RUSSIA’S MILITARYCAPACITY AND THE ROLE OF
IMPORTED COMPONENTS
Olena Bilousova, Oleksii Gribanovskiy, Benjamin Hilgenstock,
Elina Ribakova, Nataliia Shapoval, and Vladyslav Vlasiuk

June 19, 2023

Contents
I.

Executive summary

3

II.

Russia’s Military Capabilities in 2023

6

Critical Role of Imported Components

6

Overall Assessment of Military Capabilities

7

Russian Imports of Critical Components

11

Analysis of Russian Military Equipment

11

Analysis of Russian Imports of Critical Components

14

III.

Overall Dynamics: Full Recovery by End-2022

14

Trade Channels: Rise of China

15

Import Composition: Semiconductors in Focus

16

Company Analysis: Business with Russia Continues

17

IV.

Policy Recommendations: Stepped-Up Enforcement

22

V.

Appendix

26

2

I.

Executive Summary

In this study, we focus on two key dimensions of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which
is now entering its seventeenth month: (1) Russia’s overall military capabilities in terms of key
weapons systems, and (2) the extent of its continued reliance on imported components formilitary production. What sets our analysis apart is that we are able to investigate specificforeign components found in Russian equipment in Ukraine, and that we rely on a unique,comprehensive dataset on Russian international trade to identify schemes to circumvent
and/or violate sanctions, i.e., dual-use and military goods export controls. This allows us todevelop detailed policy recommendations for stronger sanctions and stepped-up enforcement
to end Russia’s war on Ukraine and prevent further aggression by Russia.
Our key findings are as follows:
1. Reduced overall military capabilities. Due to the critical role of imported components
in military production, international sanctions, i.e., dual-use and military goods export
controls, are having an impact on Russia’s ability to manufacture key weaponssystems, including armored vehicles, artillery, and missiles.
2. Russia continues to wage war on Ukraine. The country is clearly still able to produce
key weapons systems. This is due to a combination of factors: (i) large stocks of key
components; (ii) evasion of restrictions due to inconsistencies in the export controls
regime; and (iii) sanctions violations and insufficient enforcement.
3. Some high-tech inputs are missing. While Russia appears to have found ways toacquire important inputs, they are not necessarily of the same quality and may also
cost more. Thus, the lack of specific high-tech components has emerged as a major
constraint – and not all equipment contains state-of-the-art electronics.
4. Western components identified in weapons. We rely on the analysis of Russian
weaponry captured on the battlefield – in total, 58 pieces of equipment, ranging frommissiles and drones to armored vehicles and artillery – and find 1,057 individual foreigncomponents with microchips and processors playing the dominant role.
5. Continued imports of critical Western components. Using a comprehensive
dataset on Russian international trade, we investigate imports of these “criticalcomponents” and find that they rebounded weeks following an initial drop in theimmediate aftermath of the imposition of sanctions.
6. Russian ability to find alternative suppliers. By the end of last year, imports of what
we define as “critical components” had fully recovered and, in fact, risen above presanctions levels for key items such as semiconductors.1 China plays a key role – asan intermediary for shipments from other places as well as an alternative supplier.
7. Initial Q1 2023 results indicate a deceleration. For a subset of critical components,
we find that Russian imports declined in Q1 2023 (see Box 1) – by 14% compared to
Q4 2022. This could indicate growing challenges regarding their acquisition – or more
successful efforts to conceal transactions.
8. Acquisition of Western goods via third countries. We find that products of several
specific companies in sanctions coalition countries continue to be shipped to Russia,

1

In our analysis, we treat integrated circuits (HS code 8542) as part of semiconductors more broadly.

3

mainly via China but also Hong Kong and Turkey. In fact, imports from this subset havefully recovered in value terms.
9. Export control regime not as effective as needed. Components from Western
producers finding their way to Russia is a major concern, even if we recognize thatsome circumvention of export controls is unavoidable as entities in third countries may
be outside the direct reach of the sanctions coalition.
Our policy recommendations are as follows:
1. Improve information exchange. In our view, the first step to more effective
enforcement of military and dual-use goods export controls is better exchange of
information. Detailed data on transactions is available in a timely manner, including forsensitive trade activities such as those with critical military or dual-use components.
This includes data from customs services in sanctions coalition countries as well as
data from third countries that can be acquired directly or through independent providers
such as Export Genius. Authorities should set up systems through which information
can be shared effectively. In addition, authorities should cooperate closely when it
comes to investigations of sanctions violations or circumvention.
2. Utilize financial sanctions and AML framework. Restrictions regarding Russian(and third-country) financial institutions – as well as cross-border transactions moregenerally – can be used to improve the implementation and enforcement of the export
controls regime. Specifically, further restricting channels for transactions would allow
for better monitoring and increase transparency. Schemes to violate or circumvent
sanctions, including export controls, are similar to those that are being used for money
laundering or proliferation for which a regulatory framework is already in place to a
substantial extent and should be applied to the area of export controls.
3. Engage with key companies. Authorities should engage with the companies whose
products are being exported to Russia. Many large companies have extensive risk
management and compliance structures which would allow them to minimize the risk
to unknowingly violate export controles; what is likely missing at this point is a senseof urgency to do so. From a public opinion perspective, companies should be verymuch interested in avoiding having their products identified in Russian weaponry foundon the battlefield or being used for attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Small-and-medium
enterprises with less developed risk management systems may require technicalassistance from authorities to improve compliance.
4. Demonstrate consequences of violations. As we find that many of the criticalcomponents that Russia continues to be able to acquire are produced on behalf ofWestern companies, these do not appear to undertake sufficient due diligence as far
as goods under export controls are concerned. Thus, we believe that implementing
agencies need to demonstrate their commitment to preventing and/or prosecuting
violations by undertaking investigations with regard to high-profile players.
5. Align and broaden export control regimes. Export controls target categories of dualuse goods with the highest likelihood of use for military purposes. However, this leaves
loopholes through which Russia may be able to access critical inputs – for instance by
misclassifying goods. In our view, export controls should be expanded to cover broader
categories – making circumvention harder and enforcement easier. In our view, it is4also critical to align export controls across jurisdictions and enforce measuresconsistently to close loopholes in the regime.
6. Tighten documentary evidence requirements. As in other areas of the sanctions
complex, we believe that enhanced documentary requirements are key as well. For
export controls, authorities should require end user agreements from all exporters,
including companies under coalition jurisdiction that produce their products in andexport them from third countries. While the legal enforceability of such agreements canbe problematic, this would entice companies to undertake proper due diligence before
engaging in any trade with military and dual-use goods.
7. Target third-country intermediaries. We recognize that such measures arecontroversial, especially if they constitute secondary or extraterritorial sanctions.
However, imports of dual-use and military goods are critical for Russia’s war effort –this is a key area where boundaries in terms of sanctions should be pushed. We
recognize that the relative ease (and low cost) with which new entities (i.e., shellcompanies) can be set up in third countries represents a major challenge. Authorities,
thus, need to constantly monitor developments utilizing all available data sources to
identify how schemes adjust to restrictions – and revise the regime accordingly.
8. Expand export controls coalition. While several key countries resist participating in
the overall sanctions regime, we urge Ukraine’s allies to reintensify efforts to broaden
the coalition specifically in the area of export controls. We believe that morecooperation can be achieved regarding the issue of dual-use goods as thesecomponents directly contribute to Russia’s targeting of civilians in Ukraine.

5II. Russia’s Military Capabilities in 2023
Critical Role of Imported Components
Almost all of Russia’s modern military hardware is dependent on complex electronics imported
from the US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Israel, and China.2 In some instances,these components are civilian dual-use goods that can be procured commercially and harder
to reach via export controls.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimates that Russia's military uses over 450
different types of foreign-made components in 27 different equipment systems. Many of thesecomponents are made by well-known U.S. companies that create advanced microelectronics
for the U.S. military. In fact, only ten companies are responsible for more than 200 components(close to half of the total. And, most importantly, over 80 of these components are subject toexport controls by the U.S.,—but Russia's military has nevertheless managed to obtain them,possibly through third-country intermediaries.3
While Russian weapons continue to contain components that are manufactured in the West,
it is uncertain whether the companies producing these components were aware of the
products’ ultimate use by the Russian military. Russia has developed channels to conceal theorigins of these items by using third countries as intermediaries. For instance, a significant
share of computer components found in Russian ballistic and cruise missiles are purportedlybought for non-military use in Russia's space program. Thus, ROSCOSMOS has been utilized
by Russia as a means of acquiring technologies with both civilian and military applications.
Additionally, there are numerous companies across the globe, such as those in the Czech
Republic, Serbia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, India, and China, who are willing to takesubstantial risks to fulfill Russian procurement demands.
A Nikkei4 investigation has found that since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, 75% of
U.S. microchips were supplied to Russia through Hong Kong or China, while the
manufacturers state that they have suspended all the operations with Russia. Nikkei highlightsthat smaller, lesser-known chip traders and shell companies are able to evade U.S. sanctions
on Russia more easily, as they are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as larger,
established distributors. Some of such distributors are already sanctioned by the U.S., but amajority still operate.
For instance, Russian entities connected to a company called STC (Специальный
технологический центр) in St. Petersburg have been importing Western-made components.
STC produces the Orlan-10 drone and has close ties to the Russian government. Financial
records and other sources suggest that a company called SMT-iLogic in St. Petersburg ispurchasing many of these imports on behalf of STC. In the past, the U.S. government has
sanctioned STC for supporting Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.5
These components play a crucial role in Russia's drone production, enabling Russia to
conduct cost-effective yet efficient coordinated reconnaissance and bombing of targets in
Ukraine. The components are being shipped to Russia by companies based in the United

2

RUSI, Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion, 2022
RUSI, Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia's War Machine, 2022
4
Nikkei, Special report: How U.S.-made chips are flowing into Russia, 2023
5
RUSI, The Orlan Complex: Tracking the Supply Chains of Russia’s Most Successful UAV, 2022
3

6

States, Europe, China, South Korea, and Hong Kong. Some of these exporters appear to be
run by Russian nationals or expatriates based abroad with limited public profiles.
It is worth noting that Russian companies must prove to the Russian Ministry of Defense that
there is no domestic alternative before they can use foreign components in militaryequipment.2
According to the Free Russia Foundation6, the sanctions regime created by the U.S. and EU
was able to disrupt the access to Western technology only in the short term. Russia hasestablished alternative routes (mainly through China, Turkey, Cyprus, and the UAE) fairly
quickly with imports of dual-use goods now exceeding pre-war levels. Russia’s imports of
microprocessors/semiconductors increased from $1.82 billion in 2021 to $2.45 billion in 2022
(for the year as a whole). In 2022, records indicate the import of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) from China, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, and also European countries: the Netherlands
and Germany.
The Free Russia Foundation report also states that there is a great deal of uncertainty, evenamong industry experts and association representatives, regarding the scope of the US ban
on exporting chips to Russia, including which types of chips are subject to the ban.
However, some researchers are more positive about the effectiveness of sanctions. The
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) writes in a report that shortages of certain
higher-end components are forcing the Russian Ministry of Defense to substitute them withlower-quality alternatives.7 These findings are based on usage patterns of Russian militaryequipment on the battlefield, for example, the use of less effective missiles outside of theirintended purpose. Overall, CSIS points to the following components, which are lacking:advanced optical systems, bearings, engines, and microchips.
Overall Assessment of Military Capabilities
Although Russia has been implementing import substitution programs since 2014 with thegoal of reducing the country's reliance on foreign components particularly in its defense
industry, its continued use of foreign-sourced high-tech components highlights substantial
ongoing dependence—which makes it susceptible to the imposition of export controls.
However, the impact of export controls is limited by several factors:●

Long-term stocks. Researchers found that Russia stores stocks for the execution of
long-term contracts, equivalent to approximately three years of production.8 As aresult, any restrictions targeting the production of military equipment will have adelayed impact. However, considering that production needs are much higher at thetime of war, Russia will likely have to use such stocks this year.

●

Smuggling and other “gray schemes”. As discussed above, a number of cases
have been identified, which demonstrate sanctions evasion schemes. This includes:(1) using intermediaries in countries, which are not under sanctions; (2) restructuring
companies to conceal entities—or individuals—under sanctions; and (3) purchasing
components and moving final assembly to Russia instead of buying finished6Free Russia Foundation, Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions Targeting Russian Companies andIndividuals, 2023
7
CSIS, Out of Stock? Assessing the Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Defense Industry, 2023
8
The Jamestown Foundation, The Skyrocketing Costs for Russia’s War Effort, 20227

sanctioned goods. Western components have also been found in drones supplied to
Russia by Iran, which should have fallen under sanctions on the latter.
●

Inconsistent export controls and insufficient enforcement. Evasion schemes as
the ones discussed above can only succeed due to weaknesses in the sanctions andexport controls regime. Insufficient enforcement, in particular as the identification of
products’ end users are concerned, are partly to blame. Enforcement is further
complicated by the fact that the list of dual-use goods is not consistent acrosssanctions coalition countries and that it does not align to the customs codes of theHarmonized System (HS). As a result, it is often difficult to determine whether aparticular shipment is, or should have been, subject to sanctions. The U.S. recently
published a list of HS codes that warrant special attention. 9 We expect the EU to follow
suit with its list of priorities soon.

While Russia’s substantial stocks make military production somewhat resilient to sanctions
and export controls, the lack of specific high-tech components has emerged as a major
constraint. While Russian defense companies have been able to ramp up production through24-hour operations, not all equipment contains state-of-the-art advanced electronics, leading
to decreased effectiveness on the battlefield.
1. Tanks and Other Armored Vehicles
Uralvagonzavod is the only producer of tanks in Russia. In March 2022, the company wasforced to halt operations due to a lack of components (mainly, bearings) following theimposition of export controls.10 But by now, according to Rostec, production has, in fact,increased with the plant operating on a 24-hour basis.11 Key is Russia’s ability to procure
inputs from alternative sources; in the case of bearings, Turkey was the largest supplier in
2022. To address a lack of qualified employees, 12-hour shifts have been implemented.
The plant’s main task is not actually the production of new equipment, but, rather,modernization of the large number of older tanks Russia has in store, as well as repair ofdamaged equipment. According to the Russian press, a key issue is the lack of Sosna-U multichannel thermal imaging gunner's sights, meaning that the majority of tanks do not have thistype of equipment.12
The situation is similar with regard to infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). The main producer,
Kurganmashzavod, now operates on a 24-hour basis as well and is mainly tasked withmodernizing the large number of IFVs in storage.13
Despite Russia’s concerted efforts to increase capacities and acquire critical inputs throughalternative channels, the number of tanks and IFVs has fallen considerably since the start of
the full-scale invasion. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) sees a 39%

Bureau of Industry and Security, Supplemental Alert: FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
Bureau of Industry and Security Urge Continued Vigilance for Potential Russian Export Control Evasion
Attempts, 2023
10
The Kyiv Independent, Russian companies specializing in tank repair suspend operations due tosupply shortages, 2022
11
The Moscow Times, Russian Defense Chief Says Military Factories Working ‘Around the Clock’, 2023
12
TopWar, New T-80BVM tanks for a special operation: it looks like they had to save on sights, 2023
13
Rostec, Rostec has supplied the Russian Defense Ministry with a new batch of BMP-3s, 2023
98

reduction in active tanks and 20% drop in active IFVs, with the corresponding numbers forsuch vehicles in storage 51% and 53%, respectively (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles
2023

1,800

2022

2,927

2023

4,000

Active

5,180
0

2,000

In store

10,2004,150

2022

ActiveMain battle tanks

5,000

4,000

8,500
6,000

8,000

10,00012,000In store
14,000Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, KSE Institute14

2. Artillery
Russia’s military appears to encounter difficulties with the supply of artillery shells. The numberof artillery rounds is down sharply – around 75% – from last summer, when Russia fired
40,000-50,000 rounds per day in the Donbas region.15 However, remaining stocks are
considerable, even if some are old and less reliable.
ISW assesses that munitions constraints will likely prevent Russian forces from maintaining ahigh pace of operations in the Bakhmut area, and elsewhere, in the near term. 16 That Russia
has already depleted ammunition stockpiles in Belarus is a further indicator that a renewed
large-scale offensive from Belarussian territory is unlikely in the coming months.
3. Missiles
The intensity of missile attacks on the territory of Ukraine (critical infrastructure and civil andresidential buildings) has decreased. However, since the beginning of May, Russia conducts
constant attacks on civilian infrastructure with missiles and drones in response to thecounteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
For this purpose, Russia is trying to ramp up production (see Figure 2) and reportedly seeking
to buy missiles from North Korea as well as additional drones from Iran, which are much lower
cost in comparison.
The use of some missiles in an unorthodox fashion is a further indication for equipment
constraints (see Figure 3). For example, attacks on the territory of Ukraine have been
conducted using S-400 (and S-300) missiles, which were originally designed as air defense
weapons – and are extremely imprecise when being used to hit targets on the ground. Anothersign for the serious lack of cruise missiles in Russia’s arsenal is the almost instantaneous useof newly-produced equipment. The analysis of debris has shown that Russia has used cruise
missiles during recent attacks that were produced in Q1 2023 – indicating extremely low
stocks.17

14

IISS, Military Balance 2022 and Military balance 2023
CNN, Russian artillery fire down nearly 75%, US officials say, in latest sign of struggles for Moscow,
2023
16
ISW, Russian offensive campaign assessment, December 24, 2022
17
RBC Ukraine, The hunt for Patriot and the failure of the counteroffensive. How Russia changed thetargets of missile strikes, 2023
15

9Figure 2: Russian Missile Production
125x2

512 1061

100

Produced in 2022

Target for 2023

75

50

25

0

Source: KSE Institute

Figure 3: Estimated Russian Missile Stocks as at 1 June 2023
0200

Iskander-М

104

Iskander-K

52 79

Kalibr88

Kh-22/Kh-32

134

1,000

40%
11%
5%
236

36%

Estimated stocks of
missilesMissiles fired

49 25 66%
325

800
12%

689

43 876

Onyx

600

758

Kh-101/Kh-555

Kinzhal (Kh-47)

400

145

69%

Source: Ministry of Defense, RBC Ukraine, Jamestown Foundation, KSE Institute

In conclusion, Russia’s military capacity seems to be impacted most by extraordinary losseson the battlefield. Given its inability to increase production significantly in the short term andlimited access to some critical components, Russia is currently unable to rebuild its stocks fastenough. However, due to the unprecedented scope of military and dual-use goods export
controls, the effect should have been more pronounced. We believe that this indicates that
restrictions may be violated and/or circumvented. To be able to identify specific issues
associated with the export controls regime, we undertake a detailed analysis of trade withgoods that we consider to be “critical”.

10III. Russian Imports of Critical Components
Analysis of Russian Military Equipment: Methodology and Key Findings
For our comprehensive analysis of trade trends regarding military and dual-use goods, we use
information on Russian military equipment recovered on Ukrainian territory since the start of
the full-scale invasion (see Figure 4) to develop a definition of “critical components”.
Analysis of Russian weaponsForeign components
identified in weapons(1,057 items)

Producers of
foreign components(155 companies)

Identification of "critical components"

Goods exported bycompanies to Russia(1,185 HS codes)

Goods identified as
military or dual-use(385 HS codes)

Analysis of trade

Critical components
subset for analysis($26.0 billion in 2022)

1. In 58 pieces of Russian military equipment (see Figure 5a), we find a total of 1,057
individual foreign components.18 Microchips and (micro-)processors together accountfor close to half of all components (see Figure 5b).
2. 155 companies are identified as producers of these components (see Figure 5c), with
headquarters in 19 different countries (see Figure 5d).19 Entities based in the UnitedStates are responsible for roughly two-thirds of the components found.
3. We identify all shipments from this subset of companies to Russia in 2022 by relying
on a comprehensive, micro-level dataset on Russian trade. Trade data used in thisanalysis may not reflect all transactions between Russia and the countries of theEurasian Economic Union, e.g., Belarus and Kazakhstan, as direct passing of thephysical border of these countries to Russia are reflected in separate database.
4. All 1,185 HS codes20 found in these transactions are analyzed on a case-by-case basis
to determine which goods should be considered potential inputs for Russian military
production and which are purely civil in nature.
5. We arrive at 385 ten-digit HS codes that define the set of “critical components” for ouranalysis of trade activities and potential export control violations.21 Of these codes, only
170 – less than half – are included in the European Union’s dual-use goods list.22

18

Also includes 22 small electronic devices with 268 components. For details, see Appendix 1.
For a full list of companies, see Appendix 2.
20
Trade codes used in this analysis – and described in Appendix 3 – reflect Russian HS codes ("TN
VED"). The Russian goods classification matches the international HS code system at the 6-digit level,
while the more detailed breakdown may differ. This also complicates the implementation of sanctions
and their enforcement.
21
For a full list of HS codes, see Appendix 3.
22
For the EU list, see here. The comparison was undertaken at the 8-digit level.
19

11Figure 4: Russian Military Equipment Analyzed and Components Found

KalibrIskander-K

Kh-101

Drones

Kh-59

Missiles••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Armored vehicles and artillery••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Orlan-10•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Korsar••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
ShahedShahed- •••••••••
136•••••••
131••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Granat-3••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Kartograf••••••••••••••••••••••
Supercam S350

Electronic warfare stations•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Typhoon-K
•••••
••••
•••
••••••••••••••••••••
Tornado-G ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

T-72B3 /T-72B3M

Tor-M2

BMD-4M

R-330Zh
ZhytelR-166 Artek

1V119 Rheostat
Msta-S
Tornado-S

Helicopters

Ka-52• Microchip• (Micro-)processor• Transistor• Memory device• Voltage regulator

Other•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Capacitor• Transceiver• DC-to-DC converter• Video Codec• Driver/Receiver• FPGA• Other••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
•••••
•••••
•••••
••••
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Source: KSE Institute *each dot represents one identified item

12

Figure 5a: Equipment by Type
Helicopters
Electronic
warfare equip.
Armoredvehicles &artillery

3

10

Figure 5b: Components by Type
Microchips(Micro-)processors
Transistors
Memory devices
Voltage regulators
Capacitors
Transceivers
DC-to-DC converters
Analog-digital converters
FPGAs
Drivers/receivers
Amplifiers
RelaysVideo codecs

Smallelectronic
devices2

2258
pieces of Russian
military equipment

10
Missiles

11

336
146
48
47
38
34
28
27
24
23
23
19
14
12

Drones

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Source: KSE InstituteSource: KSE Institute *not shown: 238 other components

Figure 5c: Components by Producer

Figure 5d: Components by Headquarter

Analog Devices (US)Texas Instruments (US)Microchip Technology (US)Intel Corporation (US)AMD (US)Infineon Technologies (DE)STMicroelectronics (CH)
Renesas Electronics (JP)Vishay Intertechnology (US)NXP Semiconductors (NL)
Yageo (TW)
Onsemi (US)Micron Technology (US)
Murata Manufacturing (JP)

186
145
96
63
62
60

50

Other
29

28

54
UnitedStates42

Switzerland
52

28
23
23
21
19
18
16
11
0

China
Netherlands
Taiwan

350

100

150

Source: KSE Institute *not shown: 286 other components

Germany

72

1,057

Japan

75

imported components
in Russian militaryequipment

705

200
Source: KSE Institute13

Analysis of Russian Imports of Critical Components
Overall Dynamics: Full Recovery by End-2022
In a first step, we analyze overall dynamics of “critical components” imports and find several
key developments driven by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the imposition ofexport controls by the sanctions coalition (see Figure 6).
1. Building-up of stocks. In the last quarter of 2021, imports of critical components
picked up markedly, in particular in December – likely indicating the building up of
stocks in anticipation of challenges regarding the acquisition of components critical for
Russia’s military production. Compared to the Q1-Q3 2021 average of $2.2 billion,
imports were 44%, 59%, and 104% higher in October-December, respectively.23
2. Post-sanctions drop. Imports fell sharply in March-June as export controls were
imposed by Ukraine’s allies – by close to 50% compared to the January-February
average of $2.9 billion when they had normalized following the end-2021 boom. This
indicates that restrictions targeting Russia’s defense sector, specifically military anddual-use goods export controls, clearly had an initial impact on trade activities.
3. Recovery in H2 2022. Starting in July, however, Russia appears to have adjusted. By
Q4 2022, imports of critical components reached close to $2.8 billion per month – up
9.3% compared to the 2021 average. Substitution of goods from sanctions imposing
countries may have played some role. But the absence of high-quality substitutes fromalternative sources means that Russia likely succeeded at setting up schemes toimport Western components through separate channels.
4. Overall decline in full-2022. For the year 2022 overall, critical components imports
reached $26.0 billion – a 16% decline from the 2021 total of $31.0 billion. The drop is
entirely due to the temporary collapse in March-June; Q4 2022 imports were $33.9
billion in annualized terms. Should imports remain at this level in 2023, this would mean
a 30% increase over 2022 and 9% increase over 2021.
Figure 6: Imports of Critical Components
5,000$ million

4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0

Source: KSE Institute23

We recognize that some of these dynamics may also at least partially represent a post-Covid recovery
in trade.

14

Trade Channels: Rise of China
Second, we look at where critical components – as defined above – are acquired from. We
find the following with regard to critical components’ country of delivery, i.e., the country fromwhich the goods were exported to Russia, and their country of origin, i.e., the country where
the goods were produced (see Figure 7).
1. Imports from China initially fell. While China did not impose any export controls,
Russian imports from the country also declined noticeably in the immediate aftermathof the full-scale invasion. This was likely due to the fact that critical components either
manufactured in China or sold via China are, ultimately, products of Western entities.
Importantly, both categories are different from the country where the producer’s
headquarter is located geographically. Many companies, especially manufacturers ofelectronics, relocate their factories to countries with lower costs, e.g., China.
2. China’s role expanded in 2022. The country’s share (including China) in Russian
imports of critical components has risen markedly since the imposition of export
controls. By Q4 2022, China’s share as a country of delivery reached 53% (39% in2021) and as a country of origin 63% (48% in 2021). The difference between the two
illustrates that a substantial share of Russian imports, around 10%, is now acquired
from third-country manufacturers via Chinese and Hong Kong-based intermediaries(see Figure 8).
Figure 7: Imports of Critical Components by Country
By country of delivery (seller)

4,000$ million

5,000

Other
USA
TurkeyKorea
EUChina (incl. HK)

3,000
2,000

By country of origin (producer)

4,000$ million

5,000

3,000

Other
Korea
USA
TaiwanEU
China (incl. HK)

2,000

1,000

1,000

0

0

Source: KSE Institute

Figure 8: Imports from China, Delivery vs. Origin
2,500
2,000
1,500

Imports from Chinese seller(incl. HK)
Imports from Chinese origin(incl. HK)

1,000
500
-

Source: KSE Institute15

Import Composition: Semiconductors in Focus
Third, we investigate what types of critical components Russia has been importing and take acloser look at dynamics regarding semiconductors (and integrated circuits), a key target ofexport controls.
1. Broad-based pickup in H2 2022. The rebound in Russian imports of criticalcomponents towards the end of last year was relatively homogeneous across
categories (see Figure 9). However, we find that some are of particular importance,e.g., computer components as well as electric and electronic equipment.24
Figure 9: Imports of Critical Components by Type
5,000
Drones and components$ million

4,000

Military Navigation and Sensor
Systems
Semiconductors

3,000
Other
2,000

Communication Equipment

1,000

Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec

0

2021

Automotive Components andEquipment
Electrical and Electronic
Equipment and Components
Computer Components andModules2022
Source: KSE Institute

2. Key role played by semiconductors.25 These are of particular relevance for ouranalysis as they constitute the item most often found in Russian military equipment. In
fact, Western-made microchips were identified in every type of equipment investigatedby Ukrainian authorities. What sets these goods apart as well is that substitutes – forinstance, Chinese ones – continue to lag Western products in technologicaladvancement and quality.
3. Trends more pronounced. For semiconductors, we identify similar developments as
for overall critical components, including a late-2021 pickup (+56% in Q4 vs. Q1-3
average), a sharp drop in March-April (-48% vs. January-February), and a subsequent
rebound (see Figure 10). However, two differences are noteworthy: (1) The drop
following the imposition of export controls was even shorter-lived – imports had
recovered to previous levels by May. And (2), the surge in H2 2022 was much stronger– with Q4 2022 imports 123% above the 2021 average. As a result, full-year imports
in 2022 ($2.4 billion) came in 44% higher than in 2021 ($1.7 billion).

24

In this group, we include items such as RAM modules, motherboards, graphics cards, and storage
devices, which are widely used in commercial computers.
25
Semiconductors here include integrated circuits (HS code 8542).

16

4. Chinese intermediaries dominate. In Q4 2022, sellers from China (including HongKong) accounted for more than 87% of total Russian semiconductor imports, while thecorresponding number for 2021 was only 33%. Importantly, the overwhelming shareof goods is not manufactured in China but rather shipped through Chinese and HKbased intermediaries, as a look at the country of delivery composition illustrates (seeFigure 10). It appears that roughly 55% of semiconductors acquired from China (andHK) were in fact produced somewhere else (see Figure 11).
Figure 10: Imports of Semiconductors by Country$ million

300

200

By country of delivery (seller)
Other
USA
TurkeyKorea
EUChina (incl. HK)

By country of origin (producer)

400

300

$ million

400

200

100

100

0

0

Other
USA
VietnamTaiwan
Malaysia
China (incl. HK)

Source: KSE Institute

Figure 11: Semiconductor Imports from China, Delivery vs. Origin
300

Imports from Chinese seller (incl. HK)
250
Imports from Chinese producer (incl. HK)
200
150
100
50

Jan-21
Feb-21
Mar-21
Apr-21
May-21
Jun-21
Jul-21
Aug-21
Sep-21
Oct-21
Nov-21
Dec-21
Jan-22
Feb-22Mar-22
Apr-22
May-22Jun-22
Jul-22Aug-22
Sep-22Oct-22
Nov-22
Dec-220

Source: KSE InstituteCompany Analysis: Business with Russia Continues
Fourth, we focus on the subset of 155 companies (including subsidiaries), whose products
were identified in Russian weapons. These accounted for 11% of critical component sales to
Russia in 2022 – or $2.9 billion.
1. Sales to Russia rebound quickly. For these companies – among them some of thebiggest Western manufacturers of electronics – we, again, find the typical pattern of alate-2021 surge, March-April drop, and H2 2022 recovery (see Figure 12). In fact, theirexports of critical components to Russia stood 35% above their 2021 average in Q4
2022. For the full-year, this means essentially no change vs. 2021.

17

2. Business entirely through intermediaries. Importantly, shipments are almost
entirely routed via third countries now (see Figure 12) – the share of indirect sales rosefrom 54% in 2021 to 98% in Q4 2022. China is, again, playing a critical role (see Figure13). In Q4 2022, more than three-fourths of sales to Russia were conducted via anintermediary in China; in 2021, the corresponding number had only been 22%. And,consistent with earlier findings, the products are actually manufactured outside of
China to a considerable extent.
Figure 12: Composition of Imports from Select Companies
0

200

400

600

By country of delivery (seller)

400

800

IndirectIntel Corporation (US)

Direct300

Analog Devices (US)2021

Texas Instruments (US)2022

AMD (US)$ million

Samsung (KR)Xilinx (US)

200

100

STMicroelectronics (CH)Infineon (DE)0

Microchip Technology…
Micron (US)

Source: KSE Institute

Figure 13: Imports from Select Companies by Country$ million

300

200

By country of delivery (seller)

Other
TurkeyVietnam
Korea
EU
China (incl. HK)

400

300

$ million400

By country of origin (producer)

Other
TaiwanEU
Malaysia
VietnamChina (incl. HK)

200

100

100

0

0

Source: KSE Institute

3. U.S.-based companies dominate. A closer look at the companies involved showsthat U.S.-based entities represent the largest share – and it has in fact increased since
the full-scale invasion (see Figure 14). In 2021, U.S. companies accounted for 45% ofimports; by Q4 2022, this number rose to 68%. South Korean entities are the secondbiggest player, but their share has fallen from 23% to 14%.
4. Continued sales of semiconductors. In line with our earlier finding that high-quality
substitutes for Western semiconductors are difficult to find, we see that these products
have grown in importance. Not only have their sales to Russia more than recoveredfrom the post-sanction drop (+120% in Q4 2022 vs. 2021 average), they make up alarger share of the total now – 70% in Q4 2022 vs. 43% in 2021 (see Figure 15).

18

Figure 14: Imports by Location of Headquarter
400

Other
Switzerland
Japan
EU
Korea
USA

$ million

300

200

100

0

Source: KSE Institute

Figure 15: Imports from Select Companies by Type400

Drones and components
Other$ million

300

Military Navigation and Sensor
Systems
Automotive Components andEquipment
Electrical and Electronic
Equipment and Components
Communication Equipment

200

100

Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec

0

2021

Computer Components andModules
Semiconductors

2022
Source: KSE Institute

Key Companies: How Western Critical Components Reach Russia
Finally, we analyze how goods produced on behalf of major Western companies reached
Russia in March-December 2022 (see Figure 16):26
1. Production locations. Close to 80% of all critical components were produced in four
countries: China (27%), Malaysia (22%), Vietnam (18%), and South Korea (13%).

26

The sample of 12 companies includes AMD, Analog Devices, Infineon, Intel, LG, Microchip
Technology, Renesas, Samsung, Safran, STMicroelectronics, Texas Instruments, and Thales, which
accounted for roughly $1.7 billion in Russian imports of critical components in March-December 2022.

19

2. Export locations. In terms of the countries from which these goods were ultimately
exported to Russia, three are of particular importance and together account for, again,
close to 80% of the total: Hong Kong (46%), China (25%), and Turkey (8%).
3. Structures differ across companies. We do not find a common pattern; goods fromdifferent producers are manufactured in different locations and reach Russia throughdifferent countries and intermediaries (see Appendix 4).
Figure 16: Flow of Major Companies’ Goods to Russia in March-December 2022

Source: KSE Institute *charts shows Russian imports of critical components from the twelve largest suppliers in
March-December 2022; percentages show distribution on each level and numbers in parentheses denote tradevalues in $ million in March-December 2022

20

Box 1. Components Trade in 2023
Based on partial data for a subset of goods – 223 of the 386 10-digit codes included in our
main analysis – we are able to investigate how trade with certain “critical components”
developed in Q1 2023.27 In the first three months of the year, Russian imports of theseproducts reached $5.4 billion, a 14% drop compared to Q4 2022 (see Figure 17). While thismay indicate a reduced ability to acquire key inputs for military production, it could also
represent more successful concealment of transactions.
While we see a decline in imports in Q1 2023 overall, some subcategories recorded
significant increases, including electrical and electronic equipment and components (+18%vs. Q4 2022), automotive components and equipment (+24%), military navigation andsensor systems (+27%), and bearings and similar parts (+28%).
For one of the most important categories of “critical components” – semiconductors28 –, wefind a 23% decrease from Q4 2022 to Q1 2023.29 44% of their Q1 imports were produced in– and 83% shipped to Russia from – China, including Hong Kong (see Figure 18). While
China dominates in these categories, it is important to emphasize, again, that these goods
are to a large extent manufactured on behalf of companies with headquarters in the West,
including in the U.S. and EU., taking advantage of their global production infrastructure.
Figure 17: Imports of Critical Components by Type
4,000

Bearings and other
3,500
Military Navigation and Sensor
Systems

2,500

Automotive Components andEquipment$ million

3,000

2,000

Semiconductors

1,500
1,000

Communication Equipment

500

Electrical and Electronic
Equipment and Components-

Computer Components andModules
Source: KSE InstituteRussian imports of this subset amounted to $6.2 billion in Q4 2022 – close to 70% of the total for all
386 codes ($8.5 billion). For full-2022, the share was also 70% ($18.2 billion vs. $26.0 billion).
28
Including integrated circuits.
29
The subset includes 14 codes in the area of semiconductors vs. 37 codes used in the full analysis.
Imports of those goods amounted to $692 million in Q4 2022 – 75% of the total for all semiconductor
categories ($947 million). For full-2022, the respective share was also 75% ($1.8 billion vs. $2.4 billion).
27

21

Figure 18: Imports of Semiconductors by Country of Origin
-

20

40

60

80

100
China
Malaysia
Taiwan,CN
USA
Philippines
Thailand
VietnamSouth Korea
Japan
FranceOther

Jan-23

Feb-23Mar-23

Source: KSE Institute

IV. Policy Recommendations: Stepped-up Enforcement
We find that continued imports of critical components by Russia are manifestations of several
separate issues of the export controls regime: (1) Entities under coalition jurisdiction engage
in sanctions violations; in other words, they undertake activities that are illegal. (2) Entities
under coalition jurisdiction engage in sanctions circumvention; in other words, they
undertake activities that are legal but opposed to the sanctions regime’s objectives. (3) Entities
outside of coalition jurisdiction, i.e., third-country actors, contribute to sanctions violations
and/or circumvention. These distinct phenomena require specific policy responses.
It is important to recognize that certain potential inputs for military production are still notcovered by export controls. As a result, Russian imports of some critical components do notin all cases represent sanctions violations and/or circumvention.
To limit Russia’s access to inputs for its military production should be a top priority for Ukraine’s
allies; almost no other single issue is so directly linked to the objective of bringing Russia’s
war of aggression, including its attacks on civilians, to an end, and minimizing the risk of
Russia’s future aggression. Thus, we believe that the area of export controls is where thecoalition should undertake the most decisive measures – and where it should employ its
enforcement capabilities first and foremost.
To improve enforcement:
1. Information exchange. In our view, the first step to more effective enforcement ofmilitary and dual-use goods export controls is better exchange of information. Detailed
data on transactions is available in a timely manner, including for sensitive tradeactivities such as those with critical military or dual-use components. This includes datafrom customs services in sanctions coalition countries as well as data from third
countries that can be acquired directly or through independent providers such as
Export Genius. Authorities should set up systems through which information can beshared effectively – including by the academic/think tank community.
2. Joint investigations. In addition to the exchange of information, authorities in coalition
countries should cooperate closely when it comes to investigations of sanctions

22

violations or circumvention. Often, the trade with critical components involves multiple
actors in many jurisdictions which cannot be investigated by any single agency. Joint
efforts in this area would also limit the extent to which nefarious actors can do“jurisdiction shopping”. Especially in the European Union, where sanctions (and export
controls) implementation remains the responsibility of member states, improvements
would be of critical importance.
3. Utilization of AML framework. Schemes to violate or circumvent sanctions, including
export controls, are similar to those that are being used for money laundering or
proliferation, including opaque ownership structures and frequent changes tostructures and actors involved in activities. This also means, however, that theregulatory framework for the monitoring of these schemes is already in place to a
substantial extent. Sanctions coalition authorities should vigorously enforce existing
regulations and apply them to the area of export controls. In particular, the AML
framework can be applied to track structures in third countries which are of criticalimportance for both production and exports to Russia of many inputs for military
production. As we illustrated above, many of these goods do not ever physically touchsanctions coalition jurisdiction.
4. Financial sector measures. We believe that financial sector sanctions can play a
critical role in the enforcement of other restrictions – from export controls to the G7/EU
oil price caps – due to financial institutions’ critical role in cross-border transactions.
Limiting channels through which Russian entities can make payments for imports
should be limited through additional sanctions on Russian banks. This would leavespecific channels that can be monitored more effectively. Companies should also be
required to provide information to banks if they are asking to process payments forshipments of goods that may be under export-controls.
To address sanctions violations:
9. Engagement with key companies. Authorities should engage with the companies
whose products are being exported to Russia. Many large companies have extensive
risk management and compliance structures which would allow them to minimize therisk to unknowingly violate export controls; what is likely missing at this point is a senseof urgency to do so. From a public opinion perspective, companies should be verymuch interested in avoiding having their products identified in Russian weaponry foundon the battlefield or being used for attacks on Ukrainian civilians. As far as small-andmedium enterprises (SMEs) are concerned, these may actually lack the capacity to
conduct the kind of due diligence necessary. Thus, authorities should consider
providing technical assistance to enable them to track their products and limit theextent of involuntary export control violations.
10. Sharing of information with stakeholders. Clear guidance on sanctions is an
important element of such an approach as well and will need to be reviewed at regularintervals as circumvention networks adapt quickly to enforcement efforts. Companies
would also benefit from the setting-up of a database through which they can accessinformation about (potential) business partners, including company structures,
ownership, coverage by sanctions and/or information about previous violations. These23

are critical inputs for any entities’ risk assessments and need to be made available ina convenient and timely fashion.30
11. Demonstration of consequences. As we find that many of the critical componentsthat Russia continues to be able to acquire are produced on behalf of Westerncompanies, these do not appear to undertake sufficient due diligence as far as goods
under export controls are concerned. Thus, we believe that implementing agencies
need to demonstrate their commitment to preventing and/or prosecuting violations byundertaking investigations with regard to high-profile players.
12. Documentary evidence requirements. As in other areas of the sanctions complex,
we believe that enhanced documentary requirements are key as well. They should
also be accompanied by clear assignments of responsibilities for the approval oftransactions within companies.31
To address sanctions circumvention:
1. Dual-use goods lists alignment. It is critical that authorities across the sanctions
coalition align their export control regimes to close existing loopholes. The same goods
should be classified as “dual use” in all countries and criteria for licensed approvalshould be standardized. In addition, it is critical that authorities define dual-use goods
based on Harmonized System (HS) codes; otherwise, the monitoring of transactions
will be significantly more challenging.
2. Broader export controls. In several areas, export controls target very specific goods
while similar products remain excluded; as a result, the sanctions regime may misssubstitutes for controlled goods. For instance, of the 385 codes that we use for our
definition of “critical components,” only 170 are included in the EU’s list of dual-use
goods.32 This could also allow sellers and buyers to misclassify the content ofshipments on customs declarations – betting that no thorough physical inspection of
the goods will be undertaken. The issue is further complicated by the fact that
substantial advance knowledge is necessary to be able to identify specific equipment
types and distinguish export controlled and non-export controlled goods. Exemptions
for specific uses, e.g., imports by Rosatom, also represent a problem. As long as
critical components are approved for export to Russia for any reason, they will end up
being diverted and used for the war effort, rendering any controls ineffective. For
instance, only about half of the HS codes included in our definition of “criticalcomponents” are classified as dual use by the EU.
To address third-country actors:
1. Threat of secondary sanctions. The United States has previously used so-called
secondary sanctions to target third-country actors that engage with sanctioned entities.
The key for this kind of extraterritorial application of sanctions is the threat to cut off
To get banks’ “Know-your-client” (KYC) attention, a list of third-country companies should also beindexed by FACTIVA – a major business intelligence platform owned by Dow Jones. It accumulates
information from a wide scope of media sources, but not scientific publications. Once included, thisinformation will appear every time a KYC or risk management procedure is conducted.
31
For export controls, authorities could require end user agreements from all exporters, including
companies under coalition jurisdiction that produce their products in and export them from third
countries. While the legal enforceability of such agreements can be problematic, this would enticecompanies to undertake proper due diligence before engaging in any trade with military/dual-use goods.
32
For the EU list, see here.
30

24

entities from access to the U.S. dollar and the U.S. financial system. While suchmeasures are controversial and should, thus, be employed in a selective fashion, they
can be extraordinarily effective in addressing third-country loopholes. In many cases,
entities in third countries do not want to run afoul of the Office of Foreign Assets Control(OFAC) and face the aforementioned penalties. Thus, targeted threats of secondary
sanctions may be sufficient to entice cooperation in key areas.
2. New legal instrument in the EU. The European Union is fundamentally opposed tothe extraterritorial application of sanctions and, in fact, prohibits EU-based companies
from following such restrictions through the “blocking statue”. However, the EU isconsidering, in its 11th sanctions package, to create a new legal basis for theimposition of restrictions on third-country entities, which act as intermediaries andcontribute to sanctions violations by EU actors. 33 34 The EU is also considering
imposing export bans, i.e, to restrict the sale, supply, transfer, or export of certain
technologies and goods to third countries that are used by Russia as intermediaries.
3. Robust monitoring of schemes. We recognize that the relative ease (and low cost)with which new entities (i.e., shell companies) can be set up in third countries
represents a major challenge. Authorities, thus, need to constantly monitor
developments utilizing all available data sources to identify how schemes adjust to
restrictions – and revise the regime accordingly.
4. Provision of technical assistance. It should not be underestimated that some thirdcountry entities may face substantial capacity constraints when it comes to themonitoring of shipments to Russia in the context of the export controls regime. In
particular, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) may not be able to conduct the kindof due diligence that would lead to the identification of problematic transactions.
Sanctions coalition authorities should consider providing technical assistance to these
actors to reduce the number of cases in which these counteract the objective of export
controls unknowingly or unintentionally.

33

European Comission, Press statement by President von der Leyen with Ukrainian President
Zelenskyy, 2023
34
The EU has undertaken such a step, for instance, with regard to SUN Ship Management Ltd, an
UAE-incorporated ship management company that is controlled by the Russian company PAO
Sovcomflot.

25

V. Appendix
Appendix 1: Summary of Equipment and Foreign Components
Armored Drones Electronic Helicopter Missiles
Smallvehicles &warfareselectronic
artilleryequipment
devices
Microchips
48
18
19
14
145
92
(Micro-)processors
11
46
6
14
30
39
Transistors
5
18
5
1
5
14
Memory devices
4
7
17
14
5
Voltage regulators
1
23
8
2
4
Capacitors
3
1
8
3
19
Transceivers
10
3
5
10
DC-to-DC converters
6
9
1
6
5
Analog-digital converters
2
5
1
3
4
9
FPGAs
1
2
1
7
7
5
Drivers/receivers
1
14
6
2
Amplifiers
2
7
1
9
Relays3
1
2
1
7Video codecs
12
Other
32
86
16
40
16
48
Total
119
247
58
127
238
268

Total

336
146
48
47
38
34
28
27
24
23
23
19
14
12
238
1,057

Appendix 2: Foreign Companies Identified in Russian Weapons
Company
Analog Devices
Texas Instruments
Microchip Technology
Intel Corporation
AMD
Infineon Technologies
STMicroelectronics
Renesas Electronics
Vishay Intertechnologies
NXP Semiconductor
Yageo
OnsemiMicron Technologies
Murata Manufacturing
KyoceraTraco Electronic
TE Connectivity
Merrimac Industries
Anderson Electronics
SMC Corporation
Nexperia
Holt Integrated Circuits
XP-Power
U-bloxSamsung Electronics
Marvell Semiconductor
ThalesMotorola

Headquarter
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
Germany
Switzerland
Japan
United States
Netherlands
TaiwanUnited States
United States
Japan
Japan
Switzerland
Switzerland
United States
United States
Japan
Netherlands
United States
Singapore
Switzerland
South Korea
United States
FranceUnited States

Items
186
145
96
63
62
60
28
23
23
21
19
18
16
11
9
9
8
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4

Company
MaxLinear
Voltage Multipliers
Token Electronics
Michelin
Ramtron International
DFRobot Electronics
Cornell Dubilier
SECURON
TTM Technologies
Hextronik
Deyuan Technology
Lantronix
HongfaDelta Electronics
Real Support Electr.
Axis
Kodenshi Corporation
Controp
Silicon Laboratories
SemiconGuangdong Kexin Ind.
Inchange Semiconductor
Nippon Instruments
Hirose Electric
Souriau
Poccio Electronics
TelpodFuture Tech. Dev. Int.

Headquarter
United States
United States
China
FranceUnited States
United States
United States
United Kingdom
United States
United States
China
United States
China
TaiwanChina
SwedenSouth Korea
IsraelUnited States
South Korea
China
China
Japan
Japan
FranceChina
PolandUnited Kingdom

Items
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

26

TT Electronics
Littelfuse
Alliance Memory
Scientific Components
IC Haus GmbH
Macronix International
BournsSumida Corporation
VBSsemiMacom
Hitano Enterprise
Broadcom Corporation
Harting
Sony
Vicor
Silex Technology
PhilipsMornsunIDEC Corporation
Toshiba
Semtech Corporation
CTS Corporation
Wurth Elektronik
TDK Corporation
Qorvo
Fujitsu
New Jersey Semicond.
Amphenol
UN Semiconductor
HALO Electronics
WinbondHitec RCDNGK
Hemisphere GNSS
AnarenBolymin
OMRON
PlasanPanasonic
SIMCom Wireless Sol.
Coilcraft
MCL Electr. Materials
Taiwan Semiconductor
Peak Electronics
Integrated Silicon Sol.
Saito
Transcom
Phoenix Contact
AmpleonAlinx Electronic Tech.

United Kingdom
United States
United States
United States
Germany
TaiwanUnited States
Japan
China
United States
TaiwanUnited States
GermanyJapan
United States
United States
Netherlands
China
FranceJapan
United States
United States
GermanyJapan
United States
Japan
United States
United States
China
United States
TaiwanSouth Korea
Japan
United States
United States
TaiwanJapan
IsraelJapan
China
United States
China
TaiwanGermany
United States
Japan
TaiwanGermany
Philippines
China

4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1

TCB WORTH
KioxiaZ-Communications
Epson
Wolfspeed
ADLINKiFlight
3D Plus
Scorpion Power System
NVE Corporation
Ligitek Photovoltaic
Integrated Circuit Syst.
Productwell
HEICO
Molex Electronics
Nanya Technology Corp.
Mercury
M-TRON
Eaton Electronics
Dyna Logic
CML Microsystems
Futaba Corporation
Golledge Electronics
Kuwes Industry Corp.
Timoney Technology
Advanced Digital
Shenzhen Joy Battery
Cortina Systems
Transcend
Greenliant
Sonitron
DM&P Electronics
CANON
Lattice Semiconductor
ОКБ “Фотон”
Finntek
System Logic Semicond.
Brushless FanTalisman
Ebm-papst
Unisonic Technologies
Mitsubishi Electric
Weigao Group
QuartzCom
Gumstix
HitachiLG Corporation
Swatch Group
Planar Systems
Unidentified

China
TaiwanUnited States
Japan
China
TaiwanChina
United States
China
United States
TaiwanUnited States
China
United States
United States
TaiwanUnited States
United States
United States
South Korea
United Kingdom
TaiwanUnited Kingdom
TaiwanIrelandUnited States
China
United States
TaiwanUnited States
Belgium
TaiwanJapan
United States
Uzbekistan
TaiwanSouth Korea
China
CanadaGermany
United States
Japan
China
Switzerland
United States
Japan
South Korea
Switzerland
United States

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
12

27

Appendix 3: HS Codes of Critical Components
Table includes 385 10-digit HS codes which make up the universe of “critical components”.
Bold codes (223) are those in the subset of goods for which Q1 2023 data is available.
Automotive Components and Equipment
Engines and their
Electric motors
Ignition and starting Motor vehicle parts Vessels
parts
and generators equipment
and accessories
8409990009
8411123009
8411910001
8411910002
8411910008
8411990019
8412212002
8412212009
8412218008
8412298109
8412298909
8412310009
8412808009
8412904008
8412908009

8501101001
8501101009
8501109100
8501109300
8501109900
8501200009
8501310000
8501320008
8501402004
8501402009
8501408009
8501510001
8501510009
8501522001
8501522009
8501523000
8501620000

8511100009
8511300008
8511400008
8511500008
8511800008
8511900009

8708309109
8708309909
8708409909
8708509909
8708709909
8708913509
8708939009
8708949909

8907100000

8523519900
8523529001
8523529009
8523591000
8523599101
8523599109
8523809101
8523809300
8523809900
8525500000
8525600009
8525811900
8525813000
8525819100
8525891900
8525893000

8525899109
8525899900
8526100001
8526100009
8526912000
8526918000
8526920008
8527139900
8527190000
8527212009
8527911900
8527913500
8527919900
8527990000
8529101100
8529103900

8529106500
8529106901
8529106909
8529108000
8529109500
8529901027
8529902002
8529902008
8529904900
8529906502
8529906508
8529909200
8529909600

8471705000
8471707000
8471709800
8471800000

8471900000
8473299000
8473302002
8473302008

8473308000
8473502000

8504502000
8504509500
8504900600
8504901100
8504901700
8504909200

8505110000
8505191000
8505199000
8505200000
8505902009

Communication equipment
Telecommunications Radio equipment and its components
equipment
8517140000
8517610008
8517620003
8517620009
8517699000
8517711100
8517711500
8517711900
8517790009

8522904000
8523210000
8523291505
8523291509
8523293102
8523293908
8523419000
8523492500
8523493900
8523494500
8523495100
8523495900
8523511000
8523519101
8523519109
8523519300

Computer components and modules
8471300000
8471410000
8471490000
8471500000

8471606000
8471607000
8471702000
8471703000

Drones and aircraft components
8807200000

8807300000

8807900009

Electrical and electronic equipment and components
Electrical transformers, converters, and magnets
8504102000
8504108000
8504210000
8504229000
8504230009
8504312109

8504318001
8504318007
8504320002
8504320009
8504330009
8504340000

8504403008
8504403009
8504405500
8504408300
8504408500
8504408700

28

8504312909

8504403004

8504409100

8504909800

8533409000
8533900000
8534001100
8534001900
8534009000
8535100000
8535210000
8535290000
8535302000
8535400000
8535900008
8536101000
8536105000
8536109000

8536201007
8536209007
8536302000
8536304000
8536308000
8536411000
8536419000
8536490000
8536500400
8536500600
8536501109
8536501509
8536501904
8536501906

8536508008
8536611000
8536619000
8536691000
8536693000
8536699002
8536699008
8536700001
8536700002
8536700003
8536700004
8536900100
8536901000
8536908500

8537101000
8537109100
8537109800
8537209200
8537209800
8538100000
8538901200
8538909200
8538909901
8538909908
8540710009
8540890000

8543900000
8506109809
8506501000
8506503000
8506509000
8544119000
8544200000
8544300002

8544300003
8544300007
8506600000
8507202000
8507208001
8507208008
8544421000
8544429003

8544429007
8544429009
8544492000
8507302009
8507500000
8507600000
8507800009
8544499101

8544499101
8544499108
8544499309
8544499509
8544601000
8544609009
8544700000

8541600000
8541900000
8542311001
8542311009
8542319010
8542319090
8542321000
8542323100

8542323900
8542324500
8542325500
8542326100
8542326900
8542327500
8542329000
8542339000

8542391000
8542399010
8542399090
8542900000
8486909008

Electrical components and equipment
8532100000
8532210000
8532220000
8532230000
8532240000
8532250000
8532290000
8532300000
8533100000
8533210000
8533290000
8533310000
8533390000
8533401000

Batteries
8506101100
8506101801
8506101809
8506109100
8543200000
8543400000
8543703008
8543708000

Semiconductors and electronic circuits
8541100009
8541210000
8541290000
8541300009
8541410001
8541410002
8541410004
8541410006

8541410007
8541410008
8541410009
8541420000
8541430000
8541490000
8541510000
8541590000

Military navigation and sensor systems
Optical equipment
Navigation
Avionics, thermal heaters, sensors
equipment
9002110000
9002190000
9002200000
9002900009
9005100000
9013200000
9013800000
9013900000

Automatic control
instruments

9014100000
9014202009
9014208001
9014208009
9014800000
9014900000
9015101000
9015401000
9015900000

9025192000
9025198009
9025804000
9025808000
9025900003
9025900008
9026108900
9029203809
9029900009

9030310000
9030320009
9030331000
9030339900
9030390009
9030400000
9030820000
9030899009
9030908500

9032102000
9032108100
9032108900
9032200000
9032810000
9032890000
9032900000

8482101009
8482109001
8482109008
8482200009
8482400009
8482500009

8482990000
8483109500
8483200000
8483303209
8483308007
8483402100

8483402308
8483402500
8483402900
8483403009
8483405900
8483502000

8483508000
8483608000
8483908909
9020000000
9023008000

Other
3926300000
3926400000
3926909200
3926909706
3926909707
3926909709

29

Appendix 4: Trade Flow Illustrations for Major Companies
Intel Corporation

Samsung

Analog Devices

Texas Instruments

30

AMD

STMicroelectronics

Infineon Technologies

Microchip Technology

31

Thales**

Safran**LG Corporation

Renesas Electronics

Source: KSE Institute *charts shows Russian imports of critical components; percentages show distribution on each level and numbers in parentheses denote trade values in$ million in March-December 2022 **data for location of export missing in some/many cases

32