Journal of Socio-Informatics
Vol.15, No.1

Sep. 2022[Refereed Original Paper］
Perceptions of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Anxiety-Relieving Behaviors
after the Lifting of the First State of Emergency in Japan: Comparing
International Students from Mainland China and Others

Shaoyu YE[Translation］
Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156
Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook
Accounts in Communication with Japan

Junko NISHIKAWA

The Society of Socio-Informatics

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Journal of Socio-Informatics
Vol.15, No.1 Sep. 2022
◆CONTENTS◆［Refereed Original Paper］
Perceptions of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Anxiety-Relieving Behaviors
after the Lifting of the First State of Emergency in Japan: Comparing
International Students from Mainland China and Others

Shaoyu YE…   1［Translation］
Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156
Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook
Accounts in Communication with Japan

Junko NISHIKAWA

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Refereed Original Paper
Perceptions of the COVID-19 Pandemic and AnxietyRelieving Behaviors after the Lifting of the First State ofEmergency in Japan: Comparing International Students
from Mainland China and Others 1)
Keywords:
International students, Lifting of the first state of emergency, Perceptions of the COVID-19 pandemic,
Anxiety-relieving behaviors

Shaoyu YE, University of Tsukuba

Abstract
This study aimed to examine differences in perceptions of the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic and anxiety-relieving behaviors after the lifting of the first state of
emergency in Japan between mainland China international students (MCISs) and otherinternational students (ISs). An online survey targeting ISs enrolled at four national universities
in the Kanto region of Japan was conducted from early to mid-June 2020. Data from 333 ISs wereanalyzed, including 202 MCISs and 131 other ISs. The results indicated that MCISs started to pay
attention to the COVID-19 pandemic earlier and collected relevant information more proactively
than other ISs before the first state of emergency. However, MCISs used official media, such as
television and newspapers, much less than other ISs. In addition, all ISs were able to cope withstress toward the COVID-19 pandemic by asking for help and advice from same-language speakers(SLSs). However, other ISs were able to ask for more help and advice from Japanese people than
MCISs, and they engaged in more anxiety-relieving behavior than MCISs. Furthermore, although
MCISs and other ISs used different social media to collect information, the usage and methods ofcoping with stress had similar positive effects on relieving anxiety for both MCISs and other ISs.
Those who received less help and advice from SLSs and Japanese people struggled to relieve
anxiety, particularly other ISs with lower levels of Japanese language proficiency.

Received: 12 January 2022; Accepted: 13 June 2022

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Perceptions of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Anxiety-Relieving Behaviors after the Lifting of the First State of Emergency in Japan: Comparing International Students from Mainland China and OthersYE

online classes and suspending extracurricular

1. Introduction

activities, which have significantly changed
This study aimed to investigate the relationshipstudents’ campus lives (Ministry of Education,

between international students’ (ISs) perceptions

Culture,Sports,Scienceof the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)[MEXT],

2020).

In

otherwords,

FTF

pandemic and their anxiety-relieving behaviors,

communication,

known

as

“primary

voice

considering the effects of their demographics

culture,” has been greatly restricted. In general,and media usage, and differences in thesepeople maintain their physical and mental healthrelationships between ISs from mainland China

by building good interpersonal relationships with

(MCISs) and other ISs.

others, sharing worries, and relieving stressandTechnology

Since the end of 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic

through FTF communication (Sawada & Kuzumi,

caused by SARS-CoV-2, which began to spread2019). Therefore, this study investigated howfrom mainland China, has been affecting people’s

people can obtain social support, especiallylifestyles. By the end of March 2020, Japan had

emotional support, and relieve anxiety while

the second highest infection rate in Asia outside

minimizing FTF contact with others.

mainlandChina.

Therefore,

Japanese

Traditionally, it was believed that people only

government had to take various measures to deal

receive instrumental social support, such aswith this issue, including announcing the First

information collection, from computer-mediatedEmergency Declaration on April 7, 2020. Since

communication (CMC), which has no effect onthen, the Japanese government has implemented

decreasing

various infection prevention measures. Whilecontrast, Ye and Ho (2022) found that people

self-restraint

receiveassociated

with

the

the

state

of

loneliness

instrumental(Igarashi,
and2002).

emotionalInsocialemergency continues after almost two years,

support from Twitter. Although emotional social

people’s feelings of anxiety may not havesupport did not improve subjective well-being,

decreased, increasing their susceptibility to boththe findings were pre-COVID-19, which is vastly

physical and mental exhaustion. In such a state,different from the current situation. Therefore,

people may believe in rumors, hoax information,

this study examined the effects of media usage

and fake news, which might have negative effects

on people anxiety-relieving behaviors.

on people’s safety (Fukunaga, 2018). Therefore,

Compared to Japanese students, ISs face more

it is very important to clarify whether people canchallenges during the pandemic. Owing to severe

alleviatecollecting

restrictions on cross-border travel, the number of

information from various fields and adopting

part-time jobs available to ISs has decreased.

appropriate anxiety-relieving behaviors.

Therefore, ISs with financial problems, such as

emotional

anxietybyFrom April 2020, the Japanese government haslack of scholarships, might feel more anxious. In

proposed a new lifestyle to avoid the “three-Cs”:

addition, many ISs cannot enter Japan or returnclosed spaces, crowded places, and close-contact

home. Further, as most classes are conductedsettings (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 2020).

online,Therefore,

taken

communicate with others, especially Japanesemeasures such as shifting face-to-face (FTF) tolanguage speakers (JLSs), such as their academic

mostuniversities

have

ISs

have

fewer

opportunities

to2

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advisors and lab mates, inevitably increasing

mainland China (JASSO, 2021).

their online communication with same-language

Aside from mainland China, ISs in Japan comespeakers (SLSs).

from Vietnam (22.3%), Nepal (8.6%), South Korea

Ye (2017) found that male and female ISs who(5.6%), and Taiwan (2.5%) (JASSO, 2021). As

adapted well were able to form stable social

such, it is easier for MCISs to receive social

support networks (SSNs) with other language

support from each other rather than from OLSs

speakers (OLSs), especially JLSs. In contrast,

or JLSs. Other ISs might rely on OLSs, especiallythose who could not adapt well preferred to use

JLSs, to receive support to relieve anxiety, whichmore voice calls and instant messaging (IM) texts

may be expected, as they have fewer opportunities

to communicate with SLSs. Ye (2018) indicatedto communicate with others in person. In

that ISs with higher levels of generalized trust

addition, since the COVID-19 pandemic has

were able to receive more social support fromspread from mainland China, it is reasonable toJLSs, which helped improve their sense of

believe that other ISs may have different

acceptance in Japan. However, no similar effects

perceptions toward it, especially attitudes toward

were detected for SLSs. Furthermore, Ye (2021)

media reports, compared to MCISs. Therefore,

compared the effects of ISs’ generalized trust

they may have different preferences for using

toward out-group members, such as JLSs andmedia to collect relevant information. Compared

OLSs, and group identification toward in-groupwith other ISs, MCISs may prefer not to collectmembers, such as people from the same country,

information from Japan or other countries’ media,

and noted the following trends. (a) ISs’ generalizedeven if they have high levels of Japanese or othertrust toward JLSs and OLSs led them to receive

language proficiencies.

more social support from JLSs and OLSs;

In addition to the above factors, this study

however, only support from JLSs helped decrease

examined the effects of ISs’ perceptions of healthfeelings of stress in Japan, while no similar effects

risk and social consideration consciousness.

were found for OLSs’ support. (b) ISs’ group

People with higher levels of health risks are more

identification toward SLSs helped them receive

sensitive to illness and tend to collect more

more social support from SLSs, which, in turn,information to relieve their anxiety (Yamauchi etincreased their feelings of stress, since socialal., 2009). Similarly, people who are highly

support differed from that of JLSs. (c) Non-considerate of society as a whole would refrain

Chinese ISs’ group identification toward SLSs hadfrom going outside unnecessarily and reduce theno effect on social support from SLSs. Thesepossibility of infection by staying home, resulting

results suggest that ISs’ generalized trust toward

in behavioral adaptations that can relieve orout-group members and group identification

eliminate their anxieties. As mentioned above,

toward in-group members have different effects

owing to different perceptions of the COVID-19

on their intercultural adaptation, and the effects ofpandemic and attitudes toward various types ofgroup identification toward in-group members

media, the social consciousness of Japanesediffer between Chinese and non-Chinese ISs. The

society may differ between MCISs and other ISs.

former form in-groups more easily than the latter,

Therefore, it may have different effects on

as nearly half (43.6%) of the ISs in Japan are fromanxiety-relieving behaviors.
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Moreover, this study also examined the effects

informed consent, the voluntary nature of theof ISs’ lifestyles on anxiety-relieving behaviors.

participation, ability to withdraw without penalty

People are commonly comforted by others whenat any time, and privacy and protection of personalfacing problems and anxiety. For instance, people

information. In total, 367 ISs submitted responses.

are able to share opinions with each other when

Responses from ISs outside of Japan wereencountering fake news or rumors on the

excluded. The remaining 333 responses wereInternet or in other media sources. This would beanalyzed. The survey consisted of three parts.

easier for ISs who live with other people thanThe contents were as follows.

those who live alone.

Part

A

gathered

personal

information,

including demographic data, such as gender, age,

2. Research method

nationality, and academic standing, total length ofstay in Japan, duration of learning of the Japanese

To examine the above issues, a self-report

language, level of Japanese language proficiency

online survey was conducted from early to mid-(score and level from the Japanese LanguageJune2020)2).

English,and

QuestionnairesinChinese

simple(both

Japanese,

Proficiency Test [JLPT] and self-evaluation ofandJapaneselanguage

proficiency

inreading,

traditional) were used, which allowed thelistening, speaking, and writing compared to an

participants to select the version they wished toadult native Japanese speaker, reported as aanswer. The English version was translated bypercentage),3) English language proficiency

the author, and reviewed and proofread by a(score on TOEFL-iBT, TOEIC, and self-evaluation

native English speaker. The two Chinese versionsof English language proficiency in reading,were translated by native Chinese speakers

listening, speaking, and writing compared to an

whose Japanese language proficiency was close

adult native English speaker, reported as ato that of native Japanese speakers. All versions

percentage),4) lifestyle,5) and experience with andwere confirmed by back translation. The

frequency of working part-time jobs (see Table 1

participants were ISs enrolled at four national

for details).

universities in the Kanto region of Japan. The

In addition, 17 items were chosen fromquestionnaire survey with four language versions

Yamauchi et al., (2009) to measure respondents’

were created using the Monkey Survey tool. We

perception of illness and health (hereinafter

sent out the links of the survey with instructions

referred to as “perception of health risk”). Elevento ISs who had participated in the project’s

items were chosen from Shimizu and Imae (1981)previous surveys and who studied at our graduate

to measure emotional anxiety tendencies, and 10

school. In addition, we sent out an invitation toitems from Saito (1999) to measure social

participate in the survey by email to ISs in otherconsideration consciousness. The responses

graduate programs at university. Moreover, wewere rated on a five-point Likert scale (5 =asked professors at other universities to share

Strongly agree; 1 = Strongly disagree).

the links of survey. Before answering the survey,

Part B addressed the period of when the

ISs were provided with written instructions andparticipants started to pay attention to theinformation regarding the storage of their data,

COVID-19 pandemic,6) including levels of active
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information collecting (5 = Very active; 1 = Not

MCISs passed JLPT-N1/L1, whereas only 16.8%

active at all), frequency of information collectionof the other ISs passed JLPT-N1/L1. Regarding

before, during, or after the first state of emergency

English proficiency, more MCISs took English

per day, and the methods they used to obtaintests, which was likely partly because some of

information. In addition, ISs were asked to rate

the other ISs were native English speakers.

7)

how anxious they felt toward COVID-19 (5 = Very

Furthermore, only 11.4% of the MCISs received

anxious; 1 = Not anxious at all), and the reasonsscholarships, while 74.8% of the other ISs received(Table 2).

scholarships. This revealed an economic disparity

Furthermore, eight items from Ye (2021) were

between the two groups. Moreover, only 20.6%​

used to measure methods of coping with stressof other ISs had part-time jobs, whereas 43.1% of(5 = Very stressed; 1 = Not stressed at all; Table

the MCISs had part-time jobs. Therefore, MCISs

5). Moreover, this study created 11 items to

had more opportunities to communicate withidentify behaviors to relieve anxiety toward theJapanese people.

they

felt

this

level

of

anxiety

Table 2 shows the participants’ use of media

COVID-19 pandemic (5 = Strongly agree; 1 =and types of social media used. First, 59% of theStrongly disagree; Table 6).
Part C measured the participants’ use of media,

MCISs spent less than six hours using theincluding personal computers, smartphones, andInternet, whereas 55.2% of other ISs spent more

tablets, and the amount of time spent daily

than six hours. Second, MCISs spent more time

accessing the Internet via these devices (8 = Overthan other ISs using smartphones and tablets.

12 hours; 1 = Don’t use). 8) Furthermore, their

Moreover, 98% of the MCISs used WeChat, 60%

daily usage frequency, purpose of use, andused QQ, and nearly half used Twitter and LINE,

frequency of posting on social media, including

whereas nearly 80% of the other ISs used LINE

LINE, Twitter, WeChat, and Facebook, wereand 60% used other social media platforms.

measured (Table 2).

3.2 
Perception of the COVID-19 pandemic
3. Results

and related behaviors
Table 3 shows ISs’ perception and related

3.1 Descriptive results

behaviors of the two groups. First, 80% of MCISs

The results indicated that most participants

started paying attention to COVID-19 before mid-

were from mainland China (60.7%), followed by

January 2020, compared with only 42% of other

Vietnam (4.5%), Indonesia and Brazil (2.7%),

ISs. The percentage of MCISs who answered

South Korea (2.1%), and the United States (1.8%),“very anxious” or “somewhat anxious” waswhich is similar to the national survey results

slightly higher than other ISs, and the percentage(JASSO, 2021).

of MCISs who actively collected information was

Table 1 shows that there was no significant

approximately double that of other ISs. Althoughdifference between the two groups in terms ofthe top four reasons for feeling anxious were thelifestyle; however, there were many other ISs

same for both groups, 80% of MCISs felt anxious

living in university dormitories. Regarding

because of “strong infectivity,” which differed

Japanese language proficiency, 63.4% of thesignificantly from other ISs.
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Table 1. Participant characteristics
Items

MCISs (202)Gender ratio

Men 38.1%

Age (in years)

24.5 years (SD 2.37)

Academic standing
Length of stay in

Other ISs (131)

Women 61.4%

Other 0.5%

Men 50.4%

Women 49.6%

Other 0.0%

28.4 years (SD 5.77)

Undergraduate 8.9%

Master’s 63.4%

Undergraduate 19.8%

Master’s 41.2%

Doctoral 20.8%

Other 6.9%

Doctoral 37.4%

Other 1.5%

27.9 months (SD 20.1)

29. months (SD 20.4)

Length of learning

43.6 months (SD 31.1)

33.3 months (SD 45.7)

Japanese(JLPT-N1/L1 holders 128, 63.4%)(JLPT-N1/L1 holders 22, 16.8%)

English language

TOEIC 52.0%

TOEFL 39.6%

TOEIC 19.8%

TOEFL 14.5%

proficiency test2)

IELTS 7.9%

Other 0.0%

IELTS 29.0%

Other 2.3%

Japan

Residence

University dormitory 20.3%

University dormitory 34.4%

Dormitory for ISs only 16.3%

Dormitory for ISs only 15.3%

Private rental housing 62.9%

Private rental housing 43.5%

Rental/house share for foreigners 0.5%

Rental/house share for foreigners 4.6%

Other 0.0%

Other 2.3%

Alone 77.7%
LifestyleWith other ISs 18.3%

With family/relatives 1.0%
Other 1.0%

Yes 11.4% (MEXT % 60.9%
Private 34.8%

Furthermore,Yes 43.1%

ISs

Other 5.3%

Yes 74.8% (MEXT % 68.4%
Private 9.9%

Other 11.5%)

No 25.2%(Mean 12.7 hour per week)

No 56.9%

otherWith Japanese students 6.1%

Other 4.3%)

No 88.6%
Part-time job

With other ISs 6.1%

With family/relatives 19.1%

With Japanese students 2.0%
Scholarship

Alone 63.4%

Yes 20.6%(Mean 14.0 hour per week)

No 79.4%

collected

more

newspapers,

much

less

than

other

ISs.

information per day during the first state ofFurthermore, nearly 50% of the MCISs collected

emergency than before, and less after the state of

information from university bulletin boards andemergency. In contrast, MCISs’ frequency ofemails, compared with only 10% of the other ISs.

collecting information decreased during the state

3.3 Average scores and internal reliability forof emergency.
Over 85% of the MCISs used WeChat to collecteach scale and differences in two groups

information regarding COVID-19, whereas 69.5%

This study confirmed the internal reliability ofof the other ISs used Facebook. In addition, theeach scale by calculating Cronbach’s α. Table 4

percentage of MCISs using Twitter was muchpresents the detailed results for the two groups.

higher than that of other ISs. Moreover, although

The scales had extremely high reliability, except

MCISs had higher levels of Japanese proficiency,

for the anxiety-relieving behaviors toward thethey used official media, such as television and

COVID-19 pandemic of other ISs. As it was the
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Table 2. Usage of media and social media
Items
Internet time(computer)
Internet time(smartphone)Internet time
(tablet)
WeChat: private/group chat
WeChat:MomentTwitter

LINE: private/group chat

LINE: Timeline

MCISs (202)0-2h 12.9%

2-4h 22.8%

4-6h 23.3%

0-2h 9.7%

2-4h 16.8%

4-6h 16.8%

6-8h 16.3%

8-10h10.4%

10-12h 5.4%

6-8h 21.4%

8-10h 13.0%

10-12h 7.6%

Over 12h 5.0%

Don’t use 4.0%0-2h 10.4%

2-4h 24.8%

4-6h 26.2%

0-2h 16.8%

2-4h 32.8%

4-6h 18.3%

8-10h 8.4%

10-12h 3.5%

6-8h 14.5%

8-10h 5.3%

10-12h 3.1%

Over 12h 4.0%

Don’t use 0.0%

Over 12h 8.4%

Don’t use 0.8%

0-2h 25.2%

2-4h 14.4%

4-6h 11.4%

0-2h 13.0%

2-4h 6.9%

4-6h 3.8%

6-8h 3.5%

8-10h 3.5%

10-12h 1.0%

6-8h 3.1%

8-10h 1.5%

10-12h 1.5%

Over 12h 1.5%

Don’t use 39.6%

Over 12h 1.5%

Don’t use 70.2%

0-2h 59.9%

2-4h 23.3%

4-6h 9.9%0-2h 13.0%

2-4h 4.6%

4-6h 0.0%

6-8h 2.5%

8-10h 2.9%

10-12h 0.5%

6-8h 0.0%

8-10h 0.8%

10-12h 0.0%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 2.0%0-2h 66.3%

2-4h 12.9%

6-8h 1.5%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 81.7%

4-6h 6.4%

0-2h 6.9%

2-4h 0.8%

4-6h 0.0%

8-10h 1.0%

10-12h 0.0%

6-8h 0.0%

8-10h 0.0%

10-12h 0.0%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 11.9%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 92.4%

0-2h 48.5%

2-4h 3.5%

4-6h 1.0%

0-2h 26.7%

2-4h 6.1%

4-6h 0.8%

6-8h 0.5%

8-10h 0.0%

10-12h 0.0%

10-12h 0.8%

6-8h 3.1%

8-10h 0.8%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 46.5%

Over 12h 0.8%

Don’t use 61.1%

0-2h 62.4%

2-4h 3.5%

4-6h 0.0%

0-2h 58.8%

2-4h 10.7%

4-6h 4.6%

6-8h 0.0%

8-10h 0.0%

10-12h 0.0%

6-8h 2.3%

8-10h 0.8%

10-12h 0.8%

Over 12h 0.0%

Over 12h 0.8%

Don’t use 22.1%

0-2h 12.4%

2-4h 0.0%

4-6h 0.5%

0-2h 14.5%

2-4h 2.3%

4-6h 0.8%

6-8h 0.0%

8-10h 0.0%

10-12h 0.0%

6-8h 0.0%

8-10h 0.8%

10-12h 0.0%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 81.7%

Don’t use 34.2%

Don’t use 87.1%

0-2h 49.5%

2-4h 8.4%

4-6h 1.5%

0-2h 83.2%

2-4h 0.0%

4-6h 0.0%

6-8h 0.5%

8-10h 0.0%

10-12h 0.0%

6-8h 0.0%

8-10h 1.5%

10-12h 0.0%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 99.2%

Over 12h 0.0%
Other

Over 12h 13.7% Don’t use 1.5%

6-8h 22.8%

Over 12h 0.0%
QQ

Other ISs (131)Don’t use 40.1%

0-2h 18.8%

2-4h 2.5%

4-6h 0.5%

0-2h 21.4%

2-4h 16.8%

4-6h 13.0%

6-8h 0.5%

8-10h 0.0%

10-12h 0.0%

6-8h 3.1%

8-10h 0.8%

10-12h 1.5%

Over 12h 3.1%

Don’t use 40.5%

Over 12h 0.0%

Don’t use 77.7%

first time these items were measured and it

Table 5 presents the details of ISs’ methods ofseemed necessary to improve their internal

coping with stress, using the scale based onreliabilities, it was considered acceptable if

Tanaka (2000) and Ye (2021). Higher the scores

Cronbach’s α was higher than .50 (Oshio, 2020).

indicated that they coped with stress well. In

Therefore, this study used the total score forparticular, this study compared the differenceseach scale in subsequent analyses.

and similarities between MCISs and other ISs by
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Table 3. The participants’ perceptions of the COVID-19 pandemic and related behaviors

conducting t-test (independent sample), andHigher the scores indicated that they engaged infound that, compared with MCISs, other ISs

more behaviors to relieve anxiety. In order toreceived more social support from JLSs andclarify the differences between MCIS and othertended to entertain themselves by posting things

ISs, this study conducted t-test (independent

on social media, which helped them decreasesample). As a result, it was found that other ISs

stress.

relieved their anxiety by communicating with

Table 6 presents the details of the anxiety-others, collecting relevant information andrelieving behaviors examined in this study.

exercising more than MCISs.
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Table 4. Internal reliability for each scale in two groups
Names of the scale

MCISs

Others

1. Perception of health risk

.90

.92

2. Emotional anxiety tendency

.91

.92

3. Social consideration consciousness

.96

.90

4. Methods of coping with stress

.60

.61

5. Anxiety-relieving behaviors

.65

.59

Table 5. Methods of coping with stress
Items

Mean
MCISs

Others

1. Seek advice and help from other international students or friends from the same country

3.07

3.34

2. Seek advice and help from Japanese people

1.94

2.61**

3. Try to change myself according to the situation

3.95

3.90

4. Entertain myself by posting something on social media

1.77

2.50**

5. Complain to my friends from my country, or go out for a meal with them

2.25

2.15

6. Complain to my Japanese friends, or go out for a meal with them

1.59

1.79

7. Exercise

3.43

3.60

8. Concentrate on my hobbies, studies, or research

4.17

4.37

Note: ＊＊p<.01.

Table 6. Behaviors to relieve the anxiety toward the COVID-19 pandemic
Items

Mean
MCISs

Others

1. Communicate with family and friends and share information and concerns with each other

3.60

4.13***

2. View related information on Twitter, Facebook, LINE, etc.

3.44

3.73*

3. Post my thoughts and feelings about COVID-19 on Twitter, Facebook, LINE, WeChat, etc.

2.15

2.33

4. Try to collect more accurate information

3.85

4.20**

5. Exercise

3.49

3.84*

6. Sleep well

3.67

3.87

7. Eat foods that are good for improving my immunity

3.71

3.95

8. Try to stay home as much as possible

4.49

4.43

9. Watch shows and movies at home

4.02

3.62**

10. Immerse myself in other things without searching for information on COVID-19

2.68

3.14**

11. Online shopping

3.31

2.98*

＊

Note: p<.05;＊＊

p<.01;＊＊＊

p<.001.

3.4 Factors that influenced ISs’ anxiety-relieving

ISs’ perceptions of the COVID-19 pandemic andbehaviors

their anxiety-relieving behaviors and identify

This study aimed to clarify the relationship ofdifferences in these relationships between
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MCISs and other ISs. In particular, it was believed

toward COVID-19, which demonstrated positivethat ISs with higher levels of perception of healtheffects on relieving their anxiety. Conversely, ISs

risk, emotional anxiety tendency, and anxiety

received less social support and had to engage intoward COVID-19 would have more anxiety-other behavioral adaptations to relieve theirrelieving behaviors. It was predicted that thisanxiety. However, no effects for their financial

would be more obvious for those who lived alone,anxiety (scholarship), perception of health risk,

had more financial concerns, and received lessemotionalsocial support from JLSs and SLSs. To examineconsideration consciousness were found, which

this, this study conducted multiple regression

was unexpected.

anxietytendency,

andsocialanalysis, taking the total score of anxiety-relieving

Furthermore, there were some differences

behaviors as a dependent variable, and theirbetween the two groups. For instance, lower

demographics,

risk,

levels of Japanese language proficiency and lessemotional anxiety tendency, social consideration

time using computers to access the Internet led

consciousness, use of media and social media,

other ISs to require additional anxiety-relieving

perception of COVID-19, frequency of collecting

behaviors. In contrast, MCISs who lived with

relevant information, and methods of coping withothers, who exhibited a higher degree of anxiety

stress (including social support from SLSs andtoward the COVID-19 pandemic, and collected

JLSs) as independent variables. Table 7 presents

information

the significant variables of the two groups.

anxiety-relieving behaviors.

perceptionofhealth9)

moreactivelyexhibited

more

Some similarities were found, such as the useof social media to collect information about
COVID-19, and methods of coping with stress

Table 7. Factors that influenced anxiety-relieving behaviors in the two groups
MCISs (β)

Other ISs(β)

ns

-.17*

Lifestyle

.11*

ns

Anxiety toward COVID-19

.28**

ns

Active information collection

.19**

ns

Numbers of using social media to collect information

.11*

.23**

Time using WeChat (moment)-.24**

ns

Total time using social media

.18*

ns

Internet access time via computer

ns

-.17*

Methods of coping with stress.65***.80***

Social support from SLSs-.26**-.28*-.22**

-.24*

.52*

.36*

Variables
Japanese language proficiency

Social support from JLSs
Goodness of fit of the model (R and significance)2＊

Note: p<.05;＊＊

p<.01;＊＊＊

p<.001.
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Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 15 No. 1 Sep. 2022

be that MCISs can use Chinese to communicate

4. Discussion

with other Chinese people without physical
This

study

investigatedtherelationshiplimitations to share their concerns and receive

between ISs’ perceptions of the COVID-19

socialpandemic and their anxiety-relieving behaviors,

support. This type of communication might lead

including the effects of their demographics andmost MCISs to believe what the Chinese

media usage, as well as the differences in thesegovernment claims. In this sense, media usage

relationships between MCISs and other ISs.

strengthens homogeneity of in-group members.

support,especially

emotionalsocialCompared to other ISs, MCISs paid attention

In contrast, as Facebook is still the most popular

to COVID-19 from an early stage and had higher

social media platform in the world, it might belevels of emotional anxiety towards it; therefore,

one of the most convenient methods tothey collected relevant information more actively

communicate with others to receive necessary

even before the lifting of the first state ofsocial support and collect relevant information

emergency. This might be partly because Wuhan

from all over the world, which might help broaden

City was locked down in late January 2020, whichhorizons and accept different opinions toward

increased tension throughout mainland China.

the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it is necessary

However, with the cancellation of the state of

to note that this study did not investigate theemergency, both groups’ frequency of collecting

credibility of various social media platforms, theinformation on COVID-19 decreased. This might

participant’ levels of trust toward each media,

be because their anxiety toward COVID-19 was

and the languages they used to communicate

alleviated by a decrease in the number of infectedwith others and collect information. As it ispeople.

possible that accepting uncertain information on

The results showed that although MCISs had

social media might lead users to feel morehigher levels of Japanese proficiency, they usedanxious, it is necessary to examine these in more

official media, such as television and newspapers,

detail in the future. Thus, future studies shouldmuch less than other ISs. Although all the ISs

investigate ISs’ levels of trust toward media andanalyzed in this study remained in Japan, 85% ofsocialthe MCISs used WeChat, whereas nearly 70% ofcommunicate and collect information.

the other ISs used Facebook to collect relevant
informationon

COVID-19.

These

media

and

the

languageusedtoFurthermore, utilizing more behaviors to copefindings

with stress toward COVID-19 led ISs to exhibit

support the assumption that ISs from different

more anxiety-relieving behaviors. However, lesscountries and regions have different preferences

support, such as help and advice from SLSs andfor media, including social media. In Japan, there

JLSs, led them to exhibit more behaviors to

are no limitations on accessing social media,

relieve their anxieties, which was the same insuch as Facebook and Twitter; however, MCISs

both groups. Ye (2018) indicated that only social

prefer to use WeChat to collect relevant

support from JLSs improved ISs’ sense of

information, which might relate to their group

acceptance in Japan. In addition, Ye (2021)

identification and attitude toward the COVID-19

pointed out that social support from JLSs had apandemic. One of the main reasons for this might

positive effect on decreasing ISs’ feelings of
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stress, whereas social support from SLSs

5. Implications and future work

increased their feelings of stress in Japan.

5.1 Implications

However, these implications were related tounderstanding Japanese culture and feelingThis study was conducted from early- to mid-

accepted by the Japanese society. This study

June 2020, immediately after the first state ofrevealed that social support from SLSs decreased

emergency was lifted. The results indicated that

ISs’ anxieties toward the COVID-19 pandemic, as

MCISs and other ISs had different perceptions ofit had no relationship with a better understanding

the COVID-19 pandemic and adopted differentof Japanese culture or feelings of acceptance by

behaviors to alleviate their anxiety. These

Japanese people. However, as social support fromfindings are expected to be useful when

SLSs led ISs to feel more stressed, this may notconsidering the type of education and socialchange easily even after the COVID-19 pandemic;

support required for the two groups in the future.

therefore, it is necessary to consider a way to

In particular, maintaining a good balance between

maintain a good balance in the future.

FTF and online communication and social

Moreover, other ISs had lower levels of

support for ISs from SLSs and JLSs are important

Japanese language proficiency, with less than 20%

issues that merit consideration even after theof them having passed JLPT-N1/L1. The lack of

COVID-19 pandemic.

Japaneselanguage

proficiency

may

have

5.2 Future work

contributed to receiving less social support andcollecting less information. Therefore, it may beThis study did not investigate what language

necessary to improve the Japanese proficiency of

ISs used to collect information, and theother ISs in the future.

relationship between these and their attitudes

Interestingly, although the percentage of othertoward various media, including social media. In

ISs living with others was higher than that ofaddition, as the COVID-19 pandemic continues,

MCISs, only MCISs who lived with others

there are symptoms such as “corona habituation”

adopted more behaviors to relieve their anxieties,

and “corona fatigue.” Therefore, the long-term

which was unexpected. A possible reason might

impact of the pandemic using a wider range ofbe that most other ISs lived with family or

samples should be examined.

relatives, while most MCISs lived with other ISs,
as Table 1 indicates. This suggests that emotional

Notes

support from family and relatives may differ from

1) Segments of the results have been reported inthat of ISs.

2020 National Conference for the Society of Socio-

Finally, ISs’ perception of health risk or social

Informatics and IEICE Human Communicationconsideration consciousness did not exhibit

Science in October 2021.

significant effects. This may be because these2) The survey was conducted with the approval of

two variables were less significant than others.

the Research Ethics Review Board at Faculty ofThis phenomenon requires further investigation

Library,in the future.

University of Tsukuba.

Information

and

Media

Science,3) Japanese language proficiency was calculated as

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Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 15 No. 1 Sep. 2022
follows: (a) For ISs that had passed JLPT-L1/N1,​

conducting analysis.

it was calculated as L1 score/400 or N1 score/180.
(The total score of L1 is 400, while that of N1 is

Acknowledgement180.); (b) For ISs that had passed JLPT-L2/N2,​

This study was supported by JSPS KAKENHI

it was calculated as L2 score/400 × .08 or N2

Grant Number 17K17620. The author would like toscore/180 × .08. (L2/N2 level is approximately

thank all the students who helped answer this survey

80% of L1/ N1’s.); (c) For ISs who did not pass

and all the people for their kind cooperation.

JLPT 1/2, it was calculated as (self-evaluation

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Fukunaga, H. (2018) Rumors, hoaxes, fake news, and+ “writing”)/400.
4) English language proficiency was calculated as

media’s counter-news:Focusing on the June 2018

follows: (a) for ISs who had taken TOEIC: their

Earthquake in the Northern Osaka Prefecture.

score/ 990; (b) for ISs who had taken TOEFL-iBT:

NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute,68(11), pp. 84-103. (in Japanese)

their score/120; (c) for ISs who had taken IELTS:
their level/9; (d) for ISs who had taken multiple

Igarashi, T. (2002) The effects of social skills on

tests, their average percentage from (a) and/or

loneliness through mediation of CMC social(b) and/or (c) was used; (e) for ISs who had not

networks. The Journal of Social Psychology, 17(2),taken any test, proficiency was calculated as (self-

pp. 97-108. (in Japanese)
Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO) (2021)

evaluation percentage of listening + speaking +Result of an annual survey of international

reading + writing)/400.
5) Regarding their living style, “living alone” wasstudents in Japan 2020. https//www.studyinjapan.

coded as “1” and living with others was coded asgo.jp/en/statistics/zaiseki/data/2020.html(Retrieved on Dec. 31, 2021)“2” in the analysis.

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and6) Regarding the period of started to pay attention tothe

COVID-19

pandemic,“BeforeTechnology

mid-late(MEXT)(2020)

RegardingtheJanuary” was coded as 5, “Mid-late February” wasresponse status to the COVID-19 pandemic atcoded as 3, and “Mid-late March” was coded as 1.

universities (Daigakutou ni okeru shingata

7) Their frequency of information collecting waskoronauirusukansensho e no taioujyoukyou ni

calculated monthly as below: “over 10” wastsuite ) (in Japanese)counted as 300, “6-10” was counted as 240, “3-5”https://www.mext.go.jp/kaigisir yo/content/​

was counted as “120”, “1-3” was counted as 60, and20200914-mxt_koutou01-000009906_15.pdf“seldom” was 0.

(Retrieved on Dec. 31 2021)

8) The use time of media/social media was converted

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2020) Healthmonthly as follows: “over 12 hours” was 360, “10–and medical consultation: Requests to prevent​

12 hours” was 330, “8–10 hours” was 270, “6–8

the spread of infection of COVID-19 (Kenko ya

hours” was 210, “4–6 hours” was 150, “2–4 hours”

iryosoudan

was 90, and “less than 2 hours” was 30.

notameno onegai). (in Japanese) https://www.

nojyoho:

kansenkakudaiboushi

mhlw.go.jp/stf/covid-19/kenkou-ir yousoudan.

9) Since “gender” is a nominal scale, this study coded

html#h2_1 (Retrieved on Dec. 31 2021)

male as “0”, female as “1”, and other as “2” when

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Sawada, S. & Kusumi, T. (2019) Factors affecting

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group identification on social support networks

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Shimizu, H. & Imae, K. (1981), The Japanese version

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Tanaka, T. (2000) Social networks and social skills ofchanges before and during the COVID-19

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0178.

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Translation
Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social MediaChannels by 156 Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing
on the use of Twitter and Facebook Accounts in
Communication with Japan
Keywords:
Public Diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy, Social Media, Embassies in Japan, Twitter

Junko NISHIKAWA, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Abstract
Governments and embassies in various countries have opened social networking accounts andare engaged in online communication activities. Social media usage plays a significant role indiplomacy today. However, research on online communication by foreign countries with Japanesesociety is not sufficient to advance the substantive discussion.
This paper aims to understand the actual situation of online diplomatic communication withJapanese society conducted by 156 countries that have embassies in Japan through a comparative
analysis of their operations of social media channels. First, this study investigated whether the
156 embassies have opened accounts on the two platforms, Facebook and Twitter. The study
identified 89 Twitter accounts and 99 Facebook pages of 119 embassies based in Tokyo, andreviewed the openings of these accounts starting from the early days of social media. Then, adetailed analysis of the Twitter accounts was conducted—the accounts were mapped according to
the correlation between the average monthly growth of followers, the average monthly number oftweets, and the degree to which Japanese language was used in the tweets of each account.
The results revealed that more than three-quarters of the 156 countries are on social networking
sites. In contrast, only a limited number of countries use social media as a public diplomacy tool
to communicate with the Japanese public. In addition to major Western countries, medium andsmall countries tweeting in Japanese are also considered relatively strategic in operating theiraccounts.

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Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156 Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook Accounts in Communication with JapanNISHIKAWA

Japan, although the actual state of affairs remains

1. Introduction

unclear. This paper presents a comparative
More than a decade has passed since theanalysis of the social media activity of embassies

United States—under the guidance of thein Japan, focusing on communications directed

Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton—pioneered

toward Japan, with the aim of examining how

the use of digital technology in diplomacy. Now,

foreign embassies communicate with and exert

in a trend that seems unlikely to reverse itself,

influence on their host country through theirdiplomatic actors from various countries aresocial media presence. This study identifies andcompeting in the communicative sphere of social

analyzes 89 Twitter accounts and 99 Facebook

media, just as in the private sector.

pages maintained by the embassies of 119

Diplomacy was originally conducted by thecountries. This examination of social media

government of one country with those of otherusage by embassies in Japan determines thecountries as its counterparties. In contrast to

significance of foreign embassies’ social media

such traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy—acommunications with the Japanese public andnew form of diplomacy that targets the generalclarifies the current state of public diplomacy as

public of the counterpart country—has become

it is practiced through social media.

an important factor in diplomacy since the First

2. Situating the Present Study in the Existing

World War.

Literature

Spry (2020: 94) regards the incorporation of aninterdisciplinary approach as a characteristic of the

Public2. 1 

development of public diplomacy studies over the

diplomacy

and

new

publicdiplomacy

past two decades. He indicates that the emergence,characteristics, and challenges of the new public

Public diplomacy is often “broadly understood

diplomacy, which emphasizes public engagement

as an activity for ‘winning hearts and minds’ inand interactive communication in both normative

other nations and international public opinion”

values and practical strategies, have been examined(Watanabe 2014: 6). The scope and content of its

in terms of a transition from one-way to two-way

practice are wide-ranging. It is also a relatively

communication, often coinciding with the study of

new topic of focus of academic research. As noted

public relations (Spry 2020).

by Fitzpatrick (2010), referring to a review ofRegarding the idea that the new publicmore than 150 definitions of public diplomacy,

diplomacy theory is normative in that itprevious studies have interpreted the notion

represents what is considered an “ideal” approachvariously, ranging from narrow to broad.

to contemporary diplomacy rather than reflecting

However, no unified definition has been

its degree of empirical practice, Pamment (2013)

established. In this paper, following the definition

considers verifying this theory through an

proposed by Banks (2020: 64), public diplomacy

inductive approach a challenge.

is conceived as being “an international actor’s

Directing our attention to the activities ofpolicy-based communication activities designed

foreign countries toward Japan, we can confirm

to understand, engage, inform, and influence

the active social media presence of embassies inforeign publics in support of national/institutional
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interests.”

Facebook, in diplomacy. Research has covered

In keeping with its development, public

diplomatic communication among various actors,

diplomacy is characterized by two major conceptual

such as foreign ministries, ambassadors, politicalframeworks. The first framework is primarily

leaders, and international organizations.

concerned with the unilateral dissemination ofCompared to traditional means of communication,

information by a government to the citizens of

Bjola and Jiang (2015: 87) have identified social

another country and is considered to havemedia as 1) a highly effective tool for information

originated in the United States during the First

dissemination, 2) allowing the intended message toWorld War. The second framework is the newreach the target audience in depth, and 3) enabling

public diplomacy that emerged in connection witha two-way dialog between diplomats and the general

the growing recognition of the importance of public

public in foreign countries. They state that social

diplomacy in the United States after the terrorist

media has become such a powerful symbol of theattacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. The

new public diplomacy in that it has enabled

emergence of a robust civil society has made it

diplomats to directly interact with the citizens of thenecessary to be aware of public opinion in othertarget country (Bjola and Jiang 2015: 71).

countries when advancing foreign policy. In
addition,theinformationin the context of public diplomacy have beentechnology has led to the appearance of new

observed. Cull (2019) classifies the public

communication tools, intensifying competition in

diplomacy practice into five categories: listening,

the information space. Moreover, the end of the

advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy,

Cold War has prompted a growing interest in soft

and international broadcasting. However, he does

power that stems from a country’s attractiveness as

not separately consider digital methods or thea source of power other than the military. Suchexpansion of social media influence, as he considers

developments have provided the backdrop for thethat these elements are incorporated into each of

proposal of the new public diplomacy theory inthese activities. He explains that it would berecognitionofmisleading to treat social media on its own ascommunication and the diversification of actors insomething that can transform the international

the diplomatic scene, including non-state actors,

profile of certain actors (Cull 2019: 19).

ofdevelopment

the

of

Different views on how to position social media

bidirectional

naturesuch as international and non-governmental

Manor (2018) posits that diplomacy usingorganizations (Melissen 2005, Kitano 2014).

digital technologies is the digitalization of
diplomacy and explores the broader possibilities

2. 2 Public diplomacy and digital technology

of its application. He argues that digital

Since the first decade in the 21st century,

technology impacts the institutions, practitioners,

studies of diplomatic communication have been

audiences, and practices of diplomacy, and thatcharacterized, particularly in Europe and Norththe digitalization of diplomacy is a long-term

America, by an increasingly active discussion

process that goes far beyond the use of new

around the nature of public diplomacy in the age

technologies. In this sense, diplomacy in theof social media and digital diplomacy, which uses

digital age (i.e., digitalization of diplomacy) is still

digital technologies, including Twitter andin the process of development. Moreover, this17

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development is not uniform but differs frommedia in conjunction with the new publiccountry to country.

diplomacy theory and the presentation of overseas

In considering the impact of social media, incase studies, they have not yet achieved sufficientterms of diplomacy, on people in other countries,.

critical mass to advance the essential discussion of

the interactive nature of social media is beingsocial media activity, which represents a current

examined in several regions globally. Many

challenge for diplomacy. In the United States,

studies, such as those by Bjola and Jiang (2015),

where social media was adopted early on, thewho analyzed 50 days of data posted on Weibo

Japanese Embassy in Washington D.C. “appears(considered as China’s version of Twitter) by theto have been slower than several European

European Union delegation, Japanese Embassy,

nations, and than South Korea, in embracing theand the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and by Strauß etpotential of social media, such as Twitter andal. (2015), who analyzed two months of Twitter

Facebook, for burnishing Japan’s public image incommunication by the embassies of four Western

Washington” (Calder 2014: 221). It is conceivablecountries in the Gulf region, have concluded thatthat these circumstances have also affected thethe interactive nature of social media is not fully

progress of research in this area in Japan.

effective (also see Ittefaq 2019).

With respect to the focus of this study––the use

Public diplomacy can also be differentiatedof social media by other countries in the practice of

into activities that use media tools and those thatpublic diplomacy toward Japan––the introduction of

occur face-to-face. Adopting the standpoint thatvarious online platforms by the U.S. Embassy inmost people learn about foreign affairs from theJapan in the early 2010s has been describednews media rather than from projects that

previously. The U.S. Embassy introduced Twitter

attempt to convey a country’s attractions, such asalong with platforms such as nico nico douga andlanguage, education, and cultural exchange,

Google Hangout with the intention to “create a new

Golan et al. (2019) argue that because the media

paradigm melding traditional cultural diplomacy

plays a major role in international relations,with virtual engagement,” and was one of the“mediated public diplomacy” is gaining attention.

earliest to experience the transformation of public

The mediated public diplomacy model represents

diplomacy in tandem with technology development

Entman’s (2008) explanation (notionally based(Davidson 2013: 18, 2014). Underlying this was theon the example of the U.S. government) of theembassy’s attitude of seeking to engage in dialog

flow of the favorable framing of a country’s

with its target audience where they are and its viewpolicies in foreign news media. Given thethat Japanese people were becoming increasingly

ascendance of social media, Golan et al. (2019)likely to use various social media platforms

propose a modification to Entman’s model, which(Davidson 2013: 18). In fact, social media represents

presupposed a traditional media environment.

a familiar information source for the Japanese.
According to a survey by the Ministry of Internal

2. 3 
Japan-oriented public diplomacy andAffairs and Communications (MIC), the use ofsocial media

social media in Japan has been increasing annually.

Although studies of public diplomacy conducted

In 2020, the overall use rate was 73.8%, increasing toby Japanese scholars have emphasized social

80% for cohorts between the ages of 13 and 49 (MIC
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present in Japan. Of the 195 countries in theworld recognized by the Japanese government,

2. 4 Position and contribution of this study

185 countries maintain certain embassy or

Many empirical studies on social media use by

consulate in Japan. The addresses of embassies

diplomatic organizations have involved only a few

in Japan were extracted from the Ministry ofof these organizations (Spry 2020). This might beForeign Affairs (MOFA)’s “List of Foreign

due to the technical issues faced while analyzing

Diplomatic Missions in Japan” (MOFA 2021a),substantial data. In addition, these analyses haveand the actual buildings (or offices) of thebeen

medium-term

embassies of 156 countries were confirmed

phenomena, covering periods ranging from a few(excluding the European Union Delegation).

weeks to a few months. This study targets all

This accounts for 80% of the countries recognizedcountries with embassies in Japan to compare

by Japan. The 29 countries whose diplomatictheir social media usage in the context of

missions to Japan do not have a physical address

diplomacy. The study also adopts a long-termeither have only honorary consulates or maintainperspective that begins at the dawn of social

embassies in neighboring countries that serve

media usage in diplomacy.

concurrently as embassies to Japan (MOFA

limitedtoshort-

andEmbassies established in foreign countries are2021b).

a key component in maintaining and managing

3. 2 
Target data: Collecting social media

diplomatic relations with their host countries.
Discussing

diplomaticcommunicationaccounts

withJapan, this paper focuses on the official accounts

Next, between April and July 2021, the Twitter

maintained by embassies in Japan that represent

accounts and Facebook pages maintained by thetheir country in the host country. As a member

embassies in Japan that were confirmed to bestate of the Group of Seven and the country withactive during the survey period were collected.

the third largest gross domestic product in the

Because it was evident that although some ofworld, Japan is a major world power that hosts

these accounts had gone dormant for a certain

embassies from many countries. This is probably

period after their creation but then resumed

the first study of digital diplomacy practiced byposting at a later date, the survey included

these embassies toward Japan. Addressing

accounts that had not posted for a defined period

activities conducted on the common platform of

immediately prior to the start of the survey

social media can enable an unprecedented level

period. As Twitter and Facebook dominatedof scope for the comparison of Japan-focusedsocial media platforms for accounts listed oncommunication by a large number of countries.

embassies’ official websites, exceeding those of
the other platforms identified in the preliminary

3. Scope of Analysis and Methods

survey, these two types of social media accounts
were selected as target data for the survey.1

3. 1 Scope of analysis: Identifying embassies

In the cases of countries with multiple accounts

in Japanfor different languages or campaigns (e.g.,First, the investigation identified all embassies

Canada, which maintains separate accounts for
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Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156 Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook Accounts in Communication with JapanNISHIKAWA

French, English, and Japanese), the official

page. At the same time, the date of the first postembassy account that posts mainly in Japanesefor each account was checked.

was selected. Only one account per country was

Third, focusing on Twitter in particular, theincluded in the study.

numbers of followers and tweets (the total
number of organic tweets and retweets) displayed

3. 3 Survey structurein the profile section of the accounts were

The first step in this survey involved determining

collected. Furthermore, from these data, thewhether each country’s embassies in Japan

relationship between the average increase in themaintained Twitter accounts or Facebook pages.

number of followers and the average number ofSeveral methods were used to collect thesetweets for each account concerning the total

accounts, including (1) checking the social media

number of months that the account had been inaccounts listed on the embassies’ official websites

operation was clarified. With the additionaland other online public relation tools; (2) searching

criteria of whether Japanese is the primary

for accounts on Twitter and Facebook in Japanese,

language used in the tweets, the Twitter

English, and in some cases, in the official language

accounts were illustrated in the scatter diagram.

of the target country; and (3) mining the follower

4. Results of Analysis

and following lists of embassy accounts that had
already been identified.

4. 1 Active Twitter and Facebook accounts

Some Twitter accounts and Facebook pages
have a badge (blue tick), indicating that they

The survey findings reveal that 119 of the 156

have been verified by the social media platform incountries (76.3%) with embassies in Japan use atquestion. In this study, the survey included bothleast one of the two platforms: Twitter andverified and non-verified accounts. Regarding theFacebook. Sixty-nine countries (44.2%) havelatter, whether the account was an official accountaccounts on both platforms, with 20 countriesof the embassy in Japan was determined based(12.8%) on Twitter only and 30 countries (19.2%)

on three criteria: 1) the respective account’son Facebook only. No account on either platformprofile (e.g., whether a link to the embassy’s

can be confirmed for the 37 other countries

official website was included); 2) the presence of(23.7%) that maintain a physical embassy.2

followers from verified accounts, such as

In addition, no account on either platform canJapanese government agencies, other countries’

be confirmed for the 10 countries without

embassies in Japan, or other overseas embassies

diplomatic missions in Japan or for the 29of the country in question; and 3) the presence ofcountries with diplomatic missions to Japan but

posts featuring photos and videos related to theno physical embassy (39 countries in total).
By platform, the number of countries maintaining

activities of ambassadors to Japan.

Facebook pages (99) is slightly greater than those

Second, the month each Twitter account wasestablished was determined from the information

maintaining

shown in the profile section, and the start date ofaccounts are available in 39 countries (43.8%) for

Twitter

accounts(89).

Verifiedeach Facebook page was identified by theTwitter and 43 countries (43.4%) for Facebook.
Figure 1 shows the analysis results broken

creation date shown at the beginning of each
20

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Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 15 No. 1 Sep. 2022

contemporary context, Twitter launched its
Japanese-language service in 2008. Although thenumber of Twitter users in Japan increased
rapidly thereafter, as of January 2010, the numberof users on the platform was still around 5 million,
which is quite small compared to the more than
20 million users of the then-mainstream social
media services provided by domestic companies,
such as mixi, GREE, and Mobage (MIC 2011).3

Figure 1: Active Twitter and Facebook accounts

At that time, Facebook users numbered even¯
fewer than Twitter users (Omukai2015).

by region and platform usage (N =156 countries) (prepared by the

The first four countries to establish a presence

author)on Twitter and Facebook during this early period

down by region following the classification usedwere the United States, the United Kingdom,by the MOFA. Two North American countries

France, and Germany, whose embassies in Japan(the United States and Canada) have both Twittercreated Twitter accounts between May andand Facebook accounts. In Europe, 44 of the 50

November 2009. Finland, Belgium, and Israelcountries (88%) with embassies in Japan use atwere the earliest adopters of Facebook, with allleast one platform, and both the absolute number

three countries creating their pages in Octoberof accounts and relative platform usage are2010.

higher than those in other regions. In Asia,

Over the next decade or so, accounts by otheralthough the parameters are smaller, 17 of 20

countries’

countries (85%) have at least one of either Twitter

proliferated. Figure 2 shows the cumulativeor Facebook. In Latin America and the Caribbean,monthly graph for the creation of 188 accounts

17 of 22 countries (77.3%) are active on bothfor 119 countries.

platforms, as are 7 of 9 countries (77.8%) in

embassies

in

Japan

gradually

The number of accounts on both platforms has

Oceania, 12 of 15 countries (80%) in the Middle
East, and 20 of 38 countries (52.6%) in Africa. In
addition, outside of the Middle East, the use of
Facebook tends to be slightly more common
than Twitter.

4. 2 
Trends in the creation of Twitter andFacebook accounts
Based on a survey of the creation dates for
Twitter accounts for the embassies of 89 countries

Figure 2: Trends in the creation of Twitter andand Facebook pages for 99 countries, embassies

Facebook by embassies in Japan (Nin Japan started creating Twitter accounts in= 119 countries) (prepared by the2009 and Facebook pages in 2010. Looking at theauthor)21

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Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156 Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook Accounts in Communication with JapanNISHIKAWA

grown continuously. More than half of thecountries in Japan. The survey was initiated byaccounts on both platforms were created by 2014,

examining the numbers of followers and tweets

with 47 countries (52.8%) having done so on

indicated in the profile section for each account.4

Twitter and 64 countries (64.6%) on Facebook.

The total number of followers on theseAn average of 1.3 accounts were created on bothaccounts ranges from 23 at the lowest (for theplatforms each month.

Senegalese embassy account) to 161,000 at the

The number of accounts established in Marchhighest (for Finland), with most countries’

2011––a total of 11 accounts––was outstandingly

accounts concentrated in the zone with the fewest

high. During March 11–31, the embassies of thefollowers. Figure 3 shows the number of followers

United Kingdom, Spain, Chile, Estonia, Mexico,in units of 5,000.

Sweden, the Dominican Republic, and Portugal

Countries with fewer than 5,000 followers

in Japan created official Facebook pages. On

accounted for the largest number of countries, atTwitter, the embassies of Thailand, Indonesia,

53 (59.6%), and 63 countries (70.8% of the total)and Sweden created accounts in March, withhad fewer than 10,000 followers. These include

Indonesia and Thailand making their first posts

the 11 African countries for which accounts couldon March 11 and Sweden on March 17. One canbe confirmed, countries in the Middle Easteasily imagine that this sudden rush was

except for Israel (which had 23,000 followers),

occasioned by the Great East Japan Earthquake,and countries in Latin America except for Mexico

which struck on March 11, 2011.

(20,000 followers).

In the 119 countries with embassies in Japan,

In contrast, most of the accounts with the

69 countries (58%) confirmed having accounts onhighest number of followers were maintained byboth platforms,

out of which ten countries

the embassies of European countries. Only fivecreated their Twitter account and Facebook pagecountries had accounts exceeding 100,000

in the same month: South Korea (February

followers: Finland (161,000), France (132,000),2011), Sweden (March 2011), Ireland (January

the United States (130,000), Germany (128,000),2012), Togo (May 2012), the Netherlands (April2013), Russia (August 2013), Ukraine (June2014), Uganda (July 2014), Lesotho (November2017), and Jordan (November 2019). The factthat both were created around the same timesuggests the presence of certain social media
strategy. In other cases, 37 countries createdtheir Facebook pages first, while 22 countries
created their Twitter accounts first.

4. 3 Twitter followers and tweet counts

Figure 3: Number of followers of Twitter accounts

Next, a more detailed analysis of Twitter

maintained by embassies in Japan (Naccounts was conducted, focusing on the= 89 countries) (prepared by theaccounts maintained by the embassies of 89

author)22

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and the United Kingdom (118,000).

followers.

Similarly, the total number of tweets listed in

4. 4 Languages used by Twitter accounts forthe profile section of each account was examined.

each country

In 46 countries (51.7%), more than half of the total
number of tweets was less than 1,000 (Figure 4).

The languages used for spontaneous tweets

Countries with relatively few tweets include

from the time each account was opened wereanalyzed.

those with recently opened accounts, such as
Bulgaria, which opened its account in April 2021

First, an initial visual survey was conducted toand has tweeted 106 times in just over two

ascertain the languages used in tweets mademonths, and those that have been dormant for a

between January and June 2021, whereupon themedium-to-long period, such as Bangladesh,

89 accounts were classified into those whose

which opened its account in August 2017 and has

primary language appeared to be Japanese andposted only 13 tweets. In regional terms, with thethose whose primary language was not Japanese.

exception of Turkey (5,318 tweets), accounts for

Next, a secondary survey of tweets wasembassies from countries in the Middle Eastern

conducted for each account from the time of its

and African regions have each posted less thancreation to December 2020, reclassifying the 89

3,000 tweets.

accounts into the following three categories

The nine countries with accounts that havebased on the prevalence of Japanese-language

posted more than 100,000 tweets (i.e., Finland,

tweets: “mainly Japanese-language accounts,”

Cuba, Russia, Australia, India, the United States,“mixed Japanese-language accounts,” and “non-Mexico, Spain, and France) are spread overJapanese-language accounts” (Figure 5).

several regions. As with the number of followers,

For the accounts classified in the initial survey

large differences in terms of the range of theas predominantly Japanese, the number of non-number of tweets can be observed; however, thisJapanese posts was counted, and the ratio ofdifference is not as pronounced as in the case of

tweets in Japanese to the total number of tweets,
as well as the timing of the language use, wasexamined. Conversely, for accounts classified in

Figure 4: Number of tweets for Twitter accounts

Figure 5: Languages used in Twitter accounts

maintained by embassies in Japan

maintained by embassies in Japan(N = 89 countries) (prepared by the(N = 89 countries) (prepared by theauthor)author).
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Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156 Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook Accounts in Communication with JapanNISHIKAWA

the initial survey as predominantly non-Japanese,in multiple languages, including Japanese (e.g.,any Japanese tweets were looked for, and where

the United States, Australia, and India). Of these

they were present, their ratio to the total number

25 countries, 19 could be judged as communicatingof tweets was counted and calculated, and theto the general public in Japan, albeit to different

timing of their posting was checked. The

degrees. In the accounts for the remaining six

languages used were identified using Twittercountries, however, although Japanese was usedsearch codes.

in the past, only a few Japanese tweets could be

As a result, 32 countries (36%) were identified

confirmed after January 2021. As such, theyas having “mainly Japanese-language accounts.”

could not be deemed to be communicating withIn these accounts, organic tweets in English or

the Japanese general public at the time of thethe country’s native language accounted for lesssurvey.

than 20% of the total number of tweets between

A total of 32 countries (36%) were found to be

the account creation and June 2021 (themaintaining “non-Japanese-language accounts”

percentage of Japanese tweets was presumed to(the same number as that for mainly Japanese-be 80% or more). These included accounts oflanguage accounts), which comprised thosecountries that switched their primary language

tweeting primarily in languages other thanfrom English or the native language to JapaneseJapanese and where the ratio of Japanese to theat some point (e.g., South Korea, Ireland, andtotal number of tweets was less than 20%. The

Spain) and countries that posted numerous non-Maldives, North Macedonia, and Afghanistan, allJapanese tweets within a limited period (e.g.,of which made some use of Japanese for a limited

Brazil and Eritrea). The primary language of

period, had more than 11% of their tweets intweets in these countries was Japanese, even

Japanese, while 29 other countries posted lessafter January 2021. In regional terms, 20 of the 37

than 10% of their tweets in Japanese. 15 countries

Twitter accounts (54.1%) maintained by European

in the Middle Eastern and African regions fellcountries with embassies in Japan were classified

into this category.

as mainly Japanese-language accounts.

4. 5 Correlations between the average monthly

A total of 25 countries (28.1%) were identified
Japanese-language”

increase in the number of Twitter followers

accounts, featuring a moderate percentage ofand the average number of tweets per

Japanese-language tweets. As the language used

month

as

maintaining“mixedin the early stage of the account’s operation may

Based on the above analysis, the relationshipdiffer from that used more recently, the language

between the number of followers and the number

used in the accounts of these 25 countries afterof tweets for the 89 Twitter accounts surveyed

January 2021 were reconfirmed, dividing them

was investigated.

into two subcategories according to the degree of

As each account was established at a different

use of Japanese during this period. First categorytime, the number of followers per month was

includes accounts where the primary language of

calculated by dividing the total number oftweets after January 2021 is Japanese (e.g.,followers added to each account by the number

Russia and Thailand) and the accounts tweetingof months the account had been in operation.
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Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol. 15 No. 1 Sep. 2022

Similarly, the number of tweets per month wascountries, comprising more than half of the total.

calculated based on the total number of tweets

The accounts for 12 countries (13.5%),

and the number of months in operation. Figure 6

including Cuba, Honduras, and Ethiopia, show

shows the correlations between the average

more than the average number of tweets permonthly increase in the number of followers

month but have fewer followers than the overall(horizontal axis) and the average number of

average.

tweets per month (vertical axis) for the 89 Twitter

These accounts are “inefficient” in that

accounts in a four-quadrant scatter plot. The

although they tweet more than average, this has

average monthly increase in the number of

not translated into a corresponding growth in thefollowers (about 157.7) and the average number

number of followers. Conversely, accounts forof tweets per month (about 40.7) for all accounts

seven countries, including Iceland and Israel, canwere used as reference values.

be characterized as “efficient” in that the average

These results show 51 embassy accounts

monthly increase in the number of followers is(57.3%) in which both the average monthly

above average even though the number of tweets

increase in the number of followers and theis lower than the average.

number of tweets per month are below average.

Furthermore, 19 countries with higher-than-

While these countries’ accounts are classified as

average numbers in terms of both monthly“inactive” in terms of Twitter activity, thisincrease in the number of followers and number

category accounts for the largest number ofof tweets are classified as “active” on Twitter.

Figure 6: Average monthly increase in the number of followers and average number of tweets permonth for Twitter accounts maintained by embassies in Japan (N = 89 countries)(prepared by the author, labels partially omitted)
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Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156 Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook Accounts in Communication with JapanNISHIKAWA

Finland, in particular, is very active, with a highcharacteristics.

value for both parameters. In addition, the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, and China, whichMore than 76% countries maintain a social1) have significantly higher average monthly

media presence

increase in the number of followers than countries
Of the 156 countries with physical embassies

with a similar number of tweets, can thus be said

and substantial embassy operations in Japan, 119

to be particularly efficient tweeters.
Thus, the correlation between the averagecountries (76.3%) maintain a presence on majormonthly increase in the number of followers andsocial media platforms. This is a result of athe number of tweets is indicated by the fourcontinuous increase in numbers since the lateindicators of active, inactive, efficient, and2000s, when the Japanese populace began to use

inefficient. These indicators can also be used toTwitter and other leading social media platforms.

evaluate accounts relative to one another. For

The paucity of data makes it difficult toexample, in the case of Russia (average monthly

compare the situation of embassies in Japan withfollower increase of about 600, tweeting 210.5

that of foreign embassies in other countries. One

times per month on average) and its neighboring

previous study on the use of Twitter by thecountry of Georgia (average monthly follower

foreign embassies of 30 countries in the United

increase of about 550, tweeting 23.7 times perStates noted that there are 168 embassies inmonth on average), the difference in the average

Washington, D.C., but did not include information

monthly increase in the number of followers ison the total number of embassies that used

only 50. However, in terms of the number ofTwitter (Palash 2021). Another study of 114

tweets, Russia tweets almost nine times as muchcountries with diplomatic missions in Southas Georgia. Thus, compared to Russia, Georgia

Korea found that only five embassies (namely

tweets more efficiently.

those of the United States, the United Kingdom,

In terms of language, of the 26 “active”

Canada, Australia, and Israel) were actively using

accounts that gain more followers per monthsocial media. In this case, however, the analysis

than the average, and which tweet “efficiently” tofocuses on embassy websites and does not

more followers per month than the average,

extend to include a detailed survey of social

Indonesia is the only country with a non-Japanese-media use (Cha et al. 2015).

language account, while the other countries are

Nevertheless, the fact that more than three-deemed to be communicating with Japanesequarters of countries with embassies in Japan

speakers, irrespective of their size or region.

maintain a social media presence suggests that

This suggests that the use of Japanese is one ofsocial media is a tool that complements thethe conditions for gaining followers by Twittercurrent practice on the part of embassies inaccounts maintained by embassies in Japan.

Japan. Furthermore, given the apparent absenceof social media accounts for countries that do not

4. 6 Summary and discussion

have diplomatic missions in Japan or whose

From the survey results, digital diplomacy

diplomatic missions are limited to consulates thattoward Japan was found to have the following

do not maintain an actual embassy building, it
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can be assumed that a condition for an active

interview, the Ambassador wrote, “Yes, we

social media presence is the existence of adeliberately changed the language of the official

substantive base of operations.

Twitter account to Japanese. It is to show respect
to the country we serve in and to widen theoutreach to the people of Japan. As well the2) More than half the countries maintain Twitter

language of my personal Twitter account isaccounts oriented to the Japanese public

Japanese since the first day, the same reason. So,
The situation in Japan is quite distinct from

yes, it was my digital media strategy to usethat in other countries, where English is used

Japanese as a language of communication. We

every day by the general public, and language

still use English and/or Ukrainian on a FB pageissues arise when foreign organizations operate

only. Sometimes I do it, too, when I want thosein Japan. A survey of account usage from a

who more probably speak English rather thanlanguage-based perspective found that only 32

Japanese to read my posts.” With this response,

countries (36%) tweeted mainly in Japanese. In

the Ambassador’s clear intention to use social

conjunction with the 19 other countries (21.3%)

media strategically in the context of publicthat use Japanese in combination with other

diplomacy toward Japan became evident.5

languages, 51 countries (57.3%) could be

Even when Japanese is used as the primary

identified as those posting content oriented tolanguage, in some cases, different languages are

Japanese speakers at the time of the survey.

used depending on the timing or topic. Thus, theUndoubtedly, the use of Japanese is necessary to

purpose of using social media is not limited toconvey messages to the Japanese public at large,

communication with Japan but can also target

which can thus be said to be the only countries

various other stakeholders, such as compatriots

able to use social media as a tool in public

living in Japan, the embassy’s home government,

diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan.

its home country’s citizens, the embassies of

In addition, the main language used by theother countries in Tokyo, or, through them, theembassy account has changed over the course ofgovernments of other countries. The verification

its operation in some countries. For example,of these possibilities will be left to another paper.

Ukraine had been using multiple languages(English, Ukrainian, and Japanese) since the3) Major Western countries as well as many small

creation of its Twitter account in June 2014, but

and medium-sized countries that tweet inhas been posting mainly in Japanese since April

Japanese

2020. Such switches in language usage areaccounts strategicallyareconceivably

operating

theirconceivably due to some factors, such as changes
in home government policy and the influence ofA regional comparison of countries whose

the language skills of the responsible staff

embassies in Japan maintain Twitter andmembers. In the case of Ukraine, the timing ofFacebook accounts indicates that, in general, thethe switch coincided with the arrival of theUnited States and major European countries

current Ukrainian Ambassador to Japan, Dr.

show a significant presence on several indicators.

Sergiy Korsunsky. Responding to an e-mailMany particularly large European countries
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Comparative Analysis of the Operation of Social Media Channels by 156 Foreign Embassies in Japan: Focusing on the use of Twitter and Facebook Accounts in Communication with JapanNISHIKAWA

opened accounts relatively early, had numerous

5. Challenges and Prospects

Twitter followers, and were counted among the

5. 1 Significance of the research“active” and “efficient” Twitter categories. The
same is true for the United States. In contrast,

This study is probably the first to analyze

many countries in other regions, such as Africa

digital diplomacy toward Japan that addresses

and the Middle East, show the opposite tendency.

the activities of foreign embassies in Japan on

Even so, as with the case of the Finnish embassy’ssocial media. Accounts maintained by embassies

numerous followers, certain online-specific trends

in Japan were analyzed on two leading social

can be seen that differ from these offline indicators.

media platforms, taking into account the entire

As shown in Figure 6, many small-and medium-

period of their operation since their inception,

sized countries show an above-average monthly

which allowed the author to analyze a large

increase in the number of followers. This increase

number of countries from a long-term perspective.

increases the likelihood of tweets finding wider

Table 1 summarizes the study results.

engagement and thereby growing their account’sUsing publicly available information, these

online influence. Social media is a medium in whichembassy Twitter accounts were charted based

the general public—that is, individuals—becomeon the relationship between their average

carriers of information and have influence throughmonthly increase in the number of followers andinteractions among an unspecified number of

the average number of monthly tweets. The

individuals (Kaji 2014). Therefore, depending on

established indicators can also be used for more

how they use it, social media can be an effective tool

detailed analysis in the future.
Since more than 70% of embassies in Japanfor small-and medium-sized countries to gain

have a social media presence, social media can besignificant influence.
Note that all but one of the countries showing

considered a channel that complements thean above-average monthly increase in the number

current practice on the part of embassies inof followers tweeted in Japanese. Even among

Japan. However, only a limited number ofcountries with a below-average monthly increase

countries engage communicatively with Japanesein the number of followers, the small nation ofsociety on Twitter in any practical sense. This

Eritrea, for example––the only country in Africa

study offers an illustrative example of how social

withmedia is used as a tool for the new publicamainlyJapanese-language

Twitter

diplomacy.

account––had the highest total number offollowers (6,940) and the highest number of

5. 2 Future challenges

followers per month (about 59.8) among thecountries in the same region. Eritrea’s strategic

This study has clarified the presence ofuse of social media is apparent in the fact that it

embassies in Japan on Facebook and Twitter, thewas an early adopter of Twitter, creating its

degree of influence this potentially affords themaccount in November 2011.

within Japanese society, and the actual state ofaffairs regarding the operation of these accounts.
However, further research needs to be conducted
to verify how these apparent characteristics
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Table 1: List of social media accounts by country (N = 156 countries) (prepared by the author)

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relate to other events. It will be necessary tofrom the scope of this survey (i.e., Facebook

analyze the use of social media by each country’s

pages for Uzbekistan, Slovenia, and Malawi, andembassy by taking into account the content ofboth Twitter and Facebook accounts for El

social media posts and the background of how

Salvador).

accounts are used by each embassy, including

3.	These domestic social media platforms have beenwith reference to the policies of their homein decline since 2010, being replaced by global

governments, as well as activity on other social

platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook.

media platforms, such as Instagram and YouTube.

4.	
The numbers of followers and tweets for the

It would also be advisable to conduct further

accounts were collected on July 8, 2021. Because

research into Japan’s own externally directed

the computing environment used in the study

communications.

accounts

displayed these numbers in units of 1,000 for

maintained by the MOFA and overseas diplomatic

accounts with 10,000 or more followers andmissions (including consulates) have proliferated

tweets, these were the numbers that werein recent years, to the point that hundreds ofrecorded. In addition, the survey does not reflectaccounts are now being maintained on multiple

any decrease in the number of followers resulting

platforms (MOFA 2022). Further attention

from the loss of followers or account closures

should be paid to how social media is being usedprior to the time of the survey, or any decrease in

by diplomatic actors and how this complements

the number of tweets due to the deletion of posts.

current diplomatic communications, with a view

5.	Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky was appointed Ambassador

to clarifying strategies for utilizing social media

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine toconstructively to achieve diplomatic goals.

Japan in April 2020. After posing my question

Socialmedia

through the online event “Global Leadership Cafe

Acknowledgments#2: Lecture by Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky, current

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. SergiyAmbassador of Ukraine to Japan ‘Leadership in

Korsunsky, the Ukrainian Ambassador to Japan, andWorld Politics’” hosted by the Tokyo Institute of

all those who encouraged me in writing this paper.

Technology on September 10, 2021, an answer
was received on September 29, 2021.

This work was supported by JST SPRING, Grant

References

Number JPMJSP2106.

Banks, R., 2020, “Public Diplomacy Evaluation,”

Notes

Snow, N. and Cull, N., eds., Routledge Handbook of

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Public Diplomacy, Routledge, New York andlisted on the official embassy websites of 125

London.

countries that were confirmed to be active in

Bjola, C., Jiang, L., 2015, “Social Media and Public

March 2022, 60 were on Facebook, 48 on Twitter,

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Editor’s Notes
We are very pleased to announce the publication of Volume 15 of JSI (Journal of Socio-Informatics).
In this volume, one peer-refereed original papers and one translated paper already published in a
Japanese journal are included.
Since SSI is organized to promote and dispatch the studies of Socio-Informatics, JSI is open to any
researchers and students who are interested in Socio-Informatics. New submissions for the next volume
in 2023 are being invited. Please check the call for papers of JSI on http://www.ssi.or.jp/eng/index03.
html.
The Editor

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Editorial Board of The Society of Socio-Informatics
Editor in Chief
Soichiro TAKAGI, The University of Tokyo
Editor in Subchief
Masami HONDA, Kanto Gakuin University

Editorial Board of The Society of Socio-Informatics
Chair
Yorio KITAMURA, Ritsumeikan University
Sub ChairSeiichiro SAKURAI, Meiji Gakuin University
Editorial board members
Kaoru ENDO, Gakushuin University
Hiroyuki FUJISHIRO, Hosei University
Mamiko HAYASHIDA, Fukuoka Jo Gakuin University
Masami HONDA, Kanto Gakuin University
Kenji IIJIMA, Prefectural University of Kumamoto
Daisuke KAWAI, University of Tokyo
Takahiro KAWAMATA, The University of Nagasaki, Siebold
Reiichi KIMOTO, Sagami Women’s University
Yoshinori KISHIKAWA, Ube National College of Technology
Satoshi KITAMURA, Tokyo Keizai University
Yuko KITORA, Doshisha Women’s College of Liberal Arts
Keiko KOMAHASHI, Tokyo Keizai University
Ron KORENAGA, Rikkyo University
Atsushi KOTERA, Toyo Eiwa University
Keita MATSUSHITA, Kansai University
Kunihiko NAKANO, Shimane University
Naomi NEMURA, Nihon University
Shiroh OHNO, Surugadai University
Kaori OKAMOTO, Tokyo University and Graduate School of Social Welfare
Yuichi SASAKI, Tokyo Keizai University
Akeo TABATA, Kobe University
Soichiro TAKAGI, The University of Tokyo
Tomoko TAKEMURA, Ritsumeikan University
Nobumoto UEHARA, Tokyo International University
Mayu URATA, Nagoya University
Shinichi YAMAGUCHI, International University of Japan

Journal of Socio-Informatics Vol.15, No.1
Sep. 2022
Published
The Society of Socio-Informatics (SSI)
Akuahakusan Bld.5F, 1-13-7, Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
113-0001 Japan
Tel. 03-3812-5223 Fax. 03-3816-1561
Print/Binding
Shobi Printing Co., Ltd.

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