This abstract was submitted to and presented at CCRC International Conference 2022.

Building the Metaverse: ‘crypto states’ andcorporates compete, down to the hardware
Kelsie Nabben, RMIT University, Centre for Automated Decision Making and Society,
Australia

INTRODUCTION
Metaverse investor and writer Matthew Ball estimates the metaverse could be worth up to$30 trillion in the next decade (Knight, 2021). How “the Metaverse” is built and governed
will determine societal outcomes in the near future and for generations to come. The
Metaverse describes virtual worlds that break distinctions between digital and physical space(Dionisio, Burns, & Gilbert, 2013). The concept is aptly depicted in Neil Stephenson’s 1992
Novel “Snow Crash” and the book turned film “Ready Player One” as virtual worlds where
people and algorithms socialise, conduct commerce, and live (Cline, 2012; Stephenson,
1992). There are competing visions of the Metaverse. One is a privatised, centralised future
where big corporates, such as Facebook’s “Meta”, determine how people “socialize, learn,collaborate and play” (Facebook, 2021b). The other is predicated on decentralised
technological architecture, such as blockchain-based digital infrastructure, where distributed,
objective-aligned communities known as “Decentralised Autonomous Organisations” (orDAOs) build their own worlds. One example of a distributed Metaverse being built is“KONG Land”. KONG describes itself as a “crypto state”, meaning a virtual polity which
can collectively negotiate, fund, build, maintain, and reproduce without relying on external
resources (Srinivasan, 2021). This piece argues that the battle for the future of the metaverse
comes down to hardware, specifically, microchips. I explore the world building practices of
KONG Land through the lens of the digital and physical, visible and invisible, and public andprivate. Using the ethnographic methods of digital ethnography and interviews, I identify the
dynamics of threats and resilience in the concept of the metaverse and microchips as a public
good. As the next generation of digital integration, research that uncovers the dynamics of
network ownership and control in ‘the Metaverse’ is an important contribution to sociology
and public policy.
LINKING DIGITAL AND PHYSICAL
An exploration of the risks and opportunities of “the Metaverse” and decentralised
technologies would be incomplete without considering hardware. Sociologist Bruno Latour
famously posits the question “Where Are the Missing Masses?”, referring to the seminal
importance of physical elements in the analysis of sociotechnical artefacts (Latour, 1992).
Just as physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges undergird modern society, so too
does digital infrastructure undergird society from software applications, to internet service
providers, to computing hardware. Anthropological literature traces a range of ways that
infrastructure is often “anything but invisible” (Larkin, 2013). In the same way, decentralised
technologies are not only visible at the network layer in terms of public blockchaintransactions on a “block reader”, or content requests and servers on IPFS network but also at
the hardware level. At the macro scale, this includes cryptocurrency mining hardware(servers that run software) and even satellites (Nabben, 2021b, 2021c). At the micro level, it
Page 1 of 9

comes down to the silicon in microchips. Latour argues that physical artefacts are deliberately
designed to shape and constrain human behaviour, including the decisions we make and theway we move through the world (Latour, 1992). This is also true of the way that access inand out of the metaverse is constructed and governed.
The two major competing visions for the metaverse are private versus public. “Themetaverse” describes virtual worlds that break distinctions between digital and physical space(Dionisio et al., 2013). The metaverse has been described as “a massively scaled andinteroperable network of real-time rendered 3D virtual worlds which can be experienced
synchronously and persistently by an effectively unlimited number of users, and with
continuity of data, such as identity, history, entitlements, objects, communications andpayments” (Ball, 2021). The private metaverse is a centralized future where big corporates
such as Facebook’s “Meta”, whereby value is extracted from users as consumers. This
metaverse is both virtual reality accessed via headsets, such as “Oculus”, that project a digitalworld, as well as augmented reality, accessed via face wear, such as glasses, that project
digital things over the physical world. In contrast, the public metaverse is a vision ofnumerous, decentralized digital worlds that people can move between that are built andowned by participants. The public metaverse is predicated on open, interoperable
decentralized technological architecture. It integrates a suite of crypto community
innovations in decentralized finance (DeFi) for payments and NFTs for digital in-world items
that hold real value. Furthermore, the public metaverse is governed and owned by networksof “decentralized autonomous organizations” (or DAOs) where distributed, objective-aligned
communities collectively own, govern and work in digital worlds (Nabben, 2021a).
Facebook has made a number of attempts to co-opt and scale cryptocurrency community
innovation. First, Facebook attempted a blockchain and cryptocurrency play with Libra(rebranded to Diem). Now, crypto people are once again riled up about Facebook for trying
to steal and monopolize another Web 3.0 (the participatory web) idea and monopolize it, as
Facebook announced that its metaverse will leverage non-fungible-tokens (NFTs) torepresent and exchange digital assets (Morris, 2021; Tan, 2021). In response, an anonymouscollective of crypto community members recently released a jointly signed “Declaration of
the Interdependence of Cyberspace” (“A Declaration of the Interdependence of Cyberspace,”2021) that builds on the ideas in John Perry Barlow’s famous “Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace” from 1996, stating “Your cookies, copyrights and capital may
centralize your control for a small time, but they will not work in a world that will soon
distribute power,” (Barlow, 1996) as a warning to Facebook (Declaration of Interdependence,2021). Crypto communities are determined to collectively own the metaverse by building itthemselves.
“KONG Land” is a “crypto state” is predicted on secure open hardware to link digital andphysical worlds. KONG Land offers security and verification through cryptographicallysecure element micro-chip hardware known as “SiLos” (The Ambassador, 2021). By
addressing individual ownership at the hardware level, these chips can then be embedded in
virtually anything for people to securely interact across physical and digital space without anarbiter. “Non-fungible-tokens” (or NFTs) are utilised as unique cryptocurrency assets thatenable people to interoperate between metaverses. This Metaverse is owned by “citizens” that
acquire governance rights through early buy in, social graph distribution, or labour for tokens,and governed through a DAO, that co-exists with a network of other DAOs that it conducts
commerce with. Against the threat of Facebooks proposal for a centralised, corporate
metaverse, KONG Land early contributor Paul states that “The infrastructure of registering
Page 2 of 9real items with virtual items shouldn’t be a private entity, it should be a public good”. The
emergent possibility of a decentralized metaverse offers an important area of enquiry into therisks and opportunities of cyber-civilization architecture and governance as the distinction
between physical and digital spaces continues to erode.
VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE
The base, foundational layer of the metaverse is hardware, specifically, microchips. The
metaverse is dependent on physical devices to access and interact with the metaverse. An
integration between blockchain, augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) is spurring a
convergence of cross-industry opportunities for new applications of these technologies(Cannavò & Lamberti, 2021). Facebook is pursuing hardware interfaces to the metaverse
through the Oculus VR headset, which they acquired for $1.6 billion (Facebook, 2014), andan AR glasses partnership with Rayban (Facebook, 2021a). Artificial Intelligence capabilities
are expected to further enhance how data is mined and leveraged to enhance people’s
experience of the metaverse (Hyun-joo, et. al., 2021). Hardware is a core enabler to make themetaverse possible (Ball, 2021), along with compute, networking, payment services andinteroperability standards. Hardware is notoriously hard to do as a minor player in theindustry. Infamous open hardware hacker Andrew “Bunnie” Huang states in a researchinterview that “hardware is all about supply chains”, and a particular challenge in souring
reliable supply, is microchips. Not only are chips not visible but neither is their politics.
The Politics of Chips
As the building blocks of computer hardware, microchip manufacturing and supply chainsare a theatre of geopolitical tensions and economic statecraft (Meese, Frith, & Wilken, 2020).
This has long been true of communications infrastructure (Hills, 2002, 2007; Winseck &Pike, 2007; Zajácz, 2019). The politics of infrastructure was also anticipated by influential“Cypherpunk” thinkers (Bey, 1985; Davidson & Rees-Mogg, 1999). Chips are extremely
expertise and labor intensive. Factories cost billions to build and there are only a few in theworld (Leswing, 2021). The largest and most advanced chip maker is Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), which manufactures over half of the world’s made-to-order chip
supply, and the company is worth $550 billion (Campbell, 2021). These small, wafer sizedchips power mobile devices, “internet of things” hardware, refrigerators, cars, 5G
telecommunications networks and artificial intelligence. COVID-19 significantly disrupted
supply chains due to lockdowns, shipping delays and supply disruptions with cancellations
from some industries such as automotive, and increased consumption in others, such as
consumer electronics.
Competition is not just for capital but also specialized equipment and research anddevelopment expertise. During COVID, the Trump Administration began regulating
semiconductor sales to Huawei Technologies and other Chinese companies, causing Chinese
firms to stockpile supplies (Reuters, 2020; Swanson & Kang, 2020; Vakil & Linton, 2021).
The US is trying to strengthen its position in the market. Biden’s $2 trillion plan to fix
American infrastructure included $50 billion to boost semiconductor competitiveness andincluding new chip fabricator factories by Intel, TMSC, and Samsung (which will take atleast five years) (HR-7178, 2019; Rivero, 2021). The US also has a partnership with the EU
to set common manufacturing standards (BBC, 2021). The EU has announced the “chip act”
to gain greater control over their chip making supply chain as a key component of the EU’s
overarching digital strategy. “We depend on state-of-the-art chips manufactured in Asia. So
Page 3 of 9

this is not just a matter of our competitiveness. This is also a matter of tech sovereignty. So
let’s put all of our focus on it.” states EU President Ursula von der Leyen (von der Leyen,2021). Meanwhile, China will soon be the biggest producer by volume, having poured
billions into the industry (Campbell, 2021). This leaves the technological advancement of
nation-states vulnerable to supply chain shortages. These disruptions have revealed how
fragile the microchip supply chain is, resulting in increased geopolitical tension between
nation-states over microchip manufacturing.
Now, “crypto-states” also need to compete in the microchip industry to supply the essential
hardware for the open metaverse. A16z’s Balaji Srinivasan describes “network-states” and“cloud cities” as virtual political entities that can collectively negotiate, fund, build, maintainand reproduce without relying on external resources (Srinivasan, 2021). Blockchain-based
DAOs are just this - in their ability to bootstrap a digital economy, collectively negotiate andcrowdfund territory in the real world. These crypto cities and network-states are popping up
everywhere (Buterin, 2021), including CityDAO buying land in Wyoming (“CityDAO,”
2021), ConstitutionDAO aiming to buy and co-own an original copy of the U.S. Constitution(ConstitutionDAO, 2021), and Kong Land looking to mass manufacture open microchips(Kong Land, 2021).
PUBLIC AND PRIVATEThe KONG Land crypto state is the brainchild of serious open hardware hackers. Having
successfully exited a physical door lock business in Silicon Valley, the co-initiators of Kong
Land released the “ARX” whitepaper in 2018, which first articulated the vision for trust
through open silicon chip manufacturing (Arx, 2018). In 2019, open chips were trialled intheir first use case of physical hardware notes of “crypto cash.” Known as “Kong Cash,” thenotes have a microchip embedded in them which links to a smart contract to verify andultimately access cryptocurrency (Kong Cash, 2021). Experimentation in open chips has
recently culminated in “Kong Land” (Kong Land, 2021) with the launch of NFT “citizen”
tokens, which represent unique individual members of the KONG Land crypto state to build
the community for a DAO whose objective is open chip manufacturing and create utilizationof chips for an open metaverse. “Like any other country, Kong Land has citizenshiprequirements, a unique culture, a working government (a “DAO of DAOs”) and a robust
economy built on creating and exporting SiLo-factured crypto assets,” states the projects blog
(The Ambassador, 2021). At its core, Kong is about chip research and development and open
innovation.
Kong Land is predicated on secure hardware at the silicon level through cryptographic key
ownership which links to blockchain-based smart contracts to bridge the physical world tothe digital world and usher in an open metaverse. Cryptographically secured microchips are a
way for people to hold their own keys when it comes to hardware. “Through these chips you
have a way to interact without an arbiter,” stated Cameron, an early contributor to Kong
Land. By addressing individual ownership at the hardware level, these chips can then beembedded in virtually anything, for secure access to digital assets and digital lands. Kong
Land intends to do this through “silicon locked contracts” (or SiLos) to address digital andphysical asset ownership at the hardware level. SiLos are low-cost, durable, secure element
microchips that are cryptographically linked to a smart contract on a public blockchain. Eachchip self-generates a cryptographic key pair, and the public key is added to a Kong registry
contract. Using a smartphone, anyone can scan the microchip using a near-fieldcommunication (NFC) reader, to verify the private key and unlock access to the tokenized
Page 4 of 9assets stored in the contract, authenticate an identity, or even trigger real-world actions.
Embedding a SiLo microchip into any physical item transforms it into a crypto asset that canbe verified on chain, as well as interacted with in real life.
Kong Land chips have the potential for any use case you can think of. The Kong Land
manifesto states that “At inception, Kong Land will export crypto assets for projects likestablecoins, identities and art ... Given sufficient funds, it will ultimately seek to continue
research around more secure forms of physical crypto assets” (Kong Land, 2021). This
metaverse is owned by “citizens” who acquire governance rights through early buy-in, sign a“Kongstitution” social graph distribution, or work for tokens in accordance with the Kong
“green card” policy initiative. The goal is to digitize real-world assets with these secure
element chips that match physical and digital goods. NFTs enable verified ownership ofassets to port between the physical and digital, and back to physical (they assure me that thisfinal step is hard), as well as genuine ownership of assets for interoperability between
metaverses. “While traditional tech companies focus largely on bringing users into virtualworlds or augmenting reality with digital experiences, we envision a seamlessly intertwined
metaverse that doesn’t rely solely on wearable headgear,” says the Kong Land “ambassador”
in a blog post (The Ambassador, 2021). One example is “Metafactory,” a “digital factory” formerchandise that is integrated with Kong Land microchips (Metafactory, n.d). This allows
clothing items to be scanned by the NFC chip reader in a smartphone, to reveal an NFT andshare metadata about the item. Another example is “Kong card” passports, a physicalpassport with a chip embedded that allows “citizens” of Kong Land to verify their citizenshipat physical locations for access to special events. Provability of unique identity with the
passport then solves problems back in the digital crypto state, such as the challenge ofmultiple fake identities to attack a network (known as “sybil attacks”), which can be a
problem in governance voting. In the future, Kong imagines people being able to take NFTs
and digital items, and port them back to physical representations through chips, which verify
ownership of unique assets.
Kong Land’s vision is to be a “DAO of DAOs” with an orbit of “sub-DAOs” that integrate
microchips for anything they can imagine, effectively catalysing a constellation of open
metaverses. With the chip manufacturing hub at its core, Kong’s ambition to export their own
secure element chips and eventually custom silicon research and development, this crypto
state competes with Facebook’s vision of a closed metaverse.
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION
The rapid experimentation of blockchain-based DAOs as crypto-cities and states isdemonstrating innovative ways to link the digital and the physical. Fundamentally, the battle
between a public, open, decentralized, crypto metaverse and a closed, private, extractive,
corporate metaverse comes down to the hardware, as the entry point for people to accessdigital worlds. Kong Land is an example of a crypto state with the community, manufacturing
capabilities and expertise to compete for an open metaverse.
As they develop, crypto projects that operate like states will compete with big corporates andnation-states as new political actors. As the distinction between physical and digital spaces
continues to erode, the emergent battle for the future of the metaverse offers an importantarea of inquiry into the risks and opportunities of cyber-civilization. The crypto community
will need to continue to emphasize the importance of open technical architecture andparticipatory governance to pursue its vision for “interdependence.”
Page 5 of 9

Of all the components that comprise decentralised technologies to enable crypto
communities’ vision of an open Metaverse, you would think hardware would be the mostmundane. Yet, hardware is fore fronted in the technical functionality and politics of these
ensembles to form an essential component of network functioning and ownership for the
enablement of self-governance. As digital media becomes even more immersive, how the
Metaverse is architected, down to who owns and control it at the hardware level, has material
implications for people and society. The way that this infrastructure is architected and who
controls it is becoming more imperative as everyday life increasingly becomes intertwinedwith the digital. In an anthropological sense, infrastructure in decentralised digital networks
also provides insights into politics and sociality (Larkin, 2013).
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