法学研究 93 巻 12 号（2020：12）

Political Polarization and Selective Sharingin Korea:
Exploring the Role of Presumed Media Inﬂuence
1）and Hostile Media Perception

LEE, Jinah
Introduction
News Sharing across Digital and Social Media Networks
Perceptions of Susceptibility to Effects: The Inﬂuence of Presumed Media Inﬂuence“Media is biased”: Hostile Media Perception and its Consequences
Hypotheses and Research Questions
Methods
Findings
Discussion

Introduction
People have become increasingly exposed to information that is congruent with
their political orientation and have avoided news and information that conflicts
with their political views and opinions across both digital and social media
networks. As Sundar & Marathe (2010) noted, “system-initiated personalization”
and “user-initiated customization” change peopleʼs news consumption.
“Personalization” is based on the algorism of search engines and social media,
and “customization” relates to the practice of individual people who tailor theirown news feeds in order to engage more actively with information that matches
their political views. This, consequently, leads to a so-called filter bubble (Pariser,

1） The earlier version of this paper was presented with Kwangho Lee at the workshop“Disinformation, Misinformation, and Propaganda in Online News and Social Media” of
the 11th International Conference on Social Informatics held in Doha, Qatar on 18 November 2019.
(95)342Political Polarization and Selective Sharing in Korea

2012) and causes political polarization and intolerance (Prior, 2013; Stroud, 2010;
Knobloch-Westerwick, 2012) . The Pew Research Center revealed significant

differences between conservatives and liberals in the US in terms of acquiring
information and interacting with people in relation to political issues. With
regard to discussing politics online and/or with friends, people were more likely
to interact with like-minded people.
Korean society has faced an increasing confrontation between conservatives
and liberals since 2016, due to a series of political scandals and theimpeachment of the president of South Korea. In terms of political media use,conservative and liberal online media, including podcasts and YouTube channels
have increasingly appealed to citizens. The Digital News Reports of the Reuters
Institute for the Study of Journalism indicated that online news continuously
attracts people in Korea. According to the 2020 Digital News Report of theReuters Institute, the use of YouTube for news purposes in Korea, is among thehighest across the 40 countries surveyed, but was the country most concerned
about YouTube broadcasting false or misleading information online (31%).
Notably, Korea demonstrated the lowest levels of trust in relation to the2）news overall.

In particular, the results highlighted a continuously low level oftrust regarding news across the world and significant differences between
countries in terms of the trust in news overall were recorded; more than half ofthe population (56%) of Finland and Portugal put their trust in the news, bycomparison with less than a quarter in France (23%) and Korea (21%). In the2019 Digital News Report of the Reuters Institute, 26% of Korean respondents
stated that they share news via social messaging or email. As Hasell & Weeks(2016) noted, given the current news consumption patterns, sharing information

in social media is a significant means of engaging in politics. Previous research
has centered on selective exposure and its consequences on our democraticsociety, but the study of news and political information sharing is quite limited.
To better understand news engagement in relation to social media and the wholeprocess of news consumption, the way in which partisan news media influences
2） The question was as follows: “please indicate your level of agreement with the following
statement: I think you can trust most news most of the time”.
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information sharing on social media must be explored.
Considering the current media landscape in Korea, this study explores
political information sharing on social media, with an emphasis on politicalorientation, attitudes toward news media, and perceptions of the influence ofpro- and counter-attitudinal media. Based on two main theoretical frameworks,“influence of presumed media influence” and “hostile media perception”, thestudy aims to investigate the perceptive effect of pro- and counter-attitudinal
media, as well as negativity toward media outlets, by ascertaining to what extent
and in which way they relate to selective sharing in the Korean context.

News Sharing across Digital and Social Media Networks
Despite that people are increasingly turning to social media for daily news
updates and to share news, the factors which motivate citizens to share politicalinformation are not well documented (Hasell & Weeks, 2016). Based on panel
survey data from the 2012 US presidential election, Hasell & Weeks (2016) foundthat the use of pro-attitudinal partisan news online was connected withincreased anger toward the opposing partyʼs candidate, which in turn lead to
information sharing about the election on social media. On the other hand,
Weeks, Lane, Kim, Lee, & Kwak (2017) denoted that incidental exposure tocounter-attitudinal information, also motivates stronger partisans to turn tolike-minded political content, which subsequently translated into politicalinformation sharing on social media.
Both studies highlighted the role of exposure to pro- and counterattitudinal political content in the process of political information sharing, as
well as emotional response and partisanship. Shin & Thorson (2017) alsosuggested the influence of partisanship and emotion in news sharing. Focusing
on the sharing of fact-checking messages, evidence has shown that US partisansselectively share the messages that match their specific group but challenge theopposing group. Furthermore, republicans were more likely to show out-groupnegativity and hostility toward fact-checkers than democrats.
Considered as a whole, the way in which partisans perceive the effect ofpro- and counter-attitudinal media, and how those perceptions drive them to(97)340

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share information on social media must be addressed. The perceived influenceof media on others can affect the perceiversʼ own attitudes and behaviors. In
addition, emotional responses such as negativity or hostility toward the media
could be associated with citizensʼ own information sharing and dissemination,
particularly given the low level of trust in relation to the news in Korea, as
mentioned previously.

Perceptions of Susceptibility to Effects: The Influence of Presumed Media
Influence
Research into the media effect has centered on more direct influences of themedia on its audience, however, more studies should focus on the indirect
influences to better understand the process of the media effect (Gunther & Storey,2003). The idea of examining the indirect media effect is based on the researchof the third-person effect, which originated with Davison (1983). Davison (1983)
suggested that “people will tend to overestimate the influence that masscommunications have on the attitudes and behavior of others” (p.3). He argued
that people tend to believe that others are more influenced by media than theyare.
The third-person effect posits two main components: third-person
perception and the behavioral component (Perloff, 1999). The third-person
perception is a tendency to underestimate the media effect on oneself while
overestimating the media effect on others. The behavioral component is ahypothesis claiming that biased third-person perception will drive people to takeaction, such as supporting the restriction on undesirable media content (Perloff,1999) . On the whole, previous research has focused on the tendency that

persuasive and biased media content increase third-person perception to theextent that such content influences others, but not themselves (Peter, 2007). In
the context of the political message, the perception that others are more
susceptible to political content might foster negative political attitudes (Cappella& Jamieson, 1977). Lee (2009, July) also found that those with a greater third-

person perception of political content, in particular, political advertising, aremore likely to display negative political attitudes.
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Research into the third-person effect often considers the magnitude of theself-other difference (third-person perception) and its effect on peopleʼs attitudes
and intentions (the behavioral component). Gunther & Storey (2003) argued that itis necessary to take into account the way in which the media influences others,
namely, that presumed media influence (hereafter PMI) is related to the perceiverʼsown attitudes. Instead of the magnitude of the self-other difference, this study
focuses on PMI, a broader explanation of indirect media effects.
In addition, it is also necessary to examine the concept of others. This study
considers the role of social distance in the process of PMI (Gunther, 1991; Perloff,1999). Third-person effect research often compares media effect on self andothers overall, however, certain researchers have suggested that when people
identify themselves with the comparison group, the third-person perception issignificantly decreased (Lambe & McLeod, 2005; Idid & Wok, 2010, June).
Furthermore, the third-person perception in relation to undesirable content
tended to be stronger with regard to out-groups than in-groups (Lambe &McLeod, 2005). Scharrer (2002) argued that negative stereotypes of out-groupmembers might influence perceptions of susceptibility of negative media effects.
As such, it was necessary to divide the comparison group into subgroups, basedon the social and political distance for a better explanation of the perceptive
effects on others, particularly in the context of partisan media andcontemporary news engagement in Korea.

“Media is biased”: Hostile Media Perception and its Consequences
Vallone, Ross, & Lepper (1985) originally demonstrated hostile media perception(hereafter HMP) that news reports in the media relating to a particular issue arebiased against the perceiversʼ own attitudes or beliefs. In an experiment on newsof the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, undergraduate students
comprising pro-Arabs, pro-Israelis, and neutral groups showed a significant
difference in the perception of the news report. Neutral viewers saw the news asbalanced, but pro-Arab viewers evaluated the news as being opposed to them,while pro-Israeli viewers perceived the news as biased in favor of the opposing
group, namely the Arabs. Since the pioneering research on HMP, many scholars(99)338

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have researched the hostile media phenomena or effects by considering the
explanatory factors (e.g., Weeks, Kim, Hahn, Diehl, & Kwak, 2019) and its
consequences (e.g., Gunther & Chia, 2001) . In this study, I focus on the
explanation and definition of hostile media phenomena and their influence on
news engagement in an online environment.
This definition has focused on citizensʼ partisanship, prior attitudes, or
involvement (Perloff, 2015). Hansen & Kim (2011) defined HMP as one “in which
partisans perceive a neutral news report as biased against their side” (p.169).
Arpan & Raney (2003) described the hostile media effect as “the process bywhich some news consumers rate ostensibly neutral stories as biased against
their point of view (and=or in favor of someone elseʼs point of view)” (p.266). In areview of the research into the hostile media effect, Perloff (2015) defined theeffect as “the tendency for individuals with a strong preexisting attitude on anissue to perceive that ostensibly neutral, even-handed media coverage of the
topic is biased against their side and in favor of their antagonistsʼ point of view”(p.707), focusing on the audienceʼs prior attitudes.

Previous studies suggested that the consequence of HMP has significant
implications for democratic society, such as distrust in news media, perceptionsof its influences on public opinion, and news consumersʼ political behavior(Feldman, 2017). Tsfati & Cohen (2005) denoted that HMP is related to distrustin news media. Research has also shown that those with a stronger HMP tend toperceive that political content influences public opinion contrary to theirposition (Gunther & Chia, 2001).
It has also been documented that HMP is related to political behavior, suchas the intention to engage in corrective actions including political discussion(Rojas, 2010). Feldman (2017) argued that while HMP research has shown thatperception drives citizens to engage in politics, such as political discussion or
active participation, it also relates to distrust in democratic institutions andpolarized discourse in society. Given the growing partisan media and selective
engagement in the Korean context, it is important to consider the role of HMP
in the information sharing process.

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Hypotheses and Research Questions
Lee (2020) showed that people tend to engage with news and politicalinformation that match their political views, and interact with like-mindedpeople in Korea, by highlighting the political divisions in information
consumption of pro- and counter-attitudinal media. The study also analyzed theperceptions of in- and out-group membersʼ susceptibility to the effects ofconservative and liberal media, based on PMI, indicating general support for
PMI: Both conservatives and liberals perceived a high level of PMI of counterattitudinal media on out-group members and a high level of PMI of proattitudinal media on individuals and on in-group members.
Focusing on the PMI of pro- and counter-attitudinal media on in- and outgroup members, this study explores how partisan media influences politicalinformation sharing. RQ1, RQ2, and H1 focus on the presumed influence ofpro- and counter-attitudinal media and political information sharing. The
comparison groups include supporters of the liberal ruling party, supporters of
the conservative opposition party, and political centrists. Considering a higher
chance of interaction with like-minded people, the study posited that
respondents with a higher presumed influence of pro-attitudinal media on ingroups are likely to share pro-attitudinal media content (H1). As for politicalcentrists and counter-attitudinal group members, the study posed how thepresumed influences of pro- and counter-attitudinal media on centrists relate to
the sharing of pro-attitudinal media content (RQ1) and how the presumed
influences of pro- and counter-attitudinal media on counter-attitudinal groups
relate to the sharing of pro-attitudinal media content (RQ2).
H1: Higher presumed influence of pro-attitudinal media on in-groups ispositively related to the sharing of pro-attitudinal media content.
RQ1: How do the presumed influences of pro- and counter-attitudinal media on
centrists relate to the sharing of pro-attitudinal media content?
RQ2: How do the presumed influences of pro- and counter-attitudinal media on(101)336

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counter-attitudinal groups relate to the sharing of pro-attitudinal media
content?
As mentioned previously, Korea demonstrated a continuously low level oftrust regarding news (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2020) . Lee(2019) showed HMP based on political orientation, which caused a deep distrustof media and media cynicism in the Korean context. Research has documented
that HMP could drive citizens to engage in political behaviors, including
political discussion (Rojas, 2010; Feldman, 2017) . Partisan groups play asignificant role in public discourse and tend to perceive media content as biased
against their viewpoint (Schmitt, Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004). In the context of
information sharing, this study predicted that HMP is associated with selective
sharing (H2).
H2: A higher HMP is positively related to the sharing of pro-attitudinal media
content among conservatives and liberals.

Methods
SampleThe data formed part of an online survey on “Political Attitude and Media Use”
conducted between January 25th and 31st 2019. A total of 1,075 Internet users
residing in metropolitan areas in Korea, participated in the survey, including
Seoul (52.1%), Incheon (8.7%), and Kyunggi-do (39.2%).
Measurement
Political orientation
To assess political orientation, respondents were asked about their selfdesignated political orientation using a five-point scale: 1 (extremely conservative),
2 (moderately conservative), 3 (centrist), 4 (moderately liberal), and 5 (extremely
liberal).

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Political information sharing
To measure political information sharing within social media, respondents wereasked, “how often do you share information from conservative media” and “howoften do you share information from liberal media?” on SNS, such as Twitterand Facebook, and KakaoTalk, a mobile instant messaging application, popularin Korea, using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (absolutely).
Presumed media influence (PMI)
Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent the pro- and counterattitudinal media influence others, based on a five-point scale ranging from 1(not at all) to 5 (absolutely). The comparison groups included supporters of theliberal ruling party, supporters of the conservative opposition party, andpolitical centrists.
Hostile media perception (HMP)
Respondents rated the level of hostility they felt toward the media using thequestion: “do you feel hostility toward any media?” based on a four-point scaleranging between none, little, some, and substantial.
Political knowledge
Knowledge of politics was measured using a question relating to respondentsʼ
self-assessed knowledge of politics with a five-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5
(very knowledgeable).

Like-minded friends on social media
Respondents were asked about the political orientation of their friends on social
media with the following question: “what is the political orientation of people
with whom you interact on SNS?”. Respondents were asked to select a rating on
a five-point scale from the following: primarily conservative, more conservative
than liberal, half conservative and half liberal, more conservative than liberal,and primarily liberal. The degree to which respondents have like-minded friends
on social media was recoded depending on the respondentʼs political orientation.
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Table1. Sample descriptive statistics:
Gender, age, and political orientation (N=1,075)
N(%)
GenderMale
Female
Age
20s
30s
40s
50s
60s
Political orientation
Extremely conservative
Moderately conservative
Centrist
Moderately liberal
Extremely liberal536(49.9)539(50.1)
207(19.3)
211(19.6)219(20.4)
219(20.4)
219(20.4)
28( 2.6)
167(15.5)495(46.0)346(32.2)
39( 3.6)

Characteristics of the Sample
49.9% of the respondents were male (n=536) and 50.1% were female (n=539),with an average age of 44.5 (SD=13.4). The age range included the following:
19.3% were between the ages of 20 and 29, 19.6% between 30 and 39 years,
20.4% between 40 and 49 years, 20.4% between 50 and 59 years, and 20.4%
between 60 and 69 years. In the sample, 46.0% of the respondents claimed to be
centrists; the percentage of respondents who assessed themselves as liberals andconservatives was 35.8% and 18.1% respectively (See Table 1).

Findings
For the subsequent analysis, the study categorized respondents who answered“extremely conservative” and “moderately conservative” as “conservatives” (Male:
n=121, Female: n=74) and respondents who rated themselves as “extremely
liberal” and “moderately liberal” as “liberals” (Male: n=184, Female: n=201) on a
five-point scale that assessed self-designated political orientation. In the sample,
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conservative respondents were older than liberal respondents. Among theconservatives, 37.4% were between the ages of 60 and 69, 19.0% were between
50 and 59 years, 14.4% between 40 and 49 years, 15.4% between 30 and 39 years,
and 13.8% between 20 and 29 years. With regard to the liberals, 21.3% were
between the ages of 20 and 29, 22.9% were between 30 and 39 years, 24.2%
between 40 and 49 years, 19.5% between 50 and 59 years, and 12.2% between 60
and 69 years.
The study conducted a series of multiple regression analyses to examine therelative predictive power of presumed influences of pro- and counter-attitudinal
media on the political information sharing of pro-attitudinal media content onsocial media. The predictor variables included gender, age, political knowledge,
the extent to which people have like-minded friends on social media, HMP, and
the PMI of pro- and counter-attitudinal media (See Table 2).
The result indicated a significant relationship between political knowledge
and political information sharing for both conservatives ( β= .186, p= .016) andliberals ( β= .105, p= .043): Those with greater political knowledge were more
likely to share the political information of pro-attitudinal media. In addition,liberals at a more advanced age, were more likely to share pro-attitudinalcontent ( β= .156, p= .002).
The result also revealed that both conservatives and liberals who have more
like-minded friends on social media, were more likely to share the politicalinformation of pro-attitudinal media, which was close to a marginallysignificant level respectively (Conservatives: β= .132, p= .060, Liberals: β= .095, p=.053).

The first hypothesis predicted that respondents with a higher presumed
influence of pro-attitudinal media on in-groups are likely to share proattitudinal content (H1). As seen in Table 2, the study showed no significant
results, contrary to the hypothesis.
The first research question asked how the presumed influences of pro- andcounter-attitudinal media on centrists relate to the sharing of pro-attitudinalcontent. In relation to pro-attitudinal media, both conservatives and liberals
with a higher presumed influence of pro-attitudinal media on political centrists,
were significantly more likely to share pro-attitudinal content (Conservatives: β=(105)332

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Table2. Regression analyses predicting sharing of pro-attitudinal content
ConservativesaGenderAge
Political knowledge
Hostile media perception (HMP)The degree of having like-mindedfriends on social media
Presumed influence of
Pro-attitudinal media on
Supporters of pro-attitudinal party
Supporters of counter-attitudinal party
Political centrists
Counter-attitudinal media on
Supporter of pro-attitudinal party
Supporters of counter-attitudinal party
Political centrists
Adjusted R2† p ＜ .1 *p ＜ .05 **p ＜ .01 ***p ＜ .001

aLiberals.076††.027†－.010****－.186****－.005****.132††－.156***－.105***
.073†
.095†

－.103****.089††－.223****.040†－.212***－.178***.120††.067†－.010****－.046****－.208***.096†.109**.189***

Gender was coded male=1, female=0.223, p= .010, Liberals: β= .178, p= .001) . This type of news sharing of pro-attitudinal content can be referred to as “promotive sharing”. In contrast,
liberals who perceive a higher presumed influence of counter-attitudinal media
on centrists, namely that the conservative media can influence political centrists,
had a tendency to share political information relating to liberal media,
demonstrating a certain trend toward significance ( β= .096, p= .093). This can belabeled “defensive sharing”.
The second research question asked how presumed influences of pro- andcounter-attitudinal media on counter-attitudinal groups relate to the sharing of
pro-attitudinal content. The results showed that liberals with a higher presumed
influence of liberal media (pro-attitudinal media) on supporters of theconservative party (out-group members) were significantly more likely to share
information relating to liberal media ( β= .212, p= .000). This demonstrates“promotive sharing”. On the other hand, liberals with a higher presumed
influence of conservative media (counter-attitudinal media) on supporters of the331(106)

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conservative party (out-group members) were significantly less likely to share thepolitical information of liberal media ( β=－ .208, p= .000).
With regard to HMP, the second hypothesis posited that higher HMP is
positively related to the sharing of pro-attitudinal media content amongconservatives and liberals. The result showed that there was no significant
relationship, contrary to the hypothesis.

Discussion
Social media has enabled citizens to consume news and political information as
well as express, recommend and disseminate political content to others acrosssocial media (Weeks & Holbert, 2013; Kümpel, Karnowski & Keyling, 2015) .
Considering the Korean political landscape and media environment, this study
aimed to explore political information sharing on social media, focusing on the
differences between individuals with conservative and liberal politicalorientations and their perception of pro- and counter-attitudinal media, basedon theoretical frameworks including PMI and HMP.
The findings showed that liberals of an increasing age were more likely toshare pro-attitudinal content, and political knowledge was related to proattitudinal sharing among conservative and liberal respondents. This study also
revealed that interaction with like-minded friends on social media is a factor
which motivates both conservative and liberal respondents to share proattitudinal content. This tendency is consistent with the presence of social
supporters in the field of mass communication and social psychology, and theideas of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).
Most importantly, this study highlighted two different types of politicalinformation sharing, promotive and defensive, both representing the specificsharing of political information online based on the PMI of pro- and counterattitudinal media. With regard to promotive sharing in the case of politicalcentrists, the presumed influence of pro-attitudinal media among conservativeand liberal respondents was related to pro-attitudinal sharing. In addition,liberal respondents with a higher presumed influence of the liberal media on
supporters of the conservative party tended to share information relating to the(107)330

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liberal media. By comparison, the presumed influence of counter-attitudinal
media on political centrists among liberal respondents was connected to proattitudinal sharing, indicating defensive sharing.
Among liberals, the presumed influence of conservative media (counterattitudinal media) on conservatives (out-group members) was negatively related topro-attitudinal sharing, suggesting that liberals who tended to show highpolitical efficacy under the current liberal government, saw no virtue in seeking
to persuade conservatives.
In particular, the findings showed that the presumed influence of pro- andcounter-attitudinal media on political centrists plays a significant role in theprocess of sharing. With regard to in- and out-group differentiation, it ispossible that the respondents might view political persuasion and media effectamong political centrists as being in their favor. Future studies should
investigate the partisanʼs view on centrists directly for a better understanding of
the process. An experimental approach using political news and messages would
also be useful in exploring the psychological process of partisans, including
presumed influence and the emotional responses of pro- and counter-attitudinalcontent.
Overall, the findings have furthered understanding of the link between thepresumed influence of partisan media and the sharing process across the digitaland social media networks. People are more active and freer to make a choice inrelation to what they consume and what they share, recommend, anddisseminate in the current digital and social media context, rather than passively
consuming news as seen in the traditional media environment. For the wider
population, partisan news might have an indirect effect in terms of partisanʼsnews sharing, as highlighted in a two-step flow model of traditional media
effects (Hasell & Weeks, 2016). To conclude, although concerns are growing in our
democratic society as selective exposure and sharing are increasing, it is also
possible that incidental news exposure (Week et al., 2017) and shared experiences(Stroud, 2010) across digital and social media networks might foster civic

engagement with political news.

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Acknowledgement
This research was supported by Keio Institute of East Asian Studies and
Takahashi Industrial and Economic Research Foundation.

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