TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTION
Special Feature “Revising Disaster Management Policies in Light of the
Kumamoto Earthquake”
Chapter 1 Overview of the Kumamoto Earthquake ......................................................... 2
1-1 Overview of the Kumamoto Earthquake and Damage ...................................................2(1) Overview of the Kumamoto Earthquake ...............................................................2(2) Damage..................................................................................................................3
1-2 Response by the National Government ..........................................................................6(1) Major Disaster Management Headquarters, etc. .................................................6(2) On-site Major Disaster Management Headquarters .............................................6
Chapter 2 Response to the Kumamoto Earthquake ......................................................... 7
2-1 Support for Local Governments ......................................................................................7(1) Overview of Support .............................................................................................7(2) Agreements between Local Governments and Agreements between Local
Governments and Private Sector Companies ......................................................8(3) Development of Support Mechanisms ...............................................................10
2-2 Living Conditions of Evacuees and Self-help/Mutual Support Initiatives .....................12(1) Evacuation Centers ..............................................................................................12(2) Activities by Individual Volunteers and NPOs .....................................................15(3) Self-help/Mutual Support Initiatives ...................................................................24
2-3 Initiatives Aimed at Securing Temporary Housing ........................................................28(1) Damage Certification Surveys and Issuance of Disaster Affected Certificate .....28(2) Provision of Temporary Housing .........................................................................29
2-4 Initiatives for the Transport of Relief Supplies ..............................................................32(1) Provision of Supplies via Push-mode Support.....................................................32(2) Use of Private Sector’s Logistic Hubs ..................................................................35
2-5 Corporate Business Continuity Initiatives .....................................................................38(1) Overview .............................................................................................................38(2) Extent of the Damage to Companies ..................................................................41(3) Business Continuity Initiatives.............................................................................43

Chapter 3 Future Deployment in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake ............................ 50
3-1 Use of ICT (Public-Private Partnerships Focused on Disaster Management
Information) ......................................................................................................50
3-2 Local Government Support ...........................................................................................51(1) Promotion of a Disaster Management System Enabling Municipalities to Access
Assistance (Aid Acceptance System) ..................................................................51(2) Enhancement of the Content of Training for Local Government Heads andOfficials ..............................................................................................................54
3-3 Long-term Community Development ...........................................................................58
3-4 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................58

Part 1 Current Disaster Management Measures in Japan
Chapter 1 Current Disaster Management Policies ......................................................... 61
Section 1: Reducing Disaster Risk in Advance Through Self-help and Mutual Support......61
1-1 Raising Awareness of Disaster Risk Reduction Among the Public ......................61
1-2 Efforts in Disaster Management Drills ................................................................63
1-3 Tsunami Preparedness Initiatives .......................................................................65
1-4 Citizen-led Initiatives ..........................................................................................70
1-5 Development of Business Continuity Systems ...................................................76
1-6 Using Risk Finance to Prepare for a Disaster ......................................................79
Section 2: Disaster Management Frameworks, Disaster Response, and the Preparation
Thereof ..............................................................................................................83
2-1 Revision of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction .......................................83
2-2 Volcanic Eruption Evacuation Plans ....................................................................84
2-3 Revision of the Guidelines for Evacuation Recommendations ...........................87
2-4 Securing Designated Emergency Evacuation Sites and Designated Evacuation
Sites ....................................................................................................................91
Section 3 Responding to Disasters Anticipated to Occur ....................................................95
3-1 Considering Disaster Management Responses Based on Seismic Observationand Evaluation Along Nankai Trough .................................................................95
3-2 Revision of the Plan for Specific Emergency Countermeasures and Activities inLight of the Kumamoto Earthquake ...................................................................95
3-3 Deliberations on Large-scale, Extensive Evacuation from Flooding or Storm
Surge Inundation in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area ............................................96
Section 4: Promotion of Disaster Risk Reduction Activities in Coordination with Diverse
Stakeholders ......................................................................................................98
4-1 Promotion of Volunteer Activities Widely Contributing to Disaster Risk
Reduction ...........................................................................................................98
4-2 National Council for Promoting of Disaster Risk Reduction and the National
Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction .........................................100
4-3 Partnerships with Industrial Sector ..................................................................102
4-4 Initiatives by Academic Communities ..............................................................104
4-5 Initiatives from the Perspective of Gender Equality (based on the response to
the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake)....................................................................105
Section 5: International Cooperation on Disaster Risk Reduction ....................................110
5-1 Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the UN and Other International
Organizations ...................................................................................................110
5-2 Bilateral Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation .................................................116
Section 6: Efforts to Promote National Resilience ............................................................117
6-1 Approval of the Action Plan for National Resilience 2016 ...............................117
6-2 Support for the Preparation of Fundamental Plans for Regional Resilience ....117
6-3 Promotion of Private Sector Initiatives Contributing to National Resilience ...118

Chapter 2 Measures for Nuclear Disasters ....................................................................... 119
Section 1: Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems .....................................................119
1-1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System under Non-Emergency Conditions.........................................................................................................................119
1-2 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System in an Emergency............................119
Section 2: Bolstering Nuclear Disaster Management and Radiation Monitoring Under the
NRA..................................................................................................................121
2-1 Efforts in Nuclear Disaster Management .........................................................121
2-2 Emergency Response Efforts ............................................................................121
2-3 Bolstering Radiation Monitoring ......................................................................121
2-4 Accidents and Problems ...................................................................................122
Section 3: Enhancing and Strengthening Local Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Systems............................................................................................................123
3-1 Formulating and Supporting Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction /Evacuation Plans ..............................................................................................123
3-2 Stockpiling and Distribution of a Stable Iodine Agent in Jelly Form; Guidance on
Evacuation Time Estimation in Case of a Nuclear Emergency, etc. .................128
3-3 Disaster Management Drill and Training Initiatives by Local Governments andNuclear Operators ............................................................................................131
3-4 Strengthening International Partnerships ........................................................133
Section 4: 2016 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise .........................137
4-1 Overview of Exercise ........................................................................................137
4-2 Overview of Performance .................................................................................138
4-3 Post-exercise Initiatives ....................................................................................140

AppendixIntroduction
The White Paper on Disaster Management in Japan 2017 has a special feature entitled “Revising Disaster
Management Policies in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake.” This special feature describes the push-mode
support which was mobilized to provide supplies in the aftermath of the April 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake,partnerships between NPOs and local government, and other important responses by the government. It also
discusses measures to be developed in the future, including information-sharing mechanisms and theformulation of local government aid acceptance plans.
Part I, on the “Current Disaster Management Measures in Japan,” looks at the recent progress of measuresand policy initiatives with a particular focus on those implemented in FY2016, including the following measuresand initiatives:
・The March 2017 revision of the Act on the Promotion of Measures for Tsunamis to include provisions on the
promotion of international cooperation in the area of measures for tsunami, in light of the designation ofNovember 5 — Tsunami Preparedness Day — as World Tsunami Awareness Day.
・The May 2016 revision of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction based on the report by the Working
Group on Study on Evacuation and Emergency Response Measures for Flood Disasters following theTorrential Rain of September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku Regions.
・The December 2016 revision of the Guide to Developing Concrete and Practical Evacuation Plans for Volcanic
Eruption based on the lessons of the Mt. Ontake Eruption Disaster.
・The revision of the Guidelines for Producing a Handbook on Decision and Dissemination for Evacuation
Recommendations (name changed to the Guidelines for Evacuation Recommendations) based on thelessons of the floods caused by the 2016 Typhoon 10.
・The recommendations by the Study Group on Promoting Volunteer Activities Contributing Generally to
Disaster Risk Reduction (March 2017).
New and revised major Laws and Guidelines described in the White Paper on Disaster
Management in Japan 2017 (in order of description)
・Revision of the Act on the Promotion of Measures for Tsunami
・Revision of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction
・Revision of the Guide to Preparing Detailed and Practical Evacuation Plans in Case of Volcanic
Eruption
・Revision of the Guidelines for Evacuation Recommendations
・ Recommendations by the Study Group on Promoting Volunteer Activities Contributing
Generally to Disaster Risk Reduction

Page No.
54
68
69
71
80

Special Feature“Revising Disaster
Management Policies in Lightof the Kumamoto Earthquake”

Special Feature“Revising Disaster Management

Policies in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake”
The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquakes (hereinafter the “Kumamoto Earthquake”), which occurred on April 14
and 16, 2016 and had a maximum seismic intensity of 7, caused immense damage. There were 228 fatalities(as of April 13, 2017, according to a Fire and Disaster Management Agency survey) and a total of approximately
200,000 houses were completely destroyed, half-destroyed or partially destroyed. In response, the government
strove to restore transport links to the affected area without delay, completing recovery of infrastructure suchas expressways, the Shinkansen bullet train line, and Kumamoto Airport within about a month. In addition, thegovernment undertook recovery of rivers ahead of the rainy season to prevent secondary damage and has
steadily undertaken slope stabilization in the area where the Aso-ohashi Bridge stood, which suffered a major
slope failure. It carried out recovery of prefectural and municipal roads that had become impassable due tosubsidence or sediment collapse, enabling transport routes for relief supplies to be secured promptly. As well
as recovering the route to the north of National Route 57 and Aso-ohashi Bridge on National Route 325, which
is being managed by the national government on behalf of Kumamoto Prefecture, the government has applied
the Act on Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters for the first time, in respect of local roads requiring
advanced technology, such as the prefectural road between Kumamoto and Takamori, and the municipal roadbetween Tochinoki and Tateno. Thus, the government is using its authority to serve on behalf of local
governments to ensure that roads can be recovered promptly.
Support for affected people by the disaster took the form of initiatives based on the lessons learned frompast disasters, including the provision of supplies via the push-mode support, which was used for the first time,and collaboration with expert volunteers and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in the management of evacuation
centers. On the other hand, quite a few issues were highlighted that will need to be addressed in the future.
These include the fact that earthquake damage rendered the prefectural office buildings and some designatedevacuation centers unusable, non-successful response to the immense number of evacuees flooding into theevacuation centers, and inability to ensure the smooth delivery of relief supplies to evacuees. Nevertheless,dealing with the various challenges involved in supporting affected people yielded many valuable experiences
and lessons that will inform future measures for disasters.
Accordingly, the government’s Kumamoto Earthquake Initial Response Review Team has compiled a reporton the findings from its review, covering praiseworthy aspects of the initial response and areas for reflection
and improvement, to ensure that lessons are learned from the actions taken in response to the Kumamoto
Earthquake. Based on this report, in December 2016, the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response andLivelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake compiled a report that gave specificconsideration to the whole range of approaches to emergency response and livelihood support measures.
(See Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake
http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h280414jishin/h28kumamoto/okyuseikatu_wg.html)
Based on these reports, this special feature provides an overview of specific examples and data showing how
the government aims to revise its disaster management policies ahead of future major disasters, focusing inparticular on central government responses in such areas as support for local governments, evacuation center
management and the transport of supplies.

1Chapter 1

Overview of the Kumamoto Earthquake

1-1 Overview of the Kumamoto Earthquake and Damage(1) Overview of the Kumamoto Earthquake
At 21:26 on April 14, 2016, a magnitude 6.5 earthquake struck the Kumamoto region of Kumamoto
Prefecture, with a seismic intensity of 7 observed in Mashiki Town, Kumamoto Prefecture. This was followed bya magnitude 7.3 earthquake at 01:25 on April 16, with a seismic intensity of 7 observed in Mashiki Town andNishihara Village (Fig. 1-1-1). These two violent tremors occurred within a short time of each other andtriggered intense seismic activity from the Kumamoto district to the Aso district, along with central Oita
Prefecture. As a result, there was immense damage in both Kumamoto and Oita prefectures, primarily in
Mashiki Town and Nishihara Village.
This marked the first time that two tremors with a seismic intensity of 7 had been observed in the same
region since the seismic intensity rating of 7 was added to the Japan Meteorological Agency’s seismic intensity
scale in 1949, and the seventh time (including both of the Kumamoto quakes) that an earthquake with a seismic
intensity of 6-lower or more has occurred. At least 4,000 earthquakes with a seismic intensity of 1 or more
occurred over the six months or so from the first earthquake on April 14 (Fig. 1-1-2).
Fig. 1-1-1 Seismic Intensity Distribution
Earthquake at 21:26 on April 14

Earthquake at 01:25 on April 16

This seismic intensity includes the tremor from the M5.7
(reference value) earthquake that occurred in central Oita
Prefecture immediately after this quake.
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

2

Fig. 1-1-2 Number of Earthquakes with a Seismic Intensity of 1 or More Observed by Date
2016 Kumamoto Earthquake(From 14:21 on April 14, 2016; total number with a seismic intensity of
1 or more each day)

Number

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency(2) Damage
The Kumamoto Earthquake caused immense damage. Collapsing houses, landslides resulted in 228 fatalities,
while a further 2,753 people sustained severe or minor injuries (Fig. 1-1-3). In addition, approximately 200,000
houses were completely, half and partially destroyed (Fig. 1-1-4).
The number of evacuation centers operated peaked at 855, while the number of evacuees reachedapproximately 184,000 at its highest (Fig. 1-1-5).
Fig. 1-1-3 Human Casualties
People with severe/minor
injuries: 2,753

Fatalities: 228(i) Fatalities confirmed by means of police autopsy: 50(ii) Fatalities due to exacerbation of injuries caused by the disaster or thephysical burden of living as an evacuee: 170(Of which, fatalities recognized by municipalities as having been caused by
the disaster, pursuant to the Act on Provision of Disaster Condolence Grant:167)(iii) Fatalities caused by the torrential rain between June 19 and 25 that wererecognized as being related to the Kumamoto Earthquake: 5(iv) Fatalities recognized as having been caused by the disaster, pursuant to
the Act on Provision of Disaster Condolence Grant: 3((i)-(iii): Kumamoto Prefecture; (iv): Oita Prefecture)

Kumamoto
Prefecture(Otherprefectures)
Total

Severe Minor
injuries injuries
1,130 1,552
19

52

1,149 21,604*Figures for other prefectures
represent the total acrossFukuoka, Saga, Oita, andMiyazaki prefectures

Source: Data from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (as of April 13, 2017)

Fig. 1-1-4 Extent of Damage to Houses
Houses damaged (buildings)
Prefecture
Kumamoto
Oita
Other
Total

Completely
Destroyed
8,688.
9
0
8,697

Half
Destroyed
33,809222
634,037

Partially
Destroyed
147,5638,062
277
155,902

Non-residential buildings
damaged (buildings)
PublicOtherbuildings
439
10,943062
02439
11,007Fires(number)150015Source: Data from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (as of April 13, 2017)3

Fig. 1-1-5 Changes in the Number of Evacuees and Evacuation Centers in Kumamoto Prefecture Due to the
Kumamoto Earthquake

Peak (April 17)
Number of evacuees: 183,882
Number of evacuation centers:
855

Evacuation centersconsolidated due to May 9
reopening of schools useduntil then as evacuation
centers

As of September 30
Number of evacuees: 335
Number of evacuation
centers: 12

As of May 31
Number of evacuees: 8,178
Number of evacuation
centers: 185
As of June 30
Number of evacuees: 5,051
Number of evacuation
centers: 116

June 19-25
Torrential rain

As of August 31
Number of evacuees: 705
Number of evacuation
centers: 21

As of July 31
Number of evacuees: 3,229
Number of evacuation
centers: 68

November 18
All evacuation
centers closed

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from various materials, including the Report on the Review of Responses to the Kumamoto
Earthquake Over a Period of Approximately Three Months (March 2017, Kumamoto Prefecture)

In addition, lifeline utilities such as electricity, gas, and water supply were damaged, with approximately
480,000 houses suffering power cuts at the worst point. Airports, roads, railways, and other transport
infrastructure also suffered a huge amount of damage, causing significant disruption to the daily lives of local
citizens and the business activities of small and medium-sized enterprises and operators in the agriculture,
forestry, and fishery industries and the tourism sector.
Fig. 1-1-6 Extent of Damage to Lifelines
Electric
power
Gas
Water
supply4

Maximum Number of Homes Affected
477,000 homes(14:00, April 16, 2016)
105,000 homes(09:00, April 16, 2016)
445,857 homes(Cumulative total for the number of homes
whose water was cut off at the worst point ineach local government)

Status of Restoration
Restored April 20, 2016
Restored April 30, 2016

Restored July 28, 2016

Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry data
Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry data
Ministry of Health,Labour and Welfare data

Slope failure in the area where the Aso-ohashi Bridge stood5

1-2 Response by the National Government(1) Major Disaster Management Headquarters, etc.
After the Kumamoto Earthquake, the government established a Major Disaster Management Headquarters
headed by then Minister of State for Disaster Management Taro Kono at 22:10 on April 14, 2016 (44 minutes
after the earthquake struck), pursuant to the provisions of the Basic Act on Disaster Management. This
headquarters put together a policy to serve as the basis for the swift and appropriate implementation of
emergency measures for disaster. It then carried out tasks including the overall coordination of emergency
measures in a diverse array of areas, such as rescue, first aid, and medical care, as well as gathering anddistributing information, and liaising with Kumamoto Prefecture and affected municipalities.
In addition, to ensure that the government worked as an integrated team in the area of support for the daily
lives of affected people, the Team to Support the Daily Lives of Disaster Victims was established on April 17.
Composed of vice-ministerial level officials from each ministry and agency, the team shared information andidentified problems by reporting on the day-to-day status of each ministry and agency’s deliberations
concerning issues and the results of their actions in response.
(2) On-site Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Following the magnitude 6.5 earthquake that struck the Kumamoto region, the government immediately
deployed a Cabinet Office advance information-gathering team to Kumamoto Prefectural Office at 23:25 on
April 14, 2016. At 10:40 the following day, an On-site Major Disaster Management Headquarters (hereinafter“on-site disaster management headquarters”) headed by State Minister of the Cabinet Office Fumiaki
Matsumoto was established at Kumamoto Prefectural Office. Each day, the on-site disaster management
headquarters held joint meetings with the Disaster Response Headquarters headed by the Governor of
Kumamoto Prefecture, which Kumamoto Prefecture had set up on April 14. The two bodies thus sought toensure close collaboration. Kumamoto Prefecture disbanded its Disaster Response Headquarters on August 30,
due to the fact that the search for missing persons had ended and the number of evacuees had declined. In
light of this, the national government disbanded its on-site disaster management headquarters on September
16.

First meeting of the Major Disaster Management
Headquarters(Attended by Prime Minister Abe)6

The on-site disaster management headquarters in action

Chapter 2

Response to the Kumamoto Earthquake

2-1 Support for Local Governments(1) Overview of Support
The national government and local governments from across Japan deployed official to assist affected local
governments in dealing with the aftermath. The national government deployed a Team to Support the Daily
Lives of Disaster Victims, consisting of 68 information and communications official (hereinafter “Information
Liaison Officers”) from various ministries and agencies, along with a total of 8,388 support official. As well as
ascertaining the extent of the damage in affected municipalities, the Information Liaison Officers’ role involved
liaison and coordination between the national government and affected municipalities. Specifically, they sought
to gain an understanding of each municipality’s requests and issues, and, in particular, to ascertain needs at
evacuation centers, providing regular reports on their findings to the on-site disaster management
headquarters and explaining government policies, where necessary.
In addition, local governments across Japan deployed official to Kumamoto Prefecture and Kumamoto City
to assist affected local governments under a variety of schemes, including national and regional blockagreements concluded by members of the National Governors’ Association, assistance organized by the Japan
Association of City Mayors, and assistance based on agreements between individual municipalities (Figs. 2-1-1
and 2-1-2).

National government official engaged in support activities at Mashiki municipal office7

Fig. 2-1-1 Deployment of Official to Kumamoto Prefecture Based on Agreements with the Kyushu–
Yamaguchi Nine Prefectures Framework, the Union of Kansai Governments, the National
Governors’ Association, and Shizuoka Prefecture, etc. (April 21 – May 30, 2016)
Duties:Ascertaining
extent of damage

Sorting
supplies

Care fordisaster victims

Public-facing
administrative
dutiesManaging
evacuation centers

Issuing certification asaffected people

Other

800

700

600
500

400
300

200
100
PeopleSource: From materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood
Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake

Fig. 2-1-2 Deployment of Official to Kumamoto City Based on Agreements with Major Cities and the Mayors
Association of Designated Cities, etc. (April 21 – May 30, 2016)
Duties:Managing
evacuation
centers

Issuing
certification asaffected people

Supplies

Medical/healthcare

Disasterwaste

Residential land &building risk assessment

Water
supplyEducational
support

Other

1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
PeopleSource: From materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood
Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake(2) Agreements between Local Governments and Agreements between Local Governments and Private
Sector Companies
To ensure the smooth procurement and supply of goods in the event of a disaster, it is important that local
governments not only stockpile items, but also conclude support agreements with other local governments
and private sector companies before disaster strikes.
In Kumamoto Prefecture, most local governments had concluded goods procurement and supply agreements8before the earthquake, with 40 of the 46 local governments, etc. (including Kumamoto Prefectural Office)within the prefecture (approximately 90%) having concluded support agreements (Fig. 2-1-3). Of these 40 local
governments, 33 (approximately 80%) had concluded agreements with local governments outside theprefecture (Fig. 2-1-4).
Should a major disaster occur, neighboring local governments are also likely to be affected, so it is necessary
to conclude agreements with local governments in more distant areas as well.
Agreements must be concluded not only with other local governments, but also with private sector
companies. In Kumamoto Prefecture, 29 of the 40 local governments (approximately 70%) had concluded
agreements with both local governments and private sector companies (Fig. 2-1-5).
Thus, most of Kumamoto Prefecture’s local governments had concluded goods procurement and supply
agreements and this was one reason for their ability to secure assistance from so many local governments
promptly in the aftermath of the Kumamoto Earthquake. On the other hand, many local governments andprivate sector companies were affected by the disaster, so it was difficult to adequately fulfill the commitments
made in these agreements in some cases. This challenge is not specific to Kumamoto Prefecture, but rather is
one common to local governments nationwide. Accordingly, local governments need to conclude multiple
agreements to diversify their disaster risk, so that they are prepared for a major disaster of the kind expected
to occur in due course, such as Nankai Trough Earthquake.
Fig. 2-1-3 Goods Procurement and Supply Support Agreements Concluded by Local Governments within
Kumamoto Prefecture
No agreement concluded
6 local governments

Agreement(s) concluded
40 local governments

Fig. 2-1-4 Agreements Concluded with Local
Governments Outside Kumamoto
Prefecture
Concluded only with local
governments within theprefecture
7 local governments
Concluded only with local
governments outside theprefecture
3 local governments
Concluded with local governments
both within and outside theprefecture
30 local governments

Fig. 2-1-5 Agreements Concluded with Private Sector
Companies
Concluded only with local
governments
5 local governments

Concluded only with private
sector companies
6 local governments

Concluded with both private
sector companies and local
governments
29 local governments

Source: From materials distributed at the Fifth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood
Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake9(3) Development of Support Mechanisms
Mechanisms for personnel deployment and securing various other forms of support from an array of national
and local government bodies had been put in place before the earthquake occurred and were utilized in
Kumamoto (Figs. 2-1-6 and 2-1-7).
However, the support systems were not necessarily adequate, so further strengthening of functions enabling
physical support and emergency response assistance to be provided to affected local governments is required.
A key challenge in facilitating the provision of support in the event of disaster is ensuring that tasks such as thecreation of mechanisms for coordination among the various assisting organizations, the standardization ofdisaster response work, and the matching of organizations/personnel with duties are carried out in an
integrated manner. Following deliberations by the Study Group on Securing Municipal Administrative Functions
in a Major Disaster between January and March 2017, the national government (Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications) decided to establish a new scheme based on a simple checklist that would enable the statusof three key elements in affected municipalities to be ascertained without delay: senior management;
manpower; and government buildings and other aspects of the physical environment. In March 2017, theSeminar on the Deployment of Support Official to Assist Affected Residents in Rebuilding their Lives after a
Major Disaster began to consider the development of effective manpower deployment mechanisms andsupport for the management of affected local governments.
Fig. 2-1-6 Illustration of the Deployment of Support Official to Major Municipalities Following a Major
Disaster

Source: From materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood
Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake

10Fig. 2-1-7 Major Local Government Support Initiatives by each Ministry and Agency
Ministry ofInternal Affairs
andCommunications

・Mobile power generators
・Loan of mobile communications
equipment for use in disastermanagement
・Free public wireless LAN atevacuation centers

National Police
Agency・Police disaster response units

Fire and Disaster
Management
Agency (FDMA)

・Emergency fire response teams

Ministry ofLand,
Infrastructure
Transport andTourism (MLIT)

Ministry of
Health, Labourand Welfare

・Technical Emergency Control Force(TEC-FORCE)
・Deployment of emergency risk
assessors
・Support for sewerage system
repairs
・Disaster medical assistance team(DMAT)
・Disaster psychiatric assistance team
(DPAT)
・Deployment of public healthnurses, etc.
・Matching the needs of social
welfare facilities with welfare
personnel
・Deployment of investigative andtechnical official to address damage
to the water supply

Ministry of
DefenseMinistry oftheEnvironment
Ministry of
Economy,Trade andIndustry.

・Disaster relief deployment of
Self-Defense Forces(search and rescue, emergency
repairs, medical support, support
for the supply of water and food,bathing support, transport of
supplies)
・Disaster Waste Treatment
Support Network (D.Waste-Net)・Emergency fuel supply based on
the Disaster Oil Supply
Coordination Plan

Ministry ofAgriculture,
Forestry and
Fisheries

・Farming and Rural Disaster Relief
Unit (Midori Disaster Relief
Squad)

Ministry of
Education,
Culture,Sports,Science andTechnology

・Support for the reopening ofschools・Enhanced psychological care・Deployment of senior culturalproperties specialists
・Deployment of emergency risk
assessors

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from materials distributed at the Fourth Meeting of the Working Group for Studying
Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake112-2 Living Conditions of Evacuees and Self-help/Mutual Support Initiatives(1) Evacuation Centers
On April 17, 2016, the Cabinet Office published and circulated the Evacuation Center Management
Guidelines, the Guidelines for Securing and Managing Toilets at Evacuation Centers, and the Guidelines forManaging and Operating Welfare Evacuation Centers, to facilitate the appropriate operation of evacuation
centers by affected local governments. However, examples of evacuation center management that was notnecessarily appropriate were also pointed out.
Accordingly, the Cabinet Office decided to put together an anthology of examples as a complement the
Evacuation Center Management Guidelines, etc., to contribute to smoother evacuation center management.
As such, it conducted a questionnaire-based survey of relevant local governments and affected citizens inJanuary and February 2017 (Fig. 2-2-1). In addition, the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response andLivelihood Support Measures in Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake proposed that a system of advisors beestablished to support evacuation center management.

12

Fig. 2-2-1Major Comments Expressed in the Questionnaire (Excerpt)
Reality of support for those affected by the disaster and associated issues
Self-management initiatives
・Some mentioned the fact that PTA executives,
other relevant individuals, and local junior andsenior high school students had set up selfmanagement bodies, which took on the bulk of thework involved in managing evacuation centers,
thereby enabling the staff of affected local
governments to dedicate their time to liaison andcoordination with the city. Others mentioned thatelementary, junior and senior high school students
had assisted in serving meals and chatting toelderly people, and senior high school students hadcleaned the toilets.

Management of food and supplies
・Many respondents mentioned that the number of
evacuees who were served meals at evacuation
centers equipped with emergency field kitchens
fluctuated considerably. To ensure that they did not
run short of food, they dealt with this by preparing
meals that could more readily accommodate
fluctuations in the number of people to be served,
such as soup, rather than individually packaged
meals.
・Meticulous care was taken in displaying warnings
concerning food allergies and the packages for the
foods used in preparing the meals were displayed
alongside them, enabling those with food allergies
to check the ingredients.

Provision and management of toilets
・Both evacuees and those running evacuation centersstated that they felt that temporary toilets in which
the waste was sealed off in single-use bags after
each use were particularly outstanding from theperspectives of both hygiene and center
management. At the same time, some expressed theview that temporary toilets in which each toilet was
equipped with a plastic tank were not appropriate
from a center management perspective, because it
took too long to replenish the water. Others
expressed anxiety about the hygiene implications of
temporary toilets not equipped with water, because,
while requiring little management, there was atendency for feces to pile up.

Maintenance of a hygienic environment
・While the staff members conducting
consultations to check on the health ofevacuees were not always the same individuals,
they visited at the same time, without fail, andleft handover notes regarding the matters
discussed, facilitating a smooth response
without the need to repeatedly ask the samequestions.

Responses to those requiring special
consideration
・People find it easier to speak up if they are
told, “Please speak to us if you have alongstanding medical condition or a mental or
physical disorder and you need anything,”
rather than, “Please tell us if you needassistance.”

Availability of separate areas for men
and women; consideration for children
・There were complaints about the fact thatthe areas of evacuation centers designatedfor single men and single women wereplaced next to each other, but cardboard andother materials were used as partitions todivide up the areas for men, women, andfamilies.
・Families with infants and young children had
difficulty in expressing their views and eventhose running the centers found it hard to
speak to male staff in some cases, sosuggestion boxes were put in place to ensurethat support was not biased in favor of thosewith the loudest voices.
・In evacuation centers with women-only
rooms, the only staff on duty were men,leading to difficulty in cleaning the rooms
and the toilets.

Source: Cabinet Office13

Evacuees take center in the first-floor lobby of Kumamoto City Office(April 29, 2016)

Evacuees take center in the lobby of Mashiki Health and Welfare Center(April 29, 2016)

A corridor and room at Mashiki Health and Welfare Center(April 29, 2016)14

(2) Activities by Individual Volunteers and NPOs
Several cases were observed where it was difficult to respond to the Kumamoto Earthquake only byinterventions of government bodies and citizens. This is believed to have stemmed from the sheer scale of thedisaster: evacuees exceeded 180,000 at one stage and the number of evacuation centers operated peaked at855. Another reason is thought to have been the fact that local government officials and local citizens were notnecessarily proficient in responding to a disaster that caused such a huge amount of damage. As such, thesupport provided by individual volunteers (described below) and NPOs, among others, was of great assistanceto affected areas and citizens.
In Kumamoto, the support offered by NPOs led by the Hinokuni Conference for Kumamoto Earthquake
Support (described below) is particularly noteworthy. An organization that works with government bodies andNPOs, the Hinokuni Conference is an initiative unprecedented in Japan, in terms of both the speed with which
it was set up (having been established on April 19, 2016) and the scale of the support that it provided while
coordinating duties between NPOs, in partnership with government bodies.
This section provides a broad overview of the activities of individual volunteers and NPOs, and examines
future approaches to such activities.
(i) Individual volunteers
Individuals who go to affected areas at their own initiative to provide those affected by the disaster withsupport, without being affiliated to an organization of some kind are referred to here as individual volunteers.
In most cases, the task of receiving these individual volunteers and allocating duties to them is carried out by
the disaster volunteer centers (hereinafter “disaster VCs”) established by social welfare councils in disasterafflicted areas. The social welfare councils of 17 affected municipalities began setting up disaster VCs on April
19, 2016 to receive individual volunteers.
In general, surveys to ascertain the needs of those affected by a disaster cannot be carried out in theimmediate aftermath of the disaster, because those people have evacuated their homes. Immediately after theearthquake in Kumamoto, some disaster VCs took the step of restricting the volunteers sought on the basis ofwhere prospective volunteers lived (for example, accepting only those who lived in Kumamoto Prefecture or in
Kyushu), due to the impact of aftershocks, the need to prioritize efforts to rebuild the lives of local citizens andensure the safety of volunteers, and concerns about dealing with prospective volunteers who were surplus torequirements. From the latter half of April through May, the needs of those affected by the disaster graduallybecame clearer and efforts by volunteers to tidy up homes and clear away rubble got underway in earnest.
However, given concerns about road congestion during the consecutive national holidays in early May, theprefectural government put out a call on its website for people to take into account the need to alleviate suchcongestion.
At the same time, while some disaster VCs attracted more prospective volunteers than they could actuallyprocess, others struggled with a shortage of candidates. Accordingly, surplus volunteers were referred todisaster VCs without enough volunteers. After the consecutive national holidays in early May, the on-site
disaster management headquarters put out a call via bodies such as the Kyushu Economic Federation, asking
companies to participate in volunteer activities, while the Cabinet Office and various other bodies used theirwebsites, Twitter, and other means to encourage people to volunteer.
By the end of November 2016, all evacuation centers had been closed and considerable progress had been
made in moving those whose homes had been half or completely destroyed by the disaster into emergency
temporary housing or provisional temporary housing. Accordingly, activities by large numbers of volunteers
aimed at supporting the recovery of people’s daily lives were coming to an end. Consequently, the disaster VCs
15

switched to recruiting volunteers for activities on weekends only or were reorganized into “Daily Life
Reconstruction Support VCs.” Since the end of 2016, virtually no volunteer activities aimed at responding to
the disaster have taken place.
Fig. 2-2-2 Establishment of Disaster VCs Following the Kumamoto Earthquake
The main activities undertaken by individual volunteers include surveys of the needs of those affected by the disaster,tidying up homes, clearing and shifting rubble, support for the management of evacuation centers, and sorting ofrelief supplies. The status of the various disaster VCs is shown below.
Date of
Number of
Recruitment
Municipality
Establishment Participants Situation as of November 13, 2016
Area Specified(2016)(Total)by Disaster VC
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Kikuchi City
April 19777
Support VC on May 22
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Uto City
April 19
3,166 Support VC (including clearance of sludge
due to flooding, from June 25) on June 6
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Uki City
April 19
4,119
Support VC on June 1
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Minamiaso
Support VC on July 1 Reorganized into a VC
April 20
6,768
Villageto deal with all fields, not only the disaster(ordinary VC) on September 1
Reorganized into an ordinary VC on
Yamato Town
April 21275
September 1
Carried out activities on Fridays and
Mashiki Town
April 21
34,268Nationwide
Saturdays
Kumamoto City
April 22
38,267 Carried out activities on weekends
Nationwide
Ozu Town
April 22
3,178 Mainly carried out activities on Saturdays
KyushuReorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Koshi City
April 22802
Support VC on May 15
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Kikuyo Town
April 22
1,832
Support VC on May 21
Misato Town
April 22
194 Ordinary VC
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Nishihara
April 24
14,357 Support VC on July 29.
Nationwide
Village
Carried out activities on weekends
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Kosa Town
April 25732
Support VC on June 21
Aso City
April 26729 Reorganized into an ordinary VC on May 4
Reorganized into a Daily Life Reconstruction
Kashima Town
April 26
2,238
Support VC on June 1
Including clearance of sludge due to
Mifune Town
April 29
4,895
flooding, from June 25.
Yufu City(Oita
April 20204 Disaster VC closed on April 26
Prefecture)Total
116,801
Source: Data from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (as of November 13, 2016)16

Kumamoto City Disaster Volunteer Center(ii) Initiatives drawing on the know-how and expertise of NPOs and other support groups
At least 300 NPOs and other support groups from Kumamoto and outside it carried out a variety of activities
in the aftermath of the Kumamoto Earthquake, including running evacuation centers and making
improvements to the living environment that government bodies would have found difficult to carry out
unaided, as well as preparing meals for evacuees; conducting surveys of evacuees centering in their own
damaged homes or in cars and providing them with support; managing, transporting, and distributing donatedgoods; and supporting the management of Disaster VCs.
Fig. 2-2-3 Examples of NPO Activities
・Conducting surveys of the living environment at 118 evacuation centers in Kumamoto Prefecture
・Improving toilets, beds, meals, and the sanitation environment
・Devising evacuation center layouts, setting them up, and arranging spaces with consideration for evacuees
・Supporting the layout, setup, and management of welfare evacuation centers・Managing and delivering donated supplies
・Arranging cardboard beds and nursing care supplies
・Coordinating meal provision for evacuation centers
・ Delivering programs aimed at preventing “inactive lifestyle syndrome,” including conversation groups andfootbaths
・Supporting local citizens in transitioning to self-management
・Supporting consolidation into hub evacuation centers and efforts to close all evacuation centers
etc.

<Evacuation center assessments>
Following the Kumamoto Earthquake, the large number of evacuation centers meant that a lack ofunderstanding of the situation at the centers was an issue. Accordingly, NPOs worked with the on-site disastermanagement headquarters and the Kumamoto prefectural government’s Health and Welfare Department to
conduct evacuation center assessments at 118 of the more than 400 evacuation centers that were open as oflate April 2016. These 118 centers were selected because neither Kumamoto Prefecture nor Kumamoto City
had ascertained the situation there. Several NPOs worked together, dividing up the centers to be visited into
groups and visiting them in turn to find out issues to be solved. The prefectural government provided assistanceby lending NPO members official prefectural armbands to use when conducting these assessments and also
notified the relevant departments at each municipality. The evacuation center assessments conducted by NPOs
looked at a wide range of matters, including whether the toilets were in a hygienic state, whether the ban onentering living areas while wearing shoes was being thoroughly enforced, whether the minimum necessary
17living space per person had been secured, and whether there was a women-only space. The results of theassessments formed the basis of proposals for improvements to evacuation centers (Figs. 2-2-4 and 2-2-5).
It would be fair to say that the evacuation center assessments were highly effective, because they provided
an overall picture of the situation at evacuation centers and subsequently led to improvements in evacuation
center living environments.
Since December 2016, once all evacuation centers had been closed, more finely tuned support for thoseaffected by the disaster in rebuilding their lives has been expected, including care for temporary housing
tenants and efforts to build a sense of community among them, working in partnership with Community Mutual
Support Centers.
Fig. 2-2-4 Example of NPO Activities

Source: Excerpt from materials circulated at the 21st meeting of the National On-site Disaster Management Headquarters / 24th
meeting of the Kumamoto Prefecture Disaster Response Headquarters (April 30)

18

Fig. 2-2-5 Example of NPO Activities

Source: Excerpt from materials circulated by the Major Disaster Management Headquarters on May 13, 2016(iii) Partnerships between government bodies and support groups such as NPOs, and among various support
groupsa. Overview
In Kumamoto, NPOs from various parts of the country (hereinafter “external support groups”) and NPOs
from within the prefecture (hereinafter “local groups”) undertook support activities. Activities of this nature
are undertaken independently and at the initiative of the group concerned; however, on the other hand, if eachgroup is permitted to work as it chooses, there is a tendency for support to become imbalanced, with assistanceconcentrated in communities that receive the greatest media coverage while other communities miss out on
support entirely. Accordingly, it is necessary to undertake support activities that keep the big picture in mind,
ensuring that groups share information with each other and work in partnership with local government.
In Kumamoto, there were groups (hereinafter “intermediate support organizations”) that carried out
functions such as liaising and sharing information with NPOs, and coordinating the nature of the activities
conducted and the areas in which they were carried out, both at a national and at a prefectural level. These
intermediate support organizations held conferences for NPOs to share information with each other andcollaboration meetings between NPOs and local government bodies, thereby ensuring that external support
groups and local groups worked in partnership in the course of their activities.
From the emergency phase immediately after the disaster occurred to the interim response phase and on
through the recovery and reconstruction phases, external support groups drew upon their abundant
experience of responding to a variety of disasters as they worked in partnership with local groups. Through thiscollaboration, the external support groups passed on their know-how to local groups, who gradually took overthe support of those affected by the disaster as the situation changed in its aftermath.
b. Building frameworks for partnerships between NPOs and government bodies
In 2015, Japan Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (JVOAD), a national intermediate support
19

organization consisting of NPOs and other bodies, began engaging in activities to provide affected areas withsupport from a more comprehensive perspective, fulfilling liaison and coordination functions between support
organizations and government bodies (at the time of the Kumamoto Earthquake, JVOAD was positioned as apreparatory committee and subsequently became incorporated as a specified nonprofit corporation on
November 1, 2016). The Cabinet Office routinely shares information with JVOAD under ordinary circumstances
as well.
On April 15, 2016, NPO kumamoto, an intermediate support organization based in Kumamoto Prefecture,began coordinating with NPOs within the prefecture, in partnership with JVOAD.
While this collaborative inter-NPO framework was being formed, the Cabinet Office suggested to Kumamoto
Prefecture that it should collaborate with these NPOs. Accordingly, NPOs and local government began working
in partnership to support those affected by the disaster. From April 19, the Hinokuni Conference for Kumamoto
Earthquake Support (hereinafter “Hinokuni Conference”) — a meeting of NPOs to share information — began
to be held each evening and the Hinokuni Conference Secretariat was set up in a conference room at Kumamoto
Prefectural Office to serve as a hub for NPO collaboration. The Hinokuni Conference not only served as a forum
for sharing information about affected areas and evacuation centers, but also facilitated the coordination ofefforts by NPOs to complement each other’s activities, as well as offering opportunities for groups that had
joined the relief effort at a later stage to obtain information. During the consecutive public holidays in early
May, when many NPOs came to the affected areas, over 100 people attended the Hinokuni Conference,
facilitating the sharing of information.
Furthermore, from April 25, a partnership meeting attended by representatives of Kumamoto prefectural
government, Kumamoto Prefecture Social Welfare Council, and NPOs was held twice a week to facilitate
collaboration with local governments and the social welfare council, which was managing disaster VCs. As
Kumamoto City is a government ordinance-designated city, similar partnership meetings to those involving theprefecture were launched on May 13, with the participation of the municipal government, Kumamoto City
Social Welfare Council, and NPOs. These meetings became established as a means for local governments toshare their policies with NPOs, as well as being a means for information about issues at evacuation centersgathered from NPOs to be passed on quickly to local governments. These moves spread to other affectedmunicipalities and resulted in partnership meetings involving the local governments, social welfare councils,
and NPOs being held (Figs. 2-2-6 and 2-2-7).

Coordination of areas of activity and activity details at the Hinokuni Conference(The first example of systematic coordination between different groups while disaster response wasunderway)20

Fig. 2-2-6 Examples of Collaboration Between Government Bodies and NPOs, etc.

Source: Excerpt from materials circulated by the Major Disaster Management Headquarters on May 13, 2016

Fig. 2-2-7 Coordination of Support Following the Kumamoto Earthquake

Source: Provided by JVOAD

21

(iv) Tasks for the Future
While NPOs from across the country that have experience in responding to disaster participate in support
activities in affected areas, it is not practical for external support groups to conduct activities in such areas in
the long term (Fig. 2-2-8). It is expected that local groups, which have difficulty in carrying out activities in theimmediate aftermath of a disaster or which have little experience of disaster response because they usuallyconduct activities in other areas, will gradually come to play a central role in activities. For example, if thesituation has reached the stage at which evacuation centers are being closed and those unable to return home
are transitioning to temporary housing or provisional temporary housing, support rooted in the local
community is required and the “localization” of support becomes more desirable. Kumamoto Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster (KVOAD) was established to facilitate this kind of community-based support(initial meeting of association members held October 2016, incorporated as a specified nonprofit corporationin April 2017), with organizations such as NPO kumamoto and Junior Chamber International Kumamoto playing
a central role. KVOAD worked in partnership with community mutual support centers and assisted withactivities to support tenants of temporary housing or provisional temporary housing, with the aim of building
networks between various groups and strengthening collaboration between the bodies involved.
Sharing information regularly under normal circumstances is crucial to facilitating collaboration between
NPOs and local government bodies. In February 2017, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency held theTraining Course on Enhancing the Environment for Disaster Volunteer Activities, which was attended by
prefectural government officials, among others. The speakers included a representative of Kumamoto
Prefecture, who talked about cooperation between local government and disaster volunteers in the wake of
the Kumamoto Earthquake, based on real examples of collaboration measures implemented by the Hinokuni
Conference. Going forward, it would be desirable to hold more training courses of this nature and establish
specific forums for exchange, as well as rolling out initiatives focused on gathering and sharing examples of bestpractice, and facilitating more in-depth collaboration between NPOs and local government bodies in eachprefecture.

Fig. 2-2-8 Changes in the Number of NPOs Following the Kumamoto Earthquake

End of

End of

End of

End ofMay

September

NovemberJanuary

2016

2017
Number of NPOs fromwithin the prefecture

Number of NPOs fromoutside the prefecture

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from materials supplied by JVOAD and KVOAD

22

Outdoor reading area set up by an NPO (Grandmesse Kumamoto)Source: Provided by Shapla Neer = Citizens’ Committee in Japan for Overseas Support

NPO volunteers serve coffee(Grandmesse Kumamoto; April 29, 2016)23

(3) Self-help/Mutual Support Initiatives
Following the Kumamoto Earthquake, self-help and mutual support initiatives formed the basis for rescue
activities and the running of evacuation centers. For example, prior to the earthquake, there were concernsthat Nishihara Village in Kumamoto Prefecture could be cut off in the event of disaster, because of its location
which is immediately above an active fault. Accordingly, local volunteer fire corps undertook consultations
under normal circumstances regarding measures in case the community became isolated. These preparations
were put into action at the time of the Kumamoto Earthquake, with volunteer fire corps in the village confirming
the safety of the villagers and rescuing those who were trapped under collapsed houses, before rescue teams
from outside the village arrived. In running evacuation centers, villagers themselves shared out responsibility
for tasks such as providing food and first aid, undertaking these independently. Other self-help and mutual
support initiatives included villagers procuring foodstuffs unaided (Fig. 2-2-9). Similarly, in Mifune Town,
Kumamoto Prefecture, local citizens autonomously ran their evacuation centers (Figs. 2-2-10 to 2-2-12).
As described in detail in Chapter 2 2-2 (2), new activities were undertaken by NPOs working in partnershipwith local governments in the aftermath of the Kumamoto Earthquake, providing a renewed awareness of thepower of disaster management volunteers and NPOs.
Thus, self-help by individual citizens and mutual support within the context of community, corporate, andvolunteer frameworks can address key areas that cannot be fully covered by public support from local
government bodies. Accordingly, it is essential to facilitate coordination between self-help, mutual support,
and public support, striking the right balance, in order to improve the overall disaster management capability
as a nation.
As such, the Cabinet Office is promoting self-help and mutual support initiatives, such as efforts to enhancethe environment for activities by disaster management volunteers and NPOs, and the widespread formulationof Community Disaster Management Plans (see Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1-4 (1)), under which communities
identify and share information about local disaster management issues, make preparations to address them,and take steps in the event of a disaster, including emergency response, and various activities during therecovery and reconstruction period.
Fig. 2-2-9 Example of Food Procurement with the Citizens’ Own Initiatives(L) Foodstuffs contributed by local people. The rule that people should bring the food that they had in the event of adisaster had been considered beforehand.
(R) A changing room built by a local carpenter after hearing that female evacuees were in need of a place where they
could get changed at the evacuation center.
Source: Provided by Mayumi Sakamoto, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Disaster Resilience and Governance, University of
Hyogo (explanations also provided by Associate Professor Sakamoto)24

Fig. 2-2-10 Example of an Evacuation Center Managed Autonomously by Local Citizens<Mifune Town: Evacuation center run autonomously at Ozaka Elementary School>・Once the floor is dirty, people stop abiding by the rule prohibiting shoes to be worn, so the floors around theentrance and exit were kept clean to naturally encourage people to change between outdoor and indoor shoes
・Toilets were kept scrupulously clean to prevent infectious disease
・Rather than simply labeling children’s clothing that arrived among the relief supplies as “for children,” the clothes
were arranged by size (e.g. 120cm, 130cm, 140cm, etc.)

Orderly arrangement of relief supplies(Citizens living at the evacuation center came up with the idea that, when accepting relief supplies, they should
arrange them so that lightweight items were selected first, with heavy items being chosen last.)

Example of lightweight items(Moist towelettes)

Example of heavy items(Water)At Ozaka Elementary School, Mifune Town (April 29, 2016)25

Fig. 2-2-11 Example of Autonomous Participation by Students in Running Evacuation Centers

Junior and senior high school students currently or previously resident at the evacuation center make disinfectant wipes soaked
in alcoholHigh school students encourage elderly people living at the evacuation center to get together for a cup of tea and a chat (the highschool students are also evacuees). With homemade panels in hand, students visit each of the elderly residents of the evacuation
center, many of whom spend a great deal of their time asleep.

Evacuees get together for a cup of tea and a chatSocial interaction can stagnate in evacuation centers, because people sleep and spend their time apart from each other, but there
were cases in which these conversation groups helped to encourage people to leave their sleeping mats and get together for achat. In some cases, it was the first time in a long time that people had got up to talk to others.
At Mifune Junior High School (April 29, 2016)26

Fig. 2-2-12 Example of Support for Disaster Affected People Provided by Companies Outside the Prefecture

Hair-washing service provided by a business operator from Osaka

Meals served by a major Nagasaki champon noodle chain
At Ozaka Elementary School, Mifune Town (April 29, 2016)27

2-3 Initiatives Aimed at Securing Temporary Housing(1) Damage Certification Surveys and Issuance of Disaster Affected Certificate
The Disaster Affected Certificate certifies such matters as the extent of damage to an individual’s homeresulting from a disaster. It plays an important role in facilitating the smooth and appropriate provision of
support to those affected by a disaster, as it is used as basic documentation in the application of support
measures, including the provision of livelihood recovery support payments for disaster affected people,
emergency repairs of homes, and the allocation of donations, etc. (Fig. 2-3-1).
On April 15, 2016, the Cabinet Office issued a notice to all prefectures in Kyushu and to Ehime Prefecturethat they should appropriately take such steps as conducting surveys to certify damage arising from the disaster(hereinafter “damage certification surveys”) and issuing disaster affected certificates. Briefings were held for
officials in Kumamoto Prefecture on April 20 and in Oita Prefecture on April 21, to facilitate the necessary
procedures. Thereafter, the Cabinet Office provided the governments of Kumamoto Prefecture and Oita
Prefecture, and municipalities within both prefectures with advice to ensure that damage certification surveys
were conducted and disaster affected certificates issued in a timely and appropriate manner (Fig. 2-3-2).
Fig. 2-3-1 Damage Certification Survey and Disaster Affected Certificate Issuance Process
If a disaster occurs within the boundaries of a municipality and affected people by that disaster submits an application, the mayor of thatmunicipality must order a survey of the damage to the house or other form of damage specified by the mayor in question without delay
and issue a Disaster Affected Certificate (document certifying the extent of the damage resulting from the disaster in question) (Article90-2 of the Basic Act on Disaster Management). The Disaster Affected Certificate is widely used as material for determining theapplicability of various disaster affected people support measures.

28

Completely
destroyed

MostlydestroyedHalfdestroyedMore than
50%

40% to50%

20% to40%

Use of various disaster victim
support measures

DegreeofdamageExtentofdamageIssuance of Disaster Affected
Certificates (municipalities)

Survey of extent of damage(municipality)

Disaster affected people submit
application to municipality<Process toward the application of support measures>Fig. 2-3-2 Key Cabinet Office Initiatives Relating to Damage Certification Surveys and Issuance of Disaster
Affected Certificate (2016)
April 15 “Proper Implementation of Support for Affected People of the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake” issued
・ Appropriately implementing steps such as conducting damage certification surveys and issuing Disaster
Affected Certificate
April 20 & 21
Briefings on housing damage certification surveys, etc. held in Kumamoto and Oita prefectures
・Overview and procedure for damage certification surveys and issuance of Disaster Affected Certificates
April 26 “Expediting Damage Certification Surveys and the Issuance of Disaster Affected Certificate Following the 2016
Kumamoto Earthquake” issued
・Providing personnel and technical support for municipalities that had sustained immense damage, and devising
ways of expediting the issuance of Disaster Affected Certificate
May 20 “Key Issues for Consideration Regarding Damage Certification Surveys and the Issuance of Disaster Affected
Certificates Following the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake” issued
・Surveys and methods of evaluating damage to homes due to subsidence and slope failure
May 30 “Key Issues for Consideration Regarding Notification of Secondary Surveys for Certification of Damage in Respectof Disaster Affected Certificates” issued
・ Notifying disaster affected peoples of secondary surveys, support measures relating to homes whose
foundations have been damaged
June 6 “Key Issues for Consideration Regarding Damage Certification Surveys and the Issuance of Disaster Affected
Certificates” issued
・Utilization of damage certification standards, handling of the results of judgments

Where applications for certificates had been received by mid-May 2016, it was mostly possible to issue theDisaster Affected Certificate by the end of that month if the individual concerned came to the issuance desk sothat they could be informed of the report on the completion of the survey. Looking at the number of Disaster
Affected Certificates issued as a percentage of all applications received, approximately 78% had been issued by
the end of June 2016, while around 95% had been issued by the end of the following month.
Fig. 2-3-3 shows the number of applications for Disaster Affected Certificates and the number issued in
Kumamoto Prefecture as of March 31, 2017 (Disaster Affected Certificates had been issued in response toapproximately 96% of applications).
Fig. 2-3-3 Number of Applications for Disaster Affected Certificates and Number Issued in Kumamoto
Prefecture(As of March 31, 2017)
Number ofapplications (a)Number issued (b)(b/a)

208,983

201,399(96.4%)

Completely
destroyed
12,492

Mostlydestroyed
12,320

Half destroyed
53,965Significant
partial damage
122,622

Source: Excerpt from Kumamoto Prefecture, Extent of Damage Due to the Kumamoto Earthquake, etc. (Report No. 231)

(2) Provision of Temporary Housing
In addition to “constructed temporary housing,” the menu of options for providing evacuees with emergency
temporary housing includes “rented temporary housing,” which is housing rented from the private sector, andpublic housing. Following liaison and coordination with local government bodies both within and outside theprefecture and with the national government, Kumamoto Prefecture progressively provided evacuees withemergency temporary housing, taking into account the overall picture, such as local circumstances and the timethat it would take to provide such housing (Fig. 2-3-4).
As of the end of March 2017, 4,303 constructed temporary housing dwellings had been built andapproximately 11,000 people had moved into around 4,200 of these. Furthermore, the prefecture had rented

29

about 14,700 dwellings from the private sector for use as rented temporary housing, into which approximately
34,000 people had moved by this point. In addition, the prefecture was using around 1,300 public housing andnational civil servant lodging units to house about 3,000 people (Fig. 2-3-5).
Under the Disaster Relief Act, temporary housing is, in principle, provided to those who have nowhere to live
because their houses have been classified as “completely destroyed” and are unable to secure housing with
their own financial resources. In cases where homes are classified as “mostly destroyed” or “half destroyed,”such temporary housing may be provided if the damage is equivalent to complete destruction and special
circumstances apply.
In Kumamoto, the aftershocks were still continuing intermittently over a month after the April 16, 2016
earthquake. Amid this situation, many citizens felt unable to return to their own homes because of the risk ofcollapse, so they stayed on amid the inconvenience and psychological anxiety of life at the evacuation centers.
Accordingly, the Cabinet Office issued Kumamoto Prefecture with a notice containing more specific, userfriendly instructions regarding eligibility for emergency temporary housing, to encourage its provision in an
appropriate manner.
In the constructed temporary housing category, the prefecture offered not only conventional prefabricatedtemporary housing, but also wooden temporary housing built from timber originating in Kumamoto Prefecture
and accessible temporary housing suitable for wheelchair users.
With aftershocks continuing, many of those affected by the disaster were forced to continue living inevacuation centers, so the need to secure interim housing for them was deemed to be particularly urgent. As
such, the following special measures were taken in relation to rented temporary housing.
i) The National Treasury bore part of the cost of repairing private rental housing damaged by the earthquake,
if it was then made available for use as temporary housing.
ii) Since some areas which did not have enough properties suitable for families, but had a surplus of studioand studio + kitchen properties, it was permitted that a single household could stay in multiple dwellings,
as appropriate to the circumstances of those affected by the disaster and the local community.

30

Fig. 2-3-4 Housing After a Disaster

Source: Cabinet Office

Example of constructed temporary housing(wooden)Example of constructed temporary housing(accessible housing suitable for wheelchair users)

Fig. 2-3-5 Status of Emergency Temporary Housing, etc.
Type
Constructed temporary housing
Rented temporary housing
Public housing & housing for national civil servants, etc.

Number of dwellings
occupied
4,179 dwellings
14,705 dwellings
1,327 dwellings

Source: Kumamoto Prefecture (as of March 31, 2017)31

2-4 Initiatives for the Transport of Relief Supplies(1) Provision of Supplies via Push-mode Support
In light of the fact that successive earthquakes with a maximum seismic intensity of 7 centered on Mashiki
Town, Kumamoto Prefecture occurred within a short period, then Minister of State for Disaster Management
Taro Kono and Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture Ikuo Kabashima held a videoconference in the early hours ofApril 16, 2016, during which Governor Kabashima requested that the national government provide and manage
supplies. In response to this request, the government set up a supplies procurement and transport team within
the Major Disaster Management Headquarters executive office at 05:00 on April 16, which provided support in
the area of supplies.
To get this process underway, the relevant ministries and agencies met to ensure national coordination andthen, for the first time, provided “push-mode support,” which involved procuring and transporting supplies
without waiting for requests from affected areas (Fig. 2-4-1). Between April 17 and 22, the government supplied
food sufficient for approximately 1.85 million meals and a large number of daily necessities, including
underwear, face masks, and toilet necessities (Fig. 2-4-2).
By April 23, an adequate quantity of supplies had reached evacuation centers, so the government switched
to “pull-mode support,” which involves procuring and transporting supplies tailored to the diverse needs ofevacuees. In Kumamoto, tablet devices and the like were used to ascertain the needs of evacuees (Fig. 2-4-4),
enabling finely tuned support to be provided.
By May 6, food sufficient for approximately 2.78 million meals had been supplied following the Kumamoto
Earthquake, through a combination of push- and pull-mode support (Figs. 2-4-2 and 2-4-3). The provision of
push-mode support for the first time, based on the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake andother past disasters, proved to be an effective initial response.
In December 2016, a system designed to facilitate the smooth sharing of information about requests for andthe procurement and transportation of supplies between national and prefectural governments began
operating (Fig. 2-4-5).

32

Fig. 2-4-1 Pull- and Push-mode Support in the Provision of Supplies<Overview of the plan for the procurement of supplies in the event of a major earthquake(reference: Nankai Trough Earthquake)>◎ Approach to the procurement of supplies
Until 3rd day after disaster(use of stockpiles)

Suppliers of eacharticle &coordinating
ministry/agency

4th-7th day after disaster (use of push-mode support)○ Drinking water: Emergency drinking water [MHLW]○ Food / powdered baby formula: Private sector procurement [MAFF]○ Blankets: from local government stockpiles [FDMA]○ Simple toilets / portable toilets: Private sector procurement [METI] + from local government
stockpiles [FDMA]○ Diapers (adult/infant): Private sector procurement [MHLW]◎ Push-mode support preparation process
Relevant ministries andagencies prepare support
based on specific plans,
without waiting for a requestfrom the affected prefecture･ Ministries & agencies responsible
for supplies start to prepare to
procure supplies･ Ministries & agencies responsible
for transport start to coordinate
means of transport

Establishment of
acceptance system byaffected prefecture･ Opening of regional
supply hubs

Request from
Extreme Disaster
Management
Headquarters toministries &agencies responsible
for supplies for
procurement of
required quantities

Transport
coordination& shipping

Acceptance of
supplies atregional
supply hubs

○ Recipients of push-mode support:
Prefectures whose stockpiles of foodare expected to be insufficient○ Regional logistics hubs (77 locations)(Criteria)･ Satisfy new earthquake resistancecriteria･ Have a roof
･ Able to accommodate the use of
forklifts･ Enough space for large trucks toenter & cargo handling to take place
etc.

Transport tomunicipalities’
local supply
bases orevacuation
centers

The two systems, pull- and push-mode support, are available for providing relief supplies in the event of disaster. Pull-mode
support involves the procurement and transport of supplies in response to specific requests (a list of items required, etc.) from
affected areas. Virtually all of the support at the time of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake was pull-mode support. While pullmode support entails less waste in the procurement of supplies than push-mode support, it has the downside that procurement
and transport take time, so the delivery of supplies can be delayed. When a disaster first occurs, it takes affected local governments
time to ascertain accurate information and the ability of the private sector to secure supplies is also impeded, so disaster-affected
local governments alone will likely not be able to quickly procure the supply volumes needed.
Source: Cabinet Office

Fig. 2-4-2 Number of Evacuees in Kumamoto Prefecture and Number of Meals Supplied

Source: Cabinet Office33

Fig. 2-4-3 Transport Routes to Evacuation Centers for Supplies Provided as Push-mode Support Following
the Kumamoto Earthquake (overview as of May 2, 2016)

Source: Cabinet Office

Fig. 2-4-4 Tablet-based Evacuation Center Support System
Evacuation center support system (iPad system) overview
Each evacuation center (*) uses a tablet device (iPad) to submit information about the relief supplies requested, facilitating
the provision of appropriate supplies that meet the needs of each evacuation center.
*In some cases, information is being registered by municipal governments for the time being.
Evacuation center support
systemOperates in the cloud

Ordering of supplies
Evacuation centers

Information about the situation at evacuation
centers and requests for relief supplies entered

Municipality

Information about
evacuation centers
recorded

Departments for management ofevacuation centers in National,
prefectural, and municipal
governments

Aggregation & reporting

Provision of supplies toevacuation centers(In collaboration
with NPOs)

Relief supplies
distribution facility(Food, drugs, clothing,fuel, etc.)

Advantages
・The introduction of acloud-based systemmeans that information
previously exchanged byphone or fax can be
aggregated more easily.
・The cloud-based system
makes it easier to share
information between
national, prefectural andmunicipal governments.
・Needs at each
evacuation center canbe ascertained more
precisely and supplies
delivered more quickly.

Source: Excerpt from materials circulated at the 16th meeting of the National On-site Disaster Management Headquarters / 19th
meeting of the Kumamoto Prefecture Disaster Response Headquarters (April 25)

34

Fig. 2-4-5 System for Facilitating Information Sharing

Source: Cabinet Office(2) Use of Private Sector’s Logistic Hubs
The Kumamoto Earthquake damaged and rendered unusable many facilities that had been registered as
prefectural supply hubs for storing relief supplies from the national government and delivering them tomunicipal supply bases and evacuation centers.
Accordingly, with the cooperation of private sector logistics operators, distribution centers in first Tosu City,
Saga Prefecture, and then Hisayama Town, Fukuoka Prefecture were used for shipping supplies to municipal
supply bases and evacuation centers, with the assistance of those logistics operators and the Self-Defense
Forces (Fig. 2-4-6).
As the extent of a disaster could determine whether or not supply hubs managed by private sector logistics
operators need to be used in this way, the Handbook on the Opening and Management of Regional Supply Hubs
was revised from this perspective in March 2017.

35

Fig. 2-4-6 Process for Selecting Relief Supply Hubs Following the Kumamoto Earthquake

Source: Cabinet Office

Column: Results of a Questionnaire Concerning Supply Hubs
Various problems have been experienced in the establishment and management of prefectural andmunicipal bases for relief supplies. Accordingly, the Cabinet Office conducted a survey in October 2016, todiscover more about the designation of disaster supply hubs by local governments nationwide, especiallyareas likely to be affected by Nankai Trough earthquake or Tokyo inland earthquake.
(a) Designation of regional supply hubs by prefectures
・ 77% of prefectural regional logistics hubs have been designated (established), while 9% are under review(designation is being considered) from the perspective of the use of private sector facilities or theirlocation, due to earthquakes or other issues.
・The ten prefectures vulnerable to Nankai Trough earthquake and Tokyo and the other 3 prefectures thatwould be affected by a Tokyo inland earthquake have designated all of their logistics hubs.
None
Under review
Already set up

All prefectures

Prefectures vulnerable to Nankai
Trough quake (10 prefectures)Tokyo inland (Tokyo + 3
other prefectures)(b) Operation of regional logistics hubs
・Among the four prefectures that would be affected by a Tokyo inland earthquake, 67% of regional logistics
hubs are due to be operated by private sector business operators.
Independent
External*

All prefectures

36

Prefectures vulnerable to Nankai
Trough quake (10 prefectures)Tokyo inland (Tokyo + 3
other prefectures)*Supply hub operation
outsourced to private sectorbusiness operators in theevent of a disaster(c) Safety of regional supply hubs
・50% of regional supply hubs nationwide and 47% of regional logistics hubs in prefectures vulnerable to
Nankai Trough earthquake lacked adequate earthquake resistance or floor strength, were inaccessible tolarge trucks, or had other deficiencies in such areas as availability of an emergency power supply.
Noncompliant*Compliant

All prefectures

Tokyo inland (Tokyo + 3
other prefectures)

Prefectures vulnerable to Nankai
Trough quake (10 prefectures)*Lacking in such areas asearthquake resistance, floor
strength, accessibility to large
trucks, and availability of an
emergency power supply(d) Designation of local logistics bases by municipalities
・61% of municipal local logistics bases have been designated, while 11% are under some kind of review inlight of issues following the Kumamoto Earthquake.
・Among these, 79% of municipalities in prefectures vulnerable to Nankai Trough earthquake and 73% ofmunicipalities in Tokyo and the 3 other prefectures that would be affected by a Tokyo inland earthquake
have designated their logistics bases.
None
Under review
Already set up

All municipalities

Prefectures vulnerable to Nankai
Trough quake (10 prefectures)Tokyo inland (Tokyo + 3
other prefectures)(e) Operation of local logistics bases by municipalities
・Most municipalities plan to operate their local logistics bases independently, with just 7% of municipalities
nationwide planning to outsource their operation to private sector business operators.
Independent
External*

All municipalities

Prefectures vulnerable to Nankai
Trough quake (10 prefectures)Tokyo inland (Tokyo + 3
other prefectures)*Supply hub operation
outsourced to private sectorbusiness operators in theevent of a disaster<Glossary of Terms>
Regional logistics hub:Hubs at which affected prefectures accept supplies coordinated by the government and dispatch them to local logistics
bases and evacuation centers established by each municipality.
Prefectures vulnerable to Nankai Trough earthquake:
The 10 prefectures (Shizuoka Prefecture, Aichi Prefecture, Mie Prefecture, Wakayama Prefecture, Tokushima
Prefecture, Kagawa Prefecture, Ehime Prefecture, Kochi Prefecture, Oita Prefecture, and Miyazaki Prefecture) that would
be expected to suffer immense damage beyond the response capabilities of police and firefighting organizations within
the affected areas, based on the damage estimates for Nankai Trough earthquake (August 2012, Working Group on
Measures to Deal with Nankai Trough Megathrust Earthquake).
Tokyo and 3 other prefectures that would be affected by a Tokyo inland earthquake:
The prefectures that would be expected to suffer immense damage in the event of a Tokyo inland earthquake (Saitama
Prefecture, Chiba Prefecture, Tokyo, Kanagawa Prefecture).

37

2-5 Corporate Business Continuity Initiatives
In the aftermath of a disaster, it is necessary not only to enable those affected to rebuild their lives as soon
as possible, but also to ensure that business activities return to normal without delay, to facilitate recovery andreconstruction. Accordingly, corporate business continuity initiatives aimed at minimizing the damage caused
by a disaster and facilitating swift recovery in the event of any damage or implementing alternative measures
are crucial. In March 2017, the Cabinet Office conducted a questionnaire- and interview-based survey mainly
focused on the extent of the damage suffered by affected companies in Kumamoto Prefecture, to discover more
about companies’ business continuity initiatives and learn lessons from them (Survey of the Impact of the
Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for Companies (June 2017); hereinafter the “Business Continuity
Survey.”) The following provides a broad overview of company circumstances, based on the Business Continuity
Survey, among other information.
(1) Overview(i) General outline of companies
According to the basic survey in the 2014 Economic Census, there were 47,916 companies (total for private
enterprises, corporations, and juridical persons other than these; Fig. 2-5-1) headquartered within the area ofKumamoto Prefecture defined as the “affected area” (Fig. 2-5-4). The Business Continuity Survey drew upon a“private sector survey” (see p. 41 <Definitions for the Business Continuity Survey> for definitions).
According to the private sector survey, at least 15,845 companies nationwide located outside the affectedarea have a business relationship (are “companies with a business relationship” (see p. 41 for definitions)) with“companies in the affected area” (see p. 41 for definitions) (16,509 companies) (Fig. 2-5-2). Fig. 2-5-3 showstheir regional distribution.
Fig. 2-5-1 Location of Head Office of Companies (Government Statistics)
Location of head office
Affected area
Kumamoto Prefecture (including
the affected area)
Kyushu & Okinawa
Nationwide

47,916

1.2%

Net sales(100 million
yen)65,27858,158

1.4%

74,20755,664

479,861

11.7%

705,130

4,098,284

100%

13,777,208

477,869(Total for all prefectures)
5,086,456

Number ofcompanies

Share

Total production within
the prefecture(100 million yen)－

Source: Number of companies and net sales are taken from the 2014 Economic Census basic survey (Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications). Total production within the prefecture is taken from the FY2013 Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts(Cabinet Office). Figures for net sales cover those companies that provided figures for the necessary items.

Fig. 2-5-2 Location of Head Office of Companies (Private Sector Survey)
Location of head office
Affected area
Kumamoto Prefecture (including the affectedarea)
Kyushu & Okinawa
Nationwide

No. of companies
16,50919,680167,645
1,497,322

Source: Private sector survey (results of a survey by Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd. as of February 2017)

38

Share
1.1%
1.3%
11.2%
100%

Fig. 2-5-3 Location of Head Office of Companies with a Business Relationship
Hokkaido & Tohoku
Kanto
Chubu
Kinki
Chugoku & Shikoku
Kyushu & Okinawa (excluding Kumamoto)Kumamoto (excluding the affected area)
Total

No. of companies
375
3,547
1,006
1,858
851
6,632
1,576
15,845

Share
2.4%
22.4%
6.3%
11.7%
5.4%
41.9%
9.9%
100%

Source: Private sector survey (results of a survey by Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd. as of February 2017)

Fig. 2-5-4 Area of Focus of the Business Continuity Survey, etc. in regard to the Extent of the Damage(Affected Area)(See p. 41 for names of municipalities.)39

(ii) General outline of the economy
An indicator that provides a broad overview of consumer spending in Kumamoto Prefecture is the value ofsales at department stores and supermarkets on a store-wide basis compared with the same month of theprevious year. In April 2016, when the Kumamoto Earthquake struck, this indicator fell by more than 30% fromthe same month of the previous year. Sales remained down thereafter, tracking between 1.6% and 5.8% lower
than the same month of the previous year from June onward (Fig. 2-5-5).
Although the ratio of active job openings to applicants (active opening ratio) in Kumamoto Prefecture waslower than the national figure through August 2016, it has been higher than the national figure since September
2016 (Fig. 2-5-6).
Fig. 2-5-5 Value of Department Store and Supermarket Sales Compared with the Same Month of thePrevious Year

Source: Current Survey of Commerce (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)Fig. 2-5-6 Active Opening Ratio

Source: Employment Referrals for General Workers (Report on Employment Service) (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)40

(2) Extent of the Damage to Companies
According to the Business Continuity Survey, approximately 80% of “companies in the affected area” suffered“some kind of damage” (see p. 41 for definitions), while approximately 46% of “companies with a traderelationship” suffered “some kind of damage” (Fig. 2-5-7).
Fig. 2-5-7 Extent of Damage

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)

When “companies in the affected area” that had suffered some kind of damage were asked about the timingof their resumption of business in the wake of the earthquake, approximately 80% replied that they “did notsuspend business” or resumed business “within a week of the earthquake.” On the other hand, somecompanies responded that they have “still not resumed business, due to severe damage” (Fig. 2-5-8).
Fig. 2-5-8 Timing of the Resumption of Business by “Companies in the Affected Area” that Suffered “SomeKind of Damage” (N=1002)

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)41

When “companies in the affected area” were asked about their net sales between April and June 2016 (thefirst quarter of the fiscal year), at least 60% of companies that had suffered some kind of damage stated thatnet sales were down from the previous year, with almost 30% reporting a fall in excess of 20%. On the other
hand, among companies that did not suffer any damage, at least 70% stated that the fluctuation had been
within 10% of the figure for the previous year (Fig. 2-5-9).
Moreover, approximately 40% of “companies with a business relationship” that had suffered some kind ofdamage reported that their net sales for the period April to June 2016 had declined.
Fig. 2-5-9 April–June 2016 Net Sales of “Companies in the Affected Area” and “Companies with a Business
Relationship”

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)

Looking at net sales between October and December 2016 (the third quarter of the fiscal year) among“companies in the affected area,” around 8% of companies that had suffered some kind of damage reported
having seen a fall in excess of 20%; when companies that reported a fall of more than 10% were included, thepercentage of companies rose to just under 20% (Fig. 2-5-10).
It is observed that the difference in the extent of the decline in sales between companies that suffereddamage and those that did not has decreased among both “companies in the affected area” and “companies
with a business relationship” compared with the situation in the April–June period (first quarter).

42

Fig. 2-5-10 October–December 2016 Net Sales of “Companies in the Affected Area” and “Companies with aBusiness Relationship”

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)(3) Business Continuity Initiatives(i) Results of the Business Continuity Survey(Companies surveyed)
Fig. 2-5-11 shows the number of completed questionnaires returned in this Business Continuity Survey. The
distribution of company scale should be noted when looking at figures from the Business Continuity Survey.
Fig. 2-5-11 Return of Questionnaires in the Business Continuity Survey
Company scale

Second-tier
Medium-sizedcorporations
companies
SMEs(Stated capital of(Stated capital of(Those not in
Total¥100 million or¥100 million or more,the 3 groups tomore, 100 or more
fewer than 100
the left)
Classification
employees, etc.)
employees, etc.)
5,000 (100%)
1,351 (27%)
600 (12%)263 (5%)2,786 (56%)
Total
2,011 (100%)
428 (21%)179 (9%)90 (4%)
1,314 (65%)
40%
32%
30%
34%
47%
2,500 (100%)
20 (1%)
45 (2%)
66 (3%)
2369 (95%)
Companies in the
1,255 (100%)
10 (1%)
14 (1%)
33 (3%)
1198 (95%)
affected area
50%
50%
31%
50%
51%
2,500 (100%)
1,331 (53%)
555 (22%)197 (8%)417 (17%)Companies with abusiness
756 (100%)
418 (55%)
165 (22%)57 (8%)
116 (15%)
relationship
30%
31%
30%
29%
28%
Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)
In each category, the top row shows the number of questionnaires sent out, the middle row shows the number returned, and thebottom row shows the response rate. Figures in brackets in the top and middle rows show the number as a percentage of each
total
Large
corporations(Stated capitalof ¥1 billion or
more)

43

(Development of Business Continuity Planning)
Fig. 2-5-12 shows the status of the preparation of business continuity plans (BCPs) according to this BusinessContinuity Survey.
Fig. 2-5-12 Development of BCPs by Company Scale

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)

Companies that had suffered some kind of damage were asked about initiatives that had been effective at
the time of the earthquake. At least 30% of companies that responded stated that “Purchasing / adding tostockpiles (water, food, other disaster supplies),” “Deciding on disaster response coordinators, etc.,”“Introduction of an electronic system for confirming people’s safety / contacting each other,” “Taking out fireand earthquake insurance, etc.,” and “Introduction/revision of evacuation drills” had been “effective” (Fig. 2-513).

44

Fig. 2-5-13 Initiatives that were Effective at the Time of the Earthquake
%
0

10

20

30

40

Purchasing / adding to stockpiles (water, food, other disastersupplies)
Deciding on disaster response coordinators, creation ofdisaster response teams

60

46

38

Introduction of an electronic system for confirming people’s safety /contacting each other (including disaster response apps, etc.)

34

Taking out fire and earthquake insurance (earthquake extended
coverage endorsement, business interruption insurance, etc.)

31

Introduction/revision of evacuation drills

30

Inspection of property (company buildings, machinery,equipment, etc.)
Seismic retrofit / seismic isolation of property or installationof earthquake-resistant mountings

27
24

Purchase of emergency generators

22

Identification of crucial elements (management resources)

21

Introduction of radio systems or priority telephone links(satellite phone, etc.) for use in a disaster
Increasing internal reserves (keeping reserves of cash,
savings, etc.)

14
14

Revision of BCP

9Securing alternative suppliers

8

Concluding agreements (alternative supplies or financial
assistance, etc. in the event of disaster)

8

Regular participation in disaster preparedness seminars, recommending obtaining qualifications in disastermanagement (qualified disaster prevention specialist, etc.) or creating financial assistance systems for
employees

7

Securing or preparing alternative facilities/buildings to serveas head office or business offices, etc.
Cross-training (cultivating replacement personnel inadvance)Securing or preparing alternative facilities/buildings for
production equipment

50

6
6

6

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)
Excludes those that did not provide a response.

Similarly, companies that had suffered some kind of damage were asked about initiatives were asked about“actions that your company wishes to take but are not currently taking (actions that your company wishes totake going forward).” The companies that responded selected “Action that we wish to take going forward” inresponse to most statements, but a particularly large number of respondents selected this in relation tostatements about rethinking the situation within their companies, such as “Revision of BCP,” “Cultivating
replacement personnel in advance,” “Acquisition of certification as an organization contributing to national
resilience,” and “Acquisition of ISO or other BCP certification” (Fig. 2-5-14).

45

Fig. 2-5-14 Actions that Companies Wish to Take Going Forward (N=1294)
%
0

10

20

30

40

50

Revision of BCP

48.5

Cross-training (cultivating replacement
personnel in advance)

47.8

Acquisition of certification as an organization
contributing to national resilience

45.4

Acquisition of ISO or other BCP certification

44.9

Introduction of an electronic system for confirming people’s safety/ contacting each other (including disaster response apps, etc.)

42.6

Introduction of radio systems or priority telephone links(satellite phone, etc.) for use in a disaster

42.5

Regular participation in disaster preparedness seminars, recommending obtaining
qualifications in disaster management (qualified disaster prevention specialist, etc.) or
creating financial assistance systems for employees

41.8

Securing or preparing alternative
facilities/buildings for production equipment

39.7

Securing or preparing alternative facilities/buildings toserve as head office or business offices, etc.

39.4

Purchase/lease of warehouses or land toprepare for increased inventory

38.5

Purchase of emergency generators

38.4

Concluding agreements (alternative supplies orfinancial assistance, etc. in the event of disaster)

38.2

Relocation of stores/factories, etc. to otherprefectures or overseas

37.5

Introduction/revision of evacuation drills

37.4

Deciding on disaster response coordinators,
creation of disaster response teams
Seismic retrofit / seismic isolation of property or
installation of earthquake-resistant mountings

34.8
34.7

Securing alternative suppliers

33.7

Cultivation of / gathering information aboutalternative buyers, etc.

33.1

Temporary suspension of trading

32.7

Purchasing / adding to stockpiles (water, food,other disaster supplies)
Deferred delivery (postponement of delivery
dates)

60

31.9
31.7

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from Survey of the Impact of the Kumamoto Earthquake on Business Continuity for
Companies (June 2017)
Excludes those that did not provide a response.

(ii) Findings from interviews with companies
As part of the Business Continuity Survey, 10 companies — mainly in the manufacturing and distributionsectors — were interviewed. Some expressed the view that formulating a BCP or making advance preparations
when constructing buildings had been helpful, while others stressed the importance of confirming the safetyof employees and their families after a disaster, along with the transmission and sharing of information. The
following provides a general outline of the findings from these interviews.

46

(Preparations that were useful at the time of the disaster)・We had formulated a BCP based on our past experiences of being affected by a disaster, so we were able
to get moving immediately after the earthquake struck.
・We succeeded in minimizing the damage that we suffered because we had increased the earthquake
resistance of our building from the design stage to be prepared for an anticipated earthquake. This was
based on the lessons learned from our business establishments outside Kumamoto that had experienceof being affected by a disaster and also due to the presence of the Hinagu fault.
・Due in part to the fact that we had halted production at the time of the earthquake on April 14, we did
not suffer any fatal equipment damage as a result of the April 16 earthquake.
・Regarding systems for communicating information and issuing instructions, we had already installed
communications equipment as part of our routine set-up, so we were able to maintain uninterrupted
contact with head office, etc.
・We have built a system enabling us to see the operational status of all our stores nationwide, which
operate 24 hours a day, so we were able to grasp the severity of the situation immediately after thedisaster occurred.
・We have a thin client IT system, so we were able to continue operations, even though we were prohibitedfrom entering the office.
(Response at the time of the disaster)・The first thing every company did was to confirm the safety of its employees.
・Most companies sent out messages to employees from senior executive management and are providing
livelihood recovery support payments.
・We greatly admire our local employees, who worked enthusiastically and independently to repair our local
business establishment, even though they themselves had been personally affected by the disaster.
・Our swift recovery was facilitated by the support of all group companies under the leadership of head
office. This included dispatching engineers who promptly carried out a building diagnosis immediately
after the disaster and determined that our building could be used, and making arrangements for relief
supplies and materials and equipment to assist with repairs.
・Other parts of the group provided support by assembling a team of people with experience of Kumamotoor the Great East Japan Earthquake.
・Thanks to the presence of employees from other parts of the group, we were able to encourage our
employees to take time off, so none of them suffered any major illnesses.
・It was essential to use alternative hubs for products that needed to be supplied without delay, due to thescale of the damage.
・We asked other companies in the same industry to lend us equipment components that we were unable
to purchase or obtain by other means.
・Distribution operators have professionals in the procurement of supplies within the group, so we wereable to provide supplies when we received orders from local governments. In doing so, we received
support in preparing and storing manifests and breakdowns from other business establishments within
the group that had experience of being affected by disaster, so we were able to carry out the reconciliationof accounts smoothly once we returned to normal operations.
・We had a backup system in which we arranged deliveries of bento meals to Kumamoto from Factory A,
which is close to Kumamoto, and then made up the resultant shortfall from Factory A’s usual output withproducts from Factory B, which is located in the neighboring region.
・Being able to start the sale of food and daily necessities as early as possible assists those affected by adisaster. We adjusted the payment method used at cash registered on a case-by-case basis, because
different stores were doing business in different ways, with some forced to set up shop outdoors in theinterim due to damage to the store itself, while others were able to partly reopen their premises.
・We shared information within the company about roads that were passable, based on the roads that ouremployees had been able to use.
・The power was restored promptly and we were able to communicate using smartphones, which helped
us to recover swiftly.

47

・Many of our subcontractors are micro-enterprises, so we managed our business in such a way as to ensurethat our suppliers did not run short of funds.
・We provided local citizens with supplies from our stockpile.
(Future initiatives)
・The fact that our employees did not sustain any great harm helped us to recover quickly, so we plan toreview our BCP, etc. from the perspective of putting human life first.
・ Preparation and circulation of an anthology of examples of impacts resulting from the Kumamoto
Earthquake.
・Revision of our equipment layout, such as moving items away from walls, in case tremors cause equipment
to move.
・Installation of sensors, so that we can ascertain the damage to the interior of the building or equipment
without going inside.
・Revamp of our system so that it can deal with variations in business formats in the event of being affectedby a disaster.
・Distributed storage of customer equipment maintenance tools, etc., in case we cannot enter our businesspremises.
・ Augmenting our bases in other regions and developing closer cooperative relationships with othercompanies in the same industry.
・Greater collaboration with the community, such as opening our building up to the community for use as
an evacuation center.
・Support for a volunteer group established by our employees, which is contributing to the community.

(iii) Conclusion
The Business Continuity Survey revealed that indirect damage had effects outside the affected area as well,while the interviews provided a renewed awareness that companies cannot respond to disaster if they havenot made appropriate preparations. Most of the companies affected by the disaster are about to start revising
their systems, so it is necessary to identify the priorities for business continuity, revise damage assumptions,and put in place alternative strategies.
<Definitions for the Business Continuity Survey>■ Definition of “affected area”
The areas where a seismic intensity of 6-lower or more was recorded during the two earthquakes with amaximum seismic intensity of 7 (in the case of rural districts, those districts where multiple municipalities
recorded a seismic intensity of 6-lower or more have mainly been selected). Specifically, these are Kumamoto
City (Chuo-ku, Higashi-ku, Nishi-ku, Minami-ku, Kita-ku), Yatsushiro City, Tamana City, Kikuchi City, Uto City,
Kamiamakusa City, Uki City, Aso City, Amakusa City, Koshi City, Misato Town in Shimomashiki District, Kikuchi
District (Ozu Town, Kikuyo Town), Aso District (Minamioguni Town, Oguni Town, Ubuyama Village, Takamori
Town, Nishihara Village, Minamiaso Village), Kamimashiki District (Mifune Town, Kashima Town, Mashiki
Town, Kosa Town, Yamato Town). Due to data constraints, the Business Continuity Survey covers only areasof Kumamoto Prefecture affected by the disaster.
■ Definition of “companies in the affected area”
Companies with their head office in the affected area
■ Definition of “companies with a business relationship”
48

“Companies outside the affected area” which, based on the results of the survey by a private sector survey
company, are supplied with “goods or services” by a company with its head office in the affected area ofKumamoto Prefecture or which supply “goods or services” to such a company■ Private sector survey
Results of a survey by Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd. as of February 2017
■ Company scale
Large
corporations

Second-tiercorporations

Medium-sizedcompanies

WholesaleStated capital of atleast ¥1 billion and a
regular workforce of atleast 101 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥100 million but
less than ¥1 billion anda regular workforce ofat least 101 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥100 million anda regular workforce of
100 people or fewer

SMEs

RetailStated capital of atleast ¥1 billion and a
regular workforce of atleast 51 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥50 million but
less than ¥1 billion anda regular workforce ofat least 51 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥50 million and a
regular workforce of 50
people or fewer

Service industry
Stated capital of atleast ¥1 billion and a
regular workforce of atleast 101 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥50 million but
less than ¥1 billion anda regular workforce ofat least 101 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥50 million and a
regular workforce of
100 people or fewer

Other
Stated capital of atleast ¥1 billion and a
regular workforce of atleast 301 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥300 million but
less than ¥1 billion anda regular workforce ofat least 301 people
Stated capital of atleast ¥100 million but
less than ¥300 million,
andStated capital of atleast ¥300 million anda regular workforce of
300 people or fewer

Companies other than the above■ Regions
Hokkaido & Tohoku: Hokkaido, Aomori Prefecture, Iwate Prefecture, Iwate Prefecture, Miyagi Prefecture,
Akita Prefecture, Yamagata Prefecture, Fukushima Prefecture, Niigata Prefecture
Kanto: Ibaraki Prefecture, Tochigi Prefecture, Gunma Prefecture, Saitama Prefecture, Chiba Prefecture,
Tokyo, Kanagawa Prefecture
Chubu: Toyama Prefecture, Ishikawa Prefecture, Fukui Prefecture, Yamanashi Prefecture, Nagano
Prefecture, Gifu Prefecture, Shizuoka Prefecture, Aichi Prefecture, Mie Prefecture
Kinki: Shiga Prefecture, Kyoto Prefecture, Osaka Prefecture, Hyogo Prefecture, Nara Prefecture, Wakayama
Prefecture
Chugoku & Shikoku: Tottori Prefecture, Shimane Prefecture, Okayama Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture,
Yamaguchi Prefecture, Tokushima Prefecture, Kagawa Prefecture, Ehime Prefecture, Kochi
Prefecture
Kyushu & Okinawa: Fukuoka Prefecture, Saga Prefecture, Nagasaki Prefecture, Kumamoto Prefecture, Oita
Prefecture, Miyazaki Prefecture, Kagoshima Prefecture, Okinawa Prefecture■ Damage
Direct damage: Physical damage arising from damage to stores, factories, equipment, etc.
Indirect damage: Impacts of the earthquake other than physical damage, such as suspension of business,
decline in net sales, inability of employees to attend work, etc.
Some kind of damage (suffered damage): Direct and/or indirect damage

49

Chapter 3

Future Deployment in Light of the Kumamoto

Earthquake
3-1 Use of ICT (Public-Private Partnerships Focused on Disaster Management
Information)
A large number of those affected by the Kumamoto Earthquake ended up living in their cars, rather thanstaying at an evacuation center. As such, it was difficult to gather information about trends among such people,
and to understand needs among disaster affected people in evacuation centers and progress regarding
distribution of supplies to them. To resolve such issues, it is necessary to establish a framework for sharing
information gathered by the national government, local governments, and private sector companies andorganizations that will assist in disaster response. There is a particular need for a swift response based on
public-private partnerships in times of disaster, so it is vital to ensure that information held by each organizationis shared easily, based on certain rules.
Accordingly, the Cabinet Office decided to set up a team to consider the implementation of specific projects
based on information and communications technology (ICT), which is thought likely to offer an effective meansof sharing information. It will also examine rules concerning the sharing of information among organizations
including national and local governments, and private companies and organizations, including the methods
used to share information and the duration of such sharing, as well as promoting the exchange of informationby this means (hereinafter, the “Disaster Information Hub”). As a result, the National and Local Government
Public-Private Disaster Information Hub Promotion Team was established under the Working Group for the
Promotion of Standardization of Disaster Measures of the National Disaster Management Council’s Disaster
Management Implementation Committee and began its deliberations in FY2017.
Ahead of the team’s establishment, the Cabinet Office sought to solicit ideas from a wide range of sources
concerning new techniques that could be employed through the use of IT. As such, it began seeking submissions
from companies in November 2016 and held a hackathon (a portmanteau word coined from the words “hack”
and “marathon.” It is a competitive event in which programmers, designers, and other creators get together
and test their software development capabilities and ability to propose new services using IT within a shortperiod of time) in January 2017. The most outstanding ideas obtained from the hackathon will form the basis
for deliberations concerning the construction of the Disaster Information Hub (Fig. 3-1-1).

50

Fig. 3-1-1 Disaster Information Hub Concept

3-2 Local Government Support(1) Promotion of a Disaster Management System Enabling Municipalities to Access Assistance (Aid
Acceptance System)
Should a major disaster occur, it will be difficult for the affected municipalities to carry out an extensive rangeof disaster response operations singlehandedly. Accordingly, it is absolutely crucial for local governments tomake preparations under normal circumstances by thinking about how to ensure the smooth acceptance of
personnel and physical support from national and local governments, private companies, and volunteer groups,
so that these resources can be effectively utilized in responding to disaster. It is also vital for local governments
to put in place an aid acceptance system to this end.
However, only 40% or so of prefectures and just over 10% of municipalities have formulated aid acceptanceplans to date. Given the major earthquakes, storm and flood disasters of recent years, as well as fears that
Nankai Trough earthquake or Tokyo inland earthquake could occur, it is imperative that local governments
develop aid acceptance systems without delay (Figs. 3-2-1 and 3-2-2).

51

Fig. 3-2-1 Development of Aid Acceptance Plans

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications report “Administrative
Evaluation and Monitoring of the Promotion of Earthquake Countermeasures Focused on Emergency Disaster Control Measures:
Recommendations (Summary)” (June 2014)

Fig. 3-2-2 Local Government Mutual Support Agreements

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

Accordingly, to enable local governments to establish aid acceptance measures without delay, the Cabinet
Office set up the Study Group on Local Government Aid Acceptance Systems to undertake consultations on theformulation of guidelines. Taking into account the lessons of the Kumamoto Earthquake, the committee
published the Guidelines on Local Government Aid Acceptance Systems in Case of Disaster in March 2017 (Figs.
3-2-3 and 3-2-4).

52

Fig. 3-2-3 Guidelines on Local Government Aid Acceptance Systems in Case of Disaster

Source: Cabinet Office53

Fig. 3-2-4 Overall Structure of Local Government Support and Aid AcceptanceSource: Cabinet Office(2) Enhancement of the Content of Training for Local Government Heads and Officials
The ability to respond swiftly and accurately to a disaster relies to a great extent on the knowledge andexperience of the official tasked with disaster management. Accordingly, in FY2013, the Cabinet Office beganoffering Disaster Management Specialist Training Courses for national and local government employees, tocultivate personnel capable of responding swiftly and accurately to crises and personnel able to develop
networks of national and local government organizations.
One of these, the Training Course at the Ariake no Oka Core Wide-area Disaster Prevention Base features
lectures provided in collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies on such topics as “The Reality ofRunning an Evacuation Center” and “Emergency Operations Policy.” Efforts have been made to enhance thecontent of these courses in light of the recommendations in the aforementioned report.
Moreover, the Cabinet Office supports efforts to enhance the decision-making capacity of mayors, who leadthe response in the event of a disaster. Accordingly, in partnership with the Fire and Disaster Management
Agency, it organized the National Seminar on Disaster Prevention and Crisis Management for Heads of Local
Government for city mayors from across Japan. At the FY2016 seminar, Professor Toshitaka Katada of Gunma
University’s graduate school gave a lecture on “Initial Responses by Mayors,” while the Mayor of Sanjo City in
Niigata Prefecture spoke of his experience of dealing with disaster in a lecture on “Torrential Rain Disasters andDisaster Management Measures Taken by the Mayor of Sanjo City.”
54

Furthermore, in April 2017, the Cabinet Office jointly organized the Special Training Course on Disaster
Prevention and Crisis Management with the Cabinet Secretariat and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency.
Held at the Local Autonomy College, this course was aimed at officials in charge of disaster prevention and crisis
management at relevant ministries and agencies, prefectures, and cities designated by government ordinance.
It will be necessary to continue to enhance the content of training courses and strive to improve disasterprevention and response capabilities.

A lecture during the FY2016 Training Course at the Ariake
no Oka Core Wide-area Disaster Prevention BaseA lecture during the FY2016 National Seminar on Disaster
Prevention and Crisis Management for Heads of Local
Government

Column: What Leaders Should Do in the Event of Disaster
The Flood Disaster Summit is a gathering of local government leaders who have experienced major flood
disasters. At this summit, the views of local government leaders who have experienced such major
earthquakes as the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Kumamoto Earthquake were added to “What
Leaders Should Do in the Event of Disaster,” a list of pointers for local leaders intended to provide them withthe bare minimum knowledge that they should have in case of a flood disaster. This information is intended
to be applicable to storm and flood disasters, and earthquake and tsunami disasters alike. It is hoped that
this information will serve as an aid to decision-making in the event of future major disasters and will help
to mitigate the damage.
What Leaders Should Do in the Event of Disaster (Digest)
Prepared by the Joint Committee for Compiling “What Leaders Should Do in the Event of Disaster”
Mayor of Rikuzentakata City, Iwate Prefecture; Mayor of Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture; Mayor of
Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture; Mayor of Minamisanriku Town, Miyagi Prefecture; Mayor of Inashiki City,
Ibaraki Prefecture; Mayor of Katori City, Chiba Prefecture; Mayor of Sanjo City, Niigata Prefecture; Mayor of
Mitsuke City, Niigata Prefecture; Mayor of Hakuba Village, Nagano Prefecture; Mayor of Toyooka City, Hyogo
Prefecture; Mayor of Kumamoto City, Kumamoto Prefecture; Mayor of Kashima Town, Kumamoto Prefecture;
Mayor of Kosa Town, Kumamoto Prefecture; Mayor of Mashiki Town, Kumamoto Prefecture; Mayor of
Nishihara Village, Kumamoto Prefecture[I. Preparations Before Disaster Strikes]
1. Both legally and in practice, primary responsibility for dealing with the crisis posed by an impending
disaster and facilitating the recovery and reconstruction of people’s lives after a disaster is shouldered by
the mayor of a municipality. Criticism also converges on the mayor. A leader must be prepared for this andstrive to hone their skills.

55

2. For the most part, success or failure is determined when nature poses an imminent threat. The difficultyof decision-making in the event of a major disaster defies imagination. Efforts to deal with a crisis almost
invariably fail unless practice drills and preparations have been implemented before disaster strikes.
3. While the responsibility shouldered by mayors is heavy, their ability to deal with a crisis is limited. On theother hand, there are no mechanisms to provide systematic and expert support for mayoral decisionmaking.
At the very least, investigate in advance what kind of support capabilities are held by other organizations,such as the Self-Defense Forces, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism’s TEC-FORCE, andmeteorological observatories. Through activities such as collaborative drills, build relationships within
which you feel comfortable enough to ask for help.
4. Routinely engage in dialogue with local citizens; communicate with them and seek their understanding in
advance regarding the decision-making process in the event of a crisis. This process will help to lessen any
hesitation should the worst occur.
5. Routinely and openly inform local citizens that there are limits to what local government can do and ask
them to be prepared to protect their own lives based on their own judgment.
6. A mayor can lose their own life in a disaster. An organization ceases to function in the absence of its leader.
Ensure that you decide on the order of deputies in advance, without fail.
7. Routinely provide proactive support to disaster-stricken areas. The experience of official temporarily
deployed to disaster-stricken areas helps to build disaster response know-how.
[II. Responding to the Immediate Crisis]
1. Delays in decision-making cost lives. Delays in the initial response are particularly critical. First andforemost, you must speed up your ability to make decisions as a leader.
2. Protecting lives must be the top priority; you must not hesitate to issue evacuation recommendations.
3. Be aware that people are not inclined to try to escape. When faced with a disaster, humans have a strong
tendency to lapse into a mental state called “normalcy bias,” in which they underestimate impending
danger in an attempt to remain calm. Both in actual disasters and in psychology experiments, people havea tendency to delay their escape.
Of course, the timing of evacuation recommendations is important, but more crucial still is acquiring theskills required to convince people to overcome their inclination against escaping to safety, such asproviding danger warnings as needed and using words that convey a sense of urgency.
4. You will be inundated with telephone calls from local citizens and the media. Set up a call center or similar
to deal with these.
5. Whatever happens, keep records.
[III. Dealing with Rescue, Recovery, and Reconstruction]
1. A leader must be as visible as possible to citizens via the media, communicating that the municipal office
is doing its utmost to deal with the situation and encouraging those affected by the disaster. The eyes of
local citizens are on the leader. Ensure that you are fully aware of the words that you use and yourdemeanor.
2. Set up a Volunteer Center straight away. Volunteers are not just a source of labor. The presence ofvolunteers brings courage to those affected by the disaster and helps to create a more cheerfulatmosphere in disaster-stricken areas. Deploy official to serve as a link between the Volunteer Center andlocal government. (However, if an earthquake has occurred and there are concerns about aftershocks,
ensure that consideration is given to preventing secondary disasters when setting up a Volunteer Center.)56

3. Prioritize the allocation of tasks that only municipal official can fulfill to municipal official.
4. Understand the pain and sadness of local citizens and communicate the fact that the leader fully
understands it. Knowing that others share their pain and sadness brings comfort to those affected by thedisaster, reinforces their sense of unity, and helps to stimulate recovery and reconstruction.
5. Hold a press conference at a set time every day and continually supply information. The ironclad rules ofcrisis management are don’t run away, don’t hide, and don’t lie. The media are sometimes a nuisance andcan disrupt your work, but beyond them are local citizens and other worried people. Positive news brings
courage to local citizens.
6. There will be a massive quantity of rubble and waste. Secure a spacious temporary holding site without
delay. Call on local citizens to separate waste such as tatami mats, household electrical appliances, andtires as far as possible. This will help to speed up disposal later on.
7. Set up a one-stop service desk within the government building, to alleviate the burden on those affectedby the disaster.
8. You should resolutely carry out everything necessary to rescue local citizens, without hesitation. Above
all, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, it is a race against time amid great turbulence. You alsoneed to make it abundantly clear to official that they “must not worry about money. The mayor will sort
something out.” and that they should “do everything that they ought to. The mayor will takeresponsibility.”
9. Graciously accept visits from official visitors who come to see the situation, even if you are busy. Those
who see the situation on the ground will invariably become allies.
10. Keep expressing your gratitude to those who provide assistance and carry out rescue operations. Your
official are affected by the disaster, too. Express your gratitude to your official and their families.
11. Make a conscious effort to ensure that official members have an opportunity to take a break.
12. Disasters are infinitely varied and you will bump up against a mountain of systems and practices that do
not mesh with the reality of the situation. In partnership with the leaders of other disaster-stricken areas,demonstrating a strong sense of purposefulness, encourage a change in the situation or practice or thecreation of new systems by calling for assistance from the high-ranking government officials and politicians
who come to see the situation, and seeking to influence public opinion via the media.

573-3 Long-term Community Development
When undertaking reconstruction in the aftermath of a disaster, it is necessary for disaster affected local
governments to formulate a basic vision promptly and ensure that reconstruction and community development
proceed smoothly. Local governments can ensure a level-headed response from the early stages of a disasterby undertaking in advance the basic preparations, such as deliberations among relevant parties concerning thepolicy on formulating a vision for reconstruction in the aftermath of envisaged disasters, as well as drills focusedon drawing up such visions. To encourage municipalities to prepare for reconstruction based on the assumptionof a disaster before disaster actually strikes, the national government needs to promote the widespread
implementation of scenario visualization and simulation exercises involving reconstruction and community
development. It must also make available the requisite guides and manuals. Moreover, it would be desirable topromote the establishment of a scheme for providing introductions to experts who offer support in postdisaster reconstruction and community development.
Accordingly, the national government has decided to compile and publish the “Guide to Scenario
Visualization and Simulation Exercises for Reconstruction and Community Development.” As well as explaining
the need for this form of visualization exercise and providing an overview of the process, the guide will cover
the things that need to be prepared to carry out these exercises and points to bear in mind in running them. It
was trialed at five local governments in FY2016 and the specific content of the exercises will be highlighted in
the form of an anthology of examples. After publication, the government intends to promote widespreadawareness and understanding of exercises based on the guide, as well as preparing guidelines on preparing forreconstruction before disaster strikes, which will reflect the content of the guide.
Some local governments have already embarked on initiatives of this kind. For example, Tokyo Metropolitan
Government has put together the “TMG Earthquake Disaster Recovery Manual” (revised March 2016) toprepare for the Tokyo inland earthquake expected to strike in due course. This manual sets out the fundamental
approach to reconstruction based on a combination of self-help, mutual support, and public support, involving
a wide range of stakeholders, including not only national and local governments, but also disaster affected
people, NPOs, volunteers, experts, and companies. It also presents mechanisms that enable citizens toproactively undertake reconstruction.

3-4 Conclusion
The government endeavored to ensure that recovery following the Kumamoto Earthquake were carried out
promptly, including emergency recovery transport infrastructure to facilitate the distribution of supplies to theaffected areas and recovery of rivers to prevent secondary damage. In addition to what has been learned fromthe stock of examples amassed since the Great East Japan Earthquake, a great deal of inspiration was obtained
from new initiatives such as push-mode support and collaboration between NPOs and local government bodies.
The national government, and prefectural and municipal governments must use these lessons to strengthen
the systems needed in times of disaster, as well as enhancing their partnership and coordination functions. In
addition, it is necessary to establish and revise the requisite systems, guidelines, and manuals.
In particular, if a major disaster such as Tokyo inland earthquake or Nankai Trough earthquake should occur,
the damage will be extensive. This could give rise to problems never before experienced with past earthquakes,
because not only will the ability of the national and local governments to rescue people be more diffuse, butthere could also be a substantial reduction in rescue leadership functions if the core bodies of national
government are damaged by Tokyo inland earthquake, for example. Moreover, it is also important to swell theranks of those involved in disaster preparedness initiatives. This will encourage self-help and mutual support,
to address aspects that support in the form of public support cannot fully cover.

58

Rather than waiting in the hope that public support will be available, the most important thing in increasing
disaster prevention capabilities will be for each and every individual to love the area where they live; to regard
the disaster risk of their local community as an issue that concerns them personally; and to think seriously
about the preparations that they can make to address that risk and be ready and willing to take all possible
measures in response. It is imperative that local citizens band together with others in their community to build
systems that will enable them to mitigate disasters.

59

Part I
Current Disaster Management
Measures in Japan

Part I

Current Disaster Management Measures inJapan
Due to its natural conditions, Japan is prone to various natural disasters. A variety of natural disasters
occurred in 2016, such as earthquakes, torrential rain disasters due to typhoon, and volcanic eruptions. Part I
focuses on the recent countermeasures for disaster risk reduction, in particular the status of policies
implemented intensively in 2015.

Chapter 1

Current Disaster Management Policies

Section 1: Reducing Disaster Risk in Advance Through Self-help and Mutual
Support
1-1 Raising Awareness of Disaster Risk Reduction Among the Public
Japan experiences many natural disasters, so the government is continually undertaking initiatives that
constitute “public support.” These include measures undertaken before disaster strikes: for example, building
embankments and other hard infrastructure measures, as well as soft infrastructure measures, such as
conducting drills. In addition, in times of disaster, this public support includes providing supplies via push-mode
support and deploying extra official to the affected region, as in the case of the April 2016 Kumamoto
Earthquake. Other examples of public support include designating the damage resulting from 2016 Typhoon
10 as a Disaster of Extreme Severity and providing financial support under the Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims to those affected by the conflagration that engulfed the
downtown area of Itoigawa City in Niigata Prefecture.
However, there will be limits to the support that can be provided as public support in the event of a majordisaster such as Nankai Trough earthquake, which is anticipated to occur in due course. In fact, a study showedthat when the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck, just under 70% of people were rescued as a result of
self-help by themselves and their families, while approximately 30% were rescued through mutual support,such as the assistance of their neighbors (Fig. 1-1-1). With falling population numbers causing the depopulationof towns and villages, and membership of voluntary disaster management organizations and volunteer fire
corps on the decline, it is vital to raise each and every person’s awareness of disaster risk reduction and spurthem to take specific steps to address it, ensuring that they regard disasters as something that affects themspecifically, rather than something that happens to other people.
It is necessary to ensure that people understand disaster risk in their local area and make preparations, suchas securing furniture and stockpiling food; take all opportunities to participate in evacuation drills, so that they
are prepared to take appropriate evacuation actions; and undertake self-help and mutual support with theirneighbors in the event of disasters.
In the Survey on Awareness of and Activities Related to Disaster Management in Daily Activities conductedby the Cabinet Office last year, the public demonstrated a high level of awareness of the possibility of a disasteroccurring. More than 60% of respondents recognize the possibility of a major disaster occurring, including61those who believe that it is “almost certain to occur” and those who believe that it is “highly likely to occur”(Fig. 1-1-2). Meanwhile, when asked about disaster preparedness, the percentage of people who said either
that they are making sufficient preparations or that they are making the preparations that can be made in daily
life was lower than 40% (Fig. 1-1-3). While recognizing the possibility of a major disaster occurring, respondents
do not acknowledge that their preparations are inadequate. In addition, the survey revealed that older age
groups have a higher tendency to prepare for disasters than younger age groups.
In the future, it will be necessary to consider enlightenment activities to encourage people who are alreadyaware of the possibility of disaster to make preparations for its occurrence. Focusing on reducing disaster riskin advance through self-help and mutual support, this chapter introduces a variety of measures.
Fig. 1-1-1 Types of Rescuers of Buried or Confined People at the Time of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

Sample survey: See Japan Association for Fire Science and Engineering (1996) “Survey Report Concerning Fires at the Time of theSouthern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake in 1995.”

Fig. 1-1-2 Awareness of Disaster Possibility

N = 10,000

Fig. 1-1-3 Importance of Disaster Preparedness

N = 10,000

Source: Prepared from the Survey on Awareness of and Activities Related to Disaster Management in Daily Activities (May 2016)

62

1-2 Efforts in Disaster Management Drills
In the event of a natural disaster, national government institutions, local governments, designated public
corporations, and other institutions involved in disaster management must work as one in cooperation withlocal residents to respond appropriately to that disaster. Accordingly, it is vital to implement disaster risk
reduction initiatives before disaster strikes, such as drills involving collaboration between relevant organizations.
For this reason, institutions involved in disaster management implement disaster management drills based on
the Basic Act on Disaster Management, Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction, and other regulations to verify
and confirm the emergency measures to be taken when a natural disaster strikes and to enhance residents’awareness of disasters.
In FY2016, the following drills were conducted in accordance with the 2016 Comprehensive Disaster
Management Drill Framework, which prescribed the basic policy on conducting disaster management drills anddetails of the government’s comprehensive disaster management drills.
(1) Comprehensive “Disaster Preparedness Day” Disaster Management Drills
On September 1, 2016, which is Disaster Preparedness Day in Japan, the government held a drill based on
the scenario of the situation immediately after an earthquake. First, Prime Minister Abe and the rest of the
Cabinet made their way on foot to the Prime Minister’s Office. They then held a meeting of the Extreme Disaster
Management Headquarters (a Disaster Response Headquarters set up in the event of an especially unusual andcatastrophic major disaster, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake), which is attended by the whole Cabinet.
This included video-conferences with the governors of Mie, Wakayama, and Kochi prefectures to ascertain theextent of the damage and the support requested, as well as reports by members of the Cabinet about thedamage and the response to the disaster. Participants worked with local governments and other bodies toconfirm response guidelines that assigned the highest priority to saving human lives, dispatch a governmental
investigation team, and establish an On-site Disaster Management Headquarters. Throughout this process, they
sought to ensure that the systems required for implementing emergency measures in the immediate aftermathof an earthquake were in place, as well as checking the procedures. In addition, part of the meeting was opened
up to the media. Afterwards, Prime Minister Abe held a press conference and made a televised appeal to the
public via NHK to request their cooperation and inform them of the government’s initial response measures.
On the same day, a joint emergency drill involving nine prefectures and cities was held in a number oflocations, primarily in Saitama City. Prime Minister Abe traveled by helicopter from the Prime Minister’s Office
to the drill venue, where he watched a rescue drill and casualty triage drill based on the scenario of an
expressway accident. The Prime Minister also participated in a first aid drill to practice using an AED.

Government headquarters operational drill

Prime Minister Abe takes part in a first aid drill(Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters meeting)using an AED

63

(2) Government Tabletop Exercises
In November 2016, a tabletop exercise based on the scenario of Nankai Trough earthquake was held toimprove the knowledge and proficiency of officials from relevant ministries and agencies. A similar exercise,based on a Tokyo Inland Earthquake scenario, was held in January 2017. Using simulations that replicated nearreal-life disaster situations, participants tackled practical exercises without having been informed of the drill
scenarios in advance. The drills were followed by a review of the effectiveness of emergency measuresprescribed in plans and manuals.

Video-conference with the on-site disastermanagement headquarters(Drill based on Nankai Trough Earthquake scenario)

Executive office drill(Drill based on Nankai Trough Earthquake scenario)

Regional drills based on the running of an On-site Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters in the eventof Nankai Trough earthquake were held in Shikoku (Takamatsu) in November 2016, in Wakayama in December
2016, and in Shizuoka in January 2017. A drill based on the running of an On-site Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters was also held in Tokyo in January 2017, using the scenario of a Tokyo inland earthquake.

State Minister of the Cabinet Office Matsumoto receives a briefing(Wakayama On-site Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters operational drill)641-3 Tsunami Preparedness Initiatives
Loss of life in the event of a tsunami can be minimized to some extent if people take swift, appropriate action.
Accordingly, it is vital to provide people with a more profound understanding of tsunami and the specific natureof the damage that they cause, as well as the necessity of being prepared for a tsunami. The enactment of the
Act on the Promotion of Measures for Tsunami was inspired by experiences of the Great East Japan Earthquake,
which triggered a tsunami that caused unprecedented damage. As well as prescribing the obligation to makeefforts to take both tangible and intangible tsunami countermeasures, this act establishes November 5 as
Tsunami Preparedness Day and stipulates that both national and local governments should strive to hold events
appropriate to the purpose thereof. Furthermore, a resolution proposed jointly by 142 countries including
Japan was unanimously adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 2015, designating
November 5 as World Tsunami Awareness Day. The Act on the Promotion of Measures for Tsunami was revisedin March 2017 to add a provision specifying that contributions to the promotion of international cooperationin the area of tsunami countermeasures should also be considered, in light of the designation of November 5— Tsunami Preparedness Day — as World Tsunami Awareness Day. As such, the Cabinet Office, relevant
ministries and agencies, and local governments, among others, undertake initiatives around the country thatassist in raise awareness of tsunami preparedness.
(1) Tsunami Evacuation Drills
In FY2016, the national government (9 ministries and agencies), local governments (167 government bodies),and private companies (120 organizations) held earthquake and tsunami preparedness events around thecountry in which approximately 650,000 people took part.
Among them were drills in which local citizens took part, which were held by the Cabinet Office in partnershipwith local governments in 10 locations across the country (Haboro Town in Hokkaido, Nikaho City in Akita
Prefecture, Chigasaki City in Kanagawa Prefecture, Sado City in Niigata Prefecture, Matsusaka City in Mie
Prefecture, Hirogawa Town in Wakayama Prefecture, Saka Town in Hiroshima Prefecture, Matsushige Town inTokushima Prefecture, Kuroshio Town in Kochi Prefecture, and Ashiya Town in Fukuoka Prefecture).
Approximately 25,000 people participated in these drills, in which people practiced protecting themselves
when an earthquake occurred (shakeout drill) and evacuating to the nearest evacuation site once the tremors
subsided (evacuation drill). In some areas, various other drills also took place, to practice such skills as setting
up an evacuation center, preparing and serving food for evacuees, and first aid.

Night-time drill involving evacuation to a tsunami
evacuation tower

Evacuation drill at a nursery school(Kuroshio Town, Kochi Prefecture)(Hirogawa Town, Wakayama Prefecture)65

Disaster preparedness class given by
local high school students

Shakeout drill(Nikaho City, Akita Prefecture)(Ashiya Town, Fukuoka Prefecture)

Moreover, the Relay Tsunami Disaster Drills for “World Tsunami Awareness Day” were held in various partsof the globe (Valparaiso, Chile; Miyazaki Prefecture, Japan; Aceh, Indonesia; Kochi Prefecture, Japan; Hawaii,USA), with the cooperation of relevant ministries and agencies, JICA, and local governments, aiming to linkexperiences of and lessons from tsunami around the world.
(2) Public Awareness Campaigns(i) Public Awareness Campaign Involving the Tsunami Bosai Promotion Squad
The Tsunami Bosai Promotion Squad, a group of local mascot characters including Funassyi and Kumamon,
was again involved in a public awareness campaign in FY2016. Various media were used to maximize exposure,in order to achieve greater public awareness nationwide about appropriate emergency evacuation actions in
the event of a tsunami. These included the display of public awareness posters by companies and local
governments across the country, the use of visuals on customer-facing cash registers and displays at major
convenience stores and supermarkets, the dissemination of information via the dedicated Tsunami Bosai
Promotion Squad website, and the screening of videos at cinemas and on monitors at commercial facilities. In
addition, members of the Tsunami Bosai Promotion Squad appeared at a Tsunami Preparedness Day event toraise awareness (described below).

FY2016 tsunami preparedness awareness visual

FY2016 public awareness poster

66

(ii) FY2016 Tsunami Preparedness Day Public Awareness Event
On November 5, 2016, which was the first Tsunami Preparedness Day to be held since World Tsunami
Awareness Day was adopted by the UN General Assembly, a public awareness event was held at Iino Hall andConference Center in Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, under the title “Passing on the Lessons from the Great East Japan
Earthquake to Future Generations: Taking on the Challenge of Disaster Preparedness Education to Save Lives.”
The goal of this event was to pass on the lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and highlight theimportance of initiatives to prepare for a tsunami before one actually strikes and of disaster preparedness
education. It featured presentations about disaster preparedness knowledge and initiatives, by junior highschool students from Kamaishi City in Iwate Prefecture, which is renowned for the fact that, when the Great
East Japan Earthquake occurred, elementary and junior high school students took the initiative in evacuating
to higher ground, thereby saving countless lives; and by junior high school students from Kuroshio Town in
Kochi Prefecture, where the whole town is engaged in a Zero Victims initiative, aimed at ensuring that a tsunami
would not claim any lives, despite the fact that estimates suggest that Nankai Trough megathrust earthquake
could result in the town being struck by a tsunami with a maximum height of 34m. Responding to aquestionnaire distributed to participants, 85.9% of respondents stated that the event had been useful, while
6.3% stated that it had been somewhat useful. Comments provided as feedback included, “Greater efforts
should be made to provide disaster preparedness education at schools” and “I have a greater awareness oftsunami preparedness.” The event was also broadcast live on the Internet, attracting more than 5,400 views.

Presentation by students from Ogata Junior High School,
Kuroshio Town

Students from Kamaishi Junior High School

Talk session(iii) World Tsunami Awareness Day ForumOn November 5, 2016, the Cabinet Secretariat (National Resilience Promotion Office) hosted the World
Tsunami Awareness Day Forum. The primary objective of the forum was to ensure a proper understanding of
national resilience as a means of preparing for tsunami and other major disasters among the relevant ministries
and agencies and local governments that will need to lead national resilience measures, as well as among
business operators and the public.
67

Through their speeches, the speakers helped participants to develop a shared understanding of theimportance of sustainable socioeconomic growth in preparing for disaster and of the fact that Japan’scontribution to disaster prevention and mitigation on the global stage helps to promote growth worldwide.

Storyteller Hirano Keiko

Discussion involving the three keynote speakers(iv) International Conferences on Disaster Management
Various events to promote tsunami awareness have also been held overseas, spreading the message about
the importance of tsunami preparedness worldwide. In particular, the 7th Asian Ministerial Conference on
Disaster Risk Reduction, which was held in India, featured a special session on World Tsunami Awareness Day.
During the session, entitled, “Asian Initiatives to Protect Precious Lives Against Natural Disaster! National
Resilience Across Oceans,” Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai gave a speech
about the national resilience initiatives that have been undertaken over many years, mentioning the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami and the Great East Japan Earthquake.
(v) Various Initiatives Associated with Tsunami Preparedness Day and World Tsunami Awareness Day
In addition to those described above, various other initiatives were undertaken. These included the HighSchool Students Summit on “World Tsunami Awareness Day” in Kuroshio (hosted by Kochi Prefecture, Kochi
Prefectural Board of Education, Kuroshio Town, and Kuroshio Town Board of Education), which brought
together around 360 high school students from 30 countries around the world, including Japan, in Kuroshio
Town in Kochi Prefecture to exchange views about natural disasters; and the founding by the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of the Hamaguchi Award (awarded by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport) for individuals and/or organizations within Japan or overseas that have made significant
contributions in the field of technologies for coastal disaster risk reduction, especially tsunami preparedness.

Hamaguchi Award Ceremony68Column: Video to Raise Awareness of Disaster Preparedness
The Cabinet Office produces videos that can be used for raising awareness concerning disastermanagement and for disaster preparedness education in schools. These videos are published on the Team
Bosai Japan portal (https://bosaijapan.jp/), a website that brings together information about disaster
preparedness. The Cabinet Office hopes that these videos will be widely used as teaching materials in
disaster preparedness education for elementary and junior high school students and in training courses for
local government and other official tasked with disaster preparedness.

Pictures of videos on the Team Bosai Japan portal

69

1-4 Citizen-led Initiatives(1) Promoting Widespread Adoption and Awareness of Community Disaster Management Plans(i) FY2016 Model Projects
Citizens must gain an understanding of the regional attributes and risks of the area where they live and build
relationships of trust with their neighbors before disaster strikes, to ensure that self-help and mutual support
functions effectively in coordination with public support in the event of a disaster. An effective way of achieving
this is for citizens to independently formulate action plans and share them with their neighbors before disasterstrikes. As such, the Cabinet Office revised the Basic Act on Disaster Management, positioning Community
Disaster Management Plans under the Local Disaster Management Plans of municipalities from April 2014. It
implemented model projects in 44 districts over the three fiscal years through to FY2016, promoting initiatives
in which local citizens put together plans for their community (Fig. 1-1-4).
In the FY2014 and FY2015 projects, the Cabinet Office issued a public call for applicants and selected 37
districts that it considered to be highly motivated about preparing plans for their communities. It thendispatched university professors and other experts (advisors) to them to provide support tailored to theprogress of initiatives in each area. The initiatives carried out as a result took various forms, including initiatives
focused on systems for supporting persons requiring special care, the formulation of plans for evacuation toother prefectures, partnerships with local companies, efforts by condominium management associations toconfirm the safety of residents, and temporary hosting of evacuees.
In FY2016, the Cabinet Office decided to select the model districts from among prefectures (municipalities)
that had not yet had model districts selected, while also seeking to ensure a good balance of geographical andregional features. To facilitate this initiative, the Cabinet Office held a meeting of the Advisory Panel on
Promoting the Widespread Adoption of the Community Disaster Management Plans at which seven of the
districts nominated by the experts and municipalities were selected on the basis of the aforementioned policy.
Several workshops were held in each district and members of the Advisory Panel were dispatched as advisors
to those districts, to assist in drawing up the plans. The results included a review of a Community Disaster
Management Plan as a regional development measure for districts in the vicinity of a tourist attraction and an
initiative centered on school districts in Kumamoto immediately after the disaster.

70

Fig. 1-1-4 Districts where Cabinet Office Community Disaster Management Plan Model Projects were
Implemented

Source: Cabinet Office

As a result of the three years of model projects, 23 of the 44 districts drafted Community Disaster
Management Plans and six districts’ plans resulted in the Local Disaster Management Plans of the relevant
municipalities being revised to reflect the community plans.
The Advisory Panel reviewed the outcomes of initiatives to date and the issues that arose, and published theReport on Community Disaster Management Plan Model Projects at the end of FY2016.
This report pointed out the effects of Community Disaster Management Plans, noting the fact thatparticipation in the model projects awakened an awareness of disaster preparedness and a spirit of mutual
support among local residents who did not usually talk about disasters, and also triggered regional revitalization.
In addition, the projects acted as a catalyst for participants to make more specific mental preparations andvisualize the disasters that could occur, including taking the initiative to check the risks foreseen in the area inwhich they live and the locations to which they should evacuate, as well as thinking about the division of rolesin the event of disaster.
Moreover, the report identified a number of issues, including the need to maintain a moderate sense of
distance between government official and local citizens while building relationships of trust between them, as
well as the difficulty of maintaining the continuity of initiatives once plans have been drawn up and thenecessity of generational change. The report recommended that drills be conducted on the basis of the plansto check the plans’ effectiveness and identify any areas for improvement. It also pointed out the need tofamiliarize the citizens of surrounding districts with the content of the plans.
(ii) Community Disaster Management Plan ForumOn March 25, 2017, the Community Disaster Management Plan Forum was held in the city of Nagoya, Aichi
71

Prefecture (Nagoya International Center) to introduce the outcomes of the model projects to date and issues
to be tackled going forward, thereby promoting the spread of such initiatives and raising awareness of themnationwide. At the forum, the Cabinet Office reviewed the model projects conducted to date and outlined theinitiatives that had taken place in each district, as well as sharing the sum total of knowledge gained from thethree years of projects, focusing on such themes as management to ensure the continuation of the plans andthe future of Community Disaster Management Plans.

Workshop held as part of a model projectCommunity Disaster Management Plan Forum

It would be desirable for every district to take the initiative and begin putting a plan together, with reference
to the model projects undertaken so far. It is likely that awareness of disaster mitigation and prevention will be
propagated through the support provided by municipalities to these model districts and the roll-out of
information both within the districts concerned and to other districts through seminars, etc. The Cabinet Officewill continue with its endeavors to popularize these initiatives, in order to ensure full awareness of this systemamong the public.
(2) Citizens’ Disaster Preparedness Councils
National and local governments implement various policies to raise awareness of disaster prevention andmitigation among local citizens. Among these are seminars held for local citizens by municipalities, but most of
those who take part are already interested in disaster preparedness. The government therefore decided toinvestigate how to increase awareness concerning disaster preparedness in order to devise ways of attracting
the participation of a broader range of local citizens.
Accordingly, having identified Naka-ku in the Shizuoka Prefecture city of Hamamatsu as an area likely to be
at risk of multiple disasters, such as tsunami and river flooding, the Cabinet Office selected the district as thevenue for a trial initiative in FY2016 and held meetings of the Hamamatsu Citizens’ Disaster Preparedness
Council.
Local citizens with differing levels of awareness and interest in disasters were asked to participate, toinvestigate how to foster awareness during discussions. With the cooperation of Hamamatsu City Office,residents on the basic resident register were randomly sampled, with the Hamamatsu municipal government
itself inviting members of the sample group to participate. This method secured the participation of local
citizens (a total of 78 men and women) — including local high school students — with varying levels ofawareness and interest, from teenagers to those in their 70s.
During the meetings, participants split up into groups in which they shared their awareness of danger fromdisasters with other citizens, while discussing responses in the event of disaster. Five meetings were held in
total, with pre-project (first meeting) and post-project (fifth meeting) questionnaires distributed to participants.
72

This survey revealed that the number of citizens who had begun making preparations for disasters increased
as a result of participation in the council, compared with the situation at the start (Fig. 1-1-5).
Fig. 1-1-5 Results of the Pre- and Post-project Questionnaire of Participants in the Citizens’ Disaster
Preparedness Council

Source: Results of a questionnaire distributed by the Cabinet Office

The Cabinet Office put together its findings from the trial citizens’ council and compiled a list of similar
examples, which it published in March 2016 as the “Guide to Initiatives to Increase Awareness of Disaster
Preparedness Among Local Citizens via Random Sampling.” It is hoped that this guide will be used to promote
initiatives aimed at increasing awareness of disaster preparedness among local citizens.

Hamamatsu Citizens’ Disaster Preparedness Council

Group discussion73Column: Disaster Imagination Games
There are a variety of disaster imagination games, which seek to increase people’s ability to deal withdisaster. Participating in these games provides an enjoyable way to think about disaster and learn about
many other people’s views. This column introduces a number of frequently used disaster imagination games.
<Crossroads>
Participants, who each have cards marked “Yes” and “No,” are asked a yes–no question at random (forexample, “Not enough food has been distributed to the evacuation center, but everyone is hungry. Do you
decide on an order of priority and distribute the food accordingly, or do you refrain from distributing thefood until more supplies arrive?”) Each person decides on what they would do and they all show the cardcorresponding to their choice at the same time. This enables people to see the majority view, but it is not
the case that the majority view is the best course of action. The important thing is to share with othermembers of the group one’s thoughts about why that course of action should be taken. It is therefore betterto split up into small groups of five or six people, rather than playing as a large group, so that participants
can spend time discussing each other’s opinions.

<DIG: Disaster Imagination Game>This is a tabletop exercise game in which participants add information about their local community — suchas the location of evacuation centers, public telephones, hazardous areas, and residents requiring assistanceduring a disaster — to a map (ground plan) of the area in which they live. In addition, participants consider
evacuation routes that would need to be taken to reach evacuation sites or centers in a disaster scenario andthink about preparedness measures.
<EVAG: Evacuation Activity Game>This is a role-playing game that tests evacuation behavior. First, each person takes an “attribute card” andconsiders the timing at which the person on that card would leave for an evacuation center if a torrential
rain disaster struck their neighborhood. There are dozens of different types of card, covering different
genders, ages, and nationalities; conditions on the card impose constraints on the means of transport thatthe person on the card can use. Young people can take on the role of an elderly person and imagine theirthought processes, while able-bodied people can think about the situation from the perspective of a person
requiring special care.

74

<HUG: Hinanjyo Unei Game>The Hinanjyo Unei Game (evacuation center management game) was devised by Shizuoka Prefecture toprepare for a Tokai earthquake. It uses site plans (ground plans) of evacuation centers and gymnasiums. The“evacuee card” detailing the evacuee’s age, gender, nationality, and personal circumstances is used torepresent the space actually required by the evacuee (three square meters per person). Participants then lay
the cards on the ground plan to see how appropriately they can arrange them, and think about how to deal
with problems that could actually arise in an actual evacuation center.
To prepare for a major disaster, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology issued
a notice in January 2017, regarding key points concerning cooperation in the running of evacuation centersin schools. In response, elementary schools in Tokyo’s Taito-ku used HUG for a drill involving teachers andother school staff.
<LODE>
Acronym of Little children, Old people, Disabled people and Evacuation. Designed to explore responses toissues involving people who would be vulnerable in the event of disaster and people living in medium- andhigh-rise residential buildings, this game uses simplified elevation views of condominiums and colored
stickers providing information about the residents in each apartment. More than other tabletop exercises,
this game focuses on providing evacuation guidance to people requiring assistance to evacuate in the eventof disaster.

75

1-5 Development of Business Continuity Systems(1) Development of Business Continuity Systems by National Government’s Ministries and Agencies
In March 2014, the Central Government’s Business Continuity Plan (Measures for a Tokyo Inland Earthquake)
was approved by the Cabinet. National government’s ministries and agencies use this document as the basis
for revisions of their own business continuity plans (BCPs), as needed. The Cabinet Office assessed the ministry
and agency BCPs with experts on the basis of the Central Government BCP. In addition, it formulated theBusiness Continuity Guidelines for National Central Government Ministries: Second Edition (Measures to Deal
With a Tokyo Inland Earthquake) in April 2016. Through such initiatives, the government is building business
continuity systems that will enable the business of government to continue operating smoothly even in theevent of a Tokyo inland earthquake.
(2) Development of Business Continuity Systems by Local Government
It is absolutely vital for local governments to develop a BCP to ensure business continuity in the event of adisaster. However, the BCP preparation rate remains low among municipalities, with only 42% of municipalities
having formulated a BCP as of April 2016, as compared to 100% of prefectures (Fig. 1-1-6).
In response to this situation, the Cabinet Office published the Business Continuity Plan Formulation
Guidelines for Municipalities in FY2015, with the aim of making it easier for small municipalities with apopulation of less than 10,000 to prepare a BCP. In addition, it amended the Business Continuity Manual for
Local Governments During Earthquake Disasters (April 2010) to take account of past disasters, publishing therevised version under the title Business Continuity Manual for Local Governments During Major Disasters,
which it issued as a notice to local governments. Moreover, since FY2015, the Cabinet Office has been holding
workshops (co-organized by the Cabinet Office and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency) to train relevant
municipal employees in preparing BCPs. Through such initiatives, the Cabinet Office will continue to support
local governments in strengthening and enhancing their business continuity systems.

76Fig. 1-1-6 Development of Business Continuity Plans by Local Governments

Source: November 2009
April 2011
August 2013
December 2015

April 2016

Survey of Business Continuity Plans Based on an Earthquake Disaster (Cabinet Office and Fire andDisaster Management Agency Survey)
Local Government Information Management Report (March 2012) Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications Local Administration Bureau Regional Information Policy Office Survey
BCP Formulation Rate for Large-Scale Earthquakes and Other Natural Disasters (preliminary
figures) (Fire and Disaster Management Agency Survey)
Survey of the Current Status of the Formulation of Business Continuity Plans and the Formulationof Specific Criteria for the Issuance of Evacuation Recommendations by Local Governments (Fireand Disaster Management Agency Survey)
Survey of the Current Status of the Formulation of Business Continuity Plans (Fire and Disaster
Management Agency Survey)(3) Development of Business Continuity Systems by Private Sector Companies
If a company’s business activities stagnate due to a major disaster, the effects would not be confined to thatcompany: the impact would also be felt by its business partners, the local economy and community, and, byextension, the economy of Japan and the world as a whole. Accordingly, in 2005, the Cabinet Office formulated
the Business Continuity Guidelines, having determined that there was a need to examine guidelines concerningbusiness continuity plans (BCPs). This decision was informed by the Basic Recommendation of a Disaster
Management Strategy by Utilizing Civil and Market Abilities, a set of public-private partnership measures put
together in 2004 by the Central Disaster Management Council’s Special Board of Inquiry on Enhancing Disaster
Management by Utilizing the Private Sector and Markets. The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 clearlyhighlighted the importance of incorporating business continuity management (BCM) into the routine
management strategy of companies. As such, in 2013, the Cabinet Office revised the guidelines to incorporate
the concept of BCM and published them under the title Business Continuity Guidelines (Third Edition)―Strategies and Responses for Surviving Critical Incidents―. This edition remains current today.
Following its revision in 2014, the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction specified that “companies should
strive to promote BCM, while the national government and local governments should endeavor to support
BCM.” Accordingly, this stipulation was incorporated into a number of plans, including the Basic Plan for the
Promotion of Tokyo Inland Earthquake Emergency Measures, which was approved in 2014. The Basic Plan for
the Promotion of Nankai Trough Earthquake Countermeasures included a specific goal of ensuring that close to77

100% (nationwide) of large corporations and at least 50% (nationwide) of medium-sized companies haveformulated BCPs.
In terms of specific government targets, the Action Plan for National Resilience 2016 sets a goal of ensuringthat more or less 100% (nationwide) of large corporations and 50% (nationwide) of medium-sized companies
have prepared BCPs by 2020.
As such, the Cabinet Office conducts a fact-finding survey every second fiscal year, to ascertain what
proportion of private sector companies have formulated a BCP and investigate their disaster preparedness
initiatives. The results of the FY2015 Fact-finding Survey on Company Business Continuity and Disaster
Preparedness Initiatives, which was conducted in February 2016, showed that preparation of BCPs was on therise, with 60.4% of large corporations (up from 53.6% in the previous survey) and 29.9% of medium-sizedcompanies (up from 25.3% in the previous survey) having already prepared a BCP. When companies currently
in the process of preparing a BCP are also included, these figures rise to just under 80% and just over 40%,
respectively (the overall BCP preparation rate was 66.1%) (Fig. 1-1-7).
The Cabinet Office will continue to undertake initiatives to popularize and raise awareness of BCP preparation,with the aim of encouraging companies to formulate a BCP and engage in BCM.
Fig. 1-1-7 BCP Development by Large Corporations and Medium-Sized Companies

Source: “FY2015 Fact-finding Survey on Company Business Continuity and Disaster Preparedness Initiatives,” Cabinet Office(March 2016)78

1-6 Using Risk Finance to Prepare for a Disaster
While protecting human life is the top priority in the event of disaster, recovering from any economic damage
without delay is also crucial to the swift, smooth recovery and reconstruction of the affected area. Disasters
have a serious impact on business management, so ensuring business continuity through appropriate
preparations before disaster strikes is essential to ensuring that the local economy recovers without delay.
Moreover, securing somewhere to live is vital in enabling individuals (those affected by the disaster) to rebuild
their lives; problems in rebuilding homes extinguish both people’s motivation to work toward recovery andtheir hopes for the future. To facilitate swift recovery from such economic losses arising from disasters, it isimportant to utilize risk finance such as insurance and mutual insurance in preparing for a disaster.
(1) Risk Finance among Business Operators
Disaster risk management by business operators to prepare for disaster can be divided into two categories:
disaster risk control initiatives, which aim to reduce the level of risk itself through such measures as preparing
a BCP and seismic retrofit of facilities; and disaster risk finance initiatives, which seek to alleviate any impacts
on business management by sharing (relocating) risk or holding appropriate levels thereof through suchmeasures as taking out insurance or securing credit lines (Fig. 1-1-8). It cannot be said that there has beenenough discussion of the latter in present-day Japan, nor that the concept has become prevalent.
In light of this situation, the Study Group on Risk Finance for Catastrophic Natural Disasters began its meetingin September 2016. Aiming to summarize the current status of risk finance and relevant issues, and increaserisk resilience to natural disasters among Japanese business operators, this panel of academic experts,
practitioners, and representatives of relevant ministries and agencies published its report in March 2017.
The Study Group found that, despite hopes that risk finance initiatives among business operators would havea synergistic effect with risk control initiatives, risk finance initiatives have in fact not necessarily progressed aswell as risk control initiatives. Moreover, it found that there is a gap between risk holders (business operators)
and service providers (direct-writing insurance companies, etc.) in their awareness of risk, making it difficult forthe private sector to independently encourage more widespread take-up at present. As such, the panel pointed
out the need for “diverse actors” to provide services that contribute to risk management among relevantbusiness operators through their core businesses. In addition, it recommended that principles serving as
guidelines for the conduct for those diverse actors should be formulated to promote ongoing initiatives, andthat public institutions such as the national government and local governments should support the creation ofa framework for this.

79Fig. 1-1-8 The Concept of Risk Management Concerning Natural Disasters≒ Disaster
Preparedness

Risk Management

Risk Control∙∙∙∙

Seismic retrofit
Securing alternative bases
Preparing a BCP
Dispersal of operational
centers, etc.

Risk Finance∙∙∙∙Insurance
Disaster derivatives
CAT bonds
Securing credit lines, etc.

Source: Cabinet Office(2) Encouraging Individuals to Enroll in Insurance/Mutual Insurance
A key concept in risk finance is that it is desirable to utilize insurance and mutual insurance to obtainrecompense for damage caused by natural disasters.
Insurance and mutual insurance are an effective means of helping those whose homes or other assets havesuffered major damage as a result of disaster to rebuild their lives. However, while around 80% of homeowninghouseholds are enrolled in insurance or mutual insurance with fire coverage, the enrollment rate in insurance
or mutual insurance that offers coverage for flood or earthquake damage is low (Fig. 1-1-9).
Accordingly, in December 2016, the Cabinet Office set up the Study Group on Promoting Preparations for
Disaster Using Insurance/Mutual Insurance, to summarize discussion points concerning the role of insurance
and mutual insurance in rebuilding homes, challenges faced in promoting more widespread take-up of
insurance/mutual insurance, and approaches to future initiatives. With the cooperation of relevant ministries,
agencies, and organizations, the panel published a report on its findings in March 2017. This report set out thedirection that needs to be taken going forward, to encourage enrollment in insurance and mutual insurance.
This included initiatives and methods for raising awareness and promoting greater take-up via insurance broker
channels, and techniques for providing risk information, such as using existing real estate information systems
to show people hazard maps. Among the medium- to long-term challenges associated with insurance andmutual insurance mechanisms listed in the report were linkages to disaster mitigation measures and official
support, the relationship to financial burden, and the advantages and disadvantages of each enrollment
method.
Moreover, with the cooperation of relevant ministries, agencies, and organizations, the Cabinet Officesummarized approaches to providing information when encouraging enrollment in insurance or mutual
insurance, and put together a pamphlet for the general public. Based on these initiatives, the Cabinet Officewill redouble its efforts to encourage enrollment in insurance and mutual insurance offering coverage against
natural disasters.

80Fig. 1-1-9 Number and Percentage of Enrollments in Insurance/Mutual Insurance (Building Only) by
Homeowning Households (*1)

Insurance
Mutual Insurance
Insurance + Mutual
Insurance(Simple total)
Insurance + Mutual
Insurance(Adjusted for
duplication*6)

Fire coverage

Flood coverage*5

Earthquake coverage*5

21.23 million*2(61%)
11.68 million*4(33%)

14.75 million*2(42%)
11.61 million*4(33%)

12.09 million*3(35%)
7.7 million*4(22%)

32.91 million(94%)

26.36 million(75%)

19.79 million(57%)

28.8 million(82%)*No insurance/mutual
insurance policy 18%

23.07 million(66%)

17.32 million(49%)

Source: The figures in the table above are provisional calculations by the Cabinet Office.
*1 The number of homeowning households is estimated at 35.02 million households. This figure was obtained by multiplying thetotal number of households (56.95 million households) in the FY2015 Survey of Population, Population Dynamics, and Numberof Households Based on the Basic Resident Register conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, by thepercentage of homeowning households (61.5%) in the 2013 Housing and Land Survey of Japan conducted by the Ministry ofInternal Affairs and Communications.
*2 According to data from the General Insurance Rating Organization of Japan (Total number of fire insurance policies held onbuildings (homes) at the end of FY2015 (including housing loan fire insurance, but excluding condominium insurance).
“Policies that include buildings in the insurance coverage” refers to policies that cover either the building alone or the building
and contents, but does not include policies where the insurance coverage is unclear.)*3 According to FY2015 statistics from the General Insurance Rating Organization of Japan. (Total number of policies held coveringbuildings (class A and class B buildings) as of FY2015.)*4 According to data from the Japan Cooperative Insurance Association Incorporated. (Total number of mutual insurance policies
held with the National Mutual Insurance Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (ZENKYOREN), National Mutual Insurance
Federation of Fishery Cooperative Associations (JF Kyosuiren), National Federation of Workers and Consumers Insurance
Cooperatives (ZENROSAI), and Federation of Japanese Consumer Cooperatives (Zenkokuseikyoren) covering buildings (homes)
at the end of FY2015.)*5 Excluding those that pay out only a small sum or a token consolation payment even in cases where the building is completely
destroyed.
*6 According to a questionnaire-based survey conducted among households that received a livelihood recovery support payment
for disaster victims due to having suffered a loss caused by a natural disaster between FY2010 and FY2014, some people havemultiple insurance/mutual insurance policies, so the number of policyholders is 87.5% of the number of policies held.
(N=5,752 people)

81Pamphlet aimed at the general public
Recommendations on Insurance/Mutual Insurance Scheme Enrollment

82Section 2: Disaster Management Frameworks, Disaster Response, and thePreparation Thereof
2-1 Revision of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction
The Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction is a basic plan for disaster management in Japan, which is decided
by the National Disaster Management Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Basic Act on Disaster
Management. It is reviewed annually and revised when deemed necessary, to take account of the findings fromscientific research concerning disasters and their prevention, as well as disasters that have occurred and theeffects of emergency disaster control measures implemented in response. Local governments are required todevelop Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction, while Designated Administrative Organizations and DesignatedPublic Corporations are required to develop Disaster Management Operations Plans, which must be based on
the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction.
In FY2016, the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction was revised once, in May 2016 (Fig. 1-2-1).
Revisions based on lessons from the disaster resulting from the Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the
Kanto and Tohoku Regions (May 2016)
The May 2016 revisions were based on the report by the Working Group on Study on Evacuation andEmergency Response Measures for Flood Disasters, which the government established under Disaster
Management Implementation Committee in the National Disaster Management Council. The revisions mainly
focused on enhancing disaster management measures in light of issues faced in dealing with the Torrential Rainof September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku Regions. These included the lack of adequate preparations for selfhelp and mutual support and the fact that there was scope for devising better ways to communicate
information concerning evacuation.
More specifically, the content added covered such matters as the preparation of materials highlighting the
key points that municipalities should address when responding to disaster and efforts to ensure thoroughawareness of and compliance with these; efforts to encourage people to take out flood insurance / mutual
insurance to be prepared for the growing risk of flooding; and highlighting on hazard maps those areas which
need to be cleared and evacuated promptly.
Fig. 1-2-1 Overview of Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (May 2016)

Source: Cabinet Office83

The National Disaster Management Council (Officers Meeting) discusses revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction(Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office Yasumasa Nagasaka makes a statement, as chair of the Officers Meeting)

2-2 Volcanic Eruption Evacuation Plans
The Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes was revised in 2015 in light of lessons learned from the
Mt. Ontake Eruption Disaster (September 2014). Under the revised act, local governments designated as
volcanic eruption hazard zones (140 municipalities in 23 prefectures) are obliged to include a Volcanic Eruption
Evacuation Plan in their Local Disaster Management Plan.
In March 2012, the Cabinet Office put together the Guide to Developing Concrete and Practical Evacuation
Plans for Volcanic Eruption and has provided local governments with support in preparing these plans. This
guide was revised in December 2016 to take account of the lessons of the Mt. Ontake Eruption Disaster,following deliberations by the Committee to Draft a Guide to Preparing Evacuation Plans in Case of a Volcanic
Eruption, a panel consisting of volcanologists, local governments in volcanic regions, and individuals involved
in mountain climbing and tourism, among others (Fig. 1-2-2).
More specifically, as well as ensuring that the guide provides a framework in preparing an Evacuation Plan
which is required by Volcanic Disaster Management Councils to develop for each volcano, the panel enhanced
the guide’s measures targeting climbers and tourists, such as ensuring the rapid communication of informationand the provision of evacuation guidance. In addition, the guide identified the bodies responsible for taking
action to address the measures that the member organizations of Volcanic Disaster Management Councils (e.g.
municipalities and prefectures) are expected to deal with, not only in cases in which the volcanic alert level has
been raised in advance, but also in the event of a sudden eruption.

84

Fig. 1-2-2 Guide to Evacuation Plans (after revision)

Source: Cabinet Office85Column: Support for the Development of Volcanic Eruption Evacuation Plans Based on the Guide toDeveloping Evacuation Plans
Local governments obliged to put alert and evacuation systems in place need to consider a specific,
practical Evacuation Plan. However, the scale of volcanic eruptions, the phenomena that occur, and thenature of the damage vary from one volcano to another, while only a very few employees actually have any
experience of handling disaster management in the event of a volcanic eruption. This makes it difficult formost local governments to consider and formulate an Evacuation Plan without assistance.
Accordingly, the Cabinet Office conducted a survey about the issues faced in each volcanic region and set
four key themes for consideration, based also on the views of relevant experts. Then, in FY2016, it undertook
an initiative in which the Cabinet Office and local governments undertook collaborative deliberations
concerning Evacuation Plans that addressed those issues in relation to 17 volcanoes.
In this initiative, Cabinet Office official worked in partnership with local governments officials, visiting eachvolcanic region to conduct field surveys of areas expected to suffer damage and considering specific mattersrelating to evacuation routes and evacuation centers in each area subject to evacuation. For each theme,
deliberations were carried out with reference to the guide and other literature, examining such matters as
criteria for restricting access to mountain trails and other areas, methods of evacuating large numbers ofpeople from urban areas, Evacuation Plans tailored to multiple craters or eruption scenarios, and evacuation
methods for outlying islands, covering both on- and off-island evacuation.
It is expected that initiatives involving collaborative deliberations on issues faced in preparing Volcanic
Eruption Evacuation Plans will assist in the steady development of alert and evacuation systems in volcanic
regions.

86

2-3 Revision of the Guidelines for Evacuation Recommendations
The flooding resulting from 2016 Typhoon 10 caused immense damage in the Tohoku and Hokkaido regions,
including 27 fatalities and missing persons. Most notably, the failure to take appropriate emergency evacuation
actions at a facility for elderly people in the Iwate Prefecture town of Iwaizumi took a serious human toll, withall nine residents losing their lives.
In light of this situation, the Cabinet Office set up the Study Group on Guidelines for Producing a Decision
and Dissemination for Evacuation Recommendations, a panel of representatives from relevant ministries andagencies and experts in related fields, including disaster management and welfare. The Study Group examinedways to improve the provision of information concerning evacuation and published a report in December 2016.
(See http://www.bousai.go.jp/oukyu/hinankankoku/h28_hinankankoku_guideline/index.html)
This report highlighted the issue that appropriate emergency evacuation actions could not be taken because
the meaning of the evacuation preparation information was not conveyed to an elderly people’s facility. To
clarify the fact that this is the stage at which elderly and other vulnerable people should start to evacuate, theCabinet Office changed the name “evacuation preparation information” to “prepare to evacuate and startevacuating elderly and other persons requiring special care.” In addition, to clarify the difference between an
evacuation recommendation and an evacuation instruction, the Cabinet Office changed the name “evacuation
instruction” to “evacuation instruction (emergency).”
Furthermore, in light of this report, the Cabinet Office revised the Guidelines for Producing a Decision and
Dissemination for Evacuation Recommendations to ensure that residents and managers of facilities for elderly
people can take appropriate evacuation actions (the guidelines also renamed the title of the Guidance as “theGuidelines for Evacuation Recommendations.”).
As well as the changes to evacuation information nomenclature described above, the main changes in theguidelines included enhancing the content of sections on “Approaches to the provision of information that takeaccount of the perspective of those receiving evacuation recommendations,” “Ways to increase theeffectiveness of the evacuation of persons requiring special care,” and “Building municipal systems for issuing
evacuation recommendations without hesitation.” In addition, various useful examples were added (Fig. 1-23).

87

Fig. 1-2-3 Main Changes in the Guidelines for Evacuation Recommendations (revised January 2017)

Source: Cabinet Office

Minister of State for Disaster Management Jun Matsumoto conducts a field survey following 2016 Typhoon 10(Iwaizumi Town, Iwate Prefecture)88Column: Air Rescue Operations and Aviation Safety During the Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the
Kanto and Tohoku Regions
Heavy rain on September 10, 2015 caused embankments along the Kinugawa River to be breached. As aresult, the city of Joso in Ibaraki Prefecture and many other areas became flooded, leaving many people
stranded. A request for a disaster relief deployment to rescue stranded people was received the same dayfrom Ibaraki Prefecture, with further requests received from Miyagi and Tochigi prefectures the following
day. In response, the Self-Defense Forces used helicopters and boats to conduct search and rescue
operations.

Helicopter rescue to save lives

A large number of helicopters — including those belonging to the police, firefighters, Japan Coast Guard,
and Self-Defense Forces — were operating over the affected areas. However, having so many helicopters
concentrated in the same area actually impedes safe search and rescue operations. Accordingly, a landing
guidance system (JTPN-P20) belonging to the Ground Self-Defense Force was installed at Shimotsuma
Heliport (H/P) on September 11, where it provided information to a total of 374 helicopters belonging torelevant organizations.
The information provided by the JTPN-P20 covers the area south of the control area on the northern sideof Shimotsuma H/P (Utsunomiya Air Field) and north of the control area on the southern side of the heliport(Kasumigaura Air Field). This information is provided to aircraft flying at an altitude of approximately 900 m
or less, within a radius of 9.3 km of Shimotsuma H/P (excluding aircraft that are taking off from or landing at
airports such as Haneda and Narita, as they do not enter this airspace). To facilitate the provision of
information, information was gathered about the flight plans of relevant aircraft, air traffic information wasshared on a common frequency, and detailed information gathered on pilot intentions.
Moreover, flight controls were put in place to ensure that Ground Self-Defense Force helicopters taking
off from Kasumigaura Air Field to carry out search and rescue operations passed Yatabe Point. This point
ensures that the fastest, most efficient route to the waypoint is used when flying from Kasumigaura to thearea where search and rescue operations are taking place. Yatabe Point is located in the airspace over the
Yatabe expressway interchange; one reason for choosing this location was the absence of private homes,
which means that there is no need for concern about excessive noise. Ultimately, search and rescue
operations were concluded safely, without any accidents.
This disaster relief deployment highlighted the need to establish specific guidelines for undertaking searchand rescue operations in the initial period after a disaster occurs, when a large number of aircraft belonging
to the relevant organizations are operating. In light of this lesson, the first Tachikawa Helicopter Conference
was held in March 2016, organized primarily by the Ground Self-Defense Force’s Eastern Army Aviation
Group. Participants in the conference, who included police officers, firefighters, and members of the US Army
Aviation Battalion Japan, established a shared understanding concerning efforts to ensure air safety andguidelines for collaboration. At the second conference, which was held in July the same year and attended
89

by private sector business operators as well, participants established a shared understanding of theguidelines for helicopter operations in the event of Nankai Trough earthquake.
As swift communication of information with relevant organizations will be expected in the event of adisaster, there are plans to hold further conferences in the future, as needed.

Landing guidance system (JTPN-P20)(A compact, vehicle-towed mobile air traffic control platform that consists of a surveillance radar, control
devices, and communications equipment)

Range controlled by the landing guidance system (JTPN-P20)

90

2-4 Securing Designated Emergency Evacuation Sites and Designated Evacuation Sites
Designated emergency evacuation sites are positioned as facilities or places to which local citizens and others
should evacuate urgently to safeguard their lives in the event of imminent danger from a tsunami, flood, orother such hazard. Designated evacuation sites are facilities for accommodating people who have evacuateduntil the danger posed by a disaster has passed or for accommodating them temporarily when a disasterprevents their returning home.
The distinction between evacuation sites and evacuation centers was not entirely clear at the time of theGreat East Japan Earthquake, which was a factor that contributed to increasing the resultant harm. Accordingly,
the Cabinet Office revised the Basic Act on Disaster Management in 2013 to require mayors of municipalities
to designate both kinds of evacuation facility in advance, making a distinction between designated emergency
evacuation sites and designated evacuation sites, and issue a public notice to notify citizens of details of thesefacilities. Fig. 1-2-4 shows the designation status of designated emergency evacuation sites as of April 1, 2016.
Fig. 1-2-4 Designation of Designated Emergency Evacuation Sites
Flood

Sediment
Disaster

Storm
Surge

Earthquake Tsunami

Widespread Rainfall
Volcanic
Fire
Inundation Phenomena

Total

Number of
Designated49,82347,022
14,06160,947
29,171
30,27527,654
7,106
83,452
Evacuation Sites(Sites)Expected
Capacity
9,484
9,473
3,694
16,301
5,873
11,413
4,714
1,583
－
(10,000 people)
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration” (multiple responses permitted for each category)

Along with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Cabinet Office is encouraging local governments
to specify their designated emergency evacuation sites without delay. As local governments are required to
specify designated emergency evacuation sites for each type of disaster, the Cabinet Office is calling on local
governments nationwide to lose no time in starting to install signs that comply with the Hazard SpecificEvacuation Guidance Sign System (JIS Z 9098), which was instituted to enable evacuees to clearly identify such
facilities.

Example of a sign compliant with the Hazard Specific Evacuation Guidance Sign System

Fig. 1-2-5 shows the designation status of designated evacuation sites pursuant to Article 49-7 of the Basic
Act on Disaster Management as of April 1, 2016. However, a Cabinet Office survey conducted among
municipalities nationwide revealed that, as of October 1, 2016, the number of evacuation centers (including91

agreements) was 92,561, while the number of welfare evacuation centers (including agreements) was 20,185.
Following situations that have arisen in recent disasters, various problems have been pointed out in relation
to efforts to provide an appropriate living environment at evacuation centers, including the need to improve
toilet facilities there. Even in the event of a disaster, when evacuees are compelled to lead their lives amid theinconvenient conditions of an evacuation center, it is important to improve the quality of life in centers andseek to ensure a good living environment. Accordingly, since July 2015, the Cabinet Office has been holding
meetings of the Study Group on Securing Evacuation Centers and Improving their Quality, to consider and takethe necessary steps to deal with a wide range of issues, including encouraging municipalities to designate
evacuation centers and welfare evacuation centers, improving toilet facilities at evacuation centers, anddeveloping support and consultation systems for persons requiring special care.
The Study Group has discussed efforts to secure evacuation centers and improve their quality in generalterms. In addition, meetings of the Quality Improvement Working Group have been held to examine ways of
improving the living environment in evacuation centers in general, and meetings of the Welfare Evacuation
Center Working Group to consider efforts to promote the securing of welfare evacuation centers and ensure
their smooth management in the event of a disaster. In their deliberations, these working groups have taken
into account recent disasters including the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Hiroshima Landslide Disaster.
In FY2016, based on discussions by this committee, the Guidelines for Ensuring Satisfactory Living Conditions
at Evacuation Centers (published by the Cabinet Office in August 2013) were partially revised the day after themain Kumamoto Earthquake. At the same time, based on these revised guidelines, the Cabinet Office publishedthree other sets of guidelines: the Evacuation Center Management Guidelines; the Guidelines for Securing andManaging Toilets at Evacuation Centers; and the Guidelines for Securing and Managing Welfare Evacuation
Centers (Fig. 1-2-6). Local governments must make preparations to ensure that evacuation centers can be
operated appropriately in times of disaster, such as designating evacuation centers in advance based on thekinds of disaster that could occur in the area.
Fig. 1-2-5 Designation of Designated Evacuation Sites
Number of Designated Evacuation Sites(Sites)Expected Capacity(million people)

65,33035.88

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

92

Fig. 1-2-6 Guidelines on Evacuation Centers
Evacuation Center Management Guidelines (April 2016)
These guidelines emphasize the establishment of systems for internal and external partnership and cooperation
before disaster strikes, as well as attaching importance to maintaining the health of evacuees. In addition, they
provide a specific checklist of 19 tasks that should be carried out at each stage of disaster response (preparation,
initial response, emergency response, and recovery), specifying detailed tasks that tend to be overlooked, such asarrangements for toilets, beds, baths, and pets.
Guidelines for Securing and Managing Toilets at Evacuation Centers (April 2016)
These guidelines stress the importance of securing and managing toilets. This is because a growing number ofdisaster victims experience discomfort due to the unhygienic state of toilets in times of disaster, which leads themto refrain from using the toilet (by restricting food and/or water intake to reduce the need to use the toilet),running the risk of adverse impacts on their health or even their lives, in a worst-case scenario.
Guidelines for Securing and Managing Welfare Evacuation Centers (April 2016)
These guidelines have a particular focus on matters that should be addressed before disaster strikes, in relation
to the designation of welfare evacuation centers. In addition, they cover such matters as consideration for thelessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake, systems for supporting persons requiring special care, securing meansof transport, and devising ways to guide evacuees to appropriate evacuation centers.

Minister of State for Disaster Management Jun Matsumoto listens to an explanation while visiting an evacuation center(Mashiki Town, Kumamoto Prefecture)93Column: Online Information About Designated Emergency Evacuation Sites
Since the designated emergency evacuation site designation system was introduced by the 2013 revisionof the Basic Act on Disaster Management, the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, the Cabinet Office,and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency have worked with prefectural and municipal governments todevelop data about designated emergency evacuation sites that can be displayed on online maps.
As a result of this work, the information about designated emergency evacuation sites supplied to the
Geospatial Information Authority of Japan has been published online on the authority’s GSI Map since
February 22, 2017.
This data can easily be accessed on both computers and smartphones via the Geospatial Information
Authority of Japan’s website (http://www.gsi.go.jp/). Along with the name and location of each designatedemergency evacuation site, users can access information about the type of disaster each site is intended toaddress, maps and aerial photographs, and a variety of other information. Using this website makes it easy
for each and every citizen to check which designated emergency evacuation site they should evacuate to in
the event of a disaster.

From the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan website

94Section 3 Responding to Disasters Anticipated to Occur
3-1 Considering Disaster Management Responses Based on Seismic Observation and Evaluation
Along Nankai TroughThe area likely to be affected by Tokai Earthquake is designated as an area subject to intensified earthquake
countermeasures under the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes,
which was enacted in 1978. However, concerns currently center not simply on Tokai Earthquake, but on a major
earthquake affecting an extensive area along Nankai Trough. Regarding the predictability of a major earthquake
in the region in question, a May 2013 report by the Study Group on the Predictability of a Major Earthquake
Along Nankai Trough, a panel established under the National Disaster Management Council’s Committee for
Policy Planning on Disaster Management, stated, “Based on current scientific knowledge, it is difficult to makehighly accurate earthquake predictions.”
In light of this situation, the Cabinet Office established the Working Group on Disaster Response Based on
Seismic Observation and Evaluation Along Nankai Trough under the National Disaster Management Council’s
Disaster Management Implementation Committee in June 2016. Through this working group, the Cabinet Office
is gathering scientific knowledge about the predictability of major earthquakes along Nankai Trough andconsidering approaches to earthquake preparedness with a view to leveraging the phenomena observed in
Nankai Trough focal region.
(See http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg.html)

3-2 Revision of the Plan for Specific Emergency Countermeasures and Activities in Light of the
Kumamoto Earthquake
In March 2015, the government developed the Plan for Specific Emergency Countermeasures and Activities
for Nankai Trough Earthquake (hereinafter the “Specific Plan for Nankai Trough Earthquake”), which details the
emergency measures to be taken by the government in the aftermath of an earthquake.
The Specific Plan for Nankai Trough Earthquake provides specific details of the government’s plans for
emergency transportation routes; rescue, first aid, and firefighting; medical activities; goods procurement; fuelsupplies; and disaster management bases. The plans are informed by the results of estimates by the Committee
for Modeling Nankai Trough Megaquake of the distribution of seismic intensity and tsunami height in the eventof the largest-possible earthquake and tsunami, based on the latest scientific knowledge. They also take into
account the damage scenarios set out in a report by the Working Group on Measures to Deal with Nankai
Trough Megathrust Earthquake.
Currently, the Specific Plan for Nankai Trough Earthquake is under discussion following a recent review by
the Working Group for Studying Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measures in Light of the
Kumamoto Earthquake. Among the matters under consideration are the revision of systems for providing relief
supplies, including a review of regional supply hubs, and the addition of temporary power and gas supplies toensure the business continuity of key facilities.

95

3-3 Deliberations on Large-scale, Extensive Evacuation from Flooding or Storm Surge
Inundation in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
Climate change caused by global warming in recent years makes it necessary to be prepared for increasingly
catastrophic flooding beyond existing assumptions. Extensive portions of Japan’s three major metropolitan
areas are located below sea level. As such, large-scale flooding caused by the collapse of river embankments is
expected to result in huge crowds as large numbers of residents seek to evacuate, as well as many people being
left stranded after failing to escape in time (Fig. 1-3-1).
Accordingly, the Cabinet Office set up the Working Group for Studying Large-scale, Extensive Evacuation From
Flooding or Storm Surge Inundation established under the National Disaster Management Council’s Disaster
Management Implementation Committee in June 2016. This working group is examining approaches to largescale, extensive evacuation from flooding or storm surge inundation in Japan’s three major metropolitan areas.
(See http://www.bousai.go.jp/fusuigai/kozuiworking/)
Fig. 1-3-1 Areas Below Sea Level in the Three Major Metropolitan Areas
Tokyo Metropolitan Area

Chubu Region

Area below sea level
Area: 116km2
Population: 1.76 million

Kinki Region

Height above
sea level

Area below sea level
Area: 124km2
Population: 1.38 million

Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan

96

Area below sea level
Area: 336km2
Population: 0.90 million

Column: Multilingual Support in Times of DisasterIn February 2017, Tokyo Metropolitan Government and Shibuya City held a joint drill focused on measures
to deal with stranded persons unable to return home in the event of a magnitude 7.3 Tokyo inland
earthquake. Approximately 4,000 people, including foreign nationals, took part in the drill, which was heldin the area around Shibuya Station. Foreign participants downloaded a multilingual app, which they used tocheck the evacuation route to a temporary evacuation center. In addition, a multilingual megaphone that
automatically translates words into four languages (Japanese, English, Chinese, and Korean) was used toprovide guidance to foreign participants.
Both smartphone apps and digital signage can be used to provide multilingual support. One of the various
smartphone apps that have been developed is VoiceTra, which provides speech-to-speech translation into a
number of languages just by speaking into the smartphone on which it is installed. Another is Safety tips, an
app that provides useful information to foreign travelers in the event of an earthquake, tsunami, or othernatural disaster. These apps are widely available and easy for the public to use.

Flow charts that use
illustrations to show
evacuation actions enable
even foreign travelers
without prior experience ofa natural disaster to findout what action they shouldtake.

The Safety tips disaster information app

97Section 4: Promotion of Disaster Risk Reduction Activities in Coordination with
Diverse Stakeholders
4-1 Promotion of Volunteer Activities Widely Contributing to Disaster Risk Reduction
Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake ushered in what has been called a new era of volunteerism,
volunteers have come to play an important role in emergency response and support for reconstruction,
undertaking widespread activities in affected areas. Moreover, the establishment of disaster volunteer centersby social welfare councils in affected areas to receive individual volunteers has gradually become firmly
established. Furthermore, NPOs and other volunteer groups with expertise and know-how in such fields as
running evacuation centers now undertake support activities, playing a major role in the aftermath of the Great
East Japan Earthquake and the Kumamoto Earthquake.
The Cabinet Office formed the Study Group on Promoting Volunteer Activities Contributing Generally to
Disaster Risk Reduction, which met a number of times in FY2015 and FY2016 to summarize the issues andconsider measures for promoting such activities. In FY2016, having summarized a wide range of issues relating
to volunteers in FY2015, this panel discussed future measures and approaches to address the highest-priority
issues among those it had identified, and put together a set of recommendations (Fig. 1-4-1).
Fig. 1-4-1 Recommendations by the Study Group on Promoting Volunteer Activities Contributing Generally
to Disaster Risk Reduction (summary)98Company staff and NPO members work together in preparing to distribute supplies(Relief supplies contributed by the company from its stockpiles)

994-2 National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction and the National Conference on
Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which was adopted at the Third UN
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March 2015, prescribed that all stakeholders(including companies, the academic community, volunteers and other community groups, and the media)
should encourage disaster risk reduction (DRR) initiatives. In response, the National Council for the Promotionof Disaster Prevention, consisting of leaders of groups in all sections of society, was set up in September 2015
at the urging of Prime Minister Abe, who chairs the Central Disaster Management Council. The panel’s objective
is to use the networks of groups in all sections of society to improve DRR awareness among a broad swathe of
the public. In partnership with the National Council for the Promotion of Disaster Prevention and the Council
for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction, which mainly consists of industry groups associated with disastermanagement, the Cabinet Office held the First National Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction.
Featuring symposiums and exhibitions on the subject of disaster risk reduction, this event brought together arange of groups and organizations from all sections of society. The aim of this event was to increase awarenessof disaster risk reduction by establishing a shared understanding of the importance of self-help and mutual
support.
(1) First National Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction
Focused on the theme “Preparing for a Major Disaster: Learning From the Past to Lay a Path for the Future,”
the First National Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction took place on Saturday, August 27 andSunday, August 28, 2016 at the University of Tokyo’s Hongo campus.
The opening ceremony was held in the Yasuda Auditorium, which was the main venue. Minister of State forDisaster Management Jun Matsumoto kicked off proceedings with the opening declaration, in which hestressed the importance of self-help and mutual support, and the need for collaboration between all
stakeholders. President of the Science Council of Japan Takashi Onishi then gave a keynote address on theconference theme, preparing for a major disaster. This was followed by a symposium involving representativesof the worlds of business and academia, and field-specific discussions on such topics as citizen organizations
and partnerships with companies. During these discussions, representatives of the various sections of society
spoke of the need for extensive collaboration with other groups and organizations, and the importance ofbuilding partnerships before disaster strikes.
There were many attractions for children and families, including the Earthquake Cushion, which allows theuser to experience long-period ground motion and other tremors caused by real earthquakes; HERASEON,
which simulates the experience of a typhoon; and Dr. Nadarenja’s Disaster Prevention Science Show, in which
PET plastic bottles and other everyday items are used to explain various natural disaster phenomena. Kumamon
made a special appearance to thank people for their support in the aftermath of the Kumamoto Earthquake
and call for reconstruction of the region. A wide variety of other events that showcased the specific skills andattributes of the various presenters and exhibitors also took place as part of the conference, including specialist
lectures by academics, such as one entitled “Disseminating Disaster Research From Tohoku,” which describedvanguard research into the most recent disasters and future prospects for such research; discussions by disastermanagement experts active on the front line in various fields, on topics such as the Community Disaster
Management Plan Forum and public-private partnerships focused on community development for disasterprevention and mitigation; workshops offering the chance to gain basic knowledge about methods of creating
disaster preparedness maps and first aid techniques; and panels and videos explaining disaster risk reduction
initiatives by various groups.
The event attracted approximately 12,000 visitors over the course of the weekend, while the online live feed
was watched by around 12,000 people. Coupled with media coverage on television and in the newspapers, theevent succeeded in reaching a large audience. In particular, 95% of those who completed a questionnaire100distributed to visitors stated, “My awareness of disaster risk reduction has improved as a result of my visit,”
which was a very positive outcome. Around half of all visitors had no particular links to the field of disaster risk
reduction, while many had never participated in a disaster prevention drill and stated, “I want to actively
participate in local disaster prevention drills in future.” In the questionnaire for presenters/exhibitors, all of thegroups that responded stated that they would like to present/exhibit again next time. With feedback comments
including “It was very meaningful, because we were able to interact with other groups taking part,” this event
appears to have been highly effective in promoting collaboration between groups.
The 2017 conference is due to take place at Sendai International Center on Sunday, November 26 andMonday, November 27.

Opening ceremony

Minister of State for Disaster Management Jun
Matsumoto makes the opening declaration

The Earthquake Cushion replicates the experience ofan earthquake

A lecture at the Sanjo Conference Hall

(2) Second Meeting of the National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction
The second meeting of the National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction was held on October 20,
2016 in the Grand Hall of the Prime Minister’s Office, attended by the leaders of groups in all sections of society.
As host, Prime Minister Abe opened proceedings with some words of welcome, in which he expressed his
gratitude to the participating groups and spoke of his hope that the meeting would result in knowledge
concerning disaster preparedness being shared widely by the public, enabling each and every to take action toprotect their lives. The Prime Minister also expressed a wish that the meeting should increase the nation’s
overall ability to undertake disaster risk reduction through self-help and mutual support, and that it would help
to broadcast Japan’s knowledge as a leader in the field of disaster risk reduction to a global audience.
Following on from this, council chairman Tadateru Konoe (President, Japanese Red Cross Society) reported
on the body’s activities, focusing primarily on the aforementioned First National Conference on Promoting
Disaster Risk Reduction. He also outlined the proposed policy for future activities and a resolution on this was
passed. The Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union and the Japanese Nursing Association, which are both
members of the council, then reported on their routine initiatives and the support activities that they
conducted following the Kumamoto Earthquake.

101

4-3 Partnerships with Industrial Sector
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which was adopted at the Third UN
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March 2015, highlighted the importance of publicprivate partnerships in disaster risk reduction. It is necessary to establish close cooperation and build
relationships of trust between the private sector and governmental organizations at both the national and local
levels.
Given that Japan’s private sector companies have accumulated advanced technologies and know-how in thefield of disaster risk reduction through their wealth of experience of disasters to date, it is anticipated thatpartnerships between government and private sector companies will contribute significantly to disastermeasures in the future.
The Disaster Risk Reduction Industry Conference of Japan is a body established in July 2015 with theparticipation of companies from various business sectors, to promote the development and cultivation of adisaster preparedness industry by the private sector. Organized by a Japanese newspaper company, theconference has 30 member companies as of April 1, 2017. This body aims to build a cooperative inter-industry
framework for cooperation that encompasses all industries, not only those focused on equipment and systems
relating to disaster management. Its objective is to achieve innovation by mobilizing the advanced technology
and know-how held in industries relevant to disaster preparedness. In FY2016, it established an Information
Subcommittee and a Goods and Technology Subcommittee, which undertook activities aimed at collaboration
between companies in each field.
Moreover, it holds regular meetings of the Round Table on Public-Private Cooperation, at which theconference’s member companies exchange views with representatives from the Cabinet Office and otherrelevant ministries and agencies, as well as practitioners from local governments. The aim of these gatherings
is to establish frameworks for public-private partnerships that can be leveraged both before and after disasterstrikes. Two meetings were held in FY2016, with a lively exchange of views taking place. In the field of
information, discussions centered on greater efficiency in disaster response through information sharing by the
public and private sectors. Talks on the subject of goods and technology looked at issues brought to the surface
by the Kumamoto Earthquake and considered the creation of “disaster-ready evacuation centers” throughpublic-private partnerships, focusing on evacuation centers as places where the technologies of each company
can be brought together.

State Minister of the Cabinet Office Jun Matsumoto gives the opening address
at the Fourth Round Table on Public-Private Cooperation102

It is preferable to engage in a variety of public-private partnership activities not only in the aftermath of adisaster, but also before disaster strikes. Experiences of the use of disaster support agreements in the wake of
the Kumamoto Earthquake have triggered a fresh understanding that the steady conclusion of such agreements
will be increasingly important in future. Some local governments are systematically concluding agreementswith numerous companies in specific fields. This approach is expected to facilitate swift, effective functioning
in the event of disaster (Fig. 1-4-2).
Fig. 1-4-2 Examples of Support Agreements in Case of Disasters

Support agreements in Case of Disasters concluded by Sakura City (asofMinistry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism Kanto Regional Development
BureauLocal governments that belong to theliaison council of the National Iris Summit
for Municipalities

Lifeline utilities

Chiba Prefecture

Mutual assistance in the eventof disaster
Opening and use of a regionwide disaster management
base

Publicizing widespread power
via the disaster
Chiba branch of an electric power company outages
management radio
communications system
Publicizing widespreadtransmission outages via the
Cable TV station A
disaster management radio
communications system
Publicizing widespread gas
Gas company A
outages via the disasterGas company B
management radio
communications system
Chiba City, Ichikawa City, Funabashi City,
Narita City, Narashino City, Urayasu City,
Yotsukaido City, Shisui Town, Tomisato City, Using expressways in the
Katori City, district municipal administration course of firefighting activities
association, Sakurashi Yachimatashi
Shisuimachi Firefighting Association, Itako
City, Rokko District Authority
Chiba LPG Association, Inba Branch
Sakura City Oil Commercial Cooperative
Water supply and sewerage company A
Sakura City Plumbing Cooperative
Association

Medical careand rescue

Sakura City Pharmaceutical Association
Inba Medical Association
Inba Dental Association
Chiba Prefecture Midwives Association
Hospital A
Hospital B

Emergency repair activities

Information exchange

Supplying fuelInformation transmission system

Prefectural high schools within the city

Mutual assistance in the eventof disaster
Treatment of garbage, humanwaste, and disaster waste
Use of facilities in the event ofdisaster

Sakura Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CO-OP Mirai
Home improvement store
Supplying daily necessities
Convenience store
Distribution company A
Distribution company B
Food company A
Food company B
Supply of food
Inba agricultural cooperative
Food company C
Transport company
Supplying drinking water
Food company D
Food company E
Supplying remaining products inFood company F
vending machines free ofchargeFood distribution company A
Food distribution company B

Chiba Prefecture
Communications systems company
Cable TV station A
Broadcasting station
Communications company B
System development company

Installing disaster management
wireless stations, disastermanagement information
systems, and seismometers
Deployment of engineers
Broadcasting disaster
information, opening atemporary emergency FM radio
station (disaster FM)
Broadcast of disaster
information
Installation of special public
telephones
Provision of information about
evacuation centers nationwide
via an app

Chiba Trucking Association, Inba Branch
Bus company A
Bus company B
Taxi company A
Taxi company B

Ceremonial Occasion Mutual Aid Society
transport, and laying
Chiba Central Funeral Directors Cooperative Pick-up,
out of dead bodies
Japan Hearse Association
Opening and operation of
Sakura City Social Welfare Council
volunteer centers
17 social welfare service corporations with Opening and operation offacilities in Sakura City
welfare evacuation centers
Hotel A
Temporary use of facilities
Hotel B
Installation of information
Equipment company
boards at evacuation sites
The Association of Care Goods Providers
Provision of care goods

Repairing water supply
facilities, etc.
Repairing water supply
facilities, assisting in the supplyof waterSupplying pharmaceuticals
Cooperation in medical careand rescue activities
Cooperation in dental care
Cooperation in midwifery
activities
Accepting those requiring
midwifery services

Mutual assistance in watersupply activities

Transport

Chiba Prefecture and municipalities within
the prefecture
Municipalities in Chiba Prefecture and 18
cleaning and sanitation associations

Yachiyo City’s water utility administrator

Water, food, and daily necessities

Municipalities and special district
Mutual assistance inauthorities in Chiba Prefecture
firefighting activities
42 water suppliers, Shibayama Town, 6 bulk Mutual support in the event ofwater suppliers, 1 rural water supplier,a water supply disaster
Chiba Prefecture

Other

Government/public bodies

July 2016)

Transport of supplies
Transport of evacuees

Post offices in Sakura City
Providing facilities and land,
Cable TV station A
etc.
Materials and equipment company A
Supplying machinery for rent
Chiba Civil Engineering and Construction
Labor Union, Sakura Branch
Cooperation in emergency
Sakura City Construction Industry
countermeasures and activities
Association for Disaster Management
Sakura Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Chiba Society of Architects and Building
Engineers, Sakura Branch
Cooperation in damage
Chiba Association of Architectural Firms
certification surveys
Chiba Prefecture Association of Land andHouse Investigators
Supply of materials andMaterials and equipment company B
equipment

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office from the Report on Approaches to Emergency Response and Livelihood Support Measuresin Light of the Kumamoto Earthquake103

4-4 Initiatives by Academic Communities
A wide range of research is being conducted in Japan on the subject of disaster management, covering avariety of fields, including natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tsunami, volcanoes, and meteorologicalphenomena; civil engineering; buildings; earthquake-resistant structures; emergency medical care;environmental health and other medical care and hygiene issues; geography; history and other aspects ofhuman life; information; and energy. The Great East Japan Earthquake led to an awareness that disastermanagement and mitigation research from a comprehensive perspective that integrated all these fields isessential, giving rise to a need for interdisciplinary collaboration through information sharing and interaction
with other fields across the boundaries of different specialisms. Accordingly, following discussions with the
Science Council of Japan and various other relevant academic societies, the Japan Academic Network for
Disaster Reduction was established to serve as a network of academic societies involved in disastermanagement, mitigation, and reconstruction. The network counted 47 academic societies among its
membership at the time of its launch in January 2016, but this figure had grown to 55 by the end of March2017.
Following the Kumamoto Earthquake, the network held an emergency press conference on April 18 and an
emergency briefing on May 2, at which researchers from various academic societies presented information.
Through such endeavors, the network strives to share and disseminate information aimed at communicating
technical content in a way that is easy for the public to understand. In addition, a symposium entitled“Mobilizing 52 Academic Societies to Take on the Challenge of Disaster Risk Reduction: Initiatives Following the
Kumamoto Earthquake” was held during the First National Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction(August 27-28, 2016). At this symposium, academic societies from the network gave presentations concerningseismic observation and the explanation of phenomena, and measures focused on hard infrastructure such asbuildings and soft infrastructure such as the provision of information. Network members also pledged to work
together to increase Japan’s disaster resilience.
The network is mainly focused on collaboration in sharing and disseminating information at present, but itaims to expand its activities to include surveys and research conducted jointly by participating academic
societies.

Mobilizing 52 Academic Societies to Take on the Challenge of Disaster Risk Reduction: Initiatives Following the
Kumamoto Earthquake(August 28, 2016, First National Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction)104

4-5 Initiatives from the Perspective of Gender Equality (based on the response to the 2016
Kumamoto Earthquake)
In the Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality (approved by the Cabinet on December 25, 2015) and the Basic
Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (approved by the National Disaster Management Council on February 16, 2016),
the Cabinet Office has specified that consideration must be given to the differing needs of men and women in
all aspects of disaster management, including prevention (before disaster strikes), emergency response, andrecovery and reconstruction. Moreover, these plans require efforts to be made to promote women’s
participation in decision-making forums relating to both disaster management and reconstruction (Figs. 1-4-3
to 1-4-5).
In addition, the Cabinet Office formulated the Guidelines on Disaster Management and Reconstruction
Initiatives from a Gender Equality Perspective (2013), based on experiences from the Great East Japan
Earthquake and responses to other past disasters. Serving as a basic set of guidelines for local governments tofollow from a gender equality perspective when implementing the necessary measures and responses, thesehave been shared with local governments, as well as relevant groups and organizations. Various problems
emerged at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake, due to a failure to give sufficient consideration to thestockpiling and provision of supplies and the running of evacuation centers. Among the issues raised were alack of supplies for women and the failure to provide places where women could breastfeed or get changed.
Using these guidelines, the Cabinet Office has sought to encourage local governments to take action before
disaster strikes, by such means as increasing female representation on Local Councils for Disaster Management
and undertaking initiatives aimed at reflecting the perspective of gender equality when preparing and revising
Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction. When the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred, the Cabinet Office made an
initial request to both Kumamoto Prefecture and Kumamoto City, asking them to adopt the perspective ofgender equality based on these guidelines, especially in the running of evacuation centers. The Cabinet Officehas continued to liaise with both the prefectural and the municipal governments since then, working toascertain the status of local initiatives and providing advice where required.

105

Fig. 1-4-3 Female Representation on Local Councils for Disaster Management

Note: Following its revision in June 2012, the Basic Act on Disaster Management specified that members of voluntary disasterprevention organizations and/or individuals with a relevant academic background should be added to the membership ofLocal Councils for Disaster Management, in addition to the staff of disaster management organizations who are already ex
officio members, in order to reflect the views of a more diverse range of bodies in the preparation of Local Disaster
Management Plans and the like.
Notes: 1. Compiled from Cabinet Office, Progress of Local Government Measures Focused on Women or the Promotion of a
Gender-Equal Society
2. Figures for April 1 each year, in principle.
3. Due to the impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake, figures for 2011 do not include parts of Iwate Prefecture(Hanamaki City, Rikuzentakata City, Kamaishi City, Otsuchi Town), Miyagi Prefecture (Onagawa Town, Minamisanriku
Town), and Fukushima Prefecture (Minamisoma City, Shimogo Town, Hirono Town, Naraha Town, Tomioka Town,
Okuma Town, Futaba Town, Namie Town, Iitate Village), while figures for 2012 do not include parts of Fukushima
Prefecture (Kawauchi Village, Katsurao Village, Iitate Village).
4. Data for Municipal Councils for Disaster Management in 2015 is based on a survey of 1,741 municipalities nationwide,using figures for 1,644 municipalities, which was the number remaining after excluding the 97 that either failed torespond or reported having 0 members. Special wards are included in “Wards other than those in cities designated bygovernment ordinance.”106Fig. 1-4-4 Female Representation on Prefectural Councils for Disaster Management

Notes. 1. The shapes of the 47 prefectures have been simplified to show female participation in each prefecture’s disastermanagement council
2. Compiled from Cabinet Office, Progress of Local Government Measures Focused on Women or the Promotion of a
Gender-Equal Society
3. In principle, figures are based on the preliminary results of the April 2016 survey, but the situation differs according to
the local government concerned.

Fig. 1-4-5 Target Outcomes for Prefectural Councils for Disaster Management and Municipal Councils for
Disaster Management in the Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality
Item
Female Representation on Prefectural
Councils for Disaster Management

Current
13.2%(2015)

Female Representation on Municipal
Councils for Disaster Management

・Number of bodies with no
women appointed as members:
515 (2014)
・Women as a proportion of themembership: 7.7% (2015)

Target (Deadline)
30%(2020)
・Number of bodies with no
women appointed as members:
0 (2030)
・Women as a proportion of themembership: 10% (ASAP),
aiming for 30% in due course(2020)

Even in the immediate aftermath of the April 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, some evacuation centers werealready taking the female perspective into account in their running, providing separate toilets for men andwomen, and involving women in the running of the evacuation centers. Moreover, some childcare facilities
reopened early on, to enable women to return to the workplace without delay. On the other hand, there wereareas in which the perspective of gender equality was lacking at evacuation centers and in other systems to
support those affected by the disaster, so the Cabinet Office received feedback that responses taking the female
perspective into consideration were inadequate (delayed).

107

In light of this, in FY2016, the Cabinet Office began to gather information about the preparations made before
disaster struck by local governments in affected areas that had to deal with the Kumamoto Earthquake, local
governments that provided support in affected areas, and private sector groups, among others. It also sought
to find out about their responses at the time of the disaster and the status of recovery and reconstruction
efforts to date, collecting a variety of examples. Furthermore, the Cabinet Office conducted a survey of
responses by various groups and examples of their activities, with the objective of clarifying issues that need
to be solved for the future. After analyzing and considering the results from the perspective of gender equality,
the Cabinet Office published its findings in March 2017, in the Report on the Survey of Responses to the 2016
Kumamoto Earthquake from the Perspective of Gender Equality.
This report also outlined the status of disaster response from the perspective of gender equality after the
Kumamoto Earthquake and described the situation in various settings. Some expressed the view that initiatives
focused on the perspective of gender equality were embarked on earlier than in the case of the Great East
Japan Earthquake and were successfully implemented, thanks to advice and support from the national
government, local governments nationwide, and private sector support groups, especially those in the Tohoku
region.
On the other hand, the survey revealed that problems had occurred. For example, there were evacuation
centers where consideration for women, elderly people, people with disabilities, and infants and young children
was not adequate. In addition, diverse needs were not clearly identified in some cases, due to a lack ofawareness of the perspective of gender equality. Among the data obtained from the results of thequestionnaire was the finding that just under 60% of evacuation centers surveyed had involved women in therunning of the evacuation centers within a week (Fig. 1-4-6).

108

Fig. 1-4-6 Results of a Questionnaire-based Survey Regarding Gender Equality Perspectives(i) Implementation status of initiatives reflecting the perspective of gender equality at evacuation centers (top:(5) Separate toilets for men and women(6) Providing more women’s toilets than men’s(7) Female participation in the operational frameworks of evacuation
centers(8) Distribution of supplies for women (sanitary protection, underwear,etc.) by women(9) Efforts to ascertain women’s needs(10) Measures to prevent violence against women(11) Opening and publicizing an advice desk for women(12) Providing a dedicated section for families with infants and young
children(13) Providing a dedicated women’s and/or mother-and-child section(14) Initiatives to avoid the fixed division of roles on the basis of sex or age
in the running of evacuation centers, such as assigning the cooking andserving of food to women only

7
29.2%
5
20.8%
3
12.5%
1
4.2%
2
8.3%
1
4.2%
1
4.2%
1
4.2%
4
16.7%
2
8.3%
4
16.7%
4
16.7%
3
12.5%
0
0.0%

4
16.7%
1
4.2%
1
4.2%
0
0.0%
1
4.2%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
4.2%
1
4.2%
1
4.2%
0
0.0%

13
54.2%
11
45.8%
11
45.8%
1
4.2%
20
83.3%
4
16.7%
15
62.5%
8
33.3%
8
33.3%
4
16.7%
6
25.0%
8
33.3%
6
25.0%
3
12.5%

Don't know(4) Women-only laundry drying area

2
8.3%
5
0.8%
7
29.2%
0
0.0%
17
70.8%
3
12.5%
14
58.3%
7
29.2%
4
16.7%
2
8.3%
1
4.2%
3
12.5%
2
8.3%
3
12.5%

No

(3) Breastfeeding room

Total(2) Women’s changing room

Within 1month(1) Ensuring privacy using partitions

Within half amonth

Initiatives Reflecting the Perspective of Gender Equality

Within 1
week

Implemented within 1 month

Total implemented
after 1 month or morenumber of municipalities; bottom: %)

1
4.2%
3
12.5%
2
8.3%
4
16.7%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
2
8.3%
3
12.5%
1
4.2%
3
12.5%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
4.2%

10
41.7%
10
41.7%
10
41.7%
16
66.7%
4
16.7%
15
62.5%
7
29.2%
13
54.2%
12
50.0%
14
58.3%
12
50.0%
12
50.0%
15
62.5%
17
70.8%

0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
4.2%
3
12.5%
0
0.0%
5
20.8%
2
8.3%
1
4.2%
1
4.2%
5
20.8%
3
12.5%
4
16.7%
3
12.5%
3
12.5%

(ii) Status of the department in charge of gender equality at the time of the disaster (within a month of occurrence)(top: number of municipalities; bottom: %)Prefecture
Municipality
Total

Asked relevant organizations toincorporate the perspective of genderequality into their response and staff
from the department themselves visited
evacuation centers
1
50.0
1
2.7
2
5.1

Asked relevant organizations
to incorporate theperspective of genderequality into their response

Engaged inother disaster
response tasks

Carrying out
normal duties

0
0.0
3
8.1
3
7.7

0
0.0
19
51.4
19
48.7

1
50.0
11
29.7
12
30.8

Other

0
0.0
3
8.1
3
2.6

Source: Survey of Responses to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake from the Perspective of Gender Equality (Cabinet Office)109

Section 5: International Cooperation on Disaster Risk Reduction
Japan has accumulated a great deal of experience and knowledge concerning disasters, along with numerous
policies on disaster risk reduction. By sharing these, it is driving global discussions in the field of disaster risk
reduction and contributing to initiatives in this field in countries worldwide. In particular, the international
communities expect Japan to play a leading role in the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which was concluded at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk
Reduction, hosted by Japan in Sendai City in March 2015. Accordingly, the Cabinet Office Disaster Management
Bureau is proactively promoting cooperation in disaster risk reduction through the UN and other internationalorganizations, as well as bilateral disaster risk reduction cooperation.

5-1 Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the UN and Other International Organizations(1) Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction(UNISDR)The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) is undertaking intensive activities focused on
the following three strategic objectives, to promote the SFDRR.
Strategic objective 1: Strengthen global monitoring, analysis and coordination of Sendai Framework
implementation
Strategic objective 2: Support to regional and national Sendai Framework implementation
Strategic objective 3: Catalyse action through Member States and Partners
As well as playing a leading role in the activities of UNISDR, Japan provides financial support for those
activities, contributing a total of approximately $2.89 million (approximately ¥346.8 million) through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Office in FY2016.
The establishment of an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group (OEIWG) to formulate
indicators to measure progress toward the global targets and relevant terminology was approved by the UN
General Assembly in June 2015 and the OEIWG began its deliberations that September. In this process, Japan
made a substantial contribution to the OEIWG’s discussions, conducting a prior survey to ascertain whether
countries held any data concerning indicators that were tabled for consideration. As a result of thesedeliberations, the Recommendations of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Global
Indicators for the Global Targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and on the
Follow-up to and Operationalization of the Indicators were adopted at the UN General Assembly in February
2017 (Fig. 1-5-1).
In conjunction with the Seventh Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, which was held in
New Delhi, India, on November 3–5, 2016, the Vice-Minister for Policy Coordination held talks with Robert
Glasser, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction (SRSG) on November 4.
The SRSG expressed his gratitude to Japan for its leadership of the OEIWG and established a sharedunderstanding with the vice-minister through discussions on such topics as closer partnership and cooperation
between the Government of Japan (Cabinet Office) and UNISDR in promoting the SFDRR.

110

Fig. 1-5-1 Recommendations of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group (OIEWG) on
Global Indicators for the Global Targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015-2030 and on the Follow-up to and Operationalization of the Indicators
Global target A:
Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 global mortality between
2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.
A-1 (compound) Number of deaths and missing persons attributed to disasters, per 100,000 population.
A-2
Number of deaths attributed to disasters, per 100,000 population.
A-3
Number of missing persons attributed to disasters, per 100,000 population.
The scope of disaster in this and subsequent targets is defined in paragraph 15 of the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and applies to small-scale and large-scale,frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters caused by natural or man-made hazards,
as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risk.
Global target B:
Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average global figure per
100,000 between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.
B-1 (compound) Number of directly affected people attributed to disasters, per 100,000 population.
B-2
Number of injured or ill people attributed to disasters, per 100,000 population.
B-3
Number of people whose damaged dwellings were attributed to disasters.
B-4
Number of people whose destroyed dwellings were attributed to disasters.
B-5
Number of people whose livelihoods were disrupted or destroyed, attributed to disasters.
Global target C:
Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030.
C-1 (compound) Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to global gross domestic product.
C-2
Direct agricultural loss attributed to disasters.
Agriculture is understood to include the crops, livestock, fisheries, apiculture, aquaculture and forest
sectors as well as associated facilities and infrastructure.
C-3
Direct economic loss to all other damaged or destroyed productive assets attributed to disasters.
Productive assets would be disaggregated by economic sector, including services, according tostandard international classifications. Countries would report against those economic sectors
relevant to their economies. This would be described in the associated metadata.
C-4
Direct economic loss in the housing sector attributed to disasters.
Data would be disaggregated according to damaged and destroyed dwellings.
C-5
Direct economic loss resulting from damaged or destroyed critical infrastructure attributed todisasters.
The decision regarding those elements of critical infrastructure to be included in the calculation willbe left to the Member States and described in the accompanying metadata. Protective infrastructureand green infrastructure should be included where relevant.
C-6
Direct economic loss to cultural heritage damaged or destroyed attributed to disasters.
Global target D:
Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health andeducational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030.
D-1 (compound) Damage to critical infrastructure attributed to disasters.
D-2
Number of destroyed or damaged health facilities attributed to disasters.
D-3
Number of destroyed or damaged educational facilities attributed to disasters.
D-4
Number of other destroyed or damaged critical infrastructure units and facilities attributed todisasters.
The decision regarding those elements of critical infrastructure to be included in the calculation willbe left to the Member States and described in the accompanying metadata. Protective infrastructureand green infrastructure should be included where relevant.
D-5 (compound) Number of disruptions to basic services attributed to disasters.
D-6
Number of disruptions to educational services attributed to disasters.
D-7
Number of disruptions to health services attributed to disasters.
D-8
Number of disruptions to other basic services attributed to disasters.
The decision regarding those elements of basic services to be included in the calculation will be left
to the Member States and described in the accompanying metadata.

111

Global target E:
Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.
E-1
Number of countries that adopt and implement national disaster risk reduction strategies in line with
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.
E-2
Percentage of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies inline with national strategies.
Information should be provided on the appropriate levels of government below the national levelwith responsibility for disaster risk reduction.
Global target F:
Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support tocomplement their national actions for implementation of this framework by 2030.
F-1
Total official international support, (official development assistance (ODA) plus other official flows),
for national disaster risk reduction actions.
Reporting of the provision or receipt of international cooperation for disaster risk reduction shall bedone in accordance with the modalities applied in respective countries. Recipient countries areencouraged to provide information on the estimated amount of national disaster risk reduction
expenditure.
F-2
Total official international support (ODA plus other official flows) for national disaster risk reduction
actions provided by multilateral agencies.
F-3
Total official international support (ODA plus other official flows) for national disaster risk reduction
actions provided bilaterally.
F-4
Total official international support (ODA plus other official flows) for the transfer and exchange ofdisaster risk reduction-related technology.
F-5
Number of international, regional and bilateral programmes and initiatives for the transfer andexchange of science, technology and innovation in disaster risk reduction for developing countries.
F-6
Total official international support (ODA plus other official flows) for disaster risk reduction capacitybuilding.
F-7
Number of international, regional and bilateral programmes and initiatives for disaster risk reductionrelated capacity-building in developing countries.
F-8
Number of developing countries supported by international, regional and bilateral initiatives tostrengthen their disaster risk reduction-related statistical capacity
Global target G:
Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information
and assessments to the people by 2030.
G-1
Number of countries that have multi-hazard early warning systems. (compound G2-G5)
G-2
Number of countries that have multi-hazard monitoring and forecasting systems.
G-3
Number of people per 100,000 that are covered by early warning information through local
governments or through national dissemination mechanisms.
G-4
Percentage of local governments having a plan to act on early warnings.
G-5
Number of countries that have accessible, understandable, usable and relevant disaster risk
information and assessment available to the people at the national and local levels.
G-6
Percentage of population exposed to or at risk from disasters protected through pre-emptive
evacuation following early warning.
Member States in a position to do so are encouraged to provide information on the number of
evacuated people.
Source: (The section on follow-up and operationalization of the indicators has been omitted)
United Nations General Assembly (Seventy-first session)
Agenda item 19(c)Sustainable development: disaster risk reduction
Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and terminology relating to disasterrisk reduction(2) Seventh Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR)
The Indian government (Ministry of Home Affairs) and UNISDR hosted the Seventh Asian Ministerial
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) in New Delhi, India, on November 3–5, 2016. This conferenceof ministers responsible for disaster risk reduction is held once every two years, to provide an overview of theoutcomes of Asian initiatives aimed at mitigating the harm caused by disasters and challenges to these efforts.
112

The key objective of the most recent conference was to discuss the implementation status of the SFDRR(adopted at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction) by Asian countries and their measures
to promote the framework. It was attended by around 4,500 people, including ministers from the Asia-Pacificcountries and other government representatives from a total of 51 countries, as well as representatives ofinternational organizations, regional bodies, and NGOs, among others.
Japan was represented by the Vice-Minister for Policy Coordination, who chaired a technical session on thetheme “Disaster Preparedness for effective response and ‘to build back better.’” The conference was also
attended by a delegation of Diet members, which included Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary-General
Toshihiro Nikai, former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Motoo Hayashi, and former Minister of State
for Disaster Management Tatsuo Hirano. Members of the delegation gave speeches on the importance oftsunami preparedness and prior investment at a special pre-event session on November 2 to mark World
Tsunami Awareness Day and also at the opening ceremony.

The Vice-Minister for Policy Coordination (on the right-hand side of the screen) chairs a technical session(3) International Recovery Platform (IRP)The Hyogo Framework for Action was adopted in 2005 at the Second UN World Conference on Disaster Risk
Reduction, which was held in the city of Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture. In response to this, the IRP was established in
the city the same year, to enhance networks and frameworks for supporting smoother post-disasterreconstruction, disseminate lessons concerning reconstruction and develop common techniques andmechanisms to facilitate reconstruction, and provide advice and support to those formulating reconstructionplans and visions following a disaster. The IRP’s activities include holding the International Recovery Forum,
preparing guidance notes on recovery, and organizing workshops for human resource development. The SFDRR
advocates that the IRP should be enhanced, as an international mechanism for promoting the “build backbetter” approach, which is positioned in the SFDRR as the fourth priority area for action. The Government ofJapan (Cabinet Office) supports the activities of the IRP, as well as contributing to enhancing the infrastructure
for its development, as Co-Chair of the IRP Steering Committee.
The FY2016 International Recovery Forum was held in Kobe on January 24, focusing on the theme “Sending
the Message of Build Back Better from Hyogo, Japan.” It was attended by around 140 people from 33 countries
and 16 international organizations, including Hyogo Prefectural Governor Toshizo Ido, the Vice-Minister for
Policy Coordination, and Vice Minister for Interior of Thailand Police Lieutenant General Nadhapit Snidvongs.
At the forum, participating countries discussed practical matters and experiences in such areas as post-disasterreconstruction and health and medical care measures.

113

The International Recovery Forum(4) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Disaster Management Officials ForumThe 10th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Disaster Management Officials Forum (SDMOF)
was held in Iquitos, Peru on October 8–9, 2016. Focusing on the theme “Emergency Preparedness for Supply
Chain and Emergency Food Security,” participants discussed topics including food supply chain resilience in theevent of disaster and the provision of food support for affected areas. Japan was represented by Cabinet Office
Policy Advisor Yasuyuki Ishii, who talked about the provision of push-type support and other experiences in thewake of the Kumamoto Earthquake.
(5) Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the Activities of the Asian Disaster Reduction Center
The Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) was established in Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture in 1998 to sharethe lessons of the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and other disasters in Japan with the rest of Asia. The
ADRC currently has 30 member countries and its activities center on four key areas: sharing information about
disasters, human resource development in member countries, improving the disaster management capabilities
of communities, and promoting partnerships with member countries, international organizations, localorganizations, and NGOs. It also hosts visiting researchers from member countries each year: as of March 2017,
the ADRC had hosted a total of 99 such researchers, thereby helping to cultivate personnel who contribute topolicymaking in the field of disaster risk reduction in member countries. The ADRC also gathers information
about disaster management systems and the latest disasters in each country and publishes this on its website,
as well as providing information obtained from satellite observation of the extent of the damage when adisaster occurs.

114

Asian Disaster Reduction Center member countries and advisory countries

After a major natural disaster in a member country, the ADRC deploys government experts from various
countries to conduct field surveys. In December 2016, with the cooperation of Kumamoto Prefecture,
Kumamoto City, and Mashiki Town, among others, the ADRC sent a delegation of representatives of disastermanagement organizations from 23 Asian member countries to inspect areas affected by the Kumamoto
Earthquake.
Some member countries were devastated by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami triggered by a major earthquake
off the Indonesian island of Sumatra, so they have a particularly strong interest in tsunami. As such, the ADRC
takes advantage of World Tsunami Awareness Day to share each country’s experiences and knowledge, in orderto promote tsunami preparedness. Accordingly, the ADRC held two tsunami workshops in FY2016. One, which
was timed to coincide with a meeting of the APEC Emergency Preparedness Working Group, was held in Lima,
with the cooperation of Peru’s National Institute of Civil Defense, which is responsible for disaster preparedness(August 2016). The other, focused on anti-tsunami measures at the local level, was held in Krabi in September
2016, with the cooperation of the Thai Ministry of Interior’s Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.
At the workshop, representatives of the Thai government, private sector, and NGOs discussed tsunami
preparedness initiatives after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Great East Japan Earthquake with experts fromJapan and Indonesia.

A workshop in Krabi, Thailand115

5-2 Bilateral Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation
In addition to the initiatives of international organizations in which it engages, Japan is building stronger
partnerships with the disaster management authorities of national governments across the globe by sharing
its experiences of disaster management policy through opportunities such as more than 10 visits by ministeriallevel officials involved in the field of disaster management in other countries. The following describes Japan’sbilateral partnership with the U.S.A. and its trilateral partnership with China and South Korea.
(1) Partnership between the Cabinet Office and the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Based on the Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the Cabinet Office and the U.S. Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in December 2014, an annual meeting was held on September 14, 2016 at FEMA’s
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Japan was represented by State Minister of the Cabinet Office Jun
Matsumoto, while FEMA was represented by its then Administrator Craig Fugate. During the meeting, theyshared information about their countries’ disaster management policies and agreed on cooperation in the areasof disaster information sharing and workshop participation in FY2016/17.

State Minister of the Cabinet Office Jun Matsumoto and then FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate(2) Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation among Japan, China, and South Korea
Based on the matters agreed upon in the Leaders’ Declaration at the 4th Japan-China-Republic of Korea
Summit Meeting held in Tokyo in May 2011, the Japan-China-Republic of Korea Trilateral Tabletop Exercise on
Disaster Management is held to improve all three countries’ capabilities in providing and accepting support. In
FY2016, this exercise was held in Seoul, South Korea in June, based on the scenario of a major typhoon making
landfall in South Korea. During the exercise, the participants discussed effective, efficient methods ofproviding/receiving support between the three countries.

116Section 6: Efforts to Promote National Resilience
6-1 Approval of the Action Plan for National Resilience 2016
On May 24, 2016, the Action Plan for National Resilience 2016 (hereinafter the “Action Plan 2016”) wasapproved by the National Resilience Promotion Office.
The Action Plan 2016 sought to enhance measures in response to such disasters as the Torrential Rain of
September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku Regions and the volcanic eruptions of Mt. Ontake and Kuchinoerabujima. In addition, it aimed to strengthen initiatives aimed at broadening the base of those involved in national
resilience endeavors by encouraging local governments and the private sector to implement initiatives and byraising awareness both within Japan and overseas.
Regarding the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the Action Plan 2016 stated, “Taking the opportunity of thisrecent earthquake, the government will undertake more in-depth discussions, position the necessary measures
firmly within the national resilience framework, and promote these measures as a priority.” Based on this,relevant ministries and agencies worked together to check their national resilience measures in light of the
Kumamoto Earthquake, putting together a summary of issues and approaches to be taken in response.

6-2 Support for the Preparation of Fundamental Plans for Regional Resilience
Local governments are in the process of preparing Fundamental Plans for Regional Resilience (hereinafter“Regional Plans”). As of April 1, 2017, five prefectures and 31 municipalities were working toward theformulation of a Regional Plan, while 42 prefectures and 40 municipalities had already formulated one (Fig. 16-1). Staff from the Cabinet Secretariat held briefings to support local governments in formulating Regional
Plans. In addition, 32 grants and subsidies under the jurisdiction of relevant ministries and agencies wereavailable to provide financial assistance for initiatives undertaken by local governments based on these
Regional Plans. Follow-up surveys were conducted to ascertain the implementation status of support provided
via these ministries and agencies, and local governments were informed of the results.
Fig. 1-6-1 Preparation of Fundamental Plans for Regional Resilience by Prefectures

Source: National Resilience Promotion Office, Cabinet Secretariat

117

6-3 Promotion of Private Sector Initiatives Contributing to National Resilience
In FY2016, the government launched a system under which companies actively implementing business
continuity initiatives can apply for third-party certification as an Organization Contributing to National
Resilience. The objective of this system is to encourage private sector initiatives contributing to national
resilience. A total of 71 organizations had been certified under this system as of the end of March 2017.
In conjunction with this, in FY2016, the government held seminars in 16 cities across the country and sought
applications from businesses to participate in the Model Projects for Promoting Widespread Adoption of BCP
initiative. Under this initiative, the successful applicants undertook model projects in which they preparedbusiness continuity plans (BCPs) with the assistance of experts. Going forward, the common issues faced by
SMEs and tips for formulating BCPs will be identified, with a view to promoting the spread of such initiatives.
Column: High School Students Summit on “World Tsunami Awareness Day” in Kuroshio
In a world first, the High School Students Summit on “World Tsunami Awareness Day” in Kuroshio washeld over two days from November 25, 2016 in Kuroshio Town, Kochi Prefecture.
Focusing on the overall theme “What we, who are responsible for the next generation, can do to survive
disasters – From the perspectives of self-help, mutual support and public support,” the summit brought
together around 360 high school students from 30 countries around the world, including Japan. Participants
gave presentations and exchanged opinions on their countries’ initiatives in three thematic areas: 1)
Understanding the risks of disasters caused by natural hazards; 2) Preparing for disasters caused by natural
hazards; and 3) Recovery and reconstruction from damage caused by disasters. In addition, participantslearned about initiatives by Kochi Prefecture and Kuroshio Town to prepare for Nankai Trough earthquake byobserving a tsunami evacuation drill involving evacuation to high ground and going to see a tsunami
evacuation tower. The participating high school students had differing levels of knowledge and awarenessconcerning natural disasters and disaster preparedness, but among them were students who had actuallyexperienced disaster and sought to ensure that their survival was meaningful by actively learning more about
disaster preparedness and telling others about it.
These lively, cross-border discussions culminated in the unanimous adoption of the Kuroshio Declarationby the participants. The declaration states, “we all share the common goal of saving all human lives fromdisasters” and goes on to make a commitment that participants will continue to do their utmost tounderstand the risks and effects of tsunami, pass on their predecessors’ experiences and knowledge ofdisaster mitigation and risk reduction to future generations, and save people’s lives from tsunami and otherhazards. This summit appears to have provided the high school students who took part with a valuable
opportunity to broaden their horizons from an international perspective by getting to know people from adiverse array of countries and regions, and sharing knowledge concerning disaster risk reduction initiatives.
Just 11 days after the summit, on December 7, a magnitude 6.5 earthquake struck northern Aceh province
in Indonesia. Participating students who had returned home to Indonesia reportedly received many e-mails
from participating students from other countries, checking that they were safe. It is hoped that in the future,
the participating students from each country will go on to play an active role as Young Tsunami Preparedness
Ambassadors (Disaster Preparedness Leaders) and build networks that transcend the boundaries between
countries and regions.

Plenary session of the High School Students Summit on “World Tsunami Awareness Day”

118

Chapter 2 Measures for Nuclear Disasters
Section 1: Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems
1-1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System under Non-Emergency Conditions
In the case of a nuclear emergency, the resultant damage would be immense and extensive, so the whole
government must work together cohesively to develop and promote nuclear emergency response measures.
Accordingly, the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council has been established within the Cabinet to promote
nuclear emergency preparedness measures by the government as a whole under non-emergency conditions.
The main role of this Council, whose members include representatives of the Cabinet Office and otherrelevant ministries and agencies and local governments, is to take national responsibility for verifying theeffectiveness of the emergency response plans drawn up by each region and grant approval for those that meetthe necessary standard. The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council is chaired by the Prime Minister, with
the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment, Cabinet Office Minister of State for Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness, and the Chairman of the NRA as vice-chairs, and all Ministers of State and the Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, among others, serving as commissioners (Fig. 2-1-1).

1-2 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System in an Emergency
In the event of a nuclear emergency involving the release of a large quantity of radioactive material, a Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters will be established. The main role of this headquarters will be to ascertain
the actual situation on the field and the extent of the damage and to take overall charge of coordinating
relevant national government organizations and local government bodies to ensure that emergency response
measures suited to the situation are implemented swiftly and accurately. The Prime Minister will serve as
Director-General of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, with the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Ministerof the Environment, Cabinet Office Minister of State for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and the Chairmanof the NRA as deputy directors-general, and all Ministers of State and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for
Crisis Management, among others, serving as regular members (Fig. 2-1-1).
In the Headquarters, the NRA holds primary responsibility for decisions on technical and specialized matters(on-site), while matters relating to the procurement of equipment and supplies required to deal with thenuclear facilities and all matters associated with the response outside the facilities (off-site) are handled by therelevant ministries and agencies, based on the directions of the director-general (the Prime Minister). The
organization headed by the Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Disaster Management that was
launched on October 14, 2014, will serve as the Secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.
Moreover, the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction was revised in July 2015 to enhance the system for
dealing with a complex disaster. This revision put in place a cooperation framework that will, in the event of acomplex disaster, enable the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters (which deals with natural disasters)
and the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (which deals with nuclear emergencies) to undertake
integrated information gathering, decision making, and direction and coordination (Fig. 2-1-2). In addition, the2016 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise, which was held on November 13 and 14, 2016,
was based on the scenario of a complex disaster involving an earthquake and tsunami, along with a nuclear
power plant accident. To review cooperation between the headquarters, the exercise included joint meetings
between the Major Disaster Management Headquarters and the Nuclear Accident Response Headquarters, andbetween the Major Disaster Management Headquarters and the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.

119Fig. 2-1-1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems Under Emergency and Non-emergency Conditions

Source: Cabinet Office

Fig. 2-1-2 Illustration of Responses by Both Headquarters in the Event of a Major Complex Disaster

Source: Cabinet Office120Section 2: Bolstering Nuclear Disaster Management and Radiation Monitoring
Under the NRA
It is absolutely vital to implement ongoing initiatives to ensure trust in the administration of nuclear energy
regulation, taking into account the lessons from the accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) is tackling various policy challenges, based on its guiding principles
of independent decision making, effective actions, open and transparent organization, improvement andcommitment, and emergency response, in order to fulfill its mission of protecting the general public and theenvironment through rigorous and reliable regulation of nuclear activities.

2-1 Efforts in Nuclear Disaster Management
The NRA strives to enhance the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines by actively incorporating the latest
international knowledge, in order to ensure that the optimal judgment criteria are used in formulating disasterprevention plans at all times. Over the last year, the Study Team on Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Measures
has been examining approaches to nuclear emergency response measures relating to nuclear fuel facilities. On
December 28, 2016, the draft revisions to the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines formulated in light ofthe outcomes of this panel’s deliberations were opened up for public comment and the guidelines were revisedon March 22, 2017.
The revision of the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for commercial power reactors and the setting of EALs
for nuclear fuel facilities, etc. were also considered and a framework opinion on these matters was publishedon March 8, 2017.
Steady progress is being made in developing a medical care system for use in the event of a nuclear
emergency, with support being provided to promote the designation of nuclear disaster base hospitals.

2-2 Emergency Response Efforts
In FY2016, the NRA again actively participated in disaster prevention drills held by nuclear operators, sending
staff to take part. The NRA is also endeavoring to maintain and improve its emergency response capabilities bysuch means as conducting information-sharing exercises involving the Secretariat of the NRA’s Emergency
Response Center (ERC) and rapid response centers and emergency response rooms at nuclear facilities.
In addition, at the debriefing on the disaster prevention drills held by nuclear operators in FY2016, the NRA
decided to revise five of the evaluation indicators and criteria, including public relations activities and exercise
participation rates, based on the findings from evaluations of the disaster prevention drills held by nuclear
operators. The revised indicators and criteria will be applied to evaluations starting in FY2016.

2-3 Bolstering Radiation Monitoring
To conduct effective emergency monitoring in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines,
the NRA opened Local Radiation Monitoring Offices in Hokkaido and Niigata Prefecture in April 2016. Moreover,
the NRA increased the number of Local Radiation Monitoring Officers at the Saga Local Radiation Monitoring
Office in December 2016, thereby bolstering the local emergency monitoring framework. In addition, on
September 26, 2016, and March 22, 2017, the Secretariat of the NRA published revised editions of “About
Emergency Monitoring (Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines Supplementary Reference Materials),” which
provides detailed guidance concerning emergency monitoring. Furthermore, the Emergency Radiation
Monitoring Information Sharing and Disclosure System began operating in June 2015, enabling the results ofemergency monitoring to be swiftly consolidated, shared with relevant parties, and published.
121

Pursuant to the Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan (approved by the Monitoring Coordination
Council on August 2, 2011, revised April 28, 2017), the NRA conducts monitoring related to the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident. It monitors aerial radiation rates in Fukushima Prefecture andthroughout Japan, and publishes its results monthly. Just as in FY2015, experts from the Environment
Laboratories of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited Japan in May and November 2016. They
jointly collected ocean water samples around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station with the NRA andcompared the results of their analyses with those of Japanese analysis laboratories. Following similar
comparisons in both 2014 and 2015, the IAEA concluded from the results that the participating Japanese
analysis laboratories demonstrate strong capabilities and achieve high standards of accuracy in their analyses.
In light of decisions taken at the NRA’s 55th meeting in FY2015, which took place on February 10, 2016,detailed monitoring of areas to which it will be difficult to return was carried out and the results published in
November that year.
In addition, to study the impact of radiation in the areas around nuclear facilities and environmental radiationlevels nationwide, the IAEA provided support for environmental radiation level surveys in all 47 prefectures,
ocean water radiation analyses in areas around nuclear power plants (all 16 seas), and radiation surveys
conducted by the locations and neighboring prefectures of nuclear facilities (24 prefectures). To improveradioactivity analysis skills among local government employees and enhance the effectiveness of emergency
monitoring, the NRA held three training courses: the Environmental Radioactivity Analysis Training Course, thePractical Training Course in Monitoring, and the Training Course on Emergency Monitoring Centers.

2-4 Accidents and Problems
The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material, and Reactors requires a licenseeof nuclear energy activity, etc. to report accidents that occur at nuclear power facilities to the NRA, while the
Act on Prevention of Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes, etc. requires that permission or notification users,
etc. do the same. Of the reports received in FY2016, five came from licensee of nuclear energy activity, etc. andthree from permission or notification users, etc.

122Section 3: Enhancing and Strengthening Local Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Systems
3-1 Formulating and Supporting Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction / Evacuation Plans
Under the Basic Act on Disaster Management, local governments must prepare Local Plans for Disaster Risk
Reduction with Nuclear Emergency Response Measures (hereinafter “Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction”)
that set out the basic response to be adopted by prefectures and municipalities in dealing with a nuclear
emergency.
Currently, relevant local governments within a radius of around 30km of a nuclear power plant are preparing
Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction based on the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Nuclear
Emergency Response Guidelines (Fig. 2-3-1). Ensuring that the content of Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction
is highly specific and effective is crucial, so the government provides proactive support regarding measures totackle issues that are difficult for local governments alone to resolve in developing more specific Evacuation
Plans and measures to assist persons requiring special care.
Fig. 2-3-1 Status of Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction / Evacuation Plans (as of March 31, 2017)

Tomari region
Higashidori region
Onagawa region

13
5
7

Number of
Local Plans for
Disaster Risk
Reduction
Formulated
13
5
7

Fukushima region*

13

11

8

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
region999Tokai region

14

13

0

Hamaoka region

11

11

1

Municipalities
Concerned

Number of
Evacuation
Plans
Formulated

Remarks

13
5
7
In December 2016, Fukushima Prefecture revised
the Fukushima Prefecture Region-wide
Evacuation Plan in Case of Nuclear Emergency.

In March 2015, Ibaraki Prefecture formulated thePlan for Region-wide Evacuation in Ibaraki
Prefecture in Case of a Nuclear Emergency.
In March 2017, Shizuoka Prefecture revised thePlan for Region-wide Evacuation in Case of a
Nuclear Emergency in the Hamaoka Region.

Shika region
99
9
Fukui area
23
23
23
Shimane region
6
6
6
Ikata region88
8Genkai region888Sendai region
999
Total for the 13
135
132
106
regions
Note: * Readers should be aware that Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which is aSpecified Nuclear Facility, is located in the Fukushima region and that the area around it is an evacuation instruction area.
Source: Cabinet Office

In March 2015, the Cabinet Office established Local Nuclear Disaster Management Councils (hereinafter“Management Councils”) to serve as working teams for resolving issues in areas where nuclear power plants
are located. Its aim in doing so was to support efforts to flesh out and enhance the content of the Local Plans
for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans formulated by prefectures and municipalities in accordancewith “Future Responses to Enhancing Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction” (approved by the Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Council in September 2013). The Cabinet Office also established working groups123reporting to these Management Councils. The working groups in each region are considering support andregion-wide coordination in the formulation of Evacuation Plans, and the assistance provided by national frontline response organizations, while the national government and relevant local governments are working
together to develop more specific, enhanced Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans (Fig.
2-3-2).
Areas where more specific, enhanced Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans have beendeveloped, must summarize their emergency response including evacuation plans and have it checked by theManagement Councils, to ensure that it is specific and rational. The Cabinet Office then reports the councils’
findings to the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council, to seek the Council’s approval. A PDCA review cycle
is introduced for regions whose emergency response has been checked: in addition to support for enhancing
the emergency response and making it more specific, followed by checks of the emergency response (Plan), a
drill is carried out by the Management Council based on the checked emergency response (Do), areas for
improvement are identified from the outcomes of the drill (Check), and the emergency response of the region
in question is improved on the basis of those areas for improvement (Action). Thus, the local nuclear emergency
preparedness system goes through an ongoing process of enhancement and strengthening.
In FY2016, the Tomari Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council checked the Tomari Region Emergency
Response and the Genkai Area Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council checked the Genkai Region
Emergency Response, with the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council approving the findings of bothcouncils (Fig. 2-3-3). Also, the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council revised the Ikata Region
Emergency Response.
Fig. 2-3-2 Formulation of Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans

Source: Cabinet Office124

In the Tomari region, the working group assisting the Tomari Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council has
met 10 times to consider the emergency response in the event of a nuclear emergency. The Tomari Region
Emergency Response was put together at the September 2, 2016, meeting of the Tomari Local Nuclear Disaster
Management Council.
Fig. 2-3-3 List of Regions Whose Emergency Response Has Been Approved by the Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Council in FY2016
Tomari Region
Genkai Region
Hokkaido
Saga, Nagasaki, Fukuoka
Tomari Village, Kyowa Town, Iwanai Town.
Relevant
Kamoenai Village, Suttu Town, Rankoshi Town, Genkai Town, Karatsu City, Imari City, Matsuura
Local
Municipality Niseko Town, Kutchan Town, Shakotan Town, City, Mayor of Matsuura City, Sasebo City, Hirado
Governments
Furubira Town, Niki Toen, Yoichi Town, Akaigawa City, Iki City, Itoshima City
Village
Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Council
October 14, 2016
December 9, 2016
Date Held
Local Nuclear Disaster
Management Council
September 2, 2016
November 22, 2016
Date Held○FY2013: November 6○FY2013: October 22, November 6, November○FY2014: March 12
22○FY2015: June 1, August 28, January 19,○FY2014: May 14, January 30, March 23
February 4, February 19, March 15,○FY2015: July 30, December 22, January 14,
Working Group Meetings
March 23
February 25
Held○FY2016: April 14, June 3, August 4, August 31,○FY2016: April 25, May 24, June 30, July 19,
September
16,
October
26,
August 29
November 17(Held as Working Team meetings through(Held as Working Team meetings throughDecember 2, 2014)
December 2, 2014)*The representatives of relevant local governments participated as members of Local Nuclear Disaster Management Councils or
observers
Source: Cabinet Office
Prefecture

The four key points of the Tomari Region Emergency Response are as follows.
(1) The PAZ (within a radius of around 5km of the power plant, encompassing around 3,000 people) will be
evacuated immediately in the event of a General Emergency. Evacuation sites will be secured outside the
30km radius. However, in the event of blizzards, sheltering indoors will be prioritized until the weather
improves.
(2) Evacuation of residents of social welfare facilities, those requiring care support in their own homes, andchildren at schools, nurseries, and kindergartens within the PAZ will begin at an early stage following an
accident (Site Area Emergency) before a General Emergency is announced. Those whose health would be atrisk if evacuated when not absolutely necessary will not be evacuated unless necessary and will shelterindoors temporarily in facilities equipped with radiation protection.
(3) People in the UPZ (within a radius of around 5-30km from the power plant, encompassing around 76,000
people) will be advised to shelter indoors in the event of a General Emergency. Temporary relocation will be
carried out within about a week in areas where emergency environmental radiation monitoring shows thatthe radiation dose is above a certain level. Evacuation sites capable of dealing with the 76,000 or so people
from within the UPZ will be secured.
(4) Tourists and others staying in the area temporarily will be sent home or evacuated outside the UPZ in theevent of a Site Area Emergency. Information will be provided in English and other languages for foreign
visitors.
125

<For more information about the PAZ and UPZ, see p. 111 (Fig. 2-4-1)*.>The Hokkaido government informed the Tomari Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council that, based on
its awareness that developing nuclear emergency preparedness measures is an ongoing process without an
end point, it will work with relevant local governments to further enhance such measures. In addition, thenational government stated that it will continue to provide support via the Tomari Local Nuclear Disaster
Management Council, while four front-line response organizations — the police, firefighters, Japan Coast Guard,
and Self-Defense Forces — announced that they will provide support as required based on the needs andrequests of the Hokkaido government and relevant municipalities in the event of unforeseen circumstances.
Moreover, Hokkaido Electric Power Company stated that it will steadily address the matters that it should deal
with as a nuclear operator, such as ensuring the availability of vehicles for people with disabilities. Accordingly,
the responses of the Hokkaido government and other relevant governments, and of relevant ministries andagencies were deemed to be specific and were confirmed to be sufficiently specific and rational in light of the
Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines, etc.
In the Genkai region, the working group assisting the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council has
met 14 times to consider the emergency response in the event of a nuclear emergency. The Genkai Region
Emergency Response was put together at the November 22, 2016, meeting of the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster
Management Council.
The three key points of the Genkai Region Emergency Response are as follows.
(1) If temporary relocation of people from 20 outlying islands within the UPZ is required, those people will betemporarily relocated by sea and other means. If evacuation by sea, etc. is not possible, people on thoseislands will continue to shelter indoors in facilities equipped with radiation protection. Facilities equippedwith radiation protection, which have the capacity to hold all the island’s citizens, will be established on every
island, except islands where people can evacuate to other parts of the island or from which people canevacuate to the mainland via bridges.
(2) Multiple evacuation routes and evacuation destinations will be secured for the PAZ (which has a populationof around 8,100). The transport capacity required for evacuation will be secured using buses and othermethods. Evacuation facilities sufficient to house approximately 8,600 ordinary members of the public (18facilities) and approximately 7,200 people requiring care support (127 facilities) will be secured. Facilities
equipped with radiation protection (six facilities) will be established for those whose health would be at risk
if evacuated when not absolutely necessary.
(3) Multiple evacuation routes and temporary relocation sites will be secured for the UPZ (which has apopulation of around 255,000). The transport capacity required for temporary relocation will be secured
using buses and other methods. Facilities sufficient to house approximately 300,000 people (approximately
2,200 facilities) will be secured at evacuation destinations.
The governments of Saga, Nagasaki, and Fukuoka prefectures informed the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster
Management Council that they will work with relevant local governments to further enhance nuclear
emergency preparedness measures. In addition, the national government stated that it will continue to provide
support via the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council, while four front-line responseorganizations — the police, firefighters, Japan Coast Guard, and Self-Defense Forces — announced that they
will provide support as required based on the needs and requests of relevant local governments in the eventof unforeseen circumstances. Moreover, Kyushu Electric Power Company stated that it will steadily address thematters that it should deal with as a nuclear operator, such as ensuring the availability of vehicles for people

126with disabilities. Accordingly, the responses of relevant local governments, including Saga Prefecture, Nagasaki
Prefecture, and Fukuoka Prefecture, and of relevant ministries and agencies were deemed to be specific andwere confirmed to be sufficiently specific and rational in light of the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines,
etc.
In the Ikata region, the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council finalized the Ikata Region
Emergency Response in August 2015; the report confirming the final outcome was submitted to and approvedby the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council in October that year. In November the same year, a National
Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise was held to verify the effectiveness of the response inan emergency. In light of the lessons from the exercise, which were detailed in the March 2016 Report on the
Findings from the Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise, the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster
Management Council revised the Ikata Region Emergency Response on July 14, 2016, to further flesh out andenhance the region’s emergency response.
The five key points of the revisions made to the Ikata Region Emergency Response based on the exercise areas follows.
(1) Provision of more specific details concerning response methods in the Precautionary Evacuation Area (theSadamisaki Peninsula west of the PAZ) in the event that the evacuation route is cut off along the way. These
details include evacuation destinations for land and sea evacuation, evacuation routes, and means ofevacuation(2) Clarification of evacuation routes to evacuation destinations and places to conduct inspections whenevacuating each area for each local government within the UPZ and establishment of multiple routes in casea natural disaster renders one or more routes impassable(3) Establishment of evacuation routes to each temporary assembly point in the PAZ and Precautionary
Evacuation Area; specification of the size of vehicles to be used for evacuation, taking into account suchmatters as road width, when establishing evacuation routes to temporary assembly points(4) Implementation of evacuation guidance and traffic restrictions using information gathered via thetransmission of video footage (regarding traffic congestion and evacuation status)(5) In addition to existing facilities equipped with radiation protection, two new such facilities will be developed(at the former Sadamisaki Elementary School (Sadamisaki Peninsula Precautionary Evacuation Area) and at
Kashima Elementary School (on an outlying island in the UPZ))
Among the other revisions were improved communication of information to citizens and enhanced
emergency environmental radiation monitoring systems.
Ehime Prefecture informed the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council that, based on its
awareness that developing nuclear emergency preparedness measures is an ongoing process without an end
point, it will strive to further enhance evacuation measures by revising the Plan for Region-wide Evacuation andconducting exercises that take into account revisions to the emergency response. The national government
expressed its intention to continue providing support via the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council.
These revisions were confirmed to have further fleshed out and enhanced the emergency response in light of
the lessons from the FY2015 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise.
The Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2016 (approved by the Cabinet on June 2,2016) stipulated, “In the area of measures against a nuclear disaster, evacuation plans will be created, andhuman resource development programs for training and education will be created. Road projects to secure127evacuation routes and construction of radiation-proof facilities will be implemented.” In light of this, relevant
ministries and agencies worked together to promote ongoing efforts to enhance and strengthen measures. A
study financed under the Second Supplementary Budget for FY2016 is being conducted, regarding the statusof evacuation routes and support for facilities equipped with radiation protection for persons requiring special
care of the highest priority. In a project financed under the initial budget for FY2017, the government will
provide local governments with support in acquiring radiation meters, protective clothing, and other materials
and equipment required for their disaster management activities.

3-2 Stockpiling and Distribution of a Stable Iodine Agent in Jelly Form; Guidance on Evacuation
Time Estimation in Case of a Nuclear Emergency, etc.
(1) Stockpiling and Distribution of a Stable Iodine Agent in Jelly Form
Stable iodine agents in pill form are not suitable for infants and young children (aged under three) because
their swallowing ability is not fully developed by that stage. In an emergency, a pharmacist or other trained
person has to administer a powdered stable iodine agent dissolved in syrup, so agents suitable for such children
cannot be distributed in advance, which is a major issue.
In March 2016, the manufacturer of the pills developed a prepackaged product consisting of the active
ingredient (potassium iodide) dissolved in a jelly. Accordingly, local governments in the PAZ and UPZ worked inpartnership with the Cabinet Office to build up a stockpile of this dosage form. Specifically, between September
2016 and March 2017, these local governments purchased and stockpiled around 1.5 times the number ofdoses of the stable iodine agent in jelly form required for all infants and young children in the PAZ and UPZ, toensure that an adequate quantity could be distributed. The purchase was funded with financial assistance fromthe national government and advance distribution of the jellies was carried out once the necessary
preparations had been made.
Potassium Iodide Oral Jelly 16.3mg

Potassium Iodide Oral Jelly 32.5mg[Usage and dosage]
Potassium iodide should be administered orally. The usual dosage is
100 mg/time for individuals aged 13 or over; 50 mg/time forchildren aged at least 3 but under 13; 32.5 mg/time for infants aged
at least 1 month but under 3; and 16.3 mg for newborn infants.

Stable iodine agent in jelly form

128

(2) Guidance on Evacuation Time Estimation in Case of a Nuclear Emergency
In April 2016, the Cabinet Office developed guidance on evacuation time estimation (ETE) in case of a nuclear
emergency, with the objective of further enhancing evacuation plans. This guidance was based on existing
examples of ETE prepared by local governments, as well as the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines andinternational trends in ETE (Fig. 2-3-4).
This guidance provides local government practitioners with an explanation of the basic approaches andtechnical procedures required in ETE. The main content is as follows.
(i) Establishing the purpose of ETE based on the method of use
Measures for using ETE to improve the effectiveness of evacuation plans, assist in responding to an
emergency, and raise awareness of the evacuation plan among local citizens(ii) Approaches to establishing scenarios based on the purpose of ETE
Approaches to establishing scenarios required to appropriately evaluate the effects of evacuation plans andvarious measures (evacuation management, establishing evacuation routes, considering means of evacuation,
traffic measures, management of places to conduct inspections when evacuating each area and of evacuation
destinations, etc.)(iii) Developing input data appropriate to each scenario
Points to bear in mind regarding the places from which the requisite input data should be obtained, and thedevelopment of input data that help to ensure that scenarios are practical and effective(iv) Evaluating and using ETE
Methods of summarizing ETE results to appropriately evaluate evacuation plans and various measures, andmethods of evaluating and using ETE results tailored to the purpose of their use
Fig. 2-3-4 Evacuation Times in an Evacuation Time Estimation (using Ehime Prefecture as an example)[Case 1: Mass Evacuation]
First hour after theevacuation order

2 hours after the evacuationorder

3 hours after the evacuation
order[Case 2: Mass Evacuation on Designated Evacuation Routes]
First hour after theevacuation order

2 hours after the evacuationorder

3 hours after the evacuationorder

4 hours after the evacuationorder

15 hours after theevacuation order

18 hours after theevacuation orderTime to complete evacuation of the PAZ (90%): 18 hours from the evacuation orderTime to complete evacuation of the UPZ (90%): 14 hours 30 minutes from the evacuation order
4 hours after the evacuationorder

8 hours after the evacuation
Key: Traffic density (vehicles/km)
order

Time to complete evacuation of the PAZ (90%): 7 hours 45 minutes from the evacuation orderTime to complete evacuation of the UPZ (90%): 9 hours from the evacuation order

Source: Cabinet Office129

(3) Designation of Off-site Centers
Under Article 12 (1) of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Prime
Minister is required to designate an emergency response base facility (known as “an off-site center”) for eachnuclear site, for the coordination of emergency response measures.
The requirements that off-site centers must satisfy are prescribed in the Cabinet Office Ordinance on Offsite Centers Pursuant to the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Based on
the lessons from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the siting requirements for the offsite centers of commercial power reactors were revised in September 2012 to state specifically that off-site
centers should be sited within a radius of 5-30km from the power station (i.e. within the Urgent Protective
action planning Zone (UPZ)).
In light of this revision, the off-site centers for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini
Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, and Chubu Electric Power Company’s
Hamaoka Power Station were relocated and the new facilities were designated as off-site centers in July 2016,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Act.
In July 2016, then Cabinet Office Minister of State for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Tamayo Marukawa,the Governor of Fukushima Prefecture, and local Diet members and municipal leaders attended the opening
ceremony for the new off-site centers of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings’ Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station, in Soma City and Naraha Town, Fukushima
Prefecture.

Opening ceremony for the Minamisoma Center for
Nuclear Emergency Response Measures, Fukushima
Prefecture

Naraha Center for Nuclear Emergency Response
Measures, Fukushima Prefecture (exterior)(4) Enhancing Nuclear Emergency Response Measures
At a meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Council for Nuclear Power in March 2016, a document concerning
nuclear energy policy, entitled Stance on Enhancing Nuclear Emergency Response Measures, was put together
at the request of the National Governors’ Association, in response to calls from local governments in charge of
local disaster management. The Committee of Relevant Ministries and Agencies on Nuclear Emergency
Response Measures was convened in April 2016 to facilitate a government-wide effort to enhance nuclear
emergency response measures in light of this stance. At this meeting, committee members decided to establish
subcommittees focused on three themes: cooperation between front-line response units (No. 1 Subcommittee),cooperation between private sector business operators (No. 2 Subcommittee), and approaches to the provisionof information, including diffusion calculations (No. 3 Subcommittee). Each subcommittee is engaged in
specialist, practical deliberations that take into account the views of local governments.

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3-3 Disaster Management Drill and Training Initiatives by Local Governments and Nuclear
Operators(1) Support for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Drills Conducted by Local Governments
Under the Basic Act on Disaster Management, etc., local governments are required to hold a nuclear
emergency preparedness drill on a regular basis (Fig. 2-3-5). Drills organized by relevant prefectural
governments are carried out with the participation of prefectural governors and local governments, as well as
national and regional front-line response organizations, namely the police, firefighters, the Japan Coast Guard,
and the Self-Defense Forces. They include exercises in evacuating local citizens and conducting inspections
when evacuating each area.
In regions where the Local Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plan have been enhanced andmade more specific, the Management Council provides the necessary support in such areas as planning andimplementing the drills, promoting the widespread use of evaluation methods, and operating the PDCA cycle
via the drills, with the goal of verifying the specificity and effectiveness of the Local Plan for Disaster Risk
Reduction and Evacuation Plan.

Drill in the Takahama region(August 2016)

Drill in the Sendai region(January 2017)131

Fig. 2-3-5 Nuclear Emergency Response Exercises Held by Local Governments in FY2016
RegionTomari
Higashidori
Onagawa
Fukushima
Shika

Fukui
Hamaoka
Shimane
Ikata

GenkaiSendaiName of Drill
Hokkaido Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(Held as the National Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency
Response Exercise)
Aomori Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Miyagi Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Fukushima Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response
Exercise
Ishikawa Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Toyama Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(i) Fukui Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(ii) Kyoto Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(iii) Shiga Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(iv) Gifu Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Shizuoka Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Shimane Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Tottori Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Ehime Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Yamaguchi Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response
Exercise
Saga Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Nagasaki Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Fukuoka Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Kagoshima Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response
Exercise

Date
November 13 and 14, 2016
(comprehensive exercise)
February 4, 2017 (winter exercise)
October 25, 2016
November 11, 2016
October 14 and 22, 2016
November 20, 2016
August 27, 2016 (held jointly by (i)–(iii))
August 28, 2016 ((i))
November 27, 2016 ((iv))
February 9 and 10, 2017
November 14 and 19, 2016
September 4, 2016 (only Ehime
Prefecture) November 11, 2016
October 10, 2016
January 28, 2017

Source: Cabinet Office(2) Training for Staff of Local Governments and Front-line Response Organizations
The Cabinet Office has organized training for drivers of buses and other commercial vehicles, basic training
in nuclear emergency preparedness, training of key nuclear emergency response personnel, and tabletop
exercises for Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. The objective of these initiatives was to provide local
governments and other disaster response personnel with an understanding of approaches to protection
measures in the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines and to improve their ability to respond in the eventof a nuclear emergency.
(i) Training for drivers of buses and other commercial vehicles
Training is provided for drivers of buses and other commercial vehicles who carry out activities to protect
local citizens from radiation in the event of a nuclear emergency. As well as providing drivers with the basic
knowledge required for radiation protection, this course teaches them about the basic approach to protecting
citizens from radiation and the sequence of protective activities. These training sessions were held on 29
occasions in FY2016. The main topics covered in the training are as follows.
・ Basic knowledge concerning radiation
・ Handling of radiation meters and how to put on and take off protective clothing, etc.
・ Basic approach to the protection of citizens in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Response
Guidelines, etc.
(ii) Basic training in nuclear emergency preparedness
Basic training in nuclear emergency preparedness is provided to key disaster response personnel at local
governments who deal with nuclear emergency preparedness, to teach them the basic knowledge required for132radiation protection. These training sessions were held on 43 occasions in FY2016. The main topics covered in
the training are as follows.
・ Basic knowledge concerning radiation
・ Handling of radiation meters and how to put on and take off protective clothing, etc.
(iii) Training of key nuclear emergency response personnel
Training is provided to key disaster response personnel at local governments who deal with nuclear
emergency preparedness, to teach them basic knowledge required for nuclear emergency management. The
course covers legislation concerning nuclear emergency preparedness, the Nuclear Emergency Response
Guidelines, and lessons from the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Station. These training sessions were
held on 34 occasions in FY2016. The main topics covered in the training are as follows.
・ Legislation concerning nuclear emergency preparedness
・ Approaches to radiation protection in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines
・ Lessons from the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Station, etc.
(iv) Tabletop Exercises for Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Tabletop Exercises for Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters are organized for key disaster response
personnel at local governments who deal with nuclear emergency preparedness, to provide them with theability to respond in the event of an emergency and also to review and improve the Local Plans for Disaster Risk
Reduction and Evacuation Plans formulated by local governments. These exercises were held on 8 occasions in
FY2016. The main topics covered in the training are as follows.
・ Activities at off-site centers (classroom learning and practical training)・ Exercises focused on challenges specific to each functional team・ Tabletop exercise based on scenarios, etc.

LecturePractical training(Basic knowledge concerning radiation)(How to put on and take off protective clothing, etc.)

3-4 Strengthening International Partnerships
International organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and various countries
undertake initiatives concerning off-site nuclear emergency preparedness. Such advanced knowledge isrequired to raise the standard of Japan’s own nuclear emergency preparedness.
Accordingly, the government has sought to share its knowledge and experience of nuclear emergency
133

preparedness with other countries by such means as strengthening cooperative frameworks with authorities
responsible for nuclear emergency preparedness in other countries, conducting regular exchanges of opinionswith them, and participating in multilateral exercises. In addition, Japan conducts surveys of the IAEA’s
standards regarding off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and the systems/management of major countries
engaging in nuclear power generation.
(1) Cooperation Focused on Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems(i) Cooperation with the U.S.A.
Japan is deepening its partnership with the U.S.A. in the area of nuclear emergency prevention systems via
reciprocal invitations to exercises and regular exchanges of opinions with such bodies as the Department ofEnergy (DOE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC), based on the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation framework established in2012 under the Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG).
More specifically, in FY2016, Japan and the U.S.A. held two exchanges of opinions and issued two reciprocal
invitations to exercises, etc. under this framework, exchanging opinions regarding such matters as bothcountries’ experiences and lessons regarding the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station andother nuclear emergencies, as well as their on-site emergency organizations, and human resource development
and training programs. First, in September 2016, Japan participated in an educational program concerning
nuclear emergency response held in California, U.S.A. for senior officials, taking part in an exchange of views
concerning nuclear emergency preparedness education and training. Then, in November last year, Japan invited
relevant individuals from the U.S.A. to observe the Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise held
to verify systems for responding to a nuclear emergency at Hokkaido Electric Power Company’s Tomari Nuclear
Power Station. After the exercise, representatives of the two countries held an exchange of views.
With the aims of strengthening international cooperation between Japan and the U.S.A., then Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Tamayo Marukawa visited FEMA, the NRC, and the DOE
in July that year, where she exchanged views with representatives of those organizations concerning inspection
systems and initiatives for increasing the effectiveness of evacuation plans.

Then Cabinet Office Minister of State for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Tamayo Marukawa and then FEMA
Administrator Craig Fugate hold talks

134

(ii) Cooperation with France
The Memorandum of Cooperation Between the Minister of State for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness of
the Cabinet Office of Japan and the Ministry of the Interior (Director-General for Civil Security and Crisis
Management) of France on Emergency Management related to Nuclear Accidents was signed on May 5, 2015.
Based on this memorandum, the Cabinet Office is pursuing closer collaboration with the French Ministry of theInterior (Director-General for Civil Security and Crisis Management) and other relevant French organizations in
the area of nuclear emergency prevention systems through exchanges of opinions and reciprocal invitations toexercises. Specifically, then State Minister of the Cabinet Office Shinji Inoue held an exchange of views
concerning nuclear emergency preparedness with officials from the Ministry of the Interior in May 2016. In
addition, in November the same year, State Minister Inoue observed a nuclear emergency response exercise
held in the Gironde department in the French region of Bordeaux, sharing his feedback on the structure of theexercise and the scenario formulated.

Then State Minister of the Cabinet Office Shinji Inoue during his visit to France(iii) Other international cooperation
Japan has also engaged in exchanges of opinions and issued reciprocal invitations to observe exercises withinternational organizations such as the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA), as well as countries including the UK, France, China, the Republicof Korea, and Taiwan.
In November 2016, Japan invited 17 representatives of international organizations and the nuclear
emergency preparedness organizations in various countries to observe the Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency
Response Exercise held to verify systems for responding to a nuclear emergency at Hokkaido Electric Power
Company’s Tomari Nuclear Power Station. Members of the delegation of observers spent three days in the area,
during which time they attended a pre-exercise briefing and a meeting to exchange views on the exercise, giving
them the opportunity to observe the evacuation of residents and the Prime Minister’s declaration of a nuclear
emergency.
(2) Participation in Multilateral Exercises
INEX-5, an international nuclear emergency preparedness drill organized by OECD/NEA, was held in
November 2016.
INEX is a “question-driven” tabletop nuclear emergency preparedness exercise organized by OECD/NEA.

135

INEX-5, which is the sixth such exercise, focused on decision-making processes when a complex disaster causes
the loss of communication functions. Japan was primarily involved in two thematic areas: communicating
information to other countries and accepting international emergency relief.
(3) Holding International Workshops
In November 2016, OECD/NEA and the Cabinet Office co-hosted an international workshop on “Post‑
accident Food Safety Science” in Fukushima Prefecture.
This workshop was an opportunity to tell the world not only about the current situation in Fukushima andinitiatives by producers but also about the valuable experiences of people from the area, including themanagement of food within the prefecture and the views of local consumers. Scientists from around the world
compared the situation in Fukushima with international standards and responses in the wake of Chernobyl andconcluded afresh that Fukushima producers, local governments, and the national government are acting
rationally from a scientific viewpoint. Participants confirmed that the OECD and other organizations would takethis into account when discussing approaches to safety in relation to radioactive material in food.
In addition, students from Fukushima Prefectural Soma Agricultural High School mapped out their vision for
the future of Fukushima’s agriculture at the workshop. The students’ involvement seems set to open up future
opportunities, as their vision was included in a report compiled by OECD/NEA and they received an invitation
to an exchange event for students organized by OECD/NEA in France.

State Minister of the Cabinet Office Tadahiko Ito gives

Exchange of views with students from Soma

the opening address at the workshop

Agricultural High School(4) Surveys of International Standards, etc.
December 2015 saw the first meeting of the IAEA’s new Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards
Committee (EPReSC), which has been established to examine the IAEA’s standards regarding off-site nuclear
emergency preparedness and the systems/management of major countries engaging in nuclear power
generation. Japan attended this meeting, participating in discussions with experts from the IAEA and othermember countries.

136

Section 4: 2016 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
4-1 Overview of Exercise(1) Positioning and Objectives
The Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise is a joint exercise involving the national
government, local governments, and nuclear operators, in accordance with the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Based on the scenario of a nuclear emergency, it aims to verify
systems for responding to such an emergency. The 2016 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
had the following objectives:・ To check the effectiveness of the disaster preparedness systems of the national government, local
governments, and nuclear operators, and the cooperative frameworks of relevant organizations
・To check national and local systems and procedures specified in manuals for responding to a nuclear
emergency
・To examine the Evacuation Plan based on the Tomari Region Emergency Response
・To identify lessons from the outcomes of the exercise and improve emergency responses
・To enhance the skills of key personnel involved in nuclear emergency response measures and promote
public understanding of nuclear emergency preparedness(2) Timing and Power Plant
The exercise was held on November 13 and 14, 2016, focusing on Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc’s TomariPower Station.
Fig. 2-4-1 Tomari Region Priority Zones for Nuclear Emergency Response

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.
Tomari Power Station*PAZ: Precautionary Action Zone
*UPZ: Urgent Protective action planning Zone
Source: Cabinet Office(3) Participants, etc.
(Number of participating organizations: approximately 360; number of participants, including local citizens:approximately 18,000)
・ Governmental organizations: Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office, NRA, and other relevant ministries and137

agencies
・ Local governments: Hokkaido Prefecture, Tomari Village, Kyowa Town, 11 municipalities within the UPZ
and other relevant prefectures and municipalities
・ Nuclear operator: Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.
・ Relevant organizations: National Institute of Radiological Sciences of the National Institutes for Quantum
and Radiological Science and Technology, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, etc.
(4) Accident Scenario
In this scenario, an earthquake with a hypocenter located off the southwest coast of Hokkaido leads to amajor tsunami warning being issued. Leakage of reactor coolant subsequently escalates into a General
Emergency due to the loss of function in the reactor water injection system, resulting in the release ofradioactive material.
(5) Content of Exercise
This exercise was held with the aim of further improving the effectiveness of the Evacuation Plan based on
the Tomari Region Emergency Response. It involved decision-making and operational drills relating to theevacuation of residents, tailored to the escalation of the situation in a complex disaster scenario based on atsunami and nuclear emergency.
(6) Winter Exercise
As part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise, a component exercise was held on
February 4, 2017, to check procedures for snow removal and evacuation in the event of a winter blizzard.

4-2 Overview of Performance(1) Comprehensive Exercise Held in November 2016(i) Exercise in Rapid Establishment of an Initial Response System
The national government, local governments, and nuclear operator mobilized key personnel to set up an
initial response system at their respective operational bases following an earthquake and major tsunami
warning and gathered information about the status of the natural disaster and the power station. In addition,
they used teleconferencing and other systems to strengthen communication between relevant organizations
and prepare for an escalation of the situation.

Key personnel gather information(Off-site Center)138

(ii) Exercise in Making Decisions Concerning the Evacuation Plan, etc. Based on Collaboration Between
National and Local Bodies
Following an escalation of the situation, the Prime Minister’s Office and the other bases worked together toformulate and decide on protection measures, including the evacuation of local citizens. At the Prime Minister’s
Office, the Prime Minister declared a nuclear emergency in response to the General Emergency and, with theparticipation of relevant Cabinet ministers, held a meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.
During this meeting, they checked initiatives relating to protection measures, including the evacuation of local
citizens, and approved the government’s basic guidelines on emergency response measures.

Meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (at the Prime Minister’s Office) with the participationof Prime Minister Abe and relevant Cabinet ministers(iii) Field Training Exercise in Response to General Emergency
In this exercise, following the General Emergency, evacuation destinations were coordinated and means oftransport secured for residents within the PAZ, based on the extent of the damage caused by the tsunami. In
addition, residents took stable iodine agents before evacuating. As the scenario envisaged radioactive releases,
residents of the UPZ sheltered indoors and stable iodine agents were urgently distributed. This was followedby temporary relocation and inspections when evacuating each area. For each evacuation, video footagetransmitted by Hokkaido Prefectural Police helicopters was used to gain an understanding of the situation on
the ground.

Exercise in evacuation by bus(From Kyowa Town to Rusutsu Village)

Distribution of stable iodine agents(Furubira Town)(2) Winter Exercise Held in February 2017
An exercise was carried out based on a scenario in which a nuclear emergency escalates during a severe
blizzard centered on Hokkaido’s Shiribeshi region. It involved decision-making and operational drills focused on
measures to protect residents amid this situation.

139

Exercise in making decisions on the evacuation ofresidents during a headquarters meeting

Exercise in using snowplows to lead an evacuation
convoy(Hokkaido Prefectural Office)(Kyowa Town)

4-3 Post-exercise Initiatives
Following the 2016 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise, areas for improvement wereidentified from views expressed by experts and responses to a questionnaire distributed to local citizens who
participated in the drill. These are summarized in the Report on the Findings from the 2016 Comprehensive
Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise. Going forward, the Tomari Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council
will make improvements to the Tomari Region Emergency Response and various manuals, following
deliberations informed by the lessons and response guidelines described in this report. Moreover, thegovernment will seek to further enhance the methods used for conducting the Comprehensive Nuclear
Emergency Response Exercise, as well as the menu of scenarios and exercises, constantly reviewing the exercise
to make it more realistic.

140

Appendix

TABLE OF CONTENTS: APPENDIX
1. Overview of Japan’s National Land
Fig. A-1 Worldwide Hypocenter Distribution (for Magnitude 6 and Higher Earthquakes) and
Plate Boundaries ......................................................................................................... A-1
Fig. A-2 Distribution of Volcanoes Worldwide ......................................................................... A-1
Fig. A-3 Overview of Major Trenches and Major Active Faults ................................................ A-2
Fig. A-4 Distribution of Active Volcanoes in Japan ................................................................... A-4

2. Disasters in Japan5
Fig. A-5 Major Earthquake Damage in Japan (Since the Meiji Period) .................................... A-5
Fig. A-6 Major Natural Disaster in Japan Since 1945 ............................................................... A-6
Fig. A-7 Major Natural Disasters in Japan in Recent Years ....................................................... A-7
Fig. A-8 Number of Fatalities and Missing Persons Resulting from Natural Disasters ............. A-9
Fig. A-9 Breakdown of Fatalities and Missing Persons Caused by Natural Disasters ............... A-9
Fig. A-10 Recent Major Natural Disasters (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)....... A-10
Fig. A-11 Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters and Major
Disaster Management Headquarters ........................................................................ A-17
Fig. A-12 Deployment of Government Survey Teams (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake) ............................................................................................................... A-18
Fig. A-13 Invocation History of the Disaster Relief Act (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthqauke) ............................................................................................................... A-20
Fig. A-14 Actual Designations of Extremely Severe Disasters in the Past Five Years ............. A-24
Fig. A-15 Response of Government Ministries and Agencies to Major Disasters Since 2016 A-26
Fig. A-16 Trends in Facility-Related Damage, Actual and as a Percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)............................................................................................................ A-35
Fig. A-17 Facility-Related Damage by Disaster Type for Disasters Occurring in 2015 ............ A-35
Fig. A-18 Comparison of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan
Earthquake, and the Sumatra Earthquake ................................................................ A-36
Fig. A-19 Damage Estimate for the Great East Japan Earthquake ......................................... A-37
Fig. A-20 Main Volcanic Eruptions and Eruption Disasters in Japan ...................................... A-38
Fig. A-21 Number of Sediment Disasters ............................................................................... A-39
Fig. A-22 Sediment Disaster Risk Areas by Municipalities ..................................................... A-39
Fig. A-23 Increase in Torrential Rain During Short Periods .................................................... A-40
Fig. A-24 Number of Confirmed Occurrences of Tornados .................................................... A-41
Fig. A-25 Major Natural Disasters in the World Since 1900 ................................................... A-42
Fig. A-26 Top 10 Largest Earthquakes Since 1900 .................................................................. A-44
Fig. A-27 Major Natural Disasters Since 2016 ........................................................................ A-45

3. Laws and Systems
Fig. A-28 Progress on Disaster Management Laws and Systems Since 1945 ......................... A-48
Fig. A-29 Major Disaster Management Laws by Type of Disaster .......................................... A-49

Fig. A-30 Structure and System of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction ...................... A-50
Fig. A-31 History of Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction ......................... A-51

4. Organizations
Fig. A-32 Organization of the National Disaster Management Council ................................. A-53
Fig. A-33 Recent Meetings of the National Disaster Management Council (Since 2009) ...... A-54
Fig. A-34 Status of the Establishment of National Disaster Management Council
Committees for Technical Investigation .................................................................... A-55

5. Budget
Fig. A-35 Disaster Management Budgets by Year .................................................................. A-56
Fig. A-36 Trends in Disaster Management Budget ................................................................. A-57
Fig. A-37 Earthquake Emergency Development Project Plans ............................................... A-58
Fig. A-38 Estimated Budgets for Five-Year Plans for Emergency Earthquake Disaster
Management Project................................................................................................. A-59

6. Status of Disaster Management Facilities and Equipment
Fig. A-39 Number of Medical Facilities for Disasters by Prefecture ....................................... A-60
Fig. A-40 Number of Red Cross Hospitals, Emergency Medical Centers, and DMATDesignated Medical Facilities .................................................................................... A-61
Fig. A-41 Designation of Designated Evacuation Centers ...................................................... A-62
Fig. A-42 Seismic Reinforcement of Public Infrastructure ..................................................... A-62
Fig. A-43 Trends in the Seismic Reinforcement Rate of Public Facilities That Serve as Disaster
Management Bases ................................................................................................... A-63
Fig. A-44 Seismic Reinforcement Status of Public Elementary and Junior High Schools ....... A-63

7. Trends in Numbers of Workers in Disaster Management
Fig. A-45 Trends in Numbers of Fire Corps Volunteers .......................................................... A-64
Fig. A-46 Trends in Age Composition Ratios among Fire Corps Volunteers ........................... A-64
Fig. A-47 Trends in Numbers of Flood Fighting Corps Personnel ........................................... A-65
Fig. A-48 Trends in Voluntary Disaster Management Organizations...................................... A-65
Fig. A-49 Female Representation on Local Disaster Management Councils (by Prefecture,2016) ......................................................................................................................... A-66

8. Various Policies and Measures
Fig. A-50 Hazard Map Development ...................................................................................... A-67
Fig. A-51 Formulation Status of Official Announcement Criteria for Evacuation
Recommendations in Municipalities where Natural Disasters are Anticipated ....... A-67
Fig. A-52 Methods of Communicating Evacuation Instructions to Residents in Municipalities................................................................................................................................... A-68
Fig. A-53 Instances of Assistance based on Mutual Support Agreements between
Prefectures and Support Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions in Recent
Years .......................................................................................................................... A-69
Fig. A-54 Status of Mutual Support Agreements in Municipalities ........................................ A-70
Fig. A-55 Status of Municipalities’ Support Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions .... A-71

Fig. A-56 Status of Disaster Management Drill Implementation ........................................... A-72
Fig. A-57 Status of Earthquake Disaster Management Drill Implementation ........................ A-73
Fig. A-58 Implementation Status of Tsunami Countermeasures ........................................... A-74

9. Japan's International Cooperation
Fig. A-59 List of Cooperation Projects Conducted by Ministries and Agencies ..................... A-75
Fig. A-60 Examples of Technical Cooperation Projects in Disaster Risk Reduction (FY2016). A-80

10. Others
Fig. A-61 Trends in the Number of Earthquake Insurance Contracts ..................................... A-83
Fig. A-62 Awareness of Self-Help, Mutual Support, and Public Support Measures .............. A-83
Fig. A-63 Explanations Regarding the Japan Meteorological Agency’s Seismic Intensity
Ratings ....................................................................................................................... A-84
Fig. A-64 Emergency Warning Issuance Criteria .................................................................... A-89

1. Overview of Japan’s National Land
Fig.
Fig.A-1
A-1 Worldwide Hypocenter Distribution (for Magnitude 6 and Higher Earthquakes) and Plate Boundaries

Note: 2006–2015
Source: Created by the Japan Meteorological Agency based on earthquake data from the U.S. Geological Survey

Fig.
Fig.A-2A-2 Distribution of Volcanoes Worldwide

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

A-1

Fig.
Fig.A-3A-3 Overview of Major Trenches and Major Active Faults

Major Trenches and Likely Earthquake Zones

Major Active Faults

Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

A-2

101

No.

Sarobetsu fault zone

424

102
103
104

425
426
427
428

Noubi fault zone

429
430
431
432
433
501
502
503
504
505

Yanagase Sekigahara fault zone
Nosaka Shufukuji fault zone
Kohoku-sanchi fault zone
Yoro-Kuwana-Yokkaichi
Isewan fault zone
Suzuka-toen fault zone
Nunobiki-sanchi-toen fault zone
Suzuka-seien fault zone
Tongu fault
Kizugawa fault zone

506

Biwako-seigan fault zone

208

Shibetsu fault zone
Tokachi-heiya fault zone
Furano fault zone
Mashike-sanchi-toen fault zone · Numata-Sunagawa
fault zone
Toubetsu fault
Ishikari-teichi-toen fault zone
Kuromatsunai-teichi fault zone
Hakodate-teiya-seien fault zone
Aomori-wan-seigan fault zone
Tsugaru-sanchi-seien fault zone
Oritsume fault
Hanawa-higashi fault zone
Noshiro fault zone
Kitakami-teichi-seien fault zone
Shizukuishi-bonchi-seien - Mahiru-sanchi-toen fault
zone
Yokote-bonchi-toen fault zone

Name of Fault
Byoubuyama Enasan fault zone & Sanageyama fault
zone
Shokawa fault zone
Nagaragawa-joryu fault zone
Fukui-heiya-toen fault zone

507

209

Kitayuri fault

508

210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
301
302

509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
601
602
603

Chojagahara-Yoshii fault

604
605

Yasaka fault
Jifuku fault

606

Tsutsuga fault

307
308
401
402
403
404
405

Shinjo-bonchi fault zone
Yamagata-bonchi fault zone
Shonai-heiya-toen fault zone
Nagai-bonchi-seien fault zone
Nagamachi-Rifu Line fault zone
Fukushima-bonchi-seien fault zone
Futaba fault
Aizu-bonchi-seien-toen fault zone
Sekiya fault
Okubo fault
Fukaya Fault Zone and the Ayasegawa Fault (Kantoheiya hokuseien fault zone and Motoarakawa fault
zone)
Tachikawa fault zone
Isehara fault
Shiozawa fault zone, Hirayama-Matsuda-kita fault
zone and Kouzu-Matsuda fault zone (Kannawa
Kouzu-Matsuda fault zone)
Miura-hanto fault group
Kamogawa-teichi fault zone
Kitaizu fault zone
Fujikawa-kako fault zone
Minobu fault
Sone-kyuryo fault zone
Kushigata-sanmyaku fault zone

Mikata Hanaore fault zone
Sourthern fault zone of Kyoto-bonchi-Nara-bonchi(Nara-bonchi-toen fault zone)
Yamada fault zone
Mitoke Kyoto Nishiyama fault zone
Ikoma fault zone
Uemachi fault zone
Arima-Takatsuki fault zone
Rokko Awajishima fault zone
Osaka-wan fault zone
Yamasaki fault zone
Shikano-Yoshioka fault
Shinji (Kashima) fault

607
608
609
610
611
612
613

406

Tsukioka fault zone

701

407
408
409
410

Nagaoka-heiya-seien fault zone
Muikamachi fault zone
Tokamachi fault zone
Takada-heiya fault zone
Nagano-bonchi-seien fault zone (Shinanogawa fault
zone)
Itoigawa-Shizuoka-kozosen fault zone
Sakaitoge Kamiya fault zone
Inadani fault zone
Kiso-sanmyaku-seien fault zone
Uozu fault zone
Tonami-heiya fault zone · Kurehayama fault zone
Ouchigata fault zone
Morimoto Togashi fault zone
Ushikubi fault zone
Atotsugawa fault zone
Takayama Oppara fault zone
Atera fault zone

702
801
802
803

Hiroshima-wan-Iwakuni-oki fault zone
Akinada fault zone
Iwakuni-Itsukaichi fault zone
Oharako fault
Ogori fault
Suounada fault zone
Kikugawa fault zone
Chuo-kozosen fault zone (Kongo-sanchi-toen –Iyonada)Nagao fault zone
Fukuchiyama fault zone
Nishiyama fault zone
Umi fault

804

Kego fault zone

805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
901

Hinata-toge-Okasagi-toge fault zone
Minoh fault zone
Saga-heiya-hokuen fault zone
Beppu-Haneyama fault zone
Unzen fault group
Futagawa-Hinagu fault zone
Midorikawa fault zone
Hitoyoshi-bonchi-nanen fault
Izumi fault zone
Koshiki fault zone
Miyakojima fault zone

105
106
107
108
109
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

303
304
305
306

411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423

Name of Fault

No.

Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

A-3

Fig.
Fig.A-4A-4 Distribution of Active Volcanoes in Japan

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office from the Japan Meteorological Agency website (As of March 2017)

A-4

2. Disasters in Japan
Fig.
Fig.A-5A-5 Major Earthquake Damage in Japan (Since the Meiji Period)
Disaster

Date

Number of
Fatalities andMissing Persons

Nobi Earthquake(M8.0)

October 28, 1891

Meiji Sanriku Earthquake and Tsunami(M8.25)June 15, 1896

Approx. 22,000

7,273Great Kanto Earthquake(M7.9)

September 1, 1923

Approx. 105,000

1927 Kita Tango Earthquake(M7.3)March 7, 1927

2,925

Showa Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami(M8.1)March 3, 1933

3,064

1943 Tottori Earthquake(M7.2)

September 10, 1943

1,083

Tonankai Earthquake(M7.9)

December 7, 1944

1,251

Mikawa Earthquake(M6.8)

January 13, 1945

2,306

Nankai Earthquake(M8.0)

December 21, 1946

1,443

Fukui Earthquake(M7.1)

June 28, 1948

3,769

Tokachi‐oki Earthquake(M8.2)March 4, 195233

1960 Chile Earthquake and Tsunami(Mw9.5)

May 23, 1960

142

1964 Niigata Earthquake(M7.5)

June 16, 1964

26

1968 Tokachi-oki Earthquake(M7.9)

May 16, 1968

52

1974 Izu-hanto-oki Earthquake(M6.9)

May 9, 197430

1978 Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake(M7.0)

January 14, 1978

25

1978 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake(M7.4)

June 12, 1978

28

Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake(M7.7)

May 26, 1983

104

Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake(M6.8)

September 14, 1984

29

Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake(M7.8)

July 12, 1993

230

Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake(M7.3)

January 17, 1995

6,437

Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake(M6.8)

October 23, 2004

68

Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake(M7.2)

June 14, 2008

23

Great East Japan Earthquake(Mw9.0)March 11, 201122,1182016 Kumamoto Earthquake(M7.3)

April 14, 2016

228

*Mw: Moment magnitude
Notes:
1. The earthquakes listed before World War II are those with more than 1,000 fatalities and missing persons, while theearthquakes listed after World War II are those with more than 20 fatalities and missing persons.
2. The number of fatalities and missing persons from the Great Kanto Earthquake are based on the revised Chronological
Scientific Table (2006), which changed the number from approximately 142,000 to approximately 105,000.
3. The number of fatalities and missing persons from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake is the current figure as of December
22, 2005. The number of fatalities directly caused by structures collapsing, fire, and other factors caused by seismic shaking
on the day of the earthquake, excluding so-called “related deaths,” is 5,515.
4. The number of fatalities (including disaster-related fatalities) and missing persons from the Great East Japan Earthquake is thecurrent figure as of March 1, 2017.
5. The details given for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake is the current figure as of April 13, 2017.
Source: Chronological Scientific Tables, Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials, National Police Agency materials,
Comprehensive List of Destructive Earthquakes in Japan, Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters materials, Major
Disaster Management Headquarters materials

A-5

Fig.
Fig.A-6A-6 Major Natural Disaster in Japan Since 1945
Date

Disaster

Main Affected Areas

January 13, 1945
September 17-18, 1945
December 21, 1946
August 14, 1947
September 14-15, 1947
June 28, 1948
September 15-17, 1948
September 2-4, 1950
October 13-15, 1951
March 4, 1952
June 25-29, 1953
July 16-24, 1953
May 8-12, 1954
September 25-27, 1954
July 25-28, 1957
June 24, 1958
September 26-28, 1958
September 26-27, 1959
May 23, 1960
January 1963
June 16, 1964
September 10-18, 1965
September 23-25, 1966
July to August 1967

Mikawa Earthquake (M6.8)
Typhoon Makurazaki
Nankai Earthquake (M8.0)
Mt. Asama Eruption
Typhoon Kathleen
Fukui Earthquake (M7.1)
Typhoon Ione
Typhoon Jane
Typhoon Ruth
Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M8.2)
Heavy Rains
Torrential Rains
Storm Disaster
Typhoon Toyamaru
Torrential Rains
Mt. Aso Eruption
Typhoon Kanogawa
Typhoon Ise-wan
Chile Earthquake Tsunami
Heavy snowfall
Niigata Earthquake (M7.5)
Typhoons 23, 24, 25
Typhoons 24, 26
Torrential Rains

May 16, 1968

Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M7.9)

July 3-15, 1972
May 9, 1974
September 8-14, 1976
January 1977
August 7, 1977- October 1978
January 14, 1978
June 12, 1978
October 17-20, 1979
December 1980 - March 1981
July to August 1982
May 26, 1983
July 20-29, 1983
October 3, 1983
December 1983 - March 1984
September 14, 1984
November 15 - December 18, 1986
November 17, 1990 – June 3, 1995
July 12, 1993
July 31 - August7, 1993
January 17, 1995
March 31, 2000 - June 28, 2001
October 20-21, 2004
October 23, 2004
December 2005 - March 2006
July 16, 2007
June 14, 2008

Typhoons 6, 7, 9 and Torrential Rains
Izu-hanto-oki Earthquake (M6.9)
Typhoon 17 and Torrential Rains
Snow Disasters
Mt. Usu Eruption
Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake (M7.0)
Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (M7.4)
Typhoon 20
Snow Disasters
Torrential Rains and Typhoon 10
Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake (M7.7)
Torrential Rains
Miyake Is. Eruption
Snow Disasters
Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake (M6.8)
Izu-Oshima Eruption
Mr. Unzen Eruption
Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake (M7.8)
Torrential Rains
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (M7.3)
Mt. Usu Eruption
Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima andKozushima Is. Earthquake (M6.5)
Typhoon 23
Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake (M6.8)
Heavy Snowfall
Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (M6.8)
Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake (M7.2)

December 2010 - March 2011

Snow Disasters

March 11, 2011
August 30 - September 5, 2011

Great East Japan Earthquake (Mw9.0)
Typhoon 12

November 2011 - March 2012

Heavy Snowfall in 2011

November 2012 - March 2013

Heavy Snowfall fin 2012

November 2013 - May 2014

Heavy Snowfall in 2013

June 25, 2001 - March 31, 2005

August 20, 2014

Torrential Rains of August 2014 (Hiroshima
Sediment Disaster)
2014 Eruption of Mt. Ontake
2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (M7.3)

Southern Aichi
Western Japan (Especially in Hiroshima)
Various Places in West of Chubu
Around Mt. Asama
North of Tokai
Around the Fukui Plains
From Shikoku into Tohoku (Especially in Iwate)
North of Shikoku (Especially in Osaka)
Nationwide (Especially in Yamaguchi)Southern Hokkaido, Northern Tohoku
Kyushu, Shikoku, Chugoku (Especially Kitakyushu)
West of Tohoku (Especially in Wakayama)
Northern Japan, Kinki
Nationwide (Especially in Hokkaido and Shikoku)
Kyushu (Especially around Isahaya)Around Mt. Aso
East of Kinki (Especially in Shizuoka)
Nationwide (Except for Kyushu, especially in Aichi)
Southern Coast of Hokkaido, Sanriku Coast, Shima Coast
Hokuriku, Sanin, Yamagata, Shiga, Gifu
Niigata, Akita, Yamagata
Nationwide (Especially in Tokushima, Hyogo, Fukui)
Chubu, Kanto, Tohoku (Especially in Shizuoka, Yamanashi)West of Chubu, Southern Tohoku
Southern Hokkaido and Tohoku Area centering around
AomoriNationwide (Especially in Kitakyushu, Shimane, Hiroshima)
Southern Tip of Izu-hanto
Nationwide (Especially in Kagawa, Okayama)
Tohoku, Northern Kinki, Hokuriku
Hokkaido
Izu-hanto
MiyagiNationwide (Especially Tokai, Kanto, Tohoku)
Tohoku, Hokuriku
Nationwide (Especially in Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Mie)
Akita, Aomori
East of Sanin (Especially in Shimane)
Around Miyake-jima Island
Tohoku, Hokuriku (Especially in Niigata, Toyama)Western Nagano
Izu Oshima Island
Nagasaki
Hokkaido
Nationwide
Hyogo
Hokkaido
Tokyo
Nationwide
Niigata
Japan Sea Coast centering around Hokuriku Area
Niigata
Tohoku (Especially in Miyagi, Iwate)
From Northern Japan through into West Japan on theJapan Sea Coast
Eastern Japan (Especially in Miyagi, Iwate, Fukushima)
Kinki, Shikoku
From Northern Japan through into West Japan on theJapan Sea Coast
From Northern Japan through into West Japan on theJapan Sea Coast
From Northern Japan through into Kanto-Koshinetsu Area
(Especially in Yamanashi)
Hiroshima

Number of
Dead andMissing

2,306
3,756
1,443
11
1,930
3,769
838
539
943
33
1,013
1,124
670
1,761
722
12
1,269
5,098
142
231
26
181
317
256
52
447
30
171
101
3
25
28
115
152
439
104
117
－
131
29
－
44
230
79
6,437
－
1
98
68
152
15
23
131
22,118
98
133
104
95
77

September 27, 2014
Nagano, Gifu
63
April 14 and 16, 2014
Kyushu Area
228
Notes:
1. The disasters listed resulted in fatalities and missing persons as follows: 500 or more for storm and flood disasters, 100 or more for snow disasters, and10 or more for earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. It also includes disasters for which governmental Major Disaster Management
Headquarters were established based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management.
2. The number of fatalities and missing persons for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake is the current figure as of December 22, 2005. The number ofdeaths directly caused by structural collapse, fire, and other factors caused by seismic shaking on the day of the earthquake, excluding so-called“related deaths,” is 5,521.
3. The numbers of fatalities from the Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Is. Earthquake are from the earthquake of July 1, 2000.
4. The number of fatalities (including disaster-related fatalities) and missing persons resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake is the current figure
as of March 1, 2017.
5. The details given for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake show the toll as of April 13, 2017.
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the meteorological almanac of Japan, Chronological Scientific Tables, National Police Agency materials,
Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials, Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters materials, Major Disaster Management
Headquarters materials, and Hyogo Prefecture materials

A-6

Fig.
Fig.A-7A-7 Major Natural Disasters in Japan in Recent Years
Date
March 24, 2001
April 3, 2001

Disaster

Main Affected Areas

Geiyo Earthquake (M6.7)
Earthquake (M5.3) epicentered in central
Shizuoka

July 11-13, 2001

Heavy rains in northern Kyushu Region

August 20-23, 2001
September 6-13, 2001
September 8-12, 2001
July 9-11, 2002
July 13-16, 2002
October 1-2, 2002

September 4-8, 2004
September 26-30, 2004
October 8-10 , 2004

Typhoon 11
Typhoon 16
Typhoon 15
Typhoon 6
Typhoon 7
Typhoon 21
Earthquake (M7.1) epicentered off coast of
Miyagi Prefecture
Torrential rains from seasonal rain front
Earthquake (M6.4) epicentered in northern
Miyagi Prefecture
Typhoon 10
Typhoon 14
Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M8.0)
Torrential rains in Niigata and Fukushima in July
2004
Torrential rains in Fukui in July 2004
Heavy rains from and related to Typhoons 10
and 11
Heavy rains from and related to Typhoon 15
Typhoon 16
Earthquakes (M7.1, M7.4) epicentered off coastof Kii Peninsula/off the coast of Tokaido
Typhoon 18
Typhoon 21
Typhoon 22

October 18-21 , 2004

Typhoon 23

October 23, 2004
December 2004- March 2005
March 20, 2005

2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake (M6.8)
Snow disasters
Fukuoka-ken-Seihou-oki Earthquake (M7.0)

June 27 - July 25, 2005

Heavy rains due to the seasonal rain front

May 26, 2003
July 18-21, 2003
July 26, 2003
August 7-10, 2003
September 11-14, 2003
September 26, 2003
July 12-13, 2004
July 17-18, 2004
July 29 - August 6, 2004
August 17-20, 2004
August 27-31, 2004
September 5, 2004

July 23, 2005
August 16, 2005
August 25-26, 2005
September 4-8, 2005
December 2005- March 2006
June 10 - July 29, 2006
September 15-20, 2006
November 7, 2006
March 25 2007
April 15, 2007
July 5-17, 2007
July 16, 2007
August 2-4, 2007
September 6-8, 2007
September 13-18, 2007
October 1, 2007
February 23-24, 2008
June 14, 2008
July 24, 2008
July 28-29, 2008
August 26-31, 2008
July 21-26, 2009
August 10-11, 2009
August 11, 2009
October 7-8, 2009
February 28, 2010
June 11 - July 19, 2010
October 18-30, 2010
November 2010- March 2011

Hiroshima, Ehime, Yamaguchi
Shizuoka
Fukuoka, Saga, Kumamoto, Nagasaki,
Yamaguchi
Nationwide centering around Western Japan
Okinawa, Western Japan
Nationwide centering around Eastern Japan
Nationwide centering around Tohoku
Nationwide centering around Kagoshima
Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu

0
0
7
0
8
7
0
4

Tohoku0

Kyushu23

Miyagi0Nationwide centering around Hokkaido
Nationwide centering around Okinawa
Hokkaido

19
3
2

Niigata, Fukushima

16

Fukui

5

Chugoku, Shikoku

3

Tohoku, Shikoku
Nationwide centering around Western Japan

10
17

Aichi, Mie, Wakayama0

Nationwide centering around Chugoku
Nationwide centering around Western Japan
East Japan on the Pacific Ocean side
Nationwide centering around Kinki and
Shikoku
Niigata
Hokkaido, Tohoku, and Hokuriku Regions
Fukuoka
From the southern Tohoku Region to the
Kyushu Region

46
27
9

Earthquake (M6.0) epicentered in northwesternTokyo, Saitama, Kanagawa and Chiba
Chiba Prefecture
Earthquake (M7.2) epicentered off coast of
Tohoku Region
Miyagi Prefecture
Typhoon 11
Kanto and Tokai Regions
Nationwide centering around Chugoku,
Typhoon 14
Shikoku, and Kyushu Regions
Japan Sea side centering around Hokuriku
Heavy snowfall in 2006
RegionTorrential rains due to seasonal rain front
Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Kyushu Regions
Typhoon 13
Chugoku and Kyushu Regions
Tornado in town of Saroma
Hokkaido (Saroma-cho)
Noto Hanto Earthquake (M6.9) of 2007
Ishikawa
Earthquake (M5.4) epicentered in central Mie
Mie
Prefecture
Heavy rains from Typhoon 4 and seasonal rain
Chubu, Shikoku and Kyushu Regions
front
2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (M6.8) Niigata
Typhoon 5
Kyushu Region
Typhoon 9
Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu Regions
Heavy rains from Typhoon 11 and rain front
Tohoku Region
Earthquake (M4.9) epicentered is western
Kanagawa
Kanagawa Prefecture
Damage from low-pressure system
Hokkaido, Tohoku and Chubu Regions
Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake (M7.2) of 2008 Tohoku Region (Especially Miyagi and Iwate)
Earthquake (M6.8) epicentered on northern
Hokkaido and Tohoku Regions
coast of Iwate Prefecture
Damage from heavy rains
Hokuriku and Kinki Regions (Especially Hyogo)
Tohoku, Kanto, Tokai and Chugoku Regions
Torrential rains at the end of August 2008
(Especially Aichi)
Torrential rains in Chugoku and northern Kyushu Chugoku and Kyushu Regions (Especially
Regions in July 2009
Yamaguchi and Fukuoka)
2009 Typhoon 9
Kinki and Shikoku Regions (Especially Hyogo)
Earthquake (M6.5) epicentered in Suruga Bay
Tokai Region
2009 Typhoon 18
Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu and Kinki Regions
Tsunami from an earthquake epicentered on
Tohoku, Kanto, Tokai, Kinki and Shikoku
central Chilean coast
Regions
Nationwide centering around Chugoku andHeavy rains due to 2010 seasonal rain front
Kyushu Regions
Heavy rains in Amami region of Kagoshima
Kagoshima (Amami)
Prefecture
Heavy snowfall in 2010
Hokkaido, Tohoku and Hokuriku Regions

A-7

Number of
Dead andMissing
2

98
68
88
1
12
0
0
0
29
152
33
10
9
1
0
7
15
0
3
4
0
3
23
1
6
2
36
27
1
5
0
22
3
131

Date
January 26 - September 7,
2011
March 11, 2011
July 19-24, 2011

Disaster

Main Affected Areas

Mt. Kirishima (Shinmoedake) Eruption

Miyazaki and Kagoshima

Great East Japan Earthquake (Mw9.0)
2011 Typhoon 6
Torrential rains in Niigata and Fukushima in July
2011

Number of
Dead andMissing0

July 2-9, 2012

Heavy rains from July 3, 2012

July 11-14, 2012

Heavy rains from July 11, 2012

August 13-15, 2012
September 15-19, 2012
September 28 - October 1,
2012
November 2012- March 2013
April 6-9, 2013
June 8 - August 9, 2013
August 23-28, 2013
September 2 & 4, 2013

Heavy rains from August 13, 20122012 Typhoon 16

Nationwide centering around Tohoku Region
Kanto, Tokai, Kinki and Shikoku Regions
Tohoku and Hokuriku Regions (Especially
Niigata and Fukushima)
Kanto, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku and Shikoku
Regions
Nationwide
Hokkaido, Tohoku and Hokuriku Regions
Kanto Region (Especially Ibaraki and Tochigi)
Nationwide
Nationwide centering around Kyushu andOkinawa Regions
Nationwide centering around northern
Kyushu Region
Kinki and Chubu Regions
Nationwide

2012 Typhoon 17

Chubu, Kinki, Kyushu and Okinawa Regions

1

Heavy snowfall in 2012
Low-pressure system from April 6, 2013
Heavy rains in the 2013 rainy season
Heavy rains from August 23, 2013
Tornados on September 2 and 4, 2013

104
1
17
2
0

September 15-16, 20132013 Typhoon 18

Hokkaido, Tohoku and Hokuriku Regions
Nationwide
Tohoku and Chugoku Regions
Nationwide centering around Chugoku Region
Kanto Region
From Northern Japan to Western Japan on
the Japan Sea side (especially Kinki)
From Eastern Japan to Western Japan on the
Pacific Ocean side (especially Kanto)
Tohoku and Kanto-Koshinetsu Regions
Nationwide
Nationwide

July 28-30, 2011
August 30 – September 5,
2011
September 15-22, 2011
November 2011- March 2012
May 6, 2012
June 18-20, 2012

October 15-16, 2013
October 24-26, 2013
November 2013- March 2014
July 6-11, 2014
July 30 - August 11, 2014
August 15-26, 2014
August 20, 2014
September 27, 2014
November 22, 2014
November 2014 - March 20152011 Typhoon 122011 Typhoon 15
Heavy snowfall in 2011
Wind gusts occurring in May 20122012 Typhoon 42013 Typhoon 26 & 27
Heavy snowfall in 20132014 Typhoon 82014 Typhoon 12 & 11
Heavy rains from August 15, 2014 (Except
Hiroshima Sediment Disaster)
Torrential rains of August 2014 (Hiroshima
Sediment Disaster)
2014 Eruption of Mt. Ontake
Earthquake (M6.7) epicentered in northern
Nagano Prefecture
Heavy snowfall in 2014

September 27-28, 2015
April 14 and 16, 2016
June 16, 2016
June 20 - July 17, 2016
August 16 - 18, 2016
August 20 - 23, 2016

Kuchinoerabu-jima Eruption (Volcanic Alert
Level 5)
Eruption of Mt. Hakone (Volcanic Alert Level 3)2015 Typhoon 11
Volcanic activity at Sakurajima (Volcanic Alert
Level 4)2015 Typhoon 15
Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the Kanto
and Tohoku Regions
2015 Typhoon 21
2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (M7.3)
Earthquake in Uchiura Bay (M5.3)
Heavy rains from June 20, 20162016 Typhoon 72016 Typhoon 11 & 9

August 26 - 31, 20162016 Typhoon 10

September 1 - 5, 20162016 Typhoon 12
Heavy rains from 2016 Typhoon 13 and rain
front2016 Typhoon 16

May 29, 2015
June 30, 2015
July 16-18, 2015
August 15, 2015
August 22-26, 2015
September 9-11, 2015

September 6 - 7, 2016
September 16 - 20, 2016
September 30 - October 5,
2016
October 8, 2016
October 21, 2016
November 22, 2016
December 28, 20162016 Typhoon 18
Volcanic activity at Asosan (Volcanic Alert Level
3)
Earthquake (M6.6) epicentered in central Tottori
Prefecture
Earthquake (M7.4) epicentered off coast of
Fukushima Prefecture
Earthquake (M6.3) epicentered in northern
Ibaraki Prefecture

22,118
3
6
98
20
133
3
1
2
33
3
0

6
45
95
3
5

Kinki, Hokuriku and Tokai Regions

8

Hiroshima

77

Nagano and Gifu

63

Nagano0

Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokuriku and Shikoku
Regions

83

Kagoshima0

Kanagawa
Various Places from Western to Eastern Japan

0
2

Kagoshima0

Various Places in Western Japan
Kanto and Tohoku Regions (especially Ibaraki,
Tochigi, Miyagi)
Okinawa
Kyushu Region
Hokkaido
Kyushu Region (especially Kumamoto)Hokkaido, Tohoku and Kanto Regisions
Hokkaido, Tohoku and Kanto Regisions
Hokkaido and Tohoku Regisions (especially
Iwate)
Kyushu Region

1
14
0
228
0
7
0
2
27
0

Nationwide

1

Various Places from Western to Eastern Japan

1

Nationwide

0

Kumamoto0

Tottori, Okayama

0

Fukushima

0

Ibaraki0

Notes:
1. Natural disasters for which a Disaster Management Office or a Communication Office was set up in the Cabinet Office and which resulted in
fatalities/missing persons.
2. The Great East Japan Earthquake (2011) includes damage from earthquakes deemed aftershocks.* The number of fatalities (including
disaster-related fatalities) and missing persons is the current figure as of March 1, 2017.
(*April 7, 2011, earthquake hypocentered off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture, April 11, 2011, earthquake hypocentered in the Hamadori
region of Fukushima Prefecture, March 14, 2012, earthquake hypocentered off the eastern coast of Chiba Prefecture, and December 7, 2012,
earthquake hypocentered off the coast of Sanriku)
3. The details given for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake show the toll as of April 13, 2017.
Source: Meteorological Almanac of Japan, Chronological Scientific Tables, National Police Agency materials, Fire and Disaster Management
Agency Materials, Major Disaster Management Headquarters materials

A-8

Fig.
Fig.A-8A-8 Number of Fatalities and Missing Persons Resulting from Natural Disasters

Note: Of the fatalities in 1995, the deaths from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake include 919 so-called "related deaths" (Hyogo Prefecture).
The fatalities and missing persons in 2016 are based on flash bulletins from the Cabinet Office.
(The earthquake/tsunami disaster figures for 2011 include disaster-related fatalities from the Great East Japan Earthquake based on the Fire andDisaster Management Agency document, “Damage Conditions of the 2011 Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake (Great East Japan Earthquake)”(March 1, 2017).)
Source: Fatalities and missing persons for the year 1945 came only from major disasters (source: Chronological Scientific Table). Years 1946–1952 use theJapanese Meteorological Disasters Annual Report; years 1953–1962 use National Police Agency documents; years 1963 and after created by the
Cabinet Office based on Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials.

Fig.
Fig.A-9A-9 Breakdown of Fatalities and Missing Persons Caused by Natural Disasters(Unit: persons)
Earthquake/
Volcano
Snow
Other
Total
Tsunami
1993
183
234
1
9
11
438
1994
8
3
0
21
7
39
1995
19
6,437
4
14
8
6,482
1996
21
0
0
28
35
84
1997
51
0
0
16
4
71
1998
80
0
0
28
1
109
1999
109
0
0
29
3
141
2000
19
1
0
52
6
78
2001
27
2
0
59
2
90
2002
20
0
0
26
2
48
2003
48
2
0
12
0
62
2004
240
68
0
16
3
327
2005
43
1
0
98
6
148
2006
87
0
0
88
2
177
2007
14
16
0
5
4
39
2008
22
24
0
48
7
101
2009
76
1
0
35
3
115
2010
31
0
0
57
1
89
2011
136
22,1220125
222,385
2012
52
0
0
138
0
190
2013
75
0
0
92
6
173
2014
112
0
63
108
0
283
2015
22
0
0
49
0
71
2016
38
228
0
6
0
272
Notes: This table shows the number of deaths and missing persons between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31.
Fatalities and missing persons in 2016 are based on flash bulletins from the Cabinet Office.
(The earthquake/tsunami disaster figures for 2011 include disaster-related fatalities from the Great East Japan Earthquake based on“Damage Conditions of the 2011 Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake (Great East Japan Earthquake)” (March 1, 2017).)
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report "Status of Regional Disaster Management
Administration"Year

Storm/Flood

A-9

Fig.
Fig.A-10
A-10 Recent Major Natural Disasters (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)(Total: As of March 21, 2016)
Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)

Name of Disaster

Major Events

The Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake(January 17, 2005)

Maximum seismic intensity of 7.
Unprecedented major disaster inWestern Japan. Became a turning
point in DRR measures for national
and local governments, with various
DRR measures developed andstrengthened.

6,437

43,792 104,906 144,274

Maximum seismic intensity of 7.
The Great East Japan Tsunami caused extreme damage
Earthquake
mainly along the coast of Eastern(March 11, 2011)
Japan, including Iwate, Miyagi, andFukushima Prefectures.

22,1186,230 121,768 280,160

The Japan Meteorological Agency
2000 Eruption of Mt. announced emergency volcano
Usu
information and residents evacuated(March 31, 2000 before the eruption began, resulting in
June 28, 2001)
no human casualties.

－

Completely
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

－

119

355

A caldera was formed along with thesummit eruption. Large amounts of
volcanic gases were emitted over an
extended period, and evacuation
instructions were issued to all
residents of the town of Miyake, which
forced all residents to evacuate andlive off the island.
Very large number of humancasualties due to rising river levels,
sediment disasters, and high waves
nationally, but concentrated in the
Kinki and Shikoku regions. The
Maruyama River, Izushigawa River, andother Maruyama River system rivers
overflowed their banks and flooded.
Maximum seismic intensity of 7.
Homes were destroyed, landslides andother disasters caused many humancasualties, communities were isolated,people were forced to evacuate, andthere was massive damage to homes,
lifelines, transportation, andagricultural land.

98

68

4,805

3,175

13,810Fukuoka-kenSeihouoki
Earthquake(March 20, 2005)

Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Homes were destroyed on Genkai
Island and elsewhere, and window
glass fell from buildings in Fukuoka
City.

1

1,204

144

353

2005 Typhoon 14(September 4-8,
2005)

Record-breaking rains fell, mainly in
the Kyushu region, and sedimentdisasters caused many humancasualties.

29

177

1,217

3,896

152

2,145

18

28

2000 Miyake Is.
Eruption and Niijima
and Kozushima Is.
Earthquake(June 25, 2000 March 31, 2005)

2004 Typhoon 23(October 18-21,
2004)

2004 Mid Niigata
Prefecture
Earthquake(October 23, 2004)

2006 Heavy
Following 1963, the second-largest
Snowfalls
number of fatalities and missing(December 2005 persons since WW II (on par with
March 2006)
1981.)
2006 Torrential Rains
Due to Seasonal Rain Many fatalities due to sediment
Front
disasters in Nagano and Kagoshima(June 10–July 29,
Prefectures.
2006)

1

15

555

15

909

・Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters*1
・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
by Prime Minister－ ・Inspection
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Special Measures Act for Specified
Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Extreme Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Deployment of government survey teamby Minister of State for Disaster
3,352 ・Inspection
Management
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Invocation of Special Measures Act for Specified
Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
by Prime Minister－ ・Inspection
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

20

7,776

・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Deployment of government survey team
14,323 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

64

313

1,457

Damage due to strong winds from the
Okinawa region to the Kyushu region,
and a tornado in Nobeoka City,
Miyazaki Prefecture.

10

446

121

518

Tornado in Saroma
number of fatalities on record
Hokkaido Prefecture Highest
attributed to a tornado.
(November 7, 2006)

9

31

7

7

A-10

Remarks

・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Inspection by Prime Minister－ ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

33

2006 Typhoon 13(September 15–20,
2006)

Abovefloor
Flooding

・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Inspection by Prime Ministerof government survey team
－ ・Deployment
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Deployment of government survey teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Invocation of Remote Islands Development Act
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
3,551 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster12 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
1,971 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
251 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Deployment of government survey teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims

Name of Disaster

Major Events

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Completely
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Abovefloor
Flooding

Remarks

・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Deployment of government survey teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disasterMaximum seismic intensity of Upper 6.
Disaster in mountainous regions with ahigh percentage of aging population
and advancing depopulation.

1

356

686

1,740

2007 Heavy Rains
The typhoon that made landfall in Julyfrom Typhoon 4 and was very powerful. Record rainfalls in
Seasonal Rain Frontvarious regions.
(July 5-31, 2007)

7

75

33

33

Maximum seismic intensity of Upper 6.
Many human causalities due to homes
collapsing. Damage to homes, lifelines,
transportation, and nuclear power
plants.

15

2,346

1,331

5,710

23

426

30

146

1

210

1

0

－ ・Deployment of government survey team

6

13

6

16

of Act Concerning Support for the
585 ・Invocation
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims

2007 Noto Hanto
Earthquake(March 25, 2007)

2007 Niigataken
Chuetsu-oki
Earthquake(July 16, 2007)2008 Iwate-Miyagi
Nairiku Earthquake(June 14, 2008)
Earthquake
epicentered on
Northern Coast of
Iwate Prefecture(July 24, 2008)
Heavy Rains from
July 28(July 28-29, 2008)

Maximum seismic intensity of Upper 6.
Many human causalities due tolandslides and other sediment disasters.
Many river channels became blocked(natural dams) in rivers in mountainous
areas.
Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Earthquake with a deep hypocenteroccurring inside a plate. Seismic
intensity of Lower 5 and higher
recorded in affected areas of inland
Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures.
Localized heavy rains in the Hokuriku
and Kinki regions.
Human casualties along the Togagawa
River in Kobe City.

Torrential Rains at
Record heavy rains in various regions,
the End of August
especially extensive flood damage in2008
Aichi Prefecture.
(August 26-31, 2008)
Record heavy rains in Yamaguchi andJuly 2009 Torrential Fukuoka Prefectures due to seasonal
Rains in Chugoku and rain front.
Northern Kyushu
Numerous fatalities from sediment(July 19-26, 2009)
disasters in Yamaguchi Prefecture andother prefectures.

・Deployment of government survey team

434 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
of Act Concerning Support for the－ ・Invocation
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Invocation of Special Measures Act for Specified
Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Deployment of government survey teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

2

7

6

7

36

59

52

102

・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Deployment of government survey teamof Disaster Relief Act
3,106 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Deployment of government survey teamof Disaster Relief Act
2,139 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Deployment of government survey teamof Disaster Relief Act
974 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster2009 Typhoon 9(August 8-11, 2009)

Heavy rains from the Chugoku andShikoku regions to the Tohoku region
due to the effects of the typhoon.
Human casualties and homes damaged
due to flooding in Hyogo Prefecture.

27

23

183

1,130

Earthquake
epicentered in
Suruga Bay(August 11, 2009)

Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Tomei Expressway closed due to slope
collapse.

1

319

0

6

－

5

139

9

86

571 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

0

0

0

0

6 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

91

・Inspection by Prime Minister
・Inspection by Minister of State for Disaster
Management
1,844 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

Destructive storm and heavy rains overa wide area from the Okinawa region to
Hokkaido Prefecture due to the effects
2009 Typhoon 18
the typhoon.
(October 6-8, 2009) ofWinds and rains in Aichi Prefecturecaused partial damage and flood
damage to many homes.
An earthquake struck the central coast
Tsunami fromof Chile just after noon on Feb. 27. A
Earthquake
tsunami was approaching Japan theepicentered innext day on the 28th, and a major
Central Chilean Coast tsunami warning and tsunami warning(February 27-28,
were issued at 9:33 a.m. on the 28th.
2010)
Extensive fishery damage toaquaculture facilities.
The seasonal rain front stalled over theregion from Kyushu to Honshu from2010 Heavy Rains
mid-June, with intermittent bursts ofDue to Seasonal Rain activity. Southern Kyushu received moreFrontthan twice its average annual rainfall.
(June 11 - July 19,
There were large-scale landslides in2010)
Kagoshima Prefecture, and fatalities andmissing persons mainly in Hiroshima
and Gifu Prefectures.
The rain front stalled over the Amami
region, with moist air flowing in from
Heavy Rains inthe south toward this rain front,
Amami Region ofcreating unstable atmospheric
Kagoshima
conditions.
Prefecture
The Amami region received intense(October 18-25,
rainfall of more than 120 mm per hour,
2010)with more than 800 mm of rainfall since
the rains began.
Record snows fell from the end of theyear to the beginning of the following
Heavy Snowfall inyear in some areas of the Japan Sea side2010of Western Japan.
(November 2010 Fishing boats overturned and sankMarch 2011)
along with other damage in Tottori and

22

21

43

3

2

10

443

・Inspection by Minister of State for Disaster
Managementof Disaster Relief Act
116 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for the
Reconstruction of Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

131

1,537

9

14

by Minister of State for Disaster6 ・Inspection
Management

・Cabinet meeting held

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

Shimane Prefectures.

A-11

Name of Disaster

Major Events

Following a small eruption on January 19, a
medium-sized eruption occurred at
Shinmoedake on January 26 and the volcanic
Mt. Kirishima
alert level was raised to 3. Eruptions continued(Shinmoedake)
repeatedly thereafter until early September, with
Eruption
air waves and cinders breaking windows and(January 26 causing other damage. In addition, falling ash
September 7,
from the eruptions was recorded over a wide
2011)
area mainly to the southeast of the mountain,
including Kirishima City, Kagoshima Prefecture,
and Miyakonojo City, Miyazaki Prefecture.
The typhoon made landfall in southern
Tokushima Prefecture around 12:30 a.m. on July
20. At the time of landfall, maximum peak windsof 40m/s were recorded, and the large typhoon
2011 Typhoon 6
maintained its powerful force.
(July 12-24, 2011) Record heavy rains were recorded in WesternJapan, with rainfall of more than 1,000 mm
recorded in some pars of the Shikoku region
since the rains began.
Rain began falling in Niigata Prefecture and Aizu,
Fukushima Prefecture, from around noon on theJuly 2011 Niigata 27th. Intermittent intense rains of more than 80
and Fukushima
mm per hour fell starting on the 28th.
Torrential Rains
In Niigata and Fukushima Prefectures, record(July 27-30, 2011) heavy rains exceeding the July 2004 Niigata andFukushima Torrential Rains were recorded.

2011 Typhoon 12(August 30 September 5,
2011)

Record rains were recorded across a wide areafrom Western Japan to Northern Japan.
Especially on the Kii Peninsula, the highest
amount of rainfall since the rains began at 5:00
p.m. on August 30 exceeded 1,800 mm, andmany river channels became blocked.

Strong winds and record rains were recorded
across a wide area from Western Japan to
Japan.
2011 Typhoon 15 Northern
Total rainfall from 12:00 a.m., September 15 to(September 15-22, 9:00 a.m., September 22 exceeded 1,000 mm in2011)
some parts of Kyushu and Shikoku, with many
points recording rainfall of more than double theaverage rainfall for September.
Record snows fell mainly on the Japan Sea side,
Heavy Snowfall in with cumulative snowfall of more than 28%
2011higher than the average for the past 5 years. In(November 2011 - addition, in some regions the depth of the
March 2012)
snowfall was more than double the average forthe past 30 years.
Lightning strikes, wind gusts, and hail wererecorded from the Tokai region to the Tohoku
region. From Joso City to Tsukuba City, Ibaraki
Prefecture, a tornado formed that wasWind Gusts in May estimated to be one of the strongest (F3)2012
recorded in Japan. Multiple tornadoes were
(May 6, 2012)
recorded in the region from Mooka City, Tochigi
Prefecture, to Hitachi-Omiya City, Ibaraki
Prefecture, including a destructive tornado of
approx. 32 km, the second longest recorded
since statistics have been kept.
Heavy rains fell across a wide area from the
Okinawa region to the Tohoku region due to thetyphoon and seasonal rain front. Following the2012 Typhoon 4(June 18-20, 2012) path of the typhoon, strong winds, high waves,and a storm surge were recorded across a wide
area from the Okinawa region to the Tohoku
region.
to the effects of the seasonal rain front andHeavy Rains from Due
low-pressure system in the Yellow Sea forming
June 21 to July 7, aabove
the seasonal rain front, from June 21 to
2012
7, rains were recorded from Western to(June 21 - July 7, July
Eastern Japan, and Northern Japan, with heavy
2012)rains in parts of Kyushu and other locations.

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Remarks

Completel
AboveHalfy
floor
Destroyed
Destroyed
Flooding

0

52

0

0

・Cabinet meeting held (twice)・Inspection by Minister of State for Disaster
Management- ・Designation as an area requiring the
emergency development of evacuation
facilities and an ash prevention area
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

3

54

0

1

28 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

6

13

74

1,000

98

113

379

3,159

20

425

34

1,524

133

1,990

13

12

・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)・Local survey by Minister of State forDisaster Management
1,082 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister Noda
・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)・Local survey by Minister of State for
5,500 Disaster Management
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster(national)

2,270

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Cabinet meeting held (twice)survey by Minister of State for
3 ・LocalDisaster Management (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

3

61

103

234

・Deployment of government survey team・Local survey by Minister of State forDisaster Management－ ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims

1

85

1

3

49 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

2

7

36

180

(*2)

(*2)

July 2012
Northern Kyushu
Torrential Rains(July 11-14, 2012)

From July 11 to 14, moist air from the south
flowed in toward the seasonal rain front thatwas stalled near Honshu, and heavy rains wererecorded across a wide area from Western toEastern Japan. Extremely heavy rains fellintermittently with thunder especially in thenorthern region of Kyushu.

33

34

276

2,306

Heavy Snowfall in
2012(November 2012 March 2013)

Due to the cold, there was a long stretch of lowtemperature days in Northern Japan, with alarge amount of snow falling mainly on the Japan
Sea side. This resulted in record snowfall
recorded mainly on the Japan Sea side ofNorthern Japan, including snowfall with a depthof 566 cm recorded at Sukayu, Aomori
Prefecture.

104

1,517

5

7

A-12

(*3)

(*3)

・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

1,131 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for(*2)

the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister Noda
・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)2,574 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act(*3) ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Cabinet meeting held

2 ・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

Name of Disaster
Earthquake
epicentered Near
Awajishima Island(April 13, 2013)

Major Events

Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.

・From June 8 to August 9, the seasonalrain front stalled from Kyushu to thevicinity of Honshu with intermittent
bursts of activity. In addition, warm andvery moist air surrounding a highpressure
ridge flowed in even after the rainyseason ended. During this time, Typhoons
4 and 7 approached Japan, causing heavy
rains in various regions.
Warm, moist air flowed in toward the rain
front, creating extremely unstable
atmospheric conditions and heavy rains
mainly on the Japan Sea side of Eastern
Heavy Rains fromJapan, and Western Japan. On August 24,
August 23, 2013
record heavy rains on par with the torrential(August 23-28, 2013)rains of July 28 were recorded, especially in
Shimane Prefecture. Some areas of
Hokkaido Prefecture also received heavy
rains.
・On September 2, F2 tornadoes wererecorded in Saitama City, Koshigaya City,and Matsubushi Town, Saitama
Prefecture, Noda City, Chiba Prefecture,
and Bando City, Ibaraki Prefecture.
・On September 4, an F0 tornado was
Tornadoes onrecorded in Sukumo City, Kochi
September 2 and 4,
Prefecture, an F0 tornado in Aki City,
2013
Kochi Prefecture, F1 tornadoes(September 2, 4, & 7, respectively from Kanuma City to2013)
Utsunomiya City, Tochigi Prefecture, andfrom Shioya Town, Shioya District to Yaita
City, and F0 tornadoes from Ise City to
Obata Town, Mie Prefecture.
・On September 7, F0 wind gusts wererecorded in Komaki City, Hokkaido
Prefecture.
On September 15, localized intense rains fellin Eastern Japan and Northern Japan. On
Heavy Rains fromthe 16th, heavy rains fell across a wide area
2013 Typhoon 18
from Shikoku to Hokkaido. Record heavy(September 15-16,
rains fell especially in Fukui, Shiga, and Kyoto
2013)
Prefectures. A total of ten F0–F1 tornadoes
also occurred.
Heavy Rains in 2013
Seasonal Rain Front(Disaster due totorrential rains anddestructive storms
between June 8 andAugust 9, 2013)2013 Typhoon 26 &27
(October 14-16,
2013)(October 24-26,
2013)

Heavy rains fell mainly on the Pacific Oceanside of Eastern Japan and Northern Japan.
Driving rains of more than 100 mm per hourfell especially in Oshima-machi, Tokyo
Prefecture, with record rainfall of 824 mmrecorded in 24 hours.

・Record heavy snowfall was recorded
across a wide area from Northern Japanto Kanto-Koshinetsu.
・Especially from February 14 to 16, record
Heavy Snowfall inheavy snows fell, substantially surpassing
2013
past snowfall depths mainly in the Kanto(November 2013 Koshinetsu region, including Kofu
March 2014)(Yamanashi Prefecture) with 114 cm,
Chichibu (Saitama Prefecture) with 98 cm,
and Maebashi (Gunma Prefecture) with73 cm of snowfall.
・Record heavy rains were recorded on
Okinawa Island.
・Due to the effects of the moist southerly
2014 Typhoon 8
wind surrounding the typhoon and the(July 6-11, 2014)
seasonal rain front, some regions even far
from the typhoon received localized
driving rains.
Torrential Rains of August 2014
<Typhoon 12>
・From the night of the 5th, heavy rains
were recorded in the Chugoku andTohoku regions. Especially in Yamaguchi
Prefecture, localized driving rains of morethan 100 mm per hour were recorded insome places.
11>2014 Typhoon 12 <Typhoon
Heavy rains fell across a wide area from
& 11
WesternJapan
to Northern Japan. Especially(July 30 - August in Kochi Prefecture,
total rainfall from the11, 2014)
7th to the 11th, when the heaviest rains fell,

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons0Houses Damaged (houses)
Completel
AboveHalfy
floor
Destroyed
Destroyed
Flooding

34

8

97

17

50

73

222

2

4

9

53

0

67

13

38

6

136

40

967

45

140

65

63

95

3

5

1,770

70

93

was more than 1,000 mm. Total rainfall fromthe Shikoku region to the Tokai region was
more than 600 mm.
Atmospheric conditions were extremely
unstable, with extremely strong winds
including tornadoes in Tochigi Prefecture
and other areas.

A-13

28

14

22

－

Remarks－

・Local survey by Prime Minister Abe
・Deployment of government survey team(seven times)of Disaster Relief Act
1,845 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

243

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)of Disaster Relief Act
0 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims

・Deployment of government survey team
(five times)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
2,453 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Local survey by Prime Minister Abe
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
2,011 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster40

・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
3 ・Siteinspection by Prime Minister Abe
・Deployment of government survey team
(five times)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

12・Deployment of government survey team(three times)of Disaster Relief Act
409 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims

374

・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
1,529 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disasterName of Disaster

Major Events

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Heavy Rains from ・Extremely intense localized rains with
August 15, 2014
thunder. The amount of rainfall that
(August 15-26,
fell during the 2 days of the 16th and2014)
17th set new records in places such as*Excludes
Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto Prefecture,
Hiroshima
and Takayama City, Gifu Prefecture,
Sediment Disasterwith heavy rains mainly in the Kinki,
on August 20
Hokuriku, and Tokai regions.

8・ Warm, moist air flowed in toward theHiroshima
rain front, and extremely unstable
Sediment Disasteratmospheric conditions were recordedon August 20,
mainly in the Chugoku region and2014
northern Kyushu region.
(Disaster in・At 3:30 a.m. on the 20th, driving rains
Hiroshimaof approx. 120 mm per hour werePrefecture due torecorded in Hiroshima Prefecture, andheavy rains fromheavy rains, including a new record set
August 19, 2014)
for the highest recorded rainfall in a
24-hour period, were recorded.

77

・Volcanic tremors started at 11:41 a.m.
on September 27, with an eruption on
the same day around 11:52 a.m.
2014 Eruption of Mt. ・Volcanic smoke descended thesouthern slope and was recorded for
Ontakemore than 3 km. Therefore, a level 3(September 27,
volcano warning (mountain access2014)
restricted) was issued, with entry

63

Houses Damaged (houses)
Completel
AboveHalfy
floor
Destroyed
Destroyed
Flooding

7

68

69

38

179

0

332

・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
2,240 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

217

・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister Abe
・Deployment of government survey team
1,086 (three times)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster0・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster0 Management Headquarters
・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

within 4 km of the crater restricted.
・Many mountain climbers sufferedcasualties due to this eruption.
Earthquake with a
Seismic Source inNorthern Nagano
Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Prefecture(November 22, 2014)
Due to the effects of a strong winter airpressure pattern as well as a lowpressure system and cold air, heavysnows fell on the mountainous areas of
the Japan Sea side from Northern Japanto Eastern Japan.
・An explosive eruption occurred at
Shindake at 9:59 am on May 29. Thiseruption triggered a volcanic cloud of
black-gray smoke that rose 9,000m
above the crater rim and a pyroclastic
Kuchinoerabu-jimaflow that reached the northwestern
Eruptioncoast (Mukaehama district).
[Volcanic Alert Level ・At 10:07 am, the JMA raised the5]Volcanic Alert Level from 3 to 5
(May 29, 2015)(evacuate).
・The municipal ferry, Ferry-Taiyo, andother vessels were used to evacuate
all those on the island at the time ofthe eruption to Yakushima (allindividuals were confirmed to be safe)
・A very small amount of volcanic ash
was observed inside the crater, which
was thought to have been the result ofa very small eruption, so the JMA
raised the volcanic alert level from 2 toEruption of Mt.
3 (Do not approach the volcano) at
Hakone12:30 on June 30[Volcanic Alert Level ・At the same time, Hakone-machi
3]
imposed a ban on entering the area
(June 30, 2015)
within around 1km of the crater andissued an evacuation instruction forparts of the Ubako, Kamiyuba,
Shimoyuba, and Hakone Sounkyo
Bessochi areas, as well as evacuating
residents, etc. from those areas
・The typhoon and warm, moist air
heading toward the typhoon caused
increased rainfall, primarily over Westand East Japan. The Kinki region inparticular saw the highest rainfall in 24
hours since records began, with heavy
2015 Typhoon 11
rain in excess of the usual rainfall for(July 16-18, 2015)
the entire month of July in an ordinary
year.
・This caused river flooding, damage to
public civil engineering works, andsuspension of transport services,
mainly in West Japan.
Heavy Snowfall in
2014(November 2014 March 2015)

Remarks

0

46

81

133

・Site inspection by Prime Minister Abe
・Deployment of government survey team
(twice)of Disaster Relief Act
0 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

83

1,029

9

12

of government survey team
5 ・Deployment
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Installation of government on-sitecommunications office (Yakushima Town,
Kagoshima)
・Site inspection by Prime Minister Abe
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

0

1

To be confirmed

0

0

0

0

of a Cabinet Office advance
0 ・Deployment
information-gathering team

2

57

5

10

to the public by the Minister of
85 ・Appeal
State for Disaster Management

A-14

Name of Disaster

Major Events

・At around 07:00 on August 15, a seriesof volcanic earthquakes centered on
the island occurred. Rapid crustal
movement indicative of inflation of
the volcanic edifice was also observed.
・At 10:15 that day, the JMA raised thevolcanic alert level from 3 to 4
(Prepare to evacuate) (caution
required in Arimura-cho and FurusatoVolcanic activity atcho, within 3km of the Showa crater
Sakurajima
and the Minamidake summit crater).
[Volcanic Alert Level・At 16:50 that day, Kagoshima City
4]
issued evacuation advisories to the(August 15, 2015)
residents of the Arimura district ofArimura-cho, the Furusato district ofFurusato-cho (areas within 3km of thecrater), and the Shioyagamoto districtof Kurokami-cho.
・At 18:10 that day, evacuation of allresidents (77 people from 51
households) in the areas subject toevacuation was completed.
・The typhoon that made landfall near
Arao City in Kumamoto Prefecture justafter 06:00 on the 25th retained its
powerful momentum as it moved
northward to northern Kyushu,
reaching the Sea of Japan during thedaylight hours of the 25th.
・A
maximum instantaneous wind speed2015 Typhoon 15
of 71.0m was observed at 21:16 on(August 22-26, 2015)
the 23rd on Ishigaki Island, Okinawa
Prefecture. In addition, the typhoon
and warm, moist air flowing in fromthe south resulted in heavy rain overthe Ryukyu Islands, West Japan, andthe Tokai region, with more than
500mm of rain falling on Mie
Prefecture in a single day on the 25th.
・After making landfall near Nishio City,
Aichi Prefecture at around 09:30 on
September 9, 2015 Typhoon 18 moved
on to the Sea of Japan and turned into
an extra-tropical cyclone at 15:00 thatday.
・As a result of 2015 Typhoon 18 andweather fronts, heavy rain fell over a
Torrential Rain ofwide area from western to northern
September 2015 in
Japan. In particular, between the 9th
the Kanto andand the 11th, a southerly wind flowing
Tohoku Regions
into the low-pressure system into
[Including 2015
which 2015 Typhoon 18 developed
Typhoon 18]
and, subsequently, a southeasterly(September 9-11,
wind from the vicinity of 2005
2015)
Typhoon 17 supplied flows of moist air

2015 Typhoon 21(September 27-28,
2015)

2016 Kumamoto
Earthquake(April 14 and 16,2016)that triggered a succession of lineshaped rainbands, causing recordbreaking rainfall in the Kanto andTohoku regions and prompting theissue of emergency heavy rain
warnings for Tochigi, Ibaraki, andMiyagi prefectures.
・2015 Typhoon 21 approached the
Ishigaki and Yonaguni island areas withferocious intensity during the day on
the 28th.
・On Yonaguni Island, a maximum
instantaneous wind speed of 81.1m
was observed at 15:41 on the 28th,
the highest figure since statistics
began to be compiled. A severe galebuffeted Yaeyama and the surroundingarea, while the Sakishima Islands saw
stormy seas with high swells and the
Okinawa Island area was also batteredby rough seas.

・At 09:26 p.m. on April 14, 2016
Maximum seismic intensity of 7
・At 01:25 a.m. on April 16, 2016
Maximum seismic intensity of 7

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Remarks

Completel
AboveHalfy
floor
Destroyed
Destroyed
Flooding

・Field survey by Parliamentary Vice Minister

0

0

0

0

Matsumoto0 ・Deploymentof a Cabinet Office liaison
team

1

147

12

138

53 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Minister of State for Disaster Management
issues a list of requests to relevant
ministries and agencies
・Deployment of a Cabinet Office advance
information-gathering team・Deployment of government survey team
2,495 ・Cabinet meeting held (twice)・Site inspection by Prime Minister Abe
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

14

80

81

7,045

0

0

5

23

228

2,753

A-15

8,697

34,037of government survey team
0 ・Deployment
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister Abe(three times)
・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation
Disaster Relief Act
0 ・Invocation ofof Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Invocation of Special Measures Act forSpecified Disaster・Partial invocation of the Act on
Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters
・Designation as an extremely severe disasterName of
Disaster

Major Events・2016 Typhoon 7 moved northward along
the Pacific coast of the Kanto and Tohoku
regions, making landfall near Cape Erimo ataround 17:30 on August 17. It thencontinued up through Hokkaido and turned
into an extra-tropical cyclone near Sakhalinat 03:00 on the 18th.
2016 Typhoon 7 ・The passage of the cold front of the extra(August 16-18,
tropical cyclone that was formerly Typhoon
2016)
7 caused localized driving rains in the Kanto
region, with 83 mm per hour of rain
recorded in Utsunomiya City, Tochigi
Prefecture up to 03:14 on the 18th.
・The total rainfall between 00:00 on August
16 and 06:00 on August 18 exceeded 100
mm over an extensive area in the Kanto,
Tohoku, and Hokkaido regions.
・2016 Typhoon 11 originated over the sea tothe east of Japan at 09:00 on August 20 andapproached the Tohoku region before
making landfall near Kushiro City, Hokkaido
after 23:00 on the 21st. It then continued
up through Hokkaido and turned into an
extra-tropical cyclone in the Sea of Okhotsk
at 03:00 on the 22nd.
・2016 Typhoon 9 made landfall near
Tateyama City, Chiba Prefecture at around12:30 on August 22 and continued up
through the Kanto and Tohoku regions,2016 Typhoon
making landfall once more in the central
11 & 9Hidaka region of Hokkaido before 06:00 on(August 20-23,
the 23rd. It then continued up through2016)
Hokkaido before turning into an extratropical cyclone in the Sea of Okhotsk at
12:00 on the 23rd.
・These typhoons and weather fronts caused
heavy rain in eastern and northern Japan.
Between 00:00 on August 20 and 24:00 on
the 23rd, there was 448.5 mm of rainfall at
Mt. Amagi in Izu City, Shizuoka Prefecture;
297.5 mm at Ome in Ome City, Tokyo; and296.0 mm at Itokushibetsu in Shibetsu
Town, Hokkaido. Hokkaido experienced
particularly heavy rain, receiving double theaverage rainfall for August.
・2016 Typhoon 10 approached the Kanto
region in the morning of August 30 andmade landfall near Ofunato City, Iwate
Prefecture at around 17:30 on the 30th,
accompanied by a storm area. It then2016 Typhoon
gathered speed as it passed through the10
Tohoku region on a peculiar course that saw(August 26-31,
it exit onto the Sea of Japan, and turned
2016)
into an extra-tropical cyclone on the 31st.
・This was the first time that a typhoon had
made landfall on the northeastern Pacificcoast since the Japan Meteorological
Agency began recording statistics in 1951.
・With powerful momentum, 2016 Typhoon
16 made landfall on the Osumi Peninsula,
Kagoshima Prefecture after 00:00 on
September 20 and then headed northeast
across the waters off Shikoku before
2016 Typhoon
making landfall once more near Tanabe
16City, Wakayama Prefecture at around 13:30(Sptember 16the same day. After making landfall yet
20, 2016)
again just after 17:00 that day near
Tokoname City, Aichi Prefecture, it turned
into an extra-tropical cyclone at 21:00 thesame day over the waters off the Tokaido
coast.
2016
Earthquake
seismic intensity of Lower 6
centered in the Maximum
and date of quake: 14:07, October 21
central Tottori ・Time
・Hypocenter, etc.: Central Tottori Prefecture,
Prefecture
11 km deep, M6.6
(October 21,
2016)

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Completel
AboveHalfy
floor
Destroyed
Destroyed
Flooding

Remarks

0

5

0

9

67 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

2

87

6

17

of government survey team
665 ・Deployment
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

27

14

513

2,280

・Installation of government on-sitecommunications office・Appeal to the public by the Minister ofState for Disaster Management
・Local survey by Prime Minister Abe (twice)・Deploymentof government survey team278 (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

1

47

8

65

489 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

0

31

18

290

0 ・Invocation of Act Concerning Support for・Deployment of government survey team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
the Reconstruction of Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims*1 Established by a Cabinet meeting decision, and therefore not based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management.
*2 The number of damaged houses in the July 2012 Northern Kyushu Torrential Rains contains some duplications.
*3 The number of damaged houses due to heavy rains from June 21 to July 7, 2012 contains some duplications.
*4 The details given for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake show the toll as of April 13, 2017.
Source: Cabinet Office, Fire and Disaster Management Agency Materials, Major Disaster Management Headquarters materials

A-16

Fig.
Fig.A-11
A-11 Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters and Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
As of March 31, 2017

Period of Establishment
Jan. 29 - May 31, 1963
Jun. 16 - Oct. 31, 1964

Manager of Headquarters
Minister of State
Minister of State

Sep. 17 - Dec. 17, 1965

Minister of State

Sep. 26 - Dec. 27, 1966

Minister of State

Jul. 9 - Dec. 26, 1967

Minister of State

6
7

Name of Headquarters
Heavy Snowfall Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Niigata Earthquake Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1965 Typhoon 23, 24, and 25 Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1966 Typhoon 24 and 26 Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1967 July and August Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1968 Tokachi-oki Earthquake Major Disaster Management Headquarters
July 1972 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters

May 16, 1968 - May 2, 1969
Jul. 8 - Dec. 19, 1972

81976 Typhoon 17 Major Disaster Management Headquarters

Sep. 13 - Dec. 10, 1976

91977 Mt. Usu Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1978 Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1978 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1979 Typhoon 20 Major Disaster Management Headquarters
July and August 1982 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1983 Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
July 1983 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1983 Miyake Island Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1984 Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1991 Mt. Unzen Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1993 Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
August 1993 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters

Aug. 11, 1977 - Dec. 4, 1979

Minister of State
Minister of State
Director General of National
Land Agency (NLA)
Director General of NLA

Jan. 15 - Aug. 4, 1978

Director General of NLA

Jun. 13 - Nov. 28, 1978

Director General of NLA

Oct. 20 - Dec. 4, 1979

Director General of NLA

Jul. 24 - Dec. 24, 1982

Director General of NLA

May 26 - Dec. 23, 1983

Director General of NLA

Jul. 23 - Dec. 23, 1983
Oct. 4, 1983 - Jun. 5, 1984

Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA

Sep. 16, 1984 - Feb. 19, 1985

Director General of NLA

Jun. 4, 1991 - Jun. 4, 1996

Director General of NLA

Jul. 13, 1993 - Mar. 31, 1996

Director General of NLA

Aug. 9, 1993 - Mar. 15, 1994

Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA↓
Minister of Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake Measures↓
Director General of NLA↓
Minister of State for Disaster
Management

1
2
3
4
5

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21

1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters

Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters*1
1997 Diamond Grace Oil Spill Major Disaster Management
22
Headquarters
23 2000 Mt. Usu Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
2000 Miyake Island Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Island
Earthquake Emergency Management Headquarters
24 2000 Miyake Island Eruption Major Disaster Management
Headquarters*3

Jan. 17, 1995 - Apr. 21, 2002

Jan. 19 - Apr. 28, 1995

Prime Minister

Jul. 2-11, 1997

Minister of Transport

Mar. 31, 2000 - Jun. 28, 2001*2
Aug. 29, 2000 - May 15, 2002
May 16, 2002 - Mar. 31, 2005

25 2004 Typhoon 23 Major Disaster Management Headquarters

Oct. 21, 2004 - Mar. 31, 2007

2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Extreme Disaster Management
27
Headquarters
26

Oct. 24, 2004 - Mar. 31, 2008
Mar. 11, 2011 -Director General of NLA↓
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Director General of NLA↓
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Prime Minister

Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Minister of State for Disaster29 2014 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Feb. 18 - May 30, 2014
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
30 August 2014 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters Aug. 22, 2014 - Jan. 9, 2015
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
31 2014 Mt. Ontake Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Sep. 28, 2014 – Nov. 9, 2015
Management
2016 Emergency Response Headquarters for the Earthquake Centered
Minister of State for Disaster
32
April 14, 2016 in the Kumamoto Region of Kumamoto PrefectureManagement
Notes: The above are Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters and Major Disaster Management Headquarters based on the Basic Act on
Disaster Management (Act No. 223 of 1961).
*1 Established within the Cabinet Office based on a Cabinet meeting resolution, not based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management.
*2 Based on reports that the eruption had subsided. Upon dissolution of the Headquarters, the Mt. Usu Eruption Disaster Restoration andRecovery Measures Council was established.
*3 The names of Niijima Island and Kozushima Island were changed with the conclusion of response measures.
Source: Cabinet Office
28 2011 Typhoon 12 Major Disaster Management Headquarters

Sep. 4, 2011 - Dec. 26, 2014

A-17

Fig.
Fig.A-12
A-12 Deployment of Government Survey Teams (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
As of March 31, 2017Year

Name of Disaster1995 1995 Hyogo-ken-Nanbu Earthquake(Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
1997 July 1997 Torrential Rains from Seasonal
Rain Front1998 End of August 1998 Torrential Rains
1999 Heavy Rains Starting June 23, 1999
Heavy Rains from 1999 Typhoon 18 andRain Front
2000 2000 Eruption of Mt. Usu
2000 Tottori-seibu Earthquake
2001 2001 Geiyo Earthquake
2003
July Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains
Northern Miyagi Earthquake
2003Tokachi-oki Earthquake
2004 July 2004 Niigata and Fukushima
Torrential Rains
July 2004 Fukui Torrential Rains
2004 Typhoon 21
2004 Typhoon 22
2004 Typhoon 23
2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake
2005 Fukuoka-ken-Seihou-oki Earthquake
Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake
2005 Typhoon 14
2006 Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front
Starting July 42006 Typhoon 13
Tornado in Saroma, Hokkaido
2007 2007 Noto-hanto Earthquake
Heavy Rains from Typhoon 4 andSeasonal Rain Front2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
2008 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake
Earthquake Epicentered Along Northern
Coast of Iwate Prefecture
End of August 2008 Torrential Rains2009 July 2009 Torrential Rains in Chubu andNorthern Kyushu
2009 Typhoon 9
20112011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami(Great East Japan Earthquake)
July 2011 Niigata and Fukushima
Torrential Rains

Deployment
Dates
Jan. 17-18
Jul. 11-12
Aug. 28
Jun. 30 - Jul. 1
Sep. 25

Team Leader
Director General of National Land Agency(NLA)

Kagoshima,
Director General of NLA
Kumamoto
Tochigi, Fukushima Parliamentary Vice-Minister of National Land
Hiroshima
Director General of NLA

Mar. 31 - Apr. 1 Hokkaido
Oct. 7
TottoriMar. 29
Hiroshima, Ehime
Kumamoto,
Jul. 22
Kagoshima
Jul. 27
MiyagiSep. 26-27
HokkaidoJul. 14
NiigataJul. 15
Fukushima
Jul. 20
Fukui
Oct. 1Mie
Oct. 14
Shizuoka
Oct. 22
Hyogo, Kyoto
Oct. 22
Kagawa, Okayama
Oct. 24
NiigataMar. 20-21
Fukuoka
Aug. 16-17
MiyagiSep. 9MiyazakiJul. 21
NaganoJul. 25
Kagoshima
Sep. 19
MiyazakiNov. 7-8
HokkaidoMar. 25-26
Ishikawa

Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Jul. 13

KumamotoState-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Jul. 16
Jun. 14-15

Niigata
Iwate, Miyagi

Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Jul. 24

Iwate, Aomori

Minister of State for Disaster Management

Aug. 29
Jul. 22
Jul. 27
Aug. 11Mar. 11Mar. 12Mar. 12
Jul. 31
Aug. 2

Aichi
Yamaguchi
Fukuoka
Hyogo, Okayama
Miyagi
Iwate
Fukushima
Niigata, Fukushima
Fukushima
Wakayama, Nara,
Mie

Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Finance
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Sep. 4-7
Sep. 6

July 2012 Torrential Rains in Northern
Kyushu

Hyogo

Kumamoto

2011 Typhoon 122012 May 2012 Gust

Prefecture
Surveyed

Nara

May 7
Jul. 13-14
Jul. 21-22

Ibaraki, Tochigi
Kumamoto, Oita
Fukuoka, Oita,
Kagoshima

A-18

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Year
2013

Name of Disaster
Heavy Snowfall in2012

Deployment
Dates
Mar. 4-5

Prefecture
Surveyed
HokkaidoJul. 29-30
Aug. 3

Shimane,
Yamaguchi
Yamagata,
Fukushima

Aug. 3

NiigataAug. 3

Iwate, Miyagi

Heavy Rains with Seasonal Rain Front

Heavy Rains from Typhoon 18

2014
Heavy Snowfall in 2013

Typhoon 8 and Seasonal Rain Front
Typhoon 12 & 11
Heavy Rains Starting August 15
Heavy Rains in Hiroshima Prefecture
Starting August 19
Mt. Ontake Eruption
Earthquake Epicentered in Northern
Nagano Prefecture
Heavy Snowfall in 20142015 Eruption of Kuchinoerabu-jima
Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the
Kanto and Tohoku Regions
Typhoon 21
2016 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake2016 Typhoon 11 & 9
2016 Typhoon 10
Earthquake centered in the central
Tottori PrefectureState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Aug. 13
Aug. 13
Sep. 3
Sep. 4
Sep. 17
Sep. 18

Kyoto

Sep. 18
Sep. 19

Feb. 6
Feb. 17

Shiga, Fukui
Mie
Aomori, Iwate,
Akita
Oshimacho(Tokyo)Akita
Yamanashi

Mar. 7

Tokyo, Yamanashi

Mar. 10
Mar. 15
Jul. 11
Jul. 12
Jul. 14-15
Aug. 11-13
Aug. 11
Aug. 18-19
Aug. 19
Aug. 20-21
Sep. 6
Sep. 17
Sep. 28
Oct. 11
Nov. 23
Dec. 2
Dec. 9
May 29-30

Saitama
Nagano, Gunma
NaganoYamagata
Okinawa
Tokushima, Kochi
Tochigi
Hyogo, Kyoto
Gifu
Hiroshima
Hiroshima
Hiroshima
NaganoNaganoNaganoNaganoTokushima
Kagoshima

State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office, StateMinister of the EnvironmentState-Minister of the Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Sep. 11

Ibaraki, TochigiState-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Okinawa
Kumamoto
Hokkaido
Iwate
Hokkaido

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management

TottoriState-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Sep. 19-20
Typhoon 26

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet
Office, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister

Shimane,
Yamaguchi
Akita
Iwate, Akita
Saitama
Chiba
Saitama

Aug. 9Tornadoes on September 2 and 4

Team Leader

Oct. 19

Sep. 30-Oct. 1
Apr. 15
Aug. 28-29
Aug. 31-Sep. 1
Sep. 5Oct. 29

Source: Cabinet Office

A-19

Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeActing Minister of State for Disaster
Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeSpecial Advisor to the Prime Minister
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Fig.
Fig.A-13
A-13 Invocation History of the Disaster Relief Act (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthqauke)Year

Date of
Invocation

Name of Disaster1995 1995 Hyogo-ken-Nanbu Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake)
Niigata-ken-Hokubu Earthquake
July 1995 Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains
1997 July 1997 Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains
1997 Typhoon 19

1998 Typhoon 5

Aug. 4
Aug. 27
Aug. 28
Aug. 27, Aug. 30
Aug. 28
Aug. 3
Sep. 16

1998 Typhoon 7

Sep. 22

Heavy Rains of September 23–25, 1998
1998 Typhoon 10

Sep. 25
Oct. 17

Heavy Rains Starting June 23, 1999

Jun. 29

Torrential Rains in Tsushima Region on August 27–28, 1999

Aug. 27

Heavy Rains from 1999 Typhoon 18 and Rain Front

Sep. 24

Tokaimura Criticality Accident

Sep. 3Heavy Rains Starting October 27, 1999

Oct. 28

End of August 1998 Torrential Rains

2000 2000 Eruption of Mt. Usu
2000 Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Is.
Earthquake
2000 Niijima and Kozushima Is. Earthquake
2000 Typhoon 3

2001

Apr. 1
Jul. 11
Jul. 11, Jul. 12
Jul. 1
Sep. 16

1998 Early August 1998 Torrential Rains

1999

Jan. 17Mar. 29
Jun. 26

Tokyo

1

Jul. 1, Jul. 15
Jul. 8

Tokyo
SaitamaAichi
Gifu
Tottori
ShimaneHiroshima
Ehime
Kochi
Okinawa
Iwate
Gifu
Fukuoka
Kumamoto
Miyagi
Hokkaido
Niigata
Fukui
Tokushima
Ehime
Kochi

2
1
21
1
6
2
13
1
2
2
1
1
5
1
5
3
7
5
2
1
1

Heavy Rains from 2000 Autumn Rain Front and Typhoon 14

Sep. 112000 Tottori-ken-Seibu Earthquake

Oct. 6

2001 Geiyo Earthquake

Mar. 24

Heavy Rains of September 6, 2001
2001 Typhoon 16

Northern Miyagi Earthquake
2003 Typhoon 10
2004 July 2004 Niigata and Fukushima Torrential Rains
July 2004 Fukui Torrential Rains
2004 Typhoon 10, Typhoon 11, and Related Heavy Rains

Sep. 6
Sep. 8, Sep. 11
Jul. 10
Jul. 11
Jul. 19
Jul. 20
Jul. 26
Aug. 9Jul. 13
Jul. 18
Jul. 312004 Typhoon 15 and Heavy Rains from Rain Front

Aug. 172002
2003

2002 Typhoon 6
July Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains

A-20

As of March 31, 2017
No. ofPrefecture
Municipalities
Invoking the Act
Hyogo
20
Osaka
5
Niigata
1
Niigata2
Nagano2
Kagoshima
1
Oita
1
Miyazaki
4
Kagoshima
1
Niigata
3
Fukushima
3
Ibaraki1
Tochigi
4
Saitama1
Shizuoka
1
Saitama
1
Fukui
1
Hyogo
1
Nara
1
Kochi
6
Okayama4
Hiroshima
2
Fukuoka1
Nagasaki1
Yamaguchi
9
Fukuoka
1
Kumamoto
9
Ibaraki
2
Aomori
1
Iwate
1
Hokkaido3

Year

Date of
Invocation

Name of Disaster2004
2004 Typhoon 16

Aug. 30

2004 Typhoon 18

Sep. 7

2004 Typhoon 21

Sep. 29

2004 Typhoon 22

Oct. 92004 Typhoon 23

Oct. 2

2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake
2005 2005 Fukuoka-ken-Seihou-oki Earthquake

Oct. 23
Mar. 20
Sep. 42005 Typhoon 14

Sep. 6
Sep. 4Jan. 6, Jan. 8,
Jan. 11, Jan. 13
Jan. 7, Jan. 12
Jun. 15
Jul. 192006 Heavy Snowfall
2006 June 2006 Extended Rain Landslide Disaster
Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front Starting July 4

Jul. 22

2006 Typhoon 13
Tornado in Saroma, Hokkaido
2007 2007 Noto-hanto Earthquake
Heavy Rains from Typhoon 4 and Seasonal Rain Front2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
2007 Typhoon 52007 Heavy Rains from Typhoon 11 and Rain Front
2008 Low-Pressure System from February 23 to 24

2009

Sep. 17
Nov. 7Mar. 25
Jul. 6
Jul. 16
Aug. 2
Sep. 17
Feb. 242008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake

Jun. 14

Heavy Rains Starting July 28

Jul. 28

End of August 2008 Torrential Rains

Aug. 28
Jul. 21
Jul. 24

July 2009 Torrential Rains in Chubu and Northern Kyushu
2009 Typhoon 9

Aug. 92010

Jul. 14
Jul. 15
Jul. 16
Oct. 20
Jan. 27
Jan. 30
Jan. 31
Jan. 30
Feb. 102010 Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front
Heavy Rains in Amami Region, Kagoshima Prefecture
2011
Heavy Snowfall Starting November 2010
Mt. Kirishima (Shinmoedake) Eruption

A-21

Okayama
KagawaEhime
Miyazaki
Hiroshima
Mie
Ehime
Hyogo
Shizuoka
Miyazaki
Tokushima
Kagawa
Hyogo
Gifu
Kyoto
Niigata
FukuokaTokyo
Yamaguchi
Kochi
MiyazakiKagoshima

No. ofMunicipalities
Invoking the Act
9
13
1
2
2
5
4
2
1
1
4
9
18
1
7
54
1
2
2
1
13
1

Niigata11

NaganoOkinawa
NaganoKagoshima
MiyazakiMiyazaki
Hokkaido
Ishikawa
Kumamoto
NiigataMiyazaki
Akita
ToyamaIwate
MiyagiToyamaIshikawa
Aichi
Yamaguchi
Fukuoka
Hyogo
Okayama
Hiroshima
Yamaguchi
Hiroshima
Kagoshima
Niigata
Niigata
NiigataMiyazakiMiyazaki

8
2
3
6
1
1
1
7
1
10
1
2
1
5
2
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
2
1
1
3
4
2
3
1
1

Prefecture

Year

Date of
Invocation

Name of Disaster2011

2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

Mar. 11

July 2011 Niigata and Fukushima Torrential Rains

Jul. 29

Sep. 2

2011 Typhoon 12

Sep. 32011 Typhoon 15

Sep. 212012

Jan. 14Jan. 28
Jan.31
Heavy Winter Snowfall

Feb. 1Feb. 3Feb. 4

May 2012 Gust

May 6

Heavy Rains Starting July 3

Jul. 3Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front Starting July 11

Jul. 12

Snow Melt Landslide
Heavy Rains Starting July 22

Jul. 13
Aug. 14
Sep. 15
Nov. 27
Feb. 22
Feb. 25
Feb. 26
Feb. 28
May 1
Jul. 22

Heavy Rains Starting July 28

Jul. 28

Heavy Rains Starting August 9Aug. 9Heavy Rains Starting August 23
September 2 Gust

Aug. 23
Sep. 2

2013 Typhoon 18

Sep. 162013 Typhoon 26

Oct. 16

Heavy Rains Starting August 13
2012 Typhoon 16
November 27 Destructive Snow Storm
2013
Heavy Winter Snowfall

2014
Feb. 15
Heavy Winter Snowfall

Feb. 17
Feb. 18
Feb. 21

A-22

Prefecture
Aomori
Iwate
Miyagi
Fukushima
IbarakiTochigi
Chiba
Tokyo
Niigata
Fukushima
Mie
Nara
Wakayama
Okayama
Tottori
Aomori
Fukushima
Niigata
Niigata
Niigata
Aomori
NaganoNiigata
Niigata
IbarakiTochigi
Fukuoka
Oita
Kumamoto
Oita
Fukuoka
Kyoto
Kagoshima
Hokkaido
Niigata
Niigata
Yamagata
Yamagata
Yamagata
Yamagata
Yamaguchi
ShimaneAkita
Iwate
Shimane
Saitama
Saitama
Kyoto
Tokyo
Chiba
NaganoGunma
Yamanashi
Gunma
Saitama
Gunma
Yamanashi
Yamanashi

No. ofMunicipalities
Invoking the Act
2
34
35
59
37
15
8
47
15
9
3
10
5
1
2
1
1
2
4
1
2
5
4
1
4
3
1
2
5
1
7
1
1
7
8
1
1
1
1
4
3
1
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
4
1
16
7
7
1
3
2

Year
2014

Date of
Invocation

Name of Disaster
Heavy Rains from 2014 Typhoon 8

Jul. 92014 Typhoon 12

Aug. 32014 Typhoon 11

Aug. 9Heavy Rains Starting August 15, 2014

Aug. 17

Heavy Rains Starting August 19, 2014
Damage Related to Mt. Ontake Eruption
Nagano Prefecture Kamishiro Fault Earthquake
Heavy Snowfall Starting December 52015 Eruption of Kuchinoerabu-jima

Aug. 20
Sep. 27
Nov. 22
Dec. 8May 29Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku
Regions
2015 Typhoon 21
2016 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake2016 Typhoon 10

Sep. 9Sep. 10
Sep. 28
Apr. 14
Aug. 30

2016 Earthquake centered in the central Tottori Prefecture2016 Conflagration in Itoigawa City, Niigata Prefecture
Source: Cabinet Office

A-23

Oct. 21
Dec. 22

Prefecture
NaganoYamagata
Kochi
Kochi
Tokushima
Kyoto
Hyogo
Hiroshima
NaganoNaganoTokushima
Kagoshima
IbarakiTochigi
Miyagi
Okinawa
Kumamoto
Hokkaido
Iwate
Tottori
NiigataNo. ofMunicipalities
Invoking the Act
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
1
10
8
8
1
45
20
12
4
1

Fig.
Fig.A-14
A-14 Actual Designations of Extremely Severe Disasters in the Past Five Years
Title of Legislation

Disaster Name

Main Affected
Areas

Aomori, Iwate,
Miyagi,Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe DisasterGreat East Japan Fukushima,
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Earthquake
Ibaraki, Tochigi,
Measures for the Great East Japan Earthquake
Chiba, Niigata
and Nagano Pref.
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2010 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―
Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2010
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Miyake Island
Measures for the District of Miyake-mura, Tokyo
Volcanic
Tokyo
Prefecture Due to Volcanic Phenomena from 2000 to Phenomena
2010
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Mie, Wakayama
Typhoon 6
Measures for Aki City, Kochi Prefecture Due toand Kochi Pref.
Rainstorms from July 17 to 20, 2011
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
July 2011
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Niigata/
Niigata andMeasures for Torrential Rains from July 24 to August Fukushima
Fukushima Pref.
1, 2011
Torrential Rains
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Mie, Nara andTyphoon 12
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from
Wakayama Pref.
August 29 to September 7, 2011
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Fukushima, Gifu
Typhoon 15
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains fromand Hyogo Pref.
September 15 to 23, 2011
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2011 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―
Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2011
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe DisasterFukuoka,
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Seasonal Rain
Kumamoto andMeasures for Torrential Rains and Rainstorms from Front/Typhoon 4
Oita Pref.
June 8 to July 23, 2011
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2012 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―
Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2012
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe DisasterSeasonal Rain
Iwate, Yamagata,
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Front/ Typhoon Shimane andMeasures for Torrential Rains and Rainstorms from4/ Typhoon 7
Yamaguchi Pref.
June 8 to August 9, 2013
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for the Districts of Gotsu City and Onan- Torrential Rains Shimane Pref.
cho, Ochigun, Shimane Prefecture Due to Heavy
Rains from August 23 to 25, 2013
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Fukui, Shiga andTyphoon 18
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from
Kyoto Pref.
September 15 to 17, 2013
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for the District of Oshima-machi, Tokyo
Typhoon 26
Tokyo
Prefecture Due to Rainstorms on October 15 and 16,
2013
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2013 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―
Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2013
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for the Districts of Nagiso-machi, Kiso-gun, Seasonal Rain
Nagano andNagano Prefecture, and Shiiba-son, Higashi UsukiFront/Typhoon 8 Miyazaki Pref.
gun, Miyazaki Prefecture Due to Rainstorms andTorrential Rains on July 9 and 10, 2014
Torrential Rains Hokkaido, Kyoto,
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Caused by
Hyogo, Osaka,
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Typhoon 11/
Nara, Hiroshima,
Measures for Rainstorms and Heavy Rains from July Typhoon 12/
Tokushima,
30 to August 25, 2014
Seasonal Rain
Ehime, and Kochi
Front
Pref.

A-24

Main Applicable Measures
Other
Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Applicable
3, 4 56
7
12 16 17 19 24 Measures

○

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*2

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*1

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Title of Legislation

Disaster Name

Main Applicable Measures
Other
Main DisasterArt. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Applicable
Affected Regions
3, 4 56
7
12 16 17 19 24 Measures

Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for the Districts of Sumoto City and Awaji Typhoon 19
Hyogo Pref.
●●
City, Hyogo Prefecture Due to Rainstorms on
October 13 and 14, 2014
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Earthquake of
Measures for the Districts of Ikeda-cho and OtariNagano Pref
● ●●Nov. 22, 2014
mura, Kitaazumi-gun, Nagano Prefecture Due to the
Earthquake of November 22, 2014.
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2014 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―● ●●Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2014
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe DisasterSeasonal Rain
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Front/Typhoon○
Kumamoto Pref.
● ○Measures for Torrential Rains and Rainstorms from 9/ Typhoon 11/*1
June 2 to July 26, 2015
Typhoon 12
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for the Districts of Odai Town, Taki-gun
Typhoon 15
Mie Pref.
●●and Kihoku Town, Kitamuro-gun, Mie Prefecture Dueto Rainstorms on August 24 and 26, 2015
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Miyagi,
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Fukushima,○
Typhoon 18, etc.
● ○ ○●Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from
Ibaraki, and*1
September 7 to 11, 2015
Tochigi Pref.
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2015 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―● ●●Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2015
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2016 Kumamoto Kumamoto Pref.,Designation and Identification of Essential Response○ ○ ○○ ○ ○ ○ ○○Earthquakeetc.
Measures for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Seasonal Rain
Kumamoto and○● ○Measures for Torrential Rains from June 6 to July 15, Front
Miyazaki Pref.
*1
2016
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Typhoon 7/
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Typhoon 9/
Hokkaido and○ ● ○ ○ ○ ○○ ○ ○ *2
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from Typhoon 10/
Iwate Pref.
August 16 to September 1, 2016
Typhoon 11, etc.
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Miyazaki and○
Typhoon 16● ○ ○Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from
Kagoshima Pref.
*1
September 17 to 21, 2016
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2016 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―●●
Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2016
*1 Public works facilities were considered as regional disaster*2 Limited to portions concerning item 3[Legend]○: Indicates a national disaster (Region is not specified, the disaster itself is specified).
●: Indicates a regional disaster (Disaster is specified at the municipal level.).
The applicable measures are the measures listed below prescribed in the Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with Extremely Severe Disasters.
[Main applicable measures][Other applicable measures]Art. 3, 4: Special financial support for disaster recovery projects for public Art. 8: Application of interim measures related to financing for agricultural,works facilities
forestry, and fishery operators who are victims of natural disasters
Art. 5: Special measures on subsidies for disaster recovery projects forArt. 9: Subsidies for projects to remove deposited earth and sandagricultural land
conducted by forestry associations
Art. 6: Special cases of subsidies for disaster recovery projects forArt. 10: Subsidies for projects to remove floodwater conducted by land
agricultural, forestry, and fisheries shared-used facilities
improvement districts
Art. 7 (iii): Special financial support for disaster recovery projects for plant Art. 11: Subsidies for construction expenses for shared-use small fishing
and animal aquaculture facilities
boats
Art. 12: Special provision concerning disaster-related credit guarantees
Art. 11-2: Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for forests
under the Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act Art. 14: Subsidies for disaster reconstruction projects for facilities including
Art 16.: Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for public social andbusiness cooperatives
educational facilities
Art. 20: Special cases of government loans based on the Act for the Welfare
Art. 17: Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for private school facilities
of Fatherless Families, motherless families and Widows
Art. 19: Special cases of cost coverage for projects implemented byArt. 22: Special cases of subsidies for public housing construction projects
municipalities to prevent infectious diseases
for victims
Art. 24: Inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal and interest
Art. 25: Special cases of paying job seeker benefits based on therelated to small disaster bonds in the standard budget request
Employment Insurance Act

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Fig.
Fig.A-15
A-15 Response of Government Ministries and Agencies to Major Disasters Since 201615-1 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake [Maximum seismic intensity of 7](1) Damage
At 21:26 on April 14, 2016, a magnitude 6.5 earthquake struck the Kumamoto region of Kumamoto Prefecture(latitude 32° 44.5 north, longitude 130° 48.5 east) at a depth of 11 km, with a seismic intensity of 7 observed in
Mashiki Town, Kumamoto Prefecture. 28 hours later, at 01:25 on April 16, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake with ahypocenter in the same region (latitude 32° 45.2 north, longitude 130° 45.7 east) struck at a depth of 12 km, with aseismic intensity of 7 observed in Mashiki Town and Nishihara Village, and strong tremors observed in otherprefectures in the Kyushu area.
The human casualties of this earthquake amounted to 228 fatalities and 2,753 injured, while the damage to homes
encompassed 8,697 homes that were completely destroyed, 34,037 half-destroyed, and 155,902 partially destroyed.
A total of 1,166 evacuation centers were opened in the affected areas, with the number of evacuees peaking at
approximately 196,000 (of whom approximately 180,000 were within Kumamoto Prefecture). (As of April 13, 2017)
In addition, a total of 190 slope failures and other sediment disasters occurred. In terms of impacts on lifeline utilities,
up to around 477,000 households in the area served by Kyushu Electric Power Company suffered power outages; up
to around 105,000 households experienced gas outages (excluding vacant dwellings and the like, up to around
101,000 were households with consumer gas supply contracts); and up to around 445,857 households experienced
interruptions to the water supply. Furthermore, transport infrastructure including the airport, roads, and railways
suffered immense damage and the earthquake had a major impact both on the daily lives of local citizens and on theeconomic activities of SMEs, enterprises in the agriculture, forestry and fishery industries, and tourism industry
businesses.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
At 21:36 on April 14, after the earthquake, the Prime Minister issued the following instructions to relevant ministries
and agencies.
1. Ascertain the extent of the damage without delay.
2. Work closely with local governments as an integrated government team, sparing no effort in taking emergency
disaster control measures.
3. Ensure timely and accurate provision of information to the public regarding evacuation and the extent of thedamage.
In response to the Prime Minister’s instructions, the Emergency Response Team met and confirmed that they would
spare no effort in implementing emergency disaster control measures. At 22:10 that day, the government establishedthe Emergency Response Headquarters for the Earthquake Centered in the Kumamoto Region of Kumamoto
Prefecture 2016, headed by the Minister of State for Disaster Management. At 23:21 the same day, the first meetingof the Major Disaster Management Headquarters was held with the Prime Minister in attendance.
At 23:25 that day, the government deployed a Cabinet Office advance information-gathering team to Kumamoto
Prefecture, and at 06:40 on April 15, a government investigation team led by the State Minister of the Cabinet Officefor Disaster Management was deployed there as well.
At 08:08 on April 15, the second meeting of the Major Disaster Management Headquarters was held, attended by
the Prime Minister, during which participants held a videoconference with the Kumamoto Prefectural Office andconfirmed that the government would continue to work as an integrated team, sparing no effort in implementing
emergency disaster control measures.
At 10:40 the same day, the government established the On-site Disaster Management Headquarters for the
Earthquake Centered in the Kumamoto Region of Kumamoto Prefecture 2016 and held a joint meeting with the
Kumamoto Prefecture Disaster Response Headquarters at 13:00 that day, during which participants shared
information on such matters as the extent of the damage and the status of activities by relevant organizations (atotal of 44 joint meetings with the Kumamoto Prefecture Disaster Response Headquarters were held thereafter).
At 16:07 that day, the third meeting of the Major Disaster Management Headquarters was held, attended by thePrime Minister, during which participants confirmed the extent of the damage and information concerning the
response by each ministry and agency.
Following the earthquake at 01:25 on April 16, the Prime Minister issued the following instructions to relevant
ministries and agencies at 02:38 that day.

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1. Ascertain the extent of the damage without delay, as the damage is spread over a wide area and there is a riskthat it could expand further.
2. Work closely with local governments as an integrated government team, sparing no effort in taking emergency
disaster control measures, including the rescue and relief of affected people.
3. Ensure timely and accurate provision of information to the public regarding evacuation and the extent of thedamage.
In response to the Prime Minister’s instructions, the Emergency Response Team met and confirmed that they would
spare no effort in implementing emergency disaster control measures. At 05:10 that day, the fourth meeting of the
Major Disaster Management Headquarters was held, attended by the Prime Minister. (A total of 31 meetings of the
Major Disaster Management Headquarters were held thereafter, 20 of which were attended by the Prime Minister)At 05:00 on April 16, the government set up a supplies procurement and transport team within the Major Disaster
Management Headquarters and decided to provide supplies via push-mode support, which involves procuring andshipping relief supplies without waiting for requests from the affected areas. A total of approximately 2.78 million
meals were supplied between April 17 and May 6; those supplied through April 22 took the form of push-mode
support, while those from April 23 were supplied as pull-type support, in response to requests from affected areas.
At 17:00 on April 17, the Team to Support the Daily Lives of Disaster Victims for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake,headed by the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (administrative duties), was established to provide powerful support
for the swift rebuilding of the daily lives of people affected by the disaster. The first meeting of this body was thenheld, attended by the Prime Minister.
The SDF carried out the following disaster relief operations in the areas concerned, in response to requests from thegovernors of Kumamoto and Oita prefectures.
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・At 22:40 on Thursday, April 14, the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture contacted the Commander of
the GSDF 8th Division (Kita Kumamoto) to request a disaster relief deployment for the purpose ofsaving lives (request for withdrawal: 09:00 on Monday, May 30)
・At 02:36 on Saturday, April 16, the Governor of Oita Prefecture contacted the Commander of the
GSDF Western Army Artillery Unit (Yufuin) to request a disaster relief deployment for the purpose ofsaving lives (request for withdrawal: 09:00 on Thursday, April 28)
B. Scale of Deployment
・ Personnel: Approximately 814,200 people in total (with approximately 26,000 deployedsimultaneously at its peak); aircraft: 2,618 in total (peaking at 132); naval vessels: 300 in total (peaking
at 15)In addition, police organizations deployed 27,936 personnel to the area and firefighting organizations deployed
15,613 to conduct rescue operations. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) TEC-FORCE
deployed a total of 10,912 people/day in the areas affected, where they surveyed the extent of the damage,inspected Sediment Disaster Risk Areas, and cleared transport routes.
The Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to capture video footage
and analyze crustal movement, which they provided to relevant organizations as needed and also published on the
GSI website.
On April 23, the Prime Minister visited Kumamoto Prefecture to inspect the extent of the damage; after doing so, heexchanged views with the leaders of affected local governments and visited evacuation centers.
On April 29, the Prime Minister visited both Oita Prefecture and Kumamoto Prefecture to inspect the extent of thedamage; after doing so, he exchanged views with the leaders of affected local governments and representatives of
local shopping arcades, and visited evacuation centers.
On May 5, the head of the Major Disaster Management Headquarters (the Minister of State for Disaster
Management) visited Kumamoto Prefecture, where he exchanged views with the leaders of affected local
governments and conducted a survey of evacuation centers and disaster sites.
On June 4, the Prime Minister visited Oita Prefecture and Kumamoto Prefecture to inspect progress with recovery
and reconstruction. In addition, he exchanged views with representatives from the tourism industry and visited
evacuation centers.
On June 15 and August 17, the head of the Major Disaster Management Headquarters (the Minister of State forDisaster Management) visited Kumamoto Prefecture, where he exchanged views with the leaders of affected local
governments and conducted a survey of evacuation centers, temporary housing, and disaster sites.

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Due to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked in respect of 45 municipalities inKumamoto Prefecture, while the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims was invoked in
respect of 46 municipalities in 2 prefectures.
[Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act]
Kumamoto Prefecture: All 45 municipalities (Kumamoto City, Yatsushiro City, Hitotoshi City, Arao City,
Minamata City, Tamana City, Yamaga City, Kikuchi City, Uto City, Kamiamakusa City, Uki City, Aso
City, Amakusa City, Koshi City, Misato Town, Gyokuto Town, Nankan Town, Magasu Town,
Nagomi Town, Ozu Town, Kikuyo Town, Minamioguni Town, Oguni Town, Ubuyama Village,
Takamori Town, Nishihara Village, Minamiazo Village, Mifune Town, Kashima Town, Masiki Town,
Kosa Town, Yamato Town, Hikawa Town, Ashikita Town, Tsunagi Town, Nishiki Town, Taragi Town,
Yunomae Town, Mizukami Village, Sagara Village, Itsuki Village, Yamae Village, Kuma Village,
Asagiri Town, Reihoku Town) (Date of invocation: April 14)[Invocation of the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims]
Kumamoto Prefecture: All areas (Date of invocation: April 14)
Oita Prefecture: Yufu City (Date of invocation: April 16)
In addition, the government issued the Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster Designation and
Identification of Essential Response Measures for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, which designated the earthquake
as a Disaster of Extreme Severity affecting the entire nation and specified the measures to be applied in respect ofthe disaster (including special financial support for disaster recovery projects focused on public civil engineering
facilities; special financial aid for disaster recovery projects focused on agricultural land; special provisions on
financial assistance for disaster recovery projects for facilities for the joint use of the agriculture, forestry, andfisheries industries; a special provision concerning disaster-related credit guarantees under the Small and Mediumsized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act; subsidies for disaster reconstruction projects for facilities including businesscooperatives; subsidies for disaster recovery projects for public social and educational facilities; subsidies for disasterrecovery projects for private school facilities; special cases of cost coverage for projects implemented bymunicipalities to prevent infectious diseases; special cases of government loans based on the Act for the Welfare ofFatherless Families, Motherless Families and Widows; special cases of subsidies for public housing construction
projects for victims; inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal and interest on small disaster bonds in thestandard budget request; and special cases of paying job seeker benefits based on the Employment Insurance Act)
(promulgated and entered into force on April 26).
The Cabinet Order on the Specified Disaster Designation and Identification of Essential Response Measures for the2016 Kumamoto Earthquake designated the disaster caused by the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake as a specified
disaster and stipulated the measures to be applied in respect of it (including measures relating to extending thedeadlines for administrative rights and interests; measures relating to exemptions associated with obligations not
carried out within the required period; measures relating to the special provisions on decisions concerning the startof corporate bankruptcy proceedings on the grounds of insolvency; and measures relating to the special provisions
on the period for acceptance or renunciation of inheritance) (promulgated and entered into force on May 2).
Subsequently, the Cabinet Order on the Specified Disaster Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake was partially revised, with the addition of measures to be applied in
respect of the disaster (measures relating to the special provision on fees for the filing of a petition for conciliation
under the Civil Conciliation Act) (promulgated and entered into force on June 24).
The Cabinet Order on the Major Disaster Designation for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake designated the disaster
caused by the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake as a major disaster (promulgated and entered into force on May 13).
Under this ordinance, if so requested by a local government that has been affected by a disaster, the national
government or a prefectural government is able to carry out disaster recovery projects that would normally be
carried out by the affected local government, insofar as doing so does not impede the administrative duties of thenational government or the prefectural government concerned. This was the first time that a disaster had been
designated as a major disaster under the Act on Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters.

15-2 Typhoons in August 2016 (2016 Typhoons 7, 11, 9, and 10)(1) Damage
Typhoons 7, 11, 9, and 10 occurred in quick succession in August, causing river flooding, sediment disasters, andother floods and damage, primarily in Hokkaido and Iwate Prefecture.

A-28

The human casualties of this series of typhoons amounted to 29 fatalities and missing persons, and 106 injured,
while the damage to homes encompassed 519 homes that were completely destroyed, 2,306 half-destroyed, 1,010
with above-floor flooding and 4,538 with below-floor flooding.
2016 Typhoon 7 originated over the sea to the west of the Northern Mariana Islands at 03:00 on August 14, 2016
and moved north, progressing from the sea to the east of the Kanto region to the waters off the Sanriku Coast. It
made landfall near Cape Erimo, Hokkaido around 17:30 on the 17th and continued up through Hokkaido, turning
into an extra-tropical cyclone near Sakhalin at 03:00 on the 18th.
This typhoon and weather front caused heavy rain centered on northern Japan. Between 00:00 on August 16 and
06:00 on the 18th, there was 234.0 mm of rainfall at Morino in Shiraoi Town, Hokkaido and 228.0 mm at Washikura
in Fukushima City, Fukushima Prefecture.
Some parts of Hokkaido also experienced severe gales, with a maximum peak wind of 31.8 m and a maximum
instantaneous wind speed of 43.2 m observed in at Kushiro in Kushiro City, Hokkaido.
The human casualties of Typhoon 7 amounted to 5 injured, while the damage to homes encompassed 9 homes thatwere half-destroyed, 67 with above-floor flooding and 173 with below-floor flooding. A total of 6 slope failures andother sediment disasters occurred, while up to approximately 2,260 households in the area served by Tohoku ElectricPower Company, Inc. suffered power outages.
2016 Typhoon 11 originated over the sea to the east of Japan at 09:00 on August 20, 2016 and moved northwest,
approaching the Tohoku region before moving north off the Sanriku Coast. It made landfall near Kushiro City,
Hokkaido after 23:00 on the 21st and continued up through Hokkaido before turning into an extra-tropical cyclone
in the Sea of Okhotsk at 03:00 on the 22nd.
2016 Typhoon 9 originated over the sea to the west of the Northern Mariana Islands at 15:00 on August 19, 2016
and continued to develop as it moved north, nearing the Izu Islands in the early hours of the 22nd, accompanied bya storm area. It subsequently made landfall near Tateyama City, Chiba Prefecture at around 12:30 on the 22nd andcontinued up through the Kanto and Tohoku regions, making landfall once more in the central Hidaka region of
Hokkaido before 06:00 on the 23rd. It then continued up through Hokkaido before turning into an extra-tropical
cyclone in the Sea of Okhotsk at 12:00 on the 23rd.
These typhoons and weather fronts caused heavy rain in eastern and northern Japan. Between 00:00 on August 20
and 24:00 on the 23rd, there was 448.5 mm of rainfall at Mt. Amagi in Izu City, Shizuoka Prefecture; 297.5 mm at
Ome in Ome City, Tokyo; and 296.0 mm at Itokushibetsu in Shibetsu Town, Hokkaido. Hokkaido experienced
particularly heavy rain, receiving double the average rainfall for August. In addition, various areas experienced severe
gales, with a maximum instantaneous wind speed of 50.9 m observed at Yaemigahara in Hachijo Town, Tokyo; 45.5m at Katsuura in Katsuura City, Chiba Prefecture; and 34.3 m at Onahama in Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture.
The human casualties of Typhoon 11 and Typhoon 9 amounted to 2 fatalities and 87 injured, while the damage tohomes encompassed 6 homes that were completely destroyed, 17 half-destroyed, 665 with above-floor flooding and
2,581 with below-floor flooding. A total of 65 slope failures and other sediment disasters occurred, while up to
approximately 104,200 households in the area served by Tokyo Electric Power Company experienced power outages,
along with up to approximately 710 households in the area served by Hokkaido Electric Power Company. In addition,
up to 16,714 households in Hokkaido and Ibaraki Prefecture suffered interruptions to the water supply.
2016 Typhoon 10 originated over the sea south of Shikoku on August 21, 2016 and continued to develop as it moved
north on the 26th, nearing the Kanto region in the morning of the 30th. It made landfall near Ofunato City, Iwate
Prefecture at around 17:30 on the 30th, accompanied by a storm area, and gathered speed as it passed through the
Tohoku region before exiting onto the Sea of Japan, where it turned into an extra-tropical cyclone on the 31st. This
was the first time that a typhoon had made landfall on the northeastern Pacific coast since the Japan Meteorological
Agency began recording statistics in 1951.
As a result of Typhoon 10, heavy rain fell over a wide area from western to northern Japan, primarily in the Tohoku
and Hokkaido regions. Miyako City and Kuji City, Iwate Prefecture experienced driving rains, with 80 mm of rain fallingin an hour. In addition, between 00:00 on the 28th and 06:00 on the 31st, Kamishihoro Town received recordbreaking rainfall of 329 mm, which is more than it usually receives for the entire month of August in an average year.
Areas from eastern to northern Japan experienced windstorms, with a maximum instantaneous wind speed of 37.7
m observed in Miyako City, Iwate Prefecture and 36.5 m in Setana City, Hokkaido. In addition, some areas saw stormyseas.
The human casualties of Typhoon 10 amounted to 27 fatalities and missing persons, and 14 injured, while the damage
to homes encompassed 513 homes that were completely destroyed, 2,280 half-destroyed, 278 with above-floor
flooding and 1,784 with below-floor flooding. A total of 177 slope failures and other sediment disasters occurred,with up to 1,093 people from 535 households in Iwate Prefecture being cut off due to river flooding or sedimentcollapse. Up to approximately 40,380 households in the area served by Hokkaido Electric Power Company and up to

A-29

approximately 36,500 households in the area served by Tohoku Electric Power Company suffered power outages,
while up to approximately 17,000 households in Hokkaido and Iwate Prefecture experienced interruptions to thewater supply.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
At 13:30 on August 13, before Typhoon 7 made landfall, the government held an Inter-Agency Disaster Measures
Alert Meeting, during which participants shared information about the weather outlook and the steps being taken
by ministries and agencies in response, confirming that they would take appropriate response measures.
At 17:00 on August 20, before Typhoons 11 and 9 made landfall, the government held an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert
Meeting, during which participants shared information about the weather outlook and the steps being taken byministries and agencies in response, confirming that they would take appropriate response measures.
At 16:00 on August 26, the government held an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting concerning Typhoons 11 and 9
and an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting concerning Typhoon 10, attended by the Minister of State for Disaster
Management, the State Minister of the Cabinet Office for Disaster Management, and the Parliamentary Vice-Minister
for Disaster Management. During this meeting, participants shared information about the weather outlook, theextent of the damage, and the steps being taken by ministries and agencies in response, confirming that they would
take appropriate response measures.
The same day, the Minister of State for Disaster Management made the following appeal to the public via the website
and social media, concerning the response to Typhoon 10.
1. The large and very powerful Typhoon 10 seems likely to approach North Japan and the Kanto region and makelandfall tomorrow, the 30th, accompanied by a storm area. Localized driving rains centered on North Japan andsevere gales centered on marine areas are expected, with stormy seas in some areas. In particular, there is a riskof record-breaking heavy rains in the Tohoku region, so please be particularly vigilant about sediment disasters
and river flooding with the potential to threaten human lives.
2. We ask all members of the public to comply with advisories, etc. issued by municipalities and take the initiativein evacuating at an early stage in order to protect your life. Even if your municipality has not issued an advisory,etc., please pay attention to weather information and do not hesitate to evacuate if you judge that it might bewise to evacuate. If you feel that it is too dangerous to get to an evacuation site, please evacuate to a nearby
place of safety; if you feel that it is already too dangerous to venture outside, please evacuate to a safer place,such as the second or third floor of the building where you are. Please refrain from going outside unlessessential and urgent, and do not, under any circumstances, go near any waterways or the coast.
3. We also ask all members of the public to take the initiative in taking evacuation actions or any other actions
necessary to keep themselves safe, without fearing that it might be a wasted effort.
In light of the landfall of the typhoon and its progress thereafter, at 13:30 on August 29, the government held asecond Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting, attended by the Minister of State for Disaster Management, the State
Minister of the Cabinet Office for Disaster Management, and the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Disaster
Management. During this meeting, participants shared information about the weather outlook, the extent of thedamage, and the steps being taken by ministries and agencies in response, confirming that they would continue totake appropriate response measures.
At 08:50 on August 31, the Prime Minister issued the following instructions to relevant ministries and agencies.
1. Ascertain the extent of the damage without delay.
2. Work closely with local governments as an integrated government team, making human life the top priority andsparing no effort in taking emergency disaster control measures, including the rescue and relief of affected
people. In addition, fully implement measures to prevent further harm by such means as providing support for
the evacuation of local citizens.
3. Ensure timely and accurate provision of information to the public regarding evacuation and the status of therain, rivers, and floods, etc.
At 08:57 the same day, a meeting of the directors-general of relevant ministries and agencies was held, at which
participants confirmed that they would spare no effort to ascertain the full extent of the damage and to undertake
rescue and relief activities, in response to the Prime Minister’s instructions. At 13:00 that day, an Inter-Agency
Disaster Management Meeting was held, attended by the Minister of State for Disaster Management, the State
Minister of the Cabinet Office for Disaster Management, and the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Disaster
Management. During this meeting, participants shared information about the weather outlook, the extent of thedamage, and the steps being taken by ministries and agencies in response, confirming that they would continue to

A-30

work as one, sparing no effort in taking emergency disaster control measures, such as ascertaining the extent of thedamage and undertaking rescue and relief activities. (A total of 7 Inter-Agency Disaster Management Meetings were
held thereafter)
The SDF carried out the following disaster relief operations in relation to Typhoon 10, in response to requests fromthe governors of Iwate and Hokkaido prefectures.
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・At 19:55 on Tuesday, August 30, the Governor of Iwate Prefecture contacted the Commander of the
GSDF 9th Artillery Regiment (Iwate) to request a disaster relief deployment for the purpose of
rescuing stranded people, providing support for the supply of water, road clearance, transporting
personnel and supplies, providing support for the supply of food, and bathing support (request forwithdrawal: 21:00 on Friday, September 16)
・At 04:00 on Wednesday, August 31, the Governor of Hokkaido (Director General, Tokachi General
Subprefectural Bureau) contacted the Commander of the GSDF 5th Brigade (Obihiro) to request adisaster relief deployment for the purpose of rescuing stranded people, searching for missing persons,providing support for the supply of water, bathing support, and flood prevention activities (request
for withdrawal: 17:00 on Sunday, September 18)
・At 04:15 on Wednesday, August 31, the Governor of Hokkaido (Director General, Kamikawa General
Subprefectural Bureau) contacted the Commander of the GSDF 4th Artillery Group (Kamifurano) torequest a disaster relief deployment for the purpose of rescuing stranded people, providing support
for the supply of water and food, and transporting supplies (request for withdrawal: 19:00 on Tuesday,
September 6)
B. Scale of Deployment
・Iwate Prefecture
Personnel: approx. 2,090 in total; vehicles: approx. 690 in total; aircraft: approx.
77 in total
・Hokkaido Personnel: approx. 1,705 in total; vehicles: approx. 790 in total; aircraft: approx. 19 in total;
reconnaissance boats: 5 in total
In addition, police organizations deployed a total of 1,217 personnel to the area to conduct rescue operations.
Having deployed a Cabinet Office advance information-gathering team on August 31 to Iwate Prefecture (August 31– September 2) and Hokkaido (August 31 – September 5), the government established a Government Local Liaison
and Coordination Office at Iwate Prefectural Office on September 2.
From August 31 to September 1, to ascertain the extent of the damage and the status of the local response, agovernment investigation team led by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Disaster Management was deployed to
Iwate Prefecture, where it conducted a survey of the affected area, as well as exchanging views with the leaders of
local governments affected by the disaster.
In addition, on September 5, to ascertain the extent of the damage and the status of the local response, a government
investigation team led by the Minister of State for Disaster Management was deployed to Hokkaido, where it
conducted surveys of the affected areas, as as exchanging views with the leaders of local governments affected by
the disaster.
On September 14, the Prime Minister visited Hokkaido and conducted an aerial inspection of the extent of thedamage in Obihiro City from a helicopter, after which he exchanged views with local farming representatives and theleaders of local governments affected by the disaster. (His originally scheduled visit to Iwate Prefecture was cancelled
due to poor weather)
On October 8, the Prime Minister visited Iwate Prefecture, where he inspected a group home for elderly people withdementia and a dairy factory in Iwaizumi Town, which suffered damage as a result of the typhoon. He also visited anevacuation center, after which he exchanged views with the leaders of local governments affected by the disaster.
Due to Typhoon 10, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked in respect of 20 municipalities in Hokkaido and 12
municipalities in Iwate Prefecture, and the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims was also
invoked.
[Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act]
[Hokkaido Prefecture] (Date of invocation: August 30)
Obihiro City, Minamifurano Town, Otofuke Town, Shihoro Town, Kamishihoro Town, Shikaoi Town,
ShintokuTown, Shimizu Town, Memuro Town, Nakasatsunai Village, Sarabetsu Village, Taiki Town,
Hiroo Town, Makubetsu Town, Ikeda Town, Toyokoro Town, Honbetsu Town, Ashoro Town, Rikubetsu
Town, Urahoro Town

A-31

[Iwate Prefecture] (Date of invocation: August 30)
Morioka City, Miyako City, Kuji Citym, Tono City, Kamaishi City, Otsuchi Town, Iwaizumi Town, Tanohata
Village, Fudai Village, Karumai Town, Noda Village, Ichonohe Town
[Invocation of the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims][Hokkaido Prefecture] (Date of invocation: August 30)
Muroran City, Minamifurano Town, Shiraoi Town, Toyako Town, Shintoku Town, Shimizu Town,
Makubetsu Town
[Iwate Prefecture] (Date of invocation: August 30)
All areas
Since Typhoons 7, 11, 9, and 10 had caused immense damage to various parts of the country, the weather events
between August 16 and September 1, 2016 were grouped together in the Ordinance Designating the Disaster Dueto Rainstorms and Torrential Rains between August 16 and September 1, 2016 as a Disaster of Extreme Severity andSpecifying the Measures to be Applied. As well as designating the group of events as a Disaster of Extreme Severity
affecting the entire nation and specified the measures to be applied in respect of the disaster (including special
financial support for disaster recovery projects focused on public civil engineering facilities; special financial aid fordisaster recovery projects focused on agricultural land; special provisions on financial assistance for disaster recovery
projects for facilities for the joint use of the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries industries; subsidies for disasterrecovery projects for public social and educational facilities; subsidies for disaster recovery projects for private school
facilities; special cases of cost coverage for projects implemented by municipalities to prevent infectious diseases;
and inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal and interest on small disaster bonds in the standard budget
request). In addition, a measure to be applied in respect of the disaster (a special provision concerning disasterrelated credit guarantees under the Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act) was specified in regard
to Minamifurano Town in Hokkaido and Miyako City, Kuji City, and Iwaizumi Town in Iwate Prefecture (promulgatedand entered into force on September 23).
Subsequently, the Ordinance Designating the Disaster Due to Rainstorms and Torrential Rains between August 16
and September 1, 2016 as a Disaster of Extreme Severity and Specifying the Measures to be Applied was partiallyrevised, with the addition of special financial support for disaster recovery projects for plant and animal aquaculture
facilities as a measure to be applied in respect of the disaster for the whole country (promulgated and entered into
force on October 13).

15-3 2016 Typhoon 16(1) Damage
2016 Typhoon 16 originated over the sea to the west of the Northern Mariana Islands at 03:00 on September 13,
2016 and passed close to Yonaguni Island, Okinawa Prefecture at about 12:00 on the 17th, heading north. Having
progressed northeast over the East China Sea, it made landfall on the Osumi Peninsula, Kagoshima Prefecture withpowerful momentum after 00:00 on September 20 and then headed northeast across the waters off Shikoku before
making landfall once more near Tanabe City, Wakayama Prefecture at around 13:30 the same day. After making
landfall yet again just after 17:00 that day near Tokoname City, Aichi Prefecture, it turned into an extra-tropical
cyclone at 21:00 the same day over the waters off the Tokaido coast.
As a result of this typhoon and weather front, driving rains were observed in many areas, with 115 mm of rain fallingin Makurazaki City, Kagoshima Prefecture in the hour to 00:19 on the 20th. Between the 16th and the 20th, heavy
rain in excess of 200 mm fell over extensive swathes of eastern and western Japan, with 607 mm observed in Hyuga
City, Miyazaki Prefecture during that period. In particular, some parts of West Japan received 1.5 times their usual
average rainfall for September.
In addition, severe gales buffeted areas from the Ryukyu Islands to West Japan, with maximum instantaneous windspeeds of 66.8 m observed at 10:06 on the 17th in Yonaguni Town, Okinawa Prefecture and 44.5 m observed at 00:08
on the 20th in Makurazaki City, Kagoshima Prefecture, while offshore areas saw rough seas.
The human casualties of Typhoon 16 amounted to 1 fatality and 47 injured, while the damage to homes encompassed
8 homes that were completely destroyed, 65 half-destroyed, 489 with above-floor flooding and 1,941 with belowfloor flooding. A total of 233 slope failures and other sediment disasters occurred, while approximately 182,560
households suffered power outages, including around 181,900 households in the area served by Kyushu ElectricPower Company. In addition, up to 3,249 households, mainly in the Kyushu area, experienced interruptions to thewater supply.

A-32

(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
On September 16, before the typhoon made landfall, the government held an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting,during which participants shared information about the weather outlook and the steps being taken by ministries andagencies in response, confirming that they would take appropriate response measures. At 13:00 on September 20,
an Inter-Agency Disaster Management Meeting was held, attended by the State Minister of the Cabinet Office forDisaster Management and the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Disaster Management, during which participantsconfirmed that the government would continue to work as an integrated team, sparing no effort in implementing
emergency disaster control measures.
Due to the damage caused by Typhoon 16, the government issued the Ordinance Designating the Disaster Due toRainstorms and Torrential Rains between September 17 and 21, 2016 as a Disaster of Extreme Severity and Specifying
the Measures to be Applied, which designated the typhoon as a Disaster of Extreme Severity affecting the entire
nation and specified the measures to be applied (including special provisions on financial assistance for disasterrecovery projects for agricultural land; special provisions on financial assistance for disaster recovery projects forfacilities for the joint use of the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries industries; and the inclusion of funds for theredemption of principal and interest on small disaster bonds in the standard budget request). This also specified themeasures to be applied in respect of the disaster in Tarumizu City, Kagoshima Prefecture (special financial support
for projects to recover public civil engineering works damaged by disaster and the inclusion of funds for theredemption of principal and interest on small disaster bonds in the standard budget request; promulgated andentered into force on October 26).
Subsequently, the Ordinance Designating the Disaster Due to Rainstorms and Torrential Rains between September
17 and 21, 2016 as a Disaster of Extreme Severity and Specifying the Measures to be Applied was partially revised,adding Mihara Village, Kochi Prefecture to the areas to which the measures (special financial support for projects torecover public civil engineering works damaged by disaster and the inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal
and interest on small disaster bonds in the standard budget request) were to be applied (promulgated and enteredinto force on March 10).

15-4 2016 Central Tottori Earthquake [Maximum Seismic Intensity:
6-Lower](1) Damage
At 14:07 on October 21, 2016, a magnitude 6.6 earthquake with the hypocenter located in central Tottori Prefecture
occurred. The seismic intensity observed in the Tottori Prefecture municipalities of Kurayoshi City, Yurihama Town,
and Hokuei Town was 6-lower, with an intensity of 5-upper observed in the Tottori Prefecture municipalities of Tottori
City and Misasa Town, and the Okayama Prefecture municipalities of Kagamino Town and Maniwa City. In addition,
the seismic intensity observed from the Kanto to the Kyushu regions, centering on the Chugoku region, ranged
between 5-lower and 1.
The human casualties of this earthquake amounted to 32 injured, while the damage to homes encompassed 18
homes that were completely destroyed and 290 homes that were half-destroyed. In terms of impacts on lifeline
utilities, a total of around 77,100 homes in the area served by Chubu Electric Power Company suffered power outages,
while up to 16,187 homes in Tottori and Okayama prefectures suffered interruptions to their water supply.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
At 14:10 on October 21, 2016, immediately after the earthquake, the Prime Minister issued the following instructions
to relevant ministries and agencies.
1. Ascertain the extent of the damage without delay.
2. Work closely with local governments as an integrated government team, sparing no effort in taking emergency
disaster control measures, including the rescue and relief of affected people.
3. Ensure timely and accurate provision of information to the public regarding evacuation and the extent of thedamage.
In response to the Prime Minister’s instructions, the Emergency Response Team met and confirmed that they would
spare no effort in implementing emergency disaster control measures.
At 18:00 that day, an Inter-Agency Disaster Management Meeting was held, during which participants confirmed theextent of the damage, and the steps being taken by ministries and agencies in response.
The SDF carried out the following disaster relief operations in the areas concerned, in response to a request from theA-33

Governor of Tottori Prefecture.
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・At 19:22 on Friday, October 21, the Governor of Tottori Prefecture contacted the Commander of the
GSDF 8th Infantry Regiment (Yonago) to request a disaster relief deployment for the purpose ofproviding support for the supply of water (request for withdrawal: 17:00 on Friday, October 28)
B. Scale of Deployment
Personnel: approx. 620 in total; vehicles: approx. 140 in total; aircraft: approx. 13 in total
In addition, police organizations deployed a total of 226 personnel to the area to stand guard and carry out otheractivities.
At 14:00 on October 22, the government held a second Inter-Agency Disaster Management Meeting, during which
participants shared information about seismic activity forecasts, the extent of the damage, and the steps being taken
by ministries and agencies in response, confirming that they would continue to take appropriate response measures.
At 16:00 on October 26, the government held a third Inter-Agency Disaster Measure Meeting, attended by the
Minister of State for Disaster Management, the State Minister of the Cabinet Office for Disaster Management, and
the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Disaster Management. During this meeting, participants shared information
about seismic activity forecasts, the extent of the damage, and the steps being taken by ministries and agencies in
response, confirming that they would take appropriate measures to ensure a satisfactory living environment inevacuation centers.
On October 29, to ascertain the extent of the damage and the status of the local response, a government
investigation team led by the State Minister of the Cabinet Office for Disaster Management was deployed to Tottori
Prefecture, where it conducted a survey of disaster sites and evacuation centers, as well as exchanging views withthe leaders of local governments affected by the disaster.
Due to the damage caused by this earthquake, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked (effective October 21) to Kurayoshi
City, Misasa Town, Yurihama Town, and Hokuei Town in Tottori Prefecture, while the Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims was invoked (effective October 21) to Kurayoshi City and Hokuei Town
in Tottori Prefecture.

15-5 2016 Conflagration in Itoigawa City, Niigata Prefecture(1) Damage
At around 10:20 on December 22, 2016, a major fire broke out in the Omachi district of Itoigawa City, Niigata
Prefecture. Strong winds caused the conflagration to spread over an area of approximately 40,000 square meters;
120 buildings were completely destroyed by the fire, 5 half destroyed, and 22 partly destroyed.
It was the biggest urban fire for 40 years, since the 1976 Sakata Fire.
In terms of human casualties of the fire, 2 local citizens suffered minor injuries, while 15 fire corps volunteers
sustained minor injuries in the course of their efforts to extinguish the fire.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
On December 28, to ascertain the extent of the damage and the status of the local response, a government
investigation team led by the State Minister of the Cabinet Office for Disaster Management was deployed to Itoigawa
City, Niigata Prefecture, where it conducted a survey of disaster sites and evacuation centers, as well as exchanging
views with the leaders of local governments affected by the disaster.
On December 30, the Disaster Relief Act and the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster wereinvoked (effective December 22) to Itoigawa City, Niigata Prefecture, as the fire was deemed to be a natural disaster
resulting from strong winds.
On January 11, 2017, the Prime Minister inspected the area and exchanged views with affected people, the Governorof Niigata Prefecture, and the Mayor of Itoigawa City, among others. The decision was then taken to set up the
Itoigawa Community Development Promotion Council, a body bringing together the national, prefectural, and city
governments.

A-34

Fig.
Fig.A-16
A-16 Trends in Facility-Related Damage, Actual and as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office using materials from various ministries and agencies.
Note: Gross domestic product (GDP) figures up to 1993 are based on the 2000 standard (SNA 1993), while those for 1994 onward are
based on the 2011 standard (SNA 2008)

Fig.
Fig.A-17
A-17 Facility-Related Damage by Disaster Type for Disasters Occurring in 2015
(Unit: JPY 1 million)
Facility type

Public works

Typhoon

Torrential
rain

Earthquake

91,981

21,30638

Heavy
snowfall
0

Other

Total

Notes

26,181

Rivers, forestry
139,505 conservation facilities,
ports, etc.
Farmland, agricultural
facilities, forestry
89,995roads, fishing facilities,
etc.

Agriculture, forest,and fisheries
industry

39,35037,39090

146

13,019

Educational facilities

797

1,763

3

0

81

2,643

Public welfare
facilities

2,278

6,341

1,128

0

14

Social welfare
9,760 facilities, waterworks
facilities, etc.

Other facilities

1,811

1,166

0

0

3

Nature parks,
2,980 telegraph/telephone,urban facilities, etc.

136,21767,965

1,259

146

39,298Total

Note: Totals may not agree due to rounding.
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office using materials from various ministries and agencies.

A-35

244,884

School facilities,
cultural heritages, etc.

Fig.
Fig.A-18
A-18 Comparison of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and theSumatra Earthquake
Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake (Japan)

Great East Japan Earthquake(Japan)Sumatra Earthquake(Indonesia)

Date & time

5:46 a.m., Jan. 17, 1995

2:46 p.m., March 11, 20119:58 a.m., Dec. 26, 2004

Magnitude

7.3

9.0

9.1

Earthquake typeInlandOceanic trench

Oceanic trench

Affected area

City center

Mainly agricultural, forestry,
and fishery regions

No. of prefectures withseismic intensity ofLower 6 or higher

1 (Hyogo)

8 (Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki,
Tochigi, Iwate, Gunma,
Saitama, Chiba)

TsunamiReports of tsunami measuringtens of centimeters, nodamageLarge tsunami observed invarious regions (max. wave
height of more than 9.3 m inSoma, more than 8.5 m in
Miyako, more than 8.0 m in
Ofunato)Large tsunami observed inIndonesia as well as othercountries with coastline along
the Indian Ocean

Damage characteristics

Structures destroyed, large
fires erupted mainly in Nagataku

Large tsunami caused massive
damage in coastal areas,
destruction across many
districts

Large tsunami caused damage
to countries with coastline
along the Indian Ocean, withIndonesia suffering particularly
massive damage

Fatalities
Missing persons

Fatalities: 6,437
Missing persons: 3(May 19, 2006)

Fatalities: 19,418
Missing persons: 2,592(as of March 1, 2016)

Fatalities: 126,732
Missing persons: 93,662(as of March 30, 2005)

Homes damaged(totally destroyed)

104,906

121,809(as of March 1, 2016)

Unknown*

25 municipalities(2 prefectures)

241 municipalities(10 prefectures)*Including 4 municipalities (2prefectures) that invoked the
Act for an earthquake centeredin northern Nagano prefecture

Invocation of theDisaster Relief Act

Seismic intensity
distribution map(showing seismic
intensity of 4 and above)
震度階級

７
６
５
４

Note: The seismic intensity levels were revised in 1996 to newly add Lower 5, Upper 5, Lower 6, and Upper 6.
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office from Cabinet Office materials, Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials, andUNOCHA materials.

A-36

Fig.
Fig.A-19
A-19 Damage Estimate for the Great East Japan Earthquake
June 24, 2011
Category

Damage (Approx. Value)

Structures(Homes/housing sites, stores/offices, factories, machines, etc.)

JPY 10.4 trillion

Lifeline facilities(Water, gas, electricity, communications/broadcasting facilities)

JPY 1.3 trillion

Infrastructure facilities(Rivers, roads, ports, sewers, airports, etc.)

JPY 2.2 trillion

Agriculture, forest, and fisheries-related facilities(Farmland/agricultural facilities, forests and fields, fisheries-related
facilities, etc.)

JPY 1.9 trillion

Other(Educational facilities, healthcare/social welfare facilities, waste treatment
facilities, other public facilities)

JPY 1.1 trillion

Total

JPY 16.9 trillion

Note: This information has been compiled by Disaster Management Bureau of the Cabinet Office based on information provided
by individual prefectures and relevant ministries and agencies regarding damage to property (including buildings, lifeline
facilities, and infrastructure facilities). Information is subject to change as the details become clear. In addition, the total
and breakdown may not agree due to rounding.
Source: Cabinet Office

A-37

Fig.
Fig.A-20
A-20 Main Volcanic Eruptions and Eruption Disasters in Japan
Year of
Eruption

Name of Volcano

No. ofVictims

1640

Hokkaido-Komagatake*At least 700

1663
1664
1667

Usuzan*Unzendake
Tarumaesan*5
At least 30

1694

Hokkaido-Komagatake

1707

Fujisan *

1721
1739

Asamayama
Tarumaesan *

15

1741

Oshima-Oshima

1,467

1769
1777
1779
1781

UsuzanIzu-Oshima
Sakurajima*
Sakurajima

At least 150
15

1783

Asamayama

1,151

1785

Aogashima

130–140

1792

Unzendake

15,0001822

Usuzan50–1031853

Usuzan1856

Hokkaido-Komagatake

1888

Bandaisan*

1900
1902

Adatarayama
Izu-Torishima

72
125

1914

Sakurajima*

58

1926

Tokachidake

144

1929

Hokkaido-Komagatake

2

1940

Miyakejima
Beyonesu (Bayonnaise)
Rocks (Myojin-sho)

11

1952
1943–45
1958
1991
2014

UsuzanAsosanUnzendake
Ontakesan

Eruption and Damage Characteristics

21–29
461–477

Sector collapse, debris flow, tsunami, large amount offalling ash, pyroclastic flow
Nearby homes disappeared or were buried
Lava flow, flood of water from crater
Pyroclastic flow, large amount of falling ash/pumice
Eruption with earthquake/volcanic thunder, falling pumicestone, pyroclastic flow
"Great Hoei eruption," large amount of falling ash,landslide disaster after eruption
Cinders
Pyroclastic flow, large amount of falling ash/pumice
Sector collapse, large tsunami occurred due to debris
avalanche
Large amount of falling ash/pumice, pyroclastic flow
"Great Anei eruption," lava flow, scoria fall
"Great Anei eruption," cinders, lava flow
Eruption on an island off of Komen, tsunami"Great Tenmei eruption," pyroclastic flow, lava flow,
flooding of Agatsuma River and Tone River
Cinders, mud, more than one-third of islanders became
victims. Uninhabited island for more than 50 years
thereafter"Shimabara taihen, Higo meiwaku," tsunami on opposing
shore due to collapse of Mt. Mayuyama
Pyroclastic flow, former Abuta village totally destroyed
Large amount of volcanic ash/pumice, formation of lava
dome, pyroclastic flow
Falling pumice, pyroclastic flow
5 towns and 11 villages buried in debris avalanche, debris
flow (volcanic mud flow)
Cinders, sulfur mine at crater totally destroyed
All islanders became victims"Great Taisho eruption," volcanic thunder, lava flow,earthquake, air wave, villages buried, large amount offalling ash
Larger mudflow, towns of Kamifurano and Biei buried
Large amount of falling ash/pumice, pyroclastic flow,
volcanic gas damage
Large amount of volcanic ash/volcanic bombs, lava flow

31 Pyroclastic surge
Large amount of volcanic ash, cinders, formation ofShowa-shinzan (new mountain)
12 Cinders
43 Pyroclastic flow, debris flow
58 Cinders
1

Note: Lists "Eruption disasters with 10 or more fatalities and/or missing persons" and "Large eruptions with an apparent volume
of ejecta of 0.1 km3 or more"*Indicates eruptions with apparent volume of ejecta of more than 1 km3
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the National Catalogue of the Active Volcanoes in Japan (4th Edition) (edited by
the Japan Meteorological Agency, 2013).

A-38

Fig.
Fig.A-21
A-21 Number of Sediment Disasters
As of December 31, 2016

*In addition, there were 3 disaster-related deaths due to the Hiroshima Sediment Disaster
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Fig.
Fig.A-22
A-22 Sediment Disaster Risk Areas by Municipalities

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, as of March 31, 2015

A-39

Fig.
Fig.A-23
A-23 Increase in Torrential Rain During Short Periods[AMEDAS] Annual Frequency of Observation of 50 mm or More of Rainfall Per Hour

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (website)

A-40

Fig.
Fig.A-24
A-24 Number of Confirmed Occurrences of Tornados

Tornado Distribution Map (All Japan: 1961–2015)
Created by the Japan Meteorological Agency (April 18, 2016)

Source: (Upper) Japan Meteorological Agency.
(Lower) Created by the Cabinet Office based on the document, “Number of Confirmed Occurrences by Year (1961–2015)” on the Japan Meteorological Agency website.

A-41

Fig.
Fig.A-25
A-25 Major Natural Disasters in the World Since 1900
Year

Disaster Type

1900
1902
1902
1905
1906
1906
1906
1906
1907
1907
1908
1911
1911
1912
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1922
1923
1927
1927
1928
1930

Hurricane Galveston
Volcanic Eruption
Volcanic Eruption
Earthquake
Earthquake (Chiayi earthquake)
Earthquake/Fire
Earthquake
TyphoonEarthquake
Earthquake
Earthquake (Messina earthquake)
Flood
Volcanic Eruption
TyphoonEarthquake
Landslide
Earthquake
Earthquake
Volcanic Eruption
Earthquake/Landslide (Haiyuan earthquake)
TyphoonEarthquake/Fire (Great Kanto earthquake)
Earthquake (Kitatango earthquake)
Earthquake
Hurricane/Flood
Volcanic Eruption

1931

Flood

1932
1933
1933
1933
1935
1935
1939
1939
1939
1942
1942
1943
1944
1944
1945
1945

Earthquake (Gansu earthquake)
Flood
Tsunami (Showa Sanriku Tsunami)
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake (Quetta Earthquake)
Earthquake/Tsunami
Flood
Earthquake
CycloneCycloneEarthquake
Earthquake (Showa Tonankai Earthquake)
Earthquake
Earthquake (Mikawa Earthquake)
Typhoon (Typhoon Makurazaki)
Earthquake/Tsunami (Showa Nankai
Earthquake)
Typhoon (Typhoon Kathleen)
Earthquake (Fukui Earthquake)
Earthquake (Ashgabat Earthquake)
Earthquake/Landslide
Flood
Flood
Volcanic Eruption
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Typhoon (Typhoon Toyamaru)
Flood
Typhoon (Typhoon Ise-wan)
Flood
Earthquake
Earthquake/Tsunami
Cyclone

1946
1947
1948
1948
1949
1949
1949
1951
1953
1953
1953
1954
1954
1959
1959
1960
1960
1960
1961

Country (Areas)
Texas, USA
Martinique (West Indies, Mt. Pelée)Santa Maria Volcano, Guatemala
Northern India
TaiwanSan Francisco, USA
Chile
Hong Kong
Tianshan, China
Uzbekistan (former Soviet Union)
Sicily, Italy
China
Taal Volcano, Philippines
Wenzhou, China
Central Italy
Italy, Austria
Bali, Indonesia
Guangdong, China
Kelut Volcano, Indonesia
Gansu, China
Shantou, China
Southeast Kanto region, Japan
Northern Kyoto, Japan
Nanchang, China
Florida, USA
Merapi volcano, Indonesia
Coastal areas of the Yangtze River and otherrivers in China
Gansu, China
Henan, China
Sanriku, Japan
China
China
Baltistan, Pakistan
Chile
Hunan, China
Eastern Turkey
Bangladesh
Orissa, India
Tottori, Japan
Tonankai, Japan
Midwestern Argentina
Aichi, Japan
Western Japan
Nankai, Japan
North of Tohoku, Japan
Fukui, Japan
Turkmenistan (former Soviet Union)
Tajikistan (former Soviet Union)
China
Guatemala
Mt. Lamington, Papua New Guinea
Coastal areas of the North Sea
Kyushu, Japan
Honshu, Japan
China
Japan
China
Japan
Bangladesh
Southwestern Morocco
Chile
Bangladesh

A-42

Fatalities/Missing Persons(approx.)
6,000
29,0006,000
20,0006,000
1,500
20,00010,00012,00012,00075,000100,000
1,300
50,00030,00010,00015,00010,0005,200
180,000
100,000
143,000
2,930
200,000
2,000
1,400
3,700,000
70,00018,0003,000
10,000142,000
60,00030,000500,000
32,96261,00040,0001,083
1,200
10,000
2,300
3,700
1,400
1,900
3,900
110,000
12,00057,00040,000
2,900
1,800
1,000
1,100
40,0001,700
2,000,000
5,100
10,00012,0006,000
11,000Year

Disaster Type

1962
1963
1965
1965
1968
1970
1970
1970
1971
1972
1974
1974
1975
1976
1976
1977
1978
1982
1985
1985
1985
1986
1986
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1995
1995
1995

Earthquake
CycloneCycloneCycloneEarthquake
Earthquake
Earthquake/Landslide
Cyclone Bhola
CycloneEarthquake (Managua earthquake)
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake
Earthquake (Guatemala earthquake)
Earthquake (Tangshan earthquake)
CycloneEarthquake
Volcanic Eruption
CycloneEarthquake
Volcanic Eruption
Toxic gas
Earthquake
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake (Spitak Earthquake)
Earthquake
Flood
Flood/Landslide
Earthquake (Manjil Earthquake)
Earthquake
Cyclone/Storm Surge
Flood
Typhoon Thelma
Flood
Earthquake/Tsunami
Flood
Earthquake (Maharashtra Earthquake)
Flood
Torrential Rain, Flood
Typhoon, Flood
Tropical Storm
Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
Earthquake
Flood

1996

Flood/Typhoon

1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998

Typhoon/Flood
Earthquake
Flood
Flood
Typhoon Linda
Earthquake
Earthquake
Flood/Landslide
Cyclone
Flood

1998

Flood

1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999

Tsunami (Aitape Tsunami)
Hurricane Mitch
Earthquake (Quindio Earthquake)
Earthquake (Izmit Earthquake)
Earthquake (Chi-Chi earthquake)
CycloneCountry (Areas)
Northwestern Iran
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Southern Pakistan
Northwestern IranYunnan, China
Northern Peru
Bangladesh
Orissa, India
Nicaragua
Yunnan and Sichuan, China
Bangladesh
Liaoning, China
GuatemalaTianjin, China
Andhra Pradesh, India
Northeastern IranEl Chichon Volcano, Mexico
Bangladesh
Mexico City, Mexico
Nevado del Ruiz Volcano, Colombia
Lake Nyos, Western Cameroon
San Salvador, El Salvador
Northwestern Ecuador
Bangladesh
India, Nepal
Bangladesh
Armenia (former Soviet Union)
Yunnan, China
India
Sichuan, China
Northern IranPhilippines
Chittagong, Bangladesh
Jiangsu, China
Philippines
PakistanIndonesia
Nepal
India
India
India
Six Southern Provinces of China
Haiti
Japan
RussiaChina
Seven southern and five northern andnorthwestern provinces of China
Viet Nam
Eastern Iran
India
Southern SomaliaSouthern Viet Nam
Northern Afghanistan
Northern Afghanistan
Assam state, India
India
Bangladesh
Coastal areas of the Yangtze River and otherrivers in China
Papua New Guinea
Honduras, Nicaragua
Mid-western Colombia
Western Turkey
TaiwanIndia

A-43

Fatalities/Missing Persons(approx.)
12,00022,00036,00010,00012,00010,00070,000300,000
10,00010,00020,00028,70010,00024,000242,000
20,00025,00017,00010,00010,00022,000
1,700
1,000
5,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
25,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
41,0002,000
137,000
1,900
6,000
1,300
2,100
1,800
9,800
1,200
2,000
1,000
1,100
6,300
1,800
1,200
2,800
1,000
1,600
1,400
2,000
3,700
2,300
4,700
3,000
2,900
1,000
3,700
2,600
17,0001,200
15,500
2,300
9,500

Year

Disaster TypeCountry (Areas)

2000
2001
2001
2003
2003
2004
2004

Flood
Earthquake (Gujarat earthquake)
Earthquake
Earthquake
Earthquake (Bam earthquake)
Flood
Hurricane

2004

Earthquake, Tsunami (2004 Indian Ocean
Earthquake and Tsunami)

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2012
2013
2013
2015

Flood/Landslide
Hurricane Katrina
Rainstorm
Hurricane Stan/Flood
Earthquake (Pakistan earthquake)Landslide
Earthquake/Volcanic Eruption
Typhoon Xangsane
Heavy Rain, Flood
Cyclone Sidr
Earthquake (Great Sichuan Earthquake)
Cyclone Nargis
Flood
Earthquake (2009 Sumatra Earthquake)
Flood
Earthquake (Haiti Earthquake)
Earthquake (Yushu Earthquake)
Flood
Torrential Rain, Debris Flow
Earthquake, Tsunami (Great East Japan
Earthquake)
Typhoon Washi
Typhoon Bopha
Flood
Typhoon Haiyan
Earthquake (Nepal Earthquake)

Venezuela
India
El Salvador
Northern Algeria
Iran
Haiti
USA, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Haiti
Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives, India, Thailand,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Seychelles, Somalia,
Tanzania, Bangladesh, Kenya
India
USA
India, Bangladesh
Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico
Northern Pakistan and India
Philippines
Merapi volcano, Indonesia
Luzon, Philippines
India
Bangladesh
China
Myanmar
North-eastern India
Indonesia
Southern India
Haiti
Qinghai, China
North-western Pakistan
Yangtze River Basin, China

Fatalities/Missing Persons(approx.)
30,00020,0001,200
2,300
26,8002,700
3,000Over 226,000
1,200
1,800
1,300
1,500
75,000
1,100
5,800
1,400
1,100
4,200
87,500138,400
1,100
1,200
1,200
222,600
3,000
2,000
1,800

Tohoku and Kanto regions, Japan

19,000Mindanao, Philippines
Mindanao, Philippines
Northern India
Leyte, Philippines
Nepal

1,400
1,900
1,500
6,200
9,000

Source: Prepared by the Cabinet Office based on materials from EM-DAT: The International Disaster Database (Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université Catholique de Louvain).

Fig.
Fig.A-26
A-26 Top 10 Largest Earthquakes Since 1900
(As of March 31, 2017)

Ranking

Date (Japan Time)

Location

1
2
3
4

May 23, 1960
March 28, 1964
December 26, 2004
March 11, 2011
November 5, 1952
February 27, 2010
February 1, 1906
February 4, 1965
April 11, 2012
March 29, 2005
March 10, 1957
August 16, 1950
April 1, 1946

Chile
Gulf of Alaska
Off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
Off the Sanriku Coast, Japan (Great East Japan Earthquake)
Kamchatka Peninsula
Offshore Maule, Chile
Offshore Ecuador
Aleutian Islands, Alaska
Off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
Aleutian Islands, Alaska
Tibet, Assam
Aleutian Islands, Alaska

6
8
9

Magnitude
(Mw)
9.5
9.2
9.1
9.0
9.0
8.8
8.8
8.7
8.6
8.6
8.6
8.6
8.6

Mw: Moment magnitude
Source: US Geological Survey*The figure for the magnitude (Mw) of the Great East Japan Earthquake is from the Japan Meteorological Agency.

A-44

Fig.
Fig.A-27
A-27 Major Natural Disasters Since 2016
Date
Jan.-May 2016
Jan.-Mar. 2016
Jan.-Nov. 2016
Jan.4-8, 2016
Jan.9-15, 2016
Jan.20-26, 2016
Jan.20-26, 2016
Jan.23-26, 2016
Feb.-Nov. 2016
Feb. 6, 2016
Feb. 20-21, 2016
Mar.-May 2016
Mar. 6-7, 2016
Mar. 10-11, 2016
Mar. 19-22, 2016
Apr. 1-May 20, 2016
Apr. 2-8, 2016
Apr. 4-Oct. 1, 2016
Apr. 10-13, 2016
Apr. 15-18, 2016
Apr. 14 and 16, 2016
Apr. 16, 2016
Apr. 22-25, 2016
May 2016
May 1-9, 2016
May 4-11, 2016
May 7-10, 2016
May 14-15, 2016
May 18-21, 2016
May 21, 2016
May 31-Jun. 5, 2016
Jun.-Aug. 2016
Jun.-Nov. 2016
Jun. 2-8, 2016
Jun. 9-16, 2016
Jun. 16-23, 2016
Jun. 18-20, 2016
Jun. 18-23, 2016
Jun. 23-30, 2016
Jun. 24, 2016
Jun. 25-26, 2016
Jun. 28-Jul. 6, 2016
Jul. 9, 2016
Jul. 15-Aug. 3, 2016
Jul. 18-25, 2016
Jul. 19-Aug. 6, 2016

Country

Disaster Type

India
Haiti
MozambiqueUSA
BrazilChina
Republic of Korea
USA
South Sudan
TaiwanFiji
Ethiopia
SerbiaBrazilChina
India
PakistanArgentina
USA
Chile
Japan
EcuadorIndia
Cambodia
CanadaChina
USA
Sri Lanka
China
Bangladesh
France
China
Kenya
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
USA
China
China
India
China
Bangladesh

Drought
Drought
Drought
Rainstorms
Flood
Cold wave
Cold wave
Rainstorms
Drought
Earthquake
Tropical cyclone
Flash flood
Flash flood
Flash flood
Flash flood
Heat wave
Flood
Flood
Rainstorms
River flooding
Earthquake
Earthquake
Flood
Drought
Forest fireLandslide
Rainstorms
FloodRiver flooding
Tropical cyclone
Flood
Drought
Drought
Rainstorms
Flood
Rainstorms
Flood
Flood
Flood
Rainstorms
Forest fire
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Flood
Flood
River flooding

A-45

Affected Direct Damages
People(USD 1,000)— 330,000,000—
3,600,000－－
2,000,000－－
125,000－－
550,500100,000
5
1,600,000－
6127,000－
58
12
2,000,000
3,600,000
－
－
117
525
－
44
350,000
470,000
100
20,000－7,000
100,000－
30
100,000－
5
219,300
170,000
300
－
－
121
2,400
－
72,1191,300,000－
3,500,000
－
－
12
100
100,000
49
298,432
20,000,000
683
1,230,000
3,300,000
18
100,000
150,000
2,500,000－－
7,200
3,900,000－
66
237,600
820,000
2
12575,000203
301,6022,000,000
12
44,100447,000
27
1,300,000－
424
1,000,000
1,600,000－ 10,000,000
1,254,600－－
12
150,000
768,000
25
254,400
664,000
102
46,000302,000
42
197,000
410,000
68
165,000
2,300,000
34
150,000
675,000
102
46,000302,000
2
891
100,000
128
160,000
5,729,590
75
24,9001,511,160
127
377,097－289
900,000－106
1,900,000－

Fatalities

DateJul. 25-27, 2016
Jul. 28-30, 2016
Jul. 28, 2016
Aug. 2, 2016
Aug. 2, 2016
Aug. 5-10, 2016
Aug. 6-7, 2016
Aug. 6-7, 2016
Aug. 8-16, 2016
Aug. 9-16, 2016
Aug. 19-22, 2016
Aug. 24, 2016
Aug. 29-Sep. 6, 2016
Sep. 1-6, 2016
Sep. 10, 2016
Sep. 15, 2016
Sep. 19-23, 2016
Sep. 21-Oct. 16, 2016
Sep. 27, 2016
Sep. 28, 2016
Sep. 28-Oct. 10, 2016
Sep. 28-Oct. 7, 2016
Sep. 28-Oct. 7, 2016
Oct. 5-12, 2016
Oct. 7-9, 2016
Oct. 16-19, 2016
Nov. 13, 2016
Nov. 18-26, 2016
Nov. 23-25, 2016
Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 2016
Dec. 7, 2016

Country

Disaster Type

Fatalities

Nepal
India
Viet Nam
China
Viet Nam
China
Macedonia
Macedonia
Philippines
USA
India
Italy
North Korea
USA
Tanzania
China
USA
India
TaiwanChina
BahamasCuba
Haiti
Republic of Korea
USA
China
New ZealandIsraelItaly
USA
Indonesia

Flood
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Rainstorms
Rainstorms
Flood
Flash flood
Flash flood
Flood
Flood
River flooding
Earthquake
River flooding
Tropical cyclone
Earthquake
Tropical cyclone
River flooding
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Tropical cyclone
Rainstorms
Rainstorms
Rainstorms
Rainstorms
Rainstorms
Tropical cyclone
Earthquake
Forest fireRiver flooding
Forest fire
Earthquake

138
134
1
－
25
23
22
22
26
13
40
241
538
3
17
－
2
17
7
35
－
－
674
10
49
－
2
－
2
14
100

Affected Direct Damages
People(USD 1,000)
10,551－700,000－
191,750
191,000
18,000123,000
182,500
144,000
36,900123,000
33,582100,000
33,582100,000
1,263,098
9,320
330,000
8,733,000
312,000－
4,854－
600,000－
2,250
800,000
139,601
458,000
205,500
2,300,000
100,000－
3,000
479,000
160
110,000
36,000830,000
600,000－
190,000
2,600,000
2,100,438
2,000,000
1,500
126,000
10,000,000－
890,000－50
3,900,000
60,137520,000
400
100,000
2,234
100,000
152,138－

Source: Prepared by the Cabinet Office based on materials including relevant information from countries, UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and EM-DAT: The International Disaster Database (Centre for Researchon the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université Catholique de Louvain).

(1) Ecuador Earthquake
On April 16, 2016 at 18:58 local time (08:58 on the 17th in Japan), Ecuador was struck by a magnitude 7.8
earthquake centered near the towns of Pedernales and Muisne, on the country’s Pacific coast. This earthquake
caused immense damage, resulting in damage to around 20,000 buildings, with at least 661 people killed and
12 missing. The focal depth was about 20 km and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center called on people to bealert to the risk of tsunami on the Ecuadorean coast, but this alert was lifted around three hours later. About amonth after the earthquake, on May 18, earthquakes with a magnitude of 6.8 and 6.9 struck Esmeraldas Canton,
adjacent to Muisne Canton, resulting in two fatalities.
The Government of Japan provided emergency support in the areas of water and hygiene, shelter, andemergency grant aid for prompt repairs via through the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), theInternational Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), andalso provided disaster relief supplies (tents, etc.)

A-46

(2) Italy Earthquake
On August 24, 2016 at 03:36 local time (10:36 in Japan), Central Italy was struck by a magnitude 6.2 earthquake
centered on the province of Rieti, in the region of Lazio. The earthquake caused many buildings to collapse infive provinces across four regions, mainly in Lazio, and resulted in 241 fatalities and more than 400 people
injured, while more than 1,000 people had to evacuate. A total of 460 earthquakes were observed between
03:00, when the first quake occurred, and 07:00 that morning, two of which had a magnitude in excess of 5.
Many historic buildings in areas such as Amatrice, in Lazio’s Rieti Province, were also damaged.
Due to fears of secondary damage due to landslides and the collapse of buildings weakened by the earthquake,the Government of Japan issued a warning to Japanese nationals living in or planning to travel to or stay in
Lazio’s Rieti Province, Umbria’s Terni Province, Marche’s Ascoli Piceno and Fermo provinces, and Abruzzo’s
Teramo Province.
(3) Hurricane in Haiti
On October 4, 2016, Hurricane Matthew struck southern Haiti’s Tiburon Peninsula, with winds of up to
approximately 64 m (230 km/h) recorded. The hurricane caused 546 fatalities, with 128 people missing and 432
injured. Floods and landslides destroyed approximately 500 homes, with a further 25,160 or so sustaining
serious damage and around 2,380 suffering flooding. Roads, schools, and other structures also sustained major
damage, with interruptions to power and water supplies, and more than 170,000 people were forced toevacuate. Medical facilities in the affected area are vulnerable, so there were concerns about outbreaks ofcholera and other infectious diseases in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane.
The Government of Japan provided support in the areas of food, transport of humanitarian relief supplies, andprompt repairs through the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), theInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). In addition, it provided support in the areas of water and hygiene, and health and medicalcare to address infectious diseases, and provided disaster relief supplies (tents, etc.)

A-47

3. Laws and Systems
Fig.
Fig.A-28
A-28 Progress on Disaster Management Laws and Systems Since 1945
Disasters that triggered law/system introduction

Disaster Management Law

Explanation

1940s
1945

Typhoon Ida (Makurazaki)

1946

The Nankai Earthquake

1947

Typhoon Kathleen

1948

The Fukui Earthquake

47 The Disaster Relief Act

49 The Flood Control Act
1950s
50 The Building Standards Act
1959

Typhoon Vera (Isewan)

1961

Heavy Snowfalls

1964

The 1964 Niigata Earthquake

1967

Torrential Rains in Uetsu

1973

Mt. Sakurajima Eruption
Mt. Asama Eruption
The Seismological Society ofJapan publishes reports on a
possible Tokai Earthquake

73 Act on Provision of Disaster Condolence Grant
Act on Developemt of Evacuation Facilities in Areas Surrounding Active
Volcanoes (Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes (1978))1978

The 1978 Miyagi Earthquake

78 Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale
Earthquakes

1960s
60 Soil Conservation and Flood Control Urgent Measures Act
61 Basic Act on Disaster Management
62 National Disaster Management Council established
63 Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction
62 Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with Extremely Severe Disasters
Act on Special Measures for Heavy Snowfall Areas

Establishment of fundamental disaster prevention laws
・Clear assignment of federal responsibilities
・Development of cumulative and organized disaster prevention
structures etc

66 Act on Earthquake Insurance

1970s

1980s
80 Act on Special Financial Measures for Urgent Earthquake Countermeasure
Improvement Projects in Areas for Intensified Measures
81 Partial amendment of Order for Enforcement of the Building Standard Law

・Induction of current earthquake engineering laws, etc.

1990s
1995

The Southern Hyogo Earthquake(The Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake)

1999

Torrential Rains in Hiroshima
Tokaimura Nuclear Accident(The JCO Nuclear Accident)

95 Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures
Act on Promotion of the Earthquake-proof Retrofit of Buildings
Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
96 Act on Special Measures for the Preservation of Rights and Interests of theVictims of Specified Disasters
97 Act on Promotion of Disaster Resilience Improvement in Densely InhabitedAreas
98 Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims

99 Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

2000s
2000

2004

Torrential Rains in the TokaiRegionTorrential Rains in Niigata,
Fukushima
The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu
Earthquake

00 Act on the Promotion of Sediment Disaster Countermeasures for Sediment
Disaster Hazard Areas
01 Partial amendment of the Flood Control Act
02 Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Tohnankai and Nankai
Earthquake Disaster Management
03 Specified Urban River Inundation Countermeasures Act
04 Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trenchtype Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima Trenches

05 Partial amendment of the Flood Control Act
Partial amendment of the Act on the Promotion of Sediment Disaster
Countermeasures in Sediment Disaster Hazard Areas
Partial amendment of the Act on the Promotion of the Seismic Reinforcement
and Retrofitting of Buildings
06 Partial amendment of the Act on the Regulation of Residential Land
Development
2011

The 2011 Tohoku Region Pacific
Coast Earthquake(The Great East Japan
Earthquake)

11 Act on the Promotion of Measures for Tsunami
Act on Development of Areas Resilient to Tsunami Disasters
12 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority
13 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
Act on Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters
Partial amendment of the Act on the Promotion of the Seismic Reinforcement
and Retrofitting of Buildings
Partial amendment of the Flood Control Act and River Act
Act on Special Measures for Land and Building Leases in Areas Affected byLarge-scale Disasters

2014

Heavy Snowfall
Hiroshima Sediment Disaster
Mt. Ontak Eruption

・More rivers were added to flood alert lists, announcement of
expected inundation areas.
・Expansion of list of designated rivers in expected inundation area.
・Increased efforts in public education through use of Sediment
Disaster Hazard Maps.
・Establishment of basic national directives and regional
earthquake-proof retrofit plans, and promotion of organizedearthquake-proofing.
First Amendment (2012)
・Regional response for large-scale disasters.
・Incorporated lessons from the disaster, improvements to disastermanagement education, and improvements to regional disastermanagement capabilities through participation of diverse entities
in implementation.
Second Amendment (2013)
・Improvement of support for affected people.
・Improvements to rapid response capabilities in the event of alarge-scale and regional disaster.
・Smooth and safe evacuation of residents.
・Improvements in disaster countermeasures in daily life.
・Establishment of obligatory earthquake-proofing examinations
and publication of test results for large buildings in need ofemergency safety checks.
・Participation of diverse entities including river management
organizations in flood control activities, acquisition of
appropriate maintenance and management needs in rivermanagement facilities, etc.
・Designation of Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster
Countermeasure Promotion Areas, promotion of earthquake
disaster management for the Nankai Trough Earthquake
through the creation of a Basic Plan.
・Designation of Areas for Urgent Implementation of Measuresagainst a Tokyo Inland Earthquake and promotion of earthquake
management through the creation of a Basic Plan.

Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Nankai Trough Earthquake
Disaster Management (Partial amendment of the Act on Special Measures for
the Promotion of Tonankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management)

・Establishment of laws regarding abandoned vehicles in
opening up transportation routes for emergency vehicles inlarge-scale disasters, etc. (Responsible organization: roadmanagers)

Act on Special Measures against Tokyo Inland Earthquake

・Clear definitions of sediment disaster-prone areas (publicationof basic investigations), provision of information necessary for
issuing evacuation alerts.

14 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
Partial amendment of Act on the Promotion of Sediment Disaster
Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Hazard Areas
15 Partial amendment of Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes
Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management

2016

・Establishment of disaster management mechanisms basedon volunteer groups and private organizations, loosening of
requirements for the establishment of a National Disaster
Management Council led by the Prime Minister, thecodification of disaster relief requests for the JSDF, etc.

16 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management

Source: Cabinet Office

A-48

・Formulation of basic guidelines by the government;
designation of volcanic eruption hazard zones; establishment ofVolcanic Disaster Management Councils in designated zones;
imposition of mandatory preparation of evacuation
implementation plans, etc.
・Matters concerning the disposal of waste generated by aspecific major disaster: formulation of disaster waste
management guidelines by the Minister of the Environment;
central government takeover of the disposal of disaster waste,etc.

・Establishment of laws regarding abandoned vehicles in
opening up transportation routes for emergency vehicles inlarge-scale disasters.
(Port management bodies and fishing port management
bodies added as responsible organizations)Fig.
Fig.A-29
A-29 Major Disaster Management Laws by Type of Disaster

Source: Cabinet Office

A-49

Fig.
Fig.A-30
A-30 Structure and System of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction

Source: Cabinet Office

A-50

Fig.
Fig.A-31
A-31 History of Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction
Revision
Date

Outline of Revision

Background‐ The Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction formulated based on the Basic Act on DisasterSep. 26, 1959: Typhoon Ise-wan
Management
Nov. 15, 1961: Enactment of the Basic‐ Stipulations regarding various measures to prevent natural disasters, mitigate damage, andAct on Disaster Management
promote disaster reconstruction
Partial revisionSep. 6, 1967 Recommendation‐ Enhancement of earthquake countermeasures (facilities for earthquake prediction,May
concerning Disaster Prevention
preparation of fire fighting helicopters)
1971
Measures (recommending revisions in‐ Renewed positioning of countermeasures to tackle hazardous materials, petrochemical
response to a modern socioeconomy)complexes, and wildfires
Complete revision‐ Structured this version by disaster type, and included stipulations in the following order:
prevention, emergency response, recovery/reconstruction
July
Jan. 17, 1995: Great Hanshin-Awaji‐ Clearly defined the stakeholders, such as national governments, public agencies, local
1995
Earthquake
governments, and businesses, and specified countermeasures‐ Stipulated that changes in social structure such as the aging of society should be taken into
account
Partial revision
June‐ Addition of section on countermeasures to address disasters caused by accidents (structural
Jan. 2, 1997: Nakhodka Oil Spill Accident
1997
improvements such as the establishment of an emergency countermeasures headquarters)‐ Addition of a section on snowstorm countermeasures
Partial revisionSep. 30, 1999: Criticality accident at
May‐ Revision of the section on countermeasures to tackle nuclear power disasters, following the uranium fabrication plant in Tokai-mura,
2000
enactment of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Ibaraki prefecture
December Partial revision
National government reformation
2000‐ Revisions resulting from the national government reformation
Partial revisionJun. 29, 1999: Torrential rain disaster in
April‐ Enhancement of descriptions relating to information transmission to residents and evacuation Hiroshima Prefecture
2002
measures regarding countermeasures against flooding, sediment disasters, and storm surges Sep. 24, 1999: Storm surge disaster in‐ New positioning of nuclear power disasters related to nuclear vessels
Kumamoto Prefecture
Partial revision‐ Revisions based on the creation of the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Tonankai and Nankai
Mar. 31, 2004: Creation of a Basic Plan
March
Earthquake Countermeasures (seismic retrofitting of public buildings, etc.)
for the Promotion of Tohnankai and2004‐ Revisions based on the development of policies such as the development of an earthquake
Nankai Earthquake Countermeasures
early warning system
Partial revision‐ Revisions based on developments in policy, such as the promotion of a nationwide movement July 28, 2004: Creation of an Earthquake
July
to practice disaster preparedness, the promotion of corporate disaster risk reduction efforts, Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy
2005
the formulation and implementation of an earthquake DRR strategy, tsunami DRR measures Dec. 26, 2004: Indian Ocean Tsunami
such as the development of tsunami evacuation buildings, information transmission during(Sumatra/Andaman Earthquake)torrential rains, evacuation support for the elderly, etc.
March
Partial revision
Transition from Defense Agency to
2007‐ Revisions resulting from the transition from Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Partial revision‐ Implementation of follow-up actions on key issues regarding the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk
February
Reduction, development of strategic national movements, establishment of conditions for the July 16, 2007:The Niigataken Chuetsu2008
promotion of corporate disaster risk reduction, full-scale introduction of earthquake earlyoki Earthquake
warning system, strengthening of nuclear power disaster countermeasures in light of lessons
learned from the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
Partial revisionDecemberMar. 11, 2011 The Great East Japan‐ Radical strengthening of earthquake/tsunami countermeasures in light of the Great East
2011
Earthquake
Japan Earthquake (addition of tsunami disaster countermeasure section)
Partial revision‐ Strengthening of countermeasures against large-scale regional disasters in light of revisions to Mar. 11, 2011 The Great East Japanthe Basic Act on Disaster Management (First Revision), and the final report of the National
Earthquake
September Disaster Management Council's Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management (each Jun. 27, 2012 Partial revisions to the2012section)Basic Act on Disaster Management‐ Strengthening of nuclear power disaster countermeasures in light of the enactment of the Act Sep. 19, 2012 Inauguration of thefor Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (nuclear power disaster
Nuclear Regulatory Authority
countermeasures section)
Partial revision
Mar. 11, 2011 The Great East Japan‐ Strengthening of countermeasures against large-scale disasters in light of revisions to the
Earthquake
January
Basic Act on Disaster Management (Second Revision) and the enactment of the Act on
Jun. 21, 2013 Partial revisions to the2014
Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters (each section)
Basic Act on Disaster Management,‐ Strengthening of nuclear disaster countermeasures in light of investigations by the Nuclear
enactment of the Act on Reconstruction
Regulation Authority
from Large-Scale Disasters
June
1963

A-51

Revision
Date

Outline of Revision

Background

Partial revision‐ Strengthening of countermeasures against abandoned and stranded vehicles following
Feb. 2014: Heavy snowfall
November revision of the Basic Act on Disaster Management
Nov. 21, 2014: Partial revisions to the2014‐ Addition of descriptions in light of lessons learned from heavy snowfall of February 2014,
Basic Act on Disaster Management
such as the diversification of information transmission methods such as warnings of heavy
snowPartial revision
Mar. 5, 2015: Cabinet Secretariat Three‐ Improvement and strengthening of nuclear disaster risk reduction systems e.g., through the Year Revision and Investigation TeamMarch
establishment of local nuclear disaster management committees and national support for the "Improvement and Strengthening of the2015
enhancement of local plans for disaster risk reduction/evacuation plans (nuclear disaster
Nuclear Disaster Management Systemcountermeasures section)(Second Report)"
Jan. 18, 2015: Partial revisions to the Act
on the Promotion of Sediment Disaster
Countermeasures in Sediment Disaster
Hazard Areas
Partial revision
Mar. 26, 2015: Working Group for the
July-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of lessons learned from thePromotion of Volcano Disaster
2015
Hiroshima Sediment Disaster and the Mt. Ontake Eruption (each section)
Prevention report
Jun. 4, 2015: Working Group forStudying Comprehensive
Countermeasures against Sediment
Disasters report
Partial revision-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of the revision of laws,
Dec. 10, 2015: Partial revisions to the
February
including the Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes, the Flood Control Act, theAct on Special Measures for Active
2016
Sewerage Act, the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act, and the Basic Act on Disaster Volcanoes
Management (each section)
Partial revision
Mar. 31, 2016: Working Group on StudyMay-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of lessons learned from theon Evacuation and Emergency Response
2016
Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku Regions (each section)
Measures for Flood Disasters report
Dec. 20, 2016: Report of the Working
Group for Studying Emergency
Response and Livelihood Support
Measures in Light of the Kumamoto
Partial revision
April
Earthquake-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of lessons learned from the2017
Dec. 26, 2016: Report of the Study
2016 Kumamoto Earthquake and 2016 Typhoon 10 disaster (each section)
Group on Guidelines for Producing a
Handbook on Decision and
Dissemination for Evacuation
Recommendations
Source: Cabinet Office

A-52

4. Organizations
Fig.
Fig.A-32
A-32 Organization of the National Disaster Management Council
Inquiry

National Disaster Management Council (Section I, Chapter II of the Basic Act on Disaster Management)
Chair

Prime Minister

ReportMembers Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Heads of Designated Public
Corporations(appointed by Prime Minister)Experts(appointed by Prime Minister)Haruhiko Kuroda
Governor of the Bank of Japan

Kazuo Ueda
Vice President of the Japan Firefighters
Association

Tadateru Konoe
President of Japanese Red Cross Hisako Komuro
Society
Professor of Tokyo International
University
Ryoichi Ueda

President of Japan Broadcasting Eikei Suzuki
Corporation (NHK)
Chairman, Special Committee for Risk
Management/Disaster Control,
Hiroo Unoura
President of Nippon Telegraph National Governors’ Association (Mie
Prefecture Governor)
and Telephone Corporation
Naoshi Hirata
Director, Earthquake Prediction
Research Center, Earthquake ResearchInstitute, The University of Tokyo

Prime Minister, Minister of State for Disaster Management

Other ministers of state(all appointed by Prime
Minister)Offer Opinion

Yoshitake Yokokuta
Chairman of the Disaster Victims
Health Support Liaison Council

Committees for Technical Investigation●Disaster Management Implementation Committee (established March 26, 2013)

Officers' Meeting
Chair: Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeVice Chair: Director General for Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, and Deputy Manager of the Fire andDisaster Management Agency
Advisor: Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management
Secretary: Relevant directors-general of each ministry and agency[Role]○ Formulate a Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Earthquake Disaster Management Plan and promote their implementation○ Discuss important issues related to disaster management in response to inquiries from the Prime Minister or the Minister of State
for Disaster Management (e.g., basic approaches to disaster management, comprehensive coordination of disaster management
policies, and the declaration of states of emergency)○ Offer opinions on important issues related to disaster management to the Prime Minister or the Minister of State for Disaster
Management

Source: Cabinet Office

A-53

Fig.
Fig.A-33
A-33 Recent Meetings of the National Disaster Management Council (Since 2009)
FY2009Apr. 21, 2009

Jan. 15, 2010

• FY2009 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Framework for Chubu and Kinki Region Inland Earthquake Countermeasures• New Promotion of Earthquake Research• Volcanic eruption possibilities and DRR measures• Establishment of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Best Practices for Earthquake Disaster
Management in Regional Cities• Revisions to the General Framework for Tokyo Inland Earthquake Countermeasures• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of the Dissemination of Lessons Learned from Disasters• Earthquake DRR measures in Japan

FY2010
Apr. 21, 2010

• FY2010 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Establishment of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Disaster Evacuation• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Large-Scale Flood Measures• Tsunamis caused by earthquakes centered along the coast of Chile• Tokyo Metropolitan Area Flooding: Measures Needed for Damage Mitigation

FY2011
Apr. 27, 2011
Oct. 11, 2011

Dec. 27, 2011

Mar. 29, 2012

• Great East Japan Earthquake: Characteristics and Challenges• Conventional earthquake and tsunami policies• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Earthquake and Tsunami Measures Based on Lessons
Learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake• Government ministry and agency efforts related to future DRR efforts• Establishment of the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Revisions to the National Disaster Management Council Operation Guidelines• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of the Dissemination of Lessons Learned from Disasters• Status of the investigations by the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Interim Report of the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Current efforts aimed at bolstering and reinforcing DRR measures• FY2012 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework

FY2012
Sep. 6, 2012

Mar. 26, 2013

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Framework for Large-Scale Flood Measures in the Capital Region• New Promotion of Earthquake Research• Final Report of the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Best Practices for Earthquake Disaster Managementin Regional Cities• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Disaster Evacuation• Report on Tsunami Heights and Inundation Areas Resulting from Nankai Trough Megaquake (Secondary Report)
and Damage Estimates (Primary Report)• Review of the legal systems for disaster management; status of investigations into Nankai Trough Megaquake
Measures and Tokyo Inland Earthquake Measures• Establishment of the Disaster Management Implementation Committee• FY2013 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework

FY2013Jan. 17, 2014

Mar. 28, 2014

• Designation of Areas for the Promotion of Nankai Trough Earthquake DRR Measures and Areas for the Special
Reinforcement of Nankai Trough Earthquake Tsunami Evacuation Measures• Designation of Tokyo Inland Earthquake Emergency Management Zones• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Final Report of the Working Group to Investigate Tokyo Inland Earthquake Measures and a National Government
Business Continuity Plan Proposal• Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster Management• Act on Special Measures against Tokyo Inland Earthquake• Framework for Large-Scale Earthquake Disaster Management and Reduction• FY2014 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework

FY2014
Nov. 28, 2014
Mar. 31, 2015

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• FY2015 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Earthquake Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy for a Tokyo Inland Earthquake

FY2015
Jul. 7, 2015
Feb. 16, 2016

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Basic Guidelines on the Comprehensive Promotion of Measures for Active Volcanoes• Designation of volcanic eruption hazard areas• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction

FY2016
May 31, 2016

• FY2016 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction

FY2017
Apr. 11, 2017

• FY2017 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction

Source: Cabinet Office

A-54

Source: Cabinet Office

A-55

Disaster Management Implementation Committee

Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management(total 13 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Earthquake
and Tsunami Measures Based on Lessons Learned fromthe Great East Japan Earthquake (total 12 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Disaster
Evacuation(total 8 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Effective
Practices for Earthquake Disaster Management inRegional Cities(total 10 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Large-Scale
Flood Measures(total 20 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Tokyo
Inland Earthquake Evacuation Measures(total 14 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Improving
Disaster Resilience Using the Power of the Markets andPrivate Sector(total 5 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of Trench-type
Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan and Chishima
Trenches(total 17 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of thePromotion of Citizen Campaigns to Reduce Disaster
Damage(total 14 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Tokyo
Inland Earthquake Measures(total 20 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of theDissemination of Lessons Learned from Disasters(total 15 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Disaster
Management Information Sharing(total 12 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of the
Cultivation of Disaster Management Human Resources(total 5 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Tokai
Earthquake Measures(total 10 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Basic Plans
for Disaster Risk Reduction(total 9 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Tonankai
and Nankai Earthquakes(total 36 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Future
Earthquake Measure Effective Practices(total 11 meetings)

Committee for the Technical Investigation of Tokai
Earthquakes(total 11 meetings)

Name of Committee for Technical
Investigation

FY2000FY2002

FY2003

Jun. 28, '02

Oct. 3, '02

Sep. 25, '02

Oct. 27, '03

Sep. 18, '03

Sep. 12, '03

Jul. 31, '03

Jul. 16, '03

May 13, '03

May 12, '03

FY2006

FY2007

Dec. 9, '05

Dec. 13, '06

Aug. 29, '06

Aug. 16, '06

Jan. 23, '06

Oct. 14, '05

Oct. 21, '08

Dec. 2, '08

FY2008

Chubu and Kinki Inland Earthquake Measures(meetings 17-36)

Jul. 22, '05

FY2005

Nov. 26, '04

FY2004

Tohnankai and Nankai Earthquake
Measures (meetings 1-16)

Jun. 26, '02

Mar. 4, '02

Oct. 11, '01

Oct. 3, '01

Sep. 17, '01

Mar. 14, '01 Dec. 11, '01

FY2001

FY2009

May 28, '11

Aug. 26, '10

Apr. 26, '10

Mar. 18, '10

FY2012

Oct. 28, '11

Jul. 31, '12Mar. 22, '12Mar. 12, '12

Sep. 28, '11

FY2011

Dec. 22, '10

FY2010Jun. 14, '13

FY2013

FY2014FY2015FY2016

Fig.
Fig.A-34
A-34 Status of the Establishment of National Disaster Management Council Committees for Technical
Investigation

Reform of Ministries and Agencies

5. Budget
Fig.
Fig.A-35
A-35 Disaster Management Budgets by Year
Fiscal
Year
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Science andDisasterDisaster Prevention
Land Conservation
Total
Technology Research
Reconstruction
Share
Share
Share
Share
(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
751
0.4
8,864
4.3
97,92947.1
100,64248.3
208,006
1,021
0.4
8,906
3.7
116,13147.7
117,47348.2
243,522
1,776
0.7
13,724
5.4
122,40948.3
115,39345.6
253,302
1,605
0.5
17,143
5.6
147,85848.3
139,42445.6
306,030
1,773
0.5
20,436
5.9
170,65049.0
155,71544.7
348,574
2,115
0.6
23,152
6.1
197,833
52.3
154,855
41.0
377,955
2,730
0.7
25,5146.8
207,600
55.4
138,81537.1
374,659
2,747
0.7
30,1777.5
236,20959.0
131,27032.8
400,403
2,756
0.6
36,0278.2
269,15960.9
133,99830.3
441,940
3,078
0.5
50,4648.6
352,68660.3
178,20930.5
584,4373,700
0.4
93,425
10.3
488,81854.1
316,895
35.1
902,8386,287
0.7
111,32112.4
493,58054.9
287,082
32.0
898,270
14,5691.5
118,59612.1
505,208
51.5
342,55634.9
980,929
17,795
1.5
159,595
13.3
615,457
51.3
405,77133.9
1,198,618
21,143
1.3
186,297
11.5
711,15943.9
700,68843.3
1,619,287
22,836
1.4
234,409
13.9
904,30253.6
525,88631.2
1,687,433
29,642
1.7
307,17017.3
1,093,847
61.6
345,603
19.5
1,776,262
35,145
1.6
435,963
20.4
1,229,401
57.6
432,759
20.3
2,133,268
29,9291.2
456,575
18.9
1,229,615
50.8
705,16829.1
2,421,287
29,621
1.2
474,92618.9
1,240,788
49.5
761,95030.4
2,507,285
28,945
1.1
469,44317.2
1,261,326
46.3
963,98435.4
2,723,698
29,825
1.1
489,918
18.4
1,268,712
47.6
875,85132.9
2,664,306
28,215
1.2
485,21920.7
1,350,592
57.7
475,878
20.3
2,339,904
27,6801.1
512,83720.2
1,355,917
53.5
640,22525.2
2,536,659
28,646
1.2
482,88919.7
1,354,397
55.3
581,46223.8
2,447,394
38,296
1.4
612,50521.9
1,603,599
57.2
548,33719.6
2,802,737
31,051
1.1
587,07320.8
1,550,132
54.9
657,68123.3
2,825,937
34,542
1.2
588,35420.7
1,638,104
57.5
587,81920.6
2,848,819
35,382
1.1
625,239
20.0
1,669,336
53.4
796,23125.5
3,126,188
35,791
1.1
628,596
19.8
1,729,332
54.3
788,60324.8
3,182,322
36,302
1.1
745,40522.8
2,017,898
61.6
475,41114.5
3,275,015
43,152
0.9
866,17018.6
2,462,800
52.9
1,280,569
27.5
4,652,691
40,460
1.0
747,22318.9
1,945,295
49.1
1,230,072
31.0
3,963,050
105,845
1.4
1,208,134
16.0
2,529,386
33.5
3,696,010
49.0
7,539,375
52,3851.2
1,029,658
24.5
2,156,714
51.3
968,182
23.0
4,206,938
49,1281.2
1,147,102
28.2
2,014,695
49.4
864,370
21.2
4,075,295
62,4351.1
1,228,539
22.3
2,905,921
52.8
1,310,515
23.8
5,507,411
78,134
1.7
1,142,199
25.0
2,400,534
52.6
941,886
20.6
4,562,752
73,5021.8
1,011,535
24.4
2,376,083
57.3
689,225
16.6
4,150,346
49,3101.2
1,060,445
26.7
2,238,816
56.4
618,427
15.6
3,966,998
48,1641.3
1,202,984
31.9
1,981,686
52.5
543,949
14.4
3,776,783
35,1331.1
814,101
25.7
1,625,670
51.4
689,25521.8
3,164,159
30,4780.7
815,059
19.3
1,753,418
41.5
1,622,112
38.4
4,221,067
11,0970.4
866,29028.6
1,426,745
47.0
728,606
24.0
3,032,738

A-56

Fiscal
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Science andDisasterDisaster Prevention
Land Conservation
Total
Technology Research
Reconstruction
Share
Share
Share
Share
(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
11,627
0.4
689,50525.1
1,439,12952.3
610,30222.2
2,750,563
9,687
0.4
706,853
29.0
1,332,222
54.6
391,63716.0
2,440,399
8,921
0.4
819,35933.2
1,275,135
51.7
363,47114.7
2,466,886
8,761
0.4
498,39723.0
1,383,254
63.7
279,78912.9
2,170,201
7,695
0.6
224,841
16.9
813,35961.1
285,03821.4
1,330,933
28,072
0.6
376,169
8.0
743,93615.9
3,536,475
75.5
4,684,652
29,4220.6
561,02112.0
790,42217.0
3,129,561
67.2
4,656,656
15,3390.3
788,576
14.1
879,93215.8
3,883,911
69.6
5,578,036
16,688
0.4
639,966
13.9
836,580
18.2
3,101,555
67.5
4,594,789
14,961
0.4
713,477
18.6
155,475
4.1
2,954,355
77.0
3,838,268
14,023
0.3
696,39914.3
318,3206.5
3,855,516
78.9
4,884,258
9,136
0.3
524,87418.6
100,332
3.5
2,192,077
77.6
2,826,419

Notes:
1. These are adjusted budget (national expenditures) amounts. However, the FY2017 figures are preliminary figures reflecting
the initial budget.
2. The reduced amount allocated to science and technology research in FY2007 is largely due to the structural conversion ofnational lab and research institutions into independent administrative agencies (the budgets of independent administrative
agencies are not included in this table).
3. The amount allocated to disaster prevention in FY2009 is reduced because a portion of the revenue sources set aside for road
construction were converted to general fund sources making it impossible to allocate certain portions to the disastermanagement budget.
4. The reduced amount allocated to disaster prevention and land conservation in FY2010 is due to the fact that, following thecreation of the General Grant for Social Capital Development, some disaster prevention policies and many subsidy programsin land conservation were established using those grants.
5. The reduced amount allocated to land conservation in FY2011 is a result of the fact that relevant personnel expenses were
accounted for separately.
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office using materials from various ministries and agencies.

Fig.
Fig.A-36
A-36 Trends in Disaster Management Budget

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office using materials from various ministries and agencies.

A-57

Fig.
Fig.A-37
A-37 Earthquake Emergency Development Project Plans(As of the end of FY2015; Unit: JPY million)

FY1980 - FY2019

Category

Planned Amount(a)

Actual Amount(b)

Rate of Progress(b)/(a)1 Evacuation sites

177,539

157,24488.6%

2 Evacuation roads

93,98380,11785.2%

3 Firefighting facilities

140,658

123,780

88.0%

4 Emergency transport routes

936,037

785,51983.9%

4-1 Emergency transport routes

825,601

690,94483.7%

4-2 Emergency transport ports

59,631

52,77488.5%

4-3 Emergency transport fishing ports

50,80541,801

82.3%

5 Telecommunications facilities

17,24016,71496.9%

6 Public medical institutions

54,01250,90094.2%

7 Social welfare facilities

55,58655,586100.0%

8 Public elementary and junior high schools

441,934

422,459

95.6%

9 Tsunami countermeasures

270,660

172,243

63.6%

9-1 River management facilities

104,233

58,11655.8%

9-2 Coastal preservation facilities

166,427

114,127

68.6%

540,087

484,81489.8%

10-1 Erosion control facilities

102,887

91,79889.2%

10-2 Security facilities

171,243

151,22088.3%

10-3 Landslide facilities

84,52777,04091.1%

10-4 Steep slope facilities

159,800

149,83893.8%

10-5 Ponds

21,63014,91869.0%

2,727,736

2,349,376

86.1%

10 Landslide prevention

Total

Notes:
1. The content of Earthquake Emergency Development Project Plans (FY1980-2019) is as of the end of FY2015.
2. Project expenses include expenses for projects that may not be solely designed for earthquake disaster management, butthat, while having other policy objectives, also are intended to have an overall effect on earthquake disaster management.
Project expenses are not comprised solely of expenses used entirely for disaster management.
Source: Cabinet Office

A-58

526,548

219,490-

261,385

784,899482,317-

6. Multipurpose underground utility conduits

7. Medical institutions
8. Social welfare facilities
8-2. Public kindergartens

A-59

5,267

187,31077,8091,702,042

247,050

469,126

356,531

24,169235,686

140,865

94,821

1,729,574

268,151

409,216

359,433

522,26112-1. Coastal preservation facilities

12-2. River management facilities
13. Erosion control facilities, etc.
13-1. Erosion control facilities
13-2. Security facilities

13-3. Landslide prevention facilities

13-4. Steep slope failure prevention facilities

102,857

126,236

126,320

8,028

659

1,431,714

14,117,470

162,319

224,276

221,622

17,7633,595

2,814,605

18,503,368

15. Disaster management radio communications system

16. Potable water facilities/power generation systems

17. Storage warehouses
18. Response and relief systems
76.3%

50.9%

18.3%

45.2%

57.0%

56.3%

63.4%

77.2%

95.3%

99.2%

114.6%

92.1%

98.4%

82.1%

77.7%

79.5%

21.8%

35.1%

56.3%

-

45.5%

67.1%

105.6%

85.0%

66.2%

33.1%

87.9%

96.4%

94.3%

76.1%

76.0%

74.6%

65.6%

(b)/(a)% Complete
ha

6,960

ha

610 groups

437 sites

444 sites

1,702 sites

121 sites

1,252 sites

3,568 sites

1,651 sites

5,583 sites

2,278 sites

14,332 sites

119 sites

215 sites

334 sites

29 facilities

114 schools

5,840 schools-

857 facilities

115 facilities

844 km

73 sites

113 sites

1 sites

3,448 facilities

3,920 km

161 km

28,153 sites

2,601 km

3,168

(c)

Project Scope (Unit)

14,157,285

1,725,532

1,133

10,33889,822

126,944

81,642133,038

446,098

275,558

330,719436,635

1,622,048

76,248

196,496

272,744

2,662

32,094

1,078,849-

280,028

391,016

394,948

70,423

181,503550

16,855

4,998,577

5,267,908

119,329

540,784

1,188,051

931,413(d)Planned Amt.

10,018,773

916,981

687

5,292

55,59938,69340,342

90,165356,530

219,200

263,907409,636

1,339,438

78,899146,699

225,598

1,199

12,070594,777-

176,408

277,721257,890

46,387

119,869

387

8,473

4,067,023

4,242,139

92,958297,301

900,446543,233(e)Actual Amt.

Second Five-Year Plan (FY 2001-2005)

70.8%

53.1%

60.6%

51.2%

61.9%

30.5%

49.4%

67.8%

79.9%

79.5%

79.8%

93.8%

82.6%

103.5%

74.7%

82.7%

45.0%

37.6%

55.1%

-

63.0%

71.0%

65.3%

65.9%

66.0%

70.4%

50.3%

81.4%

80.5%

77.9%

55.0%

75.8%

58.3%

(e)/(d)% Complete
ha

7,839

ha

515 groups

296 sites

405 sites

5,844 sites

78 sites

1,147 sites

2,500 sites

1,151 sites

3,673 sites

2,033 sites

10,504 sites

68 sites

423 sites

491 sites

670 facilities

264 schools

16,256 schools

995 schools

521 facilities

93 facilities

591 km43 sites

100 sites

0 sites

2,439 facilities

2,552 km

102 km21,039 sites

1,405 km

2,515

(f)

Project Scope (Unit)

12,197,074

846,197

314

4,081

142,958

239,525

60,905100,913244,461

158,479

210,861

354,972

1,069,686

50,380187,407237,787

62,97556,834

3,077,544

35,198

114,756

239,424

259,420

47,594

198,676

0

9,242

3,557,657

3,813,169

46,719448,460

952,865

488,257(g)

Planned Amt.

8,359,916

563,811

262

838

72,142

78,112

34,277

66,870220,779

160,883

202,299

325,910

976,742

36,867

146,044

182,911

24,42923,262

1,399,624

7,074

56,400150,877

175,571

41,558136,895

0

6,844

3,106,165

3,291,461

49,136

246,745625,957

400,283(h)Actual Amt.

Third Five-Year Plan (FY 2006-2010)

68.5%

66.6%

83.4%

20.5%

50.5%

32.6%

56.3%

66.3%

90.3%

101.5%

95.9%

91.8%

91.3%

73.2%

77.9%

76.9%

38.8%

40.9%

45.5%

20.1%

49.1%

63.0%

67.7%

87.3%

68.9%

－

74.0%

87.3%

86.3%

105.2%

55.0%

65.7%

82.0%

(h)/(g)% Completeha12,156ha

304 groups

650 sites

517 sites

8,777 sites

161 sites

1,103 sites

2,629 sites

849 sites

2,683 sites

2,063 sites

9,327 sites

162 sites

525 sites

687 sites

1,737 facilities

199 schools

13,612 schools

1,159 schools

681 facilities

219 facilities

471 km26 sites

77 sites

2 sites

4,837 sites

2,191 km

56 km

20,052 sites

897 km1,456(i)Project Scope (Unit)

11,080,391

501,836

891

7,053

121,728

190,612

90,68383,029193,936

119,025

146,012303,286

845,288

115,601

229,583

345,184

369,417

43,1732,322,605

54,480126,275

689,917

255,017

20,843

153,101

117

15,464

2,584,039

2,773,563

23,506677,209

1,336,465

305,490(j)Planned Amt.

8,341,276

340,080

161

3,870

93,437101,183

68,59160,162

185,609108,748

172,801

256,274

783,594

117,594

184,601

302,195

209,039

29,955

1,626,867

27,20396,578506,681

207,556

17,652

133,80178

12,081

2,256,510

2,420,121

19,998468,951

779,815

255,401(k)

Actual Amt.

Fourth Five-Year Plan (FY 2011-2015)

75.3%

67.8%

18.0%

54.9%

76.8%

53.1%

75.6%

72.5%

95.7%

91.4%

118.3%

84.5%

92.7%

101.7%

80.4%

87.5%

56.6%

69.4%

70.0%

49.9%

76.5%

73.4%

81.4%

84.7%

87.4%

66.7%

78.1%

87.3%

87.3%

85.1%

69.2%

58.3%

83.6%

(k)/(j)% Complete(All prefectures, as of FY 2015. Unit: JPY 1,000,000)

Notes:
1. The content of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (FY2011-2015) is current as of the end of FY2015. However, details for Saga Prefecture are current as of the end of FY2014.
The expenses for each project are not limited to projects aimed at achieving earthquake DRR; they include expenses for projects that have other policy purposes, such as those related to urban infrastructure development, but that also are effective in terms of2.
earthquake DRR.
3. Public special education schools include schools known as schools for the blind, schools for the deaf, and schools for the physically or mentally/physically handicapped prior to FY 2006.
Source: Cabinet Office materials.

19. Downtown areas with high density dilapidated housing

131,645

170,513

13-5. Reservoirs
14. Community DRR base facilities

497,690

109,501

29,68584,577

10. Public special education schools
11. Public buildings
12. Coast and river facilities

765,344

1,359,672

9. Public elementary and jr. high schools

275,928

103,481

121,734

21,017

23,9005-5. Emergency transport fishing port facilities

5,355,365

5,555,626

237,940

5,719,897

6,067,258

359,671

128,163

168,387

5-4. Emergency transport port facilities

697,067

917,213

2,094

1,105,639

1,481,509

6,327

959,276(b)(a)

1,462,542

Actual Amt.

Planned Amt.

5-3. Emergency transport heliports

5-2. Emergency transport/traffic control facilities

1. Evacuation sites
2. Evacuation routes
3. Firefighting facilities
4. Roads for firefighting activities
5. Emergency transport roads, etc.
5-1. Emergency transport roads

Category

First Five-Year Plan (FY 1996-2000)

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures was enacted in July 1995 to protect citizens' lives, heath, and assets
from earthquake-related damage. This law allows prefectural governors to create a Five-Year Plan for Emergency Earthquake Disaster Management Projects for communities where there are concerns about
the occurrence of a severe earthquake disaster and a portion of the projects to be implemented based on this plan are eligible for an increased rate of financial support from the national government.
Thus far, these plans have been created by the prefectural governors over four terms, and earthquake disaster projects have begun to be implemented.
These plans are five-year plans created for 29 facilities that need to be urgently developed from the perspective of achieving earthquake disaster reduction. When a prefecture wants to create a plan, hearings
are held to listen to the opinions of the municipalities involved, and the consent of the Prime Minister must be obtained.
Project budgets for these plans over four terms are shown in the table below.

Fig.
Fig.A-38
A-38 Estimated Budgets for Five-Year Plans for Emergency Earthquake Disaster Management Project6. Status of Disaster Management Facilities and Equipment
Fig.
Fig.A-39
A-39 Number of Medical Facilities for Disasters by Prefecture

Source: Prepared by the Cabinet Office based on the website of the Emergency Medical Information System

A-60

Fig.
Fig.A-40
A-40 Number of Red Cross Hospitals, Emergency Medical Centers, and DMAT-Designated Medical
Facilities
Red Cross
Hospital

Emergency
MedicalCenterDMATDesignatedFacility

Red Cross
Hospital

Emergency
MedicalCenterDMATDesignatedFacility

Hokkaido

10

11

34

Shiga

3

4

10

Aomori

1

2

10

Kyoto

3

6

14

Iwate

1

3

11

Osaka

2

14

19

Miyagi

2

6

16

Hyogo

4

10

20

Akita

2

1

14

Nara

0

3

9

Yamagata038

Wakayama

1

3

11

Fukushima

1

4

9

Tottori

1

2

4

Ibaraki2

6

20

Shimane2

3

11

Tochigi

3

5

11

Okayama

2

5

10

Gunma

2

4

18

Hiroshima

3

5

18

Saitama3

919

Yamaguchi

2

5

18

Chiba

1

11

24

Tokushima

1

3

15

Tokyo

4

23

80

Kagawa1

2

9Kanagawa

6

16

33

Ehime

1

3

8

Niigata

1

6

14

Kochi

1

3

18

Toyama1

2

8

Fukuoka3

929

Ishikawa

1

2

12

Saga

1

5

9

Fukui

1

2

10

Nagasaki

2

3

15

Yamanashi

1

1

12

Kumamoto2

3

15

Nagano

6

7

11

Oita

1

4

21

Gifu

2

6

13

Miyazaki0

3

13

Shizuoka

5

921

Kagoshima

1

2

15

Aichi

2

22

35

Okinawa

1

3

16

Mie

1

4

13

Total

97

268

783

Source: Red Cross Hospital information was prepared by the Cabinet Office based on the website of the Japanese Red Cross
Society.
Information on Emergency Medical Centers and DMAT-Designated Facilities was prepared by the Cabinet Office basedon the website of the Emergency Medical Information System.

A-61

Fig.
Fig.A-41
A-41 Designation of Designated Evacuation Centers

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report "Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration"

Fig.
Fig.A-42
A-42 Seismic Reinforcement of Public Infrastructure

Notes
Roads: Rate of seismic reinforcement of bridges of emergency transport roads (important roads that have to be secured for thepassage of emergency vehicles to facilitate evacuation and rescue as well as relief supply delivery activities starting
immediately after the earthquake; national expressways, national highways, and the arterial roads that connect them.)(As of end of FY2013)
Railway (Shinkansen): Elevated bridges.
Railway (Conventional): Elevated bridges of major railway lines in regions where a seismic intensity of 6 Upper or greater would
be expected to occur in the case of a Tokyo Inland Earthquake or Nankai Trough Earthquake. (Left: As of
end of FY2012. Right: As of end of FY2013.)
Airports: Percentage of population in a 100 km area around an airport that could be used for emergency transport.
Ports and Harbors: Seismically reinforced piers (number completed as a proportion of those detailed in plans for seismic retrofitof piers to facilitate the transportation of emergency supplies (those classed as major ports or higher)).
Sewerage Facilities: Important main lines (pipes that can accommodate drainage from river basin lines, DRR bases, andevacuation sites, main pipes connected to pump stations and disposal stations, pipes buried beneathemergency transport roads and railroad tracks. (Left: As of end of FY2010. Right: As of end of FY2012.)
Source: Prepared by the Cabinet Office using materials from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)

A-62

Fig.
Fig.A-43
A-43 Trends in the Seismic Reinforcement Rate of Public Facilities That Serve as Disaster Management
Bases*Public facilities owned or managed by local governments (buildings for public or public-private use: non-wooden structures built two stories ortaller or buildings with a floor area of 200 m2 or more) that could serve as disaster management bases for implementing disaster response
measures<Classification criteria of public facilities that serve as disaster management bases>(1) Social welfare facilities(2) Education facilities (classrooms, gymnasiums)(3) Government buildings(4) Prefectural civic halls, civic centers(5) Gymnasiums(6) Health care facilities(7) Police headquarters and police stations(8) Fire headquarters and fire stations(9) Public housing(10) Employee dorms(11) OtherAll facilities
Facilities designated as designated emergency evacuation site or designated evacuation
centerFacilities that will be used for the implementation of disaster response measures
Facilities designated as designated emergency evacuation site or designated evacuation
centerFacilities designated as designated emergency evacuation site or designated evacuation
centerFacilities positioned in local plans for disaster risk reduction as medical care facilities
All facilities
All facilities
None
None
Facilities designated as designated emergency evacuation site or designated evacuation
center

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office based on “Results of the Survey on the Seismic Reinforcement Rate of Public Facilities
That Serve as Disaster Management Bases,” Fire and Disaster Management Agency

Fig.
Fig.A-44
A-44 Seismic Reinforcement Status of Public Elementary and Junior High Schools

Source: “Results of the Survey on the Seismic Reinforcement Status of Public School Facilities,” Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) (April 2016)

A-63

7. Trends in Numbers of Workers in Disaster Management
Fig.
Fig.A-45
A-45 Trends in Numbers of Fire Corps Volunteers

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on the Current Status of Fire and Earthquake Disaster Management
Measures of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency

Fig.
Fig.A-46
A-46 Trends in Age Composition Ratios among Fire Corps Volunteers

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on the Current Status of Fire and Earthquake Disaster Management
Measures of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency

A-64

Fig.
Fig.A-47
A-47 Trends in Numbers of Flood Fighting Corps Personnel*Number of full-time flood fighting corps personnel
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)

Fig.
Fig.A-48
A-48 Trends in Voluntary Disaster Management Organizations

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on the Current Status of Fire and Earthquake Disaster Management
Measures of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency. Figures as of April 1 each year.

A-65

Fig.
Fig.A-49
A-49 Female Representation on Local Disaster Management Councils (by Prefecture, 2016)

Hokkaido
Aomori
Iwate
Miyagi
Akita
Yamagata
Fukushima
IbarakiTochigi
Gunma
Saitama
Chiba
Tokyo
Kanagawa
NiigataToyamaIshikawa
Fukui
Yamanashi
NaganoGifu
Shizuoka
Aichi
Mie
Shiga
Kyoto
Osaka
Hyogo
Nara
Wakayama
Tottori
Shimane
Okayama
Hiroshima
Yamaguchi
Tokushima
KagawaEhime
Kochi
Fukuoka
Saga
Nagasaki
Kumamoto
Oita
MiyazakiKagoshima
Okinawa
Total

Prefectural Disaster Management Council
Of which,
Proportion of
Total
Female
Women
Members
Members
(%)
66
5
7.6
44
9
20.5
73
11
15.1
53
5
9.4
60
7
11.7
59
10
16.9
51
6
11.8
51
6
11.8
52
8
15.4
47
5
10.6
69
7
10.1
61
8
13.1
66
2
3.0
55
8
14.5
72
18
25.0
65
9
13.8
70
7
10.0
56
2
3.6
61
4
6.6
64
6
9.4
61
11
18.0
55
4
7.3
75
2
2.7
55
6
10.9
56
9
16.1
65
10
15.4
59
6
10.2
55
6
10.9
59
7
11.9
51
2
3.9
67
29
43.3
71
25
35.2
56
7
12.5
58
2
3.4
56
7
12.5
79
39
49.4
59
8
13.6
61
5
8.2
57
6
10.5
58
3
5.2
68
22
32.4
66
7
10.6
56
6
10.7
50
5
10.0
53
4
7.5
60
5
8.3
54
7
13.0
2,815
393
14.0

Municipal Disaster Management Council
Of which,
Proportion of
Total
Female
Women
Members
Members
(%)
3879
146
3.8
662
24
3.6
1035
72
7.0
936
63
6.7
707
82
11.6
955
57
6.0
1095
50
4.6
1282
76
5.9
689
62
9.0
816
59
7.2
2148
212
9.9
1505
152
10.1
2283
267
11.7
1018
99
9.7
866
52
6.0
519
24
4.6
422
25
5.9
453
38
8.4
617
54
8.8
2024
144
7.1
969
74
7.6
1002
79
7.9
1502
140
9.3
892
80
9.0
550
54
9.8
729
60
8.2
1433
158
11.0
1307
122
9.3
881
84
9.5
597
42
7.0
369
55
14.9
617
44
7.1
499
76
15.2
798
59
7.4
583
63
10.8
560
35
6.3
395
37
9.4
478
32
6.7
731
65
8.9
1308
187
14.3
460
46
10.0
654
39
6.0
1721
113
6.6
553
40
7.2
760
42
5.5
1051
53
5.0
679
55
8.1
45,989
3,692
8.0

Notes
1. Compiled from Cabinet Office, Progress of Local Government Measures Focused on Women or the Promotion of a GenderEqual Society (FY2016)
2. Figures for April 1, in principle.
Source: Cabinet Office

A-66

8. Various Policies and Measures
Fig.
Fig.A-50
A-50 Hazard Map Development

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office based on materials of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism(excluding Volcano Hazard Map)

Fig.
Fig.A-51
A-51 Formulation Status of Official Announcement Criteria for Evacuation Recommendations in
Municipalities where Natural Disasters are Anticipated*The disasters anticipated vary from one municipality to another, so the formulation rate is calculated using different
denominators, according to the type of disaster.
Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office based on the "Results of a Survey into the Formulation Status of Specific Official
Announcement Criteria for Evacuation Recommendations" from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency.

A-67

Fig.
Fig.A-52
A-52 Methods of Communicating Evacuation Instructions to Residents in Municipalities
Disaster management
radio communications
systemYear

Using thecommunication
facilities ofPatrols byagricultural/
loudspeaker
Individual
fishery
Simultaneous
vans
Home
Broadcasting cooperatives
Receivers(including
SystemSystemwired systems)

Siren

Bell
ringing

News
media

Throughvoluntary
disastermanagement
organizations

Other

2003

1,748
54%

2,126
66%

591
18%

2,942
92%

2,537
79%

698
22%

675
21%

1,065
33%

1,106
34%

2004

1,731
55%

2,095
67%

559
18%

2,864
92%

2,463
79%

659
21%

663
21%

1,064
34%

1,106
35%

2005

1,365
56%

1,670
69%

449
19%

2,254
93%

1,927
80%

525
22%

642
27%

942
39%

925
38%

2006

1,118
61%

1,349
73%

362
20%

1,739
94%

1,487
81%

414
22%

666
36%

887
48%

781
42%

2007

1,125
62%

1,350
74%

343
19%

1,722
94%

1,462
80%

383
21%

718
39%

939
51%

800
44%

2008

1,117
62%

1,348
74%

323
18%

1,713
95%

1,455
80%

358
20%

750
41%

987
55%

829
46%

2009

1,118
62%

1,361
76%

311
17%

1,702
95%

1,440
80%

345
19%

782
43%

1,015
56%

830
46%

2010

1,096
63%

1,333
76%

289
17%

1,647
94%

1,383
79%

324
19%

811
46%

1,033
59%

830
47%

2011

1,006
62%

1,240
77%

248
15%

1,530
95%

1,271
79%

270
17%

787
49%

1,002
62%

806
50%

2012

1,086
62%

1,340
77%

245
14%

1,644
94%

1,357
78%

285
16%

848
49%

1,129
65%

955
55%

2013

1,097
63%

1,377
79%

219
13%

1,648
95%

1,347
77%

276
16%

878
50%

1,154
66%

998
57%

2014

1,112
64%

1,398
80%

206
12%

1,651
95%

1,334
77%

256
15%

925
50%

1,169
67%

1,049
60%

2015

1,128
65%

1,412
81%

192
11%

1,659
95%

1,317
76%

238
14%

975
56%

1,193
69%

1,093
63%

1,145
1,426
178
1,654
1,282
219
993
1,204
1,078
66%
82%
10%
95%
74%
13%
57%
69%
62%
Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”
2016

A-68

Fig.
Fig.A-53
A-53 Instances of Assistance based on Mutual Support Agreements between Prefectures and Support
Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions in Recent Years
Instances ofSupportBased onMutualSupportAgreements
Year Between
Prefectures

Total
no.

Status of Support Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions

Broadcasting
Agreements(agmts.)Reporting
Agreements

Emergency
ReliefAgreements

Transportation
Agreements

Disaster
Recovery
Agreements

Resources
Agreements

Other

Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.

2003

23

6

288

47

347

31

191

37

148

39

400

37

711

34

124

19

2004

4

2

288

47

359

33

218

39

165

41

474

39

828

36

134

23

2005

13

8

304

47

362

32

221

43

178

42

504

40

873

40

182

31

2006

5

2

301

46

370

33

241

44

201

40

587

43

992

42

212

37

2007

0

0

304

46

337

34

272

43

211

41

778

43

1,196

44

317

36

2008

12

1

306

46

400

36

316

45

239

43

818

45

1,294

46

461

39

2009

5

1

314

46

399

36

339

44

247

43

857

45

1,364

46

546

41

2010

24

5

329

47

393

36

420

45

254

43

1,590

46

1,431

45

676

42

2011

18

4

318

44

373

33

472

43

235

41

1,568

43

1,357

44

676

39

2012

25

6

334

47

395

36

495

46

291

44

1,825

46

1,461

47

931

46

2013

29

8

360

47

419

38

575

47

317

46

1,913

47

1,558

47

1,178

46

2014

28

6

351

47

445

40

703

47

374

46

2,360

47

1,672

47

1,299

46

2015

24

6

343

47

454

39

893

47

382

46

2,397

47

1,694

47

1,515

46

2016

19

5

352

47

461

40

970

47

438

46

2,626

47

1,795

47

1,751

47

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

A-69

Fig.
Fig.A-54
A-54 Status of Mutual Support Agreements in Municipalities

Year

No. of Municipalities

No. of mutual support
agreements to whichmunicipalities belong within
the prefecture

No. of municipalities thathave concluded mutual
support agreements withother municipalities

2003

3,213

1,459

2,363
74%

2004

3,123

1,527

2,306
74%

2005

2,418

1,502

1,771
73%

2006

1,843

1,408

1,457
79%

2007

1,827

1,512

1,471
81%

2008

1,811

1,625

1,656
91%

2009

1,800

1,725

1,646
91%

2010

1,750

1,778

1,571
90%

2011

1,619

1,738

1,476
91%

2012

1,742

2,254

1,645
94%

2013

1,742

2,920

1,650
95%

2014

1,742

3,419

1,697
97%

2015

1,741

3,642

1,705
98%

2016

1,741

4,013

1,699
98%

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

A-70

Fig.
Fig.A-55
A-55 Status of Municipalities’ Support Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions
BroadcastAgreements
Year
No. oforgs.

Reporting
Agreements

Emergency Relief
Agreements

Transportation
Agreement

Disaster Recovery
Agreements

Resources
Agreements

Other

No. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofsupportsupportsupportsupportsupportsupportsupport
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
instancesinstancesinstancesinstancesinstancesinstancesinstances

2003

150

10

22

2

726

4

253

2

392

21

562

7

334

6

2004

171

20

20

2

713

4

260

2

445

18

589

5

361

5

2005

191

50

27

2

647

6

271

15

445

39

583

17

376

9

2006

225

38

18

2

574

10

267

3

451

24

619

8

401

2

2007

275

35

24

596

7

292

2

662

23

794

6

484

9

2008

315

62

33

619

2

319

5

813

35

936

17

510

5

2009

362

48

33

658

3

355

2

979

35 1,060

33

559

11

2010

378

35

35

683

6

376

3 1,052

42 1,125

22

580

8

2011

376

107

36

2

645

17

386

109 1,066

548 1,118

226

579

57

2012

437

59

41

3

719

19

462

48 1,242

167 1,309

123

684

54

2013

495

81

58

778

3

519

9 1,318

42 1,412

20

743

6

2014

554

59

66

827

2

602

3 1,360

131 1,466

40

800

17

2015

609

50

83

1

869

34

719

3 1,40862 1,500

31

809

15

2016

636

48

101

1

921

43

811

6 1,451

41 1,526

44

810

25

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

A-71

Fig.
Fig.A-56
A-56 Status of Disaster Management Drill Implementation

Trends in the No. of Prefectural Organizations Conducting Disaster Management
Drills and the No. of Drills Conducted

Trends in the No. of Municipal Organizations Conducting Disaster Management
Drills and the No. of Drills Conducted

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

A-72

Fig.
Fig.A-57
A-57 Status of Earthquake Disaster Management Drill Implementation

Trends in the No. of Prefectural Organizations Conducting Earthquake Disaster Management
Drills, No. of Drills Conducted, and the No. of Participants (Comprehensive Drills)

Trends in the No. of Prefectural Organizations Conducting Earthquake Disaster Management
Drills, No. of Drills Conducted, and the No. of Participants (Including Region-Wide Drills)

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

A-73

Fig.
Fig.A-58
A-58 Implementation Status of Tsunami Countermeasures
Along the Coast?
Year

No. ofgovts.

Yes

No

Designatedas likely
tsunamiinundation
areas

Recorded
Evacuation Routes Evacuation Sites
in localplan fordisasterNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofrisk
routesgovts. facilities govts.
reduction

TsunamiBreakwaters
Extendeddistance(km)

No. ofgovts.

2003

3,213

1,014

2,199

401

812

1,700

108

5,355

311

1,631

204

2004

3,123

984

2,139

420

799

1,817

104

5,609

306

1,535

204

2005

2,418

806

1,612

374

465

2,099

111

6,442

316

1,472

180

2006

1,843

666

1,177

367

299

3,066

107

6,830

286

1,233

149

2007

1,827

667

1,160

374

384

2,297

108

7,307

292

1,231

143

2008

1,811

659

1,152

417

393

2,593

118

7,647

297

1,105

133

2009

1,800

655

1,145

424

353

2,674

118

7,919

307

1,042

125

2010

1,750

648

1,102

439

385

2,757

118

8,396

304

1,025

123

2011

1,619

609

1,010

425

357

2,448

106

7,448

276

787

93

2012

1,742

646

1,096

492

379

4,058

130

12,110

323

886

107

2013

1,742

646

1,096

539

383

5,054

139

16,238

361

905

104

2014

1,742

646

1,096

576

403

5,591

155

19,405

380

848

96

2015

1,741

646

1,095

603

431

6,176

166

22,589

410

841

97

2016

1,741

646

1,095

612

444

6,086

174

23,263

418

913

93

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional Disaster
Management Administration”

A-74

9. Japan's International Cooperation
Fig.
Fig.A-59
A-59 List of Cooperation Projects Conducted by Ministries and Agencies
Ministry/ Agency

Budget for
FY2016(in JPY million; if
applicable)

Department Responsible－

Disaster Preparedness,
Public Relations andInternational Cooperation
Division, Disaster
Management Bureau, CAO－

Disaster Preparedness,
Public Relations andInternational Cooperation
Division, Disaster
Management Bureau, CAO－

Disaster Preparedness,
Public Relations andInternational Cooperation
Division, Disaster
Management Bureau, CAO－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO

FranceAlong with regular exchanges of opinions and information
between the relevant bodies in both countries, reciprocal
invitations to exercises were issued within the framework of thememorandum of cooperation on nuclear emergency
preparedness signed in May 2015.

－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO

OECD/NEA

Japan participates in the International Nuclear Emergency
Exercise (INEX) held by the OECD/NEA, with the aim of
improving working-level efforts to address nuclear accidents
and disaster countermeasures. This exercise was conducted inJapan in November 2016.

－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO

Hosting observers of a
nuclear emergency
response exercise

With the objective of sharing information and exchanging views
concerning nuclear emergency preparedness in each country,
Japan hosted relevant parties from international organizations
OECD/NEA, IAEA, US,such as the IAEA and OECD/NEA, as well as the US, France,
France, Canada,
Canada, and the Republic of Korea as observers at theRepublic of Korea
Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise held at
Tomari Power Station in November 2016 and held an exchangeof opinions with them.

－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO/
International Affairs Office,
Policy Planning and
Coordination Division,
Secretary-General’s
Secretariat, the Secretariatof the Nuclear Regulation
Authority

International workshop
on post-accident foodsafety science

In November 2016, OECD/NEA and the Cabinet Office cohosted an international workshop on “Post‑accident Food
Safety Science” in Fukushima Prefecture. This workshop was anopportunity to tell the world not only about the current
situation in Fukushima and initiatives by producers, but also
about the valuable experiences of people from the area,
including the management of food within the prefecture andthe views of local consumers. Scientists from around the world
compared the situation in Fukushima with international
standards and responses in the wake of Chernobyl andaffirmed once again that Fukushima producers, local
governments, and the national government are acting
rationally from a scientific viewpoint.

－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO

Project

Partnership between the
Cabinet Office and FEMA

Cabinet Office(CAO)

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

US

Partnership between the
Cabinet Office and theRepublic of Korea’s
Ministry of Public Safety
and Security

Republic of Korea

Japan-China-Republic ofKorea Trilateral Tabletop
Exercise on Disaster
Management

China, Republic of
Korea

Japan-U.S. Emergency
Management Working
Group

US

Cooperation between
the Cabinet Office ofJapan and the Ministryof the Interior of Franceon emergency
management related tonuclear accidents
International Nuclear
Emergency Exercise(INEX)

OECD/NEA

Description
Based on the Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the
Cabinet Office and FEMA in December 2014, an annual
meeting was held in September 2016 at FEMA’s Washington,
D.C. headquarters. During this meeting, the FEMA and the
Cabinet Office representatives signed the FY2016-17 Work Plan
as an annex to their Memorandum of Cooperation.
In December 2016, the Cabinet Office and the Republic ofKorea’s Ministry of Public Safety and Security concluded the
Operational Arrangement on Cooperation in the Field ofDisaster Management, based on the working-level exchanges
that the two countries had undertaken in the field of disastermanagement to date.
Based on the matters agreed upon in the Leaders' Declaration
at the 4th Japan-China-Republic of Korea Summit Meeting heldin Tokyo in March 2011, the 5th Japan-China-Republic of Korea
Trilateral Table Top Exercise on Disaster Management took
place in Republic of Korea in June 2016, with related institutions
from Japan, China, and Republic of Korea participating.
Partnerships in the field of nuclear emergency prevention
systems were deepened through regular exchanges of opinions
and information, and reciprocal invitations to exercises, which
took place within the framework of the Emergency
Management Working Group (EMWG) under the U.S.-Japan
Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation.

A-75

Ministry/ Agency

Ministry of Internal
Affairs andCommunications(MIC)

Project

Promotion of Overseas
Development of ICT
Systems for Disaster
Management

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Description

Through this project, MIC will test disaster management ICT
systems, which have been cultivated based on Japan's many
years of experience and expertise, in countries in the ASEAN
ASEAN, Latin America
region that are prone to natural disasters, taking the needs ofand Caribbean andeach country into account. It will also approach other
othersgovernments in cooperation with private enterprises and will
promote the overseas development of Japan's ICT systems fordisaster management.

Budget for
FY2016
Department Responsible(in JPY million; if
applicable)
Included as a partof packaged
assistanceprojects forInternational Cooperation
strengthening
Division, Global ICT Strategy
international
Bureau (GISB), MIC
competitivenessin the field of ICT,2016 (JPY 772m)

Since FY2011, MIC and MOFA have been utilizing the JapanICT Phase 3 for the
ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) to support the development of
support to AHA Center
the ICT system of the AHA Center, which is the disaster(ASEAN Coordinating
AHA Center (ASEAN) management information hub for the ASEAN region. From－Centre for Humanitarian
FY2015, they conduct to support ICT development and human
Assistance on disasterresource development to help improve the AHA Center's
management)
emergency response capacity as ICT Phase 3.
The International Forum on Fire and Disaster Management has
International Forum on
been held since 2007 to enable the countries of Asia, first andMainly AsianFire and Disaster
foremost, to enhance their firefighting and disaster3
countries
Management
management capacity, and to introduce Japan's firefighting
technologies and systems.
Fire and Disaster
During the Year of Japan-Republic of Korea National Exchange,
Management
which was held to coincide with the joint hosting of the 2002
Agency (FDMA)
FIFA World Cup by Japan and the Republic of Korea, a JapanJapan-Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea Firefighting Administration Seminar was held
Firefighting
Republic of Korea
2
in both countries to promote Japanese-Republic of Korean
Administration Seminarexchange, partnership, and cooperation, through the sharing of
information and the exchange of ideas regarding firefighting
and disaster management in both countries.
In May 2016, following torrential rain in Sri Lanka, and in
October 2016, following the hurricane in Haiti, MOFA
Provision of International
contributed international emergency relief goods to support
219.2
Emergency Relief Goods
the immediate needs of the affected people through the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (10th occasion).
MOFA provided emergency humanitarian assistance following
disasters such as earthquakes and droughts, most notably the
Emergency Grant Aid
October 2016 hurricane in Haiti, and provided emergency grant
11,612
aid to facilitate recovery and mitigate the damage arising fromthose disasters.
This project promotes (1) DRR cooperation in developing
countries through the Grant Aid for Japanese NGO's Projects,
emergency humanitarian relief and disaster recovery support (1) Included in
the JPY
through the Japan Platform,1 and (2) by establishing an
162,904m ofinternational DRR network in the Asia Pacific region andDisaster Risk Reduction
grant aid
carrying out emergency humanitarian relief through the Asia
Collaboration/ Disaster(2) Included in
Pacific Alliance (PAD).2
Restoration Support inCountries affected by 1: A framework by which Japanese NGOs, the business community, and the the JPY 28,437m
government work together to provide emergency humanitarian support of voluntary
Cooperation with Japan's natural disasters
following the occurrence of a natural disaster or conflict either in Japan or financial
Internationaloverseas.
Cooperation NGOs
contributions to
2: A framework that aims to develop an international DRR network forinternationalNGOs, the business community, and the governments of the APAD
Ministry of Foreignorganizations,member states to tackle large-scale natural disasters in the Asia PacificAffairs (MOFA)
region, under the leadership of Japanese NGOs. The Japanese government etc.

International Cooperation
Division, Global ICT Strategy
Bureau (GISB), MIC/
Regional Policy Division,
Asian and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau, MOFA(Counselor of) Civil
Protection and Disaster
Management Department,
FDMA(Counselor of) Civil
Protection and Disaster
Management Department,
FDMA

Humanitarian Assistanceand Emergency Relief
Division, International
Cooperation Bureau, MOFA
Humanitarian Assistanceand Emergency Relief
Division, International
Cooperation Bureau, MOFA

Non-Governmental
Organizations Cooperation
Division, International
Cooperation Bureau, MOFA

contributed approx. JPY 100 million in FY2013 and plans to contribute JPY
200 million in FY2015 and JPY 100 million in FY2016.

Financial Contributions
to International
Organizations in
Response to theEstablishment of World
Tsunami Awareness Day

UNISDR,UNITAR,
ESCAP

Operation of IAEARANET Capacity Building
Centre (CBC)IAEA member
countries(IAEA)In response to the establishment of World Tsunami AwarenessDay, Japan worked with international organizations on activities
to raise awareness of tsunami (symposiums and seminars, etc.)
in various parts of the world, primarily in Asian countries thatare most vulnerable to tsunami damage. In addition, Japan held
Technical Training in Japan on the topic of tsunami
preparedness.
In December 2012, the "Practical Arrangements Between the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the International
Atomic Energy Agency on Cooperation in the Area ofEmergency Preparedness and Response" was signed by MOFA
and the IAEA. Given this, in May 2013, the IAEA RANET Capacity
Building Centre (CBC) was designated in Fukushima Prefecture.
IAEA staff are permanently stationed there. As well as being
used to store materials and equipment required for dealing
with emergencies involving radiation and to undertake various
tasks in an emergency, the CBC serves as the venue for training
courses for officials from foreign and Japanese local
governments several times a year.

A-76

393

Global Issues Cooperation
Division, International
Cooperation Bureau, MOFA

International Nuclear
Energy Cooperation
Division, Disarmament,
Non-proliferation andScience Department, MOFA

Ministry/ Agency

Project

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Promotion of "SentinelAsia" Project to ShareInformation on Natural
Disasters Between Asia Pacific Countries

27 countries andregions of the Asia
Pacific Region/ 15
internationalorganizations

Budget for
FY2016(in JPY million; if
applicable)

Department Responsible

This project is led and implemented by Japan to contribute todisaster management efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region. It uses Included in JAXA
satellites to share information relating to natural disasters.
Management
Participants consist of 27 countries and regions, 89 institutions, Expenses Grant
and 15 international institutions (as of Fabruary 2017).

Office for Space Utilization
Promotion, Space
Development andUtilization Division,
Research and Development
Bureau, MEXT

(MOFA)
Included in JICAManagement
Expenses Grant(MEXT)
Included in JST
Management
Expenses Grant

International Science andTechnology Affairs Division,
Science and Technology
Policy Bureau, MEXT

26

Overseas Technical Team,
Overseas Land
Improvement Cooperation
Office, Design Division,
Rural Infrastructure
Department, Rural
Development Bureau,
MAFF

15

International Policy
Planning Office, Industrial
Port Policy Division, Portsand Harbors Bureau/ Risk
Management Office,Coastal Administration andDisaster Management
Division, Ports and Harbors
Bureau, MLIT－

Risk Management Office,Coastal Administration andDisaster Management
Division, Ports and Harbors
Bureau, MLIT－

Port and Airport ResearchInstitute, National Instituteof Maritime, Port andAviation Technology,

30River Planning Division,
Water and Disaster
Management Bureau/
Overseas Projects Division,
Policy Bureau, MLIT－

River Planning Division,
Water and Disaster
Management Bureau, MLIT－

International Affairs Office,Planning Division, Road
Bureau, MLIT

Description

Ministry of
Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and
MEXT and the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST)Science and Technology
Technology (MEXT)
together with MOFA and the Japan International Cooperation
Research Partnership for
135 countries that are Agency (JICA), through leading science and technology andSustainable
the object of ODA Official Development Assistance (ODA), have set up SATREPS in
Development (SATREPS)
order to promote joint international research on solutions to
Programglobal issues that occur in developing countries, including DRR.
Investigative Project into
Global Environment
Ministry ofIssues for Overseas
Agriculture,
Agricultural and Rural
Forestry andDevelopment (Survey toFisheries (MAFF) consider agricultural
disaster management
plans)

Between 2013 and 2016 this project will work in the rural areasof developing countries to disseminate education to raise
Targeted widely, residents' awareness of DRR, to develop system to prevent andparticularly in Asian reduce damage from natural disasters through resident
countries
participation under the leadership and support of local
governments, and to investigate methods for creating rural
disaster management plans.

Under a three-year program launched in FY2014, Japan has
been sharing the lessons learned from the Great East Japan
Earthquake with the ASEAN nations and preparing Port DRR
ASEAN-Japan Port
Guidelines to which all of the ASEAN nations can refer whenTechnology Group
implementing initiatives relating to port DRR. A substantive
ASEAN nations(Formulation of Port DRR
agreement on the guidelines was reached at a meeting of port
Guidelines)
engineers in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in February 2017 and theguidelines are due to be approved at the ASEAN and Japan
Transport Ministers Meeting, which is scheduled to take placein the autumn of 2017.
On November 4, 2016, in partnership with Chile’s National
Office of Emergency of the Interior Ministry, joint tsunami
Joint Tsunami EvacuationChileevacuation drills were held at Hososhima Port (Hyuga City,
Drill With Chile
Miyazaki Prefecture) and in Chile (Valparaiso), to facilitate aswift response to tsunami.
Taking advantage of the opportunity presented by theestablishment of World Tsunami Awareness Day, Japan
founded the Hamaguchi Award (awarded by the Minister ofLand, Infrastructure and Transport) for individuals and/ororganizations within Japan or overseas that have madeRaising Awareness ofsignificant contributions in the field of technologies for coastal
World Tsunami
All relevant countries disaster risk reduction, especially tsunami preparedness. Two
Awareness Day
individuals and one organization were recognized at the award(Hamaguchi Award)
ceremony held on October 31, 2016: Prof. Nobuo Shuto,
Ministry of Land,
Emeritus Professor, Tohoku University; Dr. Eddie Bernard,
Infrastructure
Former Director, Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory ofTransport andthe U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; andTourism (MLIT)
the National Office of Emergency of the Interior Ministry, Chile.
Held since 2013, these dialogues aim to enhance the DRR
functions of developing nations principally in Asia, while also
Vietnam, Thailand,
Disaster Management
expanding Japan's DRR technology overseas. They also aim to
Myanmar, Indonesia,
Collaboration Dialogues
develop a lasting structure for cooperation in each individual
Turkey, South Africa
country through collaborations between industry, government,
and academia.
Collaboration between
Following the exchange of correspondence between Japan's
MLIT and the European
MLIT and EU's ECHO in March 2013, an information exchange
Commission's
has been conducted every year to share DRR knowledge and
ECHO
Humanitarian Aid andexperience through the reciprocal exchange of experts andCivil Protection
practitioners, with the objective of enhancing disaster
Department (ECHO)
management systems on both sides.
In accordance with the cooperation framework concluded in
September 2014, the 3rd meeting of the Japan–India Joint
Working Group on Roads and Road Transport was held in India.
At the meeting, the Japanese side confirmed that it would
Discussion with India on
Ministry of Road
provide India with support in creating standards for slope
DRR Technology ThroughTransport anddisaster prevention technology suited to India, with referencea Bilateral Conference
Highways in India
to Japanese standards and technologies, to facilitate thedevelopment of mountain roads in areas such as India’s
northeastern states. The 4th meeting is due to be held in Tokyoin FY2017.

A-77

Ministry/ Agency

Project

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Description

Budget for
FY2015(in JPY million; if
applicable)

Department Responsible

As a UNESCO Category 2 center, the International Centre for
Water Hazard and Risk Management (ICHARM) actively
undertook research, training, and information networking
activities aimed at mitigating damage due to water hazards
Included in PWRI
worldwide. Specifically, it developed the Integrated Flood
International Centre forManagement
Analysis System and the Rainfall-Runoff-Inundation model, andPublic Works Research
Water Hazard and Risk
UNESCO, etc.
Expenses Grant
put them into practice in the field; conducted research andInstituteManagement (ICHARM)(8,665 million
development on risk management; and offered master’s andyen)
doctoral courses in disaster mitigation studies. In addition, it
undertook technical assistance and international support
initiatives funded by organizations including UNESCO and the
Asian Development Bank.
Established to share scientific knowledge concerning the
mitigation of earthquake damage and promote collaboration
with the US, this panel brings together earthquake research
Ministry of Land,
organizations in Japan and the US. A meeting of the panel was
Infrastructure
held in November 2016 in the US (held alternately in the US
Research Management
Transport and US-Japan Cooperativeand Japan every two years) to exchange information andDivision, Geography andTourism (MLIT) Program in Natural
engage in discussion concerning the latest research output andCrustal Dynamics Research
US－
Resources (UJNR) Panelfuture plans relating to earthquake research and observation.
Center, Geospatial
on Earthquake Research
The coordinating office for the Japanese side is the Geospatial
Information Authority ofInformation Authority of Japan, while that for the US side is theJapan, MLIT
United States Geological Survey (USGS). A resolution
summarizing the research on which Japan and the US should
cooperate in future to mitigate the damage caused byearthquakes was adopted at the meeting.
The 6th Plenary Meeting of UN Global Geospatial Information
6th Plenary Meeting ofManagement for Asia and the Pacific (UN-GGIM-AP), in which
International Affairs
UN Global Geospatial
the geospatial information authorities of each country
Division, Planning
Information
Member countries in participate, is due to be held in Japan in October 2017. As chair
Department, Geospatial－
Management for Asia
the Asia-Pacific region of this committee and also as a country that will be represented
Information Authority ofand the Pacific (UNby experts in the use of geospatial information in disasterJapan, MLIT
GGIM-AP)
management, Japan will seek to build capacity among themember countries.
The JMA, as a constituent member of the WMO (one of the
Office of Disasterspecialized institutions of the UN which functions to collect andInternational
Management and Planning,
WMO member
promote the distribution of observations and data on weather
Cooperation throughPlanning Division,－countries
around the world, and to improve information relating to the
WMO
Administration
weather and the climate), sends experts to international
Department, JMA
conferences, and is responsible for international centers.
The JMA provides technological contributions relating to thefield of oceans and tsunami, within the framework of the
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC).
Office of Disaster
International- It collects, analyzes, and provides data on oceans andManagement and Planning,
UNESCO member
Cooperation throughmaritime meteorology for the northeast Asian region, in
Planning Division,－countries, etc.
UNESCO
cooperation with other related countries (China, Republic of
Administration
Korea, and Russia).
Department, JMA- It provides each country with information on tsunamis caused
by earthquakes that occur in the northwest Pacific region.
The JMA participates in meetings relating to aeronauticalmeteorology organized by the ICAO, as well as investigations
International
into adopting and improving standard international criteria for
Office of DisasterJapan Metrological Cooperation through
ICAO member
aviation weather services. It has also been appointed by the
Mitigation, Planning
Agency (JMA)
International Civil－
countries
ICAO to operate international centers such as the Tokyo
Division, Administration
Aviation Organization
Volcanic Ash Information Center, and the Tropical Cyclone
Department, JMA(ICAO)
Information Center, thus contributing to the safe operation of
global aircraft.
The JMA promotes various international research projects in
Office of Disaster
Collaboration oncooperation with other countries. On climate change, it has
Management and Planning,
International Research
All relevant countries been involved in writing evaluation reports on the activities ofPlanning Division,－
Plans
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since
Administration
the panel was established in 1988.
Department, JMA
Together with the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA), the JMA has spent more than 40 years conducting
Human Resource
trainings designed for the staff of the national meteorological
Office of Disaster
Development Aid andinstitutions of developing countries, in order to improve their
Management and Planning,Technological
All relevant countries meteorological services. Also, in response to demands from thePlanning Division,－
Cooperation to
WMO and individual countries, the JMA dispatches staff who
Administration
Developing Countries
are experts in observations using meteorological radar, weather
Department, JMA
analysis, and weather forecasting, and receives trainees fromthe national meteorological institutions.

A-78

Ministry/ Agency

Project

Participation in the
projects of theNorthwest Pacific Action
Plan (NOWPAP) Marine
Japan Coast Guard Environmental(JCG)
Emergency
Preparedness andResponse Regional
Activity Centre(MERRAC)
IAEA Safety Measure
Contributions for
Nuclear Power Plants(Emergency Measures
Project)

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Description

Budget for
FY2015(in JPY million; if
applicable)

Republic of Korea,
China, Russia

The JCG participates in the projects of the NOWPAP MERRAC,
which is a center responsible for preparing for and responding
to marine environmental emergencies. As well as undertaking amarine environmental conservation initiative focused on the
Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, etc. in partnership withneighboring countries, the JCG takes part in joint oil spill cleanup drills organized by relevant organizations and attends
meetings held each year. Through these activities, it promotesinternational cooperation by striving to build systems that will
enable relevant countries to work together in the event of an
accident.

－

Protection of Marine
Environment Division,
Guard & Rescue
Department, JCG

IAEA

Japan also participates in IAEA projects to promote thepublication and sharing of information relating to accidents andissues that are reported to the IAEA by member countries
regarding their nuclear facilities.

41

International Affairs Office,
Policy Planning and
Coordination Division,
Secretary-General’s
Secretariat, the Secretariatof the Nuclear Regulation
Authority－

International Affairs Office,
Policy Planning and
Coordination Division,
Secretary-General’s
Secretariat, the Secretariatof the Nuclear Regulation
Authority－

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD－

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD－

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD－

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD－

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD－

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD－

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD

The Secretariat of
the Nuclear
Japan, China, and
The TRM is a meeting held by the regulatory bodies of Japan,
Regulation
Republic of Korea
China, and the Republic of Korea to promote the exchange of
Authority (NRA) Trilateral Top Regulators
information on regulatory issues concerning nuclear energy
Meeting (TRM) on
China, Republic of and the improvement of technology. Its other objectives are to
Nuclear Safety andKorea
increase nuclear safety and strengthen regional cooperation.
Working Group on
Established under its auspices, the WGEPR is a forum for theEmergency
exchange of information concerning emergency preparenessPreparedness andand response.
Response (WGEPR)
Multi-National Joint
This is a joint training exercise planned by the US Navy andAustralia, Canada, US,
Training Exercise,conducted with the involvement of foreign vessels. Japanand others
RIMPAC
participates in humanitarian support and disaster relief training.
Multinational Joint
Training on
Following the press release issued in May 2014, at the time of
Humanitarian Aid andFrance, Australia, the Prime Minister's visit to France, personnel were dispatched
Disaster Relief "Southern Tonga, Vanuatu, UK, to this training in November 2016, and field training was
Cross" organized by
US, and others
conducted in connection with relief activities for disasters on
French military based inislands.
New Caledonia
In addition to the existing bilateral training drills conducted
Indonesia, Republic of between the US and Thailand, this training has been
Multinational Joint
Korea, Malaysia, implemented in recent years as a multinational training
Training "Cobra Gold"
Singapore, Thailand, program focusing on peace operations in areas of conflict, UN
US, and others
peace-keeping activities, and humanitarian and public welfare
support activities. Japan participated in medical activity drills.
This is a training program that aims to improve interoperability
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint
with the US and Australian air forces with respect toMinistry of Defense Training forAustralia and US humanitarian aid and disaster relief activities. The participating(MOD)
Humanitarian Assistancecountries conduct air transport training, supply-drop training,and Disaster Relief
soft-field take-off and landing training, and search training.
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint
Training for
Aimed at improving interoperability with the US Air Force andHumanitarian AssistanceRoyal Australian Air Force in humanitarian aid and disaster relief
and Disaster Relief in theAustralia and US activities, this training includes exercises in which theFederated States ofparticipating countries undertake air transport, pack supplies,
Micronesia and otherand deliver them by air drop.
Countries
This training exercise aims to enhance the capacity for providing
ADMM-Plus Exercise inregional disaster relief, and consists of field training conducted
Humanitarian Aid,
Every ADMM-Plus
within the framework of the extended ASEAN Defense
Disaster Relief andcountry
Ministers' Meeting (ADMM-Plus). Japan participated in medical
Defense Medicine
activity drills.
Komodo 2016
Indonesia, US,
Multilateral Joint Training
Japan sent a destroyer to participate in this exercise, which
Australia, China,
Exercise Hosted by the
includes search and rescue drills.
Russia and others
Indonesian Navy

Source: Created by the Cabinet Office using materials from various ministries and agencies.

A-79

Department Responsible

Fig.
Fig.A-60
A-60 Examples of Technical Cooperation Projects in Disaster Risk Reduction (FY2016)
Country

Cooperation
PeriodProject Name

Description

Use of Disaster Management Satellite
Information Assistance for Capacitybuilding Project in the ASEAN Region
Project for Assessing and Integrating
Climate Change Impacts into the Water
Resources Management Plans for Brantas
and Musi River Basins

To improve the practical use of satellite information in DRR in the ASEAN countries, this project
conducts research using satellite information acquisition, image analysis, flood run-off analysis,
and flooding analysis.
Supports the implementation by Indonesia of water resources management that takes into
account the effects of climate change, by providing advice on the formulation of water resource
management plans in Indonesia's Brantas and Musi River Basins that take such effects into
consideration, and by drafting guidelines that can also be applied to other river basins.
Aims to comprehensively reduce disaster risks caused by the ejection of volcanic products
through the development of a "Multimodal Sediment Disaster Countermeasures DecisionMaking Support System" composed of a "Volcanic Eruption Early Warning System", an"Integrated GIS Multimodal Sediment Disaster Simulator", and a "Floating Volcanic Ash Warning
System", all addressing the six volcanoes within Indonesia (Merapi, Semeru, Kelud, Galunggung,
Guntur and Sinabung), and through the practical use of such system by the institutions related to
DRR.
In the field of integrated water resources management in Indonesia (operation and maintenanceof river facilities, coordination of water use and allocation, preservation of aquatic environments,
flood management, etc.), supports the improvement of the structure and capacity of the RBOs
and the continuous strengthening of efforts relating to integrated water resources management,
by means of (1) site confirmations using field practice, (2) development and management oforganizational structures and systems for strengthening the capacity of the RBOs, and (3)improving access to reliable guidelines and manuals.
Thailand’s National Institute for Emergency Medicine (NIEM) serves as the implementing agency
for this project, which aims to strengthen collaborative frameworks for disaster healthmanagement in the ASEAN region through collaborative intraregional disaster healthmanagement drills, the development of collaboration tools, and training courses, thereby
enhancing disaster response capabilities within the region. ASEAN has endorsed this project as
an official ASEAN project.
Enhances weather observation, forecasting, and warning capacity in the Philippines throughcapacity development for weather observations, weather data analysis and forecasting,establishment of warning criteria for Southern Luzon, and improvements in communication
methods for and details of weather information, as well as awareness-raising activities relating toweather information in Southern Luzon.
This project seeks to strengthen capacity to prepare flood forecasting and warning plans andstrengthen hydro-meteorological data quality control and storage capabilities within the HydroMeteorological Division (HMD) of the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical
Services Administration (PAGASA); standardize organizational systems and draft standards forenhancing equipment and facilities within River Centers (RCs); strengthen flood forecasting andwarning systems in the Cagayan de Oro and Tagoloan basins; and cultivate the data management
capabilities required for flood forecasting and warning at the Cagayan de Oro and Tagoloan RCs.
Through this, it aims to strengthen integrated data management and utilization capabilities inrespect of flood forecasting and warning at PAGASA HMD and the RCs in question, and thereby
contribute to improving integrated data management and utilization capabilities in respect offlood forecasting and warning throughout PAGASA.
In the mountainous area of Vietnam, landslides are a frequent occurrence due to soft groundand increasingly strong tropical winds and tropical monsoons. This project therefore aims todevelop landslide disaster risk assessment technologies for the protection of trunk roads thatconnect the north and the south of the country and to ensure the safety of the residents ofmountainous areas, as well as to develop landslide disaster risk reduction technologies that
include early warning systems and human resources development.
Project aims to strengthen the implementation capacity and integrated flood control plans of thenational government and the four ministries of Central region, by strengthening collaboration
systems with respect to integrating the national government's flood risk management efforts andstrengthening its capacity to develop integrated flood risk management plans, enhancing
capacity for flood risk analysis, and implementing structural and non-structural flood
countermeasures in the target ministries.
Observes the environment around the surface of the earth using remote sensing and conducts
research into the production of the trial version of a high level disaster risk management system
including an integrated database relating to sediment and flood disasters, in order to implement
and promote a disaster management program in Malaysia.
In order to assist in the eventual development of a natural disaster early warning system in
Myanmar, this project aims to establish an improved model of a system for transmitting early
warnings swiftly and appropriately to residents at the pilot project site, and also to implementhuman resources development for national and local government institutions and awarenessraising activities for residents such as evacuation activities. It also develops a plan for expansion
into other regions.
Yangon Technological University, which falls under the jurisdiction of Myanmar’s Ministry of
Science and Technology, is planning to develop and build a scenario analysis system that
forecasts changes in disaster vulnerability as needed, and an integrated disaster response system
based on this to enhance disaster resilience. In addition, it is planning to establish a consortium
to promote collaboration between industry, academia and government, to promote widespread
adoption of these systems by governmental organizations and industry. Japan will provide
support for R&D of these systems, human resource development required for this R&D, and theestablishment of the consortium, thereby helping to enhance disaster resilience in Myanmar.
In Tuvalu, measures to address coastal erosion are urgently required since marine pollution has
worsened due to storm surges and domestic wastewater. In this project, gravel beach
replenishment is proposed as a measure to preserve the coast, following the natural beachformation mechanism of reef islands. Through this pilot study, the project will verify suitability
and collate points to note when the pilot is disseminated to other areas.

Asia

2013-2016

Indonesia

2013-2017

Indonesia

2013-2018

Project for Integrated Study on the
Mitigation of Multimodal Disasters Causedby the Ejection of Volcanic Products(SATREPS)

Indonesia

2014-2018

Project on Capacity Development for River
Basin Organizations (RBOs) in Integrated
Water Resources Management in the
Republic of Indonesia (Phase II)Thailand2016-2019

Project for Strengthening the ASEAN
Regional Capacity on Disaster HealthManagement (ARCH Project)

Philippines

2014-2017

Project for Enhancing Capacity on Weather
Observations, Forecasting and Warnings

Philippines

2016-2019

Project for Strengthening Capacity ofIntegrated Data Management of Flood
Forecasting and Warning

Vietnam

2011-2016

Development of Landslide Risk Assessment
Technology along Transport Arterials in
Vietnam (SATREPS)

Vietnam2013-2016

Project for Building Disaster Resilient
Societies in the Central Region of Vietnam(Phase II)

Malaysia

2011-2016

Research and Development for Reducing
Geo-Hazard Damage in Malaysia caused byLandslides and Floods (SATREPS)

Myanmar2012-2016

Project on Establishment of an End-to-End
Early Warning System for Natural Disasters

Myanmar2015-2020

Project for Development of aComprehensive Disaster Resilience System
and Collaboration Platform in Myanmar(SATREPS)

Tuvalu2011-2017

Project on Pilot Gravel Beach
Replenishment against Coastal Disasters on
Fongafale Island, Tuvalu

A-80

Country

Cooperation
PeriodProject Name

Fiji

2014-2016

Project for the Planning of the Nadi River
Flood Control StructuresFiji

2014-2018

Project for Reinforcing MeteorologicalTraining Function of FMS

China

2015-2018

The Project for Promotion and Capacity
Development of Disaster Mitigation
Education in Sichuan Province

Kyrgyzstan

2016-2019

Project for Capacity Development forRoad Disaster Prevention Management

Mongolia

2016-2019

Project for Strengthening the National
Capacity of Earthquake DisasterProtection and Prevention in Mongolia

Armenia

2014-2017

Landslide Disaster Management Project

Sri Lanka

2014-2017

Technical Cooperation for Landslide
Mitigation Project

Sri Lanka

2014-2017

Project for Improving of MeteorologicalObservations, Weather Forecasting andDissemination

Nepal

2016-2021

Integrated Research on Great
Earthquakes and Disaster Mitigation in
Nepal Himalaya (SATREPS)

Pakistan

2016-2019

Project for Capacity Development ofDisaster Management

Bangladesh

2013-2017

Project for Capacity Development ofManagement for Sustainable WaterRelated Infrastructure

Bangladesh

2014-2018

Research Project on Disaster
Prevention/Mitigation Measures against
Floods and Storm Surges (SATREPS)

Bangladesh

2015-2019

Building Safety Promotion Project For
Disaster Risk Reduction (BSPP)

Bangladesh

2016-2021

Technical Development to Upgrade
Structural Integrity of Buildings in Densely
Populated Urban Areas and its Strategic
Implementation towards Resilient Cities(SATREPS)

Bhutan2013-2016

Study on Glacial Lake Outburst Floods(GLOFs) in the Bhutan Himalayas

Description
Nadi, Fiji's third largest city, is important to Fiji as a tourist center, but since no basic flood control plan
has been formulated, and no flood countermeasures program has been implemented, it isvulnerable to flooding. There has been immense damage even in recent years and the area
continues to be exposed to flood risk. For this reason, this project is working towards the formulationof a comprehensive flood countermeasures master plan for the river basin of the Nadi River, whichflows through Nadi, the performance of feasibility studies with respect to priority projects based
thereon, and the implementation of technology transfers to project counterparts.
Improves the capacity to assess the human resources development needs of Oceania for the Fiji
Meteorological Service (FMS), performs maintenance on human resources development tools(including curriculum and textbooks), and by enhancing the leadership capacity of the FMS throughthe improvement of its observation and prediction services, works towards the improvement of thehuman resources development function of the FMS with respect to Oceania, and contributes to the
independent future continuation of human resources development work in Oceania by the FMS.
As part of this project, which encompasses 100 or so model schools for disaster mitigation
education, model schools in the city of Ya’an will carry out model lessons, to facilitate research into
drills and activities that involve teaching materials, curricula, and communities, as well as research
into the development of government policy. The objective of this initiative is to build models forongoing disaster mitigation education and to improve awareness of disaster preparedness anddisaster response capabilities at every level, including boards of education, school managers,
teachers, and the students themselves.
This road disaster prevention project involving Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Transport and Roads seeks to(1) summarize the roles of relevant departments; (2) improve road disaster prevention inspection
and analysis capabilities; (3) build and operate a road disaster prevention database management
system; and (4) promote cooperation in improving capabilities in the area of preparing road disasterprevention management plans. Through this, it aims to develop capacity for road disaster prevention
management within the Ministry of Transport and Roads, and thereby increase the safety of roadtraffic against slope or snow disasters in the area under the jurisdiction of the road maintenancemanagement office targeted by the project.
This project seeks to strengthen capacity at the Mongolian national government’s disasterprevention body (National Emergency Management Agency: NEMA) by strengthening preventive
measures in respect of earthquake-related disaster preparedness. In addition to increasing NEMA’s
capacity to formulate its own disaster prevention plans, this project will promote initiatives such as
the formulation and updating of regional government disaster prevention plans by NEMA,
earthquake-resistant construction by other ministries and agencies, and disaster preparedness
education.
In Armenia, this project works towards enhancing the capacity to manage and respond to landslidedisasters of the Landslide Disaster Management Working Group, by improving the technology andcapacity relating to sediment disaster management, developing plans, guidelines, and legislation,and strengthening implementation systems.
Supports the enhancement of sediment disaster management capacity in Sri Lanka throughconducting surveys and assessments of sediment disaster countermeasures, development ofdesigns to prevent landslide, slope failures and rocks fall, construction supervision and monitoring,
and accumulation of knowledge and know-how on sediment disasters mitigation measures.
Conducts maintenance and inspection as well as calibration capacity improvements on
meteorological observation equipment, enhances the capacity to send and receive meteorological
data, improves weather forecasting capacity, refines warning criteria, improves transmission
methods for and contents of weather information, and works towards improving capacity formeteorological observations, forecasting, warnings, and dissemination in Sri Lanka.
The goal of this project is to strengthen remote monitoring systems and develop human resources inthe earthquake field by estimating future earthquakes that could occur in the Himalayan seismic gap,
thoroughly examining the ground properties of the Kathmandu basin, and enhancing theseismographic network.
Via the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM), a public training institution established in2007 to develop capacity at the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), this project will
support efforts to strengthen human resource development implementation systems in the field of
disaster management and contribute to increasing the knowledge concerning disaster management
held by personnel belonging to the country’s disaster management administration bodies.
To reduce flood damage in Bangladesh, this project provides support for investigations andinspections into the causes of damage at existing levees, and support for levee design, construction,and maintenance manuals through demonstrations to verify levee construction.
Proposes prevention and mitigation measures for storm surge and flood damage including thecreation of flood risk maps and storm surge risk maps, measures to address river bank erosion andriver levee collapse, and measures to prevent toxic substance diffusion at times of flooding, andexperimentally conducts such measures.
Mainly targeting staff at the Public Works Department under the Ministry of Housing and Public
Works, this project seeks to increase the safety of buildings in Bangladesh and reduce the risk ofdisaster in urban areas by supporting efforts to strengthen human resource development systems
aimed at increasing building safety; increase capacity to evaluate seismic capacity, undertake seismic
design, and supervise construction; and strengthen systems aimed at making buildings sounder.
Focusing on buildings in Dhaka that are primarily built from reinforced concrete, this project involves
research into diagnostic techniques and reinforcement methods suitable to local components andstructural styles, and the presentation of recommendations for a strategies for applyin them.
Through this, it aims to increase the structural resilience of buildings, and encourage technology
development and its effective implementation, thereby contributing to reducing the structuralvulnerability of buildings in Bangladesh, and increasing safety against urban earthquakes.
Supports the strengthening of emergency response capacity at the national and regional levels
through the development and pilot implementation of an early warning system to respond toflooding including Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs), as well as the development of a system forincorporating disaster risk assessment into development plans.

A-81

Country

Cooperation
PeriodCentral America

2015-2020

Mexico2016-2021

Nicaragua

2016-2019

Ecuador2013-2016

Colombia

2015-2018

Colombia

2015-2020

Chile

2014-2019

Brazil

2013-2017

Turkey2012-2016

Turkey2013-2018

Mozambique

2014-2017

Project Name

Description

The Project on Capacity Development for Disaster Risk Management in Central America wasconducted to build disaster-resilient societies by improving the disaster risk reduction capabilities
of six countries in Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, andPanama), which face similar risks in terms of natural disasters, including earthquakes, floods, andProject on Capacity Development forvolcanic disasters. Based on the results of that project, Phase 2 supports the strengthening ofDisaster Risk Management in Central
capacity among administrative organizations with a view to nationwide rollout, and theAmerica, Phase 2
strengthening of frameworks for sustained efforts to popularize systematic community disaster
preparedness, as well as supporting the construction of frameworks for sharing each country’s
experiences with others in Central America, with the aim of developing disaster risk
management capacity throughout the region.
This project involves installing measuring instruments on the earth’s surface and sea floor in the
coastal region of Guerrero state in southern Mexico, and gathering and analyzing earthquake
Hazard Assessment of Large Earthquakes
data. This will be used to develop scenarios for major earthquake and tsunami hazards that could
and Tsunamis in the Mexican Pacific Coastoccur in future and to prepare a hazard map, and tsunami evacuation signs will also be created.
for Disaster Mitigation (SATREPS)
In addition, the project will develop and disseminate a disaster mitigation education programthat takes local sociocultural attributes into account.
Focusing on the Central American Tsunami Advisory Center (CATAC) in Nicaragua, the goal of thisproject is to improve the quantitative tsunami forecasting capabilities required for CATAC’s
tsunami advisory information so that the information can be used in the tsunami warnings ofProject for Strengthening of Capacity of theCentral American countries. It will involve increasing CATAC’s ability to analyze earthquake
Central American Tsunami Advisory Centerparameters and forecast tsunami using observation data from Central American countries;(CATAC)
putting in place facilities and infrastructure for conducting human resource development inCentral American countries; and conducting human resource development among corepersonnel.
Conducts facility maintenance and core personnel development to ensure swift judgement
regarding the parameters of earthquakes that accompany tsunamis in Ecuador, the issuing ofProject for the Enhancement of Tsunamitsunami warnings, the improvement of tsunami observation, warning, and cancellationinduced Earthquake Monitoring Capability technologies, the adoption of criteria, and the improvement of tsunami warning procedures. As
a result, it is strengthening earthquake and tsunami monitoring capacity and working towards
the development of a tsunami warning system.
This project will seek to strengthen flood risk management capabilities among relevantorganizations in Colombia by strengthening capacity in the areas of flood risk assessment, flood
Project for Strengthening Flood Risk
forecast and warning, and the communication of forecasts and warnings, as well as by clarifying
Management Capacity
the roles and responsibilities of national and local governments, and enhancing flood risk
management planning capabilities.
Colombia experiences frequent disasters due to earthquakes, tsunami, and volcanic eruptions.
Project for Application of State of the Art
This project involves promoting partnerships between research institutes and relevant disasterTechnologies to Strengthen Research andmanagement organizations, along with research and practical activities aimed at strengthening
Response to Seismic, Volcanic and Tsunami measures to mitigate the damage due to disaster through capacity building in such areas asEvents, and Enhance Risk Management
earthquake, tsunami, and volcanic activity monitoring, modeling, damage forecasting, and the(SATREPS)transmission of information. In addition, it will contribute to advances in disaster research inSouth America through collaboration with neighboring countries.
With a view to contributing to the improvement of disaster risk reduction measures in Latin
America and the Caribbean, this project will support the development of mechanisms toDisaster Risk Reduction Training Program
establish Chile as a base for human resource development in the field of disaster risk reduction,
for Latin America and the Caribbean
focusing primarily on earthquakes and tsunami. These mechanisms will cover such matters ascooperation policy, budget planning, needs surveys in countries receiving assistance, and thecoordination and investment of cooperation resources appropriate to those needs.
Damage from sediment disasters has been escalating in Brazil, with increased habitation of risk
Project for Strengthening the National
areas due to development cited as a contributory factor. With the objective of reducing the risk
Strategy of Integrated Natural Disaster Risk of sediment disasters, this project aims to identify disaster risks and, based on this, strengthen
Management
comprehensive disaster response capabilities, including urban expansion plans, prevention andrecovery, monitoring, and the transmission of information.
This project is for staff members of relevant organizations, such as ministries and agencies
Capacity Development for Effective
responsible for DRR, sector government offices, and local governments, and works towards
Disaster Risk Management
supporting and strengthening the capacity to adopt disaster management plans based on risk
assessments, and to contribute to the improvement of DRR capacity in Turkey.
In the Marmara Region, with its high earthquake risk, this project conducts research on
Project on Earthquake and Tsunami
earthquake observations and on earthquake and tsunami disaster simulations. By maintaining
Disaster Mitigation in the Marmara Region
the results of this research in the form of visual resources (such as images and pamphlets), thisand Disaster Education in Turkey (SATREPS)
project works to improve the general public's awareness and knowledge of DRR.
This project, which targets the staff of the Mozambique Meteorological Office and regional
observation stations, aims to improve the capacity for responding to water-related disasters in
Project for the Capacity Enhancement ofMozambique, a country which is vulnerable to natural disasters and is exposed to cyclones andMeteorological Observations, Weather
flooding every year. The project works towards the improvement of forecasts and warnings that
Forecasting and Warnings
use quality controlled weather data by aiming to improve meteorological observation capacity
and weather forecasting and warning capacity.

Note: SATREPS: Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development
Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

A-82

10. Others
Fig.
Fig.A-61
A-61 Trends in the Number of Earthquake Insurance Contracts

Source: Produced by the Cabinet Office based on materials from the General Insurance Rating Organization of Japan

Fig.
Fig.A-62
A-62 Awareness of Self-Help, Mutual Support, and Public Support Measures

Source: Produced by Cabinet Office on basis of "Public Opinion Poll regarding Disaster Risk Reduction” conducted by the Cabinet

A-83

Fig.
Fig.A-63
A-63 Explanations Regarding the Japan Meteorological Agency’s Seismic Intensity Ratings
Notes:(1) The seismic intensity values published by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) are generally observed
values from seismometers situated on the surface of the earth or on the first floor of low-rise buildings.
When a particular seismic intensity is observed, these materials indicate what type of phenomenon ordamage has occurred. It is impossible to determine the seismic intensity based on the phenomena
described for each seismic intensity level.
(2) Seismic motion is strongly influenced by type of ground and topography. A seismic intensity value is theobserved value for the place where the seismometer is situated, and seismic intensity can vary even
within a municipality depending on where it is measured. Furthermore, even within the same building,the strength of a tremor will depend on the floor or place where it is felt. For example, a tremor isgenerally stronger on the upper floor of a middle- or high-rise building than at ground level.
(3) Even with tremors of the same seismic intensity, the damage will differ according to the amplitude of theearthquake vibration (the size of the tremor), the cycle (the length of time taken for one repetition of thetremor), and the duration of the tremor, as well as the condition of the building or structure that is
affected and the ground conditions.
(4) In this data, of all the damage that occurs when a particular seismic intensity is observed, that which isseen relatively often has been recorded. However, there are also instances where greater or lesser
amounts of damage have been caused. Note also that not all of the phenomena indicated for any
particular level of seismic intensity will necessarily occur.
(5) This data is primarily collated from earthquakes that have occurred in recent years. Going forward, thedetails of these tables will be regularly inspected every five years, new examples will be added, andamendments will be made where the data no longer reflects true conditions due to, for example,
improvements in the earthquake-proofing of houses and structures.
(6) In these materials, where the extent of damage is not shown in round numbers, the following adverbs andadjectives have been used as a tentative guide.
Term

Definition

RarelyA few/little
Majority
Almost all

Extremely limited. Hardly ever.
Number/extent is extremely small. Just a little bit.
Half or more. Less than “almost all.”
Not all but close to all.

There are (also),
there may be

Used to express something that typically starts to appear at this seismic intensity
level, where the quantity is not great, but it is hard to quantify the number/extent.

Increases

It is difficult to specify the quantity, but it is more than would be the case for a lower
level of intensity.

Increases further

Same meaning as “increases” above. Used in relation to lower levels of intensity, justlike “increases” above.

* The JMA sometimes publishes earthquake intensities obtained from questionnaire surveys, but these areexpressed as “corresponding to seismic intensity xx” and are distinguished from seismic intensity levels
observed by seismometers.

A-84

●Human Sensation/Reaction, Indoor Conditions, Outdoor Conditions
Seismic
intensity
level
0

1

2

3

Human sensation/reaction
A person will not feel thetremor but it will be recordedby seismometers
If people are indoors keeping
quiet, some will feel a slight
tremor.
If people are indoors keeping
quiet, the majority will feel thetremor. If people are asleep,some will be awakened.
Most people who are indoors
will feel the tremor. Of those
who are walking, some will feelthe tremor. The majority ofpeople who are sleeping will beawakened.

4

Most people will be startled.
Most of those walking will feelthe tremor. Most who are
sleeping will be awakened.

5 Lower

The majority of people will befrightened and feel as if theywant to hold onto something.

Indoor conditions

Outdoor conditions

－

－

－

－

Things hanging from the ceilingsuch as lamps will sway slightly.

－

Dishes in cupboards may rattle.

Things hanging from the ceilingsuch as lamps will sway
significantly, dishes incupboards will rattle. Unstable
ornaments may fall over.
Things hanging from the ceilingsuch as lamps will swayviolently. Dishes in cupboards
and books on bookshelves may
fall down. The majority of
unstable ornaments will fall
over. Furniture that is notsecured may move andunstable items may fall over.

Electric wires will tremble
slightly.

Electric wires will tremble
significantly. Some people whoare driving vehicles will notice
the tremor.

Rarely, windows may break andglass may fall out. People will
notice electric poles swaying.
Roads may be damaged.

5 Upper

The majority of people will findthe tremors an obstacle tomovement, and find it hard towalk unless they hold onto
something.

More dishes in cupboards andbooks on bookshelves will fall.
TV sets may fall from theirstands. Furniture that is notsecured may fall over.

Windows may break and glass
may fall out. Unreinforced
concrete block walls may
collapse. Vending machinesthat are not properly installed
may fall over. Driving a vehicle
will become difficult and somecars may come to a stop.

6 Lower

It will become difficult toremain standing.

The majority of unsecured
furniture will move, and somewill fall over. Some doors will
become impossible to open.

Tiles on walls and glass inwindows may break and fall.

6 Upper7

It will become impossible toremain standing or to move
without crawling. People may
be tossed around, being unable
to move, and may even bethrown through the air.

Almost all unsecured furniture
will move and more of it will fallover.
Almost all unsecured furniture
will move and fall over, someeven being thrown through the
air.

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More buildings will have broken
tiles and glass. Almost all of theunreinforced concrete block
walls will collapse.
Even more buildings will havebroken tiles and glass. Even
reinforced concrete block walls
may be damaged.

●Conditions of Wooden Buildings (Residential)
Seismic
intensity
level

High earthquake resistance

5 Lower－

Slight crazing or cracks may be seen in walls.

5 Upper－

Crazing or cracks may be seen in walls.

Wooden Buildings (Residential)
Low earthquake resistance

6 Lower

Slight crazing or cracks may be seen in walls.

Crazing or cracks in walls become morecommon.
Large cracks may form in walls.
Tiles may fall and buildings may lean. Some may
topple.

6 Upper

Crazing or cracks may be seen in walls.

Large cracks in walls become more common.
Buildings that lean or collapse become morecommon.

7

Crazing or cracks in walls become morecommon.
Rarely, buildings may lean.

Buildings that lean or collapse become evenmore common.

Notes:(1) Wooden building (residential) are classified into two types according to their earthquake resistance. Earthquake resistancetends to be better in newer buildings, tending to be lower in structures built prior to 1981 and higher in structures built since1982. However, there is wide variation in earthquake resistance due to differences in construction methods and the placementof walls. Just because a building is old does not necessarily mean that you can determine its level of earthquake resistance.
The earthquake resistance of existing buildings can be ascertained through seismic diagnosis.
(2) The crazing, cracks and damage to the walls in the wooden buildings referred to in this table are deemed to appear in walls
made of soil (split bamboo substrate) or mortar (including lath and wire mesh substrate). Where walls have weak foundations,even when the deformation to the building is slight, the mortar readily becomes detached and falls off.
(3) Damage to wooden buildings will differ depending on the cycle and duration of the seismic motion. There are examples ofdamage to buildings being low in relation to seismic intensity, such as the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake in 2008.

●Conditions of Reinforced Concrete Buildings
Reinforced Concrete Buildings

Seismic
intensity
level

High earthquake resistance

5 Upper－

Low earthquake resistance
Cracks may form in walls, crossbeams, andpillars.

6 Lower

Cracks may form in walls, crossbeams, andpillars.

Cracks become more common in walls,
crossbeams, and pillars.

6 Upper

Cracks become more common in walls,
crossbeams, and pillars.

Diagonal and X-shaped cracks may be seen inwalls, crossbeams, and pillars.
Pillars on the ground floor or middle floors may
crumble and some buildings may collapse.

Cracks become even more common in walls,
crossbeams, and pillars. Ground floor andmiddle floors may be deformed, and rarely,buildings may lean.

Diagonal and X-shaped cracks become morecommon in walls, crossbeams, and pillars.
Pillars on the ground floor or middle floors
crumble and more buildings will collapse.

7

Notes:(1) Earthquake resistance tends to be better in newer buildings, tending to be lower in structures built prior to 1981 and higher
in structures built since 1982. However, there is wide variation in earthquake resistance, due to differences in structural
types, the placement of quake-resistant walls, and whether the walls are planar or vertical. Just because a building is olddoes not necessarily mean that you can determine its level of earthquake resistance. The earthquake resistance of existingbuildings can be ascertained through seismic diagnosis.
(2) In reinforced concrete buildings, slight cracks may be observed even where the core structure of the building is not affected.

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●Ground and Slope Conditions
Seismic
intensitylevel
5 Lower
5 Upper
6 Lower
6 Upper
7

Ground Conditions

Slope Conditions

Cracks*1 and liquefaction*2 may occur.

Rock falls and slope failures may occur.

Fissures may form.

Slope failures and landslides may occur.

Large fissures may form.

Landslips become more frequent, large-scalelandslides and sector collapses may occur.*3

Notes:*1 A crack is the same phenomenon as a fissure, but the expression is used here to refer to a small fissure or opening in the
ground.
*2 Where the groundwater level is high, and the ground is loose and sandy, liquefaction may occur. As liquefaction progresses,
muddy water may spout out of the ground, subsidence may occur, embankments and quays may be broken, sewage pipes andmanhole covers may float to the surface, and damage may include the leaning or destruction of building foundations.
*3 If a large-scale landslide or a sector collapse occurs, depending on the topography of the area, this may also cause natural
dams to be formed. Large volumes of sediment may also cause debris flows.

●Effect on Utilities and Infrastructure
Suspension of gas supply

When the seismic intensity level reaches 5 Lower or greater, gas meters with safety
devices (“intelligent gas meters”) will trip, and the gas supply will be shut off.
If tremors become even stronger, the gas supply for entire communities may be shut
off in the interest of safety.*

Suspension of watersupply, power outages

In communities where tremors are recorded at seismic level 5 Lower or greater, thewater supply may be suspended and there may be power outages.

Suspension of rail
services, expressway
regulation

If the seismic intensity level is 4 or greater, in the interest of safety, theimplementation of suspensions, speed restrictions, and traffic regulations on
railways and expressways will be enacted at the discretion of the relevant operatingcompany (criteria applied to confirm safety will differ by operating company andgeographical area).

Disruption to telephonelines and other means ofcommunication

When an earthquake disaster occurs, there is an increase in communications using
the telephone and the internet in the areas where the tremors are strong and in thesurrounding areas, as people try to confirm the safety of loved ones, offer
condolences, and ask about friends and relatives. This can lead to telephone line
congestion. To address this, when a natural disaster such as an earthquake with aseismic level of 6 Lower or greater occurs, communication companies provide
services such as the Disaster Emergency Message Dial 171 (which allows people inaffected areas to record a message about their safety, and allows people outside thearea to listen to that message) and the Disaster Emergency Message Board (web171,
which allows people in affected areas to record information using text, voice, or
images, and allows people anywhere in the world to access that information).

Elevators taken out ofserviceElevators equipped with earthquake control devices will automatically stop, in theinterest of safety, in the event of a tremor of seismic intensity level 5 Lower orgreater. It can take time for operations to resume while safety inspections are
conducted.

*When there are tremors with a seismic intensity of 6 Upper or greater, gas, water, and electricity supply services may be widelysuspended across large regions of the country.

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●Effect on Large-scale Structures
Shaking of skyscrapers due
to long-period earthquake
ground motion*

Since skyscrapers have a long natural period, they react less violently toearthquakes than ordinary reinforced concrete buildings, which have a shortnatural period. However, in response to long-period earthquake ground motion,
they shake more slowly over a long period of time. If the tremors are strong, thenpoorly secured office fixtures may move significantly, and people inside may needto hold onto fixed objects in order to remain in one place.

Sloshing inside oil tanks

Sloshing of liquid inside oil tanks may occur as a result of long-period earthquake
motion, oil may overflow the tanks, and fires may occur.

Damage to or collapse ofceilings at facilities thatoccupy large spaces

At facilities such as gymnasiums and indoor swimming pools, which occupy large
spaces, even earthquake movements that do not cause significant damage to thestructure itself, such as the pillars and walls of the building, may cause ceilings toshake significantly, become damaged, and collapse.

*Large-scale earthquakes can generate long-period seismic waves, which can travel long distances from the epicenter of the quake.
Depending on the natural period of the ground, such long-period seismic waves may become amplified as they travel over plains,
and the duration of the tremors may be lengthened.
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

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Fig.
Fig.A-64
A-64 Emergency Warning Issuance Criteria■Criteria for Meteorological Emergency Warnings
Type of Event
Criteria
Heavy rainfall with a level of intensity observed only once every few decades ispredicted in association with a typhoon or intense heavy rains or
Heavy rain
Heavy rainfall is predicted in association with a strong typhoon whose expectedlevel of intensity is observed only once every few decades or an extra-tropical
cyclone of comparable intensity.
…in association with a strong typhoon
Storm
A storm is predicted…
whose expected level of intensity is
Storm surge
A storm surge is predicted…
observed only once every few decades oran extra-tropical cyclone of comparable
High waves
High waves are predicted…
intensity.
A snowstorm is predicted in association with an extra-tropical cyclone ofSnowstormcomparable intensity with a strong typhoon whose expected level of intensity isobserved only once every few decades.
Heavy snowfall with accumulations observed only once every few decades is
Heavy snowfall
predicted.
■ Criteria for Tsunami, Volcano, and Earthquake (Seismic Motion) Emergency Warnings
Type of Event
Criteria
A tsunami greater than 3m at its highest is predicted (a major tsunami warning is
Tsunamiclassed as an Emergency Warning)
A volcanic eruption that will cause serious damage to residential areas is predicted
Volcanic eruption(a Warning (Residential Areas)* is classed as an Emergency Warning)
Seismic motion with a seismic intensity of 6-lower or more is predicted (anEarthquake
earthquake early warning (seismic intensity of 6-lower or more) is classed as an(seismic motion)
Emergency Warning)*In the case of volcanoes to which volcanic alert levels are applied, a Warning (Residential Areas) (volcanic alert level 4 or 5) isclassed as an Emergency Warning, while for volcanoes to which volcanic alert levels are not applied, a Warning (Residential
Areas) (Keyword: Extreme caution advised in residential areas and non-residential areas nearer the crater) is classed as an
Emergency Warning.
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

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