Title

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in
Resolving Labour Conflicts : In Comparison Japan
with Australia and the UK

Author(s)Nose, Masaharu

Citation

国際公共政策研究. 2018, 23(1), p. 51-73

Version Type VoR
URL

https://doi.org/10.18910/70591

rights
Note

Osaka University Knowledge Archive : OUKA
https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/
Osaka University

51


Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving
Labour Conflicts―In Comparison Japan with Australia and the UK―*
Masaharu NOSE**

Refereed Article
Received: 3 April 2018, Accepted: 3 September 2018
Abstract
As industrial structures are changing, the nature and the way of resolving each country's labour conflicts in the workplace is also changing. About 50 years ago in Japan, most conflicts in the workplace were resolved by labour unions.
But now the number of collective labour disputes are much smaller, but on the other hand the number of individual labour conflicts is larger.
In this article, by comparing systems in Japan to those of Australia and the UK, I argue that there are insufficient coordination systems in Japan regarding the resolution of individual labour conflicts, especially by administrative bodies.
Namely, (1) The amount of advice and conciliation by administrative bodies involved in solving labour conflicts in Japan should be increased. (2) A rule for a compulsory conference by administrative bodies in Japan should be introduced.
(3) Early conciliation systems by administrative bodies should be introduced in Japan.
Importantly, the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan should support more individual employees through these threepoints as industrial structures are changing.

Keywords：early conciliation, compulsory conference, workplace rights, individual worker, fairness at work.

My special thanks to Professor Richard Mitchell and Professor Carolyn Sutherland. I received guidance when I visited Monash University as a visiting scholar in 2014.
**
Professor, Graduate School of Sociology, Kwansei Gakuin University.
*

52

国際公共政策研究第 23 巻第１号

1. Introduction
Recently, collective labour-management relations have not worked sufficiently to resolve labour problems inJapan. The Dentsu Company's “overtime work hour death case” in December 2015 is a case symbolizing theissue. Also, the Dentsu case symbolizes the seriousness of the overtime work issue in Japan. This case coupledwith the government's "Work Style Reform" has evolved into reform of overtime management, and reform ofsupervisory administrations. At last on April 6th, 2018, the Government presented the Work-Style ReformRelated Bills to the Diet and the Act on the arrangement of Related Acts to promote work Style Reform1 wasenacted on June 29th, 2018.
In the era of collective labour-management relations, labour problems in the workplace were corrected by alabour-management council before a problem became complicated. But recently many labour problems in theworkplace remain unresolved. In the background of those circumstances, there is an increase of irregular workers,
including dispatch workers, and a decrease of trade union membership density. Also, in recent years, personal
performance and responsibility of outcomes have increased. As a result, the reconciliation function by collective
labour-management relations is deteriorating. This structural problem symbolized by the Dentsu case is acommon problem leading to increased bullying, abuse of authority and sexual harassment.
In this paper, from the viewpoint of ADR (alternative dispute resolutions), I will discuss administrative bodies
involved in solving labour conflicts in the workplace in comparison to Australia, and the UK, in order to realize
fairness at work in Japan. (In Australia, administrative bodies involved in labour problems get good results in
non-enforcement efforts and in ADR efforts, and in the UK independent statutory bodies backed up by the courts
are active in non-judicial efforts and gets good results.)
Firstly, through the problem of long overtime working hours in the workplace which is becoming social issue,
I point out that actual practices in the workplace such as in-house adjustment or a conciliation by administrative
agencies, is more effective. Secondly, I point out that protection by collective labour management relations has
been weakened in recent years. As a result, individual labour management relations are diffused, and the numberof non-protected workers has increased.
Finally, I argue that assistance like conciliation by administrative agencies, which is widely practiced inAustralia and the UK, but is not widely practiced in Japan, is effective for protecting employees efficiently in thepresent workplace in Japan.

2. Identification of Problems
Besides long overtime working hour problems and labour condition problems, there are various individual
labour problems occurring in the workplace, such as bullying, abuse of authority, sexual harassment, etc. However,a common feature of these diverse labour problems is not based on collective labour-management relations, buton the relationship between an individual employee and a company. It is not a collective relationship between a
trade union and a company. A victim is not a group, but an individual worker. Given the problem of death from1

The Act on the arrangement of Related Acts to promote work Style Reform, Act No.71, 2018.

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

53

long overtime working hours like in the Dentsu case, the remedy is to figure out how to back up an individual
when an injustice problem occurs in the workplace.
In other words, a new solution mechanism is necessary for an individual in order to resolve individual labour
problems that are not sufficiently addressed in accordance with changes in the times.

2.1: Problems of Long Overtime Working Hours in Japan
Considering the problem of long overtime working hours in the workplace, it was usually handled by apermanent labour-management council, a labour department, or a shop steward. If there were signs of healthcomplaints or health problems from employees, the problem was systematically resolved by the mechanism ofcollective labour-management relations. However, like the Dentsu case, in recent years, Section 36 of the Labour
Standards Act and collective labour-management mechanisms are not functioning well, as compared to those in
the era of the industrial society (pre-information society).
Looking at the situation of the “Section 36 Agreement”2 (Table 1), the percentage of coverage of agreements
is about 47% in business establishments with 9 or fewer people, so the percentage is less than half. In businessestablishments with less than 30 people, the percentage of agreements is about 50%. Similarly, looking at thesituation of the “Section 36 Agreement” by type of industry (retail, restaurants, etc), the percentage is low ataround 50%. The mechanism of the “Section 36 Agreement” has not spread to industries that seem to have many
problems with long overtime working hours.
Table 1. Situation of Labour-Management Agreement (Section 36) as to "Overtime Work / Work on
Holidays" by Size of the Business㻌 persons

1-9

10--30(1-30)

31-100101-300

301-

Situation of labourmanagementagreement (%)

46.8

77.4

(52.5)

90.1

94.9

96.1

(source)㻌 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,” Survey on comprehensive actual conditions of working hours, 2013.

Table 2. Number of Employees by Size of Employment (non-agricultural, non-forestry sectors), 2012
7RWDO
１～４ ５～９ 10～19 20～29 30～49 50～99 100～299 300～499 500～999 1000～  






 











 









JRYHUQPHQW
DJHQF\





RWKHUV




(source) written by the author, based on the Annual Labor Force Survey, 2012.

In the past, fairness at work and labour-management equality were practiced by collective labour-management
relations. In recent years, the practice of collective labour-management relations has been insufficient, so
individuals are exposed to weak positions including long overtime working hour problems, without being aided
and protected. A new practice or mechanism that can ensure labour-management equality is needed.

2

The Fair Labour Standard Act, Act No.49, 1947.

54

第 23 巻第１号

国際公共政策研究2.2: Insufficient Coordinating Mechanism in Japan
1) Issue of Long Overtime Working Hour Problems
Looking at the ripple in society from long-time labour problems symbolized by the Dentsu case from theviewpoint of (1) “Social standards (including law) and normative mechanisms”, the amendment of Section 36
results in a reform of social standards and norms. This reform started with the decision of the Action Plan for the
Realization of Work Style Reform by the Council for the Realization of Work Style Reform (2017.3.28.).
Currently, Section 36 is insufficient to rectify firms with long overtime working hour problems, and is only meant
to use minimal effort to help parties deal with their current situation, in regards to current laws and workplace
norms. In order to be able to rectify firms with long overtime working hour problems, a drastic improvement bymaking new rules is necessary for within and outside of the organization. But the new clarification of the legal
criteria of the ceiling control of long overtime working hours3 is big progress, apart from the adequacy of degree.
However, in addition to reform (setting) of this legal standard, a further important point is (2) the “support
mechanism of coordination (conciliation)”. Such organizations as cannot improve unfair practices cannot rectify
unfairness or reconcile disputes, no matter how strict the standards become. According to the Nikkei public
opinion survey (implemented in March 2017 with 943 respondents), which concerned the reform of the upper
limit of long overtime working hours by law, looking at the response rate to the question of"Do you think actual

long overtime working hours will actually decrease by regulating the upper limit of long overtime working hours
by law?”:
A.1. “I think that long overtime working hours will decrease” was 24% (Table 3),
A.2. “I think that it will not change” was 65%,
A.3. “I think overtime hours will increase” was 6%,
A.4. “I do not know” was 5%.
The sum of A2 and A3 is 71 %. The result of the survey does not necessarily mean that the amendment of thelaw is effective.
Table 3. The Attitude Survey on Overtime Work Hours Restrictions(n=943)
No.
Question
100 (％)
A.1.
Overtime hours will decrease.
24
A.2.
It won’t change.
65
A.3.
Overtime hours will increase.
6
A.4.
I do not know.
5（source）written by the author, based on the survey conducted by Nikkei in March．

2) Not Enough Working Corrective Mechanisms in the Workplace
The unfairness problem in the workplace is not improved easily. Workplace culture affects employee's behavior.
It is the reason why the unfairness problem in the workplace is not improved only by law. There are many cases
where the problem arises again because a company could not step in to reform workplace norms (workplaceculture). Namely, companies tend to justify the situation contrary to legal norms based on its workplace culture(workplace norms), and do not recognize the problem itself as "unfair".

3

The Work-Style Reform-Related Bills

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

55

In such cases, no matter how many times a company change rules, as corporate culture is not corrected, theremediation mechanism does not operate as expected. If a company does not refresh the corporate culture whichshould be corrected, the results will be similar. In other words, even if a company removes the surface of the
problem, the problem persists because the corporate culture does not change.
If a company cannot correct an injustice within the company, unfairness within the company will need to berectified by the social system. About 50 years ago, unfairness within the company was corrected by collective
labour-management relations.
However, as individualization of labour problems is progressing now, it is not easily able to cover the wholeby “collective labour-management relations” alone.

3) Insufficient Coordination Mechanism Between an Individual Employee and Management
In general, there are two mechanisms, regardless of collective labour problems or individual labour problems,
when we consider a correction. One is (1) “Mechanism of social standards and norms” and the other is (2)“Support mechanism of coordination (conciliation)”.
These mechanisms complement each other and labour problems are resolved. When a collective labour
problem happens in Japan, it is resolved by civil courts, employment tribunals, administrative organizations
such as the Labour Relations Commission of the Independent Administrative Committee and the Prefectural
Labour Committee, etc. which are based on the Trade Union Law, the Labour Relations Reconciliation Law,
workplace norms, and collective norms, etc.
On the other hand, the number of individual labour problems are increasing 4 . When an individual labour
problem happens, it is resolved by various organizations such as the the Prefectural Labour Bureau 5 , andadministrative organizations of prefectures and cities as practical organizations, based on the Civil Code, theLabour Standards Law, and the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes enforced
in 20016, etc.
After the Industrial Revolution, three primary labour rights were established as industrial relations mechanisms
for protecting workers of trade unions (collective labour-management relations). Like these, mechanisms(individual labour-management relations) for protecting individual workers should be developed.
In particular, (2) “Support mechanism of coordination” has not responded to the need of current individual
labour-management relations. If an individual labour problem cannot be resolved within the enterprise, (2)“Support mechanism of coordination (conciliation)” from outside the company is necessary. The mechanism is
not an enforcement procedure, but a mechanism to back up the correction function and reconciliation function
between the parties. (Many actual problems occur even in meeting regulation criteria.)
In addition, it is important that an individual labour problem should be reconciled early before problems
become serious. If a reconciliation mechanism within an organization does not function, or if it cannot be expected,
help for them from outside a company is needed.

With collective labor disputes sharply decreasing, it became a matter of discussion that individual labor-management conflict coordination
system is needed in the latter half of the 1990s, and as a result, the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes came tolegislation in 2001 and the Labor Tribunal Act was established in 2004.
5
The Japanese name in roman letters is “To Dou Fu Ken Roudou Kyoku”.
6This law was established for the first time in order to settle individual labor disputes.
4

56

国際公共政策研究第 23 巻第１号

In order to realize fairness at work, it is necessary to establish a mechanism to conciliate individual labour
problems which are increasing in the modern society. In particular, there is a need to improve (2) “Support
mechanism of coordination (conciliation)”.

3. Mechanism of Remediation of Individual Labour Problems in Japan: Status andCharacteristics of the Prefectural Labour Bureau, the Labour Standards Inspection
OfficeThere are two major approaches to resolve individual labour problems in Japan. One is from the viewpoint ofsocial standards and rules. For example, resolution of long overtime working hour problems by Section 36 of thelabour Standards Act, which is based on social standards and rules. The second major approach is through areconciliation mechanism for individual labour problems. For example, from outside of an enterprise, advice andconciliation services are currently provided by the the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan.
In recent times, the number of labour problem cases that trade unions resolve has decreased. On the other hand,the number of cases in which the parties could not conciliate because of lack of help from outside the company
is increasing. Therefore, in Japan "the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes"
passed the Diet in 2001, in response to the increase in individual labour disputes 7 in society. This act made it
possible for the Prefectural Labour Bureau to conciliate individual labour disputes.
When I review individual labour dispute resolutions by administrative institutions internationally, I can pointout three characteristics regarding conflict coordination with the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan. First of all,in Japan there is little advice and conciliation by the Prefectural Labour Bureau. Looking at the number of thosein the fiscal year 2016, there were about 1,130,000 labour consultations, but the number of applications foradvice/guidance was 8,976 (0.79%), and the number of applications for conciliation was only 5,123 (0.45 %)(Table 4).
For several years after the “Lehman shock”, consultation on “dismissal” was the largest number ofconsultations among civil labour counseling cases (247,302 in FY2009), but now it is in the third place with
36,760 cases, while "bullying and harassment" which was in the third place at that time, is ranked first with
70,917 cases. The contents of consultation in the workplace has changed greatly.
Table 4. Changes Numbers of Incidents of Labour Consultations, Advice/Guidance, and Conciliation(the Prefectural Labour Bureau)㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼘㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼟㼡㼘㼠㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻔㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼏㼛㼚㼟㼡㼘㼠㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻎㻌㻕㻔㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻩㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻕㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼕㼚㼐㼕㼢㼕㼐㼡㼍㼘㻌㼏㼕㼢㼕㼘㻌㼘㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼐㼕㼟㼜㼡㼠㼑㼟㻔㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼕㼚㼐㼕㼢㼕㼐㼡㼍㼘㻌㼏㼕㼢㼕㼘㻌㼘㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼐㼕㼟㼜㼡㼠㼑㼟㻌㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻎㻌㻕㻔㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻩㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻕
Number of advice/guidance ｏｆｆｅｒｓ received(Number of advice/guidance ｏｆｆｅｒｓ received per "labor force 1,000 persons" )㻔㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻩㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻕
Number of applicatioｓ for conciliation received(Number of applicatioｓ for conciliation received per "labor force 1,000 persons" )㻔㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻩㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻕㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻲㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻔㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻝
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻞
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻡
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻢
㻝㻘㻝㻟㻜㻘㻞㻟㻠 㻝㻘㻝㻜㻥㻘㻠㻡㻠 㻝㻘㻜㻢㻣㻘㻞㻝㻜 㻝㻘㻜㻡㻜㻘㻜㻠㻞 㻝㻘㻜㻟㻟㻘㻜㻠㻣 㻝㻘㻜㻟㻠㻘㻥㻟㻢 㻝㻘㻝㻟㻜㻘㻣㻠㻝 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻣㻚㻜
㻝㻢㻚㻤
㻝㻢㻚㻟
㻝㻡㻚㻥
㻝㻡㻚㻢
㻝㻡㻚㻢
㻝㻢㻚㻥
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻥㻤㻚㻞
㻥㻠㻚㻠
㻥㻞㻚㻥
㻥㻝㻚㻠
㻥㻝㻚㻢
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻞㻠㻢㻘㻥㻜㻣
㻞㻡㻢㻘㻟㻠㻟
㻞㻡㻠㻘㻣㻝㻥 㻞㻠㻡㻘㻣㻤㻟㻞㻟㻤㻘㻤㻜㻢 㻞㻠㻡㻘㻝㻞㻡㻞㻡㻡㻘㻠㻢㻜
㻟㻚㻣
㻟㻚㻥
㻟㻚㻥
㻟㻚㻣
㻟㻚㻢
㻟㻚㻣
㻟㻚㻤 㻙
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻜㻟㻚㻤
㻝㻜㻟㻚㻞
㻥㻥㻚㻡
㻥㻢㻚㻣
㻥㻥㻚㻟
㻝㻜㻟㻚㻡
㻣㻘㻢㻥㻞
㻥㻘㻡㻥㻜
㻝㻜㻘㻟㻢㻟
㻝㻜㻘㻜㻞㻠㻥㻘㻠㻣㻝㻤㻘㻥㻞㻡㻤㻘㻥㻣㻢 㻜㻚㻣㻥
㻜㻚㻝㻞
㻜㻚㻝㻡
㻜㻚㻝㻢
㻜㻚㻝㻡
㻜㻚㻝㻠
㻜㻚㻝㻟
㻜㻚㻝㻟
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻞㻠㻚㻣
㻝㻟㻠㻚㻣
㻝㻟㻜㻚㻟
㻝㻞㻟㻚㻝
㻝㻝㻢㻚㻜
㻝㻝㻢㻚㻣 㻙
㻢㻘㻟㻥㻜
㻢㻘㻡㻝㻜
㻢㻘㻜㻠㻣
㻡㻘㻣㻝㻞
㻡㻘㻜㻝㻜
㻠㻘㻣㻣㻡
㻡㻘㻝㻞㻟 㻜㻚㻠㻡
㻜㻚㻝㻜
㻜㻚㻝㻜
㻜㻚㻜㻥
㻜㻚㻜㻥
㻜㻚㻜㻤
㻜㻚㻜㻣
㻜㻚㻜㻤
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻜㻝㻚㻥
㻥㻠㻚㻢
㻤㻥㻚㻠
㻣㻤㻚㻠
㻣㻠㻚㻣
㻤㻜㻚㻞 㻙
㻢㻢㻘㻟㻝㻣㻚㻡 㻢㻡㻘㻥㻡㻡㻚㻜 㻢㻡㻘㻢㻡㻝㻚㻣 㻢㻡㻘㻥㻞㻣㻚㻡 㻢㻢㻘㻜㻤㻣㻚㻡 㻢㻢㻘㻞㻠㻣㻚㻡 㻢㻢㻘㻣㻟㻜㻚㻤（source）written by the author, based on “The state of enforcement of Individual labor dispute resolution systems, 201617”(mhlw) and “OECD Data”.

Noriaki Kojima, 1992, “Dispute Resolution (DR) in the Enterprise”, Journal of labour law No.80: On the System to settle labour disputes, Japan
Labor Law Association.

7

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

57

Table 5. Changes of Numbers and Ratios by Settlement Categories of Labor Tribunal Cases
㻞㻜㻝㻟
㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘
㻟㻘㻢㻝㻞 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㼟㼑㼠㼠㼘㼑㼐㻌㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻚㻞㻘㻡㻞㻤 㻣㻜㻚㻜㼟㼑㼠㼠㼘㼑㼐㻌㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼛㼚㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻞㻠㻚㻝㻡㻥㻠㻚㻠㼣㼕㼠㼔㼐㼞㼍㼣㼍㼘㻌㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻚㻞㻢㻜㻣㻚㻞㼞㼑㼖㼑㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻘㼑㼠㼏㻚㻝㻡㻜㻚㻠㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼘㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼠㼞㼕㼎㼡㼚㼍㼘㻌㼖㼡㼐㼓㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㻚㻢㻡㻜 㻝㻤㻚㻜㻞㻜㻝㻠㻟㻘㻠㻜㻤 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻞㻘㻟㻝㻠
㻢㻣㻚㻥
㻝㻡㻜
㻠㻚㻠
㻞㻥㻞
㻤㻚㻢
㻝㻥
㻜㻚㻢
㻢㻟㻟
㻝㻤㻚㻢

㻞㻜㻝㻡
㻟㻘㻢㻣㻠 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻞㻘㻠㻥㻣
㻢㻤㻚㻜
㻝㻥㻟
㻡㻚㻟
㻟㻠㻜
㻥㻚㻟
㻟㻜
㻜㻚㻤
㻢㻝㻠
㻝㻢㻚㻣

（source）written by the author, based on “the White Paper on Attorneys 2016” (JFBA).

8,000
7,000
6,000
labourrelated civil
cases

5,000
4,000

labourtribunal
cases

3,000

total

2,000
1,000

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

0

（source）written by the author, based on “Trend of labour-related civil ･ administrative cases” Lawyers
Association journal, The Supreme Court General Secretariat.
Fig. 1. Changes of Numbers of Civil Labour Suits and Petitions for Labour Tribunal Proceedings

The second point is that the amount of counseling has increased since the establishment of the system, but theamount of applications for conciliation has been on a downward trend since the fiscal year 2010

(Table4)

Furthermore, looking at the rate of application of advice offered and conciliation against the amount of
individual labour dispute counseling on civil cases, the advice application rate peaked at 4.1% in the fiscal year
2012, but in the fiscal year 2016 it declined to 3.5% (Table 6).
The conciliation application rate has also declined to peak at 2.6% in the fiscal year 2010, and it was sluggish
around 2.0% in the fiscal year 2016.
Table 6. Ratio of Advice/Guidance and Conciliation to Consultation㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㼐㼢㼕㼏㼑㻛㼓㼡㼕㼐㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㼛㼒㼒㼑㼞㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼍㼜㼜㼘㼕㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼒㼛㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜㻟㻚㻝㻑㻞㻚㻢㻑㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻝㻟㻚㻣㻑㻞㻚㻡㻑㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻞㻠㻚㻝㻑㻞㻚㻠㻑㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟㻠㻚㻝㻑㻞㻚㻟㻑㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠㻠㻚㻜㻑㻞㻚㻝㻑㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻡㻟㻚㻢㻑㻝㻚㻥㻑㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻢㻟㻚㻡㻑㻞㻚㻜㻑(source）written by the author, based on“The state of enforcement of Individual labor dispute resolution systems, 2016-17”(mhlw).

58

第 23 巻第１号

国際公共政策研究

The third point is that the cutoff rate (3,141 in the fiscal year 2015) was as high as 55.2% (Table 7). In particular,
the discontinuance rate of cases due to the absence of opponents was as high as 37.0%.
The features of these three points are serious obstacles when the Prefectural Labour Bureau resolves or adjusts
individual labour issues, so I feel the necessity of reforming the system in Japan. This point will be further
discussed in comparison with Australia later.
Table 7. Status of Practice of Labor Tribunal Proceedings㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘㼎㼑㼒㼛㼞㼑㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻔㻭㻕㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻔㻮㻕㼟㼡㼎㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻔㻭㻕㻗㻔㻮㻕㼣㼕㼠㼔㼐㼞㼍㼣㼍㼘discontinuance (nonparticipation)（A)discontinuance (others)（B)
sub total（A)+（B)㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼠㼔㼑㼞㼟㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟㻔㻮㻕
㻠㻘㻢㻣㻥
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻝㻣
㻞㻚㻡
㻝㻘㻣㻞㻜
㻟㻢㻚㻤
㻝㻘㻤㻟㻣
㻟㻥㻚㻟
㻞㻝㻤
㻠㻚㻣
㻝㻘㻢㻣㻣
㻟㻡㻚㻤
㻥㻠㻞
㻞㻜㻚㻝
㻞㻘㻢㻝㻥
㻡㻢㻚㻜
㻡
㻜㻚㻝

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠
㻡㻘㻜㻠㻡
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻥㻝
㻝㻚㻤
㻝㻘㻤㻜㻠
㻟㻡㻚㻤
㻝㻘㻤㻥㻡
㻟㻣㻚㻢
㻞㻣㻣
㻡㻚㻡
㻝㻘㻥㻟㻠
㻟㻤㻚㻟
㻥㻝㻢
㻝㻤㻚㻞
㻞㻘㻤㻡㻜
㻡㻢㻚㻡
㻞㻟
㻜㻚㻡

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻡㻔㻭㻕㻡㻘㻢㻤㻤 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻞㻣
㻞㻚㻞
㻞㻘㻜㻥㻤
㻟㻢㻚㻥
㻞㻘㻞㻞㻡
㻟㻥㻚㻝
㻟㻜㻣
㻡㻚㻠
㻞㻘㻝㻜㻞
㻟㻣㻚㻜
㻝㻘㻜㻟㻥
㻝㻤㻚㻟
㻟㻘㻝㻠㻝
㻡㻡㻚㻞
㻝㻡
㻜㻚㻟

（A) - (B)㻝㻘㻜㻜㻥 （100.0）
㻝㻜
㻝㻚㻜
㻟㻣㻤
㻟㻣㻚㻡
㻤㻥
㻠㻞㻡
㻥㻣

㻤㻚㻤
㻠㻞㻚㻝
㻥㻚㻢

㻝㻜

㻝㻚㻜

(source）written by the author, based on “The state of enforcement of Individual labor dispute resolution systems, 201617”(mhlw).

In addition, when I look at the characteristics of "declaration processing situation" of the Labour Standards
Inspection Office (Table 8), I found the number of declared cases of individual conflicts was 26,280 cases (2015),
so this number is larger than the amount of advice/conciliation given by the Prefectural Labour Bureau and otheragencies.
Table 8. Status of Practice of Labor Standards Inspection Office (Report Inspection)
reports received
workplaces inspectedviolated workplaces
violation ratio (%)

㻞㻜㻝㻟㻞㻥㻘㻟㻝㻤
㻞㻟㻘㻠㻜㻤
㻝㻣㻘㻟㻞㻟㻣㻠㻚㻜㻞㻜㻝㻠㻞㻣㻘㻜㻤㻥
㻞㻞㻘㻠㻟㻜
㻝㻢㻘㻟㻞㻝㻣㻞㻚㻤㻞㻜㻝㻡㻞㻢㻘㻞㻤㻜
㻞㻞㻘㻟㻝㻞
㻝㻡㻘㻣㻤㻞
㻣㻜㻚㻣(source）written by the author, based on “Status of Practice of Labor Standards Inspection Office” Labor Standards
Inspection Administration,2017,(mhlw).

It is a feature of the “practice of the Labour Standards Inspection Office” that the main category in the numberof declared cases is the matter concerning non-payment of wages, rather than dismissal, bullying, harassment,
etc. Looking at the year 2015, 22,362 cases (85.1%) were nonpayment of wages, and 4,017 (15.3%) weredismissals8. In Japan, the Prefectural Labour Bureau is very different from the Labour Standard Inspection Officein the way they support employees.
The Dentsu incident triggered the oversight of long overtime working hours, by implementing a new restriction
under the law. But there are some problems in how to do it. This point will be discussed in comparison with the
UK and Australia later.

8

The number of cases is including duplicate cases.

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

59

4. The UK’s New Trends; Comparison With ACAS
ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service) 9 was established in the UK by the Employment
Protection Act 197510 as an independent statutory body in 1976. It provides conciliation, impartial advice andinformation for free to resolve workplace problems.
There are four features11 of ACAS’s service as follows: (1) ACAS uses “the code of practice”12 flexibly13. (2)Conciliation by ACAS is respected14 by ET (Employment Tribunal)15. (3) ACAS’s conciliation is done according
to the type of a labour dispute. (4) ACAS’s conciliation must be done before ET. The "Conciliation First" Principle
was prescribed by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 201316 (Section 7.“Conciliation before institutionof proceedings”, Section 8 and Section 9). By this Act, if an employee wants to make a claim to the Employment
Tribunal, conciliation should be attempted by ACAS before a trial.
When I look at the number of complaints handled by ACAS in the fiscal year 2016, the National Helpline
received 886,929 telephone calls. On the other hand, the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan received 1,130,741
cases, or 1.3 times the inquiries of ACAS (Table 9). But when I look at the size of the labour forces, the numberof ACAS’s labour consultations is 1.58 times, the number of ACAS’s advice/guidance offers received is 20.6
times, and the number of ACAS’s applications for conciliation received is 7.3 times, those of the Prefectural
Labour Bureau of Japan.
It is clear that the Prefectural Labour Bureau’s service (advice/guidance and conciliation, etc.) is fairly lessused than ACAS of the UK (Table 9).
Table 9. Prefectural Labour Bureau Conciliation status in comparison with ACAS (FY 2016)㼘㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼟㼡㼘㼠㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕advice/guidance ｏｆｆｅｒｓ received㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕applicatioｓ for conciliation received㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻲㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻔㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻢
㻔㻭㻕㻌㻼㼞㼑㼒㼑㼏㼠㼡㼍㼘㼏㼛㼚㼜㼍㼞㼕㼟㼛㼚㻌㼠㼛㻔㻮㻕㻌㻭㻯㻭㻿 㼠㼔㼑㻌㼁㻷㻌㻌㻔㻮㻛㻭㻕㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻮㼡㼞㼑㼍㼡㼟㻝㻘㻝㻟㻜㻘㻣㻠㻝㻤㻤㻢㻘㻥㻞㻥
㻜㻚㻣㻤
㻝㻢㻚㻥
㻞㻢㻚㻣
㻝㻚㻡㻤
㻤㻘㻥㻣㻢
㻥㻞㻘㻞㻡㻝
㻝㻜㻚㻟
㻜㻚㻝㻟
㻞㻚㻣㻤
㻞㻜㻚㻢
㻡㻘㻝㻞㻟
㻝㻤㻘㻢㻠㻣
㻟㻚㻢
㻜㻚㻜㻤
㻜㻚㻡㻢
㻣㻚㻟
㻢㻢㻣㻟㻜㻚㻤㻠
㻟㻟㻞㻞㻣㻚㻜㻞
㻜㻚㻡㻜(source）written by the author, based on Implementation status of individual labor dispute resolution system in 201617( MHLW) and Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas): Annual Report and Accounts 2016/17 and “OECDData”.

Ryuich Yamakawa , 2007, The report of Labour policy Study No.86: Middle Report of Research on the system of in-house conflicts, resolution,
the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training.
10
The Employment Protection Act 1975 (Chapter 71).
11
Masaharu Nose, 2011, “The Issue of Individual Labour Dispute Resolution Systems in Japan: Comparisons with the UK” The Japanese
Journal of Labour Studies: Background and Resolution System of Individual Labor, No/613, the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training.
12
It is a rule of employment practice, issed by ACAS, approved by Parliament and referred by ET.
13
Shinobu Naito, 2009, “A Study of Code of Practice: The Function of Promoting Autonomous Action”, JIL Discussion Paper 09−05, the Japan
Institute for Labour Policy and Training.
14
Section 207 (2) of Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992: In any proceedings before an employment tribuna l or theCentral Arbitration Committee any Code of Practice issued under this Chapter by ACAS shall be admissible in evidence, and any provision o f theCode which appears to the tribunal or Committee to be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings shall be taken into account indetermining that question.
15
Masaharu Nose, 2012, “Promotion of Individual Labour Dispute Resolution both inside and outside a company: Implication from A CAS andSurvey of Workplace” Journal of Japanese Arbitration and ADR, Japan Association of the Law of Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution.
16
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (Chapter 24).
9

60

国際公共政策研究第 23 巻第１号

In the UK, in order to facilitate smooth handling of complaints in the workplace, the amendment of the
Employment Act 200217, and the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004 18, were made.
The procedures for resolving complaints before the amendment were complex to employees and employers, andthere was dissatisfaction. The employment Act 2008 19 improved this complex procedure. At present, theprocedure of the Code of Practice, which is not law, but based on the employment Act 2008, has promoted
informal dispute resolutions.20
ACAS is an independent administrative corporation and different from private enterprises. This uniquecharacteristic is the starting point for the UK's more flexible initiatives. On this point, Australia is different fromthe UK. The degree of involvement of administrative organizations (ex, Fair Work Ombudsman of Australia) ishigher than it of the UK.
The point to be noted when comparing the status of conciliation of ACAS to Japan is the number of responses
to complaints by ACAS is much larger than in Japan, and the number of resolutions is much larger as well. When
I compared “early conciliation” (EC) of ACAS and “advice / guidance” of the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japanto the number of cases, the number of EC cases was 92,110 (Table 10) and the amount of "advice / guidance”
from the Prefectural Labour Bureau was 8,976 cases (only 9.7% of ACAS) (Table 9).
Also, when I look at the situation of resolution by ACAS (Table 10), there were 16,924 cases of EC (COT 3 21:
an agreement document), which is a ratio of 18.4% of all of the EC cases. The number of cases which didn’t
proceed to the Employment Tribunal, but were settled beforehand, was 57,707 (62.7% of all the EC cases). (Table
10). The sum of these two ratios reached 81.1%, so the resolution rate was high.
On the other hand, the number of cases of settlement by conciliation by the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japanwas small at 2,003 cases (39.4％)(Table 11). The discontinuance was 2,847 cases (56.0％) and the withdrawal
was 222 cases (4.4％). The number of cases to be handled and resolved by the Prefectural Labour Bureau wassmaller. As a result, the ratio of non-resolution was 56.2% (Table 11), so the ratio of resolution wasn’t high.
Table 10. Final status of Early Conciliation Notifications㻌㻾㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐㻘㻌㻶㼍㼚㻌㻝㻢㻙㻰㼑㼏㻌㻝㻢㻘㻌㻞㻜㻝㻢㻑㻯㻻㼀㻟㻌㻿㼑㼠㼠㼘㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㻝㻢㻘㻥㻞㻠 㻝㻤㻚㻠㻰㼕㼐㻌㼚㼛㼠㻌㼜㼞㼛㼓㼞㼑㼟㼟㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼞㼕㼎㼡㼚㼍㼘㻌㼏㼘㼍㼕㼙㻡㻣㻘㻣㻜㻣 㻢㻞㻚㻣㻰㼕㼟㼜㼡㼠㼑㻌㼜㼞㼛㼓㼞㼑㼟㼟㼑㼐㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼞㼕㼎㼡㼚㼍㼘㻌㼏㼘㼍㼕㼙㻝㻣㻘㻠㻣㻥 㻝㻥㻚㻜㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘㻥㻞㻘㻝㻝㻜 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜(source）written by the author, based on Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas): Annual Report and Accounts 2016/17.

Table 11. Prefectural Labour Bureau Conciliation Case Outcomes (FY 2016)㼟㼑㼠㼠㼘㼑㼐㻌㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻚㼣㼕㼠㼔㼐㼞㼍㼣㼍㼘㻌㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻚㼐㼕㼟㼏㼛㼚㼠㼕㼚㼡㼍㼚㼏㼑㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼠㼔㼑㼞㼟㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻢
㻞㻘㻜㻜㻟
㻞㻞㻞
㻞㻘㻤㻠㻣
㻝㻝

㻑
㻟㻥㻚㻠
㻠㻚㻠
㻡㻢㻚㻜
㻜㻚㻞

(source）written by the author, based on Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas): Annual Report andAccounts 2016/17.
The Employment Act 2002 (Amendment of Schedules 3, 4 and 5) Order 2007 (No.30).
The Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004 (No.752).
19
The employment Act 2008 (Chapter 24).
20
Michael Gibbons, 2007, Better Dispute Resolution: A review of employment dispute resolution in Great Britain, Department of Trade andIndustry.
21
COT3 is an ACAS form on which an agreement is recorded as a legally-binding contract between the parties.
17
18

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

61

We should note that in the UK, ACAS resolved most conflicts in the workplace before going to Employment
Tribunal. Specifically, the percentage of EC cases which proceeded to Employment Tribunal was only 19.0% of
all, and about 80 % were resolved before Employment Tribunal (Table 10). When I look at 18,220 cases of
Employment Tribunal applications22 (ET 1), ACAS resolved 72.6% of them (Table 12). In the end, 25.9% casesof those proceeded to Employment Tribunal (Table 12).
It shows it is very important that conflicts at work should be conciliated before Employment Tribunal. 23
Table 12.

ET1 Conciliation Case Outcomes㻔㼍㻕㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼗㻌㼛㼡㼠㻔㼎㻕㻌㻿㼑㼠㼠㼘㼑㼐㻔㼏㻕㻌㼃㼕㼠㼔㼐㼞㼍㼣㼚㻔㼐㻕㻌㻰㼑㼒㼍㼡㼘㼠㻌㼖㼡㼐㼓㼙㼑㼚㼠㻔㼑㻕㻌㻴㼑㼍㼞㼐㻔㼒㻕㻌㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘㻾㼑㼟㼛㼘㼡㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼞㼍㼠㼑㻘㻌㻔㼎㻗㼏㻕㻛㻔㼒㻙㼍㻕㻞㻜㻝㻢㻙㻝㻣
㻝㻘㻜㻞㻜
㻥㻘㻠㻠㻜
㻟㻘㻜㻡㻜
㻡㻣㻠
㻠㻘㻝㻟㻢
㻝㻤㻘㻞㻞㻜
㻙

㻑
㻡㻚㻢
㻡㻝㻚㻤
㻝㻢㻚㻣
㻟㻚㻞
㻞㻞㻚㻣
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻣㻞㻚㻢

(note) Resolution rates are calculated excluding cases struck out by the Tribunal since these are generally notsusceptible to conciliation.
(source）written by the author, based on Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS): Annual Report andAccounts 2016/17.

5. Australia’s Trends in Reconciliation and Resolution of Individual Labour Problems
Individual labour-management relations in Japan are expanding as described above, but this trend is similarinternationally as well, and the background of it is a change in industrial structure and a decline in the trade union
membership density rates, etc. Advancement and specialization of organizational activities are expanding
individual labour-management relations. These structural changes need a new way to resolve labour problems.
The new way is based on a change from a collective labour-management system to an individual labourmanagement system.
In Australia “collective labour-management relations” were the main mechanism of relations between
employees and enterprises until the 1980s. But in the 1990s, collective labour-management relations became
weaker in the time of the Conservative Party and the Liberal’s coalition government.
However, the excessive decentralization of industrial relations invited strong criticism, especially against theAustralian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). In December 2007, criticism for the Howard administration during
the general election became very strong, and the Labour government won the victory. Individualization ofindustrial relations without protection for labour came to be rectified.
The important point is that the Fair Work Act 200924 by the Labour government did not simply return to theold days, but created new concepts of “workplace rights”. It is important that workplace rights are not based only
on collective relations, but are based on both sides of collective and individual labour-management relations toprotect employees.

ET1 is an Employment Tribunal form of an application to resolve Employment Tribunal claims.
Masaharu Nose, 2015, “Implication from the UK Individual Labour Dispute Resolution: A UK-Japan Comparative Study” School of Sociology
Journal, 121, KwanseiGakuin University.
24
The Fair Work Act, No.28, 2009,Cth.
22
23

62

国際公共政策研究第 23 巻第１号

According to the annual report of the Fair Work Commission (Our Future Direction) (2012-13, p.8, 15), incomparison of the number of individual labour cases since 1998 to the number of collective labour cases, current
employee-enterprise relations are pointed out to be "an era in which individual labour incidents are central".
In other words, even though the number of collective labour cases had drastically decreased in the fiscal year
1998 to the fiscal year 2005 (the Workplace Relations Act25 era), the number of collective labour cases was stilllarger than individual labour cases. But from the fiscal year 2006 to the fiscal year 2008 (during the work Choices
Act26 era, the era of AWAs), the number of individual labour cases came to exceed collective cases, and in thefiscal year 2009 and beyond (Fair Work Act era), the number of individual labour cases has become much larger
than collective labour cases. (Fig. 2).
In addition to FWC, organizations that promote reconciliation and resolution of individual labour problems in
the workplace based on the Fair Work Act 2009 are: the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), the Australian Human
Right Commission (AHRC), and others. In the next section, I will discuss how each organization in Australia
responds in the era where individual labour cases are central.

(source) written by the author, based on ANNUAL REPORT 2012–13： OUR FUTURE DIRECTION, FWC.

Fig.2. Comparison of Trends in the Number of Collective and Individual Labor Incidents in Australia.

6. Organizations Involved in Resolving Labour Conflicts in Australia and Situation
In Japan, regarding the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes27, which tookeffect in 2001, the Prefectural Labour Bureau is supposed to play a major role as an administrative agency 28. In
Australia, there are Australia's judicial and administrative organizations including the Fair Work Commission(FWC), the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), the Australia Human Rights Commission (AHRA), and at the statelevel, for example, the Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal (VCAT).In Japan as well, advice,encouragement, and mediation are effective ways to coordinate labour conflict resolutions, but as mentioned
above, the degree of utilization of administrative ADR such as the Prefectural Labour Bureau is low. There is a

The Workplace Relations Act 1996, Act No.86, Cth.
The Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005, Act No.153, Cth.
27
The Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, Act No.112, 2001.
28
In addition, there are conciliation by the Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment
and the Gender Equality Dispute Resolution Committee of Toyonaka City, etc.
25
26

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

63

problem in Japan in the realization of fairness at work by conciliation of administrative bodies. I will examine
the concrete approach to resolving labour problems in Australia as follows.

6.1: The Fair Work Commission
FWC is a national workplace relations tribunal which was founded as Fair Work Australia (FWA). It became
the current Fair Work Commission (FWC) on January 1, 2013 29 by the Fair Work Act (Fair work Act 2009)
which was approved in March 2009 and took effect in July of that year. FWA inherited the function of theAustralian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC).
Major functions and authorities of FWC are: (1) setting of some labour standards such as minimum wage, etc.
(2) promotion of labour-management negotiations by company, (3) correspondence to unfair dismissals, (4)coordination and resolution of individual/collective labour issues by advice, conciliation, mediation and hearing,and (5) response to labour disputes.
In particular, looking at the specific efforts of the individual labour issues in (3) and (4) above in regard to
unfair dismissal (Table 13), the resolution rate by FWC conciliation and mediation is around 90%. The proportion
proceeding to trial, etc. was only around 10%. Conciliation and mediation are functioning extremely efficiently.
Table 13. Status of Conciliation by FWC as to Unfair Dismissal
2012–132013–142014–15㻞㻘㻟㻜㻜 㻝㻢㻚㻡㻞㻘㻞㻣㻟 㻝㻡㻚㻡㻞㻘㻝㻡㻢 㻝㻠㻚㻞㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻜㻚㻞 㻙
㻜㻚㻞 㻙
㻜㻚㻞 㻙
㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻤㻘㻤㻠㻟 㻢㻟㻚㻠㻤㻘㻢㻡㻥 㻡㻥㻚㻝㻤㻘㻣㻤㻤 㻡㻣㻚㻥㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻜㻚㻣 㻙
㻜㻚㻣 㻙
㻜㻚㻣 㻙
㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻞㻘㻜㻥㻟 㻝㻡㻚㻜㻞㻘㻠㻣㻡 㻝㻢㻚㻥㻞㻘㻢㻡㻠 㻝㻣㻚㻡㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻜㻚㻞 㻙
㻜㻚㻞 㻙
㻜㻚㻞 㻙
㼟㼡㼎㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻝㻟㻘㻞㻟㻣 㻥㻠㻚㻥㻝㻟㻘㻠㻜㻤 㻥㻝㻚㻡㻝㻟㻘㻡㻥㻥 㻤㻥㻚㻢㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻝㻚㻝 㻙
㻝㻚㻝 㻙
㻝㻚㻝 㻙
㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻠㻥 㻜㻚㻠㻠㻝 㻜㻚㻟
㻡㻞㻜㻚㻟㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻜㻚㻜㻜㻠 㻙㻜㻚㻜㻜㻟 㻙㻜㻚㻜㻜㻠 㻙㼍㼐㼖㼡㼐㼕㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼎㼥㻌㼘㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼠㼞㼕㼎㼡㼚㼍㼘㼟㻢㻢㻜㻠㻚㻣㻝㻘㻞㻜㻜 㻤㻚㻞㻝㻘㻡㻞㻣 㻝㻜㻚㻝㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻜㻚㻜㻡㻡 㻙㻜㻚㻜㻥㻥 㻙㻜㻚㻝㻞㻠 㻙㼀㼛㼠㼍㼘㻝㻟㻘㻥㻠㻡 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻝㻠㻘㻢㻠㻤 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻝㻡㻘㻝㻣㻣 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻲㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻔㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻝㻝㻘㻥㻤㻞㻚㻠㻠 㻙㻝㻞㻘㻝㻡㻣㻚㻥㻣 㻙㻝㻞㻘㻞㻥㻠㻚㻢㻝 㻙
before conciliation（person, %）2015–16㻞㻘㻝㻟㻜 㻝㻠㻚㻞㻜㻚㻞 㻙㻤㻘㻡㻞㻥 㻡㻢㻚㻤㻜㻚㻣 㻙㻞㻘㻤㻜㻤 㻝㻤㻚㻣㻜㻚㻞 㻙㻝㻟㻘㻠㻢㻤 㻤㻥㻚㻢㻝㻚㻝 㻙㻝㻜㻠 㻜㻚㻣
㻜㻚㻜㻜㻤 㻙㻝㻘㻠㻡㻣 㻥㻚㻣㻜㻚㻝㻝㻢 㻙㻝㻡㻘㻜㻞㻤 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻝㻞㻘㻡㻠㻜㻚㻟㻠 㻙(source) written by the author, based on ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, (FWC) and “OECD Data”.

One of the reasons for enabling this efficient procedure is to force parties to attend at the time of conciliationby the Fair Work Act 2009: Section 592 (1) "Legal consultation (conference)". Therefore, unlike conciliation by
the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan based on the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related
Disputes, the opponent should participate in conciliation. This leads to a high resolution rate by the FWC andreduces the proportion of cases going to judgement by FWC (about 10%).
Looking at individual cases of resolution by the Labour Tribunal System of Japan 30 , which is not an
administrative system, but a judicial system, success rate of conciliation was as high as 68%, and the ratio going

The Fair Work Amendment Act 2012, Act No.174, Cth.
Takashi Shimoi, 2008, “The resolution of Individual Labour Disputes: From the viewpoints of my experience of a coordination c ommittee,
Journal of labour law No.112, Japan Labor Law Association.

29
30

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第 23 巻第１号

国際公共政策研究

to court was as low as 16.7% in 2015, so most cases were resolved by agreement between the parties beforehand.
The resolution rate before trials was high 31.
Looking at the overview of all cases including collective labour-management disputes (Table 14), there wereabout 35,000 applications in the fiscal year 2015, and after application to FWC, approximately 50% were resolved(which is high), and final judgment by tribunal etc. was around 35%.
Table 14. Status of Conciliation of All Cases by FWC
㻞㻜㻝㻞㻙㻝㻟
㻞㻜㻝㻟㻙㻝㻠
㼍㼜㼜㼘㼕㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼞㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐㻟㻢㻘㻢㻝㻢 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻌㻔㻑㻕㻟㻣㻘㻜㻢㻢
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻟㻚㻜㻢
㻟㻚㻜㻡
㼎㼑㼒㼛㼞㼑㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻘㼣㼕㼠㼔㼐㼞㼛㼣㼍㼘㻝㻣㻘㻢㻞㻡
㻠㻤㻚㻝㻝㻣㻘㻠㻠㻢
㻠㻣㻚㻝㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻝㻚㻠㻣
㻝㻚㻠㻟
FWC（hearing/conference）㻲㼃㻌㻭㼏㼠㻌㼟㻚㻟㻥㻣㻘㼟㻚㻟㻥㻤㻝㻤㻘㻥㻥㻝
㻡㻝㻚㻥 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻌㻔㻑㻕㻝㻥㻘㻢㻞㻜
㻡㻞㻚㻥㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻝㻚㻡㻤
㻝㻚㻢㻝
㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻘㼣㼕㼠㼔㼐㼞㼛㼣㼍㼘
㻣㻘㻟㻝㻤
㻞㻜㻚㻜
㻟㻤㻚㻡
㻢㻘㻟㻝㻤
㻝㻣㻚㻜
㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻜㻚㻢㻝㼍㼐㼖㼡㼐㼕㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼎㼥㻌㼘㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼠㼞㼕㼎㼡㼚㼍㼘㼟㻝㻝㻘㻢㻣㻟㻟㻝㻚㻥㻢㻝㻚㻡㻝㻟㻘㻟㻜㻞
㻟㻡㻚㻥㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻜㻚㻥㻣
㻝㻚㻜㻥
㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻲㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻔㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻝㻝㻘㻥㻤㻞㻚㻠㻠㻝㻞㻘㻝㻡㻣㻚㻥㻣

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻟㻟㻚㻟
㻢㻣㻚㻤

㻟㻠㻘㻝㻡㻞
㻞㻚㻣㻤㻝㻠㻘㻞㻟㻜
㻝㻚㻝㻢㻝㻥㻘㻥㻞㻞㻝㻚㻢㻞㻣㻘㻠㻤㻞㻝㻞㻘㻠㻠㻜
㻝㻚㻜㻝㻝㻞㻘㻞㻥㻠㻚㻢㻝㻞㻜㻝㻠㻙㻝㻡
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻠㻝㻚㻣
㻡㻤㻚㻟

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜

㻞㻝㻚㻥

㻟㻥㻚㻠

㻟㻢㻚㻠

㻢㻞㻚㻠

㻟㻠㻘㻞㻝㻡
㻞㻚㻣㻟㻝㻣㻘㻡㻟㻞
㻝㻚㻠㻜㻝㻢㻘㻢㻤㻟㻝㻚㻟㻟㻠㻘㻡㻠㻟㻝㻞㻘㻝㻠㻜
㻜㻚㻥㻣㻝㻞㻘㻡㻠㻜㻚㻟㻠㻞㻜㻝㻡㻙㻝㻢
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻡㻝㻚㻞
㻠㻤㻚㻤

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜

㻝㻟㻚㻟

㻞㻟㻚㻥

㻟㻡㻚㻡

㻣㻞㻚㻤

(source) written by the author, based on ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, (FWC) and “OECD Data”.

6.2: The Fair Work Ombudsman
The Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) is also an organization based on the Fair Work Act 2009, which is a federal
law that was approved in March 2009. FWO provides necessary advice and guidance, etc. concerning the FWC's
orders, rulings, and registered workplace agreements.
In practice, FWO can appoint a Fair Work Inspector and conduct on-going surveys to resolve labour problems.
If necessary, corrections are made to the parties by mediation, notification of problems by a Findings Letter,
notification of warning by a Letter of Caution, notice of violation by Infringement Notice, or announcement ofcompliance by Compliance Notice. One of the features of FWO is that voluntary resolutions among the partiesare respected from a viewpoint which is different from supervisory positions, and another feature is that advice
is given and conciliation begins at an earlier stage.
Even if it meets the standards of laws and regulations, there are many cases which have actual problems in theworkplace. FWO can deal with such problems as well. Also, even though coordination between the parties could
fail, FWO can monitor and supervise them. Therefore the parties cannot help but tackle problems seriously.
In addition, FWO is actively working on the mission of providing information. Through websites, social media,
publications, and consultations, it prevents labour conflicts.
Recently there has been a tendency away from information provision by telephone. Responses to online
inquiries are 1.72 times higher than the previous year. Looking at 29,940 complaints filed in the fiscal year 2015
by activity category (Table 15), about 34% of them were solved with "early intervention" efforts, which
demonstrates the importance of dealing with problems before the problem worsens. About 40% were solved,
helping the persons concerned not by enforcement, but by education and advice. In other words, we should beaware that about 75% of cases in these two categories were resolved. In addition, it is necessary to pay attention
to the fact that resolution by conciliation as a solution method was around 15% (about 4,500 in the fiscal year

Shigeru Haruna, 2010, "Current status and problems of the Labor Tribunal System" Jurist: Special Feature: Actual and Legal Treatment of the
Individual Labor Dispute, No.1408, Yuhikaku. The Labour Tribunal System is thought highly. I also think highly of the actual performance of thelabor tribunal system.

31

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

652015) 32 , which was rising compared to 10.7% in the fiscal year 2012 (Table 16). Meanwhile, in so-called
enforcement activities (FWO’s compliance activities), preliminary checks or audit activities resolved about 20%of all. In addition, it is only about 6% that led to the category of compulsory procedure (enforcement procedure),
which is an effort towards enforcement, and it is necessary to keep in mind that resolution is attempted before theenforcement procedure stage.
Table 15. Status of Enforcement Activities of FWO by Category (FY2015)㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞
（%）
㻝㻜㻘㻞㻡㻜 㻟㻠㻚㻞㼑㼍㼞㼘㼥㻌㼕㼚㼠㼑㼞㼢㼑㼚㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻜㻚㻤㻞㼑㼐㼡㼏㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼐㼕㼟㼜㼡㼠㼑㻌㼞㼑㼟㼛㼘㼡㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼟㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㼟㻝㻝㻘㻥㻟㻜 㻟㻥㻚㻤㻜㻚㻥㻡㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㼑㼚㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼍㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻝㻘㻣㻠㻜
㻡㻚㻤
㻜㻚㻝㻠
㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㼏㼛㼙㼜㼘㼕㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㻢㻘㻜㻞㻜 㻞㻜㻚㻝㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻜㻚㻠㻤
㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘
㻞㻥㻘㻥㻠㻜 㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻞㻚㻟㻥㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻲㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻔㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻝㻞㻘㻡㻠㻜㻚㻟㻠(source) written by the author, based on ANNUAL REPORT 2015-16, FWC and “OECD Data”.

In addition, looking at the status of initiatives in the fiscal year 2012 (Table 16), the number of consultations
was about 616,000, about 4% (about 25,000) of them were filed as complaints. The resolution rate by conciliation
was as high as about 82%.
Table 16.

Status of Conciliation by FWO in FY 2012㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞

㼏㼛㼚㼟㼡㼘㼠㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻢㻝㻡㻘㻥㻜㻡
㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻡㻝㻚㻠㻜㼏㼛㼙㼜㼘㼍㼕㼚㼠㼟㻌㼞㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐㻞㻠㻘㻢㻣㻤
㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻞㻚㻜㻢㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻟㻘㻞㻜㻤㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻜㻚㻞㻣㼞㼑㼟㼛㼘㼢㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼏㼛㼚㼏㼕㼘㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻞㻘㻢㻟㻝㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻜㻚㻞㻞㼏㼛㼙㼜㼘㼍㼕㼚㼠㼟㻌㼒㼕㼚㼍㼘㼕㼟㼑㼐㻞㻢㻘㻡㻣㻠
㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻞㻚㻞㻞㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻲㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻔㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻝㻝㻘㻥㻤㻞㻚㻠㻠㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻝

㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻞

－－㻙㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻟

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑

㻝㻟㻚㻜㻑

㻤㻞㻚㻜㻑

㻝㻜㻚㻣㻑
㻝㻜㻣㻚㻣㻑

－

㻠㻚㻜㻑
－
㻙
㻙

㻙

（note）Since it includes processing of cases received in the previous year, the number of resolutions in the current
fiscal year exceeded the number of cases received.
(source) written by the author, based on ANNUAL REPORT 2012-13,(FWO) and “OECD Data”.

Though the FWO has supervisory authority, labour problems are not necessarily resolved by crackdown(enforcement procedure). In many cases, they are effectively resolved by "early response" and "education andadvice". The point is that problems which cannot be resolved by laws and regulations are effectively resolved byconciliation. In Japan, the Labour Standards Inspection Office practices only the inspection (supervision) work.
Advice / conciliation of labour problems are practiced by the Prefectural Labour Bureau. As continuation of
employment is one of the characteristics of labour problems, it is important to deal with labour problems at an
32

FWO, 2016, Annual Report 2015-16.

66

国際公共政策研究第 23 巻第１号

early stage in order to practice effective administrative services, and it is necessary to introduce a new mechanism
to realize it.
At the time of legislation of the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, theinstitutional design of which organization is responsible for coordination of individual labour dispute treatments
was discussed. One of the arguments was whether it would be good or not that crackdown institutions such as thepolice or the Labour Inspector Office would participate in conciliation.
Today, as we have accumulated many cases of individual labour conflicts, such concerns that enforcement
institutions like the Labour Standards Inspection Office would force their opinions on involved persons, havebeen eliminated. I think that it is time to rethink the present system.
The FWO has a number of consultation cases (about 620,000 cases in in the fiscal year 2012) (Table 16) andcarries out extensive efforts (29,940 in the fiscal year 2015) (Table 15) including early intervention, education,
guidance and mediation etc. The solution rate is also high. It is necessary to pay attention to the point that FWO
can practice both supervisory work and advice/conciliation initiatives without contradiction.

6.3: The Australian Human Rights Commission
The Australian Human Rights Commission was established in 1986 by the Australian Human Rights
Commission Act 198633 as the Human Rights and the Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC). In Septemberof 2009, in order to clarify efforts from the viewpoint of human rights, which is a higher level concept including
equality of opportunities, and to avoid confusion with each state's equal opportunity committee, the name of
HREOC was renamed the Australian Human Rights Commission.
Specifically, it conducts coordination and resolution of disputes and conflicts, such as human rights violations
and labour issues in the workplace. Other efforts are conducting surveys related to human rights issues andproviding information through websites34.
Table 17. Number of Complaints Received and Finalized㻺㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼍㼕㼚㼠㼟㻌㻾㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻲㼕㼚㼍㼘㼕㼟㼑㼐㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻝 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻞 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠㼏㼛㼙㼜㼘㼍㼕㼚㼠㻌㼞㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐
㻞㻘㻝㻡㻞
㻞㻘㻢㻝㻜
㻞㻘㻝㻣㻣
㻞㻘㻞㻞㻟
㻞㻘㻟㻤㻤
㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻜㻚㻝㻥
㻜㻚㻞㻞
㻜㻚㻝㻤
㻜㻚㻝㻤
㻜㻚㻝㻥
㼏㼛㼙㼜㼘㼍㼕㼚㼠㻌㼒㼕㼚㼍㼘㼕㼟㼑㼐
㻞㻘㻞㻢㻢
㻞㻘㻢㻜㻡
㻞㻘㻡㻜㻜
㻞㻘㻝㻣㻤
㻞㻘㻞㻡㻝
㻌㻔㼜㼑㼞㻌㻎㼘㼍㼎㼛㼞㻌㼒㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕
㻜㻚㻝㻥
㻜㻚㻞㻞
㻜㻚㻞㻝
㻜㻚㻝㻤
㻜㻚㻝㻤
㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㻲㼛㼞㼏㼑㻌㻔㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㼟㼛㼚㼟㻕㻝㻝㻢㻞㻢㻚㻡㻜 㻝㻝㻤㻝㻢㻚㻜㻜 㻝㻝㻥㻤㻞㻚㻠㻠 㻝㻞㻝㻡㻣㻚㻥㻣 㻝㻞㻞㻥㻠㻚㻢㻝（note）Since it includes processing of cases received in the previous year, the number of resolutions in the current
fiscal year exceeded the number of cases received.
(source) written by the author, based on ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15,(AHRC) and “OECD Data”.

Looking at the processing situation of actual complaints (Table 17), the number of new complaints received
has been from about 2,100 to 2,400, which is around 12% of the consultation number. In addition, although thenumber of initiatives by conciliation was 47% in the fiscal year 2010, in the fiscal year 2014 it increased to 51%(Table 18). The importance of conciliation is growing.

33
34

The Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986, Act No.125, Cth.
There were 176,670 accesses to the site on complaints, where information on law and grievance procedure is provided.

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

67

Table 18. Outcomes of Complaints Finalized by AHRC（％）
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜
（1） ratio of grievances finalized before conciliation（2) ratio of conciliation（3） ratio of grievances finalized by conciliation（A)（4） ratio of withdrowal (B)（A)+(B)（5）ratio of discontinuance（6）others（1+2+4+5+6)

㻟㻡
㻠㻣
㻟㻜
㻝㻝
㻠㻝
㻢
㻝
㻝㻜㻜

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻝

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻞

㻟㻝
㻠㻤
㻟㻞
㻝㻞
㻠㻠
㻤
㻝
㻝㻜㻜

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟
㻟㻟
㻠㻡
㻞㻥
㻝㻟
㻠㻞
㻥

–
㻝㻜㻜

㻞㻟
㻠㻥
㻟㻠
㻝㻢
㻡㻜
㻥
㻟
㻝㻜㻜

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠
㻞㻟
㻡㻝
㻟㻣
㻝㻢
㻡㻟
㻥
㻝
㻝㻜㻜

(source) written by the author, based on ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15,(AHRC).

Also, looking at the resolution rate of conciliation (Table 19), the rate of resolution increased to 76% 35 in thefiscal year 2015, which was 64% in the fiscal year 2010.
Complaints will be withdrawn by the understanding of the complaints through conciliation, and a consensus
will also be formed by discussion between the parties. The withdrawal rate has risen from 11% in the fiscal year
2010 to 16% in the fiscal year 2014 (Table 18).
Table 19. Complaints Resolved by Conciliation over the Past Five Years（％）
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻜 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻝 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻞 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠 㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻡㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼍㼕㼚㼠㼟㻌㼟㼡㼏㼏㼑㼟㼟㼒㼡㼘㼘㼥㻌㼞㼑㼟㼛㼘㼢㼑㼐
㻢㻠
㻢㻢
㻢㻡
㻣㻜
㻣㻞
㻣㻢
㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼍㼕㼚㼠㼟㻌㼡㼚㼍㼎㼘㼑㻌㼠㼛㻌㼎㼑㻌㼞㼑㼟㼛㼘㼢㼑㼐
㻟㻢
㻟㻠
㻟㻡
㻟㻜
㻞㻤
㻞㻠
(source) ANNUAL REPORT 2014-2015

Unlike conflict coordination by the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan, which has a high discontinuation rate,
the parties in Australia are forced to participate in conferences (Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986:
Section 46PJ). Therefore, the discontinuation rate is much lower than in Japan. This mechanism can greatly
contribute to resolving labour conflicts.
Regarding information provision initiatives, information provision using websites has been growing year by
year, and media by publication is on a downward trend. The information provision function in consultations is
progressing more efficiently by using the websites.

6.4: The Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal
Not only efforts at the national level, but also efforts in each state are important. Here I consider the Victorian
Civil & Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) in Victoria. VCAT is a state judicial body which was established in 1998
by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 36. Even though it is a judicial institution, a lawyer is notalways needed at the time of filing a suit. As a tribunal which citizens can use easily without requiring legal
experts, VCAT regards an informal approach as important in order to resolve conflicts.
If a complainant wants to resolve an issue by consensus between the parties, rather than by authoritative
judgement, a complainant can choose mediation, compulsory conference, etc. Both are efforts by discussion
between the parties, but the compulsory conference greatly differs from mediation in that the opponent is obliged
35
36

Third- fourth of conciliation cases are resolved by conciliation.
The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, Act No.53, 1998, Vic.

68

第 23 巻第１号

国際公共政策研究

to participate in the discussion. In the case of non-participation, the absent side is likely to be at a disadvantage.
If consultation fails, the case will proceed to a hearing, which is the next stage to resolve conflicts.
In conflict coordination with the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan, there is no obligation for the other party
to participate in the consultation, and if the other party does not participate, dispute procedures are discontinued.
Table 20. Trend of Number of Cases Finalized by Conference and Mediation㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼞㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐㻌㼍㼟㻌㼠㼛㻌㼑㼝㼡㼍㼘㻌㼑㼙㼜㼘㼛㼥㼙㼑㼚㼠㼛㼜㼜㼛㼞㼠㼡㼚㼕㼠㼥㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼞㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐㻌㼛㼒㻌㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻛㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼒㼕㼚㼍㼘㼕㼟㼑㼐㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟
㻟㻜㻝
㻙
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻥㻠
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻟㻝㻚㻞㻑㻠㻞㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻡㻞㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻠㻤
㻡㻝㻚㻝㻑
㻞㻟
㻡㻠㻚㻤㻑
㻞㻡
㻠㻤㻚㻝㻑

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠
㻟㻝㻢
㻙
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻠㻝
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻠㻠㻚㻢㻑㻣㻠㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻢㻣㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻤㻟
㻡㻤㻚㻥㻑
㻠㻟
㻡㻤㻚㻝㻑
㻠㻜
㻡㻥㻚㻣㻑

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻡
㻞㻣㻝
㻙
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻝㻜㻥
㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻠㻜㻚㻞㻑㻣㻡㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻟㻠㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㻑
㻢㻞
㻡㻢㻚㻥㻑
㻠㻣
㻢㻞㻚㻣㻑
㻝㻡
㻠㻠㻚㻝㻑

(source) written by the author based on ANNUAL REPORT 2015-16, VCAT.

Specifically, when I look at the situation of efforts under the agreement between the parties in the field of equal
opportunity at VCAT, the percentage of newly received cases was about 40.2% (FY2015) (Table 20). 56.9% of
those were solved by discussion procedure (mediation/compulsory conferences).
In addition, about 75% of all cases were solved in a series of processes after the procedure of compulsory
conference and mediation (Table 21).
About three quarters of all were resolved by discussion procedure, so the conciliation rate was high. As a result,
the ratio to the hearing in the final stage was low at 6.0% (FY2014). This means that in order to resolve labour
problems, conciliation (mediation) is important between the parties.
Table 21. Status of Numbers Finalized by Conference/Mediation Received㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟
㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠
㻠㻞㼒㼕㼚㼍㼘㼕㼟㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻛㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻞㻟㼒㼕㼚㼍㼘㼕㼟㼑㼐㻌㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻛㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼎㼑㼒㼛㼞㼑㻌㼔㼑㼍㼞㼕㼚㼓㼟㼡㼎㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘

㻣
㻟㻜

㻝㻢㻚㻣㻑
㻣㻝㻚㻠㻑

㻝㻠
㻡㻣

㻝㻤㻚㻥㻑
㻣㻣㻚㻜㻑

㻝㻡
㻠㻜

㻞㻤㻚㻤㻑
㻣㻢㻚㻥㻑

㻤
㻠㻤

㻝㻝㻚㻥㻑
㻣㻝㻚㻢㻑

㻝

㻞㻚㻠㻑

㻞

㻞㻚㻣㻑

㻜

㻜㻚㻜㻑

㻞

㻟㻚㻜㻑

㻝㻜

㻞㻟㻚㻤㻑

㻝㻜

㻝㻟㻚㻡㻑

㻥

㻝㻣㻚㻟㻑

㻝㻟

㻝㻥㻚㻠㻑

㻝

㻞㻚㻠㻑

㻡

㻢㻚㻤㻑

㻟

㻡㻚㻤㻑

㻠

㻢㻚㻜㻑

㼏㼍㼟㼑㼟㻌㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻛㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼎㼑㼒㼛㼞㼑㻌㼔㼑㼍㼞㼕㼚㼓㼔㼑㼍㼞㼕㼚㼓

㻡㻠㻚㻤㻑

㻣㻠
㻠㻟

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻡㻤㻚㻝㻑

㻡㻞
㻞㻡

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜

㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻠

㼞㼑㼏㼑㼕㼢㼑㼐

㼏㼛㼚㼒㼑㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻛㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼏㼛㼚㼠㼕㼚㼡㼑㼕㼚㼓㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻲㼅㻞㻜㻝㻟

㻠㻤㻚㻝㻑

㻢㻣
㻠㻜

㻝㻜㻜㻚㻜
㻡㻥㻚㻣㻑

(source) written by the author based on ANNUAL REPORT 2015-16 , VCAT.

6.5: Comparison of Prefectural Labour Bureau with FWO and FWC
The number of corrected and conciliated cases in Japan by the Prefectural Labour Bureau and District Courts(including the Labour Tribunal System) was smaller than in Australia in 2015. In Australia there were 2.39
cases/thousand persons of labour force of 29,940 cases (FWO) (table 15), and 2.73 cases/thousand persons oflabour force of 34,215 cases (FWC) (table 14), with a total of 5.12 cases/thousand persons of labour force of
64,155 cases.

Study on Administrative Bodies Involved in Resolving Labour Conﬂicts

69

On the other hand, in Japan in 2015 there were 0.05 cases/thousand persons of labour force of 3,390 cases37(new field civil cases), 0.06 cases/thousand persons of labour force of 3,679 cases (new labour trial cases), 0.13
cases/thousand persons of labour force of 8,925 cases (applications for the Prefectural Labour Bureau’s advice
and guidance) (table 4), 0.07 cases/thousand persons of labour force of 4,775 cases (applications for conciliation)(table 4), and 0.40 cases/thousand persons of labour force of 26,280 cases (declaration supervision by the Labor
Standards Inspection Office) (table 8), with a total of 0.71 cases/thousand persons of labour force of 47,049 cases.
In comparison to the 64,155 cases of Australia, Japan covered less cases.
In Australia, in the two organizations, FWO and FWC, the number of cases covered is 7.2 times larger (perthousand persons of labour force) than in Japan, justice in the workplace is more successful than in Japan. In
particular, when comparing each, except in the case of compliance and enforcement action, I find Australia (4.5
cases/thousand persons of labour force of 56,395 cases (table 15) is covering 14.5 times more than Japan (0.31
cases/thousand persons of labour force of 20,769 cases). In order to realize fairness at work, it is essential not
only to crackdown on infringements, but also to carry out effective conciliation. It is necessary to raise the rateof conciliation. The Prefectural Labour Bureau's service (advice/guidance and conciliation, etc.) of Japan is fairly
less utilized than that of Australia.

7. Conclusion: Implication From Australia and the UK
The practice of fairness at work including the remedy of long overtime working was pre-adjusted by collective
labour-management relations (for example, by labour-management councils) in the era of the industrial society.
But recently, due to a decline in trade union membership density rates and an increase in irregular workers suchas dispatch workers, the ability to resolve conflicts by conventional collective labour-management relations has
declined. As a result, problems such as suicide due to long overtime working hours and individual labour
problems are increasing.
Currently, in Japan there are various organizations which resolve labour problems in the workplace. For
example, the Prefectural Labour Bureau (efforts based on the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual
Labor-Related Disputes), the Labour Standards Inspection Office, and courts (efforts based on the labour tribunal
systems, and ordinary civil trials).
But in order to realize fairness at work, it is necessary to build a new mechanism in Japan. I would like to pointout the following three points especially in comparison to Australia and the UK (ACAS) mentioned above.

7.1: Necessity to Increase Coverage Ratio by the Prefectural Labour Bureau's service
One of the problems pointed out at the beginning of this article was that workers who had been widely protectedby collective labour-management relations in the era of the industrial society have been becoming unprotected as
individualization progresses.
These increasing worker groups (“gc” worker group) are shown in Fig 3. (“G” means more effective grievanceprocedures, etc., “g” means less effective grievance procedures, etc., “C” means more effective collective
agreements, etc., and “c” means less effective collective agreements, etc.)
According to the Supreme Court. (p14, https://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-11201250-RoudoukijunkyokuRoudoujoukenseisakuka/0000167799.pdf)

37

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国際公共政策研究第 23 巻第１号

Initially, the “GC” worker group had been protected by the collective labour-management relations system.
But they became “gc” group workers who are no longer backed up, and there was an increase in the number ofdisputes of individual labour relations. This trend, including in Australia, is a rapid change from collective labourmanagement relations to individual labour-management relations. As mentioned above, FWO and FWC etc.
protect workers in response to this change.
active

G: more effective grievance procedures, etc.

G
 Gcinactivec        GC  

g : less effective grievance procedures, etc.
C: more effective collective agreements, etc.

C
active                 c :less effective collective agreements, etc.
gc     ggC

inactive(source) written by the auther.

Fig. 3．Change of Protection of Labours by Collective Agreements and Grievance Procedures
Workers with no labour union or labour union representative, or situations where worker protection systems
and mechanisms are not well worked into the enterprise, are increasing with recent social changes. This issue iscommon in the world.
There are many consultations and complaints of individual labour issues in Japan as well. The number ofinquiries in Japan is over 1,000,000/year. There are many potential cases that need to be rectified and conciliatedby administrative organizations. In comparison, ACAS in the UK has about 950,000 inquiries per year, and FWO
etc. in Australia have about 650,000 inquiries per year.
But the Prefectural Labour Bureau's service (advice/guidance and conciliation, etc.) is fairly less used than inboth Australia and UK as I mentioned. As a whole, the proportion of actual corrected/conciliated labour
counseling cases by the Prefectural Labour Bureau is not high. To realize fairness at work, the Prefectural Labour
Bureau must firstly increase the rate of advice/guidance and conciliation by increasing the number of actual
corrections and adjustments to the complaints.

7.2: Necessity of Compulsion of Participation in Conciliation at the Prefectural Labour Bureau andBackup by the Court
Since conciliation by the Prefectural Labour Bureau of Japan is voluntary, and participation of the parties isalso voluntary, the procedure of conciliation will be discontinued in the case of refusal by either party to takepart. But looking at conciliations by AHRC and FWC in Australia, participation in “conferences by AHRC” ispromoted by enforcement with a penalty to the absent parties, etc., and participation in “conferences by FWC” isalso promoted by Section 592 of the Fair Work Act 2009 which stipulates that both parties should attend at thetime of conciliation. At the result of it, the rate of discontinuance of conciliation decreases.

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In the UK, ACAS plays a new role by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which stipulates thatthe persons concerned (parties) should be conciliated by ACAS before filing a suit with the Employment Tribunal(ET), and not only that ET only respects the conciliation process of ACAS. ACAS's role in resolving individual
labour disputes became more important. This means that the function of ADR by administrative bodies became
more important with an increase in the number of individual labour dispute in the UK.
Institutionally speaking, if it is a system in which parties at a disadvantage do not need to participate inconciliation, generally they will not participate. On the other hand, if the parties must participate, or if it isdisadvantageous not to participate, parties at a disadvantage will also participate in conciliation to make efforts
for an agreement. In Japan, the number of inquiries to the Prefectural Labour Bureau is increasing, but the amountof advice/mediation etc. has been stagnant. One of the reasons for this is discontinuance of conciliation, and it isnecessary to have a rule that forces parties to take part in conciliation.
In Japan it is necessary to put practices in effect, like Australia and the UK. Such mechanisms that force
participation in conciliation in order to raise participation rates in conciliation are firstly needed by the Prefectural
Labour Bureau. Secondly, the mechanism that the labour tribunal systems of Japan respects the Prefectural Labour
Bureau’s conciliation process is needed.

7.3: Necessity of Practice of Early Conciliation
Regarding how to practice fairness in the workplace in Japan, measures to be taken by enforcement are also
necessary, but FWO and FWC are engaging in efforts that respect early intervention for resolving conflicts.
Indeed, when I look at FWO's efforts in the fiscal year 2015, early conciliations like efforts of ACAS brought
good results, with 34% of “complaints received” settled by early conciliation. (The UK has already introduced
an early conciliation system and the settlement ratio by early conciliation is also high as mentioned above.)
In Japan as well, advice and conciliation are necessary at early stages to resolve workplace problems
effectively. In addition, educational awareness activities are indispensable for early solutions. As for FWO,
AHRC, FWC and VCAT, they utilize the internet and a social media to do educational awareness activities, andpublish results as data.
When I consider mechanisms of administrative bodies involved in resolving conflicts in the workplace, andrealizing fairness at work in Japan, first of all, Japan should establish a mechanism based on the three points that
I pointed out above.
Efforts to realize fairness at work are not limited to long overtime working hour problems. Problems ofbullying, sexual harassment and abuse of authority etc. are increasing recently as well.
Along with the development of the modern society, three rights of workers have been formed as social rights.
Being based on the three rights of work, the practical mechanism of industrial relations has also developed ascollective labour-management relations, to protect workers in an industrial society. But recently this system(collective labour-management relations) has not come to be able to protect workers. If employees cannot expect
collective labour-management relations and self-correcting mechanisms within the organization, they will needhelp from administrative bodies, etc.

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As I pointed out, without establishing a mechanism based on the three points, administrative bodies involved
in resolving labour conflicts in Japan can’t protect employees in the present workplace efficiently, nor realize
fairness at work.

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