592 As of 1 July 2020,
there is no indication as to when the Niigata investigation committees will conclude their workor what the governor’s strategy will be.
As recent WNISRs have reported, the mayor of Kashiwazaki, Masahiro Sakurai, on
1 January 2017, announced that, as a condition for allowing restart of Units 6 and 7, TEPCO
must propose a decommissioning plan by 2019 for at least one reactor from Units 1–5 (withno upward limit on the number of these reactors to be permanently shuttered).593 The mayor
suggested it was inevitable to scale down the plant, “Considering the Fukushima nuclear
accident, seven reactors are too many.”594 The mayor extended his position on 25 July 2017, when
he agreed to the restart of Units 6 and 7 but on the condition that TEPCO within two years“presents a plan to decommission the remaining five…”595 The demand was made in the mayor’s
first meeting with TEPCO’s new president, Tomoaki Kobayakawa, where June 2019 was set as adate when TEPCO would provide a plan. However, in the end, TEPCO did not meet with mayor
Sakurai until 26 August 2019, at which company President Tomoaki Kobayakawa announced
that they would consider plans to decommission one or more reactors at Kashiwazaki Kariwa
within five years of restart of Units 6 and 7.596
At the meeting TEPCO presented a short briefing that outlined its approach in which thecompany restated that they consider Kashiwazaki Kariwa units 1–5 as necessary to meet an
obligation of reaching the national target for non-fossil fuel generation.597 This, “future desired
power-source composition” was to comply with the fifth national Strategic Energy Plan ofachieving about 40 percent of total generated electricity using non-fossil power sources by2030. TEPCO assured that if they are able to secure sufficient renewable energy over the
coming few years then steps will be taken for decommissioning.
TEPCO in recent years have communicated their intention to invest in renewables to make ita core area of their business, but the scale of growth and timeframe remains unclear. Making alink between future installed renewable capacity and decommissioning of Kashiwazaki Kariwa
reactors would suggest that TEPCO are not yet ready to admit that a number of reactors at thesite are not likely to operate again.
591 - Kentaro Hamada and Osamu Tsukimori, “Niigata governor’s plans may upend TEPCO’s nuclear restarts, restructuring”, Reuters,
9 June 2017, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-tepco-idUSKBN1900OR, accessed 27 April 2019.
592 - The Asahi Shimbun, “LDP-backed candidate wins governor’s race in Niigata”, 11 June 2018,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201806110049.html, accessed 20 May 2020.
593 - Niigata-Nippo, “Mayor Kashiwazaki asks TEPCO for decommissioning one of Units 1 to 5”, 6 January 2017 (in Japanese)see http://www.niigata-nippo.co.jp/news/national/20170601327254.html, accessed 25 May 2018.
594 - The Mainichi Shimbun, “Mayor to link reactor decommissioning to restarting 2 others at same TEPCO plant”, 2 June 2017,see https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170602/p2a/00m/0na/002000c, accessed 28 May 2020.
595 - The Asahi Shimbun, “Mayor: TEPCO’s Niigata plant must close 5 reactors”, 26 July 2017 (in Japanese),see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201707260037.html, accessed 28 May 2020.
596 - The Asahi Shimbun, “EDITORIAL: Put state in charge of TEPCO’s plan for reactor restarts”, 10 September 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201909100038.html, accessed 20 May 2020.
597 - TEPCO Holdings Ltd, “Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant Reoperation and Decommissioning Basic Concept”,
26 August 2019 (in Japanese), see https://www.tepco.co.jp/press/release/2019/pdf3/190826j0101.pdf, accessed 20 May 2020.

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In January 2019, TEPCO, in partnership with global wind energy leader Orsted, launched its
first commercial offshore wind project at Choshi off the coast of Chiba.598 In September 2019,
TEPCO announced that it was aiming for 370 MW of installed capacity by 2024 at the Choshisite.599 Each of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa Units 1–5 have a power rating of 1,067 MW, for a total of
5.3 GW. Assuming a possible restart of Units 6 and 7 in 2022, a decision on decommissioning ofother units within five years could see a significant increase in TEPCO’s renewables portfolio.
With a successful and rapid offshore wind development, it is possible that TEPCO will install
sufficient GW of offshore wind to replace one or more units at Kashiwazaki Kariwa. The
current Basic Energy Plan projects 10 GW of offshore wind by 2030. How much of this will
be TEPCO/Orsted capacity remains to be seen but it could be substantial. However, the wider
problem is the lack of ambition for renewables growth, including offshore wind, within thecurrent Basic Energy Plan.
At the local level in Niigata, TEPCO is seeking to secure early approval for restart while
offering the prospect of an earlier decommissioning schedule. It is, however, also aiming to
influence the national Government. The current business plan of TEPCO was agreed with the
Abe administration and is based on all seven reactors at Kashiwazaki Kariwa restarting during
the early to mid 2020s. While that plan lacks credibility,600 it aims to signal to the Governmentthat by restarting reactors its financial viability is being restored.601
Following a meeting between the mayor of Kashiwazaki and TEPCO’s president in
December 2019, it was reported that the mayor had given his basic approval to TEPCO’s
proposed basis for decommissioning of one or more of its reactors.602 On the basis of the plan’s
progress the mayor will decide on whether to approve restart for Units 6 and 7. The mayor
stated that this did not mean he has accepted the restart of the reactors. After the meeting
TEPCO’s president stated that he believes the mayor broadly agrees to TEPCO’s plans torestart Units 6 and 7.
The Niigata citizens’ administrative lawsuit against the Kashiwazaki Kariwa reactor restarts
remains ongoing, with earthquake risks a major focus. There are multiple seismic fault lines
in the area of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa site, including large-scale submarine active faults, withfour main ones, three of which run along either edge of the Sado Basin, a depression between
Sado Island and mainland Kashiwazaki.603 The seismic risks at the Kashiwazaki Kariwa siteremain unresolved despite assurances from TEPCO that retrofits are sufficient to meet seismic
hazards.
598 - Offshore WIND, “TEPCO Ponders 1GW Offshore Wind Farm in Japan”, 9 January 2019,see https://www.offshorewind.biz/2019/01/09/tepco-ponders-1gw-offshore-wind-farm-japan/;and Offshore WIND, “TEPCO and Ørsted Form Offshore Wind Pact, First Stop Japan”, 18 January 2019,see https://www.offshorewind.biz/2019/01/18/tepco-and-orsted-form-offshore-wind-pact-first-stop-japan/; both accessed 20 May 2020.
599 - Offshore WIND, “TEPCO Floats 370MW Choshi Offshore Wind Farm Plan”, 5 September 2019,see https://www.offshorewind.biz/2019/09/05/tepco-floats-370mw-choshi-offshore-wind-farm-plan/, accessed 20 May 2020.
600 - Shaun Burnie, “TEPCO’S Atomic Delusion”, Greenpeace Japan, 25 June 2018,see https://storage.googleapis.com/planet4-japan-stateless/2019/08/3d2e8976-atomic_delusion.pdf, accessed 20 May 2020.
601 - The Asahi Shimbun, “EDITORIAL: Put state in charge of TEPCO’s plan for reactor restarts”, 10 September 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13058650, accessed 20 May 2020.
602 - Jiji Press, “Mayor approves TEPCO’s N-reactor decomissioning plan”, as published by The Japan Times, 9 November 2019,see https://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0006171647, accessed 20 May 2020.
603 - Katsuhiko Ishibashi and Mitsuhisa Watanabe, “Earthquakes and Ground Condition Just how safe is the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Nuclear Power Plant?”, CNIC, Nuke Info Tokyo No. 123, March/April 2008, see http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/pdffiles/nit123.
pdf, accessed 20 May 2020.

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There have been steps forward and further delays in plans for the restart of the 1100-MW
BWR Tokai-2, owned by Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC). The reactor, located in Ibaraki
Prefecture and connected to the grid in 1978, is the closest to the Tokyo metropolitan area.
It was shut down on 11 March 2011. Japan Atomic Power announced on 28 January 2020
that engineering and construction works at the plant, including a 1.7 km long coastal levee,
were taking longer than anticipated.604 On 22 February 2019, JAPC announced its intention
to proceed with the restart of Tokai-2.605 The target date is January 2023. This followed a
7 November 2018 unanimous decision by NRA commissioners to approve an additional 20
years of operation.606
As reported in WNISR2019, local approval is more complicated for Tokai-2 than other sites inJapan as the power plant is covered by an agreement between the utility and municipalities.
There is strong public opposition within Ibaraki to restart of Tokai-2.607 JAPC must obtain
restart consent for Tokai-2 from six municipalities — Tokai village and the cities of Hitachi,
Hitachinaka, Hitachiota, Mito and Naka—as well as the prefectural government of Ibaraki
before it can restart the unit. About 940,000 people live in 14 municipalities within a
30-kilometer (18.6-mile) radius of the Tokai plant and the facility is closer to the Tokyo area
than any other nuclear plant.
More positively for the utility, on 28 October 2019, the board of TEPCO approved the financingof ¥220 billion (US$2 billion) for the Tokai-2 reactor.608 Explaining the decision, Rikuo Ohtsuki,
a managing executive officer at TEPCO stated “We have reached a conclusion that we can
expect the Tokai No. 2 nuclear plant to be a source of power that helps provide inexpensive
and stable electricity that emits less carbon dioxide to customers.”609 TEPCO’s contribution is
expected to cover around 60 percent of the current estimate cost. The decision is particularly
controversial as TEPCO is effectively a state-owned utility and technically bankrupt following
3/11. JAPC is unique in Japan as it is a utility owned by all other nuclear utilities. A framework
plan for financing Tokai-2 has been agreed by TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power Company.610
They both have contracts for the electricity generated at the reactor. KEPCO, Chubu ElectricPower Company and Hokuriku Electric Power Company have also agreed to contribute to thereactor costs.
The securing of financing for retrofits has been one of the biggest challenges for JAPC, originallyestimated at ¥174 billion (US$1.54 billion),611 by March 2019, this was revised to ¥300 billion

604 - JAPC, “Tokai Nuclear Power Plant license About change of construction plan”, Japan Atomic Power Company, 28 January 2020
(in Japanese), see http://www.japc.co.jp/news/press/2019/pdf/200128.pdf, accessed 29 May 2020.
605 - JAPC, “Revision of the Tokai Power Station and Tokai No. 2 Power Plant nuclear operator emergency plan”, 22 February 2019,see http://www.japc.co.jp/news/press/2018/pdf/310222_1.pdf, accessed 28 May 2020.
606 - JAIF, “NRA Allows Tokai-2 to Be Operated for Sixty Years, a First for a BWR”, 16 November 2018,see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-allows-tokai-2-to-be-operated-for-sixty-years-a-first-for-a-bwr/, accessed 28 April 2019.
607 - The Asahi Shimbun, “EDITORIAL: TEPCO needs to make its case for bailing out aging nuclear plant”, 31 October 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201910310032.html, accessed 21 May 2020.
608 - The Asahi Shimbun, “TEPCO to pour 220 billion yen into Tokai No. 2 nuclear plant”, 29 October 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201910290042.html, accessed 21 May 2020.
609 - Ibidem.
610 - The Mainichi Shimbun, “TEPCO, Tohoku Electric to give Japan Atomic financial boost to help restart reactor”, 29 March 2018,see https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180329/p2a/00m/0na/015000c, accessed 21 May 2020.
611 - S&P Platts, “NRA approves Tokai-2 life extension”, 7 November 2018.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 (US$2.73 billion).612 The company itself was incapable of funding the retrofits due to its direfinancial straits as consequence of loss of revenue from electricity sales following reactor
shutdowns, bad investment decisions in plans for the constructions of Tsuruga-3 and -4 (whichwere abandoned) and decommissioning costs related to its Tsuruga-1 and Tokai-1 reactors.613
Failure to secure financing for Tokai-2 would have taken JAPC one step closer to bankruptcy,
with serious implications for other utilities. This represents one major reason why TEPCO andthe other utilities have agreed to finance the reactor backfitting. The utility has only one otherreactor, Tsuruga-2 in Fukui Prefecture. It has been in dispute with the NRA for the past years
over the designation of an active seismic fault at the site, and there are currently no prospects
for the reactor operating.
The utility in February 2020 indicated an envisaged restart date of December 2022 in its
application to the NRA for pre-operational inspections. This had been widely criticized in
the local community given that no approval had been granted and negotiations have not evenformally commenced. In January 2020, the completion of construction works at the site wasdelayed to November and December 2022, with restart scheduled for the first half of 2023.614
With likely additional cost escalations, the uncertainties in the latest construction schedule,
and the complexities of overcoming opposition within Ibaraki and securing municipality
approval, there remains major doubt about a 2023 restart for Tokai-2, by which time it will havebeen in LTO for 12 years.
Other reactors within the NRA review process continue to have multiple challenges. For
example, Hokkaido Electric Power Company, the owner of the PWR Tomari nuclear plant,
continues to be in dispute with the NRA over the status of a seismic fault line at the site. The
utility claims that the fault has not been active for 400,000 years, whereas the NRA takes the
position that there is no evidence that the fault was “not active within the past 120,000 years”,615
the latter is the time period which, if confirmed, would preclude restart of the reactor.
The risks from major seismic events was demonstrated when on 6 September 2018 amagnitude 6.7 earthquake struck the island of Hokkaido.616 Thermal power plants shut down
across the island, and the Tomari nuclear plant, including spent fuel pools, were reliant upononsite emergency generators for a period of 10 hours.

Prospects for Nuclear Power
It is clear that nine years after 3/11, Japan’s nuclear utilities have failed to overcome the multiple
obstacles to restarting a major part of their nuclear fleet. Reflecting the negative state of theJapanese nuclear industry was the results of the JAIF 2018 Fact Finding Review released in
612 - The Asahi Shimbun, “TEPCO takes risk over soaring costs at Tokai nuclear plant”, 15 March 2019,see http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201903150001.html, accessed 28 May 2020.
613 - Mitsunobu Ohishi, “Tokai II Nuclear Power Plant’s 20 year extension: A story of economic inefficiency and passing the buck”,
Co-Representative of the class action lawsuit demanding an injunction on Tokai II, CNIC, 2 February 2018, see http://www.cnic.jp/
english/?p=4044, accessed 28 April 2020.
614 - JAPC, 28 January 2020, op. cit.; and JAPC, “Fiscal 2020 Tokai Power Station / Tokai Daini Power Station’s annual major businessplans”, 30 April 2020, see http://www.japc.co.jp/news/press/2020/pdf/200430.pdf, accessed 21 May 2020.
615 - NW, “NRA’s restart review of Onagawa-2 ‘most progressed’ official say”, 15 May 2019.
616 - The Japan Times, “Powerful M6.7 earthquake rocks Hokkaido, causing massive landslides; nine dead and 31 reported missing”,
6 September 2018.

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November 2019.617 The survey covered the fiscal year 2018 (ended March 2019). Questionnaires
were distributed to a total of 350 for-profit companies engaged in the nuclear power field,
including JAIF’s member companies, seeking information on their expenditures, sales andnumbers of employees. As JAIF commented, “nuclear-related expenditures by electric powercompanies rose substantially by 12 percent from the previous year. By expenditure item,
capital investment increased by 40 percent, and fuel and materials costs by 28 percent. (…)
Regarding business sentiment in industries related to nuclear power, most survey respondents(responding in FY19) described theirs as ‘bad’ (80 percent). Those expecting it to be worse in
one year (in FY20) increased from 10 percent in the previous survey to 24 percent.”618
In terms of selecting a potential path to recovery, the most common answer was with 73 percent
prioritizing consistent promotion of nuclear policy by the Government, with 53 percent stating
restoration of public confidence in nuclear power, and 58 percent early restarts of reactors andstable operation. Utilities are far from attaining their wishes. As polling continues to show,619
as well as numerous ongoing lawsuits, there is no shift in public opinion in favor of nuclear
reactor operations; and with multiple shutdowns in 2020 there is continuing instability innuclear reactor operations.
In terms of that public opposition and technical challenges, a report by Fitch Solutions in
February 2020 noted that, “We expect these factors will continue to challenge Japan’s push fornuclear restarts, prompting our more bearish outlook on nuclear power generation which we
now expect will reach approximately 85.4 TWh by 2029, accounting for 8.4% of the total powermix.”620 That would be a very modest recovery a decade from now, not even a percentage point
above the nuclear contribution in 2019. And yet, it might turn out overly optimistic a few years
from now.

SOUTH KOREA
FOCUS
On the Korean Peninsula, South Korea (Republic of Korea) operates 22 reactors, with one
reactor (Hanbit-4) remaining in Long-Term Outage (LTO) and one reactor (Hanbit-3) meetingthe LTO criteria as of July 2020. Four reactors are under construction as of 1 July 2020. In
June 2018, the commercial operation of Wolsong-1 was “terminated”,621 and the Nuclear
Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) on 24 December 2019 formally passed the bill for its
closure.622
617 - JAIF, “JAIF Releases Results of Fact-Finding Survey of Japanese Nuclear Industry for Fiscal 2018”, Press Release,
27 November 2019, op. cit.
618 - Ibidem.
619 - JAERO, “2019 poll results”, Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization, March 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.jaero.or.jp/data/01jigyou/pdf/tyousakenkyu2019/r2019.pdf, accessed 20 July 2020.
620 - Asian Power, “Japan to miss nuclear targets amidst industry headwinds”, 24 February 2020,see https://asian-power.com/regulation/news/japan-miss-nuclear-targets-amidst-industry-headwinds, accessed 18 May 2020.
621 - KHNP, “Nuclear Power Operation - Plant Status”, 31 December 2018,see http://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/529/main.do?mnCd=EN03020101, accessed 3 June 2020.
622 - NSSC, “The 112th Meeting of the Commission Was Held”, 24 December 2019, see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_
CON/BoardView.do?pageNo=4&pagePerCnt=10&MENU_ID=90&CONTENTS_NO=&SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_
SEQ=45891&USER_NAME=&TEL_NO=&WRITER_DI=&_csrf=&SEARCH_FLD=&SEARCH, accessed 7 June 2020.

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The Government is currently reviewing a new draft energy plan which, if implemented, willsee further reduction in installed nuclear capacity, with a consequences of generating only
10 percent of the nation’s electricity in 2034623 compared to 26.2 percent in 2019 and 53.3 percent
in 1987. The further reduction of nuclear capacity, combined with a commitment to phase out
coal and increased expansion of renewable energy reflects the continuing electoral success of
the ruling Democratic Party and President Moon Jae-in.624 In mid-April 2020, the party had its
largest win in National Assembly elections, with a manifesto commitment to a Green New Deal
aimed at delivering net zero carbon emissions by 2050, the first by a nation in East Asia.625
South Korea’s nuclear fleet, owned by Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company (KHNP), is
located at the Hanbit, Hanul, Kori and Wolsong sites. Nuclear power provided 138.6 TWh in
2019, compared with 127 TWh in 2018, a year-on-year increase of 9.1 percent.

Permanent Closure
The NSSC formally passed the bill for the permanent closure of Wolsong-1 on
24 December 2019.626 The decision has met with protests from the main opposition Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and the labor union of KHNP, which have launched legal action against
NSSC and its members.627 Following the closure of Wolsong-1, the seven reactors that are now
planned to be closed just prior to reaching their 40-year operating lifetime total 6.6 GW ofcapacity and are Kori-2 in 2023, Kori-3 in 2024, Kori-4 and Hanbit-1 in 2025, and Hanbit-2 in
2026, Hanul-1 in 2027 and Hanul-2 in 2028. Three reactors are scheduled to be closed as theyreach their 30-year lifetime: Wolsong-2 in 2026, Wolsong-3 in 2027 and Wolsong-4 in 2029
(see Table 8).628

623 - Yonhap, “S. unveils draft plan to foster renewable energy”, 8 May 2020,see https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200508002200320, accessed 1 August 2020.
624 - Hankyoreh, “Democratic Party’s sweeping victory shows the public supports for Moon administration”, 16 April 2020,see http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/937401.html; and Tim Shorrock, “Electoral Triumph Spurs GreenNew Deal in South Korea”, The Nation, 1 May 2020, see https://www.thenation.com/article/world/south-korea-elections-climate/,
both accessed 4 June 2020.
625 - Yonhap, “S. Korea to include green projects in ‘New Deal’ plan”, as published by The Korea Herald, 20 May 2020,see http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200520000815; and Tim Ha, “In East Asian first, South Korea announces ambitions
to reach net zero by 2050”, Eco-business, 17 March 2020, see https://www.eco-business.com/news/in-east-asian-first-south-koreaannounces-ambitions-to-reach-net-zero-by-2050/; both accessed 4 June 2020.
626 - NSSC, “The 112th Meeting of the Commission Was Held”, 24 December 2019, op. cit.
627 - NEI, “Permanent closure of South Korea’s Wolsong 1 sparks protests”, 2 January 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newspermanent-closure-of-south-koreas-wolsong-1-sparks-protests-7581947;
and Business Korea, “Firestorm Erupts over Permanent Shutdown of Wolsong Nuclear Plant Unit 1”, 30 December 2019,see http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=39649, both accessed 3 June 2020.
628 - MOTIE, “The 8th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand (2017-2031)”, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy,
2017, see https://www.kpx.or.kr/www/downloadBbsFile.do?atchmnflNo=30051, accessed 3 June 2020.

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Table 8 · Status of Nuclear Reactor Fleet in South Korea (with scheduled closure dates)
Type

MW

Grid
connection

Expected
ClosureKori-2

PWR

640

1983

2023

Kori-3

PWR

1011

1985

2024

Kori-4

PWR

1012

1985

2025

Hanbit-1

PWR

995

1986

2025

Hanbit-2

PWR

988

1986

2026

Wolsong-2

PHWR

606

1997

2026

Wolsong-3

PHWR

630

1998

2027

Hanul-1

PWR

966

1988

2027

Hanul-2

PWR

967

1989

2028

Wolsong-4

PHWR

609

1999

2029

Hanbit-3

PWR

986

1994

Hanbit-4

PWR

970

1995

Hanbit-5

PWR

992

2001

Hanbit-6

PWR

993

2002

Hanul-3

PWR

997

1998

Hanul-4

PWR

999

1998

Hanul-5

PWR

998

2003

Hanul-6

PWR

997

2005

Shin-Kori-1

PWR

996

2010

Shin-Kori-2

PWR

996

2012

Shin-Kori-3

PWR

1416

2016

Shin-Kori-4

PWR

1418

2019

Shin-Wolsong-1

PWR

997

2012

Shin-Wolsong-2

PWR

993

2015

Reactor

Source: MOTIE, 2017

Notes:PWR : Pressurized Water Reactor; PHWR : Pressurized Heavy-Water Reactor.

Containment Liner Plate Corrosion
In recent years, there have been extended outages of South Korea’s nuclear reactors. The
principle reason for this has been that out of the 24 reactors South Korea operated (prior tostartup of Shin-Kori-4 in 2019) 21 were found to have corrosion in the Containment Liner
Plates (CLP) or voids in the concrete structure.629

629 - Charles Lee, “South Korea completing safety checks on all reactor containment structures”, Nucleonics Week, 9 May 2019.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

Reactor containment-buildings in Korea are insulated with a CLP of six millimeters indiameter, and then concrete 1.2 meters in diameter thick. As the U.S. NRC noted in 1997:
Any corrosion (metal thinning) of the liner plate could change the failure threshold of theliner plate under a challenging environmental or accident condition. Thinning changes thegeometry of the liner plate, creating different transitions and strain concentration conditions.
This may reduce the design margin of safety against postulated accident and environmentalloads.630

Under nuclear regulation evidence of structural deterioration that could affect the structural
integrity or leak-tightness of metal and concrete containments must be corrected before thecontainment can be returned to service. Corrosion of a liner plate can occur at a numberof places where the metal is exposed to moisture, or where moisture can condense (behind
insulation) or accumulate. Corrosion damage of CLPs historically has primarily been either the
result of embedded foreign material (e.g. wood) in contact with the liner resulting in corrosion
or inside initiated corrosion resulting from coating failures or moisture barrier degradation.
The corrosion repair has consisted of removal of the damaged liner section and embedded
foreign material, grouting the resulting void, and replacing the liner plate section.631
Root cause analysis of the causes of CLP corrosion reported by Korea Institute of Nuclear
Safety (KINS) were predominately due to exposure to moisture (environment), as well as thepresence of foreign debris.632
During 2019, CLP issues continued to be detected at reactors undergoing inspection
leading to extended outages. Hanul-2, which had been undergoing periodic inspection since
October 2019, was found to have 2,116 spots short of standard thickness. However, the NSSC
confirmed that the integrity of the CLPs had been maintained through the repair work andintegrity assessments. In addition, 53 locations of the CLPs which were suspected of having
voids in the concrete were cut and inspected, and as a result, one spot was found to have avoid. The NSSC required the licensee to repair the spot, prior to restart of the reactor in earlyFebruary 2020.633 Hanul-4 also was found to have 180 spots thinned to 5.4 mm or less due tosurface corrosion caused by moisture in the gap, but no voids were detected.634 The reactor
was permitted to restart in February 2020 following completion of repair work and safetyassessments. Hanul-5 was inspected in September 2019 and three spots in the CLPs were below
regulatory requirements. A total of 93 locations of the CLPs were suspected of having voids inthe concrete were cut and inspected, and as a result, two spots were found. After repair and630 - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, “Information Notice No. 97-10: Liner Plate Corrosion in Concrete Containments”,
U.S.NRC, 13 March 1997, see https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1997/in97010.html,
accessed 7 June 2019.
631 - Jason P. Petti, Dan Naus et al., “Nuclear Containment Steel Liner Corrosion Workshop: Final Summary and Recommendation
Report”, Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the U.S. Department of Energy, Report SAND2010-8718, July 2011,see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ML112150012.pdf, accessed 7 June 2019.
632 - Yonglak Paek, Sangyun Kim, Euisik Yoon and Hun Cha, “Introduction of Containment Liner Plate (CLP) Corrosion”, Korea
Institute of Nuclear Safety, Transactions of the “Korean Nuclear Society Spring Meeting”, 17–18 May 2018,see https://www.kns.org/files/pre_paper/39/18S-189%EB%B0%B1%EC%9A%A9%EB%9D%BD.pdf, accessed 3 June 2020.
633 - NSSC, “The NSSC Approves the Criticality of Hanul Unit 2 During Periodic Inspection”, 4 February 2020,see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_CON/BoardView.do?pageNo=3&pagePerCnt=10&MENU_ID=90&CONTENTS_
NO=&SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_SEQ=45902&USER_NAME=&TEL_NO=&WRITER_DI=&_csrf=&SEARCH_
FLD=&SEARCH=, accessed 3 June 2020.
634 - NSSC, “The NSSC Approves the Criticality of Hanul Unit 4”, 21 February 2020, see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_
BBS_CON/BoardView.do?pageNo=3&pagePerCnt=10&MENU_ID=90&CONTENTS_NO=&SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_
SEQ=45907&USER_NAME=&TEL_NO=&WRITER_DI=&_csrf=&SEARCH_FLD=&SEARCH, accessed 3 June 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 safety assessment, the NSSC granted restart approval to KHNP in December 2019.635 KHNP
is required to submit its structural integrity assessment of the concrete voids found in thecontainment building of the reactors to the NSSC, which will then require a technical review
by KINS, a technical support organization, and independent verification by the Korea Concrete
Institute.636
As of 1 July 2020, Hanbit-3 and -4 remain shut down due to CLP. On 7 July 2019, Koreanbroadcaster MBC reported that KHNP had confirmed 94 holes between the steel plate andconcrete inside the reactor building of Hanbit-3 and 96 holes in Hanbit-4. KHNP, according to
MBC, explained that the holes found are up to 90 cm in size, but there would be “no problem
with the structural stability of the containment.”637 Hanbit-4 has been shut down since
May 2017 and remains in LTO status as of 1 July 2020, and Hanbit-3 met the LTO criteria at
this date.

Power Surge
In October 2019, KHNP’s Hanbit-1 returned to service after it was manually tripped following
a power surge on 10 May 2019.638 The reactor had been in maintenance outage since 2018 but
had been authorized to restart. The NSSC reported thermal power had exceeded the 5 percent
limit set in the reactor license Technical Specifications, reaching 18 percent.639 This caused thetemperature of the reactor coolant to rise rapidly, along with the steam generator level. The
rising level of the steam generator tripped the main feed water pump, activating the auxiliarywater pump. The NSSC reported that KHNP did not immediately shut down the reactor eventhough the thermal output of the reactor exceeded the limit during a test. In addition, thecontrol rods were operated by a person who does not hold a Reactor Operator’s license (RO).
The reactor was eventually shut down 12 hours after the initial event.640 NSSC confirmed that“the main cause of the event is a human error that involved a violation of the relevant laws andprocedures and operation of inexperienced operators”.641

635 - NSSC, “The NSSC Approves the Criticality of Hanul Unit 5 During Periodic Inspection and Conducts Power
Ascension and Other Remaining Tests”, 23 December 2019, see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_CON/BoardView.
do?pageNo=4&pagePerCnt=10&MENU_ID=90&CONTENTS_NO=&SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_SEQ=45890&USER_
NAME=&TEL_NO=&WRITER_DI=&_csrf=&SEARCH_FLD=&SEARCH, accessed 3 June 2020.
636 - NSSC, “Regarding Concrete Voids of Containment Buildings of Hanbit Unit 3 and 4, the NSSC Will Verify Structural
Integrity Objectively and Transparently”, 12 March 2020, see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_CON/BoardView.
do?pageNo=2&pagePerCnt=10&MENU_ID=90&CONTENTS_NO=&SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_SEQ=45909&USER_
NAME=&TEL_NO=&WRITER_DI=&_csrf=&SEARCH_FLD=&SEARCH, accessed 3 June 2020.
637 - MBC News, “190 hatch holes in the containment building of Hanvit 3. 4”, 7 July 2019 (in Korean),see https://n.news.naver.com/article/214/0000961974, accessed 19 July 2019.
638 - NSSC, “The NSSC to Start Inspection of Hanbit Unit 1 After Manual Shutdown”, 10 May 2019,see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_CON/BoardView.do?SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_SEQ=45422&MENU_
ID=90&CONTENTS_NO=1, accessed 5 June 2020.
639 - NSSC, “The NSSC to Expand the Special Inspection on Manual Shutdown of Hanbit Unit 1”, 20 May 2019,see http://www.nssc.go.kr/nssc/english/release/list.jsp?mode=view&article_no=45431&pager.offset=10&board_no=501,
accessed 3 June 2020.
640 - Choi Ha-yan, “Nuclear reactor kept running for 12 hours after it should have been shut down”, Hankyoreh,
21 May 2019, see http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/894763.html, accessed 3 June 2020.
641 - NSSC, “The NSSC Discussed and Passed the Result of the Special Investigation of the Hanbit Unit 1 and the Plan”,
Press Release, 9 August 2019, see https://www.nssc.go.kr/en/cms/FR_BBS_CON/BoardView.do?SITE_NO=3&BOARD_SEQ=1&BBS_
SEQ=45626&MENU_ID=90&CONTENTS_NO=1, accessed 27 August 2020.

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Energy Policy
In December 2017, the Government approved the 8th Basic Plan for long-term Electricity supply
and demand (BPE), which marked a major shift in overall energy policy, while confirming thegradual nuclear phase-out road-map announced in October 2017.642 Over more than three
decades the energy policy of successive South Korean Governments had been premised on thecontinued expansion of nuclear power, including for example a target of 41 percent by 2030
(2008 first National Energy Basic Plan for 2008–2030) and in 2011, when Korea Electric Power
Corporation (KEPCO) proposed 43 GW of nuclear capacity by 2035.
According to the May 2020 draft energy plan, 11 reactors with a combined capacity of 9.5 GW
will be closed by 2034.643 The plan, known as the “Long-Term Basic Blueprint for Power Supply
over 2020–2034”, is expected to be finalized during summer 2020, following discussions in the
National Assembly and public hearings. Overall, the Government plan is to reduce dependence
on nuclear and fossil fuel from the 46.3 percent in 2020 to 24.8 percent by 2034 while at the sametime expanding reliance on renewables from 15.1 percent to 40 percent.644 Under the current
draft, the number of units would peak at 26 in 2024, and by 2034 there would be 17 reactors
still operating with a total of 19.4 GW installed nuclear capacity and generating 10 percent ofSouth Korea’s electricity. This compares with 25 reactors in 2020 and 23.3 GW and 19.2 percentof the nation’s electricity. A total of 5.6 GW of new nuclear capacity—Shin-Hanul-1 and -2, andShin-Kori-5 and -6—are scheduled to begin commercial operation between 2020–2024.

UNITED KINGDOM
FOCUS
In 2019, the United Kingdom operated 12 reactors, which provided 56 TWh, a decline overthe previous year. Three reactors, Dungeness B-1 and B-2, as well as Hunterston B-1 entered
the LTO category. Nuclear power provided 14 percent of power, down from a maximum of
26.9 percent in 1997. The average age of the U.K. fleet stands at 36.4 years (see Figure 41).
Power demand continued to fall in the U.K., by 2.8 percent to reach 324 TWh, a trend thatstarted in 2010. The use of renewables increased to 37 percent of consumption in 2019, up fromwith 33 percent in 2018, representing now more than double the supply from nuclear power.
The other major event over the past few years has been the decline in the use of coal, which
produced just 7 TWh in 2019.645
A total of 30 power reactors have been permanently closed, all 26 Magnox reactors, both fast
reactors, a prototype Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) at Windscale and a prototype SteamGenerating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR) at Winfrith. The U.K.’s seven second-generation
642 - Se Young Jang, “South Korea’s Nuclear Energy Debate”, The Diplomat, as published by Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 26 October 2017, see http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/26/south-korea-s-nuclear-energy-debate-pub-73561,
accessed 3 June 2020.
643 - Nucleonics Week, “South Korea would cut nuclear capacity 20% by 2034 under draft energy plan”, S&P Platts, 21 May 2020.
644 - Pulse, “Seoul keeps to plan of weaning the country off nuclear fuel, expand renewables to 40%”, Maeil Business News Korea,
8 May 2020, see https://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2020&no=471886, accessed 4 June 2020.
645 - BEIS, “UK electricity, generation, trade and consumption, October to December 2019”, U.K. Government, 30 April 2020,see https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electricity-section-5-energy-trends, accessed 21 May 2020.

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nuclear stations, each with two AGRs, are all operating past the end of their original 25-year
design lives. These are expected to close between 2023 and 2030, while the country’s only
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), at Sizewell B, is scheduled to operate until at least 2035.646
EDF Energy, a wholly owned subsidiary of French state-controlled utility EDF, is the majority
owner of the company Lake Acquisitions that owns these reactors. Centrica has a minority
share (20 percent) in Lake Acquisitions. However, Centrica has been trying to sell its stakesince 2013; the 2019 annual report says, “we re-affirmed our strategic direction back towards
the customer and our desire to exit nuclear”.647 EDF has been trying to reduce its stake to51 percent since 2016 but equally without any takers.
Managing reactors as they age is a constant problem for any technology design and theAGRs are no exception. In recent years problems with the core’s graphite moderator bricks
have raised concerns. In particular, keyway root cracks (KWRC), exceeding the number the
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) previously deemed permissible, have been found at oneof the Hunterston B reactors. This can lead to the degradation of the keying system, a vital
component which houses the fuel, the control rods and the coolant (CO2). Their cracking or
distortion could impact on the insertion of the control rods or the flow of the coolant. There
are also issues of erosion of the graphite, and a number of the AGRs are close to the limit oferosion that the ONR has set. With age, the graphite bricks also distort and may eventuallycompromise the operation of the safety control rods. ONR has said these issues are likely to be
the life-limiting factor for the AGRs, as it is not possible to replace the graphite bricks.648
In March 2018, during a scheduled outage, EDF discovered a higher number of keyway root
cracks in the older of the two reactors than was predicted by its computer models in 2016
when the reactor underwent its statutory 10-year Periodic Safety Review. Then in May 2018,
EDF announced that Hunterston B-1’s current shutdown, previously expected to be completed
in May 2018, would be extended for further investigation and revised modeling, with theintention of restarting the reactor before the end of 2018. In late December 2018, EDF statedthat they have…observed around 100 keyway root cracks in Reactor 3 [Hunterston B-1]. This is from theinspection of just over a quarter of the reactor. Using modeling to project the number ofcracks across the whole reactor our best estimate of the current number of cracks is around370. This takes the core over the operational limit of 350 contained in the existing safety casefor that period of operation.649

In December 2018, EDF estimated that Hunterston B-1 would be restarted in March 2019;
however this deadline was revised several times, and, as of early July 2020, the reactor was
still offline, with restart scheduled for late August 2020.650 The reactor met the LTO criteria in
646 - EDF Energy, “Reactor Lifetimes—Nuclear Lifetime Management”, Undated,
see https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/nuclear-lifetime-management, accessed 21 May 2020.
647 - Centrica, “Annual Report and Accounts 2019”, March 2020,see https://www.centrica.com/investors/annual-report-2019/, accessed 21 May 2020.
648 - ONR, “Graphite core ageing”, Updated 6 August 2019,see http://www.onr.org.uk/civil-nuclear-reactors/graphite-core-ageing.htm, accessed 3 August 2020.
649 - EDF Energy, “Hunterston Graphite Inspections – December 2018”, Press Release, December 2018,see https://www.edfenergy.com/sites/default/files/hunterston_december_update_final.pdf, accessed 21 May 2020.
650 - EDF Energy, “Letter to the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group - 2 July 2020”, 2 July 2020, see https://www.edfenergy.com/mediacentre/news-releases/letter-hunterston-site-stakeholder-group-2-july-2020, accessed 14 July 2020.

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July 2020, and is considered as LTO since last production in March 2018. Hunterston B-2 wasshut for inspection in October 2018, and in August 2019 ONR granted EDF Energy permission
to restart the reactor for the next period of operation (about 4 months)651 before it was shutagain in December 2019. After several delays, as of early July 2020, its restart is scheduled for
September 2020.652
In July 2019, the ONR’s Annual Report stated that Hunterston B were in an “enhanced levelof regulatory attention”, rather than routine. This was because assessment of the cracks
required “substantial additional effort.” Part of the reason for the delay is that ONR revealed
in a technical report that 58 fragments had broken from the graphite bricks and there was“significant uncertainty”, over the risk of these blocking the fuel channels. The ONR would
require more robust arguments before agreeing to the restart of the reactors.653
Figure 41 · Age Distribution of the U.K. Nuclear Fleet

Age of UK Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

3i
nL
TO

Reactor Age
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over

10

1

15 Reactors(3 in LTO)
Mean Age36.4 Years

4

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Age-related problems have also been found at similar reactors at Dungeness-B, with Unit 2
closed for what was supposed to be a 12-week outage in August 2018 and then Unit 1 for“common statutory outage work”, in September 2018, with both expected to restart in
April 2019. However, the outage has been extended, with current restart dates for the units set
at September 2020.654 Concerns have been raised that life-limiting cracking will be found at theother AGRs; and in May 2020 it was revealed that the ONR in its 10-year review had estimatedthat “The predicted timescales for onset of keyway root cracking has changed from 2028 tomid-2022.”655 Consequently, the future of many of the AGRs is being questioned by investors,
651 - ONR, “Hunterston B Reactor 4”, 20 August 2019, see http://news.onr.org.uk/2019/08/hunterston-b-reactor-4/,
accessed 6 June 2020.
652 - EDF Energy, “Letter to the Hunterston Site Stakeholder Group - 2 July 2020”, 2 July 2020, op. cit.
653 - Rob Edwards, “Safety fears as Hunterston’s cracked nuclear reactors start to crumble”, The Ferret, 17 October 2019,see https://theferret.scot/hunterston-graphite-debris-nuclear/, accessed 21 May 2020.
654 - EDF Energy, “Dungeness B - Site Stakeholder Group Report June 2020”, 2 June 2020, see https://www.edfenergy.com/mediacentre/news-releases/dungeness-b-site-stakeholder-group-report-june-2020, accessed 3 June 2020.
655 - Rob Edwards, “Torness nuclear reactors predicted to start cracking in 2022”, The Ferret, 6 May 2020,see https://theferret.scot/torness-nuclear-reactors-cracking-2022/, accessed 21 May 2020.

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who see ongoing outages and higher maintenance costs not outweighing the economic benefitsof a possible additional couple of years of operation.656 Both Dungeness-B reactors met the LTO
criteria in July 2020, and are therefore considered in LTO since their respective last power
production.
The development of new nuclear reactors in the U.K. has been slow and gradually grinding
to a halt. The current development cycle was “officially launched” in 2006, when then Prime
Minister Tony Blair stated that nuclear issues were “back on the agenda with a vengeance”.657
In July 2011, the Government released the National Policy Statement (NPS) for Nuclear Power
Generation.658 The eight “potentially suitable” sites considered in the document for deployment“before the end of 2025” are exclusively current or past nuclear power plant sites in Englandor Wales, except for one new site, Moorside, adjacent to the fuel-chain facilities at Sellafield.
Northern Ireland and Scotland are not included. The Scottish Government is opposed to newbuild and have reiterated their “continued opposition to new nuclear stations, under current
technologies. The economics of these stations are prohibitive, especially given the falling costsof renewable and storage technologies”.659

Hinkley Point C
EDF Energy was given planning permission to build two reactors at Hinkley Point in April 2013.
In October 2015, EDF and the U.K. Government660 announced updates to the October 2013provisional agreement of commercial terms of the deal for the £16 billion (US$19.5 billion)
overnight cost of construction of Hinkley Point C (HPC). The estimated price of construction
has since risen and as of 2017 stood at £201519.6 billion (US$201525.3 billion), up from the£201518 billion (US$201523.2 billion). EDF said at the time that the £1.5 billion (US$1.9 billion)
increase results mainly “from a better understanding of the design adapted to the requirementsof the British regulators, the volume and sequencing of work on site and the gradual
implementation of supplier contracts.”661 Then in November 2019 EDF announced a further
increase in costs due to “challenging ground conditions”, “revised action plan targets” and“extra costs needed to implement the completed functional design”, with the new completion
cost (in 2015 values) now being estimated between £21.5 billion (US$26.6 billion) and£22.5 billion (US$27.9 billion). Furthermore, it was stated that the risk of delay had increased
and that such a delay would increase costs by £0.7 billion (US$0.9 billion)over and above theseestimates, so the upper end of the range is now £23.2 billion (US$28.8 billion).662 EDF stated656 - Phil Chaffee, “Restive Investors Challenge EDF on UK’s Troubled AGRs.”, NIW, 28 February 2020.
657 - BBC, “Blair backs nuclear power plans”, 16 May 2006, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4987196.stm,
accessed 21 May 2020.
658 - DECC, “National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation”, Department of Energy & Climate Change, U.K. Government,
July 2011.
659 - Scottish Government, “Scottish Energy Strategy: The future of energy in Scotland”, 20 December 2017,see https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-energy-strategy-future-energy-scotland-9781788515276/, accessed 21 May 2020.
660 - DECC, “Hinkley Point C to power six million UK homes”, Department of Energy & Climate Change, U.K. Government,
Press Release, 21 October 2015, see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hinkley-point-c-to-power-six-million-uk-homes,
accessed 21 May 2020.
661 - EDF, “Clarifications on Hinkley Point C project”, Press Release, 3 July 2017, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/dedicatedsections/journalists/all-press-releases/clarifications-on-hinkley-point-c-project, accessed 21 May 2020.
662 - EDF Energy, “Update on Hinkley Point C project”, EDF, 25 September 2019,see https://www.edfenergy.com/media-centre/news-releases/update-on-hinkley-point-c-project, accessed 21 May 2020.

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Figure 42 · The Hinkley Point C Construction Site

Photo: EDF Energy, 2019.

Note: The Hinkley Point C site six months after the official construction start (beginning of concreting of the base slab of the reactor building) of Unit 1 andsix months before construction start of Unit 2. The term “construction start” does not appear to reflect any reality anymore.

that “management of the project remains obilized to begin generating power from Unit 1 at theend of 2025”, which is not a clear statement of confidence in the current schedule.663
The IAEA dates formal start of construction for a nuclear power plant as the pouring of firststructural concrete for the base slab of the reactor building and this occurred for the first unit
at HPC on 11 December 2018 and for the second on 12 December 2019.664 However, EDF Energy
claimed that construction only “begins” on the completion of the nuclear island’s “common
raft” (referred to as J-0) which occurred for the first unit in June 2019 and for the second unit inJune 2020.665 By completing a large amount of the work before formally declaring construction
began, EDF can claim a shortened construction timetable. Given the construction delays in
China, Finland and France, this could be of primary importance for EDF.

663 - Ibidem.
664 - WNISR, “The Oddly Discreet Construction Start of Hinkley Point C”, World Nuclear Industry Status Report, 29 December 2018,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-Oddly-Discreet-Construction-Start-of-Hinkley-Point-C.html, accessed 21 May 2020.
665 - EDF, “Hinkley Point C nuclear power project achieves latest major milestone on schedule”, 1 June 2020,see https://www.edfenergy.com/media-centre/news-releases/hinkley-point-c-nuclear-power-project-achieves-latest-major-milestone,
accessed 1 June 2020.

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The critical points of the Hinkley deal were a Contract for Difference (CfD), effectively aguaranteed real electricity price for 35 years, which, depending on the number of units ultimately
built, would be £89.5–92.5/MWh, in 2012 values (US$2020110–115/MWh), with annual increases
linked to the Retail Price Index. In early 2020, EDF broke down the £92.50/MWh (US$1152020)
strike price saying that £19.5 (US$202024.1) would go toward operating and maintenance costs,
and only £11 (US$202013.6) to standard construction costs, excluding financing. The remaining£62 (US$202076.8) covers risk, with £26 (US$202032.2) for financing costs “for typical regulated
asset without construction risk” and £36 (US$202044.6) to cover first-of-a-kind construction
risk.666 The validity of and rationale for releasing these figures remain unclear. On the one
hand, it could be designed to say that the cost of construction has been inflated in the U.K. dueto the particular conditions in the U.K. leading to an extremely high cost of risk. However, on
the other hand, it does highlight that building reactors is financially extremely risky.

“The deal for HPC has locked consumers into a risky and expensive
project with uncertain strategic and economic benefits”
The cost of this support scheme has rocketed and the U.K. National Audit Office (NAO)
suggested that the additional ‘top-up’ payments—the difference between the wholesale price(as of the beginning of 2020 at £36/MWh) and the agreed fixed price (or Strike Price), required
through the CfD—have increased from £6.1 billion (US$20139.9 billion) in October 2013 to£29.7 billion (US$201641.2 billion in March 2016. This was due to falling wholesale electricity
prices. This is the discounted667 estimate, and the undiscounted estimate would be closer to£50 billion (US$202062 billion) The NAO also stated that “the [Government] Department’s dealfor HPC has locked consumers into a risky and expensive project with uncertain strategic andeconomic benefits.”668
There was an expectation that construction would be primarily funded by debt (borrowing)backed by U.K. sovereign loan guarantees, expected to be about £17 billion (US$26.9 billion).
EDF announced in November 2015 its intention to sell non-core assets worth up to €10 billion(US$11.4 billion), including a stake in Lake Acquisitions, to help finance HPC and other capitalintensive projects.669
The expected composition of the consortium owning the plant changed from October 2013 to
October 2015 with the effective bankruptcy and dismantling of AREVA making their planned
contribution of 10 percent impossible; the Chinese stake, through CGN, fell to 33.5 percent andthe other investors had not materialized, leaving EDF with 66.5 percent rather than 45 percent
it had hoped for in 2013. The rising construction cost and its increased share has impacted
upon the amount EDF has to pay. Since 2013, the cost of EDF’s expected share of the project
has gone up by about 150 per cent.670
666 - Phil Chaffee, “Industry Pushes for Government Action”, NIW, 6 March 2020.
667 - Discounting reduces the nominal value of costs and estimates the further in the future they occur.
668 - NAO, “Hinkley Point C”, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy,June 2017, p.12, see https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Hinkley-Point-C.pdf, accessed 21 May 2020.
669 - Michael Stothard, “EDF looks to sell €10bn of assets to boost balance sheet”, Financial Times, 18 October 2015,see https://www.ft.com/content/fcd6a462-7578-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7, accessed 21 May 2020.
670 - Steve Thomas and Alison Downes, “Financing the Hinkley Point C”, Commissioned by the Therberton & Eastbridge Action
Group on Sizewell, January 2020, see https://www.nuclearconsult.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/HPC-finance-Steve-Thomas.
pdf, accessed 21 May 2020.

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The administration of Prime Minister Theresa May finally approved the HPC project in
September 2016, with the Government retaining a ‘special share’, that would give it a vetoright over changes to ownership, if national security concerns arose.671 The U.S. Government
continues to have security concerns and in October 2018 Assistant Secretary of State,
Christopher Ashley Ford, even warned the U.K. explicitly against partnering with CGN, sayingthat Washington had evidence that the business was engaged in taking civilian technology andconverting it to military uses.672
The construction of the plant has also been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, butconstruction was not stopped, despite concerns about the ability of large construction
projects to adequately social distance. During April 2020, the number of construction workers
was reduced to about 2,500, fewer than half of what it was at the beginning of the year.673
The economic consequences of the pandemic also led investors to lose confidence and in
March 2020, within two weeks, EDF Group lost half of its stock-market value, when sharesplunged to historically low levels (see France Focus).

Other U.K. New-Build Projects
Sizewell C
EDF and CGN are also preparing to launch the development of the follow-on to
Hinkley Point C (HPC), the Sizewell C project. Chinese investment would be limited to
20 percent, leaving EDF with 80 percent. However, these relative values could change in theevent of the Government agreeing to a new financing model. Given the problems EDF is having
financing HPC, this makes the Sizewell project even more difficult. Despite this, a public
engagement process has been ongoing, and EDF was expected to submit a planning application,a so called ‘development consent order’ in March 2020; but the pandemic and the Government’s
control measures led to a delay.674 On 24 June 2020, the Planning Inspectorate, accepted theapplication and consequently the next stage of the planning processes could begin.675 The final
decision on whether to grant a development consent order to build Sizewell-C will be taken by
the Government.676
EDF are hoping that they can sequence the construction of Sizewell C with the completion of
HPC, so that workers can move from one project to another. But given the earliest conceivable
671 - Rowena Mason and Simon Goodley, “Hinkley Point C nuclear power station gets government green light”, The Guardian,
15 September 2016, see http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/15/hinkley-point-c-nuclear-power-station-gets-go-ahead,
accessed 21 May 2020.
672 - Jonathan Ford, “UK’s reliance on China’s nuclear tech poses test for policymakers”, Financial Times, 14 February 2019,see https://www.ft.com/content/7734e3be-2f6f-11e9-8744-e7016697f225, accessed 21 May 2020.
673 - EDF Energy, “Coronavirus update from Hinkley Point C - May 5”, EDF, 5 May 2020, see https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/
nuclear-new-build-projects/hinkley-point-c/news-views/coronavirus-update-from-hinkley-point-c-5-may, accessed 21 May 2020.
674 - EDF Energy, “Sizewell C submits planning application”, 27 May 2020, see https://www.edfenergy.com/media-centre/newsreleases/sizewell-c-dco, accessed 6 June 2020.
675 - The Planning Inspectorate, “Application by NNB Nuclear Generation (SZC) Limited for an Order Granting Development Consent
for The Sizewell C Project”, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 24 June 2020, see https://infrastructure.
planninginspectorate.gov.uk/wp-content/ipc/uploads/projects/EN010012/EN010012-002268-A05%20Notification%20of%20
decision%20to%20accept%20application_.pdf, accessed 26 June 2020.
676 - ITV, “Sizewell C delay to give locked down communities more time to have their say”, 26 March 2020, see https://www.itv.com/
news/anglia/2020-03-26/sizewell-c-delay-to-give-locked-down-communities-more-time-to-have-their-say/, accessed 21 May 2020.

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construction start date of Sizewell C in 2022, this seems unlikely. EDF is optimistic that it can
reduce construction costs, with their current estimate is put at £18 billion (US$22 billion).677
However, they are also hoping that the financing costs of Sizewell-C can be reduced by shiftingfrom the CfD mechanism to the Regulated Asset Base model. EDF have suggested that witha better financing model and no ‘first of a kind costs’, they could ‘peel away’ the ‘strike-price’by £36/MWh (US$44.5/MWh)678 as a result of EDF’s ‘base case’ for Sizewell C’s cost being£20 billion (US$24.8 billion), with 60 percent financed by loans.679 In its planning documents,
EDF confirmed construction costs of £20 billion (US$24.8 billion), despite previously
suggesting that costs would be 20 percent lower than HPC, and therefore, it was expectedthat Sizewell C would be £18 billion (US$22.3 billion).680 However, without the development of
a new financing model and confidence that the problems that have plagued the constructionof EPRs around the world have been solved, it is unlikely, especially in the current economic
climate, that Sizewell C will proceed.

Bradwell
EDF is allowing CGN to use the Bradwell site it had bought as back-up, if either the
Hinkley Point or Sizewell sites proved not to be viable. CGN plans to build with its own
technology, the Hualong One (or HPR-1000) at this site, with EDF taking a 33.5 percent stake.681
In January 2017, the U.K. Government requested that the regulator begin the Generic Design
Assessment (GDA) of the HPR-1000 reactor.682 By November 2018 the Office for Nuclear
Regulation (ONR) and the Environment Agency had completed a high level scrutiny of thedesign,683 and by February 2020 the ONR had completed Step 3 of the GDA, with the final
Step expected to be completed by the end of 2021, with a closure stage potentially taking
another year.684 The key moment in the GDA, when specific issues are identified, is Step 4. The
increasing breakdown in the relationship between China, the U.S. and to some extent Europe,
may well impact on the development of Bradwell as will the current economic climate and thelikelihood of a global recession.

Moorside
In June 2014, NuGen finalized a new ownership structure with Toshiba-Westinghouse(60 percent) and Engie – then GDF Suez – (40 percent), as Iberdrola sold its shares to
677 - NEI, “Plans for Sizewell C submitted to UK Planning Inspectorate”, 28 May 2020, see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/
newsplans-for-sizewell-c-submitted-to-uk-planning-inspectorate-7943163, accessed 30 May 2020.
678 - Phil Chaffee, “Industry Pushes for Government Action”, NIW, 2020, op.cit.
679 - Roger Murray, “Hinkley Point Cost Overrun- Bad News for Sizewell C?”, NIW, 27 September 2019.
680 - Financial Times, “Cost of new Sizewell C nuclear plant put at £20bn”, 26 June 2020,see https://www.ft.com/content/77c209f7-6d18-4609-ac3c-77d1b5b82b34, accessed 26 June 2020.
681 - EDF Energy, “Agreements in place for construction of Hinkley Point C nuclear power station”, Press Release, 21 October 2015,see https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/nuclear-new-build-projects/hinkley-point-c/news-views/agreements-in-place,accessed 21 May 2020.
682 - ONR, “Assessing new nuclear reactor designs—Generic Design Assessment Periodic Report: November 2016 – January 2017”,
March 2017, see http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/reports/gda-quarterly-report-nov16-jan17.pdf, accessed 21 May 2020.
683 - ONR, “UK HPR1000 completes GDA Step 2”, 15 November 2018,see http://news.onr.org.uk/2018/11/uk-hpr1000-completes-gda-step-2/, accessed 21 May 2020.
684 - ONR, “Generic Design Assessment (GDA) of new reactors—Timeline”, Undated,
see http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/timeline.htm, accessed 21 May 2020.

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Toshiba-Westinghouse. The group planned to build three Toshiba-Westinghouse-designed
AP1000 reactors at the Moorside site, with units proposed to begin operating in 2024.685
However, Westinghouse, after its financial collapse, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protectionin the U.S. in March 2017. This had a disastrous impact on the parent company Toshiba, whenthe extent of Westinghouse’s problems came to light.686 The perilous state of the project also
led to Engie selling its remaining 40 percent to Toshiba-Westinghouse for US$138 million,
who were contractually obliged to buy at pre-determined price. In late April 2017, Toshiba
started mothballing the project.687 Amongst all this economic chaos, the U.K. Office of Nuclear
Regulation had approved the AP1000 reactor design on 30 March 2017.688
Toshiba was initially in talks with both Korea’s KEPCO, a nationally owned utility andreactor vendor, and CGN of China, as potential buyers of NuGen. In October 2017, the CEOof NuGen said that they were expecting to find a buyer by early 2018,689 but KEPCO put off adecision until the autumn of 2018 and said they would only proceed if “a preliminary analysis
concludes the project serves the national interests.”690 However, in November 2018, Toshibaannounced that it was winding down NuGen, without finding a buyer. This might open up theopportunities for others to buy the Moorside site and build their own reactors—although thishas not yet occurred. In the meantime, the Moorside site has reverted to the U.K.’s Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority.

Wylfa and Oldbury
The other company that was involved in the proposed nuclear new-build is Horizon Nuclear
Power, which was bought by the Japanese company Hitachi-GE from German utilities E.ON
and Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE) for an estimated price of £700 million(US$1.2 billion) in 2012. The company submitted its Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
design for technical review, whilst at the time making it clear that its continuation in the
project would depend on the outcome of the negotiations with the Government.691
Hitachi was looking for partners in their project, hoping to reduce their stake to 50 percent
and, if no other investors could be found, the company would have to withdraw. An internal
review had found that the construction cost was likely to reach US$27.5 billion, considered too
big a risk for the company on its own. In June 2018, the U.K. Government formally announced
that it was considering taking an equity stake in the Wylfa project. However, Energy Secretary
Greg Clark while “reaffirming the government’s commitment to nuclear”, also stated a strike
685 - David Dalton, “Toshiba Finalises Controlling Stake In UK Nuclear Company NuGen”, NucNet, 30 June 2014,see https://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/06/30/toshiba-finalises-controlling-stake-in-uk-nuclear-company-nugen,accessed 23 May 2020.
686 - Kana Inagaki, “Westinghouse files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection”, Financial Times, 29 March 2017,see https://www.ft.com/content/ba9d8e42-de63-320e-b29c-70dcf19e1f28, accessed 23 May 2020.
687 - John Collingridge, “Toshiba mothballs Cumbrian nuclear power project”, The Sunday Times, 30 April 2017.
688 - ONR, “Design acceptance for the AP1000 reactor”, 30 March 2017,see http://news.onr.org.uk/2017/03/design-acceptance-for-the-ap1000-reactor/, accessed 23 May 2020.
689 - NIW, “United Kingdom”, 6 October 2017.
690 - Phil Chaffee, “With Eyes on Saudi Arabia, Kepco Treads Water in the UK”, NIW, 4 May 2018.
691 - Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Hitachi reluctant about UK nuclear reactor plan”, The Telegraph, 14 April 2013,see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/9993564/Hitachi-reluctant-about-UK-nuclear-reactor-plan.html,
accessed 23 May 2020.

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price above £75/MWh (US$96.5/MWh) could not be justified for new nuclear.692 In January 2019,
Hitachi announced that it was suspending the project and that this decision was taken “fromthe standpoint of economic rationality”; in doing so the company accepted a ¥300 billion(US$20192.75 billion) impairment. Hitachi pointed to “significant changes in the power market
environment,” including the rising competitiveness of renewable energies.693
Against all odds, the project is officially still going through the U.K.’s planning processes andthe Secretary of State has set a new deadline for the decision on the development consent orderfor this application to the 30 September 2020.694

A New Funding Model for Nuclear New-build?
In July 2019, the Government announced a consultation for the introduction of a new funding
model to facilitate the construction of new nuclear via a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) with asimple idea: “In the case of a nuclear RAB, suppliers would be charged as users of the electricity
system and would be able to pass these costs onto their consumers who also use the electricity
system”.695 If approved by the Government, the project developer could charge consumers
upfront for the construction, which would be broken down into different phases during thebuild process. EDF have claimed that all households would have to pay only £6 (US$7.5) per
year additionally for them to build the proposed reactors at Sizewell C.696 In the U.S., thismodel has led to at least nine tariff increases for consumers for the construction of the two
V.C. Summer reactors in South Carolina, started in 2012 and abandoned in 2017 after the
expenditure of over US$10 billion (see previous editions of the WNISR). The financing scheme
had been abandoned by most of the U.S. states in the 1970s and led to the cancellation of morereactor orders than were eventually carried through.
Charging upfront reduces the overall construction costs as it avoids the need to include
interest during the construction phase, thus cutting the amount of compounded debt to beserviced and paid off during the life of the asset, which could be key for nuclear projects asfinancing represents a significant share of the overall project costs. Furthermore, by breaking
the construction into different phases, it is expected that this would increase certainty andtherefore further reduce the cost of finance. EDF argues that the aim would be to reduce theweighted average cost of capital (WACC) from the 9.2 percent on Hinkley Point C (HPC)
to around 5.5–6 percent.697 However, as a paper by the National Infrastructure Commission
concludes:692 - Greg Clark, “Statement on suspension of work on the Wylfa Newydd nuclear project”, Business and Energy Secretary, Oral
Statement to Parliament, BEIS, 17 January 2019, see https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-suspension-of-work-onthewylfa-newyddnuclear-project, accessed 4 August 2020.
693 - Dennis Engbarth, “Hitachi Cites ‘Economic Rationality’ for Wylfa Decision”, NIW, 1 January 2019.
694 - National Infrastructure Planning, “Wylfa Newydd Nuclear Power Station”, 1 April 2020,see https://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/projects/wales/wylfa-newydd-nuclear-power-station/, accessed 30 May 2020.
695 - BEIS, “RAB Model for Nuclear—Consultation on a RAB model for new nuclear projects”, Department for Business, Energy &Industrial Strategy, U.K. Government, July 2019, see https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/regulated-asset-base-rab-modelfor-nuclear, accessed 23 May 2020.
696 - David Sheppard, “EDF forecasts nuclear plant project would add £6 a year to UK bills”, Financial Times, 11 June 2019,see https://www.ft.com/content/897d548a-8c34-11e9-a24d-b42f641eca37, accessed 23 May 2020.
697 - Jonathan Ford, “EDF seeks to charge customers upfront for UK nuclear plants”, Financial Times, 22 November 2018,see https://www.ft.com/content/f9a96304-e980-11e8-885c-e64da4c0f981, accessed 23 May 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 …it would be inappropriate to compare the price achieved under a CfD model, into which thedeveloper has priced the risks of cost and time overruns, with a price achieved under a RAB
model made on the basis that the project will be built on time and on budget.698

For nuclear, the segmented RAB might include:…initial costs of preparing to get started; the costs of laying the foundations; the installationof the reactor; and commissioning - and at each stage, with the costs agreed in advance, there
would be scrutiny by the regulator and then, subject to this efficiency test, these costs would
then go into the RAB and be recovered from the use of systems charges.699

However, even following the consultation, it is far from clear, if the RAB does proceed, and if
yes, how it will be structured.
A key selling point for the Government is that funding does not have to come from theTreasury—and therefore remains off the Government’s balance sheet—and that it removes
the need for or at least reduces the cost level of the Contract for Difference, which highlights
the high cost of nuclear compared to all other power generating sources. However, the price toconsumers will most likely still go up (presumably on an annual basis) so that investors earn
their guaranteed rate of return.

“the price to consumers will most likely still go up so that investors
earn their guaranteed rate of return”
Using RAB financing would bring with it particular characteristics compared to using thismodel in other sectors, which include: the capital required to construct a new nuclear plant
is significant, which could lead to different outcomes in terms of the availability of project
financing; nuclear plants come with complex construction requirements which createsmaterial uncertainty in cost forecasts that cannot be resolved until construction is started
and the limitations in the expertise available to assess the efficiency of forecast and outturn
expenditure due to a lack of comparable data and the unique characteristics of each new
nuclear plant built.700
Furthermore, this model is seen as transferring the financing risks away from the project
promoter, as the Financial Times pointed out:
What RAB financing does is transfer project risks to customers, who are least well placed
to bear them,” said [the late] Martin Blaiklock, an infrastructure expert who likened thetechnique to “being forced to pay for a meal at a restaurant before the restaurant has evenbeen built, let alone served any food.701

698 - National Infrastructure Commission, “Estimating comparable costs of a nuclear regulated asset base versus a contract fordifference financing model”, October 2019, see https://www.nic.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/NIC_RAB_Paper_October_2019-3rdLayout-003.pdf, accessed 30 May 2020.
699 - Dieter Helm, “The Nuclear RAB Model”, 12 June 2018, see http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/energy/energy/the-nuclear-rab-model/,accessed 23 May 2020.
700 - National Infrastructure Commission, “Estimating Comparable Costs of a Nuclear Regulated Asset Base versus a Contract for
Difference Financing Model”, October 2019, op.cit.
701 - Jonathan Ford, “EDF seeks to charge customers upfront for UK nuclear plants”, Financial Times, 2018, op.cit.

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The consumer protection association, Citizens Advice stated in their response to theconsultation that:
While there are credible reasons to believe that a RAB model would reduce the cost of capital
associated with bringing forward new nuclear power stations, these are outweighed by
the risk of highly material increases in the volume of capital that consumers will need tofinance.702

The U.K. Government asked for comments on the proposal until October 2019, but have notmade any statements since, much to the industry’s frustration. In March 2020 the Nuclear
Industry Association wrote to the Government urging them to respond to the RAB consultationand develop a ‘“a robust financing model” that “is in place before the end of 2020”.703
Over the last few years, the Government’s agenda has been dominated by Brexit and now the
COVID pandemic, squeezing out discussions and the attention of ministers and civil servantsaround energy and nuclear power. While it is possible that space in the political agenda may befound to conclude internal discussions around the RAB, given the economics of the country
and likely recession, the Government will undoubtedly be extremely wary about new measuresthat will visibly add costs to consumers’ bills.

UNITED STATES
FOCUS
Overview
With 95 commercial reactors operating as of 1 July 2020,704 the U.S. possesses the largest
nuclear fleet in the world. Two reactors were closed in the year since WNISR2019. The Three
Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1 was withdrawn from the grid on 20 September 2019.705 The 45-year
old 819-MW PWR, located near Middletown in Pennsylvania, was first connected to the gridon 19 June 1974. The closure brought to an end nuclear generation at the site where Unit 2
in 1979 suffered a partial core-melt accident. On 20 April 2020, the Indian Point-2 reactor
was closed.706 Construction has continued on the one new nuclear plant in the U.S., the twin
AP‑1000s at Plant Vogtle Units -3 and -4, in the state of Georgia. As in previous years, evidence
has continued to emerge of the enormous scale of the problems with the Vogtle project. During
the past year, there have been multiple disclosures of failure of installed components, further
702 - Citizens Advice, “Response to BEIS consultation on whether it should move to a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model to financenew nuclear power stations”, 11 October 2019, see http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-us/policy/policy-research-topics/energypolicy-research-and-consultation-responses/energy-consultation-responses/response-to-beis-consultation-on-whether-it-shouldmove-to-a-regulated-asset-base-rab-model-to-finance-new-nuclear-power-stations/, accessed 23 May 2020.
703 - Phil Chaffee, “Industry Pushes for Government Action”, NIW, 2020, op. cit.
704 - Duane Arnold-1 was closed on 10 August 2020, following significant storm damage, four months earlier than scheduled. Thatleaves 94 reactors operating in the U.S. as of the end of August 2020; see WNISR, “Storm Damage Prompts Early Closure of Duane
Arnold Nuclear Reactor in the U.S.”, 26 August 2020, see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Storm-Damage-Prompts-Early-Closureof-Duane-Arnold-Nuclear-Reactor-in-the-U-S.html, accessed 27 August 2020.
705 - WNISR, “Three Mile Island-1 Closed at Age 45”, 22 September 2019,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Three-Mile-Island-1-Closed-at-Age-45.html, accessed 1 July 2020.
706 - WNISR, “Closure of 47-Year-Old Indian Point Reactor Near New York City”, 30 April 2020,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Closure-of-47-Year-Old-Indian-Point-Reactor-Near-New-York-City.html, accessed 1 July 2020.

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cost increases and almost certain further delays in startup.707 The owners continue to hold totheir latest estimated operational dates of November 2021 and November 2022, five years later
than originally planned.
In June 2020, it was confirmed that the former CEO of SCANA, the parent company ofSouth Carolina Electric & Gas (SCG&E) and owner of the abandoned V.C. Summer plant, will
plead guilty to defrauding investors and utility customers. Documents released during thepast year allege that the CEO and other officials conducted, “a years-long cover-up to hidehuge losses in then-ongoing construction at the V.C. Summer nuclear plant.”708 This follows
the July 2017 to terminate construction of the twin V.C. Summer AP-1000 reactor project inSouth Carolina.709 The guilty plea follows FBI criminal investigations into the failed nuclear
project, which cost South Carolina power customers billions of dollars. Investigations are ongoing and federal officials in June stated that they “anticipate filing additional criminal charges
against other members of the conspiracy.”710
During the past few years, utilities have both succeeded and failed in their ongoing efforts
to secure state financial support for operating nuclear plants, with the balance being in theindustry’s favor. As of July 2020, 13 reactors in the U.S. were receiving or are eligible forsubsidies as a result of state legislation such as Zero Emission Credits (ZEC) or equivalent:
Nine Mile Point, FitzPatrick and Ginna in New York; Clinton and Quad Cities in Illinois; Salemand Hope Creek in New Jersey; Millstone in Connecticut; Davis Besse and Perry in Ohio. While
it is inevitable that the size of the U.S. nuclear fleet will continue to decline for the foreseeable
future, the decline is likely to be slowed by directly subsidizing economically threatened
operating plants.
The U.S. reactor fleet provided 809.4 TWh in 2019, compared to 808.03 TWh in 2018, a newrecord. The fleet’s mean load factor was 90.6 percent, amongst the Top Ten in the world while
by far operating the largest number of reactors (nonsensical to compare e.g. to Slovenia with
one unit). Nuclear plants provided 19.7 percent of electricity in 2019, compared to 19.3 percent
of U.S. electricity in 2018, and about 3 percentage points below the highest nuclear share of
22.5 percent, reached in 1995.
With only one new reactor started up in the past 20 years, the U.S. fleet continues to age, witha mid-2020 average of 39.8 years, amongst the oldest in the world: 46 units have operated for 41
and more years and all but six for 31 and more years (see Figure 43).

707 - Matt Kempner, “Georgia Vogtle nuclear report: more delays, $1B in extra costs, flaws”, The Atlanta JournalConstitution, 9 June 2020, see https://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-vogtle-nuclear-report-more-delays-extra-costs-flaws/
mBxlgXiDcf0SIaTFr0cZXL/, accessed 1 July 2020.
708 - The State, “SCANA conspirators helped Byrne spin lies about nuclear project, document alleges”, 9 June 2020,see https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article243395241.html, accessed 5 July 2020.
709 - SCANA, “South Carolina Electric & Gas Company To Cease Construction And Will File Plan Of Abandonment Of The New
Nuclear Project”, CISION PR Newswire, 31 July 2017, see https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/south-carolina-electric-gas-company-to-cease-construction-and-will-file-plan-of-abandonment-of-the-new-nuclear-project-300496644.html, accessed
10 May 2019.
710 - PowerMag, “Senior Exec Will Plead Guilty to Fraud in Abandoned Nuclear Project”, 8 June 2020,see https://www.powermag.com/senior-exec-will-plead-guilty-to-fraud-in-abandoned-nuclear-project/, accessed 5 July 2020.

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Figure 43 · Age Distribution of the U.S. Nuclear Fleet

Age of US Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

Reactor Age
43
46

5
1

95 Reactors
Mean Age39.8 Years

0–10 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over
50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

As of 1 July 2020, 87 of the 95 operating U.S. units had already received a license extension.
In the past year, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) did not issue any additional
20‑year license renewals. Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, and NRC
regulations, the NRC issues initial operating licenses for commercial power reactors for
40 years. NRC regulations permit license renewals that extend the initial 40-year license for up
to 20 additional years per renewal. However, in July 2017, the NRC published a final document
describing “aging management programs” that allow the NRC to grant nuclear power plants
operating licenses for “up to 80 years”.711 As of 1 July 2020, a total of six reactors have applied
for subsequent license renewal, four of which have been approved during the past 12 months.
The NRC on 4 December 2019 issued its first ever subsequent license renewal for Turkey Point-3
and -4. The license grants Florida Light and Power (FL&P), permission to operate the reactors
for a total of 80 years.712 The reactors are located 32 kilometers (20 miles) miles south ofMiami and their previous 20 year license extensions, which were granted in 2002, had allowed
them to operate until 2032 and 2033. FL&P applied for an additional 20 years of operation in
May 2018.713

711 - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, “Generic Aging Lessons Learned for Subsequent License Renewal (GALL-SLR) Report”,
NRC, Final Report, NUREG-2191, Vol. 2, July 2017, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1718/ML17187A204.pdf, accessed 10 June 2020.
712 - NRC, “ISSUANCE Of Subsequent Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 And DPR-41 For Turkey Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 3 And 4 (EPID L-2018-RNW-0002)”, 4 December 2019, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1930/ML19305C879.
pdf; and Utility Dive, “FPL’s Turkey Point first US nuclear plant to get license out to 80 years”, 4 December 2020, see https://www.
utilitydive.com/news/fpls-turkey-point-first-us-nuclear-plant-to-get-license-out-to-80-years/568593/, both accessed 2 July 2020.
713 - NRC, “Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 & 4 – Subsequent License Renewal Application”,
see https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/turkey-point-subsequent.html, accessed 11 May 2019.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

On 5 March 2020, the NRC granted subsequent license renewal for the Peach Bottom
Unit 2 and Unit 3 owned by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon).714 Prior to thisdecision, Peach Bottom Unit 2 had an operating license until 8 August 2033, while the license
for Peach Bottom Unit 3 was to run until 2 July 2034.715 Exelon Generation Company, LLC(Exelon), applied to the NRC on 10 July 2018 for subsequent license renewal for the reactors.716
Peach Bottom-2 and -3 were both connected to the grid in 1974 and are General Electric MK1
Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). With the additional extension of 20 years, the reactors arelicensed to operate until 8 August 2053 and 2 July 2054 respectively.
The subsequent license renewals for Peach Bottom-2 and-3 were contested by the organization
Beyond Nuclear.717 In evidence, seeking a review by the Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB),
expert witness David Lochbaum contends that Exelon in its application to the NRC had failed
to provide evidence of adequate aging management programs and on how operating experience
will be applied during the 60–80 year period of operation of Peach Bottom-2 and -3. Lochbaum
added: “Abundant evidence also speaks to gaps, deficiencies, and uncertainties in present
understanding of aging degradation mechanisms.”718 The ASLB on 20 June 2019 denied therequest for a review. As of 1 July 2020, the issue remains under appeal to NRC Commissioners.719
A new filing to the NRC related to non-compliance with the National Environmental Protection
Act (NEPA) and NRC regulations 10 CFR § 51.71 was filed in September 2019.720

714 - NRC, “Exelon Generation Company, Llc PSEG Nuclear, Llc Docket No. 50-278 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3
Subsequent Renewed Facility Operating License Subsequent Renewed License No. DPR-56, 5 March 2020, see http://static1.1.sqspcdn.
com/static/f/356082/28268685/1583938196653/pch_slr_03052020_approval_ML20024G426.pdf?token=thU59yfOgtDRthueNS6NLUzJ8
NY%3D; also NRC, “Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3 – Subsequent License Renewal Application”,
see https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/peach-bottom-subsequent.html;
and Beyond Nuclear, “NRC Greenlights Peach Bottom 80-year license extension despite significant safety questions”, 12 March 2020,see http://www.beyondnuclear.org/relicensing/; all accessed 2 July 2020.
715 - NRC, “Second Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 10, Second
Renewal Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Final Report”, NUREG-1437
Supplement 10, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, January 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2002/ML20023A937.pdf,
accessed 2 July 2020.
716 - NRC, “Subsequent License Renewal Application: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3— The Second License
Renewal Application”, Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, 10 July 2018, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1819/
ML18193A773.pdf, accessed 10 May 2019.
717 - NRC, “U.S.NRC Before The Atomic Safety And Licensing Board—In the Matter of Exelon Generation Company, LLC Peach
Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3—Beyond Nuclear, Inc.’s Amended Hearing Request And Petition To Intervene”, Docket
Nos. 50-277/278 SLR, 1 May 2019, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1912/ML19121A453.pdf; and Lindsay C. VanAsdalan, “Activists
challenge license extension for Peach Bottom nuclear plant”, York Dispatch, 6 March 2019, see https://eu.yorkdispatch.com/story/
news/2019/03/05/activists-challenge-license-extension-peach-bottom-nuclear-plant/3060252002/, both accessed 12 July 2019.
718 - David A. Lochbaum, “Proposed Subsequent License Renewal of Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3: Exelon’s Aging Management
Programs Fail to Provide Adequate Measures for Consideration of Operating Experience Throughout the Period of Extended
Operation”, Report prepared for Beyond Nuclear, 16 November 2018; attached to “Declaration of David A. Lochbaum—In the Matterof Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3”, Docket Nos. 50-277/278 SLR, U.S.NRC before
the Secretary, 16 November 2018, see http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/356082/28029077/1542673242727/PB-SLR_11192018_
Attachments+to+Hearing+Request.pdf?token=6dfkmNSlZgmM33rZ%2Fx%2FV4Bp3%2FWk%3D, accessed 12 July 2019.
719 - NRC, “Beyond Nuclear’s Brief On Appeal Of LBP-19-05”, United States Of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission Before The
Commission In the Matter of Exelon Generation Company, LLC ) Docket Nos. 50-277/278 SLR Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,
Units 2 & 3, 15 July 2019, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1919/ML19196A372.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.
720 - NRC, “Beyond Nuclear, Inc.’s Motion For Leave To File New Contention Based On Draft Supplement 10 To Generic
Environmental Impact Statement For Subsequent License Renewal Of Peach Bottom Operating License”, United States Of America
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Before The Atomic Safety And Licensing Board And The Commission, In the Matter of Exelon
Generation Company, LLC Docket Nos. 50-277/278 SLR Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, 3 September 2019 Units 2 & 3,
3 September 2019, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1924/ML19246C301.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.

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Currently, the NRC is reviewing the October 2018 subsequent license-renewal application for
Surry-1 and -2 in the state of Virginia, owned by Dominion Energy.721 The NRC has completed
its safety 722 and environmental assessment review 723 , and while a decision to grant a license
was scheduled for June 2020, as of 1 July 2020 the decision had been delayed while Dominion
prepared to submit revised documentation related to compliance with the Coastal Zone
Management Act.724
While not guaranteeing reactors continued operation, multiple applications are expected overthe coming years for subsequent license renewals. Applications are scheduled for North Anna-1
and -2 before December 2020, while Duke Energy Corporation has said it plans to seek license
extensions for all 11 of its reactors.725

Reactor Closures
Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1 was closed on 20 September 2019.726 The 45-year old 819 MW
PWR, owned by Exelon Corporation and located near Middletown in Pennsylvania, wasconnected to the grid on 19 June 1974. The closure brought to an end nuclear generation at thesite where on 28 March 1979 TMI Unit 2 suffered a partial core-melt accident.727“Today we celebrate the proud legacy of TMI Unit 1 and the thousands of employees whoshared our commitment to safety, operational excellence and environmental stewardship fornearly five decades,” Bryan Hanson, Exelon’s senior vice president and chief nuclear officer
stated.728 Although in 2009 the reactor had been granted an NRC 20-year license extension
to operate until 2034, Exelon announced on 8 May 2019 that TMI-1 would permanently closeby 30 September 2019.729 In August 2015, TMI-1 did not clear the Pennsylvania New Jersey
Maryland Interconnection LLC (PJM) electricity-capacity auction for the 2018-2019 planning
year,730 and in 2017 Exelon had warned that failure to approve subsidies by the Pennsylvania

721 - Virginia Electric and Power Company, “Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Application for Subsequent License Renewal Technicaland Administrative Information”, Dominion Energy Virginia or Dominion, October 2018, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1829/
ML18291A828.pdf, accessed 2 July 2020.
722 - NRC, “Surry Power Station Subsequent License Renewal - Issuance of the Final Safety Evaluation”, Accession
Number: ML20052F520, 9 March 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2005/ML20052F520.html, accessed 2 July 2020.
723 - NRC, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 6, Second Renewal Regarding
Subsequent License Renewal for Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Final Report”, NUREG-1437 Supplement 6 Second Renewal, Officeof Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, April 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2007/ML20071D538.pdf, accessed 2 July 2020.
724 - NRC, “Surry, Units 1 and 2 – Subsequent License Renewal Application”, as of 1 July 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/
operating/licensing/renewal/applications/surry-subsequent.html#statement, accessed 2 July 2020.
725 - Ari Natter, “The U.S. May Soon Have the World’s Oldest Nuclear Power Plants”, Bloomberg, 4 February 2020, see https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-04/the-u-s-may-soon-have-the-world-s-oldest-nuclear-power-plants, accessed 2 July 2020.
726 - Exelon Corp, “Three Mile Island Generating Station Unit 1 Retires from Service After 45 Years”, 20 September 2019,see https://www.exeloncorp.com/newsroom/three-mile-island-generating-station-unit-1-retires, accessed 2 July 2020.
727 - B. Drummond Ayres Jr., “Three Mile Island: Notes From a Nightmare”, New York Times 16 April 1979, see https://www.nytimes.
com/1979/04/16/archives/three-mile-island-notes-from-a-nightmare-three-mile-island-a.html, accessed 3 July 2020.
728 - Ibidem.
729 - Exelon Corp, “Three Mile Island Unit 1 To Shut Down By September 30, 2019”, 8 May 2019, see https://www.exeloncorp.com/
newsroom/Pages/Three-Mile-Island-Unit-1-To-Shut-Down-By-September-30,-2019.aspx, accessed 3 July 2020.
730 - PowerMag, “Two Exelon Nuclear Plants Fail to Clear PJM Auction”, 25 May 2019, see https://www.powermag.com/two-exelonnuclear-plants-fail-to-clear-pjm-auction/, accessed 3 July 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 legislature before 1 June 2019 would lead to the reactor’s closure.731 As of closure date, no such
legislation had been passed.
Forty years ago, TMI-2 suffered the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power
plant operating history when its core partially melted on 28 March 1979.732 In closing down
TMI-1, Exelon stressed that it had never owned TMI-2 that suffered the accident.733 The official
President’s Commission report on the causes of the accident concluded that a combination of
personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures was responsible.734 TMI-1 was shut
down following the accident but permitted to restart in 1985 against objections from the local
community, non-governmental organizations and a Commissioner of the NRC.735 The NRC
issued 20-year life extension approval for TMI Unit 1 in August 2009, granting the reactor
operation until 2034.736
Indian Point-2 closed on 30 April 2020.737 Located on the Hudson River, 48 km from
Manhattan, New York, the reactor was taken off the grid under the terms of an unusual
8 January 2017 agreement between the nuclear plant owner Entergy, non-governmentalorganization Riverkeeper and the state of New York.738 Entergy invested over US$1 billion
in the two remaining 1,000 MW Units 2 and 3 in recent years.739 In April 2007 Entergy filedwith the NRC a 20-year license renewal application for both Indian Point operating units
beyond the original expiration dates of 2013 and 2015.740 These subsequently became subject tosustained opposition from citizens groups.741 As part of the 2017 agreement, Entergy amended
its application to the NRC seeking a shorter renewal term. The NRC’s Atomic Safety andLicensing Board issued an Order on 13 March 2017, dismissing remaining contentions andclosing the adjudicatory hearing on the renewal. The renewed NRC licenses enabled Entergy
to operate the reactors through 30 April 2024 for Unit 2 and 30 April 2025 for Unit 3. Unit 1, a
smaller 250-MW reactor, was closed in 1974 just 12 years after it had started up.

731 - Utility Dive, “After failing to clear PJM auction, Exelon says Three Mile Island nuke will close in 2019”, 30 May 2017,see https://www.utilitydive.com/news/after-failing-to-clear-pjm-auction-exelon-says-three-mile-island-nuke-will/443794/,
accessed 3 July 2020.
732 - NRC, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident”, as of June 2018,see https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html, accessed 3 July 2020.
733 - Reuters, “Exelon to close Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania on Friday”, 20 September 2019,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-threemileisland/exelon-to-close-three-mile-island-nuclear-plant-in-pennsylvaniaon-friday-idUSKBN1W51FD, accessed 3 July 2020.
734 - President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, “The Need For Change: The Legacy Of TMI”, 30 October 1979,see http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph241/tran1/docs/188.pdf, accessed 3 July 2020.
735 - TMI Alert, “Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of the Beginning of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident”, March 2019,see http://www.tmia.com/sites/tmia.com/files/media/Press-Packet.pdf, accessed 3 July 2020.
736 - NRC, “Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - License Renewal Application”, as of April 2016,see https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/three-mile-island.html#appls, accessed 3 July 2020.
737 - Entergy, “Entergy’s Indian Point Unit 2 to Shut Down Permanently”, 29 April 2020,see https://www.entergynewsroom.com/news/entergy-s-indian-point-unit-2-shut-down-permanently/, accessed 3 July 2020.
738 - Riverkeeper, “Indian Point Closure FAQ”,
see https://www.riverkeeper.org/campaigns/stop-polluters/indian-point/indian-point-closure-faq/, accessed 3 July 2020.
739 - WNN, “Entergy agrees to Indian Point closure”, 9 January 2017,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Entergy-agrees-to-Indian-Point-closure, accessed 3 July 2020.
740 - NRC, “NRC Renews Operating Licenses for Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Units 2 and 3”, 17 September 2018,see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1828/ML18283A096.pdf, accessed 3 July 2020.
741 - Vivian Yee and Patrick McGeehan, “Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Could Close by 2021”, The New York Times, 6 January 2017,see https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/nyregion/indian-point-nuclear-power-plant-shutdown.html, accessed 3 July 2020.

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Connected to the grid on 26 June 1973, Unit 2, along with Unit 3 that followed on 27 April 1976,
have long been challenged on two crucial environmental requirements: a coastal zone
management certification and a water permit application. While Entergy had declared that
it was exempt from needing the coastal zone management certification, New York Statedisagreed. The two parties continued through 2016 to battle it out in the Court of Appeals.742
Figure 44 · Timelines of Early Retirement in the United States

Timelines of 19 U.S. Reactors Subject to Early-Retirement 2009–2025
as of 1 July 2020
Closed Units
Crystal River-3*
San Onofre-2
San Onofre-3
Kewaunee
Vermont Yankee
Fort Calhoun-1
Oyster Creek
Pilgrim-1
Three Mile Island-1
Indian Point-2

2009
2012
2012
2013
2014
2016
2018
2019
2019
2020

Units Scheduled for Closure
Duane Arnold-1
Indian Point-3
Palisades
Diablo Canyon-1
Diablo Canyon-2
Reversed Early Closure
Davis Besse-1
Perry-1**
Beaver Valley-1
Beaver Valley-2
Years

Construction

2020
2021
2022
2024
2025
2020
2021
2021
2021

10

0

10

Operation

Expected
Remaining
Operation

LicenseRenewal© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

20

Date of Closure
or Expected Closure
Reversed Closure Date

30

40

50

60

Early Closure Potentially Reversed
Early Closure Reversed, but Likely to be Repealed
License Renewal Withdrawn

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020
Notes:* Crystal River: No production after 2009 (WNISR considers it closed as of this date). Official closure announced in 2013. Renewal application submitted in 2008,
withdrawn in 2013. See U.S. NRC, “Crystal River – License Renewal Application”, Updated 9 December 2016, see https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/crystal-river.html, accessed 8 September 2020.
** License Renewal Application cancelled in 2018. See FENOC, “Perry Nuclear Power Plant—Change of Intent to Submit License Renewal Application”, First
Energy Nuclear Operating Company, 27 November 2018, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1833/ML18331A155.pdf, accessed 8 September 2020.

According to the 2017 agreement, Indian Point Unit 2 was to shut down no later than
30 April 2020 and Unit 3 no later than 30 April 2021. Entergy has also stated that low natural
gas prices and increased operating costs of the reactors were key factors in its decision to close
Indian Point.743 A recent study highlighted that rather than increasing natural gas electricity
generation to meet New York state 2025 clean energy targets, there will have to be a build

742 - Chris Dolmetsch and Mark Chediak, “Cuomo Wins Round in Bid to Shut Entergy’s Indian Point Plant”, Bloomberg ,21 November 2016, see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-21/entergy-s-new-york-nuke-plant-needs-coastal-reviewcourt-says, accessed 3 July 2020.
743 - Mary Esch, “Curtain lowers on nuke plant a stone’s throw from Manhattan”, Associated Press, 29 April 2020,see https://apnews.com/41b32c474b9aa75bf4261bdac1816e22, accessed 3 July 2020.

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out of renewables, storage, and energy efficiency far exceeding the loss in generation from theIndian Point reactors.744
Table 9 · 15 Early-Retirements for U.S. Reactors 2009–2025
Owner

Decision Date

Closure/Expected
Closure Date
(last electricity
generation)

Oyster Creek

Exelon8 December 2010

December 2019 brought
forward to 17 September
2018

49

Yes

Crystal River-3

Duke Energy

5 February 2013

26 September 200932

Application withdrawn

San Onofre-2 & -3

SCE/SDG&E

7 June 2013

January 201229 / 28

No application

Dominion Energy

22 October 2012

7 May 2013

39

Yes

Vermont Yankee

Entergy

28 August 201329 December 2014

42

Yes

PilgrimEntergy

13 October 2015

31 May 2019

47

Yes

Diablo Canyon-1 & -2

PG&E

21 June 2016

November 2024 & August
2025

40

Suspended

Fort Calhoun

OPPD

26 August 2016

24 October 2016

43

Yes

PalisadesEntergy

8 December 2016/
28 September 2017

2022

51

Yes

30 April 2020

47

Entergy

9 January 201730 April 2021

44

Three Mile Island-1

Exelon30 May 2017

September 2019

45

Yes

Duane Arnold

NextEra27 July 2018

30 October 2020

46

Yes

Reactor

Kewaunee

Indian Point-2
Indian Point-3

Age at Closure(in years)

NRC 60-Year License
Approval

Yes

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes:As anticipated in WNISR2019, early closure decisions for four reactors (Beaver Valley-1 and -2, Davis-Besse and Perry) have been reversed (see section on
Securing Subsidies to Prevent Closures), and those reactors have been removed from the table in the WNISR2020 version.

SCE: Southern California Edison; SDG&E: San Diego Gas & Electric; PG&E: Pacific Gas & Electric Company; OPPD: Omaha Public Power District.

744 - PSE, “Evaluating the potential for renewables, storage, and energy efficiency to offset retiring nuclear power generation in New
York”, April 2020, see https://www.psehealthyenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/PSE-Research-Brief_-Indian-Point_4_13_20.
pdf, accessed 3 July 2020.

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Reactor Construction“Simply stated, it is to develop an unachievable plan, fail relatively quickly,
and repeat the process to develop a new (and still unachievable) plan.”Georgia Public Service Commission Public Interest Advocacy Staff,
on Southern Company approach to Vogtle Construction745

The Vogtle Debacle
Only two commercial reactors are currently under construction in the U.S. – the AP‑1000
reactors Vogtle-3, which officially began in March 2013, and Vogtle-4, which began inNovember 2013.746 The reactors are being built in Burke County, near Waynesboro, in the stateof Georgia, in the southeastern U.S. and are owned by Southern Company (parent company
of majority Vogtle plant owner, Georgia Power). In 2017, Southern Company gave fuel-loading
times as November 2021 for Unit 3 and November 2022 for Unit 4, which compares with an
original planned startup date of 2016. However, the operational dates from Southern are atvariance with the assessment made by the Georgia Public Services Commission (PSC) staff
in its December 2016 quarterly progress report, which indicated a credible completion date of2023.747
While the project during the past year has passed certain construction milestones, as inprevious years, evidence continues to emerge that reveals the enormous scale of the Vogtle
project failure.
As of March 2020, construction was 81.2 percent complete, with the total project at 85.7 percent.
Milestones achieved included: Unit 3 conical roof structure on top of the shield building;
Unit 3 main control room declared to be ready to support testing; installed reactor coolant
pump variable frequency drive units; set Unit 4 third containment vessel ring; installed Unit 4
passive residual heat exchanger. However, these achievements mask the continuing delays in
the project. In expert testimony to the Georgia PSC on 5 June 2020, it was concluded that…in spite of achieving these construction milestones, construction progress on the Projectcontinued to fall behind the production needed to achieve the April 2019 Baseline with a Unit
3 COD (Commercial Operation Date) of May 23, 2021.748

It was also pointed out that construction milestones are reported by the contractors as
successful when they are started, rather than when they are completed, which means, “thatthey do not provide an accurate status of the Project.”749

745 - Georgia Public Service Commission, 5 June 2020, op. cit.
746 - WNISR, “Construction Start on US Vogtle Unit 4”, 25 November 2013,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Construction-Start-on-US-Vogtle.html, accessed 28 May 2019.
747 - Kristi E. Schwartz, “Evidence mounts that Vogtle project won’t start up in 2020”, E&E News, 8 February 2017,see https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2017/02/08/stories/1060049693, accessed 28 May 2019.
748 - Georgia Public Service Commission, “Direct Testimony And Exhibits Of Steven D. Roetger William R. Jacobs, Jr., Phd., In The
Matter Of Georgia Power Company’s Twenty-Second Semi-Annual Vogtle Construction Monitoring Report Docket No. 29849, On
Behalf Of The Georgia Public Service Commission Public Interest Advocacy Staff”, 5 June 2020.
749 - Ibidem.

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In June 2020, in damning expert-witness evidence to the Georgia PSC, it was concluded thatthe construction schedule will not be met and the budget awarded by the PSC will be exceeded.
The evidence was submitted by Donald Grace, Vice President of Engineering for the Vogtle
Monitoring Group (“VMG”) which is engaged by the Georgia Public Service Commission(“GPSC”) Public Interest Advocacy (“PIA”) Staff which is tasked with independently
evaluating Southern’s ability to successfully manage completion of the Vogtle project.750
The evidence showed for example that the Schedule Performance Indices (SPIs) for weekly
installation of Instrumentation and Control (I&C) cable pulling and termination show swings
in values that, “are “off the chart” (both figuratively, and actually off the scale of Chart)”, withperformance that is “erratic and unpredictable”.751 On terms of completing this major task, on
current schedule it could take57.5 months (i.e., 5.75 x 10 months) to complete the amount of termination effort that had
been planned to be completed during this 10-month period...This leads to the conclusion thatthe project is having difficulty in establishing, and then working to, an achievable plan.752

In any construction of a nuclear plant, the performance of the many tens of thousands of
installed components is critical. The testing of components, the so-called Inspection and Test
Plan (ITPs) for the Vogtle reactors revealed according to VMG thatthe test failure rate is at an unacceptably high rate of roughly 80%...In the professional
opinion of VMG it is much greater (by at least a factor of 4) of what one should expect...(andin conclusion) All the above greatly increases the complexity of planning work and providing
meaningful reports of progress vs plan (as evidenced by there being more than 60,000
remaining activities within the IPS - Integrated Project Schedules).753

Upon discovery that 80 percent of tested components failed, the PSC staff expressed shock,given that
While some problems are expected during this phase but a failure rate of 80% indicatesthat construction, quality control and ITP in their normal daily functions are not doing anadequate job to verify that the components are ready for testing.754

VMG warned that
The component test failure rate is indeed a serious issue; however, it is too early to tellwhether the extent of the failures are the result of ITP’s performance (e.g., not properly

750 - Georgia PSC Public Interest Advocacy Staff, “Direct Testimony Of Donald N. Grace P.E. On Behalf Of The Georgia PublicService Commission Public Interest Advocacy Staff, Before The Georgia Public Service Commission In The Matter Of: Georgia Power
Company’s Twenty-Second Semiannual Vogtle Construction Monitoring (“VCM”)”, Report Docket No. 29849, 5 June 2020,see https://www.powermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/29849-22vcm-d-grace-pd.pdf, accessed 1 July 2020.
751 - Ibidem.
752 - Ibidem.
753 - Ibidem.
754 - Georgia Public Service Commission, 5 June 2020, op. cit.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 testing the component), or others’ performance (e.g., a fabrication failure beyond the scope ofwhat the quality documentation would be able to detect).”755

VMG concluded that in terms of Southern’s project planning and construction schedule
performance for Vogtle-3 and -4: “Simply stated, it is to develop an unachievable plan, failrelatively quickly, and repeat the process to develop a new (and still unachievable) plan.”
Critics of the Vogtle project had long predicted that there would be delays and thatcosts would be much higher.756 The original project cost approved by the Georgia PublicService Commission (PSC) was US$6.1 billion in 2009, which corresponds to a cost of
US$2,440/kWe (gross), whereas the 2017 estimate of US$23 billion translates to a cost of
US$9,200/kW. The revised 2018 estimates in the range of US$28 billion have increased costs to
US$11,200/kW, a 4.6-fold increase over the approved original estimate.757 These costs comparewith the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 2009-assessment of the prospects for
new nuclear power based on overnight costs of US$20074,000/kW (US$20184,800/kW).758
As WNISR2018 reported, in December 2017 the Georgia PSC, following the recommendationfrom Southern Company, decided to continue to support the project. The Georgia PSC has
backed the Plant Vogtle project from the start, including awarding the generous Construction
Work In Progress (CWIP), where all construction costs incurred by Georgia Power are passed
directly on to the customer. The Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, signed into law in2009, allows regulated utilities to recover from their customers the financing costs associatedwith the construction of nuclear generation projects—years before those projects arescheduled to begin producing benefits for ratepayers. As a result of the CWIP legislation, outof Georgia Power’s original estimated US$6.1 billion Vogtle costs, US$1.7 billion is financing
costs recoverable from the ratepayer. The utility began recovering these financing costs fromits customers starting in 2011. For that first year, the rule translates to Georgia Power electricbills’ rising by an average of US$3.73 per month. Georgia Power estimated that this monthly
charge would escalate so that by 2018, a Georgia Power residential customer using 1,000 kWh
per month would have seen his/her bill go up by US$10 per month due to Vogtle-3 and -4. As aresult of increased costs of the project and approval by the Georgia PSC, ratepayers had alreadypaid US$2 billion to Georgia Power as of November 2017.759 But given the long timescale of the
project, including planned operational life, the actual costs to ratepayers will be much higher.
Under the financing terms agreed with the Georgia PSC, the longer the Vogtle plant takes toconstruct, the higher its costs, which have invariably been passed on to Georgia ratepayers,
755 - Ibidem.
756 - For example, see NIRS,“MIT Nuke Study Uses Unsupportable Reactor Cost Estimates”, Nuclear Information and Resource
Service, Press Release, 16 September 2010, see https://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/09/16/mit-nuke-study-usesunsupportable- reactor-cost-estimates, accessed 23 May 2018; and Travis Madsen et al., “The High Cost of Nuclear Power—Why
America Should Choose a Clean Energy Future Over New Nuclear Reactors”, Maryland PIRG Foundation, March 2009,see https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/nukerelapse/calvert/highcostnpower_mdpirg.pdf, accessed 28 May 2019.
757 - Liam Denning, “Nuclear Power’s Big Problem Isn’t That It’s Nuclear”, Bloomberg, 27 September 2018, see https://www.bloomberg.
com/opinion/articles/2018-09-27/nuclear-power-s-big-problem-isn-t-that-it-s-nuclear, accessed 28 May 2019.
758 - John M. Deutch, Charles W. Forsberg, et al., “Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power”, MIT Energy Initiative,
Interdisciplinary Study, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009, see http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpowerupdate2009.pdf, accessed 5 August 2019.
759 - Southern Environmental Law Center, “Groups Intervene in Vogtle Cost Proceedings—Georgians Should Not Bear Financial
Burden of Georgia Power’s Project Mismanagement”, Press Release, 6 November 2017, see https://www.southernenvironment.org/
news-and-press/press-releases/groups-intervene-in-vogtle-cost-proceedings-georgians-should-not-bear-finan, accessed 28 May 2019.

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resulting in higher income streams for Georgia Power and therefore Southern. In reporting2018 Southern earnings, CEO Thomas A. Fanning stated that2018 was a banner year for Southern Company (...) All of our state-regulated electric and gas
companies delivered strong performancewith full-year 2018 earnings of US$2.23 billion, compared with earnings of US$842 million in2017.760
WNISR2019 reported extensively on the economics of the Vogtle project. The past year has
not improved matters for ratepayers in Georgia. Expert witness to the PSC on 5 June 2020
reported
The Staff CTC (cost to complete) analyses, which ignore the [US]$8.1 billion already incurredby the Company (Georgia Power) as of December 31, 2019, indicate that it is economic tocomplete the Project if the Company adheres to its current construction cost and theNovember 2021 and November 2022 regulatory COD [Commercial Operation Date] forecasts.
The Staff analyses indicate that it is not economic to complete the Project if there is a delay of
24 months or longer beyond the current regulatory CODs.761

The prospect of a delay beyond 24 months is highly likely.

“In conclusion, ratepayers will pay substantially more both prior to and after
the Units begin providing service due to the delays and cost overruns.”
Georgia Power is currently expected to recover approximately US$3.9 billion under the Nuclear
Construction Cost Recovery (“NCCR”) tariffs imposed on customers during the construction
period. “This is nearly double the US$2.1 billion the Company would have collected if the Units
had been completed in accordance with the certification schedule of 11 April 2016 and 2017.”762
Under the NCCR, Georgia Power is permitted to request to add US$8.0 billion to its rate baseonce Units 3 and 4 are in commercial service. The Georgia PSC points out:
This amount is more than 80 percent greater than the US$4.4 billion assumed at certification.
This additional US$3.6 billion in rate base will increase ratepayer revenue requirements byapproximately US$12 billion over the 60-year life of the Units and increase annual revenue
requirements by an average of US$380 million and US$350 million during the first five andten years in operation, respectively. In conclusion, ratepayers will pay substantially more bothprior to and after the Units begin providing service due to the delays and cost overruns.763

An additional complicating factor has been the impact of COVID-19. As reported in June 2020,
Southern warned shareholders of possible further delays as a result of the pandemic,
with challenges including “the supply chain, high absentee rates and slower productivity.
Georgia Power cut the 9,000-strong workforce to 7,000 to aid social distancing efforts and760 - Southern Company, “Southern Company reports fourth-quarter and full-year 2018 earnings”, PR Newswire, 20 February 2019,see https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/southern-company-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2018-earnings-300798574.
html, accessed 28 May 2019.
761 - Georgia Public Service Commission , “Direct Testimony And Exhibits Of Tom Newsome, PE, CFA Philip Hayet Lane Kollen,
CPA, CMA, CGMA, On Behalf Of The Georgia Public Service Commission Public Interest Advocacy Staff”, Before The Georgia
Public Service Commission In The Matter Of: Georgia Power Company’s Twenty-Second Semiannual Vogtle Construction
Monitoring (“VCM”) Report Docket No. 29849, 5 June 2020, see https://www.eenews.net/assets/2020/06/09/document_ew_04.pdf,
accessed 3 June 2020.
762 - Ibidem.
763 - Ibidem.

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improve workflow.”764 In spite of the implementation of social distancing and mask-wearing
rules, early July 2020, the construction site had registered 54 active COVID-19 cases.765
During the past year, as in previous years, the Vogtle construction schedule of Southern
Company was challenged by expert witnesses. In 2019, PSC staff had concluded that “at thistime the status of the Project is uncertain,”766 with major uncertainties whether the target dateof hot functional tests scheduled for Unit 3 on 31 March 2020 can be achieved. Fuel loadingat that time was scheduled for 14 October 2020. As it turned out, as of 1 July 2020 hot testing
has yet to be conducted. On 30 April 2020, Thomas Fanning, CEO of Georgia Power parent
Southern Company, stated that, “cold hydro testing is planned to begin in June or July, with
hot functional testing beginning in August or September.”767 This schedule changed again,
when in June, Southern announced that cold testing would take place “this fall” to then befollowed by hot testing. Credit-rating agency Moody’s said in a statement: “The unexpected,
late-stage changes to these planned activities is credit negative for Georgia Power because it
signals that challenges with the project continue, increasing the likelihood of additional cost
overruns and further schedule delays.”768 With these delays, the schedule for fuel loading
which in February 2020 was pushed back from October 2020 to November 2020, also appears
in doubt.769
Multiple lawsuits against the Vogtle project initiated over the years have continued throughthe courts. As reported in WNISR2018, on 13 February 2018 a coalition of groups filed in Fulton
County Superior Court a complaint challenging the Georgia PSC decision, declaring that it was
unlawful, violating the PSC’s own guidelines and Georgia state law.770 On 21 December 2018,
the court found that dissatisfied customers cannot raise concerns about the unfairness ofGeorgia PSC’s process “until 2022 or later, after the project is complete... The court dismissed
the appeal on technical grounds without addressing its substance,” attorney Kurt Ebersbachof Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC) stated.771 “The people of Georgia have been
pre-paying for this mismanaged project since 2011, while the price tag has ballooned and the
project timeline has slipped again and again,” Liz Coyle, executive director of Georgia Watch,

764 - Kristi E. Swartz, “‘Aggressive’ timeline may actually delay Plant Vogtle”, E&E News, 9 June 2020,see https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2020/06/09/stories/1063355257, accessed 4 July 2020.
765 - Jozsef Papp, “More than 50 active COVID-19 cases at Plant Vogtle”, The Augusta Chronicle, 8 July 2020.
766 - Georgia PSC, “Public Disclosure—Direct Testimony And Exhibits Of Steven D. Roetger and William R. Jacobs, Jr., PhD.—On
Behalf Of The Georgia Public Service Commission Public Interest Advocacy Staff—In The Matter Of Georgia Power Company’s
Nineteenth Semi-Annual Vogtle Construction Monitoring Report”, Testimony Before The Georgia Public Service Commission, Docket
No. 29849, 30 November 2018.
767 - WNN, “Major component installed at Vogtle 3”, 14 May 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Major-component-installed-at-Vogtle-3, accessed 4 July 2020.
768 - S&P Global, “Resequencing of Vogtle nuclear plant expansion activities is credit negative: Moody’s”, 24 June 2020,see https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/062420-resequencing-of-vogtle-nuclear-plantexpansion-activities-is-credit-negative-moodys, accessed 4 July 2020.
769 - Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 3; Hearing Opportunity Associated With Inspections,Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria”, Docket No. 52–025, NRC–2008–0252, Federal Register/Vol. 85, No. 29, 12 February 2020.
770 - Dave Williams, “Plant Vogtle opponents appeal vote to complete nuclear project”, Atlanta Business Chronicle,
12 February 2018, see https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2018/02/12/plant-vogtle-opponents-appeal-vote-to-complete.html,
accessed 28 May 2019.
771 - Albany Herald, “Groups Challenge Court Decision Regarding Plant Vogtle Over Cost Concerns”, as published by Georgia Watch,
10 January 2019, see https://www.georgiawatch.org/groups-challenge-court-decision-regarding-plant-vogtle-over-cost-concerns/,
accessed 28 May 2019.

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said. “Unless the court reverses the commission’s decision, Georgia Power customers remain
exposed to significant financial risk with seemingly no end in sight.”772
In October 2019, the Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the lower Court to determine
whether the citizens groups had met their burden to show that postponing their appeal until
after the project is finished would not provide them an adequate remedy.773 In April 2020,
Fulton County Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case until
the reactors’ construction is finished.774
The most recent challenge to the Vogtle construction project was in May 2020, when the Blue
Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL) filed a challenge to a NRC License Amendment
request from Southern.775 BREDL contends that, under the guise of a one-inch change in theseismic gap between two critical walls in the Vogtle Unit 3 reactor, Southern has admitted
to a much more serious structural problem, the “dishing” of the nuclear plant’s concrete
foundation which creates instability.776 Southern contends that it’s just a minor construction
flaw, whereas BREDL expert witness, nuclear engineer Arne Gundersen, stated, “that the sheer
weight of the nuclear island building is causing it to sink into the red Georgia clay.”777 During apreliminary oral hearing of Southern’s License Amendment request, the case was heard by the
NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on 1 July 2020.

Vogtle Federal Loan Guarantees
Under the terms of the Department of Energy (DOE) Loan Guarantee Program, owners of
nuclear projects are able to borrow at below-market Federal Financing Bank rates with therepayment assurance of the U.S. Government. DOE loan guarantees permitted Vogtle’s owners
to finance a substantial portion of their construction costs at interest rates well below market
rates, and to increase their debt fraction, which significantly reduced overall financing costs.
In justification for the loan guarantee to Vogtle, the Obama administration stated in 2010 that
the Vogtle project represents an important advance in nuclear technology, other innovative
nuclear projects may be unable to obtain full commercial financing due to the perceived
risks associated with technology that has never been deployed at commercial scale in the
U.S. The loan guarantees from this draft solicitation would support advanced nuclear energy
772 - Ibidem.
773 - Georgia Watch, “Georgia Court Of Appeals Sends Plant Vogtle Challenge Back To Fulton County Superior Court”,
30 October 2019, see https://georgiawatch.org/georgia-court-of-appeals-sends-plant-vogtle-challenge-back-to-fulton-county-superiorcourt/, accessed 4 July 2020.
774 - Southern Environmental Law Center, “Fulton County Superior Court Again Rules that Flawed Decision to Continue Vogtle
Project May Not be Challenged Until Project is Finished”, 21 April 2020, see https://www.southernenvironment.org/news-and-press/
press-releases/court-again-rules-that-flawed-decision-to-continue-vogtle-project-may-not-be-challenged-until-project-is-finished,
accessed 4 July 2020.
775 - BREDL, “BREDL And Our Chapter Concerned Citizens Of Shell Bluff File Petition Regarding Plant Vogtle Plant 3 License
Amendment And Exemption”, 12 May 2020, see http://www.bredl.org/nuclear/200511_BREDL_Petition_to_Intervene_Vogtle_3.htm;
and U.S.NRC, “Petition For Leave To Intervene And Request For Hearing By The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League And Its
Chapter Concerned Citizens Of Shell Bluff Regarding Southern Nuclear Operating Company’s Request For A License Amendment
And Exemption For Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Wall 11 Seismic Gap Requirements”, LAR-20-001, In the Matter of Southern Nuclear
Operating Co. License Amendment Application for Combined Licenses NPF-91, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3, Docket No. 52025-LA-3, NRC-2008-0252, 11 May 2020, see http://www.bredl.org/pdf6/200511_BREDL_Petition_to_Intervene_Vogtle_3_Docket_52025-LA-3.pdf, both accessed 4 July 2020.
776 - BREDL, “Residents Fight to Bring Case Against Georgia Nuclear Plant Legal Brief”, 15 June 2020,see http://www.bredl.org/press/2020/200615_PR_Reply_Filed_VEGP-3_Plant_Sinking.pdf, accessed 4 July 2020.
777 - Ibidem.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 technologies that will catalyze the deployment of future projects that replicate or extend atechnological innovation.778

The loan guarantee program has therefore played a critical role in permitting the Vogtle project
to proceed but has failed to catalyze a nuclear revival, with no prospects of further new nuclear
plants being built in the U.S. in the coming decades. Oglethorpe Power Corporation (OPC),
which has a 30 percent stake in Vogtle, confirmed in August 2017 that it had submitted arequest to DOE for up to US$1.6 billion in additional loan guarantees. The company alreadyhad a US$3 billion loan guarantee from DOE. The other owners, Georgia Power and Municipal
Electric Authority of Georgia (MEAG), have secured US$8.3 billion in separate loan guarantees
from DOE since 2010, when they were approved by the Obama administration. Both of thesecompanies confirmed in August 2017 that they were seeking additional loan guarantee funding.
On 29 September 2017, DOE Secretary Perry announced approval of additional US$3.7 billion
loan guarantees for the Vogtle owners, with US$1.67 billion to Georgia Power, US$1.6 billion to
OPC, and US$415 million to MEAG.779 A decision on terminating the Vogtle project would raise
the prospect of repayment of the previous US$8.3 billion loan to Southern.780 In April 2019, theDOE provided an additional loan guarantee of US$3.7 billion to Plant Vogtle construction, only
the second loan guarantee issued under the Trump administration and the second to Plant
Vogtle.781 This brings the total loan guarantees provided for the Vogtle project by the DOE to
US$12.03 billion.782

778 - Peter W. Davidson, “Fostering the Next Generation of Nuclear Energy Technology—Investing in American Energy”, Loan
Programs Office, U.S.DOE, 29 September 2014, see https://energy.gov/lpo/articles/fostering-next-generation-nuclear-energytechnology, accessed 6 July 2020.
779 - U.S.DOE, “Secretary Perry Announces Conditional Commitment to Support Continued Construction of Vogtle Advanced
Nuclear Energy Project”, 29 September 2017, see https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-perry-announces-conditionalcommitment-support-continued-construction-vogtle, accessed 12 August 2020.
780 - Peter Maloney, “Westinghouse bankruptcy puts $8.3B in federal loan guarantees for Vogtle plant at risk”, Utility Dive,
3 April 2017, see http://www.utilitydive.com/news/westinghouse-bankruptcy-puts-83b-in-federal-loan-guarantees-for-vogtlepl/439508/, accessed 28 May 2019.
781 - Jacqueline Toth, “DOE Program’s $3.7 Billion Loan Highlights Lack of Action on Other $40 Billion It Holds”, Morning Consult,
8 April 2019, see https://morningconsult.com/2019/04/08/doe-programs-3-7-billion-loan-highlights-lack-of-action-on-other-40-billionit-holds/, accessed 10 May 2019.
782 - Taxpayers for Common Sense, “DOE Loan Guarantee Program: Vogtle Reactors 3 & 4”, 21 March 2019, see https://www.taxpayer.
net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/3-21-19-ENR-Vogtle-Fact-Sheet_MARCH-2019_-v.4.pdf, accessed 10 May 2019.

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Ongoing Fallout from Termination of V.C. Summer Project“The object of the conspiracy was for the defendant,
Stephen Andrew Byrne, and others, through SCANA, to provide false
representations and omit necessary facts in disclosures to the PSC, the
ORS, the South Carolina State Government, the media, and to customers,
so that the construction of the Nuclear Project would continue, minimizing
regulatory risk, and avoiding state government oversight, all to defraud
customers through inflated bills.”783
United States Vs SCANA CEO Stephen Andrew Byrne – Plea Agreement, Criminal No 3:20 355
District of the United States for the District of South Carolina Columbia Division, 8 June 2020

As reported in previous WNISR editions, the decision on 31 July 2017 by Santee Cooper and
SCANA Corporation (the parent company of South Carolina Electric & Gas or SCG&E) toterminate construction of the V.C. Summer reactor project, during the past year has seen
ongoing financial and legal fallout for the companies and ratepayers of South Carolina. At thetime of cancellation, the total costs for completion of the two AP-1000 reactors at V.C. Summer
was projected to exceed US$25 billion—a 75 percent increase over initial estimates.784
On 27 February 2020, a lawsuit over the V.C. Summer project was filed by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) against SCANA executives and Dominion Energy
South Carolina, Inc. The lawsuit concerned securities fraud perpetrated by senior executivesof SCANA over the V.C. Summer project. As the filing from SEC explained, from 2015 through2017,
construction of the new nuclear units at V.C. Summer was a tale of two projects. Publicly,
SCANA touted progress being made on the project in its periodic filings with the SEC, on
earnings calls with financial analysts, in press releases and video presentations, and in filings
and testimony before the South Carolina Public Service Commission (“PSC”). These false
statements enabled SCANA to bolster its stock price, sell $1 billion in corporate bonds atfavorable rates, and obtain regulatory approval to charge its customers more than $1 billion inincreased rates to help finance the project. Internally, however, SCANA knew that – contrary
to its public statements – the project was significantly delayed, the construction schedule
was unreliable and unachievable, and the company was unlikely to qualify for $1.4 billion
in federal production tax credits because the new units would not be completed by the783 - District of the United States for the District of South Carolina Columbia Division, “United States Vs Stephen Andrew Byrne – Plea
Agreement”, Criminal No 3:20 355, 8 June 2020, see https://srswatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Byrne-court-plea-June-8-2020.
pdf, accessed 6 July 2020.
784 - Robert Walton, “SCANA agrees to settle $2B class action suit over nuclear costs”, Utility Dive, 26 November 2018,see https://www.utilitydive.com/news/scana-agrees-to-settle-2b-class-action-suit-over-nuclear-costs/542911/, accessed 26 May 2019.

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January 1, 2021 deadline for receiving the tax credits. SCANA and its senior managementknew that the expansion project was not viable without those tax credits.785

The February 2020 filing by SEC included evidence of how SCANA “executives privately
harbored dire concerns about the biggest project their company had ever undertaken and how
they publicly sought to convince regulators and investors that everything was under control...”while knowing that there, “was [g]onna be a blood letting the likes of which we have neverseen.”786 One SCANA executive concluded, “We got on our jet airplanes and flew around thecountry showing the same damn construction pictures from different angles and played ourfiddles while the whole mf [sic] was going up in flames.”“The members of the conspiracy’s actions and the associated cover-up
allowed the project to continue until the contractor went bankrupt andthe project was abandoned, resulting in billions of dollars of loss”
While the SEC filing was not a criminal proceeding, one was expected. On 8 June 2020, a plea
filing agreement to U.S. District Court in Columbia stated that SCANA CEO Stephen Byrne
orchestrated a cover-up of costly errors at the V.C. Summer nuclear site and “deceived
regulators and customers in order to maintain financing for the project and to financiallybenefit SCANA... As construction problems mounted, costs rose, and schedules slipped, thedefendant Stephen A. Byrne, and others, hid the true state of the project”.787 The filing said:“The members of the conspiracy’s actions and the associated cover-up allowed the project
to continue until the contractor went bankrupt and the project was abandoned, resulting inbillions of dollars of loss.”788 While the information doesn’t say that all top SCANA officials
were part of the conspiracy, the court documents assert that leading the “failed effort toconstruct two nuclear power generators in Fairfield County” were “executives, employees andthe lawyers who advised them.” As reported in WNSIR18 onwards, the FBI and prosecutors in
the U.S. Attorney’s Office since 2017 have been investigating the V.C. Summer nuclear plant
project. The prospects are that other officials will be charged.
The June 2020 filing states that Stephen Byrne and other officials
represented to regulatory agencies that V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 would be operational in2019 and 2020, when in truth members of the conspiracy had hired Bechtel to evaluate theproject; Bechtel found the Nuclear Project to be significantly off schedule and over-budget.
785 - United States District Court District Of South Carolina Columbia Division, “UNITED States Securities And Exchange
Commission, Plaintiff, V. Scana Corporation, Dominion Energy South Carolina, Inc. (f/k/a South Carolina Electric & Gas Company),
Kevin B. Marsh, And Stephen A. Byrne, Defendants”, 27 February 2020, see https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/
postandcourier.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/b/ca/bca4c31c-59bf-11ea-8609-5f7574a496f2/5e585c9cc4fec.pdf.pdf; and Post
and Courier, “SCANA and former execs sued by SEC for ‘fraud’ over failed SC nuclear project”, 27 February 2020, see https://www.
postandcourier.com/business/scana-and-former-execs-sued-by-sec-for-fraud-over-failed-sc-nuclear-project/article_93fa2116-59a911ea-a3e4-a31678d9c119.html, both accessed 6 July 2020.
786 - United States District Court District Of South Carolina Columbia Division, “UNITED States Securities And Exchange
Commission, Plaintiff, V. Scana Corporation, Dominion Energy South Carolina, Inc. (f/k/a South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company), Kevin B. Marsh, And Stephen A. Byrne, Defendants”, 27 February 2020, see https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.
com/postandcourier.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/b/ca/bca4c31c-59bf-11ea-8609-5f7574a496f2/5e585c9cc4fec.pdf.pdf,
accessed 6 July 2020.
787 - In the District of the United States for the District of South Carolina Columbia Division, “United States Vs Stephen Andrew
Byrne – Plea Agreement”, Criminal No 3:20 355, 8 June 2020, see https://srswatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Byrne-court-pleaJune-8-2020.pdf; and The State, “SCANA conspirators helped Byrne spin lies about nuclear project, document alleges 9 June, 2020”,
updated 15 June 2020, see https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article243395241.html, both accessed 6 July 2020.
788 - Ibidem.

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Members of the conspiracy never provided this information to the regulatory agencies... When
Bechtel provided data demonstrating that the Nuclear Project was failing catastrophically,bifurcated, edited, and buried the Bechtel report(s) and the information contained within
under disingenuous representations of attorney-client privilege.789

The conspiracy to deceive allowed SCANA to apply for numerous rate increases to help pay for
ongoing reactor construction. The rate increases were, “fraudulently inflated bills to customers
for the stated purpose of funding the project,” according to the filings.790 Under legislation
passed by the South Carolina Public Services Commissioners in 2008—but strongly opposedby civil society groups—construction costs for the V.C. Summer reactors were to be paidby state ratepayers. The former SCANA CEO in the June-2020 plea agreement promised tocooperate with federal law enforcement and testify, “before any grand juries and at any trials
or other proceedings if called upon to do so....” A plea hearing was scheduled for July 2020.791
The fraud scandal has extended to Dominion Energy, which took over SCANA in January 2019,at which time it inherited the company’s legal liability, along with all of SCE&G’s ratepayers
in South Carolina. Dominion Energy South Carolina, along with former SCANA officials,
were named in the February 2020 lawsuit filed by the SEC.792 Since when the utility had been
seeking to recuse itself from the proceedings by settling the case without admitting any fraud
by SCANA. In May 2020, it was reported that agreement was near to being reached whereby
Dominion would pay a US$25 million settlement with the SEC.793 As trade journal Nucleonics
Week reported in June 2020, Dominion had entered into a cooperation agreement with the
U.S. Attorney Office’s Office of South Carolina and the South Carolina Attorney General
27 December 2018, according to an attachment to the 8 June 2020 filing.794 In its takeover of
SCANA, Dominion “has committed to make extensive remedial efforts to redress ratepayers,”
which is estimated to be approximately US$4 billion. Exactly what this means remains unclear,as under current plans Dominion will be charging South Carolina ratepayers an additional
US$2.3 billion over the next two decades for the collapsed V.C. Summer project.795 The 8 Junefiling made it clear that Dominion will not be prosecuted, with a utility spokesman stating that
“We have no further comment regarding this matter or the investigation”.796
In a related matter, on 3 June 2020 Dominion Energy agreed to pay upwards of US$192.5 million
in reparations to former SCANA investors following a shareholder lawsuit-settlement over the789 - Ibidem.
790 - Ibidem.
791 - Lexington Chronicle, “Ex-SCE&G Exec Faces 5 Years In Prison”, 5 July 2020,see https://www.lexingtonchronicle.com/news/ex-sceg-exec-faces-5-years-prison, accessed 6 July 2020.
792 - Post and Courier, “SCANA and former execs sued by SEC for ‘fraud’ over failed SC nuclear project”, 27 February 2020,see https://www.postandcourier.com/business/scana-and-former-execs-sued-by-sec-for-fraud-over-failed-sc-nuclear-project/article_93fa2116-59a9-11ea-a3e4-a31678d9c119.html, accessed 6 July 2020.
793 - Post and Courier, “Dominion close to settling case with securities regulators over SC nuclear project”, 8 May 2020,see https://www.postandcourier.com/business/dominion-close-to-settling-case-with-securities-regulators-over-sc-nuclear-project/article_9a4244fa-9148-11ea-8762-87d6c73e0964.html, accessed 6 July 2020.
794 - NW, “Former Summer executive to plead guilty to fraud”, 11 June 2020.
795 - Post and Courier, “Ex-SCE&G official will cooperate as witness in criminal probe of failed VC Summer project”, 9 June 2020,see https://www.postandcourier.com/business/ex-sce-g-official-will-cooperate-as-witness-in-criminal-probe-of-failed-vc-summer/
article_e8a99396-aa4d-11ea-bcb3-77378b75c486.html, accessed 6 July 2020.
796 - Ibidem.

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V.C. Summer project.797 The termination of the V.C. Summer reactor project and revelations
about years of cover-ups by SCANA led to the collapse of the company’s stock value which wasa factor in the takeover by Dominion. Dominion officials do not have to admit to fraud or false
pretenses of their former buyout as part of the settlement.
The cancellation of the V.C. Summer project adds to the history of 40 other stranded nuclear
reactor projects in the United States whose construction started in the 1970s and which wereabandoned between 1977 and 1989.

Securing Subsidies to Prevent Closures
As WNISR has reported in recent years, utilities have been actively lobbying for state legislationand contracts that would provide significant financial support for their reactor operations(for details see Table 10 and WNISR2018 Annex 4). As of 1 July 2020, legislation in five states(Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Ohio) had been enacted, which in total
provide state subsidies to 13 reactors at ten nuclear plants. All of these five state states have
unbundled, retail-choice electricity markets, where generators do not receive cost recovery
from state regulatory commissions. These account for 9 percent of the utility-scale generating
capacity in those five states and 13 percent of the U.S. nuclear generating capacity.798
Central to the future of nuclear power in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
Interconnection LLC (PJM) wholesale electricity market are the rules expected to be proposedby the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).799 In June 2018, FERC invalidated
the PJM market rules.800 The FERC order relates to how the PJM sets the price of capacity it
procures through its capacity market, known as the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM). They
will affect how state subsidies, including ZECs, will be considered in the wholesale market. At
issue is whether the subsidies being received by utilities for their nuclear plants will be factored
into the capacity auction pricing. As reported in WNISR, much of the legislation passed in
the five states has been Zero Emission Credits or ZECs, which have evolved from small-scale
renewables to thousands of megawatts from larger nuclear units. FERC has noted that “Witheach such subsidy, the market becomes less grounded in fundamental principles of supply anddemand.”801797 - Class Action Lawsuit Center, “SCANA Corporation (NYSE: SCG) Now (NYSE:D) Shareholder Lawsuit Settlement”, 3 June 2020,see https://classactionlawsuitcenter.com/securities-settlements/scana-corporation-nyse-scg-now-nysed-shareholder-lawsuitsettlement/, accessed 6 July 2020.
798 - U.S. EIA, “Five states have implemented programs to assist nuclear power plants”, US. Energy Information Agency,
7 October 2019, see https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41534, accessed 7 July 2020.
799 - The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission ofnatural gas, oil, and electricity. FERC also regulates natural gas and hydropower projects.
800 - Sonal Patel, “FERC Nixes PJM’s Fixes for Capacity Market Besieged by Subsidized Resources”, POWER Magazine, 5 July 2018,see https://www.powermag.com/ferc-nixes-pjms-fixes-for-capacity-market-besieged-by-subsidized-resources/?printmode=1,
accessed 7 July 2020
801 - FERC, “Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions, Granting In Part And Denying In Part Complaint, And Instituting Proceeding
Under Section 206 Of The Federal Power Act”, Docket Nos. EL16-49-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, issued 29 June 2018,see https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20180629212349-EL16-49-000.pdf, accessed 30 May 2019.

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Table 10 · U.S. State Emission Credits for Uneconomic Nuclear Reactors 2016–2019 (asof 1 July 2020)
Permanent Closure
State

Illinois

Utility

ExelonReactors

New York

Ohio

Value

Legal Status

Illinois Future Energy Jobs
Act passed by legislature– June 2016

US$16.50/MWh(US$200 million
a year)ZEC Upheld in
Court(a)Likely to berepealed

Legislature passed –April 2018 (reactors with
operating license through2030 only)

US$300 million ayear(b)Legal challenge
filed(c)Likely to berepealed

Eligible
Senate Zero Carbon Procurement Act approved
by Governor November
2017(d)

US$330 million
a yearN/A

NYPSC Clean EnergyStandard ZEC passed in2016

US$482 million
2018–2019;
US$8 billion
2017–2029

N/A

Legislation passed as of
27 July 2019

US$150 million per
year

N/A

Planning
StatusClinton-1

June 2017

Repealed

Quad Cities-1 & -2

June 2018

Repealed

PSEG/Exelon

Salem-1 & -2

Threatened by
2019

PSEG

Hope Creek

Threatened by
2019

Dominion

Millstone-2 & -3

Threatened –no dateRepealed

ExelonFitzpatrickThreatened

Likely to berepealed

Ginna

Threatened

Likely to berepealed

Nine Mile Point-1

Threatened

Likely to berepealed

Davis Besse

May 2020

Perry

May 2021

New Jersey

Connecticut

Status of Emissions
Credit Legislation

Planned
Date

EntergyFirstEnergy

Repealed (e)Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes:
PSEG: Public Service Enterprise Group; ZEC: Zero Emission Credits; NYPSC: New York State Department of Public Service.
a - See Pamela King, “The fight’s not over yet on state nuclear credits”, E&ENews, 16 April 2019, see https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060166933.
b – Christen Smith, “NJ Approves $300M ZECs for Salem, Hope Creek Nukes”, RTO Insiders, 19 April 2019,see https://rtoinsider.com/nj-approves-zecs-nukes-114741/, accessed 15 July 2019.

c – Talia Buford, “New Jersey’s $300 Million Nuclear Power Bailout Is Facing a Court Challenge. Does It Have a Chance?”, ProPublica, 16 May 2019,see https://www.propublica.org/article/new-jerseys-300-million-nuclear-power-bailout-is-facing-a-court-challenge-does-it-have-a-chance,
accessed 13 July 2019.
d - Robert Walton, “Dominion threatens Millstone closure if plant shut out of support program”, Utility Dive, 10 July 2018,see https://www.utilitydive.com/news/dominion-threatens-millstone-closure-if-plant-shut-out-of-support-program/527364/, accessed 12 July 2018.
e - First Energy has announced that it will begin the process to rescind the deactivation orders for its Perry and Davis-Besse reactors. See FirstEnergy
Solutions, “FirstEnergy Solutions Applauds Enactment of HB6 Legislation”, 24 July 2019.

In December 2019, FERC released an order802 directing PJM803 to significantly expand its
minimum offer price rule (MOPR) to mitigate the impacts of state-subsidized resources on
the capacity market. The ruling has the potential to undermine renewable energy development
and as such is likely to be legally challenged by renewable energy industry associations andenvironmental groups, which are particularly concerned about the ruling’s de-facto support
for continued fossil fuel use.804 It was utilities with significant nuclear capacity that were most
802 - FERC, “Order Establishing Just And Reasonable Rate”, United States Of America Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket
Nos. EL16-49000 and EL18-178-000, 169 FERC 61,239, issued 19 December 2019, see https://www.pjm.com/-/media/documents/ferc/
orders/2019/20191219-el16-46-000-el18-178-000.ashx, accessed 7 July 2020.
803 - Adam Keech, “Capacity Market Minimum Offer Price Rule Order”, Vice President of Market Operations, Market Implementation
Committee, PJM, 8 January 2020, see https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/2020/20200108/20200108item-04a-ferc-order-on-mopr.ashx, accessed 7 July 2020.
804 - Jeff St. John, “FERC Denies Rehearings on PJM Capacity Orders, in a Blow to States’ Renewables Plans”, GreenTechMedia,
16 April 2020, see https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ferc-denies-rehearings-on-its-pjm-capacity-rulings-opening-doorfor-legal-challenges, accessed 7 July 2020.

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concerned by the FERC ruling. Dependent on capacity market revenues, ZECs or equivalent,
exist in Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Ohio and provide state subsidies toreactors. A total of nearly 8,000 MW of capacity exists in these states.
The long-expected FERC order did not offer an exemption for existing nuclear plants thatcurrently receive state support. The FERC decision would require nuclear plants receiving
state zero-emission credits and much other subsidized resources, including energy procured
through a state renewable portfolio standard, to bid their capacity into PJM without factoringin the subsidies. That could raise their capacity market bid price leading to them to fail toclear the auction and thereafter stop receiving capacity market fees. Nuclear plants would
have to bid into the capacity market at their net Avoidable Cost Rate (ACR), which equals apredetermined ACR, minus any expected net revenues from the energy and ancillary services
markets.805 The proposed ACR numbers (from 2018) show that nuclear had the highest possible
ACR value of any technology, at US$631/MW-day.806 If this number is set at a level too high,the result could be that the reactors do not clear the capacity market, with resulting risk ofclosure.807 As noted in an analysis by Resources for the Future, the FERC order also applies
to resources that are eligible to receive state subsidies, which potentially means reactors thatcurrently do not receive state financing.808
Exelon, the largest nuclear reactor operator in the U.S. called the FERC decision “stunning”,
and that “by granting the request of fossil generators, this order completely undermines stateclean and renewable energy programs and will cost thousands of jobs, increase air pollution
and unnecessarily raise electricity bills by US$2.4 billion annually”.809
The complex impact of the FERC ruling has been to raise questions over the future of the PJM
capacity market, with the possibility of states deciding to withdraw from the regional market.
At the very least, legal challenges to the ruling have already been filed, by state regulators,
industry groups and environmental organizations. In one filing, the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC), Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, and the Union of Concerned
Scientists are challenging FERC over its de-facto bailout of coal and gas power plants at theexpense of state clean energy policies.810

805 - Kathryne Cleary, “What the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) Means for Clean Energy in PJM”, Resources, 21 January 2020,see https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/what-minimum-offer-price-rule-mopr-means-clean-energy-pjm/#:~:text=In%20
December%202019%2C%20the%20Federal,resources%20on%20the%20capacity%20market, accessed 7 July 2020.
806 - Ibidem.
807 - Ibidem.
808 - Ibidem
809 - Exelon, “Exelon Statement on FERC’s Minimum Offer Price Rule Order”, 19 December 2019, see https://www.exeloncorp.com/
newsroom/media-statement-on-ferc-mopr, accessed 7 July 2020; and Nucleonics Week, “Subsidized resources face challenges in Eastern
capacity markets: analysts”, 9 January 2020.
810 - PowerMag, “Mixed Reactions to FERC’s Recent MOPR Order from Power Generators”, 26 December 2019,see https://www.powermag.com/mixed-reactions-to-fercs-recent-mopr-order-from-power-generators/; andUtility Dive, “Broad array of groups sue FERC over PJM MOPR decision as Chatterjee rejects cost, renewable concerns”, 27 April 2020,see https://www.utilitydive.com/news/broad-array-of-groups-sue-ferc-over-pjm-mopr-decision-as-chatterjee-rejects/576478/;
and EarthJustice, “FERC Sued over Unlawful Rule That Props Up Gas, Coal Plants”, 21 April 2020,see https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2020/ferc-sued-over-unlawful-rule-that-props-up-gas-coal-plants, all accessed 7 July 2020.

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The U.S. Energy Information Agency reported in autumn 2019 that additional state support
will likely only apply to about 30 percent of the U.S. nuclear fleet, or those plants located inretail-choice or wholesale power markets.811
While efforts to secure ZEC legislation stalled in Pennsylvania, the decision by the state
Governor to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has led to a decision toreverse the decision to close the Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2. Plant owner Energy Harbor
Corp. notified the PJM Interconnection grid operator that it would rescind its March 2018
deactivation notices. The reactors were owned previously by Energy Solutions which had
filed for bankruptcy in 2018. Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 were scheduled to close in May andOctober 2021. The RGGI is a cap-and-trade program to limit carbon dioxide emissions frompower plants. “The decision to rescind the deactivations for Beaver Valley was largely driven by
the efforts of Governor Wolf’s administration to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative...
and will begin to help level the playing field for our carbon-free nuclear generators” and will
help it market “carbon free energy” to customers”, said Energy Harbor President and Chief
Executive Officer John Judge on 13 March 2020.812 Analysis in October 2019 reported that a
carbon price of US$3 to US$5 per ton would be enough to keep nuclear plants in Pennsylvania
economically viable for the foreseeable future.813 Carbon allowances were sold at US$5.65
per ton in the RGGI’s most recent quarterly auction.814 The states that are in the RGGI are
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, Vermont and New Jersey; Virginia in early 2020 passed a law that paves the way for it
to join.

Conclusions and Prospects for Nuclear Power in an Election YearThe nuclear power issue in the U.S. remains centered around the relentless efforts of theindustry and their supporters to gain financial assistance for lifetime extensions of theirageing reactor fleet, increasingly struggling in a competitive electricity market with low prices,
flat consumption (at best) and ferocious rivals in the renewable energy sector. These efforts,
as of July 2020, are currently suffering a severe backlash with the massive corruption scandal
involving key industry and political leaders unfolding in the state of Ohio. This is likely tolead not only to the reversal of large subsidies that had been allocated to the involved nuclear
utilities but also has the potential to cascade to other states and undermine similar efforts tosecure financing.

811 - Ibidem.
812 - State Impact Pennsylvania, “Owners of Pa.’s Beaver Valley nuclear power station will keep it open because of state’s climateplan”, 13 March 2020, see https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2020/03/13/owners-of-pa-s-beaver-valley-nuclear-power-stationwill-keep-it-open-because-of-states-climate-plan/, accessed 6 July 2020; and DailyEnergyInsider, “Energy Harbor Corp rescinds
deactivation of Beaver Valley nuclear power facility”, 18 March 2020, see https://dailyenergyinsider.com/news/24695-energy-harborcorp-rescinds-deactivation-of-beaver-valley-nuclear-power-facility/, accessed 25 July 2020.
813 - Resources for the Future, “Options for Issuing Emissions Allowances in a Pennsylvania Carbon Pricing Policy”, 21 October 2019,see https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/options-issuing-emissions-allowances-pennsylvania-carbon-pricing-policy/,
accessed 6 July 2020.
814 - PowerMag, “Pennsylvania Move to Join RGGI May Save Nuclear Plant”, 15 March 2020,see https://www.powermag.com/pennsylvania-move-to-join-rggi-may-save-nuclear-plant/, accessed 6 July 2020.

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The other industry focus is the desperate attempt to complete the construction of the two
AP1000 units at the Vogtle site that has been struggling for years with delays and cost overruns,
and now was hit by the COVID-19 pandemic (see Nuclear Power in the Age of COVID-19).
Finally, there is some industry hope for generous federal support for various programs aiming
at the development of a set of new reactor types and for a rapid move into practical realizations.
However, considering the difficulties the industry has been illustrating in delivering the first
couple of so-called Generation III reactors and the past history of failed efforts to get a newgeneration of “advanced reactor designs” off the ground, the outlook for a significant shift tosuccess is rather bleak.
The immediate prospects for nuclear power in the coming few years are unlikely to change asa result of the Presidential election in November 2020. While there are differences in degrees
of support for nuclear power between the Republican and Democratic Parties, in reality there
has been bi-partisan support for some form of nuclear power amongst the leading Members of
the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate. Policy on nuclear energy in both chambersof Congress is not generally a point of division between the two parties. There are active
supporters as well as critics in both parties. The fact that nuclear energy retains politicalsupport within the leadership of both parties is a reflection of the continuing influence of thenuclear industry at state level and in Washington DC.
In March 2020, the U.S. Senate voted on the American Energy Innovation Act of 2020,
proposed as bi-partisan bill and the first comprehensive update to U.S. energy policy since2008. While supporting renewable energy development, the proposed legislation also backed
advanced nuclear power, as well as gas fracking and new oil extraction. Despite being proposedby leading Republicans and Democrats in the Senate, it failed to secure sufficient votes.
Potentially more significant to the prospects of nuclear power in the U.S. is the Nuclear Energy
Leadership Act (NELA) (H.R. 3306). Some of its key provisions include providing for at least
two advanced nuclear reactor demonstration projects to be completed by the end of 2025
and revising federal energy contracting authority so the Government can enter into Power
Purchase Agreements for up to 40 years, which in the words of Democratic House member
Luria, would be “better reflecting the length of time that nuclear power offers a return on
investment.” NELA, included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(NDAA, S 4049) by Senate Republican Lisa Murkowski and Democrat Cory Booker, was passed
in July 2020, but it remains unclear whether it will be included in final legislation to be voted
on by both House and Senate.
Similarly, in legislation passed in July 2020 by the Democrat-controlled House ofRepresentatives, the Appropriations Committee approved fiscal year 2021 spending legislation
for the Department of Energy (DOE). The legislation, if approved in the Senate, would provide
billions of dollars in one-time “emergency” funding to DOE, citing a need to support economic
recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. For the Office of Nuclear Energy, the bill includes
US$700 million for its new Advanced Reactor Demonstration program, US$192 million for
its Advanced SMR program, US$100 million for integrated hydrogen-nuclear demonstration
projects, and US$125 million for recapitalization of the Advanced Test Reactor at Idaho National
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long-term operation of the Davis-Besse reactors, including the recent DOE program to install
an electrolysis unit at the plant to demonstrate hybrid hydrogen energy production.
The consequences of the potential defeat for Donald J Trump in the November 2020 Presidential
elections and a victory for Democratic Party candidate Joseph Biden cannot be considered insimple terms as a downside for the prospects of nuclear power in the U.S. Presidential hopeful
Joe Biden’s US$2 trillion clean energy plan, designed to achieve a carbon emissions-free energy
sector by 2035, includes keeping existing nuclear energy plants in operation. The plan itself ismore circumspect on what it actually means for continued operation of reactors in the U.S. In
the section on the future of nuclear energy, Biden’s plan states support for “advanced nuclear”
and SMRs, but without providing any details. Support for nuclear is framed in the context ofclimate change “to address the climate emergency threatening our communities, economy,
and national security, we must look at all low- and zero-carbon technologies”. That’s why
Biden will support a research agenda to look at issues ranging from cost to safety to waste
disposal systems, that remain an ongoing challenge with nuclear power today. Biden alsoplans to establish an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) with the aim of securing a
100%-clean-energy target, based upon technologies including, “small modular nuclear reactors
at half the construction cost of today’s reactors.” Given the many obstacles that are likely toprevent such economics for SMRs, it remains unclear what this actually means in the realworld.

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FUKUSHIMA STATUS REPORTINTRODUCTION
More than nine years have passed since the Fukushima accident occurred in March 2011 andthe situation onsite is still not stabilized. Since WNISR2019, the medium- and long-term
roadmap was revised again. Plans to retrieve more spent nuclear fuel and molten fuel debris
have been further delayed. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Government statethat storage capacity for contaminated water will reach capacity in 2022, while a government
appointed panel recommended the release of the water into the environment.
Most of the remaining evacuation orders have not been lifted, and the return rate of evacuatedresidents has remained very low.

ONSITE CHALLENGES

815

Current Status of Each Reactor
Water injection into the reactor pressure vessels of Units 1 to 3, which all contain fuel debris,is still ongoing. The temperature of the lower part of the reactor pressure vessel and thecontainment vessel is maintained at about 15–20 °C. The temperature in the spent fuel storage
pool is kept at about 17–23 °C.816 The air dose-levels of radiation have been mostly 10 μSv/hor less on the power plant site as a whole817, but the levels are much higher near the reactor
buildings; for example, in January 2020, the dose level between Units 3 and 4 was 1.7 mSv/h,
170 times higher than the site average.818 Inside the building, for example at a location on the
2nd floor of Unit 1, levels of 280 mSv/h or higher were recorded.819
The removal of spent nuclear fuel from the pool at Unit 3 (a total of 566 fuel assemblies) started
on 15 April 2019. As of March 2020, only 119 assemblies had been removed, while Units 1 and 2
have not got beyond the preparatory stage.
In September 2019, it was decided to start retrieving fuel debris with Unit 2,820 as it wasdetermined that Unit 2 was easier to access due to the unit’s relatively low dose levels. The
retrieved fuel debris will be put in storage cans and temporarily stored in a dry state. According
815 - In this section, unless indicated otherwise, the following reference is used: Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasuresfor Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment, “Summary of Decommissioning and Contaminated Water
Management”, METI, 27 March 2020, see https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/mp202003.pdf,
accessed 27 April 2020.
816 - Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment, “Plant parameters of
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant”, Undated (in Japanese), see https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/committee/osensuitaisakuteam/2020/03/1-1.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
817 - TEPCO, “Fukushima Daiichi Ground Survey Map (for March 5 and 6, 2020)”, March 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/data/surveymap/pdf/2020/f1-sv-20200326-j.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
818 - TEPCO, “Fukushima Daiichi Survey Map (March 2020)”, March 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/data/surveymap/pdf/2020/f1-sv-20200326-j.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
819 - TEPCO, “About air dose rate in the building (Unit 1, 1 January 2019–31 December 2019)”, 3 April 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/data/surveymap/pdf/2020/sv-u1-20200403-j.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
820 - Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation, “Technical Strategic Plan 2019 forthe Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.”,
9 September 2019, see http://www.dd.ndf.go.jp/en/strategic-plan/book/20191101_SP2019eFT.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.

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to TEPCO’s action plan, the removal will start during 2021.821 Furthermore, according
to TEPCO, the total amount allocated for this limited debris retrieval work is ¥1.37 trillion(US$1.28 billion822).823
In December 2019, the fourth revision of the medium- and long-term roadmap fordecommissioning was published;824 it reported that more than 4,650 fuel assemblies (mainly
spent fuel, incl. around 8 percent fresh fuel) or roughly 790 tons are still stored in the pools825
and that the timing of removal from the pools of Units 1 and 2 was delayed by 4–5 years and
1–3 years respectively. However, the goal to complete the decommissioning process between
2041 and 2051 was maintained (see Table 11).
Table 11 · Fukushima Decommissioning: Evolution of the Medium- and Long-Term Roadmap

Fuel removal fromspent fuel pools

Fuel debris retrieval

2019 edition2017 edition

2015 edition

Start of fuel removal from Unit 1

FY2027-FY2028

Around FY2023

FY2020Start of fuel removal from Unit 2

FY2024-FY2026

Around FY2023

FY2020Start of fuel removal from Unit 3[Started April 2019]

Mid-FY2018

FY2017

Completion of nuclear fuel removal
for Units 1–6

During 2031——

Determination of fuel debris retrieval
methods for each unit——

Around two years
from now

Determination of fuel debris retrieval
methods for the first scheduled unit—

FY2019First half of FY2018

Start of fuel debris retrieval at the firstscheduled unit

During 2021

During 2021

During 2021

Sources: Compiled by the author based on the following materials: Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water and Decommissioning Issues,“Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, 2015, 2017 and 2019 editions.

Contaminated Water Management
TEPCO has continued to employ a variety of countermeasures against the further increaseof contaminated water, including frozen soil walls, land-side impermeable walls,826 andthe pumping of groundwater.827 Despite this, the company has not been able to prevent thefurther generation of contaminated water. The amount of contaminated water generated
was about 180 m3/day on average in FY2019, which is higher than the 170 m3/day in FY2018(it was about 470 m³/day in FY2014 before taking measures). The new roadmap set a target of821 - TEPCO, “Medium- to Long-Term Decommissioning Execution Plan 2020”, 27 March 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/information/newsrelease/reference/pdf/2020/1h/rf_20200327_1.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
822 - Exchange rate is US$1 = ¥107, as of May 2020.
823 - TEPCO, “Consolidated financial forecasts for FY2019”, 30 March 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.tepco.co.jp/press/release/2020/pdf1/200330j0301.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
824 - Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water and Decommissioning Issues, “Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards theDecommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, 27 December 2019,see https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20191227_3.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
825 - Fuel assemblies stored in each pool: 392 for Unit 1, 615 for Unit 2, 447 for Unit 3, 0 for Unit 4, 1,542 for Unit 5, 1,654 for Unit 6.
See Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment, “Summary of
Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Management”, 27 March 2020, see https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/mp202003.pdf, accessed 27 April 2020.
826 - An ice wall is made by circulating a refrigerant at approximately –30 °C) in the piping buried underground to freeze the soil
containing groundwater.
827 - Generic term for water contaminated with radioactive substances such as seawater injected at the time of the accident andgroundwater flowing into the building basements.

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150 m3/day by 2020 and 100 m3/day by 2025. A total of 62 radionuclides were targeted forremoval, including Strontium-90. The technology used however, did not perform as claimed
by TEPCO. Consequently, in 2018 TEPCO admitted that 80 percent of the contaminated water
would have to undergo further processing to reduce concentrations of radionuclides such as
strontium and iodine. TEPCO has not deployed any technology for tritium removal.
The contaminated water continues to be stored on site. The current storage tank plan has a capacity of 1.37 million m3 and is expected to be saturated by
the end of 2022.828 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) spent three years
discussing the treatment of tritiated water not only from a technical point of view but also
from a social point of view such as reputational damage. The ministry’s final report, publishedin February 2020, presented two possibilities: diluting the tritiated water and releasing it into
the ocean or converting it into steam and releasing it into the atmosphere. The report said
that both methods may cause reputational damage, so the Government should take prompt
action.829 Recommended measures include the following:ɆɆ Radionuclides other than tritium should be treated by secondary purification.
ɆɆ The starting time of disposal, disposal volume, period for disposal, and levels ofconcentration at the time of disposal should be determined appropriately, taking into
account the opinions of the parties concerned.
ɆɆ Efforts to strengthen monitoring of the surrounding environment and to disclose themonitoring results in an easy-to-understand manner are important.
ɆɆ Risk communication measures to convey information accurately as well as countermeasures
to prevent, neutralize, and compensate the reputational damage should be enlarged andstrengthened.830
The IAEA has also stated that both of the water management options would be technicallyfeasible and has advised that “a decision (…) must be taken urgently, engaging all stakeholders”.831
TEPCO has published a draft proposal based on METI’s position.832 According to the company,
as of March 2020, the number of tanks is 979, the storage capacity is about 1.19 million m3 , andthe total amount of tritium is about 860 trillion becquerels.833 TEPCO argued that no matter
which option the company selects, it will adopt a method that does not release a large amount828 - TEPCO, “Regarding our draft proposal in response to the Report of the Subcommittee on the Handling of the ALPS Treated
Water”, 24 March 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/progress/watertreatment/images/200324.pdf,
accessed 4 May 2020.
829 - Subcommittee on Handling of the ALPS Treated Water, “The Subcommittee on Handling of the ALPS Treated Water Report”,
Provisional Translation, METI, 10 February 2020, see https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/
pdf/20200210_alps.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
830 - Ibidem, p.51–52.
831 - IAEA, “IAEA Follow-up Review of Progress Made on Management of ALPS Treated Water and the Report of the Subcommittee on
Handling of ALPS treated water at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, Review Report to the Government of Japan,
2 April 2020, see https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/4fu-report.pdf.
832 - TEPCO, “Regarding our draft proposal in response to the Report of the Subcommittee on the Handling of the ALPS Treated
Water”, 24 March 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/progress/watertreatment/images/200324.pdf,
accessed 4 May 2020.
833 - If the amount of tritium released into the seawater before the Fukushima accident is assumed as 2 trillion Bq per year, it meansthat 430 years’ worth of tritium is currently stored.

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at any one time, guided by the conventional concentration limit (5 Bq/L in the atmosphere, or
60,000 Bq/L in seawater).
The proposal to release the contaminated water into the environment has generated substantial
opposition, extending from within Fukushima, including LDP controlled municipalities,834
to wider civil society in Japan, as well as overseas from the Governments of the Republic ofKorea835 and China.836 In May 2020, four UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs raised theirconcerns over the implications for Fukushima citizens and the wider community.837 A decisionby the Government and a corresponding legislative proposal is expected in late 2020.838

Worker Exposure
TEPCO claims to have enough workers for decommissioning, but in reality, there are many
challenges. The decommissioning work relies heavily on subcontractors, for example, asof March 2020, of the 6,978 decommissioning workers, only 917 (13 percent) were TEPCO
employees while 6,061 (87 percent) are employees of subcontractors. Moreover, the maximum
effective dose of external exposure in March 2020 was limited to 1.86 mSv for TEPCO
employees but a dose almost eight times higher of 14.28 mSv was allowed for employees ofpartner companies.839
TEPCO actually seems to be lacking manpower. The company had expressed the idea of
accepting “special skill foreign workers” for decommissioning work. However, this schemeof the Japanese Government is designed to allow foreigners to work in industries with labor
shortages in Japan, such as the construction industry and agriculture, and does not include
work that involves exposure to radiation. In the end, TEPCO withdrew this plan in May 2019
after the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) intervened.840
The MHLW is still conducting the epidemiological study of about 20,000 workers who were
exposed to 100 mSv at the time of the Fukushima accident. However, according to a report
released in March 2019, the survey had encountered difficulties due to the lack of participating
834 - Fukushima Minpo, “Fukushima localities speak out against dumping radioactive water in sea”, as published by The Japan
Times, 17 July 2020, see https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/17/national/fukushima-assemblies-radioactive-water/,accessed 20 July 2020.
835 - Mi Ock Mun, “Statement”, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Science and ICT Head Delegate of the Republic of Korea, 63rd
IAEA General Conference, 19 September 2019, see https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/09/gc63-korea-republic-of.pdf,
accessed 20 July 2020.
836 - Greenpeace East Asia, “China, Korea and Chile challenge Japan over Fukushima contaminated water crisis at United Nations
maritime meeting”, 15 November 2019, see https://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/press/2698/china-korea-and-chile-challenge-japanover-fukushima-contaminated-water-crisis-at-united-nations-maritime-meeting/, accessed 20 July 2020.
837 - MOFA, “Response to the Joint Communication from four UN Special Rapporteurs from the Government of Japan concerning
ALPS treated water at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 12 June 2020,see https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/hr_ha/page4e_001067.html; and Kyodo News, “U.N. experts urge Japan not to rush discharge ofradioactive water”, 9 June 2020, see https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/06/6f6afd14d6a4-un-experts-urge-japan-not-to-rushdischarge-of-radioactive-water.html, both accessed 20 July 2020.
838 - Kahoku, “Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant’s Treated Water Disposal Law Decided to be delayed after autumn”,
25 June 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.kahoku.co.jp/special/spe1090/20200625_01.html.
839 - TEPCO, “Evaluation of the exposure dose of workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, 24 April 2020
(in Japanese), see https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/information/newsrelease/exposure/pdf/2020/exposure_20200424-j.pdf,
accessed 4 May 2020.
840 - TEPCO, “Response to the notification from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare about thoroughly ensuring theoccupational safety and health of foreign workers at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”, 22 May 2019 (in Japanese),see https://www.tepco.co.jp/press/news/2019/1515153_8967.html, accessed 4 May 2020.

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subjects, and the researchers had not been able to reach a conclusion. Of the 19,808 study
subjects, only 7,270 (36.7 percent) participated in the study; 3,334 (16.8 percent) refused toparticipate, 6,976 (35.2 percent) did not reply, and the address information were unavailable
for 1,828 (9.2 percent).841 These figures are almost the same as those of the previous fiscal year.

OFFSITE CHALLENGES
Current Status of Evacuation and Legal Claims
As of 6 April 2020, 38,658 Fukushima residents were still living as evacuees (7,915 are living
within the prefecture, 30,730 are living outside the prefecture, and 13 are missing).842 This
number has hardly changed compared to the previous fiscal year. According to Fukushima
Prefecture, the peak level of evacuees was 164,865 (May 2012). 843
Little progress has been made since WNISR2019 in lifting evacuation orders.844 The only recent
lifting of an evacuation order, in March 2020, was for a small part of the remaining Zone
in Preparation for Lifting the Evacuation Order.845846 In areas where evacuation orders havealready been lifted, the number of returnees is still not increasing significantly. For example,
the return rate is 1.8 percent in Okuma Town (the location of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant), where the evacuation order was partially lifted in April 2019, and 7.5 percent in
Tomioka Town, where the evacuation order was partially lifted in April 2017.847
According to the Reconstruction Agency, the earthquake-related deaths848 caused by the2011 Great East Japan Earthquake are only prominent in Fukushima Prefecture. As of
September 2019, the number of such deaths in Japan was 3,739 of which 2,286 (61 percent of thetotal) were in Fukushima Prefecture, an increase of 14 deaths from the previous fiscal year.849

841 - Radiation Effects Research Foundation, “Comprehensive Research Report of the Epidemiological Study on the TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Emergency Workers”, MHLW, March 2019 (in Japanese), see https://www.news.johas.go.jp/
hp/pdf/report_h30.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
842 - Fukushima Disaster Measures Headquarters, “Immediate report on damage caused by the 2011 Tohoku Region Pacific Coast
Earthquake”, Report No. 1764, (in Japanese).
843 - Fukushima prefecture, “Steps for Revitalization Fukushima, December 25, 2018 edition”, 25 December 2018, p.3.
844 - The conditions for lifting an evacuation order are: 1. It is certain that the annual accumulated value (estimated value) of air
dose rate will be less than 20mSv, 2. Recovery of infrastructure (electricity, gas, etc.) and life services (medical, postal, etc.) essential
for daily life. Decontamination of children’s living environment and so on will sufficiently progress, 3. Sufficient consultation withprefectures, municipalities and residents. See METI, “Requirements for lifting an evacuation order”, December 2011 (in Japanese),see https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/kinkyu/hinanshiji/2017/pdf/0310_01e.pdf, accessed 1 May 2019.
845 - The area where it is certain that annual accumulated value will be less than 20mSv one year after the accident.
846 - METI, “Lifting of evacuation orders in Futaba, Okuma and Tomioka: Conceptual diagram of evacuation zones”,
Undated (in Japanese), see https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/kinkyu/hinanshiji/2020/maruni200117gainennzu.pdf,
accessed 4 May 2020.
847 - Reconstruction Agency, “Results of the Survey on the Intentions of Residents in the Nuclear Accident-affected Local
Municipalities”, Summary, 19 March 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/
ikoucyousa/200319_ikouchousa_zentai_gaiyou.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
848 - In comparison to deaths due to direct damages caused by the tsunami or earthquake, deaths due to indirect damages (such as
poor physical condition or stress) that occur as a result of living as an evacuee following the disaster.
849 - Reconstruction Agency, “Number of deaths of earthquake related death”, 27 December 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-6/20191227_kanrenshi.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.

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TEPCO continues its compensation policy. As of 24 April 2020, the total amount paid out wasapproximately ¥9.5 trillion (US$95 billion).850 However, there are still many group complaints
against the level of compensation and TEPCO continues to refuse to pay some proposed
settlements and consequently the number of lawsuits by residents is increasing. For example, inMarch 2020, in a lawsuit filed by 216 residents of Fukushima Prefecture seeking compensation,
the High Court ordered TEPCO to pay a total of ¥610 million (US$5.6 million)—which wasless than was being sought by the claimants but higher than in other court orders.851
In September 2019, the Tokyo District Court judge delivered the verdict in the criminal trial ofthree former TEPCO management members (former chairman and two former vice presidents)
accused of professional negligence resulting in injury or death. As a result, the three wereacquitted on the grounds that it is unclear whether they could have taken adequate measureseven if they could have predicted the tsunami.852 The ruling was widely condemned as flawed,
including its failure to consider the tsunami countermeasure options that TEPCO could havetaken prior to 2011, and the lawyers for the plaintiffs have filed an appeal to the Tokyo High
Court.853

Radiation Exposure and Health Effects
Fukushima Prefecture is still implementing examinations for thyroid cancer for people who
were under the age of 18 at the time of the accident.854 As of February 2020, there were 237 casesof malignancy or suspected malignancy and 187 cases of surgery855. These numbers can becompared to the data as of April 2019 with 212 cases of malignancy or suspected malignancy,
169 cases of surgery.856 Although the numbers of diagnosed cases and of performed operations
are increasing every year, the Fukushima Prefectural Health Survey Committee still has notrecognized a causal relationship between the occurrence of thyroid cancer and the Fukushima
accident. This may not be a sustainable position given emerging evidence of a statisticallysignificant relationship between radiation dose rates and cancer rates. For example, in 2019,a scientific study concluded: “The average radiation dose-rates in the 59 municipalities of the
Fukushima prefecture in June2011 and the corresponding thyroid cancer detection rates in the
period October 2011 to March 2016 show statistically significant relationships.”857
850 - TEPCO, “Requests and payments for nuclear damage compensation”, as of 24 April 2020 (in Japanese),see http://www.tepco.co.jp/fukushima_hq/compensation/results/, accessed 4 May 2020.
851 - JIJI Press, “Increased solatium payment, a 700-million-yen compensation order”, 12 March 2020 (in Japanese),see https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020031201338&g=soc, accessed 4 May 2020.
852 - BBC, “Fukushima disaster: Nuclear executives found not guilty”, 19 September 2019,see https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49750180, accessed 4 May 2020.
853 - Kaido Yuichi, “TEPCO Criminal Trial: Defendants Acquitted—Court Went Completely Out of its Way to Rescue TEPCO
Executives”, CNIC, 7 October 2019, see https://cnic.jp/english/?p=4580, accessed 21 July 2020.
854 - Office of International Cooperation, “Radiation Medical Science Center for the Fukushima Health Management Survey”.
855 - Fukushima Prefecture, “Status of thyroid examination results”, 37th Prefectural Oversight Committee Meeting for Fukushima
Health Management Survey, 13 February 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/369448.pdf,
accessed 4 May 2020.
856 - Fukushima Prefecture, “Status of thyroid examination results”, 34th Prefectural Oversight Committee Meeting for Fukushima
Health Management Survey, 8 April 2019 (in Japanese), see https://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/320844.pdf.
857 - Hidehiko Yamamoto, Keiji Hayashi and Hagen Scherb, “Association between the detection rate of thyroid cancer and theexternal radiation dose-rate after the nuclear power plant accidents in Fukushima, Japan”, Observational Study, Medicine, Vol
98:37(e17165), 2019, see https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6750239/pdf/medi-98-e17165.pdf, accessed 5 August 2020.

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Food Contamination
Of 266,424 food samples tested for contamination nationwide in FY2020, 157 food items
exceeded the legal limits858 (FY2019: 313 food items).859 Among the 29 cases detected in
Fukushima Prefecture, 20 cases were detected in wild birds and meats (boar, deer and bear).
Currently, there are still some difficulties for the food export industry. Of the 54 countries
that started import restrictions after the Fukushima accident in 2011, as of March 2020,
34 countries have lifted all restrictions, but 20 countries (23 as of April 2019) are still imposing
some restrictions.860 Among the countries suspending food imports from Japan, as of 2019,
Hong Kong is the region with the highest export value at ¥203.7 billion (US$2 billion).861

Decontamination862, 863
Decontamination of the Special Decontamination Area864 in Fukushima Prefecture directly
managed by the Japanese Government was completed in March 2018, and decontaminationof designated areas (agricultural fields, along roads, around houses, etc.) in municipalities
including the rest of Fukushima Prefecture865 was completed in March 2017. These programs
did not cover difficult-to-return zones and did not cover mountainous forested areas whichmake up more than 70 percent of Fukushima prefecture.866
Meanwhile, the management of the decontamination waste generated by these projects hasturned into a major issue. The contaminated soil in the temporary storage area in Fukushima
Prefecture is currently being transferred to intermediate storage facilities867 in eight areas. As
of June 2020, the total amount transferred was 7.81 million m3 out of a total of 14 million m3 .
Thus, around 56 percent of the total has been shipped.868, 869 The sorting and storage activities

858 - The standard value established by the MHLW: The level of radioactive cesium is 100 Bq/kg for food, 10 Bq/kg for drinking water,
50 Bq/kg for milk, and 50 Bq/kg for infant food.
859 - MHLW, “Public inspection result FY 2019—outline (preliminary value)”, as of 30 March 2020 (in Japanese).
860 - Food Industry Affairs Bureau, “Status of countries and regions introduced import measures on Japanese foods after the TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident”, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, as of 2 March 2020, see https://www.maff.go.jp/j/export/e_info/pdf/kisei_gaiyo_en.pdf.
861 - Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, “Elimination and relaxation of food and other food import restrictions in foreigncountries and regions due to the nuclear accident”, as of 16 January 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.maff.go.jp/j/export/e_info/pdf/
teishi.pdf.
862 - Ministry of the Environment, “Environmental Remediation”, Undated, see http://josen.env.go.jp/en/, accessed 30 July 2020.
863 - Ministry of the Environment, “Off-site Environmental Remediation in Affected Areas in Japan”, March 2020, see http://josen.env.
go.jp/en/pdf/environmental_remediation_2003.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
864 - A high dose area within a 20 km radius of the power plant, located around the difficult-to-return zone.
865 - It covers all eight prefectures, including Fukushima Prefecture, except for the Special Decontamination Area managed by thegovernment.
866 - It is considered as an area where residence will be restricted well into the future. However, decontamination work to enable
residence is currently being carried out in some areas (Specified Restoration and Revitalization Base).
867 - Until final disposal, facilities store removed soil, waste, incinerated ash with levels exceeding 100,000 Bq/kg, etc. that weregenerated from decontamination activities in Fukushima Prefecture.
868 - Ministry of the Environment, “Off-site Environmental Remediation in Affected Areas in Japan”, 16 July 2020, see http://josen.env.
go.jp/en/pdf/environmental_remediation_2007.pdf, accessed 30 July 2020.
869 - With the volume of one flexible container bag being about 1 m3 , there are 14 million bags.

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have already started (see Figure 45).870 Picture 1 shows one of Okuma area’s receiving andsorting facilities. Black flexible container bags can be seen at the bottom of the photo. Picture 2
shows a soil storage facility which is vast but has a storage capacity of only about 180,000 m3 .
After 30 years of intermediate storage, the decontaminated soil is planned for final disposal
outside Fukushima Prefecture, but its location has not yet been determined.
Figure 45 · Receiving and Sorting Facility (Left) and Soil Storage Facility (Right), Okuma Town, Fukushima Prefecture

Source: Ministry of the Environment, 2020

Contaminated soil containing 8,000 Bq/kg or more871 in prefectures other than Fukushima
Prefecture must be kept as is by the respective administration. According to a calculation by
the Ministry of the Environment, for example, the 3,643 tons of contaminated soil in Ibaraki
Prefecture should decrease to just 0.6 tons (no typo) after processing.872 Firstly, cesium isseparated from contaminated soil by chemical treatment or heat treatment and recovered
with an adsorbent. After volume reduction, it will be stored in an intermediate storage facility
for 30 years. Finally, the soil will be transported to the final disposal site located outside theprefecture. However, volume reduction technology is still in the stage of verification andtesting.873
However, the remaining amount of the 135,333 tons of contaminated soil in Tochigi Prefecture
will still be 4,250 tons 15 years later.874

870 - Ministry of the Environment, “The situation of the intermediate storage facility project”, August 2019 (in Japanese),see http://josen.env.go.jp/chukanchozou/action/safety_commission/pdf/safety_commission_02_190828.pdf, accessed 4 May 2020.
871 - According to the Ministry of the Environment, if the level of contamination in the soil is 8,000 Bq/kg, the workers’ exposure dosewhen landfilling the incinerated ash will be lower than the dose limit of 1 mSv/year for public exposure recommended by the ICRP
(when working 1,000 hours per year––8 hours a day, 50 percent of 250 days per year working time––near incineration ash).
872 - We are not aware of any independent assessment of these spectacular volume reduction targets.
873 - JESCO, “Technology demonstration projects such as volume reduction of removed soil”, Japan Environmental Storage & Safety
Corporation, Undated (in Japanese), see http://www.jesconet.co.jp/interim/information/josenjissho.html.
874 - Ministry of the Environment, “Estimation of future radioactivity concentrations of designated wastes in 5 prefectures”,
Undated (in Japanese), see http://shiteihaiki.env.go.jp/initiatives_other/others_materials/pdf/others_materials_info_1602.pdf,
accessed 4 May 2020.

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CONCLUSION
Approaching ten years after 3/11, as of 1 July 2020, the work at Fukushima Daiichi remains in
the preparatory phase of decommissioning. That is critically important, essential, but it should
not be confused with actual decommissioning. The actual “decommissioning work” usually
starts after the removal of spent fuel. According to that definition, decommissioning has noteven begun, as spent fuel is still stored in three of the four reactor pools.
Furthermore, “evacuation” usually refers to removing people temporarily from a specificlocation in order to avoid danger. According to that definition, the current situation of tensof thousands of “evacuees” who have been deprived of a normal life for nearly ten years andfor many who will never return home is rather to be called near-permanent displacement. But
they remain under the status of evacuees. The Government’s policy of pressurized return tocontaminated areas is failing and has no prospect of success. The consequences of the ongoing nuclear disaster at Fukushima remain complex and serious.

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DECOMMISSIONINGSTATUS REPORT 2020
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Decommissioning Worldwide
Decommissioning nuclear power plants is an important element of the nuclear powersystem, and one that remains under-researched. The defueling, deconstruction, anddismantling—summarized by the term decommissioning—are the final steps in the life
cycle of a nuclear power plant (excluding waste management and disposal). The process istechnically complex and poses major challenges in terms of long-term planning, execution,and financing. Decommissioning was rarely considered in the reactor design, and the costs fordecommissioning at the end of the lifetime of a reactor were usually discounted away, and thus,
subsequently, largely ignored. However, as an increasing number of nuclear facilities either
reach the end of their operational lifetimes or are already closed, the challenges of reactor
decommissioning are coming to the fore, and also attract increasing public attention.
As of 1 July 2020, worldwide, there are 189 closed reactors totaling 84 GW of capacity. Since
WNISR2019, eight additional reactors (6.3 GW) have officially been closed: two in the U.S.
(Indian Point-2 and Three Mile Island-1), two in France (Fessenheim-1 and -2), one each inGermany (Philippsburg-2), Sweden (Ringhals-2), Switzerland (Mühleberg) and Taiwan(Chinshan-2). Of the closed units, 60 percent are located in Europe (90 in Western Europe and23 in Central and Eastern Europe), with nearly a quarter of closed units in North America (44)and one sixth in Asia (32). Almost four in five or 148 reactors used three technologies:
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) (32 percent or 60 units), Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs)(27 percent or 50 units), and Gas-Cooled Reactors (GCRs) (20 percent or 38 units). Of thelatter, the majority (27 units) are in the U.K.
Decommissioning plays an increasing role in nuclear politics, both in timing and production
process, and therefore financing. The number of reactors facing decommissioning will
increase significantly over the coming decade: assuming a 40-year average lifetime, a further
203 reactors will close by 2031 (reactors connected to the grid between 1980 and 1991); andan additional 122 will be closed by 2060; this does not even account for the 83 reactors whichstarted operating before 1980, an additional 31 reactors in Long-term Outage (LTO) and the
52 reactors under construction as of mid-2020.

Elements of National Decommissioning Policies
When analyzing decommissioning policies, one needs to distinguish between the processitself (in the sense of the actual implementation), and the financing of decommissioning. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines decommissioning as the administrative
and technical actions taken to allow the removal of some or all of the regulatory controls from

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a facility.875 The technical actions of the decommissioning process can generally be divided into
three main stages, which are briefly described hereunder (for more details, see WNISR2018).
ɆɆ The warm-up stage comprises the post-operational stage, the dismantling of systems
that are not needed for the decommissioning process. Also, the dismantling of higher
contaminated system parts begins. A key indicator for the progress of this stage is thedefueling of the reactor as it is crucial for further undertakings: defueling means removing
the spent fuel from the reactor core and the spent fuel pools.
ɆɆ The hot-zone stage comprises the dismantling activities in the hot zone, i.e. dismantlingof highly contaminated or activated parts, e.g. the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and theReactor Vessel Internals (RVI), the biological shield.
ɆɆ The ease-off stage comprises the removal of operating systems as well as decontaminationof the buildings. This stage ideally ends with the demolition of the buildings and site
remediation to the state of a greenfield. The completion of this stage defines the end of thetechnical decommissioning process.
Once the technical process is completed, final site survey and the necessary administrative
steps for the removal of the regulatory control of the facility are carried out. Depending on
the national regulatory framework, the site can be released as a greenfield or brownfield.
Brownfield use is allowed in some countries, which means that the buildings can continue
to be used for nuclear and other purposes. The license can also be reduced; this is the casein the U.S., where the license is reduced to only covering the remaining spent fuel storage
installations. With respect to financing, four main approaches are observable: Public budget,
external segregated fund, internal non-segregated fund, and internal segregated fund (formore details, see WNISR2018).

Overview of Reactors with Completed Decommissioning
As of the first quarter of 2020, 169 units are globally awaiting or in various stages ofdecommissioning, seven more than in the first quarter of 2019. Since WNISR2019, one
reactor finished the technical decommissioning process. In November 2019, EnergySolutions
announced the completion of the “physical work” at the La Crosse station.876 Final site
survey and license reduction to the independent spent fuel installation is currently plannedfor 2020.877 The 48-MW La Crosse plant was decommissioned 37 years after its closure. Thisfinished decommissioning project increased the total number of decommissioned reactors
from 19 to 20, with a total capacity of around 6 GW. This represents only 7 percent of the total
85 GW withdrawn from the grid.
Of the 20 decommissioned reactors, only 10 have been returned to greenfield sites. The average
duration of the decommissioning process, independent of the chosen strategy, is around20 years, with a very high variance: the minimum of six years for the 22-MW Elk River plant,
875 - IAEA, “IAEA Safety Glossary—Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection”, International Atomic Energy
Agency, June 2007, see http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1290_web.pdf, accessed 7 July 2020.
876 - NEI Magazine, “Physical work completed for decommissioning of US La Crosse NPP”, 14 November 2019, see https://www.
neimagazine.com/news/newsphysical-work-completed-for-decommissioning-of-us-la-crosse-npp-7508092, accessed 7 July 2020.
877 - NRC, “La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor”, Updated 19 November 2019, see https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/
power-reactor/lacrosse-boiling-water-reactor.html, accessed 7 July 2020.

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and the maximum of 42 years for the 17-MW CVTR (Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor), both in
the U.S.
The only countries to have completed the technical decommissioning process are the UnitedStates (14), Germany (5), and Japan (1). Some of the U.S. reactors are amongst the most
rapidly decommissioned. In Germany, the HDR (Heißdampfreaktor – a superheated steam
reactor) Großwelzheim was only on the grid for one year, but decommissioning lasted wellover 20 years. Gundremmingen-A and Würgassen have de facto completed the technicaldecommissioning process but, legally, cannot be released from regulatory control as buildings
are used for interim storage of wastes or conditioning work for operational units (in the case of
Gundremmingen).878 In Japan, the only reactor decommissioned was a small research reactor,
whereas none of the commercial reactors has yet been decommissioned.879 Figure 46 provides
the timelines of the 20 reactors that have completed the decommissioning process.
Figure 46 · Overview of Completed Reactor Decommissioning Projects, 1953–2020

Overview of Completed Reactor Decommissioning Projects, 1954-2020
in the U.S., Germany and Japan
United States
Shippingport
Yankee NPS
Elk River
Pathfinder
SaxtonCVTR
Big Rock Point
Lacrosse
Haddam Neck
Fort St. Vrain
Maine Yankee
Rancho Seco-1
TrojanShorehamGermany

VAK Kahl
Gundremmingen-A (KRB A)
HDR Grosswelzheim
Niederaichbach (KKN)
Wuergassen (KWW)

Japan

JPDR
1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010s

1954

2020
2020

Construction

OperatingDecommissioning© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes:
CVTR: Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor; HDR: Heißdampfreaktor/Boiling Water Reactor; KKN: Kernkraftwerk/Nuclear Power Station Niederaichbach;
KWW: Kernkraftwerk/Nuclear Power Station Würgassen; JPDR: Japan Power Demonstration Reactor.

878 - Ines Bredberg et al., “Statusbericht zur Kernenergienutzung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2018”, Bundesamt fürkerntechnische Entsorgungssicherheit, 2019.
879 - Marc Schmittem, “Nuclear Decommissioning in Japan – Opportunities for European Companies”, EU-Japan Centre for Industrial
Cooperation, March 2016, see https://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/default/files/publications/docs/2016-03-nuclear-decommissioning-japanschmittem-min_0.pdf, accessed 23 April 2018.

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OVERVIEW OF REACTORS WITH ONGOING
DECOMMISSIONING IN 11 SELECTED COUNTRIESWNISR2018 provided an in-depth review of developments in six major countries, namely
in the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K. covering 136 closed reactors.
WNISR2019 updated these case studies and provided an in-depth review of developments in
Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Russia, and South Korea. Altogether, WNSIR2019 covered a total of
159 closed reactors, representing almost 87 percent of the worldwide closed fleet. The countrycase-studies suggest that both duration and costs have been largely underestimated. In nearly
all the cases, the ongoing decommissioning projects encounter delays as well as cost increases.
WNISR2020 provides an update of these case studies. This section provides a review ofdevelopments since WNISR2019, while the following section contains the more detailed casestudies. WNISR2020 counted 164 reactors currently in the different decommissioning stages
in these 11 countries; this represents around 87 percent of all closed reactors.
Currently 55 are in the warm-up stage, only 10 reactors in the “hot-zone -stage”, and 13 arein the ease-off stage. The early nuclear states U.K., France, Russia, and Canada have not fully
decommissioned one single reactor. Canada, U.K. and Russia put all their closed reactors into
Long-Term Enclosure (LTE), postponing decommissioning into the future. The U.S. has also alarge number of reactors in LTE too. WNISR2020 counts a total of 66 reactors in LTE in these11 countries, one third of all closed units.
Figure 47 · Progress and Status of Reactor Decommissioning

Progress and Status of Reactor Decommissioning in Selected Countries
in Units, as of June 2018–2020
2020
2019
2018

USA
GermanyJapan© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

FranceStatusWarm-upHot-zone
Ease-off
Completed

Italy
Spain
Lithuania
South Korea
25

Ongoing20

15

10Completed
5

5

10

15

Decommissioning
0

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2018–2020

Note: This graph does not include 22 reactors in LTE (long-term enclosure) in four of those countries, including twelve in the U.S., eight in France, and one
each in Germany and Spain.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Figure 47 reflects the little progress that the global decommissioning industry is making.
Between July 2019 and June 2020, little progress can be reported for most of the reactors
undergoing decommissioning except for the U.S. In France, the two Fessenheim reactors
entered the warm-up stage and Superphénix entered the hot-zone stage. In Germany four
reactors advanced to the hot-zone stage, while one additional reactor entered the warm-upstage. In the U.S., two more reactors entered the warm-up stage, while one plant finished thetechnical decommissioning process (see the following Case Studies for details).

Focus Country: United States
The U.S. has not only the largest fleet of operating (95) and closed reactors (38), but also thehighest number of decommissioned units (14) in the world, representing about two thirds ofthe total. WNISR2020 therefore looks in detail into the decommissioning sector in the U.S.

Decommissioning Monitoring
In the U.S., so far, 38 reactors (17.5 GW) have been closed.880 By 2050, at least 100 reactors
are likely to be undergoing decommissioning in the country. Of the 38 reactors (19 PWR,
13 BWR, 2 HTGR, 1 FBR, 1 PHWR, 2 others)881, 14 units or 5 GW have been decommissioned(see Table 12). Currently, decommissioning work is ongoing at 12 units:ɆɆ Eight reactors are in the warm-up stage: Fort Calhoun-1, Vermont Yankee, San Onofre-2
and -3, Oyster Creek, Pilgrim, Indian Point-2, and Crystal River-3;
ɆɆ Four reactors are in ease-off stage (Humboldt Bay, San Onofre-1, Zion-1 and -2).
Since WNISR2018, the number of reactors in the warm-up stage has doubled to eight reactors
in 2020, although no unit has yet entered the hot-zone stage. In May 2020, the operator Omaha
Public Power District (OPPD) announced that Fort Calhoun-1 (482 MW) was defueled, with
fuel being stored in dry casks.882 Crystal River-3883 and Vermont Yankee884 are defueled too. San
Onofre-2 and -3885 were scheduled to be defueled by 2019, but that goal was not achieved886. Since
880 - Another closed reactor is GE ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR), which is next to the GE Vallecitos
BWR. Although, the reactor never produced electricity, the site was not decommissioned but has been put into LTE. NRC, “Status of
the Decommissioning Program—Annual Report”, 2018.
881 - PWR: Pressurized Water Reactor; BWR: Boiling Water Reactor; HTGR: High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor; FBR: Fast Breeder
Reactor; PHWR: Pressurized Heavy-Water Reactor.
882 - The Wire, “Video: Fort Calhoun Station crosses fuel-move milestone”, Omaha Public Power District, 18 May 2020,see https://oppdthewire.com/nuclear-decommissioning-spent-fuel-secure-2020/, accessed 7 July 2020.
883 - NRC, “Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant”, 2019,see https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/power-reactor/cr3.html, accessed 11 May 2020.
884 - William Irwin, “Experiences with the Decommissioning of Vermont Yankee”, Radiological & Toxicological Sciences Program,
Vermont Department of Health, presented at the NDCAP Meeting, 24 January 2018,see https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/01/25/bill-irwin-1-24-2-18-mass-ndcap-presentation.pdf, accessed 1 June 2018.
885 - In 2014, former CEO of San Onofre majority owner Southern California Edison and then California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) President Michael Peevey approved a deal that put 70 percent of the estimated US$4.7 billion “early closure”
costs for both units onto the shoulders of the ratepayers. Then in February 2018, a settlement was reached that will see the utilities
cover US$775 million in final costs for the closure of the power plant, overriding the 2014 agreement.
See Jeff St. John, “Southern California Utilities to Pay $775M in San Onofre Closure Deal”, GreenTech Media, 1 February 2018,see https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/southern-california-utilities-to-pay-775-in-final-san-onofre, accessed 5 July 2018.
886 - Southern California Edison, “Decommissioning Funding Status Report San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3
and ISFSI”, addressed to the U.S.NRC, 10 CFR 50.75, 10 CFR 50.82 and 10 CFR 72.30, 28 March 2017,see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1709/ML17090A152.pdf, accessed 7 September 2020.

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WNISR2019, two more reactors went permanently offline: the 45-year old Three Mile Island-1
in Pennsylvania was closed in September 2019, and the 47-year old Indian Point-2 in New York
followed in April 2020. Exelon, the operator of Three Mile Island-1, closed the station 15 years
ahead of the expiration of the operating license due to unfavorable economic conditions.
Exelon plans to completely defuel the pools by 2022 and opts for the LTE strategy887. Total
decommissioning is estimated to take 60 years for a total cost of US$1.2 billion888 around
US$1,465/kW. Holtec and Entergy agreed on the transfer of the three Indian Point reactors(Unit 1 is in LTE, Unit 3 is scheduled to close in 2021) to a Holtec International subsidiary for
immediate decommissioning. The decommissioning strategy for Crystal River-3 was changed
from LTE to immediate decommissioning after the NorthStar-Orano joint-venture purchased
the unit. WNISR2020 counts the reactor now, with the approval of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), as in the warm-up-stage.
Since WNISR2019, La Crosse de facto finished technical decommissioning, 32 years after
closure. However, the site is not yet released from regulatory control as the final site survey
and license reduction to the independent spent fuel installations on site are still pending.
For the decommissioned reactors, the process was completed on average 17 years after the
closure of the reactor. In six cases, decommissioning was completed in less than 10 years, whichis quick by international comparison. One reason for these short decommissioning periods isthat in most cases the pressure vessel was removed and transported intact for final disposal,
while the internals were segmented under water or in air and dry stored onsite along withspent nuclear fuel awaiting a federal repository.889
Among the shortest of all decommissioning periods is Shippingport, where decommissioning
took only seven years. In this case, not only the reactor pressure vessel was removed as a whole,
but also the vessel internals were not segmented but put into the vessel and disposed of at adisposal site together, using the vessel as shipping container.890 In some cases, this removal asa whole was also done for other larger components, e.g. the steam generators. This not only led
to short decommissioning times but also lower costs ranging from US$280/kW (Trojan plant,
Oregon) to US$1,500/kW (Haddam Neck, Connecticut).891
The U.S. has also a large number of reactors in LTE (12 units or 3.6 GW, including three units
in “Entombment”892). The LTE period is limited to 60 years, after which the reactor has to887 - Exelon, “Three Mile Island Decommissioning”, Undated, see https://www.exeloncorp.com/locations/three-mile-islanddecommissioning, accessed 11 May 2020.
888 - Andrew Maykuth, “Three Mile Island’s 60-year shutdown: ‘More akin to a marathon than a sprint’”, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
16 July 2019, see https://www.inquirer.com/business/three-mile-island-nrc-nuclear-decommissioning-plans-spelled-out-20190716.
html, accessed 11 May 2020.
889 - T. S. LaGuardia, “Decommissioning of Western-type light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs)”, in “Nuclear Decommissioning—
Planning, Execution and International Experience”, Woodhead Publishing Series in Energy, 2012, pp. 513–563,
see https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780857091154500191, accessed 2 May 2018.
890 - Karen Dorn Steele, “Hanford: America’s Nuclear Graveyard”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 October 1989.
891 - The total costs including the site restoration amounted to US$836 million for Connecticut Yankee (also named Haddam Neck),see OECD/NEA, “Costs of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants”, Nuclear Energy Agency / Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2016.
892 - Entombment is defined by the NRC as “A method of decommissioning, in which radioactive contaminants are encased ina structurally long-lived material, such as concrete. The entombed structure is maintained and surveillance is continued until
the entombed radioactive waste decays to a level permitting termination of the license and unrestricted release of the property”.
For further information, see U.S.NRC, “Glossary”, Updated 29 June 2020, see https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/
entomb.html, accessed 7 September 2020.

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be decommissioned. Problems of knowledge management, availability of human and financial
resources in the decades to come, and safety issues during LTE still have to be resolved.
Finally, as in other countries exploring decommissioning, one of the largest hurdles is thedisposal of used nuclear fuel and “Greater-Than-Class C” or GTCC waste893 , as facilities
continue to host waste onsite preventing full regulatory release as a greenfield site.894 In thesecases, the site license is reduced to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI): a
dry storage facility for spent fuel installed on the site. Of the fully decommissioned reactors,
more than half (8) of the sites have been or will be relicensed as ISFSI. With no centralizedinterim storage facility and no disposal solution for spent fuel, ISFSIs will likely spread in the
future. Table 12 shows the current status of reactor decommissioning in the U.S.
Table 12 · Status of Reactor Decommissioning in the U.S. (as of May 2020)
United States of America“Warm-up-stage“May 2018

May 2019

May 2020468

of which defueled“Hot-zone-stage“

1
0

1
0

3
0

“Ease-off-stage“

5

5

4

LTE

12(a)

12(a)

12(a)

Completed

13

13

14

of which released from regulatory control
Total Closed Reactors

6
34

6
36

6
38

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes:
LTE: Long-Term Enclosure.
a - Of which 3 reactors are in “Entombment”: the Department of Energy-reactors Piqua (Ohio), Bonus (Puerto Rico), Hallam (Nebraska).

Organizational Challenges
Decommissioning Funds Under Threat
Going forward, decommissioning in the U.S. faces challenges of effective dismantling andof financing the process in a context of low electricity prices placing a further strain on thecompetitiveness of nuclear power plants, early closures, and low provisions of earmarked
funds.895 Approximately 70 percent of the owners of nuclear power plants in the U.S.—generally
traditional, rate-regulated utilities—collect decommissioning money from customers’ reactorspecific payments in Nuclear Decommissioning Trust funds (NDT), while the remaining
operators must provide financial assurance through one of the other two basic methods (a893 - For further information on GTCC and waste classification in the U.S., see U.S.NRC, “Greater-Than-Class-C and Transuranic
Waste”, Updated 9 October 2019, see https://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/llw-pa/gtcc-transuranic-waste-disposal.html,
accessed 7 September 2020.
894 - Robert Rosner and Rebecca Lordan, “Why America should move towards dry cask consolidated interim storage of used nuclear
fuel”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2014.
895 - Ben Wealer et al., “Nuclear Energy Policy in the United States: Between Rocks and Hard Places”, IAEE Energy Forum, 2017.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

prepayment; a surety, insurance, or parent-company guarantee).896 In 2016, the overall balancein the NDT as around US$64 billion, with specific costs to decommission a nuclear reactor ofaround US$700/kW for public power utilities and US$850/kW for investor-owned utilities.897
There is an increasing risk that the NDT will not be sufficient to cover all the decommissioning
costs in the foreseeable future due to systematic underestimation of future costs and asignificant number of early closures. Especially important is the fact that an increasing numberof nuclear plants are taken off the grid for good due to deteriorating economic conditions,leading to lower income, as in most cases the NDT is built up year-by-year over the expected
lifetime of the reactor. A recent audit by the U.S. Office of the Inspector General concluded
that the cost estimates should be based on the best available knowledge from research andoperational experience, but with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) estimation
formula being based on studies conducted between 1978 and 1980, this is hardly fulfillingthe conditions. The audit recommended among other things that the funding formula be reevaluated to determine whether a site-specific cost estimate would be more efficient.898

Outsourcing the Decommissioning Process:EnergySolutions, NorthStar, Holtec International
For the time being, decommissioning remains the responsibility of the operators, who tenderout to specialized companies some of the work, especially in the hot-zone stage.899 It seems,
however, that the new organizational model of selling the license to a decommissioning
contractor (identified in WNISR2018) is increasingly popular and may even accelerate
decommissioning. This new method consists of transferring the decommissioning license fromthe operator to a decommissioning contractor, mostly a waste management company with thegoal to reap efficiency gains through the co-management of the decommissioning process by acompany owning disposal facilities.
EnergySolutions, the major waste management service provider, which seems to be involvedin nearly all decommissioning projects and also provided support for early nuclear power
plant decommissioning projects, including those at Fort St. Vrain, Trojan, Haddam Neck,
Maine Yankee and Yankee Rowe900 was the first company to acquire units for decommissioning
through limited liability subsidiaries. This was done for the first time for the two Zion units inIllinois and La Crosse in Wisconsin.
In 2019, EnergySolutions, for the first time, announced that it completed a decommissioning
project, at least from a technical point-of-view, as final site survey of the La Crosse site and license
896 - Julia A. Moriarty, “2017 Nuclear Decommissioning Funding Study”, Callan Institute, 2017,see https://www.callan.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Callan-2017-NDT-Survey.pdf.
897 - Ibidem.
898 - Office of the Inspector General, “Audit of NRC’s Decommissioning Funds Program”, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, June 2016, see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1616/ML16160A208.pdf,
accessed 1 May 2018.
899 - Conrad Cooke and Holger Spann, “Reactor vessel internals segmentation at Zion”, Nuclear Engineering International,
20 September 2013, see http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurereactor-vessel-internals-segmentation-at-zion/;and AREVA, “Decommissioning & Dismantling”, AREVA, 2018, see http://us.areva.com/EN/home-3783/orano-usa-decommissioning-dismantling.html.
900 - WNN, “EnergySolutions to decommission Fort Calhoun”, 3 April 2019,see http://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/EnergySolutions-to-decommission-Fort-Calhoun, accessed 9 May 2019.

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reduction to the ISFSI is currently planned for 2020. The ISFSI will then again be transferredto Dairyland Power Cooperative. The infamous second unit of Three Mile Island (TMI)
is owned by GPU Nuclear, a subsidiary of FirstEnergy (which filed for bankruptcy in 2018).
EnergySolutions negotiated with GPU Nuclear on purchasing TMI-2, currently in LTE, and tocomplete its decommissioning. With the basic terms agreed, EnergySolutions and FirstEnergy
will proceed with definitive agreements and applications to the NRC for the transfer of all
licenses and assets.901 The contract between EnergySolutions and the FirstEnergy subsidiary
was signed in October 2019 and the decommissioning responsibility will be transferred toEnergySolutions subsidiary TMI-2 Solutions LLC. To perform the decommissioning work at
TMI-2, EnergySolutions and New Jersey-based construction company Jingoli formed a joint
venture, called ES/Jingoli Decommissioning LLC.902
Another company entering the decommissioning market is U.S. company NorthStar, which
so far is lacking major decommissioning experience. NorthStar had entered into a purchaseand-sale agreement with Entergy for Vermont Yankee; the deal included the transfer of thedecommissioning trust and, in 2017, Entergy promised to add another US$125 million.
NorthStar had already signed a contract with AREVA (now Orano) for the dismantling of thepressure vessel and internal structures.903 The State of Vermont petitioned before the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board of the NRC for leave to intervene in the plans and hearing request
due to underestimated risks to the ratepayers.904 Then in December 2018, the Vermont Public
Utility Commission approved the license transfer to NorthStar, in particular due to theaccelerated decommissioning plan, NorthStar would start with decommissioning no later than
2021.905 The transfer includes the dry storage facility906 but questions remain on the secure
funding.
In June 2019, the owner of Crystal River-3, Duke Energy, announced that it plans to sell theoperating license for Crystal River-3, which is currently in LTE, to the NorthStar and Orano
joint-venture Accelerated Decommissioning Partners.907 The US$540 million-deal would
foresee decommissioning the station by 2027, around 50 years earlier and US$260 million
cheaper.908 In April 2020, the NRC approved the transfer. Under this agreement Duke Energy
will remain the owner of the reactor and retain ownership and control of the decommissioning

901 - Rod Walton, “EnergySolutions signs deal on final decommissioning efforts for Three Mile Island Unit 2”, Power Engineering,
24 July 2019, see https://www.power-eng.com/2019/07/24/energysolutions-signs-deal-on-final-decommissioning-efforts-for-threemile-island-unit-2/#gref, accessed 11 May 2020.
902 - WNN, “EnergySolutions adds TMI-2 to decommissioning projects”, 16 October 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/EnergySolutions-takes-on-TMI-2-for-decommissioning, accessed 11 May 2020.
903 - Timothy McQuiston, “French firm wins Vermont Yankee reactor dismantling contract”, Vermont Business Magazine, 12 July 2017,see https://vermontbiz.com/news/july/french-firm-wins-vermont-yankee-reactor-dismantling-contract, accessed 2 May 2018.
904 - U.S. NRC, “State of Vermont’s petition for leave to intervene and hearing request”, 2017,see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1716/ML17164A419.pdf, accessed 3 July 2018.
905 - John Dillon, “Vermont Yankee transfer approved, Northstar will decommission plant”, Vermont Public Radio, 7 December 2018,see https://www.nepm.org/post/vermont-yankee-transfer-approved-northstar-will-decommission-plant, accessed7 September 2020.
906 - U.S.NRC, “NRC Approves License Transfer for Vermont Yankee”, Press Release No. 18-047, 12 October 2018,see https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2018/18-047.pdf, accessed 16 August 2020.
907 - WNN, “Accelerated decommissioning for Crystal River”, 31 May 2019,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Accelerated-decommissioning-for-Crystal-River, accessed 1 June 2019.
908 - Nuclear Energy Insider, “Crystal River to be decommissioned 50 years early”, Reuters, 5 June 2019,see https://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/crystal-river-be-decommissioned-50-years-early, accessed 11 May 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 fund; while Accelerated Decommissioning Partners will become the NRC licensee responsiblefor decommissioning the station.
A third company following EnergySolutions and NorthStar is Holtec International. The
company is already involved in numerous decommissioning projects through their dry cask
storage and transportation products but not yet in large-scale decommissioning projects.
According to Holtec, the company purchases the reactors with the objective to move quickly,transfer the reactors’ used fuel into dry storage and ultimately to a “consolidated interim
storage” facility that Holtec seeks to build in southeast New Mexico.909
In mid-2019, the NRC approved of the transfer of the operating license of Oyster Creek from
Exelon to Holtec subsidiaries Oyster Creek Environmental Protection LLC (OCEP) as owner,and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) as operator for decommissioning.910
In August 2019, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station was purchased by Holtec International in adeal that allowed the site to enter immediate decommissioning.911 Holtec Pilgrim LLC will own
the company; HDI is the licensed operator.912 The NRC approved the deal. Holtec and Entergy
also agreed on the transfer of the three Indian Point reactors (Unit 1 is in LTE, Unit 3 is still
operating but scheduled to close in 2021) to a Holtec International subsidiary for immediate
decommissioning; the license transfer application is currently reviewed by the NRC.913 Holtec
has proposed decommissioning and demolishing the facility by year-end 2033, at a projected
cost of US$2.3 billion.914
Of the 12 reactors currently in the warm-up and ease-off stage as well as recently completed
La Crosse, only Humboldt Bay was not transferred to a decommissioning licensee or contracted
to one of the above companies. Already seven units were transferred to decommissioning
companies, while another two transfers are pending for two units which are slated fordecommissioning in the coming years. Table 13 gives an overview of the outsourcing of thedecommissioning process to these three companies. Overall, the new scheme of outsourcing
entire decommissioning steps may have an advantage of generating economies of scale. In
fact, a specialized company (e.g. Energy Solutions) may be able to benefit from a large numberof reactors that it decommissions. The new organizational model also seems to accelerate
decommissioning at a first glance. The two units TMI-2, Indian Point-1, which are currently in
LTE (for 60 years) could enter the decommissioning process in the coming years. On the other909 - Joy Russel, “Holtec: Oyster Creek nuke site offer explained”, Chief Communications Officer, Holtec International, Letter
published in South Jersey Times, 12 August 2019, see https://www.nj.com/opinion/2018/08/holtec_oyster_creek_nuke_site_offer_
explained_feedback.html, accessed 11 May 2020.
910 - Holtec International, “Holtec Completes Acquisition of Oyster Creek Generating Station”, 1 July 2019, see https://holtecinternational.com/2019/07/01/holtec-completes-acquisition-of-oyster-creek-generating-station/, accessed 11 May 2020.
911 - Holtec Decommissioning International, “Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Decommissioning”, n.d.,see https://hdi-decom.com/our-fleet/pilgrim-decommissioning/, accessed 11 May 2020.
912 - Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) will contract out the work through a Decommissioning General Contractor
Agreement to Comprehensive Decommissioning International, which is jointly owned by Holtec (through its subsidiary Holtec
Decommissioning International, majority holder) and SNC-Lavalin (through its subsidiary Kentz, USA). Entergy, “Application for
Order Consenting to Direct and Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendment; andRequest for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A”, 16 November 2018, Docket Nos. 50-293 & 72-1044,
see https://hdi-decom.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Pilgrim-License-Transfer-Application-Without-Enclosure-1P.pdf.
913 - Allison Dunne, “NRC Delivers Briefing On Indian Point Decommissioning”, WAMC Northeast Public Radio, 22 April 2020,see https://www.wamc.org/post/nrc-delivers-briefing-indian-point-decommissioning, accessed 16 September 2020.
914 - Darrell Proctor, “Indian Point Unit 2 Will Shut Down April 30”, POWER Magazine, 27 April 2020,see https://www.powermag.com/indian-point-unit-2-will-shut-down-april-30/, accessed 11 May 2020.

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hand, the success of this model relies on the contract design and the appropriate allocationof risks. A major concern is the allocation of the financial risk of cost overruns. In fact, if thedecommissioning funds are exhausted, such a third-party company could declare bankruptcy,
leaving the bill for the taxpayer.915
Table 13 · Overview of Outsourcing of U.S. Decommissioning Projects
Company

EnergySolutions
Accelerated Decommissioning Partners(NorthStar-Orano joint-venture)
Holtec (wit SNC-Lavalin)

License Transfers

General Decommissioning
Contractor(without license transfer)

4 units: Zion-1, Zion-2, Lacrosse,
Three Mile Island-2 (pending)Fort Calhoun-1, San Onofre-1, San Onofre-2,
San Onofre-3

2 units: Vermont Yankee, Crystal River-3
6 units: Oyster Creek, Pilgrim, Indian Point-1(in LTE, pending), Indian Point-2 (pending),
Indian Point-3 (pending), Palisades (operational)

Total

12 units

4 units
Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

However, according to some NGOs, closer scrutiny of these companies raises some serious
concerns, for instance SNC-Lavalin faces a big bribery scandal at home, in Canada, andcorruption allegations also in Mexico, India and Bangladesh; therefore close attention should
to be paid on money flows and radioactive waste stream.916

COUNTRY CASE STUDIESCanadaIn Canada, no commercial reactor has been decommissioned thus far. By mid-2020, six reactors
or 2.1 GW, all CANDU—CANadian Deuterium Uranium—reactors except for Gentilly-1, a
Heavy-Water Moderated Boiling Light-Water Cooled Reactor (HWBLWR) had been closed.
Although some parts have been dismantled of the closed facilities, not one CANDU reactor
has even started decommissioning. Gentilly-1, the demonstration reactor in Rolphton, as wellas the Douglas Point station are now licensed as waste facilities.917 In 2016, decommissioning
licenses were issued for Gentilly-2 as well as for Pickering-1 and -2. The Pickering units lastgenerated electricity in 1997 but were officially closed only in 2007–2008 and are also inLong-Term Enclosure (LTE).918 The financial burden of decommissioning is to be shoulderedby the operators Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Bruce Power, and New Brunswick Power.
However, OPG and New Brunswick Power are wholly-owned public companies.
915 - D. Schlissel, P. Peterson and B. Biewald, “Financial Insecurity: The Increasing Use of Limited Liability Companies and MultiTiered Holding Companies to Own Nuclear Power Plants”, Synapse Energy Economics; STAR Foundation Riverkeeper, Inc., 2002.
916 - Beyond Nuclear, “Company to decommission US reactors has corruption history”, 5 August 2018, see http://www.beyondnuclear.
org/home/2018/8/5/company-to-decommission-us-reactors-has-corruption-history.html, accessed 11 May 2020.
917 - CNSC, “Nuclear Power Plants—Decommissioning activities”, 28 October 2016,see https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/index.cfm#DA, accessed 2 May 2018.
918 - CNSC, “Gentilly-2 Nuclear Facility”, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, September 2017, see http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/
reactors/power-plants/nuclear-facilities/gentilly-2-nuclear-generating-station/index.cfm, accessed 2 May 2018.

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The required decommissioning fund is accumulated by making annual contributions overthe entire planned lifetime of the facility; funds can also be collected over a shorter period to
reduce the risk of insufficient funding associated with potential early closure.919 The operators
are not required to hold the funds in an external fund but are required to separate them fromthe other assets920, i.e. internal segregated funds. In addition, there is no clear form of control
over the funds, as it is largely up to the utilities to choose the form of control921. With all
the reactors in LTE and hence no decommissioned commercial reactor, cost experiences for
CANDU reactors are non-existent (see WNISR2018 for more details on the decommissioning
process in Canada).

Japan
As of mid-June 2020, 27 reactors or 17.1 GW were permanently disconnected from the grid inJapan. The decommissioning of Tokai-1 is ongoing since 2001 and scheduled to be completed
in 2025; the decommissioning of Fugen ATR started in 2008 and is planned to be completed
by 2034; work on Hamaoka-1 and -2 began in 2009 and is to last until 2036. Genkai-1, Ikata-1,
Mihama-1 and -2, Shimane-1, and Tsuruga-1 received their decommissioning licenses in 2017.
The plans of the latter foresee the reactors to complete decommissioning in the mid-2040s,
respectively mid-2050s for Ikata-1. Fukushima Daiichi-5 and -6 as well as the Units 1–4 haveno completion date. In 2019, the U.K.-based company Cavendish Nuclear won a contract tosupport decommissioning of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) Monju; it is expected that work
will last around 30 years and cost more than ¥375 billion (US$3.5 billion).922
Similar to other countries, Japan lacks experience in decommissioning—both, regarding thephysical deconstruction and its financing. Japan, one of the early adopters of nuclear power,
has not finished decommissioning of a single commercial reactor, and the only completed
decommissioning project is the research reactor Japan Power Demonstration Reactor (JPDR),
released as a greenfield site in 2002. Japan has not yet developed a decommissioning industry,
which could provide efficient solutions applicable throughout a range of reactor types.
The general regulation in Japan stipulates that the licensed operator of a nuclear power
plant is responsible for decommissioning. The standard scenario in Japan includes a periodof LTE of five to ten years before the hot-zone is deconstructed. The Japan Atomic Energy
Commission (JAEC) reports in a 2019 White Paper, that the country is entering an era of
massive nuclear plant decommissioning and urges operators to plan ahead to lower safety risks
and costs requiring decades of and billions of dollars in finances. JAEC also urged utilities tolearn from U.S. and European examples.923
Furthermore, the financial burden of the decommissioning projects is to be shoulderedby the operators too. Historically, electric utilities had to establish tangible fixed assets for919 - OECD/NEA, Costs of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants.
920 - Wuppertal Institut, “Comparison among different decommissioning funds methodologies for nuclear installations”, EC-EAEC,
2007.
921 - Ibidem.
922 - NEI Magazine, “Cavendish wins contract to help with Monju decommissioning”, 2 September 2019, see https://www.neimagazine.
com/news/newscavendish-wins-contract-to-help-with-monju-decommissioning-7394600, accessed 16 August 2020.
923 - Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan urges nuke plants to prepare for decommissioning era”, Associated Press, as published on CTV News,
2 September 2019, see https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/japan-urges-nuke-plants-to-prepare-for-decommissioning-era-1.4574443.

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decommissioning during the period of operation through surcharges on the retail price ofelectricity and based on the output of a facility.924 The Fukushima disaster in 2011, however,caused the shutdown of all operating plants by 2014 and thus a halt in the allocation of funds
resulting in a shortage of decommissioning capital. In accordance with a Ministerial Ordinancein 2013925, total asset retirement costs related to decommissioning are henceforth allocated by
the straight-line method over the period of operation and safe storage. As a response to 3/11,
the surcharges were decoupled from the electricity output of a reactor. To cover the financial
shortage, many operators chose the strategy of intermediate storage (5–10 years) for theirreactors in order to collect more money (Fugen ATR, Hamaoka-1 and 2, Tsuruga-1, Tokai-1).
It is likely that this strategy will increasingly be chosen for decommissioning projects in the
short- and medium-term or the period of storage will possibly be prolonged due to financial
deficits. The operators have to consider whether it is worth pursuing reactor restart with apossible single reactor lifetime extension of 20 years under the new regulations and, by doing
that, enriching their reserves for decommissioning, or to choose the closure option, with theconsequence of LTE in order to generate sufficient funding.
For some reactors, the restart option might be more expensive than closure. With nodecommissioned commercial reactors and no available final waste disposal route, there is no
actual financial experience, which makes estimates difficult. Additionally, it remains unclear
which technical processes are included in the calculations. In 2015, the Power Generation
Cost Analysis Working Group by Ministry for Economy Trade and Industry (METI) estimatedan average of ¥71.6 billion (US$600 million) per reactor.926 This average value is congruent
with estimates published by the World Nuclear Association (WNA).927 A recent study by theInstitute of Energy Economics of Japan (IEEJ) expects decommissioning costs—with anaverage of ¥68 billion (US$560 million) per reactor.928 That these estimates are likely to heavily
underestimate real costs is illustrated by more recent estimates for the five latest Japanesereactors slated for decommissioning, where estimates have more than doubled to ¥160 billion(US$1.46 billion) per reactor.929
Another issue for the decommissioning process in Japan is that under ministerial guidelines,
companies are permitted to temporarily divert decommissioning funds for other businesspurposes and thus risking that the funds are not available when needed. This has come to lightin November 2017, with Japan Atomic Power Co using its decommissioning fund to cover costsof building the Tsuruga nuclear power station Units 3 and 4, which later were abandoned.930
924 - Ibidem; and Chubu Electric Power Company, “Quarterly Financial Report for the Nine Months Period Ended December 31, 2013”,
31 January 2014, see http://www.chuden.co.jp/english/resource/ir/20140131_3rdqua_fr.pdf, accessed 24 April 2018.
925 - Ordinance No. 52 of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 30 September 2013.
926 - Based on a calculation estimate for a sample plant, then for the other reactors multiplied with the generation output; the costs
include an enclosure period of ten years. METI, “Report on Analysis of Generation Costs, Etc. for Subcommittee on Long-term Energy
Supply-Demand Outlook”, Power Generation Cost Analysis Working Group, May 2015.
927 - WNN, “Ikata 1 decommissioning gets regulatory approval”, 29 June 2017; and WNA, “Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle”,
April 2018, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx,
accessed 26 April 2018.
928 - Yuhji Matsuo, Kei Shimogori and Atsuhiko Suzuki, “Major Issues Regarding Nuclear Power Generation Costs Assessment inJapan”, IEEJ Energy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 2015, see https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/6474.pdf.
929 - Nikkei Asian Review, “Japan to scrap 5 more nuclear reactors”, 20 April 2017,see https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-to-scrap-5-more-nuclear-reactors, accessed 26 April 2018.
930 - Tsuneo Sasai, “Japan Atomic Power in dire straits after diverting funds”, The Asahi Shimbun, 17 November 2017.

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South Korea is running a large nuclear program, including 26 power reactors in various stages.
As of mid-2020, two commercial reactors had been closed: South Korea’s oldest unit Kori1, a 576 MW PWR, and Wolsong-1, a 661 MW Pressurized Heavy-Water Reactor (PHWR).
Wolsong-1 ceased generating power in May 2017 (see South Korea Focus for details) but was
officially closed only in December 2019.931
In 2016, the operator Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) submitted an application todecommission Kori-1, the first reactor to enter the decommissioning stage in the country. A final
and detailed decommissioning plan is under development and has to be submitted by KHNP to
the regulator by 2021. Decommissioning of Kori-1 is estimated to start in mid-2022, last until
December 2032, and cost around US$570 million or US$990/kW.932 According to the Moon
Administration’s policy, South Korea will implement a nuclear phase-out policy in the long run.
Existing capacity will not be extended after the completion of the units under construction
and operating licenses not be extended beyond design lifetimes. Kori-2 is the next unit to beclosed in 2023, followed by nine additional ones prior to 2030. In the next decades, South Korea
is expected to build up its own decommissioning industry. Meanwhile, the Korean Atomic
Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is taking steps to enhance decommissioning expertise anda series of contracts were signed to develop suitable technologies. In early 2020, South Korea
announced plans to launch the construction of an institute that will develop technologies forthe decommissioning of nuclear power plants, which is part of Government plans to accessa global decommissioning market. Two establishments are planned: one focusing on LWRs
and the other one PHWRs933 (see WNISR2019 for details on the decommissioning process inSouth Korea).

FranceIn February 2020, France closed the first unit of the Fessenheim station, followed by Unit 2
in June 2020. These represent the first large PWRs to enter decommissioning in France. The
closure increases the French closed reactor fleet to 14 reactors (8 GCR UNGG, 1 HWGCR,
2 FBR, 3 PWR) or 5.6 GW.934 French regulation states that decommissioning has to begin
immediately after reactor closure, but depending on the type of reactor, this could mean many
years up to several decades.
With 56 Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs), French utility EDF operates the moststandardized fleet in the world, with the already closed units consisting mainly of Gas-Cooled
Reactors (GCRs). In 2016, EDF shelved its ambitious plan of decommissioning its GCRs
until 2036. In the next 15 years, the focus would lie on dismantling installations except for
the reactors and their buildings. The plans foresee that the first reactor (Chinon A-1) would
931 - KHNP, “Nuclear Power Operation - Plant Status”, 31 December 2018,see http://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/529/main.do?mnCd=EN03020101, accessed 27 March 2019932 - Jane Chung, “South Korea to complete dismantling of oldest nuclear reactor by 2032”, Reuters, 19 June 2017,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-nuclear-idUSKBN19A02R, accessed 26 June 2019.
933 - David Dalton, “Seoul To Build Institute For Nuclear Decommissioning”, NucNet, 22 April 2020,see https://www.nucnet.org/news/seoul-to-build-institute-for-nuclear-decommissioning-4-3-2020, accessed 11 May 2020.
934 - In addition, there is the military reactor G-1 on the Marcoule site, closed in 1968 and being decommissioned ever since.

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only start dismantling in 2031; until then, the five remaining reactors would be in LTE. This
new strategy aims to release the GCRs from regulatory control only by the beginning of the
22nd century.
In 2006, decommissioning of the 1200 MWe Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) Superphénix
started.935 Since 2019, the first of three plugs that seal the reactor pressure vessel is being
cut underwater using a remote-controlled robot.936 In 2014, the end of decommissioning wasanticipated in 2026937, the current estimate is 2030–2035.938 The reactor has entered the hotzone-stage.
The HWR EL-4 on the Brennilis site was closed in 1985; since then decommissioning work
has been ongoing—with some interruptions for legal reasons—and the reactor is still in thewarm-up stage. The process depends on the construction of interim storage facilities and the
granting of a complete dismantling license.939 In 2019, it was announced that decommissioning
will be further delayed, with the earliest possible completion in 2038. The decree formalizingthat timeframe is expected to be signed by 2021.940
Decommissioning of the FBR Phénix, jointly operated by Électricité de France (EDF) andthe French Alternative Energies & Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and closed in 2009, isunderway and the dismantling is operated by CEA, with Orano, and EDF. The decommissioning
license was issued in 2016 and the spent fuel is currently being evacuated, the sodium drained
and neutralized, i.e. the reactor is in the warm-up stage and full decommissioning is currently
estimated to be achieved by 2045.941
Decommissioning of the plutonium-production GCRs G-2 and G-3 on the Marcoule site is the
responsibility of the CEA. The reactors are defueled and put into LTE. The next steps, which
are expected to begin in 2020, are the removal of the graphite from the reactor as well as thedismantling of the nuclear island, estimated to be completed sometime after 2040.942
Current cost estimates for EDFs closed reactors are around €6.5 billion (US$20177 billion), while
EDF has only set aside €3.3 billion (US$20163.5 billion).943 The costs for the legacy fleet have935 - Decommissioning of the FBR Phénix is the scope of the French Alternative Energies & Atomic Energy Commission (CEA).
936 - Tristan Hurel, “À Creys-Malville, tout est prêt pour la découpe de la cuve de Superphénix”, Revue génerale nucléaire,
14 January 2019 (in French), see https://www.sfen.org/rgn/creys-malville-pret-decoupe-cuve-superphenix, accessed 4 May 2020.
937 - Cour des Comptes, “Le coût de production de l’électricité nucléaire—Actualisation 2014”, 27 May 2014.
938 - Tristan Hurel, “À Creys-Malville, tout est prêt pour la découpe de la cuve de Superphénix”, Revue Générale Nucléaire,
14 January 2019, op. cit.
939 - EDF, “Déconstruction du site nucléaire de Brennilis”, 2016 (in French), see https://www.edf.fr/sites/default/files/contrib/groupeedf/producteur-industriel/carte-des-implantations/centrale-brennilis/presentation/dossier_de_presse_centrale_de_brennilis_2016.
pdf, accessed 14 August 2018.
940 - Commission Locale d’Information des monts d’Arrée, “Réunion plénière de la CLI des monts d’Arrée du jeudi 5 juillet 2018“,Press Release, 17 July 2018 (in French), see https://www.finistere.fr/content/download/36289/573127/file/2018-07-17%20CP%20
Réunion%20plénière%20de%20la%20CLI%20des%20Monts%20d’Arrée%20du%205-07-2018.pdf, accessed 26 June 2019.
941 - Laurence Pickety, “Decommissioning of Sodium Fast Reactors: Presentation of French experience”, Dismantling Division for
civilian applications, Nuclear Energy Division, CEA, presented at the “Expert Panel on ‘Monju’ Decommissioning”, July 2017, see http://
www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/022/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2017/08/23/1393867_02.pdf, accessed 14 August 2018.
942 - CEA, “Dossier de presse—Démantèlement”, Commissariat ´à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives, 4 April 2015
(in French), see https://www.francetnp.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/dossier_de_presse_demantelement_-_2015_v2.pdf, accessed 14 August 2018.
943 - EDF, “Consolidated financial statements at 31 December 2016”, 2017.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 235increased steadily and doubled since 2001, when they were estimated to be around €3.3 billion(US$20012.9 billion).944
Until the Fessenheim station was disconnected from the grid, the only closed PWR was
Chooz-A, which ceased operating in 1991. Since 2014, the reactor pressure vessel is being
dismantled under water, hence the reactor is in the hot-zone-stage. EDF missed the ambitious
target of completing decommissioning by 2016; the process is now expected to be completed
by 2025.945
For Fessenheim, EDF foresees a post-operational stage lasting five years, during which thepressure vessel and the pools will be defueled and the spent fuel will be sent to La Hague.
During this stage, the first non-nuclear installations will be dismantled too. After the postoperational stage, the partial dismantling of the reactor will begin in 2025, during which all
the buildings except for the reactor building will be dismantled. During this period, the reactor
will be isolated and under surveillance.946 The dismantling of the nuclear island will be done in
the final stage and last around five years; decommissioning of Fessenheim is thus scheduled tolast around 20 years. EDF has undertaken to completely reclassify the site by 2041 and to keep
it “for industrial use” which has yet to be defined.947
Table 14 · Status of Reactor Decommissioning in France (as of May 2020)
France“Warm-up-stage”

May 2018

May 2019

3

3

of which defueled2

May 2020
4
2

1“Hot-zone-stage”

1

1

2

“Ease-off-stage”

0

0

0

LTE

8

8

8

Completed000of which released from regulatory control
Total Closed Reactors

0
12

0
12

0
14

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

For the entire PWR fleet, EDF expects total costs of around €23 billion (US$26 billion), whichcorresponds to around €300/kW (US$337/kW) of installed capacity, very low by international
standards. In a recent report on the technical and financial feasibility of the decommissioning
process, the French National Assembly alleged that EDF shows “excessive optimism”.948 The
report concluded that decommissioning and clean-up will take more time, that the technical944 - Cour des Comptes, “Le coût de production de l’électricité nucléaire—Actualisation 2014”, 27 May 2014.
945 - Bertrand Martelet, “EDF’s Expertise and Position in Nuclear Decommissioning”, EDF, presented at the “1st World Nuclear
Decommissioning & Waste Management Congress”, 12–14 September 2016.
946 - Adélaïde Tenaglia, “Fessenheim: comment démantèle-t-on une centrale nucléaire?”, Le Parisien, 19 February 2020 (in French),see http://www.leparisien.fr/economie/fessenheim-comment-demantele-t-on-une-centrale-nucleaire-19-02-2020-8262930.php,
accessed 11 May 2020.
947 - Adrien Dentz, “Le complexe et coûteux démantèlement de la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim”, Le Monde, 20 February 2020
(in French), see https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2020/02/20/le-complexe-et-couteux-demantelement-de-la-centralenucleaire-de-fessenheim_6030185_3234.html, accessed 11 May 2020.
948 - Mission d’information relative à la faisabilité technique et financière du démantèlement des installations nucléaires de base,“Rapport d’Information déposé en application de l’article 145 du règlement par la mission d’Information relative à la faisabilité
technique et financière du démantèlement des installations nucléaires de base”, N°4428, Commission du Développement Durable et del’Aménagement du Territoire, French National Assembly, 1 February 2017 (in French), see http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/
rap-info/i4428.pdf, accessed 18 August 2018.

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feasibility is not fully assured, and that the process will cost overall much more than EDF
anticipates. Table 14 shows the current status of reactor decommissioning in France. (SeeWNISR 2018 for details)..

Lithuania
In Lithuania, there was no tangible progress on decommissioning of the two Soviet-Style
RBMK-1500 reactors at the Ignalina station since WNISR2019. The two 1185 MW (each)reactors were closed in 2004 and 2009 respectively following a pre-requisite engagement for
Lithuania to join the European Union. The two reactor cores are defueled, but the spent fuel inthe pools has not yet been evacuated as the interim dry storage facility is delayed by more than
10 years.949 The transfer of all spent fuel to the onsite storage facility is a prerequisite for thedecommissioning license.950 The decommissioning end date has, since 2011, been postponed bya further nine years to 2038. It is planned to decommission Ignalina to “brownfield” status.951
The European Union (EU) covers more than half of the costs for the decommissioning of
Ignalina. A 2016 report by the European Court of Auditors concluded that the EU funding
programs for decommissioning have not created the right incentives for timely and costeffective decommissioning. The auditors concluded that the funding programs should
be discontinued after 2020, when EU support for Lithuania will have totaled €1.8 billion(US$2 billion).952 Between 2010 and 2015, costs increased by 67 percent to an estimated totalof €3.4 billion (US$3.8 billion) and, as of 2015, the country faced a financing gap of €1.6 billion(US$1.8 billion). If high-level waste management and spent fuel disposal were included, thetotal costs were estimated at €6 billion (US$6.8 billion) and the financing gap would more thandouble to €4.2 billion (US$4.7 billion).953 In addition, Lithuania faces a lack of qualified engineers
for decommissioning, as this is the first RBMK decommissioning project anywhere; qualified
international experts are also missing. (See WNISR2019 for details on the decommissioning in
Lithuania).

949 - ENSREG, “Lithuania”, Updated 6 February 2019, see http://www.ensreg.eu/country-profile/Lithuania, accessed 20 June 2019.
950 - Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, “The list of documents of the State Enterprise Ignalina NPP required to issue a license fordecommissioning and the schedule for their submission were agreed”, 6 December 2018, see https://www.iae.lt/en/the-list-ofdocuments-of-the-state-enterprise-ignalina-npp-required-to-issue-a-license-for-decommissioning-and-the-schedule-for-theirsubmission-were-agreed/323, accessed 20 June 2019s
951 - European Court of Auditors, “EU nuclear decommissioning assistance programmes in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia: some
progress made since 2011, but critical changes ahead.”, Special Report No. 22, European Court of Auditors, 2016,see http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_22/SR_NUCLEAR_DECOMMISSIONING_EN.pdf, accessed 20 June 2019.
952 - Ibidem.
953 - Ibidem.

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Germany
The closure of Philppsburg-2 in Bavaria on 31 December 2019 increased the number of closed
units in Germany to 30 or 18.3 GW (15 PWRs, 10 BWRs, 2 HTGR, 1 FBR, 1 HWGCR, 1 PHWR)954 .
Currently, decommissioning work is ongoing at 24 units:ɆɆ Eight reactors are in the warm-up stage: Biblis-A/B (both defueled), Grafenrheinfeld,
Gundremmingen-B, Isar-1, Krümmel (defueled), Lingen (defueled), and Philippsburg-2;
ɆɆ Eight reactors are in the hot-zone stage: AVR Jülich, Brunsbüttel, KNK II, Mülheim-Kärlich,
Neckarwestheim-1, Obrigheim, Philippsburg-1, and Unterweser;
ɆɆ Eight reactors are in ease-off zone stage: Greifswald units 1–5, MZFR, Rheinsberg, andStade.
The thorium prototype reactor THTR-300 is the only reactor in LTE in the country. Only
three reactors or 140 MW have been successfully released from regulatory control (BWR VAK
Kahl, BWR HDR Großwelzheim, and the PHWR Niederaichbach). Of these early prototype
reactors only VAK Kahl operated for a significant period of time (24 years). Decommissioning
costs for VAK Kahl were given as €150 million (US$2010215 million) in 2010955 or ~€10,000/kW(~US$201014,366/kW).
Of the commercial reactors only Würgassen and Gundremmingen-A have de facto
completed decommissioning. Gundremmingen-A, which started decommissioning in 1983,
has finished the ease-off stage with the decontamination of the buildings only in 2016.956
The latest cost estimate was around €2.2 billion (US$2.4 billion) or €9,000/kW (US$9,690/
kW) for Gundremmingen-A, and €1 billion (US$1.1 billion) or €1,500/kW (US$1,615/kW) for
Würgassen.957 Due to its central position in Germany and the proximity to “Konrad”, thegeological disposal facility for low- and intermediate-level waste, the German federal company
for interim storage (Gesellschaft für Zwischenlagerung or BGZ) is planning to build a logistic
center at the Würgassen site in order to ensure the timely supply of the Konrad repository nearSalzgitter.958 Decommissioning of Stade (640 MW) was thought to be achieved by 2014, but
ongoing difficulties due to unexpected contamination keeps delaying the project.
The legacy fleet of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) consisting of Rheinsberg
and the five units of Greifswald are currently in the ease-off stage. For both sites, the deferreddismantling strategy was chosen: The six pressure vessels were transported to the onsite
interim storage facility (Zwischenlager Nord or ZLN), also operated by Entsorgungswerk für
Nuklearanlagen or EWN, as were 17 steam generators and parts of the primary cooling system.

954 - PWR: Pressurized Water Reactor; BWR: Boiling Water Reactor, HTGR: High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor; FBR: Fast
Breeder Reactor; HWGCR: Heavy Water Gas Cooled Reactor; PHWR: Pressurized Heavy-Water Reactor.
955 - Katja Riedel, “Anfang und Ende des ersten deutschen Meilers”, Focus Online, 17 June 2011 (in German),see https://www.focus.de/wissen/klima/tid-22667/versuchsatomkraftwerk-kahl-anfang-und-ende-des-ersten-deutschen-meilers_
aid_637434.html, accessed 3 July 2020.
956 - Ines Bredberg et al., “Statusbericht zur Kernenergie­nutzung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2016”, Bundesamt fürkerntechnische Entsorgungssicherheit, 2017.
957 - Both sites cannot be released from regulatory control as the buildings are used for further decommissioning works orinterim storage of wastes; see Ben Wealer et al., “Stand und Perspektiven des Rückbaus von Kernkraftwerken in Deutschland(»Rückbau‑Monitoring 2015«)”, DIW Berlin, TU Berlin, 2015.
958 - BGZ, “Logistikzentrum für Endlager Konrad entsteht in Würgassen”, 2020 (in German),see https://bgz.de/2020/03/06/logistikzentrum-fuer-endlager-konrad-entsteht-in-wuergassen/, accessed 3 July 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 With the issuing of the permit for Philippsburg-2 in December 2019, all eight reactors closed
in the aftermath of the Fukushima events in March 2011 received the decommissioning permit
from the regulatory authorities.959 In addition, with the defueling of the Krümmel power
plant in December 2019960, all of these reactors, with the exception of Isar-1, are now defueled.
Grafenrheinfeld, closed in 2015, is thought to be defueled by late-2020961 and to enter the
hot-zone works in 2021.
In early 2020, dismantling of the reactor internals was started at the Unterweser station,
PreussenElektra tendered this work to a Westinghouse-GNS consortium. In 2019,
PreussenElektra had subcontracted the reactor vessel segmentation to the GNS group.962 Also
during the year 2019:
ɆɆ The first decommissioning work in the hot-zone of the Brunsbüttel reactor was carriedout; Vattenfall had opted to start the decommissioning process with the most radioactive
parts, e.g. with the dismantling of the internals of the reactor pressure vessel.963
ɆɆ EnBW got the second and final permit for decommissioning work at the Neckarwestheim
plant, this includes the dismantling of the biological shield, the lower part of the reactor
pressure vessel, and the spent fuel pool.964 Although, some decommissioning activities of
the hot-zone-stage have already been carried out, i.e. in mid-2019 EnBW completed thedismantling and disassembly of the reactor pressure vessel internals.
ɆɆ At the Philippsburg-1 unit, EnBW is currently dismantling the internals and the head of
the reactor pressure vessel.965
WNISR2020 counts those four reactors as in the hot-zone stage.
The Lingen reactor was put into LTE in 1988, and decommissioning started in 2018. The
reactor is currently in the warm-up stage and RWE estimates that dismantling of the reactor
pressure vessel could be started later this year. RWE tendered this work to the U.S. company
Atkins.
The segmentation of the complete pressure vessel of the Mülheim-Kärlich and the vesselinternals of the two Biblis units was also successfully tendered in 2019 to KORE, a consortium

959 - Bredberg et al., Statusbericht zur Kernenergienutzung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2018.
960 - IWR Online, “Atomkraftwerk Krümmel ist jetzt frei von Kernbrennstoff”, Internationales Wirtschaftsforum Regenerative
Energien, 16 December 2019 (in German), see https://www.iwr.de/ticker/letzter-castor-atomkraftwerk-kruemmel-ist-jetzt-frei-vonkernbrennstoff-artikel2075, accessed 11 May 2020.
961 - Irene Spiegel, “Kernkraftwerk: Rückbau startet 2021 in die heiße Phase”, Main-Post, 31 January 2020 (in German),see https://www.mainpost.de/regional/schweinfurt/Kernkraftwerk-Rueckbau-startet-2021-in-die-heissePhase;art763,10397091#kommentare, accessed 11 May 2020.
962 - PreussenElektra, “Kernkraftwerk Unterweser: Zerlegearbeiten im Reaktordruckbehälter haben begonnen”,
6 February 2020 (in German), see https://www.preussenelektra.de/de/unser-unternehmen/newsroom/pressemitteilungen/2020/
KKUZerlegearbeitenimRDBhabenbegonnen.html, accessed 11 May 2020.
963 - Sven Jachmann, “Roboter zerschneidet das Herzstück des AKW Brunsbüttel”, NDR, 28 November 2019 (in German),see https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/AKW-Brunsbuettel-Unterwasser-Roboter-im-Einsatz,akw344.html,
accessed 11 May 2020.
964 - EnBW, “Kernkraftwerk Neckarwestheim: EnBW erhält zweite und letzte Genehmigung für den Rückbau von Block I”,
Press Release, 12 December 2019 (in German), see https://www.enbw.com/unternehmen/presse/kernkraftwerk-neckarwestheim-enbwerhaelt-zweite-und-letzte-geneh.html, accessed 16 August 2020.
965 - EnBW Kernkraft GmbH, “TOP 4 – Aktuelles. Bericht der EnBW”, presented at the 13. Sitzung derInformationskommission Philippsburg, 18 November 2019 (in German), see https://infokommission-kkp.de/documents/20596/218072/13.+Sitzung+TOP+4+Herr+Michels.pdf/af9f6ab9-7364-4e6c-8122-8c1de28e04a8, accessed 16 August 2020.

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of EWN and Orano; while the segmentation of the vessel was awarded to Kraftanlagen
Heidelberg, a Steag consortium.966
Table 15 shows the development in the decommissioning process since 2015 (see WNISR2018 formore details on decommissioning in Germany).
Table 15 · Status of Reactor Decommissioning in Germany (as of May 2020)
Germany“Warm-up-stage”

2015

May 2018

May 2019

May 2020

10

11(a)

11

8

of which defueled

0

3

(a)

(a)

4

6

“Hot-zone-stage”

3

4

4

8

“Ease-off-stage”

9

8

8

8

LTE(b)

2

1(a)

1

1

Completed

4of which released from regulatory control
Total Closed Reactors

5
3

28

5
3

29

5
3

29

3
30

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Notes:
a - corrected from WNISR2019.
b - LTE or Long-Term Enclosure.

Italy
Following a referendum on the use of nuclear power in November 1987, triggered by the
Chernobyl accident in April 1986, Italy no longer generated nuclear electricity.967 The
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Enrico Fermi (Trino) produced its last kilowatt-hours in
March 1987, the Gas-Cooled Reactor (GCR) Latina and the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
Caorso in 1986 and the BWR Garigliano in 1978. Caorso is the only larger BWR (860 MW) Italy
has to dismantle. Although Italy has only four units to dismantle, they have to deal with all
three major reactor types. In 2017, Italy estimated the cost to decommission the four reactors
and the entailed waste management at €7.2 billion (US$20178.1 billion).968 While this estimate
does not include the disposal of high-level waste, it takes into account interim storage as wellas the disposal of low- and intermediate-level waste. The estimate has almost doubled since2004, when the total estimate was around €4 billion (US$4.5 billion), and more than tripled
since the closure of the reactors, when decommissioning of the four reactors was projected tocost €2 billion (US$2.3 billion).969
In 1999, the state-owned company Sogin (Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari SpA) wasestablished during the privatization process of Enel with the task to decommission Italy’s
966 - RWE, “RWE setzt sicheren Abbau von Großkomponenten an drei Kernkraftwerksstandorten konsequent fort”, Press Release,
18 October 2019 (in German), see https://www.group.rwe/-/media/RWE/documents/07-presse/rwe-nuclear-gmbh/2019-10-18-rwe-setztsicheren-abbau-von-grosskomponenten-konsequent-fort.pdf, accessed 26 July 2020967 - WNISR considers the day of the last electricity generation as the closure date.
968 - David Dalton, “Italy’s €7.2 Billion Decommissioning Cost Estimate Is Robust And Thorough, Says IAEA”, NucNet,
21 September 2017, see https://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2017/09/21/italy-s-7-2-billion-decommissioning-cost-estimate-is-robustand-thorough-says-iaea, accessed 3 May 2019.
969 - Wolfgang Irrek, Lars Kirchner and Lutz Jarczynski, “Comparison among different decommissioning funds methodologies fornuclear installations - Final Country Report (WP 1/ WP 3) Italy”, Wuppertal Institut for Climate, Environment and Energy, 2007.

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nuclear power plants as well as finding a national waste storage site. The shareholder of Sogin
is the Ministry of Economy and Finance, while the strategic and operational directives comefrom the Ministry of Economic Development. At the same time, the initial strategy of longterm enclosure was changed to immediate dismantling. In 2004, it was estimated that Sogin
would decommission the four reactors by 2024.
As there is no disposal facility available, the national decommissioning strategy is divided into
two distinct phases with an estimated endpoint set at 2035:
ɆɆ First phase: Decommissioning up to brownfield level; dismantling and waste treatment
activities to be completed and the waste stored onsite. The duration of this phase depends
on the availability of the final disposal facility.
ɆɆ Second phase: Decommissioning of the reactor itself up to greenfield level; transfer of all
the wastes to the repository and release of the site from regulatory control.
Italian legislation allows to authorize specific dismantling activities before the overall
decommissioning plan is approved, if these activities benefit safety and radiation protection,some of which are underway, e.g., decontamination works, conditioning, construction ofinterim storages.
All four closed reactors are in the warm-up stage and have been defueled. The decommissioning
licenses for the PWR Enrico Fermi (Trino) and the BWR Garigliano have been issued in
2012970, although decommissioning works have been carried out at both stations since 1999.
Sogin expects to complete decommissioning of Enrico Fermi to a brownfield site by 2031971 andGarigliano by 2026.972
The decommissioning license for the BWR Caorso was issued in 2014.973 The reactor has
been defueled since 2010, when the spent fuel was sent to France for reprocessing. Caorso iscurrently in the warm-up stage and Sogin expects to conclude decommissioning by 2031.974
The only GCR in Italy, Latina, has been defueled in the early 1990s and the spent fuel sent to
the U.K. for reprocessing. The decommissioning license for Latina was expected in 2018 but has
only been granted in June 2020.975 Since 2006, some decommissioning work has been carriedout. Sogin currently expects to finish decommissioning up to the brownfield stage with waste
storage onsite by 2027.976 Subsequently, it will start with the decommissioning of the reactor
building until it reaches the stage of greenfield site. Wastes are currently stored on-site, but the
970 - ISPRA, “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Fifth Italian National Report”, National Centre for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection of the Institute for the Environmental
Protection and Research, October 2017, see https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/6rm-italy.pdf.
971 - Sogin, “Trino nuclear power plant Vercelli - Decommissioning”, 2019, see https://www.sogin.it/en/about-us/environmentalremediation-of-nuclear-sites/where-we-are/trino-nuclear-power-plant-vercelli.html, accessed 6 May 2019.
972 - Sogin, “Garigliano nuclear power plant”, 2020, see https://www.sogin.it/en/closureoftheitaliannuclearcycle/italian-nuclear-sites/
gariglianonuclearpowerplant/Pagine/default.aspx, accessed 3 July 2020.
973 - ISPRA, “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management - Fifth
Italian National Report”, October 2017, op. cit., p.13.
974 - Sogin, “Caorso nuclear power plant”, 2020, see https://www.sogin.it/en/closureoftheitaliannuclearcycle/italian-nuclear-sites/
caorsonuclearpowerplant/Pagine/default.aspx, accessed 6 July 2020.
975 - WNN, “Italy approves dismantling of Latina plant”, 2 June 2020, see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Dismantling-ofItalys-Latina-plant-to-begin, accessed 6 July 2020.
976 - Sogin, “Latina nuclear power plant”, 2020, see https://www.sogin.it/en/closureoftheitaliannuclearcycle/italian-nuclear-sites/
latinanuclearpowerplant/Pagine/default.aspx, accessed 6 July 2020.

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GCR Latina depends more than any other reactor on the opening of a national repository as
the dismantling of the reactor will produce around 2,000 tons of highly radioactive graphite.
(See WNISR2019 for details on the decommissioning process in Italy).

United Kingdom
Since 1977, 30 reactors or 4.7 GW were closed in the U.K., consisting mainly of small, first
generation Gas-Cooled Reactors (GCRs), the Magnox design (26 reactors). Decommissioningof this legacy fleet is the responsibility of the public body Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority (NDA). The NDA’s strategy is to seal and store the biological shield, the pressure
vessel, the external pressure circuit, and steam generators, while the actual dismantling of thereactors would begin only 85 years after the initial closure. This strategy is controversial andrecent studies have shown that after 85 years, large amounts of the reactor waste will still not
be suitable for disposal as low-level waste. In addition, the NDA realized that the reduction indecommissioning costs with the increase in deferral time is largely offset by the increased costof preparing and managing the LTE of the reactor.977
Most of the waste will be conditioned on-site until the final disposal route is available. Somesite decommissioning and remediation work has been undertaken at most sites with a major
focus on defueling the reactors and emptying the ponds for the LTE state (all fuel will betransferred to Sellafield). Magnox Ltd., the service provider, is working towards a target of
placing all the reactors into LTE by 2028. NDA’s current plan indicates that it will take another
110 years to complete the core-mission of nuclear clean-up and waste management.978
The NDA sites are managed through private-sector consortia, while Sellafield is managed by
the NDA itself. The NDA owns these sites and takes the role as the supervising and contracting
authority and is turning the management over to the contractors, the so-called Site License
Companies (SLC). The SLCs are the long-term shareholders of the sites, but the management
is periodically opened to competition. The winner of these contracts (formerly tendered
under EU public procurement law) acts as the Parent Body Organization (PBO), receives theshares of the SLC, and organizes the strategic management. This mechanism was thought toincrease the efficiency of the procedure by opening the work to private contractors.979 In a
2018-report, the House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee stated the NDA failed inboth the procurement and management of the contract (one of the highest value and mostimportant contracts awarded by the Government), e.g. the procurement process was overly
complex, the contract was awarded to the wrong bidder, the settlement of legal claims reachednearly £100 million to a losing consortium, and the scale of the work was drastically underestimated.980

977 - NDA, “Strategy—Effective from April 2016”, Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, March 2016.
978 - Ibidem.
979 - Gordon MacKerron, “Multiple Challenges - Nuclear Waste Governance in the United Kingdom”, in Nuclear Waste Governance.
An International Comparison, ed. by Lutz Mez and Achim Brunnengräber, Springer VS, 2015.
980 - Public Accounts Committee, “The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Magnox contract (Summary)”, U.K. Houseof Commons, 28 February 2018, see https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/461/46103.htm#_
idTextAnchor000, accessed 15 April 2018.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 With the exception of Calder Hall 1–4, all the sites with Magnox reactors are operated by the
SLC Magnox Ltd. From 2014 onwards, Cavendish Fluor Partnership was the PBO, but thecontract officially ended in 2019. The Sellafield complex is operated by the SLC Sellafield Ltd.,
which since 2016 is a wholly owned subsidiary of the NDA. A detailed NDA review concluded
that the PBO model was less suited for the complex, technical uncertainties at the Sellafieldsite.981 Its mission to retrieve nuclear waste from some of the world’s oldest nuclear facilities
is planned to extend well into the 22nd century and the amounts of money involved are far
greater than for other NDA sites. In July 2018, the NDA announced that Magnox Ltd will also
become a subsidiary of the NDA.982 Hence, since 2019, decommissioning of the entire legacy
fleet, with the exception of the two Dounreay fast breeders,983 is managed by the NDA. While
the NDA funding largely comes directly from the Government, a segregated fund—the Nuclear
Liabilities Fund—fed by payments from the only remaining nuclear power plant operator EDF
Energy is in place for the operational fleet. (See WNISR2018 for details on the decommissioning
process in the U.K.).

Spain
Spain has a national policy for decommissioning its reactors, specified by the official
periodically updated “General Radioactive Waste Plan”. In this plan, all decommissioning andwaste management activities are developed by Enresa, the state-owned company Empresa
Nacional de Residuos Radiactivos S.A. While the LTE strategy is applied for the Gas-Cooled
Reactor (GCR) Vandellos-1, all LWRs are bound to be immediately dismantled to greenfield.
Spain describes decommissioning and waste management as an essential public service andassigns these tasks to Enresa.984
The operator of the reactor is responsible for spent fuel, or must otherwise provide a spent fuelmanagement plan, as this task falls under activities prior to decommissioning (e.g. defuelingthe reactor, conditioning of operational wastes).985 Once these activities are completed, thedecommissioning plan set up by Enresa must be approved, before the site is temporarilytransferred to Enresa which then becomes the decommissioning licensee.986 In general,
this transition period of conditioning the waste, defueling the reactor and transferring
the license is expected to last three years, while the decommissioning work is estimated totake 10 years. Although this seems short compared to the international average of 20 years
for decommissioned reactors, if Enresa did finish the ease-off stage of the José Cabrera-1
reactor in the course of 2020, decommissioning would indeed have lasted only 10 years. When981 - NDA, “Explained: the new model for managing Sellafield”, Updated 1 April 2016, see https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/new-model-for-managing-sellafield/explained-the-new-model-for-managing-sellafield, accessed 16 May 2017.
982 - NDA and Magnox Ltd, “Magnox Limited to become a Nuclear Decommissioning Authority subsidiary”, 2 July 2018, see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/magnox-limited-to-become-a-nuclear-decommissioning-authority-subsidiary, accessed 18 July 2018.
983 - Here a consortium of Cavendish Nuclear, Jacobs, and AECOM owns the SLC Dounreay Site Restoration Ltd.
984 - By Article 38 bis of Law 25/1964 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
985 - IAEA, “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management—
Sixth Spanish National Report”, Report drafted by the Spanish Ministry of Energy, Tourism and the Digital Agenda, theNuclear Safety Council, the Spanish Radioactive Waste Management Agency, and the Spanish Electrical Industry Association,
October 2017, see https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/national_report_of_spain_for_the_6th_review_meeting_-_english.pdf,
accessed 11 August 2019.
986 - Ibidem.

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decommissioning is complete and the “Closure Declaration” has been issued by the regulatory
body—the Nuclear Safety Council or CSN987—the site will be returned to its former owner.988
Enresa is also responsible for managing the funds and liabilities for decommissioning. The
external segregated fund is fed by two fees, the rate of which is regulated. The first fee isincluded in the electricity prices and used to finance waste management and decommissioning
activities for those reactors closed prior to 2010 (José Cabrera and Vandellos-1). The second
fee is for the reactors that have been operating beyond 2010 and stems from the income fromoperating the reactors.989 After decommissioning starts, there are no more payments to thefund and in the case of a shortfall, it would be the full responsibility of the decommissioning
licensee Enresa and hence the taxpayer to cover these costs.990
The latest “General Radioactive Waste Plan” estimates that decommissioning all of Spain’s
reactors will cost around €4.79 billion (~US$5.3 billion)991 or around €585/kW (~US$645/kW),
which is less than a third of the estimated decommissioning costs for the José Cabrera-1 reactor.
The cost estimates for the latter have already doubled to around €259 million or €1,800/kW(US$292 million or US$2,100/kW), although this included cost estimates for waste processing,storage, and disposal.992
As of mid-2020, Spain had three closed reactors with a combined capacity of just over 1 GW.
There was no tangible progress in decommissioning since WNISR2019. José Cabrera-1,
a 241-MW Westinghouse PWR (1-Loop), which was closed in 2006 is still in the “ease-off
stage”, which is expected to be completed in 2020. Vandellos-1 is a 480-MW GCR designed
and supplied by the French state agency CEA and was closed in 1990. Although some limited
decommissioning work was carried out, WNISR considers the reactor as in LTE, as the main
decommissioning will be carried out after an enclosure period of 25 years. The GE BWR at theSanta Maria de Garoña station was closed in 2012 due to economic reasons (see WNISR2018).
The operator, Nuclenor (a joint venture of Endesa and Iberdrola), is currently defueling thereactor and plans to transfer the spent fuel to the interim storage facility as well as condition
the operational wastes. In May 2020, Enresa has submitted an application for the transferof ownership and decommissioning start to the Ministry for Ecological Transition and
Demographic Challenge (MITECO), which Enresa expects for 2022.993 The reactor is currently
in the warm-up stage. (See WNISR2019 for details on the decommissioning process in Spain).

987 - CSN stands for Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear.
988 - Nuclear Energy Agency, “Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning in Spain”, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, October 2018, see https://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/profiles/Spain_report.pdf, accessed 11 August 2019.
989 - IAEA, “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management—Sixth
Spanish National Report”, Report drafted by the Spanish Ministry of Energy, Tourism and the Digital Agenda, the Nuclear Safety
Council, the Spanish Radioactive Waste Management Agency, and the Spanish Electrical Industry Association, October 2017.
990 - OECD/NEA, “Costs of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants”, Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016.
991 - Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico and Government of Spain, “Borrador de 7o PGRR”, Government of
Spain, March 2020 (in Spanish), see https://energia.gob.es/es-es/Novedades/Documents/borrador_7_PGRR.pdf.
992 - OECD/NEA, “Costs of Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants”, 2016.
993 - WNN, “Decommissioning application submitted for Garoña”, 26 May 2020, see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/
Decommissioning-application-submitted-for-Garona, accessed 26 May 2020.

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RussiaIn Russia, owner/operators are expected to have earmarked finances to cover the costs
associated with decommissioning; for this purpose “special reserve funds” were establishedwithin the state corporation Rosatom.994 Information about the Russian decommissioning
fund has been inconclusive and contradictory; the terms “reserve” and “funds” have different
institutional components.995 In 2002, it was established that Rosatom should transfer money
to a special reserve fund and that this amount should be 1.3 percent of the gross income
generated by the sale of electricity. Money from the reserves is already spent on current
decommissioning projects, though it is unclear how much.996 In 2012, the percentage of thegross income generated by the sale of electricity that has to be put aside by Rosatom into thefunds was increased to 3.2 percent.997
According to Rosatom, around €160 million (US$182 million) were accumulated in the “special
reserve funds” by 2015.998 To put the amount into perspective, this is roughly a fifth of theestimated decommissioning costs for the four Leningrad reactors alone. In addition, if thenumbers from Lithuania’s Ignalina site are taken as reference, the decommissioning of the four
Leningrad RBMKs will cost more likely around €6 billion (US$6.7 billion).
It seems that in addition to technological challenges with dismantling, Russia has not set aside
appropriate funding for decommissioning and has been heavily underestimating costs. It is
unclear how Russia will handle this challenge in the future. One short-term option would be
the long-term enclosure of closed reactors, while other units still generate income. A muchriskier strategy that Russia has apparently adopted consists in the building of new reactors
dedicated to generate income to replace ageing, life-extended units,999 pushing the financing
challenge further into the future.
In Russia, there was no tangible process in reactor decommissioning in 2019-20. As of mid2020, Russia had eight closed reactors with a combined capacity of 2,107 MW consisting of
two different reactor types: five first-generation Light-Water Gas-cooled Reactors (LWGR or
RBMK)—among them one Chernobyl-type reactor—and three Soviet-style PWRs. WNISR
considers them all in LTE (see WNISR2019 for details on the decommissioning process in
Russia).

994 - Russian Federation, “The Fifth National Report of the Russian Federation on Compliance with the Obligations of the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management”, Prepared for the Sixth Review
Meeting of the Joint Convention, IAEA, 2017.
995 - Kjersti Album et al., “Status of Russia’s decommission fund”, 2006.
996 - Kjersti Album, Tore Braend and Audun Randen Johnson, “How to pay? Financing decommissioning of nuclear power
plants”, Naturvernforbundet/Friends of the Earth Norway, 2017, see https://naturvernforbundet.no/getfile.php/13122760/Bilder/
International%20projects/Report%20How%20To%20Pay%202017.pdf.
997 - Ibidem.
998 - Ibidem.
999 - Oskar Njaa, Nils Bøhmer and Charles Digges, “Russian Nuclear Power 2018”, Bellona, 2018.

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CONCLUSION ON REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING
Reactor decommissioning is an important element of the nuclear power system, but its technicaland financial challenges are still largely underestimated. The size of the decommissioning
activities is increasing rapidly, though: Assuming a 40-year average lifetime, a further 203
reactors will close by 2031 (reactors connected to the grid between 1980 and 1991); and an
additional 122 will be closed by 2060; this does not even account for the 83 reactors whichstarted operating before 1980, an additional 31 reactors in Long-term Outage (LTO) and the
52 reactors under construction as of mid-2020.
Around 60 percent of the closed reactors are located in Europe (90 in Western Europe and 23
in Central & Eastern Europe), followed by North America (44 reactors), and Asia (32 reactors).
As of mid-2020, 169 units are globally awaiting or are in various stages of decommissioning,
six more than in the first quarter of 2019. Since WNISR2019, only one reactor (La Crosse in
the U.S.) completed the technical decommissioning, although the site is not yet released from
regulatory control pending the final site survey and license reduction to the independent spent
fuel installations on site.
These accomplished projects increased the total number of decommissioned reactors in
the world from 19 to 20, with a combined capacity of around 6 GW. This represents only
7 percent of the total 84 GW withdrawn from the grid. The average worldwide duration of thedecommissioning process, independent of the chosen strategy, is around 20 years, with a very
high variance: the minimum of six years for the 22-MW Elk River plant, and the maximum of
42 years for the 17-MW CVTR (Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor), both small reactors, both in
the U.S.
Around three-quarters of the closed reactors belong to the three major reactor technologies:
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and Gas-Cooled
Reactor (GCR). Not one graphite-moderated reactor has yet been decommissioned (see casestudies on France and the U.K.); this also holds true for Light Water Cooled and Graphite
Moderated Reactors (LWGR) such as the Chernobyl-type RBMK. How to safely dismantle
graphite-moderated reactors has yet to be demonstrated, not only in Russia but worldwide. Theinternationally preferred strategy is long-term enclosure, although some countries, including
Italy and Lithuania, appear to be opting for a faster dismantling strategy. This remains to beseen, as the units in these countries are still in the warm-up stage and the Ignalina reactors in
Lithuania are not even yet fully defueled.
The U.S. is still the most advanced country and has now with 14 completed projects by far themost decommissioned reactors, representing around three quarters of the world total. A neworganizational model of selling decommissioning licenses to a contractor is gaining popularity
in the country. Of the 12 reactors currently in the warm-up and ease-off stage as well as
recently completed La Crosse, only Humboldt Bay was not transferred to a decommissioning
licensee or contracted to one of the above companies. Already seven units were transferred
to decommissioning companies, while another two transfers are pending for two units
which are slated for decommissioning in the coming years. The waste management company
EnergySolutions seems to be involved in most if not all U.S. decommissioning projects andplans to enter the Japanese market. Limited-liability decommissioning companies appear| 245

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to operate according to business incentives that are starting to attract regulatory and legal
attention. This new organizational model may allow to exploit economies of scale, but it relies
on an efficient allocation of financial risks that has not yet been established.
The early nuclear states Canada, France, Russia and U.K. have not fully decommissioned one
single reactor. Canada, Russia and U.K. put all their closed reactors into LTE, postponing
decommissioning into the far future. Russia especially faces challenges concerning thedecommissioning of its 11 RBMK reactors. Information about the Russian decommissioning
fund has been inconclusive and contradictory.
Table 16 · Overview of reactor decommissioning in 11 selected countries (as of May 2020)
Country

Closed Reactors

Warm-upHot-zone

Ease-off

LTE

Completed

Percentage

USA

38

8

0

4

12

14

37%

UK

30

0

0

0

30

0

0%

Germany

30

8

8

8

1

5

17%

Japan

27

26

0

0

0

1

4%

France

14

4

2

0

8

0

0%

Russia

8

0

0

0

8

0

0%

Canada

6

0

0

0

6

0

0%

Italy

4

4

0

0

0

0

0%

Spain

3

1

0

1

1

0

0%

Lithuania

2

2

0

0

0

0

0%

South Korea

2

2

0

0

0

0

0%

164

55

10

13

66

20

Total

Sources: Various, compiled by WNISR, 2020

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POTENTIAL NEWCOMER
COUNTRIES
ASIA
Suspended or Cancelled ProgramsIndonesia is ranked sixteenth in terms of GDP and is the only one of three countries in the
top 20, the others being Australia and Saudi Arabia, that have not deployed nuclear power.
However, in 1997 a Nuclear Energy Law was adopted that gave guidance on construction,
operation, and decommissioning. After various attempts, in December 2015, the Government
pulled the plug on all nuclear plans, even for the longer-term future. The latest revision of the
new and renewable energy policy mix mentions that nuclear will be only considered should therenewable energy target to produce 23 percent of power by 2025 not be achieved.1000
Kazakhstan operated a small fast breeder reactor, the BN 350 at Aktau, between 1972-1998
and is one of only three countries in the world to have abandoned commercial nuclear power,
the others being Italy and Lithuania. In the following years, Kazakhstan has had a numberof discussions with countries and reactor suppliers. in April 2019, during a meeting between
President Putin of Russia and Kazakhstan’s president Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, it was suggested
that Russia help in the construction of a nuclear power plant at Ulken in the southeastern
Almaty Province. Soon after this, Deputy Kazakh Energy Minister Magzum Mirzagaliev said
there was no “concrete decision” to construct a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan.1001
In June 2007, in Thailand the cabinet set up the Nuclear Power Program Development Officeunder the National Energy Policy Council and appointed an Infrastructure Establishment
Committee, the Nuclear Power Utility subcommittee which is supervising the electricity utility(Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand – EGAT) in assessing the options for nuclear
power. Since then various policy options and companies have been considered, and in April 2017,
China and Thailand signed a nuclear co-operation agreement. At that occasion, CGN statedthat “China is very willing to provide Thailand with the most advanced, most economical andsafest nuclear power technology, as well as equipment, management experience and quality
service.”1002 However, since then, there seem to have been no progress in developing nuclear
power in Thailand.
Uzbekistan has announced its intention to develop nuclear power, with the help of Russia. In an
April 2019 interview with Nuclear Engineering International (NEI), Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov,
director general of Uzatom, announced site analysis work over the following 18 months at threelocations. Mirzamakhmudov says that they have chosen the VVER-1200 reactor design, which
would be financed through an engineering, procurement and construction agreement via asoft loan from Russia. The reactors would provide power for domestic consumption, but some1000 - Norton Rose Fulbright, “Renewable energy snapshot: Indonesia”, April 2019, see https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/
knowledge/publications/0552a1f0/renewable-energy-snapshot-indonesia, accessed 4 July 2020.
1001 - Bruce Pannier, “Putin Offers Russian Help To Build Kazakh Nuclear Plant”, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 6 April 2019,see https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-putin-offers-russian-nuclear-plant-help/29865177.html, accessed 28 May 2020.
1002 - WNN, “China, Thailand agree to nuclear energy cooperation”, 5 April 2017, see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-ChinaThailand-agree-to-nuclear-energy-cooperation-0504174.html, accessed 28 May 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 of it could also be exported to neighboring countries such as Afghanistan.1003 It was later statedthat the intention was to choose a site, and have it licensed by September 2020,1004 although
this would appear extremely optimistic.
Vietnam, with its growing economy and energy demand for decades had been seen a perfectcountry to develop nuclear power, and in October 2010, Vietnam signed an intergovernmental
agreement with Russia’s Atomstroyexport to build the Ninh Thuan-1 nuclear power plant,
using 1200 MW VVER reactors. Construction was expected to begin in 2014, with theturnkey project being owned and operated by the state utility Electricity of Vietnam (EVN).
A second agreement was also signed with Japanese companies to develop an additional
plant.1005 10.1 percent to 5.7 percent by 2030.1006 However, ambitions were severely curtailedin November 2016, when 92 percent of the members of the National Assembly approved agovernment motion to cancel the proposed nuclear projects with both Russia and Japan, due toslowing electricity demand increases, concerns of safety and rising construction costs.1007

CONTINENTAL EUROPE
BelarusConstruction started in November 2013 at Belarus’s first nuclear reactor at the Ostrovets
power plant, also called Belarusian-1. Construction of a second 1200 MWe AES-2006 reactor
started at the same site in June 2014.
In October 2011, a contract was signed between the Belarus Nuclear Power Plant Construction
Directorate, and Russia’s AtomStroyExport (ASE). It defines the main terms of the generalcontract for the construction of two reactors as a turnkey project to be carried out by ASE,
with the first unit scheduled to be commissioned in 2017 and the second in 2018.1008 Aftervarious delays, the reactors are now close to completion and fuel loading of unit 1 is scheduled
for July 2020, with grid connection expected later that year and Unit 2 following in 2021.1009
However, during the summer of 2020, there were increasing concerns about the spread of the
COVID-19 virus amongst the 4,000 Belarus and Russian workers on site.1010 The imminency ofcompletion is increasing the political attention the project is now facing.

1003 - NEI Magazine, “Uzbekistan’s nuclear aspirations”, 9 April 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureuzbekistans-nuclear-aspirations-7145738/, accessed 28 May 2020.
1004 - WNN, “Russia and Uzbekistan agree to start survey of new plant site”, 17 May 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Russia-and-Uzbekistan-agree-to-start-survey-of-new, accessed 28 May 2020.
1005 - WNN, “Vietnam prepares for nuclear power”, 6 October 2011,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Vietnam-prepares-for-nuclear-power, accessed 28 May 2020.
1006 - Viet Phuong Nguyen, “The fate of nuclear power in Vietnam”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 5 December 2016,see https://thebulletin.org/fate-nuclear-power-vietnam10245, accessed 28 May 2020.
1007 - NIW, “Briefs—Vietnam”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 28 November 2016.
1008 - WNN, “Contract signed for Belarusian reactors”, 11 October 2011,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Contract-signed-for-Belarusian-reactors, accessed 28 May 2020.
1009 - NEI Magazine, “Belarus 1 prepares for fuel loading”, 14 May 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsbelarus-1-prepares-for-fuel-loading-7924095/, accessed 30 May 2020.
1010 - Gary Peach, “Belarus Prepares Reactor Launch Despite Covid-19 Surge”, NIW, 29 May 2020.

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The Russian and Belarusian Governments agreed that Russia would lend up to US$10 billion
for 25 years to finance 90 percent of the project. In July 2012, the contract was signed for theconstruction of the two reactors for an estimated cost of US$10 billion, including US$3 billion
for new infrastructure to accommodate the remoteness of Ostrovets in northern Belarus.1011
Under the terms of the loan agreement Belarus should begin to repay the loan no later than
1 April 2021. Furthermore, the current loan rate for Belarus is a fixed 5.23 a year for half ofthe selected funds and “six-month LIBOR in dollars (now 1.72%) plus 1.83% per annum” forthe other half.1012 Belarus has also proposed increasing the repayment period from 25 years(counting from the date of opening a credit line in 2011) to 35 years, but this has so far been
rejected by the Russian counterparts.1013 The Minsk Government is also seeking to reduce theinterest rate and to delay the start of payments from April 2021 to April 2023.1014
The project assumes liability for the supply of all fuel and repatriation of spent fuel for thelife of the plant. The fuel is to be reprocessed in Russia and the separated wastes returned
to Belarus. In May 2016, the respective startup months were specified as November 2018 andJuly 2020.1015 In August 2016, the reactor pressure vessel of unit one slipped and fell two meters
before hitting the ground, during installation. This led to an eight-month delay, while it was
replaced.1016
The official cost of the project has increased by 26 percent, to 56 billion Russian rubles in
2001-prices (US$20011.8 billion).1017 However, the falling exchange rate of the ruble against the
dollar significantly affects the dollar price of the project.
The project is the focus of international opposition and criticism, with formal complaints
from the Lithuanian Government1018 that has published a list of fundamental problems of the
project. These include claims of major construction problems, doubts about the site suitability
and accusations of non-compliance with some of its public engagement obligations according
to the Espoo Convention. Belarus was in 2017 found in non-compliance with the Aarhus
Convention for harassing members of civil society campaigning against the project.1019 Then,in April 2019, a meeting of the Espoo Convention voted by 30 to 6 that Belarus had violated theconvention’s rules while choosing Ostrovets as the site for a nuclear power plant.1020
1011 - NIW, “Belarus, Aided by Russia and Broke, Europe’s Last Dictatorship Proceeds With NPP”, 28 September 2012.
1012 - NEI, “Finance discussed as unit 1 of Belarus NPP prepares for start-up”, 14 February 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsfinance-discussed-as-unit-1-of-belarus-npp-prepares-for-start-up-7773070/,
accessed 28 May 2020.
1013 - NEI, “Finance Discussed as Unit 1 of Belarus NPP Prepares for Start-Up”, 14 February 2020, op. cit.
1014 - Gary Peach, “Belarus Prepares Reactor Launch Despite Covid-19 Surge”, NIW, 29 May 2020.
1015 - WNN, “Reactor vessel assembly completed for second Belarusian unit”, 26 May 2016, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/
NN-Reactor-vessel-assembly-completed-for-second-Belarusian-unit-26051601.html, accessed 28 May 2020.
1016 - NIW, “Briefs – Belarus”, 15 February 2019.
1017 - Charter 97, “Astravets NPP Becomes 12 Billion More Expensive In One Day”, 30 December 2016,see https://charter97.org/en/news/2016/12/30/236059/, accessed 30 May 2020.
1018 - Bryan Bradley, “Lithuania Urges Belarus to Halt Nuclear Project on Safety Issues”, Bloomberg, 20 August 2013,see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-20/lithuania-urges-belarus-to-halt-nuclear-project-on-safety-issues,
accessed 30 May 2020.
1019 - UNECE, “Findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2014/102 concerning compliance by Belarus”,
UN Economic Commission for Europe, presented at the Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters – 58th Meeting 10-13 September 2017, 24 July 2017,see https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CC-58/ece.mp.pp.c.1.2017.19.e.pdf, accessed 30 May 2020.
1020 - NIW, “Briefs – Belarus”, 15 February 2019.

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In April 2017, an accord was signed by all parties in the Lithuanian Parliament noting that allnecessary measures should be taken to stop the construction of Ostrovets and “at least to ensurethat the electricity produced in this nuclear power plant will not be allowed into Lithuania nor
will it be allowed to be sold on the Lithuanian market under any circumstances”.1021
The Belarussian Government, in order to allay European concerns about Ostrovets, submitted
the project to a post-Fukushima nuclear stress test and produced a national report, which
was submitted to peer-review by a commission from the European Nuclear Safety Regulators
Group (ENSREG) and the European Commission. In July 2018, the European Commission
announced that the ENSREG report had been presented to the Belarussian authorities andthe executive summary was made public, which concludes that “although the report is overall
positive, it includes important recommendations that necessitate an appropriate follow up”.
For example, on the topic of assessment of severe accident management, it says, “the overall
concept of practical elimination of early and large releases should be more explicitly reflectedin an updated plant safety case.” It also gave recommendations for better seismic robustness.1022
The Belarus authorities have not responded to the peer-review report and in June 2019 theCouncil of the European Union stated: “The Commission and ENSREG have been callingupon Belarus to swiftly prepare and present a National Action Plan to address the peerreview findings and recommendations, in line with the practice followed for previous stresstests within the EU and with third countries. At the moment of preparation of this report,
the Commission and ENSREG are still awaiting reception of this plan.”1023 The LithuanianPresident has called upon the European Commission to take all possible actions to ensure
the safety of the power plant and in March 2020, the Belarus nuclear regulator discussed thenational action plan with ENSREG.1024
Belarus has historically been an importer of electricity from Russia and Ukraine. Lithuania
is trying to get its neighbors to follow the ban on nuclear power from Belarus, and will use
the Espoo ruling to add weight to its claim. In February 2020, the Governments of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania put out a joint declaration that they would oppose electricity purchasesfrom the nuclear power plant.1025 In addition, in May 2020, the Lithuanian Parliament passed
a resolution on Energy Independence proposing that the Government take technical means
to block electricity from Belarus.1026 The sale of electricity to the West will be vital for the
economics of the project, as increasing domestic consumption or even sale back to Russia willraise significantly lower revenues, due to lower prices. The inability to export the power will
1021 - Lithuanian Parliament, “Accord between the Parliamentary Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania on Joint Actions
Against the Unsafe Nuclear Power plant in Astraveyets”, April 2017.
1022 - ENSREG, “Belarus Stress Test National Report”, European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group, 22 May 2018,see http://www.ensreg.eu/news/belarus-stress-test-national-report, accessed 30 May 2020.
1023 - Council of the European Union, “Report on the implementation of the obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety - 8th
Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties”, 19 June 2019, see https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10365-2019-ADD-1/
en/pdf, accessed 30 May 2020.
1024 - Belta, “Fulfillment of national action plan in wake of Belarusian nuclear power plant stress tests reviewed”, News from Belarus,
11 March 2020, see https://atom.belta.by/en/belaes_en/view/fulfillment-of-national-action-plan-in-wake-of-belarusian-nuclear-powerplant-stress-tests-reviewed-10573/, accessed 10 June 2020.
1025 - Dominik Istrate, “Baltic States will not buy energy from Belarus NPP”, Emerging Europe, 13 February 2020,see https://emerging-europe.com/news/baltic-states-will-not-buy-energy-from-belarus-npp/, accessed 30 May 2020.
1026 - LRT, “Lithuanian parliament ups the ante on Belarus nuclear plant”, 5 May 2020, see https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-inenglish/19/1175343/lithuanian-parliament-ups-the-ante-on-belarus-nuclear-plant, accessed 30 May 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 lead to significant overcapacity and consequently President Alexander Lukashenko has said
that the Government needed to devise ways to get the population to use more electricity,
including retrofitting houses for electric heating and installing more water boilers.1027

PolandPoland planned the development of a series of nuclear power stations in the 1980s andstarted construction of two VVER1000/320 reactors in Żarnowiec on the Baltic coast, butboth construction and further plans were halted following the Chernobyl accident. Since
then there has been a long, expensive and time-consuming series of attempts to restart thenuclear program. In 2008, Poland announced that it was going to re-enter the nuclear arenaand in November 2010, the Ministry of Economy put forward a Nuclear Energy Program. On
28 January 2014, the Polish Government adopted a document with the title “Polish Nuclear
Power Programme” outlining the framework of the strategy. The plan included proposals tobuild 6 GW of nuclear power capacity with the first reactor starting up by 2024.1028 The reactor
types then under consideration included AREVA’s EPR, Westinghouse’s AP1000, and HitachiGE’s ABWR.
In January 2013, the Polish state-owned utility PGE (Polska Grupa Energetyczna) selected
WorleyParsons to conduct a five-year, US$81.5 million study, on the siting and development of
a nuclear power plant with a capacity of up to 3 GW.1029 At that time, the project was estimatedat US$13–19 billion and construction was to begin in 2019.1030 In January 2014, PGE received
four bids from companies looking to become the company’s “Owner’s Engineer” to help in thetendering and development of the project, which was eventually awarded to AMEC Nuclear
U.K. in July 2014. The timetable demanded that PGE make a final investment decision on thetwo plants by early 2017.1031 That did not happen.
In late 2017, the Energy Minister, Krzysztof Tchórzewski, said that he would like to see Poland
build three nuclear reactors, at five-yearly intervals, the first to operate in 2029, with each
unit costing US$7 billion.1032 In November 2018, the Government published a draft strategicenergy development program, which called for the construction of four reactors (providing
between 6–10 GW of capacity) by 2040, with the first in operation by 20331033—a decade later
than a plan published just five years earlier—with up to six units with a combined capacityof 6-9 GWe to be put into operation until 2043.1034 The Ministry of Energy envisages the site1027 - Gary Peach, “Belarus Prepares Reactor Launch Despite Covid-19 Surge”, NIW, 29 May 2020.
1028 - Lukasz Kuzniarski, “Polish Nuclear Power Programme”, Ministry of Economy, 17 March 2014, see https://www.iaea.org/
NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2014/2014-03-17-03-21-WS-INIG/DAY2/COUNTRY/L_Kuzniarski_POLAND_IAEA_workshop_
Seoul_2014.pdf, accessed 30 May 2020.
1029 - NIW, “Briefs – Poland”, 8 February 2013.
1030 - The Economist, “Going nuclear”, 31 January 2014, see https://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/01/polishenergy, accessed 30 May 2020.
1031 - Nucnet, “Amec Wins USD 430 Million Contract To Support Polish New-Build”, 9 July 2014, see https://www.nucnet.org/all-thenews/2014/07/21/amec-wins-usd-430-million-contract-to-support-polish-new-build, accessed 30 May 2020.
1032 - Wojciech Zurawski, “Poland may have first nuclear power plant by 2029”, Reuters, 6 September 2017, see https://www.reuters.
com/article/poland-nuclear/poland-may-have-first-nuclear-power-plant-by-2029-idUSL8N1LN222, accessed 30 May 2020.
1033 - Gary Peach, “Power Demand in Poland Bolsters Case for Nuclear”, NIW, 11 November 2018.
1034 - WNN, “Poland sets financing target for nuclear plant : Nuclear Policies”, 19 November 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Poland-sets-financing-target-for-nuclear-plant, accessed 30 May 2020.

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selection for the first plant in 2020, while the technology would be chosen in 2021.1035 While theplans are being developed, Poland is angering political parties and its neighbors with sparsity of
information. In November 2019, in a letter sent to German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier,
MP Sylvia Kötting-Uhl said the fact that Germany had not heard of the matter thus far was“incomprehensible and unacceptable” and that it was ignoring international law, such as the
Espoo Convention.1036
The financing model being proposed by the Government is not clear, although Poland’ssecretary of state in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and Government plenipotentiary
for strategic energy infrastructure said in November 2019 that the Government plans to set
up a special-purpose company in which it will own a 51 percent stake, with the remaining
49 percent to be held by a foreign partner. PGE could be a shareholder in that special-purpose
company.1037 PGE’s incoming CEO Wojciech Dąbrowski, however, declared in May 2020 that
although he was in favor of Poland developing nuclear power, “PGE will not be an investor in a
nuclear project”.1038
In 2019, renewable energy deployment continued to grow and, by mid-2020 is accounting for
10 GW of capacity, with the fastest developing renewable technology being solar power.1039

AFRICAIn continental Africa, only South Africa has an operating nuclear power plant. This is despite
sporadic support from national Governments and encouragement from international vendors,
now particularly China and Russia. According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA),
China has agreements with (but no plants under construction) in Kenya, Sudan and Uganda,
while Russia signed agreements with Algeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Rwanda andZambia.1040
Across the continent, electricity generation increased from 670 TWh in 2010 to 870 TWh in
2018, with natural gas and coal (the latter largely in South Africa) accounting for 40 percent
and 30 percent respectively, hydropower representing a further 16 percent, oil 9 percent, nonhydro renewables (solar, wind etc.) 3 percent and nuclear less than 2 percent. Africa does
however have a significant role for the global nuclear industry with Namibia and Niger theworld’s fourth- and fifth-largest uranium producers.
1035 - WNN, “Poland already preparing for nuclear plant, says energy minister”, 16 May 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Poland-already-preparing-for-nuclear-plant,-says-e, accessed 30 May 2020.
1036 - Florence Schulz, “Poland’s first nuclear power plants are attracting criticism - from neigbours”, Euractiv, 26 February 2020,see https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/polands-first-nuclear-power-plants-are-attracting-criticism-from-its-neigbours/,
accessed 4 July 2020.
1037 - WNN, “Poland Sets Financing Target for Nuclear Plant”, 19 November 2019,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Poland-sets-financing-target-for-nuclear-plant, accessed 30 May 2020.
1038 - Adam Easton, “Poland’s PGE puts forward plan to spin off coal, focus on renewables”, S&P Global, 13 May 2020,see https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/poland-s-pge-puts-forward-plan-to-spinoff-coal-focus-on-renewables-58602638, accessed 4 July 2020.
1039 - The First News, “Poland generates 10GW from renewables, solar fastest growing source”, 22 June 2020,see https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/poland-generates-10gw-from-renewables-solar-fastest-growing-source-13528,
accessed 23 June 2020.
1040 - WNA, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries | New Nuclear Build Countries”, March 2020,see https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx,
accessed 4 July 2020.

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For more information on the South African program see section on South Africa in Annex 1,
and on Egypt’s program see dedicated section in Middle East Focus.

While the WNA lists Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia as having considered nuclear power at one time or another in West, Central
or Southern Africa,1041 the vast majority of these are little more than political statements ofsupport designed to increase diplomatic links with key infrastructure providers and recipients.
However, over the past year some developments have occurred. Of significance is Rwanda thatin October 2019 signed an agreement with Rosatom to build a nuclear science center, with theintention of developing an interest in small modular reactors.1042 In Nigeria, in November 2019,
the Senate called on the Government to consider including nuclear power in the power mix
to give a mandate to the Atomic Energy Commission to negotiate with international nuclear
vendors. Nigeria has previously sought the support of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)to develop plans for up to 4,000 MWe of nuclear capacity by 2025, which are
obviously not achievable, at least in the originally envisaged timeframe.1043

1041 - WNA, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries”, January 2018, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/countryprofiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx, accessed 24 April 2018.
1042 - Katya Golubkova, “Russia’s Rosatom, Rwanda sign deal to build nuclear science center”, Reuters, 24 October 2019,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-rwanda-nuclear-idUSKBN1X32DV, accessed 4 July 2020.
1043 - WNN, “Nigerian Senate calls for inclusion of nuclear in energy mix”, 21 November 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Senate-calls-for-nuclear-inclusion-in-Nigeria-s-en, accessed 4 July 2020.

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SMALL MODULAR REACTORS
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)1044 continue to be the focus of much of the discussion about
the future of nuclear power. These have so far been suffering many of the development
problems experienced in large nuclear power plant projects, especially deadlines for licensing
and construction being pushed back and costs increasing. However, in the case of SMRs,
most designs are purely theoretical ones, and no real reactors have been constructed basedon that design. Going by current trends, they are unlikely to ever be constructed beyond a
few prototypes. What follows is an update of earlier analysis (in particular WNISR2015 and
WNISR2017 and WNISR2019) on SMR programs in selected countries (in alphabetical order).

ARGENTINAThe CAREM-251045 reactor has been under construction in Argentina since February 2014.1046
The idea dates back to 1984, when the concept was presented at an IAEA Conference on Small
Modular Reactors.1047 CAREM-25 was projected to receive its first fuel load in the second halfof 2017.1048 By 2018, this date had been pushed back to 2020.1049 An update from July 2019suggested that overall progress was around 55 percent, but enough for the spokespersonfrom the National Atomic Energy Commission of Argentina (CNEA) to claim that “Argentina
is leading the PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] SMR design-construction process with the
FOAK [First Of A Kind] CAREM25”.1050
Despite such claims, it is clear that the commissioning date has been significantly delayed.
In November 2019, an important contracting company, Techint Engineering & Construction,
halted work on the project “citing late payment from the government, design changes andlate delivery of technical documentation”.1051 Nucleoeléctrica Argentina SA announced in
April 2020 that construction is to be resumed,1052 but there is no update about when the reactor
might become operational.

1044 - The acronym SMR is also used to mean “small and medium-sized reactor” by the IAEA. For the IAEA, a ‘‘small’’ reactor is one
having electrical output less than 300 MWe and a ‘‘medium’’ reactor is one having a power output between 300 MWe and 700 MWe.
1045 - CAREM stands for Central Argentina de Elementos Modulares.
1046 - WNN, “Construction of CAREM underway”, 10 February 2014,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Construction-of-CAREM-underway-1002144.html, accessed 24 May 2015.
1047 - Silvia Lucila Molina, Natalia Sofía Tucci Branco and María Noelia Dusau, “CAREM Reactor: An Innovative and Achievable
Option for Enhancing Nuclear Energy Supply”, presented at the INTER JURA 2018, International Nuclear Law Association,
4 November 2018, see https://emirates.meeting-app.events/inla2018/congress-papers/, accessed 29 June 2019.
1048 - WNN, “Construction of CAREM Underway”, 10 February 2014, op. cit.
1049 - NEI, “Progress for Argentina’s CAREM SMR”, 9 May 2018,see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsprogress-for-argentinas-carem-smr-6144828, accessed 20 May 2018.
1050 - Ignacio de Arenaza, “CAREM25 Current Status”, presented at the 17th INPRO Dialogue Forum on Opportunities andChallenges in Small Modular Reactors, 2 July 2019, see https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/INPRO/df17/IV.2-de%20Arenaza-CAREM.pdf,
accessed 4 July 2020.
1051 - Global Construction Review, “Techint halts work on Argentina’s pioneering small modular reactor scheme”, 15 November 2019,see http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/techint-halts-work-argentinas-pioneering-small-mod/, accessed 24 June 2020.
1052 - WNN, “Argentinean projects to resume after hiatus”, 21 April 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Argentinean-projects-to-resume-after-hiatus, accessed 24 June 2020.

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CANADA
Over the past few years, a variety of officials in Canada, both at the federal level and provincial
levels, have been advocating for SMRs and would like the country to be among the first to
deploy an SMR. Talk about SMRs increased after December 2019, when the Premiers of Ontario,
Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick announced that they would work together to research andbuild SMRs.1053 Saskatchewan has since included the development of SMR technology amongst
its goals for 2030,1054 and announced that it is setting up a dedicated office to coordinate
policy.1055
The most concrete proposal that is starting to move forward is from a company called Global
First Power to develop a demonstration project, the Micro Modular Reactor Project, at the
Chalk River Laboratories site in the province of Ontario.1056 In March 2019, the proponent
submitted an application for a license to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) toconstruct this design and the CNSC has determined the scope for the necessary environmental
assessment for the project.1057 Since the beginning, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), thecountry’s largest operator of nuclear power plants, has supported the project, and in June 2020
formally joined Global First Power and Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation as a partner.1058
According to its proponents, the Micro Modular Reactor Project is intended to be “acommercial demonstration reactor” and “a model for future deployment opportunities
where the low-carbon and versatile power from an SMR could support the energy needs ofremote communities and heavy industry”.1059 This follows the ideas set out in the 2018 SMR
Roadmap put out by provincial utilities, Natural Resources Canada and Atomic Energy ofCanada Limited (AECL), which talked of “three potential applications for SMRs in Canada: ongrid, heavy industry, and remote communities” and multiple designs to meet these “different
energy demands”.1060 But an evaluation of the net electricity demand from remote mines andcommunities shows that these markets are insufficient to develop the facilities needed to
manufacture these SMRs, and the costs of the electricity any reactors small enough to power aremote mine or community would be prohibitively high.1061

1053 - Elise von Scheel, “Group of premiers band together to develop nuclear reactor technology”, CBC News, 1 December 2019,see https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/group-of-premiers-band-together-to-develop-nuclear-reactor-technology-1.5380316,
accessed 3 July 2020.
1054 - WNN, “Saskatchewan includes SMRs in growth plan”, 15 November 2019,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Saskatchewan-includes-SMRs-in-growth-plan, accessed 5 July 2020.
1055 - David Giles, “Saskatchewan’s nuclear secretariat tasked to develop, deploy small modular reactors”, Global News, 24 June 2020,see https://globalnews.ca/news/7102249/saskatchewan-nuclear-secretariat-small-modular-reactors/, accessed 3 July 2020.
1056 - GFP, “MMR Project at Chalk River”, Global First Power, 2019,see https://www.globalfirstpower.com/proposed-project-at-chalk-river-ont, accessed 3 July 2020.
1057 - CNSC, “New reactor facility projects”, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 6 March 2020,see http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/new-reactor-facilities/index.cfm, accessed 3 July 2020.
1058 - OPG, “OPG marks major milestone in SMR development in Canada”, Ontario Power Generation, 29 June 2020,see https://www.opg.com/story/opg-marks-major-milestone-in-smr-development-in-canada/, accessed 3 July 2020.
1059 - Ibidem.
1060 - Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, “A Call to Action: A Canadian Roadmap for Small Modular
Reactors”, 2018, see https://smrroadmap.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SMRroadmap_EN_nov6_Web-1.pdf, accessed 3 July 2020.
1061 - Sarah Froese, Nadja C. Kunz and M.V. Ramana, “Too Small to be Viable? The Potential Market for Small Modular Reactors
in Mining and Remote Communities in Canada”, Energy Policy, 2020, see https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/
S030142152030327X, accessed 3 July 2020.

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Canada’s other initiative to promote SMRs is the CNSC’s “pre-licensing vendor design review”,
an optional service for SMR vendors that takes place in three phases. The first phase involves“an overall assessment of the vendor’s nuclear power plant design against the most recent
CNSC design requirements for new nuclear power plants in Canada” as well as “all otherrelated CNSC regulatory documents and Canadian codes & standards”. The second phasefocuses on “identifying any potential fundamental barriers to licensing the vendor’s nuclear
power plant design in Canada”. The third phase “allows the vendor to follow-up on certain
aspects of Phase 2 findings by:ɆɆ seeking more information from the CNSC about a Phase 2 topic; and/or
ɆɆ asking the CNSC to review activities taken by the vendor towards the reactor’s design
readiness, following the completion of Phase 2”.1062
Table 17 · Vendor Design Review Service Agreements in Force Between Vendors and the CNSC
(as of mid-2020)
VendorName of design andcooling type

Approximate
capacity (MWe)Terrestrial Energy Inc.

IMSR
Integral Molten Salt Reactor

200

MMR-5 and
MMR-10High-temperature gas

5-10

LeadCold Nuclear Inc.

SEALER
Molten Lead

Advanced Reactor
Concepts Ltd.

Applied for

Review start date

StatusPhase 1

April 2016

Complete

Phase 2

December 2018

Assessment in progress

Phase 1

December 2016

Complete

Phase 2

Pending

Project start pending

3

Phase 1January 2017

On hold at vendor’srequestARC-100
Liquid Sodium

100

Phase 1

September 2017

Complete

Moltex Energy

Moltex Energy Stable Salt
Reactor,
Molten Salt

300

Phase 1 and 2

December 2017

Phase 1 assessmentin progress

SMR, LLC. (A Holtec
International Company)

SMR-160 Pressurized Light
Water

160

Phase 1

July 2018

Assessment in progress

NuScale Power, LLC

NuScale Integral pressurizedwater reactor

60

Phase 2*January 2020

Assessment in progress

U-Battery Canada Ltd.

U-BatteryHigh-temperature gas

4Phase 1February 2017

Project start pending

GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy

BWRX-300 boiling water
reactor

300

Phase 2*January 2020

Assessment in progress

X Energy, LLC

Xe-100 High-temperaturegas

75Phase 2*

July 2020

Project start pending

Ultra Safe Nuclear
Corporation

Source: CNSC Website, 2020

Note: *NuScale Power, X Energy, and GE-Hitachi, have opted to have Phase 1 objectives be addressed within the Phase 2 scope of work.

Over the past year, the ARC-100 design completed the Phase 1 review process and in
October 2019 CNSC staff publicly shared their conclusions, including the specification that“additional work is required by ARC to address the findings raised as part of this review,
including the need to implement planned changes to its management system” and a listing of1062 - CNSC, “Pre-Licensing Vendor Design Review”, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 15 June 2020,see http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/pre-licensing-vendor-design-review/index.cfm, accessed 4 July 2020.

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a number of issues that needed resolution.1063 The other new development is the addition of
the Xe-100 high-temperature gas cooled reactor to the list of reactors undergoing review. As of
July 2020, CNSC lists 12 designs (see Table 17 and Table 18) at various stages of this process,including designs like ARC-100 that are listed having completed Phase 1 but without having
any ongoing further review.

Table 18 · Vendor Design Review Service Agreement Between Vendors and the CNSC Under
Development
Vendor
StarCore Nuclear
Westinghouse ElectricCompany, LLC

Name of design and coolingtype

Approximate
capacity (MWe)Applied forApplication
received

StarCore Module
High-temperature gas

10Phase 1 and 2

October 2016

eVinci Micro Reactor solid coreand heat pipes

Various, up to 25 MWe

Phase 2*February 2018
Source: CNSC Website, 2020

Note: *Phase 1 objectives will be addressed within the Phase 2 scope of work.

CHINA
China continues to construct the High-Temperature Reactor (HTR-PM) at Shidaowan(Shidao Bay) in the eastern Shandong province. It consists of two 100 MW modules driving
one 200 MW turbine.
The HTR-PM received final approval from China’s cabinet and its national energy bureau in
2011,1064 construction commenced in December 2012.1065 At that time, the Huaneng Shandong
Shidao Bay Nuclear Power Company Ltd. (HSNPC), builder and operator of the unit,
announced that construction would “take 50 months, with 18 months for building, 18 months
for installation and 14 months for pre‑commissioning”.1066 HSNPC stated that the power plant
would start generating commercial electricity by the end of 2017. That did not happen.
In January 2018, a construction company involved in installing the pressure vessel head statedthat the reactor was “expected to be connected to the grid and start electricity generation thisyear” (in other words, in 2018).1067 Again, that did not happen.
In March 2020, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) announced that the “reactor
pressure vessel, steam generator, and hot gas duct of the second reactor” were paired and1063 - CNSC, “Phase 1 Pre-Licensing Vendor Design Review Executive Summary: ARC Nuclear Canada Inc.”, Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission, 1 October 2019, see http://cnsc.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/pre-licensing-vendor-design-review/arc-nuclear-canadaexecutive-summary.cfm, accessed 4 July 2020.
1064 - Keith Bradsher, “China Building Nuclear Reactors With Radically Different Design”, New York Times, 24 March 2011,see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/energy-environment/25chinanuke.html, accessed 24 April 2012.
1065 - Zuoyi Zhang et al., “The Shandong Shidao Bay 200 MWe High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Pebble-Bed Module (HTR-PM)
Demonstration Power Plant: An Engineering and Technological Innovation”, Engineering, March 2016.
1066 - NucNet, “China Begins Construction Of First Generation IV HTR-PM Unit”, The Communications Network for Nuclear
Energy and Ionising Radiation, 7 January 2013, see http://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2013/01/07/china-begins-construction-of-firstgeneration-iv-htr-pm-unit, accessed 10 January 2013.
1067 - WNN, “First HTR-PM vessel head in place”, 4 January 2018, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-First-HTR-PM-vesselhead-in-place-0401185.html, accessed 9 April 2018.

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connected.1068 According to a June 2020 presentation, “criticality and power operation” arenow scheduled for 2021,1069 at least four years later than originally envisaged. There appear to
be no plans to construct more reactors of the same design due to high economic costs (see also
China Focus and previous WNISRs).
Other SMR designs that are under development include the ACPR50 and ACPR100 from China
General Nuclear (CGN) and the ACP100 from China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).
In July 2019, it was reported that CNNC is starting to “build an ACP100 small modular reactor
at Changjiang in Hainan, an island province in the south of the country” and the formal
construction was to start at the end of 2019.1070 However, this has not been confirmed. One
reason why the ACP100 might not be deployed in China, at least at scale, is that even CNNC
admits that in the case of the proposed ACP100 demonstration project, the construction cost
per kilowatt “is 2 times higher than that of [a] large NPP [nuclear power plant]”.1071

INDIA
India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has been developing the Advanced Heavy Water
Reactor (AHWR) design since the 1990s,1072 but the reactor still seems far from being complete.
The AHWR was one way for the DAE to get experience with the use of thorium, a long-standing
dream for the organization.1073 Because thorium cannot be used as fuel, the AHWR has to uselarge quantities of some other fissile material that can be fissioned with low-energy neutronsin addition to thorium. The first AHWR design utilized plutonium, but subsequently DAE
developed another version using low enriched uranium (but close to 20 percent enrichment inuranium-235) instead of plutonium.1074
By the end of the 1990s, the DAE had started talking about construction of the AHWR. In
2000, the head of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India projected that construction would
start in 2004 and be finished by 2011.1075 In a 2001 interview, the Director of the Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre projected that “the Detailed Project Report” for the AHWR “will be ready1068 - WNN, “Key components of second HTR-PM reactor connected”, 25 March 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Key-components-of-second-HTR-PM-reactor-connected, accessed 29 April 2020.
1069 - Fu Li, “Chinese HTR Program”, presented at the IFNEC SMR Webinar Series, 23 June 2020,see https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-06/slides_deck_-_webinar_4.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.
1070 - David Dalton, “CNNC Announces Plans For ‘Linglong One’ SMR”, NucNet, 23 July 2019,see https://www.nucnet.org/news/cnnc-announces-plans-for-linglong-one-smr-7-2-2019, accessed 26 June 2020.
1071 - Danrong Song, “Opportunities and Challenges in SMR and Its Practice in ACP100”, presented at the 17th INPRO Dialogue
Forum on Opportunities and Challenges in Small Modular Reactors, 2 July 2019, see https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/INPRO/df17/IV.1.DanrongSong-ACP100.pdf, accessed 4 July 2020.
1072 - R. K. Sinha and Anil Kakodkar, “Advanced Heavy Water Reactor”, Nu-Power, 1999.
1073 - M. V. Ramana, “The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India”, Penguin India, 2012.
1074 - K. L. Ramkumar, “Th-LEU Fuel in AHWR to enhance proliferation resistance characteristics”, presented at the IAEA 3rd
Technical Meeting on Options to incorporate intrinsic proliferation resistance features to Nuclear Power Plants with innovative Small
Modular Reactors, 15 August 2011.
1075 - V. K Chaturvedi, “CMD’s page”, Nu-Power, 2000.

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by April 2002; the construction is scheduled to start in April 2004”.1076 Two years later, theconstruction start was moved to 2005.1077
All those projections proved unrealistically premature and a decade later, in 2014, thedescription of the state of the project from the DAE was still “‘we are almost ready’ forconstruction”.1078 Going by a presentation at an IAEA meeting on SMRs in July 2019, the
AHWR was entitled an “R&D programme” suggesting that construction is unlikely to startanytime soon.1079

RUSSIA
Russia is developing a number of SMR designs. One of these designs, the KLT-40S, is intended
for deployment on a barge as a floating nuclear power plant. Two KLT-40S reactors were
deployed on the Akademik Lomonosov, connected to the grid in December 2019,1080 andcommissioned in May 20201081 (see also Figure 8). The Akademik Lomonosov’s construction
has taken about four times as long as originally projected; a little before construction of the ship
began in 2007, Rosatom announced that the plant would begin to operate in October 2010.1082
Not surprisingly, it has become more expensive, from an initial estimate of around 6 billion
rubles (US$2007232 million),1083 to at least 37 billion rubles as of 2015 (US$2015740 million).1084
Rosatom is now promoting the RITM series of small PWR-type reactors and does not seem tobe prioritizing the KLT-40S design anymore. In a June 2020 presentation to the International
Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC, formerly Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership or GNEP), a Rosatom Marketing Director termed these “the latest developmentthat incorporates all the best features from its predecessors”.1085 The RITM series is not new
since it has already been manufactured for icebreaker ships.1086 However, future variants of this1076 - B. Bhattacharjee, “‘Sanctions act as catalyst’: Interview with B. Bhattacharjee, Director, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre”,
Frontline, 24 November 2001.
1077 - B. Bhattacharjee, “An Overview of R&D in Fuel Cycle Activities of AHWR”, in Indian Nuclear Society, “Nuclear fuel cycle
technologies: closing the fuel cycle”, INSAC-2003, 2003.
1078 - Phil Chaffee, “Behind the First AHWR”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 10 October 2014.
1079 - Alok Chaurey, “R&D Programme in BARC on AHWR-300 Design & Technology Development and Innovative Reactors”,
presented at the Second Meeting of the Technical Working Group for Small and Medium-sized or Modular Reactor (TWG-SMR),
9 July 2019, see https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/htgr-kb/twg-smr/SitePages/2019.aspx, accessed 25 June 2020.
1080 - NIW, “Russia”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 20 December 2019.
1081 - Elena Pashina, “Rosatom RITM series SMRs”, presented at the IFNEC SMR Webinar Series, 23 June 2020,see https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-06/slides_deck_-_webinar_4.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.
1082 - Rosatom, “The first offshore nuclear heat and electrical power plant of small capacity is planned to operate in October 2010 in
Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk district)”, Press Release, 15 December 2006; IPFM, “Global Fissile Material Report 2007 – Developing thetechnical basis for policy initiatives to secure and irreversibly reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials”, Second Report of
the International Panel on Fissile Materials, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, October 2007.
1083 - WNN, “Russian floating reactor construction starts”, 17 April 2007,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=13250, accessed 30 April 2017.
1084 - Charles Digges, “New documents show cost of Russian floating nuclear power plant skyrockets”, Bellona, 25 May 2015,see http://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2015-05-new-documents-show-cost-russian-nuclear-power-plant-skyrockets,
accessed 28 December 2015.
1085 - Elena Pashina, “Rosatom RITM series SMRs”, IFNEC, 23 June 2020, op. cit.
1086 - WNN, “Russia plans next two nuclear icebreakers”, 30 October 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Russia-plans-next-two-nuclear-icebreakers, accessed 7 July 2020.

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series are either land-based (RITM-200N) or having longer periods between refuelings, most
likely because of higher enrichment levels for the fuel used.1087
Two other SMR designs by Russian developers that have long been promoted are the leadbismuth cooled SVBR-100 and the lead cooled BREST-300 fast reactors. It was reported in May
that pre-construction activities had commenced at the Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC) in
Seversk prior to the eventual construction of a lead-cooled BREST.1088 This is about four years
later than planned: according to the official Federal Target Program (FTP) titled “Nuclear
power technologies of the new generation”, the construction of a prototype unit of the leadcooled fast reactor BREST-300 was to have started in 2016.1089 The reactor is now projected tobe completed “before the end of 2026”.1090
The SVBR-100 lead-bismuth cooled fast reactor development appears to have been “effectively
discontinued”.1091 Officially, according to a Government resolution adopted in November 2017
on amending the FTP, the construction of the SVBR-100 has just been postponed beyond thehorizon of 2020.1092 The dubious status of the project is because the reactor is reported to havecost much more than initially estimated—36 billion rubles (US$632 million) as compared to
15 billion rubles.1093

SOUTH KOREA
South Korea’s System-Integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART), a 100 MW Pressurized
Water Reactor, received Standard Design Approval from Korea’s Nuclear Safety and Security
Commission in July 2012.1094 Although Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), thedeveloper of the design, was planning “to build a demonstration plant to operate from 2017”,
there were no orders for “an initial reference unit” in South Korea.1095

1087 - Elena Pashina, “Rosatom RITM series SMRs”, IFNEC, 23 June 2020, op. cit.; and IAEA, “Advances in Small Modular Reactor
Technology Developments: A Supplement to: Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS) 2018 Edition”, 2018.
1088 - NEI, “Preparatory construction for Brest-300 reactor begins in Russia”, NEI Magazine, 22 May 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newspreparatory-construction-for-brest-300-reactor-begins-in-russia-7936880,
accessed 7 July 2020.
1089 - L. Andreeva-Andrievskaya and Rosatom, “Nuclear R&D Activities in Russia”, presented at the NI2050 Workshop, July 2015,see https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/workshops/ni2050/presentations/docs/2_20_Russia_Nuclear%20R_D%20Activities%20in%20
Russia_L_Andreeva_Andrievskaya,%20ROSATOM.pdf, accessed 29 July 2019.
1090 - WNN, “Russia awards contract to build BREST reactor”, 5 December 2019,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Russia-awards-contract-to-build-BREST-reactor, accessed 7 July 2020.
1091 - Anatoli Diakov and Pavel Podvig, “Construction of Russia’s BN-1200 fast-neutron reactor delayed until 2030s”, IPFM Blog,
20 August 2019, see http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2019/08/the_construction_of_the_b.html, accessed 7 July 2020.
1092 - Government of the Russian Federation, “О внесении изменений в федеральную целевую программу ‘Ядерные
энерготехнологии нового поколения на период 2010-2015 годов и на перспективу до 2020 года’ (утратило силу с
01.01.2019 на основании постановления Правительства Российской Федерации от 30.11.2018 N 1451), Постановление
Правительства РФ от 11 ноября 2017 года №1367”, 11 November 2017, see http://docs.cntd.ru/document/555631831,
accessed 30 July 2019. Thanks to Anatoli Diakov for this reference and information.
1093 - NEI, “Russia seeks partners for its SVBR project”, 15 November 2016,see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsrussia-seeks-partners-for-its-svbr-project-5669556, accessed 30 April 2017.
1094 - Kwon Dong-joon, “Korean All-in-one SMR Won World’s First Standard Design Approval”, etnews, 5 July 2012,see http://english.etnews.com/20120705200008, accessed 30 April 2017.
1095 - WNN, “Korea, Saudi Arabia progress with SMART collaboration”, 7 January 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Korea-Saudi-Arabia-progress-with-SMART-collaborati, accessed 4 July 2020.

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As a result, KAERI has been pursuing export orders, especially with Saudi Arabia. (The SMART
is also one of eight SMR designs under consideration in Jordan.1096) In 2015, KAERI signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable
Energy (KA-CARE), to “conduct a three-year preliminary study to review the feasibility of
constructing SMART reactors in Saudi Arabia”.1097 That study ended by focusing on what it
called Pre Project Engineering (PPE), including developing a First Of A Kind (FOAK) design
and training Saudi engineers; a SMART PPE package was delivered to KA-CARE at the end of
February 2019.1098 In January 2020, the agreement was updated to create a joint venture, thatis “to complete the design of the reactor and non-nuclear infrastructure to support it”, and“seek a license to build the unit in Saudi Arabia and to offer it for export”.1099 KA-CARE has
also advanced ambitious if unrealistic plans of localizing some of the reactor manufacture in
Saudi Arabia.1100

UNITED KINGDOMIn 2014, the U.K. Government and a consortium of nuclear industry organizationscommissioned a feasibility study for SMRs that was carried out by the National Nuclear
Laboratory (NNL).1101 That study “considered four designs in detail”: ACP100+ (designed by
China National Nuclear Corporation – CNNC); mPower (B&W and Bechtel); Westinghouse
SMR (Westinghouse); and NuScale (Fluor). Of these, two designs, mPower and Westinghouse
SMR, are no longer being pursued.
The following year the U.K. Government announced that “at least £250 million”(US$2015380 million) will be spent by 2020 on an “ambitious” program to “position the UK
as a globa leader in innovative nuclear technologies” and that there would “be a competition”
to identify the best SMR and aim to build “one of the world’s first SMRs in the UK in the
2020s”.1102
It might be somewhat surprising that since then the SMR design selected for the provision ofGovernment funding is not one of the four designs that were considered in the 2014 study,
but a design by Rolls Royce that is still in an early stage of development. In November 2019,
the Government announced that it would provide “match funding” of up to £18 million(US$22.7 million) to a “consortium of companies” whose most prominent member is Rolls1096 - Kamal Araj, “Jordan’s Nuclear Power Perspective for SMR Deployment”, presented at the IFNEC SMR Webinar Series,
2 June 2020, see https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/jcms/g_13206/ifnec-smr-webinar-series-june-2020, accessed 5 July 2020.
1097 - WNN, “Saudi Arabia teams up with Korea on SMART”, 4 March 2015,see http://world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Saudi-Arabia-teams-up-with-Korea-on-SMART-0403154.html.
1098 - Joo Hyung Moon, “SMART PPE Achievements”, presented at the 17th INPRO Dialogue Forum on Opportunities and Challenges
in Small Modular Reactors, 2 July 2019, see https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/INPRO/df17/IV.3-JooHyoungMoon.pdf, accessed 4 July 2020.
1099 - Dan Yurman, “South Korea’s SMART SMR Gets New Life”, Neutron Bytes, 18 January 2020,see https://neutronbytes.com/2020/01/18/south-koreas-smart-smr-gets-new-life/, accessed 4 July 2020.
1100 - Ali Ahmad, Reem Salameh and M. V. Ramana, “Localizing Nuclear Capacity? Small Modular Reactors and Saudi Arabia”, Issam
Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, July 2019, see www.aub.edu.lb/ifi.
1101 - WNN, “National Nuclear Laboratory urges UK investment in SMRs”, 4 December 2014, see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/
NN-National-Nuclear-Laboratory-urges-UK-investment-in-SMRs-4121401.html, accessed 6 July 2019.
1102 - Damian Carrington, “George Osborne puts UK at the heart of global race for mini-nuclear reactors”, The Guardian,
24 November 2015, see https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/24/mini-nuclear-reactors-answer-to-climate-changecrisis, accessed 6 July 2019.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Royce.1103 This figure is much lower than the figure of over £200 million (US$252 million)
that Rolls Royce reportedly demanded of the Government in 2019.1104 That figure went up to£250 million (US$315 million) in 2020 in proposals reportedly submitted to Ministers in the
U.K. to construct factories to build these SMRs “by next year”.1105
Although Rolls Royce has been talking about small reactors since the 1970s,1106 the SMR designfavored by Rolls Royce does not really fit the usual definition of an SMR because its output is
440 MW.1107 The IAEA’s Advanced Reactors Information System terms this a “mature concept”
but it is not clear how well developed it really is. The U.K. Office for Nuclear Regulation states on
its Generic Design Assessment webpage that as of 25 February 2020, when it was last updated,that it is “currently assessing one reactor design: General Nuclear System’s UK HPR1000” (orthe Hualong).1108 It is not clear how Rolls Royce seeks to start building a manufacturing plant,
when it has not even submitted a reactor design for regulatory review.

UNITED STATESThe United States continues to actively pursue SMRs and the Department of Energy (DOE)
invested hundreds of millions of dollars into promoting research and development work on
SMRs over the past decade. The main funding program was established in 2012 in the form ofa cost-share funding opportunity to cover expenses associated with research and development,
design certification, and licensing. One of the designs that received DOE funding through thisprogram, the NuScale design, is currently the one that can be said to be closest to deployment
in the U.S., because it has submitted the first design certification application for an SMR of thisclass to the NRC.
NuScale has received US$226 million from the DOE through the 2012 program, and in 2018,
DOE provided another grant of US$40 million to NuScale.1109 In February 2020, the DOE
reportedly “agreed to spend up to US$350 million in new matching funds”.1110In the “initialproject baseline” DOE would spend US$263 million over the next five years and NuScale would
have to match these funds. However, the agreement also envisions the possibility of the project
cost escalating “to a ceiling of US$700 million, with overruns to be split on a 50-50 basis”.
The rest of the funding for NuScale comes from its parent company, the Fluor Corp. In March
2020, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of NuScale Power told the House Committee
1103 - WNN, “UK confirms funding for Rolls-Royce SMR”, 7 November 2019,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/UK-confirms-funding-for-Rolls-Royce-SMR, accessed 7 July 2020.
1104 - Sylvia Pfeifer and David Sheppard, “Rolls-Royce leads drive for small nuclear sites: Energy”, Financial Times, 28 January 2019.
1105 - Neil Craven, “Rolls-Royce triggers £250bn nuclear mini reactor race: Huge boost for economy if UK consortium gets goahead to build fleet of mini reactor plants”, Financial Mail on Sunday, as published on This is Money, 13 June 2020, see https://www.
thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-8417289/Rolls-Royce-triggers-250bn-nuclear-mini-reactor-race.html, accessed 16 June 2020.
1106 - C.D. Heising-Goodman, “Supply of appropriate nuclear technology for the developing world: Small power reactors for electricity
generation”, Applied Energy, 1981.
1107 - Martin J. Goodfellow, “Rolls Royce consortium SMR”, presented at the IFNEC SMR Webinar Series, 23 June 2020,see https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-06/slides_deck_-_webinar_4.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.
1108 - ONR, “Generic Design Assessement (GDA)”, Office for Nuclear Regulation, 25 February 2020,see http://www.onr.org.uk/civil-nuclear-reactors/generic-design-assessment.htm, accessed 7 July 2020.
1109 - Pete Danko, “Oregon’s small-nuke company wins $40M federal grant”, Portland Business Journal, 27 April 2018, see https://www.
bizjournals.com/portland/news/2018/04/27/oregon-small-nuke-company-nuscale-wins-40m-federal.html, accessed 28 June 2019.
1110 - Phil Chaffee, “DOE Agrees Major New Commitment to NuScale”, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 21 February 2020.

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on Energy and Commerce that “Fluor and its investors contributed $643 million, or 67% of
expenditures to date, and the Federal Government has contributed $314 million” to make up a
total of US$957 million.1111 In all, there would have been an investment of at least US$1.5 billion
into NuScale before it can receive design certification from the NRC, a necessary step for a
NuScale unit to be deployed.
The expected date for certification has been continually pushed back. NuScale officials
announced in 2008 that NuScale Power has “advised the US Nuclear Regulatory Commissionof its intent to initiate preapplication reviews with a view towards submitting an application
for design certification in 2010. The first preapplication meeting was held on 24 July 2008…
With timely application for a combined construction and operating licence (COL), a NuScaleplant could be producing electricity by 2015-16”.1112 In a October 2008 talk, an NRC official
projected that NuScale would submit an application for design certification in early 2010 andthat review would be completed by early 2015.1113
In 2010, SNL Energy’s Power Daily reported that NuScale intended “to submit a design
certification application to the NRC early in 2012” and was hoping “to have its first reactor
online in 2018”.1114 The NRC even issued a notice in the Federal Registry that said “NuScale
Power, Inc. (NuScale) has submitted a letter of intent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) for a design certification application in 2012”.1115 The following year, theOECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency report on SMRs projected that NuScale would file a licensing
application in 2011 and had a targeted deployment date of 2018 for a FOAK (First Of A Kind)
plant.1116 NuScale finally submitted its design for review only on the last day of 2016.
Over the past year, it has become clear that the road ahead will not be smooth. In March
2020, the NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) issued a letter warningthat the “design and performance of the steam generators have not yet been sufficiently
validated”.1117 The Advisory Committee pointed out that the present design of the steam
generators “introduces different failure modes” resulting in their “design and performance”
not being sufficiently validated. There are two concerns, one having to do with instability
and the other with corrosion, due to “accelerated wear of the alloy 690TT steam generator
tubing material”.1118 The NRC has concurred with the ACRS findings and its staff have said thatfurther analysis or testing results to “demonstrate the design and performance of the steam

1111 - John L. Hopkins, “Building a 100 Percent Clean Economy: Advanced Nuclear Technology’s Role in a Decarbonized Future”,
presented at the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, 3 March 2020, see https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF03/20200303/110640/HHRG-116-IF03-Wstate-HopkinsJ-20200303.pdf, accessed 23 June 2020.
1112 - Paul Lorenzini and Jose N. Reyes, “Power Plant Design - Compact and bijou: a new approach to design”, Nuclear Engineering
International, 2 October 2008.
1113 - Edward Baker, “NRC’s Advanced Reactor Program”, NRC, 16 October 2008.
1114 - Wayne Barbe, “NuScale sees large upside in small nuclear units”, SNL Energy Power Daily, 30 June 2010.
1115 - NRC, “Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Notices: In the Matter of NuScale Power, Inc. and All Other Persons; Who Seek or
Obtain Access to Safeguards Information Described Herein; Order Imposing Safeguards Information Protection Requirements forAccess to Safeguards Information (Effective Immediately): [FR DOC # 2010-15730]”, Federal Register, 29 June 2010.
1116 - NEA, “Current Status, Technical Feasibility, and Economics of Small Nuclear Reactors”, Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD, 2011.
1117 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, “NuScale Area of Focus - Helical Tube Steam Generator Design”, 2020,see https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2009/ML20091G387.pdf, accessed 19 April 2020.
1118 - Jessica Sondgeroth, “A Pox on NuScale’s SMR Design Certification”, NIW, 15 May 2020.

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generators” will have to be included as part of the application for the license to construct andoperate the reactor.1119
NuScale has also increased the power rating per module from 50 MW to 60 MW and this willcause further delays. A NRC spokesperson clarified, “NuScale must apply separately for the
uprate” and that the current schedule only applies to the 50 MW design.1120 The changes in
the reactor design will have to be evaluated by NRC and that could result in NRC requiringchanges in the NuScale design to address potential vulnerabilities.
Another source of potential delays are the financial troubles of Fluor Corporation. Stock prices
have declined from roughly US$60 in October 2018 to roughly US$12 in early July 2020.1121 It
is being investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department
has subpoenaed documents concerning a fixed-price federal project.1122 In May 2019, a seniorCredit Suisse analyst wrote to investors that there was “opportunity for positive change at
Fluor” but went on to suggesting that the firm could reduce “underperforming investments,”
including its NuScale SMR startup “which is long overdue, in our opinion”.1123
Amidst all this, NuScale is trying to effect its first construction with commitment for theelectricity to be purchased by Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS), but, asof June 2020, it has not received sufficient orders from members of UAMPS to absorb all theelectrical output of a NuScale power plant, which consists of 12 units with gross outputs of
60 MW each.
NuScale claims that the levelized cost of energy from the UAMPS project would be around
US$65/MWh, largely because of favorable financing that might be available for this project.1124
But, if one goes by the history of cost overruns at nuclear projects, this figure is unlikely tomaterialize, and the levelized cost of generation might be as high as US$86 to US$104/MWh,depending on the assumptions.1125 Even if one goes with NuScale’s claim about electricity
costing up to US$65/MWh, there are many other alternatives at lower cost1126 (see also Nuclear
Power vs. Renewable Energy Deployment).
A more recent focus for SMR vendors has been the U.S. Department of Defense. There is a
growing set of reports extolling the advantages of microreactors for military bases. The
American Security Project, for example, called for micro reactors to “be fueled with…high-1119 - Michael McAuliffe, “NRC raises questions about NuScale design, delays interim review milestone”, NW, 7 May 2020.
1120 - Stephanie Cooke, “US Nuclear’s Last Hope Hits Snags”, NIW, 26 July 2019.
1121 - Yahoo Finance, “Fluor Corporation (FLR)”, 17 April 2020.
1122 - Paul O’Donnell, “Fluor faces Justice Department subpoena over costs for Army project”, Dallas News, 8 May 2020,see https://www.dallasnews.com/business/local-companies/2020/05/08/fluor-faces-justice-department-subpoena-over-us-armyproject-costs/, accessed 10 May 2020; and Tomi Kilgore, “Fluor’s stock drops after disclosing investigation by regulators over charges
recorded”, MarketWatch, 8 May 2020, see https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fluors-stock-drops-after-disclosing-investigation-byregulators-over-charges-recorded-2020-05-08, accessed 9 May 2020.
1123 - Debra K Robin, “Fluor Continues Management Shakeout to Boost Results”, Engineering News-Record, 30 May 2019,see https://www.enr.com/articles/46979-fluor-continues-management-shakeout, accessed 21 September 2019.
1124 - Stephanie Cooke, “NuScale Prepares for SMR Development Phase”, NIW, 29 March 2019.
1125 - M. V. Ramana, “Eyes Wide Shut: Problems with the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems Proposal to Construct NuScale
Small Modular Nuclear Reactors”, Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility, September 2020.
1126 - Energy Strategies, “Analyzing the Cost of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors and Alternate Power Portfolios”, Healthy
Environment Alliance of Utah, May 2019, see https://www.healutah.org/smnr/, accessed 28 June 2019.

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assay low-enriched uranium fuel [that] would be enriched to between 5% and 20% of U-235”,
which is higher than the fuel used in commercial nuclear plants.1127
While all this talk about using SMRs someday to power military bases is going on, renewables
are becoming a real source of energy in many bases already. The U.S. state of New Jersey’s
biggest 28.5 MW solar project is actually on a naval base, which was built as “part of the Navy’s
energy resiliency initiative” and became operational in May 2020.1128 Although connected to
the local utility grid, reports suggest that it is designed to also direct all power locally to thebase itself in the event of an emergency, making it “islandable”.1129

CONCLUSION
While talk about SMRs continues unabated, there is growing evidence that the trends thathave largely diminished prospects for large nuclear plants—delays, poor economics, and theincreased availability of low-carbon alternatives at rapidly decreasing cost—plague thesetechnologies as well, and there is no need to wait with bated breath for SMRs to be deployed.

1127 - Andrew Holland, “Micro Nuclear Reactors: Prospects for Deploying Land-Based Nuclear Energy for the US Military”,
American Security Project, October 2019, see https://www.americansecurityproject.org/perspective-micro-nuclear-reactors/,
accessed 6 June 2020.
1128 - Linda Lindner, “CS Energy completes construction of New Jersey’s largest solar project”, NJBIZ, 18 May 2020,see https://njbiz.com/cs-energy-completes-construction-new-jerseys-largest-solar-project/, accessed 6 June 2020.
1129 - Michelle Lewis, “New Jersey’s largest solar farm has been completed”, Electrek, 18 May 2020,see https://electrek.co/2020/05/18/new-jersey-largest-solar-plant-completed/, accessed 6 June 2020.

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NUCLEAR POWER VS.
RENEWABLE ENERGYDEPLOYMENTINTRODUCTION
As with other divisions in the economy, the impact of measures to contain the COVID-19
pandemic will be significant in the power sector in the short, medium, and probably long term.
The IEA expected in April 20201130 that global power demand would fall by 5 percent in 2020,
eight times more than in the 2009 financial crisis, but this was revised in June to a 6 percent
drop.1131 However, the impact is likely to be far greater in some regions. This is highlighted by
the significant decline that has been seen in some countries where daily electricity demanddecreased by at least 15 percent in France, India, Italy, Spain, the U.K. and large parts of the
U.S.1132
Despite falling demand, the contribution and actual volume of generation of power fromrenewables has been growing in 2020. In Q1, global renewable electricity production increased
3 percent mainly because of a double-digit percentage increase for wind power and a jump insolar photovoltaic (PV) output from projects installed over the previous year. The share of
renewables in global electricity supply, including hydro, reached 27.5 percent in Q1 2020, up
from 26 percent in Q1 2019. On the other hand, nuclear power generation fell by 3 percent yearon-year in Q1 2020 in response to lower demand and because fewer reactors were operationalin some regions.1133
Falling demand in power markets has resulted in lower prices. In Europe, the most significant
year-on-year decline was seen in the Nord Pool market, with a plunge of 78 percent, withthe average price being €9/MWh during March 2020, while the smallest decline was seen inGermany with a fall of still 27 percent, to €22.5/MWh.1134 In Japan, the day-ahead prices on theJapan Electric Power Exchange (JEPX) were 0.01 yen (US$0.0001 or US$c0.01) per kilowatt
hour (kWh) for the first time in February 20201135—virtually free electricity.
The medium-term impact of the pandemic on the power mix is far from clear. Falling power
demand and prices are likely to reduce the economic imperative to invest in new capacity, andtherefore the extent to which new power plants are built may to a large degree depend on
governmental stimulus packages. The IEA has called on the Governments, “when designing
1130 - IEA, “Global Energy Review 2020”, International Energy Agency, April 2020,see https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics, accessed 13 June 2020.
1131 - IEA, “Sustainable Recovery - World Energy Outlook Special Report”, June 2020,see https://www.iea.org/reports/sustainable-recovery, accessed 20 June 20201132 - IEA, “Global Energy Review 2020”, April 2020, op. cit.
1133 - IEA, “Global Energy Review 2020”, April 2020, op. cit.
1134 - AleaSoft Energy Forecasting, “Fall in electricity markets prices in march due to the coronavirus crisis”, 2 April 2020,see https://aleasoft.com/fall-electricity-markets-prices-march-coronavirus-crisis/, accessed 13 June 2020.
1135 - Financial Tribune, “Japan Power Prices Hit Zero as Coronavirus Hammers Industries”, 13 May 2020,see https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/103347/japan-power-prices-hit-zero-as-coronavirus-hammers-industries,
accessed 13 June 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 these packages, governments should bear in mind the structural benefits that renewables canbring in terms of economic development and job creation while also reducing emissions andfostering technology innovation”.1136“The financial weakness of the electricity sector is likely to shift
investment away from nuclear power”
While there is undoubtedly greater support for renewable energy, the same cannot be said
for nuclear power and the prospects for the atom have worsened. Laszlo Varro, the Chief
Economist of the IEA, notes that:
The financial weakness of the electricity sector is likely to shift investment away from
nuclear power. There are indications that even utilities that have already made the necessary
investments in safety measures and secured approvals for lifetime extensions could shut
down their nuclear plants prematurely for financial reasons. A mothballed gas turbine can berestarted fairly easily, but the shutdown of a nuclear plant is usually final.1137

Therefore, the impact of the pandemic could lead to a slowdown of investment in the power
sector generally, with renewables affected the least. However, it is also possible that thestimulus program will be used as a means not only to create employment but to advancedecarbonization objectives. As and when this occurs it would be important for policy makers
and financiers to look to recent trends, as described below, and take note of the extent to which
renewable energy is outperforming nuclear power as a mitigation tool.

INVESTMENT
Figure 48 compares the annual investment decisions for the construction of new nuclear plants
with those for renewable energy since 2004. Construction began on five nuclear reactors in
2019, two in China (possibly two more, but there is no official confirmation, see Construction
Starts; those are not included in Figure 48 and Figure 49) and one each in Iran, Russia, and the
U.K. this is the same as in 2018, four new reactors in 2017, three in 2016, and eight new projects
in 2015. The total reported investment for the construction of the 2019-projects is around
US$31 billion for 5.8 GW. However, this is still less than a quarter of the investment in wind or
in solar individually, with over US$138 billion investment in wind power and US$131 billion insolar.
Globally, the relative importance of Europe and North America for renewable energy
investments continues to diminish, with the rise of Asia, especially China (see Figure 51).
Chinese nominal-dollar renewable investment rose from US$26 billion in 2008 to US$135 billion
in 2017 before a steep cut to US$91 billion in 2018 and $83 billion in 2019. Total cumulated
investment in nuclear in China over the same period was about US$90 billion (not including
two CAP1400 reactors, whose construction start has not been confirmed yet).
1136 - Heymi Bahar, “The coronavirus pandemic could derail renewable energy’s progress. Governments can help.”, IEA, 4 April 2020,see https://www.iea.org/commentaries/the-coronavirus-pandemic-could-derail-renewable-energy-s-progress-governments-can-help,
accessed 13 June 2020.
1137 - Laszlo Varro and Peter Fraser, “The Covid-19 crisis is undermining nuclear power’s important role in clean energy transitions”,
IEA, 12 June 2020, see https://www.iea.org/commentaries/the-covid-19-crisis-is-undermining-nuclear-power-s-important-role-inclean-energy-transitions, accessed 13 June 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 268

Figure 48 · Global Investment Decisions in Renewables and Nuclear Power 2004–2019

Global Investment Decisions in
New Renewables and Nuclear Power

300

in US$ billion, 2004-2019

250© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

200

150

Other Renewables

100

Solar
Wind

50

Nuclear*2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 20190

Sources: FS-UNEP/BNEF 2018, 2020, REN21 2019 and WNISR Original Research, 2020

Note:
*In the absence of comprehensive, publicly available investment estimates for nuclear power by year, and to simplify the approach, WNISR includes the total
projected investment costs in the year in which construction was started, rather than spreading them out over the entire construction period. Furthermore,
nuclear investment figures do not include revised budgets if—as generally is the case—cost overruns occur.
In addition, this graph does not show investments for two reactors in China—two CAP1400 Rongcheng/Shidaowan—whose construction start in 2019 has
not been officially confirmed.

Figure 49 · Regional Breakdown of Nuclear and Renewable Energy Investment Decisions 2010–2019

Regional Breakdown of Nuclear and Renewable Energy Investment Decisions
in US$ Billion, 2010-2019

300

250

Renewable

200

NuclearAsia (excluding China
and India)

100

50

0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

150

India
China
Middle East
and Africa
Europe (Including Turkey)
Latin America
US

Sources: BNEF/UNEP 2020, WNISR Original Analysis, 2020

Notes: This graph does not show investments for two reactors in China—two CAP1400 Rongcheng/Shidaowan—whose construction start in 2019 has not been officially confirmed.

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TECHNOLOGY COSTS
The annual levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) analysis for the U.S. undertaken by Lazard at
the end of 2019 (see Figure 50), suggests that the cost of solar PV (crystalline, utility-scale)averages US$40/MWh, compared to US$65 in 2015; onshore wind is US$41/MWh compared
to US$55/MWh in 2015 and nuclear is US$155 (US$117 in 2015). Over the last five years, the
LCOE of nuclear has risen by over 50 percent, while renewables have now become the cheapestof any type of power generation. What is remarkable about these trends is that the costs ofrenewables continue to fall due to incremental manufacturing and installation improvements,
while nuclear, despite over half a century of industrial experience, continue to see costs rising.
Nuclear power is now the most expensive form of generation, except for gas peaking plants.1138
Figure 50 · The Declining Costs of Renewables vs. Traditional Power Sources

Selected Historical Mean Costs by Technology
LCOE values in US$/MWh *350

Nuclear: 123 → 155
Coal: 111 → 109

300

Gas - Combined Cycle: 83 → 56

250

Solar PV-Crystalline: 359 → 41
Wind: 135 → 40

200

+26%

150

–2%

100
50

–33%
–89%
–70%

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

0
2009
3.0

2010
4.0

2011
5.0

2012
2013
2014
2015
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
Lazard LCOE Versions

2016
10.0

2017
11.0

2018
12.0

2019
13.0

* Reflects total decrease in mean LCOE since Lazard's LCOE VERSION 3.0 in 2009.

Source: Lazard Estimates, 2019

1139

Notes
LCOE=Levelized Cost of Energy.
This graph reflects average of unsubsidized high and low LCOE range for given version of LCOE study.
It primarily relates to North American renewable energy landscape, but reflects broader/global cost declines.

According to an International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) estimate, the global
weighted average LCOE of utility-scale PV plants fell 13 percent year on year in 2019, leading toa worldwide average of US$68/MWh. The cost of onshore wind declined by 9 percent to US$53/
MWh and offshore reached a new low of US$115/MWh, still according to IRENA.1140 The IEA
stated in June 2020 on global costs:1141
1138 - Lazards, “Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis—Version 13.0”, November 2019.
1139 - Lazards, “Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis—Version 13.0”, November 2019.
1140 - IRENA, “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2019”, March 2019, see https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/
Publication/2019/Mar/IRENA_RE_Capacity_Statistics_2019.pdf, accessed 3 April 2019.
1141 - IEA, “Sustainable Recovery - World Energy Outlook Special Report”, June 2020, op. cit.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

Falling costs for new solar PV and wind projects over the past decade have made capital
investment far more productive. The expected annual generation from investment in solar PV
in 2020 is more than seven-times the amount for the same investment in 2010: for onshore
wind it has nearly doubled and for offshore wind it has risen by over 60 percent.

Further declines in the costs of renewables are likely, in particular for offshore wind, as
experience continues to lead to costs already significantly below that of the global averages
estimated by IRENA; for example in Denmark and the Netherlands costs have fallen to
the range of US$53-64/MWh (excl. transmission). Furthermore, Bloomberg New Energy
Finance (BNEF) estimated in October 2019 that the global average LCOE for offshore wind
was then US$78/MWh.1142
As Lazard shows for the U.S., the declining costs of renewables globally contrast with nuclear
costs that are at best constant, and more often, when numbers are available, are rising, often
significantly. As a consequence, it is now widely recognized that the cost of renewables is now
significantly below that of either nuclear power or gas. The IEA stated in their 2019-assessmentof nuclear power thatthe high capital cost of nuclear makes it significantly more costly on a levelized costs basis
than wind power or gas fired generation in both the European Union and United States.1143

INSTALLED CAPACITY AND
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
While there has been a slowdown in the rate of increase of investment in renewables, thisreflects changes in policies in some countries and regions. Despite this, the rapid reduction
in investment costs per MW mean that there is still a rise in the net annual increase ininstalled capacity. In total, a record 184 GW of new-renewable energy capacity (excludinghydro) was installed in 2019, according to the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21stCentury (REN21), 20 GW more than the previous year.1144
After a slowdown in the past three years, the net capacity addition of wind power has increased
with 59.2 GW of new installations in 2019, but still slightly lower than that installed in 2015.
Solar PV increased with 97.6 GW to a global record, similar to the 97.4 GW of added capacity
in 2018.
Figure 51 illustrates the extent to which renewables have been deployed at scale since thestart of the millennium, an increase in capacity of 605 GW for wind and of 578 GW for solar
according to IRENA, compared to the relative stagnation of nuclear power capacity, which overthis period increased by around 42 GW, including all reactors currently in LTO. Consideringthat around 27.5 GW of nuclear power were in LTO as of the end of 2019, and thus not operating,the balance is an addition of 14.5 GW compared to 2000.
1142 - Renews.biz, “Offshore wind costs ‘drop 32%’”, reNEWS - Renewable Energy News, 28 October 2019,see https://renews.biz/56081/offshore-wind-costs-drop-32/, accessed 5 July 2020.
1143 - IEA, “Nuclear Power in a Clean Energy System”, May 2019,see https://webstore.iea.org/download/direct/2779?fileName=Nuclear_Power_in_a_Clean_Energy_System.pdf, accessed 23 June 2019.
1144 - Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance andBloombergNEF, “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment in 2020”, June 2020,see https://www.fs-unep-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GTR_2020.pdf, accessed 20 June 2020.

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Figure 51 · Variation of Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the World

Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity Developments: Installed Capacity and Electricty Production in the Worldin net added TWh

0
2000

Wind
Solar
Nuclear
Nuclear (excl. LTO)

605
546

578
480

399

217
164
41
17

40

4

15

-11

2005

2010

2015

21

23

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Annual Production Compared to 1997

in GWe© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Capacity Added Since 2000

12

142018 19

1,258

Wind
Solar
Nuclear

820

723
582
363

0
1997

394

366
256

335

180
92

40 42

1,418

19

33

100

299
178

82

3
2000

2005

2010

2016

2018 19

Sources: WNISR, IAEA-PRIS, IRENA, BP Statistical Review, 2020

The characteristics of electricity generating technologies vary due to different load factors.
In general, over the year, operating nuclear power plants produce more electricity per MW of
installed capacity than renewables. However, as can be seen in Figure 53, compared to 2000,
there has been an additional 1,500 TWh of wind power in 2019, over 720 TWh more electricity
from solar PV, compared to an additional 215 TWh of nuclear energy.
Figure 52 · Net Added Electricity Generation by Power Source 2009–2019

Power Generation in the World
Annual Production Compared to 2009
in added TWh by Source
Non-hydro renewables
Gas
Coal
Hydro
Nuclear
Oil

2,169
1,844
1,709

970

97

0

-167
© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: BP Statistical Review, 2020

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In 2019, annual global growth rates for the generation from wind power were 12.6 percent(11.3 percent in 2018), 24.3 percent (30.4 percent in 2018) for solar PV, and 3.7 percent(2.4 percent in 2018) for nuclear power.
The growth of renewable energy is now not only outcompeting nuclear power but is rapidly
overtaking fossil fuels and has become the source of economic choice for new generation.
Figure 52 hows the extent to which, over the last decade, different energy sources haveincreased their electricity production. The energy source that has added the greatest amount ofelectricity over the past decade is non-hydro renewables, generating an additional 2,169 TWhof power. The power sector with the second largest growth was natural gas, followed by coal,hydro and nuclear, while oil’s net production remains below its 2009 level.
Due to the stagnation of nuclear power’s development, it has been overtaken by wind and solar
in total installed generating capacity. And while in 2019, nuclear generated more electricity(2,657 TWh) than the previous year, wind (1,430 TWh) and solar (724 TWh) continue catching
up fast, and together now represent 81 percent of nuclear power production (see Figure 53).
Figure 53 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Installed Capacity and Electricity Production in the World

Installed Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the World
Annual Production

Installed Capacity

in TWh/year
622

Wind
Solar
Nuclear
Nuclear (excl. LTO)

563

579

481
416

350

367

372
365

339

390 392
362 364

217
181

58
17

5

2000

2005

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

in GWe

40
2010

2015

2018 19

1997

2,660
2,444

2,657

2,630
2,441

2,626

2,563

1,430

Nuclear
Wind
Solar

1,270
832
583
347

31

104

2000

2005

724

257

34
2010

2015

2018 19

Sources: WNISR, IAEA-PRIS, IRENA, BP Statistical Review, 2020

In 2019, for the first time the generation of non-hydro renewables, wind, solar, biomass andother non-hydro renewables like geothermal, exceeded the electricity generation of nuclear
power (see Figure 54). While non-hydro renewables increased by a factor of 3.7 over the past
decade and generated 2,808 TWh (gross), nuclear power just caught up to pre-Fukushima
levels to reach 2,657 TWh (net) or 2,796 (gross).

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 273

Figure 54 · Non-Hydro Renewables and Nuclear Electricity Production in the World

Nuclear vs. Non-Hydro Renewable Electricity Productionin the World 2010–2019

652
724
1,430

in TWh
2,630

2,806

2,657

2500
Wind
Solar

2000

Other Non-Hydro Renewables
Nuclear

761

1500

347
34
380

1000

500

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

0

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: BP Statistical Review and IAEA-PRIS, 2020

STATUS AND TRENDS IN CHINA, THE EUROPEAN
UNION, INDIA, AND THE UNITED STATES
China
China is still the most important country in terms of renewable energy manufacturing anddeployment. However, the latest Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness index, publishedby Ernst & Young, published in May 2020, drops China from the top spot, to second, behind
the U.S.1145 The reason given is that the Chinese Government has lowered market subsidies
and the reduction in demand following the COVID-19 pandemic, that has affected demand fordomestic use and for the manufacturing of goods for export.
In the case of China, there are usually a range of numbers for the capacity and production
volumes of energy, especially for renewable sources. According to the Government’s National
Energy Administration (NEA), by the end of 2019, the total installed capacity of renewableenergy was 794 GW, up 9 percent on the previous year. This included 356 GW of hydro,
210 GW of wind, 204 GW of solar and 22.5 GW of biomass, which between them accountfor 39.5 percent of the installed capacity. In 2019, renewable-energy-based power generation
reached 2,040 TWh, an increase of about 176.1 TWh year-on-year. As a result, renewableenergy power generation accounted for 27.9 percent of power generation, up 1.2 percentage
points year-on-year.1146
1145 - EY, “Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index”, May 2020, see https://www.ey.com/en_gl/recai, accessed 4 June 2020.
1146 - NEA, “NEA press conference on the 2019 status of renewable power generation”, China Energy Portal, 6 March 2020
(in Chinese), see https://chinaenergyportal.org/nea-press-conference-on-the-2019-status-of-renewable-power-generation/,
accessed 4 June 2020.

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Compared to 2000, nuclear power generation increased 20-fold by 2019, while new renewables
output—biomass, wind and solar, not including hydro—was virtually non-existent in 2000
(see Figure 55). In 2010, new renewables overtook nuclear output for the first time with 75 TWhvs. 71 TWh for nuclear. And although nuclear output grew by an impressive 4.6 times between
2010 and 2019, new renewables increased production more than twice as fast, 9.8 times, overthe same period (see Figure 55).
Figure 55 · Nuclear vs Non-Hydro Renewables in China 2000–2019

Nuclear vs. Non-Hydro Renewable Electricity Productionin China 2000–2019
in TWh

732

102
224
406
330

700
600

Wind
Solar
Other Non-Hydro Renewables

500

Nuclear
400

75

300

25
1
49

200

71

100

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

2014

2016

2018 190

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, BP Statistical Review, 2020

Despite the impressive total numbers, the annual capacity additions for solar PV in 2019 weresignificantly lower at just over 30 GW compared with 44 GW in 2018—a fall of 32 percent.1147 In
2019, 17.9 GW of new solar was centralized and 12.2 GW were decentralized. While the rapidly
increasing share of decentralized solar is a remarkable development, the total added capacity
represents a further decline from the record deployment in 2017 of 53 GW (see Figure 56).
According to the NEA, PV power generation reached 224.3 TWh, which exceeded 200 TWh
for the first time, a year-on-year increase of 26.3 percent. In July 2019, the country released
results for its first national auction for solar PV projects and the NEA approved 22.78 GW ofsolar capacity with the lowest bid at CNY279.5/MWh (US$41/MWh), which is falling, but still
significantly higher than in other countries, such as in the Middle East and US.1148

1147 - Globaldata Energy, “Solar PV capacity additions in China fell by 32% in 2019”, Power Technology, 23 January 2020,see https://www.power-technology.com/comment/solar-pv-capacity-additions-china-2019/, accessed 4 June 2020.
1148 - Globaldata Energy, “Solar PV Capacity Additions in China Fell by 32% in 2019”,
see https://www.power-technology.com/comment/solar-pv-capacity-additions-china-2019/, accessed 6 July 2020.

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Figure 56 · Installed Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in China 2000–2019

Installed Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in China 2000–2019
210

in GWe185 205
175

Wind
Solar
Nuclear

131

44

43 46

30
2

2000

7

16

27

2005

2010

2015

Annual Production© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Installed Capacity

in TWh/year
Wind
Nuclear
Solar

330
277

224
186

177

161
50
16

2018 19

406
366

2

2000

2005

71
39
49
1
2010

2015

2018 19

Sources: IRENA, BP Statistical Review, IAEA-PRIS, WNISR, 2020

Wind power in 2019 increased its annual deployment with an additional 26.2 GW of new
capacity—44 percent of the global total1149 —compared to a 21.2 GW increase in 20181150,
according the Global Wind Energy Council. In 2019, about 2.3 GW of the new deployment was
offshore—39 percent of the global total, the rest was onshore. China now has 37 percent of
the world’s wind power fleet. According to the NEA, the total electricity production was justunder 406 TWh, exceeding 400 TWh for the first time, an increase of 10.9 percent year-onyear. Importantly, the level of wind curtailment, when the power generated cannot be used,fell to 4 percent, which is the continuation of an important trend within the sector. China isaiming to become a subsidy-free market from 2021 by eliminating feed-in-tariffs for wind andsolar PV.1151
The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) proposed new targets for energy efficiency and the
reduction of carbon intensity as well as diversification away from fossil fuels, whereby
non-fossil fuels are to provide 15 percent of primary energy consumption by 2020, up from
7.4 percent in 2005.1152 However, in 2016, a total of 34.5 GW of solar PV were installed, almost
double the forecasted 15 to 20 GW per year.1153 In November 2016, NEA announced an update of
the 13th Five-Year Plan for the power sector (2016–2020). The target for wind power (210 GW)
is higher than the previous announcements (200 GW), while the target for solar (110 GW) is
considerably lower (up to 150 GW previously). Given the real deployment levels of solar andwind at the end of 2019, both over 200 GW, both targets have already been met.
1149 - GWEC, “GWEC: Over 60GW of wind energy capacity installed in 2019, the second-biggest year in history”, Global Wind Energy
Council, 25 March 2020, see https://gwec.net/gwec-over-60gw-of-wind-energy-capacity-installed-in-2019-the-second-biggest-year-inhistory/, accessed 4 June 2020.
1150 - GWEC, “Global Wind Energy Report 2018”, Global Wind Energy Council, April 2018,see https://gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GWEC-Global-Wind-Report-2018.pdf, accessed 23 June 2019.
1151 - Globaldata Energy, “Solar PV Capacity Additions in China Fell by 32% in 2019”.
1152 - China Dialogue, “Climate, energy and China’s 13th Five-Year Plan in graphics”, 18 March 2016,see https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8734-Climate-energy-and-China-s-13th-Five-Year-Plan-in-graphics,
accessed 4 June 2020.
1153 - Richard Martin, “China Is on an Epic Solar Power Binge”, MIT Technology Review, 22 March 2016,see https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/03/22/161462/china-is-on-an-epic-solar-power-binge/, accessed 4 June 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

The 13th Five-Year Plan was also proposing to increase nuclear capacities to a total of 58 GW
by 2020 with an additional 30 GW under construction. However, only 44.5 GW are operating
as of 1 July 2020, and 13.8 GW are under construction (see Overview of Current New-build).
Therefore, it will be impossible to meet this target.
In mid-2020 the Chinese Government is preparing the 14th Five-Year Plan, with the final plan
expected to be approved by China’s top legislature in early 2021. Internationally, as part of theParis Agreement, China has pledged to peak carbon emissions by 2030 at the latest but has
been reluctant to promise an absolute cap on emissions. The 14th Five-Year Plan will also beaffected by the stimulus package which is focusing on increasing electrification and the use ofelectric vehicles.

European Union
In the European Union (EU)1154 , renewables, including hydro, continue to grow and supplied arecord 35 percent of the power in 2019, up by 1.8 percent over the previous year. During 2019, thecombined outputs from solar and wind at 18 percent were greater than that provided by coal.
The other renewables, hydro and biomass provided 10.8 percent and 6.2 percent respectively,
while nuclear power provided 25.5 percent.1155
Figure 57 shows how over the past decade new renewables, particular solar and wind, having
increased output by a factor of 2.5, while nuclear output dropped by more than 9 percent overthe same period. In 2020, for the first time, the production of new renewables will almost
certainly exceed that from nuclear plants.
As illustrated in Figure 58, in 2019, wind generation increased by 14 percent (+54 TWh) with
73 percent of the growth occurring in just five countries: France, Germany, Spain, Sweden andthe U.K. Solar generation rose by 7 percent (+9.5 TWh) with the Netherlands (+3 TWh) andSpain (+2 TWh) accounting for 54 percent of the EU-wide increase in solar generation. Nuclear
generation decreased slightly by 1 percent (–6 TWh), in particular due to a 3 percent decreasein France and a 14 percent drop in the U.K.
Overall fossil fuel generation fell by 6 percent, with natural gas increasing by 12 percent, hardcoal decreasing by 32 percent—caused by renewables growth and rising CO₂ prices (leading
to increased gas generation)—and a fall in lignite-based production of 16 percent. Electricity
consumption decreased by 1.7 percent in 2019 (–56 TWh), bringing demand back to 2015 levels.
Because of all of these changes CO2 emissions from the power sectors fell by 12 percent. 1156

1154 - As the U.K. left the EU only on 31 January 2020, we are providing the statistics for 2019 for the EU28 including the U.K.
1155 - Agora Energiewende et al., “The European Power Sector in 2019: Up-to-Date Analysis on the Electricity Transition”,
February 2020, see https://www.agora-energiewende.de/en/publications/the-european-power-sector-in-2019/, accessed 20 June 2020.
1156 - Ibidem.

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Figure 57 · Renewable Energy and Nuclear Power Generation in the EU28 2010–2019

Nuclear vs Renewable Electricity Productionin the EU28 2010–2019
in TWh/year
768

871

199
137
432
783

Biomass
Solar
Wind
129
23
151

600

Nuclear
303

400

200

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

0

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

1157

Sources: IAEA-PRIS, Agora Energiewende/Sandbag

Since 2000, wind added 178.5 GW of installed capacity, solar 129.6 GW, while nuclear declinedby 21 GW. Since the signature of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, wind and solar increased annual
production by 423 TWh and 138 TWh respectively, while nuclear generated 98 TWh less power
than two decades earlier (see Figure 58).

Figure 58 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the EU28 (Developments)

0Capacity Added Since 2000
in GWe net

166

Wind
Solar
Nuclear

129

129
114

95
72

28

30

2
-3

2000

179

2005

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Wind, Solar and Nuclear Developments: Installed Capacity and Electricity Production in the EU28

0
-8
2010

-17
2015

Annual Production Compared to 1997
in net added TWh
Wind
Solar
Nuclear

296

108

127

67
15

1

63

9

23
-9
-65

1997

138

142

-19 -212018 19

423
370

2000

2005

2010

2015

-94 -98
2018 19

Sources: IRENA, BP, IAEA-PRIS, WNISR, 2020

1157 - Agora Energiewende et al., “The European Power Sector in 2019: Up-to-Date Analysis on the Electricity Transition”, 2020,
op. cit.

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In 2019, solar installed capacity for the first time exceeded the nuclear one in the EU28 with
130 GW vs. 116 GW. Wind had outpaced nuclear already in the 2014 and has since enlarged
the gap with a total of 191 GW installed as of the end of 2019. On the electricity generationside, nuclear is still generating more than either wind or solar, but its slow decline continues.
(See Figure 59)Production in the EU28 (Absolute Numbers)
Figure 59 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the EU28 (Absolute Numbers)

Installed Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in the EU28
Annual Production

Installed Capacity
191

137

134

141
129

84

40

120
95

889

130
118
115

116

Wind
Solar
Nuclear

30

13
2

2000

2005

2010

2015

2018 19

in TWh/year

947

179

871
815

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

in GWe

22

1997

2000

783
787

Nuclear
Wind
Solar

431
377
303
150
71
2
2005

108

23
2010

138
128

2015

2018 19

Sources: BP Statistical Review, IAEA-PRIS, IRENA, WNISR, 2020

The growth in renewable electricity production is set to continue beyond the current 2020
targets, as in preparation of the U.N. climate meeting in Paris in December 2015, the EU
initially agreed a binding target of at least 27 percent renewables in the primary energy mix by
2030, which is likely to have meant 40–50 percent of power coming from renewables. However,in June 2018, it was agreed to increase ambition, with a new target of 32 percent of renewables
in primary energy by 2030, with an opportunity to further increase this in 2023.1158 By 2050,
the EU aims for a completely low-carbon electricity system. This will require speeding up thecurrent rate of renewable electricity deployment. There is no EU-wide nuclear deployment
target.
During 2019, the costs of new renewable installations continued to fall in most countries.
In France, 12 solar projects totaling 94.2 MW of capacity were selected to be built at the
Fessenheim nuclear power station in France’s Haut-Rhin department, which has been closed
in the first half of 2020. The allocation—which attracted bids averaging €55.8–98.5/MWh(US$62–110/MWh)—was the result of the second round of the Fessenheim scheme, which
ultimately aims to install 300 MW of solar in the vicinity of the nuclear site that is to be
decommissioned.1159 In Germany, the latest onshore wind auction prices are averaging €61.4/
1158 - European Commission, “Europe leads the global clean energy transition: Commission welcomes ambitious agreement on further
renewable energy development in the EU”, Press Release, 14 June 2018, see https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
STATEMENT_18_4155, accessed 14 June 2020.
1159 - Sophie Vorrath, “France solar auction success delivered at nuclear’s expense”, Renew Economy, 3 April 2020 ,see https://reneweconomy.com.au/france-solar-auction-success-delivered-at-nuclears-expense-59426/, accessed 6 April 2020.

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MWh (US$69/MWh) and for solar €52.7/MWh (US$60/MWh).1160 In the U.K., the Contracts
for Difference (CfD) Allocation Round 3 for offshore wind, held in 2019, will be delivered at a
strike price as low as £39.65/MWh (US$50/MWh).1161
The European Commission introduced a Green New Deal in order to meet medium- and longterm emissions-reduction objectives in 2019. This would enable the EU to move towards a net
zero economy while maintaining economic growth. Following the global pandemic, the EU
revised this and in May 2020 published a green recovery plan, which assumes that investment
needs amount to at least €1.5 trillion (~US$1.1 trillion) in 2020–2021. “Investment in key
sectors and technologies, from 5G to artificial intelligence and from clean hydrogen to offshore
renewable energy, holds the key to Europe’s future”.1162
The European Commission has developed a taxonomy framework to facilitate sustainable
investment. The text agreed by the European institutions (the European Parliament andCouncil), notes that renewable energy is an economic activity that contributes to climatechange mitigation, but no mention is made of nuclear power. The regulation asked a TechnicalExpert Group (TEG) to:develop recommendations for technical screening criteria for economic activities that canmake a substantial contribution to climate change mitigation or adaptation, while avoiding
significant harm to the four other environmental objective.1163

The Group concluded on nuclear power:
It was not possible for TEG, nor its members, to conclude that the nuclear energy value chain
does not cause significant harm to other environmental objectives on the time scales inquestion. The TEG has therefore not recommended the inclusion of nuclear energy in theTaxonomy at this stage.1164

This is a significant development, as the EU stimulus package is designed to use additional
EU and Member State funds to rebuild parts of the economy while meeting decarbonization
objectives. Not including nuclear power within the funding framework will further increase
the gap between renewables and nuclear power with greater deployment leading to cheaperand cheaper solar and wind, and in relation to policy support.

1160 - reNEWS.BIZ , “Latest German onshore auction lacks allure”, 24 June 2020,see https://renews.biz/61205/latest-german-onshore-auction-lacks-allure/, accessed 5 July 2020.
1161 - reNEWS.BIZ , “UK offshore wind ‘cheaper than new nuclear’”, 25 June 2020,see https://renews.biz/61228/uk-offshore-wind-cheaper-than-new-nuclear/, accessed 26 June 2020.
1162 - European Commission, “The EU budget powering the Recovery Plan for Europe”, 27 May 2020,see https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/eu-budget-powering-recovery-plan-europe_en, accessed 14 June 2020.
1163 - Council of the European Union, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the establishmentof a framework to facilitate sustainable investment - Approval of the final compromise text”, Interinstitutional File 2018/0178 (COD),
17 December 2020, see https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14970-2019-ADD-1/en/pdf, accessed 14 June 2020.
1164 - European Commission, “Technical annex to the TEG final report on the EU taxonomy”, 9 March 2020,see https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/200309-sustainable-finance-teg-final-report-taxonomy-annexes_en, accessed 14 June 2020.

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According to IRENA, since 2010, the capacity of solar has increased from 65 MW to 35 GW at
the end of 2019, while wind increased from 13 GW to 37.5 GW.1165 Figure 60 shows that since
the turn of the century, wind power output has grown rapidly, from 1.5 TWh to 63.3 TWh in
20191166 and has overtaken nuclear’s contribution to electricity generation since 2016, which
now stands at 45.2 TWh. Solar is also growing rapidly, from 7 MWh in 2000 to 46.3 TWh in
2019, having overtaken nuclear power for the first time. The differences between renewables
and nuclear will likely increase in the coming years, because of the rapid growth of solar andwind capacity, and stagnation in the nuclear sector.
India has put in place ambitious targets for the deployment of renewables 175 GW by 2022
including 100 GW solar and 60 GW wind. Between 2014 and 2018, the annual growth of
the new-renewable energy sector increased tenfold from 2.6 GW to 28 GW—a cumulative
aggregated growth rate of around 18 percent.1167 However, the growth rate has now slowed. At
the start of financial year 2019–2020, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE)
agree to add 11.8 GW of renewable energy capacity. This target was the lowest in four years,
yet deployment levels failed to achieve it. During the period of April 2019 to March 2020, thecountry managed to add 8.7 GW of renewable energy capacity, a shortfall of 26 percent.1168
The failure to meet targets is despite world beating falling costs. IRENA reported that India
had the lowest installation costs for solar PV power plants in both 2018 and 2019. The global
weighted-average total installed cost of projects commissioned in 2019 fell, to US$995/kW
with India having the lowest costs of US$618/kW. While the LCOE between 2010 and 2019 inIndia declined by 85 percent to reach US$45/MWh in 2019—34 percent lower than the global
weighted average, according to IRENA figures.1169
In 2019, the global weighted-average LCOE of onshore wind stood at US$53/MWh, but in India
it had fallen to US$49/MWh and is now lower than the cheapest fossil fuel-fired option.1170
It is notable that with the auctions for both solar and wind power there is maximum pricedisclosure, which contrasts with the nuclear sector, where there is little information. However,
one academic analysis suggests that costs for light water reactors are around US$140/MWh
depending on the waste management strategy.1171

1165 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020: a pivotal moment”, Press Release, 17 June 2020, see https://www.bp.com/en/global/
corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2020-published.html, accessed 26 June 2020.
1166 - BP, ”Statistical Review of World Energy”, 2020, see https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/
xlsx/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-all-data.xlsx, accessed 17 June 2020.
1167 - Economic Times of India, “India may find it difficult to meet 175 GW renewable energy capacity target by 2022, says think tank”,
12 February 2020, see https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/productline/power-generation/india-may-find-it-difficult-tomeet-175-gw-renewable-energy-capacity-target-by-2022-says-think-tank/articleshow/74094698.cms?from=mdr, accessed 14 June 2020.
1168 - CleanTechnica, “India Misses Renewable Energy Targets In 4th Consecutive Year”, 23 May 2020,see https://cleantechnica.com/2020/05/23/india-misses-renewable-energy-targets-in-fourth-consecutive-year/, accessed 14 June 2020.
1169 - IRENA, “Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2019”, June 2020,see https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2019, accessed 13 June 2020.
1170 - Ibidem.
1171 - Anoop Singh et al., “Levelised Cost of Electricity for Nuclear Power Using Light Water Reactor Technology in India”, Economic

and Political Weekly, 10 March 2018.

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Figure 60 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Installed Capacity and Electricity Production in India

Installed Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Electricity Production in India 2000–2019
Annual Production

Installed Capacity
38
35

Wind
Solar
Nuclear

25

35

27

13

3
2000

4

4

3

0.1

2006

2010

5

63

46
41

36

35

35

33
21
16

14

2000

20

6

2
2018 19

60

Wind
Solar
Nuclear

6 6

5
2015

in TWh/year© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

in GWe

2005

0.1

7

2010

2016

2018 19

Sources: BP Statistical Review, IRENA, IAEA-PRIS, WNISR, 2020

United States
Despite pledges by the incoming Trump administration to support the coal and nuclear
sectors, neither have thrived, on the contrary: in 2019, coal consumption decreased for thesixth consecutive year to 11.3 quadrillion Btu, the lowest level since 1964. Electricity generationfrom coal also declined significantly over the past decade and, in 2019, fell to its lowest levelin 42 years. In April 2019, for the first time since before 1885, the renewable energy sector(hydro, biomass, wind, solar and geothermal) generated more electricity than coal-fired plants
across the U.S.1172 In 2019, 23 GW of new production capacity was installed, of which 9.1 GW
was wind, 8.3 GW natural gas and 5.3 GW solar PV.1173 For the first time, installed wind power
exceeded installed nuclear capacity with 104 GW vs. 98 GW (see Figure 61).
No new nuclear power capacity came on-line for the past four years and one reactor (ThreeMile-Island-1) was closed in September 2019, and yet the industry succeeded in generatinga new record volume of electricity with 809 TWh supplying just under 20 percent of theelectricity. Across the U.S., there are 30 states with operating nuclear power plants, and 12 ofthese generated more than 30 percent of their power from their reactors.
As solar and wind continue to be deployed at scale, their installation costs keep falling andtherefore, so does the cost of electricity they produce. Consequently, the combined fuel,maintenance, and other going-forward costs of coal-fired power from many existing plants isnow more expensive than the all-in costs of new wind or solar projects. Energy Innovation
partnered with Vibrant Clean Energy (VCE) research finds that in 2018, 211 GW of existing(end of 2017) U.S. coal capacity, or 74 percent of the national fleet, was at risk from local wind
1172 - Mickey Francis, “U.S. renewable energy consumption surpasses coal for the first time in over 130 years”, Today in Energy,
U.S. EIA, 28 May 2020, see https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43895, accessed 4 June 2020.
1173 - Manussawee Sukunta, “Wind and natural gas-fired generators led U.S. power sector capacity additions in 2019”, U.S. EIA,
April 2020, see https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43415, accessed 4 June 2020.

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or solar that could provide the same amount of electricity more cheaply. By 2025, at-risk coalincreases to 246 GW, nearly the entire U.S. fleet.1174 The Institute for Energy Economics andFinancial Analysis (IEEFA) projected in November 2019 that renewables would fully outpace
coal-fired generation on an annual basis in 2021. By March 2020, they had assumed that “thetransition in fact is gaining speed as utilities phase out coal-fired generation and turn to gas
and renewables”. They further assume that renewables contribution, excluding that from
distributed solar, will exceed that of nuclear power by 2024.1175
Despite support from the White House, nuclear power and coal have not thrived under the
Trump Presidency, which is primarily due to support on the State level for renewables andbasic economics. Across the U.S., as was shown by the Lazard assessment (see Figure 50), costsof renewables continue to fall and are significantly cheaper than nuclear new build.
Figure 61 · Wind, Solar and Nuclear Installed Capacity and Electricity Production in the U.S

Capacity

Production

in GW

in TWh/year
98

96

100

99

99

104

94

98

73

Nuclear
Wind
Solar

61
51
39
22
9

2

1

2000

2005

3
2010

2015 2018 19© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Installed Wind, Solar and Nuclear Capacity and Production in the U.S. 2000–2019

783

756

807

809

798

808

771

Nuclear
Wind
Solar

275

303

193
96
6

18

3

2000

2005

2010

108
39
2015

94
2018 19

Sources: BP Statistical Review, IRENA, IAEA-PRIS, WNISR 2020

CONCLUSION ON NUCLEAR POWER VS.
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEPLOYMENTIn June 2020, the IEA put forward a three-year Sustainable Recovery Plan, “focused on
cost-effective measures that could be implemented during the specific timeframe of 2021 to2023”.1176 The plan has three main goals: boosting economic growth, creating jobs and building

1174 - Eric Gimon, Christopher T M Clack and Sarah Mckee, “The coal cost crossover: economic viability of existing coal compared to
new local wind and solar resources”, Energy Innovation and Vibrant Clean Energy, March 2019.
1175 - Dennis Warmsted, Seith Feaster and Karl Cates, “U.S. Coal Outlook 2020: Market Trends Pushing Industry Ever Closer
to a Reckoning”, IEEFA, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, March 2020, see https://ieefa.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/US-Coal-Outlook-2020_March-2020.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.
1176 - IEA, Sustainable Recovery - World Energy Outlook Special Report.

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more resilient and cleaner energy systems. The proposal for the power sector suggested aprioritization of investment in renewable energy and a strengthening of the grid, such thata range of measures could be put in place to support the expansion and modernization ofelectricity grids; accelerate new wind and solar installations and repower existing ones.

For all other energy sources, including nuclear power, the IEA suggests that they should bemaintained or managed. The message is clear: for economic, employment and sustainability
reasons the clear priority is renewable energy.
The IEA’s conclusions—echoed in this chapter—if enacted, will accelerate a trend that has been
seen over the past decade, at least, that nuclear power appears increasingly as an outdated,
incompatible and expensive technology that cannot compete in a decarbonized energy sector
with the range of cheaper renewable energy sources.

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TABLE OF ANNEX
Annex 1 – Overview by Region and Country		

285

Annex 2 – Status of Canadian Nuclear Fleet		

343

Annex 3 – Status of Japanese Nuclear Fleet		344

Annex 4 – Status of Nuclear Power in the World		

346

Annex 5 – Nuclear Reactors in the World “Under Construction”		

347

Annex 6 – Abbreviations		

353

Annex 7 – About the Authors		

358

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ANNEX 1 – OVERVIEW BY
REGION AND COUNTRY
These “quick view”
indicators will be usedin the country sections
throughout the report.

Unless otherwise noted, data on the numbers of reactors operating and under construction andtheir capacity (as of mid-2020) and nuclear’s share in electricity generation in 2019 are from theInternational Atomic Energy Agency’s Power Reactor Information System (IAEA-PRIS) online
database.1177 Historical maximum figures indicate the year that the nuclear share in the power
generation of a given country was the highest since 1986, the year of the Chernobyl disaster.
Unless otherwise noted, the load factor figures are from Nuclear Engineering International(NEI).1178

AFRICASouth Africa
Africa’s only commercial nuclear power plant houses two 900 MW reactors, located at
Koeberg, near Cape Town in South Africa. Both reactors started operating in the mid-1980s.
In 2019, they generated 13.6 TWh representing 6.7 percent of the country’s power, an increaseof 2 percentage points over the previous year, but down from the historical maximum of
7.4 percent in 1989.
The reactors had been given permission to operate for 40 years and are now planning a seriesof replacement and upgrading work to extend their operational lifetimes.1179 The decision to
replace all six steam generators of the two units was taken in 2010. AREVA was awarded thecontract in 20141180 and a lengthy legal battle with competitor Westinghouse followed. In 2018,
the Parliament began investigations into the actions of several Eskom officials relating to anumber of issues, including the steam generator contracts. The Parliament committee reportconcluded that the former chairmen and executives of Eskom “reasonably ought to have
known or suspected” that their failure to report the flouting of governance rules relating to1177 - IAEA-PRIS, “Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation in 2019”, see https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/
NuclearShareofElectricityGeneration.aspx.
1178 - NEI, “Load factors to end December 2019”, June 2020.
1179 - Kevin Brandt, “Koeberg nuclear plant components can run beyond 2045, say experts”, EWN, 5 November 2019,see https://ewn.co.za/2019/11/05/koeberg-nuclear-plant-components-can-run-beyond-2045-say-experts, accessed 5 November 2019.
1180 - NEI, “AREVA to replace steam generators at Koeberg”, 19 August 2014,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsareva-to-replace-steam-generators-at-koeberg-4346550/, accessed 5 June 2020.

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some contracts, including those relating to the steam generator replacement “may constitutecriminal conduct”.1181
The plant has been operating at low temperatures to reduce the pace of corrosion in the steam
generator tubes. The replacement of the steam generators is scheduled to be carried out in
2021.1182
The state-owned South African utility and Koeberg operator Eskom had considered
acquiring additional large PWRs and had made plans to build 20 GW of generating capacity
by 2025. However, in November 2008, Eskom scrapped an international tender because theGovernment was unwilling to give the loan guarantees demanded by potential financiers,
and credit-rating agencies threatened downgrades. In 2011, the Department of Energy (DOE)
published an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for future power generation investments that
contained a 9.6 GW target, or six nuclear units, by 2030. Startup would have been one unit
every 18 months beginning in 2022. The total price of the project was estimated to be in therange of US$37‑100 billion.1183
In April 2017, the Western Cape division of South Africa’s High Court ruled in favor of twoNGOs, the Southern African Faith Communities Environment Institute (SAFCEI) and
Earthlife Africa, in their cases against the Government; halting a December 2015 decision toproceed with the procurement of 9.6 GW of new nuclear capacity, and annulling the nuclear
co-operation agreements that the Government had signed with Russia, South Korea andthe United States. The court concluded that the lack of public consultation on the decisions“rendered its decision procedurally unfair” and breached its statute.1184 In May 2017, theGovernment announced that it would not appeal the court. The 2018 Goldman environmental
prize was awarded to grassroots activists Makoma Lekalakala and Liz McDaid for the successful
legal challenge in this case.1185
In January 2018, future President Cyril Ramaphosa said in Davos that “we have no money to go
for major nuclear plant building.”1186 Even the chief financial officer of Eskom stated: “I can’t
go and commit to additional expenditure around a nuclear program.”1187 In August 2018, theGovernment published its draft IRP 20181188, in which new nuclear is absent in the period up to2030.1189
1181 - Renee Bonorchis and Ana Monteiro, “Three former Eskom chairmen to be criminally probed”, Bloomberg, as publishedby BizNews.com, 28 November 2018, see https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2018/11/28/eskom-chairmen-criminal-probe,
accessed 5 June 2020.
1182 - According to an Eskom spokesperson, personal communication, Anton Eberhard, email dated 13 July 2020.
1183 - NEI, “Eskom plans RFP for new reactors by mid-year”, 15 March 2017,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newseskom-plans-rfp-for-new-reactors-by-mid-year-5761595/, accessed 5 June 2020.
1184 - Phil Chaffee, “Legal, High Court Upends South African Newbuild Plans”, NIW, 28 April 2017.
1185 - Jonathan Watts, “Goldman prize awarded to South African women who stopped an international nuclear deal”, The Guardian,
23 April 2018, see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/23/goldman-prize-awarded-to-south-african-women-who-stopped-aninternational-nuclear-deal, accessed 5 June 2020.
1186 - Alexis Akwagyiram, “South Africa has no money for major nuclear expansion, Ramaphosa says”, Reuters, 25 January 2018,see https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N1PK6S9, accessed 5 June 2020.
1187 - NIW, “Weekly Roundup”, 2 February 2018.
1188 - Despite there being half a dozen versions of the IRP, only one, the revision of 2011 was ‘promulgated’ so all the other versions
including the August 2018 version have no policy status.
1189 - NEI, “South Africa cancels nuclear expansion plans”, 30 August 2018,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newssouth-africa-cancels-nuclear-expansion-plans-6728356/, accessed 5 June 2020.

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However, in October 2019, in the updated IRP document, nuclear power was described as a “noregret option”. The document stated that due to expected decommissioning of 24 GW of coalcapacity, it was proposed to implement nuclear “at an affordable pace and modular scale” and“at a pace and scale the country can afford”.1190
In June 2020, the Government issued a “Request for Information” (RfI) to enable an assessmentof the potential reactor technologies to “be considered” under a future newbuild program thatmight encompass both conventional reactors and SMRs. The vendors were expected to supply
technical and financial information by 15 September 2020. It is not clear whether the RfI will
be followed by a Request for Proposals, i.e. a formal, competitive tender, and it is unlikely that afurther nuclear power plant will be started up in South Africa this decade.1191

THE AMERICAS
Argentina
Argentina has three nuclear reactors. In 2019, the operating units provided 7.9 TWh or
5.9 percent of the country’s electricity (down from a maximum of 19.8 percent in 1990, but up
on the previous year). The plants were supplied by foreign reactor builders: Atucha-1, whichstarted operation in 1974, was supplied by Siemens, and the CANDU (CANadian Deuterium
Uranium) type reactor at Embalse was supplied by Canadian Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited (AECL) and started operating in 1983. In April 2018, the regulatory authority gave alifetime extension license to enable Atucha-1 to continue operating until 2024, which would
thus allow for a 50-year operating life.1192
The Embalse plant was shut down at the end of 2015 for major overhaul, including the
replacement of hundreds of pressure tubes, to enable it to operate for up to 30 more years.
Reportedly, contracts worth US$444 million were signed in August 2011 with the bulk of
the work done during a 20-month shutdown starting in November 2013.1193 According to theWorld Nuclear Association (WNA), the reactor was shut down in December 2015, completed
in December 2018 and eventually returned to service in May 2019.1194 It is now expected tooperate for another 30 years.1195
Atucha-2 was ordered in 1979 and was listed as “under construction” in 1981. Construction
was on and off for the following decades, but finally grid connection was announced on

1190 - Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, “Integrated Resource Plan (IRP2019)”, Republic of South Africa,
see http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/2019/IRP-2019.pdf, accessed 5 June 2020.
1191 - Roger Murray and Phil Chaffee, “Government RFI Keeps New Nuclear Option Alive”, NIW, 19 June 2020.
1192 - WNN, “Atucha 1 operating licence renewed”, 16 April 2018,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Atucha-1-operating-licence-renewed-1604184.html, accessed 1 June 2020.
1193 - WNN, “Embalse refurbishment contracts signed”, 25 August 2011,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Embalse_refurbishment_contracts_signed-2508114.html, accessed 1 June 2020.
1194 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in Argentina”, Updated April 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/argentina.aspx, accessed 1 June 2020.
1195 - NEI, “Argentina’s Embalse resumes commercial operation”, 5 June 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsargentinas-embalse-resumes-commercial-operation-7244154/, accessed 10 May 2020.

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27 June 2014. However, it took until 19 February 2015 for the unit to reach full capacity 1196 anduntil 26 May 2016 to enter commercial operation.1197
For the past decade discussions have been held on the construction of a fourth reactor. In
February 2015, Argentina and China ratified an agreement to build an 800 MW CANDU-type
reactor at the Atucha site, when Atucha-3 was expected to cost US$5.8 billion.1198
A framework agreement was also signed in 2015 between the two companies for theconstruction of a Hualong One reactor, China’s new, and as yet unoperated, Generation-III
design, without a site being specified.1199 In May 2017, a co-operation agreement was signed
between Argentina and China, whereby China would help build and mainly finance theconstruction of the two reactors, with the CANDU-6 starting construction in 2018 and the
Hualong reactor in 2020.1200 However, the site for the Hualong reactor has not been agreed
on, as the Governor of Rio Negro—the Government’s preferred location—rejected the locationof the reactor in his province, citing a lack of social acceptance for the project.1201 Despite
this, the Government insisted in October 2017 that construction on both projects would begin
in the 2nd half of 2018.1202 The total cost of the Hualong and Atucha-3 projects were expected
to be US$12.5 billion, (other sources indicate US$15 billion)1203 financed with a 20-year loan
from China at an interest rate of 4.5 percent. In May 2018, the Government announced that it
was suspending talks with China regarding the construction of both reactors for at least four
years.1204
Then, in the run up to the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires at the end of 2018, there was more
optimism that the project could be revised, due to a better financial offer from the Chinese andthe conclusion of a wider bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). During
2019, discussions were said to be still ongoing and centered around interest rates, although thiswas said to be just one of many issues to be resolved.1205 According to a January 2019 note by
the French Economy and Finance Ministry, the Hualong One project with a 750 MW reactor
could be entirely financed by China and started up by 2027 or 2028.1206 In June 2019, theArgentine Government expressed ongoing support for the project following official meetings
1196 - WNN, “Atucha 2 reaches 100% rated power”, 19 February 2015,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Atucha-2-reaches-100-percent-rated-power-19021502.html, accessed 2 June 2020.
1197 - WNN, “Atucha 2 receives full operating licence”, 31 May 2016,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Atucha-2-receives-full-operating-licence-3105165.html, accessed 2 June 2020.
1198 - WNN, “Argentina and China sign contract for two reactors”, 18 May 2017,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Argentina-and-China-sign-contract-for-two-reactors-1805175.html, accessed 2 June 2020.
1199 - Phil Chaffee and Jason Fargo, “Moving closer to Atucha-3 and HPR1000 Newbuilds”, NIW, 6 November 2015.
1200 - CNNC, “CNNC to build heavy water reactor and HPR 1000 units in Argentina”, 19 May 2017,see http://en.cnnc.com.cn/2017-05/19/c_77725.htm, accessed 2 June 2020.
1201 - Phil Chaffee, “Argentina”, NIW, 29 September 2017.
1202 - Sylvia Westall, “Argentina to start building two new nuclear reactors in 2018”, Reuters, 31 October 2017,see https://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-nuclearpower/argentina-to-start-building-two-new-nuclear-reactors-in-2018idUSL8N1N67EG, accessed 2 June 2020.
1203 - WNN, “Argentina and China sign contract for two reactors”, 18 May 2017,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Argentina-and-China-sign-contract-for-two-reactors-1805175.html,
accessed 2 June 2020.
1204 - Phil Chaffee, “The Fallout From Argentina’s Newbuild Retreat”, NIW, 25 May 2018.
1205 - NIW, “Briefs–Argentina”, 5 April 2019.
1206 - Direction générale du Trésor, “Le secteur nucléaire en Argentine”, French Ministry for the Economy and Finance,
28 January 2019, see https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2019/01/28/le-secteur-nucleaire-en-argentine, accessed 16 May 2019.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 with the Chinese, with Argentina’s cabinet chief Marcos Pena saying “there is an intention
to move forward.”1207 While the President of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)
Jun Gu told delegates at an IAEA conference in October 2019 that construction of the reactors
would begin in 2020.1208
After repeated delays, construction of a prototype 27-MWe PWR, the domestically designed
CAREM25 (Central Argentina de Elementos Modulares—a pressurized-water SMR) began near
the Atucha site in February 2014, with startup initially planned for 2018. The reactor was said
to cost US$446 million1209. In 2019, it was rescheduled to begin operating in 2022,1210 with the
expected costs having risen to an estimated US$700 million or about US$26,000 per installed
kWe.1211 However, late in 2019, Techint Engineering & Construction, the main contractors
halted work citing late payment from the Government, unanticipated design changes and latedelivery of technical documentation. In April 2020, reports suggested that the dispute had
been resolved and that work should begin again in May; there is no indication about the impact
this would have on project’s timeline.1212

BrazilBrazil operates two nuclear reactors that provided the country with 15.2 TWh or 2.7 percent
of its electricity in 2019, just as in 2017, well below the maximum of 4.3 percent in 2001.
Construction of a third reactor was suspended in late 2015.
The first contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant, Angra-1, was awarded toWestinghouse in 1970. The reactor eventually went critical in 1981. Angra-2 was connected to
the grid in July 2000, 24 years after construction started. Preparatory work for the constructionof Angra-3 started in 1984, although it is unclear how much progress was made. Then, in
May 2010, Brazil’s Nuclear Energy Commission issued a construction license and the IAEA
noted that a “new” construction started on 1 June 2010. In early 2011, the Brazilian national
development bank (BNDES) approved a BRL6.1-billion (US$3.6-billion)-loan for work on the
project.1213 Reportedly, in November 2013, utility Eletronuclear, subsidiary of state-owned
Eletrobras, signed a €1.25 billion (US$20131.67 billion) contract with French builder AREVA for
1207 - Cassandra Garrison and Hugh Bronstein, “Argentine official, in China, talks nuclear deal and soymeal”, Reuters, as publishedby TheGuardian.pe.ca, 25 June 2019, see https://www.theguardian.pe.ca/business/argentine-official-in-china-talks-nuclear-deal-andsoymeal-326387/, accessed 2 June 2020.
1208 - WNN, “China confident of ‘new era’ for nuclear, says CNNC president”, 9 October 2019,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/China-confident-of-new-era-for-nuclear-says-CNNC, accessed 3 May 2020.
1209 - WNN, “Construction of CAREM underway”, 10 February 2014,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Construction-of-CAREM-underway-1002144.html, accessed 2 June 2020.
1210 - Matías Alonso, “CAREM: Reactor en alta tensión”, Agencia TSS, 21 February 2019 (in Spanish),see http://www.unsam.edu.ar/tss/carem-reactor-en-alta-tension/, accessed 2 June 2020.
1211 - Jim Green, “Small and Medium Nuclear Reactors (SMRs) – cost estimates, and what they cost to build”, Nuclear Monitor, as
published on Nuclear-News, 7 March 2019, see https://nuclear-news.net/2019/03/25/small-and-medium-nuclear-reactors-smrs-costestimates-and-what-they-cost-to-build/#more-147114, accessed 12 May 2019.
1212 - Nucnet, “Argentina Plans To Revive CAREM-25 SMR”, Energy Central, 26 April 2020,see https://energycentral.com/c/ec/argentina-plans-revive-carem-25-smr, accessed 3 May 2020.
1213 - However, it is surprising to note that AREVA’s 400-page Reference Document 2012 does not even contain the word “Angra”;
see AREVA, “2012—Reference Document”, 2013, see http://www.sa.areva.com/mediatheque/liblocal/docs/groupe/Documentreference/2012/DDR_AREVA_2012_EN.pdf, accessed 2 June 2020.

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the completion of the plant.1214 Commissioning was previously planned for July 2016 but wasdelayed to May 2018 in 2015,1215 and by February 2016, the following deadline of mid-2019 was“already being reevaluated”.1216
In June 2019, the industry invited 10 foreign firms to express interest in a partnership forthe completion of the project. Leonam Guimaraes, president of Eletronuclear (the Eletrobas
subsidiary), announced in October 2019 that Angra-3 would be completed with either CNNC,
Rosatom or EDF and that the costs would be around US$3.7 billion, despite apparently being
70 percent complete, with 80 percent of the nuclear equipment already purchased.1217 As of
May 2020, Angra-3 grid connection was planned for November 2026.1218
In an effort to restart construction, the Government has agreed a long-term power purchasingagreement for Angra-3 of BRL480/MWh (US$115/MWh).1219 In June 2020, the Government
approved plans for the completion of the project, “with or without a partner joining
Eletronuclear”. This is despite the President of Eletronuclear suggesting that an additional
BRL14.5 billion (US$2.65 billion) of investment would be needed to complete the unit.1220 Aswith other construction projects, preparatory work at the Angra plant has slowed as a resultof the COVID-19 pandemic, which is likely to further impact upon the completion schedule.1221
Despite the lack of construction the project has created political scandals and even the former
Brazilian President Michel Temer has become involved and arrested, along with others, inMarch 2019, for allegedly diverting BRL1.8 billion (US$475 million) from Eletronuclear’s
Angra-3 new-build project.1222 (See also earlier WNISR editions).

CanadaCanada has 19 CANDU reactors that produced 94.9 TWh in 2019, or 14.9 percent of Canada’s
total electricity. Both were almost identical to the 2018 figures. Eighteen out of the 19 nuclear
reactors are located in the province of Ontario, where nuclear power constituted 34 percent of
installed capacity and contributed 61 percent of the electricity generated in 2019.1223

1214 - WNN, “Areva contracted to complete Angra 3”, 8 November 2013,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-Areva-contracted-to-complete-Angra-3-081134.html, accessed 2 June 2020.
1215 - NIW, “Briefs – Brazil”, 9 January 2015.
1216 - NIW, “Brazil: Politics, Corruption and Finances Grind Angra-3 to a Halt”, 19 August 2016.
1217 - NEI, “Brazil seeks partners to complete Angra 3”, 29 October 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsbrazil-seeks-partners-to-complete-angra-3-7478476/, accessed 6 May 2020.
1218 - NW, “Brazil postpones long-term energy plan and proposal for 10 GW of new nuclear capacity”, 21 May 2020.
1219 - Phil Chaffee, “Angra-3 Financing Plan Approved”, NIW, 12 June 2020.
1220 - Marcela Ayres and Anthony Boadle, “UPDATE 1-Brazil government approves plan to complete third nuclear plant”, Reuters,
10 June 2020, see https://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL1N2DN367, accessed 11 June 2020.
1221 - BNamericas, “COVID-19: What next for Brazil’s Angra 3 nuclear plant?”, 15 June 2020,see https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/covid-19-what-next-for-brazils-angra-3-nuclear-plant, accessed 15 June 2020.
1222 - NIW, “Brazil: ‘Radioactivity’ Probe Nets Ex-President; Shoot-Out Near Angra”, 22 March 2019.
1223 - IESO, “Supply Overview”, Independent Electricity System Operator, 2020,see http://ieso.ca/Power-Data/Supply-Overview/Transmission-Connected-Generation, accessed 23 March 2020.

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Most of Canada’s electricity comes from renewable sources. In 2019, renewables (includinghydro) contributed close to 65 percent of the total electricity generated, slightly lower thanthe 2018 share.1224 Renewable electricity is dominated by hydro power, which contributed over
58 percent of all of Canada’s 666 TWh generated in 2019; of the remaining, wind contributed
5.1 percent, biomass 1.6 percent, and solar 0.6 percent. While hydro power’s contribution islower than the 2018 figure, the share of all the other renewables has increased slightly fromthe corresponding figures in 2018. According to IRENA, in the past decade, Canada’s total
renewable electricity capacity has grown from 80.8 GW (2010) to 101 GW (2019), hydropowerfrom 75 GW (2010) to 81 GW (2019), wind from 4 GW (2010) to 13.4 GW (2019), and solar from
0.2 GW (2010) to 3.3 GW (2019).1225
The Canada Energy Regulator (or CER, previously the National Energy Board or NEB), now
projects a declining trend for nuclear power. In the CER’s 2019 “Energy Future” report, thelatest available as of July 2020, the reference scenario involves the nuclear share of total
electricity generation decreasing from 14.8 percent in 2018 to 11.2 percent in 2040. Its projection
for renewables seems quite modest, since it foresees wind and solar energy supplying only justover 10 percent of all electricity.1226 However, the decline of nuclear power could be more rapid
than CER’s projections, which presume that nearly all of the reactors operating today will be
refurbished and kept operational. The only nuclear power plant that is not to be refurbished is
the Pickering plant with six operating reactors; these are scheduled to be shut down in 2024.
Those refurbishments that are expected to occur are contingent on their costs remaining
within expected amounts and ongoing expenditures being economically justified.1227 Both ofthese assumptions are questionable. The Darlington-2 refurbishment project was scheduled to
wrap up in the first quarter (Q1) of 2020 but was completed only on 4 June 20201228, with thereactor restarting and thus leaving the LTO status. The start of refurbishment at Darlington-3
has been delayed as well, in part due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and is now scheduled for
Fall 2020 instead of Spring 2020.1229 Historically, these delays have been accompanied bysignificant cost overruns.
With the ongoing decline in costs of solar and wind power, and of batteries and otherelectricity storage technologies, it becomes cheaper to meet electricity needs reliably using

1224 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020”, BP, June 2020,see https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html, accessed 17 June 2020.
1225 - IRENA, “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2020”, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020,see https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Mar/Renewable-Capacity-Statistics-2020, accessed 24 April 2020.
1226 - CER, “Canada’s Energy Future 2019—Energy Supply and Demand Projections to 2040”, Canada Energy Regulator, 2019,see http://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/ftr/index-eng.html, accessed 5 August 2020.
1227 - FAO, “An Assessment of the Financial Risks of the Nuclear Refurbishment Plan”, Financial Accountability Office of Ontario,
21 November 2017.
1228 - OPG, “Darlington Unit 2 powers on”, Ontario Power Generation, 4 June 2020, see https://www.opg.com/news/darlington-unit-2powers-on/, accessed 12 July 2020;and Jennifer O’Meara, “Darlington nuclear power plant refurbishment hits delay”, Toronto Star, 19 August 2019,see https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2019/08/19/darlington-nuclear-power-plant-refurbishment-hits-delay.html,
accessed 4 March 2020.
1229 - OPG, “OPG targets fall date for Unit 3 refurbishment in response to COVID-19”, Ontario Power Generation, 2 April 2020,see https://www.opg.com/news/opg-targets-fall-date-for-unit-3-refurbishment-due-to-covid-19/, accessed 12 July 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 these resources than nuclear power.1230 Going through with nuclear reactor refurbishment will
increase electricity bills for ratepayers.1231
At the same time, many Canadian provinces have elected leaders who have promised to either
promote fossil fuels or curtail renewables. The Governments of two large Canadian provinces,
Ontario and Alberta, have recently terminated procurement projects aimed at encouraging
development of large renewable projects.1232 These policy changes will likely impede the futureof renewables in those provinces.
In contrast, several federal government agencies, and some provincial governments, continue
to promote nuclear power, including the development of SMRs. This promotion is sought to bejustified by referring to the challenges posed by climate change. During a keynote address to
the Canadian Nuclear Association in February 2020, for example, Federal Natural Resources
Minister, Seamus O’Regan stated, “this is nuclear’s moment […] to move to the frontlines
in the battle against climate change and the plan to get Canada to net zero by 2050.”1233 In
December 2019, the three Canadian Premiers of Saskatchewan, Ontario, and New Brunswick
announced a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on the development of SMRs in
Canada (see also Chapter on Small Modular Reactors).1234

MexicoIn Mexico, two General Electric (GE) reactors operate at the Laguna Verde power plant, locatedin Alto Lucero, Veracruz. The first unit was connected to the grid in 1989 and the second unit
in 1994. In 2019, nuclear power generation decreased to 10.8 TWh, down from 13.2 TWh theprevious year and providing 4.5 percent of the country’s electricity, compared to 5.3 percent
in 2018. The two reactors achieved an average load factor of 96.1 percent in 2018, the highestof any country that year. The power plant is owned and operated by the state utility Federal
Electricity Commission (Comisión Federal de Electricidad - CFE).
The IAEA completed a long-term operational safety review of the Laguna Verde nuclear power
plant in March 2019. The IAEA team has made recommendations as part of the process toextend the operating lives of the reactors, as the CFE has requested that the units be granted a1230 - M. V. Ramana and Xiao Wei, “Ontario can phase out nuclear and avoid increased carbon emissions”, The Conversation,
5 January 2020, see http://theconversation.com/ontario-can-phase-out-nuclear-and-avoid-increased-carbon-emissions-128854,
accessed 22 March 2020.
1231 - M. V. Ramana and Xiao Wei, “Why Ontario must rethink its nuclear refurbishment plans”, The Conversation, 6 January 2020,see http://theconversation.com/why-ontario-must-rethink-its-nuclear-refurbishment-plans-127667, accessed 22 March 2020.
1232 - Josee St-Onge, “Government casts shadow over future of Alberta solar industry”, CBC News, 22 June 2019,see https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/ucp-end-rebates-solar-energy-jobs-future-industry-1.5179127;
and Mike Crawley, “Doug Ford government spent $231M to scrap green energy projects”, CBC News, 19 November 2019,see https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/doug-ford-green-energy-wind-turbines-cancelled-230-million-1.5364815,
both accessed 23 March 2020.
1233 - Seamus O’Regan, “Keynote Address”, presented at the Canadian Nuclear Association – 2020 Conference, 27 February 2020,see https://www.terrestrialenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Keynote-Address-Minister-ORegan-CNA-Feb-27.pdf,
accessed 23 March 2020.
1234 - Mickey Djuric, “Premiers Moe, Ford, Higgs to collaborate on development of nuclear reactors in Canada”, Global News,
1 December 2019, see https://globalnews.ca/news/6241337/premiers-collaborate-nuclear-reactors/, accessed 22 March 2020.

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30-year lifetime extension, to enable each unit to operate for a total of 60 years.1235 The license
renewal was granted in July 2020 to July 2050.1236
In 2013 the Mexican Congress began restructuring the power sector, to move away from a
vertically integrated utility to enable private actors to enter the sector, for private financing
for the transmission and distribution networks and eventually to enable retail competition.
The role of CFE was also modified as it was unbundled into different supply, distribution
and retail arms, which included a separate entity to operate Laguna Verde. According to the
Wilson Centre, “The reform allows all participants in the newly created power market tocompete under equal conditions to sell generation supply contracts in a competitive bidding
process and gives open access to the grid. The sole exception to this new open market is nuclear
power generation, which remains controlled by CFE”.1237 But in March 2019—following theelection in December 2018 of President López Obrador who always opposed the 2013-reform—
the Wilson Centre stated: “Mexico’s energy reform is still incomplete and faces new challenges
under a new Andrés Manuel López Obrador administration”.1238 Indeed, the incoming President
said he would not try to “constitutionally reverse the reforms”, but has sought to prioritize
public utilities, and canceled renewable energy and oil auctions alike, announced a revisionof CFE’s contracts with renewable energy companies “because of the subsidies” and vowed
to dramatically expand CFE’s power generation business, “if private power companies do notboost their investment in the sector”.1239 However, the renewable energy industry has won asignificant battle, when, in December 2019, a federal judge in Mexico City overturned rulesthat would have extended clean energy certificates meant to support post-2014 renewableprojects to legacy hydro and nuclear power.1240
Also in December 2019, it was reported that CFE was considering the construction of anadditional four reactors, two at the existing site at Laguna Verde—an idea that has been aroundfor years, without any follow-up—and two on the Pacific coast. It was further stated thateach 1.4 GW-unit would be able to operate for 60 years and would each cost US$7 billion.1241 A
feasibility study for the project was to be developed and completed in 2020 and presented to
the Government.1242

1235 - NEI, “IAEA reviews long term operation of Mexico’s Laguna Verde”, 25 March 2019, see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/
newsiaea-reviews-long-term-operation-of-mexicos-laguna-verde-7057990/, accessed 2 June 2020.
1236 - Secretaría de Energía, “La Secretaría de Energía renueva la licencia de operación a Unidad 1 de la Central Nuclear Laguna Verde”,
17 July 2020, see http://www.gob.mx/sener/articulos/la-secretaria-de-energia-renueva-la-licencia-de-operacion-a-unidad-1-de-lacentral-nuclear-laguna-verde?idiom=es, accessed 20 July 2020.
1237 - Duncan Wood, Sarah Ladislaw et al., “Mexico’s New Energy Reform”, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, October 2018, see https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/mexicos-new-energy-reform, accessed 2 June 2020.
1238 - Wilson International Center for Scholars, “The Outlook for Mexico’s Energy Sector under the AMLO Administration”,
5 March 2019, see https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-outlook-for-mexicos-energy-sector-under-the-amlo-administration,accessed 2 August 2020.
1239 - Anthony Esposito, “Mexico’s president doubles down on nationalist line: no oil auctions”, Reuters, 8 January 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-oil-auctions/mexicos-president-doubles-down-on-nationalist-line-no-oil-auctionsidUSKBN1Z729H, accessed 2 August 2020.
1240 - José Rojo Martín, “Victory for Mexican solar as court blocks ‘damaging’ policy changes – reports”, PV Tech,
3 December 2019, see https://www.pv-tech.org/news/victory-for-mexican-solar-as-court-blocks-damaging-policy-changes-reports,
accessed 2 August 2020.
1241 - Forbes Mexico, “4 nuclear reactors under consideration by electricity commission”, Mexico News Daily, 11 December 2019.
1242 - Arms Control Association, “The U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 At a Glance”, Fact Sheets & Briefs, April 2019,see https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/AEASection123, accessed 2 June 2020.

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United States
See United States Focus.

ASIA & MIDDLE EAST
Bangladesh
The construction of Bangladesh’s two inaugural nuclear reactors at Rooppur has continued
over the past year, and the Government has continued to back it up with high budgetary
inputs.1243 However, construction is expected to slow due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In
April 2020, Russian-based nuclear energy company, Rosatom, announced personnel working
on construction sites abroad will be “given the opportunity to return” home.1244 Numbers of
local day laborers working on site had also dropped over coronavirus fears.1245
The two 1200-MWe VVER reactors are owned by the Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC), and the initial contract with Rosatom was worth US$12.65 billion.1246 Of
this amount, Russia is to provide 90 percent of the cost as state credit for the project, whichis to be paid back over “the next 28 years with an 8-year grace period”.1247 Construction on
Rooppur-1 and -2 began in November 2017 and July 2018, respectively.1248
In March 2020, Russia and Bangladesh signed an intergovernmental agreement to expand
Rosatom’s engagement on a “long-term basis to assist in the operation, maintenance andrepair” of Rooppur-1 and -2.1249 The agreement between Government bodies also stipulates
that Russia is to supply the equipment, materials, and crew training required of the two units,
and Rosatom subsidiary, TVEL JSC, is to supply the nuclear fuel.
The project’s economics have been widely questioned. Earlier in 2017, a retired nuclear
engineer who had been involved in advising the BAEC, argued in one of the leading Englishlanguage newspapers in Bangladesh that the country was “paying a heavy price” for BAEC
not having “undertaken a large-scale programme of recruitment, and training of engineers”;
he also charged that Bangladesh was buying reactors at the “unreasonable and unacceptable”

1243 - Nazmul Likhon, “Rooppur to Get Highest Budget Allocation”, Bangladesh Post, 12 May 2020,see https://bangladeshpost.net/posts/rooppur-to-get-highest-budget-allocation-33241.
1244 - WNN, “COVID Impact On Construction Projects Not Yet Clear”, 3 April 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/COVID-impact-on-construction-projects-not-yet-clea, accessed 20 August 2020.
1245 - Eyamin Sajid, “Rooppur Power Plant Construction Continues as Usual”, The Business Standard, 1 April 2020,see https://tbsnews.net/bangladesh/energy/rooppur-power-plant-construction-continues-usual-63928, accessed 20 August 2020.
1246 - WNN, “Bangladesh Completes Basemat of Second Rooppur Turbine Hall” 7 August 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Second-Rooppur-turbine-hall-basemat-completed, accessed 20 August 2020.
1247 - Fakruddin Mehedi, “Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant Unit Sale Rate Tk 3.5”, The Asian Age, 11 April 2016,see http://dailyasianage.com/news/15846/?regenerate, accessed 20 August 2020.
1248 - IAEA, “Country Details - Bangladesh”, Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) Database, 11 May 2020,see https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=BD.
1249 - WNN, “Russia and Bangladesh Expand Nuclear Cooperation”, 18 March 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Russia-and-Bangladesh-expand-nuclear-cooperation, accessed 20 August 2020.

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price of US$5,500/kW because its “negotiators didn’t have the expertise to properly scrutinise
the quoted price”.1250
There have been reports about corruption in the construction of the nuclear plant, althoughthese allegations largely revolve around materials for housing of plant workers and theirfamilies.1251
Nuclear power is projected in the Bangladesh Revised Power Sector Master Plan to accountfor about 4 percent of electricity generation in 2030, and there are ongoing discussions
with Chinese nuclear officials from Dongfang Electric Corporation and China Nuclear
Engineering & Construction Corp, about building a second plant.1252
However, according to a report published by the Atlantic Council even this small contribution
is not necessary, and “Bangladesh can move towards a more sustainable, lower carbon future
by limiting coal development, installing efficient natural gas, expanding renewables, andimproving end-use energy efficiency”.1253
Bangladesh has experienced substantial growth in renewable capacity over the last decade,increasing from roughly 0.26 GW in 2010 to 0.52 GW in 2019.1254 While the total remains
small and mostly hydropower that remained stable, the bulk of the growth stems from solar
capacity installations, which expanded by a factor of nine from 0.032 GW in 2010 to 0.28 GW
in 2019. Wind power capacity grew by very modest 1 MW from 2 MW to 3 MW total. Actual
electrical energy generated from solar power is increasing at a 40-percent growth rate as of2019, albeit from a low base.1255 The expansion continues, with some financing from the World
Bank. Earlier this year, in January 2020, the Electricity Generation Company of Bangladesh
tendered a 50 MW solar plant; roughly US$74 million from the World Bank loan will financethis project.1256

China
See China Focus.

1250 - Abdul Martin, “The economics of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant”, The Daily Star, 2 March 2017,see https://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/economics/the-economics-the-rooppur-nuclear-power-plant-1369345, accessed 28 May 2020.
1251 - The Daily Star, “Corruption in Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant: HC seeks to know steps”, 2 July 2019,see https://www.thedailystar.net/city/corruption-in-rooppur-power-plant-hc-seeks-know-steps-1765591, accessed 28 May 2020.
1252 - NEI, “Newcomer nations”, NEI Magazine, 25 June 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurenewcomer-nation-7274233/, accessed 28 May 2020.
1253 - Dr Robert F. Ichord, “Transforming the power sector in developing countries: Geopolitics, poverty, and climate change
in Bangladesh”, Atlantic Council, 9 January 2020, see https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issuebrief/transforming-the-power-sector-in-developing-countries-geopolitics-poverty-and-climate-change-in-bangladesh/,accessed 4 July 2020.
1254 - IRENA, “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2020”, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020,see https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Mar/Renewable-Capacity-Statistics-2020.
1255 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020”, June 2020,see https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html.
1256 - Syful Islam, “Bangladesh Tenders 50 MW Solar Plant”, PV Magazine International, 2 January 2020,see https://www.pv-magazine.com/2020/01/02/bangladesh-tenders-50-mw-solar-plant/.

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India
The IAEA lists India as having 22 operational nuclear power reactors, with a total net
generating capacity of 6.2 GW. However, according to the WNISR criteria, some of these fallunder the LTO category. The new entrant to the LTO category this year is Madras-1, which
was shut down on 30 January 2018 to carry out repair work, and had not come back up as of
the beginning of July 2020.1257 The Rajasthan-1 reactor which has not generated power since2004, was moved from LTO to “closed” in WNISR2018, as its final closure had been officiallyannounced.1258
In addition to these operating reactors, seven more reactors, with a combined capacity of
4.8 GW, are under construction. These include two VVER-1000s at Kudankulam (since Juneand October 2017), four Pressurized Heavy-Water Reactors (PHWR), two at Kakrapar (sinceNovember 2010) and two at Rajasthan (since July and September 2011), and a Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor (PFBR), construction of which started in October 2004. One of the Kakrapar
PHWRs reached first criticality in July 2020.
Nuclear power contributed 40.7 TWh of electricity in 2019, up from 35.4 TWh in 2018. The
share of nuclear power in 2019 has increased slightly from 3.1 percent in 2018 to match the 2017
figure of 3.2 percent. These IAEA-PRIS numbers are somewhat different from those reported
by India’s Central Electricity Authority (CEA). For the period from April 2019 to March 2020,
CEA records 46.4 TWh from nuclear power, higher than the corresponding figure of 37.8 TWhfrom April 2018 to March 2019.1259
In comparison, renewable energy sources, without including large hydropower plants, together
generated 138.3 TWh during the period from April 2019 to March 2020, up from 126.8 TWhgenerated from April 2018 to March 2019.1260 Of the generation in 2019–2020, wind and solar
energy contributed 64.6 TWh and 50.1 TWh respectively. Likewise, BP records figures of
46.3 TWh, 63.3 TWh, and 45.2 TWh for solar, wind, and nuclear energy in the calendar year
2019.1261 Thus, both wind and solar power have larger shares of overall electricity generation
than nuclear power. This was to be expected, given the high rates of growth in solar andwind energy. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), installed
solar capacity has increased from 9.6 GW in 2016 to 34.8 GW in 2019, and wind capacity from
28.7 GW in 2016 to 37.5 GW in 2019.1262
1257 - NPCIL, “Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) – Operating Performance”, May 2020,see https://www.npcil.nic.in/content/324_1_OperatingPerformance.aspx; andPIB, “Nuclear Power Plants”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 11 March 2020,see https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=200062; andIANS, “Madras Atomic Power Station’s Unit-1 yet to restart”, Outlook India, 5 December 2019,see https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/madras-atomic-power-stations-unit1-yet-to-restart/1678018, all accessed May 2020.
1258 - Deccan Herald, “End of the road for RAPS 1”, 6 September 2014,see http://www.deccanherald.com/content/429550/end-road-raps-1.html, accessed 16 June 2016.
1259 - CEA, “Executive Summary on Power Sector March 2020”, Central Electric Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India,
March 2020, see http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/executivesummary/2020/exe_summary-03.pdf, accessed 16 May 2020.
1260 - CEA, “Renewable Energy Project Monitoring Division: March 2020”, Central Electric Authority, Sub Report-1, 2020,see http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/renewable/2020/renewable-03.pdf, accessed 16 May 2020.
1261 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020”, June 2020, see https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/
statistical-review-of-world-energy.html, accessed 17 June 2020.
1262 - IRENA, “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2020”, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020,see https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Mar/Renewable-Capacity-Statistics-2020, accessed 24 April 2020.

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The divergence between a growing renewable energy sector and a relatively stagnant
nuclear sector is expected to increase in coming years, and this is openly acknowledged by
the Government of India. The reason for the divergence was explained by the ParliamentaryStanding Committee on Science & Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate Change
in March 2020 when it contrasted the “crashing” price of solar power with the costs ofnuclear power that it described as “going up due to greater concerns on safety, following the
Fukushima disaster in May 2011”.1263 A Task Force set up by the Department of Economic
Affairs of India’s Ministry of Finance to, among other things, “identify technically feasible
and financially/ economically viable infrastructure projects that can be initiated in fiscal years
2020 to 2025”,1264 foresees renewable capacity (not including large hydropower projects) goingfrom 22 percent of the total installed electrical capacity, as of March 2019, to 39 percent by
2025, or an increase of over 250 percent over today’s installed capacity.1265 In contrast, nuclear
stays more or less constant at 2 percent of installed capacity. This, despite, an ambitious goal ofcommissioning seven new reactors during this five-year period.
The nuclear construction goal is unlikely to be met given the earlier history of missed
targets,1266 and how slow the current set of reactor construction projects are going. Although
the Government has “accorded administrative approval and financial sanction” forconstructing ten 700-MW PHWRs at various sites around the country and two more VVER1000s at Kudankulam (Kudankulam-5 and -6), construction is yet to begin on any of these.1267
No new reactor has been connected to the grid since 2018, and at least five of the seven reactor
construction projects underway are delayed. Initially, the two PHWRs at Kakrapar were to
be commissioned in 2015 and the two at Rajasthan, in late 2016.1268 According to the Indian
government, as of March 2020, the anticipated dates of commissioning are October 2020and September 2021 for Kakrapar-3 and -4 respectively, and March 2022 and March 2023 forRajasthan-7 and -8 respectively.1269 In other words, even if these current expectations weremet, construction time for these projects would have more than doubled.
The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) has been the most delayed project for some years
now. It was supposed to be completed by 2010 but its startup date has been repeatedly pushed
back. In March 2020, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology,
Environment, Forests and Climate Change outlined the “hope” that the Department of Atomic
Energy (DAE) will be in a position to commission the PFBR at Kalpakkam by the end of1263 - Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate
Change, “Demands for Grants (2020-2021) of the Department of Atomic Energy (Demand No. 03)”, Report No. 326, Parliamentof India, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 6 March 2020, see https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/Committee_File/
ReportFile/19/126/326_2020_3_15.pdf, accessed 16 May 2020.
1264 - Department of Economic Affairs, “National Infrastructure Pipeline—Volume I”, Report of the Task Force, Ministry of Finance,
Government of India, 2020, see https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Task%20Force%20National%20
Infrastructure%20Pipeline%20%28NIP%29%20-%20volume-i_1.pdf, accessed 30 August 2020.
1265 - Department of Economic Affairs, “National Infrastructure Pipeline—Volume II”, Report of the Task Force, Ministry of Finance,
Government of India, 2020, see https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Task%20Force%20National%20
Infrastructure%20Pipeline%20%28NIP%29%20-%20volume-ii_0.pdf, accessed 16 May 2020.
1266 - M. V. Ramana, “The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India”, Penguin India, 2012.
1267 - PIB, “Nuclear Power Plants”, Press Information Bureau, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 11 March 2020,see https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=200062, accessed 16 May 2020.
1268 - MoSPI, “37th Report on Mega Projects (Rs. 1000 Crores and above) June, 2012”, Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation, 2012.
1269 - Jitendra Singh, “Unstarred Question No. 1602: Commissioning of heavy water reactor at Kakrapar Nuclear Plant”, Parliament ofIndia, Rajya Sabha, March 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 2021,1270 a timeline that accords with other recent statements.1271 The Committee acknowledges
the lengthy delay on this project, but advocates for completion, suggesting the PFBR will“transform” India’s nuclear energy program.
That “transformation” might take longer than India’s nuclear establishment promised. In thelatest annual report published by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited (BHAVINI),
the organization in charge of building and operating the PFBR, the Chairman admits thatwithin the organization “a re-think is being done” about the capacity of the next fast breeder
reactors and “based on the on-going difficulties and experience generated during the entire
on-going commissioning phase of PFBR, it is being deliberated whether for the purpose ofstandardization it may be prudent to retain them as 500 MWe units” in contrast to earlier
proposals to build a design capable of generating 600 MWe.1272 The on-going difficulties during
the commissioning phase refers to numerous problems involving various components of the
PFBR, including electro-magnetic pumps, fueling machinery, and secondary sodium pumps. In
addition to considering lowering the power level of future FBRs, the annual report also admits
that “construction of these reactors is expected to commence, only after the power operationof PFBR, so as to ensure availability of adequate performance feedback /data from PFBR andcorrespondingly bringing about suitable incorporation of required design changes in the
proposed FBRs”.1273 In contrast, the previous annual report had asserted that “construction ofthese reactors is expected to commence in 2021 by which time, adequate performance feedback
on full power operation from PFBR is expected to be available, for factoring in the proposed
600 MWe designs”.1274
The projected cost of the PFBR has also risen, from the initially anticipatedRs.34.9 billion (US$463 million) to, first, Rs.56.7 billion (US$752 million), to currently
Rs.68.4 billion (US$907 million).1275 Other projects have become more expensive too.1276
Kakrapar-3 and -4 are now projected to cost Rs.165.8 billion (US$2.2 billion), up from
Rs.114.6 billion (US$1.5 billion), while Rajasthan-7 and -8 are now projected to cost
Rs.170.8 billion (US$2.3 billion), up from Rs.123.2 billion (US$1.7 billion).1277
The increase in construction cost is leading to difficulty in selling its power. The Nuclear
Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) sent a formal communication to the state of Gujarat,
where the Kakrapar reactor site is located, seeking an increase in tariff, from Rs.3.34/kWh to1270 - Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate
Change, “Demands for Grants (2020-2021) of the Department of Atomic Energy (Demand No. 03)”, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha
Secretariat, March 2020.
1271 - Jitendra Singh, “Unstarred Question No. 1602: Commissioning of Heavy Water Reactor at Kakrapar Nuclear Plant”, Parliamentof India, Rajya Sabha, March 2020.
1272 - BHAVINI, “16th Annual Report 2018-19”, Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited, 2019,see https://bhavini.nic.in/writereaddata/AnnualReport/42.pdf, accessed 12 July 2020.
1273 - Ibidem, p.2.
1274 - BHAVINI, “15th Annual Report 2017-18”, Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited, September 2018,see https://bhavini.nic.in/writereaddata/AnnualReport/40.pdf, accessed 12 July 2020.
1275 - MoSPI, “Flash Report on Central Sector Projects (Rs. 150 crore and above) December 2019”, Ministry of Statistics andProgramme Implementation, 2019.
1276 - As of 1 July 2020, the conversion rate to US dollars is around Rs.75 per US dollar. All of these cost indications remain extremely
low compared to other countries. While the lack of independent assessments of these cost calculations is an issue, it is clear that
incomparably lower labor costs dramatically change overall costs if compared to nuclear projects elsewhere. Also, the PFBR costs are inmixed-year Rupees and so directly converting it into other currencies using one conversion rate is rather misleading.
1277 - Ibidem, Table 30.

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Rs.5.31/kWh (US$0.05 to US$0.07 per kWh).1278 The state of Gujarat is to purchase 50 percentof the power output when the reactor commences operations.1279 After being notified of theintention to increase tariff, the state reportedly asked the central Government to intervene andlower the tariff, pointing out that the average purchase price for non-renewable based powerin the previous year was Rs.3.98/kWh (US$0.06/kWh). For comparison, the three successful
bids in the March 2020 solar power auction were Rs.2.61, Rs.2.63, and Rs.2.64/kWh,1280 clear
evidence of the disjuncture between the evolving costs of nuclear and solar power that theParliamentary Committee spoke about in March 2020.1281 The higher rate was particularly
problematic for Gujarat because nuclear reactors have what is called “must run” status.1282
The next set of two 700-MW PHWRs are at Gorakhpur in the northern state of Haryana, which
was selected in June 2007; at that time, a high-level government official had stated that “workto set up a nuclear power plant in the state would commence soon”.1283 More than a dozen
years later, a similar promise was made in October 2019 by a senior NPCIL official who told ajournalist that first pour of concrete was “expected very soon”.1284 Although concrete pouring
has not commenced the project is listed as “under construction” by the Department of Atomic
Energy.1285 International definition of construction start is the beginning of the concreting of
the base slab of the reactor building. As of July 2020, the IAEA’s PRIS database does not list
any reactors as under construction at Gorakhpur.
According to the same NPCIL official, the design of the reactors to be constructed at
Gorakhpur was one that NPCIL had made “the standard design”.1286 However, at Rs.206 billion(US$2.7 billion), its projected cost is nearly 25 percent higher than Rs.165.8 billion(US$2.2 billion), the revised cost of the first of a kind (FOAK) version of the same reactor
design, the 700-MW PHWRs at Kakrapar-3 and -4.1287 And since even the latter is alreadytwice as expensive as the cost of solar power, electricity from this “standard design” PHWR
will likely be thrice or more as expensive as solar power. A similar increase is also observedin estimated costs of imported VVERs from Russia, with Kudankulam-3 and -4 being more

1278 - Anupam Chatterjee, “Delay impact: Gujarat seeks tariff cut for power from Kakrapar N-units”, Financial Express,
24 October 2019, see https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/delay-impact-gujarat-seeks-tariff-cut-for-power-from-kakrapar-nunits/1744478/, accessed 14 May 2020.
1279 - Rishi Banerji, “Construction of nuclear power plant begins at Kakrapar”, Daily News & Analysis, 29 November 2010.
1280 - Rakesh Ranjan, “Juniper Green, Vena Energy, and Tata Power Win Gujarat’s 500 MW Solar Auction”, Mercom India,
18 March 2020, see https://mercomindia.com/gujarat-500-mw-solar-auction/, accessed 14 May 2020.
1281 - Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate
Change, “Demands for Grants (2020-2021) of the Department of Atomic Energy (Demand No. 03)”, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha
Secretariat, March 2020.
1282 - Anupam Chatterjee, “Delay Impact: Gujarat Seeks Tariff Cut for Power from Kakrapar N-Units”, Financial Express,
24 October 2019.
1283 - ENS, “Work on nuclear power plant to start soon: CS”, Indian Express, 21 June 2007.
1284 - Ritu Sharma, “First Concrete Pour for Haryana’s Nuclear Reactor expected soon: NPCIL Technical Director”, Nuclear Asia,
29 October 2019, see https://www.nuclearasia.com/news/first-concrete-pour-haryanas-nuclear-reactor-expected-soon-npcil-technicaldirector/3209/, accessed 17 May 2020.
1285 - PIB, “Nuclear Power Plants”, Press Information Bureau, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 11 March 2020.
1286 - Ritu Sharma, “First Concrete Pour for Haryana’s Nuclear Reactor Expected Soon: NPCIL Technical Director”, Nuclear Asia,
29 October 2019.
1287 - PIB, “Nuclear Power Plants”, Press Information Bureau, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 11 March 2020.

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expensive than the first two units, and Kudankulam-5 and -6 being nearly 25 percent more
expensive than Kudankulam-3 and -4.1288
Officially, there are still plans to import reactors from the United States and France for theKovvada and Jaitapur sites. These were first proposed as part of the US-India nuclear deal
that was negotiated between 2005 and 2008.1289 Although there are mounting concerns overtheir costs, these plans get dusted off every time there is a visit from a head of state from thesetwo countries. The latest such effort happened in the case of the Kovvada site when President
Donald Trump visited in February 2020; at the end of the visit, a joint statement was released,
which merely encouraged “the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited and Westinghouse
Electric Company to finalize the techno-commercial offer for the construction of six nuclear
reactors in India at the earliest date”.1290 If these reactors are constructed, it has been estimatedthat the tariffs for electricity from these could be around Rs.25/kWh (US$0.33/kWh), about
eight to ten times the cost of solar power.1291
The performance of the last major imported reactors operating in India, Kudankulam-1 and -2,
has been poor. For the past three years, NPCIL records an average capacity factor of around54 percent and 44 percent for the two reactors respectively.1292 Kudankulam-1 and -2 had loadfactors of 59.6 percent and 58.2 percent in 2019, and cumulative load factors of 26.6 percent
and 41.4 percent respectively. Kudankulam nuclear power plant was also the site of the firstpublicly acknowledged cyber-attack on a nuclear power plant in India.1293

Iran
See Middle East Focus – Section on Iran.

Pakistan
Pakistan operates five nuclear reactors with a combined capacity of 1.3 GW.1294 Nuclear
electricity production in Pakistan has decreased slightly from 2018 to 2019, from 9.3 TWhin 2018 to 9.1 TWh in 2019. The share of electricity from nuclear power plants in 2019 was
6.6 percent, down from 6.8 percent in 2018. The slight decrease appears to be primarily
because the first unit of the Karachi nuclear power plant (Kanupp-1), that was commissioned
1288 - Ibidem.
1289 - Prerna Gupta and M. V. Ramana, “A Decade After the Nuclear Deal”, The India Forum, 3 April 2019,see https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/decade-after-nuclear-deal, accessed 17 May 2020.
1290 - Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Statement: Vision and Principles for India-U.S. Comprehensive Global StrategicPartnership”, Government of India, 25 February 2020, see https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32421/Joint_Statement_
Vision_and_Principles_for_IndiaUS_Comprehensive_Global_Strategic_Partnership, accessed 26 February 2020.
1291 - M.V. Ramana and Suvrat Raju, “Pushing the wrong energy buttons”, The Hindu, 3 March 2020,see https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/pushing-the-wrong-energy-buttons/article30965454.ece, accessed 22 April 2020.
1292 - NPCIL, “Operating Performance: Kudankulam Atomic Power Project”, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited,
Department of Atomic Energy, March 2020, see https://www.npcil.nic.in/content/320_1_OperatingPerformance.aspx, accessed
17 May 2020.
1293 - ETGovernment.com, “NPCIL Accepts Cyber Attack on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant”, 30 October 2019,see https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/secure-india/npcil-accepts-cyber-attack-on-kudankulam-nuclear-powerplant/71820813, accessed 22 April 2020.
1294 - IAEA, “Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) Database”, see http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/, accessed 4 May 2020.

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in 1972, operated with a low capacity factor, which in 2019 was a mere 4.9 percent. Some years
back, it was reported that the reactor was scheduled for decommissioning in 2019.1295 But it
now appears that the reactor will continue to operate until 2021.1296
At the same site, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) continued building two
Hualong One reactors. In April 2020, the containment building of the first of these units,
Kanupp-2, was completed.1297 Construction of this unit started in 2015 and it is scheduled forcommercial operation in 2021. Construction of the sister unit, Kanupp-3, started in 2016 and
it is scheduled for commercial operation in 2022. Power Technology reports that “more than
80 percent of the estimated project cost is being financed through a loan from China’s stateowned Export-Import (Exim) Bank”.1298 Elsewhere, it is reported that Exim Bank has invested“over $6.6 billion over three phases”.1299
In parallel, Pakistan has been rapidly expanding its renewable energy capacity, in particularsolar energy and wind energy. Over the last five years, total renewable capacity in Pakistan
has grown nearly 40 percent, climbing from 7.9 GW in 2014 to just under 13 GW in 2019.1300
Wind and solar capacity have grown from around 0.2 GW in 2014 each to 1.2 GW and 1.3 GW
respectively in 2019. Wind’s share of electricity generation in the country reached 3.5 percent
whereas solar was just under 1 percent.1301 In November 2019, Pakistan’s Minister of Economic
Affairs announced that the country aims to add an additional 7 to 8 GW of renewable power
capacity within the next four years.1302 The renewable sector is currently worth US$40 billion
in investment opportunities, according to Pakistan’s Minister for Power Division.1303 He also
stated that US$700 million in investment funding was already “pouring in 12 wind energy
projects”.1304 The attractiveness of the renewable energy sector in Pakistan is underscored byreports that the Denmark-based wind turbine manufacturer, Vestas, is considering establishinga wind turbine factory in the country.1305
1295 - Hussain Ahmad Siddiqui, “Moving forward”, The News International, 2016,see https://www.thenews.com.pk/magazine/money-matters/137321-Moving-forward, accessed 11 May 2020.
1296 - Tasneem Fatima, “Characterization of KANUPP Irradiated Fuel Bundles”, KANUPP, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission,
12 November 2019, presented at the “Technical Meeting on Spent Fuel Characterization for Management of Spent Fuel in the Back
End of the Fuel Cycle”, IAEA, 12–14 November 2019, see https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/connect/SFMpublic/TM%20on%20Spent%20
Fuel%20Characterization%20for%20the%20Manageme/Fatima_KANUPP.pdf, accessed 10 May 2020.
1297 - WNN, “Karachi 2 Containment Building Completed”, 16 April 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Karachi-2-containment-building-completed, accessed 6 May 2020.
1298 - Power Technology, “Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) Expansion”, 2020,see https://www.power-technology.com/projects/karachi-nuclear-power-plant-expansion/, accessed 6 May 2020.
1299 - Merlin Linehan, “How Chinese Financing is Fueling Megaprojects Around the World”, Rising Powers, 18 January 2020,see https://rising-powers.com/how-chinese-financing-is-fueling-megaprojects-around-the-world/, accessed 11 May 2020.
1300 - IRENA, “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2020”, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020,see https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Mar/Renewable-Capacity-Statistics-2020, accessed 24 April 2020.
1301 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020”, June 2020,see https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html, accessed 17 June 2020.
1302 - The Express Tribune, “Pakistan Planning to Add 8,000MW of Renewable Energy to National Grid”, 21 November 2019,see https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/571971-government-eyes-8-000mw-of-renewable-energy, accessed 10 May 2020.
1303 - Daily Times, “Up to 20,000MW renewable energy to be added to system by 2030: Omar Ayub”, 21 November 2019, see https://dailytimes.com.pk/504071/minister-says-cost-of-electricity-will-decrease-with-implementation-of-alternative-energy-policy/,
accessed 11 May 2020.
1304 - The Express Tribune, “’$700m Investment In Pakistan’s Power Sector Under Way”, 20 November 2019, see https://tribune.com.
pk/story/2103479/1-700m-investment-power-sector-way-omar/, accessed 6 May 2020.
1305 - Reve, “Wind Turbines Manufacturer Vestas Studies its Implementation in Pakistan”, 8 February 2020, see https://www.evwind.
es/2020/02/08/wind-turbines-manufacturer-vestas-starts-factory-in-pakistan/73483, accessed 6 May 2020.

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See South Korea Focus.

TaiwanTaiwan has four operating reactors at Kuosheng (Guosheng) and Maanshan, all owned
by Taipower, the state-owned utility monopoly.1306 In 2019, there was 31.1 TWh of nuclear
generation, 13.4 percent of the nation’s electricity, compared to 26.6 TWh or 11.4 percent in2018. Nuclear generation reached its maximum share of 41 percent in 1988.
In terms of energy policy and the future of nuclear power in Taiwan, the most significant
development during the past year was the 11 January 2020 landslide re-election of
President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).1307 Elected for a second
term, President Tsai secured 57.1 percent of the vote. The DPP also retained its majority in thelegislative assembly. President Tsai was first elected in May 2016. Her party remains committed
to the nuclear phase-out by 2025, introduced in her first term, while transitioning the energy
economy to renewables.
The re-election of President Tsai is a major setback for those in Taiwan seeking to preventthe phase-out of nuclear power and the energy transition to renewable energy. The rival
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and its presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu, had strongly
opposed President Tsai’s energy policy, calling for a life extension of existing reactors and theconstruction of new plants.1308
Historical public opposition to nuclear power in Taiwan dramatically escalated during and in
the months following the start of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and has been a principal
driver of the nation’s ambitious plans for a renewable energy transition. The “New Energy
Policy Vision”, announced by the administration in summer 2016, aims at establishing “a low
carbon, sustainable, stable, high-quality and economically efficient energy system” throughan energy transition and energy industry reform.1309 On 12 January 2017, the Electricity Act
Amendment completed and passed its third reading in the legislature, setting in place themechanisms for Taiwan’s energy transition, including nuclear phase-out.1310 The law also gives
priority to distributed renewable energy generation, by which its generators will be given

1306 - Atomic Energy Council, “NPP Real-time Operating Status”, 9 June 2019,see https://www.aec.gov.tw/english/nuclear/index11.php, accessed 10 June 2020.
1307 - Taipei Times, “2020 Elections: Tsai wins by a landslide”, 12 January 2020,see https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/01/12/2003729107, accessed 10 June 2020.
1308 - Taipei Times, “Han, nuclear fans lie about wind”, 5 January 2020,see https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/01/05/2003728728, accessed 10 June 2020;
and Nucleonics Week, “Taiwan election returns anti-nuclear president to office”, 6 February 2020.
1309 - MOEA, “Taiwan’s New Energy Policy”, 6 April 2017, Ministry of Economic Affairs,
see https://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/ ietc_e/content/Content. aspx?menu_id=21511, accessed 9 June 2019.
1310 - Bureau of Energy, “The Three-Stage Reading Process for Electricity Act Amendment Completed Moving Towards the 2025
Target of Nuclear-Free Homeland”, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1 March 2017, see https://eng.wra.gov.tw/7618/7662/7717/30138/,
accessed 9 June 2019.

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preferential rates, and small generators will be exempt from having to prepare operating
reserves. The monopoly of the state-run Taipower will also be terminated.1311
To reach its renewable energy goals of 20 percent of the nation’s generation by 2025,
approximately 27 GW of new offshore wind and solar capacity will be required.1312 Between
2018-19, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) awarded grid capacity to nine developers
for 14 offshore wind projects, with 738 MW operating capacity by 2020 and 4,762 MW between
2021 and 2025.1313 The attractive feed-in tariffs offered for offshore have attracted overseas
companies.1314 In March 2020, Orsted announced that it has committed NT$380 billion(US$12.5 billion) in total capital expenditure for off shore wind projects in Taiwan, witha capacity of 2.4 GW.1315 Taiwan’s overall target is for 5.7 GW offshore wind power by 2025
and an additional 10 GW by 2035.1316 In the case of solar PV, the target is for 20 GW by 2025,with 4.3 GW installed as of December 20191317 (compared with 2.24 GW in September 2018).1318
A total of 2.25 GW of solar PV is planned for deployment in 2020. In February 2020, it wasreported that Taiwan was on track to meet its 2025 solar PV target.1319

Reactor Closures
As reported in WNISR 2019, Taipower announced the closure of Chinshan Unit 1 on
5 December 2018. Chinshan-2 which remained shut down from June 2017 was officially closed
on 15 July 2019, when its 40-year operating license expired. Both reactors at Chinshan areMark 1 BWRs, which began operation in 1977 and 1978 respectively. On 16 July 2019, the AEC
issued the Decommissioning Permit for the Chinshan nuclear plant in accordance with the“Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act”.1320 (See Table 19 for details).
The next reactors scheduled for closure are the two BWR Units at Kuosheng (Guosheng),
both of which will take place during the second four-year term of President Tsai. The 985-MW
Kuosheng Unit 1 is planned for shutdown in March 2021. This is nine months before the end
1311 - The China Post, “Lawmakers OK wide-ranging amendments to Electricity Act”, 12 January 2017,see https://chinapost.nownews.com/20170112-14213, accessed 10 June 2020.
1312 - Miaojung Lin and Lianting Tu, “Taiwan Lays Plans for $59 Billion in Renewable-Energy Finance”, Bloomberg, 18 June 2017,see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-18/taiwan-lays-plans-for-59-billion-in-renewable-energy-finance,
accessed 10 June 2020.
1313 - Bureau of Energy, “Offshore wind auction winners announced! 2 winners with 4 projects will provide 1,664 MW by2025”, Ministry of Enconomic Affairs, Press Release, 26 July 2018, see https://www.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/news/News.
aspx?kind=6&menu_id=958&news_id=16111, accessed 28 July 2020.
1314 - Heidi Vella, “Taiwan: pursuing a new green energy revolution in the East”, Power Technology, 5 November 2018,see https://www.power-technology.com/features/taiwan-pursuing-new-green-energy-revolution-east/, accessed 10 June 2020.
1315 - Taipei Times, “Orsted weighing nearly US$13bn in local projects”, 27 March 2020,see https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2020/03/27/2003733433, accessed 10 June 2020.
1316 - Ibidem.
1317 - Asia-Power, “Taiwan’s solar PV installations could hit 20GW by 2025”, 25 February 2020, see https://asian-power.com/powerutility/news/taiwans-solar-pv-installations-could-hit-20gw-2025#:~:text=Taiwan%20could%20ramp%20up%20its,generation%20
capacity%20of%204.3GW, accessed 10 June 2020.
1318 - Rhea Tsao, “Will Taiwan meet its 20 GW solar goal by 2025?”, PV Magazine, 7 September 2018,see https://www.pv-magazine.com/2018/09/07/will-taiwan-meet-its-20-gw-solar-goal-by-2025/, accessed 9 July 2019.
1319 - Power-Technology, “Taiwan marching towards record installation of 20GW solar PV by 2025”, 24 February 2020, see https://www.
power-technology.com/comment/taiwan-marching-towards-record-installation-of-20gw-solar-pv-by-2025/, accessed 10 June 2020.
1320 - AEC, “The Atomic Energy Council Issued the Decommissioning Permit for Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant on July 12, 2019”,
Press Release, Atomic Energy Council, 12 July 2019, see https://www.aec.gov.tw/, accessed 26 July 2019.

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of its operating license on 27 December as a result of inadequate spent fuel pool capacity. The
Kuosheng Unit 2 is planned for closure on 15 March 2023. Maanshan’s PWR Unit 1 and Unit 2
are scheduled for closure on 26 July 2024 and 17 May 2025, respectively.
Table 19 · Scheduled Closure Dates for Nuclear Reactors in Taiwan 2018–2025
Spent Fuel Storage Status

ReactorType

CapacityMW(a)Grid Connection(dd/mm/yyyy)

Date of Cessationof Operation(dd/mm/yyyy)(b)Capacity(Assembly)

Storage Inventory
Fuel Assembly

Chinshan-1

BWR

604

16/11/1977

05/12/ 2018

3,083

3,074

Chinshan-2

BWR

604

19/12/1978

15/07/2019

3,083

3,076

Kuosheng-1

BWR

948

21/05/1981

27/12/ 2021

4,838

4,688

Kuosheng-2

BWR

948

29/06/1982

14/03/ 2023

4,838

4,540

Maanshan-1

PWR

890

09/05/1984

26/07/ 2024

2,160

1,581

Maanshan-2

PWR

890

25/02/1985

17/05/ 2025

Total: 4 operating Reactors / 2 Closed: 4 884 MW

2,160

1,593

20,162

18,5521321

Sources: Taipower, 2017, AEC, WNISR, 2020.

Note

BWR = Boiling Water Reactor; PWR = Pressurized Water Reactor.
a – Design Capacityb – Official closing dates for Chinshan-1 & Chinshan-2

EUROPEAN UNION(EU27-28)
About half of the European Union (EU28)1322 member states have gone through three nuclear
construction waves (see Figure 62)—two small ones in the 1960s and the 1970s and a larger
one in the 1980s (mainly in France).
The region has not had any significant nuclear building activity since the 1990s. There were no
construction starts in Western Europe since 1991 prior to Olkiluoto-3 (2005) and Flamanville-3(2007). Only three reactors were connected to the EU-grid over the past 20 years, all in Eastern
Europe (two in the Czech Republic and one in Romania), none since Cernavoda-2 started up in
Romania in 2007. Two reactors are under construction in Slovakia (Mochovce-3 and -4), whereconstruction started in 1985.
Four reactors were closed in the EU since WNISR2019, two in France and one each in Sweden
and Germany. The total number of permanently closed units in the European Union is 68(almost nine in ten located in Western Europe, of which 30 in Germany). With U.K. leaving theEU, there are 30 less closed reactors in the EU. As of 1 July 2020, the remaining 27 countries
1321 - Atomic Energy Council, “Spent Fuel Storage Status (31 July 2020)”, Atomic Energy Council, Atomic Energy Council,
28 August 2020, see https://www.aec.gov.tw/english/Radioactive-Waste-Management/Spent-Fuel-Management-148.html,
accessed 28 August 2020.
1322 - The U.K. left the E.U. on 31 January 2020. We are considering annual data until the end of 2019 including the U.K. (EU28) andthe status as of mid-2020 without the U.K. (EU27).

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in the EU operated 107 reactors, about one-fourth of the world total, 29 less than the historicmaximum of 136 units in 1989 (see Figure 63).
Figure 62 · Nuclear Reactors Startups and Closures in the EU27 1959–1 July 2020

Reactor Startups and Closures in the EU27
in Units, from 1959 to 1 July 2020
15

YearlyBalance

Reactor Startups
Reactor Closures© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

10

5

Temelin-1
Temelin-2
Cernavoda-2
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

-5

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

The vast majority of the operating facilities, 88 units or over 80 percent, are located in sevenof the western countries, and only 19 are in the six newer member states with nuclear power.
In the EU28, in 2019, nuclear plants have generated 783 TWh, stable (-0.5 percent) comparedto the previous year. While the nuclear’s share in net power production is not yet available, BP
indicates a stable 25.6 percent share in gross generation (25.3 percent in 2018).1323
In the absence of any significant delivering new-build program, the average age of nuclear
power plants keeps increasing and at mid-2020 stands at 35 years (see Figure 64). The age
distribution shows that now over 84 percent—90 of 107—of the EU’s operating nuclear
reactors have been in operation for 31 years and beyond.

1323 - BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy–Workbook”, Statistics Work Book, June 2020, op. cit.

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Figure 63 · Nuclear Reactors and Net Operating Capacity in the EU27

Nuclear Reactors and Net Operating Capacity in the EU 27
in Units and GWe, from 1959 to 1 July 2020

1989
Maximum Number
of Reactors: 136

2002
Maximum Operating
Capacity: 124.5 GWe

Number of Reactors

7/2020107 Reactors
105 GWe

120

90

GWe
120

90

Reactors in Operation
Operating Capacity

60© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

60

30

0

30

1959

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

7/20

0

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Figure 64 · Age Distribution of the EU27 Reactor Fleet

Age of EU27 Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

Reactor Age80

11–20 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over12
5

107 Reactors
Mean Age
35 Years

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class
10© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

WESTERN EUROPE
As of 1 July 2020, 104 nuclear power reactors operated in Western Europe (including U.K. andSwitzerland), 56 units fewer than in the peak 1988/89. There are also three reactors in LTO in
the U.K. In addition to the four reactors closed in the EU since WNISR2019, one reactor was
closed in Switzerland (the 48-year old unit at Mühleberg).

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With the U.K. and Switzerland both operating three reactors over 41 years old—of which the51-year old Beznau reactor—the average age of operating reactors in Western Europe reaches
36.4 years.
Figure 65 · Age Distribution of the Western European Reactor Fleet (incl. Switzerland and the U.K.)

Age of Western European Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

Reactor Age
11–20 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over

77

10
1

104 Reactors
Mean Age36.4 Years

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class
16© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Four reactors are currently under construction, two in the U.K (Hinkley Point C-1 and C-2) and
one each in Finland (Olkiluoto-3) and France (Flamanville-3). All are European Pressurized
Water Reactors (EPR) and all are many years behind their initial schedule and billions of Euros
over budget (details are discussed in other chapters of the report).

Belgium
Belgium operates seven pressurized-water reactors that have generated 27.3 TWh in 2018,
almost one-third less than the 40.2 TWh in 2017. Production greatly recovered in 2019 toreach 41.4 TWh, that is a 52-percent increase over the previous year, still somewhat below a
maximum of 46.7 TWh twenty years earlier, in 1999. Nuclear power contributed 47.6 percent
of Belgium’s electricity in 2019, a jump of 8.6 percentage points over 2018, while the maximum
was 67.2 percent in 1986.
Due to continuous technical issues and extended outages, the average load factor of the Belgian
fleet plunged to 48.6 percent in 2018, the second lowest in the world behind Argentina. In 2019,it was back up to 79.1 percent.
The average age of the Belgian fleet exceeds 40 years for the first time (40.3 years).
The nuclear capacity constraints in the winters 2018–2019 and 2019–2020 were seen as
test cases, as legally the country remains bound to a nuclear phase-out target of 2025. In
January 2003, legislation was passed that requires the closure of all of Belgium’s nuclear plants
after 40 years of operation, so based on their startup dates, plants would be closed progressively
between 2015 and 2025 (see Table 20). Practically, however, after lifetime extension to 50 years

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was granted for three reactors, five of the seven reactors would go offline in the single year of2025. This represents a challenging policy goal.
In November 2017, the Belgian transmission system operator Elia published a study urging theconstruction of “at least 3.6 GW of new-build adjustable (thermal) capacity” to “cope with theshock of the nuclear exit in 2025”1324 . The Belgian government confirmed the nuclear phase-out
date, when, on 30 March 2018, it presented the Federal Energy Strategy.
Table 20 · Status of Belgian Nuclear Fleet (as of 1 July 2020)
Reactor

Net Capacity(MW)

Grid Connection

Load Factor

Operating Age(as of 1 July 2020)

End of License(Latest Closure Date)

2019

Lifetime

57.6

80.4

Doel-1433

28/08/1974

45.8

10-year lifetime extension to
15 February 2025

Doel-2433

21/08/1975

44.9

10-year lifetime extension to
1 December 2025

63.7

80.4

Doel-3

1 006

23/06/1982

38.0

1 October 2022

86.3

74.8

Doel-4

1 038

08/04/1985

35.2

1 July 2025

93.3

80.9

Tihange-1

962

07/03/1975

45.3

10-year lifetime extension to
1 October 2025

98.6

76.8

Tihange-2

1 008

13/10/1982

37.7

1 February 2023

36.8

76.5

Tihange-3

1 038

15/06/1985

35.0

1 September 2025

96.7

83.7
1325

Sources: WNISR, NEI, 2020; Belgian Law of 28 June 2015; Electrabel/GDF-Suez, 2015

Shaky Legal Ground for Lifetime Extensions
In summer 2012, the operator identified an unprecedented number of hydrogen-induced crack
indications in the pressure vessels of Doel-3 and Tihange-2, with respectively over 8,000 and
2,000—which later increased to over 13,000 and over 3,000—previously undetected defects.
In spite of widespread concerns, and although no failsafe explanation about the negative initial
fracture-toughness test results was given, on 17 November 2015, the Federal Agency for Nuclear
Control (FANC or AFCN) authorized the restart of Doel-3 and Tihange-2 (see previous WNISR
editions for details).
The Belgian government did not wait for the outcome of the Doel-3/Tihange-2 issue anddecided in March 2015 to draft legislation to extend the lifetime of Doel-1 and Doel-2 by ten
years to 2025. The law went into effect on 6 July 2015. On 22 December 2015, FANC authorized
the lifetime extension and restart of Doel-1 and -2.
1324 - Elia, “Electricity Scenarios for Belgium Towards 2050–Elia’s Quantified Study on the Energy Transition in 2030 and2040”, November 2017, see http://www.elia.be/~/media/files/Elia/About-Elia/Studies/20171114_ELIA_4584_AdequacyScenario.pdf,
accessed 1 August 2019.
1325 - Moniteur Belge, “Loi modifiant la loi du 31 janvier 2003 sur la sortie progressive de l’énergie nucléaire à des fins de productionindustrielle d’électricité afin de garantir la sécurité d’approvisionnement sur le plan énergétique”, N.174, Second Edition, 6 July 2015
(in French and Dutch), see http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/2015/07/06_2.pdf.
• For Doel-1&-2, see Electrabel, GDF Suez/Engie, “Note de Presse—Sécurité d’approvisionnement et transition énergétique—Accord
sur la prolongation de Doel 1 et Doel 2”, Press Release,1 December 2015 (in French) and Engie Electrabel, “Doel Nuclear Power Plant—
Profile of the 4 units”, Updated 7 August 2017, see http://corporate.engie-electrabel.be/local-player/nuclear-3/doel/;• For Tihange-1, see Engie/Electrabel, “Tihange”, Undated, see http://corporate.engie-electrabel.be/local-player/nuclear-3/tihange/;
all accessed 23 June 2019.

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On 6 January 2016, two Belgian NGOs filed a complaint against the 28 June 2015 law with
the Belgian Constitutional Court, arguing in particular that the lifetime extension had beenauthorized without a legally binding public enquiry. In a 22 June 2017 pre-ruling decision, theCourt addressed a series of questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in particularconcerning the interpretation of the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions, as well as the European
legislation. On 29 November 2018, the ECJ’s Advocate General presented its advice on therequest of the Belgian Constitutional Court concerning the applicability of the EU-Aarhus/
Espoo with regards to the Plant Life Extension or PLEX of Doel-1 and -2 and Tihange-1. In her
advice, the Advocate General clearly states thatthe definition of ‘project’ under Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2011/92 [Environmental Impact
Assessment Directive] includes the extension by 10 years of the period of industrial
production of electricity by a nuclear power stationand thatpublic participation must take place in accordance with Article 6(4) of Directive 2011/92 as
early as possible, when all options are open, that is to say, before the decision on the extension
is taken.1326

The ECJ is not bound by, but often follows, the advice of the Advocate General. In WNISR2019,
we wrote: “Should the ECJ rule in accordance with the Advocate General’s recommendations,this could have major implications also for past or planned lifetime extensions in othercountries.”
On 29 July 2019, the ECJ followed the Advocate General stating that the lifetime extension ofa reactor
must be regarded as being of a comparable scale, in terms of risks of environmental impact,
to the initial commissioning of those power stations. Consequently, it is mandatory forsuch a project to be the subject of an environmental impact assessment provided for by the
EIA [Environmental Impact Assessment] directive.1327

In addition, as the Doel-1 and -2 reactors are particularly close to the Belgian-Dutch border,“such a project must also be subject to the transboundary assessment procedure”. The
judgement permitted though to delay the implementation of the order, if a national court
considers it isjustified by overriding considerations relating to the need to exclude a genuine and serious
threat of interruption to the electricity supply in the Member State concerned, which cannot
be addressed by other means or alternatives, inter alia in the context of the internal market.
That maintenance may only last for the amount of time strictly necessary in order to remedy
that illegality.1328

1326 - InfoCuria, “Opinion of Advocate General Kokott”, Case C‑411/17, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL, Bond Beter Leefmilieu
Vlaanderen vzw v. Conseil des ministres, Intervener: Electrabel SA, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Constitutional Court ofBelgium, Provisional text, 29 November 2018, see http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=208286&text=&dir=&doc
lang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=7984750, accessed 27 June 2019.
1327 - ECJ, “The Belgian law extending the operating life of nuclear power stations Doel 1 and Doel 2 was adopted without the required
environmental assessments being carried out first”, Press Release, 29 July 2020.
1328 - Ibidem.

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On 5 March 2020, the Belgian Constitutional Court nullified the lifetime extension legislationin its entirety but gave the government until the end of 2022 “at the latest” to carry out anappropriate Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a transboundary consultation.1329
This precedent will have significant consequences on the lifetime extension projects in
European Union Member States that now will all have to carry out full-scale EIAs and organize
transboundary consultations prior to granting permission for lifetime extensions.
In the meantime, Electrabel has signaled that it wished to extend the lifetime of two or threeunits beyond 2025 and warned that it would need legislation to be adapted by the end of theyear 2020.1330

Flaws in Reinforced Concrete and Other Issues
In October 2017, Electrabel identified serious flaws in the concrete of a building adjacent to thereactor buildings of Doel-3. These bunkered buildings contain backup systems for the safetyof the facilities and are supposed to be able to withstand impact from outside like an airplanecrash. According to Engie, some of these “anomalies at the reinforcements of the reinforced
concrete [were] present since the construction of the building”.1331 Doel-3 was originally
expected to be off-line for scheduled maintenance for 45 days, however, the outage lasted
302 days.
Similar problems, to varying degrees, have been identified at Tihange-2 and -3, as well as Doel-4.
The entire roof of the bunkered building of Tihange-3 is scheduled to be replaced during theoutage that began on 7 June 2020 and is scheduled to last until 24 October 2020.
On 28 May 2020, Electrabel announced that the Tihange-1 will remain offline until the endof 2020, “following the discovery of a failure in a cooling water reservoir tank during anattempted restart of the unit after five months of planned maintenance”.1332
The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) noted in its March 2019 national progress
report on the stress tests of nuclear power plants that review and assessment “progresses
slightly slower than expected”. The reasons indicated are workload related, for both licensee
and regulator, triggered by the “safety events that occurred in 2018” and “by other safety
projects (Long Term Operation of Tihange-1 or Doel-1 & -2) that are resource-~intensive forboth organizations.”1333 While FANC had issued its annual progress reports in the month ofMarch over the past few years, as of the end of July, the 2020 report had not been released yet.

1329 - Cour constitutionnelle, “La Cour annule la loi qui prolonge l’activité des centrales nucléaires de Doel 1 et 2, en l’absence d’étudespréalables d’incidences environnementales, mais en maintient les effets jusqu’au plus tard le 31 décembre 2022” ; Press Release,
5 March 2020 ; for the text of the judgement see Cour constitutionnelle, “Arrêt 34/2020”, 5 March 2020,see https://www.const-court.be/public/f/2020/2020-034f.pdf, accessed 8 August 2020.
1330 - Montel, “Electrabel réitère son appel à prolonger le nucléaire belge”, 28 January 2020,see http://www.montelnews.com/fr/story/electrabel-ritre-son-appel-à-prolonger-le-nuclaire-belge/1082410, accessed 8 August 2020.
1331 - Engie/Electrabel, “Révision en cours dans les centrales de Doel 3 et Tihange 3: réaction d’ENGIE Electrabel à propos de l’article
dans Le Soir”, 5 July 2018.
1332 - Platts Nuclear News Flash, “Vapor release in turbine hall takes Belgium’s Tihange-2 offline”, 15 July 2020.
1333 - FANC, “Belgian Stress Tests—National progress report on the stress tests of nuclear power plants”, March 2019.

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The COVID-19 pandemic has led Electrabel to revise by up to 25 weeks its outage schedules
until 2023 for at least three of its seven reactors.1334

FinlandSee Finland Focus.

FranceSee France Focus.

Germany
Germany’s nuclear fleet generated 75.1 TWh gross1335 (71.2 TWh net) in 2019, practically stable
over the past three years, but less than half of the generation of 162.4 TWh (net) in the record
year of 2001. Nuclear plants provided a stable 12.4 percent of Germany’s electricity generation,
representing little more than one-third of the historic maximum of 30.8 percent in 1997. One
more reactor, the 1400-MWe Philippsburg-2 PWR, was closed at the end of 2019, according
to the nuclear phase-out legislation that will see all six remaining reactors closed by the endof 2022 (see Table 21 for details). The average load factor slightly declined by 1.3 percentage
points to 85.4 percent. All seven units that generated power in 2019 are in the Top Ten lifetime
electricity generators in the world, five of which are holding positions one to five (only three
U.S. reactors made it into the Top Ten alongside the German units).1336
Germany decided immediately after 3/11 to close eight of the oldest1337 of its 17 operating
reactors and to phase out the remaining nine until the end of 2022, effectively reactivating the“consensus agreement” negotiated between the Red-Green Government and the utilities in
2000–01 and the Nuclear Phase-out Law of January 2002. This choice was implemented by aconservative, pro-business, and, until the Fukushima disaster, very pro-nuclear Government,
led by physicist Chancellor Angela Merkel, with no political party dissenting, which makes it
virtually irreversible under any political constellation. On 6 June 2011, the Bundestag passed
a seven-part energy transition legislation almost by consensus and it came into force on
6 August 2011 (see earlier WNISR editions for details).
Renewables generated 244 TWh (+8.7 percent) representing 40 percent of gross national
electricity generation or 42 percent of gross national power consumption in 2019; more than halfof this is from wind power (126 TWh), which, since 2017, out-generates nuclear power.

1334 - Montel, “Engie revises 2021-23 outage dates at 4 Belgian reactors”, 21 July 2020.
1335 - AGEB, “Energieverbrauch in Deutschland im Jahr 2019”, March 2020. Germany has not reported its 2019 net nuclear power
production to IAEA-PRIS.
1336 - NEI, “Load factors to end December 2019”, June 2020.
1337 - Including the Krümmel and Brunsbüttel reactors that by then had not generated power for almost two and four years
respectively.

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In the first half of 2020, based on preliminary estimates, renewables accounted for around halfof the national electricity production (49 percent gross, according to Agora Energiewende1338,
and 55.8 percent net, according to the Fraunhofer-Institute for Solar Energy Systems1339) andconsumption (50.3 percent, says Agora Energiewende). At the same time, national production
shrank by 4.9 percent and the coal-based power generation declined by around 40 percent
compared to the first half of 2019. Agora Energiewende warns that about two thirds of thedecline is due to the COVID-19 effect, and that consumption and greenhouse gas emissions
could rapidly rebound if there is no policy change, reinforcing efficiency, expansion of solar,
and especially on-land wind power.

“Renewables covered 17.1% of final energy in Germany,
nuclear 17.5% in France”
To put this into perspective, provisional figures for 2019 show respective shares of 17.1 percent
for German renewables1340 and 17.5 percent for French nuclear of final energy consumption.1341
As renewables accelerate their expansion beyond the power sector throughout the German
economy, their share in final energy has increased by more than 5 percentage points since2010, while the French nuclear share remained about stable (16.9 percent in 2010). However,both figures indicate how modest the contribution of the respective technologies to the overall
energy sector remains, with oil remaining the dominant primary source in both countries.
Coal-based electricity generation in Germany dropped by unprecedented margins in 2019—
hard coal by 30.6 percent and lignite by 21.8 percent, while natural gas generation increased by
10.3 percent. Renewables were again by far the largest contributor to the power mix (gross) andsupplied far more than lignite (18.6 percent) and hard coal (9.4 percent) together, while natural
gas combustion for power was at an all-time high and contributed 14.9 percent. Electricity
consumption dropped to its lowest level since 2000.1342
In 2019, net power exports plunged by one third to about 35 TWh. The main reasons were low
gas prices that triggered higher production in neighboring countries and the cost increase ofemission certificates, which drove up the cost of German coal-based electricity. The parallel
decline of coal/lignite power generation and exports clearly indicate that a significant share ofexports is coal-based (e.g. to France that struggles with winter peaks).
Figure 66 summarizes the main developments of the German power system between 2010—
the last year prior to the post-3/11 closure of the eight oldest nuclear reactors—and 2019.

1338 - Agora Energiewende, “Stromerzeugung im ersten Halbjahr 2020”, 30 June 2020,see https://www.agora-energiewende.de/blog/default-5ec368c8fd/, accessed 9 August 2020.
1339 - ISE, Fraunhofer Institut, “Nettostromerzeugung im 1. Halbjahr 2020: Rekordanteil erneuerbarer Energien von 55,8 Prozent”,
1 July 2020, see https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/de/presse-und-medien/presseinformationen/2020/nettostromerzeugung-im-erstenhalbjahr-2020-rekordanteil-erneuerbarer-energien.html, accessed 9 August 2020.
1340 - Share calculated according to EU-Directive 2009/28/EC. The share calculated according to German Energiekonzept is17.5 percent, see Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Development of Renewable Energy Sources in Germany in the year
2019”, February 2020.
1341 - General Commission for Sustainable Development, “Bilan énergétique de la France en 2018–Données provisoires”, French
Ministry for the Ecological and Inclusive Transition, April 2019.
1342 - AGEB, “Energieverbrauch in Deutschland im Jahr 2019”, op.cit.

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Figure 66 · Main Developments of the German Power System Between 2010 and 2019

Main Evolution of the German Power System Between 2010 and 2019
in TWhNet Export
Increase
18

Nuclear
Reduction-65.6

Consumption
Decrease-38

Renewables
Increase
150
139

Fossil Fuel
Reduction
-93.6

100

Fossil fuel and nuclear
generation reductions
as well as export increase...

... are covered byconsumption decrease andrenewable production increase.

© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

50

0Sources: WNISR based on AGEB, 2020

It illustrates that Germany has definitely now embarked on the double phase-out of nuclear
power and coal. Renewable electricity generation (+139 TWh) and the reduction in domestic
consumption (–38 TWh) were more than sufficient to compensate for the reduction of nuclear
generation (–65.6 TWh), and a dramatic reduction in power generation from fossil fuels(–93.6 TWh). Within the fossil-fuel generating segment:
ɆɆ Lignite peaked in 2013 and then declined—especially in 2019— to 22 percent below the2010 level;ɆɆ Hard coal also peaked in 2013 then dropped to less than half (49 percent) of the 2010 level;ɆɆ Natural gas fluctuated since 2010 and peaked in 2019 at 2 percent above the 2010 level;ɆɆ Oil was insignificant and dropped further to 41 percent below the 2010 level representing
0.8 percent of the gross power generation.
Greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector dropped by an estimated 18 percent or
50 million tons of CO2 in 2019, mainly due to higher carbon prices in the EU emissions trade
and therefore lower coal and lignite use, lower electricity consumption and higher renewableenergy contribution.
Carbon intensity of the power mix decreased by 12.6 percent from 474 to 414 g CO2/kWh.1343

1343 Agora Energiewende, “Die Energiewende im Stromsektor: Stand der Dinge 2019—Rückblick auf die wesentlichen Entwicklungensowie Ausblick auf 2020”, January 2020 (in German), see https://www.agora-energiewende.de/veroeffentlichungen/die-energiewendeim-stromsektor-stand-der-dinge-2019/, accessed 9 August 2020.

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Table 21 · Legal Closure Dates for German Nuclear Reactors 2011–2022
Reactor Name
(Type, Net Capacity)

Owner/Operator

First Grid
Connection

End of License(latest closure date)

Biblis-A (PWR, 1167 MW)
Biblis-B (PWR, 1240 MW)
Brunsbüttel (BWR, 771 MW)
Isar-1 (BWR, 878 MW)
Krümmel (BWR, 1346 MW)
Neckarwestheim-1 (PWR, 785 MW)
Philippsburg-1 (BWR, 890 MW)
Unterweser (BWR, 1345 MW)

RWE
RWE
KKW Brunsbüttel(a)PreussenElektra
KKW Krümmel(b)
EnBW
EnBW
PreussenElektra

1974
1976
1976
1977
1983
1976
1979
1978

6 August 2011

Grafenrheinfeld (PWR, 1275 MW)

PreussenElektra

1981

31 December 2015
(closed 27 June 2015)

KKW Gundremmingen(c)1984

31 December 2017

EnBW

1984

31 December 2019

Brokdorf (PWR, 1410 MW)
Grohnde (PWR, 1360 MW)
Gundremmingen-C (BWR, 1288 MW)

PreussenElektra/Vattenfall(d)PreussenElektra
KKW Gundremmingen

1986
1984
1984

31 December 2021

Isar-2 (PWR, 1410 MW)
Emsland (PWR, 1329 MW)
Neckarwestheim-2 (PWR, 1310 MW)

PreussenElektra
KKW Lippe-Ems(e)
EnBW

1988
1988
1989

31 December 2022

Gundremmingen-B (BWR, 1284 MW)
Philippsburg-2 (PWR, 1402 MW)

Sources: Atomgesetz, 31 July 2011, Atomforum Kernenergie May 2011; WNISR with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

Notes:
Krümmel and Brunsbüttel were officially closed in 2011 but had not been providing electricity to the grid since 2009 and 2007 respectively
a - Vattenfall 66.67%, E.ON 33.33%
b - Vattenfall 50%, E.ON 50%.
c - RWE 75%, E.ON 25%.
d - E.ON 80%, Vattenfall 20%.
e - RWE 87.5%, E.ON 12.5%.

PWR: Pressurized Water Reactor; BWR: Boiling Water Reactor; KKW: Nuclear Power Plants (Kerkraftwerk);
RWE: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk Power AG; EnBW: Energie Baden-Württemberg AG.

The Netherlands
The Netherlands operates a single, 47-year-old 480 MW PWR at Borssele that provided a stable
3.7 TWh and 3.15 percent of the country’s electricity in 2019, compared with a maximum of
6.2 percent in 1986. In late 2006, the operator and the Government reached an agreement
to allow operation of the reactor to continue until 2033.1344 In June 2020, operator EPZ(Elektriciteits Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland) announced a return to profit of around€20 million (US$22.6 million) for 2019,1345 compared to losses of €50 million (US$56 million)
for 2018.1346

1344 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in the Netherlands”, Updated February 2017,see http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf107.html, accessed 17 June 2019.
1345 - Rolf Bosboom, “Energy company PZEM is out of the red, but 2020 will be ‘a difficult year’”, PZC, 4 June 2020 (in Dutch),see https://www.pzc.nl/zeeuws-nieuws/energiebedrijf-pzem-is-uit-de-rode-cijfers-maar-2020-wordt-een-moeilijk-jaar~a61684a7/,
accessed 10 June 2020.
1346 - Frank Balkenende, “PZEM’s birthday is full of confidence again”, PZC, 2 May 2019 (in Dutch),see https://www.pzc.nl/zeeuws-nieuws/jarig-pzem-blaakt-weer-van-het-zelfvertrouwen~a8cd3352/, accessed 10 June 2020.

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The ruling governing party VVD announced in January 2019 that it was developing new ideas
for nuclear power in Netherlands. The options under consideration were further extension ofoperations at Borssele, construction of a new plant, or realizing new nuclear power plants in a
European context. The response from industry in the Netherlands was to dismiss the initiativeas wholly unrealistic. “The business case for nuclear energy is all in all very unattractive,” saidenergy company Eneco, as “the cost of nuclear energy is currently two to three times higher
than renewable energy from wind and solar.”1347 The operator of Borssele in May 2019 statedthat any new nuclear plant would “never happen” without government financing.1348
In March 2020, the province of Zeeland, which is a part owner of the Borssele plant, indicatedits support for continued operation of the reactor beyond 2033—that is beyond 60 years—
as part of its strategy to meet its climate goals.1349 In its Regional Energy Strategy, Zeelandcalled on the reactor operator, Elektriciteits Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland (EPZ), toprovide details as to what it would be required for the reactor to operate for more than anotherdozen years. It was reported that EPZ is interested in possible life extension.1350 German utility
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG (RWE), that holds 30 percent of Borssele, has
not indicated its position. The current Dutch Nuclear Energy Act does not permit life extension
and would have to be amended.
In 2019, it was reported that Netherlands is lagging behind much of the rest of Europe when it
comes to reaching sustainable energy targets, according to figures from the European statistics
agency, Eurostat.1351 In 2018, just 7.4 percent of the energy used in the Netherlands came fromrenewable energy, with a target of 14 percent by 2020.1352 The Dutch environmental assessment
agency stated that the Netherlands will not meet its target of cutting carbon dioxide emissions
by 25 percent by 2020 when compared with 1990.1353
In October 2018, the Dutch government was found to be in non-compliance with the Aarhus
Convention when it failed to conduct a public consultation on extending the operating life of
Borssele.1354 The convention is an international environmental agreement under the auspices of
the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) which addresses access to information andpublic participation. The ruling requires the Dutch government to conduct an Environmental
1347 - David Bremmer, “Energy giants fill the VVD proposal for new nuclear power stations”, AD, 6 November 2018 (in Dutch),see https://www.ad.nl/economie/energiereuzen-fileren-vvd-voorstel-voor-nieuwe-kerncentrales~a93c015e/, accessed 12 June 2019.
1348 - Frank Balkenende, “PZEM’s birthday is full of confidence again”, PZC, 2 May 2019, op. cit.;and Laka, “PZEM: “profit again in 2021; no new nuclear power plant without a subsidy”, 3 May 2019 (in Dutch), see https://www.laka.
org/nieuws/2019/pzem-in-2021-weer-winst-geen-nieuwe-kerncentrale-zonder-subsidie-10626, accessed 12 June 2019.
1349 - NOS, “Nuclear power plant Borssele may remain open longer”, 10 March 2020 (in Dutch),see https://nos.nl/artikel/2326559-kerncentrale-borssele-blijft-mogelijk-langer-open.html, accessed 10 June 2020.
1350 - Frank Balkenende, “Keep nuclear power plant Borssele open longer? It is now up to the state”, PZC, 19 March 2020 (in Dutch),see https://www.pzc.nl/zeeuws-nieuws/kerncentrale-borssele-langer-openhouden-rijk-is-nu-aan-zet~a0c121f75/, accessed 10 June 2020.
1351 - Dutch News.nl, “The Netherlands still trailing behind on EU renewable energy targets”, 12 February 2019, see https://www.
dutchnews.nl/news/2019/02/the-netherlands-still-trailing-behind-on-eu-renewable-energy-targets/, accessed 10 June 2020.
1352 - Eurostat, “Renewable energy statistics”, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_
statistics#Renewable_energy_produced_in_the_EU_increased_by_two_thirds_in_2007-2017, accessed 10 June 2020.
1353 - Mike Corder, “Dutch emission reduction targets probably won’t be met”, Associated Press, 1 November 2019,see https://phys.org/news/2019-11-dutch-emission-reduction-wont-met.html, accessed 28 July 2020.
1354 - UNECE, “Findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2014/104 concerning compliance by the
Netherlands”, Adopted by the Compliance Committee on 4 October 2018, Economic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties
to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
Compliance Committee, 63rd meeting, 11–15 March 2019, see https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CC-63/ece.
mp.pp.c.1.2019.3.en.pdf, accessed 12 June 2019.

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Impact Assessment (EIA) involving stakeholders in the Netherlands, but also in neighboringstates. The evidence of non-compliance was submitted to Aarhus by Greenpeace Netherlands,
which had lost previous claims in Dutch courts on the public consultation process.
In 2014, EPZ started using uranium-plutonium Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel at Borssele. EPZ
is currently the only remaining foreign customer for commercial spent fuel reprocessing of
Orano’s La Hague plant. The plan is to consume all of the plutonium that is separated in asmuch as 40 percent MOX in the core, likely a higher share than any other commercial lightwater reactor in the world operating with MOX fuel, and definitely the oldest.1355

Spain
Spain operates seven reactors that provided 55.9 TWh in 2019, a slight increase comparedto the 53.4 TWh in 2018, representing 21.5 percent of the country’s electricity, compared to20.4 percent in 2018 and a maximum of 38.4 percent in 1989. Spain’s reactors have a mean
operating age of 35.4 years as of 1 July 2020. Meanwhile, in the year to May 2020, solar PV
installed capacity doubled from 4.62 GW to 9.28 GW,1356 generating 98 TWh total electricity in
2019, representing 37.5 percent of the nation’s electricity.1357
The end of the conservative government of Mariano Rajoy and the formation of a new
government in May 2018 under Socialist Party (PSOE) leader Pedro Sánchez led to a major
shift in energy and climate policy.1358 The PSOE policy platform in 2016 had focused on energy
efficiency and renewable energy, while reducing fossil fuel use and a commitment to permit
operation of Spain’s reactors for a maximum of forty years.1359 Shortly after forming a coalition
government, it restated that a nuclear phase-out would take place between 2021–2028.1360
In late January 2019, a new nuclear phase-out plan was agreed between the then PSOE-led
government and utilities Endesa, Iberdrola and Naturgy. The phase-out was part of the overall
Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (INECP) which was approved by the Cabinet
meeting on 22 February 2019.1361 The details of the reactor closure-dates were published in
February 2019 by newspaper Cinco Días.1362 All of Spain’s reactors would be closed by 2035;
however, the policy also secures lifetime extension of all reactors beyond 40 years, in contrast
1355 - Jan Wieman, “Borssele moves to MOX”, Fuel Cycle Manager – EPZ, as published in NEI, 11 March 2015,see http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureborssele-moves-to-mox-4530062/, accessed 14 June 2019.
1356 - Argus, “Spanish solar PV capacity doubles in a year to top coal”, 11 June 2020,see https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2113565-spanish-solar-pv-capacity-doubles-in-a-year-to-top-coal, accessed 16 June 2020.
1357 - Renewables Now, “Spain connects close to 6.5 GW of renewables in 2019”, 24 January 2020,see https://renewablesnow.com/news/spain-connects-close-to-65-gw-of-renewables-in-2019-684733/, accessed 28 July 2020.
1358 - Manuel Planelles, “Spain’s new PM signals change of tack on climate change”, El País, 6 June 2018,see https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/06/06/inenglish/1528270804_597351.html, accessed 16 June 2020.
1359 - PSOE, “Programa Electoral—Elecciones Generales 2016”, 2016 (in Spanish),see https://www.psoe.es/transparencia/informacion-politica-organizativa/programa/.
1360 - Sam Morgan, “Spain to nix nuclear and coal power by 2030”, Euractiv, 15 November 2018,see https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/spain-to-nix-nuclear-and-coal-power-by-2030/, accessed 28 July 2020.
1361 - Carmen Monforte, “El Gobierno cierra el calendario con las fechas de clausura de cada central nuclear”, CincoDías, El País
Economía, 11 February 2019 (in Spanish), see https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2019/02/08/companias/1549647160_807281.html,
accessed 16 June 2020.
1362 - Ibidem.

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to previous stated PSOE policy. On 3 March 2019, Teresa Ribera, Minister for the EcologicalTransition, confirmed that an agreement had been reached with Iberdrola, Endesa and Naturgy
that in effect extends operation of their reactors.1363 After inconclusive elections in April andNovember 2019, with a narrow victory for PSOE, a coalition agreement for government wasreached with left-of-center Podemos.1364
In March 2020, the government updated the INECP 2021-2030.1365 The 2030 target of 161 GW
of total installed power generating capacity is to include 50 GW of wind, 39 GW PV, 27 GW
CCGTs (Combined Cycle Gas Turbines), 16 GW hydro, 9.5 GW pumped hydro, 7 GW thermosolar, 3 GW nuclear (1.9 percent).1366
A major point of tension between the utilities was over the amortization time of their reactors.
Iberdrola had accounted for the nuclear plants’ operating until 40 years, whereas Endesa
had planned for 50-year operation in its accounts. Iberdrola said that it also has no financial
incentive to continue nuclear operations if the business continues to lose money.1367 Iberdrola
and Naturgy had put forward plans for extension of the Almaraz reactors to 2027, of which
they jointly share ownership together with Endesa, on the condition that they would be able
to withdraw if there was a requirement to make further investments. Endesa, which was notin favor of reactor closure before 50 years, set no conditions. On 22 March 2019, Iberdrola
confirmed that it had reached agreement for the extension of the Almaraz-1 and -2 reactors
to operate until 1 November 2027 and 31 October 2028 respectively, and that it had applied
for license extension.1368 The agreement is based on the condition that Iberdrola will spend
no more than €600 million (US$677 million) during the remaining operational life of thereactors.1369
On 7 May 2020, the Plenary of the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN) announced that it had
decided to approve a technical assessment on the request for license renewal for the two
Almaraz reactors.1370 As a result, CSN recommends to the Government to authorize the39‑year old Almaraz-1 to operate until 1 November 2027 and Almaraz-2, connected to thegrid in October 1983, to operate until 31 October 2028. The approval by CSN set safety andcompliance conditions, including the requirement, as noted above, to invest up to €600 million
1363 - Público, “La ministra Ribera afirma que es necesario prolongar la vida de las centrales nucleares”, 3 March 2019 (in Spanish),see https://www.publico.es/politica/energia-nuclear-prolonga-vida-centrales-nucleares.html, accessed 16 June 2020.
1364 - El País, “Socialists and Unidas Podemos strike preliminary deal to form coalition government”, 13 November 2019,see https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/11/12/inenglish/1573562718_041862.html, accessed 16 June 2020.
1365 - Renewables Now, “Spain raises ambitions in new 2030 NECP - more emission cuts, wind, solar”, 13 April 2020,see https://renewablesnow.com/news/spain-raises-ambitions-in-new-2030-necp-more-emission-cuts-wind-solar-694786/,
accessed 28 July 2020.
1366 - Massimo Schiavo, Pierre Georges et al., “The Energy Transition And What It Means For European Power Prices And Producers:
Midyear 2020 Update”, S&P Global, 8 June 2020, see https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200608-the-energytransition-and-what-it-means-for-european-power-prices-and-producers-midyear-2020-update-11509932, accessed 28 July 2020.
1367 - NW, “Spain’s Endesa to apply to renew all reactor licenses in 2019, 2020”, Platts, 7 March 2019.
1368 - Iberdrola, “Iberdrola finalises the Almaraz renewal agreement, which guarantees economic activity and employment at the plant
for the next 25 years”, 22 March 2019, see https://www.iberdrola.com/press-room/news/detail/iberdrola-finalises-almaraz-renewalagreement-which-guarantees-economic-activity-employment-plant-next-years, accessed 16 June 2020.
1369 - Isla Binnie, “Power firms agree on route to close Spain’s oldest nuclear plant”, Reuters, 22 March 2019,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-energy-nuclearpower/power-firms-agree-on-route-to-close-spains-oldest-nuclear-plantidUSKCN1R325G, accessed 16 June 2020.
1370 - CSN, “El CSN informa favorablemente la renovación de la autorización de explotación de la central nuclear Almaraz (Cáceres)”,
7 May 2020 (in Spanish), see https://www.csn.es/noticias-csn/2020/-/asset_publisher/7wHne5sV6dgf/content/el-csn-informafavorablemente-la-renovacion-de-la-autorizacion-de-explotacion-de-la-central-nuclear-almaraz-caceres-, accessed 16 June 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 (US$677 million).1371 In June 2020, a decision on whether to grant extension of the licenses for
the Almaraz reactors was postponed by the Government until late August 2020.1372
The Almaraz plant is located adjacent to the Tagus River in an area of significant seismic riskand 110 kilometers from the Portuguese border.1373 For this reason the continued operationof the plant has been opposed by Portuguese environmental groups, political parties andgovernments. The decision of the CSN prompted the Portuguese government to demand that
Almaraz be subject to an environmental impact assessment.1374
Asociación Nuclear Ascó-Vandellós II, known as ANAV, the operator of Vandellos-2, has applied
for 10-year license renewal taking it to 2030.1375 Under the recently agreed Integrated Energy
and Climate Plan, Vandellos-2 is scheduled to operate until 2034, and therefore a further
license extension may be sought prior to 2030. On 24 June 2020, the CSN approved a ten-year
extension for Vandellos-2 until 2030.1376 The reactor is scheduled for closure in 2034.1377

SwedenSweden’s nuclear fleet of eight reactors generated 64.4 TWh or 34 percent of the country’s
electricity production in 2019, a drop of 2.2 percent in generation and 6.3 percentage
points if compared to 65.9 TWh and 40.3 percent in 2018. On 30 December 2019, the45‑year old Ringhals-2 reactor was permanently closed,1378 leaving the country with seven
operating reactors. State-owned utility Vattenfall co-owns six operating reactors,1379 while
OKG (Oskarshamns Kraftgrupp AB)1380 owns the seventh, Oskarshamn-3.
The past year has seen a continuation of efforts by right-of-center opposition parties tooverturn the decision in 2016 on shutting down all nuclear reactors in Sweden by 2040.
On 10 December 2019, the Moderate Party and the Christian Democrats announced their
1371 - Eleconomista, “El CSN autoriza a la central nuclear de Almaraz a operar hasta octubre de 2028”, 7 May 2020 (in Spanish),see https://www.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/noticias/10529185/05/20/El-CSN-autoriza-a-la-central-nuclear-de-Almaraz-aoperar-hasta-octubre-de-2028.html, accessed 16 June 2020.
1372 - El Periódico, “La decisión sobre Almaraz, aplazada”, 6 June 2020 (in Spanish),see https://www.elperiodicoextremadura.com/noticias/extremadura/decision-almaraz-aplazada_1236171.html, accessed 28 July 2020.
1373 - Jornal Económico, “Spanish nuclear power plant in Almaraz authorized to operate until 2028”, 8 May 2020,see https://jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/en/news/Spanish-nuclear-power-plant-in-Almaraz-authorized-to-operate-until-2028-586165,
accessed 16 June 2020.
1374 - Notícias ao Minuto, “Governo quer que extensão de funcionamento de Almaraz seja avaliada”, 5 May 2020 (in Portuguese),see https://www.noticiasaominuto.com/pais/1483078/governo-quer-que-extensao-de-funcionamento-de-almaraz-seja-avaliada,
accessed 16 June 2020.
1375 - Platts Nuclear News Flashes, “Operator of Spain’s Vandellos-2 applies for 10-year license renewal”, 28 March 2019.
1376 - CSN, “El Pleno del CSN informa favorablemente la solicitud de renovación de autorización de explotación de la central nuclear
Vandellós II (Tarragona)”, 24 June 2020 (in Spanish), see https://www.csn.es/noticias-csn/2020/-/asset_publisher/7wHne5sV6dgf/
content/el-pleno-del-csn-informa-favorablemente-la-solicitud-de-renovacion-de-autorizacion-de-explotacion-de-la-central-nuclearvandellos-ii-tarragon-1, accessed 28 July 2020.
1377 - Platts Nuclear News Flashes, “Spain approves 10-year license extension for Vandellos-2 reactor”, 25 June 2020.
1378 - Vattenfall, “Ringhals 2 nuclear plant shuts down”, 19 December 2019, see https://group.vattenfall.com/press-and-media/
news--press-releases/newsroom/2019/ringhals-2-nuclear-plant-shuts-down; and Svenska Dagbladet, “Ringhals 2 tystnade: ‘Vemod’”,
30 December 2019 (in Swedish), see https://www.svd.se/medelalders-elforsorjare-tystnar, both accessed 16 June 2020.
1379 - Ringhals-1–4 (Vattenfall 70.4%, E.ON 29.6%), Forsmark-1–3 (Forsmarks Kraftgrupp FKG, Vattenfall 66%, Mellansvensk
Kraftgrupp 25.5%, E.ON 8.5%)1380 - OKG is owned by Uniper Sverige (formerly Sydkraft), an E.ON spinoff, for 54.5% and Fortum for 45.5%.

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withdrawal from the June 2016 energy policy agreement.1381 This was when the ruling Red
Green coalition and three opposition parties, including the Center Party, had reached a“traditional Swedish compromise” on future energy policy,1382 which fixed a 2040 target for a
100-percent renewable electricity mix.
Even after the closure of Ringhals-2 in December 2019, calls have continued to reverse
the decision and scrap plans for closure of Ringhals-1, which is scheduled no later than
31 December 2020. A parliamentary motion on 22 January 2020 attempting to reverse theclosure of the Ringhals reactors failed by one vote. The motion was put forward by the farright Sweden Democrats party, and backed by the Moderates, the Liberals and the Christian
Democrats, and was opposed by the Social Democratic Party and Green Party coalitiongovernment. However, a conservative parties’ victory would not necessarily have led to reoperation of Ringhals-2 or prevented the closure of Ringhals-1 later this year.
As reported in WNISR2019, the efforts to stop the closure of Ringhals conflicts with the positionof the reactor owners. Vattenfall’s decision to close the reactors was due to the reactors being
uneconomic, safety concerns over containment aging, the requirement for major investment inmany upgrades, as well as the need for new licensing.1383 On 28 November 2019, the head of thecompany’s generation department, Torbjorn Wahlborg, said that Vattenfall never intended tooperate Ringhals-1 and -2 longer than into the mid-2020s. He added that although electricity
prices are higher now (at the end of 2019) than they were in 2015 when the company took thedecision to close the reactors, “there is so much renewable energy in the [electricity] systemthat there is no place in the market for these reactors.”1384
For more than four decades phasing out nuclear power has been on the agenda in Sweden.
A 1980 public referendum decided to end nuclear power by 2010. Sweden retained the 2010
phase-out date until the middle of the 1990s, but an active debate on the country’s nuclear
future continued and led to a new inter-party deal to start the phase-out earlier but abandon
the 2010 deadline. The first reactor (Barsebäck-1) was closed in 1999 and the second one(Barsebäck-2) in 2005. In June 2010, the parliament voted by a tight margin (174–172) toabandon the phase-out legislation. As a result, theoretically, a new plant could again be built—
but only if an existing plant is closed.
On 22 December 2016, the 40-year-old Oskarshamn-2 was officially closed, followed on
17 June 2017 with the closure of the 46-year-old Oskarshamn-1.1385
To operate reactors into the 2040s, owners need to win approval following ten-year periodic
safety reviews. The first to do so under the new 2016 policy were the 39-year-old Forsmark-1 and
1381 - Svenska Dagbladet, “M och KD lämnar – vill ha svar om kärnkraften”, 10 December 2019 (in Swedish),see https://www.svd.se/m-och-kd-ratar-energioverenskommelsen, accessed 16 June 2020.
1382 - Government Offices of Sweden, “Agreement on Swedish energy policy—Framework agreement between the Swedish Social
Democratic Party, the Moderate Party, the Swedish Green Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats”, 16 June 2016,see https://www.government.se/articles/2016/06/agreement-on-swedish-energy-policy/, accessed 1 August 2020.
1383 - Birgitta Forsberg, “Vattenfalls vd: Mer kärnkraft inte lösningen”, Svenska Dagbladet, 20 May 2019 (in Swedish),see https://www.svd.se/vattenfalls-vd-mer-karnkraft-inte-losningen, accessed 24 June 2019;and Lars Larsson, “Kärnkraftsförespråkare förlorade om Ringhals”, Svenska Dagbladet, 22 January 2020 (in Swedish),see https://www.svd.se/riksdagen-rostar-om-ringhals, accessed 16 June 2020.
1384 - Ariane Sains, “Swedish parliament to debate continued operation of Ringhals reactors”, NW, 2 January 2020.
1385 - WNISR, “Sweden Retires First Commercial Nuclear Reactor (Oskarshamn-1)”, 21 June 2017, see https://www.worldnuclearreport.
org/Sweden-Retires-First-Commercial-Nuclear-Reactor-Oskarshamn-1.html, accessed 24 June 2019.

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38-year-old Forsmark-2, which secured approval on 18 June 2019 from the Swedish Radiation
Safety Authority (SSM) to operate for 10 more years until 2028.1386 The SSM approved continued
operation for the reactors, while also finding “deficiencies regarding the containment and aging
of concrete structures deemed as small in the current situation, but it may increase in the longterm if the deficiencies are not remedied since serious degradations....may occur in the reactor
containment and other building structures of importance for radiation safety.”1387 This could
mean significant repair work may be indispensable in the coming years.
The SSM on 19 May 2020, approved routine operation after a power increase of Forsmark-2.1388
The uprating of Forsmark was to 1118 MWe net. The original design capacity was 900 MWe
net.
Major construction work at all of Sweden’s reactors is scheduled for completion during2020. This relates to the requirement that all reactors operating beyond 2020 have in place
Independent Core Cooling Systems (ICCS).1389 The new system is a consequence of the stresstests following the Fukushima accident and the SSM requirements for an independent corecooling system, designed to withstand extreme external hazards.
The 2016 policy agreement also allowed for the building of new reactors, but, as in the previous
agreement, only for replacement and not in addition to existing units. The agreement also
stipulated: “Central Government support for nuclear energy, in the form of direct or indirect
subsidies, cannot be assumed”.1390 While Vattenfall CEO Hall stated in May 2019 that “thedisadvantage of nuclear power is that it has become so expensive to build that it is difficult tomotivate to build new nuclear power,”1391 the company has indicated during the past year that it
is open to operating reactors beyond the 2040 deadline.1392 “We will consider the possibility ofdriving them longer,” said Torbjörn Wahlborg, production manager at Vattenfall.1393
Currently, six of the seven Swedish reactors are scheduled for 60-year operation into the2040s, with closure of the last reactor in 2045,1394 when Sweden plans to have 100 percent of its
electricity generated by renewable energy.
1386 - SSM, “Forsmark har förutsättningar att fortsätta driva F1 och F2 strålsäkert till 2028s”, 24 June 2019 (in Swedish),see https://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/press/nyheter/2019/forsmark-har-forutsattningar-att-fortsatta-driva-f1-och-f2stralsakert-till-2028/, accessed 25 June 2019.
1387 - SSM, “Återkommande helhetsbedömning / Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB / Forsmark 1 och 2”, 18 June 2019 (in Swedish),see https://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/contentassets/6b998f90ef4c4dda8a5914ce3c3ca982/granskning-av-aterkommandehelhetsbedomning-av-forsmark-1-och-2.pdf, accessed 24 June 2019.
1388 - SSM, “Rutinmässig drift efter effekthöjning av Forsmark 2 godkänd”, 19 May 2020 (in Swedish),see https://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/press/nyheter/2020/rutinmassig-drift-efter-effekthojning-av-forsmark-2-godkand/,accessed 16 June 2020.
1389 - Ministry of the Environment, “Sweden’s Eighth National Report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety—Sweden’s
Implementation of the Obligations of the Convention”, Swedish Government, Ds 2019:16, August 2019 see https://www.regeringen.
se/4adae6/contentassets/c8c431c94efb4c4abefb38ca36272b5a/swedens-eighth-national-report-under-the-convention-on-nuclearsafety-ds-201916.pdf, accessed 16 June 2020.
1390 - Government Offices of Sweden, “Framework agreement between the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Moderate Party, theSwedish Green Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrats”, 16 June 2016.
1391 - Birgitta Forsberg, “Vattenfalls vd: Mer kärnkraft inte lösningen”, Svenska Dagbladet, 20 May 2019 (in Swedish), op. cit.
1392 - Lovisa Åkesson, “Vattenfall öppnar för kärnkraft efter 2040”, Expressen, 24 November 2019 (in Swedish),see https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/klimat/vattenfall-oppnar-for-karnkraft-efter-2040-/, accessed 16 June 2020.
1393 - svt Nyheter, “Ringhals ägare öppnar för ny kärnkraft”, 23 November 2019 (in Swedish),see https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/ringhals-agare-oppnar-for-nya-karnkraftverk, accessed 16 June 2020.
1394 - Vattenfall, “Asset Management At Nuclear Power Plants—With International Standards And Principles”, IAEACN-246-14,
Presented at the 4th International Conference on NPP Life Management”, IAEA, 23–27 October 2017, see https://www.iaea.org/
NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2017/2017-10-23-10-27- NPTDS/054_Frojd_ Presentation.pdf, accessed 24 June 2019.

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New emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances were announced inJune 2020 for Swedish nuclear power plants.1395 The sites will be surrounded by a Precautionary
Action Zone (PAZ) and an Urgent Protective action planning Zone (UPZ) as well as an Extended
Planning Distance (EPD), extending approximately 5, 25 and 100 kilometers respectively. With
SSM stating that
An inner and an outer emergency planning zone extending approximately 5 and 25 kilometersrespectively will be introduced around each of Sweden’s nuclear power plants. Within theseemergency planning zones, iodine tablets will be pre-distributed, warnings for the public in
the event of a nuclear accident will be pre-planned, and plans for evacuation and sheltering
will be put in place. (…) For the extended planning distance [out to 100 km], planning will
be put in place for relocation based on input from measurements of ground deposition,
sheltering, and limited distribution of iodine tablets. (…) The new emergency planningzones and distances are to be implemented in Swedish contingency planning no later than
1 July 2022.1396

The reorganization of emergency planning will likely have significant cost implications fornuclear operators.

Switzerland
Prior to the U.K. leaving the EU on 31 January 2020, Switzerland has been the only non-EU
Western European country generating nuclear power. Swiss nuclear output was stable at25.3 TWh in 2019 (less than 1 percentage-point increase over 2018). The average load factor
was 89.1 percent, up from 88.3 percent in 2018. Nuclear generated a stable 35.2 percent of thecountry’s electricity (36.1 percent in 2018, maximum of 44.4 percent in 1996).1397 With anaverage age of 44.3 years (see Figure 67), Switzerland operates the oldest nuclear fleet and—with Beznau-1, age 51 since grid connection—the oldest commercially operating reactor in theworld.
In October 2013, operator BKW announced that it would close its Mühleberg reactor in 2019,
due to “indefinable and unquantifiable… technical, economic and political uncertainties[that] could increase the economic risks of long-term operation.”1398 In March 2016, BKW
communicated that Mühleberg would be disconnected from the grid as of 20 December 2019.1399
On 20 June 2018, the Federal Energy Department issued the formal closure decision and1395 - SSM, “New emergency and planning zones are introduced around Swedish nuclear power plants”, 18 June 2020,see https://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/en/press/news/2020/new-emergency-and-planning-zones-are-introduced-aroundswedish-nuclear-power-plants/, accessed 20 July 2020.
1396 - Ibidem.
1397 - SFOE/BFE, “Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik 2019/Statistique Suisse de l’Électricité 2019”, Swiss Federal Office ofEnergy, June 2019 (in German and French), see https://www.bfe.admin.ch/bfe/de/home/versorgung/statistik-und-geodaten/
energiestatistiken/elektrizitaetsstatistik.exturl.html/aHR0cHM6Ly9wdWJkYi5iZmUuYWRtaW4uY2gvZGUvcHVibGljYX/
Rpb24vZG93bmxvYWQvMTAxMTI=.html, accessed 3 August 2020. The official national figures vary slightly from the IAEA-PRIS
statistics.
1398 - NIW, “Switzerland—Briefs”, 1 November 2013.
1399 - BKW, “Kernkraftwerk Mühleberg geht am 20. Dezember 2019 definitiv vom Netz—Endgültige Einstellung desLeistungsbetriebs”, Press Release, 2 March 2016 (in German), see https://www.bkw.ch/en/about-us/newsroom/details/kernkraftwerkmuehleberg-geht-am-20-dezember-2019-definitiv-vom-netz, accessed 15 June 2016.

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granted a general decommissioning license.1400 The closure date of the Mühleberg nuclear unit
was respected with Swiss precision and the reactor was disconnected from the grid on thetarget date.
Figure 67 · Age Distribution of the Swiss Nuclear Fleet

Age of Swiss Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

3
Reactor Age
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over1
4 Reactors
Mean Age
44.3 Years

50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

On 21 May 2017, 58 percent of Swiss voters agreed to the Energy Strategy 2050 that provides
a long-term policy framework based on the dynamic development of energy efficiency andrenewable energies. The strategy does not fix any closure dates for nuclear power plants andaims to keep the existing reactors operating “as long as they are safe”. However, it prohibits
the construction of new nuclear power plants and the reprocessing of spent fuel. The “totallyrevised energy legislation” was adopted by the Swiss parliament on 1 November 2017 andentered into force on 1 January 2018.1401
The legislation is comprehensive, providing a framework for grid development regulation,
renewable energy incentives, auto-consumption, energy efficiency and the “organic phaseout” of nuclear power. The efficiency targets are ambitious, with reduction of per-capita energy
consumption levels—compared to the 2000 baseline—by 16 percent by 2020 and 43 percent by
2035, while per-capita electricity consumption is to decrease by 3 percent by the end of 2020
and 13 percent by 2035. According to the “Energy Strategy 2050 Monitoring Report 2019”, final
energy consumption per capita (weather-adjusted) had decreased by 17.2 percent as of the endof 2018, while per-capita power consumption had decreased by 6.4 percent—as in the previous
year, both indicators are already exceeding the 2020 targets.1402 In addition, per-capita power
consumption decreased by another 1.5 percent in 2019, so Switzerland has again demonstrated
that significantly more ambitious targets would be achievable.
1400 - UVEK/DETEC, “Verfügung des Eidgenössischen Departements für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation UVEK vom
20. Juni 2018—betreffend Gesuch vom 18. Dezember 2015 auf Anordnung der Stilllegung für das Kernkraftwerk Mühleberg”, Federal
Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, 20 June 2018, see https://www.bkw.ch/fileadmin/user_
upload/17_Stilllegung/2015/2018.06.20_Stilllegungsverf%C3%BCgung_KKM_Internet.pdf, accessed 13 August 2020.
1401 - SFOE, “Wichtigste Neuerungen im Energierecht ab 2018”, Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2 November 2017 (in German),see https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/50166.pdf, accessed 12 July 2018.
1402 - SFOE, “Energy Strategy 2050—Monitoring Report 2019”, Abridged Version, Swiss Federal Office of Energy,
November 2019, see https://www.bfe.admin.ch/bfe/en/home/supply/statistics-and-geodata/monitoring-energy-strategy-2050.
html, accessed 19 September 2020; and SFOE, “Stratégie Énergétique 2050—Rapport de Monitoring 2019/Energiestrategie 2050—
Monitoring-Bericht 2019”, November 2019 (in French and German).

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Domestic production of non-hydro renewable-energy based electricity is to reach a modest
target of 4.4 TWh by 2020, which was almost achieved in 2019 with 4.2 TWh and represents
only 5.8 percent of the net power generated.1403
The demand to significantly increase the targets for renewables is therefore a logical point ofpublic demand in the ongoing debate around a new energy bill. The government has decided
to liberalize the electricity market and adapt the energy legislation accordingly. It has statedthat a key goal of the reform would be to stimulate distributed renewable energies, includingcollective auto-consumer and energy-coop schemes.1404
An August-2019 study into the potential effects of a major nuclear accident in one of the thenfive operating Swiss and four French reactors at Bugey concluded:
The average number of people to be resettled in Europe would range between 250,000 and
500,000 (from the least impacting nuclear power plant to the most impacting one). Such asituation could be unmanageable by governmental bodies.
Sixthly, the surface of grazing and crop lands that would be unavailable in Europe – dependingon the nuclear power plant – would represent between 16,000 to 37,000 km2 – in comparison
with Switzerland’s surface area (41,285 km2).1405

In particular the safety of Beznau-1, the eldest of the Swiss reactors, continues to raise concerns.
In November 2019, two senior nuclear experts with respectively 35 and 25 years of experienceat the German Öko-Institut and both members of various advisory government committees,
released an assessment of the safety case of the Beznau-1 reactor pressure vessel prior to its
restart after a three-year outage (see previous WNISR editions for details). Their judgement
is severe: wrong measuring technology, innovative, untested and unqualified methodology
to prove origin of defects and numerous uncertainties in the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety
Inspectorate’s (ENSI) conclusion that over 3,000 discovered material defects would not haveany effect on the embrittlement of the vessel.1406
ENSI replied half a year after the publication and claimed the Öko-Institut study would becontaining “gross mistakes and false statements” and postulated that “the reactor pressure
vessel of the nuclear power plant Beznau-1 is safe”.1407 It is precisely the absolute nature of the
ENSI judgement that the Öko-Institut experts question in their response:
The reactor pressure vessel of a nuclear power plant must not fail. (…) The reactor pressure
vessel [RPV] however shows a high level of embrittlement and, in addition, material defects.

1403 - SFOE, “Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik 2019/Statistique Suisse de l’Électricité 2019”, op. cit.
1404 - UVEK/DETEC, “Bundesrat will einheimische erneuerbare Energien stärken und Strommarkt öffnen”, 3 April 2020, Federal
Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, see https://www.uvek.admin.ch/uvek/de/home/uvek/
medien/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-78665.html, accessed 3 August 2020.
1405 - Frédéric-Paul Piguet et al., “Modeling of a Major Accident in Five Nuclear Power Plants From 365 Meteorological Situationsin Western Europe and Analysis of the Potential Impacts on Populations, Soils and Affected Countries”, Institut Biosphère, Geneva,
27 August 2019.
1406 - Simone Mohr and Christian Küppers, “Materialfehler im hochversprödeten Reaktordruckbehälter des Kernkraftwerks Beznau
Block 1— Stellungnahme zum Sicherheitsbericht der Axpo, zum Review des ENSI und zum Assessment des IRP bezüglich desSicherheitsnachweises des Reaktordruckbehälters von Beznau 1”, commissioned by Greenpeace Switzerland and SES, 28 June 2019; also
Simon Banholzer, “Öko-Institut zweifelt am Sicherheitsnachweis von Beznau I”, SES, 6 November 2019 (in German), see https://www.
energiestiftung.ch/medienmitteilung/oeko-institut-zweifelt-am-sicherheitsnachweis-von-beznau-i.html, accessed 10 August 2020.
1407 - ENSI, “NGO-Kritik am KKW Beznau ist unhaltbar”, Eidgenössisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat, 4 June 2020,see https://www.ensi.ch/de/2020/06/04/ngo-kritik-am-kkw-beznau-ist-unhaltbar/, accessed 10 August 2020.

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Furthermore, a methodology and approaches were chosen for the safety case, which havebeen implemented for the first time worldwide.1408

Therefore, the experts say, the comprehensibility of the assessment needs to be fully guaranteed
for third parties, which is not the case.
Meanwhile, Switzerland continues to struggle with the implementation of a credible
independent national nuclear regulator. On 24 June 2020, Martin Zimmermann resigned
from his position as Chairman of the Board of the national safety authority ENSI as of theend of the month. His decision was “triggered by accusations of a lack of independence thathave been expressed in the media as well as in procedural requests”, according to a statementby the ENSI Board.1409 Ten days earlier, the online service Infosperber had revealed that the
top nuclear safety official had been an active member of the Nuklearforum, “the propaganda
organization of the nuclear lobby” between 2017, when he was first appointed to the ENSI
board and 1 January 2020, when he took the Chair.1410 He had not disclosed the membershipto the Energy Ministry prior to his nomination. The demonstrated lack of independence led
to two parliamentary initiatives and an NGO-driven public outcry, leaving little choice for
Zimmermann but to step down. The Berner Zeitung gave it the headline “And Again the Highest
Nuclear Watchdog Resigns”, as in 2011, a predecessor of Zimmermann had to leave—for thesame reason.1411
In a December 2019 paper, the Swiss Energy Foundation (SES) analyzed the drivers for the
Mühleberg closure and the continued operation of the other four reactors. It concludes thatwhile the Mühleberg owners soon after 3/11 had developed a strategy to abandon their unit,
the other nuclear utilities’ strategies never considered a nuclear phase-out as a potential goal.
“However, today, only the hope for higher power prices appear to justify this strategy,” theauthors conclude.1412

United Kingdom
See United Kingdom Focus.

1408 - Öko-Institut e.V., “Stellungnahme des Öko-Instituts zu den Kommentaren des ENSI vom 20.05.2020”, 15 July 2020 (in German),see https://www.energiestiftung.ch/medienmitteilung/akw-beznau-ensi-weicht-zentraler-kritik-aus.html, accessed 10 August 2020.
1409 - ENSI, “Martin Zimmermann to stand down as Chairman of the ENSI Board at the end of June 2020”, 25 June 2020,see https://www.ensi.ch/en/2020/06/25/martin-zimmermann-to-stand-down-as-chairman-of-the-ensi-board-at-the-end-of-june-2020/,
accessed 6 August 2020.
1410 - Kurt Marti, “Die atomare Vergangenheit des obersten Atomaufsehers”, Infosperber, 15 June 2020 (in German),see https://www.infosperber.ch/Umwelt/Oberste-Atomaufsicht-Der-Bock-wird-zum-Gartner, accessed 6 August 2020.
1411 - Stefan Häne, “Zweifel an Glaubwürdigkeit – Und wieder tritt der oberste Atomaufseher zurück”, Berner Zeitung,
25 June 2020 (in German), see https://www.bernerzeitung.ch/und-wieder-tritt-der-oberste-atomaufseher-zurueck-387124148865,
accessed 6 August 2020.
1412 - Simon Banholzer et al., “Treiber für Stillegungsentscheide in der Schweizer Atomindustrie”, SES, 18 December 2019.

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Bulgaria
In Bulgaria, nuclear power provided 15.9 TWh or 37.5 percent of the country’s electricity in 2019,
down from a maximum of 47.3 percent in 2002, which is produced by two VVER-1000 reactors
at Kozloduy. Originally, there were six reactors on site, but the oldest four (VVER‑440 v230)
were closed as part of the agreement for Bulgaria to join the E.U. The two VVER‑1000 reactors(Units 5 and 6), that started up in 1987 and 1991 respectively, are undergoing a relicensing
program intending to try and extend their operating lifetimes for up to 60 years, comparedto their initial 30-year license. In 2017, Unit 5 was awarded an additional 10-year operating
life, to enable it to continue operating until 2027, and in October 2019, Unit 6, was granted
a license until 2029. It is reported that the total cost of the two-unit extension program was
BGN292 million (US$163 million).1413 In December 2019, the Russian fuel company TVEL
announced that it had signed a five-year fuel-supply contract until 2025. This is despiteprevious requests from the EU for diversification of nuclear fuel supply in Bulgaria.1414
There have been ongoing attempts since the mid-1980s to build another nuclear power plant
at Belene in Northern Bulgaria, but so far, all of them failed. In March 2019, the Government
announced that it was preparing to select a single strategic investor for the project and started atender procedure1415, which officially started after publication in the EU Official Journal. Initialinterest has been expressed by China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and Rosatom.
In December 2019 during a visit to the U.S. by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov conversations
were held with President Trump about the construction of Belene, including the supply of
turbines by American firms.1416 The same month, the Bulgarian Government announced thatfive companies had been shortlisted for negotiations, namely CNNC, Korea Hydro & Nuclear
Power (KHNP) and Rosatom’s subsidiary Atomenergoprom, although Russia very much sees
the project as its own. Two companies, Framatome and General Electric (GE) were shortlisted
to supply either the project’s turbine island (GE) or Instrumentation and Control – I&C(Framatome) rather than the whole reactor.
The finalists were expected to submit binding bids by the end of January 2020.1417 The
Government announced that investors would be able to negotiate electricity purchases withcompanies seeking to acquire minority stakes in Belene. At the end of the deadline, thedirector of the nuclear regulator held a press conference and stated that no application had
been received from any company and that it would take months to review any application,

1413 - WNN, “Kozloduy unit 6 clear to operate for another 10 years”, 2 October 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Kozloduy-unit-6-clear-to-operate-for-another-10-ye, accessed 14 April 2020.
1414 - NEI, “Russia to supply fuel to Kozloduy NPP until 2025”, 5 December 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsrussia-to-supply-fuel-to-kozloduy-npp-until-2025-7541032/, accessed 14 April 2020.
1415 - Ministry of Energy, “Launch of the procedure for a strategic investor for ‘Belene’ NPP project”, Press Release, Republic of
Bulgaria, 11 March 2019, see https://www.me.government.bg/en/theme-news/startira-procedurata-za-izbor-na-strategicheskiinvestitor-po-proekta-aec-belene-2706-m0-a0-1.html, accessed 12 May 2020.
1416 - Gary Peach, “Newbuild. Bulgaria Forced to Balance US, Russian Interests”, NIW, 6 December 2019.
1417 - NIW, “Weekly Roundup: Bulgaria Announces Finalists for Belene”, 20 December 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 undermining the Government’s previous claiming that the project could be licensed at thestart of 2020.1418
The state has reserved the right to have a blocking minority in a future project company.1419
However, as a result of the global pandemic the Government had been unable to fully access all
the bids, with delays of at least a month expected, although Reuters reported that the Russian,Chinese and Korean bids were to include an investment pledge of €10 billion (US$10.7 billion)
for the completion of the units, while the French and U.S. bids were to provide equipment aswell as financing.1420 However, questions have been raised as to the economic viability of the
project, with electricity prices the lowest in Europe and the parliamentary decision prohibiting
the state from granting such guarantees; therefore, without substantial changes, it is difficult
to see how the project could proceed.1421

Czech Republic
The Czech Republic has six Russian-designed reactors in operation at two sites, Dukovany andTemelín. The former houses four VVER-440 v213 reactors, the latter two VVER‑1000 v320
units. In 2019, nuclear plants generated 28.6 TWh or 35.2 percent of the electricity, practicallyequivalent to the 28.3 TWh or 34.5 percent in 2018.
The country was a net exporter of 13.1 TWh of electricity in 2019, equivalent to around half ofthe nuclear output, comparable to the output of Temelín. Czech electricity exports strongly
increased to this level after Temelín was brought to the grid in 2000 and have been roughly
stable ever since.
The Dukovany units were started up during 1985–87 and have already undergone a lifetimeextension upgrading-program under the expectation they would operate until 2025. In
March 2016, the state regulator extended the operating license of Dukovany-1 indefinitely 1422,
with a similar request granted for Unit 2 in July 2017 and for Units 3 and 4 in January 2018.
However, in February 2018, the head of the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety, Dana
Drábová,1423 said that there was pressure from the EU to restrict the operation life of thereactors to 40 years.1424 Furthermore, the fact that the lifetime extension was decided without
an environmental impact assessment is contested by Czech and Austrian NGOs under the
Espoo and Aarhus Conventions.
1418 - NIW, “Briefs – Bulgaria”, 17 January 2020.
1419 - NEI, “Five companies shortlisted for Belene NPP”, 24 December 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsfive-companies-shortlisted-for-belene-npp-7569814, accessed 26 December 2019.
1420 - Tsvetelia Tsolova, “Bulgaria delays deadline for Belene nuclear project bids”, Reuters, 22 March 2020,see https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N2BF0DR, accessed 22 March 2020.
1421 - Gary Peach, “Newbuild. Bulgaria Forced to Balance US, Russian Interests”, NIW, 6 December 2019.
1422 - NucNet, “Dukovany-2 And -3 To Undergo Extended Checks On Pipe Welds”, 13 May 2016, see https://www.nucnet.org/all-thenews/2016/05/13/dukovany-2-and-3-to-undergo-extended-checks-on-pipe-welds, accessed 15 May 2020.
1423 - ČEZ, “ČEZ Group Annual Report 2017”, 2018, see https://www.cez.cz/edee/content/file/investori/vz-2017/vz-2017-en.pdf,
accessed 15 May 2020.
1424 - NEI, “Czech Republic under European pressure over Dukovany”, 26 February 2018, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/
newsczech-republic-under-european-pressure-over-dukovany-6065809/, accessed 15 May 2020.

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Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 This did not prevent ČEZ, the state-owned operator, from announcing three months laterplans to prolong the lifetime of the Temelín power plant to 60 years.1425
Over the past two decades the Government and industry have announced new initiatives tobuild additional reactors, the most recent round of which was in May 2018. It was reported
that the government had postponed a decision saying it needed more time to evaluate theimpact on its budget and find out EU views on state aid for such a project.1426 In January 2019,
special nuclear envoy Ján Štuller was replaced by former ČEZ CEO Jaroslav Míl1427, followed bya government announcement in February 2019 that it was willing to give a contract to ČEZ tobuild further units at Dukovany, but without a guaranteed purchase price for electricity. On
13 November 2019, the Czech parliamentary committee for the construction of new nuclear
resources approved the construction of the Dukovany-2 nuclear plant.1428 Subsequently, Prime
Minister Andrej Babis said that they would start construction in 2029 with first power in 2036.
This would require holding a tender in 2021 and select a vendor by the end of 2022, two years
ahead of the previous tentative schedule.1429
Minister of Industry Karel Havlicek told reporters in February 2020 that by the end of 2022,
the supplier should be selected.1430 In March 2020, ČEZ submitted an application to the State
Office for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB) for permission to construct two new 1200 MW units at the
Dukovany site. In June 2020, the government announced that it had agreed a financing model
whereby the government will provide a loan covering 70 percent of the project’s approximate
US$6 billion price tag, while CEZ will have to front the remaining 30 percent. The government
said it was their intention to launch a tender later in 2020.1431
The government is expected to prepare draft contracts with ČEZ and its project company
subsidiary that would establish a long-term (30-40 years) offtake agreement from theprospective newbuild, in order to give the project greater financial security. It is also suggested
that the Government is prepared to guarantee the project’s legislative and regulatory risks sothat if a subsequent government were to phase out nuclear power, it would be committed tobuy the project and reimburse the investor’s expenses.1432 It is not yet clear how the contracts
between the state and ČEZ will be drawn up to provide such guarantees to ČEZ and minority
shareholders.
As with other European countries the COVID-19 pandemic has affected power consumption.
Analysis from Carbon Brief suggests that during April 2020 power demand was down by
1425 - Chris Johnstone, “Czech power giant bolsters arguments for 60 year lifespan of nuclear plants”, Radio Praha, 11 May 2018,see http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/czech-power-giant-bolsters-arguments-for-60-year-lifespan-of-nuclear-plants,
accessed 15 May 2020.
1426 - Jan Lopatka, “Czechs put off decision on building new nuclear plants”, Reuters, 17 May 2018, see https://uk.reuters.com/article/
uk-czech-nuclearpower/czechs-put-off-decision-on-building-new-nuclear-plants-idUKKCN1II2SD, accessed 15 May 2020.
1427 - Prague Daily Monitor, “Jaroslav Míl appointed Special Envoy for Nuclear Energy”, 8 January 2019,see http://praguemonitor.com/2019/01/08/jaroslav-m%C3%Adl-appointed-special-envoy-nuclear-energy, accessed 15 May 2020.
1428 - NEI, “Czech Republic approves new unit for Dukovany”, 18 November 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsczech-republic-approves-new-unit-for-dukovany-7513325/, accessed 18 April 2020.
1429 - NIW, “Briefs - Czech Republic”, 15 November 2019.NIW, “Briefs – Czech Republic”, 15 November 2019.
1430 - NEI, “ČEZ applies to build new nuclear units at Dukovany”, 30 March 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newscez-applies-to-build-new-nuclear-units-at-dukovany-7844971/, accessed 14 April 2020.
1431 - Gary Peach, “Prague Announces 70% Financing for Dukovany”, NIW, 5 June 2020.
1432 - Phil Chaffee, “Prague Advances Dukovany Plans”, NIW, 1 May 2020.

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11 percent compared to the same period in 2019. This combined with higher production fromrenewables—in the Czech Republic and the EU as a whole—has further squeezed the market
for fossil fuels and nuclear power.1433 This increasingly challenges the economics of nuclear
power, as, due to their inflexibility they cannot respond to price signals from the market andthus will continue to operate even when it is uneconomic to do so. In response to low power
demand the outage from Dukovany-3 was extended.1434

Hungary
Hungary has one nuclear power plant, at Paks, where four VVER-440 v213 reactors provided
a stable 15.4 TWh or 49.2 percent of the country’s electricity in 2019. The nuclear share in
the national power mix is down from 53.6 percent in 2014. The reactors started operation
1982–1987 and have been the subject of engineering works to enable their operation for up
to 50 years (compared to their initial 30-year license). The first unit received permission tooperate for another 20 years in 2012, the second unit in 2014, the third in 2016 and the fourthin December 2017, enabling operation until the mid-2030s.
In March 2009, the Parliament approved a government decision-in-principle to build additional
reactors and a tender was prepared according to European rules. In 2014, the Paks II project
was suddenly awarded to Rosatom without reference to the public tender, with Russia financing
80 percent of the project in loans.1435 In February 2017, during a visit to Hungary, Russia’s
President Putin confirmed that it was willing to fund 100 percent of the estimated €12 billion(US$12.9 billion) investment.1436 The Russian-Hungarian bilateral financing agreement
proposed at the time consisted of a €10 billion (US$11.3 billion) loan to the Hungarian state, tobe repaid starting in 2026, irrespective whether the project will be online at that time. Hungary
itself will have to invest 20 percent or €2 billion (US$2.3 billion) into the project.
In November 2016, the European Commission cleared the award of the contract to Rosatomof any infringement on its procurement rules. In March 2017, the European Commission
also approved the financial package for Paks II.1437 However, in February 2018 the Austrian
Government challenged the validity of the decision, which is still under review by the European
Court of Justice.1438 The legal challenge has subsequently been supported by the Luxembourg
Government.

1433 - Dave Jones, “Analysis: Coronavirus has cut CO2 from Europe’s electricity system by 39%”, Carbon Brief, 29 April 2020,see https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-coronavirus-has-cut-co2-from-europes-electricity-system-by-39-per-cent,accessed 18 May 2020.
1434 - WNA, “COVID-19 Coronavirus and Nuclear Energy”, 12 May 2020, see https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/covid-19-coronavirus-and-nuclear-energy.aspx, accessed 18 May 2020.
1435 - Krisztina Than, “Special Report: Inside Hungary’s $10.8 billion nuclear deal with Russia”, Reuters, 30 March 2015,see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-europe-hungary-specialreport-idUSKBN0MQ0MP20150330, accessed 15 May 2020.
1436 - NIW, “Briefs – Hungary”, 3 February 2017.
1437 - European Commission, “State Aid—Hungary—SA.38454 (2015/C) (ex 2015/N)— Possible aid to the Paks nuclear power
station”, Official Journal of the European Union, 12 January 2016, see https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/669cd986-b8fd-11e5-8d3c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en, accessed 15 May 2020.
1438 - WNN, “Austria takes EC to court over Paks decision”, 23 February 2018,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Austria-takes-EC-to-court-over-Paks-decision-2302184.html, accessed 15 May 2020.

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The plant was granted an environmental license in September 2016, and in March 2017 the
Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority approved the site license for the new construction.1439
However, since then, there has been increasing concerns over the impact of hotter summers
on the cooling water availability due to higher water temperatures from the Danube
river, especially if both Paks I and II are in operation. Within the (Environmental Impact
Assessment) EIA process the solution to this problem was to reduce output from the plants
when cooling water availability was limited, which would affect the economics of the project
and the demand-supply grid balance.1440
In early 2018 reports suggested that a construction permit was expected by mid-20181441 and the
project to be completed in 2024–2025. In June 2019, a ceremony was held with representatives ofRosatom to mark the start of the erection of buildings at the site.1442 In October 2019, Rosatom
handed over the project technical documents.1443 On 30 June 2020, Paks II Ltd. submitted theconstruction license application to the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA). The
regulatory procedure started its assessment the next day and HAEA has 12 months that canbe extended by an additional three months to make known its views.1444 If all did go according
to plan, site preparation would take an additional 18 months, therefore construction is tostart in mid-2022, some six years after the Hungarian and Russian Government signed theintergovernmental agreements. Power production is therefore likely to be in 2030, rather thanthe 2025 originally envisaged. It has been noted that neither government is pressing for the
project to proceed. Russia, where the economy is suffering, awarded the project a fixed pricecontract that “might no longer be favorable”, while in Hungary cheaper solar deployment is
rapidly highlighting the high costs of Paks II, which would be borne by the taxpayers.1445

Romania
Romania has one nuclear power plant at Cernavoda, where two Canadian-designed CANadian
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors are in operation. In 2019, they provided a stable
10.4 TWh or 18.5 percent of the country’s electricity, compared to 20.6 percent in 2009.
The reactors are the only CANDU reactors operating in Europe. Construction started between
1982 and 1987 initially on five reactors. Unit 1 was completed in 1996, and Unit 2 started up in
2007, respectively 14 and 24 years after construction started. The two units were partly fundedby the Canadian Export Development Corporation, the second also partly by the Euratom
1439 - NIW, “Briefs – Hungary”, 31 March 2017.
1440 - Gary Peach, “Five Years on, Hungary’s Paks Expansion Stumbles Along”, NIW, 8 February 2019.
1441 - WNA, “Nuclear power in Hungary”, Updated June 2019,see http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/hungary.aspx, accessed 15 May 2020.
1442 - Rosatom, “The first construction and installation work launches at the construction base of the Paks-2 NPP (Hungary)”,
Press Release, 20 June 2019, see https://www.rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/the-first-construction-and-installation-work-launchesat-the-construction-base-of-the-paks-2-npp-hun/, accessed 15 May 2020.
1443 - Tamas Szilagyi, “Hungarian government acknowledges delay at Paks nuclear power plant”, bne IntelliNews, 20 November 2019,see http://www.intellinews.com/hungarian-government-acknowledges-delay-at-paks-nuclear-power-plant-171884/.
1444 - Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, “Paks II. Ltd. submitted the construction license application to the HAEA”, 30 June 2020,see http://www.oah.hu/web/v3/HAEAportal.nsf/web?OpenAgent&article=news&uid=5B9108F378B8DFBCC1258597003BF3DE,
accessed 5 July 2020.
1445 - Gary Peach, “Exorbitant Costs, Solar Energy Remove Luster From Paks II”, NIW, 22 May 2020.

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Loan Facility. As with other CANDU reactors, major refurbishment will be needed after longer
operation, and in January 2020 a US$10.8 million contract was signed with Candu Energy,
part of the Canadian SNC-Lavalin Group, to undertake engineering analysis and assessmentson the fuel channels to enable Unit 1 to operate until a large scale refurbishment expected in
2026.1446
As with other countries, the operation of Cernavoda has been affected by the COVID-19
pandemic and in April 2020, the planned overhaul of Unit 1 has been delayed. This would havebeen done during a planned maintenance which is performed every two years, during May andJune and usually last 30 days. It is unclear when it will be undertaken now.1447
Various foreign companies have been involved in the attempts to revive the construction ofUnits 3, 4 and 5. The latest attempt was launched in cooperation with CGN, which signed a letterof intent in November 2013 with the Cernavoda operator, state-owned electricity producer
Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica (SNN) to complete the projects in 2019 and 2020. Thiswas followed in November 2015, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
between Nuclearelectrica and CGN for the construction, operation and decommissioningof Units 3 and 4. The MoU also included agreements on investments, and, remarkably, CGN
was to be the majority share owner of the project with at least 51 percent of the shares.1448 In
January 2016, the Romania Government formally expressed support for the project. The costof the completion of two reactors with 720 MW each was expected to be US$7.8 billion.1449
However, by late 2017, the Government admitted that negotiations needed to be restarted, witha hope that a binding investment agreement would be signed by February or March 2018,1450 a
deadline which has again been missed.
In January 2020 the Government announced that it would cancel the deal and Prime Minister
Ludovic Orban stated, that “the partnership with the Chinese company is not going to work”.1451
Some of the reasons given for the collapse of the project are the increasing concerns in the U.S.
about relations with China. Energy Minister Virgil Popescu highlighted the country’s ties toboth the U.S. and E.U. and said that the press in both places “abounds with information on theaccusation of the Chinese company CGN for spying on the American territory”.1452
The Government has not abandoned the project and is said to be looking for additional partners.
It is suggested that one of the reasons why the partnership with China has been abandoned isthe signing of a nuclear co-operation agreement with the U.S. signed in August 2019.1453

1446 - NEI, “Romania cancels China deal on Cernavoda but proceeds with life extension”, 24 January 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsromania-cancels-china-deal-on-cernavoda-but-proceeds-with-life-extension-7653710/,
accessed 23 April 2020.
1447 - SEE Energy News, “Romania: Maintenance of NPP Cernavoda’s unit 1 postponed”, Serbia SEE Energy Mining News,
10 April 2020, see https://serbia-energy.eu/romania-maintenance-of-npp-cernavodas-unit-1-postponed/, accessed 18 May 2020.
1448 - Romania Insider, “Romania and China seal deal for Cernavoda nuclear plant expansion”, 9 May 2019,see https://www.romania-insider.com/index.php/romania-china-seal-deal-nuclear-plant, accessed 15 May 2020.
1449 - WNN, “Romania expresses support for China’s role at Cernavoda”, 25 January 2016, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/
NN-Romania-expresses-support-for-China-role-at-Cernavoda-25011601.html, accessed 15 May 2020.
1450 - Phil Chaffee, “Romania: Can SNN end stalemate with CGN over Cernavoda ?”, NIW, 22 September 2017.
1451 - NEI, “Romania Cancels China Deal on Cernavoda but Proceeds with Life Extension”, 24 January 2020, op. cit.
1452 - Phil Chaffee, “Political Risk: CGN Faces Headwinds in Europe”, NIW, 24 January 2020.
1453 - NEI, “Romania Cancels China Deal on Cernavoda but Proceeds with Life Extension”, 24 January 2020, op. cit.

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Slovakia
In Slovakia, the state utility Slovenské Elektrárne (SE) operates two nuclear sites, Jaslovské
Bohunice, which houses two operating VVER-440 v213 units, and Mochovce, which has two
similar reactors. In 2019, their production increased to 14.3 TWh or 54 percent of the country’s
electricity, compared to 13.8 TWh and 55 percent in 2018.
The country has three permanently closed reactors at the Bohunice site. The A-1, a small
92 MW unit which started operation in 1972 was closed in 1977 following an accident. The
other two VVER-440 v230 reactors were closed in 2006 and 2008, as part of an agreement by
the G7 in Munich 1992 implemented in the agreement to join the European Union in 2004.
Units 1 and 2 at the Mochovce plant were started up in 1998 and 2000 respectively. In
October 2004, the Italian national utility ENEL (Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica)
acquired a 66 percent stake in SE and, as part of its bid, proposed to invest nearly €2 billion(US$2.7 billion) in new nuclear generating capacity, including completion of the third andfourth blocks of Mochovce, whose construction originally began in January 1985.
In February 2007, SE announced that it was proceeding with the completion of Mochovce-3
and -4 and that ENEL had agreed to invest €1.8 billion (US$20072.6 billion). According to the
IAEA’s PRIS, construction restarted in June 2009, and, at the time, the units were expected togenerate power in 2012 and 2013 respectively.1454
Towards the end of 2014, ENEL announced it was seeking to sell its share in SE and had received
several non-binding bids. In December 2015, Czech holding EPH (Energeticky a Prumyslovy
Holding) was revealed as the winner of the bid, with a preliminary price of €750 million(US$812 million). Under the deal, ENEL got €150 million (US$171 million) in the first stage, inwhich EPH received a share of 33 percent in the company, the remaining share and final priceto be agreed one year after Mochovce is completed.1455
The construction project was beset with problems, and by May 2016, the estimate for the total
costs of completion had risen to €5.1 billion (US$5.72016 billion), with completion at the end of
2016/early 2017.1456 In March 2017, SE announced a considerable further delay in the projectwith operation expected only at the end of 2018 and 2019 for Units 3 and 4, respectively. Thisis an additional two years of construction, while the officially expected cost increase was only
€300 million (US$333 million).1457 As of early 2018, completion of the projects was still expected
at the end of 2018 and 2019 respectively.1458 In June 2018, the Slovak Prime Minister himself
raised doubts, if the latest schedule would be met, as he stated that “a number of problems

1454 - ENEL, “ENEL Starts Site Works at Mochovce 3–4”, Press Release, Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica, 3 November 2008,
see https://servizi.enel.it/eWCM/salastampa/comunicati_eng/1594888-1_PDF-1.pdf, accessed 15 May 2020.
1455 - Reuters, “Enel sells stake in Slovak power group, including nuclear plant, to EPH”, 18 December 2015, see https://www.reuters.
com/article/slovakia-enel-eph/enel-sells-stake-in-slovak-power-group-including-nuclear-plant-to-eph-idUSL8N14657L20151218,
accessed 15 May 2020.
1456 - Spravy Pravda, “Ďalšie peniaze na Mochovce? Žiga nemá oficiálnu informáciu // Additional money for Mochovce ?”, 5 May 2016
(in Slovak), see http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/392783-dalsie-peniaze-na-mochovce-ziga-nema-oficialnu-informaciu/,
accessed 15 May 2020.
1457 - WNN, “Slovak utility increases Mochovce expansion budget”, 31 March 2017, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NNSlovak-utility-increases-Mochovce-expansion-budget-31031701.html, accessed 15 May 2020.
1458 - NIW, “Briefs–Slovakia”, 16 February 2018.

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arose during construction, and even now this makes us doubt whether this year’s deadline forthe third unit is realistic.”1459
In April 2019, Mochovce-3 completed “hot testing” in preparation for fuel loading in thesummer, although the regulatory process could at that time still take eight months. A new
delay was reported to add an estimated €270 million (US$305 million) to the cost of the
Mochovce-3 and -4 project, representing a 5 percent increase in costs, and bringing total costs to€5.4 billion (US$6.1 billion).1460 However, in September 2019 it was announced that the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority (UJD) would require further modifications prior to fuel loading.1461
In January 2020 it was announced that the nuclear regulator had found two deficiencies in
Unit 3 following a second round of hot testing. The regulator highlighted reduced insulation
resistance in the four electric heaters of the pressurizer, and reduced air quality in the hermetic
zone, “probably due to vapors from applied coatings.” SE had to submit a plan for corrective
action.1462
Fuel loading has been further delayed, and prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was expected
at the beginning of the summer of 2020. “In the worst case, it will be the end of 2020” said
Branislav Strýček, CEO of SE.1463 However, this schedule must be in doubt, as due to social
distancing measures the number of workers allowed on the site halved in March.1464 The
National regulator said that “it is impossible to estimate a precise delay for commissioningof the third nuclear unit. It will depend on the results of the ongoing inspections of thematerial and the extent of the measures that may be required.”1465 In June 2020, it announced afurther of six month “extension of the period for decision in the administrative proceeding for
authorization for commissioning of nuclear installation of the Unit 3 - NPP Mochovce”.1466 In
June 2019, the TVEL Fuel Company, part of Rosatom, had agreed to fuel the Slovak reactors forthe next five years, with the possibility of a contract extension to 2030.
On 15 April 2019, the Slovak anti-corruption police raided several SE offices, including thoseat Mochovce, and arrested the former CEO of Slovenské Elektrárne, Paolo Ruzzini, andNicola Cotugno, former Mochovce director and Ruzzini’s successor at SE on corruption
charges. Both were involved in the privatization of SE to ENEL in 2004 and responsible for1459 - NIW, “Slovakia: Are Mochovce’s Headaches Over ?”, 8 June 2018.
1460 - WNN, “Mochovce 3 completes commissioning test”, 16 April 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Mochovce-3-completes-commissioning-test, accessed 15 May 2020.
1461 - NEI, “Hot testing of Mohovce 3 revealed the need for further modifications”, 18 September 2019, see https://www.neimagazine.
com/news/newshot-testing-of-mohovce-3-revealed-the-need-for-further-modifications-7413902/, accessed 23 April 2020.
1462 - NIW, “Briefs - Slovakia”, 31 January 2020.
1463 - Slovenske Elektrarne, “Mochovce 3: Nuclear authority issued a draft decision on fuel loading”, 18 February 2020,see https://www.seas.sk/article/mochovce-3-nuclear-authority-issued-a-draft-decision-on-fuel-loading/409, accessed 23 April 2020.
1464 - vEnergetike, “Completion of Mochovce NPP may be delayed again”, Webnoviny.sk, 18 May 2020,see https://www.webnoviny.sk/venergetike/completion-of-mochovce-npp-may-be-delayed-again/, accessed 27 June 2020.
1465 - vEnergetike.sk, “Mochovce NPP will be delayed, UJD confirms”, 26 May 2020,see https://www.webnoviny.sk/venergetike/mochovce-npp-will-be-delayed-ujd-confirms/, accessed 9 June 2020.
1466 - UJD, “Announcement of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic on the extension of the period for decisionin the administrative proceeding for authorization for commissioning of nuclear installation of the Unit 3 - NPP Mochovce”,
Press Release, Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic, 16 June 2020,see https://www.ujd.gov.sk/ujd/www1.nsf/$All/4188834860C1B178C125858B002981AB, accessed 7 August 2020.

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the restart of the Mochovce-3 and -4 construction.1467 Another raid was undertaken 1 year
later, in March 2020, when the national criminal agency entered the Mochovce site looking
into a discrepancy between the “composition, manufacturing process or origin” of certain
components at the reactors and their documentation, relating to one pipe subcontractor.
However, the press reported concerns the investigation could spread to other suppliers, further
delaying startup.1468
In addition to the delays and cost overruns, concerns have been raised about the state of thepower market, with power prices currently at €20–25/MWh (US$21–27/MWh) and electricity
demand following the sluggish economy and the short- and medium-term impact of COVID-19
pandemic. It is expected that, if and when the Mochovce units are completed, their capacity
will mainly be used for export, so given the low electricity prices in the European market, thechance that SE will recover their ever-increasing investment seems slim. According to SE, by
December 2019, Unit 3 was 99.3 percent complete and Unit 4 stood at 87.1 percent.1469
The accession to the Presidency in June 2019 of public interest lawyer Zuzana Čaputová anda landslide change in government in 2020 shed more doubt on how further investments inthe project are to be financed. After the elections held on 29 February 2020, the new Slovak
government is composed of four political parties. With exception of the party Sloboda andSolidarita, the remaining three parties have not been part of a government before and therefore
are less associated with previous corruption schemes. All four parties support the completionof the Mochovce but have mixed positions about further new nuclear projects. The largest
political party, OľaNO (Obyčajní Ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti), aims to amend the current“non-transparency particularly/only in the nuclear sector”.1470 Čaputová is a recipient of theprestigious Goldman Environmental Prize (2016)1471 for her successful campaigning against amajor waste dump.

Slovenia
Slovenia jointly owns the Krsko nuclear power plant with Croatia—a 696-MW Westinghouse
PWR. In 2019, it provided a stable 5.5 TWh or 37 percent of Slovenia’s electricity, a nuclear
share well below the maximum of 42.4 percent in 2005.
The reactor was started in 1981 with an initial operational life of 40 years. In July 2015, anInter-State Commission agreed to extend the plant’s operational life to 60 years, so that it
would continue until 2043, as well as to construct a dry storage facility for the spent fuel. In
1467 - Finweb, “NAKA na letisku zadržala exšéfa Slovenských elektrární. Preverujú podozrenia týkajúce sa Mochoviec”, 15 April 2019
(in Slovak), see https://finweb.hnonline.sk/ekonomika/1924600-naka-na-letisku-zadrzala-exsefa-slovenskych-elektrarni-preverujupodozrenia-tykajuce-sa-mochoviec, accessed 15 May 2020.
1468 - Phil Chaffee, “Slovakia: Police Raid Mochovce New Build”, NIW, 6 March 2020.
1469 - Slovenské elektrárne, “Mochovce 3 & 4 Construction - as of 31 December 2019”, Undated, see “Mochovce 3 and 4 Project
Completion”, 29 April 2018, see https://www.seas.sk/mochovce-3-4-npp, accessed 15 May 2020.
1470 - Centre for Sustainable Alternatives, “Where do new government parties stand on nuclear in Slovakia?”, Nuclear Transparency
Watch, April 2020, see http://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Positions_of_Slovak_political_
parties.pdf, accessed 8 September 2020.
1471 - For more information: The Goldman Environmental Prize, “Zuzana Čaputová—2016 Goldman Prize Recipient”, Undated,
see https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/zuzana-caputova/, accessed 13 June 2020.

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May 2016, a spokeswoman for the operator NEK (Nuklearna Elektrarna Krško) said: “Thelifespan of Krsko has been extended providing that the plant passes a security check every
10 years with the next checks due in 2023 and 2033.”1472 In 2018, the operator announced
around €50 million (US$57 million) worth of investment being planned for 2019, mostly forcompleting safety upgrades and replacing obsolete equipment.1473 The first outage for this wasundertaken in October 2019, with the next scheduled for April 2021, when work is expected tobe completed.1474 This life-time extension was carried out without a prior environmental impact
assessment or public participation, in spite of a court order to carry out such an assessment. It
is currently unclear whether this has any implications.
As part of the co-ownership, Croatia is partly responsible for waste management andits preferred location for storage of the material produced by the Krsko plant is proving
controversial with its neighbors as it is only 1 km from its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina
whose Foreign Minister, in April 2020, characterized the proposal as unacceptable.1475
In January 2010, an application was made by the nuclear operator to the Ministry of Economy
to build an additional unit, but no advancement of the project has been reported ever since.

FORMER SOVIET UNION
Armenia
Armenia has one remaining reactor at the Metsamor nuclear power plant, situated within
30 kilometers of the capital Yerevan. Armenian-2 provided 2 TWh or 27.8 percent of thecountry’s electricity in 2019, about half of the maximum nuclear share of 45 percent in 2009.
Armenia has the lowest lifetime load factor of any nuclear country in the world, averaging
53.6 percent; in 2019, the load factor was a still modest 61.5 percent.
The reactor started generating electricity in January 1980 and is a first-generation, Sovietdesigned reactor, a VVER-440 v270. In December 1988, Armenia suffered a major earthquakethat led to the rapid closure of its two reactors in March 1989. During the early 1990s andfollowing the collapse of the former Soviet Union, a territorial dispute between Armenia andAzerbaijan resulted in an energy blockade that led to significant power shortages, which led to
the Government’s decision in 1993 to re-open Unit 2 at Metsamor. Since 2003, the Metsamor
plant is operated by InterRAO, a subsidiary of Russian Rosatom, as a part of an arrangement to
repay debts to Rosatom’s TVEL fuel supplier.1476
1472 - NEI, “Life extension for Slovenia’s Krslo NPP”, 6 May 2016,see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newslife-extension-for-slovenias-krslo-npp-4885976/, accessed 15 May 2020.
1473 - The Slovenia Times, “Krško nuclear plant operating efficiently, upgrades planned”, 27 November 2018,see http://www.sloveniatimes.com/krsko-nuclear-plant-operating-efficiently-security-upgrade-on-track, accessed 15 May 2020.
1474 - NEI, “Upgrading Krsko”, 15 April 2020, see https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureupgrading-krsko-7874556/,
accessed 23 April 2020.
1475 - Igor Todorovic, “BiH warns Croatia against storing nuclear waste from Krško at border”, Balkan Green Energy News,
3 April 2020, see https://balkangreenenergynews.com/bih-warns-croatia-against-storing-nuclear-waste-from-krsko-at-border/,accessed 23 April 2020.
1476 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in Armenia”, Updated April 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/armenia.aspx, accessed 28 May 2020.

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In October 2012, the Armenia Government announced that it planned to operate Metsamor
until 2026. The lifetime extension was made possible by a Russian loan of US$270 million anda US$30 million grant.1477 In 2011, the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority had granted thereactor an extension of its operating license until 2021, subject to annual safety demonstrations
starting 2016.1478 In June 2020, the Government, citing economic considerations, said it would
only be using 60 percent of the US$270 million of the loan available.1479
In June 2016, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) issued the “EUPeer Review Report of the Armenian Stress Tests”1480 confirming numerous safety-related
problems. In September 2017, the European Commission published its proposed partnershipagreement with Armenia, which included recommendations for co-operation on “the closureand safe decommissioning of Metsamor nuclear power plant and the early adoption of a roadmap or action plan to that effect.”1481 Opposition parties in Turkey called on their Government
in December 2019 through a parliamentary resolution to take steps to resolve the risks posedby Metsamor.1482
In February 2020, Government officials said that they were considering, as part of the country’s
2040 energy strategy, further extending the life of the reactor along with measures to increase
its output by 12-15 percent.1483 In March 2019, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that
there were no plans to close Metsamor and that “we will extend the lifecycle of the nuclear
power station as long as possible, although it is clear that it cannot work forever.”1484
In March 2020, the European Commission published a Communication proposing a new“Eastern Partnership Policy Beyond 2020”, which included recommendations on energy policy
and nuclear power. The proposal notes that diversification of fuel supply is necessary, notably
via renewable energy sources. Furthermore, it acknowledges that countries may choose nuclear
power but that “the EU’s forerunner role in binding nuclear legislation will be the basis offurther bilateral exchanges. We will continue to organize nuclear stress test peer reviews andfollow-up activities”.1485

1477 - NEI, “Armenian NPP to close for refurb”, 21 March 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsarmenian-npp-to-close-for-refurb-7054023/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1478 - NEI, “Armenian NPP to close for refurb”, 21 March 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsarmenian-npp-to-close-for-refurb-7054023/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1479 - Azatutyun.am, “Yerevan Snubs Russian Funding for Metsamor Nuclear Plant”, Asbarez, 11 June 2020,see http://asbarez.com/194683/yerevan-snubs-russian-funding-for-metsamor-nuclear-plant/, accessed 27 June 2020.
1480 - ENSREG, “EU Peer Review Report of the Armenia Stress Tests”, June 2016, see http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/
attachments/2016-07-20_4259241_armenia_stress_tests_report-_ensreg_template_final.pdf, accessed 16 May 2020.
1481 - European Commission, “Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Union, of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community and their Member States, of the one part and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part.”, 25 September 2017, see https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-armenia_comprehensive_and_enhanced_partnership_agreement_cepa.pdf, accessed 16 May 2020.
1482 - Emin Avundukluoglu, “Turkey: CHP submits motion on Armenian nuclear plant”, Anadolu Agency, 12 December 2019,see https://www.aa.com.tr/en/environment/turkey-chp-submits-motion-on-armenian-nuclear-plant/1671672, accessed 23 April 2020.
1483 - NEI, “Armenia considers further life extension for Metsamor”, 2 March 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsarmenia-considers-further-life-extension-for-metsamor-7802500/,
accessed 23 April 2020.
1484 - NEI, “Armenian NPP to Close for Refurb”, 21 March 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsarmenian-npp-to-close-for-refurb-7054023/, accessed 18 Mai 2020.
1485 - European Commission, “Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020, Reinforcing Resilience - an Eastern Partnership that delivers
for all”, 18 March 2020.

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In early June 2019, Armenia’s reactor was shut down for substantial repair and upgrade, during
an outage that was scheduled to last for 110 days.1486 In July 2019, the country experienced
widespread blackouts as a result of a drop in the grid frequency.1487 Metsamor has generated
power in the first half of 2020, but it is unclear when it returned to service.
For years, Armenia has been negotiating with Russia for the construction of a new 1000 MW
unit and signed an intergovernmental agreement to that effect in August 2010. Since then,little progress has been made, and there is no clear choice on future technologies, with some
proposing the development of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).1488

BelarusSee Potential Newcomer Countries: section on Belarus.

RussiaIn 2019, nuclear energy contributed 19.7 percent to the country’s electricity mix with anotherrecord production of 195.6 TWh of electricity as new reactors have come online.
However, the past year has been mixed for the Russian nuclear industry. On the one hand, thegrid connection of Novovoronezh 2-2 occurred on 1 May 20191489 with commercial operation
starting on 1 November 20191490; and the grid connection of the two reactors of the floating
nuclear power plant, the Akademik Lomonosov, took place in December 2019 with commercial
operation starting on 22 May 20201491. Consequently, as of mid-2020, 38 reactors are operatingin the Russian Federation and eight are permanently closed.
On the other hand, Russian society has been significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic
and the nuclear sector is no different. Concerns were raised by the head of Rosatom about the
spread of the virus in the three “nuclear cities” which host civil and military nuclear research.1492
Rosatom has said that they are introducing additional measures in their nuclear power plants
domestically and those being built abroad, to “minimise the negative impact this health crisis

1486 - NEI, “Armenian NPP to close for refurb”, 21 March 2019,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsarmenian-npp-to-close-for-refurb-7054023, accessed 25 July 2020.
1487 - RFE/RL, “Power In Armenia ‘Being Gradually Restored’ After Massive Outages”, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty,
10 July 2019, see https://www.rferl.org/a/power-supply-in-armenia-being-gradually-restored-after-massive-outages/30047895.html,
accessed 23 April 2020.
1488 - Arka News Agency, “Minister: Armenia not to give up the idea of building new nuclear power plant”, 20 October 2017,see http://arka.am/en/news/technology/minister_armenia_not_to_give_up_the_idea_of_building_new_nuclear_power_plant/,
accessed 16 May 2020.
1489 - WNN, “Novovoronezh II-2 starts pilot operation”, 4 June 2019,see http://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Novovoronezh-II-2-starts-pilot-operation, accessed 16 May 2020.
1490 - WNN, “Second Novovoronezh II unit enters commercial operation ”, 1 November 2019,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Second-Novovoronezh-II-unit-enters-commercial-oper, accessed 28 May 2020.
1491 - NEI, “Akademik Lomonosov begins commercial operation”, 25 May 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsakademik-lomonosov-begins-commercial-operation-7938482, accessed 28 May 2020.
1492 - Tom Balmforth, “Coronavirus threatens workforce in Russia’s nuclear cities - Rosatom”, Reuters, 28 April 2020,see https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-russia-nuclear-idUSL5N2CG5CY, accessed 16 May 2020.

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has on supply chains”.1493 However, there are reports of construction staff being affected inboth Belarus and Bangladesh, which are likely to cause further delays in construction.
Three large reactors remain under construction, two units at the Kursk site and one atLeningrad 2-2. The Kursk reactors are a particularly important project, as they would be
the first of the latest Russian design, the VVER-TOI (VVER-V-510). These are 1200 MW,
Generation III+ design, and destined for export. At construction start of Unit 1 completion wasscheduled for late 2023, and in April 2020, the first deputy director for construction claimed
that the project was on schedule.1494
Construction started at Leningrad 2-2 in April 2010, with the reactor expected to begin
commercial operation at the beginning of 2021,1495 that is even longer than it took to build
the first unit: ten years from construction start to commercial operation. In June 2020,
Rosenergoatom announced that preparation work would begin for the construction of four
new reactors, Units 3 and 4 at Leningrad 2, as well as two reactors at Smolensk.1496
Construction started at Baltic-1, a 1109 MW VVER-491 reactor project, in February 2012.
However, construction was suspended in June 2013 for a variety of reasons, including
recognition of the limited market for electricity. Accordingly, WNISR has removed it from the
project construction listing. Despite no indication that construction has ever restarted, theproject remains “under construction” in IAEA-PRIS statistics.
In August 2016, a Government decree called for the construction of an additional 11 reactors
by 2030, including two new Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs), a VVER-600 at Kola, and seven new
VVER–TOI units at Kola, Smolensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Kostrom and Tatar.1497
In early 2017, the CEO of Rosatom said that the Government would end state support for theconstruction of new nuclear units in 2020, and therefore any new reactors would have to befinanced primarily via commercial nuclear energy projects on the international market.1498 Even
before this date, the budget for construction of new reactors was expected to be in 2018, 2019and 2020, a modest 15.7 billion rubles (US$250 million), 16.6 billion rubles (US$260 million)and 17.7 billion rubles (US$280 million) respectively,1499 which may explain the lack of new
construction in Russia beyond Kursk 2.
The latest Federal Target Program envisages a 25–30 percent nuclear share in electricity supply
by 2030, 45–50 percent by 2050 and 70–80 percent by the end of the century. According to
the World Nuclear Association’s (WNA) nuclear profile for Russia, from 2019, the Government
1493 - WNN, “Rosatom takes measures to protect workers from COVID-19”, 30 March 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Rosatom-takes-measures-to-protect-workers-from-COV, accessed 16 May 2020.
1494 - NEI, “Russia’s Kursk II on schedule”, 14 April 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsrussias-kursk-ii-on-schedule-7872033/, accessed 23 April 2020.
1495 - NEI, “Nuclear island almost complete at Leningrad II-2”, 4 April 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsnuclear-island-almost-complete-at-leningrad-ii-2-7854322, accessed 23 April 2020.
1496 - WNN, “Russia begins preparatory work for four new reactors ”, 26 June 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Russia-begins-preparatory-work-for-four-new-reacto, accessed 27 June 2020.
1497 - WNN, “Russia to build 11 new nuclear reactors by 2030”, 10 August 2016,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Russia-to-build-11-new-nuclear-reactors-by-2030-10081602.html, accessed 16 May 2020.
1498 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in Russia”, Updated April 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx,
accessed 23 April 2020.
1499 - NIW, “Briefs – Russia”, 22 September 2017.

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estimates that ten units will be completed by 2030, including the two completed Akademik
Lomonosov reactors and the three reactors under-construction (Leningrad 2-2 and Kursk 2-1
and -2). Their list then includes two more reactors at Leningrad, two reactors at Smolensk anda fast reactor at Beloyarsk. However, it was reported that Rosatom received a budget of only
880 billion rubles (US$11 billion) and not the requested 1.16 trillion rubles ($US15.6 billion) for
construction through to 2035. Startup of the fast reactor at Beloyarsk was delayed until 2036,
from 2027, with no mention of the Smolensk units.1500
Russia has closed eight power generating reactors: Obninsk-1, Beloyarsk-1 and -2, Bilibino-1,
Leningrad 1–1 and Novovoronezh 1–3. The average age of the Russian reactor fleet is now
28.5 years, with close to two thirds being 31 years or more, of which nine over 40 (see Figure 68).
Therefore, a key issue for the industry is how to manage its aging units.
Figure 68 · Age Distribution of the Russian Nuclear Fleet

Age of Russian Nuclear Fleet
as of 1 July 2020

2

10

2

Reactor Age

15

38 Reactors
Mean Age28.5 Years9

0–10 Years
11–20 Years
21–30 Years
31–40 Years
41 Years and Over
50 Number of Reactors
by Age Class© WNISR - Mycle Schneider Consulting

Sources: WNISR, with IAEA-PRIS, 2020

There are six classes of reactors in operation: the RBMK (a graphite-moderated reactor of
the Chernobyl type), the VVER 440, the VVER 1000, the VVER 1200, the KLT-40 and FBRs.
Designed for an operational lifetime of 30 years, both the RBMKs and VVER-440 designs havebeen granted 15-year lifetime extensions to enable them to operate for 45 years. There are plans
to extend the operating life in some cases to 60 years1501, while the VVER 1000s are expected towork for up to 50 years. Consequently, the closure of Leningrad 1–1 is potentially a significant
event, as, after 46 years of operation, it would indicate that 60-year operational life is beyond
the RMBK potential, and, if applied across the fleet, would lead to the closure of 10 of theremaining 13 operating RBMKs in the coming decade.
The country also has two FBRs in operation at Beloyarsk. The older and smaller of the tworeactors is a 600 MW unit, which started in 1980 with an expected operational life of 30 years.
This was once again extended in April 2020 for a further five years to enable the unit to1500 - WNN, “Rosatom postpones fast reactor project, report says”, 13 August 2019,see http://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Rosatom-postpones-fast-reactor-project-report-say, accessed 13 August 2019.
1501 - NEI, “Russia permanently closes Novovoronezh 3”, 4 January 2017,see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsrussia-permanently-closes-novovoronezh-3-5709099/, accessed 15 May 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

operate until 2025.1502 The new VVER 1200 reactors in Novovorenezh II and Leningrad II havea design lifetime of 60 years, with plans to extend this to 80. The floating KLT-40 reactors on
the Akademik Lomonosov are designed for three or four 12-year operational cycles.
Russia is an aggressive exporter of nuclear power, with, according to Rosatom, 36 separate
projects including; Bangladesh (two reactors at Rooppur); Belarus (two at Ostrovets); China(two at Tianwan and two in the Liaoning province); Egypt (four at El Dabaa); Finland (oneat Hanhikivi); Hungary (two at Paks); India (four at Kudankulam); Iran (two at Bushehr) andTurkey (four at Akkuyu).1503 Alexey Likhachyov, head of Rosatom, expects that by 2030, up
to 70 percent of their revenue will come from outside the country. Likhochyov claims thatthe current order book is worth US$190 billion, of which US$133 billion for projects thisdecade and US$90 billion on projects already underway.1504 However, the WNISR considersof these only nine reactors as under construction (two each in Bangladesh, Belarus, India andTurkey and one in Iran). Nervous of the logistical and transport challenges that these multiple
construction projects will bring, Rosatom in early 2020 purchased a 30 percent share in Delo,a Russian logistics firm, which had recently bought a 50 percent share in Russia’s largest cargocontainer shipper Trans/Container. This is likely to give Rosatom priority access to both railand ship transportation.1505
The relative success of Russia’s export drive in a niche market of state-funded projects is notprimarily the technology but the access to cheap financing that accompanies the deals. The
COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on global oil and gas prices, which in turnhas a major impact on the Russian economy. The oil and gas production represents nearly
40 percent of the Russian state income and the collapse of prices will significantly affect thestate budget on the short term. However, as worrying for the Russian economy will be themedium and long term of the pandemic on oil demand and therefore price. Therefore, the poor
economic situation in Russia and the rise of national developers from China with greater accessto capital are likely to undermine Rosatom’s dominance of the very limited export market.

1502 - NIW, “Briefs–Russia”, 3 April 2020.
1503 - Rosatom, “Projects”, Undated, see http://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1504 - Nuclear-news, “Russia’s nuclear company Rosatom on a drive to sell nuclear technology overseas”, 25 June 2019,see https://nuclear-news.net/2019/06/25/russias-nuclear-company-rosatom-on-a-drive-to-sell-nuclear-technology-overseas/,
accessed 16 May 2020.
1505 - Gary Peach, “Rosatom Invests in Transport, Charts ‘Lessons Learned’”, NIW, 7 February 2020.

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UkraineUkraine has 15 operating reactors, two of the VVER-440 design and the rest VVER-1000s. They
provided 78.1 TWh or 54 percent of power generation in the country in 2019, a small increase
from the previous year with 79.5 TWh or 53 percent. Output is expected to decrease in 2020
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, Energoatom withdrew three of its plants fromservice following a plunge in power demand.1506 In response to the pandemic, special measures
were taken to restrict the movement around the country’s nuclear power plants with criticaloperational personnel housed in hotels near the power plants.
Twelve out of Ukraine’s 15 reactors were completed in the late 1970s and 1980s and had an
original design lifetime of 30 years. Ukraine has carried out a safety upgrade program for all of
its reactors at an estimated cost of €1.45 billion (US$1.62 billion) in total, of which the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and EURATOM contribute €600 million(US$670 million) between them.
The nuclear operator has proposed to extend lifetimes of some of the reactors for another20 years. The proposal was accepted and now constitutes a core element of the nuclear strategy
approved by the Government. The country has four closed reactors, all at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant. Three nuclear reactors (two VVER-440s and one VVER-1000) at Rovno(also spelled Rivne) have been granted a lifetime extension of 20 years,1507 two units at South
Ukraine for ten years, and four units at Zaporozhye for ten years1508.
The IAEA completed a Pre-SALTO (Safety Aspects of Long-Term Operation) peer review
mission at the third unit of the South Ukraine plant in April 2018 and concluded that the “plant
has made progress in the field of ageing management” but noted that it had only “initiatedmany activities to prepare for safe LTO [long term operation]”. The initial IAEA report also
concluded: “The plant has developed a catalogue of operational defects in heat exchanging
tubes in the steam generators”.1509
The lifetime extension of Rovno-1 and -2 (or Rivne) is part of an ongoing controversy within
the Espoo Convention on transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), whichconcluded that Ukraine was in non-compliance for not executing an EIA before it decided toprolong the lifetime of these VVER440 reactors beyond their original technical lifetime of
30 years.1510 Environmental groups in Ukraine have called upon European institutions to stop
the support for “risky” life extension programs.1511 The intermediary session of the Meeting
1506 - WNN, “Ukraine prepares to reduce output during pandemic”, 30 April 2020,see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Ukraine-prepares-to-reduce-output-during-pandemic, accessed 16 May 2020.
1507 - NEI, “Life extension for Ukraine’s Rovno 3”, 23 July 2018,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newslife-extension-for-ukraines-rovno-3-6258731/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1508 - NEI, “Life extension for Ukraine’s Zaporozhye 4”, 16 October 2018,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newslife-extension-for-ukraines-zaporozhye-4-6803714/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1509 - IAEA, “IAEA Concludes Long-Term Operational Safety Review at South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant”, Press Release,
25 April 2018, see https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-concludes-long-term-operational-safety-review-at-southukraine-nuclear-power-plant, accessed 16 May 2020.
1510 - UNECE, “EIA/IC/CI/4 Ukraine – Information on matters considered by the Committee”, Undated,
see http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/conventions/environmental-assessment/areas-of-work/review-of-compliance/
committee-initiative/eiaicci4-ukraine.html, accessed 16 May 2020.
1511 - Iryna Holovko, “Time for Europe to stop Ukraine’s nuclear energy sector”, Energy Post, 18 May 2016,see http://energypost.eu/time-europe-stop-supporting-ukraines-risky-nuclear-power-sector/, accessed 16 May 2020.

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Context (Espoo Convention) adopted a decision in February 2019 that “despite the positive
steps taken, Ukraine remains in non-compliance with its obligations under the Convention”
regarding the Rovno life-extension projects.1512 In April 2017, the Ukrainian Ministry ofEnvironment had sent an official notification to neighboring countries on the start of the EIA
for the lifetime extension of South Ukraine and at Zaporozhye.1513
Two reactors, Khmelnitsky-3 and -4, are officially under construction, but WNISR removed
them from the construction list as no active work has been reported in many years. Building
work started in 1986 and 1987 but stopped in 1990. In September 2015, the Ukrainian
Parliament voted to cancel the project.1514 In January 2017, the Russian Government confirmedthat the 2011-agreement on the completion of the units had been canceled.1515 Subsequently,
Skoda JS has been appointed as the main supplier for the completion of the reactors and an EIA
procedure has begun.1516 As part of the Espoo Convention, in the spring of 2019, the Austrian
Government sent documents on the potential environmental impact, with a comment period,for Governments and citizens until early May 2019.1517 Despite this initiation of the EIA
processes, there seems little chance that construction will restart in the near term.
In November 2019, Prime Minister Alexei Goncharuk sacked Yuri Nedashkovsky, head ofEnergoatom. Three reasons were given for the dismissal, “the deterioration of Energoatom’s
performance, the increase in the number of negative incidents and a procurement investigation
with which the deputy of the previous convocation is associated.” 1518 Energoatom later addedthat he had been fired because of inefficient management, suspicion of embezzlement of state
funds, and mismanagement of procurement. The statement said procurement problems had
led to defective products being used at nuclear plants.
In August 2017, the Government adopted an energy strategy which aims to maintain thecurrent level of nuclear in the power mix of about 50 percent up to 2035, while at the sametime to halve the level of energy intensity in the economy and increase the contribution ofrenewables to electricity to 25 percent (excluding hydro with 13 percent).1519 The Government isalso considering the future use of SMRs, with Holtec International, Ukraine’s Energoatom and1512 - UNECE, “Decision IS/1g – Compliance by Ukraine with its obligations under the Convention in respect of extension of
the lifetime of the Rivne nuclear power plant”, Excerpt from ECE/MP.EIA/27/Add.1 - ECE/MP.EIA/SEA/11/Add.1, February 2019,see http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/meetings/2019/IS_MOP_5-7_February_2019__Geneva/Decision_IS.1g.pdf,
accessed 16 May 2020.
1513 - Resource and Analysis Center ‘Society and Environment’, “Ukraine starts transboundary environmental impact assessment
for nuclear power plants”, Press Release, 19 April 2017, see http://www.rac.org.ua/en/for-media/press-releases--comments/19042017ukraine-starts-transboundary-environmental-impact-assessment-for-nuclear-power-plants, accessed 16 May 2020.
1514 - Ed Adamczyk, “Ukraine scraps nuclear reactor deal with Russia”, UPI, 16 September 2015, see https://www.upi.com/Top_News/
World-News/2015/09/16/Ukraine-scraps-nuclear-reactor-deal-with-Russia/9811442413199/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1515 - NEI, “Russia ends Khmelnitsky construction agreement with Ukraine”, 13 January 2017, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/
newsrussia-ends-khmelnitsky-construction-agreement-with-ukraine-5718894/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1516 - Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine, “Notice on activities to be assessed for environmental impact”, 2017,see http://eia.menr.gov.ua/uploads/documents/332/reports/10f33f0f9340fb1cd06c16c7bcc24950.pdf, accessed 16 May 2020.
1517 - Environment Agency Austria, “UVP KKW Khmelnitsky 3&4”, Public Consultation Documents, 2019, see http://www.
umweltbundesamt.at/umweltsituation/uvpsup/espooverfahren/espoo_ukraine/kkwkhmelnitsky34/, accessed 16 May 2020.
1518 - NEI, “Ukraine dismisses head of Energoatom reflecting political tensionsl”, 2 December 2019, see https://www.neimagazine.com/
news/newsukraine-dismisses-head-of-energoatom-reflecting-political-tensions-7534772/, accessed 23 April 2020.
1519 - NEI, “Ukraine reveals new energy strategy”, 28 August 2017, see http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsukraine-reveals-newenergy-strategy-5910630/, accessed 15 May 2020.

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the country’s State Scientific and Technology Centre (SSTC) entering a formal partnershipto advance the U.S. company’s SMR-160 for deployment.1520 The SMR-160 remains underdevelopment and no country in the world has licensed the design yet. In March 2020, Energy
Minister Oleksiy Orzhel, who was formerly head of the Energy Sector Better Regulation Officeand head of the Ukrainian Association of Renewable Energy, was fired. It has been suggested
that the dismissal was due to the Minister’s apparent favor of renewable energy and his disdain
for coal and nuclear power.1521
Proposals are now being developed to introduce a direct power line from Khmelnitsky-2
to the European market. The Ukraine-EU Energy Bridge project, with an estimated cost of€243 million (US$290 million), is to be carried out in the form of a public-private partnership
between the Ukrainian state and an investor consortium consisting of Westinghouse Electric
Sweden, Luxembourg-based Polish Polenergia International, and U.K.-based EDF Trading.1522
Ukraine is already exporting electricity to Hungary, Romania and Slovakia through the
Burshtyn ‘energy island’ and to Poland and Moldova, while also importing electricity from
Russia and Belarus. The Khmelnitsky project foresees electricity export in two ways: via the
750kV transmission line to Rzeszów in Poland and the line to the Albertirsa substation in
Hungary. Upgrading work on these lines would enable the addition of 1000 MWe of nuclear
power to the existing export potential of Burshtyn Energy Island.1523
The Ministry of Energy is also considering other means to consume the excess electricity inthe country including cryptocurrency mining and the creation of data centers near nuclear
power plants, with a pilot project connected to the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant.1524

1520 - WNN, “Consortium established for SMR-160 deployment in Ukraine”, 12 June 2019,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Consortium-established-for-SMR-160-deployment-in-U, accessed 28 May 2020.
1521 - Gary Peach, “Ukraine, Is Nuclear at a Crossroad ?”, NIW, 27 March 2020.
1522 - Ukraine Energy, “Winner of ‘Ukraine-EU Energy Bridge’ project is determined”, 15 August 2019,see https://ua-energy.org/en/posts/15-08-2019-2370f1a2-3ba4-439b-b2d0-b8b382d349ab, accessed 27 June 2020.
1523 - WNN, “Energoatom awaits approval for energy bridge tender”, 18 April 2018,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Energoatom-awaits-approval-for-energy-bridge-tender-18041801.html,
accessed 15 May 2020.
1524 - Interfax Ukraine, “Cryptomining is modern tool to remove surplus of electricity – Energy ministry”, 7 May 2020,see https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/660620.html, accessed 7 May 2020.

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ANNEX 2 - STATUS OF
CANADIAN NUCLEAR FLEET
Table 22 · Status of Canadian Nuclear Fleet - PLEX and Expected Closure
Grid
Connection

Refurbishment(a)Bruce-1

1977

Restarted in 2012

Bruce-2

1976

Restarted in 2012

Bruce-3

1977

01/01/23–30/06/26

1978

01/01/25–31/12/27

1984

01/07/26–30/06/29

Bruce-6

1984

01/01/20–19/10/23

Bruce-7

1986

01/07/28–30/06/31

Bruce-8

1987

01/07/30–30/06/33

Darlington-1

1990

15/10/21–25/12/24

1990

10/16–15/02/20(d)1992

15/02/20–15/06/23(e)Darlington-4

1993

01/05-23–31/05/26

Pickering-1

1971

2022(f)Pickering-4

1973

2022(f)

1982

2024

1983

2024

Pickering-7

1984

2024

Pickering-8

1986

2024

Reactor

Bruce-4Bruce-5

Darlington-2
Darlington-3

Pickering-5
Pickering-6

Point Lepreau

Operator

Bruce

OPG

OPG

NB Power

1982

03/2008–03/2012

Planned
Closure(b)Licensed to(c)

2064

2028

2055

2025

2040(h)2028(g)2022

Sources: Compiled by WNISR, from IESO, Operators, CNSC, 2020

Notes:

OPG = Ontario Power Generation.
a - IESO, “Annual Planning Outlook - A view of Ontario’s electricity system needs”, January 2020,see http://www.ieso.ca/-/media/Files/IESO/Document-Library/planning-forecasts/apo/Annual-Planning-Outlook-Jan2020.pdf?la=en, accessed 1 August 2020.
b - As announced by operator.
c - As listed on Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC) website for each station.
Bruce: https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/nuclear-facilities/bruce-nuclear-generating-station/index.cfm;
Darlington: https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/nuclear-facilities/darlington-nuclear-generating-station/index.cfm;
Pickering: https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/nuclear-facilities/pickering-nuclear-generating-station/index.cfm;
Point Lepreau: https://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/nuclear-facilities/point-lepreau-nuclear-generating-station/index.cfm.
d - Refurbishment of Darlington-2 was completed in June 2020, with the reactor being reconnected to the grid on 2 June 2020. OPG, “Darlington Unit 2
powers on—Refurbishment now complete on first unit”, 4 June 2020, see https://www.opg.com/news/darlington-unit-2-powers-on/, accessed 28 July 2020.
e - As of July 2020, refurbishment of Darlington-3 is expected in Q3 2020 with completion in Q4 2026, see OPG, “Darlington Refurbishment”, n.d.,see https://www.opg.com/strengthening-the-economy/our-projects/darlington-refurbishment/, accessed 1 August 2020.
f - Pickering-1 and -4 are expected to be closed in 2022. Recent announcements suggest that Ontario Power Generation and the Ontario government support
continuing operating Units 1 and 4 till the end of 2024 and run Units 5 to 8 until the end of 2025; see DurhanRegion.com, “Ontario government supports
extending Pickering nuclear station’s lifespan”, 16 August 2020, see https://www.durhamregion.com/news-story/10138629-ontario-government-supportsextending-pickering-nuclear-station-s-lifespan/, accessed 7 September 2020.
g - The Pickering Power Plan is licensed to 2028 but operation beyond 2024 would require additional authorizations,see https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/reactors/power-plants/nuclear-facilities/pickering-nuclear-generating-station/index.cfm?pedisable=true)h - NB Power, “NB Power’s 10-Year Plan - Fiscal Years 2021 to 2030”, September 2019,see https://www.nbpower.com/media/1489656/10-year-plan-2021-to-2030.pdf, accessed 13 May 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 344

ANNEX 3 - STATUS OF
JAPANESE NUCLEAR FLEET
Table 23 · Status of Japanese Nuclear Reactor Fleet (as of 1 July 2020)
Operator

CHUBU

CHUGOKUHEPCO

HOKURIKU

JAPCO

KEPCO

KYUSHUSHIKOKUTEPCOTOHOKU

ReactorMW

StartupYear

Hamaoka-3 (BWR)

1 056

1987

Hamaoka-4 (BWR)

1 092

Hamaoka-5 (BWR)

Age
Years

Shutdown

NRA Compliance(b)StatusDate(a)dd/mm/yy

Duration

Application
dd/mm/yy

33.4

29/11/10

9.6

16/06/15

LTO

1993

27.4

13/05/11

9.1

14/02/14(c)

LTO

1 325

2004

16.2

14/05/11

9.1

Shimane-2 (BWR)

789

1988

32.0

27/01/12

8.4

25/12/13

LTO

Tomari-1 (PWR)

550

1988

31.6

22/04/11

9.2

08/07/13

LTO

Tomari-2 (PWR)

550

1990

29.8

26/08/11

8.8

08/07/13

LTO

Tomari-3 (PWR)

866

2009

10.6

05/05/12

8.2

08/07/13

LTO

LTO

Approval
dd/mm/yy

LTO

Shika-1 (BWR)

505

1993

27.5

01/03/11

9.3

Shika-2 (BWR)

1 108

2005

15.0

11/03/11

9.3

12/08/14

LTO

Tokai-2 (BWR)

1 060

1978

42.3

11/03/11

9.3

20/05/14

Tsuruga-2 (PWR)

1 108

1986

34.0

07/05/11

8.8

05/11/15

Mihama-3 (PWR)

780

1976

44.4

14/05/11

9.1

17/03/15

Second Stage:
26/10/16(e)LTO

Ohi-3 (PWR)

1 127

1991

29.1

02/09/13(4.5)

08/07/13

01/09/17

Restarted 16/03/18

Ohi-4 (PWR)

1 127

1992

28.0

15/09/13(4.6)

08/07/13

01/09/17

Restarted 11/05/18

Second Stage:
18/10/18(d)

LTO
LTO

Second Stage:
10/06/16(f)Second Stage:
10/06/16(f)Takahama-1 (PWR)

780

1974

46.3

10/01/11

9.5

17/03/15

Takahama-2 (PWR)

780

1975

45.4

25/11/11

8.6

17/03/15

Takahama-3 (PWR)

830

1984

36.1

20/02/12(3.9)

08/07/13

09/10/15

Restarted 9/06/17(g)Takahama-4 (PWR)

830

1984

35.7

21/07/11(5.8)

08/07/13

09/10/15

Restarted 22/05/17

Genkai-3 (PWR)

1 127

1993

27.0

11/12/10(7.3)

12/07/13

14/09/17

Restarted 23/03/18

Genkai-4 (PWR)

1 127

1996

23.6

25/12/11(6.5)

12/07/13

14/09/17

Restarted 20/06/18

Sendai-1 (PWR)

846

1983

36.8

10/05/11(4.3)

08/07/13

27/05/15

Restarted(h) 14/08/15

Sendai-2 (PWR)

846

1985

35.2

01/09/11(4.1)

08/07/13

27/05/15

Restarted(h) 15/10/15

Ikaka-3 (PWR)

846

1994

26.3

29/04/11(5.3)

08/07/13

19/04/16

Restarted(i)15/08/16

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1 (BWR)

1 067

1985

35.4

06/08/11

8.9

LTO

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-2 (BWR)

1 067

1990

30.4

05/07/07

13.0

LTO

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-3 (BWR)

1 067

1992

27.6

16/07/07

13.0

LTO

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-4 (BWR)

1 067

1993

26.5

16/07/07

13.0

LTO

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5 (BWR)

1 067

1989

30.8

25/01/12

8.4

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6 (BWR)

1 315

1996

24.4

26/03/12

8.3

27/09/13(j)First Stage: 27/12/17

LTO

Kashiwazaki Kariwa-7 (BWR)

1 315

1996

23.5

23/08/11

8.9

27/09/13

First Stage: 27/12/17

LTO

Higashi Dori-1 (BWR)

1 067

2005

14.8

06/02/11

9.4

20/06/14

Onagawa-2 (BWR)

796

1994

25.5

06/11/10

9.7

Onagawa-3 (BWR)

796

2001

19.1

11/03/11

9.3

LTO
LTO

LTO

27/12/13

LTO
First Stage:
26/02/20(k)

LTO
LTO

Total: 33 Reactors / 31.7 GWe
Sources: JAIF, NRA, compiled by WNISR, 2020

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

| 345

Notes

BWR = Boiling Water Reactor; PWR = Pressurized Water Reactor; LTO = Long-Term Outage.
a – The shutdown dates are from JAIF, “Current Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Japan”, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, as of 4 June 2020, Japan Atomic
Industrial Forum, see https://www.jaif.or.jp/cms_admin/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/jp-npps-operation190606_en.pdf, accessed 4 June 2020.
b – Unless otherwise indicated the application and approval dates are from NRA, “Current circumstances regarding examinations for NPP adherence to new
regulations”, Nuclear Regulatory Authority, 15 May 2019; and NRA, “Regarding the progress status of the new regulatory standard compliance examination,(Power reactor relation)”, 1 July 2020 (in Japanese), see https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000257174.pdf, accessed 28 July 2020. Gray dates refer to the first stage(Permission for change in reactor-installation) or second stage (Construction plan approval) of the procedure. All others indicate final agreement of the
3-step conformity review.
c – Application withdrawn and resubmitted on 26 January 2015.
d – Nuclear Regulatory Authority’s (NRA) Approval for Basic Design (Step 2). In November 2018, NRA also approved lifetime extension to 60 years; see JAIF,“NRA Allows Tokai-2 to Be Operated for Sixty Years, a First for a BWR”, 16 November 2018, see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-allows-tokai-2-to-be-operatedfor-sixty-years-a-first-for-a-bwr/, accessed 28 April 2019.
e – Application for extension of operating period approved by NRA on 16 November 2016.
f – For both Takahama-1 and -2, the first two steps of the conformity review were achieved on 10 June 2016. The NRA also granted KEPCO approval ofextension of operation for 20 years on 20 June 2016. For details see NRA, “The NRA approved the extension of operation period of Takahama Power Station
Units 1 and 2”, 21 June 2016, see http://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000154256.pdf, accessed 14 July 2017.
g – Takahama-3 had operated briefly between 29 January and 10 March 2016, before it was shut down by court order. The “Shutdown Duration” is calculated
until the first restart.
h – Kyushu Electric Power Company was required to finish installing counter-terrorism facilities at the Sendai-1 and -2 reactors by 17 March and 21 May 2020,
respectively, but missed the deadline. As a result, Sendai-1 has been shut down since 16 March 2020 and is scheduled for restart on 26 December 2020. While
Sendai-2 was shut down on 20 May 2020 after only operating for four months following its maintenance and inspection outage completed in January. It isscheduled for restart on 26 January 2021
i – In December 2019, Ikata-3 was shut down for maintenance and refueling (with restart of operation expected on 27 April 2020). On 17 January 2020, theHiroshima High Court ruled in favor of a lawsuit brought by local residents within a 50-kilometer radius of the Ikata plant, the effect of which was to extend
the outage of the Ikata-3 reactor; see Asahi Shimbun, “Residents win appeal to halt Ikata reactor over safety fears”, 17 January 2020, see http://www.asahi.com/
ajw/articles/AJ202001170057.html, accessed 15 May 2020.
As of 1 July 2020 the court order remained in place with the likelihood of a further court decision following appeal by Kyushu Electric decision from
September 2020.
j – On 16 June 2017, TEPCO re-filed its application with the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) to confirm compliance with safety requirements for
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6 and -7. The NRA had requested resubmission in February 2017.
k – JAIF, “NRA Approves Changes to Reactor Installation for Onagawa-2 under New Regulatory Standards”, 27 February 2020,see https://www.jaif.or.jp/en/nra-approves-changes-to-reactor-installation-for-onagawa-2-under-new-regulatory-standards/, accessed 20 May 2020.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 | 346

ANNEX 4 - STATUS OF NUCLEAR
POWER IN THE WORLD
Table 24 · Status of Nuclear Power in the World (as of 1 July 2020)
Nuclear Fleet
Operating

Country

LTO

Mean Age(a)UnderConstruction

Units

Years

Units
1

Units

Capacity(MW)

Argentina

3

1 633

29.8

Armenia

1

375

40.5

Bangladesh

-

-

-

2
2

Power

EnergyShare ofElectricity(b)Share ofCommercial
Primary Energy(c)

5.9%

(+)

27.8%

(+)

2.2%

(=)

(+)

Belarus---Belgium

7

5 920

40.3

47.6%

(+)

14.4%

Brazil

2

1 884

29.1

2.7%

(=)

1.2%

(=)

Bulgaria

2

2 006

30.8

37.5%

(+)

19.8%

(+)

14.9%

(=)

6.3%

(=)

4.9%

(=)

2.2%

(=)

35.2%

(=)

15.8%

(=)

Canada19

13 554China

47

45 498Czech Republic

6

3 932

29

Finland

4

2 784

41.3

1

34.7%

(+)

18.6%

(=)

France56

61 370

35.1

1

70.6%

(–)

36.8%

(=)

Germany

6

8 113

33.5

12.4%

(=)

5.1%

(=)

Hungary

4

1 902

35.0

49.2%

(–)

14.6%

(=)

India

20

5 960

3.2%

(=)

1.2%

(=)

Iran

1

915

1.8%

(=)

0.5%

(=)

Japan

9

8 706

7.5%

(+)

3.1%

(=)

Mexico

2

1 552

28.4

4.5%

(=)

1.3%

(=)

37
1

1

8.2

23.3/22.6

15

7

7.8
24

29.4/30.9

Netherlands

1

482

47,0

Pakistan

5

1 318

16.9

1

3.2%

(=)

1%

(=)

2

6.6%

(=)

2.4%

(=)

Romania

2

1 300

18.5

18.5%

(+)

7.3%

(=)

Russia38

28 437

28.5

3

19.7%

(+)

6.3%

(=)

Slovakia

4

1 814

28.3

2

53.9%

(–)

21%

(=)

Slovenia

1

688

38.7

37%

(+)

18.5%

(=)

South Africa

2

1 860

South Korea

22

21 216

Spain

7

7 121

Sweden7

7 740

Switzerland

4

Taiwan

35.6

6.7%

(+)

2.3%

(=)

26.2%

(+)

10.5%

(+)

35.4

21.4%

(=)

9.1%

(=)

35.4

34%

(–)

26.7%

(–)

2 960

44.3

35.2%

(=)

18.2%

(–)

4

3 844

37.1

13.4%

(+)

6%

(+)

Turkey

-

-

-

2

UAE

-

-

-

4

UK

12

7 343

36.4/35.8

1

Ukraine15

13 10731.4

2

3

21.1/20.6

4

15.6%

(–)

6.4%

(=)

53.9%

(=)

21.7%

(=)

19.7%

(=)

8%

(=)

5

25.6%(c)

(=)

10.7%

(=)

52

(c)

(=)

4.3%

(=)

USA

95

97 154

39.8

2

EU27

107

105 182

35.1

4

EU28
World

408

362 506

31

30.6

10.3%

Sources: WNISR, IAEA-PRIS, BP, 2020

a – Including reactors in LTO/Excluding reactors in LTO (when different).
b – From IAEA-PRIS, “Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation in 2019”, as of 8 August 2020 – except for Switzerland, see SFOE, “Schweizerische
Elektrizitätsstatistik 2019”, Swiss Federal Office of Energy, June 2019 (in German/French).
c – From BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy”, 2020.

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ANNEX 5 - NUCLEAR
REACTORS IN THE WORLD“UNDER CONSTRUCTION”
Table 25 · Nuclear Reactors in the World “Under Construction” (as of 1 July 2020)
Country
ARGENTINA

Units

Capacity
MW netModel

Construction Start(dd/mm/yyyy)

Expected Grid
Connection

DelayedCAREM (PWR)

08/02/2014

20211

yes

25

Carem25

25

BANGLADESH

2

2 160

Rooppur-1

1 080

VVER-1200

30/11/2017

20232(commercial operation)

Rooppur-2

1 080

VVER-1200

14/07/2018

20243(commercial operation)

BELARUS2

2 218

Belarusian-1

1 109

VVER V-491

06/11/2013

20204

yes

Belarusian-2

1 109

VVER V-491

03/06/2014

20215

yes

CHINA

15

13 842

CFR-600

600

FBR

29/12/2017

20236

Fangchenggang-3

1 000

HPR-1000

24/12/2015

20217

Fangchenggang-4

1 000

HPR-1000

23/12/2016

20228

Fuqing-5

1 000

HPR-1000

07/05/2015

20209(completion)

Fuqing-6

1 000

HPR-1000

22/12/2015

Hongyanhe-5

1 000

ACPR-1000

29/03/2015

Hongyanhe-6

1 000

ACPR-1000

24/07/2015

2021

yes

10

yes

11

yes

12

yes

14

2021

2022

13

Shidao Bay 1-1

100

HTR-PM

01/12/2012

2021

yes

Shidao Bay 1-2

100

HTR-PM

01/12/2012

202115

yes

17

16

1 400

CAP1400

04/2019?

Shidao-Bay 2-2

1 400

CAP1400

11/201919?20

Taipingling-1

1 116

HPR-1000

26/12/201921

202522(grid connection)

Tianwan-5

1 000

CNP-1000

27/12/2015

202023

Tianwan-6

1 000

CPR-1000

07/09/2016

10/202124(commercial operation)

Zhangzhou-1

1 000

HPR-1000

16/10/201925

202426(grid connection)

EPR

12/08/2005

05/202127

yes

EPR

03/12/2007

202228yes

Shidao-Bay 2-1

FINLAND

1

Olkiluoto-3
FRANCE
Flamanville-3

1 600
1 600

1

18

1 600
1 600

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Country
INDIA

Units

Capacity
MW net7

4 824

Kakrapar-3

630

Kakrapar-4

630

| 348

Model

Construction Start(dd/mm/yyyy)

Expected Grid
Connection

Delayed

PHWR-700

22/11/2010

202029yes

22/11/2010

September 202130(commissioning)yes

PHWR-700

31

Kudankulam-3

917

VVER V-412

29/06/2017

3/2023(commercial operation)

Kudankulam-4

917

VVER V-412

23/10/2017

11/202332(commercial operation)

PFBR

470

FBR

33

?
yes

23/10/2004

10/2021yes

Rajasthan-7

630

PHWR

18/07/2011

02/202234(expected completion)

Rajasthan-8

630

PHWR

30/09/2011

03/202335(commercial operation)

yes

VVER V-446

02/197636

2024

yes

ABWR

12/10/2007

?37

yes

IRAN

1

Bushehr-2
JAPAN

1 196
1

Shimane-3
PAKISTAN

1 196
1 325
1 325

2

2 028

Kanupp-2

1 014

ACP-1000

20/08/2015

Kanupp-3

1 014

ACP-1000

31/05/2016

RUSSIA3

202138(expected operation)
202139(expected operation)

yes

3 115

Kursk 2-1

1 115

VVER V-510

29/04/2018

202240

Kursk 2-2

1 115

VVER V-510

15/04/2019

04/202341

Leningrad 2-2

1 085

VVER V-491

15/04/2010

202142yes

SLOVAKIA

2

880

Mochovce-3

440

VVER V-213

01/01/1985

202043yes

Mochovce-4

440

VVER V-213

01/01/1985

202144

yes

SOUTH KOREA

4

5 360
10/202045(commercial operation)
8/202146(commercial operation)
3/202347(commercial operation)

yes

20/09/2018

6/202448

yes

VVER V-491

03/04/2018

202449yes

VVER V-491

08/4/2020

50

51

APR-1400

19/07/2012

202052

yes

53

yes

Shin-Hanul-1

1 340

APR-1400

10/07/2012

Shin-Hanul-2

1 340

APR-1400

19/06/2013

Shin-Kori-5

1 340

APR-1400

03/04/2017

Shin-Kori-6

1 340

APR-1400

TURKEY

2

Akkuyu-1

UAE

1 114
4

Barakah-1

yes

2 228
1 114

Akkuyu-2

yes

2025

5 380
1 345

Barakah-2

1 345

APR-1400

30/05/2013

2021

Barakah-3

1 345

APR-1400

24/09/2014

202254yes

APR-1400

30/07/2015

2023

55

yes

Barakah-4

1 345

U.K.

2

3 260

Hinkley Point C-1

1

1 630

EPR-1750

11/12/201856

202557

Hinkley Point C-2

1

1 630

EPR-1750

12/12/201958

202659

USA

2

2 234
AP-1000

12/03/2013

11/202160

yes

19/11/2013

11/202261

yes

1976-2020

2020–2026

Vogtle-3

1 117

Vogtle-4
World

1 117
52

53 475

AP-1000

33

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

1 - Repeatedly delayed. In 2019, CAREM was rescheduled to begin operating in late 2021 or 2022. The construction, suspended in 2019
“due to breaches by contractor companies”, was expected to restart in May 2020, with no indication about the impact this would haveon project’s timeline. See NEI, “Work resumes on nuclear projects in Argentina”, 23 April 2020, see https://www.neimagazine.com/
news/newswork-resumes-on-nuclear-projects-in-argentina-7887154, accessed 30 July 2020.
2 - Rosatom, “First concrete poured at the constructed Rooppur NPP site (Bangladesh)”, Press Release, 30 November 2017,see http://www.rusatom-overseas.com/media/news/first-concrete-poured-at-the-site-constructed-npp-rooppur-bangladesh.html,
accessed 17 August 2020.
3 - Rosatom, “Main construction of the 2nd Unit of Rooppur NPP begins with the ‘First Concrete’ ceremony”, Press Release,
14 July 2018, see http://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/main-construction-of-the-2nd-unit-of-rooppur-npp-begins-with-the-firstconcrete-ceremony/, accessed 15 July 2018.
4 - Further delayed by one year since WNISR2019. Fuel loading started in August 2020, with grid connection expected in fourth
quarter of 2020, see BelTA , “Fueling of Belarusian nuclear power plant’s first reactor in progress”, 7 August 2020, see https://eng.belta.
by/economics/view/fueling-of-belarusian-nuclear-power-plants-first-reactor-in-progress-132336-2020/, accessed 10 August 2020.
5 - First delay (formally acknowledged). In early 2020, startup of Belarusian-2 was officially delayed to 2021.The reactor is now
expected to come online in 2021, a delay of one year since WNISR2019. BelTA , “Second reactor of Belarusian nuclear power plantgetting flushed, cleansed”, 17 June 2020, see https://atom.belta.by/en/belaes_en/view/second-reactor-of-belarusian-nuclear-powerplant-getting-flushed-cleansed-10678/, accessed 16 July 2020.
6 - CFR-600 is not listed as under construction by IAEA-PRIS. Concrete pouring is reported to have taken place in December 2017;
commercial operation was then expected 2023. See WNN, “China begins building pilot fast reactor”, 29 December 2017,see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-China-begins-building-pilot-fast-reactor-2912174.html, accessed 30 December 2017.
7 - No information concerning expected startup date in CGN’s announcement of construction start. CGN’s Annual Reports for 2016 to2018 refer to 2022 as “Expected Date of Commencement of Operation” for both units. CGN, “Annual Report 2018”, 2019,see http://www3.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2019/0408/LTN20190408772.pdf, accessed 9 April 2019. Sources in Chinasuggest that because the two units are the first HPR-1000 to be constructed, grid connection appears impossible before 2020–21 for
Unit 3 and 2021–22 for Unit 4, although CGN has pledged to do its utmost to connect its first domestic Generation III reactor to thegrid in 2021, at the earliest in November 2021. WNISR2019 advanced the date from 2022 to 2021.
8 - See previous note.
9 - Further delayed since WNISR2019. Completion of the reactor, previously expected in June 2020, is however still expected in 2020.
See NIW, “China: Economic Case for Nuclear Worsens With Covid-19”, 15 May 2020.
10 - Delayed. The completion date announced at construction start was 2020. See WNN, “First concrete for sixth Fuqingunit”, 22 December 2015, see http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-First-concrete-for-sixth-Fuqing-unit-2212154.html,
accessed 26 June 2016.
Grid connection is now expected in 2021. NEI, “Outer containment installed at China’s Fuqing 6”, 30 July 2020,see https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newsouter-containment-installed-at-chinas-fuqing-6-8053007, accessed 4 August 2020.
11 - First delay. In January 2020, CGN announced that operation of of Hongyanhe-5 was delayed to second half of 2021, a delayof one year. CGN Power, “Inside Information - Operation Briefings for the Fourth Quarter of 2019”, 6 January 2020, see http://en.cgnp.com.cn/encgnp/c20191226/202001/917f4904f06d4826be1ae98e96780703/files/0627a0191ddb4a07bcfe0b4764a196e4.pdf,
accessed 12 January 2020.
12 - First delay. In January 2020, CGN announced that operation of Hongyanhe-6 was delayed to 2022, a delay of six months. CGN
Power, “Inside Information - Operation Briefings for the Fourth Quarter of 2019”, 6 January 2020.
13 - IAEA-PRIS reports the twin High-Temperature Reactors (HTR-PM) being under construction at the Shidao Bay site plant as
consisting of one 200-MW unit. Accordingly, in previous WNISR editions, Shidao Bay-1 has been accounted for as one unit. However, itturns out that Shidao Bay-1 (also called Shidaowan-1) consists of two 100-MW reactors, and consequently, as of WNISR2020, they are
considered separately, i.o.w. as two units under construction (Shidao Bay 1-1 and 1-2). See CNEA, “Key components of second HTR-PM
reactor connected”, China Nuclear Energy Association, n.d., see http://en.china-nea.cn/site/content/176.html, accessed 10 May 2020.
14 - Further delayed since WNISR2019. Fu Li, “Chinese HTR Program”, presented at the IFNEC SMR Webinar Series, 23 June 2020,see https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-06/slides_deck_-_webinar_4.pdf, accessed 5 July 2020.
15 - Twin reactor. See previous note.
16 - Provisional names for the two CAP1400 at Rongcheng/Shidaowan. Construction of those reactors was introduced in WNISR stats
in 2020 following NIW articles (in particular 10 July 2019) and confirmation from sources in China. The two CAP1400 are not listed
as under construction neither by WNA (planned, with construction start in 2020) nor IAEA-PRIS. In July 2019, NIW classified themas “under construction” on the basis of the NNSA map as of June 2019. See NIW, “Why the Secrecy Over Reactor Construction Start?”,12 July 2019.
17 - According to sources in China, first basemat concrete for the first CAP1400 reactor was poured on 8 April 2019. See also C.F. Yu,“CGN’s Taipingling Project Moves Ahead”, NIW, 20 December 2019. See previous note.
18 - No official startup dates at this point. WNISR2020 uses 2025 for modelling purposes.
19 - According to sources in China, first basemat concrete for the second CAP1400 reactor was poured in November 2019. See previous
notes.
20 - No official startup dates at this point. WNISR2020 uses 2025 for modelling purposes.

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21 - CGN, “Annual Report 2019”, CGN Power, April 2020, see http://en.cgnp.com.cn/encgnp/c100882/202004/
f3c20533b65c4cf3a41583190c02057c/files/a5bc0c2ac79c425398a2296b2b054005.pdf, accessed 2 April 2020.
22 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in China”, July 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx, accessed 29 July 2020.
23 - Connected to the grid on 8 August 2020. WNN, “Tianwan 5 achieves grid connection”, 10 August 2020,see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Tianwan-5-achieves-grid-connection, accessed 10 August 2020.
24 - WNISR, “China: Grid Connection for Fuqing-3 and Construction Start on Tianwan-6”, 9 September 2016,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/China-Grid-Connection-for-Fuqing-3-and-Construction-Start-on-Tianwan-6.html,
accessed 22 August 2019.
25 - CNNC, “CNNC’s Zhangzhou nuclear plant goes into construction”, 23 December 2019,see http://en.cnnc.com.cn/2019-12/23/c_435889.htm, accessed 17 January 2020.
26 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in China”, July 2020.
27 - Further delayed. Grid connection is further delayed, at least to May 2021. A further delay of about one year compared
to WNISR2019. Roger Fry, “TVO reporte le démarrage d’Olkiluoto 3 (1,6 GW) à mai 2021”, Montel, 2 July 2020 (in French),see https://www.montelnews.com/fr/story/tvo-reporte-le-dmarrage-dolkiluoto-3-16-gw-%C3%A0-mai-2021/1128407,
accessed 12 July 2020. TVO, “TVO - OL3 EPR’s schedule work continues”, 2 July 2020, see https://www.tvo.fi/en/index/news/
pressreleasesstockexchangereleases/2020/ol3eprsscheduleworkcontinues.html, accessed 17 August 2020.
28 - Probably further delayed. Delayed many times from its original planned startup date of 2012. As of July 2019, startup was expected
in 2022. No new schedule has been provided but in July 2020, EDF noted that “As regards Flamanville 3, in the context of health crisis,
all construction activities have been temporarily interrupted between mid-March and early May, which could result in further delays
and additional costs.”, see EDF, “2020 Half-Year Results”, 30 July 2020, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/dedicated-sections/journalists/all-press-releases/2020-half-year-results, accessed 30 July 2020.
29 - Further delayed. First criticality achieved on 22 July 2020. A further delay compared to WNISR2019, when commercial operation
was expected in December 2019. NPCIL, “Unit-3 of Kakrapar Atomic Power Project achieves First Criticality”, 22 July 2020,see https://www.npcil.nic.in/writereaddata/Orders/202007220324143941331News_22jul2020_01.pdf, accessed 28 July 2020.
30 - Further delayed. Jitendra Singh, “Unstarred Question No. 1602: Commissioning of heavy water reactor at Kakrapar Nuclear Plant”,
Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha, March 2020.
31 - Jitendra Singh, “Unstarred Question No. 1602: Commissioning of heavy water reactor at Kakrapar Nuclear Plant”, Parliament ofIndia, Rajya Sabha, March 2020.
32 - Jitendra Singh, “Unstarred Question No. 1602: Commissioning of heavy water reactor at Kakrapar Nuclear Plant”, Parliament ofIndia, Rajya Sabha, March 2020. In 2018, ASE quoted 2024 as “guarantee operation date”. See Atomstroyexport, “Kudankulam NPP(India)”, Undated, see http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/wps/wcm/connect/ase/eng/about/NPP+Projects/Current/Kudankulam_india/,
accessed 9 May 2018. In December 2019, Jitendra Singh also quoted “2023-2024” as “expected completion” date for Kakrapar-4,
see Department of Atomic Energy and Government of India, “Lok Sabha - Unstarred Question No.3702 To Be Answered on
11.12.2019—Nuclear Power Plants”, 11 December 2019, see http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/172/AU3702.pdf,
accessed 2 January 2020.
33 - Repeatedly delayed. Commissioning still expected in October 2021. Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Science & Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate Change, “Demands for Grants (2020-2021) of the Department of Atomic
Energy (Demand No. 03)”, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, March 2020.
34 - Further delayed since WNISR2019. As of March 2020, anticipated date for commissioning is March 2022, a year and a half delay
compared to WNISR2019. Jitendra Singh, “Unstarred Question No. 1602: Commissioning of heavy water reactor at Kakrapar Nuclear
Plant”, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha, March 2020.
35 - Further delayed since WNISR2019. As of March 2020, anticipated date for commissioning is March 2023, 1.5 year of delay
compared to WNISR2019. Jitendra Singh, “Unstarred Question No. 1602: Commissioning of heavy water reactor at Kakrapar Nuclear
Plant”, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha, March 2020.
36 - Original construction of Bushehr-2 had started in February 1976, and the reactor remained listed as under construction in
PRIS-IAEA “Nuclear Power Reactors in the World” until the 1994 edition. See WNISR, “Iran: Construction Restart of Busheer-2”,
14 November 2019, see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Iran-Construction-Restart-of-Busheer-2.html.
37 - Construction status unclear. Chugoku “took the first step” toward Shimane-3 startup by asking prefectural and local governments
for their consent on applying to the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) for safety screening; see The Asahi Shimbun, “Process begins
at Shimane nuclear plant to operate new reactor”, 22 May 2018. Still no clear date for startup. 2021 is used for modeling purposes.
38 - First delay. Expected start of operation, according to PNRA, was 2020 “PNRA Annual Report 2018”, 2019,see https://www.pnra.org/upload/pnrarpt/PNRA%20Report%202018.pdf, accessed 15 May 2019. Kanupp-2 is now expected to come online in 2021, see The Nation, “PAEC nuclear power plants expected to connect to grid by end of 2021”, 2 July 2020,see https://nation.com.pk/02-Jul-2020/paec-nuclear-power-plants-expected-to-connect-to-grid-by-end-of-2021, accessed 20 July 2020.
39 - No new information on expected start of operation. See “PNRA Annual Report 2018”, 2019 and “PNRA Annual Report 2019”, 2020.
40 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in Russia”, April 2020, see https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countrieso-s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx, accessed 23 April 2020.

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41 - WNA, “Nuclear Power in Russia”, April 2020.
42 - Delayed. In 2018, TASS agency reported that Russia was ready to postpone commissioning of Leningrad 2-2—then planned
for February 2020—by two years. As of 2019, commissioning was expected in 2021. As of May 2020, commissioning is expected in
April 2021, see WNN, “Leningrad II-2 start-up postponed to April 2021”, 19 May 2020, see https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/
Leningrad-II-2-start-up-postponed-to-April-2021, accessed 19 May 2020. Fuel loading started in July 2020, see WNN, “Fuel loading
starts at Leningrad II-2”, 20 July 2020, see https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Fuel-loading-starts-at-Leningrad-II-2,
accessed 2 August 2020.
43 - Further delayed since WNISR2019. Construction was suspended between March 1993 and June 2009. In the Framework of theStrategic Plan, approved by the extraordinary General Assembly of Slovenské Elektrárne, a.s. (SE) on 28 March 2017, operation of
Mochovce-3 was expected by the end of 2018. In May 2019, CEO of SE Branislav Strycek announced that startup would be delayed
again to March 2020. As of June 2020, the safety authority announced a further delay, partly due to the pandemic crisis, but no new
deadline was provided.
See ÚJD SR, “Announcement of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic on the extension of the period for decision in
the administrative proceeding for authorization for commissioning of nuclear installation of the Unit 3 - NPP Mochovce”, 16 June 2020,see https://www.ujd.gov.sk/ujd/www1.nsf/$All/4188834860C1B178C125858B002981AB, accessed 7 August 2020;
and Chris Johnstone, “Six-month commissioning delay for Mochovce-3”, Power in Europe, 29 June 2020.
44 - Further delayed since WNISR2019. Construction was suspended between March 1993 and June 2009. In the Framework of theStrategic Plan, approved by the extraordinary General Assembly of Slovenské Elektrárne, a.s. (SE) on 28 March 2017, operation of
Mochovce-4 was expected by the end of 2019. As of July 2020, it is still expected in 2021. See previous note.
45 - Further delayed since WNISR2019. In August 2019, KHNP’s webpage dedicated to Shin-Hanul-1 introduced a change in
Commercial Operation (October 2020), a delay of one year compared to WNISR2019. However, in this revised schedule, fuel loading
was to take place in April 2020, which did not happen as of 1 July 2020. KHNP, “Nuclear Power Construction—Shin-Hanul #1,2”,
1 January 2020, see http://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/547/main.do?mnCd=EN03020303, last accessed 8 August 2020.
46 - Further delayed. In August 2019, KHNP’s webpage dedicated to Shin-Hanul-2 announced a change in Commercial Operation(August 2021) a delay of one year compared to WNISR2019. See previous note.
47 - Delayed. Construction officially started in April 2017, suspended in July to resume in October of the same year. Commercial
operation at construction start was October 2021, it is now expected in March 2023, almost 1.5 year of delay. KHNP, “Nuclear Power
Construction – Shin-Kori #5,6”, various dates, see http://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/548/main.do?mnCd=EN03020304, last accessed
8 August 2020.
48 - Delayed. KHNP, “Nuclear Power Construction—Shin-Kori #5,6”, Various dates,
see http://cms.khnp.co.kr/eng/content/548/main.do?mnCd=EN03020304, last accessed 8 August 2020
49 - Delayed. In March 2019, the project management announced that it had finished the concreting of the basemat for the nuclear
island and that it was now expected that Akkuyu-1 would be physically completed in 2023, with generation coming at a later date.
Phil Chaffee, “New Build, Revised 2023 Milestone for Akkuyu”, NIW, 29 March 2019.
50 - See NIW, 31 July 2020.
51 - Officials have repeatedly indicated the scheduled startup date as 2024, but that seems rather impossible. WNISR2020 uses a
5-year construction period. Daily Sabah, “Construction starts on 2nd unit of Turkey’s 1st nuclear power plant Akkuyu”, 28 June 2020,see https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/construction-starts-on-2nd-unit-of-turkeys-1st-nuclear-power-plant-akkuyu,
accessed 28 June 2020.
52 - Repeatedly delayed. In May 2017, startup of Barakah-1 was first postponed to 2018. In May 2018, the reviewed forecast of its
operator, Nawah, after it had “completed a comprehensive operational readiness review to generate an updated schedule for the startup”, is that “the loading of nuclear fuel assemblies required to commence nuclear operations at Barakah Unit 1 will occur between
the end of 2019 and early 2020”. See Nawah, “Next phase of preparations for Barakah Unit 1 Nuclear Operations starts”, 28 May 2018,
Press Release, see https://www.nawah.ae/media/press-news/2018/05/26/Next-phase-of-preparations-for-Barakah, accessed 26 July 2019.
In July 2019, FANR announced that “Unit 1 construction is complete and the unit is currently undergoing commissioning and testing,prior to receipt of the Operating License from FANR, which is currently in the final stages of reviewing the Operating License
application for the Unit, in preparation for the loading of the first nuclear assemblies”. See FANR, “FANR Certifies ENEC’s First groupof UAE National Nuclear Reactor Operators”, 8 July 2019, see https://www.fanr.gov.ae/en/media-centre/news?g=0b7fd437-2044-434690ef-76d8eaeb5c59, accessed 8 July 2019.
The reactor was connected to the grid in August 2020, see ENEC, “Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant Unit 1 Successfully Connects to
UAE’s Transmission Grid”, 19 August 2020, see https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/latest-news/barakah-nuclear-energy-plant-unit-1successfully-connects-to-uae-transmission-grid/, accessed 23 August 2020.
53 - Delayed. No new date for Barakah-2. WNA uses 2021, a three-year delay compared to original schedule. See WNA, “Plans For New
Reactors Worldwide”, August 2020, see https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/plans-fornew-reactors-worldwide.aspx, accessed 21 August 2020. In July 2020, ENEC announced construction completion of Unit 2. ENEC,“ENEC Completes Construction of Unit 2 of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant”, 15 July 2020, see https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/latestnews/enec-completes-construction-of-unit-2-of-the-barakah-nuclear-energy-plant/, accessed 16 July 2020.
54 - Delayed. No new date for Barakah-3 in updated schedule. WNA uses 2022, a three-year delay compared to original schedule.
(See previous notes).
55 - Delayed. No new date for Barakah-4 in updated schedule. WNA uses 2023, a three-year delay compared to original schedule.
(See previous notes).

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56 - See WNISR, “The Oddly Discreet Construction Start of Hinkley Point C”, 29 December 2018,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-Oddly-Discreet-Construction-Start-of-Hinkley-Point-C.html, accessed 24 August 2019.
57 - EDF, “Clarifications on Hinkley Point C project”, 3 July 2017, see https://www.edf.fr/en/the-edf-group/dedicated-sections/journalists/all-press-releases/clarifications-on-hinkley-point-c-project, accessed 7 May 2018.
58 - See WNISR, “Strangely Belated Announcement of Hinkley Point C-2 Construction Start”, 18 March 2020,see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Strangely-Belated-Announcement-of-Hinkley-Point-C-2-Construction-Start.html.
59 - No official startup date announced.
60 - Delayed. Georgia Power is expressing confidence that it can meet target dates of November 2021 and November 2022 for Units 3
and 4 respectively, announced in 2018. Georgia Power, “Georgia Power Announces Resequencing of Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Planned
Activities”, 23 June 2020, see https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/georgia-power-announces-resequencing-of-vogtle-units-3-4-planned-activities-301081896.html, accessed 17 August 2020. No change since WNISR2019.
61 - Delayed. No change since WNISR2019. (See previous note).

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ANNEX 6 - ABBREVIATIONSELECTRICAL AND OTHER UNITS
kW

kilowatt (unit of installed electric power capacity)kWhkilowatt hour (unit of electricity production or consumption)MWmegawatt (106 watts)

MWemegawatt electric (as distinguished from megawatt thermal, MWt)

GW

gigawatt (109 watts)

GWe

gigawatt electricTWhterawatt hour (1012 watt-hours)

Bq

Becquerel

Bq/kg

Becquerel per kg

Bq/L

Becquerel per litre

mSv

millisievert

mSv/hmillisievert per hour

Sv

SievertSv/h

Sievert per hour

ACR

Avoidable Cost Rate

AEOI

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

AFCN/FANC

Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire/Federaal agentschap voor nucleaire contrôle — Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (Belgium)

AGR

Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor

AKP

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi — Justice and Development Party (Turkey)

ALPS

Advanced Liquid Processing System

AMF

Autorité des Marchés Financiers — Financial Market Authority (France)

ANAV

Asociación Nuclear Ascó-Vandellós — Economic interest grouping formed by Endesa Generación and Iberdrola Generación

APE

Agence des Participations de l’État — National Holding Agency (France)

ASE

AtomStroyExport — Subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia)

ATMEA

ATMEA reactor Design (Joint Company of AREVA and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries)

AWHR

Advanced Heavy Water Reactor

BfS

Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz — Federal Office for Radiation Protection (Germany)

BMU

Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Nukleare Sicherheit
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (Germany)

BNEF

Bloomberg New Energy Finance

BOO

Build-Own Operate

BREDL

Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League

BWR

Boiling Water Reactor

CANDU

CANadian Deuterium Uranium (reactor design)

CAPEX

Capital Expenditure

CAREM

Central Argentina de Elementos Modulares — Small Modular PWR Design (under construction in/by Argentina)

CEA

Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives — The French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission
or Central Electricity Authority (India)

CEFR

China Experimental Fast Reactor

CEO

Chief Deputy Officer

CER

Canadian Energy Regulator (former National Energy Board or NEB)Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

ČEZ

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České Energetické Závody — State-owned Energy Utility (Czech Republic)

CFE

Comisión Federal de Electricidad — Federal Electricity Commission

CGN

China General Nuclear Power Corporation

CLP

Containment Liner Plates

CNEA

Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica — National Atomic Energy Commission (Argentina) or China Nuclear Energy Association

CNEC

China Nuclear Engineering Group Corporation

CNIC

Citizens Nuclear Information Center (Japan)

CNNC

China National Nuclear Corporation

CNSC

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

CSN

Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear — Nuclear Safety Council (Spain)

CVTR

Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor (U.S.)

DAE

Department of Atomic Energy (India)

DG

Director General

DOE

Department of Energy (U.S. or South Africa)

EDF

Électricité de France — Power Utility (France)

EIA

Environmental Impact Assessment or Energy Information Administration, also referred to as U.S.EIA (U.S.)

ENEC

Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation

ENEL

Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica — National Electric Power Corporation (Italy)

ENSI/IFSN

Eidgenössisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat/Inspection Fédérale de la Sécurité Nucélaire
Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate

ENSREG

European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group

EPH

Energeticky a Prumyslovy Holding — Czech-Slovak Energy & Industry Holding Company

EPZ

Elektriciteits Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland — Electricity Production Company South-Netherlands

EU

European Union

EURATOM

Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community

EWN

Entsorgungswerk für Nuklearanlagen — State-owned Decommissioning Company (Germany)[former Energiewerke Nord]

FANC/AFCN

Federaal agentschap voor nucleaire contrôle/Agence Fédérale de Contrôle Nucléaire — Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (Belgium)

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.)

FBR

Fast Breeder Reactor

FERC

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (U.S.)

FL3

Flamanville-3

FY

Financial Year

GCR

Gas-Cooled Reactor

GDA

Generic Design Assessment

GE

General Electric (Company, U.S.)

HDR

Heißdampfreaktor — Superheated steam reactor

HPC

Hinkley Point C (U.K.)

HTGR

High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor

HTR

High-Temperature Reactor

HTR-PM

High-Temperature gas-cooled Reactor Pebble-bed Module (Demonstration plant, China)

HWGCR

Heavy Water Gas-Cooled Reactor

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IANS

Indo-Asian News Service

IFNEC

International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation – formerly Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)IMSR

Integral Molten Salt Reactor

INRAG

International Nuclear Risk Assessment GroupIRENAInternational Renewable Energy Agency

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IRP

Integrated Resource Plan (South Africa)

IRSN

Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire — Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (France)

JAEC

Japan Atomic Energy Commission or Jordan Atomic Energy Commission

JAIF

Japan Atomic Industrial Forum

JAPC

Japan Atomic Power Company

JCPOA

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

JEPX

Japan Electric Power Exchange

JPDR

Japan Power Demonstration Reactor

JSC

Joint Stock Company

KA-CAREKing Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (Saudi Arabia)

KAERI

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (South Korea)

KEPCO

Korean Electric Power Corporation or Kansai Electric Power Company (Japan)

KHNP

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (South Korea)

KINS

Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (South Korea)

LCOE

Levelized Cost Of Energy

LDP

Liberal Democratic Party (South Korea or Japan)

LTE

Long-Term Enclosure

LTO

Long-Term Outage

LTS

Long-Term Shutdown (IAEA definition)

MBS

Mohammed bin Salman (Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia)

METI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan)

MHLW

Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (Japan)

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (U.S.)MITECO

Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica y el Reto Demográfico — Ministry for Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge (Spain)

MMR

Micro Modular Reactor

MNRE

Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (India)

MOEA

Ministry of Economic Affairs (Republic of China, Taiwan)

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)

MOPR

Minimum Offer Price Rule

MOTIE

Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (South Korea)

MoU

Memorandum of Understanding

MOX

Mixed Oxide fuel

MTES

Ministère de la Transition Écologique et Solidaire — Ministry for Ecological and Solidarity Transition (France)[now Ministère de la Transition Écologique — Ministry for the Ecological Transition]

MP

Member of Parliament

MZFR

Mehrzweckforschungsreaktor – (Germany)

NAO

National Audit Office (U.K.)

NCCR

Nuclear Construction Cost Recovery tariffs

NDRC

National Development and Reform Commission

NDT

Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (U.S.)

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency (of the OECD) or National Energy Administration (China)

NEB

National Energy Board (Canada) — now Canada Energy Regulator (CER)

NECP

National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan 2021–2030

NEI

Nuclear Engineering International (Publication) or Nuclear Energy Institute

NEK

Nuklearna Elektrarna Krško

NELA

Nuclear Energy Leadership Act (USA)NEPA

National Environmental Protection Act (USA)NGO

Non-Governmental OrganizationWo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 

NIW

Nuclear Intelligence Weekly (Publication)

NPCIL

Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd

NPP

Nuclear Power Plant

NPPA

Nuclear Power Plants Authority (Egypt)

NPPD

Nuclear Power Production and Development Co. (Iran)

NPS

Nuclear Power Station or National Policy Statement (U.K.)

NRA

Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Japan)

NRDC

Natural Resources Defense Council

NSPC

Nuclear Security and Physical Protection System Cell (Bangladesh Army)

NSSC

Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (South Korea)

NTA

National Tax Agency (Japan)

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OKG

Oskarshamns Kraftgrupp AB

OL3

Olkiluoto-3 (Reactor, Finland)

ONR

Office for Nuclear Regulation (U.K.)

OPG

Ontario Power Generation (Canada)

PFBR

Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

PGE

Polska Grupa Energetyczna — State-owned Public Power Company (Poland)

PHWR

Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors

PJM

Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection LLC (U.S.)

PLEX

Plant Life Extension

PPA

Power Purchase Agreement

PPE

Programmation Pluriannuelle de l’Énergie — Multi-Annual Energy Plan (France) or Pre-Project Engineering

PSC

Public Services Commission (Georgia, South Carolina or New York U.S.)

PSOEPartido Socialista Obrero Español – Socialist Party (Spain)

PV

Photovoltaic

Q1

1st Quarter

RAB

Regulated Asset Base

RBMK

Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalnyi — Graphite-Moderated Reactor (Chernobyl Type)

REN21

Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century

RGGI

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (U.S.)

RSK

Reaktor-Sicherheitskommission — Reactor Safety Commission (Germany)

RTE

Réseau de Transport d’Électricité — Transmission System Operator (France)

RWE

Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk — RWE AG — Rhine-Westphalia Power Utility (Germany)

SEC

Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S.)

SES

Swiss Energy Foundation

SFOE

Swiss Federal Office of Energy

SLC

Site License Company

SMART

System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactors

SMR

Small Modular Reactor

SNBC

Stratégie National Bas-Carbone – National Low-Carbone Strategy (France)

Sogin

Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari SpA – State-owned Decommissioning Company

SPIC

State Power Investment Corporation

SSMStrålsäkerhetsmyndigheten — Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

STUK

Säteilyturvakeskus – Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (Finland)SÚJB

Státní úřad pro jadernou bezpečnost — State Office for Nuclear Safety (Czech Republic)

TEG

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TEPCO

Tokyo Electric Power Company (Japan)

THTR

Thorium-Hoch-Temperatur-Reaktor — Thorium High-Temperature Reactor

TMI

Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant (U.S.)

TSO

Technical Support Organization

TVEL

Nuclear fuel cycle Company (Russia)

TVO

Teollisuuden Voima Oyj — Nuclear Power Company (Finland)

U.K.

United Kingdom

U.S.

United States

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAMPS

Utah Associated Municipal Power SystemsÚJDÚrad jadrového dozoru Slovenskej republiky – Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Slovakia)

UNECE

UN Economic Commission for Europe

USA

United States of America

UVEK/
DETEC

Eidgenössische Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation/ Département fédéral de l’environnement, destransports, de l’énergie et de la communication — Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications(Switzerland)

VAK

Versuchsatomkraftwerk

VD4

4e Visite Décennale – 4th Decennial Safety Review (ASN, France)

VVER

Vodo-Vodianoï Energuetitcheski Reaktor — Russian Pressurized Water Reactor Designs

WNA

World Nuclear Association

WNISRWorld Nuclear Industry Status Report

WNN

World Nuclear News (Publication of the World Nuclear Association)

ZLN

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ANNEX 7
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Mycle Schneider is an independent international analyst on energy and nuclear policy basedin Paris. He is the Convening Lead Author and Publisher of the World Nuclear Industry Status
Reports (WNISR). Mycle is a founding board member of the International Energy Advisory
Council (IEAC) and serves as the Coordinator of the Seoul International Energy Advisory
Council (SIEAC). He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), based
at Princeton University, U.S and the International Nuclear Risk Assessment Group (INRAG).
He has provided information and consulting services, amongst others, to the Belgian Energy
Minister, the French and German Environment Ministries, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Commission, and theFrench Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety. Schneider has given evidence
and held briefings at national Parliaments in 15 countries and at the European Parliament. He
has given lectures at over 20 universities and engineering schools around the globe. In 1997,
along with Japan’s Jinzaburo Takagi, he received the Right Livelihood Award, also known as
the “Alternative Nobel Prize”.

Antony Froggatt joined Chatham House in 2007 and is a Senior Research Fellow in the
Energy, Environment and Resources Department. He studied energy and environmental policy
at the University of Westminster and the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University
and is currently an Associate Member of the Energy Policy Group at Exeter University. For over
20 years he has been involved in the publication of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report.
At Chatham House, he specializes on global electricity policy and the public understandingof climate change. He has worked as an independent consultant for two decades withenvironmental groups, academics and public bodies in Europe and Asia as well as a freelance
journalist. His most recent research project is understanding the energy and climate policy
implications of Brexit.

Julie Hazemann, based in Paris, France, is the Director of EnerWebWatch, an international
documentation monitoring service, specializing in energy and climate issues, launched in
2004. As an information engineer and researcher, she has maintained, since 1992, a world
nuclear reactor database and undertakes data-modelling and data-visualization work for theWorld Nuclear Industry Status Report. Active in information and documentation projectmanagement, she has a strong tropism for information structuration, dataviz and developmentof electronic information products. She also undertakes specialized translation andresearch activities for specific projects. She is a member of négaWatt (France) and develops
EnerWebWatch in the framework of the Coopaname Coop.

Wo r l d N u c l e a r I n d u s t r y S t a t u s R e p o r t | 2 0 2 0 Frank N. von Hippel is a Senior Research Physicist and Professor of Public and International
Affairs emeritus in Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, which
he co-founded. He was also a founding co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile
Materials (IPFM) and served as Assistant Director for National Security in the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy during 1993–1994. He has worked on nuclear safety andnonproliferation issues since 1974, when he organized the American Physical Society’s (APS)
Study on Light Water Reactor Safety. He advised the Carter Administration on its decision toend the U.S. plutonium breeder reactor program, the Clinton Administration on its decision to
end nuclear testing and President Gorbachev’s arms control advisors on ending the Soviet-U.S.
nuclear arms race. He has received numerous awards, including the MacArthur Foundation’s“genius” fellowship in 1993 and the APS Leo Szilard award for “for his outstanding work andleadership in using physics to illuminate public policy in the areas of nuclear arms control andnonproliferation, nuclear energy, and energy efficiency.”

Jungmin Kang is an independent consultant and South Korea’s member of the International
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). He was chairman of South Korea’s Nuclear Safety andSecurity Commission in 2018. Dr. Kang was a senior research fellow in the Nuclear Programat Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in 2015–2017. Previously, he was a visiting
professor at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) in Daejeon,South Korea. He holds a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from Tokyo University in Japan andcompleted his BS and MS at the Nuclear Engineering Department of South Korea’s Seoul
National University. Dr. Kang has held previous positions at the Program on Science andGlobal Security, Princeton University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation(CISAC), Stanford University, and the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns
Hopkins University, all in the U.S.

Ali Ahmad is a Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Project on Managing the Atomand International Security Program (ISP). His research interests include energy security andresilience and the political economy of nuclear energy in newcomer markets, with focus on the
Middle East. Prior to joining MTA, Ali served as Director of the Energy Policy and Security
Program at the American University of Beirut. From 2013 to 2016, Ali was a postdoctoral
fellow at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security where he worked
on informing nuclear diplomacy with Iran. Outside academia, Ali is a senior consultant at theWorld Bank advising the Energy and Extractive Industries Global Practice. Ali holds a first
degree in Physics from the Lebanese University and a PhD in Engineering from Cambridge
University.

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Tadahiro Katsuta holds a PhD in plasma physics from Hiroshima University (1997). He iscurrently a Professor at Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan. During 2014–2015 he was a Visiting
Fellow in the Program on Science and Global Security (PSGS) at Princeton University, U.S.
He is researching Japan’s spent fuel management issues. He is also studying the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant accident and following the new regulation standards with a focus
on technical and political aspects. He has been appointed by Japan’s Nuclear Regulation
Authority (NRA) as a member of the study teams on the New Regulatory Requirements forCommercial Nuclear Power Reactors, for Nuclear Fuel Facilities, Research Reactors, and for
Nuclear Waste Storage/Disposal Facilities. During 2008–2009, he conducted research on
multilateral nuclear fuel cycle systems as a Visiting Fellow at PSGS. During 2006–2008, he
carried out research at the University of Tokyo on separated plutonium issues linked to the
Rokkasho reprocessing plant. During 1999–2005, he worked as a researcher at the Citizens
Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) in Tokyo.

M.V. Ramana is the Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human Security and Directorof the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. During 2020–2021, he will be a Scholar at
the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies. He received his Ph.D. in theoretical physics from
Boston University. Ramana is the author of “The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy
in India” (Penguin Books, 2012) and co editor of “Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream” (Orient
Longman, 2003). He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), theInternational Nuclear Risk Assessment Group (INRAG) and the Canadian Pugwash Group.
He is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship and a Leo Szilard Award from the American
Physical Society.

Ben Wealer is a Research Associate at the Workgroup for Economic and Infrastructure
Policy (WIP) at Berlin University of Technology (TU Berlin), and guest researcher at DIW Berlin(German Institute for Economic Research). He holds an MSc in Industrial Engineering in thediscipline of energy and resource management from TU Berlin. His field of research is nuclear
power economics with a focus on organizational models for decommissioning of nuclear power
plants and radioactive waste management, economics of nuclear power plant new-build, andthe dual-use issues of nuclear power. Wealer is a founding member of a research project on
nuclear energy in Germany, Europe, and abroad run jointly by TU Berlin and DIW Berlin andhe is a co-author of the first German independent decommissioning monitoring survey.

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Agnès Stienne is an artist, cartographer, and independent graphic designer. She has
contributed for over a decade to the French journal Le Monde Diplomatique, and the Visioncarto.
net website dedicated to cartographical experimentation. She has created numerous “narrative
cartographics” to illustrate a wide range of complex subjects and issues, including international
treatises on armed conflicts, and the damages of wars. She currently leads a research projectfocusing on agricultural practices, “land grabbing” and other fundamental agriculture andfood issues. The results of her research are featured on the Visioncarto.net website, as “geopoetic” briefs, in which she uses aquarelle-paint to translate her findings into maps anddata-visualizations. Over the Summer 2017, the exhibition “Géopoétique des champs”, in theframework of the #Ensemble Festival, presented her work at the Musée de la Mode et du Designin Paris. Her assignments include the design of the United Nations “Unosat Global Report on
Maritime Piracy: a geospacial analysis 1995-2003”, published in 2014.
Friedhelm Meinaß, born in 1948, is a visual artist and painter based in the Frankfurt area,
Germany. His characteristic pieces including his cover art for Nina Hagen, are on display in theGerman History Museum in Berlin, and his work is internationally acclaimed. Amongst others,
Meinaß has cooperated with Leonard Bernstein, The Byrds, Johnny Cash, Vladimir Horowitz
and Billy Joel. He is collaborating with the Designer Constantin E. Breuer, who congenially
implements his ideas. Meinaß held a professorship at the University of Design in Darmstadt inthe early 1970s.

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