法学研究 93 巻 12 号（2020：12）

From Liberal Multiculturalism to
Muscular Liberalism:

1）

Changes in the Official Discourses of Multiculturalism in Australia

SHIOBARA, Yoshikazu
Introduction
Liberal Values: Alternating between “Sharing” and “Coercion”
The Discursive Formation of Official Multiculturalism
Changes in the Official Discourses of Multiculturalism after 2000
Neoliberalism in Muscular Liberal Multiculturalism
Conclusion: Moving toward a “Multiculturalism of Associations”

Introduction
While multiculturalism is broadly defined as a variety of principles, movements
and policies that recognize the existence of culturally diverse people in anational society, and seek a fair society where they can all live together (Shiobara2012), understanding the concept and implications of multiculturalism has beena controversial topic of academic and political debates in many countries. In theearly 2010s, European political leaders such as David Cameron, Angela Merkel
and Nicolas Sarközy proclaimed the “failure” of multiculturalism. Highlighting
the increase in the Muslim population and “home-grown terrorism” in theircountries, these political leaders insisted that multiculturalism is a “laissez-faire”
concept that overemphasizes the cultural rights and self-determination of
immigrants and inhibits the social integration of immigrants into mainstream
society. Therefore, according to this criticism, multiculturalism eventually erodes
the principle and institutions of liberalism and creates “parallel societies” innation states (Joppke 2017:44-45). Alternatively, many European politicians and
1） This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 20K02070.
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From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism

intellectuals argued for the enhancement of civic integration (Adachi 2020),
recognizing the cultural diversity of individuals rather than ethnic groups,
promoting intercultural communication and cultural diversity based not onrights and dignity but the economic productivity of migrants and introducing
migrants to liberal values (Joppke 2017: 43-75; Cantle 2012). Thus, British Prime
Minister Cameron emphasized the promotion of “muscular liberalism” insteadof “state multiculturalism” (Joppke 2017: 44). However, as Christian Joppke
argues, in many European countries, state-level multicultural policies thatemphasize the maintenance of group rights and cultural identities have neverexisted, and therefore, the logic of highlighting the “failure” of multiculturalism
was a discursive strategy used by people who wanted to emphasize theimportance of liberal values for dealing with anti-Muslim public sentiment(Joppke 2017: 74-75).

On the other hand, objecting to arguments about the failure ofmulticulturalism in Europe, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard stated in2010 that multiculturalism in Australia is quite a different from the“multiculturalism” policies enacted in Western Europe, and Australia definitely“succeeded” (Sekine et al. eds. 2020) . As argued later, the “alternatives” ofmulticulturalism supported in Europe, such as intercultural communication, theeconomic utilization of diversity and civic integration, are actually considered to
be important principles of multiculturalism in Australia that have been pursued
since the 1970s.
The formation of policies and discourses of official multiculturalism inAustralia from the 1970s to the 1990s have been examined in some previous
studies (Shiobara 2005; Sekine 1989; Hage 1998, 2003; Lopez 2000; Moran 2017). The
authors argued that official multiculturalism in Australia does not involve theprinciple and policies that aim to unlimitedly recognize cultural differences andthe self-determination of ethnic minorities, which could compromise the social
integration of Australia as a nation. Rather, as Ghassan Hage argued,
multiculturalism has been practised as a way of integrating the Australiannation while maintaining the supremacy of “White” majority people bycontrolling the cultural differences of minorities and promoting an image ofAustralia as a nondiscriminatory and liberal democratic state making a break415(22)

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with the past of White Australia (Hage 1998). According to Masami Sekine, theofficial principle of multiculturalism in Australia presupposed the promotion ofnational interests and social integration from the very beginning. Under thisprecondition, Australia recognizes the cultural diversity of “all Australians”,
including immigrants, and guarantees economic and social equity. Multicultural
policies in Australia have been developed in various policy areas, such as 1)
settlement assistance and the facilitation of social participation of immigrants,
2) the maintenance of minority cultures and languages, 3) the promotion ofintercultural communication, and 4) the awareness of cultural diversity inmainstream public services (Sekine et al. eds. 2020: 130-131). Since the 1990s, thelogic of “productive diversity”, which emphasizes the utilization of cultural
diversity as a source of economic productivity and creativity, has emerged(Shiobara 2005). As Geoffrey Levy insists, since its introduction in the 1970s,

official multiculturalism in Australia has been typical “liberal multiculturalism(Kymlicka 2001)” that aims to recognize the cultural diversity of minorities within

the frame of liberal democracy while revising the assimilationist model of thenation state (Levy 2013). Since the 1980s, multicultural policies in Australia havefocused on “welfare multiculturalism”, which facilitates the social inclusion of
ethnic minorities as citizens through social policies founded on the principle ofwelfare states (Shiobara 2010).
However, like other European and North American countries, discourses of
exclusionism and associated movements, mainly targeting Muslim migrants,
emerged in the 2010s (Shiobara 2019). In the conservative Coalition (Liberal Party
and National Party) government that has been operating since 2013, the influenceof the principle of multiculturalism has drastically decreased, and the word
“multicultural” tends to be used in terms of supporting programs for ethnic
minorities and disadvantaged people rather than as an ideology of national
integration (Sekine et al. eds., 2020: 145-158). While the Coalition government has
not abandoned multiculturalism, as argued later, it increasingly emphasizes theimportance of “sharing liberal values” for national integration and is more likely
to support “muscular liberalism”, which was proposed by Cameron in 2010. In
this article, I analyze the change of the discourses of official multiculturalism inAustralia and examine the question of whether trends from liberal welfare(23)414

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism

multiculturalism to muscular liberal multiculturalism imply a fundamental
change in the ideology of liberal multiculturalism or it is a logical consequenceof liberal multiculturalism.

Liberal Values: Alternating between “Sharing” and “Coercion”
Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka argued that the principles of liberalmulticulturalism and liberal nationalism both involve “liberal culturalism”.
Liberal culturalism is the view that liberal democratic states should not
only uphold the familiar set of common civil and political rights ofcitizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies; they must also
adopt various group-specific rights or policies which are intended torecognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of
ethnocultural groups (Kymlicka 2001: 42).
According to Kymlicka, unlike illiberal nationalism, liberal nationalism does notenforce a particular form of national identity on people who do not share theideology, permits “political activities aimed at giving public space a different
national character”, and maintains more inclusive forms of the principles of anation and national identities that are not limited to a particular race, ethnicity
and religion (Kymlicka 2001: 39-41) . David Miller also argued that liberalnationalism promotes tolerance for cultural differences and the social inclusionof ethnic minorities to redefine the national identity, but he also emphasizedthat the national identity should be based on the majorityʼs culture and society(Miller 1995).

The assumption of the supremacy of the majority and its culture in atolerant and inclusive state was present in the early periods of official
multicultural discourses in Australia. For instance, in Australia as a
Multicultural Society, an opinion paper of the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council
submitted to the Australia Population and Immigration Council in 1977, thesupremacy of the majorityʼs “fundamental values of the dominant Australianculture” was assumed while the importance of dialogue among different cultural413(24)

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groups was emphasized.
Because of differences among minority cultures themselves and also
because some minority values are totally inconsistent with fundamental
values of the dominant Australian culture (e.g., the norm that the family takes
the law into its own hands to redress a wrong done to one of its members), it

would be nonsense to say that multiculturalism means that every culture isequally valued and equally legitimate (AEAC 1978: 16).
In discourses about official multiculturalism, it has been taken for granted thatthe majority people in Australia are Anglo-Australian (or Anglo-Celtic) people
whose mother language is English. On the other hand, the term “ethnic groups”
implied “non-English-speaking background (NESB) ” people in documents
written in the 1970s and 1980ʼs (Shiobara 2005). As a result, the logic of binary
opposition between the majority Anglo-Celtic people and the minority “NESB”
people was constructed and enhanced. Based on this binary opposition,
multicultural policies in Australia intending to promote liberal welfare
multiculturalism aim to promote the “liberal values” of the majority to ethnic
minorities by encouraging “tolerance” toward cultural differences andfacilitating the equal participation of ethnic minorities through social policies.
The “tolerance” that British Prime Minister James Cameron blamed in his
public speech in 2010 referred to the implementation of a hands-off policy forcultural differences. He insisted that to defend British society from the threat ofIslamic extremism and “home-grown terrorism”, “state multiculturalism” that
overruns the common values of British society with the unlimited acceptance ofIslamic culture should be abandoned. Instead, he argued that “muscularliberalism” that requires Islamic individuals to assimilate liberal values isnecessary (Joppke 2014). As Joppke suggested, however, the idea that “liberalvalues” should be forced onto ethnic minorities is never liberalism because
liberalism is based on defending individualsʼ freedom of thought and beliefs. In
contrast, the logic of muscular liberalism essentializes liberal values as a “cultureof majority people” and forces minorities to assimilate these values. Therefore,
when it is connected to discourses on Orientalism that essentialize minorities(25)412

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism(such as Muslim people) as people who will never share Western liberal values,

muscular liberalism turned into a logic for legitimizing exclusionism to thedetriment of minorities.
Nevertheless, the line between liberal multiculturalism/nationalism andmuscular liberalism is not clear. As Hage suggested, the logic of “tolerance”
constituted the core of liberal multiculturalism, presupposing that unequal
power relationships exist between tolerant people and people to be tolerated.
Tolerant majority people, therefore, have the power to become intolerant at any
time, and they also have the power to freely decide the “limits of tolerance”(Hage 1998). In these asymmetric relationships, the distinction between a request

made by majority people to ethnic minorities to respect liberal values and thecoercion of ethnic minorities by majority people to accept liberal values isfundamentally unclear. Therefore, the theoretical distinction between liberalmulticulturalism/nationalism and muscular liberalism that is likely to be arguedby more conservative political camps is also unclear. In this article, I analyze
policy documents related to multiculturalism in Australia and suggest that theofficial discourse of multiculturalism that has requested Asian immigrants toaccept liberal values since the 1980s and after the 2000s, has wavered between“sharing” and “coercion” in terms of how ethnic minorities should assimilate
liberal values. As a result, official multicultural polices in Australia enacted in
the late 2010s could be called “muscular liberal multiculturalism”.
Policy documents are not actually policies but rather the summaries ofactual policy programs enacted by a state. Therefore, to understand the detailsof the change in multicultural policies in Australia, we need to examine thepolicy-making process from various viewpoints and materials. However, it isdifficult to grasp the complex body of policy on multiculturalism in Australia.
As the “access and equity” principle was institutionalized in the 1980s,
appropriate treatments for cultural diversity are required for the whole policy
planning and implementation processes. As a result, in addition to the provisionof settlement services for newly arriving migrants, the principle ofmulticulturalism was inserted into policy related to various public support
programs such as multilingual public services, employment, education andtraining, housing, health, public transportation, civic participation, family
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support, and justice. The federal government and state, territory and local
governments develop multicultural policies. As many public services areoutsourced, many contracted service providers provide support for immigrants(DSS 2016, Shiobara 2017). Due to the difficulty of grasping the complex policy

processes and discourses, in this article, I focus on official policy statements
about multiculturalism in Australia. While these documents can be examined as
first-hand policy materials, an analysis based on policy statements might beinsufficient because it would not involve an examination of the performance ofpolicy-based programs. However, there is a benefit to analyzing policy
statements, as the analysis of the critical discourse analysis by using official
documents can reveal the ideology and logic used to legitimize policies (Wodak
and Meyer eds. 2016).

In Australia before 2000, vigorous debates on multicultural policies werecarried out during the policy-making processes and by mass media, and many
policy documents, including opinion papers by migrant support organizations
and other stake holders were published. In some of these documents, some key
concepts were formed and reformed, such as “multiculturalism for all
Australians”, “access and equity”, “community relations”, “harmony”, and the“economic contribution of cultural diversity (productive diversity)” (Shiobara2005). While most of these concepts have been continuously used in official
documents after the 2000s, I focus on changes in the key concepts to understandthe evolution of the official discourse of multiculturalism. In the first half of the
Howard Coalition governmentʼs term, the official discourse of multiculturalism
focused on “individualization” and “nationalization” (Shiobara 2005), implyingthat the liberal nationalism of Australian multiculturalism would “deessentialize” ethnic groups and share common liberal democratic values withimmigrants as culturally diverse individuals. On the other hand, since the 2000s,
the influence of neoliberal norms of self-reliance/responsibility on the practicalimplementation of multicultural policy programs has increased (Shiobara 2010).
In this paper, I examine policy statements about multiculturalism from the 1970s
to the end of the 2010s and explain how official discourses have changed sincethe 2000s.
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The Discursive Formation of Official Multiculturalism
The principle of official multiculturalism in Australia was established in the
1980-1990s, when there was an increasing population of NESB residents. As
described above, it was liberal multiculturalism in essence that has a principle of“tolerance” toward different cultures as well as it expected ethnic minorities toshare liberal values. However, the Coalition and Labour Parties, two major
parties of Australian national politics, are different in terms of how liberalvalues, the cultural nor ms of majority people and the principle ofmulticulturalism are combined in official discourses.
Multiculturalism for All Australians was a report published by theAustralian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs (ACPEA) in 1982, the lastyears of the Malcom Fraser Coalition government. This document highlighted
some “typical features of the Australian scene”:- A unique mix of peoples, derived from all parts of the world andincluding the descendants of the original inhabitants of Australia, theAboriginals- An open society, capable of accommodating within itself many different
groups, and a resultant blend of cultures- Social attitudes that combine, in a special Australian way: matter-of-fact
egalitarianism, dislike of privilege and snobbery and ʻtall poppiesʼ,
suspicion of patronage, pragmatic disregard for rhetoric and abstract
ideologies, propensity to criticize but an ability to accept criticism,masculine emphasis on mateship, and a tolerant ideal of ʻa fair goʼ for all(ACPEA 1982: 5).

Liberal values such as “an open society,” “egalitarianism,” “tolerance” and “aunique mix of peoples” were emphasized as “typical features” of Australiansociety. This publication indicated that the discourse of official multiculturalism
in Australia in the early periods already assumed that these liberal values were
included in the culture of the majority people in Australia. At the same time,
however, this report emphasized the particular cultural traditions of Anglo409(28)法学研究 93 巻 12 号（2020：12）

Celtic Australia, such as “the bush” and “the outback”, “Australian beaches”,“Australian brand of English”, and “Australian popular culture, art andliterature”. In particular, this report emphasized “masculine emphasis onmateship” in Australian society, indicating that masculinity was incorporated
into the earliest discourses of multiculturalism (ACPEA 1982: 4-5).
In 1997, the National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC) of the John
Howard Coalition government published Multicultural Australia: The Way
Forward. This opinion paper emphasized that Australian multiculturalism isbased on the “core values” of Australian society, such as the ability to have a“fair go”, mutual respect, egalitarianism, parliamentary democracy, the rule oflaw, freedom of religion and expression, equal opportunity, and the rejection of
bigotry and prejudice (NMAC 1997) . In the final report of the NMAC,
Australian Multiculturalism for the New Century: Towards Inclusiveness, it wasargued that “Australian Multiculturalism” is built on the “core societal values”
of Australian society (NMAC 1999: 36) . This report stated that the “coreAustralian principles and values” include the following:- Commitment to Australia- Freedom- A fair go- Democracy- Rule of Law- Tolerance- Mutual Respect- Political Equality- Equal Opportunity- Non-discrimination (NMAC 1999: 42)
This report emphasized that Australian Multiculturalism has “been built on our
free democratic system” (NMAC 1999: 38), and the purpose of multicultural
policies should be “inclusiveness” for all Australians, including NESB
immigrants and indigenous peoples, into democratic Australian society (NMAC
1999: 47-48). After accepting the many recommendations of the NMAC final(29)408

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism

report, the Howard government published A New Agenda for Multicultural
Australia published in 1999 (Commonwealth of Australia 1999). In this way, theCoalitionʼs discourse on multiculturalism in the 1990s was explicitly developed
as liberal nationalism.
Similarly, in discourses of official multiculturalism in the Bob Hawke andPaul Keating Labour government from 1983 to 1996, the importance of liberalvalues was emphasized, and multiculturalism was seen as a method fordisseminating these values. However, unlike the discourses of the Coalition
government, it did not tend to see liberal values as equating to nationalism
based on the Anglo-Celtic majority. For example, in 1986, the “Jupp Report”
argued that “All members of Australian community should have the right,
within the law, to enjoy their own culture, to practice their own religion, and touse their own language, and should respect the rights of others to their own
culture, religion and language” (DIEA 1986: 325) . In addition, this report
explicitly claimed that the laws and institutions of Australian society are deeply
influenced by “dominant cultural values”, and therefore, it is not possible thatevery cultural value is treated equally (DIEA 1986: 80) . Logically, thesestatements mean that to treat every cultural group as equal as possible,
Australian laws and institutions should be independent of the influence of thedominant culture as soon as possible. Of course, the discourses of Labour
governments recognized the central status of the Anglo-Celtic majority andassumed that this culture does not necessarily contradict liberal values, but these
discourses also implied that liberal values should be treated separately from thecultures of particular groups, including that of the majority people. As a result,the logic of the “limits” of multiculturalism emerged as a principle arguing thatmulticulturalism that recognizes the differences in particular cultures, including
the majorityʼs culture, should be considered as liberal laws and institutions.
Other important policy documents generated by Labour governments
included the universal/cosmopolitan interpretation of “liberal values”. For
instance, in 1988, the “Fitzgerald Report” stated the following:
Immigrants will be required to respect the institutions and principles which
are basic to Australian society, including parliamentary democracy, the rule407(30)

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of law and equality before the law, freedom of the individual, freedom ofspeech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, equality of women,
universal education. Reciprocally, Australia will be committed tofacilitating the equal participation of immigrants in society (CAAIP 1988:
22)

In 1989, in the preface of the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, the“limits” to multiculturalism were clearly declared:- Multicultural policies are based upon the premise that all Australians
should have an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia, to its
interests and future first and foremost;- Multicultural policies require all Australians to accept the basic
structures and principles of Australian society – the Constitution andthe rule of law, tolerance and equality, Parliamentary democracy,
freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language andequality of the sexes; and- Multicultural policies impose obligations as well as conferring rights:
the right to express oneʼs own culture and belief involves a reciprocal
responsibility to accept the right of others to express their views andvalues (OMA 1989).
The logic that there are “limits” to multiculturalism” clearly highlights thedifference in the official multiculturalism discourses of the Labour andCoalition governments. In the discourses of Labour governments, but not thoseof Coalition governments, the logic of the “limits of multiculturalism” tends tobe emphasized because multiculturalism is carefully distinguished from the
majorityʼs traditional culture (“English as the national language” is an important
exception). The principle of multiculturalism accepted by the Hawke-Keating

government had a cosmopolitan aspect by making the particularity of majority
culture open to liberal values. For instance, The NMACʼs first report,
Multicultural Australia: The Next Step, was published in 1995, the last years of
the Keating government. In this report, the authors, including some leading(31)406

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism

authors of Australian multiculturalism studies from cosmopolitan perspectives,
aimed to redefine multiculturalism as a cosmopolitan form of national identity.
According to the report, “the traditional ethos of ʻa fair goʼ, once applied only tomembers of the dominant culture, retains a freshness and appeal to which mostAustralians aspire. Indeed, it is now seen as a unifying aspiration which
influences the perceptions of the rights and responsibilities of all groups inAustralia” (NMAC 1995: 7). Then, this report introduced the ideas of indigenous
right movements into official multiculturalism. By emphasizing a closer
relationship between Australia and Asia, it was suggested that Australiaʼs future
population would be an “exciting and unique mix of ethnic and cultural groups”,
and therefore, Australia should become “a society in which all its residents are
comfortable in their dual roles as both Australian and global citizens” (NMAC
1995: 9). Here, multiculturalism was reinterpreted as an intent to establish acosmopolitan citizenship that includes immigrants and indigenous peoples into
the tradition of a “fair go”, which was historically enjoyed by only Anglo-Celtic
majority people.
The Labour governmentʼs multiculturalism intended to separate liberalmulticulturalism from the dominant majority culture, but it was unrealistic toneglect the role of the ethnic tradition of the Anglo-Celtic majority in social
integration. Therefore, as a compromise, multiculturalism should be “limited”.
In contrast, the official multiculturalism discourses of the Coalition
governments presupposed that the traditions and culture of Anglo Australians
are liberal; liberal values are interpreted as the “essence” of the majority culture.
Therefore, the role of Australian Multiculturalism was to make ethnic minorities
who were not essentially liberal share “Australian” values. According to the
Coalition governmentʼs discourses, multiculturalism need not be “limited”
because more it is thoroughly conducted, and the cultures of minorities are
more assimilated into the majority culture (Shiobara 2005).
In this way, while official discourses of multiculturalism before 2000
basically focused on liberal multiculturalism that promoted national integration
by making people share liberal values; however, the implication of “sharing
liberal values” differed in the documents published by the Coalition and Labour
governments. For the Coalition governments, multiculturalism was more overt
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liberal nationalism aiming to include ethnic minorities into the dominantculture, which referred to the culture of the Anglo Australian majority people,
and the majority people are assumed to intrinsically have liberal values. In
contrast, the Labour governments pursued, at least partly, cosmopolitan
nationalism that sought to transform both the majorityʼs and minoritiesʼ culture
into a cosmopolitan identity that was more open to liberal values. Thisdifference in the logic used by the two major parties affects the changes that
occurred in official multiculturalism discourses after 2000.

Changes in the Official Discourses of Multiculturalism after 2000
As mentioned above, multiculturalism was a controversial issue in Australia
until the 1990s. Various government and parliament committees were organized,
and many opinion papers and recommendations were published for the public,
and these became the foundation for several policy statements (Shiobara 2005).
However, after the reports published by the NMAC in the late 1990s and theHoward governmentʼs response, A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia in
1999, active debates on multicultural policies were not observed at the federal
level. While some scholars might consider the lack of active debates as evidenceof the decline of Australian multiculturalism, public policies based on theconcepts derived from multiculturalism, such as access and equity, harmony,and cultural diversity, and the related economic benefits are still enacted by thefederal, state, and local governments and service providers. As argued later, inthe federal governmentʼs multicultural policies enacted since 2000, these key
terms are emphasized, and it has been stated that the multicultural policies
enacted in Australia are successful and sustainable. Therefore, the decrease inpublic arguments might mean that the official definitions and evaluations ofmulticulturalism generated by the federal government are fixed and no longer
need further political debates (Shiobara 2011).
Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity (2003)
Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity (hereafter called the 2003 statement)
aimed to update the 1999 New Agenda and therefore has many things in(33)404

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism

common with it. The principle of “Australian Multiculturalism” and“inclusiveness” were defined as its purpose and were inherited from A New
Agenda. On the other hand, the difference between these two statements is thatin the 2003 statement, multiculturalism was situated as an aspect ofantiterrorism after the 9.11 incident in 2001 and Bali Bombings in 2002. That is,
the 2003 statement suggested that Australia is the most harmonious community
in the world, but it is challenged by the international environment of terrorism,
and community harmony and social cohesion are crucial because they makeAustralians available to fight against terrorism and defend Australian domestic
society. Therefore, the 2003 statement emphasized that the Australian
government believes that multicultural policy provides a coherent ethos for adiverse Australia, strengthening national security (Commonwealth of Australia
2003:10). Therefore, in the name of social cohesion and to “advance Australia

fair,” the commitment of the federal government to the multicultural policy “forall Australians” was confirmed (Commonwealth of Australia 2003) . The
coexistence of the freedom to express and share cultural values and a shared“civic duty” was required, and all Australians were required to support the “basic
structures and principles of Australian society”: the Constitution, Parliamentarydemocracy, the freedom of speech and religion, English as the national
language, the rule of law, and acceptance and equity. In addition, theimportance of the “Australian values of equity, democracy and freedom” wasemphasized (Commonwealth of Australia 2003: 9).
The People of Australia: Australia s Multicultural Policy (2011)
While John Howard was known for his negative stance on multiculturalism,
Kevin Ruddʼs Labour government that succeeded Howardʼs in 2007 did not
publish its major statement on multiculturalism. Julia Gillard, who took overfrom Rudd, announced The People of Australia: Australia’s Multicultural Policy
in 2011 (hereafter called the 2011 statement). This Labour governmentʼs statement
was published in a period during which some influential European politicians
highlighted “the failure of multiculturalism” (Joppke 2017). Consequently, the2011 statement played a role in emphasizing the differences in and success ofmulticulturalism in Australia, unlike the European versions.
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Interestingly, in this 2011 statement, the logic of the “limits” ofmulticulturalism was emphasized. As described above, this logic was appearedon statements in the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, which was
published by Bob Hawkeʼs Labour government in 1989; however, this logic was
not included in the 2000 New Agenda and the 2003 statement made by Howardʼs
Coalition government. In the 2011 statement, terms such as “Australian values”
and the “basic structures” of Australian society were not used, andmulticulturalism was logically separated from the “shared values” implied in theliberal nationalism of the Coalitionʼs discourse, indicating that the principle ofmulticulturalism in the Gillard government can/should be limited within “thelaw and free from discrimination” in the liberal democracy (Commonwealth ofAustralia 2011: 2).

This difference between the 2003 and 2011 statements sharply reflects theusage of the political term “harmony”. This term was originally introduced by
the Howard government as a substitute for the term “community relations” that
implicates antiracism policies based on the United Nationsʼ legislation. That is,the change from “community relations” to “harmony” meant a change from theconcept of promoting antiracism and antidiscrimination toward minorities tothe principle of celebrating the social cohesion of the national society (Shiobara2005). In addition, in the 2003 statement, where multiculturalism is connected toantiterrorism, the term “harmony” refers to the social cohesion needed to fightagainst “enemies outside.”, while a description of antiracism was not provided.
In contrast, in the 2011 statement, there are many descriptions of antiracism,
while antiterrorism is minimally described, indicating that in this statement,
discrimination and the division of the majority and minorities within Australiansociety were more emphasized than the threat of external enemies. This usage of“harmony” was, however, temporary, and after the return of the Coalition
government, “harmony” was again connected to national security.
Multicultural Australia: United, Strong, Successful (2017)
The Tony Abbot Coalition government came to power in 2013 and enacted
draconian policies against asylum seekers. The Department of Immigration andCitizenship (DIAC) was renamed the Department of Immigration and Border(35)402

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism

Protection (DIBP) in 2013. Abbott was replaced by Malcom Turnbull as a resultof internal struggles in the Liberal Party in 2015. Multicultural Australia:
United, Strong, Successful - Australia’s Multicultural Statement - was publishedby the Turnbull government in 2017 (hereafter called the 2017 statement). This
document confirmed a “a firm commitment to a multicultural Australia(Commonwealth of Australia 2017: 15)”; however, the terms “multiculturalism” and“multicultural policy” were not mentioned in the texts. This “Australiaʼs
Multicultural Statement” was quite different from the previous 2003 and 2011
statements on this point, and the 2017 statement evokes John Howardʼs disuseof the term “multicultural” in the late 1990s (Shiobara 2010). However, many of
the key concepts, such as harmony, access and equity, and the economic benefitsof cultural diversity, mentioned in previous documents were included in the2017 statement.
The 2017 statement was basically an updated version of the 2003 Coalition
governmentʼs statement, and unlike the 2011 Labour governmentʼs statement,
the importance of social harmony for maintaining national security was againemphasized (Commonwealth of Australia 2017: 11). However, the 2017 statement
focused more on the element of nationalism for strengthening unity amongculturally diverse Australians than the 2003 statement. The term “shared
Australian values (shared values)” was defined as follows: 1) Respect, 2) Equality,and 3) Freedom (Commonwealth of Australia 2017: 9, 15). In addition, in the 2017
statement, the commitment and loyalty of Australian citizens to shared values
were emphasized in the statement, “practices and behaviours that undermine ourvalues have no place in Australia” (Commonwealth of Australia 2017: 9). In thisway, multiculturalism as a principle of “inclusiveness” for ethnically andculturally diverse people was transformed into logic for excluding people who
were seen as not sharing Australian values. Arab/Muslim residents in Australia
were strongly required to accept shared values and loyalty for Australia because
they were perceived as “threats of the national security”, although the Turnbull
government statement never explicitly suggested this. The binary opposition of
Anglo-Celtic and NESB people mentioned in the official discourse ofmulticulturalism before 2000 changed to the binary opposition of “people whoshare liberal values” and “Muslim people who cannot share liberal values”.
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Some previous studies noted the vitalization of anti-Arabic andIslamophobic sentiments and movements in Australian society during the same
period the 2017 statement was published (Shiobara 2019). The 2017 statement, ofcourse, did not aim to exclude Arab/Muslim Australian citizens. It rather
focused more on the importance of intercultural/religious dialogues than theprevious 2003 and 2011 statements. The 2017 statement suggested that throughdialogue, prejudice against different religions and cultures is mitigated, andcross-cultural understandings, a sense of belongings, and mutual trust among
different ethnic and religious groups are enhanced (Commonwealth of Australia
2017: 15). As argued above, mutual respect for others is still included as a part ofthe shared Australian values mentioned in this statement. Nevertheless, this2017 statement has had a very limited impact on reducing prejudices anddiscrimination against Arab/Muslim residents because anti-Arab/Islamophobic
discourses originally included the assumption that these individuals essentially
do not/cannot share “our values” (Hage 2003). Therefore, far from resisting thisnotion, the 2017 statement implicitly justifies the exclusion of Muslim people
who are seen as not sharing Australian values. For instance, in his speech in the
U.K. in July 2018, Alan Tudge, the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship for
the Turnbull government, emphasized that multiculturalism in Australia isdifferent from European variations because it can be called “integrated
multiculturalism” and succeeded in making people share liberal Australianvalues. He stated that the Australian government needs “muscular ongoingpromotion of our values” (Tudge 2018: 3-6).
In this way, the official discourses of multiculturalism in Australia in thelate 2010s included the logic of muscular liberalism that aims to force liberalvalues as “shared Australian values” and exclude people who are seen to refuse
these values from the national space. Therefore, official discourses on
multiculturalism become discourses of social division. While conventional
arguments about “the failure of multiculturalism” insist that multiculturalism isdivisive because it does not enforce common values on the diverse population,muscular liberal multiculturalism is divisive because it enforces common values
on the population. The serious problem is that the majority (non-Arab/Muslim)of Australians are assumed to hold the power of judging who does not accept(37)400

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalism

Australian values. It is unclear whether the intercultural/religious dialogues thatthe government promotes can have an effect on changing this unequal power
relations.

Neoliberalism in Muscular Liberal Multiculturalism
The logic that cultural diversity contributes to the Australian economy was
explicitly introduced into the official discourse of multiculturalism during termsof the Keating Labour government in the early 1990s (Shiobara 2005). While the2003 Coalition statement inherited the concept of “productive diversity” fromthe 1999 New Agenda, it was more emphasized in the 2011 Labour governmentʼsstatement. In that statement, immigrants and cultural diversity were closely
connected with economic national interests, as they help the Australianeconomy become more competitive in the global economy (Commonwealth ofAustralia 2011: 5).

In the 2017 Turnbull Coalition governmentʼs statement, the contribution of
immigrants and cultural diversity to economic national interests and global
competitiveness was also emphasized (Commonwealth of Australia 2017: 13).
However, this statement strongly implied that the economic contribution of
immigrants was due to the self-motivation and resources of the immigrants.
Columns inserted into the document recount the personal histories andexperiences of some first- and second-generation immigrants. These individuals
were depicted as self-reliant individuals who inherited the virtue of diligencefrom the culture of their home country or parents, were educated in Australia,
made continuous efforts, and achieved economic success and social prestige.
These “model minorities” in turn advised newly coming immigrants to work
hard, contribute to the Australian economy in gratitude and repay theAustralian society. For instance, in one column, a middle-aged Syrian women
was featured. She came to Australia as a refugee and had been an English
teacher in her home country. After arriving in Australia, this woman made aneffort to obtain an Australian academic degree and teacherʼs license, and she
started to teach English to other refugees. She gave her students the following
advice: “first, learn English. Second, study or look for job. Finally, I tell them to399(38)

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become an active member of the community.” (Commonwealth of Australia 2017:14). Her case was treated as an example of many refugees and immigrants who

had professional training, skills and experiences.
In this way, in the 2017 statement, the economic contribution of
immigrants and cultural diversity to Australia was reinterpreted as the selfreliance and self-responsibility of immigrants. Immigrants are expected not todepend on government social support; they are expected to study, train
themselves and repay to Australian society. The individual life stories provided
in the official statements in the federal government policies have two
implications. First, the message of the multicultural social policy that focuses on
the support programs for newly arrived immigrants (DSS 2016) indicates thatthese programs were not intended to make these individuals “welfare dependent”
but rather to act as a transitional support to help immigrants become
economically self-reliant. This neoliberal interpretation of the support programs
is a response to the public criticism of support policies for immigrants,
particularly humanitarian entrants. Second, this message implies that theeconomic success of immigrants is evidence of their acceptance of Australianvalues because they must appreciate Australia and want to “repay” it as active
citizens. In other words, immigrants are required to “repay” their debt toAustralia to illustrate their shared Australian values. In this way, the neoliberal
norm of self-reliance/responsibility intersects with the logic of the economic
contribution of immigrants and muscular liberalism.

Conclusion: Moving toward a “Multiculturalism of Associations”
The emergence of the logic of muscular liberalism in the conservative
governmentʼs discourses of multiculturalism in the late 2010s is not a disconnect
from the previous official discourses of multiculturalism in Australia. Since theintroduction of multiculturalism in the 1970s, the request for NESB immigrants
to engage in sharing liberal values based on the culture of Anglo-Celtic
Australian majority people was already included in official discourses ofmulticulturalism. The sharing of values was formulated as a principle of liberalmulticulturalism by the end of the 1990s, and the logic has been increasingly(39)398

From Liberal Multiculturalism to Muscular Liberalismemphasized since the 2000s in Anti-Arab/Islamophobic discourses.
Consequently, the illiberal logic of “forcing them to share liberal values” wasintroduced in official discourses of multiculturalism in the late 2010s. While thelogic of muscular liberalism has more in common with the Coalition
governmentʼs official discourses of multiculturalism, which is viewed as liberalnationalism, the Labour governmentʼs discourses of multiculturalism ascosmopolitan multiculturalism retain the purpose of sharing liberal values
because it must compromise with the dominance of majority culture inAustralian society. The logic of “limits” of multiculturalism is a byproduct of
the compromise. Therefore, the Labour governmentʼs discourses ofmulticulturalism may also involve enforcing liberal values on ethnic minorities.
To differentiate from the Coalition governmentʼs policies, the Labour
government had to legitimize the promotion of multiculturalism from the pointof view of economic national interests. The Labour government consequently
permits the exclusion of migrants who are not beneficial but become a financial
burden or risk to Australian society. In this way, in 2013, Ruddʼs Labour
government could insist on policies excluding asylum seekers that were stricter
than the Coalition governmentʼs policies without abandoning multiculturalism
altogether (Shiobara 2017). It appears that migrant groups who do not shareliberal values and are not economically or socially beneficial for Australia
should not be recognized and can be excluded from official discourses ofmulticulturalism. The Coalition governmentʼs 2017 statement disclosed thehidden implication of official discourses of multiculturalism.
The analysis conducted in this article, therefore, confirmed that the line
between liberal multiculturalism and muscular liberalism is vague boththeoretically and in policy processes, indicating that in the age of the emergenceof exclusionist populism in the contemporary world, it seems that it will bedifficult for liberal multiculturalism to remain a theoretical breakwater of
exclusionism because it inevitably presupposes the logic of sharing liberal values
and therefore necessarily promotes muscular liberalism that forces some toadapt liberal values and excludes others who are seen not to share them.
This dilemma might be solved by overcoming the idea of social integrationthat presupposes the importance of “sharing values” in society. Bruno Latour
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has criticized cultural pluralism based on a theory he proposed, Actor Network
Theory (Latour 2005) . From this perspective, the concept of liberalmulticulturalism can be criticized because it is based on the standard
sociological theory, “sociology of the social (Latour 2005: 9)”. It presupposes theexistence of “liberal values” as a priori and sui-generis independent factors insociety prior to the arrival of migrants. Considering the “sociology of
associations”, Latour called, what actually happens in everyday practices andplaces, including Australia and Japan, is not the arrival of others to a “society”
already filled with “values” but the creation of “assemblages” (Latour 2005)
through encounters, conflicts, negotiations and compromises with others. When“values” are reimagined not as a priori elements to be shared by a society but asa product of the new associations created by encountering others that create a
new form of society, multiculturalism can be extended to the concept of“cohabitation (Butler 2015)”, where people live in different and multiple realities(Hage 2015).

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