James Claxton

A Survey of Japan-Related ISDSJames Claxton

Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kobe University

International arbitration is a principal means ofSection 4 will consider what Japan can do tosettling international commercial disputes andprepare for possible cases brought against it bydisputes between investors and the states hosting

foreign investors.

1their investments. While international

As the title suggests, this paper is meant to be acommercial arbitration (ICA) has a tradition

survey of the aforementioned topics. A much

lasting centuries, investor-state dispute settlement

more detailed paper could be written about any(ISDS) is a relatively new phenomenon. The rise

one of them.

of ISDS can be explained by a concurrent
increase in foreign direct investment and theproliferation of bilateral investment treaties

Ⅰ

Section 1: ICA andISDS Compared(BITs) in recent times.2
This paper considers ISDS and its relevance to

It might be tempting to think of ICA and ISDS

Japan and Japanese investors. The specific topics

merely as two types of arbitration, like twothat it will address include the following:

branches of the same tree. There are many

Section 1 will consider the nature of investor-

obvious similarities. Consent by the disputing

state arbitration and how it differs fromparties is required to extend jurisdiction over theirtraditional commercial arbitration;

dispute to an arbitral tribunal under either system.

Section 2 will survey public cases in which

The parties select the procedural rules, and theyJapanese parties have been implicated inchoose arbitrators to decide their dispute in bothinvestor-state proceedings;

systems. There are also overlaps in the laws,

Section 3 will consider how Japanese investors

rules, and guidelines that support the processes as

can structure their investment to take advantage

well as the arbitrators and counsel that appear onof substantive protections in international

behalf of the parties.

investment instruments; and1

2

See, e.g., Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 6th edition, Oxford
University Press 1 (2015); Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Cases and Materials, 2nd edition, Kluwer Law Internationalxxix (2015).
Since 1960, foreign direct investment has expanded faster than the growth of global economic output: see, e.g., Scott Miller
and Gregory N. Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check (CSIS Reports), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 6(2015); According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the number of BITs increased from
385 at the end of the 1980’s to a total of 2,926 by the end of 2014: see UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2015) available at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf (last verified 26 December 2015).

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.1899

6．A Survey of Japan-Related ISDSICA and ISDS cases may also intersect at thestate from public funds that may come fromlevel of individual disputes. An investor may

taxpayers with no knowledge of or involvement

have the option to bring a single dispute to either

in the dispute.

ICA or ISDS. Even after the choice has been

There are other differences that stem from themade, relations between the two systems may

unique nature of ISDS. ICA normally opposesremain clouded. An investor may seek elevateparties that have a horizontal, private contractual

commitments made in a contract that contains anrelationship. By contrast, ISDS opposes a private

ICA clause to the level of treaty claims in ISDS

entity and a sovereign state. 5 Moreover, ICA

proceedings by operation of a so-called “umbrella

disputes concern rights and obligations under3

clause” in the treaty. An investor may otherwise

private contracts normally governed by a national

need to establish breaches of a commercial

law, whereas ISDS disputes normally concern thecontract as a precursor to finding liability under a

responsibility of a host state for its actions ortreaty in ISDS proceedings.

inactions under international law.
In sum, although both ISDS and ICA are forms

Despite the similarities and overlap, there areof international arbitration, the two systems raisenotable differences between ICA and ISDS. Thed i ff e r e n t i s s u e s a n d i m p l i c a t e d i ff e r e n t

greatest of these may concern the stakes.

stakeholders. A proper understanding of these

Whereas ICA normally impacts only the disputing

differences is important to avoid

parties, ISDS can have wide-reaching effects

misunderstandings or mistaken assumptions.

across society. ISDS tribunals can re-examine

This may be of particular interest in a jurisdiction

and sanction regulatory action by a state or

like Japan where legal practitioners are familiar

judgments made by national courts. These mightwith ICA but have limited ISDS experience.

include measures taken to protect theenvironment, protect consumers, stabilize theeconomy, or promote public health.

4

If theⅡ

Section 2: JapanRelated Cases

investor prevails, damages will be paid by the
3

4

5

100

For an overview of the operation of umbrella clauses, see, e.g., Doak Bishop, James Crawford, et al. (eds.), Foreign Investment
Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary, Second Edition, Kluwer Law International 753 (2014); and Andrés Rigo Sureda,“The Umbrella Clause,” Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID, Kluwer Law International 374-387(2015).
Some notorious examples include the following: Abengoa S.A. y COFIDES S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/09/2; Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.
2009-23; Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2; Ethyl Corporation v. The
Government of Canada, UNCITRAL; Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1;
Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL; Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe
Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6; and William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton,
Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04.
See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 American Journalof International Law 1 (2013); and Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006).

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18

James Claxton

Japanese investors have used ISDS far lessthan investors from other countries, which isand therefore failed to meet the definition of “investor” under the NE-CZ BIT.

paradoxical given that Japan has comparatively
high levels of outbound investment. 6

This

The tribunal rejected this argument. The NE-

section summarizes the two Japan-related cases

CZ BIT defines “investor” as “legal persons

that are in the public domain.

constituted under the law of one of theContracting Parties.”8 The tribunal considered

Saluka v. The Czech Republic, conductedthat this definition was broad enough to include

under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,

Saluka. It went on to find that the Czech

concerned the privatization and reorganization of

Republic had breached the NE-CZ BIT and, after

the Czech banking system as it had existed during

a separate hearing on quantum, awarded US$236

7

the Communist period.

Saluka Investments BV

million to the Japanese group of companies.9(Saluka), a Dutch company, acquired shares of a
Czech state-owned bank (IPB). Saluka claimed

JGC Corporation v. Kingdom of Spain was firstthat the Czech Republic gave discriminatory state

arbitration brought directly by a Japanese

aid to Saluka’s competitors and otherwise

investor.10 The case was registered on 22 June

violated Article 3 (fair and equitable treatment)2015 with the International Centre for Settlement

and Article 5 (deprivation of investment) of theof Investment Disputes (ICSID), the leading

BIT between the Netherlands and the Czech

specialist ISDS institution. JGC Corporation

Republic (NE-CZ BIT).

(JGC) claims to have invested in two solarthermal power plants in southern Spain in the late

The Czech Republic challenged the jurisdiction

2000s. In 2007, Spain began offering feed-inof the tribunal. It claimed that the real investor

tariffs and subsidies to encourage investment in

was not Saluka but an English company, Nomura

solar projects. In the wake of the global

Europe, which was a subsidiary of a Japanese

recession, Spain reversed its policy and begangroup of companies. According to the Czech

capping the number of hours of electricity that

Republic, Saluka was merely a shell company

could benefit from the feed-in tariff in 2010.

with no real economic interest in the IPB shares

Since then, Spain has continued to roll back the

6

7

8

9
10

The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014 identifies Japan as second only to the United States in terms of FDI outflows (page5).
See Saluka v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award of 17 March 2006, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0740.pdf (last verified 26 December 2015).
Article 1(b)(ii) of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of theNetherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/968 (last verified on 26 December 2015). By letter of 8 December 1994, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech
Republic confirmed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of The Netherlands that the BIT remained in force after the
separation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Saluka v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award of 17 March 2006 at para. 31).
See “Saluka resolved following battle of experts,” Global Arbitration Review, 27 June 2008.
See “Japanese investor joins solar claim bandwagon,” Global Arbitration Review, 25 June 2015; see also the case register on
the ICSID website at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/15/27 (lastverified 26 December 2015).

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18101

6．A Survey of Japan-Related ISDS

incentives, including by passing a law in 2013

with the many issues that arise when defendingthat cut subsidies for alternative-energy projects.

itself in such as case. The remaining two sectionsof this paper provide a basic overview of the main

JGC bases its claims on alleged violations of
the Energy Charter Treaty, a convention that
establishes a multilateral framework for crossborder cooperation in the energy industry. At thetime this paper was written, the parties are in theprocess of constituting the arbitral tribunal.

issues facing Japanese investors and the Japanese
government in these circumstances.

Ⅲ

Section 3: Securing
Investment Treaty
Protection

This is not the first time that Spain has beenStates are not bound to harmonize thechallenged for its policy reversal on renewableprotections afforded to investors in treaties, laws,thenergy. In fact, JGC brought the 16 of 23 suchand contracts. A state may conclude ancases (at present) against Spain at ICSID, andinvestment treaty with one country but notother arbitrations have been commenced against

another, and it may offer investment protections

Spain on similar grounds under other arbitralfor investors from one country that are different

rules.

11

Perhaps the spate of existing cases

comforted JGC in initiating the first known

or better than those offered to investors fromanother country.

Japanese ICDS case. In any event, it remains to

In practice, investors may have ways ofbe seen whether this arbitration, perhaps paired

avoiding these differences in treatment. Somewith the extensive news coverage of the Trans

rely on most-favored nation clauses in treaties toPacific Partnership Agreement and its inclusion

benefit from superior investment protection. 12

of ISDS, will encourage other JapaneseAnother way to achieve maximum treaty benefit

companies to consider using ISDS to resolve theiris to structure investments to take advantage ofdisputes.

treaties that offer the broadest protection toinvestors.

While a relative lack of experience in ISDS
may not itself be a hindrance, it may mean that

Consider a Japanese investor planning to buy

Japanese investors do not consider ISDS as

shares in a company that is a national of a statereadily as investors in other jurisdictions wherethat has no investment treaty with Japan. The

ISDS is more common. Similarly, that Japan has

investor might purchase shares in the foreign

not been a respondent in ISDS proceedings means

company in its own name and fail to benefit fromthat the Japanese government has not had to deal

any investment treaty protection. Conversely, the

11
12

102

See “Spain claims count at ICSID hits 23,” Global Arbitration Review, 27 November 2015.
For an overview of the operation of most-favored nation clauses, see, e.g., Doak Bishop, James Crawford, et al. (eds.), Foreign
Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary, Second Edition, Kluwer Law International 754 (2014); and David D.
Caron and Esmé Shirlow, “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment: Substantive Protection,” Building International Investment Law: The
First 50 Years of ICSID, Kluwer Law International 398-414 (2015).

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18

James Claxton

investor could establish a subsidiary as antreaty provides direct access to arbitration. Some

investment vehicle in a country that has atreaties require, for example, that investors bringfavorable investment treaty with the state hosting

their claims to the courts of the host state before

the investment. The investor would thereby gothey can be brought to arbitration. The investor

from no treaty protection to wide-ranging

must also consider how difficult and costly it

protection backed by international law andwould be to set up a subsidiary in a state with aenforceable in arbitration outside of the reach offavorable treaty.

the national courts of the host state. Suchstructuring might also give the host state greater

The process of structuring investments toincentive to treat the investment fairly to avoid abenefit from treaty protection is a complex subject

public and costly arbitration. Moreover, even ifthat is beyond the scope of this paper. What is

the Japan did have an investment treaty with theimportant to take away is that Japanese investors

host state that would cover the aforementioned

should consider investment structuring as early as

investor, the investor might still be able topossible in the process of investing, and thisstructure its investment to benefit from anassessment should include consideration of all

investment agreement that offers better protection

viable investment treaties between the statefor its investment.

hosting the investment and other states and not
merely any treaty that might exist between the

Optimal structuring in any case will depend on
the investment and the treaties that might apply.
As a starting point, an investor can compare theprotections available in different treaties between

host state and Japan.

Ⅳ

Section 4: Preparing
for and Avoiding ISDS

its home state and the host state, on one hand, andthe host state and third states (not Japan), on the

As noted, Japan has not been a respondent stateother hand, in order to find instruments offeringin a case brought by a foreign investor. This

the maximum protection. As part of this analysis,might not be surprising given the relatively low

the investor must consider what restrictions thoselevels of incoming foreign investment and thetreaties place on the protections they offer. For

modest number of investment treaties to which

example, a treaty might define “investment” andJapan is a party compared with other countries in“investor” restrictively to limit the scope ofthe region.13

protection.
That said, the amount of foreign investment
The investor should also consider whether the13

into Japan has been increasing, and the AbeE.g, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported in April 2015 that Japan had the lowest
share of inward foreign direct investment as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) among member countries (OECDEconomic Surveys JAPAN, April 2015, pge. 4, available at http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Japan-2015-overview.pdf (lastverified 26 December 2015)).

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18103

6．A Survey of Japan-Related ISDS

government is working to increase the number of

early case assessment to determine cost exposure,investment treaties. At least nine new BIT’s andpolitical concerns, and non-legal objectives.

two free trade agreements have been singed or

Meanwhile, steps should be taken to preserve the14Japan is also

state’s position should the arbitration go forward.

an intended member of the Trans Pacific

Dispute managers should identify staff who may

Partnership Agreement, which contains ISDS

be implicated in the dispute; internal and external

provisions and will cover more than one-third ofcommunications by these individuals can behave come into force since 2014.

15

Japan may

restricted, and the staff can be directed to retain

yet find itself as a respondent in ISDS

documents that might be relevant to the dispute.

proceedings.

Dispute managers should also identify thethe world’s gross domestic product.

documents and witnesses that may be relevant to
There are steps that the Japanese government

the case early in the process.

can take to protect Japan from claims brought byinvestors. One is to ensure that government

On a broader scale, Japan could limit its

agents and officials are aware of Japan’s treaty

exposure to claims by changing or harmonizing

obligations and the risk of arbitration. This might

the scope of protections that it offers investors in

be achieved through education programs andtreaties. This is a large topic with many politicalsystems of communication across agencies thatand strategic implications. As an overview, Japan

include a mechanism to alert the appropriate

could consider supplementing the vague standards

agency of problems when they arise withof protections in its investment treaties withinvestors.

definitions that explain them; exempt certain
investors, investments, or activities from

Other steps can be taken if arbitration seems

protection; systematically include denial ofeminent. Preparations should begin early sincebenefits clauses in investment treaties; reserve thecoordination across various governmental

rights to regulate in certain domains, such as form i n i s t r i e s m a y b e n e c e s s a r y. A d i s p u t e

the benefit of the environment or public health;management team should be put in place.

and reserve the right to take safeguard measures,

Internal counsel should be identified, and externalsuch as after a financial crisis. Such provisions

counsel should be used in most cases. It may also

could be included in new treaties or incorporated

be advisable to establish a team to manage press

into treaties with existing partners throughreleases and communications with the media.

renegotiation.

The case management team should perform an

14

15

104

Japan might also consider using and publishingUnited Nations and UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub available at  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/105?type=c#iiaInnerMenu (last verified 26 December 2015).
See, e.g., The Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives,”
available at https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives (last verified 26 December 2015).

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18

James Claxton

a model BIT, which could offer a number ofadvantages.

16

Generally speaking, thereforms, and some to propose alternative
systems.17

preparation of a model BIT may itself enable astate to carefully review its investment treaty

Despite this activity, there has only been one

policy in consultation with interested private andpublic case in which a Japanese investor usedgovernmental stakeholders. This may be less

ISDS. Meanwhile, Japan has not been a

relevant to Japan given its recent investment

respondent in proceedings and so it has not beentreaty activity, but there might still be scope fordirectly impacted by the sort of concerns

refinement or harmonization.

expressed by states that have been obligateddefend themselves or pay large damage awards toOnce complete, the resulting model BIT can beinvestors. This relative lack of experience should

publicized to communicate a state’s position toneither prevent investors from using ISDS as apotential partners. This may place the state on

dispute resolution tool nor prevent the Japanese

firm footing at the outset of future treaty

government from preparing to avert or properly

negotiations by setting a framework for the

manage a case brought against it.

negotiations and by forcing its negotiating
partners to respond to the model rather than frame
the negotiations themselves.

Ⅴ

Conclusion

B a c k e d b y m o r e t h a n 2 8 0 0 B I T ’s a n dsignificant multilateral investment treaties
providing for arbitration, ISDS has establisheditself as an important means of resolving disputes
between investors and host states. The system
continues to evolve with more cases, cases in new
sectors, cases in new parts of the world, and morelawyers specializing in the area. At the sametime, there has been a backlash against the present
system that has caused some commentators toquestion its long-term viability, some to propose

16
17

See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press 132-133 (2015).
For a recent survey of concerns about the ISDS system and proposals for reform, see Jean E. Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret (eds.),
Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century, Hotei Publishing (2015). The introduction
to the book provides a helpful overview of the main issues and can be found at http://www.transnational-disputemanagement.com/article.asp?key (last verified 26 December 2015).

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18105

Claxton 報告コメント

C l a x t o n 報 告 コ メ ン ト
古屋邦彦

元九州国際大学 教授

本 報 告 は 日 本 企 業 を 当 事 者 と す るISDS（日本は米国に次いで世界第 2 位 1 ）ISDS条（Investor State Dispute Settlement-投資家/投資項に基づいて仲裁を申し立てた事例はまだ受入国間の紛争解決）に関するものである。

2 件に過ぎない（古屋注：全世界では2012

発表者は本件を以下 4 段階に分けて述べて年だけで50件 2 ）としこれら 2 件の概要を述いる：

べている。一件はチェコ国営銀行の民営化に

1） ISDSによる仲裁の内容と従来の国際商事仲裁（ICA）との比較。
2） 日 本当事者が関与しているISDS仲裁

関して野村欧州がオランダの子会社を通じて、オランダとチェコの投資協定第 3 条、第 5 条に基づいてチェコ政府を訴えた件で、もう一件はスペインにおける太陽光発電プロについて。
3） 日本当事者が対外投資を行う際の有効ジェクトに投資した日揮が、電力買い取り条
件を一方的に変更したスペイン政府をエネル

なリスク回避手段。
4） 海外の対内投資家からの訴えにホスト

ギー憲章条約に違反したとして訴えた事案で国の日本としての有効な対処方法。

ある。また本論は、スペイン政府が新規エネ1）について発表者は、ISDS仲裁とICA仲

ルギーに関して政策変更をするのは本件が初裁との基本的な違いとして、①ICAは紛争当

めてではなく、日揮はスペインがICSIDに提事者間だけの利害関係だが、ISDSは社会全訴された20件中16番目のケースにあたると体にまたがる問題である事、②もし原告が勝し、他のケースは、UNCITRAL仲裁規則に利したら損害賠償金はその紛争に無関係な国

よりストックホルム商業会議所仲裁協会に対民の負担で支払われる事、③ICAは当事者のスペイン案件として登録されていると述べて

水 平 的 な 関 係 を 律 す る 私 法 の 関 係 だ が、いる。

ISDSは私的組織と国家という垂直的な関係

3）では日本企業が対外投資を行い 2）のを律する公法が関係する事、④ICAは契約両ような問題に遭遇した場合、如何にホスト国

当事者相互の責任を対象とするが、ISDSはでの投資リスクを回避できるかについて述べ

投資受け入れ国の責任のみを追及する事等のている。ある投資家達はこれらの問題を実務

相違点を挙げている。

処理で回避してきたし、あるものは協定中の2）については、日本の対外投資額が世界最恵国待遇条項をより強固なリスク防衛のよ的に非常に高いレベルにあるにもかかわらずりどころとしてきたとしている。もう一つの

1
2

106

The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014
ICSIDに関する基本情報p.5、http://siteresources.worldbank.org/JAPANINJAPANESEEXT/Resources/515497-1173431677052/I CSID-FactSheet-ja.pdf 、2015.10.31

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18古屋邦彦

最大の協定防御方法は、ISDS条項のようなく、取引や付き合いはそこで終わってしまう

第三者とのより広い防御を有する協定から利ことが多い。日本では国民一人当たりの弁護益を得る投資方法を構築することであると述士数が欧米に比べて桁違いに少ないにもかかべている。

わらず裁判制度があまり問題なく維持されて

4）では3）項とは逆に、日本は現在のといることがこれを裏付けている。これは投資

ころ外国投資家からの仲裁被申し立て国には協定を対象とする紛争に限ったことではな

なっていないが、安倍内閣は投資協定を増加

い。このようなDNAで長い間育ってきたた

させようとしている等の理由から、将来日本

め、日本企業を当事者とする紛争では、今回が国際投資案件のホスト国として被申立人の日揮・スペイン間の事案の結果の如何を問(respondent)になるかもしれないリスクにつわず、今後ともISDS条項による仲裁が投資いて、幾つかの防御策を推奨している。まず額に見合うほど増える可能性は少ないのでは

は、政府の付属機関や職員達に、日本が締結ないだろうかと思われる。

する協定における責任やリスクを認識させる

2）について最近の報道では、安倍内閣もことであり、その後は政府各省にまたがる連

日本がISDS条項による被申し立て国になっ携による係争管理チームやメディア対策チー

た場合の対策を関係部署に指示したようであムの設置、外部弁護士の起用等が必要である

る。Claxton教授も本論でそれに対する具体と述べている。

策を述べている。特に対策にあたっては省庁の縦割り構造が大きな弊害になることを懸念

Claxton教授が本発表で主張したかったことは下記二点に要約されよう：

し横断的な組織の構築を推奨しているが、まさに正鵠をついた提言といえよう。

1 ）日本は対外投資額では米国に次いで尚、蛇足ではあるが、本論第二章に述べら

世界第二位であるにもかかわらず、投資仲裁れているスペイン王国を被申立人とする太陽の申し立てはたった二件に過ぎない。グロー

光発電の紛争20案件にはEU諸国を申立人とバルにビジネスを進めていくには紛争解決手する仲裁がかなり含まれている。日揮関係者

段としてISDS仲裁をもっと活用すべきであに小職がヒアリングしたところ、これらの案る。

件に対してスペイン政府は、EU諸国はISDS

2）現在のところ日本はISDS条項による被条約が対象とする独立国家ではないとして仲申し立て国にはなっていないが、対内投資の裁不適格による門前払いを考えているとのこ

増加につれこのケースが増えると思われるのとである。もしこれが事実であれば、本件紛で、その対策を早めに行っておく必要がある。

争がEU諸国の法的独立性を問うという、予1）については日本企業ひいては“日本人の想もしなかった論争に波及するかもしれず極紛争嫌い”の資質が大きく影響していると思

めて興味あることである。

われる。一般的に日本企業（日本人）は私的な紛争を裁判や仲裁等、公の場で争うことを忌避する傾向にある。その場合、狭い日本という土俵の中での両者の関係は勝敗、結果の如何を問わず将来的に修復されることがな

国際商取引学会年報 2016vol.18107