法学研究 95 巻 5 号（2022：5）

Cooperation and Competition:
1）

The Dynamics of Regional Order in Southeast Asia

YAMAMOTO Nobuto
Introduction
Southeast Asian Cold War
Security System
Economic System
ASEAN and China
A New Security Network
Conclusion

Introduction
In a 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, then young American journalist Nicholas D.
Kristof contributed an essay entitled “The Rise of China” (Kristof 1993). Thiswas one of the earliest essays that focused on and explained the so-called rise of
China. In his essay, Kristof points out that the “only group that is paying serious
attention to Chinaʼs long-term prospects is the business community.” He goes on
to warn that “the international community is not given adequate consideration
to the colossal implication – economic, political, environmental and evenmilitary – of the rise of powerful China” (Kristof 1993: 59, 60). The international
community, according to Kristof, held a doubtful view of whether Chinaʼseconomy could take off smoothly. The essay suggests hope, speculation, andanxiety about Chinaʼs developing economy in the early 1990s. A decade later, the1） This article is a revised version of my conference paper entitled “The Dynamics of Regional Cooperation Games: Perspectives from Southeast Asia.” It was originally prepared
for the JAIR/KAIS Co-Hosted Panel, “Constructing Regional Architecture: Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific” at the 2021 Annual Convention of the Japan Association of International Relations on 30 October 2021 (online session).
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rise of China became a given fact; no one doubted the growing power of China
in global and regional affairs. Some argue that China is a challenger to the USor the US-made regional order in Southeast Asia (Shambaugh 2005; Goh 2005a),while others are concerned if China is attempting to establish a Sino-centric
regional order in the Asia-Pacific region (Callahan 2016).
The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly the worldʼs political and economic
center of gravity (Mack and Raenhill 1995; Beeson 2008). Since the 2010s, theSino-US competition has been accelerated in the region. It has grown out of two
factors: the “rise of China” since the 2000s and Americaʼs “rebalance” policy
since 2011 (Connelly 2017; Lin and Gertner 2015). For the latter, the US relocatedits military power to the Asia-Pacific and tried to strengthen the regionʼsinstitutional architecture to reinforce a rules-based order (Sutter, Brown andAdamson 2013). The competition between the two powers in the region revolves

around a range of issues from geopolitical and geostrategic to geoeconomic
2）

interests.

It has also stimulated new arrangements and policy initiatives forregional cooperation such as Chinaʼs Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from 2013
and the USʼs Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy from 2017. Therefore, one
might say that China and the US have been playing regional cooperation andcompetitive games in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.
The core arena of the games lies in Southeast Asia (Emmerson 2020; Egbrinkand van der Putten 2011). The region has sea lanes whose strategic meaning has

grown more consequential. Geopolitically, in the pre-COVID-19 pandemic era,
the sea lanes in Southeast Asia provided thoroughfare for half of the worldʼsmercantile capacity, while one-third of global maritime traffic journeys from thePersian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to the economic powerhouses of Southeast
Asia and Northeast Asia. In particular, the South China Sea catches observersʼ
eyes, because geopolitically it functions as “the throat of the Western Pacific and3）

Indian oceans” (Kaplan 2014: 9).

The largest amount of oil in the globe is2） Geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic perspectives derive from realist theories
that stress competitive and conflictual aspects of international relations (Dalby 2013;
Scholvin and Wigell 2018).
3） Italic is the original text.
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法学研究 95 巻 5 号（2022：5）

transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean to East Asia andit passes through the South China Sea. Northeast Asian countries – Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, and China – heavily rely on their energy supplies coming
through the South China Sea. Three other major straits that go throughIndonesian territory – Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits – are crucial sea
routes to the South China Sea.
The South China Sea also has critical geostrategic importance (Buszynski
and Hai 2021). It is the troubled water that is under territorial disputes among

concerned states: China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, andBrunei. Chinaʼs claim of its historic line that covers most parts of the South
China Sea and its effort in constructing and enlarging artificial islands in thedisputed parts has stirred international concern. In response to Chinaʼs assertive,
if not aggressive, attitude, concerned states including the US, Japan, and others
regard the South China Sea as the international water where freedom of the seasis guaranteed. This is a principle in international law and sea that stresses
freedom to navigate the oceans. Therefore, these countries attempt to convince
China to follow such internationally shared norms.
Despite Sino-US competition over the years, the Southeast Asian regional
order looks stable. Southeast Asia consists of 11 small- and medium-sizedcountries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore,
Thailand, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. Except for Timor-Leste,
all other 10 countries form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). ASEAN started with 5 states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
and the Philippines) in 1967 and expanded its member states to 10 by 2000. The

member states have different political systems – from democracy to quasiauthoritarianism to authoritarianism – while their economic performances varyfrom advanced economy to middle-income countries to underdeveloped
countries. External powers also have established various kinds of relations with
Southeast Asian states. Both external great powers such as China and the US,
and external middle powers like Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia,
deeply commit to and are concerned about the regionʼs political and economic
affairs. Since the 1990s, ASEAN has made great efforts to reach out to external
powers and international organizations and even provided the basis for(3)104

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multinational institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
for a free trade framework and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for multilateral
security dialogue. Although there are some inter-ASEAN disagreements overcertain issues, and external powers have consistently interfered in the regional
affairs, the Southeast Asian regional order has generally remained calm. This
decades-long regional order has caught some scholarly attention (Acharya andStubbs 2009; Yates 2019). Amitav Acharya wonders if we are witnessing “ASEANʼslong peace” (Acharya 2021: 1-29).
How is the stable and resilient regional order possible in Southeast Asia?
This article illustrates how the Southeast Asian regional order has been achieved
and transformed over the years. It employs and slightly modifies Peter J.
Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishiʼs argument for Asian regionalism, that the
US-led twin regional systems – security and economic systems – have provided“some collective goods” for the stakeholders which required both formal andinformal international arrangements and cooperation (Katzenstein and Shiraishi
4）1997).

In the 21st century, however, this article maintains that the twin systems,

although remain operating, have been altered due to a new power dynamism
between the US and China over the region that facilitates the formation of new
regional arrangements with the stakeholders.

Southeast Asian Cold War
From the 1950s until 1998 the regional order in Southeast Asia was rather
simple. It was a combination of economic and security regionalism, in which the
US provided peace and security using its military power, while Japan offeredeconomic cooperation by way of its technological dominance. During the Asian
Cold War period,

5）Southeast Asian nations in the US bloc needed to conformlargely with the intentions of the US and Japan, and the diplomatic game was4） Katzenstein contends that Asian regionalism “centered on a convergence of interests inthe provision of some collective goods” (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997: 23).
5） Not only had the Asian Cold War its own characteristics and structures which were different from global Cold War, but also its period did not match with the global one.
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relatively uncomplicated. Since the 1990s, after the Cold War, the regional
international relations and diplomatic games in Southeast Asia have gone
through alterations. Whereas in the Cold War period the US-Sino and SinoSoviet relations cast shadows on the regional affairs, in the post-Cold War
period the regional order in Southeast Asia has been composed by the triangular
relation between US-Japan-China.
The security and economic twin systems grew out of the context of the
Asian Cold War structure. It constrained and provided the opportunity for postWorld War II Asian regionalism. The conventional wisdom is that the Asian
Cold War was the Sino-US rivalry relations; it started in late 1949 as the Peopleʼs
Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949 and ended in 1972 when
Sino-US reproachment was reached. During this period, the US engaged in
6）

regional affairs to contain Communism in Asia. Katzenstein argues that Asianand European regionalism is linked to “American imperium” and to coreregional states; Japan and Germany (Katzenstein 2005).
In the context of Southeast Asia, the Asian Cold War was slightly different
from the conventional view. In terms of time frame, it has two phases. The firstphase stretched from 1948 to 1975. In 1948 the British colonial government
declared a state of emergency in the whole territory of British Malaya tocontain Communist activities.

7）

The infant Indonesian military forces put an

end to the communist uprising in Madiun, a city in East Java (the so-called
Madiun Affairs), while the Philippine government had a hard time containing the

Hukbalahap Rebellion. In other words, Southeast Asian countries had a6） Wen-Qing Ngoei argues that after World War II, US and British policymakers perceived
Southeast Asian insecurity through both the prism of Japanese imperialism during thewar period and their fears of the relationship between China and Southeast Asiaʼs Chinese
diaspora. This mindset, he maintains, underpinned US policy toward Southeast Asia until
the 1970s (Ngoei 2014). As for detailed case studies of the Western intelligence and special
operations in the first two decades of the Cold War in Asia, see Aldrich, Rawnsley, andRawnsley (2000).
7） The British government considered the beginning of the Cold War in British Malaya inearly 1948 (Hack 2009). By declaring the Emergency, the British colonial government
banned the Malaya Communist Party and contained communist-related labor movementsin the colony.
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domestic prelude to the Cold War in the early days of independence. After these
local developments, the US policy circle made the first comprehensive policy
8）

toward Southeast Asia in early 1949.

From the 1950s through the 1980s, Southeast Asian nations concentrated
on postcolonial national consolidation and nation-building. Except for
Thailand, which was never formally colonized by any European power,
Southeast nations gained their independence from colonial rules. Their paths toindependence varied; Indonesia and Vietnam fought a war of independence
against the Dutch and the French respectively, while in the Philippines andMalaya (later Malaysia) the transfer of power from the US and Britain wentsmoothly. Burma was tossed by Britain, the US, and two Chinas (Foley 2010).
Except for North Vietnam, newly independent nations faced a serious andcommon political issue, that is, the domestic communist movement. A kind ofdomestic Cold War was embedded in each country.
Toward the end of the first phase of the regional Cold War, the original fivemembers of ASEAN came to be ruled by authoritarian and/or anti-communist
regimes. The timing of the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 was important.
Thailand was run by a military dictator, Thanom Kittikachorn. MalaysiaʼsPrime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had introduced the Internal Security Act
1960 that allowed preventive detention in Malaysia. President Ferdinand
Marcos of the Philippines was in his first term, marked with increased
industrialization and the creation of solid infrastructures nationwide. The year
1967 was two years after Singapore, under the leadership of Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew, gained independence from Malaysia. In Indonesia President
Soeharto, a former Major General, had assumed full and formal control since
March 1967 after the alleged Communist-led coup dʼétat in 1965.
Southeast Asia was undergoing a serious integration into the Cold War
structure. The year 1967 was in the middle of the USʼs Operation of Rolling8） The State Department issued a classified document called PPS (Policy Planning Staff
Paper) 51 on 29 March 1949. It described a region remarkable for its undeveloped natural
wealth, convulsed by nationalism and the “target of a coordinated offensive plainly directed by the Kremlin.” This paper was subsequently circulated for the information of the National Security Council as document NSC 51 on 1 July 1949 (US State Department 1949).
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Thunder (1965-1968), which was an aerial bombardment campaign. Thailand
and the Philippines hosted US military bases respectively. Among other nations,
Indonesia received special treatment from the stakeholders. Indonesia started toreceive foreign aid through the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI).
The IGGI was established and led by the US and Japan as an international
consortium of official donors to coordinate the provision of foreign assistanceto Indonesia. Its observers included the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) , the Asian Development Bank (ADB) , the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). The IGGI was the first international
supporting group for a particular country. Thus, the original ASEAN member
states heavily relied on the US and its system. It was not surprising that ASEAN
was widely considered an anti-Communist organization.
The first phase ended in 1975 when Vietnam was united after the Vietnam
War (aka the Second Indochina War). The Second Indochina War was officiallyfought between North Vietnam and South Vietnam; the former was supportedby the Soviet Union and China, while the latter by the US, South Korea, thePhilippines, Thailand, and Australia. The second phase covers the period of
1978 to 1991 when the Cambodian-Vietnamese War (the Third Indochina War)
took place. It was an armed conflict between Democratic Kampuchea,
controlled by the Khmer Rouge, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. On 25
December 1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Kampuchea, andsubsequently occupied the country, removed the government of the Communist
Party of Kampuchea from power, and installed on 8 January 1979 the proVietnam Peopleʼs Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in Phnom Penh, marking the
beginning of a ten-year Vietnamese occupation of the country.
The second phase of the Cold War in Southeast Asia eventually ended in
October 1991 when the Cambodian Peace Agreement of Paris was reachedamong the stakeholders. It was considered a successful diplomatic effort byIndonesia, Australia, and Japan along with France and Cambodiaʼs four
factions (Ratner 1993). It was arguably the first major multilateral peace accord
after the end of the Global Cold War. The literal end of the Cold War inSoutheast Asia paved the way to a new chapter for the region and individual(7)100Cooperation and Competition

countries, while ASEAN expanded its engagement in the fields of security andeconomy within the region as well as with external powers and stakeholders.

Security System
The security system, one of the twin systems in the region, was conceived anddeveloped by the US. In the post-World War II period, the US-organized
security system has maintained its importance against the influences of theSoviet Union and China. It is the system of “hub and spokes,” which wasbilateral security agreements, including provisions concerning military base andfacility, such as between US-Japan, US-South Korea, US-Philippines, and USSingapore. Here the US is the hub and the Asian nations spoke from the US
strategic perspective. Southeast Asian nations expected the US to provide theregional security order, while the latter maintained its commitment to regional
stability (Weatherbee and Emmers 2005; Katzenstein 2005; Beeson 2001).
This was the story of Southeast Asian countries that chose to be US allies;
such countries enjoyed US-provided security and economic order. There isanother version of the story in the region that was excluded from such regional
order. When World War II ended, Indochina continued to be a battlefield.
North Vietnam and South Vietnam were unified in 1975 following the
Indochina War (1949-1954) and the Vietnam War (1955-1975) (Turley 2021). In
1979 Vietnam fought China for a month. The civil war in Laos ended in 1975.
Cambodia had experienced civil wars since the 1970 coup by Lon Nol and thebrutal rule of the Khmer Rouge (1975-1979) . For decades, tensions had
continued at borders between Thailand and Laos, between Thailand andCambodia, and between Vietnam and China (Path 2020).
Due to the continuous instability in Indochina, the US needed to install its
military bases in the region. During the Cold War, the US had military bases in
the Philippines and Thailand, which had to do with the development of US
bases involved in the Vietnam War. When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, US
troops withdrew from Thailand, while in 1991 the Clark Air Force Base and1992 the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines were returned respectively. Still, theUS continues to maintain its military hard power in Southeast Asia into the99(8)法学研究 95 巻 5 号（2022：5）

twenty-first century. In recent years, it has strengthened military cooperation in
response to Chinaʼs policies and actions regarding Southeast Asia. The first isbilateral military cooperation with the US military. Since the 2000s, the US has
been engaged in military cooperation with Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, andVietnam, as well as the Philippines and Thailand, which are allied with the US.
With the US-Singapore Strategic Framework in 2005, the US-Malaysia Mutual
Provision of Goods and Services Agreement, the US-Indonesia Comprehensive
Partnership Agreement in 2010, and the US-Japan Defense Policy Dialogue, theUS has been expanding its network of bilateral military cooperation.
The second is a multilateral military exercise. Amid such changes, since
1982, the US and Thai forces have been conducting multilateral joint militarytraining called the “Cobra Gold.” It was originally aimed at preventing the
spread of communist power on the Indochina Peninsula but was transformed
into a peacekeeping means after the Cold War. The representative characteristic
is the annual multilateral military exercise Cobra Gold, the largest in Southeast
Asia. In recent years, the US military has made clear its strategic intention toprotect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and stabilize the IndoPacific in response to Chinaʼs Belt and Road initiative. The 20-year Cobra Gold
took place from 25 February to 6 March 2020. A total of about 10,000 people
from 29 countries participated in military training in various parts of Thailand.
Not only Thailand, but also Indonesian, Malaysian, Singapore, and Philippine
troops participated, even the Vietnamese troops joined from 2019. About 240
people from the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and others participated.
The end of the Cold War changed the security system in Southeast Asia.
The concept of security has been broadened, not only mere military security, but
security including the economy, and multilateral cooperation have become ademand for the times. It was the rise of the liberal political and economic
systems. Symbolically, APEC was established in 1989, and the Paris Peace
Agreement was signed in 1991 and the Cambodian peacebuilding process began.
It was ASEAN that had played an active role in this process. In the 1990s,
against the backdrop of strong economic growth, ASEAN increased its presence
in international politics, promoting cooperation with Europe, the US, andJapan, as well as dialogue and cooperation between countries in the region. The(9)98

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principles of consensus, non-interference in domestic affairs, informalism, etc.,
came to be known as the ASEAN Way, which has also been shared withcountries outside the region.
On the security front, ASEAN established the ARF in 1993 through theregional security dialogue mechanism. It involved the US, EU, Japan, China,
and Australia. What is noteworthy about ARF is Chinaʼs participation as a
dialogue partner. For the first time in its history, China began to adopt
multilateralism as a security policy. Needless to say, ASEAN played a significant
role in socializing China as a regional political and economic power (Ba 2006).
Thus in the twenty-first century, a new regional environment emerged.
China was now seen as a regional power and an emerging global player. The riseof China changed power relations within and outside the region and has led tothe emergence of new frameworks for security-related dialogue and cooperation.
In particular, alarmed by Chinaʼs growing economic and military influences in
Asia and beyond, the US pushed for further engagement in Asia and established
two security dialogue and cooperation frameworks: the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (QUAD) and most recently a trilateral security pact between Australia,
the UK, and the US (AUKUS). The QUAD was originally initiated in 2007 andwas reestablished in November 2017, whereas the AUKUS was announced in
September 2021. Both frameworks are designed for the Indo-Pacific security
dialogue.
Both the QUAD and the AUKUS do not officially include ASEAN, eventhough ASEAN has played the role of the driving force behind regional
cooperation in Asia. Do the new security dialogue and cooperation frameworks
leave ASEAN or Southeast Asia behind? It is not that simple for a geopoliticalreason. This is because, although the QUAD and the AUKUS are wary of
Chinaʼs military modernization and military deployment, the areas where China
makes concrete military inroads are the South China Sea and the East China
Sea. The South China Sea is in the center of Southeast Asia and is also a vitalsea area connecting India and East Asia. Moreover, the Strait of Malacca is aninternational sea area that runs from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea.
From a geopolitical perspective, neither the QUAD nor the AUKUS canspecifically confront China without involving the Southeast Asian region,
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namely ASEAN and its member countries.

Economic System
The economic system in and around Southeast Asia was also tied to the USplanned project of post-World War II Asia. ASEAN and its member states
turned regional stability into economic dynamism. ASEANʼs form of regional
cooperation was based on informality, unanimous consensus building, and nonconfrontational negotiations. In the decade leading up to 1976, the ASEAN
agenda was dominated by matters related to the political and security spheres.
As peace and stability were gradually fostered, trust among nations wasestablished and the focus shifted to the promotion of economic cooperation.
This shift was engineered by external economic giants, namely the US and
9）Japan.

In the 1970s and 1980s, political and social order and economic
development became the two major themes in Southeast Asia. The five ASEAN
member countries all became development-oriented authoritarian regimes, with
policies and institutions designed to induce foreign capital by maintaining
domestic order. This was an attempt to establish a market economy throughcooperation between ASEAN countries and to make close trade and economic
ties with countries outside the region. In other words, it was a political project inwhich the state protected the market and made it work. This was an irony
because even after the Sino-US reproachment was realized, regional cooperationin Asia was made to be limited to the economic and social fields, such as tradeliberalization and development cooperation, whereas the security and politicalfields tended to be avoided. Policymakers in each country recognized that it
would be unwise to overstimulate China by putting forward security andpolitical cooperation. This however did not mean that economic and social
cooperation had no political intention. While ASEAN ostensibly promotedcooperation in the economic and social spheres, the actual cooperation was9） Suehiro Akira describes how Japan re-engaged in the Asian economy in the 1950s and1960s (Suehiro 1999).
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political.
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, adopted in 1976, was the beginningof a full-scale ASEAN economic cooperation. The ASEAN Concord launchedefforts for three projects: the Preferential Tariff Arrangement (TAP), ASEAN
Industrial Projects (AIP), and ASEAN Industrial Complementarity (AIC).
However, after a series of meetings at the practitionerʼs level, from the 1970s to
the mid-1980s, economic cooperation projects in ASEAN failed to produce
desirable results. The bureaucracy of the ASEAN member governments and theASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry Council (ASEAN-CCI) was
pointed out as factors for the malfunction of economic cooperation. This led toa shift in the direction of promoting new economic cooperation by transferring
authority to the private sector in the late 1980s. The Plaza Accord in September
1985 was the turning point. It paved the way for the Japanese small- and middlesize businesses to pour into Southeast Asia. This was in line with the
deregulation and privatization drive initiated by the IMF and the World Bank inthe mid-1980s and marked ASEANʼs turn toward neoliberal policies. As aresult, from the 1970s to the 1980s, ASEAN countries entered a period of rapid
economic growth, acclaimed by the World Bank in 1993 as “the East Asian
Miracle” (World Bank 1993).
In this context, Katzenstein and Shiraishiʼs edited volumes, Network Power(1997), Beyond Japan (2006), and Sinicization and the Rise of China (2012) deserve10）

a revisit.

They attempt to explain how de facto Asian regionalism structured,functioned, and transformed over the years. Katzenstein emphasizes that Asian
regionalism has grown out of markets rather than through formal regional
institutions (Katzenstein 1997: 1-44). Network Power takes a new approach toregionalism. Unlike the conventional wisdom of regionalism being based on thede jure, state-driven nature of regionalism in (Western) Europe, it pays little
attention to formal regional institutions. It instead emphasizes region-wide
informal and/or business networks; it attributes the creation of East Asia to theactivities of non-governmental agencies. The book explains the “inclusive
character of Asiaʼs market-driven network-style integration in contrast to the
exclusive character of Europeʼs emphasis on formal institutions” (Katzenstein
1997: 3). It describes how the production networks of Japanese companies
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penetrated and expanded in the region, as well as how overseas Chinese madeefforts to utilize their commercial connections across the region. It thus
demonstrates that bottom-up economic integration shaped East Asian
regionalism.
In the latter half of the 1980s, Southeast Asia also transformed its
economic reality. A geopolitical change began to shape new regionalarrangements. In August 1988, soon after taking office as prime minister ofThailand, Chatichai Choonhavan, as the countryʼs first elected leader since
1976, started publicly talking about improving general relations with Indochina
and exploring economic opportunities there. He advocated “the conversion of
Indochina from battlefields into marketplaces,” which became the slogan of the
new government (Szalontai 2011). The decade-long Cambodian conflict had notbeen officially resolved yet, but diplomatic efforts for peace talks appeared to seea pathway to the end. The idea of a larger regional economic forum became atrendy one, with the Japanese and the Australians pushing their suggestions at
ministerial levels. Chatichaiʼs statement led to the opening of a new chapter not
only in Indochina or mainland Southeast Asia but in Southeast Asia in general.
The era of politics was over and the era of the economy had arrived; it was theera of market economy in the region.
Socialist countries in Southeast Asia were ready for such political and10） Unlike conventional studies on regionalism, Katzenstein and Shiraishi edited three volumes explaining the changing socio-cultural aspect in Southeast Asia. They reveal the importance of economic and social activities in the region. Such activities strengthen, Katzenstein argues, networking and interdependence relationship among citizens in theregion. Cultures and values from the US and Japan were welcomed in the region and contributed to creating hybrid cultures and forming regionally shared social foundations. Katzenstein calls them Americanization and Japanization. Since the middle of the 1990s whenSoutheast Asian countries opened their market to China, the economic, social, and political status of local ethnic Chinese became significant and in return, Chinaʼs cultural influence began to penetrate the region. Katzenstein names it Sinicization. Hence, he concludes,
Americanization, Japanization, and Sinicization have all contributed to form a hybrid regionalism. With these changes in mind, Sinicization and the so-called Rise of China details the Sinicization process and social transformation that attribute to Asian regionalism(Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein 2012).
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economic changes. In the 1980s they began to change their economic policies. In
1986, Vietnam mandated the Doi Moi (Open Door or Renovation) policy andbegan its all-around diplomacy and started a market-oriented economic policy,
while Laos declared Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking). These policies shiftedfrom a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. In 1988 BurmaʼsState Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) abandoned reclusive
Burmese socialism that ran from 1962 under the Burma Socialist Programme
Party. In addition, Cambodia furthered its market economy after the generalelection in 1993 under the surveillance of the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Countries in Indochina gradually integrated
into ASEANʼs economic framework. From the middle of the 1990s, these four
11）

countries began to join ASEAN; Vietnam in July 1995, Laos and Myanmar
12）

in July 1997, and Cambodia in April 1999.

As ASEAN expanded its member states, it sought to establish a free tradearea in the region. In early 1993 ASEAN began to form the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA). In January 1992 the 4th ASEAN Summit signed the Agreementon the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (CEPT). It was the starting point for the creation of AFTA. The 5th
ASEAN Summit in December 1995 decided to launch an initiative for theestablishment of an investment liberalization area. At the 30th ASEAN
Economic Ministersʼ Meeting in October 1998, the Framework Agreement on
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA Agreement) was signed that allowed theestablishment of the AIA Council.
In the Asian Cold War structure, ASEAN focused on regional tradeliberalization from the middle of the 1970s, because its member states did nothave to worry about territorial conflicts with one another, nor any direct
military interventions by external powers. In the middle of the 1980s, Vietnamand Laos changed their economic policies to the market economy and opened
their economy to neighboring countries. Their policy change happened when the11） In 1989, the military government officially changed the country name from Burma to
Myanmar.
12） The four countries are often referred as CLMV taken from the first letters of them.
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Cambodian conflict subsided. The end of the Cambodian conflict brought a
new economic opportunity to ASEAN member states as well as to countries
outside the region.

ASEAN and China
Since the early 2000s, ASEAN and China have kept close coordination andcooperation on international and regional issues. China firmly acknowledges
ASEAN centrality

13）

in regional cooperation and supports ASEAN in playing abigger role in developing an open and inclusive regional architecture. Both sides
have jointly dedicated themselves to promoting the sound development ofcooperation in East Asia and have been coping with existing and potential
challenges within the region. The two sides have also maintained goodcommunication and collaboration within the cooperation mechanisms which
include ASEAN Plus China, Japan, and South Korea (ASEAN Plus Three), East
Asia Summit, ARF, Asia Cooperation Dialogue, APEC, etc.
The US-Sino rapprochement in 1972 changed diplomatic relations between
ASEAN member states and China. In May 1974 Malaysia formalized its
diplomatic relation with China, followed by the Philippines in June 1975 andThailand in July of the same year. Indonesia and Singapore continued to close
their door to China. Although three ASEAN nations had official diplomatic
relations with China, the volume of trade was limited in the 1970s mainly due toChinaʼs protectionism under the socialist economic policy. ASEAN states usedHong Kong as an entrepôt to bridge their trades with China. ASEAN statesʼ
trades with China started to grow in the mid-1980s. Although ASEAN statesstill used Hong Kong as an entrepôt for export to China, they started to import
goods directly from China. The 1990s opened a new chapter for ASEAN-China
relations. In August 1990 Indonesia normalized its diplomatic tie with China,
followed by Singapore in October the same year. Indonesiaʼs decision changed13） ASEAN centrality has many meanings, but generally refers to ASEAN as the “leader,”“driver,” “architect,” “institutional hub,” “vanguard,” “nucleus,” and “fulcrum” of regional
processes and institutional designs in the Asia-Pacific region (Acharya 2017: 273).
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fundamentally the relationship between ASEAN and China. Since then, theeconomic relationship between ASEAN and China has rapidly grown throughofficial diplomatic channels and business exchanges. The former is bilateraldiplomacy and the diplomatic relations between China and ASEAN as anorganization that began in earnest in the early 1990s. Ethnic Chinese business
communities in Southeast Asia played significant roles in investing in China.
Up until the late 1990s, China and ASEAN were fundamentally rivals interms of investment and trade, and therefore hardly supplement mutually in thefield of economy. In 1992, however, ASEAN agreed upon the formation of
AFTA with aims at strengthening its membersʼ competitive edge. In 1998,
ASEAN agreed to promote direct investment from outside its border and toform ASEAN Investment Area to promote direct investment from an advanced
country in the region for the underdeveloped country in the region. China wasbuilt into the regional production formed in East Asia and the network ofcirculation in the 1990s. An industrial cluster existing in various parts of Chinais gradually becoming the hub. This way, China became embedded in theregional industrial structure.
Once embedded into the regional industrial structure and network, Chinabegan to conduct various kinds of dialogues with ASEAN. In 1993, China
became a Consultative Partner of ASEAN and in 1996 became a full dialogue
partner. The monetary and financial crisis in 1997 brought a sea-change to therelationship between ASEAN and China. The monetary and financial crisis thatkicked off in Thailand in 1997 before proceeding to the rest of Southeast Asia
and South Korea had consequentially damaged the international perception of
the East Asian economy from “miracle” to “meltdown” (Bird and Milne 1999).
The crisis continued in 1998 and set off political effects such as the collapse of
the Soeharto government in Indonesia. The dire situation left a strong
impression on the affected governments as to the depth of economic
interdependence of East Asia. Also, it triggered a chain reaction in terms of
economic cooperation among East Asian nations.
China changed its passive posture to a more aggressive one. Becoming amember state of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2001 is
one example of the new posture. China aimed at strengthening economic
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relations with Southeast Asia and aggressively proposed the free trade
agreement (FTA) with members of ASEAN. In November 2002, ASEAN and
China signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation, kicking off the process of building the ASEAN-China Free Trade
Area (ACFTA). In January 2010, ACFTA was fully completed. In June 2003,
China was admitted to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
14）

(TAC),and in October of the same year, ASEAN and China agreed to build astrategic partnership for peace and prosperity. China was the first extra-regional
power to gain such status with ASEAN. With the agreement of strategic
partnership, ASEAN and China held several Special Summits, including theSpecial ASEAN-China Leaders Meeting on SARS in 2003 and theCommemorative Summit marking the 15th Anniversary of ASEAN-China
Dialogue Relations in 2006. In November 2011, the ASEAN-China Centre(ACC) was established.

In the 2000s, Chinaʼs economic presence became undeniable in Southeast
Asia, and its strategic approach to the Indochina region is quite clear. By the
2000s, China has taken over the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) development
project, which began in 1992 under the leadership of the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). The GMS consists of 6 countries in the Mekong River basin, andChina initially sent the Yunnan provincial government as its official
representative. The Beijing government was not represented until the first GMS
summit in Manila in November 2002; since the second GSM summit inKunming in 2005, in addition to the Yunnan provincial government and the
Beijing central government, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Government
also became an official member. The purpose of Chinaʼs participation in the
GMS was not merely to invest in GMS development projects; there was anational goal of using the regional cooperation framework of the GMS toachieve Chinaʼs expansion into Southeast Asia and the development of the14） The TAC is a peace treaty signed in 1976 among ASEAN members to establish a set of
guidelines to govern interstate relations in the region, promote perpetual peace and cooperation among signatories. In 2003, China and India were the first countries outside of
ASEAN to accede to the treaty, followed by Japan and South Korea in 2004, Australia
and New Zealand in 2005, and the US and EU in 2009.
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countryʼs inland (Suehiro 2014). China uses its geoeconomic power for the GMS
development project (Soong 2016).
In the 2010s, Chinaʼs economic assertiveness turned into building its
initiated free trade agreement in East Asia. In November 2020, the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed and officially started
in January 2022. It is a free trade agreement (FTA) between ten member statesof ASEAN and its six FTA partners (Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, andSouth Korea). In other words, ASEAN Plus Six played a central role in pushing

forward RCEP. However, since the official process was set out in November
2012, China dominated the negotiation process by taking advantage of ASEANʼs
FTA network. Since President Donald Trump took office in 2017 in the US,
China expedited the negotiation process. China emphasized the importance of
free trade in the face of US protectionism and cast itself as the standard-bearerof free trade. It is no doubt that RCEP is a China-led agreement. It carries two
significant facts: it becomes the first free trade agreement between China, Japan,
and South Korea, and it excludes the US from the RCEP framework.
Eventually, RCEP demonstrates the importance of ASEAN centrality in East
Asian economic integration (Kimura 2021).
China is now an indispensable trading partner for Southeast Asian
countries. In the latter half of the 20th century, many Southeast Asian countries
were highly dependent on trade relations with the US and Japan. From ageoeconomic perspective, the fact that trade relations with China have become
more important for Southeast Asian countries means that economically the US
and Japan have become comparatively less important, and therefore China hasan advantageous environment to Southeast Asian countries as well as to the US
and Japan. Moreover, from Chinaʼs geopolitical point of view, Southeast Asia is
an integral part of the BRI strategy that China has been developing since 2013.
It has benefited both ASEAN countries and China in terms of increased trade
flow among these countries (Foo, Lean, and Salim 2020) . Economic
interdependence between ASEAN countries and China thus has deepened andexpanded in the 21st century and cannot break so easily.

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A New Security Network
The economic system helped China to integrate into the Asian economy sincethe 1990s when ASEAN member states were ready to engage with China. The
security system maintains a cautious approach to the Chinese militaristic power
and position; up until 2010, even formal ASEAN-centric security dialogue
excluded China. But in the 2010s, the security network arrangement has alteredand expanded. It is the various layers of networks for non-traditional security
issue areas. This move reflected growing concerns in emerging or non-traditional
security threats. Non-traditional security threats constitute the security agenda
and policy priorities of many states. They pose threats to national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of states as well as to the well-being of their respective
societies (Cook and Nair 2020).
In 2010, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) was
launched as an expanded version of the ADMM. The ADMM-Plus aims to“provide a platform for ASEAN and its eight dialogue partners to strengthen
security and defense cooperation for peace, stability and development in theregion” (ASEAN 2017). Its constituents are the ten ASEAN member countries
and the eight ASEAN dialogue partners – Australia, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the US. Initially, the ADMM-Plus was
supposed to be held every three years, then every two years, and now it is held
annually. It is to be noted that this is the first time for China to be included as amember country for a defense dialogue in the ASEAN hosted framework.
A major difference between the ADMM-Plus and the traditional
multilateral security dialogue framework is the Expert Working Group (EWG)
system consisting of sub-meetings of the seven non-traditional security areas:
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, maritime security,
counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian mine action, andcyber security. This emphasis on non-traditional security issues reflects the factthat those areas have been securitized and become crucial security matters for
ASEAN as a regional organization as well as its member states since the late
1990s (Cook and Nair 2020; Caballero-Anthony and Gong 2021). To tackle various
non-traditional security matters, ASEAN member states need capacity-building(19)88

Cooperation and Competition

for each area, that is, bureaucratic, technical, methodological, and financial
assistance from external states. The ADMM-Plus utilizes co-chaired system for
the EWG; each EWG is co-chaired by a pair of ASEAN members and a
dialogue country. The EWGs are oriented towards specific cooperation in theseven areas and are engaged in joint exercise and the development of common
standard operating procedures (SOPs). The EWG system has been functioning;many meetings, seminars, and exercises have been held in various nontraditional areas. The EWG system has become a forum for capacity-building
support to ASEAN countries by non-regional countries.
However, the ADMM-Plus has sometimes failed to make much progress inconfidence-building and somewhat confrontational situations, especially among
non-regional countries; this is noticeable against the backdrop of theintensifying confrontation between the US and China. For example, at the third
ADMM-Plus in 2015, the US attempted to insert language on the South China
Sea issue into the Joint Declaration, but China strongly opposed it. As a result,the discussion led to nowhere, and the ADMM-Plus failed to issue a joint
declaration (Tan 2017b).
The 8th and most recent ADMM Plus revealed again the current Sino-US
conflict.

15）

It was held online on 16 June 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

At the end of the meeting, it issued the ADMM-Plus Joint Declaration. It was a
short statement lacking concrete content that leads to a consensus among
member countries. The declaration does not use the term “South China Sea,”but refers abstractly to “the importance of maintaining and promoting peace,security, stability, prosperity, safety, and freedom of navigation and overflight aswell as the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in
the conduct of activities and avoid actions that may further complicate thesituation, and pursue peaceful resolution of disputes, without coercion, in
accordance with international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea” (ASEAN 2021).
It also continues from the previous declaration to use the unfamiliar phrase
15） Sino-US conflict cast a shadow in the declaration since the 7th ADMM-Plus meeting
held online on 9-10 December 2020.
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法学研究 95 巻 5 号（2022：5）“the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” to describe the region
encompassing the ADMM-Plus member countries. This phrase is a compromise
between the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific initiative” promoted by
Japan, the US, Australia, and India, and the continued use of “the Asia-Pacific”
by China, which rejects the idea of “Indo-Pacific.” The phrase “Asia-Pacific andIndia Ocean regions” revealed conflicts of opinion among the member countries.
That said, however, the declaration puts the phrase “Indo-Pacific” in the context
of reaffirming the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) (ASEAN 2019).
It includes “the principles of strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness,transparency, inclusivity, good governance, respect for sovereignty, nonintervention, complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality,
mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and respect for international law
where the AOIP is intended to enhance ASEANʼs Community-building process
and not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing ones.” It is to be
noted that the AOIP was initiated by Indonesia. It sets an agenda in regards to
Indo-Pacific cooperation, which reflects Indonesiaʼs ambition to be a maritime
power in the region – to make Indonesia a Global Maritime Fulcrum (Anwar
2020).

This kind of confrontation and rivalry between countries in the region has
a positive side for ASEAN (Beeson 2016; Stubbs 2019; Rivera 2018) . The US,
China, and other external powers could promote stronger cooperation with
ASEAN, and as a result, capacity-building support for ASEAN countries in the
EWG system will advance. Non-traditional security arrangements need multiple
layers and sustainable cooperation among concerned countries. Therefore,
competition among extraterritorial countries has increased the strategic
importance of ASEAN and helped maintain its centrality. The 8th Declarationof ADMM-Plus Meeting underscores “the ADMM-Plus as the main
multilateral mechanism for defence cooperation within the ASEAN-centred
regional architecture to advance the cause of peace, stability, and prosperity inthe region based on the principles of ASEAN unity, solidarity, centrality, andupholding of international law” (ASEAN 2021). Ironically, the Sino-US conflict
has in effect boosted ASEANʼs position as the center of regional architecture. It
proves that ASEANʼs way of diplomacy can serve as a basis for such Asian(21)86

Cooperation and Competition

regionalism, even when there are various kinds of regional and national
16）

pressures.

Conclusion
Thanks to the US-made twin regional systems, the Southeast Asian regional
order has kept its stability over the last seven decades. Both security systems andeconomic systems have evolved over the years, and ASEAN member states and
ASEAN have played constructive engagement, hedging, and balancing withexternal powers (Goh 2005b). ASEAN member states have demonstrated that
diplomatic attitudes of small- and middle-powers are not always coherent andthey may change depending on issue areas as well as their domestic factors. Such
diplomatic attitudes have become normal among small- and middle powers in
the region. There are times when ASEAN member states disagree on certain
matters; there are times when external powers approach particular member
states for security and economic reasons. Over the last several decades, ASEAN
has been successful in building its networks with external powers, while its
member states have made use of their engagement with ASEAN to maximize
their national interests and minimize their international threats.
Some Southeast Asian states facilitated Chinaʼs economic rise since the1980s. The ethnic Chinese business community played a significant role in it.
After Indonesia normalized its diplomatic relation with China, ASEAN opened
the door to China. China in return made use of its relationship with ASEAN
and its member states. ASEAN socialized China and China became dominanteconomically. And now their economic relationship is closely tied. After the
Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, ASEAN expanded its external relations fromASEAN Plus Three in 1997 to ASEAN Plus Six in 2005. ASEANʼs effort toreach out to and engage with external powers transformed regional security andeconomic systems. ADMM Plus started in 2010, while RCEP officially started16） Since the 2010s, ASEAN centrality has been questioned about its effectiveness due toSino-US power games (Kraft 2017; Tan 2017a; Mueller 2020). As for the recent development of ASEANʼs contribution to regional order, see Acharya (2021).
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in January 2022. All these new cooperation arrangements and frameworks cameout from stakeholdersʼ demands. Despite internal disputes and disagreements,
advancing multitiered and comprehensive dialogues expedite regional
cooperation. It is secure to say that the twin regional systems remain functioning
and provide “some collective goods” for the stakeholders.
Having said that, the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2022 may havechanged diplomatic practice. During one and half years when the pandemic hit
globally, both ASEAN and ASEAN-related mega-regional meetings were held
online. Digital diplomacy has come to be established as a new format of17）

diplomacy.

It favors small- and middle-powers because it gives them more

opportunities to be heard (DiploFoundation 2021). At the same time, unlike
onsite meetings, it is challenging to secure backdoor deals with the online
format. In the latter half of 2021, international meetings have started to return
to normal, occasionally operating in a hybrid format of onsite and online
settings. Under these current circumstances, the diplomatic customs that
ASEAN has built in the region may undergo some changes that will affectregional cooperation games in the post-COVID-19 era. The dynamics ofregional cooperation and competition will continue.

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