September 2013 IEG Meeting
Summary Report

November 21, 2013
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CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICEThis document is the property of the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning(IRID). It may not be distributed without prior written permission of IRID.

Principal Contributors
Robert Coward
Anton Leshchenko
Joel. Pijselman
Adrian Simper
Nikolai. Steinberg
Prepared forInternational Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

Contents
1

2

3

Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1
1.1

Meeting Information .....................................................................................................1

1.2

IEG Mission ..................................................................................................................1

Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................. 2
2.1

Conclusions...................................................................................................................2

2.2

Recommendations.........................................................................................................4

2.3

Next IEG Meeting Topics .............................................................................................5

Discussion Topics ................................................................................................ 6
3.1

Formation of IRID ........................................................................................................6

3.2

Fuel Debris Removal R&D Solicitation .......................................................................7

3.3

Contaminated Groundwater ..........................................................................................8

3.4

Tank Leakage..............................................................................................................12

3.5

Roadmap .....................................................................................................................14

3.6

Spent Fuel Removal ....................................................................................................15

3.7

Site Visit .....................................................................................................................16

3.8

IEG Operations ...........................................................................................................17A

Principal Personnel Contacted

B

Meeting Agenda

C

Exit Meeting Presentation

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1Introduction

1.1 MEETING INFORMATION
Dates:

September 23-27, 2013

Location:

Tokyo (Monday and Friday)
Fukushima Daini (Tuesday-Thursday)
Fukushima Diaichi (Wednesday)

Members of IEG Present:

Principal Personnel Contacted:

Robert Coward (for D. Chapin)
Anton Leshchenko
Joel. Pijselman
Adrian Simper
Nikolai. Steinberg

Listed in Appendix A

AgendaIncluded as Appendix B

1.2 IEG MISSION
The IEG is part of the organization developed by IRID to provide support and advice to IRID
and TEPCO to contribute to the successful decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi. As definedby IRID and TEPCO:
The mission of the International Expert Group (the “IEG”) is to contribute to thesafe and efficient implementation of the decommissioning of the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (the “Decommissioning”) and R&D activity for
the Decommissioning, by providing advice to The International Research Institutefor Nuclear Decommissioning (the ”IRID”).
The IEG shall provide such advice to IRID from an objective perspective basedon the collective view of the IEG reflecting the differing international expertiseand experience of each member of the IEG.
The IEG provides IRID with recommendations on the specific issues faced at Fukushima Daiichi
and the specific issues of Research & Development for decommissioning.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

2.1 CONCLUSIONSTEPCO has made progress at Fukushima Daiichi. Evidence of this progress is easily seen when
visiting the site. The TEPCO and contractor teams are dedicated and hard working.
There are ongoing and future technical challenges to execute the Fukushima decommissioning.
However, right now the organizational and stakeholder challenges associated with the ongoingwork are more significant and more important. IEG believes it will be difficult to make theoverall progress desired by all stakeholders without progress on these softer issues.
IRID was formed recently to provide a separate organization to focus on the medium and longterm research and development needs for decommissioning in Japan (Fukushima Daiichi andother sites). This organization change, which separated that function from TEPCO and involves
other utilities and the Japanese NSSS vendors, coupled with increased involvement and support
from METI provide a potential foundation for improved effectiveness of the combinedorganizations. The key will be for the Leadership of all organizations to commit to the successof the program.
The key challenges to be addressed are:








Stakeholder engagement and education – Challenges arising from societal considerations are
slowing progress at the site, creating additional work, and generally making the project
harder. TEPCO, IRID, and METI can all improve engagement with stakeholders andcontribute to improved education of those stakeholders on critical topics.
Prioritization of activities – There is a significant amount of work needed and planned at the
Fukushima Diaichi site and at the Tokyo offices to support that work. Trying to accomplish
too much at one time will prevent progress and create additional challenges. As a result, thework should be prioritized, and that prioritization should be agreed by all participants. It isbetter to do fewer things well, than to try many things and not do them well.
Definition of Interim and End States – In order to confirm they are working in the right
direction and to guide their activities, TEPCO and the contractor teams need to be aware of
key interim and end states. These need to be developed. Further, developing the interim andend states will likely identify additional policy and strategy questions to address and resolve(enhancing the plan).
Organizational alignment and effectiveness – It is imperative for success at Fukushima
Daiichi that all participating organizations operate smoothly, both as stand-alone companies
as well as collaborative partners in an overall project organization. The effectiveness of theorganization must be high and all organizations must be aligned on project direction forward,
prioritization of activities, and key outstanding questions and risks.

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The IEG sees opportunity and need for improvement in each area listed above.
A parallel issue is public confidence. Developing and maintaining public confidence is vital –the project will not succeed without it, and the best way to improve confidence is to improveorganizational effectiveness. There are two specific ways to increase public confidence in
TEPCO and the overall project. First, it is critical to meet all commitments. Performancemeeting commitments can be enhanced through three checks: (1) when commitments are made,they must be within the capability of delivering organization, (2) top down goals must be
validated by bottom up planning, and (3) the amount of work involved must be reasonable.
Second, it is important for TEPCO, IRID, and METI to understand fully that they are partners inthis program and they need to act as partners in all aspects, including mutual public support.
There are many questions regarding how Fukushima Daiichi will be decommissioned, and there
are people working to address these questions. It is important to recognize that there is ahierarchy to defining priorities and work:
Policy defined → supporting strategies developed → implementation plans finalized
It is difficult for a single organization to fill all three of those roles. As the Division of
Responsibility between TEPCO, IRID, and METI is finalized and adjusted, each of these roles
should be considered separately.
It is important for all stakeholders to recognize and accept that Fukushima Daiichi is no longer anuclear power plant site. It is now a decommissioning site. As a decommissioning site withsignificant amounts of unknown conditions on site, there will be regular and routine surprises
and emergent issues that were unanticipated. The way all stakeholders look at Fukushima
Daiichi needs to reflect this situation. This includes government and the NRA. Policy
development and regulation need to respond to realities of the situation.
TEPCO is presently pursuing at least eight major work programs at Fukushima Daiichi. These
include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Remediation of the trenches
Restoring the subdrains to operability
Implementing groundwater bypass
Improving risk management of the contaminated water storage tanks
Increasing ALPS capacity and improving its reliability
Considering reductions in cooling water flow to the Reactor Buildings and potential
installation of local water treatment system capability
7. Preparing for and implementing Unit 4 spent fuel removal
8. Preparing for Unit 3 spent fuel removal
In parallel with the work at the Fukushima Daiichi site and supporting that work, there are also
important activities underway in the strategy and policy area, including:
1. Development of national waste policy to allow defining interim and end states for Fukushima
Daiichi

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2. NRA developing a regulatory environment suitable for the realities of decommissioning(instead of an operating nuclear power plant)
3. All organizations’ role in stakeholder engagement and building public confidence
These are long lists of important and hard objectives. It is important to continually prioritize thework activities, achieve stakeholder alignment around the prioritization, and apply the proper
focus on the high priority activities. The IEG notes that this may require difficult choices aswork is prioritized. However, prioritization is crucial to achieve success.

2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary IEG recommendations from this meeting are:
1. Review the priorities for Contaminated Water countermeasures and adjust work plan
accordingly to ensure effort is focused on high priority actions with the best impact toward
the project objectives. This will involve aligning actions with goals and priorities and taking
actions to reduce the risk of unexpected events and the consequences of those events.
2. Improve expectation management with the public. It is critical to improve engagement withall stakeholders to improve their understanding of the risks at Fukushima Daiichi, bothcurrent and future risks. Also, ensure internal work schedules have margin compared toexternal schedules so that all external schedule milestones are satisfied.. The public needs tohave expectations for TEPCO and the work at Fukushima Daiichi that are realistic andinformed.
3. Improve clarity of organizational roles and responsibilities among TEPCO, METI, IRID andother key organizations. This includes ensuring the Division of Responsibilities of all parties
is communicated and understood by all stakeholders and participants, not just the seniorleaders. Also, ensure project priorities are shared, understood, and communicated among all
stakeholders.
4. Make meaningful progress on the critical need define Interim and End States. This
information is needed to provide direction for ongoing activities, to improve theireffectiveness, reduce future rework, and lower overall risk. The IEG notes this will likely
require addressing national policy questions related to nuclear waste (high level and low
level). Until the End States and key milestones are defined it will be difficult to develop andimplement a clear plan – this needs to be a high priority action.
5. Perform a rigorous readiness review of plans and bases for performing Unit 4 spent fuelremoval. This review should focus on potential upset or unexpected conditions, the safetysignificance, and how they will be addressed. The review should also include participation
by personnel from outside organizations to gain the insights from their independent thinking(this includes the IEG).
Additional IEG suggestions to support the meeting discussion topics are provided in eachsubsection of Section 3.

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Finally, the IEG highly recommends that IRID and the IEG implement an approach thatmaintains the IEG engaged with IRID and TEPCO personnel on a periodic basis between IEG
meetings. The IEG will provide IRID separately with a suggested approach to achieve thisobjective.

2.3 NEXT IEG MEETING TOPICS
Based on the results of this meeting, upcoming activities and needs, and discussions withTEPCO, IRID, and METI personnel, the IEG anticipates engaging on the following topics at thenext meeting (tentatively scheduled for February 2014):








Roadmap, in particular Interim and End States that may be included in next revision(expected in Spring/Summer 2014)
Progress in the development of IRID and its effectiveness as an organization working withthe other organizations
Design processes for development of medium and long term systems and equipment to beinstalled and/or used at Fukushima Daiichi
Planning for fault and off-normal scenarios during upcoming activities
Fuel debris removal, including evaluation of feedback from the international solicitation
Site clean-up and restoration to upgrade work conditions
Most effective methods for engaging IEG members to contribute outside of team-wide
meetings

In addition to planning for these topics at the next meeting, the IEG will provide separately
potential topics to engage with IRID and TEPCO prior to the next meeting (in order to both stayengaged between meetings and to contribute further).

Revision 053Discussion Topics

3.1 FORMATION OF IRID
IRID Leadership provided the IEG a summary of the formation of IRID, including the vision for
IRID’s contributions and role, and how TEPCO, IRID and the various government agencies (inparticular METI) will collaborate on the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi. Of particularnote are two objectives for IRID:


IRID is intended to be a window to the international community to identify experience andtechnology that may benefit decommissioning activities in Japan.
IRID is intended to pursue research and development that will benefit decommissioning of
all nuclear facilities in Japan (not just Fukushima Daiichi).

IEG observations include:The goals and vision for IRID are good. Separating those functions from TEPCO andallowing a single organization to focus on the medium and long term development needs
should improve the effectiveness of those activities.



There is a need for clarity in organizational roles, responsibility, and accountability between
TEPCO, IRID, and METI. The vision for how these organizations will collaborate is achange from the way of working for the past two years. Given this change, it is critical thatthe role and responsibilities of each organization be defined and communicated clearly andbroadly. This includes ensuring the roles are understood by all project participants, not justthe executives.



Achieving the new way of working between TEPCO, IRID and METI will require asignificant investment of time and focus by the leadership of those organizations. It will be
important to maintain a commitment to improve communication and alignment and shift theoverall project toward the organizational vision.

Specific IEG suggestions concerning the formation of IRID are provided below. These areintended to provide advice on how to develop and ensure clear division of responsibility between
TEPCO, IRID, and METI.
1. Schedule and perform self assessments of the progress of IRID developing as an organization
and achieving the desired vision, role, and collaborative relationship with TEPCO as well as
contributions to progress of the 1F decommissioning.

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2. Develop an internal website (inside IRID and TEPCO) for the purpose of communicating
critical information to the IRID and TEPCO project teams. The website would address
topics such as: Division of responsibility between IRID, TEPCO, and METI Current priorities for the overall project Current priorities for each organization
 Implications for health and safety of the workers and the public from the current
conditions. These would be key talking points all stakeholders should understand andcommunicate.
The existence of the website should be communicated broadly among all project participants
and personnel should be encouraged to visit the site regularly.

3.2 FUEL DEBRIS REMOVAL R&D SOLICITATIONIRID provided the IEG a summary of the planned international solicitation to identify research
topics to investigate and develop options for fuel debris removal from Fukushima Daiichi Units
1, 2 and 3. The objective of the solicitation is to engage international organizations andcompanies in an effort to stimulate creation of innovative ideas for removal of fuel debris in thechallenging conditions at Fukushima Daiichi. Of important note, IRID and TEPCO have avision to provide international equal opportunity (with the Japanese vendors) to contribute to andparticipate in the work at Fukushima Daiichi.
IEG observations include:The objectives to engage with international organizations and to engage with them early inthe process are good. This is a solid approach for identifying world-wide innovative ideas
for overcoming the technical challenges at Fukushima Daiichi.

The current plan for fuel debris removal is to seal the primary containment vessel (PCV) of
each unit, flood the reactor and containment vessels, and perform the debris removal
underwater. This approach has advantages, but also has risks, especially since TEPCO does
not know yet if the PCVs can be sealed. Thus, the plan to consider other options beyond aflooded PCV is a good contingency approach.

The planned approach for performing the solicitation, including how the solicitation ispresented to potential responders could create a risk that the number of responses will be low
and that the target organizations with the best experience and capabilities may not respond.
This is driven by four factors:− Concerns about ownership of Intellectual Property: the current plan is for the Japanese
Government to own any Intellectual Property developed in the research (not theoriginator of the ideas).
− Concerns about whether this solicitation will create a real opportunity for the market:
many of the target organizations have primary missions to sell solutions and services, notto sell ideas. These organizations will desire to have a line of sight to meaningful roles
supporting the development and implementation of their ideas. Although the long term

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vision of IRID and TEPCO is for those organizations to have that opportunity, right now
they cannot make that commitment.
− Concerns about Japan’s history as a closed market: historically, services and solutions
provided to Japanese nuclear power plants have been overwhelmingly provided by
Japanese vendors. This has resulted in many organizations around the world viewing
Japan as a closed market with little opportunity for them. The long term of IRID andTEPCO is to have an open market supporting Fukushima Daiichi, but work likely
remains to convince the market place of this commitment.
− Concerns about the time scale for the process: IRID anticipates executing this solicitation
process on an aggressive schedule. This may cause some organizations to conclude theycannot support the schedule needs for the process.
Specific IEG suggestions concerning the planned solicitation are provided below. Thesesuggestions focus on approaches for communication with potential responders to ensure they
understand the IRID/TEPCO long term vision for international participation and will actively
engage with IRID.
1. Engage with IEG members and international advisors to identify the key organizations most
likely to provide technology and innovative ideas that could contribute to the overall program
goals, as well as organizations in leadership roles that would influence other organizations
view toward the solicitation. Reach out to those organizations and schedule one-on-one
meetings to: Ensure those organizations fully understand the IRID vision for technology development
and implementation of solutions
 Encourage them to participate as well as to encourage other organizations to participate
 Listen to their concerns about the solicitation and the planned process
After the meetings, consider revising or updating the solicitation based on the feedback.
2. In all meetings with potential responders, both small group meetings as well as larger public
meetings, reinforce the long term goals for international participation in the overall program,including the vision for non-Japanese companies to participate in on-site implementation ofsolutions.
3. Through the solicitation process, IRID and TEPCO should develop a program for assessingof opportunity to convert fuel debris cooling from water cooling to air cooling (there would
be important advantages). This program should include the option to exclude the turbine
building from the cooling process as the first and very important step.

3.3 CONTAMINATED GROUNDWATER
The management of contaminated groundwater at the Fukushima Daiichi site and theimplications of potential contamination releases was a main discussion topic of the IEG meeting.
The TEPCO team provided summaries of the current status on site, including recent
measurements of contamination and dose, as well as the status of ongoing and planned
countermeasures to improve the situation.

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IEG observations include:

IEG does not see an immediate threat to people or environment from the conditions on site.
Yes, there is contamination in the groundwater near the buildings and some of that
contamination is reaching the port. However, the levels of contamination are well below any
applicable regulatory limits everywhere (including nearby offsite in the ocean) except for one
location in the port near a contaminated trench. Even at this location, the contaminationlevels are comparable to the regulatory limit for releases. It is important to improve thesituation, including reducing the amount of contamination reaching the port and the amountof contaminated water being generated, but there is not an emergency on-site, and emergency
actions are not required.
The public does not understand the results and meaning of radiation measurements publishedby TEPCO, especially with regard to beta dose rate measurements. Confusion aboutmeasured equivalent dose rates and effective dose rate in the TEPCO handouts leads tounwarranted public anxiety. The IEG notes that this apparent conflict – the public perceptionof a safety significant emergency on-site when the actual condition is acceptable and within
regulatory limits, highlights the need for improved communication and stakeholder
engagement and education. These are needed to improve public confidence as well as reduce
the number and extent of distractions to the ongoing work program.



Based on the data and information provided, the IEG sees three primary objectives ofimproving the management of contaminated groundwater. These three objectives are related,but each is also important as a stand-alone objective.
− Reduce the risk of contamination entering to ocean (at the port). This is both goodpractice (stewardship of the environment) and important to building public confidence.
− Lower the water levels in Reactor and Turbine Buildings. This is needed to enable accessto the building to characterize their condition as well as begin characterizing thecondition of the PCVs.
− Reduce amount of water requiring treatment and storage. The existing site systems are
generating about 400 tons/day of contaminated water, requiring considerable treatment
capability and large storage capacities. It is impractical to continue in this mode for thelong term.

Achieving these objectives requires prioritizing the on-site countermeasures and actions,placing the greatest priority on the actions expected to provide the greatest benefits toward
the objectives. Based on the available information, the IEG suggests the following priorities:
1. Trench remediation – The most significant source of contamination reaching the ocean
appears to be from the contaminated trenches between the Turbine Buildings and theport. Remediation of the trenches (removal of contaminated material and sealing thetrenches) will greatly reduce the amount of contamination reaching the ocean.
2. Restore subdrain functionality – The Reactor and Turbine Building subdrains have notfunctioned since the tsunami. These systems were originally designed and installed forthe purpose of managing groundwater around the buildings. Restoring this capability
will reduce the amount of groundwater flowing into the buildings, reduce the amount ofRevision 09contaminated water being generated, and will enable reducing the water level in thebuildings.
3. Groundwater bypass – TEPCO is planning to implement groundwater bypass. In thisapproach, wells will be installed and groundwater removed upstream of the buildings andthe clean water diverted to the ocean. This will reduce the amount of groundwater near
the buildings, reduce the demand on the subdrains, and reduce the amount of waterflowing past the buildings into the ocean.
4. Consider options for reduction of cooling water flow – Currently the cooling water
systems pump a total of about 400 tons/day of water into the Reactor Buildings for fueland fuel debris cooling, causing the water to become contaminated in the process. Thiswater then requires treatment and storage. TEPCO should evaluate the potential toreduce this cooling water flow to reduce the amount of contaminated water being
generated. Options up to and including air cooling may be practical depending on theconditions in each unit.
In addition to these prioritization recommendations, the IEG suggests the following specificactions be considered:
1. Define priorities and adjust the work plan accordingly. It is important to recognize thatTEPCO cannot do everything at the same time and that prioritizing the goals and work planis necessary.
2. Update and improve TEPCO and METI communication materials to more accurately reflectsite conditions and the actual consequences of contaminated ground water.
3. Develop and implement an overall engagement campaign with stakeholders to help themunderstand the actual conditions and the actual consequences of the site conditions. It is
critical to influence public opinion and get society to understand the actual consequences atthe site.
4. Change the public presentation of dose rates to properly describe the actual dose rates andactual consequences at the site. Consider additional public outreach to communicate
regarding impact of dose rates on human health, as well as including comparisons of dose
received at the site compared to annual limits and natural radiation sources.
Ice Dam
METI and TEPCO are planning to create an ice dam around the Units 1 to 4 Reactor and Turbine
Buildings. In this approach the ground is frozen to a depth below the active water table and used
as a seal to prevent groundwater flow into the building area (to minimize groundwater flow into
the buildings). The IEG discussed the ice dam plan and provided the following summarycomments:

The objective of the ice dam is clear (to prevent clean groundwater from entering thebuildings and becoming contaminated). Given the uncertainties on site it is worth pursuing
as a feasibility study basis as a potential contingency.

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10The ice dam will be a first-of-a-kind application of technology in Japan and is currently
unproven in the geology and soil conditions at the Fukushima Daiichi site. Further, the ice
dam will result in significant change to the natural groundwater flow on site. Although the
IEG members are not experts in hydrology and groundwater flow, their collective experienceis that changes of this magnitude can have unintended and unexpected consequences(accurately modeling these conditions and phenomena is hard). As a result, it is very
important to evaluate in detail the feasibility and impact of the ice dam before making a firm
commitment to implement it. In particular:− Studies are needed to investigate and understand the likely impact on groundwater flow,building stability, and soil conditions. The local soil within the ice dam supports theexisting buildings and will be the foundation for future structures constructed to support
decommissioning. Understanding any potential impacts due to the changes ingroundwater flow and soil properties is critical. For example, does the seismic capabilityof the structures change after implementing the ice dam?
− Physical trials and testing are essential to confirm the feasibility of implementing the ice
dam as well as to determine its effectiveness.

The final decision to implement the ice dam and the appropriate schedule should be decided
based on the results of the feasibility studies (including testing and impact on site structures)
as well as the site conditions after restoring the subdrains and implementing groundwater
bypass. There is a reasonable possibility the ice dam may not be necessary if the subdrains
are functioning properly and groundwater bypass is diverting much of the groundwater awayfrom the buildings.

Shield WallTEPCO is installing a shield wall in the port to prevent contaminated groundwater flow into theocean from leaving the port and spreading to the neighboring environment. The wall is about
50% complete with plans to finish in 2014. The IEG discussed the shield wall plan and provided
the following summary comments:

The objective of the shield wall is clear (to prevent contaminated groundwater from leaving
the immediate port area). Given the uncertainties on site it is worth pursuing as part of adefense-in-depth strategy.



It is important to complete additional evaluations of the shield wall before completing thefinal section and sealing the port from the ocean. These evaluations need to address thepotential for unexpected consequences and how to be prepared for potential undesired
developments. These include:− The potential for unintended consequences on site groundwater flow. There is about 800
tons/day of groundwater coming down the hill flowing toward the ocean. Currently,
about 400 tons/day leaks into the Reactor and Turbine Buildings and about 400 tons/day
flows into the ocean. When the shield wall is complete, the same amount of water will
still want to flow down to the ocean, and with the shield wall in place the overall natureof the groundwater flow will change. The potential for unintended consequences (forexample, greatly raising the groundwater level in the ground adjacent to the ocean and as
a result changing the soil properties – or conversely requiring a new pump to continually

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pump groundwater out of that area to maintain lower ground water levels) is very real.
These changes need to be understood. The IEG briefly reviewed some high levelgroundwater flow modeling results and was not convinced the model used the properboundary conditions at the shield wall. Additional reviews and evaluations should be
performed.
− The potential for concentrating contamination in one location. If groundwater flowing tothe ocean remains contaminated, there could be a concentrating effect of transferring
much of the ground contamination to the shield wall area, resulting in increasing doselevels in that area.
− How to handle and manage a potentially large volume of contaminated soil and water.
The ground in the area of the shield wall is already believed to be among the mostcontaminated on site, especially near the trenches from the Turbine Buildings. The shieldwall will trap in place a large volume of contaminated and high saline water, likely withadditional contamination flowing into the area each day. Special purpose cleanup andhandling systems will be needed for the large amount of contaminated soil and water inthat area.
The overall IEG comment on the shield wall is that the TEPCO goal should be to prevent
contamination from reaching the ocean (i.e., ensure the groundwater reaching the ocean is well
below any contamination limits), not to prevent contaminated water from leaving the port.

3.4 TANK LEAKAGE
Along with the overall topic of management of contaminated water at the Fukushima Daiichi
site, the recent experiences with leakage from contaminated water storage tanks and how to
implement countermeasures to address these vulnerabilities were also main topics for discussion.
The TEPCO team provided summaries of the current status on site, including recent
measurements of contamination and dose, as well as the status of ongoing and planned
countermeasures to improve the situation. It is important to note that, although they are related(both involve water contamination), the IEG sees groundwater management and the issues withtank reliability to be separate issues.
IEG observations include:The current situation for storage of contaminated water is not ideal. Numerous bolted tankswith flanged joints creates a high likelihood of leakage. There is minimal margin in terms of
capacity and available contingency actions in the event of leaks.
Actions to improve the situation are needed. The objective of these actions is to remove therisk of contamination from the contents of the tanks.
Achieving this objective requires prioritizing the on-site countermeasures and actions. Basedon the available information, the IEG suggests the following priorities:
1. Ensure adequate storage capacity – The fuel cooling operations are producing about 400
tons/day of contaminated water, filling about three 1000 ton tanks each week. It is
critical to ensure adequate storage capacity while measures to reduce the generation ofcontaminated water are implemented.
2. Continue implementation of increased monitoring and surveillance measures – TEPCO is
implementing increased surveillance walkdowns and monitoring programs to minimize

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12the significance of future leaks by identifying them early. These measures should becontinued as a high priority.
3. Accelerate additional ALPS capacity – TEPCO is planning to add additional ALPS water
treatment capacity to enable treating of the contaminated water stored in the on-site tanks.
The design, procurement, licensing, and construction of this capacity should beaccelerated.
4. Mitigate risks of leaks – Many of the existing storage tanks are vertical, bolted type tanks
that are subject to leakage. Actions should be taken to mitigate risks of these leaks.
TEPCO should pursue installing spare tanks to provide margin in the event of leaks (forexample, one spare tank for each collection of connected tanks), replacing the bolted
tanks and replacing the horizontal tanks. An engineering evaluation considering risks,
costs, and schedule, should be performed to differentiate the relative priority between
those three actions (spare tanks, replace bolted tanks, replace horizontal tanks).
5. Local treatment capability – Presently, the cooling water systems and ALPS treatment
system require pumping contaminated water several km across the site, introducing risksof pipe and fitting leaks in locations away from tanks and buildings. TEPCO should
consider designing and installing local water treatment capability in the Turbine Building(or adjacent to the building) for each unit, allowing treated water to be pumped to storage
tanks instead of contaminated water.
Specific IEG suggestions concerning potential tank leakage are provided below.
1. Consider redundant control of tank water level and include functional tests of level sensors.
Also, countermeasures against accidental overflow of tanks should be implemented. As
stated in IAEA safety guide: “There should be reserve storage capacity available toaccommodate waste arising in various situations. Such situations may include abnormal
conditions (e.g. the need to empty a leaking tank) or periods when modifications or
refurbishments are being undertaken” (paragraph 6.58. Storage of radioactive waste: safety
guide. — Vienna: International, Atomic Energy Agency, 2006).
2. As a countermeasure against contaminated water leakage, an empty tank should be installedin the tank storage area. The tank storage area should have adequate illumination to support
inspections of the tanks and emergency response operations in the dark.
Finally, the IEG also notes that:

Replacing the bolted and horizontal tanks with more reliable tanks does not reduce risk ofpiping leaks. These can only be mitigated through local water treatment near or in thebuildings so that the piping contains treated water rather than contaminated water.
Discharge of treated water to the ocean would create immediate storage capacity. Pending amore detailed evaluation of surveillance data, the IEG sees no safety or environmental
reasons preventing discharge of treated water from the storage tanks to the ocean. Of course,
TEPCO must maintain any discharge within its existing regulatory limits.

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3.5 ROADMAPTEPCO provided the IEG a summary of the latest revision of the Fukushima Daiichi
Decommissioning Roadmap, with a focus on explaining the changes in the June 27, 2013
revision.
IEG observations include:

Building public confidence in TEPCO and the ongoing work at Fukushima Daiichi is critical.
Without that confidence progress will continually be slowed by distractions and emergent
issues driven by societal and political reasons, not technical or scientific. The Roadmap is an
important tool to contribute to building that confidence (in addition to providing an overall
direction and guide for the work program).



The Roadmap should be relative stable, defining key policy items and the important Interim
and End States. The most recent revision has added some detailed and more tactical items.
The Roadmap should remain at the strategic and policy level of information.



The Roadmap dates should be realistic and achievable. In the June revision the start dates forremoval of spent fuel from Units 1 and 2 were moved up by about 18 months. This was at atime without major advancement in knowledge of site conditions, in particular the ability toaccess the fuel and ability to remove it. This revision appears unnecessary and likely
aggressive.

Specific IEG suggestions concerning the Roadmap are provided below. These suggestions focus
actions to increase stakeholder confidence in the Roadmap and improve its use as a guidance
document.
1. In the next revision of the Roadmap:
 Revise the spent fuel removal dates to be less aggressive
 Include notes to recognize the important uncertainties and the potential impact onschedule (do not over promise) Remove the detailed tactical information (for example tank leakage); keep the Roadmap
focused on longer term strategic goals and plans Include additional information on important interim and end state conditions
2. Begin developing this next revision immediately and use that process to identify the criticalinformation needed to complete the revision (for example the interim and end states). This
will allow that information to be developed in parallel.
3. Using the Roadmap as a tool and guide, it is import to improve world-wide communication.
TEPCO and IRID should consider reaching out to society in the Fukushima area, inparticular, doctors, teachers, etc., and training/informing them about radiation and its effecton the environment and people’s health – enable them to assist TEPCO as messengers tosociety. Also, it is important to present to society clear explanations of the activities of theGovernment, TEPCO, IRID, and others to overcome the consequences of the accident. The
first step is to communicate among potential messengers with single voice in a coherent andRevision 0

14

consistent approach. It is very important – people should understand the worlds they hear orread, and every word is written must be understandable. This initiative may potentially be
led by IRID or the government because of the current negative perceptions of TEPCO.
4. As part of the Roadmap communication, consider informing the public about the risk ofpotential incidents during the decommissioning process (manage expectations). The public
needs to understand that the decommissioning process involves risks of contamination of theenvironment. Risk analyses of future operations should also include potential human errors.

3.6 SPENT FUEL REMOVALTEPCO provided the IEG a summary of the latest plans for removal of spent fuel from Unit 4
along with some summary updated information on the longer term Unit 3 plan.
IEG observations include:

TEPCO has made good progress preparing Unit 4 for spent fuel removal. The fuel removal
structure is impressive and was designed and constructed successfully on a rapid schedule.

TEPCO plans to begin removing fuel in November and for the fuel removal operation torequire about 12 months (there are about 1550 assemblies in the pool). Based on thisschedule and the discussions with TEPCO personnel, the IEG believes the overall plan may
be too optimistic. The rate at which assemblies will be removed from the pool and placed intransportation casks appears to assume an efficiency closer to an operating power plant thanthe damaged decommissioning facility present at Fukushima Daiichi. It is inevitable that
there will be surprise issues and challenges during fuel removal, whether it be damaged fuel,damaged racks or some unexpected fuel assembly/fuel rack/debris interaction.



The Common Spent Fuel Pool has space for about 1/3 of the assemblies in the Unit 4 spent
fuel pool. Moving assemblies to the Common Spent Fuel Pool will require a coordinatedeffort to also in parallel move assemblies from the Common Spent Fuel Pool to dry cask
storage. There is space in the Common Spent Fuel Pool to allow beginning removal of theUnit 4 assemblies; however, there are not storage casks on-site to begin moving fuelassemblies out of the Common Spent Fuel Pool.

Specific IEG suggestions concerning spent fuel removal are provided below. These suggestions
focus on increasing the robustness and confidence of the overall plan for spent fuel removal.
1. Perform a rigorous Readiness Review of the plan to remove spent fuel from Unit 4. This
review should include independent personnel as well as IEG members. The review should
focus on potential difficulties and upset/fault conditions along with implications of, andcontingency plans for each one. Do not begin fuel movement activities until the review iscomplete and follow-up actions complete as well.
2. Perform a review of the Unit 3 spent fuel removal activities, including status, risks, plans,etc., and confirm the work plan is appropriate in the overall site priorities.

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3.7 SITE VISIT
The IEG made a visit to the Fukushima Daiichi site on the afternoon of September 25. The tour
led by TEPCO included inspection and observation of:Contaminated water storage tanks, including the tank with recent leaks
Unit 4 spent fuel removal structure, including the refueling floor
Shield wall under construction in the port

The tour also included observation of general progress on the site, progress removing rubble
from the Unit 3 Reactor Building, the dry storage cask facility, and the dike system from thetransportation bus.
IEG observations include:Progress can be seen at the site. The most obvious examples are the Unit 4 spent fuelremoval structures and equipment, removal of rubble from the Unit 3 Reactor Building, andimproved site access. The TEPCO team is dedicated, working hard, and making progress.



The IEG considers that radiation protection practices on the Fukushima Daiichi site seem
overly conservative for the site conditions. For example, all workers on-site were full facemasks, even though the airborne contamination levels are well below applicable criteria
necessitating respirators. Although this may appear to be a conservative decision, the IEG isconcerned that from a holistic view of worker risk, this may actually be a non-conservativedecision that increases worker risk and has a negative impact. In particular:− Full personnel protective equipment (PPE), including masks/respirators increases therisks of industrial accidents and injuries. TEPCO noted multiple instances in the past
year of workers fracturing limbs because of reduced visibility with masks. The increase
in industrial risk may exceed the minimal reduction in radiological risk.
− Full PPE decreases worker productivity, requiring workers to spend even longer periodsin the site environment, increasing their overall risk profile.
− Finally, unnecessary PPE can send unintended messages to the broad community. Thishas two potential impacts. First, the morale of the work force is reduced, impacting
performance and increasing risk. Second, it contributes to the difficulties achieving
public confidence in the ongoing work at the Fukushima Daiichi site.

The site appears to still be operating in “crisis” or “emergency” mode rather than a morenormal mode of operations. TEPCO acknowledged this condition, saying they were making
progress prior to the recent tank leaks that pushed them back into emergency mode. Further,
there always seemed to be some emergent issue that prevented making the shift to normal
mode a reality. The IEG noted that there will continue to be emergent issues, challenges, andsurprises for year as the full condition of the site is learned and new activities are initiated.
Sometimes you simply need to make the shift now, even if will be hard.

Specific IEG suggestions concerning the site conditions are provided below. These suggestions
focus on practices to improve worker efficiency as well as reduce overall worker risk
(radiological and industrial) and worker burden.
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1. Develop a coherent and consistent program for the site clean-up and enhancement of theradiation protection regime. The program should be developed for two to three years withspecification for each year (quarter). The program should include tasks for the cleaning of
the 1F territory and premises, as well as inside units 1 through 4. The program should also
cover the site with asphalt and concrete and restore landscaping where it is possible andacceptable, zoning of the territory and premises according to level of contamination and dose
rates. Development and implementation of such program is necessary to change thepsychological condition of the staff and regain respect of society.
2. Reduce overall safety risks, including industrial safety risks. Begin a transition to having
small area radiation/contamination work areas near the storage tanks, near and in the reactor
and turbine buildings, and near other high contamination areas on site. The required
protective equipment and clothing should be based on the conditions in the planned work
areas. For example, eliminate the need for full face masks in areas with low airborne
contamination levels.
3. Develop and implement a Communication Campaign for the site workers to help themdevelop a better understanding of the consequences of the actual site conditions and theimpact on health and safety.

3.8 IEG OPERATIONSThe IEG reviewed its own performance during the meeting to identify potential adjustments toimprove effectiveness of future meetings. The IEG review identified that:

The IEG is coming together as a team. The members have complementary skills andexperience and the ability to work collaboratively as a team is beneficial to each other as well
as TEPCO, IRID, and other stakeholders.
The support provided by IRID and TEPCO is helpful and makes a strong contribution to
enabling the IEG to work effectively.
The support from Embassy personnel is also helpful, providing insights from personnel
stationed full-time in Tokyo.

Specific IEG suggestions to improve the effectiveness of IEG meetings are provided below.
1. IRID, TEPCO, and IEG should work together to develop and implement an approach for the
IEG members to remain involved and interacting with IRD and TEPCO in between IEG
meetings. This will allow IEG members to be most effective as well as be conduits to otherorganizations in their countries.
2. The IRID and TEPCO presentations should be focused on conclusions, goals and the key
supporting technical information. This will allow and encourage interaction andengagement. Many of the technical details from the presentations at this meeting were notnecessary.
3. Minimize the use of video conference during IEG meetings.

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17

4. Consider schedule adjustments to increase amount of face-to-face communication (forexample, change from standard Tokyo, 2F, 1F, 2F, Tokyo schedule if it will improve
effectiveness of meetings).

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18

A

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Principal Personnel Contacted

IRID
Mr.Hajimu YAMANA
Mr.Kazuhiro SUZUKI
Mr.Toshihiko FUKUDA
Mr.Shunichi SUZUKI
Mr.Masahiro ECHIZEN
Mr.Shin TAKIZAWA
Mr.Kazuhito TAKEDA
Mr.Kosuke TAKAHASHI
Mr.Naoto YAGI
Mr.Akinori YAMAGUCHI

Director General
Executive Director
Director
Research Promotion Department Manager
International and Alliance Department Manager
International and Alliance Department Deputy Manager
International and Alliance Department Team Leader
International and Alliance Department
International and Alliance Department
International and Alliance Department

TEPCO Head Office
Mr.Zengo AIZAWA
Mr.Akio KOMORI
Mr.John CROFTSMr.Naohiro MASUDA
Mr.Yasuhiro KUBO
Mr.Jun MATSUMOTO
Mr.Tomoyuki ARAI
Mr.Hiroya SHIRAKIMr.Junichi TAIRAMr.Noriyoshi NAKAMURA
Mr.Yoshitaka HAGIWARA
Mr.Yoshiyuki SATO
Mr.Ritsuro TOKUMORIMr.Masayuki YAMAMOTO

Vice President/Chief Nuclear Officer
Fellow
Nuclear Safety Oversight Office,Chief Officer
Nuclear Safety Oversight Office,Deputy Chief Officer
Nuclear Safety Oversight Office
1F Project General Manager
1F Project, Comprehensive Strategic Planning Group
1F Project, Environmental Assessment Group General Manager
1F Project, Environmental Assessment Group
1F Project, Civil&Architectural Engineering Group General Manager
1F Project, Civil&Architectural Engineering Group
1F Project, Civil&Architectural Engineering Group
1F Project, Defueling Strategy Group
Nuclear International Relations and Strategy Group Manager

TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
Mr.Akira ONO
Mr.Takeshi TAKAHASHI
Mr.Katsuhiko IWAKIMr.Tomoaki SHIRAKAWA
Mr.Kazuo MOMOSE
Mr.Hiroyuki SHINOHARA
Mr.Seiji UENO
Mr.Kazuo YAMANAKA
Mr.Tomomi OKAMURA
Mr.Shinji SAITOHMr.Takashi SATOH
Mr.Kazuo YASHIROMr.Takashi HARA
Mr.Toshimitsu TAMAIMr.Masahiro YAMAMOTO

1F Site President
1F Stabilization Centre General Manager
1F Stabilization Centre Deputy General Manager
1F Unit General Manager
Civil Engineering Department General Manager
Civil Engineering Department
Architectural Department General Manager
Radiation Management and Environment Department General Manger
Radiation Management and Environment Department
Cooling System Department General Manager
Water Treatment System Department General Manager
Mechanical Equipment Department General Manager
Mechanical Equipment Department Manager
Electrical Equipment Dpartment General Manager
Project Management Department General Manager

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B

Revision 0

Meeting Agenda

(R7)2013/09/19

International Expert Group(IEG) Meeting
September 23 - 27, 2013
International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning(IRID)
AgendaArrival Time of IEG Members
Schedule
Dr.Adrian Simper
September 22nd PM15:35(NH0208), Narita Airport
Mr.Bob Coward
September 19th PM15:15(UA0803), Narita Airport
Dr.Joel Pijselman
September 23rd AM 6:30(JL042), Haneda Airport
Mr.Nikolai Steinberg
September 22nd AM10:30(SU260), Narita Airport
Mr.Anton Leshchenko September 22nd AM10:30(SU260), Narita Airport
Hotel : Daiichi Hotel Tokyo
Sunday, September 22, 2013 (Tokyo)
Location
Schedule
Restaurant 19:00-21:00 Small dinner hosted by IRID
(inthe
(Restaurant “Enchante” in Daiichi Hotel Tokyo)
hotel)

Monday, September 23, 2013 (Tokyo, TEPCO HQs)
Location
Schedule and Agenda
Transfer
9:50
Meet at hotel lobby (Mr.Takeda)
9:50-10:00 Hotel => TEPCO HQs(walk)
TEPCO
10:00-10:45 Meeting with Secretariat
HQs
10:45-11:30 Team Building Meeting
Meeting
11:30-12:00 Preparation meetingRoom- Framework of IRID,TEPCO and IEG
12:00-13:00 Working lunch
13:00-14:00 Preparation meeting- Framework of IRID,TEPCO and IEG- Decision process around contaminatedwater management- An emergency to planned normal
situation-Operator/Regulator
interfaceandinteraction
14:00-15:00 International Public Offering Plans ofContaminated Water Measures by IRID
Transfer
15:00-15:20 TEPCO HQs =>Ueno St.(Taxi)
16:00-18:08 Ueno St. => Iwaki St.
(Express Super Hitachi #39)
Restaurant 19:00-21:00 Dinner hosted by IRID
in the hotel
1/4

Participants<IEG member>
Adrian Simper
Bob Coward
Nikolai Steinberg
Anton Leshchenko<IRID>
Kazuhiro Suzuki
Masahiro Echizen

Participants<IEG member>
Adrian Simper
Bob Coward
Joel Pijselman
Nikolai Steinberg
Anton Leshchenko<Embassy Officials><IRID secretariat><TEPCO>
Matsumoto

IEG member
IRID executives
InterpreterHotelGrandpark Hotel Panex Iwaki (Fukushima)

Tuesday, September 24, 2013 (Fukushima Daini)
Location
Schedule and Agenda
Transfer
Fukushima
Daini
MeetingRoom

7:30-8:30 Hotel => Fukushima Daini (Bus)8:45-9:30 Entrance Meeting- Self Introduction (IEG,IRID,TEPCO)- Remarks from IRID Chief Director- Remarks from IAT Alternate Chairman
9:30-11:00

Transfer

Background of IRID establishment,
framework, organization and Positions of
IEG/International Advisor (by IRID)
11:00-12:00 [Discussion Item 1] International Public
Offering of Alternative Plans of Fuel Debris
Removal
1. Explanation from ERID
-Introduction of the Scheme-Draft Specifications
2. QA and Discussion
12:00-12:30 Lunch
12:30-13:00 IAT’s Suggestions (IAT Report summary)(by IEG Mr.Bob Coward)(Mr.Aizawa (TEPCO CNO) attends
through video link)
13:00-13:30
IAT’s Suggestions and TEPCO’s
Management
Policy(by
TEPCO)(Mr.Aizawa (TEPCO CNO) attends
through video link)
14:00-17:00 [Discussion Item 2] Contaminated Water
Issues (Session A: Information Sharing
and Deepening Understanding)
1. Explanation from TEPCO (Overview,
Latest conditions and Topics)- Overview
LatestConditions
andCountermeasures- Contaminated Water Leakage fromTanks
2. QA and Discussion
17:30-18:30 Fukushima Daini => Hotel (Bus)HotelGrandpark Hotel Panex Iwaki (Fukushima)

Participants

IEG member
Embassy Officials
INSJ
IRID executives
IRID secretariat
TEPCO executives
TEPCO managers
1F executives
1F managers
Interpreter

Wednesday, September 25, 2013 (Fukushima-Daini, Fukushima-Daiichi)
Location
Schedule and Agenda
Participants
IEG member
Transfer
7:30-9:20 Hotel=>J-Village(WBC)
Embassy Officials=>Fukushima Daini(Bus)INSJ
IRID secretariat
TEPCO managers
Interpreter

2/4

Fukushima
Daini
MeetingRoom

9:45-10:45 Revised Roadmap and Progress(By TEPCO)
10:45-12:00[Discussion Item 4] Spent
Handling and Disposition
1. Explanation from TEPCO
2. Discussion
12:00-12:30

Fuel

Lunch

Transfer
Fukushima
Daiichi Site

13:00-13:40 Fukushima Daini=> Daiichi
13:40-17:00 Site Tour of Fukushima Daiichi NPP<Contaminated water issue areas>- Walkdown with Water Tanks Patrol Team- M4 well point, Trenches related to contaminatedwater issues<SF handling facilities>- Unit4 SFP and Cover- Dry Cask Facility

Transfer
Hotel
MeetingRoom

17:00-19:00
19:30-22:30

HotelGrandpark Hotel Panex Iwaki (Fukushima)

Daiichi=>J-Village(WBC)=>HotelWorking Dinner (A meeting room withdinner to be booked in the hotel for teamdiscussion)

Thursday, September 26, 2013 (Fukushima-Daini)
Location
Schedule and Agenda
Transfer
6:45-7:45 Hotel => Fukushima-Daini(Bus)Fukushima
Daini
MeetingRoom

8:00-10:00 [Discussion Item 2] Contaminated Water
Issues (Session B : Mid-Long Term
Strategies)- Discussion on middle/long term strategies
and IEG’s Advices=Example of Discussion Items=- Priority of Countermeasures- Possible Risks of Current Plans- Strategy of Risk Reduction etc.
10:00-10:45

IEG member
Embassy Officials
INSJ
IRID secretariat
TEPCO managers
1F managers
Interpreter

IEG member
IRID secretariat
TEPCO managers
1F site managers
Interpreter

IEG member

Participants
IEG member
Embassy Officials
INSJ
IRID secretariat
TEPCO managers
Interpreter
IEG member
Embassy Officials
INSJ
IRID secretariat
TEPCO managers
1F managers
Interpreter[Visit]Council
MeetingforDecommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi
NPS (The Government(METI)-TEPCO
Joint Meeting)

10:45-13:00 Team Meeting with Lunch

3/4

IEG member
IRID secretariat

13:00-15:00

Report to Site Executives/Management
1. Report from IEG
2. Discussion
3. Closing Remarks from IEG Alternate
ChairmanTransfer

15:30-16:30
17:20-19:36

Fukushima Daini=>Iwaki St.(Bus)Iwaki St.=>Ueno St.
(Express Super Hitachi #58)
Ueno St.=>Daiichi Hotel Tokyo(Taxi)

Hotel

Daiichi Hotel Tokyo

Friday, September 27, 2013 (Tokyo, TEPCO HQs)
Location
Schedule and Agenda
Transfer
8:50
Meet at hotel lobby(Mr.Yagi)
8:50-9:00
Hotel=> TEPCO HQs(walk)
TEPCO HQs 9:00-12:00 Team Meeting
Meeting
12:00-13:00 Lunch
Room
13:00-15:00 Exit Meeting
1. Report from IEG
2. Discussion
3. Closing Remarks from
Alternate Chairman
15:00-16:00

Press meeting(doorstepping)

16:00-17:00

Transfer
Restaurant

Meeting with Secretariat
1.About Next IAT Meeting
2.Preparation for Press meeting
3.Miscellaneous
17:00Back to Hotel
19:00-22:00 Dinner hosted by IRID

Hotel

Daiichi Hotel Tokyo

IEG member
Embassy Officials
INSJ
IRID executives
IRID secretariat
TEPCO executives
TEPCO managers
1F executives
1F managers
Interpreter

Participants

IEG member
IRID secretariat

IEG

IEG member
IRID executives
IRID secretariat
TEPCO
executives(incl.
CNO)
andmanagers
Embassy Officials
Interpreter
IEG member
IRID secretariat
PR , SC members
Interpreter
IEG member
IRID secretariat
PR , SC members
Interpreter

IEG member
IRID executives
TEPCO
executives(incl. CNO)
Interpreter

Departure Time of IEG Members
Schedule
Dr.Adrian Simper
October 2nd AM 1:00(NH0203), Haneda Airport
Mr.Bob Coward
September 28th PM12:30(OZ0101), Narita Airport
Dr.Joel Pijselman
September 28th AM 0:40(JL041), Haneda Airport
Mr.Nikolai Steinberg
September 28th PM12:00(SU263), Narita Airport
Mr.Anton Leshchenko September 28th PM12:00(SU263), Narita Airport

4/4

C

Revision 0

Exit Meeting Presentation

IRID International Expert Group

September 2013 IEG Meeting Summary

IEG Mission
The mission of the International Expert Group (the “IEG”)
IEG ) is tocontribute to the safe and efficient implementation of thedecommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station(th “Decommissioning”)(the“D
i i i ”) andd R&D activity
ti it forf thethDecommissioning, by providing advice to The International
Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (the ”IRID”).
The IEG shall provide such advice to IRID from an objective
perspective based on the collective view of the IEG reflecting thediffering international expertise and experience of each member of
the IEG.

The IEG will provide IRID with recommendations on the specific issues
pissues of Research
faced at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and the specific& Development for decommissioning
IRID International Expert Group2

Summary Comments• A good visit and good meeting• Organization changes (formation of IRID, METI increased
involvement) provide a potential foundation for improved
effectiveness• Key challenges remain to be:– Stakeholder engagement and education– Prioritization of activities– Definition of Interim and End States (to guide activities)– Organizational alignment and effectiveness

There are technical challenges to execute the Fukushima
decommissioning ‐ right now the organizational and stakeholder
challenges are more significant and more important
IRID International Expert Group3

Summary Comments• Developing and maintaining public confidence is vital– Commitments must be met• Commitments must be within the capability of delivering organization• Top down goals must be validated by bottom up planning• The amount of work must be reasonable (this will require some hard choices toprioritise)– TEPCO,TEPCO IRID and METI must be partners supporting each other• There is a hierarchy to defining priorities and work:
policy ‐> supporting strategies ‐> implementation plans• Policy and regulation needs to respond to realities of the situation• 1F is no longer a nuclear power plant site, it is a nuclearddecommissioningi i i siteit

IRID International Expert Group4

Formation of IRID
• Observations:– Goals and vision for IRID are good
– There is a need for clarity in organizational roles, responsibility, andaccountability between TEPCOTEPCO, IRID
IRID, and METI• They need to be understood by everyone– Achieving the new way of working will require significant investment of timeandd ffocus• IEG recommendations will include suggestions on how to develop
and ensure clear division of responsibility between TEPCO, IRID,
and METI– For example: regular assessments to determine if adjustments are needed

IRID International Expert Group5

Fuel Debris Removal R&D Solicitation• Observations:– Objectives to engage international organizations, and to engage with themearly are good
– Plan to consider options other than flooded PCV is good
– Planned approach could create risk that the number of responses will be low
and not from organizations with the right experience and capabilities• Concerns
C
about
b
ownership
hi off IIntellectuallllP
Property• Concerns about whether this process will create a real opportunity for market• Concerns about Japan’s history as a closed market• Concerns
C
about
b
time
i
scale
l for
f process• IEG recommendations will focus on communication with potentialpto ensure theyy understand longg term planp and will
responders
engage with IRID
– For example, engagement with selected companies in advance to discuss theirconcerns and reinforce the reasons they should participate
IRID International Expert Group

6

Contaminated Water• Observations:– IEG does not see immediate threat to people or environment• Emergency actions are not required• Situation highlights need for improved communications– Three objectives:• Reduce risk of contamination to ocean• Lower water levels
l l iin Reactor andd Turbinebi Buildings
ildi• Reduce amount of water to be treated and stored• Priorities/Recommendations:• Trench remediation• Subdrain functionality• Groundwater bypass• Options for reduction of cooling water flow

IRID International Expert Group7

Additional Comments• Ice Dam
– We understand the objectives of the ice dam– It is important to evaluate in detail the feasibility and impact• NeedN d to understanddd iimpact on groundwaterdflflow, bbuilding
ildi stability,bili andd soilil conditions
di i• Physical trials and testing are essential– Implementation schedule should be decided based on site conditions after
restoringi subdrains
bd i andd implementing
i l
i groundwaterdplus
l results
l off physicalh i ltrials and testing• Shield Wall
– We understand the objectives of the shield wall
– It is important to evaluate further:• Potential for unintended consequences on ground water flow
• Potential for concentrating contamination in one location• How to handle and manage a large volume of contaminated soil and water

IRID International Expert Group8

Tank Farm
• Observations:– Existing situation is not ideal• Leaks likely• Low marginsg– Objective is to remove risk of contamination from tanks• Priorities/Recommendations:– Ensure adequate storage capacity– Accelerate additional ALPS capacity– Mitigate risks of leaks – pursue spare tanks– Replace bolted tanks– Replace horizontal tanks• Note:– Replacing tanks does not reduce risk of piping leaks– Discharge of treated water creates immediate capacity• IEG sees no safety or environmental reasons preventing discharge

IRID International Expert Group

9

Roadmap• Observations:– Building public confidence is critical• The Roadmap should be relative stable, defining key policy items and the importantInterim and End States• Roadmap dates should be realistic and achievable– The Roadmap plays a role in establishing public confidence and guiding the
program• IEG Recommendations will focus on actions to increase stakeholder
confidence in the Roadmap and improve it’s use as a guidance
document– For example, top down date goals should be validated from a bottom‐up
approach

IRID International Expert Group10

Spent Fuel Removal• Observations:– Good progress preparing Unit 4 for spent fuel removal– Overall plan appears optimistic• SeemsS
to assume ““normal”l” operationi type experiencei• Issues with damaged fuel and racks will occur more than anticipated– Removal of fuel from Unit 4 and moving fuel from Common Pool to casks mustb coordinatedbedid to ensure sufficient
ffi ispace iin the
h CommonC
P
Pooll• IEG Recommendations will focus on increasing the robustness andconfidence of the overall pplan for spentpfuel removal– For example, this is a high risk activity ‐ IEG would like to engage with TEPCO toreview the plans in detail, including failure analyses

IRID International Expert Group11

Site Visit• Observations:– Progress can be seen, for example:• Unit 4 spent fuel removal structures and equipment• Removal of rubble from Unit 3 reactor Building• Site access– Radiation protection practices seem overly conservative• Increase worker
k risksi k (increased(id riski k off industriali d
i l incidents)
i id)• Decrease worker productivity• Sends unintended messages to broad community– Efforts still needed to get out of emergency mode

• IEG recommendations will focus on practices to improve worker
eefficiency
c e cy as welle as reduce
educe overallo e a workero e risks ((radiologicalad o og ca anda dindustrial) and worker burden

IRID International Expert Group12

Priority Work Programmes
Operator
1. Trenches
2. Sub Drains
3. Groundwater Bypass
4. Tank Farm management
5 ALPS capacity5.
6. Cooling water reduction and installation of local water treatment
7. Unit 4 Spent Fuel removal
8. Unit 3 Spent Fuel removal
Strategy and Policy
1 National waste policy
1.
2. Regulatory environment suitable for realities of decommissioning
3. Stakeholder engagement and building public confidence
IRID International Expert Group13

IEG Operations• Observations:– IEG is coming together as a team – complementary skills and experience arebeneficial– IRID and TEPCO support is helpful– Embassy engagement is helpful• IEG recommendations will focus on improving the effectiveness of
IEG meetings

IRID International Expert Group14

Key IEG Recommendations (to IRID, METI & TEPCO)• Review the ppriorities for Contaminated Water countermeasures andadjust work plan
– Align actions with goals and priorities– Reduce risk of unexpected consequences• ImproveI
expectationt ti managementt– Improve engagement with stakeholders to improve understanding of risks– Ensure internal work schedules have margin compared to external schedules• Improve clarity of organizational roles and responsibilities among TEPCO,TEPCO
METI, IRID and other key organizations– Ensure Division of Responsibilities of all parties is communicated and understood– Ensure ppriorities are shared,, understood,, and communicated• Progress on defining Interim and End States is critical– Provide direction for ongoing activities– Requires addressing national policy questions• Perform readiness review of plans and bases for performing Unit 4 spent
fuel removal– Include outside participation for independence (including IEG)

IRID International Expert Group15

Looking Ahead – Next IEG Meeting• At next meeting,meeting IEG desires to engage on:– Roadmap, in particular Interim and End States to be included in next revision– Development of IRID
– Design processes– Fault scenarios for fuel removal– Fuel debris removal

IRID International Expert Group

16