Convention on Nuclear Safety
National Report of Japanfor 6th Review Meeting
August 2013

Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)
Roppongi 1-9-9, Minato-ku Tokyo Japan, 106-8450(NCP: International Affairs Division)

|1Convention on Nuclear Safety National Report of Japanfor the Sixth Review Meeting
Table of Contents
A

B

C

Introduction

1

1

The Current Situation on Nuclear Energy Use in Japan

1

2

Implementation Status of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Japan and Related
Initiatives

1

3

Development of the National Report

4

Summary5

1

Progress on Nuclear Safety since the Previous National Report52

Response to Challenges Identified at the Previous Review Meeting

13

Reporting Article by Article
Article 6

Existing Nuclear Installations

16

Article 7

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

26

Article 7 (1)Establishment of the Legislative and Regulatory Framework

27

Article 7 (2)Safety Requirements and Safety Regulations

30

Regulatory Body

33

Article 8 (1)Establishment of a Regulatory Body

34

Article 8 (2)Status of the Regulatory Body

44

Article 8

Article9

Responsibility of the License Holder

46

Article10

Priority to Safety

49

Article11

Financial and Human Resources

52

Article 11 (1)Financial Resources

53

Article 11 (2)Human Resources54

Article12

Human Factors

55

Article13

Quality Assurance

58

Article14

Assessment and Verification of Safety

62

Article 14 (1)Safety Assessments

63

Article 14 (2)Verification of Safety

64

Article15

Radiation Protection

68

Article16

Emergency Preparedness

75

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Article 16 (1)Planning for an Emergency

76

Article 16 (2)Information for the Public and Neighboring Countries

96

Siting98

Article 17 (1)Evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location

99

Article 17 (2)Prevention of Impacts on Individuals, Society, and the Environment
Resulting from Reactor Facilities

99

Article 17 (3)Re-evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location

100

Article 17 (4)Discussion with Other Countries That Could be Affected by Reactor
Facilities

100

Design and Construction

101

Article 18 (1)Implementing Defense in Depth

102

Article 18 (2)Application of Proven Technologies

108

Article 18 (3)Design for Highly Reliable, Stable, and Easily Manageable Operation

109

Operation

110

Article 19 (1)Initial Approval

111

Article 19 (2)Operational Limits and Conditions

117

Article 19 (3)Procedures for Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing118

Article 19 (4)Procedures for Dealing with Accidents and Events Occurring during
Operation

124

Article 19 (5)Engineering and Technical Support

126

Article 19 (6)Reporting of Accidents or Failures

126

Article 19 (7)Making Effective Use of Operational Experience

128

Article 19 (8)On-site Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste

129

Article17

Article 18

Article 19D

Annexes132

1

List of nuclear installations

133

2

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act
during the reporting period

135

3Implementation Status of the IAEA Action Plan

137

4

Consideration of IAEA Safety Standards

139

5

Major amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act

142

6References

149

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Abbreviations in this report
ABWR

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

APWR

Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor

ATR

Advanced Thermal Reactor

BWR

Boiling Water Reactor

ConvExConvention Exercise

EAL

Emergency Action Levels

FBR

Fast Breeder Reactor

GCR

Gas Cooled Reactor

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP

International Commission on Radiation Protection

INES

International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

IRRS

Integrated Regulatory Review Service

IRS

Incident Reporting System

JAEA

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

JANSI

Japan Nuclear Safety Institute

JEAC 4111
JNES

Quality Assurance Standard for the Safety for Reactor Facilities, Nuclear
Standards Committee of the Japan Electric Association
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, an incorporated administrative
agencyMETI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MEXT

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

NAC

National Assistance Capability

NCA

National Competent Authority

NIRS

National Institute of Radiological Science

NISA

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (former nuclear regulator)
Notification to Establish Dose Limits in accordance with the Provisions ofNotification on Doses

the NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation, Operation of Commercial
Power Reactors

NPS

Nuclear Power Station

NRA

Nuclear Regulation Authority

NRA Ordinance on

NRA Ordinance concerning the Installation and Operation, of Commercial

Commercial Reactors

Power Reactors

NRA Ordinance onStandards for the
Location, etc.
NRA Ordinances on
Quality Control Methods

NRA Ordinance prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, andEquipment of Commercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities
NRA Ordinances on Technical Standards for Quality Control Methods
Concerning the Design and Construction of Commercial Power Reactors forLicensees of Power Reactor Operation and Systems for their Inspection

4|

NRA Ordinance on

NRA Ordinance prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial PowerTechnical Standards

Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities

NSC

Nuclear Safety Commission, former safety related governmentalorganization resolved on September 2013

Nuclear Emergency Act

Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

OIL

Operational Intervention Level

PAZ

Precautionary Action Zone

PPA

Plume Protection Planning Areas

PWR

Pressurized Water Reactor

RANET

Response Assistance Network

Reactor Regulation Act

Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors

SPEEDI

System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information

TEPCOTokyo Electric Power Company

TRU Waste

Low Heat Production and a Long Half-life Waste

UPZ

Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone

USIE

Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies

INTRODUCTIONA1AINTRODUCTION

Current Nuclear Energy Use in JapanThe March 11, 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami off the Pacific coastline of Japan’s
Tohoku region caused severe damage at the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Nuclear
Power Stations and particularly at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station where the impact
measured Level 7 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES). Largeamounts of radioactive materials were released causing extensive environmental

and social

consequences. There were fatalities connected to the evacuation procedures in disaster. Entire
populations of residents around the nuclear power station were forced to evacuate their homes
and more than two years later an estimated 150,000 people remain evacuees. Untold numbers
face ongoing health concerns because of radiation exposure. Cleaning up operations and initialreconstruction began almost immediately but it is anticipated it will take many years to complete.
Public trust in Japan’s nuclear safety was lost and it has become difficult to establish a national
consensus on the future role of nuclear power in Japan. Subsequently, power plants were shut
down one by one, as each one underwent their scheduled periodic inspections and by May, 2012
all power stations had suspended operations. Following a government decision Units 3 and 4 at
the Kansai Electric Power Company’s Ohi Power Station resumed operations and they remained
the only operational nuclear power stations in the country as of August 2013.
There were 50 reactor units in service at the end of March 2013 following a decision todecommission Units 1 to 4 at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
Figure A-1 shows the location and status of power reactors in Japan.
2

Implementation Status of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Japan and Related
Initiatives
Through measures based on the Atomic Energy Basic Act, the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Reactor Regulation Act), and related
legislation, Japan has been steadily fulfilling its obligations under the Convention on Nuclear
Safety (CNS). These include establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework
to govern the safety of nuclear installations, and establishing a regulatory body to implement theregulations. However, following the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident the Reactor
Regulation Act was drastically revised and the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) wasestablished on September 19, 2012. Efforts are underway to implement a full revision ofregulatory requirements.
The newly established NRA has been given centralized jurisdiction over regulations on nuclear
security, safeguards, radiation monitoring, and regulations on the use of radioisotopes―all of1

A

INTRODUCTION

which were previously administered by multiple administrative organs, such as the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology - aswell as over regulations on nuclear safety.
This report sets forth Japan’s new nuclear regulation and confirms its compliance with its
obligations under each article.
The new regulatory requirements for power reactors, based on lessons learned from theaccident and in consideration of international requirements such as the IAEA Safety Standards,
came into force on July 8, 2013. From now on, nuclear power stations seeking to resume
operations will be assessed on whether they meet the new regulatory requirements.
One of the characteristics of these requirements is that nuclear operators must take backfitting
measures based on experience and the latest available technical knowledge. Continuous efforts
will be made to implement improvements based on these measures.
Because these regulatory requirements came into force only recently and as Japan works
continuously to improve its overall nuclear regulation has drastically improved its framework wewelcome reviews by the Contracting Parties during this Sixth Review process of the CNS.

2

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear power station
BWR (operational)

PWR (operational)

BWR (under construction)

PWR (under construction)

BWR (decommissioned or permanently shut down)

Tomari NPS
1

2

3

Oma NPS

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS

Higashidori NPS

1

1

2

3

4 5 6

7

Shika NPS
1

Fugen NPS

Onagawa NPS

2

ATR (being decommissioned)

1

2

1 2

FBR (under construction)

Ohi Power Station

Tokai NPS

4GCR (being
decommissioned)

Takahama Power Station
2 3

5 6

1 2 3 4

1 2 3

1

3 4

Fukushima Daini NPS

Mihama Power Station

2 3

3

Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Monju NPS

1

2

1

Tsuruga NPS

Tokai Daini NPS

4Shimane NPS
1Hamaoka NPS

2
1

2

3

Genkai NPS
1

2

Ikata Power Station

3 4

1

2

3

Sendai NPS
1 2Figure A-1

Location and Status of Reactor Facilities

3

4

5

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3

INTRODUCTION

Development of the National Report
The Fukushima Daiichi accident led directly to the establishment of the NRA in September 2012,
and the extensive revision of nuclear safety regulations taking into account lessons from theaccident. This report on those developments is the first to be given to a Review Meeting.
The new regulatory requirements have inherited some of nuclear safety activities which werebeing carried out even before the 2011 crisis, while some others have been revised forincorporation and several new requirements have been freshly added.
New regulatory requirements introduced here will remain under review and future
improvements will be made as necessary.
This Sixth National Report does not purport to discuss about changes from the nuclear
regulations that were previously implemented by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA).
Rather, it presents the new nuclear regulations and related issues, focusing primarily on theircompliance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
The content of this report is largely based on information available as of July 31, 2013.

4

SUMMARYB

SUMMARY

1

Progress on Nuclear Safety since the previous National Report

1-1

Establishment of the NRA

The March 11, 2011 earthquake-tsunami damaged 14 reactor units at four nuclear
power stations on Japan’s Pacific Ocean coastline. In particular, the TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant was severely damaged and INES level 7 accident followed.
Large amounts of radioactive materials were released causing extensive environmental
and social consequences. There were fatalities connected to the evacuation procedures
in disaster. Entire populations of residents around the nuclear power station were forced
to evacuate their homes and more than two years later an estimated 150,000 people
remain evacuees. Untold numbers face ongoing health concerns because of radiation
exposure. Cleaning up operations and initial reconstruction began almost immediately
but it is anticipated it will take many years to complete. In addition to the direct causesof the earthquake and tsunami, the lack of a true safety culture at TEPCO, and any
genuine regulatory independence contributed to the overall devastating impact.
In the wake of the controversy and based on ‘lessons learned’ an Act for Establishmentof the Nuclear Regulation Authority was enacted on June 20, 2012 and promulgated onJune 27 to strengthen the regulatory structure and a new regulatory body,the Nuclear

Regulation Authority (NRA), was established. As an external organ of the Ministry of theEnvironment the NRA is charged with separating the functions of promoting andregulating the nuclear energy industry, eliminating an earlier system whereby one single
government organization was responsible for both. The Act of Establishment empowers
the NRA Chairman and its Commissioners to follow an independent, neutral and fair rolein enforcing regulations on nuclear energy, security, international safeguards, radiation
monitoring, and regulations on the use of radioisotopes, which previously had been
governed by other administrative units. On September 19, 2012, the Prime Minister
appointed a Chairman and four Commissioners (the ex post facto consent of the Diet
was obtained on February 15, 2013), and the NRA was officially inaugurated. A report on
the organizational structure and independence of the NRA is provided in Article 8.
1-2

Revamp of the Regulatory System

Following the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station’s accident, the Reactor
Regulation Act was revised and strengthened with the incorporation of the latest
available technical knowledge and regulations and guidelines from such overseasorganizations as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The overall purpose of

5

B

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SUMMARY

the Act is to protect public health and preserve the environment. The main points ofrevision include (1) strengthening countermeasures against severe accidents; (2)adoption of the latest technical knowledge and introduction of a backfit system to whicheven already authorized nuclear facilities will be also required to conform; (3) the
introduction of an approval system for the extension of operational periods, and (4)integration of regulations on power reactor into the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Act for the Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority provides that the new
power reactor regulations will come into force on a day specified by Cabinet Orderwithin a period not exceeding ten months from the effective date of the said Act (by July18, 2013) and that new regulations for other facilities (such as nuclear fuel facilities)
shall come into force on a day specified by Cabinet Order within a period not exceeding
one year and three months from the effective date of the said Act (by December 18,2013). The NRA therefore established a Study Team on New Regulatory Requirementsfor Light Water Power Reactors, a Study Team on New Regulatory Requirements for Light
Water Nuclear Power Plants (Earthquakes and Tsunamis), and a Study Team on
Establishment of New Regulations for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants and held
discussions on enforcing the new rules.
The Study Team on New Regulatory Requirements for Light Water Power Reactors
discussed the tightening of conventional designs and proposed measures to counter
severe accidents. The Study Team on New Regulatory Requirements for Light Water
Nuclear Power Plants (Earthquakes and Tsunamis) discussed designs to counter
earthquakes and tsunamis. When establishing these new regulatory requirements,
particular emphasis was placed on utilizing the lessons learned from the Fukushima
Daiichi accident, incorporating international knowledge and experience and ensuringconsistency with the safety standards and guidelines established by the IAEA, andreflecting in these new regulatory requirements the fact that Japan is among the mostvulnerable nations in the world to earthquakes, tsunamis and other natural disasters.
Discussions were also held to establish the most rigorous regulations in the world.
Public comments were solicited February 7-28, 2013, on the proposed regulatory
requirements and then compiled for review by the Study Teams after which additional
amendments were adopted. They included the need for tsunami protection facilities
against design basis earthquake ground motions.
The Study Team on Establishment of New Regulations for Light Water Nuclear Power
Plants discussed issues such as the integration of the regulations on power reactor
facilities into the Reactor Regulation Act, and conducted hearings with organizations
subject to regulation.

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SUMMARY

Table B-1

Main Points of the New Regulatory Requirements for Light Water Power
Reactors

Main Topic
Tightening of design basis

Main Points of the New Regulatory Requirements-

Countermeasures toprevent core damage
during severe accidents-

Measures to prevent
damage of containment
vessels.

--

Add tornados, forest fires and others as natural disasters to betaken into consideration in designing facilities
Strengthen and thoroughly ensure fire protection measures
Strengthen the trustworthiness of essential safety equipment
Strengthen external power supplies
Physical protection of systems to allow heat dissipation
Measures to be taken when nuclear reactors cannot be shut down
by ordinary procedures
Measures to be taken in the event of losing the ability to cool
down and reduce pressures of reactors
Measures to be taken with the failure of the ultimate heat sinks
Ensuring support functions (power supply, water, etc.)
Measures to cooling down and reduce atmospheric pressure andreducing the presence of radioactive materials in containment
vessels (containment spray system)
Measures for preventing damage caused by pressure increase ofcontainment vessels (filter vent)Measures for cooling down reactor cores that have melted downat the base of containment vessels
Measures for preventing hydrogen explosions in containment
vessels
Measures for preventing hydrogen explosions in reactor buildings
Measures for cooling down spent fuel storage pools

Countermeasures against
intentional aircraft crash-

Develop specified safety facilities to be used in the event of coredamage caused by terrorist attacks such as intentional aircraft
crashes

Measures to curb the
spread of radioactive
materials outside theimmediate vicinity-

Install outdoor water equipment and other measures to counterany damage to containment vessels

Strengthening of countertsunami measures-

Use the largest-ever previously recorded tsunami as a new‘standard’ level and install tsunami protection facilities such asseawalls, which meet these new standards.

Expansion of facilities torequire a high quake
resistance level-

In the design stage categorize facilities that help protect against
tsunamis as Class S, the same category as reactor pressure
vessels, for which the highest quake resistance is required.

Tightening standards fordetermining active faults-

When determining possible active faults to be considered inaseismic design, evaluate all active faults activity from the middle
Pleistocene epoch (approx. 400 million years ago), as necessary

Setting an accurate designbasis for earthquake
ground motions-

Ascertain subsurface structures at NPS sites in three dimensions

Clarification of standards
for ground shifts anddeformation, in addition to
those for quakes-

Construct buildings and structures categorized as Class S on
grounds where there are no capable faults

7

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SUMMARYOn February 27, 2013, the NRA decided that new regulatory requirements for the Monju
prototype Fast Breeder Reactor would be developed in line with the enforcement of therevised Act in July which included strengthened requirements for light water powerreactors. Safety issues peculiar to Fast Breeder Reactors would be discussed separately,
both medium and long term.
With regard to the new regulatory requirements for nuclear fuel facilities, it was decided
on March 27, 2013 to establish a Study Team on the New Regulatory Requirements for
Nuclear Fuel Facilities, with membership consisting of a NRA Commissioner, external
experts, staff members of the NRA Secretariat and Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization (JNES) staff. This team began discussions on April 15, 2013.
Recognizing the importance of on-going safety efforts a March 19, 2013 NRA
Commission Meeting decided basic policy for strengthening the backfitting system forcontinuous employment. It was also agreed that a transitional period would be allowed,
in principle, whenever new regulatory requirements were introduced and that a final
judgment on their efficacy would be made at the time operations were scheduled torestart.
Based on the main points of the new regulatory requirements and the Study Team’s
discussions, the NRA Ordinances, including regulations concerning the installation andoperation of commercial power reactors, came into force on July 8, 2013.
A report on the legislative system as of July 2013 is provided in Article 7, and further
details of the regulatory system are provided in Articles 17 - 19.
1-3

Strengthening the Nuclear Emergency Response System(1)

Framework for the Government’s Nuclear Emergency Responses

To develop a new nuclear emergency response system based on the experience and‘lessons learned’ from the accident at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station and the establishment of the NRA on September, 2012, the Atomic Energy Basic
Act, the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Nuclear
Emergency Act), and other related laws and regulations were amended and thegovernment developed a new framework of nuclear emergency responses.
These response policies need to be implemented uniformly by all involved government
agencies and to achieve that goal, a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission was
set up within the Cabinet with the Prime Minister as Chairperson, and the NRA
Chairman as one of the Vice Chairpersons.
A Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters will also be established in response to anuclear emergency with the Prime Minister serving as Chief and the NRA Chairman

8

SUMMARY

serving as one of the Vice Chiefs.
Reflecting the fact that there had been confusion in responding to Fukushima, on-siteand off-site roles were clearly spelled out. The NRA will now oversee the technical andprofessional safety requirements of on-site nuclear facilities. Other relevant ministries
and agencies will handle the procurement of needed equipment at nuclear facilities andother off-site activities under the supervision of the Chief of the Headquarters. The
Secretary-General of the NRA Secretariat will serve as the Director-General of the
Headquarters.
(2)

Preparation of the Manual.

As part of the overall strengthening of the new response system, the chapter for nuclear
emergency responses of Japan’s Basic Disaster Prevention Plan was also revised.
Jurisdictions were changed following the establishment of NRA and the crisis
management system at the Official Residence of the Prime Minister, including the NRA,
and allocation of roles in taking on-site and off-site measures, were clearly specified.
It was also decided that appropriate alternative facilities should be designated inadvance to meet the challenge of possible malfunction of emergency response facilities(hereinafter referred to as “off-site centers”) because of large scale natural disasters
such as earthquakes and tsunamis.
At the first meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission, a Nuclear
Emergency Response Manual was approved. It specifies such issues as the deploymentof staff and response procedures of the NRA and other ministries and agencies during an
emergency. The manual specifies that the Chairman, Commissioners, and NRA will meetin the operations room of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters to collect andtransmit information, supervise relevant nuclear operators’ restoration efforts and makeany necessary professional judgments on the advisability of evacuating and providing
other protective measures for affected local residents. NRA Commissioners and the
Director General for Emergency Response of the NRA Secretariat will be dispatched toan emergency rapid response center to be set up in the head office of the relevant
electric power company, and the Senior Vice Minister of the Environment (or the
Parliamentary Secretary of the Environment) and the Director General for Regional
Safety Management of the NRA Secretariat will be dispatched to headquarters at off-site
centers to strengthen local response systems.
In conjunction with the September 19, 2012 revised Nuclear Emergency Act, the Cabinet
Office revised related Ministerial Ordinances covering off-site centers and theirtechnical standards guidelines. Prefectures hosting off-site centers will be responsible

9

B

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SUMMARY

for checking their preparedness based on revised Ministerial Ordinances and theguidelines.
If necessary, the prefectures will take measures such as relocating facilities or providing
necessary equipment. In preparation for the possible relocation of off-site centers, theCabinet Office has also undertaken to enhance the supply of emergency power supply
equipment, increasing storage of protective clothing, masks, and emergency food, andpreparing communication materials and equipment for such an eventuality.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures and the revised
Nuclear Emergency Act, it was also decided that local governments should amend theirregional disaster prevention plans by around March 18, 2013. These included evacuation
guidelines, based on the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines.
To support any needed local government reorganization, the Cabinet Office held briefing
sessions and prepared an amended manual on Regional Disaster Prevention Plans in
December 2012. As areas included in the Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone (UPZ;
see Table B-2) may extend over multiple prefectures, the Cabinet Office held aconference on multi-prefecture regional disaster prevention measures and madeadjustments to ensure consistency.
To help determine a UPZ in preparing Regional Disaster Prevention Plans, the NRA
conducted a simulation on the spread of radioactive materials resulting from a crisis
equal to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, but under even more severe conditions. Results
were released in October and partial corrections made on December 13.
As of July 18, 2013, all relevant local governments had completed their Regional Disaster
Prevention Plans based on the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines. The NRA andthe Cabinet Office will provide ongoing support to local governments to enhance
regional systems.
(3)

Preparation of Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines

Under the Nuclear Emergency Act, the NRA will prepare Nuclear Emergency Response
Guidelines to ensure that licensees and national and local governments will implement
nuclear emergency responses. The NRA began relevant discussions immediately after its
inauguration and completed them on October 31, 2012 (Table B-2).

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SUMMARY

Table B-2

Main Points of the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines (decided on
October 31, 2012)

Basic issues
concerning
nuclearemergency
responses-

Positioning of the guidelines
Characteristics of nuclear disasters
Basic concept of protective actions against radiation exposure

Issuesconcerning
nuclearemergency
preparedness
measures-Establishment of the EAL and OIL as standards for implementing
protective actions, including evacuation, in an emergency
In anticipation of massive disasters unique measures need to beprepared in advance The PAZ (around 5km from nuclear facilities)
should be established where immediate evacuation is necessary,and the UPZ (around 30km from nuclear facilities) where evacuation
should be implemented depending on circumstances
Provision of information to residents on a regular basis concerning
the potential discharge of radioactive materials, characteristics ofnuclear disasters, protective actions against radiation exposure, etc.
Implementation of comprehensive emergency drills for ensuring
cooperation with residents and related organizations and practicalemergency drills in conditions similar to a real situation
Consideration for the socially vulnerable and others who havedifficulties in taking refuge by themselves and need help during any
evacuation.
As areas included in the UPZ may extend over multiple prefectures,
there is a need for proactive involvement of the national
government to make adjustments among prefectures and ensure
consistency in regional zonal measures.
Other advance preparation for establishing monitoring and radiation
emergency medicine systems in collaboration with disaster medical
agencies

-

-

-

-

-

-

Emergency
response
measuresMedium- tolong-termmeasuresagainst nuclear
disasters-

Implementation of emergency monitoring to promptly ascertain thesituation
Prompt and appropriate information distribution to residents
Implementation of effective protective measures based on the EAL
and OIL (sheltering indoors, evacuation, intake of stable iodine, etc.)
Long-term evaluation of the effects of radiation on human healthand the environment
Implementation of decontamination measures to minimize effects

The EAL and OIL (see Table B-2) are used as the criteria for the implementation ofprotective emergency actions. The NRA held discussions to enhance these measures,and radiation emergency medical procedures, such as screening and preventive
ingestion of stable iodine. Discussions were also held on how to best utilize weather
forecasts and the projected aerial spread of radioactive materials from the System for
Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI). Based on these
discussions and public input which was sought from January 30, 2013, further guideline
revisions were decided on February 27 (Table B-3).

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SUMMARY

Table B-3

Main Points of the Revision to the Nuclear Emergency Response
Guidelines (February 27, 2013)

Nuclearemergency
preparedness
measures-

Radiation
medicine-

Others-Classification of the initial stage of emergencies into the Situation on
Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.
Specification of the EAL for making judgments on the above mentioned
classification and the OIL as the standard for implementing protective
actions in the case of a General Emergency
Utilization of emergency disaster medical organizations, andbroad-based collaboration among medical institutions
Preparation of a system for preventive intake of stable iodine, such as
distributing tablets to residents in the PAZ in advance
Development of a screening system
Utilization of weather forecasts, etc. as reference materials for
implementing protective actions
Need to consider TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS separately from otherfacilities

The NRA also discussed effective emergency radiation monitoring systems andprocedures for changing the OIL, compiled their discussions on March 11, 2013 (Table
B-4), and incorporated the results into the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines onJune 5, 2013.
Table B-4:

Main Points concerning Emergency Radiation Monitoring to be included in
the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines

Basic policy-

Under the control of the national government, local governments, licensees,and related designated public organizations shall share objectives andcollaborate, while fulfilling respective responsibilities.

Objective,
definitions-

Collection of information on radiation levels resulting from accidents andprovision of information for making decisions on the implementation ofprotective actions based on the OIL
Provision of information for evaluating effects of radiation on residents andthe environment

Advancepreparation-

Implementation-

The national government shall prepare a system for emergency radiation
monitoring centers at relevant areas and make plans for deploying staff andequipment
Local governments shall each make an emergency radiation monitoring plan.
The national government shall make an implementation plan for emergency
monitoring.
Related parties shall conduct emergency radiation monitoring based on theimplementation plan.
The national government shall analyze and evaluate the results of emergency
radiation monitoring and release the information in an integrated manner.

A report on nuclear emergency response systems is provided in Article 16.

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SUMMARY2

Response to Challenges identified at the previous Review Meeting

2-1

Securing qualified personnel to serve as regulators and licensees

Nuclear regulation is an administrative field requiring highly professional and technicaljudgments. In order to prevent the regulatory authority from being unduly influenced bylicensees, it is imperative to recruit a sufficient number of highly trained professional
personnel and thereafter continuously enhance their expertise. To achieve these aims,
the NRA began new training programs.
NRA officials attended Japanese graduate schools and preparations are continuing tosend other personnel to overseas nuclear regulatory organizations such as the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the IAEA.
The NRA is continuing to recruit highly educated new graduates and mid-career workers
for FY2013 and thereafter.
It was decided at a March 27, 2013 NRA Commission Meeting that the NRA Secretariat
and JNES, which provides technical support to the NRA, should strengthen theircollaboration. This will include not only issues directly related to nuclear regulation suchas requirements, examinations, and inspections, but also human resource development
including personnel exchanges and training sessions.
A report on the personnel strategy of the NRA is provided in Article 8.
2-2

Full-scale implementation of the aging management program and reviews of its
effectiveness

Under the new regulatory requirements of July 8, 2013 based on the revised Reactor
Regulation Act, the working life of power reactors is set at 40 years, in principle. Thismay be extended one time only for another 20 years if approval is obtained before theexpiration of the initial 40 years. With the introduction of this system, a February 27,
2013 NRA Commission Meeting decided that before any extension could be agreed, thecurrent status of the relevant plant would be assessed as further anticipateddeterioration during the proposed extension period. A maintenance policy for thisextension period must be included in an application, with particular attention paid topreventive measures against aging.
Regarding commercial power reactors in operation for thirty years or more, adegradation assessment and a long-term maintenance policy covering every ten years
are already required, based on the Reactor Regulation Act and related legislation. Thishas been one of the requirements for approval of Operational Safety Programs (aging
management system). The NRA decided on January 23, 2013 that as provisional step
applications for approval of Operational Safety Programs covering the aging

13

B

B

SUMMARY

management system would not be allowed until the Reactor Regulation Act came into
force in July 2013.
A report on aging management measure is provided in Article 14.
2-3

Transition status of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

In December 2012, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters confirmed thefollowings with regard to Units 1 to 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS: (1) temperatures atthe bottom of the pressure vessels are mostly below 100°C; (2) discharge of radioactive
materials from the containment vessels is controlled and public exposure due toadditional discharge have been considerably reduced (the goal is to reduce the doses
below 1 mSv/year at the boundary of the site); and (3) in order to maintain (1) and (2),the medium-term safety of the circulating water cooling system must be ensured.
TEPCO and the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters have continued to monitor
the situation and confirmed that the nuclear reactors are gradually cooling down andthat additional discharges of radioactive materials have been significantly reduced.
However, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is still completely reliant on
temporary safety facilities installed after the accident which frequently experienceproblems.
On March 18, 2013, power was lost in part of the power-supply facility. This halted thealternative cooling system for the spent fuel pool, the cooling system for the common
spent fuel pool, part of the gas treatment system for the containment vessel of Unit 3,
the cesium absorbers, and part of the nitrogen gas transfer unit. This underlined thatproblems continue to arise, and temporary facilities are being replaced with morereliable permanent facilities.
Another problem is the seepage of groundwater into the reactor buildings with TEPCO
estimating the increase of 400m 3 of groundwater every day. TEPCO is increasing storage
facility capacity, but further measures must be taken to halt the increase ofcontaminated water. Despite TEPCO’s ongoing efforts to prevent continued inflow into
the reactor buildings and to ensure the stable operation of the contaminated water
treatment facility, the contaminated water situation is increasingly serious.
The NRA has designated the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as a Specified
Nuclear Facility and provides necessary instructions to ensure the safety ofdecommissioning measures. The NRA established a Supervision and Evaluation
Committee for Specified Nuclear Facilities to detail risk factors and evaluate various
measures to meet specified situations.

14

SUMMARY

2-4

Identification of the root causes, lessons from the accident and sharing thatknowledge throughout the nuclear industry

The government, the Diet, and the private sector individually published accident
investigation reports. All the reports noted that the accident occurred because of theloss of all power sources and the ultimate heat sink, and that measures to deal withsuch a severe accident were inadequate.
The NRA is required to conduct an accident investigation separate from those alreadyheld. The NRA therefore established the Investigation Committee on the Accident at
TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and has been carrying out on-site
surveys and pursuing the causes of the accident. However, due to high radiation levels,
access is still limited and only the area around the isolation condenser in Unit 1 and thehydrogen explosion in Unit 4 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have beenstudied so far. Ongoing long-term studies will continue to determine the causes of theaccident, while taking into account the progress of the decommissioning measures.
Relevant industrial organizations also established the Japan Nuclear Safety Institute(JANSI) on November 15, 2012 with the ongoing goal of strengthening measures toensure the safety of nuclear power stations, including countermeasures against severe
accidents.

15

BArticle 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSARTICLE 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSEach Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear
installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party is reviewed
as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this Convention, the Contracting Party shallensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade thesafety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to
shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take
into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental andeconomic impact.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 6
As of the current reporting period, there are 50 reactor units in Japan, following the decision by thelicensee to decommission four reactors at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
The NRA takes the measures to ensure the safety of existing NPS such as assessing fracture zones atfacility sites.
The NRA has designated TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as a Specified Nuclear
Power Facility and continues to monitor this power station in order to ensure the proper
management of the facility post-accident safety.
Reactor facilities in Japan are required to conform to technical standards based on the provisions of
the Reactor Regulation Act. If a facility is deemed not to comply with these standards, the NRA mayorder action including the suspension of the use of that facility.

16

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

1

Article 6

Reactor Facilities in Japan
As of the end of March 2013, there were a total of 50 reactors (26 Boiling Water Reactors and 24
Pressurized Water Reactors) for power generation purposes in Japan. Four reactors werepermanently shut down to take decommissioning measures, and the decommissioning ofanother four reactors is currently underway.
The Annex provides a list of reactors for power generation in Japan.

2

Events during the Reporting Period
During the three-year period FY2010-2012, 30 incidents were reported to the regulatory
authorities by licensees, in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act. The Annex provides a listof these incidents. The most serious accident during this period was at TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
For further details of this incident and the subsequent Urgent Safety Measures, please refer to agovernment report to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June 2011 1 and thereport submitted to the IAEA in September of that year 2.

3

Initiatives to Ensure Nuclear Safety

3-1

Designation as a Specified Nuclear Power Facility in Accordance with the Reactor
Regulation Act

A nuclear accident resulting in core damage took place at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station, during the March 11, 2011 earthquake-tsunami in the Tohoku region of northern
Japan. Temporary response measures were formulated in accordance with the Reactor
Regulation Act to ensure safety in the aftermath of this accident.
Because it is envisaged that the special management of TEPCO’s Fukushima Power Station willcontinue for some time to come, the NRA designated the plant as a “Specified Nuclear Power
Facility” on November 7, 2012, in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, in order to ensure
appropriate measures were adopted to suit the particular circumstances.
In doing so, and in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, the NRA gave the licensee a list
entitled Matters for which the Measures Should be Taken (Table 6-1) and ordered it to submit aplan for implementing these measures including those focused on the operational safety of the
facility.
On December 7, 2012, the NRA received the TEPCO implementation plan.
In response, the NRA established the Supervision and Evaluation Committee for Specified
Nuclear Power Facilities, which is conducting a review to determine whether each of the facilities
12

http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/iaea_houkokusho_e.html
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/iaea/iaea_110911.html

17Article 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

and measures detailed in the implementation plan conform to the safety requirements detailedin Matters for which the Measures Should be Taken. On-site inspections form part of this process.
(See Figure 6-1)
Main Points of Matters for which the Measures Should be Taken

Table 6-1-

With the goal of completing fuel removal thereby reducing risks to the specified nuclear
power facilities as a whole and ensuring safety both inside and outside the premises,
measures should be taken promptly and efficiently.

-

Regarding Units 1 to 4, decommissioning measures, including removal and storage ofmelted fuel rods, should be completed as early as possible, while ensuring safety in theprocess.

-

Regarding Units 5 and 6, the cold shutdown status should be maintained.

Lifting of the designation as specified
nuclear power facility

Enforced on
March 8, 2013

When the grounds for thedesignation have ceased to exist

Enforcement of the Cabinet Order on
special exception of the Reactor
Regulation Act

Submitted on
December 7,

Approval of the implementation plan

Submission of the implementation
plan from the licensee

Figure 6-1

By the deadline that the
NRA indicatedIndication of the matters for which
the measures should be taken

Immediately after the designation

Designation as specified nuclear
power facility

Finished on
November 7, 2012

Action Scheme for Specified Nuclear Power Facility and Progress Thereof

The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that only parts of the Reactor Regulation Act need beapplied, pursuant to the provisions of the Cabinet Order, and only if measures are in force toensure operational safety. Accordingly, on March 8, 2012, the Cabinet Order Concerning Special
Provisions for the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material andReactors with Regard to Reactor Facilities at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi
NPS entered into force setting out the specific application of the Act.
The regulation in question is to be applied to TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
upon approval of the implementation plan.
From February to March 2013, a public consultation was conducted on the draft versions of the18

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSArticle 6

NRA Ordinance and notification required to be put in place upon the entry into force of theaforementioned Cabinet Order.
3-2

Investigation of the Causes of the Accident

Continuous investigation of the causes of the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Power Station is
one of the NRA’s most crucial roles, and it is examining technical factors based on the results of
medium- to long-term studies of the situation inside the reactors.
TEPCO is progressively conducting surveys inside the containment vessels and the reactor
buildings, including an October 2012 internal survey of the containment vessel at Unit 1 and a
November survey of high-dose rate areas within the Unit 3 reactor building using acamera-equipped robot. The Secretariat of the NRA was informed of the results of these surveys.
At a March 27, 2013 NRA Commission Meeting it was decided to establish the Committee forAnalysis of the Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, to pursue both
medium and long term studies. The membership of this body consists of NRA Commissioners,
external experts, staff members from the Secretariat of the NRA, and staff members from the
JNES.
3-3

Evaluation of On-site Fracture Zones

While verifying existing facilities (re-evaluation of seismic safety) during the review of the seismic
design of nuclear power stations which began in September 2006, the possibility that active
fracture zones within the site of the Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station of the Japan Atomic Power
Company could affect important power station facilities was examined under NISA. Following theGreat East Japan Earthquake of 2011, a decision was made to evaluate the status of fracturezones at the sites of nuclear power stations nationwide. In July 2012, deliberations began at theearthquake and tsunami experts hearing.
In September 2012, the experts hearings on all nuclear power stations and the Rokkasho
Reprocessing Plant having been completed, points of note and response guidelines were
established. Plants noted as needing an additional survey were instructed to carry this out, while
the others were requested to continue to augment their data and overall knowledge.
After the NRA was established in September 2012, it was decided that the NRA would take oversurveys of fracture zones from the former regulator, NISA. Accordingly, the NRA decided to
conduct its own checks and evaluation of those fracture zones by appointing its own teams ofexperts, established for each of six sites originally identified by the NISA to identify and evaluate
active faults and measures to be incorporated in seismic design.
Thus, additional surveys were to be conducted on sites involving 6 nuclear power stations (OhiPower Station, Kansai Electric Power Company; Higashidori Nuclear Power Station, Tohoku

19Article 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSElectric Power Company; Shika Nuclear Power Station, Hokuriku Electric Power Company;
Mihama Power Station, Kansai Electric Power Company; Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station, Japan
Atomic Power Company; and Monju Nuclear Power Station, Japan Atomic Energy Agency). The
NRA will progressively conduct active fault evaluations on-site, based on the surveys carried out
by the licensees.
The following provides an outline of the studies conducted up to July 31, 2013.
(1)

Ohi Power Station

Following a preliminary meeting to ascertain progress to date, the Expert Meeting on
Investigation of Fracture Zones at the Ohi Power Station, conducted five days of on-site
inspections followed by three evaluation meetings.
The results of the second on-site inspection formed the basis of the evaluation meeting held on
January 16, 2011. Opinions were divided as to whether the fracture zone visible at the
Daibahama Trench was due to a landslide or whether it resulted from faulting; accordingly, it was
decided to hold another evaluation meeting after scrutinizing and analyzing the results of afuture boring survey and conducting a trench excavation survey on the south side of the site. The
third on-site inspection was conducted on July 27 and 28, 2013.
(2)

Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station

Following a preliminary meeting to ascertain progress to date, the Expert Meeting on
Investigation of Fracture Zones at the Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station, Japan Atomic Power Co.,
Inc. conducted a two-day on-site inspection (December 1 and 2, 2012) and then held two
evaluation meetings.
On January 28, 2013, agreement was reached on an outline of a draft evaluation report, statingthat there was a strong possibility that the fracture zone directly below the Unit 2 reactor is anactive fault.
On March 8, a peer review meeting was held to seek the opinions of a wide range of experts
concerning the initial draft evaluation report. It was decided to put together a draft evaluation
report based on the comments at this meeting. The evaluation report was compiled at the fifthevaluation meeting and was approved at the NRA Commission Meeting on May 22.
(3)

Higashidori Nuclear Power Station

Following a preliminary meeting to ascertain progress to date, the Expert Meeting on
Investigation of Fracture Zones at the Higashidori Nuclear Power Station, Tohoku Electric Power
Co., Inc. conducted a two-day on-site inspection (December 13 and 14, 2012) and then held
three evaluation meetings.

20

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSArticle 6

During the on-site inspection and the first and second evaluation meetings, members of thepanel were generally in agreement that there is a strong possibility that the on-site fracture zone
is an active fault Agreement was reached on an outline of the draft evaluation report at the third
meeting on February 18, 2013.
(4)

Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju Power Station

The members of the Expert Meeting on Investigation of Fracture Zones at the Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor Monju Power Station of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency conducted an on-site
inspection for two days (July 17 and 18, 2013) after ascertaining the progress to date at apreliminary meeting.
3-4

Investigation of Seawater Inflow into Unit 5 of Hamaoka NPS

On May 14, 2011, an incident occurred at Unit 5 of the Chubu Electric Power Company’s
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station during which approximately 400m3 of seawater from a
condenser flooded the reactor facilities after a reactor shutdown.
This was an unprecedented global event in which large amounts of seawater flowed into the
nuclear facilities, possibly seriously affecting those facilities.
To implement precise nuclear regulations following this incident, it was considered necessary toaccumulate further nuclear regulation knowledge in addition to monitoring and evaluating aseawater inflow impact survey to be conducted by the licensee, as well as its maintenance andmanagement of equipment and instruments, and ascertaining the impact on the safety of thereactor facilities.
In order to precisely monitor and evaluate the seawater inflow impact survey and themaintenance and management of equipment and instruments, the NRA established theSupervision and Evaluation Committee for the Event of Seawater Inflow into Unit 5 of Hamaoka
NPS with members including external experts in advanced specialist fields such as corrosion andhydrochemistry. Committee deliberations are now underway.
At hearings organized by the NISA, experts examined the status of inspections and investigations
conducted by Chubu Electric Power Company and an interim summary of their deliberations wascompiled in September 2012.
In the interim summary, the Committee in question is analyzing the impact of seawater inflow
and evaluating the integrity of the reactor facilities, and will monitor and evaluate the response
measures to be implemented by Chubu Electric Power Company.
3-5

Hosting of International Review Missions

During the current reporting period Japan hosted a number of IAEA teams of experts in relation

21

Article 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

to the Fukushima Daiichi accident; specifically these were a Fact-Finding Mission, a Review
Mission on Stress Tests, and a Seismic Safety Mission to the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station.
The IAEA provides reports 3 on those missions.
4

Facilities to be Decommissioned

4-1

Tokai Nuclear Power Station, Japan Atomic Power Company

Electric generating power: 166,000kW
Reactor type: Graphite-moderated carbon dioxide gas-cooled reactor (GCR)
Fuel: Natural uranium
Commissioned: July 25, 1966
Operations terminated: March 31, 1998
Operation period: 31 years, 8 months
Status: Decommissioning measures underway (being dismantled outside the reactor area)
Overview:
Tokai Nuclear Power Station is a natural uranium, graphite-moderated carbon dioxide
gas-cooled reactor facility that began trial operations on May 4, 1965 and became the firstcommercial nuclear power station to begin operating in Japan on July 25, 1966; it ceased
commercial operation on March 31, 1998.
Subsequently, the Japan Atomic Power Company submitted notification of its dismantling on
October 4, 2001, and decommissioning commenced on December 4 of that year.
The decommissioning plan was approved on June 30, 2006, following the revision of theReactor Regulation Act.
All of the spent fuel had been removed by June 21, 2001, before notification of thedecommissioning.
The decommissioning began with the serial dismantlement of the auxiliary equipment. The
dismantlement of the reactor area has been deferred until radioactivity levels are reduced andthe immediate focus has been on safe storage until reactor dismantlement begins.
At present, non-operational facilities and equipment which have comparatively low levels ofradioactivity or are uncontaminated are being dismantled in the area outside the reactor area
are being dismantled.

3

Fact-Finding Mission
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2011/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_R
eport.pdf
Review Mission on the Stress Test
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/nisa-mission-report0312.pdf
Seismic Safety Mission to Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/onagawa0413.pdf

22

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

4-2

Article 6

Fugen Nuclear Power Plant Advanced Thermal Reactor, Japan Atomic Energy Agency

Electric generating power: 165,000kW
Reactor type: Heavy-water-moderated light-water-cooled boiling water reactor (pressure tube
reactor)
Fuel: Natural or enriched uranium, plutonium mixed oxide
Commissioned: July 29, 1978
Operations terminated: March 29, 2003
Operation period: 24 years, 8 months
Status: Decommissioning measures underway (spent fuel currently being removed)
Overview:
The Advanced Thermal Reactor facility (Fugen) reached its first critical state on March 20, 1978and operated for about 25 years before ending operations on March 29, 2003. Removal of thewhole fuel assemblies from the reactor was completed on August 13, 2003.
On February 20, 2004, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry approved measures toensure that the fuel could not be reloaded and to shut down the reactor permanently.
Subsequently, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency received approval for its decommissioning plan
on February 12, 2008.
It called for dismantling the facilities safely and efficiently, taking into account the need forongoing management and equipment maintenance even after operations end.
Moreover, all of the spent fuel stored in a spent fuel storage pool will be disposed of in due
course at the reprocessing plant of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Tokai Research andDevelopment Center.
4-3

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, Chubu Electric Power Company (Units 1 & 2)

Electric generating power: 540,000kW (Unit 1); 840,000kW (Unit 2)
Reactor type: Light-water-moderated, light-water-cooled reactor, boiling water reactor (BWR)
Fuel: Enriched uranium
Commissioned: March 17, 1976 (Unit 1); November 29, 1978 (Unit 2)
Operations terminated: January 30, 2009
Operation period: 32 years, 10 months (Unit 1); 30 years, 2 months (Unit 2)
Status: Decommissioning measures underway (preparations for dismantling work underway)
Overview:
Both Units 1 and 2 at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station are enriched uranium,
light-water-cooled and moderated reactors (boiling water reactors); Unit 1 reached its firstcritical state on June 20, 1974 and operated for about 27 years until November 7, 2001, when
the reactor was shut down due to the rupture of a pipe in the residual heat removal system.

23

Article 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Subsequently, the Chubu Electric Power Company decided halt reactor operations afterJanuary 30, 2009, and began decommissioning following approval of its decommissioning planon November 18 that year.
Unit 2 reached its first critical state on March 28, 1978 and operated for about 26 years, until it
was shut down on February 22, 2004 to conduct the 20th periodic inspection.
Subsequently, the Chubu Electric Power Company decided to end reactor operations afterJanuary 30, 2009 (the same date as Unit 1), and commenced decommissioning measures
following approval of its decommissioning plan on November 18 that year.
At present, preparations are being made to dismantle both units; system decontamination is
now underway in Unit 1, following completion of the removal of spent fuel on January 22,
2013.
In the case of Unit 2, dismantling preparations are underway with the removal of fuel from thespent fuel pool as the top priority. System decontamination is also underway.
4-4

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Tokyo Electric Power Company (Units 1-4)

Electric generating power: 460,000kW (Unit 1); 784,000kW (Units 2-4)
Reactor type: Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
Fuel: Enriched uranium
Commissioned: March 26, 1971 (Unit 1); July 18, 1974 (Unit 2); March 27, 1976 (Unit 3); October
12, 1978 (Unit 4)
Operations terminated: March 11, 2011
Operation period: 40 years (Unit 1); 37 years, 4 months (Unit 2); 35 years (Unit 3); 33 years, 7months (Unit 4)
Status: Decommissioned as a commercial source of power under the Electricity Business Act(April 19, 2012)
Overview:
In the wake of the March 11, 2011 accident and having concluded that it was impossible tofurther use Units 1-4 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as electric facilities forbusiness purposes, TEPCO submitted a plan, on March 30, 2012, for their decommissioning as
a commercial source of power on April 19 that year, pursuant to the provisions of theElectricity Business Act.
After the accident, emergency measures pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation
Act were taken at the Fukushima plant to deal with this dangerous situation.
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (as it was known at the time) published The Concept
of Securing Mid-Term Safety, which set out basic targets to be achieved before starting workon specific decommissioning tasks. It instructed TEPCO to submit a facility operation plan and24

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSArticle 6then evaluated the validity of this emergency plan.
Because the safety of the Fukushima power station could not be guaranteed in the long-termby such emergency measures, the NRA On November 7, 2012, designated it as a Specified
Nuclear Power Facility requiring special management. It further gave TEPCO a list entitled
Matters for which Measures Should be Taken and told the company to submit an
implementation plan to ensure operational safety and the protection of specified nuclear
fuels.
The NRA established the Supervision and Evaluation Committee for Specified Nuclear Power
Facilities, and reviewed TEPCO’s implementation plan to ensure to ensure its compliance withthe guidelines.
5

Operation of ‘Safe’ Reactor Facilities
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that “In the event that the location, structure, or
equipment of a reactor facility for generating power does not comply with the standards set
forth in the Ordinance of the NRA, the NRA can suspend the use of the reactor facility in question,or its modification, repair, or relocation, or may designate a specific method of operating thereactor in question, or may order any other measure required to ensure operational safety.”
This means that reactor facilities that have not been confirmed to be safe will not be operated
unless such necessary steps are taken, and that no reactor will be allowed to operate for power
generation without its safety having first been ensured.

25

Article 7

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKARTICLE 7
1
2

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework
to govern the safety of nuclear installations.
The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;(ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of theoperation of a nuclear installation without a licence;(iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain
compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licences;(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licences, including
suspension, modification or revocation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 7
In the Japanese legal system governing nuclear energy regulation, the Atomic Energy Basic Act isthe most important piece of legislation and defines the basic principles of nuclear energy use. The
Reactor Regulation Act, which prescribes government safety regulations and the NRA Ordinanceswere enacted under this Act.
Moreover, other necessary legislation has been put in place, such as the Nuclear Emergency Act,
which stipulates responses to nuclear disasters.
In response to the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, these Acts wererevised on September 19, 2012.
The NRA formulating standards for implementing safety regulations are designated as theOrdinance of the NRA.
The Reactor Regulation Act prescribes the permits, approvals, and inspections required for reactor
construction and operations. It clearly stipulates the authority of the NRA to revoke permits,suspend the operation of facilities and approve penalties for violations of its provisions.

26

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Article 7 (1)Article 7

Establishment of a Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1

Outline of Major Legislation Relating to Nuclear Safety

1-1

The Atomic Energy Basic Act

Promulgated in 1955, the Atomic Energy Basic Act is the legal basis of nuclear energy use inJapan.
The objective of the Act is to secure current and future energy resources, promoting advanced
learning and industrial development thus ensuring that nuclear energy will contribute toimproved standards of living and the overall welfare of mankind.
The Act’s basic principles ensure that the research, development and utilization of nuclear energy
shall be strictly limited to peaceful purposes, developed safely and contribute to international
cooperation.
The Act further stipulates that the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan shall ensure thedemocratic operation of nuclear energy governance, and that government regulations must be
followed in the construction of reactors and the use of nuclear fuel material.
Government regulations to be followed in reactor construction are prescribed in the Act on theRegulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.
In response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the Act was amended, establishing the NRA and
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission, and abolishing the NSC, in September 2012
1-2

The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors(Reactor Regulation Act) and Relevant Ordinances

Promulgated in 1957, the Reactor Regulation Act is a law dealing with all regulations concerning
the use of nuclear energy.
This Act, in accordance with the spirit of the Atomic Energy Basic Act, was enacted to provide
necessary regulations on refining, fabricating and enrichment, interim storage, reprocessing andwaste disposal activities, as well as on the installation and operation of reactors. The Act provides
necessary regulations on the uses of internationally controlled materials. It executes treaties andother international agreements ensuring the use of nuclear energy – source materials, nuclear
fuel and reactors are limited to peaceful ones. At the same time, it promotes public safety andthe protection of nuclear fuel materials in the event of a serious nuclear accident resulting inabnormal radioactive levels.
The Reactor Regulation Act governing the construction and operation of reactors establishes
safety regulations and standards for granting permits and approval, including Reactor Installation
Permits, Approval of Construction Plan, Pre-service Inspections, Periodic Facility Inspections,
Approvals for Operational Safety Programs and Operational Safety Inspections, and reactor

27

Article 7

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

decommissioning. The regulations establish administrative procedures such as suspension ofoperations and the revocation of permits, as well as criminal penalties, such as imprisonment ora fine, which can be imposed if an operator does not comply with the provisions of this Act.
It stipulates a system for employee feedback system (whistle blowers) whereby they can reportany violation of the Reactor Regulation Act to the NRA without any fear of penalty.
While Installation Permits for commercial power reactors are regulated on the basis of theReactor Regulation Act, certain procedures from design and construction through to operation –namely Approval for Design and Construction Methods, Pre-service Inspections, welding
methods and their inspection, and Periodic Facility Inspections – were also subject to equivalent
regulation under the Electricity Business Act.
To avoid duplication of these two laws, commercial power reactors had been exempt from theprovisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. But in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident andsubsequent revisions, this exemption was abolished and procedures relating to approval andinspection of commercial power reactors were added, making them subject to the application of
the Reactor Regulation Act.
Consequently, the regulation of all reactors was consolidated into the Reactor Regulation Act.
Of the NRA Ordinances established in response to the Reactor Regulation Act, those covering theregulation of reactor facilities are as follows.


NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation and Operation, of Commercial Power
Reactors (NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors)
Rules prescribing the specific regulatory system based on the Reactor Regulation Act. The
regulatory scope of these rules encompasses boiling water reactors (BWR) and pressurizedwater reactors (PWR).

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities (NRA Ordinance onStandards for the Location, etc.)
Standards relating to the location, structure, and equipment of reactor facilities, which form
one of the criteria for obtaining a power reactor construction permit.



NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors andtheir Auxiliary Facilities (NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards)
Technical standards relating to construction plan approvals and the maintenance of powerreactor facilities.



NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards for Quality Control Methods Concerning the
Design and Construction of Commercial Power Reactors for Licensees of Power
Reactor Operation and Systems for Their Inspection (NRA Ordinance on Quality
Control Methods)

28

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Article 7

Technical standards prescribing quality control methods relating to design and construction
for licensees, which are one of the criteria for approval of a construction plan, and systems
for their inspection.


NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Nuclear Fuel Material Being Used
as a Fuel in Commercial Power Reactors
These are technical standards relating to the inspection of fuel assemblies.

As well as BWR and PWR commercial power reactors, Japan has the Monju prototype fast
breeder reactor. However, Monju is considered in law to be a reactor for power generation at the
research and development stage, so the following NRA Ordinances have been established,separate from those governing commercial power reactors.
These ordinances take into account the attributes of power reactors at the research anddevelopment stage, but still establish the same regulations as those for commercial powerreactors.


NRA Ordinance on the Installation and Operation of Reactors for the Purpose ofPower Generation at the Research and Development StageNRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofReactors for the Purpose of Power Generation at the Research and Development
Stage and their Auxiliary Facilities

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Reactors for the Purpose of Power
Generation at the Research and Development Stage and their Auxiliary Facilities

NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards for Quality Control Methods Concerning the
Design and Construction of Power Reactors for Licensees of Power Reactor Operation
at the Research and Development Stage and Systems for Their Inspection

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Nuclear Fuel Material Being Used
as a Fuel for the Purpose of Power Generation at the Research and Development
Stage

In addition to the aforementioned ordinances, the Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that it may
be only partially applied if proper implementation of measures to ensure operational safety isensured. Accordingly, the following ordinances have been enacted that stipulate the steps to betaken to ensure safety at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, as the situation there
differs from that at ordinary reactor facilities.


NRA Ordinance on the Operational Safety of Reactor Facilities at the Tokyo ElectricPower Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the PhysicalProtection of Specified Nuclear Fuel Material

29Article 7

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Major amendments of the Reactor Regulation Act in the light of the accident at TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station are indicated in the Annex.
1-3

The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Nuclear
Emergency Act)

Because of the specific nature of nuclear disasters, the Nuclear Emergency Act was promulgatedin 1999, with the objective of strengthening measures against nuclear disasters. Combined with
the Reactor Regulation Act, the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, and other related laws,
they were designed to protect the lives, health, and property of the population by prescribing thedisaster responsibilities of nuclear operators, the issue of a Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency
Situation, the establishment of a Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, and theimplementation of emergency response measures, and other special measures relating to
nuclear disasters.
Under this law, licensees must take all possible steps to prevent a nuclear disaster, preventing the
spread of the effects of a crisis and repairing any damage caused by such an incident.
It stipulates that the government must implement emergency response measures, take steps toprevent any nuclear disaster, but in that event deal effectively with such an incident.
Following the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident the Nuclear Emergency Act was revised on
September 19, 2012, to enhance preventive measures and strengthen the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters.
Measures relating to nuclear disasters are detailed in Article 16.
2

International Conventions
Japan is a contracting party of the following conventions relating to nuclear safety.
Convention on Nuclear Safety

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety ofRadioactive Waste Management

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear AccidentConvention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

Article 7 (2)1Safety Requirements and Safety Regulations

Safety Requirements
The regulatory requirements relating to reactor facilities are prescribed in the Reactor Regulation

30

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Article 7

Act, and the NRA Ordinance has been put in place on the basis of this law.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors clearly documents the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act as more specific regulations.
2

Permit and Approval Systems
When constructing commercial power reactors, a permit must be obtained from the NRA,
pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Reactor Regulation Act sets forth the reasons for disqualification from obtaining a permit,
stipulating that anyone who has had a Reactor Installation Permit revoked within the last two
years may not obtain a new permit.
If a licensee wishes to change an already approved he must seek permission for any amendment
or, if the change is a minor one prescribed in law, must submit notification of the change.
No expiry date is set for Reactor Installation Permit in Japan so there are no procedures forrenewing a permit. A 40-year operation limit is stipulated though this may be extended one time
only for a maximum of 20 additional years.
The safety reviews for obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit are carried out by the NRA, theregulatory authority. Article 17 provides an explanation concerning Reactor Installation Permit.
In granting Reactor Installation Permits, the NRA must seek the opinion of the Atomic Energy
Commission of Japan, in order to confirm that there is no risk that the facility will be used foranything other than peaceful purposes.
Anyone who constructs a reactor without obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit will be subject
to a penalty of imprisonment with work for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than
three million yen, or both, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
Holders of a Reactor Installation Permit must obtain NRA approval for their construction plan
before commencing construction, or notify the NRA of the plan.
NRA approval must be sought for the design of the fuel assembly to be loaded into the reactor.

3

Inspection and Assessment Systems
In constructing a reactor facility, the licensee must undergo a Pre-service Inspection by the NRA
and may not use the reactor facility in question if it does not pass this inspection.
The fuel assembly to be loaded into the reactor must undergo a Fuel Assembly Inspection by the
NRA and may not be used if it does not pass this inspection.
As well as conducting inspections of welding contractors, particularly in areas which mustwithstand high pressures and the containment vessel itself, licensees must undergo a review by
the JNES (Welding Safety Management Review). This will focus on the systems involved in
conducting the inspection, the inspection method, process controls, and other matters stipulated31Article 7

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKin the NRA Ordinance.
After commencing operations, licensees must undertake Periodic Licensee’s Inspections, as wellas undergoing Periodic Facility Inspections by the NRA, focusing on designated key safety
components.
Systems involved in conducting inspections, inspection methods, process controls and othermatters stipulated in NRA Ordinances must undergo a Periodic Safety Management Review by
the JNES.
Operational Safety Inspectors from the NRA will also periodically conduct inspections to confirm
compliance with Operational Safety Programs of operational facilities pursuant to the provisionsof the Reactor Regulation Act.
Other inspections will examine compliance with regulations concerning the physical protection of
nuclear material, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
If reactor facilities or fuel assemblies that have not passed the Pre-service Inspection or Fuel
Assembly Inspection are used, or if a licensee is obstructionist they may be subject toimprisonment with labor for not more than one year, a fine of not more than one million yen, or
both, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. These include a refusal or
obstruction or evasion of a Pre-service Safety Management Review, a Welding Safety
Management Review, a Periodic Facility Inspection, or a Periodic Safety Management Review.
Additionally, if a licensee has refused, obstructed, or evaded granting entry to the site, aninspection, or submitting samples for an Operational Safety Inspection or nuclear material
physical protection inspection, or fails to respond to questions, or makes false statements in
response to questions.
4

Law Enforcement Measures
In the event that a licensee is deemed to be violating legal provisions, the NRA may revoke their
Reactor Installation Permit or order reactor operations to be suspended for not more than one
year.
Moreover, if the capability of a reactor facility does not conform to technical standards, the NRA
may order the suspension of the use of the reactor facility in question, or its modification, repair,or relocation, or may designate a specific method of operating the reactor in question, or mayorder any other measure required to ensure operational safety.

32

REGULATORY BODY

ARTICLE 8
1

2

Article 8

REGULATORY BODY

Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with theimplementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, andprovided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill
its assigned responsibilities.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation
between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization
concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 8
In Japan, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) deals with regulations concerning nuclear
installations. In the case of research reactors, which do not fall under the purview of thisConvention, regulation of these has been centralized under the NRA.
The NRA is established as an external bureau of the Ministry of the Environment, in order toseparate the regulation from the promotion of nuclear energy use, and to carry out its regulation
mandate in a fair, neutral and independent manner. Its Chairman and Commissioners are appointed
by the Prime Minister, with the consent of the Diet.
As a new organization the NRA urgently needs to acquire and train personnel.
The NRA will seek to ensure independent and transparent decision-making to help rebuild the
public trust lost in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

33Article 8

REGULATORY BODY

Article 8 (1)Establishment of a Regulatory Body

1

Nuclear Regulation Authority

1-1

Organization, Authority, and Duties

The NRA regulates nuclear-related activities in Japan, while the NRA Secretariat deals withrelated administrative matters.
The NRA is established as an external bureau of the Ministry of the Environment. The Chairman
and Commissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime Minister, with the consent of the Diet,
based on the provisions of the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority. It will
exercise independent authority from a fair and neutral standpoint.
The NRA will provide the Diet with a detailed report, via the Prime Minister, concerning its
activities. The appointment or dismissal of NRA Secretariat members rests with the NRA
Chairman.
The NRA has the authority to establish the Ordinance of the NRA to implement laws and Cabinet
Orders relating to the affairs under its jurisdiction. The term of office of the Chairman andCommissioners is five year but they may be reappointed at the end of this initial term.
The duty of the NRA is to ensure safety in the use of nuclear energy, so it has the right to review
planned nuclear installations to confirm their location, structure, and equipment do not pose adisaster threat, and that being the case to give the permission for their construction.
Moreover, as well as formulating the Ordinance of the NRA that includes regulations concerning
nuclear-related activities such as emergency, operational safety measures and programs, and thephysical protection of specified nuclear fuel material, the NRA handles other issues such as theapproval of the design and construction of facilities, inspections, approval of Operational Safety
Programs, and the approval of plans for nuclear reactor decommissioning measures. It alsocollects reports from licensees and conducts on-site inspections, if necessary.
It has the authority to revoke Reactor Installation Permits or suspend the use of such facilities; toorder safety measures, the dismissal of Chief Reactor Engineers and measures coveringdecommissioning and disaster prevention.
The NRA has under its auspices the Reactor Safety Examination Committee, which investigatesand discusses the safety of nuclear reactors; the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee,
which investigates and discusses the safety of nuclear fuel material; the Radiation Council, which
examines the technical standards for the prevention of radiation hazards, and the Administrative
Evaluation Bureau, which evaluates the incorporated administrative agencies under the NRA's
jurisdiction.
As well as the General Affairs Division, which carries out general internal coordination, theSecretariat of the NRA consists of the Policy Review and Public Affairs Division which evaluates

34

REGULATORY BODY

Article 8

policy and handles public and media relations; the International Affairs Division which liaises withinternational organizations and various other countries; the Regulatory Standard and Research
Division which formulates standards and guidelines; the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Division which is responsible for developing emergency preparedness and response systems,
providing any initial emergency response and physically protecting nuclear material; theRadiation Monitoring Division which compiles summaries of the results of radiation monitoring;
the Radiation Protection and Safeguards Division which implements safeguards based on
regulations and international commitments concerning such matters as the use of radioactive
isotopes; and five directors for nuclear regulation (BWR; PWR and advanced reactors; researchand test reactors, reprocessing, fuel fabrication and utilization; waste, storage, andtransportation; and earthquake and tsunami safety measures), who deal with the practicalaspects of regulation, based on the Reactor Regulation Act (Figure 8-1).
Moreover, as shown in Table 8-1, there are Nuclear Regulation Offices at 22 nuclear sites, withsafety inspectors and nuclear emergency preparedness officers permanently stationed there.
The full complement of staff at the NRA Secretariat is 527, including the nuclear safety inspectors
and nuclear emergency preparedness officers stationed at nuclear sites.

35

Article 8

REGULATORY BODY

Nuclear Regulation Authority

Nuclear Fuel Safety
Examination Committee

Reactor Safety Examination
Committee

Administrative Evaluation
BureauRadiation Council

Secretariat of the NRA
Secretary-General

Deputy Secretary-General

Director-General for Emergency

GeneralAffairs
Division

PolicyReview and
Public Affairs
Division

Director-General for
Nuclear Regulation Policy

International
Affairs
Division

Regulatory
Standard andResearch
Division

Director-General for Regional Safety

Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness
Division

Radiation
Monitoring
Division

Radiation
Protection and
Safeguards
Division

Regional Structures
Nuclear Safety Inspector Office- Nuclear Safety Inspectors- Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Officers

Director for
Nuclear Regulation
BWR, PWR, etc.
Research and test
reactors, etc.
Waste, etc.
Earthquakes,
etc.

Local Nuclear Safety Liaison Officers

Local Radiation Monitoring Officers

Yokosuka Nuclear Vessel Monitoring Center

Rokkasho Safeguards Center

Incorporated Administrative Agencies
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization

Figure 8-1

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

NRA Organizational Chart

36

National Institute of Radiological
Sciences

REGULATORY BODY

Article 8

Table 8-1 NRA Nuclear Regulation Offices
Office Name
Tomari Nuclear Regulation Office
Higashidori Nuclear Regulation Office
Rokkasho Nuclear Regulation Office
Onagawa Nuclear Regulation Office
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Regulation
OfficeFukushima Daini Nuclear Regulation Office
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Regulation
OfficeTokai and Oarai Nuclear Regulation Office
Kawasaki Nuclear Regulation Office
Yokosuka Nuclear Regulation Office
Shika Nuclear Regulation Office
Hamaoka Nuclear Regulation Office
Tsuruga Nuclear Regulation Office
Mihama Nuclear Regulation Office
Ohi Nuclear Regulation Office
Takahama Nuclear Regulation Office
Kumatori Nuclear Regulation Office
Kamisaibara Nuclear Regulation Office
Shimane Nuclear Regulation Office
Ikata Nuclear Regulation Office
Genkai Nuclear Regulation OfficeSendai Nuclear Regulation Office

1-2Target Facilities
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (BWR); research reactor; SF interim storage
Uranium enrichment; reprocessing; disposal facility
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR, GCR); research reactor, fuelfabrication, reprocessing, and usage facilities; disposal
facility
Research reactor; usage facilities
fuel fabrication; research reactor
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (PWR, BWR, FBR, ATR)Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
fuel fabrication; research reactor; usage facilities
Uranium enrichment
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)

Human Resource Development

Nuclear regulation is an administrative field requiring highly professional and technicaljudgments. In order to prevent the regulatory authority from being unduly influenced bylicensees, it is indispensable to secure a sufficient number of highly professional personnel andthereafter continuously enhance their expertise.
To achieve these aims, the NRA initially introduced and carried out new training programs for its
officials to improve their expertise. In practical, (1) specialized training on nuclear regulation andtargeting Operational Safety Inspectors and Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Officers who needlegal status, (2) practical inspection training to learn mechanism of abnormal event and methodof measuring using real-sized machinery, equipment and simulation test equipment, and (3)practice for operation control, including responses to severe accidents, by using plant simulators.
To maintain and enhance officials’ expertise in nuclear engineering, the NRA began new37

Article 8

REGULATORY BODY

programs including lectures with graduate school level textbooks and other lectures covering
national government-level crisis management and quality control.
Three NRA officials went to Japanese graduate schools related to nuclear engineering.
Preparation of station to foreign nuclear regulatory organizations etc., including the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the IAEA, is progressing.
Following its launch, the NRA recruited 13 highly experienced personnel at the middle of the
fiscal year and has begun recruiting activities for new graduates and mid-career workers for
FY2013 and thereafter.
In order to have the NRA assume responsibility for the work of JNES pursuant to the
Supplementary Provisions of the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, thegovernment will abolish that organization as soon as possible and take any further legal steps
necessary, such as for transferring former JNES officials to the relevant sections of the NRA
Secretariat. Additionally, the government will review the structures and operations ofincorporated administrative agencies and related organizations to ensure regulations for safety of
nuclear energy use are implemented in a more efficient and effective manner.
At the March 27, 2013 NRA Commission Meeting, it was decided that the NRA Secretariat and
JNES, which provides technical support to the NRA, should strengthen their collaboration not
only on issues directly relating to nuclear regulation such as establishment of requirements,
examinations, and inspections, but also in human resources development, such as personnel
exchanges and training sessions.
1-3

Funding

As a regulatory body the government funds the NRA which compiles a proposed annual budget
and submits it to the appropriate financial authorities.
This procedure is carried out in the same manner as all government departments.
The FY2013 NRA in FY2013 is 57.3 billion yen.
1-4

Ensuring Transparency and openness(1)

Ensuring Transparency

To restore confidence in nuclear regulation it is vital to ensure the transparency of thedecision-making process.
The Policy on Ensuring the Operational Transparency of the NRA stipulates that the basic policy ofthe organization is (1) to be able to release information not subject to disclosure under the Act
on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs; (2) to adhere to the process of
disclosure and discussion; and (3) to adhere to the principle of administration based on written
documents. Accordingly, to ensure full transparency it has been decided that details of the

38

REGULATORY BODY

Article 8

agenda, minutes and distributed materials at NRA Commission and committee meetings andinformation from its study teams, shall be published, as a general rule.
Following meetings concerning regulations attended by at least three Commissioners orinterviews between NRA Commissioners or Secretariat staff and those subject to regulation, it
was decided that outlines of these proceedings will be published, together with the names of
those present and reference materials used. Overviews of particularly important information will
be reported at the NRA Commission Meetings.
Based on such guidelines as the Policy on Ensuring the Operational Transparency of the NRA andOperational Guidelines for NRA Commission Meetings, the proceedings of NRA Commission
Meetings and its study teams will generally be made available to the public.
For this purpose, an official page has been set up on online video-sharing websites, with the NRA
Commission Meetings and study teams meetings being broadcast live whenever possible; in
addition, recordings and edited highlights of these meetings will also be made available.
Reference materials used in the NRA Commission Meetings and its study teams are published on
the NRA's website at the start of each meeting, increasing the ease and accessibility of interested
parties.
As a rule, minutes of NRA Commission Meetings are posted on the website the following day
while those of study team meetings are generally published within a week.
The NRA Chairman conducts weekly press conference. The Deputy Secretary-General of the NRA
Secretariat, in his capacity as spokesman, also conducts press conference twice a week. If
necessary, extraordinary press conferences are held.
These press conferences are made available as live broadcasts and recordings, in the same way as
the NRA Commission Meetings and study team meetings, while the minutes of the press
conferences are, as far as possible, made available on the NRA’s website on the same day in thecase of the Chairman's press conferences, and the following day in the case of the spokesman'spress conferences.
(2)

Ensuring openness

One of the guiding principles in NRA’s Core Values and Principles is “We shall be open to all
opinions and advice from Japan and the international community and avoid both self-isolationand self-righteousness.”
Based on these principles, the NRA has utilized the expertise of external experts, including thoseserving on study teams, and has actively held discussions with other experts and relevant
licensees.
To seek the opinions of a wide range of both domestic and foreign experts concerning its
activities, the NRA held a meeting in November 2012 with members of the accident investigation

39

Article 8

REGULATORY BODY

committees established by the Diet and the government and NPO specialists; in December
international advisors participated in an exchange of opinions.
In other activities, the NRA has published information and conducted interviews with relevant
experts and licensees to ensure transparency, closer communications and stronger relationships
to facilitate a swift response to any emergency, encouraging a wider understanding of regulations
and gathering a wider knowledge from both domestic and overseas sources.
The NRA canvassed widespread public views to help formulate new regulatory requirements andcountermeasures in the event of nuclear disasters and published those findings.
Even before inviting public comment on the draft text of provisions, the NRA sought publiccomment on the draft framework stage, further encouraging widespread public participation.
The NRA established a website and call centers enabling the public to express their opinions orquestions via the internet or telephone whenever they wish.
1-5

Technical Support(1)

Technical support organizations

As well as holding jurisdiction over the JNES (which, as of January 1, 2013 had some 400 full-timeofficers and staff), the NRA has joint jurisdiction over the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) andthe National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) with the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).
Moreover, in order to enable the NRA to carry out the duties performed by the JNES, the JNES
shall be abolished as quickly as possible, with the requisite legislative measures being formulated
swiftly, including assigning the staff of the JNES to equivalent posts within the Secretariat of the
NRA.
Following deliberations concerning the organization and duties of the incorporated agencies andother relevant bodies, requisite measures shall be formulated to facilitate more efficient,effective nuclear regulations.
JNES was established to ensure nuclear safety by conducting safety analysis and design appraisalsof nuclear facilities and reactor facilities. This also included on-site inspections and activities topre-empt a nuclear disaster, to prevent the effects of such a crisis spreading and to restore thesituation to normalcy in the event of such an incident.
The JAEA is a body that, in accordance with the basic policy prescribed in the Atomic Energy Basic
Act, conducts basic and applied research into nuclear energy; the development of fast breeder
reactors and the nuclear fuel material required for this, in order to establish the nuclear fuelcycle. It also seeks the comprehensive, systematic, efficient development of reprocessing of
nuclear fuel material techniques and the disposal of high-level radioactive waste. This
information is disseminated to help promote nuclear energy research which in turn should help

40

REGULATORY BODY

Article 8

improve the standard of living and welfare of mankind.
Activities carried out by the JAEA in the fields of ensuring the safety in nuclear energy research,its development, and use fall under the joint jurisdiction of the MEXT and the NRA.
The NIRS encouraged search and development focused on the radiation effects on the human
body, thereby improving the scientific and technological level of medicine; the prevention ofhuman radiation injuries, diagnosis and treatment, and the medical use of radiation.
Activities by the NIRS in the fields of radiation effects on the human body, the prevention ofradiation injury in humans, and diagnosis and treatment also fall under the joint jurisdiction of
the MEXT and the NRA.
(2)

Input from external experts

The NRA holds regular meetings of the following study teams, consisting of experts who examine
individual regulatory issues.
(NRA study teams)
Study Team on New Safety Standards for Light Water Power Reactors

Study Team on Establishment of New Safety Regulations for Light Water Nuclear Power
Plants

Study Team on the New Safety Design Basis for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants(Earthquakes and Tsunamis)Study Team on Nuclear Emergency Preparedness MeasuresStudy Team on Radiation Emergency MedicineStudy Team on Emergency MonitoringStudy Team on Health-care of the Residents related to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
Accident(Expert meetings on investigation of fracture zones in the sites of nuclear power stations)

Expert Meeting on Investigation of Fracture Zones in the Site of Higashidori Nuclear
Power Station, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.



Expert Meeting on Investigation of Fracture Zones in the Site of Tsuruga Nuclear Power
Station

Expert Meeting on Investigation of Fracture Zones in the Site of Ohi Power Station, Kansai
Electric Power Co., Inc.

(Specific investigative committees and study teams)


NRA Policy Review Panel

Study Team on Nuclear SecuritySupervision and Evaluation Committee for the Specified Nuclear Power FacilitiesSupervision and Evaluation Committee for the Event of Seawater Inflow into Unit 5 of41

Article 8

REGULATORY BODY

Hamaoka NPS(3)

Safety Research

In administering regulations, the NRA uses research results into nuclear regulations, as required.
The following examples enable the NRA to accurately resolve regulatory issues.
Planning, and deployment of safety regulation systems-

Research involving analysis of the progress of severe accidents, focusing on a wide
variety of events, which is necessary in order to investigate the imposition of regulatory
requirements in relation to severe accidents when developing regulatory standards-

Research aimed at the development of guidelines for safety reviews conducted byregulatory authorities, in response to the deployment of a legal framework for nuclear
regulations concerning the disposal of high-level radioactive waste

Developing technical methods and techniques to be used when implementing regulatory
measures-

Acquiring technical knowledge when developing technical manuals and guidelines to be
used in design and construction approvals, welding inspections, pre-service inspections,periodic inspections, and facility integrity evaluations



Acquiring the technical knowledge required when making judgments concerning theimplementation of regulatory measures-

Research involving the acquisition of data required to evaluate the validity andeffectiveness of measures against severe accidents put in place by licensees of reactor
operation, and the examination of evaluation techniques-

Investigating technical knowledge to evaluate the validity of measures to deal with theaging of each plant, and acquiring technical data concerning events associated with thedegradation of plants over timeLaying the technical foundations required for regulation-

Research concerning the development of methods of probabilistic safety assessment
essential to the identification of severity scenarios in measures against severe accidents
at reactor facilities and nuclear fuel cycle facilities-

Collecting and analyzing information concerning accidents and incidents within Japanand overseas, as well as the causes thereof and the countermeasures Investigating
trends in the establishment and revision of overseas regulatory requirements, acquiringand developing evaluation data, and investigating the deployment of safety standards
by international organizations such as the IAEA

42

REGULATORY BODY

1-6

Article 8

Management of the Duties of the NRA

As employees of the Japanese government, NRA staff members are obliged to comply with thelaw, in accordance with the provisions of the National Public Service Act.
To ensure safety in the use of nuclear energy in protecting the lives and property of the populace,
the NRA has stipulated NRA’s Core Values and Principles for the execution of its duties.
With a new system, the General Affairs Division has put into place a system enabling it to identify
any matters requiring clarification, evaluation, or rectification of duties by each division.
Moreover, it sets operational targets for each fiscal year for the Secretariat, including the Nuclear
Regulation Offices, to aid performance.
Because serious errors were repeatedly discovered in simulations of the dispersal of radioactive
material published by the NRA in October 2012, it was decided that during large-scale
simulations or when specifications were altered task objectives and systems for carrying themout would be checked to ensure that the work was carried out appropriately. In addition, thequality control process was strengthened through the establishment of the Quality Control Office
to check compliance with these processes.
To increase quality control throughout the NRA Secretariat, staff members have been trained inquality assurance.
In the same way as other Japanese administrative bodies, the NRA conducts policy reviews.
These allow government agencies to fulfill their mission more efficiently by summarizing
information that will assist in the accurate planning, formulation, and implementation of policy,
reflecting this information appropriately in policies, and making continuous revisions andimprovements to policies. Disclosure of this process and the outcomes also ensures thoroughpublic accountability.
Policy reviews are used by the NRA Secretariat in budgetary requests, project decisions, requests
concerning staffing numbers, and the establishment of new systems or abolishment of existingones.
2Integrated Regulatory Review Service
In June 2007, the NISA hosted the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) of the IAEA, andplanned to invite a follow-up mission in February 2010; this was postponed, because it was
decided it would be more effective for a review to be conducted after having implemented
proposals from the Basic Safety Policy Subcommittee which was examining regulatory issues atthat time.
Since then, although the follow-up mission has not yet been invited to visit, Japan has
established the NRA and overhauled its nuclear energy regulation, and the intention is to invite
the IRRS mission to review the new regime as soon as possible.

43Article 8

REGULATORY BODY

Article 8 (2)1Status of the Regulatory Body

Centralization of Nuclear Energy Regulation
The government institutions under the auspices of the Japanese government consist of the
Cabinet Office and 11 ministries, with regulation of nuclear energy centralized in the hands of the
NRA.
In Japan, the ministries that oversee nuclear energy differ according to the form of use of nuclear
energy technology, with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) holding jurisdiction
over the use of nuclear energy as a source of energy, and the MEXT supervising the use of
nuclear energy in relation to research and development.
Responsibility for the regulation of nuclear energy was also previously divided between theministries with jurisdiction over it.
The accident at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011 was thecatalyst for the establishment of the NRA on September 19, 2012.
The NRA now has sole responsibility for the regulations on nuclear safety, nuclear security,
safeguards based on international commitments, and regulations on the radiation monitoring
and the use of radioactive isotopes that were formerly handled by a range of administrative
bodies.

Current regulatory framework

Previous regulatory framework
Cabinet Office
Atomic Energy
Commission ofJapan
Coordination of
nuclear material
protection
measures

Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry
Agency for Natural
Resources andEnergyNuclear andIndustrial Safety
AgencyNuclear Safety
Commission ofJapan
Regulation
based
double-checksonElectric powercompanies, etc.

Figure 8-2

Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports Science andTechnology

 Research & test
reactor safety
regulations
 Safeguards
 Radiation monitoring,
management ofSPEEDI (System for
Prediction ofEnvironment
Emergency Dose
Information)
 Regulation ofradioactive isotope
use
Regulation

Nuclear Regulation

Ministry of the

Authority

Environment

Secretariat of the
NRA

Electric power companies, research
institutes, & universities, etc.

Previous and current regulatory framework

44

Trade and Industry
Agency for Natural
ResourcesandEnergyRegulation

Research
institutes &universities, etc.

Ministry of Economy,REGULATORY BODY

2

Article 8

Ensuring Effective Separation
The use of nuclear energy has been separated into promotional aspects and regulatory aspects;
the NRA is tasked with duties relating to the regulation of nuclear energy based on expert
knowledge, from a fair and neutral standpoint as an independent body.
The Chairman and Commissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime Minister with theconsent of the Diet, and the NRA Chairman appoints the staff of the Secretariat of the NRA, so
the authorities tasked with promoting nuclear energy have no involvement in the appointment
and dismissal of staff.
From a fiscal perspective, the activities of the NRA are funded by the national budget, withbudget proposals being submitted to the Ministry of Finance by the NRA.
The budget proposals undergo appraisal by the financial authorities, according to the fiscal
situation of the government as a whole, but the authorities tasked with promoting nuclear
energy are not involved from a financial perspective either.
The NRA has clear authority and competence over safety regulation, in accordance with theprovisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, and it engages in independent decision-making
concerning regulatory activities focused on reactor facilities, such as permits, approvals, andinspections, including nuclear reactor construction permits, without any involvement by theauthorities tasked with promoting nuclear energy.
Moreover, with the objective of ensuring the independence and neutrality of regulation, Article 6,paragraph (2) of the Supplementary Provisions of the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear
Regulation Authority stipulates that, following a five-year period of transitional measures after
the entry into force of the Act, staff members of the Secretariat of the NRA shall not be
permitted to be redeployed to administrative bodies with jurisdiction over administrative mattersrelating to the use of nuclear energy (the so-called “no-return rule”).

45Article 9

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDERARTICLE 9RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests
with the holder of the relevant licence and shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that each suchlicence holder meets its responsibility.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 9
The use of nuclear energy is based on the principle that licensees will bear primary responsibility
for ensuring safety, with the Atomic Energy Basic Act clearly stipulating that the use of such energy
shall be aimed at ensuring safety and be performed independently under democratic management.
To implement this principle, the Reactor Regulation Act aims to enforce nuclear-related activities
and regulations and stipulates primary responsibility of licensees to ensure safety.
The Reactor Regulation Act includes a system of penalties to be imposed on licensees if they violate
the law or any orders based thereon.

46

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER

1

Article 9

The Primary Responsibility to Ensure Safety
The Atomic Energy Basic Act establishes the most basic issues concerning the use of nuclear
energy in Japan. This Act stipulates that “The research, development and utilization of nuclear
energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed
independently under democratic management. The results therefrom shall be made public tocontribute to international cooperation.”
Based on this provision, licensees bear the primary responsibility to ensure the safe and peacefuluse of nuclear energy.
Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Basic Act establishes that “Those wishing to build a nuclear
reactor must comply with the regulations imposed by the government, as prescribed separately
by law.”
In other words, those seeking or holding a license bear responsibility to comply with regulations
imposed by the government as set forth in the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Reactor Regulation Act explicitly states the legal responsibilities of licensees that they “shallbe responsible for installing equipment or apparatus contributing to the improvement of thesafety of nuclear facilities, enhancing education on operational safety, or taking any othernecessary measures for preventing disasters resulting from nuclear source material, nuclear fuelmaterial, and reactors, while taking into account the latest knowledge on safety at nuclear
facilities.”

2. Measures to Ensure That Licensees Meet Their Responsibilities
In the Reactor Regulation Act, measures for operation and maintenance of reactor facility,
shipment, storage and disposal are stipulated as the measures licensees should take to ensure
operational safety.
These measures are detailed in the NRA Ordinance pursuant to the Reactor Regulation Act.
In addition to establishing Operation Safety Programs and obtaining NRA approval, licensees
must also undergo NRA compliance inspections.
Licensees must stipulate in their Operational Safety Programs that they will disclose
noncompliance information in the event that such noncompliance results in the non fulfillmentof basic operational targets. Measures have thus been put in place to ensure that licensees do
not conceal noncompliance.
Licensees are liable to penalty if they fail fulfill the legal responsibility for operational safety.
In case a reactor facility fails to meet legal technical standards or its operations contravene
regulatory requirements, the NRA may require the licensee to adopt alternative operating
methods or order it to take any other necessary measures pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
If the licensee violates this order, the NRA may revoke its permission or order it to suspend

47Article 9

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER

operations for a specified period not exceeding one year.
If an operator establishes a nuclear reactor without permission, it shall be sentenced to
imprisonment with work and/or a fine, pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
The same shall apply if licensee fails to obtain Approval of Operational Safety Programs oramends it without obtaining approval, or if a licensee and/or its employee(s) fails to comply withthose Operational Safety Programs.

48

PRIORITY TO SAFETY

ARTICLE 10

Article 10

PRIORITY TO SAFETY

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in
activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear
safety.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 10
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribes that Operational Safety Programs
established by licensees shall stipulate provisions fostering safety culture and disclosing
noncompliance, thereby focusing on the operational safety of reactor facilities.
Quality assurance plans have been established in Operational Safety Programs and incorporated
into a quality management system to prioritize overall safety.
NRA discussed its core values and principles, and decided that the organization’s mission was to“protect the general public and the environment through rigorous and reliable regulation of nuclear
activities.” It established five guiding principles focusing on independence, effectiveness,transparency, expertise, and readiness, in order to achieve this mission.

49Article 10

1

PRIORITY TO SAFETY

Regulatory Requirements Prioritizing Safety
The Reactor Regulation Act clearly states that licensees are responsible for installing appropriate
safety equipment and apparatus, enhancing operational safety education, and other appropriate
measures, while incorporating the latest nuclear safety knowledge.
It further stipulates that licensees must ensure safety in the maintenance and operation ofreactor facilities, in the storage of waste and in other related activities.
In the event that a licensee contravenes these rules, the NRA may order to take other necessary
safety measures and, if the licensee violates this order, may revoke its Reactor Installation Permit
or order the licensee to suspend operation of the facility for a specific period not exceeding one
year.
Moreover, licensees must establish and obtain NRA approval for Operational Safety Programs
before commencing reactor operations, in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act.
Such Operational Safety Programs are required to establish a system fostering safety culture anda plan for quality assurance incorporating safety-first into the quality management system.
Licensees and their employees must comply with Operational Safety Programs, as stipulated by
the Reactor Regulation Act. If the programs are violated, the NRA may revoke its Reactor
Installment Permit or order the licensee to suspend operations for a period not exceeding one
year.

2

Measures to Prioritize Safety Taken by Licensees
In Operational Safety Programs, licensees must establish provisions to foster a safety culture
wherein safety is the first priority of the nuclear energy business.
Further licensees must establish the policy for fostering safety culture, develop annual plan, andimplement the activities for fostering safety culture, in order to realize prioritize safety in theirbusiness operations.
They must evaluate the implementation of the plan, report the results to the company president,
and seek improvements in subsequent fiscal years.
Operational Safety Programs must comply with relevant legislation and the operational safety
programs themselves at the same time as activities to improve compliance awareness arefollowed.
The quality assurance plan must assign the highest priority to nuclear safety under the direct
responsibility of senior management. Duties must be clearly specified, and structured in such a
way to ensure that these requirements are met.

3

Efforts by the Regulatory Authority to Prioritize Safety
At its 22nd Commission Meeting in FY2012 on January 9, 2013, the NRA discussed its core values

50

PRIORITY TO SAFETY

Article 10

and principles, and decided that the organization’s mission was to “protect the general public
and the environment through rigorous and reliable regulation of nuclear activities.” It establishedfive guiding principles focusing on independence, effectiveness, transparency, expertise, andreadiness, in order to achieve this mission (Table 10-1).
Table 10-1

The NRA’s Core Values and Principles

The Nuclear Regulation Authority was established to absorb and learn the lessons of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident of March 11, 2011. Such nuclear accidents should never be allowed to happen
again. Restoring public trust, both within Japan and overseas, in the nation’s nuclear regulatoryorganization is of utmost importance, and the nuclear safety system and management must be rebuilt
on a solid basis, placing the highest priority on public safety and a genuine safety culture.
Everyone involved in nuclear activities must have a high degree of responsibility and ethical values, andseek to achieve the highest levels of global safety.
We hereby solemnly pledge our full commitment and unwavering efforts in regard to the foregoing.
MissionOur fundamental mission is to protect the general public and the environment through rigorous andreliable regulation of nuclear activities.
Guiding Principles for Activities
We in the NRA and its supporting Secretariat shall perform our duties diligently, acting in accordancewith the following principles.
(1) Independent Decision Making
We shall make decisions independently, based on the scientific and technological information, freefrom any outside pressure or bias.
(2) Effective Actions
We shall discard the previous formalistic handling of regulatory work and stress the importance of afield-oriented approach in achieving genuinely effective regulations.
(3) Open and Transparent Organization
We shall ensure transparency and appropriate information disclosure on regulations, including thedecision-making process.
We shall be open to all opinions and advice from Japan and the international community and avoid
both self-isolation and self-righteousness.
(4) Improvement and Commitment
We shall be assiduous in learning and absorbing the latest regulatory know-how and best practices,enhancing individual capacity, and performing our duties, mindful of high ethical standards, a senseof mission, and rightful pride.
(5) Emergency Response
We shall be ready to swiftly respond to all emergency situations while ensuring that in ‘normal’times a fully effective response system is always in place.

51

Article 11

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCESARTICLE 11
1

2

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial
resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its
life.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbersof qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all
safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 11
In addition to basic financial reviews in the examination stage of Reactor Installation Permits, amechanism is always included for financial reserves to cover the cost of possible decommissioning
as well as the cost of processing and disposal of all spent fuel and radioactive waste.
The recruitment of competent personnel is a regulatory requirement.

52

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Article 11 (1)1Article 11

Financial Resources

Regulatory Requirements
The Reactor Regulation Act requires that any seeking permission to construct a reactor haveadequate financial resources to undertake such a project.
In addition to a request for a Reactor Installation Permit, applicants must provide appropriate
financial evidence outlining funding needed for construction and the source of such finances,details to acquire the necessary fuel materials an and recent inventories of assets and balance
sheets. The NRA will check and confirm that any applicant has the appropriate financial
resources.

2

Steps to be taken by Licensees
Licensees are also obligated to guarantee financial reserves to cover any decommissioning ofgenerating facilities in accordance with the Ministerial Ordinance on Reserve Fund forDismantling Nuclear Power Facilities enacted by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry,
pursuant to the Electricity Business Act.
On the final day of each business year, licensees must provide a cost estimate of dismantling
their reactor facilities which must be approved by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry by
the end of the business year in question.
While the plant is in operation and to fund the cost of any reprocessing of spent fuel, licensees
must build up a financial reserve with a Deposit Management Entity designated by the Ministerof Economy, Trade and Industry while the plant is in operation, pursuant to the Spent Nuclear
Fuel Reprocessing Fund Act.
The fund amount shall be determined by such factors as the amount of spent fuel generated, thecapacity and operational status of reprocessing facilities, and the cost of reprocessing. The Act
states that the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry shall notify each licensee of the amountof needed reserves according to set criteria and any necessary changes in accordance with thecriteria set forth in an ordinance of the METI and licensees will be further informed shouldchanges needed to be made in the reserves depending on status of spent fuel generation.
With regard to the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste and radioactive waste with lowheat production and a long half-life (TRU waste) generated by reprocessing, the SpecificRadioactive Waste Final Disposal Act stipulates that needed financial reserves shall be calculated
by multiplying the final disposal cost per unit of high-level radioactive waste by the quantity ofgenerated waste; and that the final cost of disposal per unit shall be prescribed in an ordinanceof the METI, based on these factors.
Funds designated for the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated through spent53

Article 11

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

fuel reprocessing shall be deposited with a Deposit Management Entity designated by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
The legislation limits the ability to utilize these reserves which may not be used for anythingother than their designated purpose. Furthermore, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
may conduct on-site inspections of electric utilities and Deposit Management Entities.

Article 11 (2)Human Resources

In granting Reactor Installation Permits the NRA must ensure that the applicant possesses thetechnical and personnel ability to build such a facility, operate it safety and efficiently and prevent
severe accidents.
Before commencing reactor operations, licensees must both outline Operational Safety Programs
and obtain NRA approval.
There are regulatory requirements to ensure operational safety that only fully qualified staff andtechnicians meeting NRA criteria and having undergone NRA checks are engaged in the reactor
operation. Checks must be carried out before the reactor is started, while it is operational, and after
it is shutdown.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors outlines Operational Safety Programs, including thecontent of operational safety education and its implementation for personnel operating andmanaging reactor facilities.
A quality assurance plan in the Operational Safety Programs outlines requirements on staff
competence for operational safety and any supplemental education or training to be implemented
should staff be deficient in such competency.
The NRA conducts inspections four times a year, focused compliance with Operational Safety
Programs, as well as checking that competence management and education and training are carriedout appropriately.
From among qualified applications, including the provisions of the NRA Ordinance, licensees must
appoint a Chief Reactor Engineers to supervise the operational safety of reactor operations.
When implementing decommissioning measures, licensees must establish appropriate Operational
Safety Programs and obtain NRA approval.
Human resource provisions covering Operational Safety Programs follow the same system as thosefor reactor operations, including operational safety education in such fields as decommissioning
and providing for competence management and similar matters in the quality assurance plan as
well.

54

HUMAN FACTORSARTICLE 12

Article 12

HUMAN FACTORS

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and limitations ofhuman performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 12
Licensees must deal with both human and organizational factors in anticipating problems andmanaging any noncompliance with rules and regulations.
In the Operational Safety Program and its quality assurance plan, licensee set force guidelines
dealing with noncompliance. These include programs for the analysis, prevention, detection, andcorrection of human error, and for self-appraisal of management and organizational problems.
Incidents of noncompliance due to human or organizational error are shared within the licensee
organization, as well as with other licensees to ensure a strong and effective system.
All designs must incorporate appropriate measures to prevent mis-operations by operators.

55

Article 12

1

HUMAN FACTORS

Design Considerations
Regulatory requirements governing the prevention and rectification of human error at reactor
facilities are stipulated in the NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc. Such facilities
must incorporate safety measures which are easy to operate and where there is no possibility of
mis-operation.
The NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards requires that the main reactor safety systems must beconcentrated in a facility such as the control room. At the construction plan approval stage,
systems must be installed in such a way as to ensure their safe operation and prevent any
mis-operation.

2

Consideration in the Management of Reactor Operation
In their Operational Safety Programs, licensees must establish a quality assurance plan, outlining
their plans to deal with noncompliance situations, including steps to be taken to prevent thefurther deterioration of noncompliance situations and those involving human error.
Licensees are required to undertake close analysis and evaluation of human error, and take steps
to prevent future human error situations.
The NRA evaluates these licensee measures during Operational Safety Inspections.
Guidelines are described in the Guidelines for Evaluation by Regulatory Authorities ofAutonomous Initiatives by Business Operators for Rectifying Noncompliance Concerning Direct
Factors in Human Error (February 2008). The Guidelines state that clarity is essential in analyzing
the direct cause of any problem and whether human error was responsible. The mechanism forsharing information with other licensees’ about noncompliance due to human error must also be
clear, as well as the system for enabling all licensees to effectively utilize such information.
Noncompliance events are classified according to their impact on overall safety with categories
including accident/failure, deviation from operational conditions, violation of Operational Safety
Programs, and autonomous analysis of direct causes. Key points to be checked in specificexamples include:that the condition of systems, equipment, and components and any changes therein;
and

the

behaviorofindividuals,

relationships

betweenindividuals,

andcommunications, are described logically, together with any associated problems.
that factors surrounding any human error are summarized objectively in a way easily
understood by third parties; that safety factors are identified and described in
specific detail; and that proposed corrective safety measures are described in
specific terms and then applied if necessary.

Accumulating, analyzing and utilizing data from human error noncompliance are checked during
Operational Safety Inspections taking into account the frequency and timing of data analysis

56

HUMAN FACTORS

Article 12

carried out by each licensee:that data concerning direct causes of noncompliance resulting from human error arecollected and accumulated;that this accumulated data is analyzed;that, should the collected data indicate such actions are necessary, preventive
measures are formulated, evaluated, and implemented and the outcomes checked;andthat information about noncompliance resulting from human error is shared withother licensees and utilized as appropriate.

The overall objective is not to assign individual responsibility but to construct a more efficient
operational management structure to try to eliminate human error or, if it occurs, to reduce theseverity of the impact. Based on this objective, the NRA conducts the aforementioned checks,
while encouraging licensees to implement the PDCA cycle (Plan ⇒ Do ⇒ Check ⇒ Act ---make
improvements and formulate another plan), share the information with their workers and otherlicensees and implement continuous improvement initiatives.

57

Article 13

QUALITY ASSURANCEARTICLE 13

QUALITY ASSURANCE

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance programmes are
established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified requirements for all
activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of a nuclear installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 13
The concept of quality assurance as part of the safety of reactor facilities was introduced in Japan in
October 2003, and quality management systems are now required to be incorporated into
operational safety activities.
Licensees formulate their management systems based on the JEAC 4111 quality assurance standard(Nuclear Standards Committee of the Japan Electric Association: a quality assurance standard forthe safety for reactor facilities), which was revised while taking into account ISO 9001 (International
Organization for Standardization: Quality Management Systems) and GS-R-3 (IAEA Safety Standard:
The Management System for Facilities and Activities).

58

QUALITY ASSURANCE

1

Article 13

Regulatory Requirements and Measures
Under the Reactor Regulation Act, one of the criteria for obtaining construction approval of a
nuclear facility is that the quality control methods and inspection systems comply with technicalstandards of the NRA Ordinance (the NRA Ordinance on Quality Control Methods).
In practice, this ordinance requires that a quality control supervision system be established forthe design and construction of reactor facilities; that the responsibility of management
executives be clearly stated; and that management of human and other resources, planning andimplementation of specific duties, measurement, analysis, and continuous improvement be
carried out.
Concerning operational safety activities, licensees must outline a quality assurance plan in their
Operational Safety Programs, and must make continuous improvements to this plan, as well asplanning, implementing, evaluating, and improving operational safety activities.
Quality assurance plans must be operated by licensee senior management; have clearly
identified responsibilities, authority, and duties; and to feature mechanisms for the formulation,
implementation, evaluation, and continuous improvement of such plans.
Operational safety plans must establish appropriate management methods covering external
goods or services procurement; procedures for the appropriate management of operationalsafety documents and records; and education and training courses in safety activities.
It is necessary to clarify individual goals and requirements during operational safety activities,
and to check at appropriate times that these are being carried out in accordance with theimplementation plan.
To check this, licensees must conduct requisite inspections and tests, and establish an effective
system to deal with incidents of noncompliance.
To evaluate operational safety activities, licensees must conduct systematic monitoring andimplementation procedures; auditing should be carried out on a regular basis by persons notdirectly involved in the items under review.
Licensees should establish procedures to ensure the continuous improvement of operationalsafety activities and to institute preventive measures to avoid noncompliance situations or,should one occur, to introduce remedial measures to prevent a reoccurrence. Preventive
knowledge acquired at both their own plant and other nuclear facilities should be evaluated and,
where appropriate, incorporated by licensees in their operations.

2

Implementation Status of Quality Assurance by Licensees
Based on the private-sector quality assurance standard for ensuring safety at nuclear power
stations (JEAC 4111-2009), licensees formulate quality assurance plans and conduct quality
assurance activities in order to meet the regulatory requirements mentioned above.

59

Article 13

QUALITY ASSURANCE

The technical adequacy of the JEAC 4111-2009 standard was evaluated by the former regulatory
authority, NISA, when it was published as a set of specifications and criteria for meeting statutory
performance standards; it complies with the quality assurance requirements of the IAEA’s safety
standard GS-R-3.
In terms of the general requirements in JEAC 4111-2009, licensees are required to establish,
document, implement, and maintain a quality management system, as well as making continuous
improvements. These regulations establish specific requirements for a quality management
system including “responsibility of top executives,” “operational management of resources,”“planning and implementation of duties,” and “evaluation and improvement.”
Human resources requirements stipulate that key personnel involved in nuclear safety must becompetent in areas such as education, training, skills and experience.
Licensees must identify needed competences and if necessary provide further education andtraining to ensure personnel reach the necessary standards.
Licensees should conduct procurement procedures having clearly identified the requirements for
product approval procedures, processes, and equipment; personnel competence checks, andquality management systems. Moreover, the standard stipulates that procured items must be
inspected on the premises of the supplier if possible to ensure that they meet set standards.
Reactor quality assurance programs are audited.
To guarantee its impartiality an audit should be conducted by the appropriate authority at thelicensee’s head office and it should have no direct involvement with the department running thenuclear facility. The auditing department should be directly under the president in the company’sorganizational structure so that he can be quickly informed of any situation needing remedialaction or improvement.
In procurement management, it is common for licensees to conduct audits of suppliers directly,
to ensure that the suppliers satisfy the specification sheet requirements.
Such specification sheets are given to the supplier at the time of ordering and products are thenchecked upon delivery.
If checks are required during the product manufacturing process, licensees can directly checkthat process.
In the case of services, the specification sheet is given to the service provider in advance in orderto ensure that a person with the requisite skills is recruited.
These include checking to confirm the provider has technicians with the required specific skills i.e.
welding.
On the issue of outsourcing, the provider must submit to the licensee a quality assurance plan toguarantee all requirements are met.
This prevents sub-standard outsourcing to providers with inappropriate quality assurance

60

QUALITY ASSURANCE

Article 13

systems.
This provides licensees in Japan with the confidence that quality assurance systems constituteone of the major elements for maintaining their own quality assurance systems; accordingly,
mechanisms to enable licensees themselves to conduct audits of providers and suppliers arebeing developed, as required.

61

Article 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

ARTICLE 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction
and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shallbe well documented, subsequently updated in the light of operating experience andsignificant new safety information, and reviewed under the authority of the regulatory body;(i) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that thephysical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance withits design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits and conditions.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 14
In obtaining a reactor installation permit, licensees must conduct an evaluation to confirm that thebasic reactor facility design would not impede disaster prevention measures. During construction
licensees must evaluate safety measures of all processes approved in the construction plan.
After beginning operations, licensees are obliged to conduct regular evaluations during periods of
not more than ten years.
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that pre-service Inspections are conducted at theconstruction stage, and that Periodic Facility Inspections and Operational Safety Inspections arecarried out during the operational stage, with checks focusing on both the hard and soft aspects ofthe safety of reactor facilities.
In response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident the Reactor Regulation Act was revised and anevaluation system to enhance the safety of reactor facilities was introduced.

62

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Article 14 (1)Article 14

Safety Assessments

Anyone seeking to construct reactor facilities, in addition to an installation permit application, theymust provide evidence that the basic design and design principles will not impede disasterprevention. Such documentation will be submitted to the NRA, pursuant to the provisions of theReactor Regulation Act.
The Installation Permit procedure is detailed in Article 18.
After obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit, licensees must obtain approval for their constructionplans, as well as for the design of the fuel assembly to be loaded in the reactor.
When seeking construction plan approval, applicants must append a safety evaluation conductedby the licensee, based on the detailed design for the reactor facility. This document will coverearthquake-resistance and strength, as well as an attachment document concerning thesafety-related design features specific to the equipment for which the application is being
submitted.
When seeking approval for the design of the fuel assembly, applicants must attach a document
covering such features of the fuel assembly as its heat, radiation and corrosion resistance, as well asa document featuring calculations of the strength of the fuel assembly (or the fuel elements, if theassembly consists of a bundle of fuel elements), a structural drawing of the fuel assembly, a flow
chart for processing, and an attachment document concerning quality assurance.
Licensees must conduct welding inspections focusing specifically on areas which must withstandextra pressures and the containment vessel. Licensees welding inspections must be reviewed by
the JNES.
Before beginning reactor operations, licensees must obtain approval for their Operational Safety
Programs, with which they must comply to assure such operational safety.
Matters concerning construction plans, Pre-service Inspections, Fuel Assembly Design Approval,
Fuel Assembly Inspections, and Welding Safety Management Reviews are detailed in Article 18.
Licensees are required to conduct regular safety evaluations during the course of their lifetime, fora period not exceeding ten years.
A report on these evaluations is provided in Article 19.
In response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident the Reactor Regulation Act was revised in June 2012
and an evaluation system to enhance the safety of commercial power reactor facilities wasintroduced. The system requires licensees to evaluate the safety of their reactor facilities wheneverthey undertake voluntary measures to prevent nuclear accidents other than those under regulatory
requirements and to report these results to the NRA, and the public.
Safety evaluations have been incorporated into the legislative regulation structure to ensure thatsuch evaluations are conducted throughout the lifetime of the reactor as part of the responsibilities

63

Article 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETYof the licensees, taking IAEA safety standards (GSR Part 4) into account.

Article 14 (2)1Verification of Safety

Measures Relating to Safety Verification
After receiving approval for the construction plan, the licensee may not use the facility until it has
passed a Pre-service Inspection.
The licensee may not use the fuel assembly unless it has passed a Fuel Assembly Inspection.
Licensees are obliged to undergo Periodic Facility Inspections and inspections of the status of
their compliance with the Operational Safety Programs.
A report on inspections pursuant to the Reactor Regulation Act is provided in Article 19.
In their Operational Safety Programs, licensees establish internal safety mechanisms and conduct
internal deliberations on such matters as changes to structures, systems, and components thathave already received a Reactor Installation Permit, amendments to the Operational Safety
Programs, and the results of regular evaluation of reactor facilities.

2

Aging management
The oldest reactor facilities in Japan have been operating since the 1970s, or 40 plus years.
Dealing with age-related deterioration is therefore a crucial issue. Figure 14-1 shows the numberof reactor units and the number of years they have been operating in Japan.
Number ofunits (units)

12

BWR:
PWR:
Total:

10

26 units
24 units
50 units

8
6
4
2
0

0-4

Number of years of

5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40- operation (years)

Figure 14-1

Number of Years of Operation and Number of Units

64

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Article 14

The Reactor Regulation Act prescribes an operating life of 40 years, but it is possible to extend
this once, for a period of no more than 20 years, if approval is obtained from the NRA.
In determining whether or not to extend the operation period of a facility, it is necessary toascertain the current status of the plant in detail so extension applicants must conduct a special
inspection to assess such factors as deterioration.
Licensees must carry out a technical evaluation of any deterioration, set out their maintenanceand management policy during the extension period, and append these details to their extension
application.
The special inspection must include all equipment, components, and structures with functions
required to ensure plant safety that have not hitherto been subject to a deterioration inspection
or which have only undergone partial inspection, excluding those items that should be dealt withas part of the usual maintenance process. More specifically, it involves inspections of suchcomponents as the base metal of the reactor pressure vessel, and strength checks of concrete
structures by means of core sampling.
The main equipment subject to special inspections in PWR and BWR is shown in Tables 14-1 and
14-2, respectively.
Table 14-1

Equipment and Areas Subject to Special Inspection at PWR Plants and the Inspection
Methods Used

Equipment
Targeted

Areas Targeted

Inspection Method- Base metal and welded parts (100% of
the reactor core area)- Primary coolant nozzle side (the partwith the highest fatigue usage factor)- Check for defects using ultrasonicinspection- Check for cracks by means of surface
inspection or eddy-current testing- Check for cracks in the welded parts in
4question, using MVT-1 , and check for
defects on the inner surface of thebottom mounted instrumentation
nozzles by means of surface inspection
or eddy-current testing- Visual check of the condition of thecoating- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling

Reactor vessel- Bottom mounted instrumentation
nozzles (all)Containment
vesselConcrete
structures

4
5- Steel plates for the containment vessel(all areas to which it is possible to getclose enough to inspect)- Pre-stressed concrete containment
vessel- Concrete structures designed to ensure
5
the safety of reactor equipment(primary shield wall)

Visual inspection using a camera that can distinguish between wires with a width of 0.025mm
Support functions, shielding functions, leak-prevention functions, etc.

65Article 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Table 14-2

Equipment and Area Subject to Special Inspection at BWR Plants and the Inspection
Methods Used

Equipment
Targeted

Areas Targeted

Inspection Method- Base metal and welded parts (reactor
core area and all areas to which it ispossible to get close enough to inspect)- Primary coolant nozzle side (the partwith the highest fatigue usage factor)
Reactor pressure
vessel- Control rod drive mechanism stub tubes
and drive housing (all).

- Foundation bolts (all)- Suppression chamber vent pipes andvent pipe bellows (Mark I, modified
Mark I)
Containment vessel

Concrete structures- Steel plates for the containment vessel(all areas to which it is possible to getclose enough to inspect)- Reinforced concrete containment vessel- Concrete structures with functions
required to ensure the safety of reactor
2
equipment (reactor pressure vesselpedestal or equivalent part, etc.)- Check for defects using ultrasonicinspection- Check for cracks by means of surface
inspection or eddy-current testing- Check for cracks in the welded parts
1
in question, using MVT-1 , and checkfor defects on the inner surface ofthe housing by means of surface
inspection or eddy-current testing- Check via ultrasonic inspection, toensure there are no anomalies within
the bolts- Check for hazardous defects or
cracks, by means of surface
inspection of all relevant surfaces,
6
using MVT-1- Visual check of the condition of thecoating- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling

Deterioration situations subject to evaluation and the evaluation techniques to be used areoutlined in technical evaluations of deterioration. The evaluation focuses on situations such as
stress corrosion cracking, corrosion, embrittlement, abrasion, fatigue cracks, and otherpossibilities.
During an extension period licensees must submit a maintenance and management policy
covering all relevant maintenance measures identified as a result of technical evaluation ofdeterioration.
During an extended operational period, a system for aging management is used. Under thissystem, licensees operating reactors 30 years or older are required to include in their Operational
Safety Programs a deterioration evaluation for equipment covering a period of ten years and amaintenance and management policy, thereby ensuring compliance. Efforts are made to ensure
appropriate implementation including a maintenance and management policy focused on the6

Visual inspection using a camera that can distinguish between wires with a width of 0.025mm

66

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Article 14

period up to the last day of the extended operation period of the facility run for ten years.
The content implemented in each operational cycle, fleshing out the maintenance andmanagement policy, is reflected in the inspections of individual items of equipment and themaintenance plan, taking into account past inspection performances and the status ofdeterioration. These details are checked by the NRA.
Under this system, an NRA Operational Safety Inspector checks the implementation status of themaintenance plan by such means as an Operational Safety Inspection. Figure 14-2 provides anoutline.
Approval of operationalsafety programs

30th year

Operational safety programs
Maintenance & management policy(every 10 years)

Technical evaluation of
aging facilities

Advancesubmission

Specify the timing of
implementation,
implementation plan, andprogress status

Reflected

Substantial
maintenance
plan

Maintenanceplan

Substantial
maintenanceplan

Substantial
periodic
inspection

Periodic
inspection

Substantial
maintenanceplan

Substantial
periodic
inspection

Maintenance plan
implementation
statuschecked by meansof anatinspection
Figure14-2
Maintenance
Activities
Reactor(operational
Facilities safety inspection, etc.)

Figure 14-2

Maintenance Activities at Reactor Facilities

67Article 15

RADIATION PROTECTION

ARTICLE 15

RADIATION PROTECTION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states theradiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be kept as low asreasonably achievable and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed
prescribed national dose limits.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 15
Working conditions of radiation workers at nuclear facilities ensure they are not exposed to levels inexcess of those prescribed in law.
Established release control targets for gaseous and liquid wastes are set lower than legal
concentration limits. Such waste is treated by filtration or allowing radioactive decay over time to
reduce the concentration of radioactive material that it contains, and is managed to ensure thatradioactivity concentrations outside the surrounding monitored area do not exceed the prescribed
limits.
Initiatives to reduce the exposure dose include management of prior records of radiation exposureand task management.

68

RADIATION PROTECTION

1

Article 15

Legislative and Regulatory Measures for Radiation Protection
Measures for radiation protection in a reactor facility are outlined in in laws such as the Reactor
Regulation Act and other legislation.
Radiation protection standards comply with those of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) and have been incorporated into legislation.
The Radiation Council ensures consistency between relevant pieces of radiation hazard
legislation.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribes the legislative requirements of radiation
protection. These include measures controlling the exposure of radiation workers, and themonitoring of concentrations of radioactive material released as part of the management ofgaseous or liquid waste.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors stipulates that in the event of certain problems
licensees must immediately report to the NRA and submit a situation report and measures taken
within 10 days. These include incidents when concentration limits in the air outside theSurrounding Monitored Area are breached, a disposal facility is emitting gaseous radioactive
waste or when a drainage facility releases liquid radioactive waste and concentration limits arealso breached in water outside, the boundary of the Surrounding Monitored Area.
The “Notification to Establish Dose Limits in Accordance with the Provisions of the NRA
Ordinance Concerning the Installation, Operation of Commercial Power Reactors (Notification on
Doses)” prescribes in quantitative terms the dose limits and radioactive material concentration
limits within Radiation Controlled Areas, dose limits and radioactive material concentration limits
outside the Surrounding Monitored Area, dose limits for radiation workers, and dose limits
relating to emergency work.
To comply with these guidelines licensees

must include the following provisions in their

Operational Safety Programs: matters relating to operational safety education and radiation
protection; the establishment of Radiation Controlled Areas, Conservation Areas, andSurrounding Monitored Areas and entry restriction; exhaust gas and effluent monitoring
equipment; the monitoring of doses, dose equivalent, radioactive material concentrations, andthe surface density of radioactive material of contaminated items and decontamination; and the
management of radiation detectors.
Compliance with such matters is included in the Operational Safety Programs and checked byOperational Safety Inspectors during periodic NRA inspections.
In addition, the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors also requires licensees to submit reports
for each business establishment, detail in doses received by radiation workers over the course of
the year.
Japan’s radiation protection standard complies with the ICRP’s 1990 Recommendations

69

Article 15

RADIATION PROTECTION(Publication 60).
This standard incorporates basic ICRP Recommendations and additional provisions:

The standard for the boundary of Radiation Controlled Areas has been set at 1.3 mSv
per three months, based on the special limit for the public (5 mSv per year).



The limit for female radiation workers has been set at 5 mSv per three months, thisshorter period reflecting the need for stronger protection of a fetus before any
pregnancy has been recognized.

The dose limit relating to emergency work remains at 100 mSv, taking into accountthe IAEA’s Basic Safety Standards (BSS).

Since 2008, the Radiation Council has conducted deliberations aimed at incorporating the ICRP’s
2007 Recommendations into domestic legislation.
Table 15-1 shows the dose limits for radiation workers and the general public prescribed in the
Notification on Doses.
Table 15-1

Dose Limits

Item
A
Radiation workers(1) Effective dose limit(2) Women(3) Pregnant women

Dose Limit
100 mSv/5 years and 50 mSv/year
As prescribed in (1), plus 5 mSv/3 months
As prescribed in (1), plus 1 mSv/user for internal
exposure from the time the pregnancy isrecognized until childbirth
150 mSv/year(4) Equivalent dose limit for the lens of
the eye(5) Equivalent dose limit for the skin
500 mSv/year(6) Equivalent dose limit for the
2 mSv/user from the time the pregnancy is
abdominal surface in pregnant women
recognized until childbirth
B
Radiation workers involved in emergency work
(1) Effective dose limit
100 mSv(2) Equivalent dose limit for the lens of
300 mSv
the eye(3) Equivalent dose limit for the skin
1 Sv
CGeneral public(1) Effective dose
1 mSv/year(2) Equivalent dose limit for the lens of
15 mSv/year
the eye(3) Equivalent dose limit for the skin
50 mSv/year

70

RADIATION PROTECTION

2Radiation Protection Programs Implemented by Licensees

2-1Annual Exposure for Individuals

Article 15

The average dose per person for radiation workers from FY2010 to FY2012 was 0.2-0.9 mSv per
year at reactor facilities, according to reports made by nuclear operators under the Reactor
Regulation Act. (The effects of the Fukushima Daiichi accident are excluded.)
The effective dose for radiation workers at reactor facilities in FY2012 was lower than the legallyprescribed limits.
2-2

Total Dose of radiation workers in reactor facilities

The total dose remained basically unchanged in recent years. Figure 15-1 shows the trend of total
dose and average dose for past 10 years; based on reports made by licensees under the Reactor
Regulation Act (data does not include the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi accident).
At present, the individual dose, excluding the effects of the accident, is lower than the legal dose
limit. So, in effect, current dose levels are not in themselves a problem, but it is important tocontinue activities to reduce radiation exposure based on the ALARA Principle.

person-Sv

Total dose

Average dose

mSv
1.5

75

1.0

50
0.5

25
0

0.0
2003

2004

2005

Figure 15-1
2-3

Average dose

Total dose

100

2006

2007 2008
Fiscal Year

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total Dose and Average Dose

Release Control of Gaseous/Liquid Waste

In accordance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, licensees
reduce the concentration of radioactive material in gaseous waste as far as possible by suchmeans as filtration in an exhaust gas facility, radioactive decay over time, or dilution, and then,measure and monitor its release.
In the case of liquid waste, they reduce the concentration of radioactive material as far as
possible by filtration in a drainage facility, evaporation, adsorbing with the ion exchange resin

71Article 15

RADIATION PROTECTION

method, radioactive decay over time, or dilution, and then, they measure and monitor its
release.
Licensees in turn outline measures in their own Operational Safety Programs to control therelease of gaseous and liquid waste ensuring that the legally-prescribed radioactive material
concentration limits outside the Surrounding Monitored Area are not exceeded.
To ensure that release levels are below the legal limits outside the Surrounding Monitored Area,licensees release control targets equal to the annual release quantity stipulated at the time theyreceived their Installation Permit. They guarantee in their Operational Safety Programs that they
will not exceed those levels and the NRA checks the status of compliance when conducting
Operational Safety Inspections.
Figures 15-2 and 15-3 show that release of gaseous and liquid waste from reactor facilities (BWR
and PWR) over the last ten years, based on reports made by nuclear operators under the Reactor
Regulation Act (data does not include the Fukushima Daiichi incident. Based on reports from
nuclear operators gaseous waste increased in FY2010 but did not exceed the release control
targets. Iodine-131 was not detected in FY2012.

Radioactive noble gases kBq

Radioactive Noble gases

1.0E+10

Iodine131

Iodine 131 kBq
1.0E+101.0E+09

1.0E+09

1.0E+08
1.0E+07

1.0E+08

1.0E+06
1.0E+05
1.0E+04

1.0E+07

1.0E+03
1.0E+02

1.0E+06

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Fiscal Year

Figure 15-2

The Quantity of Gaseous Waste Released(Radioactive Noble Gases and Iodine-131)

72

2012

RADIATION PROTECTION

Article 15

kBq
1.0E+12Tritium

1.0E+10Other

1.0E+08
1.0E+06
1.0E+04
1.0E+02
1.0E+00

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fiscal Year

Figure 15-3
2-4

The Quantity of Liquid Waste Released

Measures to Reduce Radiation Exposure

Radiation exposure at reactor facilities in Japan is below the legal dose limits.
To further reduce exposure, licensees conduct autonomous initiatives such as reducing the dosein work environments and managing the time of radiation work.
It is usual for Japanese radiation workers to carry out maintenance work at several reactor
facilities.
To reduce the exposure of such radiation workers, it is vital to implement centralized
management system of their individual exposure histories.
Under the Reactor Regulation Act, licensees must maintain records of radiation workers’ doses,
but they may forward records older than five years to NRA designated organizations. These
organizations can provide centralized data management covering individual workers.
This enables licensees to ascertain the prior exposure records and better management ofradiation workers who have been engaged at multiple reactor facilities
2-5

Environmental Radiation Monitoring

To evaluate radioactive release on the surrounding environment licensees monitor air radiation
does rates and environmental samples with the aim of improving release control and facility
management.
To help protect the health and safety of nearby public communities local governments (inprefectures where reactor facilities are located) have also conducted local radiation monitoring.
After the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident, the government developed a “Comprehensive
Radiation Monitoring Plan (decided in August 2011, revised in March, April 2012 and April 2013)”

73

Article 15

RADIATION PROTECTION

governing environmental radiation monitoring work related to Fukushima Daiichi accident.
Environmental radiation monitoring was increased after the accident, and relevant ministries andbodies including the government of Fukushima Prefecture are now working in partnership in
accordance with the Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan.
Environmental radiation monitoring data are uploaded on the website of the Disaster Prevention
and Nuclear Safety Network for the Nuclear Environment (http://www.bousai.ne.jp/eng/), which
is run by the NRA, enabling the general public to see it in real time.

74

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSARTICLE 16
1

2

3

Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSEach Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site andoff-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover theactivities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear installation,such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation above a low power
level agreed by the regulatory body.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they arelikely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the competentauthorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are provided withappropriate information for emergency planning and response.
Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as
they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear
installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testingof emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried out in theevent of such an emergency.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 16
Nuclear emergency responses in Japan are conducted on the basis of the Nuclear Emergency Act.
The accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station has been the catalyst
tostrengthen the nuclear emergency response system, such as establishing a new Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Commission within the Cabinet. This is chaired by the Prime Minister, andwill enable the government to promote measures to prevent future nuclear emergencies as part ofits routine work, and failing that, to be prepared to deal with any crisis.

75

Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Article 16 (1)1Planning for an Emergency

Outline of the Laws and Regulations Concerning a Nuclear Emergency
Based on the experiences and lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
accident, the government revised the Atomic Energy Basic Act, the Nuclear Emergency Act, andrelated legislations in September 2012 to develop new nuclear emergency responses. As a resultof the revision of the Atomic Energy Basic Act, a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission
was established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister serving as the Chairperson and theChief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of the Environment, and the NRA Chairman serving as Vice
Chairpersons. The goal of the Commission is to ensure unified nuclear emergency response
policies are part of the routine work of the entire government. The Revision of the Nuclear
Emergency Act enhanced measures to prevent nuclear disasters and strengthened the functionsof the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters in any emergency.
In Japan, emergency measures follow those contained in the Basic Plan on Disaster Prevention,
which is drawn up in accordance with the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, the Nuclear
Emergency Act, and the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines, which in turn are formulated inaccordance with the Nuclear Emergency Act. The former prescribes the division of roles andresponsibilities between nuclear operators, the national government and local governments,
while the latter stipulates the specialized and technical measures required to deal with an
emergency (such as references for the extent of zoning and criteria). The diagram below provides
an outline of the relevant legal system.

<Action Plans of Each Organization><National frameworks>[Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures]- Establishment of the Central Disaster Prevention
Council- Implementation of emergency measures for disaster- Formulation of the Basic Disaster Management Plan
- Formulation of regional disaster prevention plans[Basic Disaster Management Plan]

National Government

Local Governments

Nuclear Operators[Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness](Special law under the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures)- Establishment of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters(based on the instruction from government)- Implementation of emergency response measures- Formulation of the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines- Formulation of nuclear operator emergency action plans(Nuclear emergency Countermeasures)*Enforcement of the national crisis management system*Preparation for protecting residents and supporting
affected people*Enhancing disaster prevention and mitigation
infrastructure[Nuclear Emergency Response
Guidelines]- Describes specialist/technicalcontent relating to disaster response
measures

Nuclear Emergency Response Manual- Manuals prescribing the roles of relevant ministries and agencies- Descriptions for the structure of the secretariat surrounding the Prime Minister’s Office and on-site/off-site operational
procedures

Regional disaster prevention plans- Plans relating to disaster prevention by prefectures and municipalities- Formulation of wider-area evacuation plans based on the establishment of the PAZ and UPZ; furnishing of materials andequipment required for disaster prevention
Nuclear operator emergency action plans- Precautions, emergency response measures, and ex post facto measures by nuclear operators- Preparation of a liaison and coordination base ; implementation of drills simulating severe accidents

76

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

1-1

Article 16

The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Nuclear
Emergency Act)In the event of an emergency such as the release of large amount of radioactive material, a
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters will be temporarily established within thegovernment. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the Nuclear Emergency Act was revised
and the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was strengthened. The Prime Ministerserves as Headquarters director, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment, andthe NRA as deputy director generals, with all Ministers of State and the Deputy Chief Cabinet
Secretary for Crisis Management serving as regular members. The NRA holds primary
responsibility technical and specialized on-site safety issues. Matters Procurement of equipment
and supplies required to deal with the nuclear facilities and all matters associated with off-site
response are handled by the relevant ministries and agencies, according to the directions of thedirector (the Prime Minister).
The NRA formulates specialized and technical guidelines to implement emergency preparedness
measures, emergency response and the restoration of facilities (hereinafter referred to as“Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines”).
The responsibility of nuclear operators outlined in the Nuclear Emergency Act is to take all
possible steps to prevent a nuclear disaster, to prevent the spread of any subsequent accident
and to restore any resultant damage. Operators must make a Nuclear Operator Emergency
Preparedness Program and formally notify the Prime Minister and the NRA and prepare asynopsis. An on-site organization for nuclear emergency preparedness must be established ateach nuclear site and actions to either prevent a disaster or limit the spread of such a crisis must
be carried out in accordance with the Nuclear Operator Emergency Preparedness Program.
Accordingly, nuclear operators must appoint Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Personnel to theon-site emergency organization and notify the NRA, the governors of the local and neighboring
prefectures and the municipal mayor. These officials and organizations must also be formallynotified about the appointment or dismissal of a nuclear emergency preparedness manager
chosen by the operator. If a specified event prescribed in the Nuclear Emergency Act occurs,
the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager must alert the above actors and the Prime
Minister.
In addition, nuclear operators must maintain radiation measurement equipment to provide
notification of specified developments 7 Instruments for radiation protection and emergency
communications equipment required to enable the on-site emergency team to undertake its
activities must be permanently available and regularly inspected and maintained. If radiation
measurement instruments to provide alerts are installed, they must undergo NRA performance
7

Events of which notification is required under Article 10, paragraph (1) of the Nuclear Emergency Act

77

Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

checks.
As part of their routine work local governments formulate regional disaster prevention plans
based on the Basic Plan on Disaster Response and the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines
and, and are able to respond to any emergency.
The Prime Minister designates an off-site disaster response center for each nuclear site at whicha local nuclear emergency response headquarters is established to coordinate emergency
response measures.
Government emergency drills are carried out on the basis of a plan drawn up by the Prime
Minister. Drills conducted by nuclear operators are carried out on the basis of legislation, disaster
response plans, or nuclear operator emergency response programs, and nuclear operators must
report the results to the NRA, as well as a synopsis.
1-2

Basic Plan on Disaster Response

The Central Disaster Response Council formulated a Basic Plan on Disaster Response based on
the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures and the Nuclear Emergency Act. The section on
nuclear emergency response measures prescribes basic matters and the respective division ofroles of nuclear operators, the government and local authorities.
The Basic Plan on Disaster Response was revised in September 2012 following the Fukushima
Daiichi accident. The major revisions are as follows.


The revisions prescribe the immediate assembly of the NRA Chairman at the Official
Residence

of

Prime

Ministerandstrengthen

theOfficial

Residence’s

decision-making and information dissemination functions.


A rapid response center for emergencies shall be established at the head office or
any other office of the relevant power company as the base for accident response
measures, and a local headquarters shall be established at an off-site center to takeresponsibility for ensuring residents’ safety. Measures to be taken on-site andoff-site are thus clarified.

The revisions prescribe the implementation of practical drills simulating complex
disasters and severe accidents.



The revisions prescribe close cooperation when multiple headquarters are
established in the event of a complex disaster.

1-3

Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines

In response to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, nuclear emergency
preparedness measures, were strengthened in the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines.
These guidelines stipulate disaster response measures and their implementing frameworks and78

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

the establishment of specific zones where such measures will be treated as a priority.

Article 16

Thenational government, relevant local governments and the nuclear operators plan the measures
to deal with a nuclear disaster based on the Basic Plan on Disaster Prevention and the Nuclear
Emergency Response Guidelines (the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines are detailed in “3Measures for Dealing with an Emergency” below).
The main items indicated in the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines are as follows.


Basic matters concerning nuclear emergency responses-

Guideline Objectives-

Characteristics of nuclear disasters-

Basic concept of protective actions against radiation exposure

Nuclear emergency preparedness measures-

Establishment of EAL and OIL, which form the standards for decision-making inan emergency-

Introduction of a PAZ (around 5km from the facility) and UPZ (around 30km fromthe facility), the zones for which prior measures, such as preparations forevacuation, should be formulated-

Advance preparations, such as the development of information systems,
emergency radiation monitoring, and a framework for radiation emergency
medicine, as well as education and trainingEmergency response measures-

Prompt emergency radiation monitoring-

Providing prompt public information-

Implementation of proper protective actions (sheltering, evacuation, medicationof stable iodine tablets, etc.), based on EAL and OIL

Medium- to long-term measures in response to nuclear disasters-

Long-term evaluation of radiation effects on human health and the environment-

Implementation of decontamination measures to minimize effects

The Guidelines stipulate the following as matters for further consideration.
Introduction of Plume Protection Planning Areas (PPA) and establishment of priority
zones and emergency response measures for facilities other than commercial reactors



Responses to the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station-

Determination of approaches to the transition from an emergency exposure
situation to an existing exposure situation and a planned exposure situation-

Determination of approaches to priority zones for nuclear emergency response
measures peculiar to TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station based on79Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

risk assessment
Establishment of a regular forum for information sharing with local residents2

Responsibilities of Relevant Organizations Involved in Nuclear Emergency Response
The national government, local governments, and nuclear operators prepare the following
systems to prevent a nuclear disaster or respond when a nuclear emergency occurs.

2-1

The National Government
In the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, the NRA holds primary

responsibility for technical and specialized matters associated with the safety of
nuclear facilities (on-site), while matters relating to the procurement of equipment
and supplies required to deal with the nuclear facilities and all matters associatedwith the response outside the facilities (off-site) are handled by the relevant
ministries and agencies, based on the directions of the director (the Prime Minister).
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Officers stationed in regions where nuclear facilities

are located provide guidance and advice to help prevent nuclear emergency, such as
preparing Nuclear Operator Emergency Response Programs and help carrying out
measures to prevent a disaster spreading.
Off-site centers have been located in areas near each nuclear installation site with

essential equipment and communications to reach the Prime Minister’s Official
Residence, the NRA Emergency Response Center, nuclear operators, and relevant
local governments. They can monitor in real time the plant status and environmental
radiation levels since they are linked with monitoring posts located around thefacilities. The national government supervises emergency environmental radiation
monitoring and implements Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Drills withlocal governments, nuclear operators, and local residents.
2-2
Nuclear Operators
Nuclear operators must prepare a Nuclear Operator Emergency Response Program
after conducting discussions with local governments before operations begin and thenformally notify the NRA. The following must be included in the Nuclear Operator
Emergency Response Program:-

The duties of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager.

-

The composition of the organizations for nuclear emergency preparedness at each
emergency base location.

-

The implementation policy of nuclear emergency response education for80

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

appropriate-

Article 16

personnel

Needed equipment for nuclear any emergency response including maintenanceand inspections.

-

Planning, implementation, evaluation and improvement of nuclear emergency
response drills.

-

Measures to be taken during specified events following the declaration orcancellation of a nuclear emergency.

Nuclear operators must establish an on-site nuclear emergency preparedness
organization and appoint a Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager.

This Manager must notify the government and surrounding prefectures immediately
following specified developments.



Nuclear operators must install and maintain radiation measurement equipment,
radiation protection equipment and emergency communications to undertake on-site
emergency responsible activities.

2-3


Local Governments
Local governments formulate and implement Regional Disaster Prevention Plans basedon the Basic Plan on Disaster Prevention and the Nuclear Emergency Response
Guidelines. The main points in the Regional Disaster Prevention Plans are included:-

Maintain communication networks among disaster prevention centers to ensure
reliable communication with the national government, other local governments,
and nuclear operators.

-

Preparation of facilities, materials and equipment, and systems to enable local
headquarters to continue activities even in the event of a severe accident;
establishment of collaboration with the NRA, designated administrative organs,public agencies, and nuclear operators; and development of a system to carry out
extensive and flexible emergency radiation monitoring.

-

Preparation of precautionary protection measures (initial emergency evacuation)
within the PAZ; formulation of extensive evacuation plans and with the national
government ensuring effective instruction for evacuation and transportation ofpeople who need support.

-

Development of systems regulating the shipment of water, and food.

-

Ensuring a comprehensive traffic control system to transport people fromprioritized areas such as PAZ-

Preparation of a system governing iodine tablets including their timely and proper
distribution and administration; establishment of a radiation emergency medicine

81Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

system; and development and maintenance of systems to dispatch and accept
radiation emergency medical teams.
-

Preparation of information systems in the event of a complex disaster.

Prefectures support and coordinate administrative duties by municipalities.

3

Measures for Dealing with an Emergency 8

3-1

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Measures(1)

Basic Approach to Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

In case of a nuclear emergency, appropriate measures to protect local residents and others
against radiation exposure to avoid further contamination and random knock-on effects. .
Because of the rapid escalation of the Fukushima catastrophe, in future it will be necessary

toanticipate a developing emergency even before the release of radioactive materials and takeprecautionary measures such as evacuation. If radioactive material is released it may benecessary to take other requisite protection measures.
(2)

The Establishment of EAL and OIL

To establish such protection measures, it is necessary to set forth nuclear facility emergency
categories and resulting exposure risks so that all stakeholders can share a common
understanding of the emergency. The NRA has deliberated on agreed radiation exposure doses atwhich protection measures should be taken need to be specified in advance.
To enable appropriate protection measures to be implemented in various emergency categories,
it is necessary to establish operational judgment criteria based on observations and figures.
Specifically, it is necessary to stipulate Emergency Action Levels (EALs) which determine
emergency categories. They are primarily used to implement preventive protection measures inthe event of an emergency at nuclear facilities. Also, it is necessary to stipulate OILs, which areused to formulate protection measures particularly after the radioactive release. They areprescribed in the form of measurements, such as the radiation dose rate envisaged in case of an
emergency. Following detailed deliberations the following conclusion was reached.
The emergency categories are divided into three:Alert
In this phase, there is no radiation effects on the public or any imminent risk, but caution isrequired because of the possibility of an ‘abnormal’ event occurring. The PAZ, the body
implementing protection measures such as a local government, begins preparations which
may require a comparatively long time to implement.


8Site Area Emergency

Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines (revised June 5, 2013)82

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Article 16

In this phase, it is necessary for local governments and the PAZ to put into place the main
protection measures around a nuclear facility where a radioactive material release alreadythreatens public safety. They include the evacuation of all local residents.
General Emergency
It is now necessary for controlling organizations such as local governments to implement fullemergency protection measures, to mitigate inevitable damage impact and prevent its spreadfollowing the radioactive material release. The PAZ will organize preventive activities such as
the evacuation of local residents and the distribution of stable iodine tablets. It may also
become necessary to take preventive protection measures such as evacuation of workers
within the UPZ, in the same way as within the PAZ.

Emergency Action Levels are guidelines to establish whether a specific situation corresponds toone of these emergency categories, such as the status of the facility’s defense-in-depth
equipment, the status of radioactive material confinement functions, and whether or not any
external events have also occurred. Table 16-1 shows emergency categories relating tocommercial reactor facilities and the details of current EALs.
Nuclear operators are required to consider establishing more detailed EALs specifically reflecting
conditions at each power reactor and submit them to the NRA, which will examine them andamend recommendations if warranted.

83Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSTable 16-1

Emergency Categories and EALs

Emergency
Category

Alert

Site Area
Emergency

GeneralEmergency

EAL- If an earthquake with a magnitude of at least 6-lower on the Japanese seismic intensity
scale has occurred in the prefecture in which the nuclear facilities are sited- If a major tsunami warning has been issued in the prefecture in which nuclear facilities
are sited- If a Tokai Earthquake Advisory has been issued- In the event of a crucial failure of the reactor facilities that a Director-General of the NRA
Secretariat or the Director of the Accident Countermeasures Office of the Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Division deems to necessitate an alert- In any other case in which the Chairman of the NRA deems the establishment of an NRA
Nuclear Accident Vigilance Headquarters to be necessary- Leakage of reactor coolant- Failure of emergency core cooling system in the high pressure coolant injection system inthe event of the loss of feedwater functions- Loss of all feedwater functions to steam generators- Loss of residual heat removal functions in the event of the loss of residual heat removal
functions from the reactor by means of the main condenser- Station blackout (continuing for at least five minutes)- If a situation in which only one power source is supplying electricity to the DC bus
continues for at least five minutes, in the event that there is only one emergency DC bus- Decline of the water level within the reactor vessel while the reactor is shut down to thelevel at which the emergency core cooling system begins to actuate- Loss of all functions for cooling the reactor during outage- Unavailability of the reactor control room
- Inability to shut down the reactor, if required, by means of a conventional neutron
absorber.
- Loss of all functions to shut down the reactor, in such an emergency is required.
- Inability to inject water into the reactor in question using any of the emergency corecooling systems- If the pressure within the containment vessel reaches the design-basis maximum
allowable working pressure- Loss of pressure control functions in the containment vessel, in the event that functions
for removing residual heat from the reactor have been lost
- Loss of all functions for cooling the reactor- Loss of all emergency DC power supply continues for at least five minutes- Detection of radiation or temperature indicative of core meltdown- Detection of a change in the liquid level within the reactor vessel or other phenomenon
indicative of exposure of the irradiated fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel- If a situation continues for at least one hour in which the water level declines to a point
where residual heat removal functions are lost
- Unavailability of the reactor control room
- The liquid level in the irradiated fuel assembly storage tank declines to the level at which
the fuel assemblies in question are exposed- If a situation in which the air radiation dose rate at the site boundary reaches 5 mSv/hour
continues for at least ten minutes

If the initial phase of an emergency reaches the General Emergency level, based on thejudgement of the local EAL facility, it may be necessary to begin protection measures such as
precautionary evacuations to reduce exposure of the general public. There is a possibility that84

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

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high air radiation dose rates could occur over a comparatively extensive area after radioactive
release because of air dispersal.
Accordingly, it is necessary to conduct emergency monitoring and to measure results against set
criteria before taking any requisite protection measures. The criteria take the form of setting
Operational Intervention Levels using figures such as the air radiation dose rate and theconcentration of radioactive material in environmental samples. Table 16-2 shows the content of
OILs corresponding to each type of protection measure.
Table 16-2
Classification

Outline of Classification

Initial Figure

OIL1

Criteria for advising local residents
to evacuate within a few hours or
sheltering, in order to prevent
radiation effects from surface soil,
inhalation of re-suspended
radioactive material, or
inadvertent oral ingestion

500μSv/h(air radiation dose rate whenmeasured 1m above theground)OIL4Criteria for conducting
decontamination to prevent
inadvertent oral ingestion andexternal exposure via skincontamination

βrays:40,000 cpm(detector counting rate a few
cm from the skin)
βrays:13,000 cpm(detector counting rate a few
cm from the skin)

Emergency
protection
measures

Initialprotection
measures

Restrictions
oningestionof food and
drink

OIL2

Screening
criteria forfood anddrink(Response
to OIL3)

Criteria for restricting ingestion of
local produce and advising local
residents, to temporarily relocate
within a week or so, in order toprevent radiation effects fromsurface soil, inhalation ofradioactive material, or
inadvertent oral ingestion
Criteria for identifying areas where
measurement of radionuclide
concentrations in food and drink
should be carried out in
preparation for possible food anddrink restrictions at OIL6

Criteria when restricting foodand drink intake in order toprevent radiation exposure via oral
ingestion

Outline of Protection
Measures
Identification of zones andevacuation within a few
hours (including ordering
those who cannot easily
move to shelter indoors
temporarily)
Screening of evacuees basedon the evacuation standards
and prompt
decontamination of thoseexceeding the criteria

20μSv/h(air radiation dose rate whenmeasured 1m above theground)Identification of zones
within a day or so andrestriction of ingestion of
local produce, as well as
temporary relocation withina week or so

0.5μSv/h(air radiation dose rate whenmeasured 1m above theground)Identification of zones
where radionuclide
concentrations in food anddrink should be measured
within a few days

NuclideOIL6(3)

OILs and Protection Measures

Radioactive
iodineRadioactive
cesiumAlpha-emitt
ing nuclidesofplutoniumandtransuranicelements
Uranium

Drinking
water, milk,
dairy
products

Vegetables,
cereals,
meat, eggs,
fish, other

300Bq/kg

2,000Bq/kg

200Bq/kg

500Bq/kg

1Bq/kg10Bq/kg

20Bq/kg

100Bq/kg

Analysis of radionuclide
concentrations in food anddrink within a week, andprompt restrictions on foodand drink intake if results
are in excess of the criteria

Radiation Medicine

In addition to conventional medicines, radiation emergency medicine may be required in a
nuclear emergency. Medical controls must be implemented for affected populations including
recording exposure doses, the extent of the affected area, and the potential for contamination.

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Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSAppropriate medical procedures should then be provided with various medical institutions
fulfilling their respective roles (emergency treatment, contamination checks, etc.), Effective
systems and chains of command should be established as a routine measure in institutions
dealing with emergencies and disasters. An issue particular to radiation medicine is the long-termand late-onset effects of radiation, so it is vital to develop a knowledge of these and ensureproficiency in relevant techniques.
From the foregoing perspective, the NRA incorporates radiation medicine systems into the
Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines, together with education, training and practice drills forappropriate institutions, including the national and local governments.
If radioactive iodine enters the body, it can accumulate in the thyroid gland and cause thyroid
cancer from a few years after exposure up to a dozen or more years thereafter. This risk can be
reduced through the prior administration of stable iodine tablets and preparations should bemade in any possible crisis situation. The effectiveness of stable iodine tablets does varyconsiderably according to the timing of their administration, and there is a possibility ofside-effects and so the NRA has instructed their use in compliance with medical advice.
In the PAZ, because of the possibility of immediate evacuations, a system is being developed toenable local governments to distribute iodine tablets to local residents in advance as a routine
measure, ensuring maximum effectiveness.
3-2

Emergency Response Measures(1)

Basic Approach to Emergency Response Measures

In an emergency and in order to institute the most effective preventive measures to protect local
residents, it is necessary to collect the most credible information on the situation as speedily as
possible.
(2)

Identifying Abnormal Situations and taking Emergency Response Measures

Following the release, or threat of, abnormal levels of radioactive materials or radiation, theoperator of a nuclear facility must immediately determine the applicable emergency category
based on available information and notify the national and local governments and propose
appropriate protection measures. The national government and local governments shall take thefollowing emergency response measures:

If the situation has reached Alert or Site Area Emergency status, they shall begin
protection measures in case it develops into a General Emergency and provide
information to local residents.

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSArticle 16

If situation has reached General Emergency status, they will begin measures such as
the evacuation of local residents from the PAZ, as a general rule, and from part of
the UPZ, depending on the situation at the plant.



Depending on the results of emergency environmental radiation monitoring,measures such as evacuation, temporary relocation, and/or restrictions on food anddrink intake shall be implemented outside the areas where precautionary protection
measures have already been taken.

(3)aImplementation of Emergency Environmental Radiation Monitoring
Preparation and initial response to emergency environmental radiation monitoring

The national and local governments, nuclear operators, and designated public organizations
prepare emergency environmental radiation monitoring in an Alert status. In a Site Area
Emergency, the national government establishes and begins operating an emergency
environmental radiation monitoring center with the cooperation of local governments, andrequests necessary personnel based on a staff deployment plan providing them with disaster
information with which to begin emergency environmental radiation monitoring.
b

Establishment of an emergency environmental radiation monitoring implementation plan

The national government swiftly formulates an emergency environmental radiation monitoring
implementation plan, taking into consideration such practical factors as the seriousness of theaccident, location of homes and population centers, topography, weather forecasts and theresults of atmospheric dispersion predictions, and integrates supervision of emergency
environmental radiation monitoring among various fields.
cImplementation of emergency environmental radiation monitoring

The national and local governments, nuclear operators, and designated public organizations
conduct emergency environmental radiation monitoring based on the emergency environmental
radiation monitoring implementation plan under the supervision of the emergency
environmental radiation monitoring center. Initial monitoring should focus on the measurementof air dose rates, to determine future protection measures based on OILs. The aerial
concentration of radioactive materials, mainly radioactive iodine, should also be measured.
Measurement targets are to be expanded sequentially.
The reactor operator is responsible for monitoring the radiation source, such as theconcentration of radioactive material discharged from the facility, and air dose rates at the edgeof the site. The operator must report the results to the emergency environmental radiation
monitoring center.

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Depending on the severity of the problem, the emergency environmental radiation monitoring
center shall effectively utilize available staff, materials and equipment, focusing on measurementtargets to be prioritized.
dResults of emergency environmental radiation monitoring

The emergency environmental radiation monitoring center first judges the validity of themonitoring results, and the national government collects, analyzes and evaluates the verified
results. These are utilized as a reference in determining future protection measures based on
OILs. The national government takes weather data and atmospheric dispersion predictions into
account when analyzing and evaluating the monitoring results. The government publicizes
analysis and evaluation results promptly in an easy-to-understand manner.
(4)

Providing Information to Local Residents in an Emergency

The national and local governments must make full use of all feasible means of communication,
including diverse forms of media, in order to swiftly provide accurate, easily-understandable
information to local residents. In doing so, they should convey the following matters repeatedly
to local residents.


The name of the affected facility, the time when it occurred, and details of thesituation.



The state of the surrounding environment such as measurements of air radiationdose rates, as well as future projections.



Action that local residents should take, broken down by zone or settlement

When the national or local governments disseminate information, they must seek the help of themedia. In providing information, consideration must be given to those requiring assistance andthose who are only staying in the area temporarily. Information should also be shared with
relevant organizations and there are no discrepancies in such information.
(5)

Protection Measures

When abnormal levels of radioactive material or radiation are released, or there is a risk of suchan occurrence the following protection measures shall be taken.
aEvacuation and temporary relocation

Urgent evacuation and temporary relocation should be taken if local residents are exposed tounacceptable levels of radiation. Moving them reduces such risk. Temporary relocation willtake place in areas where the air radiation dose rates are lower than more seriously affectedareas. Temporary relocation is carried out over a longer period of time compared with high-risk

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areas to reduce any unnecessary radiation exposure should residents continue to live there.
Contamination status of evacuation shelters must be checked. Following screening,decontamination of evacuees may be necessary to help fight internal exposure and reduce skinsurface exposure.
Evacuation and temporary relocation measures should be tailored to the Priority Zones for
Nuclear Emergency Response.
In the PAZ, evacuation of all local residents must generally be carried out
immediately when the situation reaches General Emergency status.

In the UPZ, it is necessary to carry out a phased evacuation, depending on thesituation at the nuclear facility. Emergency environmental radiation monitoring shallbe conducted, with zones higher than OIL1 being identified and evacuated within a
few hours. Emergency environmental radiation monitoring shall be ongoing
thereafter, and identification of and temporary relocation from zones higher than
OIL2 must be carried out within a day.

Outside the UPZ, areas higher than OIL1 and OIL2 must be identified following
radioactive releases, in the same way as in the UPZ, and evacuation or temporary
relocation must be carried out.

In implementing evacuation or temporary relocation as described above, the government’s
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters judges the necessity of evacuation and must clearly
and without confusion convey its decisions to residents through appropriate local governments..
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters will considers transport methods, and routes,
ensuring evacuation shelter, utilize emergency environmental radiation monitoring results
obtained by the NRA and weather predictions and atmospheric dispersion predictions as areferenceSpecial assistance must be given to residents, particularly those who need special help becauseof physical or psychological reasons. Attention should be paid to coordinating evacuation
centers in advance of an emergency and the possibility that these shelters may need to be
relocated. Radiation protection measures must be included at evacuation centers like hospitals,
nursing homes and community centers which serve as temporary refuge centers for locals whose
evacuation has been delayed or patients in hospitals and nursing homes.
b

Sheltering

Receiving shelter is relatively easy to arrange by local residents and helps to reduce radiation
exposure and shielding the body from neutron and gamma radiation. Residents should follow
government advice to shelter indoors while awaiting orders. At hospitals and nursing homes it is89

Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

sometimes necessary to prioritize shelter over evacuation. In such situations, providing shelter ina concrete building providing a solid ‘shielding’ effect and air tightness is generally effective.
Practical sheltering measures are tailored to the Priority Zones for Nuclear Emergency Response.
In the PAZ, evacuation is generally carried out in the event of a General Emergency,
but sheltering is prioritized over evacuation.

In the UPZ, sheltering must be implemented as a general rule, until phased
evacuation or protection measures based on the OIL are carried out.

Outside the UPZ, sheltering is generally implemented in the same way as within the
UPZ. Accordingly, local residents must be warned that there is a possibility that
temporary sheltering might be necessary if the situation reaches General Emergency
status.

Once a shelter regime is established the focus will eventually shift to evacuation if it appears
possible that such shelter will likely become prolonged because of prevailing conditions. Thus
radiation exposure reduction would be lost due to the influx of contaminated air and it would
become increasingly difficult to maintain a normal lifestyle. Life would become more complicatedin indoor shelters in such areas as providing information, medical supplies and other relief items
becomes difficult.
In formulating Regional Disaster Prevention Plans (Nuclear Emergency Response Section),buildings must fulfill stringent air-tightness conditions, and evacuation shelters and routes must
be secured because of the possibility of a switch in evacuation plans.

Local residents must be

provided with such relevant information.
cPreventive prescriptions of stable iodine tablets

To prevent internal radioactive iodine exposure, stable iodine tablets should be taken according
to government directives. In addition to warnings about possible side-effects the following points
should be considered:Stable iodine has no protective effect against radionuclides other than radioactive
iodine.



It is necessary to take stable iodine tablets in addition to other protective measures
such as evacuation, shelter, and restrictions on food and drink intake. An excessive
reliance on the effects of stable iodine alone must be avoided and it is necessary to
prevent inadvertent oral ingestion.

When taking stable iodine tablets, psychological anxiety could give rise to unusual
reactions.



Doses must be appropriate to the age of the patient. Particular care is required to
avoid an overdose to infants and young children.

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The following methods of taking stable iodine tablets should be used, tailored to the Priority
Zones for Nuclear Emergency Response.
In the PAZ, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters or local governments
immediately issue instructions concerning evacuation and taking stable iodine
tablets when the situation reaches the General Emergency phase. However, persons
unable to take stable iodine tablets, as well as infants and young children (for whom
the impact of thyroid gland exposure to radiation from radioactive iodine is greater)
and their guardians should evacuate earlier upon the declaration of a Site Area
Emergency, when taking stable iodine tablets is unnecessary.

When a situation enters the General Emergency phase outside the PAZ, the NRA
determines the necessity of taking stable iodine tablets, in addition to possible
evacuation and shelter, after which the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
or local governments issue instructions. Residents are advised to take stable iodine
tablets in line with such instructions.

dRadiation emergency medicine

Medical procedures shall be carried out in accordance with the medical care system developed inadvance, with a focus on contaminated patients or those exposed to radiation.
The NRA which consolidates information from emergency environmental radiation monitoring
and conveys information about radiation doses, to key medical personnel coordinating care inaffected areas via the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.
These medical personnel direct patients to the appropriate hospital and rescue services andinstruct these institutions to accept the incoming patient.

People who are severely stricken canbe taken to an advanced medical facility. If radioactive iodine has been released or may bereleased shortly, responsible officials can direct that stable iodine tablets are taken promptly by
the general public in according with government instructions. Decontamination, protection
guidance and screening shall be carried out. If there is a strong possibility of internal exposure, itis necessary to carry out thyroid screening and measurements.
e

Contamination screening and decontamination

Screening to ascertain the degree of contamination is essential to curb internal exposure via
inhalation and oral ingestion, reduce skin exposure, and prevent the spread of contamination, as
well as ensuring that medical interventions can take place smoothly.
The place for contamination screening should be selected to ensure all procedures (the human
body, objects, etc.) can be screened; it is desirable for such screening to take place in a location
where the radiation background is as low as possible.

91Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSIt is necessary to conduct contamination screening of evacuees and people suffering temporary
location at convenient centers and to carry out decontamination if the level is higher than thereference value.
(i)

Body surface contamination screening

Body surface contamination screening shall be carried out primarily among evacuees. The OIL4
criteria shall determine decontamination. It is also desirable to carry out decontamination
below OIL4 guidance being provided on required radiation protection measures.
If OIL4 is exceeded in body surface contamination screening at evacuation shelters, simple
decontamination (change of clothes, wiping of the skin, use of a simple decontamination agentor shower) shall be implemented, taking into account the effectiveness of such measures. Nasal
smears should be taken to check contamination of the nasal cavity, if there is concern about
inhalation exposure. If the individual cannot be decontaminated there, they should undergo theprocedure without delay when the return home or another suitable venue
Medical personnel should were two layers of gloves to prevent secondary contamination when
examining persons suffering body surface contamination.
It is desirable to explain the results of body surface contamination screening measures whencarrying out protection measures such as decontamination.
(ii)

Thyroid screening

Thyroid screening shall be carried out if concerns arise about radioactive iodine exposure
following screening and emergency environmental radiation monitoring. However, it must be
accepted that thyroid screening do not provide an accurate estimate of thyroid gland exposure
dose.
Screening should initially be carried out using a simple measurement technique. If more detailed
measurement is required, a thyroid monitor or whole body counter should be used, dependingon the nuclide(s) involved. When making detailed estimates of internal exposure, it is necessary
to utilize instruments capable of carrying out such detailed measurements.
(iii)

Screening of goods

The screening of goods shall be carried out to curb external and/or internal exposure among
those handling said goods, and preventing the spread of contamination. Moreover, OIL4 shallalso be used in the screening of goods, with simple decontamination procedures being carriedout ion contaminated goods

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

f

Article 16

Restrictions on ingestion of food and drink

Restrictions on food and drink consumption are enforced when radionuclide concentrations rise
above a certain level. These restrictions are designed to reduce internal exposure due to oral
ingestion, but it is vital to provide alternative food and drink from outside the affected zone if
necessary.
Practical restrictions on the consumption of food and drink should be implemented as follows:

As well as identifying areas where the air radiation dose rate is higher than OIL2 andconsidering the temporary relocation, consuming local produce must be restricted.
Once the radionuclide concentrations in food and drink have been obtained, possible
restriction shall be determined on the basis of OIL6.



Areas where air radiation dose rates are higher than the screening criteria for foodand drink must be identified and measurement of radionuclide concentrations
started. If these measurements confirm radionuclide concentrations in excess of
OIL6, consumption of food or drink must be restricted.

In implementing the aforementioned restrictions the NRA must disseminate all relevant
information to local governments via the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. Local
governments in turn must inform all local residents.
3-3

Medium- Long-term Measures in response to Nuclear Disasters(1)

Basic Approach to Medium- Long-term Measures in response to Nuclear Disasters

In response to a nuclear disaster proper measures need to be taken with regard to radioactive
materials discharged into the environment once the immediate crisis ends. It is therefore
important to take the following medium- to long-term measures as discussions continue:(2)

Environmental Radiation Monitoring to Promote Disaster Recovery

The national and local governments must conduct continuous environmental radiation
monitoring to ascertain changes in radiation doses and concentrations of radioactive materials toenable the following disaster recovery decisions to be made.


Revision of evacuation zones



Determination of measures to manage and reduce exposure doses

Estimates of current and future exposure doses (estimation of individual radiation
doses)

A system to integrating the collection, preservation, and utilization of data must be
created to enable relevant organizations to efficiently use the information and ensure thevalidity of environmental radioactivity monitoring to be conducted on a medium- tolong-term basis.

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Estimation of Individual Radiation Doses to Promote Disaster Recovery

In addition to environmental radiation monitoring, national and local governments must estimate
individual radiation doses assuming medium- and long-term exposure to contamination and takeappropriate measures.
Individual radiation doses vary according to a person’s daily activities so the results of behavioral
surveys must be checked againstthose of environmental radiation monitoring. Actual measured
values obtained through individual dose monitoring are also necessary. By combining thesevalues, individual radiation doses may be estimated with higher accuracy.
(4)

Health Assessment to Promote Disaster Recovery

Residents suffer not only radiation exposure but also mental and physical stresses of living in an
abnormal environment when they must evacuate, take shelter, and live communally over a long
period of time. National and local governments must therefore conduct long-term healthassessments including the mental health of residents in addition to monitoring diseases
associated with radiation exposure. Through such health assessments, officials must eliminate
pubic fear about present and future health problems.
(5)

Decontamination Measures

Government officials must institute decontamination measures to enable residents to return totheir normal lives as quickly as possible. Such decontamination measures must take relevantsocial factors into consideration
Government organizations must encourage public participation by providing all decontamination
information, guidance, materials, equipment and training, and by deploying specialized advisors.
The exposure of workers engaged in decontamination situations should be managed by relevantlaws and regulations.
(6)

The transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation
and a planned exposure situation

Nuclear facilities experience an emergency situation when the release of radioactive materials
exceeds planned targets. The situation is considered ‘stable’ when such release falls below acontrollable level. But even in the aftermath of an emergency some areas may continue toexperience both an emergency-and-existing exposure concurrently. The transition between thetwo is a major factor in judging such issues as lifting evacuation directives and other protective
measures and should be carefully considered. Once a ‘situation exposure’ measures should
immediately be taken to transition to a ‘planned exposure.

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

4

Article 16

Nuclear Emergency Drills
Previously, nuclear emergency drills have been carried out by the national and local governments
and nuclear operators, in order to check the effectiveness of emergency response systems inaccordance with the Nuclear Emergency Act. However, following the Fukushima Daiichi accident
these drills are under review. Future drills must now incorporate ‘lessons learned’ from
Fukushima Daiichi accident including the possibility of a complex earthquake-tsunami-nuclear
accident disaster which had never before been experienced as well as incorporating more
realistic evacuation drills. Such exercises range from large-scale national government drills to
those carried out by nuclear operators within a single facility. The following provides an
explanation of these.

4-1

Drills Drawn up by the National Government

Hitherto, local governments have drawn up nuclear emergency drills. The national government
provided support and coordination. Following the enactment of the Nuclear Emergency Act, forwhich the 1999 JCO criticality accident was the catalyst, the national government drew up plans
and implemented independent drills.
The Fukushima Daiichi accident marked the first time that such a nuclear emergency had been
declared in Japan, and the nuclear emergency response system, including nuclear emergency
drills, was put to the test. Based on this experience, the NRA is now reviewing the disaster
response system, as well as nuclear emergency drills.
The key feature of the drills is that they envisage severe accidents or complex disasters and areintended to test close collaboration with related ministries and agencies, through such aspects asevacuation of local residents within the UPZ (around 30km from the facility). These drills will
form the basis for subsequent revisions of various plans and manuals.
4-2

Drills Based on Plans Drawn up by Nuclear Operators

Nuclear operators conduct drills approximately once a year, focusing on such aspects asestablishment and operation of a response headquarters, notification and liaison, and emergency
environmental radiation monitoring, in accordance with the Nuclear Operator Emergency
Response Program prescribed for each site. Drills check the effectiveness of organizations
implementing accident management. In addition, if a local government carries out a site drill,that site management will also conduct a drill at the same time.
4-3

Drills Drawn up by Local Governments

Even since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, prefectures and municipalities have conducted drills

95Article 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

stipulated in their Regional Disaster Prevention Plans.
These drills simulate severe accidents and complex disasters, train participants without providingthem of the scenarios in advance and conduct map exercises.
4-4

Participation in International Drills

Japan is a contracting party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and theConvention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. In orderto ensure that notification is provided pursuant to the provisions of these conventions without
fail in an emergency, Japan consistently participates in the ConvEx organized by the IAEA.

Article 16 (2)1Information to the Public and Neighboring Countries

Measures for Providing Public Information
To enhance widespread public dissemination of disaster response plans, local residents
participate in national and local government emergency drills.

Local authorities explain adisaster response plan to local residents who then simulate evacuations to actual refugee
facilities and radiation surveys are carried out.
NISA launched its emergency information mailing service in July 2008, which is to enable people
to register their mobile phone e-mail addresses in advance and promptly receive emergency
information. This system was inherited by the NRA in September 2012 as N-alert.
During a nuclear emergency, the media will provide information to local residents. Press briefings,
highlighted by television and radio broadcasts, will be held as required at the local off-site
disaster prevention centers and at the Emergency Response Center in Tokyo, and these will
provide local residents with relevant information.
Information posted on websites provide emergency information.
2

Providing Information to Neighbor Countries
Japan is an island nation and shares no land borders with its immediate neighbors. However, its
geographical neighbors – China and South Korea – also have reactor facilities. Following the
Fukushima Daiichi accident sharing information during a nuclear emergency is an important issue
for all of the neighboring countries. In August 2009, senior Japanese, Chinese and South Korean
regulators met and agreed to share emergency information. The three countries had earlier
exchanged information as required, but Fukushima underlined the importance of closer
cooperation’s and talks are currently underway to achieve such an outcome.
At a Japan - China - South Korea Top Regulators’ Meeting in November 2011, the three countries

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Article 16

reached agreement on a Nuclear Safety Cooperation Initiative, which includes improving theexchange of information, cooperating in response to severe accidents, and cooperating on
disaster prevention and emergency responses.
In terms of existing mechanisms for the providing information other than the aforementioned
tripartite mechanism, Japan will disseminate information via the Unified System for Information
Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE) web portal run by the IAEA’s Incident andEmergency Centre (IEC).
3

Response in the Event of a Nuclear Accident and a Radiological Emergency in a
Neighboring Country
To carry out the provisions of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and theConvention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Japan has
designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the National Warning Point (NWP) and National
Competent Authority for an Emergency Abroad (NCA(A)), in the event of a nuclear accident orradiological emergency occurring outside the territory of Japan.

In the event of a radiologicalemergency outside the territory of Japan, including in a neighboring country, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs will receive a notification and pass on the details without delay to the National
Competent Authority for a Domestic Emergency (NCA(D)) and other relevant authorities, as well
as taking any the necessary action. Moreover, in relation to the Convention on Assistance in theCase of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the National Assistance Capabilities (NAC)of relevant organizations within Japan have been registered with RANET (the IAEA Response
Assistance Network).

97

Article 17

SITINGARTICLE 17

SITING

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are
established and implemented:(i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear
installation for its projected lifetime;(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals,
society and the environment;(iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii)so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;(iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, insofar
as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request providing thenecessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate andmake their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear
installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 17
In deciding on the siting of reactor facilities, licensees are required to conduct adequate studies ofexternal events that could occur at the proposed location and to take these into account in its
design.
The impact on society and the environment of a proposed reactor facility is evaluated as part of theprocedure for granting a Reactor Installation Permit.
Moreover, in the same way as other large-scale industrial facilities, there is an obligation to conduct
an environmental impact assessment of the siting location.

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Article 17 (1)Article 17

Evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location

Factors relating to the siting location that may affect the safety of reactor facilities are evaluatedduring the Reactor Installation Permit review process. Licensees are required to conduct adequate
studies of external events that could occur at the siting location and to take these into account in
the design of such facilities.
The NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc. establishes the review criteria relating toReactor Installation Permits; it also presents design requirements in regard to external events,
which include the followings:
Reactor facilities shall be constructed on ground that can adequately support thefacilities, and can even withstand a major seismic occurrence.



Reactor facilities shall be able to adequately withstand seismic force.



There will be no major risk of the safety functions of reactor facilities from any
tsunamis which may impact on the facilities.



Safety facilities shall be such that there is no risk to their safety from other natural
phenomena.

There will be no major risk of the safety from accidental human action within thesurrounding monitored area.

Article 17 (2)Prevention of Impacts on Individuals, Society, and the Environment Resulting
from Reactor Facilities

The risk of radiological consequences in the surrounding area arises from the siting of reactor
facilities.
In reviewing Reactor Installation Permits, the siting conditions and design of facilities are evaluatedto confirm that the risk of radiological consequences for the public or the environment as a result ofradioactive releases is ‘acceptably’ low.
In applying for a Reactor Installation Permit, the applicant must evaluate the effective dose outside
the surrounding monitored area, as well as evaluating the risk of a major accident.
The NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc. requires that such facilities are able todispose of radioactive waste during normal operations to ensure that concentrations of radioactive
material in the air and in the water outside the surrounding monitored area can be reduced
sufficiently to ensure safety. Also that step can be taken to ensure that air dose rates around thesite due to direct gamma radiation from the reactor facilities and gamma-ray skyshine can also be
reduced adequately.

99

Article 17

SITINGIn the event of a severe accident, licensees are required to take necessary measures to prevent thecontainment vessel failure and abnormally high radioactive release outside the plant or site.
An environmental impact assessment, which is required when siting a large-scale plant or otherfacility, is carried out before applying for a Reactor Installation Permit.

Article 17 (3)Re-evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location

The Reactor Regulation Act does not provide for the re-evaluation of factors related to siting
location, but re-evaluation is carried out as required, such as re-evaluation based on new
knowledge.
In terms of related legislative measures, licensees must submit an application for amendment of
the Reactor Installation Permit, in the event that the safety analysis changes due to a change in theconditions or envisaged events that formed the assumptions of the safety analysis in the original
Reactor Installation Permit application.
In the event that the factors altering the safety analysis are related to factors associated with thesiting location, the factors relating to the siting location are re-evaluated when submitting theapplication for amendment.

Article 17 (4)Discussion with Other Countries That Could be Affected by Reactor Facilities

Japan is an island chain located in East Asia and shares no land borders with its neighbors.
As reactor facilities in Japan use seawater as a coolant, they are sited along the coast. But all such
facilities are sufficiently separated from neighboring countries by the sea, and none are sited close
to any borders, so reactor sitings and operations do not affect other countries.
Consequently, it is not deemed necessary to obtain the consent of these states for the siting offacilities, and no such procedures have been prescribed in law.

100

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

ARTICLE 18

Article 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels andmethods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of radioactive materials, witha view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiologicalconsequences should they occur;(ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation areproven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;(iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable
operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 18
In Japan, the mechanism for the design review by the regulatory authority consists of three
procedures: a Reactor Construction Permit which includes a review of the basic design and safety
evaluation in relation to the siting of a reactor facility; Approval of a Construction Plan which entails
a review of the detailed design of specific facilities; and Approval for the Fuel Assembly Design
which entails a review of the design of the fuel assembly to be used in the reactor facility.
The NRA conducts Pre-service Inspections and Fuel Assembly Inspections to check that reactor
facilities have been constructed and fabricated in accordance with the approved plans.

101

Article 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Article 18 (1)1Implementing a Defense in Depth Strategy

Regulatory Procedures Relating to Design and Construction of Reactor Facilities
Figure 18-1 shows the permits and approvals process in the design and construction of reactor
facilities.

Licensees of Reactor
Operation

Basic design

Detailed design

Construction

Nuclear Regulation Authority
Application
Installation
permitApplication
Approval of
construction plan
Application
Inspection*

Completion

Safety review

Review

Pre-service
inspection**Issue ofcertification* Part of the inspection is carried out by the JNES, at the instruction of the NRA, which is notifiedof the results.
**The fuel assembly inspection and welding safety management review are carried out inconjunction with the pre-service inspection.

Figure 18-1
1-1

Main Procedures Involved in the Design and Construction of Reactor Facilities

Reactor Installation Permits

As explained under Article 17, an evaluation of siting is carried out as part of the process ofgranting a Reactor Installation Permit. The safety of the facility is evaluated at the same time.
The NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc. broadly classifies the requirements for thesafe design of reactor facilities into those relating to equipment dealing with a design basis
accident and those relating to equipment to deal with a severe accident.
The requirements relating to equipment dealing with a design basis accident focused onearthquakes and other external events, and design requirements for ensuring the safety ofreactor facilities.
The requirements relating to equipment for severe accidents stipulate the necessity for avoiding
such crises as well as preventing the spread of such accidents and resolving them.
1-2

Approvals of Construction Plans

Having obtained a Reactor Installation Permit, licensees must then develop a detailed design of102

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Article 18

the reactor facility, and before commencing construction work must seek NRA design approval
pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
When constructing a new reactor facility, the detailed equipment design stipulated in the NRA
Ordinance must be described on the application form for Approval of the Construction Plan;these include the reactor unit and facilities for the handling and storage of nuclear fuel material,
the reactor cooling system, the instrument and control system, facilities for the disposal ofradioactive waste, radiation management and reactor containment facilities. In addition, an
explanatory documentation prescribed in the Ordinance must be appended.
If modifications to an existing reactor facility are required, the licensee must either obtain an
Approval of Construction Plan or carry out formal notification procedures, depending on thenature of the construction work.
The standards for the Approval of Construction Plans are stipulated in the NRA Ordinance on
Technical Standards; in the same way as the Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc. These
are broadly categorized into requirements concerning equipment to deal with a design basis
accident and requirements concerning equipment to deal with a severe accident.
In addition to the foregoing, the procedure for the Approval of Construction Plans involves
checking the quality control methods used by the licensee from the reactor facility design andconstruction stage onward, so one of the standards for Approval of Construction Plan is having atechnically-appropriate quality assurance method and system for its inspection.
The requirements for quality assurance relating to construction plans are prescribed in the NRA
Ordinance on Quality Control Methods. (See Article 13)
Licensees carry out construction work on reactor facilities after receiving an Approval ofConstruction Plan. A mechanism has been put in place whereby the NRA conducts Pre-service
Inspections to check that the construction work is being carried out in accordance with the plan
approved in advance.
1-3

Pre-service Inspections

Pre-service Inspections are carried out for each construction process, in accordance with the NRA
Ordinance.
Before manufacturing the fuel assemblies used in reactor facilities, fuel manufacturers mustobtain prior NRA approval for their design. If they do not pass the Fuel Assembly Inspection
ensuring their manufacture in accordance with the approved specifications, they cannot be used
as fuel in a reactor facility.
Furthermore, under the Reactor Regulation Act, licensees are obliged to conduct a welding
inspection, focusing on the welded areas of key components, such as the containment vessel.
The system (organization, methods of testing, etc.) for conducting these welding inspections

103

Article 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

must be reviewed by the JNES.
1-4

Model Certification and Model Designation for Components

Following an application for Model Certification in relation to specified components prescribed in
the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, the NRA certifies the model if it complies with the
NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc. In the construction permit process, certified
components are deemed to comply with the technical standards, so it is anticipated that this willcontribute to greater efficiency in the construction permit process.
In the event of an application, the NRA approves a Model Certification if all of the following areapplicable: it is based on a design that has already received Model Certification; it complies with
the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards; and it demonstrates homogeneity. In the approval
process of construction plan, specified components that have received this designation are
deemed to comply with the technical standards and it is anticipated that this will contribute to
greater efficiency in the approval process of the construction plan.
2

Regulatory Requirements Relating to Reactor Facility Design
The NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards sets forth the standards for approving constructionplans in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The main requirements for safety functions in the standards concerning equipment to deal with adesign basis accident are as follows.
Prevention of damage due to an earthquake, tsunamis, or other external forcePrevention of fire damage

Prevention of flood damage within the reactor facilityReactor facility functions such as inherent characteristics for reactivity control, etc.

Measures to prevent a station blackoutPrevention of damage due to fluid oscillation, etc.

The NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards prescribes requirements relating to the vessels, pipes
and pumps used in reactor facilities, as well as support structures and the materials andstructures of reactor core support structures, stipulating these by component class and by
operational status (in the case of concrete containment vessels and liner plates, these areprescribed by load status).
Table 18-1 shows the classification of equipment to deal with a design basis accident, Table 18-3
shows the operational status classes, and Table 18-4 shows the load status classes.
In addition, requirements for individual components of reactor facilities are also prescribed.
As well as prescribing the requisite features of equipment to prevent, deal with, or mitigate asevere accident, the standards also require the installation of specified safety facilities to deal

104

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Article 18

with a severe accident caused by an aircraft collision or other acts of terrorism.
Moreover, requirements relating to vessels, pipes and pumps which are part of systems dealing
with a severe accident, and materials and structures of their support structures and reactor core
support structures, are prescribed by component class and by operational status.
Table 18-2 shows the classes of equipment to deal with a severe accident.
The following equipment must be installed to deal with a severe accident, separately fromequipment to deal with a design basis accident.


Equipment for bringing the reactor to a subcritical state in the event of failure of thereactor emergency shutdown systemEquipment for cooling the reactor in the event of a high pressure load on the coolant
boundaryEquipment for reducing the pressure on the coolant boundaryEquipment for cooling the reactor in the event of a low pressure load on the coolant
boundaryEquipment for transporting heat to the ultimate heat sinkEquipment for cooling the containment atmosphereEquipment for preventing containment failure due to overpressureEquipment for cooling a molten reactor core in the bottom of the containment vesselEquipment for preventing damage to the containment vessel due to a hydrogen
explosion

Equipment for preventing damage to the reactor building due to a hydrogen
explosion

Equipment for cooling the spent fuel storage tankEquipment for curbing the radioactive dispersion outside the plant or industrial
establishment

The requisite water source for tackling a severe accident and equipment for
supplying such waterPower supply facilities



Instrumentation

Reactor control roomMonitoring and measurement equipment



Office for Emergency responseCommunications and liaison equipment

The concept behind power station design requirements focuses on using equipment to deal witha design basis accident in order to prevent an anticipated operational event from progressing toan accident. It seeks to create a mechanism to prevent damage to the reactor core and105Article 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

radioactive releases outside the facility, and to return the power station to a safe condition even
if the original problem had already become a more serious ‘accident.’
Even if a severe accident occurred, equipment to deal with a severe accident should enableradioactive releases to be kept as low as reasonably achievable.
Thus, design requirements have been implemented in order to introduce the concept of defense
in depth.
Table 18-1
Class 1

Class 2

Vessels, pipes,
pumps, and valves
Support structures

Vessels, pipes,
pumps, and valves

Support structures

Class 3Vessels and pipes

Class 4

Pipes

Table 18-2
Major
Accident
Class 1
Major
Accident
Class 2Major
Accident
Class 3Vessels, pipes,
pumps, and valves
Support structures
Vessels, pipes,
pumps, and valves
Support structures
Vessels, pipes,
pumps, and valves

Classification of Equipment for Design Basis Accidents
Components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary
Structures supporting Class 1 components
Equipment required to safely shut down a power reactor or ensure its safety
in an emergency, which could indirectly cause radiation hazards to the public
Equipment associated with circuits through which fluid circulates for the
primary purpose of driving the turbines, which form part of the steam line
located downstream of the Class 1 components and are located between theClass 1 components and the valve closest to those components; also thosewhich form part of the feedwater system located upstream of the Class 1
components and are located between the Class 1 components and the valve
closest to those components
Components other than the foregoing, from the containment vessel
penetration to the inner or outer isolation valve
Structures supporting Class 2 components
This refers to vessels or pipes (only pipes in which the concentration ofradioactive material in the fluid contained therein is at least 37mBq per cubic
centimeter (37kBq per cubic centimeter, if the fluid is in liquid form) or pipesin which the maximum allowable working pressure is greater than 0 MPa)
other than ducts that belong to Class 1 components, Class 2 components, thecontainment vessel, and the radiation control facility or reactor containment
facility (standby gas treatment equipment)This refers to ducts belonging to the radiation control facility or reactor
containment facility (restricted to the standby gas treatment equipment), in
which the concentration of radioactive material in the fluid contained therein
is at least 37mBq per cubic centimeter (excluding those parts that belong toClass 2 pipes)

Classification of Equipment for a severe Accident
Components of specified safety facilities
Structures supporting Major Accident Class 1 components
Components of static equipment to deal with a severe accident that are notpart of specified safety facilities
Structures supporting Major Accident Class 2 components
Components of portable equipment for a severe accident

106

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Table 18-3
Operational
Status I
Operational
Status II

Article 18

Classification of Operational Status

Status of power reactor facilities during normal operation
Status other than Operational Status I, Operational Status III, Operational Status IV, or Testing Status

Operational

Status in which power reactor operation needs to be halted as a matter of urgency, due to a failure or

Status III

mis-operation of the power reactor facilities

Operational

Status in which an abnormal situation envisaged in the safety-related design standards of the power

Status IV

reactor facility has arisen

Testing

Status in which pressure in excess of the maximum allowable working pressure is being applied to the

Statuspower reactor facilities during a pressure test

Table 18-4
Load Status I

Classification of Load Status

Status in which a concrete containment vessel is subjected to a load envisaged in Operational Status
I (apart from when snow has accumulated or there is a storm)
Status in which a concrete containment vessel is subjected to a load envisaged in one of thefollowing situations:(a)Load Status II

A situation when the safety relief valve is operating (apart from when snow has

accumulated or there is a storm)(b) A situation when pressure testing of the containment vessel is taking place (apart fromwhen snow has accumulated or there is a storm)(c) A situation when snow has accumulated and the containment vessel is in Operational Status I(apart from when there is a storm)

Load Status III

Status in which a concrete containment vessel is in Operational Status I and there is a storm, or
status other than Load Status IV when the containment vessel is in Operational Status IV
Status in which a concrete containment vessel is in Operational Status IV (including times when

Load Status IV

snow has accumulated or there is a storm) and is in an abnormal state envisaged in thesafety-related design standards for the containment vessel

3

Main Modifications Carried Out in Response to the Results of Safety Evaluations
When constructing reactor facilities, licensees are required to give prior consideration topreventing an accident beyond the design basis and mitigating any effects if such an accident
were to occur, and to ensure that there is sufficient leeway in the design for this. However, theReactor Regulation Act stipulates that the NRA can order licensees to suspend reactor operations
or implement improvements, if its location, structure, or equipment does not meet NRA
standards. Even when a Reactor Installation Permit has been granted, if the standards for
granting a Reactor Installation Permit have changed, the NRA can order licensees to take steps to
become compliant with these new levels.
Since the revised Act entered into force only recently, no improvements to reactor facilities have
yet been made in accordance with the new provisions.

107Article 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Article 18 (2) Application of Proven Technologies
1

Regulatory Requirements Concerning the Technologies Applied
There are no provisions in laws that clearly prescribe the use of proven technologies in facility
design. But if new technology is introduced when seeking Approval of Construction Plan, it will
be necessary to conduct testing and analysis to prove that the technology in question complies
with the technical standards set forth by the NRA.

2

Measures that Licensees should take in the Application of Proven Technologies
The NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities requires the highest standards ofreliability for safety structures, systems, and components with safety functions, and that theirdesign is such that this can be maintained.
This should not impede the application of new technologies, but licensees are required to ensure
the reliability of these technologies when designing reactor facilities.
Safety facilities should function in all envisaged environmental conditions up to the occurrence ofa design basis accident; moreover, in order to check their soundness and capabilities, they must
be tested or inspected while the reactor facility is operating or shut down.
More specifically, in obtaining Reactor Installation Permits and Approval of Construction Plans, itis necessary for licensees to verify the technologies used in the design of reactor facilities.

3

Reflection of Knowledge through Testing and Analysis
In formulating its safety standards, the NRA has sought to strengthen design standards, tighten
measures against severe accidents, and improve earthquake and tsunami resistance, so it isproactively promoting safety research into nuclear regulations that can resolve regulatory issues.
The main research themes are:

Research into the development of design standards-

Developing evaluation techniques focused on earthquakes and tsunamis-

Research into fuel behavior in the event of an accident-

Developing measures to deal with the aging of facilities and evaluation
techniques for approving life extensions



Research into measures against severe accidents-

Developing regulatory standards focused on severe accidents-

Experiments focused on severe accidents; developing a domestic severe accident
analysis code-

Research into the progress of severe accidents

108

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Article 18

Research into the safety management of Specified Nuclear Power Facilities-

Studies of the cause of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station; evaluation of the situation within the reactors-

Developing appropriate techniques for evaluating implementation plans relating to
specified nuclear power facilities

Research into nuclear emergency response measures-

Research into fire protection measures-

Research into risk communication and the prevention of nuclear disasters due toearthquakes, tsunamis, or other external events

Fostering a safety culture-

Developing safety regulatory requirements relating to people and organizations in
nuclear facilities

Article 18 (3)Design for Highly Reliable, Stable, and Easily Manageable Operations

In terms of regulatory reliability requirements, important safety systems are designed to handle thesingle failure of a component to guarantee continued system functioning even in the event of an
off-site power failure.
It is necessary for redundancy or diversity and independence to be incorporated into the design ofsuch systems, taking into account their physical make-up, working principles, and assigned safetyfunctions.
For easily managed operation, the design incorporates appropriate measures to prevent
mis-operation and allows the operator to safely operate said equipment in appropriate
environmental conditions.
Vital safety functions will continue even during an unanticipated absence by an operator including
during a design basis accident. This involves taking such steps as giving consideration to operability
in the design of panel layouts, handling devices, and valves, taking ergonomic factors into account;bearing in mind the need to be able to grasp the status of reactor facilities quickly and accuratelyfrom measuring instrument and alarm displays; and taking into account the need to ensure thaterrors cannot easily occur when carrying out maintenance or inspections.

109Article 19

OPERATION

ARTICLE 19

OPERATION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate
safety analysis and a commissioning programme demonstrating that the installation, as
constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and operational
experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for
operation;(iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted inaccordance with approved procedures;(iv) procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to
accidents;(v) necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant
licence to the regulatory body;(vii) programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the results
obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms are used
to share important experience with international bodies and with other operatingorganizations and regulatory bodies;(viii) the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation is
kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and in volume,
and any necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste directly related to theoperation and on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take into consideration
conditioning and disposal.

Outline of the implementation of Article 19
Licensees may not use a reactor facility unless the facility in question passes Pre-service Inspections
confirming that the construction work carried out corresponds to the approved design.
In commencing operation, licensees must set forth Operational Safety Programs and obtain NRA
approval. Operational Safety Programs prescribe such matters as limiting conditions for operation,
operational matters, maintenance, inspection, and testing of the reactor facilities, steps to deal
with accidents and anticipated operational events, requirement to report major safety problems to
the regulatory body, and requirement to gain operational experience and share it with otherlicensees as necessary. Licensees are required to comply with the Operational Safety Programs,with the status of compliance being checked periodically by the NRA.
Radioactive waste resulting from the operation of reactor facilities is treated and managed
appropriately and its volume reduced using suitable methods.

110

OPERATION

Article 19

Article 19 (1) Initial Authorization
In Japan, after obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit, in accordance with the provisions of theReactor Regulation Act, approval must be obtained for the detailed design of the facility inquestion.
Figure 19-1 provides an outline of the procedures from the construction of a reactor facility to its
operation.
Licensees of Reactor
Operation
Operationalsafetyprogram
Construction

Physicalprotection
program

Nuclear Regulation Authority

Application
Review
Approval
Application
Review
Approval
Application

Pre-service
inspection, etc.

Inspection
Completion

Issue ofcertification

Inspection
Periodic evaluation

Technical evaluation of
aging facilities

Operation

Figure 19-1

Inspection
Application
Inspection

Operational safety
inspection
Inspection of thephysical protection of
nuclear material
Periodic facility
inspection

Main Procedures at the Operation StageA reactor facility is in construction stage, the NRA carries out Pre-service Inspections to check thatthe construction work has been carried out in accordance with the approved construction plan.
The licensee must undergo Pre-service Inspections, in accordance with the provisions of theReactor Regulation Act, and may not use the reactor facility until it passes these inspections.
The licensee applies to the NRA for a Pre-service Inspection conducted after Approval ofConstruction Plan.

111

Article 19

OPERATION

These inspections are conducted at an appropriate time during the construction process; before
each inspection takes place, the regulatory authority compiles documentation, such as proceduralmanuals for the Pre-service Inspection, and this documentation forms the basis for the inspection.
Once it receives an application for a Pre-service Inspection from a licensee, the NRA provides JNES
with inspection instructions so that it can carry out part of the inspection in accordance with theprovisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
Table 19-1 shows the items to be inspected in each construction process during the Pre-service
Inspection in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The items to be inspected during the Pre-service Inspection are prescribed in advance and aredetermined on the basis of the design of the reactor facility and the safety functions required. The
criteria for judging success or failure are determined on the basis of the construction plan that has
already been approved.
Consequently, the safety analysis employed in the Pre-service Inspection has already been carriedout at the design stage and been approved by the NRA, so a new safety analysis is not carried out at
this stage, as a general rule.
The practical work involved in Pre-service Inspections is carried out by NRA’s Nuclear Facility
Inspectors.
Inspectors from JNES are required to conduct the Pre-service Inspection in accordance with NRA
instructions and the NRA is notified of the results.
The NRA compiles the inspection results by its Nuclear Facility and JNES Inspectors and thenconducts a comprehensive examination of the results of the Pre-service Inspection. If the facility
passes the inspection, the NRA issues a Pre-service Inspection Certificate to the licensee.
Table 19-1

Items Inspected in Each Construction Process during the Pre-service Inspection
Construction Process

Matters Inspected

1. The reactor unit, nuclear fuel material handling and

The following inspections (excluding those focused onstorage facilities, reactor cooling system facilities

portable machinery or appliances) relating to the structure,(excluding steam turbines), instrumentation andfunctions, or performance of the reactor unit, nuclear fuelcontrol system facilities (excluding power reactor

material handling and storage facilities, reactor cooling

operation

control

devices),

radioactivewaste

system facilities (excluding steam turbines), instrumentation

disposalfacilities(excluding

exhauststacks),and control system facilities (excluding power reactor

radiation control facilities or reactor containment

operation control devices), radioactive waste disposal

facilities, when it is possible to carry out tests

facilities (excluding exhaust stacks), radiation control facilities

relating to their structure, strength, or leakageor reactor containment facilities:(1) Inspection of material(2) Inspection of dimensions(3) Inspection of external appearance(4) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(5) Inspection of pressure resistance112

OPERATION

Construction Process

Article 19

Matters Inspected(6) Inspection for leakages(7) Inspection to check the status of foundations on which
the reactor containment facility has been directly
installed

2. When the mounting of the lower half of the steam(1) The following inspections to check the structure,

turbine casing has been completed and thefunctions, or performance of the steam turbine:

assembly of the auxiliary boiler unit has been(a) Inspection of materials

completed(b) Inspection of dimensions(c) Inspection of external appearance(d) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(2) The following inspections to check the structure,functions, or performance of the auxiliary boiler:(a) Inspection of material(b) Inspection of dimensions(c) Inspection of external appearance(d) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(e) Inspection of pressure resistance(f) Inspection for leakages

3. When the state of the power reactor allows the fuelto be inserted

Inspection to check the necessary functions or performanceof the nuclear fuel material handling and storage facilities,
reactor cooling system facilities, instrumentation and control
system facilities, radioactive waste disposal facilities,
radiation control facilities, reactor containment facilities,
emergency power supply system, normal power supply
system, fire protection equipment, flood protection facilities,
fuel equipment for driving auxiliaries (excluding that relating
to the emergency power supply system and the auxiliary
boiler), emergency water intake equipment, on-site civilengineering structures, and the Office for Emergency
Response, when the state of the power reactor is such thatthe fuel can be inserted

4. When critical reaction operations can commence inthe power reactor

Inspection to check the necessary functions or performanceof the reactor unit, reactor cooling system facilities,
instrumentation and control system facilities (excluding
power reactor operation control devices), and generators,
when the reactor reaches criticality

5. When all construction work in the construction plan
has been completed

Inspection to check the overall performance of the powerreactor facilities when the reactor is generating output andany other inspections required in order to check thecompletion of construction work

Nuclear fuel material used in reactors must undergo the Fuel Assembly Inspections prescribed in
the NRA Ordinance during each engineering process, and may not be used unless it passes these
inspections.

113

Article 19

OPERATION

When a licensee of fabricating or enrichment activity wishes to undergo a Fuel Assembly Inspection
it must obtain prior NRA approval for the design of the fuel assembly in question.
The licensee of fabricating or enrichment activity applies to the NRA to have the Fuel Assembly
Inspection conducted after it has received approval for the fuel assembly design.
These inspections are conducted at an appropriate time during the fuel assembly engineering
process, based on Inspection Manuals which are developed before such an inspection.
Once it receives an application for a Fuel Assembly Inspection from a licensee of fabricating or
enrichment activity, the NRA provides JNES with inspection instructions so that it can carry out partof the inspection in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
Table 19-2 shows the items inspected in each engineering process during the Fuel Assembly
Inspection conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The practical work involved in Fuel Assembly Inspections is carried out by NRA’s Nuclear Facility
Inspectors.
Moreover, the inspectors from JNES who carry out part of the inspection work are required to
conduct the Fuel Assembly Inspection in accordance with instructions provided by the NRA andnotify the NRA of the results.
The NRA compiles the results of the inspections carried out by the NRA Nuclear Facility Inspectors
and the results of the inspections by JNES inspectors, and conducts a comprehensive examinationof the Fuel Assembly Inspection. If it passes the inspection the NRA issues a Fuel Assembly
Inspection Certificate to the licensee of fabricating or enrichment activity, etc.
Table 19-2

Items Inspected in Each Engineering Process during the Fuel Assembly Inspection

Engineering Process
1. The fuel material, cladding material, and othercomponents, when they are in a state in which tests
relating to their composition, structure, or strength
can be carried out
2. The fuel assembly, which is an assembly of fuelelements, when processing of the fuel elements has
been completed

3. When engineering has been completed

Matters Inspected
Inspection to check the results of analysis of the chemicalcomposition of the fuel material, cladding material, andother components, and other inspections relating to thecomposition, structure, or strength of these components
The following inspections relating to the fuel assembly,
which is an assembly of fuel elements:(1) Inspection of dimensions(2) Inspection to check the degree of bend(3) Inspection of external appearance(4) Inspection of surface contamination density(5) Non-destructive inspection of welded areas(6) Helium leak inspection (excluding cases in which an
inspection will be carried out in relation to (3) in item 3.
below)
The following inspections of the assembled fuel assembly:(1) Inspection of dimensions(2) Inspection of external appearance(3) Helium leak inspection (excluding cases in which an
inspection will be carried out in relation to (6) in item 2.
above)

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Licensees must obtain approval for their Operational Safety Programs before commencing
operation. After receiving an application from a licensee, the NRA reviews the content of its
programs.
Operational Safety Programs also prescribe the measures that should be taken under conditions
that could have a direct impact on safety, such as the establishment of limiting conditions for
operation to ensure the safe operation of reactor facilities, and measures in the event of deviationfrom limiting condition for operation.
Licensees must comply with their Operational Safety Programs when operating and maintaining
reactor facilities.
The matters that should be regulated in the Operational Safety Programs are prescribed in the NRA
Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, as shown below.
Matters relating to systems for compliance with relevant legislation and Operational
Safety Programs (including the involvement of senior management)

Matters relating to systems for fostering a safety culture (including the involvement ofsenior management)

Matters relating to quality assurance at reactor facilities (including matters relating toroot cause analysis methods and systems for implementing this, the positioning ofprocedure manuals in Operational Safety Programs, and the periodic evaluation ofreactor facilities)

Matters relating to the duties and organization of those who operate and manage
reactor facilities (excluding those listed in the next item)

Matters relating to the scope and content of the duties of Chief Reactor Engineers, theauthority required by them in supervising operational safety, and their organizational
positioningMatters relating to the scope and content of the duties of Chief Electrical Engineers,
the authority required by them in supervising operational safety, and theirorganizational positioningMatters relating to the scope and content of the duties of Chief Engineers of Boilers
and Turbines, the authority required by them in supervising operational safety, andtheir organizational positioningThe following matters relating to operational safety education among those who
operate and manage reactor facilities:

Matters relating to the policy on implementing operational safety education (including
the formulation of implementation plans)

The following matters relating to the content of operational safety education:(1)

Matters relating to compliance with relevant legislation and Operational Safety

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Programs(2)

Matters relating to the structure, performance, and operation of reactor facilities(3)

Matters relating to radiation control(4)Matters relating to the handling of nuclear fuel material and items contaminatedwith such material(5)Matters relating to measures that should be taken in an emergency

Other matters required in relation to operational safety education concerning reactor
facilities



Matters relating to the operation of reactor facilities (excluding those listed in the next
two items)Matters relating to the operation period of reactors

Matters relating to safety reviews of the operation of reactor facilities



Matters relating to the establishment of controlled areas, conservation areas, andsurrounding monitored areas and restrictions on entry to these

Matters relating to exhaust gas and effluent monitoring equipment

Matters relating to the monitoring of dose, dose equivalent, radioactive material
concentrations, and the surface contamination density, as well as matters concerning
the removal of such contaminationMatters relating to the management of radiation detectors

Matters relating to visits to and inspections of reactor facilities and procedures arisingfrom these

Matters relating to receipt and send out of nuclear fuel material, as well as its
transport and storage, and other matters relating to its handlingMatters relating to the disposal of radioactive waste

Matters relating to measures that should be taken in an emergency

Matters relating to the development of systems for conducting activities to maintainthe integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, large-scale damage,fire, or internal floodingMatters relating to appropriate recording and reporting of operational safety at reactor
facilities (including the status of compliance with Operational Safety Programs)Matters relating to the maintenance management of reactor facilities (including
matters relating to systems for the implementation of licensee’s welding inspections
and Periodic Licensee’s Inspections, matters relating to the technical evaluation ofage-related deterioration, and the long-term maintenance management policy)Matters relating to the sharing of information with other licensees, focused ontechnical information concerning operational safety obtained from contractors who

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have carried out maintenance checks
Matters relating to the disclosure of information concerning noncompliance, in theevent that such noncompliance has occurred

Other matters required in relation to the operational safety of reactor facilities

Operational Safety Programs can be revised after being approved, due to such factors as thoserelating to the organization of the licensee or modification of the reactor facilities.
If intending to change their Operational Safety Programs, licensees must obtain the approval of the
NRA for the amended programs.
Moreover, the NRA may order the amendment of Operational Safety Programs in accordance withthe provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, if it deems this to be necessary in order to prevent adisaster resulting from nuclear fuel material, material contaminated by nuclear fuel material, or
reactors.
The Operational Safety Programs are the most important documents in the operation of a reactor
facility, so licensees put together various operating procedure manuals and testing guidelines thatset forth the procedures for the actual operation and maintenance of reactor facilities.
These provisions subordinate to Operational Safety Programs are managed appropriately under thequality management systems of licensees, including matters relating to consistency with their
Operational Safety Programs.

Article 19 (2)1Limiting Condition for Operation

Regulatory Requirements Concerning Limiting Conditions for Operation
In Japan, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, licensee must set forth
their Operational Safety Programs and obtain NRA approval therefor before commencing
operation of a reactor facility.
The figures for the limiting conditions for operation of reactor facilities correspond to such values
as the shutdown margin and thermal limit value of the reactor, and are all prescribed in the
Operational Safety Programs.
If a licensee fails to comply with the limiting conditions for operation, the NRA may order the
licensee concerned to take such action as shutting down the reactor facility, in accordance withthe provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
In the event that a reactor facility deviates from its limiting conditions for operation, the licensee
is required to immediately declare a deviation from the limiting conditions for operation andreport this to the NRA.
Licensees must take measures to revert from a state of deviation from the limiting conditions for117Article 19

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operation within the allowed time of operation permitted in the event of a deviation fromlimiting conditions for operation. However, if it cannot resolve the deviation within the timeallowed, it must modify the reactor’s status in such a way as to ensure that the limiting
conditions for operation do not apply.
This includes shutting down the reactor.
If the NRA receives a report of a deviation from the limiting conditions for operation from alicensee, it examines the root cause and provides other licensees with feedback, if necessary.
2

Establishment, Implementation, and Revision of Limiting Conditions for Operation
Operators at reactor facilities take turns to operate and monitor the reactor, and are responsible
for such practical duties as ensuring compliance with the limiting conditions for operation andtaking the necessary steps in the event of deviation from these.
The limiting conditions for operation and steps to be taken in the event of deviation from them
are specifically documented in Operational Safety Programs and operators are required to
implement those procedures correctly.
The limiting conditions for operation are conditions relating to the safe operation of reactor
facilities, and there are cases in which it is necessary to alter them, such as when related
equipment is modified.
As described above, the limiting conditions for operation are detailed in operational safety
programs and if they are revised, it is necessary to obtain approval from the NRA for thatrevision.
More specifically, when revising the limiting conditions for operation, licensees must not only
conduct their own review, including a safety evaluation, but also undergo a review by the NRA.

Article 19 (3)Procedures for Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing1

Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing of Reactor Facilities

1-1

Periodic Facility Inspections

Carried out periodically in order to prevent the occurrence or escalation of accidents or failure
involving reactors, their auxiliary equipment, and steam turbine equipment, Periodic Facility
Inspections of reactor facilities (excluding those being decommissioned) are inspections offacilities that are of particular importance in ensuring the safety of reactor facilities.
The JNES carries out part of the work involved in periodic facility inspections, based on
instructions from the NRA, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, andnotifies the NRA of the results.

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After compiling the results of inspections conducted by Nuclear Facility Inspectors and theinspection results provided by the JNES, the NRA evaluates the Periodic Facility Inspection.
Moreover, licensees must undergo a Periodic Safety Management Review, which focuses on theorganization involved in the Periodic Licensee Inspection, inspection methods, process controls,
and other matters stipulated in the NRA Ordinance.
The Periodic Safety Management Review is conducted by the JNES and the NRA is notified of theresults. Based on the notification from the JNES, the NRA evaluates the Periodic Safety
Management Review.
In accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, the timing of the Periodic Facility Inspection is
stipulated in the NRA Ordinance, which prescribes that reactors and their auxiliary equipment
are to undergo inspection at intervals of 13, 18, or 24 months, as specified by the NRA in a public
notification.
The Periodic Facility Inspection checks that the facilities and equipment are being maintained
and operated in compliance with the technical standards prescribed in the NRA Ordinance.
An NRA’s Nuclear Facility Inspector or an inspector from the JNES attends or checks the records
of Periodic Licensee’s Inspections of equipment that is of particular importance in terms ofsafety; quality assurance standards are utilized in the checking of processes for conducting
Periodic Licensee’s Inspections (such as the Inspection Manuals, inspecting personnel, and theappropriateness of judgments concerning the results).
Moreover, the maintenance plans are checked before the Periodic Facility Inspection is carriedout. This is a procedure in which the plans for the inspection and maintenance of individualcomponents (maintenance plans), which take into account past inspections and the deteriorationof components, are submitted to the NRA so that their content can be checked.
In addition, Operational Safety Inspectors check the implementation status of maintenanceactivities carried out by licensees during Operational Safety Inspections, etc.
The Periodic Facility Inspection checks that facilities are compliant with the technical standards
for commercial power reactors and their auxiliary facilities.
1-2

Periodic Licensee’s Inspections and Periodic Safety Management Reviews

Licensees are obliged to carry out Periodic Licensee’s Inspections, in which they independently
check compliance with technical standards for reactor facility; the JNES checks theimplementation status of these Periodic Licensee’s Inspections.
More specifically, the JNES conducts a document review and on-site inspection to examine thesystem for implementing Periodic Licensee’s Inspections from the perspective of theappropriateness of the implementing organization, inspection methods, process controls, record
management, management of contractors, and education and training (Periodic Safety

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OPERATIONManagement Review).
The NRA conducts a comprehensive evaluation based on the results of the Periodic Safety
Management Review provided by this body.
The evaluation is carried out in the following two stages and the licensee subject to review isinformed of the outcome.
1

Evaluation of whether the Periodic Licensee’s Inspection implementation system at theorganization under review is adequate, enabling such inspections to be carried out
autonomously and appropriately.

2

Evaluation of whether the Periodic Licensee’s Inspection implementation system at theorganization under review is such that checks are required to see whether corrective action
has become firmly established, or whether improvements are necessary.

Moreover, if the system for conducting Periodic Licensee’s Inspections is judged to be adequate,
incentive regulations are implemented, such as excluding checks of record management andeducation and training from the legally-prescribed checks at the time of the next review, with aview to encouraging licensees to implement safety initiatives.
1-3

Operational Safety Inspections

Operational Safety Inspections are designed to check that licensees comply with the Operational
Safety Programs previously approved by the NRA in the operation and maintenance of reactor
facilities. They are carried out four times a year, with each inspection taking about two weeks.
During the Operational Safety Inspections, Operational Safety Inspectors may, in accordance withthe provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, enter business establishments, inspect documents
and equipment, ask questions of relevant personnel, and request the submission of the requisite
samples.
Furthermore, as well as the quarterly inspections in accordance with the provisions of the NRA
Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, the status of compliance with the Operational Safety
Programs may be inspected when conducting the Periodic Facility Inspections prescribed in theReactor Regulation Act, in the event that the following operations will be carried out.


Operations relating to the startup or shutdown of a reactor

Operations relating to refueling

Operations relating to the switchover of the residual heat removal seawater system
in BWR

Operations relating to the reduction of the water level within the reactor vessel in
PWR and operations relating to the removal of residual heat carried out while thewater level within the reactor vessel is reduced

When drills which are recognized by the NRA as necessary to inspect are carried out

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for key response personnel who would be involved in dealing with a severe accident
or large-scale damage
The new inspection system introduced in January 2009 obliges licensees to gather and store data
concerning age-related deterioration, in order to make continuous improvements, and to use thisas the basis for evaluating deterioration leading to the aging of facilities as part of daily
maintenance. Accordingly, licensees are enhancing the status monitoring of components inoperation.
The NRA checks the implementation status of such maintenance activities as part of its
Operational Safety Inspections.
1-4

Maintenance management of reactor facilities

Licensees must take the following steps in relation to checks, tests, inspections, repairs,
replacement, modification, and any other measures deemed necessary to the maintenance ofreactor facilities (maintenance management), both while the reactor is operating and while shut
down, in accordance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors.
Set forth a policy concerning the maintenance management of reactor facilities(hereinafter referred to as the “maintenance management policy”) to ensure thatthe reactor facility performance detailed in the Reactor Installation Permit is being
maintained.



Set out targets for maintenance management that should be achieved in accordancewith the maintenance management policy (including quantitative maintenancemanagement targets relating to systems of high importance in regard to the reactor
and maintenance management).



Formulate a plan for the implementation of maintenance management that sets out
the following matters, in order to achieve the maintenance management targets, andimplement maintenance management in accordance with this plan.
-

Matters relating to the timing of the commencement and the duration of theplan concerning the implementation of maintenance management-

Matters relating to methods used for conducting checks, tests, inspections,repairs, replacement, and modifications (inspections, etc.) of reactor facilities,
and the frequency and timing thereof-

Matters relating to measures to ensure operational safety taken when
conducting inspections, etc. of reactor facilities-

Matters relating to checks of the results of inspections, etc. of reactor facilities
and methods of evaluating these-

Matters relating to corrective and preventive measures concerning methods of121

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conducting the inspections, etc. that should be carried out at reactor facilities,
in light of checks of the results of such reactor facility inspections, etc. and theresults of the evaluation thereof, as well as the frequency and timing thereof
Matters relating to records of maintenance management at reactor facilities



Periodically evaluate the reactor facility maintenance management policy, themaintenance management targets, and plans for the implementation of maintenancemanagement.



Reflect the results of the evaluation referred to in the item above in the reactor
facility maintenance management policy, the maintenance management targets, orplans for the implementation of maintenance management.



Take special measures in relation to the steps referred to in the foregoing items,
tailored to the particular condition of the reactor facility in question, in the eventthat operation of the reactor is suspended for a considerable period of time or inother situations that differ from the norm from the perspective of the maintenancemanagement of a reactor facility.

In addition, if a licensee has formulated or amended a long-term maintenance management
policy of the kind described below, this must be reflected in the maintenance and management
policy. A report on measures to deal with the aging of facilities is provided in Article 14.
1-5

Periodic Assessment

In accordance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, licensees must
conduct evaluations of the implementation status of operational safety activities at their reactor
facilities, focusing on a period of not more than ten years, as well as evaluating the situation interms of reflecting the latest technical knowledge in operational safety activities at their reactor
facilities.
Periodic safety reviews were implemented as administrative guidance from 1992, but they wereenshrined in law as operational safety measures in the Ordinance on Commercial Reactors in
2003; in 2005, deterioration in the organizational climate within licensees was added to the focusof the evaluation.
In August 2008, the NISA established guidelines for implementing periodic safety reviews andrequested that licensees conduct their periodic safety reviews in accordance with these.
Among the evaluations to be carried out in periodic safety reviews cited in the guidelines are an
evaluation of the implementation status of operational safety activities at reactor facilities, anevaluation of the situation in terms of reflecting the latest technical knowledge in operationalsafety activities at reactor facilities, and a probabilistic safety assessment. The guidelines statethat it is preferable for licensees to conduct probabilistic safety assessments at their own

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discretion.
Under this mechanism, licensees are required to consider the necessity of effective additional
measures to further improve the safety and reliability of plants, in light of the results of periodic
safety reviews.
1-6

On-site inspections

In accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, the NRA may conduct on-site
inspections to the extent necessary for enforcing the Act.
During these on-site inspections, NRA staff may enter the offices or business establishments oflicensees and inspect documents, records, and other articles, as well as questioning thepersonnel there.
These inspections include inspections of manufacturers, etc. The NRA may directly inspect those
involved in the design or construction of nuclear facilities, as well as those involved in the
manufacture of equipment for such facilities.
1-7

Chief Reactor Engineers and Operation Supervisor

Chief Reactor Engineers, who are deployed at each reactor by the relevant licensee, are selectedfrom among those who have qualifications certified by means of a national examination, andhave the practical experience 9 stipulated in the NRA Ordinance; it is necessary to formally notify
the NRA of their appointment and dismissal.
If deemed necessary in terms of operational safety, Chief Reactor Engineers may give theiropinions to the station chief, provide staff at all levels with advice and recommendations, andparticipate in the formulation of plans for operational safety.
Operation Supervisor are appointed by licensees and deployed at each reactor.
The duties of Operation Supervisor is to monitor operation in general and provide leadership andsupervision for operators, touring the plant site periodically to gain an understanding of thecurrent status of operation and operational safety.
The Reactor Regulation Act requires that records concerning fuel assemblies, reactor inspections,operation, radiation control, maintenance, anomalies or accidents, and weather be included in
the operational records compiled and retained by licensees.
Moreover, the Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that the results of Periodic Licensee’s Inspections
9

The Rules on Commercial Reactors stipulate that at least three years of practical experience are required, adding
together the periods listed below.
(i) Period of involvement in duties relating to construction work on or maintenance management of powerreactor facilities(ii) Period of involvement in duties relating to the operation of power reactors(iii) Period of involvement in duties relating to the analysis and evaluation of the safety of power reactor facility
design(iv) Period of involvement in duties relating to the design or management of power reactor fuel assemblies

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be recorded and saved, covering such matters as the focus of inspections, as well as the methods
used to conduct them and the results thereof.
2

Establishment, Implementation, and Revision of Operation Manuals
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors stipulate that licensees must set forth manuals,
procedural manuals, and other documentation relating to operational safety, based on their
Operational Safety Programs, and must comply with these.
Procedural manuals are required to be documented, following an approval procedure within the
nuclear power station, and applied to the operation and maintenance of the reactor facility inquestion.
Moreover, in the event that the procedure is altered, due to such reasons as the modification ofequipment, licensees are required to ensure that those carrying out tasks do not follow theincorrect procedure.
Procedural manuals are required to be made available in such a way as to ensure that all staff
involved in the operation and maintenance of a reactor facility can make appropriate use of them,such as placing them in the control room.
Procedural manuals are documents put in place on the basis of Operational Safety Programs, sothey are included in the scope of application of quality management systems.
Procedural manuals are reviewed regularly and revised if necessary.

Article 19 (4)1Procedures for Dealing with Events Occurring during Operation

Regulatory Requirements Concerning Responses to Abnormal Events
In the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, licensees are obliged to take the necessary steps,in the form of emergency measures, to prevent radiation hazards.
This is prescribed in Operational Safety Programs as a measure that should be taken in an
emergency.
Furthermore, licensees are obliged to detail “matters relating to the operation of reactor facilities”
in their Operational Safety Programs.
As well as procedural manuals focused on the handling of normal operation, these include
procedures relating to handling operation in the event of an accident or other abnormal situation,
thereby ensuring a smooth response to accidents and abnormal events.
Matters prescribed in relation to “steps in the event of an abnormal situation” include statuschecks, the removal of root causes, the necessary measures in order to prevent escalation, andmeasures following reactor scram.

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The operating procedures in an emergency are one of the operating procedures based on the
Operational Safety Programs. During the operational safety inspection, the NRA checks theprocedures and system for their implementation.
2

Operating Procedures in an Emergency
The emergency operating procedures are put in place as provisions subordinate to and based on
the Operational Safety Programs; they include procedures formulated as standards based on
events such as the occurrence of an earthquake or a fire, as well as those formulated as
standards based on changes in the operational parameters of the reactor.

3

Responses to Severe Accidents
As well as stipulating the following with regard to responses to severe accidents, the NRA
Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribe that these measures shall be evaluated periodically,
with the requisite measures being taken on the basis of the results.
Formulating the plans required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc.



Deploying the personnel required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc. (key response
personnel)Implementing regular education and drills at least once a year among key response
personnel

Furnishing vehicle-mounted generators, fire trucks, fire hoses, and other materials
and equipment required in order to carry out activities to maintain the integrity ofreactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc.



Setting forth the following matters required in order to carry out activities tomaintain the integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc. andensuring that key response personnel comply with these-

Matters relating to measures to prevent substantial core damage-

Matters relating to measures to prevent the containment failure-

Matters relating to measures to prevent damage to fuel assemblies stored in spent fuelstorage facilities



Matters relating to measures to prevent damage to fuel assemblies during outage

Putting in place the systems required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc., other than thoselisted above

Moreover, the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors stipulate that matters relating to putting

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in place systems for carrying out activities to maintain the integrity of reactor facilities in theevent of a severe accident, large-scale damage, fire, or internal flooding should be detailed in
Operational Safety Programs; accordingly, licensees take measures to prepare for a severe
accident.

Article 19 (5)Engineering and Technical Support

There is no regulation of engineering or technical support for licensees.
This enables licensees to respond flexibly, at their own discretion, if they require engineering or
technical support to ensure the safety of reactor facilities.
If licensees outsource technical support for duties relating to the operation and management ofreactor facilities to a specialist contractor, it is vital that the contractor to which the work is
outsourced is equipped with the necessary capabilities and conditions to ensure the safety ofreactor facilities; accordingly, Operational Safety Programs require licensees to monitor and manage
contractors appropriately, on the basis of their own quality management systems, and theirperformance in this regard is checked by the NRA in inspections such as Operational Safety
Inspections.

Article 19 (6)1Reporting of Events, Failures, etc.

Regulatory Requirements
In the event of an accident or failure at a reactor facility, licensees are obliged to report this fact
immediately, in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, and also have an obligation toprovide the NRA with a report on the situation and the measures taken to deal with it within tendays of its occurrence.
Moreover, in the event of a specified event or emergency prescribed in the Nuclear Emergency
Act, licensees are required to notify the Prime Minister and NRA of this fact immediately.

2

Outline of Reporting Criteria and Reporting Procedures for Events, Failures, etc.
The criteria for reporting an event in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation
Act are prescribed in the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors.
Licensees are required to report such cases to the NRA, based on these criteria.
The NRA has constructed a system that enables reports of event to be accepted 24 hours a day,365 days of the year. In the event that should be reported, the licensee immediately provides an

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initial report to the duty NRA officer and continues to provide reports thereafter in accordancewith legislation.
Upon receiving such reports from licensees, the NRA releases such information as the details of
the event, the NRA’s response, and the provisional INES rating without delay.
3

Reporting of Events and Failures during the Past Three Years
The annex provides list of events reported by licensees to the NRA and its predecessor, NISA,
during the period FY2010-2012, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
There were 16 events in FY2010, eight in FY2011, and six in FY2012. Based on criteria relating to
the discharge amount, the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on
March 2011 was assigned a rating of 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).

4Investigation of the Causes of Events or Failures and Measures to Prevent Their
Recurrence
Licensees have a primary responsibility to deal with events that occur at their reactor facilities
and must take responsibility for everything from investigating the root cause of the event toimplementing measures to prevent recurrence.
The NRA checks that this process is being carried out appropriately, or provides guidance toensure that this is the case.
As well as investigating the event, compiling a report outlining the root cause and measures todeal with it, and submitting the report to the NRA, licensees also publish their reports.
The NRA examines the details reported by the licensee concerning the root cause and measures
to prevent recurrence, in order to check the validity of the investigation and the measuresformulated by the licensee as a result.
Moreover, with regard to measures to prevent recurrence of the event in question, licensees are
required to take preventive measures not only in regard to knowledge gained from eventsoccurring at their own reactor facilities, but also knowledge gained from events that haveoccurred at other facilities, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.

5

Use of INESIn July 1989, Japan began to use its own nuclear event evaluation scale to assign ratings to events
that occurred within Japan, but since August 1992, it has used the INES to evaluate an event.

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Article 19 (7)1Making Effective Use of Operational Experiences

Measures for Effective Use of Operational Experiences
If a safety significant event occurs, licensees are required to report this to the NRA without delay,in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. Once in receipt of the reportconcerning the event, the NRA immediately publishes the details and checks the response of thelicensee to the event. Moreover, once the root cause has been identified and a decision has beentaken on measures to prevent recurrence, these are also published.
Having received advice from experts in operation management, inspection, and radiation control,
the NRA scrutinizes information concerning the event and strives to identify safety lessons from it,
if necessary, it requests that licensees reflect these lessons in their operation and maintenanceactivities, or reflects them in its own regulatory activities.
The JNES has put in place a system for gathering and evaluating safety information from bothwithin Japan and overseas. In order to promptly share the outcomes of this information
gathering and evaluation with the NRA, provide a regulatory response, and implement precise
follow-up, the JNES has established a joint committee with the NRA, called the Safety
Information Committee, which conducts regular deliberations.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribe that Operational Safety Programs should
stipulate matters relating to sharing with other licensees any technical information about
operational safety obtained from licensees who have conducted maintenance checks.
This provision is a measure aimed at encouraging licensees to contribute to improvements insafety by sharing with each other details of incidents, even if they have a comparatively small
impact on safety.
In addition, during its review process, the NRA instructs licensees to ensure the necessary lateral
spread of information about evens that should be reported to the NRA, in accordance withlegislation.

2

International Sharing of Operational Experiences
As a country that has experiences of operating many reactor facilities, Japan believes that it isvital to share these experiences with a wide range of countries on the international stage, andthat it has a responsibility to do so in order to improve international nuclear safety.
The NRA and the JNES share information internationally via mechanisms for sharing information
about events with international organizations such as the IAEA and OECD/NEA, as well as throughbilateral cooperation.
Mechanisms relating to the sharing of operational experiences with international organizations
include the proactive provision of information via the Incident Reporting System (IRS). In Japan,

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the mechanism involves the JNES gathering information about operational experiences within
Japan, compiling it as a database, and providing these data to the IRS.
In terms of bilateral activities, information is shared through a long-established system of regularmeetings etc., to exchange information.

Article 19 (8)1On-site Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste

On-site Management of Spent FuelIn addition to the spent fuel pools used at many reactor facilities, dry storage casks are used tostore spent fuel at some power stations.
In storing spent fuel, licensees are required to take the necessary measures to cool the fuel, andto ensure that the design of the storage system is such that the fuel is kept subcritical. The
Pre-service Inspections check that construction work has been carried out according to thisdesign, while the Periodic Licensee’s Inspections carried out by licensees check that thesoundness of the storage facility is being maintained during the lifetime of the reactor facility.
The on-site management of spent fuel is positioned in safety regulations as part of measures toensure the operational safety of reactor facilities, so its implementation status is checked in
Operational Safety Inspections.

2

On-site Management of Radioactive Waste
Licensees are required to take appropriate steps in relation to the transport, storage, and/or
disposal on-site of radioactive waste as part of the measures required for operational safety, in
accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
If disposing of radioactive waste at a site, licensees are required to ensure that this takes place
under the supervision of someone who has the requisite knowledge concerning disposal andradiation protection associated with disposal.
The measures that should be taken to dispose of radioactive waste are prescribed according to
the nature of such waste.
Gaseous radioactive waste is required to be discharged using an exhaust facility, or to be retained
as waste in disposal tanks.
Liquid radioactive waste is required to be discharged using a drainage facility, retained as waste indisposal tanks, or placed in containers or solidified along with the container and stored at aretained waste facility, or incinerated at an incineration facility.
Solid radioactive waste is required to be incinerated at an incineration facility, placed incontainers, or solidified along with the container and stored at a retained waste facility.

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Alternatively, radioactive waste that is extremely difficult to dispose of using these methods, suchas large items of machinery, and radioactive waste that requires the decay of radioactivity overtime is required to be stored at a retained waste facility.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribe requirements and criteria for eachdisposal method in relation to the type of radiation monitoring necessary to prevent radiation
hazards and the containers required for disposal, thereby ensuring the appropriate handling ofradioactive waste.
Licensees store radioactive waste generated by their own reactor facilities at on-site storage
facilities, until it can be taken to a disposal facility.
Radioactive waste is classified into gaseous, liquid, and solid waste. Gaseous radioactive waste is
exhaust gas generated by ventilating components and rooms in the radiation controlled area, and
it is discharged via exhaust stacks while using exhaust radiation monitors to monitor it.
Liquid radioactive waste is effluent generated within the controlled area, which is filtered,desalinated, and concentrated; apart from some that has an extremely low level of radioactivity,
the treated liquid is re-used in the facility, as a general rule, rather than being discharged into theenvironment.
Solid waste such as scrap material generated in the course of maintenance and repair work
during the period of Periodic Facility Inspections is either placed as it is into drums, or incinerated,
melted, or compressed in order to reduce the volume before being placed into drums, and isthen stored at the on-site radioactive waste storage facility.
In Japan, there are no legal provisions imposing an obligation to minimize the volume ofradioactive waste generated, but as there is a limit to the quantity of radioactive waste that canbe stored on-site, and it costs money to treat and dispose of waste, licensees voluntarily strive tominimize the amount of radioactive waste by such means as evaporative concentration of liquid
waste and the compression or melting of solid waste.
The on-site management of radioactive waste is positioned in safety regulations as part ofmeasures to ensure the operational safety of reactor facilities, so its implementation status ischecked in Operational Safety Inspections.
3

Clearance Procedures
In Japan, of the scrap material generated due to the operation and maintenance of reactor
facilities or decommissioning measures, radioactive waste with an extremely low radioactivity
concentration is safely classified as “material not required to be handled as radioactive waste”
after the approval and confirmation by the NRA, following which it is appropriately and rationallyrecycled or disposed of. (Clearance system)
The methods of measuring and evaluating the radioactivity concentration of items for which

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Article 19

licensees are seeking clearance are formulated in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act, and the regulatory authority approves radioactivity concentration measurement
and evaluation methods and checks the result of such measurements.
The NRA is involved at the following two stages.
Stage 1:The NRA judges and approves the validity of the radioactivity concentration
measurement and evaluation methods formulated by licensees

Stage 2:Using records and sampling, the NRA checks that licensees are carrying out
radioactivity concentration measurement and evaluation using the methods forthis for which approval was granted, as well as confirming that the licensee
concerned is below the clearance level

In addition, this system targets not only reactor facilities, but also other nuclear fuel cycle
facilities.

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ANNEXES

1

List of nuclear installations

2

List of events during reported period under the Reactor Regulation Act

3

Implementation Status of the IAEA Action Plan

4

Consideration for the IAEA Safety Standards

5

Revision of the Reactor Regulation Act

6

References

132

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1

D

List of nuclear installations (Article 6)
Licensee

Hokkaido ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Tohoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Power Station

TomariOnagawa
Higashidori

Fukushima Daiichi

Tokyo ElectricPower Co. Inc.

Fukushima Daini

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

Higashidori
Chubu ElectricPower Co., Inc.

HamaokaMihamaKansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Takahama

Ohi

Unit

ReactorType

Output(MWe)Commissioned

Status

1
2
3
1
2
3
1

PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR4
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5

579
579
912
524
825
825
1,100

June 22, 1989
April 12, 1991
Dec. 22, 2009
Jun. 01, 1984
Jul. 28, 1995
Jan. 30, 2002
Dec. 08, 2005

1

BWR3

460

Mar. 26, 1971

2

BWR4

784

Jul. 18, 1974

3

BWR4

784

Mar. 27, 1976

4

BWR4

784

Oct. 12, 1978

5
6
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

BWR4
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR
ABWR
ABWR
BWR4
BWR4
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR

784
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,356
1,356
1,385
540
840
1,100
1,137
1,267
340
500
826
826
826
870
870
1,175
1,175
1,180
1,180

Apr. 18, 1978
Oct. 24, 1979
Apr. 20, 1982
Feb. 3, 1984
Jun. 21, 1985
Aug. 25, 1987
Sep. 18, 1985
Sep. 28, 1990
Aug. 11, 1993
Aug. 11, 1994
Apr. 10, 1990
Nov. 07, 1996
Jul. 02, 1997

In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
Under permanentsuspension
Under permanentsuspension
Under permanentsuspension
Under permanentsuspension
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
Under Construction
decommissioning
decommissioning
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation

133

Mar. 17, 1976
Nov. 29, 1978
Aug. 28, 1987
Sep. 3, 1993
Jan. 18, 2005
Nov. 28, 1970
Jul. 25, 1972
Dec. 1, 1976
Nov. 14, 1974
Nov. 14, 1975
Jan. 17, 1985
Jun. 5, 1985
Mar. 27, 1979
Dec. 5, 1979
Dec. 18, 1991
Feb. 2, 1993

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ANNEXES

Licensee

Hokuriku ElectricPower Company
Chugoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Power Station

Shika
ShimaneKaminoseki

Shikoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Ikata

GenkaiKyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Sendai
Tokai
Tokai DainiJapan Atomic
Power Company

Tsuruga

Unit

ReactorType

Output
(MWe)

1
2
1
2
3
1
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

BWR5
ABWR
BWR3
BWR5
ABWR
ABWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
APWR
GCR
BWR5
BWR2
PWR
APWR
APWR

540
1,206
460
820
1,373
1,373
566
566
890
559
559
1,180
1,180
890
890
1,590
166
1,100
357
1,160
1,538
1,538

1

ABWR

1,383

ATR

165

FBR

280

Electric Power
Development
Co.,Ltd.
(J-POWER)

Oma

Japan Atomic
Energy Agency

Advanced Thermal Reactor“Fugen”
Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor “Monju”

Commissioned

StatusJul. 30, 1993
Mar. 15, 2006
Mar. 29, 1974
Feb. 10, 1989

In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
Under construction
In Planning
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Planningdecommissioning
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Planning
In Planning

Sep. 30, 1977
Mar. 19, 1982
Dec. 15, 1994
Oct. 15, 1975
Mar. 30, 1981
Mar. 18, 1994
Jul. 25, 1997
Jul. 4, 1984
Nov. 28, 1985
Jul. 25, 1966
Nov. 28, 1978
Mar. 14, 1970
Feb. 17, 1987

Under construction

Mar. 20, 1979

decommissioning
Under construction

Notes:In Planning:
NPS for which the operator submitted a license application, but not yet approved
Under construction: NPS has been licensed, but has not yet passed a pre-service inspection
In Operation:
NPS that has passed a pre-service inspection
Under permanent suspension:
NPS that where operations have been suspended pending
decommissioning
Under decommissioning: NPS whose decommissioning plan has already been approved134ANNEXES

2

D

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act during thereporting period (Article 6 and Article 19)(1)

Accidents and failures reported in FY2010

Power Station

Accidents and Failures

Date

INES 10

Ikata PS Unit 1

Flaws on the seawater piping for cooling the emergency diesel
generator (Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Apr. 27, 2010

0-

Fukushima DainiNPS Unit 1

Manual reactor shutdown (Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.)

Jun. 2, 2010

0+

Ikata PS Unit 1

Flaws on the seawater piping for the component cooling system(Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Jun. 11, 2010

0-

Tokai Daini PS

Manual reactor shutdown (Japan Atomic Power Company)

Jun. 25, 2010

0-

Fukushima Daiichi
NPS Unit 5

Automatic reactor shutdown (Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.)

Nov. 2, 2010

0+

Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor“Monju”

Deformation of in-vessel transfer machine (Japan Atomic Energy
Agency)Nov. 9, 20100-Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Erroneous insertion of a control rod (Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.)NPS Unit 3

Dec. 1, 2010

0-

Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor“Monju”

Flaws on a cylinder liner confirmed in the emergency diesel
generator (Japan Atomic Energy Agency)

Dec. 28, 2010

0-

Shika NPS Unit 2

Manual reactor shutdown(Hokuriku Electric Power Company)

Jan. 21, 2011

0-

Fukushima Daiichi
NPS Units 1-4 11

Leak of radioactive substances from the nuclear reactor buildings to
the non radiation controlled areas (Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.)

Mar. 11, 20117(interim)

Fukushima Daini
NPS11

Impact of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake off the Pacific Coastof Tohoku (Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.)

Mar. 11, 2011

Unit 1：3
Unit 2：3
Unit 3：1
Unit 4：3(interim)

Tokai Daini PS

A trip of a seawater pump for the emergency diesel generator (Japan
Atomic Power Company)

Mar. 18, 20111
(interim)

Tokai Daini PS

Releasing traces of radioactive substance outside the radiation
controlled area (Japan Atomic Power Company)

Mar. 28, 2011

0(interim)

Onagawa NPS
Unit 2Current status of Onagawa NPS (failures of a pump of a reactor
building closed cooling system) (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Mar. 29, 20112
(interim)

1011Japan uses the values of 0- and 0+ for the events evaluated and classified by the INES Scale.
For Fukushima Daiichi NPS, an event is counted per station, but for Fukushima Daini NPS, an event is counted
per unit.

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ANNEXES(2)

Accidents and failures reported in FY2011
Accidents and failures

Date

INES 12

Onagawa NPS
Unit 1

Current status of Onagawa NPS (damage to the emergency diesel
generator (A)) (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Apr. 8, 20110+(interim)

Takahama PS Unit
4

Flaws on the SG tubes, which were indicated and confirmed during
the periodic inspection (Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Aug. 18, 2011

0-

Fukushima DainiNPS Unit 2

Failures of a seawater pump for cooling the diesel generator facilityof the high pressure core spray system (Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Inc.)

Aug. 30, 2011

0(interim)Genkai NPS Unit 4

Automatic reactor shutdown (Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Oct. 4, 2011

0+

Genkai NPS Unit 3

Breaking of a main shaft of the charging pump (Kyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc.)

Dec. 16, 2011

0-

Fukushima DainiNPS Units 3 and 4

Radioactive contamination confirmed outsidecontrolled areas (Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.)

Mar. 27, 2012

1

Takahama PS Unit
3

Flaws on the SG tubes, which were indicated and confirmed during
the periodic inspection (Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Mar. 29, 20120-

Hamaoka NPS
Unit 5

Through holes confirmed in the liner of the condensate storage tank
(Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Mar. 30, 2012

0-

Accidents and failures

Date

INES12

Onagawa NPS
Unit 1

Failures of a pump for the emergency service water system (Tohoku
Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Apr. 4, 2012

0-Onagawa NPS
Unit 1

Damage to the travelling section of the ceiling crane in the reactor
building (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Jun. 7, 2012

below scale

Tokai Daini PS

Leak of radioactive substances outside the radiation controlled areas(Japan Atomic Power Company)

Nov. 30, 2012

0(interim)

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Some fuel rods touching in the fuel assemblies (Tokyo Electric PowerCo. Inc.)
NPS Unit 5

Dec. 12, 20121
(interim)

Failures of an emergency diesel generator (Kansai Electric Power Co.,Inc.)

Feb. 6, 2013

0(interim)

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Some fuel rods touching in the fuel assemblies (Tokyo Electric PowerCo. Inc.)
NPS Unit 1

Mar. 19, 20131
(interim)

Power Station(3)

radiation

Accidents and failures reported in FY2012

Power Station

Mihama PS Unit 1

12

the

Japan uses the values of 0- and 0+ for the events evaluated by the INES Scale.

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ANNEXES

3

Implementation Status of the IAEA Action Plan
Progress in Japan with regard to the 12-point IAEA Action Plan for Nuclear Safety adopted at the2011 IAEA General Conference, includes:(1) Safety assessments following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident
Following a January 2012 visit by IAEA experts to Japan an assessment of the durability of
power plants against extreme natural hazards was carried out in a Comprehensive Assessmenton the Safety of Reactor Facility.
(2) IAEA peer reviews
In terms of reviews focused on the safety of nuclear power stations, which is within the scope of
this Convention, Japan has hosted a Fact-Finding Mission on the TPCO Fukushima Daiichi
accident and a Seismic Safety Mission to Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, as well as theaforementioned Review Mission stated in (1).
(3) Emergency preparedness and response
Japan proposed strengthening the RANET in January 2012 and designated the IAEA RANET
Capacity Building Centre in Fukushima Prefecture for a May 2013 IAEA RANET Workshop.
(4) National regulatory bodies
A Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) was established in September 2012 and is preparing tohost an IRRS mission as soon as possible.
(5) Operating organizations
No IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions have been hosted during the current
reporting period.
(6) IAEA Safety Standards
In formulating its new regulations, the NRA has referred when necessary to the IAEA Safety
Standards, guided by Japanese regulatory requirements.
(7) International legal framework
Japan actively participates in deliberations to enhance the implementation of international
conventions relating to nuclear safety.

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ANNEXES(8) Capacity building
Following lessons learned at Fukushima, the NRA is pursuing an urgent human resource
development program to attract the highest quality personnel(9) Protecting the public and the environment from ionizing radiation
The NRA regularly compiles, analyzes, and publishes radiation domestic monitoring results
Japan invited an IAEA international decontamination mission in October 2011 to exchange views
and to explain post-accident decontamination work and treatment of the contaminated waste.
(10) Communication and information provision
The establishment of the NRA triggered the restructuring of cooperative relationships, such as
bilateral information exchanges with regulatory authorities in other countries. In December
2012, Japan hosted the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety jointly with the
IAEA to share with international partners the findings and lessons learned from that incident.
(11) Research and development
As stated in Article 8, the NRA conducts safety research for nuclear regulation.

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4

D

Consideration of IAEA Safety Standards
The NRA takes IAEA Safety Standards into consideration when formulating its own regulations
because there is a good level of consistency between Japan’s nuclear regulations and the IAEA
Safety Standard Fundamental Safety Principles (SF-1). The following describes Japan’s
regulations in response to SF-1.

Principle 1: Safety Responsibility
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that nuclear operators are responsible for installing
equipment or apparatus to improve nuclear safety, enhancing operational safety education andtaking any other necessary measures to prevent disasters resulting from nuclear source material,
nuclear fuel material, and reactors, while taking into account the latest safety knowledge.
(Article 59-9 of the Reactor Regulation Act)
Principle 2: Role of the government
As described in Article 7, Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Act was amended to establish the NRA toensure safety in the use of nuclear energy. The Reactor Regulation Act was enacted as
legislation subordinate to the Atomic Energy Basic Act, stipulating the regulation to be carriedout by the government.
Article 8 of this report states that the NRA is a regulatory body that exercises its authority
independently, that it has the legal competence and human and financial resources required ofa regulatory body, and that it establishes and maintains regulatory frameworks such as thecriteria for nuclear regulation.
Principle 3: Leadership and safety management
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors oblige licensees to establish a quality assurance
plan and make continuous improvements to it, as well as planning, implementing, evaluating,and improving operational safety activities. Article 13 stipulates that licensees use a quality
assurance standard (JEAC-4111), which complies with such international standards as IAEA
Safety Standards (GS-R-3) for establishing the management system.
Principle 4: Justification of facilities and activities
Once a reactor has been constructed the level of risk is judged during the NRA’s Reactor
Installation Permit reviews which are carried out under the Reactor Regulation Act.

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ANNEXESPrinciple 5: Optimization of physical protection
One of the objectives of the Reactor Regulation Act is to prevent nuclear disaster and its criteria
are clearly stated in the Act. Licensees can select practical measures to meet needed criteria
according to the specific nature of each facility to avoid excess restrictions.
Principle 6: Limitation of risks to individuals
Established under the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, the Public Notification on Dosesprescribes limits on individual exposure (see Article 15). Radiation protection measures are
implemented to ensure that individual exposure doses are kept at levels that significantly lower
than dose limits, ensuring that no individual is subjected to unpermissable levels.
Principle 7: Protection of current and future generations
Radioactive waste and spent reactor fuel are stored at reactor facilities or other on-site
locations to ensure that they do not pose a radiation risk to people or the environment (seeArticle 19). As reported in our 4th National Report on the Joint Convention, radioactive waste
should be disposed at an underground depth that offers an adequate protective effectaccording to the level of radioactivity.
Principle 8: Prevention of accidents
The concept of defense in depth has been introduced at reactor facilities and measures havebeen taken to prevent accidents or their escalation. In the event of accidents operators are
required to equip facilities to quickly restore control functions and mitigate the impact of such
accidents.
Principle 9: Emergency preparedness and response
As well as explaining the responsibilities of the national and local governments and nuclear
operators, the Nuclear Emergency Act outlines steps that should be taken at each stage of adisaster. Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines must be set forth; based on these, local
authorities prepare for and respond to emergencies (Regional Disaster Prevention Plans).
Japan uses international mechanisms (for example, USIE) to share disaster information inaccordance with the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident promptly with othercontracting parties.
Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks
With regard to “remedial measures, taken following an uncontrolled release of radionuclides
into the environment”, one of the solutions in SF-1 and one in which Japan believes is that it is140

ANNEXES

beneficial to take protection measures to ensure the legally-prescribed individual exposure
limits are not exceeded and that decontamination procedures are carried out accordingly.

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5

Revision of the Reactor Regulation Act
The law prescribing nuclear regulations in Japan is the Reactor Regulation Act, and the new
regulations formulated by the NRA are also based on this Act.
This section provides an overview of the main revisions to the Reactor Regulation Act.

(1)

Clarification concerning responses to severe accidents

The March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident (hereinafter referred to as “the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident”) escalated into a severe accident (an accident beyond the design basis).
Large amount of radioactive material was released into the surrounding area and the effects
were widespread, with local residents being forced to evacuate.
Accordingly, it has been emphasized that preventing disasters (resulting from nuclear fuelmaterial, etc.), which is one of the objectives of the Reactor Regulation Act, includes not only
the prevention of design-basis events, but also the prevention of the release of large amount ofradioactive material outside the reactor facility because of ‘severe accidents.’
A Japanese Government report to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (approvedby the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters in June 2011 and hereinafter referred to as“the IAEA Report”) stated one of the lessons of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident was thefact that severe accident countermeasures were inadequate. To strengthen severe accident
countermeasures in future--the safety and integrity of ‘hard’ areas such as the water-tightnessof buildings and the redundancy or diversity of power sources must be guaranteed. But also,
during reviews for power reactor construction permits it will be just as important to review ‘soft
aspects’, to ensure the effectiveness of materials and equipment for emergencies to mitigate
the impact of a severe accident (what is termed accident management capability).
It has been explicitly stated that “having sufficient technical capability for competently
operating a nuclear reactor”, which is one of the criteria for granting a installation permit in thefirst place, includes “sufficient technical capability for competently dealing with a serious
accident, should one occur”. It has also been decided that accident management capability shallbe reviewed when a Reactor Installation Permit is sought.
During the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, it became clear that the usual preparations oflicensees for a severe accident were inadequate; in regard to this point, the IAEA Report cites
the need to implement severe accident countermeasures in future as one of the major lessonsof this accident.
In particular, it said drills focused on dealing with severe accidents, response measures andmanaging radiation exposure must be strengthened. This so-called ‘accident management’ is nolonger a voluntary safety measure by the licensee but is now a legislative requirement.

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Although licensees previously were obliged to take the necessary operational safety measures
under the Reactor Regulation Act, the revision has made explicit the fact that the necessary
operational safety measures include “measures in the event of a severe accident”.
Since this has been made explicit, Chief Reactor Engineers, who are responsible for operationalsafety must be able to respond competently in such circumstances.
Therefore Chief Engineers must have practical experience in addition to certification as a Chief
Reactor Engineers.
(2)

Revision of procedures for Reactor Installation Permit

Because equipment failure during the tsunami was a major factor in the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident, it is vital to check whether safety analysis and evaluation of the facilities
actually ensure the safety of the reactor. Such procedures should take into account unlikely
phenomena and conditions such as accidents or failure and their impact on overall safety.
Under the existing system, licensees were required to conduct a safety analysis as part of thereview process to obtain a Reactor Installation Permit. But this safety analysis was only one ofseveral documents accompanying the application and there was no requirement to obtain
official permission to alter said documents. Consequently, some safety alterations were noteven submitted to the authorities unless they involved a major change in the location, structure,or equipment of reactor facilities.
Thus, even if the safety analysis was revised and a scenario not previously envisaged was now
added and the safety evaluation of the reactor was altered as a result, this information was notnecessarily submitted to the authorities. They were now not in a position to confirm the actual
safety situation of the reactor facilities.
To allow authorities a true picture of the safety situation and allow them to envisage possible
additional scenarios which could alter that situation, issues related to safety analysis have been
added to the required items accompanying an application.
(3)

Quality assurance at the design and construction stages

Under the former Reactor Regulation Act, systems for quality assurance of licensees aftercommissioning a reactor could be checked via their operational safety programs. But to preventa potential disaster it is necessary not only to check quality assurance after commissioning, butalso quality assurance in earlier stages of the reactor’s life such as design and construction toensure they also achieved the required standards.
IAEA Safety Standards should ensure that design, technology, and materials are of thehighest quality to guarantee overall safety.

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ANNEXESTo check the licensee quality control methods from the design and construction stage onward,
having a quality assurance system was added as a criterion for approval of the construction
plan.
(4)

Backfit system

Under the former Reactor Regulation Act, there was no legal requirement for licensees to apply
new regulatory standards on existing reactors, even if new safety measures incorporating new
and improved technology were now available.
Accordingly, even if the Reactor Installation Permit standards relating to earthquakes ortsunamis were revised, licensees were given only ‘administrative guidance’ to comply with therevised standards and so any changes were purely voluntary
To incorporate the latest scientific and technical knowledge to safety procedures and in light of
the lessons learned during the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the NRA can now orderlicensees to comply with any new Reactor Installation Permit standards even if the reactor
facilities in question have already been granted a Reactor Installation Permit.
(5)

Evaluations to improve the safety of power reactors (enforceable by December 18, 2013)

The Reactor Regulation Act ensures the safety and integrity of power reactors through reviews
for Reactor Installation Permits and subsequent reviews and inspections, such as construction
plan approval reviews, Pre-service Inspections, and Periodic Facility Inspections. It forms thebasis for checks of the operational safety activities of licensees, by such means as approvals forOperational Safety Programs and Operational Safety Inspections.
In addition to the content of such regulatory requirements relating to safety that are imposed
uniformly in law, licensees should be encouraged to voluntarily strengthen existing safety
requirements.
To encourage autonomous initiatives, if licensees draw up their own measures to prevent theoccurrence or escalation of accidents which exceed current regulatory requirements, theyshould then carry out an evaluation of such plans and then formally notify the NRA and publish
the results.
(6)

Model certification system for equipment

There had been expectations that modern equipment able to withstand even severe accidents
would be introduced in following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS. However, under
the system in place hitherto, each reactor facility was required to undergo a Reactor Installation
Permit (amendment) review and obtain approval for a construction plan when introducing such
equipment, even if it was the same type of equipment as that which had already received

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ANNEXES

approval. This led to concerns that such a burden of reviews would slow down the introductionof new safety equipment.
To speed up the introduction of better safety equipment, it was decided to introduce typecertification to reduce the review burden on licensees and shorten the review period.
(7)

Limits on the operation period
After the commissioning of a reactor, its safety is checked by Periodic Licensees’ Inspections

and Periodic Facility Inspections. However, it is clear that risks increase with the age of thereactor with the obvious conclusion that the life of such facilities should be restricted. In fact
there have been ongoing public discussions over the age-related deterioration of plants whichhave been operational for many years.
In this vein, the government report submitted to an IAEA ministerial conference contained areference that, learning lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, “the Japanese
government will review and improve the legal structure governing nuclear safety and nuclear
emergency preparedness and response, along with related criteria and guidelines, and during
this process it will reevaluate measures taken against age-related degradation of existing
facilities from the viewpoint of structural reliability as well as the necessity of responding to
new knowledge and expertise including progress in system concepts.”
As a result of such review, the operation period of 40 years has been introduced as a mandatory
stipulation. This rule took into account several factors: that the safety evaluations of criticalequipment and components during the Reactor Installation Permit Review generally envisaged alife-span of 40 years after commencing operations; that almost all facilities are assessed on a
40-year period in evaluation of deterioration due to neutron irradiation and material stress.
However, it is not clearly the case that nuclear reactors can remain ‘problem free’ for 40-year
periods and then suddenly become dangerous after that time span. The status of individual
plants also varies greatly depending on such factors as the effectiveness of maintenance and thedecade in which the reactor was built.
Accordingly, some flexibility was thought necessary in the system of operation period, with thepossibility of granting an extension “for a period not exceeding 20 years in cases that certain
requirements are met as stipulated in a Cabinet Order”.
On the other hand, even if a rector is less than 40 years old since commencing operation, the
new system of backfit could result in suspension of its operation or revoking its Reactor
Installation Permit if it fails to meet technical standards.
It should be added that one of the points of reference in adopting the 40-year period, was the
US system where the allowable operational period is up to 40 years after the granting of theoperational license. Under the US system, the licenses can be renewed for an additional 20

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years, beyond the life of the original operating license, although this period is chosen taking into
account other factors such as asset depreciation.
(8)

Clarification of the responsibilities of nuclear operators

The Fundamental Safety Principles in the IAEA Safety Standards stipulate that the prime
responsibility for safety at nuclear facilities rests with the licensee.
Furthermore, the report submitted to an IAEA Ministerial Conference notes that one of thelessons learned from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPS was that nuclear operators musttake all appropriate steps to enhance safety. In the interim report compiled by the Investigation
Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo ElectricPower Company in December 2011, it was pointed out that operators’ countermeasures fornatural disasters, such as tsunamis, which was one of the main causes of the accident at
Fukushima Daiichi NPS, were inadequate.
Taking into consideration international standards and efforts to avoid ‘future’ Fukushimas or theescalation of crises, it was decided to legally clarify the responsibility of licensees. They should
work on an ongoing basis to verify the soundness of nuclear design, modify equipment toenhance safety whenever possible, develop accident procedures, enhance operational safety
education, and undertake regular safety drills.
(9)

Steps to prevent a disaster in an emergency

Until now it has not been possible to order licensees, to take emergency measures such as
shutting down a facility, even if the threat of a disaster was considered extremely high, until
such a crisis actually occurred
Following a major earthquake, for instance, and the possibility of aftershocks, it was still notpossible to take legal steps to prevent an impending disaster.
Therefore, should the NRA consider a disaster imminent, it will now be able to order licensees
to take preventive measures, including suspending nuclear operators, even if such threats as anearthquake do not materialize.
(10)

Special regulations concerning facilities at which nuclear disasters have occurred

As became clear from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, once a nuclear disasteroccurs, it can take a considerable amount of time before repairs or decommissioning canbe carried out. In such situations, the nuclear facility in question could remain in a stateof noncompliance with the Reactor Regulation Act. Special measures that differ fromthose for ordinary nuclear facilities are required during this period, and it is necessary to
clarify matters relating to the application of the Reactor Regulation Act.

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After emergency measures in the Reactor Regulation Act have been implemented following a
nuclear disaster, facilities deemed to require special management shall be designated asSpecified Nuclear Power Facilities.
In this situation, the NRA shall issue a public notice to this effect and shall immediately informthe specified nuclear operator of the “Matters for which Measures should be Undertaken” andsubmission deadline for their implementation.
The nuclear operator that has been designated in this way shall obtain NRA approval for the
implementation plan and take steps to ensure operational safety or physical protection of
specified nuclear materials.
They must undergo an NRA inspection to confirm compliance with the implementation plan.
During implementation other not normally part of the Reactor Regulation Act may be applied as
specified by Cabinet Order.
Once these special measures have been implemented and the plant can once more
comply with normal regulations in the Reactor Regulation Act - or if decommissioning
measures can be carried out - the designation of Specified Nuclear Power Facility shallbe revoked and a public notice to this effect issued.
(11)

Inspections of manufacturers

Until now safety inspections of nuclear power reactors and other facilities focused oncomponents that have actually been completed, namely Pre-service Inspections and Periodic
Facility Inspections. These, however, may be insufficient on their own and checks are necessary
from the facility manufacture and construction stages, focusing on such areas as management.
Authorities, however, were unable to conduct direct inspections of parties other than nuclear
operators, pursuant to laws and regulations; in other words, they could not inspect
manufacturers, so authorities were unable to adequately check the safety and integrity of
nuclear facilities.
In light of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, there are expectations that a more diverse
range of equipment will be introduced to improve nuclear safety, and an increase inprocurement from manufacturers not previously engaged in such nuclear production is also
anticipated, so there is a growing need for procurement management regulations.
Moreover, the necessity of inspections of manufacturers by the authorities is stipulated in the
IAEA Safety Standards.
Accordingly, authorities themselves will now be able to inspect those involved in the design orconstruction of nuclear facilities, or the manufacture of equipment for such facilities.

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Consolidation of nuclear safety regulation systems for power reactor facilities

In the relevant Cabinet approval dated August 12, 2011, the duties relating to the regulation of
nuclear safety were separated from the ministries and agencies responsible for the use of
nuclear energy and centralized in the hands of the NRA, thereby seeking to further improve its
functions as a regulatory body.
With regard to administrative matters concerning electrical facilities generating nuclear energy(hereinafter referred to as “nuclear power generation facilities”) under the Electricity Business
Act, those relating to the regulation of nuclear safety are now overseen by the NRA, while someadministrative matters relating to nuclear power generation facilities under the Electricity
Business Act have been placed under the joint jurisdiction of the Minister of Economy, Tradeand Industry and the NRA.
Hitherto, safety regulation of nuclear power station equipment was carried out on the basis of
two legal codes:

by the Reactor Regulation Act as power reactor facilities and by the Electricity

Business Act as electrical facilities. However, the operation of systems based on multiple legal
codes was complex and unclear, so in light of the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS,
the need to clarify the regulatory system for nuclear safety was noted, along with the necessityof putting in place an environment that would encourage licensees of power reactor operation
to implement initiatives aimed at ensuring safety.
It was decided to centralize safety regulation of nuclear reactor facilities under the Reactor
Regulation Act, by setting out in this Act provisions for regulating safety measures focused on
nuclear power generation facilities previously under the Electricity Business Act; and further
setting out relevant provisions in the Electricity Business Act, such as a directive stating thatsome provisions therein do not apply to nuclear power generation, as power reactor facilities
are regulated by the Reactor Regulation Act.

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3

References

Nuclear Energy Basic Act

Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation AuthorityAct on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material andReactorsAct on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

FY 2012 Annual Report (Nuclear Regulation Authority)
http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/data/ar_0701.pdf

Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear
Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations -Additional Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA - The accident at
TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations - (Second Report)

Final Report (Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear
Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company)
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html

The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission
http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/



The Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident



IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP
Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_Report.pdf



IAEA Mission to Review NISA’s Approach to the “Comprehensive Assessments for

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http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/nisa-mission-report0312.pdf


IAEA Mission to Onagawa Nuclear Power Station to Examine the Performance ofSystems, Structures and Components Following the Great East Japanese
Earthquake and Tsunami
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/onagawa0413.pdf

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