参 考 資 料 1- 3

Existing Practices against
Disinformation（EPaD）

In the Ministerial Declaration of the G7 Digital and Tech Ministers’ Meeting held on April 29-30, 2023,
we recognized “the importance of actions taken by a wide range of stakeholders, including social
media platforms, civil society, the internet technical community, and academia, to address online
information manipulation and interference and disinformation while respecting human rights, inparticular the right to freedom of expression.” Also, the Declaration stated: “We plan to collaborate
in gathering and compiling existing practices by various stakeholders to address online
disinformation as Existing Practices against Disinformation (EPaD), and we intend to publicize andpresent this report at the UN IGF 2023 in Kyoto.” We are pleased with the publication of this EPaD,
and it is expected to be referred to when tackling online disinformation.

CanadaCivil Society •Established in, CIVIX provides authentic learning opportunities to help millions of schoolaged youth develop the habits of active and informed citizenship. The CTRL-F initiative,
developed by CIVIX, is an evidence-based lateral reading program designed for students
aged between 11-18 years old where students learn three core lateral reading strategies
and apply these strategies to authentic online examples. A mounting body of evidenceshows that individuals’ ability to evaluate online information and identify mis- anddisinformation improves dramatically if they are taught the skills of lateral reading, a term
describing the process of opening a new tab and conducting quick searches to learn more
about a source or claim. These skills are meant to replace commonly taught, but ultimately
ineffective, digital literacy techniques that emphasize superficial signals of authority (e.g.
checking the domain, looking for typos, reading a site's "About" page, etc.). Research
confirms that CTRL-F substantially improves students' ability to verify sources and claims.

•

Capacity-building for educators: CIVIX’s experience working closely with educators thoughtthem that teacher training and capacity-building is essential for the proper implementationof effective digital literacy programs. Much of this is new for teachers, and many evidencebased best practices run counter to commonly-taught methods. As such, teachers require1

参 考 資 料 1- 3
hand-on workshops to become familiar with the resources and also benefit from expert
panels to help frame the problem of false and misleading information and its impact on
democracy.
Social•Reporting Platforms: Young Canadians Evaluate Efforts to Counter Disinformation: In 2023,

Media

MediaSmarts facilitated online focus groups with youth ages 16 to 29 to examine andPlatforms

assess reporting processes on popular apps (Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, and YouTube). This
research examines how young Canadians feel about current efforts to counter
misinformation and disinformation online and what solutions they have regarding the
problems and concerns they experience while navigating online information ecosystems
and communities. Overall, youth expressed a lack of trust and confidence in the ability ofplatforms to counter misinformation and disinformation and to keep them informed and safe
online. Participants emphasized that users are not provided with meaningful opportunities
to engage with platforms to prevent and address misinformation and disinformation, andthey felt platforms must make design changes that prioritize values of accuracy,transparency, trust, responsibility, and safety.

Research•

Entities

Know it Or Not! (2022): In collaboration with Digital Public Square (DSP), MediaSmarts
developed a series of lesson plans designed to integrate DPS’ Know it Or Not! Tool, which
had previously been used with general audiences, into Canadian classrooms. Along withthe gamified instruction of the tool, the lessons teach students what scientific consensus isand how it can change, the relationship between correlation and causation, and how science
news articles are written.

•

Leveraging Digital Tools to Increase Vaccine Adoption: From 2021 to 2023, Digital Public
Square (DPS) advanced a program to engage more than 150,000 Canadians to address
COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy driven by mis and disinformation. The program was focusedon delivering engagement that improved knowledge, increased confidence in vaccines, andthe intent to vaccinate. A randomized controlled trial with +4000 participants showed that
information delivered through the engagement platform, when compared to a blog and noinformation control group, was significantly more likely to improve the three outcome
measures. Significant impact on participants’ knowledge retention was maintained, evenone month post intervention.

•

Strengthening Resilience of Civil Society to Online Disinformation: Working with civil society
partners in 5 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Digital Public Square (DPS) is
using its standard approach to build on a successful pilot project to help civil society
organizations (SCOs) develop the capacity to identify, analyze and counter foreignsponsored disinformation. As well as vertical knowledge sharing between DPS and CSO
partners, horizontal knowledge sharing between the partners is also successfully promoted.
See the latest product from one of our partner countries https://getitrightnigeria.com•

Building Resilience to Mis/Dis/Mal-information about the Ukraine Crisis among
Communities in Canada: In 2022-2023, Digital Public Square (DPS) advanced a programthat engaged more than 100,000 Canadians to build resilience against Russian Ukraine2

参 考 資 料 1- 3
related disinformation. A randomized control trial to assess the efficacy of the engagement
platform demonstrated a 256% improvement in knowledge scores over a control group.
Recommendations included the need for enhanced intergovernmental coordination, support
for civil society, schools and researchers, and real time monitoring systems.
•

Promoting Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Myanmar: In Myanmar, Digital Public Square(DPS) is advancing a program that has engaged more than 800,000 people to promotereligious and ethnic tolerance by correcting misconceptions about world religions. A
randomized controlled trial has demonstrated that those who engaged with the engagement
platform reported higher willingness to interact with religious and ethnic minorities andhigher support for the right to protection of minorities. See one of several gamified products
released in this project: https://maunghmangyi.com.

•

Digital Public Square (DPS) has developed a standard approach that involves monitoring,mapping and analyzing a specific online environment as the basis for the development of acustom-made engagement tool to build resilience to mis and disinformation. This process,and DPS’ engagement tools have demonstrated statistically significant effects on arepeated basis at reducing the harm caused by mis and disinformation in multiple countries
around the world.

Government •Digital Citizen Contribution Program (DCCP): Canadians themselves can be the best lineof defense in our efforts to fight mis- and disinformation. The program works through third
party organizations undertaking research and carrying out learning activities, such as publicawareness tools and online workshops, to help Canadians become more resilient and thinkcritically about the information they consume and share online.

These projects reach

Canadians on a national and local scale, online and offline, in minority communities, in bothofficial languages and in Indigenous communities.
•

From Access to Engagement: Building a Digital Media Literacy Strategy for Canada (2022):
With funding from the Department of Canadian Heritage, MediaSmarts hosted a symposiumthat brought together key stakeholders and community partners from across Canada whoshare an interest in developing and implementing a national digital media literacy strategy.
They also conducted an environmental scan of existing national and international digital
media literacy strategies and interviews with key informants from Canada and international
jurisdictions about their experiences working on digital media literacy frameworks. This
project confirms the need for a commitment from the federal government to support thedevelopment, implementation and evaluation of a national digital media literacy strategy
through appropriate investments in the community and ongoing engagement that fosters
collaboration and innovation.

A national strategy will provide experts, advocates andservice providers in the digital media literacy field with a unified but flexible approach forpreventing and responding to online harms (such as misinformation and disinformation)
through education and critical skills development.
•

Canadian Digital Media Research Network - The Government of Canada has funded a newpartnership ($5.5 million investment) with civil society to help combat misinformation and3

参 考 資 料 1- 3
disinformation and strengthen the capacity of civil society partners to counter disinformation.
Funding for the Canadian Digital Media Research Network will help Canadians become
more resilient and think critically about the information they consume online.

This will

enable Canadians to have a greater awareness of the information ecosystem, including byidentifying foreign interference and mis- and disinformation narratives, and will support
strategies for Canadian’s digital literacy.
•

Canada leads the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM), established at the Charlevoix
Summit in 2018, to bolster G7 collaboration to identify and respond to foreign threats todemocracy, including disinformation. We leverage the G7 RRM for real-time informationexchange and through new Working Groups established in 2023: on collective response,
on sub-national interference and on transnational repression – issues where disinformationand foreign information manipulation and interference play a significant role. During the
Ukraine crisis, G7 RRM supported a GAC-funded pilot project with the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace on a multi-stakeholder crisis network comprised of G7
governments, social media platforms and civil society partners to tackle Russian
disinformation and support the integrity of the Ukrainian information environment.

•

Diplomatic Engagement Strategy: GAC developed a Diplomatic Engagement Plan tosustain and increase international alignment on supporting Ukraine and condemning theinvasion. This plan builds the need to counter disinformation within diplomatic environments,
including UNGA, for example. The team links policy, strategic thinking, and engagement
strategies – which are all broader necessities to counter Russian disinformation mosteffectively.

•

Building Through Programming: In March 2022, the Prime Minister announced $3M in new
funding to counter Russian disinformation. In line with this announcement, approximately$3.8M in new programming with experienced partners is now underway to build the strategic
communication capacity of the Ukrainian government and civil society and to build theresilience of Ukrainians to disinformation. Canada is also providing a $15M to the multidonor Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine, which includes support to enhance strategic
communications, counter disinformation, strengthen community resilience, and improve
civilian protection.

•

Government of Canada’s core policy on disinformation is found within the Plan to Protect
Canada’s Democracy, which aims to enhance digital literacy, combat foreign interference,and safeguard Canada’s federal elections.

The government recently launched the an

Online Disinformation webpage to explain Canada’s policy response to disinformation, anda page to counteract Russian Invasion of Ukraine disinformation.
•

Protecting Democracy Unit- The Government of Canada has stood up a unit within the Privy
Council Office to coordinate, develop, and implement Canadian government-widemeasures designed to combat disinformation and protect our democratic institutions andprocesses, including developing a whole-of-society approach to protecting Canada’s
democracy, implementation of a counter disinformation toolkit, and training for4

参 考 資 料 1- 3
Parliamentarians and public servants on misinformation and disinformation. The unit also
facilitates interdepartmental collaboration and information sharing and helps to alignstrategies, research, and action among relevant stakeholders; and works to help refocus
research and analysis to better understand the impacts of disinformation and to engage withexperts and civil society to inform the development of policies.
•

Digital Citizen Contribution Program: Since January 2020, the Government of Canada’s
DCCP has provided over $21 million to The Digital Citizen Contribution Program. There
have been three calls for proposals since 2018, with a fourth underway now. Government
supports the priorities of the Digital Citizen Initiative by providing time-limited financial
assistance for research and citizen-focused activities. The Program aims to support
democracy and social inclusion in Canada by enhancing and/or supporting efforts to counter
online disinformation and other online harms and threats•

From Access to Engagement: Building a Digital Media Literacy Strategy for Canada (2022):
With funding from the Department of Canadian Heritage, MediaSmarts hosted a symposiumthat brought together key stakeholders and community partners from across Canada whoshare an interest in developing and implementing a national digital media literacy strategy.
They also conducted an environmental scan of existing national and international digital
media literacy strategies and interviews with key informants from Canada and international
jurisdictions about their experiences working on digital media literacy frameworks. This
project confirms the need for a commitment from the federal government to support thedevelopment, implementation and evaluation of a national digital media literacy strategy
through appropriate investments in the community and ongoing engagement that fosters
collaboration and innovation.

A national strategy will provide experts, advocates andservice providers in the digital media literacy field with a unified but flexible approach forpreventing and responding to online harms (such as misinformation and disinformation)
through education and critical skills development.
•

Canada led the establishment of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism as a coordinatedeffort with Canada’s allies to confront the threat of disinformation and protect G7
democracies from foreign threats. Since its establishment, the program has played a keyrole in detecting and identifying foreign interference and state-sponsored disinformation
against democracies and also in monitoring federal elections in Canada.

•

Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online: Canada and the Netherlands are working
to develop and launch a Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online that establishes
a set of high-level international commitments to serve as a framework and guide forgovernments to uphold information integrity online, including government expectations ofindustry actions. The Declaration will draw from existing research, policy, and principles on
safeguarding the information ecosystem to establish a set of high-level international
commitments by states. It will constitute a concrete step towards the development ofinternational norms for addressing information integrity online that is rooted in democraticvalues.

The Declaration was first announced by the two Ministers at the 2022 United5

参 考 資 料 1- 3
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) High Level Week side event Upholding Democracy and
Human Rights in the Face of Disinformation. It is expected to be launched in the fall of 2023,
with the aim to secure a large number of committed States signing on.
•

Canada, Latvia, and the Alliance for Securing Democracy co-led the Summit for Democracy
Cohort on Information Integrity. This Cohort aimed to discuss, highlight, and amplify bestpractices on strengthening a healthy information ecosystem and information integrity while
reinforcing democracy and respect for human rights, including through resilience todisinformation. The cohort had four working groups: taxonomy, literacy, international
cooperation on resilience to disinformation, and political micro-targeting in the Global South.
The working groups fed into a final deliverable that highlighted their respective issue areas,
provided a mapping of existing initiatives, and presented high-level policy recommendations
in time for the second Summit for Democracy in 2023.

EU
Civil Society ••Collaborate with industry to develop open source tools to tackle disinformation
Awareness-raising on disinformation around critical events, including elections and public
emergencies•

Research on the effectiveness of online services’ efforts to tackle disinformation•

Strategic communications, including pre-bunking and de-bunking, around public policy
matters•

Fact-checking activities•

Participation in structured dialogues and for a with other stakeholders, including
governments and online services•

Participation in structured dialogues with governments, online platforms and otherstakeholders

Social•Research on the effectiveness of measures by platforms to counter disinformation•

Independent scrutiny of the transparency of political advertising•

Support to educators and civil society in the development of media literacy materials andMedia
Platformtraining•

Awareness-raising on disinformation around critical events, including elections and public
emergencies•

Design services that are robust against malicious activity aiming at spreading disinformation•

Actions to empower users to assess information sources and identify disinformation (e.g.,labelling or demotion of content debunked as false by fact-checkers)•

Detection of disinformation campaigns•

Policies and controls to demonetize disinformation spread through online advertisingsystem•Policies and controls to prevent manipulative behaviors by malicious actors (e.g., fakeaccounts, deep fake content
6参 考 資 料 1-3•

Supporting fact-checkers and integrating their work into platform services, including e.g.
through the labelling and downranking of content determined to be patently false•

Providing transparency around political advertising, including labeling, user-facing
contextual information and the establishment of repositories of political ads•

Improving large platforms’ accountability through the Digital Services Act’s (DSA) newly
created legal due diligence requirements•

Participation in structured dialogues with governments, civil society and other stakeholders

Research•Researching the evolution of disinformation phenomena

Entities•

Advancing scientific understanding of cognitive and societal impact of disinformation•

Mapping clusters of disinformation•

Actions to empower the research community through e.g., access to platform data•

Research on effectiveness of platform actions•

Research on effectiveness of policy responses•

Participation in structured dialogues with governments, online platforms and otherstakeholders to provide expert input

Government •Support to educators and civil society in the development of media literacy materials andtraining•

Awareness-raising on disinformation around critical events, including elections and public
emergencies•

Support to research and innovation projects on disinformation•

Strengthening situational awareness on Foreign Interference and Manipulation ofInformation (FIMI) by working on developing a common framework and methodology for thesystematic collection of evidence of FIMI incidents for example with EU MS in dedicatedforum (in the EU’s Rapid Alert System active since 2019) or with international partners as
for example in the G7 RRM, with the US in the Trade and Technology Council and with
NATO.

•

Supporting and enhancing the threat analysis by civil society and academia by creating acommon information sharing and analysis centre/community (ISAC) on FIMI.

•

Raising awareness of Russia’s and China’s information manipulation activities via the
EUvsDisinfo project (website and social media accounts) on a daily basis, including with the“LEARN” dedicated webpage, explaining the mechanisms, tactics, common narratives andactors behind disinformation and information manipulation, and also by providing capacity
building to civil society organizations, fact-checkers and journalists.

•

Publication of the 1st EEAS Report on FIMI threats as well as an annual Report about thework of EEAS StratCom on FIMI.

•

Provide strategic communications support to EU Delegations and Security Common
Security and Defense Policy missions and operations on the ground, including by providing
situational awareness of the concerned Missions and Operations on FIMI actors and theirtactics and techniques, as well as on building capacity and increasing expertise at mission
level, as a long-term strategy. This is complemented by regular training sessions on FIMI in
7

参 考 資 料 1- 3
order to increase their threat awareness.
•

Strategic communications, including pre-bunking and de-bunking, around public policy
matters•

Combining data analysis and media monitoring in 15 languages to identify, compile andexposes disinformation and FIMI cases via the EUvsDisinfo project•

Facilitate multi-stakeholder action and cooperation in countering disinformation, including
demonetization of disinformation spread through online advertising systems, ensuring the
integrity of online services against manipulative behaviors (e.g., fake accounts),
empowering users, and empowering the research and fact-checking communities.

•

Regulatory or co-regulatory measures to ensure transparency and platform accountability(e.g., mandatory access to data for research purposes): 2022 Code of Practice on
Disinformation; Digital Services Act•

Regulatory or co-regulatory measures requiring major large online platforms to assess andmitigate disinformation risks presented by their services: 2022 Code of Practice on
Disinformation; Digital Services Act•

Cooperating with and provide capacity building to international partners and stakeholders
in order to prevent, deter and respond to FIMI threats•

Requiring or facilitating access to data for research on disinformation: : 2022 Code ofPractice on Disinformation; Digital Services Act•

Requiring or promoting transparency around political advertising, including labeling, userfacing contextual information and the establishment of repositories of political ads; 2022
Code of Practice on Disinformation; Commission proposal for a Regulation on thetransparency and targeting of political advertisingFranceCivil Society •Strengthen cooperation between platforms and civil society

SocialStrengthen the accountability of platforms by requiring platforms to analyze the systemic

•

Media

risks generated by the operation of their services on the dissemination of misinformation

Platformand to take the necessary measures to mitigate them.
•Strengthen the accountability of platforms by requiring platforms to analyze the systemicrisks generated by the operation of their services on the dissemination of misinformationand to take the necessary measures to mitigate them.

•

Cooperating closely with fact checkers so that they can report misinformation content andadvertisements placed on services containing misinformation to the platform.

•

Facilitating access to non-personal and anonymized data for researchers for the purpose of
misinformation research.
Squeeze out monetization of misinformation via online advertising, for example via EdiPub's
SCID initiative that allows for the tracking of ad investment across the value chain andcreation of a common repository of rejected ads between players, implementation of white8

参 考 資 料 1- 3
lists
Government •The draft law to secure and govern the digital space is actually being discussed in
Parliament. It will adapt the EU Digital Services Act in domestic law and will contain several
dispositions to fight disinformation and foreign interference. Notably, it will reinforce theFrench Media regulator's ability to shut down broadcasting of foreign media underinternational sanction. It will also reinforce the regulation of deep fakes

Germany
Civil Society •Strengthening collaboration with civil society, business and research community in eventsand designed workshops•

Strengthening collaboration and projects with universities•

Supporting projects such as “European Statistics Contest” (ESC) for young students (Age:
14-18 years), Webinar on “common mistakes in dealing with statistics” for journalists. freee-learning tool Digital Enquirer Kit - All (atingi.org) for training and exchange on identifying
misinformation as well as on finding, collecting and analyzing information online

Social•Cooperation with Google to counter disinformation before and during the elections•

The departments for public information of governmental institutions provide explanations

Media
Platformaround data on social media•

Production of explanation videos through governmental institutions or under theirsupervision, for a better understanding of statistical concepts and their relevance for thesociety•Social media channels (Twitter, Instagram) of the Federal Returning Officer around theelections, to give first-hand information and to avoid disinformation

Research•

Collaboration/projects with universities (bilateral and multilateral co-operations)

Entities•

FSO as part of the scientific society (for example as member of the German StatisticalSociety as well as member of the German Data Forum•

Integration of topics of official statistics in bachelor and master programs, EMOS as an
example(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de/web/european-statistical-system/-/emos-

european-master-in-official-statistics-join-the-network-)•

Strengthening collaboration with civil society, business and research community•

Conferences, Publications

Government •Promoting societal resilience against disinformation through projects focusing on media
literacy/independent journalism in partner countries with a special focus on the Baltics andthe Western Balkans•

Alignment of approaches to protecting information environments by enhancing resiliencethrough civic education, in particular digital and media literacy in cooperation with theFederal Agency for Civic Education (BpB)•

National and subnational level work on “Joint Federal and State Action Plan against
9参 考 資 料 1-3
Disinformation and for a Resilient Democracy”•

Bi-weekly situation report on hybrid threats including disinformation (contributions fromministries, intelligence, other agencies)•

Several products to increase societal resilience also available on various websites:•

FAQ “Disinformation related to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine” (in different
languages)•

One-pager “Fighting disinformation together” (in different languages)•

Information sheet in simple language “We fight together against false information”•

Pro-active communication, i.e. accurate, consistent and reliable information is critical,
especially for governments. Strengthening inter-ministerial exchange of information, forexample Task Force RUS / UKR meets weekly to exchange information•

Strengthening Germany’s active communication globally, by enabling our missions abroad
to communicate faster and more effectively•

Monitoring debates in social media to identify foreign information manipulation andinterference campaigns from external actors at an early stage.

•

Regular exchange with international partners, e.g. EU Rapid Alert System, G7, NATO,OECD•

Addressing hybrid threats including disinformation at the subnational level by establishingcross-sectional structures•

Strengthening international best practice exchange and coordination for example throughthe G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) and its working groups•

The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) is pursuing coordination across several
Working Groups and areas with a view to facilitate practical measures for societal resilienceand response to adversarial activities. Working Groups:Collective response (led by EEAS): multi-year; analysis of respective approaches anddevelopment of a framework and operational principles for coordinated actions acrossvarious pillars;Sub-national interference (led by GER): multi-year; map existing threats, policy gaps
and approaches and facilitate collaboration across domestic and foreign mandates;Transnational Repression (led by the US): multi-year; share threat information, goodpractices and lessons learned, and raise public awareness, with a view to facilitate acommon approach across democracies;Knowledge & Capacity Development (co-led by the US, EEAS and CAN): multi-year;
map existing assets and approaches to improve planning and coordinated delivery ofcapacity activities; explore coordinated support of research and knowledge generationfor evidence-informed policymaking•

Implementation of a data literacy network (data literacy experts from governmental bodies
and national institutions, universities, etc.)•

Funding of a feasibility study for a “Democracy Newsroom” of leading news agencies of theG7 aiming to contribute to independent reporting, to bundle and provide information on
10

参 考 資 料 1- 3
democratic developments worldwide and to offer trainings for journalists

Italy
Research•

Entities

Italian Digital Media Observatory- IDMO （https://www.idmo.it/）
DMO – Italian Digital Media Observatory is a national hub that supports and implements thework of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). IDMO is part of a multidisciplinary
community that fights disinformation.

Government •Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation - Direzione Generale per ladiplomazia pubblica e culturale（https://www.esteri.it/it/ministero/struttura/dg-diplomazia-pubblica-culturale /）The Unit was created in January 2022 and oversees topics related to information andstrategic communication including disinformation and foreign manipulation of informationand interference, in bilateral and multilateral fora.
As such, the Unit is responsible for the Italian position on these topics in relevantinternational fora, like the EU, the UN, NATO. It also gives instructions to the Italian
diplomatic network on these topics and provides training to staff of the Ministry and other
Italian public Institutions.
The Unit regularly provides cross-government coordination on FIMI and disinformationrelated topics discussed at the international level, particularly in negotiation processes. It
coordinates the national position, within the Ministry with relevant Offices and with the other
Italian Administrations responsible for the mentioned topics, only for international-related
fora.

•

AGCOM - Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni .
In 2017, AGCOM, the independent National Regulatory Authority in charge, inter alia, forelectronic communications and audiovisual sectors, established a working group aimed at
fostering pluralism and freedom to information, also on digital platforms (Decision423/17/CONS). the link is:（https://www.agcom.it/tavolo-pluralismo-e-piattaforme-online）
The working group comprises 5 fields of intervention:

Monitoring methodologies



Monitoring of the advertising revenues onlineFact checking

Media and digital literacyTransparency and consumer campaigns

Furthermore, within the ERGA- European Regulators Group for Audio-visual Media
Services, AGCOM contributes to the implementation of the EU activities aimed at preventing
and contrasting disinformation introduced by the European Democracy Action Plan
11

参 考 資 料 1- 3(https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-pusheuropean-democracy/european-democracy-action-plan_en)
and detailed by the 2022 Strengthened Code of Practice on disinformation(https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation)

Japan
Civil

○ Establishment of the Japan Fact Check Center (JFC)

Society•

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications' "Study Group on Platform Services"
pointed out the need for countermeasures against the distribution of disinformation on social
media and recommended the promotion of voluntary efforts by the private sector, while taking
into consideration freedom of expression. In response to the study group's recommendations,
the Safer Internet Association (SIA) established the "Disinformation Countermeasures Forum,"consisting of experts and platform operators, with the aim of building a cooperative relationshipamong various stakeholders and establishing a framework for dialogue regarding
countermeasures against disinformation.
The "Forum on Disinformation Countermeasures" was established and operated as asecretariat for the purpose of building a cooperative relationship among various stakeholders
and establishing a framework for dialogue. Through discussions at said forum, it wasrecommended that efforts be made to "create a fact-checking organization," and it became
necessary to implement these efforts in concrete terms.

•

In response to the above recommendations, SIA secured the necessary funds for its activities
and established the Japan Fact Check Center (JFC) as of October 1, 2022, as a division of
SIA. The JFC has a governance structure to ensure the legitimacy of its activities, including a"Steering Committee" and "Audit Committee" composed of experts.

•

JFC conducts fact-checking on disinformation and misinformation circulating on the Internet,
and disseminates fact-check articles not only through its own website but also through social
media and news sites. JFC selects subjects that are widely disseminated in light of thresholds
while paying attention to neutrality and impartiality, and accepts information and verification
requests from the general public, prioritizing those that amplify social unrest or have asignificant impact on the existence of democracy.

○

Increase awareness of fact-checking articles in Japan（FIJ（FactCheck Initiative Japan）
FIJ offers FactCheck Navi, a platform (app) that lists and makes fact-checking articles
searchable. FactCheck Navi aggregates articles from media and organizations that conductfact-checking and makes it possible to list and search articles.

•

On important events such as elections, we will strengthen our system for monitoring andproviding information on questionable discourse, establish a special website, hold seminars toraise awareness and share results, and request cooperation from all quarters to promote fact12

参 考 資 料 1-3
checking activities by all media outlets.
•

We will post links to a special page on FactCheckNavi that consolidates the results of factchecking on the situation in Ukraine on multiple platforms, including the latest information on
Ukraine.

•

JFC alerts people through social networking sites, distributes "fact-checking newsletters" on
the latest developments inside and outside the country, and holds talk events and webinars.

Social○ Reliable information posting (Yahoo Japan)

Media

Circulation of fake news, etc., leads to user confusion and discreditation of the Internet industry

Platform

as a whole. Therefore, we decided to counteract uncertain information at an early stage by
posting reliable information quickly and proactively.
•

Yahoo! NEWSSpecial sites and content designed to raise awareness with the help of experts.



Public information and information to counteract hoaxes is posted in the most prominent
locations. A special website consolidating COVID-related information, with a section toalert the public to hoaxes and links to fact-checking support groups, government agencies,etc.

To improve user understanding, we contract with authors who have expertise in specificfields and add supplementary views (author comments) to articles in their areas ofexpertise (Experts are selected after screening based on their expertise, reputation, andvisibility in specific fields. (Experts are selected after screening based on their expertise in
specific fields, reputation, name recognition, etc. All submissions are checked by the
person in charge.)•

Yahoo! Wisdom Browser: A cautionary statement is posted at the top of the page related to
COVID-19, and the websites of public institutions, such as the Ministry of Health, Labor, andWelfare, are also indicated.

•

Yahoo! TOP page: For important matters concerning life and property, users are directed tocontents provided by the media or to a special site that consolidates information. In the eventof an emergency, video clips of the Prime Minister's press conference, etc., are embedded andposted in locations that are easily recognized by users. In the event of a disaster, earthquake
alerts and regional alert information are posted. Both of these sources of information are media
and public organizations, and we strive to provide highly reliable information.

○

Awareness-raising activities (LINE Mirai Foundation)•

In the field of education, there is an accelerating increase in the need for education related tothe use of ICT (mainly information morality education, information literacy education,
development of information use skills, digital citizenship, etc.), and various needs (guidanceon avoiding Internet problems, use of GIGA school terminals, etc.). However, the amount oftime needed for learning and the training of instructors have not kept pace with these needs.
Curriculum and teaching materials that are easy to use in the field, that can be started withminimal preparation, and that can be used in a short period of time are needed, with a focus
13

参 考 資 料 1-3
on use in educational settings.
•

In response to the needs of the educational field, the LINE Mirai Foundation has developed
and provided the GIGA Workbook, a series of educational materials to foster and improveinformation use skills. In addition to this, the Foundation is also introducing and disseminating
original GIGA Workbooks to municipalities that wish to use them. Taking into consideration theease of implementation in each collaborating municipality, we have prepared a package ofeducational materials with designs and original pages for each municipality (such as
information morality development goals for each region, and results of surveys and research).

•

In 2022, we developed educational materials, secured municipalities for initial introduction, andestablished a support system. In addition, in order to verify the effectiveness of the introductionof the teaching materials in the partner municipalities, we conducted a survey on changes in
the awareness of children and teachers as a result of the use of the teaching materials.

○

Promotion of countermeasures against disinformation and misinformation through support for
the Safer Internet Association (SIA)（Google）•

Google, the philanthropic arm of Google, will provide US$1.5 million to SIA to support thefollowing activities by SIA to curb the distribution of false information and misinformation in
Japan.


Establishment of fact-checking agencies

Conduct fact-checking

Conduct analytical research on trends of disinformation and misinformation in Japan's
information space (patterns and methods)

Conduct media literacy training and human resource development

Conduct surveys and research activities, educational activities, holding symposiums, etc.

○

Efforts for fair elections (Meta Platforms, Inc.)•

In the absence of widely agreed upon norms and laws on how digital platforms should protect
elections, we address issues, such as the opacity of political advertising and foreigninterference in domestic civic events. Basically, we believe that users and advertisers should
be given freedom of expression, but we also recognize the need for certain guidelines foradvertisements that could influence users, behaviors, or some outcomes (such as elections).

•

In order to protect elections, not only during critical periods but throughout the year, we areworking to i. prevent interference, ii. remove harmful content and reduce misinformation, andiii. improve transparency. To improve transparency, we are working on verifying electoral andpolitical advertisers, storing publicly accessible information on electoral and political
advertising, ensuring page transparency, and controlling newsfeed rankings.

•

We also have a certification process in place to verify the authenticity and legitimacy of
individuals or organizations placing election- or politics-related advertisements.

Research
Entities○ Conduct awareness-raising events and campaigns to produce and distribute awarenessraising videos created by YouTube creators. (GLOCOM)
14

参 考 資 料 1- 3•

Event Title: "Fake News and Japan: What We Can Do and What We Can Do as a Society•

The event had 373 applicants (140 at the venue and 233 via YouTube live-streaming), withactual participation at the venue by 134 people (including related parties), 300 views of theYouTube live-streaming, and a maximum of 134 simultaneous viewers on the YouTube livestreaming. In addition, archived videos were viewed 9077 times as of September 12, 2023,
and the event was widely publicized.

•

A lot of fake news about the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and theelection has spread. About three out of four people who see or hear fake news do not realize
it is false. This event discussed how people should be aware and how industry, government,
academia, and the private sector can counteract this.

•Created and released an anti-fake news awareness video with the cooperation of 9 YouTube
creators (total of 12.1 million channel subscriptions); the video was released on April 26, 2023,
in conjunction with the G7 related event “Fake News and Japan." The video received 12.7
millionviews,

600,000highratings,

and

6,180

comments.

(asof

9/12/2023)（https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLQntWbrycbJcpM6aVvc5gnP_HMxPF5weB）
Government ○ Development and publication of educational materials on disinformation•

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has developed a guideline for instructors
on "How to Face Up to the Internet - To Avoid Being Fooled by Fake and False Information"
as educational materials for raising awareness of fake and false information. The guideline
was published in June 2022. (Target) Created for a wide range of age groups from young
children to adults. (Format) The content is available online and can be added at the discretionof the instructor by making it public in the easy-to-edit PowerPoint format. Guidelines are alsoavailable for teachers who hold lectures. The content of each slide is detailed and can be readto enable the course.

•

The developed teaching materials are used by related ministries and agencies, local
governments, general incorporated associations, universities, vocational schools, technicalcolleges, junior high schools, media organizations, online media, hospitals, and private
businesses.

○

Efforts to improve user literacy•

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has promoted measures to improve ICT
literacy, mainly targeting young people, with the aim of encouraging them to avoid the risks
associated with ICT use, such as the internet trouble prevention law. As ICT use becomes amatter of course for a wide range of generations, it is necessary to understand thecharacteristics of online services, the responsibilities associated with the behavior of thoseservices, and to learn how to select services, critically accept and utilize distributed information,and disseminate information.

•

In November 2022, the Study Group on Improving Literacy for ICT Use was held. Based on
the concept of "digital citizenship," which is to engage autonomously with the digital society,the group will study measures to promote literacy required for the digital society in the future15

参 考 資 料 1- 3
and will aim to formulate a roadmap by the end of this summer.

UK
Civil Society •Media literacy - develop resources and projects to help build resilience to
mis/disinformation. For example, ‘Be Internet Citizens’ (Institute for Strategic Dialogue), fakenews and misinformation advice hub and ‘Find the fake!’ game (Internet Matters).

•

Capacity building - Work with local partners to upskill capabilities to counter disinformation(Center for Information Resilience).

•

Monitoring and analysis - Monitor and produce reports on disinformation, particularly aroundelections and other key disinformation events (Reset Tech/ Graphika).

•

Research and analysis - Inform policy and campaigns, sometimes joint projects withgovernment policy-makers (Global Disinformation Index/ Institute for Strategic Dialogue/
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/ Oxford Internet Institute).

•

Information sharing - Share resources, open source intelligence hub (Global Disinformation
Index).

Social•Promoting authoritative information - Raise the profile of authoritative information, especiallyMedia

in search functions, for example direct users towards gov.uk or Electoral Commission in the

Platform

lead up to an election (Meta, Google, TikTok, Twitter).
•Labelling - Apply labels to content from state-controlled media, to provide greatertransparency into these publishers (Meta).

•

Content removal - Where content violates Terms of Service it may be removed (Meta,
Google, Twitter, TikTok)•

Identifying operations - Identify and produce reports on covert influence operations foundand removed, for example networks artificially amplifying narratives and/or creating
inauthentic accounts (Meta, Google, Twitter, TikTok).

•Event specific measures - Threat teams may do proactive sweeps of platforms at times ofheightened risk like elections (Meta).

•

Fact-checking - use of third-party fact checkers (Meta).

•

Terms of Service - Range of policies, that are regularly reviewed and updated, to address
different forms of mis/disinformation and online manipulation (Meta, Google, Twitter,
TikTok).

•Transparency reports - Reporting and data on content moderation decisions and action
taken by platforms e.g. accounts suspended or content removed (Meta, Google, Twitter,16

参 考 資 料 1-3
TikTok).
Government •Media literacy - In July 2021, the UK government published its Online Media Literacy
Strategy setting out our plans to improve the national media literacy landscape•

The Strategy identified six key challenges as inhibiting better media literacy outcomes forthe public, including building citizens’ resilience to misinformation and disinformation.

•

To meet the Strategy’s ambition to tackle these challenges, we have committed to publishingannual Action Plans every year until FY2024/25. In our Year 2 Action Plan, published April
2022, we established:
The £1.6m Media Literacy Programme Fund to fund media literacy projects running acrossthe previous and current financial years, including those designed to support users to
respond effectively to the spread of mis- and disinformation. This includes projects targeting
elderly people from ethnic minority groups, vulnerable girls and women, & children fromsocio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds.

•

The Media Literacy Taskforce Fund, providing grants for organizations to deliver media
literacy education to citizens who are typically disengaged or lack access to support (alsoknown as ‘hard-to-reach’ citizens). These projects are teaching users of all ages to develop
skills to identify mis- and disinformation online.

•

An ambitious Media Literacy Research Programme to understand why citizens aren’t
engaging with media literacy initiatives, and to better understand the challenges facing thesector, including those related to educating people about mis- and disinformation.

•

Operational response - The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology’s Counter
Disinformation Unit (CDU) analyses online disinformation threats and narratives to help the
UK government understand trends and coordinated attempts to artificially manipulate thedomestic information environment. This includes responding to acute information incidents,
such as the Russian information operations during the war in Ukraine, Covid-19, key
national events (e.g. the Platinum jubilee and Operation London Bridge) and generalelections, and proactively monitoring for harmful narratives that threaten the UK.

•

Communications - When false narratives are identified, the CDU coordinates withdepartments across Whitehall to deploy the appropriate response, which could involve a
direct rebuttal on social media or awareness raising campaigns to promote the facts.

•

Content escalation - When the CDU does identify particular pieces of harmful content which
violates platforms’ terms of service, these are referred to the relevant platform forconsideration, who in turn decide what action to take.

•

Legislation - The Online Safety Bill is a groundbreaking piece of legislation which will tackle
misinformation and disinformation where it constitutes illegal content or harmful content tochildren in scope of the regulatory framework. This includes:
The False Communications Offence, which will capture communications where the senderknows information to be false but sends it intending to cause harm, such as hoax COVID19 cures.

•

The Foreign Interference Offence as introduced by the National Security Act 2023, will force
17参 考 資 料 1- 3
companies to take action against a wide range of state-sponsored disinformation and statelinked interference online. This will disrupt covert attempts by foreign state actors tomanipulate our information environment to interfere in UK society and undermine ourdemocratic, political and legal processes.
•

Legislation – The Elections Act 2022 introduced a new digital imprint regime which, once
commenced in Autumn 2023, will increase transparency of digital political advertising byrequiring those promoting eligible digital campaigning material targeted at the UK electorate
to include an imprint with their name and address, as well as the details of anyone promoting
material on their behalf if different from the promoter. Digital platforms such as social media
companies will be required to take down content that breaches the rules if they have beenasked to do so by the relevant enforcement authorities.

•

Sanctions - Introduced in April 2022, new trade sanctions in relation to internet and online
media services. The UK sanctioned the parent entities of Russia Today and Sputnik, toprevent these entities using their platforms and websites to spread propaganda to UK
audiences online.

•

Platform engagement - We work closely with platforms to understand the disinformation riskon their platforms and develop effective policy responses, such as, checking that theirpolicies and enforcement are fit for purpose and consistent.

•

Stakeholder engagement - We work closely with stakeholders from industry, civil society
and academia to maintain a well-evidenced and diverse understanding of the issue of
mis/disinformation; to gather stakeholder views on policy interventions; and, to pursue
strategic objectives that seek to drive better system-wide responses to mis/disinformation.

US
Civil Society •The research, documentation, and digital forensics work of civil society, independent media,
and academia to expose foreign state information manipulation activity can build societal

Socialresilience to it. The Participants should consider this work as governments develop andMedia

implement counter disinformation strategies.

Platform•

Support the role of civil society organizations in fostering independent media.

•

Promote civil society organizations’ engagement in unbiased fact-checking initiatives

Research

designed to identify and counteract foreign state information manipulation messaging, toEntities

include pre-bunking and debunking of disinformation narratives.
•

Promote transparency in the financing and ownership of media, including the role ofgovernment, and in the provenance of foreign-sourced news and media.

Government •Invest in emerging technologies and artificial intelligence-enabled digital security tools that
support foreign state information manipulation detection. Such tools should be used in amanner that respects human rights including freedom of expression.

•

Leverage international partnerships and digital platform technology to enable a sharedarchive of foreign state information manipulation activities and related information to include
18

参 考 資 料 1-3
disinformation activities and narratives. Such tools should be used by governments in amanner that respects human rights including freedom of expression.
•Develop official digital communications channels that ensure credible, fact-based
information is openly available to the public.

•

Development of strategies and other guiding documents establishing national policies on
countering foreign state information manipulation, in a manner that complies withinternational human rights law.

•

Assign a government organization to coordinate national efforts to counter foreign state
information manipulation and designate areas for international engagement.

19